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work_22qalzna7nfv7ln2mipkipb3gi	----	Microsoft Word - linkapil_wp.docx econstor Make Your Publications Visible. A Service of zbw Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft Leibniz Information Centre for Economics Licuanan, Victoria; Omar Mahmoud, Toman; Steinmayr, Andreas Working Paper The drivers of diaspora donations for development: Evidence from the Philippines Kiel Working Paper, No. 1807 Provided in Cooperation with: Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW) Suggested Citation: Licuanan, Victoria; Omar Mahmoud, Toman; Steinmayr, Andreas (2012) : The drivers of diaspora donations for development: Evidence from the Philippines, Kiel Working Paper, No. 1807, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW), Kiel This Version is available at: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/67338 Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your personal and scholarly purposes. You are not to copy documents for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public. If the documents have been made available under an Open Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence. www.econstor.eu The Drivers of Diaspora Donations for Development: Evidence from the Philippines Victoria Licuanan Toman Omar Mahmoud Andreas Steinmayr No. 1807 | November 2012 1  Kiel Institute for the World Economy, Hindenburgufer 66, 24105 Kiel, Germany  Kiel Working Paper No. 1807 | November 2012 The Drivers of Diaspora Donations for Development: Evidence from the Philippines * Victoria Licuanan, Toman Omar Mahmoud, Andreas Steinmayr Little is known about the drivers of migrant donations to their home countries. Using data on all donations from Filipino migrants administered by the Philippine Commission on Filipinos Overseas between 1990 and 2010, this paper explores which host and home country factors are associated with migrant donations. On the host country side, we find that donations increase with the level of income earned by the Filipino diaspora and with the number of hate crimes against minorities. On the home country side, we find that donations are not well-targeted. As donations mainly flow to provinces with high rates of emigration, they do not reach the least developed Philippine provinces. However, the diaspora is responsive to natural disasters and channels donations to provinces when they are hit by a typhoon. Keywords: International migration, philanthropy, collective remittances JEL classification: F22, F24 Victoria Licuanan Toman Omar Mahmoud Asian Institute of Managament Kiel Institute for the World Economy Email: vlicuanan.aim@gmail.com Email: toman.mahmoud@ifw-kiel.de Andreas Steinmayr University of of St. Gallen Email: andreas.steinmayr@unisg.ch * We are very grateful to Imelda Nicolas, Mary Grace Ampil Tirona and Erwin Tiongson as well as various staff members of the Commission on Filipinos Overseas for their invaluable support. We also thank Jennifer Umlas and Marita del Rosario Apattad for their assistance in compiling the database. All remaining errors are our own.   ____________________________________ The responsibility for the contents of the working papers rests with the author, not the Institute. Since working papers are of a preliminary nature, it may be useful to contact the author of a particular working paper about results or caveats before referring to, or quoting, a paper. Any comments on working papers should be sent directly to the author. 2 1. Introduction Migrant-sending countries are increasingly recognizing the development potential of their diasporas. Many developing countries are trying to integrate their native citizens abroad into efforts to promote development at home. Above all, migrants have been encouraged to contribute to the provision of public infrastructure (Newland et al., 2010). The most prominent policy example is Mexico’s 3-for-1 program where every dollar donated by a migrant or a migrant association is matched by three dollars of government funds at the federal, state and municipal level to finance local development projects in the home communities.1 In contrast to private remittances which migrants send to family members or friends for their private benefits, donations by migrants to community projects potentially generate benefits to all community members. In other words, migrant donations can be seen as migrants’ private contribution to the provision of local public goods at home. Therefore, such migrant donations have also been termed collective remittances (Goldring, 2004). Despite the increasing policy interest, little is known about migrant donations to their home countries. The literature on migrants’ transfers to their home countries has almost exclusively focused on private, not collective remittances. Exceptions include Beauchemin and Schoumaker (2009) and Kiyima and Gonzales-Ramirez (2012) who show that migrant donations can foster local development in Burkina Faso and Mexico. Aparicio and Meseguer (2012) investigate the municipality-level determinants of the utilization of the 3-for-1 program in Mexico. They find that the program does not reach poorer municipalities and is politically biased. Luecke et al. (2012) analyze the individual-level determinants of donations by migrants from Moldova. They document that migrants are more likely to donate if they earn a high income, communicate frequently with their family members left behind, plan to return to their home country, have an insecure status in the host country, or have left children or elderly family members left behind. This paper is the first to assess the host and the home country drivers of migrant donations simultaneously and over a long period of time using unique administrative data from the Philippines. The Philippines make a very interesting case study. With an estimated stock of 4.4 million permanent and 4.3 million temporary migrants in 2010 the Philippines is one of the largest migrant-sending countries in the world. In addition, the Philippine government has a long history of managing migration. The Commission on Filipinos Overseas (CFO) is one of the central government agencies entrusted with the management of migration. Since 1990 CFO has                                                              1 In addition, governments of several migrant-sending countries like Kenya, Nepal, or India have issued diaspora bonds, mainly to finance infrastructure development. 3 been facilitating the flow of migrant donations in the so-called LINKAPIL program (Lingkod sa Kapwa Pilipino, also known as Link for Philippine Development Program). The ultimate aim of this program is to increase the development impact of migration by channeling donations from Filipino migrants to local development projects in Philippine communities. Our analysis draws on detailed data on all LINKAPIL donations from Filipino migrants that were administered by CFO between 1990 and 2010. We conduct the analysis in two steps. First, we analyze who donates by studying the relationship between host country characteristics and migrant donations. As the vast majority of LINKAPIL donations originate from the United States, the main destination of permanent migrants from the Philippines, we concentrate on donations from the US and use variation in the socio-economic conditions of the overall population and the Filipino population between US states and over time. Second, we analyze how donations are allocated across the Philippines by studying the relationship between home country characteristics and migrant donations. We consider all donations regardless of their origin and use variation in the socio-economic conditions between Philippine provinces and over time. We draw on the economic literature on the motives of private remittances and philanthropy in general to inform the choice of host and home country characteristics used in our analysis (see Rapoport and Docquier, 2006, and Andreoni, 2006, for a summary). As Luecke et al. (2012) discuss in detail, these two literatures provide guidance to potentially relevant drivers of migrant donations. They identify altruism and exchange as the principal motives for migrant donations. In the case of altruism, migrants care about the welfare of those who stay behind in the home country. If those in the home country are worse off than the migrant, altruism induces migrants to make donations for their home country. Altruism may play an important role as migrants typically multiply their income by working abroad (Clemens et al., 2008; McKenzie et al., 2010) thus widening the income gap between migrants and those who stay behind. The altruism motive predicts that donations increase with migrants’ income and the degree they are still attached to their home country. In addition, for given stocks of migrants, more donations should flow to relatively poor areas in their home country. In the case of exchange, migrants enter an (implicit) agreement with their home communities. Migrants donate to community projects to compensate community members for services they provide to migrants. For instance, migrants may need to rely on community members to look after children or elderly they leave behind. Migrants would donate to community facilities such as 4 schools or health centers to reward community members directly or indirectly for their additional efforts. Alternatively, migrant donations may also be viewed as a form of intertemporal exchange. Migrants would donate to build up or maintain social capital in their home communities, so they can draw on community support in the future. In this sense, donations would also help to preserve community membership rights, which may be important should migrants ever (need to) return home (Osili, 2004). The exchange motive predicts that donations rise if migrants intend to return home (compare Dustmann and Mestres, 2010) or if their status abroad is insecure so that the option of return provides insurance (compare Delpierre and Verheyden, 2010). Moreover, donations should primarily flow to migrants’ home communities, not to other areas of the home country. Our results provide support for both the altruism and the exchange motive for migrant donations. On the host country side, we find that migrant donations from the US increase with the level of income earned by the Filipino diaspora and with migrants’ insecurity in the home country which we proxy by xenophobia as measured by the number of hate crimes. On the home country side, we find that migrant donations flow to provinces with high rates of emigration, but not to those with low levels of development. However, the Filipino diaspora is responsive to natural disasters and channels donations to provinces when they are hit by a typhoon. 2. Data and Empirical Strategy 2.1 Migrant Donations and the LINKAPIL Program The Philippine government has built strong capacities to manage permanent and temporary migration. Among the most important government agencies entrusted with the task of migration management is the Commission on Filipinos Overseas (CFO). Its mission is to promote and uphold the interests of Filipino migrants abroad and preserve and strengthen the ties with overseas Filipino communities. One of CFO’s core tasks is to facilitate migrant donations in the LINKAPIL program. CFO acts as the principal conduit between overseas Filipino donors, local counterparts such as local authorities and NGOs and the beneficiaries of the donations in the Philippines. Donations may be in cash (e.g., to finance scholarships), in kind (e.g., medical materials or school books) or in the form of direct assistance (e.g., medical missions). We base our analysis on administrative data of all LINKAPIL donations between 1990 and 2010. CFO records information on the donor and recipient including the geographical origin and destination as well as the type, purpose and amount of each donation. It is important to note that by no means all donations made by Filipino migrants are channeled through the LINKAPIL program 5 and recorded by CFO. The data capture only those donations that have been facilitated by CFO. In most cases, CFO facilitation is required due to Philippine regulations. For instance, donations of goods such as medical equipment, books, computers and the like are typically subject to tariffs or taxes or require a government permit to enter the country. Donations of direct assistance such as medical missions require a government permit, too. Therefore, the LINKAPIL database should provide an accurate picture of the types of donations that need CFO facilitation. At the same time, however, the database certainly misses a very substantial amount of donations that do not need CFO facilitation. Most LINKAPIL donations come from individual Filipino migrants or migrant associations. Some LINKAPIL donations, however, are made by non-Filipino individuals or organizations that use CFO’s facilitation services. We exclude these donations from our analysis. To distinguish between donations of Filipino and non-Filipino origin, we first examine whether the name of the donating organization bears any reference to the Philippines (e.g., Arkansas Philippine Association). If not, we then examine whether the name of the person who organized the donation is (likely to be) of Filipino origin.2 We restrict our analysis to the remaining donations. According to this definition, 78 percent of all donations and 61 percent of the overall value of the donations involved Filipino migrants. These numbers are likely to be lower bounds as some of the donations that we classify as donations of non-Filipino origin may not have been made without the initiative and active role played by a Filipino migrant.3 For the period 1990-2010, the LINKAPIL database lists 3648 donations by Filipino migrants amounting to a total of about US$ 40 million (evaluated in constant 2010 PHP and converted into US$) or about US$ 11,080 for the average donation. Most donations, however, are smaller than the average donation. The median donation has a value of US$ 1127. Donations come from 259 different Filipino diaspora associations and 388 different private Filipino individuals. With 93% of the total volume of donations, diaspora associations play a far more important role than private Filipino individuals. As diaspora associations raise money among the Filipino population in the US and channel the money as a single donation to the Philippines, it is not possible to estimate how many Filipino migrants actually contributed to a LINKAPIL donation. 71% of the                                                              2  This task was performed by our Filipino research assistant at the Asian Institute of Management.  3 At the same time, however, many Filipino migrant associations raise funds from both Filipinos and non-Filipinos. Although, as a consequence, we do not know much money is actually donated by Filipino migrants, there is certainly migrant effort involved in all donations that we classify as donations of Filipino origin. 6 total amount donated was in form of an in-kind contribution4, which also reflects the fact that cash donations by migrants are less likely to be captured by CFO. Figure 1 plots the value of donations by purpose and over time. In general, the volume of donation does not follow a noticeable trend and fluctuates considerably over time. The overwhelming share of donations is health-related, mostly in the form of medical missions and medical materials. A sizeable share is dedicated to educational purposes such as educational materials, scholarships and the construction/renovation of classroom buildings. Other types of donation play a minor role. They include donations for calamity relief, or feeding and gift-giving programs. Table A1 in the appendix provides more details on the different types of donations. The unusually high levels of other donations in 1990 and 1991 are due to donations for calamity relief in response to a severe earthquake in Luzon, the most populated Philippine island, and the volcanic explosion of Mount Pinatubo. FIGURE 1: Value of migrant donations by purpose and over time (1990-2010), in constant 2010 US$                                                              4 Valuation of in-kind donations is based on a standard rate sheet, which gives standard valuation for goods and services. E.g., for medical missions, the imputed value of the service rendered per patient is PHP 500 per patient for medical consultations, PHP 15,000-25,000 for minor surgery and PHP 30,000-50,000 for major surgery. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 A m o u n t in m ill io n 2 0 1 0 U S $ 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Health Education Other 7 While Filipino migrants are relatively dispersed around the globe, the origin of migrant donations is very concentrated. Table 1 shows that more than 90 percent of donations (as measured by value) come from Filipino migrants in the US. This number contrasts with the fact that only 65 percent of recorded Filipino migrants (considering only permanent, not temporary migrants) live there. In other words, Filipino migrants in other countries account for only ten percent of donations. TABLE 1: Origin of Filipino migrant donations and Filipino migrants’ host countries Origin of donations (1990-2010) Permanent migrants’ host countries (stocks in 2010) USA 90.75% 65.2% Canada 4.58% 13.1% Europe 1.71% 7.1% Australia 0.43% 6.8% Other 2.52% 7.8% Notes: Data come from the Commission on Filipinos Overseas. It is also illustrative to compare the overall amount of donations to the overall number of Filipino migrants. According to CFO estimates, there were 4.4 million permanent Filipino migrants in 2010. In addition, there were about 4.3 million temporary Filipino migrants who typically work on short-term contracts in the Middle East and Asian countries. Compared to these numbers, the amount of donations received in 2010, US$ 2.6 million, appears low. However, one should keep in mind that the LINKAPIL database is likely to miss a considerable amount of other migrant donations to the Philippines. 2.2 Host and Home Country Characteristics In the following, we introduce the host and home country characteristics used in our analysis. We also provide a visual analysis of the association between the most important host and home country characteristics and migrant donations. On the host country side, we exploit variation between US states and over time. On the home country side, we exploit variation between Philippine provinces and over time. Host Country Characteristics: Socio-economic Conditions in US States For the analysis of host country drivers of migrant donations, we only consider Filipinos who live in the US. We do so for two reasons. First, as shown above, migrants in other countries hardly make any donations through the LINKAPIL program. Second, for the US a wide range of state- level socio-economic variables is available including variables that are specifically based on the residential Filipino population. We characterize economic conditions of US states by their overall 8 levels of GDP per capita and unemployment rates (as reported by the Bureau of Economic Analysis) as well as Filipino-specific levels of per-capita income and unemployment rates (based on American Community Survey and Census data). In line with the altruism motive, we expect favorable economic conditions to increase migrant donations. We proxy the degree to which migrants’ status abroad is insecure by the existence of xenophobic tendencies as measured by the number of hate crimes in each US state (as recorded by the Federal Bureau of Investigation). Xenophobia may increase migrants’ probability to relocate and eventually return to their home country. In line with the exchange motive, we therefore expect the number of hate crimes to be positively associated with migrant donations. We also consider the share of naturalized Filipinos and the median age of the Filipino population in each US state (based on Census and American Community Survey data) as proxy for integration into the American society. Better integration into the host society may weaken links to the home country and possibly reduce migrant donations. Additional variables include the absolute and relative population size of the Filipino diaspora in each US state. For some state-year observations, data are missing. If data gaps are reasonably small, we interpolate missing values linearly. The upper two panels of Table A2 in the appendix provide summary statistics of the US variables used in our analysis. As the maps in Figure 2 show, by far the largest amount of donations originates from California, which is also the state with the largest Filipino population. Other sizeable donation flows originate from Illinois, Michigan, and Virginia. As expected, there is a strong association between the flow of donations and the size of the Filipino population. One big exception is Hawaii, which hosts the second largest Filipino population after California, but ranks only 14th when it comes to the level of migrant donations. The last map in Figure 2 plots the average income of Filipinos across the US. Incomes of Filipinos are highest in New York and New Jersey and lowest in Hawaii and Alaska. Although reliable data is available for only 18 states, a positive association between migrant donations and the average income becomes apparent. The low average income of Filipinos in Hawaii may explain why donations from Hawaii are relatively low given the size of the local Filipino diaspora. Home Country Characteristics: Socio-economic Conditions in Philippine Provinces For the analysis of home country drivers of migrant donations, we examine the allocation of migrant donations across Philippine provinces. We consider all migrant donations regardless of their origin, not only those from the US. As a proxy for the level of socio-economic development of each Philippine province, we use the Human Development Index (HDI, compiled by the National Statistical Coordination Board). The HDI is a normalized and composite index that 9 gives equal weight to life expectancy, schooling levels, and per-capita income. Altruism suggests that less developed provinces attract more donations. Likewise, the literature on the allocation of aid argues that well-targeted aid should favor less developed regions (World Bank, 1998). Demographic variables include the overall population size (based on Census data and official population estimates) and the number of emigrants in flows not stocks (as recorded by CFO). We calculate the emigration rate as the share of the population that emigrates from the Philippines in a given year. As stock estimates of the number of emigrants by Philippine provinces are not available over time, we use the cumulative emigration rate of the past five years to proxy for the stock of emigrants. We expect provinces with higher emigration rates to receive more donations. We also examine whether Filipino migrants donate in response to natural disasters. Every year, several typhoons hit different parts of the country. We include a dummy that takes the value of one if a province was hit by a severe typhoon in a given year. In line with the altruism motive, we expect donations to be channeled to provinces that have been hit by a typhoon. The lower panel of Table A2 in the appendix provides summary statistics of the Philippine variables used in our analysis. Figure 3 maps migrant donations, emigration rates, and the level of human development across Philippine provinces. It clearly shows that provinces with higher emigration rates receive more donations. The provinces with the highest inflows of donations are Calabarzon and Central Luzon, which also have a high number of emigrants both in terms of absolute numbers and relative to the population. There is a positive correlation between the level of socio-economic development and emigration rates. Thus, migrant donations are not targeted less developed provinces, which may be due to the fact that migrants originate from more developed provinces.   10 FIGURE 2: Origin of migrant donations, Filipino population and Filipino per-capita income by US states (1996-2010)   Notes: Cumulative donations are the sum of LINKAPIL donations in the period 1996-2010 in constant 2010 US$. Average Filipino population size is calculated for the period 1996-2010. The size of the Filipino population is interpolated for the years, in which no numbers are available. Average Filipino per capita income is calculated for the period 2000-2010.  Legend (in thousands) 5000 - 9000 1000 - 5000 500 - 1000 200 - 500 100 - 200 10 - 100 0 - 10 Cumulative LINKAPIL donations in US$ Legend (in thousands) 200 - 900 100 - 200 50 - 100 10 - 50 5 - 10 0 - 5 Average filipino population size Legend (in thousands) 29.3 - 34.4 26 - 29.3 22.4 - 26 20.8 - 22.4 19.3 - 20.8 No data Average filipino per-capita income in US$ 11  FIGURE 3: Destination of migrant donations, emigration rate and Human Development Index by Philippine provinces (1995-2006)   Notes: Cumulative donations are the sum of LINKAPIL donations in the period 1995-2006 in constant 2010 US$. The emigration rate is defined as the share of the population that emigrates from the Philippines in a given year. The average emigration rate is calculated for the period 1995-2006. Total population size is interpolated for the years, in which no numbers are available. The average human development index is calculated for the period 1995-2006. Legend (in thousands) 2000 - 6000 1000 - 2000 500 - 1000 200 - 500 100 - 200 10 - 100 0 - 10 Cumulative LINKAPIL donations in US$ Legend (in percent) .2 - .4 .15 - .2 .1 - .15 .05 - .1 .02 - .05 0 - .02 No data Average emigration rate in % Legend .8 - .9 .7 - .8 .6 - .7 .5 - .6 .4 - .5 .3 - .4 No data Average human development index 12  2.3 Econometric Framework We estimate the following equation to analyze the host and home country drivers of migrant donations: with t indexing years and r indexing host (US states) or home country (Philippine provinces) regions. X is a vector of home or host country characteristics introduced above. We aggregate donations in the LINKAPIL database at the region-year level and use two different donation measures D as dependent variables: i) a dummy capturing whether at least one donation from/to region r was made in year t and ii) the volume of donations measured in constant 2010 US$. For the first donation variable, we use the Probit model to take into account the binary nature of the dependent variable. For the second donation variable, we face the problem of a high number of region-year cells with zero donations. Performing OLS on such a variable and using linear approximation for the relationship between the conditional mean of donations and our explanatory variables is likely to lead to biased results. We therefore use the Tobit model that explicitly considers the censored nature of the dependent variable. Using the Tobit model we can compute the overall marginal effect and the marginal effect for positive outcomes. Together with the results from the Probit estimation we are thus able to assess the extensive and intensive margins of donations. We estimate the model separately for US states to investigate the host country drivers of migrant donations and Philippine provinces to investigate the home country drivers of migrant donations. Although our analysis does not claim to identify causal effects, we aim to control for some important confounding factors that may lead to spurious relationships. Most importantly, we want to rule out that observed relationships are the mere result of correlated time trends. As donations fluctuate considerably over time (compare Figure 1), controlling for common time trends may be important to understand the structural drivers of migrant donations. In alternative specifications, we therefore include year dummies in our model. When looking at the host country drivers of donations, year dummies capture all (observed and unobserved) aggregate changes in the US (e.g., general economic trends) as well as in the Philippines (e.g., general trends in living conditions or the severity of the typhoon season). When looking at the home country drivers of donations, year dummies control for all aggregate changes in the world as well as in the Philippines. 13 In addition, we also consider region fixed effects . Region fixed effects eliminate all (observed and unobserved) heterogeneity in the host country (e.g., general attitudes towards immigration) and the home country (e.g., institutional quality) that is constant over the period under consideration. Region fixed effects may also be important to control for the (time-invariant) selection of specific types of Filipinos into migration and their sorting into specific destinations. For instance, migrants who generally care about the Philippines may choose to locate in California, which hosts a huge Filipino community. As a result, any relationship between socio- economic conditions and donation flows from California may be spurious because it merely reflects the type of migrants who choose to live in California. In principle, region fixed effects are helpful to arrive at more causal estimates. However, they limit the identifying variation to different changes between regions over time. Many of the explanatory variables used in our analysis do not vary much over time. As a result, there may be only little identifying variation left, which may lead to imprecise estimates. Hence, the specifications with state fixed effects have to be interpreted with caution. Allowing for unobserved heterogeneity by means of state or year fixed effects in non-linear models like the Probit or Tobit model is tricky. We start with normal Probit and Tobit models that ignore the panel structure of the data. To consider year fixed effects, we estimate random effects versions of the Probit and Tobit models. To consider region fixed effects, we estimate correlated random effects versions of the two models. These models make parametric assumptions about the distribution of unobserved effects given the observed covariates (see Wooldridge, 2002). The random effects model assumes independence of unobserved effects and the covariates. The correlated random effects model is an extension of the traditional random effects model that allows for correlation between unobserved effects and the covariates. This relationship, however, needs to be modeled parametrically (Mundlak, 1978). We implement the correlated random effects model by including region-specific averages of each covariate over time as additional regressors. Even though our analysis does not necessarily identify causal effects, the results are still informative for policymakers. Those attributes for which we document a robust statistical relationship with donations, provide a useful starting point for leveraging donations from Filipino migrants abroad to different provinces in the Philippines.   14 3. Results 3.1 Host Country Drivers of Migrant Donations We investigate the host country drivers of migrant donations in two ways. First, we examine the relationship between migrant donations and general characteristics of US states including the absolute and relative population size of the Filipino population, overall levels of GDP per capita and unemployment as well as the number of hate crimes (Table 2). Second, we examine the relationship between migrant donations and Filipino-specific characteristics of US states including Filipino per-capita income, Filipino unemployment rate, the share of naturalized Filipinos, and the median age of the Filipino population (Table 3). Filipino-specific variables are only available for the 2000s and only for the 18 US states that host more than 10,000 Filipinos.5 Therefore the sample to study Filipino-specific characteristics of US states is considerably smaller. As expected, we find robust evidence that larger Filipino populations donate more. In the specifications that are based on all US states (Table 2), the marginal effect of the logged Filipino population is close to one. As the dependent variable is also measured in logs, the marginal effect points to a unit elasticity of donations with respect to the Filipino population. In other words, donations increase in proportion to the Filipino population. In the specifications that are based only on US states with a sizeable Filipino population (Table 3), however, the elasticity is higher than one. This result suggests that larger local diasporas facilitate the collection of migrant donations, possibly because they reduce communication and transaction costs. Donations are driven by the economic situation of Filipinos in the US. Higher per-capita incomes among the Filipino population are strongly associated with higher levels of migrant donations (Table 3). An increase in the average income of Filipino migrants by US$ 1000 is associated with an increase in the amount of donations by 0.5 to 1 percent. This overall increase is driven by an increase on both the extensive and intensive margin. The relationship is statistically significant and robust to the inclusion of time dummies. Controlling for time invariant characteristics changes the marginal effects only slightly. However, due to the increased standard errors, the marginal effects are no longer statistically significant. By contrast, the relationship between Filipino-specific unemployment rates and migrant donations does not yield a clear pattern (Table                                                              5 US states with a Filipino population larger than 10,000 are Alaska, Arizona, California, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland, Michigan, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas, Virginia, Washington. 15 3). It may be that potential Filipino donors are not at risk of becoming unemployed. If so, the association between Filipino per-capita incomes and migrant donations would be relevant mainly for the intensive margin of income (i.e., when Filipinos are employed and earn income). The general economic situation in the US as measured by overall levels of GDP per capita and unemployment rates is not related to the donation behavior of Filipino migrants in a robust way (Table 2). We do not find supportive evidence that the level of integration in the American society matters for migrant donations. Naturalization rates are positively associated with migrant donations in the specifications without year dummies and state fixed effects (Table 3). This association ceases to be significant, however, once we control for year dummies. It may hence be that the association is due to common time trends in naturalization rates and donation flows. We find a very robust and in many specifications statistically significant positive relationship between the number of hate crimes and migrant donations (Table 2). This result is consistent with the idea that a xenophobic environment increases migrants’ probability of return and therefore the need to maintain membership rights in their home communities. 3.2 Home Country Drivers of Migrant Donations We investigate the home country drivers of migrant donations by examining the relationship between migrant donations and characteristics of Philippine provinces including the cumulative emigration rate of the past five years, the human development index, the population size as well as a dummy indicating whether a province was hit by a severe typhoon in a given year (Table 4). Several patterns arise. Most importantly, donations are not targeted well. Migrants appear to channel donations primarily to their home provinces. There is a strong association between past emigration rates and migrant donations on the intensive as well as the extensive margin. As Filipino migrants typically originate from more developed provinces, however, donations do not reach less developed provinces. This argument is supported by the fact that the human development index is not associated with migrant donations. The positive, but insignificant marginal effects suggest that migrant donations do not benefit the poorest parts of the Philippines. Nevertheless, the results also show that the diaspora responds altruistically to natural disasters. Provinces that are hit by a severe typhoon are 15 to 20 percentage points more likely to receive donations and also receive significantly higher amounts of donations in the year of the typhoon. 16 4. Conclusion There is no doubt that migrant donations have been a welcome addition to the limited resources available in the Philippines. For instance, health-related donations are a major contribution from the Filipino diaspora and augment the low public health budget. At the same time, our analysis suggests that expectations regarding the development potential of diaspora donations should not be too high. The overall amount of donations has been relatively modest given the enormous size of the Filipino diaspora and donation patterns do not only point to altruism, but also exchange as a motive for donations. Therefore, donations flow primarily into migrants’ home provinces, which are relatively well developed. Donations are hence not targeted to those provinces with the greatest needs. Nonetheless, the Filipino diaspora is responsive to natural disasters in its home country. These results provide useful guidance for policymakers who want to improve the management and coordination of diaspora donations. Three specific policy implications can be drawn from our analysis for the LINKAPIL program. First, CFO may play a more active role in channeling donations to the least developed provinces with low levels of migration. Second, after natural disasters such as typhoons CFO may specifically target migrants from affected provinces and call for their support in calamity relief efforts. Third, CFO may specifically target rich and large segments of the global Filipino diaspora to increase the overall amount of donations. Such measures may help to share the gains from migration and increase the development impact of migrant donations. 17 Literature Andreoni, James (2006). Philanthropy. In: Serge-Christophe Kolm and Jean Mercier Ythier (Eds.), Handbook of the Economics of Giving, Altruism and Reciprocity: Applications. Amsterdam: North Holland. Aparicio, Francisco Javier, and Covadonga Meseguer (2012). Collective Remittances and the State: The 3x1 Program in Mexican Municipalities. World Development 40(1): 206-222. Beauchemin, Cris, and Bruno Schoumaker (2009). Are Migrant Associations Actors in Local Development? A National Event-History Analysis in Rural Burkina Faso. World Development 37(12): 1897-1913. Clemens, Michael A., Claudio Montenegro and Lant Pritchett (2008). The Place Premium: Wage Differences for Identical Workers across the US Border. CGD Working Paper No. 148. Delpierre, Matthieu, and Bertrand Verheyden (2010). Remittances as Pure or Precautionary Investment? Risk, Savings and Return Migration. CEPS/INSTEAD Working Paper No. 2010-39. Dustmann, Christian, and Josep Mestres (2010). Remittances and Temporary Migration. Journal of Development Economics 92(1): 62-70. Goldring, Luin (2004). Family and Collective Remittances to Mexico: A Multi-dimensional Typology. Development and Change 35(4): 799-840. Kiyima, Yoko, and H. Gonzales-Ramirez (2012). Has the Program 3x1 for Migrants Contributed to Community Development in Mexico? Evidence from Panel Data of 2000 and 2005. Review of Development Economics 16(2): 291-304. Luecke, Matthias, Toman Omar Mahmoud and Christian Peuker (2012). Identifying the Motives of Migrant Philanthropy. Kiel Working Paper 1790. McKenzie, David, Steven Stillman and John Gibson (2010). How Important is Selection? Experimental vs. Non-experimental Measures of the Income Gains from Migration. Journal of the European Economic Association 8(4): 913-945. Mundlak, Yair. (1978). On the Pooling of Time Series and Cross Section Data. Econometrica 46(1): 69-75. Newland, Kathleen, Aaron Terrazas, and Roberto Munster (2010). Diaspora Philantropy: Private Giving and Public Policy. USAID. Osili, Una Okonkwo (2004). Migrants and Housing Investments: Theory and Evidence from Nigeria. Economic Development and Cultural Change 52(4): 821-849. Rapoport, Hillel, and Frédéric Docquier (2006). The Economics of Migrants’ Remittances. In: Serge-Christophe Kolm and Jean Mercier Ythier (Eds.), Handbook of the Economics of Giving, Altruism and Reciprocity: Applications. Amsterdam: North Holland. Wooldridge, Jeffrey (2002). Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data (Second Edition). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. World Bank (1998). Assessing Aid: What Works, What Doesn’t, and Why. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 18  Tables TABLE 2: Host-country drivers of migrant donations: The Filipino diaspora in the US, general determinants (1996-2010)   Notes: Clustered standard errors in parenthesis. Standard errors for random effects (RE) and correlated random effects (CRE) models are obtained from 999 bootstrap replications with state clusters. ***/**/* denote significance at the 1/5/10 percent level. Total m.e. are mean marginal effects for the overall change in donations. Pos. m.e. are mean marginal effects for the change in positive donations.     (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) OLS OLS OLS Tobit Tobit RE Tobit RE Tobit CRE Tobit CRE Tobit Probit RE Probit CRE Probit coef/m.e. coef/m.e. coef/m.e. total m.e. pos. m.e. total m.e. pos. m.e. total m.e. pos. m.e. m.e. m.e. m.e. 0.942** 0.963** 4.975** 0.904** 0.843** 1.067** 1.012** 8.051** 7.517** 0.076** 0.097** 0.548 (0.434) (0.463) (2.512) (0.454) (0.409) (0.502) (0.469) (3.610) (3.076) (0.037) (0.045) (0.400) -0.515 -0.503 2.629** -0.917* -0.856* -0.194 -0.184 6.472 6.043 -0.068 -0.021 0.956 (0.699) (0.713) (1.257) (0.555) (0.501) (1.447) (1.372) (4.441) (4.218) (0.049) (0.139) (0.752) 0.024* 0.023 0.016 0.030*** 0.028*** 0.015 0.014 -0.039 -0.037 0.003*** 0.002 -0.004 (0.014) (0.017) (0.073) (0.011) (0.010) (0.082) (0.077) (0.139) (0.130) (0.001) (0.008) (0.016) 0.096 0.010 0.131 0.141 0.131 0.097 0.092 -0.130 -0.122 0.015 0.015 -0.006 (0.169) (0.364) (0.186) (0.137) (0.129) (0.255) (0.239) (0.250) (0.236) (0.013) (0.027) (0.026) 0.525* 0.505 0.406 0.635* 0.592* 0.455 0.432 0.697 0.650* 0.054* 0.036 0.058 (0.296) (0.315) (0.426) (0.381) (0.352) (0.394) (0.373) (0.428) (0.384) (0.032) (0.038) (0.045) Year fixed effects X X X X X X X X State fixed effects X State averages X X X Observations 744 744 744 744 744 744 744 744 744 744 744 744 Adjusted R2 0.20 0.19 0.05 observed donations (log) binary donations Filipino population (logged) General GDP per capita (thousand 2010 US$) General unemployment rate (%) Filipino population share (%) Number of hate crimes (logged) 19 TABLE 3: Host-country drivers of migrant donations: The Filipino diaspora in the US, Filipino-specific determinants (2000-2010)   Notes: Clustered standard errors in parenthesis. Standard errors for random effects (RE) and correlated random effects (CRE) models are obtained from 999 bootstrap replications with state clusters. ***/**/* denote significance at the 1/5/10 percent level. Total m.e. are mean marginal effects for the overall change in donations. Pos. m.e. are mean marginal effects for the change in positive donations.   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) OLS OLS OLS Tobit Tobit RE Tobit RE Tobit CRE Tobit CRE Tobit Probit RE Probit CRE coef/m.e. coef/m.e. coef/m.e. total m.e. pos. m.e. total m.e. pos. m.e. total m.e. pos. m.e. m.e. m.e. m.e. 1.576** 1.689** 14.289*** 2.032*** 1.561*** 2.062 1.597 21.086* 16.817 0.146*** 0.185 1.254 (0.737) (0.694) (4.431) (0.583) (0.453) (1.477) (1.161) (12.726) (11.425) (0.055) (0.285) (2,159.266) 0.164 0.149 -1.391 0.225 0.173 0.275 0.213 -0.238 -0.190 0.019* 0.023 0.099 (0.177) (0.157) (2.418) (0.160) (0.125) (1.638) (1.273) (7.641) (6.092) (0.011) (0.324) (625.683) 0.658** 0.676** 0.658* 0.920*** 0.707*** 0.926** 0.717** 0.551 0.440 0.068*** 0.096 0.048 (0.276) (0.310) (0.387) (0.288) (0.230) (0.401) (0.328) (0.594) (0.487) (0.015) (0.062) (275.4) -0.491 -0.494 0.478* -0.934 -0.717 0.513 0.397 0.895 0.714 -0.064 0.056 0.086 (0.545) (0.594) (0.247) (0.703) (0.538) (0.442) (0.346) (0.650) (0.571) (0.050) (0.074) (94.063) -1.067** -1.118** -0.433 -1.665*** -1.279*** -1.149 -0.890 -0.264 -0.211 -0.128*** -0.142 -0.074 (0.438) (0.461) (0.395) (0.440) (0.340) (0.747) (0.580) (0.828) (0.662) (0.034) (0.122) (2,036.161) 0.104** 0.049 -0.075 0.175*** 0.134*** 0.075 0.058 0.222 0.177 0.014*** 0.008 0.019 (0.048) (0.240) (0.147) (0.049) (0.037) (0.195) (0.151) (0.291) (0.240) (0.004) (0.041) (36.427) Year fixed effects X X X X X X X X State fixed effects X State averages X X X Observations 198 198 198 198 198 198 198 198 198 198 198 198 Adjusted R2 0.24 0.22 0.07 binary donationsobserved donations (log) Filipino median age Share of naturalized filipinos (%) Filipino population (logged) Filipino population share (%) Filipino per-capita income (thousand 2010 US$) Filipino unemployment rate (%) 20 TABLE 4: Home-country drivers of migrant donations: The allocation of migrant donations across Philippine provinces (1995-2006)   Notes: Clustered standard errors in parenthesis. Standard errors for random effects (RE) and correlated random effects (CRE) models are obtained from 999 bootstrap replications with province clusters. ***/**/* denote significance at the 1/5/10 percent level. Total m.e. are mean marginal effects for the overall change in donations. Pos. m.e. are mean marginal effects for the change in positive donations. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) OLS OLS OLS Tobit Tobit RE Tobit RE Tobit CRE Tobit CRE Tobit Probit RE Probit CRE coef/m.e. coef/m.e. coef/m.e. total m.e. pos. m.e. total m.e. pos. m.e. total m.e. pos. m.e. m.e. m.e. m.e. 1.665*** 1.951*** -0.581 1.531*** 1.147*** 1.968** 1.517** 1.435 1.111 0.150** 0.173* 0.026 (0.569) (0.596) (1.635) (0.510) (0.386) (0.949) (0.737) (4.215) (3.265) (0.060) (0.092) (0.404) 3.398 3.228 2.752 3.120 2.336 3.823 2.948 5.081 3.936 0.258 0.353 0.716 (3.302) (3.275) (6.138) (3.668) (2.752) (3.777) (2.920) (8.041) (6.231) (0.348) (0.395) (0.880) 1.416*** 1.717*** 0.840 1.597*** 1.196*** 1.419*** 1.094*** 1.161** 0.900** 0.199*** 0.173*** 0.147** (0.511) (0.535) (0.546) (0.531) (0.400) (0.538) (0.415) (0.564) (0.436) (0.059) (0.061) (0.062) 1.923*** 1.834*** 1.571 2.257*** 1.690*** 2.067*** 1.594*** -2.656 -2.057 0.199*** 0.206*** 0.323 (0.188) (0.183) (3.720) (0.207) (0.161) (0.237) (0.188) (4.387) (3.405) (0.019) (0.022) (0.565) Year fixed effects X X X X X X X X Province fixed effects X Province averages X X X Observations 876 876 876 876 876 876 876 876 876 876 876 876 Adjusted R2 0.19 0.28 0.16 observed donations (log) binary donation Cumulative emigration rate in periods t-5 to t-1 (%) Human development index Typhoon (dummy) Population (logged) 21  Appendix TABLE A1: Types of donations (ordered by importance) Type Description Share in total donations (by value) Medical materials Donations of medicines, medical supplies and medical equipment, ranging from ambulances, dental chairs, reading glasses up to X-ray machines and diagnostic equipment; freight, shipment and distribution costs are also included 37.46% Medical mission Groups of medical personnel come to the Philippines to render medical services such as such as dental, surgical, eye care or medical consultation 28.72% Calamity relief Donations for calamity relief including food and non-food items like blankets, medicines and medical supplies, used clothing and donations of cash; freight, shipment and distribution costs are also included 17.96% Educational materials Donations of books, school supplies, equipment such as computers including the associated freight, shipment and distribution costs 4.65% Skills transfer First component: Participants in the Exchange Visitors Program (EVP) enter the USA on a J-1 visa, which requires the holder to return to her country for at least 2 years prior to re-entering the USA on a regular working visa. However, waivers to the two-year period can be obtained if the holder conducts a training program in the Philippines. Donations are in the form of seminars and workshops conducted by the individual. Second component: Under the EVP Program, another requirement for converting from a J-1 visa to a regular working visa is a donation of US$ 1,500 which is used by CFO to grant scholarships for students in master or doctoral degrees in the Philippines. 2.97% Scholarship Donations to finance scholarships including tuition, stipend, school supplies, uniforms etc. 2.69% Small-scale infrastructure Donations mostly for the construction of classrooms, repair of housing, and sanitary facilities and water-well systems 2.38% Gift giving Gift bags (assorted goods) for distribution to needy families including rice, toys, assorted goods, including cash for this purpose; may be associated with Christmas 2.29% Financial assistance Financial assistance may go to any of the other categories 0.52% Feeding program Donations for supplementary feeding such as milk, rice, etc. 0.34% All 100.00% Notes: While donations have only been classified for one purpose by CFO, the used classification categories are not mutually exclusive. For instance, medical missions could also be part of calamity relief and vice versa.   22 TABLE A2: Summary statistics Notes: All numbers are based on region-year cells. # regions # obs. mean std. dev. minimum maximum US states (1996 - 2010) value of donations (2010 US$) 47-50 744 28,004 93,096 0 985,766 donation (dummy) 47-50 744 0.25 - 0 1 number of filipinos 47-50 744 38,717 144,295 303 1,195,580 filipino population share (%) 47-50 744 0.40 0.62 0.05 3.64 GDP per capita (thousand 2010 US$) 47-50 744 46.16 17.67 27.77 169.90 general unemployment rate 47-50 744 5.29 1.87 2.30 14.90 number of hate crimes 47-50 744 156.39 263.46 0.00 2,246.00 US states with Filipino populations > 10,000 (2000 - 2010) value of donations (2010 US$) 18 198 67,713 147,728 0 985,766 donation (dummy) 18 198 0.48 - 0 1 number of filipinos 18 198 115,287 236,893 11,068 1,195,580 filipino population share (%) 18 198 1.70 3.35 0.11 15.48 filipino per-capita income (thousand 2010 US$) 18 198 25.72 4.55 18.12 36.40 filipino unemployment rate 18 198 5.62 1.41 3.00 12.70 filipino median age 18 198 32.43 2.20 27.30 38.00 share of naturalized filipinos (%) 18 198 51.14 10.89 22.90 69.75 Philippine provinces (1995 - 2006) value of donations (in 2010 US$) 73 876 19,529 59,701 0 832,422 donation (dummy) 73 876 0.47 - 0 1.00 current emigration rate (%) 73 876 0.04 0.05 0.00 0.43 cumul. emigration rate in periods t-5 to t-1 (%) 73 876 0.20 0.28 0.01 2.21 human development index 73 876 0.56 0.09 0.28 0.87 typhoon (dummy) 73 876 0.09 - 0.00 1.00 population size 73 876 860,548 712,932 14,180 3,780,296 
work_23so6t5jwjajhg47wk2kf27vi4	----	Mental health and suicide risk in Northern Ireland: a legacy of the Troubles? | Semantic Scholar Skip to search formSkip to main content> Semantic Scholar's Logo Search Sign InCreate Free Account You are currently offline. Some features of the site may not work correctly. Corpus ID: 53619470Mental health and suicide risk in Northern Ireland: a legacy of the Troubles? @inproceedings{Fergusson2015MentalHA, title={Mental health and suicide risk in Northern Ireland: a legacy of the Troubles?}, author={D. Fergusson and J. Boden and L. Horwood}, year={2015} } D. Fergusson, J. Boden, L. Horwood Published 2015 Sociology 582 www.thelancet.com/psychiatry Vol 2 July 2015 covariates. The frequency of both tobacco and cannabis use were signifi cantly related to rates of psychotic symptoms (table). After adjustment, cannabis use remained signifi cantly related to rates of psychotic symptoms, whereas cigarette smoking did not (table). These fi ndings suggest a possible causal eff ect of cannabis use on rates of psychotic symptoms and imply that the associations between cigarette smoking and psychotic symptoms are… Expand 3cc3a7df-a-c1e75e68-s-sites.googlegroups.com Save to Library Create Alert Cite Launch Research Feed Share This Paper References SHOWING 1-10 OF 14 REFERENCES SORT BYRelevance Most Influenced Papers Recency Tests of causal linkages between cannabis use and psychotic symptoms. D. Fergusson, L. Horwood, E. Ridder Medicine Addiction 2005 268 PDF Save Alert Research Feed Patterns of Suicidal Ideation and Behavior in Northern Ireland and Associations with Conflict Related Trauma S. O'Neill, F. Ferry, +5 authors B. Bunting Psychology, Medicine PloS one 2014 58 Save Alert Research Feed Genetics of Smoking and Schizophrenia S. Leonard, S. Mexal, R. Freedman Psychology 2007 98 Save Alert Research Feed The psychology of suicidal behaviour. R. O'Connor, M. Nock Psychology, Medicine The lancet. Psychiatry 2014 541 Save Alert Research Feed Mental disorders and suicide in Northern Ireland. T. Foster, K. Gillespie, R. Mcclelland Medicine The British journal of psychiatry : the journal of mental science 1997 318 Save Alert Research Feed Lifetime prevalence of mental health disorders and delay in treatment following initial onset: evidence from the Northern Ireland Study of Health and Stress. B. Bunting, S. Murphy, Siobhan O'Neill, F. Ferry Medicine Psychological medicine 2012 81 Save Alert Research Feed Prevalence and treatment of 12-month DSM-IV disorders in the Northern Ireland study of health and stress B. Bunting, S. Murphy, S. O'Neill, F. Ferry Medicine Social Psychiatry and Psychiatric Epidemiology 2012 32 Save Alert Research Feed Adolescent self-harm: a school-based study in Northern Ireland. R. O'Connor, S. Rasmussen, K. Hawton Psychology, Medicine Journal of affective disorders 2014 85 Save Alert Research Feed Trauma associated with civil conflict and posttraumatic stress disorder: evidence from the Northern Ireland study of health and stress. B. Bunting, F. Ferry, S. Murphy, Siobhan O'Neill, David A. E. Bolton Psychology, Medicine Journal of traumatic stress 2013 62 Save Alert Research Feed Towards a better future: the trans-generational impact of the Troubles on mental health. S. O'Neill, C. Armour, +8 authors S. Murphy Psychology 2015 12 PDF Save Alert Research Feed ... 1 2 ... Related Papers Abstract 14 References Related Papers Stay Connected With Semantic Scholar Sign Up About Semantic Scholar Semantic Scholar is a free, AI-powered research tool for scientific literature, based at the Allen Institute for AI. Learn More → Resources DatasetsSupp.aiAPIOpen Corpus Organization About UsResearchPublishing PartnersData Partners   FAQContact Proudly built by AI2 with the help of our Collaborators Terms of Service•Privacy Policy The Allen Institute for AI By clicking accept or continuing to use the site, you agree to the terms outlined in our Privacy Policy, Terms of Service, and Dataset License ACCEPT & CONTINUE 
work_27tahmz7jvfgpawothpz7dv66q	----	How will Brexit affect the healthcare workforce? BRIEFING How will Brexit affect the healthcare workforce? As part of a series of briefings as we near the end of the Brexit transition period, May van Schalkwyk and colleagues look at its potential impact on NHS and social care staff May C I van Schalkwyk, 1 Tamara K Hervey, 2 Martha McCarey, 3 Mark Dayan, 3 Pepita Barlow, 4 Martin McKee1 Do we have good data on how many EU doctors work in the UK? Data are collected on the nationality of NHS staff, but there are questions about the accuracy of some of these data and a number of other problems with the arrangements around how they’re maintained and updated. All NHS employees have an electronic staff record containing their details, and this includes their nationality when recruited. However, the information is monitored in separate systems in each of the four nations (in England, it’s the responsibility of NHS Digital). There’s also no obligation for NHS workers who acquire British nationality to update their information, and there’s no record of whether this has happened. So, some doctors may be misclassified as not having British nationality (because they haven’t updated their records), while others won’t be recorded as coming from the EU (because they have updated their records). It’s also not clear how the system deals with dual nationals, including the large number with joint UK and Irish nationality. The General Medical Council (GMC) also monitors the movement of doctors to and from all four UK nations. However, the only indicator of national affiliation in the GMC record is the country of primary qualification. Thus, British citizens qualifying abroad would be considered overseas graduates, while EU citizens qualifying in the UK would be UK graduates. Do we know whether more EU doctors have left the UK in recent years or whether fewer are now coming to the UK? Over the past two years the overall number of staff from the EU working in the NHS in England has remained stable, at around 5.5% of all staff.1 The picture for doctors specifically is also one of relative stability, in data from both NHS Digital (for which EU doctors are defined by nationality on NHS records) and the GMC (for which EU doctors are defined by country of qualification). For instance, NHS Digital data show that 490 EU doctors left NHS trusts in England in March and April 2019, and 432 did so in March and April 2020. The NHS Digital and the GMC figures show that, although the number of EU qualified doctors has increased over the past two years, the rate of this increase has been lower than among overseas doctors from outside the EU. The number of EU qualified doctors increased by 2.9% in 2018-19 and by 8.2% in 2019-20, whereas the number of overseas qualified doctors from outside the EU rose by 7.4% and 13.2% over those two periods. However, doctors don’t work in isolation from other staff, so we also need to think about staffing across the entire health and social care system, including support staff, research scientists, nurses, and social care staff. From 2018 to 2020 the overall headcount of EU nurses and health visitors in NHS trusts in England has slightly decreased, although numbers from the rest of the world are increasing in a more sustained manner. Some regions face particular staffing challenges—such as Northern Ireland, which draws on the same labour market for health workers as the Republic of Ireland, with considerable cross border working. The wider environment for immigrant labour should also be considered, as it’s likely to affect EU and other overseas citizens coming to the UK. What effect might Brexit, deal or no deal, have on the NHS’s ability to attract and recruit doctors from the EU? There are many uncertainties around this, and they make it difficult to predict future levels of medical migration. Firstly, will the restrictions on free movement for EU citizens be sustainable? There is widespread recognition that a no deal or minimalist Brexit deal can only be a temporary situation given the disruption it will create,2 and UK governments in the future will face a permanent economic incentive to change course. More widely, although the UK government has placed stricter migration controls at the centre of its case for Brexit, in the longer term it may have difficulty sustaining this as it tries to negotiate trade deals with countries such as India, which will want greater opportunities for their citizens to come to the UK.3 NHS Employers and the Institute for Public Policy Research have both raised concerns about the impact of the new points based immigration system on recruitment to social care.4 5 In addition, the BMA has called for the UK government to establish a flexible migration system that promotes entry into the UK for health and social care staff, as well as allowing UK trained doctors to work in the EU.6 Secondly, if barriers to entry remain, will potential migrants consider them too expensive and burdensome? The UK’s reputation among potential 1the bmj | BMJ 2020;371:m4439 | doi: 10.1136/bmj.m4439 FEATURE 1 Faculty of Public Health and Policy, London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, London 2 SchoolofLaw,UniversityofSheffield, Sheffield 3 Nuffield Trust, London 4 DepartmentofHealthPolicy,London School of Economics, London Cite this as: BMJ 2020;371:m4439 http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/bmj.m4439 Published: 17 November 2020 o n 5 A p ril 2 0 2 1 b y g u e st. P ro te cte d b y co p yrig h t. h ttp ://w w w .b m j.co m / B M J: first p u b lish e d a s 1 0 .1 1 3 6 /b m j.m 4 4 3 9 o n 1 7 N o ve m b e r 2 0 2 0 . D o w n lo a d e d fro m https://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1136/bmj.m4439&domain=pdf&date_stamp=17-11-2020 http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/bmj.m4439 http://www.bmj.com/ migrants has been damaged by the government’s “hostile environment” approach7 and its treatment of the Windrush generation.8 As of November 2020 there’s little clarity about the fees that incoming doctors will have to pay, and the Home Office is known to view such charges as a valuable revenue stream. Workers will also need reassurance about ease of entry for their spouses and dependants—and their ability to also work and access healthcare, as well as other services such as education.9 Thirdly, for workers who are supporting relatives in their country of origin, the declining value of the pound may mean that the value of their remissions falls. What might a well negotiated Brexit outcome look like, in terms of EU healthcare professionals working in the UK? Any form of Brexit will make the UK a less attractive destination for EU health professionals. They will lack certainty about many practical issues, such as taxation, portability of pensions, and their right to remain in the long term. The UK’s refusal to issue documentation specifying that people with “settled status” have the right to remain in the UK is already causing problems for those seeking to access services, use banks, or rent property.10 The current UK guidance lacks detail, stating only that the UK will continue to recognise European Economic Area and Swiss qualifications “for a temporary period” after 1 January 2021.11 This approach is consistent with the many other areas12 where the UK has delayed making a final decision for as long as possible, going beyond the end of the transition where it can. If an EU-UK trade agreement is reached, continued recognition of each other’s qualification frameworks for health and care staff will be feasible, and the EU and UK draft texts both propose a framework for collaboration here. Unless the UK decides to diverge significantly from EU medical professional standards, we may see relative continuity in this context. However, exchange of information about fitness to practise cannot occur, as the UK will lose access to the EU’s Internal Market Information system because it insists on leaving the internal market. Increased vigilance over fitness to practise will therefore be critical to maintaining standards of patient care.13 The outcome of the negotiations will have implications for working conditions. The EU wants to secure a non-regression clause in labour standards, whereas the UK wants the ability to develop standards independently. If there is no agreement, erosion of employment conditions may compound the impact of immigration changes on staffing levels. However, domestic law and policy could embed working conditions in practice: the terms of junior doctors’ contracts in England include existing working time rules based on EU law, although these protections have long been a target of Brexit supporters.13 14 After the end of the transition period, what might still attract EU doctors to work in the UK? The UK continues to have a strong research record in life sciences. However, this is threatened by Brexit, especially if there’s no deal—with the UK losing access to European Reference Networks, for example, and potential obstacles to collaboration on clinical trials.15 Negotiations on the UK’s continuing inclusion in Horizon Europe, one of the most ambitious research collaborations globally, have reached an impasse.16 Since the 2016 EU referendum the reported levels of race related hate crimes have increased in the UK,17 18 and while the most recent NHS staff survey revealed an increase in staff morale and patient safety scores, almost 40 000 of respondents (7.2%) reported experiencing discrimination from patients in the past year, an increase from 5.8% in 2015.19 In a 2018 study, most EU doctors who were interviewed reported that the referendum and its political aftermath had given rise to feelings of uncertainty and of being unwanted and undervalued.20 Persuading those doctors to stay will be contingent on building confidence that future work conditions will not deteriorate—and reassurance that they are wanted and valued.20 MvS is funded by an NIHR doctoral fellowship (ref NIHR300156). TKH acknowledges the support of the Economic and Social Research Council’s Health Governance After Brexit project (ES/S00730X/1). The views presented here are those of the authors and should not be attributed to the above funding organisations, their directors, officers, or staff. Competing interests: None declared. Provenance and peer review: Commissioned; not peer reviewed. 1 HouseofCommonsLibrary.NHSstaff fromoverseas:statistics.4 Jun2020.https://researchbrief- ings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-7783/CBP-7783.pdf. 2 Savage M. UK industry chief says business needs more from “thin” Brexit deal. Guardian 2020 Nov 1. https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2020/nov/01/uk-industry-chief-says-business- needs-more-from-thin-brexit-deal. 3 Sengupta K. UK post-Brexit trade deal with India threatened by Theresa May’s visa crackdown. Independent2017Jan18.https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/brexit-uk-britain-india- trade-deal-freedom-movement-delhi-boris-johnson-a7534026.html. 4 NHS Confederation. Immigration announcement provides no obvious solution for social care. 19 Feb2020.https://www.nhsconfed.org/news/2020/02/response-to-immigration-policy-announce- ment. 5 Institute for Public Policy Research. New migration system risks Covid economic recovery due to curbs on carers and key workers, warns IPPR. 3 Nov 2020. https://www.ippr.org/news-and- media/press-releases/new-migration-system-risks-covid-economic-recovery-due-to-curbs-on- carers-and-key-workers-warns-ippr. 6 BMA. BMA and Brexit. 7 Sep 2020. https://www.bma.org.uk/what-we-do/working-with-eu- rope/brexit/bma-and-brexit. 7 Hiam L,Steele S,McKee M.Creatinga“hostileenvironmentformigrants”: theBritishgovernment’s use of health service data to restrict immigration is a very bad idea. Health Econ Policy Law 2018;13:107-17. doi: 10.1017/S1744133117000251. pmid: 29306349 8 McKee M. Lessons from the Windrush generation. BMJ 2018;361:k2017. doi: 10.1136/bmj.k2017 pmid: 29739792 9 O’Carroll L. UK to face questions over Northern Ireland citizenship laws. Guardian 2019 Oct 14. https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2019/oct/14/uk-court-rules-against-derry-woman-in- irish-identity-case. 10 Tims A. Brexit: EU citizens in UK could be shut out of vital services. Guardian 2020 Sep 6. https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2020/sep/26/eu-citizens-uk-brexit-settled-status-jobs- banking-healthcare. 11 UK Government. Get your EEA qualification recognised in the UK from 1 January 2021. 12 Oct 2018.https://www.gov.uk/guidance/get-your-eea-qualification-recognised-in-the-uk-from-1-jan- uary-2021. 12 Wishart I. Brexit negotiators move close to breaking impasse over fish. Bloomberg 2020 Nov 1. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-11-01/brexit-negotiators-move-close-to- breaking-key-impasse-over-fish. 13 Fahy N, Hervey T, Dayan M, etal. Assessing the potential impact on health of the UK’s future relationshipagreementwiththeEU:analysisof thenegotiatingpositions.HealthEconPolicyLaw 2020:1-18. doi: 10.1017/S1744133120000171. pmid: 32487272 14 Dobbins T. Tory attack on Working Time Directive signals a post-Brexit race to the bottom. Conversation 2017 Dec 20. https://theconversation.com/tory-attack-on-working-time-directive- signals-a-post-brexit-race-to-the-bottom-89395. 15 Fahy N, Hervey T, Greer S, etal. How will Brexit affect health services in the UK? An updated evaluation. Lancet 2019;393:949-58. doi: 10.1016/S0140-6736(19)30425-8. pmid: 30819519 16 O’Carroll L. Brexit: £3bn standoff over UK-EU scientific collaboration. 22 Oct 2020. https://www.theguardian.com/science/2020/oct/22/science-brexit-deal-faces-3bn-hurdle-in-eu- funding-programme-uk-horizon-europe. 17 Brexit “major influence” in racism and hate crime rise. BBC News 2019 Jun 19. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-wales-48692863. 18 Booth R. Racism rising since Brexit vote, nationwide study reveals. Guardian 2019 May 20. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/may/20/racism-on-the-rise-since-brexit-vote-nation- wide-study-reveals. the bmj | BMJ 2020;371:m4439 | doi: 10.1136/bmj.m44392 FEATURE o n 5 A p ril 2 0 2 1 b y g u e st. P ro te cte d b y co p yrig h t. h ttp ://w w w .b m j.co m / B M J: first p u b lish e d a s 1 0 .1 1 3 6 /b m j.m 4 4 3 9 o n 1 7 N o ve m b e r 2 0 2 0 . D o w n lo a d e d fro m https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-7783/CBP-7783.pdf https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-7783/CBP-7783.pdf https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2020/nov/01/uk-industry-chief-says-business-needs-more-from-thin-brexit-deal https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2020/nov/01/uk-industry-chief-says-business-needs-more-from-thin-brexit-deal https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/brexit-uk-britain-india-trade-deal-freedom-movement-delhi-boris-johnson-a7534026.html https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/brexit-uk-britain-india-trade-deal-freedom-movement-delhi-boris-johnson-a7534026.html https://www.nhsconfed.org/news/2020/02/response-to-immigration-policy-announcement https://www.nhsconfed.org/news/2020/02/response-to-immigration-policy-announcement https://www.ippr.org/news-and-media/press-releases/new-migration-system-risks-covid-economic-recovery-due-to-curbs-on-carers-and-key-workers-warns-ippr https://www.ippr.org/news-and-media/press-releases/new-migration-system-risks-covid-economic-recovery-due-to-curbs-on-carers-and-key-workers-warns-ippr https://www.ippr.org/news-and-media/press-releases/new-migration-system-risks-covid-economic-recovery-due-to-curbs-on-carers-and-key-workers-warns-ippr https://www.bma.org.uk/what-we-do/working-with-europe/brexit/bma-and-brexit https://www.bma.org.uk/what-we-do/working-with-europe/brexit/bma-and-brexit https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2019/oct/14/uk-court-rules-against-derry-woman-in-irish-identity-case https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2019/oct/14/uk-court-rules-against-derry-woman-in-irish-identity-case https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2020/sep/26/eu-citizens-uk-brexit-settled-status-jobs-banking-healthcare https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2020/sep/26/eu-citizens-uk-brexit-settled-status-jobs-banking-healthcare https://www.gov.uk/guidance/get-your-eea-qualification-recognised-in-the-uk-from-1-january-2021 https://www.gov.uk/guidance/get-your-eea-qualification-recognised-in-the-uk-from-1-january-2021 https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-11-01/brexit-negotiators-move-close-to-breaking-key-impasse-over-fish https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-11-01/brexit-negotiators-move-close-to-breaking-key-impasse-over-fish https://theconversation.com/tory-attack-on-working-time-directive-signals-a-post-brexit-race-to-the-bottom-89395 https://theconversation.com/tory-attack-on-working-time-directive-signals-a-post-brexit-race-to-the-bottom-89395 https://www.theguardian.com/science/2020/oct/22/science-brexit-deal-faces-3bn-hurdle-in-eu-funding-programme-uk-horizon-europe https://www.theguardian.com/science/2020/oct/22/science-brexit-deal-faces-3bn-hurdle-in-eu-funding-programme-uk-horizon-europe https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-wales-48692863 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/may/20/racism-on-the-rise-since-brexit-vote-nationwide-study-reveals https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/may/20/racism-on-the-rise-since-brexit-vote-nationwide-study-reveals http://www.bmj.com/ 19 NHS. NHS staff morale improves but too many facing abuse. 18 Feb 2020. https://www.eng- land.nhs.uk/2020/02/nhs-staff-morale-improves-but-too-many-facing-abuse/. 20 Chick W, Exworthy M. Post-Brexit views of European Union doctors on their future in the NHS: a qualitative study. BMJ Leader 2018;2:20-4. doi: 10.1136/leader-2017-000049. 3the bmj | BMJ 2020;371:m4439 | doi: 10.1136/bmj.m4439 FEATURE o n 5 A p ril 2 0 2 1 b y g u e st. P ro te cte d b y co p yrig h t. h ttp ://w w w .b m j.co m / B M J: first p u b lish e d a s 1 0 .1 1 3 6 /b m j.m 4 4 3 9 o n 1 7 N o ve m b e r 2 0 2 0 . D o w n lo a d e d fro m https://www.england.nhs.uk/2020/02/nhs-staff-morale-improves-but-too-many-facing-abuse/ https://www.england.nhs.uk/2020/02/nhs-staff-morale-improves-but-too-many-facing-abuse/ http://www.bmj.com/ 
work_2bzpg76cmzdbzdv2wmoxegpxfm	----	Microsoft Word - PROBATION JNL FINAL.doc 1 Abstract This article reports on research conducted for the Youth Justice Board (YJB) which sought to establish the prevalence of racially motivated offending (RMO) amongst young people and the level of provision for such offenders. The paper examines trends in youth RMO over the period 2002-2007 and explores the characteristics of offenders; geographical trends of RMO and sanctioning outcomes. Analysis demonstrates that of those young people referred to youth offending service (YOS) teams for RMO, the vast majority were male and white. There was a noticeable ‘North-South’ split in RMO, with levels in the North generally higher than in the South and sanctions for racially motivated offences were more severe than for offences generally. The paper calls for further investigation into the legislation and practice around youth RMO. Introduction Racially motivated offending (RMO) is a form of hate (or bias) crime. The latter is defined by the Home Office as a crime which is perceived by the victim or any other person as being motivated by prejudice or hate. The prejudice may be based on the (actual or perceived) race, colour, ethnic origin, nationality or national origin, religion, gender or gender identity, sexual orientation or disability of the victim. 1 Racially motivated crimes, therefore, are hate crimes motivated by an offenders’ dislike of the victim’s race, colour, ethnic or national origin. This article reports on research conducted on behalf of the youth justice board (YJB) which sought to look at the nature and extent of youth RMO and explore responses to it within the youth justice system. The two main aims of the YJB funded research were, firstly, to establish the number of offenders referred to youth offending service teams (YOS) for racially motivated offences, and, secondly, to map the level and nature of programmes provided by YOS teams and secure establishments for these young people. It is the first aim that the data provided in this article reports on (see Wilcox et al 2008 for the full report). Policy The policy and operational landscape in relation to racially motivated offending has altered significantly in the last ten years in response to factors including high profile racially motivated killings (such as the murder of Stephen Lawrence in 1993), riots and disturbances arising from conflicts between racially demarcated communities in the North of England during 2001 in Bradford, Burnley and Oldham, and concerns about insecurity following the events of ‘9/11’ and the impact of this on cohesion between communities. Previously, policy responses to racial unrest and racist crime had been small scale, and it was not, on the whole, a political priority. Prior to the Criminal Justice Act 1991 (Section 95) racist crime was not systematically monitored or recorded and as a result it was not possible to establish its extent or impact (Dixon and Ray 2007). Where policy change did take place in the 1980s and 1990s it was driven largely by victim groups rather than by public or political pressure (Bowling, 1998). The Crime and Disorder Act (1998) brought about the creation of a category of racially aggravated offences. This resulted in nine existing offences in the areas of assault, harassment, criminal damage and public order having racially aggravated labels appended (see Box 1 below) all of which carry higher potential penalties or tariffs. Racially aggravated offences are now not only legally defined under the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (section 28), but also the Antiterrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 (section 39), the Race Relations Amendment Act (2000) and the Race and Religious Hatred Act (2006). 1 See: http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/crime-victims/reducing-crime/hate-crime/ (accessed 21 November 2008) 2 This has resulted in a systematic reconfiguration of the ways in which the criminal justice system now deals with prejudice-related offending. The 2000 and 2006 statutes added the religiously aggravated aspect and had the effect of broadening what constitutes racial or religious hatred. The various offences comprising racially motivated offending are detailed in the box below, and we use these definitions of racially motivated offending within this study. Box 1 Home Office racially aggravated offences It should also be noted that the offences of ‘Racially or religiously aggravated criminal damage to a dwelling’ and ‘Racially or religiously aggravated criminal damage to a building other than a dwelling’ were added to the Home Office series from 1 April 1999, and prior to that they were included in the original classifications. Religiously aggravated offences were added to the series from April 2002 (Nicholas et al, 2007). An offence may be classified as racially or religiously aggravated if: • at the time of committing the offence, or immediately before or after doing so, the offender demonstrates toward the victim of the offence hostility based on the victim’s membership (or presumed membership) of a racial or religious group; or • the offence is motivated (wholly or partly) by hostility towards members of a racial or religious group based on their membership of that group (s28, Crime and Disorder Act,1998) Limitations of statistics relating to RMO It is well known that there is a ‘dark figure’ of hidden crime - that is to say there is often a large discrepancy between the number of incidents defined as a crime and officially recorded as such and the experiences and perceptions of victims (Coleman and Moynihan, 1996). There is even greater attrition when one considers the number of offenders ‘brought to justice’ (cautioned or convicted). 2 This ‘attrition’ is particularly severe with regard to racially motivated offending. The true size of this pool of unreported and unrecorded incidents is of course unknown, but is subject to the same processes of attrition within the criminal justice system and the varying definitions and institutional mechanisms used in capturing these data that other categories of crime are subject to. The chief cause of attrition is the notoriously low level of reporting of racially aggravated crime by victims (for instance, the police estimate that the majority of racist and religious hate 2 Barclay and Tavares (1999) estimate from British Crime Survey data that as few as three in every hundred crimes committed against individuals or their property results in the offender being convicted or cautioned. I. 8D. Racially or religiously aggravated less serious wounding II. 8E. Racially or religiously aggravated harassment III. 105B. Racially or religiously aggravated assault without injury (Previously termed ‘Racially or religiously aggravated common assault’). IV. 58E. Racially or religiously aggravated criminal damage to a dwelling V. 58F. Racially or religiously aggravated criminal damage to a building other than a dwelling VI. 58G. Racially or religiously aggravated criminal damage to a vehicle VII. 58H. Racially or religiously aggravated other criminal damage 3 crime, and as much as 90 per cent of homophobic crime, goes unreported). 3 Further attrition can take place within the criminal justice system itself, from the reporting stage, through to recording, detection and conviction. Although a considerable proportion of the ‘dark figure’ of racially motivated offending is due to under reporting, studies of police recording practices more generally suggest that under recording by the police, due either to police discretion or the application of an evidential standard to allegations of crime also plays an important role (Burrows et al, 2004). However, in response to these institutional criticisms, police forces adopted ‘ethical’ crime recording practices in 2000 (Simmons et al, 2003). This is the practice whereby the police record all incidents that are reported by the public, whether or not the police believe that evidence exists to support the report or whether the incident in fact constitutes a racial or religiously motivated crime. All of these considerations indicate the partial nature of official statistics on racially aggravated crime and emphasize that official statistics detailing trends over time may be more of a reflection of changes in willingness to report and record such offences, or in definitional issues for example, than changes in the actual level of offending. All of the above considerations indicate the partial nature of official statistics on racially aggravated crime and emphasize that official statistics detailing trends over time may be more of a reflection of changes in willingness to report and record such offences, or in definitional issues for example, than changes in the actual level of offending. Motivations of Racially motivated offenders A number of writers have suggested that racially motivated offenders can be categorised according to the basis of their motivations. In 1993, Levin and McDevitt argued that hate crime offenders could be divided into three different categories: i) thrill seekers ii) defenders and iii) mission offenders. These three typologies were derived from undertaking interviews with the members of the police, victims and hate crime offenders themselves (McDevitt et al, 2002). However, in 2002 McDevitt et al included a fourth category to the typology; the ‘retaliatory’ offender. This fourth category was added as; ‘..it occurred to us that there are sometimes additional factors and indicators present that seem to relate to bias motivation but are not currently specified in the literature. Offences that involve these factors and indicators are bias motivated but include distinct characteristics that indicate a retaliatory theme’ (McDevitt et al, 2002 pg. 306). McDevitt et al’s (2002) four typologies are described below: • Thrill seekers – who commit hate crime offences for the thrill and excitement. Thrill seekers chose the target because the offender perceived the victim was in some way significantly different from the offender. Dixon and Court (2003) have suggested that such offenders are influenced by a wider peer group ‘often getting drawn into violence without any regard to the victim.’ In addition ‘they may consider their activities territorial rather than racist’. • Defenders – committed hate crime offences in order to protect the offender’s neighbourhood from outsiders or intruders. Dixon and Court (2003) referred to ‘reactive offenders’ as individuals who were older than thrill seekers who had ‘a sense of grievance and believe that they are acting to protect a perceived threat to their way of life. • Retaliatory offenders – committed hate crime offences in response to a hate crime against themselves or an individual in the group to which the offender belongs. 3 Hate Crime: Delivering a Quality Service, Home Office. http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/crime- victims/reducing-crime/hate-crime/?version=2 (accessed 21 November 2008). 4 • Mission offender – committed hate crimes inspired by a higher order. Dixon and Court (2003) have suggested that such offenders may have mental health problems (David Copeland, the ‘nail bomber’) and includes politically motivated offenders such as right wing or religious extremist activists. Methods The research aims called for a multi method approach to the study. A literature review was conducted to provide a theoretical basis for the research and this assisted in the development of the research instruments used. In order to establish the extent of provision for RMO in the youth justice system, an electronic survey was sent to all YOS and secure establishments (young offender institutions, local authority secure children’s homes and secure training centres). A purposive sample of responding YOS teams and establishments were then visited and interviews conducted with practitioners. Interviews with a sample of young people who had been subject to an intervention for RMO, were also undertaken. To assess the extent of RMO a variety of data sources were used. Firstly, the YJB provided the research team with aggregate THEMIS data (information system used by YOS teams) for the period 2002/3 to 2006/7 for the 157 YOS teams in England and Wales. The THEMIS database is based on the quarterly returns which each YOS team provides to the YJB. Among other variables it contains information about the characteristics of young people (aged 10 to 17) referred to YOS teams for racially motivated offences, including those who were sentenced to custody. THEMIS data are collected at the offence level and not the individual level. The data supplied to us were complete, with no missing data in terms of age or sanction received, while ethnicity of the offender was recorded in over 90 per cent of cases. These data were analysed and we formulated an assessment of trends and the prevalence of (detected) RMO among young people. However, it should be noted that the THEMIS data relate only to young people referred to YOS teams for racially motivated offending – who inevitably represent a small proportion of the total quantity of such offences. We therefore, placed the THEMIS data in a wider context by examining a range of other datasets including the Offending, Crime and Justice Survey (OCJS) (2005) and data from the Ministry of Justice, as well as British Crime Survey data and official police statistics. It should be noted that these datasets are not directly comparable; firstly because they do not all deal with the same age range, and secondly, because the nature of what is captured evidently varies between victimisation surveys, self reported offending surveys and police figures. It should also be remembered that racially or religiously aggravated offences cannot be identified separately in police recorded crime data, THEMIS, OCJS or the BCS datasets. Young People and RMO As a victimisation survey, it is not surprising that the British Crime Survey (BCS) generates by far the highest estimate of RMO, indicating that there were 179,000 racially motivated incidents in England and Wales in 2005 (Home Office, 2006: 9). The BCS estimate is substantially higher than the number of racially motivated incidents recorded by the police (57,902) and this suggests that over two thirds (67.6%) of racially motivated incidents are never reported to the police. When one considers the number of incidents which the police recorded as racially motivated offences in 2004/5 (37,028) there is still further attrition (Home Office, 2006: 10). In other words over one third (36%) of incidents which the victim perceived to be racially motivated and reported to the police, did not achieve the evidentiary threshold required to be recorded as a racially motivated offence. 5 This paper is concerned with racially motivated offending by young people. BCS and police incident data do not allow us to determine what proportion of incidents were committed by 10-17 year olds but analysis of YJB 2004/05 THEMIS data enable us to determine the proportion of offences which resulted in a sanction. The YJB’s THEMIS data for the year 2004/5 indicate that there were 1864 racially motivated offences committed by young people which resulted in the referral of a young person to a YOS team. This is slightly higher than the Home Office figures (1743) which relate to the number of young offenders who were prosecuted or cautioned for a RMO in 2004/5 (Home Office, 2006). The discrepancy is due to the fact that a young person may be sanctioned for more than one racially motivated offence at one sanctioning occasion. The Home Office figures indicate that young people accounted for 24 per cent of the 7,276 people cautioned or prosecuted for RMO. The 2005 Offending, Crime and Justice Survey (OCJS) found that the proportion of 10-25 year-olds who said they had physically attacked someone because of their skin colour, race or religion in the last 12 months (racially/religiously motivated assault) was less than one per cent (the same proportion found in the preceding 2004 survey). This was also the first time that racially/religiously motivated attacks and abuse were asked about separately. The OCJS survey also measured anti social behaviour (ASB), with one of the four components focusing on racial or religious offending: being ‘threatening or being rude to someone because of their race or religion’ (racially/religiously motivated abuse). The survey found its occurrence relatively rare, accounting for only two per cent of their sample, again a similar proportion to that found in the 2004 OCJS (Budd et al., 2005). Respondents in the survey were asked how often they had committed each of the racially/religiously motivated anti-social behaviours within the last 12 months. The majority (56%) of those who had, had committed the offence once or twice in the last 12 months, while 18 per cent had committed three or four offences, and ten per cent between five and ten. There was a significant minority (16%) who reported committing racial/religious abuse more than ten times in the year. The mean age for committing racial/religious abuse was 17. Trends in youth racially motivated offending With the exception of (2006/7) figures, the British Crime Survey (BCS) has shown a downward trend in racist victimisation in recent years, in line with experiences of crime more generally. According to BCS estimates the number of racially motivated incidents (as experienced by victims) was around 206,000 in 2002/03 and 2003/04. The following two years saw substantial decreases (Jansson, 2006). In 2004/05 there were an estimated 179,000 incidents (13% decrease), and by 2005/06 around 139,000 – an overall decrease since 2002 of almost one third (32.5%). However, BCS figures indicate that this decline has been reversed; there was a substantial increase (32%) in the number of incidents in 2006/7 (184,000) compared to the previous year (Jansson et al, 2007: 7). Over the five year period as a whole, the number of incidents declined by 10.7 per cent. Therefore after a period of declining racist victimisation (in line with the declining crime rates more generally) there was a significant increase in 2006/7 in the number of such incidents. Looking at THEMIS and police data over the five year period 2002-07, it is apparent that there is a diverging trend between the two data sources, with racially motivated offending by young people increasing proportionately faster than for all age groups as recorded by the police. Overall there has been a near doubling (94% increase) in the number of offences of RMO resulting in young people being referred to a YOS team, while over the same period there was an increase of just 39 per cent in RMO offences recorded by the police (all age groups). The reasons for this are not apparent, although part of the explanation will lie in the 6 fact that the two data sources deal with different age groups. Of course, it should also be noted that the absolute number of offences resulting in a referral to a YOS team is considerably smaller than the number of RMO offences recorded by the police. Thus, over the five years for which data are available, the number of RMO offences resulting in referral to a YOS team rose from 1392 in 2002/3 to 2701 by 2006/7. It is interesting that the trends in BCS figures (declining, with the exception of 2006/7 figures) and police and THEMIS data (increasing) are in opposite directions. What this suggests is that while overall victimisation appears to be falling, reporting and recording rates seem to have increased, as have the chances of young perpetrators being detected and referred to a YOS team. Findings from the surveys undertaken with each YOS team and secure establishment in England and Wales would suggest that practitioners do not on the whole believe RMO to be a significant problem. Just 18 per cent of the combined YOS and secure estate respondents believed that racially motivated offending was a significant issue in their YOS team area / secure establishment. Among responding institutions, a total of 1599 RMOs had been referred over the past twelve months, an average of just over 14 offenders per organisation. These figures are very close to the THEMIS data which suggest that the 157 YOS teams dealt with around 2700 cases of RMO in 2006/7, an average of 17 per team. The figures present a confused picture, RMO is by no means a volume crime – the proportion of offences that YOS teams dealt with that were accounted for by RMO averaged around one per cent. Our findings cannot explain the discrepancy in trends between the different data sources but nevertheless it is an important finding and one which warrants further investigation not least by those responsible for the policing and sentencing of offenders. Ethnicity, offending and victimisation A striking finding to emerge from the BCS survey is in relation to victims’ perceptions of the ethnicity of offenders, where this was known. This shows that while white offenders comprised the largest single group identified, they were not in a majority (43%), and victims believed that in 34 per cent of cases the offenders were Asian, and, in 29 per cent, black (Jansson, 2006). These findings are in stark contrast to the YJB’s THEMIS data for young people which demonstrate that the overwhelming majority of racially motivated offenders that YOS teams dealt with were classified as white (nearly 87%). This dwarfs all the other ethnic categories, which together accounted for just 10.7 per cent of offenders (in the BCS this figure was 65%). Within the YOS data for black and minority ethnic (BME) offenders, black offenders accounted for 4.5 per cent of referrals, and Asian offenders for 3.4 per cent. The question arises as to the reason for the apparent discrepancy between the BCS and THEMIS regarding the ethnicity of offenders. Of course it should be emphasized that the BCS details victim’s perceptions of the ethnicity of the offender (of all ages, and only when this is known), whilst the THEMIS data records the actual ethnicity of detected 10-17 year old perpetrators. Furthermore, the BCS covers only the experiences of those aged 17 and above, while THEMIS data relates to those aged 10-17. Given the significance of this finding (discussed below), it is worth exploring the data in more detail. Firstly, evidence from the BCS and other sources shows that offending and 7 victimisation is a complicated picture. Racially motivated crime can be committed by, and against, any ethnic group. The table presents some reanalysis of figures from the BCS report (Jannson, 2006) and combines this with census data on the ethnic make up of the population to try to shed some light on the interaction between RMO and ethnicity. Table 1 Ethnicity of victims of RM offences 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Ethnicity No. of offences experienced % of RMO offences No. in population (E&W) Rate of RMO experienced per 1000 population % of RMO offences committed No. of RMO offences committed Rate of offending per 1000 population** White 92,200 51.4% 48,072,000 1.9 43 77,099 1.6 Asian 51,100 28.5% 2,134,000 23.9 34 60,962 28.6 Black 16,000 8.9% 1,194,000 13.4 29 51,997 43.5 Mixed and other 20,000 11.2% 906,000 22.1 2 3,586 4.0 Total 179,300 100.0 52,426,000 3.4 108* - - *Percentages sum to more than one hundred because more than one offender could be involved, and in some cases may be from different ethnic groups. ** Based on BCS estimates. As can be seen, the second and third columns present data already discussed above, which show that white people experienced the majority of RMOs, followed by Asian, mixed race and other groups. Given that white people account for around 91 per cent of the total population of England and Wales 4 it is not surprising that they also experienced the largest number of RMOs. In order to calculate the risk of victimisation one needs to take into account the size of the various ethnic groups, and this is shown in columns four and five. It can be seen that the majority white population has a low risk of being victimised – around two offences per 1000 people. By contrast, Asians and mixed and other groups experience over 20 RMOs per 1000 population. In other words, according to the BCS, people from ethnic minorities experience far higher levels of RMO than do white people. Some of the RMOs experienced by people from one ethnic group could have been committed by people from the same broad ethnic group. The crude categorisations of white, black and Asian can hide ethnic differences, such as black (Somali) on black (Nigerian), Asian (Pakistani) or Asian (Indian) or white (English) on white (Polish) racially motivated crimes. The data do not allow us to determine what proportion of such offences occurred within these broad ethnic groups. However, we start with the reasonable assumption (and it is only an assumption) that most racially motivated crime will be between rather than within these broad categories. Based on this assumption one could therefore hypothesise that most of the 92,000 RMOs experienced by white people were committed by people from Asian, black, mixed or other ethnic groups, and that most of the 51,100 RMOs experienced by Asians were committed by offenders from white, black or other ethnic groups, and so on. This means that since most RMOs were committed against white people, most of the offenders are likely to be from non-white ethnic groups. This hypothesis receives support from the victim reports of offender ethnicity noted above and in column six of table 1, which shows that 57 per cent of RMOs were said by victims to have been conducted by a non- white offender. As with our earlier calculation of risk of victimisation, we can also estimate the ‘risk of offending’. This is done firstly by apportioning the RMOs experienced by BCS respondents according to the ethnicity of the offender where known (column seven). This 4 http://www.statistics.gov.uk/STATBASE/Expodata/Spreadsheets/D5984.xls (accessed 21 November 2008). 8 gives an estimate of 77,099 (43% of the 179,300 RMO offences) for whites and 60,962 for Asians and so on. We can then divide the number of offences committed by each ethnic group by the number of people in that group to arrive at a risk of offending (column eight). This shows that white people were by far the least likely to commit RMO (2 per thousand), while the black and Asian groups were most likely to offend (over 30 per 1000). These estimates seem to show that ethnic minorities (at least the broadly defined Asian and black groups) are both most at risk of being victims of RMO and most likely to commit it. Again, the available data do not provide an explanation as to why this might be the case. One possible explanation lies in the notion of retaliation, which has been proposed in the literature as one of the causal factors in RMO (e.g. McDevitt et al, 2002). According to this, a (hate) crime is committed in response to a (hate) crime against themselves or an individual in the group to which the offender belongs. Data we collected suggested that while retaliation was an important concern, the extent to which this was linked explicitly to race was overstated. Offending in some of the YOS teams we visited (primarily in the North of England) appeared to be fairly evenly split between white and Asian youths and retaliatory in nature, with attacks by whites on Asians followed by attacks on whites by Asians and so on. However, interviews with some of the young people indicated that the motivations for such attacks were not primarily racial, but rather gang related. As gangs tend to be linked to location (e.g. postcode gangs) and young people in these cities lived in highly ethnically segregated areas, gangs tended to be either white or Asian. The traditional model of racist offending, which is generally portrayed in terms of a problem of powerful white offenders and vulnerable BME victims, did not reflect the reality as they saw it. It was interesting that a number of young people described fights or other incidents with other young people from different ethnic groups in terms of territory or respect rather than race, as the following exchange with an Asian offender illustrates: Interviewer: You said you didn’t have a problem with race, it was about how they looked at you. Basically, I didn’t have a problem with race. My fights were just with people looking at me. But obviously some fights we used to fight in groups. Different area [post] codes and all that. Would that be based on race? No, no. we used to fight some Asians from [estate], it’s areas innit? What’s that about, why do you fight people in other areas? Is it about defending territory? No, it’s like if one my boys got in trouble with someone else from a different crew, obviously he’s going to bring his people down, and my boys are going to bring my people down, so from there, it becomes bigger and bigger. Is it about retaliation, respect, what is the reason? Respect really. If it is indeed the case that offending between young people from different ethnic groups is fairly evenly split (and moreover often motivated by more by territory or retaliation rather than racism per se), why is it that the large majority of young people referred to YOS teams for RMO are white? Firstly, it may be that white victims of RMO are much less likely than other ethnic groups to report such incidents to the police, thus reducing the chances that black or Asian offenders are detected by the police and subsequently sanctioned. This may be because victims thought the offence would not be taken seriously, or were unaware the definition of racially motivated offending included offences against white people. In fact, one of our YOS practitioner interviewees believed this to be the case, saying that he had found that young white males were much less likely to consider reporting racially motivated offending committed against them, in part because they believed that because they were white, the offences could not be defined as racially motivated: 9 One of the biggest problems at that time was you couldn’t get a good reflection because a lot of the white kids were attacked by Asian youths, and they got beaten up, and the white youths would not report it, and we started looking into it, they could not conceptualise that a white person could face racism, it was difficult for them to accept it. They didn’t want that tag of racially motivated offence, they just got attacked by some Asians. Geographical trends in racially motivated offending Regional patterns of RMO were analysed by allocating each YOS team in England and Wales into one of the government’s ten regions for regional development agencies (nine in England, and one for Wales). 5 The frequency of racially motivated offending was analysed by these ten regions throughout England and Wales over the five year data period in order to establish which regions had the highest numbers of RMO. The ten regions were examined using three differing methods: (i) Total RMO by region, (ii) YOS region ranked for RMO by rate of young person population (x 1000) per region (iii) Percentage increase in RMO 2002/3 to 2006/7 by YOS region The overall picture that emerges is the prominence of the North-West and Yorkshire and Humber within the analyses. The North-East shows the highest prevalence when considering the rate of young people living in the region, but figures less prominently when considering increases in RMO over the five year period. It is the North-West and Yorkshire and Humber which display the most consistent measures of prevalence for RMO, irrespective of how it is measured. In fact, there was a noticeable ‘North-South’ split in RMO, with levels in the North generally higher than in the South. It was not possible to determine from the data available to us, the reasons for regional variations in RMO. Further investigation would be needed to determine whether factors such as levels of residential segregation or deprivation were associated with RMO. It could sensibly be argued that if YOS teams in the North of England (the North West particularly) tend to have higher levels of overall RMO then they should be allocated extra resources for interventions to tackle the behaviour and attitudes of young people. We would urge caution with this approach as YOS teams in the ‘top ten’ move in and out of this category with some regularity. It may be that future resources are partially based on regional patterns of RMO. Sanctioning outcomes for the period 2004/05 – 2006/07 The THEMIS data provided to us contained sanctioning 6 outcomes only for the three most recent years of 2004/5 to 2006/7. Sanctioning outcomes across the three years of available data were aggregated and examined for all 157 YOS teams. The following table presents the percentage accounted for by each of the main sanctions, over the three year period. 5 See: http://www.yjb.gov.uk/en-gb/yjs/YouthOffendingTeams/ContactDetails.htm 6 The term sanction is used in preference to sentence, as some of the disposals (final warnings, reprimands) are not court sentences, but police disposals. 10 Table 2 Disposals for RMOs 2004/5 to 2006/7 Sanction 2004/5 2005/6 2006/7 Reprimand 13.1 17.0 16.6 FW (no intervention) 3.0 3.3 6.2 FW (with intervention) 12.9 13.4 12.0 Total pre court disposals 29.0 33.7 34.8 Conditional or absolute discharge 4.7 4.3 4.8 Bind over 1.6 0.5 0.4 Fine / compensation order 3.1 3.3 3.6 Referral 27.6 26.0 24.5 Reparation 2.5 2.6 3.7 Attendance Centre Order 2.3 1.5 2.2 Action Plan Order 5.1 5.9 5.7 Supervision Order 12.1 11.8 10.4 Community Rehabilitation Order 2.8 2.0 2.1 Community Punishment Order 3.0 2.9 1.9 Other* 2.2 1.7 3.1 Detention and Training Order and other custodial* 4.2 4.1 2.9 *Includes DTTO, CPRO and Curfew **S90-1 and S226-8 custody. As can be seen, only a few of the sanctions were used with any regularity. For example, in 2006/7 just five sanctions were used in more than five per cent of cases; these were reprimands, final warnings with intervention, referral orders, action plan orders and supervision orders. Pre court disposals – reprimands and final warnings – accounted for around one third of all sanctions, and their use increased over the period from 29 per cent to just under 35 per cent. It is interesting to note that the use of Final Warnings without interventions doubled over the period to account for six per cent of sanctions. If one considers also that most reprimands are unlikely to receive any YOS intervention, then this means that around one fifth of racially motivated offenders probably received no intervention designed to challenge their offending. The most common single disposal was the referral order, which in 2006/7 accounted for just under a quarter (24.5%) of all sanctions. The only other court order which was used with any regularity was the supervision order, in around ten per cent of cases. The remaining eight different community disposals are clustered with none accounting for more than six per cent of total disposals. Custodial sentences for racially motivated offences were quite rare (around 3-4%). If one compares sanctions for racially motivated offences to sanctions for all offences, it is clear that racially motivated offences are treated on the whole more harshly. For example, in 2005/6, almost half (44.5%) of sanctions for all offences were pre-court, compared to 33.7 per cent for RMOs in the same year. Conversely, those charged with racially motivated offences were far more likely to receive a referral order (26.0% against 13.4%) or supervision order (11.8% against 6.7%) than offenders generally (Youth Justice Board, 2006: 16). The variety of disposals received for RMO has implications for the nature of any intervention which could be carried out with young people. For example, most of those on action plan and referral orders are likely to be in contact with the YOS for no more than three months, while those on supervision orders may have a much longer involvement. Any intervention for racially motivated offenders would need to be sufficiently flexible to be able to deal with these variations in length of contact. 11 Conclusion One of the key issues to emerge from this study is the contrasting picture from the different data sets. In summary, the evidence from the British Crime Survey (BCS) shows that the level of racist victimisation fell (until 2006/7 at least) in line with the crime rate overall over the past few years but at the same time, police recorded racist incidents and racially aggravated offences increased, as did offences dealt with by YOS teams. Indeed, these saw some of the sharpest increases in prevalence, although absolute numbers remained small compared to overall racially motivated incidents. The central question remains; is the increase in the number of offences dealt with by YOS teams the result of a recording or reporting phenomenon, or, alternatively, are we witnessing a genuine increase in the number of racially and religiously motivated offences in England and Wales? Docking and Tuffin’s (2005) research examining the progress in the handling of racist incidents since the Lawrence enquiry and the subsequent introduction of the Home Office’s ‘Code of Practice on Reporting and Recording Racist Incidents’ concluded that the sharp rise in police recorded incidents coincided with the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry, and was sustained after the ‘Code of Practice on Reporting and Recording Racist Incidents’ was published in 2000. Furthermore, evidence from 1999 suggests that whilst victimisation fell, a higher proportion of incidents were reported to the police (Clancy et al., 2001). Indeed, rates of reporting victimisation to the police have increased compared to 1995, for both white and BME respondents, although there have been sharper rises for BME victims (28 to 40 per cent) compared to white victims (54 to 61 per cent). These different rates of improvement appear to demonstrate an increased willingness on the part of BME victims to report incidents, and perhaps reflect the success of the Lawrence Inquiry and the Code in encouraging reporting by agencies and community groups as Docking and Tuffin (2005) argue. This pattern of increased reporting (especially by traditionally victimised groups) and recording by agencies could explain at least part of the substantial increase in racially motivated offending by young people as reflected in the THEMIS data. However, whether this explains the full extent of the increase remains an open question. Could this response also have been facilitated by the government's guidance as to the definition of a racist incident as '…any incident which is viewed as racist by the victim or any other person'. This leaves it open to the police, or other agency, to ascribe a racial motive to an offence, even where the victim and offender believe this not to be the case. This could easily lend itself to the misidentification of offences and subsequent inappropriate conviction of suspects. The label of racially motivated offender is not one which should be applied lightly, and where it is applied incorrectly, it risks alienating the offender and encouraging the very behaviour one is trying to change. On a practical level for YOS team practitioners, these findings have implications for the provision of interventions to tackle RMO. The results of our study have demonstrated that YOS teams are dealing with a sharp increase in the number of young people referred to them for RMO but this does not necessarily mean that YOS teams have effective and appropriate programmes with which to address young people’s behaviour. The authors address these issues in a forthcoming paper entitled ‘Current Responses to Youth Racially Motivated Offending’. It was found that there is little to guide those developing programmes for RMOs and that there is a genuine gap in provision of training for practitioners around the assessment of racially motivated offending, and the design and delivery of appropriate interventions. 12 The issues raised in this paper highlight the pressing need for further investigation into the legislation and practice around racially motivated offending, specifically into how offences are experienced and reported by victims and how they are recorded and investigated by the police and prosecuted by the CPS. References Barclay, G. and Tavares, C. (1999) Digest 4 – Information on the Criminal Justice System in England and Wales London: Home Office. Bowling, B. (1998) Violent Racism: Victimisation, Policing and Social Context. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Budd, T., Sharpe, C., Weir, G., Wilson, D. and Owen, N. (2005) Young People and Crime: Findings from the 2004 Offending, Crime and Justice Survey Home Office Statistical Bulletin 20/05. London: Home Office. Burrows, J., Tarling, R., Mackie, A., Lewis, R. and Taylor, G. (2004) Review of Police Forces’ Crime Recording Practices Home Office Research Study 204. London: Home Office. Clancy, A., Hough, M., Aust, R. and Kershaw, C. (2001) Crime, Policing and Justice: The Experience of Ethnic Minorities. Findings from the 2000 British Crime Survey. London: Home Office. Coleman, C. and Moynihan, J. (1996) Understanding Crime Data. Buckingham: Open University Press. Dixon, L. and Ray, L. (2007) ‘Current Issues and Developments in Race Hate Crime’, The Journal of Community and Criminal Justice 54(2):109-124. Dixon, L. and Court, D. (2003) ‘Developing Good Practice with Racially Motivated Offenders’, Probation Journal 50(2): 149-153. Docking, M. and Tuffin, R. (2005) Racist Incidents: Progress since the Lawrence Inquiry Home Office Online Report 42/05 available at: http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs05/rdsolr4205.pdf Home Office (2006) Statistics on Race and the Criminal Justice System 2005: A Publication under S95 of the Criminal Justice Act 1991. London: Home Office. Jansson, K,. Budd, S., Lovbakke, J., Moley, S. and Thorpe, K. (2007) Attitudes, Perceptions and Risks of Crime: Supplementary Volume 1 to Crime in England and Wales 2006/07 Home Office Statistical Bulletin 19/07 London: Home Office. Available online at: http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs07/hosb1907.pdf Jansson, K (2006) Black and Minority Ethnic groups’ experiences and perceptions of crime, racially motivated crime and the police: findings from the 2004/05 British Crime Survey, Home Office Online Report 25/06 http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs06/rdsolr2506.pdf Levin, J. and McDevitt, J. (1993) Hate Crimes: The Rising Tide of Bigotry and Bloodshed. New York: Plenum 13 Macpherson, W. (1999) The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry. Cm 4262-I. London: The Stationery Office. McDevitt, J., Levin, J., and Bennett, S. (2002) ‘Hate Crime Offenders: An Expanded Typology’, Journal of Social Issues 58(2):303-317. Nicholas, S. Kershaw, C. and Walker, A. (2007) Crime in England and Wales, Home Office Statistical Bulletin (4 th Ed.) London: Home Office. Available online at: http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs07/hosb1107.pdf Simmons, J., Legg, C. and Hosking, R. (2003) National Crime Recording Standard (NCRS): An Analysis of the Impact on Recorded Crime Home Office Online Report 31/03 available at: http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs2/rdsolr3103.pdf Wilcox, A., Christmann, K., Monchuk, L., Smithson, H and Wong, K. (2008) The Prevalence of Racially Motivated Offending and the Provision of Targeted Interventions Report to the Youth Justice Board. Youth Justice Board (2006) Youth Justice Annual Statistics 2005/06 London: YJB. Available online at: http://www.yjb.gov.uk/Publications/Resources/Downloads/Youth%20Justice%20Annual%20S tatistics%202005-06.pdf 
work_2coqogo6xnfojojhhrtewdymba	----	S205442511700022Xjra 1..20 POLICY AND SYSTEMS REVIEW Mental health service user experiences of targeted violence and hostility and help-seeking in the UK: a scoping review Sarah Carr*, Jessica Holley, Trish Hafford-Letchfield, Alison Faulkner, Dorothy Gould, Christine Khisa and Claudia Megele Department of Mental Health, Social Work and Integrative Medicine, Middlesex University London, Hendon Campus, The Burroughs, London NW4 4BT, UK Global Mental Health (2017), 4, e25, page 1 of 20. doi:10.1017/gmh.2017.22 Background. The aim of this research scoping review was to assemble an evidence base for the UK on mental health service user experiences and perspectives on mental health-related targeted violence and hostility (‘disability hate crime’). It also aims to address some of the gaps in the knowledge on risk management, help-seeking and prevention from the perspectives of those who experienced targeted violence and hostility because of their mental health problems or psychiatric status. Methods. Seven key mental health and social care bibliographic databases were searched for relevant UK research stud- ies from 1990 until 2016. Grey literature was identified through online searches. A scoping review charting approach and thematic analysis methodology were used to analyse the studies. Results. In total 13 studies were finally included, over half of which used survey methods. All studies included people with experiences of mental health problems. The studies provide information on: the types of potential hate crime; indi- cate where incidents take place; give some insight into the victims’ relationship with the perpetrators; the location of inci- dents as well as the psychological, social, financial and physical impacts on the victim; the types of help-seeking behaviours adopted by the victims; a range coping strategies that people with mental health problems adopted in response to experiences of targeted violence or abuse. Conclusion. This scoping review provides a UK-based overview of mental health service user concepts and experiences of mental health-related targeted violence and hostility (‘disability hate crime’). It reveals some specific issues relating to mental health and disability hate crime. Further investigation into disability hate crime with a specific focus on mental health is required. This is a UK-based overview, which offers a useful comparator for researchers, practitioners and policy-makers internationally. Received 7 March 2017; Revised 24 July 2017; Accepted 3 October 2017 Key words: Disability hate crime, interpersonal violence, mental health service user experience, mental health policy and systems, targeted violence and abuse, UK. Introduction While always an issue of concern, particularly since deinstitutionalization in the UK (Thornicroft, 2006), violence, hostility and discrimination against people with mental health problems have been increasing in * Address for correspondence: Dr Sarah Carr, Department of Mental Health, Social Work and Integrative Medicine, Middlesex University London, Hendon Campus, The Burroughs, London NW4 4BT, UK. (Email: s.carr@mdx.ac.uk) © The Author(s) 2017. This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted reuse, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. global mental health https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/gmh.2017.22 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:25, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at mailto:s.carr@mdx.ac.uk https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/gmh.2017.22 https://www.cambridge.org/core prominence in international research and policy over the last 10 years. One recent study investigating the social effects of the 2008 economic crisis on people with mental health problems in 27 European countries found that ‘times of economic hardship may intensify social exclusion of people with mental health pro- blems’ (Evans-Lacko et al. 2013, p. 1). The UN Human Rights Council’s ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and men- tal health’ is clear that ‘persons with psychosocial dis- abilities continue to be falsely viewed as dangerous, despite clear evidence that they are commonly victims rather than perpetrators of violence’ (UN Human Rights Council, 2017, p. 7). Accordingly, the report recommends that States ‘take policy and legislative measures on the prevention of violence in all environ- ments where people live, study and work’ (UN Human Rights Council, 2017, p. 20). Therefore, vio- lence, hostility and discrimination against people with mental health problems have been prioritised as a human rights issue of global concern. This paper presents a body evidence on the topic from the UK deriving from the scoping review stage of a larger service user researcher-led (Beresford & Croft, 2012) qualitative study set in England entitled: ‘Keeping control: Exploring mental health service user perspectives on targeted violence and hostility in the context of adult safeguarding.’ The study has been designed in the context of State legal and policy reforms in the UK concerning adult safeguarding (DH, 2014). These reforms determine that adult safe- guarding should be less reactive and mechanistic, and more about achieving the best outcomes for the individual concerned and responsive to the person and their specific circumstances. Policy implementa- tion work found that ‘using an asset-based approach to identify a person’s strengths and networks can help them and their family to make difficult decisions and manage complex situations’ (LGA, 2013). In the UK ‘adult safeguarding’ is defined as: ‘working with adults with care and support needs to keep them safe from abuse or neglect. It is an important part of what many public services in the do, and a key respon- sibility of local authorities. Safeguarding is aimed at people with care and support needs who may be in vulnerable circumstances and at risk of abuse or neg- lect. In these cases, local services must work together to spot those at risk and take steps to protect them’ (DH, 2014). Sin et al. (2011) use the term ‘targeted violence and hostility’ against disabled people, which in UK legal terms is categorised as ‘disability hate crime’. In the UK ‘hate crime’ is defined as ‘any criminal offence, which is perceived, by the victim or any other person, to be motivated by a hostility or prejudice based on a personal characteristic.’ (HM Government, 2013). For the purposes of the larger study, the ‘personal character- istic’ is having a mental health problem (also defined as a disability in the UK Equality Act 2010). It is well docu- mented that disabled people, particularly people with mental health problems, are at higher risk of being victims of targeted violence and hostility, although effective evidence-based prevention and protection strategies remain lacking (Emerson & Roulstone, 2014; Mikton et al. 2014). This paper will largely use the terms ‘hate crime’ and ‘targeted violence and abuse’ to describe the incidents reported in the studies, with the acknowledgement that victims may not describe or rec- ognise their experience as a disability/mental health related ‘hate crime’, and professionals may not classify or recognise it as such. The discourses on adult safe- guarding and risk, mental health and ‘disability hate crime’ have appeared to remain largely separate in research, policy and practice, and overall, mental health service user experiences remain under-researched. The larger study, of which is scoping review is an element, aims to address this situation. Scoping review questions and objectives The scoping review addresses the core components of the main study inquiry and builds on the literature review on risk and safeguarding in UK adult social care Mitchell et al. (2012). Among other things, they found that there were a significant gap in the UK pri- mary research evidence on mental health service users’ views and experiences of risk and safeguarding. The main aim is to ‘map rapidly the key concepts underpinning a research area and the main sources and types of evidence available’ for the UK (Arksey & O’Malley, 2005, p. 194). The scoping review research questions focus on what is known from the existing UK literature about the following: a) mental health service user concepts and experiences of mental health-related targeted violence and hos- tility (‘disability hate crime’), risk, prevention and protection b) where mental health service users go to get support if they are frightened, or have been victims of, tar- geted violence and hostility because of their mental health problem or psychiatric status (help-seeking behaviour) c) responses of adult safeguarding agencies, mental health services and other organisations to mental health-related targeted violence and hostility (‘dis- ability hate crime’) against people with mental health problems because of their mental health problem or psychiatric status global mental health https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/gmh.2017.22 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:25, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/gmh.2017.22 https://www.cambridge.org/core d) the key concepts underpinning the literature in the research area and the main sources and types of evidence available e) what and where are the main gaps in the literature The objectives of the scoping review were to: • systematically search for peer-reviewed journal papers and ‘grey literature’ that addresses the key research questions; • assess the types and quality of the included litera- ture (as a determinant of the strength of the reported evidence); • conduct an analysis and thematic synthesis of the lit- erature identified to address the key research ques- tions and to inform the larger research study investigation; • assemble an evidence base on adult safeguarding that focuses on mental health service user experi- ences and perspectives on mental health-related tar- geted violence and hostility, risk management, help-seeking, prevention and protection. Methods The six-stage methodological framework for scoping reviews, as developed by Arksey & O’Malley (2005) and further refined by Levac et al. (2010), was used to conduct and structure the literature review. The six stages are as follows: 1. Identifying the research question 2. Identifying relevant studies 3. Study selection 4. Charting the data 5. Collating, summarising and reporting the results 6. Consultation with expert/stakeholder advisory group Peer-reviewed English language journal papers were identified via the relevant health and social care data- bases available at Middlesex University through a key- word search using terms relating to mental health, adult safeguarding, service users, disability hate crime and targeted violence and hostility. In total, seven databases were searched for the years 1990– 2016: CINAHL; PsycINFO; Medline; Social Care Online; Emerald; BNI; Cochrane reviews. Searches for English language ‘grey literature’ was also conducted via online searches (Summon, Google Scholar, Open Grey, relevant UK government websites and organisational websites such as Mind, Mental Health Foundation, Shaping Our Lives, National Survivor User Network, Joseph Rowntree Foundation, Victim Support, SPRU, NIHR SSCR, Disability Archive UK, SCIE, EHRC, BASW), contact with topic experts, key organisations and via team and advisory group member networks. Hand searching of key journals (i.e. The Journal of Adult Protection) and examinations of article reference lists (particularly previous literature reviews) was undertaken. The search strategy included both primary and sec- ondary search terms (see Box 1: Primary research terms). Inclusion and exclusion criteria were used to elimin- ate studies that did not answer the research question and to ensure a consistent approach between scoping team members (see Box 2: Inclusion and exclusion cri- teria). Rather than adhering to a hierarchy of evidence approach, based on methodology, we included empirical studies (quantitative and qualitative) most likely to answer our research question (Aveyard, 2007). However, the methodological quality of included stud- ies was assessed by their using appropriate critical appraisal (CASP) checklists, which are series of ques- tions designed to help reviewers interrogate the quality and reliability of various types of health and social care research, including qualitative studies (CASP, no date). The study data were synthesised according to the scoping review ‘charting’ approach developed by Arksey & O’Malley (2005). Their ‘data charting form’ the following key information was recorded about each study (see Table 1: Data charting form and numerical in-text reference key), including: • Author(s), year of publication, study location • Intervention type, and comparator (if any); duration of the intervention • Study populations Box 1. Primary search terms In order to search for mental health service users’ experi- ences of hate-crime, targeted violence and hostility the fol- lowing search terms were used: mental* OR mad* OR psychiatr* OR disab AND service user OR survivor OR consumer OR client OR expert by experience OR lived exper* OR patient AND views OR experience OR perspectives OR narratives AND violence OR abuse OR hate crime OR hostil* OR danger* OR risk* OR victim* OR crime OR bully* OR harass* Secondary search terms In the context of the searches retrieved through the pri- mary search terms mental health service users’ help- seeking behaviours and their experiences of support and safeguarding were searched for using the following search terms: adult safeguard OR vulnerable adult* OR protect* OR safe* OR prevent* OR peer support OR resilience* OR coping OR help* OR managing OR protect* OR support global mental health https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/gmh.2017.22 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:25, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/gmh.2017.22 https://www.cambridge.org/core • Aims of the study • Methodology • Key findings or important results A final column was added to the table in order to make additional comments or notes on the included studies (not included in Table 1). A basic thematic analysis approach (Braun & Clarke, 2006) was used in order to identify, analyse and report patterns (or themes) that ran between the findings of the 13 finally included studies. The key stages in the thematic analysis were as follows: 1. Becoming familiar with the data. 2. Generating initial codes. 3. Searching for themes. 4. Reviewing themes. 5. Defining and naming themes. 6. Producing the report. Using the data charting table, an initial list of key findings from each of the included studies was created. These key findings were grouped and merged together in order to develop a list of themes and sub-themes that mapped on to the scoping review’s key research questions and objectives. The findings sections of each of the 13 original papers were re-checked in order to ensure that extracts of data reported on the findings had not been missed thus further refining the emergent themes and sub-themes. In order to avoid potential bias and subjective decision-making, the papers were re-read by another research team member in order to check whether the first reviewers’ interpretations or conclusions drawn from the included studies’ findings were aligned to the data presented in the original studies. The two reviewers were largely in agreement, and where there was some discrepancy in opinion, the differences were discussed and a mutually agreed position reached. Findings Search results The database, grey literature and previous relevant litera- ture review searches yielded a total of 2774 papers, redu- cing to 2671 after duplicates were removed. A total of 2634 articles were excluded as they did not meet inclusion. A total of 37 full-text copies were obtained and 13 relevant papers were finally included in the final scoping review (see Fig. 1: PRISMA flow diagram). The studies are numerically referenced in the text. The numbers and corresponding references are detailed in Table 1: Data charting form and numerical in-text reference key. Seven out of the 13 studies included in the review explicitly focused on mental health service users’ experiences of hate-crime and targeted harassment, abuse, violence or victimisation (e.g. 1, 7, 2, 11, 13, 8, 5). In the six remaining studies, experiences of targeted violence or abuse were implicit within the wider stud- ies aims and objectives. For example, three studies explored services users’ perceptions, experiences and involvement in risk management (6, 3, 10), two studies explored quality of life and social inclusion whilst liv- ing in the community (5, 12), one study explored experiences of discrimination (9) and one study explored experiences and perceptions of healthcare (4). Over half of the included studies used survey methods (1, 2, 5, 7, 8, 9, 13). With the exception of one study, these studies employed mixed methods approaches by using a variety of qualitative methods alongside the survey data including, open-ended questions (9), focus groups (7), semi-structured interviews (1, 8, 2, 5) and field diaries (2). The remaining six studies employed a qualitative methodology using either semi-structured (10, 11) or in-depth interviews (4, 3, 6, 12). One study also con- ducted follow up in-depth interviews (6). Box 2. Inclusion and exclusion criteria Inclusion criteria a) Empirical studies conducted in the UK published in peer reviewed journals addressing the areas in the key research questions that have adults (18–65) and/or older people (65+) with mental health problems in their population. b) Systematic reviews and other research reviews pub- lished in peer reviewed journals (or peer reviewed for- mats such as Cochrane or Campbell) addressing the areas in the key research questions that have adults (18–65) and/or older people (65+) with mental health problems in their population. c) Conference papers addressing the areas in the key research questions published in peer reviewed journals or as ‘grey literature’ conference proceedings. d) Mental health service user and survivor research addressing the areas in the key research questions pub- lished in peer reviewed journals or as ‘grey literature’. e) Research reports or research reviews from key organi- sations working in the areas of mental health, hate crime and adult safeguarding, including user-led orga- nisations and initiatives and voluntary and community sector organisations. f) Individual narratives that do not use a recognised qualitative method. g) English language publications. h) Material published between 1990 and 2016. Exclusion criteria a) Duplications. b) Non-UK studies. c) Studies that do not include mental health service user experiences. d) Studies concerning children and young people (0–18). e) Studies concerning dementia or brain injury. f) Commentary pieces. g) Policy and guidance documents. global mental health https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/gmh.2017.22 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:25, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/gmh.2017.22 https://www.cambridge.org/core Table 1. Data charting form and numerical in-text reference key Reference Study aims Setting and study population Methodology Key findings 1. Berzins et al. (2003) To measure levels and experience of harassment experienced by people with mental health problems in the community in Scotland and compare them with the general population. Community mental health teams. Sampled from four main areas: cities, towns, peripheral housing estates and scattered rural settlements. People with severe and enduring mental health problems between 25 and 65 years old (people with dementia and homeless people were excluded). In the general population those who has been in contact with mental health services within the past 10 years were excluded. Mixed methods study (collected quantitative and qualitative data in interview). Purposive sample of mental health group on basis of sampling criteria, matched GP group on the basis of criteria. Face to face structured interview to explore experiences of harassment. Allowance of less-structured responses to explore incidence in more depth. Interview schedules developed through focus groups involving service users from voluntary and statutory services. Information gathered on what harassment consisted of, where it took place, who committed it, why it was felt to be occurring and what impact it had upon them. Comparisons between quant data analysed using chi-squared test, qualitative data analysed using Nudist software. Participants: 330 people interviewed (165 people with mental health problems and 165 from general population). Detailed demographics included in paper (age, gender, ethnicity, employment status, living status). Findings: 60% of people with mental health problems experienced harassment compared to 44% from general public. (p = 0.004). Age had significant influence on whether people with mental health problems experienced harassment (not case for general public). Significant relationship between harassment and both groups who lived in local authority accommodation. Features of harassment: verbal abuse most common (those with mental health problems having problems exposed); unwanted interference including false accusation to LA’s and telephone calls. Other features included physical threats and actual assaults on occasion. Who was committing it: teenagers and neighbours most common across both groups. Teenagers particularly under influence of parents and peers when verbally abusing people with mental health problems. 21% of people with mental health problems experienced harassment from family whereas none from general public reported from family. This harassment was due to being taken advantage of for welfare benefits or medication. Also called names due to mental health problems. Reasons being harassed: substantial differences. Majority of people with mental problems thought it was because of mental health problems. General public saw it as fulfilling need of harasser (get money or something to do). Reporting harassment: 71% general public reported to police compared to 43% of people with mental health problems. Mental health problems fear will not be taken seriously. Not wanting contact due to negative experiences in past (if under the Mental Health Act 1983). Majority in both groups reported to more than one agency. Mental health group to medical/support staff. Majority in both groups said reporting made no difference. Strategies to stop harassment: 46% mental health group took no action; 30% people from mental health group had moved house whilst 16% tried to reason with harasser. Impact: almost all mental health group referred to adverse effect it had upon their mental health. Half of GP group also experienced adverse effect on mental health. Mental health group more likely to report fear compared to GP group who were annoyed. Prevention: both groups reported education (about mental health problems or of the impact of anti-social behaviour). g lo b a lm e n ta lh e a lth h ttp s://w w w .cam b rid g e.o rg /co re/term s. h ttp s://d o i.o rg /10.1017/g m h .2017.22 D o w n lo ad ed fro m h ttp s://w w w .cam b rid g e.o rg /co re. C arn eg ie M ello n U n iversity, o n 06 A p r 2021 at 01:18:25, su b ject to th e C am b rid g e C o re term s o f u se, availab le at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/gmh.2017.22 https://www.cambridge.org/core Table 1. (cont.) Reference Study aims Setting and study population Methodology Key findings 2. Chakraborti et al. (2014) To examine people’s experiences of hate, prejudice and targeted hostility; to understand the physical and emotional harms suffered by individuals and their families; and to identify ways of improving the quality of support available to victims. People over the age of 16 who had experienced hate crime. Mixed methods approach. Online and hard-copy surveys (translate into eight different languages). In-depth, semi-structured face-to-face interviews. Personal and reflective researcher field diary observations. Participants: 1106 questionnaires were completed by people over the age of 16. In total134 people identified as disabled from sample of which 28% (37) were targeted because of mental ill-health. 374 victims were interviewed (no idea of number who had mental ill-health). The profile of research participants was extremely diverse in terms of age, gender identity, ethnicity, refugee and asylum status, religion, sexuality and disability. Key findings: 46% of those victimised because of their mental ill-health stated that being a victim of targeted hostility had made them feel suicidal, and 41% had turned to alcohol. 88% of respondents victimised because of their mental ill-health, physical disabilities or learning disabilities were very concerned about becoming a victim of violent crime in the future. 72% of people who reported ill mental health were more likely to feel vulnerable after hate crime committed as opposed to overall sample. Also more likely to feel suicidal after hate crime. Those who were from ethnic minority groups experienced hostility from those who shared same ethnicity or faith as them. This was due to particular identity markers and form of difference. Poor level of support from police was commonly reported because of who they were. Those with a disability (non-mental health specific) were more likely to report crime to other supports i.e. Social workers, nurse or doctor, housing association. 3. Faulkner. (2012) Giving voice to service users’ fears and concerns about risk Identify additional risks to those commonly identified by professionals and policy-makers Explore differences in perceptions of risks and rights between service users and professionals Community. Qualitative research. Sampling: A selection of people through networking programme manager and the author. Individual interviews. Participants: 17 people include disabled people, older people, people with learning difficulties and people with mental health problems. By observation only, the majority may be described as white British. Two people were Black African Caribbean. Risk of abuse: current awareness of accusations directed at disabled people being ‘benefits scroungers’ or as ‘faking it’. Heightened risk of taking part in community because of hate crime. People with learning difficulties are at particular risk of bullying and abuse in the community. Fear of institutional and interpersonal abuse: mainly within residential settings. Unpleasant treatment, a constant weighing up process as to whether they should speak up about their rights out of fear and who are consequently not receiving the care that is right (e.g. in residential care keeps money that they are entitled to, not getting choice on what you buy, fear of asserting your rights and consequences if you do). 4. Kai & Crosland. (2001)51 To explore experiences and perceptions of healthcare of people Four general practices (referring to two consultant Qualitative design Theoretical sampling In-depth interviews- discuss Participants: 32 patients. All receiving continuing care from primary care teams. Selected key themes relevant to scoping review: Experience of social exclusion: taking control of their lives and mental health was g lo b a lm e n ta lh e a lth h ttp s://w w w .cam b rid g e.o rg /co re/term s. h ttp s://d o i.o rg /10.1017/g m h .2017.22 D o w n lo ad ed fro m h ttp s://w w w .cam b rid g e.o rg /co re. C arn eg ie M ello n U n iversity, o n 06 A p r 2021 at 01:18:25, su b ject to th e C am b rid g e C o re term s o f u se, availab le at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/gmh.2017.22 https://www.cambridge.org/core with enduring mental ill health. psychiatric-led community mental health teams linked to local hospital inpatient unit). Patients with enduring mental health problems. Other inclusion criteria: including inability to fulfil roles such as holding down a job; participating in recreational activities; impairment of social behaviour (hallucinations/ delusions; violence towards others and self); a mental health diagnosis; excluded if had dementia or other organic brain disorder, LD or under 16. and reflect upon experiences of healthcare. Broad topics were used as prompts. Grounded methodology. Themes were identified by open coding of key categories. jeopardised by experiences of victimisation and crime. Most had experienced victimisation where they lived, attributed to their apparent differences to others. Led to feeling fearful about people finding out about mental health problems. Experience both verbal and physical abuse within their local community. Fear of people finding out led to social isolation. Social isolation exacerbated by fear of crime, reluctance to go out as had experienced of crime and burglary. Contribution of professional care: valued positive therapeutic relationship with professionals within the context of social exclusion and their need to protect their anonymity about their ill mental health (as able to discuss issues/problems). 5. Kelly (1999) A part of Kelly’s thesis (1999) which explored quality of life of peoples with enduring forms of mental illness. In the community. People who met the criteria for severe and enduring mental illness (the House of Commons Report, 1994). Mixed methods. Random sampling strategy. Structured questionnaire based on Quality of Life profile (developed and tested for the study) with follow up comments made by participants. Participants interviewed in their own homes. Participants: 160 respondents. Findings of this discussion paper based upon participants’ responses in relation to one of the components of the QoL structured questionnaire asking people to identify from a list of problems what they have experienced whilst living in the community in the past year namely: broken windows; damp/condensation; mice/rats; poor heating; and harassment. 60% of respondents reported harassment (n = 100) Experiences ranged from minor (e.g. children knocking on door and running away to more serious being pushed, jostled or threatened.) Acts of harassment categorised into 3 broad themes: Harassment while at home: children and teens banging on their door. Fourteen people reported being subjected to taunts and name-calling while in their own homes (i.e. being sung at from outside their window). Six female respondents reported pornographic material being pushed through their door.One participant reported lit matches being put through their door. Eight reported windows being broken; 15 stones being thrown at windows and doors; 5 reported graffiti (ie. pervert; paedophile). Three found urine or faeces outside their flat; 1 reported bin being emptied outside his flat (followed by complaints by neighbours to council); Perpetrators of home incidents: majority reported as the local children. Some adults and teens. g lo b a lm e n ta lh e a lth h ttp s://w w w .cam b rid g e.o rg /co re/term s. h ttp s://d o i.o rg /10.1017/g m h .2017.22 D o w n lo ad ed fro m h ttp s://w w w .cam b rid g e.o rg /co re. C arn eg ie M ello n U n iversity, o n 06 A p r 2021 at 01:18:25, su b ject to th e C am b rid g e C o re term s o f u se, availab le at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/gmh.2017.22 https://www.cambridge.org/core Table 1. (cont.) Reference Study aims Setting and study population Methodology Key findings Reasons for harassment: in some instances harassment was carried out to force person out of their house. Children model stigmatising attitudes and behaviours of adults. Giving up tenancy and leaving home due to neighbours’ harassment. Harassment on the street: 12 reported regular harassment for no reason outside of their homes. Often in the form of name-calling; taunting; and sometimes verbal abuse. Seven reported having stones thrown at them or being jostled whilst out running daily errands. Perpetrators: children and also significant proportion carried out by teens and adults. Financial exploitation: Eleven people reported not doing their own shopping because of harassment or inability. People paid between £5 and £10 for others to do their shopping (but were not aware of being able to place a weekly order by telephone free of charge). Four people reported being accosted after picking up benefit claims. Some reported giving money to persistent beggars due to the location of their accommodation. Seventeen reported neighbours regularly borrowing money or cigarettes and never repaying. Several reported using unofficial home-help services that were above good value. Most blatant financial exploitation was by female neighbours who befriended male and got him to buy register for a mail order catalogue. They ran up a large bill and never repaid him. Reportingharassment: some noted how they chose to ignore harassment as ‘it wouldmake it worse’. Reluctance to report harassment. Also did not report it to police as the culprits run away and return when police leave not prepared to report to police or mental health professionals as they would not be believed or they would think they was ill again. 1 man chose not to report to police because the only contact he had with them was when being escorted to hospital (previous negative experiences). Majority are prepared to suffer harassment in silence. Coping mechanisms: avoid situations likely to experience harassment. Reclusive lifestyle resulting in onlyleavinghousewhen absolutely necessarily (e.g.oneperson had not left house in 8 months). Three people said they carried a weapon with them when going out (i.e. pocket knives, sock with a rock in it). 6. Langan & Lindow (2004) Provide information on the involvement in risk assessment and management of mental health service users who are considered by One urban area in England who were inpatients at two hospitals within the same MHT. Inclusion: People who In-depth interview with service users at point of discharge (phase 1), and six months later (phase 2). Purposive sampling, psychiatrists who selected Participants: 129 interviews conducted. 17 service users took part (2 female; 4 from ethnic minority group). Only 14 were interviewed at phase 2. Key theme relevant to scoping review: Risk or harm that people experienced from others. Four service users were seen as behaving in ways that increased the risk that they would be attacked by others - for example, preaching to people or being aggressive or confrontational to others when experiencing psychosis. g lo b a lm e n ta lh e a lth h ttp s://w w w .cam b rid g e.o rg /co re/term s. h ttp s://d o i.o rg /10.1017/g m h .2017.22 D o w n lo ad ed fro m h ttp s://w w w .cam b rid g e.o rg /co re. C arn eg ie M ello n U n iversity, o n 06 A p r 2021 at 01:18:25, su b ject to th e C am b rid g e C o re term s o f u se, availab le at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/gmh.2017.22 https://www.cambridge.org/core professionals to pose a risk to other people. were being discharged from in-patient treatment and moving into the community. Aged between 18–65 years old. Living in set geographical area whom they considered to be a possible risk to others. Exclusion: some service users could not be asked as the service users did not know that they were considered risk to others. people on the basis of the criteria. At each time point, also interviewed three mental health professionals, as well as a relative and a friend. Professional interviewed included psychiatrists, CPNs, social workers, psychologists, housing workers and day care staff. Differences in perceptions of risk: service users reported defending themselves as a result of being provoked rather than making unprovoked threats. The differing accounts revolved around whether this service user was being threatening or trying to protect himself (albeit in a threatening way) due to fear. Insecurity in accommodation: two had been at the receiving end of harassment by neighbours. 7. MIND (2007) To explore the extent of fear, crime, and victimisation to which people with mental distress are exposed, and to uncover barriers people face in accessing criminal justice agencies. Voluntary organisations (Mind associations) People with experience of mental distress. Mixed methods Short questionnaire (both closed and open ended questions) sent to 2000 people. Assessed attitudes towards personal safety and the role of agencies Two focus groups using vignettes. Explored issues of isolation, exploitation, protection and empowerment and the role of social workers and other agencies to keep people safe from abuse. Participants: 84 completed surveys (response rate of 3.6%); 10 participants took part in a focus group (five in each) and were mixed in terms of age, gender, ethnicity, diagnosis. Survey key findings: 84% felt vulnerable or at risk of abuse some or all of the time. Only 16% did not feel at risk. Anecdotal evidence of abuse perpetrated by: family; friends; neighbours; carers; health professionals; care home staff. 86% respondents felt they were responsible for keeping themselves safe; 55% health professionals; 43% family; 37 and friends; 35% police. Disempowering and excluding from decisions about risk; lack of systematic approach to safeguarding which is dealt with internally (rather than referred to police or SG teams); discrimination at heart of criminal justice system results in abuse not being reported by victims (not believed). 8. Pettitt et al. (2013) To understand experiences of victimisation and engagement with the criminal justice system among people with mental health problems. Community mental health services in London. People with severe mental illness (SMI) based in community mental health teams (CMHTs) for one year or over. 18–65 years old with any diagnosis. Mixed methods research study. Random sampling strategy for quant research in local London MH Trusts. For qual, invitations were circulated to individuals who had been a victim of crime in the past 3 years. Recruited from local Mind Participants: Quantitative survey: 361 people with SMI responded to the survey. Comparison sample is 3138 people. 60% schizophrenia and 20% bi-polar or depressive disorder. A majority had been ill for more than 10 years and more than half had been admitted under mental health Act1983. Sample was mostly male and Black/ Black British ethnicity. Greater personal and area deprivation of 72% v. (43% from comparison) were unemployed 63% (v. 21%) were council tenants 52% (v. 27%) and lived in most deprived areas. Quantitative survey findings (comparisons to general population): Targeted crime: 43% felt crime was motivated by race, age, sex, disability which was 8 times more likely than control group. g lo b a lm e n ta lh e a lth h ttp s://w w w .cam b rid g e.o rg /co re/term s. h ttp s://d o i.o rg /10.1017/g m h .2017.22 D o w n lo ad ed fro m h ttp s://w w w .cam b rid g e.o rg /co re. C arn eg ie M ello n U n iversity, o n 06 A p r 2021 at 01:18:25, su b ject to th e C am b rid g e C o re term s o f u se, availab le at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/gmh.2017.22 https://www.cambridge.org/core Table 1. (cont.) Reference Study aims Setting and study population Methodology Key findings Care needed to be planned using Care Programme Approach. Excluded those whose were too ill to consent and whose English language was limited. Those from general population over the age of 16 living in London. and Victim Support services as well as CMHTs. Quantitative survey- computer based questionnaires modified version of the Crime Survey for England and Wales (CSEW) was used. Compared to that of the general population who took part in the survey over the same period of time in London. Qualitative semi-structured interviews with service users. Data analysed using thematic analysis. Focus groups and interviews also conducted with 30 relevant professional from range of different background i.e. police officers and mental health coordinators. A majority of crimes took place in the home, followed by public places. 9% described incident happening in health facility. Impact of victimisation: more likely to perceive the crime as serious compared to general population. 98% said they had emotional or mental health problems following the crimes. Also social problems (financial loss/relationship breakdown). More likely to be physically injured but 70% less likely to seek medical help. Disclosure: 45% informed the police themselves compared with 35% of control group (not statistically significant). No difference in progress through criminal justice system however, SMI victims less satisfied and less likely to describe police as respectful. 40% did not disclose their experiences to mental health professionals. A third to disclose experiences to their police or mental health professionals. Help received and wanted: SMI victims 13 times more likely to receive help than those without SMI. Less likely to receive crime prevention advice compared with 35% of control group. Less likely to make changes following events than control group. Most likely to seek support from mental health professionals and family and friends. Unmet needs were most high in seeking practical of financial help (60%), talking help (40%) and help with accessing CJS (40%). Participants: Qualitative interviews: 81 individuals were interviewed. 82% sample lived in London. 57% women and 43% men. 78% were aged between 25 and 54 years. Over half were White British, 22% Black or Black British, 9% Asian, Asian British and 5% White other or White non-British. 17% described themselves as LGB. 23 and described having another disability as well as mental health problem. Only fifth were in unemployed. Half of sample had experienced depression, third anxiety and a third psychosis. Two thirds were accessing support from CMHTs. Quantitative survey findings Types of crime: Commonly experienced assault and harassment. Nine people reported being victims of crime whilst in psychiatric settings and in some cases, the offender were staff. Three fifths of crimes were by people they knew and had existing relationships with. Perceptions of why they were victimised: Because they would not be believed and would be easily discredited. People saw them as vulnerable because of their mental health problems. Targeted Mental health problem used as a basis for abuse, e.g. mocking verbally and displaying prejudice towards their mental health problem. Hate crime: 14 p’s described being victims of hate crime. Motivated by hostility or g lo b a lm e n ta lh e a lth h ttp s://w w w .cam b rid g e.o rg /co re/term s. h ttp s://d o i.o rg /10.1017/g m h .2017.22 D o w n lo ad ed fro m h ttp s://w w w .cam b rid g e.o rg /co re. C arn eg ie M ello n U n iversity, o n 06 A p r 2021 at 01:18:25, su b ject to th e C am b rid g e C o re term s o f u se, availab le at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/gmh.2017.22 https://www.cambridge.org/core prejudice towards their mental illness. Incidences on wards- imbalance of power between SU and mental health professional made them vulnerable to abuse. Discredited and could block access to help if they complained. Factors helping them to report crimes: decisions being taken out of their hands (someone else alerting police): accessibility of the police; Severity of the crime; A desire to prevent reoccurrence or to protect others Two thirds of sample described negative experiences reporting to the police: fear incident will be escalated; being blamed; lack of empathy/respect; dropping cases; lack of info and communication; not taken seriously; not being believed; poor responses to disclosure of mental health problem; prejudice attitudes towards mental health Three quarters of sample described positive experience from police: positive responses to mental health problems; caring attitude; taking incident seriously; communication; working with other services. Enabling experiences of court: pre-court visits, prep; witness service; special measures; judge/magistrate intervening on their behalf Poor experiences of court: seeing the perpetrator and their family/supported; cross-examination in court; not being able to make their point; long waiting times; not being given special measures’ lack of info after the trial. Enablers to seeking help: presence of support network; current or prior relationships with services; impact of crime as triggers. Barriers to seeking help: fearing response; fear or situation becoming worse; barriers associated with knowing the perpetrator; barriers of services; poor responses by individuals in services; impact of crime as barrier (or emotional and mental health); mental health problems as a barrier. Sources of support: Informal: family friend, partner, neighbours, work colleagues. Services: CMHTs, inpatient teams; GPs; emergency services; social care services; housing services; solicitors; probations services; local councillors/MPs; voluntary/ community sector services. Problems with services: inadequate help provided; inappropriate help provided; disempowering or punitive responses; lack of responsiveness of services; complex cases and a lack of effective multi-agency working. 9. Read & Baker (1996) Investigate discrimination faced by people with mental health problems, and the extent to which it affects their everyday lives. Community People with mental health problems who are members of local Mind association or similar groups. Mixed methods study Questionnaires (with closed and open ended questions) sent out to local Mind associations, Mindlink members, and the UKAN network of independent advocacy agencies. Participants: 778 completed questionnaires. Range of diagnoses including: anxiety, depression, OCD, psychosis, PTSD, agoraphobia, panic attacks, eating disorders, and SADs. 51% women and 49% men. Ages ranged from 18–74. Majority identified their ethnic background as UK (675), others ethnicities included: European, Caribbean, Irish, Indian, Asian and others. Main findings Daily life in public: 47% reported having experienced harassment or abuse in public because of mental health problems. (29% shouted at in street; 21% threatened; 14% physically attacked; 16% forced to leave premises). g lo b a lm e n ta lh e a lth h ttp s://w w w .cam b rid g e.o rg /co re/term s. h ttp s://d o i.o rg /10.1017/g m h .2017.22 D o w n lo ad ed fro m h ttp s://w w w .cam b rid g e.o rg /co re. C arn eg ie M ello n U n iversity, o n 06 A p r 2021 at 01:18:25, su b ject to th e C am b rid g e C o re term s o f u se, availab le at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/gmh.2017.22 https://www.cambridge.org/core Table 1. (cont.) Reference Study aims Setting and study population Methodology Key findings Daily life at home: 57% were afraid of being attacked in their own homes, with as many actually being harassed (25% in their own homes; 34% outside in immediate neighbourhood) (e.g. of abuse: burgled, lit matches and put in letter box, others had dog faeces, used condoms and abusive letters stuffed through front door). People described being attacked by neighbours, family and friends, landlords, people in authority (police, staff), other patients. 49% had actually been attacked or harassed (21% by neighbours and other tenants; 20% strangers; 7% by landlords). 26% had been forced to move because of harassment. Daily life at work: 38% said they had been harassed and teased at work (16% by manager; 25% colleagues; 6% personnel department; 7% other staff). Parenting: 24% of children had been teased or bullied because of their psychiatric condition (by other school children, neighbours). 10. Ryan (2000) 2 To explore the risk management strategies employed by users of mental health services To mental health sites in the North of England. Service users with a diagnosis of schizophrenia, depression or bi-polar disorder were included. Also recruited people who had been an informal inpatient, detained under MENTAL HEALTH ACT 1983, and those who had never been in hospital. Qualitative research Quota sampling employed. Semi-structured interviews. Explored underclass, medical disempowerment, vulnerability, threat, self-harm, dependency, self-neglect. Grounded theory employed. Participants: 22 participants took part. Mean age of 48.4 years, nine women and 13 men. nine people had diagnosis of schizophrenia, six bi-polar, seven depression. Results: viewed risks as the ‘everyday risks’ they faced such as being teased and ridiculed by people they met, neighbours avoiding them. Previous experiences of assaults had impacted upon people’s risk management strategies. Avoidance was a key theme that resulted in people then becoming socially isolated. ‘Many of the users who felt in danger from other people, whether they were friends, other users or people they did not know, became socially isolated as their risk management response was often unassertive and aimed at avoiding conflict.’ Participants also reported ‘doing nothing’ in order to avoid experiencing crime. With regard to self-neglect, participants took the line of least resistance and were therefore exploited by others (i.e. from relatives). ‘In relation to other risks users talked about times when they had been homeless, lost contact with family and friends, been assaulted and verbally abused by people in the street, shunned by neighbours and abused physically, financially and sexually.’ Sometimes sought help from other service users or social workers. 11. Hedges et al. (2009) To explore disabled people’s experiences of violence and hostility. Qualitative research Semi-structured interviews with a number of stakeholders from key organisations including those with disabilities. Participants: 30 disabled people were interviewed either with a learning disability or mental health condition. Key findings Typology of 8 key types of victimisation: physical, verbal and sexual incidents, targeted anti-social behaviour, damage to property and theft, school bullying, incidents by statutory agency staff, cyber bullying. g lo b a lm e n ta lh e a lth h ttp s://w w w .cam b rid g e.o rg /co re/term s. h ttp s://d o i.o rg /10.1017/g m h .2017.22 D o w n lo ad ed fro m h ttp s://w w w .cam b rid g e.o rg /co re. C arn eg ie M ello n U n iversity, o n 06 A p r 2021 at 01:18:25, su b ject to th e C am b rid g e C o re term s o f u se, availab le at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/gmh.2017.22 https://www.cambridge.org/core Settings and motivation: Most likely to occur in the street or home-based setting. But also in colleges, work and public transport. Motivations of perpetrator, threat and vulnerability. Also may see people as lesser than them. Prevention tactics: People may re-structure their lives to minimise risks (e.g. longer walking route). Most common strategies were acceptance or avoidance. Reporting and seeking redress: tended to report to a third party rather than police however, third parties involvement is under studied (i.e. social workers, housing associations, local authorities, civil justice agencies, voluntary bodies, and others can play.) A need for better joined up inter-agency working. Barriers to reporting: physical, procedural and attitudinal barriers of reporting to police. Will be in the wrong. Also may be because of victims relationship with perpetrator, may blame themselves for what happened or just believe it’s a part of everyday life. 12. Smyth et al. (2011) 74(7) This research aimed to explore the experiences of social inclusion for mental health service users when engaged in everyday community occupations and to identify possible factors that influenced the service user experience. Mental Health Trust’s rehabilitation service in an inner-city area in UK. Service users from rehabilitation service who were engaged in any type of community occupation and who were able to give informed consent. Qualitative research Convenience sample Individual in-depth interviews in two parts: (1) inclusion web to identify community occupations; (2) used an interview schedule, which covered three main topics: identifying and describing the experience of community occupations, factors that have an impact on engagement and the participant’s feelings of inclusion or exclusion. IPA to analyse data Participants: The eight participants consisted of six men and two women with a mean age (range) of 39 years (32–46 years). Findings: The three super-ordinate themes were the outside experience, the internal disability and an active lifestyle. Environmental features of exclusion: experienced unfriendly, hostile and bullying reactions from other people due to mental health prejudice, racism or homophobia. Negative experiences of social support provided by mental health services which, at times, felt unsupportive and abusive. Internal disability, internal features of inclusion and exclusion: Stigma and safety: some people ceased to feel safe in their community and restricted them from engaging in community activities due to dealing with unpleasant memories with experiences of hostility and abuse. 13. Wood & Edwards (2005) 10(2) This study aimed to compare crimes against mentally ill patients living in the community with crimes against students who have a high life-style risk of victimisation. Community mental health teams and university population. 40 organisations approached to recruit mental health service users Quantitative research Questionnaire-based research A 55-item victimisation questionnaire was adapted from the British Crime Survey England and Wales (2000) and the National Crime Victimisation Survey (2000). 20 participating charities were sent 225 questionnaires but only 25 Participants: The mentally ill patients (N ¼ 40) consisted of 22 females and 18 males with a mean age of 42.28 years (SD ¼ 11 : 27). Of the mentally ill patients, 32.5% suffered from depression, 15% suffered manic depression, 12.5% suffered schizophrenia, and 12.5% had a dual diagnosis. Individual diagnoses included personality, anxiety, and eating disorders. Patients were mainly White (97.5%), the remainder being Black (2.5%). The student participants (N ¼ 80) consisted of 46 females and 34 males. Students were asked if they had ever suffered from a mental illness: none said they had. Key findings: Half (50%, N = 20) of the mentally ill patients and just over a third (38.75%, N = 31) of students reported being victimised at least once. Offender relationship: students most likely victimised by strangers whereas mentally ill people likely to be victimised by range of people including family, partners, friends and strangers. g lo b a lm e n ta lh e a lth h ttp s://w w w .cam b rid g e.o rg /co re/term s. h ttp s://d o i.o rg /10.1017/g m h .2017.22 D o w n lo ad ed fro m h ttp s://w w w .cam b rid g e.o rg /co re. C arn eg ie M ello n U n iversity, o n 06 A p r 2021 at 01:18:25, su b ject to th e C am b rid g e C o re term s o f u se, availab le at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/gmh.2017.22 https://www.cambridge.org/core Three out of the seven studies that adopted a survey approach used standardised measures (13, 8, 5). Both Wood & Edwards (2005) and Pettit et al. (2013) used an adapted version of the Crime Survey for England and Wales. Kelly (1999) used a structured question- naire based on a quality of life profile that was devel- oped and tested for the study. With regard to sampling and recruitment, five stud- ies recruited from community mental health teams (1, 12, 13, 8, 10), four from the community (3, 5, 2, 9), two from voluntary services (7, 11), one from general practices (4) and one from inpatient hospitals (6). A purposive sampling strategy was used to recruit parti- cipants in four studies (1, 4, 6, 10) whilst other studies used random (5, 8) and opportunistic sampling strat- egies (12). The sampling strategy was not reported in six of the included studies (3, 7, 2, 11, 13, 9). All studies included people with experiences of mental health problems. One study also collected data on mental health professionals’ views (8), and in two studies data were collected on the experiences of those with learning disabilities as well as those with mental health problems (11), or encompassed within experiences of all victims from the general public (2). Furthermore, two studies directly compared the experiences of people with mental health problems with the general population (1, 8) and one study com- pared with students who had high life-style risks (13). With regard to participant demographics, a majority ofstudiesreportedanearevenspreadofmaleandfemale participants (1, 2, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 13). In addition, in two studies a small number of the participant sample identi- fied themselves as transgender (2, 11). The age range of participants for most of the included studies were between 18 and 70 years with the average age range in four of the studies being between 40 and 49 years old (13, 1, 7, 12), and between 20 and 29 years old in three of the studies (2, 4, 10). Those studies that reported parti- cipant’s ethnicity, reported a majority of their sample as White British (2, 3, 6, 5, 7, 8, 9, 11, 13). Some studies did not give specific details on participant demographics, only stated how the participant sample were diverse with regard to, for example, age, gender, ethnicity, reli- gion, sexual orientation and disability (e.g. 2, 3 ,5, 12). Review findings Nature of incidents The types of hate crime experienced by those with mental health problems included verbal abuse (1, 4, 5, 8, 9, 10), physical threats and assaults (1, 4, 5, 8, 9), vandalism of property (5, 9), financial exploitation, (3, 5, 10) and in one study, one participant reported sexual exploitation (10).T ab le 1. (c on t. ) R ef er en ce St u d y ai m s Se tt in g an d st u d y p op u la ti on M et h od ol og y K ey fi n d in g s w er e co m p le te d (1 0% re sp on se ra te ) A ll st at is ti ca l an al ys es w er e co n d u ct ed u si n g 0. 05 al p h a le v el . M en ta ll y il l p at ie n ts ex p er ie n ce d m or e fr eq u en t to v ic ti m iz at io n . M or e li ke ly to ex p er ie n ce p er so n al v ic ti m is at io n th an st u d en ts . T h er e w as an in te ra ct io n b et w ee n g en d er an d g ro u p , F ð1 ; 11 7Þ ¼ 13 :3 3, p, :0 01 , h ¼ :1 0, p ow er ¼ 0. 95 , re v ea li n g th at m en ta ll y il l fe m al es ex p er ie n ce m or e fr eq u en t v ic ti m is at io n th an d id m en ta ll y il l m al es or st u d en ts of ei th er g en d er . T h os e w it h m en ta l il ln es s m or e li ke ly to h ol d m or e n eg at iv e at ti tu d es to w ar d s p ol ic e. N o d if fe re n ce s in am ou n t of in ci d en t re p or te d to p ol ic e B u t m en ta ll y il l p op u la ti on m or e li ke ly to b e d is sa ti sfi ed . O n ly m en ta ll y il l p eo p le fe lt d is sa ti sfi ed b y th e p ol ic e re sp on se d u e to th e w ay th ey w er e re sp on d ed to on a p er so n al le v el . global mental health https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/gmh.2017.22 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:25, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/gmh.2017.22 https://www.cambridge.org/core Location of incidents and relationship to perpetrator In order to provide more detail on the types of hate crimes, violence or abuse people with mental health problems experience, it is important to describe where the incidents usually took place and the indivi- dual’s relationship with the perpetrator/s. Whilst out in their local communities, participants from several studies described how their neighbours, more often teenagers and children, would shout offen- sive comments and sing abusive chants at them (5, 6, 8, 4). This verbal abuse would usually result in the perpe- trators specifically setting out to expose the victim’s mental health problems. Some experienced verbal abuse from strangers whilst on public transport (2, 11) whilst in one study, one participant reported phys- ical and verbal abuse by strangers whilst sleeping rough on the streets (10). Participants in several studies reported experiencing harassment and intimidation from neighbours, land- lords and other tenants whilst in their own homes (5, 8, 9, 11). This ranged from children knocking on their door and running away, to various acts of vandalism, such as stones being thrown at windows, graffiti (5) and unwanted content being pushed through their letterbox (i.e. abusive letters, used condoms, porno- graphic material, lit matches and dog faeces) (9). In Kelly’s (1999) study, one participant reported having their bin emptied out onto their front garden only to then be reported to the local authority with false accu- sations of not keeping their property tidy. This sup- ports findings by Berzins et al. (2003) that there was a significant association between harassment and those living in local authority accommodation for both peo- ple living with mental health problems and the general public. According to Woods & Edwards (2005), those with mental health problems are more likely to experience victimisation by people they know as opposed to a stu- dent population who are more likely to be victimised by strangers. In some cases, neighbours or other tenants within their supported accommodation would ‘be-friend’ those with mental health problems in order to exploit them, for example, by borrowing money or cigarettes and never paying them back (5, 10). Family abuse was also more likely to be reported Fig. 1. PRISMA flow diagram: The study identification, screening and selection process. global mental health https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/gmh.2017.22 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:25, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/gmh.2017.22 https://www.cambridge.org/core by those with mental health problems (Berzins et al. 2003). This concurs with several of the studies in which participants described how family and friends would also try to take advantage of their disability allowance (7, 9, 10). In one study, participants described how healthcare professionals would keep hold of their money and not give them a choice about how they spent it (3). In one survey-based study, 38% of respondents reported having been harassed and teased in the work- place by managers, colleagues and the personnel department because of their mental health problems. These findings were supported by Sin et al. (2009) who also reported those with disabilities having experi- enced victimisation in work and colleges. However, this study did not report details on nature of the victimisa- tion and furthermore, collected data from a non-mental health specific population. Participants in one study reported being victims of crime within psychiatric set- tings, and in some cases, the offenders were staff (8). Two other studies reported people with mental health problems experiencing victimisation by those in authoritative positions such as health care professionals and police (7, 9); however, there were no details pro- vided on the nature of the offences. Reasons and motivations for attacks or abuse There were several motives behind perpetrators’ attacks on those with mental health problems. The most common motivation for the violence or abuse to occur was because of noted differences between the victim and the perpetrator. Examples of this included, the perpetrator holding prejudiced views towards those with mental health problems (4, 8), the victim behaving in ways that may increase the risk that they would be attacked by others (e.g. preaching to others; being confrontational when extremely distressed) (6), and the perpetrator seeing them victim as ‘lesser than them’ (11). Some experienced hostility from indivi- duals who were the same ethnicity and/or had the same faith as them, where those with mental health problems were seen as going against specific identity markers held within that specific community (2). In a 2014 study, some participants described being victi- mised due to recent focuses on the Government’s ben- efits reform whereby they were called ‘benefit scroungers’ by others (2). In some studies, participants felt that they had been a victim of a crime because the perpetrator knew they could take advantage of the person because of their mental health problems. For example, some victims believed that they were targeted by family and friends who wanted to take their welfare benefits or medica- tion (1, 3, 5). In one study, participants believed they were an easy target as they would not be believed and would be easily discredited due to having a men- tal health problem (8). Some victims felt that teenagers and children who committed hate crimes against them were influenced by the inter-generational beliefs of older family mem- bers; they, therefore, modelled the stigmatising atti- tudes of others (1, 5). Impact of targeted violence and abuse Following experiences of hate crime, violence or abuse participants in several studies reported feeling vulner- able, afraid and unsafe about becoming victimised again in the future (1, 2, 9, 3, 12). In contrast, this study found that the general public sample were more likely to experience anger rather than fear (1). In another study, participants who experienced verbal abuse within their local community were more afraid of others finding out about their mental health pro- blems than the actual incident reoccurring (4). Participants in one study described how their exist- ing mental health problems had either deteriorated or they had developed new mental health problems after being victimised (1). In addition, nearly half of the participant sample reported feeling suicidal (1). Some studies indicated other impacts of mental health-related targeted violence and abuse. For example, some people experienced financial loss due to exploitation or loss of their job whereas others’ rela- tionships had broken down (8). In one study, partici- pants reported turning to alcohol abuse (2). Individuals also reported physical injuries following from physical abuse (8). Help-seeking behaviour People with mental health problems most commonly disclosed their experiences to and sought support from mental health professionals (social workers, nurses and doctors) (2, 7, 10), police (1, 7) or family and friends (7). Other reported sources of support included housing associations, support provider char- ities (i.e. Victim Support), probation services, solicitors, and local councillors or politicians (2, 8). According to Pettit et al. (2013), there were a number of factors that helped people to report experiences of what could be categorised as a hate crime. These included a desire to prevent reoccurrence or to protect others, having a good support network, having current or prior contact with services, and a positive thera- peutic relationship with mental health or other support professionals. For those who did not want to report hate crime incidents, it helped having someone in an advocacy role who could peruse the matter on behalf of the individual (e.g. someone else alerting the police). global mental health https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/gmh.2017.22 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:25, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/gmh.2017.22 https://www.cambridge.org/core In several of the included studies, the police were a common source of potential help for victims. In Pettit’s study (2013), participants described several fac- tors that helped them report crimes and seek help from the police, which included them having a caring atti- tude, taking the incident seriously, communicating effectively and being willing to liaise with other ser- vices or professionals (8). In some studies, participants reported dissatisfaction with previous experiences of reporting incidents that could be classified as hate crimes to the police where they were not taken ser- iously and/or where reporting had made no difference (8, 1, 5). Participants also described how police had lacked sympathy, were disrespectful, or had not sup- ported the person due to negative attitudes towards mental health problems (2, 8). There were cases where participants described how they had not and would not report incidents to the police due to a fear and distrust of the police, which was often described in the context of previous negative experiences with police (i.e. only had contact when having had police involvement with hospitalisation) (8). In another study, some people did not report to the police as they felt that they ‘would be in the wrong’ (11). There were also various other reasons why partici- pants chose not to report being victimised because of their mental health problems. Some reported feeling afraid that it would make the situation worse (5, 8), or that they would be penalised (e.g. the support they receive would be negatively affected) (3). In one study, participants reported being worried that access to services would be blocked if they made a complaint about abuse on wards by mental health professionals (8). In some cases, participants were unsure of where to go for support and who to seek help from (8). In another study, a majority of participants (86%) felt solely responsible for keeping themselves safe and therefore did not feel the need to report the incident or seek help from others (7). Whether people reported the incident or crime was, at times, dependent upon the extent to which the victim understood it to be motivated by their mental health status. For example, in one study, some participants did not perceive the incident to be worth reporting because it was either considered to be a part of everyday life or was not seen as mental health-related disability hate-crime due to the nature of their relationship with the perpetrator (i.e. a member of their family) (11). Personal coping strategies Avoidance. There were a number of ways in which people chose to manage and cope with the aftermath of being attacked or abused because of their mental health problem. Participants in several studies most often reported changing their lifestyle in order to avoid similar incidents reoccurring. This ranged from individuals avoiding certain walking routes or places (11), through to avoiding leaving their home altogether (10), with Kelly’s study (1999) reporting one partici- pant having not left their home in 8 months. In more extreme cases, people described having to move homes in order to get away from the verbal abuse and harassment they were exposed to within their neighbourhood (1, 5, 9). As a result of these avoidance strategies, participants often described feelings of isola- tion and social exclusion (3, 4, 12, 5). Self-defence. Some individuals preferred to adopt more proactive coping strategies including attempting to reason with their abuser (1). More specifically, Langan & Lindow (2004) described incidences where victims attempted to retaliate by returning the verbal abuse, but what was seen as self-defence by the victim was often viewed by others as threatening behaviour due to the person’s history of mental health problems (6). One individual described carrying around weapons (i.e. pocket knives and a sock with a rock in it) in prep- aration for the next time that they are attacked (5). Acceptance. Linking to those individuals who chose not to report incidences of targeted violence or abuse, some people chose to accept what had happened to them by doing nothing about it (5, 1, 8). Findings from two studies noted that crime victims with mental health problems were less likely to make changes fol- lowing the incident compared with victims from the general population (1, 8). Furthermore, participants in one study reported ‘doing nothing’ in order to avoid experiencing similar incidences in future (10). What types of help and support do people need or want? Reflecting the findings from Mitchell et al. (2012), only three of the 13 studies included the perspectives of people with mental health problems who had been vic- tims of targeted violence, hostility or hate-crime on what type help and support is needed. This constitutes a gap in the UK literature. In one study, participants were asked what sort of support would they want or need following from their experiences of hate-crime (8). Participants’ suggestions included crime preven- tion advice, advice on how to access the criminal justice system and psychological support services such as talking therapies. The need for the delivery of psycho-educational classes for the general public to help stop anti-social behaviour and targeted abuse within local communities was highlighted (1). One study showed that people with mental health global mental health https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/gmh.2017.22 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:25, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/gmh.2017.22 https://www.cambridge.org/core problems were not routinely involved in discussions about risk management and safeguarding, which was indicated as a problem (6). Discussion Much of the current general research on adult safeguard- ing in the UK explores systemic issues, service configur- ation and models, decision-making and practitioner concepts of safeguarding (Johnson, 2011; Graham et al. 2014; Norrie et al. 2014; Trainor, 2015). Research suggests that reactive and technical approaches to risk manage- ment and safeguarding are inadequate for addressing the complex circumstances and individual needs (Manthorpe et al. 2008). There is evidence that organisa- tional and professional concerns about risk and safe- guarding could impede progressing UK adult safeguarding practice reforms for people with mental health problems (Carr, 2011). The risk-averse culture within UK mental health services has been found to be disempowering for service users who are unable to be meaningfully involved in the processes of risk manage- ment, assessment and decision-making that affect them (Whitelock, 2009; Faulkner, 2012; Wallcraft, 2012). Literature reviews highlight the absence of all ser- vice user perspectives, and particularly mental health service user perspectives, in studies on risk and safe- guarding and that risk and safety, are defined by prac- titioners and articulated using managerial language (Mitchell & Glendinning, 2007; Carr, 2011; Mitchell et al. 2012; Wallcraft, 2012). Only one piece of UK user-led research work started to address the issue of absent user voices and revealed that fear was a signifi- cant concern for service users, particularly those with mental health problems, but this is not necessarily something considered by practitioners (Faulkner, 2012) or community safety. Discourses from the UK on adult safeguarding and risk, mental health and ‘disability hate crime’ have remained largely separate across research, policy and practice. Despite limitations on the number of studies, and the types and quality of evidence included in this scoping review, the findings reveal a degree of thematic consist- ency and important insights into mental health service userexperiences of targeted violence andhostility, victim- isation or ‘disability hate crime’ and adult safeguarding that begins to address some of the gaps in the knowledge. The studies provide information on the types of potential hate crime experienced by people with men- tal health problems, indicate where incidents take place, give some insight into the victims’ relationship with the perpetrators. The small body of research stud- ies examined here gives an overview of the location of incidents as well as the psychological, social, financial and physical impacts on the victim. The included studies also highlighted the types of help-seeking behaviours adopted by the victims; where they seek support and whom they disclose their experience to; the factors that may help or hinder the victim from reporting the crime and/or seeking support through to the types of support that people may want or need. The studies revealed range coping strategies that people with mental health problems adopted in response to experiences of targeted violence or abuse. From the studies, it appears that people who are tar- geted for violence and abuse or exploitation because of their mental health status or problems are more likely to have a fear than an angry response, with a tendency to avoid situations perceived to be risky or to self-isolate, and a heightened sense of vulnerability. Some of the reported fear is related to fear of exposure of having mental health problems. This raises a wider concern about factors that prevent the social and community inclusion of people with mental health problems in the UK, and circumstances that increase people’s vul- nerability. However, the studies raised the question: are people being targeted because someone has an active dislike for them due to their mental health pro- blems OR are they victimised because the perpetrator/ s know that someone is vulnerable because of their mental health problems and associated circumstances? Although none of the studies allowed for a compara- tor in terms of types of disability, it is notable that peo- ple with mental health problems tended to feel that they would not be believed by authorities; that some- how the abuse, violence or exploitation is their fault or is to be accepted as part of daily life; and that some saw themselves as an ‘easy target’ because of their mental health problems. These patterns of ‘psychi- atric disqualification’ (where people feel they will be delegitimised or discredited because of their mental health problems: Lindow, 2001), chronically low self- esteem or self-worth can act a serious barriers to vic- tims of mental-health related disability hate crime from recognising abuse, accessing appropriate mental health, police and criminal justice support and from pursuing their right to justice as citizens. Finally, the lit- erature suggests that experiences of violence and abuse relating to mental health can increase the risk of further mental health problems or mental health crisis. The review revealed some tentative but important findings about the relationship of services and profes- sionals to the issues under investigation. Mental health professionals (including social workers), police or family and friends were most commonly identified as sources of help or the first course for reporting the incident. Adult safeguarding did not feature strongly in the findings about help-seeking behaviour and reporting. Of particu- lar concern was the emerging finding on experiences of mental health-related violence, abuse or victimisation global mental health https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/gmh.2017.22 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:25, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/gmh.2017.22 https://www.cambridge.org/core within mental health services and inpatient wards, some- times by staff. In such cases, victims described being too afraid to report the incident because they believed their mental health support would be compromised or that they would be told they were ‘in the wrong’. Finally, the included studies outlined the importance of positive therapeutic relationships with mental health professionals; advocacy and liaison or joint working between all involved services; clear communi- cation and caring attitudes from police and mental health professionals; and having the incident taken ser- iously by the person it is reported to. These offer help- ful recommendations for improving mental health and policing practice for victims of mental health-related hate crime, or targeted violence and abuse for the UK and potentially, other countries with similar health and social service policies and infrastructure. Study limitations Although findings can potentially inform developments internationally, this study is limited to the UK. A limita- tion of the included studies is in relation to the adopted recruitment and sampling strategies whereby three stud- ies either used opportunistic sampling whilst a further six studies did not report any details on the sampling strategy and/or no specific detail on participants’ demo- graphics. The four studies that used a strategic or pur- posive sampling strategy provided limited detail on the criteria used to inform their sampling framework. It is therefore difficult to know how representative and varied the findings are to the types of targeted vio- lence and abuse experienced by mental health service users and whether the findings capture the varied sources of support that are sought and coping strat- egies that are adopted. The lack of data detailing ethni- city, sexual orientation, physical disability, gender and gender identity makes it problematic to assess if and how these characteristics intersect in cases of mental health-related violence and hostility. A number of the studies included in the review explored the experiences of mental health service users alongside those of the general public. One study examined hate crime and victimisation without break- ing down the data to reveal specific findings for people with mental health problems, so it was very difficult to discern the extent to which study findings were specif- ically relevant to the scoping review question and topic. Conclusion This scoping review provides a UK-based overview of mental health service user concepts and experiences of mental health-related targeted violence and hostility (‘disability hate crime’), risk, prevention and protec- tion; where victims go for help and approach protection and prevention, including what might pre- vent them from seeking help; and their experiences of the responses mental health services, the police and other organisations to their reporting incidents of violence or abuse relating to their mental health status. It reveals some specific issues regarding mental health and disability hate crime, particularly relating to victim fear responses, social isolation, ‘psychiatric disqualification’, acceptance of violence or abuse as part of everyday life, stigma and its relationship to help-seeking and the expectation of ‘not being believed’ or ‘being in the wrong’. This suggests that further investigation into disability hate crime with a specific focus on mental health is required; and one that considers other intersecting forms of targeted vio- lence and abuse (such as sexism, racism or homopho- bia). It also reveals that incidents can occur within mental health settings, with staff cited as perpetrators. This is a UK-based overview that offers a useful com- parator for researchers, policy makers and practitioners inothercountries,particularlynationswithsocialpolicies on safeguarding vulnerable adults. It is well documented thatthestigma,discrimination,andabuseexperiencedby thosewith mental health problem are aconcern for global mental health, with the action being taken on an inter- national level (Thornicroft et al. 2008; UN Human Rights Council, 2017). It is likely that there will be commonalities and variations in people’s experiences internationally, and comparative national reviews of research are useful for understanding the international picture on the targeted violence and abuse of people with mental health problems and service responses to it. Acknowledgements This report is independent research by the National Institute for Health Research School for Social Care Research. The views expressed in this publication are those of the author(s) and not necessarily those of the NIHR SSCR, NHS, The National Institute for Health Research or the Department of Health for England and Wales. Declaration of Interest None. References Arksey H, O’Malley L (2005). Scoping studies: towards a methodological framework. International Journal of Social Research Methodology 8, 19–32. Aveyard H (2007). Doing A Literature Review in Health and Social Care. Open University Press: Maidenhead. Beresford P, Croft S (2012). User Controlled Research. NIHR SSCR: London. global mental health https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/gmh.2017.22 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:25, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/gmh.2017.22 https://www.cambridge.org/core Berzins KM, Petch A, Atkinson JM (2003). Prevalence and experience of harassment of people with mental health problems living in the community. The British Journal of Psychiatry 183, 526–533. Braun V, Clarke V (2006). Using thematic analysis in psychology. Qualitative Research in Psychology 3, 77–101. Carr S (2011). Enabling risk and ensuring safety: self-directed support and personal budgets. The Journal of Adult Protection 13, 122–136. CASP (not dated). CASP Qualitative Checklist. Oxford: CASP. Chakraborti N, Garland J, Hardy S (2014). The Leicester Hate Crime Project: Findings and Conclusions. University of Leicester: Leicester. DH (2014). Factsheet 7: The Care Act – Protecting Adults From Abuse and Neglect. DH: London. Emerson E, Roulstone A (2014). Developing an evidence base for violent and disablist hate crime in Britain: findings from the life opportunities survey. Journal of Interpersonal Violence 29, 3086–3104. Evans-Lacko S, Knapp M, McCrone P, Thornicroft G, Mojtabai R (2013). The mental health consequences of the recession: economic hardship and employment of people with mental health problems in 27 European countries. PLoS ONE 8, e69792. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0069792. Faulkner A (2012). The Right to Take Risks: Service Users’ Views of Risk in Adult Social Care. 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Smyth G, Harries P, Dorer G (2011). Exploring mental health service users’ experiences of social inclusion in their community occupations. The British Journal of Occupational Therapy 74(), 323–331. Thornicroft G (2006). Shunned: Discrimination Against People with Mental Illness. Oxford University Press: Oxford. Thornicroft G, Brohan E, Kassam A, Lewis-Holmes E (2008). Reducing stigma and discrimination: candidate interventions. International Journal of Mental Health Systems 2. doi: 10.1186/1752-4458-2-3. Trainor P (2015). A review of factors which potentially influence decisions in adult safeguarding investigations. The Journal of Adult Protection 17, 51–61. UN Human Rights Council (2017). A/HRC/35/21: Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right of Everyone to the Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental Health. UN: Geneva. Wallcraft J (2012). Involvement of service users in adult safeguarding. The Journal of Adult Protection 14, 142–150. Whitelock A (2009). Safeguarding in mental health: towards a rights-basedapproach.TheJournalofAdultProtection11,30–42. Wood J, Edwards K (2005). Victimization of mentally ill patients living in the community: is it a life‐style issue? Legal and Criminological Psychology 10, 279–290. global mental health https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/gmh.2017.22 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:25, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at http://www.implementationscience.com/content/5/1/69 https://doi.org/10.1093/bjsw/bcn028 https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/gmh.2017.22 https://www.cambridge.org/core Mental health service user experiences of targeted violence and hostility and help-seeking in the UK: a scoping review Introduction Scoping review questions and objectives Methods Box 1. Findings Search results Box 2. Review findings Nature of incidents Location of incidents and relationship to perpetrator Reasons and motivations for attacks or abuse Impact of targeted violence and abuse Help-seeking behaviour Personal coping strategies Avoidance Self-defence Acceptance Outline placeholder What types of help and support do people need or want? Discussion Study limitations Conclusion Acknowledgements Declaration of Interest References 
work_2cvg7ctfbrbefitejhkioaqcai	----	dspace cover page The Dynamics of State Policy Liberalism, 1936-2014 The MIT Faculty has made this article openly available. Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters. Citation Caughey, Devin, and Christopher Warshaw. “The Dynamics of State Policy Liberalism, 1936-2014: THE DYNAMICS OF STATE POLICY LIBERALISM.” American Journal of Political Science 60.4 (2016): 899–913. As Published http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12219 Publisher Wiley Blackwell Version Author's final manuscript Citable link http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/105870 Terms of Use Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike Detailed Terms http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/ https://libraries.mit.edu/forms/dspace-oa-articles.html http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/105870 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/ The Dynamics of State Policy Liberalism, 1936–2014 Devin Caughey∗ Department of Political Science MIT Christopher Warshaw† Department of Political Science MIT First draft: March 5, 2014 This draft: March 4, 2015 Abstract Applying a dynamic latent-variable model to data on 148 policies collected over eight decades (1936–2012), we produce the first yearly measure of the policy liberalism of U.S. states. Our dynamic measure of state policy liberalism marks an important advance over existing measures, almost all of which are purely cross-sectional and thus cannot be used to study policy change. We find that, in the aggregate, the policy liberalism of U.S. states steadily increased between the 1930s and 1970s and then largely plateaued. The policy liberalism of most states has remained stable in relative terms, though several states have shifted considerably over time. We also find surprisingly little evidence of multidimensionality in state policy outputs. Our new estimates of state policy liberalism have broad application to the study of political development, representation, accountability, and other important issues in political science. We appreciate the excellent research assistance of Melissa Meek, Kelly Alexander, Aneesh Anand, Ti↵any Chung, Emma Frank, Jose↵ Kolman, Mathew Peterson, Steve Powell, Charlotte Swasey, Lauren Ullmann, and Amy Wickett. We also appreciate the willingness of Frederick Boehmke and Carl Klarner to generously share their data. We are grateful for research support from the Dean of the School of Humanities, Arts, and Social Sciences at MIT. All mistakes, however, are our own. ∗Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, caughey@mit.edu †Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, cwar- shaw@mit.edu “Change,” Chandler et al. (1974, 108) noted four decades ago, “is both methodologically and substantively critical for any theory of policy.” This is true of both of the determinants of government policies, such as shifts in public mood or changes in the eligible electorate (e.g., Stimson, MacKuen, and Erikson 1995; Husted and Kenny 1997), and of policy feedback on political and social outcomes (e.g., Wlezien 1995; Campbell 2012). Theories of all these phenomena rely explicitly or implicitly on models of policy change. Moreover, many of the most ambitious theories focus not on individual policies or policy domains, but on the character of government policy as a whole. In short, most theories of policymaking are both dynamic and holistic: they are concerned with changes in the general orientation of government policy. Unfortunately, the literature on U.S. state politics, perhaps the most vibrant field for testing theories of policymaking, relies almost exclusively on policy indicators that are either measured at a single point in time (e.g., Wright, Erikson, and McIver 1987) or else cover only a partial subset of state policy outputs (e.g., Besley and Case 2003).1 Static measures are poorly suited to studying causes of policy change over time (Lowery, Gray, and Hager 1989; Ringquist and Garand 1999; Jacoby and Schneider 2009). And while domain-specific measures may provide useful summaries of some aspects of state policy, such as welfare spending (Mo�tt 2002) or gay rights (Lax and Phillips 2009a), they are at best imperfect proxies for what is often the outcome of interest, the overall orientation of state policy. In this paper, we develop a holistic yearly summary of the ideological orientation of state policies, which we refer to as state policy liberalism. This measure is based on a unique dataset of 148 policies, which covers nearly eight decades (1936–2014) and includes policy domains ranging from labor regulation and civil rights to gun control and gay rights.2 Based on these data, we estimate policy liberalism in each year using a dynamic Bayesian latent- 1. To our knowledge, the only existing holistic yearly summary of state policies is Jacoby and Schneider’s (2009) measure of particularistic versus collective state spending priorities between 1982 and 2005. As we discuss below, our measures di↵er substantially in time coverage, conceptual interpretation, and the data used to construct them. 2. Both the policy data and our policy liberalism estimates will be made available to the public upon publication of this article. 1 variable model designed for a mix of continuous, ordinal, and dichotomous policy indicators. This measurement model enables us to make use of many indicators of policy liberalism, thus substantially reducing measurement error on the estimates of our construct of interest. Despite the disparate policy domains covered by our dataset, allowing for additional latent policy dimensions does little to improve the predictive accuracy of the model. This suggests that contrary to previous claims (e.g., Sorens, Muedini, and Ruger 2008), a single latent dimension su�ces to capture the systematic variation in state policies. Consistent with this conclusion, our dynamic measure is highly correlated with existing cross-sectional measures of state policy liberalism as well as with issue-specific ideological scales. Substantively, we find that while U.S. states as a whole have drifted to the left (that is, they have increasingly adopted liberal policies), most have remained ideologically sta- ble in relative terms. Across our entire time series, the most conservative states are in the South, whereas California, New York, Massachusetts, and New Jersey are always among the most liberal. The relative policy liberalism of a few states, however, has changed substan- tially. Several Midwestern and Mountain states have become considerably more conservative relative to the rest of the nation, whereas most of the Northeast has become more liberal. Our new dynamic estimates can be used to study a wide variety of possible questions, many of which are not easily investigated using cross-sectional measures. Potential topics of study include the short- and long-term determinants of policy outputs, such as economic development, political institutions, mass policy preferences, and electoral outcomes. Policy liberalism could also be used as an independent variable, as a means of examining policy feedback or other consequences of policy change. These measures thus o↵er new research av- enues onto political development, representation, accountability, and other important issues in political science. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We begin by defining the concept of policy liberalism and situating it in the literature on U.S. state politics and policy. Next, we describe our policy dataset, our measurement model, and our yearly estimates of state policy 2 liberalism. We then provide evidence for the validity of our measure. We show that it is highly correlated with existing measures of policy liberalism and related concepts, and that a one-dimensional scale adequately accounts for systematic policy variation across states. The penultimate section discusses potential applications of our measure, illustrating its usefulness with an analysis of the policy e↵ects of voter registration laws. The final section concludes. Measuring State Policies Studies of state policy generally employ one of two measurement strategies: they either con- sider policy separately using policy-specific indicators, or they construct composite measures intended to summarize the general orientation of state policies within or across domains (Jacoby and Schneider 2014, 568). Among studies in the first camp, some have focused on whether or not states have particular policies. Lax and Phillips (2009a), for example, exam- ine the representational congruence between a series of dichotomous state gay-rights policies and state opinion majorities. Other studies have employed continuous policy-specific indi- cators, such as welfare expenditures (Husted and Kenny 1997), tax rates (Besley and Case 2003), or minimum wages (Leigh 2008), which potentially have greater sensitivity to dif- ferences between states. Whether dichotomous or continuous, policy-specific measures are appropriate when the research question is limited to a particular policy area. But they are suboptimal as summary measures of the general orientation of state policies, though this is how they are often used.3 For this reason, a number of scholars have sought to combine information from multiple policies, using factor analysis or other dimension-reduction methods to summarize them in terms of one or more dimensions of variation. Dimension reduction has several advantages over policy-specific measures. First, from a statistical point of view, using multiple indica- 3. Lax and Phillips (2009a, 369) claim that “using. . . policy-specific estimates” allows them to “avoid problems of inference that arise when policy and opinion lack a common metric.” On a policy-by-policy basis this is probably true. But evaluating congruence on state policy in general, or even just in the domain of gay rights, requires that the policy-specific estimates of congruence be weighted or otherwise mapped onto a single dimension. Thus, dimension reduction must occur at some point, whether at the measurement stage or later in the analysis. 3 tors for a latent trait usually reduces measurement error on the construct of interest, often substantially (Ho↵erbert 1966; Ansolabehere, Rodden, and Snyder 2008). Secondly, many concepts require multiple indicators to adequately represent the full content or empirical do- main of the concept. For example, the concept of liberalism, in its contemporary American meaning, encompasses policy domains ranging from social welfare to environmental protec- tion to civil rights. A measure of liberalism based on only a subset of these domains would thus fare poorly in terms of content validation (Adcock and Collier 2001, 538–40). A final benefit is parsimony. If a single measure can predict variation in disparate domains, then we have achieved an important desideratum of social science: “explaining as much as possible with as little as possible” (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994, 29). Di↵erent works have identified di↵erent traits or dimensions underlying state policies. Walker (1969), for example, creates an “innovation score” that captures the speed with which states adopt new programs. Sharkansky and Ho↵erbert (1969) identify two latent factors that structure variation in state policies, as do Sorens, Muedini, and Ruger (2008). Hopkins and Weber (1976) uncover a total of five. But primarily the state politics literature has focused on a single left–right policy dimension (e.g., Ho↵erbert 1966; Klingman and Lammers 1984; Wright, Erikson, and McIver 1987; Gray et al. 2004). As a number of studies have confirmed, states with minimal restrictions on abortion tend to ban the death penalty, regulate guns more tightly, o↵er generous welfare benefits, and have progressive tax systems, and vice versa for states with more restrictive abortion laws. Following Wright, Erikson, and McIver (1987), we label this dimension policy liberalism. What is policy liberalism? We conceptualize liberalism not as a logically coherent ideol- ogy, but as a set of ideas and issue positions that, in the context of American politics, “go together” (Converse 1964). Relative to conservatism, liberalism involves greater government regulation and welfare provision to promote equality and protect collective goods, and less government e↵ort to uphold traditional morality and social order at the expense of personal autonomy. Conversely, conservatism places greater emphasis on the values of economic free- 4 dom and cultural traditionalism (e.g., Ellis and Stimson 2012, 3–6). Although the definitions of liberalism and conservatism have evolved over time, with civil rights and then social issues becoming more salient relative to economics (Ladd 1976, 589–93), these ideological cleavages have existed in identifiable form since at least the mid-20th century (Schickler 2013; Noel 2014). There are several things to note about this definition of policy liberalism. First, it is comprehensive, in that it covers most if not all domains of salient policy conflict in American domestic politics.4 This is not to say that policy liberalism explains all variation in state policy, or that all policies are equally structured by this latent dimension. But it is a concept that attempts to summarize, holistically, all the policy outputs of a state. Second, we define policy liberalism solely in terms of state policies themselves. By contrast, some previous measures (e.g., Sharkansky and Ho↵erbert 1969; Hopkins and Weber 1976) incorporate so- cietal outcomes like infant mortality rates and high school graduation rates, muddying the distinction between government policies and socio-economic conditions (Sorens, Muedini, and Ruger 2008). A final characteristic of our conceptualization of policy liberalism, which is particularly crucial for our purposes, is that it is dynamic. Unlike, say, state political culture (Elazar 1966), which changes slowly if at all, policy liberalism can and does vary across time in response to changes in public opinion, partisan control, and social conditions. Defining policy liberalism as a time-varying concept is hardly controversial, but it does conflict with previous operationalizations of this concept, all of which are cross-sectional. Cross-sectional measures are problematic for two reasons. First, many are based on data from a long time span—over a decade, in the case of Wright, Erikson, and McIver (1987)—averaging over possibly large year-to-year changes in state policy (Jacoby and Schneider 2001). More importantly, cross- sectional measures preclude the analysis of policy change, which not only is theoretically limiting, but also inimical to strong causal inference since the temporal order of the variables 4. We do not include foreign policy in the domain of policy liberalism because states typically do not make foreign policy. 5 cannot be established (Lowery, Gray, and Hager 1989; Ringquist and Garand 1999). To our knowledge, the only existing time-varying measure that provides a holistic sum- mary of state policy outputs is the measure of policy spending priorities developed by Jacoby and Schneider (2009).5 This measure, available annually between 1982 and 2005, is estimated with a spatial proximity model using data on the proportions of state budgets allocated to each of nine broad policy domains (corrections, education, welfare, etc.). Jacoby and Schnei- der interpret their measure as capturing the relative priority that states place on collective goods versus particularized benefits, an important concept in the theoretical literature on political economy (e.g., Persson and Tabellini 2006) as well as in empirical work on state politics (e.g., Gamm and Kousser 2010). Despite both being holistic yearly policy measures, policy liberalism and policy priorities di↵er in important ways. As Jacoby and Schneider emphasize, policy liberalism and policy priorities are conceptually distinct; indices of policy liberalism “simply do not measure the same thing”as their policy priorities scale (2009, 19). For example, the policy priorities scale is not intended to capture “how much states spend” but rather “how states divide up their yearly pools of available resources” (Jacoby and Schneider 2009, 4). Consequently, variation in the size of government, which lies at the heart of most liberal–conservative conflict (e.g., Meltzer and Richard 1981; Stimson 1991), is orthogonal to their measure. Another salient di↵erence is that the policy priorities scale is based solely on state spending data. This endows their measure with a direct and intuitive interpretation, but at the cost of excluding taxes, mandates, prohibitions, and other non-spending policies that shape the lives of citizens in equally important ways. Our policy liberalism measure resolves this trade-o↵ di↵erently, emphasizing broad policy coverage at the possible expense of intuitive interpretation. In summary, there is no existing time-varying measure of state policy liberalism, one of the central concepts of state politics. Nearly all existing summaries of state policy orientations are cross-sectional. Those that are dynamic either examine policy liberalism in a particular 5. For a cross-sectional implementation of this measure, see Jacoby and Schneider (2001). 6 policy area or, in the case of Jacoby and Schneider’s policy priorities scale, measure a di↵erent concept entirely. Thus what is required is a measurement strategy that summarizes the global ideological orientation of state policies using time-varying data that capture the full empirical domain of policy liberalism. Policy Data As Jacoby and Schneider (2014) observe, composite measures of policy liberalism risk tau- tology if they are derived from policy indicators selected for their ideological character. Although the resulting scale may be a valid measure of policy liberalism, selection bias in the component indicators undermines any claim that state policies vary along a single di- mension. For this reason, we sought to make our dataset of state policies as comprehensive as possible, so as to allow ideological structure to emerge from the data rather than imposing it a priori. Given resource constraints and data limitations, we cannot claim to have con- structed a random sample of the universe of state policies (if such a thing is even possible). We are confident, however, that our dataset of 148 distinct policies is broadly representative of the policy outputs of states across a wide range of domains. (For complete details on the policies in our dataset, see the online appendix accompanying this article.) To be included in our dataset, a policy had to meet the following criteria. First, it had to be a policy output rather than a policy outcome (i.e., an aspect of the social environment a↵ected by policy) or a government institution (i.e., one of the basic structures or rules of the government). For example, we excluded state incarceration and infant-mortality rates, which we considered outcomes. We also excluded indicators for whether states had particular legislative rules or government agencies, which we classified as institutions.6 Second, the policy had to be politically salient. To identify salient policies, we canvassed books and articles on state politics, legal surveys of state policies, state party platforms, governors’ biographies, state-specific political histories, and government and interest-group websites. 6. The dataset used in this paper excludes electoral policies as well. We do this for the pragmatic reason that scholars may want to use our measure to examine the e↵ect of such policies. 7 Third, the policies had to be comparable across all states. Many environmental, parks, and farm policies, for example, are not comparable across states due to fundamental di↵erences in state geography (e.g., coastal versus non-coastal). Some policies we normalized by an appropriate baseline to make them more comparable.7 Finally, in keeping with our focus on dynamics, data on a given policy had to be available in comparable form in at least five di↵erent years. The actual policy data themselves were obtained from many di↵erent sources, including government documents, the Book of the States, interest-group publications, and various secondary sources.8 Over four-fifths of the policies are ordinal (primarily dichotomous), but the 26 continuous variables provide disproportionate information because they di↵erentiate more finely between states.9 The policy domains covered by the dataset include • abortion (e.g., parental notification requirements for minors) • criminal justice (e.g., the death penalty) • drugs and alcohol (e.g., marijuana decriminalization) • education (e.g., per-pupil education spending; ban on corporal punishment) • the environment (e.g., protections for endangered species) • civil rights (e.g., fair employment laws; gay marriage) • gun control (e.g., handgun registration) • labor (e.g., right-to-work laws) • social welfare (e.g., AFDC/TANF benefits) • taxation (e.g., income tax rates) and miscellaneous other regulations, such as fireworks bans and bicycle helmet laws. To validate the comprehensiveness of our dataset, we can compare its coverage to other datasets that were constructed for di↵erent purposes. For example, our policies cover 17 7. We adjusted all monetary expenditure and welfare benefit policies into 2012 dollars. We also adjusted for cost-of-living di↵erences between states (Berry, Fording, and Hanson 2000). 8. In general, we tried to obtain primary sources for each policy indicator. When this proved impossible, we obtained multiple secondary sources to corroborate the information about each policy in our database. 9. We standardized each continuous policy to ensure that the scales were comparable across policy areas. 8 of the 20 non-electoral policy areas contained in Sorens, Muedini, and Ruger’s (2008) state policy database. Similarly, seven of the eight policy categories in the National Survey of State Laws, a lengthy legal compendium of“the most-asked about and controversial”state statutes, are represented in our dataset (Leiter 2008, xii).10 Our data also include 40 of the 56 policy outputs in Walker’s (1969) policy innovation dataset and 21 of the 34 non-electoral policies examined by Lax and Phillips (2011).11 The overlap between these last three datasets and ours is particularly significant, because none of the three were constructed for the purpose of studying the ideological structure of state policies. Even Sorens, Muedini, and Ruger (2008), who do analyze policy in ideological terms, conceive of state policies as varying along two dimensions. In sum, our dataset, while not a random sample of the universe of policies, is broadly representative of available data on the salient policy activities of U.S. states. Measurement Model We use the policy dataset described above to construct yearly measures of state policy liberalism. Like most previous work on the subject, we treat policy liberalism as a latent variable whose values can be inferred from observed policy indicators. Our latent-variable model (LVM), however, o↵ers several improvements over previous measurement strategies, most of which have relied on factor analysis applied to cross-sectional data. First, we use a Bayesian LVM, which unlike classical factor analysis provides straightforward means of characterizing the uncertainty of the latent scores and also easily handles missing data by imputing estimates on the fly (Jackman 2009, 237–8). Second, most of our policy indicators are dichotomous variables, a poor fit for a factor-analytic model, which assumes that the observed indicators are continuous. We therefore follow Quinn (2004) and specify a mixed LVM that models continuous indicators with a factor-analytic model and ordinal (including 10. The categories are Business and Consumer, Criminal, Education, Employment, Family, General Civil, Real Estate, and Tax. There are no real estate laws in our dataset because we could not locate comparable time-varying data on these laws. 11. The remaining policies are missing either because time-varying data were not available or because the policies are not su�ciently comparable across states. 9 dichotomous) variables with an item-response model. Third, our measurement model is dynamic, both in that it allows policy liberalism to vary by year and in that it specifies a dynamic linear model that links the measurement model between periods. We parameterize policy liberalism as a latent trait ✓st that varies across states and years. For each state s and year t, we observe a mix of J continuous and ordinal policies, denoted yst = (y1st, . . . , yjst, . . . , yJst), whose distribution is governed by a corresponding vector of latent variables y⇤st. We model y ⇤ st as a function of policy liberalism (✓st) and item-specific parameters ↵t = (↵1t, . . . , ↵jt, . . . , ↵Jt) and � = (�1, . . . , �j, . . . , �J), y⇤st ⇠ NJ(�✓st � ↵t, ), (1) where NJ indicates a J-dimensional multivariate normal distribution and is a J ⇥ J covariance matrix. In this application, we assume to be diagonal, but this assumption could be relaxed to allow for correlated measurement error across variables. Note that ↵jt, which is analogous to the “di�culty” parameter in the language of item-response theory, varies by year t, whereas the “discrimination” �j is assumed to be constant across time. We accommodate data of mixed type via the function linking latent and observed vari- ables. If policy j is continuous, we assume y⇤jst is directly observed (i.e., yjst = y ⇤ jst), just as in the conventional factor analysis model. If policy j is ordinal, we treat the observed yjst as a coarsened realization of y ⇤ jst whose distribution across Kj > 1 ordered categories is determined by a set of Kj + 1 thresholds ⌧j = (⌧j0, . . . , ⌧jk, . . . , ⌧j,Kj ). Following convention, we define ⌧j0 ⌘ �1, ⌧j1 ⌘ 0, and ⌧jKj ⌘ 1, and we set the diagonal elements of that cor- respond to ordinal variables equal to 1. As in a ordered probit model, yjst falls into category k if and only if ⌧j,k�1 < y ⇤ jst  ⌧jk. Thus for ordinal variable j, the conditional probability that y⇤jst ⇠ N(�j✓st � ↵jt, 1) is observed as yjst = k is Pr(⌧j,k�1 < y ⇤ jst  ⌧jk | �j✓st � ↵jt) = Pr(y ⇤ jst  ⌧jk | �j✓st � ↵jt) � Pr(y ⇤ jst  ⌧j,k�1 | �j✓st � ↵jt) =�(⌧jk � [�j✓st � ↵jt]) � �(⌧j,k�1 � [�j✓st � ↵jt]), (2) 10 where � is the standard normal CDF (Fahrmeir and Raach 2007, 329). In the dichotomous case, where there are Kj = 2 categories (“0” and “1”), the conditional probability that yjst falls in the second category (i.e., “1”) is Pr(⌧j1 < y ⇤ jst  ⌧j2 | �j✓st � ↵jt] = �(⌧j2 � [�j✓st � ↵jt]) � �(⌧j1 � [�j✓st � ↵jt]) = �(�j✓st � ↵jt), (3) which is identical to the conventional probit item-response model (Quinn 2004, 341). We allow the ↵jt to vary by year to account for the fact that many policies (e.g., seg- regation laws) trend over time towards universal adoption or non-adoption. The simplest way to deal with this problem is to estimate the di�culty parameters anew in each year. A more general approach, however, which pools information about ↵jt over time, is to model the evolution of the ↵jt with a dynamic linear model, or DLM (West and Harrison 1997; Jackman 2009, 471–2). In this application we use a local-level DLM, which models ↵jt using a “random walk” prior centered on ↵j,t�1: ↵jt ⇠ N(↵j,t�1, �2↵). (4) If there is no new data for an item in period t, then the transition model in Equation 4 acts as a predictive model, imputing a value for ↵jt (Jackman 2009, 474). The transition variance �2↵ controls the degree of smoothing over time. Setting � 2 ↵ = 1 is equivalent to estimating ↵jt separately each year, and � 2 ↵ = 0 is the same as assuming no change over time. We take the more agnostic approach of estimating �2↵ from the data, while also allowing it to di↵er between continuous and ordinal variables. The parameters in an LVM cannot be identified without restrictions on the parameter space (e.g., Clinton, Jackman, and Rivers 2004). In the case of a one-dimensional model, the direction, location, and scale of the latent dimension must be fixed a priori. We identify the location and scale of the model by post-processing the latent measure of state policy 11 liberalism to be standard normal. For the prior on the innovation parameter �↵, we use a half-Cauchy distribution with a mean of 0 and a scale of 2.5 (Gelman 2006). The di�culty and discrimination parameters are drawn from normal distributions with a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 10. We fix the direction of the model by constraining the sign of a small number of the item parameters (Bafumi et al. 2005).12 We further constrain the polarity by assigning an informed prior to the policy measure for four states in year t = 0 (Martin and Quinn 2002).13 We estimated the model using the program Stan, as called from R (Stan Development Team 2013; R Core Team 2013).14 Running the model for 1,000 iterations (the first 500 used for adaptation) in each of 4 parallel chains proved su�cient to obtain satisfactory samples from the posterior distribution. Estimates of State Policy Liberalism Estimating our measurement model using the policy data described earlier produces a mea- sure of the policy liberalism of each state in each year 1936–2014. When interpreting these estimates, one should bear in mind that the model allows the di�culty parameters ↵t to evolve over time. As a result, aggregate ideological shifts common to all states will be par- tially assigned to the policy di�culties. Since states did adopt increasingly liberal policies over this period, the model partially attributes this trend to the increasing di�culty of con- servative policies (and increasing “easiness” of liberal ones). If we modify the model so as to hold the item di�culties constant over time, the policies of all U.S. states are estimated to 12. Specifically, we constrain continuous measures of state spending to have a positive discrimination pa- rameter, which implies that more liberal states spend more money. We also constrain the polarity of four dichotomous items. The discrimination of ERA ratification and prevailing wage laws are constrained to be positive, while the discrimination of right to work laws and bans on interracial marriage are constrained to be negative. 13. Note that we started the model in 1935 (t = 0) and discarded the first year of estimates. As a result, the informed priors on ✓ for four states in year t = 0 have little e↵ect on the estimates of state policy liberalism that we report in our analysis. We assign a N(1, 0.22) prior on ✓s0 to New York and Massachusetts, and a N(�1, 0.22) prior for Georgia and South Carolina. Other states are given di↵use priors for ✓st. 14. Stan is a C++ library that implements the No-U-Turn sampler (Ho↵man and Gelman, Forthcoming), a variant of Hamiltonian Monte Carlo that estimates complicated hierarchical Bayesian models more e�ciently than alternatives such as BUGS. 12 1940 1975 2010 Figure 1: The geographic distribution of government policy liberalism in 1940, 1975, and 2010. Darker shading indicates liberalism; lighter shading indicates conservatism. The esti- mates have been centered and standardized in each year to accentuate the shading contrasts. have become substantially more liberal, especially between the 1930s and 1970s.15 We use a time-varying model instead because it helps avoid the interpretational di�culties of assum- ing that policies have the same substantive meaning across long stretches of time. The price of this flexibility is that states’ policy liberalism scores are comparable over time primarily in a relative sense. Figure 1 maps state policy liberalism in 1940, 1975, and 2010. As is clear from this figure, the geographic distribution of policy liberalism has remained remarkably stable, despite huge changes in the distribution of mass partisanship, congressional ideology, and other political variables over past seven decades. Throughout the period, Southern states had the most conservative policies. This holds not only on civil rights, but on taxes, welfare, and a host of social issues. By contrast, the most liberal states have consistently been in the Northeast, Pacific, and Great Lakes regions. New York, for example, has consistently had the most liberal tax and welfare policies in the nation, and it was also among the first states to adopt liberal policies on cultural issues such as abortion, gun control, and gay rights. The overall picture of aggregate stability, however, masks considerable year-to-year fluc- tuation in policy liberalism as well as major long-term trends in certain states. These details can be discerned more easily in Figure 2, which plots the yearly time series of individual states 15. In these years, U.S. states expanded their welfare responsibilities and tax bases while loosening a variety of social restrictions. This aggregate trend towards more liberal policies largely ceased after 1980. 13 AL AR AZ CA CO CT DE FL GA IAID IL IN KS KY LA MA MD ME MI MN MO MS MT NC NDNE NH NJ NM NV NY OH OK OR PA RI SC SD TN TX UT VA VT WAWI WV WY AK AL AR AZ CA CO CT DE FL GA HI IA ID IL IN KS KY LA MA MD ME MI MN MO MS MT NC ND NE NH NJ NM NV NY OH OK OR PA RI SC SD TN TX UT VA VT WA WI WV WY −2 −1 0 1 2 3 1936 1950 1975 2000 2014 Year S ta te G ov er m en t P ol ic y Li be ra lis m South Mountain West Midwest Northeast Pacific Coast Figure 2: State government policy liberalism, 1936–2014. The thicker black line tracks the mean in each year, and the colored lines indicate the means in five geographic regions. 14 between 1936 and 2014. Due to explicit policy revisions as well as to policy“drift”relative to other states, policy liberalism can change substantially between years, though cross-sectional di↵erences between states are generally much larger than within-state changes. The variance across states has also increased over time, possibly due to growing geographic polarization. Figure 2 also shows that not all states have been ideologically stable. The policies of Northeastern states became steadily more liberal over this time period. Whereas states like Delaware, Maryland, and Vermont were once more conservative than average, by 2014 all three had joined most of the rest of the Northeast in the top quartile of liberalism. Their early adoption of gay marriage and other rights for homosexuals, for example, contrasts with their slowness in passing racial anti-discrimination laws in the 1950s and 1960s. The welfare benefits and regulatory policies of these states exhibited a similar liberalizing trajectory. Several Midwestern, Mountain, and Southern states have followed the opposite trajectory. Idaho, for example, became much more conservative over this period. In the 1930s–1950s, Idaho actually had some of the most generous welfare benefits in the nation, but by the early 2000s they were among the least generous. Louisiana too has shifted substantially to the right. In the 1930s, Louisiana’s welfare benefits were the most generous in the South and roughly equivalent to those of several Northern states, but they gradually become less generous over the next few decades. Louisiana also waited longer than any other Southern state to pass a durable right-to-work law, but it finally did so in 1976.16 These states’ shifts in policy liberalism track the evolution of their presidential partisan- ship. For instance, in the presidential election of 1936, the first year in our dataset, Maine, Vermont, and New Hampshire were the three most Republican states in the nation, but by 2012 all three (especially Vermont) were more Democratic than average. The opposite is true of the Mountain West, which transformed from Democratic-leaning to solidly Republican. On the whole, the 2010 map in Figure 1 matches contemporaneous state partisanship much 16. Louisiana passed a right-to-work law in 1954 but repealed it in 1956, when the populist Long faction of the Democratic Party recaptured control of state government (Canak and Miller 1990). The unusual power of this faction, forged by Governor and Senator Huey Long in the late 1920s, may help explain Louisiana’s anomalously (for the region) liberal state policies in that era (Key 1949, 156–82). 15 better than the earlier maps, primarily because the South’s shift to the Republicans finally aligned its partisanship to match its consistently conservative state policies. Measurement Validity Having illustrated the face validity of the policy liberalism estimates, we now conduct a more systematic validation of our measure. We begin with convergent validation (Adcock and Collier 2001), documenting the very strong cross-sectional relationships between our estimates’ and existing measures of policy liberalism. We then turn to construct validation, demonstrating that our policy liberalism scale is also highly correlated with measures of theoretically related concepts, such as presidential partisanship. Finally, we show that our policy liberalism scale is strongly related to domain-specific policy measures, and that the predictive fit of the model barely increases if a second dimension is added to the measure- ment model. Overall, this evidence corroborates our claim that a one-dimensional model adequately captures the systematic variation in state policies, and that this dimension is properly interpreted as policy liberalism. Convergent Validation If our estimates provide a valid measure of policy liberalism, they should be strongly related to other (valid) measures of the same concept. Since ours is the first time-varying measure of state policy liberalism, we must content ourselves with examining the cross-sectional relationship between our measure and ones developed by other scholars at various points in time. Figure 3 plots the cross-sectional relationships between our measure of policy liberalism and six existing measures: • “liberalness”/“welfare orientation” rank circa 1957 (Ho↵erbert 1966)17 • welfare-education liberalism in 1962 (Sharkansky and Ho↵erbert 1969)18 17. This index is based on mean per-recipient expenditures for 1952–61 for aid to the blind, old age assistance, unemployment compensation, expenditure for elementary and secondary education, and aid to dependent children. We compare Ho↵erbert’s (1966) scale with our measure of state policy liberalism in 1957 since this is the midpoint of the years he includes in his index. 18. This index is based on about twenty education and welfare policies. Note, however, that this index 16 AL AR AZ CA CO CT DE FLGA IA ID IL IN KS KY LA MA MD ME MI MN MO MS MT NC ND NE NH NJ NM NV NY OH OK OR PA RI SC SD TN TX UT VA VT WA WI WV WYr=−0.76 1957 0 10 20 30 40 50 −2 −1 0 1 2 Policy Liberalism Po lic y in ~ 19 57 (H of fe rb er t, 19 66 ) AL AR AZ CA CO CT DE FL GA IA ID IL IN KS KY LA MA MD ME MIMN MO MS MT NC ND NE NH NJ NM NV NY OH OK OR PA RI SC SD TN TX UTVA VT WA WI WV WY r=0.9 1973 −2 −1 0 1 2 −2 −1 0 1 2 Policy Liberalism Po lic y in ~ 19 73 (K lin gm an & L am m er s, 1 98 4) ALAR AZ CA CO CT DE FLGA IA ID IL INKS KY LA MA MD ME MI MN MO MS MT NCND NE NH NJ NM NV NY OH OK OR PA RI SC SD TN TX UT VA VT WA WI WV WY r=0.88 2000 −5.0 −2.5 0.0 2.5 5.0 7.5 −2 −1 0 1 2 Policy Liberalism Po lic y in 2 00 0 (G ra y, e t a l, 20 04 ) AL AR AZ CA CO CT DE FL GA IA ID IL IN KS KY LA MA MD ME MI MN MO MS MT NC ND NE NH NJ NM NV NY OH OK OR PA RI SC SD TN TX UT VA VT WA WI WV WY r=0.85 1962 −2 −1 0 1 2 −2 −1 0 1 Policy Liberalism Po lic y in 1 96 2 (S ha r. & H of f., 1 96 9) AL AR AZ CA CO CTDE FL GA IA ID IL IN KS KY LA MA MD ME MI MN MO MS MT NC ND NH NJ NM NY OH OK OR PA RI SC SDTN TX UT VA VT WA WI WV WY r=0.9 1980 −1 0 1 2 −1 0 1 2 Policy Liberalism Po lic y in ~ 19 80 (E W M , 1 99 3) AK AL AR AZ CA CO CT DE FL GA HI IA ID IL INKSKYLA MA MD ME MI MN MO MS MT NC ND NE NH NJ NM NV NY OH OK ORPA RI SC SD TNTX UT VA VTWA WIWV WY r=0.84 2006 −5 0 5 10 −2 −1 0 1 2 Policy Liberalism Po lic y in 2 00 6 (S or en s, e t a l, 20 08 ) Figure 3: Convergent validation: relationships between our policy liberalism estimates and six existing measures. Fitted lines indicate loess curves. • policy liberalism circa 1973 (Klingman and Lammers 1984)19 • policy liberalism circa 1980 (Wright, Erikson, and McIver 1987)20 • policy liberalism in 2000 (Gray et al. 2004)21 also includes several social outcomes, such as school graduation rates. 19. This index is based on data measured at a variety of points between 1961 and 1980 on state innovative- ness, anti-discrimination policies, monthly payments for Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), the number of years since ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment for Women, the number of consumer- oriented provisions, and the percentage of federal allotment to the state for Title XX social services programs actually spent by the state. We compare Klingman and Lammers’s (1984) scale with our measure of state policy liberalism in 1973 since this is the midpoint of the years they include in their index. 20. This measure is based on state education spending, the scope of state Medicaid programs, consumer protection laws, criminal justice provisions, whether states allowed legalized gambling, the number of years since ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment for Women, and the progressivity of state tax systems. We compare Wright, Erikson, and McIver’s (1987) scale with our measure of state policy liberalism in 1980 since this is roughly the midpoint of the years they include in their index. 21. This index is based on state firearms laws, state abortion laws, welfare stringency, state right-to-work laws, and the progressively of state tax systems. 17 • policy liberalism in 2006 (Sorens, Muedini, and Ruger 2008)22 Each panel plots the relationship between our policy liberalism estimates (horizontal axis) and one of the six existing measures listed above. A loess curve summarizes each relationship, and the bivariate correlation is given on the left side of each panel. Notwithstanding measurement error and di↵erences in data sources, our estimates are highly predictive of other measures of policy liberalism. The weakest correlation, 0.76 for Ho↵erbert (1966), is primarily the result of a few puzzling outliers (Washington, for example, is the seventh-most conservative state on Ho↵erbert’s measure, whereas Wyoming is the ninth-most liberal). In addition, all the relationships are highly linear. The only partial exception is for Sorens, Muedini, and Ruger (2008), whose measure of policy liberalism does not discriminate as much between Southern states as our measure, resulting in a flat relationship at the conservative end of our scale. In short, the very strong empirical relationships between our policy liberalism scale and existing measures of the same concept provide compelling evidence for the validity of our measure. It is worth noting that most of the existing scales were constructed explicitly with the goal of di↵erentiating between liberal and conservative states. Thus their tight relation- ship with our measure, which is based on a much more comprehensive policy dataset and was estimated without regard to the ideological content of the policy indicators,23 suggests in particular that we are on firm ground in calling our latent dimension “policy liberalism.” Construct Validation The purpose of construct (a.k.a. “nomological”) validation is to demonstrate that a mea- sure conforms to well-established hypotheses relating the concept being measured to other concepts (Adcock and Collier 2001, 542–3). One such hypothesis is that the liberalism of a state’s policies is strongly related to the liberalism of its state legislature, though due to 22. This is the first principal component uncovered by Sorens, Muedini, and Ruger’s (2008) analysis of over 100 state policies. They label this dimension “policy liberalism” and give the label “policy urbanism” to the second principal component. 23. This is true except for the hard coding required to identify the latent scale. 18 factors such as legislative gridlock the relationship may not be perfect (e.g., Krehbiel 1998). To measure legislative liberalism on a common scale, we rely on Shor and McCarty’s (2011) estimates of the conservatism of members of state legislative lower houses. As Figure 4 demonstrates for presidential years between 1996 and 2008, states with more liberal policies tend to have more liberal median legislators. Due possibly to the lingering Democratic ad- vantage in Southern state legislatures, the relationship at the conservative end of the policy spectrum is fairly flat, though by 2008 the relationship had become much more linear. The correlation between legislative conservatism and policy liberalism has also strengthened over time, from �0.51 in 1996 to �0.80 in 2008. AK AL AZ CA CO CT DE FL GA HI IA ID IL IN KS KY LA MA MD ME MI MN MO MS NC NH NJ NM NY OH OK PA RI SC SD TN TX UT VA VT WA WI WV WY r=−0.51 AKAK ALALARAR AZAZ CACA COCO CTCT DEDE FLFL GAGA HI IAIA IDID ILILININ KSKS KYKY LALA MAMA MDMD MEME MIMI MNMN MOMO MSMS MTMT NCNC NDND NHNH NJNJ NMNM NVNV NYNY OHOH OKOK ORORPAPA RIRI SCSC SDSD TNTN TXTX UTUT VAVA VTVT WAWA WIWI WVWV WYWY r=−0.56 AK ALAR AZ CA CO CT DE FL GA HI IA ID IL IN KS KY LA MA MD ME MI MN MO MS MT NC ND NH NJ NM NV NY OH OK ORPA RI SC TN TXUT VA VT WA WI WV WY r=−0.69 AK AL AR AZ CA CO CT DE FL GA HI IA ID IL IN KSKYLA MD ME MI MN MO MS MT NC ND NH NJ NY OH OR PA RI SC SD TN TX VA WA WI WV WY r=−0.8 1996 2000 2004 2008 −1.0 −0.5 0.0 0.5 −1.0 −0.5 0.0 0.5 −1.5 −1.0 −0.5 0.0 0.5 −1.5 −1.0 −0.5 0.0 0.5 −2 −1 0 1 2 −2 −1 0 1 2 −2 −1 0 1 2 −2 −1 0 1 2 Policy Liberalism M ed ia n Le gi sl at or in S ta te H ou se (S ho r & M cC ar ty , 2 01 1) Figure 4: The relationship between state policy liberalism and the conservatism of the median member of the lower house of the state legislature (Shor and McCarty 2011), 1996–2008. An analogous pattern of increasing association over time can be seen in an examination of the relationship between policy liberalism and Democratic presidential vote share. It is natural to hypothesize that both presidential vote and state policy liberalism are responsive 19 to the party and policy preferences of mass publics and thus should be correlated at the state level. Since the anomalously Democratic partisanship of the “Solid South” would distort this relationship, we focus on the non-South only. Even without Southerns states, however, pol- icy liberalism and presidential vote are only weakly related in the early part of the period, as Figure 5 shows. The correlation jumped to 0.58 in 1960 and continued to increase grad- ually through 2012, when it reached nearly 0.9. This increasing association between policy liberalism and presidential vote mirrors the growing alignment of party identification, pol- icy preferences, and presidential vote at the mass level (Fiorina and Abrams 2008, 577–82). The analysis of presidential vote thus provides further evidence for the validity of our pol- icy liberalism scale. At same time, however, it suggests the limitations of presidential vote share as a proxy for mass preferences before the 1960s, even in the non-South (contra, e.g., Canes-Wrone, Brady, and Cogan 2002). Finally, we examine the relationship between our policy liberalism measure and its clos- est analogue, Jacoby and Schneider’s (2009) policy priorities scale. As we emphasize above, policy liberalism and policy priorities are di↵erent concepts. Moreover, the theoretical rela- tionship between policy liberalism and preference for collective over particularistic spending is not self-evident. Nevertheless, Jacoby and Schneider convincingly argue that in U.S. states tend to target particularized policies at needy constituencies. Consistent with that expec- tation, they find a moderately negative cross-sectional correlation between policy liberalism and preference for collective goods. Based on a similar analysis, we too find policy liberalism and policy priorities to be negatively correlated, on the order of �0.5. As Figure 6 shows, their relationship atten- uated somewhat between 1982 and 2005. Also, like Jacoby and Schneider (2009, 18–20), we find that non-linearity in the measures’ relationship contributes to the weak correlation: their association is much stronger among relatively liberal and particularistic states than on the conservative/collective-good end of the spectrum. This seems to be driven in part by Southern states, which always anchor the conservative end of our scale but seem to favor par- 20 AZ CA CO CT DE IA ID ILIN KS MA MD ME MI MN MO MT ND NE NH NJ NM NV NYOH OR PA RISD UT VT WAWI WY r=0.12 AZ CA CO CTDE IA ID ILIN KS MA MD ME MI MNMO MT NDNE NH NJ NM NV NYOH OR PA RI SD UT VT WA WI WY r=0.12 AZ CA CO CTDE IA ID IL IN KS MAMD ME MI MNMO MT ND NE NH NJ NMNV NY OH ORPA RI SD UT VT WA WIWY r=0.29 AZ CA CO CTDE IAID ILIN KS MA MD ME MI MNMO MT NDNE NH NJ NM NV NYOHOR PA RI SD UT VT WA WIWY r=0.16 AZ CA CO CT DE IAID IL IN KS MAMD ME MIMN MO MT ND NE NH NJNM NV NYOH OR PA RI SD UT VT WA WIWY r=0.44 AZ CA CO CT DE IA ID ILIN KS MAMD ME MIMN MO MT ND NE NH NJ NMNV NYOH ORPARISD UT VT WA WIWY r=0.12 AK AZ CA CO CT DE HI IA ID IL IN KS MA MD ME MIMNMO MT ND NE NH NJNMNV NY OH OR PA RI SD UT VT WAWI WY r=0.58 AK AZ CA CO CT DEIA ID IL INKS MD ME MI MNMO MTND NE NH NJ NMNV NY OH OR PA SD UT VT WA WI WY r=0.58 AK AZ CA CO CT DE HI IA ID IL IN KS MA MD ME MI MN MO MT ND NE NH NJ NMNV NY OHOR PA RI SD UT VT WA WI WY r=0.61 AK AZ CA CO CTDE HI IA ID IL IN KS MA MDME MI MN MOMTND NE NH NJNMNV NY OH OR PA RISD UT VT WA WI WY r=0.52 AK AZ CA CO CT DE HIIA ID IL INKS MA MD ME MI MN MO MTND NE NH NJNMNV NYOH ORPA RI SD UT VT WA WI WY r=0.54 AKAZ CA CO CT DE HI IA ID IL IN KS MAMDMEMI MN MO MT ND NE NH NJ NM NV NY OH ORPA RI SD UT VT WA WI WY r=0.71 AKAZ CA CO CTDE HIIA ID IL IN KS MAMD MEMI MN MO MT ND NE NH NJNM NV NY OH OR PA RI SD UT VT WAWI WY r=0.72 AKAZ CA CO CT DE HIIA ID IL IN KS MA MD MEMI MN MO MT ND NE NH NJ NM NV NY OH OR PA RI SD UT VT WAWI WY r=0.67 AK AZ CA CO CT DE HIIA ID IL INKS MA MD MEMI MNMO MT ND NE NH NJ NM NV NY OH ORPA RI SD UT VT WA WI WY r=0.66 AK AZ CA CO CTDE HI IA ID IL IN KS MA MD ME MI MN MO MT ND NE NH NJ NM NV NY OH ORPA RI SD UT VT WAWI WY r=0.76 AKAK AZAZ CACA COCO CTCT DEDE HI IAIA IDID ILIL ININ KSKS MAMA MDMD MEMEMIMI MNMN MOMO MTMTNDND NENE NHNH NJNJ NMNMNVNV NYNY OHOH OROR PAPA RIRI SDSD UTUT VTVT WAWA WIWI WYWY r=0.81 AK AZ CA CO CTDE HI IA ID IL IN KS MA MDME MI MN MO MT ND NE NH NJ NMNV NY OH ORPA RI SD UT VT WA WI WY r=0.82 AK AZ CA CO CTDE HI IA ID IL IN KS MAMD MEMI MN MO MT ND NE NH NJNMNV NY OH OR PA RI SD UT VT WAWI WY r=0.82 AK AZ CA CO CTDE HI IA ID IL IN KS MAMD ME MI MN MO MT ND NE NH NJ NMNV NY OH OR PA RI SD UT VT WA WI WY r=0.89 1936 1940 1944 1948 1952 1956 1960 1964 1968 1972 1976 1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 20 30 40 50 60 70 20 30 40 50 60 70 20 30 40 50 60 70 20 30 40 50 60 70 20 30 40 50 60 70 20 30 40 50 60 70 20 30 40 50 60 70 20 30 40 50 60 70 20 30 40 50 60 70 20 30 40 50 60 70 20 30 40 50 60 70 20 30 40 50 60 70 20 30 40 50 60 70 20 30 40 50 60 70 20 30 40 50 60 70 20 30 40 50 60 70 20 30 40 50 60 70 20 30 40 50 60 70 20 30 40 50 60 70 20 30 40 50 60 70 −1 0 1 2 −1 0 1 2 −1 0 1 2 −1 0 1 2 Policy Liberalism D em oc ra tic P re si de nt ia l V ot e % (N on −S ou th ) Figure 5: The relationship between state policy liberalism and Democratic presidential vote share, 1936–2012 (non-South only). 21 ticularistic spending. The sources of this discrepancy between the two measures—perhaps di↵erences in political culture, budgetary decentralization, or economic need—could be an interesting topic for future research. AK AL AR AZ CA CO CT DE FL GA IA ID IL IN KS KY LA MA MD ME MI MN MO MS MT NC ND NE NH NJ NM NV NY OH OK OR PA RI SC SD TN TX UT VA VT WA WI WV WY r=−0.57 AK AL AR AZ CA CO CT DE FLGA IA ID IL IN KS KY LA MA MD ME MI MN MO MS MT NCND NE NH NJ NM NV NY OH OK OR PA RI SC SD TN TX UTVA VTWA WI WV WY r=−0.55 AK AL AR AZ CA CO CT DE FLGA IA ID IL IN KS KYLA MA MD ME MI MNMOMS MT NC ND NE NH NJ NM NV NY OH OK OR PA RI SC SD TN TX UT VA VTWA WI WV WY r=−0.44 AK AL AR AZ CA CO CT DE FLGA IA ID IL IN KS KYLA MA MD ME MI MN MO MS MT NC ND NE NH NJ NM NV NY OH OK OR PA RI SC SD TN TX UT VA VT WAWI WV WY r=−0.33 1982 1990 1998 2005 −0.2 −0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2 −0.2 −0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2 −2 −1 0 1 2 −2 −1 0 1 2 Policy Liberalism Po lic y P rio rit ie s (J ac ob y & S ch ne id er , 2 00 9) Figure 6: The relationship between policy liberalism and policy priorities (Jacoby and Schnei- der 2009) in selected years, 1982–2005. Dimensionality Our one-dimensional model of state policies implies that a single latent trait captures system- atic policy variation across states. This is not to say that it captures all policy di↵erences, but it does imply that once policies’ characteristics and states’ policy liberalism are ac- counted for, any additional variation in state policies is essentially random. This assumption would be violated if there were instead multiple dimensions of state policy, as some schol- 22 ars have claimed. Given that roll-call alignments in the U.S. Congress were substantially two-dimensional for much of the 20th century (Poole and Rosenthal 2007), it is not un- reasonable to suspect that state policies might be as well. As we demonstrate, however, a one-dimensional model captures state policy variation surprisingly well, and there is little value to increasing the complexity of the model by adding further dimensions. AK ALAR AZ CA CO CT DE FL GA HI IA ID IL INKSKYLA MA MDME MI MN MOMS MT NC ND NE NH NJNMNV NY OHOK OR PA RI SC SD TN TXUTVA VT WA WI WV WY r=0.79 2011 5 10 −2 −1 0 1 2 Policy Liberalism A bo rt io n Po lic y (N A R A L, 2 01 2) AK ALAR AZ CA CO CT DE FLGA HIIA ID IL INKS KY LA MA MD ME MI MN MOMS MT NC ND NE NH NJ NM NV NY OHOK OR PA RI SC SDTN TXUT VA VT WA WI WVWY r=0.85 2008 0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00 −2 −1 0 1 2 Policy Liberalism G ay R ig ht s (L ax a nd P hi lli ps , 2 00 9) AK AL AR AZ CA CO CT DE FL GA HI IA ID IL IN KS KY LA MA MD ME MI MN MOMS MT NC ND NE NH NJ NM NV NY OH OK OR PA RI SC SD TN TX UT VA VTWA WI WV WY r=0.72 1991 10 20 30 −2 −1 0 1 2 Policy Liberalism E nv iro nm en ta l I nn ov at io n (G re en In de x, 1 99 1− 19 92 ) AL AR AZ CA CO CT DEFL GA HI IA ID IL IN KS KY LA MA MDME MI MN MO MS MT NC ND NENH NJ NM NV NY OH OK OR PA RI SC SD TNTX UT VA VT WAWI WV WY r=0.76 1988 200 400 600 800 1000 −2 −1 0 1 2 Policy Liberalism Av er ag e M on th ly A FD C B en ef its P er F am ily (2 01 0 do lla rs ) Figure 7: Relationships between policy liberalism and four issue-specific scales (abortion rights, environmental protection, gay rights, and welfare benefits). One fact in support for unidimensionality is that the most discriminating policies in our dataset—those most strongly related to the latent factor—span a wide range of issues, in- cluding racial discrimination, women’s rights, gun control, labor law, energy policy, criminal 23 Table 1: Correlations between policy liberalism scales estimated using economic, social, racial, and all policies. The unit of analysis is the state-year. The racial policy scale is estimated for the 1950–70 period only. All Economic Social Economic 0.92 Social 0.84 0.69 Racial 0.86 0.68 0.55 rights, and welfare policy. Additional evidence is provided by the relationships between pol- icy liberalism and four issue-specific scales: NARAL’s abortion rights scale (NARAL 2012), the Green Index of Environmental Innovation in 1991–92 (Hall and Kerr 1991; Ringquist and Garand 1999), a gay rights index derived from Lax and Phillips (2009b), and average AFDC benefits per family in each state (Mo�tt 2002). As Figure 7 shows, policy liberalism accurately predicts variation within each of these disparate policy areas. We can explore this question at a higher level of generality by scaling state policies within each of three broad issue domains: economic, social, and racial.24 Policy cleavages in the mass public and in the U.S. Congress are often considered to di↵er across these domains, especially earlier in the 1936–2014 period (e.g., Layman, Carsey, and Horowitz 2006; Poole and Rosenthal 2007). As the first column of the correlation matrix in Table 1 shows, however, each domain-specific scale is strongly related to the policy liberalism scale based on all policies. The domain-specific scales are also highly correlated with each other, with the correlation being weakest for racial and social policies (estimated for 1950–70 only). On the whole, Table 1 provides strong evidence that variation in state policies is one-dimensional and does not vary importantly across issue domains. As a final piece of evidence, we show that allowing for multiple latent dimensions does not 24. Because cross-state variation in civil rights policies is concentrated in the 1950–70 period, we estimate the racial policy dimension for these two decades only. 24 substantially improve our ability to predict policy di↵erences between states. As our measure of model fit we use percentage correctly predicted (PCP), which for binary variables is the percentage of cases for which the observed value corresponds to its model-based predicted value (0 or 1). In order to include ordinal and continuous variables in this calculation, we convert them into binary variables by dichotomizing them at a threshold randomly generated for each variable. We estimate one and two-dimensional probit IRT models separately in each year using the R function ideal (Jackman 2012), which automatically calculates PCP. We then evaluate how much the second dimension improves PCP (adding dimensions cannot decrease PCP). Based on this method, we find little evidence that adding dimensions improves our ability to account for the data. In the average year, a one-dimensional model correctly classifies 82% of all dichotomized policy observations. Adding a second dimension increases average PCP by only 1.5 percentage points. This improvement in model fit is less than the increase in fit that is used in the congressional literature as a barometer of whether roll-call voting in Congress has a one-dimensional structure (Poole and Rosenthal 2007, 33–4). Further, the minimal improvement in model fit gained from adding a second dimension is consistent across time—even during the mid-century heyday of two-dimensional voting in Congress. Taken as a whole, the evidence supports two conclusions. First, a single latent dimension captures the vast majority of policy variation across states across disparate policy domains. This is true even at times when national politics was multidimensional. Second, the approxi- mately 20% of cross-sectional policy variation not captured by a one-dimensional model does not seem to have a systematic structure to it, or at least not one that can be described by additional dimensions. Substantive Applications Our dynamic measure of policy liberalism opens up multiple avenues of research not possible with cross-sectional measures. Most obviously, as we have shown, it permits descriptive 25 analyses of the ideological evolution of state policies over long periods of time. But the availability of a dynamic measure also facilitates causal analyses that incorporate policy liberalism as an outcome, treatment, or control variable. In particular, because it is available for each state-year, our measure can be used in time-series–cross-sectional (TSCS) research designs, which leverage variation across both units and time. The fact that our estimates are available for nearly 80 years is especially valuable because TSCS estimators can perform poorly unless the number of time units is large (e.g., Nickell 1981). For example, scholars could examine how the cross-sectional relationship between state public opinion and policy liberalism has evolved over time (Burstein 2003); estimate the state- level relationship between changes in opinion and changes in policy (cf. Stimson, MacKuen, and Erikson 1995); or analyze how interest groups or electoral institutions moderate the opinion–policy link (cf. Gray et al. 2004; Lax and Phillips 2011). Or scholars could evaluate the policy e↵ects of electoral outcomes or the partisan composition of state government (cf. Erikson, Wright, and McIver 1989; T. Kousser 2002; Besley and Case 2003; Leigh 2008). An alternative approach would be to analyze policy liberalism as a cause rather than an e↵ect. For example, one prominent view is that citizens respond“thermostatically”to changes in policy by moving in the ideologically opposite direction (Wlezien 1995). A related perspec- tive argues that voters compensate for partisan e↵ects on policy through partisan balancing (e.g., Erikson 1988; Alesina, Londregan, and Rosenthal 1993). Other scholars, however, highlight the positive feedback e↵ects of policy changes (e.g., Pierson 1993; Campbell 2012). Our policy liberalism estimates open up ways of adjudicating among these theories using state-level TSCS designs. The Policy E↵ects of Voter Registration Reforms To illustrate the kinds of analyses made possible by our estimates, we conduct a brief inves- tigation into the policy e↵ects of reforms designed to make voter registration easier. While debate over such reforms often focuses on e↵ects on turnout or partisan advantage, their ef- 26 fects on policy are arguably most important.25 One intuitive theoretical prediction, derived from median-voter models of redistribution, is that lowering registration barriers makes the electorate larger and poorer, which in turn increases political support for redistributive (i.e., liberal) policies (Meltzer and Richard 1981; Husted and Kenny 1997). The policy consequences of registration regulations specifically have been examined by Besley and Case (2003, 35–7), who using a fixed-e↵ect (FE) framework find liberalizing e↵ects of lower registration barriers on five state taxation and spending policies in the period 1958–98. Besley and Case’s two-way FE specification improves substantially over cross- sectional comparisons, which cannot control for unobserved di↵erences between states. An important weakness of their specification, however, is that it assumes that states did not trend in di↵erent directions over the period they examine.26 Figure 2 suggests, however, that this assumption is false (see, e.g., the liberalizing trend among Northeastern states). The likely consequence is that Besley and Case’s e↵ect estimates are much too large. We replicate and extend Besley and Case’s analysis, examining the policy e↵ects of three electoral policies—“motor voter”laws, election-day registration, and mail-in registration—on state policy liberalism between 1950 and 2000.27 To guard against di↵erential time trends, we use a more conservative specification that includes a lagged dependent variable (LDV) as well as state and year FEs.28 One advantage of a long time series is the finite-sample bias of LDV-FE models is of order 1/T and thus decreases rapidly as the number of time units increases (Beck and Katz 2011, 342). Table 2 reports the estimated e↵ect estimates, all of which are positive and, except for motor voter registration, distinguishable from 0. In terms of substantive magnitude, these estimates imply that making voter registration easier increases the probability of a state adopting a liberal law by about 1 percentage point. 25. See, for example, Key’s (1949) and J. M. Kousser’s (1974) analyses of the policy e↵ects of su↵rage restrictions in the post-Reconstruction South. 26. Besley and Case (2003) do include a few time-varying demographic controls, but these are unlikely to account for di↵erential state trends. 27. We obtained data on the first two policies from Besley and Case (2003) and data on the third from Springer (2014). 28. Following Besley and Case (2003), we define a unit-year as “treated” by a registration policy if that policy was in e↵ect at the last election. 27 Consistent with our concern about state-specific trends, the estimates from a simple two-way FE model (not shown) are all an order of magnitude larger than their LDV-FE counterparts. Table 2: E↵ect of Electoral Reforms on State Policy Liberalism Policy Motor voter registration 0.012 (0.013) Election day registration 0.035⇤⇤ (0.017) Mail-in registration 0.021⇤⇤ (0.011) Lagged Policy 0.925⇤⇤ (0.008) Constant 0.007 (0.026) FE for state X FE for year X Observations 2,581 R2 0.983 Adjusted R2 0.983 Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05 Though brief, this application highlights several advantages of our measure of policy lib- eralism. First, its TSCS structure enables us to exploit within-state variation in institutions such as registration regulation. Second, its long time series permits the use of estimators, such as LDV-FE models, whose performance improves as T increases. Third, the precision of our composite measure relative to any individual indicator of liberalism means allows us to detect small but meaningful e↵ects, such as the ones reported in Table 2. 28 Conclusion This paper has addressed a major gap in the state politics literature: the lack of a measure of state policy liberalism that varies across time. Using a dataset covering 148 policies and a latent-variable model designed for a mix of ordinal and continuous data, we have generated estimates of the policy liberalism of every state in every year for the past three-quarters of a century. As indicated by their high correlations with existing measures of state policy liberalism as well as with domain-specific indices, our estimates exhibit strong evidence of validity as a measure of policy liberalism. Our yearly estimates of policy liberalism are illuminating for their own sake, revealing historical patterns in the development of state policymaking that would be hard to discern otherwise. But they also open up research designs that leverage temporal variation in state policies to explore questions involving the causes and e↵ects of policy outcomes. These topics include the policy e↵ects of public mood, electoral outcomes, interest groups, and institutions, as well as the consequences of policy change on political attitudes and behavior. The relevance of this paper extends well beyond the field of state politics. In addition to facilitating the study of topics of general significance, our measurement model could be ap- plied to policymaking by local governments (cf. Tausanovitch and Warshaw 2014) as well as in cross-national studies. 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McIver. 1987.“Public Opinion and Policy Liberalism in the American States.” American Journal of Political Science 31 (4): 980– 1001. 36 Online Appendix: “The Dynamics of State Policy Liberalism, 1936–2012” Table 1: Description of Policies Policy Years Description Sources Abortion Policies: Access for Contraceptives 1974-2014 Can pharmacies dispense emergency contraception with- out a prescription? [78, 100, 106, 104] Forced Counseling before Abortions 1992-2014 Does the state mandate counseling before an abortion? [78, 100, 136] Forced Counseling before Abortions 1973-1991 Does the state mandate counseling before an abortion? [78, 100, 136] Legal Abortion Pre-Roe 1967-1973 Did the state allow abortion before Roe v. Wade? [84, 48] Parental Notification/Consent Required for Abortion 1983-2014 Does the state require parental notification or consent prior to a minor obtaining an abortion? [78, 100, 99, 52] Partial Birth Abortion Ban 1996-2000 Does the state ban late-term or partial birth abortions? [78, 100, 8, 51] Medicaid for Abortion 1981-2014 Does the state’s Medicaid system pay for abortions? [78, 100, 53, 8, 96] Criminal Justice Policies: Age Span Provisions for Statutory Rape 1950-1998 Does a state adopt an age span provision into its statutory rape law which e↵ectively decriminalizes sexual activity between similar-aged teens? [26] Death Penalty 1936-2014 Has the state abolished the death penalty? [32] Drug & Alcohol Policies: Beer Keg Registration Requirement 1978-2013 Does the state require the registration upon purchase of a beer keg? [78, 120, 176] Decriminalization of Marijuana Possession 1973-2014 Is marijuana possession a criminal act? [127, 86] Medical Marijuana 1996-2014 Is it legal to use marijuana for medical purposes? [91, 109] Minimum Legal Drinking Age 21 1936-1985 Does the state have a minimum legal drinking age of 21? [119] Smoking Ban - Workplaces 1995-2014 Does the state ban smoking in all workplaces? [11, 25] Smoking Ban - Restaurants 1995-2014 Does the state ban smoking in restaurants? [11, 25] Zero Tolerance (<.02 BAC) for Underage Drinking 1983-1995 Does the state have a Zero Tolerance law for blood alcohol levels <0.02 for individuals under age 21? [119] Education Policies: Allow Ten Commandments in Schools 1936-2013 Does the state allow the Ten Commandments to be posted in educational institutions? [35, 5] Ban on Corporal Punishment in Schools 1970-2014 Does the state ban corporal punishment in schools? [78, 50] Education Spending Per Pupil 1936-2009 What is the per capita spending on public education per pupil based on daily average attendance? [151] Moment of Silence Required 1957-2014 Does the state have a mandatory moment of silence period at the beginning of each school day? [35, 108, 79] Per Student Spending on Higher Education 1988-2013 What is the per student subsidy for higher education? [144] Teacher Degree Required - High School 1936-1963 In what year does the state require high school teachers to hold a degree? [112] Teacher Degree Required - Elementary 1936-1969 In what year does the state require elementary school teachers to hold a degree? [112] School for Deaf 1936-1950 In what year did the state establish residential schools for the deaf? [163] State Library System 1936-1955 In what year did the state establish a library system? [162] Compulsory Education - Age 1936-1939 At what age are children allowed to leave school? [154] Environmental Policies: Air Pollution Control Acts (Pre-CAA) 1947-1967 Does the state have an air pollution control act (Pre-Clean Air Act)? [6, 102] Bottle Bill 1970-2014 Does the state require a deposit on bottles paid by the consumer and refunded when the consumer recycles? [29] CA Car Emissions Standard 2003-2012 Does the state adopt California’s car emissions standards (which are more stringent than the federal level)? [92] Electronic Waste Recycling Program 2000-2014 Does the state have a recycling program for electronic waste? [37, 146, 36] Endangered Species Act 1969-2014 Does the state have an endangered species act? [78, 146, 13] Environmental Protection Act 1969-2014 Does the state have its own version of the federal National Environmental Policy Act? [78, 90, 178] Greenhouse Gas Cap 2006-2014 Does the state have a binding cap on greenhouse gas emis- sions in the utility sector? [134, 19, 23] 1 Description of Policies – Continued from previous page Policy Years Description Sources Public Benefit Fund 1996-2014 Does the state have a public benefit fund for renewable energy and energy e�ciency? [24, 118, 31] Solar Tax Credit 1975-2014 Does the state have a tax credit for residential solar in- stallations? [78, 121, 177] Gambling Policies: Casinos Allowed 1977-2012 Does the state allow casinos? [10] Lottery Allowed 1964-2014 Does the state have a lottery? [132, 97] Gay Rights Policies: Ban on Discrimination - Public Accommoda- tion 1989-2014 Does the state ban discrimination against gays in public accommodations? [58] Civil Unions and Gay Marriage 2000-2012 Does the state allow civil unions or gay marriage (ordinal)? [78, 115, 110] Employment Discrimination Protections 1982-2014 Does the state forbid employment discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and/or sexual identity? [78, 115, 116] Hate Crimes Ban 1999-2014 Are hate crimes explicity illegal in the state? [78, 58, 131] Sodomy Ban 1962-2003 Does the state forbid sodomy? [43, 9] Gun Control Policies: Assault Weapon Ban 1989-2014 Are assault weapons banned in the state? [78, 68, 175] Background Check - Dealer Purchase 1936-1993 Does the state require a background check on gun pur- chases from dealers? [78, 175, 69] Background Check - Private Sales 1936-2014 Does the state require a background check on privately sold guns? [78, 175, 74] Gun Dealer Licenses 1936-2014 Does the state have any license requirements for manufac- turers or dealers? [78, 175, 70] Gun Purchases - Waiting Period 1936-2014 Does the state have a waiting period for gun purchases? [78, 175, 75] Open Carry Law 1961-2014 Is there an open carry law for guns? [78, 175] Saturday Night Special 1974-2013 Does the state ban “Saturday Night Special” handguns? [78, 175, 71] “Stand Your Ground” Law 1993-2014 Does the state have a “stand your ground” law? [78, 175, 73] Gun Registration 1936-2014 Does the state have a registration requirement for guns? [78, 175, 72] Immigration Policies: English as O�cial Language 1961-2014 Is English the state’s o�cial language? [38] Instate Tuition for Immigrants 2001-2014 Does the state allow in-state tuition for illegal immigrants? [105] Labor Rights Policies: Age discrimination ban 1936-1999 Does the state ban age discrimination in hiring? [124, 123, 67] Anti-Injunction Act 1936-1966 Does the state have an anti-injunction law? [170] Collective Bargaining - State Employees 1966-1996 Does the state have collective bargaining rights for state government employees? [46, 27, 174] Collective Bargaining - Teachers 1960-1996 Does the state have collective bargaining rights for local teachers? [34, 113, 114, 80, 46, 27, 174] Disability Discrimination Ban 1965-1990 Does the state ban discrimination against disabled people? [62] Merit System for State Employees 1936-1953 Does the state have a merit system for state employees? [148] Minimum Wage above Federal Level 1968-2012 Is the state’s minimum wage above the federal level? [139, 140, 141, 166, 167, 168, 171] Minimum Wage for Men 1944-1968 Does the state have a minimum wage for men? [139, 140, 141, 166, 167, 168, 171] Minimum Wage for Women 1936-1980 Does the state have a minimum wage for women? [139, 140, 141, 166, 167, 168, 171] Prevailing Wage Law 1936-2014 Does the state have prevailing wage laws? [157, 66] Right to Work Law 1944-2014 Is the state a right-to-work state? [4, 28, 85] State Pension System 1936-1960 When did the state establish its pension system? [149] Temporary Disability Insurance 1945-2014 Does the state have a temporary disability insurance pro- gram? [158] Unemployment Compensation 1937-2014 What is the maximum weekly amount of unemployment benefits? [137, 165] Workers’ Compensation 1936-1947 Has the state established workers’ compensation? [41, 169, 41] Child Labor Work Certificates 1936-1939 Does the state require employment certificates for child labor (14 and 15)? [93, 173, 94, 95, 161, 81, 88, 89, 83] Labor Relations Acts 1937-1966 Does the state have a Labor Relations Act? [103, 164, 172, 88, 89, 83] Licensing Policies: Chiropractor Licensing 1936-1951 When did the state require licensing for chiropractors? [150] Dentist Licensing 1936-1951 When did the state require licensing for dentists? [150] Architect Licening 1936-1951 When did the state require licensing for architects? [150] Beautician Licensing 1936-1951 When did the state require licensing for beauticians? [150] Pharmacist Licensing 1936-1951 When did the state require licensing for pharmacists? [150] Engineer Licensing 1936-1951 When did the state require licensing for engineers? [150] 2 Description of Policies – Continued from previous page Policy Years Description Sources Nurse Licensing 1936-1951 When did the state require licensing for nurses? [150] Accountant Licensing 1936-1951 When did the state require licensing for accountants? [150] Real Estate Licensing 1936-1951 When did the state require licensing for real estate agents? [150] Misc. Regulatatory Policies: Anti-sedition Laws 1936-1955 Does the state have anti-sedition laws? [1] Compulsory Sterilization 1945-1974 Does the state have a forced sterilization program (di- rected toward the disabled, delinquent, etc.)? [63] Grandparents’ Visitation Rights 1964-1987 Does the state have a law guaranteeing grandparents’ vis- itation rights? [45, 57] Hate Crimes Ban 1981-2014 Are hate crimes explicity illegal in the state? [60] Urban Housing - Enabling Federal Aid 1936-1953 Does the state have a law enabling federal housing aid? [59] Urban Housing - Direct State Aid 1939-1951 Does the state provide direct aid for urban housing? [30] Living Wills 1976-1992 Does the state have a law permitting individuals control over the use of heroic medical treatment in the event of a terminal illness? [55] Pain and Su↵ering Limits in Lawsuits 1961-2012 Are there limits on damages for pain and su↵ering in law- suits? [78, 160] Physician-assisted suicide 1998-2014 Does the state allow physician-assisted suicide? [78, 130, 126] Planning Laws Required for Local Gov. 1961-2007 Does the state have a law authorizing or requiring growth- management planning? [128] Protections Against Compelling Reporters to Disclose Sources 1936-2013 Does the state have a Shield Law protecting journalists from revealing their sources? [78, 135, 129] Rent Control Prohibition 1950-2014 Does the state prohibit the passage of rent control laws in its cities or municipalities? [78, 101, 61] Religious Freedom Restoration Act 1993-2014 Did the state pass the Religious Freedom Restoration Act? [54] State Debt Limitation 1936-1966 In what year did the state establish debt limitation? [56] Municipal Home Rule 1936-1961 Did the state pass a law enabling voters to adopt a mu- nicipal home rule charter? [87] Lemon Laws 1970-2014 Did the state pass a law protecting consumers who pur- chase automobiles which fail after repeated repairs? [78, 3, 76, 138] Utility Regulation 1936-1960 In what year did the state regulate utilities? [145] Cruelty to Animals 1936-2014 Has the state made aggravated animal cruelty a first- or second-o↵ense felony? [78, 14, 12, 42] Racial Discrimination Policies: School Segregation 1936-1953 Did the state require segregation in public schools? [78, 98, 133, 33, 16] Ban on Interracial Marriage 1936-1967 Does the state have a law banning interracial marriages? [78, 98, 133, 33, 16] Banning discrimination in public accommoda- tions (pre-CRA) 1936-1963 Does the state pass a law (with adminstrative enforce- ment) banning discrimination in public accomodations (pre-Civil Rights Act)? [78, 82, 22] Banning discrimination in public accommoda- tions (post-CRA) 1964-2010 Does the state pass a law (with adminstrative enforce- ment) banning discrimination in public accomodations (post-Civil Rights Act)? [78, 82, 22] Fair Employment Laws 1945-1964 Does the state have a fair employment law? [16, 156, 39] Fair Employment Laws (post-1964) 1965-2014 Does the state have a fair employment law? (post-1964) [16, 156, 39] Fair Housing - Private Housing 1959-1968 Does the state ban discrimination in private housing? [16, 156, 39] Fair Housing - Public Housing 1937-1964 Does the state ban discrimination in public housing? [16, 156, 39] Fair Housing - Urban Renewal Areas 1945-1964 Does the state have urban renewal areas? [59] Cigarette Tax 1936-1946 Does the state have a cigarette tax? [151, 147] Cigarette Tax Rate 1947-2014 What is the state’s tax on a pack of cigarettes? [151, 147] Earned Income Tax Credit 1988-2014 Does the state have an earned income tax credit? [151, 147] Income Tax 1936-2014 Does the state have an income tax? [151, 147] Income Tax Rate - Wealthy 1977-2012 What is the state individual income tax rate for an indi- vidual that makes more than 1.5 million real dollars? [151, 147] Sales Tax 1936-1945 Does the state have a sales tax? [151, 147] Sales Tax Rate 1946-2014 What is the sales tax rate? [151, 147] Tax Burden 1977-2010 What is the state’s tax burden (per capita taxes/per capita income)? [151, 147] Corporate Income Tax 1936-1940 Is there a corporate income tax? [151, 147] Top Corporate Tax Rate 1941-2014 What is the highest corporate tax rate? [151, 147] Estate Tax 2009-2014 Is there a state estate tax? [151, 147] Transportation Policies: Controlled Access Highways 1937-1946 In what year did the state enact controlled-access high- ways? [77, 20] Bicycle Helmets Required 1985-2014 Does the state require that people use helmets while on bicycles? [18] 3 Description of Policies – Continued from previous page Policy Years Description Sources Mandatory Seat Belts 1984-2014 Does the state require the usage of seat belts (either pri- mary or secondary enforcement)? [40] Motorcycle Helmets Required 1967-2014 Does the state require the usage of helments by people on motorcycles? [47] Mandatory Car Insurance 1945-2012 Does the state require drivers to obtain car insurance? [159] Welfare Policies: AFDC - Benefits for Average Family 1936-1992 What is the average level of benefits per family under the Aid for Families with Dependent Children program? [17, 142, 143, 155] AFDC-UP Policy 1961-1990 What is the average level of benefits under the Aid for Families with Dependent Children program? [15] Aid to Blind - Average Payment per Recipient 1936-1965 What is the average monthly payment per recipient for the permanently blind or disabled? [17, 142, 143, 155] Aid to Blind - Avgerage Payment per Recipi- ent (post-1965) 1966-1972 What is the average monthly payment per recipient for the permanently blind or disabled? (post-1965) [142, 143, 155] Aid to Disabled - Average Payment per Recip- ient 1951-1965 What is the average monthly payment per recipient for the permanently blind or disabled? [142, 143, 155] Aid to Disabled - Average Payment per Recip- ient (post-1965) 1966-1972 What is the average monthly payment per recipient for the permanently blind or disabled? (post-1965) [142, 143, 155] CHIP - Eligibility Level for Children 1998-2012 What is the CHIP eligibility level for children? [117] CHIP - Eligibility Level for Infants 1998-2012 What is the CHIP eligibility level for infants? [117] CHIP - Eligibility Level for Pregnant Women 1998-2012 What is the CHIP eligibility level for pregnant women? [117] General Assistance Payment Per Case 1937-1963 What is the average monthly payment per case for general assistance (an early form of welfare)? [17, 142, 143, 155] General Assistance Payment Per Recipient 1964-1980 What is the average monthly payment per recipient for general assistance (an early form of welfare)? [142, 143, 155] Old Age Assistance - Average Payment per Re- cipient 1936-1965 What is the average monthly payment per recipient per recipient for old age assistance? [17, 142, 143, 155] Old Age Assistance - Average Payment per Re- cipient (post-1965) 1966-1972 What is the average monthly payment per recipient per recipient for old age assistance? (post-1965) [142, 143, 155] Senior Prescription Drugs 1975-2001 Does the state provide pharmaceutical coverage or assis- tance for seniors who do not qualify for Medicaid? [111, 65] State Adoption of Medicaid 1966-1983 Does the state have a Medicaid program? [49] Medicaid - Eligibility Level for Pregnant Women 1990-1997 What is the Medicaid eligibility level for pregnant women? [117] TANF - Average Payment per Family 2006-2010 What is the average monthly level of benefits per family under the Temporary Aid for Needy Families program? [152] TANF - Initial Eligibility Level 1996-2013 What is the initial eligibility level for benefits for a fam- ily of three under the Temporary Aid for Needy Families Program? [152] TANF - Max Payments 1990-2013 What is the maximum level of benefis under the Tempo- rary Aid for Needy Families program for a family of three with no income? [152] Women’s Rights Policies: Equal Pay 1936-1972 Does the state have a law providing for equal pay for women working in the same job? [78, 107, 2, 21] ERA Ratification 1972-2014 Has the state ratified the Equal Rights Amendment? [7, 122, 64] State Equal Rights Law 1971-2014 Has the state passed a state-level equivalent to the Equal Rights Amendment? [78, 44, 153] Gender Discrimination Laws 1961-1964 Does the state ban hiring discrimination on the basis of gender? [125] Gender Discrimination Laws (post-1964) 1965-2014 Does the state ban hiring discrimination on the basis of gender? (post-1964) [125] No Fault Divorce 1966-2014 Does the state have a no-fault divorce policy? [151] Jury Service for Women 1936-1967 Can women serve on juries? [151] 4 References [1] State sedition laws: Their scope and misapplication. Indiana Law Journal, 31(2):270–285, 1956. [2] Equal Pay for Equal Work. The Bureau of National A↵airs, Washington, D.C., 1963. [3] A sour note: A look at the Minnesota lemon law. Minnesota Law Review, 68(1):846–880, 1983. [4] The new encyclopedia of Southern culture. In Gri�n, Larry J., Peggy G. Hargis, and Charles Reagan Wilson, editor, Social Class, volume 20. University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, NC, 2012. [5] Abdel-Monem, Tarik. Posting the Ten Commandments as a historical document in public schools. 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work_2evnddphdncrlcmcvvmghgey5y	----	Three case studies of community behavioral health support from the US Department of Veterans Affairs after disasters RESEARCH ARTICLE Open Access Three case studies of community behavioral health support from the US Department of Veterans Affairs after disasters Tamar Wyte-Lake1,2* , Susan Schmitz1, Reginald J. Kornegay3, Felix Acevedo4 and Aram Dobalian1,5 Abstract Background: Community disaster resilience is comprised of a multitude of factors, including the capacity of citizens to psychologically recover. There is growing recognition of the need for public health departments to prioritize a communitywide mental health response strategy to facilitate access to behavioral health services and reduce potential psychological impacts. Due to the US Department of Veterans Affairs’ (VA) extensive experience providing trauma-informed behavioral healthcare to its Veterans, and the fact that VA Medical Centers (VAMCs) are located throughout the United States, the VA is well situated to be a key partner in local communities’ response plans. In this study we examined the role the VA can play in a community’s behavioral health response using case studies from three disasters. Methods: This study investigated experiences of VA employees in critical emergency response positions (N = 17) in communities where disasters occurred between 2017 and 2019. All respondents were interviewed March–July 2019. Data were collected via semi-structured interviews exploring participants’ experiences and knowledge about VA activities provided to communities following the regional disasters. Data were analyzed using thematic and grounded theory coding methods. Results: Respondents underscored VA’s primary mission after a disaster was to maintain continuity of care to Veterans. The majority also described the VA supporting community recovery. Specifically, three recent events provided key examples of VA’s involvement in disaster behavioral health response. Each event showed VA’s integration into local response structures was facilitated by pre-existing emergency management and clinical relationships as well as prioritization from VA leadership to engage in humanitarian missions. The behavioral health interventions were provided by behavioral health teams integrated into disaster assistance centers and non-VA hospitals, VA mobile units deployed into the community, and VA telehealth services. (Continued on next page) © The Author(s). 2021 Open Access This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence, and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this article are included in the article's Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the article's Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder. To view a copy of this licence, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/. The Creative Commons Public Domain Dedication waiver (http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/) applies to the data made available in this article, unless otherwise stated in a credit line to the data. * Correspondence: tamar.wyte@va.gov 1Department of Veterans Affairs, Veterans Emergency Management Evaluation Center (VEMEC), 16111 Plummer St. MS-152, North Hills, CA 91343, USA 2Department of Family Medicine, Oregon Health & Science University, 3181 SW Sam Jackson Park Rd, Portland, OR 97239, USA Full list of author information is available at the end of the article Wyte-Lake et al. BMC Public Health (2021) 21:639 https://doi.org/10.1186/s12889-021-10650-x http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1186/s12889-021-10650-x&domain=pdf http://orcid.org/0000-0001-8449-7701 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/ mailto:tamar.wyte@va.gov (Continued from previous page) Conclusions: Recent disasters have revealed that coordinated efforts between multidisciplinary agencies can strengthen communities’ capacity to respond to mental health needs, thereby fostering resilience. Building relationships with local VAMCs can help expedite how VA can be incorporated into emergency management strategies. In considering the strengths community partners can bring to bear, a coordinated disaster mental health response would benefit from involving VA as a partner during planning. Keywords: Emergency preparedness, Behavioral health; disaster response, US Department of Veterans Affairs Background Disaster behavioral health The current COVID-19 pandemic, while still underway, has already demonstrated the need for psychological in- terventions to manage the isolation, stress, and trauma stemming from the ongoing disaster [1–5]. While the scale of the event is unprecedented, interest in under- standing the psychological consequences of disasters is not unique to the pandemic [6–10]. Generally, studies exploring the impacts of disasters on behavioral health have found increases in psychological distress in the short term, with the potential for some individuals to ex- perience long-term psychiatric disorders such as post- traumatic stress disorder, depression, and anxiety [6– 10]. To ameliorate the potential negative health effects to impacted populations, numerous early interventions have been explored [7, 11–14]. Some countries such as the Netherlands and Iceland use federally structured plans to implement disaster behavioral health interven- tions [12, 15]. And countries like New Zealand have invested heavily in developing extensive mental health programs in response to large scale disaster events [16, 17]. In the United States, federal entities strive to create resources and guidance on implementing behavioral health services after disaster, however, interventions are generally managed and delivered by state, territory, and local agencies [14, 18, 19]. Often, after federally declared disasters, the US Federal Government additionally pro- vides funding through the Crisis Counseling Assistance and Training Program (CCP) to community behavioral health programs [8, 13, 20]. Yet the structure and con- tent of interventions are left to the discretion of the implementing agency. Regardless of the services provided, having a plan in place prior to a disaster can facilitate implementation [8, 11–13, 19, 21, 22]. Few publications detail the creation of a local disaster behavioral health response plans [15, 18, 20] or describe the process in which interventions were deployed following an incident [7, 10, 15, 20, 23, 24]. Common themes arising in studies exploring disas- ter behavioral health plans or interventions are the need for interdisciplinary teams and interagency collaboration [8, 12, 18–20] and strong community response [16]. The United States Department of Veterans Affairs One interagency partner often overlooked in the United States is the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Veterans Health Administration (VHA). Previous publi- cations on VHA’s participation in collaborative disaster planning and preparedness efforts with local communi- ties identified barriers to its involvement [25, 26]. One such barrier is that the community, and sometime even VHA employees, are unaware that VHA is tasked with planning for and acting to support “national, state, and local emergency management, public health, safety and homeland security efforts” [9, 27]. This responsibility to contribute to community efforts is called the VA’s Fourth Mission and is in addition to VHA’s duty to en- sure continuity of services to veterans after a disaster. The expertise of VHA’s 322,030 healthcare profes- sionals and support staff who provide a range of services at its 1255 healthcare facilities spread throughout the U.S. and its territories makes VHA a valuable potential partner in disaster response [28]. In addition to inpatient and ambulatory medical care, VHA provides a variety of reintegration programs including trauma recovery and behavioral health services for Veterans and their families at its facilities and through community-based care at Vet Centers, Mobile Vet Centers, and college and university campuses [29]. How these services are applied in com- munity response efforts has been detailed in the grey lit- erature [28, 30–32]. This study highlights the potential role of local VA facil- ities in supporting local behavioral health activities after a disaster, and specifically, presents three exemplars of VHA integrating into communities’ disaster behavioral health response and providing behavioral health support to non- Veterans. The three VA facilities and the events they responded to are: (1) VA Pacific Island Healthcare System (VAPIHC), which is based in Honolulu, Hawaii but pro- vides care to Veterans throughout numerous Pacific Islands. On October 24th, 2018, Super Typhoon Yutu made direct landfall on the Mariana Islands, a US Com- monwealth with a nascent established VA tele-mental health clinic on the island of Tinian. This was the stron- gest typhoon ever recorded to strike the area, severely damaging or destroying many buildings and much of the critical infrastructure of Tinian [33]; (2) Orlando VA Wyte-Lake et al. BMC Public Health (2021) 21:639 Page 2 of 12 Healthcare System, which serves east central Florida, and encompasses 7 counties. On June 12, 2016, a domestic ter- rorist attack [34], targeted hate crime, and one of the deadliest mass shootings in the U.S. occurred at a local es- tablishment, Pulse Nightclub. In a matter of hours, 49 people were killed and 53 were wounded before law en- forcement breached the building and ended the violence [35]; and (3) VA Southern Nevada HCS (VASNHCS), lo- cated in and providing care throughout Las Vegas, Nev- ada. On October 1, 2017, the worst mass shooting in modern history took place at the Route 91 Harvest Music Festival on the downtown Las Vegas Strip. A gunman opened fire on a crowd of more than 22,000, killing 58 people and wounding 413 [36]. These cases provide exam- ples of interagency partnerships and the implementation of collaborative responses for communities developing their own plans to address the behavioral health needs of their citizens during disasters, including the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. Methods Study design The results presented in this paper stem from a larger study broadly examining the role of local VA facilities in responding to regional large-scale disasters. This study used qualitative interview methods to elicit study partici- pants’ experiences during disasters impacting the U.S. between 2016 and 2018 (see Table 1 for the full list of the disasters covered in the study, the impacted US states and territories, and VA entities affiliated with the impacted areas). Findings on disaster behavioral health functions were pulled as a subset of data and analyzed. The VA Greater Los Angeles Healthcare System Institu- tional Review Board (Los Angeles, California USA) ap- proved this study. Setting and sample The full study sample was purposively chosen to repre- sent individuals with emergency response roles critical to coordinating VA’s local response to disasters. Emer- gency management personnel at various levels of the VA were the first point of contact and, when applicable, identified additional individuals with critical response roles to interview. Additional respondents were recruited independently by the project team These facilities made up the broad recruitment sample. Due to some respon- dents covering multiple disasters or being deployed to Table 1 States, disasters, and VA facilities represented by the research Disaster Dates of Disaster US States & territories Impacted Affiliated VA entities impacted by the disaster Pulse Nightclub Shooting June 12, 2016 Florida Orlando VA HCS VISN 8 VA OEM Hurricane Harvey Aug. 17 – Sept. 1, 2017 Texas; Louisiana VA Texas Valley Coastal Bend HCS VISN 16 VA OEM Hurricane Irma Aug. 30 – Sept. 9, 2017 US Virgin Islands; Puerto Rico; Florida; Georgia; Alabama VA Caribbean HCS VISN 8 VA OEM Hurricane Maria Sept. 16–30, 2017 US Virgin Islands; Puerto Rico VA Caribbean HCS VISN 8 VA OEM Route 91 Harvest Festival Shooting Oct. 1, 2017 Nevada VA Southern Nevada HCS VISN 21 VA OEM California Wildfire Seasons 2017 & 2018 California VA San Francisco HCS VA Northern California HCS VA Greater Los Angeles HCS VISN 21 VISN 22 VA OEM Hurricane Michael Oct. 7–11, 2018 Florida; Georgia; Virginia; North Carolina Gulf Coast HCS VISN 8 VISN 16 VA OEM Typhoon Yutu Oct. 24, 2018 Northern Mariana Islands VA Pacific Islands HCS VISN 21 VA OEM Note: VA HCS Veterans Health Administration Health Care System, VISN Veterans Integrated Service Network. The national VA system is currently divided into 18 of these regional networks; VA OEM = Office of Emergency Management headquartered in Washington, DC Wyte-Lake et al. BMC Public Health (2021) 21:639 Page 3 of 12 disasters outside their normal service region, not all en- tities were included in the final sample. Data collection methods Data were collected through semi-structured, 60-min telephone interviews between March–August 2019, using an interview guide developed for this study (see Additional file 1). Interviews were conducted individu- ally with each respondent and led jointly by at least two of the authors. Interviews explored participants’ experi- ences and knowledge about VA activities in the commu- nity, specifically focusing on how VA networked and coordinated with non-VA community agencies. Inter- views were audio-recorded, although one respondent de- clined to be recorded. Analysis plan A total of 17 individuals were interviewed. However, five interviews did not indicate collaborating with non-VA entities and were therefore not included in the analysis. Due to their involvement in multiple disasters, two re- spondents were interviewed twice. At completion of the interviews, this resulted in 13 interview recordings being transcribed, and one set of interview notes (due to inter- viewee declining to be recorded), resulting in a total of 14 interviews that were analyzed with Atlas.ti (v.7) using a grounded theory approach. In phase one of analysis, one author reviewed all 14 interviews, using inductive coding to identify emergent themes in the data, and in- formed by extensive conversations about project findings held by the project team at the conclusion of each inter- view [37]. As a product of this process, a significant emergent theme [37] was the presence of interagency partnerships implementing collaborative responses to address the behavioral health needs of local citizens dur- ing disasters. A decision was made by the project team to narrow the focused coding analyses [37] to the way local VA facilities engaged in a behavioral response within their local community, in response to their re- spective large-scale disaster events. In phase two of the analysis, the initial codes identified by SS were reviewed by TWL for consistency and agree- ment. Codes not deemed consistent to the focus topic were dropped. Additional grounded themes were con- firmed by the team and applied to the data set [37]. Consensus on final codes was achieved, and one code list was finalized. In phase three of the analysis, the final code list was applied across all relevant interviews. The final code list had a focus on behavioral health response, including behavioral health activities, method of delivery, reactions of staff, and types of impacted community populations, but also included an identification of high level themes across all disasters, including VA expertise, integrating into local, established response activities, identification of local needs, and logistical challenges. Authors TWL and SS then independently coded each interview and resolved discrepancies by consensus. Results All respondents played a substantial role in VA’s activ- ities following the respective disasters. However, only 12 participants indicated the VAMC they supported collab- orated with non-VA partners during the event in ques- tion. Included disasters ranged from widespread to geographically contained; weather-related to acts of vio- lence; and direct impact on VA facilities ranged from none to significant. Though not all respondents de- scribed intensive engagement with the community fol- lowing the event, all respondents described the importance of integrating into local, established response activities. This translated into involvement in community-wide drills and planning committees and following the lead of local incident command. Respon- dents indicated one of the areas where the VA could provide support to the community was in disaster be- havioral health relief operations. Activities described by respondents were often cen- tered around tasks where the VA could reduce the case- load of other community agencies by identifying Veterans obtaining services in the community and meet- ing their needs regardless if they were previously en- rolled in VA benefits. One key activity described by several respondents included outreach into local shelters. As one respondent explained, VA staff at shelters “[dis- tribute] fliers [that] outline that our counselors are ex- perts in trauma, loss, and in readjustment. They also provide referrals to Veterans for a variety of services, in- cluding housing and employment. We also offered free counseling for all community members impacted.” Identifying where shelters were established and receiv- ing authorization to deploy VA assets to those locations required coordination with local authorities. Multiple re- spondents mentioned connecting with emergency man- agement running relief efforts to describe available VA resources and detail the services available to both Vet- erans and the community at large. In some of the events explored in this study, the non-VA authorities were un- aware of what the VA could offer while others had pre- existing relationships that allowed for more transparent understanding of how the VA could support response efforts. One respondent went on to describe how the disaster that impacted their VAMC led to additional outreach to local jurisdictions and shelter coordinating agencies (e.g., the American Red Cross) to build rela- tionships and understanding specifically of the behav- ioral health services the VA could deploy, if needed and approved. Wyte-Lake et al. BMC Public Health (2021) 21:639 Page 4 of 12 Respondents noted there were specific benefits to con- ducting outreach in locations where other agencies pro- vided services to the people impacted such as shelters and Local Assistance Centers. They noted that VA staff could more easily reach Veterans to enroll them, if eli- gible, into VA services and offer care to those who usu- ally used non-VA health and mental health facilities, thereby supporting local agencies by reducing potential patient loads elsewhere. Additionally, by positioning re- sources at a central location, VA could more readily offer community members services as an extension of their work with Veterans. One specific resource identi- fied as useful for Veteran and community support was Mobile Vet Centers, which have the primary goal of pro- viding social work and mental health services to Vet- erans. In cases where respondents mentioned this resource, they underscored that non-Veteran community members who requested services in the first days after the disaster were never turned away. Three community profiles Three disaster events described by respondents distinctly highlighted cases where the VA was deeply involved in the local community’s disaster behavioral health re- sponse. Each event showed VA’s integration into local response structures was facilitated by pre-existing emer- gency management and clinical relationships, as well as prioritization from VA leadership to engage in humani- tarian missions to support the community. Telehealth in Tinian, Mariana Islands Prior to Super Typhoon Yutu impacting the Mariana Islands, the VA Pacific Island Healthcare System (VAPI HC) established tele-mental health services on the island of Tinian. These services were located at a non-VA owned healthcare clinic using pre-positioned VA tele- medicine equipment and coordinated with the clinic dir- ector and staff. Typhoon Yutu devastated the island and led to many Tinian healthcare clinic employees losing their homes. The clinic with VA tele-mental health equipment became a temporary housing site for staff as it was undamaged by the storm. The clinic director real- ized that in addition to sheltering needs, employees also experienced significant trauma. However, there were limited mental health resources on the island. Once VA became aware of the need, it worked with other federal agencies to manage the logistics of implementing ser- vices that took advantage of pre-positioned VA resources. “… it was a relationship that we had with [the US Department of Health and Human Services] (HHS) and a relationship that we had with the folks on Guam and Saipan … we have a lot of relationships going on. So, we knew that we had that telehealth equipment. We also knew that Tinian was … hit pretty hard. And that there was a lot of grief. And so I can’t say how it totally emerged, but there’s so many relationships and there’s so much communi- cation during an emergency.” Respondents reported it was initially challenging to identify whether VA could provide mental health ser- vices in the community and how the services would be funded. Staff at all levels of the VA worked with the Fed- eral Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and HHS to get official authorization as well as receive federal funding for VAPIHC to provide time limited tele-mental health interventions to clinic staff on Tinian. VAPIHC Tele-mental Health Hub coordinated with the local clinic director to inform employees about available ser- vices and utilized technology onsite to provide weekly support groups for 13 health center employees. Director’s 50 in Orlando, Florida and the pulse nightclub shooting The Orlando VA Healthcare System (OVAHCS) houses a unique emergency response team “The Director’s 50.” Made up of multi-disciplinary VA healthcare workers, including mental health professionals (i.e. psychologists, psychiatrists, mental health nurses), the Director’s 50 can deploy a team of up to 50 volunteers within 2 hours to areas throughout the region when authorized by the Orlando VAMC Director. As described by one respond- ent, the mission of the team is, “to provide an immediate gap fill to an emergency before VA can get its assets organized and into a formal support and response role. So the team is multi-disciplinary and multi-functional with its cap- abilities, so that it can immediately address the needs of the emergency response until VA can formalize how it’s going to provide their support to the community.” The Director’s 50 includes interdisciplinary clinical and service support training for all members such as tri- age and treatment services, mental health intervention, peer counseling, and psychological support to trauma. Through participation in community-wide exercises and drills, the Director’s 50 has built versatile capabilities and strong relationships with local emergency manage- ment agencies and area hospitals. In response to the Pulse Nightclub Shooting, VA Cen- tral Office requested OVAHCS to deploy the Director’s 50 to provide VA resources and support the commu- nity’s response. The team activated their mass notifica- tion system to alert their nearly 100 volunteer members Wyte-Lake et al. BMC Public Health (2021) 21:639 Page 5 of 12 and quickly assembled an initial response team of about 15 clinical, mental health, and support professionals within 1 hour. Respondents noted having internal ap- proval can speed up the process of deploying teams. In general, to distribute VA resources into the community, a federal disaster declaration is required to initiate the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assist- ance Act or where the HHS Secretary has activated the National Disaster Medical System, both of which grant VA the ability to provide assistance. Therefore, respon- dents noted a need to balance expectations of leadership to help quickly, while also ensuring VA resources were legally allowed to be used in the response. One thing that facilitated OVAHCS’s integration into the local response system was a pre-existing relationship with the City of Orlando’s Office of Emergency Manage- ment and the Central Florida Medical Disaster Coalition, which facilitated the Director’s 50 integration into the city’s response and allowed them to report to the victim reunification center. The team was tasked. “to be the initial communication to the family mem- bers for those victims that actually passed away. So, 49 victims, our team was assigned to go ahead and be the initial contact to let them know that their loved ones had passed, and to begin the coordin- ation for services, grief counseling and victim advo- cacy, you know, to help them prepare the initial points of piecing together their lives after being no- tified of such tragic events.” Accordingly, the initial multi-disciplinary team nar- rowed its focus to mainly members with mental health expertise. Over the next 2 weeks, the team worked with the community, helping to manage vigils and gatherings for the public, and continuing grief counseling and men- tal health support for the whole community, including providing peer behavioral health support to municipal first responders. Since this act of violence targeted people who were Lesbian Gay Bisexual Transgender Queer (LGBTQ) frequenting Pulse Nightclub, not only were relatives of victims or survivors from inside the building affected, but the entire LGBTQ community felt the traumatic impact of the shooting. One respondent described the importance of providing mental health support from multiple community agencies when a dis- aster of this magnitude occurs, “And they [the people who were at the shooting] truly needed a place, and this is why we were there for greater than just the 24-48 hours of initially identifying the people who was killed during the shooting, you had everyone that was inside of the club who were seeking a place where they could go and receive the care and support that they needed as well. And obviously, you know, this is something that is an endemic issue with healthcare as a whole, is the access to mental health counseling and ser- vices. So VA, as well as some other partnering men- tal health organizations were able to supply that need right there at the site where they were doing victim notification or victim reunification and family support. We were able to do that.” One respondent noted a key point to remember about the Director’s 50, “they are all volunteers...And these people will go—you know, 24 hours a day, day in and day out, to execute that mission. And we have to think about team resiliency.” This included caring for team member’s well-being by rotating staff and providing and attending to the mental heath of one another. As de- scribed by one respondent, “Because when it was all said and done, the team was very affected by what they had to do. You know, just imagine hearing—you know, overwhelming grief for every one of the 49 victims’ families that would show up. And the team took that burden on … and I will tell you, to this day, it still affects the people who went and supported that mission. And they really—those who supported that mission have a greater reverence for what we do now, as a team. So you’d never have to ask them to—whether they are going to support anything related to the Direc- tor’s 50. That comradery that’s there, they won’t let their own kind of—go into the bowels of despair like that, alone.” Integrating into community response in Las Vegas, Nevada after the route 91 harvest festival shooting As a large city with many national and international visi- tors, respondents described Las Vegas as having a very centralized emergency response structure. Relationships between VA Southern Nevada HCS (VASNHCS) and local response agencies and area hospitals were de- scribed as “tightknit” with great working relationships where organizations plan and prepare for disasters to- gether. As one respondent put it, “what I do know is my community. I know my com- munity partners. I know what they have, what they don’t have, they know what I have, what I don’t have. And that’s what makes us so resilient. That’s community.” Although located too far away from the Las Vegas Strip to actively receive injured victims when the shoot- ing occurred at the Route 91 Harvest Music Festival, Wyte-Lake et al. BMC Public Health (2021) 21:639 Page 6 of 12 VASNHCS activated its Hospital Incident Command System so it could actively participate in the commu- nity’s response and organize efforts. A Multi-Agency Co- ordination Center (MACC) organized the response activities, and respondents underscored the value of both pre-existing relationships and an understanding of the county’s emergency response structure. As explained by a respondent, “You can’t wait for your community to ask you. You have to be on the forefront and know what they need. And you only do that by knowing your com- munity. You know, I spent probably as much time in my community as I do in my medical center. A lot of the time, it’s my own time, but again, it builds that relationship that when they’re updating their mass casualty plan, one of the people they’re calling is [me].” This previous collaboration, as well as being present at the MACC, allowed VASNHCS to identify community needs that it could address. As news of the shooting spread, VA leadership tasked VASNHCS with deploying staff into the community. However, it was challenging to balance the push from VA to deploy with continuing to respect established local coordination structures. VASNHCS maintained a presence within the Medical Area Surge Command of the MACC to offer resources and expertise, waiting for requests, instead of directly deploying assets outside of the established system. In the immediate response, VASNHCS assisted with managing fatalities. It offered morgue space to the county and initiated the mass fatality plan to increase morgue capacity. This provided the county and partner hospitals space for victims until they could be processed, and families could claim them. Additionally, VASNHC offered a Psychological First Aid (PFA) team. Initially, VASNHCS deployed their PFA team to the community’s family reunification center. The team was composed of social workers, psychologists, psychiatrists, administrators (as support staff), canteen services (for water and snacks to sustain clients and staff), and the medical center’s Chief of Staff. As the situation evolved, the MACC received requests from local agencies for psy- chological assistance and VASNHCS transitioned to dir- ectly integrating into area hospitals. Three Las Vegas hospitals received the bulk of the in- jured or dead and recognized the need for psychological interventions with their staff. Due to their close relation- ships with other hospitals, one respondent explained that they were familiar with the Employee Assistance Program (EAP) at these hospitals. The respondent knew it would take time for the EAP to arrive onsite and they would most likely focus on clinical staff involved in dir- ectly treating the injured. Therefore, VASNHCS devel- oped a three-pronged approach to complement EAP services at the receiving hospitals. Firstly, the PFA team provided what one respondent called “trauma therapy” to hospital staff, regardless whether they worked the night of the shooting. The assistance extended beyond clinical staff to non-clinical departments, such as envir- onmental services/housekeeping, whose staff were also impacted through their response roles. Respondents reported one of the reasons their re- sponse in the hospitals was so successful was that the team was multidisciplinary, allowing staff from different departments to talk to people in similar positions, which was valued by the recipients. “So for example, we have a nurse that’s trained in trauma, psychological first aid. So they want the nurses at [the hospital with a patient surge], they want to talk to our team. They were still processing. But when we brought our nurse into the ward, they were more than willing to open up to her, because she was one of them. She was part of their tribe. So we try to match our tribe to their tribe, and that’s why we were successful.” Secondly, the VASNHCS team worked with victims of the shooting, providing PFA and social work services. Thirdly, they integrated with family members of patients at the hospitals and provided them items that they did not otherwise have because they were visitors to Las Vegas. Examples included coordinating free transporta- tion to and from hospitals and hotels, connecting them to local mortuary services, and providing information about how to access services when they returned home. The PFA team ran for 24 h a day, for 7 days in those three impacted hospitals. To balance VA patient care with the community response mission, VASNHCS staff volunteered shifts outside of their normal work hours. One respondent described the overwhelming desire of VA staff to help their community. “And while it didn’t impact our staff or our clinics, or our patients, it impacted our community. I think another thing that still amazes me to this day, was the outpour of our staff and what I mean by that is they were coming out of the woodwork to support. We had more volunteers working an eight-hour shift and then coming in [to volunteer] at five o’clock or four o’clock and working to midnight to two in the morning and not go home until four or five in the morning, and then go to work the next day, because we didn’t want to impact our patient care. And they were doing this out of their—you Wyte-Lake et al. BMC Public Health (2021) 21:639 Page 7 of 12 know, because they care. They care about the com- munity, they care about the event, they care about the people. And then at the end of the day, you know, we had more volunteers than we had place- ments, because we did not want to overwhelm the health systems with all of these VA personnel.” However, with new volunteers each shift, a key lesson learned was to have a daily team debrief. As people changed daily, a debrief provided key information and a running tally of support being provided to save time and avoid reinventing the wheel identifying contacts or sys- tems already developed. Another lesson was that preparedness requires on- going maintenance. The importance of ongoing pre- paredness was underscored when VASNHCS realized that leading up to the shooting, they had reduced their focus on PFA training. As described by one re- spondent, “We noticed that we need that continuous [psychological first aid] training, that we need con- tinuous exercising, and it’s not an easy fit, to send a bunch of people to someone else’s hospital or an area to do that kind of service.” They also realized the first wave of personnel went into community hospi- tals without basic supplies they needed to provide services, including basic items such as pens, PFA guides, and informational brochures. Three months following the shooting, the VASNHCS Emergency Manager, working with the Chief of Social Work hosted a lunch for staff who volunteered to thank them for their involvement. During that event, they real- ized volunteers were not only impacted by the event it- self, but also by their time providing support in the community. They therefore created a forum to again gather staff who had deployed at the 6 month and 9 month marks to eat and talk about the impact of the event on the healthcare system and themselves. On the 1 year anniversary, management had a special event for the volunteers, “we actually had people from the community that we supported coming in and they broke bread with our team and what they did was, they talked about what the impact of the VA Southern Nevada Healthcare System was going into that event, and how we helped them bridge the gap [of mental health support] that was cru- cial at that time, and how appreciative they were to our cause and our Clark County Office of Emergency Management gave all our staff that responded T-shirts that said Vegas Strong, be- cause they wanted them to know that we—they appreciated the work that we did for them to support our community.” Discussion The need for attention to the psychological well-being of individuals during and after a disaster has been well proven as disasters have been found to be associated with both short and long-term symptoms and disorders [6–10, 38]. Although in some parts of the world there are federally structured plans to implement disaster be- havioral health interventions, in the United States there is a patchwork system that often relies on support and resource allocation from a multitude of agencies [8, 13, 14, 18–20]. In this study we examined the role the VA can play in a community’s disaster relief effort and highlighted the opportunity for VA to support behav- ioral health response focusing specifically on case studies from three disasters. Essential to effective emergency management is an un- derstanding of, and engagement with, available resources in a local community. This is of particular importance when considering complex individual and group needs such as behavioral health support. VA Medical Centers can be seen as challenging partners to work with be- cause they are both a federal entity and a local health- care facility [26]. However, in the case of Super Typhoon Yutu, the federal positioning of the VA and its connec- tion with HHS and FEMA facilitated the deployment of VAPIHC virtual resources. The regional respondents who supported the VA disaster mission in Tinian de- scribed how preexisting relationships with federal part- ners facilitated authorization and funding. Another potential challenge to incorporating the VA into response efforts is that prior to offering services, VA leadership must balance the mission of the agency with community needs, without contradicting the re- strictions of the Stafford Act. In all three presented cases, VA’s behavioral health support was not formally included in a city or county response plan, and yet pre- existing relationships between key stakeholders facili- tated the provision of VA behavioral health services to support identified community needs. Respondents also described participating in interagency coordinating groups, response trainings, and exercises before the dis- aster. These activities aided in a deeper understanding of the response structures each partner operated under and encouraged strong rapport between agencies. Relationships between VA emergency management and local emergency management proved invaluable as VA staff understood that services should not be pro- vided without first engaging local response coordinators. All VA facility leadership and emergency managers are required to be trained in the Incident Command System (ICS) and National Incident Management System (NIMS), which are the coordinating structures all U.S. response agencies work within [39]. As a health care provider at a national level, VHA falls within the Wyte-Lake et al. BMC Public Health (2021) 21:639 Page 8 of 12 operations section Essential Support Function (ESF) 8: Public Health and Medical Services to support the De- partment of Health and Human Services [40]. Local ju- risdictions may also connect with VAMCs through ESF 8 representation. For example, the VA has provided sig- nificant support to communities impacted by COVID- 19. As of July 8, 2020, VA provided more than 330,000 pieces of Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) in sup- port of the Fourth Mission, as well as hand sanitizer, laundry support, test kits and testing support, and web- cams for use with existing equipment to state and local facilities. In addition, VA has admitted 279 non- Veterans to VA Medical Centers because of the pan- demic [27]. Much of this coordination was done through ESF 8 coordination at a local or national level. While respondents did not go into detail about their participation in the emergency management structure, some participants described their VA’s roles within emergency operations as liaisons. Groups such as this could report to either the planning, operations, or com- mand sections within the ICS. Group supervisors would most commonly report to the operations section chief, likely through branch directors, given that the focus of the work would be more on specialized functions as needed for tactical operations. Regardless of where they fit, their presence at emergency operations centers and command posts facilitated communication to allow for VA’s integration into incident action plans. Particularly during the response to mass casualty events in Orlando and Las Vegas, understanding the local response net- work and then proffering available services was essential to avoid confusion or duplication of activities. By work- ing within the established coordination centers, VA’s ef- forts were effectively integrated into the greater community behavioral health response and were de- ployed to points of greatest need. Although a detailed understanding of the integration of VA activities into ICS structures fell outside of the scope of this work, fu- ture assessment of the integration of VA representatives into local, state, and/or regional ICS structures could help clarify roles and identify which section liaisons best support (e.g., operations, planning, logistics) [40]. VA is increasingly strengthening partnerships with agencies that provide behavioral health services to Vet- erans and their families who use non-VA community- based care [41]. In each case example, the primary sup- port provided by VA to the community was the provision of behavioral health services in response to an identified need. Respondents described this as being due, in large part, to the recognition of VA’s expertise in trauma and post-trauma treatment, thereby allowing these resources to come to the forefront. While not mentioned by the respondents, an additional value that VA providers add to disaster behavioral health responses is their exposure to and understanding of the unique needs of various populations throughout their communi- ties. In addition to ensuring care is culturally competent to the unique identity of being a Veteran, VA staff must respect the diversity of Veterans themselves. Just like the U.S. population at large, Veterans represent a range of ages, races, genders, sexual orientations, socioeconomic statuses, etc. and mental health services must be consid- erate of this diversity. The VA recognizes this and offers training to providers to understand and respect their pa- tients’ unique needs [42]. Working with a variety of pop- ulations preposition VA staff to have a deeper understanding of the post-disaster needs of the wider community. Two of the case examples described in this study espe- cially bring to the forefront the importance of disaster behavioral health response planning and implementation teams understanding unique experiences of community members. Super Typhoon Yutu directly impacted an ar- chipelago housing a majority Asian and/or Pacific Island population. The Pulse Nightclub shooting, while a ter- rorist event, was a targeted hate crime intended to inflict violence on the LGBTQ community. Disaster behavioral health interventions for these affected groups not only need to take into consideration the importance of cul- tural competency but also the potential of re- traumatization and distinct population mental health needs. In the Northern Mariana Islands, while there is a mix of ethnic groups (Filipino, Chamorro, Chinese, Carolin- ian, Korean, Palauan, etc.), many either identify as or are categorized more broadly as Asian and/or Pacific Is- landers. Although there are more than 1.4 million people who are considered Pacific Islanders living the in the U.S., there is a dearth of information on the mental health of this population [43]. Similarly, the prevalence and incidence rates of mental illness in the Mariana Islands is not well studied [44]. Some sources attribute this lack of understanding to a disproportionate under- use of mental health services [43]. However, Asian and Pacific Islanders within the U.S. and those territories af- filiated with it often experience transgenerational trauma, discrimination, continued loss from colonization, historical trauma, and mental health stigma which can impact psychological wellbeing and help seek- ing behavior. Additionally, cultural elements (collectiv- ism, reverence for the past, hierarchical social order, etc.) of this population are important to understand when providing behavioral health services [43, 45]. One of the reasons respondents indicated that the VA was asked to provide assistance following Typhoon Yutu was the lack of availability of mental health services in Ti- nian. The established VA telehealth technology in- creased accessibility to behavioral practitioners from Wyte-Lake et al. BMC Public Health (2021) 21:639 Page 9 of 12 VAPIHC who most likely were experienced working with Asian and Pacific Island populations since more than 55,000 Veterans who identify as this ethnicity live in Island Areas or Hawaii [46, 47]. The Pulse Nightclub Shooting was a terrorist driven hate crime targeting individuals who identified as LGBTQ. Members of this group often experience dis- crimination, stigma, and trauma throughout their lives. Discrimination and heterocentric health and mental health practices can marginalize this population and im- pact help seeking behavior [48, 49]. This is of particular concern as individuals who are LGBTQ face numerous mental health disparities with a higher likelihood of ex- periencing depression, anxiety, substance misuse, and suicide attempts. The shooting not only targeted LGBTQ people but it also took place during Latin Pride Night meaning many of the victims and casualties were LGBTQ Latinx. The resulting psychological impacts of the Pulse Nightclub shooting on those directly impacted, people who are LGBTQ Latinx, and individuals in the wider LGBTQ community have been investigated and show experiences of trauma and impacts on perceived safety [50]. At the time of the shooting, the Orlando VAMC had established relationships with LGBTQ local mental health services and had staff knowledgeable in the needs of this community [51]. In fact, in the recent past, the VA has increased its efforts to ensure Veterans who are LGBTQ receive the highest quality patient- centered care possible [52]. Mental health services in particular have bolstered recognition of the complex needs of these Veterans [52]. All three cases demonstrate innovative ways VA can provide behavioral health support outside of their facil- ities, i.e., via telehealth capabilities across an ocean and into a healthcare clinic, teams of mobile units reaching directly into the community to support victims, victims’ families, and the community at large, and finally by in- corporating PFA teams directly into hospitals to support staff, patients, and patients’ families. This flexibility across sites to address different needs and populations while using varying available infrastructure support, is paramount to any local jurisdiction’s ability to meet on the ground needs following a disaster. It demonstrates the variability between VAMCs and the importance of local disaster behavioral health planning teams to pre- identify resources to assess local capacity. Plans can then be developed that access and deploy the tools/skills of interdisciplinary and interagency teams. Building pro- cesses to deploy local health and mental health practi- tioners can lead to more rapid implementation of interventions and help ensure the diversity of the im- pacted community is recognized and respected. Add- itional studies focused on how communities develop disaster behavioral health plans could provide insight into which agencies are involved and how they collabor- ate. It may also be useful to assess whether and how these plans are implemented to identify best practices. In addition to the people directly impacted by disas- ters, respondents underscored the importance of offering support to responders as well. There is growing recogni- tion that health care workers are themselves front-line response workers who may be psychologically impacted when caring for others, leading to a growing emphasis on the importance of selfcare and employee wellbeing [39–42]. In all three case studies, behavioral health sup- port was, at least in part, directed toward healthcare workers. In the case of Las Vegas, a respondent highlighted the advantage of having behavioral health support come from individuals who understood the cul- ture of the population they were helping, e.g., nurses supporting nurses. Further, respondents in Las Vegas and Orlando highlighted the importance of supporting deployed behavioral health team members. They detailed actions to maintain staff well-being by having rotating shifts, encouraging peer support, and facilitating gather- ings for staff to publicly thank them for their efforts and allow them to address their experiences together as a group. Understanding the needs of healthcare and be- havioral health personnel and building support networks into response frameworks can help better sustain and strengthen the overall response process. A primary limitation of this study is that interviews were conducted up to one and a half years after the di- sasters described, potentially impacting recall. However, multiple interviewees corroborated the information pre- sented for each of the case studies. Another limitation is that this study focused exclusively on the experiences of VA employees fulfilling mission requirements and their description of instances where VA acted in support of the Fourth Mission. Very few of the respondents directly provided the behavioral health interventions. These per- spectives could provide deeper understanding of the in- terventions themselves as well as the impacts they may have on practitioners. Neither community members nor coalition partners were interviewed in this study. Future research would benefit from both interviewing non-VA participants to explore additional perspectives and gain greater insight on how local jurisdictions experienced collaborating with VA representatives and exploring al- ternative approaches to mental health units within and outside VA to examine whether and when different ap- proaches may be preferable. Conclusion As the largest integrated healthcare system in the United States, VA can play an important role in disaster re- sponse across the country. As recognition of VA’s ex- pertise in behavioral health grows, particularly around Wyte-Lake et al. BMC Public Health (2021) 21:639 Page 10 of 12 trauma and post-trauma treatment, VA should be con- sidered a strong potential partner in behavioral health responses. Local VAMC staff are part of the community in which they live and the Veterans they serve are a microcosm of the larger population of the U.S. As the respondents in this study showed, there is a deep desire by VA staff to provide support following a disaster if they are able. Anticipating potential behavioral health concerns, and having a plan to address them, can foster community disaster resilience. While these plans may be different for each jurisdiction, they can be strengthened by identifying and incorporating a range of partners. Having preexisting relationships where VA’s capabilities are known before a disaster occurs can facilitate the rapid deployment of VA resources into identified areas of community need. The case studies presented demon- strate the flexible nature of these resources. By extend- ing knowledge about innovative ways to share behavioral health and other resources in a disaster response, com- munities and healthcare coalitions can be better pre- pared to engage collectively and rapidly mobilize essential assets to support the wellbeing of those who need it most. Abbreviations CCP: Crisis Counseling Assistance and Training Program; VA: U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs; VHA: Veterans Health Administration; VAMC: VA Medical Center; VAPIHC: VA Pacific Island Healthcare System; VASNHCS: VA Southern Nevada HCS; VA HCS: Veterans Health Administration Health Care System; VISN: Veterans Integrated Service Network; VA OEM: Office of Emergency Management; HHS: US Department of Health and Human Services; FEMA: Federal Emergency Management Agency; LGBTQ: Lesbian Gay Bisexual Transgender Queer; MACC: Multi-Agency Coordination Center; PFA: Psychological First Aid; EAP: Employee Assistance Program; PPE: Personal Protective Equipment Supplementary Information The online version contains supplementary material available at https://doi. org/10.1186/s12889-021-10650-x. Additional file 1. 2017 Disaster Qualitative Study: Collaboration Project Interview Guide. Interview guide utilized during project’s semi-structured interviews. Acknowledgements Not applicable. Authors’ contributions TWL and SS planned the study, including instrumentation, conducted the data analysis, and wrote the paper. RJK and FA supported the qualitative analysis and contributed to revising the paper. AD helped to plan the study and contributed to revising the manuscript. All authors have read and approved the manuscript. Funding This work was supported by the US Department of Veterans Affairs, Veterans Health Administration, Office of Emergency Management and the Office of Population Health. The views expressed in this presentation are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position or policy of the VA or the US government. Availability of data and materials The datasets used and/or analyzed during the current study are available from the corresponding author on reasonable request. Declarations Ethics approval and consent to participate The Greater Los Angeles VA Healthcare System Institutional Review Board (Los Angeles, CA USA) approved this study. As the research presented no more than minimal risk of harm to subjects and involved no procedures for which written consent would be normally required outside of the research context, the study received a waiver for documentation of consent from the Institutional Review Board, and verbal, recorded audio consent was approved. Consent for publication Not applicable. Competing interests The authors declare that they have no competing interests. Author details 1Department of Veterans Affairs, Veterans Emergency Management Evaluation Center (VEMEC), 16111 Plummer St. MS-152, North Hills, CA 91343, USA. 2Department of Family Medicine, Oregon Health & Science University, 3181 SW Sam Jackson Park Rd, Portland, OR 97239, USA. 3Orlando VA Medical Center, 13800 Veterans Way, Orlando, FL 32728, USA. 4VA Southern Nevada Healthcare System, 6900 N. Pecos Road, North Las Vegas, NV 89086, USA. 5Division of Health Systems Management and Policy, University of Memphis School of Public Health, Memphis, TN, USA. Received: 5 August 2020 Accepted: 18 March 2021 References 1. Brooks SK, Webster RK, Smith LE, Woodland L, Wessely S, Greenberg N, et al. The psychological impact of quarantine and how to reduce it: rapid review of the evidence. Lancet. 2020;395(10227):912–20. https://doi.org/10.1016/ S0140-6736(20)30460-8. 2. Fiorillo A, Gorwood P. The consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic on mental health and implications for clinical practice. Eur Psychiatry. 2020; 63(1):e32. https://doi.org/10.1192/j.eurpsy.2020.35. 3. Pfefferbaum B, North CS. Mental health and the COVID-19 pandemic. N Engl J Med. 2020;383(6):510–2. https://doi.org/10.1056/NEJMp2008017. 4. Qiu J, Shen B, Zhao M, Wang Z, Xie B, Xu Y. A nationwide survey of psychological distress among Chinese people in the COVID-19 epidemic: implications and policy recommendations. 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work_2f37rn5tyrhblp46cbshduf7he	----	Процесуирање злочина из мржње у Републици Србији и Босни и Херцеговини БЕЗБЕДНОСТ 2/2020100 Проф. др Муамер НИЦЕВИЋ Департман за правне науке Универзитета у Новом Пазару МА Самра ДЕЧКОВИЋ Департман за правне науке Универзитета у Новом Пазару ДОИ: УДК: 343.611:177.82]:343.13(497.11+497.6) Прегледни научни рад Примљен: 8. 10. 2019. године Ревизија: 20. 11. 2019. године Датум прихватања: 5. 8. 2020. године Процесуирање злочина из мржње у Републици Србији и Босни и Херцеговини Апстракт: Аутори се у раду баве питањем процесуирања злочина из мржње у Републици Србији и Босни и Херцеговини. С тим у вези настоје елаборирати најзначајније концепте везане за законску регулацију и борбу против ове врсте злочина, и указати на њихове међусобне разлике и односе. У раду се посебна пажња посвећује проблемима са којима се правосудни органи сусрећу приликом процесуирања злочина из мржње. Наиме, досадашња казнена политика била је изузетно блага – постојање мржње као посебног мотива није узимано у обзир, већ је само утврђивано да ли кривично дело постоји. Аутори настоје указати да је важно да држава покаже одлучност у борби против насиља. Та борба не представља само заштиту појединаца од стране власти и не доприноси само једнаком положају у друштву, већ се кроз мере репресије у овој области унапређују и слободе свих грађана које су загарантоване највишим правним актом – Уставом. Посебно се апострофира чињеница да је за борбу против таквог вида понашања потребно да се у Кривични законик унесе одредба о мржњи као отежавајућој околности. Наравно, треба имати у виду да се стање у друштву не може аутоматски променити увођењем поменуте одредбе. То је дугорочан процес и од изузетне је важности успешна имплементација закона од  aedbernp@ptt.rs  s.kucevic@uninp.edu.rs ДОИ: 10.5937/bezbednost2002100N ПРЕГЛЕДНИ НАУЧНИ РАДОВИ БЕЗБЕДНОСТ 2/2020 101 стране судова; од ње зависи и превенција будућих кривичних дела. Самим тим, увођење злочина из мржње у законодавство представља први корак ка друштву у којем мржња неће бити толерисана. Циљ рада је да кроз призму кривичних дела почињених из мржње, као примарног фокуса анализе, усвајајући поставку према којој специфични друштвени контекст у БиХ диктира и снажнију интервенцију у домену кривичноправне регулације изражавања мржње и предрасуда, укаже на основне недостатке законског оквира и праксе у БиХ у том домену. Кључне речи: злочин, мржња, предрасуде. Увод Злочини из мржње имају веома дугу историју, али њихова инкриминација карактеристична је за другу половину двадесетог века. Главни разлог су потешкоће и проблеми који отежавају њихово препознавање, пре свега недовољна едукација особља у полицији и правосуђу, недостатак судске праксе везане за ова кривична дела, као и остале потешкоће које се јављају у свим фазама кривичног поступка. Осим тога, када је реч о Босни и Херцеговини, полиција и органи кривичног гоњења који учествују у супротстављању овом облику криминалитета суочавају се са низом проблема који произлазе и из неадекватности важећих прописа везаних за кривична дела изазивања националне, расне и верске мржње, раздора и нетрпељивости, попут недефинисања појмова јавности, мржње, раздора, нетрпељивости и сл. (Лучић- Ћатић, Бајрић, 2013: 16), или проблема везаних за одређивање надлежности када је реч о процесуирању ових кривичних дела (Кнежевић, 2013: 45), што свакако изазива проблеме у примени тих прописа. С обзиром на то да је реч о кривичним делима мотивисаним нетолеранцијом према одређеним групама у друштву, која као таква прете да поделе друштво и створе циклусе насиља и одмазде, енергична реакција неопходна је и ради безбедности појединца и заједнице, зато што свако од нас може бити жртва, односно свако од нас има особине које га чине другачијим од осталих. Осуђивањем починиоца шаље се порука да не само што друштво не толерише такво понашање већ и Процесуирање злочина из мржње у Републици Србији и Босни и Херцеговини БЕЗБЕДНОСТ 2/2020102 кривичноправни систем штити жртве од учињене неправде. Наиме, кривична дела почињена из мржње догађају се у свим државама, у већем или мањем обиму. Државе са делотворним механизмима прикупљања података обично приказују већи број кривичних дела почињених из мржње него оне без таквих механизама. Међутим, и у тим државама подаци из друштвених истраживања, од невладиних организација и других посматрача, могу показати да постоји проблем који постојећи системи не откривају нити се њиме баве.1 Наиме, о мотиву починиоца кривичног дела почињеног из мржње ретко се води довољно детаљна истрага, јер је он ирелевантан за доказивање суштинских елемената кривичног дела. Међутим, управо се по мотиву разликују кривична дела из мржње од осталих кривичних дела, а тај мотив је искључиво предрасуда, односно негативно мишљење или став према групи људи због њихових карактеристика које се најчешће директно штите кривичним законима. Из тог разлога државне институције, али и друштво, имају задатак да подстичу толеранцију и да се боре против стереотипа и предрасуда, како би спречили појаву злочина из мржње. Појам и основне карактеристике злочина из мржње Законска дефиниција злочина из мржње у великој мери зависи од друштвенополитичких прилика и социокултурних кара- ктеристика одређеног друштва, што значи да се законско одређе- ње ових кривичних дела разликује од државе до државе. Међу- тим, сматра се да је Организација за европску сигурност и сарад- њу (ОЕБС), односно њихов Уред за демократске институције и људска права (ОДИХР), формулисао ова кривична дела на опште прихватљив начин. Према њима, свако кривично дело у којем је објект напада изабран на основу његове стварне или перципиране припадности, повезаности, подршке или чланства у групи која је заснована на њиховом стварном или перципираном расном, националном или етничком пореклу, језику, боји коже, религији, полу, старосној 1 Закони о кривичним делима почињеним из мржње, ОЕБС – Уред за демократ- ске институције и људска права, Практични водич, 2009. ПРЕГЛЕДНИ НАУЧНИ РАДОВИ БЕЗБЕДНОСТ 2/2020 103 доби, менталној или физичкој онеспособљености, сексуалној ори- јентацији или неком другом сличном статусу може се сматрати кривичним делом почињеним из мржње.2 Из ове дефиниције про- изилази да се злочин из мржње у сваком случају састоји од два елемента: кривичног дела као основног преступа и специфичног мотива који се огледа у постојању предрасуда, по којем се криви- чна дела из мржње и разликују од уобичајених кривичних дела. Наиме, жртва може бити једна или више особа, намерно изабрана због неке заштићене карактеристике која је заједничка за одређе- ну групу, попут расе, језика, религије, етничке и националне при- падности, сексуалног опредељења, али и имовине. Жртве ових кривичних дела посебно карактерише и чињеница да нису одабра- не због онога што јесу, већ због онога што представљају. То значи да су сви чланови заједнице који имају заједничко обележје поте- нцијалне мете, јер је порука која се на овај начин преноси упућена не само непосредној жртви већ и групи којој она припада. У циљу препознавања осумњичених, проналажења учини- лаца, стицања увида у то како жртва перципира сопствену рањи- вост, стицања увида у природу и интензитет мотивације, одређе- ња вероватноће ескалације или предвиђања одговора заједнице, неопходно је познавање основних карактеристика личности учи- ниоца кривичног дела из мржње. Међутим, у теорији не постоји јединствен став у погледу основних карактеристика његове личности, јер нема правила које показује ко то може бити нити како ће кривично дело бити почи- њено. У сваком случају то не морају бити особе које су претходно испољавале предрасуде или особе које припадају десничарским групама. Из тог разлога се најчешће говори о тростепеној класи- фикацији учинилаца кривичних дела почињених из мржње. То су: - учиниоци из забаве (млађе особе жељне узбуђења и доказивања, неорганизоване групе, непредвидљиви и насумични напади на жртве, склоност ка вандализму), - реактивни учиниоци (реакција на претходни стварни или умиш- љени инцидент из мржње, заштита/одбрана од перципиране пре- тње, одсуство кривице) и 2 OSCE (2006). Challenges and Responses to Hate-Motivated Incidents in the OSCE Region, OSCE/ODIHR, Warsaw, стр. 7. Процесуирање злочина из мржње у Републици Србији и Босни и Херцеговини БЕЗБЕДНОСТ 2/2020104 - мисионари (особе са изражено искривљеном сликом стварности и патолошким проблемима; догађаје који их окружују тумаче једнострано, преувеличавајући тешкоће које настају као последи- ца суживота различитих друштвених група; учиниоци су најтежих кривичних дела из мржње чија се мисија углавном завршава самоубиством).3 Осим због специфичног мотива, злочини из мржње захте- вају другачији правни приступ и због последица које их разликују од осталих кривичних дела. Наиме, с обзиром да утичу на шири круг људи и да могу довести до друштвених подела и грађанских немира, кривична дела из мржње обично прате фазу ескалације. У ситуацијама када су односи измећу етничких, националних или религијских група већ осетљиви, могу имати експлозиван утицај. Директна жртва може искусити већу психолошку повреду и поја- чано осећање угрожености зато што није у могућности да проме- ни карактеристику која ју је учинила жртвом. Кривична дела по- чињена из мржње имају дубок психолошки утицај на жртве, који води ка осећањима депресије и тескобе.4 Осим непосредне жртве, последице трпи и заједница, односно остали чланови групе који могу страховати од неког будућег напада. Ефекти могу бити вишеструко увећани уколико се ради о заједници која је кроз историју била жртва дискримина- ције. Указивање на последице кривичних дела из мржње омогући- ће тужиоцима да лакше донесу одлуке које се односе на процесуи- рање кривичног дела, али ће им помоћи и у заступању оптужнице пред надлежним судом. С друге стране, приликом доношења ко- начне одлуке, односно избора врсте и мере кривичноправне санк- ције, судови треба да узму у обзир и околности које се односе на јачину угрожавања или повреде заштићеног добра, па је за доно- шење адекватне одлуке потребно познавање ефеката кривичних дела почињених из мржње на појединце и ширу заједницу. Осим 3 Community Research Associates, National Hate Crimes Training Curricula: Stu- dent Manual, стр. 19; American Prosecutors Research Institute, A Local Prosecu- tor’s Guide for Responding to Hate Crimes. Arlington: American Prosecutors Re- search Institute, 2001, стр. 7; McLaughlin, Responding to Hate Crime: A Multidis- ciplinary Curriculum for Law Enforcement and Victim Assistance Professionals, стр. 48. 4 Удружење америчких психолога: Кривична дела почињена из мржње данас – дугогодишњи непријатељ у модерном одијелу, 1998. ПРЕГЛЕДНИ НАУЧНИ РАДОВИ БЕЗБЕДНОСТ 2/2020 105 наведеног, посебно је значајно и знање практичара о ефектима кривичних дела почињених из мржње, које доприноси смањењу секундарне виктимизације жртава (Маљевић, Вујовић, 2013: 26). За ефикасно сузбијање криминалитета почињеног из мрж- ње неопходно је и да полицијски службеници који учествују у том процесу обрате пажњу на индикаторе који могу указати на посто- јање таквог кривичног дела, усмерити их на правилан рад на пред- мету, тј. на примену одговарајуће тактике, и помоћи им да прави- лно одговоре на потребе жртве. Наиме, може се рећи да су индикатори мржње објективне чињенице које се морају узети у обзир приликом одређивања да ли неки инцидент представља злочин из мржње или не. Они нису довољни да би се један инцидент сматрао злочином из мржње, али указују на неопходност спровођења даље истраге у циљу утв- рђивања мотива. У доступним смерницама и приручницима који се тичу криминалитета из мржње, као могући индикатори наводе се следећи5: - расне, етничке, верске, полне, културне и друге разлике (постоја- ле су расне, верске, етничке, полне, културне или друге разлике између група којима припада жртва, односно починитељ); - цртежи, ознаке, симболи, графити (налазе се на месту на којем је наступила последица кривичног дела); - претходно присуство кривичних дела (или других деликата) по- чињених из мржње (неколико инцидената догодило се на истом подручју, а жртве су чланови исте групе); - перцепција жртве/сведока (жртве и/или сведоци су, на основу властитог опажања, мишљења или уверења да је инцидент био мотивисан предрасудама); - мотив осумњиченог (починитељ има криминалну прошлост која указује на то да је један или више претходних инцидената изазвао на сличан начин, а жртве су имале исто држављанство, расу, веру, етничко/национално порекло, онеспособљење, сексуалну оријен- тацију или пол); - место инцидента (жртва је била у близини или на подручју/месту које се обично повезује са конкретним групама чији чланови деле држављанство, расу, религију, етничко порекло, онеспособљење, 5 FBI (2015). Hate Crime Data Collection Guidelines and Training Manual, стр. 5. Процесуирање злочина из мржње у Републици Србији и Босни и Херцеговини БЕЗБЕДНОСТ 2/2020106 сексуалну оријентацију (нпр. геј бар), пол и сл. или које припад- ници тих група обично посећују); - недостатак других мотива (нема јасних назнака да се ради о кри- вичном делу из користољубља или да постоји неки други мотив за инцидент). Међутим, с обзиром на то да ови индикатори указују само на могућност постојања кривичног дела почињеног из мржње, неопходно је бити веома опрезан у раду са њима, не доносити бр- зе одлуке, већ поштовати основна криминалистичка начела при откривању и расветљавању кривичних дела, како би се омогућило евидентирање и ефикасније процесуирање злочина из мржње. Злочин из мржње у кривичном законодавству Републике Србије Пораст насиља заснованог на мржњи и нетолеранцији, уче- сталост дискриминације и напада на угрожене друштвене групе у Србији, као и шира друштвена потреба за превенцијом и борбом против оваквог понашања, представљају главне разлоге за увође- ње злочина из мржње (Стјеља, 2014: 6). Из тог разлога, у јануару 2012. године, Комитет правника за људска права (YUCOM) и Геј стрејт алијанса (ГСА), предложи- ли су допуну Кривичног законика, између осталог, и због тога што је досадашња пракса показала да се надлежни органи нису на одговарајући начин бавили злочинима који за мотив имају мрж- њу, што се уочава у свим фазама поступка, а били су и само дели- мично инкриминисани. С обзиром на то да се овим кривичним де- лима угрожавају основна људска права и слободе које су гаран- товане Уставом Републике Србије6, њихово увођење у Кривични законик има уставни основ, садржан у члановима 43 (став 4) и 49, којима је прописана слобода мисли, савести и вероисповести и забрана изазивања расне, националне и верске мржње. Кривичним закоником који је ступио на снагу 1. јануара 2013. године предви- ђено је следеће. Ако је кривично дело учињено из мржње због припадности раси и вероисповести, националне или етничке припадности, по- 6 Устав Републике Србије, Службени гласник Републике Србије, бр. 98/2006. ПРЕГЛЕДНИ НАУЧНИ РАДОВИ БЕЗБЕДНОСТ 2/2020 107 ла, сексуалне оријентације или родног идентитета другог лица, ту околност суд ће ценити као отежавајућу околност, осим ако она није прописана као обележје кривичног дела.7 Увођењем ове од- редбе злочин из мржње је први пут кодификован у домаћем кри- вичном законодавству. Циљ је да се на одговарајући начин казни лице које је повредило неког само због тога што не може да прих- вати различитост, али и да се спрече будући злочини из мржње. То значи да члан 54а представља посебну обавезу за суд приликом одлучивања о врсти и висини кривичне санкције, коју суд мора ценити у светлу отежавајућих околности, а самим тим и изрицања теже кривичне санкције учиниоцу. Осим тога, ако се уз- ме у обзир да је злочин из мржње увек усмерен на рањиве групе и да негативно утиче не само на лице које је жртва злочина, већ и на све чланове групе којој то лице припада, угрожавају се и темељне вредности међународног права на чију заштиту се Србија обавеза- ла потписивањем и ратификацијом низа међународних инструме- ната о равноправности, недискриминацији и толеранцији, као и о сузбијању и кажњавању насиља побуђеног мржњом по основу расе, боје коже, националне и етничке припадности, религијског уверења итд. За разлику од Закона о забрани дискриминације8 ко- ји наводи 19 основа дискриминације, Законик предвиђа седам ли- чних својстава која могу бити основ за извршење злочина из мрж- ње, и то: раса и вероисповест, национална или етничка припадно- ст, пол, сексуална оријентација и родни идентитет. Иако се YU- COM залагао за увођење шире листе разлога који доводе до зло- чина из мржње, сматра се да је усвојено компромисно решење, јер су то лична својства због којих се најчешће врше ова кривична дела. Међутим, и поред унетих новина, у пракси нема довољно процесуираних случајева овог кривичног дела иако се она свакод- невно дешавају. Такође, судови нису довољно сензибилисани за одредбе новог члана. Званични представници државе, посебно по- лиција и правосуђе, морају се одлучно поставити према предрасу- дама против одређених група, како би се ефикасно казнили посто- јећи злочини из мржње и спречили нови. Важно је да држава по- 7 Кривични законик, Службени гласник Републике Србије, бр. 85/2005, 88/2005 – испр., 107/2005 – испр., 72/2009, 111/2009, 121/2012 и 104/2013. 8 Службени гласник Републике Србије, бр. 22/2009. Процесуирање злочина из мржње у Републици Србији и Босни и Херцеговини БЕЗБЕДНОСТ 2/2020108 каже одлучност у борби против насиља, која не представља само заштиту појединца од стране власти, и не доприноси само једна- ком положају у друштву, већ се кроз такве мере државе унапређу- ју и основне слободе свих грађана које су загарантоване Уставом.9 Злочин из мржње у кривичном законодавству Босне и Херцеговине У свету данас постоје два модела инкриминисања или, тач- није, увођења кривичног дела почињеног из мржње у кривичне за- коне. Први модел се односи на прописивање посебног кривичног дела у кривичном закону, а други на прописивање општих отежа- вајућих околности за кривична дела почињена из мржње (Лучић- Ћатић, Бајрић, 2013: 14). Оба модела имају предности и недоста- тке. У Босни и Херцеговини примењује се комбинација помену- тих модела тако што је прописано кривично дело изазивања националне, расне и верске мржње, раздора и нетрпељивости, али су прописане и отежавајуће околности у случају да је кривично дело почињено из мржње. То значи да се злочин из мржње у зако- нодавству Босне и Херцеговине третира као посебно кривично де- ло изазивања националне, расне и врске мржње, раздора и нетрпе- љивости, што се сматра оправданим с обзиром да је реч о терито- рији на којој њихова извршења представљају специфичан проб- лем. Прописивање посебног кривичног дела извршено је у свим кривичним законима у Босни и Херцеговини10, с тим што постоје одређене разлике у смислу прописивања елемента јавности (тај елемент прописују Кривични закон Босне и Херцеговине, као и Кривични закон Федерације Босне и Херцеговине) у погледу заш- тићене групе према којој се дело може починити, у погледу радњи 9 YUCOM, Комитет правника за људска права, Злочин из мржње, Београд, 2013. 10 Кривични закон Босне и Херцеговине, Службени гласник Босне и Херцегови- не 3/03, 32/03, 37/03, 54/04, 61/04, 30/05,53/06, 55/06, 32/07, 8/10, чл. 145.а, Кри- вични закон Републике Српске, Службени гласник Републике Српске 49/03, 108/04,37/06, 70/06, 73/10, 1/12, 67/13, чл. 294.а, Кривични закон Федерације Босне и Херцеговине, Службене новине Федерације Босне и Херцеговине 36/03, 37/03, 21/04, 69/04, 18/05, 42/10, 42/11, чл. 163, Кривични закон Брчко Дистрик- та Босне и Херцеговине, Службени гласник Брчко Дистрикта 10/03, 45/04, 6/05, 21/10, чл. 160. ПРЕГЛЕДНИ НАУЧНИ РАДОВИ БЕЗБЕДНОСТ 2/2020 109 извршења и територијалног одређења (односно дела администра- тивне структуре Босне и Херцеговине на којем се дело може по- чинити), али и у смислу запрећене кривичноправне санкције. По- менуте разлике односе се на основни облик кривичног дела, док се разлике у квалификованим облицима овог дела првенствено ог- ледају у легислативној техници и запрећеној санкцији, али и у не- ким квалификаторним околностима (Лучић-Ћатић, Бајрић, 2013: 16). Између осталог, неопходно је напоменути да је за постоја- ње овог кривичног дела потребно само предузимање радње извр- шења, али не и наступање последице, која се у овом случају огле- да у угрожавању заједничког живота; другим речима, није неоп- ходно да наведена мржња и раздор буду изазвани, нити је од зна- чаја да ли су се и који даљи циљеви желели постићи. Осим тога, због недефинисања појмова распиривања, мржње, раздора и нетр- пељивости, као и због постојања „елемента јавности“ у неким од кривичних закона, у пракси се јављају проблеми који свакако ути- чу на ефикасно сузбијање ових кривичних дела. Такође, позитиван став законодавца о значајној тежини кривичног дела почињеног из мржње изражава се и прописива- њем тежих квалификованих облика у случају да је мотив за њихо- во извршење била мржња, што свакако са собом повлачи и строже кажњавање учиниоца. Међутим, у том погледу постоје одређене разлике: - Кривични закон Републике Српске прописује мржњу као квали- фикаторну околност код кривичних дела: тешко убиство, тешка телесна повреда, силовање, тешка крађа, разбојништво, разбојнич- ка крађа, оштећење туђе ствари и изазивање опште опасности; - Кривични закон Брчко Дистрикта Босне и Херцеговине пропису- је мржњу као квалификаторну околност у опису кривичних дела: убиство, тешка телесна повреда, силовање, тешка крађа, разбојни- чка крађа, разбојништво, оштећење туђе ствари, изазивање опште опасности, уништење или оштећење важних привредних објеката или јавних справа, оштећење заштитних направа на раду и непро- писно и неправилно извођење грађевинских радова; - Кривични закон Федерације Босне и Херцеговине прописује мр- жњу (предрасуду) као квалификаторну околност код кривичних Процесуирање злочина из мржње у Републици Србији и Босни и Херцеговини БЕЗБЕДНОСТ 2/2020110 дела: убиство, тешка телесна повреда, силовање и оштећење туђе ствари. Осим тога, неопходно је напоменути да је у Кривичном закону Републике Српске дефинисано кривично дело из мржње, док је у Кривичном закону Брчко Дистрикта Босне и Херцеговине елемент предрасуде изражен као „мржња“ која је притом законом дефинисана. За разлику од поменутих законских решења, у Кривичном закону Федерације Босне и Херцеговине предрасуда је, као елемент квалификованих облика кривичних дела, ограни- чена на „расне, народносне и верске“ побуде у случају кривичних дела убиства и тешке телесне повреде, на „етничку, народносну, расну, верску или језичку“ нетрпељивост у случају кривичног де- ла силовања, те на разлике у „етничкој или народносној припад- ности, раси, вероисповијести, полу или језику“ у случају криви- чног дела оштећења туђе ствари (Маљевић, Вујовић, 2013: 36). С обзиром на то да за кривична дела прописана Кривичним законом Босне и Херцеговине није предвиђена предрасуда као квалификована околност, суд Босне и Херцеговине није надлежан за кривична дела као што су: убиство, тешко убиство, тешка теле- сна повреда, силовање, оштећење туђе ствари, тешка крађа, разбо- јничка крађа, разбојништво и изазивање опште опасности. Осим тога, у Босни и Херцеговини свакако постоји могућност тежег ка- жњавања учиниоца било којег кривичног дела, уколико је био мо- тивисан мржњом. На ту могућност указују и Кривични закон Ре- публике Српске и Кривични закон Брчко Дистрикта Босне и Хер- цеговине прописивањем мржње као отежавајуће околности при- ликом избора врсте и мере кривичноправне санкције за учиниоца било којег кривичног дела уколико не постоји одредба о квалифи- кованом облику тог конкретног кривичног дела. Међутим, Криви- чни закон Босне и Херцеговине и Кривични закон Федерације Бо- сне и Херцеговине, иако нису непосредно прописали мржњу као отежавајућу околност, индиректно пружају могућност тежег каж- њавања учинилаца кривичних дела из мржње, јер у општим правилима за одмеравање казне предвиђају узимање у обзир „по- буда из којих је дело учињено“. ПРЕГЛЕДНИ НАУЧНИ РАДОВИ БЕЗБЕДНОСТ 2/2020 111 Откривање и расветљавање злочина из мржње Ефикасно супротстављање криминалитету почињеном из мржње захтева од полицијских службеника и осталих органа пра- вовремено препознавање индикатора, као објективних чињеница које указују на то да су поступци учиниоца били мотивисани пре- драсудама, по чему се ова кривична дела и разликују од уобичаје- них. Затим, он захтева интензивну комуникацију приликом истра- ге и специфичан однос према жртвама кривичног дела, као и пре- ма начинима спровођења радњи доказивања. Наиме, да би истрага за ова кривична дела могла да се води неопходно је да их полициј- ски службеници препознају, а то ће најпре учинити утврђивањем да ли су жртва и учинилац различите расне, верске, етнич- ке/националне, полне, културне или друге припадности, а затим проверавањем да ли постоје и неки други индикатори који указују на то да се ради о кривичном делу почињеном из мржње. Иако је кључни елемент у идентификацији кривичних дела почињених из мржње препознавање мотива, то може бити веома тежак задатак ако се узме у обзир чињеница да један број ових кривичних дела остаје непознат, односно жртве их не пријављују надлежним органима. У току спровођења истраге неопходна је међусобна сарадња полиције и тужилаштва како би се постигли очекивани резултати. Међутим, у Србији, као и Босни и Херцего- вини, постоји проблем недовољне едукације полицијских службе- ника о кривичним делима почињеним из мржње. Она захтевају посебан приступ у разговору са жртвама, које су често и једини сведоци. Приликом успостављања првог контакта са жртвом нео- пходно је да полицијски службеници воде рачуна о њеном тренут- ном психичком стању, да јој пруже подршку и упуте је на одгова- рајуће установе које ће јој помоћи у превазилажењу проблема, како не би доживела секундарну виктимизацију, што ће свакако омогућити лакше прикупљање доказа. Наиме, неке ће жртве порицати да се ради о кривичном делу из мржње, а то никако не сме одвести истрагу у погрешном правцу. Осим тога, честе су и грешке полицијских службеника, које се манифестују као небрига о физичкој сигурности жртве, незаинтересираност, журба, одбијање жртвине тврдње да је инци- дент био кривично дело почињено из мржње, минимизирање до- Процесуирање злочина из мржње у Републици Србији и Босни и Херцеговини БЕЗБЕДНОСТ 2/2020112 гађаја и сл. Због тога је потребно исказати поштовање према жртви, бригу за њену сигурност и сигурност њене породице, обја- снити зашто је потребно да јој се поставе питања (ако у датом тре- нутку питања сматра тешким, на њих може одговорити и накна- дно), те објаснити вероватни след догађаја. Дакле, полицијски службеници морају бити припремљени, проактивни, професио- нални и неутрални. Након контакта са жртвом, потребно је спро- вести прелиминарну истрагу. Она треба да укључи прикупљање података о учиниоцу/осумњиченом (обратити пажњу на његово понашање и изјаве, припадност групама, ранији живот и сл.), о жртви (посебно о томе да ли јој се то догађало и раније) и о простору/месту (да ли су се такви догађаји дешавали и раније), што се сматра веома битним јер се заједници шаље порука да је за полицију решавање кривичних дела почињених из мржње високо на листи приоритета (Маљевић, Вујовић, 2013: 48). Већ од првих сазнања да се догодио инцидент који би мо- гао бити кривично дело почињено из мржње, неопходна је интен- зивна сарадња између полиције и тужилаштва. Тужилац ће поли- цијским службеницима дати смернице за даље поступање. Уколи- ко се утврди постојање основа сумње да је почињено кривично дело из мржње, тужилац ће покренути истрагу, с циљем подизања нивоа сумње на основану односно оправдану сумњу, како би се стекли услови и за подизање оптужнице против осумњиченог или више њих. Ако се узме у обзир чињеница да се у Босни и Херце- говини кривично дело почињено из мржње третира на три начина, тужилац је у сваком случају дужан да предузме кривично гоњење уколико се ради о кривичном делу из мржње као посебном делу или квалификованом обликом кривичног дела, али и у случају ка- да мотив мржње није законски елемент кривичног дела него само обавезна отежавајућа околност, што је случај и у Републици Србији. Приликом прикупљања обавештења о кривичном делу, учиниоцу или другим важним околностима, потребно је обратити посебну пажњу на веродостојност исказа сведока, с обзиром да се међу њима неретко могу појавити и сведоци лажљивци, који ће због жеље да заштите припадника своје расе, вере или етничке групе дати исказ који иде њима у прилог. Осим што полицијски службеници и представници других органа треба да воде рачуна о ПРЕГЛЕДНИ НАУЧНИ РАДОВИ БЕЗБЕДНОСТ 2/2020 113 начину успостављања првог контакта са жртвом, за добијање ре- левантних података неопходно је применити и посебну тактику када је реч и о лицима осумњиченим за кривично дело почињено из мржње. У том циљу је потребно имати у виду следеће: - приликом испитивања осумњиченог за кривично дело почињено из мржње, треба обратити пажњу на сваку његову реченицу (посе- бно на то како ословљава жртву или групу којој жртва припада), сваку гестикулацију и сл., тражећи у њима елементе предрасуда; - важно је знати да учиниоци кривичних дела из мржње веома че- сто не негирају (односно, мало им треба да признају) почињено дело, јер сматрају да иза њих стоји група/заједница која подржава такве ставове, а своје поступке сматрају исправним па често и не осећају кривицу и кајање; - треба показати равнодушност и не осуђивати осумњиченог због његових поступака, те му дозволити да, без прекидања, исприча своју верзију догађаја; - потребно је дозволити починитељу да искаже своја осећања пре- ма жртви, односно групи којој она припада; ако то не чини, потре- бно му је поставити низ питања која ће омогућити увид у то како осумњичени перципира жртву и групу којој она припада; та пита- ња могу се односити на мишљење учиниоца о различитим карак- теристикама жртве/групе, њиховом животу и вредностима и сл.; - учинилац може користити скраћене називе и надимке за жртву или устаљене називе за групу којој жртва припада, али то не сме олако довести до закључка да је осумњичени починио дело моти- висано предрасудама.11 Сасвим је очигледно да крајњи циљ у овом случају није само сазнање да је осумњичени заиста учинио кривично дело које му се ставља на терет, већ утврђивање мотива, што представља изазов за полицију и тужилаштво. У зависности од прикупљених доказа, али и од карактера самог кривичног дела из мржње, тужи- лац ће користити различите тактике. Наиме, ако се ради о кривич- ном делу из мржње као отежавајућој околности, какав је случај у Републици Србији, најпре ће настојати да докаже кривично дело, а затим предрасуду као мотив извршења, с обзиром да суд суди само о ономе што тужилац наведе у оптужници, и да је то једини 11 OSCE/ODIHR, Разумевање кривичних дела почињених из мржње: Приручник за Босну и Херцеговину, 2015, стр. 25. Процесуирање злочина из мржње у Републици Србији и Босни и Херцеговини БЕЗБЕДНОСТ 2/2020114 начин да учинилац буде кажњен. То значи да ће и у случају про- цесуирања злочина из мржње као посебних кривичних дела и у случају примене увећаних казнених одредби, исход предмета у ве- ликој мери зависити од квалитета истражног поступка и презенто- вања доказа о мотиву. Иако ова кривична дела, с обзиром на последице, захтевају строже кажњавање, кривични закони у Босни и Херцеговини пре- двиђају и могућност изрицања судске опомене, условне осуде, ра- да у јавном интересу, али и кућног затвора са електронским над- зором. Досадашња казнена политика у Републици Србији била је изузетно блага. Постојање мржње као посебног мотива није узи- мано у обзир, већ је само утврђивано да ли кривично дело посто- ји. Тако се пре уношења измена у Закон, исписивање расистичких или хомофобичних графита на фасадама зграда сматрало оштеће- њем туђих ствари, а не нападом на мањине нити злочином из мр- жње. Међутим, суд приликом санкционисања треба да узме у об- зир чињеницу да пресуда на неки начин представља адекватну са- тисфакцију за све припаднике одређене групе, јер код кривичних дела учињених из мржње поред примарне, директне жртве постоје и секундарне, којима се на тај начин шаље порука да систем шти- ти њихова права. Закључак Изградњи поверења у кривичноправни систем доприноси озакоњење друштвене осуде кривичних дела почињених из мрж- ње. Када приликом процесуирања и доношења пресуде суд узме у обзир мотив предрасуде, такво јавно признање може уверити ос- тале чланове заједнице да та кривична дела неће проћи некажње- но. Наиме, ако се у процесуирање злочина из мржње не укључи мотив као основ за одабир жртве (као што су раса жртве, њена на- ционалност или етничко порекло), губи се могућност да казна из- речена учиниоцу делује обесхрабрујуће на друге, а истовремено се жртви и учиниоцу поручује да држава не придаје велики значај мржњи која је узрок злочина. По узору на државе које имају више искуства у супротстављању кривичним делима почињеним из мржње, и Србија и БиХ могу поћи овим путем и применити у пракси искуства оних држава које су показале завидне резултате у ПРЕГЛЕДНИ НАУЧНИ РАДОВИ БЕЗБЕДНОСТ 2/2020 115 процесуирању тих дела. Наиме, може се размишљати у правцу ус- постављања специјализоване јединице за истраживање кривичних дела почињених из мржње, као и о едукацији полицијских служ- беника, који би након проласка посебних обука били задужени за евалуацију таквих предмета. Осим тога, приликом прикупљања информација и током истраге треба водити рачуна о заштити података о личности лица која су жртве злочина из мржње, како би се избегла секундарна виктимизација. Такође, у циљу ефикас- није превенције злочина из мржње и заштите маргинализованих група, треба узети у обзир и позитивне ефекте механизма за при- купљање података, јер је евидентан тежак положај тих група у Ср- бији, њихова честа дискриминација, напади и насиље, који се не пријављују због страха за личну безбедност и неповерења у рад институција. То значи да би Министарство унутрашњих послова, тужилаштво и органи правосуђа требало да изграде систем за пра- ћење и вођење статистике о кривичним делима у којима се јавља дискриминација, као и о кривичним делима злочина из мржње. Литература 1. Кнежевић, З. (2013). Проблеми надлежности за процесуирање кри-вичног дела изазивања националне, расне и вјерске мржње, раздора и нетрпељивости. Сарајево. 2. Комитет правника за људска права, YUCOM, (2013). Злочин из мржње. Београд. 3. Лучић-Ћатић, М., Бајрић, А. (2013). Процесуирање казнених дела почињених из мржње у Босни и Херцеговини., Aналитика - Центар за друштвена истраживања, Сарајево. 4. Маљевић, А., Вујовић, С. (2013). Водич за процесуирање кривичних дела почињених из мржње у Босни и Херцеговини. Аналитика – Центар за друштвена истраживања, Сарајево. 5. OSCE, (2006). Challenges and Responses to Hate-Motivated Inci- dents in the OSCE Region. OSCE/ODIHR, Warsaw. 6. OSCE/ODIHR, (2015). Разумевање кривичних дела почињених из мржње: Приручник за Босну и Херцеговину. 7. Стјеља, И. (2014). Злочин из мржње – годину дана од увођења у кривично законодавство. Тужилачка реч, бр. 26, Удружење тужилаца, Београд. Процесуирање злочина из мржње у Републици Србији и Босни и Херцеговини БЕЗБЕДНОСТ 2/2020116 8. Удружење америчких психолога, (1998). Кривична дела почињена из мржње данас – дугогодишњи непријатељ у модерном одијелу. 9. ФБИ (2015). Hate Crime Data Collection Guidelines and Training Manual. 10. Community Research Associates, National Hate Crimes Training Curricula: Student Manual, American Prosecutors Research Insti- tute, A Local Prosecutor’s Guide for Responding to Hate Crimes. Arlington: American Prosecutors Research Institute, 2001; McLaughlin, Responding to Hate Crime: A Multidisciplinary Cur- riculum for Law Enforcement and Victim Assistance Profession- als. 11. Кривични законик, Службени гласник Републике Србије, бр. 85/2005, 88/2005 – испр., 107/2005 – испр., 72/2009, 111/2009, 121/2012 и 104/2013. 12. Кривични закон Босне и Херцеговине, Службени гласник Босне и Херцеговине 3/03, 32/03, 37/03, 54/04, 61/04, 30/05, 53/06, 55/06, 32/07, 8/10, чл. 145.а), Кривични закон Републике Српске, Службени гласник Републике Српске 49/03, 108/04, 37/06, 70/06, 73/10, 1/12, 67/13, чл. 294.а, Кривични закон Федерације Босне и Херцеговине, Службене новине Федерације Босне и Херцеговине 36/03, 37/03, 21/04, 69/04, 18/05, 42/10, 42/11, чл. 163, Кривични закон Брчко Дистрикта Босне и Херцеговине, Службени гласник Брчко Дистрикта 10/03, 45/04, 6/05, 21/10, чл. 160. 13. ОЕБС (2009). Закони о кривичним делима почињеним из мржње, Практични водич. Уред за демократске институције и људска права. 14. Устав Републике Србије, Службени гласник Републике Србије, бр. 98/2006. Prosecution of Hate Crimes in the Republic of Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina Abstract: The author deals with the issue of prosecution of hate crimes in Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. In this regard, the author tries to elaborate on the most important concepts related to the legal regulation and the fight against this type of crime, to point out their differences and relationships. The paper pays special attention to the problems that judicial ПРЕГЛЕДНИ НАУЧНИ РАДОВИ БЕЗБЕДНОСТ 2/2020 117 authorities face when they prosecute hate crimes. The current criminal policy is extremely mild; the existence of hatred as a special motive has not been taken into account and the goal is only to determine whether there is a crimi- nal offense. The author tries to point out how important it is for a country to demonstrate determination in combating violence, which means not only the protection of individuals by the authorities and not only a contribution to social equality, but also implies state measures to promote rights and free- doms of all citizens that are guaranteed by the highest legal act - the Consti- tution. The paper emphasizes that one of the ways to combat this behavior is the introduction of the provisions on hate as an aggravating circumstance in the Criminal Code. Of course, it should be noted that the situation in the society cannot automatically be improved by introducing the aforementioned provisions. This is a long-term process, so it is of utmost importance the suc- cessfully implement the law as the prevention of future crimes depends on it. Therefore, the introduction of hate crimes into law is the first step towards a society in which hatred will not be tolerated. The paper aims to point out the basic shortcomings in the legal framework and practice in Bosnia and Herzegovina in this domain by ob- serving it through the prism of criminal acts committed out of hatred as the primary focus of analysis, adopting the proposition according to which the specific social context in Bosnia and Herzegovina dictates greater interven- tion in the domain of criminal regulation of expression of hatred and preju- dice. Keywords: crime, hatred, prejudice. 
work_2k7ymwq7grczvdf4otyoj3mhhy	----	1Wood LCN, Devakumar D. BMJ Paediatrics Open 2020;4:e000705. doi:10.1136/bmjpo-2020-000705 Open access Healthcare access for migrant children in England during the COVID-19 pandemic Laura C N Wood ,1 Delanjathan Devakumar2 To cite: Wood LCN, Devakumar D. Healthcare access for migrant children in England during the COVID-19 pandemic. BMJ Paediatrics Open 2020;4:e000705. doi:10.1136/ bmjpo-2020-000705 Received 3 May 2020 Revised 29 June 2020 Accepted 3 July 2020 1Sociology, Lancaster University, Lancaster, UK 2Centre for the Health of Women, Children and Adolescents, Institute for Global Health, University College London, London, UK Correspondence to Dr Laura C N Wood; laura. wood@ lancaster. ac. uk Editorial © Author(s) (or their employer(s)) 2020. Re- use permitted under CC BY- NC. No commercial re- use. See rights and permissions. Published by BMJ. HEALTHCARE ACCESS—A CHILD RIGHT Access to healthcare services without discrim- ination is fundamental to the right to health. The principles of equitable, accessible, affordable healthcare are also embedded within the United Nations (UN) resolution on Universal Health Coverage, hailed as ‘the single most powerful concept that public health has to offer’ by the former WHO director- general.1 In 2016, the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child raised significant concerns regarding healthcare access inequal- ities between migrant and non- migrant chil- dren in the UK.2 These unresolved concerns and subsequent serious child health conse- quences have been echoed repeatedly by leading health and migrant support experts.3 The global COVID-19 pandemic and impacts of mitigation policies have dealt multiple blows to the health and well- being of many sectors of the population, particularly those already living precarious lives. Migrant fami- lies and children are recognised as a group already burdened with health challenges and barriers to healthcare access which risk further exacerbation during and beyond the COVID-19 pandemic.3 The ongoing public health crisis presents an urgent and distinc- tive opportunity to permanently address the unacceptable hostile policy and practice envi- ronment that restricts equitable healthcare access, endangers child health and so poorly enables the rights of migrant children to be realised. MIGRANTS IN THE UK In 2017, an estimated 6 208 000 foreign national individuals resided in the UK, including 332 604 children and young people (CYP) from the European Economic Area (EEA+) and 332 000 undocumented CYP. An estimated 133 000 CYP without secure immi- gration status were estimated to be living in London alone.4 Undetected victims of inter- national human trafficking, including family units and children, are likely to number in their thousands.5 In 2018, asylum seekers represented approx- imately 6% of immigrants (34 500 people) in the UK.6 Five thousand six hundred and fifty- five dependent children under the age of 18 years were included in asylum applications, including 2711 under the age of 5.7 Between May 2018 and 2019, 2872 unaccompanied minors applied for asylum. Additionally, around 20 000 refugees have been resettled through government schemes.8 Migrant individuals are therefore very diverse, with potentially complex, nuanced and even harrowing reasons for leaving ‘home’. For those who are fit and able to travel, perhaps entering the UK for employ- ment, study or family reasons, reported that health is often better than their UK coun- terparts.9 For those in need of sanctuary, compounding experiences of profound human cruelty, human rights violations, chronic oppression, threat or severe strangu- lation of opportunity are the burden of many. Migrant children may have been subject to chronic conditions of poverty, food inse- curity, heightened risk of disease, disorder, abuse, injury and trauma both before, during and after migration resulting in underlying malnutrition, prolonged stress, the impacts of active disease and the sequalae of chronic illness and its inadequate management.10 Far from being the great equaliser, the COVID-19 pandemic has starkly exposed and widened the inequalities of society further, with the poor and disempowered dispropor- tionately affected through disease, difficulties accessing healthcare, social support weak- nesses, local economic shocks and the relayed impacts of dangerously unstable global markets.11 12 Many migrants with complex medical histories, subsequent multifactorial o n A p ril 5 , 2 0 2 1 b y g u e st. P ro te cte d b y co p yrig h t. h ttp ://b m jp a e d so p e n .b m j.co m / b m jp o : first p u b lish e d a s 1 0 .1 1 3 6 /b m jp o -2 0 2 0 -0 0 0 7 0 5 o n 1 6 Ju ly 2 0 2 0 . D o w n lo a d e d fro m http://bmjopen.bmj.com/ http://orcid.org/0000-0001-8947-2677 http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1136/bmjpo-2020-000705&domain=pdf&date_stamp=2020-07-16 http://bmjpaedsopen.bmj.com/ 2 Wood LCN, Devakumar D. BMJ Paediatrics Open 2020;4:e000705. doi:10.1136/bmjpo-2020-000705 Open access weakening of the immune system and ongoing chal- lenging socioeconomic circumstances should be consid- ered at high risk of COVID-19 complications.13 Concerningly, the emerging evidence suggests excess mortality due to COVID-19 in Black, Asian and minority ethnic (BAME) populations, with individuals of Black African, Black Caribbean and Asian ethnic groups at the highest increased risk.14 Socioeconomic factors, working environments, the legacy of racism and the hostile polit- ical environment towards migrants are likely to have critical contextual roles in understanding this data. Early evidence regarding BAME children has suggested that they are at greater risk of COVID-19 complications requiring hospitalisation.15 Migrant BAME children experience the pandemic differently to children not exposed to these additional challenges, and as a group are facing greater risks of caregiver illness, bereavement, poverty, racism and vicarious racism, lack of educational access and healthcare, all with significant consequences for their physical, mental and developmental well- being. The overarching public message that COVID-19 poses little threat to children directly risks isolating migrant and BAME children further from much needed policy consideration, needs assessment and support. ELIGIBILITY FOR NATIONAL HEALTH SERVICE (NHS) HEALTHCARE Free NHS healthcare access eligibility in England is tied to immigration status and lawful, settled residence. Eligi- bility may change rapidly in line with immigration deci- sions and is very complex for both migrants and profes- sionals to navigate. All adults and children in England are entitled to register with a general practitioner and receive free primary care, regardless of immigration or other status. Accident and emergency treatment is also exempt from charge as are a number of defined condi- tions including COVID-19 testing and treatment and direct health consequences of torture and domestic violence. Many migrants are exempt from NHS charges in line with British nationals including refugees, asylum seekers, recognised victims of modern slavery and their children (<18 years), unaccompanied minors looked after by a local authority and immigration detainees. Non- EEA migrants in the UK under visa restrictions (ie, for work or study) must pay an annual immigration health surcharge, currently standing at £400 per adult and child (rising to £624 this October) that enables them to use the NHS in line with British nationals. In May 2020, the govern- ment responded to pressure to commit to removing the health surcharge requirement for non- EEA migrant NHS staff and care workers (many on minimum wage).16 It is not confirmed whether the exemption applies to their dependents, or if the surcharge will be dropped for other staff groups. All individuals outside of these exemption groups, including undetected international human traf- ficking victims, non- EEA migrants with a visa for less than 6 months stay and those without lawful residence (including visa overstayers) may be charged for NHS care at 150% tariff. This includes charges for maternity and paediatric care. Immigration and residence status does not only deter- mine healthcare access, but government legislation in 201517 and 201718 has embedded mechanisms of immi- gration enforcement within the NHS in England. Active measures include immigration status checks on patients and sharing of non- clinical patient data and outstanding debt with the Home Office,19 risking adverse immigra- tion outcomes. BARRIERS TO HEALTHCARE ACCESS FOR MIGRANT CHILDREN Migrants still face many barriers in the realisation of their right to free NHS care even when eligible, and thousands of children and their caregivers subject to restrictions remain in very precarious health contexts. While England’s ‘hostile environment’ (since renamed ‘compliant environment’) had been hailed as a mech- anism to tackle unauthorised immigration, ripples of perceived pervasive discrimination and threat have disseminated throughout the wider migrant population. For many, the sense of being unwelcome has been pain- fully exacerbated by the Windrush Scandal in 2018,20 widespread racist and xenophobic narrative surrounding ‘Brexit’ (the departure of the UK from the European Union, 2020),21 unsympathetic responses to refugees and current incidents of anti- Asian hate crimes, stigmatisa- tion and bullying of children perceived to be Chinese in the wake of COVID-19.22 Murphy et al demonstrated that healthcare professionals have recorded recent instances of profound harm to migrant families and children, including interuterine death and delayed treatment of childhood cancer where access to necessary healthcare has been deeply feared and avoided, denied (without payment) or delayed.3 Testing and treatment of COVID-19 have been decreed free of charge and exempt from immigration status checks,23 yet urgent and substantial concerns remain that these exemptions cannot mitigate the extensive barriers to migrants accessing healthcare and the subsequent severe mistrust in the integrity of the NHS generated by hostile policies.24 Possible symptoms of COVID-19 are diverse in presentation and severity, particularly in chil- dren,25 and many will be deterred from accessing the help they need risking increased community transmis- sion, health complications, inappropriate use of home treatments and avoidable deaths. MOVING FORWARD—ENABLING MIGRANT CHILDREN TO ACCESS HEALTHCARE In order to enable migrant children to realise their right to health, we recommend that: ► All migrant children have the same access to health- care as British nationals with immediate and ongoing o n A p ril 5 , 2 0 2 1 b y g u e st. P ro te cte d b y co p yrig h t. h ttp ://b m jp a e d so p e n .b m j.co m / b m jp o : first p u b lish e d a s 1 0 .1 1 3 6 /b m jp o -2 0 2 0 -0 0 0 7 0 5 o n 1 6 Ju ly 2 0 2 0 . D o w n lo a d e d fro m http://bmjpaedsopen.bmj.com/ 3Wood LCN, Devakumar D. BMJ Paediatrics Open 2020;4:e000705. doi:10.1136/bmjpo-2020-000705 Open access effect, in line with France, Italy, Norway, Portugal and Spain.26 Their healthcare access must be determined by their health or developmental needs, not by immi- gration status. ► All migrants must have access to NHS healthcare for ALL necessary treatments and preventative health- care without cost during the course of the COVID-19 pandemic and ongoing. Caregivers must feel safe to attend for their own, and their children’s healthcare needs without fear of debt and impoverishment. ► A firewall between the NHS, justice services and immigration must be urgently established. Migrant caregivers and children must be able to seek and receive healthcare, report violence and unsafe working and living conditions without any fear of being reported to immigration services, detained or deported. ► The healthcare surcharge for non- EEA migrants requires urgent review due to the risk of impover- ishment of low- paid workers and their dependents during a season of severe economic instability. ► Research into the risks of COVID-19, social deter- minants of health, systemic racism, hostile policies and hostile indifference towards migrant health outcomes must be ongoing and considered through a child rights framework. All barriers to healthcare access including language and physical barriers, legal, administrative and financial constraints should be removed. ► The principles of Universal Health Coverage must be clarified through the lens of international human rights law with a view to enhanced understanding of how legal avenues can be used to combat inadequa- cies in current healthcare access policy.27 The ongoing COVID-19 public health crisis presents an urgent, distinctive opportunity to enable the full rights of migrant children to health to be realised, recognising their situation within the wider picture of the enabled rights of their parents, carers and communities. Twitter Laura C N Wood @DrLauraCN Contributors LCNW took lead author role and provided main content. DD led key structural revisions and content review. Funding The authors have not declared a specific grant for this research from any funding agency in the public, commercial or not- for- profit sectors. Competing interests LCNW: (non- financial association) is the Child & Family Modern Slavery Lead for VITA, an organisation seeking to advance the public health response to modern slavery. Patient and public involvement Patients and/or the public were not involved in the design, or conduct, or reporting, or dissemination plans of this research. Patient consent for publication Not required. Provenance and peer review Commissioned; externally peer reviewed. Open access This is an open access article distributed in accordance with the Creative Commons Attribution Non Commercial (CC BY- NC 4.0) license, which permits others to distribute, remix, adapt, build upon this work non- commercially, and license their derivative works on different terms, provided the original work is properly cited, appropriate credit is given, any changes made indicated, and the use is non- commercial. See: http:// creativecommons. org/ licenses/ by- nc/ 4. 0/. ORCID iD Laura C N Wood http:// orcid. org/ 0000- 0001- 8947- 2677 REFERENCES 1 World Health Organisation. Address by DR Margaret Chan, Director- General, to the Sixty- Fifth World health assembly 2012. 2 United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child. Concluding observations on the fifth periodic report of the United Kingdom of great britain and Northern Ireland 2016. 3 Murphy L, Broad J, Hopkinshaw B, et al. Healthcare access for children and families on the move and migrants 2020;4:588. 4 Mayor of London. London’s Children and Young People Who Are Not British Citizens: A Profile. Available: www. london. gov. uk [Accessed 28 Apr 2020]. 5 HM Government. Modern slavery strategy, 2014. Available: www. gov. uk/ government/ publications [Accessed 25 Jun 2020]. 6 Sturge G. BriefingBRIEFING paper number SN01403, asylum statistics. house of commons library 2020. 7 Refugee Council. Information - Children in the Asylum System, 2019. 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Coronavirus (COVID-19): get support if you’re a migrant living in the UK, 2020. Available: https://www. gov. uk/ guidance/ coronavirus- covid- 19- get- support- if- youre- a- migrant- living- in- the- uk [Accessed 1 May 2020]. 24 Doctors of the World. Open letter to the Secretary of state for the home office and Secretary of state for health and social care, 2020. Available: https://www. doctorsoftheworld. org. uk/ wp- content/ uploads/ 2020/ 04/ Letter- to- HS- and- SSHSC_ 13. 04. 2020. pdf [Accessed 1 May 2020]. o n A p ril 5 , 2 0 2 1 b y g u e st. P ro te cte d b y co p yrig h t. h ttp ://b m jp a e d so p e n .b m j.co m / b m jp o : first p u b lish e d a s 1 0 .1 1 3 6 /b m jp o -2 0 2 0 -0 0 0 7 0 5 o n 1 6 Ju ly 2 0 2 0 . D o w n lo a d e d fro m https://twitter.com/DrLauraCN http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ http://orcid.org/0000-0001-8947-2677 www.london.gov.uk www.gov.uk/government/publications www.gov.uk/government/publications https://www.refugeecouncil.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/Children-in-the-Asylum-System-May-2019.pdf https://www.refugeecouncil.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/Children-in-the-Asylum-System-May-2019.pdf https://www.unhcr.org/uk/asylum-in-the-uk.html www.migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(18)32114-7 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S2468-2667(20)30084-0 http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/bmj.m1557 http://www.helenbamber.org/our-services/legal/medico-legal-reports/ http://www.helenbamber.org/our-services/legal/medico-legal-reports/ http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/bmj.m2094 https://www.nursingtimes.net/news/policies-and-guidance/rcn-keeps-pressure-on-pm-over-pledge-to-scrap-immigration-surcharge-10-06-2020/ https://www.nursingtimes.net/news/policies-and-guidance/rcn-keeps-pressure-on-pm-over-pledge-to-scrap-immigration-surcharge-10-06-2020/ https://www.nursingtimes.net/news/policies-and-guidance/rcn-keeps-pressure-on-pm-over-pledge-to-scrap-immigration-surcharge-10-06-2020/ http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2015/238/contents/made http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2015/238/contents/made http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2017/756/contents/made http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2017/756/contents/made https://www.medact.org http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(20)30792-3 https://www.gov.uk/guidance/coronavirus-covid-19-get-support-if-youre-a-migrant-living-in-the-uk https://www.gov.uk/guidance/coronavirus-covid-19-get-support-if-youre-a-migrant-living-in-the-uk https://www.gov.uk/guidance/coronavirus-covid-19-get-support-if-youre-a-migrant-living-in-the-uk https://www.doctorsoftheworld.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/Letter-to-HS-and-SSHSC_13.04.2020.pdf https://www.doctorsoftheworld.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/Letter-to-HS-and-SSHSC_13.04.2020.pdf http://bmjpaedsopen.bmj.com/ 4 Wood LCN, Devakumar D. BMJ Paediatrics Open 2020;4:e000705. doi:10.1136/bmjpo-2020-000705 Open access 25 Qiu H, Wu J, Hong L, et al. Clinical and epidemiological features of 36 children with coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) in Zhejiang, China: an observational cohort study. Lancet Infect Dis 2020. 26 Stubbe Østergaard L, Norredam M, Mock- Munoz de Luna C, et al. Restricted health care entitlements for child migrants in Europe and Australia. Eur J Public Health 2017;27:869–73. 27 Health and Human Rights Journal. Using the Right to Health to Promote Universal Health Coverage: A Better Tool for Protecting Non- Nationals’ Access to Affordable Health Care? Available: https://www. hhrjournal. org/ 2016/ 12/ using- the- right- to- health- to- promote- universal- health- coverage- a- better- tool- for- protecting- non- nationals- access- to- affordable- health- care/#_ edn2 [Accessed 25 Jun 2020]. o n A p ril 5 , 2 0 2 1 b y g u e st. 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D o w n lo a d e d fro m http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/eurpub/ckx083 https://www.hhrjournal.org/2016/12/using-the-right-to-health-to-promote-universal-health-coverage-a-better-tool-for-protecting-non-nationals-access-to-affordable-health-care/#_edn2 https://www.hhrjournal.org/2016/12/using-the-right-to-health-to-promote-universal-health-coverage-a-better-tool-for-protecting-non-nationals-access-to-affordable-health-care/#_edn2 https://www.hhrjournal.org/2016/12/using-the-right-to-health-to-promote-universal-health-coverage-a-better-tool-for-protecting-non-nationals-access-to-affordable-health-care/#_edn2 http://bmjpaedsopen.bmj.com/ Healthcare access for migrant children in England during the COVID-19 pandemic Healthcare access—a child right Migrants in the UK Eligibility for National Health Service (NHS) healthcare Barriers to healthcare access for migrant children Moving forward—enabling migrant children to access healthcare References 
work_2kftc6v6ivaiznxwkdx26kdruq	----	City, University of London Institutional Repository Citation: Myers, C. A. ORCID: 0000-0001-8216-2844 and Cowie, H. (2019). Cyberbullying Across the Lifespan of Education: Issues and Interventions from School to University. International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health, 16(7), 1217.. doi: 10.3390/ijerph16071217 This is the published version of the paper. This version of the publication may differ from the final published version. Permanent repository link: https://openaccess.city.ac.uk/id/eprint/21968/ Link to published version: http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/ijerph16071217 Copyright and reuse: City Research Online aims to make research outputs of City, University of London available to a wider audience. Copyright and Moral Rights remain with the author(s) and/or copyright holders. URLs from City Research Online may be freely distributed and linked to. City Research Online: http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/ publications@city.ac.uk City Research Online http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/ mailto:publications@city.ac.uk Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2019, 16, 1217; doi:10.3390/ijerph16071217 www.mdpi.com/journal/ijerph Article Cyberbullying Across the Lifespan of Education: Issues and Interventions from School to University Carrie-Anne Myers 1,* and Helen Cowie 2 1 Deptartment. of Sociology, City, University of London, London, EC1V 0HB, UK 2 Department of Health and Medical Sciences, University of Surrey, Guildford, GU2 7XH, UK; H.Cowie@surrey.ac.uk * Correspondence: Carrie.Myers.1@city.ac.uk; Tel.: +44-207-040-4556 Received: 12 March 2019; Accepted: 02 April 2019; Published: 4 April 2019 Abstract: Research on cyberbullying amongst students has tended to be conducted separately within specific education institutional contexts, schools, further education (FE) and higher education (HE), neglecting a view that takes account of the entire educational lifespan. The present article addresses this gap in the literature, providing a novel take on examining its nature, social environments, legal consequences and potentially helpful interventions. To facilitate this, the article conceptualises cyberbullying in broad terms, recognising that it can take multiple forms of online and digital practice including: spreading rumours, ridiculing and/or demeaning another person, casting aspirations on the grounds of race, disability, gender, religion or sexual orientation; seeking revenge or deliberately embarrassing a person by posting intimate photos or videos about them without their consent; accessing another’s social networking profiles with malicious intent and socially excluding a person from a social network or gaming site. This article demonstrates that harm from cyberbullying is a cause for concern for students at each developmental stage and that there are continuities in its appearance that need to be challenged at each point in the educational lifespan. And inaccurately, by university, the idea that ‘nothing can be done’ still is one of the main concerns for the victims. The article concludes with five key recommendations for future research and practice across the educational lifespan. Keywords: cyberbullying; peer support; bystanders; moral disengagement; cyberbullying and the law; mental health; social environment; cyberbullying interventions; educational lifespan. 1. The Nature of Cyberbullying In the past decade, cyberbullying has emerged as a phenomenon at the school, college and university levels. Definitions of cyberbullying fall into two main categories. Some researchers view cyberbullying as a new form of traditional bullying, following the classical definition originally proposed by Olweus, which states that it is repeated over time, involves a power imbalance between perpetrator and target and has an intention to harm. In fact, Olweus, describes cyberbullying as “an overrated phenomenon”, preferring to view it as simply an extension of traditional bullying into the virtual world. He argues that cyberbullying has low prevalence and that most of those who are being cyberbullied are also being bullied in traditional ways in the ‘real’ world [1] By contrast, other researchers [2–4] consider that cyberbullying differs from traditional bullying in distinctive ways since it can invade all aspects of a target’s privacy day and night, both at home and at the educational institution where the target studies. Furthermore, the perpetrators can choose to disguise their identity, so heightening the target students’ insecurity about the quality of their relationships since they may not know which members of their peer group are involved in the cyberbullying. Additionally, if a harmful message “goes viral” through the actions of bystanders who forward the messages to others in their networks, the cybervictim’s distress is compounded. Finally, Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2019, 16, 1217 2 of 14 if, in a ‘one-off’ attack, the action is severe, such as sharing a sexually explicit image of the victim, it transcends the boundaries of cyberbullying and in some countries becomes a criminal offence [5]. From this second perspective, like traditional face-to-face bullying, cyberbullying involves the deliberate intent to hurt a person or persons repeatedly over time. However, researchers such as Schulze-Krumbholz et al. found structural differences in cyberbullying when compared to traditional bullying with an absence of the “pure” cybervictim category in their sample of 6260 adolescents. In their study, they found that the perpetrators of cyberbullying reported that they had been bullied themselves in traditional ways. The researchers speculate that the anonymity of cyberbullying enabled these young people to fight back in ways that would be impossible face-to-face. This study confirms that there is some overlap between traditional and cyberbullying but that the latter has its own distinctive nature [6]. Boulton et al. conclude from their research into bullying at university that findings from traditional bullying should not be generalised to cyberbullying and vice versa. Furthermore, they argue, each broad category (whether bullying or cyberbullying) has sub-types of behaviour, each of which may be distinctive in its own right. They recommend a focus on attitudes towards the behaviour of both bullies and victims to predict whether a student will engage in bullying or cyberbullying in the future [2]. For the purpose of this article, we acknowledge the distinctive features of cyberbullying while at the same time accepting that to some extent there is an overlap between traditional and cyberbullying. In order to move the agenda along and look at continuities across the educational lifespan, and the ever-evolving nature of social media platforms, technology and the internet, we also argue that cyberbullying, as a stand-alone category, has to be considered in order to understand more deeply its potential for social and emotional harm to those directly involved as well as to the witnesses and bystanders. The objective of this paper is to address the following two research questions: 1) To what extent has cyberbullying across the lifespan of education, that is from primary/elementary school, through college to university, been identified as an issue? 2) What are the implications for educational establishments and educators to reduce and prevent cyberbullying across this learning lifespan? 2. Research Findings on Cyberbullying Most of the research on cyberbullying has taken place in schools and we can gain a great deal of knowledge from this literature about the phenomenon [7]. More recently, there has been an upsurge of interest in cyberbullying among post-16 students, whether in further education (college) or higher education (university), for example, in Canada [8–10], in Finland [11,12], in the US [13] and in the UK [14]. The systematic review of cyberbullying among adults by Jenaro, Flores and Frias (2018) provides useful evidence on prevalence, contributing factors, short- and long-term impact and the role of bystanders. Although this review focuses on adults, in practice the authors found that most of the studies had been carried out in college student populations. They conclude that the impact of cyberbullying may be as severe amongst adult populations as amongst children but they note the buffering effect of personal and environmental factors, with emotional intelligence (in the individual) and social support (in the school and community environment) being the most influential variables [15]. Essentially, research into cyberbullying indicates negative immediate effects on the target with potentially harmful long-term impacts on psychosocial development, self-esteem, academic achievement and mental health [16–19]. For the students who are the targets of such bullying behaviours, the experience is unpleasant and distressing in the short term. However, for some there are longer term negative consequences for their mental health and their academic career. Bullying affects the target’s self-esteem and often leads to social withdrawal from peer-group networks. Consequently, victims of cyberbullying run a heightened risk of mental health disorders, including depression and social anxiety [12,13]. For example, Schenk and Fremouw found that college student victims of cyberbullying were more likely than non-bullied peers to suffer from depression, anxiety and a range of psychosomatic complaints, as well as academic difficulties [20]. Research into the Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2019, 16, 1217 3 of 14 experiences of lesbian, gay, bi-sexual and transgendered (LGBT) students confirms the negative effect of bullying on the mental health of targets. One National Union of Students (NUS) survey [21] found that one in five lesbian, gay and bi-sexual (LGB) students and one in three transgendered (T) students reported at least one form of bullying on campus; many reported that they had to pass as ‘straight’ in order to protect themselves from homophobia and transphobia. Rivers and Valentine et al. report on the extremely negative effect that such treatment had on the mental health of staff and students [22,23]. In extremes, this could lead to suicide. Cyberbullying involves many, if not all, of the children in a school class since not only the perpetrators and targets are affected but also the witnesses who view negative online messages and harmful video clips and who may in turn forward them to other people for their own amusement, regardless of the feelings of the victim. Cyberbullies are often rewarded for their online behaviour by the approval of the peer group. On the surface, they are the dominant ones with a côterie of admiring followers, but research indicates that the long-term outcomes for them are not good in terms of mental health, social competence and anti-social behaviour [24]. There is a high risk that they will continue to repeat their cyberbullying behaviour [25] since their popularity (which they value) is based on fear and intimidation rather than genuine friendship, making it highly likely that they will continue this method of relating to others as a means of acceptance in their peer group across the educational lifespan Cyberbullying among post-16 students continues to cause harmful effects on fellow students. It takes many forms, including such behaviours as: spreading nasty rumours on the grounds of race, disability, gender, religion and sexual orientation; ridiculing or demeaning a person; social exclusion; unwelcome sexual advances; stalking; threatening someone online; revealing personal information about a person that was shared in confidence [14]. West in two studies of cyberbullying among college students in the age-group 16–19 years, found that victims reported such disturbing behaviour as: being told to kill themselves; being sexually harassed; being taunted on account of their religion; being bullied on account of their sexual orientation; being attacked by a ‘gang’ of former friends on Twitter; having nasty comments posted online by a former romantic partner. The emotions experienced by the targets of bullying included anger, hurt, sadness, depression, embarrassment, anxiety, difficulty in concentrating, isolation, self-blame, fear, suicidal thoughts; victims also reported that the cyberbullying had an adverse effect on their capacity to study and on their ability to form social relationships online and in the real world. In the same study, the students who admitted to being cyberbullies reported reasons that included: fun; revenge; anger; jealousy; provocation; desire for power and status; freedom to behave in this way through the anonymity of the social media [26,27]. These findings are confirmed in a larger Canadian study (N = 1925) by Faucher et al. (2014) who also noted that women students were more vulnerable to attack through such forms of cyberbullying as “sexting”, “morphing”, “virtual rape” and “revenge porn” [9]. Phipps and Young made similar discoveries in their study of bullying and harassment among UK university students [28]. As indicated in many studies globally and across the educational lifespan, the effects of cyberbullying on mental health can be long-lasting [12,13,29,30]. The public nature of cyberbullying means that it can create a social context where cyberbullying is perceived as “normal” and “acceptable” ([5] p.1172). Sexting (the exchange of online sexual images or videos) whether generated by others or self-generated, has contributed to recent increases in cyberbullying. This kind of material may begin within a close friendship group or couple but can quickly go viral and be circulated, without consent, to a much larger audience. 3. Cyberbullying across the Educational Lifespan There is, a small, but growing, body of evidence to suggest that there is some continuity in being a bully or a victim from childhood through adolescence and into young adulthood [9,31,32]. Curwen et al. in a retrospective study of 186 university students who admitted to bullying their peers, found that, although there was an overall decrease in the incidence of verbal and physical bullying between high school and university, a substantial proportion of the student bullies in their study had also Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2019, 16, 1217 4 of 14 engaged in bullying behaviour at elementary and high school levels [33]. Chapell et al. found that over half of the adult bullies in their sample had also bullied others during childhood and adolescence. They conclude that this history of bullying indicates long-term benefits so that the behaviour becomes entrenched and continues to be a successful strategy for improving the bully’s social status [34]. Not only that, there is evidence that bullies are popular amongst their peers and that bystanders are often indifferent to the suffering of the victims [25] and that this insensitivity to others’ distress increases over time [35]. The impact on the victims is well documented within the school setting and is emerging as a core focus for looking at cyberbullying within the university sector [31]. The evidence indicates that, while cyberbullying behaviours follow the traditional bullying notions of an imbalance of power, with the added dimension of the internet, the anonymity of the behaviours gives ‘more power’ to the perpetrators and a greater feeling of helplessness to the victims. Additionally, the anonymity of the internet gives perceived power to former victims who can then take revenge on those who tormented them without the repercussions which would happen in a face- to-face context. Furthermore, we also need to take account of the social contexts where the cyberbullying takes place. As Cassidy et al., argue: “Power imbalances are prevalent in the hierarchical context of universities: administrator to faculty member, senior to junior faculty, tenured to untenured, faculty to staff, supervisor to graduate student, instructor to student, not to mention imbalances based on gender, age, ethnicity, race, social status, and sexual orientation, which can permeate all of those relationships.”([36], p.2) Indeed, in their research into cyberbullying among students, faculty staff and administrators at four Canadian universities, they link their analysis of cyberbullying to the power and control model, adapted from the field of intimate partner violence, which considers behaviours such as “intimidation, threats, harmful language, social standing, exclusion and harassment in the exercise of power and control over another in a relationship.” ([36],p.2) Furthermore, they demonstrate that the internet and relevant communication technologies can be used to carry out any, or all, of these forms of behaviour. They conclude that “currently too many students and faculty are suffering the impacts of cyberbullying in isolation, frustrated with the attempts for solving their situations, without any clear guidelines to follow, and within the context of a university culture which benignly seems to tolerate such actions.” ([36], p.16) Because of the global reach of the internet, social media platforms and any aggressive online behaviour such as cyberbullying, it follows that research within the university sector is global in its production. Increasingly, researchers in universities reach the same conclusion, namely that cyberbullying is a vast problem and that something has to be done about it [37,38]. 4. The Role of the Bystander/Witness Bullying is rarely something that happens only between two individuals, the bully and the victim. Rather, it happens in a social context where bystanders are fully aware of what is happening and take on distinctive participant roles, such as bully, victim, assistant, reinforcer, outsider and defender [39]. In fact, Salmivalli argues that bystanders/outsiders are trapped in a moral dilemma. Although they understand that bullying is wrong, they are acutely aware of their own need for security within the peer group [39]. Many bullies enjoy tormenting a vulnerable peer “for fun” and this can involve entertainment value for the onlookers [40]. The ways in which bystanders respond has a powerful impact on whether the cyberbullying continues or, even worse, goes viral. Through the actions of bystanders, a message that was intended for one other person or for a small group of close friends can quickly be sent to strangers without the permission of the target person. Too often, it is easier for the bystanders to enjoy the spectacle of another’s distress than to challenge the bullies. Bystanders may even blame the victims for not being capable of defending themselves [41]. This indifference, or moral disengagement, is often justified on the grounds that the victim in some way deserved the treatment being meted out to them. In fact, by forwarding distressing images or videos, bystanders collude with the bullies and demonstrate that a process of moral disengagement has taken place [42]. The bystanders’ lack of action to support the victim of cyberbullying can be explained in several ways. They may be afraid of becoming a target in turn if they challenge the bullies or defend Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2019, 16, 1217 5 of 14 the victim and they may justify their actions by rationalising them in terms of blaming the victim [35]. They may even admire the bullies and feel pride in the bullies’ actions [43]. In turn, the actions of bystanders influence the behaviour of the wider peer group, for example, in whether to condone the cyberbullying or to defend the victim publicly. However, many bystanders report feelings of discomfort and concern when they witness the occurrence of cyberbullying. Condeza et al. ([44], p.44) report the following comments from witnesses of cyberbullying at a university in Chile: “I felt powerless about the offenders’ anonymity, and I felt ignorant because I did not know what to do.” (female, second year) “It angered me, but since it was not my friend, I cannot intervene.” (male, second year) Additionally, these researchers found that 44.5% of their sample of witnesses reported that they were afraid of becoming cybervictims if they intervened [44]. The problem has become so serious in the UK that Universities UK (UUK) has issued a report, Changing the Culture, on sexual violence, harassment and hate crime on campus with a list of recommendations, emphasising prevention, that all universities should take on board, which we will discuss below in the section on the complexities of cyberbullying and the law [45]. Victims’ reactions to cyberbullying are crucial in understanding its incidence and impact. Some researchers argue that there are distinctive roles that can be assigned. For example, Cunningham et al surveyed 1004 university students and found that more than 60% of respondents reported involvement in cyberbullying in the following ways: 45.7% had been witnesses, 5.7% had been victims, 4.9% were perpetrator victims and 4.5% were perpetrators [46]. These are similar roles to the ones suggested by Salmivalli in her research on school bullying [39]. 5. Victim Coping Strategies in Cyberbullying Recent research considers cyberbullying in the university setting and its possible relationship with other personal and family variables. For example, Martinez-Monteagudo et al. consider the predictive capacity of the family environment and emotional intelligence in relation to cyberbullying among university students [47]. They sampled 1282 students and found that a deteriorated family environment increased the probability of being both a victim and a perpetrator of cyberbullying. Furthermore, they also found that the emotional intelligence of the students had a correlation with predicting the levels of participation in cyberbullying. They argue that: “…part of the problem of cyberbullying in the university setting may depend on the quality of the student’s family relationships and EI level. These are variables that have yet to receive much attention from the scientific field. Thus, the family is seen to play a relevant role as a protective factor from cyberbullying, even in a university setting, controlling the behaviour of its members and the use of new technologies. Similarly, EI acts as a protective factor to prevent students from being victims as well as aggressors, highlighting the fundamental role exercised by emotional regulation in students. Thus, it is corroborated that both variables are relevant factors to be taken into consideration when developing social and educational policies, and when developing intervention programs to alleviate this problem.” ([47] p. 224). Such research demonstrates the continuities and patterns across the educational lifespan, but crucially also suggests that even though the students are at university, there is still an element of family involvement and engagement that will help the student if they become involved in a cyberbullying scenario. This is also pertinent since an increasing number of students choose to live at home whilst they study to keep down the costs and expenditure of being at university. Assumptions that students are over 18 and able to defend for themselves need to be challenged as positive relationships with the family emerge as a coping mechanism for involvement in cyberbullying, as they do for school students. Attachments to members of the peer group are also significant, as McCloughlin et al. found in their survey of Australian adolescents [48]. Young people in this age-group have a strong need for social connectedness. Those who were more socially connected had better mental health than those Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2019, 16, 1217 6 of 14 who were not and had more effective defences against cyberbullying when it happened. The less young people feel socially connected to their peer group, the lower their self-esteem and the greater their sense of loneliness, both offline and online [49]. Gender also plays a very significant role in cyberbullying across the educational lifespan, notably at the university level. Cunningham et al., found that male students were more likely than their female counterparts to report as perpetrators or bully-victims [46], while Boulton et al., argued that the male undergraduates in their study viewed cyberbullying and those who perpetrate it, less negatively than the female students did [2]. Younger victims may try to fight back (often unsuccessfully) against the bullies or express their distress through tears and emotional displays, so risking further physical and psychological attacks from the bullies, and contempt from bystanders [50]. As victims progress through the educational lifespan, they are less likely to retaliate actively but are more likely to employ passive tactics, such as blocking or ignoring. As Kernaghan and Elwood argue in their qualitative study of cyberbullying during early adolescence, the cyberbullying event becomes a performance where the bystanders take the role of audience to a drama. The more the victims become distressed, the greater the entertainment and the less likely that bystanders will intervene to help [51]. Similarly, in focus groups, the adolescents in the study by Purdy and York reported that during an episode of cyberbullying, it is often easier to go along with the crowd since they were afraid that the bullies would turn on them [35]. Understandably, victims learn to disguise their true feelings. As children become adolescents, they are less likely to engage in fighting fire with fire, perhaps because of such negative experiences from peers and perceived inaction from adults. By the time cybervictims are at university, while they may have learned that aggressive retaliation achieves little, many have failed to find alternative coping strategies to reduce or prevent the cyberbullying [52]. A small number of studies indicate that the university sector could be better equipped to deal with cyberbullying, with lecturers and other staff becoming more proactive in helping. When considering victims of cyberbullying and how they deal with the situation whilst at university research is scant, in comparison to the school setting. Nonetheless there are some illuminating studies. For example, Orel et al., in a sample of 282 students, investigated the coping strategies the students would potentially use in response to future cyberbullying incidents. Blocking of the perpetrator was found to be the most common tactic considered [53], but does this passive tactic solve the problem? Research from the school setting provides strong evidence that telling someone about being bullied is a crucial first step to resolving the problem, however, studies of college and university cyberbullying find that victims feel, at university, that telling someone about their situation will not result in a satisfactory outcome. For instance, Alqahtani et al., in their study of 165 university students found that 49% of students felt that their university could not or would not do anything about cyberbullying, even if it was reported; 47% felt that university staff would not believe or understand them even if they did complain or report what had happened [54]. Thus interventions that actively encourage children to tell someone that they are being cyberbullied, for example a member of staff from the pastoral care team, a school nurse or a peer supporter, are not being carried over to FE and HE levels so therefore are not being practiced across the educational lifespan. 6. The Victim-Offender Cycle. In Finland, Pörhölä [25,55] found that nearly half of those who reported being bullied at university had previously been subjected to school bullying. Retrospective studies, for example, Bauman and Newman in the US, also indicate that there is a high likelihood that university students who report being bullied were also bullied at junior and high school levels, but that being a stable victim from junior high to high school and then to university was more characteristic of male than female students [56]. However, the distinctive participant roles that are often researched and reported in more traditional forms of bullying [39] are not always as clear cut in cyberbullying incidents. Some researchers [2] have argued that it is almost impossible to make the distinction between the ‘bully’ and the ‘victim’ in the online world where cybervictims hide behind anonymity to become Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2019, 16, 1217 7 of 14 cyberbullies in revenge. Similarly, at secondary school level, Schultze-Krumbholz, et al., found that adolescents who bully others online are very likely to have been victims themselves [6]. Cyberbullying research confirms some degree of continuity across the educational lifespan but there are also discontinuities that need to be further investigated. The discipline of criminology potentially offers useful insights since the ‘victim/offender’ cycle is played out in different criminal scenarios and the distinction between roles is not that clear cut. Decades of research have shown that there exists a connection between the perpetrator and the target, which has a number of complicated dynamics that need further investigation [57], with some arguing that the overlap is developmental in its nature and predictable from childhood [58] and others arguing that the relationship is so “intimately connected” that trying to understand victims and offenders as separate entities is not possible [59]. Clearly, the relationship between cyberbully and victim is key to understanding the wider cultural context and significance of the act [60] and is an area of further study that is needed when considering cyberbullying across the educational lifespan. The victim/offender relationship is a difficult area to unpack when it comes to cyberbullying and research is beginning to show that it becomes even more difficult within the university sector because of the age and potential previous experience of all those who are involved. One way to begin to understand the complex interactions is to look at reactions to cyberbullying when it occurs. For example, Eristi and Akbulut surveyed 567 undergraduate students and 211 high school students. Among this sample they found that 170 (29.98%) of the undergraduates and 120 (56.87%) of the school aged students had been cyberbullied within the last six months prior to the study. They then considered and investigated the behavioural cyberbullying reactions of victimised students under four key factors, which were revenge, countermeasure, negotiation and avoidance. They also considered victimized students’ emotional reactions as either internalizing (for example, ‘fear’, ‘panic’, ‘anxiety’ ‘embarrassment’ or ‘guilt’) or externalizing (for example, ‘seeking revenge’, ‘getting aggressive’ or ‘angry’). Their research demonstrated that behavioural and emotional reactions varied according to gender and whether they were in school or at university [61]. Furthermore, computer self-efficacy and internet use were associated with different reaction types. They conclude that: “...new model and intervention proposals directed at reducing the unpleasant/damaging victimization consequences may better serve the goal of mitigating these consequences than descriptive investigations.”([61], p. 9) Although this is a relatively large scale survey in an emerging field of investigation, it highlights, and adds to the debate, that victim reactions and retaliation processes must be included when considering how to understand cyberbullying across the educational lifespan. 7. Current Policy and the Role of the Law – the UK Context The issues around law, the boundaries of responsibility and criminalization of behaviours are to be considered country by country, due to the nature of individual criminal justice systems. Here, we look at the UK as an example to highlight the minefield of problems that are emerging around cyberbullying and its intersection with crime. Although the authors acknowledge that there are many different laws and practices within other jurisdictions, focusing on one system will highlight the complexities of not tackling cyberbullying across the educational lifespan. Within the UK, Advance HE, who were appointed as independent evaluators for the Office for Students (OfS) Catalyst-funded projects, were tasked with looking at ‘what works’ in student engagement in safeguarding projects following the UUK Changing the Culture Report [45] follow up report Changing the Culture: One Year On [62] and subsequent Catalyst funding to evaluate good practice across the sector. So far, they have identified the following as being the most effective ways to achieve this: firstly, “co-creation with students of training content and campaigns”, secondly, “Peer-to-peer learning or mentoring” and thirdly, “Collaboration with Student Unions.” ([63], p.2). They strongly recommend that students themselves should be encouraged to re-engage with practices, such as peer support and peer mentoring, that are commonplace in most primary and secondary schools in some form or another [64]. Perhaps rather than re-invent the wheel, the further Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2019, 16, 1217 8 of 14 and higher education systems need to reintroduce practices and policies to their students that the majority would have had some knowledge about whilst in their earlier years of their education. Furthermore, UUK has now uncovered many issues that should be taken into consideration when focussing on sexual misconduct, hate crime and harassment, the original remit of Changing the Culture [45]. In October 2018 they held a round table event to explore the nature and scope of online harassment and cyberbullying within the university sector and to see what more can be done to prevent and respond to this form of hate crime. A report will follow in April 2019. Therefore, cyberbullying within universities is under consideration but it is still key to remember that any recommendations that are made are not mandatory as there is not a regulatory body that enforces universities to develop centralised policies. This is in contrast to schools and FE colleges that are required by law to have safeguarding practices in place and anti-bullying policies. The problem here is the age of the students and, as has been argued in previous research, once students are at university, they are over the age of 18 and are legally adults, which brings with it challenges of responsibility and boundaries of policing [5]. It is worth noting here that although cyberbullying is not a criminal offence, there are a number of laws and relevant legislation that are used by the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) to prosecute cases that involve online communication in England and Wales. These include: Offences Against the Person Act (1861), Protection from Harassment Act (1997), Malicious Communications Act (1988), The Crime and Disorder Act (1998) and the Serious Crime Act (2015) Students over the age of 18 can potentially be prosecuted for cyberbullying related offences. Since many students are unaware of this legislation, we recommend that education on the legal consequences of actions must be bought into the curriculum at a much earlier level. If behaviour is learned and repeated across the educational lifespan, the legal aspects need to be dealt with from the beginning, as soon as children and young people are able to understand the implications of what they are doing [49]. It would appear to be the case that certain communities within the wider society have a very high tolerance level for what is considered ‘normal’ or ‘acceptable’ in terms of violent behaviours. For example, within the UK amongst teenagers, sexting, upskirting and revenge porn have become particular causes for concern [5,65,66] and this is especially pertinent in the online world. The boundary between ‘flirty’ behaviour and crime is becoming even more blurred. Therefore, this needs to be factored in along with challenging a lack of knowledge about the law. It needs to be embedded in education, across the educational lifespan, with legal awareness training. 8. Intervening to Prevent and Reduce Cyberbullying International evaluation studies [67,68] have systematically reviewed the successes and failures of interventions to combat bullying/cyberbullying at school level. For example, Ttofi and Farrington, in their meta-analysis of 44 school-based interventions carried out over a period of 25 years in Europe, Australia, America and South Africa, found that certain intervention programmes reduced rates of bullying others by 20–23% and victimisation by 17–20% [68]. The key components of such programmes included parent meetings and training, consistent disciplinary methods, classroom rules, school conferences and skilled classroom management by teachers. Smith et al. (2016) examined the effect of disciplinary methods and concluded that these needed to be non-punitive, negotiated by adults and children, and restorative in nature, with an emphasis on school safety for all, on the promotion of a positive school ethos, and on positive relationships throughout the school. [67]. The evidence pointed to the effectiveness of sanctions that were perceived by the students as fair and reasonable, arising from a process of consultation in which members of the school community had taken part. Purdy and York, focussing on cyberbullying, argue that new ground rules are emerging concerning responsibility for action to counteract cyberbullying since the bullying frequently occurs at home during evenings and weekends when it is parents who have responsibility for their child’s behaviour [35]. Within the school setting, bullying and cyberbullying interventions typically engage in a ‘whole school’ approach considering other factors such as the family and wider community in addressing the problem. Many schools across the world now adopt Social and Emotional Learning (SEL) Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2019, 16, 1217 9 of 14 programmes to enhance children’s and young people’s empathy for the distress of others and to create a more pro-social climate in the classroom and the school at large (for a comprehensive international overview, see [69]). An international review of successful and unsuccessful interventions [70] identified key components in the reduction of bullying, to include the creation of a whole-school policy against bullying and meetings/workshops with parents. Smith et al. (2016) identified the effectiveness of restorative methods within the school and the community in order to create a co-operative school climate with an emphasis on positive relationships and active participation on the part of students and staff in the creation and implementation of anti-bullying action [67]. Going one step further, Finne et al. argue that the dynamics of bullying are likely to persist in a school context if only superficial anti-bullying action is taken [71]. They argue that some form of rehabilitation needs to take place to change the quality of “peer ecology” ([71] p. 356) in the classroom. They argue that the moral disengagement that occurs when bullying persists creates a group norm that may well continue even when the active forms of bullying have ceased as a result of a successful intervention. Their model of relational rehabilitation takes three steps: 1) Ensuring teacher authority: teachers play a crucial role through an authoritative teaching style that emphasises warmth, acceptance and tolerance. This can counteract the destructive power of the bullies; 2) Redistribution of social power and promoting a supportive classroom community: In an abusive class community, power will have been wielded by the bullies. The teacher plays a crucial role in breaking up the previous hierarchies and creating a fairer social system that promotes friendship and prosocial behaviour. Such a class culture will be tolerant of difference and open to discussions about social inclusion and caring. The teacher plays an active part in helping the pupils to repair the damage that has been done. 3) Providing social and emotional learning (SEL) to the whole class: Whole-class SEL programmes take a variety of forms but their essential principles concern the inclusion of all, the valuing of prosocial behaviour and the creation of a warm, supportive classroom community. Similarly, in the college and university sector, the idea of rehabilitation is beginning to be discussed, with a growing emphasis on changing the culture to one of tolerance and community [62,72]. However, there is not to date the same level of coherence nor shared practice as appears at school level. Whilst a number of studies focus on reporting the levels of cyberbullying across the educational lifespan, there are huge variations in how the problem should actually be tackled. Following the recommendations from cyberbullying within the school setting, research within the university sector is beginning to acknowledge that a very important and often neglected way to understand and deal with the problem is to engage with the students themselves. Cunningham et al (2015) stipulated that there were five key areas that need to be considered when tackling cyberbullying within the university sector: 1) Emphasise the impact of cyberbullying on victims; 2) Change cyberbullying prevention attitudes; 3) Teach anti-cyberbullying strategies; 4) Enable anonymous online reporting; 5) Combine prevention with consequences ([46], p.380). These recommendations were made by the students themselves and the authors conclude that they would help when designing and implementing university anti-cyberbullying programmes. Such research and subsequent recommendations indicate the need for a rather more complex whole university sector approach to tackling the problem than is currently available. Furthermore, the involvement of the students themselves is crucial, especially given the age of undergraduate students. They are adults and they need to be consulted in what works to reduce cyberbullying and thus make their learning environment more positive, especially in the light of the move to a heavy reliance on the online world for everything within the university sector, from online registration and Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2019, 16, 1217 10 of 14 timetables, to attendance monitoring, assignment submission and virtual learning environments. Universities continue to advance in adapting online systems and practices. Thus, it follows that mechanisms could also be introduced and improved to support students who have to use and engage with the online world. 9. Conclusions To what extent has cyberbullying across the lifespan of education, that is from primary/elementary school, through college to university, been identified as an issue? The evidence from the literature that we reviewed indicates that cyberbullying across the educational lifespan continues to be a critical issue for a proportion of students. Despite the wealth of high-quality research over three decades, the problem still needs to be addressed as a matter of urgency. Cyberbullying, to some extent, is a continuity and attitudes towards it need to change. While there are some overlaps with traditional bullying, there are clearly aspects unique to the online existence that have to be considered. Traditional anti-bullying interventions may not always be sufficient to capture the complexities of cyberbullying. The following gaps in knowledge need to be considered: 1) One important gap concerns the widespread lack of knowledge amongst educators and their students about the legal consequences of cyberbullying behaviour across the educational lifespan. 2) A second concerns the finding that cyberbullying is distressing at all stages of the educational lifespan but there is a lot of evidence now to support the view that cybervictims become less likely to report it as they reach FE and HE levels. The gap in understanding appears to be at university level and the assumption that students as young adults no longer need support in dealing with cyberbullying. 3) Furthermore, the bystanders express less empathy and more moral disengagement the older they get, with university students showing the least sensitivity to peers’ distress. 4) Finally, by the time they reach adolescence and young adulthood cybervictims have run out of options for the help and support which they are more likely to get at primary school but which are less likely to feature as they progress through the educational lifespan They can resort to acceptance of their fate with all the attendant mental health difficulties that this entails or they can take revenge on their tormentors by becoming cyberbullies themselves. Neither is a good coping strategy. The gap here is we need more information on successful and unsuccessful strategies adopted by cybervictims across the educational lifespan. What are the implications for educational establishments and educators to reduce and prevent cyberbullying across the educational lifespan? Looking at cyberbullying in educational silos is not helpful. Students do not arrive at university and their problems begin. Rather, looking at education as a longitudinal journey is more helpful. Good practice could and should be shared amongst schools, colleges and universities in order to safeguard and educate students at all levels of their education. The following action points emerged from the literature search: 1) At primary school level and to an extent at secondary level, schools are increasingly developing Social Emotional Learning (SEL) [69], restorative practices [73] or emotional rehabilitation [71] interventions to address the issue of cyberbullying, with an emphasis on the destructive nature of moral disengagement. Peer support systems are widespread [64]. Participant role theory is also successfully used in Finland [39]. However, at FE and HE levels this is not happening. We have already mentioned the work that UUK [62] advocated around bystander training but to date this is only used in a few institutions and is yet to roll out across the sector. For those students that do identify as victims, there need to be improved systems, such as student welfare and counselling, to help them. Perhaps what Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2019, 16, 1217 11 of 14 need to be introduced at the FE and HE level are more comprehensive pastoral systems with appropriate training for the staff involved 2) While there is a strong emphasis at school level on social skills, the development of empathy and the need for restorative practice to mediate in disputes, the legal aspects of cyberbullying are scarcely mentioned. By contrast, legal aspects of cyberbullying are increasingly on the agenda at FE and HE levels since the students are by now young adults. When cyberbullying incidents become criminal acts, the police are involved and legal proceedings may ensue. This indicates an imbalance at different levels of the educational lifespan. What is needed is legal awareness training across the educational lifespan. 3) There is strong evidence of both continuities and discontinuities in cyberbullying across the educational lifespan but, to date, there is little information on the nature of successful and unsuccessful coping strategies used by the targets of cyberbullying. Consequently, researchers and practitioners need to continue to collaborate to design methods for equipping future generations with the tools to navigate the internet safely and, in a socially positive way. 4) Primary and secondary schools have invested a great deal in counteracting the harmful effects of xenophobia, misogyny and homophobia; this is less evident at FE and HE levels. There should be considerably more sharing of expertise between schools, colleges and universities about interventions that are effective in this domain. 5) Finally, the literature indicates an urgent need to consider cyberbullying in its cultural context - its social and environmental ecology. The issue of moral disengagement is scarcely mentioned in the curriculum or in the pastoral care systems at HE and FE levels despite the evidence of cultural issues such as “laddism” [28], xenophobia [74], sexism [10,49] and homophobia [22] in FE and HE settings. Cyberbullying needs to be addressed and understood in all of its cultureal contexts across the educational lifespan One thing that is for certain is that the internet is not going to disappear. Technology will evolve, and more social media platforms will emerge. 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Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/). 1. The Nature of Cyberbullying 2. Research Findings on Cyberbullying 3. Cyberbullying across the Educational Lifespan 4. The Role of the Bystander/Witness 5. Victim Coping Strategies in Cyberbullying 6. The Victim-Offender Cycle. 7. Current Policy and the Role of the Law – the UK Context 8. Intervening to Prevent and Reduce Cyberbullying 9. Conclusions References 
work_2lzrm74ykbfutgriu6yn45qs7a	----	WORKING LIFE STRESS, REHABILITATION COUNSELLING AND INCLUSION ‘‘To tell or not to tell?’’ Managing a concealable identity in the workplace Ross Flett* School of Psychology, Massey University, Palmerston North, New Zealand Abstract The management of identities, particularly stigmatized identities, represents considerable challenge. This article considers some of the issues around the decision to conceal or reveal a stigmatized or potentially stigmatizing identity. The potential consequences of ‘‘telling or not telling’’ are examined. There is a need for all individuals to monitor behaviours, attitudes, systems and structures that convey disrespect, discrimination, and derogation towards those with a stigmatized identity (concealed or otherwise). Keywords: identity; stigma; workplace; disclosure; theory The warp and weft of everyday working life involves the management of multiple identities and for the most part these are seamlessly intertwined. We can at the same time be friend, acquaintance, col- league, worker, and boss. The notion of social identity and the management of multiple identities are well canvassed in the psychological literature (e.g. Brook, Garcia, & Fleming, 2008; Dutton, Roberts, & Bednar, 2010; Gregg, 1995; Settles, 2004). But at the same time there may be other identities that we wish to conceal (often because of their potentially stigmatizing nature). Goffman (1963) defines a stigma as an attribute that prevents an individual from being fully accepted in or con- nected to the social world. Goffman makes the distinction between stigmas that are ‘‘discredited’’ versus those that are ‘‘discreditable’’. The discredited are those that are more obvious such as race, physical disability while the discreditable are those that can be hidden such as sexual orientation, HIV/AIDS, mental illness and so on. A non-exhaustive list of stigmatised identities might include *Correspondence to: Ross Flett, Senior Lecturer, School of Psychology, Massey University, Palmerston North 4410, New Zealand. Email R.A.Flett@massey.ac.nz Vulnerable Groups & Inclusion #2012 R. Flett. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution- Noncommercial 3.0 Unported License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/), permitting all non-commercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. Citation: Vulnerable Groups & Inclusion. DOI: 10.3402/vgi.v3i0.16145 1 (page number not for citation purpose) http://www.vulnerablegroupsandinclusion.net/index.php/vgi/article/view/16145 mental illness, HIV/AIDS, sexual orien- tation, race, chronic illness (e.g. epilepsy, arthritis), sexual assault, childhood sex- ual abuse, and abortion (Chaudoir & Fisher, 2010). A central issue facing an individual with these invisible, discreditable iden- tities is ‘‘Do I tell or do I keep it to myself?’’ The potential negative conse- quences of revealing such an identity are well documented (e.g. Pachankis, 2007; Rose Ragins, Singh, & Cornwell, 2007). The protection of vulnerable groups in the workplace has received much legis- lative and research attention in past decades but as Bell (2007) notes, ‘‘After more than two decades of diversity re- search, four decades of antidiscrimina- tion legislation, and extraordinary media attention to diversity, discrimination and exclusion in organizations persist’’ (p. 3). The present article seeks firstly to briefly review some research on examples of concealable stigmatizing identities. The aim is to bring to the foreground the potential vulnerability of those groups such that those who are con- cerned with wellbeing in the workplace might gain some additional insights and understandings. Secondly, I review, from a psychological perspective, research concerned with documenting some of the antecedents, contextual factors, and consequences of the decision to disclose a stigmatised concealable identity. Then it considers a number of theoretical models that have been advanced as frameworks for organising and under- standing this research, and highlight some of the commonalities across these models. Finally, drawing on some of the research on the psychology of secrecy, the current article makes a case that sometimes it may in fact be ‘‘better’’ to simply keep the identity secret. As noted earlier, Goffman (1963) defined stigma as some type of devalued or unacceptable negative characteristic that sets an individual apart from others, creating what he referred to as a spoiled identity. The stigmatising effects of men- tal illness are extensive. Individuals are disliked, feared, avoided, excluded and seen as fundamentally ‘‘different’’ from the wider society (e.g. Crabtree, Haslam, Postmes, & Haslam, 2010). Workers with mental illnesses worry about their illnesses being ‘‘discovered’’. The direct stigmatization effects of mental illness are profound (Jones, 2011) and indirect effects (stigma by association, or cour- tesy stigma) have also been noted (Parfene, Stewart, & King, 2009). Sim- ply being a parent, sibling, caregiver, or friend of a person with mental illness may result in the same kinds of dis- crimination, exclusion, and avoidance experiences that are the reality for members of the stigmatized group. Sexual orientation has carried with it a significant stigma (e.g. Herek, Gillis, & Cogan, 2009). Whilst there has been a considerable shift in societal attitudes toward sexual orientation (Herek, 2010), hate crimes and other crimes of violence are not uncommon experiences for sex- ual minority adults (Herek, 2009). Rose Ragins et al. (2007) emphasise the on- going importance of understanding the fear of disclosure of a gay identity in the workplace. Among physical illnesses much has been written about HIV/AIDS as a widely recognised stigmatising physical health condition (e.g. Munir, Leka, & Griffiths, 2005; Neal, Lichtenstein, & Brodsky, 2010; Phillips, Moneyham, & R. Flett 2 (page number not for citation purpose) Tavakoli, 2011; Rutledge, Whyte, Abell, Brown, & Cesnales, 2011; Sengupta, Banks, Jonas, Miles, & Smith, 2011; Sowell & Phillips, 2010). Perhaps one of the less high profile but equally profound examples of a chronic physical illness that is a stigmatized identity is epilepsy (Munir et al., 2005). A study by Smith et al. (2009) provides extensive discussion of psychosocial factors asso- ciated with stigma in adults with epilepsy and noted that epilepsy and HIV/AIDS have similar stigma levels. Bishop, Stenhoff, Bradley, and Allen (2007) showed that individuals with cancer in remission, depression, history of heart problems, mild mental retardation, or spinal cord injury were seen by a sample of employers and HR professionals as more likely to get hired than a person with epilepsy. The overarching picture that emerges here is of identities that individuals are highly motivated to conceal for good reasons*the psychological, social, emo- tional and practical costs of such iden- tities being revealed or discovered is potentially very high. What then do we know about the psychology behind the management of such identities? How do I decide when to tell? Who to tell? How to tell? What are the consequences of telling (or not telling)? A number of models have been pro- posed as a means of understanding the dynamics of concealed identities. The process model of the psychological implications of concealing a stigma (Pachankis, 2007) outlines some of the cognitive, affective and behavioural im- plications driving the disclosure decision. He notes some important aspects of the situation (salience of the stigma, the threat/consequences of discovery) and some of the self evaluative implications such as identity ambivalence, reduced self-efficacy and negative views of self that underlie the decision to disclose, and the consequences of the feedback elicited by that disclosure decision. Chaudoir and Fisher (2010) outline a ‘‘Disclosure Processes Model (DPM)’’ which is aimed at providing a framework for understanding when and how disclo- sure might be a positive experience that is beneficial in terms of subsequent wellbeing. They argue that there are approach and avoidance motivations that impact on the decision to disclose (e.g. wanting more understanding, in- timacy, greater acceptance versus trying to avoid conflict, rejection, distancing and so on). The model outlined by Ragins (2008) emphasises the influence of the extent of a disclosure decision on what she calls ‘‘disclosure disconnects’’ (p. 194). She suggests the fact that there can be a continuum of disclosure in both work and non-work domains can lead to ‘‘disclosure disconnects’’. If I tell every- one in my non-work environment about my heretofore concealed identity but decide to continue to keep it secret at work then this ‘‘ . . . disclosure discon- nect[s] may result in psychological stress and conflict as individuals attempt to manage an identity that is concealed to various degrees across life settings’’ (p. 2008). Other models from the re- search literature on secrecy provide some additional insights into the kinds of strategies people might use to reveal a secret identity (e.g. The Revelation Risk Model), (Afifi & Steuber, 2009), or why such an identity might continue to remain hidden (e.g. The Cycle of Con- cealment Model), (Afifi & Steuber, 2010). It is beyond the scope of this Managing a concealable identity in the workplace 3 (page number not for citation purpose) article to provide a detailed critical analysis of these and other relevant models reported in the literature. At the risk of stating the obvious, it is clear that there is substantial psychological ‘‘work’’ involved in the maintenance of a con- cealable stigmatized identity. A useful distinction proposed by Goffman and others is between ‘‘pas- sing’’ and ‘‘revealing’’. Revealing is the disclosure of the previously invisible identity (often referred to in the sexual orientation literature, as well as in pop- ular parlance, as ‘‘coming out’’). The emphasis in the literature is on revealing as being ‘‘good’’ for an individual in a normative sense. Everyday language re- flects this view. People claim that it is important for an individual ‘‘to get it off your chest’’, ‘‘to clear the air’’, ‘‘to be true to yourself ’’. The notion of self- verification suggests that individuals find it important for others to see them as they see themselves (Chen, English, & Peng, 2006; Gómez, Morales, Huici, Gaviria, & Jiménez, 2007; Swann, Polzer, Seyle, & Ko, 2004). The positive benefits of revealing suggest that ‘‘ . . . considered together, disclosure is a powerful behaviour that can shape nearly every domain of people’s lives’’ (Chaudoir & Fisher, 2010, p. 3). On the other hand, ‘‘revealing’’ may be some- thing of a two-edged sword. Potential negative consequences might include; increases in discrimination, prejudice and stigmatization experiences (Clair, Beatty, & Maclean, 2005), increasingly strained relationships with co-workers (Jones, 2011), rejection, social avoidance and disapproval (Mak, Ng, Mo, & Chong, 2010), and more generally experiences ranging from ‘‘ . . . social isolation . . . to verbal harassment, job discrimination, job loss, and even physi- cal assault . . .’’ (Ragins, 2008, p. 201). Clearly ‘‘revealing’’ must be a carefully considered decision. ‘‘Passing’’ is, in simple terms, keeping the identity hidden*‘‘passing’’ on any opportunities that may arise to reveal the identity. Goffman (1963, p. 74) notes that ‘‘ . . . because of the great rewards in being considered normal, almost all persons who are in a position to pass will do so on some occasion by intent’’. There is evidence that management of a concealed identity or multiple concealed identities is both effortful and stressful in terms of the need for emotion regula- tion and suppression (to avoid intrusive thoughts associated with the concealed identity), creates a sense of cognitive dissonance, and generally reduces well- being and increases stress (Beals, Peplau, & Gable, 2009; Hatzenbuehler, Nolen- Hoeksema, & Dovidio, 2009). There is some evidence, deriving from the pre- occupation model of secrecy (Afifi & Caughlin, 2006), that the process of thought suppression*attempting to sup- press any thoughts about one’s concealed identity in order to avoid any inadvertent ‘‘slips of the tongue’’ that may result in the identity being revealed, may in fact increase the frequency of those thoughts, a supposed ‘‘rebound effect’’ (Afifi & Caughlin, 2006). In broad brush stroke terms, the implicit message in the re- search literature seems to be that, all things considered, ‘‘revealing’’ may be a ‘‘better’’ strategy for the individual to consider, depending on the target audi- ence (Chaudoir & Quinn, 2010). So, what to do? How does an indivi- dual resolve what seems to be an intract- able dilemma*‘‘do I tell’’ or, ‘‘do I not tell?’’ There are no clear advantages to R. Flett 4 (page number not for citation purpose) either strategy. Perhaps the fundamental question to ask oneself is ‘‘Does it bother me?’’ If the answer to that question is ‘‘no’’ then don’t tell (Kelly & McKillop, 1996). If the answer is ‘‘yes’’ then the decision making process becomes more complex. Most of the models emphasise some form of risk assessment process (Afifi & Steuber, 2009; Chaudoir & Fisher, 2010; Omarzu, 2000; Pachankis, 2007; Ragins, 2008). A pivotal factor here is the assessment of the availability of social support from the target for the disclosure, and the general likelihood that there will be a positive reaction to the disclosure from that target. Afifi and Steuber (2009) argue that feelings of closeness to the target of disclosure might reduce perceptions of risk. Other writers emphasise the importance of supportive relationships in general and having a supportive confidant in parti- cular (Beals et al., 2009; Chaudoir & Fisher, 2010; Gignac & Cao, 2009; Ragins, 2008). The expectation of a hostile, angry, or aggressive reaction from a potential disclosure target is likely to perpetuate an ongoing ‘‘cycle of con- cealment’’ (Afifi & Steuber, 2010). If a potential confidant is assessed as being discreet, non-judgemental, and able to help (Kelly & McKillop, 1996) then disclosure becomes more likely. The stress buffering effects of such social support are well documented (e.g. Cohen & Wills, 1985) and may be an important resource with which an individual might confront any of the post-disclosure turbulence that occurs. Evidence suggests that workplace man- agers have an important role to play here in providing emotional and practical support particularly for those disclosing and coping with a chronic health condi- tion in the workplace (Munir, Pryce, Haslam, Leka, & Griffiths, 2006; Munir, Randall, Yarker, & Nielsen, 2009). On the other hand, keeping a conceal- able identity concealed may simply be the best decision. One must ask the question ‘‘do other people really need to know?’’ Kelly and McKillop (1996) suggest that ‘‘ . . . Although confessions may be ‘good for the soul’, given that they can wreak havoc with one’s network of friends and supporters, some things truly are better left unsaid . . .’’ (p. 461). Maintaining that boundary between work and non-work through a lack of disclosure may be important for the equilibrium of the workplace (Phillips, Rothbard, & Dumas, 2009). Significant asymmetries in disclosure levels can ex- acerbate status differences, cause dis- comfort and embarrassment, and leave individuals vulnerable to exploitation. Having a ‘‘private sense of self ’’ contain- ing information, thoughts, feelings, desires that are known only to the in- dividual is arguably a positive aspect of ego development (Kelly & McKillop, 1996). It is important to try and un- tangle these notions of ‘‘public’’ and ‘‘private’’, ‘‘individual’’ and ‘‘collective’’ when trying to understand identity. What one thinks about oneself as a member of a stigmatised group may be quite different (and potentially much more favourable) from one’s ratings of how other people see that same group (Ashburn-Nardo, 2010). In summary, the decision to disclose a concealable and stigmatized identity is an important one that cannot be taken lightly. At the same time one must be careful to avoid gloomy and pessimistic assumptions about a potential post- disclosure life inevitably fraught with Managing a concealable identity in the workplace 5 (page number not for citation purpose) danger and difficulty. Quinn and Chaudoir (2009) note that ‘‘ . . . some people exhibit distress; others do not. Some situations result in negative out- comes; some do not . . . many people, despite living in a culture that often devalues them, can be happy, resilient, and well adjusted’’ (p. 649). Stigmatized individuals may indeed ‘‘ . . . flourish des- pite others’ negative perceptions . . .’’ (Shelton, Alegre, & Son, 2010, p. 621). The challenge for researchers involves one of specificity; what kinds of disclo- sures?, what types of people?, what types of identities?, what kinds of circum- stances?, lead to the most adaptive outcomes. The theoretical models and associated empirical research reviewed here provides the roadmap for further elaboration of the question ‘‘to tell or not to tell?’’ To conclude, individuals are able to manage multiple identities without major dissonance (DeJordy, 2008) and can successfully maintain a distinction be- tween one’s working and non working life without living in a constant state of anxiety that their secret identity will be discovered. There is not an inevitable long term health cost associated with concealing a private identity (even though it may be a stigmatized one). A study by Kelly and Yip (2006) con- cluded that: ‘‘By demonstrating that keeping a major secret is not linked to greater symptomatology down the road, perhaps the results from this study will provide some comfort to those who feel that they cannot reveal a personal secret’’ (p. 1366). The literature on resilience and psychological flexibility (Kashdan & Rottenberg, 2010; Newman, 2005; Windle, 2011) indicates that people do have, or with appropriate supports can develop, the resources to ‘‘bounce back’’ from adversity. However one must be cautious about sending a mixed mes- sage here. All individuals in the work- place and the wider community have the fundamental and inalienable right to be treated with dignity and respect. We must be ever vigilant in monitoring behaviours, attitudes, systems and struc- tures that convey disrespect, discrimina- tion, and derogation towards those with a stigmatized identity (concealed or otherwise). The research is clear about the potential destructiveness of those experiences in the lives of people living with stigma and the research agenda must be vigorous in the pursuit of under- standings and insights into how preju- dice and discrimination might best be dismantled and overcome. These things will take time. But, as noted above, as well as elsewhere in the literature (Shih, 2004; Thoits, 2011), individuals with concealed stigmatised identities can re- veal them, can overcome the conse- quences of that revelation, and lead positive and optimistic lives. The re- search agenda needs to be equally vig- orous in developing understandings of that process of empowerment. REFERENCES Afifi, T., & Steuber, K. (2009). The revelation risk model (RRM): Factors that predict the revelation of secrets and the strate- gies used to reveal them. Communication Monographs, 76(2), 144�176. Afifi, T.D., & Steuber, K. (2010). The cycle of concealment model. 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AIDS Patient Care and STDs, 25(11), 673�682. Sengupta, S., Banks, B., Jonas, D., Miles, M.S., & Smith, G.C. (2011). HIV interventions to reduce HIV/AIDS stigma: A systema- tic review. AIDS and Behavior, 15(6), 1075�1087. Settles, I.H. (2004). When multiple identities interfere: The role of identity centrality. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 30(4), 487�500. Shelton, J.N., Alegre, J.M., & Son, D. (2010). Social stigma and disadvantage: Current R. Flett 8 (page number not for citation purpose) themes and future prospects. Journal of Social Issues, 66(3), 618�633. Shih, M. (2004). Positive stigma: Examining resilience and empowerment in overcom- ing stigma. Annals of the American Acad- emy of Political and Social Science, 591, 175�185. Smith, G. Ferguson, P.L. Saunders, L.L. Wagner, J.L. Wannamaker, B.B. & Selassie, A.W. (2009). Psychosocial factors associated with stigma in adults with epilepsy. Epilepsy and Behavior, 16(3), 484�490. doi: 10.1016/j.yebeh.2009.08.028 Sowell, R.L., & Phillips, K.D. (2010). Under- standing and responding to HIV/AIDS stigma and disclosure: An international challenge for mental health nurses. Issues in Mental Health Nursing, 31(6), 394�402. Swann Jr, W.B., Polzer, J.T., Seyle, D.C., & Ko, S.J. (2004). Finding value in diversity: Verification of personal and social self- views in diverse groupsm. Academy of Management Review, 29(1), 9�27. Thoits, P.A. (2011). Resisting the stigma of mental illness. Social Psychology Quarterly, 74(1), 6�28. Windle, G. (2011). What is resilience? A review and concept analysis. Reviews in Clinical Gerontology, 21(2), 152�169. Managing a concealable identity in the workplace 9 (page number not for citation purpose) MASSEY UNIVERSITY MASSEY RESEARCH ONLINE http://mro.massey.ac.nz/ Massey Documents by Type Journal Articles 'To tell or not to tell?' Managing a concealable identity in the workplace Flett, R 2012 08/12/2020 - Downloaded from MASSEY RESEARCH ONLINE 
work_2oedyucylzagfowgnsvd5crjme	----	Science Magazine SAMBO CREEK, TEGUCIGALPA, AND LA CEIBA, HONDURAS—As a small group of men and women from this impoverished fishing village watch intently, Daniel Martínez holds up a placard that shows horrific photos of diseased female and male genitals. “Syphilis!” he yells, and the group, which is sitting under a thatched- roof shelter on the beach, looks down at what amount to bingo cards that Martínez has given them. Those who have a syphilis square mark it with an uncooked bean. The HIV/AIDS educa- tion game, Lotería Vive, continues with pictures of other sexually transmitted diseases and cartoons of transvestites, a drunken man, and then the Grim Reaper. “Oh!” groans the crowd at the last card, but one man has bingo and yells, “Lotería!” Martínez, who works with the Pan American Social Marketing Organization (PASMO), hands the winner a baseball cap and two condoms. The residents of this village are Garifuna, so-called Black Caribs who are descendents of shipwrecked Nigerian slaves and who have maintained a distinct culture for more than 200 years. The best HIV studies done in this and three other Garifuna communities—which were conducted by the Ministry of Health more than 7 years ago—found that the adult prevalence was an astonishing 8.4%. Martínez plays Lotería Vive in this and other Garifuna villages in the region several times each week. In 2005, Honduras in general had an adult prevalence of 1.5%, according to the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS. That makes it the hardest-hit country in Central America other than relatively tiny Belize (see p. 483). The spread is mainly through heterosexual sex, which is reflected by a nearly 1:1 ratio of male to female AIDS cases. Yet the virus has also spread widely through the community of gay men, who have a prevalence of 13%—even higher than that of female sex workers, at 9.7%. By November 2005, almost 4500 people were receiving anti-HIV Why So High? A Knotty Story H O N D U R A S Garifuna culture, discrimination against gay men, massive migration, the Cold War, and ignored prisoners all are theories that attempt to explain this country’s serious epidemic Mayans, who are often treated as second-class citizens, than in ladinos. “We think that group’s more vulnerable,” says Arathoon. Not only do many Mayans have trouble with Spanish, complicating prevention efforts, but they also have less access to health care in general. “We think that’s where the epidemic will move,” says Arathoon. A study of patients at the government-run Rodolfo Robles tuberculosis hospital in Quetzaltenango suppor ts that asser tion. Between 1995 and 2002, HIV prevalence in TB patients at the hospital—74% of whom were Mayan—jumped from 4.2% to 12%. As of May 2005, no antiretroviral drugs were available in Quetzaltenango, the country’s second-largest city. Tough transitions No one knows how many people are dying because they do not have access to antiretroviral dr ugs, says the National AIDS Prog ram’s Hirschmann. And even some of those taking the drugs are concerned about their continued sup- ply because MSF announced in July 2005 that it was phasing out its program in Coatepeque, which now treats 500 people. Lucas is worried that the government will not respond adequately, and some Guatemalan AIDS clinicians and gov- ernment AIDS officials share those concerns. “MSF obviously did something really good because they brought treatment to a country that wasn’t offering it,” says Hirschmann. “But they have created somewhat of a panic in patients on treatment. … I would be very afraid if I were a patient living with HIV and had to cross over to receive treatment from the government.” Frank Doerner, MSF’s chief of mission in Guatemala, says those fears were unfounded. “It was calculated pressure, but it was not playing with the lives of the people,” Doerner says of the charity’s announcement that it would shut down its program. MSF earlier had successfully handed over a program in Guatemala City, Doerner notes, and MSF says it will stay longer in Coatepeque if the transition is not going smoothly. “After 5 years of being here and treat- ing thousands of people, we showed how it was possible,” says Doerner. “Now it’s really up to the state to show that it’s interested in taking over the responsibility that belongs to them.” –JON COHEN www.sciencemag.org SCIENCE VOL 313 28 JULY 2006 481 SPECIALSECTION Game theory. PASMO dispatches Daniel Martínez to Garifuna communities to teach HIV prevention through the bingolike Lotería Vive. Worried. Luz Imelda Lucas fears that she’ll lose access to the anti-HIV drugs that have saved her life. Published by AAAS o n A p ril 5 , 2 0 2 1 h ttp ://scie n ce .scie n ce m a g .o rg / D o w n lo a d e d fro m http://science.sciencemag.org/ 28 JULY 2006 VOL 313 SCIENCE www.sciencemag.org482 drugs, up from 200 three years earlier. But the national AIDS committee, CONASIDA, estimates that the drugs are reaching only about one-third of those with advanced disease. No convincing studies explain how the virus made so much headway in Honduras, but theo- ries abound. Epidemiologist Manuel Sierra, who headed the Ministry of Health study of the Gari- funa and now works at the National Autonomous University, says in most countries in the region, the virus entered through gay men and then “incubated,” which means it took a long time t o bridge into other communities. The first AIDS cases in Hon- duras were also gay men, he says, but HIV quickly spread through heterosexual sex, both in the Garifuna com- munity and the country at large. “The main d i fference between Honduras and the rest of Central America is the incubation period,” posits Sierra. A key distinguish- ing factor in Honduras, he contends, was the country’s role during the Cold War. Sierra notes that when the first AIDS cases were detected in the early 1980s, the Cold War was raging, and U.S. military person- nel were flooding into Honduras in an attempt to influence the civil wars in neighboring Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala. “Honduras was the center used by the United States to fight all the countries,” says Sierra. The influx of soldiers—including Nicaraguan con- tras who staged attacks from Honduras—led to a boom in sex workers, which in turn played a “major role,” he says. César Núñez, a Honduran epidemiologist who heads the multicountry PASCA study of HIV prevalence in high-risk groups in Central America (see p. 480), says this is “a good hypothesis.” As in other countries, prisoners are another driver of the epidemic in Honduras. A Ministry of Health study found a prevalence of 7.6% in prisons. “That’s the ideal population to spread the virus,” says Sierra. “You have spouse visits, lots of homosexual sex, low access to con- doms, and lots of HIV.” Núñez and Sierra say rampant migration has also played a central role. In particular, the country has a large num- Mission Possible: Integrating The Church With HIV/AIDS Efforts TEGUCIGALPA AND JUTICALPA, HONDURAS—Throughout heavily Catholic Latin America, few topics have riled those working to slow the spread of HIV more than the Vatican’s opposition to condoms. Many HIV/AIDS workers have also decried what they see as the tendency by many denominations to treat as outcasts the two groups especially hard hit by the epidemic: homosexuals and sex workers. But in Honduras especially, church leaders are now trying to become part of the solution with stepped-up efforts that aim to slow HIV’s spread and help the infected. These church representatives are not, by any means, advocating the use of condoms, as Maryknoll sisters in Guatemala do with sex workers and other at-risk people they help (see p. 480). But representatives from four denominations are working with the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), which is famous for promoting family planning, in the year-old Interreligious Committee to contribute to Honduras’s national strategic plan for confronting its HIV/AIDS epidemic. “This is the first time we’ve worked with faith-based organizations, and the nice thing is we put our position on the table,” says Alanna Armitage, who heads the UNFPA office here. “We would not work with them if we couldn’t talk about condoms or they said they weren’t effective. There’s no more time to fight on this.” The representatives from the Episcopal, Evangelical, Adventist, and Catholic churches do not speak with one voice about condoms; some think, for example, that they should be promoted if one partner in a marriage is HIV-infected. Nor do they exactly embrace homosexuality. “We don’t have a specific program with homosexuals, but where we work, there are people with HIV/AIDS, and we treat them like anyone else,” says Elvia Maria Galindo, a committee member speaking for the Episcopal church. “We’re all sinners.” But Javier Medina, a gay activist here, charges that the religious community—particularly Evangelicals—have fanned the rampant homophobia in the country. He points to marches held by Evangelicals that protested the government’s decision in 2004 to officially recognize his group, called Kukulcán, and two other gay organiza- t i o n s . “ T h i s c re a t e d m o re hatred toward us,” says Medina, adding that a few dozen gay men have recently been killed in hate crimes and that his group has received death threats. This does not reflect the opinion of other denominations, however, says Carmen Molina, the committee’s Catholic representative. Although Padre Alberto Gauci, a Franciscan, does not condone homo- sexuality, he’s fervently trying to help thwart HIV at a men’s prison in Juticalpa, 3 hours from the capital. Gauci, who favors flip-flops, jeans, and T-shirts and looks more like an aging hippie than a clergyman, is on a somewhat quixotic quest to build a new prison in Juticalpa, where he runs an HIV/AIDS orphanage and hospice. The prison, built more than 100 years ago for 90 inmates, currently holds more than 400 men who sleep at least two to a bunk. More than 5% are known to have AIDS. In December 2005, no HIV tests or anti-HIV drugs were available. “The church has to play a role because people have lost all hope with politicians here,” says Gauci, a native of Malta. “Illness is spreading in the prison in a very accelerated way.” Gauci supports his efforts by running a bakery and occasionally staging horseraces and dogfights on the grounds of his compound. “Gambling is not a sin if you’re raising the money for good things,” shrugs Gauci. Now that’s working in mysterious ways. –J.C. Crossing the divide. Padre Alberto Gauci provides many HIV/AIDS prevention and care services in Juticalpa. Above and beyond. Honduras has more HIV-infected patients than any country in Central America. They frequently fill the beds at Tegucigalpa’s Torax Hospital. HIV/AIDS: Latin America & Caribbean Published by AAAS o n A p ril 5 , 2 0 2 1 h ttp ://scie n ce .scie n ce m a g .o rg / D o w n lo a d e d fro m http://science.sciencemag.org/ www.sciencemag.org SCIENCE VOL 313 28 JULY 2006 483 SPECIALSECTION ber of merchant seamen, many of whom travel to Asia and Africa. Although the Garifuna do not explain the country’s high prevalence—they only number about 100,000 out of a population of 7.3 mil- lion—they are an important part of a complex story, says Sierra. When he tried to tease out why Garifuna have such a high prevalence, he found no evidence that they were more promis- cuous than the ladinos who make up the major- ity in the country. Yet this has become a common belief, in part because Garifuna more openly discuss their sexual habits. “Garifuna as a group are more innocent, and they’ll give you a straight answer,” says Sierra. “We ladinos have learned how to lie.” Garifuna, some of whom make their livings as merchant seamen, also frequently migrate to the United States and other countries for work. Sierra notes that many shuttle between the large Garifuna community in New York City, which itself has a high HIV infection rate. Garifuna have other risk factors, including widespread poverty and less access to health serv- ices. The culture also has many myths that make it more difficult for HIV-prevention educators. “They believe a spirit can enter a person and there- fore that HIV is an inherited thing,” says PASMO’s Martínez, who is half Garifuna himself. “And when a person is showing symptoms, they think it’s an ancestor asking for a religious ceremony.” Sergio Flores, the top HIV/AIDS doctor in La Ceiba—the nearest city to Sambo Creek—wor- ries about highlighting the high prevalence in the Garifuna, because the population already suffers so much stigma and discrimination. “The com- munity was essentially forgotten about, but when HIV arrived, we put our eyes on them,” says Flores. “It doesn’t seem right to me. And if you go to the street and ask the people about AIDS issues, many of them think ‘AIDS, it’s not in my house— it’s the house of the Garifuna.’ ” –JON COHEN Taking It to the Streets B E L I Z E An unusual prevention program targets gang members, who are seen as particularly vulnerable to HIV BELIZE CITY, BELIZE—Shortly after Douglas Hyde started working 4 years ago doing HIV/AIDS prevention work with gang members, he was welcomed with a “pint bottle” to his face that left a nasty scar above one eye. Today, Hyde, a former gang member, continues the work through a multipronged government program called Youth for the Future that attempts to link violence reduction with HIV/AIDS education. As Hyde drives around the rough South Side streets where he grew up, he repeatedly toots the horn of his van at gang members. “What’s up, fam?” he asks a group of men and boys hanging out on one street who don’t exactly look like his family. The group gives a warm “Ya ya” to “Dougie,” who has o-n-e l-o-v-e inked across his f ingers and barbed wire tattooed on a bicep. Several of the men wonder whether he has leads on any jobs. “I have become the job god in the street,” says Hyde. This is Blood territory, the gang that Hyde used to run with until a showdown with the rival Crips scared him straight, and he notices the finer details of the street. The pile of used clothing for sale on the sidewalk is a front for dealing drugs. Most of the guys in this group are “strapped” with pistols. “Scopes” at second-story windows of the incongruously colorful clapboard homes are monitoring his every move. And he sees something else that may be less than obvious to outsiders: a strong link between the gang lifestyle and Belize’s high prevalence of HIV, which at the end of 2005 had infected 2.5% of adults. That’s why Youth for the Future believes that finding people legitimate jobs and encouraging them to quit gangs is a potentially powerful HIV prevention strategy. Although many Latin American countries have problems with gangs, a 2005 report by the nonpartisan U.S. Congressional Research Service said “the largest and most violent” ones are in Central America and Mexico. According to the report, several factors have led to an increase in gangs: weapons left over from the many civil wars in the region, the stepped-up U.S. deporta- tion of law-breaking immigrants, and staggering income inequalities in Belize and its neighbors. Youth for the Future is one of the few efforts that explicitly targets gang members as “at-risk youths” for HIV infection. Not only do gang members often share one woman, Hyde says, but “transactional sex” for a meal or protection is also the norm. “Give some, get some,” says Hyde. Condom use is also low. “And some guys in the street, especially the lead- ers, believe that they don’t need to take the HIV test,” says Hyde. “They believe they just need to send their girls or wives to take the test to know their status. We’re telling them that’s not true.” Supported by the United Nations Population Fund and a grant from the OPEC Fund, Youth for the Future maintains a resource center that’s essentially a hangout for anyone, and gang mem- bers are welcome. It stages frequent HIV/AIDS prevention education sessions and has a big bowl f illed with free male and female condoms, free pamphlets on HIV/AIDS prevention, and Inter net access for a small fee (free t o students). “They h av e d o n e t r e m e n - d o u s w o r k ,” s a y s e p i demiologist Paul Edwards, head of the Ministry of Health’s National AIDS Pro- gram. “These kids have a lack of education and don’t make the best decisions possible.” No study has ever assessed HIV preva- lence in gang mem- bers in Belize, which has a tiny population of 280,000 people. A study done in the countr y’s one prison— which almost every longtime gang member knows intimately—found an HIV prevalence of 4.6%. Youth for the Future plans to start offering HIV counseling and testing, and Hyde hopes to recruit gang members to participate in a prevalence study. Meanwhile, he’s become increasingly cautious about how he conducts his business. “I’m good with everyone,” says Hyde. “But I’m very smart now to recognize when I shouldn’t be around.” –JON COHEN Ganging up on HIV. Youth for the Future’s Douglas Hyde (right) found these former gang members jobs with a company that’s clearing this junkyard. Published by AAAS o n A p ril 5 , 2 0 2 1 h ttp ://scie n ce .scie n ce m a g .o rg / D o w n lo a d e d fro m http://science.sciencemag.org/ Why So High? A Knotty Story Jon Cohen DOI: 10.1126/science.313.5786.481 (5786), 481-483.313Science ARTICLE TOOLS http://science.sciencemag.org/content/313/5786/481 CONTENT RELATED file:/content/sci/313/5786/news-summaries.full http://science.sciencemag.org/content/sci/313/5786/467.full http://science.sciencemag.org/content/sci/313/5786/482.full PERMISSIONS http://www.sciencemag.org/help/reprints-and-permissions Terms of ServiceUse of this article is subject to the is a registered trademark of AAAS.ScienceScience, 1200 New York Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20005. The title (print ISSN 0036-8075; online ISSN 1095-9203) is published by the American Association for the Advancement ofScience © 2006 American Association for the Advancement of Science o n A p ril 5 , 2 0 2 1 h ttp ://scie n ce .scie n ce m a g .o rg / D o w n lo a d e d fro m http://science.sciencemag.org/content/313/5786/481 http://science.sciencemag.org/content/sci/313/5786/482.full http://science.sciencemag.org/content/sci/313/5786/467.full http://www.sciencemag.org/help/reprints-and-permissions http://www.sciencemag.org/about/terms-service http://science.sciencemag.org/ 
work_2rvskp6lhjcrxdxtj5lgbvpcdy	----	Connecting to Get Things Done: A Conceptual Model of the Process Used to Respond to Bias Incidents Loyola University Chicago From the SelectedWorks of Demetri L. Morgan, Ph.D. 2015 Connecting to Get Things Done: A Conceptual Model of the Process Used to Respond to Bias Incidents Lucy A. LePeau, Indiana University - Bloomington Demetri L. Morgan, University of Pennsylvania Hilary B. Zimmerman, University of California - Los Angeles J.T. Snipes, Indiana University - Bloomington Beth A. Marcotte, Loyola University Chicago Available at: https://works.bepress.com/demetrilmorgan/9/ http://libraries.luc.edu https://works.bepress.com/demetrilmorgan/ https://works.bepress.com/demetrilmorgan/9/ Journal of Diversity in Higher Education Connecting to Get Things Done: A Conceptual Model of the Process Used to Respond to Bias Incidents Lucy A. LePeau, Demetri L. Morgan, Hilary B. Zimmerman, Jeremy T. Snipes, and Beth A. Marcotte Online First Publication, July 6, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0039509 CITATION LePeau, L. A., Morgan, D. L., Zimmerman, H. B., Snipes, J. T., & Marcotte, B. A. (2015, July 6). Connecting to Get Things Done: A Conceptual Model of the Process Used to Respond to Bias Incidents. Journal of Diversity in Higher Education. Advance online publication. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0039509 Connecting to Get Things Done: A Conceptual Model of the Process Used to Respond to Bias Incidents Lucy A. LePeau Indiana University Bloomington Demetri L. Morgan University of Pennsylvania Hilary B. Zimmerman University of California Los Angeles Jeremy T. Snipes Indiana University Bloomington Beth A. Marcotte Loyola University Chicago In this study, we interviewed victims of bias incidents and members of a bias response team to investigate the process the team used to respond to incidents. Incidents included acts of sexism, homophobia, and racism on a large, predominantly White research university in the Midwest. Data were analyzed using a 4-stage coding process. The emergent model focused on the way the bias response team members connected to students, other team members, and colleagues from across campus to respond to the bias incidents. Important tensions that team members navigate also became evident and are depicted in the model. Findings from this study inform practice by illuminating the complexity of how educators carry out social justice work on a campus. Furthermore, this study expands diversity scholarship by examining the intersection between indi- viduals, campus climate, and their environment. Keywords: bias incident, social justice, diversity, campus climate, student affairs Bias-related incidents are defined as “diver- sity-related conflict,” “acts of ignorance or hate,” and “a breach of trust for an individual or community harmed by a pervasive and hostile climate” (Schrage & Giacomini, 2009, p. 14). These conflicts are based on gender, race, cul- ture, sexual orientation, and religion, and occur in both curricular and cocurricular environ- ments (Boysen, Vogel, Cope, & Hubbard, 2009; Reason & Rankin, 2005; Renn, 2010; Schrage & Giacomini, 2009). Unfortunately, minoritized students are victimized by bias-related incidents such as racially themed parties, graffiti on res- idence hall wipe boards, and sexist and/or ho- mophobic slurs all too often in college and university environments (Anthony & Johnson, 2012; Johnston & Garcia, 2014; Hughes, 2013). We use the term minoritized students instead of the terms minority students or underrepresented students because of our agreement with and adaptation of Harper’s (2012) assessment that minoritized better signifies “the social construc- tion of underrepresentation and subordination in U.S. social institutions, including colleges and universities” (p. 9).1 Student affairs profession- 1 “Persons are not born into a minority status nor are they minoritized in every social context (e.g., their families, racially homogeneous friendship groups, or places of wor- ship). Instead, they are rendered minorities in particular situations and institutional environments that sustain an overrepresentation of Whiteness [and other hegemonic forces that oppress certain social identities (e.g., homopho- bia, religious intolerance, sexism, etc.)]” (p. 9). Lucy A. LePeau, Higher Education and Student Affairs, Indiana University Bloomington; Demetri L. Morgan, De- partment of Higher Education, University of Pennsylvania; Hilary B. Zimmerman, Higher Education and Organiza- tional Change, University of California Los Angeles; Jer- emy T. Snipes, Higher Education, Indiana University Bloomington; Beth A. Marcotte, Department of Residence Life, Loyola University Chicago. Correspondence concerning this article should be ad- dressed to Lucy A. LePeau, Indiana University, Higher Education and Student Affairs, 201 North Rose Avenue, Bloomington, IN 47405. E-mail: llepeau@indiana.edu T hi s do cu m en t is co py ri gh te d by th e A m er ic an P sy ch ol og ic al A ss oc ia ti on or on e of it s al li ed pu bl is he rs . T hi s ar ti cl e is in te nd ed so le ly fo r th e pe rs on al us e of th e in di vi du al us er an d is no t to be di ss em in at ed br oa dl y. Journal of Diversity in Higher Education © 2015 National Association of Diversity Officers in Higher Education 2015, Vol. 8, No. 3, 000 1938-8926/15/$12.00 http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0039509 1 als in student conduct, the National Association of Diversity Officers in Higher Education, and researchers and policymakers have generated formal and informal professional standards for campus educators (i.e., administrators, faculty, and student affairs professionals) to refer to when bias-related incidents occur (Council for the Advancement of Standards, 2012; U.S. De- partment of Justice, 2001, 2003; Worthington, Stanley, & Lewis, 2014). These guidelines offer suggestions for campus educators to align prac- tices for responding to bias-related incidents with values related to equity, diversity, and in- clusion, and comply with federal laws and reg- ulations (Council for the Advancement of Stan- dards, 2012; U.S. Department of Justice, 2001, 2003; Worthington et al., 2014). Subsequently, bias response teams (BRTs) have proliferated across the country on college campuses in direct response to the formal and informal calls for protocols and procedures from governing bod- ies (Anthony & Johnson, 2012; Hughes, 2013).2 A BRT brings together campus educators to address reported incidents of bias experienced by students, staff, or faculty on a campus. Yet, minimal empirical evidence exists about the process campus educators who oversee or enact these teams employ. Researchers and adminis- trators call for practice, especially related to social justice and diversity, to be informed by scholarly research and vice versa (Harper & Hurtado, 2007; Milem, Chang, & Antonio, 2005; Pope, Mueller, & Reynolds, 2009). Thus, this lack of research is problematic because of the unexamined dynamics related to how cam- pus educators consider their own identities, ne- gotiate team dynamics, and strive for organiza- tional change when responding to bias-related incidents. For this reason, this grounded theory study investigated the process that one BRT uses to address incidents of bias. This study is necessary because increasing the field’s under- standing of a BRT will provide opportunities to better situate how a BRT contributes to positive campus climates and how policies and proce- dures can be best structured to support a BRT. Because we employed constructivist grounded theory methodology, we drew on the literature related to policies and procedures for respond- ing to bias-related incidents and positive cam- pus climate for diverse students and campus educators as sensitizing concepts (Charmaz, 2006). Recommended Policies and Procedures for Addressing Bias-Related Incidents Organizing bodies related to the U.S. Depart- ment of Justice, student conduct, and the Na- tional Association of Diversity Officers in Higher Education are clear about an institu- tion’s responsibilities to comply with federal laws related to addressing hate crimes and ha- rassment (e.g., due process for hearings, Clery Act, Title IX; Council for the Advancement of Standards, 2012; U.S. Department of Justice, 2001, 2003; Worthington et al., 2014). The U.S. Department of Justice (n.d.) defines a hate crime as “violence of intolerance and bigotry, in- tended to hurt and intimidate someone because of their race, ethnicity, national origin, religion, sexual orientation, or disability” (para. 1). Schools or colleges rank third among locations where hate crimes take place (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2011). Campus educators and students often refer bias-related incidents or hate incidents (i.e., reactive, impulsive, and pre- meditated) to student conduct administrators if the accused is perceived to be in violation of policies outlined in an institution’s student code of conduct but does not rise to the level of a hate crime (e.g., harassment, vandalism; Council for the Advancement of Standards, 2012; U.S. De- partment of Justice, 2001, 2003). Most institu- tions have formal student conduct and punitive processes to respond to hate crimes; however, less serious incidents of bias may still cause the victim to feel physically and psychologically unsafe. This concern is why institutions gener- ate alternative response mechanisms such as victim assistance resources and BRTs (U.S. De- partment of Justice, 2001, 2003). For example, some institutions have formed behavioral threat and assessment teams in the wake of the 2007 Virginia Tech shooting to respond to students who might be at risk of harming themselves or others due to mental 2 Internet searches for bias response teams on October 30, 2012, by Hughes (2013) and the current authors on March 25, 2015, generated hundreds of diverse colleges and universities employing BRTs such as University of Chi- cago, University of Oregon, Vassar, University of Rhode Island, Ball State University, The Ohio State University, Saint Mary’s College, Southern Oregon University, Univer- sity of Texas at Austin, Lafayette College, Juniata College, and Fairfield College. 2 LEPEAU, MORGAN, ZIMMERMAN, SNIPES, AND MARCOTTE T hi s do cu m en t is co py ri gh te d by th e A m er ic an P sy ch ol og ic al A ss oc ia ti on or on e of it s al li ed pu bl is he rs . T hi s ar ti cl e is in te nd ed so le ly fo r th e pe rs on al us e of th e in di vi du al us er an d is no t to be di ss em in at ed br oa dl y. health issues or other stressors (Fox & Savage, 2009). Traditionally, these teams do not provide educational programs, nor are they exclusively concerned with the prevention of bias incidents or improving campus climate (Dunkle, Silver- stein, & Warner, 2008; Eells & Rockland- Miller, 2010). In addition, Schlosser and Sed- lacek (2001) offered suggestions for constructing critical incident teams on college campuses to address hate crimes from a proactive construct. Their three-pronged approach includes (a) evalu- ating or putting the incident in the context of what is happening on a college campus by reviewing archived materials such as student newspapers, (b) understanding or gathering information about the incident, and (c) dealing with the incident by con- structing ongoing dialogues and workshops with members of the respective community (Schlosser & Sedlacek, 2001). These established institutional levers are use- ful, but are not empirically based on how par- ticular BRTs operate and take into consider- ation the individual characteristics and team dynamics of its members. Organizing bodies are calling on campus educators to be responsive to bias incidents on college campuses and connect those responses to ultimately improving campus climate for diverse students, faculty, and staff (Council for the Advancement of Standards, 2012; U.S. Department of Justice, 2001, 2003; Worthington et al., 2014). Thus, it is important to draw attention to theoretical constructs to consider how BRT initiatives may enhance pos- itive campus climate for diverse learning envi- ronments. Conceptual Framework: BRTs in Relation to Cultivating Diverse Learning Environments The multicontextual mode for diverse learn- ing environments (DLEs) is a theoretical frame- work that examines the intersection of the indi- vidual, organizational, and institutional levels in relation to campus climate for diversity (Hur- tado, Alvarez, Guillermo-Wann, Cuellar, & Arellano, 2012). The creators of the DLE model suggested that the model “may help to identify other converging areas of scholarship that influ- ence practice and/or lead to greater awareness about actors’ roles as institutional agents (i.e. campus educators) who determine student suc- cess (Stanton-Salazar, 2011) and/or the repro- duction of inequality” (Hurtado et al., 2012, p. 63). This study takes a particular context, BRTs, to investigate how campus educators respond to incidents of bias on a college campus. Aspects of the DLE are relevant to investigating how a BRT operates because the theory sits at the nexus of how campus educators have the capac- ity to influence the institutional dimensions of creating DLEs. This framework suggests that campus educators need to consider their multi- ple identities in relation to initiatives they enact and how those initiatives can contribute to cre- ating a positive DLE for students to thrive (Hur- tado et al., 2012). Thus, the DLE model is an appropriate con- ceptual framework for this study for two addi- tional reasons. First, we made an intentional effort to reflect the broadening definition of diversity. Whereas the early work on campus climate has focused almost exclusively on race and ethnicity (Hurtado, Clayton-Pedersen, Al- len, & Milem, 1998; Hurtado, Milem, Clayton- Pedersen, & Allen, 1999), the new model “is intended to reflect inclusion of the developing scholarship on multiple social identity groups” (Hurtado et al., 2012, p. 48). Similarly, the BRT in our study was not limited to responding to racial bias incidents only. This study illustrates how institutional responses are structured to be effective (or not) for a range of social identities that experience acts of bias differently but re- quire similar institutional support. Second, the creators of the DLE model ar- gued that the educational outcomes of DLEs (e.g., skills for lifelong learning and multicul- tural competency) are engendered via both the curriculum and cocurriculum. For the cocur- riculum in this study, the model focuses on the “interaction of staff identities with student iden- tities, programming for design of content, and practices centered on student development” (Hurtado et al., 2012, p. 81). The DLE is a framework that encompasses scholarship re- lated to “climate, practices, and outcomes” (Hurtado et al., 2012, p. 101); the authors sug- gested that theory development is needed to address the intersection of these tenets. With respect to the extensive body of work on climate and outcomes, this study focused on the practice aspect of the DLE in hopes of adding nuance to the DLE framework by illuminating how prac- tices such as the BRT inform campus climate and lead to the educationally beneficial campus 3BIAS REPONSE TEAMS T hi s do cu m en t is co py ri gh te d by th e A m er ic an P sy ch ol og ic al A ss oc ia ti on or on e of it s al li ed pu bl is he rs . T hi s ar ti cl e is in te nd ed so le ly fo r th e pe rs on al us e of th e in di vi du al us er an d is no t to be di ss em in at ed br oa dl y. that campus educators desire on a macrolevel. Thus, the purpose of this study was to under- stand the process participants use to address incidents of bias that students face. Further- more, this study was situated within a particular context related to the following question: How do campus educators who encompass a BRT operate toward organizational change (or not)? The conceptual framework used for this study was not imposed on the data. Rather, sensitizing concepts informed the design of our interview protocols and enhanced our interpretations of the participants’ work with the BRT. These practices enhanced our theoretical sensitivity, consistent with designing a constructivist grounded theory study (Charmaz, 2006). Method In this study, we employed constructivist epistemology (Guba & Lincoln, 1989; Lincoln & Guba, 1985) and grounded theory methodol- ogy because the study focused on the process used by a BRT (Charmaz, 2006). According to Bryant and Charmaz (2007), constructivism as- sumes that both researcher and participants to- gether construct multiple, complex, and some- what indeterminate realities. As a research team, we were keenly interested in the cocon- structed reality created by the participants and subsequently interpreted by our research team in relation to addressing bias incidents on col- lege campuses (Charmaz, 2006). We chose con- structivist grounded theory methodology as the methodological approach to data collection and analysis because of the emphasis on generating theory from data (Charmaz, 2006). Building on more objectivist perspectives of Glaser and Strauss (1967) and Corbin and Strauss (2008), Charmaz (2006) offers more flexible guidelines for coding and analyzing data. Researcher Positionality The primary investigator focused initial meetings with the team of 11 researchers on examining the constructivist epistemological approach, grounded theory methodology, and reflecting on researcher positionalities (Jones, Torres, & Arminio, 2013). We are diverse in regards to social identities such as, but not lim- ited to, race and gender but also in regard to experiences working with BRT approaches as student affairs practitioners. Thus, we examined how both dominant and marginalized identities may influence the way(s) one interprets the data and how researchers strive to establish rapport with participants with similar or different social identities (Jones et al., 2013). All research team members conducted interviews and participated in early stages of data analysis. Four research team members and the primary investigator continued the study at the point of axial coding. Research Setting Violet University (pseudonym) is a large, predominantly White research university in the Midwest. There are between 30,000 and 50,000 enrolled students hailing from different regions in the United States and a growing international student population. The publicized mission of the BRT is to support student success when someone experiences hate or bias. Members of the BRT espouse that Violet is committed to ending discrimination on campus. Gloria (pseudonym), one senior-level administrator in student affairs, oversees the BRT and reports direction to the chief student affairs officer. Administrators in student affairs, faculty mem- bers, and graduate students staff the BRT on a volunteer basis. Current members invite staff or students to join when a vacancy occurs; there are no term limits for members and current members have served between 1 and more than 15 years. Although there is no formal training or orientation process, there is an annual retreat that team members attend to review the previ- ous year’s cases. There are four subcommittees of approxi- mately six members each. The subcommittees recognize that identities are intersectional in nature, but each group focuses attention on in- cidents primarily related to (a) disability, (b) sexual orientation, (c) gender, or (d) racial and/or religious-related incidents. BRT mem- bers describe bias incidents as anything related to personal verbal attacks, graffiti, threatening behavior, classroom concerns, and policy- supported discrimination. The subcommittees meet weekly to review reports that students, faculty, or staff file by e-mail, phone, or mobile application. In the online reporting system, vic- tims are informed that the information is kept confidential. Because the student, faculty, or staff member is responsible for reporting an 4 LEPEAU, MORGAN, ZIMMERMAN, SNIPES, AND MARCOTTE T hi s do cu m en t is co py ri gh te d by th e A m er ic an P sy ch ol og ic al A ss oc ia ti on or on e of it s al li ed pu bl is he rs . T hi s ar ti cl e is in te nd ed so le ly fo r th e pe rs on al us e of th e in di vi du al us er an d is no t to be di ss em in at ed br oa dl y. incident of bias, this process is victim-driven. Although the BRT is separate from the student conduct process at Violet, it is possible that a bias-related incident filed with the BRT is also filed with student conduct. The findings from this study describe what happens after a victim or third party files a report. Participants For this study, we used purposeful, criterion, and snowball sampling to recruit participants (Creswell, 2013; Patton, 2014). The primary investigator first contacted Gloria to discuss the study and ask her to suggest participants who could provide information-rich data about the process used by the BRT (Glesne, 2006; Patton, 2014). Because this study focused on the pro- cess used to respond to an incident of bias at Violet, primary research participants were members of the BRT. We asked Gloria to sug- gest incidents that occurred within the past sev- eral years in contexts such as residence halls or classroom settings. These types of incidents in- volved more than a singular victim and com- plainant and were not currently under review by the BRT. Gloria first contacted about 30 potential par- ticipants to inquire about participation in the study and, if they were interested, the contact information was given to the primary investiga- tor. Two participants were added as data collec- tion progressed because participants recom- mended individuals who could speak to the formation of the BRT; this process of snowball and theoretical sampling was used to further our analysis with saturating the categories in the emerging process (Charmaz, 2006; Corbin & Strauss, 2008). See Table 1 for additional infor- mation about participants. The final sample con- sisted of 16 participants from three cases related to incidents of bias due to racism, heterosexism, sexism, and/or religious oppression. To pre- serve confidentiality of the victims’ experience with bias, we chose not to provide a detailed description of the bias incidents around which participants engaged their work. However, we provide a general description of the cases and participants involved in Table 2. Data Collection We gathered information from participants using a series of two, semistructured, 60-min individual interviews in Spring 2013, resulting in 32 total interviews (Fontana & Frey, 2005). We designed interview protocols but also asked probing questions to elicit in-depth responses (Fontana & Frey, 2005) focusing on how par- ticipants make meaning of terms such as diver- sity and equity, the process used to address the particular bias incident, participants’ roles in Table 1 Participant Demographic Information Participant Race Gender Religion Socioeconomic status Role Allan White Transgender man Atheist Middle Victim, student AllyD White Man Christian Upper middle BRT member Calvin White Man Christian Middle BRT member Chris White Man Spiritualist Middle BRT member Crimson White Woman —a Middle BRT member Dyas Biracial Man Spiritual Middle BRT member Eric White Man Nonspecific Upper middle Past BRT member Freda Multiracial Woman Spiritual Lower middle BRT member Harold White Woman —a Middle BRT member Jeff White Man —a —a BRT member Judy White Woman Protestant Upper middle Past BRT member Kate Caucasian Woman Questioning Middle BRT member Martha White Woman Questioning Lower lower Victim, student Mikaela White Woman Christian Middle Campus stakeholder Samantha White Woman Christian Upper middle Campus stakeholder Sophie White Woman None Middle BRT member Note. Campus stakeholder � individual who does not serve on the bias response team (BRT) but worked with BRT members to address bias-related incidents. a Information not shared with researchers. 5BIAS REPONSE TEAMS T hi s do cu m en t is co py ri gh te d by th e A m er ic an P sy ch ol og ic al A ss oc ia ti on or on e of it s al li ed pu bl is he rs . T hi s ar ti cl e is in te nd ed so le ly fo r th e pe rs on al us e of th e in di vi du al us er an d is no t to be di ss em in at ed br oa dl y. addressing the incident, and the longer term outcome of the process. We interviewed the participants in person to build rapport; partici- pants chose pseudonyms to protect their ano- nymity. We recorded and transcribed verbatim the interviews and kept field notes and a re- searcher journal in which we recorded observa- tions about the interviews, inconsistencies in responses from participants, questions for future interviews, and personal reflections about the interviews. The transcripts from participant in- terviews served as the primary data source. Ad- ditional data sources collected and analyzed with the transcripts included case notes and condensed victim reports that Gloria provided, promotional materials about the BRT such as brochures, and articles in local newspapers about incidents when applicable. Data Analysis We employed four levels of data analysis: initial, focused, axial, and theoretical coding alongside memo-writing at each phase (Charmaz, 2006; Lempert, 2007). We analyzed the data individually and in the three incident case teams (see Table 2). Two researchers in- dependently coded each transcript line-by-line to fracture the data into inductive codes finding action in the participants’ words (Charmaz, 2006). We also simultaneously analyzed the case notes and victim reports to examine simi- larities and differences between the notes and the participants’ descriptions of the cases. We then collapsed similar inductive codes into 5,000 codes. We discussed codes that cut across the data from both the transcripts and case notes, narrowing initial codes to 72 focused codes such as “being an ally,” “knowing the history,” and “being victim driven” (Charmaz, 2006). This process reflected the constant com- parative technique, that is, we compared con- cept-to-concept to get at action within the pro- cess (Corbin & Strauss, 2008). Next, in axial coding, we connected properties and dimen- sions of the codes that narrowed focused codes around an axis (Charmaz, 2006; Corbin & Strauss, 2008). We wrote memos about the pri- mary themes and ongoing questions about our interpretations of the data and drew concept maps reconnecting data around emerging cate- gories (Charmaz, 2006). The final stages of analysis related to theoretical coding or tying the theoretical storyline together. We reached saturation in data analysis (i.e., no new infor- mation emerged) with two key categories and the core category of “connecting” that outlines the primary theoretical storyline for all partici- pants (Charmaz, 2006). Trustworthiness and Limitations We used strategies to assure trustworthiness or the credibility in research findings such as the following: Multiple researchers individually coded transcripts and compared codes, we Table 2 Description of Cases and Participants Involved Biased/related incident Location Key informant Response Transphobia such as students and staff not using pronouns Allan prefers Student documentation not reflecting student’s preferred name Residence hall Allan Chris Harold Kate Mikaela Samantha Town hall with students in the residence hall Evaluation of the program Racist artwork that disrupts classroom learning environment and climate Classroom building Eric Judy Freda Jeff Dyas Sophie Passive programming bulletin board in the classroom setting; educational video about the artist and artwork; faculty members processing the video with students Homophobic graffiti on Martha’s wipe board Additional harassment and hate messages Residence hall AllyD Calvin Crimson Martha Educational LGBT student and staff panel Town meeting 6 LEPEAU, MORGAN, ZIMMERMAN, SNIPES, AND MARCOTTE T hi s do cu m en t is co py ri gh te d by th e A m er ic an P sy ch ol og ic al A ss oc ia ti on or on e of it s al li ed pu bl is he rs . T hi s ar ti cl e is in te nd ed so le ly fo r th e pe rs on al us e of th e in di vi du al us er an d is no t to be di ss em in at ed br oa dl y. shared findings with each other in the large research team as a form of peer debriefing, participants reviewed their transcripts as a form of member check, and we reviewed documents pertaining to each reported incident in conjunc- tion with analyzing transcripts as a means of triangulating the data (Creswell, 2013, 2014; Guba & Lincoln, 1989). We also kept re- searcher journals and questioned each other’s biases in relation to the data to further the ex- amination of researcher reflexivity of the pro- cess (Jones et al., 2013). Participants received a summary of findings and offered questions about any perceived inconsistencies about the conceptual model (Creswell, 2013; Jones et al., 2013). Some participants found aspects of the depiction of the original model unclear, so we learned how to alter the model to better explain the process. When participants raised questions about themes, we returned to the data to find more evidence to support a particular idea. Fi- nally, we used an outside peer debriefer, a re- searcher versed in qualitative methods who studies issues related to race and racism, who discussed the conceptual model with the pri- mary investigator and reviewed the summary of findings. We generated this conceptual model from 16 participants’ experiences with the BRT at Violet University. Results Our analysis of the data revealed one core category and two key categories that character- ize the two-sided process through which partic- ipants respond to incidents of bias. The core category, connecting, weaves throughout the two key categories, the transparent side of the process and the opaque side of the process. The transparent side is victim-driven and in- volves a series of clear steps and connections participants make to address incidents of bias after they have received a report. As Calvin stated, “The BRT is victim-driven or complain- ant-driven where the student can really talk about their level of involvement or what they’d like to see done.” The victim-driven process keeps the victim at the center of the action and response, and the BRT members hope that this philosophy can restore a feeling of control or power to the victim. The opaque side undergirds the way in which BRT members respond and make decisions based on their navigation of different tensions. Participants navigate these tensions on both conscious and unconscious levels related to how they perceive their roles on the teams. Figure 1 provides a visual depiction of the process. There are two sides of the pro- cess representing the two key categories pre- sented in the findings. The left side of the model shows the transparent side of the process and each of its three distinct properties that flow in a somewhat linear fashion. The right side of the model depicts the opaque side of the process and the three properties that characterize the opaque side. The opaque side is not linear in nature and there are different things happening simultaneously on each side of the process. For example, the way in which a participant goes about educating others (transparent side) is po- tentially influenced by the way that s/he is nav- igating tensions surrounding individual or sys- temic change and allyship (opaque side). The arrows show how the core category of connect- ing moves the process along because BRT members connect to each other, the victim(s), and stakeholders across campus to move from one sequence to the next on the transparent side of the process. Core Category: Connecting to Get Things Done Participants connect in various ways that per- meate both sides of the theoretical process (i.e., transparent and opaque) because “things get done.” As Mikaela stated, “. . . we have very good people and we have lots of good friends across departments, and that’s how things get done.” BRT participants connect with the vic- tims to understand their needs, meet their wishes when possible, and uphold the mission of the teams; BRT members discuss and plan a response; and institutional stakeholders may be able to assist them in implementing the pro- posed response. Because the BRT operates on a voluntary basis, participants are not given finan- cial resources, nor do they have formal power to carry out their work. Subsequently, connecting emerged as the core category, expressing the way participants are able to move the response process forward despite the institutional and personal tensions they face such as supporting the victim while also considering how to make systemic change. 7BIAS REPONSE TEAMS T hi s do cu m en t is co py ri gh te d by th e A m er ic an P sy ch ol og ic al A ss oc ia ti on or on e of it s al li ed pu bl is he rs . T hi s ar ti cl e is in te nd ed so le ly fo r th e pe rs on al us e of th e in di vi du al us er an d is no t to be di ss em in at ed br oa dl y. Transparent Side of the Process There are three distinct properties that char- acterize the way the transparent side unfolds. These three dimensions are (1) setting off the chain reaction, (2) educating others, and (3) building a better environment. Setting off the chain reaction. The BRT process begins when the BRT receives an inci- dent report. As Allan, a victim of a bias inci- dent, shared (see Table 2), “I guess ultimately [I was] the first person who reported and that set off a chain reaction.” This dimension links the complainants (victims) to the BRT and moves the process from one that exists in theory to one that is operationalized in reality. Jeff described this dimension as a catalyst as he further out- lined the chain reaction: Just like all BRT reports, we will get a report from someone, and that really is the catalyst that gets us working, so we receive reports from several students concerning this particular incident and then that’s where the team involvement goes. And then the team, we are victim-driven, so we meet with people and see what kind of outcome they want, and then we try to help them through that process. As BRT members connect to other stakehold- ers on campus, they create official and unoffi- Figure 1. Repetitive process for the bias response team (BRT). The transparent side represents three distinct themes that exemplify the process that BRT members use. On the opaque side, these three themes represent considerations that BRT members make on continuums through every phase of the transparent side of the process. Some of these considerations are more obvious to some BRT members than others; thus, this side is opaque. The arrows represent the way BRT members connect (i.e., to each other, campus stakeholders, and victims) to move the process along. 8 LEPEAU, MORGAN, ZIMMERMAN, SNIPES, AND MARCOTTE T hi s do cu m en t is co py ri gh te d by th e A m er ic an P sy ch ol og ic al A ss oc ia ti on or on e of it s al li ed pu bl is he rs . T hi s ar ti cl e is in te nd ed so le ly fo r th e pe rs on al us e of th e in di vi du al us er an d is no t to be di ss em in at ed br oa dl y. cial networks of potential support for victims of bias incidents. Connecting then moves the pro- cess forward as participants connect with others to work toward educational solutions with the intent of creating a better, more understanding, and diverse environment for all individuals at the institution. Educating others. The BRT responds to a situation or incident by educating others on the individual and sometimes the systemic level as well. Martha, a victim of a bias incident at the institution (see Table 2), talked about her expe- riences with the individual aspect of the BRT’s education: It was nice to have university backing because even when I’m facing something like this, my family can only do so much to help. And I think that’s the biggest thing, and I appreciate that [BRT members] were there to help. On the individual level, educating others is about supporting and educating the individual victim and perpetrator (if known). On the sys- temic level, educating others involves program- ming, awareness campaigns, or policy change that stretches beyond the individual victim and perpetrator and impacts an entire community at the institution in a nonpunitive manner. As Al- lyD noted, the BRT response is “not punitive but educational.” Building a better environment. Building a better environment occurs on the individual and systemic level as well. If one individual has a better experience, feels supported, and is re- tained on the institutional level, then the envi- ronment is better for that individual. Mikaela talked further about her experience in providing support to a transgender student who experi- enced bias because of others’ refusal to use his new name instead of his old name: There have been two or three members on his floor who still insist when they’re talking about Allan, they use feminine pronouns. And one happened in my of- fice, and I corrected him, and he said, “Oh whatever.” The pessimist in me thinks that they’re doing it on purpose. I hope that that’s not just a continuous little nibble that he hears all the time. . . . We’ll just have to keep an eye on things and see if we need to intervene more. Mikaela provided support to Allan when he experienced issues of bias around his name and gender identity. She also responded to the inci- dent by correcting those who victimized Allan by using incorrect pronouns. Although Mikaela recognized the progress that had been made in part because of the support from the BRT, she was also prepared for more incidents to arise in the future. In this way, she acknowledged the pervasive nature of bias toward Allan within his environment and the challenges that arose when the incident response focused only on the victim and did not move to systemically change the environment. On the systemic level, the BRT hopes to make an impact and build a better environment for all students who experience bias. Partici- pants connect with people who can influence the situation on an institution-wide level. Kate ex- panded on the name incident from above: We were talking in team and we were like, “Wow, I wonder how hard it is to get your name changed all over campus.” We started thinking about where else could this be occurring. So right after this first incident is when I started talking to [Chris] about this and we decided to pull together a group of people that I thought might have some input with figuring out the name change process on campus. But the reality is we knew this was an issue in little small pockets, so we started investigating and finding out it was an issue in a lot of other places and we never had to use this particular person’s details to discuss it because it’s just a reality, not only for our students who identify as transgender. Because the BRT exists within the larger context of the institution, there is an implicit need for the BRT to place their efforts in the larger culture of their institution. Building a better environment takes the outcome of edu- cating others further by saying that there is an intended goal within the response process; by educating others, a better environment is achieved. Opaque Side of the Process Participants acknowledged that they negoti- ate tensions within the process, but the degree to which the tensions are visible from their view- point varies from one participant to another, making this part of the process opaque. This key category also consists of three dimensions that become apparent as participants confront differ- ent tensions that exist for them in their BRT work: navigating between individual and sys- temic change, being proactive versus being re- active, and self-defining as an ally or being perceived as an ally. Each dimension exists on a spectrum, and the participants find themselves 9BIAS REPONSE TEAMS T hi s do cu m en t is co py ri gh te d by th e A m er ic an P sy ch ol og ic al A ss oc ia ti on or on e of it s al li ed pu bl is he rs . T hi s ar ti cl e is in te nd ed so le ly fo r th e pe rs on al us e of th e in di vi du al us er an d is no t to be di ss em in at ed br oa dl y. fluctuating between the two ends of the spec- trum. Navigating between individual and sys- temic change. Because the BRT impacts the individual as well as the larger, systemic envi- ronment throughout the process, different par- ticipants think about creating change in differ- ent ways. Dyas, a BRT participant, described this nuanced deliberation: “The victim is a pri- mary goal of the BRT, then some sort of edu- cational aspect of the situation . . . improving the overall campus environment if possible. And in most cases [we] don’t get to sort of a macro-institutional level.” Dyas’ quotation illu- minates how responding on an individual level with a victim or perpetrator does not necessarily constitute systemic change in the larger com- munity. Conversely, the following quotation from Mikaela shows how not all BRT members think that the teams do or should only be focused on individual change: All of those things boil down to good community and civility, and treating each other with respect, and cre- ating an environment where students can succeed. And so with all of that emphasis, I think at this point it’s just a given that we’ll address these kinds of things. Likewise, Kate, in response to a question about her ideal outcome, expressed, When you do see a really positive impact and where a student maybe had this horrible situation, you see some healing happen and some institutional changes, and some are connected to campus in some way they didn’t before, and they succeed because they felt supported through that. Whereas some participants see the impor- tance of systemic change and how that is im- portant for educating others and creating a bet- ter environment, other participants gain satisfaction and fulfillment based on the BRT’s ability to impact an individual. Each participant navigates this tension internally, which poten- tially leads to a lack of cohesion as the process moves along. The response to a bias-related incident is impacted by the participants’ percep- tion of their ability to influence the process. Navigating between being proactive and reactive. Because the BRT was set up as a response to bias incidents at the institution, the BRT is inherently reactive. However, building a better environment, an aspect of the transparent side, potentially has roots in proactive practice. BRT members put energy toward creating that better environment in which acts of bias do not reoccur or negatively influence someone else, thus making aspects of their process proactive. For some BRT participants, the process remains tied strictly to the victim and therefore the BRT must react and respond to that individual’s in- cident. As Sophie discussed, [The BRT] really is meant to be a reporting mechanism and a victim support educational body. So I think some folks sometimes get frustrated with that and want us to do more like create a campus response. But that’s really not . . . was never the intention of the teams. However, other BRT members, like Eric, choose to focus on the broader capabilities of the BRT taking a more proactive focus: “And there were times when we could do things, we could influence policy to make things more inclusive.” Dyas also commented on the partic- ipants’ desire to be proactive, “. . . I think that we do pretty well, but at times, we . . . overstep our original mission when necessary.” Dyas re- ferred to the founders of the BRT who designed the process as victim-driven. Again, each mem- ber navigates this tension internally based on the way he or she makes meaning of the pro- cess. This can lead to a lack of consistency in the different approaches of the BRT because, although some responses may have implications for future policy changes, the response itself stays solely within an individual-level response. Navigating between self-defining as an ally and wanting to be perceived as an ally. To be a member of a BRT, some participants stated that they have to see themselves as allies for those who possess marginalized social identities. This implicit requirement leads par- ticipants to struggle with either their role on the BRT validating their internal identification as an ally or their role on the BRT serving as evidence to others who would then subse- quently designate them as an ally. Freda, for example, talked about how part of the process became validating ally status for some partici- pants: I just think that it’s important that folks know that you choose to be an ally, you choose to be on their side and you will not insofar as possible, you will not allow anything to happen to them while you’re on watch. So I just think that’s totally important . . . choosing to be an ally, letting others know you’re an ally being very clearly identified as an ally and I think that that’s what the [BRT] are. 10 LEPEAU, MORGAN, ZIMMERMAN, SNIPES, AND MARCOTTE T hi s do cu m en t is co py ri gh te d by th e A m er ic an P sy ch ol og ic al A ss oc ia ti on or on e of it s al li ed pu bl is he rs . T hi s ar ti cl e is in te nd ed so le ly fo r th e pe rs on al us e of th e in di vi du al us er an d is no t to be di ss em in at ed br oa dl y. Those who wanted to be perceived as allies use the teams as a way to contribute to the hopeful attainment of others’ perception of them as allies. Eric articulated this when he recounted, I think there are so many of my gay and lesbian friends who are involved in diversity education, fighting rac- ism and other isms, and they’re White, and I think it’s because we have an understanding of what it’s like to be both in the majority and have privilege. . . . Some of my radical friends would say we’re chosen people because we can see the privilege, but we can also see the oppression and that gives us a special insight. Because of the focus on ally status, part of the process became about validating ally status for BRT members. Navigating ally status, or per- ception thereof, takes away from the original intent of the victim-driven process and detracts from keeping the victim at the center of the process. Participants grapple with the dimensions of the opaque side in uneven ways. Thus, we dis- play the two-sided multidimensional theoretical process in the conceptual model (see Figure 1). Discussion The findings from this study touch on the delicate interplay between the participants and their work in addressing an incident of bias. The core category of connecting reveals how partic- ipants work together to resolve incidents of bias while seeking to be victim-driven and striving for organizational or systemic change to en- hance the climate for diversity. However, this work does not happen without addressing opaque tensions in every phase of the process. The DLE (Hurtado et al., 2012) is useful in situating how the emerging theoretical process speaks to the cocurricular interaction between student and campus educator within the BRT context. From the findings, three themes emerged that extend or complicate what we know about diversity work in student affairs and BRTs. Toward Improving Campus Climate: The Role of Connecting The current literature highlights how student conduct administrators or police officers may rely on guidelines and protocols or punitive actions to respond to incidents of bias (Associ- ation for Student Conduct Administrators, 2013; Footer, 1996; Schrage & Giacomini, 2009). Furthermore, one of the standards of professional practice for chief diversity officers calls for “procedural knowledge” of how to respond to incidents on campus (Worthington et al., 2014, p. 231). These suggest that a clear set of guidelines or policies exists that dictate how bias incidents should be responded to. In con- trast, the core category of connecting emerged as the mechanism participants operationalize to move the response process along despite the myriad organizational challenges they face. Our findings add to the literature by explicating how campus educators leverage relationships and build coalitions to work through the tensions outlined in the Results section to address inci- dents of bias. Thus, the findings suggest that the quest for connecting is happening in two planes while BRT members work through the transpar- ent and opaque sides of the process simultane- ously. The first plane is student to institutional agent (or campus educator), one who influences student success and/or the reproduction of in- equality in an organization (Stanton-Salazar, 2011). Allan, one of the victims in our study, exemplified this dynamic between student and campus educator when he noted how he felt empowered by the victim-driven philosophy of the BRT. In the second plane, BRT members are working to increase their own institutional power and prestige. This presents previously unexamined dynamics related to ways partici- pants (a) respond to incidents, (b) develop ally status, and (c) strive for organizational change. All the participants viewed their ability to connect as positive because it affords them agency in spite of the organizational limita- tions of the BRT. However, the concept of connecting is not without its challenges. One critical challenge is that BRT members often have to renegotiate their expectations regard- ing the amount of change they can create. The DLE notes that processes exist that influence the (re)socialization of students, validation, and building of a sense of community through encouraging students’ sense of belonging at the intersection of students and staff identities and their intentional practices (Hurtado et al., 2012). These processes are supposed to work in union with each other. The emergent model suggests that some of the participants may have enough power and/or connections to en- 11BIAS REPONSE TEAMS T hi s do cu m en t is co py ri gh te d by th e A m er ic an P sy ch ol og ic al A ss oc ia ti on or on e of it s al li ed pu bl is he rs . T hi s ar ti cl e is in te nd ed so le ly fo r th e pe rs on al us e of th e in di vi du al us er an d is no t to be di ss em in at ed br oa dl y. gender positive individual change for the stu- dent involved, but they may not have enough power and/or connections to produce the sort of systemic change that some participants in our study espoused as a goal of the BRT. This challenge underscores the difficulty in align- ing all of the cocurricular processes (e.g., educational responses to bias-related inci- dents or proactive programs presented by staff in cultural centers) to one goal. Rendon (1994) in her theory of validating culturally diverse students asserted the importance of institutional transformation that emphasizes serving diverse student populations in concert with the interpersonal interactions between campus educators and students. Some litera- ture has looked at how students are validated in the classroom space exists (Barnett, 2011; Hurtado, Cuellar, & Guillermo-Wann, 2011), but our conceptual model suggests that from a cocurricular vantage point, a BRT’s ability to create systemic change rests in the depth and breadth of team members’ connections. This dynamic also presents another chal- lenge associated with connecting— how the team members are socialized on the teams. The DLE notes that the historical context “is rarely assessed and as a consequence, there are minimal links established to educational outcomes” (Hurtado et al., 2012, p. 59). Our findings suggest that the historical context of an organization has been an understudied but critical influence on the response process. Al- though team members receive little formal training, all the participants were able to ar- ticulate the history of the BRT, including why and how the teams started. This practice con- stitutes an “information channel” or the means by which connecting is used to provide information that then facilitates action (Cole- man, 1988). The informal passing of histori- cal information limits innovation in the pro- cess due to team members who are tied to the original intent of the teams. Epistemological differences that the team members possess are not readily discussed. Participants holding conflicting beliefs of the purpose and goals of the BRT may be a reason why systemic change is not always accomplished, as it is difficult to move as a cohesive unit toward multiple goals simultaneously. Complicating Ally Status in Diversity and Bias-Incident Work Conflicting views of the goals and purpose of the teams are not the only instance of the team members working from differing epistemolo- gies. Being perceived as an ally or self-defining as an ally stood out because of the variability in the responses from participants. Much of the literature to date on ally identity development in higher education is from the student point of view (Bishop, 2002; Broido, 2000; Reason, Roosa Millar, & Scales, 2005). The DLE model acknowledges the importance of staff identity in cocurricular experiences. Therefore, partici- pants openly identifying as an ally has impor- tant implications for campus climate (Hurtado et al., 2012). Few articles directly speak to the role and skills needed for campus educators who view themselves as allies. Reason and Da- vis’ (2005) study highlights the “interrelated concepts of socially constructed identities, mul- tiple identities and cognitive development” (p. 6), potentially explaining why the team mem- bers in our study fluctuated in response to think- ing about their ally identity. However, this study does not detail the effect of a group of educators negotiating their ally identity together and separately. Edwards’ (2006) theoretical model on aspir- ing social justice ally development builds on Reason and Davis’ (2005) work to present non- linear statuses that are useful in delineating dif- ferent types of allies. Allyship was seemingly the goal for some of the participants in our study, consistent with the aspiring ally for al- truism (i.e., participants limiting the focus of the BRT to individual support of victims), whereas for others, the focus on the interrelatedness of social issues on campus was more of a concern, consistent with aspiring allies for social justice. Edwards asserted, “the most credible and au- thentic naming of social justice allies is done by members of the oppressed group” (p. 54). Yet, many of the participants in our study felt com- fortable identifying as allies, even noting it as an implicit requirement to be on the BRT. Eric’s quotation is an example of a partici- pant who had a salient sensitivity to the impor- tance of being named an ally and not wanting to define for himself because in his view that ac- tion perpetuates privilege and hegemony, rein- forcing a status quo of Whiteness because a 12 LEPEAU, MORGAN, ZIMMERMAN, SNIPES, AND MARCOTTE T hi s do cu m en t is co py ri gh te d by th e A m er ic an P sy ch ol og ic al A ss oc ia ti on or on e of it s al li ed pu bl is he rs . T hi s ar ti cl e is in te nd ed so le ly fo r th e pe rs on al us e of th e in di vi du al us er an d is no t to be di ss em in at ed br oa dl y. White person with unearned power names one- self as an ally to an oppressed individual or group. Often, participants who operated with this thinking recognized and tried to work around the limiting effects of the reactive nature of the BRT when trying to create a better envi- ronment. Interestingly, the participants did not articulate that the differing ally identity inter- pretations impeded the response process in any substantive way. Thus, our model suggests that like-mindedness with regards to ally identity is not a requisite for social justice work in a group. Accordingly, our model complicates the field’s understanding of ally development and how it is manifested for campus educators. This point does raise the question of whether the effective- ness of the teams would be altered if they were all operating from a similar understanding in regards to their ally identity. If participants talked about the differences in their conceptions of allyship, they might understand each other’s perspectives about how to best respond to a bias-related incident and why. A New Look at Systemic Change and Climate for Diversity Efforts As evidenced from some of the participant responses in the tension of creating systemic or individual change, some participants viewed helping just one student as a positive outcome of the process. This model of changing campus climate one person at a time is rooted in human- ist notions of social change. Humanists believe the words of Martin Luther King that “We are caught in an inescapable network of mutuality, tied in a single garment of destiny. Whatever affects one directly, affects all indirectly” (King, 1964). So by changing one student di- rectly, participants indirectly affect campus cli- mate. Helping one student was in the BRT’s locus of control and served as a tangible mea- sure of the team’s efficacy. Participants such as Sophie staunchly believed that the response process should be reactive in nature, true to the original mandate of the teams. The intense fo- cus on the individual student’s perception of the environment aligns with the psychological di- mension of the DLE (Hurtado et al., 2012) and other literature that highlights the importance of intentionally responding to the differences in campus climate perception between minoritized students and students with dominant social identities (Evans & Broido, 2002; Harper & Hurtado, 2007; Museus, Nichols, & Lambert, 2008; Renn, 2010). Working in the institutional context and on the two dimensions of psychological and histor- ical climate (Hurtado et al., 1999, 2012) is ex- tremely important and should be lauded. How- ever, our model suggests that the BRT has the capacity to address other dimensions of campus climate and other contexts of the DLE model toward truly making a better environment for the victims of bias (Hurtado et al., 2012). For example, participants noted the ad hoc creation of a task force to seek policy changes related to preferred student name. This effort stemmed from the work of the BRT to substantively address the policy context of the DLE and the organizational and behavioral aspects of cam- pus climate (Hurtado et al., 2012). Dyas noted that sometimes teams have to step beyond their original mission to create a more sustained in- fluence on the campus environment. So, al- though the capacity may exist and is sometimes used, there is not a consistent agreement among participants about their work being connected to the different dimensions of climate and different contexts of the DLE (Hurtado et al., 2012). This theme accentuates the complications some cam- pus educators face with trying to address the different aspects of social justice work as a collective. In addition, our findings assert as does the DLE that the effective intersection of “staff identity, programming for design of con- tent, and practices centered on student develop- ment” are critical to maximizing organizational efforts that seek to foster a more inclusive cli- mate (Hurtado et al., 2012, p. 81). Implications for Practice and Future Research As BRTs continue to proliferate across insti- tutions of higher education, we offer three spe- cific implications for practice. These ideas em- anate from the discussion about the way participants connected to accomplish their goals, conceived of their ally status, and strived to use their work with the BRT in enhancing the overall climate for diversity. First, we found that often participants worked outside of their formal job requirements and leveraged connec- tions to get things done. Participants believed that working outside the system is advanta- 13BIAS REPONSE TEAMS T hi s do cu m en t is co py ri gh te d by th e A m er ic an P sy ch ol og ic al A ss oc ia ti on or on e of it s al li ed pu bl is he rs . T hi s ar ti cl e is in te nd ed so le ly fo r th e pe rs on al us e of th e in di vi du al us er an d is no t to be di ss em in at ed br oa dl y. geous, it leads to questioning whether or not having connections on campus is a prerequisite for being able to serve on the team. This ques- tioning is a product of how participants set unclear boundaries between institutional role and responsibility and the resources they use in addressing bias-related incidents. Stanton- Salazar (2011) stated that empowering institu- tional agents builds and leverages social capital (connections) through three types of resources: personal, positional, and other alters (i.e., indi- viduals mobilizing efforts on behalf of students who have experienced a bias-related incident). For participants it was imperative that they have the requisite level of social capital to redress bias on an individual and institutional level; however, what was unclear was the level of social capital that was embedded in the posi- tional role as BRT members. Although long- tenured BRT members may have the social cap- ital to mediate a bias incident, their presence on the team may also hinder the imagination of what the BRT could become. We encourage campus educators to be conscious of the re- sources (personal, positional, and alter) they deploy and the complications that can arise from negotiating the three types in diversity work. Stanton-Salazar (2011) is clear that insti- tutional agents must have the three types of resources to empower campus constituents, and more research needs to be done that examines how these resources are accrued and deployed by practitioners engaged in diversity work. Second, we suggest that epistemological dif- ferences between participants related to their conceptions of the purpose of the BRT as well as constructions of allyship matter. Campus ed- ucators might consider using external facilita- tors with expertise in bias response to work with the teams to outline their objectives. BRT mem- bers must be reflexive and continue with ongo- ing training because increased cultural self- awareness can improve the effectiveness of the team (Howard, 2003; Pope, Reynolds, & Muel- ler, 2004; Reason & Broido, 2005). For exam- ple, we suggest that campus educators should make explicit how they conceptualize allyship (e.g., allies for altruism or social justice) be- cause different understandings of allyship man- ifest in different ways of connecting with vic- tims of bias (Edwards, 2006). It was unclear the extent to which all participants interrogated their notions of allyship with their notions of privilege. Without this level of individual re- flexivity, a BRT focus may become helping marginalized students rather than working in solidarity with students to alter systems of in- equity in the campus environment. Third, the findings from this study speak to the capacity of a BRT to move beyond the individual level to systemic change for DLEs (Hurtado et al., 2012). We suggest that admin- istrators periodically reevaluate the structure and philosophy of the BRT. Although the BRT at this particular institution collects some as- sessment data, the team could improve its as- sessment efforts by connecting their work to larger institutional learning objectives related to how the outcomes move beyond psychological and historical dimensions of campus climate (Hurtado et al., 2012; Schuh, 2009). This call also falls in line with standards put forth by Worthington et al. (2014) for chief diversity officers to be actively involved in campus ef- forts to address bias incidents and assess the effectiveness of programs and interventions re- lated to issues of equity and inclusion. Campus educators look to mission statements as impor- tant signaling mechanisms; they outline the val- ues, aims, and purposes for the institution (Mor- phew & Hartley, 2006). Researchers have demonstrated that diversity initiatives not con- nected to institutional missions are doomed for failure and ineffectiveness (Bensimon, 2004; Hurtado et al., 2012; Milem et al., 2005). We recommend that BRTs incorporate a cycle of assessment that includes Council for the Ad- vancement of Standards self-assessment, bench- marking, external review (Olshak, 2009), and reference to standards of professional practice for chief diversity officers (Worthington et al., 2014). By engaging in this rigorous form of assessment, BRTs can clearly articulate their connection to the institutional learning objec- tives related to multiple dimensions of climate for diversity to more effectively report out- comes of addressing bias-related incidents on campus (Hurtado et al., 2012). In conclusion, this study explored the process by which an institution responds to bias-related incidents and in the process the findings exem- plified the tensions that make diversity work for researchers and campus educators in higher ed- ucation challenging. We offer three recommen- dations for future research. First, this study should be extended to different types of cam- 14 LEPEAU, MORGAN, ZIMMERMAN, SNIPES, AND MARCOTTE T hi s do cu m en t is co py ri gh te d by th e A m er ic an P sy ch ol og ic al A ss oc ia ti on or on e of it s al li ed pu bl is he rs . T hi s ar ti cl e is in te nd ed so le ly fo r th e pe rs on al us e of th e in di vi du al us er an d is no t to be di ss em in at ed br oa dl y. puses (e.g., minority-serving institutions, urban, community college) to see whether the process is different at institutions that serve different student populations. Second, crucial to the work of bias response is the application of scholarly notions of allyship. More empirical work is needed to both validate and expand our theoret- ical constructs of allyship, particularly beyond the individual level to the group level. Finally, we call for more scholarly inquiry that explicitly examines the ways in which a BRT influences systemic change, particularly how campus edu- cators within BRTs leverage the three types of resources (personal, positional, and alters; Stan- ton-Salazar, 2011). This work may lead to al- tering systemic processes that perpetuate ineq- uitable systems from which incidents of bias originate. References Anthony, M. 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The development of social justice allies during college: A phenomenological investigation. Journal of College Student Develop- ment, 41, 3–18. Bryant, A., & Charmaz, K. (Eds.). (2007). The Sage handbook of grounded theory. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Charmaz, K. (2006). Constructing grounded theory: A practical guide through qualitative analysis. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Coleman, J. S. (1988). Social capital in the creation of human capital. American Journal of Sociology, 94(Suppl.), S95–S120. Corbin, J., & Strauss, A. L. (2008). Basics of quali- tative research: Techniques and procedures for developing grounded theory (3rd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Council for the Advancement of Standards. (2012). Council for the Advancement of Standards profes- sional standards for higher education (8th ed.). Washington, DC: Author. Creswell, J. W. (2013). Qualitative inquiry and re- search design: Choosing among five approaches (3rd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Creswell, J. W. (2014). Research design: Qualitative, quantitative, and mixed methods approaches (4th ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Dunkle, J. H., Silverstein, Z. B., & Warner, S. L. (2008). Managing violent and other troubling stu- dents: The role of threat assessment teams on campus. The Journal of College and University Law, 34, 585– 636. Edwards, K. E. (2006). Aspiring social justice ally identity development: A conceptual model. NASPA Journal, 43, 39 – 60. Eells, G. T., & Rockland-Miller, H. S. (2010). As- sessing and responding to disturbed and disturbing students: Understanding the role of administrative teams in institutions of higher education. Journal of College Student Psychotherapy, 25, 8 –23. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/87568225.2011.532470 Evans, N. J., & Broido, E. M. (2002). The experi- ences of lesbian and bisexual women in college residence halls: Implications for addressing ho- mophobia and heterosexism. Journal of Lesbian Studies, 6, 29 – 42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1300/ J155v06n03_04 Federal Bureau of Investigation. (2011). Hate crime statistics. Washington, DC: Author. Fontana, A., & Frey, J. H. (2005). The interview: From neutral stance to political involvement. In N. K. Denzin & Y. S. Lincoln (Eds.), The Sage handbook of qualitative research (3rd ed., pp. 695–728). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Footer, N. S. (1996). Achieving fundamental fair- ness: The code of conduct. New Directions for Student Services, 1996, 19 –33. http://dx.doi.org/ 10.1002/ss.37119967304 Fox, J. A., & Savage, J. (2009). Mass murder goes to college: An examination of changes on college campuses following Virginia Tech. American Be- havioral Scientist, 52, 1465–1485. http://dx.doi .org/10.1177/0002764209332558 Glaser, B. G., & Strauss, A. L. (1967). The discovery of grounded theory: Strategies for qualitative re- search. Chicago, IL: Aldine. Glesne, C. (2006). Becoming qualitative researchers: An introduction. Boston, MA: Pearson/Allyn & Bacon. Guba, E. G., & Lincoln, Y. S. (1989). Fourth gener- ation evaluation. Newbury Park, CA: Sage. 15BIAS REPONSE TEAMS T hi s do cu m en t is co py ri gh te d by th e A m er ic an P sy ch ol og ic al A ss oc ia ti on or on e of it s al li ed pu bl is he rs . T hi s ar ti cl e is in te nd ed so le ly fo r th e pe rs on al us e of th e in di vi du al us er an d is no t to be di ss em in at ed br oa dl y. Harper, S. R. (2012). Race without racism: How higher education researchers minimize racist insti- tutional norms. Review of Higher Education, 36, 9 –29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/rhe.2012.0047 Harper, S. R., & Hurtado, S. (2007). Nine themes in campus racial climates and implications for insti- tutional transformation. New Directions for Stu- dent Services, 2007, 7–24. http://dx.doi.org/ 10.1002/ss.254 Howard, T. C. (2003). Culturally relevant pedagogy: Ingredients for critical teacher reflection. 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Review of Higher Education, 21, 279 – 302. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/rhe.1998.0003 Hurtado, S., Milem, J. F., Clayton-Pedersen, A. R., & Allen, W. R. (1999). Enacting diverse learning environments: Improving the climate for racial/ ethnic diversity in higher education. San Fran- cisco, CA: Jossey-Bass. Johnston, M., & Garcia, G. (2014, March). Exploring racially biased incidents on campus in a “postra- cial” era. Workshop at the ACPA-College Student Educators International Convention, Indianapolis, IN. Jones, S. R., Torres, V., & Arminio, J. (2013). Ne- gotiating the complexities of qualitative research in higher education: Fundamental elements and issues (2nd ed.). New York, NY: Routledge. King, M. L. (1964). Letter from Birmingham jail. In M. L. King (Ed.), Why we can’t wait (p. 65). New York, NY: Harper & Row. Lempert, L. B. (2007). Asking questions of the data: Memo writing in the grounded theory tradition. In A. Bryant & K. 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Antecedents, precursors, and concurrent concepts in the devel- opment of social justice attitudes and actions. New Directions for Student Services, 2005, 5–15. http:// dx.doi.org/10.1002/ss.161 Reason, R. D., & Rankin, S. R. (2005). College students’ experiences and perceptions of harass- ment on campus: An exploration of gender differ- ences. College Student Affairs Journal, 26, 7–29. Reason, R. D., Roosa Millar, E. A., & Scales, T. C. (2005). Toward a model of racial justice ally de- velopment. Journal of College Student Develop- ment, 46, 530 –546. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/csd .2005.0054 Rendon, L. I. (1994). Validating culturally diverse students: Toward a new model of learning and student development. Innovative Higher Educa- tion, 19, 33–51. Renn, K. A. (2010). LGBT and queer research in higher education: The state and status of the field. Educational Researcher, 39, 132–141. http://dx .doi.org/10.3102/0013189X10362579 16 LEPEAU, MORGAN, ZIMMERMAN, SNIPES, AND MARCOTTE T hi s do cu m en t is co py ri gh te d by th e A m er ic an P sy ch ol og ic al A ss oc ia ti on or on e of it s al li ed pu bl is he rs . T hi s ar ti cl e is in te nd ed so le ly fo r th e pe rs on al us e of th e in di vi du al us er an d is no t to be di ss em in at ed br oa dl y. Schlosser, L. Z., & Sedlacek, W. E. (2001). Hate on campus: A model for evaluating, understanding, and handling critical incidents. About Campus: Enriching the Student Learning Experience, 6, 25–27. Schrage, J. M., & Giacomini, N. G. (Eds.). (2009). Reframing campus conflict: Student conduct prac- tice through a social justice lens. Sterling, VA: Stylus Publishing. Schuh, J. H. (2009). Assessment methods for student affairs. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass. Stanton-Salazar, R. D. (2011). A social capital frame- work for the study of institutional agents and their role in the empowerment of low-status students and youth. Youth & Society, 43, 1066 –1109. http:// dx.doi.org/10.1177/0044118X10382877 U.S. Department of Justice. (2001). Hate crimes on campus: The problem and efforts to confront it. Washington, DC: Author. Retrieved from https:// www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bja/187249.pdf U.S. Department of Justice. (2003). Responding to hate crimes and bias-motivated incidents on col- lege/university campuses. Washington, DC: Au- thor. Retrieved from http://search.justice.gov/ search?query�Responding�to�hate�crimes� and�bias-motivated�incidents�on�college% 2Funiversity�campuses&op�Search&affiliate� justice U.S. Department of Justice. (n.d.). Hate crime: The violence of intolerance. Retrieved from http:// www.justice.gov/crs/pubs/htecrm.htm Worthington, R. L., Stanley, C. A., & Lewis, W. T. (2014). National Association of Diversity Officers in Higher Education standards of professional practice for chief diversity officers. Journal of Diversity in Higher Education, 7, 227–234. http:// dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0038391 Received October 16, 2014 Revision received April 17, 2015 Accepted May 14, 2015 � 17BIAS REPONSE TEAMS T hi s do cu m en t is co py ri gh te d by th e A m er ic an P sy ch ol og ic al A ss oc ia ti on or on e of it s al li ed pu bl is he rs . T hi s ar ti cl e is in te nd ed so le ly fo r th e pe rs on al us e of th e in di vi du al us er an d is no t to be di ss em in at ed br oa dl y. Loyola University Chicago From the SelectedWorks of Demetri L. Morgan, Ph.D. 2015 Connecting to Get Things Done: A Conceptual Model of the Process Used to Respond to Bias Incidents tmpdyDWjv.pdf 
work_2syetlnzsfhbni346dtic3w7ie	----	HEQ-2017-0002-ver9-Gonzales_2P 83..86 PERSPECTIVE Open Access What an Emerging Trump Administration Means for Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health Gilbert Gonzales1,* and Tara McKay2 Abstract The policies of the Trump administration are likely to have direct and indirect implications for lesbian, gay, bisex- ual, and transgender (LGBT) health. With the assistance of a Republican-controlled Congress, President Trump may repeal President Obama’s health reform law, undermine same-sex marriage laws and other nondiscrimina- tion protections, reduce funding for research on sexual and gender minority health, and institutionalize discrim- ination through new legislation, such as the First Amendment Defense Act. Public health researchers, healthcare providers, and professional organizations must continue to combat discrimination and advocate for LGBT health equity under an emerging Trump presidency. Keywords: election; health disparities; public policy and advocacy Introduction On November 8, 2016, Donald J. Trump defied public opinion polls and election experts when he defeated Hillary Clinton in the 2016 election for the presidency of the United States. Meanwhile, Republicans main- tained control of the U.S. House of Representatives and the U.S. Senate, and they increased their control at the state level—holding both legislative chambers in 32 states.1 Although President Trump’s policy posi- tions are still materializing, the anticipated policy posi- tions of the Trump administration may have direct and indirect implications for lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) health. The Affordable Care Act On the campaign trail, President Trump repeatedly vowed to repeal and replace President Obama’s signa- ture healthcare reform law, the Affordable Care Act (ACA), which extended health insurance coverage to more than 20 million Americans since its enactment in 2010.2 Through health insurance reforms (e.g., pre-existing condition exclusion bans, annual and life- time limit prohibitions, guaranteed issue, and commu- nity rating), expansions in Medicaid for low-income residents, and subsidies for middle-income Americans to purchase private health insurance through the Mar- ketplaces, millions of previously uninsured Americans gained health insurance for the first time—including many LGBT people.3,4 Moreover, the ACA extended new protections for sexual and gender minorities (SGMs) in healthcare. Specifically, Section 1557 under the ACA prohibits healthcare providers and facilities receiving federal funds from discriminating against individuals based on sex, which the Office for Civil Rights (OCR) at the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) de- termined included gender identity and sex stereotypes.5 In addition, under the ACA, public health plans (e.g., Medicare and Medicaid) and health plans sold on the Marketplaces can no longer categorically deny health 1Department of Health Policy, Vanderbilt University School of Medicine, Nashville, Tennessee. 2Center for Medicine, Health and Society, Vanderbilt University, Nashville, Tennessee. *Address correspondence to: Gilbert Gonzales, PhD, MHA, Department of Health Policy, Vanderbilt University School of Medicine, 2525 West End, Suite 1200, Nashville, 37203, TN, E-mail: gilbert.gonzales@vanderbilt.edu ª Gilbert Gonzales and Tara McKay 2017; Published by Mary Ann Liebert, Inc. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. Mary Ann Liebert, Inc. offers reprint services for those who want to order professionally produced copies of articles published under the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license. To obtain a price quote, email Reprints@liebertpub.com. Please include the article’s title or DOI, quantity, and delivery destination in your email. Health Equity Volume 1.1, 2017 DOI: 10.1089/heq.2017.0002 Health Equity 83 services related to gender transition, nor can they deny health services to an individual if they are available to other patients. Legislative actions to repeal, defund, or delay the implementation of the ACA already risk taking away health insurance from low- and middle- income LGBT Americans; a complete repeal may also erase nondiscrimination protections for transgender Americans. These protections are already being chal- lenged in court and will be further threatened by a re- peal of the ACA (at the time of this writing, a U.S. District Court had issued a nationwide injunction on the OCR rule). Same-Sex Marriage and Discriminatory LGBT Laws Another legacy of the Obama administration has been the federal recognition and implementation of same-sex mar- riage across the country after the Supreme Court’s deci- sions in United States v. Windsor (which overturned the federal definition of marriage between one man and one woman) and Obergefell v. Hodges (which recognized marriage as a constitutional right for same-sex couples). Now that same-sex marriage is legal nationwide, same- sex couples are eligible for spousal benefits, including employer-sponsored health insurance, joint tax benefits, social security spousal protections, and healthcare protec- tions, such as hospital visitation rights and medical decision-making for married same-sex couples. Although President Trump has changed his position on same-sex marriage in the past, Vice President Mike Pence and many congressional Republicans have expressed their disapproval of same-sex marriage and already taken steps to undermine the law. For instance, as Governor of Indiana, Pence signed Indiana’s 2015 Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), which al- lows individuals and businesses to deny services to LGBT people based on their religious beliefs. State- level RFRAs may also allow some clerks and judges to opt out of officiating same-sex marriages. At the time of this writing, 21 states have enacted state-level RFRAs, and another 12 states considered but did not pass RFRA legislation in 2016.6 At least five RFRA- related bills have been introduced in 2017 in Colorado (HB1013), Oklahoma (SB530), Hawaii (HB823), Min- nesota (HF43), and West Virginia (SB19).6 Meanwhile, U.S. Senators Ted Cruz and Mike Lee plan to reintroduce the First Amendment Defense Act, which would prohibit the federal government from taking discriminatory action against a person who believes that (1) marriage is or should be recog- nized as the union of one man and one woman or (2) sexual relations are properly reserved to such a mar- riage.7 Such provisions may allow businesses and indi- viduals to discriminate against LGBT people in public and private sector industries, including healthcare set- tings. Ultimately, although more pro-LGBT bills were introduced and passed in 2016 than anti-LGBT laws,8 gains in nondiscrimination protections, relationship recognition, and health and safety remain precarious. LGBT Health Research Funding The field of LGBT health research has grown exponen- tially, thanks, in part, to a series of new initiatives aimed to increase sponsorship of LGBT health studies by the National Institutes of Health (NIH) and the National Institute on Minority Health and Health Dis- parities. Specifically, the NIH issued a call for proposals for research on SGMs,9 established the Sexual and Gen- der Minority Research Office,10 and, in October 2016, designated SGM people as a health disparity popula- tion for research purposes.11 This designation broadens funding and research opportunities on LGBT popula- tions and other SGMs. Despite these advancements, research funding for SGM health is at risk under a Republican Congress and Trump administration. President Trump’s pro- posed budget includes an 18% cut to the NIH and fund- ing reforms for the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC),12 which would reduce funding avail- able for multiple areas of research, including research at the intersections of sexual orientation, gender identity, and health. Congress may also take a more targeted ap- proach toward reducing funding for LGBT health re- search. Several legislative attempts in the past have specifically targeted research on human sexuality and health conditions, disproportionately affecting LGBT populations, including HIV/AIDS and other sexually transmitted infections.13 In 2003, *150 NIH-funded re- searchers were identified on a ‘‘hit list’’ created by the Traditional Values Coalition for conducting research on risky sexual behaviors, stigmatization of LGBT pop- ulations, and substance use among SGMs.14 Although this attempt to curtail federal funding of sexuality re- search was unsuccessful, future legislation may target SGM health for funding freezes. Discrimination and Stigma Individuals espousing anti-LGBT sentiment may be emboldened by the incoming Trump administration. According to the Federal Bureau of Investigations, LGBT people are most likely to be victims of hate Gonzales and McKay; Health Equity 2017, 1.1 http://online.liebertpub.com/doi/10.1089/heq.2017.0002 84 crimes compared to other minority groups.15 In the month after the election, the Southern Poverty Law Center recorded more than 1000 hate crimes against immigrants, racial and ethnic minorities, and LGBT Americans.16 Meanwhile, anti-LGBT sentiment per- sists in many communities. Although public opinion polls suggest that more Americans support same-sex marriage and legal protections for LGBT people, sup- port remains low among older adults, conservatives, and evangelical Protestants.17 New research using the National Inmate Survey also finds that LGBT people are disproportionately incarcerated, mistreated, and sexually victimized in U.S. jails and prisons, suggesting systematic biases against LGBT people at various stages of the criminal justice system.18 Public health research consistently finds that anti- LGBT discrimination and stigma are associated with worse LGBT health outcomes. Discriminatory acts expose LGBT people to verbal harassment, physical violence, and, in the most extreme cases, death.19 Discriminatory public policies—such as same-sex marriage bans20 and lack of protections against hate crimes or employment- based discrimination at the state level21—have been asso- ciated with worse LGBT health outcomes. These effects are especially pronounced for transgender Americans. The 2015 U.S. Transgender Survey of more than 27,000 transgender adults found that 39% of respondents experi- enced serious psychological distress compared with only 5% of the U.S. population.22 Similar health outcomes may worsen under a Trump administration. In the days after the election, LGBT people experienced substantial declines in their life evaluations: the percentage of LGBT adults considered ‘‘thriving’’ dropped 10% (from 51% to 41%) in the month after the election.23 Conclusion Donald Trump was sworn in on January 20, 2017, as the 45th President of the United States. In his first year, President Trump may overturn LGBT-affirming policies established by the Obama administration, including an executive order prohibiting federal contractors from dis- criminating on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity24 and agency guidelines protecting transgender students in public schools from gender identity-based discrimination.25 With the assistance of a Republican- controlled Congress, President Trump may also repeal President Obama’s health reform law, reduce funding for research on SGM health, and institutionalize dis- crimination through new legislation, such as the First Amendment Defense Act. What can be done? Public health researchers and providers must continue to advocate for LGBT health equity throughout all levels of government and across private sector industries. Healthcare facilities should implement policies prohibiting LGBT-based discrimi- nation, and providers should continue to broaden their awareness on LGBT health issues. In addition, public health researchers should continue to document the effects of evolving public policies on health and ac- cess to care for LGBT people. Data collection and rig- orous studies on LGBT people are needed more than ever to inform best practices and evidence-based poli- cies for eliminating LGBT health disparities. In conclusion, the Trump administration portends a sea change for LGBT policy and research. We provide a (nonexhaustive) set of policies that are likely to hinder LGBT health and research. In many ways, the fates of LGBT Americans are intertwined with the millions of Americans at risk of losing health insurance and other protections with the ongoing ACA reform. How- ever, LGBT Americans may face additional barriers and health disparities as a result of explicit policy deci- sions and discrimination that public health researchers, healthcare providers, and professional organizations must continue to actively address to promote LGBT health equity. Author Disclosure Statement No competing financial interests exist. References 1. National Conference of State Legislatures. 2016 Pre- and PostElection State Legislative Control. 2016. Available at www.ncsl.org/research/ elections-and-campaigns/2016-pre-and-postelection-state-legislative- control.aspx Accessed April 2, 2017. 2. Congressional Budget Office. Federal Subsidies for Health Insurance Coverage for People Under Age 65: 2016 to 2026. 2016. Available at www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/114th-congress-2015-2016/reports/ 51385-HealthInsuranceBaseline_OneCol.pdf (accessed January 9, 2017). 3. Baker K, Durso LE, Cray A. Moving the Needle: The Impact of the Affordable Care Act on LGBT Communities. Washington, DC: Center for American Progress. 2014. Available at https://cdn.americanprogress.org/ wp-content/uploads/2014/11/LGBTandACA-report.pdf (accessed January 9, 2017). 4. Skopec L, Long SK. Lesbian, gay, and bisexual adults making gains in health insurance and access to care. 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Available at www.whitehouse.gov/blog/ 2014/07/21/president-obama-signs-new-executive-order-protect-lgbt- workers Accessed December 21, 2016. 25. U.S. Departments of Education and Justice Release Joint Guidance to Help Schools Ensure the Civil Rights of Transgender Students. US Department of Education. 2016. Available at www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/us- departments-education-and-justice-release-joint-guidance-help-schools- ensure-civil-rights-transgender-students Accessed December 21, 2016. Cite this article as: Gonzales G, McKay T (2017) What an emerging Trump administration means for lesbian, gay, bisexual, and trans- gender health, Health Equity 1:1, 83–86, DOI: 10.1089/heq.2017.0002. Abbreviations Used ACA¼Affordable Care Act CDC¼Centers for Disease Control and Prevention NIH¼National Institutes of Health OCR¼Office for Civil Rights SGMs¼sexual and gender minorities Publish in Health Equity - Immediate, unrestricted online access - Rigorous peer review - Compliance with open access mandates - Authors retain copyright - Highly indexed - Targeted email marketing liebertpub.com/heq Gonzales and McKay; Health Equity 2017, 1.1 http://online.liebertpub.com/doi/10.1089/heq.2017.0002 86 http://www.liebertpub.com/heq 
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work_2trce7f3kbdgzma333psn3qxya	----	JHSP19(4)Print-j.pdf Discrimination of Gays and Lesbians: A Social Justice Perspective Christopher W. Blackwell, ARNP, MSN Janice L. Ricks, LCSW, ACSW Sophia F. Dziegielewski, PhD, LCSW ABSTRACT. The existence of discrimination against America’s gay and lesbian citizens is widely supported in the research literature of many disciplines. This article provides a specific analysis of this dis- crimination and demonstrates the stark contrast between the discrimina- tion of gays and lesbians in American society and the social justice concepts of equality and fairness. The works of Rawls, and later the works of Nussbaum, provide the theoretical framework highlighting the factors related to this discrimination and inequality. In the concluding section, specific implications for future policy development are pre- sented that are designed to ensure that gays and lesbians are not further discriminated against. Areas examined include civil unions, gay mar- riages, adoptions, hate crime legislation and cessation of the U.S. mili- tary’s “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell, Don’t Pursue” policy, advocating for inclusion of open gays and lesbians in military positions and command- ership. [Article copies available for a fee from The Haworth Document Delivery Service: 1-800-HAWORTH. E-mail address: <docdelivery@haworthpress.com> Website: <http://www.HaworthPress.com> © 2004 by The Haworth Press, Inc. All rights reserved.] Christopher W. Blackwell is Visiting Instructor, School of Nursing, University of Central Florida, College of Health and Public Affairs, PhD Program in Public Affairs. Janice L. Ricks is Adjunct Professor, School of Social Work, College of Health and Public Affairs, University of Central Florida. Sophia F. Dziegielewski is Professor and Director, School of Social Work, Univer- sity of Cincinnati. Address correspondence to: Dr. Sophia F. Dziegielewski, School of Social Work, University of Cincinatti, 4130 One Edwards Center, P.O. Box 210808, Cincinnati, OH 45221-0108 (E-mail: sophia.dziegielewski@uc.edu). Journal of Health & Social Policy, Vol. 19(4) 2004 http://www.haworthpress.com/web/JHSP © 2004 by The Haworth Press, Inc. All rights reserved. Digital Object Identifier: 10.1300/J045v19n04_02 27 http://www.HaworthPress.com http://www.haworthpress.com/web/JHSP KEYWORDS. Discrimination, social justice for gays and lesbians, gay and lesbian issues, Stonewall, human rights, gays in the military, civil union and gay marriage DISCRIMINATION AGAINST GAYS AND LESBIANS IN AMERICAN SOCIETY Discrimination and inequality faced by gays and lesbians in the United States is widespread, and the social movement to end such dis- criminatory practices has been recognized by many modern theorists re- searching queer theory (Kirsch, 2000). While some segments of Ameri- can society may not identify with the modern gay rights movement, these issues are intertwined with the principles of equality and fairness (Na- tional Center for Human Rights Education, 2003). The extensive existence of discrimination, hate crimes, violence, op- pression and heterosexist hatred against homosexuals is widely sup- ported in the research literature (Herek, 2002; Ellis, Kitzinger, & Wilkinson, 2002; Pierce, 2001; Conley, Devine, Rabow, & Evett, 2002; Irwin, 2002; Wetzel, 2001). The gay civil rights movement has as its agenda, the cessation of practices and cultural norms that inflict harm on homosexuals, visible directly in hate crimes aimed at inflicting vio- lence on gays and lesbians and labeling of gay civil rights as special rights to undermine advances, or indirectly as in avoidance of taxation benefits afforded to married heterosexual couples through illegalization of gay marriages (Pierce, 2001). Most researchers and authors in queer theory believe the gay civil rights movement began in 1969 with the Stonewall riots (Wetzel, 2001; Morrow, 2001; Poindexter, 1997; Weiss & Schiller, 1988). In his book Stonewall, Martin Duberman reveals that on the morning of June 28, 1969, at a little after 1 a.m., the police arrived to carry out a routine raid on the bar. The crowd fought back and the five days of rioting that fol- lowed forever changed the face of lesbian and gay life (Duberman, 1993). This event was perhaps most significant to gay and lesbian cul- ture because it was the first time gays and lesbians rose up against police oppression and became actively resistant to institutionalized antigay vi- olence (Morrow, 2001). Stonewall was a defining moment in gay and lesbian history that marked a significant change in the way homosexu- als defined themselves. A sense of empowerment was born in the resis- tance that took place that morning. Before this historic event, gays and lesbians felt a sense of isolation. 28 JOURNAL OF HEALTH & SOCIAL POLICY Accurate information about this population was not available. Research on sexual orientation and the psychological health of lesbians and gays was in its infancy and opportunities for social supports and social inter- action among homosexuals were limited (Morrow, 2001, p. 153). Pervasive and commonplace in American culture, the exact etiologic source for discrimination against gays and lesbians is multifaceted (Herek, 2002). Research has shown a strong correlation between Chris- tianity, male gender, belief in the “free choice” model of homosexuality (the thinking that gays and lesbians choose their sexual orientation) and other variables that create a hostile environment. In addition, other fac- tors contribute to a discriminatory climate including a lack of associa- tion with gays, accurate information about gays and lesbians, lower educational levels and high regard for traditional family ideologies and structures with homo-negative attitudes and discriminatory practices (Crawford, McLeod, Zamboni, & Jordan 2000; Swigonski, 2001; Lim, 2002; Rivers, 2002). In summary, Crawford et al. (2000) stated: In general, individuals who are most likely to hold negative atti- tudes toward gays and lesbians and gay and lesbian parenting are theistic, highly traditional men who believe homosexuality is a life-style choice, who know few if any gay or lesbian people per- sonally, and who are surrounded by other people who share their views of homosexuality. (Crawford, McLeod, Zamboni, & Jordan 2000, pp. 394-401) While some segments of American society hold personal prejudices against gays and lesbians, it is essential to examine how these preju- dices correlate to discriminatory practices within state and federal judi- ciary systems and public policy drafting. Private consensual sexual acts between members of the same sex have been criminalized in some states through sodomy statutes; and the criminalization of these prac- tices has had a negative impact on gay parenting issues in the nation’s court system (Patterson & Redding, 1996). Discrimination is also evident in the regulations of some states in re- lation to adoption. For example, adoption of children by either single gay and lesbian individuals or gay and lesbian couples is illegal in the state of Florida. In contrast, there are no limitations to adoptions by het- erosexual individuals or couples who qualify. Ironically, professionals within the welfare system are not without discriminatory bias. Studies have shown the presence of discriminatory practices and beliefs by so- cial workers and child welfare specialists working in states where adop- Blackwell, Ricks, and Dziegielewski 29 tion by gays and lesbians is not illegal (Crawford et al., 1999; Ryan, 2000). While there has been evidence of direct discrimination in the child welfare system and adoption services, there has also been empiri- cally supported evidence of discrimination and inequalities in state and federal laws that relate to custody and parental rights (Cullum, 1993). In a legal context, the term “family” carries an ambiguous and ill-termed definition that has resulted in laws and regulations that fail to acknowl- edge gay parents. This has resulted in unfair and unequal treatment of homosexuals who attempt adoption, in comparison with heterosexuals. Irwin (2002) has also found evidence in his research that harassment and homophobic treatment of gays and lesbians working in education are widespread. In a research study comprised of 900 gay men, lesbians and transgender individuals working as teachers and educators, 59 per- cent of participants reported “the existence of discrimination in both current and previous workplaces” (Irwin, 2002, p. 69). Perhaps some of the etiology for hatred and homophobia towards gays is rooted in psychological science itself. Freud’s psychoanalytic theory, which dominated psychological literature well into the 1960s, claimed that homosexuals were in arrested development, representing a fixation in the Oedipal stage of psychosexual development. This led to the widely viewed belief that homosexuality was pathological and was the result of dysfunctional parent-child relationships (Morrow, 2001): Based on this social construction of homosexuality as abnormal, many lesbians and gays living in the first half of the twentieth cen- tury dared not disclose their sexual orientation for fear of being in- stitutionalized as mentally ill. (Morrow, 2001, p. 154) Historically, homosexuals have been the targets of unjust discriminatory practices that singled them out in a uniquely predatory fashion. In New York City in 1953 the House Un-American Activities Committee, in conjunction with McCarthy, targeted lesbians and gays labeling them as threats to the stability of the country (Morrow, 2001). In his book, The Gay Metropolis, Kaiser states that the Un-American Activities Com- mittee was involved in the deformation of homosexuals circulating ru- mors about congressional investigators threatening to “. . . blackmail American homosexuals if they refused to discuss their previous ties to the communist party” (Kaiser, 1997, p. 72). After World War II, the U.S. military began discharging gays and lesbians and prevented them from serving. “Lesbians and gays termi- nated from military service were given undesirable discharges which 30 JOURNAL OF HEALTH & SOCIAL POLICY precluded their receiving future military benefits and marred their repu- tations, damaging their ability to obtain civilian employment.” In addi- tion, “mandatory lectures on the pathology of homosexuality were instituted for new military troops” (Morrow, 2001, p. 156). In 1941 the Army and the Selective Service both included “homosexual proclivi- ties” in their lists of disqualifying deviations. The War Department, in conjunction with the psychiatric community, defined homosexuality as a mental illness. Homosexuals were described as individuals who were comprised of three personality disorders: psychopaths and sexual per- verts, paranoid personalities suffering from homosexual panic, and schizoid personalities (Kaiser, 1997, p. 29). While these practices are pre-Stonewall, some of them are still preva- lent today. Although altered through the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell, Don’t Pursue” policy of the U.S. military, the 1994 National Defense Authori- zation Act, homosexuals still cannot openly serve in the Air Force, Army, Marine Corps, Navy, or Coast Guard (Belkin, 2003). Their lives are in jeopardy as is seen in the death of Barry Winchell, a man killed by a fellow solder while serving in the Army. In 1999, the 21-year-old Pri- vate First Class was beaten to death while sleeping in his barracks. A member of his unit who perceived him as being homosexual assaulted and killed him. A similar incident had occurred in Japan in 1992. A sail- or airman beat a gay Seaman, Allan Schindler, to death after he came out to his commanding officer (Service Members Legal Defense Net- work, 2002). Some gay rights organizations and those advocating for the repeal of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell, Don’t Pursue” claim that if these soldiers had been able to openly discuss concerns related to harassment based on sexual orientation, their murders might have been prevented (SMLDN, 2002). Spiritual violence (the validation of hatred and discriminatory prac- tice against homosexuals because of religious-associated immorality) is also a prevalent issue in America today (Swigonski, 2001). As Swigon- ski asserts: Hebrew and Christian scriptures have been used to characterize GLBT (gay, lesbian, bisexual and transgender) persons as moral transgressors, as individuals who stand outside the cloak of protec- tion of human rights, and to justify or rationalize hate crimes again- st them. (2001, p. 34) Regardless of religious influences, historical psychological contribu- tions, or other factors that contributed to the oppression of homosexu- Blackwell, Ricks, and Dziegielewski 31 als, the existence of discrimination alone should be enough to warrant concern by all Americans who believe in the foundation of the princi- ples of freedom, justice and equality. On the contrary, discrimination is alive, well and still prevalent against minorities in America today. The challenge is for all Americans to renounce the oppression of any minor- ity and promote fairness and egalitarianism. Of great influence to this ideology is the work of ethicist John Rawls. Rawls wrote of a “veil of ig- norance” under the “original position,” in which social status and label- ing were removed as an individual imagined himself or herself without socially prescribed adjectives and without a predestined social class and position. Rawls believed that if this were the primary ideal then people would want all rights and liberties to be afforded equally since he or she would not know their eventual status in society. Consequently, those who found themselves to be members of oppressed groups would have the same social rights provided to those who were not oppressed (Miller, 1999). If his work has validity in the ethics of social justice principles, it is essential that we examine it in relation to the gay civil rights move- ment. In addition, it would be detrimental to ignore his work as it relates to the rights, freedoms and liberties of all individuals, not just to the rights of gays and lesbians. The work of John Rawls is not the only so- cial justice theoretical framework that can be utilized when examining the implications of social justice theory and the principles within the scope of gay and lesbian discrimination. Many principles of Martha Nussbaum’s theories of social justice can also be applied to gay and les- bian rights, especially within the context of the social justice principles of equality and fairness. EQUALITY AND FAIRNESS IN A SOCIAL JUSTICE FRAMEWORK Many authors and researchers have correlated Rawls’ theories of so- cial justice and distributive justice theory to the gay civil rights move- ment (Schauer, Sinnott & Armstrong, 2003). Perhaps Rawls’ most important contribution to the field of social justice theory is his text A Theory of Justice (1971). In this publication, Rawls gives what he be- lieves are the foundational characteristics of the social justice principles of fairness and equality. While Rawls never gives a formal definition of the two terms, he does accentuate the societal implications of justice and fairness and also discusses the obligation of society to ensure that everyone employs both of these principles (Rawls, 1971). Rawls also 32 JOURNAL OF HEALTH & SOCIAL POLICY mentions governmental responsibility, referred to as institutions of prac- tices, in ensuring the meeting of these social justice principles: “It is im- portant to note, however, that the principles of fairness has two parts, the first which states the institutions of practices in question must be just, the second which characterizes the requisite voluntary acts” (Rawls, 1971, p. 112). It is perhaps the first part, the need for just institutions of practices, to which discrimination against gays in American society stands in opposition. For example, many gays believe that government is not just and thus, extrapolating into Rawls’ requirements for fairness, is not fair. Specifically, gay rights advocates have proposed the addition of laws that protect homosexuals against violent crimes by allowing the federal government to intervene in cases where the local authority is un- able or unwilling (EF, 2002). Some states will not pass such legislation because of the opposition of some conservative policymakers. Lawmakers in the state of Florida have not passed the Local Law Enforcement Enhancement Act (also known as the Florida Hate Crimes Prevention Act), which “would en- able federal authorities to act in cases of violent crimes either where lo- cal authorities lack sufficient resources, or where they fail to act” (EF, 2002). Like Rawls, others researching the effects of public policy on ho- mosexuals also believe in a governmental duty to meet such fairness re- sponsibilities. Janice Wood Wetzel (2001) examined human rights in relation to both international and national policy and mentions this gov- ernmental requirement: The human rights system is built upon the premise that governments are obligated to create the conditions under which human rights laws can be fulfilled, thus providing each individual with freedom from human rights violations either by the government itself or by others. (Wetzel, 2001, p. 15) Echoing these sentiments is Amnesty International, an organization concerned with fairness and equality on a global level. In 1997, Amnesty International’s United Kingdom Chapter questioned the rationale of why gays and lesbians were not afforded fair protection in both national and international law, “Why is it that general human rights protections so often fail to shield gay men and lesbians from serious abuses” (Am- nesty International–United Kingdom, 1997, p. 9). Arguably, some might consider the failure to meet the safety and protection needs of gays and lesbians by the national government of the United States to be contra- Blackwell, Ricks, and Dziegielewski 33 dictory to Rawls’ definition of fairness, as the institutions of practice fails to be just. One more aspect of Rawls’ theory of social justice is pertinent: the principle of equality. Like fairness, equality is poorly defined in refer- ence to how it relates to the gay civil rights movement. Many describe the impact and meaning of equality differently, making it difficult to de- fine equality in generalized terms. Rawls’ A Theory of Justice defines equality as “the features of human beings in virtue of which they are to be treated in accordance with the principles of justice” (Rawls, 1971, p. 504). While some discussion of governmental failure to protect gays and lesbians from harm is in contrast to Rawls’ theory as it relates to fair- ness, equality principles and definitional differences between Rawls’ theory and current American societal practices are also evident. Rawls explains three application-principle levels of equality. The levels are from most basic to complex, with the third level considering the role of morality (Rawls, 1971). Rawls doesn’t identify moral individuals as those who commit right and wrong, but rather those who have the po- tential to develop a “moral personality”–those individuals who deserve the “equality of justice” (Rawls, 1971, p. 506). Rawls clearly states “there is no race or recognized group of human beings that lacks this attribute” (Rawls, 1971, p. 6). He later continues that “It is sometimes thought that basic right and liberties should vary with capacity, but justice as fairness denies this provided the minimum for moral personality is satisfied, a person is owed all the guarantees of justice” (Rawls, 1971, p. 507). Thus when applying Rawls’ theory to practice, the assumption is made that regard- less of whether gays and lesbians are identified with a group that lacks the attributes required to develop a moral personality they are still enti- tled to the guarantees of justice, the equality rights afforded to hetero- sexuals and heterosexual couples. Currently in American society, inequalities between gays and non- gays prevail and discrimination against gays and lesbians is a common occurrence (Morrow, 2001; Irwin, 2002; Conley, Devine, Rabow, & Evett, 2002). Rights that are given to heterosexuals and heterosexual couples, including the institution of marriage which is the formal recog- nition of the unification of a couple by state and federal registry and law, taxation compensation based on marriage, the ability to identify sexual orientation while serving in the U.S. Armed Forces, adoption privileges and the extension of health and life insurance benefits to same-sex part- 34 JOURNAL OF HEALTH & SOCIAL POLICY ners in both federal and nonfederal employment positions, are some ar- eas where equality for homosexuals simply doesn’t exist (EF, 2002). Governmental officials vary greatly on many of these equality issues. In a publication released in 2002 by Equality Florida, a nonprofit orga- nization that lobbies for equal treatment of lesbians and gays in the state of Florida, it was affirmed that 12 out of 38 candidates running for pub- lic office, including the incumbent Florida Gov. Jeb Bush, opposed one or more gay rights initiatives the organization lobbies for. Twelve of the 38 candidates supported one or more of the initiatives, with some over- lap in both supportive and nonsupportive issues within each candidate’s supportive profile (EF, 2002). Gov. Jeb Bush has openly vocal- ized op- position to many gay rights in Florida (EF, 2002). Responding to ques- tioning about the provision of same-sex partner benefits for state employees, Bush stated, “The state should not be in the business of ac- tively sanctioning this particular lifestyle” (EF, 2002, p. 2); and when commenting on the issue of lifting Florida’s ban on gay adoptions, he replied, “Gay adoption . . . I would consider on the Richter scale of po- litical importance, I’d put that down below 100. That’d be my position” (EF, 2002, p. 2). Statements such as these and the opposition to afford- ing equality to lesbians and gays appears to dramatically conflict with many theories of social justice and the concept of human rights (Nuss- baum, 2000; National Center for Human Rights Education, 2003). Like Rawls, Martha Nussbaum has also developed a theory of social justice and human rights. Nussbaum’s theory, while certainly feminist in foun- dation, addresses the rights of gays, lesbians and bisexuals. In her work, Nussbaum proposes six rights that should be afforded to lesbians and gays: • The right to military service. • The right to be protected against violence. • The right to have consensual adult sexual relations without crimi- nal penalty. • The right to marriage and/or the legal and social benefits of mar- riage. • The right to retain custody of children and/or to adopt. • The right to be free from discrimination in housing, employment, and education, with an exception for religious organizations only. Nussbaum was widely influenced by the work of Rawls and credits him for much of her work (Garrett, 2002). While an entire overview of her theory is beyond the scope of this exposition, it is salient to examine her theory of human rights especially in terms of equality and fairness. Blackwell, Ricks, and Dziegielewski 35 Like many feminist theorists, Nussbaum affirms a liberal view that is compatible with the feminist affirmation of the value of women as per- sons: At the heart of this tradition [of liberal political thought] is a two- fold intuition about human beings: namely, that all, just by being human, are of equal dignity and worth, no matter where they are situated in society, and that the primary source of this worth is a power of moral choice within them, a power that consists in the ability to plan a life in accordance with one’s own evaluation of ends. (Nussbaum, 1999, p. 57) In her theory, Nussbaum discusses equality: “the moral equality of persons gives them a fair claim to certain types of treatment at the hands of society and politics. This treatment must do two things: respect and promote the liberty of choice, and respect and promote the equal worth of persons as choosers” (Nussbaum, 1999, p. 57). At the core of Nuss- baum’s theory on human rights is what she terms the basic capabilities, which are based on Amartya Sen’s substantial freedoms. These are ba- sic human rights that Nussbaum believes everyone is entitled: 1. Life: being able to live to the end of a human life of normal len- gth. 2. Bodily health and integrity. 3. Bodily integrity: being able to move freely from place to place; being able to be secure against violent assault, including sexual assault. 4. Senses, imagination, thought: being able to use the senses; being able to imagine, to think and to reason; being able to use one’s mind in ways protected by guarantees of freedom of expression with respect to both political and artistic speech and freedom of religious exercise; being able to have pleasurable experiences and to avoid non-beneficial pain. 5. Emotions: being able to have attachments to things and persons outside ourselves; being able to love those who love and care for us; not having one’s emotional development blighted by fear or anxiety. 6. Practical reason: being able to form a conception of the good and to engage in critical reflection about the planning of one’s own life. 7. Affiliation: being able to live for and in relation to others, to rec- ognize and show concern for other human beings, to engage in 36 JOURNAL OF HEALTH & SOCIAL POLICY various forms of social interaction; being able to imagine an- other’s situation and to have compassion for that situation; hav- ing the capability for both justice and friendship; being able to be treated as a dignified being whose worth is equal to that of oth- ers. 8. Other species: being able to live with concern for and in relation to animals, plants and the world of nature. 9. Play: being able to laugh, plays, and enjoy recreational activities. 10. Control over one’s environment: (A) Political: being able to participate effectively in political choices that govern one’s life; having the rights of political participation, free speech and freedom of association . . . (B) Material: being able to hold property (both land and mov able goods); having the right to seek employment on an equal basis with others (Garrett, 2002). By encompassing the rights of gays and lesbians into this theory of human rights, Nussbaum created an argument in support of homosexu- als in relation to many of the major civil liberties, rights, and equalities gays and lesbian strive to achieve. Her basic capabilities provide a foun- dation for consideration of the characteristics basic human rights should afford to all individuals, not just gays and lesbians. While works like those produced by Rawls and Nussbaum provide a theoretical basis for the rights of gays and lesbians, the topics examined in these works have shown multiple areas of American society where gays and lesbians face discrimination and inequality. IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE POLICY DEVELOPMENT AND REVERSAL Civil Unions and Homosexual Marriage Currently in the United States, marriages between a man and another man or a woman and another woman are not legally recognized. Fur- thermore, only the states of Vermont and California have enacted legis- lation that gives some of the rights of marriage to gays and lesbians through “civil unions,” though many of the taxation benefits and other incentives enjoyed by heterosexual married couples are not provided in these states’ civil union statutes (Vermonters for Civil Unions, 2001). In Vermont, civil unions provide the following benefits to same-sex cou- ples: Blackwell, Ricks, and Dziegielewski 37 • Automatic inheritance rights without having to get a will, and broad protections for the surviving partner under the probate laws. • The right to dispose of partner’s bodily remains upon death. • The preference for becoming partner’s guardian if partner is inca- pacitated. • The preference for making health care decisions without having to execute a Power of Attorney. • The right to visit in the hospital. • Wrongful death cause of action if partner is killed in an accident. • Loss of consortium claim if partner is injured due to another’s neg- ligence. • Exemption from Property Transfer Tax when one person puts his or her partner’s name on the deed. • The right to hold property as Tenants by the Entirety, protecting property from some creditors. • Communication privileges, so partners cannot be forced to testify against the other. • Leave from work to care for an ill partner under family medical leave laws. • Leave from work when one’s partner gives birth to or adopts a child under parental leave law rights as a stepparent for a child of the other partner. • Protection from discrimination in insurance and credit (to get, for example, joint car insurance). • Greater access to health insurance coverage to partners in a civil union. • Potential responsibility to provide support (alimony) to the other partner upon dissolution (VFCU, 2001). While implementation of Vermont law into legislation for all 50 states is not likely to occur, perhaps tailoring a civil-union statute in each state is not unreasonable. Using the Vermont civil union statute as a bench- mark, other states could ensure that the civil union law enacted in their state fairly affords rights and legal recognition to homosexual couples that have entered into a contractual commitment with each other. Many gay equality organizations throughout the United States have already drafted civil union proposals and are lobbying for consideration into legislation (EF, 2002). Hate Crimes and Anti-Gay Violence Protection Nussbaum asserts that homosexuals should be protected from vio- lence and that some states and local jurisdictions have enacted laws that include sexual orientation in strengthening the penalties for violence 38 JOURNAL OF HEALTH & SOCIAL POLICY levied towards gays and lesbians (Nussbaum, 1999). Some claim these efforts are not enough and some jurisdictions do not have hate crime laws. Organizations such as the Anti-Defamation League show strong support for hate crime legislation: All Americans have a stake in an effective response to violent big- otry. Hate crimes demand a priority response because of their spe- cial emotional and psychological impact on the victim and the victim’s community. The damage done by hate crimes cannot be measured solely in terms of physical injury or dollars and cents. Hate crimes may effectively intimidate other members of the vic- tim’s community, leaving them feeling isolated, vulnerable and unprotected by the law. By making members of minority commu- nities fearful, angry and suspicious of other groups, and of the power structure that is supposed to protect them, these incidents can damage the fabric of our society and fragment communities. (Anti-Defamation League, 2001, p. 1) One particular proposal being considered is the Local Law Enforce- ment Enhancement Act, also known as the Federal Hate Crimes Preven- tion Act. If passed and written into federal law, this legislation would increase the amount of resources available to local law enforcement agencies (EF, 2002). If a violent crime was committed and was deemed to have prejudice and discrimination as its underlying motive, local au- thorities could employ the use of federal authorities to help assist with the incident. In addition to increasing the resources of local authorities, this legislation would also allow the federal government to intervene in cases where victims of hate crimes believe local authorities were either not providing adequate resource allocation, or were not treating the crime in accordance with legislation that includes homosexuals as a protected class. Cessation of the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell, Don’t Pursue” Policy The U.S. military’s ban of allowing open homosexuals to serve in the armed forces is deep-rooted (Morrow, 2001). By the end of the 1940s, the U.S. military was discharging 1,000 gays and lesbians per year; and by the 1950s, the figure doubled to 2,000 discharges annually (D’Emil- io & Berube, 1984). With the election of President William Jefferson Clinton in 1992, a new policy was drafted. President Clinton wanted to successfully end Blackwell, Ricks, and Dziegielewski 39 the discrimination against gays who were serving in the U.S. Armed Forces and, in 1993, attempted to fulfill his campaign promise to sus- pend the ban (Clinton, 1993, p. 240). His effort was met with strong op- position from a majority of lawmakers in combination with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and prominent members of Congress like Sam Nunn that lobbied to continue the practice of asking whether or not applicants had ever practiced homosexual acts or ever would in the future; and, those who answered affirmatively were disqualified for duty (Belkin, 2003; Showtime Network, 2003). President Clinton had embraced an issue that proved to be a political firecracker. In her book Living History, Hil- lary Rodham Clinton surmised that she found the military’s treatment of homosexuals to be hypocrisy. She stated that “just three years earlier during the Gulf War, soldiers known to be homosexual . . . were sent into harm’s way because their country needed them. After the war ended, when they were no longer needed, they were discharged on the basis of their sexual orientation, that seemed indefensible to me” (Clin- ton, 2003, p. 240). The resulting compromise between the two factions was the current 1994 National Defense Authorization Act, commonly referred to as the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell, Don’t Pursue Policy” of the U.S. military. Mul- tiple studies have shown that a large number of gays and lesbians have historically served in the U.S. Army, Navy, Coast Guard, Marines and Air Force (Belkin, 2003). A large amount of data exists that refutes the current argument. Those in favor of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell, Don’t Pur- sue” cite: “The official justification for the current policy is the unit co- hesion rationale, which states that military performance would decline if known gay and lesbian soldiers were permitted to serve in uniform” (Belkin, 2003, p. 108). Those who oppose the ban have recently lauded a research study entitled “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell: Is the Gay Ban Based on Military Necessity?” This study, published in Parameters, a “highly regarded and read military journal” (Alexander, 2003), specifically ex- amined issues such as unit cohesiveness in the armed forces of Canada, who lifted it’s ban on gays in 1992 (Clinton, 2003, p. 241), Australia, Great Britain, who lifted their ban in 2000 (p. 241) and Israel, where gays are permitted to openly serve. The research conducted by the Cen- ter for Studies of Sexual Minorities in the Military (CSSM) was perhaps exhaustive: To prepare the case studies, every identifiable pro-gay and anti- gay expert on the policy change in each country was interviewed, including officers and enlisted personnel, ministry representatives, 40 JOURNAL OF HEALTH & SOCIAL POLICY academics, veterans, politicians and nongovernmental observers. During each interview, experts were asked to recommend addi- tional contacts, all of who were contacted. By the end of our re- search, 104 experts were interviewed and 622 documents and articles were examined. Although it is possible that additional data exist, CSSMM believes that the findings reflect a comprehensive appraisal of all relevant evidence. (Belkin, 2003, pp. 108-109) The major implication of this research was disproval and dissociation of support for the major fallacies (including unit cohesiveness) supporters of the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell, Don’t Pursue” claim (Alexander, 2003). “Not a single one of the 104 experts interviewed believed that the Aus- tralian, Canadian (lifted ban in 1992), Israeli, or British (lifted ban in 2000) decisions to lift their gay bans undermined military performance, readiness, or cohesion, led to increased difficulties in recruiting or re- tention, or increased the rate of HIV infection among the troops” (Bel- kin, 2003, pp. 109-110). Because of studies such as this one and the perpetuation of hate crimes and violence targeted at homosexuals (including the murders of two sol- diers discussed previously in this text), a change in military policy is perhaps an obligation of ensuring equality and fairness in America’s Armed Forces. Barry Goldwater, an icon of the American Right, sums it up with eloquent simplicity when he says, “You don’t need to be straight to fight and die for your country; you just need to shoot straight” (Clin- ton, 2003, p. 242). The ideal of social justice, of living in a society where all people are treated with equal regard and respect, and where differences are seen as benefits, not debilitations, remains only a vision for many. Homosexu- als continue to suffer the oppression of discrimination and the social justice concepts of equality and fairness remain absent from their lives. The acceptance of diversity is essential to the survival of democracy. This is not a new concept, but rather, one that has been considered for decades and is reflected in this statement made by Franklin D. Roose- velt in a letter he wrote to the NAACP in 1938, “No Democracy can long survive which does not accept as fundamental to its very existence the recognition of the rights of minorities” (Minor, 1994, p. 349). It is clear that the concept of social justice will not be realized until society can embrace the notion that different does not mean bad. “The only ide- als involved in all questions of sexual orientation are the great transcen- dent questions of justice and love . . . acceptance of the homosexual community will leave both communities free from the need to conform to narrow stereotypes . . . and free to develop all the qualities that belong to the fullness of the human personality” (McNeill, 1993, p. 149). Blackwell, Ricks, and Dziegielewski 41 REFERENCES Alexander, R. (2003, June 6). Planet out: News and politics. Retrieved June 25, 2003, from http://www.planetout.com/pno/splash.html Amnesty International. (1997). Breaking the silence: Human rights violations based on sexual orientation. London: Amnesty International–United Kingdom. Anti-Defamation League. (2001). Hate crime laws. Retrieved June 25, 03, from http://www.adl.org/99hatecrime/intro.asp Conley, C., Devine, P., Rabow, J., & Evett (2002). Gay men and lesbians’ expectations for interactions with heterosexuals. Journal of Homosexuality, 44(1), 83-109. Belkin, A. (2003). Don’t ask, don’t tell: Is the gay ban based on military necessity? Pa- rameters, 33(Summer 2003), 108-119. Clinton, Hillary Rodham. (2003). Living history: Hillary Rodham Clinton. New York: Simon & Schuster. Crawford, I., Mcleod, A., Zamboni, B., & Jordan, M. (1999). Psychologists’ attitudes toward gay and lesbian parenting. Professional Psychology: Research and Prac- tice, 30(4), 394-401. Crawford, J. (1999). Co-parent adoptions by same-sex couples: From loophole to law. Families in Society: The Journal of Contemporary Human Services, 80(3), 271- 278. Cullum, C. (1993). Co-parent adoptions: Lesbian and gay parenting. Trial, 29, 29-36. D’Emilio, J. & Berube, A. (1984). The military and lesbians during the McCarthy years. Journal of Women in Culture and Society, 9(4), 759-775. Duberman, M. (1993). Stonewall, England: Penguin Books Ltd. Ellis, S. J., Kitzinger, C., & Wilkinson, S. (2002). Attitudes towards lesbians and gay men and support for human rights among psychology students. Journal of Homo- sexuality, 44(1), 121-138. Equality Florida (EF). (2002). Equality Florida 2002 voters guide [Brochure]. Tampa, FL: Author. Garrett, J. (December 3, 2002). Martha Nussbaum on capabilities and human rights. Retrieved June 24, 2003, from http://www.wku.edu/~jan.garrett/ethics/nussbaum. htm Herek, G. (2002). Gender gaps in pubic opinion about lesbian and gay men. Public Opinion Quarterly, 66, 40-66. Irwin, J. (2002). Discrimination against gay men, lesbians, and transgender people working in education. Journal of Gay & Lesbian Social Services, 14(2), 65-77. Kaiser, C. (1998). The Gay Metropolis: The landmark history of gay life in America since World War II. San Diego: Harcourt Brace & Company. Kirsch, M. (2000). Queer theory and social change. New York, NY: Taylor & Francis Group. Lim, V. (2002). Gender differences and attitudes towards homosexuality. Journal of Homosexuality, 43(1), 85-97. McNeill J. J. (Eds.). (1993). The church and the homosexual. Boston, MA: Beacon Press. Miller, D. (Eds.). (1999). Social science and political philosophy. Principles of social justice (pp. 54-57). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 42 JOURNAL OF HEALTH & SOCIAL POLICY http://www.planetout.com/pno/splash.html http://www.adl.org/99hatecrime/intro.asp http://www.wku.edu/~jan.garrett/ethics/nussbaum Minor, M. (Eds.). (1994). The new international dictionary of quotations. New York: Signet. Morrow, D. (2001). Older gays and lesbians: Surviving a generation of hate and vio- lence. Journal of Gay & Lesbian Social Services, 13(1/2), 151-169. National Center for Human Rights Education. (2003). Linking social movements. Re- trieved June 20, 2003 from the World Wide Web: http://www.nchre.org/links/ linking_social_movements.shtml Nussbaum, M. (1999). Sex and social justice. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. Patterson, C. & Redding, R. (1996). Lesbian and gay families with children: Implica- tions for social science research for policy. Journal of Social Issues, 52(3), 29-50. Pierce, D. (2001). Language, violence, and queer people: Social and cultural change strategies. Journal of Gay & Lesbian Social Services, 13(1/2), 47-61. Poindexter, D. (1997). Sociopolitical antecedents to Stonewall: Analysis of the origins of the gay rights movement. Social Work, 42(6), 607-715. Rawls, J. (1971). A theory of justice. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. Rivers, I. (2002). Developmental issues for lesbian and gay youth. In Coyle, A. & Kitzinger, C. (Eds.), Lesbian & gay psychology: New perspectives (pp. 30-44). Maden, MA: Blackwell Publishers Ltd. Schauer, F., & Sinnott-Armstrong, W. (2003). Philosophy of law: Classic and contem- porary readings with commentary. Retrieved June 18, 2003, from the World Wide Web: http://www.oup-usa.org/toc/tc_0195155122.html Service Members Legal Defense Network. (October 4, 2002). Press room. Retrieved June 21, 2003, from http://www.sldn.org/templates/press/record.html?record=596 Showtime Network. (2003). Soldier’s secrets [Motion picture]. United States: Show- time Original Pictures. Swigonski, M. (2001). Human rights, hate crimes, and Hebrew-Christian scripture. Journal of Gay & Lesbian Social Services, 13(1/2), 33-45. Vermonters for Civil Unions. (2001). Vermonters for Civil Unions legislative defense fund. Retrieved June 24, 03, from http://www.vtmarriageaction.org/civilunionis_ 01.html Weiss, A. & Schiller, G. (1988). Before Stonewall: The making of a gay and lesbian community. Tallahassee, FL: Naiad Press. Wetzel, J. (2001). Human rights in the 20th century: Weren’t gays and lesbians human? Journal of Gay & Lesbian Social Services, 13(1/2), 15-31. Blackwell, Ricks, and Dziegielewski 43 http://www.nchre.org/links/ http://www.oup-usa.org/toc/tc_0195155122.html http://www.sldn.org/templates/press/record.html?record=596 http://www.vtmarriageaction.org/civilunionis_ 
work_2uhzrzk6vjcnrevk7jtsv2jw5y	----	Non-Binary Methodology: Book Review of Contemporary Arts as Political Practice in Singapore Non-Binary Methodology: Book Review of Contemporary Arts as Political Practice in Singapore Wong Bing Hao Southeast of Now: Directions in Contemporary and Modern Art in Asia, Volume 3, Number 1, March 2019, pp. 217-226 (Review) Published by NUS Press Pte Ltd DOI: For additional information about this article [ Access provided at 6 Apr 2021 02:18 GMT from Carnegie Mellon University ] https://doi.org/10.1353/sen.2019.0016 https://muse.jhu.edu/article/721058 https://doi.org/10.1353/sen.2019.0016 https://muse.jhu.edu/article/721058 Non-Binary Methodology: Book Review of Contemporary Arts as Political Practice in Singapore, ed. Wernmei Yong Ade and Lim Lee Ching (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016) WONG BING HAO In response to the recent global fascisms that threaten to asphyxiate socio- personal ethics, such as right-wing governments in America and Europe and the targeted brutalisation of black, brown and transgender people around the world, art has become increasingly politicised as a site of ‘resistance’ against tyrannical power. Exhibitions and research foregrounding art by or about disenfranchised communities have proliferated in the past half a decade.1 So too have discussions about the ethics of institutional representations of gender, race and indigeneity. However, I use terms like ‘political’ and ‘resistance’ cautiously, as well-intentioned or politically correct efforts by arts practitioners to galvanise art often end up being conceived in binary, myopic ways that lack tactical nuance, thus ironically perpetuating demagogical moral policing and reinforcing the same hierarchical asymmetries that they claim to dismantle. Attempts to generate categories and discourses of difference can para- doxically flatten the potentialities of their networked realities, (re)producing reductive, categorical modes of representation. For example, while exhibitions Southeast of Now Vol. 3 No. 1 (March 2019), pp. 217– 26 © Wong Bing Hao 217 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ 218 Southeast of Now: Directions in Contemporary and Modern Art in Asia dealing with ‘marginal’ identities certainly raise important questions about canonical (in)visibility and representational accountability, it could also be argued that they capitalise on the cultural currency of disenfranchisement through tokenistic inclusions, without addressing the root causes of exclusion. Furthermore, such projects risk aggrandising a particular political cause while implicitly denigrating others.2 These curatorial gestures and artistic representations fail to conceive of basic social entanglements, and blithely perpetuate binary falsehoods that fuel their theatrical performances of political correctness. In a contemporary climate in which being socially progressive is fashionable and marketable, superficial projections of liberal ‘resistance’ must be carefully interrogated. This review offers a non-binary methodology: one that acknowledges as critical tools the complicities, lived realities, imbrications and visceral desires of gendered life. A recent anthology, Contemporary Arts as Political Practice in Singapore, edited by Wernmei Yong Ade and Lim Lee Ching, wades into the contentious territory of identifying art as a tool for socio-political change. The editors’ introduction presents a series of methodological contradictions. Although they productively aim to explore a “mutually informative relationship” between art and politics in Singapore, they also pre-emptively moralise and polarise the two entities, claiming that politics often “limits the flourishing of the arts” in this context, which lacks the “democratic space” needed to nurture art.3 In other words, the editors paradoxically acknowledge the necessary confluence between art and politics, while simultaneously cleaving apart the two entities. The inconsistency of their investigative framework is reflected in the contributions, which vary in their handling of a sensitive and topical issue. Some of the contributors’ essays resort to the easy, throwaway binary of ‘right versus wrong’ approaches to political art, while others view the topic at hand holistically, addressing the nuances and complexities of lived realities that often blur such reductive bifurcations. As Jacques Rancière, a key theoretical reference for the editors, cogently writes in Hatred of Democracy, “there is only one good democracy, the one that represses the catastrophe of democratic civilization.” 4 For Rancière, “freedom also means the freedom to do wrong”; therefore, the acceptance of disorder and anarchy as potentially destructive outcomes encapsulates the true “intensity of democratic life”.5 The anthology could have benefited from a more trenchant, well-rounded inquiry by embracing a similarly nihilistic uncertainty to lacerate the tenuous, hygienic dichotomy between art and politics. Some contributions in Ade and Lim’s anthology appear to uphold this binary by associating performative radicality with a ‘political art’ practice. In curator Louis Ho’s essay on artist Loo Zihan’s practice, Ho identifies Non-Binary Methodology 219 “corporeal confessionalism” and “disclosure” as key tropes in Loo’s oeuvre, where “uncovered flesh stands in for divulged confidence”.6 For Ho, nudity — of the artist or of bodies in general — is “disruptive, deviant”, literally and metaphorically “ungovernable”.7 Writing about Loo’s Cane (2012), the artist’s re-enactment of Josef Ng’s canonical performance Brother Cane (1994), Ho recounts the opposition the artist faced from government authorities such as the Media Development Authority in the lead-up to the performance. In particular, the point of contention in Ng’s original performance was the act of snipping his pubic hair with his genitals away from public view. In response to these reservations, Loo replaced this act in his performance with an intentional and prolonged full-frontal exposure of his shaved genitals, alluding to the obscured end result of Ng’s original act. Here, the suggested radicality of Loo’s “climactic revelation” lies in its circumnavigation, “resistance” and mockery of systems of control.8 Who does Loo’s ‘resistance’ serve? What socio-political norms are he pushing back against? How and why is his exposure ‘deviant’? Ho’s essay certainly answers these questions within a delineated theoretical and political framework. All re-enactments are not, by nature, staid repetitions, but rather per- sonalised modifications of their obsolescent original. A re-enactment thereby makes a paradoxical claim to be a new original. Therefore, by being “simulta- neously representational and live”, to use Amelia Jones’ terms, re-enactments self-reflexively shore up the impossibility of presence and authenticity.9 Likewise, although Ho concentrates on the “maximum exposure” of Loo’s body, he also productively observes the “ontological ghostliness” of Ng’s original performance recording, which lives on in a “phenomenon of obscura- tion” and “occlusion”.10 Instead of attempting to recuperate the compromised visibility of the original event, Ng’s shadow y presence may reveal other intentions for the performance, reception and dissemination of the work. In this regard, cultural critic Lee Weng Choy’s comprehensive and clinical timeline of Ng’s original performance, as well as the events preceding and following it, proves incredibly insightful. In particular, Lee records that Ng’s performance focused on “the arrest of 12 men for allegedly committing homosexual solicitations and the press’ exposure of the incident”.11 In Ng’s performance, the artist’s revelation (of sexed body and creative impulse) therefore takes a backseat to collective urgencies and broader registers of perception. With these factual chronologies and theoretical trenchancies in mind, how then might an informed viewer contextualise Loo’s extended, ticketed and spotlighted exposure? It remains to be seen if the idealistic cultural transformation of wider perceptions and attitudes towards bodies of difference are best achieved through such artistic choices. 220 Southeast of Now: Directions in Contemporary and Modern Art in Asia Within the framework of Western liberal rhetorics of visibility, ‘coming out’ and its connotations of explicit disclosure are often perceived as requi- site, universal experience. However, such claims of unbridled exhibitionism do not necessarily apply in the transnational contexts of Southeast Asia, where gender and sexuality are negotiated with social realities such as familial and religious environments. Two brief excursions into the latter are in order. In delineating the subjectivity of the bakla and its alternative queer modernity in the context of the Philippines, Martin F. Manalansan describes how his interlocutors prefer to adopt implicit modes of communication, or even complete silence, between family and friends with regards to their gender or sexual identity. For them, Western norms of ‘coming out’ are “superfluous” declarations to which they do not subscribe.12 Likewise, Azza Basarudin observes how Muslim women in Malaysia often disregard the colonial baggage of the label ‘feminist’ in their attempts to “infuse Islam with lived experience[s]” of gender, family and society.13 For these women, “liberal feminist frameworks of religious agency remain limited within the binaries of modern/traditional, subordination/resistance, freedom/unfreedom”, which fail to take into account their daily negotiations of gender.14 In both Manalansan and Basarudin’s accounts, social realities — such as filial piety, societal expectations and desires for socio-economic mobility — are inextricably entrenched in their interlocutors’ unspectacular and nuanced manifestations of gender and sexuality. In the era of 1960s identity politics, weaponising visibility and accruing representation could have sufficed for an upheaval of the status quo. However, since then, the contestations of being visible have been well docu- mented, especially by dark-skinned and gender non-conforming people around the world, who are all too familiar with the unwanted surveillance and punishment their bodies are subject to just for being visible. It is no longer enough to just be “insistently visible”, because not all bodies are treated equally when exposed.15 Echoing these concerns, Jasbir Puar asks a perennially pertinent question: “Who gets to be visible?”, undercutting privi- leged, moralistic impositions of explicit sexual outness without considering other socio-cultural positionings.16 In his contribution to the anthology, theorist Jeremy Fernando similarly writes that not “everyone has the same response [or] is affected in the same way” under laws and surveillance.17 Fernando astutely alludes to the insurmountable contingencies of optics and lived experiences that cannot be counterbalanced with a singular, headstrong solution. Other contributors also deftly sidestep sensationalism in favour of more balanced commentary on the intersections between art and politics. Writing Non-Binary Methodology 221 about his experiences directing Mosaic, a trailblazing play by Geraldine Song that featured a cast actor with Down syndrome, Stephen Fernandez discusses his calculated decision to articulate the “tension between ‘seeing’ and ‘not seeing’ ” disability.18 Mosaic features two characters with Down syndrome, but only one phenotypically manifests its physical symptoms while the other passes as able-bodied. Fernandez’s essay on disability in Singaporean theatre provides a timely theoretical and topical contribution to the anthology’s discussions around politicising art and identity. Importantly, instead of hastily prescribing heightened visibility as a blanket solution to counter a lack of representation and discourse around disabled bodies, Fernandez underscores the “risk” and ethical struggle of rendering a margin- alised body visible.19 He accurately notes that “performers with disabilities are caught in a bind”, as they are “at once an invisible [and ignored] member of the public domain and a highly visible object of deviance that invites the scrutiny of able-bodied individuals”.20 By highlighting the tension between the simultaneous invisibility and hypervisibility of bodies of difference, Fernandez presents an accountable, layered treatment of disability that carefully considers its subjects’ sensitivities and social contingencies. In her essay on Eleanor Wong’s trilogy of plays, Invitation to Treat, Ade similarly articulates the dual effects of visibility, cautioning that “granting marginalised groups access to modes of representation” should be “viewed with suspicion”.21 Like Fernandez, Ade is sceptical about the efficacy of visibility as the sole method of remediation. In other words, simply granting exposure to or including marginalised groups is insufficient. These short- sighted countermeasures neither rectify exclusionary systems nor address the lived realities of the demographics in question. A selection of critical case studies on women’s art exhibitions in Asia are useful in articulating the limitations of a statistical approach to remunerating representation. Jeannine Tang flags up “the problem of measuring equality [and] the rhetorical equation of numerical representation with equality” in all-women exhibitions, arguing instead that “the leap from a politics of equality to a transformative feminist politics constitute contradictions and/or gaps that remain unbridged”.22 In essence, Tang interrogates the remunerative efficacy of the empirical method in women’s art exhibitions. Her anti-assimilationist critique acutely questions if the superficial inclusion of women in exhibitions actually serves to correct structural misogyny. Furthermore, a positivist approach risks exacerbating already narrow and deterministic categories of gender. In the context of Hong Kong art history, Christina Yuen Zi Chung observes that women’s art exhibitions, although potentially or symbolically able to recoup a certain lack in patriarchal art 222 Southeast of Now: Directions in Contemporary and Modern Art in Asia historical canons, can also be “doubly marginalising — as the categories ‘woman artist’ or ‘women art’ produce stereotypical confines that stifle recognition of individuality and innovation beyond established gender norms.” 23 Ruminating on the category of women artists in Singapore, Adele Tan underscores this observation, noting that it is a “fraught” and tricky task to exhibit under the label of ‘woman artist’ as it can potentially be both a politicised and burdensome term.24 Viewing its inherent ambivalence productively, she argues instead for the productive “capaciousness” of the term, stressing its mercurial “stages of becoming and un-becoming”.25 These disparate critiques, compiled from a variety of sources including exhibition catalogues and art historical journals, offer a brief foray into the richness of a transformative, rather than a positivist approach to representing marginalised groups in art, one that demands a revision of the very hierarchies and canons of power. Instead of resorting to superficial strategies of inclusion, Ade highlights how the characters in Wong’s plays adroitly appropriate and subvert the stultifying structures of legality to their benefit. Cases in point: in the pursuit of her “strategic goals”, protagonist Ellen Toh enters into a marriage of convenience with a man so she can “have it all”: sexual gratification with other women, a child of her own, a burgeoning career, and a performance of heteronormativity that appeases society and family.26 Later, separated from her husband, Ellen’s new lesbian partner Lesley writes her into her will before she passes on, granting her jurisprudence over her funereal proceedings.27 Through these examples and her titular puns on legality, Wong demonstrates how the women in her plays strategically manoeuvre within systems of control that diminish their socio-political claims in order to pragmatically attain life benefits. Therefore, by taking back hostile territory that was never made for them, these women do not simply identify as queer, but also actively do queerness.28 Legal scholar Dean Spade articulates a similar stratagem in his formula- tion of “critical trans politics”, which “demands more than legal recognition and inclusion” but rather seeks to totally “transform current logics of state […] and social equality”.29 Spade, like Fernandez and Ade, does not believe that recognition is enough to change and uproot the status quo. In fact, inclusion, visibility and representation often achieve the exact opposite effect. Decrying the criminal justice system, Spade exposes how hate crime laws actually “target the very people” [they are] supposedly passed to protect.30 In contrast, by working within the constraints of existing laws, Ellen Toh and her partners do not desire skin-deep or symbolic acknowledgement, but rather pragmatic and transformative outcomes. Their actions echo Rancière’s Non-Binary Methodology 223 claim that in a “ ‘real’ democracy […] liberty and equality would no longer be represented in the institutions of law and State but embodied in the very forms of concrete life and sensible experience” (emphasis my own).31 For, as Ade succinctly concludes, Wong conveys not an appearance of queer love, but rather its “practicalities”, which encompass the veritable complexities and incongruences of lived experiences.32 Ade and Lim’s anthology features some essays that productively inter- polate the subject of art and democratic space. For more insightful future forays into the issue at hand, it might be useful to jettison the idea that a ‘political art’ can only exist in tandem with idealised or universal notions of freedom and democracy. This brand of unbridled liberalism is often a luxury, especially for the people and communities featured in the anthology. Instead, certain contributions could have benefited from a non-binary method’s critical understanding that the boundaries between resistance and capitulation, and martyrdom and helplessness are often nebulous. As artist-researcher Debbie Ding insightfully points out in her concluding essay on The Substation, Singapore’s pioneering independent art space, “what is considered within institutional space and what is outside [are increasingly] difficult to define.” 33 It should become apparent by now that performative politicisation is not necessarily an effective or productive method of navigating within the structures of an art ecology. More importantly, it is illuminating to note who can afford to subscribe to these elevated registers of recognition, and who choose (or are forced to choose) more subtle, under- estimated strategies of rebuttal. BIOGRAPHY Wong Bing Hao is a writer and curator based in Singapore. Their research looks at gender and sexuality in theory, art and everyday realities. Recent projects include Indifferent Idols, the first in a new series of online research publications. They write for Frieze and Leap, among others, and received a BA in Art History from University College London, where they wrote a dissertation on transgender in contemporary art. Currently, they are Research Assistant at the National Gallery Singapore, and an MA candidate in Southeast Asian Studies at the National University of Singapore, where they research contemporary art of queer diasporas. 224 Southeast of Now: Directions in Contemporary and Modern Art in Asia NOTES 1 Recent examples include Trigger: Gender as a Tool and a Weapon (2017–18) at the New Museum, New York; Queer British Art 1861–1967 (2017) at Tate Britain, London, Spectrosynthesis — Asian LGBTQ Issues and Art Now (2017) at the Museum of Contemporary Art, Taipei; Soul of a Nation: Art in the Age of Black Power (2017), at the Tate Modern, London; and We Wanted a Revolution: Black Radical Women, 1965–85 (2017) at the Brooklyn Museum, New York. 2 For instance, reviews of the Queer British Art exhibition have noted its narrow and neutered portrayal of ‘LGBTQ’ issues through its focus on cisgender gay men and the overall absence of women and transgender people. Equally, Western-centric projects delineating ‘queer’ and ‘feminist’ art practices risk demonising ethnic, gendered and religious ways of life in transnational geopolitical contexts that do not subscribe to globalised lexica and activist mechanisms. 3 Wernmei Yong Ade and Lim Lee Ching, “Introduction”, in Contemporary Arts as Political Practice in Singapore (New York: Palgrave, 2016), p. 2. 4 Jacques Rancière, Hatred of Democracy, trans. Steve Corcoran (London: Verso, 2006), p. 4. 5 Rancière, Democracy, pp. 6–7. 6 Louis Ho, “Loo Zihan and the Body Confessional”, in Contemporary Arts as Political Practice in Singapore, p. 30. 7 Ho, “Confessional”, pp. 36–8. 8 Ibid., p. 39. 9 Amelia Jones, “ ‘The Artist is Present’: Artistic Re-enactments and the Impossibility of Presence”, The Drama Review 55, 1 (Spring 2011): 16–45. 10 Ho, “Confessional”, pp. 34–5. 11 Lee Weng Choy, “Chronology of a Controversy”, in Looking at Culture, ed. Sanjay Krishnan et al. (Singapore: Artres Design and Communications, 1996), pp. 63–72. 12 Martin F. Manalansan, Global Divas: Filipino Gay Men in the Diaspora (North Carolina: Duke University Press, 2003), p. 43. 13 Azza Basarudin, “Negotiating Lives, Crafting Selves. Narratives of Belonging”, in Humanizing the Sacred: Sisters in Islam and the Struggle for Gender Justice in Malaysia (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2016), p. 182. 14 Basarudin, “Negotiating Lives”, pp. 187–8. 15 Ho, “Confessional”, p. 42. 16 Jasbir Puar, “Transnational Sexualities: South Asian (Trans)nation(alism)s and Queer Diasporas”, in Q&A: Queer in Asian America, ed. David L. Eng and Alice Y. Hom (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1998), pp. 414–5. 17 Jeremy Fernando, “Waxing on Wagers”, in Contemporary Arts as Political Practice in Singapore, p. 21. 18 Stephen Fernandez, “The Mosaic Body: Interpreting Disability in Performance”, in Contemporary Arts as Political Practice in Singapore, p. 64. Non-Binary Methodology 225 19 Fernandez, “Mosaic”, p. 80. 20 Ibid., pp. 79–80. 21 Wernmei Yong Ade, “Becoming Ellen Toh: The Politics of Visibility in Invitation to Treat: The Eleanor Wong Trilogy ”, in Contemporary Arts as Political Practice in Singapore, p. 107. 22 Jeannine Tang, “The Problem of Equality, or Translating ‘Woman’ in the Age of Global Exhibitions”, in Politics in a Glass Case: Feminism, Exhibition Cultures and Curatorial Transgressions (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2013), p. 248. 23 Christina Yuen Zi Chung, “Gendering Her Art: The Category of “Woman” in the Art History of Hong Kong”, Asia Art Archive (May 2018), https://aaa.org.hk/en/ideas/ ideas/gendering-her-art-the-category-of-woman-in-the-art-history-of-hong-kong [accessed Jan. 2019]. 24 Adele Tan, “Shades of Becoming: Seeing “Women Artists” in Singapore,” in exh. cat. Women In-Between: Asian Women Artists 1984–2012 (Japan: Fukuoka Asian Art Museum, 2012), p. 173. 25 Ibid., p. 174. 26 Ade, “Ellen Toh”, pp. 112, 114. 27 Ibid., p. 118. 28 Ibid., pp. 109–10. 29 Dean Spade, Normal Life: Administrative Violence, Critical Trans Politics, and the Limits of Law (New York: South End Press, 2011), p. 19. 30 Spade, Normal Life, pp. 87–8. For example, Spade notes how “criminal punishment cannot be the method we use to stop transphobia when the criminal punishment system is the most significant perpetrator of violence against trans people”. 31 Rancière, Democracy, p. 3. 32 Ade, “Ellen Toh”, p. 116. 33 Debbie Ding, “The Substation at 25: On Institutional Memory and Forgetting”, in Contemporary Arts as Political Practice in Singapore, p. 147. REFERENCES Ade, Wernmei Yong and Lim Lee Ching. Contemporary Arts as Political Practice in Singapore. New York: Palgrave, 2016. Basarudin, Azza. Humanizing the Sacred: Sisters in Islam and the Struggle for Gender Justice in Malaysia. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2016. Chung, Christina Yuen Zi. “Gendering Her Art: The Category of “Woman” in the Art History of Hong Kong.” Asia Art Archive (May 2018), https://aaa.org.hk/en/ideas/ ideas/gendering-her-art-the-category-of-woman-in-the-art-history-of-hong-kong [accessed Jan. 2019]. Jones, Amelia. “ ‘The Artist is Present’: Artistic Re-enactments and the Impossibility of Presence”. The Drama Review 55, 1 (Spring 2011): 16–45. 226 Southeast of Now: Directions in Contemporary and Modern Art in Asia Lee Weng Choy. “Chronology of a Controversy”. In Looking at Culture, ed. Sanjay Krishnan et al., pp. 63–72. Singapore: Artres Design and Communications, 1996. Manalansan, Martin F. Global Divas: Filipino Gay Men in the Diaspora. North Carolina: Duke University Press, 2003. Puar, Jasbir. “Transnational Sexualities: South Asian (Trans)nation(alism)s and Queer Diasporas”. In Q&A: Queer in Asian America, ed. David L. Eng and Alice Y. Hom, pp. 405–24. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1998. Rancière, Jacques. Hatred of Democracy. London: Verso, 2006. Spade, Dean. Normal Life: Administrative Violence, Critical Trans Politics, and the Limits of Law. New York: South End Press, 2011. Tan, Adele. “Shades of Becoming: Seeing ‘Women Artists’ in Singapore”. In exh. cat. Women In-Between: Asian Women Artists 1984–2012, pp. 172–4. Japan: Fukuoka Asian Art Museum, 2012. Tang, Jeannine. “The Problem of Equality, or Translating ‘Woman’ in the Age of Global Exhibitions”. In Politics in a Glass Case: Feminism, Exhibition Cultures and Curatorial Transgressions, pp. 244–59. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2013. Southeast of Now Vol. 3 No. 1 (March 2019), pp. 217–26 
work_34de3c53rvctjj2h6volk73k5q	----	1 Title: Talking about Learning Disability: Promoting positive perceptions of people with intellectual disabilities in Scottish schools Title: Talking about Learning Disability: Promoting positive perceptions of people with intellectual disabilities in Scottish schools Authors: Roseann Maguire, School of Education, University of Strathclyde; +44 (0)141 444 8108; roseann.maguire@strath.ac.uk Alastair Wilson, School of Education, University of Strathclyde; +44 (0)141 444 8108; al.wilson@strath.ac.uk Andrew Jahoda*, Institute of Health and Wellbeing, University of Glasgow; +44 (0)141 211 0282; Andrew.Jahoda@glasgow.ac.uk *Corresponding author: The Academic Centre, Gartnavel Royal Hospital, 1055 Great Western Road, Glasgow G12 OXH. E-Mail: Andrew.Jahoda@glasgow.ac.uk Key words: Stigma; Intellectual Disabilities; School pupils; Understanding; Bullying; Empathy; Attitudes mailto:al.wilson@strath.ac.uk 2 Abstract Pupils with intellectual disabilities are one of the most bullied groups in the school system and in local communities. Moreover, young people also play a significant role in hate crimes against people with intellectual disabilities of all ages beyond the school gates. This paper describes the development of a research informed programme of lessons for children in mainstream secondary schools, aimed at counteracting bullying towards people with intellectual disabilities by promoting empathy and more positive attitudes towards them. A literature review, a review of current practice and the experiences and views of young people with intellectual disabilities and their families all contributed to the development of the programme. Data from subsequent piloting and feasibility work was used to finalise the programme which consists of the following five lessons concerning: i) difference and disability, ii) an understanding of intellectual disability, iii) the nature and impact of disablist bullying towards people with intellectual disabilities and iv) opportunities for inclusion. One conclusion from this work is that that there needs to be further research to explore the impact of school based interventions, promoting an understanding of people with intellectual disabilities, in the wider community. Teachers delivering the lessons may have greater influence than transitory campaigns to counteract bullying and promote positive attitudes towards people with intellectual disabilities. However, a first step is to ensure that teachers delivering the lessons have an understanding of people with intellectual disabilities. 3 Introduction There are no published evaluations of school based anti-bullying interventions concerning young people with intellectual disabilities. Despite longstanding attempts to promote the inclusion of children and young people with intellectual disabilities in mainstream school settings where they are educated alongside their peers without intellectual disabilities, they continue to be some of the most socially excluded and bullied pupils in the school system (Green, Collingwood and Ross, 2010; Naylor, Walters, Dawson, Digby and Emerson, 2012). Even attending a special school does not necessarily help pupils to escape victimisation beyond the school gates (Kelly and Norwich, 2004; Cooney, Jahoda, Gumley and Knott, 2006). Young people also play a significant role in hate crime against people with intellectual disabilities above school age living in the wider community (DRC, 2004; Gravell, 2012; Beadle-Brown et al, 2013). A barrier to tackling the bullying faced by young people with intellectual disabilities has been the reluctance to identify and or label them in schools. There has been a concern that using terms such as ‘learning disability’ or ‘intellectual disability’, is stigmatising and would set these children and young people apart from their peers as learners in the school (Norwich, 2014). For this reason, children and young people with intellectual disabilities have been labelled more broadly as having ‘additional support needs’, a term used to describe all pupils who might need extra help with learning, including those with specific learning difficulties such as dyslexia or those who might have behavioural difficulties. Although the wish to avoid formally labelling children and young people with intellectual disabilities in the school system is understandable, this does not protect them from being seen as different. Nor does it stop children and young people with intellectual disabilities from being informally labelled and bullied or socially marginalised by their peers (Cooney et al, 2006; Mencap, 2007, Stalker and Moscardini, 2013). A growing awareness of the negative impact of bullying and hate crime on the lives of people with intellectual disabilities has concentrated minds at a policy level internationally (Emerson, 2010; Scior and Werner, 2015). School-based interventions have been used to tackle stigma and discriminatory attitudes in a number of areas, including mental health, race, and attitudes towards the lesbian, gay and transgender 4 community (Mind, www.time-to-change.org.uk/get-involved/resources-youth- professionals; SeeMe, www.seemescotland.org; Show Racism the Red Card, www.srtrc.org; LGBT Scotland, www.lgbtyouth.org.uk/pro-toolkit). Adopting a school- based approach to changing young people’s attitudes to their peers with intellectual disabilities has been suggested by Scior and Werner (2015). Such interventions have the possibility of influencing the views of the wider community the schools are a part of. This paper outlines the development of a research informed school-based intervention designed to help pupils gain a greater understanding of people with intellectual disabilities. Three forms of enquiry were used to underpin the development of the lessons: i) evidence from the anti-bullying research literature, ii) review of existing best practice, through an event organised to bring together organisations in Scotland actively involved in counteracting bullying, and iii) exploring the views of people with intellectual disabilities and their families themselves, sought through a series of case studies, capturing the experience of young people with intellectual disabilities and their families. The key findings from the three strands of underpinning work are described, followed by an explanation of how this evidence helped to inform the content and delivery of a programme of lessons for young people in mainstream secondary school. The aim of the lessons is to counteract bullying towards people with intellectual disabilities by promoting empathy and more positive attitudes towards them. Results from initial pilot and feasibility work are then briefly described before a framework for the future use and evaluation of the resource is outlined. Evidence underpinning the development process The literature (how is bullying of people with intellectual disabilities currently understood) A key first question for us to consider was what a targeted intervention concerning people with intellectual disabilities might add to the generic anti-bullying work already being delivered in schools. Earlier work on bullying in schools tended to focus on the individual pathology of bullying, seeking to determine the characteristics of both the http://www.time-to-change.org.uk/get-involved/resources-youth-professionals http://www.time-to-change.org.uk/get-involved/resources-youth-professionals http://www.seemescotland.org/ http://www.srtrc.org/ http://www.lgbtyouth.org.uk/pro-toolkit 5 bully and the victim. From this perspective the bullying of children and young people with an intellectual disability tended to be linked to their vulnerability; they were viewed as having characteristics and displaying behaviours that made them more likely to be bullied (McLaughlin, Byers and Peppin-Vaughn, 2010). The key vulnerability factors identified were communication difficulties and a lack of social competence (Luciano and Savage, 2007; Tywman et al, 2010). However, the focus of anti-bullying work shifted away from individual pathology and took greater account of the social relational and contextual nature of bullying. In relation to people with intellectual disabilities, this meant that attention was given to the structural and social factors that lead to young people becoming socially marginalised. This included segregated schooling and segregated teaching within mainstream schools, lack of social opportunities and identity based prejudicial bullying (Stalker and Moscardini, 2013). Thus, there was a growing recognition that people with intellectual disabilities may be more vulnerable to bullying not only because of their own impairments and perceived vulnerability, but also because of social and structural factors and negative societal attitudes towards them. If young people hold negative attitudes towards their peers with intellectual disabilities then they may be less empathic and more likely to exploit their vulnerabilities. This means that while children and young people with an intellectual disability can experience the same type of bullying behaviours as non-disabled children and young people, they can also be subject to particular forms of harassment (Holzabauer, 2008). Thus, young people with intellectual disabilities may experience manipulative bullying where the perpetrator tries to get the victim to act in a certain way; conditional friendship where the victim is ‘allowed’ to be in the friendship group only on certain conditions and exploitative bullying where features of a child’s condition are used to bully them (McLaughlin, Byers and Oliver, 2012). In addition, some children and young people with intellectual disability may be unaware they are being bullied and this may also be the case with adults in the community. Despite carrying out an extensive review of the literature, we were not able to find any evaluations of school based approaches to counteracting the bullying of people with intellectual disabilities. Hence, it was decided to focus on the large literature concerning 6 generic anti-bullying approaches (Olweus 1994; Smith, Pepler and Rigby 2004; Myton, DiGuiseppi, Gough, Taylor and Logan, 2002; Farrington and Ttofi, 2009; Thompson and Smith, 2010; Barbero, Hernández, Esteban and García, 2012), and to consider whether successful elements of generic interventions adequately address the bullying of young people with intellectual disabilities. Farrington and Ttofi’s’s (2009) comprehensive review of all known evaluations of school based anti-bullying programmes included a meta-analysis of the general pattern of change. They identified twenty distinct components from the different interventions and examined their effectiveness. However, they did not consider what elements of the programmes they reviewed were most effective at addressing different types of bullying, targeted at particular groups of individuals. Some elements, such as disciplining perpetrators and having proactive strategies such as playground supervision, are likely to prove just as helpful to children and young people with intellectual disabilities as to other pupils while a number of other intervention components, may prove more problematic for pupils with intellectual disabilities. Farrington and Tofti, in common with several other meta analyses (Barbero et al, 2012; Merrell, Gueldner, Ross and Isava, 2008; Mytonn et al, 2002), highlighted the effectiveness of working with victims of bullying to improve their assertiveness skills and to deal more effectively with being bullied. However training in social skills and teaching coping strategies are less straightforward for young people with intellectual disabilities, whose cognitive impairments are likely to make it more challenging for them to learn such skills and to become more resilient. The reviewed approaches also imply that children and young people have social bonds with their peers and that part of overcoming bullying and victimisation is to build stronger and more positive peer relationships. Again, this is not necessarily straightforward for young people with intellectual disabilities, who are often socially marginalised (Fredrickson & Furnham 2004; Kuhne and Weiner, 2000; Nabuzoka and Smith, 1993), even when they do not face unpleasantness or hostility from peers (Jahoda and Pownall, 2014). This suggests that a key step is to try to close the social gap between young people with intellectual disabilities and their peers. Fredrickson (2010) argues that one way to do this is to inform children and young people about what it means to have an intellectual disability. 7 She reasons that this understanding enhances peer acceptance and can lead to respectful, helpful relationships between children and young people with intellectual disability and their peers. She posits that these relationships have the potential to develop into friendships within a context of positive opportunities for action. Whole school interventions, another effective measure (Farrington and Tofti, 2009; Mytonn et al, 2002; Smith et al, 2004) also presents a challenge. Whole school interventions imply that all children and young people share a similar position within the school community. This is not necessarily the experience of children and young people with an intellectual disability, as they may attend separate classes for particular subjects or they may be located in a separate teaching block or be educated in a separate ‘special’ school for children with additional support needs. Therefore, a starting point for a whole school intervention might be to help pupils understand who their peers with intellectual disabilities are, the lives they lead and the challenges they face both inside and outside school. The existing generic anti-bullying literature does provide important evidence about the composition and delivery of effective interventions. Farrington and Ttofi’s analysis recognised a number of key process issues including the active engagement of the children and young people through the use of ‘videos, work with peers and co-operative group work’. They also found that children over the age of 11 years benefited most from anti-bullying interventions, suggesting that this may have be due to the developmental stage of the children and their ability to grasp the concepts being used. Whether or not this was due to the particular content of the interventions or the mode of delivery, it highlighted the importance of producing materials that are engaging and appropriate for the age group of the target children. The length and intensity was also a significant factor, with longer and more intensive interventions being identified as more effective. The evidence from the literature indicates that generic interventions do not adequately address the bullying of people with intellectual disabilities. In particular, generic interventions fail to take account of negative attitudes towards people with intellectual disabilities and their wider social position, both within the school system and society. However, the literature does point to important process and delivery factors which 8 could be incorporated effectively into a targeted anti-bullying intervention Understanding existing practice Enable Scotland, a third sector organisation working on behalf of people with intellectual disabilities and their families, hosted an event to bring together practitioners working to reduce the bullying of people with intellectual disabilities. This event involved a formal meeting and workshops. The purpose of the day was twofold: firstly to share information on current initiatives and secondly to deliberate upon the content and delivery of a school-based anti-bullying intervention. A total of sixteen people attended, from 10 organisations across the state and voluntary sector. The discussion on current practice revealed that most school-based interventions tended to be reactive; these included restorative practices and programmes to promote the resilience of young people who were bullied. It was attended by a researcher who observed the proceedings making field notes throughout and who also had access to the minutes of the formal meeting. Analysis of the event revealed that participants only identified two forms of activity targeted at the bullying of people with intellectual disabilities. School assemblies were used to raise awareness of prejudiced based bullying and input on disability hate crime was provided by statutory agencies such as Police Scotland or community based charities. Organisations working with people with intellectual disabilities outwith schools had also developed community based ‘keeping safe’ initiatives, including theatre workshops, to support people with intellectual disabilities to feel more confident to recognise and report hate crime. The meeting minutes reflected a strong consensus observed by the researcher about the need for curriculum-based resources taking account of the lived experience of individuals with an intellectual disability, which could be delivered nationally. Evidence from people with intellectual disabilities and their families In the second strand of this work the research team sought the views of people with intellectual disabilities and their families. Three voluntary organisations and one school for young people with intellectual disabilities were approached and a convenience sample of broad age range of participants were recruited. Twelve young people aged 9 between 14 to 20 years and six adults aged between 24 to 54 years were recruited for in depth interviewing. The inclusion criteria were that participants should have an intellectual disability, be able to give consent and had experienced bullying. In addition two focus groups (n=6, n=7) were held. Participants were young people (aged 13-17) with intellectual disabilities also recruited via voluntary organisations and school. All of the participants, and the families of five of the young people, were asked about their experiences of bullying and social exclusion and also for their views on what should be done to counteract bullying. Upon obtaining consent we filmed some of the interviews of the young people and their families as we anticipated that this content might contribute to the anti-bullying lessons themselves. Interviews were recorded and transcribed for analysis. Findings from this strand of the work revealed that participants consistently took the view that supporting children and young people to understand and value difference and disability was important. It was seen a potentially effective way to tackle and help to prevent the bullying and harassment they had experienced because of their intellectual disabilities. Their perspective was consistent with the findings from other research and consultation exercises with disabled children and young people (Anti-bullying alliance, 2010; Stalker and Moscardini, 2013; Sykes, Groom and Desai, 2011). The Equalities and Human Rights Commission (2012) has also recommended that schools contribute to preventing bullying and harassment by developing and using materials to help students understand disabled people and the social model of disability, thereby encouraging a better understanding and respect for diversity. Synthesising the evidence to develop the lessons Synthesising the evidence involved drawing from the literature review, our understanding of existing practice and views of people with intellectual disabilities and their families. Drawing from the literature it is clear that generic anti-bullying interventions fail to address the negative attitudes underlying the prejudicial bullying of people with intellectual disabilities. Furthermore they do not routinely take into account the particular individual needs and social challenges faced by individuals with intellectual disabilities. While some of the methods adopted to challenge other prejudicial attitudes can be adapted and developed to tackle the bullying of people with 10 intellectual disabilities, the particular difficulties faced by people with intellectual disabilities have to be recognised, otherwise how can prejudice be challenged and empathy promoted (Zitek and Hebl, 2007). This position was supported by our empirical work which identified that it was important that pupils be made more aware of the different lives of people with intellectual disabilities. The synthesis of this evidence led us towards developing an intervention that could focus on respecting diversity and sharing knowledge in order to break down barriers and challenge assumptions about intellectual disability. On this basis it was decided that the most effective means of delivering an intervention with this focus and composition would be a series of lessons for pupils, aged 11-13, in the first and second years (S1 and S2) of their secondary schooling. At this stage of the development we were cautious that acknowledging and identifying impairment effects would not locate people with intellectual disabilities as the source of the problems faced but rather bring to the fore the social dimension and ways to challenge this. Thus the starting point of our anti-bullying resource was a wider position of ‘talking about difference’. Whilst an anti-bullying message remains at the core of the materials our resource was also an attempt to reduce the social gap between those with and without disabilities. Developing the intervention - a series of lessons The series of lessons that were developed begin with an appreciation of difference and disability more broadly (lessons 1 & 2). This provides a context for looking at what it means to have an intellectual disability (lessons 3 & 4), before going onto look at disablist bullying and encouraging pupils to reflect on their own attitudes and behaviours (5 & 6). The lessons end by exploring potential opportunities for increased contact and activities between children and young people with and without intellectual disabilities (lesson 7). The intention is to help the pupils move from an understanding of diversity and disability to an understanding and appreciation of what it might be like to live with an intellectual disability. This background should help pupils to understand what it feels like for individuals to be bullied just because of their intellectual disability. The lessons conclude on a positive note by considering the opportunities and benefits of inclusion. 11 As the aim is to increase empathy as well as understanding, we endeavoured to create lessons that were interesting, informative and emotionally engaging. Throughout the lessons pupils are encouraged to play an active role and to generate their own ideas. Drawing upon the evidence of what works (Farrington and Tofti, 2009) we placed collaborative tasks and activities at the core of each lesson. We also use videos of young people with intellectual disabilities and family members talking about their experiences as stimulus materials. For example, an emotive film, recreating the experience of a young woman with Down’s syndrome who was victimised on a bus going home from a swimming gala, was used to prompt discussion about the impact of bullying. In line with Farrington and Tofti’s findings, the lessons were targeted at young people in their first and second year of Secondary school, aged over 11 years old. As the existing anti-bullying literature shows, the key challenge is to try to ensure that a school-based intervention will have the necessary reach and longevity to produce meaningful and lasting effects (Farrington and Ttofi, 2009). Hence, we developed a series of lessons that fitted into the Personal and Social Education (PSE) component of the Scottish Curriculum for Excellence. Unlike current interventions to address the bullying of people with intellectual disabilities our lessons were delivered by teachers. Thus the materials were produced in collaboration with teachers and teacher educators, to ensure that they were relevant and appropriate for use in a classroom setting. Embedding these lessons into the PSE curriculum had the potential to allow all young people in their first or second year of Secondary education to work with these resources. Feasibility and Acceptability of the Lessons Following development of the lessons a feasibility study was carried out to establish i) the possibility of delivering the lessons and to examine teachers’ perceptions of the ease of delivery of the lessons, ii) pupils’ understanding of the lessons and their engagement with the materials, and iii) the acceptability of the lessons to the pupils and to the teachers delivering them. Initial feasibility work began in two schools in different local authority areas, followed by further work in three schools in another local authority area. This was effectively a convenience sample, consisting of local authorities and schools who were open to participating in the feasibility work. All the schools were from 12 the Central Belt of Scotland and covered both urban and more rural areas, with young pupils from a range of socio-economic backgrounds. The feasibility work contributing to the development of the lessons consisted of semi structured individual and focus group interviews Semi-structured individual interviews with pupils: A sample of 4 to 6 pupils, were interviewed individually immediately after each of the seven lessons (total=34). . The topics covered included: i) Understanding and Engagement - whether the pupils understood what the lesson was about and whether they could recall what they did during the lesson / what they had learned, ii) possible areas of confusion / what they liked and disliked about the lesson, iii) and whether the activities evoked empathy and understanding for their peers with intellectual disabilities. Pupil focus groups: Eight pupils from three other participating schools took part in focus groups once the lessons had been completed (n=24). The pupil focus groups began by asking an open question about what participants recalled about the lessons, before discussing the activities and messages from each lesson. The group discussions were audio recorded. Two focus groups were held with teachers, four teachers from one school and two from another school. Individual feedback was obtained from a further four teachers from three other schools. The topic guide for the teachers’ focus groups and individual interviews centred on: i) teachers’ perceptions of pupil engagement with and understanding of the lessons, ii) ease of delivery of the materials, including identifying sections that worked particularly well or that proved problematic. Procedure The interviews and focus groups took place in a room that afforded privacy. Pupils’ responses on the interviews carried out after each lesson were recorded onto prepared response sheets. The focus groups and open ended interviews with teachers were audio recorded and transcribed. Ethical approval for the feasibility study was granted by the University of Glasgow, College of Medical, Veterinary and Life Sciences Ethics Panel. 13 Analysis A framework analysis was carried out on the responses from the individual pupil interviews and involved categorising the type of responses given by the pupils to the questions for each lesson. The transcripts of the data from the focus groups and teachers’ interviews were analysed using a framework approach (Richie and Lewis, 2003). Results from feasibility study Across the two stages of the piloting process the lessons were successfully delivered to 17 classes in five schools, to a total of 390 pupil. Pupil Post Lesson Interviews (i) Knowledge and Understanding: The majority of pupils’ responses indicated they had a good recall of both the content and the format of the lessons. Most pupils also demonstrated a good grasp of the individual lessons and there were no obvious sources of confusion. The pupils appeared particularly engaged with materials that called for discussion, problem solving and reflection with their peers, as shown by the following response: I liked it when we were working in groups and got to discuss how people act towards people with disabilities and the difficulties they face. (S1 Male) These discussions, initiated by the video and scenario materials, stimulated pupils’ own thinking on inclusion. If people have a disability they should be able to go to clubs and school with everyone else. ..And at work people should give people with a disability a chance to work alongside them. (S1 Male) …that they should all be able to go to the same clubs because they’re just the same as us. (S1 Female). 14 (ii) Pupils’ engagement and empathy: All of the young people who were interviewed after the lessons on bullying expressed an emotional reaction, ranging from anger to sadness (shocked, disgusted, angry, sad). Pupils’ Focus Groups In general, the findings from the pupils’ focus groups were consistent with the data obtained from the individuals interviews carried out after each lesson. Their responses also revealed that they were emotionally engaged with the materials: It (video) was about a lassie named Lucy. She won a gold medal for swimming. She takes the bus, gets on – the bullies said, ‘Hi retard, mongo’ and loads of insults. They take her flowers off her. I felt disgusted. (S1 male, Lesson 6) Teachers’ Focus Groups and individual interviews (i) A mature response: All teachers reported that their pupils had engaged well with the materials; they spoke of them ‘taking it seriously’, ‘responding to them very.. well, very sensitively’ and also of the overall impact of the lessons. As one teacher explained: In terms of the message – I think it definitely did have an impact. The children were sensitive towards the video clips. We talked about language around disability. It was good for them to hear from the families - There was a boy in my class who had a family member with Down’s syndrome and it gave him a chance to talk about it. … (ii) Delivering the lessons and talking openly: Teachers reported no difficulties with the delivery of the lessons, commenting that the PowerPoint presentations for all of the lessons were self explanatory and easy to follow. Across the schools the teachers commented that open discussion of disablist bullying was key to the success of the resources. As one teacher explained: I think talking openly about disability and disability bullying is long overdue! I like how it started by getting them to think about difference and then moving on to harder stuff. I think it did need to be done over a period of weeks to reinforce the messages – I really liked it in the entirety. 15 (iii) A positive package: While they thought that the individual lessons worked in their own right and were straightforward to deliver, they particularly liked the progressive nature of the resource and how it ended with a positive message. It was a good message to end with the way forward… more integration. (iv) Creating space in the curriculum: There were concerns that seven lessons presented a timetabling difficulty. Indeed, in the second phase of the pilot, some schools struggled to complete the lessons in a reasonable timeframe due to other demands within the PSE curriculum. Teachers also commented on how individual lessons could be changed but opinions differed as to what activities should be reduced or extended. (v) Importance for teachers: It was suggested that the resource could be used for Continuing Professional Development as many teachers have limited knowledge about intellectual disabilities and disablist bullying. Implications of the feasibility work and final adaptations to the lessons In addition to evidencing the feasibility of delivering the resource, the data helped us to identify how the resource might be improved, both in its overall shape and with respect to particular activities. Furthermore, it also highlighted the need for additional materials to support teachers to deliver the resource. As seven lessons had proved difficult for some schools to deliver in a reasonable time scale the programme was reduced to five lessons. This was achieved by refining lessons 1 and 2 into one lesson and removing lesson 5 because it contained material pupils had already covered in previous generic anti-bullying lessons. A number of other small changes were made to the exercises and materials to ensure they were engaging and relevant to the pupils and the format of the slides were also improved. In order to address some teachers’ limited knowledge about intellectual disabilities, a series of online training videos were developed for teachers. These introduce the lessons and provide guidance about their delivery. Discussion The process of developing anti-bullying lessons described in this paper has aimed to build on existing research evidence and best practice, taking account of the views of 16 people with intellectual disabilities and their families. The lessons aim to help the young people to gain an understanding of who people with intellectual disabilities are and the lives they lead, as part of a positive introduction to difference. In this context the impact of bullying and hate crime are examined, before finishing by considering how greater inclusion can be promoted. The lessons were delivered successfully in all piloted schools and the pupils had grasped the key messages. Both teachers and young people also highlighted the mode of delivery as a key ingredient of the lessons. They found the videos and the more interactive activities to be the most thought provoking aspects of the lessons. The lessons are novel because they are the first targeted anti-bullying resource concerning people with intellectual disabilities that have been developed to be delivered as part of a school curriculum. The lessons also represent a shift from commonly held views in UK schools that it is discriminatory to label pupils as having an intellectual disability. This standpoint appears to assume that the pupils and teachers fail to see or treat people with intellectual disabilities as different if they are not labelled as such. Hence, avoiding labelling people is a simple way of preventing wider societal prejudices penetrating the school system (Norwich, 2014). The lived experience of families and individuals with intellectual disabilities who contributed to the development of the lessons, in common with the research evidence, would contradict this view. Thus, the starting point for lessons is to talk positively about difference and about who people with intellectual disabilities are. While an anti-bullying message is central to the lessons, the theoretical framework draws on Frederickson’s (2010) proposition that if young people know why a peer with an intellectual disability (or any other impairment) has difficulty communicating or handling social situations, then it allows them to develop more respectful and helpful relationships. Gaining a greater understanding of peers with intellectual disabilities as persons is a way of counteracting prejudicial attitudes that young people may hold. The aim is not only to change young people’s thinking or attributions, it also to make them more empathic towards people with intellectual disabilities. Hence, in line with Fredrickson’s views, the materials and activities were designed to be emotionally engaging. The evidence would also suggest that the most effective way of overcoming 17 prejudicial attitudes is to facilitate positive contact with stigmatised individuals. Hence the lessons finish by exploring ways that pupils can bridge the social gap and spend time with and get to know their peers with an intellectual disability better (Carter, Biggs and Blustein, 2016). Whether the lessons prove successful in reducing bullying and promote more positive relationships between young people and their peers who have an intellectual disability are empirical questions. It is difficult to measure change in disablist bullying when this is not routinely recorded in schools. Moreover, charting attitude change is a complex matter, given that pupils are often very sensitive to socially desirable responses. This was apparent in another component of the pilot work we have not reported in this paper, where questionnaire based approaches were used to examine pupils’ attitudes toward people with intellectual disabilities. Thus, there is a need to develop more sensitive approaches to examining changes in attitudes towards people with an intellectual disability. This might include more creative and less opaque methods than questionnaires. Whether the materials developed for teachers and delivering the lessons in schools also helps to shift teachers’ perspectives towards those with intellectual disabilities is another question which needs to be addressed. However, it might be wrong to focus solely on individual change when examining the impact of a school based intervention of this nature. The advantage of introducing lessons as part of the school curriculum is that, over time, they could be delivered to all pupils in a school and all schools in a local area. It would also be interesting to examine if this resulted in structural or organisational changes, such as evidence of greater efforts to promote inclusion within schools or whether links had been forged between mainstream and special schools. Moreover, it would also be interesting to examine whether there were signs of community change, such as a reduction in hate crime against people with intellectual disabilities in a given area, if all schools delivered the lessons to their pupils over the course of a five or ten year period? To maintain the lessons over the longer term means keeping the materials alive and relevant. If the lessons continue to be maintained in cooperation with teachers and educationalists, this will help to ensure that they continue to fit with the evolving 18 curriculum and educational priorities. From a practical point of view, having the resources online makes this goal of sustainability more achievable. Conclusions This paper has described the process of developing an innovative set of school based lessons (www.talkingabout.org) to promote understanding of people with intellectual disabilities and reduce the bullying they face. The work moves beyond existing anti- bullying approaches to tackle the prejudicial attitudes underlying the victimisation of people with intellectual disabilities. This is essentially a preventative approach that talks openly about difference and includes reference to people with more profound and complex needs, who are often invisible to young people in mainstream education. A challenge when developing the materials has been to achieve a balance between presenting a positive view of people with intellectual disabilities whilst acknowledging some of the challenges they face in their lives. When fostering empathy and understanding the emphasis was about the acceptance of difference, overcoming prejudice and bringing young people closer to their peers with intellectual disabilities. This also provides a context for demonstrating the heightened impact of bullying on an already socially marginalised group. Of course, the question remains as to whether the lessons will prove effective but there is now evidence to suggest that we have developed a sustainable resource that can be delivered in schools over the longer-term. This represents a significant step forward from short-term campaigns and will hopefully complement existing generic anti-bullying teaching provided in schools. References Anti Bullying Alliance (2010). Responding to bullying among children and young people with SEN and/or disabilities: the views and experiences of children and young people with SEN and/or disabilities. Bullying and SEN/D Briefing Paper Jiménez Barbero, J. A., Ruiz Hernández, J. A., Llor Esteban, B., & Pérez García, M. (2012). (2012) Effectiveness of anti bullying programmes: A systematic review by evidence levels Children and Youth Services Review 34, 1646-1658 http://www.talkingabout.org/ 19 Beadle-Brown, J.,C. Guest,L. Richardson, A. Malvoic, J. Bradshaw, and J. Himmerich.2013. 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London: Sage Publications 22 See Me: End Mental Health Stigma; www.seemescotland.org Show Racism the Red Card; www.srtrc.org Scior, K. and Werner, S. (2015) Changing Attitudes to Learning Disability: A Review of the Evidence. Mencap: London Smith, P. K., Pepler., D., & Rigby, K. (Eds.) (2004). Bullying in schools: How successful can interventions be? Cambridge: Cambridge University Press Stalker, K. & Moscardini, L. (2013) A critical review and analysis of current research and policy relating to disabled children and young people in Scotland. A report to Scotland’s Commissioner for Children and Young People. Sykes, W., Groom, C., Desai P., (2011) Disability-related harassment: the role of public bodies: A qualitative research report. Equality and Human Rights Commission Research report 78 Thompson, F. & Smith P. K. (2011) The Use and Effectiveness of Anti-Bullying Strategies in Schools. DfE Research Report DFE-RR0 Twyman, K.A., Saylor, C.F., Saia, D., Macias, M.M., Taylor, L.A. and Spratt, E. (2010) Bullying and ostracism experiences in children with special health care needs, Journal of Developmental and Behavioral Pediatrics, Vol. 31, No. 1, 1-8 Werner, S.) & Scior, K. (2016) Interventions Aimed at Tackling Intellectual Disability Stigma: What Works and What Still Needs to Be Done. In K. Scior and S. Werner (Eds) Intellectual Disability and Stigma: Stepping Out from the Margins. London: Palgrave. Zitek, E.M. and Hebl, M.R, (2007) The role of social norm clarity in the influenced expression of prejudice over time, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 43 (6), 867-876 http://www.srtrc.org/ 
work_35pgx7dlznafnllgbphh7auzxi	----	The Anxiety of Being Asian American: Hate Crimes and Negative Biases During the COVID-19 Pandemic The Anxiety of Being Asian American: Hate Crimes and Negative Biases During the COVID-19 Pandemic Hannah Tessler1 & Meera Choi1 & Grace Kao1 Received: 8 May 2020 /Accepted: 3 June 2020 / Published online: 10 June 2020 # Southern Criminal Justice Association 2020 Abstract In this essay, we review how the COVID-19 (coronavirus) pandemic that began in the United States in early 2020 has elevated the risks of Asian Americans to hate crimes and Asian American businesses to vandalism. During the COVID-19 pandemic, the incidents of negative bias and microaggressions against Asian Americans have also increased. COVID- 19 is directly linked to China, not just in terms of the origins of the disease, but also in the coverage of it. Because Asian Americans have historically been viewed as perpetually foreign no matter how long they have lived in the United States, we posit that it has been relatively easy for people to treat Chinese or Asian Americans as the physical embodiment of foreignness and disease. We examine the historical antecedents that link Asian Americans to infectious diseases. Finally, we contemplate the possibility that these experiences will lead to a reinvigoration of a panethnic Asian American identity and social movement. Keywords COVID-19 . Hate crime . Asian American . Race . Ethnicity . Racial discrimination . Bias incident . Racialization Introduction COVID-19 (or the coronavirus) is a global pandemic that has affected the everyday lives of hundreds of millions of people. At the time we write this, there have been over four million cases across over 200 countries worldwide (Pettersson, Manley, & Hern, 2020). Moreover, pervasive stay-at-home orders and calls for social distancing, as well as the disruptions to American Journal of Criminal Justice (2020) 45:636–646 https://doi.org/10.1007/s12103-020-09541-5 * Hannah Tessler hannah.tessler@yale.edu Meera Choi meera.choi@yale.edu Grace Kao g.kao@yale.edu 1 Department of Sociology, Yale University, 493 College Street, New Haven, CT 06511, USA http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1007/s12103-020-09541-5&domain=pdf mailto:hannah.tessler@yale.edu every facet of our lives make it difficult to overstate the importance of COVID-19. As the beginning of the outbreak has been traced to China (and Wuhan in particular), both in the United States and elsewhere, people who are Chinese or seen as East Asian have become associated with this contagious disease. Early reports in the United States were often accompanied by stock photos of Asians in masks (Burton, 2020; Walker, 2020). Many of the first reports labeled the disease as the “Wuhan Virus,” or “Chinese Virus,” and the Trump administration has also used these terms (Levenson, 2020; Maitra, 2020; Marquardt & Hansler, 2020; Rogers, Jakes, & Swanson, 2020; Schwartz, 2020). News media coverage in the United States focused on the hygiene of the seafood market in Wuhan and wild animal consumption as a possible cause of coronavirus (Gomera, 2020; Mackenzie & Smith, 2020). Memes and jokes about bats and China flooded social media, including posts by our peers online. These reports provide the American public a straightforward narrative that focuses on China as the origin of COVID-19. In this paper, we review current patterns of hate crimes, microaggressions, and other negative responses against Asian individuals and businesses during the COVID-19 pandemic. These hate crimes and bias incidents occur in the landscape of American racism in which Asian Americans are seen as the embodiment of China and potential carriers of COVID-19, regardless of their ethnicity or generational status. We believe that Asian Americans not only are not “honorary whites,” but their very status as Americans is, at best, precarious, and at worst, in doubt during the COVID-19 crisis. We suggest that what we witness today is an extension of the history of Asians in the United States and that this experience may lead to the reemergence of a vibrant panethnic Asian American identity. Hate Crimes Against Asian Americans During COVID-19 As of early May 2020, there have been over 1.8 million individuals who have tested positive for and over 105,000 deaths from COVID-19 in the United States alone and the numbers are growing rapidly every day (“Cases in the U.S.,” 2020). Although researchers have traced cases of the virus in the United States to travelers from Europe (Gonzalez-Reiche et al., 2020) and to travelers within the United States (Fauver et al., 2020), some members of the general public regard Asian Americans with suspicion and as carriers of the disease. On April 28th, 2020, NBC News reported that 30% of Americans have personally witnessed someone blaming Asians for the coronavirus (Ellerbeck, 2020). The COVID-19 pandemic has revealed the negative perceptions of Asian Americans that have long been prevalent in American society. Many individuals in the United States see the virus as foreign and condemn phenotypically Asian bodies as the spreaders of the virus (Ellerbeck, 2020). Consistent with Claire Jean Kim’s theory on racial triangulation (Kim, 1999) and the concept of Asians as perpetual foreigners (Ancheta, 2006; Saito, 1997; Tuan, 1998; E. D. Wu, 2015), we posit that during COVID-19, the racial positionality of Asian Americans as foreign and Other persists, and that this pernicious designation may be a threat to the safety and mental health of Asian Americans. They are not only at risk of exposure to COVID-19, but they must contend with the additional risk of victimization, which may increase their anxiety. American Journal of Criminal Justice (2020) 45:636–646 637 Historically, from the late 19th through the mid twentieth century, popular culture and news media portrayed Asians in America as the “Yellow Peril,” which symbolized the Western fear of uncivilized, nonwhite Asian invasion and domination (Okihiro, 2014; Saito, 1997). It is possible that the perceived threat of the Yellow Peril has reemerged in the time of COVID-19. The spread of the coronavirus and the increased severity of the pandemic has caused fear and panic for most Americans, as COVID-19 has brought about physical restric- tions and financial hardships. So far, forty-two states have issued stay-at-home orders, which has resulted in 95% of the American population facing restrictions that impact their daily lives (Woodward, 2020). Novel efforts to end the pandemic across the states have led businesses to shut down. As a result, more than 30 million people in the United States have filed for unemployment since the onset of the coronavirus crisis (Gura, 2020). Because this virus has been identified as foreign, for some individuals, their feelings have been expressed as xenophobia, prejudice, and violence against Asian Americans. These negative perceptions and actions have gained traction due to the unprecedented impact COVID-19 has on people’s lives, and institutions such as UC Berkeley have even normal- ized these reactions (Chiu, 2020). However, racism and xenophobia are not a “natural” reaction to the threat of the virus; rather, we speculate that the historical legacies of whiteness and citizenship have produced these reactions, where many individuals may interpret Asian Americans as foreign and present- ing a higher risk of transmission of the disease. Already, the FBI has issued a warning that due to COVID-19, there may be increased hate crimes against Asian Americans, because “a portion of the US public will associate COVID-19 with China and Asian American populations” (Margolin, 2020). News reports, police departments, and community organizations have been documenting these incidents. Evidence suggests that the FBI’s warning was warranted. Based on reporting from Stop AAPI Hate, in the one-month period from March 19th to April 23rd, there were nearly 1500 alleged instances of anti-Asian bias (Jeung & Nham, 2020). The reported incidents have been concentrated in New York and California, with 42% of the reports hailing from California and 17% of reports from New York, but Asian Americans in 45 states across the nation have reported incidents (Jeung & Nham, 2020). Reports of Hate Crimes and Bias Incidents There have been a large number of physical assaults against Asian Americans and ethnically Asian individuals in the United States directly related to COVID-19. While the majority of Americans are sheltering-in-place and staying at home, 80% of the self- reported anti-Asian incidents have taken place outside people’s private residences, in grocery stores, local businesses, and public places (Jeung & Nham, 2020). We suggest that these hate crimes and other incidents of bias have historical roots that have placed Asians outside the boundaries of whiteness and American citizenship. In addition, we believe that the current COVID-19 crisis draws attention to ongoing racial issues and provides a lens through which to challenge the notion of America as a post-racial society (Bonilla-Silva, 2006). 638 American Journal of Criminal Justice (2020) 45:636–646 One of the incidents under investigation as a hate crime includes the attempted murder of a Burmese-American family at a Sam’s Club in Midland, Texas (Yam, 2020a). The suspect said that he stabbed the father, a four-year-old child, and a two- year-old child because he “thought the family was Chinese, and infecting people with coronavirus” (Yam, 2020a). Police are investigating numerous other physical incidents including attacks with acid (Moore & Cassady, 2020), an umbrella (Madani, 2020), and a log (Kang, 2020). There have been a number of physical altercations at bus stops (Bensimon, 2020; Madani, 2020), subway stations (Parnell, 2020), convenience stores (Oliveira, 2020), and on the street (Jeung & Nham, 2020; Sheldon, 2020). Asian Americans are also reporting physical threats being made against them (Driscoll, 2020; Parascandola, 2020). Based on Stop AAPI Hate statistics, 127 Asian Americans filed reports of physical assaults in four weeks (Jeung & Nham, 2020), and it is likely that other Asians have not reported their experiences out of fear or concern about the legal process. In addition to the physical attacks and threats against Asian Americans, individuals have also filed reports of vandalism and property damage targeted at Asian businesses. One Korean restaurant in New York City had the graffiti “stop eating dogs” written on its window (Adams, 2020). Perpetrators have also made explicit references to COVID-19 in their vandalism, where phrases such as “take the corona back you ch*nk” (Goodell & Mann, 2020), and “watch out for corona” (Wang, 2020) have been documented on Asian-owned restaurants. Some of these incidents were not reported to the police and therefore will not be investigated as hate crimes, as business owners reasoned that it would be difficult to track the vandals (Adams, 2020; Buscher, 2020). These incidents of vandalism demonstrate the association some people make between Asian Amer- ican businesses and COVID-19. Beyond the narrow definition of the incidents that can be classified as punishable hate crimes, Asian Americans have also documented a large number of alleged bias and hate incidents. Stop AAPI Hate reports indicate that 70% of coronavirus discrimination against Asian Americans has involved verbal harassment, with over 1000 incidents of verbal harassment reported in just four weeks (Jeung & Nham, 2020). In addition, there have been over 90 reports of Asian Americans being coughed or spat on. One prevalent theme in the verbal incidents is the linking of Asian bodies to COVID-19, where the aggressors are purportedly calling Asians “coronavirus,” “Chinese virus,” or “dis- eased,” and telling them that they should “be quarantined,” or “go back to China” (ADL 2020). In all of these incidents, the perpetrators consistently use anti-Asian racial slurs (Buscher, 2020; Goodell & Mann, 2020; Sheldon, 2020). This hateful language that targets all Asians (and not just Chinese Americans) demonstrates the racialization of Asian Americans. The threat of a global pandemic to people’s everyday lives is something that most Americans have not experienced before. However, the act of interpreting the current national crisis as an external threat and ascribing this danger to Chinese bodies and more broadly Asian bodies should not surprise scholars of Asian Americans. In fact, this deeply-rooted cognitive association of Asian Americans to Asia and to disease has a long history. Hence, we examine the phenomenon of xenophobia against Asian Americans in the context of historical racial dynamics in the United States. American Journal of Criminal Justice (2020) 45:636–646 639 The Color Line and the Positionality of Asian Americans Race has been posited as a socio-historical concept, and while many race scholars in the United States have focused on the black/white binary, others have documented how Asian Americans have also been racialized over time (Omi & Winant, 2014). These scholars have examined how the racialization of Asian Americans has developed in relation to African Americans and white Americans (Bonilla-Silva, 2004; Kim, 1999). One of the dominant stereotypes of Asian Americans is that they are perpetual foreigners, where individuals directly link phenotypical Asian ethnic appearance with foreignness, regardless of Asian immigrant or generational status (Ancheta, 2006; Tuan, 1998; F. H. Wu, 2002). This stereotype is longstanding in American history and has forcefully re-emerged during the COVID-19 crisis. The perception of an Asian- looking person as simultaneously Chinese, Asian, and foreign underscores how this racial categorization affects all Asian Americans. Thus, we suggest that the concept of Asian American panethnicity (Okamoto & Mora, 2014) may be particularly applicable during the COVID-19 pandemic. The legacy of white supremacy equates white bodies with purity and innocence, while nonwhite bodies are designated as unclean, uncivilized, and dangerous. White supremacy and its tactic of othering Asian bodies has been a consistent recurrence over earlier pandemics. Dating back to the nineteenth century, the bubonic plague was framed as a “racial disease” which only Asian bodies could be infected by whereas white bodies were seen as immune (Randall, 2019). In 1899, Honolulu officials quarantined and burned Chinatown as a precaution against the bubonic plague (Mohr, 2004). In 1900, San Francisco authorities quarantined Chinatown residents, and regulated food and people in and out of Chinatown, believing that the unclean food and Asian people were the cause of the epidemic (Shah, 2001; Trauner, 1978). The history of the Yellow Peril has continued throughout the 20th and 21st centuries in the embodied perceptions of Asian immigrants as the spreaders of disease (Molina, 2006). More recently, during the 2003 SARS (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome) epi- demic, the discourse in the United States focused on Chinatown as the epicenter of the disease (Eichelberger, 2007). Studies suggest that 14 % of Americans reported avoiding Asian businesses and Asian Americans experienced increased threat and anxiety during SARS (Blendon, Benson, DesRoches, Raleigh, & Taylor-Clark, 2004). We suspect the negative impact of COVID-19 on Asian Americans has been far greater than the impact of SARS. In New York City’s Chinatown, restaurants suffered immediately after the first reports of COVID-19, as some restaurants and businesses experienced up to an 85% drop in profits for the two months prior to March 16th, 2020 – far before any stay- at-home orders were given (Roberts, 2020). When moral panic arises, foreign bodies, typically the undesirable and “un-American” yellow bodies, may be seen as a threat that can harm pure white bodies. The cycle of elevated risk, followed by fearing and blaming what is foreign is not just limited to disease outbreaks, but also occurs during economic downturns. In 1982, Vincent Chin was beaten to death by two men who blamed him for the influx of Japanese cars into the United States auto market. Vincent Chin was attacked with racial slurs and specifically targeted because of his race. Although Chin was Chinese American, in the minds of these two men, he represented the downturn of the auto industry in Detroit and the increased imports of Japanese automobiles (Choy & Tajima-Pena, 1987). 640 American Journal of Criminal Justice (2020) 45:636–646 Similarly, after the 9/11 attacks in the United States, retaliatory aggressions were not limited to attacks against Arabs or Muslims (Perry, 2003). Violence and hatred against the perceived enemy resulted in incidents targeting Sikhs, second and third generation Indian Americans, and even Lebanese and Greeks (Perry, 2003). More recently, the hate crime murder of Srinivas Kuchibhotla, an Indian immigrant falsely assumed to be an Iranian terrorist and told “get out of my country” before being shot to death, illustrates the association between racialized perceptions of threat and incidents of violence (Fuchs 2018). With the COVID-19 pandemic, violent attacks and racial discrimination against Asian Americans have emerged as non-Asian Americans look for someone or something Asian to blame for their anger and fear about illness, economic insecurity, and stay-at-home orders. Fear and the Mental Health of Asian Americans The current perceptions of China and more broadly East Asia as both economic and public health threats have made Chinese and East Asians in America fearful for their own safety. Some Asian Americans have made efforts to hide their Asian identity or assert their status as American in an attempt to prevent hate crime attacks (Buscher, 2020; Tang, 2020). While this tactic may be effective on the individual level, it does not modify the positionality of Asian bodies during COVID-19. The attempt to distinguish Asian Americans from Asians who are foreign nationals misses the fact that in the United States, being Asians and being foreign are inextricably bound together. After World War II, news media and local organizations encouraged Chinese Americans to distinguish themselves from the Japanese, and similarly encouraged Japanese Americans to show their Americanness and patriotism to gain acceptance by the white majority (E. D. Wu, 2015). Muslim and Sikh Americans displayed American flags after 9/11 to show that they were not a threat to the United States, and more recently there has been a movement to celebrate Sikh Captain America (Ishisaka, 2018). Former presidential candidate Andrew Yang suggested that Asian Americans fight against racism by wearing red white and blue and prominently displaying their Americanness (Yang, 2020). In many of these situations, these strat- egies did not directly address the problems of racism and xenophobia – they simply shifted the blame towards another group. Disease does not differentiate among people based on skin color or national origin, yet many Asian Americans have suffered from discrimination and hatred during the COVID-19 pandemic. Although the threat of the virus is real for all Americans, Asian Americans bear the additional burden of feeling unsafe and vulnerable to attack by others. The link between COVID-19 and hate crimes and bias incidents against Asian Americans is indicative of the widespread racial sentiments which continue to be prominent in American society. While some scholars have gone as far as to regard Asian Americans as “honorary whites” (Tuan, 1998), the current COVID-19 crisis has made markedly clear this is an illusion, at best. There are a number of reasons why the racial dynamics of anti-Asian crimes during COVID-19 should be examined more closely. First, the majority of incidents and attacks have occurred in diverse metropolitan areas such as New York City, Boston, and Los Angeles. These are spaces that most American Journal of Criminal Justice (2020) 45:636–646 641 Americans have traditionally regarded as more liberal and tolerant of difference than other parts of the United States. In New York City alone, from the start of the COVID- 19 outbreak through April 2020, the NYPD’s hate crime task force has investigated fourteen cases where all the victims were Asian and targeted due to coronavirus discrimination (NYPD, 2020). The remarks of a Kansas governor that said his town was safe “because it had only a few Chinese residents” (Lefler & Heying 2020) offers one explanation for the high concentration of racial incidents in large cities with sizable Asian populations, but we think that this is not sufficient in explaining the data so far. Future research should track racial bias and hate crimes more systematically in order to further our understanding of how demography and urbanicity influence these incidents. Second, these hate crimes have increased the anxiety of Asian Americans during already uncertain times, with many fearful for their physical safety when running everyday errands (Tavernise & Oppel Jr., 2020). Asian Americans are now self-conscious about “coughing while Asian” (Aratani, 2020), and concerned about being targeted for hate crimes (Liu, 2020; Wong, 2020). There is evidence to suggest that Asian Americans under-report crimes (Allport, 1993), and some recent immigrants may lack an understanding of the legal system and process of reporting crimes, particularly in the case of hate crimes. Therefore, scholars should take additional care to document and analyze these incidents and their effects on Asian American communities across the United States. The possible upward trend of anti-Asian bias incidents and hate crimes is indicative of the growth of white nationalism and xenophobia. The image of a disease carrier with respect to COVID-19 is bound in Asian bodies and includes assumptions about race, ethnicity, and citizenship. As Vincent Chin, Srinivas Kuchibhotla, the Burmese-American family, and many others have shown us, the level of fungibility in terms of how Asian ethnicities are perceived can be deadly. It does not matter if the person is from China, of Chinese origin, or simply looks Asian – the perpetrators of this violence see all of these bodies as foreign and threatening. While there have been numerous instances of anti-Asian bias and crime, there have not been similarly patterned anti-European tourist incidents or an avoidance of Italian restaurants, suggesting that COVID-19 illuminates the particular racialization of disease that extends beyond this virus, and further back in American history. Already there has been substantial news coverage of these anti-Asian crimes, which suggests that people are paying attention to this issue, and police departments are actively investigating many of these incidents. Activists and community organizations have started online campaigns such as #washthehate and #hateisavirus to combat anti-Asian racism during this time. The BBC has documented 120 distinct news articles covering alleged incidents of discrimination since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic (Cheung, Feng, & Deng, 2020). In addition, the Chinese for Affirmative Action and Asian Pacific Policy and Planning Council have created a platform where individuals can record incidents of racism and coronavirus discrimination. The reporting of hate crimes during COVID-19 is superior to the reports of these types of incidents during the SARS outbreak (Leung Coleman, 2020; Washer, 2004). Although the federal government response has been limited compared to the hate crime prevention initiatives after 9/11 and SARS, in May 2020, the Commission on Civil Rights agreed to take on the demands proposed by a group of Democratic Senators in a letter requesting a stronger response to the anti-Asian hate crimes and discrimination during COVID-19 (Campbell & Ellerbeck, 2020; Yam, 2020b). Similar to the murder of Vincent Chin, which served to ignite an Asian American activist movement, we hypothesize that the racial incidents against Asian Americans 642 American Journal of Criminal Justice (2020) 45:636–646 during the COVID-19 pandemic may encourage the political mobilization of a panethnic Asian American movement. At the same time, we believe that the incidents that are classified as “hate crimes” and “bias incidents” based on legal definitions do not fully capture the extent or pervasiveness of racist and xenophobic thoughts against Asian Americans. We encourage future scholars to more closely examine the culturally embedded racial logics that lead to these incidents, rather than focusing solely on the incidents themselves as the object of analysis. The hate crimes against Asians in the time of COVID-19 highlight the ways that Asian Americans continue to be viewed as foreign and suspect. 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NJ.Com. https://www.nj.com/coronavirus/2020/04/girl-charged-with-racially-assaulting-asian-woman-over- American Journal of Criminal Justice (2020) 45:636–646 645 https://doi.org/https://ny.eater.com/2020/4/13/21218921/jeju-noodle-bar-racist-graffiti-harrasment-coronavirus-nyc https://doi.org/https://ny.eater.com/2020/4/13/21218921/jeju-noodle-bar-racist-graffiti-harrasment-coronavirus-nyc https://doi.org/https://ny.eater.com/2020/4/13/21218921/jeju-noodle-bar-racist-graffiti-harrasment-coronavirus-nyc https://doi.org/https://ny.eater.com/2020/4/13/21218921/jeju-noodle-bar-racist-graffiti-harrasment-coronavirus-nyc https://doi.org/https://ny.eater.com/2020/4/13/21218921/jeju-noodle-bar-racist-graffiti-harrasment-coronavirus-nyc https://doi.org/https://ny.eater.com/2020/4/13/21218921/jeju-noodle-bar-racist-graffiti-harrasment-coronavirus-nyc https://doi.org/https://ny.eater.com/2020/4/13/21218921/jeju-noodle-bar-racist-graffiti-harrasment-coronavirus-nyc https://doi.org/https://ny.eater.com/2020/4/13/21218921/jeju-noodle-bar-racist-graffiti-harrasment-coronavirus-nyc https://doi.org/https://ny.eater.com/2020/4/13/21218921/jeju-noodle-bar-racist-graffiti-harrasment-coronavirus-nyc https://doi.org/https://ny.eater.com/2020/4/13/21218921/jeju-noodle-bar-racist-graffiti-harrasment-coronavirus-nyc https://doi.org/https://ny.eater.com/2020/4/13/21218921/jeju-noodle-bar-racist-graffiti-harrasment-coronavirus-nyc https://doi.org/https://ny.eater.com/2020/4/13/21218921/jeju-noodle-bar-racist-graffiti-harrasment-coronavirus-nyc https://doi.org/https://ny.eater.com/2020/4/13/21218921/jeju-noodle-bar-racist-graffiti-harrasment-coronavirus-nyc https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-soc-071913-043201 https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-soc-071913-043201 https://doi.org/https://ny.eater.com/2020/4/13/21218921/jeju-noodle-bar-racist-graffiti-harrasment-coronavirus-nyc https://doi.org/https://ny.eater.com/2020/4/13/21218921/jeju-noodle-bar-racist-graffiti-harrasment-coronavirus-nyc https://doi.org/https://ny.eater.com/2020/4/13/21218921/jeju-noodle-bar-racist-graffiti-harrasment-coronavirus-nyc https://doi.org/https://ny.eater.com/2020/4/13/21218921/jeju-noodle-bar-racist-graffiti-harrasment-coronavirus-nyc https://doi.org/https://ny.eater.com/2020/4/13/21218921/jeju-noodle-bar-racist-graffiti-harrasment-coronavirus-nyc https://doi.org/https://ny.eater.com/2020/4/13/21218921/jeju-noodle-bar-racist-graffiti-harrasment-coronavirus-nyc https://doi.org/https://ny.eater.com/2020/4/13/21218921/jeju-noodle-bar-racist-graffiti-harrasment-coronavirus-nyc https://doi.org/https://ny.eater.com/2020/4/13/21218921/jeju-noodle-bar-racist-graffiti-harrasment-coronavirus-nyc https://doi.org/https://ny.eater.com/2020/4/13/21218921/jeju-noodle-bar-racist-graffiti-harrasment-coronavirus-nyc https://doi.org/https://ny.eater.com/2020/4/13/21218921/jeju-noodle-bar-racist-graffiti-harrasment-coronavirus-nyc https://doi.org/https://ny.eater.com/2020/4/13/21218921/jeju-noodle-bar-racist-graffiti-harrasment-coronavirus-nyc https://doi.org/https://ny.eater.com/2020/4/13/21218921/jeju-noodle-bar-racist-graffiti-harrasment-coronavirus-nyc https://doi.org/https://ny.eater.com/2020/4/13/21218921/jeju-noodle-bar-racist-graffiti-harrasment-coronavirus-nyc https://doi.org/https://ny.eater.com/2020/4/13/21218921/jeju-noodle-bar-racist-graffiti-harrasment-coronavirus-nyc coronavirus.html?utm_content=nj_twitter_njdotcom&utm_source=twitter&utm_campaign=njdotcom_ sf&utm_medium=social . 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UC Berkeley health account calls xenophobia a “common reaction” to coronavirus. NBC News. https://www.nbcnews.com/news/asian-america/uc-berkeley-health-account-calls-xenophobia- common-reaction-coronavirus-n1127271 . Accessed 26 April 2020. Yam, K. (2020b). Civil rights commission agrees to senate Democrats’ call for action against anti-Asian racism. NBC News. https://www.nbcnews.com/news/asian-america/civil-rights-commission-agrees- senate-democrats-call-action-against-anti-n1207136?fbclid=IwAR3vsE3rCMg7hsjBCnBswa_95 LRVyjfIIf27y3j_wKuxWafkhUtcVXGvOXM. Accessed 29 May 2020. Yang, A. (2020). Andrew Yang: We Asian Americans are not the virus, but we can be part of the cure. Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/04/01/andrew-yang-coronavirus- discrimination/ . Accessed 26 Apr 2020. Publisher’s Note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Hannah Tessler is a PhD student in Sociology at Yale University. Her research focuses on race, ethnicity, and sociology of education. Meera Choi is a PhD student in Sociology at Yale University. Her research focuses on the intersection of family and culture. Grace Kao is Chair and IBM Professor of Sociology and Faculty Director of Education Studies at Yale University. She is the immediate past Vice President of the American Sociological Association. Her research focuses on race, ethnicity, immigrant adaptation, Asian Americans, adolescence, and sociology of education. 646 American Journal of Criminal Justice (2020) 45:636–646 https://doi.org/https://ny.eater.com/2020/4/13/21218921/jeju-noodle-bar-racist-graffiti-harrasment-coronavirus-nyc https://doi.org/https://ny.eater.com/2020/4/13/21218921/jeju-noodle-bar-racist-graffiti-harrasment-coronavirus-nyc https://doi.org/https://ny.eater.com/2020/4/13/21218921/jeju-noodle-bar-racist-graffiti-harrasment-coronavirus-nyc https://doi.org/https://ny.eater.com/2020/4/13/21218921/jeju-noodle-bar-racist-graffiti-harrasment-coronavirus-nyc https://doi.org/10.2307/25157817 https://doi.org/https://ny.eater.com/2020/4/13/21218921/jeju-noodle-bar-racist-graffiti-harrasment-coronavirus-nyc https://doi.org/https://ny.eater.com/2020/4/13/21218921/jeju-noodle-bar-racist-graffiti-harrasment-coronavirus-nyc https://doi.org/https://ny.eater.com/2020/4/13/21218921/jeju-noodle-bar-racist-graffiti-harrasment-coronavirus-nyc https://doi.org/https://ny.eater.com/2020/4/13/21218921/jeju-noodle-bar-racist-graffiti-harrasment-coronavirus-nyc https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2004.03.038 https://doi.org/https://ny.eater.com/2020/4/13/21218921/jeju-noodle-bar-racist-graffiti-harrasment-coronavirus-nyc https://doi.org/https://ny.eater.com/2020/4/13/21218921/jeju-noodle-bar-racist-graffiti-harrasment-coronavirus-nyc https://doi.org/https://ny.eater.com/2020/4/13/21218921/jeju-noodle-bar-racist-graffiti-harrasment-coronavirus-nyc https://doi.org/https://ny.eater.com/2020/4/13/21218921/jeju-noodle-bar-racist-graffiti-harrasment-coronavirus-nyc https://doi.org/https://ny.eater.com/2020/4/13/21218921/jeju-noodle-bar-racist-graffiti-harrasment-coronavirus-nyc https://doi.org/https://ny.eater.com/2020/4/13/21218921/jeju-noodle-bar-racist-graffiti-harrasment-coronavirus-nyc https://doi.org/https://ny.eater.com/2020/4/13/21218921/jeju-noodle-bar-racist-graffiti-harrasment-coronavirus-nyc https://doi.org/https://ny.eater.com/2020/4/13/21218921/jeju-noodle-bar-racist-graffiti-harrasment-coronavirus-nyc https://doi.org/https://ny.eater.com/2020/4/13/21218921/jeju-noodle-bar-racist-graffiti-harrasment-coronavirus-nyc https://doi.org/https://ny.eater.com/2020/4/13/21218921/jeju-noodle-bar-racist-graffiti-harrasment-coronavirus-nyc https://doi.org/https://ny.eater.com/2020/4/13/21218921/jeju-noodle-bar-racist-graffiti-harrasment-coronavirus-nyc The Anxiety of Being Asian American: Hate Crimes and Negative Biases During the COVID-19 Pandemic Abstract Introduction Hate Crimes Against Asian Americans During COVID-19 Reports of Hate Crimes and Bias Incidents The Color Line and the Positionality of Asian Americans Fear and the Mental Health of Asian Americans References 
work_37hwznmtuvcanlr73bqv2o3jeq	----	1 ‘YOU ALL LOOK THE SAME’: Non-Muslim Men who Suffer Islamophobic Hate Crime in the post-Brexit era Abstract Existing research on Islamophobic hate crime has examined in detail the verbal, physical and emotional attacks against Muslims. However, the experiences of non-Muslim men who suffer Islamophobic hate crime because they look Muslim remain ‘invisible’ in both official statistics and empirical research. Drawing on data from qualitative interviews with 20 non-Muslim men based in the United Kingdom, we examined their lived experiences of Islamophobic hate crime. Interviews were transcribed and analysed using thematic analysis. A deductive approach to thematic analysis was adopted to analyse participants’ narratives, and six overarching themes were developed: (1) Nature of Islamophobic hate crime; (2) Triggers of Islamophobic hate crime; (3) Impact of Islamophobic hate crime; (4) Reporting incidents, responses and barriers to Islamophobic hate; (5) Victims’ coping strategies and (6) Recommendations on tackling the problem. Our findings show that participants experienced Islamophobic hate crime because of ‘trigger’ events namely the Brexit vote, Donald Trump’s presidency as well as ISIS-inspired terrorist attacks in European countries such as France, Germany, Sweden and UK. Participants described being verbally and physically attacked, threatened and harassed as well as their property being damaged. The impacts upon victims included physical, emotional, psychological, and economic damage. These experiences were also damaging to community cohesion and led to polarisation between different communities in the UK. Keywords: Islamophobia; Hate Crimes; Brexit; Trump; Europe Introduction Islamophobic hate crimes towards ‘visible’ Muslims have increased dramatically in Europe following the terrorist attacks of 9/11 in the US (Organisation for Cooperation and Security in Europe, 2016). In a post-9/11 climate, a particular anxiety towards Muslim ‘others’ has led to suspicion and outright hostility towards Muslims in the West. Following the terrorist attacks on 7/7, and more recently, the Manchester and London terrorist attacks in May and June 2017, these anxieties have intensified. Muslims in the UK face significantly heightened levels of religious and racial hatred, manifested as hate crimes and incidents. In this context, the rhetoric surrounding Donald Trump’s presidency, Brexit and the rise of far right groups throughout Europe have promoted white supremacist ideologies, identities and movements, which reflect Huntington’s (1997) ‘Clash of Civilizations’ thesis. This theory posits that Islam and the West are two monoliths that are ‘at war’ with each other. The West offers equality, rights, liberties and tolerance whilst ‘Islam’ offers gender oppression, subordination and violence. To this end, Islamophobic hate crimes 2 have increased to a level not seen since 9/11’s aftermath. For example, in Germany attacks against recently arrived migrants, many of them refugees coming from predominantly Muslim countries (namely Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq) have increased significantly; more than 3,500 such attacks occurred in 2016, compared with 1,031 in 2015 (OCSE, 2016). It is important to point out that through forms of racialisation, Islamophobia has led to ‘Muslim-looking’ individuals also being the victims of this type of hate crime (Ahmad, 2004). Therefore, someone who may have a similar disposition to a Muslim (for example, through appearance, ethnicity or race) is more likely to be seen as an ‘ideal’ target for Islamophobic hate crimes because of their perceived Muslim identity. Importantly, as our study shows, this can also include people who come from an Atheist, Christian, Hindu or Sikh background. Parvaresh (2014: 1313) observes that “…not only have Middle Eastern Muslims been targeted, but so also have been non-Arabs, non-South Asian Muslims, and non-Muslim Arabs and South Asians, leading all three groups to be racialized into one.” In America, the effects of racialisation and people being targeted for their ‘Muslim-looking’ appearance is not new. Whilst reported incidents of Hindus, Arab Christians and Latinos being targeted is well- documented, the rise in Islamophobic hate crimes amongst American Sikh men who have continued to be victimised because of the similarity between the Sikh turban and the Muslim cap is growing. In the UK, whilst attacks against non-Muslim men may not have been well- documented this does not mean they do not occur. Through the lens of a political and cultural threat, those communities who are mistaken for Muslims face a spike in hate crimes in the UK, particularly in the wake of ‘trigger’ events such as ISIS-inspired terrorist attacks. For example, in 2015 Zack Davies was sentenced to life imprisonment for attacking Dr Sarandev Singh Bhambra with a claw hammer and a 30cm-long machete. The attack according to Davies, was for “Lee Rigby” - the British soldier who was murdered by Islamist extremists in May 2013. The fact that Bhambra was not Muslim is significant; he was simply targeted because of his perceived identity of being Muslim. Bhambra’s brother stated: “Sarandev was singled out because of the colour of his skin” (Morris, 2014). The body of Islamophobic hate crime scholarship has grown significantly over the past decade (see, for example, Abbas, 2011; Allen, 2010; Zempi and Awan, 2016). However, what is missing from this literature is a focus on the experiences of non-Muslim individuals who suffer Islamophobic hate crime because they look Muslim. In contrast to a growing scholarship on the nature of Islamophobic hate crime victimisation, there is surprisingly little research that considers the experiences of (non-Muslim) men who suffer Islamophobic hate crime because they are perceived to be Muslim. Drawing from qualitative data elicited through a UK-based study, this article aims to address this gap in the literature. Specifically, we conducted 20 individual, semi-structured interviews 3 with a diverse sample of non-Muslim men who have experienced Islamophobic hate crime. Our study therefore advances the hate crime scholarship by examining the experiences of ‘invisible’ victims of Islamophobic hate crime, that is, men who suffer Islamophobic hate crime on the basis that they look Muslim. Hate Crime Post Brexit Hate crime is a social construct, which is culturally and historically situated. This is evident by the fact that there are different legal definitions across countries and jurisdictions (Wickes et al., 2015). As Jacobs and Potter (1998: 27) point out, understanding the prevalence of hate crime (and the development of appropriate responses to its occurrence) depends on ‘how hate crime is conceptualized and defined’. By and large, the consensus view tends to be that hate crimes are criminal acts which are motivated by the offender’s bias, prejudice and/or ‘hate’ towards the victim’s identity. In the British context, legislation is centred around the five monitored strands of identity, namely: disability, race, religion, sexual orientation and transgender status (College of Policing, 2014). That said, it is important to note that the social construction of crime has multiple variations as opposed to a statutory perspective of crime which is often seen through the lens of the mens rea i.e. ‘the criminal intention and responsibility’ to the actus reus ‘the wrongdoing and actual physical aspects of a crime’. Although the legal aspect looks at crime in a linear process, the social construction of crime uses the notion of deviance, and cultural perspectives. The problem with both these competing areas is that crime cannot ever be socially constructed without an application of the legal interpretation of crime. Crime therefore should be viewed in the paradigm of power and society (Foucault, 1977). Within the statutory of construct of crime, crime is therefore viewed on the basis of evidential proofs and the interpretation of legal decision- making (Walklate, 2002). In the UK, hate crime legislation combines a range of penalty-enhancement provisions and offences. For example, the Public Order Act 1986 and the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 create offences specially relating to stirring up racial hatred and racially aggravated offences that relate to assault and harassment. Moreover, the combined nature of offences relate back to the five monitored strands of hate crime i.e. race, religion, gender identity, sexual and disability hate. The UK also adopts the use of victimization surveys in order to measure hate crimes that go unreported. Harassment can include verbal abuse, threats, stalking, online abuse, and bullying. It is a criminal offence under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 and a person can take civil action in the civil courts. If someone is using the internet to target someone they too can be prosecuted so long as the Crown Prosecution Service view the content of the online communication as constituting threats of violence to the 4 person or damage to their property. The communication can constitute verbal harassment, grossly offensive, indecent, obscene, false or coercive behaviour. However, as McDevitt et al. (2001) observe, ‘hate’ is absent from the vast majority of hate crimes. Rather, hate crimes may be driven by bias, prejudice, or ‘negative feelings held by the offender towards a social group that, in their eyes, have an “outsider status”’ (Garland and Chakraborti, 2012: 40). A key element of hate crime is that offenders target potential victims because of their membership of despised ‘out-groups’. Referring to the powerful symbolic nature of hate crimes, Chakraborti and Garland (2009) state that such incidents transmit a ‘message’ not just to the immediate victim but to fellow members of their minority community that reminds them of their ‘othered’ status: that ‘their kind’ are not welcome. For authors such as Gerstenfeld (2013) it is the fact that the victim is targeted because of their actual or perceived membership of a social grouping – rather than the presence of any bias or hatred – that is the most significant factor when defining hate crime: it is the attack on their (actual or perceived) identity that sets these acts apart. Implicit in this argument is that these are ‘stranger danger’ offences, in which the perpetrator selects the victim not because of who they are as an individual but rather because they are part of a despised ‘out-group’ in the eyes of the aggressor (Perry, 2001). Islamophobic hate crime scholarship has advanced significantly in a post 9/11 climate. We now have a solid understanding of the motivations associated with hate crime perpetration and the effects of hate crime on victims and fellow group members (Wickes et al., 2017). However, despite important advances in Islamophobic hate crime scholarship, we know little about the experiences of non-Muslim individuals who suffer Islamophobic hate crime because they are perceived to be Muslim. Official data on hate crime only capture the “tip of the iceberg” (Levin, Rabrenovic, Ferraro, Doran, and Methe, 2007: 247), significantly underrepresenting actual levels of hate crime across communities (Wickes et al., 2017). In the case of non-Muslim men who suffer Islamophobic hate crime, using official statistics is even more problematic as high levels of underreporting and errors in police recording render these data largely incomplete (Balboni and McDevitt, 2001). Research Methods The article derives from a qualitative study, which set out to record the experiences of non-Muslim men who suffer Islamophobic hate crime because they look Muslim. Participation to the study was voluntary. The study involved individual, in-depth interviews with 20 non-Muslim men. Qualitative research generates knowledge grounded in human experience (Sandelowski, 2004). Individual, in-depth interviews allow for ‘rich’ data to be collected with detailed descriptions (Hennink, Hutter and Bailey, 2011). Participants were recruited through engagement with (non-Muslim) religious and secular organisations in 5 the UK. In order to ensure participants’ anonymity, their real names have been replaced by pseudonyms whilst any personal information that could identify them has been removed. The sample was diverse in terms of age, race/ethnicity and religion. Participants’ ages ranged from 19 to 59. In terms of race/ethnicity, participants included those from Asian heritage (fourteen), Black (three), White Other (two) and White British (one). In terms of faith/belief, participants included those of Christian faith (six), Sikh (nine), Hindu (three) and Atheist (two). The research questions examined: (Q1) the nature of Islamophobic hate crime directed towards non-Muslim men who are perceived to be Muslim; (Q2) the impact of Islamophobic hate crime upon victims and wider communities; (Q3) the coping strategies that were used by victims in response to their experiences of such hostility; (Q4) recommendations on preventing and responding to this hostility. Correspondingly, the interview guide contained a series of open-ended questions related to these research questions. All interviews were undertaken by the authors, and ranged from one to two hours, with an average interview length of one hour. Interviews were digitally recorded and transcribed verbatim. Interview transcripts were analysed using thematic analysis, a qualitative method used for ‘identifying, analysing and reporting patterns (themes) within data’ (Braun and Clarke, 2006, p. 79). Thematic analysis is a strategy for organising, describing and making sense of data. Also, it is ‘a way of seeing’, which highlights the subjective notion of encoding and interpreting data (Boyatzis, 1998, p. 1). Themes refer to specific patterns of meanings found in the data. They may be identified inductively from the raw data or deductively from the existing literature. In the present study, the analysis was driven by the authors’ theoretical interest in hate crime as well as the analytic preconceptions regarding the nature, extent and impact of Islamophobic hate crime that has been identified in the literature. This form of thematic analysis is understood as ‘deductive’ (Joffe, 2012). Ontologically, the thematic analysis in this study was conducted within a realist/essentialist framework on the basis that the authors theorised participants’ experiences, views and beliefs at face value whilst the epistemological framework was contextualism, an approach that assumes meaning to be related to the context in which it is produced (Attride-Stirling, 2001). The theoretical approach was enhanced by the authors’ engagement with the hate crime literature prior to analysis whereby early reading informed them about the nature, extent and impact of Islamophobic hate crime. The authors used Braun and Clarke’s (2006) six-phase approach to thematic analysis. The first step included the researchers familiarising themselves with the data by repeated, active reading of the transcripts and noting down initial ideas for coding. The second step involved generating initial codes across the entire data set, collating data relevant to each code. Coding was performed 6 electronically through copying extracts of data from individual transcripts and collating each code together in a separate file on the computer. The third step included searching for themes. The authors examined the codes and collated data to identify significant broader patterns of meaning (i.e. collating data relevant to each candidate theme). The fourth step included reviewing and refining the candidate themes to ensure that there were clear distinctions between the final themes. Candidate themes were refined, split, combined or discarded. Final themes were clearly linked back to the research questions, but each theme was distinct. The fifth step included defining and naming themes. The authors wrote a detailed analysis of each theme. This included making sense of the content of the data extracts presented, and considering whether they agreed with, or contradicted the existing literature. At this stage, the authors chose an informative name for each theme. The final step included producing the current article. Six overarching themes were developed: (1) Nature of Islamophobic hate crime; (2) Triggers of Islamophobic hate crime; (3) Impact of Islamophobic hate crime; (4) Reporting Incidents, responses and barriers to Islamophobic hate; (5) Victims’ coping strategies and (6) Recommendations on tackling the problem. The authors selected illustrative data extracts in order to provide sufficient evidence of the themes within the data. In the analysis provided in the next section, both shorter quotes within the narrative and longer block quotes are included, and all quotes are accompanied by participant’s gender, race, and any other characteristic relevant to their experiences of victimisation. Attride-Stirling (2001) argue that to be accepted as trustworthy, qualitative researchers must demonstrate that data analysis has been conducted in a precise, consistent, and exhaustive manner through recording, systematising, and disclosing the methods of analysis with enough detail to enable the reader to determine whether the process is credible. According to Nowell et al., (2017), it is crucial that researchers conduct theoretically and methodologically sound thematic analysis research that aims to create sensitive, insightful, rich, and trustworthy research findings. Indeed, the authors’ aim was to meet the trustworthiness criteria outlined by Lincoln and Guba (1985). To this end, the authors conducted the research in a rigorous and methodical manner to yield meaningful and useful results. Before outlining how this was achieved, it is important to note that the concept of trustworthiness entails the criteria of credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability (to parallel the conventional quantitative assessment criteria of validity and reliability) (Lincoln and Guba, 1985). Specifically, credibility addresses the ‘fit’ between participants’ views and the researchers’ representation of them (Tobin and Begley, 2004). Transferability refers to the generalizability of inquiry; in qualitative research, this relates only to case-to-case transfer (Tobin and Begley, 2004). Although it is not possible for researchers to know the sites that may wish to transfer the findings; yet, they should provide thick descriptions, so 7 that those who seek to transfer the findings to their own site can judge transferability (Nowell et al., 2017). To achieve dependability, researchers can ensure the research process is logical, traceable, and clearly documented (Tobin and Begley, 2004). According to Lincoln and Guba (1985), confirmability is established when credibility, transferability, and dependability are all achieved. Confirmability is concerned with establishing that the findings are clearly derived from the data (Tobin and Begley, 2004). The table below highlights how the authors addressed Lincoln and Guba’s (1985) criteria for trustworthiness during each phase of thematic analysis. Table 1. Establishing trustworthiness during each phase of thematic analysis Phases of thematic analysis Means of Establishing Trustworthiness Phase 1: Familiarising self with the data - Archived all records of the raw data - Prolonged engagement with data - Documented initial analytic interests and thoughts, interpretations, and questions in reflexive journal Phase 2: Generating initial codes - Peer debriefing - Reflexive writing - Audit trail of code generation Phase 3: Searching for themes - Thematic map to make sense of connections between themes - Kept detailed notes about development and hierarchies of concepts and themes Phase 4: Reviewing themes - Themes and sub-themes vetted by both authors during team meetings - Returned to raw data to ensure that the themes reflected participants’ voice (i.e. tested for referential adequacy) Phase 5: Defining and naming themes - Team meetings to discuss themes and reach consensus on overarching themes Phase 6: Producing the report -Described process of coding and analysis in detail -Thick descriptions of context -Reported on theoretical, methodological, and analytical choices throughout the entire study 8 Analysis A deductive approach to thematic analysis was adopted to analyse participants’ narratives, and six overarching themes were developed: (1) Nature of Islamophobic hate crime; (2) Triggers of Islamophobic hate crime; (3) Impact of Islamophobic hate crime; (4) Reporting incidents, responses and barriers to Islamophobic hate; (5) Victims’ coping strategies and (6) Recommendations on tackling the problem. Due to word restrictions, the first four themes will be explored and discussed in this paper. Theme: Nature of Islamophobic Hate Crimes Islamophobic language used by the offender(s) was the most common reported indicator for participants that their victimisation was motivated by the perpetrators’ hostility towards Islam and Muslims. Participants described incidents where they were verbally attacked in public places, although in some cases, the verbal abuse had escalated to physical abuse, as indicated in the comments below. I’ve had experiences where people have made comments, for example, “you p**i Muslim” or swearing about Prophet Mohammed. They think I’m Muslim because of my skin colour but I’m not Muslim, I’m Sikh. (Deepak, 45, Indian, Sikh) Another driver overtook my car shouting “You’ve killed innocent people, go back to Syria, you ISIS terrorist”. (Richard, 28, White, Atheist) I was walking late at night, and someone came from behind. I had a rucksack on my back. I felt a knock on my back, and when I looked back, I saw that a knife had gone through it. Luckily, I had some clothes in the rucksack so they had stopped it going any further. (Parminder, 59, Indian, Sikh) In addition to verbal and physical abuse, Islamophobic hate crimes often moved beyond the victim and in fact targeted the individual’s home or business. Some participants described how their homes, business or places of work were targeted because they were perceived to be Muslim. I live on a rough estate. I had dog excrement shoved through the mailbox. They also threw paint over my door. (Paul, 37, White, Atheist) Slogans including “Muzzies out” were painted across the exterior walls of my house. The graffiti was in large white letters. A week 9 later, I received anti-Muslim hate letter in the post. My parents were concerned for my safety, given the threats made on the letter. (Joshua, 21, Pakistani, Christian Catholic) They smashed the windows of my shop. The shop name sounds Muslim, and we are the only Asian shop in the high street, that’s why I think, we also look like Muslims and my kids wear the turban too. (Taranjeet, 36, Asian, Sikh) In addition to being verbally and/or physically attacked in the ‘real’ world, participants also reported experiencing Islamophobic hate crime in the cyber world, as indicated in the comments below. For me it’s more online than offline. People leave horrible comments like "Go home, you f***king Muslim” on my Facebook. (Parminder, 59, Indian, Sikh) I suffer hate crime when I’m online on social media. I was on Twitter and I shared a post about Muslims giving money for charity after the terrorist attack in London and I got abuse hurled at me. I have my picture on my twitter profile. People started commenting on the tweet and saying “you f***ing asshole f*** off with the terrorists, you terrorist, Bin Laden”. (Govinda, 42, Indian, Hindu) Theme: Triggers to Islamophobic hate crime In lights of these experiences of Islamophobic victimisation, participants differentiated between ‘external’ and ‘personal’ factors that contributed to their experiences of Islamophobic hate crime. External factors included issues unrelated to them (such as Brexit, Trump and ISIS-inspired terrorist events) whereas personal factors entailed aspects of their appearance that contributed to them being perceived as Muslim. Awan and Zempi (2015) note how ‘trigger’ events of local, national and international significance can influence the prevalence and severity of hate incidents both in the online and offline world, thereby heightening the vulnerability of ‘other’ groups and communities. In June 2016, the British public took part in a historic vote to decide on whether the UK should remain in the European Union (EU). The vote, which was held on Thursday 23rd June 2016, resulted in England voting in favour for Brexit, by 53.4% to 46.6%. At the same time as England voted to leave, the UK witnessed a sudden surge in hate crimes. This led to an increase of 42% in England and Wales since the Brexit result was announced. In this study, participants reported that they experienced a spike in Islamophobic hate crimes after the Brexit vote. 10 The Brexit campaign has promoted an atmosphere where it’s fine to be racist, Islamophobic and xenophobic. (Deepak, 45, Indian, Sikh) I have seen a spike in abuse since the UK voted to leave the EU last year. (Paul, 37, White, Atheist) On Facebook, someone wrote on my timeline “Shouldn’t you be on a plane back to Pakistan? We voted for you being out.” (Joshua, 21, Pakistani, Christian Catholic) Indeed, evidence shows that the EU referendum result of June 2016 was a catalyst for an unprecedented surge in reports of hate crime (BBC News, 2017). A majority of police forces in England and Wales saw record levels of hate crimes in the first full three months following the EU referendum. More than 14,000 hate crimes were recorded between July and September 2016 whilst in 10 forces, the number of suspected hate crimes increased by more than 50%, compared to the previous three months. Similarly, the 2016 Presidential Election in the US, has resulted in worrying spikes in hate crime, especially towards (actual and perceived) Muslims (Southern Poverty Law Centre, 2016). Along similar lines, participants also noted how the Trump administration and its stance towards Muslims had promoted Islamophobic sentiments both nationally and globally. I’ve noticed that abuse has increased on social media after Trump coming into power. People are now very open on social media about their hatred. Before Trump, people were more reserved. I’m on a lot of sites having discussions with people, and I find that racism and Islamophobia are very prevalent. Trump’s views are very extreme like banning Muslims to enter US. (Richard, 28, White, Atheist) Trump really changed everything, didn't he? He is so blatantly racist and anti-Muslim that he changed the climate completely. Brexit added to that and then you have the rise of Marie Le Pen and far- right groups everywhere in Europe like France, Germany, Netherlands and Austria. The rise of the far-right is now a global thing, their voices are heard more and more, and acted upon, which is really worrying. (Paul, 37, White, Atheist) Furthermore, participants noted how ISIS-inspired terrorist events in European countries such as France, Germany, Sweden and UK have led to an increase in Islamophobic hate crime attacks in the UK. 11 I’ve noticed a rise in abuse when there is a terrorist attack. Sadly the overall situation is deteriorating. Islamophobia is having an increasing impact on the lives of Asian men who look Muslim. The hatred that lies behind Islamophobia is spreading. (Deepak, 45, Indian, Sikh) My 15-year old son was recently verbally abused by a gang of youths. They shouted to his face: "you’re a terrorist". The incident took place following the Manchester terrorist bombings. (Jayesh, 40, Indian, Sikh) I’ve experienced a rise in hostility after the Manchester terrorist bombings and the London Bridge attack. I’ve witnessed the same trend after the Lee Rigby murder and the Charlie Hebdo terrorist attacks. (Raj, 39, Indian, Hindu) With respect to personal factors, some participants argued that their beard and/or turban (for Sikh men) were key aspects of their appearance that led to being perceived to be Muslim, as indicated in the following quotes. On a daily basis, I get people on the streets calling me ‘traitor’ and ‘Ginger Terrorist’ because of my beard. They think that I’m Muslim, a convert to Islam but I’m not, I’m an atheist. Having a beard is part of my style, not for any religious reasons. (Paul, 37, White, Atheist) Because of being a Sikh man with a beard and turban, people see me as a terrorist. (Dalvinder, 22, Indian, Sikh) In addition, participants argued that other aspects of their identity such as their skin colour and gender contributed to being perceived as Muslim and thus, being victimised. It’s my skin colour and also because I have a little beard, I think that’s why they think “he must be a Muslim”. As I am a male too, and all these Islamist terrorists are males too, that’s probably why they look at me and target me too. (Nick, 24, Afro-Caribbean, Christian) Being held at the airport consistently and being treated as a suspect. Because I’m mixed race and I look Muslim, I always get stopped and get abuse at airports. The association of looking like a Muslim is the problem for me. Someone actually asked me “why do you look like a Muslim? Why are you denying it?” (Samuel, 58, African-Caribbean, Christian) 12 Having explored the nature and motivations of these attacks, the following section highlights the multiple layers of harm associated with Islamophobic hate crimes including emotional damage, psychological scars, physical violence as well as the escalation of social tensions between different religious communities. Theme: Impacts of Islamophobic hate crime Participants reported that they suffered anxiety and panic attacks, depression, difficulty sleeping, fear, loss of confidence and feelings of vulnerability, physical illness, loss of income and employment as a result of their experiences of Islamophobic hate crime. Participants unanimously reported feeling fearful for their personal safety in public. I’ve experienced more attacks and intimidation after the terror attacks in London and Manchester […] I don’t feel secure in the UK anymore. The UK has become a much scarier place. (Joshua, 21, Pakistani, Christian Catholic) People have been calling me names on Twitter like “You're a p**i c**t”. I have also been threatened on Facebook like "Today is the day we get rid of the likes of you!" I fear for my safety when I read this. (Vinesh, 32, Indian, Hindu) In some cases, participants had to leave their job (particularly those working in the night-time economy) as they feared for their safety; this had implications for them financially. The most horrific incident was when a group of white lads punched me and broke my teeth on my way back from work. While they were punching me, they shouted ‘all Muslims should be killed’. I was working in a chip shop at the time. I have now left my job since this incident happened. (Richard, 28, White, Atheist) Clearly, participants feared for their safety although this sense of vulnerability depended upon the geographical area in which they were located. For example, some participants argued that they felt safer in diverse cities in the UK such as Birmingham. In contrast, in less diverse areas, the sense of vulnerability as well as the risk of attack was perceived to be significantly higher. Thus participants argued that they avoided going to predominantly ‘white’ areas. This infers that the impact of fear of future attacks had restricted participants’ freedom of movement. 13 Whenever I consider going to a place where there are less people of colour, I feel literally very scared. That’s why I love Birmingham. You see people from all over the world here. I feel safer here. (Dalvinder, 22, Indian, Sikh) At the same time though, the geographical area where participants lived was also a factor that identified them as Muslims and thus enhanced their vulnerability to both online and offline attacks. For example, one of our participants, Richard (28, White, Atheist) argued that people thought that he was a Muslim convert because he lived in a Muslim neighbourhood. He noted that people could see his location on his profile on social media, and this meant that he was targeted (both online and offline) because of his perceived affiliation to Islam. Richard moved out of this area to prevent being targeted in the future. Other participants also referred to examples of behavioural changes. They argued that they tried to be aware of their surroundings, minimise the time they were in public, and/or avoid certain areas. It worried me when someone tried to stab me. But I can’t let this affect me. I minimise how much I go out but if it’s going to happen, it’s going to happen. But I try not to let it affect me. I do what I want to do but I try to be aware of my surroundings, more now than I used to. (Parminder, 59, Indian, Sikh) Other participants changed their appearance in order to protect themselves from future abuse. For some individuals, shaving their beard and/or taking their turban off seemed to be a promising strategy for helping them to erase the perceived source of their vulnerability, and therefore reduce the risk of future attacks. But despite taking measures to prevent future victimisation, feelings of insecurity were exacerbated by the fact that these incidents usually took place in public places in view of people passing-by who did not intervene to help them. Considering the serious limitations of official data on hate crimes, bystanders could be an important source of information on the level of hate crime occurring in the community (Wickes et al., 2017). However, the fact that no one would normally intervene to help victims had culminated in feelings of loneliness and isolation, as indicated in the following quotes. I was verbally abused by another passenger on the bus who branded me an "ISIS terrorist" while passengers looked on without intervening. In another incident, I had ‘Brexit’ yelled in my face. I feel very lonely. No one has come to my assistance or even console me. (Mark, 40, White, Christian Orthodox) When I was younger, I was chased by a gang of skinheads. I was beaten up. I had stones thrown at me. I had incidents where people 14 tried to knock my turban off. No one has ever come to my defense. (Parminder, 59, Indian, Sikh) Furthermore, a key finding amongst our participants was the fact that they constantly felt the need to prove their identity, and differentiate themselves from Islam and Muslims. They explained that this was an attempt to prevent future victimisation; however, this was also emotionally draining for our participants. As the following quotes indicate, the need to constantly ‘prove their identity’ had resulted in a cumulative experience of emotional burnout over time. We [Sikhs and Muslims] are different people. People see us through eyes of Muslims but we are not. Because of my beard, I need to explain why I have this and that I’m not Muslim. I think ‘why do I need to prove who I am?’ Every second, every minute, every day I have to prove myself. (Dalvinder, 22, Indian, Sikh) Finally, participants noted that fellow members of their communities were also affected by their personal experiences of Islamophobic hate crime. For example, participants argued that other members of their communities were fearful for their safety because they knew that they themselves were equally vulnerable to verbal and physical abuse as (perceived) Muslims. Participants argued that some members of their communities were angry, upset and frustrated as they felt it was unfair to be targeted because of their perceived affiliation with Islam. This had led to feelings of polarisation and hostility between the Muslim community and other religious groups, particularly Sikhs and Hindus. In the words of one of our participants: ‘Communities are polarised’. Similar views were expressed below. This is a divided society. Some Sikhs blame Muslims for the abuse they get. We are facing a huge challenge is cohesion in our communities. Local councils need to do more to bring the Muslim community and the Sikh community together. (Parminder, 59, Indian, Sikh) People think that Muslims are the same as ISIS. I know that the Muslim community are doing the best they can internally to fight ISIS but it’s not enough. (Mark, 40, White, Christian Orthodox) Theme: Reporting Incidents, Responses and Barriers to Islamophobic Hate With respect to reporting their experiences of Islamophobic hate crime to the police, participants argued that they did not feel satisfied with the way the police had dealt with their case. In most cases, participants felt that the police were dismissive of their case. 15 The last incident included being verbally abused by a taxi driver in Oxford. When I got into the car, he said “Get out! I don't put Muslims in my car”. I said I’m not Muslim but then he came out and dragged me out the car. I reported it to the police but they said that the CCTV outside the train station did not work this so it was my word against his. They did not believe me and the case was closed. (Mark, 40, White, Christian Orthodox) At the same time though, some participants argued that they would not normally report their experiences to the police. Indeed, as the following quotes demonstrate, lack of confidence in the police was prevalent amongst our participants. I don't have confidence in local police. I don't think I will be listened to, I don't think I will be taken seriously. Offenders will not be brought to justice. (Raj, 39, Indian, Hindu) Once I punched a man who called me a ‘Muslim child groomer’. I didn’t report it to the police but the man who I punched did (laughing). The police were rubbish. They said it was my fault for punching him. (Paul, 37, White, Atheist) To complicate matters further, participants who had experienced online abuse decided to take action and report their abusers to social media providers namely Twitter and Facebook. However, they unanimously reported that ‘nothing happens’ when they report their abusers to the social media providers. On Twitter I just report the accounts that verbally abuse me but I still see those people on there so I’m confused why Twitter fails to remove people. (Govinda, 42, Indian, Hindu) My profile on Facebook is open. Other users downloaded my pictures, wrote ‘Ginger Terrorist’ on them and then reposted them on Facebook tagging me along. I reported these accounts to Facebook but nothing happened. I have now made my account private. (Paul, 37, White, Atheist) Discussion As the preceding discussion demonstrates, participants experienced Islamophobic hate crime in the ‘real’ world but also in the cyber world because of ‘trigger’ events namely the Brexit vote, Donald Trump’s presidency as well as ISIS-inspired terrorist attacks in European countries. Also, key aspects of participants’ identity such as appearance, race/ethnicity, and gender 16 contributed to them being perceived as Muslim, and thus suffering Islamophobic hate crime. That said, it is important to note that hate crimes cause greater harm than equivalent crimes without bias intent (Iganski, 2001). Compared with non-hate victims, hate crime victims more commonly report feeling unsafe and fear future victimisation (McDevitt et al., 2001). Craig- Henderson and Sloan argued that the range of negative emotions experienced by victims of racist crime are ‘qualitatively distinct’ from the emotions experienced by victims of parallel crimes (2003: 482). For example, Iganski and Lagou (2014) note that, compared with victims of parallel crimes, victims of hate crime are more likely to report experiencing: higher levels depression and withdrawal; anxiety and nervousness; loss of confidence; anger; increased sleep difficulties; difficulty concentrating; fear and reduced feelings of safety. Correspondingly, the research data in our study illustrated the emotional, psychological, behavioural, physical and financial impacts of experiencing offline and/or online Islamophobic hate crime upon our participants. Each hate crime has many victims in respect of the vicarious, or terroristic, impacts they can have upon targeted communities (Iganski, 2001). The harms of hate crime extend beyond the immediate victim to negatively impact the victim’s reference community. This is a problem that affects not only the victim but the wider community to which victims belong. Hate crimes are more harmful to the community than non-hate crimes on the basis that they undermine tolerance and social inclusion by conveying an “outsider” status of the victim and fellow group members to the broader community (Wickes et al., 2017). Indeed, hate crime is a unique form of offending. The aim of the offender is to send a message to the victim and the victim’s group members that they are not welcome in the community (King, Messner, and Baller, 2009). Correspondingly, the impact of hate crime extends even further, affecting all members of the community in question. Therefore, hate crimes are considered more damaging to the social fabric of society than parallel crimes as they attack collective values, disrupt social harmony, and fuel intolerance for diversity (Wickes et al., 2017). Indeed, participants in our study argued that Islamophobic hate crimes were damaging, not only to individual victims, but also to community cohesion and led to polarisation between different communities in the UK. Victims of hate crime can often minimise their experiences, because of their everyday experiences of suffering hate crimes. The normalisation of targeted harassment and violence can also lead to non-reporting of such incidents to the police. Indeed, our participants argued that they were unlikely to report such incidents to the police (but even when they did report it, their case was likely to be dismissed). Underreporting of hate crime is also a common factor when taking into account official statistics. Victims of hate crime are less likely to report incidents for a variety of reasons such as anxiety, mental health related problems, fear that they will not be taken seriously, previous unsatisfactory 17 experiences, a lack of confidence in the police, and fear they will be become the victims of repeat offences (Berzins et al., 2003). Clement et al., (2011) argue that victims will not report hate crimes because of the overall trauma of the incident and that fact that they fear being humiliated or targeted again because of the power relationship perpetrators often have over their victims. It is important to note that not all aspects of hate crime or hate incidents should solely be reported to the police. In fact, the range of responses from our participants means that some incidents we argue should be reported to third party reporting centres, victim support, citizens advice bureau, social media companies and local community organisations. As hate crimes are message crimes that go beyond the individual we argue that community impact statements should also be adopted as a way to enhance reporting of hate crimes and also providing victims with aftercare following an incident. Conclusion There is a dearth of empirical research exploring the experiences of non- Muslim men who are especially vulnerable to Islamophobic hate bias, prejudice and hate on the basis that they can be identified as ‘Muslim-looking’. Drawing from qualitative interviews with 20 individuals, the study addressed this gap by exploring their lived experiences. Individual, semi-structured interviews were transcribed and analysed using thematic analysis (Braun and Clarke, 2006, 2013). The ontological framework was realism (focuses on reporting an assumed reality evident in the data) and the broad theoretical (epistemological) framework was contextualism, an approach that assumes meaning to be related to the context in which it is produced. Thematic analysis was used deductively; thus, coding and theme development were directed by existing concepts or ideas. These ontological and epistemological positions tie in with the authors’ aim to stay close to the participants’ worldview and to this end, view the world through their eyes (Braun, Clarke, & Rance, 2014). Six overarching themes were developed: (1) Nature of Islamophobic hate crime; (2) Triggers of Islamophobic hate crime; (3) Impact of Islamophobic hate crime; (4) Reporting incidents, responses and barriers to Islamophobic hate; (5) Victims’ coping strategies and (6) Recommendations on tackling the problem. Due to word restrictions, only the first four themes were explored and discussed in this paper. Hate crimes send a message to the victim and the victim’s group members that they are neither safe nor welcome in the community (Perry, 2014). On the strength of the present evidence, it is clear that Islamophobic hate crimes caused significant damage to the emotional, psychological and physical well- being of our participants, and reinforced the sense of isolation and powerlessness typically felt within groups who encounter targeted hostility as a routine feature of being ‘different’. A number of third party reporting centres have now emerged, which provide an alternative system for victims to report 18 incidents. The use of a third party reporting mechanism is meant to make things easier for victims of hate crime. However, in our study, participants were not aware of the range of these resources. We argue that for victims, better signage and visible posters displayed across public platforms, could have a direct and indirect impact on helping dismantle some of the barriers towards reporting hate crimes. In 2015, the British Prime Minister, Theresa May announced that all police forces in England and Wales must record Islamophobic hate crimes as a separate category within their central recording systems. It was envisaged that this would mean a more accurate picture could be ascertained in regards incidents of Islamophobic hate crimes. In our study, as the victims were not Muslim, questions about how the police might record such incidents were less clear. For example, some participants noted how they would like the incident to be recorded as a religious hate crime and not necessarily as an Islamophobic incident. This does therefore raise further questions about reporting and recording incidents of hate crime. At present, not all of the protected monitored strands are treated the same. This can be problematic for victims because they may view that if they report a hate crime it will not be taken seriously. This is also highlighted by the fact that certain types of hate crimes may attract longer sentencing than others (Walters et al. 2017). Combined with the fact that some police forces record misogyny and alternative subcultures as a form of hate crime and others do not leaves victims with a confused picture. We argue that all forms of hate crime should be treated the same and that until sentencing is more consistent victims are likely to feel less confidence within the criminal justice system. For example, the Crime Survey for England and Wales state that 48% of hate crimes are reported to the police (Corcoran et al. 2015). We know that ‘trigger’ events have also significantly impacted upon hate crimes in schools in England following incidents such as the Brexit vote and the election of the US president Donald Trump. For example, in the middle of the Brexit referendum campaign in May, the number of reports of hate crimes and hate incidents in schools rose by 89% compared to the same month in 2015. Moreover, during the summer and autumn terms in 2016 – when the Brexit referendum took place and Donald Trump won the US presidential election – the number of hate crimes and hate incidents in schools increased by 48%, compared with the same period in 2015 (Busby, 2017). As a result, we argue that schools must adopt a strong campaign in relation to understanding hate crimes. We feel that this is best situated within the training of teachers and also within the school curriculum that children must follow. This should go beyond core values to actual core actions about respect, dignity and tolerance. 19 References Abbas T (2011) Islamophobia in the UK: Historical and Contemporary Political and Media Discourses in the Framing of a Twenty-First century Anti-Muslim Racism. 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Perry B (2001) In the name of hate: Understanding hate crimes. New York, NY: Routledge. Perry B (2014) Exploring the community impacts of hate crime. In: Hall N, Corb A, Giannasi P and Grieve J (eds) The Routledge international handbook on hate crime. New York, NY: Routledge, pp. 47-57. https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/jun/25/zack-davies-racist-guilty-attempted-murder-dentist https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/jun/25/zack-davies-racist-guilty-attempted-murder-dentist 22 OSCE (2016) Racism and Xenophobia. Available at: http://hatecrime.osce.org/what-hate-crime/racism-and-xenophobia (accessed 26 January 2018). Sandelowski M (2004) Using qualitative research Qualitative Health Research 14: 1366–1386. Southern Poverty Law Centre (2016) The Trump effect: The impact of the 2016 presidential election on our nation’s schools. Available at: www.splcenter.org/20161128/trump-effectimpact-2016-presidential-election- our-nations-schools (accessed 28 January 2018). Tobin GA and Begley CM (2004) Methodological rigour within a qualitative framework. Journal of Advanced Nursing 48: 388–396. Walklate, S. (2002) ‘Perspectives in Criminological Theory’ In Jewkes, Y. & Letherby, G. (eds.) Criminology: A Reader, (Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks). Walters M, Wiedlitzka S, Owusu-Bempah A and Goodall K (2017) Hate Crime and the Legal Process (Online) Available at: http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/70598/3/FINAL%20REPORT%20- %20HATE%20CRIME%20AND%20THE%20LEGAL%20PROCESS.pdf (accessed on 18 July 2018). Wickes RL, Pickering S, Mason G, Maher JM and McCulloch J (2015) From hate to prejudice: Does the new terminology of prejudice motivated crime change perceptions and reporting actions? British Journal of Criminology 56 (2): 239-255. Wickes R, Sydes M, Benier K and Higginson A (2016) "Seeing" hate crime in the community: Do resident perceptions of hate crime align with self-reported victimization? Crime and Delinquency 63(7): 875-896. http://hatecrime.osce.org/what-hate-crime/racism-and-xenophobia http://www.splcenter.org/20161128/trump-effectimpact-2016-presidential-election-our-nations-schools http://www.splcenter.org/20161128/trump-effectimpact-2016-presidential-election-our-nations-schools http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/70598/3/FINAL%20REPORT%20-%20HATE%20CRIME%20AND%20THE%20LEGAL%20PROCESS.pdf http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/70598/3/FINAL%20REPORT%20-%20HATE%20CRIME%20AND%20THE%20LEGAL%20PROCESS.pdf 
work_3fgdu2t5g5bzxl7lascvvvj57q	----	Crossing disciplinary, empirical and theoretical boundaries on gender and violence This is a repository copy of Crossing disciplinary, empirical and theoretical boundaries on gender and violence. White Rose Research Online URL for this paper: http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/100352/ Version: Accepted Version Article: Wilding, P orcid.org/0000-0002-0084-2967 (2016) Crossing disciplinary, empirical and theoretical boundaries on gender and violence. Dialogues in Human Geography, 6 (2). pp. 198-201. ISSN 2043-8206 https://doi.org/10.1177/2043820616655031 (c) 2016, The Author. This is an author produced version of a paper published in Dialogues in Human Geography. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy. eprints@whiterose.ac.uk https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/ Reuse Unless indicated otherwise, fulltext items are protected by copyright with all rights reserved. The copyright exception in section 29 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 allows the making of a single copy solely for the purpose of non-commercial research or private study within the limits of fair dealing. The publisher or other rights-holder may allow further reproduction and re-use of this version - refer to the White Rose Research Online record for this item. Where records identify the publisher as the copyright holder, users can verify any specific terms of use on the publisher’s website. Takedown If you consider content in White Rose Research Online to be in breach of UK law, please notify us by emailing eprints@whiterose.ac.uk including the URL of the record and the reason for the withdrawal request. mailto:eprints@whiterose.ac.uk https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/ Dialogues in Human Geography Crossing disciplinary, empirical and theoretical boundaries on gender and violence Commentary on: Geographic Frontiers of Gendered Violence Author: Polly Wilding P.Wilding@leeds.ac.uk Politics and International Studies University of Leeds Leeds LS6 3NL Keywords Gender, violence, feminist geography, boundaries Abstract Responding to the four interventions on gendered violence, this commentary asks why feminist geographers should be working on the issue of gendered violence, arguing that the discipline offers a particular language to problematise the discursive crossroads that violence occupies, thus making sense of the legal, moral and ideological boundaries that govern how violence is understood and responded to. It concludes with the call to not only continue working within our (sub)disciplines, but to work together to ask a range of tricky questions that need addressing if we are to claim those spaces where disciplinary, empirical and theoretical boundaries can be pushed and identify when violence can act as catalyst for effective action and organizing. First and foremost, together these interventions on gendered violence serve as a timely reminder of the continued relevance of an overtly feminist approach to understanding violence in all its manifestations. These four interventions seek to push at the boundaries of our knowledge, and suggest alternative analytical frameworks as well as potential areas for further enquiry. They also raise difficult questions, about the categorisation of actors, issues of complicity and responsibility, the reliability of statistics, the spatial and social segregation of violence, and questions about what constitutes ordinary versus exceptional violence. However, in particular these thought provoking interventions demonstrate the insights feminist geography can provide towards an improved understanding of the mutually constitutive role of violence and unequal gendered power relations. mailto:P.Wilding@leeds.ac.uk Underlying these interventions are questions about who carries out research into gendered violence, within which disciplinary boundaries. As the introduction to these papers points out, relatively few geographers have published on this topic in the last decade, notwithstanding some notable examples (Brickell 2008, Datta 2012, McIlwaine 2013, Moser and McIlwaine 2004, Pain 2010, 2014, 2015). This apparent absence raises questions about the gendered status of specific research areas within the academy, which academic spaces valorise which topics of research, and which are dismissed as belonging to another disciplinary area. Gendered violence tends to be considered a specialism that is not relevant to the wider academic community, where, to paraphrase loosely from Stanko┸ ╅real╆ research gets done ゅStanko 1990). Nevertheless, the fact that there is a need for critical social, cultural, economic and political geographers to contribute to the debate on violence and its gendered dynamics may seem self-evident to researchers already working in the field of gender and violence. However, it is worth unpacking the rationale and urgency behind such claims. To put it bluntly, why does it matter if (feminist) geographers work on these issues? This question can be approached in different ways. We can ask why feminist geographers should be working on this topic; in other words, why this discipline in particular needs to make an intervention in this area. Alternatively, we can explore why feminist geographers should be working on these issues. The former approach implies that geographers have particular insights, and methodological and theoretical tools that can shed a distinctive light on the subject. The latter approach suggests a moral imperative, to challenge what is a clearly gendered and global form of injustice. After all, a central feminist concern is to unpack and transform practices that feed gendered inequalities and patriarchal power relations across space and scale ‒ which violence clearly does. Given the range and breadth of research into gendered violence found in other disciplines, at worst the question could be interpreted as lamenting the idea that the research is left to others, and a parochial need to make a mark ╅as geographers╆. But at best, it prompts an exploration of how to combine disciplinary insights and tools most constructively. As an issue that lends itself to interdisciplinary research, it would seem prudent to constantly look out for, learn from, and critically engage with research on violence emerging from different disciplinary origins. Yet, as with all forms of interdisciplinarity, the task requires sensitivity and reflexivity in acknowledging how disciplinary viewpoints shape our methods and understandings, in order to enable conversations across the disciplines. So what does geography offer to this debate? One contribution it offers is a language to locate and unpack the various boundaries that make violence such a slippery phenomenon┻ The boundaries between what is considered ╅real╆ ゅStanko 1990ょ┸ ╅ordinary╆ ゅDobash et al. 2004) or ╅acceptable╆ (Wilding 2010) violence, and what is not, are highly subjective, playing out differently across space and scale. As these institutions show, violence is managed, manipulated and interpreted by a range of stakeholders, who promote the myth of clear-cut distinctions between ╅public╆┸ ╅private╆ and ╅insider╆┸ ╅outsider╆ and ╅other╆┹ a myth that results in judgements of laws as ╅just╆┸ the family as a ╅safe╆ place┸ and equating the ╅protection╆ of women with restricted freedoms┻. In contrast to these myths, the lived experiences of people living in the context of high levels of violence demonstrate clearly that not only are these boundaries in fact blurred, but also shifting and contested. The state and other actors can choose to reinforce these norms, but may also decide to selectively intervene. Thus, the fluidity of these boundaries facilitates the slippage between locating a ╅lack of toilets╆ as the cause of vulnerability and risk, instead of the more entrenched and messy reasons for why diverse forms of gendered violence persist. This convenient blindspot lets the state off the hook from promoting more radical┸ and potentially ╅uncomfortable╆ responses to the structural causes and social norms that [re]produce gendered violence. To facilitate more transformative responses, as Ayona Datta argues, further investigation is needed into ╉the complex exchanges of gendered and sexualized violence between and across home and outside┼leadいingう to better understanding of the spaces┸ scales and terrains of violence and the multiples ways they lay siege on women╆s bodies┻╊ What geography offers, therefore, is a particular language to problematise the discursive crossroads that violence occupies, and in which violence is both perpetrated as well as managed by a range of stakeholders through defining spatial and ideological boundaries, and social and political norms. One way in which these discursive boundaries are managed is by means of the legal frameworks, which set normative limits on acceptable behaviour. The law, as Katherine Brickell puts it┸ not only draws lines┸ but ╉assigns legal meanings to lines╊ and who is in and who is out┻ On the one hand┸ it is clear that research examining legal frameworks is crucial, given its role in setting normative boundaries. On the other, the law is only ever as good as its implementation and the hiatus between legal reform and transformative change has long been a frustration of feminist activism. As Ayona Datta highlights, the law judges different forms of violence against different criteria ‒ in this case focusing on public rape, whilst omitting rape in marriage. Such inconsistencies raise questions about the complex and contradictory political imperatives for legal change, the need to identify easy wins, and the disincentive to introduce laws that are messy to apply, with the potential for widespread application. It also shines a light on how violence is often constructed as experienced and perpetrated by the ╅other╆, casting rape for example as ╅out there╆ and domestic violence as something that doesn╆t happen in ╅my family╆ (Pain 1997). As I have argued elsewhere, on an individual and communal level, distancing can be functional (Wilding 2014). It does not simply represent denial of real risk, but operates as a means of constructing a sense of personal safety, the illusion of safe spaces, and of violence as something that ╅ordinary╆ men do not do (Dobash et al 2004). When this functional distancing gets intertwined with policy it can have insidious results ‒ resulting in the distraction from other forms of violence, as Ayona Datta and Anindita Datta show┸ and 【 or the state╆s own abuses┸ as in the case of Cambodia. Advances in the fight for laws to formally protect women in the private sphere, and criminalise perpetrators, now in place in many parts of the world (Moser and McIllwaine 2014), disrupt the simplistic assumption that private violence continues to be condoned or accepted by state institutions. Nevertheless, the complex ways in which functionaries engage with the rules are less measurable, and less visible, than the ╅hard fact╆ of legislature would suggest, resulting in what Fraser refers to as ╅unruly practices╆ ゅ1989). This means that law in practice, its actual implementation, is often inaccessible to vast swathes of the population. Who gets access to justice is determined in part by how rules are interpreted by state representatives and social institutions at the local level, resulting in highly varied experiences and encounters. In particular, in societies with deep social cleavages, an intersectional lens allows us to ask who the law speaks to, and under what circumstances different people can appeal to justice. All four interventions hone in on the nuanced experiences of particular groups╆ experiences of justice, and how this relates to their identities. Given the infinite variations of individual experience, the importance of unpacking the specificity of power relations needs careful balancing against an analytical approach that recognises structure, in order to avoid reducing gender to merely one in a range of inequalities. Although gender shapes all violent interactions, since all social relations are gendered, at least at a theoretical level we need to be able to distinguish between when gender is the primary rationale behind the violence and when gender identity is targeted as one weapon in the available arsenal to attack a wider group. Peter Hopkin╆s discussion of attacks against men and women presumed to be Muslim puts women centre stage as they constitute the majority of victims of far right attacks. If a fixed gendered analysis is applied, this would be interpreted as hate crime based on gender, ignoring the possibility of seeing it as a hate crime based on religion that takes on gendered forms. Opening analysis up to other axes of difference in this case allows for consideration of the visibility of women╆s symbols of faith┸ through the niqab and headscarf, as a constituting factor in their being targetted. Such an approach implies treading a fine line between naming and analysing the gendered organization of power relations and gendered regimes, which make a particular manifestation of gendered violence possible and have meaning, without making the a priori assumption that women are the main or only target. As research into gender and conflict and gender and nation has shown, women are often seen as bearers of culture and nation, and thus a target as representatives of their community (Yuval-Davis 1997). Thus, acknowledging that gender shapes vulnerability and forms of violence, should not be equated with collapsing all forms of violence against women into the same category. I believe making this distinction adds further potency to Anindita Datta╆s genderscapes of hate, which vividly highlights when and how women are targeted as a specific object of hate. This discussion is by no means comprehensive, the selection of what to focus on was no easy task, and there many other elements equally eligible for further elaboration. However, I would like to finish by touching on the question posed of how gendered actors and networks can resist violence. On one level, the complexity evidenced in these papers expose the absurdity of assuming that simplistic measures, such as toilets, can prevent violence. However, they also raise questions about strategic moments for change, and the risks inherent in these. Since there is a lack of collective indignation about rates of violence against women generally, we should ask, when incidents like the Delhi bus rape hit the news, why this case at this time captured the collective imagination. Questions about strategic moments are important, both not to romanticise them as moments of transformation, but also to be aware of how, in such moments, key feminist messages may be stripped of their nuance, and result in potentially adverse outcomes. Proposed solutions to protect women may produce other forms of violence and control over women╆s bodies┻ But also┸ intersectionality warns against simplistic causal explanations; and the mosaic of allegiances, oppressions and struggles for power shape ╅insides╆ and ╅outsides╆, and under what circumstances men and women can protect themselves. Ultimately, this raises the question of who is entitled to dignity? Who gets to live a life free of violence? And when does the fragile illusion of security break? As such, these four interventions constitute a persuasive argument to not only continue working within our (sub)disciplines, but to provoke us to work together to ask a range of tricky questions that need to be addressed if we are to claim those spaces where disciplinary, empirical and theoretical boundaries can be pushed, and identify when violence can act as catalyst for effective action and organizing. Bibliography Brickell K ゅにどどぱょ ╅Fire in the (ouse╆┺ Gendered experiences of drunkenness and violence in Siem Reap, Cambodia. Geoforum 39(5): 1667-1675 Datta A (2012) The Illegal City: Space, law and gender in a Delhi squatter settlement. Farnham: Ashgate. Dobash R E, Dobash R P, Cavanagh K, & Lewis R (2004) Not an ordinary killerを just an ordinary guy: When men murder an intimate woman partner. Violence against Women 10(6): 577-60 Fraser N (1989) Unruly Practices: power discourse and agenda in contemporary social theory. Cambridge: Polity Press. McIlwaine C (2013) Urbanisation and Gender-based Violence: Exploring the Paradoxes in the Global South. Environment and Urbanization 25(1): 65-79. Moser C and McIlwaine C (2014) Editorial: New frontiers in twenty-first century urban conflict and violence. Environment and Urbanization 26(2): 331-344. Moser C and McIlwaine C (2004) Encounters with Violence in Latin America. London: Routledge. Pain R (1997) Social Geographies of Women's Fear of Crime. Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 22(2): 231-244 Pain R (2010) The new geopolitics of fear. Geography Compass 4: 226-240. Pain R (2014) Everyday terrorism: connecting domestic violence and global terrorism. Progress in Human Geography 38: 531-550. Pain R (2015) Intimate war. Political Geography 44: 64-73. Stanko E (1990) Everyday violence: how women and men experience sexual and physical danger. London: Pandora http://www.ashgate.com/isbn/9781409445548 http://www.ashgate.com/isbn/9781409445548 Wilding P (2010) Negotiating Boundaries: Gender, Violence and Transformation in Brazil. Palgrave Macmillon Wilding P (2014) Gendered meanings and everyday experiences of violence in urban Brazil. Gender, Place and Culture 21(2):228-243 Yuval-Davis N (1997) Gender and Nation. London: Sage Publications 
work_3fzzz2xevveg5epwzoac2kc66i	----	SPECIAL FEATURE Violent attacks on Middle Easterners in the United States during the month following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks M H Swahn, R R Mahendra, L J Paulozzi, R L Winston, G A Shelley, J Taliano, L Frazier, J R Saul . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Injury Prevention 2003;9:187–189 Objectives: To document and describe hate related violent attacks on Middle Easterners or those per- ceived to be Middle Easterners during the month following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in New York City and Washington, DC. Methods: The LexisNexis database of newspaper reports were used to identify incidents of hate related violent acts against Middle Easterners or those perceived to be Middle Easterners in the US between September 1 and October 11, 2001. A total of 100 incidents of hate related violence were identified in the 2659 news articles that were reviewed. Results: Of the 100 incidents of violent victimization that took place during the period September 1 to October 11, only one incident occurred before September 11. The 99 incidents that occurred after September 11 involved at least 128 victims and 171 perpetrators. Most violent victimizations occurred within 10 days of the attacks, involved male perpetrators and male victims, and occurred in conven- ience stores, on the streets, at gas stations, at schools/colleges, and at places of worship. Discussion: Most violent victimizations occurred in the 10 days immediately following the terrorist attacks indicating that interventions that promote tolerance and understanding of diversity need to be implemented quickly in order to be effective. In addition, patrolling by police and Neighborhood Watch programs around convenience stores and gas stations may also be effective strategies for reducing hate related violent crimes. F ollowing the terrorist attacks in New York City and Wash- ington, DC on September 11, 2001, several sources includ- ing police and advocacy groups reported what seemed to be an increase in violent hate crimes against Middle Eastern- ers or those perceived to be Middle Easterners.1–3 A recent FBI report confirmed that there was indeed a dramatic increase in the number of hate crimes motivated by bias toward the Islamic religion in the year 2001 compared with the year 2000.4 However, little is still known about the incidence, char- acteristics, or circumstances of the violent hate crimes against Middle Easterners following the terrorist attacks. The objective of this study was to use newspaper reports to docu- ment and describe hate related violent victimizations of Mid- dle Easterners or those perceived to be Middle Easterners during the month following the September 11 attacks. METHODS The Nexis database, which is the companion service to Lexis in the LexisNexis information service, was used to identify and collect information reported in the media about violent victimizations experienced by Middle Easterners or those per- ceived to be of Middle Eastern descent. The Nexis database provides access to the full text of over 30 000 domestic and international news sources.5 These news files are updated daily and organized into libraries allowing users to focus searches topically and geographically to identify relevant arti- cles. For this study, articles were selected using key words describing hate crimes, harassment, and different types of violent acts and key words identifying victims who were either Muslims or Middle Easterners. Key words also included religious terms (Muslim, Islam, Sikh) and the names of coun- tries in the Middle East, North Africa, and South Asia. The LexisNexis database search yielded 2659 news articles that were each reviewed to identify incidents that met the case definition. To meet the case definition, an incident had to have the fol- lowing characteristics: (1) the incident took place in the US between September 1 and October 11 (the period between September 1 and 11 was included to establish a baseline); (2) the incident was described as a homicide, a physical assault on a person, a threat with a weapon, or an attack on people in buildings (for example, drive-by shootings, explosions, arson); (3) the victim was a Muslim or from a Middle Eastern coun- try, or was perceived to be a Muslim or from a Middle Eastern country; and (4) there was evidence that the incident was motivated, in whole or in part, by the offender’s bias against Muslims or Middle Easterners. Evidence of such a motive was defined according to the Hate Crime Data Collection Guidelines of the US Department of Justice.6 Verbal assaults without physical contact were excluded. Physical attacks lack- ing evidence that they were bias-motivated were also excluded. RESULTS Our review found 100 incidents of violent victimization during the period September 1 to October 11 (fig 1) that met the case definition. Only one of these incidents occurred before September 11 and will not be discussed further. More than three quarters (77%) of the 99 incidents that occurred after September 11 were reported in the 10 days immediately after the terrorist attacks (9/11–9/20). The 99 incidents involved at least 128 victims and 171 perpetrators and included 15 attacks on people in buildings. Incidents were reported in 26 states with California (n=23) and New York (n=15) reporting the most incidents. The violent incidents included murder (7%), attempted murder (7%), aggravated assault (36%), simple See end of article for authors’ affiliations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Correspondence to: Dr Monica H Swahn, Division of Violence Prevention, Mailstop K 60, National Center for Injury Prevention and Control, CDC, 4770 Buford Highway, Atlanta, GA 30341–3724, USA; mswahn@cdc.gov . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187 www.injuryprevention.com o n A p ril 5 , 2 0 2 1 b y g u e st. P ro te cte d b y co p yrig h t. h ttp ://in ju ryp re ve n tio n .b m j.co m / In j P re v: first p u b lish e d a s 1 0 .1 1 3 6 /ip .9 .2 .1 8 7 o n 1 Ju n e 2 0 0 3 . D o w n lo a d e d fro m http://injuryprevention.bmj.com/ assault (28%), intimidation (5%), arson (1%), and destruction of property (15%). The locations of these violent incidents were convenience stores (13%), on the street (13%), gas stations (12%), school/college (11%), places of worship (9%), other locations (24%), and unspecified locations (18%). Among all incidents, 12% involved multiple victims, 40% involved multiple perpetrators, and 68% involved the use of a weapon. Of the 105 victims with known sex, 84% were males. The mean age of the 39 victims who had their age reported was 33 years (ranging from 3 to 71 years). Information about injuries was reported for 96 of the victims, and 39% of these victims were injured. Of the 81 victims with known national origin, 42% were Middle Easterners, 44% were South Asians, and 14% were of other national origins (Latin American, Native Ameri- can, Moroccan, Somalian, Sudanese, Guyanan). Of the 52 vic- tims with known religious affiliations, 75% were Muslims, 19% were Sikhs, and 6% were Christians. At least nine victims (7%) were neither Middle Easterners nor Muslims. Of the 133 perpetrators with known sex, 98% were males. The mean age of the 33 perpetrators who had their age reported was 32 years (ranging from 13 to 76 years). Of the 15 occupied buildings that were attacked, seven were gas stations and convenience stores, four were places of worship, two were community centers, one was a private residence, and one was a specialty store. Six of the attacks were arson/explosions, five involved gunfire, two involved throwing rocks, and two were unspecified vandalism. DISCUSSION These results suggest a backlash of violence against Middle Easterners in the US immediately following the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Baseline rates of hate crimes against Middle Eastern- ers in the US are not known. However, FBI reported 93 anti-Islamic hate crime assaults in 2001 compared with only 12 anti-Islamic hate crime assaults in 2000.4 7 In fact, the FBI reported that anti-Islamic religion incidents increased by more than 1600% between the years 2000 and 2001 which they attributed to the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001.4 Unlike previous reports of violent hate crimes against Mid- dle Easterners following the 9/11 terrorist attacks1–3 we used a stringent case definition to include only those violent acts that were motivated by the perpetrators’ bias against Middle East- erners or Muslims and that resulted in actual injuries or risk of injuries. We also reviewed violent incidents occurring before September 11 (September 1 to September 10) to document a potential increase in violent acts against Middle Easterners or Muslims that could be attributed to the terrorist attacks. Our findings show that there was a substantial increase in violent attacks on Middle Easterners following the terrorist attacks. There are some similarities between the characteristics of violent attacks targeting Middle Easterners described in this report and the violent hate crimes reported by the Bureau of Justice Statistics for the years 1997 to 1999.8 For example, both reports found that the majority of victims and perpetrators of violent hate crimes were males. In addition, 12% of the violent attacks against Middle Easterners in this review involved multiple victims, which is comparable to the 17% of violent hate crimes involving multiple victims as reported by the Bureau of Justice Statistics.8 However, our findings indicate that violent attacks against Middle Easterners were more likely to involve multiple offenders (40%) than violent hate crimes overall (25%).8 The findings in this report are subject to at least three limi- tations. First, what is published in the media and how it is described is often incomplete and subject to the biases of reporters and editors. The extent of this bias is unknown because news reports have so rarely been used to collect pub- lic health data on injuries.9–11 A previous study found that newspapers under-reported suicides, rapes, and assaults com- pared with official records but reported more incidents of homicide than were documented by city and county law enforcement.9 However, it is often difficult to measure the bias of newspaper coverage since there may not exist any other sources to which the data can be compared. Second, the current report represents a serious undercount of violent hate crimes targeting Middle Easterners and those perceived to be of Middle Eastern descent because of our stringent case defi- nition, the limited information on the motivation of the perpetrators, and because many crimes may not have received any press coverage. Finally, due to the nature of the data that we collected we can not infer that the reported acts of violence against Middle Easterners were caused by the terrorist attacks. However, we found that the perpetrators in at least 30 of the incidents specifically mentioned the September 11 ter- rorist attacks, or accused the victims of being terrorists, while they attacked their victims. These statements clearly link the perpetrators’ bias against Middle Easterners to the terrorist attacks on September 11. IMPLICATIONS FOR PREVENTION There are three implications of our findings. First, despite its limitations, the media can be a useful source of information Figure 1 Hate related violent attacks on Middle Easterners, United States, September 1 to October 11, 2001. (Seven attacks are not included in the figure due to missing information about their exact date.) 188 Swahn, Mahendra, Paulozzi, et al www.injuryprevention.com o n A p ril 5 , 2 0 2 1 b y g u e st. P ro te cte d b y co p yrig h t. h ttp ://in ju ryp re ve n tio n .b m j.co m / In j P re v: first p u b lish e d a s 1 0 .1 1 3 6 /ip .9 .2 .1 8 7 o n 1 Ju n e 2 0 0 3 . D o w n lo a d e d fro m http://injuryprevention.bmj.com/ about violent hate crimes. The primary value of using media reports is that the information can be gathered, summarized, and disseminated relatively quickly and inexpensively com- pared with other methods of data gathering. Second, public health and criminal justice professionals should anticipate violent hate crimes shortly after well publicized attacks on the US that are perpetrated or appear to be perpetrated by mem- bers of ethnic and religious minorities. Moreover, since most violent victimizations occurred in the 10 days immediately following the terrorist attacks, interventions that promote tol- erance and understanding of diversity need to be imple- mented quickly in order to be effective. Public health messages that highlight religious and cultural similarities of people from different ethnic backgrounds may help to decrease ten- sion and hostility. Finally, many violent victimizations occurred in businesses owned or operated by minorities such as convenience stores and gas stations suggesting that increased presence at these locations by police and neighbor- hood watch programs may be a useful strategy to prevent vio- lent hate crimes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Authors’ affiliations M H Swahn, R R Mahendra, L J Paulozzi, R L Winston, G A Shelley, L Frazier, J R Saul, Division of Violence Prevention, National Center for Injury Prevention and Control, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia J Taliano, Office of Communication Resources, National Center for Injury Prevention and Control, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia REFERENCES 1 Fries JH. Complaints of anti-Arab bias crimes dip, but concerns linger. New York Times 22 December, 2001: B8. 2 South Asian American Leaders of Tomorrow. American backlash: terrorists bring home war in more ways than one. SAALT, 2001. Available at http://www.saalt.org/abr.htm (accessed 07/19/2002). 3 Sikh Coalition, Incidents and Hate Crimes. Available at http://www.sikhcoalition.org/ListReports.asp (accessed 07/19/2002). 4 US Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform crime reporting system. Hate crimes statistics, 2001. Available at http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/01hate.pdf (accessed 01/03/2003). 5 LexisNexis Group. Nexis, NEWS, USNWS [online database]. Dayton, OH: LexisNexis, 2001. Available at http://www.nexis.com/research (accessed 12/10/2001). 6 US Department of Justice. Hate crime data collection guidelines. Uniform Crime Reporting, Revised October 1999. Available at http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/hatecrime.pdf (accessed 07/19/2002). 7 US Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Reporting System. Hate crimes statistics, 2000. Available at http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius_00/hate00.pdf (accessed 07/19/2002). 8 Strom K. Hate crimes reported in NIBRS, 1997–1999. Washington, DC: Bureau of Justice Statistics, US Department of Justice, 2001 (publication no NCJ 186765). 9 CDC. Dog-bite-related fatalities—United States 1995–1996. MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 1997;46(21):463–6. 10 Rainey DY, Runyan CW. Newspapers: a source for injury surveillance? Am J Public Health 1992;82:745–6. 11 Fine PR, Jones CS, Wrigley JM, et al. Are newspapers a viable source for intentional injury surveillance data? South Med J 1998;91:234–42. Key points • There was a significant increase in violent hate crimes against Middle Easterners in the 10 days following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. • Most violent hate crimes involved male victims and male perpetrators. • The most common locations of violent hate crimes were gas stations and convenience stores. • Public health and criminal justice professionals should anticipate violent hate crimes shortly after well publicized attacks on the US that are perpetrated or appear to be per- petrated by members of ethnic and religious minorities. Violence against Middle Easterners 189 www.injuryprevention.com o n A p ril 5 , 2 0 2 1 b y g u e st. P ro te cte d b y co p yrig h t. h ttp ://in ju ryp re ve n tio n .b m j.co m / In j P re v: first p u b lish e d a s 1 0 .1 1 3 6 /ip .9 .2 .1 8 7 o n 1 Ju n e 2 0 0 3 . D o w n lo a d e d fro m http://injuryprevention.bmj.com/ 
work_3ln5itf7abej7nzgblbvk2cmnq	----	The Europeanization of anti-LGBT hate crime laws in the Western Balkans The Europeanization of anti-LGBT hate crime laws in the Western Balkans Piotr Godzisz1 Published online: 28 January 2019 # The Author(s) 2019 Abstract Despite high levels of societal homophobia, Western Balkan countries have recently passed laws proscribing anti-LGBT violence. The laws, however, are rarely used, as these countries report few or no recorded cases. The question is: Why do Western Balkan countries legislate against homophobia, but then fail to operationalize that legislation? Hate studies, still over-focused on the West, do not provide the answer. The aim of this paper is to offer a possible explanation based on a combination of secondary data provided by the OSCE and primary research undertaken by the author. Using the theory of Europeanization as an explanatory frame, the paper argues that hate crime laws are enacted as part of the democratization process, with the support of the OSCE and NGOs, and under EU influence. As this is done before favourable sentiments are assured, insufficient resources are put into the policing and monitoring of hate crime. Key words Europeanization.Anti-LGBTHateCrime.WesternBalkans.Organizationfor Security and Cooperation in Europe Introduction and research problem1 Hate crime is a criminal offence committed with a bias motive [1]. The motivation relates to someone’s personal characteristic, such as ‘race’, ethnicity, religion, sexual orientation, gender, gender identity, disability or other categories. A considerable amount of research has been conducted on the proliferation of hate crime statutes in the North American and British contexts (for a recent review, see [2]). Other parts of the Crime, Law and Social Change (2019) 71:291–306 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10611-019-09818-9 1I would like to thank Joanna Perry, Aleš Hanek and dr. Azra Junuzović for helping me to conceptualize the research problem, and anonymous reviewers for their useful comments. All mistakes are mine. * Piotr Godzisz pgodzisz@lambdawarszawa.org 1 Lambda Warszawa, Żurawia 24a, 00-515 Warszawa, Poland http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1007/s10611-019-09818-9&domain=pdf mailto:pgodzisz@lambdawarszawa.org world have not received as much attention, even though developments in some regions, particularly in Europe, are remarkable. For example, in the Western Balkans (WB), all seven states – Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo,2 Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYR Macedonia), Montenegro and Serbia – have recently passed legislation providing penalty enhancements for bias-motivated violence. This is despite having some of the most homophobic societies in Europe [3, 4]. Why do, then, WB governments pass laws protecting LGBT (lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender) people? While the proliferation of hate crime laws in the region is already a reason worth investigating, there are more issues that need to be explained. Although the legal framework is established, it seems to be little used in practice, as there are few, if any, prosecutions. For some reason, however, this paradox has failed to attract signif- icant attention of hate crime scholars. With some exceptions (e.g. [5]), if the region is mentioned in hate crime literature, it is in the context of ‘balkanization’, purportedly happening in the US as an effect of introducing hate crime laws [6]. This process, however, if at all happening, has little to do with how WB states respond to hate crime. One possible answer for the developments in law could be in the ongoing democratization of the region, which overlaps with preparations to join the European Union (EU) – an aspiration of the WB governments expressed over a decade ago [7]. For that, they need to undertake reforms and adopt EU norms and values. This process has been studied in the framework of Europeanization [8]. While current research in this area is helpful, the adoption of hate crime laws has never been a central research question. For this reason, some aspects specific to hate crime laws, as opposed to, for example, equal treatment legislation, have largely skipped attention of scholars of Europeanization. In particular, the literature is almost silent on the activities of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), dubbed a leading international authority on hate crime [9]. Most importantly, little has been offered, in terms of theory, to explain its political impacts. In attempting to address this gap, this paper responds to the following questions: Have (1) the integration with the EU and (2) the activities of the OSCE impacted how Western Balkan states respond to anti-LGBT violence? If yes, then how? The aim of this paper is to provide a possible explanation for the recent legal and policy develop- ments regarding countering anti-LGBT hate crime in the WB. The paper proposes that the developments are best understood in the context of Europeanization of fundamental rights. This framework allows to appreciate the role of both activists and the OSCE, and describe how they work together to achieve common goals. The argument expounded in this paper develops as follows: First, it lays out theoretical considerations in relation to the Europeanization of fundamental rights. Next, the paper presents the international framework on countering anti-LGBT hate crime, focusing on the work of the OSCE. The paper then moves onto the empirical section, which provides an analysis on how and why WB governments respond to anti- LGBT hate crimes. From here it is argued that hate crime laws are provided as an expedient way for governments to prove their bona fide towards fundamental rights. 2 Kosovo is not uniformly recognized as an independent state. However, as law and police systems are separate from those in Serbia, and the OSCE has separate operations in Prishtinë/Priština, this study treats Kosovo as a separate case. 292 P. Godzisz Lack of statistics means, however, that the norm of protecting people from homophobia is yet to be realized in practice. The paper closes by reflecting on implications for future research and policy. Specifically, it points to the need: (1) for a broader comparative research; and (2) to find a way of making hate crime laws work in the context of delays in joining the EU. Fundamental rights and Europeanization Research from the US evidences that jurisdictions with an active advocacy community, higher income and progressive population and friendly elites are more likely to legislate against anti-LGBT violence [2, 10, 11]. In line with US research, some European scholars link hate crime laws with advocacy work of minority organizations. For example, Schweppe [12] asserts that ‘[m]any hate crimes statutes are created, not out of an evidence-based objective approach, but rather as the result of sustained lobbying on the part of particular interest groups’. Observations of scholars focused on the Western world, are, however, some way off in parts of Europe (cf. [13], p. 441). In most countries on the continent, laws proscribing racism and xenophobia can be traced to international human rights treaties enacted after the World War 2 ([13], p. 423). The current wave of anti-LGBT hate crime laws is, however, not so easily explicable. Laws providing for higher penalties for anti-LGBT hate crimes are passed in some LGBT- friendly and some LGBT-hostile countries; some countries with high and some coun- tries with low GDP; some older democracies and some countries in the process of democratization. In the context of the WB, particularly the last category seems to be the key. While EU accession negotiations are mostly about economic issues, in recent years the EU has developed an approach in which human rights are pushed to the front, described as ‘fundamentals first’ [14]. Among the norms championed by European institutions is LGBT equality. For example, in 2012 the European Commission (EC) confirmed that LGBT rights constitute ‘an integral part of both the Copenhagen political criteria for accession and the EU legal framework on combatting discrimination’ [15]. The process of adopting EU rules by third states is known as Europeanization ([16], p. 7). Europeanization can include the transfer of ‘formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’ and shared beliefs and norms’ ([17], p. 3). When engaging in norm promotion, the EU uses two mechanisms – external incentives [18, 19] and social learning [20]. In the former, the norm is implemented by new-adopters when they decide that the benefits outweigh the costs. In the latter - the norm is adopted if it resonates domestically and is perceived as natural, legitimate and appropriate [16, 21]. To encourage states to adopt norms the EU often uses condition- ality, providing a reward to candidate states and withholding something it if states fail to comply. The reinforcement by reward is visible particularly before accession. Krizsan and Popa observe that the ‘logic of consequences dominates before accession, while appropriateness becomes the predominant logic post-accession, when conditionality is no longer in place’ ([22]:384 citing Beveridge 2009 and Krizsan 2009). Both the above mechanisms – external conditioning and social learning – are top- down processes, in which the norms are transferred from the EU to third countries [23]. Scholars such as Kulpa [24] critique this aspect of Europeanization theories arguing The Europeanization of anti-LGBT hate crime laws in the Western... 293 that it is a form of a cultural hegemony of the West. Slootmaeckers [25] adds that the EU does not introduce new norms to enlargement countries, but rather helps to mobilize norms which are already present, though perhaps marginalized. The mobili- zation is facilitated by transnational advocacy networks, in which non-governmental organizations (NGOs) play the central role [26]. In the context of LGBT rights, NGOs received a lot of attention, most recently from Ayoub [27], Ayoub and Paternotte [28] and Paternotte [29]. Considerably less academic attention has been paid to the role of institutional actors, particularly the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and OSCE missions. In the context of hate crime, as the section below shows, a closer look at the mandate and activities of OSCE bodies allows us to better explain the proliferation of laws. Anti-LGBT hate crime and international organizations To date, there is no international obligation to recognize anti-LGBT hate crimes as specific offences. The most relevant EU law pertaining to bias-motivated violence – the Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA [30], while setting out an obligation to provide penalty enhancements for crimes motivated by racism and xenophobia, leaves out sexual orientation and gender identity (SOGI), as well as gender or disability hate crime. The Directive 2012/29 [31] recognizes a range of personal characteristics that should be taken into account when assessing victim’s needs (including SOGI), but does not provide for penalty enhancements. The term ‘hate crime’ first appeared in international commitments in the context of the OSCE in 2003 [32]. Since the early 2000s, as Swiebel and van der Veur observe, the OSCE ‘has become the leading international authority in combating hate crimes, including hate crimes against LGBT persons’, despite ‘the lacking official mandate to include sexual orientation and gender identity as a ‘bias ground^ ([9], p. 31). Indeed, OSCE states have made a number of commitments relating to bias-motivated violence, including enacting legislation which would provide for enhanced sentences if bias motivation is detected, and reporting statistics to ODIHR [1]. The OSCE promotes the ‘hate crime model’ (according to Goodey [13] ‘based essentially on a US model’) as a new and effective way of understanding and responding to the old problem of bigoted violence. The model, as Perry [5]describes, . . . elaborate[s] on traditional descriptions of racist violence in that more than one type of bias motivation is covered and that the response to this violence goes beyond the legal sphere, and into the realm of policy actions that aim to increase reporting, victim support, practitioner training and access to justice (P. 75). Because hate crime is such an ‘OSCE thing,’ it is the most obvious aspect of democratization work conducted by the OSCE to analyse. But the organizations’ bodies’ unique characteristics provide even more reasons to look at the OSCE more closely. ODIHR, the human rights agency working across 57 countries, has a mandate ‘to serve as a collection point for information and statistics on hate crimes and relevant legislation’, build capacity of law enforcement and criminal justice personnel, and to review current and proposed hate crime laws [33]. Field missions, on the other hand, 294 P. Godzisz each with an individual mandate, are tasked with assisting host countries in the democratization process.3 In this sense, OSCE bodies are in a unique position between international institutions, such as the European Commission, which sets requirements and provides incentives for fulfilling them, and NGOs, which facilitate the adoption of the international norm on the ground. But, while the OSCE (through the missions and ODIHR) has been active in the field of hate crimes for about fifteen years now, it has attracted surprisingly little attention from academics. Commentaries are few and far between, and they seem to contradict each other. On the one hand, Goodall [34] speaks about the ‘under-acknowledged influence’ of the OSCE. On the other hand, Garland and Funnell [35] suggest that, ‘. . . while they have devised well-intentioned hate crime policies, organisations like ODIHR appear to have little influence over whether states actively seek to address and combat hate’. Findings below show, however, that the truth may lie somewhere in the middle. Data and methods This research uses data collected for a broader, pan-European comparative research between March 2015 and December 2016. Seven WB states are selected for analysis: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, FYR Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia. They share a number of characteristics: low GDP per capita [36], compared to the rest of Europe; deeply ingrained anti-gay attitudes [37]; unresolved interethnic conflicts and minority issues; and an ongoing process of democratization.4 Finally, as current or recent EU candidates,5 all have been subject to similar EU conditioning (‘fundamentals first’). Results and discussion Influencing factors Homophobia in the Western Balkans is explained through a combination of cultural, social and religious factors. Homosexuality (and LGBT visibility) is seen as a threat to national dignity, an insult to public morals and religion ([40], p. 20). Despite high levels of societal homophobia, Western Balkans have an active LGBT advocacy community. ILGA-Europe has three member organizations from Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Montenegro each; four from FYR Macedonia; and seven from Croatia and Serbia each.6 Similarly to other countries in Central and Eastern Europe, the movement ‘experienced a ‘condensed’ version of the development in the West ([41], p. 3 See the list of missions and their mandates on the OSCE website at http://www.osce.org/where-we-are (accessed 29 April 2017). 4 Except for Albania, all countries are in a post-war state. For an up-to-date discussion on the democratization of the WB, see contributions in the volume edited by Keil [38]. 5 This group includes countries at various stage of integration with the EU (see [39]). Croatia joined the EU in 2013. 6 As of 19 April 2017. See the list of organizations at http://www.ilga-europe.org/who-we-are/members. The Europeanization of anti-LGBT hate crime laws in the Western... 295 http://www.osce.org/where-we-are http://www.ilga-europe.org/who-we-are/members 30), prioritizing legal recognition of same-sex unions from the onset. Many organiza- tions are also involved in hate crime advocacy. For example, Bosnian activists wel- comed the amendments of the law in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH; one of three jurisdictions in the country), calling them ‘the result of all the hard work and advocacy of all the members of [hate crime] Coalition and other BH and international organisations’ ([42], emphasis added). Indeed - hate crime advo- cacy in the WB – unlike in the West – is conducted side by side with international organizations. The involvement of international actors includes, inter alia, joint activities on the ground, shadow reporting and funding. First, international organizations, as well as NGOs, are involved in countering hate crime in the WB through working with legislators. For example, in Serbia, activists drafted a bill proposing amendments to the criminal code [43]. ODIHR, on its part, provided three law reviews – two for FYR Macedonia and one for Bosnia and Herzegovina [44–46], recommending changes in the criminal code provisions proscrib- ing targeted violence. Second, further to working on the legal framework, OSCE missions often engage in monitoring hate crime on the ground (e.g. [47]). The OSCE is also active in capacity- building, delivering training to police, prosecutors, judges and civil society represen- tatives. So far, Croatia, FYR Macedonia, Kosovo and Montenegro signed agreements with ODIHR to implement its hate crime training programme for law enforcement, whereas in other countries the training is provided as one-off events.7 OSCE bodies engage also with academia. For example, in November 2016, the mission in Sarajevo organized a conference Hate crimes in South-East Europe, gathering over 70 partici- pants [48]. Third, local activists engage in the so-called ‘boomerang pattern’ of advocacy [26], sending shadow reports to the European Commission, ODIHR, or various United Nations (UN) human rights bodies. The aim of that is to provide the international community with an alternative – to the one presented by the government – information about the adequacy of the legal and policy frameworks to tackle hate crime. In return, international bodies are expected to apply pressure on the government. For example, in 2012 advocates from Montenegro sent a shadow report to the UN Human Rights Council, in which they recommended ‘that the Criminal Code should be amended so that hate crimes against persons of homosexual orientation (homophobia) or transgen- der persons (transphobia), as well as other forms of hate crimes, would be considered as severe forms of criminal offence’ ([49], p. 4). ODIHR, too, provides the Human Rights Council with information about hate crime in countries under review, similarly to NGOs.8 Finally, another way in which international bodies aim at influencing WB govern- ments’ hate crime policies is through money transfers. In general, both NGOs and governments from accession countries have access to various international funding sources which may be useful in improving protection from hate crime. Funds may come from international organizations (e.g. the European Commission) or Western countries’ governments. For example, between 2016-2017 the USA State Department 7 Email from ODIHR representative to the author, 20 April 2016. 8 S e e t h e w e b s i t e o f t h e U n i v e r s a l P e r i o d i c R e v i e w a t h t t p : / / w w w. o h c h r. org/EN/HRBodies/UPR/Pages/RSSession15.aspx (accessed 19 April 2017). 296 P. Godzisz http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/UPR/Pages/RSSession15.aspx http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/UPR/Pages/RSSession15.aspx financed a project called Using EU integration process for improvement of LGBT rights in the Western Balkans, developed across the region by a consortium of six organiza- tions [50]. The empirical consequences of the involvement of international bodies in the of hate crime advocacy in the WB are presented below. Legal framework As of 1 August 2016, all seven countries have hate crime laws in the form of penalty enhancements (sometimes mixed with substantive offences). Sexual orientation is explicitly recognized as a protected category in six countries (except FYR Macedonia). Out of the six, five also include gender identity in the list of protected grounds (Kosovo does not). Croatia was the first jurisdiction to recognize sexual orientation (2006), while the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovinais the most recent one (2016).9 The overview of adoption is presented in Table 1 below. The influence of the OSCE’s hate crime model on the criminal codes in the region is identifiable in the use of penalty top-ups, a broad list of protected grounds, and types of crime under the umbrella of ‘hate crime.’ For example, FYR Macedonia, which did not have hate crime laws before 2009, introduced a general penalty enhancement for bias- motivated crimes, as suggested by ODIHR in its law review [45].10 In the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, ODIHR suggested expanding the definition of hate crime to include property damage, as a reminder that any type of criminal act may be motivated by bias ([44], p. 4). In fact, even actual definitions of hate crime, based on that of the OSCE, found its way to some of the criminal codes in the region. For example, the amendments in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina define hate crime as ‘every criminal act committed because of the race, skin colour, religious belief, national or ethnic origin, language, disability, gender, sexual orientation or gender identity of the victim’ [42]. The openness of WB countries to legislating against old problems, such as intereth- nic violence, with new solutions provided by the OSCE is noted by some informants interviewed in this research.11 For example, one international civil servant comments that . . . candidate countries are [a] really good kind of target for international organizations, because they are in this learning state. . . And they are very open to what’s coming from the international environment. So, if the question is, ‘are they more receptive?’ Yes, they are much more receptive to new concepts – because it [hate crime] is a new concept – but also to solutions, and how to address them.12 9 Two out of three Bosnia and Herzegovina constituencies – Brčko District and Republika Srpska – included sexual orientation as one of the protected characteristics in 2010. In 2013 Republika Serpska additionally improved the legislation and gender identity was added to the list. Email from representative of the Sarajevo Open Centre to the author, 7 June 2016. 10 Article 39(5). Excerpts of hate crime laws from the OSCE participating states are available at http://www. legislationline.org/topics/subtopic/79/topic/4. 11 Interview with an international civil servant, 30 May 2016; interview with a former member of the UN Human Rights Committee, 21 November 2015. 12 Interview with an international civil servant, 30 May 2016. The Europeanization of anti-LGBT hate crime laws in the Western... 297 http://www.legislationline.org/topics/subtopic/79/topic/4 http://www.legislationline.org/topics/subtopic/79/topic/4 This finding is in line with previous research, which confirms that democratizing countries, observant of their international reputation, are susceptible to both new concepts and solutions [38]. As a result, they are likely to pass the most recent version of the legislation, ‘despite being followers on LGBT rights in earlier years’ (Moravcsik, in [51], p. 308). Similarly, in the US, Jenness and Grattet [52] observe that, as time went on ‘laggard states, those who passed the laws later, ironically tended to employ a more expansive and progressive definition of hate crime.’ Conversely, coun- tries which had undertaken reforms earlier have little incentive to ‘update’ their frameworks. For example, in the old EU, Ireland has provisions prohibiting incitement to hatred based on sexual orientation, but the law does not stipulate for penalty enhancements for bias-motivated violence ([53], p. 49). Despite criticism from international bodies [54] and evidence showing the inadequacy of the current provisions [55], the government has so far not started works to introduce harsher sentences for hate crime. In the Western Balkans, the norm to protect people from targeted violence is mobilized in the light of the new ‘fundamentals first’ standard and facilitated by templates provided by the OSCE. As one of the experts observes, The OSCE and the Council of Europe played a very important role in shaping their [WB countries] legal systems, and at that time it [sexual orientation hate crime law] was already a standard.13 As a result, countries in the accession process passed hate crime laws as asked by activists, in a form promoted by the OSCE, and approved by the EU. Since this was a part of ongoing legislative reform, and the templates were provided by a trusted partner – the OSCE, the deliberative process as to whether SOGI should be included in the new hate crime laws was limited to a minimum. As one of the informants interviewed in this research states, 13 Interview with a former member of the UN Human Rights Committee, 21 November 2015. Table 1 Selected measures to tackle anti-LGBT hate crime in the Western Balkans. Explanation of symbols: ✓-present; (5)- number of cases registered in 2015. Source: Author’s own analysis, based on Rainbow Europe 2016, legislationline.org and ODIHR Hate Crime Reporting 2015. Country Law Policy Statistics Albania ✓ Bosnia & Herzegovina ✓ Croatia ✓ ✓ ✓(5) FYR Macedonia Kosovo ✓a Montenegro ✓ Serbia ✓ a Sexual orientation only. 298 P. Godzisz http://legislationline.org sexual orientation makes its way to criminal law without the government explic- itly knowing or noticing. . . Often it ends up being there by accident. I think rarely there’s a specific public debate about how the hate crime law should look like.14 The above observation – that laws in accession countries are passed as presented, as part of a larger reform – is confirmed in the literature on Europeanization. For example, Ladrech (2011, cited in [56], pp. 221–222) found that ‘laws were passed quickly, without proper debate, because of the desire of political elites to ‘gain membership in the EU, as soon as possible.’ It is, however, new to the field of hate studies, which rarely considers international organizations, focusing on advocacy work of minority groups (e.g. [52]). While all countries need to meet the same criteria, country-specific issues can explain differences in the level (and time) of norm adoption. For example, Vasilev [57] observes that ‘Croatia’s strong identification with Europe accelerated LGBT recognition there while Serbia’s relatively weaker identification with Europe slowed it down’. On the other hand, in FYR Macedonia, the parliament did not include sexual orientation as a protected ground until today, despite amending the law in 2009 and 2014, and despite ODIHR recommendations [45]. Instead, the list of protected grounds includes vague categories of ‘belonging to a marginalized group’, as well as ‘any other ground provided in law or ratified international agreement’ – which are supposed to cover ‘any discrimination on grounds of any personal characteristic’ ([58], p. 7). In the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, SOGI hate crime law was passed only in 2016, several years after the hate crime law reform commenced. Therefore, while the passage of the law in the form of penalty top-ups is a good example of OSCE influence on the region, non-inclusion of SOGI reflects how controversial LGBT rights remain in the region.15 Enforcement Although criminal codes have been reformed across the region, as Table 1 shows, only Croatia has drafted an anti-hate policy document indicating steps to counter hatred against LGBT people. While levels of reporting of anti-LGBT hate crime across the region are very low (for example, in Croatia, only 7.7 per cent of participants of a survey reported violence to the police ([59], p. 40), governments’ efforts to improve these statistics are limited. In most countries, activities are isolated and implemented on the initiative of NGOs, or the OSCE, rather than governments. For example, the OSCE mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina organized hate crime training sessions for law enforcement, the judiciary and NGOs, sometimes jointly with the Sarajevo Open Centre, in the framework of a project Fighting Hate Crime in BiH.16 Government activities can amount to allowing the OSCE and NGOs to work, and to symbolic gestures. For example, in 2015, the European forum on anti-LGBT hate crime was 14 Interview with an international civil servant, 30 May 2016. 15 Recently, the Macedonian authorities have started works on another amendment of the hate crime law, and ODIHR was once again asked to provide a law review [46]. This suggests that either the country has learned that the flawed law contains gaps (interview with an international civil servant, 30 May 2016), or it has ‘given into’ external pressures, ‘sacrificing’ homophobic views for the European perspective. 16 See the information in Developments on http://hatecrime.osce.org/bosnia-and-herzegovina. The Europeanization of anti-LGBT hate crime laws in the Western... 299 http://hatecrime.osce.org/bosnia-and-herzegovina organized in Montenegro, with the participation of government ministers from across the region. While everyone expressed commitment to tackling the problem, the event was not followed by any concrete actions.17 While some governments say that they monitor anti-LGBT hate crime,18 as Table 1 shows, there are virtually no detected cases. Only Croatia reports on anti-LGBT hate crime to ODIHR, and the number of cases is negligible (five in 2015). As such, it does not reflect the actual victimization levels, as evidenced in surveys [59, 60]. In other words, the laws on paper are not being put into action, meaning there are few prosecutions of anti-LGBT hate crime offenders. Such a disconnect between law and implementation has already been noticed in hate crime scholarship, with authors such as Garland & Funnell [35] and Turpin-Petrosino [61] noting their concerns about the level of commitment in those states that do not publish hate crime statistics. While the low number of detected cases may largely be a question of apathy, or worse, bad will, there are likely to be other practical reasons for their non-enforcement. One potential problem is that the template for laws provided by ODIHR is not enough to change the established practices of a country, particularly where financial resources are limited. In 2012, FRA came to a realization that simply having a general penalty enhancement, as in the case of Albania, may not be sufficient to address hate crime and to collect data ([62], p. 11). Having this in mind, ODIHR has recently started recommending adding a list of substantive offences, together with a general penalty enhancement, when reviewing hate crime provisions ([63], p. 10). The institution argues that such a combination facilitates law enforcement and recording. ODIHR’s and NGOs’ interventions in the WB, while sufficient to change the law, have yet to bear fruits when it comes to actual implementation, evidenced by good quality data being captured and reported. Here, there is an important role of both the OSCE and NGOs on the one hand, and the government on the other. Paraphrasing McVeigh et al. [64], ‘the presence of resourceful civil rights organizations in a county can lead to higher numbers of reported hate crimes’, but their impact ‘is contingent upon the political context’. In the WB, the political context includes both internal politics (e.g. elections), and the European perspective. External pressures The fact that laws are passed, but not enforced, suggests that the political will and resources to implement legal changes are lacking. It also suggests that laws are passed under external pressure. Adding a few provisions to the criminal code (in the extreme form, in Albania, only one - Article 50) is an easy and low-cost way for governments to prove their bona fide towards fundamental rights.19 Commenting on this, one of the informants in this research complains: 17 Interview with an international civil servant, 27 October 2016. 18 For example, according to ODIHR’s Hate Crime Reporting website, Bosnia and Herzegovina conducts a victimization survey with questions about hate crime. 19 Interviews with a member of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance, 20 November 2015; and a former member of the UN Human Rights Committee, 21 November 2015. 300 P. Godzisz I find, speaking generally, that this is a stronger motivator than a real will to do something about hate crime . . . They’re not interested in solving domestic problems: They want to score points.20 Lack of enforcement suggests that the system – and society, remaining largely homo- phobic in social attitudes–does not see the value in protecting LGBT people from targeted violence. In other words, the EU norm of safeguarding LGBT people does not resonate well. In this sense, WB countries are simply fulfilling the EU external conditionality superficially, without attempting to internalize the norms seriously. Similar findings suggesting shallow Europeanization because of incongruence with dominant norms have been found in previous in research. For example, Ayoub [51] argues that accession countries ‘were confronted with policy and programmatic frame- works before philosophical viability –favourable public sentiments – could be assured’. The above finding (laws without implementation as an effect of the external incentives) is also confirmed by the fact that the enthusiasm for reforms seems to decrease after the country is already inside the EU. As one of the interviewees observes, . . . I can compare them [current EU candidates], and their enthusiasm, and their openness, to those which are already in. And Croatia… Croatia is not very open nowadays. And I know from the annals of the OSCE history that once they were very open.21 This is in line with previous research on the topic. For example, a Montenegrin activist interviewed by Pelz ‘suggested that Montenegro needs to remain in the accession process for several more years to help build the LGBT movement, and to ensure proper implementation of laws while EU oversight remains significant’ ([56], p. 15). A tendency to slow down reforms, or even undergo an anti-gay backlash, was observed in some 2004 enlargement countries as well. For example, Lithuania adopted a law on the protection of minors forcing news outlets to censor information related to LGBT persons, effectively limiting the right to freedom of expression of LGBT persons ([65], p. 3). The law has been compared with the ‘Section 28’ which used to prohibit discussion of homosexuality in UK schools [66]. Quasi-activists As shown above, OSCE bodies are in an interesting position between activists and the European Commission. They both set the standards and support governments in meeting standards set by others. From the point of view of social movements theory, they are quasi-activists, engaged in work on the ground, but with international creden- tials and additional tools, giving them more legitimacy and leverage. Together with local activists and ILGA-Europe, they form part of a transnational advocacy network [67], bound together by a shared commitment to tackle hate crime in all its forms. From the point of view of Europeanization theory, the OSCE, through sharing expertise and offering solutions to the issue of bias-motivated violence, helped activists to 20 Interview with an international civil servant, 30 May 2016. 21 Interview with an international civil servant, 30 May 2016. The Europeanization of anti-LGBT hate crime laws in the Western... 301 conceptualize their claims and governments to select legislative options. The enlarge- ment process, in turn, gave them visibility, and the pressure from the European Commission resulted in passing the laws.22 While the work on the ground is important, the example of current EU countries, some of which are lagging behind candidate states in terms of legislative frameworks, shows that the EU pressure, particularly in the context of a broader reform, was crucial. Conclusions The goal of this of this paper is to provide a possible explanation for the fact that Western Balkan states, despite having some of the highest levels of intolerance in Europe, have recently passed some of the most progressive laws proscribing anti- LGBT violence on the continent. Using a mix of primary and secondary sources, this study analyses how transnational advocacy networks urge WB governments to respond to violence targeting LGBT people. This work is conducted in the light of new EU accession policy (‘fundamentals first’), which emphasizes respect for LGBT rights. In practice, this means that the EU expects aspiring countries to pass anti-LGBT hate crime laws. Failure to comply may impede the integration process and delay benefits stemming from EU membership. The external EU pressure, coupled with the mobilization of advocacy networks, results in the passage of modern hate crime laws. Nevertheless, while the legal norm is adopted, the values which it is supposed to express are not internalized, and limited efforts are put into enforcement. As a result, new laws are rarely used in action. In the advocacy network, activists on the ground evidence the problem, while transnational allies provide expertise and funding. The OSCE has a special role here. While active in the field for over 15 years, the OSCE has attracted surprisingly little academic attention, even though it is through this organization that the ‘hate crime model’, offering the description and solutions for bias-motivated violence, started to permeate WB states’ legal systems [34]. But it is not only the effects, but also methods: OSCE bodies, such as the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, active in 57 states, are ‘quasi-activists,’ involved in work on the ground, but benefitting from international credentials and specific tools, giving them more leverage. The OSCE can not only make hate crime policy recommendations, but can also help to implement them. Such bodies did not play a part in passing hate crime laws in the West. In the WB, they are key players in deciding how governments respond to the problem of homophobia. The above findings are in line with Europeanization theory, which is a framework commonly used to explain norm adoption in Europe, but new to hate crime scholarship. This discipline, over-focused on the West, usually explains the passage of hate crime laws through social movements theories. In the WB, however, on its own, social movements framework falls short, as it does not account for external EU influence. This research is focused on WB with limited references to other jurisdictions. A broader study using a similar framework should be conducted in the future to explain patterns of diffusion of anti-LGBT hate crime laws across Europe. Such a study should 22 I would like to thank dr. Koen Slootmaeckers for helping me develop this argument. 302 P. Godzisz include a range of social and political, intra- and inter-state factors. It could explain ‘anomalies’ on the map of Europe, such as the fact that Ireland, which recognizes same-sex marriage, does not have hate crime laws. It could also explain the different results of LGBT mobilization in countries subjected to different ‘democratic packages’, e.g. Lithuania and Croatia, or show if there is a ‘learning curve’ and time affects adoption. It could also explore whether countries such as Serbia or Montenegro, frustrated over the dwindling prospect of joining the EU membership [68], are continuing to improving their hate crime frameworks, or the reforms have stalled. 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Retrieved August 27, 2017, from http://www.pinknews.co.uk/2009/07/14/lithuanias-parliament- passes-section-28-style-law/ 67. Keck, M. E., & Sikkink, K. (1999). Transnational advocacy networks in international and regional politics. International Social Science Journal, 51(159), 89–101. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468- 2451.00179. 68. Arbutina, Z. (2017, February 24). Balkan countries see rise in hate speech. Retrieved April 19, 2017, from http://p.dw.com/p/2YEO6 306 P. Godzisz https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G13/185/36/PDF/G1318536.pdf?OpenElement https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G13/185/36/PDF/G1318536.pdf?OpenElement http://www.zagreb-pride.net/new/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/brutalna_stvarnost_en_web.pdf http://www.zagreb-pride.net/new/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/brutalna_stvarnost_en_web.pdf http://fra.europa.eu/DVS/DVT/lgbt.php http://fra.europa.eu/DVS/DVT/lgbt.php http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra-2012_hate-crime.pdf http://www.legislationline.org https://doi.org/10.2307/1519748 https://www.upr-info.org/sites/default/files/document/lithuania/session_26_-_november_2016/a_hrc_wg.6_33_ltu_1_e_0.pdf https://www.upr-info.org/sites/default/files/document/lithuania/session_26_-_november_2016/a_hrc_wg.6_33_ltu_1_e_0.pdf http://www.pinknews.co.uk/2009/07/14/lithuanias-parliament-passes-section-28-style-law/ http://www.pinknews.co.uk/2009/07/14/lithuanias-parliament-passes-section-28-style-law/ https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2451.00179 https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2451.00179 http://p.dw.com/p/2YEO6 The Europeanization of anti-LGBT hate crime laws in the Western Balkans Abstract Introduction and research problem Fundamental rights and Europeanization Anti-LGBT hate crime and international organizations Data and methods Results and discussion Influencing factors Legal framework Enforcement External pressures Quasi-activists Conclusions References 
work_3quspanovrhzri3uj2qicnp55a	----	Revisiting and Reshaping Constructions of Hate Crime 1 1 Reconceptualising hate crime victimisation through the lens of vulnerability and ‘difference’ Neil Chakraborti and Jon Garland Abstract This article suggests that the concepts of vulnerability and ‘difference’ should be the focal points of hate crime scholarship if the values at the heart of the hate crime movement are not to be diluted. By stringently associating hate crime with particular strands of victims and sets of motivations through singular constructions of identity, criminologists have created a divisive and hierarchical approach to understanding hate crime. To counter these limitations, we propose that vulnerability and ‘difference’, rather than identity and group membership alone, should be central to investigations of hate crime. These concepts would allow for a more inclusive conceptual framework enabling hitherto overlooked and vulnerable victims of targeted violence to receive the recognition they urgently need. Keywords Hate crime, vulnerability, ‘difference’, victimisation, identity http://tcr.sagepub.com/search?author1=Neil+Chakraborti&sortspec=date&submit=Submit http://tcr.sagepub.com/search?author1=Jon+Garland&sortspec=date&submit=Submit 2 2 Introduction The concept of a ‘hate crime’ is now a familiar one to criminologists and to scholars in the related disciplines of sociology, psychology, public policy, political science and legal studies. For many, it is a politically and socially significant crime that captures the intersections between various forms of bigotry; an umbrella concept with the capacity to unite disparate social movements and to direct attention towards the collective experiences of minority groups and the commonalities in their victimisation. For others, hate crime is a slippery and somewhat elusive term whose conceptual and operational ambiguity raises thorny questions for those charged with responding to the forms of victimisation and perpetration associated with the construct. Whatever one’s viewpoint – and many criminologists would agree that neither stance is mutually exclusive – the underlying principles of the hate crime movement are laudable. A growing awareness of the harms associated with acts of bigotry and prejudice has been evident in most Western democracies over recent decades. The apparent rise in the number of such incidents (at least in terms of recorded figures), together with greater public acceptance of ‘difference’ and the legacy of progressive social movements, has stimulated considerable interest within scholarly and law enforcement domains. The ensuing raft of empirical, legislative and other associated policy interventions reveals the regional, national and international prioritisation of hate crime discourse and its importance to the governance of diversity and community cohesion. 3 3 At the same time however, our understanding of hate crime is far from complete, or as Phyllis Gerstenfeld (2004: xv) observed some years ago, ‘hate crimes seem to be a topic of some interest to nearly everybody, and yet few people really know much about them’. This remains a valid point despite the time that has passed since that assertion. Certainly, on the basis of what we learn through academic, policy and public discourse it would seem that hate crime can mean very different things to different people. Some, particularly lay-people, will understandably adopt a more literal interpretation of hate crimes in line with the more violent and extreme cases that make the news. Scholars, meanwhile, tend to see them as a social construct with no straightforward meaning and offer a set of defining characteristics which they regard as central to their commission.1 Practitioners are likely to pursue a much less complex view which requires few of the machinations evident within academic interpretations. Amidst this conceptual confusion a keenly-argued debate has taken place regarding which groups are able to think of themselves as ‘hate crime victim groups’, and thus be entitled to protection by relevant ‘bias crime’ legislation. This debate, and the accompanying legislation, has tended to centre around relatively narrow conceptualisations of identity and community, commonly regarded as immutable or fundamental as protected characteristics2. Reflecting the roots of the concept of hate crime in the civil rights struggles in 1960s and 1970s America, a common pre-requisite for scholars and criminal justice practitioners regarding hate crime victims is that they must come from traditionally marginalised minority groups. In other words, members of majority communities cannot be 4 4 understood to be victims of hate crimes as this is the preserve of historically disadvantaged minorities, even if the nature of their targeted victimisation is very similar. The limitations of this approach to hate crimes were thrown into sharp relief by the killing of goth Sophie Lancaster in 2007 in a public park in Lancashire, northern England. Sophie had been the victim of a brutal assault from five strangers who targeted her because of her visually striking appearance – her ‘difference’ (Garland, 2010). Even though the Judge at the Court of Appeal labelled the case a ‘hate crime’ no specific hate crime legislation existed under which her attackers could be prosecuted, because Sophie was not from one of those officially recognised hate crime victim groups that are included under such laws. Since this case pressure has grown, not least from the Sophie Lancaster Foundation itself, to include other groups in the remit of hate crime legislation3. However – and as this article goes on to argue – approaching the issue of inclusion through the lens of group identity politics merely exacerbates existing problems, creating divisions among communities of identity rather than highlighting the shared nature of their victimisation. Instead, we call for a re-evaluation of the way in which hate crime has come to be stringently associated with particular forms of victimisation based upon one-dimensional, though well-intentioned interpretations of identity. Specifically, we propose that perceived vulnerability and ‘difference’ should feature more prominently in the ways in which scholars and policy- makers across the world think about hate crime in order to counter the limitations of prevailing frameworks. 5 5 This article begins by examining the overarching themes of such frameworks, and considers them within the context of particular lived realities of hate crime victimisation that have been marginal to the construction of theory and policy. It then argues the case for a fresh vulnerability-based framework designed to prevent scholars, law enforcers and practitioners from becoming side-tracked by factors peripheral to targeted victimisation. Such a focus, we assert, would extend recognition to the more ‘hidden’ victims of hate crime and would enable them to receive access to a more extensive range of support services. Conventional conceptual frameworks As with crime in general, hate crime is a social construct. It emerges from a complex network of events, structures and underlying processes, and, as such, will be constructed according to different actors’ perceptions, whether they are scholars, law enforcers or victims (Hall, 2012). That hate crime can have multiple meanings is evident from the variety of interpretations offered within the existing literature. For some, hate crimes are those which inflict greater harm upon their victims than other crimes (Iganski, 2001). For others, they are illegal acts motivated, at least in part, by the group affiliation of the victim (Gerstenfeld, 2004). Alternatively, and reflecting the UK’s post-Macpherson victim-oriented agenda,4 hate crimes can refer simply to any incident perceived by the victim to be motivated by hate or prejudice (ACPO, 2005). In the absence of a universal definition it is Barbara Perry’s (2001) work in this area that has garnered the most support. Perry’s contribution is by no means the only one to have influenced the development of hate crime scholarship (see for example, Lawrence, 1999; 6 6 Jacobs, 2002), nor does it offer a hegemonic conceptualisation that has anchored academic interpretations or law enforcement responses. That said, her conceptual framework has left an indelible imprint upon contemporary hate crime discourse not just in her ‘home territory’ of North America but elsewhere as well (see, inter alia, Hall, 2005; Iganski, 2008; Chakraborti, 2010; Garland, 2012). As such, it is worth examining her stance in some detail as its implications – and limitations – are central to the arguments that follow in this article. According to Perry (2001: 10): Hate crime … involves acts of violence and intimidation, usually directed towards already stigmatised and marginalised groups. As such, it is a mechanism of power and oppression, intended to reaffirm the precarious hierarchies that characterise a given social order. It attempts to re-create simultaneously the threatened (real or imagined) hegemony of the perpetrator’s group and the ‘appropriate’ subordinate identity of the victim’s group. It is a means of marking both the Self and the Other in such a way as to re-establish their ‘proper’ relative positions, as given and reproduced by broader ideologies and patterns of social and political inequality. For Perry, violent and intimidating behaviour is distinctive when it involves an act of bigotry directed towards marginalised communities. As such hate crime cannot be divorced from the power dynamics present within modern societies that reinforce the ‘othering’ of those who are different. Indeed, the process of ‘doing difference’ is a central tenet of Perry’s 7 7 framework which sees hate as rooted in the ideological structures of societal oppression that govern normative conceptions of identity. Within such a process, hate crime emerges as a response to the threats posed by ‘others’ when they attempt to step out of their ‘proper’ subordinate position within the structural order. It is, in other words, a mechanism through which violence is used to sustain both the hegemonic identity of the perpetrator and to reinforce the boundaries between dominant and subordinate groups, reminding the victim of their place (Perry, 2009). Hate crimes in this view are acts of violence and intimidation directed towards the collective wider community whom the victim is perceived to represent. As such, hate crimes symbolise the ‘natural’ relations of superiority and inferiority within the confines of structural norms, and are designed to transmit a message to the victim’s community that they are ‘different’ and that they ‘don’t belong’. Within this framework, the victims themselves are interchangeable and almost invariably strangers with whom the perpetrator has had little or no contact as they are chosen on the basis of their generic subordinate identity rather than any individual characteristics (Perry, 2001: 29). Perry’s conceptualisation of hate crime within the broader psychological and socio-political contexts that condition hostile reactions to the ‘other’ has been of considerable value. Crucially, her framework recognises that hate crimes are part of a process of repeated or systematic victimisation shaped by context, structure and agency (see also Kelly, 1987; Bowling, 1993). However, despite the strengths of Perry’s definition and its influence upon contemporary hate studies, its implications for the way in which we conceive of hate crime victimisation and perpetration are not exclusively constructive. Whilst there is merit to each of the composite propositions of Perry’s framework, there is danger in simply interpreting 8 8 them as automatic pre-requisites to be ‘chalked off’ when seeking to identify a hate crime. Hate crimes are more expansive than even this framework allows, and scholars should not be discouraged from stepping outside of its confines when seeking to shape criminological and criminal justice responses to them. In presenting this argument, we do not wish to contest the legitimacy of Perry’s framework of ‘doing difference’ nor to downplay its relevance for understanding hate crime as a product of underlying social and cultural tensions. Rather, our concern lies with the way in which her explanation has been used by scholars, policy-makers and practitioners to shape the parameters of what is categorised as hate crime without giving due regard to whether such an explanation satisfactorily accounts for the experiences and motivations that are connected to various manifestations of hate. Her framework assumes that hate offences are mechanisms of oppression designed to reinforce the hegemonic and subordinate identities of the perpetrator’s and victim’s group, are directed towards particular communities only, and that perpetrators and victims are strangers to one another. In so doing, it inadvertently marginalises a range of experiences that could, and should, be considered alongside the more familiar aspects of hate crime discourse. It is to these issues that the article now turns. Challenging conventional frameworks: hate crime victimisation A consistent theme throughout much of the literature on hate crime is the idea that expressions of hate are intrinsically linked to prevailing power dynamics that reinforce the dominance of the powerful and the marginalisation of the ‘other’. When viewed through such a lens, hate crimes prop up the perceived superiority of the perpetrators whilst simultaneously keeping victims in their ‘proper’ place by conveying a hate-fuelled message 9 9 to their wider community. While this stance accounts for many expressions of hate crime, it does not cover them all. Missing from this picture are those more spontaneous actions which result not from any entrenched prejudice on the part of the perpetrator but which occur in the context of a highly individualised ‘trigger’ situation (McGhee, 2007). Not all perpetrators of hate crime are prejudiced all or even most of the time, but instead may express prejudice as the outcome of a particular trigger incident or event in a departure from their standard norms of behaviour. The vast array of disputes and conflicts that could conceivably be motivated only in part by prejudice challenge the assumption that hate offences are invariably a mechanism of power designed to suppress the ‘other’. This assumption also seems to overlook the ‘ordinariness’ of much hate crime: ordinary not in relation to its impact upon the victim but in the sense of how it is conceived of by the perpetrator (see also Iganski, 2008). As Kidd and Witten (2008) observe in the context of transphobic violence, victims of hate crime may be targeted not just for their violation of accepted social norms but because they are stereotypically perceived as ‘easy’ or ‘soft’ targets. While hate crimes are undeniably linked to the underlying structural and cultural processes that leave minorities susceptible to systemic violence, conceiving of these offences exclusively as a mechanism of subordination overplays what for some perpetrators will be an act borne from more banal motivations. This point is key to drawing attention to those groups of victim whose experiences have been marginalised in conventional hate crime frameworks. Wachholz (2009), for instance, notes that there has been a long tradition of subjecting the homeless to acts of violence and 10 10 intimidation and yet this victimisation has been excluded from the social construction of hate crime. A review of recent cases in the UK suggests that similar points could be made in relation to targeted violence suffered by elderly and isolated victims (Meikle, 2011); by those with mental health issues or drug and alcohol dependency (Doward, 2010); by members of alternative subcultures such as goths or nu-metallers (Garland, 2010); by sex workers (Carter, 2010); or by foreign nationals, refugees, asylum seekers, migrant workers or overseas students (Athwal, Bourne and Wood, 2010; Fekete and Webber, 2010). These groups of victims could all conceivably be classified as ‘stigmatised and marginalised groups’ (to use Perry’s (2001) description), yet they are not. Lacking either the support of lobby groups or political representation, and typically seen as ‘undesirables’, criminogenic or less worthy than other more ‘legitimate’ or credible victim groups, they are commonly excluded from view. Hate crime frameworks can also fail to recognise the diversity within the broad labels that are used to denote categories of hate crime victim. In her study of hate crimes against Asian Americans, for example, Ahn Lin (2009) notes the rich diversity of ethnic groups associated with the term ‘Asian American’ – Asian Indians, Cambodians, Chinese, Filipinos, Hmong, Japanese, Koreans, Samoans, Thai and Vietnamese – whose experiences might deliberately or unwittingly be homogenised by scholars and policy makers. Similar points have been made in relation to the experiences of those who are grouped under the broad-brush categories of BME (black and minority ethnic), LGBT (lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender) and disabled communities, where the dynamics and specificities of victimisation can be lost through the deployment of generic labels (Garland, Spalek and Chakraborti, 2006; Sherry, 11 11 2010). Generalising about diverse populations – or relying on empty notions of ‘community’ – instead of considering the discrete experiences of those who fall within the parameters of a particular group label tells us little about their particularities and the context behind their vulnerability. Furthermore, accounts of hate crime need to be more attuned to the intersectional nature of identity. For example, the harassment of lesbians may be caused by homophobia and by misogyny. A similar issue occurs in some instances against transgendered people where the higher level of victimisation incurred by male-to-female (MtF), as opposed to female-to- male (FtM) transgender people has been explained by gender oppression (Whittle et al., 2007). Equally, the intersections between a range of identity characteristics – including sexual orientation, ethnicity, disability, age, class, mental health, material deprivation or bodily shape and appearance (to name but some) – have been observed by a number of scholars, all of whom have exposed what Moran and Sharpe (2004: 400) describe as ‘the differences, the heterogeneity, within what are assumed to be homogeneous identity categories and groups’ (see also Dick, 2008; Meyer, 2010; Sherry, 2010). Recognising that hate crime can be the outcome of prejudice based upon multiple distinct yet connected lines is important for recognising the reality behind both the experience of victimisation and the commission of the offence. For instance, the accumulation of years of disablist harassment directed towards Fiona Pilkington and her family – which tragically led to her taking her own life and that of her daughter Francecca5 – has since been referred to as a watershed for the prioritisation of disablist victimisation.6 However, whilst the case acts 12 12 as a potent reminder of the nature and impact of prejudice directed towards disabled people, the relevance of related factors such as the family’s social isolation and their economically deprived locality should not be discounted. Hate crimes can often be exacerbated by socio-economic conditions, and some potential targets of hate crime may be better placed than others to avoid persecution by virtue of living at a greater distance from prejudiced neighbours or in less overtly hostile environments (Walters and Hoyle, 2012). Vulnerability to hate crime stems from a broader range of factors than singular conceptions of identity allow and this should be factored into contemporary conceptual frameworks, as should a further, often overlooked, dynamic of hate crime: namely, the capacity for members of minority groups to be perpetrators as well as victims of hate crime. **As Walters and Hoyle (ibid) suggest, it can become very difficult to distinguish between supposed perpetrators and victims during long-running and complex neighbourly disputes that feature hate incidents. Yet, within the study of hate crime, the contrasting roles of perpetrator and victim have often been taken as a ‘given’. This is reflected in Perry’s model which, by describing perpetrators and victims of hate offences in terms of their ‘superior’ and ‘subordinate’ identities, reinforces the sense that these are majority versus minority crimes; crimes which sustain the boundaries between dominant and subordinate groups and between perpetrator and victim. However, to conceive of hate crimes exclusively in this manner is to discount prejudice-fuelled violence and harassment perpetrated by minorities against fellow minorities, or indeed against those who might conventionally and simplistically be described as majority group members. Put simply, the kinds of biases, prejudices and stereotypes that form the basis of hate crimes are not the exclusive domain 13 13 of any particular group. The article now turns to acknowledge several similarly marginalised features of hate crime perpetration that can shape the development of a more nuanced conceptual framework. Challenging conventional frameworks: hate crime perpetration One of the more problematic issues surrounding hate crime relates to the fact that successful prosecution is contingent upon proof of the offender’s motive. However, contrary to popular stereotypes and the emotive imagery conjured up by the terminology, hate crimes are only very rarely committed by members of organised hate groups, supremacists or far-right extremists; the kinds of people whom one might immediately associate with being motivated by ‘hate’ for their victim and what they purportedly stand for. Rather, in much the same way that we referred to the ‘ordinariness’ of much hate crime offending in the passages above, most hate crimes tend to be committed by relatively ordinary people in the context of their everyday lives. For instance, Mason (2005: 844) has warned against the pursuit of ‘one size fits all’ explanations in this context, suggesting that hate crime perpetrators are often familiar to their victim either as an acquaintance, friend, family member, carer or partner. Equally, Iganski (2008) drawing on the work of Marcus Felson, reminds us that hate offenders are not so different from non-offenders in terms of their values and attitudes that they share. Studies conducted by Sibbitt (1997) and Ray, Smith and Wastell (2004) have come to similar conclusions regarding the parallels between racist offenders and perpetrators of non-hate crimes. For these scholars, hate offending is best understood as a feature of the ‘everyday’ prejudice that can be located in mainly deprived urban neighbourhoods7 where situational cues can give rise to the ‘animus expressed by 14 14 offenders, which lies beneath the surface of everyday cognition for many individuals’ (Iganski, 2008: 41). Of course, these explanations of offending behaviour do not necessarily contradict Perry’s thoughts about hate offences being mechanisms of oppression designed to reinforce the structural order. For Perry, such ideas can be applied even to perpetrators in positions which might be deprived or disadvantaged because it is the relative position of the powerful and subordinate groups within a social structure that confers ‘dominance, normativity and privilege’ on certain identities, and ‘subordination, marginality and disadvantage’ on others (Perry, 2001: 47). However, we would suggest that this line of thinking accounts for some, but not all forms of hate offending. Offences that we label as hate crimes may sometimes have little to do with any entrenched prejudice or hate on the part of the perpetrator but may instead arise as a departure from standard norms of behaviour; or through an inability to control language or behaviour in moments of stress, anger or inebriation; or from a sense of weakness or inadequacy that can stem from a range of subconscious emotional and psychological processes (Dixon and Gadd, 2006; Gadd, 2009; Walters, 2010). Equally, the selection of ‘soft’ or convenient targets because they are obviously ‘different’ (for instance, through markers of language, skin colour, dress or culture) or because they seem vulnerable (because of their age, isolation, disability or physical presence, to name but several factors) may have little to do with any conscious intent to suppress the ‘other’ or to communicate a message of hate to the victim’s wider community. Conceiving of these offences purely as a mechanism of oppression or subordination overplays what for some perpetrators will be an act borne from boredom, jealousy, convenience or unfamiliarity with ‘difference’. This 15 15 reality may not make the act any less reprehensible, but recognising it does affect our interpretation of hate crime. The relevance of perceived vulnerability and ‘difference’ The identity-based approach that has shaped conventional explanations of hate crime is constrained by the parameters set by official discourses, which often limit the reach of hate crime to prejudice directed towards the specific group identities. However, a vulnerability- based approach acknowledges the heightened level of risk posed to certain groups or individuals that can arise through a complex interplay of different factors, including hate, prejudice, hostility, unfamiliarity, discomfort or simply opportunism or convenience. Vulnerability has rarely taken centre stage in hate crime discourse, although it is considered in some North American theorising, most notably in Woods’s (2009) work on unfair advantage theory which advocates that courts impose additional punishment in those cases where perpetrators exploit perceived disadvantages stemming from their victim’s group membership. Indeed, Woods (2009) advocates the use of the discriminatory selection model of hate crime, for which the notion of vulnerability is especially well suited. Under such a model, offenders target victims because of their particular characteristics which may or may not be inspired by hatred or hostility; or to use the words of the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR, 2009: 48), where the offender ‘selected victims based on prejudices or stereotyped information about victim vulnerabilities’. As the ODIHR note, laws based on the discriminatory selection model can be easier to apply in practice and are more likely to better address the harms associated with hate crime than laws based 16 16 on a hostility model where proof of hostility or hatred towards the victim’s identity is required. Although the term ‘vulnerability’ is increasingly used by the mass media, politicians and scholars to characterise the significance of the fragile and contingent nature of contemporary society, its meaning is not always clear (Misztal, 2011). According to Cops and Pleysier (2011: 59), vulnerability refers to ‘the perception of exposure to danger, a loss of control over the situation and a perceived inadequate capacity to resist the direct and indirect consequences of victimisation’. Typically vulnerable groups or individuals include those who are impoverished, disenfranchised, or subject to discrimination, intolerance, subordination and stigma (Nyamathi, 1998). In the context of the preceding discussion this would include the elderly, the homeless, sex workers, refugees and asylum seekers, people with mental health issues or drug and alcohol dependency as well as other marginalised, invisible and tabooed populations targeted on the basis of their apparent vulnerability or obvious markers of ‘difference’. The victimisation suffered by these groups is likely to ‘hurt’ every bit as much as that suffered by established hate crime victim groups – and in some senses much more so. Green (2007) argues that vulnerability can have a political currency indicating the ‘value’ of the victim in the sense that the more vulnerable someone is, the greater the level of sympathy they elicit and the greater their need for security to minimise chances of victimisation (thereby cementing their transformation from victim to commodity). However, there are particular types of vulnerable victim who appear to have little or no political 17 17 currency whatsoever. Indeed as we write, the announcement of a package of ring-fenced UK government funding to protect society’s most vulnerable and persistently targeted victims makes no mention of the kinds of marginal, disenfranchised groups referred to above, but instead refers to victims of rape, sexual and domestic violence, robbery and burglary, anti-social behaviour and other worthy, yet familiar groups of victims (Ministry of Justice, 2011)8. This continued failure to account for the experiences of those who find themselves at the bottom of the hierarchy of victimisation and denied victim status (Walklate, 2011) underlines the relevance of vulnerability to criminology. Nonetheless, there is some resistance to the term ‘vulnerability’ in the field of hate studies. References to the disabled as vulnerable, for example, have been criticised for being inherently disablist in automatically conflating disability with vulnerability9 (Sherry, 2010; Quarmby, 2011) and for casting victims of disablist hate crime as requiring adult protection measures and a social care response rather than the fullest range of legal rights and protections provided through a criminal justice response (Perry, 2008). Roulstone, Thomas and Balderstone (2011) meanwhile, criticise the use of ‘vulnerable’ for its connotations of weakness and make reference to the inherently paternalistic process of powerful majority group members designating another as vulnerable as part of their service provision responsibilities. These concerns are certainly valid up to a point. However, we would argue that ‘vulnerable’ encapsulates the way in which many hate crime perpetrators view their target: as weak, defenceless, powerless or with a limited capacity to resist. A conceptual focus upon 18 18 perceived vulnerability should not be construed as suggesting that those in vulnerable positions suffer hate crime as an inevitability or as passive victims. As Walklate (2011) notes, we should not overlook victims’ capacity for resilience, and identifying factors that make people more or less resilient to hate crime victimisation should be a priority for researchers. Nor is it the case that all crimes against the vulnerable will invariably be hate crimes: legal frameworks tend to require evidence of bias motivation against the victim, whether this takes the form of hostility, prejudice, bigotry or hate, in conjunction with the crime itself (ODIHR, 2009). Moreover, it is not someone’s identity (their disability, their sexuality and so on) per se that makes them vulnerable in the context of hate crime. Rather, they may become a victim because of how that aspect of their identity intersects with other aspects of their self, and with other situational factors and context, to make them vulnerable in the eyes of the perpetrator. Green (2007), for instance, suggests that the higher rates of victimisation among black and minority ethnic communities should be understood not simply through reference to ethnicity but by recognising the relevance of socio-economic circumstance, age and the type of area they live in. A similar argument could be extended to other categories of hate crimes where the likelihood of being targeted is increased by the presence of factors that are separate from an individual’s ‘main’ or visible identity characteristic. Such a view underscores the relevance of our manner of dress, our command of English, our social class, our isolation, our routine activities, our physical presence – to name but some factors – to the process of victim selection. Whereas these factors are peripheral to an identity-centric 19 19 framework they assume a more prominent position within a framework which recognises vulnerability and ‘difference’. Understanding how ‘difference’ is central to many acts of hate crime is important if the notion of hate crime is to be reconfigured into a more inclusive concept. While being ‘different’ does not automatically mean that someone is singled out for harassment or abuse, it can mean that those in vulnerable situations are at heightened risk of victimisation. For instance, a number of studies have shown that being ‘different’ in some conservative and traditional rural environments can be dangerous in communities intolerant of non- conformity and outsiders (see, for instance, Neal, 2009; Cloke, 2004). Arguably, a fear of ‘difference’ fuelled the harassment and bullying of Mary Fox and her son Raum in Bodmin in the West of England in 2009. Both were deemed to be ‘eccentric’ by local youths who subjected them to a sustained campaign of physical and verbal abuse that in the end resulted in Mary’s death (BBC, 2010).10 This case bore similarities to that of Fiona and Francecca Pilkington, discussed above, as it involved the bullying of those who were judged to be ‘different’ and whose learning difficulties made them appear an ‘easy target’. Elsewhere, Perry (2001) and Moran and Sharpe (2004) have argued that gay and transgendered people may be targeted because they too ‘stand out’ from accepted gender norms, while Hodkinson (2002) suggests that male Goths are harassed due to their ‘effeminate’ appearance as well as their membership of an alternative subculture, leaving them especially vulnerable through this intersection of two aspects of their identity. In these instances, vulnerability is exacerbated through social conditions, prevailing norms and people’s reactions to ‘difference’. 20 20 Interpretations of vulnerability are diffuse, and incorporating factors that are vague or ill- defined into our theoretical and policy frameworks could conceivably undermine the concept of hate crime. That said, vulnerability is no more ambiguous a term than any of the existing factors necessary for establishing whether or not a hate crime has occurred, whether this be hate, prejudice or hostility. Nor indeed is it any more ambiguous than some of the protected characteristics currently enshrined in different countries’ legislative hate crime frameworks, including social position or health status (Croatia11), political affiliation (Russia12), ideology (Spain13) or philosophy of life (Belgium14). Both the motivating factors and the protected grounds that form the basis of hate crime theory and policy in most countries are contingent upon contextual factors relevant to individual cases and are open to the interpretation of law enforcers. Similarly, another potential question mark against the widening of our conceptual understanding would be in relation to the practical implications this has for hate crime policy. Might the advantages of adopting a more inclusive interpretation of hate crime be offset by the operational challenges the expansion would pose to the development of policy guidance for legislators and criminal justice agencies? We would argue not. Many states use forms of bias motive as a factor which can result in a penalty enhancement for a criminal offence. Targeting someone because of their vulnerability could be one such factor that is incorporated into penal codes without overhauling existing hate crime laws. Equally, the dissemination of operational guidance on how to interpret hate crime which occurs at both 21 21 the state and transnational level could easily incorporate explicit direction on the relevance of perceived vulnerability. There are three further inter-related justifications for developing hate crime thinking around notions of perceived vulnerability and ‘difference’. First, and crucially, it directs attention towards those who fall between the cracks of existing scholarship and policy frameworks. At present we have little understanding of the victimisation directed towards less visible targets who may lack the power of class or language, the privilege of advocacy groups and support networks, or the bargaining clout of political, economic or social mobility. All too often these are people on the margins of society, or as Allan (2011) observes with reference to the homeless, ‘an inconvenient collection of individual tragedies … [people who] conjure an instant mental image, a quickening of the footsteps, an urge to rush past avoiding eye contact’. Acknowledging these kinds of ‘stigmatised and marginalised groups’ (to use Perry’s (2001) description) is precisely what hate crime scholarship and policy-making should be chiefly concerned with if it is to have meaning and legitimacy. Secondly, a vulnerability-centred approach to thinking about hate crime would be better attuned to recognising the intersectionality of identities that can be targeted by perpetrators of hate crime. Conceiving of hate crimes simply as offences directed towards individual strands of a person’s identity fails to give effect to the interplay of identities with one another and with other personal, social and situational characteristics. However, broadening our lines of enquiry to look at those targeted on the basis of their perceived vulnerability or ‘difference’ might allow us to move beyond singular constructions of 22 22 identity, and in particular to recognise the interplay between social class, socio-economic status and vulnerability. Many harrowing accounts of hate crime victimisation take place in areas on the economic margins – in areas that are avoided, ignored, written off – and yet the relevance of class and economic marginalisation to the commission of hate crime has rarely been a central feature of academic enquiry. Thirdly, giving greater focus to vulnerability feels all the more urgent in the current global financial climate where governments across the world are making drastic cuts to public and welfare services as part of ongoing austerity measures. These cuts are – and will continue to have – alarming social implications, as acknowledged by the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA) who have urged governments not to forget the risk posed by austerity measures to social protection, public health and education programmes (UNDESA, 2011), and by recent warnings from the Council for Europe Commissioner for Human Rights emphasising the potential impact of budget cuts on vulnerable groups (PILA, 2011). A painful reality for most, if not all of the societies we live in is that grants are running out, contracts are winding down and the provision of services is shrinking at an alarming rate. Many of these are the kinds of unglamorous, sometimes discretionary or charitable services which rarely generate widespread publicity but whose closure has dire implications for the more disadvantaged and vulnerable members of any society. Conclusion Hate crime is a conceptually ambiguous and divisive subject area within criminology and this article has deliberately steered away from rehearsing now familiar ground in debating the 23 23 pros and cons of the hate crime label. Instead, and in light of the increased prioritisation of hate crime amongst criminologists and within criminal justice policy, this article has sought to re-align our conceptual focus in order to facilitate a more sophisticated model of theorising and policy formation. Within this context we noted the enduring influence of Barbara Perry’s (2001) theoretical framework, and observed that whilst there is little that is intrinsically contentious about this framework we have concerns about the way in which it has been interpreted to define the parameters of hate crime victimisation unduly narrowly. In particular, we have been critical of the way in which dominant interpretations of hate crime have reinforced the marginalisation of key issues. This includes our understanding of the more individualised acts of hate borne from boredom, jealousy or unfamiliarity with ‘difference’; our awareness of those groups of victims whose experiences have been marginalised because they typically lack access to resources or political representation or because they are seen as less worthy than other more ‘legitimate’ victim groups; and our recognition of the intersectionality of identities that can be targeted by perpetrators of hate crime. These are all issues which should be central to our understanding of what a hate crime is, whom it affects and how we should respond. In order to address these oversights, we have proposed that perceived vulnerability and ‘difference’ should be given a more prominent position within hate crime frameworks. Such a stance would encourage criminologists and policy-makers to move beyond the conventionally hierarchical identity-based approach that stringently, and singularly, associates hate crime with particular strands of victims and particular sets of motivations, 24 24 and instead to focus upon factors that unite victims of hate crime, which in essence is their perceived vulnerability and ‘difference’. It is not someone’s identity per se which makes them a vulnerable target in the eyes of the perpetrator, but rather the way in which that identity intersects with other aspects of their self and with other situational factors and context. As such, conceiving of hate crime through the lens of perceived vulnerability and ‘difference’ gives effect to the realities of targeted victimisation, and in so doing allows us to transcend the homogenised generalisations all too prevalent within scholarly and policy domains. 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UCLA Law Review 56(2): 489-541. 1 This may include characteristics such as the group affiliation of the victim; the imbalance of power between perpetrator and victim; the relevance of context, structure and agency to the process of hate crime; or the notion of acts of hate being ‘message’ crimes designed to create fear within the victim’s broader community (Chakraborti and Garland, 2009: 150). 2 In the context of the United Kingdom for example, ACPO’s (2005) strategic hate crime guidance obliges the police to record all incidents where the motivation for hate or prejudice is based upon race, sexual orientation, faith, disability or transgender status. Across other countries, race, national origin and ethnicity are the characteristics most commonly protected through hate crime policy, closely followed by religion, whilst gender, age, disability and sexual orientation are also quite frequently protected characteristics (ODIHR, 2009). 3 The SOPHIE (Stamp Out Prejudice, Hatred and Intolerance Everywhere) campaign, run by the Sophie Lancaster Foundation, aims to attain equal legal protection for members of alternative subcultures with those groups that are included in hate crime legislation. 4 The Macpherson report – or the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry report as it sometimes referred to – is the report of a public inquiry, chaired by Sir William Macpherson, into the flawed police investigation into the racist murder of Stephen Lawrence in south-east London in 1993. Published in 1999 the report produced over 70 recommendations designed to transform the policing of ‘race’ and diversity within the UK, including Recommendation 12 which places the power to define racist incidents (and subsequently all hate incidents) in the hands of the individual victim rather than the police, thereby reducing the influence of discretion and occupational culture in the recording of a hate crime. 5 Fiona, a 38 year old mother of Francecca, an 18 year old girl with learning difficulties, was driven to kill herself and her daughter in October 2007 by setting light to her car, with them both inside, near their home in Leicestershire, England, following years of disablist abuse from local youths directed at her family. 6 Or ‘Macpherson moment’ for disablist hate crime (Williams, 2009). 7 See also Chakraborti and Garland (2004) for an analysis of how everyday prejudice operates within a rural context. 8 Other vulnerable victim groups referred to in the Ministry of Justice announcement include victims of serious violent crime; individuals bereaved by murder and manslaughter; and bereaved families of fatal road traffic crimes. Victims of hate crime are also included, and although no explanation is offered as to which groups this includes and how they would be supported through guaranteed funding, it presumably extends to those groups recognised within current Ministry of Justice and Association of Chief Police Officers guidance: namely, victims of racist, religiously motivated, homophobic, disablist and transphobic hate crime. 9 Pain (2003: cited in Walklate, 2011) makes a similar point in relation to the stereotyping of the elderly as ‘frail’ through presumptions of physical vulnerability. 10 The harassment of Mary and Raum culminated in a firework being put through their letterbox on 5 November 2009. Mary was killed in the resultant fire (BBC, 2010). 31 31 11 As noted in article 89, para. 36 of Croatia’s Criminal Code which criminalises hatred motivated by factors such as the victim’s social position or health status. 12 As noted in article 63 of the Russian Criminal Code which includes hatred or animosity towards a political group as an aggravating factor. 13 As noted by article 22.4 of Spain’s Criminal Code which includes discrimination motivated by the victim’s ideology as an aggravating factor. 14 As noted in articles 33-42 of Belgium’s Law of 10 May 2007 which includes hatred against philosophy of life as one of the aggravating circumstances that can double the penalty of specified crimes. Abstract Keywords Hate crime, vulnerability, ‘difference’, victimisation, identity Introduction Conventional conceptual frameworks Challenging conventional frameworks: hate crime victimisation Challenging conventional frameworks: hate crime perpetration The relevance of perceived vulnerability and ‘difference’ Conclusion 
work_3rqalcnhvfhy5affd3lgavjaba	----	Editorial The dismantling of our future Latino Studies (2010) 8, 299–303. doi:10.1057/lst.2010.39 A man’s admiration for absolute government is proportionate to the contempt he feels for those around him. (De Tocqueville, 1955[1856]) When it comes to respecting rights, the country’s downward spiral is clearly intensifying. In the past 6 months alone, for example, we have witnessed blatant attacks on rights and human dignity in US society, including, K the enactment of Arizona’s SB 1070, officially promoting racial profiling; K the establishment of officially endorsed censorship through HB 2281, which bans ethnic studies classes and textbooks in Arizona’s public schools; K the official condoning of the removal of teachers who speak English with heavy accents from Arizona’s classrooms; K multiple efforts to begin the process of repealing the fourteenth amendment through proposals to deny citizenship to the US-born children of undocumen- ted immigrants; K frontal attacks on religious freedom and rights, in the form of a “debate” on the building of a mosque near New York City’s “ground zero,” which has led, in the words of William River Pitts, to a growth in hate crimes and violent threats against Muslims;1 K ongoing attacks on equal rights for gays and lesbians through the challenge to the judge’s recent ruling on Proposition 8; K the arbitrary dismissal of a government official, Shirley Sherrod, in Georgia, who was forced to step down from her post as Director of Rural Develop- ment, without recourse to a fair hearing, because of slanderous lies posted on the internet. To these we must add the ongoing abuses of power through immigration raids, and in detention and deportation centers, as well as the escalating hate crimes and violence, particularly but certainly not only, against Latino/as in the United States. The test of a just society lies in the protections afforded to its least fortunate members. Yet in the case of the United States, how can these even be measured? r 2010 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1476-3435 Latino Studies Vol. 8, 3, 299–303 www.palgrave-journals.com/lst/ 1 In River Pitts’ (2010) words, “Mosques have been firebombed. A Muslim cabdriver in New York City was savagely slashed by a man screaming anti-Islam epithets. A Sikh man was punched in a store for wearing a turban, even though he was as After all, today, only lies surround every attack, every act of violence, every threat against the rights of all in this nation; and there are lies, it seems, about everything – about the causes and consequences of immigration (the only reason “they” come is to “drop their ‘anchor babies’ on American soil”), about the resulting growth in crime and violence along the border region (yet as research shows, Arizona today, for example, has the lowest crime rates since 1983);2 about the jobs Latino/as ostensibly take from US citizens – they don’t! (cf. Factcheck.org, 2010); about the ever-growing numbers of undocumented (the numbers are instead “down sharply since mid-decade” (Passel and Cohn, 2010). The result is that the country today is so entangled in disentangling the lies, that we now seem to be living in a parallel world, far removed from reality y . Concerns about what the presence of Latino/as, regardless of their legal status, is doing or not doing to US society are for the most part – not matched in the media with an equal concern about the impact and consequences for immigrants of the decline in the society’s awareness of the need to protect the rights of all. Martha Caminero Santangelo’s article in this issue analyzes recent novels that seek to bring attention to the “human costs of inhuman border and immigration policies.” Her focus is the trauma created among Latino/as by nativism, the emphasis on cheap and exploitable labor, and the border enforce- ment initiatives that continue to imperil the lives of migrants crossing the desert; she also points to the construction of collective identities responding to the contemporary context in which Latino/a migrants live their lives. Douglas S. Massey and Julia Gelatt’s article further adds to the context in which Mexican immigrants are forced to live their lives. Noting that Mexican immigrant wages have actually stagnated for decades, Massey and Gelatt emphasize that in 2007 these stood roughly at 1960s levels. They point to the shifts in the political economy to present evidence to explain this stagnation in terms of the consequences, for immigrants, of declining labor rights and the concomitant increase in practices of discrimination and exclusion. Practices of discrimination and exclusion, of course, are not limited to the immigrant experience. Two articles in this issue analyze the experiences of US Latino/a citizens, in an effort to nuance and hence act as a corrective to the available scholarly literature and current public discourse shaping percep- tions about Latino/as in the United States. Inmaculada Lara-Bonilla provides a careful analysis of the now classic collective memoir, Getting Home Alive, (1986) coauthored across two generations, by mother and daughter Aurora Levins Morales and Rosario Morales. The significance of Lara-Bonilla’s article lies in her insistence on exploring the internal diversity and hybridity of Puerto Rican cultural identity as reflected in Getting Home Alive, in order to better understand “the variety of motives for migration and its relationship with the phenomenon of exile.” Firmly grounded in this still largely neglected historical text, Lara-Bonilla Muslim as a church steeple. The controversy over the Cordoba House project has inspired a rash of threats against the Imam in charge, the Muslims involved, and the building itself.” 2 This is to say nothing of course about the ongoing web of deceit and lies concerning, for example, BP’s environmental catastrophe, the bank profits, the withdrawal of the US troop presence in Iraq; Blackwater’s “30 false fronts” that obtained “millions of dollars in federal government contracts” (Risen and Mazzetti, 2010), and the President’s “Muslim” faith (Pew Research Center, 2010). Editorial 300 r 2010 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1476-3435 Latino Studies Vol. 8, 3, 299–303 argues that closer attention to the multiplicity of Puerto Rican identities is essential to better understand the Puerto Rican experience, as well as the nature of displacement itself and its role in constructing the individual and collective identities of a community. In the context of the ongoing clouding of complexity of the Latino/a experience, Latino/a studies scholarship’s emphasis on the nuances that ultimately shape and diversify the experiences of the community can serve as a corrective to the stereotypes, ignorance, and miseducation that currently underlies and shapes public discourse and perceptions. Thus, Robert J. Durán addresses misconceptions about Latino/a gangs by focusing on the issue of drug dealing. His article both describes and explains the reasons and conditions under which drugs become (or not) a part of the gangs’ raison d’être. Exploring the composition and context for the emergence and existence of gangs invol- ved in drug sales, Durán cautions that “[t]here is a tremendous power in the ability to confer the labels of gang and drug dealer to large groups of individuals who don’t empirically meet these criteria.” Thus, he notes that in cities such as Ogden, Utah and Denver, Colorado where he conducted his comparative study, “most gangs y are not organizations for profit.” Durán’s ethnographic “insider” research both acknowledges and goes beyond initial factors such as “friendship, protection, and status in the barrio” that are understood as motiva- ting inner-city Latino/a youth to join gangs. Instead, in addition to the speci- ficities of the gangs’ membership, he also focuses on the importance of assessing their experience with, and the responses of, law enforcement, the differentiated organizational structure of the gangs, and the context of drug sales. This multiple approach allows him to nuance the literature’s insistent focus on the gang’s level of organization as the key determinant for gang activity. In addition, Durán also contextualizes his assessment of these factors in terms of the social and economic specificities of the barrios that contribute to shaping the emer- gence, experience, and types of gangs in his research sites, concluding that in Ogden and Denver, “[g]angs and drug dealing were largely two separate issues despite the stereotype in both cities that they are combined.” The stark invisibility of the conditions under which Latino/as live their lives in the barrios, reinforced by racial discrimination and social exclusion, undoubtedly contributes to strengthening misconceptions about Latino/as’ daily-life experiences in US society – whether in the context of gang formation and activity, or in the institutions of the broader mainstream society. In the continued absence of information and scholarship, the multiple distortions and societal stereotypes undoubtedly become yet another layer in the ongoing obfuscation of the social reality structuring Latino/as’ experiences in US society today. The two essays in this Issue’s VIVENCIAS: Reports from the field section vividly seek to inform and portray to the broader US community some of the human costs of the ongoing willful blindness and passivity toward the deadly injustices that individuals continue to suffer as a result of this nation’s mis- Editorial 301r 2010 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1476-3435 Latino Studies Vol. 8, 3, 299–303 informed and inhumane immigration policies. Brian Rich’s report from Lexington documents his informal talk at a Kentucky bar in which he discussed what he defines as the “death prisons for the innocent.” His essay portrays the horrifying last months and death of Ana Romero, an immigrant woman who died alone in a jail house in Frankfort Kentucky, where, despite the protests of family and friends, she was wrongfully detained. From Mexico, Joel Medina writes of the circumstances that led to his 12-year imprisonment and the impact on his life today, of his subsequent deportation to Mexico, a country he barely remembered, having moved at the age of 4 to the United States where he grew up and where his entire family still lives. One can only wonder what would have become of his life and that of the thousands of other Latino/a youths deported today, had they been allowed to have the opportunities to participate on a more equal footing in this society. Instead, the lack of adequate schools, the failure to pass immigration reform and the DREAM Act, and, perhaps most importantly, the societal unwillingness to affirm the nation’s discourse and values of humanity and fairness today continue to destroy people’s lives, hopes, and dreams. More detailed and nuanced information grounded in research on the realities of the Latino/a experience in the United States, coupled with a strong, renewed societal commitment to a public education grounded in critical thinking, could begin to provide an antidote for the ignorance that is contributing to the deaths and the suffering of so many thousands of Latino/as like Ana Romero and Joel Medina, and thus comprise an essential component of any real movement for social change. It is in this context too that the negative consequences of the government’s continued inaction – on the Dream Act; on implementing humane and comprehensive immigration reform; on laws such as Arizona’s HB 2281, resulting in the censorship of Ethnic Studies courses and books in public schools; on reigning in educational initiatives grounded in market forces and privatization; or on correcting misguided policies such as “No Child Left Behind” – can be clearly seen. One obvious result is the growth of the school-to- prison pipeline and the creation of a future grounded in fear and the death of hope, particularly among poor and minority youth. Indeed, we are witnessing today the unprecedented dismantling of the nation’s education system at all levels, with consequences not only for the least/less fortunate in our society, but for the entire population.3 The overall result is an ever-expanding trend toward the criminalization of all social issues, while social protections are either eliminated or fatally weakened, as witnessed in the increasing incarceration of young people, the modeling of public schools after prisons, and state policies that bail out investment bankers, while simultaneously leaving the middle and working classes increasingly destitute. In the face of the current economic meltdown, anger is replacing critique, ignorance is informing politics, and American society tends to limit choices, legitimize political illiteracy, and promote violence (Hernández, 2010). This 3 As Henry Giroux (2010) describes “Shaping the neoliberal framing of public and higher education is a corporate-based ideology that embraces standardizing the curriculum, supporting Editorial 302 r 2010 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1476-3435 Latino Studies Vol. 8, 3, 299–303 requires a response adequate to confront the threat to the very fabric of our society: a true Resistance that, as aptly pointed out by Ramzy Baroud (2010), “is not a band of armed men hell-bent on wreaking havoc y True resistance is a culture. It is a collective retort to oppression,” – one which Latino/a Studies scholars and intellectuals must sign on to as they practice their vocation of upholding human dignity and freedom. Saludos! References Baroud, R. 2010. Beyond Violence and Nonviolence: Resistance as a Culture. Truthout, 8 August, http://www.truth-out.org/beyond-violence-and-nonviolence-resistance- a-culture61623. De Tocqueville, A. 1955[1856]. The Old Regime and the Revolution. New York: Anchor books. Factcheck.org. 2010. Does Immigration Cost Jobs? Economists Say Immigration, Legal or Illegal, Doesn’t Hurt American Workers, May 13, http://www.factcheck.org/2010/05/ does-immigration-cost-jobs/. Giroux, H.A. 2010. The Disappearing Intellectual in the Age of Economic Darwinism. Truthout/OpEd, 12 July, http://www.truth-out.org/the-disappearing-intellectual-age- economic-darwinism61287. Hernández, T.K. 2010. Black-on-Mexican Violence in Staten Island, NY: The Untold Tale of Turf Defense. New York: National Institute for Latino Policy Guest Commentary, 24 August, http://archive.constantcontact.com/fs057/1101040629095/archive/1103635 857372.html. Passel, J. and D. Cohn. 2010. U.S. Unauthorized Immigration Flows Are Down Sharply Since Mid-Decade. Pew Hispanic Center, 1 September, http://pewhispanic.org/reports/ report.php?ReportID=126. Pew Research Center. 2010. Growing Number of Americans Say Obama is a Muslim: Religion, Politics and the President. http://people-press.org/report/645/. Risen, J. and M. Mazzetti. 2010. 30 False Fronts Won Contracts for Blackwater. The New York Times, 3 September, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/04/world/middleeast/ 04blackwater.html. River Pitts, W. 2010. Hatred and StupidityyBut I Repeat Myself. Truthout, 4 September, http://www.truth-out.org/hatred-and-stupidity%E2%80%A6but-i-repeat-myself62916. Suzanne Oboler John Jay College of Criminal Justice-CUNY, New York, NY, USA. E-mail: soboler@jjay.cuny.edu top-down management, implementing more courses that promote business values and reducing all levels of education to job training sites y . Such modes of education do not foster a sense of organized responsibility central to a democracy. Instead, they foster what might be called a sense of organized irresponsibility – a practice that underlies the economic Darwinism, public pedagogy and corruption at the heart of both the current recession and American politics.” Editorial 303r 2010 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1476-3435 Latino Studies Vol. 8, 3, 299–303 The dismantling of our future Notes References 
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work_3yjwjb2abnfmhemkfd257yre3y	----	Minority stress and physical health among sexual minority individuals David M. Frost • Keren Lehavot • Ilan H. Meyer Received: July 2, 2012 / Accepted: June 26, 2013 � Springer Science+Business Media New York 2013 Abstract This study examined the effects of minority stress on the physical health of lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals (LGBs). Participants (N = 396) completed baseline and one year follow-up interviews. Exposure to stress and health outcomes were assessed with two meth- ods: a subjective self-appraisal method and a method whereby two independent judges externally rated event narratives using standardized criteria. The odds of experi- encing a physical health problem at follow-up were sig- nificantly higher among LGBs who experienced an externally rated prejudice event during the follow-up per- iod compared to those who did not. This association per- sisted after adjusting for experiences of general stressful life events that were not related to prejudice. Self-appraised minority stress exposures were not associated with poorer physical health at 1-year follow-up. Prejudice-related stressful life events have a unique deleterious impact on health that persists above and beyond the effect of stressful life events unrelated to prejudice. Keywords Minority stress � Prejudice � Life events � Physical health � Lesbian � Gay � Bisexual Introduction A substantial body of research has demonstrated that stress, in a multitude of forms, has a negative effect on people’s physical health (for a review, see Thoits, 2010). Minority stress theory suggests that sexual minority individuals (i.e., lesbian, gay, and bisexual men and women, or LGBs) are at greater risk for health problems than heterosexuals, because LGBs face greater exposure to social stress related to prejudice and stigma (Conron et al., 2010; Institute of Medicine, 2011; Meyer, 2003a, b; Sandfort et al., 2006). Sexual minorities are exposed to excess stress related to a variety of stigma-related experiences that stem from their sexual minority status: prejudice-related stressful life events such as being attacked or fired; everyday discrimi- nation including microaggressions and slights; expectations of rejection regardless of actual discriminatory circum- stances; the cognitive burden associated with negotiating outness; and the self-devaluation inherent to internalized homophobia (Meyer, 2003a, b; Meyer et al., 2008). Few studies, however, have examined the impact of minority stressors on physical health outcomes among sexual minority individuals (Huebner & Davis, 2007; Lehavot et al., 2009; Pantalone et al., 2010). Although some forms of minority stress can be experi- enced by any socially stigmatized minority group (i.e., prejudice-related life events, everyday discrimination, and expectations of rejection), concealment of sexual minority D. M. Frost (&) Department of Population and Family Health, Mailman School of Public Health, Columbia University, 60 Haven Avenue B2, New York, NY 10032, USA e-mail: dmf2119@columbia.edu K. Lehavot VA Puget Sound Health Care System (Seattle Division), Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences, University of Washington, 1660 S. Columbian Way, Seattle, WA 98108, USA e-mail: klehavot@uw.edu I. H. Meyer The Williams Institute, UCLA School of Law, Box 951476, Los Angeles, CA 90095, USA e-mail: MEYER@law.ucla.edu 123 J Behav Med DOI 10.1007/s10865-013-9523-8 status (i.e., outness) and internalized homophobia are unique to the experience of sexual minority individuals. We use the term ‘‘minority stress’’ in the present investi- gation of the health of sexual minorities to inclusively refer to the multiple social stressors (specified above) resulting from stigmatized social status, regardless of their unique- ness to the experience of sexual minority individuals. Existing research on the effects of minority stress on the physical health of sexual minorities is limited by cross- sectional data, and an exclusive focus on subjectively reported stressors. The latter limitation is important for both conceptual and methodological reasons (Meyer, 2003b). For example, studies relying only on subjective measures are not able to account for the effects of minority stress in instances where sexual minority individuals do not attribute prejudice or discrimination as the cause for an adverse life experience. Also, subjective measures are vulnerable to reporting bias of stressful events, even when the events are perceived, because reporting may be correlated with individual and situational characteristics (Dohrenwend, 2006). For instance, individuals may be motivated to attribute causes of negative life experiences to prejudice and discrimination in order to avoid self-blame (Frost, 2011; Major et al., 2003). Or individuals may be reluctant to attribute negative experiences to prejudice and discrimination in order to minimize the psychological, social, and interpersonal disruptions, such as distrust for others and anxiety or workplace conflicts, that can occur if they falsely attribute an event to prejudice (Feldman Barret & Swim, 1998). Research employing measures of minority stress that are based on external ratings of self-reported experiences can overcome some of these limitations and can help improve inferences about the relationship between minority stress and physical health among sexual minority individuals (Dohrenwend, 2006). The current study aimed to address these limitations. In addition to excess stress exposure, sexual minorities may be at increased risk for health problems because of the unique impact on health of prejudice events when com- pared to similar events unrelated to prejudice. For example, research has suggested that hate crimes have a greater mental health impact on their victims as compared to similar crimes that are not motivated by hate (Herek et al., 1999). However, this pattern of findings has yet to be extended to physical health. Furthermore, a focus on hate crimes alone does not account for stressful life events involving prejudice that are not criminal, such as being fired from a job due to discrimination. Aims and hypotheses In the current study we examined the effect of minority stressors on sexual minorities’ physical health. We hypothesized that experiences of minority stressors— especially when measured using methods that rely on external ratings that are not commonly used in prejudice and health studies—would have an adverse effect on health outcomes above and beyond the effects of general stressful life events not related to prejudice. Method Data for the current study were collected as part of Project Stride, a study of identity, stress, and health among sexual minority individuals (Meyer et al., 2008). Baseline inter- views were conducted with 396 lesbian, gay, and bisexual men and women living in New York City. Participants were recruited from venues in New York City chosen to represent a wide diversity of cultural, political, ethnic, and sexual communities. Sampling venues included business establishments (e.g., bookstores, cafes), social groups, and outdoor areas (e.g., parks), as well as snowball referrals. Participants were screened for eligibility, and if eligible, they were invited to participate in a face-to-face interview. Participants were eligible if they were 18–59 years-old, New York City residents for two years or more who could communicate in English and self-identified as: (a) lesbian, gay, or bisexual; (b) male or female; and (c) White, Black or Latino (participants may have used other identity terms in referring to these social groups). We used quota sam- pling to ensure approximately equivalent numbers of par- ticipants across sex, race/ethnicity, and age group (18–30 and 31–59). The response rate was 60 % (AAPOR, 2005). Participants resided in 128 different New York City zip codes; no more than 4 % of the sample resided in any one zip code area. Interviews lasted a mean of 3.82 h (SD = 55 min) and participants were paid $80 upon com- pleting the interview. Ninety-four percent of the baseline sample was retained for participation in a follow-up inter- view 1 year after their initial participation. Sample demo- graphics are presented in Table 1. Additional detail on Project Stride’s methodology is available online at: http:// www.columbia.edu/*im15/. Measures Participants completed the following measures of stress and health at baseline and 1-year follow-up in-person interviews. Self-appraised experiences of minority stress Experiences of everyday discrimination were assessed via a measure (Williams et al., 1997; 8 items, Cronbach’s alpha = 0.84) gauging the frequency of the following eight J Behav Med 123 http://www.columbia.edu/~im15/ http://www.columbia.edu/~im15/ types of day-to-day experiences: being treated with less courtesy, less respect, receiving poorer services, being treated as not smart, people acting like they are afraid of you, people acting like you are dishonest, people acting like they are better than you, and being called names or insulted. One item from the original measure, ‘‘being threatened or harassed,’’ was not included in the current study as these experiences were assessed as part of the stressful life event measure (see following discussion of externally rated minority stress). Frequency of occurrence was reported on a 4-point scale (1 ‘‘often’’ through 4 ‘‘never’’). Scores were recoded such that higher scores reflected greater everyday discrimination. Recognizing that intersections of identity work in sometimes indivisible ways, we attempted to capture the experiences of the per- son in his or her entirety. Therefore, this measure was not focused on experiences of discrimination directed at par- ticipants only because of their sexual minority status. Expectations of rejection (Link, 1987; 6 items, Cron- bach’s alpha = 0.88) were assessed with a measure based on a scale developed to assess stigma of mental illness. We adapted the scale so that the stigmatized condition was not mental illness and so that it could be applied to multiple social categories at once. Interviewers first read the fol- lowing instructions: ‘‘These next statements refer to ‘a person like you’; by this I mean persons who have the same gender, race, sexual orientation, nationality, ethnicity, and/ or socioeconomic class as you. I would like you to respond on the basis of how you feel people regard you in terms of such groups.’’ Respondents rated statements such as: ‘‘Most people would willingly accept someone like me as a close friend’’ on a 4-point scale ranging from 1 ‘‘agree strongly’’ to 4 ‘‘disagree strongly.’’ Scores were recoded such that higher scores reflected greater expectations of rejection. For the same rationale described above, this measure was not solely focused on expectations of rejec- tion related to participants’ sexual minority status. Outness (Meyer et al., 2002; 4 items, Cronbach’s alpha = 0.75) was assessed via the degree of disclosure of sexual orientation to (a) family, (b) straight friends, (c) LGB friends, and (d) co-workers. Participants described the extent to which they were ‘‘out of the closet’’ to each of these groups on a scale of 1 ‘‘out to none’’ to 4 ‘‘out to all.’’ The measure has good face validity, using simple language and referring to behaviors that are commonly discussed among LGB individuals. Internalized homophobia (Meyer & Dean, 1998; 8-items, Cronbach’s alpha = 0.86) was measured with a scale developed to assess the extent to which LGB indi- viduals reject their sexual orientation, are uneasy about their same-sex desires, and seek to avoid same-sex attrac- tions and sexual feelings. The current study included a modified version (presented in Frost & Meyer, 2009) that assessed how often participants have ‘‘wished you weren’t gay,’’ ‘‘felt alienated from yourself because of being gay,’’ and ‘‘felt that being gay is a personal shortcoming.’’ Par- ticipants rated the frequency with which they experienced such thoughts and feelings in the year prior to the interview on a 4-point scale ranging from 1 ‘‘often’’ to 4 ‘‘never.’’ Scores were recoded such that higher scores reflected more internalized homophobia. Externally rated forms of minority stress An externally rated indicator of minority stress was assessed in the form of Prejudice Events using the narrative life event interview and rating method (Dohrenwend, 2006). This method involved a trained interviewer asking participants whether or not they experienced any of 47 classes of life events including natural disasters, being fired from a job, assault, and homelessness. If participants reported experiencing an event, they then provided a detailed verbal narrative on their experience of the event. These narratives were recorded by the interviewers and later rated by two external independent raters (not includ- ing the interviewer) on several dimensions including whether or not prejudice was involved in the experience of the event. An event was coded as involving prejudice if the narrative of the event contained evidence of prejudice related to the participant’s sexual orientation, gender, gender non-conformity, race, ethnicity, age, religion, dis- ability, physical appearance, and/or socio-economic status. Those events that did involve prejudice were coded as prejudice events. Discrepancies were minimal (2 % of ratings) and were resolved in weekly meetings where independent referees helped arrive at consensus (Meyer et al., 2008). A binary predictor variable was created comparing participants who experienced one or more pre- judice events (1) to those who experienced none (0). This procedure was conducted at baseline regarding partici- pants’ lifetime exposure to prejudice events and at the Table 1 Sample demographics Characteristics Baseline (N = 396) 1 year follow-up (N = 370) Age in years, mean (SD) 32.43 (9.24) 32.52 (9.28) Unemployed (non-student), f (%) 64 (16.2) 59 (15.9) High school diploma or less, f (%) 86 (21.7) 77 (20.8) Female, f (%) 198 (50) 185 (50) Race/ethnicity, f (%) White 134 (33.8) 127 (34.3) Black/African American 131 (33.1) 125 (33.8) Latino 131 (33.1) 118 (31.9) J Behav Med 123 follow-up interview with regard to experiences of events that occurred in the year after the baseline interview. We focus on the follow-up measure of prejudice events in the present analysis as this measure reflects whether or not an increase in exposure to minority stress in the form of prejudice events occurred in the 1-year period between baseline and follow-up. Given the frequency of prejudice events was somewhat rare over one year (i.e., 7 %), our measure combined prejudice events into a single binary variable reflecting whether or not participants had experi- enced any prejudice event. Self-appraised physical health Self-rated physical health was measured using the single- item General Health Rating from the SF-12 (Ware et al., 1996): ‘‘In general, would you say your health is…’’ Par- ticipants responded on a 5-point scale ranging from ‘‘excellent’’ to ‘‘poor’’, with greater numbers indicating worse self-rated health. This approach to measuring self- appraised physical health has demonstrated validity with regard to morbidity and mortality outcomes (Idler & Be- nyamini, 1997). Externally rated physical health problems An externally rated indicator of physical health problems was obtained from the narrative life event interview and rating method (Dohrenwend, 2006). Specifically, experi- encing a Physical Health Problem was assessed via par- ticipants’ responses to event prompts regarding physical health problems. These event prompts at the follow-up interview assessed experiences of a physical health prob- lem that had newly occurred only during the year between baseline and follow-up. These prompts read as follows: ‘‘Have you had a life-threatening or disabling illness in the past year?’’ and ‘‘Did anything else significant happen related to your health (other than what was discussed)?’’ Interviewers explicitly instructed participants at the 1-year follow-up that they were being asked about new physical health problems that had occurred only in the past year (i.e., since their last interview). Two independent raters judged participants’ responses regarding whether or not they met criteria for physical health problems. As a result of the external rating procedure, only onset of significant physical health problems were included in analyses. In other words, some participants noted health problems that were determined in the rating process not to meet criteria for a physical health problem and were therefore not included in analysis. A binary outcome variable compared participants who experienced one or more physical health problems (1) to those who experienced none (0). Examples of physical health problems experienced by participants during this period included but were not limited to flu, hypertension, HIV and sexually transmitted infections, tendonitis, and cancer. Lifetime experiences of physical health problems were also assessed at baseline. Covariates All analyses were adjusted for self-reported sex, race/eth- nicity, age, employment, education, and lifetime diagnoses of physical health problems assessed at baseline. Results were also adjusted for the experience of general stressful life events over one year operationalized as any event captured by the narrative life event interview and rating method that was not related to physical health and did not involve prejudice. Analysis plan Initial bivariate analyses were conducted to examine asso- ciations between all study variables. Bivariate analyses consisted of Pearson correlations (for interval and ratio variables) and point biserial correlations (for binary vari- ables). Next, multivariate regression models were computed to test the study’s primary hypotheses. Multivariate analyses focused on participants’ experiences of minority stressors and physical health outcomes during the 1-year period that occurred between the baseline and follow-up interviews. A three-step hierarchical approach was utilized in all multi- variate regression analyses. In the first step, all covariates were entered into the model. Externally rated non-prejudice events (i.e., stressful life events not involving prejudice) were entered in the second step. All minority stress variables were entered in the final step. Logistic regression was used to test models predicting the onset of an externally rated physical health problem. Linear regression was used to test models predicting self-appraised physical health. Results Bivariate and descriptive analyses Descriptive statistics and correlations between measures of physical health and minority stress are presented in Table 2. In bivariate analyses, experiencing a health problem in the year between baseline and follow-up was associated with experiencing a prejudice event, higher expectations of rejection, and more frequent experiences of everyday discrimination. Worse self-rated physical health at follow-up was associated with higher expectations of J Behav Med 123 rejection, more frequent experiences of everyday discrim- ination, and higher levels of internalized homophobia. Multivariate analyses Logistic regression analyses (Table 3, Column 1) showed that the odds of experiencing an externally rated physical health problem during the 1-year follow-up period were approximately three times higher among sexual minorities who experienced an externally rated prejudice event com- pared to those who did not experience a prejudice event during the same period. This finding remained robust and statistically significant even after adjusting for externally rated non-prejudice life events, which were also indepen- dently related to experiencing a physical health problem. In contrast, in all multivariate analyses, the four self- appraised minority stressors (expectations of rejection, everyday discrimination, internalized homophobia, and outness) were not associated with externally rated experi- ences of physical health problems (Table 3, Column 1) or self-appraised health ratings (Table 3, Column 2) over the 1-year follow-up. Also, neither externally rated prejudice events nor non-prejudice related life events were associated with self-appraised health at follow-up when all forms of minority stress were included in the regression model. Discussion When measured with the externally rated methods recom- mended by Dohrenwend (2006), minority stress—opera- tionalized as prejudice events—was associated with onset of a physical health problem over a 1-year period among LGB people. Physical health problems included a variety of health problems and conditions, such as cancer, flu, and hypertension. Although some statistically significant bivariate associations were observed, the associations between self-appraised minority stressors and the onset of a physical health problem did not persist in multivariate models. This pattern of results was also found regarding the effects of subjective minority stressors when physical health was measured using a self-appraised, subjective method. Although these findings provide evidence for the general negative impact of minority stressors on physical health, the effect of minority stress was not consistent: it depended on the measure, type of stressor, and physical health out- come under consideration. Externally rated measures of minority stress (i.e., prejudice events) predicted onset of externally rated physical health problems, but self- appraised experiences of minority stress did not. And self- appraised experiences of minority stress (e.g., self-reported everyday discrimination) were not predictive of physical health, regardless of its method of assessment. In other words, we found support for our hypothesis of a relation- ship between minority stress and health outcomes but only for minority stress measured as stressful life events and externally rated by independent judges for prejudice. The hypothesis was not supported for other measures of self- appraised stress, nor for the global self-appraised health outcome. Because the externally rated measure does not rely entirely on subjective self-appraisals, we tend to give greater credence to findings stemming from this measure than to findings stemming from the self-appraised minority stressors. This is because of the potential for confounding Table 2 Descriptive statistics and correlations between minority stress and health outcome variables Variables Bivariate correlations 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1. Lifetime physical health diagnoses (BL) 1 2. ER physical health problem (FU) 0.27*** 1 3. SA Physical Health (BL) 0.37*** 0.18*** 1 4. SA physical health (FU) 0.36*** 0.24*** 0.68*** 1 5. ER non-prejudice event (FU) 0.10* 0.15** 0.11* 0.09 1 6. ER prejudice event (FU) 0.10 0.20*** 0 -0.01 0.06 1 7. SA expectations of rejection (FU) 0.08 0.13* 0.18** 0.19*** 0.07 0.12* 1 8. SA everyday discrimination (FU) 0.15** 0.14** 0.26*** 0.16** 0.06 0.21*** 0.48*** 1 9. SA internalized homophobia (FU) 0.02 0.03 0.19*** 0.16** 0.10 -0.02 0.17** 0.23*** 1 10. SA outness (FU) 0.14** 0.07 -0.01 0.04 -0.02 0.09 -0.02 -0.11* -0.49*** 1 M (%) 2.57 (21 %) 2.26 2.34 (71 %) (7 %) 1.86 1.99 1.37 3.36 SD 2.31 NA 0.93 1.03 NA NA 0.72 0.60 0.46 0.70 ER Externally Rated, SA Self-Appraised, BL Baseline, FU Follow-up *** p \ .001, ** p \ .01, * p \ .05 J Behav Med 123 between independent and dependent variables when using subjective measures (Dohrenwend, 2006). The risk of confounding is that a person’s adverse health (especially mental health) might lead him or her to subjectively view events as stressful. This risk is much reduced with use of an externally rated measure of stress through the minimization of perception biases. However, it is important to note that the externally rated measure of life events still depends on participants’ ability to recall and report the experience of specific stressful life events (Meyer, 2003b). Still, our findings that the subjective measures did not yield similar results to the externally rated measure are intriguing. We view our findings as preliminary. Further investigation would be required to carefully assess the associations between externally rated and subjective measures. The differential association between types of minority stressors and types of physical health outcomes—and their corresponding measurement—raises important questions for future research (Meyer, 2003b). Perhaps, as the current findings indicate, event-based minority stressors have a greater impact on health problems than everyday or chronic forms of minority stress. This may be due to the fact that event-based forms of minority stress are often more severe than everyday slights or microaggressions, and therefore may be more impactful on health. However, this interpre- tation must be examined in future research because the present study is limited by confounding of measure and stress type: our externally rated measure is a measure of discrete major life events, whereas the more subjective, self-appraisal measures are measures of less discrete, more minor (everyday), and internalized stressors. This con- founding limits our ability to distinguish between measure and type of stress. Issues pertaining to the type and measurement of minority stressors need to be examined in future research on health disparities between sexual minorities and het- erosexuals. This is particularly important in light of emerging evidence that compared with heterosexuals, White LGB individuals experience higher levels of minority stressors when assessed using externally rated methods but not when assessed using self-appraisal. Also, compared to White LGBs, Black and Latino LGB indi- viduals experience higher levels of minority stressors regardless of the type of measure used (Meyer et al., 2008). In line with an intersectional approach (Bowleg, 2008; Stewart & McDermott, 2004)—which posits that the lived experience sexual identity is not separable from other identities (e.g., race/ethnicity, gender)—the measures of some forms of minority stress used in the current study were not particular to sexual minority status. Researchers Table 3 Associations between externally rated and self-appraised minority stress and physical health outcomes at 1-year follow-up among lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals (N = 370) ER physical health problem a SA physical health b B OR 95 % CI DR2 B Beta 95 % CI DR2 Step 1: Control variables 0.16 0.46 Black 0.60 1.83 0.88 to 3.79 0.07 0.03 -0.13 to 0.27 Latino 1.12** 3.06 1.50 to 6.22 0.16 0.07 -0.05 to 0.36 Female -0.35 0.70 0.41 to 1.21 0.01 0.00 -0.15 to 0.17 CBachelors degree -0.24 0.78 0.44 to 1.39 -0.01 -0.01 -0.18 to 0.16 Age 0.03* 1.03 1.00 to 1.06 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 to 0.01 Unemployed 0.01 1.01 0.49 to 2.09 -0.04 -0.01 -0.27 to 0.18 Physical health diagnoses (BL) 0.22*** 1.25 1.11 to 1.40 SA Physical health (BL) 0.75*** 0.67 0.66 to 0.84 Step 2: General stress 0.03 0.00 ER non-prejudice event 0.86* 2.36 1.17 to 4.77 0.05 0.02 -0.13 to 0.22 Step 3: Minority stress 0.05 0.01 ER prejudice event 1.24** 3.47 1.31 to 9.16 -0.09 -0.02 -0.42 to 0.24 SA expectations of rejection 0.21 1.23 0.77 to 1.97 0.12 0.09 -0.01 to 0.26 SA everyday discrimination 0.28 1.32 0.76 to 2.29 -0.10 -0.06 -0.26 to 0.06 SA internalized homophobia 0.19 1.20 0.59 to 2.45 0.15 0.07 -0.06 to 0.36 SA outness 0.30 1.34 0.83 to 2.18 0.11 0.07 -0.03 to 0.24 ER Externally Rated, SA Self-Appraised, BL Baseline *** p \ .001, ** p \ .01, * p \ .05 a Results obtained from binary logistic regression analyses b Results obtained from multiple linear regression analyses J Behav Med 123 interested examining the differential impact of minority stressors stemming from different stigmatized social sta- tuses (e.g., sexual minority vs. racial/ethnic minority sta- tus) should incorporate measures that allow for such distinctions. Additionally, recent studies show increased prevalence of specific physical health outcomes, such as asthma, among sexual minorities (Conron et al., 2010). This sug- gests that it is important to assess variation in minority stress–illness relationships in the study of health disparities related to sexual orientation. Our analysis did not allow for distinctions among types of physical health problems, but such research may provide further insight into stress’s impact on health (Schwartz & Meyer, 2010). Moreover, our study did not assess any pathophysiological mecha- nisms that would explain these associations, something that is needed to gain full understanding of the minority stress– illness relationship. Despite these limitations, our findings provide partial evidence for the hypothesized negative effects of minority stress on the physical health of sexual minorities (Meyer, 2003a). Results indicate that prejudice events can be more damaging to physical health than general stressful life events that do not involve prejudice. This parallels previous research that shows bias motivated crimes, such as assault, have a greater mental health impact than similar crimes not motivated by bias (Herek et al., 1999). Thus, the deleteri- ous effect of prejudice events on physical health is robust, and can persist above and beyond the impact of general life stress. However, the negative effects of minority stressors on physical health are not uniform. Future research and interventions focused on understanding and addressing the influence of minority stress on health must account for the full spectrum of minority stressors and explicate the potentially differential mechanisms linking minority stressors to a variety of physical health problems in the lives of sexual minorities. References American Association for Public Opinion Research (AAPOR) (2005). Standard Definitions: Final Dispositions of Case Codes and Outcome Rates for Surveys. Bowleg, L. (2008). When black + lesbian + woman = black lesbian woman: The methodological challenges of qualitative and quan- titative intersectionality research. Sex Roles, 59, 312–325. Conron, K. J., Mimiaga, M. J., & Landers, S. J. (2010). A population- based study of sexual orientation identity and gender differences in adult health. American Journal of Public Health, 100, 1953–1960. Dohrenwend, B. P. (2006). Inventorying stressful life events as risk factors for psychopathology: Toward resolution of the problem of intracategory variability. Psychological Bulletin, 132, 477–495. Feldman Barret, L., & Swim, J. K. (1998). Appraisals of prejudice and discrimination. In J. K. Swim & C. Stangor (Eds.), Prejudice: The target’s perspective (pp. 11–36). San Diego: Academic Press. Frost, D. M. (2011). Stigma and intimacy in same-sex relationships: A narrative approach. Journal of Family Psychology, 25, 1–10. Frost, D. M., & Meyer, I. H. (2009). Internalized homophobia and relationship quality among lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals. Journal of Counseling Psychology, 56, 97–109. Herek, G. M., Gillis, J. R., & Cogan, J. C. (1999). Psychological sequelae of hate-crime victimization among lesbian, gay, and bisexual adults. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 67, 945–951. Huebner, D. M., & Davis, M. C. (2007). Perceived antigay discrimination and physical health outcomes. Health Psychol- ogy, 26, 627–634. Idler, E. L., & Benyamini, Y. (1997). Self-rated health and mortality: a review of twenty-seven community studies. Journal of Health and Social Behavior, 38, 21–37. Institute of Medicine. (2011). The health of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender people: Building a foundation for better understanding. Washington: The National Academies Press. Lehavot, K., Walters, K. L., & Simoni, J. M. (2009). Abuse, mastery, and health among lesbian, bisexual, and two-spirit American Indian and Alaska Native women. Cultural Diversity and Ethnic Minority Psychology, 15, 275–284. Link, B. G. (1987). Understanding labeling effects in the area of mental disorders: An assessment of the effects of expectations of rejection. American Sociological Review, 52, 96–112. Major, B., Kaiser, C. R., & McCoy, S. K. (2003). It’s not my fault: When and why attributions to prejudice protect self-esteem. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 29, 772–781. Meyer, I. H. (2003a). Prejudice, social stress, and mental health in lesbian, gay, and bisexual populations: Conceptual issues and research evidence. Psychological Bulletin, 129, 674–697. Meyer, I. H. (2003b). Prejudice as stress: Conceptual and measure- ment problems. American Journal of Public Health, 93, 262–265. Meyer, I. H., & Dean, L. (1998). Internalized homophobia, intimacy, and sexual behavior among gay and bisexual men. In G. M. Herek (Ed.), Stigma and sexual orientation: Understanding prejudice against lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals (pp. 160–186). Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications. Meyer, I., Rossano, L., Ellis, J., & Bradford, J. (2002). A brief telephone interview to identify lesbian and bisexual women in random digit dialing sampling. Journal of Sex Research, 39(2), 139–144. Meyer, I. H., Schwartz, S., & Frost, D. M. (2008). Social patterning of stress and coping: Does disadvantaged social statuses confer more stress and fewer coping resources? Social Science and Medicine, 67(3), 368–379. Pantalone, D. W., Hessler, D. M., & Simoni, J. M. (2010). Mental health pathways from interpersonal violence to health-related outcomes in HIV-positive sexual minority men. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 78(3), 387–397. Sandfort, T. G. M., Bakker, F., Schellevis, F. G., & Vanwesenbeeck, I. (2006). Sexual orientation and mental and physical health status: findings from a Dutch population survey. American Journal of Public Health, 96, 1119–1125. Schwartz, S., & Meyer, I. H. (2010). Mental health disparities research: The impact of within and between group analyses on tests of social stress hypotheses. Social Science and Medicine, 70, 1111–1118. Stewart, A. J., & McDermott, C. (2004). Gender in psychology. Annual Review of Psychology, 55, 519–544. J Behav Med 123 Thoits, P. A. (2010). Stress and health: major findings and policy implications. Journal of Health and Social Behavior, 51(Suppl), S41–S53. Ware, J, Jr, Kosinski, M., & Keller, S. D. (1996). A 12-item short- form health survey: Construction of scales and preliminary tests of reliability and validity. Medical Care, 34, 220–233. Williams, D. R., Yu, Y., Jackson, J. S., & Anderson, N. B. (1997). Racial differences in physical and mental health: Socio-eco- nomic status, stress and discrimination. Journal of Health Psychology, 2, 335–351. J Behav Med 123 Minority stress and physical health among sexual minority individuals Abstract Introduction Aims and hypotheses Method Measures Self-appraised experiences of minority stress Externally rated forms of minority stress Self-appraised physical health Externally rated physical health problems Covariates Analysis plan Results Bivariate and descriptive analyses Multivariate analyses Discussion References 
work_3ysdrquutngk7lvqwuqcw7yqqy	----	Integration of and the Potential for Islamic Radicalization Among Ethnic Turks in Germany Western Michigan University From the SelectedWorks of Alev Dudek Spring April 9, 2015 Integration of and the Potential for Islamic Radicalization Among Ethnic Turks in Germany Alev Dudek, Western Michigan University Available at: http://works.bepress.com/alev_akbulut/1/ http://www.wmich.edu http://works.bepress.com/alev_akbulut/ http://works.bepress.com/alev_akbulut/1/ Integration of and the Potential for Islamic Radicalization Among Ethnic Turks in Germany Alev Akbulut Georgetown University Sponsored by The Library of Congress 6/16/2014 2 Abstract In spite of ongoing improvements, integration of ethnic Turks in Germany remains a challenge from the dominant culture perspective, whereas a deeply ingrained institutional and everyday racism and the lack of legal protection against discrimination pose a challenge to full participation of ethnic Turks from another perspective. In an increasingly xenophobic Europe, particularly Germany, an increase in potential for religious and nationalist radicalization in different groups including ethnic Turks is becoming more and more evident. This increase in radical attitudes is not necessarily caused by a lack of integration, as evidenced among well-integrated individuals. In view of recent developments toward increased radicalization in Germany and in Europe overall, an important question emerges. Where is this trend going and how will it affect the national security of the United States? Introduction Much has been written about integration in Germany from the perspective of the German government and the dominant culture. Ethnic Turks have historically played a significant role in the debate, given that they are the largest ethnic minority and allegedly the least integrated group.1 So far, little attention has been paid, however, to their and the perspective of other minorities. In this report, integration will be explored from both perspectives; of the dominant culture as well as the ethnic Turkish community. This report addresses two main questions. First, to what degree are ethnic Turks inclined today to integrate. For this, parallel society, marginalization, and Germany’s complex citizenship policy are examined. Second, the potential for Islamic radicalization among ethnic Turks will be explored. The overall lack of effective anti-discrimination laws to combat discrimination and an increase in xenophobia2 in Germany have posed an important barrier to integration and done a great deal to alienate minorities. This alienation, however, is not only a socio-political and economic problem, but may also become a matter of national security for Germany, Europe, and as a result of it, for the United States. Especially in view of an overall increase in radicalization in Germany, not limited to Islam, it is 3 evident that integration does not preclude radicalization, as evidenced in radical attitudes among well- integrated individuals. The discontent among minorities caused by their marginalization, combined with the current high under- and unemployment among the youth may add to further radicalization that may not be limited to attitudes but also lead to increased action, in the future. Findings RQ1: To what degree are Turks inclined today to integrate? The first generation is less integrated than the second and third generations. However, ethnic Turks are considered the least integrated among minorities; their unemployment and high-school drop-out rates are higher, compared to the dominant culture and other minorities. Sub-questions Sub-question 1: Do many ‘Turks’ opt to live in a parallel society separate from mainstream German society? There is not enough evidence to support the notion that a parallel society exists, in spite of the presence of some Turkish schools and claims of “parallel justice.” Sub-question 2: Is marginalization a barrier to integration? Racism has been a substantial barrier to integration in Germany. The anti-discrimination clause in the Basic Law (paragraph 3 (Section 3)) has offered little protection for minorities against discrimination since 1949. So does the anti-discrimination law (Allgemeines Gleichbehandlungsgesetz (AGG)) passed through the pressure of EU in 2006. Sub-question 3: What is the role of the citizenship policy in connection with integration? Germany’s citizenship law discourages dual-citizenship in case of some countries, e.g. Turkey. However, the law permits it in case of citizens of other EU member states. RQ2: Given their state of integration into German society today, what is the potential for Islamic radicalization among ethnic Turks in Germany? 4 An increase in potential for Islamic radicalization among the ethnic Turkish community is evident. Radicalization overall is not necessarily caused by a lack of integration, but can be observed particularly among well-integrated individuals. Evidence RQ1: The second and third generations of ethnic Turks are better integrated than the first. However, according to statistics, ethnic Turks are still the least integrated among minorities; their unemployment and high-school drop-out rates are higher, compared to the dominant culture and other minorities. Many ethnic Turks do not feel like they are a part of the German society3 even though half of the approximately 3 million living in Germany (2011)4 were born there. They are considered among the least integrated minorities in Germany,5 although improvements from the first generation to the latter are evident. The offspring of the first generation is better integrated. 6 However, unemployment and high- school drop-out rates are still higher among the ethnic Turks, compared to the dominant culture and other minorities: “The chances of ethnic Turks born in Germany having an Abitur (preparatory high-school degree for entrance to universities in Germany; usually obtained at highly selective high-schools called Gymnasium) has doubled, compared to the first generation. Yet, this number is still 50 percent lower, compared to the dominant culture,” 7 although nearly half of them were born in Germany. Further, among the 15- to 64-year-old ethnic Turks who were born in Germany, ten percent has not even obtained a high-school diploma; a number that is reportedly seven times higher than for the same age group in the dominant culture. In spite of their perceived or real shortcomings in context of integration, many ethnic Turks have achieved substantial successes. Intellectuals such as feminist and social scientist Necla Kelek, high- profile lawyer Mehmet Gürcan Daimagüler, co-chairman of Germany’s Green Party Cem Özdemir, film director Fatih Akın, actor, musician, comedian, film director Serdar Somuncu make up the German society. Many have also achieved economic successes as entrepreneurs and investors. Additionally, Turkish restaurants and supermarkets are now a popular part of the culinary and commercial landscape 5 in Germany. The community is also becoming an important force in politics. Many organizations such as the Turkish Community Germany (Türkische Gemeinde in Deutschland (TGD)) are contributing to the political landscape. The number of ethnic Turks, for example, elected to the Parliament (Bundestag) has more than doubled in the last election. 8 Out of 630 members of the parliament, 11 reportedly have a Turkish background, although, compared to the total population, this percentage is still low (they make up 3.7 percent of total population, 11 represents only 1.75 percent). Sub-question 1: In context of a “parallel society,” the existence of Turkish schools and claims of “parallel justice system” which is a sharia-style mediation without consulting the legitimate court systems, were examined.9 There is not sufficient evidence for the existence of a “parallel society” of ethnic Turks in Germany. Turkish high-schools (Gymnasium) have been established in cities such as Berlin, Cologne, Hannover Mannheim, and Paderborn. Although Turkish is a mandatory class, in all other classes, the students are taught in German. Non-ethnic Turks are encouraged to attend these schools. 10 The schools have formed in response to the concerns of parents that their children may not have the opportunities in mainstream German schools, as they do in these private schools. The German government cooperates with the schools and considers them “substitute-schools.” 11 Even though the existence of separate Turkish schools can be justified from various perspectives, among other, as a response to marginalization, the curriculum and possible conservative religious agendas, and the schools’ possible connections to the conservative Islamic “Gulen/Hizmet movement”12 and future implications should not be underestimated. In context of “parallel society,” journalist Joachim Wagner, in a recently published book "Islamischer Paralleljustiz" (Islamic Parallel Justice), argues that a “parallel justice system” exists that threatens the rule of law in Germany (Rechtsstaat).13 Mediators reportedly arbitrate outside of the official court system, in case of domestic violence, family feuds, and other instances.14 Further research on this topic did not generate sufficient evidence for what would constitute a “parallel justice system” even though the existence of such mediation-cases could be verified among other, in the 6 “Kurdish-Lebanese” communities.15 Overall, little support could be established that such systems exist within the Turkish community to a notable extent.16 In spite of evidence for the presence of “mediation cases,” experts such as Carl Chung, Mobile Counseling Team Ostkreuz for Democratic Development, Human Rights, and Integration17, or Peter Scholz, Vice President of the Berlin District Court Zoo, argue that there are no indications for a parallel justice system. This notion is also supported by the Bavarian Minister of Justice Winfried Bausback18 who reports that two and a half years of research has not provided any data that “allows reliable conclusions about the extent” of any such cases which would support that a parallel justice system exists. Mr. Bausback, however, confirms that there are incidents and cautions about underreporting. In conclusion, even though there is insufficient evidence that would support the notion of any “parallel society” in Germany, particularly, of ethnic Turks, any “mediations” outside of the official court system are very concerning and deserve utmost attention and immediate action. Sub-question 2: Racism and discrimination are substantial barriers to integration and participation of ethnic Turks. Integration may most efficiently be summarized as a barrier-free-participation regardless of one’s race, national origin, religion and other personal features. Integration is additionally a two-way street where the dominant culture is expected to open the channels of a barrier-free-participation for the minorities by discouraging discrimination and exclusion with the support of suitable laws and public policies. Minorities on the other hand, are expected to learn the official language of the country, be open and willing to participate; and realistically, also to assimilate at least to a minimum degree to ensure an efficient exchange and at some point, ideally, integrate fully. However, in Germany, integration, for the most part, has not been a two-way street. There has traditionally been insufficient protection from discrimination even though the anti-discrimination clause has been anchored in the constitution (Basic Law, article 3 paragraph; 3) since the beginning of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1949.19 The avenues for filing complaints and thereby obtaining remedies in cases of discrimination where the Basic Law would apply have historically neither been present, nor effective. Additionally, Basic Law only regulates the relationship between government and the people. A law that discourages discrimination 7 among private parties such as private sector job applicants and housing applicants did not exist until the anti-discrimination law Allgemeines Gleichbehandlungsgesetz (AGG) was passed in 2006. AGG was not a voluntary accomplishment, but rather required to meet minimum requirements of the EU. The sentiment of the environment in which the law was passed is reflected in its content and the little protection that the law offers. Even in its current form, the AGG is still very controversial.20 There is also a lack of research, data, and statistics on discrimination. Germany, for example, “has no separate category of offenses for “hate crimes” involving violence. Nor does it explicitly provide for higher sentences for them. But the courts can still take hate motivation into account during sentencing using general sentencing principles.” 21 Instead of separate statistics for hate crimes, The Federal Ministry of Interior keeps track of “politically motivated crimes” which includes left-wing and right-wing political crimes, and crimes identified as “hostility toward foreigners” (fremdenfeindliche Straftaten). Whereas right-extremist and hostility toward foreigners is treated separately in this case;22 based on the separate definitions, it is unclear how Germany keeps track of the overlapping numbers in this case. It is noteworthy that this “politically motivated crimes” statistic also includes sedition and treason.23 Discussion on racism generally focuses on right-extremists. Institutional racism and racism among the general population are rarely discussed. This explains why even in the case of the National Socialist Union (NSU) related murders,24 the official NSU Commission in its final report, stated that there were no indications for institutional racism in the handling of the case.25 However, much evidence, such as the handling of the murder cases overall and the shredding of important files that could have shed light into the case, supports the opposite notion.26 Moreover, the “German identity” poses a significant barrier to integration as even well-integrated ethnic German minorities are often considered “foreigners.” Therefore, many minorities try to find ways to deal with their identity. Since ethnic Turks generally are not accepted as Germans, one journalist and an outspoken representative of the ethnic Turkish community, Kamuran Sezer, refers to himself as a “Turk with a German passport.”27 In conclusion, from the perspective of the German government, integration seems to be a one-sided task, even though, officially, the opposite is claimed. Otherwise, the lack of legal protection, research, education, and data on discrimination and racism versus the over-supply of debate, research, 8 publications, and “action plans”28 is difficult to explain. Unless a change in perception toward minorities occurs in Germany, the problems associated with so called integration will only worsen over time. Sub-question 3: Germany’s citizenship law discourages dual-citizenship in case of some countries, e.g. Turkey, however, permits in case of citizens of other EU member states. Germany officially discourages dual-citizenship. Regardless, dual-citizenship is a possibility for many Germans. For example, citizens of EU member states or Germans who live abroad and have the right to become naturalized citizens in their host country, as long as they apply for a permission to keep the German citizenship (Beibehaltungsgenehmigung); citizens of states that do not allow renouncing of citizenship are also allowed to be naturalized while remaining a citizen of the country of their origin.29 This official prohibition disproportionately affects ethnic Turks, but not all of them; a situation which adds to the state of confusion concerning Germany’s citizenship policy. Some Turkish citizens are eligible for dual-citizenship, depending on which state they live. The federal law can apparently be interpreted differently in various states. Over 60 percent of non-Turkish applicants for naturalization are able to obtain dual-citizenship while at the same only 27.7 percent of the Turkish applicant can do so.30 In response to continuing pressure by the Turkish community, German government recently updated its “option-duty” (opportunity to remain a dual-citizen until age 23; required to choose between the parents’ and German citizenship by age 23) policy. Recent changes in the law suggest that, individuals who qualify for the Optionspflicht, are eligible to file for a permission (Beibehaltungsgenehmigung) to keep both citizenships. 31 This permission however, is granted only in cases of undue hardship.32 In case of failure to file and obtain this permission, the affected individuals would lose their German citizenship, if they don’t renounce the other citizenship. For the Turkish community, the recent improvements to the Optionspflicht are too minor. The former leader of the community in Germany (TGD), Kenan Kolat, states that the new policy makes matters only more complicated and offers little relief in the dilemma that many ethnic Turks face—having to decide between their Turkish and German citizenship. 9 Up until 2000, the German citizenship policy was significantly based on the principle of lineage (Abstammungsprinzip (Ius Sanguinis)) according to the law from 1913 („Reichs- und Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetzes“ (RuStaG)). Major reforms were made in 2000 which also includes the change from principle of lineage to the principle of place of birth („Geburtsortsprinzips“ (Ius Soli)) for children born in Germany. 33 In this context, it should be noted that, contrary to a wide-spread belief, not all children born to foreign nationals, obtain citizenship by birth. The law applies to children born after January 1, 200034 and certain requirements must be met. The requirements include that parents must have had their official residence in Germany for at least eight years, and their residence permits must be unlimited. (See § 4 (1), citizenship law). The history of Germany’s citizenship policy illustrates the overall negative sentiments toward minorities in Germany. Hans-Peter Uhl, a conservative national lawmaker and member of the Parliament’s interior affairs committee, argues that “individuals with dual nationality, if involved in any criminal activities, can evade the judicial authorities by using their second passport. This creates all sorts of problems for us. Countries have different legal systems and different cultures, and we have to take that into account.”35 This raises the question why dual-citizenship is a legal option for many. Additionally, the low probability of a dual-citizen being involved in criminal activities that pose a problem to Germany’s judicial system defies the argument and allows for an opportunity to explore more feasible explanations for Germany’s continuation of exclusive citizenship policy. RQ2: Increase in potential for Islamic radicalization among the ethnic Turkish community is evident. Radicalization overall is not necessarily caused by a lack of integration, but can be observed particularly among well-integrated individuals. Germany’s Office for the Protection of the Basic Law reports an increase in “Islamist Organizations nationwide”: 42,550 members in 2012, up from 38,080 in 2011, even though the increase is reportedly due to the first time inclusion of Salafists (4,500).36 10 Since beginning of the war in Syria, 2000-3000 individuals from Europe—700 from France, 300 from Germany—went to Syria to fight in the war, compared to approximately 7037 from the USA. Additionally, 500038 more from Europe are expected to join the war. A shorter distance from Europe to Syria versus the USA can hardly explain the alarming difference in the numbers. There seems to be not only an increase in Islamic, but in other forms of radicalization in Germany as reflected in the statistics for Politically Motivated Crimes1—overall increase 15+ percent, plus 11+ percent increase in xenophobic crimes—provided by the Office for the Protection of the Basic Law.39 However, there is no clear evidence that the ethnic Turkish community stands out40 in regard to possible radicalization, even though an increase in conservative religious attitudes and vulnerability for recruitment of Islamist nature is observable. The membership in two representational organizations such as the Türkische Hizbullah (TH) apparently remained constant from 2011-2012: 350, so did the Milli Gorus with 31.000 members. Religious radicalization among ethnic Turks is still a concern, given that religion seems to play an increasing role among the younger and more educated individuals of Turkish descent. Der Spiegel reports that a representational study among German-Turks showed that two-third of the 15-29 year-old individuals surveyed were in favor of the controversial Koran distribution events launched by Salafists in many cities in Germany, in 2011.41 The survey additionally shows that many are willing to support Islamists with donations. Compared to their younger counterparts, among the 30 to 49 year-olds, 54 percent find the Koran-campaign “rather bad” or “very bad.” The support for the campaign decreases among the individuals beyond the age of 50; only one third supports the campaign. Notable is also that among the surveyed, the campaign finds more support among the better educated. The implication is that at least Islamization, or becoming more religious, is not necessarily caused by a lack of integration, but can be observed particularly among well-integrated individuals. Moreover, even though it is 1 Please note that politically motivated crimes in Germany overall, are defined as crimes that target the German government exclusively. Therefore, an increase of 11+ percent in xenophobic crimes, for example, is not included in the politically right motivated crimes statistics. 11 less likely that better educated individuals would be more prone to support violence, they are apparently likely to be more religious. 42 “Auffällig ist, dass unter den Befragten, die keinen oder einen niedrigen Schulabschluss haben, die Zustimmung zu der Koranverteilung am niedrigsten ist.” (What is striking is that among the respondents who have no or a lower school degrees, the approval of the Salfists’ Koran distribution campaign is lowest.) This leaves the USA with the following question: why are well-educated ethnic Turks of the second and third generation becoming more religious and what will these developments translate into, in the future? Are the ethnic Turks representational for other minority groups in Germany, Europe? However, the community affected by possible Islamist recruitment is very diverse, as the example of Burak Karan, a successful national soccer player, who died while fighting in Syria demonstrates.43 Future Trends: The recent European Parliamentary election in May illustrated an alarming overall tendency for radicalization in Europe.44 Right-wing parties in France, Germany, Denmark, Austria, and the UK, recorded substantial gains. An increase in right-wing radicalization raises concern as it not only corresponds with other forms of radicalization45 but may even be encouraging an Islamic response. It is important to emphasize that Islamic radicalization is not a homogenous phenomenon across certain minority groups. More and more individuals also from the dominant culture, who have no initial connection to Islam, subscribe to a radical interpretation of the religion as illustrated in the cases of the conservative preacher Pierre Vogel46 and Sven Lau. As Islamic expert Claudia Dantschke accurately confirms: Islamic radicalization such as Salafism is a “youth phenomenon” (Jugendphänomen)47ranging from search for community, belonging, identity, self- esteem, to purpose in life. Exclusion as often practiced in Germany for various reasons, only makes the 12 matter worse, whereas inclusion could be an effective method of prevention against future radicalization. 13 WORKS CITED 1 Lauer, C., Siems, D., and Ehrentraut, D., “ Türken sind die Sorgenkinder der Integration.“ (Turks, the problem children of integration.) Die Welt. 17 April 2010. 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Web. 14 Jun. 2014. https://www.destatis.de/DE/PresseService/Presse/Pressemitteilungen/2012/09/PD12_326_122.html;jsessionid=2 9B43FB5757E12B4A036ACB9B3C1D11F.cae2. 5 Lauer, C., Siems, D., and Ehrentraut, D., “ Türken sind die Sorgenkinder der Integration.“ (Turks, the problem children of integration.) Die Welt. 17 April 2010. Web. 14 Jun. 2014.http://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article7222075/Tuerken-sind-die-Sorgenkinder-der- Integration.html. Elger, K., Kneip, A., and Theile, M. “Immigration: Survey Shows Alarming Lack of Integration in Germany.” Der Spiegel. 26 Jan. 2009. Web. 14 Jun. 2014.http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/immigration-survey- shows-alarming-lack-of-integration-in-germany-a-603588.html. 6 Am Orde, S. „Probleme türkischer Einwanderer. Integration ist mangelhaft.“ (Problems of Turkish immigrants. Integration is unsatisfactory.) Die Tageszeitung (TAZ). 29 Jan. 2009. Web. 14 Jun. 2014. http://www.taz.de/!29319/. Günnewig, J. “Studie zu Integration von Migranten: "Emotionale Heimat in der Türkei".“ (Study of integration of immigrants: „emotional homeland is Turkey.“) Westdeutsche Rundfunk (WDR). 31 Oct. 2010. Web. 14 Jun. 2014.http://www1.wdr.de/themen/politik/integration380.html. http://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article7222075/Tuerken-sind-die-Sorgenkinder-der-Integration.html http://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article7222075/Tuerken-sind-die-Sorgenkinder-der-Integration.html http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/immigration-survey-shows-alarming-lack-of-integration-in-germany-a-603588.html http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/immigration-survey-shows-alarming-lack-of-integration-in-germany-a-603588.html http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/uno-europa-wird-immer-fremdenfeindlicher-a-974365.html http://www.verfassungsschutz.de/de/oeffentlichkeitsarbeit/publikationen/verfassungsschutzberichte/vsbericht-2012 http://www.verfassungsschutz.de/de/oeffentlichkeitsarbeit/publikationen/verfassungsschutzberichte/vsbericht-2012 http://nottinghamerrundschau.co.uk/wp/parallelgesellschaften-als-tummelplatz-fur-extremisten/ http://www.zr2.jura.uni-erlangen.de/islamedia/newsletter/islamedia_newsletter_110_06_09.pdf http://www.zr2.jura.uni-erlangen.de/islamedia/newsletter/islamedia_newsletter_110_06_09.pdf https://www.destatis.de/DE/PresseService/Presse/Pressemitteilungen/2012/09/PD12_326_122.html;jsessionid=29B43FB5757E12B4A036ACB9B3C1D11F.cae2 https://www.destatis.de/DE/PresseService/Presse/Pressemitteilungen/2012/09/PD12_326_122.html;jsessionid=29B43FB5757E12B4A036ACB9B3C1D11F.cae2 http://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article7222075/Tuerken-sind-die-Sorgenkinder-der-Integration.html http://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article7222075/Tuerken-sind-die-Sorgenkinder-der-Integration.html http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/immigration-survey-shows-alarming-lack-of-integration-in-germany-a-603588.html http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/immigration-survey-shows-alarming-lack-of-integration-in-germany-a-603588.html http://www.taz.de/!29319/ http://www1.wdr.de/themen/politik/integration380.html 14 7 n. a. „Ungenutzte Potenziale. Zur Lage der Integration in Deutschland.“ (Unused potentials. The status-quo of integration in Germany.) Berlin-Institut für Bevölkerung und Entwicklung. Jan. 2009. Web. 14 Jun. 2014. http://www.berlin-institut.org/fileadmin/user_upload/Zuwanderung/Integration_RZ_online.pdf. 8 n.a. “Der neue Bundestag. Fünf Prozent Abgeordnete mit Migrationshintergrund.“ (The new parliament. Five percent of the representatives elected have “immigrant roots.”) Migazin. 24 Sept. 2013. Web. 14 Jun. 2014. http://www.migazin.de/2013/09/24/bundestag-abgeordnete-mit-migrationshintergrund/. 9 Karytianos, A. “Parallel societies: An acknowledgement of failure or a step towards integration? The Greek paradigm.” The 3rd Hellenic Observatory PhD Symposium Contemporary Greece: Structures, Context and Challenges. The London School of Economics and Political Science European Institute, Hellenic Observatory. 15 Jun. 2007. Web. 14 Jun. 2014. http://www.lse.ac.uk/europeanInstitute/research/hellenicObservatory/pdf/3rd_Symposium/PAPERS/KARYTIANOS _ADAMANTIOS.pdf. „The term “Parallel Societies” is in fact a German neologism (Parallelgesellschaften) that was created in 1996 for the purpose of describing secluded communities of immigrants in Germany. […]Meyer (2002: 343-346) suggests five indicators for the examination of the formation of parallel immigrant societies: i. ethnocultural or religious-cultural homogeneity of an immigrant group ii. economic segregation and civil society segregation iii. duplication of majoritarian institutions iv. (technically speaking) self-induced isolation as a result of discrimination v. if all four criteria apply, then spatial segregation also constitutes an indicator, e.g. isolation within a specific area of the city.” 10 Rasche, U. “Türkische Schulen in Deutschland. Muslime mit calvinistischem Ehrgeiz.“ (Turkish schools in Germany. Muslims with Calvinistic Ambitions.) Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ). 28 Mar. 2010. Web. 14 Jun. 2014. http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/inland/tuerkische-schulen-in-deutschland-muslime-mit-calvinistischem- ehrgeiz-1593636.html. 11 Vitzthum, T. “Tuerkische Schulen in Deutschland gibt es laengst.” (Turkish schools in Germany. Already a reality.) Die Welt. 9 Feb. 2008. Web. 14 Jun. 2014. http://www.welt.de/politik/article1653966/Tuerkische-Schulen-in- Deutschland-Gibt-es-laengst.html. 12 n.a. ” Profile: Fethullah Gulen's Hizmet movement.” Britisch Broadcasting Channel (BBC). 18 Dec. 2013. Web. 14 Jun. 2014. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-13503361. “Supporters regard the Hizmet movement inspired by US-based Turkish preacher Fethullah Gulen as the benign, modern face of Islam, but critics question its motives.” 13 Popp, M. „Islam. Allahs Richter.“ (Islam. Allah’s judges.) Der Spiegel. 29 Aug. 2011. Web. 14 Jun. 2014. http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-80165560.html. 14 Ripperger, S. “Parallel societies, parallel justice.” Deutsche Welle (DW). 25 Apr. 2012. Web. 14 Jun. 2014. http://www.dw.de/parallel-societies-parallel-justice/a-15908155. 15 Lohse, E. „Bayern geht gegen Clanstrukturen vor„Paralleljustiz findet deutschlandweit statt“.“ (Bavaria goes against clan-structures: parallel-justice happening nationwide.) Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ). 21 Apr. 2014. Web. 14 Jun. 2014. http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/inland/justizminister-bausback-paralleljustiz- deutschlandweit-12903805.html. http://www.migazin.de/2013/09/24/bundestag-abgeordnete-mit-migrationshintergrund/ http://www.lse.ac.uk/europeanInstitute/research/hellenicObservatory/pdf/3rd_Symposium/PAPERS/KARYTIANOS_ADAMANTIOS.pdf http://www.lse.ac.uk/europeanInstitute/research/hellenicObservatory/pdf/3rd_Symposium/PAPERS/KARYTIANOS_ADAMANTIOS.pdf http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/inland/tuerkische-schulen-in-deutschland-muslime-mit-calvinistischem-ehrgeiz-1593636.html http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/inland/tuerkische-schulen-in-deutschland-muslime-mit-calvinistischem-ehrgeiz-1593636.html http://www.welt.de/politik/article1653966/Tuerkische-Schulen-in-Deutschland-Gibt-es-laengst.html http://www.welt.de/politik/article1653966/Tuerkische-Schulen-in-Deutschland-Gibt-es-laengst.html http://www.bbc.com/news/world-13503361 http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-80165560.html http://www.dw.de/parallel-societies-parallel-justice/a-15908155 http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/inland/justizminister-bausback-paralleljustiz-deutschlandweit-12903805.html http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/inland/justizminister-bausback-paralleljustiz-deutschlandweit-12903805.html 15 Ruppel, U. “Paralleljustiz. Viermal Unrecht im Namen der Scharia.“ (Parallel-justice. Injustice for times, in the name of Sharia.) 23 Apr. 2012. Web. 14 Jun. 2014. http://www.bz-berlin.de/aktuell/berlin/viermal-unrecht-im-namen- der-scharia-article1441876.html. Wagner, J. „Justiz. Im Namen Allahs.“ (Justice. In the name of Allah.) Der Spiegel. 18 Jun. 2012. Web. 14 Jun. 2014. http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-86486650.html. Rollmann, A. “Im Namen der Ehre am Staat vorbei. Islamistische Paralleljustiz in Deutschland.“ (In the name of honor; disregarding the state. Islamic parallel-justice in Germany.) 5 Jul. 2012. Web. 14 Jun. 2014. http://www.deutschlandfunk.de/im-namen-der-ehre-am-staat-vorbei.886.de.html?dram:article_id=211442. "Die Clans und die sogenannten Friedensrichter stammen vor allem aus dem kurdisch-libanesischen Milieu, sie kommen aus palästinensischen Flüchtlingslagern. In Neukölln stammen nur sieben Prozent der Bewohner aus arabischen Ländern. Die Liste der Intensivtäter führen sie aber ganz weit oben an. 47 Prozent der Serienstraftäter tragen arabische Namen. Der Anteil der türkischstämmigen Serientäter ging hingegen von 33 auf 24 Prozent zurück, berichtet Mengelkoch: "Die türkische Community in Berlin ist riesengroß. Das ist sehr heterogen. In der arabischen Community sieht das ganz anders aus. Das sind etwas 60.000, da kennt jeder jeden. Der größte Teil kommt aus einem der zwölf palästinensischen Flüchtlingslager im Libanon. Das hat die Leute zusammengeschweißt. Jetzt sind große Teile dieser Clans hier. Sie korrespondieren mit ihren Clans im Libanon, im Gazastreifen im Westjordanland. Das, was da unten geschieht, geschieht auch bei uns in Nord-Neukölln." 16 Mohr, R. “Parallelgesellschaft. Richter von Allahs Gnaden erodieren deutsche Justiz.“ (Parallel society. Allah’s judges eroding Germany’s justice system.) Die Welt. 26 Sept. 2011. Web. 14 Jun. 2014. http://www.welt.de/kultur/literarischewelt/article13613800/Richter-von-Allahs-Gnaden-erodieren-deutsche- Justiz.html. 17 Wierth, A. “Muslime. Grusel-Islam im Parlament.“ (Moslems. Creepy-Islam in Parliament.) Die Tageszeitung (TAZ). 31 May 2012. Web. 14 Jun. 2014. http://www.taz.de/!94408/. „Ebenso gebe es unter deutschen Muslimen eine „Vielfalt von Auffassungen“ über die Rolle von Koran und Scharia: „Viele Muslime kennen solche Paralleljustiz gar nicht“, so Chung. Er warnte deshalb davor, diese zu ethnisieren oder mit einer Religion zu verbinden. Und auch, wenn „die Ernsthaftigkeit des Problems nicht zu bestreiten sei“ – etwa, wenn schwere Straftaten nicht vor staatliche Gerichte gelangten – fehle ihm bei Wagner „die Basis für die Aussage, dieses Phänomen gefährde unser Rechtssystem“. 83 Prozent der Muslime in Deutschland lehnten laut Bundesinnenministerium das islamische Rechtssystem der Scharia klar ab, hielt Ülker Radziwill (SPD) dem Autor entgegen – nur 4,9 Prozent befürworteten es.“ (English: German Muslims, have a "diversity of views" about the role of the Koran and Sharia: "Many Muslims do not even know such a parallel justice," said Chung. He therefore warned against ethicizing this or connecting it to a http://www.bz-berlin.de/aktuell/berlin/viermal-unrecht-im-namen-der-scharia-article1441876.html http://www.bz-berlin.de/aktuell/berlin/viermal-unrecht-im-namen-der-scharia-article1441876.html http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-86486650.html http://www.deutschlandfunk.de/im-namen-der-ehre-am-staat-vorbei.886.de.html?dram:article_id=211442 http://www.welt.de/kultur/literarischewelt/article13613800/Richter-von-Allahs-Gnaden-erodieren-deutsche-Justiz.html http://www.welt.de/kultur/literarischewelt/article13613800/Richter-von-Allahs-Gnaden-erodieren-deutsche-Justiz.html http://www.taz.de/!94408/ 16 religion. And even if "the seriousness of the problem was not to be denied" - for example, when serious crimes never reached state courts - Wagner lacks "the basis for his statement that this phenomenon (“parallel justice system”) endangers our legal system." According to the Federal Ministry of the Interior, 83 percent of Muslims in Germany reject the Islamic legal system of Sharia, Ülker Radziwill (SPD) explained, and only 4.9 percent support it.) 18 n.a. „Paralleljustiz in Bayern. Im Schatten der Rechtsordnung.“ (Parallel justice in Bavaria. In the shadow of the justice system.) Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ). 22 April. 2014. Web. 14 Jun. 2014. http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/inland/paralleljustiz-in-bayern-friedensrichter-gegen-gesetze-12903961- p2.html. 19 n.a. „Grundgesetz fuer die Bundesrepublik Deutschland.“ (Offical source: Basic Law of Federal Republic of Germany.) Bundesministerium der Justiz und Verbraucherschutz. 11 Jul. 2012. Web. 14 Jun. 2014. http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/gg/BJNR000010949.html. “No one should be treated favorably or unfavorably, based on gender, background, race, language, national origin, belief system, religious or political beliefs or disability.” (Niemand darf wegen seines Geschlechtes, seiner Abstammung, seiner Rasse, seiner Sprache, seiner Heimat und Herkunft, seines Glaubens, seiner religiösen oder politischen Anschauungen benachteiligt oder bevorzugt werden. Niemand darf wegen seiner Behinderung benachteiligt werden.)” 20 Nickel, R. „Drei Jahre Allgemeines Gleichbehandlungsgesetz (AGG): eine Zwischenbilanz.“ (Three years of anti- discrimination law. An interim update.) Heinrich Boell Stiftung. n.d. Web. 14 Jun. 2014. http://heimatkunde.boell.de/sites/default/files/pics/Rainer_Nickel_Drei_Jahre_AGG_PDF.pdf. „Kaum ein Gesetzesprojekt in diesem Jahrzehnt so umstritten wie das AGG.“ (Hardly any bill in this decade was as controversial as the AGG). 21 n.a. “The State Response to “Hate Crimes” in Germany.” Human Rights Watch. 9 Dec. 2011. Web. 14 Jun. 2014. http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/12/09/state-response-hate-crimes-germany. 22 n.a. “Was heißt überhaupt fremdenfeindliche Straftat?“ (What is xenophobic crime?) Informationsportal zum Thema Kriminalitaet. Journascience.org. n.d. Web. 14 Jun. 2014. http://www.journascience.org/de/fremdenfeindlich/basics/kubink/straftaten_1-2.shtml. 23 n.a. “Politisch motivierte Kriminalität.” (Politically motivated crimes.) Bundesministerium des Innern. n.d. Web. 14 Jun. 2014. http://www.bmi.bund.de/DE/Themen/Sicherheit/Kriminalitaetsbekaempfung/Politisch-motivierte- Kriminalitaet/politisch-motivierte-kriminalitaet_node.html. http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/inland/paralleljustiz-in-bayern-friedensrichter-gegen-gesetze-12903961-p2.html http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/inland/paralleljustiz-in-bayern-friedensrichter-gegen-gesetze-12903961-p2.html http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/gg/BJNR000010949.html http://heimatkunde.boell.de/sites/default/files/pics/Rainer_Nickel_Drei_Jahre_AGG_PDF.pdf http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/12/09/state-response-hate-crimes-germany http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/12/09/state-response-hate-crimes-germany http://www.journascience.org/de/fremdenfeindlich/basics/kubink/straftaten_1-2.shtml http://www.bmi.bund.de/DE/Themen/Sicherheit/Kriminalitaetsbekaempfung/Politisch-motivierte-Kriminalitaet/politisch-motivierte-kriminalitaet_node.html http://www.bmi.bund.de/DE/Themen/Sicherheit/Kriminalitaetsbekaempfung/Politisch-motivierte-Kriminalitaet/politisch-motivierte-kriminalitaet_node.html 17 24 Kulish, N. “Neo-Nazis Suspected in Long Wave of Crimes, Including Murders, in Germany.” New York Times. 13 Nov. 2011. Web. 14 Jun. 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/14/world/europe/neo-nazis-suspected-in- wave-of-crimes-in-germany.html. Kulish, N. “German Woman Charged in Neo-Nazi Crime Rampage.” New York Times. 8 Nov. 2012. Web. 14 Jun. 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/09/world/europe/german-woman-charged-in-neo-nazi-crime- rampage.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 25 Carstens, P. “Abschlussbericht vorgestellt. NSU-Opfer kritisieren Untersuchungsausschuss.“ (Final report presented. NSU-victims criticize investigation commission.) Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ). 22 Aug. 2013. Web. 14 Jun. 2014. http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/abschlussbericht-vorgestellt-nsu-opfer-kritisieren- untersuchungsausschuss-12542819.html. 26 Gude, H. “Neo-Nazi Mole: Could the NSU Murders Have Been Prevented?” Der Spiegel. 27 Feb. 2014. Web. 14 Jun. 2014. http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/former-neo-nazi-informant-sheds-new-light-on-nsu- murders-a-955787.html. Friedrichsen, G. „Neo-Nazi Terror: Trial Advances Despite Immense Complexity.” Der Spiegel. 21 Jul. 2013. Web. 30 May 2014. http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/nsu-neo-nazi-terror-trial-advances-despite-complexity- a-913817.html. n.a. “Germany apologizes to the UN for NSU murders.” Die Deutsche Welle (DW). 25 May 2013. Web. 14 Jun. 2014. http://www.dw.de/germany-apologizes-to-the-un-for-nsu-murders/a-16772650. “Germany has apologized at the UN for mistakes made while investigating the NSU murder series, which were allegedly committed by a neo-Nazi trio. German leaders have publicly apologized for the way the case was handled.” Jansen, F. “Opfervertreter: Bundesanwaltschaft blockiert Aufklärung.” (Representatives of the victims: Attorney General’s office blocking the investigations.) Der Tagesspiegel. 17 Feb. 2014. Web. 14 Jun. 2014. http://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/nsu-prozess-opfervertreter-bundesanwaltschaft-blockiert- aufklaerung/9496880.html. “Die 33 Nebenklage-Anwälte sind allerdings nicht nur mit der juristischen Aufarbeitung des NSU-Terrors unzufrieden. Ihnen fehlen auch politische Diskussionen, vor allem zum „Problem des strukturellen und institutionellen Rassismus“ als einer der Ursachen „für das Versagen der Ermittlungsbehörden, aber auch der Medien und der Gesellschaft“, wie es in dem Papier heißt. Scharmer und der ebenfalls aus Berlin stammende Nebenklage-Anwalt Mehmet Daimagüler trugen die Forderung vor, der Bundestag müsse dazu eine Enquetekommission einsetzen.“ 27 Sezer, K. “Türke mit deutschem Pass? Was denn sonst!“ (Turk with a German passport? What else!) Deutsch Tuerkisches Journal (DTJ). 1 Aug. 2013. Web. 14 Jun. 2014. http://dtj-online.de/turke-mit-deutschem-pass-was- denn-sonst-1503. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/14/world/europe/neo-nazis-suspected-in-wave-of-crimes-in-germany.html http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/14/world/europe/neo-nazis-suspected-in-wave-of-crimes-in-germany.html http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/09/world/europe/german-woman-charged-in-neo-nazi-crime-rampage.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/09/world/europe/german-woman-charged-in-neo-nazi-crime-rampage.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/abschlussbericht-vorgestellt-nsu-opfer-kritisieren-untersuchungsausschuss-12542819.html http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/abschlussbericht-vorgestellt-nsu-opfer-kritisieren-untersuchungsausschuss-12542819.html http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/former-neo-nazi-informant-sheds-new-light-on-nsu-murders-a-955787.html http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/former-neo-nazi-informant-sheds-new-light-on-nsu-murders-a-955787.html http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/nsu-neo-nazi-terror-trial-advances-despite-complexity-a-913817.html http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/nsu-neo-nazi-terror-trial-advances-despite-complexity-a-913817.html http://www.dw.de/germany-apologizes-to-the-un-for-nsu-murders/a-16772650 http://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/nsu-prozess-opfervertreter-bundesanwaltschaft-blockiert-aufklaerung/9496880.html http://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/nsu-prozess-opfervertreter-bundesanwaltschaft-blockiert-aufklaerung/9496880.html http://dtj-online.de/turke-mit-deutschem-pass-was-denn-sonst-1503 http://dtj-online.de/turke-mit-deutschem-pass-was-denn-sonst-1503 18 28 n.a.“Nationaler Aktionsplan Integration.“ (National action plan, integration.) Die Bundesregierung. 31 Jan. 2012. Web. 14 Jun. 2014. http://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/_Anlagen/IB/2012-01-31-nap-gesamt- barrierefrei.pdf?__blob=publicationFile. 29 n.a. “Staatsangehoerigkeitsgesetz.” (Official site: Citizenship Laws of Germany.) Bundesministerium der Justiz und fuer Verbraucherschutz. 28 Aug. 2013. Web. 14 Jun. 2014. http://www.gesetze-im- internet.de/rustag/BJNR005830913.html. 30 Senol, E. “Saarland hui, Bayern pfui. Hier gibt’s den Doppelpass auch für Türken.“ (Saaland, yes. Bayern, no. Here, they have dual-citizenship also for Turks.) Migazin. 14 Nov. 2011. Web. 14 Jun. 2014. http://www.migazin.de/2011/11/14/hier-gibts-den-doppelpass-auch-fur-turken/. 31 n.a. “Kritik am neuen Gesetzesentwurf zur Staatsangehoerigkeit.” (Critique of the new citizenship bill.) Tuerkische Gemeinde Deutschland (TGD). 28 Mar. 2014. Web. 14 Jun. 2014. http://www.tgd.de/2014/03/28/kritik-am-neuen-gesetzesentwurf-zur-staatsangehorigkeit/. 32 n.a. “Beibehaltungsantrag stellen – Wie Optionspflichtige ihre bisherigen Pässe in Ausnahmefällen behalten können.“ (Filing a petition to remain dual-citizen. How affected citizens can keep their second passport in exceptional situations.) Bertelsmann Stiftung. http://bertelsmann- stiftung.de/cps/rde/xchg/bst/hs.xsl/113688.htm. 33 n.a. “Fact Sheet „Optionspflicht.“” (Option-duty; dual-citizenship policy.) Bertelsmann Stiftung. n.d. Web. 14 Jun. 2014. http://bertelsmann-stiftung.de/cps/rde/xbcr/SID-0066DACA- 0FAC83B1/bst/xcms_bst_dms_37047_37131_2.pdf. 34 n.a. „Optionspflicht.“ (Option-duty; dual-citizenship policy.) Bundesministerium des Innern. n.d. Web. 14 Jun. 2014. http://www.bmi.bund.de/DE/Themen/Migration-Integration/Optionspflicht/optionspflicht_node.html. 35 Dempsey, J. “A difficult choice for Turks in Germany.” New York Times. 15 Apr. 2013. Web. 14 Jun. 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/16/world/europe/16iht-letter16.html?_r=1&. 36 n.a. “Verfassungsschutzbericht.” (Official source: Office for the Protection of the Basic Law.) Bundesamt fuer Verfassungsschutz. 11 Jun. 2013. Web. 14 Jun. 2014. http://www.verfassungsschutz.de/de/oeffentlichkeitsarbeit/publikationen/verfassungsschutzberichte/vsbericht- 2012. 37 De Freytas-Tamura, K. “Foreign Jihadis Fighting in Syria Pose Risk in West.” New York Times. 29 May 2014. Web. 14 Jun. 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/30/world/middleeast/foreign-jihadis-fighting-in-syria-pose-risk- in-west.html. 38 n.a. „Geheimdienste alarmiert: 5.000 Dschihadisten aus Europa wollen gen Syrien.“ (Intelligence community alarms: 5,000 Jihadists from Europe on their way to Syria.) Deutsch-Tuerkische-Nachrichten (DTN). 8 Jun. 2014. Web. 14 Jun. 2014. http://www.deutsch-tuerkische-nachrichten.de/2014/06/502872/geheimdienste-alarmiert-5- 000-dschihadisten-aus-europa-wollen-gen-syrien/. 39 n.a. “Verfassungsschutzbericht.” (Official source: Office for the Protection of the Basic Law.) Bundesamt fuer Verfassungsschutz. 11 Jun. 2013. Web. 14 Jun. 2014. http://www.verfassungsschutz.de/de/oeffentlichkeitsarbeit/publikationen/verfassungsschutzberichte/vsbericht- 2012. http://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/_Anlagen/IB/2012-01-31-nap-gesamt-barrierefrei.pdf?__blob=publicationFile http://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/_Anlagen/IB/2012-01-31-nap-gesamt-barrierefrei.pdf?__blob=publicationFile http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/rustag/BJNR005830913.html http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/rustag/BJNR005830913.html http://www.migazin.de/2011/11/14/hier-gibts-den-doppelpass-auch-fur-turken/ http://www.tgd.de/2014/03/28/kritik-am-neuen-gesetzesentwurf-zur-staatsangehorigkeit/ http://bertelsmann-stiftung.de/cps/rde/xchg/bst/hs.xsl/113688.htm http://bertelsmann-stiftung.de/cps/rde/xchg/bst/hs.xsl/113688.htm http://bertelsmann-stiftung.de/cps/rde/xbcr/SID-0066DACA-0FAC83B1/bst/xcms_bst_dms_37047_37131_2.pdf http://bertelsmann-stiftung.de/cps/rde/xbcr/SID-0066DACA-0FAC83B1/bst/xcms_bst_dms_37047_37131_2.pdf http://www.bmi.bund.de/DE/Themen/Migration-Integration/Optionspflicht/optionspflicht_node.html http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/16/world/europe/16iht-letter16.html?_r=1& http://www.verfassungsschutz.de/de/oeffentlichkeitsarbeit/publikationen/verfassungsschutzberichte/vsbericht-2012 http://www.verfassungsschutz.de/de/oeffentlichkeitsarbeit/publikationen/verfassungsschutzberichte/vsbericht-2012 http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/30/world/middleeast/foreign-jihadis-fighting-in-syria-pose-risk-in-west.html http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/30/world/middleeast/foreign-jihadis-fighting-in-syria-pose-risk-in-west.html http://www.deutsch-tuerkische-nachrichten.de/2014/06/502872/geheimdienste-alarmiert-5-000-dschihadisten-aus-europa-wollen-gen-syrien/ http://www.deutsch-tuerkische-nachrichten.de/2014/06/502872/geheimdienste-alarmiert-5-000-dschihadisten-aus-europa-wollen-gen-syrien/ http://www.verfassungsschutz.de/de/oeffentlichkeitsarbeit/publikationen/verfassungsschutzberichte/vsbericht-2012 http://www.verfassungsschutz.de/de/oeffentlichkeitsarbeit/publikationen/verfassungsschutzberichte/vsbericht-2012 19 „Die Zahl der politisch motivierten Straftaten ist im Jahr 2013 in Deutschland deutlich angestiegen. Insgesamt wurden 31.645 Straftaten und 2.848 Gewalttaten registriert, was einer Steigerung von 15,3 Prozent bzw. 15,6 Prozent entspricht (2012: 27.440 bzw.2012: 2.464). Überdurchschnittlich fällt der Zuwachs bei Straftaten, die dem linken Spektrum zuzuordnen sind, aus (+40,1 Prozent). Politisch rechts motivierte Straftaten nahmen von hohem Niveau leicht ab (-3,3 Prozent). Erneut kam es allerdings zu einem Anstieg fremdenfeindlicher Delikte (+11,2 Prozent).“ (Please note that politically motivated crimes in Germany overall, are crimes that allegedly target the government exclusively. Therefore, an increase of 11+ percent in xenophobic crimes, for example, is not included in the politically right motivated crimes statistics.) 40 n.a. “Verfassungsschutzbericht.” (Official source: Office for the Protection of the Basic Law.) Bundesamt fuer Verfassungsschutz. 11 Jun. 2013. Web. 14 Jun. 2014. http://www.verfassungsschutz.de/de/oeffentlichkeitsarbeit/publikationen/verfassungsschutzberichte/vsbericht- 2012. 41 Reimann, A. “Salafisten: junge Deutsch-Tuerken finden Koran Aktion gut.” (Salafists: young German-Turks approve the Koran- distribution-campaign.) Der Spiegel. 16 Aug. 2012. Web. 14 Jun. 2014. http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/salafisten-junge-deutsch-tuerken-finden-koran-aktion-gut-a- 850346.html. 42 Reimann, A. “Salafisten: junge Deutsch-Tuerken finden Koran Aktion gut.” (Salafists: young German-Turks approve the Koran- distribution-campaign.) Der Spiegel. 16 Aug. 2012. Web. 14 Jun. 2014. http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/salafisten-junge-deutsch-tuerken-finden-koran-aktion-gut-a- 850346.html. 43 n.a. „Ex-Nationalspieler und Islamist Burak Karan wurde in Syrien getoetet.“ (Ex-football star and Islamist Burak Karan killed in Syria.) Der Spiegel. 18 Nov. 2013. Web. 14 Jun. 2014. http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/ex- nationalspieler-und-islamist-burak-karan-wurde-in-syrien-getoetet-a-934142.html. 44 n.a. „Prognosen in EU-Ländern: Extreme Parteien legen bei Europawahl deutlich zu.“ (EU parliamentary election, forecast: substantial gains for extremist parties.) Der Spiegel. 26 May 2014. Web. 14 Jun. 2014. http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/europawahl-extreme-parteien-legen-bei-europawahl-deutlich-zu-a- 971618.html. 45 n.a. „Politisch motivierte Kriminalität im Jahr 2013.“ (Politically motivated crimes in 2013.) Bundesministerium des Innern. 29 Apr. 2014. Web. 14 Jun. 2014. http://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Pressemitteilungen/DE/2014/04/politisch-motivierte-kriminalitaet- 2013.html. 46 Diehl, J. „Pierre Vogel: Islamisten-Prediger kreuzbrav.“ (Pierre Vogel: the Islamist-preacher.) Der Spiegel. 9 Jun. 2012. Web. 14 Jun. 2014. http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/islamisten-prediger-vogel-in-koeln-zurueck- im-schafspelz-a-837947.html. 47 Kuhlmann, J. „Salafismus als Jugendphänomen.” (Salafism as a youth problem.) Deutschlandfunk. 1 Feb. 2013. Web. 14 Jun. 2014. http://www.deutschlandfunk.de/salafismus-als- jugendphaenomen.886.de.html?dram:article_id=236066. Cileli, S. “Fetullah Gulen: Wolf im Schaftspelz?” Web. 12 Jul. 2014. http://www.cileli.de/2013/02/fethullah-guelen- wolf-im-schafspelz/ http://www.verfassungsschutz.de/de/oeffentlichkeitsarbeit/publikationen/verfassungsschutzberichte/vsbericht-2012 http://www.verfassungsschutz.de/de/oeffentlichkeitsarbeit/publikationen/verfassungsschutzberichte/vsbericht-2012 http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/salafisten-junge-deutsch-tuerken-finden-koran-aktion-gut-a-850346.html http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/salafisten-junge-deutsch-tuerken-finden-koran-aktion-gut-a-850346.html http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/salafisten-junge-deutsch-tuerken-finden-koran-aktion-gut-a-850346.html http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/salafisten-junge-deutsch-tuerken-finden-koran-aktion-gut-a-850346.html http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/ex-nationalspieler-und-islamist-burak-karan-wurde-in-syrien-getoetet-a-934142.html http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/ex-nationalspieler-und-islamist-burak-karan-wurde-in-syrien-getoetet-a-934142.html http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/europawahl-extreme-parteien-legen-bei-europawahl-deutlich-zu-a-971618.html http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/europawahl-extreme-parteien-legen-bei-europawahl-deutlich-zu-a-971618.html http://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Pressemitteilungen/DE/2014/04/politisch-motivierte-kriminalitaet-2013.html http://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Pressemitteilungen/DE/2014/04/politisch-motivierte-kriminalitaet-2013.html http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/islamisten-prediger-vogel-in-koeln-zurueck-im-schafspelz-a-837947.html http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/islamisten-prediger-vogel-in-koeln-zurueck-im-schafspelz-a-837947.html http://www.deutschlandfunk.de/salafismus-als-jugendphaenomen.886.de.html?dram:article_id=236066 http://www.deutschlandfunk.de/salafismus-als-jugendphaenomen.886.de.html?dram:article_id=236066 http://www.cileli.de/2013/02/fethullah-guelen-wolf-im-schafspelz/ http://www.cileli.de/2013/02/fethullah-guelen-wolf-im-schafspelz/ Western Michigan University From the SelectedWorks of Alev Dudek Spring April 9, 2015 Integration of and the Potential for Islamic Radicalization Among Ethnic Turks in Germany tmpV4NVNU.pdf 
work_42awjrcnp5b4toplbzm2umwg34	----	Ring v. Arizona: Who Decides Death? Charles L. Scott, MD, and Joan B. Gerbasi, JD, MD J Am Acad Psychiatry Law 31:106 –9, 2003 In the United States, the right to a jury trial is guar- anteed by the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Consti- tution, made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. The Sixth Amendment states, in part, “In all criminal prosecutions, the ac- cused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have been committed.” The U.S. Supreme Court has also held that the “Consti- tution gives a criminal defendant the right to have a jury determine, beyond a reasonable doubt, his guilt of every element of the crime with which he is charged.”1 In Walton v. Arizona,2 the U.S. Supreme Court held that an Arizona statute permitting a judge to determine whether the death penalty should be im- posed on a capital defendant did not violate the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee to a trial by jury. In partic- ular, the Court found that aggravating factors neces- sary to impose the death penalty were not elements of the offense and instead served as circumstances for consideration by a judge when deciding between the penalties of life imprisonment or death. In contrast, the Court held in Apprendi v. New Jersey,3 that a judge could not make findings that would increase a defendant’s sentence beyond the maximum, because that was comparable with an ad- ditional conviction. In Apprendi, the defendant was convicted of second-degree possession of a firearm, an offense carrying a maximum penalty of 10 years under New Jersey law. The sentencing judge found that Apprendi’s crime was racially motivated and therefore under New Jersey law triggered the appli- cation of a hate crime enhancement. The trial judge sentenced Apprendi to 12 years, two years over the maximum sentence that the jury could impose but for the hate crime enhancement. The U.S. Supreme Court held that Apprendi’s sentence violated his right to a jury determination that he was guilty be- yond a reasonable doubt of each element of the crime with which he was charged. The Court noted, “If a State makes an increase in a defendant’s authorized punishment contingent on the finding of a fact, that fact—no matter how the State labels it—must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt” (Ref. 3, pp 482– 83). The Apprendi Court appreciated that a conflict could be found between its holdings in Apprendi and Walton, but stated that the rulings could be reconciled. The key distinction was that the Ari- zona statutory scheme that was at issue in Walton provided that a conviction of first-degree murder carried a maximum sentence of death. The Court stated: Once a jury has found the defendant guilty of all the elements of an offense which carries as its maximum penalty the sen- tence of death, it may be left to the judge to decide whether that maximum penalty, rather than a lesser one, ought to be imposed [Ref. 3, p 497, emphasis deleted, quoting Almen- darez-Torres v. U.S., 523 U.S. 224, 257, n 2 (1998), Scalia J, dissenting]. On January 11, 2002, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear Ring v. Arizona to reconsider the con- stitutionality of having a judge, rather than a jury, decide the critical sentencing issues in a death penalty case. The case was decided on June 24, 2002.4 Case Background Timothy Ring was charged with murder and armed robbery. On November 28, 1994, a Wells Fargo armored van pulled up to a store in a local mall, and the courier left the van to pick up money inside the mall. When he returned, the van and its driver Dr. Scott is Chief of the Forensic Psychiatry Division and Assistant Professor of Clinical Psychiatry and Forensic Psychiatry Residency Training Director and Dr. Gerbasi is Assistant Clinical Professor of Psychiatry and Associate Director of the Forensic Psychiatry Resi- dency, University of California, Davis, Sacramento, CA. Address cor- respondence to: Charles L. Scott, MD, Department of Psychiatry, University of California, Davis Medical Center, 2230 Stockton Blvd., Sacramento, CA 95817. E-mail: charles.scott@ucdmc.ucdavis.edu 106 The Journal of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law A N A L Y S I S A N D C O M M E N T A R Y were gone. The van was later found in a parking lot with the driver dead of a single gunshot to the head. More than $562,000 in cash and $270,000 in checks were missing from the van. Based on an informant’s tip, the police placed wiretaps on the telephones of Timothy Ring, James Greenham, and William Fer- guson. Ring was noted to make statements in his telephone conversation with Ferguson that indicated he had knowledge about the stolen money. The po- lice executed a search warrant at Ring’s house and discovered a duffel bag in his garage containing more that $271,000 in cash. Ring alleged that the money was startup capital for a construction company he and Greenham were planning to form. He stated that he had obtained the money from his work as a con- fidential informant for the Federal Bureau of Inves- tigation and as a bail bondsman, although other ev- idence indicated that he had made less than $10,000 from these jobs. The trial judge instructed the jury on alternative charges of premeditated murder and felony murder. The jury convicted Ring of felony murder but dead- locked on the charge of premeditated murder. Under Arizona law, Ring could not be sentenced to death unless further findings were made. In addition, the Arizona statute required the judge who presided at trial to conduct a separate sentencing hearing to de- termine the presence or absence of certain circum- stances to assist in deciding what sentence should be imposed. The judge was also responsible for deter- mining the presence or absence of enumerated “ag- gravating circumstances” and “mitigating circum- stances” at the conclusion of the sentencing hearing. At the sentencing hearing, Greenham (who had pleaded guilty to second-degree murder and armed robbery) testified that Ring had shot the driver of the van and had taken the role as leader in planning the robbery. This testimony contradicted prior state- ments Greenham had made to Ring’s attorney that Ring had not planned or initiated the robbery. The trial judge sentenced Ring to death and acknowl- edged that because Ring had been convicted of fel- ony murder, Ring was eligible for the death penalty only if he was the actual killer of the van driver or if he was a “major participant in the armed robbery” and “exhibited a reckless disregard or indifference for hu- man life.” Based on Greenham’s testimony, the judge concluded that Ring shot the van driver and was a major participant in the armed robbery. The judge noted that two aggravating factors were present: Ring’s expectation of receiving something of “pecuniary value” and the commission of the crime “in an especially heinous, cruel or depraved manner.” The one mitigating factor noted by the judge was Ring’s “minimal” criminal record. However, the judge found that this factor did not “call for le- niency” and sentenced Ring to death. Ring appealed to the Arizona Supreme Court ar- guing that Arizona’s capital sentencing scheme vio- lated the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, because it entrusts to a judge, rather than a jury, the finding of a fact that would serve to raise the defendant’s maximum penalty. The Arizona Supreme Court viewed the Apprendi major- ity’s portrayal of Arizona’s capital sentencing law as incorrect and agreed with the dissent that the deter- minations made by the judge with respect to the aggravating factors required “factual findings.” However, the Arizona Supreme Court noted that the U.S. Supreme Court had previously upheld Arizo- na’s sentencing statute in Walton v. Arizona and had stated, 10 years later, in Apprendi that Walton re- mained good law. Therefore, the Arizona Supreme Court, citing its duties under the supremacy clause, upheld the death sentence imposed on Ring. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to revisit the case, given the tension between Walton and the rea- soning of Apprendi. The Decision In a seven-to-two decision, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Arizona Supreme Court and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with the judgment. Justice Ginsberg, writ- ing for the majority, stated that the question before the Supreme Court was “whether th[e] aggravating factor may be found by the judge, as Arizona law specifies, or whether the Sixth Amendment’s jury trial guarantee, made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, requires that the aggravat- ing factor determination be entrusted to the jury” (Ref. 4, p 2437, citations omitted). The Court opined that its holdings in Walton and Apprendi are irreconcilable. Taken together, the holdings would mean that it is permissible under the Sixth Amendment for a state to allow a judge, instead of a jury, to make a finding that would determine whether a defendant served life in prison or was put to death but is a violation of the Sixth Amendment for a state to do the same with respect to a factual Scott and Gerbasi 107Volume 31, Number 1, 2003 determination that results in a two-year increase in the maximum sentence. In their discussion regarding whether an aggravating-factor determination in death penalty cases should be considered as an ele- ment of the offense that must be determined by a jury, the Court majority wrote, “We see no reason to differentiate capital crimes from all others in this re- gard” (Ref. 4, p 2442). The Court emphasized that “the relevant inquiry is one not of form, but of effect” (Ref. 4, p 2439, citing Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S., at 494), and found that “because Arizona’s enumerated aggravating factors operate as the func- tional equivalent of an element of a greater offense, the Sixth Amendment requires that they be found by a jury” (Ref. 4, p 2443, internal citations omitted). The state of Arizona also argued that, even if facts increasing punishment beyond the maximum autho- rized by the jury verdict must ordinarily be found by a jury, aggravating circumstances necessary to result in a death sentence may nonetheless be reserved for determination by a judge because “death is different” and is deserving of greater protection. The state ar- gued that granting judges authority to find aggravat- ing factors “may be a better way to guarantee against the arbitrary imposition of the death penalty” (Ref. 4, p 2442). Writing for the majority, however, Jus- tice Ginsberg dismissed this argument and opined that the superiority of judicial fact finding in capital cases is “far from evident” and observed, addition- ally, that most states with statutes requiring the pres- ence of aggravating factors entrust those determina- tions to the jury, not the judge (Ref. 4, p. 2442). The Court majority concluded: Walton and Apprendi are irreconcilable; our Sixth Amendment jurisprudence cannot be home to both. Accordingly, we over- rule Walton to the extent that it allows a sentencing judge sitting without a jury to find an aggravating circumstance necessary for imposition of the death penalty. Because Arizona’s enumerated aggravating factors operate as the functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense, the Sixth Amendment requires that they be found by a jury [Ref. 4, p 2443, internal quotations and citations omitted]. Justice Scalia wrote a concurring opinion in which Justice Thomas joined. Justice Scalia expressed con- cern regarding the increasing movement of state and federal legislatures to adopt sentencing factors that increase punishment beyond that which is autho- rized by the jury. He emphasized, . . .that the fundamental meaning of the jury trial guarantee of the Sixth Amendment is that all facts essential to imposition of the level of punishment that the defendant receives—whether the statute calls them elements of the offense, sentencing factors, or Mary Jane—must be found by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt [Ref. 4, p 2444]. He observed: [The ] decline [in our people’s belief in the right to trial by jury] is bound to be confirmed, and indeed accelerated by the re- peated spectacle of a man’s going to his death because a judge found that an aggravating factor existed. We cannot preserve our veneration for the protection of the jury in criminal cases if we render ourselves callous to the need for that protection by regularly imposing the death penalty without it [Ref. 4, p 2445; emphasis in original]. In his concurring opinion, Justice Breyer stated that he concurred in the judgment of the majority, but on different grounds. He believes that that jury sentencing in capital cases is mandated by the Eighth Amendment because juries have a comparative ad- vantage over judges in determining whether capital punishment will serve society’s needs for retribution in a given case, as jury members are “more attuned to the community’s moral sensibility” (Ref. 4, p 2447; internal quotations and citations omitted). Justice O’Connor, writing a dissent that was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, argued that the Court should overturn their previous holding in Ap- prendi rather than their holding in Walton. Justice O’Connor commented that the Constitution did not require that any fact that could increase the penalty of the crime be treated as an element of the offense. The dissent cautioned that a substantial increase in criminal appeals had already resulted from their prior ruling in Apprendi and foreshadowed similar appeals in cases in which judges had imposed the death pen- alty on capital defendants. Discussion By overturning their prior ruling in Walton, the U.S. Supreme Court violated the principle of follow- ing precedent, a doctrine known as stare decisis (let the decision stand). The Court observed that al- though “the doctrine of stare decisis is of fundamen- tal importance to the rule of law. . .our precedents are not sacrosanct. . .[and must be overruled] where the necessity and propriety of doing so has been es- tablished” (Ref. 4, pp 2442– 43, internal quotations and citations omitted). The Court was satisfied that Ring presented such a case. The Supreme Court’s holding in this case is likely to have a substantial impact on sentencing practices in capital cases in several states. Before this ruling, Imposition of the Death Penalty 108 The Journal of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law three States (Arizona, Idaho, and Montana) had stat- utes authorizing a single judge to impose the death penalty, and two states (Colorado, Nebraska) al- lowed the determination of the death penalty by a three-judge panel. Based on the Ring decision, these five state statutes are no longer likely to meet consti- tutional muster. Three of these states (Arizona, Mon- tana, and Colorado) have already rewritten their stat- utes so that juries, not judges, determine when the death penalty will be imposed. Four other states (Alabama, Delaware, Florida, and Indiana) allow a judge to make a sentencing decision after the jury has made a recommendation regarding the imposition of the death penalty. Al- though the impact of the Ring decision regarding the constitutionality of these statutes is less clear, both Delaware and Indiana have rewritten their statutes and now require a jury to determine eligibility for the death penalty without involvement by the judge in this decision. The retroactive application of the Ring decision to capital defendants sentenced under stat- utes that may now be unconstitutional has yet to be determined. The applicability of the Court’s holding also remains unknown in those situations in which a defendant waived his or her right to a trial by jury or when the judge imposed the death penalty on the recommendation of the jury. The Court’s decision may affect nearly 800 death sentences in nine states and may require resentencing of hundreds of inmates. References 1. U.S. v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 510 (1995) 2. Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990) 3. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) 4. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002) Scott and Gerbasi 109Volume 31, Number 1, 2003 
work_42lt5ltpgfflpp6iyxunzj2f2q	----	The Rejection Sensitivity Model: Sexual Minority Adolescents in Context Vol.:(0123456789)1 3 Archives of Sexual Behavior (2020) 49:2259–2263 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10508-019-01572-2 CO M M E N TA RY The Rejection Sensitivity Model: Sexual Minority Adolescents in Context Laura Baams1 · Wouter J. Kiekens2 · Jessica N. Fish3 Received: 13 October 2019 / Revised: 18 October 2019 / Accepted: 19 October 2019 / Published online: 29 October 2019 © The Author(s) 2019 Introduction Theoretical and empirical integration of the rejection sen- sitivity (RS) model to sexual minority people is one of the few attempts to extend existing theoretical frameworks that explain mental health disparities for this population, namely the minority stress framework (Meyer, 2003) and its exten- sions (Hatzenbuehler, 2009; Testa, Habarth, Peta, Balsam, & Bockting, 2015). Theoretical origins of RS are rooted in the desire to understand how rejection from significant oth- ers affects subsequent other close relationships (Downey & Feldman, 1996). This was later extended to conceptualize rejection based on membership of a stigmatized group and modified to understand sexual orientation-related RS among sexual minorities (Dyar, Feinstein, Eaton, & London, 2016; Pachankis, Goldfried, & Ramrattan, 2008). Feinstein (2019) brings new life to this adapted application by grounding and integrating the basic tenets of sexual orientation-related RS alongside a critical health compromising process of minority stress: vigilance. Meyer theorized vigilance as a core form of proximal minority stressors and explains that “LGB people learn to anticipate—indeed, expect—negative regard from members of the dominant culture. To ward off potential nega- tive regard, discrimination, and violence, they must be vigi- lant” and this vigilance is “related to feared possible (even if imagined) negative events” (Meyer, 2003, p. 680–681). Fein- stein explains that existing theoretical frameworks (Hatzen- buehler, 2009; Meyer, 2003) mention vigilance and RS as important processes, but lack a comprehensive integration of these concepts. Given that schemas for RS are formed early in the life course, we focus on the applicability to sexual minority adolescents, and other marginalized groups. How Rejection Sensitivity Might Expand Understandings of LGBTQ Adolescent Mental Health Overwhelmingly, research testing the negative impacts of minority stress among sexual minority adolescents has focused on mental health, and more specifically depression and suici- dality. With good reason, studies show that sexual minority adolescents experience depression (Lucassen, Stasiak, Samra, Frampton, & Merry, 2017) and suicidality (Salway et al., 2019) at much higher rates than heterosexual adolescents, sometimes as young as age 11 (La Roi, Kretschmer, Dijkstra, Veenstra, & Oldehinkel, 2016). A smaller subsection of this research has enumerated anxiety as a correlate of minority stress (Jones, Robinson, Oginni, Rahman, & Rimes, 2017). The RS frame- work presented by Feinstein (2019) includes “anxiety” as an important feature of RS: To “anxiously expect rejection” is distinct from expecting rejection in the absence of anxiety or fear. This is a crucial distinction, because it is the anxiety that accompanies these expectations which activate RS as a detri- mental process for sexual minority adolescents’ mental health. The integration of the RS framework may also increase understanding of other important consequences of differential anticipatory emotions of rejection, namely anger and aggres- sion. We may, for example, see different associations between RS and externalizing or internalizing behaviors as a result of anticipatory responses that reflect anger relative to anxiety. In a study among lesbian and bisexual women, for example, results showed that drinking expectancies of aggression and anger This commentary refers to the article available at https ://doi. org/10.1007/s1050 8-019-1428-3. * Laura Baams l.baams@rug.nl 1 Department of Pedagogy and Educational Sciences, University of Groningen, Grote Rozenstraat 38, 9712 TJ Groningen, The Netherlands 2 Department of Sociology/Interuniversity Center for Social Science Theory and Methodology, University of Groningen, Groningen, The Netherlands 3 Department of Family Science, School of Public Health, University of Maryland, College Park, MD, USA http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1007/s10508-019-01572-2&domain=pdf https://doi.org/10.1007/s10508-019-1428-3 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10508-019-1428-3 2260 Archives of Sexual Behavior (2020) 49:2259–2263 1 3 were associated with alcohol abuse and dependency, whereas expecting that drinking will help you forget your worries when depressed was associated with heavy episodic drinking (Fish & Hughes, 2018). Research investigating victimization and bullying (Lereya, Copeland, Zammit, & Wolke, 2015) may benefit from testing the role of different anticipatory emotions as these might influence outcomes of aggression (anticipation of anger) relative to poor mental health (anticipation of anxi- ety). Aligning with Feinstein’s (2019) framework, we might hypothesize that some adolescents who are rejected may be more likely to respond with aggression. For example, a study among Minnesotan adolescents showed that sexual minority adolescents were more likely to be both victims and perpe- trators of bullying behaviors than their heterosexual peers (Eisenberg, Gower, McMorris, & Bucchianeri, 2015). At the same time, there could be positive, adaptive features of anticipation of anger in response to rejection: Shared anger may bring about and strengthen community, activism, civic engagement, and other forms of resilience among sexual minority adolescents through, for example, Gender and Sex- uality Alliances in schools (Poteat, Scheer, Marx, Calzo, & Yoshikawa, 2015). Youth may also anticipate and cope with negative experiences by hyper-engaging in school (Watson & Russell, 2016). Whether anxious or angry expectations of rejection bring about mental and behavioral problems, or posi- tive change, likely depends on the context in which the rejec- tion takes place and the support sexual minority youth might find in other contexts. Importantly, the distinction between these anticipatory emotions in relation to externalizing and internalizing behaviors may also require different intervention strategies (e.g., targeting anger versus targeting youth anxiety). Critical Developmental Periods for Rejection Sensitivity Research shows that sexual orientation disparities in victimiza- tion are evident at young ages, well before many adolescents acknowledge an awareness of their sexual orientation (Mar- tin-Storey & Fish, 2019; Mittleman, 2019). Might these early experiences of rejection become part of the learning history that sets an early precedent for elevated sexual orientation-spe- cific RS across the life course? Further, considering the declin- ing age of coming out for adolescents, experiences with rejec- tion and internalization of negative messaging around sexual minority identity may come at a younger age than previous generations, when both mental health (Russell & Fish, 2019) and RS are more vulnerable to these unique social stressors. According to Feinstein (2019), the cognitive social learning history of sexual minority individuals might also include vicarious experiences of rejection that impact their own RS (e.g., witnessing victimization or hearing nega- tive messages about sexual minority individuals in media). Although media has become more inclusive of sexual (and gender) diversity, debates around marriage equality, bath- room access, and conversion therapy might also portray negative views of sexual and gender diversity. Thus, in addition to witnessing hate crimes, (social) media portray- als of violence against sexual minority individuals might impact young people’s anxious expectations of the world (Paterson, Brown, & Walters, 2019). A parallel process can be observed in children and youth of color, who experience vicarious racism negatively impacting various health out- comes (Heard-Garris, Cale, Camaj, Hamati, & Dominguez, 2018). Importantly, vicarious experiences may be more or less impactful depending on when they occur in the life course, in that contemporary cohorts of sexual minority youth may be uniquely influenced by the negative politi- cal rhetoric in ways that alter their RS and hypervigilance across the life course. In fact, some might argue that the degree to which contemporary youth engage in new media may make this cohort of sexual minority youth particularly susceptible to RS, and the negative mental health conse- quences therein. With rapid changes in social attitudes toward sexual and gender diversity, research has increasingly included a focus on cohort differences among sexual minority people. Our focus on adolescence is in part due to the developmental stage and its importance for the development of RS, but also because contemporary sexual minority adolescents grow up in a social environment that is unique from older cohorts of sexual minority adults—and its impact on their lived experience and health will likely play out in unforetold ways across their life course. For example, in a study examining experiences of discrimination across the life course, gay and bisexual men in their 40s and 50s evidenced the highest rates of perceived discrimination relative to lesbian, gay, and bisexual adults of other ages (both older and younger). Rice, Fish, Russell, and Lanza (2019) attributed this anomoly to the fact that these men would have been in their late teens and early 20s during the AIDS epidemic, therefore (potentially) heightening these men’s perceptions of discrimination. We imagine, given the tenets of RS, that these men might have altered attributions of potentially neutral or ambiguous stimuli and elevated RS given the social stigma they experienced during this contentious time in history. Growing attention for cohort differences in perceptions of discrimination and compromised health might foreshadow how different cohorts have unique RS-inducing experiences, and therefore unique health consequences. 2261Archives of Sexual Behavior (2020) 49:2259–2263 1 3 Sociocontextual Perspectives on Rejection Sensitivity Processes Existing theoretical frameworks, including the current RS framework, pay little attention to the context in which people develop RS or experience early rejection. As Feinstein (2019) outlines, context matters both for the occurrence and salience of rejection and may impact the development of RS. In addi- tion, experiencing rejection in spaces that are thought to be “safe” might have a stronger impact on RS than experiencing rejection in historically unaccepting spaces. For example, when bisexual individuals experience rejection in the LGBTQ community, this may impact their RS to a larger extent than when they experience rejection in historically heterosexual spaces (Bostwick & Hequembourg, 2014). Additionally, expe- riencing RS in “safe” spaces might elicit different anticipatory emotions (e.g., anxiety, anger) compared to experiencing RS in more traditionally unaccepting spaces. Further, many sex- ual minority adolescents experience victimization in multiple contexts: their family home, school, or in public (Goldbach & Gibbs, 2017). Experiences in one context might translate to elevated RS in other contexts. For RS in particular, it is important to attend to multiple intersecting contexts and how experiences with rejection in one context does not preclude the experience of rejection in another, and may even set in motion the development of “generalized” RS, because it likely manifests as the result of experiences across multiple contexts. Alternatively, sexual minority adolescents might also gradu- ally select more supportive social environments (i.e., friends, LGBTQ community) limiting experiences with rejection and increasing positive and supportive experiences (Cohen, Padilla, & Aravena, 2006). Applicability to Other Marginalized/ Minority Groups Preliminary research on RS supports the notion that pro- cesses of RS explain the associations between minority stress and health outcomes, and that this mechanistic pro- cess holds for different sexual minority subgroups (e.g., men/women, monosexual/bisexual sexual minority people; Feinstein, 2019), which is what one hopes to see when the- ory building. However, Feinstein reflects on how anxious expectations of rejection might differ when we account for intersections with gender, race/ethnicity, and age, and that cues triggering anxious expectations may be different from cues triggering angry expectations among specific groups. A focus on intersecting experiences of rejection is crucial in understanding the development of RS for many sexual minority youth. That is, sexual minority youth of color likely develops RS related to two social statuses: sexual orientation- related RS from society in general, as well as race/ethnicity- related RS from both society in general, but also within the LGBTQ community, whereas White sexual minority people likely do not experience RS related to racial/ethnic identity. Along these same lines, however, RS related to different iden- tities—such as a racial/ethnic identity—may also cultivate unique strategies to combat the negative influence of rejec- tion, staving off RS. For example, parents of youth of color often engage in conversations around race-related experi- ences, including race-related rejection (i.e., family racial/eth- nic socialization practices), which has been shown to have positive effects for mental health and academic achievement among youth of color (Hughes et al., 2006). It could be that these strategies to address race-related rejection could help sexual minority youth of color cope with sexual orientation- related rejection. Thus, intersectional views on the devel- opment of RS could provide new perspectives on “multiple minority stressors” and how these experiences are linked to resilience, but also compromised mental health. In addition, although Feinstein (2019) acknowledges the applicability of the RS framework to different genders, there is currently very little research on the development of RS among transgender and other gender minority adolescents. Theoretical work on gender minority stress mentions nega- tive expectations from the future as an important precursor of vigilance (Rood et al., 2016; Testa et al., 2015) and suggests that experiences with rejection and trauma in transgender persons form a “trauma history” which then creates vigi- lance similar to how it would in sexual minority populations (Hendricks & Testa, 2012). However, because we currently lack a measure of RS that is applicable to multiple groups and groups with multiple minority identities, we have very little knowledge of the experience and development of RS among gender minority adolescents. Further, the emergence of new identity labels among sexual and gender minority youth (e.g., pansexual, genderqueer, gender nonbinary) underline the need for measurement development for a diverse and dynamic sexual and gender minority population (Galupo, Ramirez, & Pulice-Farrow, 2017). Intervention versus Prevention Feinstein (2019) broadly discusses currently available interven- tions that target RS, such as cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT). An alternative to CBT may be to target the memory bias—an important aspect of RS—through trauma-informed care or eye movement desensitization and reprocessing (EMDR) therapies (Pantalone, Valentine, & Shipherd, 2017). However, a common- ality among these psychological approaches is that they rely on people finding their way to, and accessing, mental health providers. Adolescents with high levels of RS might struggle 2262 Archives of Sexual Behavior (2020) 49:2259–2263 1 3 to do so, may not be out to parents, and might prefer not to disclose their sexual orientation to health providers (Fuzzell, Fedesco, Alexander, Fortenberry, & Shields, 2016). Similarly, although people may suffer from mental health and substance use disorders, relatively few people engage in formal counseling or therapy (Lipari, Park-Lee, & Van Horn, 2016; SAMHSA, 2016). It is therefore necessary to understand how large-scale intervention strategies might be developed or adapted to address and intervene in RS processes for sexual minority youth. Further, Feinstein (2019) and the RS literature, more broadly, do not pay much attention to how RS might be prevented. For example, rejection might occur in one context (e.g., school) but if other contexts are supportive (e.g., home), the development of RS might be slowed down or prevented. For sexual minority adolescents, the school context might be particularly amenable to change by implementing inclusive policies and programs that reduce bullying and improve acceptance (Day, Ioverno, & Russell, 2019). LGBTQ community centers (see Fish, Moody, Grossman, & Russell, 2019; Williams, Levine, & Fish, 2019) may also be uniquely positioned to deliver programs that increase sexual minority youth’ self-esteem and develop cop- ing strategies to address RS and the associated mental health consequences. Additionally, psychoeducation and advocacy has improved support and acceptance in the family context (Parker, Hirsch, Philbin, & Parker, 2018), while medical systems might benefit from education and training to improve accessibility and cultural competence (Bidell & Stepleman, 2017). Conclusion In addition to the applicability of the RS framework for sexual minority individuals from various cohorts, the applicability of this framework to different sexual and gender minority popu- lations remains to be seen. Research among diverse groups of sexual and gender minority individuals should consider important aspects of identity development, such as identity centrality (Dyar et al., 2016). Although identity development clearly plays a role in the development of RS, these mecha- nisms are likely universal, whereas the trigger of RS is minor- ity (or status)-specific. What Feinstein’s (2019) visioning does is portray a close-up of one aspect of the minority stress frame- work, which enables us to more rigorously test hypotheses and improve the specificity of the minority stress framework. 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Publisher’s Note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. https://www.samhsa.gov/data/sites/default/files/report_2716/ShortReport-2716.html https://www.samhsa.gov/data/sites/default/files/report_2716/ShortReport-2716.html https://www.samhsa.gov/data/sites/default/files/report_2716/ShortReport-2716.html https://doi.org/10.1080/00918369.2019.1648083 https://www.samhsa.gov/data/sites/default/files/report_2389/Spotlight-2389.html https://www.samhsa.gov/data/sites/default/files/report_2389/Spotlight-2389.html The Rejection Sensitivity Model: Sexual Minority Adolescents in Context Introduction How Rejection Sensitivity Might Expand Understandings of LGBTQ Adolescent Mental Health Critical Developmental Periods for Rejection Sensitivity Sociocontextual Perspectives on Rejection Sensitivity Processes Applicability to Other MarginalizedMinority Groups Intervention versus Prevention Conclusion References 
work_42p3cyknkrhehnpbkhvmpuaanm	----	Report Copyright © Maureen McBride 2016 REPORT No.07 /2016 A Review of the Evidence on Hate Crime and Prejudice: Report for the Independent Advisory Group on Hate Crime, Prejudice and Community Cohesion A Review of the Evidence on Hate Crime and Prejudice: Report for the Independent Advisory Group on Hate Crime, Prejudice and Community Cohesion Maureen McBride University of Glasgow September 2016 Copyright © Maureen McBride 2016 REPORT No.07 /2016 A Review of the Evidence on Hate Crime and Prejudice: Report for the Independent Advisory Group on Hate Crime, Prejudice and Community Cohesion Copyright Notice Maureen McBride has asserted her right under the Copyright, Design and Patents Act, 1988 to be identified as the author of this work. Permission is granted to reproduce any part or all of this report for personal and educational use only. Commercial copying, hiring or lending is prohibited. Copyright © Maureen McBride 2016 Copyright © Maureen McBride 2016 REPORT No.07 /2016 A Review of the Evidence on Hate Crime and Prejudice: Report for the Independent Advisory Group on Hate Crime, Prejudice and Community Cohesion Contents EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ....................................................................................................................... 4 SECTION ONE: INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 8 AIMS OF THIS REPORT ................................................................................................................................ 8 STRUCTURE OF REPORT .............................................................................................................................. 8 KEY QUESTIONS / THEMES ......................................................................................................................... 9 CAVEATS ................................................................................................................................................. 9 PROTECTED CHARACTERISTICS ................................................................................................................... 11 SECTION TWO: METHODOLOGY ....................................................................................................... 12 SOURCES OF DATA .................................................................................................................................. 12 STAKEHOLDER ENGAGEMENT .................................................................................................................... 13 DESK-BASED RESEARCH ............................................................................................................................ 13 LIMITATIONS .......................................................................................................................................... 14 SECTION THREE: CONTEXT AND CAUSES .......................................................................................... 16 SECTION FOUR: THE HARMS OF HATE CRIME ................................................................................... 18 DATA FROM OFFICIAL SOURCES ................................................................................................................. 18 Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service (2015) ‘Hate Crime in Scotland 2014-2015’. ............ 18 Scottish Household Survey (2013 and 2014) ................................................................................. 19 Glasgow Household Survey (2015) ................................................................................................ 21 Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary in Scotland (HMICS) (2014) ..................................... 21 EVIDENCE FROM STAKEHOLDERS ................................................................................................................ 22 ACADEMIC RESEARCH .............................................................................................................................. 33 INTERSECTIONALITY ................................................................................................................................. 37 CONCLUSION ......................................................................................................................................... 38 SECTION FIVE: RESPONDING EFFECTIVELY TO HATE CRIME .............................................................. 39 REPORTING HATE CRIME AND ‘KNOWING YOUR RIGHTS’ .................................................................................. 39 RESOURCES FOR TACKLING HATE CRIME ....................................................................................................... 42 GAPS IDENTIFIED IN RESEARCH AND DATA ON HATE CRIME .............................................................................. 46 SECTION SIX: REFLECTIONS AND NEXT STEPS ................................................................................... 51 POSTSCRIPT – ‘BREXIT’ AND IMPLICATIONS FOR TACKLING HATE CRIME......................................... 53 REFERENCES ..................................................................................................................................... 54 APPENDIX 1: STAKEHOLDER SURVEY ON DATA COLLECTION, USE AND PERCEPTIONS ..................... 58 APPENDIX 2: STAKEHOLDER GROUPS COMPLETING SURVEYS ......................................................... 63 APPENDIX 3: SUMMARY OF SURVEY RESPONSES – SELECTED TOPICS .............................................. 64 Copyright © Maureen McBride 2016 REPORT No.07 /2016 A Review of the Evidence on Hate Crime and Prejudice: Report for the Independent Advisory Group on Hate Crime, Prejudice and Community Cohesion EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1. Background of the research: The SCCJR was commissioned to explore the nature of evidence on hate crime in Scotland in order to support the work of the Advisory Group on Hate Crime and Prejudice. This report summarises key sources of information as well as addresses some issues around the definition and understanding of hate crime as a social phenomenon. In addition, as part of this project, a series of key stakeholders comprising national and local organisations were surveyed to explore organisational data collection, usage and perceived gaps in information. 2. Sources of information about hate crime in Scotland: There are numerous sources of information about levels and types of hate crime in Scotland. These include officially produced data such as statistical information specifically about this form of crime reported by statutory agencies on an annual basis, as well as data on hate crime or other forms of discrimination collected as part of wider social surveys. This report also identifies stakeholder organisations as key collectors of data on hate crime experiences. There is also academic research on hate crime, and data collection efforts which are picking up ‘hidden’ problems of hate crime (e.g. reporting abuse experienced by NHS staff). Each of these sources of data has limitations and strengths, and in particular it is important to consider how different sources of data can be brought together in considering the extent, nature and means of addressing hate crime in Scotland. 3. Levels of hate crime in Scotland: Official data on reported incidents of hate crime establish that there is a problem of hate crime in contemporary Scotland. It is difficult to analyse trends in reported hate crime as it is widely acknowledged that reporting issues (both underreporting and uncertainty and inconsistency in reporting practices) significantly affect overall figures. However, all stakeholders consulted in this research reported higher levels of hate crime than is reported in official figures. 4. Need of qualitative research to develop a more detailed and accurate picture: In addition to underreporting of hate crime in official data, aggregation of or different definitions of protected group categories can obscure understanding of underlying trends. For example while reported Copyright © Maureen McBride 2016 REPORT No.07 /2016 A Review of the Evidence on Hate Crime and Prejudice: Report for the Independent Advisory Group on Hate Crime, Prejudice and Community Cohesion crimes related race/ethnicity have declined in the most recent reporting year, there have been reported increases among some particular ethnic/national groups. This research emphasises the need for more qualitative research on the nature and levels of hate crime, to help provide a clearer picture of victims’ experiences as an additional perspective to the official statistics. Qualitative data can reveal whether there are particular intersections of protected categories that are targeted in hate crime, draw attention to circumstantial factors of victimisation and deepen understanding of the nature of the harms caused by hate crime. 5. The harms of hate crime, both direct and indirect, are widely experienced in Scotland: Stakeholder organisations reported many and widespread experiences of direct harm (direct experiences of being targeted and harmed through hate crime and discriminatory practices). People having protected characteristics experience harm, prejudice and discrimination on a regular basis. In addition and as a result, many people also are experiencing indirect harms including self-isolation, fear, resistance to engaging with services that lead to wider social harms and inequalities of reduced health and longevity, for example. 6. Attending to marginalised perspectives in hate crime research: While there has been a great deal of progress in terms of privileging victims’ voices through qualitative research, it is also important to consider whose voices are still marginalised. The research has highlighted the fact that some groups are less likely to take part in research about hate crime victimisation, such as those with learning disabilities due to accessibility issues, or people in prison who may experience hate crime but lack the support to report or challenge it. The qualitative research base has undoubtedly improved in recent years however more is needed if we wish to be able to present a more reliable account of hate crime victimisation. 7. Perception that some protected categories are prioritised for action over others: Published research as well as responses to surveys administered in this research suggests there are perceptions that some categories and groups targeted by hate crime are prioritised over others. 8. Stakeholders wanted more detailed and more frequent information from official data: Issues were also raised about the collection and reporting of official data – consistency, the prioritisation of certain protected Copyright © Maureen McBride 2016 REPORT No.07 /2016 A Review of the Evidence on Hate Crime and Prejudice: Report for the Independent Advisory Group on Hate Crime, Prejudice and Community Cohesion characteristics over others depending on the political climate, difficulties disaggregating the data (e.g. by learning disability). 9. Intersectionality is an important consideration for understanding and acting on hate crime: Intersectionality refers to the interconnected nature of social categories. The intersectionality of hate crime was considered to be a crucial factor by most of the stakeholders who took part in this research, and was also emphasised in the literature and research studies consulted. It is important to think about how experiences of victimisation based on multiple protected characteristics might be better captured both in quantitative and qualitative research – for example by considering the statistics at an individual level - and addressed more effectively in responses to hate crime. This is recommended as a subject area for future research. 10. Need of research into perpetrators of hate crime: More information is required on the perpetrators of hate crime, and this could be a focus for future research as it has received relatively little attention to date. In this vein, it is also crucial to avoid pathologising or individualising all instances of hate crime, as what evidence does exist on the demographics of convicted perpetrators suggests that they are likely to be young, unemployed or underemployed men with increased likelihood of being involved in the criminal justice system more generally. 11. Need to attend to the structural dynamics of perpetrating, experiencing and addressing hate crime: Sufficient attention should also be paid to the structural factors that help to shape hate crime patterns (as is the case in crime patterns in general). As well as this, it is important to focus on the ways in which the structural disadvantage of minority groups (for example, in access to services, or in the labour market) combines with discrimination to negatively shape people’s life experiences. 12. Dissatisfaction with existing terminology: Some stakeholders have suggested that there should be a discussion around the use of certain terminology, a point which is also supported by some of the academic literature. Problems with the term ‘hate crime’ are raised frequently in this report, with concerns that it obscures the more ‘everyday’ prejudice that minority groups face. It also potentially prevents perpetrators of prejudice (or people with the potential to act on prejudiced attitudes) from engaging in the debate, as most people would not consider themselves capable of a ‘hate crime’. There are also issues with what was referred to as ‘generic terms’ or Copyright © Maureen McBride 2016 REPORT No.07 /2016 A Review of the Evidence on Hate Crime and Prejudice: Report for the Independent Advisory Group on Hate Crime, Prejudice and Community Cohesion terms that could be misleading, such as ‘sectarianism’, which was raised as potentially creating a misunderstanding of the issues faced by a particular group. This is particularly the case in relation to the Irish community in Scotland, as it has been argued that such focus on the religious characteristic means that victimisation based on ethnic origin or cultural difference is not paid sufficient attention. 13. Key messages on effective practices and interventions: Stakeholder responses and research identified numerous issues around effective practices including addressing barriers to reporting; developing confidence and trust in agencies responsible for managing complaints; involving those affected directly in developing solutions and interventions; improving understanding and education of what hate crime is and how to talk about it; developing training kits for use by the third sector; exploring use of restorative justice and developing information and research on effective practices. Appendix 3 summarises the stakeholder responses to the surveys conducted by this research. Copyright © Maureen McBride 2016 REPORT No.07 /2016 A Review of the Evidence on Hate Crime and Prejudice: Report for the Independent Advisory Group on Hate Crime, Prejudice and Community Cohesion SECTION ONE: INTRODUCTION Aims of this report The purpose of this report is to review the existing evidence of the levels of hate crime and violent prejudice in Scotland in order to help inform the Independent Advisory Group on Hate Crime and Prejudice, which has been established to provide ministers with advice on the priorities for tackling hate crime, eradicating prejudice and building community cohesion. This was carried out through desk-based research as well as engagement with key stakeholders identified through discussion with the Scottish Government. Structure of report The report will firstly introduce the key research questions and outline some important caveats and definitions, particularly in relation to what we mean by ‘hate crime’. It will then briefly outline some data from the literature on the context and causes of hate crime and violent prejudice. The main body of the report will focus on two sections: ‘harm’ and ‘responding to harm’ (detailed further in below section). This will utilise the information provided to us by stakeholders, as well as data obtained through desk-based research (for example official statistics) and reviews of the literature and academic work on hate crime. The report is not structured in separate sections based on different ‘protected characteristics’. This is because of the intersectional nature of victimisation which was highlighted to us by stakeholders and is also emphasised in the literature. Finally, the report concludes with some research recommendations on what gaps there are in the existing evidence as well as a reflection on the aftermath of Brexit. Copyright © Maureen McBride 2016 REPORT No.07 /2016 A Review of the Evidence on Hate Crime and Prejudice: Report for the Independent Advisory Group on Hate Crime, Prejudice and Community Cohesion Key Questions / Themes Key topic themes were identified by the Advisory Group following the Hate Crime summit in October 2015. It was decided that the following thematic areas would be addressed in the research, with the items in bold constituting the focus of the effort: 1. Context and causes: individual, structural and environmental causes and conditions of hate crime; 2. Harm: direct and indirect forms and impacts of hate crime as noted above; nature and estimated amounts of harm caused to individuals or groups; 3. Responding to Harm: existing range of responses in Scotland; evidence from the UK and beyond on any relevant effective practices; 4. Research recommendations: What further research needs to be done? Caveats It is vital to foreground this report with some discussion of the complexities involved in the topic of hate crime. ‘Hate crime’ is a fairly recent label, the usage of which increased significantly towards the end of the 20 th century as a result of high-profile incidents such as the racist murder of Stephen Lawrence in 1993 and the subsequent publication of the Macpherson report in 1999 (Chakraborti and Garland 2015: 1). It is important to note that the term may be both under and over inclusive. Some harm experienced by members of protected groups may not be covered by a legal definition of crime, but nevertheless produce distress and other negative outcomes. At the same time, the legal definition of hate crime might include behaviour that is not experienced as harmful or recognised as criminal by intended (or unintended) victims. Some scholars have also pointed out that the climate in which hate crime laws have emerged is characterised by a rise in identity politics and increasingly punitive criminal justice policy. Mason (2014: 296) argues that by ‘explicitly labelling, prohibiting and punishing the criminal manifestations of prejudice, these laws engage in a form of moral training that does not just describe and punish the phenomena of hate crime but constructs the very norms and subject positions they regulate (e.g. legitimate victim or racist offender)’. This helps to create an Copyright © Maureen McBride 2016 REPORT No.07 /2016 A Review of the Evidence on Hate Crime and Prejudice: Report for the Independent Advisory Group on Hate Crime, Prejudice and Community Cohesion understanding of ‘hate crime’ as the manifestation of the poor values of individuals, as opposed to paying sufficient attention to social and structural roots. Mason also cites Goodall’s (2013) argument that ‘hate crime laws lack a convincing rationale for why the criminal manifestations of antipathy and contempt from any social group towards any form of difference should attract a heavier punishment’ (Mason, 2014: 307). Moreover, the hate crime framework may be useful in a legislative sense but is potentially problematic when talking about how best to affect social change through shifting attitudes. A 2004 report commissioned by Stonewall suggested that: ‘The contemporary focus on hate crimes can obscure the ordinariness of everyday prejudice in terms of verbal abuse and incivility; pity and sympathy; or unwittingly derogatory language. As a result, many individuals fail to recognise their own beliefs and actions as a form of prejudice (21)’. Many perpetrators would not necessarily think themselves capable of committing a ‘hate crime’ so the term may problematic when thinking about how to respond to such behaviours – a crucial consideration when developing frameworks from responding to hate crime either directly or indirectly through community engagement or community initiatives for example. Finally, it is worth noting that with regard to Scotland this discussion is taking place in the context of debates around recent ‘hate crime’ football legislation (the Offensive Behaviour at Football and Threatening Communications (Scotland) Act 2012). Aside from the on-going controversy regarding this particular Act, it highlights the fact that hate crime legislation targets a very wide range of behaviours from singing a song identified as sectarian or which is otherwise offensive, to the most serious kinds of physical harm. This scoping document employs the term hate crime but is vigilant of its limitations, and uses it to refer more broadly to behaviour that is or has the effect of targeting people with characteristics protected under equality and diversity legislation. Copyright © Maureen McBride 2016 REPORT No.07 /2016 A Review of the Evidence on Hate Crime and Prejudice: Report for the Independent Advisory Group on Hate Crime, Prejudice and Community Cohesion Protected characteristics Protected characteristics under the Equality Act (2010) include: age, sex, sexual orientation, gender reassignment, disability, marriage or civil partnership, pregnancy and maternity, religion and belief. Discussion within this scoping document focuses on characteristics which have been identified as policy priorities in the area of responding to hate crime: religious and faith groups, ethnic and racial minorities, LGBTI people and people with physical or cognitive disabilities. While age and gender certainly are areas where there is evidence of serious harm (e.g. elder abuse and gendered violence), existing policy streams are addressing these and so this review remains focused on a selected set of protected characteristics. There will of course be overlaps and intersectional cases of hate crime (e.g. targeting particularly female Muslims because of identifiable clothing) that would be included in this review. During our engagement with stakeholders, one organisation raised the issue that they felt to be problematic from a legal / policy point of view: ‘Please note that using the protected characteristics from equality / discrimination law doesn't really work for hate crime for LGBTI people, because Scots hate crime law uses somewhat different ones. We cover sexual orientation (LGB people - here the protected characteristic is the same for equality law and hate crime law), gender identity (Trans people - the characteristic is called transgender identity in hate crime law and is NOT the same as gender reassignment - it's more inclusive), and sex characteristics (Intersex people - not included in equality / discrimination law, but included in Scottish hate crime law as ‘intersexuality’, as a sub-heading of transgender identity - which is not ideal, but at least it's included!)’ Such considerations make clear the fact that any categorisation of identity excludes in its very attempt to include. Copyright © Maureen McBride 2016 REPORT No.07 /2016 A Review of the Evidence on Hate Crime and Prejudice: Report for the Independent Advisory Group on Hate Crime, Prejudice and Community Cohesion SECTION TWO: METHODOLOGY Sources of data This evidence review involved conducting literature searches and a survey of stakeholder organisations on their perspectives of the research topic and practices and recommendations about data collection. The project’s remit did not include original data collection on hate crime, for example by speaking to victims directly. Stakeholder views captured via the survey (and in some cases meetings in addition to this), constitutes primary data findings to an extent, however this did not address levels of hate crime directly. Types of information sources drawn on for this report therefore included: • Official sources of data: including published statistics and information hate crime, specific and aggregated data on protected groups; • Academic sources: selected independent research on hate crime that may include address levels, nature or responses of hate crime experiences across a range of groups; • Organisational sources: information produced by advocacy groups, NGOs, quasi government organisations and quangos, research centres and think tanks often collect their own data or issue surveys on hate crime experiences including commissioned research and self-conducted surveys and data sweeps; • Other sources of information: in addition to evidence on quantity and qualities of hate crime, other kinds of information relevant to this review such as service brochures, annual reports, best practice guides, news items, websites and so on were drawn on – though it is important to note that given the vast amount of literature available a full picture of what exists is not possible. Copyright © Maureen McBride 2016 REPORT No.07 /2016 A Review of the Evidence on Hate Crime and Prejudice: Report for the Independent Advisory Group on Hate Crime, Prejudice and Community Cohesion Stakeholder engagement It was evident from Gormley, McBride, Armstrong and Atkinson’s (2015) ‘A Scoping Study for the Glasgow Hate Crime Working Group’ that many organisations regularly conduct their own research and collect data on the topic of hate crime, either formally or informally, or a combination of both. Not all of this is available online, and some of the documents did not appear in traditional database searches. Therefore the project leads invited stakeholder organisations to submit their own evidence and data, or links to these if available publicly. The Scottish Government provided the present research team with a list of key stakeholders who had attended the recent Hate Crime Summit (October 2015). Other stakeholders were identified as potentially holding data that may be useful to the project either through word of mouth or by online searching. It was not within our remit due to time and resource constraints to meet directly with stakeholders; however, two organisations – the Scottish Commission for Learning Disabilities and the Equality and Human Rights Commission - requested that we meet in person and we agreed to this. Surveys (see Appendix 1) were designed by SCCJR and approved by Justice Analytical Services. This research also was reviewed and approved by the University of Glasgow’s College of Social Science Ethics Committee. Surveys were sent via email (or hard copy on request) during January 2016, and responses received through approximately May 2016. The survey also was made available in easy-read format, which was utilised by at least one organisation. The list of organisations contacted and those that that were able to take part in the research can be viewed in Appendix 2. Appendix 3 summarises the key themes contained in survey responses. Desk-based research Desk-based research of official, organisational and academic data was conducted according to the following parameters: Copyright © Maureen McBride 2016 REPORT No.07 /2016 A Review of the Evidence on Hate Crime and Prejudice: Report for the Independent Advisory Group on Hate Crime, Prejudice and Community Cohesion  Online searches using major databases in the sciences and social sciences (e.g. Web of Science, EBSCOHost);  Focusing the jurisdictional scope and priority of searches to Scotland, with inclusion of other jurisdictions where appropriate (e.g. UK research where Scotland is included or where there are Scotland-relevant findings, and European research which includes relevant findings or inclusion of Scottish Data);  English language sources;  Existing relevant resources were sought to build on known resources (e.g. Gormley, McBride, Armstrong and Atkinson’s (2015) ‘A Scoping Study for the Glasgow Hate Crime Working Group’) and to identify further sources of evidence; these were identified through knowledge of the research team and networking through the team and advisory Group’s contacts;  The topical scope of the evidence search included any or all of the priority protected characteristics including relevant subgroups as noted in the introduction (e.g. Romani as part of wider hate crime category of race/ethnicity/nationality). Limitations Given the range of groups covered, the lack of comprehensive and validated official data on experiences of hate crime, the known under reporting of such crime, and the diversity of groups who support those who may experience it, there was no possibility of collating a total and fully representative picture of hate crime using existing data. Rather it was considered that each source of information has a particular value given the focus and aims of the group collecting it, and was assessed for its fundamental ability to: (1) offer information that is important for understanding the nature and/or best response to hate crime, and (2) be of a quality that it reliably represents what it claims to. For example, police and prosecution data, as with all forms of crime, are known to under represent overall rates of hate crime but are a useful indicator of official types and levels of action. Similarly, a small organisation that supports those with learning disabilities may offer a very small scale survey of its own clientele that cannot be extrapolated to other groups but can provide rich detail on experiences both of hate crime and responses to it in a particular community. The latter is a crucial source of information and finding ways of collecting and valuing such sources of information is a recommended priority for Copyright © Maureen McBride 2016 REPORT No.07 /2016 A Review of the Evidence on Hate Crime and Prejudice: Report for the Independent Advisory Group on Hate Crime, Prejudice and Community Cohesion future research. It is important to note that most of the organisations that took part in this research are primarily service or campaigning organisations, as opposed to research organisations; however, the data that they provided included a useful range of quantitative and qualitative information. Copyright © Maureen McBride 2016 REPORT No.07 /2016 A Review of the Evidence on Hate Crime and Prejudice: Report for the Independent Advisory Group on Hate Crime, Prejudice and Community Cohesion SECTION THREE: CONTEXT AND CAUSES The question of what causes prejudice and discrimination – and hate crime in its most extreme form – is complex and a large body of research exists dedicated entirely to this topic. Some points can be noted, for example Duckitt’s (1992: 1190) four level model of the causes of prejudice, though it is important to note that this explanation is problematic in that it is largely positivist and psychological: 1. Genetic and evolutionary predispositions: the ―inherently human – potentiality or propensity for prejudice; 2. Societal, organisational and intergroup patterns of contact and norms for intergroup relations (e.g. laws, regulations); 3. Mechanisms of social influence that operate in group and interpersonal interactions e.g. influenced by mass media, the educational system, the structure and functioning of organisations such as the workplace; 4. Personal differences in susceptibility to prejudiced attitudes and behaviours, and in acceptance of specific intergroup attitudes. Most literature emphasises the importance of not overstating the first of these, as it is social and intergroup contexts and circumstances that can allow psychological propensities to develop, therefore, Duckitt emphasises that attempts to reduce prejudice should take place at all of these levels. Yet such psychological-focused analyses neglect socio-economic and political contexts, such as the impact of policy decisions such as dispersal of refugees and asylum seekers into particular, often deprived, areas. A report for the Scottish Government entitled ‘What Works to Reduce Prejudice and Discrimination (McBride, 2015: 3) emphasised the importance of these structural dimensions, and also noted that ‘prejudice should be viewed as a process in a set of relationships between people’. The report suggested that the focus should be on intergroup relations rather than the characteristics of apparently prejudiced individuals, ‘moving away from an individual pathological approach towards seeing prejudice as a social problem which requires social change’, including consideration of the impact of macro-level decisions by institutions such as governments themselves. Copyright © Maureen McBride 2016 REPORT No.07 /2016 A Review of the Evidence on Hate Crime and Prejudice: Report for the Independent Advisory Group on Hate Crime, Prejudice and Community Cohesion This position was reiterated by research conducted by the Equality and Human Rights Commission entitled, Rehabilitation of Hate Crime Offenders - Research Report (2011). This is a comprehensive piece of international research which seeks to reveal what motivates people to commit these kinds of offences. The research revealed that there were, at that point, no national programmes targeting offensive behaviour and considers the implementation of the Equality Act (2010) which requires public authorities to ‘promote understanding’ and ‘tackle prejudice’. The EHRC report draws attention to the demographics of most hate crime offenders: young males; mostly from the ‘white’ ethnic majority; disproportionately likely to be unemployed or underemployed (2011: 3). The study noted that hate crime perpetrators ‘are often ‘generalist’ rather than ‘specialist’ offenders, as they are likely to have also been convicted of other offences. Crucially, most offenders ‘tend to deny being “real” racists’ which again highlights the complexity around the use of the term hate crime, as most of the people who have perpetrated the crimes do not consider themselves to be genuinely racist (or in other cases, anti-Catholic, homophobic, and so on). The report states that motives to carry out hate crimes include ‘a sense of grievance, resentment, or envy, or a feeling of being devalued or ignored’ (2011: 3). This research challenges a simplistic binary distinction between the ‘bad racist’ (or ‘bad homophobic’, etc.) and the ‘legitimate victim’ (Mason, 2014), and suggests the need for consideration of the structural factors that influence offending rates in general as opposed to simply focusing on the poor behaviours of individuals would be a step forward. It is important to note that this is not to suggest that economic inequality or living in poverty makes people more likely to hold or act on prejudiced views; rather, people living in deprived areas, for example, are more likely to experience significantly higher levels of policing, and are therefore more likely to come into contact with the criminal justice system on account of expressing particular views. To summarise, this section has briefly considered some of the key factors that influence the development of prejudiced attitudes and criminal manifestations of such attitudes. Furthermore, this section has emphasised the importance of taking into account the structural factors that influence hate crime rates; this would be a valuable area for future research which may help to provide a much-needed alternative to the current literature which is dominated by psychological, individualistic accounts. Copyright © Maureen McBride 2016 REPORT No.07 /2016 A Review of the Evidence on Hate Crime and Prejudice: Report for the Independent Advisory Group on Hate Crime, Prejudice and Community Cohesion SECTION FOUR: THE HARMS OF HATE CRIME This section examines the existing evidence on the harms of hate crime in Scotland, both direct (examples of victimisation) and indirect (e.g. wider social impact on people from minority groups’ life chances). Unsurprisingly, data about harm (direct or indirect) caused by hate crimes in Scotland is variable and patchy, but the information gathered from stakeholders has helped us to begin to achieve a better insight into this. The main data is grouped in order of: official sources; evidence from stakeholders/organisations; academic literature; and other sources of data. This is for ease of reading and because of the decision not to structure report by protected characteristic (for reasons discussed earlier), though there is of course some overlap e.g. academics conducting research on behalf of third sector organisations. The section concludes with a short discussion on the intersectionality of hate crime, and reflects on the importance of this for future research / policy approaches. Data from Official Sources A scoping exercise carried out by SCCJR for the Glasgow Hate Crime Working Group on what data exists on hate crime in Scotland (Gormley, C., McBride, M., Armstrong, S. and Atkinson, C. (2015) was a useful starting point for identifying official sources of data. However, the majority of studies cited were updated annually, so the most up-to-date reports were consulted and are cited in this section. Of course it is important to be mindful of the limitations of these data sources, due to the previously discussed issues of underreporting by victims of hate crime and varying consistency of collating and reporting data by institutions. Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service (2015) ‘Hate Crime in Scotland 2014-2015’. The COPFS ‘Hate Crime in Scotland 2014-15’ report provides details of hate crime reported to the Procurator Fiscal in Scotland in 2014-15, and earlier years. It also provides details of charges reported under the Offensive Behaviour at Football and Copyright © Maureen McBride 2016 REPORT No.07 /2016 A Review of the Evidence on Hate Crime and Prejudice: Report for the Independent Advisory Group on Hate Crime, Prejudice and Community Cohesion Threatening Communications (Scotland) Act 2012. The report included the following findings:  The number of charges reported in all hate crime categories, with the exception of disability, fell in 2014-15 compared to the previous year.  Racial crime remains the most commonly reported hate crime, with 3,785 charges reported in 2014-15, but this is the lowest number reported since 2003-04.  Sexual orientation aggravated crime is the second most common type of hate crime reported. The number of charges reported decreased by 5% in 2014-15 to 841. This is the first annual fall in charges reported since the legislation introducing this aggravation came into force in 2010.  The number of religiously aggravated charges reported, at 569, is at its lowest level since 2004-05., Religious related charges (including charges that are now reported under the Offensive Behaviour at football legislation) are at their lowest level since 2007-08. It is worth noting that this overall reduction (with the notable exception of disability hate crime) came after increases in previous years. Between 2010/11 and 2013/14, the number of cases of reported hate crime increased by 8% (from 5,387 to 5,804). Interpreting the meanings of increases followed by a recent decrease is complicated, as increased reporting could mean either that more hate crimes are occurring or that there is increased confidence in the police. Similarly, decreases in official figures may reflect changes in reporting – and there are numerous documented reasons that people choose not to report or experience barriers to reporting experiences of hate crime – rather than underlying change in the phenomenon of hate crime. Finally, we note that official data on crime, for hate crime as well as other types, consistently reports lower levels compared to crime reported by people in other data collection activities (e.g. Scottish Crime and Justice Survey, household surveys, organisational surveys). Scottish Household Survey (2013 and 2014) The Scottish Government oversees the Scottish Household Survey (SHS), a continuous survey of households and people in Scotland that allows for national and Copyright © Maureen McBride 2016 REPORT No.07 /2016 A Review of the Evidence on Hate Crime and Prejudice: Report for the Independent Advisory Group on Hate Crime, Prejudice and Community Cohesion sub-national analysis. It does not focus on hate crime or criminal victimisation in general, though it does include a small section with questions on experiences of discrimination and harassment. However, the SHS uses limited definitions of categories of ‘equality characteristics’. For example, data collected on experiences of discrimination and harassment due to sexual orientation excludes trans-people. It is nevertheless a useful indicator. Some key findings are indicated below:  In the 2014 survey, 6% of respondents (1 in 20) reported discrimination in the last three years, and 5% reported personal harassment.  When asked about the perceived reasons for this, 32% of those who reported discrimination believed this was on account of being members of a particular ethnic group. The figure was 18% for those reporting experiences of harassment.  21% of respondents who identified as LGBT said that they had experienced discrimination, and 17% reported personal harassment. Interestingly, the Neighbourhood and Communities section of the 2013 Survey highlights that people have considered ‘Groups or individuals harassing others’ to have decreased in occurrence in the past 9 years – from 11% of respondents stating that it is a problem in 2005 to just 7% in 2013. The report shows that there is a marked difference in experience of this when comparing the areas of most and least deprivation, with 38% of those living in the most deprived areas (lowest two 10-percentiles) stating that harassment from groups or individuals was very common in their neighbourhood while only 3% of those living the least deprived areas (highest two 10-percentiles) saying the same about their neighbourhoods. This further highlights the need to look at economic and other structural issues as contributing to context in which a large proportion of hate crime cases – and other criminal instances – occur. Again it is important to reiterate that the report does not assume people are more likely to hold or act on prejudiced views purely because they live in a more deprived area. However economic inequality is likely to help shape the context in which hate crimes take place, for example through higher levels of policing, or the dispersal of asylum seekers in deprived areas with little or no community consultation. Copyright © Maureen McBride 2016 REPORT No.07 /2016 A Review of the Evidence on Hate Crime and Prejudice: Report for the Independent Advisory Group on Hate Crime, Prejudice and Community Cohesion Glasgow Household Survey (2015) The Glasgow Household Survey is commissioned by Glasgow Council and collects data annually. The section on personal experience of hate crime was interesting but used a small sample: 92 people from a sample size of 1021 residents and a ‘booster’ of 202 interviews with (Black and ethnic minority) BEM residents in total reported victimisation. Respondents were asked about when the hate crime attacks occurred; whether or not they were reported; and, what measures would encourage reporting to police for future incidents. Key findings from this survey included:  74% of those who disclosed being victimised in the last 12 months (insulted, pestered or intimidated on the basis of a protected characteristic) did not report this to the police or any other authority;  85% of respondents who had been victimised were not aware that they could report such incidents to a Third Party Reporting Centre;  51% were also unaware that they could report experiences of victimisation on the Police Scotland website. Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary in Scotland (HMICS) (2014) We also sought evidence on the police classification and handling of hate incidents / hate crimes, data which are contained in the 2013/2014 annual report of the HMICS. Police data on hate crime had previously (and again in the survey responses of stakeholders in the present research) been raised as problematic and inconsistent. The HMICS (2014) found that:  Of 688 incidents that were initially opened as being hate crime related, 405 resulted in a crime report, and 504 crimes were ultimately recorded.  Of the 688 incidents, 97% were closed correctly as being either a crime or non-crime related. The crimes we examined were motivated by hatred of someone’s actual or perceived race, nationality, religion, disability, sexual orientation or transgender identity.  Of the 504 crimes, 94% were counted and classified correctly. 96% of the crimes were recorded within 72 hours of the incident being reported to the police. Copyright © Maureen McBride 2016 REPORT No.07 /2016 A Review of the Evidence on Hate Crime and Prejudice: Report for the Independent Advisory Group on Hate Crime, Prejudice and Community Cohesion The report noted that ‘The recording of hate crime was excellent and achieved the highest compliance rate of 97% in our audit. However, a recurring issue with regards to the classification of some hate crime should be addressed’. Evidence from Stakeholders This data was sourced from organisational websites and through responses to the survey that we sent out to key stakeholders, as detailed in the methodology section. The data is a combination of quantitative and qualitative, with relevant statistics included where raised by stakeholders and drawing on narrative extracts from victims of hate crime. Quotations are taken either from survey responses or from literature published by relevant organisations. Where a specific organisation is named in relation to a survey response, they have given consent for this. A complete copy of the survey is included as Appendix 1 to this report. We sought to establish from stakeholders:  What data they collect;  What other sources of data they use (and for what purposes);  What the key concerns of their service users are;  What gaps (if any) they identify in both the data/research on hate crime, and on responses to hate crime more generally. We asked stakeholders to submit evidence that they had collected formally (published or unpublished), or to tell us about service users’ experiences of hate crime gathered informally through dialogue networks and community engagement. An important caveat of course is that no stakeholder could claim to speak on behalf of all individuals with a particular protected characteristic. As such, survey responses relating to levels of harm should be treated with appropriate caution. All stakeholders reported that people they worked with experienced significantly high levels of ‘direct harm’, in the form of prejudice and discrimination that could be characterised as hate crime. Organisations also drew attention to the indirect impact of prejudice and exclusion, providing us with examples of the wider social impact on people victimised on account of protected characteristics. This section does not attempt to assess levels of harm in a comparative sense; rather it highlights some of the key information provided to us. However, such information helps to complement Copyright © Maureen McBride 2016 REPORT No.07 /2016 A Review of the Evidence on Hate Crime and Prejudice: Report for the Independent Advisory Group on Hate Crime, Prejudice and Community Cohesion the official data to give us a more complete picture of the extent and levels of hate crime victimisation in Scotland. Interfaith Scotland noted that ‘Particularly the Muslim and Jewish communities have stated a rise in Islamophobia and anti-Semitism, however the Sikh community also state increased prejudice’ (survey response). However, the latest COPFS figures state that religiously-aggravated crime ‘is at its lowest level since 2004-05’ (Religiously Aggravated Offending in Scotland in 2014-15) but this of course is because of fewer reported offences against Roman Catholics, which make up the vast majority of cases and a much larger group within Scotland compared to, for example, the Jewish population. Jewish communities have stated a rise in anti-Semitism despite the total number of charges being reflected by the 25 incidents officially recorded in 2014-15, and the Scottish Government funded research into experiences of anti-Semitism following a surge in this in the last part of 2014 (Scottish Council of Jewish Communities, 2015). Interfaith’s comments also highlight the intersectional nature of hate crime victimisation, as the increasing racialisation of certain religious groups in contemporary society will undoubtedly have an impact. The most recent report by the Equality Network, The Scottish LGBT Equality Report (2015), published findings from its own survey of the LGBT community in Scotland. An online survey of 1,052 self-selecting respondents in Scotland was conducted between November 2012 and March 2013 was open to all people living in Scotland, in order to gain insight into the views of both LGBT people (76% of respondents) and non-LGBT people (24% of respondents). Some key findings included:  97% of LGBT people in Scotland have personally faced prejudice or discrimination, including 79% within the last year and 49% within the last month alone.  Incidents reported by LGBT people ranged from homophobic, biphobic and transphobic comments and attitudes (82%), to acts of verbal (68%), physical (16%) and sexual abuse (7%), crimes against property (12%), and discriminatory treatment when accessing services (25%) and in employment (24%).  Of all respondents, disabled LGBT people and those LGBT people living in rural areas were most likely to have experienced an incident of prejudice and discrimination. Transgender people also experience higher levels. Copyright © Maureen McBride 2016 REPORT No.07 /2016 A Review of the Evidence on Hate Crime and Prejudice: Report for the Independent Advisory Group on Hate Crime, Prejudice and Community Cohesion The report is particularly useful because it draws on the narratives of people who have experienced such victimisation, some of which is highlighted in the quotes below:  ‘‘Fucking tranny’ shouted at me in Oban.’ (Transgender man, 35-44, Dumfries).  ‘I received homophobic abuse and got punched in the face.’ (Gay man, 15-24, Caithness).  ‘Being called a dirty dyke for kissing my wife in public.’ (Lesbian woman, 35- 44, Falkirk).  ‘I’ve been head-butted and had my front teeth broken for being gay.’ (Gay man, 25-34, Elgin). Such examples highlight the fact that institutional change such as the introduction of civil partnerships and the more recent legalisation of same-sex marriage does not necessarily lead to improved social attitudes, at least in the short term. Qualitative information from the perspective of victims of hate crime was also provided to us by the Scottish Council of Jewish Communities, which collects data on an on-going basis. The organisation noted that they collected information in a variety of forms: through surveys (online and paper versions), focus groups, one-to- one interviews, and organising events (e.g. arts, music, lectures) which would be followed by discussion such as ‘Being Jewish in Scotland’. Participants spoke about experiences of anti-Semitism – seemingly relatively rare but potentially extremely harmful:  ‘I have experienced only a small number of incidents, possibly 3-4 in 30 years. The worst was as I boarded a bus, two men were saying to every person, ‘No Jews on this bus.’ When I stared at them, they said, ‘Are you Jewish?’ I said ‘Yes, and I don’t like what you are saying.’ The thing that was difficult was that all the other passengers looked away’ (F, 60s, Edinburgh) (p.18).  ‘Last year I was staying in halls. … We weren’t allowed candles, but for Chanukah I had cut pictures of flames out and put them on a paper chanukiah on the outside of my door. … When I came back to Uni after the holidays, I found that the stems [of the chanukiah] had been taken down and torn up and replaced in the shape of a swastika’ (F, 20s) (p.19). The 2013 report also highlighted the importance of context of current affairs: Copyright © Maureen McBride 2016 REPORT No.07 /2016 A Review of the Evidence on Hate Crime and Prejudice: Report for the Independent Advisory Group on Hate Crime, Prejudice and Community Cohesion ‘Even more than during our 2012 Inquiry, people told us that there is often conflation between Judaism and Israel, and that anti-Zionism is sometimes viewed as an acceptable pretext for anti-Semitic attitudes’ (survey response). Indeed, some participants challenged the stereotype of the ‘typical’ hate crime perpetrator of hate crime giving reports of prejudice coming from older, educated, middle-class left-wing people. In 2013, YouGov, commissioned by Stonewall, surveyed more than 2,500 lesbian, gay and bisexual people across Britain to investigate their experiences of homophobic hate crimes and incidents. The report included the following key findings:  One in six (17%) lesbian, gay and bisexual people in Scotland have been the victim of a homophobic hate crime or incident in the last three years, in line with the experiences of LGB people across the UK.  Within the last 12 months one in eleven (9%) have been a victim of a hate crime or incident.  One in twenty (5%) lesbian, gay and bisexual people in Scotland see homophobic harassment or attacks as a ‘very’ or ‘fairly big’ problem in their area  Of those lesbian, gay and bisexual people in Scotland who have faced a homophobic hate crime or incident in the last three years, almost nine in ten (87%) were insulted, intimidated or harassed as part of the incident.  One in twenty (5%) were physically assaulted and one in five (21%) were threatened with violence.  One in four (25%) had their home, vehicle or property damaged and one in eight (12%) received unwanted sexual contact. One of the most important features of Stonewall/YouGov survey is that it pays attention to the question of who commits hate crimes and incidents. The analysis of the survey found:  Lesbian, gay and bisexual people in Scotland who have suffered hate crimes and incidents report a wide variety of people who victimise them.  Whilst perpetrators can be neighbours, work colleagues, family or friends, the majority are strangers. Almost two in three (63%) reported their Copyright © Maureen McBride 2016 REPORT No.07 /2016 A Review of the Evidence on Hate Crime and Prejudice: Report for the Independent Advisory Group on Hate Crime, Prejudice and Community Cohesion perpetrators as being male strangers. Half (50%) said the perpetrator was a stranger aged under 25.  More than one in five (22%) were victims of neighbours or someone living in the local area and one in eight (13%) said the perpetrator was a work colleague. Respondents were asked about the perceived triggers of hate crimes and incidents:  Victims often felt they were targeted for a variety of reasons, including because of who they were with, where they were or the way they were dressed.  One in four (25%) believe the incident was motivated by who they were with or where they were at the time of the incident, for example outside a gay bar.  More than two in five (44%) were with a partner at the time of the incident and one in three (34%) were on their own. Participants in the study disclosed examples of abuse: ‘My front door was set on fire. Only means of escape. Police never bothered to chat to neighbouring people to enquire if they’d seen anything! As if they could not be arsed!’ (Paul, 22 — Scotland). ‘In my lifetime I’ve been physically assaulted three times and hospitalised once on leaving gay venues. Police were not interested on the two occasions I reported the attacks’ (Michael, 66 — London). In many cases participants talk about more ‘everyday’ aspects of prejudice, and highlight the impact of cumulative ‘small incidents’: in some cases, most of these would probably not be enough to ‘punish’ a single perpetrator. This is not to say that individual perpetrators should not be punished for their acts; rather that an approach to hate crime that prioritises education and shifting attitudes in various ways is likely to be effective in different ways. The National Union of Students (NUS) Surveys (2011 and 2012) is an incredibly useful resource in offering an insight into hate crime experiences of students. This is a very detailed survey, which makes full use of qualitative research which gives more life to the quantitative figures. Student experiences are captured in a way which covers interpersonal forms of hate crime as well as institutional hate (i.e. Copyright © Maureen McBride 2016 REPORT No.07 /2016 A Review of the Evidence on Hate Crime and Prejudice: Report for the Independent Advisory Group on Hate Crime, Prejudice and Community Cohesion perpetuated, allowed or ignored by the university) and symbolic hate (i.e. leaflets with homophobic undertones). For this reason, the NUS study is progressive and potentially a model to follow in terms of looking at the potential harms rather than just the criminal classification. The report is broken down into four parts which address the four key protected characteristics (though of course the intersectionality of victimisation has been discussed throughout this chapter). NUS conducted online surveys of students from across the UK – capturing responses from over 9000 students in each year - examining their knowledge of hate incidents or crimes. Some key findings are highlighted below:  31% of LGB students (311 of 999 in the 2011 survey) and 38% of trans respondents had experienced one hate incident related to their sexual orientation;  20% of LGB respondents and 20% of trans respondents had experienced homophobic verbal abuse, threats of violence or threatening behaviour;  9% of LGB respondents and 20% of trans respondents had experienced physical abuse motivated by a prejudice against their sexual orientation. In the report following the 2012 survey, some notable findings relating to race and ethnicity were published:  48% of Asian or Asian British, 44% of Chinese, and 42% of Black or Black British respondents were very or fairly worried about being victimised because of their ‘race’;  Overall, 18% of Black or minority ethnicity (BME) students had experienced at least one racial hate incident during their studies;  The most common types of hate incidents were verbal abuse, threats of violence, or threatening behaviour;  Only 13% of victims of racially motivated incidents reported this to someone in an official role in their institution and only ten % had reported it to the police;  Two in five (42%) of racially motivated hate incidents took place in and around the students’ institutions, and 12% had occurred in the learning environment (e.g. the classroom); Copyright © Maureen McBride 2016 REPORT No.07 /2016 A Review of the Evidence on Hate Crime and Prejudice: Report for the Independent Advisory Group on Hate Crime, Prejudice and Community Cohesion  More than half (54%) of victims of race hate incidents had considered leaving their course as a result of their experience. Participants also spoke about the impact of victimisation based on their religion:  Substantial numbers of respondents reported that they changed their behaviour due to fears of victimisation due to their religion or belief.  43% Jewish (30), 37% Hindu (47), 36% Buddhist (32) and 36% Muslim (111) students surveyed stated that they altered their behaviour, personal appearance or daily patterns due to worries about prejudiced abuse. The NUS report notes that their findings ‘captured evidence of multiple-bias. We found that, in addition to the religion or belief of the respondent, the incidence of hate-related behaviour varied according to the race, nationality, gender and sexuality of the respondent’. For example:  21% of Jewish respondents, 17% of Hindu respondents, 17% of Muslim respondents and 14% of Sikh respondents reported a racially motivated incident.  By comparison, 6% of Christian respondents, 5% of Atheist respondents and 5% of those with no religion reported a racially motivated incident. The intersectional nature of hate crime victimisation has been well-noted in this research, and such findings highlight the importance of addressing this, with religion/race being a particularly common one. The report also includes some illuminating qualitative information from victims of hate crime, including how they behave in particular ways in everyday life to avoid being singled out on account of a particular characteristic: ‘I do not mention to people that I’m a Roman Catholic unless I’m asked. This is only recent, and due to the disgusting sex scandals that have happened. The problem is that despite … saying that I find what [those who abused others] did horrific, other people immediately cast me into the same boat as them … It has led me to not want to talk about my religion with people unless I’m specifically asked.’ ‘Being a young British Muslim I have had to slightly alter the way I behave when out in public, especially since the terror attacks in the last 10 years. It has made people a lot more aware of their surroundings especially on public Copyright © Maureen McBride 2016 REPORT No.07 /2016 A Review of the Evidence on Hate Crime and Prejudice: Report for the Independent Advisory Group on Hate Crime, Prejudice and Community Cohesion transport. The slightest comment or action could cause someone to be nervous even when it’s pure innocence. I remember I substituted my rucksack for a shoulder bag and even changed the style of my beard just to eliminate any awkward situations.’ ‘Personally, I would really like to wear a headscarf but having never worn one, I am afraid of what people at my sixth form will say.’ Someone spoke about being physically attacked and having her headscarf pulled off. Another participant recounted experiences of horrific verbal abuse: ‘I have been called “terrorist”. I have been called “monkey”. I had had my space invaded. I have been shouted at publicly. I have been publicly humiliated and belittled.’ These quotes reveal the impact of these incidents including the significant negative effects on a person’s sense of wellbeing and inclusion. That many of these incidents have taken place in the context of universities shows that prejudice based harassment, discrimination and hate crime can happen anywhere and be perpetrated by anyone, including those from the most privileged and well educated backgrounds. Indeed, the construction of the ‘typical’ perpetrator as an uneducated, un/under employed, young white man perhaps says something more about who is more likely to come into contact with the criminal justice system on account of a hate crime or prejudiced act, as opposed to what type of person is most likely to behave in such a way. Of course there is an increased general awareness of racism, homophobia, sexism and other forms of prejudice highlighted in the context of universities so this is certainly an area that needs to be addressed. Moving on to look at some examples of racism in community settings, The Coalition for Racial Equality and Rights published a report in 2013 entitled Tackling Racism in Youth Work: Scottish Youth Workers’ views on dealing with racist attitudes and behaviours, and the data very much highlights the complexities of dealing with harm caused by hate crime. In this report, youth workers were interviewed about the prevalence of and the handling of incidents of racism in their roles. Some participants discussed examples whereby it was evident that the problem was perhaps immaturity, or careless use of language, and not reflective of actual antipathy towards a ‘different’ group: Copyright © Maureen McBride 2016 REPORT No.07 /2016 A Review of the Evidence on Hate Crime and Prejudice: Report for the Independent Advisory Group on Hate Crime, Prejudice and Community Cohesion ‘The most recent incident was racism towards some young people from the travelling community that come to our youth club. I took the perpetrator to one side and told him that his behaviour wouldn't be tolerated. Turns out he didn't even know that he was being racist.’ ‘A young person who volunteered at the youth club used an inappropriate word for a black person through ignorance and upbringing. I explained to the person why it was wrong to use the word in question and she accepted this.’ Such examples highlight the importance of education in tackling hate crime and hate-related prejudice, as shifting attitudes would perhaps be more effective than criminalising behaviours of individuals. Certainly this is an area for debate. However, other examples from the same report were less positive, and certainly seemed to fall into the ‘direct harm’ camp. As the report stated: ‘The examples given often involved complex situations which were distressing for both the young people involved and the staff or volunteers. Sometimes, a mismatch in priorities between the different adults involved caused ineffective responses: ‘Racist comments made towards a young girl by a group of girls as a reaction [to another underlying conflict] provoked an angry reaction from the ethnic minority girl… which turned into a fight. The Youth Leader was later accused by the parent of one of the girls [of encouraging] the hatred incident by simply having told the young girls that they should not shout racist remarks and gang against a single girl. The ethnic minority girl ran away… the Police had to be called. Both the Police and Management tried to ignore the fact that the girls had shouted racist abuse to the other girl and this had provoked her aggressive behaviour. It was easier to blame the Youth Leader for not handling the situation properly.’ Problems resulting from the incidents and the poor handling of them had clear implications: One participant felt that racism in the local community had the effect of excluding young BME people from youth work provision: ‘Young Polish, Copyright © Maureen McBride 2016 REPORT No.07 /2016 A Review of the Evidence on Hate Crime and Prejudice: Report for the Independent Advisory Group on Hate Crime, Prejudice and Community Cohesion Lithuanian and Congolese people in our areas tend to stay away from provision because of some of the young people's attitudes. Racist attitudes stop projects being open to everyone.’ This quote highlights the indirect harm caused by individual instances of hate crime, as particular groups may no longer feel comfortable engaging with services due to fear of being victimised on account of certain characteristics. Poor handling of such events undoubtedly exacerbates this: therefore, a clear priority would be for institutions and community organisations in which such problems might occur to be trained to deal with these effectively and sensitively. Another interesting finding from engagement with stakeholders and research on organisational data was how attitudinal prejudice and structural barriers combine to (negatively) shape the life chances of people and groups. For example, we received evidence from Article 12 in Scotland which, referring to research (Article 12, 2015) carried out with disabled children and young people, noted the following findings:  ‘Participants spoke of experiencing bullying, harassment and threats, both at school and in the local community – which affect their confidence and their ability to participate’.  ‘Many of the young people complained of having to wait long periods of time for essentials such as equipment, suitable housing and adaptations to their living environment’. It was noted earlier that an approach to hate crime which pays attention to structural barriers (faced by victims and also perpetrators) would be beneficial, and several examples such as the above supported this argument. The same report (Article 12, 2015) also looked at examples of exclusion, prejudice and discrimination faced by young people in the Gypsy/Traveller community. One participant talked about personal experiences of harassment: ‘We used to have bricks thrown at us and called names every day at one site, but you just get used to it’ (p. 78) Such experiences were not unusual according to the report: ‘It is also apparent that the community's cultural rights are not respected; most young people reported that they have become the victims of hate crime when they travel to new areas. It is particularly concerning when children as Copyright © Maureen McBride 2016 REPORT No.07 /2016 A Review of the Evidence on Hate Crime and Prejudice: Report for the Independent Advisory Group on Hate Crime, Prejudice and Community Cohesion young as 10 years old report that they are ‘disliked’ by members of the settled community’ (p. 82). The report is full of evidence of structural inequalities and economic marginalisation (for example, one participant discussed being accused of stealing from the clothes shop she worked in as a teenager on account of her ‘Gypsy’ status), lack of official sites contributing to inadequate housing, problems accessing healthcare due to no fixed address and mistrust of health professionals. The report also raises the issue of the media’s role in perpetrating stereotypes of certain groups, which reiterates the point that hate crime or hate incidents do not take place in a context of perpetrator vs. victim but in a larger societal context in which norms and language circulated through media and other public discourse help to shape attitudes. This would be an interesting area for further research, as much of the literature on minority groups highlights the impact of negative stereotypes. We know that there are significant structural barriers that affect the life chances of Gypsy/Traveller communities. Research by the Equality and Human Rights Commission in 2009 on England and Wales, entitled ‘Gypsies and Travellers: simple solutions for living together’, highlighted some of this. According to the EHRC, the life expectancy for Gypsy/Travellers, both male and female, is around ten years less than the national average. The EHRC further states that Gypsy/Traveller parents are 20 times more likely to experience the death of a child than parents within the wider general population. In Scotland, this group are particularly in need of support and further research on their experiences of victimisation has been raised as a priority. As mentioned earlier, the EHRC in Scotland are addressing these issues currently and have contracted out a research project which will be carried out in the near future. In relation to LGBT groups, the earlier mentioned report by the Equality Network (2015) also highlights the fact that, as is the case with all minority groups, there are still significant structural barriers as well as attitudinal / societal prejudice. The report found the following:  A quarter of LGBT respondents (200 of the total 800 LGBT respondents to the survey) said they had personally experienced discrimination or ‘less good treatment’ in one or more services, including public, commercial and voluntary services.  In particular, one out of five LGBT respondents (21%) said they had personally experienced discrimination or less good treatment in Scotland’s healthcare Copyright © Maureen McBride 2016 REPORT No.07 /2016 A Review of the Evidence on Hate Crime and Prejudice: Report for the Independent Advisory Group on Hate Crime, Prejudice and Community Cohesion services, 18% reported discrimination or less good treatment in Scotland’s education system, and 11% reported discrimination or less good treatment in policing. Finally, the research raised the question of whether all ‘protected characteristics’ are treated equally. One stakeholder suggested that crimes against people with learning disabilities are still not taken as seriously as, for example, an incident of racism: ‘Because there is a lower value placed on the human rights and lives of people with Learning Disability within Scottish society these crimes and incidents are not recognised for what they are. If a teacher hears a pupil calling one of their peers ‘retard’ or ‘mongo’ they will either not react at all or they will react less severely than if that child had used a racially offensive word. The abuse is so common place in society that it goes un-noticed and therefore unreported. Disability hate crimes and incidents are recognised as under reported but within that group Learning Disability is even more so’. This argument is echoed by some academic research in the following section, and suggests that authorities and anyone involved in responding to hate crime should work to ensure that all claims of hate crime victimisation are treated respectfully and sensitively. The statistical information in this section has highlighted the prevalence of bigotry in our society, and the narrative extracts tell us a bit more about what that means for people who experience it. Some of the evidence highlights how attitudinal prejudice and structural barriers combine which is crucial. The final part of this section will draw on some of the academic work on the topic. Academic Research This final section on the ‘harms of hate crime’ considers some of the academic contributions to the topic. It does not attempt to provide a systematic literature review, rather to select a few key studies which raise questions on or help make sense of the other data identified in this research. A group highlighted in this research and other projects as particularly vulnerable to hate crime and other disadvantage is Gypsy/Traveller communities. Professor Colin Copyright © Maureen McBride 2016 REPORT No.07 /2016 A Review of the Evidence on Hate Crime and Prejudice: Report for the Independent Advisory Group on Hate Crime, Prejudice and Community Cohesion Clark at the University of the West of Scotland has produced recent work on this area, including an article on the specific experiences and personal accounts of Roma in Govanhill (Glasgow) which looks at the structural barriers facing this group. Clark suggests that Roma are the current ‘racialised scapegoat of endemic, structural poverty in an age of austerity and public and voluntary sector cuts’ (2014: 41). The paper does not focus on ‘hate crime’ as it is manifested in terms of direct violent attacks, however it explores examples of exclusion and stigmatisation of this group which is likely to have profoundly harmful effects at individual and group level. This is the type of data which is less likely to be captured by official statistics, especially because of underreporting. The article explores how the ‘indirect harm’ of prejudice – reluctance to engage with services thus contributing to lower standards of health, substandard housing, and increased levels of poverty significantly affects the life chances of Roma in Glasgow. Clark’s findings raise very similar themes and support the arguments made in the work by EHRC on Gypsy/Traveller communities in England, which is discussed earlier in this report. It further highlights the need to place hate crime research in a context which pays appropriate attention to structural barriers and the roles of institutions. The short-film, ‘The Harms of Hate’, produced by the University of Leicester Centre for Hate Crime, is a useful resource which enjoyed significant public engagement. The work, which comes highly recommended among disability activist circles, takes a progressive approach to the conceptual placing of the victim within the wider hate crime context to better appreciate the potential harms associated with the notions of ‘hate’, ‘victim’ and ‘vulnerability’. Chakraborti and Garland (2012) argue that the conventional identity-based approach towards enforcing hate crime legislation are ‘constrained by the parameters set by official discourses, which often limit the reach of hate crime to prejudice towards specific groups’ (2012: 506). They suggest, instead, that a vulnerability-based approach is more focused on the potential risk posed to certain groups or individuals which can arise under any given context and through various factors which include ‘hate, prejeduce, hostility, unfamiliarity, discomfort or simply opportunism or convenience’ (Chakraborti and Garland, 2012: 506). This article opens a dialogue of a ‘spectrum of vulnerability’ which can be less or more depending on circumstance, and renders some people at some times more susceptible to harm, prejudice or discrimination. By suggesting ‘convenience’ as a factor, the authors open up the typical assumed landscape of ‘hate crime’ from street-based, non-specific targeting, Copyright © Maureen McBride 2016 REPORT No.07 /2016 A Review of the Evidence on Hate Crime and Prejudice: Report for the Independent Advisory Group on Hate Crime, Prejudice and Community Cohesion to inter-personal targeting in the home, for example. There are risks to the notion of vulnerability (as discussed further below), as it may entrench paternalistic and disempowering approaches, and so the inclusion of convenience, as a hate crime motivator, is a useful additional tool for conceptualising hate crime in the round. Writing about disability, Pam Thomas (2011) extends the scope of hate crime from beyond the dominant narrative of it tending to be a public incident, committed by unknowns. Thomas argues that, in fact, people with disabilities are targeted and this can be committed by people known to the victim, contrasting with the finding of research on hate crimes in other context which typically feature a white male, who is also often a stranger. This is an extremely interesting area for further research, and has implications for organisations that support people with disabilities, particularly in terms of encouragement to report victimisation. Abuse carried out by people familiar to the victim is likely to increase the already high levels of underreporting of hate crime for this group. Joanna Perry (2008) raises an important issue with casting the label ‘vulnerable’ on people with learning disabilities and ‘creating vulnerability’ through an institutionalised perspective of harm that does not engage with criminal justice approaches. Disability scholars Alan Roulstone, Pam Thomas and Susie Balderstone’s (2010) article ‘Between Hate and Vulnerability: Unpacking the British Criminal Justice System’s Construction of Disablist Hate Crime’ draws on the evidence of hate crime being prevalent, and pervasive, within the lives of many disabled people in England. This paper argues that the term ‘hate’ is not useful in the political emancipation of disabled people due to the reliance on the prescriptive ‘vulnerable person’ status imparted on victims of such incidents, and suggests that ‘disablist hostility and harassment’ would lead to a ‘more enabling criminal justice for disabled people’. The above studies support the argument that the term ‘hate crime’ can be problematic in some contexts, and indicate that discussion around terminology may be warranted. Finally, some interesting academic work on hate crime which is worthy of inclusion in this report considers the extent to which different ‘forms’ of hate crime are treated differently, depending on the ‘protected characteristic’ in question. Quarmby (2008) in ‘Getting away with Murder’ explores disabled people’s experiences of hate crime in the UK. She outlines three examples of particularly heinous hate crimes against people with disabilities and highlights the poor response by the criminal justice system to these, commenting: Copyright © Maureen McBride 2016 REPORT No.07 /2016 A Review of the Evidence on Hate Crime and Prejudice: Report for the Independent Advisory Group on Hate Crime, Prejudice and Community Cohesion ‘The horrific facts of the three cases outlined above demonstrate that there is a long way to go before disability hate crime is routinely recognised and accepted. If these crimes had been perpetrated against a gay person or someone from a minority ethnic or religious group there can be little doubt that they would have been investigated as possible hate crimes’ (31). This chimes with findings provided to us by a charity that works with people with learning disabilities. In other work, the criminal justice system is criticised for failing to pay sufficient attention to the possible abuse of people with learning disabilities within institutions such as prisons. The Prison Reform Trust report ‘No One Knows’ highlights the prevalence of instances of disability discrimination, and possible human rights abuses. Four instances of greatest concern are listed below:  Maltreatment of people with learning disabilities and learning difficulties by the police and by prison officers  The lack of an appropriate adult for vulnerable suspects during police interview  Defendants with learning disabilities and learning difficulties being unaware of what is happening to them during their trial and an inability to understand decisions of the court  Prison information and regimes that are inaccessible to prisoners with learning disabilities and difficulties. Certainly some institutions have been addressing issues like this. The Scottish Prison Service participated in the survey sent to stakeholders and noted that they make efforts to collect information on experiences of hate crime and prejudice in the form of ‘Staff, Prisoners and Ethnic Minority and Foreign national surveys (every 2 years)’. However this may still marginalise those with learning disabilities depending on how accessible the survey is, and whether it directly addresses this specific form of victimisation. It is important to think about whose voices are still silenced despite efforts to reach marginalised groups through community engagement and qualitative research. People with learning disabilities were emphasised by various stakeholders as a group who unfortunately fall into this category, particularly if they are in institutional settings such as prisons. A key area for consideration in relation to research should be: Who takes part? Who might be excluded? How might we alter our approach to reach those who have been identified as marginalised or excluded? Copyright © Maureen McBride 2016 REPORT No.07 /2016 A Review of the Evidence on Hate Crime and Prejudice: Report for the Independent Advisory Group on Hate Crime, Prejudice and Community Cohesion Intersectionality Intersectionality refers to the interconnected nature of social categorisations. The intersectional nature of hate crime victimisation was emphasised by evidence from stakeholders as well as in the literature. For example, Goodall et al. (2004) noted that visible minority women were much more likely than majority white men or women to experience offensive remarks or threats, while visible minority men were considerably more likely to experience physical assault than majority white men or women. The Glasgow Women’s Library, who took part in the research, stated that they served women ‘with multiple protected characteristics including disability, LGBTI, age, faith/religion, race/ethnicity, gender reassignment, marriage status, and maternity/pregnancy’ (survey response). The intersectional nature of hate crime was highlighted particularly in relation to disability. The Scottish Commission for Learning Disability noted that, ‘All other protected characteristics are also applicable to this population cohort’ (comments to author in meeting on 3/2/16). Evidence from relevant stakeholders also suggests that minority people with disabilities face particular barriers to reporting. Intersectionality was also emphasised by groups that primarily focus on the protected characteristics of race and/or religion. According to BEMIS, the national Ethnic Minorities led umbrella organisation in Scotland, ‘Minority communities also share aspects of all other protected characteristics’ (survey response) Interfaith commented that ‘Race and religion can often be interconnected and it is difficult sometimes to pick out whether a hate crime towards someone is because of their religion or their perceived race’ (survey response). This is particularly the case with anti-Semitism and Islamophobia, but is also relevant for people from an Irish background in contemporary Scotland, whose experiences of discrimination typically are framed in terms of ‘sectarianism’, but this is problematic and not necessarily in fitting with how they self-define (BEMIS survey response, also see McBride 2014). In a recent submission to the Scottish Parliament’s Public Petitions Committee, BEMIS note their recognition of the Irish community ‘as an ethnic and cultural minority under the definition of ‘Race’ as set out by the Equality and Human Rights Copyright © Maureen McBride 2016 REPORT No.07 /2016 A Review of the Evidence on Hate Crime and Prejudice: Report for the Independent Advisory Group on Hate Crime, Prejudice and Community Cohesion Commission’ 1 . BEMIS noted in a meeting with the researcher on 11 th March 2016 that they are the only organisation to recognise the Irish as such, and individuals and groups from the Irish community therefore often feel that there is insufficient recognition of their minority status. Finally, the Equality Network commented that ‘Many LGBTI people have multiple protected characteristics, and we do project work specifically around intersectional identities including with minority ethnic LGBTI people, disabled LGBTI people and LGBTI asylum seekers and refugees’ (survey response). The above points also highlight the difficulty of categorising victimisation, as in surveys which seek to specify one or a primary characteristic. Hate crimes perpetrated on account of multiple protected characteristics are typical according to stakeholders who took part in this research. A recommendation of this report is that the subject of intersectionality should be a priority area for future research both quantitative and qualitative. For example, analysis of individual level victimisation data from the Scottish Crime and Justice Survey would be extremely valuable. Qualitative research could provide a different insight, for example by talking to victims about their own perceptions of the reasons they were victimised. Conclusion This section has explored some of the data available on the levels and nature of hate crime in Scotland using official, organisational and academic sources (often drawing on information on the UK more broadly due to the lack of Scotland-specific data). It is clear that there are still high levels of victimisation, and the narrative extracts highlight the fact that victims are in many cases enduring extremely harmful incidents on a regular basis. The next section will look at responses to hate crime to explore how this problem is being tackled at national and local levels. 1 http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/S4_PublicPetitionsCommittee/General%20Documents/20160113 _PE1593_BEMIS_to_Minister.pdf http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/S4_PublicPetitionsCommittee/General%20Documents/20160113_PE1593_BEMIS_to_Minister.pdf http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/S4_PublicPetitionsCommittee/General%20Documents/20160113_PE1593_BEMIS_to_Minister.pdf Copyright © Maureen McBride 2016 REPORT No.07 /2016 A Review of the Evidence on Hate Crime and Prejudice: Report for the Independent Advisory Group on Hate Crime, Prejudice and Community Cohesion SECTION FIVE: RESPONDING EFFECTIVELY TO HATE CRIME The evidence on ‘what works’ to reduce prejudice in all forms is extremely limited (e.g. McBride 2015), however where possible evidence of good practice is highlighted. This section also draws heavily on evidence from stakeholders, and considers the various responses to hate crime as follows: reporting of hate crime including attempts to raise awareness of this; supporting victims of hate crime, rehabilitation of perpetrators of hate crime and preventative / educational measures; and gaps / problems in the responses to hate crime as identified by stakeholders in our engagement with them. Reporting hate crime and ‘knowing your rights’ During meetings and through surveys many stakeholders reported to us details of service users’ barriers to reporting, and this was something that is also evident from the published research. For example, Stonewall Scotland’s (2010) ‘LGBT Experiences of Community Safety Survey’ questions specifically relating to their experiences of hate offences found that the following reasons were given for not reporting hate incidents to the police or through third party reporting: - Lack of trust (in the police) - Having also suffered homophobic comments from the police - Not thinking it would make a difference - Not having a witness or evidence - Living in a close-knit community - Not wanting personal details to be reported in the media - Unaware that bullying at school is also a crime One stakeholder in this research commented that ‘The Equality Act is not widely publicised particularly to those who would benefit from its principles. Neither is the process of reporting hate crime’ (survey response, anonymised). The latter was Copyright © Maureen McBride 2016 REPORT No.07 /2016 A Review of the Evidence on Hate Crime and Prejudice: Report for the Independent Advisory Group on Hate Crime, Prejudice and Community Cohesion echoed by several organisations, and highlighted as a priority for action. Article 12 suggested that there is a need for: ‘Clear information on how to report hate crime [e.g. Article 12 in Scotland has a reporting page on its website]. A national campaign focusing on protected characteristics and examples of groups who are protected. This campaign should be developed with *direct* input from such groups’. The Glasgow Women’s Library stated that ‘There is a need for information to improve understanding of hate crime and effective responses to come from the women themselves’. Barriers to reporting and understanding what actually constitutes a hate crime were also highlighted by the Scottish Commission for Learning Disability: ‘People with learning disabilities experience a number of barriers in identifying and reporting hate crime. Often, people may not be able to identify a crime committed against them as having a basis of hate and will not report it as such. In addition, the reporting mechanisms themselves are often not set up to take account of the additional needs of this group of people. Both of which contribute to under-reporting. Information for people with learning disabilities, those who support them and those to whom a report would be made would improve this situation’. In terms of ways to improving reporting rates of incidents, the Coalition for Racial Equality and Rights commented that: ‘We are especially interested in approaches to dealing with online hate crime, as we are aware these are less likely to be reported or result in a prosecution. Information about victims and perpetrators (e.g. which ethnic groups are most likely to target which ethnic groups) would be useful. Minority ethnic individuals we engage with also believe at times their reports are not taken seriously. Information on this process and guidelines utilised would be helpful’. A number of issues are highlighted here, but the fact that online hate speech is perceived as ‘less worthy’ of reporting is an area meriting further investigation and consideration. That minority groups feel their reports are not always taken seriously is sadly an issue which is highlighted in much of the literature on the topic of hate Copyright © Maureen McBride 2016 REPORT No.07 /2016 A Review of the Evidence on Hate Crime and Prejudice: Report for the Independent Advisory Group on Hate Crime, Prejudice and Community Cohesion crime, and was raised by all stakeholders who took part in the research. For example, Community Safety Glasgow emphasised how hate crime can become normalised: ‘A lot of hate crime is relatively low level and our experience is that victims will tolerate regular low level incidents because often it is viewed as normal – ‘it's just what you have to put up with’. This means that they are reluctant to report it and will minimise the effect. I don't think we are dealing with this effectively’. A great deal of work is going on in this area to improve institutional responses to reporting of victimisation, and it is important that this focus continues. This research identified a wide range of resources, much of it produced by stakeholders who took part in the study, which attempts to raise awareness of how to report hate crime when it is experienced. This is important given the rates of underreporting, and the high levels of respondents to studies who stated that they were not aware of how to report personal victimisation through Police Scotland or a Third Party Reporting centre. For example, Stonewall have produced the following resources:  ‘Protecting lesbian, gay, bisexual and trans people in Scotland’ is Stonewall Scotland’s practical guide for police and community safety partners, providing tips and recommendations on how to tackle homophobic and transphobic hate crime and service LGBT people effectively.  ‘Sexual Orientation: the Equality Act made simple’ provides information and guidance on the Equality Act 2010 and sample equality outcomes for public authorities in Scotland.  ‘Blow the Whistle on Gay Hate’ is Stonewall’s plain-English pocket-sized guide for lesbian, gay and bisexual people on what to do if you’ve experienced a homophobic hate crime or incident. The role of Third Party Reporting Centres was raised by many stakeholders as a resource that is inconsistent and unevaluated. The Scottish Commission for Learning Disability told us that they were undertaking a survey of third party reporting centres which would undoubtedly be a valuable piece of research contributing to understanding of hate crime and effectively responding to it. Copyright © Maureen McBride 2016 REPORT No.07 /2016 A Review of the Evidence on Hate Crime and Prejudice: Report for the Independent Advisory Group on Hate Crime, Prejudice and Community Cohesion The Equality Network also highlighted an on-going project that they were involved in: ‘We are currently contracted by the Equality and Human Rights Commission to work on encouraging LGBTI people in Scotland to report hate crime, training police and COPFS staff on how to handle it, and developing community understanding. This is only a 6 month project, ending at the end of March, but we hope that the learning and resources from it will continue to be useful and effective for some time’ (personal communication with author). Whether such projects could inform some future database which collates information on the harms of hate crime and effective practice for tackling it, it is important to develop a clear strategy that utilises the benefits and knowledge gained from such projects, and, crucially, which makes linkages between them. Resources for tackling hate crime As well as improving the reporting of hate crime, the present research considered examples of effective practice in tackling hate crime (while being mindful that there is no ‘one size fits all’ approach). Stakeholders were asked to tell us about their views on resources for tackling hate crime (directly or indirectly, for example through community engagement), and further data was obtained via desk-based research and knowledge of particular initiatives. One strand of tackling hate crime is of course the rehabilitation of hate crime offenders. As noted earlier, there is not enough known about perpetrators of hate crime, and far less on how to reduce propensity to commit hate crime. While being mindful of the need to avoid a singular focus on hate crime as a result of the poor values of individuals, it is worth examining some projects that have been highlighted in an examination of the international evidence (provided by the EHRC) on successful interventions. The EHRC report described programmes aimed at young people in European contexts. In Germany and Sweden programmes were identified that supported Copyright © Maureen McBride 2016 REPORT No.07 /2016 A Review of the Evidence on Hate Crime and Prejudice: Report for the Independent Advisory Group on Hate Crime, Prejudice and Community Cohesion young people engaged in or at risk of engagement in racist activities (through association with far-right groups) to change their behaviour and stop offending. Such programmes use group work, talks by former offenders, and individual interaction and are regarded to have positive impacts, though the lack of systematic evaluation makes it difficult to assess comprehensively (as is the case with almost all prejudice- reduction initiatives). Of course it is important to note that these programmes focus on individuals involved in far-right politics. As noted earlier, this is quite uncommon for hate crime offenders in the UK who are more often ‘generalists’ than ‘specialists’ and would not identify themselves as ‘real’ racists even if convicted of carrying out a racist act. However, there may be aspects of the interventions that are worth exploring. The Scottish Prison Service took part in our survey and indicated that more knowledge of ‘intervention on how to change a person who has committed a hate crime’ would be very useful (survey response). The SPS also noted that evaluation of interventions to get a better sense of ‘what is working’ would also be extremely valuable. Again, though, this report emphasises that an individual pathological approach in relation to tackling hate crime is limited and problematic. It may be useful to draw on some parts of the rehabilitative programmes – such as group work or talks by people who have either previously been the perpetrator of or a victim of hate crime – however if implemented this type of intervention should be carefully monitored and be in conjunction with broader approaches which focus on the social and structural levels. Other stakeholders emphasised the importance of more preventative resources for reducing hate crime. One organisation that is involved in the training of youth workers (who support young people of all backgrounds in all communities) noted that at a general level: ‘Youth Workers require information of how they can discuss Hate Crime with young people. Supporting young people and youth work practitioners to understand the relationship between prejudice, discrimination and hate crime. Resources which will build capacity are required’ (survey response, anonymous). Interfaith suggested that a priority should be ‘the development of an effective training package for the third sector on hate crime, what it is, how to report it and how to educate people not to commit hate crimes and be open to 'others' (survey response). The Glasgow Women’s Library advised that they are in the process of writing a new programme of work 'Equality in Progress' as a result of their Tackling Copyright © Maureen McBride 2016 REPORT No.07 /2016 A Review of the Evidence on Hate Crime and Prejudice: Report for the Independent Advisory Group on Hate Crime, Prejudice and Community Cohesion Sectarianism project. The project aims to address: ‘Challenging structural inequalities of people experiencing hate crime or prejudice and empowering women to take collective action to reduce hate crime’ (survey response). There are a number of educational and community initiatives, too many to cover in this report but some are highlighted to give a sense of activity that is going on. For example, North Lanarkshire Council schools projects launched a website (http://www.intolerance.scot/) which was created by pupils from schools in North Lanarkshire in partnership between Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service with Learning and Leisure Services of North Lanarkshire Council. The resource includes awareness-raising videos on the harm of hate crime, and teaching materials (group tasks, discussion and debate ideas, self-reflection guidance). There is reason to be cautious in relation to awareness-raising initiatives, as Abrams (2010) warns that provoking fear (of being ‘caught’, for example) or making people feel guilty about inequalities are unlikely to be a useful solution, as people are prone to reacting defensively. The efficacy of these initiatives has not been assessed (as is the case with most awareness-raising or diversity-promotion initiatives) however we have included these to show the range and quantity of activity happening, and to highlight the fact that hate crime is becoming a priority across Scotland and across sectors. There are various public information resources, including the following which are directed at disabled people to help raise awareness of hate crime and how to tackle it:  I AM ME (http://www.iammescotland.co.uk/what-is-hate-crime/) I AM ME is a community group which raises awareness of disability hate crime in association with Police Scotland and PACE Theatre company, and created the following information service:  Scottish Consortium for Learning Disability (http://www.scld.org.uk/sites/default/files/scld_hate_crime_booklet_final_v ersion_oct_2013_a4.pdf) As above, after receiving a grant from the Scottish Government to improve awareness of disability hate crime among people with learning disabilities, the SCLD created a fantastic easy-read document for this purpose:  People First (http://peoplefirstscotland.org/gallery/) People First is an independent self-advocacy organisation that works to support people with learning disabilities to have more choice and control http://www.intolerance.scot/ http://www.iammescotland.co.uk/what-is-hate-crime/ http://www.scld.org.uk/sites/default/files/scld_hate_crime_booklet_final_version_oct_2013_a4.pdf http://www.scld.org.uk/sites/default/files/scld_hate_crime_booklet_final_version_oct_2013_a4.pdf http://peoplefirstscotland.org/gallery/ Copyright © Maureen McBride 2016 REPORT No.07 /2016 A Review of the Evidence on Hate Crime and Prejudice: Report for the Independent Advisory Group on Hate Crime, Prejudice and Community Cohesion over their own lives. PF created a short informative film about Hate Crime for people with learning disabilities.  Perth and Kinross Council ‘It goes on and on and on’ films (http://www.pkc.gov.uk/itgoeson) ‘It goes on and on and on’ is a series of short films about harassment and bullying of people with disabilities made by residents of Perth and Kinross. There are also a series of ‘instructions’ available to accompany the films to support community groups, schools and staff to make use of the films and to inform discussions: Coalition for Racial Equality and Rights have published a resource entitled ‘Hate Online: A guide to responding to online hate speech and hate crime’ which seeks to ‘clarify some of the confusion regarding online hate speech and hate crime and provide:  A definition of online hate speech and hate crime;  Information on how online hate speech and hate crime can be identified; and,  Guidance on how to record and report online hate speech and hate crime. The Scottish Commission for Learning Disability (SCLD) were engaged in the second phase of a Disability Hate Crime Project which takes a theatre approach. Details of the project are described by SCLD below: ‘The purpose in using Forum Theatre is to enable people with a learning disability to be involved in developing and performing the drama, working alongside professional actors to do so. Once the audience has observed the performance, an opportunity to discuss issues raised is provided. The audience is encouraged to make suggested changes that are likely to result in a different outcome for the victim. The adapted drama is then performed to demonstrate the impact of their suggested changes. In this way, people with learning disabilities are supported to recognise actions they could take in the event they experience hate incidents/hate crime. ‘Crucially, services and agencies taking part in the project will be provided with a copy of the full performance scripts together with easy read and audio versions. The provision of this material is intended to create opportunities http://www.pkc.gov.uk/itgoeson Copyright © Maureen McBride 2016 REPORT No.07 /2016 A Review of the Evidence on Hate Crime and Prejudice: Report for the Independent Advisory Group on Hate Crime, Prejudice and Community Cohesion for community groups working with people with a learning disability to deliver the drama performance on a local basis. ‘SCLD will also make the material available on its website. By doing so, the project will increase the capacity of user groups to take a prominent role in raising awareness across Scotland of hate incidents and hate crime and the action that can be taken to address these’ (survey response). It is clear that at national, local and community level there is a great deal of work being done in an attempt to tackle hate crime either directly or indirectly through engagement with communities. One way to move this forward might be the creation of a forum for stakeholders to share best practice and benefit from the creativity involved in individual projects. Gaps identified in research and data on hate crime The final part of this section considers stakeholders’ views on what gaps there are in the research on hate crime and any problems with the official data sources. As noted earlier, there is a dearth of qualitative research on the topic as compared to quantitative information. Interfaith suggested that our understanding of hate crime and effective responses to it would be improved by access to ‘Some qualitative information, where victims tell the story of their experience as some people respond more immediately to an actual story than a statistic’ (survey response). Glasgow Women’s Library – following a successful project on sectarianism which involved women affected by sectarianism sharing their experiences – noted that ‘There is a lack of knowledge on the impact of empowering women to take collective action to reduce prejudice’ (survey response). The same organisation also highlighted the lack of knowledge ‘on the impact of challenging structural inequalities of people experiencing hate crime or prejudice’, which is another interesting area for consideration. The Equality Network also emphasised the need for further, more in-depth research: Copyright © Maureen McBride 2016 REPORT No.07 /2016 A Review of the Evidence on Hate Crime and Prejudice: Report for the Independent Advisory Group on Hate Crime, Prejudice and Community Cohesion ‘We need to know more about the circumstances of sexual orientation, transgender identity and disability hate crime, by analysing in detail a significant sample of cases. We need more research into homophobia, biphobia and transphobia in schools, what forms it takes, and what if anything schools are doing to address it (across a range of schools because they vary greatly on this). We need to find out whether restorative justice is being used effectively for different kinds of hate crime, including against LGBTI people, in other countries’ (survey response). Perhaps unsurprisingly, several stakeholders referred to problems or inconsistencies relating to official data sources. Community Safety Glasgow submitted the following response to the survey: ‘Better information sharing between partners would be helpful. In particular, it would be useful to have access to quarterly statistical reports of incidents recorded by the police, in order to assist with strategic planning. For example, when planning a public education campaign, it would be helpful to have access to Police Statistics at a neighbourhood level in order to support targeted advertising. ‘Finally, regardless of the trend in official police statistics, the official narratives remain the same. If the trend is upward, the narrative is that victims are feeling more confident about reporting. If the trend is downward, the narrative is that the number of incidents is decreasing. ‘This renders the statistics meaningless. We really don't know how to interpret changes in recorded incidents and should be seeking to triangulate the data from COPFS with data from other sources, including community sources. Tell Mamma is an example. Stop Hate UK is another example. Neither of these are currently relevant to Scotland but could be developed’ (survey response). Issues relating to data collection and sharing was considered to be a particular priority for certain protected characteristics. For example, and one organisation noted the following points which affect their work supporting LGBTI groups: Copyright © Maureen McBride 2016 REPORT No.07 /2016 A Review of the Evidence on Hate Crime and Prejudice: Report for the Independent Advisory Group on Hate Crime, Prejudice and Community Cohesion ‘It is a major problem that there are no proper police stats on sexual orientation or transgender identity hate incidents reported to them - we are waiting for Police Scotland to sort out their database system! COPFS stats are useful. ‘Police Scotland need urgently to get working their ‘Vulnerable Persons Database’, so that they can provide regionalised stats on numbers of hate incidents reported to them. ‘Scottish Court Service or Scottish Government should publish detailed annual stats on outcomes of prosecution of hate crimes, that can be matched up with the annual COPFS hate crime stats reports - in England the CPS publish both of these together. ‘All these, plus the existing COPFS stats, should also add information on numbers of crimes with more than one prejudice aggravator, e.g. where the crime is both racist and homophobic. ‘We also urgently need the Scottish Government to commission research on the more detailed characteristics of sexual orientation; transgender identity and disability hate crimes. They did that for religious hate crime just 18 months after the introduction of the section 74 aggravator (see http://www.gov.scot/Publications/2006/11/24133659/0) and it is now six years since the three aggravators mentioned above were introduced by the 2009 Act. We need this kind of study to find out more about the characteristics of perpetrators, these type and circumstances of crimes, etc., so that we can make better decisions on how to reduce hate crime’. Issues with official data sources were also raised by groups that work with people with learning disabilities. For example, SCLD noted the following as a priority for better understanding and addressing hate crime against this group: ‘Statistics and other data which can be dis-aggregated by learning disability are essential to understanding the prevalence of the issue in this population. Hate crime in relation to disability generally is hugely under-reported however being unable to separate out reports which relate specifically to learning disability make this more problematic’ (survey response). http://www.gov.scot/Publications/2006/11/24133659/0 Copyright © Maureen McBride 2016 REPORT No.07 /2016 A Review of the Evidence on Hate Crime and Prejudice: Report for the Independent Advisory Group on Hate Crime, Prejudice and Community Cohesion The Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service raised a similar point in relation to racially aggravated offending: ‘We only know who the targeted victim or group is for religiously aggravated offending because the Scottish Government undertake a detailed analysis of this type of offending every year. We have no idea which groups or communities are being targeted for racially aggravated offending’ (survey response). The Scottish Refugee Council submitted a piece of evidence in which they had attempted to cross-reference the results of former Strathclyde Police’s Hate Crime statistics for 2011-2014 for their Glasgow divisions against ‘what we knew were the main refugee and asylum dispersal areas at the time’ (personal communication with author). The SRC noted that the data is ‘obviously anecdotal and more indicative than anything’ but may provide a useful perspective on what is happening at a very local level. The document that the SRC submitted to us explained: ‘It is difficult to triangulate with the data shared but what we can say is that broadly speaking apart from the city centre (AB) and Greater Gorbals (GE), there are a cluster of high incident areas where refugees and people in Home Office accommodation contractor asylum accommodation primarily live (and are other new migrant communities). This highlights the need to systematically collect data at a local level as these could very usefully inform, direct and improve responses to hate crime for particularly marginalised groups such as asylum seekers. Finally, stakeholders raised an issue of terminology. For example, BEMIS highlighted problems with particular generic or ‘catch-all’ terms which may potentially obscure the reality of victimisation: ‘Conflation of religion as dominant characteristic in defining ethnic or cultural identity i.e. Islamophobia, anti-Semitism are clear issues and statements of nature of crime. ‘Sectarianism' misconstrues the nature of dominant religiously aggravated crime in Scotland. Since re-convening of Scottish Parliament, anti-Catholicism has been and continues to be dominant issue representing between 55-65% of all religiously aggravated hate crime but goes unrecognised in official documentation, public discourse or strategic Copyright © Maureen McBride 2016 REPORT No.07 /2016 A Review of the Evidence on Hate Crime and Prejudice: Report for the Independent Advisory Group on Hate Crime, Prejudice and Community Cohesion response. This proves to be problematic when religion is utilised as defining characteristic by SG, COPFS, Police Scotland when communities have self- identified via other mediums’ (survey response). This section has highlighted stakeholders’ views on responses to hate crime, exploring issues around reporting, what resources are in place and/or should be developed, and what gaps in our knowledge and in the existing data sources exist. Based on this, the final section reflects on these and suggests areas of prioritisation, including some recommendations for future work. Copyright © Maureen McBride 2016 REPORT No.07 /2016 A Review of the Evidence on Hate Crime and Prejudice: Report for the Independent Advisory Group on Hate Crime, Prejudice and Community Cohesion SECTION SIX: REFLECTIONS AND NEXT STEPS Most stakeholders noted a lack of consistency in how hate crime is addressed across the country. Several highlighted that more frequent meetings with the Scottish Government would be beneficial to ensure views are being consistently fed back. Certainly any increase in the quantity and quality of communication would be beneficial, not only between individual organisations and the Scottish Government but also between organisations themselves, as the opportunity to share research findings and examples of good practice would be advantageous to all involved. Several stakeholders commented that there should be an accessible, centralised source – most likely online – so that all data on hate crime in Scotland is easily available and interactive. People should be able to access but also to add to the database which would be updated continuously and monitored to ensure that any statistics or studies that are out of date or no longer relevant for other reasons are removed and/or replaced. It was felt that this would improve practice, particularly if it is ‘continually up-dated rather than having to rely on annual information’. We are aware of the website created by Community Safety Glasgow - http://www.hatecrimescotland.org/resources/) – perhaps a version of this that is interactive would be a project to explore. Indeed, Community Safety Glasgow took part in the research and reiterated that ‘data at a very local level to assist with hotspot mapping, trend analysis and intelligence led resource deployment’ would enhance practitioners’ ability to respond effectively to hate crime (survey response). And, a representative from the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service suggested that ‘being able to follow cases from police report to sentencing and intervention without having to individually follow each case’ would enhance organisations’ ability to respond to hate crime (survey response). Most stakeholders suggested that more qualitative research would be extremely helpful to allow them to better understand victims’ experiences of hate crime, and perhaps even use this as a resource to raise awareness of the impact of expressing prejudice. Related, thinking about how to reach the most vulnerable and marginalised individuals is an important challenge, as the existing research is not representative and there are voices that are largely silenced. Further to this, more research on people who perpetrate hate crime was highlighted as vital as very little is known about this. A programme of qualitative research that would focus on these areas is a key recommendation of this report. In particular, an exploration of how http://www.hatecrimescotland.org/resources/ Copyright © Maureen McBride 2016 REPORT No.07 /2016 A Review of the Evidence on Hate Crime and Prejudice: Report for the Independent Advisory Group on Hate Crime, Prejudice and Community Cohesion creative approaches (such as the ‘storytelling’ initiatives carried out by the Glasgow Women’s Library) might complement more traditional qualitative methods (e.g. interviews) would be useful. Such research should focus on all protected characteristics, and where possible should address the intersectional nature of hate crime victimisation. Recognition of the intersectionality of hate crime also requires attention in future quantitative research. For example, existing data or surveys could provide more detailed analysis to help reveal the multiple and interconnected nature of social categorisation and criminal victimisation. For future quantitative research it would be worth exploring how surveys might be amended to help capture this information more effectively, and to consider how this data is presented (e.g. the ability to disaggregate the data). Finally, it is suggested that we try to think about hate crime in a slightly different way – for example, paying sufficient attention to the structural barriers faced by victims of hate crime but also by those who are most likely to carry it out. The role of institutions should also be highlighted. Related to this notion of thinking more broadly, it is noted that a priority should be to explore how we best understand and address the intersectional nature of hate crime, in research, policy and practice. Copyright © Maureen McBride 2016 REPORT No.07 /2016 A Review of the Evidence on Hate Crime and Prejudice: Report for the Independent Advisory Group on Hate Crime, Prejudice and Community Cohesion POSTSCRIPT – ‘BREXIT’ AND IMPLICATIONS FOR TACKLING HATE CRIME A draft of this report was initially presented to the Advisory Group on Tackling Hate Crime, Prejudice and Community Cohesion in March 2016, in order to help inform their work. Since then, the EU referendum result of June 2016 will undoubtedly have some implications relating to the broad themes raised in this study, which are worthy of some reflection though there is inadequate space here to fully consider its consequences here. On a practical level, the human rights implications of Brexit are extremely uncertain and it will be a long and complex process to understand the effects of disentangling the various legal and regulatory frameworks at EU and national levels. It is beyond our expertise or the scope of this study to make any predictions relating to this. However the climate of uncertainty that has now descended will have an impact upon community cohesion as the UK moves into withdrawal negotiations and beyond. Moreover, there have been various media reports of post-Brexit increases in instances of hate crime towards perceived migrants which, although difficult to verify in terms of an actual increase in racist incidents, will no doubt intensify the feeling of uncertainty on the part of migrants and ethnic minorities. It is important to note that these developments are unlikely to have been avoided even in the event of a Remain vote: the often inflammatory tone of rhetoric on both sides of the Brexit referendum revealed across the UK deeply held feelings, tensions and antagonisms around identity and community belonging. Across Europe, massive migration and displacement has been accompanied by worrying signs including newly resurgent far right movements; reported increases in racist incidents; Islamophobia; and the demonization and continued victimisation of refugees and asylum seekers. These trends can be identified in countries that are not member states of the EU such as Norway, as well as countries that are at the core of the EU such as France and Germany. While analysing these developments is beyond the scope of this study, the current situation is an important context that deepens the need to refocus our attention on the topic of hate crime and the broader treatment of minorities as well as on the underlying structural conditions of societies that that play a part in fuelling resentment and inequality. Copyright © Maureen McBride 2016 REPORT No.07 /2016 A Review of the Evidence on Hate Crime and Prejudice: Report for the Independent Advisory Group on Hate Crime, Prejudice and Community Cohesion REFERENCES Abrams, D. (2010). Processes of prejudice: Theory, evidence and intervention. Equality and Human Rights Commission Research Report Series. Article 12 (2015) I Witness: The UNRC in Scotland, available online: http://www.article12.org/resources/ Chakraborti, N. and Garland, J. 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The Scottish LGBT Equality Report: Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender People’s Experiences of Inequality in Scotland. Accessed 17/02/2016. Available online at: http://www.equality-network.org/wp- content/uploads/2015/07/The-Scottish-LGBT-Equality-Report.pdf Glasgow Household Survey (2015). Accessed 01/03/2016. Available online at: https://www.glasgow.gov.uk/CHttpHandler.ashx?id=30652&p=0 Goodall, K. et al. (2004) The Policing Of Racist Incidents In Strathclyde Gormley, C. McBride, M. Armstrong, S. and Atkinson, C. (2015) Hate Crime ‘A Scoping Study for the Glasgow Hate Crime Working Group’, SCCJR (unpublished report). Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary in Scotland (2014) Annual Report 2013- 2014. Accessed 02/03/15. Available online at: http://www.hmics.org/sites/default/files/publications/HMICS%20Annual%20Report %202013-14.pdf LGBT Youth Scotland (2015). Life in Scotland for LGBT Young People: Safety. Accessed 1 st March 2016. Available online at https://www.lgbtyouth.org.uk/files/documents/LGBTYS_Life_-_Safety2c_final.pdf Mason, G. (2014). The Hate Threshold: Emotion, Causation and Difference in the Construction of Prejudice-motivated Crime. Social and Legal Studies, 23(3), 293-314. McBride, M. (2015). ‘What Works to Reduce Prejudice and Discrimination’, Scottish Government Social Research McBride, M. (2014) Can new legislation succeed in wiping out the sectarian problem in Scotland? Scottish Association for the Study of Offending (SASO) Journal. http://www.equalityhumanrights.com/about-us/devolved-authorities/the-commission-in-scotland/research-in-about-us/devolved-authorities/the-commission-in-scotland/the-rehabilitation-of-hate-crime-offenders-an-international-study http://www.equalityhumanrights.com/about-us/devolved-authorities/the-commission-in-scotland/research-in-about-us/devolved-authorities/the-commission-in-scotland/the-rehabilitation-of-hate-crime-offenders-an-international-study http://www.equalityhumanrights.com/about-us/devolved-authorities/the-commission-in-scotland/research-in-about-us/devolved-authorities/the-commission-in-scotland/the-rehabilitation-of-hate-crime-offenders-an-international-study http://www.equality-network.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/The-Scottish-LGBT-Equality-Report.pdf http://www.equality-network.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/The-Scottish-LGBT-Equality-Report.pdf https://www.glasgow.gov.uk/CHttpHandler.ashx?id=30652&p=0 http://www.hmics.org/sites/default/files/publications/HMICS%20Annual%20Report%202013-14.pdf http://www.hmics.org/sites/default/files/publications/HMICS%20Annual%20Report%202013-14.pdf https://www.lgbtyouth.org.uk/files/documents/LGBTYS_Life_-_Safety2c_final.pdf Copyright © Maureen McBride 2016 REPORT No.07 /2016 A Review of the Evidence on Hate Crime and Prejudice: Report for the Independent Advisory Group on Hate Crime, Prejudice and Community Cohesion Perry, J. (2008) ‘The Perils of an Identity Politics Approach to the Legal Recognition of Harm’ in Liverpool Law Review 29:19-36 Quarmby, K. (2008). Getting Away with Murder Disabled people’s experiences of hate crime in the UK. Accessed 25/02/2016. Available online at: http://www.scope.org.uk/Scope/media/Images/Publication%20Directory/Getting- away-with-murder.pdf Scottish Household Survey (2015). Scotland's People Annual Report: Results from the 2014 Scottish Household Survey. Accessed 23/02/2016. Available at: http://www.gov.scot/Resource/0048/00484186.pdf Stonewall Scotland (2013). Homophobic Hate Crime: The Gay British Crime Survey 2013. Scotland Cornerstone Document. Stonewall Scotland (2010). How Safe are you? LGBT Experiences of Community Safety Survey. Accessed 24 th February 2016. Available online at http://www.hatecrimescotland.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/Stonewall- Scotland-How-Safe-Are-You-LGBT-Community-Safety-Survey-2010.pdf Talbot, J. (2008). Prisoners’ Voices: Experiences of the criminal justice system by prisoners with learning disabilities and difficulties. Prison Reform Trust. Accessed 01/03/2016. Available online at: http://www.prisonreformtrust.org.uk/Portals/0/Documents/No%20One%20Knows% 20report-2.pdf The National Union of Students (NUS) Survey (2011). No Place for Hate Crime: Hate Crimes and Incidents in Further and Higher Education: Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity. Accessed 28/02/16. Available online at: http://www.nus.org.uk/PageFiles/12238/2011_NUS_No_Place_for_Hate_Full_Repor t.pdf The National Union of Students (NUS) Survey (2012) No Place for Hate Crime: Hate Crimes and Incidents in Further and Higher Education: Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity. Accessed 28/02/16. Available online at: http://www.nus.org.uk/PageFiles/12238/2012_NUS_No_Place_for_Hate_Race.pdf http://www.scope.org.uk/Scope/media/Images/Publication%20Directory/Getting-away-with-murder.pdf http://www.scope.org.uk/Scope/media/Images/Publication%20Directory/Getting-away-with-murder.pdf http://www.gov.scot/Resource/0048/00484186.pdf http://www.hatecrimescotland.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/Stonewall-Scotland-How-Safe-Are-You-LGBT-Community-Safety-Survey-2010.pdf http://www.hatecrimescotland.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/Stonewall-Scotland-How-Safe-Are-You-LGBT-Community-Safety-Survey-2010.pdf http://www.prisonreformtrust.org.uk/Portals/0/Documents/No%20One%20Knows%20report-2.pdf http://www.prisonreformtrust.org.uk/Portals/0/Documents/No%20One%20Knows%20report-2.pdf http://www.nus.org.uk/PageFiles/12238/2011_NUS_No_Place_for_Hate_Full_Report.pdf http://www.nus.org.uk/PageFiles/12238/2011_NUS_No_Place_for_Hate_Full_Report.pdf http://www.nus.org.uk/PageFiles/12238/2012_NUS_No_Place_for_Hate_Race.pdf Copyright © Maureen McBride 2016 REPORT No.07 /2016 A Review of the Evidence on Hate Crime and Prejudice: Report for the Independent Advisory Group on Hate Crime, Prejudice and Community Cohesion Scottish Commission for Learning Disability (2016) Blog: Disability Hate Crime Project. Accessed 1 st March 2016. Available online at http://www.scld.org.uk/disability-hate-crime-project/ Scottish Parliament Public Petitions Committee (2016). Letter from BEMIS to Minister. Accessed 19th March 2016. Available online at http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/S4_PublicPetitionsCommittee/General%20Docu ments/20160113_PE1593_BEMIS_to_Minister.pdf The Scottish Council of Jewish Communities (2015) What’s changed about Being Jewish in Scotland? Project report to the Scottish Government. Accessed 22/03/2016. Available online at: www.scojec.org/news/2015/15iii_bjis2_/15iii_bjis2_prelim_report.pdf The Scottish Council of Jewish Communities (2013), Being Jewish in Scotland: Project Findings August 2013. Accessed 03/03/2016. Available online at: http://www.scojec.org/resources/files/bjis.pdf Thomas, P. (2011) ‘’Mate Crime’: Ridicule, hostility and targeted attacks against disabled people’ in Disability and Society 26(1):107-111 http://disability-studies.leeds.ac.uk/files/library/DRC-Hate-Crime-report.pdf http://www.scld.org.uk/disability-hate-crime-project/ http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/S4_PublicPetitionsCommittee/General%20Documents/20160113_PE1593_BEMIS_to_Minister.pdf http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/S4_PublicPetitionsCommittee/General%20Documents/20160113_PE1593_BEMIS_to_Minister.pdf http://www.scojec.org/news/2015/15iii_bjis2_/15iii_bjis2_prelim_report.pdf http://www.scojec.org/resources/files/bjis.pdf http://disability-studies.leeds.ac.uk/files/library/DRC-Hate-Crime-report.pdf Copyright © Maureen McBride 2016 REPORT No.07 /2016 A Review of the Evidence on Hate Crime and Prejudice: Report for the Independent Advisory Group on Hate Crime, Prejudice and Community Cohesion Appendix 1: Stakeholder Survey on Data Collection, Use and Perceptions Copyright © Maureen McBride 2016 REPORT No.07 /2016 A Review of the Evidence on Hate Crime and Prejudice: Report for the Independent Advisory Group on Hate Crime, Prejudice and Community Cohesion Copyright © Maureen McBride 2016 REPORT No.07 /2016 A Review of the Evidence on Hate Crime and Prejudice: Report for the Independent Advisory Group on Hate Crime, Prejudice and Community Cohesion Copyright © Maureen McBride 2016 REPORT No.07 /2016 A Review of the Evidence on Hate Crime and Prejudice: Report for the Independent Advisory Group on Hate Crime, Prejudice and Community Cohesion Copyright © Maureen McBride 2016 REPORT No.07 /2016 A Review of the Evidence on Hate Crime and Prejudice: Report for the Independent Advisory Group on Hate Crime, Prejudice and Community Cohesion Copyright © Maureen McBride 2016 REPORT No.07 /2016 A Review of the Evidence on Hate Crime and Prejudice: Report for the Independent Advisory Group on Hate Crime, Prejudice and Community Cohesion Appendix 2: Stakeholder Groups Completing Surveys Organisation Status Interfaith Scotland Survey completed Article 12 Survey completed Scottish Commission for Learning Disability Survey completed Equality Network Survey completed People First (Scotland) Survey completed Stonewall Scotland Survey completed Prison Service Survey completed LGBT Youth Survey completed BEMIS Survey completed Coalition For Racial Equality And Rights Survey completed Scottish Council of Jewish Communities Survey completed Victim Support Scotland Survey completed Glasgow Women's Library Survey completed Scottish Courts and Tribunals Service Survey completed Community Safety Glasgow Survey completed Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service Survey completed Youthlink Scotland Survey completed Scottish Refugee Council Evidence submitted Copyright © Maureen McBride 2016 REPORT No.07 /2016 A Review of the Evidence on Hate Crime and Prejudice: Report for the Independent Advisory Group on Hate Crime, Prejudice and Community Cohesion Appendix 3: Summary of Survey Responses – Selected Topics Organisational Size 5 responding organisations had fewer than 10 FT staff 3 had between ten and less than 20 FT staff 9 reported 20 or more FT staff Organisational Coverage All organisations reported serving communities across Scotland (and some were part of UK wide organisations). Most organisations are based in the central belt. Protected Characteristics Only three responding organisations did not mention serving communities having multiple protected characteristics. Data Collection Activity 11 organisations reported conducting their own data collection on hate crime, prejudice and discrimination. Data Collection Examples Annual surveys Ongoing surveys of online media Less frequent than annual surveys (one-off or intermittent) Own research on experiences of public services Commissioning independent research Evaluations of interventions and awareness raising Focus groups Community mapping Collection of stories and experiences through informal networks Oral history Film work Dialogue Setting Google alerts to capture latest research and news Copyright © Maureen McBride 2016 REPORT No.07 /2016 A Review of the Evidence on Hate Crime and Prejudice: Report for the Independent Advisory Group on Hate Crime, Prejudice and Community Cohesion Other Sources of Data All but one organisation reported using official data, particularly COPFS and Police Scotland data. Most reported using other organisations’ data and academic research. Gaps in information  Gap between reported and actual incidents  Lack of dis-aggregated data by regions/localities and by sub-categories of groups  Mis-categorisations  Lack of information on perpetrators as well as victims  Need of qualitative research Lack of information at Local Authority level Lack of regionalised statistics on reported incidents Need to dis-aggregate data by learning disability to understand prevalence in this group Quarterly publication of hate crime statistics ‘True’ number of hate crime given under reporting Quantifying unreported incidents Generic, ‘catch all’ terms create misunderstanding of scale and specifics of problems Conflation of one protected category with multiple others (e.g. religion for cultural or ethnic identity) Mis-categorisations Outcomes of prosecutions of hate crimes that can be matched with COPFS reports of crimes (as England does) Work on a ‘Vulnerable Persons Database’ to support regionalised reporting Lack of qualitative information to convey impact of hate crime through actual stories Need research on detailed characteristics of sexual orientation, transgender identity and disability hate crimes – including perpetrators, type and circumstances of crime Research on homophobia, biphobia and transphobia in Copyright © Maureen McBride 2016 REPORT No.07 /2016 A Review of the Evidence on Hate Crime and Prejudice: Report for the Independent Advisory Group on Hate Crime, Prejudice and Community Cohesion schools, what forms it takes, and what if anything schools are doing to address it Information about both victims and perpetrators (e.g. which ethnic groups are most likely to target which ethnic groups) Suggestions for practice  Improving awareness and education  Providing practical and specific information  Dynamic, comprehensive and accurate data  Better information sharing between partners  Developing community capacity and involvement in solutions Youth Workers require information of how they can discuss Hate Crime with young people. Supporting young people and youth work practitioners to understand the relationship between prejudice, discrimination and hate crime. Resources which will build capacity are required. The development of an effective training package for the third sector on hate crime, what it is, how to report it and how to educate people not to commit hate crimes and be open to 'others'. A hate crime website where information is continually up- dated rather than having to rely on annual information. A facility which would allow relevant organisations to follow cases from police report to sentencing and intervention without having to individually follow each case. Detailed info on effective responses Information to improve understanding of hate crime and effective responses to come from the women themselves Clear information about how to report a hate crime (e.g. Article 12 has reporting page on its website) A national campaign focusing on protected characteristics and examples of groups who are protected developed with *direct* input from groups involved in the issue. We need to find out whether restorative justice is being used effectively for different kinds of hate crime, including Copyright © Maureen McBride 2016 REPORT No.07 /2016 A Review of the Evidence on Hate Crime and Prejudice: Report for the Independent Advisory Group on Hate Crime, Prejudice and Community Cohesion against LGBTI people, in other countries. Effective schools approaches Approaches to dealing with online hate crime (especially an issue with young people) Ensuring victims are taken seriously There is lack of knowledge on the impact of challenging structural inequalities of people experiencing hate crime or prejudice. Research on evidence of effectiveness of current practices/interventions Data at a very local level to assist with hotspot mapping, trend analysis and intelligence led resource deployment. 
work_45lidts5mzekrhcwscyzirqxa4	----	Northumbria Research Link Citation: Quirk, Hannah and Wortley, Natalie (2017) Criminal Law and the Society of Legal Scholars. The Journal of Criminal Law, 81 (4). pp. 278-281. ISSN 0022-0183 Published by: SAGE URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0022018317722221 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0022018317722221> This version was downloaded from Northumbria Research Link: http://nrl.northumbria.ac.uk/32062/ Northumbria University has developed Northumbria Research Link (NRL) to enable users to access the University’s research output. Copyright © and moral rights for items on NRL are retained by the individual author(s) and/or other copyright owners. Single copies of full items can be reproduced, displayed or performed, and given to third parties in any format or medium for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes without prior permission or charge, provided the authors, title and full bibliographic details are given, as well as a hyperlink and/or URL to the original metadata page. The content must not be changed in any way. Full items must not be sold commercially in any format or medium without formal permission of the copyright holder. The full policy is available online: http://nrl.northumbria.ac.uk/pol i cies.html This document may differ from the final, published version of the research and has been made available online in accordance with publisher policies. To read and/or cite from the published version of the research, please visit the publisher’s website (a subscription may be required.) http://nrl.northumbria.ac.uk/policies.html Criminal Law and the Society of Legal Scholars Hannah Quirk and Natalie Wortley This special issue was born from the Society of Legal Scholars (SLS) Annual Conference 2016.1 As joint convenors of the Criminal Justice section, we initially planned this collection would showcase some of the interesting work that was presented there. Developments in politics and policy making, however, suggested that this was an opportune moment for broader reflection about some of the issues that are of topical interest and we are grateful to the editors of the Journal of Criminal Law for giving us a forum to develop some of these ideas. Between 1993 and 2010, crime and criminal justice policy was one of the most potent electoral issues; in 2015 and 2017, it barely featured. The first period arguably began2 with the announcement of Michael Howard’s 27-point crackdown on crime to the Conservative Party Conference 1993, including his infamous claim that ‘prison works’. His Labour Shadow Home Secretary, Tony Blair, with a similar talent for a soundbite, promised to be ‘tough on crime and tough on the causes of crime’3 and the Labour Party duly abstained from voting on the momentous Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 (‘CJPOA’). This controversial Act attracted protests against provisions that curtailed the right of silence and criminalised both protesting against fox hunts, and attending unlicensed raves (music ‘characterised by the emission of a succession of repetitive beats’4). Defying straightforward categorisation, the Act also reduced the age of consent for homosexuals, banned simulated child pornography and extended the definition of rape to include anal rape. The CJPOA illustrates many of the complexities involved in reforming the criminal law: the countervailing political forces; its vulnerability to hastily drafted measures that either never come into force or require amendment; the need to respond to new harms; and the need to remove offences that have become obsolete. Despite the reality of falling crime rates, public perception of the problem – largely whipped up by politicians - meant that legislation followed the CJPOA at a bewildering rate. Significant developments include: sexual offences being reformed and largely brought together in one Act;5 the expansion of ‘hate crimes’;6 the criminalisation of new behaviours, in particular in relation to internet-enabled crime;7 and the repeal of a smaller number of crimes.8 The increasing number of unwieldy statutes makes it a struggle for legal academics to keep up – never mind the police, prosecutors, lawyers or of course, members of the public.  School of Law, University of Manchester and School of Law, Northumbria University. 1 University of Oxford 6-9 September 2016. 2 S Chakrabarti, ‘A Thinning Blue Line? Police Independence and the Rule of Law’ (2008) 2 Policing 367, 369. 3 Nick Clarke, Interview with Tony Blair, ‘The World this Weekend’ (BBC Radio 4, 10 January 1993). 4 Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, s.63(1)(b). 5 Sexual Offences Act 2003 6 Crime and Disorder Act 1998, ss.28-33; Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, s.39; Criminal Justice Act 2003, s.145-146, Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012, s.65. 7 See, for example: Fraud Act 2006, s.2(5); Communications Act 2003, s.127; Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015, s.33. 8 See James Chalmers, ‘Frenzied Law Making: Overcriminalization by Numbers’ (2014) 67(1) Current Legal Problems 483-502. This frenetic pace notwithstanding, significant areas are still untouched. The Offences Against the Person Act 1865 remains largely Victorian in form, the homicide offences are mostly unreformed and, in the absence of Parliamentary action, individuals are reliant upon guidance from the Director of Public Prosecutions and continued attempts seeking judicial approval for assisted dying.9 Despite the decriminalisation of marijuana use in some states of the United States of America, Portugal and the Netherlands, drug laws in this jurisdiction have only extended their reach – most recently and with apparently unpromising consequences through what must now presumably be called ‘illegal highs’.10 The United Kingdom’s planned exit from the European Union will consume most of the energies of the Civil Service and much of Parliament’s attention for the foreseeable future. Criminal law is one of the areas that is least affected by European law. This lacuna thus offers an opportune moment for academics to reflect on areas that need attention. Programmes or ideas for reform are often first explored by the Law Commission, an independent body established to keep the law of England and Wales under review, to conduct research and consultations, and to recommend any necessary reforms. The Commission aims to ensure that the law is ‘as fair, modern, simple and as cost-effective as possible’ and to codify the law, reducing the number of separate statutes. The Commission works closely with academics; two of the four commissioners are academics. At the SLS Conference last year, a plenary address was given by Bean LJ and Professor David Ormerod from the Law Commission, during which they encouraged academics to engage more often, and more fully, with the Law Commission, both by suggesting potential projects, responding to consultations and throughout every project the Commission takes forward.11 In recent years, the Law Commission has adjusted its approach to focusing only on areas that it thinks are likely to find a receptive audience in Whitehall.12 It explains this as a pragmatic response to its need to reduce expenditure. It was clearly frustrating that after its highly regarded enquiries into reforming the homicide offences, only limited, piecemeal reform was undertaken.13 As academics we too face increasing pressures to produce scholarship that has practical effect. At the time of writing, the details of the next Research Excellence Framework remain unclear but most assume that some measure of ‘impact’ will be included again. Research Councils often want to see potential for impact in funding applications and/or a dissemination strategy that involves policymakers. Nevertheless, it is at the heart of our role that academics retain the freedom to rail against legislative proposals, parliamentary inaction or common law developments. There is still an important place for the esoteric - or even eccentric – analysis of the law in the academy. 9 R (on the application of Pretty) v DPP [2001] UKHL 61; R (on the application of Purdy) v DPP [2009] UKHL 45; R (on the application of Nicklinson) v Ministry of Justice [2014] UKSC 38; R (Conway) v Secretary of State for Justice [2017] EWHC 640 (Admin) 10 Psychoactive Substances Act 2016 11 <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gqndBJDWT7Q> accessed 28 June 2017. 12 Law Commission Act 2009 and Protocol between the Lord Chancellor (on behalf of the Government) and the Law Commission (Law Com No. 321, 2010) 13 See Murder, Manslaughter and Infanticide (Law Com No. 304, 2006). Reforms to the law of voluntary manslaughter were introduced in isolation by the Coroners and Justice Act 2009. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gqndBJDWT7Q Immediately after our Annual Conference, the ‘Criminal Law Reform Now’ (CLRN) Conference took place at the newly launched Crime Research Centre at the University of Sussex. John Child and Jonathan Roger’s article ‘Criminal Law Reform Now: A New Reform Network’, gives details of this venture, which seeks to provide an important conduit between universities and law reformers. They also explain CLRN Network Projects as an innovative means of drawing together experts in a particular field to create their own reform recommendations. The conference involved presentations of proposals for law reform in response to the Law Commission’s public call for suggestions for its thirteenth round of reports. The SLS has a long history of assisting with such consultations – both circulating details amongst interested members and responding as a Society.14 It can be difficult for policy makers to know who to contact on a particular topic – and Whitehall can seem labyrinthine to academics – so we look forward to engaging with both the Law Commission and the Criminal Law Reform Now Network to facilitate this important work. An example of this type of reforming work is explored in Catarina Sjölin and Helen Edwards’ article ‘When Misconduct in Public Office is Really a Sexual Offence.’ They discuss their work with the Law Commission about their proposal to put this common law offence on a statutory basis. This offence covers a multitude of criminal activities and has led to some anomalies. Using the example of sexual misconduct, they examine how the narrow definition of ‘public servant’ applied by the courts can mean that the conduct of two individuals in similar positions will be treated differently depending on the status of their employer. The offence fills a gap where, for example, a public servant obtains sexual favours as a result of (usually) his status – behaviour that would not be captured by the Sexual Offences Act 2003. It can also be used to avoid the difficulties of charging a more serious sexual offence. Whilst effective, this creates the ‘Al Capone problem’15 whereby a punishment is inflicted, but for a far less serious crime than the behaviour merits. In this case there is the added problem that future criminal records will not show the true sexual nature of the offending. The authors argue that such conduct is properly labelled as a sexual wrong. They propose the creation of a new sexual offence, which could be charged when a person abuses a position of power to gain a sexual advantage. Stephanie Roberts’ article, ‘Fresh Evidence and Factual Innocence in the Criminal Division of the Court of Appeal’ provides an important corrective in the debate about criminal law which is, understandably, often focused on punishing wrongdoers. Her article examines the ongoing criticisms of the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) that it is inadequate at identifying and correcting miscarriages of justice in relation to the factually (as distinct from the legally) innocent. These criticism stem from the from the Court’s perceived difficulties in relation to appeals based on factual error. The main ground of appeal for errors of fact is fresh evidence and these appeals are particularly problematic because they require the Court to trespass on the fact-finding role of the jury in assessing new evidence on appeal against the evidence at trial in order to determine whether a conviction is unsafe. Roberts uses a mixed methods approach to analyse the Court’s attitude to fresh evidence appeals. She concludes that the Court continues to take a restrictive approach to such cases and considers whether it is the law, or the interpretation of the law by the judiciary, that 14 Past consultation responses on behalf of the Society can be found on their website, <http://www.legalscholars.ac.uk/position-papers-consultation-responses/> accessed 28 June 2017. 15 The Chicago gangster was famously convicted for not paying tax when the FBI realised that a prosecution for his murderous activities would fail due to nobody being willing to testify against him. http://www.legalscholars.ac.uk/position-papers-consultation-responses/ is to blame. She also proposes reforms designed to make it easier for the Court to rectify miscarriages of justice. Tony Ward’s article, ‘Improperly Obtained Evidence and the Epistemic Conception of the Trial’ reminds us that law reform debates can raise important normative questions. He writes about a topic that has been of critical importance in several high profile miscarriage of justice cases, namely the admissibility of improperly obtained evidence. Arguing that we need to consider the purpose of the criminal trial in order to understand the principles governing the exclusion of such evidence, he favours an epistemic conception; the principal concern of the criminal trial is the accuracy of the verdict. His ‘vindication principle’ ensures that the moral and political rights of both victims and defendants can be upheld when decisions on the exclusion of evidence are taken. These four, very different, papers speak to the liveliness of the academic debate in this area; a debate that we hope will continue through the SLS, the CLRN Network, Law Commission consultations and the work of this journal. 
work_47t76p63vrhltcfwbg6baweofe	----	ALEXANDER BROWN* WHAT IS HATE SPEECH? PART 1: THE MYTH OF HATE (Accepted 28 February 2017) ABSTRACT. The issue of hate speech has received significant attention from legal scholars and philosophers alike. But the vast majority of this attention has been focused on presenting and critically evaluating arguments for and against hate speech bans as opposed to the prior task of conceptually analysing the term ‘hate speech’ itself. This two-part article aims to put right that imbalance. It goes beyond legal texts and judgements and beyond the legal concept hate speech in an attempt to understand the general concept hate speech. And it does so using a range of well- known methods of conceptual analysis that are distinctive of analytic philosophy. One of its main aims is to explode the myth that emotions, feelings, or attitudes of hate or hatred are part of the essential nature of hate speech. It also argues that hate speech is best conceived as a family resemblances concept. One important implication is that when looking at the full range of ways of combating hate speech, including but not limited to the use of criminal law, there is every reason to embrace an understanding of hate speech as a heterogeneous collection of expressive phenomena. Another is that it would be unsound to reject hate speech laws on the premise that they are effectively in the business of criminalising emotions, feelings, or attitudes of hate or hatred. I. INTRODUCTION What does the state, acting on behalf of society as a whole, owe to citizens when it comes to regulating speech or other modes of expression? Some people believe that in answering this question it makes a positive difference whether or not the speech in question is insulting, degrading, defaming, negatively stereotyping or inciting hatred, discrimination or violence against people in virtue of their * Alexander Brown is Senior Lecturer in Contemporary Social and Political Theory at the University of East Anglia (UEA). He joined UEA in 2009 prior to which he was a lecturer in legal and political theory at University College London (UCL) (2005–2009). He is the author of Hate Speech Law: A Philosophical Examination (Routledge, 2015), Ronald Dworkin’s Theory of Equality: Domestic and Global Perspectives (Palgrave, 2009), and Personal Responsibility: Why it Matters (Continuum, 2009). Law and Philosophy (2017) 36: 419–468 � The Author(s) The article is an open access publication 2017 DOI 10.1007/s10982-017-9297-1 http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1007/s10982-017-9297-1&amp;domain=pdf http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1007/s10982-017-9297-1&amp;domain=pdf race, ethnicity, nationality, religion, sexual orientation, disability, gender identity, for example; and that it makes a positive difference because such speech implicates issues of harm, dignity, security, healthy cultural dialogue, democracy, and legitimacy, to name just a handful of relevant issues. They sometimes use the term ‘hate speech’ to express that general view.1 (In what follows I use italics for the concept hate speech and single speech marks for the term ‘hate speech’.) Critics of hate speech regulations, by contrast, claim that even though it has become ‘fashionable’ to defend such regulations and even though defenders of such regulations are (according to critics) ‘well-meaning’,2 in reality hate speech regulations are them- selves harmful to self-realization and autonomy, ineffective at best and often counterproductive, and damaging to democracy and legitimacy, amongst other things.3 Indeed, to defend hate speech regulations (critics maintain) belies an implicit wish to defend the regulation of speech that quite plainly should not be regulated, namely, merely offensive speech.4 Defenders of (some) hate speech regulations could, I suspect, respond that the critics are being patronising; that it is the critics who are adopting a fashionable and well-meaning yet wrongheaded position. Defenders could even re- tort that it is the critics who harbour a secret desire to deregulate all speech even speech that quite plainly should not be deregulated. But what exactly are the two sides arguing about here? What is hate speech? Until we can sensibly answer that question it seems that the 1 See, e.g., Alexander Tsesis, Destructive Messages: How Hate Speech Paves the Way for Harmful Social Movements (New York, NY: New York University Press, 2002); Bhikhu Parekh, ‘Hate Speech: Is There a Case for Banning?’, Public Policy Research 12 (2005-2006): 213–223; Steven J. Heyman, Free Speech and Human Dignity (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008); Alexander Brown, Hate Speech Law: A Philosophical Examination (London: Routledge, 2015). 2 See, e.g., Miklos Haraszti, ‘Forward’, in M. Herz and P. Molnar (eds.) The Content and Context of Hate Speech: Rethinking Regulation and Responses (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Martha C. Nussbaum, ‘Law for Bad Behavior’, The Indian Express, February 21, 2014. Available at http://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/law-for-bad-behaviour/. 3 See, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, ‘Hate Speech’, in M. Herz and P. Molnar (eds.) The Content and Context of Hate Speech: Rethinking Regulation and Responses (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Ronald Dworkin, ‘Reply to Jeremy Waldron’, in M. Herz and P. Molnar (eds.) The Content and Context of Hate Speech: Rethinking Regulation and Responses (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Robert Post, ‘Interview’, in M. Herz and P. Molnar (eds.) The Content and Context of Hate Speech: Rethinking Regulation and Responses (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Nadine Strossen, ‘Interview’, in M. Herz and P. Molnar (eds.) The Content and Context of Hate Speech: Rethinking Regulation and Responses (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Eric Heinze, Hate Speech and Democratic Citizenship (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016). 4 See, e.g., Robert Post, ‘Hate Speech’, in I. Hare and J. Weinstein (eds.) Extreme Speech and Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); James Weinstein, ‘Hate Speech Bans, Democracy and Political Legitimacy’, Constitutional Commentary, forthcoming. ALEXANDER BROWN420 http://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/law-for-bad-behaviour/ debate about hate speech regulations has no chance of moving forward, much less of being understood by bemused onlookers. Since every country on the planet has probably witnessed at some point in its history instances of what could be labelled ‘hate speech’, and virtually every legal system in the world contains at least one law that could be interpreted as a ‘hate speech law’, we are all of us caught up in the aforementioned debate whether we like it or not, and whether or not we know what the debate is actually about. Numerous legal scholars have put forward putative definitions of the term ‘hate speech’.5 Unsurprisingly, all of these legal scholars have sought, explicitly or implicitly, to define a legal concept hate speech, meaning a concept that refers to speech that is, or has been at one time or could be in the future, treated as hate speech for the 5 See, e.g., Mari Matsuda, ‘Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim’s Story’, Michigan Law Review 87 (1989): 2320–2381, p. 2357; Suzanna Sherry, ‘Speaking of Virtue: A Republican Approach to University Regulation of Hate Speech’, Minnesota Law Review 75 (1991): 933–944, p. 933; Sandra Coliver, ‘Hate Speech Laws: Do They Work?’, in S. Coliver (ed.) Striking a Balance: Hate Speech, Freedom of Expression and Non-Discrimination (London: Article 19 International Centre Against Censor- ship/Human Rights Centre, University of Essex, 1992), p. 363; Frederick Schauer, ‘Uncoupling Free Speech’, Columbia Law Review 92 (1992): 1321–1357, p. 1349; Rodney Smolla, Free Speech in an Open Society (New York, NY: Vintage Books, 1992), p. 152; Charles Lawrence III et al., ‘Introduction’, in M. Matsuda et al. (eds.) Words That Wound: Critical Race Theory, Assaultive Speech, and the First Amendment (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993), p. 1; Ira Glasser, ‘Introduction’, in H. Gates et al. (eds.) Speaking of Race, Speaking of Sex: Hate Speech, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties (New York, NY: New York University Press, 1994), p. 1; Laura Lederer and Richard Delgado, ‘Introduction’, in L. Lederer and R. Delgado (eds.) The Price We Pay: The Case Against Racist Speech, Hate Propaganda, and Pornography (New York, NY: Hill and Wang, 1995), pp. 4–5; Kathleen Sullivan and Gerald Gunther, Constitutional Law (New York, NY: Foundation Press, 1995), p. 1131; Larry Alexander, ‘Banning Hate: Speech and the Sticks and Stones Defense’, Constitutional Commentary 13 (1996): 71–100, p. 71; Bryan A. Garner, Black’s Law Dictionary, 7th Edn (St. Paul, MN: West Group, 1999), pp. 1407–1408; John. T. Nockleby, ‘Hate Speech’, in L. Levy and K. Karst (eds.) Encyclopedia of the American Constitution, Vol. 3, 2nd Edn (Detroit, MI: Macmillan, 2000), p. 1277; J. Angelo Corlett and Robert Francescotti, ‘Foundations of a Theory of Hate Speech’, The Wayne Law Review 48 (2002): 1071–1100, p. 1083; Tsesis, Destructive Messages, p. 211, n. 1; Jon B. Gould, Speak No Evil: The Triumph of Hate Speech Regulation (Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press, 2005), p. 14; Raphael Cohen-Almagor, The Scope of Tolerance: Studies on the Costs of Free Expression and Freedom of the Press (London: Routledge, 2006), p. 153; Raphael Cohen-Almagor, ‘Holocaust Denial is a Form of Hate Speech’, Amsterdam Law Forum 2 (2009): 33–42, p. 35; Raphael Cohen-Almagor, ‘Fighting Hate and Bigotry on the Internet’, Policy and Internet 3 (2011): 1–26, pp. 1–2; James Weinstein and Ivan Hare, ‘General Introduction: Free Speech, Democracy, and the Suppression of Extreme Speech Past and Present’, in I. Hare and J. Weinstein (eds.) Extreme Speech and Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 4; Kathleen Mahoney, ‘Hate Speech, Equality, and the State of Canadian Law’, Wake Forest Law Review 44 (2009): 321–351, pp. 325–326; Post, ‘Hate Speech’, p. 127; Steven P. Lee, ‘Hate Speech in the Marketplace of Ideas’, in D. Golash (ed.) Freedom of Expression in a Diverse World (Dor- drecht: Springer, 2010), p. 22; Douglas M. Fraleigh and Joseph S. Tuman, Freedom of Expression in the Marketplace of Ideas (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2011), p. 139; Susan Benesch, Dangerous Speech: A Proposal to Prevent Group Violence (New York: World Policy Institute Paper, 2012), p. 1; Eduardo Bertoni and Julio Rivera, ‘The American Convention on Human Rights: Regulations on Hate Speech and Other Similar Expressions’, in M. Herz and P. Molnar (eds.) The Content and Context of Hate Speech: Rethinking Regulation and Responses (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), p. 499; Kylie Weston-Scheu- ber, ‘Gender and the Prohibition of Hate Speech’, Queensland University of Technology Law and Justice Journal 12 (2012): 132–150, pp. 139–140. WHAT IS HATE SPEECH? 421 purposes of legal regulation in one form or another. Some of these legal scholars seek to characterise a specific legal concept hate speech that relates to a particular body of law and legal regime, such as incitement to hatred laws in England and Wales. Others characterise a cluster legal concept hate speech that is associated with a class of hate speech laws, such as incitement to hatred laws. Yet others characterise an umbrella legal concept hate speech that implicates a range of dif- ferent clusters or classes of hate speech law, such as laws proscribing group libel, media regulations limiting negative stereotyping or stigmatization, laws disallowing insult or denigration, laws banning incitement to hatred, and so on.6 Because these characterisations differ both in terms of whether they are grounded in what has been, what is, or what could be treated as hate speech within a body of law and in terms of the levels of generality at which they operate, they often wind up saying very different, often contradictory things about hate speech. Given that hate speech laws provoke such strong moral reactions, on the part of defenders and critics alike, and given that legal meanings will themselves draw on a range of deeper values and principles about which people reasonably disagree, it is no surprise that there remains such divergence over how to define the very term that stands at the epicentre of the disagreement. However, I believe that in order to understand how best to re- spond to hate speech, whether this is via bodies of law and legal regimes and/or through a range of extralegal measures including counter-speech and education, we must pay serious attention to the fact that hate speech is not merely a legal concept, in the narrow sense of a concept that is used and in some cases even defined, explicitly or implicitly, within bodies of law and legal systems; it is also an ordinary concept that is (a) used by people who are not legal pro- fessionals or writers about the law, and (b) has a panoply of uses not only within bodies of law and legal systems but also within a range of other social, cultural, political and economic domains. If we focus too hard on a legal concept hate speech we risk prejudging what the right response to the problem of hate speech might be: for, we may have defined the nature and contours of the phenomena in question precisely with legal responses in mind. For defenders of hate speech laws, the danger is that if all one has is a hammer, everything starts 6 Cf. Brown, Hate Speech Law, ch. 2. ALEXANDER BROWN422 to look like a nail. Conversely, for critics of hate speech laws, if one is fixated on the idea that it is wrong to use a sledge hammer to crack a nut, then everything starts to look like a nut. Therefore, I position my analysis much closer to a different scholarly tradition, one that has attempted to analyse the meaning of the term ‘hate speech’ using various techniques of conceptual philosophical analysis.7 Neverthe- less, my analysis also differs from that of these other philosophers in two main ways to be further explained and defended in the course of the articles: first, unlike them, I reject some of the implicit assumptions about hate speech carried over, consciously or uncon- sciously, from the work of legal scholars; second, unlike them, I argue that hate speech is a family resemblances concept that does not admit of definition. Before setting out these points of differentiation, however, I need to clarify what I see as the ostensible differences between the legal concept (or class of concepts) hate speech and the ordinary concept hate speech. I do not mean to claim that the legal concept hate speech is somehow detached from the ordinary concept hate speech as though legislators, legal professionals and scholars of law operate separately from and with indifference to the rest of human life car- rying on the background. Such a claim would be difficult to square with the fact that such people are all influenced or inspired by values and principles not merely of a legal character but also of a more general ethical, moral and political character, especially in areas like hate speech law, which concern what we owe to each other in matters of interpersonal interaction. Rather, what I mean to say is 7 See, e.g., Andrew Altman, ‘Liberalism and Campus Hate Speech: A Philosophical Examination’, Ethics 103 (1993): 302–317, pp. 309–310; Judith Butler, Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performative (New York, NY: Routledge, 1997), p. 77; Susan Brison, ‘The Autonomy Defense of Free Speech’, Ethics 108 (1998): 312–339, p. 313; Susan Brison, ‘Hate Speech’, in H. La Follette (ed.) The International Encyclopedia of Ethics (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013), p. 2332; David Brink, ‘Millian Principles, Freedom of Expression, and Hate Speech’, Legal Theory 7 (2001): 119–157, p. 119; L. W. Sumner, ‘Hate Crimes, Literature and Speech’, in R. Frey and C. Heath Wellman (eds.) A Companion to Applied Ethics (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003), p. 142; David Miller, Political Philosophy: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 65; Norman Fischer, ‘First Amendment Morality Versus Civility Morality’, in C. Sistare (ed.) Civility and Its Discontents: Civic Virtue, Toleration, and Cultural Fragmentation (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 2004), p. 161; Parekh, ‘Hate Speech’, p. 214; Jeremy Waldron, ‘Dignity and Defamation: The Visibility of Hate’, Harvard Law Review 123 (2010): 1596–1657, pp. 1600–1601; Kevin M. Graham, Beyond Redistribution: White Supremacy and Racial Justice (Plymouth: Lexington Books, 2010), pp. 77–78; Caleb Yong, ‘Does Freedom of Speech Include Hate Speech?’, Res Publica 17 (2011): 385–403, p. 386; Rae Langton, ‘Beyond Belief: Pragmatics in Hate Speech and Pornography’, in I. Maitra and M. McGowan (eds.) Speech and Harm: Controversies Over Free Speech (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 74–77; Rae Langton et al., ‘Language and Race’, in G. Russell and D. Graff Fara (eds.) Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Language (London: Routledge, 2012), pp. 757–760. WHAT IS HATE SPEECH? 423 that how the term ‘hate speech’ is defined, explicitly or implicitly (via interpretation), within some body of law and legal system, cases and doctrines as well as statutes, is only the tip of the iceberg. Nowadays a great many different kinds of people who are not legislators, legal professionals or scholars of law use the term ‘hate speech’ in countless different types of context about a tremendous diversity of phenomena. Now it is certainly true that the term ‘hate speech’ was coined by a group of legal scholars in the late 1980s in the United States (more on this in ‘What is Hate Speech? Part 2: Family Resemblances’, henceforth ‘Family Resemblances’) in response to what they saw as the way different legal systems tackled certain sorts of harmful racist speech. When Mari Matsuda first used the term ‘hate speech’ in her seminal article from 1989, ‘Public Response to Racist Speech: Con- sidering the Victim’s Story’, her central purpose in using the term ‘hate speech’ was to highlight the way in which the legal system in the United States failed victims of harmful racist speech by providing them with inadequate means of seeking redress, civil or criminal. In the article, she includes a number of legal cases and also some examples not associated with actual legal proceedings and not easily actionable under current laws. But these examples were intended to show the limitations of the legal concept hate speech in the United States, as a form of protected speech. She contrasted the American- based legal concept hate speech with an ideal type or model version of what the legal concept hate speech could and should be. Perhaps in the process she was also invoking specific legal concepts hate speech found in Europe. Because of the work of legal scholars like Matsuda, the term ‘hate speech’ has now been taken up legislators and legal professionals themselves more explicitly. However, and this is the crucial part, this new bit of terminology or legalese has now also been taken up by the media and by ordinary people and has taken on a life of its own. By way of evidence for this last point, entering the term ‘hate speech’ into Google returns more than eighty million results.8 No doubt a significant proportion of these results are about the concept hate speech as it pertains to hate speech law. Indeed, it seems likely that the term ‘hate speech’ (and its non-English equivalents) often 8 On December 8, 2016. ALEXANDER BROWN424 first comes to the attention of ordinary people through television and radio programmes, newspaper and magazine articles, Internet message boards, social networking websites, and Internet news channels that mention the issue of hate speech in relation to high profile court cases, especially those involving already recognised public figures. Consider well-reported hate speech cases involving the French politician Brigitte Bardot, the Australian journalist An- drew Bolt, the Indian politician Akbaruddin Owaisi, the French comedian Dieudonné M’bala M’bala, the Kenyan politicians Moses Kuria and Junet Mohamed, and the Dutch politician Geert Wilders. These and similar cases around the world have all become trending stories on social media and online news channels. Nevertheless, the term ‘hate speech’ is also used by people who are not legal profes- sionals and/or writers about the law, and in the course of talking about events that are not connected with legal proceedings and where there is virtually no possibility of legal proceedings. So, for example, at the time of writing, entering the search term ‘hate speech Donald Trump’ into Google returned over four million re- sults. Indeed, a research group funded by the European Union has recently undertaken a survey of the media across Europe using the European Media Monitor (EMM) tool to find hits of the term ‘hate speech’. The preliminary figures for the UK shows an average of just under 100 hits per month between April 2015 and February 2016, with a spike of 224 hits in December 2015 with many hits occurring within stories about the campaign speeches of Donald Trump.9 Hitherto, the term ‘hate speech’ has been perhaps most often associated with liberal progressives, or people on the left of politics – who use it to highlight and problematise speech that they view as racist, xenophobic, homophobic, Islamophobic, misogynistic, disab- list, or in some other way targeted at minority groups in ways that supposedly violate ideals of respect, solidarity, tolerance, and so forth. By contrast, many political and religious conservatives repu- diate such uses of the term, and view them simply as crude attempts to close down meaningful debate on what they believe are the evils of open-border policies, the failures of multiculturalism as a social experiment, the lamentable decline of traditional moral values, political correctness gone made, and so on. Yet even people who are 9 Preliminary figures obtained from Professor Sharon Millar, University of Southern Denmark, a member of the European Union funded research network C.O.N.T.A.C.T. WHAT IS HATE SPEECH? 425 deeply critical of what they see as an inordinate and dangerous obsession with identity-based speech will use the term ‘so-called hate speech’, thereby implicitly acknowledging that the term ‘hate speech’ has an ordinary meaning – albeit they disapprove of this term given its ordinary meaning. More importantly, some political and religious conservatives have now consciously adopted terms like ‘hate speech’, ‘hate mail’, and ‘hate’ to describe speech on the part of liberal progressives and civil rights activists – speech which, in the eyes of those political or religious conservatives, picks them out and attacks them on the basis of their conservative beliefs.10 In addition to this, the ordinary concept hate speech seems to be playing an increasing role in popular culture. Consider the South Park episode from 2005 in which Cartman’s school presentation about ‘ginger kids’ – who it is claimed are suffering from ‘gingervitis’ and have ‘no souls’ – causes Kyle to object, ‘That’s not a lecture, it’s a hate speech.’11 Or take the furore surrounding the singer Beyonce’s halftime performance at Super Bowl 50 in 2016. Some people – including members of the All Lives Matter social movement – took to social media to describe the fact that Beyonce’s backing dancers were dressed like Black Panther members, along with the content of her recent music videos and public statements in support of the Black Lives Matter movement, as ‘hate speech’.12 And no doubt there were defenders of Beyonce’s public stance on the injustices faced by people of colour in the United States who viewed the portrayal of Beyonce’s performance and music videos as ‘hate speech’ as itself hate speech. Or bear in mind what the Harry Potter author, J. K. Rowling tweeted after it emerged that Donald Trump won the 2016 presidential election. We stand together. We stick up for the vulnerable. We challenge bigots. We don’t let hate speech become normalized. We hold the line.13 10 See, e.g., interviews with, and sermons given by, the United States evangelical Christian pastor Steven Anderson broadcast as part of the television documentary Preachers of Hate, aired on the BBC UK, October 11, 2016. 11 South Park, Season 9, Episode 11, aired on Comedy Central US, November 9, 2005. 12 Adam Howard, ‘Beyoncé Super Bowl Performance Inspires Protest, Counter-protest’, NBC News Online, February 10, 2016. Available at http://www.nbcnews.com/news/nbcblk/beyonc-super-bowl- performance-inspires-protest-counter-protest-n515996. 13 J. K. Rowling, @jk_rowling, Twitter, November 8, 2016. Available at https://twitter.com/jk_ rowling/status/796252371739430913. ALEXANDER BROWN426 http://www.nbcnews.com/news/nbcblk/beyonc-super-bowl-performance-inspires-protest-counter-protest-n515996 http://www.nbcnews.com/news/nbcblk/beyonc-super-bowl-performance-inspires-protest-counter-protest-n515996 https://twitter.com/jk_rowling/status/796252371739430913 https://twitter.com/jk_rowling/status/796252371739430913 There is always a chance, of course, that as society as a whole co- opts the term ‘hate speech’ and puts it to myriad purposes, the term itself will be emptied of its original, legal-technocratic meaning to such an extent that it becomes merely an empty vessel; a generic term of disapproval that has the same semantic content as, ‘I really don’t like what you said’. But even if we are on the path toward emptying the term ‘hate speech’ of substantive meaning, I do not think we are there yet. The point is that the term ‘hate speech’ is used because it is useful, and it will remain useful so long as it can be used to do more than merely signal disapproval. If all it did were signal disapproval it would soon fall out of fashion or be replaced by newer, cooler bits of language that did the same thing but in more interesting ways. My hunch is that many ordinary people have been willing to use the term ‘hate speech’ (and its non-English equivalents) for much the same reason that legal scholars coined the term in the first place, namely, that it provides a rough but nevertheless serviceable term to describe phenomena that have been the subject of legal sanctions, of one kind or another, since the Roman laws on group defamation14 but that, in all likelihood, have also been present throughout human history beginning with the earliest multiethnic societies of the an- cient world,15 that is, the expressive dimensions of identity-based envy, hostility, conflict, mistrust and oppression. It is also worth remembering at this point that the term ‘hate speech’ is only the latest in a succession of terms that historically have been used to refer to forms of speech that attack members of groups or classes people identified by certain protected characteristics, including, for instance, ‘race hate’, ‘group libel’ and ‘hate propaganda’.16 So for some time societies have found good use for this family of terms. But what is immediately noticeable, I think, about the term ‘hate speech’ is its generality, the way it can be used to meaningfully talk about far more protected characteristics and far more varieties of speech than any of its predecessors. Thus it seems to me that it makes a material difference that people use the term ‘hate speech’ rather than these 14 See, e.g., David Riesman, ‘Democracy and Defamation: Control of Group Libel’, Columbia Law Review 42 (1942): 727–780, p. 728. 15 See, e.g., Lionel Casson, Everyday Life in Ancient Egypt, Revised and Expanded Edition (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), pp. 58–59. 16 See Samuel Walker, Hate Speech: The History of an American Controversy (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1994), p. 8. WHAT IS HATE SPEECH? 427 older terms, and it makes a difference because the term is referring to a much broader and more capacious concept; and this is not necessarily a bad thing. Judith Butler once wrote, ‘the category [hate speech] cannot exist without the state’s ratification’.17 As a claim about the legal concept hate speech this is trivially true. But there is surely an ordinary con- cept hate speech whose existence is not dependent on the state’s ratification. Butler does not explain in unambiguous detail what she means by ‘ratification’, but suppose it means that when the state takes on the role of deciding what may or may not be permissibly said, it in some sense produces legal categories, such as the legal category hate speech. (This means that even a state which assumes the aforementioned role but decides not to ban hate speech never- theless creates the category hate speech, which goes into the per- missible or protected speech column.18) This point about the dependence of the category on the state’s ratification is much harder to sustain in the case of the ordinary concept hate speech, however. Whether or not the state takes on the role of line-drawing in relation to acceptable and unacceptable speech, there may well remain an ordinary concept hate speech. I do not mean to say that the state’s decision in this regard has no impact on the content of the ordinary concept hate speech. The ordinary concept is constituted by how ordinary people use the term ‘hate speech’ and this is likely to be influenced by how legal professionals and scholars of law use the term ‘hate speech’ and vice versa. So if the state decided to refrain from line-drawing, the ordinary concept hate speech might not exist in exactly the same form. But this concept would persist, I think, pre- cisely because it reflects ordinary people’s sense of what is accept- able and unacceptable speech in relation to groups or classes of persons identified by protected characteristics, based on ordinary people’s moral values and principles. Now it is also true that the ordinary concept hate speech probably includes the idea that hate 17 Butler, Excitable Speech, p. 77. 18 I am not sure how Butler thinks that the state could avoid producing the category hate speech given that the state does not operate in a vacuum and once groups come forward to request protection against hate speech, the state will make a determination about whether or not to meet the request, and either way it will make some sort of category hate speech, either as regulatable speech or protected speech. Suppose public order law was radically reformed in England and Wales, with all the offences that the legislators and legal scholars interpret as ‘hate speech’ offences being repealed, thus going the same way as the blasphemy offence in England and Wales. In that case it would still be producing a category hate speech, only this time as speech that is not to be treated as a public order offence. ALEXANDER BROWN428 speech is regulatable speech (in the sense that there is a pro tanto reason to regulate it). But at least as regards to the ordinary concept this feature of the concept does not depend on the state’s ratification. Ordinary users of the term ‘hate speech’ could think that hate speech is regulatable speech even if the state itself decided to withdraw from line-drawing in relation to acceptable and unacceptable speech and/ or there was no immediate prospect of hate speech actually being regulated. Interestingly, there is precedent for drawing a distinction between the legal concept and the ordinary concept hate speech within normal legal practice itself. It is customary for judges to mark the distinction between the legal meaning of key words in statutes and the ordinary meaning of those words (e.g., the word ‘insulting’ discussed in Brutus v. Cozens19), whether it is to argue that the legal meaning need not depend on the ordinary meaning or to insist instead that other things remaining equal the legal meaning should be interpreted primarily according to the ordinary meaning (known as the ordinary meaning principle or plain meaning rule).20 I wish to invoke some- thing like this ubiquitous distinction within legal interpretation here; albeit, perhaps unordinarily, I am interested in a term (‘hate speech’) whose ordinary meaning has arguably developed in the light of, and certainly after, the birth of the legal meaning. How does one get at the ordinary meaning? Justice Scalia once wrote about the idea of ordinary meaning in legal interpretation that ‘the acid test of whether a word can reasonably bear a particular meaning is whether you could use the word in that sense at a cocktail party without having people look at you funny.’21 I suspect that in the late 1980s and early 1990s the only cocktail parties in which the term ‘hate speech’ could have been used without people being looked at funny would have been those attended by legal scholars. But things are different now, the term ‘hate speech’ has entered into the fields of politics, popular culture, the arts, sport, media, education, science, and many more besides. So the cocktail party test must involve a party with the most diverse set of guests imaginable. Of course, the guests will also include legislators and 19 [1973] AC 854. 20 See Brian G. Slocum, Ordinary Meaning A Theory of the Most Fundamental Principle of Legal Inter- pretation (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2015). 21 Johnson v. United States 529 U.S. 694 (2000), Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion. WHAT IS HATE SPEECH? 429 legal professionals, since they are not merely influenced by ordinary meanings but will inevitably influence ordinary meanings by adopting and promulgating certain legal meanings. At any rate, the basic idea of the cocktail party is that ordinary meaning has some- thing to do with linguistic intuitions, part of the stock-in-trade of analytical philosophers. I shall say more about this and other aspects of my methodology in Section II. In saying that more needs to be done to excavate the ordinary concept hate speech – so as to augment and, if necessary, offset the work that has already been done on the legal concept hate speech – I am advocating a new research agenda, to be pursued from a variety of academic disciplines across the arts, humanities, and social sci- ences. All too frequently when academics from other disciplines have turned their attention to the topic they have followed legal scholars in focusing on the legal concept hate speech. For example, as I have already mentioned, over the past twenty-five years or so a number of generalist philosophers have attributed meanings to the term ‘hate speech’,22 but more often than not these philosophers have not strayed very far from that which is prohibited by campus hate speech codes, certain types of municipal ordinances, and incitement to hatred laws. What is particularly striking to me about the philosophical liter- ature is the extent to which it echoes the work of legal scholars. I mention five notable overlaps. First, when legal scholars working in the field of critical race theory identified hate speech with various ways of subordinating, wounding, humiliating, or degrading histor- ically oppressed or victimised racial groups,23 arguably they laid the groundwork for those philosophers who would later utilise speech act theory to understand hate speech,24 albeit these critical race theorists and these philosophers of language were themselves influenced by the work of Catharine MacKinnon and Andrea 22 See note 7 above. 23 See, e.g., Matsuda, ‘Public Response to Racist Speech’, pp. 2358, 2363; Charles Lawrence III, ‘Cross Burning and the Sound of Silence: Anti-Subordination Theory and the First Amendment’, Villanova Law Review 37 (1992): 787–804, p. 792; Lawrence et al., ‘Introduction’, p. 1. 24 See, e.g., Altman, ‘Liberalism and Campus Hate Speech’, pp. 309–310; Langton, ‘Beyond Belief’, pp. 74–77; Langton et al., ‘Language and Race’, pp. 757–760; Ishani Maitra, ‘Subordinating Speech’, in I. Maitra and M. McGowan (eds.) Speech and Harm: Controversies Over Free Speech (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 96–118; Mary Kate McGowan, ‘On ‘Whites Only’ Signs and Racist Hate Speech: Verbal Acts of Racial Discrimination’, in I. Maitra and M. McGowan (eds.) Speech and Harm: Controversies Over Free Speech (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 122; Brown, Hate Speech Law, pp. 75–86. ALEXANDER BROWN430 Dworkin, who originally identified pornography as subordinating speech in the context of proposing anti-pornography laws.25 Second, the legal scholar Kent Greenawalt analyses the term ‘hate speech’ by appealing to the legal doctrines of fighting words, hostile environ- ment harassment, and group libel,26 and much the same character- isation can be found in the work of the philosophers Susan Brison and Timothy C. Shiell.27 Third, several legal scholars have drawn distinctions between immediate, instant, face-to-face, targeted, and individualised hate speech, on the one hand, and indirect, diffuse, generalised, and impersonal hate speech, on the other hand,28 and these same distinctions are replicated by the philosopher Caleb Yong.29 Fourth, numerous legal scholars have implied that emotions, feelings, or attitudes of hate or hatred are part of the essential nature of hate speech and what distinguishes such speech from other kinds of speech and that the meaning of the term ‘hate speech’ is com- positional, that is, a function of the literal meanings of the terms ‘hate’ and ‘speech’,30 and similar assumptions can be found in the work of some philosophers, notably Norman Fischer and Bhikhu Parekh.31 Finally, scholars of hate speech law often proceed on the assumption that the term ‘hate speech’ is univocal and definable (it 25 See, e.g., Catharine MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); Catharine MacKinnon, Only Words (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993); Catharine MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin (eds.) In Harm’s Way: The Pornography Civil Rights Hearings (Cam- bridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997). 26 Kent Greenawalt, Fighting Words: Individuals, Communities and Liberties of Speech (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), chs. 4 and 5. 27 Brison, ‘The Autonomy Defense of Free Speech’, p. 314; Timothy C. Shiell, Campus Hate Speech on Trial, 2nd Edn (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 2009), p. 162. 28 See, e.g., Alan E. Brownstein, ‘Hate Speech and Harassment: The Constitutionality of Campus Codes that Prohibit Racial Insults’, William and Mary Bill of Rights Journal 3 (1994): 179–217, p. 179; Greenawalt, Fighting Words, p. 63; Nicholas Wolfson, Hate Speech, Sex Speech, Free Speech (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1997), p. 60; Steven H. Shiffrin, Dissent, Injustice, and the Meanings of America. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), pp. 76–77; Thomas Peard, ‘Regulating Racist Speech on Campus’, in C. Sistare (ed.) Civility and Its Discontents: Civic Virtue, Toleration, and Cultural Frag- mentation (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 2004), p. 142; Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic, ‘Four Observations About Hate Speech’, Wake Forest Law Review 44 (2009): 353–370, pp. 362–363; Heinze, Hate Speech and Democratic Citizenship, p. 282. 29 Yong, ‘Does Freedom of Speech Include Hate Speech?’, pp. 394–396. 30 See, e.g., Glasser, ‘Introduction’, p. 1; Garner, Black’s Law Dictionary, pp. 1407–1408; Nadine Strossen, ‘Incitement to Hatred: Should There Be a Limit?’, Southern Illinois University Law Journal 25 (2001): 243–279, p. 244; Corlett and Francescotti, ‘Foundations of a Theory of Hate Speech’, p. 1083; Post, ‘Hate Speech’, pp. 123–125; Weinstein and Hare, ‘General Introduction’, p. 4; Iginio Gagliardone et al., Mapping and Analysing Hate Speech Online: Opportunities and Challenges for Ethiopia (Oxford: University of Oxford Programme in Comparative Media and Law Policy, 2014), p. 9. 31 Fischer, ‘First Amendment Morality Versus Civility Morality’, pp. 161–162; Parekh, ‘Hate Speech’, p. 214. WHAT IS HATE SPEECH? 431 has a single meaning, even if complex or disjunctive, and this meaning can be defined),32 and some philosophers seem to labour under the same assumption.33 Associated with this particular assumption is a tendency to be oblivious to important differences between the writer’s proffered definition and those of other scholars, and even to differences between the writer’s own definitions from earlier to later work, as though the differences are inconsequential or that they along with all other writers are essentially defining the term in the same way only using slightly different language (lan- guage that can be used interchangeably). I find some of these overlaps and shared understandings among generalist philosophers and legal scholars entirely unproblematic. The first three overlaps, I think, are extremely plausible and perhaps illuminate something of the subtle interplay and reciprocal rela- tionship between the ordinary and legal concepts of hate speech. Nevertheless, in this article I do also want to challenge some of this received wisdom: specifically, the putative wisdom that emotions, feelings, or attitudes of hate or hatred are part of the essential nature of hate speech, what I call the myth of hate; and the conventional idea that the term ‘hate speech’ is univocal or has a single meaning, call this the myth of compositionality. Now I do not claim, nor should we believe anyone who did try to claim, that challenging this received wisdom is likely to be decisive in settling disputes about whether hate speech laws are warranted. These disputes are far too deep- rooted in our understanding of a range of values and principles to be easily resolved. But challenging this received wisdom could, I think, at least remove some of the obstacles to progress, such as if, say, one side of the debate is doing more reasoning than the other on the strength of false impressions about what hate speech is. I shall try to draw out these implications at the end of ‘Family Resemblances’. Before I begin, however, let me be clear that by focusing on concepts and words I do not mean to overlook the fact that what is at stake here are interpersonal phenomena that involve the inter- action of actual human beings and often very real harms. On the 32 See, e.g., Cohen-Almagor, The Scope of Tolerance, p. 153; Cohen-Almagor, ‘Holocaust Denial is a Form of Hate Speech’, p. 35; Cohen-Almagor, ‘Fighting Hate and Bigotry on the Internet’, pp. 1–2. 33 See, e.g., Altman, ‘Liberalism and Campus Hate Speech’, pp. 309–310; Brison, ‘The Autonomy Defense of Free Speech’, p. 313; Brison, ‘Hate Speech’, p. 2332; Brink, ‘Millian Principles, Freedom of Expression, and Hate Speech’, p. 119. ALEXANDER BROWN432 contrary, the point of focusing on concepts and terms is to gain access to or illuminate our understanding of the phenomena in question. In the words of Austin, ‘[w]hen we examine what we should say when, what words we should use in what situations, we are looking again not merely at words (or ‘meanings’, whatever they may be) but also at the realities we use the words to talk about: we are using a sharpened awareness of words to sharpen our perception of, though not as the final arbiter of, the phenomena.’34 The remainder of the first part of this article is structured as follows. Section II outlines existing attempts to characterise the legal concept hate speech and highlights some of the inconsistencies and contradic- tions in this existing body of characterisations. Section III examines the ordinary concept hate speech and assumes for the sake of argument that it is a compositional concept: that the meaning of the whole concept is a function of the meanings of the parts that make up the whole. Focusing on the assumption that emotions, feelings, or attitudes of hate or hatred are one basic building block of the ordinary concept hate speech, I proceed to argue that despite the existence of several possible connections between speech and hate or hatred none appear to cap- ture an essential feature or defining quality of hate speech. This in turn undermines the compositionality assumption. Section IV looks at two, more nuanced versions of the idea that the term ‘hate speech’ has compositional semantics: the first, that it is a semi- or quasi-compo- sitional term akin to ‘zebra crossing’ or ‘pillow talk’; the second that it is part of a set of core-dependent homonyms. Although these ap- proaches have some plausibility, I argue that they only serve to underline the speciousness of the myth of hate. II. THE LEGAL CONCEPT(S) HATE SPEECH In this section, I shall use the method of conceptual jurisprudence to analyse the legal concept(s) hate speech. This method involves explicating concepts that emerge from given bodies of law and legal practices. This includes looking at the way the term ‘hate speech’ has been defined in different human rights instruments, statutes, and legal cases, both positively (‘hate speech is…’) and negatively (‘hate speech is not…’). But it also includes an attempt to reconstruct the 34 J. L. Austin, ‘A Plea for Excuses: The Presidential Address’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 57 (1956–7): 1–30, p. 8. WHAT IS HATE SPEECH? 433 legal concept(s) hate speech from the occurrences and meanings of various linked or associated concept-terms that appear in the rele- vant bodies of law and legal practices – terms such as ‘group defamation’, ‘incitement to hatred’, ‘the circulation of ideas based on inferiority’, ‘racist propaganda’, ‘speech based on xenophobia, homophobia, Islamophobia, and anti-Semitism’, ‘group vilification’, ‘violation of dignity’, ‘discriminatory harassment’, ‘racist fighting words’, ‘Holocaust denial’, and so on. Part of the aim of conceptual jurisprudence is to capture the fundamental quality of the legal concept under investigation as well as something of its relationship to other legal concepts, principles and doctrines in the relevant bodies of law and legal practices. I start by observing that the original uses of the then neologism ‘hate speech’ belonged to legal academics and journalists writing in academic journals and books and mainstream newspapers and ma- gazines. They tended to use the term ‘hate speech’ for the purposes of classifying and make generalisations about a particular group of laws. For example, the Oxford English Dictionary entry for the term ‘hate speech’ offers only three illustrations of uses.35 The first comes from a Newsweek article from 1988 in which Tamar Jacoby uses the term ‘hate speech’ in discussing the merits of university regulations designed to curb discriminatory harassment on university campuses (campus speech codes).36 The second is from Samuel Walker’s 1994 book Hate Speech: The History of an American Controversy in which the historian contrasts the constitutional protection of ‘offensive forms of expression’ in the United States with the fact that ‘[a]lmost every [other] country prohibits hate speech directed at racial, religious, or ethnic groups’.37 The third is from an article appearing in Business Day, a national daily newspaper in South Africa, from 2001 outlining aspects of the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Dis- crimination Act 2000 which, amongst other things, prohibits hate speech.38 Yet the term ‘hate speech’ is certainly not the preserve of legal scholars. It is now being utilised in the decisions of some interna- 35 Oxford English Dictionary, ‘Hate Speech’, July 2002. Available at www.oed.com. 36 Tamar Jacoby, ‘Time to Outlaw Racial Slurs? New Questions About Protecting Hateful Speech’, Newsweek, June 6, 1988. 37 Walker, Hate Speech, p. 1. 38 Unkown, Business Day, January 28, 2001, p. 13. ALEXANDER BROWN434 http://www.oed.com tional human rights courts and in some domestic legislation. In Surek v. Turkey39 and Gündüz v. Turkey,40 for example, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) directly and explicitly employed a defi- nition of the term ‘hate speech’ that had been given by the Com- mittee of Ministers of the Council of Europe back in 1997: ‘the term ‘hate speech’ shall be understood as covering all forms of expression which spread, incite, promote or justify racial hatred, xenophobia, antisemitism or other forms of hatred based on intolerance […]’.41 In both cases the Court also reiterated that to count as hate speech it is not sufficient that the words merely offend, shock or disturb; they must be capable of inciting hatred or violence. Or, to give one example from domestic law, in South Africa s. 10 of the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 2000 out- lines a set of offences under the heading ‘Prohibition of Hate Speech’, including most notably s. 10(1)(c), ‘[…] no person may publish, propagate, advocate or communicate words based on one or more of the prohibited grounds, against any person, that could reasonably be construed to demonstrate a clear intention to: (a) be hurtful; (b) be harmful or to incite harm; (c) promote or propagate hatred.’ Likewise, s. 16(2) of the South African Bill of Rights specifies that the right to freedom of expression does not extend to ‘advocacy of hatred that is based on race, ethnicity, gender or religion, and that constitutes incitement to cause harm’. A variant of the current approach also assumes that hate speech is primarily a legal concept but does not limit the materials of analysis to explicit attempts to clarify the concept within international and domestic law. In other words, it seeks to analyse the legal concept(s) hate speech through bodies of law that may not contain the exact term ‘hate speech’. It does so by picking out certain similarities or common traits that could be interpreted as elements of the legal concept hate speech. How on this approach do we know which laws and legal cases are the correct ones to look at? The ECtHR’s Press Unit points in one useful direction. Its 2016 ‘Factsheet – Hate Speech’ does not attempt to lay down a universally accepted definition of the 39 No. 26682/95, Strasbourg, July 8, 1999. At para. 62, and Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Palm. 40 No. 35071/97, Strasbourg, June 14, 2004. At paras. 21–22, 40–1, 44, 48, 51, and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Türmen. 41 Recommendation No. R (97) 20, October 30, 1997, Appendix. Available at https://rm.coe.int/ CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=0900001680505d5b. WHAT IS HATE SPEECH? 435 https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=0900001680505d5b https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=0900001680505d5b term ‘hate speech’ but instead points to various conventions and a host of legal cases which in its view pertain to hate speech.42 Following this lead, progress could be made by searching laws and legal cases for words that are indicative of, contiguous with, or being used as proxies for the term ‘hate speech’ – for example, ‘hate’, ‘hatred’, ‘contempt’, ‘hostility’, ‘enmity’, ‘inferiority’, ‘racist propaganda’, ‘xenophobia’, ‘anti-Semitism’, ‘aggressive national- ism’, ‘homophobia’, ‘Islamophobia’, ‘antisemitism’, ‘group defamation’, ‘group vilification’, ‘insult’, ‘negative stereotyping’, ‘stigmatisation’, ‘humiliation’, ‘degradation’, ‘violation of dignity’, ‘discriminatory harassment’, ‘intolerance’. I shall not attempt here to provide a complete inventory of all clusters of laws that em- ploy or exhibit this terminology and that could be used as source material for an interpretation of the legal concept(s) hate speech.43 It is enough for my present purposes to indicate what this sort of approach looks like, and to outline some of the results it has yielded. A small army of legal scholars and lexicographers have set forth characterisations of hate speech using the aforementioned approach. These characterisations exhibit numerous points of consensus but are also marked by significant inconsistencies and contradictions. First, consider how they deal with the connection between hate speech and hate or hatred. Some characterisations take hate speech literally to mean speech that expresses or communicates emotions, feelings, or attitudes of hate or hatred,44 others imply that the motive of hatred is almost all there is to hate speech,45 and still others identify hate speech as that which promotes, incites, or stirs up hatred.46 Second, there is the issue of identifying which groups are covered by the legal concept hate speech. While most characterisations pro- 42 ECtHR Press Unit, Factsheet - Hate Speech, June, 2016. Available at www.echr.coe.int/ Documents/FS_Hate_speech_ENG.pdf. 43 Cf. Brown, Hate Speech Law, ch. 2. 44 See, e.g., Garner, Black’s Law Dictionary, pp. 1407–1408; Strossen, ‘Incitement to Hatred’, p. 244; Oxford English Dictionary, ‘Hate Speech’; Corlett and Francescotti, ‘Foundations of a Theory of Hate Speech’, p. 1083; Post, ‘Hate Speech’, p. 123; Weinstein and Hare, ‘General Introduction’, p. 4; USLegal.com, ‘Hate speech’, June 2010. Available at http://definitions.uslegal.com/h/hate-speech/. 45 See, e.g., Glasser, ‘Introduction’, p. 1. 46 See, e.g., Cohen-Almagor, The Scope of Tolerance, p. 11; Cohen-Almagor, ‘Holocaust Denial is a Form of Hate Speech’, p. 35; Weston-Scheuber, ‘Gender and the Prohibition of Hate Speech’, pp. 139– 140. ALEXANDER BROWN436 http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/FS_Hate_speech_ENG.pdf http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/FS_Hate_speech_ENG.pdf http://definitions.uslegal.com/h/hate-speech/ vide a list of group-identifying characteristics, including but not limited to race, ethnicity, religion, nationality, gender or gender identity, sexual orientation, disability,47 some specify not a list of characteristics but a single core feature – for example, that the speech in question is about or against historically oppressed or victimised groups.48 Some make no mention of the kinds of groups that are germane to the legal concept hate speech,49 which is surprising given that almost without exception all actual hate speech laws attempt to specify which groups fall within the scope of the law. Third, there is the question of the nature of the speech. Whereas some characterisations depict hate speech as a special case of insulting speech (i.e., insulting about or insulting to members of certain groups)50 or offensive speech (i.e., offensive about or offen- sive to members of certain groups),51 other characterisations describe hate speech as ‘hostile verbal abuse’,52 ‘malicious speech’,53 ‘speech that denigrates people’,54 ‘speech that puts people down’,55 or ‘an- tisocial oratory’.56 Moreover, only some characterisations stress that hate speech, properly called, typically causes or has a substantial likelihood of causing harm of one kind or another.57 Fourth, most characterisations make it clear that hate speech is not simply speech but is also performative or can involve speech acts of various types. Yet even here there are important differences. Some describe hate speech in such broad terms as to mean that a large 47 See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, ‘Hate Speech’ and Freedom of Expression: A Human Rights Watch Policy Paper (New York, NY: Fund for Free Expression, 1992), p. 1; Tsesis, Destructive Messages, p. 211, n. 1; Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic, Understanding Words That Wound (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2004), p. 11; Cohen-Almagor, ‘Fighting Hate and Bigotry on the Internet’, pp. 1–2; Bertoni and Rivera, ‘The American Convention on Human Rights’, p. 499. 48 See, e.g., Matsuda, ‘Public Response to Racist Speech’, p. 2357; Walker, Hate Speech, pp. 8–9; Cohen-Almagor, The Scope of Tolerance, p. 153. 49 See, e.g., Kermit L. Hall, ‘Hate Speech’, in K. L. Hall (ed.) The Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court of the United States, 2nd Edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 426. 50 See, e.g., Alexander, ‘Banning Hate’, p. 71; Larry Alexander, ‘Hate Speech’, in R. Newman (ed.) The Constitution and Its Amendments, Vol. 3 (New York, NY: Macmillan Reference, 1998), p. 14. 51 See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, ‘Hate Speech’ and Freedom of Expression, p. 1, n. 1; Sullivan and Gunther, Constitutional Law, p. 1131; Ivan Hare, ‘Hate speech’, in P. Cane and J. Conaghan (eds.) The New Oxford Companion to Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 520; Post, ‘Hate Speech’, p. 12. 52 Oxford English Dictionary, ‘Hate Speech’. 53 Cohen-Almagor, ‘Fighting Hate and Bigotry on the Internet’, p. 1. 54 Benesch, Dangerous Speech, p. 1. 55 Anthony Cortese, Opposing Hate Speech (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2006), p. 1. 56 Tsesis, Destructive Messages, p. 211, n. 1. 57 See, e.g., Richard Delgado, ‘Toward a Legal Realist View of the First Amendment’, Harvard Law Review 113 (2000): 778–802, pp. 787–788; Tsesis, Destructive Messages, p. 211, n. 1; Delgado and Stefancic, Understanding Words That Wound, ch. 1. WHAT IS HATE SPEECH? 437 number of potential speech acts might fall under the umbrella of this category – for instance, ‘speech attacks’,58 ‘verbal aggression’.59 Others define hate speech more narrowly in terms of specific or particular speech acts or disjunctive sets of speech acts – for example, offending or advocating hatred,60 insulting or defaming,61 disparag- ing,62 degrading,63 ambushing, terrorising, wounding, humiliating or degrading,64 harming or inciting discrimination or violence,65 or inciting persecution.66 As I have said, the main aim of this article is to say something on behalf of a broader approach that goes beyond just the legal concept hate speech. In order to motivate this, let me briefly note some limitations of the foregoing approach and its results. Aside from the internal inconsistencies and contradictions in the above characteri- sations, I find them at the same time too narrow (under-inclusive) and too broad (over-inclusive). Because many of the foregoing characterisations are anchored in a particular body of law and legal doctrine, such as an extreme free speech doctrine embraced by many American legal scholars and various United States Supreme Court Justices, or a slightly less extreme free speech doctrine embraced by legislatures and courts in some European countries who are to some extent influenced by these ways of thinking, they are also tethered to the narrow purposes and perspectives of these bodies of law and legal doctrines. An acute awareness of First Amendment protections of freedom of expression and a general presumption against speech prohibitions hangs like a shadow over these characterisations. Con- sequently, some of the characterisations tend toward highly restric- tive understandings of hate speech. The rationale behind narrowing the boundaries of the concept is this: if the legal concept hate speech is 58 See, e.g., Smolla, Free Speech in an Open Society, p. 152; Gould, Speak No Evil, p. 14. Cf. Anthony Lewis, Freedom for the Thought that We Hate (New York, NY: Basic Books, 2007), p. 157. 59 Terry A. Kinney, ‘Hate Speech and Ethnophaulisms’, The International Encyclopedia of Communi- cation (Blackwell Reference Online, 2008). Available at http://www.blackwellreference.com/ subscriber/uid=/tocnode?id=g9781405131995_chunk_g978140513199513_ss4-1. 60 Coliver, ‘Hate Speech Laws: Do They Work?’, p. 363. 61 Sumner, ‘Hate Crimes, Literature and Speech’, p. 142; Fraleigh and Tuman, Freedom of Expression in the Marketplace of Ideas, p. 139. 62 Nockleby, ‘Hate Speech’, p. 1277. 63 Kevin W. Saunders, Degradation: What the History of Obscenity Tells Us About Hate Speech (New York, NY: New York University Press, 2011), p. 132. 64 Lawrence et al., ‘Introduction’, p. 1. 65 Schauer, ‘Uncoupling Free Speech’, p. 1349. 66 Tsesis, Destructive Messages, p. 211, n. 1. ALEXANDER BROWN438 http://www.blackwellreference.com/subscriber/uid%3d/tocnode%3fid%3dg9781405131995_chunk_g978140513199513_ss4-1 http://www.blackwellreference.com/subscriber/uid%3d/tocnode%3fid%3dg9781405131995_chunk_g978140513199513_ss4-1 to be useful, it should only extend to forms of speech or expression that could conceivably be regulated under a constitutional regime committed to freedom of expression. But this leads to an unneces- sarily restrictive account of the ordinary concept hate speech, in my view. For example, some writers appear to suggest that something is hate speech if and only if it is incitement to hatred.67 Others have even toyed with the idea of restricting what may count as hate speech to speech that is addressed to a captive audience.68 These suggestions may be understandable given a particular vision of the function of the legal concept hate speech, but they are nevertheless both inaccurate and unhelpful as applied to the ordinary concept. The above characterisations are also too broad (over-inclusive) in the way they handle the connection between hate speech and hate or hatred. They embrace the myth of hate: the myth that in order for speech to qualify as hate speech, and to be appropriately called ‘hate speech’ by competent users of the term, the speech must be con- nected in some relevant way with emotions, feelings, or attitudes of hate or hatred, meaning intense or extreme dislike, aversion, loathing, antipathy, enmity or hostility toward or against something or someone, even an impulse to banish or obliterate that thing or person.69 According to Parekh, for example, the word ‘hate’ in ‘hate speech’ ‘implies hostility, rejection, a wish to harm or destroy, a desire to get the target group out of one’s way, a silent or vocal and a passive or active declaration of war against it’.70 And this account of the hate in hate speech certainly echoes seminal accounts of simple hatred in the philosophy of the emotions.71 Yet those who embrace the myth of hate do not allow conceptual space for the possibility that emotions, feelings, or attitudes of hate or hatred are merely contingently associated with, and non-essential to, hate speech as 67 See, e.g., Cohen-Almagor, The Scope of Tolerance, p. 11; Cohen-Almagor, ‘Holocaust Denial is a Form of Hate Speech’, p. 35; Waldron, ‘Dignity and Defamation’, p. 1601, n. 14. 68 See, e.g., Brink, ‘Millian Principles, Freedom of Expression, and Hate Speech’, p. 135. 69 See, e.g., Glasser, ‘Introduction’, p. 1; Garner, Black’s Law Dictionary, pp. 1407–1408; Strossen, ‘Incitement to Hatred’, p. 244; Corlett and Francescotti, ‘Foundations of a Theory of Hate Speech’, p. 1083; Fischer, ‘First Amendment Morality Versus Civility Morality’, pp. 161–162; Parekh, ‘Hate Speech’, p. 214; Post, ‘Hate Speech’, pp. 123–125; Weinstein and Hare, ‘General Introduction’, p. 4; Gagliardone et al., Mapping and Analysing Hate Speech Online, p. 9. 70 Parekh, ‘Hate Speech’, p. 214. 71 See, e.g., Jean Hampton, ‘Forgiveness, Resentment and Hatred’, in J. Murphy and J. G. Hampton (eds.) Forgiveness and Mercy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 60–61. WHAT IS HATE SPEECH? 439 properly understood. The truth is, however, that even though a good deal of hate speech is connected with emotions, feelings, or attitudes of hate or hatred, this is neither inevitable nor necessarily true of all instances of hate speech. For example, some instances of hate speech have nothing to do with hate or hatred, strictly speaking, but everything to do with emotions, feelings, or attitudes of con- tempt, disdain, scorn, condescension, or dismissiveness, which are matters of regarding something or someone as unworthy of one’s consideration or respect and of having an impulse or reason there- fore to withdraw from, avoid or shun that thing or person.72 In the cases I have in mind the hate speaker does not hate the objects of his speech precisely because he holds them in contempt and, therefore, in his mind, they are beneath a level of consideration or respect that would be required to feel something or have regard for them, be that hate or anything else.73 At least some speech, then, is plausibly counted as hate speech because it expresses or conveys the speaker’s feelings or emotions or attitudes of contempt for the objects of the speech as distinct from feelings or emotions or attitudes of hate or hatred.74 Note, I do not mean to suggest that hate speech is always con- nected with hate or contempt or both, and by ‘both’ I mean something like despisement (hating people because one has con- tempt for them). If that were true, then we could simply treat the word ‘hate’ in ‘hate speech’ as referring to hate or contempt or despisement as a disjunctive mental quality that we attribute to the motivations of all hate speakers, and/or something that all hate speech conveys or symbolises, and/or something that all hate speech is designed to produce in the audience (people the hate speaker is seeking to bring on side).75 But, in fact, hate speech can be associated 72 See, e.g., Michelle Mason, ‘Contempt as a Moral Attitude’, Ethics 113 (2003): 234–272; Kate Abramson, ‘A Sentimentalist’s Defense of Contempt, Shame, and Disdain’, in P. Goldie (ed.) The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); Macalester Bell, Hard Feelings: The Moral Psychology of Contempt (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). 73 I do not claim, however, that hatred and contempt are in themselves mutually exclusive. Cf. Arthur Schopenhauer, Essays and Aphorisms, trans. R. J. Hollingdale (London: Penguin Books, 1970), p. 170; Friedrich Nietzsche, ‘Epigrams and Interludes’, in Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future, trans. W. Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books, 1966), p. 92. 74 See also Robert Simpson, ‘Dignity, Harm, and Hate Speech’, Law and Philosophy 32: 701–728, pp. 701, n. 2, 702; Robin Jeshion, ‘Slurs, Dehumanization, and the Expression of Contempt’, in D. Sosa (ed.) Bad Words (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming). 75 See, e.g., Raphael Cohen-Almagor, ‘Hate and Racist Speech in the United States - A Critique’, Philosophy and Public Issues 6 (2016): 77–123, pp. 103–104. ALEXANDER BROWN440 with a wide range of different speaker motivations not exhausted by, and potentially not even including, hate or contempt or despisement, everything from fear or envy to the need to fit in or a simple desire for attention from others. It can also express or articulate a wide range of different speaker feelings or emotions or attitudes other than hate or contempt or despisement, such as anxiety, disgust or even a sense of alienation. And it can be intended to cause or bring about a wide range of different emotional affects or cognitive states in the audience even in the absence of hate or contempt or despisement, including, for instance, shock, excitement, pleasure, or even a sense of camaraderie. By the same token, however, I am not suggesting that the term ‘hate speech’ is a misnomer in the strict or strong sense. Some hate speech clearly is associated with hate or hatred. Nevertheless, what I am saying is that the term ‘hate speech’ is highly misleading if the implication is that hate speech is always associated with hate or hatred, and is still somewhat misleading even if the suggestion is that hate speech is normally or typically or in-all-but-outlier-cases asso- ciated with hate or hatred. Now I do think it would be inaccurate, and therefore unfair, to claim that all writers on hate speech fall into the trap of blindly accepting the myth of hate. It seems to me that Catharine MacKinnon, Timothy C. Shiell, Jeremy Waldron, and Martha C. Nussbaum come much closer to avoiding the myth of hate than most writers.76 Yet it also strikes me that philosophers should do more than merely beware the myth of hate, they should try to directly challenge it and if possible explode it; and that is precisely what I shall attempt in the next two sections. III. THE ORDINARY CONCEPT HATE SPEECH AS A COMPOSITIONAL CONCEPT? Let us begin with the idea that the ordinary concept hate speech might be a complex or compositional concept. To say that a concept 76 See Catharine MacKinnon, ‘Pornography as Defamation and Discrimination’, Boston University Law Review 71 (1991): 793–808, p. 808; Catharine MacKinnon, ‘Forward’, in I. Maitra and M. McGowan (eds.) Speech and Harm: Controversies Over Free Speech (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. xvi– xvii; Shiell, Campus Hate Speech on Trial, pp. 161–162; Waldron, ‘Dignity and Defamation’, pp. 1600– 1601; and Martha C. Nussbaum, ‘Haterz Gonna Hate? There Are Limits to What the Law Can do to Police Cyberabuse’, The Nation, November 5, 2014. WHAT IS HATE SPEECH? 441 is complex or compositional is to say that it is made from or com- posed of other, simpler concepts. These simpler concepts are more basic or more ordinary concepts in the sense that they include larger classes of things. Complex or compositional concepts are said to be amenable to a method of decompositional conceptual analysis: a process of breaking down the complex concept into its component parts. The standard example is the concept bachelor which is said to be made from or composed out of three more basic or more general concepts: (1) adult human, (2) unmarried, and (3) male. Decomposi- tional conceptual analysis is often used to produce precise defini- tions, the specification of a set of necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for the application of concepts or for the appropriate use of terms used to refer to concepts. That something falls under each of the more basic or more general concepts that compose the compositional concept is necessary and jointly sufficient for that thing to fall under the compositional concept. Thus, it might be said that something falls under the concept bachelor only if (1) it is an adult human, (2) it is unmarried, and (3) it is male. And that if something is (1) an adult human, (2) unmarried, and (3) male, then it is a bachelor. To apply this method to the ordinary concept hate speech is to attempt to break down this concept into its component or con- stituent parts, its more basic, simpler concepts and to use these concepts to produce a precise definition. If the ordinary concept hate speech is a compositional concept, how are its component parts to be identified? One way is to focus on the words that make up the term ‘hate speech’. In particular, one could work on the assumption that this term is not simply a compound noun in its grammatical or syntactical form77 but also a compound noun in its meaning or semantic content. In short, one could treat the meaning of the term ‘hate speech’ as being a function of the meanings of its constituent parts. Following on from this, one might suppose that in order to divine the meaning of the term ‘hate speech’ one simply understands the meanings of the two words ‘hate’ and ‘speech’ and links those 77 One interesting grammatical or syntactic feature of compound nouns is that it is possible to stack two or more nouns together or construct compound nouns recursively. So one can add together ‘fiction’ and ‘science’ to make ‘science fiction’ and then combine ‘writer’ and ‘science fiction’ to make ‘science fiction writer’. Similarly, one can add together ‘speech’ and ‘hate’ to make ‘hate speech’ and then combine ‘law’ and ‘hate speech’ to make ‘hate speech law’. ALEXANDER BROWN442 meanings to each other in some appropriate way.78 For example, one might suppose that the term ‘hate speech’ is a hyponym of the word ‘speech’. So just as the term ‘olive oil’ denotes a subcategory of oil, the term ‘hate speech’ denotes a subcategory of speech. What is more, it might be thought that the word ‘hate’ in ‘hate speech’ functions semantically to tell us something about the essential nature of the subcategory of speech in question, namely, that it involves or is intimately connected with emotions, feelings, or attitudes of hate or hatred. Indeed, the fact that the compound noun ‘political speech’ is semantically compositional (it denotes a subcategory of speech that is political in nature) may lead us to assume that the compound noun ‘hate speech’ adheres to the same principle. So far I have been assuming that the ordinary concept hate speech is composed of the two more basic concepts hate and speech. How- ever, on further reflection we might think that the concept hate speech is even more complex than the words ‘hate’ and ‘speech’ imply. Perhaps the concept hate speech is also composed of other concepts. One possibility is the concept group or class of persons. Most people would instinctively recognise as hate speech, I think, the slogan of the nineteenth century nativist, Denis Kearney: ‘To an American, death is preferable to life on a par with the Chinaman’.79 Part of the reason we would recognise this as hate speech is that it is about or against Chinese people. Similarly, few people nowadays would fail to understand that between the two insults, ‘Fuck you!’ (one white person to another white person in anger) and ‘Fuck you, nigger!’ (one white person to a black person in anger), the latter is more likely to have the label ‘hate speech’ attached to it. Of course, a racial insult, such as this, can be, and often is, targeted at or directly addressed to only one individual. But where the insult takes the form of a pejorative reference to the individual’s race, the individual may be no more than a representative of an entire group or class of persons in the mind of the hate speaker. If the addressee is inter- changeable, in that sense, then the hate speech is really about or against the entire group or class of persons. 78 See, e.g., David Boromisza-Habashi, Speaking Hatefully: Culture, Communication, and Political Action in Hungary (University Park, PA: Penn State University Press, 2013), pp. 35–36; Gagliardone et al., Mapping and Analysing Hate Speech Online, p. 9. 79 Cited in Elmer Sandmeyer, The Anti-Chinese Movement in California (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1973), p. 65. WHAT IS HATE SPEECH? 443 Things might not be so straightforward, however. When critical race theorists started to employ the term ‘hate speech’ they did so in relation to speech about or against not just any type of group or class of persons. They classified racist insults like, ‘Fuck you, nigger!’ (a white person to a black person in anger), as hate speech precisely because of the oppressive social relationships embodied and facili- tated by this sort of speech.80 Thus, Matsuda classifies as ‘hate speech’ a case in which a group of white workers place a noose in the work area of an African-American worker,81 whereas she inter- prets ‘an angry, hateful poem by a person from a historically sub- jugated group as a victim’s struggle for self-identity in response to racism’.82 Following this lead, some writers have analysed the con- cept hate speech as being partly composed of the concept historically oppressed or victimised groups or classes of persons.83 According to this analysis, if, taking into account other tell-tale signs (to be discussed in ‘Family Resemblances’), certain words or symbols are about or against members of a historically oppressed or victimised group, then this can lend credence to words or symbols being hate speech. Then again, more recent usage seems to permit a competent user to describe as ‘hate speech’ instances in which members of an op- pressed or victimised group lashes out verbally against members of an oppressive or victimising group – ‘Fuck you, white devil!’.84 This newer accepted usage may partly reflect a white backlash against the original use of the term ‘hate speech’ (to condemn what whites had to say about other racial or ethnic groups), but it is also likely to reflect the broader work that society as a whole now expects the term ‘hate speech’ to do – for example, to identify or flag up forms of speech that society as whole fears have the potential to be very socially divisive or destructive of social cohesion. I shall expand on some of the broader functions of the term ‘hate speech’ in ‘Family Resemblances’. Therefore, maybe the more basic concept here is groups or classes of persons identified by protected characteristics. 80 See, e.g., Matsuda, Matsuda, ‘Public Response to Racist Speech’, p. 2357. 81 Ibid., p. 2327. 82 Ibid., pp. 2361–2362. 83 See, e.g., Cohen-Almagor, The Scope of Tolerance, p. 153; David Boromisza-Habashi, ‘Hate speech’, The International Encyclopedia of Language and Social Interaction (Boston, MA: John Wiley and Sons, 2015), p. 715. 84 See, e.g., Greenawalt, Fighting Words, p. 164, n. 39. ALEXANDER BROWN444 But what are protected characteristics? Many writers seem to define this concept by simply enumerating a list of characteristics, statuses or identities that they take to be examples, such as race, ethnicity, religion, nationality, gender or gender identity, sexual orientation, and disability.85 But this cannot count as an adequate definition: first, because the lists proffered are not, and are not in- tended to be, exhaustive, merely illustrative or indicative; second, because it is rarely explained what feature or essential nature is shared by all of the characteristics listed. It might be tempting at this point to define the term ‘protected characteristics’ in a legalistic way, as characteristics that are legally protected. But this seems to create a status quo bias in favour of whatever characteristics are protected by current hate speech laws. It renders problematic statements of the following form: ‘Hate speech against group x isn’t currently, but ought to be, banned because x should be a protected characteristic.’ This statement appears meaningful, but if ‘hate speech’ means speech that picks out protected characteristic, and the statement is deliberately referring to a characteristic that is not currently pro- tected, then strictly speaking the statement is meaningless. An alternative is to define the term ‘protected characteristics’ as characteristics that ought to be legally protected. But this definition relies on a deeper account of the real or underlying function or purpose of hate speech law, that is, a justification of why we should have hate speech law in the first place. With such an account in hand we might then be in a position to explain why some things should be on the list of protected characteristics and why other things should not. A right-wing politician might choose to express in public that he sincerely hates communists, for example, but we might think it inappropriate to label this ‘hate speech’ given the real or underlying function of hate speech law. Identifying or flagging up speech that attacks people on grounds of their political or ideological beliefs is arguably not one of the important jobs or roles that we have hitherto assigned to or carved out for the legalised concept hate speech. 85 See, e.g., Brison, ‘The Autonomy Defense of Free Speech’, p. 313; Delgado and Stefancic, Un- derstanding Words That Wound, p. 11. For a discussion of the numerous characteristics that governments could potentially deem ‘protected’ for the purposes of hate speech law, see Alexander Brown, ‘The ‘Who?’ Question in the Hate Speech Debate: ‘Part 1’: Consistency, Practical, and Formal Approaches’, Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence 29 (2016): 275–320; and Alexander Brown, ‘The ‘Who?’ Question in the Hate Speech Debate: Part 2: Functional and Democratic Approaches’, Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence 30 (2017): 23–55. WHAT IS HATE SPEECH? 445 So let us assume for the sake of argument that the concept hate speech is composed of the following three more basic, simpler con- cepts: (1) speech or other expressive conduct, (2) groups or classes of persons identified by protected characteristics, and (3) emotions, feelings, or attitudes of hate or hatred. This permits an analysis of the ordinary concept hate speech in terms of three necessary conditions for something being an instance of the concept. Under this analysis, something is hate speech only if it (1) is speech or expressive con- duct, (2) concerns any members of groups or classes of persons identified by protected characteristics, and (3) involves or is inti- mately connected with emotions, feelings, or attitudes of hate or hatred. What is more, this set of necessary conditions itself consti- tutes a sufficient condition for something counting as hate speech. Thus, if something qualifies as (1), (2), and (3), then it is hate speech. Let us also assume for the sake of argument that this analysis can shed light on the meaning of the compound noun ‘hate speech’, whether it is understood syntactically as a noun–noun or as an adjective-noun, compound noun. In the remainder of this section, I want to focus on the third part of this conceptualisation: the basic concept emotions, feelings, or atti- tudes of hate or hatred as a building block of the putatively complex concept hate speech. As mentioned above, an assumption that is ex- plicit or implicit in the work of quite a number of writers on hate speech is that semantically the word ‘hate’ carries its ordinary or literal meaning: it denotes the presence of emotions, feelings, or attitudes of hate or hatred.86 The myth of hate certainly takes us some of the way to understanding condition (3) above, in the sense that it reminds us of the ordinary or literal meaning of ‘hate’. But it still leaves unanalysed the precise sense in which speech involves or is intimately connected with emotions, feelings, or attitudes of hate or hatred. In principle, I believe that this involvement or connection could take at least four possible forms.87 However, I shall try to show for each form that the connection between hate speech and emotions, feelings, or attitudes of hate or hatred is contingent. 86 See, e.g., Glasser, ‘Introduction’, p. 1; Garner, Black’s Law Dictionary, pp. 1407–1408; Strossen, ‘Incitement to Hatred’, p. 244; Corlett and Francescotti, ‘Foundations of a Theory of Hate Speech’, p. 1083; Fischer, ‘First Amendment Morality Versus Civility Morality’, pp. 161–162; Parekh, ‘Hate Speech’, p. 214; Post, ‘Hate Speech’, pp. 123–125; Weinstein and Hare, ‘General Introduction’, p. 4; Gagliardone et al., Mapping and Analysing Hate Speech Online, p. 9. 87 Boromisza-Habashi proffers three. See his Speaking Hatefully, pp. 35–36. ALEXANDER BROWN446 A. The Reaction of Hearers One possible connection between speech and hate concerns the reaction of hearers. Here the presence of hate speech is signposted by hatred as a reactive emotion, by the way that hearers, including not only the objects or targets of hate speech but also its audiences, feel about hate speech when they hear or learn about it. On this analysis, something is hate speech only if: (3a) it arouses reflexive hatred amongst a significant section of society directed toward the speech and perhaps also the speaker. In other words, the putative connection between speech and hate consists in the fact that a sig- nificant section of society hates certain forms of speech that are about or against groups or classes of persons identified by protected characteristics. This connection echoes one possible analysis of the related concept hateful speech. There are two main senses of the word ‘hateful’. In one sense, the word ‘hateful’ signals something about how the hearer regards the speech in question, as speech that is detestable, repugnant or despicable, so much so that it arouses emotions, feelings, or atti- tudes of hate or hatred in the hearer toward the speech and perhaps also the speaker, or deserves to arouse such hatred. In a second sense the word ‘hateful’ connotes something about the content of the speech itself, as speech that says something derogatory or deeply insulting about members of certain groups. I shall return to this second sense in ‘Family Resemblances’. Now sometimes when people call the word ‘nigger’ a ‘hateful expression’, or describe acts of burning crosses outside the homes of African American families or marching in Jewish neighbourhoods wearing replica Nazi uniforms and Swastika symbols as ‘hateful acts’, they have in mind the first sense of ‘hateful’. They mean that such words or expressive acts are so detestable that they either do or should arouse emotions, feelings, or attitudes of hatred in any fair-minded person.88 As a conceptual analysis of the term ‘hate speech’, however, the current connection has few serious advocates, Nadine Strossen being 88 Some writers use the words ‘hate speech’ and ‘hateful speech’ interchangeably, as though they are mere synonyms, and, what is more, fail to distinguish between different senses of ‘hateful’. See, e.g., Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic, Must We Defend Nazis? Hate Speech, Pornography, and The First Amendment (New York, NY: New York University Press, 1997), p. 128; Butler, Excitable Speech, p. 102; Ian Cram, ‘Hate Speech and Disabled People: Some Comparative Constitutional Thoughts’, in A. Lawson and C. Gooding (eds.) Disability Rights in Europe: From Theory to Practice (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2005), pp. 65–67; Heinze, Hate Speech and Democratic Citizenship, p. 19. WHAT IS HATE SPEECH? 447 an exception.89 This is for good reason. For one thing, there may be things that (1) are forms of speech, (2) are about or against members of groups or classes of persons identified by protected characteristics and (3a) arouse reflexive hatred amongst some significant section of society, but which nevertheless do not seem to fall under the ordi- nary concept hate speech. Suppose a controversial politician in a majority white racist society makes a speech arguing for the equal rights of blacks. Even if this speech satisfies conditions (1), (2) and (3a), it scarcely seems plausible to call it ‘hate speech’. On the other hand, there could be things that fail to (3a) arouse reflexive hatred amongst some significant section of society, but which nevertheless do seem to fall under the ordinary concept hate speech. Consider another politician in the majority white racist society who makes an extremely subtle, veiled speech about inherent differences between racial groups, one that fails to arouse emotions, feelings, or attitudes of hate or hatred against the speech. We might yet call this ‘hate speech’ even if people do not hate it. The point is that hearer reactions, including hate or hatred, are not always reliable guides to how we should use the term ‘hate speech’. What is more, in many countries or socio-legal communities hate speech is treated as regulatable speech. I shall say more about this in the ‘Family Resemblances’. But if we define hate speech as speech that audiences hate because of what it says about members of certain groups, then this would seem to undermine the legitimacy of the idea that hate speech is regulatable speech. This is because we tend to think the mere fact that an audience hates a form of speech is not in itself a legitimate reason to ban it.90 Now it might be objected at this point that to reject the present way of understanding the ordi- nary concept hate speech on the proposed grounds would be to once again allow the legal concept hate speech to cast a shadow over the analysis. In other words, because the legal concept hate speech es- chews any suggestion that hate speech is simply speech we hate be- cause of legal sensibilities over what is regulatable speech, this deters us from understanding the ordinary concept hate speech in those terms. But the main thrust of my arguments in these articles is not toward the conclusion that the legal and ordinary concepts must 89 Strossen, ‘Incitement to Hatred’, p. 244. 90 Cf. Richard Delgado and David Yun, ‘‘The Speech We Hate’: First Amendment Totalism, the ACLU, and the Principle of Dialogic Politics’, Arizona State Law Journal 27 (1995): 1281–1300. ALEXANDER BROWN448 always be kept apart and that appealing to any analyses of the former can only detract from or thwart good analyses of the latter. Rather, my point is that some aspects of the analysis of the legal concept hate speech may be unhelpful to understanding the ordinary concept hate speech. For example, to refuse to admit as examples of hate speech anything that would be protected from regulation under a relatively extreme free speech doctrine embraced by many American legal scholars and United States Supreme Court justices would be unhelpful, especially when the ordinary concept hate speech extends well beyond that doctrine. By contrast, to reject as a conception of hate speech the idea that hate speech is simply speech we hate because it would be inconsistent with virtually any free speech doctrine embraced by legal systems around the world would be appropriate. Clearly both the legal and the ordinary concepts hate speech will draw on, and be infused by, a shared body of general ideas about what is, and what is not, regulatable speech that can be found in the wider socio-legal context or cultural milieu. B. What Hate Speakers are Expressing A second possible explanation for the connection between speech and hate focuses on what hate speakers are expressing. On this analysis, something is hate speech only if: (3b) it expresses the emotions, feelings, or attitudes of hate or hatred of the speaker for any members of groups or classes of persons identified by protected characteristics.91 Another word for this sort of speech might be ‘hate- filled speech’ or ‘hate-laden speech’. It is speech that carries forth, articulates, symbolises or represents in some way the speaker’s emotions, feelings, or attitudes of hate or hatred toward the subject of the speech. An example of hate-laden speech in its explicit form might include an utterance that began, ‘I hate…’, as in ‘I hate those damn Jews!’. However, that a speaker chooses to use or not use the words ‘I hate…’ is not decisive. Most hate speakers are only too aware of hate speech laws or regulations and sometimes prefix their 91 See note 44 above. WHAT IS HATE SPEECH? 449 utterances with ‘I honestly don’t hate x, but…’ in an attempt (probably misguided) to insulate themselves from prosecution.92 Therefore, it is important to recognise that hate-laden speech can take implicit forms, such as when people express their hatred of certain groups in subtle, careful, tendentious, disguised or dissem- bling ways (without ever explicitly saying, ‘I hate…’). Once again, however, this analysis is flawed. For one thing, not everything that seems to fall under the concept hate speech is an expression, explicit or implicit, of emotions, feelings, or attitudes of hate or hatred toward members of groups or classes of persons identified by protected characteristics. Consider four examples. First, suppose a fundamentalist or evangelical Christian directs the fol- lowing words at people on a public street as they enter an LGBT social club, ‘You homosexuals and lesbians are sinners in the eyes of God, you disobey the teachings of the Bible, and for this reason you will go to hell if you do not repent.’ It is surely conceivable that this utterance could function not as an articulation or expression of emotions, feelings, or attitudes of hate or hatred but rather as an expression of deeply held religious beliefs or as some sort of religious exercise or rite of passage or even as an outpouring of feelings or sentiments of disgust or repulsion that have been learned from parents or community leaders. If (3b) is a necessary condition for hate speech, then this example is not hate speech. But either as a form of speech that carries the prejudiced (because contemptuous) message that homosexuals are morally inferior beings or as a speech act that amounts to ranking, degrading, harassing or persecuting 92 In March 2004, for example, the BNP’s Tony Collett made a speech at a public house in Keighley in which he allegedly stated ‘I honestly don’t hate asylum seekers – these people are cockroaches and they’re doing what cockroaches do because cockroaches can’t help what they do, they just do it, like cats meow and dogs bark’. Guardian Staff and Agencies, ‘Jury Hears of BNP’s ‘Multiracial Hell’ Speech’, The Guardian, November 3, 2006. If this was a strategy to avoid prosecution it reveals a certain ignorance of the law. Putting to one side the question of whether asylum seekers could be counted as a racial group, in the UK it is not against the law to express hatred for racial groups per se. Rather, it is against the law to stir up hatred against racial groups. ALEXANDER BROWN450 homosexuals, it might qualify as hate speech nevertheless.93 Second, suppose a scientist publishes his controversial findings concerning the relative intelligence of African Americans including the state- ment, ‘African Americans tend to have lower IQs than white Americans.’94 Again, it is quite possible that his statement is not an expression of any emotions, feelings, or attitudes of hate or hatred toward African Americans, conscious or unconscious. Instead, it could be merely the expression of a sincerely held scientific belief about the effect of both genes and environment on interracial dif- ferences in IQ, and about how IQ is a good indicator of interracial differences in such things as educational attainment, income, and reproductive and marriage choices. Because of this there may be an impulse not to count it as hate speech.95 Yet it is also perfectly intelligible for people, not only African Americans, to think that this is hate speech by virtue of the fact that in a very public way it 93 Of course, it is a further question whether or not this type of hate speech should be regulated all things considered given the countervailing right to freedom of religion. See, e.g., Albert Weale, ‘Freedom of Speech vs. Freedom of Religion’, in Free Speech: Report of a Seminar. Discussion Papers 2 (London: Commission for Racial Equality, 1990); Robert Wintemute, ‘Religion vs. Sexual Orientation: A Clash of Human Rights?’, Journal of Law and Equality 1 (2002): 125–154; Ian Leigh, ‘Hatred, Sexual Orientation, Free Speech and Religious Liberty’, Ecclesiastical Law Journal 10 (2008): 337–344; Ian Leigh, ‘Homophobic Speech, Equality Denial, and Religious Expression’, in I. Hare and J. Weinstein (eds.) (2009) Extreme Speech and Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); Carolyn Evans, ‘Religious Speech that Undermines Equality’, in I. Hare and J. Weinstein (eds.) (2009) Extreme Speech and Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); Ashby Jones, ‘Is Hateful Speech at a Military Funeral Protected by the First Amendment?’, Wall Street Journal, August 31, 2010; Jeffrey Shulman, ‘When is Religious Speech Outrageous? Snyder v. Phelps and the Limitations on Religious Advocacy’, Penn Statim 114 (2010): 13–18; Adelle Banks, ‘Is Phelps a role model on free speech issues?’, Christian Century 128 (2011): 18; Alon Harel, ‘Hate Speech and Comprehensive Forms of Life’, in M. Herz and P. Molnar (eds.) The Content and Context of Hate Speech: Rethinking Regulation and Responses (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Brown, Hate Speech Law, pp. 74–75, 93–94. In Canada, for example, the part of the criminal code that bans wilful promotion of hatred also contains exemptions or permissible defences against prosecution ‘if, in good faith, the person expressed or attempted to establish by an argument an opinion on a religious subject or an opinion based on a belief in a religious text’. See s. 319(3)(b) of the Criminal Code (as amended by An Act to Amend the Criminal Code (Hate Propaganda) of 2004). Similarly, some states in Australia have on the books legislation banning incitement to hatred which sets out exemptions for speech that has a religious purpose or is motivated by sincerely held religious beliefs. See ss. 11(b)(i) and 11(2) of the Racial and Religious Tolerance Act 2001 (the State of Victoria) and see s. 80G(1)(b)(i) and 80G(1)(b)(i) (as amended by s. 6 of Law No. 80 of 2004) (the State of Western Australia). In the UK, s. 29JA of the Public Order Act 1986 (as amended by s. 74 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act in 2008 and by Schedule 7 of the Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013) might be interpreted as implicitly giving special dispensation inter alia to religious hate speech concerning sexual conduct or practices and same-sex marriage. 94 This need not be a hypothetical example. The authors of The Bell Curve: Intelligence and Class Structure in American Life, for example, assert that the average IQ of African Americans is 85, Latinos 89, Whites 103, Asians 106, and Jews 113. Richard J. Herrnstein and Charles Murray, The Bell Curve: Intelligence and Class Structure in American Life (New York, NY: Free Press, 1994). 95 See, e.g., Mari Matsuda, ‘Commentary – Language as Violence v. Freedom of Expression: Canadian and American Perspectives on Group Defamation’, Buffalo Law Review 37 (1988–1989): 359– 364, p. 364. WHAT IS HATE SPEECH? 451 rehearses and supports, rather than challenges and confronts, a particular negative stereotype or social stigma about African Amer- icans as unintelligent or less intelligent than whites.96 Third, it is possible that some disablists could use the insults ‘retard’, ‘cripple’, and ‘freak’ in order to express their contempt or disdain for people with physical or mental disabilities, to express the fact that they look down on such people, believing them to be worthless or beneath consideration, without at the same time articulating, symbolising or representing emotions, feelings, or attitudes of hate or hatred toward such people.97 They may even think that hate or hatred would be wasted on ‘pitiable creatures’ whom they believe are less than fully human. But even if such uses of ‘retard’, ‘cripple’, and ‘freak’ express emotions, feelings, or attitudes of contempt as opposed to hate, it does seem perfectly meaningful to call these uses ‘hate speech’. Fourth, consider a group of married men talking together about their wives and women in general. Together they espouse a range of derogatory ideas and negative stereotypes about women (e.g., ‘a woman’s place is in the home’, ‘the man is in charge’, ‘women are no good at practical things around the house’), and at the same time they neither question these ideas nor offset them with more positive stereotypes.98 But just suppose for the sake of argument that the men do not in fact harbour any emotions, feelings, or attitudes of hate or hatred toward their wives, meaning they do not possess intense or extreme dislike of their wives and do not have any atti- tudes of enmity or hostility toward their wives and so do not regard them as people to be banished or destroyed. Nonetheless, we might instinctively think that this sort of sexist discourse can be appropri- ately classified as hate speech, perhaps because it expresses a certain type of disdain or condescension toward women or maybe because it 96 See, e.g., Bob Herbert, ‘In America; Throwing a Curve’, The New York Times, October 26, 1994. Once again, it is a further question whether or not this particular type of hate speech should be regulated all things considered. It might be argued that hate speech laws should include exemptions or permissible defences relating to scientific speech for fear of impeding scientific truth discovery, not because scientific speech can never be hate speech but because when push comes to shove not all hate speech should be banned. In some countries, such Australia and South Africa, there are certain laws banning hate speech that include exemptions or permissible defences for scientific speech. See s. 18D(b) of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Australia), s. 20C(2)(c) of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (New South Wales), s. 66(2)(c) of the Discrimination Act 1991 (Australian Capital Territory), and s. 12 of the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 2000 (South Africa). 97 Cf. Robin Jeshion, ‘Expressivism and the Offensiveness of Slurs’, Philosophical Perspectives 27 (2013): 231–259, p. 241. 98 Note, I have given an example of some men talking about women but the example is not intended to depict or stereotype all men. ALEXANDER BROWN452 serves to maintain forms of gender subordination (from which men benefit).99 Of course, a defender of the view that hate speech necessarily has something to do with expressing the speaker’s feelings or emotions or attitudes of hate or hatred, could simply deny that the above are genuine examples of hate speech. They might insist that as soon as we move beyond the relatively narrow and precise legal concept and begin to carve out the boundaries of an ordinary concept hate speech, we are in unchartered waters, so we must expect people to use the term in inconsistent or even chaotic ways, or perhaps to use the term in ways that merely serve political or ideological ends (‘I call this hate speech because this sort of speech offends me or contradicts what I believe’). And so (according to this response), the person who uses the term ‘hate speech’ to describe the above examples, even though the speech does not express hate or hatred, is simply confused or an incompetent user of the term, or perhaps is using the term in a deliberately subversive or provocative way. However, I think that this dismissal of the counter-examples is too quick. For one thing, if one is relying on the legal concept hate speech to provide some sort of guidance for the task of carving out an ordinary concept hate speech, then we must also pay attention to the fact that most legal regimes that actually do employ the term ‘hate speech’ do so in relation to incitement to hatred legislation, wherein the necessary mental element of the relevant offences tends to be intent, as opposed to the expression of emotions, feelings, or atti- tudes of hate or hatred. Moreover, if the current version of the myth of hate were true, then ordinary users of the term ‘hate speech’ would tend to look upon the following sort of statement as involving considerable confusion on the part of the speaker, as involving a contradiction in terms. ‘What the scientist said was hate speech; now I’m not suggesting that the speech was expressing any feelings or emotions or attitudes of hate or hatred, I strongly suspect it wasn’t, but it was hate speech nevertheless because of the way it negatively stereotyped people of colour.’ But it seems to me that most ordinary language users would, or could, find this sort of statement quite meaningful and not a contradiction in terms, regardless of whether they happened to agree or disagree with it. 99 See, e.g., Donna L. Lillian, ‘A Thorn By Any Other Name: Sexist Discourse as Hate Speech’, Discourse Society 18 (2007): 719–740, pp. 732–733. WHAT IS HATE SPEECH? 453 Furthermore, arguably carving out the boundaries of a new ordinary concept hate speech is partly a matter of trying to say something about what the term ‘hate speech’ ought to mean if it is to be useful or do any good. But arguably, conceptualising hate speech as the expression of hate or hatred may have the unwelcome effect of pathologising hate speech. To conceptualise hate speech as the act of people who harbour so much hatred or deep-seated ani- mosity toward members of certain groups that they cannot help themselves but express their hatred outwardly through speech, seems to imply that hate speech is abnormal or a symptom of mental pathology. Hate speech becomes the act of someone with obses- sional, paranoid, or irrational feelings or emotions or attitudes and uncontrollable impulses to express these things to other people. However, we might intuitively think that a great deal of actual hate speech is undertaken by non-pathological people – people who may not harbour hatred or deep-seated animosity toward others, and who, even if they do harbour such hatred, are perfectly capable of resisting outwardly expressing it through speech.100 There is another potential drawback. Consider once again the proposition that hate speech is a type of regulatable speech – a proposition that is perhaps a function of the connections between the ordinary and legal concepts hate speech. The current way of defining hate speech seems to be incompatible with this proposition. After all, if what makes something hate speech is that it expresses the speaker’s emotions, feelings, or attitudes of hate or hatred, then there is potential that any laws designed specifically to prohibit hate speech so defined would thereby also prohibit, by design, potentially important forms of self-expression and self-realisation. For example, it might be that one way of coming to know one’s own emotions, feelings, or attitudes is through expressing or articulating them in 100 I take inspiration here from any argument made by Barbara Perry about conceptualisations of the concept of hate crime that emphasise feelings of hatred. Barbara Perry, ‘A Crime by Any Other Name: The Semantics of ‘Hate’’, Journal of Hate Studies 4 (2005): 121–137, p. 124. ALEXANDER BROWN454 public.101 Not only that, one might also take the view that expressing hatred in public acts as a safety-valve, a way of letting off emotional steam, so to speak, as an alternative to acting out emotions, feelings, or attitudes of hate or hatred through acts of discrimination or violence.102 (Some scholars reject certain key premises of the safety- valve argument, of course,103 but let us just assume for now the argument is sound.) If so, then potentially any laws designed specifically to prohibit hate speech so defined would thereby also prohibit, by design, potentially important forms of letting off emo- tional steam. All of this might seem to suggest that hate speech is not regulatable speech after all. Therefore, if one is committed to the proposition that hate speech is regulatable speech, then one has reason to refrain from defining hate speech as the expression of hate or hatred. C. The Motivation of Hate Speakers A third possible connection between speech and hate has to do with the motivation of speakers for saying what they say. On the pro- posed analysis, something is hate speech only if: (3c) it is motivated by the speaker’s hatred for any members of groups or classes of persons identified by protected characteristics.104 We might call this ‘hate-fuelled speech’. This is speech that is motivated by the speak- er’s hatred of a given group of people, irrespective of whether or not it serves to express or represent that hatred. As in the case of hate- laden speech, hate-fuelled speech is identified by the state of mind or 101 See, e.g., Samuel P. Nelson, Beyond the First Amendment: The Politics of Free Speech and Pluralism (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005), p. 65. Cf. Brown, Hate Speech Law, pp. 120– 127. 102 See, e.g., Calvert Magruder, ‘Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts’, Harvard Law Review 49 (1936): 1033–1067, p. 1053; Thomas Emerson, ‘Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment’, Yale Law Journal 72 (1963): 877–956, pp. 884–885; Marjorie Heins, ‘Banning Words: A Comment on ‘Words That Wound’’, Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review 18 (1983): 585–592, p. 590. 103 See, e.g., Richard Delgado, ‘Words That Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-Calling’, Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review 17 (1982): 133–181, p. 140; Richard Del- gado and David Yun, ‘Pressure Valves and Bloodied Chickens: An Assessment of Four Paternalistic Arguments for Resisting Hate-Speech Regulation’, California Law Review 82 (1994): 871–892, pp. 878– 880; Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic, ‘Ten Arguments Against Hate-Speech Regulation: How Valid?’, Northern Kentucky Law Review 23 (1996): 475–490, pp. 477–479. 104 See note 45 above. WHAT IS HATE SPEECH? 455 the emotional state of the speaker. But whereas the expressive content of hate-laden speech directly represents or articulates the hatred of the speaker, hate-fuelled speech is a function of the motivation (hatred) of the speaker. On this analysis, the term ‘hate speech’ might be interpreted as an adjective-noun compound noun meaning speech that is motivated by hatred. The task of identifying actual examples of hate-fuelled speech is made difficult by a lack of reliable information about the speaker’s state of mind. In the absence of this information, we may be left drawing inferences from what was said, the circumstances in which it was said, and the personal history of the speaker. In other words, we infer that the speaker would simply not have said what he said about members of certain groups unless he possessed, even if unconsciously, emotions, feelings, or attitudes of hate or hatred for them. For example, some people take the view that in the context of the overwhelming weight of evidence that the Holocaust happened, Holocaust denial must be motivated by an implicit hatred of Jews – a hatred that leads or motivates Holocaust deniers to misread, mis- construe, ignore, overlook, twist, and distort the evidence.105 In other words, some people take the view that but for hatred of Jews, nobody would deny the Holocaust. If this is correct, then Holocaust denial is hate-fuelled speech. Such speech is motivated by hatred even if its expressive content does not directly represent or articulate that hatred. There are, once again, difficulties with this analysis in addition to problems of identifying actual examples. When something is iden- tified as hate speech by virtue of a particular mental element that is thought to be present in the motivational structure of the speaker, this opens up the possibility of things being conceptualised as hate speech even if they do not portray any of the normal or intuitive signs of being hate speech. Suppose a senior politician or superior judge in a racist society utters the words, ‘I hereby grant equal voting rights to blacks.’ But suppose his motivation for doing so is actually an extreme hatred of blacks. Suppose he believes that once blacks have the vote they will make such poor decisions that the country will descend quickly into bankruptcy and civil war, causing blacks 105 This view is articulated on the website of the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, for example. ‘Holocaust Denial and Distortion’, Available at www.ushmm.org/confront-antisemitism/ holocaust-denial-and-distortion. ALEXANDER BROWN456 http://www.ushmm.org/confront-antisemitism/holocaust-denial-and-distortion http://www.ushmm.org/confront-antisemitism/holocaust-denial-and-distortion tremendous hardship and suffering. So powerful is his hatred that he is prepared to cut off his nose to spite his face. His utterance satisfies conditions (1), (2) and (3c), but could we appropriately call it ‘hate speech’? Conversely, there may be forms of speech that we would intuitively want to say are examples of hate speech even if they are not motivated by hatred. Someone could choose to publicly insult or deride members of the Muslim community where she lives, for example, not out of any emotion or feeling or attitude of hate or hatred but out of a sense of fear or loss or alienation caused by the presence of any ‘foreigners’ in her community. Usage of what we instinctively want to label ‘hate speech’ might be driven by a range of motives which not merely have nothing to do with hatred per se but also have nothing intrinsically to do with the groups in question. Boredom, attention-seeking, pleasure in being controversial, or even something as mundane as economic self-interest – these are just some of the generic motives that may explain the behaviour of hate speakers in some circumstances. Con- sider the shopkeeper who makes false damaging statements of fact about Jews living in his area not because he hates Jews – in fact he greatly admires Jews – but because he sees Jewish-owned businesses as economic competitors and he wishes to steal their customers with the help of a smear campaign. In addition to this, there is the thought that hate speech is reg- ulatable speech. The potential disadvantage with defining hate speech as speech motivated by hate or hatred is that any laws that are designed to regulate hate speech so defined could be seen as, in effect, regulating people’s emotions, feelings, or attitudes. Yet many people instinctively believe that it is not the job of the state to regulate people’s inner or private world. The state should no more legislate emotions and feelings than it should legislate attitudes or thoughts, even if they involve hate or hatred. Indeed, it is partly because people believe a free society is one in which legislators should not have the prerogative to use laws for the purposes of thought control that people support the constitutional right to freedom of conscience. Thus, one danger with analysing the word ‘hate’ in ‘hate speech’ in the proposed way is, as Waldron points out, that it gives the clear impression ‘that the task of legislation that restricts hate speech is to try to change people’s attitudes or control WHAT IS HATE SPEECH? 457 their thoughts’.106 Of course, there are advocates of hate speech reg- ulations (not to mention hate crime or penalty-enhancement regula- tions) that have actively embraced this impression.107 Then again, there is surely also a case to be made that creating this impression severely weakens the claim that hate speech is a type of regulat- able speech. Indeed, because civil libertarians wrongly assume that the concept hate speech is really about the attempt to legislate thoughts, they argue that there is a slippery slope that begins with the prohibition of hate speech and ends with the prohibition of ‘hate thought’, a type of thought-crime in the Orwellian sense.108 So as well as linguistic reasons not to define ‘hate speech’ in terms of a motivation of hate or hatred, there may also be sound purpose-oriented reasons not to do so. More on such reasons in ‘Family Resemblances’. D. The Effects of Hate Speech A fourth possible connection between speech and hate highlights the emotions, feelings, or attitudes of hate or hatred that can be incited or stirred up by speech, whether by intention or by likelihood. According to Waldron, for example, ‘if ‘hatred’ is relevant at all, it is relevant (in many of the statutory formulations) as the purpose of the offending speech, not as its motivation’.109 On this analysis, something is hate speech only if: (3d) it incites hatred toward any members of groups or classes of persons identified by protected characteristics.110 Call this ‘hatred-inciting speech’ or ‘incitement to hatred’. Like the first connection outlined above, incitement to hatred involves the arousal of hatred in the audience or hearer. But whereas in the case of the first connection the hatred aroused re- bounds back toward the speech itself or the speaker, in the case of incitement to hatred the hatred is aroused or stirred up in the audience or hearer toward members of some other group or class of persons. To clarify, the supposed connection between speech and 106 Waldron, ‘Dignity and Defamation’, p. 1601. 107 See, e.g., Delgado, ‘Words That Wound’, pp. 148–149; Diana Tietjens Meyers, ‘Rights in Col- lision: A Non-Punitive, Compensatory Remedy for Abusive Speech’, Law and Philosophy 14 (1995): 203– 243, p. 233. 108 Joseph Fallon, ‘UK-USA: The British Character of America’, The Social Contract (2000–2001): 91– 95, pp. 94–95. 109 Waldron, ‘Dignity and Defamation’, p. 1601, n. 14. 110 See note 46 above. ALEXANDER BROWN458 hatred has to do with either the intended or likely effect of speech, meaning that we call something ‘incitement to hatred’ either when the speech is intended to cause emotions, feelings, or attitudes of hate or hatred or when emotions, feelings, or attitudes of hate or hatred are its likely effect even if the speaker does not set out to incite hatred but nevertheless does so through recklessness or neg- ligence. It goes without saying that the difference between inten- tional and negligent stirring up hatred may be important as far issues of moral blame and legal liability are concerned. Some legal regimes may choose to only criminalise intentional stirring up hatred. However, in the present discussion I am primarily interested in articulating the basic ways in which speech can be related to hate or hatred, as part of the project of defining what hate speech is as opposed to justifying how we ought to respond to it. And so I discuss the broad category the effects of hate speech, which includes intended as well as negligently created effects. It is more important to notice that something may count as incitement to hatred quite apart from whether or not the speaker is motivated by hatred or is using speech to express or articulate his or her own hatred. Consider ‘Muslims deserve only hatred’. This might be motivated by or express the speaker’s hatred, but not necessarily. One could imagine someone engaging in this sort of speech in order to create anti-Muslim feeling in his neighbourhood yet not because he hates Muslims but because he is lonely and wants to be accepted by people who would like him to stir up hatred against Muslims; not in a way that articulates his hatred of Muslims but in a way that symbolises his own self-loathing. A familiar problem confronts this line of analysis. A good deal of speech concerning members of groups or classes of persons identi- fied by protected characteristics might not be intended to incite hatred and might not actually incite hatred against them, but we might nevertheless think it appropriate to call it ‘hate speech’. Sup- pose a white student goes up to a black student on a university campus and addresses him as ‘nigger’, without irony and without playfulness or a misguided attempt at friendship. Nobody else is around. This is not intended to, nor does it, incite hatred against black students among other white students. But it is surely hate WHAT IS HATE SPEECH? 459 speech; and perhaps even a paradigmatic example of hate speech.111 Of course, it might be countered that in these sorts of cases the speech could be intended to stir up or have the effect of stirring up self-hatred among the objects of speech.112 But just because this can sometimes be the case it does not mean it is always the case. It is equally possible that the intended and achieved purpose is to intimidate the victim, to produce feelings of fear or insecurity, to put him or her off balance, or to change the calculation of whether it is worth going to college.113 And in that scenario surely it remains plausible to call this ‘hate speech’. Conversely, much political speech could have the likely effect of stirring up hatred against members of certain groups, but it is not always clear that this speech should count as hate speech. Consider, for example, comments made by the Labour politician, and then Leader of the House of Commons, Jack Straw MP, in an article entitled ‘I Want to Unveil My Views on an Important Issue’, pub- lished in the Lancashire Evening Telegraph in October 2006, concerning his experiences of talking to Muslim women in his constituency office whilst they are wearing a full veil. It was not the first time I had conducted an interview with someone in a full veil, but this particular encounter, though very polite and respectful on both sides, got me thinking. In part, this was because of the apparent incongruity between the signals which indicate common bonds — the entirely English accent, the couple’s education (wholly in the UK) — and the fact of the veil. Above all, it was because I felt uncomfortable about talking to someone ‘face-to-face’ who I could not see.114 Some people regarded the article as measured, reasonable, non- derogatory, balanced, informed, respectful in its tone, and thought- provoking. Nevertheless, the Socialist Worker reported that the comments led to a new wave of religious hatred against Muslims in the area.115 I do not know whether this report was accurate. But suppose it was. Suppose Straw’s comments unconsciously reinforced the stigmatising assumption that being veiled means being silenced, unwittingly normalised negative stereotypes about Muslim practices 111 See, e.g., Matsuda, ‘Public Response to Racist Speech’. 112 Ibid., p. 2336, n. 84. 113 Ibid. 114 Jack Straw, ‘I Want to Unveil My Views on an Important Issue’, Lancashire Evening Telegraph, October 5, 2006. 115 Charlie Kimber, ‘Jack Straw’s Veil Comments are Ammunition for Racists’, Socialist Worker 2022, October 14, 2006. ALEXANDER BROWN460 in general, implicitly assured people that it was acceptable to hate Muslims, even created new anti-Muslim hatred. What is more, suppose that Straw’s comments were always likely to have the effect of stirring up hatred in that part of England, because of existing predispositions to animosity and hostility between Muslim and non- Muslim communities. On the current conceptualisation, Straw’s comments were hate speech. But if our intuitions tell us something different, then we may question the veracity of the conceptualisa- tion. The main thrust of the argument so far has been to challenge the assumption that the best way to explain the meaning of the term ‘hate speech’ is compositionally, including by drawing on the literal meaning of the term ‘hate’ consisting of emotions, feelings, or atti- tudes. But let us now pause to ask this important question: where does the assumption that the word ‘hate’ in ‘hate speech’ carries its ordinary or literal meaning come from? Perhaps it comes from what we take to be the semantic constant across a range of other complex terms that include the word ‘hate’, such as ‘hate crime’, ‘hate inci- dent’, ‘hate stare’, ‘hate campaign’, ‘hate mail’, ‘hate group’, ‘hate literature’, ‘hate propaganda’, ‘hate movies’, ‘hate site’, ‘hate tweets’, ‘the politics of hate’, and ‘haters gonna hate’. But the basic problem is that not all compound terms that contain the word ‘hate’ are partly composed of the ordinary or literal meaning of ‘hate’. In other words, it would be wrong to simply assume that the word ‘hate’ functions semantically within the term ‘hate speech’ in the same way it does within other complex terms which also contain it. IV. THE ORDINARY CONCEPT HATE SPEECH AS A SEMI- OR QUASI- COMPOSITIONAL CONCEPT? Nevertheless, before we give up entirely on the compositional ap- proach, there are some alternative analyses of the term that need to be considered because they construe hate speech as having semi- or quasi-compositional semantics. According to these approaches, even if syntactically the term ‘hate speech’ is a compound noun, seman- tically its meaning is not a function of the literal meanings of the parts that make up the whole term, and understanding the literal meanings of the parts of the whole term may be an unreliable or even highly misleading pathway to understanding the meaning of WHAT IS HATE SPEECH? 461 the whole term. Nevertheless, the term ‘hate speech’ is semi- or quasi-compositional in some relevant way. One approach is to treat ‘hate speech’ as a partially transparent idiom whose meaning is not directly deducible from the literal meanings of the words ‘hate’ and ‘speech’, but whose meaning can be inferred in the sense that the words ‘hate’ and ‘speech’ provide a clue to the meaning of the idiom. One possibility is that the word ‘hate’ is operating as an attributional metaphor, meaning that the word ‘hate’ refers to something that possesses a quality that can also be attributed to the phenomena referred to by ‘hate speech’. The basic idea here is that the word ‘hate’ could operate in the term ‘hate speech’ akin to how the word ‘zebra’ operates in the term ‘zebra crossing’, namely, to attribute to crossings a quality that is possessed by zebras. The word ‘zebra’ does not carry its literal meaning into the term ‘zebra crossing’: namely, as a word that refers to species of African equids with distinctive black and white striped coats. But it does continue to denote one of the attributes or qualities possessed by zebras, that is, monochromatic stripiness. In other words, the word ‘zebra’ in ‘zebra crossing’ means like a zebra in at least one respect. The reference to this quality itself partially contributes or provides a clue to the figurative meaning of ‘zebra crossing’.116 In this way the attribute or quality of monochromatic stripiness is mapped from the base domain of zebras to the target domain of crossings. Just as the word ‘zebra’ does not contribute reference to African equids to the meaning of ‘zebra crossing’, so the word ‘hate’ does not contribute reference to hate or hatred to the meaning of ‘hate speech’. This is evidenced by the fact, as demonstrated in previous sections, that many instances of hate speech have nothing whatsoever to do with hate or hatred. Nevertheless, maybe the word ‘hate’ continues to denote at least one of the attributes or qualities of hate or hatred and the reference to this attribute or quality partially contributes or provides a clue to the meaning of the term ‘hate speech’. In other words, the word ‘hate’ in ‘hate speech’ means like hate in at least one of its attributes or qualities. 116 The figurative meaning of ‘zebra crossing’ is a crossing point for pedestrians marked with black and white stripes, which stands in contrast to its literal meanings, such as a spot where zebras traverse something, the phenomenon of zebras traversing something, or the act of travelling across zebras. Compare this with compound nouns that are more straightforwardly or transparently semantically compositional such as ‘pedestrian crossing’ and ‘hedgehog crossing’. ALEXANDER BROWN462 But which likeness or quality? Perhaps the word ‘hate’ refers to the attribute or quality of being an emotion or feeling or attitude and contributes this to the meaning of ‘hate speech’. Or maybe the word ‘hate’ refers more specifically to the quality of being a negative emotion or feeling or attitude. Or conceivably it refers to the quality of being mobilising or motivational for human action. Then again, is it really part of the meaning of the term ‘hate speech’ that the speech in question possesses one or more of the aforementioned qualities? I have my doubts. Even so, I shall not attempt to provide a definitive answer here, safe to say that in each case it would be necessary to show that the relevant quality makes an appearance, without fail, in all bona fide instances of hate speech, in the same way that the quality of monochromatic stripiness can be found in all genuine zebra crossings. A far more telling point, however, is that at most we can only think of the term ‘hate speech’ as semi- or quasi-compositional, but even here it would be wrong to assume that the word ‘hate’ carries with it reference to its most distinctive quality, hate or hatred, that is intense or extreme dislike, aversion, loathing, antipathy, enmity or hostility toward or against something or someone. So there is still no escaping the myth of hate even under the proposed analysis. Alternatively, maybe the term ‘hate speech’ is a relational meta- phor, meaning that it conveys at least one relational structure that is common to both feelings or emotions or attitudes of hate or hatred and to the speech in question. In the case of ‘pillow talk’, for example, the contribution made by the word ‘pillow’ is not to refer to qualities of pillows but to connote the idea that pillows stand in a certain relation to beds, namely, they are typically found on them, which is the same relation in which pillow talk stands to beds, it happens on or in beds. Perhaps the contribution made by the word ‘hate’ is also to identify a relational structure that obtains in both hate and hate speech. In other words, the word ‘hate’ in ‘hate speech’ means analogous to hate in at least one of its relational structures. But which relation? This depends on the meaning of ‘hate’ of course, but one possibility is that hate or hatred is typically toward or against something or someone. And so the word ‘hate’ in ‘hate speech’ means toward or against something or someone analogous to how hate is toward or against something or someone. In its plain or literal sense the word ‘hate’ does not specify who or what is the object of WHAT IS HATE SPEECH? 463 hate. But perhaps when it is used in combination with ‘speech’ or ‘crime’, for example, the word ‘hate’ does not convey its plain or literal sense but means something more specific. As Cortese points out, ‘[s]ince the mid-1980s, ‘hate’ began to be used in a much more restricted sense to characterize an individual’s negative beliefs and especially feelings about the members of some other category of people based on their ethnicity, race, gender, sexual orientation, religion, age, or physical or mental disability.’117 This usage persists in current work on hate speech and hate crimes. For example, in her latest article covering these issues Matsuda talks about hate as though it were a target-specific concept.118 Or, to take another example, in her recent book on hate crimes on the Internet, Danielle Keats Citron defines ‘hate’ as saying something negative about or doing something negative to protected groups.119 What this suggests is that the word ‘hate’ can itself have different meanings depending on the context. Its core or standard meaning is intense or extreme dislike, aversion, loathing, antipathy, enmity or hostility toward or against something or someone. And this is the meaning it portrays in the term ‘hate mail’ and the slogan ‘haters gonna hate’. But in more spe- cialised contexts, such as in the terms ‘hate speech’ and ‘hate crime’, the word ‘hate’ can mean simply against members of groups or classes of persons identified by protected characteristics. This underscores why, under this analysis, the term ‘hate speech’ lacks pure compositional semantics: one cannot deduce the meaning from the literal meaning of the words involved because the term ‘hate’ itself has a figurative or metaphorical meaning. The upshot is that on the current analysis the figurative or metaphorical meaning of ‘hate speech’ is speech that is toward or against members of groups or classes of persons identified by protected characteristics analogous to how hate is toward or against something or someone. Interestingly, in her study of child development and the inter- pretation of metaphors, Dedre Gentner found that children possess 117 Cortese, Opposing Hate Speech, p. 3. 118 Mari Matsuda, ‘Is Peacemaking Unpatriotic? The Function of Homophobia in the Discursive World’, Journal of Hate Studies 11 (2013–2014): 9–28, p. 19. 119 Danielle Keats Citron, Hate Crimes in Cyberspace (Harvard, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014), p. 16. ALEXANDER BROWN464 an early ability to understand metaphors based on shared object attributes (e.g., ‘the tire is like a shoe’, both are made of rubber) before they develop the ability to interpret metaphors based on shared relational structure (e.g., ‘the tire is a shoe’, they both provide a point of connection with the ground).120 Moreover, Gentner has found that adults not merely have an ability, which children lack, to understand relational metaphors but will actually prefer or favour relational metaphors over attributional metaphors in the sense that they will tend to focus primarily on relational commonalities in interpreting metaphors and will rate metaphors based on relational commonali- ties as more apt than metaphors based on attributional commonal- ities.121 Thus, if the term ‘hate speech’ really does connote certain attributional and relational metaphors, then we cannot expect chil- dren to have the ability to understand or interpreted ‘hate speech’ as a relational metaphor, whereas we can expect adults to prefer or favour an interpretation of ‘hate speech’ as a relational metaphor. One final approach worth considering treats the terms ‘hate speech’, ‘hate crime’, ‘hate mail’, ‘haters gonna hate’, and so forth, as what philosophers of language call core-dependent homonyms. The basic idea, due to Aristotle,122 is that even though a set of terms which share a common word can have different meanings, under- standing their meanings ultimately depends on understanding the core meaning of one of their number, a core meaning on which they are all strongly dependent, whereas understanding the core meaning of the relevant foundational term does not depend on understanding the meanings of the other terms, so there is asymmetry.123 Take, for example, the terms ‘healthy body’, meaning in good physical condition, ‘health supplements’, meaning substances designed to provide nutrients that may otherwise not be consumed in sufficient quantities in a normal diet, and ‘healthy urine’, meaning urine that is the colour of pale translucent yellow to gold. To say these terms are core-dependent 120 Dedre Gentner, ‘Metaphor as Structure Mapping: The Relational Shift’, Child Development 59 (1988): 47–59. 121 Ibid. 122 Aristotle, The Metaphysics, trans. H. Lawson-Tancred (London: Penguin, 1998), pp. 80–81 [1003a- b]. 123 Cf. Christopher Shields, Order in Multiplicity: Homonymy in the Philosophy of Aristotle (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), ch. 4. WHAT IS HATE SPEECH? 465 homonyms is to say that even though they mean different things, they each have a strong dependence on a single core meaning upon which they depend. Thus, it might be that the real meaning of the term ‘health supplements’ is something like substances designed to provide nutrients that may otherwise not be consumed in sufficient quan- tities in a normal diet and that preserve good physical condition. And the real meaning of the term ‘healthy urine’ is in fact urine that is the colour of pale translucent yellow to gold and that is an indicator of good physical condition. It is not hard to see how the compound terms ‘hate speech’ and ‘hate crime’ might be dependent upon, in some cases, the meaning of the term ‘hate’, namely, emotions, feelings, or attitudes of intense or extreme dislike, aversion, loathing, antipathy, enmity or hostility towards or against something or someone. Thus suppose for the sake of argument that ‘hate speech’ means, in some cases, negative speech against members of groups or classes of persons iden- tified by protected characteristics, and ‘hate crime’ means, in some cases, criminal acts against members of groups or classes of persons identified by protected characteristics. Perhaps we could say that in these cases the meanings of ‘hate speech’ and ‘hate crime’ depend on the meaning of ‘hate’ in the following strong ways. The term ‘hate speech’ means, in some cases, negative speech against members of groups or classes of persons identified by protected characteristics that expresses the speaker’s emotions, feelings, or attitudes of intense or extreme dislike, and so on. And we could say that the term ‘hate crime’ means, in some cases, criminal acts against members of groups or classes of persons identified by protected characteristics that are motivated by the perpetrator’s emotions, feelings, or attitudes of intense or extreme dislike, and so on. But this is by no means always the case, and may not even be typically the case or generally the case. As I have tried to show in this article, there are many instances of hate speech where this putative connection is not merely weak but non-existent. In other words, it is an open question whether the dependency that the putative meanings of the terms ‘hate speech’ and ‘hate crime’ have on the core meaning of the term ‘emotions, feelings, or attitudes of hate or hatred’ are sufficiently common across all meaningful uses of the terms ‘hate speech’ and ‘hate crime’ to sustain the idea that these are core-dependent ALEXANDER BROWN466 hyponyms. In other words, it is still possible that the terms ‘hate speech’ and ‘hate crime’ can be used in cases where no hate or hatred is involved, and where the meanings of these terms are not dependent on the literal meaning of ‘hate’. So long as this is the case we are obliged to take seriously my thesis about the myth of hate. Notwithstanding everything I have said so far about semantic compositionality and the myth of hate, thus far I have not sought to directly challenge another important assumption found in the liter- ature on hate speech. This is the assumption that the term ‘hate speech’ is univocal or has a single meaning. Why should we accept this assumption? What if the principal feature of the term ‘hate speech’ is that it has multiple meanings? How do we analyse it then? Of course, we could simply try to extend some of the approaches employed in this part. We might suppose, for instance, that the term ‘hate speech’ is doubly figurative or metaphorical; which is to say, the term ‘hate speech’ is systematically ambiguous between its attributional and relational metaphor.124 Nevertheless, once we are no longer bound by the assumption of univocality, we are free to utilise a range of forms of philosophical analysis to get at the semantic multiplicity of the term ‘hate speech’. In the second part of this two-part article, ‘Family Resemblances’, I try to defend this equivocal reading of the term ‘hate speech’ and to carry out four types of philosophical analysis that can shed some light on the full extent of the family of meanings associated with it. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Versions of this two-part article were presented at the UEA School of Law Seminar in 2013, the UEA School of Politics, Philosophy, Language and Communications Studies internal speaker series in 2016, and the American Philosophical Association (APA) Pacific Division conference in 2016. I am very grateful to all those who attended and provided excellent comments on those occasions. During the course of writing I also benefited immensely from input of ideas and corrections by Susan 124 Cf. Gentner, ‘Metaphor as Structure Mapping’. WHAT IS HATE SPEECH? 467 Brison, Eugen Fischer, Michael Frazer, Robin Jeshion, Eric Kaufmann, Mary Kate Mcgowan, Catherine Rowett, Adriana Sinclair, and Robert Simpson. Finally, I would like to thank the journal’s anonymous re- viewer for much positive support and numerous helpful suggestions. OPEN ACCESS This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons At- tribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/ by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made. School of Politics, Philosophy, Language and Communication Studies, University of East Anglia (UEA), Norwich Research Park, Norwich, NR4 7TJ, UK E-mail: alexander.c.brown@uea.ac.uk ALEXANDER BROWN468 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ What is hate speech? Part 1: The Myth of Hate Abstract Introduction The Legal Concept(S) Hate Speech The Ordinary Concept Hate Speech as a Compositional Concept? The Reaction of Hearers What Hate Speakers are Expressing The Motivation of Hate Speakers The Effects of Hate Speech The Ordinary Concept Hate Speech as a Semi- or Quasi-Compositional Concept? Acknowledgments 
work_4azg7tekgndsrpbdlk5kly4ddm	----	Understanding the Needs of Female Veterans Understanding the Needs of Female Veterans Colonel (ret) Elspeth Cameron Ritchie, MD, MPH This commentary attempts to frame the article, “Safer Housing for Homeless Women Veterans,” in a wider context. It defines female veterans, homelessness, and military sexual trauma. This commentary also tackles a question that often confuses civilian providers regarding who has access to care at the Veterans Health Administration. It does not repeat in detail all of the recommendations in the article, but it advocates their broader use in shelters and transitional housing. Finally, I close with some thoughts about a new generation of young, homeless, female veterans who may have children and how to accommodate their needs. J Am Acad Psychiatry Law 47:307– 09, 2019. DOI:10.29158/JAAPL.003869-19 The article by Kim and colleagues1 is a valuable ad- dition to the literature on the importance of safe housing for the homeless, focusing on women veter- ans with PTSD related to sexual assault. In this com- mentary, I hope to provide additional context to help frame the paper on the basis of my experience. I write this commentary from the perspective of being both a retired Army psychiatrist and a female combat vet- eran. I am also a forensic psychiatrist and long-time AAPL member. I have written extensively on the topic of the health needs of female service members.2 In my last job, I worked with the homeless clinic of a Veterans Administration (VA) hospital. I currently practice psy- chiatry at a large hospital in Washington, DC, where many of our patients are homeless. I am using these skill sets to provide a framework to discuss the topics of female veterans, supported housing, and PTSD. Definitions Before I discuss the paper, it is worth defining and expanding on some of the terms and concepts used in the paper, including female veteran, homelessness and transitional and permanent supportive housing, and military sexual trauma. I will also discuss briefly who has access to VA services. Female Veterans In the United States, the term “veteran” is used to define someone who has served in the Armed Ser- vices. Generally, it refers to someone who is no lon- ger on active duty. The term “combat veteran” refers to someone who has served in a combat zone and may still be on active duty. Members of the National Guard and Reserve forces often transition back and forth from active duty to inactive status. For the last few decades, about 15 percent of the active-duty U.S. armed services have been female. Of those who deployed to the recent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, about 10 percent were female. The percent- age of total female veterans (i.e., no longer on active duty) is lower, but this figure is increasing as more recent service members come off active duty and be- come veterans. Homelessness Homelessness is a continuum. Some who call themselves homeless stay with friends and family, so called “couch surfing.” Others stay in shelters, some of which are sponsored by local governments, churches, or nonprofit organizations. Many live on the streets or in embankments, either in tents or sim- ply with a few blankets. There are definitions within the VA and other sys- tems that help govern access to services; the VA has a useful guide on its website.3 Although a full discussion is beyond the scope of this commentary, there is a Perma- nent Supportive Housing Resource Guide available on- line.4 Traditional steps in rehousing involve going from Published online August 8, 2019. Dr. Ritchie is Chair, Department of Psychiatry, Washington Hospital Center, Washington, DC. Address correspondence to: Elspeth Cam- eron Ritchie, MD, MPH, Department of Psychiatry, Washington Hospital Center, 110 Irving St., NW, East Bldg. 3105, Washington, DC 20010. E-mail: elspeth.c.ritchie@gunet.georgetown.edu. Disclosures of financial or other potential conflicts of interest: None. 307Volume 47, Number 3, 2019 C O M M E N T A R Y homelessness to shelter to transitional housing to per- manent housing. The VA Resource Guide advocates a housing-first model, going straight to permanent hous- ing with support services. Military Sexual Trauma Kim et al.1 begin by discussing homeless female vet- erans with a history of sexual assault while in the mili- tary, usually termed military sexual trauma. This term is defined by Congress and is important to obtaining ben- efits in the VA system. The definition used by the VA comes from federal law (38 U.S.C. § 1720D (2017)): “psychological trauma, which in the judgment of a VA mental health professional, resulted from a physical as- sault of a sexual nature, battery of a sexual nature, or sexual harassment which occurred while the veteran was serving on active duty, active duty for training, or inac- tive duty training.” Sexual harassment is further defined as “repeated, unsolicited verbal or physical contact of a sexual na- ture which is threatening in character.”5 Military sex- ual trauma can be a misleading term as it implies that the military service caused the sexual event. The as- sault may have nothing to do with military services, but simply may have occurred when the service member was on active duty. The trauma may have been rape by an acquaintance or stranger in an event totally unrelated to military duties. The results of one meta-analysis revealed that 15.7 percent of military personnel and veterans report military sexual trauma (3.9% of men, 38.4% of women) when the measure includes both harassment and assault.6 Generalizations There is a common generalization that should be addressed. There is an assumption that being a fe- male veteran who has been assaulted is synonymous with PTSD. Of course, reactions to such assault vary, and both male and female veterans may experience a range of psychiatric disorders, whether related to trauma or not, with depression and substance abuse being quite common. The homeless population also is likely to have se- vere mental illnesses, such as schizophrenia, along with comorbid substance abuse. Homeless individu- als, especially those living on the streets and in shel- ters, are highly exposed to all kinds of traumatic events. Therefore, although homelessness and veter- an’s status are often associated with PTSD, this asso- ciation should not be automatically assumed. Access to Health Care for Veterans The Veterans Health Administration (VHA) is only one of three parts of the VA. The other two parts are the Veterans Benefits Administration (VBA) and Veterans National Cemetery Administration. The rules of the VHA are the most relevant to this discussion. The policy governing access and priority to health care in the VHA are quite complex. A highly simplified version follows. Two years of active duty time are re- quired to be eligible for the VA. A service-connected health problem receives higher priority for health care and other benefits. If someone is discharged from the services with medical needs, generally those medical needs are addressed by the VHA.7 In the past, any dis- charge other than honorable precluded eligibility, but now emergency mental health care is available for such individuals.8 A diagnosis of military sexual trauma makes health care available for that specific diagnosis, even if the person served less than two years, did not receive an honorable discharge, or is otherwise not eli- gible for care through the VHA.5 Many veterans are also seen by practitioners who do not work for the VA. They may or may not be referred by the VA for services. Many have insurance via their school or employer. Thus, it is important for all providers to have at least a general knowledge of what the VA may offer their patients. In addition to health and other benefits, the VA offers some housing, rehabilitation, and job place- ment services. Eligibility for these is also dependent on the type of discharge. Ending homelessness is a priority for the VA, with considerable resources de- voted to housing and support services. Thus, it is generally much easier to get housing for a veteran in need than for the general population. Safe and Secure Housing The article by Kim and colleagues1 focuses on fe- male veterans with PTSD related to military sexual trauma in veteran housing. They comment on the challenges in both transitional and permanent sup- portive housing. The main thrust of the recommen- dations focuses on enhancing feelings of safety and security for female veterans. They include segregated spaces for females and adequate locks and lighted exits. Good communication and identification of staff with name badges are highlighted. These steps make perfect sense, but not just for female veterans; all of those who live in shelters and Commentary 308 The Journal of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law temporary housing have been exposed to numerous traumatic events. It is common for people who live on the streets to be beaten, robbed, sexually abused, or murdered, or to see those things happen to others. Sorting out the symptoms of schizophrenia, sub- stance abuse, and PTSD is often a daunting task. Several of the recommendations made by Kim and colleagues1 could be applied much more widely than just to female veterans. I would like to use their work as a platform to focus on the importance of safe hous- ing practices for ever-widening populations: all homeless women veterans, regardless of whether they have PTSD; all homeless women, regardless of whether they are veterans; and all homeless people, male, female, or non-binary (i.e., all genders). Female Veterans With Children I would like to expand on some challenges for female veterans with children. Depending on the study, female service members have slightly or significantly higher un- planned pregnancy rates than their civilian counter- parts.9 There are numerous factors involved, including, but not limited to, lack of available contraception, es- pecially when deployed, and lack of legal abortion in many countries where service members are assigned. The Armed Services are taking some steps to address the lack of available contraception. In many cases, the new mother is young and un- married, and she often finds that she cannot weather both the demands of the military and the demands of motherhood. So, she is discharged, either by her choosing or by not being able to meet the needs of the service. The young mother often hopes to return to school or to work, but the costs of childcare are prohibitive, and she cannot afford rent. She may start by couch surfing, but she eventually exhausts her family and friends and has no place to go. Traditional veterans housing caters to single males, often with single- room occupancy. To serve the needs of our female veterans, we need more apartment-style housing with room for small families. Many communities are recognizing this need and are moving in that direction. Conclusions Several recommendations in this excellent paper about safe and secure housing could be applied much more widely than just to female veterans. These safe housing practices should be extended to ever-widening populations: all homeless women vet- erans, regardless of whether they have PTSD; all homeless women, regardless of whether they are vet- erans; and all homeless people, male, female, or non- binary (i.e., all genders). The recommendations offered by Kim and col- leagues1 should be disseminated widely. Perhaps they could be turned into laminated flyers for the bulletin boards at every shelter and every transitional and per- manent supportive housing facility. There are recommendations here for the military and the VHA as well: they should ensure that con- traception is easily available, even in a deployed en- vironment. Both the VA and local communities should ensure that their services are safe and secure and, when needed, can accommodate children. The topic of trans women veterans also deserves more attention. A review of the literature does not reveal any existing information about the prevalence or characteristics of violence directed specifically to- ward trans veterans. We do know that trans women in general are often victims of hate crimes, so security efforts should be amplified for the trans population. References 1. Kim JC, Matto M, Kristen E: Safer housing for homeless women veterans. J Am Acad Psychiatry Law 47:299 –306, 2019 2. Ritchie EC, Naclerio A (editors): Women at War. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015 3. Application of the Homeless Definition to VA Homeless Programs. Available at: https://www.va.gov/homeless/ssvf/docs/education_ webinar_applyinghomelessdefinitiontovahomelessprograms_ 5242016.pdf. Accessed June 6, 2019 4. VA National Center for Homelessness Among Veterans: Perma- nent Supportive Housing Resource Guide, December 2015. Avail- able at: https://www.va.gov/homeless/nchav/docs/permanent%20 supportive%20housing%20resource%20guide%20-%20final. pdf. Accessed June 6, 2019 5. National Center for PTSD: Military sexual trauma. Available at: https://www.ptsd.va.gov/understand/types/sexual_trauma_ military.asp. Accessed June 6, 2019 6. Wilson LC: The prevalence of military sexual trauma: a meta- analysis. Trauma Violence Abuse 19:584 –97, 2018 7. Ritchie EC: The DoD and VA health care system overview, in Care of Military Service Members, Veterans, and their Families. Edited by Cozza SJ, Goldenberg MN, Ursano RJ. Washington DC: American Psychiatric Association Publishing, 2014 8. VA Office of Public and Intergovernmental Affairs: President Trump’s executive order supporting mental health care for transi- tioning service members now underway, May 31, 2018. Available at: https://www.va.gov/opa/pressrel/pressrelease.cfm?id�4064. Accessed June 6, 2019 9. Holt K, Grindlay K, Taskier M, Grossman D: Unintended preg- nancy and contraceptive use among women in the US military: a systematic literature review. Mil Med 176:1056 – 64, 2011 Ritchie 309Volume 47, Number 3, 2019 https://www.va.gov/homeless/ssvf/docs/education_webinar_applyinghomelessdefinitiontovahomelessprograms_5242016.pdf https://www.va.gov/homeless/ssvf/docs/education_webinar_applyinghomelessdefinitiontovahomelessprograms_5242016.pdf https://www.va.gov/homeless/ssvf/docs/education_webinar_applyinghomelessdefinitiontovahomelessprograms_5242016.pdf https://www.va.gov/homeless/nchav/docs/permanent%20supportive%20housing%20resource%20guide%20-%20final.pdf https://www.va.gov/homeless/nchav/docs/permanent%20supportive%20housing%20resource%20guide%20-%20final.pdf https://www.va.gov/homeless/nchav/docs/permanent%20supportive%20housing%20resource%20guide%20-%20final.pdf https://www.ptsd.va.gov/understand/types/sexual_trauma_military.asp https://www.ptsd.va.gov/understand/types/sexual_trauma_military.asp https://www.va.gov/opa/pressrel/pressrelease.cfm?id=4064 
work_4gpz4cxgc5ba7fwddy3x3dduae	----	113 UDK: 343.241-053.6 Рад примљен: 07.04.2015. Рад прихваћен: 24.04.2015. прегледни научни чланак * dusica@prafak.ni.ac.rs ** This article is a result of the research conducted within the project “The Protection of Human and Minority Rights within the European Legal Space” (No. 179046), which has been financially supported by the Ministry of Education, Science and Technological Development of the Republic of Serbia. Dušica Miladinović-Stefanović, LL.D.,* Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Niš JUVENILE PRISON: REMARKS ON THE SPECIFIC CHARACTERISTICS OF REGULAR SENTENCING** Abstract: The system of the juvenile criminal law in the Republic of Serbia includes different mechanisms of social response to juvenile delinquency, including corrective orders, corrective measures and juvenile prison. This paper deals with the issue of determining a relevant sentence for juvenile offenders in trial proceedings. The legislator has provided a number of guidelines for these proceedings: the specific range of the juvenile prison sentence, the purpose of punishment, the degree of maturity of a juvenile offender, the time needed for his/her educational and vocational training, and all relevant circumstances envisaged in Article 54 of the Criminal Code. The previous statement reveals the focal points of examination and structu- ral organization in this article, whose purpose is twofold: first, to explain the effect of the subject-specific legal provisions (aggravating and mitigating circumstances) envisaged in the Act on Juvenile Criminal Offenders and Protection of Juveniles in Criminal Law and, second, to establish how the general provisions from the Criminal Code are applied in this case, with special emphasis on their specific manifestations. Key words: juvenile prison, purpose of punishment, aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Зборник радова Правног факултета у Нишу | Број 69 | Година LIV | 2015 114 1. Introduction The formal social response to juvenile delinquency in Serbia has gone through different stages of development. In the first developmental stage, which covered a quite long period of time and featured a larger number of diverse sources, a minor was perceived as “an adult delinquent in a miniature form” (Perić, 1979:5); it implied the same penalties for both adults and minors, including possible limitations in terms of duration and prohibition of awarding certain penalties for minors. The second stage was characterised by a significant emphasis on and acknowledgement of the specific status of juvenile offenders; given their ongoing psycho-physical development and socialisation processes, the legislator focused on the corrective measures and envisaged the juvenile prison sentence as the only criminal sanction (punishment) for minors.1 The third stage is based on the Act on Juvenile Offenders and Protection of Juveniles in Criminal Law (hereinafter: the Juvenile Criminal Offenders Act (JCOA)2. The most prominent characteristics of this Act are the selection and codification of the substantive juvenile criminal law3, as well as the reception of the concept of restorative justice as a doctrinal basis for upholding the idea on the protection of minors’ rights and acting in their best interest. The aforementioned platform has led to introducing new mechanisms (such as corrective orders) which allow for the “diversification”, i.e. diversion of the criminal proceedings. On the other hand, the system has preserved the traditional mechanisms: corrective measures and the juvenile prison sentence. There are several idiosyncratic features that distinguish the juvenile prison sentence from the punishment of imprisonment awarded to adult criminal offenders; these are: the specific normative fra- mework; the specific requirements for sentencing and conditional release on parole; the exclusion of legal consequences of conviction by proscribing certain rights; restricting the circle of subjects who may be issued the information about prior convictions; specific statutes of limitations; and specific sentencing rules, which will be discussed further on in this paper (for more details about specific characteristics, see in: Jovašević, 2011: 431). The basic sentencing rule (Article 30, JCOA) indicates an eclectic approach to the subject matter; apart from the observance of the specific legislative framework, the specific purpose of punishment, the degree of juveniles’ maturity and the time needed for the 1 It is valid from the moment of the entry into force of the Law on Amendments and Additions to the Criminal Code of FPRY, the Official Gazette of FPRY, No. 30/59. 2 The Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, No. 85/05. 3 Apart from being in line with contemporary tendencies in this area, this process may be justified by the fact that many criminal law principles and institutes are either inapplicable in the area of juvenile criminal law or insubstantial; therefore, it could also be viewed as a quasi- or para-criminal law (Stojanović, 2012: 338-339). Д. Миладиновић-Стефановић | стр. 113-131 115 educational and vocational training, this provision obliges the court to evalu- ate all relevant circumstances envisaged in Article 54 of the Criminal Code.4 This statement reveals the central themes and structural organisation of this article, whose aim is twofold: first, to explain the effect of specific provisions from the Juvenile Criminal Offenders Act (JCOA) and, second, to establish how the general provisions from the Serbian Criminal Code are applied in this case, with emphasis on their specific manifestations. 2. Remarks on the penal framework and purpose of juvenile prison The first guiding principle in the process of sentencing is the scope of juvenile prison sentence, generally ranging from the minimum sentence of six months to the maximum sentence of five years, except in those cases where a minor stands trial for a criminal act which is punishable by a 20-year term of imprisonment or more, or in case of a concurrent commission of at least two criminal acts which are punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding 10 years, when the general maximum is reduced to ten years (Article 29, JCOA). In comparison with the former legal solution, this legal provision sustained a significant change; it has been drastically narrowed given that the formerly prescribed minimum sentence was one year and the maximum sentence was ten years. Thus, the court’s room for manoeuvre was practically cut down by half. It ultimately yi- elded negative reactions of some theorists, legal practitioners, prosecutors and judges specializing in juvenile crime (Ignjatović, 2004: 544), who raised a series of objections. The first contested issue was the impossibility of adjusting the punishment to the merits of a specific case, particularly in cases where the court estimates that a five-year term of imprisonment is not an adequate response to the commission of a serious juvenile crime which does not meet the criteria for reducing the penalty to the maximum 10-year term of imprisonment. The minimum term of imprisonment was also disputed; apart from the common objections on short-term imprisonment, the opponents particularly focused on the short period of time for organising and conducting an effective treatment which would be beneficial for a juvenile offender. Briefly, the new legal provision was said to be “undermining the logic of a good penal system” (Ignjatović, 2004: 545), which is supposed to be flexible and adaptable to personal characteristics of different perpetrators and distinct circumstances in different criminal acts.5 4 The Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, No. 85/05, 88/05-corr., 107/05-corr., 72/09, 111/09, 121/12, 104/13 and 108/14. 5 This was the reason to embark on preparing a Draft Act to amend and supplement the Juvenile Criminal Offenders Act, which proposed that the lower general maximum of 5 years’ imprisonment should be increased to 7 years’ imprisonment. As for criminal offences punishable by a 15-year term of imprisonment (instead of the current twenty) or more, Зборник радова Правног факултета у Нишу | Број 69 | Година LIV | 2015 116 There are reasonable grounds to challenge the empirical foundation of the new framework and examine its justifiability in correlation to the scope, structure and dynamics of juvenile crime. Does the legal practice reflect any significant changes in these indicators, which may eventually justify the idea on the need to institute less repressive measures? The statistical data from 1999 to 2005 indicate some stagnation in the total number of registered, charged and con- victed minors, which is contrary to (rather frequent) arbitrary estimates on the permanent rise of this form of social pathology; concurrently, the data include a remark on the notable increase of the number of juvenile delinquents in the total population of juveniles, as well as a rise of criminal acts involving elements of violence (Ilić, 2007: 298). The last two pieces of information are not in the least encouraging and they should not be overshadowed by the initial observation on the mild stagnation in juvenile crime. On the other hand, it is worth noting that the social response in the given period was primarily based on correctional and educational measures rather than punishment; thus, the ratio between the imposed correctional measures and juvenile prison was 99.1% to 0.9%; yet, the scope of corrective measures applied in juvenile prison was still very low (3,7% ) as compared to the total total number of corrective measures (Ilić, 2007: 300). All this accounts for the fact that the response was based on awarding minimal penalties and using non-repressive mechanisms, primarily those of a non-in- stitutional character. A critical evaluation of the new framework of the juvenile prison sentence would be incomplete without an overview of comparative law. In this regard, special attention is given to the neighbouring countries, primarily the former Yugoslav republics, not only because of the similar social circumstances but also because the starting points in the development of their legal systems were similar to ours. The penal systems of Montenegro,6 the Republic of Srpska,7 Croatia8 and Slovenia9 include the same minimum and maximum of juvenile prison penalties there was a proposal for imposing a 10-year term of imprisonment (Milošević, 2008: 284). However, these changes have not been adopted to the present day. 6 Article 33, par. 1 of the Act on the Treatment of Juveniles in Criminal Proceedings, the Official Gazette of Montenegro, No. 64/11. The earlier legal solution prescribed a minimum of six months’ imprisonment and a maximum of eight to ten years (more in Jovašević, 2010: 148). 7 Article 51, par. 1 of the Act on Protection and Treatment of Children and Juveniles in Criminal Proceedings, the Official Gazette of the Republic of Srpska, No. 13/10. The tendency towards a less repressive social response is obvious in the legislation of the Republic of Srpska, given that the previous legal solution prescribed a range from one to ten years’ imprisonment (Babić, Marković, 2008: 508). 8 Article 25, par. 1 of the Juvenile Courts Act, the Official Gazette of the Republic of Croatia, No. 84/11, 143/12 and 148/13. 9 Cited according to Selinšek, 2007: 335. Д. Миладиновић-Стефановић | стр. 113-131 117 as ours, whereas the penal system of FYR Macedonia includes the range of one to ten years’ imprisonment.10 As for other countries, the German legal system (for example) includes the same penal framework as the one envisaged in Serbia.11 However, if the scope is viewed in relation to other provisions, it is clearly in line with the general tendency to make the response to juvenile crime less repressi- ve. This tendency is also present in many other legal provisions, including the sentencing rule that the imposed sentence shall include only full months and years,12 the new requirements for the application of parole,13 and others. Modelled on previous legal solutions, the new legislative act includes the rule which prescribes that a minor cannot be sentenced to a term of imprisonment longer than the specifically prescribed punishment for the given crime, but the court is not bound to apply the minimum term of imprisonment. This rule does not actually have any practical significance for all criminal acts whose specific minimum is the same as the general maximum of the juvenile prison sentence. However, if the minimum is higher, the court is obliged to step out of the penal framework which is prescribed for the given crime; it practically implies a mo- dification of the institute of mitigating the punishment, which can obviously be applied regardless of the conditions provided in the general criminal law. On the other hand, the fact that a minimum of less than six months is prescribed for a specific criminal act is also irrelevant given that the juvenile prison sentence cannot be awarded for less than six months. The second guiding principle of regular sentencing is the purpose of juvenile prison sentence. To a certain extent, it coincides with the purpose of corrective measures, particularly in the segment referring to the reintegration of juveniles in the social community (Article 10, par. 1, JCOA). The necessary assumptions for successful reintegration (as the final outcome) are the development and strengthening of a minor’s personal responsibility, as well as the correction and proper development of his/her personality, which are achieved by means of supervision, assistance and vocational training. Yet, irrespective of these 10 Article 44, par. 2 of the Juvenile Justice Act, the Official Gazette of the FYR of Macedonia, No. 87/07, 103/08, 161/08 and 145/10. 11 Article 18, Јugendgerichtsgesetz. For a detailed review of this decision in comparative law, see in Knežević, 2010:84 and in Radulović, 2010: 160-162. 12 This rule has replaced the earlier one where the sentence was expressed in full years and half a year. 13 There is a partial overlapping in the old and the new requirements. Therefore, a minor is required to have served one third of the sentence before being releases; the difference is that, under the former requirements, a minor could not have been released before the completion of one year; under the new requirements, a minor cannot be releases on parole before the completion of six months. Зборник радова Правног факултета у Нишу | Број 69 | Година LIV | 2015 118 specific features, it is still penalty whose purpose is supplemented with general prevention elements. Thus, the sentence and the execution of the awarded pe- nalty should exert an impact on other minors and deter them from committing criminal acts in the future (general prevention); on the other hand, it should also exert a stronger impact on a specific juvenile offender and deter him/her from further commission of crime (specific prevention). To sum up, we may conclude that juvenile prison sentence, just like other forms of punishment, features cer- tain retributive elements; however, it should be clearly noted that the purpose of juvenile prison sentence is primarily of correctional and educational nature. 3. Minors’ level of maturity and time needed for their educational and vocational training The minor’s level of maturity is the first specific circumstance which the court should take into account in the process of sentencing a minor to serve time in juvenile prison. It is a new term, given that earlier regulations referred to the level of mental development. In the domestic theory, there is no unique approach to the interpretation of this term. While some believe that it corresponds to the concept of sanity in the general criminal law, implying the minor’s ability to comprehend the significance of his/her acts and to control his/her actions (Perić, 2005: 85, Lazarević, Grubač, 2005: 54), others deny it stating that maturity as a circumstance relevant for sentencing a minor to juvenile prison represents the so-called general and not specific maturity (sanity) as the basis of culpability (in particular, Drakić, 2010: 52, although some authors can be indirectly connected to this attitude, see Radulović, 2010: 155).14 Qualifiers such as ‘general’ and ‘specific’ unambiguously indicate different scopes of these terms. Hence, general maturity refers to the personality as a whole, i.e. “to the level of development of organs and psychological functions of a concrete minor in relation to the social environment which surrounds him/her” (Drakić, 2010: 52, previously also Singer, 1992: 205). The second point of view seems to be more acceptable, especially on the basis of a systematic interpretation. Starting from the assumption of coherence of the criminal law system, the arising question is why the legislator would include the notion of sanity into the process of sentencing twice: first, through a circumstance of maturity and, then, through a circumstance of the degree of culpability (given that it is already its constituent part). Even assu- ming that maturity (perceived in the sense of juvenile sanity) is specific and different from the sanity of adults, there would still be no justification because, as such, it would surely be included in the notion of culpability, due to the lex 14 There is also a third group of theorists who only state the relevant circumstances, without engaging themselves into the problems of interpretation (Knežević, 2010: 88, Jovašević, 2010: 154, Škulić, 2011: 307). Д. Миладиновић-Стефановић | стр. 113-131 119 specialis principle. However, the issue that perhaps confuses legal experts does not confuse psychiatrists, who are called as experts to state their opinions on this matter. Therefore, forensic psychiatry particularly emphasizes that, in the case of older minors, the expert does not only express the opinion on a minor’s bio-psycho-social maturity but also evaluates the minor’s ability to understand the significance of his/her act and the ability to control his/her actions (Krstić, 1996: 166, Ćirić, 2013: 297, etc.), which clearly makes a distinction between (general) maturity and sanity. A direct consequence of the described concept of general maturity leads to the fact that maturity is not observed in relation to a given criminal act, nor is it evaluated on the basis of the actual time when the act was committed, but within the framework of the minor’s general behaviour and within a wider time interval. On the contrary, all theorists who claim that maturity and sanity are synonymous terms (which is a generally accepted atti- tude) insist on the fact that it is evaluated tempore criminis and in relation to the committed criminal offence (Perić, 2005: 85, Lazarević, Grubač, 2005: 54). As it seems more reasonable to observe the notion of maturity in its wider sense, the court should be warned about the possible risk of digression and generalisation. The evaluation of the smallest segments of one’s bio-psycho-social profile is unnecessary; therefore, all the facts that are unrelated to the evaluation of the purpose of punishment should not be of interest to the court. The second specific circumstance is the time needed for the educational and vocational training. As compared to the earlier formulation of this circumstan- ce, there is evidence of change, which is reflected in the exclusion of the term “re-education” (correctional education). Although the lack of linguistic finesse might lead someone to to believe that these terms as synonyms, this is not the case. The term “re-education” implies a necessary assumption of a lower or higher degree of negative, deeply rooted and unacceptable attitudes and habits; on the other hand, the term “education” is slightly more neutral and places less emphasis on the aforementioned assumption of stigmatisation. However, with or without the word “re-education”, this circumstance nevertheless underlines the specific preventive character of juvenile prison. To a certain extent, insisting on the duration of penalty only within the time period which is needed for the educational and vocational training of minors indirectly points to the criteria for the evaluation of the significance of the circumstances prescribed in Article 54 of the Criminal Code. Therefore, the top of the list includes the circumstances pertaining to a juvenile offender whose influence should be more dominant than the other factors.15 15 On the contrary, when it comes to adult perpetrators, the issue of greatest significance in the process of regular sentencing is the severity of violating or endangering the protected values (Lazarević, 2011: 258). Зборник радова Правног факултета у Нишу | Број 69 | Година LIV | 2015 120 4. Specific features of general mitigating and aggravating circumstances envisaged in the Criminal Code The list of mitigating and aggravating circumstances places the degree of cul- pability at the top. There are no separate, special rules in the Juvenile Criminal Offenders Act for the notion of culpability; therefore, it is assumed that the general rules from Article 22 of the Criminal Code are applied here too.16 This necessarily implies that a minor was sane, that he/she acted with intent or negligently, and that he/she was aware or that he/she was obliged to be aware or might have been aware of the illicit nature of the criminal act. Sanity, or ma- turity in its narrow sense, would imply a minor’s psychological capacity which enables him/her to grasp the significance of his/her act within a common causal sense, and to restrain the stimuli driving him/her to commit the criminal act. In psychological terms, it includes intellectual and emotional maturity and, in the case of sex crimes, it also includes psycho-sexual maturity (Hrnjica, 2003: 202- 207). Intent and negligence, together with the awareness of the illicit nature of an act, are also commonsense concepts. However, is it all that simple? Apparently not, as the legislator has proposed a high degree of culpability as a condition for imposing a juvenile prison sentence.17 Therefore, any form of psychological content which is incompatible with the high degree of culpability would never be included in the process of sentencing because its inclusion would automatically exclude the option of imposing a juvenile prison sentence. The court would then 16 As a slight digression, we should point out to a tentative, uncertain and insufficiently profiled attitude of the legislator on the position and role of culpability in juvenile justice. It is specifically mentioned as a highly qualified condition for imposing the juvenile prison sentence. This is not the case with correctional measures; thus, culpability is not a precondition either for imposing these measures or for their duration. This is clearly confirmed by the procedural rule which states that the decision on imposing a correctional/educational measure shall not proclaim a minor guilty. Besides, a terminological analysis of basic provisions stating that the Act is applicable to “ juvenile perpetrators of criminal offences” (Article 1, JCOA) ,thus excluding the application of this Act against “a person under fourteen years of age at the time of commission of an unlawful act which is prescribed as a criminal offence” (Article 2, JCOA), clearly confirms that the starting point has been the concept of a criminal offence envisaged in the Serbian Criminal Code, which includes the notion of culpability as a constituent element of crime. How can this now be correlated with the rule that culpability does not affect the imposition of correctional measures? There is simply no way to do that because it is a result of the legislator’s inconsistency which calls for future corrections de lege ferenda, either by envisaging culpability as a condition for imposing corrective measures or by replacing it with another illicit act which is prescribed as a criminal offence. 17 The prerequisites for imposing a juvenile prison sentence are as follows: that the criminal act has been committed by an elder juvenile offender; that the committed criminal act is punishable by a term of over 5 years’ imprisonment; and that the imposition of a connectional education measure would not be justified due to a high degree of culpability as well as the nature and gravity of the committed offence (Article 28, JCOA). Д. Миладиновић-Стефановић | стр. 113-131 121 be forced to choose something else from the available registry of penalties for minors. In order to impose some boundaries on the court’s potential scope of influence, it is necessary to start from sanity and the possibility of determining the degrees of sanity. Complete sanity and a higher degree of culpability go “hand in hand”, and there is nothing disputable about it, but, what about a lower or substantially lower degree of sanity? Here too, opinions are divided, starting from the attitude that even a slightly lower degree of sanity is completely incom- patible with a high degree of culpability (Perić, 2005: 86 and further, Radulović, 2010: 151) to entirely opposite claims (Drakić, 2010: 57). Given that a lower degree of sanity is not a monolithic category and that it can be graded, it may be concluded that diminished capacity may not always annul a high degree of culpability, especially in cases involving a slightly lower degree of sanity. On the other hand, in cases concerning minors, there is a consensus that a high degree of culpability cannot be grounded on a substantially lower degree of sanity. Once again, this underscores the specific features of minors as a social category, given the fact that a substantially lower degree of sanity in adult offenders does not necessarily exclude intent. In this sense, intent can serve as a compensation for the low degree of sanity, thus increasing the degree of culpability, providing that there is awareness about the illicit nature of the act. It should also be noted that the sanity of adults is presumed (although the presumption may be contested), whereas the sanity of minors has to be proven. This is simply a consequence of the minors’ basic features and on-going development rather than a consequence of an assumption of some form of pathology. There is no doubt that a high degree of culpability can be proven on the basis of proven intent. On the contrary, negligent behaviour is usually regarded as its antipode. Certain authors point out that the aforementioned attitude is denied in practice because sometimes negligence is a cover for an inconsiderate, arrogant, completely disinterested and utterly irresponsible behaviour of minors towards the wellbeing of others (Drakić, 2010: 57, Knežević, 2010: 84). This means that in the process of determining the degree of culpability, the court, as a rule, deals with intent and, only in particular cases, with negligence. It should be noted that a small number of negligence cases is a result of a small number of these acts, which are associated with juvenile prison sentence and additionally narrowed by the condition concerning the specifically prescribed penalty (for a criminal act punishable by a proposed penalty of more than five years). However, some theorists warn that negligence should not be connected with the possibility of imposing the juvenile prison sentence as it would be “a detour from the restrictive approach in the process of punishing minors towards the extensive interpretation, which is definitely undesirable in this type of sanction” (Radulović, 2010: 151). Зборник радова Правног факултета у Нишу | Број 69 | Година LIV | 2015 122 The presence of minors’ awareness about the illicit nature of a criminal act is grounded on the so-called moral and social maturity. A morally mature indivi- dual is aware of social demands and expectations, and he/she is capable of com- plying with them not out of fear of sanctions but because he/she understands the benefits stemming from the compliance both for himself/herself and for others (Hrnjica, 2003: 207). Social maturity indicates the minor’s ability to integrate into the society, i.e. to establish successful relations on the individual/group level (Hrnjica, 2003: 204). The concept of awareness about the illicit nature of the act does not have any specific or distinctive meaning and it should be un- derstood in general commonsense terms, as a lay concept. The specific feature here is the need for a higher degree of caution in the process of establishing the presence of such awareness in juveniles, primarily because of their young age and maturity. After all, they are just minors. In comparison to adults, the constitution of a minor’s personality may make it more difficult for him/her to become aware of the illegality of certain behaviour. However, in order to get the proper picture, the entire process should include the data regarding the most common misdemeanours (delicts) performed by minors. Statistics show that the the most common criminal acts committed by minors are offences against pro- perty, public order and peace, life and limb.18 This common knowledge provides a high level of certainty for the assumption that a minor is a suitable addressee of the norm, which could not be claimed with certainty for some other cases of incrimination, especially those from the secondary legislation. Sentencing a minor to juvenile prison also includes motives, given that the evalu- ation of culpability, which is necessary in order to choose the proper measure of this penalty, would be incomplete without taking them account. We should also bear in mind that motives contribute to “putting together” of a general ethical picture about the personality of any individual, including a juvenile perpetra- 18 To illustrate: the statistical data for the year 2013 (author’s note: at the time of preparing this paper, the data for 2014 were not processed) show that there was a total number of 1,554 convicted older minors. A total of 903 minors (58.11%) committed a criminal offence against property, 201 minors (12.93%) committed an offence against public order and peace, and 184 minors (11.84%) committed an offence against life and limb. The list includes offences against: safety of public traffic (62 minors), marriage and family (17), rights and freedoms (13), state authorities (9), gender rights (8), environment (7), general public safety (5), judicial system (5), legal transactions (5), constitutional system and security (3), humanity and other values protected under international law (3), military (2), intellectual property (2), economy (2), honour and reputation (1), safety of computer data (1); eight minors were convicted for acts falling within the scope of secondary criminal legislation but there are no details about the nature of these acts (source: the Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia, 2014: 50-51). Д. Миладиновић-Стефановић | стр. 113-131 123 tor.19 The nature of this article calls for the selection of those motives which are assumed to be more common in minors than in adults. A typical example are the so-called motives of adventure, which occur due to wrong or negligent upbringing, which leads a minor to identify him/herself with negative models of behaviour: “An exaggerated influence of trashy literature and films, whose lead characters are strong, powerful, great fighters, well-armed, wealthy and extremely dynamic, leaves a strong impression on young people, whose reality and everyday life is different, bleak, full of poverty and privation. Dynamics, glitz, wealth, luxury, cars, and beautiful women fascinate and, in a metaphorical sense, hypnotise both children from poor workers’ barracks and mouldy rented rooms as well as prodigal and spoiled children of wealthy parents who have given them everything except love, working habits and modesty” (Simonović, 1991: 585-586). The motives of adven- ture can be embodied in different forms of illicit behaviour; since they lead to the creation of a crude and unrefined hedonistic life orientation, they usually guide a minor towards criminal acts against property. Besides motives of adventure, we should also mention the motives of hooliganism, which in a certain number of cases create a psychological background of violent behaviour, participation in fights, endangerment of safety, causing severe body injuries, committing ho- micides and similar criminal acts. In psychology, there is no generally accepted explanation of the motives of hooliganism; some believe that these motives stem from the need to release the accumulated negative energy; others think that this is a complex motive which is produced by combining wickedness, revenge and jealousy; there are also those who speak about a sadistic desire to prove oneself to others and to oneself through the manifestation of power over other people (Simonović, 1991: 534-535). Either way, the occurrence of such motives proves the existence of a negative and undesirable system of values, which sho- uld be taken into consideration in the process of sentencing a juvenile to prison because the time needed for correction depends on how deeply rooted these values are. Other motives which are characteristic for minors are the motives of social and psychological compensation where the act is committed with the aim of compensating real or imaginary failures and imperfections, as well as the status motive, the motive of entertainment and the motive of vengeance (Škulić, 2011: 61). The generally accepted understanding that the severity of violation or endan- germent of the protected value points to the consequence of a criminal act, in 19 Their significance is constantly emphasised within the frameworks of juvenile criminal law. Hence, motives have to be taken into account in the process of choosing a correctional measure. Yet, the fact that is confusing here is that culpability is not considered to be the basis for imposing correctional measures, in which case it seems illogical to insist on the motives. In our opinion, this is another proof that the legislator has not completely resolved the issue concerning the position of culpability in the juvenile criminal law system. Зборник радова Правног факултета у Нишу | Број 69 | Година LIV | 2015 124 its concrete and committed form, has generated certain dilemmas regarding the juvenile prison sentence. This conception has not been disputed per se but it has caused problems in the context of earlier conditions for imposing the juvenile prison sentence. In that sense, the concept of “severe consequences of an act” divided theorists and practitioners into those who thought that the juvenile prison sentence was automatically excluded if the act was qualified as “an attempt” and those who tried to find some highly disputable arguments for its application. The majority were prone to accept the interpretation that in this case the juvenile prison sentence was not an alternative (Perić, 1995: 47) even though they considered that it was not always criminally and politically justified; accordingly, they advocated the intervention de lege ferenda. In the Juvenile Criminal Offenders Act, the formulation “severe consequences of the offence” was replaced with the formulation “nature and gravity of the offence” (Article 28, JCOA), which has given this condition an entirely new, wider sense. The old dilemma is no longer valid considering that this provision is interpreted in such a way that the juvenile prison sentence can be imposed in either case: when the act was committed and when it was only attempted (Perić, 2005: 87). Considering the circumstances under which an criminal act is committed, there are two facts which seem significant. First of all, in comparison to a common adult person, it is much harder for a minor to resist when “the opportunity calls.” Psychological characteristics of a developing personality make it more difficult for minors to fight the impulses and to control their behaviour. Secondly, similar effects can be achieved by the influence of other individuals: parents, a trustworthy person or a group of peers. Minors are much more susceptible to influences and less resistant to actions of others, irrespective of how these actions are manifested: either in the form of pressure or only through the pre- sentation of possible benefits of committing the act. When it comes to an offence committed by a group of minors, we should bear in mind that it may sometimes include a minor who is not actually very “enthusiastic” about committing a crime but does not want to give up or to refuse to participate since he/she would be the subject of disrespect, ridicule and rejection; such situations are much more frustrating for minors, who are still developing their identity and searching for their place in society, than for adults. Another important element which should be singled out from the multifaceted concept of ‘life history’ is the concept of previous convictions or absence of crimi- nal record. In this context, the inefficiency of a previously imposed correctional measure is viewed as one of the indicators that it may be necessary to impose a juvenile prison sentence, whereas the previous convictions to a juvenile prison sentence are taken as an aggravating circumstance. The process of obtaining information from the registry of prior convictions to serve a juvenile prison Д. Миладиновић-Стефановић | стр. 113-131 125 sentence is regulated by referral to Article 102, par. 2 of the Criminal Code (Ar- ticle 34, JCOA). The information about the imposed correctional measures may be issued only upon the request of the competent court, the public prosecution office and the social service (guardianship) authority (Article 27, par. 1, JCOA). But, no information can be provided on the correctional measures imposed for criminal acts which are punishable by a fine or a term of imprisonment up to three years, if the person whose information is requested has attained the age of 21. The young age and general characteristics of the population of minors also call for some specification or modelling of personal life circumstances. Thus, the distinctive circumstances within the minor’s primary family unit are given priority and regarded as highly relevant in sentencing. In contrast, in an insigni- ficant number of cases, the process of sentencing may include a minor’s marital status, parenthood or employment. Yet, a low incidence of these factors in the population of minors statistically reduces the probability that these factors will influence the choice of penalty. On the one hand, the specific characteristics of minors’ age and personality may lead to the marginalisation of certain facts; on the other hand, they may also contribute to introducing some other facts (such as the fact that the offender is attending school on a regular basis), which are hardly ever related to adults. In the aetiology of juvenile crime, it has been generally recognized that the family unit, as a micro-social factor, is the most significant of all social factors (Konstan- tinović Vilić, Nikolić-Ristanović, Kostić, 2009: 229). Therefore, the court should pay attention to the fact whether perpetrators come from deficient or degraded families. A deficient and incomplete family, most frequently due to the parents’ divorce, can cause an emotional insecurity and frustrating feelings of alienation and rejection, which very often produce destructive forms of behaviour. A more detrimental impact is produced by a degraded family, marked by a negative atmosphere, disrupted relations between the family members in various combi- nations, and frequently the presence of some form of social pathology in parents (alcoholism, substance abuse, prostitution, gambling or engaging in criminal acts). The constant presence of tension, conflicts, arguments and physical and psychological violence compromises the process of social adaptation. Parents, as negative role models, greatly contribute to the creation of negative personality traits, aspirations and beliefs of minors. A special form of this type of family is the so-called criminogenic family environment, where the parents actively encourage their children to be delinquents and raise them in that direction (Kon- stantinović Vilić, Nikolić-Ristanović, Kostić, 2009: 230). In extreme conditions, parents use force in order to make their child commit criminal acts; however, the legal significance of this phenomenon is not reflected through the process Зборник радова Правног факултета у Нишу | Број 69 | Година LIV | 2015 126 of sentencing but through some other criminal law institutes. Even though the asocial behaviour, neglect and inadequate upbringing as consequences of such family circumstances cannot be attributed to a minor, they directly influence the time needed for his/her correctional education. Putting the “problematic” families aside, a mitigating circumstance may be a lack of parental control, which even does not have to be regular and substantial; it is sufficient that it has contributed to the minor’s commission of the act. Apart from the family unit, another significant factor of socialisation is school. In this sense, the school environment is one of the primary social groups where the minor’s personality is formed. It is indisputable that that the evidence of a child’s social adaptation is a demonstrated positive behaviour at school, regular attendance, no-conflict relations with others, meeting the school requirements and duties, etc. However, all these elements are seldom taken into consideration in the course of sentencing juvenile offenders, particularly considering that some empirical research have shown that minors who are in conflict with the law are almost as a rule in “conflict with the school” (Konstantinović Vilić, Ni- kolić-Ristanović, Kostić, 2009: 375; Radulović, 2010: 161). The research results indicate that low academic achievement, grade failure and repetition, truancy, bad relationships with school peers, non-acceptance and disrespect of teachers’ authority constitute a typical pre-delinquent image of a juvenile offender. Such attitude towards school and education reflects another aspect of neglect and abandonment. Another legal circumstance worth mentioning is detention of a juvenile offen- der after the commission of the act; however, it does not include any specific features which could be taken into account in the process of sentencing minors to juvenile prison. The only notable issue may be the financial status of minors, who are largely unemployed and without any personal income or property; this fact may have a significant impact on their financial capacity to compensate the victim for the incurred damage or harm, even if they may be willing to do so. Minors’ property status is the only absolutely irrelevant fact provided in the Criminal Code. As one’s property status is specifically related to monetary pe- nalty (fine), there is not point to speak about it in the context of juvenile prison sentence. Another specific circumstance that may be worth mentioning is the sentence for hate crimes, which was introduced in the new provisions of the Criminal Code of 201220; yet, a relatively short period of its usage does not provide for a substantial review of its application in our legal practice. The experiences 20 If a criminal act has been committed out of hate, due to racial or religious affiliation, national or ethnical affiliation, gender, sexual orientation or gender identity, this circumstance Д. Миладиновић-Стефановић | стр. 113-131 127 from some other countries point to the assumption that juvenile perpetrators of hate crimes may relatively often be sentenced in the course of regular court proceedings. In Germany, for example, it has been determined that almost 30% of perpetrators of hate crimes were minors aged 16 or 17, at the time of committing the act, whereas two thirds of the offenders were below the age of 20. These results were confirmed by the studies conducted in the USA (Pavlović, 2009: 332). Furthermore, some forms of hate crime (such as the so-called ‘crimes for fun’) are committed by minors, most frequently acting in groups (gangs); they are commonly aimed against a previously unknown victim and committed for fun, “to slay boredom” or to deserve respect of other “like-minded” youngsters (Pavlović, 2009: 327). 5. Concluding remarks The primary focus of this article has been to elaborate on the interpretation of specific circumstances and specific features in the general mitigating and aggravating circumstances envisaged in the Serbian Criminal Code. However, in order to provide a comprehensive understanding of the process of senten- cing juvenile offenders, it is necessary to make a short analysis of the policy for imposing penalties on juvenile offenders. The analysis shows that courts very rarely choose the option of juvenile prison and that they primarily opt for correc- tive measures. Thus, the prevalence of juvenile prison sentence in the overall structure of imposed penalties may be said to be almost irrelevant because it is around one percent on the average.21 This clearly confirms the opinion that juvenile prison sentence is “the last resort” which comes into play only if all other options are exhausted. However, it does not make the problem of sentencing minors to juvenile prison any less significant, primarily due to the sensitivity of this issue. Besides, the data from the observed ten-year period indicate that courts most frequently impose the juvenile prison sentence for a period of over six months up to two years; it means that they use the lower half of the available sentencing scale, which is evident in the Table provided below.22 will be taken by the court as an aggravating circumstance, unless it is prescribed as the essential element of a criminal act (Article 54a, Criminal Code). 21 The exact data for the period from 2004 to 2014 are as follows: 0.77%, 0.48%, 1.58%, 1.37%, 1.71%, 0.52%, 0.99%, 0.15% and 0.51%. The prevalence is calculated on the basis of data contained in the official publication of the Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia, 2014: 49. 22 The data are taken from the official publication of the Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia, 2014: 49. Зборник радова Правног факултета у Нишу | Број 69 | Година LIV | 2015 128 Year 5 to 10-years’ term of juvenile imprisonment 2 to 5 years’ term of juvenile imprisonment 1 to 2 years’ term of juvenile imprisonment 6 months to one-year term of juvenile imprisonment Total 2004 4 2 - 4 (40%) 10 2005 2 1 - 4 (57.1%) 7 2006 4 3 - 10 (58.8%) 17 2007 1 4 - 25 (83.3%) 30 2008 1 7 - 9 (52.9%) 17 2009 2 4 - 13 (68.4%) 19 2010 - 1 - 4 (80%) 5 2011 1 5 - 7 (53.8%) 13 2012 - - - 2 (100%) 2 2013 3 2 - 3 (37.5%) 8 Finally, the remaining question is what kind of developments are to be expected in the future policy for sentencing juvenile offenders, particularly taking into account that our theory contains many different suggestions not only concerning the juvenile prison sentence concerning the entire penal system for minors. Some of these suggestions could have a significant impact on the wider use of juvenile prison sentence, such as the suggestion to provide such penalty for younger minors if the committed criminal offence is punishable by a term of 30 to 40 years’ imprisonment (Perić, Milošević, Stevanović, 2008: 160-161); yet, such proposals are most unlikely to be put into effect. It is much more realistic to develop the penal system by introducing alternative sanctions, which may eventually reduce the application of juvenile prison sentence as the “last resort.” More alternatives would logically imply fewer prison sentences. A possible intro- duction of monetary penalty (fine), which is already part of the Misdemeanour Act, is fully recognized in the comparative juvenile criminal law and envisaged in international documents. 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Kriminološki, krivičnopravni, krivičnoprocesni i kriminali- stički aspekti motiva krivičnog dela, doktorska disertacija (neobjavljena). Kra- gujevac: Pravni fakultet Singer, M. (1992). Krivično pravo i kriminologija. Zagreb: Globus Stojanović, Z. (2012). Krivično pravo, Opšti deo. Beograd: Pravna knjiga Republički zavod za statistiku. (2014). Maloletni učinioci krivičnih dela – prijave, optuženja i osude. Bilten br. 588 Rešenje Vrhovnog suda Srbije, Kž. 27/2002 od 26. februara 2002. godine. Revija za kriminologiju i krivično pravo. 1 (2005). 84 Д. Миладиновић-Стефановић | стр. 113-131 131 Ćirić, Z. (2013). Sudska psihijatrija. Niš: Centar za publikacije Pravnog fakulteta Ćorović, E. (2013). Neke pravnoteorijske dileme u kažnjavanju maloletnika. Revija za kriminologiju i krivično pravo. 1 (51). 49-62 Hrnjica, S. (2003). Opšta psihologija sa psihologijom ličnosti. Beograd: Naučna knjiga Škulić, M. (2011). Maloletničko krivično pravo. Beograd: Pravni fakultet Др Душица Миладиновић-Стефановић, Доцент Правног факултета, Универзитет у Нишу МАЛОЛЕТНИЧКИ ЗАТВОР – НАПОМЕНЕ О СПЕЦИФИЧНОСТИМА РЕДОВНОГ ОДМЕРАВАЊА Резиме Систем малолетничког кривичног права у Републици Србији садржи различите механизме реаговања на малолетничку делинквенцију, почевши од васпитних налога, преко васпитних мера, до малолетничког затвора. Овај рад је посвећен проблему редовног одмеравања једине казне предвиђене за малолетнике. Законодавац је за одвијање овог процеса поставио неколико смерница: распон казне малолетничког затвора, сврху кажњавања, степен зрелости малолетника, време потребно за његово васпитање и стручно оспособљавање, али и све релевантне околности из чл. 54. Кривичног законика. Поменута констатација открива и централне теме и систематику даљег излагања, пред којим се налазе два задатка – прво, да се објасни дејство посебних околности из Закона о малолетним учиниоцима кривичних дела и кривичноправној заштити малолетних лица, и друго, да се установи како се опште околности из Кривичног законика примењују у овом случају, са посебним освртом на њихове специфичне манифестације. Кључне речи: малолетнички затвор, сврха кажњавања, олакшавајуће и отежавајуће околности. 
work_4gwrqhrb5va5lfrtezujtwalcy	----	HEQ-2016-0016-ver9-Alcala_3P 87..95 NARRATIVE REVIEW Open Access Social Determinants of Health, Violent Radicalization, and Terrorism: A Public Health Perspective Héctor E. Alcalá,1,{,* Mienah Zulfacar Sharif,2,{ and Goleen Samari3,{ Abstract Background: Terrorism-related deaths are at an all-time high as there were 32,685 and 29,376 terrorism-related deaths in 2014 and 2015, respectively. Terrorism is defined as the use of violence and intimidation in the pursuit of political aims. Terrorism is detrimental for mental health, premature mortality, and economic losses and un- dermines the central tenets of public health to improve the health and well-being of populations. Despite the impact terrorism has on avoidable morbidity and mortality, population health research largely overlooks social determinants of terrorism and risk factors that contribute to terrorist activities. Methods: Drawing from what is known about commonly studied social determinants of health topics, including the relationships between structural and interpersonal discrimination, social cohesion, and gang violence and health, we present a public health framework, rooted in the social determinants of health, for identifying poten- tial factors influencing terrorism and violent radicalization. Results: Social determinants of health provide unique insight into how interpersonal and structural factors can influence risk for violent radicalization and terrorist activity. Each of the topics we review provides an entry point for existing public health and behavioral science knowledge to be used in preventing and understanding violent radicalization and terrorism. For example, anti-Muslim sentiment has promoted discrimination against Muslims, while also serving to marginalize and stigmatize Muslim communities. These conditions limit the social resources, like social cohesion, that Muslims have access to and make political violence more appealing to some. Conclusions: Public health can contribute much to the ongoing debate around terrorism. The field must take a more prevention-focused approach to the problem of terrorism. Failure to do so only perpetuates approaches that have not been successful. Keywords: discrimination; gang violence; social cohesion; terrorism; United States Introduction Around the world, the death toll due to terrorism has reached unprecedented levels. From 2013 to 2014, there was an 80% increase in the number of terrorism- related deaths rising from 18,111 in 2013 to 32,685 in 2014.1 However, only 2.6% of all deaths from terrorism have occurred in the West, and 72% of terrorism- related deaths are concentrated in five countries— Syria, Pakistan, Iraq, Nigeria, and Afghanistan.1 In addition to premature mortality, terrorism is associated 1Department of Public Health Sciences, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Virginia. 2Department of Medicine, University of California, Irvine, Irvine, California. 3Population Research Center, University of Texas, Austin, Texas. {These three authors contributed equally to this work. *Address correspondence to: Héctor E. Alcalá, PhD, Department of Public Health Sciences, University of Virginia, 560 Ray C. Hunt Drive, Charlottesville, VA 22902, E-mail: hectorapm@ucla.edu ª Héctor E. Alcalá et al. 2017; Published by Mary Ann Liebert, Inc. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. Mary Ann Liebert, Inc. offers reprint services for those who want to order professionally produced copies of articles published under the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license. To obtain a price quote, email Reprints@liebertpub.com. Please include the articlé title or DOI, quantity, and delivery destination in your email. Health Equity Volume 1.1, 2017 DOI: 10.1089/heq.2016.0016 Health Equity 87 with a myriad of mental health outcomes, including depression, anxiety, and posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD).2 Terrorism-based fear also dissuades travel and reduces consumerism, leading to economic losses.3 As such, terrorism is a focus of United States (U.S.) for- eign policy, with the U.S. federal government annually spending an average of $600 billion for defense and an- nually increasing counterterrorism spending in a range anywhere from $17 to $60 billion.4 Despite the influence terrorism has on population well-being and political and economic systems, a public health framework for better understanding the risk fac- tors for terrorist activities is lacking. Terrorism is de- fined as the use of violence and intimidation in the pursuit of political aims. Terrorism is often perpetuated by those who have been violently radicalized.5 Violent radicalization means the process of adopting or pro- moting an extremist belief system for the purpose of facilitating ideologically based violence to advance po- litical, religious, or social change. While public health is largely involved in preparedness strategies and address- ing the aftermath of terrorist events, social determi- nants of terrorism and violent radicalization and risk factors for terrorism are glaringly absent from main- stream population health discourse. This is a short- coming of public health—given that one of the main goals of the perpetrators is to instill a population level of fear, uncertainty, and vulnerability6 and that terrorism undermines the central tenet of public health, namely, to improve the health and well-being of popu- lations and prevent avoidable morbidity and mortality. Terrorism is not an individual experience; it is vio- lence at a population level and worthy of attention in fields focusing on socioecological understanding of so- cial processes and human behavior. A public health perspective can provide insights on the risk factors for radicalization and social determinants of terrorism. We recognize the unpredictability of terrorist attacks and by no means claim to have identified strategies for ‘‘terrorism prevention.’’ Rather, given public health’s ecological perspective and unique role in iden- tifying factors that protect or hinder the health of com- munities, we describe how to use commonly used theories and frameworks to start and disentangle po- tential risk factors for either promoting and/or engag- ing in violent terrorist activity. Methods The goal of this article is to incite critical dialogue on how social determinants of health researchers and professionals can advance our understanding of risk factors for radicalization and future tragic terrorist events. A case study from the United Kingdom shows that violent radicalization is an outcome of a complex interaction among social, political, cultural, historical, and interpersonal factors.7 This article builds on this work for the U.S. context and explains how a public health understanding of health, namely, the relation- ship between discrimination, social cohesion, and gang violence and health, can help identify potential risk factors for terrorism from violent radicalization. Then, this review explores future directions for public health, behavioral and social science researchers and practitioners to understand and contribute to research on terrorism and health. Results Discrimination and health There is a mounting body of evidence linking discrimina- tion, at multiple levels (individual, as well as institutional) to poor health outcomes and health disparities.2,8,9 Per- ceived discrimination has been associated with an increase in risk factors for physical health, including high blood pressure and substance abuse, and also in physical health outcomes, including hypertension and breast cancer.8 However, the most compelling evidence suggests a link between discrimination and mental health outcomes, in- cluding depression, anxiety, and psychological distress.10 Discrimination is a specific type of stressor that is ‘‘un- controllable and unpredictable.’’11 The experience of dis- crimination is associated with the onset of physiological responses to stress that then have longer term implica- tions for health outcomes, including a ‘‘wear and tear’’ im- pact on regulatory systems as a result of ongoing activation of the allostatic systems.11 Over time, discrimi- nation can also erode protective resources, decrease one’s engagement in health-promoting behaviors (e.g., cancer screening), as well as increase their engagement in un- healthy behaviors (e.g., substance abuse), explained as maladaptive coping mechanisms to the stressor.8 Moreover, scholars argue that ‘‘context matters’’ as it is possible that the relationships (and/or magnitudes) of the effects of discrimination vary by racial and ethnic groups.10,12 Or, as Gee et al.12 argue, we should not as- sume a ‘‘one race fits all’’ effect on the relationship of indicators of discrimination on health outcomes. This holds true for many Muslim Americans or those who may be perceived as Muslim Americans (including Sikhs), who have experienced heightened levels of dis- crimination, post-9/11.13,14 This discrimination exists Alcalá, et al.; Health Equity 2017, 1.1 http://online.liebertpub.com/doi/10.1089/heq.2016.0016 88 despite the fact that many Muslim Americans, who come from the 22 Arab countries of the Middle East and North Africa, are classified as ‘‘White’’ by the cat- egories set forth by the Office of Management and Budget, even though a large proportion of them do not identify as White.15 Research on racial and ethnic health disparities among people categorized as White is limited as it is assumed that this category is ‘‘racially neutral.’’15 This disconnect is likely attributed to the rampant xenophobia and heightened levels of Islamophobia in the post-9/11 context. As Rousseau (2011) explains, ‘‘.the discourse on security stemming from the war on terror generated suspicions and increased prejudice toward all groups considered a potential threat.’’ Fol- lowing 9/11, rhetoric within the media and policy realm has disproportionately singled out the Islamic faith and Muslims as evidenced through legislation sanctioning deportation of Muslims and media cover- age portraying Arab or Muslim Americans as the ‘‘ter- rorist’’.16 This xenophobic framing fails to acknowledge the small faction of Muslims the perpetrators of these violent acts actually represent and ignores Muslim vic- tims of terrorism. For example, when looking specifi- cally at the victims of Al-Qa’ida, Muslims are seven times more likely to be killed by Al-Qa’ida than non- Muslims17 and Muslims represent between 82% and 97% of fatalities perpetrated by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).18 In the context of health dispar- ities research, xenophobia and Islamophobia are im- portant forms of discrimination that contribute to health disparities.19 Immigration policies contribute to discrimination of Muslims and Middle Eastern Americans. Immigration policies racialize and construct particular groups of im- migrants as a threat to the nation’s health.9 Several pol- icies following 9/11 establish that all immigrants of Middle-Eastern origin should be viewed as potential terror threats and only second as newcomers.20 The threat of terrorism has misappropriated immigration laws as a means to promote antiterrorism goals.21 Immigrants, particularly from the Middle East, are thus framed as a national security risk, igniting xeno- phobia and fear of the ‘‘Other.’’22 Immigrant integra- tion is a complex process that is based partially on the reception experience at destination. Many immi- grants experience discrimination, oppressive living conditions, and a lack of access to basic services, all of which are known determinants of health.23 The discrimination of Muslims and/or Middle Eastern Americans, largely formed by structural factors like im- migration policies, curtails the benefit of racial central- ity described as ‘‘strength of positive identification with one’s racial group,’’ among Muslim and Middle Eastern Americans.24 Thus, identifying as Muslim in our current sociopolitical context can be conceptualized more as a stressor than a sense of support and, thereby, be more detrimental as opposed to protective for health and behaviors. Social cohesion, terrorism, and health The ongoing stress related to being viewed as a threat can undermine social cohesion and social capital, both of which are important determinants of popula- tion health and preventing community violence.25 Thus, pathways to violent radicalization and terrorism can be better understood if health research investigates variables from the social and behavioral sciences like social cohesion and capital.26 Social cohesion refers to the extent of connectedness and solidarity among groups in society, including the absence of social conflict and the presence of social bonds.27 Social capital is defined as the features of so- cial structures, like levels of interpersonal trust and norms of reciprocity and mutual aid, that act as re- sources for individuals and facilitate collective action.27 Social capital is the resources or trust, norms, and the exercise of sanctions available to members of social groups (a work place, voluntary organization, neigh- borhood, etc.) and/or the actual resources—social sup- port, information channels, and social credentials that are embedded in social networks.28 Social capital can yield social networks that bring people together in at least two different ways: (1) bring people who are alike together (i.e., bonding networks) and (2) bring people who are not alike together (i.e., bridging net- works).29,30 The presence of oppressive conditions for relation- ship building among new immigrants may deter the so- cial participation that is crucial for the formation of social capital. Social capital is achieved through the in- vestment in social relations and resources by individu- als to enhance their expected returns or expressive actions.31 The potential impact of social capital on so- cial cohesion will vary depending on the ways in which its effects are enhanced or diminished by the wider so- cial, political, economic, and cultural environment.22 The current social environment is not conducive to fos- tering social capital and cohesion of Muslim and Arab Americans, because identifying with these respective Alcalá, et al.; Health Equity 2017, 1.1 http://online.liebertpub.com/doi/10.1089/heq.2016.0016 89 groups leaves people vulnerable to discrimination and excluded from positive social bonds. Coupled with the discrimination faced by Muslims and Arabs in the West, individuals may not have the opportunity to form either bridging or bonding networks due to pressures to distrust individuals like themselves and hostility faced from those who are unlike themselves. The relationship between social cohesion and health is well established across several indicators of health, including self-rated health, cardiovascular disease, can- cer, diabetes, and infectious diseases.32 Trust, at the in- dividual and community level, frequently serves as an indicator of social cohesion and then linked to health. Greater social capital is also an important determinant of health and mental health of children, adolescents, adults, and aging populations.28,33 Social capital is a means of consolidating resources and protecting against losses like physical health, mental health, and life satisfaction.31 The relationship between social cap- ital and health is embedded in the broader social con- text as socially active individuals report good health in countries with high levels of social capital, but are less likely to do so in countries with low levels of social cap- ital.34 Although few studies have sought to directly as- sess the mechanisms linking social capital to health, a variety of hypothesized pathways have been proposed by which cohesion may affect health, including the dif- fusion of knowledge about health promotion, promo- tion of access to local services and amenities, and psychosocial processes which provide affective support and mutual respect.27 Low levels of social capital, however, can be risk factors for population health. Prevention of vandalism and vio- lent crime is rooted in collective efficacy.33 The link be- tween social capital and violent crime is repeatedly shown.35 There is a ‘‘dark side’’ of social capital or the contagion of high risk behaviors within networks like the spread of suicidal ideation36 and alcohol and other drug use among adolescents.37 Suicide and crime are both related to low levels or absence of social cohesion.32 As such, one potential motivator of terrorist-driven sui- cide bombings and violence could be an indication of a lack of, or low levels of, social cohesion. Terrorism and gangs A useful approach to examining the role that public health and behavioral and social sciences can play to better understanding the etiology of violent radicaliza- tion and/or terrorism prevention is to examine another source of organized violence such as gang violence. Terrorist and gang members have some key similar- ities. For example, both groups are comprised dispro- portionately of males, individual members form a collective that supports its members and their actions, both groups attempt to counter the efforts of law en- forcement, and both engage in violent acts as a means of social control.38 At the individual level, gangs and terrorist organizations appeal to individuals who are psychologically deviant, have limited access to socioeconomic opportunities, or are marginalized members of society.39–44 In fact, terrorist groups attract a range of unstable individuals.45 Joining these groups provides individuals with group identification and be- longing that they cannot find in mainstream society. In addition, group membership for both the terrorist and gang member is a source of power and protec- tion.39 Overall, terrorism and gang membership appeal to members of society who are on the margins and view joining either group as a means of obtaining power and/or exercising influence. There are also characteristics that gangs have that ter- rorists (or terrorist networks) do not. These include the following: (1) goals with symbolic (and not political) ends; (2) a less rigid organizational structure; (3) shorter periods of cooperation among members; (4) transitory group membership; and (5) a physical space that is iden- tifiable and defendable.46 In this study, the key distinc- tion is that the motivations of terrorist groups are political, while those of the gang member are not al- ways.47 In addition, much of the understanding of gangs does not view them as transnational actors in the same way that we frequently understand terrorists. Despite theorized differences between terrorists and gang members, governments have not consistently dis- tinguished between the two, revealing the very subjec- tive, or politicized, nature of the ‘‘terrorist’’ label. For example, in New York, gang related murders have been successfully prosecuted using antiterrorism legis- lation.48 However, subsequent courts ruled that terror- ism laws could not be used to prosecute cases of gang violence.49 Similarly, the Salvadoran government has labeled the Mara Salvatrucha and Barrio 18 gangs as terrorist groups.50 In effect, these actions advance the argument, explicitly and implicitly, that gang activity can serve to ‘‘intimidate or coerce’’ civilians, in the same way that terrorists do. While all of this is occur- ring, the media amplifies the threat of terrorism perpe- trated by Arabs and Muslims, while downplaying and providing excuses for domestic terrorism.24 The end result is that the term ‘‘terrorist’’ is applied by Alcalá, et al.; Health Equity 2017, 1.1 http://online.liebertpub.com/doi/10.1089/heq.2016.0016 90 governments to denote extra condemnation and not necessarily to label specific acts with specific motives. As a result, terrorism becomes hard to define, and thus, harder to study and prevent. In addition, because the distinction between gangs and terrorism is highly subjective, it may be possible to use what we know about the former to address the latter. Discussion This review shows that public health and behavioral science concepts can be applied to our understanding of risk factors for engaging in, or promoting, violent acts of terrorism. Importantly, this work does not con- done or justify these acts of violence; instead, we aim to emphasize how existing public health and social sci- ence frameworks can do more to understand, and po- tentially prevent, this epidemic of violence. Specifically, pertinent to a public health perspective on terrorism include discrimination, socialization processes like so- cial cohesion, and other forms of radicalization like gang membership and violence. Prior research consis- tently demonstrates that individual and structural dis- crimination are detrimental for population health, and social cohesion and integration are integral for physical and mental health.8,51 The following discussion shows how these concepts are salient for a theoretical and em- pirical understanding of terrorism. Experiencing discrimination is a marker of social isolation and exclusion, which makes people vulnerable to extremist influences and ideologies while weakening their social cohesion.52 Hate crimes against Muslims in the United States remain five times more common since 9/11 than they did before.53,54 From reports and opinion polls, we know that hate speech and crimes against Muslim Americans are commonplace.54 In ad- dition, Muslim Americans must contend with govern- ment surveillance and monitoring, which is associated with anxiety and behavior modification, to avoid con- texts that might lead to government suspicion.55 This anxiety and behavior modification includes fear of hate crimes, distress about threats to safety, loss of community, isolation, and stigmatization.53 As discussed above, immigration policy is also a form of structural discrimination that contributes to social segregation.9 Social and economic policy are syn- onymous with health policy. Therefore, immigration policy fueled by ‘‘antiterrorism policy’’ can be a deter- minant of health. Although there are well-documented effects that immigration policies have on limiting ac- cess to health and social services for immigrants, the idea that those policies also directly impact the social determinants of disease by shaping access to life oppor- tunities is understudied.9 The effects of anti-immigrant policies can, thus, be far reaching in their ability to un- dermine the health of immigrants and their families across the life course. Furthermore, since anti- immigrant policies racialize anyone perceived to be an immigrant, the effects extend to subsequent genera- tions. There is a pattern of racial and religious profiling in the naturalization process to block citizenship of in- dividuals from Muslim countries.16 As a result, anti- immigrant sentiments create hostile environments that can compromise health of entire communities. Discriminatory acts and policies also inhibit other social determinants of health like social cohesion. Young people are particularly vulnerable to radicaliz- ing influences because of isolation, marginalization, and a lack of social capital.56 Muslims, specifically, are the object of political scrutiny and the target of neg- ative media discourses. Counterterrorism policies, however well intentioned, can damage social cohesion by isolating a group of people like Muslim Americans25 in that they perceive to be ‘‘targeted’’ because of their ethnic and/or religious identity.2 For example, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act led to investigation of Muslim American political and social activity and to the deportation of Muslims with links to terrorist activity.20 The 2001 Patriot Act extended this legislation and gave the state new powers, includ- ing surveillance, which profiles Muslim Americans or ‘‘Muslim-like’’ Americans.20 These policies isolate Muslim or Arab Americans, promote discrimination, and create barriers to the health promoting effects of social cohesion. Feelings of marginalization have been shown to lead to decreased self-worth and, in turn, increase radicali- zation.57 Structural marginalization of a group under- mines social cohesion and can lead to fragmentation, including the forming of groups with militant or ex- tremist views, thereby undermining our national secu- rity and public health goals. A need for social respect and ties can drive individuals toward radicalization when coupled with one’s fear of security and oppres- sion.45 Engaging people from all political, religious, and demographic backgrounds is essential to foster co- hesion, which prevent individuals from being drawn into extremist groups. Peace psychology has long ar- gued that the promotion of positive intergroup rela- tions is integral to the prevention of violent episodes.58 Moreover, peace psychology posits that in Alcalá, et al.; Health Equity 2017, 1.1 http://online.liebertpub.com/doi/10.1089/heq.2016.0016 91 addition to efforts to prevent incidents of violence, or ‘‘negative peace,’’ we must equally emphasize efforts fo- cusing on ‘‘positive peace,’’ meaning we must strive to- ward a more equitable society that is rooted in social, economic, gender and racial justice.59 In other words, this holistic view recognizes the importance of address- ing underlying factors, related to sense of exclusion, that drive people to extremists, including lack of eco- nomic and educational opportunities and trauma resulting from ongoing conflict.60 Taken together, a public health perspective can argue that current efforts to tackle terrorism may have, in fact, increased our risk for further violent attacks (Fig. 1). Specifically, anti-terrorism policies have promoted the discrimination of Muslims. In turn, these actions by non-Muslims erode social cohesion in Muslim commu- nities, as Muslims are incentivized to distance them- selves and mistrust their peers. As a result, some individuals may become isolated and marginalized. For a small minority, this may make them receptive to rad- icalization. For fewer still, this may motivate them to en- gage in acts of terrorism. The government responds to terrorist acts by enacting anti-terrorism policies that fuel discrimination and continues the cycle. Implications for public health research and practice Threats of terrorism operate across borders and require public health attention to globalization and the trans- national nature of people. Greater awareness of the negative reverberations for U.S. policies for people around the globe is needed. Thus, although public health training programs emphasize their interdisci- plinary focus, courses on U.S. foreign policy and inter- national relations are not included in the common topic areas of focus. Public health training programs should integrate U.S.’s foreign policy into their curric- ula and emphasize awareness of global events, given the global origins of many of our most critical public health concerns. Specific to foreign policy, it is critical that we, as a field, challenge the systems that implement certain policies, which then result in the anti-U.S. sentiment that can foster radicalization. For example, some have argued that the American-led invasion of Iraq, under the pretense of anti-terrorism, led to the death of thou- sands of Iraqis and the displacement of millions more and laid the groundwork for the rise of newer terror threats like ISIS.61 To truly understand the context of terrorism, multilevel thinking is required–the individ- ual, group, state, and global dynamics.62 To take a pub- lic health perspective of determinants of terrorism, greater attention needs to be paid to U.S. foreign policy and issues around the world that can ultimately influ- ence public health and national security. Given the heightened experiences of discrimination and social isolation among immigrations, the global di- mension of terrorism also pertains to immigrants. Immigration research increasingly recognizes that im- migrants operate in a transnational space. Transna- tionalism involves the maintenance of occupations or activities that necessarily require regular social contacts FIG. 1. Public health framework of terrorism and violent radicalization. Alcalá, et al.; Health Equity 2017, 1.1 http://online.liebertpub.com/doi/10.1089/heq.2016.0016 92 over time, across national borders and/or across cul- tures.63 Transnationalism recognizes that immigrants have ties with their country of origin as they adopt ties in the host country. However, public health and be- havioral and social science research often fail to recog- nize the interaction and integration of people across borders, drawing only on the destination contexts. Implications of transnationalism remain largely un- tested in health research. Research can be enhanced by considering the context and conditions of both sending and receiving countries to fully understand so- cial determinants of terrorism. Transnationalism and migration-related factors are integral to understanding terrorism.7 Given the similarities between terrorism and the problem of gang violence, it may be possible to extend the public health approach that some have advocated for use against gang violence and adopt approaches that have been advocated to curb political violence or terrorism. Briefly this public health approach in- volves four stages: (1) Describing the problem; (2) Identifying risk and protective factors; (3) Developing and evaluating prevention strategies; and (4) Dissem- inating prevention strategies.7,64 In this study, the focus is on preventing both individuals from joining gangs and preventing gang-related violence and dif- fers radically from the current policing and criminal justice approach toward Muslims in the anti- terrorism context that relies heavily on stigmatizing Muslims in the West and can be counterproductive.65 In fact, gang prevention and intervention efforts that focus on police suppression are not effective, while ef- forts focusing on local contexts, gang prevention among youth, and comprehensive community pro- grams tend to show promise.66 Furthermore, others have argued that a public health approach to the prob- lem of political violence can involve primary (i.e., pre- venting violence), secondary (i.e., shortening the duration of violence), and tertiary prevention (i.e., preventing violence from becoming chronic and en- gaging in rehabilitation and reconstruction).25 In this way, strategies to deal with terrorism should be rooted in evidence and science and not politics and fearmongering. For social cohesion, a potentially effective approach to counterterrorism would include: legal and political efforts that champion human rights for all members of society, embracing the development of cultural liter- acy approach to community engagement, and affirm- ing the importance of intermediate and long-term relationships between individuals and communities. Interventions should focus on how social exclusion and marginalization can generate grievances that are not processed through political engagement or demo- cratic nonviolent negotiations.52 This also has wider health benefits of cohesive communities with greater social capital, economic resources, and fair access to health. Furthermore, efforts must be undertaken to en- courage the formation of bonds among Muslims and Arabs in the West and between these groups and oth- ers. In this way, the features of social networks can be leveraged to both increase access to outside resources to marginalized groups and promote the internal stock of resources among these groups. Approaches to reducing radicalization have taken advantage of knowledge of social capital and social net- works. For example, Denmark has taken a different ap- proach toward reducing the risk of radicalization in their response to people returning from Syria, whereas other European countries (and the U.S.) impose legal consequences for travelling to Syria. Danish police of- ficers ‘‘welcomed’’ returnees from Syria by offering a psychiatrist or mentor, assistance finding an apartment and returning to school, or ‘‘whatever they needed to fully integrate back into society.’’67 This innovative ap- proach toward deradicalization is guided by the idea that ‘‘fighting’’ terrorism through policing and/or ‘‘pro- filing’’ people will only incite perceived discrimination, humiliation, and/or marginalization, which is what they believe is at the root of the problem and will only make matters worse. Conclusion Adopting a social determinant of health approach to the multifaceted and transnational dimensions of ter- rorism is not without an array of challenges, including how one goes about ‘‘defining’’ or ‘‘identifying’’ a ter- rorist. However, given the climate of heightened dis- crimination toward Muslims and high risk for violent radicalization, social and behavioral scientists are in a unique position to inform and become actively in- volved in debates and initiatives to understand and ad- dress terrorism by applying a social determinant framework. Specifically, we have discussed how litera- ture on discrimination, social cohesion, and gang vio- lence can inform such efforts. These efforts are now more urgent as the current U.S. President had prom- ised policies that target Muslims for increased govern- ment scrutiny or prevent Muslims from entering the country as refugees. Alcalá, et al.; Health Equity 2017, 1.1 http://online.liebertpub.com/doi/10.1089/heq.2016.0016 93 Acknowledgment The authors thank Dr. Jennifer Jee-Lyn Garcı́a for her helpful comments on a draft of this article. Funding The research was supported by the National Institute of Child Health and Human Development grants at the University of Texas at Austin (T32HD007081 and R24HD042849). The content does not necessar- ily represent the official views of the National Insti- tutes of Health. Author Disclosure Statement No competing financial interests exist. References 1. Institute for Economics and Peace. Global Terrorism Index. New York, NY. 2015. 2. Rousseau C, Jamil U, Bhui K, et al. Consequences of 9/11 and the war on terror on children’s and young adult’s mental health: a systematic review of the past 10 years. Clin Child Psychol Psychiatry. 2015;20:173–193. 3. Frey BS, Luechinger S, Stutzer A. Calculating tragedy: assessing the costs of terrorism. J Econ Surv. 2007;21:1–24. 4. Desilver D. U.S. spends over $16 billion annually on counter-terrorism. Pew Research Center. 2013. 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Abbreviations Used ISIS¼ Islamic State of Iraq and Syria PTSD¼posttraumatic stress disorder Publish in Health Equity - Immediate, unrestricted online access - Rigorous peer review - Compliance with open access mandates - Authors retain copyright - Highly indexed - Targeted email marketing liebertpub.com/heq Alcalá, et al.; Health Equity 2017, 1.1 http://online.liebertpub.com/doi/10.1089/heq.2016.0016 95 http://www.liebertpub.com/heq 
work_4igodeayere2xcz3mw2lyxb62i	----	Recommendations for Further Reading (Winter 2008) Recommendations for Further Reading Timothy Taylor This section will list readings that may be especially useful to teachers of undergraduate economics, as well as other articles that are of broader cultural interest. In general, the articles chosen will be expository or integrative and not focus on original research. If you write or read an appropriate article, please send a copy of the article (and possibly a few sentences describing it) to Timothy Taylor, c/o Journal of Economic Perspectives, Macalester College, 1600 Grand Ave., Saint Paul, Minnesota, 55105. Report Round-up A team of authors including Akhter U. Ahmed, Ruth Vargas Hill, Lisa C. Smith, Doris M. Wiesmann, and Tim Frankenberger discusses “The World’s Most Deprived Characteristics and Causes of Extreme Poverty and Hunger” in a report for the International Food Policy Research Institute. From the Executive Summary: “We found that 162 million people live in ultra poverty on less than 50 cents a day. This is a significant number of people: if all of the ultra poor were concentrated in a single nation, it would be the world’s seventh most populous country after China, India, the United States, Indonesia, Brazil, and Pakistan. As it is, the ultra poor are overwhelmingly concentrated in one region—Sub-Saharan Africa is home to more than three-quarters of the world’s ultra poor.” “Those consuming less than 1,600 calories per day are at risk of dying from extreme hunger or starvation . . . . [I ]n the African countries surveyed (Burundi, Ethi- opia, Kenya, Malawi, Rwanda, Senegal, and Zambia), most of the hungry consume less y Timothy Taylor is Managing Editor, Journal of Economic Perspectives, based at Macalester College, Saint Paul, Minnesota. His e-mail address is �taylort@macalester.edu�. Journal of Economic Perspectives—Volume 22, Number 1—Winter 2008 —Pages 235–242 than 1,600 calories per day.” 2020 Discussion Paper 43, October 2007. At �http:// www.ifpri.org/2020/dp/vp43/vp43.pdf�. The World Development Report 2008 from the World Bank is subtitled “Agricul- ture for Development.” “Three of every four poor people in developing countries live in rural areas—2.1 billion living on less than $2 a day and 880 million on less than $1 a day—and most depend on agriculture for their livelihoods . . . . Cross- country estimates show that GDP growth originating in agriculture is at least twice as effective in reducing poverty as GDP growth originating outside agriculture. For China, aggregate growth originating in agriculture is estimated to have been 3.5 times more effective in reducing poverty than growth outside agriculture— and for Latin America 2.7 times more.” At �http://siteresources.worldbank.org/ INTWDR2008/Resources/WDR_00_book.pdf�. The October 2007 World Economic Outlook from the International Monetary Fund is subtitled “Globalization and Inequality.” Along with its always-useful overview of prospects for the world economy in 2008, the report offers specific chapters on global financial movements and on rising economic inequality. “The analysis finds that technological progress has had a greater impact than globalization on inequality within countries. The limited overall impact of globalization reflects two offsetting tendencies: whereas trade globalization is associated with a reduction in inequality, financial globalization—and foreign direct investment in particular—is associated with an in- crease in inequality. It should be emphasized that these findings are subject to a number of caveats related to data limitations, and it is particularly difficult to disen- tangle the effects of technology and financial globalization since they both work through processes that raise the demand for skilled workers. The chapter concludes that policies aimed at reducing barriers to trade and broadening access to education and credit can allow the benefits of globalization to be shared more equally.” At �http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2007/02/pdf/text.pdf�. The Human Development Report 2007/2008 from the United Nations Development Programme is subtitled “Fighting climate change: Human solidarity in a divided world.” “We identify five key transmission mechanisms through which climate change could stall and then reverse human development:” “Agricultural production and food security,” “Water stress and water insecurity,” “Rising sea levels and exposure to climate disasters,” “Ecosystems and biodiversity,” and “Human health.” “The world lacks nei- ther the financial resources nor the technological capabilities to act. If we fail to prevent climate change it will be because we were unable to foster the political will to cooperate. Such an outcome would represent not just a failure of political imagination and leadership, but a moral failure on a scale unparalleled in history.” At �http:// hdr.undp.org/en/media/hdr_20072008_en_complete.pdf�. Smorgasbord The Summer 2007 issue of Daedalus is dedicated to the theme “On capitalism & democracy,” and contains several contributions by prominent economists. For 236 Journal of Economic Perspectives example, in “Capitalism, economic growth & democracy” (pp. 46 –55) Benjamin M. Friedman writes: “But the important fact remains that, ever since the Industrial Revolution, decentralized market economies have had a proven record of deliver- ing rising living standards over sustained periods of time. Asking whether a market economy and democracy go together is therefore tantamount to asking whether economic growth and democracy go together. And thinking of the matter in that way suggests a mechanism by which the connection between the two might indeed be causal. The experience of many countries suggests that when a society experi- ences rising standards of living, broadly distributed across the population at large, it is also likely to make progress along a variety of dimensions that are either part of the very definition of democracy or closely associated with democracy.” In “Capitalism & democracy in 2040” (pp. 87–95) Robert W. Fogel writes: “To my mind, the most striking feature of Table 2 [which offers forecasts for 2040] is the relative decline in economic power of the EU15, implied by its stagnant population and its modest growth in GDP. . . . To many, the most provocative aspect of Table 2 is the forecast that, in 2040, the Chinese economy will reach $123 trillion, or nearly three times the output of the entire globe in the year 2000. Moreover, the per-capita income of China will reach $85,000, more than twice the forecasted per-capita income of the EU15, and also much higher than India’s or Japan’s. In other words, China is predicted to go from a poor country in 2000 to a superrich country in 2040, although it will not have overtaken the United States.” The Congressional Budget Office continues to produce a steady stream of balanced background papers. In “The Potential for Carbon Sequestration in the United States”: “In all, the United States accounts for roughly one-quarter of global CO2 emissions from fossil-fuel combustion, or about 6 billion metric tons per year . . . . Studies estimate that biological sequestration has the technological po- tential to sequester about 40 billion to 60 billion metric tons of CO2 in the United States over the course of 50 years and another few tens of billions of tons over the following half-century. The total capacity for storing captured CO2 emissions in geologic formations is estimated at roughly 1.2 trillion to 3.6 trillion metric tons. Thus, the United States has the technological potential to offset roughly a decade’s worth of its current CO2 emissions through biological sequestration and a few hundred years’ worth of emissions through carbon dioxide capture and stor- age . . . . The extent to which the United States exploits its technological potential for biological sequestration and CCS [carbon dioxide capture and storage] will depend on the costs and value of those practices.” September 2007. At �http:// www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/86xx/doc8624/09-12-CarbonSequestration.pdf�. The U.S. Department of the Treasury has released a study on “Income Mobility in the U.S. from 1996 to 2005.” From the Summary: “Economic historian Joseph Schumpeter compared the income distribution to a hotel where some rooms are luxurious, but others are small and shabby. Important aspects of fairness are that those in the small rooms have an opportunity to move to a better one, and that the luxurious rooms are not always occupied by the same people.” “There was consid- erable income mobility of individuals in the U.S. economy during the 1996 through Timothy Taylor 237 2005 period with roughly half of taxpayers who began in the bottom quintile moving up to a higher income group within 10 years. About 55 percent of taxpayers moved to a different income quintile within 10 years. Among those with the very highest incomes in 1996 —the top 1/100 of 1 percent— only 25 percent remained in this group in 2005. Moreover, the median real income of these taxpayers declined over this period. The degree of mobility among income groups is un- changed from the prior decade (1987 through 1996).” November 13, 2007. At �http://www.treasury.gov/press/releases/reports/incomemobilitystudyfinal.pdf�. On the same day as the Treasury report, the Economic Mobility Project at the Pew Foundation released three studies written by Julia Isaacs: “The Economic Mobility of Families Across Generations,” “The Economic Mobility of Men and Women,” and “The Economic Mobility of Black and White Families.” Some “Key Findings” include: “Children born to parents with income on the bottom rung of the ladder are highly likely (42 percent) to also be in the bottom rung in adult- hood, while those born to parents on the top rung are very likely to stay at the top (39 percent). This is known as ‘stickiness at the ends.’” “In every income group, blacks are less likely than whites to surpass their parents’ family income and more likely to fall down the economic ladder.” “Sons and daughters have fairly similar rates of mobility across generations, that is, family incomes of both sons and daughters resemble their parents’ to a similar degree.” November 13, 2007. Avail- able at �http://www.economicmobility.org�. In the Summer 2007 issue of this journal, Dennis W. Carlton argued that antitrust agencies should make their decisions on the basis of total welfare, not consumer surplus. Russell Pittman takes the opposite view in “Consumer Surplus as the Appropriate Standard for Antitrust Enforcement.” “Several recent papers call for antitrust agencies to move in the direction of this version of a total welfare standard for enforcement. However, as Oliver Williamson noted in his 1968 paper, horizontal mergers typically result in transfers that may greatly exceed in magni- tude any deadweight loss or efficiency gain, so that a decision to ignore transfers may be quite important. In this paper, I argue that such transfers are likely overall to be quite regressive, and thus that a consumer surplus standard rather than a total welfare standard may be appropriate for antitrust.” Competition Policy International, Autumn 2007, vol. 3, no. 2, pp. 205–224. Available at �http://www.globalcompetitionpolicy. org/�. About Economists Perhaps the most useful introductions for generalist economists to the work of joint Nobel Prize winners Leonid Hurwicz, Eric S. Maskin, and Roger B. Myerson is provided by the Nobel organization itself in a paper entitled: “Scientific background on the Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 2007: Mechanism Design Theory.” “The development of mechanism design theory began with the work of Leonid Hurwicz. He defined a mechanism as a communication system 238 Journal of Economic Perspectives in which participants send messages to each other and/or to a ‘message center,’ and where a pre-specified rule assigns an outcome (such as an allocation of goods and services) for every collection of received messages. Within this framework, markets and market-like institutions could be compared with a vast array of alternative institu- tions. . . . In the 1970s, the formulation of the so-called revelation principle and the development of implementation theory led to great advances in the theory of mechanism design. The revelation principle is an insight that greatly simplifies the analysis of mechanism design problems. In force of this principle, the researcher, when searching for the best possible mechanism to solve a given allocation problem, can restrict attention to a small subclass of mechanisms, so-called direct mechanisms. . . . Roger Myerson developed the principle in its greatest generality and pioneered its application to important areas such as regulation. . . . The revelation principle . . . does not address the issue of multiple equilibria. . . . Can a mechanism be designed so that all its equilibria are optimal? The first general solution to this problem was given by Eric Maskin. The resulting theory, known as implementation theory, is a key part of modern mechanism design.” October 15, 2007. At �http://nobelprize.org/ nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/2007/ecoadv07.pdf�. Daniel Kahneman delivered “A Short Course in Thinking about Thinking” to a small group of business innovators, which is full of interesting insights. “Just to give you a sense of how little people know, my first experiment with predictive utility asked whether people knew how their taste for ice cream would change. We ran an experiment at Berkeley when we arrived, and advertised that you would get paid to eat ice cream. We were not short of volunteers. People at the first session were asked to list their favorite ice cream and were asked to come back. In the first experimental session they were given a regular helping of their favorite ice cream, while listening to a piece of music—Canadian rock music—that I had actually chosen. That took about ten–fifteen minutes, and then they were asked to rate their experience. Afterward, they were also told, because they had undertaken to do so, that they would be coming to the lab every day at the same hour for I think eight working days, and every day they would have the same ice cream, the same music, and rate it. And they were asked to predict their rating tomorrow and their rating on the last day. It turns out that people can’t do this. Most people get tired of the ice cream, but some of them get kind of addicted to the ice cream, and people do not know in advance which category they will belong to. The correlation between what the change that actually happened in their tastes and the change that they predicted was absolutely zero.” Edge: The Third Culture, July 20 –22, 2007. Edited video and transcripts of the talks are available at �http://www.edge.org/3rd_ culture/kahneman07/kahneman07_index.html�. Lawrence H. Summers has a lively interview with International Economy maga- zine. “[T ]he G7 doesn’t have the legitimacy or primacy as a steering group for the world economy that it once did. Everybody remarks that of the G7 countries, three already use the same currency and most will not be among the world’s five largest economies a generation from now.” “If the income distribution in the United States were the same today as it was in 1979, the bottom 80 percent of the population Recommendations for Further Reading 239 would have about $670 billion more, or about $8,000 per family. And the top one percent would have about $670 billion less, or about $500,000 per family. Relative to numbers like that, a $3 billion trade adjustment assistance program looks very small. We need to think in a much more comprehensive way about income distribution, the progressivity of taxation, the enforcement of tax laws, and the benefits of public spending if we’re going to maintain broad support for the legitimacy of the system including the ability to maintain open markets.” Interna- tional Economy, Fall 2007, pp. 12–17. At �http://www.international-economy. com/TIE_F07_Summers.pdf�. Prakash Loungani offers an introduction to the work of Robert Barro in “Topping the Charts.” “The idea behind Barro’s first hit paper on economic growth—a 1991 article in the Quarterly Journal of Economics—was breathtakingly simple. He assembled a data set of incomes for nearly one hundred countries since 1960. He also collated data on a long list of variables that, according to theorists, influence growth in incomes. The list included school enrollment rates (a proxy for what economists call ‘human capital’), private investment, and the size and nature of government activities. It also included measures of the economic system in place, government-induced distortions of markets, and political instability. Barro exam- ined the statistical associations between income growth and this list of variables. He found that ‘poor countries tend to catch up with rich countries if the poor countries have high human capital . . . but not otherwise.’ He also found that investments by governments did little to trigger growth and that other government spending actually detracted from growth. Political instability and market distortions tended to lower growth. There is a simple fact about a data set and scholars: build it and they will come. That is what happened with the data set that Barro built—it attracted macroeconomists to the study of economic growth.” Finance and Develop- ment, September 2007. At �http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2007/ 09/people.htm�. Caren Chesler offers an introduction to the work of Raj Chetty in “The Experimenter.” “Chetty believes that if he can bring models and theories into better alignment with real-world evidence, he will help shape economic policy. It’s an ambition that runs in the family: his father, V. K. Chetty, was an economic adviser to Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in the 1980s, helping her privatize the government-run cement industry as India’s economy began to make the transition from socialism to free-market capitalism. Chetty is drawn to the psycho- logical underpinnings of economic theory. Before deciding on a change to the tax code, he argues, politicians should study how consumers think about taxes. With that in mind, he created an experiment to determine whether separately labeling the sales tax on an item would affect a shopper’s behavior. He persuaded a large grocery chain to allow him to post tags next to 750 of their products for three weeks, showing how much the item would cost after sales tax was added. Fearing the experiment would result in lower sales, the chain did not allow Chetty to post signs on its most popular items. The store management’s fears were well founded. When consumers knew just how much more taxes would cost them, they reduced their 240 Journal of Economic Perspectives purchases of the items by about 7 percent.” The American, September/October 2007. At �http://american.com/archive/2007/september-october-magazine-contents/ the-experimenter�. Discussion Starters Bryan Caplan offers a lively discussion of “The 4 Boneheaded Biases of Stupid Voters (And we’re all stupid voters).” “Out of all the complaints that economists lodge against laymen, four families of beliefs stand out: the anti-market bias, the anti-foreign bias, the make-work bias, and the pessimistic bias. . . . Joseph Schum- peter, arguably the greatest historian of economic thought, matter-of-factly spoke of ‘the ineradicable prejudice that every action intended to serve the profit interest must be anti-social by this fact alone.’ . . . [T ]he public’s implicit model of price determination is that businesses are monopolists of variable altruism. If a CEO feels greedy when he wakes up, he raises his price— or puts low-quality merchandise on the shelves. Nice guys charge fair prices for good products; greedy scoundrels gouge with impunity for junk. . . . A shrewd businessman I know has long thought that everything wrong in the American economy could be solved with two expedi- ents: 1) a naval blockade of Japan, and 2) a Berlin Wall at the Mexican bor- der. . . . As a general rule, the public believes economic conditions are not as good as they really are. It sees a world going from bad to worse; the economy faces a long list of grim challenges, leaving little room for hope. . . . How can high levels of pessimism coexist with constantly rising standards of living?” Reason, October 2007, At �http://www.reason.com/news/show/122019.html�. Eric W. K. Tsang and Bruno S. Frey suggest a reform of journal refereeing in “The As-Is Journal Review Process: Let Authors Own Their Ideas.” “[W ]e suggest making a radical change to the existing review process: A manuscript should be reviewed on an ‘as is’ basis. Similar to developmental review, the process is double- blind, and referees are encouraged to provide constructive comments on a manu- script. In contrast to developmental review, referees are given only two options when advising the editor regarding whether the manuscript should be published: accept or reject. The option of (minor or major) revision and resubmission is ruled out. Based on the referees’ recommendations and his or her own reading of the manuscript, the editor makes the decision to accept or reject the manuscript. If the editor accepts the manuscript (subject to normal copy editing), he or she will inform the authors accordingly, enclosing the editorial comments and comments made by the referees. It is up to the authors to decide whether, and to what extent, they would like to incorporate these comments when they work on their revision for eventual publication. As a condition of acceptance, the authors are required to write a point-by-point response to the comments. If they refuse to accept a com- ment, they have to clearly state the reasons. The editor will pass on the response to the referees. In sum, the fate of a submitted manuscript is determined by one round of review, and authors of an accepted manuscript are required to make one Timothy Taylor 241 round of revision.” Academy of Management Learning & Education, March 2007, vol. 6, no. 1, pp. 128 –136. Betty Joyce Nash describes how the “Academic Labor Market’s Tenure Track Recedes” in an article subtitled “Even professors can no longer count on job security. But to many academics, tenure may have outlived its appeal anyway.” “To save money, colleges now offer fewer tenure-track and more part-time jobs. Today, 63 percent of faculty jobs are off the tenure track. Part-time faculty jobs now approach half of all faculty positions.” Region Focus: Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, Summer 2007, pp. 20 –23. At �http://www.richmondfed.org/publications/ economic_research/region_focus/summer_2007/pdf/feature2.pdf�. Alan Krueger discusses “What Makes a Terrorist.” “[T ]he available evidence is nearly unanimous in rejecting either material deprivation or inadequate education as important causes of support for terrorism or participation in terrorist activities. Such explanations have been embraced almost entirely on faith, not scientific evidence. Why is an economist studying terrorism? I have two answers. First, participation in terrorism is just a special application of the economics of occupa- tional choice. Some people choose to become doctors or lawyers, and others pursue careers in terrorism. Economics can help us understand why. The second answer is that, together with Jörn-Steffen Pischke, now at the London School of Economics, I studied the outbreak of hate crimes against foreigners in Germany in the early 1990s. Through this work, I concluded that poor economic conditions do not seem to motivate people to participate in hate crimes.” The American, Novem- ber/December 2007. At �http://www.american.com/archive/2007/november- december-magazine-contents/what-makes-a-terrorist�. The article offers some use- ful follow-up to the article by Krueger and Jitka Malečková in the Fall 2003 issue of this journal. John Buchanan looks at “Meetings: The Biggest Money Pit of Them All.” “Throughout corporate America, signs point to expenditures for off-site meetings spinning out of control. Recently, for example, Pfizer learned it was spending as much as $1 billion annually, twice management’s estimate—not including airfare. The same ratio of actual to assumed spending—a lapse that often runs into tens of millions of dollars a year— has been found at Honeywell, Cisco Systems, and many other companies. Even top-gun Fortune 500 auditor PricewaterhouseCoopers missed its original meeting-cost estimate by a country mile.” Conference Board Review, September/October 2007. At �http://www.conference-board.org/articles/atb_ article.cfm?id�399� y Thanks to Larry Willmore for suggestions and to Katherine Lim for research assistance. 242 Journal of Economic Perspectives Recommendations for Further Reading Report Round-up Smorgasbord About Economists Discussion Starters 
work_4kge5seyyzctvpjvh6hmvs5zoa	----	Addressing issues of race, ethnicity and culture in CBT to support therapists and service managers to deliver culturally competent therapy and reduce inequalities in mental health provision for BAME service users SERVICE MODELS AND FORMS OF DELIVERY Addressing issues of race, ethnicity and culture in CBT to support therapists and service managers to deliver culturally competent therapy and reduce inequalities in mental health provision for BAME service users Saiqa Naz1,*,§, Romilly Gregory2,§ and Meera Bahu3,§ 1Sheffield Specialist Psychotherapy Service, 2Talking Space Plus, Oxfordshire and 3iCope Islington *Corresponding author. Email: saiqa.naz@shsc.nhs.uk (Received 25 April 2018; revised 30 January 2019; accepted 01 February 2019) Abstract Conversations around improving access to psychological therapies for BAME (Black, Asian and minority ethnic) serviceusershavebeenongoingformanyyearswithoutanyconclusionorresolution.BAMEserviceusersareoften under-represented in primary care mental health services, and often have worse outcomes, leading to them being portrayed as ‘hard to reach’, and to deterioration in their mental health. They are over-represented in secondary carementalhealthservices.Theauthorsofthisarticlearguethatmoreresourcesarerequiredinordertounderstand thebarrierstoaccessingmentalhealthservices,andimprovebothaccessandrecoveryforBAMEserviceusers.This paper examines concepts such as race, ethnicity and culture. It aims to support service managers and therapists to develop their confidence to address these issues in order to deliver culturally competent psychological therapies to serviceusersfromBAMEcommunities,withafocusonprimarycare.Itisbasedonourexperiencesofworkingwith BAME communities and the feedback from our training events on developing cultural competence for CBT therapists. The paper also discusses the current political climate and the impact it may have on service users andtheneedfortherapiststotakethewiderpoliticalcontextintoconsiderationwhenworkingwithBAMEservice users. Finally, the paper stresses the importance of addressing structural inequalities at a service level, and developing stronger ethical guidelines in the area of working with diversity for CBT therapists in the UK. Key learning aims (1) To examine concepts such as race, ethnicity and culture and to provide a shared understanding of these terms for CBT therapists. (2) To assist CBT therapists and supervisors to develop their confidence in addressing issues of race, ethnicity and culture with BAME service users within the current political climate and to deliver culturally competent therapy. (3) To assist service managers to promote equality of access and of outcomes for service users from BAME communities. (4) To understand how unequal expectations of therapists in services impacts on CBT therapists from BAME communities. (5) To widen understanding of some of the structural inequalities at service level which the CBT community needs to overcome, including recommending stronger ethical guidelines around working with diversity in the UK. Keywords: BAME; BME; CBT; culturally adapted; culture; ethnicity; primary care; racism §All three authors are committee members for the BABCP’s Equality and Culture Special Interest Group. Saiqa Naz is Chair, Romilly Gregory is Treasurer and Meera Bahu is Secretary. © British Association for Behavioural and Cognitive Psychotherapies 2019. The Cognitive Behaviour Therapist (2019), vol. 12, e22, page 1 of 17 doi:10.1017/S1754470X19000060 https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1754470X19000060 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:32, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at mailto:saiqa.naz@shsc.nhs.uk https://doi.org/10.1017/S1754470X19000060 https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/S1754470X19000060 https://www.cambridge.org/core Introduction Addressing issues around race, ethnicity and culture in therapy can often elicit difficult emotions for therapists. In our experience of delivering training on Developing Cultural Competence with CBT therapists we have found that many therapists lack the confidence to ask questions about a service user’s ethnicity, culture or experiences of racism in case they make mistakes or offend the person. Few are provided with the time and space in supervision to reflect upon these issues and develop their confidence and skills. Due to the lack of training and support that most CBT therapists have received in this area, we think many therapists are not aware of either the importance of exploring these issues in therapy or of their own skills gaps. Commitment and investment is needed by therapists, by service managers, by Clinical Commissioning Groups, as well as at research and policy levels to make real progress to address these issues. This article will look at placing race, ethnicity and culture into some form of context and to create a shared understanding of these terms for CBT therapists. It aims to help therapists and service managers conceptualize how they can start working more effectively with service users from different cultural backgrounds by offering some best practice guidance. It also discusses the need to further develop ethical guidelines for CBT therapists in the UK and to indicate some areas where further research is required. For the purpose of this article, when we talk about therapists, this also includes supervisors and clinical leads as they also have clinical caseloads. Many of the ideas shared in this article are from our own extensive experiences of working with Black, Asian and minority ethnic (BAME) communities and the feedback we have received from the workshops we have developed and delivered alongside another CBT colleague to trainee and qualified CBT therapists on developing cultural competence in CBT, drawing on research findings where they are available. The training we deliver is typically a one-day interactive workshop exploring ideas of ethnicity, implicit biases, and culturally sensitive and culturally adapted therapy, and how they can be taken into consideration in therapy sessions. The authors themselves are from diverse backgrounds, BAME and LGBTQ communities. Workshop participants have also been from various backgrounds including white British, LGBTQ and BAME communities. Many participants have worked in primary care Improving Access to Psychological Therapies (IAPT) services, but some therapists have also worked in secondary care, voluntary sector and private practice. From November 2017 to October 2018, over 150 CBT therapists participated in workshops to develop cultural competence in CBT including developing cultural competence for CBT supervisors. We reviewed 38 feedback forms from two workshops we recently delivered, one in September 2018 and one in October 2018. Thirty-one of the 38 participants found the workshops ‘very helpful’ or ‘helpful.’ We hope to review the workshops in more detail in a future article. The Equality Act (2010): race, ethnicity and culture Race is one of the protected characteristics in the Equality Act (2010). It refers to a group of people defined by their colour, nationality, ethnic or national origins which may not be the same as their current nationality (UK, HM Government, 2010). Religion or belief (or a lack of), is a separate protected characteristic of the Equality Act (2010). The terms race and ethnicity are commonly seen as interchangeable, but they have different connotations and usage. From the 17th century in Europe the term race was grounded in beliefs of biological differences between groups, such that skin colour and other physical features, indicated essential differences in abilities and character traits (Beck, 2016). These beliefs were used to justify power hierarchies, and provide grounds for exclusion. For example, in apartheid in South Africa and racial segregation in the USA the concept of race was used to justify discrimination. Since the mid-20th century, research in genetics and social sciences have 2 Saiqa Naz et al. https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1754470X19000060 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:32, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/S1754470X19000060 https://www.cambridge.org/core discredited these beliefs and societal changes have led to race being seen as more of a social construct (Beck, 2016), but it remains a ‘loaded’ term. Ethnicity can be seen as ‘a dynamic and subjective definition of one’s self in relation to a range of factors including language, geographical origin, skin colour, political preferences and religious and cultural practices’ (Loue, 2006; cited in Beck, 2016, p.8). It can also refer to a group of individuals who share a common and distinctive culture passed through different generations (Zenner, 1996; cited in Jandt, 2017). Ethnicity can therefore be seen as a much broader social construct than race. For example, people who have migrated to the UK from other countries may still relate their ethnic identity to their country of origin, whereas their offspring, whilst sharing similar physical characteristics, may identify themselves as having a different ethnicity. Cultures provide ways of interpreting the environment and the world, as well as relating to other people (Jandt, 2017). Damasio sees culture in an evolutionary context; our world and our environment is so complex and varied that social networks and cultures develop to regulate life and help us survive (Damasio, 2010; cited in Jandt, 2017). Definitions of culture have changed over the years. In the 19th century the term culture was synonymous for Western civilizations with Western nations believing their way of life was superior (Jandt, 2017). The idea that all societies pass through different developmental stages was made popular by a British anthropologist, Sir Edward B. Tylor (1871; cited in Jandt, 2017). These stages began with ‘savagery’, progressed to ‘barbarism’, culminating in Western ‘civilisation’ (Jandt, 2017). However, Jandt (2013; p.5) states: ‘To recognize that other peoples can see the world differently is one thing. To view their interpretations as less perfect than ours is another.’ This is where we believe racism and discrimination stems from. Jandt (2017) writes that traditionally culture was referred to as a ‘group’s thoughts, experiences, and patterns of behaviour and its concepts, values and assumptions about life that guide behaviour and how those evolve with contact with other cultures’ (Jandt, 2017). Hofstede (1994; cited in Jandt, 2017) categorized these into symbols, rituals, values and heroes. Symbols refer to verbal and non-verbal language. Rituals are the collective social activities within a culture and can sometimes be influenced by religious beliefs and practices. Values are about principles and standards of behaviour, what is good or bad, normal or abnormal. These values are present in the majority of members belonging to a culture. Heroes are real or imaginary characters who serve as role models within that culture, for example heroes in cultural myths. There are various ways in which culture is transmitted. Gong (2010) talks of there being three forms of cultural transmission. Vertical transmission is where one member of one generation talks to a biologically related member of another generation, for example parents through to offspring. Horizontal transmission is where individuals of the same generation communicate, for example peer interactions. Oblique transmission is where any member of one generation talks to any non-biologically related member of a later generation, for example through interactions with adults and institutions in one’s society or community. Some of these individuals may have a shared identity with both the country they consider to be their own and also their parent’s country of birth and/or parent’s faith. They will be recipients of vertical, horizontal and oblique cultural transmissions. These different interactions will shape and form how someone makes sense of these experiences, and how they see themselves, others and the world. Despite the definition of race being broad in the Equality Act (2010), often people still focus on the physical characteristics of individuals when talking about race, implying a static concept, something which is fixed and cannot be changed. Therefore, for the purpose of this article, we will focus more on ethnicity and culture. Ethnicity is broader in definition and encompasses physical characteristics amongst others. It is more fluid and subjective. The work of Tariq Modood is important in this area. Modood et al. (1994) write: ‘Ethnic identity, far from being some primordial stamp upon an individual, is a plastic and changing badge of membership. Ethnic identity is a product of The Cognitive Behaviour Therapist 3 https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1754470X19000060 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:32, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/S1754470X19000060 https://www.cambridge.org/core a number of forces: social exclusion and stigma and political resistance to them : : : the boundaries of groups are unclear and shifting, especially when groups seek to broaden an ethnic identity or to accommodate membership in a number of overlapping groups. And this leaves out the broader social, economic and political forces.’ Ethnic diversity in Britain is a complex, multi-dimensional social and cultural issue. It poses deep challenges and opportunities to the practice of psychotherapy. This is particularly true when psychotherapy is taking place between people with ethnic identities that are labelled as ‘black’ or ‘white.’ As Lago and Thompson (2002; p. 4) ask: ‘Given that relations between black and white groups over several centuries have been typified by oppression, exploitation and discrimination, how might contemporary relationships within counselling be transformed into creative (rather than further damaging) experiences?’ Understanding the current social and political climate as it impacts on the experience of service users and therapists It is a running joke amongst many Asians that they are often asked, ‘Where are you from?’ When the person replies with which part of the UK they are from, they will be asked again ‘No, where are you really from?’ Again after giving the same answer, they will then be asked, ‘Where are your parents from?’ If someone is an offspring of a migrant, they will automatically be given the same ethnic label as their parents’ origin of birth, despite their experiences being similar to their white counterparts. This can be a confusing experience for service users who have always considered the UK to be their country and have felt part of society, and are now made to feel like the ‘Other’. Naturally thoughts of being rejected by those you consider as your own may elicit difficult emotions and force people to re-evaluate their identity. It is important that therapists are aware that regardless of what service users might identify as their ethnic identity, there may be certain experiences that will be influenced by their physical appearances, which includes their skin colour and facial features, and how they choose to dress. For example, British-born Muslim females who choose to wear the hijab, or Sikhs who choose to wear a turban, both religious head coverings, despite identifying as British, have English as their first language, work with and socialize outside of work with white British people, have been known to face both verbal and physical abuse because of how they look and how they choose to dress. Therapists also need to be aware of the impact the rise in Islamophobia, anti-Semitism and other forms of racism has on service users. Even Members of Parliament (MPs), in what is considered to be a reputable profession, have been criticised. The Conservative party has been criticised for Islamophobia in its party, and the Labour party for anti-Semitism. Issues such as austerity and Brexit and how they are portrayed in the media, along with a rise of far-right groups and activities, will have an impact on how the majority view minority groups. One example is that after the EU referendum, the Polish community suffered verbal and physical attacks against migrants in public places, at work and in schools (‘Poles in UK fear spike in hate crimes’, The Guardian, 2017). The hate crimes are often under-reported or not reported as they take place in different organizational contexts and workplaces. Often people from minority groups do not want to take the risk of reporting as they would risk losing their jobs and livelihood. This causes additional mental health problems (‘Anxious Poles in the UK won’t report hate crimes’, The Guardian, 2017). Recent policy changes in Britain linked to the rise in anti-immigration, nationalistic and racist sentiments have had a massive impact, as seen in the experiences of the Windrush Generation whereby their identities of being British citizens have been challenged (‘In Praise of David Lammy’, GQ Magazine, 2018) and they have been denied NHS treatment (‘Londoner denied NHS cancer care’, The Guardian, 2018), as well as losing their jobs and homes (‘It’s inhumane: the Windrush victims’, The Guardian, 2018). This demonstrates how government policies themselves are responsible for creating structural inequalities in our society and the NHS itself. Furthermore, it is the government agenda that influences what services are delivered, and to whom. 4 Saiqa Naz et al. https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1754470X19000060 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:32, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/S1754470X19000060 https://www.cambridge.org/core These societal changes are creating fear in large groups of individuals from different backgrounds while the majority community is perhaps experiencing intensified guilt and shame. This fear is then perpetuated by sharing of information on social media. A recent example of this is ‘Punish a Muslim Day’ letter that was widely circulated online. The letter was based upon a points system. ‘Verbally abuse a Muslim’ would earn someone 10 points, ‘Pull the headscarf off a Muslim woman’ would earn someone 25 points, ‘Throw acid in the face of a Muslim’ was 50 points, ‘Beat up a Muslim’ was 100 points, ‘Torture a Muslim using electrocution, skinning, use of a rack’ was 250 points, ‘Butcher a Muslim using gun, knife, vehicle or otherwise’ was 500 points, ‘Burn or bomb a mosque’ would be 1000 points and ‘Nuke Mecca’ would earn 2500 points (‘Man arrested for “Punish a Muslim day” letters’, Metro, 2018). Some of the hate crimes mentioned in the letter have already been committed and have (rightly) received exposure in the media. Paul Moore was jailed for life in March 2017 for running over a 47-year-old Muslim woman and a 12-year-old Muslim girl in Leicester. The judge said they were targeted for wearing Islamic clothing (‘Man jailed for life’, The Guardian, 2018). In October 2018, 35-year-old David Parnham pleaded guilty at the Old Bailey to 15 offences, including soliciting to murder and staging a bomb hoax after he was charged with sending the ‘Punish a Muslim Day’ letters. He could receive a life sentence after he encouraged recipients of his post to attack ethnic minorities and would donate £100 to charity for each killing (‘Lincoln man admits sending “Punish a Muslim Day” letters’, BBC, 2018). Two Muslim cousins were victims of an acid attack. Although the intent is unclear, the perpetrator was white. Again given the current climate, many Muslims see this as a hate crime. One of the victims himself saw this as a hate crime in an interview he gave to Channel 4 news (‘Acid attack on two Muslim cousins’, The Guardian, 2017). In April 2018 the BBC reported that John Tomlin was sentenced for 16 years for the unprovoked attack (‘Beckton birthday acid attacker’, BBC, 2018). From April 2017 to March 2018, there was a 40% rise in religious hate crime, with over half of religiously motivated attacks directed at Muslims. Jews were the next most commonly targeted group (Dearden, 2018). The Guardian reported that there were 1382 anti-Semitic incidents recorded nationwide in 2017 by the Community Security Trust, a rise of 3% in comparison with 1346 in 2016 (‘Antisemitic incidents in UK at all-time high’, The Guardian, 2018). There has been an increase in attacks on faith institutions like mosques and synagogues. A mosque in Newton Heath experienced three suspected arson attacks in three years (‘Manchester mosque left gutted’, The Guardian, 2017). In September 2018 armed officers were deployed by the Counterterror police as the Jewish community marked Yom Kippur, the Jewish new year (‘Armed police deployed in counterterror operation’, The Independent, 2018). What should have been a happy occasion may also have created anxiety in the Jewish community. In light of these recent incidents, it is understandable why people from BAME communities may be afraid and that this is something to take into consideration in therapy sessions. As an example, one of the authors was encouraging a service user with post-traumatic stress disorder, following an assault, to go outside alone as part of the treatment. However, the service user was scared after they heard about the acid attack mentioned above. Asking a victim of assault to go out alone when there are threats, whether they are real or perceived, towards their ethnic group can inadvertently cause them more distress. Understanding and exploring these factors are important and can affect the therapist’s understanding of the service user’s problems. It is important that the formulation should take service users’ cultural background into account, as well as their communities (Persons and Davidson, 2001). Developing culturally sensitive practice as CBT therapists We will explore some emerging areas of good practice drawing on experience, the literature and the evidence base. This is a developing area requiring further investment in research. The Cognitive Behaviour Therapist 5 https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1754470X19000060 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:32, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/S1754470X19000060 https://www.cambridge.org/core Culturally adapted and culturally sensitive CBT Beck (2016) distinguishes between culturally adapted CBT (CA-CBT) and culturally sensitive CBT (CS-CBT). CS-CBT is more similar to the CBT provided to the majority of white service users, but is adapted on a case-by-case basis by therapists and service users, and includes discussion of issues of ethnicity and culture. However, CA-CBT is adapted for specific ethnic groups and for a specific disorder (Beck, 2016). The active components of CBT are retained, but the language, examples and metaphors are culturally specific. The therapy incorporates cultural values and practices, and there is additional emphasis on context for the service user, such as their economic situation, experiences of discrimination and migration history. An example of a CA-CBT is Ghazala Mir’s adaptation of the Behavioural Activation (BA) approach for Muslim communities, which is widely available online (Mir et al., 2012). A BA treatment manual and self-help booklet have been developed to be used by the service user and therapist (Shabbir et al., 2012). The self-help booklet contains teachings from the Islamic faith; for example, on page 8 there is a subheading: ‘Tie your camel: do your part.’ It goes on to say, ‘Change starts with the individual. There is a cause and effect of our actions and we cannot change things unless we ourselves make an effort to change.’ To elaborate on this, they share the following story: ‘One day Prophet Muhammad (pbuh – peace be upon him) noticed a Bedouin leaving his camel without tying it. He asked the Bedouin, ‘Why don’t you tie down your camel?’ The Bedouin answered, ‘I put my trust in Allah’. The Prophet then said, ‘Tie your camel first, then put your trust in Allah.’ This example can be used to motivate service users to be active participants in therapy, something which is encouraged in standard CBT. However, the information used to facilitate this process comes from the individual’s religion, Islam in this example. Similar teachings may also be derived from other religions to help service users with different faiths. Therapists will need to have some knowledge of those religions. To help with this, we recommend using the Chaplaincy service most NHS trusts have, as well as developing relationships with local faith organizations. In their research Mir et al. (2015) found that the use of religious teachings in therapy were of more value to Muslim service users than standard approaches; however, therapists required more support than was anticipated to deliver the interventions. This is an example of the need for investment of resources and support for therapists to build their confidence when working with diverse communities. The importance of getting culturally sensitive therapy right is illustrated in an example raised at our ‘All Cards on the Table’ workshop in November 2017. One of the authors raised the example of working with a Tamil group, and the local IAPT service. The IAPT service had carefully translated the computerized CBT program ‘Beating the Blues’ into Tamil. When a video of this was shown at the Temple the reaction was immediate. The example given of behavioural activation was getting out and about by going the pub. Community leaders were not happy with this advice and did not want to engage with the training. It is important to work from the framework of the BAME service users rather than making assumptions that they would wish to engage in similar activities as the mainstream culture. When is a good time to explore someone’s ethnicity and culture? We highly recommend reading Beck’s (2016) ‘Transcultural Cognitive Behaviour Therapy in Anxiety and Depression: A Practical Guide’. Chapter 2 discusses service users’ perspectives on how to raise and discuss issues related to ethnicity and culture, different experiences and values; when to raise these issues, such as during assessment and formulation; and the impact of this on the therapeutic relationship. Beck (2016) emphasizes the importance of therapists becoming comfortable with raising these issues and skilled at following the lead of service users who raise the issue by asking additional questions. In general he recommends that these issues are raised early in the therapy but after the initial rapport has been established. 6 Saiqa Naz et al. https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1754470X19000060 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:32, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/S1754470X19000060 https://www.cambridge.org/core One example came up recently during our training events. During a lecture on Working with Diversity in CBT, trainee IAPT high-intensity therapists from the University of Nottingham discussed goal setting as a good opportunity to explore religion, ethnicity or culture. For example, if the service user would like to re-engage with certain religious or cultural practices, this would be a perfect opportunity to explore the importance of these practices and what they mean to the service user. At recent Developing Cultural Competence workshops, therapists have discussed many examples of how and when they raise these issues in a relaxed and open way with service users. Some skilled therapists described bringing these issues into the discussion early on, saying things like ‘We look very different, you and I, what will it be like for you working with someone like me?’ Others mention being tuned in to noticing important opportunities to respond to in ways that open up underlying issues and concerns. For example, one of the authors, a white therapist, gave an example of working with a black British service user who was worried about the way her teenage son behaved when angry. She expressed concern for his safety and said, ‘He’s going to be a big man’. The therapist reflected back, ‘A big, black man’, opening up an opportunity for discussion of the service user’s worry that her son needed to be extra careful with anger management to avoid triggering mainstream stereotypes of black men. Therapists often feed back that it is the wealth of stories and experience shared in a non-judgemental way at the workshops which helps them to pick up new skills and gain confidence. BAME therapist working with white service users with prejudicial views If BAME therapists are working with white service users who hold prejudicial views, we strongly advise discussing this in supervision. Therapists should feel safe and protected when working with any service user. If the therapist feels comfortable, they can explore these views with the service user. In our experience, service users often have these views because of the socio-economic problems they are experiencing, and are feeling frustrated or have a lack understanding of other cultures due to having little or no contact with them. Their perceptions of minority groups may be influenced by the media narrative that immigrants are a strain to the UK economy. We would recommend not directly challenging their views, but developing a good therapeutic relationship and understanding of how and why these views have developed. Often we find that at the end of therapy, these views have shifted due to the therapeutic relationship, even though that was not the focus of therapy. We had some encouraging feedback from a participant at the end of our ‘All Cards on the Table’ training in November 2017: ‘If a patient says racist things I take it personally and get anxious. But now, if anyone says anything racist I will ask them why’. Therapists’ own prejudices and implicit biases When working with service users from different ethnic or cultural backgrounds, it is important for therapists to be mindful that their own prejudices and stereotypes do not interfere in the therapy process. We all have implicit biases, which occur when our associative brain makes incredibly quick judgements and assessments of people and situations, often without us realizing. Our biases are influenced by our background, cultural environment and personal experiences (Greenwald and Kriege, 2006). Instead of coming from the viewpoint that we do not have any prejudices, as that can make the therapist defensive and interfere with the therapy process, we recommend therapists start with acknowledging their own implicit biases. Then whilst having this conscious awareness and with a sense of curiosity, they can explore service user’s experiences and identity. Understandably where there are constraints on the number of sessions that can be offered, therapists may feel The Cognitive Behaviour Therapist 7 https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1754470X19000060 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:32, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/S1754470X19000060 https://www.cambridge.org/core pressured to rush this process. However, they should allow for extra time in sessions for this, as this can enhance the therapeutic relationship and facilitate therapy itself. White therapist working with a service users from a BAME background: dealing with difficult emotions that may arise in the therapist As we have learned in our Developing Cultural Competency workshops, addressing issues around ethnicity and racism in therapy can sometimes trigger difficult emotions for white therapists, such as anxiety, guilt and shame. Anxiety about making mistakes can lead to avoidance behaviours, so some therapists report avoiding mentioning issues of racism, ethnicity or culture with BAME service users in case they make mistakes. The Five Areas model given in Fig. 1 demonstrates what may happen when a therapist encounters a BAME service user or someone they perceive to be ‘different’ from them. As Brown (2008, p. 56) says in a case study about a white therapist working with a black client, ‘We avoid empathetic connection by convincing ourselves that we can’t really understand experiences we haven’t actually had’. Feelings of shame and guilt may arise linked to the therapist’s awareness of their own relative social privilege in relation to ethnicity (McIntosh, 1989). A white therapist hearing a service user describing experiences of racism may experience feelings of shame and guilt. These emotions are linked to the need to belong. They tend to be triggered when we sense a possible rupture in a relationship linked to who we are (shame), or what we have done (guilt), or to what a group Situation Aware service user is ‘different’ e.g. BAME in therapy Cognitions ‘I am not knowledgeable enough to understand their ethnicity/culture/religion’ ‘I’m not sure I am the best person to work with them’ ‘If I raise questions about their ethnicity, culture or religion, it will be really awkward’ ‘What if I offend them?’ ‘What if I get something wrong? They might think I’m being racist?’ Body Mood Heart rate increases Anxious Tense Shame Change in body language Guilt Behaviours Avoid bringing up their ethnicity/religion/culture/experience of racism in therapy Don’t feel confident and therefore avoided working with people from BAME communities Figure 1. Impact on therapist Five Areas model. 8 Saiqa Naz et al. https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1754470X19000060 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:32, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/S1754470X19000060 https://www.cambridge.org/core we belong to has done. In a general way they are adaptive in that they motivate us to repair relationships and take time out to reflect and re-evaluate on our or our group’s behaviour (Tangney et al., 1996). However, the immediate response to these emotions in the therapist is likely to be a degree of emotional withdrawal, and self-focus leading to a reduction in empathy for the service user which is not helpful in a therapy session. One of the authors attended a racism and mental health event organized by Kids of Colour (http://kidsofcolour.com), an organization in Manchester for young BAME people to explore their experiences of race, identity and culture in modern Britain. The author learned that racism was affecting these young peoples’ mental health, yet it was not being explored in therapy when the young people sought help. It is understandable why these young people and others may perceive the lack of exploration of their experiences of racism, which have contributed to the deterioration of their mental health, as racism or that the particular type of therapy being offered to them is not suitable for their ethnic or cultural background. As Brown says, ‘Ultimately feeling shame about privilege actually perpetuates racism’ (Brown, 2008, p. 59). There is large body of research indicating that compassion and empathy are a good solution to the paralysing impact of shame and guilt (Brown, 2008; Gilbert, 2010). It is helpful for the white therapist to become skilled at recognizing and using their ‘self CBT’ skills to tolerate uncertainty, self-soothe and move through their own feelings of guilt and shame if they arise during therapy, focusing on reaching for their empathy and understanding of the client’s experience (Mueller et al., 2010, p. 458). Given the nature of these emotions it is essential that there is a safe and secure supervisory relationship, where the therapist can be confident in their supervisor’s skills at providing this space for learning (Beck, 2016, p. 163). Receiving supervision from colleagues with cultural competence will be important to enable therapists requiring support to develop these skills. In our experience, providing safe, non-judgemental training settings is also important for therapists to recognize their avoidance, question these beliefs and learn from challenging experiences. The Five Areas Model in Fig. 2 demonstrates being able to work with BAME communities despite experiences difficult feelings of anxiety, shame and guilt. We suggest white therapists who mainly work with white service users speak to their managers about creating opportunities to work with service users from different ethnic and cultural backgrounds, and seek cultural competency training so they can improve their confidence and skills and overcome any avoidance. The role managers of local services can play to support staff We are mindful that to meet service demands, service managers can sometimes place a cap on the number of sessions therapists can offer service users. However, service managers are responsible for the wellbeing of their staff. They need to be aware of the issues discussed in this article as these issues will be affecting their staff who work with service users from different cultural backgrounds. This could be white therapists working with BAME service users or BAME therapists working with white service users. We would like to take this opportunity to remind managers that NICE (2009; 1.5.3.2) guidance makes recommendations for the number of sessions that should be offered for different presenting problems; for example, it recommends ‘For all people with depression having individual CBT, the duration of treatment should typically be in the range of 16 to 20 sessions over 3 to 4 months.’ Service managers have a responsibility to ensure all staff are supported to work with service users of different ethnicities and cultures through providing access to interpreters, translated materials, Continuing Professional Development (CPD) workshops and culturally competent supervision, It is also important to allow more time in therapy sessions (especially when working through interpreters) because as well as dealing with service users’ mental health problems, the issues discussed in this article have to be explored. This will enhance both the service users’ and therapists’ experience of therapy. Positive experiences are likely to instil confidence in therapists to The Cognitive Behaviour Therapist 9 https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1754470X19000060 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:32, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/S1754470X19000060 https://www.cambridge.org/core work with service users from different ethnicities and cultures. They are also likely to instil confidence in service users in mental health services, and could help to break down the stigma associated with seeking support for mental health problems. We recognize that it is important to utilize therapists’ skills to help inform practice; however, in the spirit of promoting equality, managers also need to ensure that the responsibility of working with diverse communities is evenly distributed between BAME and non-BAME therapists. Gurpinar-Morgan et al. (2014) conducted qualitative research with BAME service users in Manchester who had successfully worked with cognitive behavioural therapists from white majority backgrounds. One of the themes they identified was working with ethnically similar and ethnically dissimilar therapists. They found that some service users may find it easier to discuss experiences such as racism, and cultural and religious practices with ethnically similar therapists, whilst others would prefer ethnically dissimilar therapists as they might believe that ethnically similar therapists make more assumptions about them. Therefore, there is no hard or fixed rule to match BAME therapists to BAME service users. Situation Aware service user is ‘different’,e.g. BAME in therapy Cognitions ‘I am not knowledgeable enough to understand their ethnicity/culture/religion’ ‘I’m not sure I am the best person to work with them’ ‘If I raise questions about their ethnicity, culture or religion, it will be really awkward’ ‘What if I offend them?’ ‘What if I get something wrong? They might think I’m being racist?’ Body Mood Heart rate increases Anxious Tense Shame Change in body language Guilt Behaviours Tolerate uncertainty and allow self to be vulnerable in light of difficult feelings being aroused Bring up service users ethnicity/religion/culture/experience of racism in therapy Don’t feel confident and still work with people from BAME communities. Be kind to yourself Discuss issues and reflect in supervision, attend workshops to develop confidence Consequences Acquire more knowledge of other ethnicities, cultures and religions Develop confidence to work with BAME communities including new and emerging communities Therapists’experiences of delivering therapy to BAME communities improves BAME service users’ experiences of receiving therapy improve Overall, better relationships between the mental health service and BAME communities can start to develop Figure 2. Managing impact on therapist Five Areas model. 10 Saiqa Naz et al. https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1754470X19000060 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:32, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/S1754470X19000060 https://www.cambridge.org/core BAME therapists involved in BAME mental health development work In many services we are mindful that often it is the BAME therapists who are allocated referrals of BAME service users because of their own ethnicities, while white colleagues may have little or no contact with BAME service users. BAME therapists in this position may come to feel responsible for the quality of service being provided to these service users, and struggle to deliver the best possible care, often without adequate support and resources from the service or their managers. We believe this area requires further investment and research to enable therapists to deliver therapy to as good a standard as is provided to white British service users. An example of this came up at one of our recent workshops. Two BAME therapists expressed concern about lower recovery rates for BAME service users in their services and were tasked to look into this; however, they were not allocated time in their roles to develop relationships with local community organizations in order to try and address the issue. Services also need to be mindful that not all BAME therapists will want to work exclusively with BAME communities. The different expectations some services place on BAME therapists may limit the therapists’ professional development in other areas. We believe this can be seen as indirectly discriminating against BAME therapists and disadvantages them in comparison with their white colleagues (Equality and Human Rights Commission, 2016). Where services expect BAME therapists to be involved in service development work with local communities, managers need to be aware that these therapists also need to be supported to have access to additional learning resources and time. This could include translated literature, training and attending conferences, so that the learning can be brought back into services and evidence-based interventions can be tailored to the needs of service users from different ethnic and cultural backgrounds. Service managers need to allocate funding, think flexibly and not be scared to be creative and develop different ways of working with different communities; for example, a BAME working group which one of the authors was involved in, performed an award-winning play to different communities in Urdu and English (‘Mental health support for minorities wins top prize’, Pennine Care NHS Foundation Trust, 2016). The play was to educate communities about what depression is and how it can have an impact on individuals and their families, and what support they could receive. Following on from this work, the access rates improved in the service. CBT is often seen as a Westernized concept and it is important to develop resources to make it accessible to other communities. Lucy Maddox, BABCP’s Senior Clinical Advisor has made a series of podcasts on the BABCP website called ‘Let’s Talk About CBT’. One of the Podcasts (Maddox, 2018) is about an outreach event one of the authors of this article was involved with in Glasgow at the start of BABCP’s annual conference. In this podcast, an Islamic scholar Shaykh Abdul Aziz Ahmed gives his perspective on Muslim mental health. At the event, Shaykh Abdul Aziz used an 800-year-old Islamic text which has similar teachings to what we consider to be CBT for white Western communities. Whilst we agree that promotional campaigns help raise awareness of mental health issues in the BAME community, this is not enough. We have often heard that some therapists are allowed to do some outreach work, and so services show an improvement in access rates, but we are concerned if there is no follow-through to deliver ongoing high quality of care. Doing some outreach work to improve access rates is one thing, delivering a high-quality service and moving service users to recovery is another. A recent example of this is when one of the authors questioned a therapist about what was offered to BAME communities in their service after the initial contact was made. They replied they had been trying look into this for a few years on their own and this part of their service had yet to be developed. The author advised them to share the responsibility with their service manager and to focus on their own personal development. The Cognitive Behaviour Therapist 11 https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1754470X19000060 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:32, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/S1754470X19000060 https://www.cambridge.org/core We strongly advise BAME therapists to reflect upon their own work, and think about whether the issue raised here is applicable to them. If so, we would advise them to discuss this with their supervisors, clinical leads and managers. We would also advise them to ask their white therapist colleagues to share responsibility and be involved in any work to improve access and recovery of BAME service users. Some steps towards addressing structural inequalities in CBT services The Equality Act 2010 sets a duty for sector service providers to: eliminate discrimination, harassment and victimization; advance equality of opportunity; and promote good relations between communities (UK, HM Government, 2010). The Francis report was published in 2013 after serious failings at Mid Staffordshire Hospital. One of its main findings was that patients should always be put first and be protected from avoidable harm and any deprivations of their rights, and anything done by the NHS and those associated with it should be informed by this (Francis, 2013). Mental health service providers need to remember this. There has been evidence of inequalities in mental health services for decades. For example, the Policy Studies Institute report on Ethnicity and Mental Health: Findings for the National Community Survey (Nazroo, 1999), reported that many more Afro-Caribbean men were hospitalized with schizophrenia than people from the white population, and that twice as many young Asian women committed suicide as young white women. Butt et al. (2015) summarizes ways that BAME communities have significantly poorer mental health outcomes and poorer experience of services. BAME service users are often under-represented in primary care mental health services, and often have worse outcomes, leading to them being portrayed as ‘hard to reach’, and to deterioration in their mental health. They are over-represented in secondary care mental health services. Only after we address structural inequalities and the recommendations here are implemented, can we then start to consider whether the BAME community is hard to reach; until then we are of the opinion that no community is hard to reach. The King’s Fund is a charity working in England who provide a public reference library specializing in health and social care resources to promote the best possible health and care for all. They undertake regular literature reviews in key areas. For their reading list on barriers to access to mental health services for BAME service users, see The King’s Fund (2016), or search their online library (The King’s Fund Library Catalogue, 2018). There is also a strong potential to mine the IAPT dataset for valuable information on outcomes for BAME service users in the IAPT services (NHS, 2018). Currently Lynne Carter, a Knowledge Mobilization Research Fellow and her colleagues at the University of Sheffield are reviewing such data (Carter, 2018); however, her findings are yet to be published. We are mentioning this work as it will be of interest to those with an interest in inclusion in mental health. In the areas of developing cultural competencies, there seems to be a stronger framework of training and research in the USA than the UK. For example, training courses for counsellors in ‘multicultural competencies’ have been well established for some time (Palmer, 1999). The competencies include: knowledge of own and other cultures; skills in multi-cultural counselling; and awareness of one’s own deep cultural influences. There is substantial research into their effectiveness. For example, Castillo et al. (2007) ran a quantitative study with 74 first year MA students, predominantly white, who were training to be counsellors. At the end of their training, the 40 who were attending multi-cultural counselling classes showed a significant reduction in implicit racial bias and increase in awareness of cultural influences compared with the other 44, who had received equivalent training but without a multi-cultural focus. The before and after measures used were the Race-IAT (Race Implicit Association Test) (Greenwald et al., 1998; cited 12 Saiqa Naz et al. https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1754470X19000060 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:32, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/S1754470X19000060 https://www.cambridge.org/core in Castillo, 2007) and the MCI (Multicultural Counselling Inventory) (Sodowsky et al., 1994; cited in Castillo, 2007). We suggest that there is a need for more research to help develop best practice standards for training in the UK. One of the tools for setting minimum standards in psychotherapy is the code of ethics of the professional bodies, such as BABCP. This guides therapist training, criteria for accreditation and CPD. The preamble for the code of ethics for The American Counseling Association has diversity centre stage. It states: ‘The American Counselling Association is an educational, scientific, and professional organization whose members work in a variety of settings and serve in multiple capacities. ACA members are dedicated to the enhancement of human development throughout the life-span. Association members recognize diversity and embrace a cross-cultural approach in support of the worth, dignity, potential, and uniqueness of people within their social and cultural contexts.’ (American Counseling Association, 2014, p. 2). The British Association of Counsellors and Psychotherapists ethical framework (BACP, 2016) also includes a substantial section on diversity, including promoting the valuing of diversity, avoidance of discrimination, and working sensitively with issues of identity. In contrast, the British Association for Behavioural and Cognitive Psychotherapies, (BABCP, 2017) Standards of Conduct, Performance and Ethics of the BABCP seems more uni-dimensional. It says: ‘You must not allow your views about a service user’s sex, age, colour, race, disability, sexuality, social or economic status, lifestyle, culture, religion or beliefs to affect the way you treat them or the advice you give. You must treat service users with respect and dignity. If you are providing care, you must work in partnership with your service users and involve them in their care as appropriate.’ (BABCP, 2017, p. 6). In our view there is a need to develop stronger professional, ethical guidelines in the area of working with diversity for CBT therapists in the UK. The guidelines need to be more proactive to equitably engage with BAME service users with a clear and strong emphasis on therapists to be more proactive to enable this to happen. Summary To summarize, we have provided an overview on the terms race, culture and ethnicity to provide a shared understanding of these terms for CBT therapists. We have recommended using the terms ethnicity and culture as race may be considered to be outdated, despite it being used in the Equality Act (2010) as one of its protected characteristics (HM Government, 2010). We have also provided best practice guidance for BAME and white therapists, as well as service managers, to enable them to work more effectively with service users from different ethnic and cultural backgrounds, for example to consider the current socio-political context. We have placed emphasis on evenly distributing work between BAME and non-BAME therapists, and providing access to resources including translated materials, training and supervision to deliver culturally competent care to BAME service users. We encourage therapists to recognize and question their own avoidance behaviours and implicit biases, and recommend that for therapists to do this effectively they will need training and supervision delivered in skilled, safe and non-judgemental settings. Ultimately, we believe the responsibility of ensuring that equality is embedded in mental health services lies with all involved with the service users care. This includes commitment and investment from therapists, supervisors, clinical leads, service managers, Clinical Commissioning The Cognitive Behaviour Therapist 13 https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1754470X19000060 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:32, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/S1754470X19000060 https://www.cambridge.org/core 1. BAME communities enter mental health services 4. Service users’ mental health deteriorates. Therapists feel deskilled and frustrated 5. Mental health of BAME communities deteriorates (increased cost in providing more intensive care) 2. Mental health services not adequately funded and resourced to meet the needs of BAME communities 3. Poorer outcomes for BAME patients in mental health service Figure 3. Vicious cycle of not adequately funding and resourcing mental health services for BAME communities. 1. BAME communities enter mental health services 2. Mental health services adequately funded and resourced to meet the needs of BAME communities 3. Improved outcomes for BAME in mental health service 4. Service users’ mental health less likely to deteriorate. Therapists feel more skilled working with BAME communities 5. BAME communities mental health improves. Helps alleviate some of the stigma attached to accessing mental health services and BAME communities more likely to seek help for any mental health problems. Service user may also find it easier to access support for any future mental health problems. Therapist feels more confident and enjoys working with BAME communities Figure 4. Virtuous cycle of adequately funding and resourcing mental health services for BAME communities. 14 Saiqa Naz et al. https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1754470X19000060 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:32, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/S1754470X19000060 https://www.cambridge.org/core Groups (CCGs) and NHS England, otherwise the BAME mental health agenda will continue to be like a hamster in a wheel, making little progress (Fig. 3). This article is intended to be a resource to enable services to break away from this cycle (Fig. 4). We hope it provides useful guidance to deliver culturally competent services and therapy to mental health service users, regardless of their ethnicity and culture, and will pave the way for further investment in research and improvements to practice in this area. Acknowledgements. We would like to thank the members of the BABCP’s Equality and Culture Special Interest group and other therapists who attend our workshops. Their contributions and feedback continue to enlighten us and provide us with the motivation to continue to talk about issues of inequality in mental health services for BAME service users. Financial support. No financial support was received for this study. Conflict of interest. None. Ethical statement. Ethical approval was not needed for this article. Key practice points (1) To support CBT therapists to conceptualize key terms such as race, ethnicity and culture which may be used synonymously with BAME communities. (2) To develop CBT therapists’ confidence to work with BAME communities and have an awareness of the current political context which may be affecting service users’ mental health. (3) Service managers need to work alongside commissioners to fund their services adequately to enable them to deliver training, provide support (supervision, etc.) and resources (including allocating time to do outreach work and translating materials). This will enable their staff to work effectively with BAME communities. (4) To remind CBT therapists and service managers of their duty of care towards working with all diverse com- munities as is expected under the Equality Act (2010), and renew their commit towards improving outcomes for BAME communities. Further reading Beck A (2016). Transcultural Cognitive Behavioural Therapy for Anxiety and Depression: A Practical Guide. London, UK: Routledge. Mir G, Meer S, Cottrell D, McMillan D, House A, Kanter JW (2015). Adapted behavioural activation for the treatment of depression in Muslims. Journal of Affective Disorders, 180, 190–199. Joint Commissioning Project on Mental Health (2014). Guidance for commissioners of mental health services for black and minority ethnic service users. London: Joint Commissioning Project on Mental Health. Available at: http://www.jcpmh. info/good-services/black-minority-ethnic-communities/ References American Counselling Association (2014). Code of Ethics. Available at: https://www.counseling.org/knowledge-center/ethics BACP (2016). Ethical Framework for the Counselling Professions. Available at: https://www.bacp.co.uk/events-and- resources/ethics-and-standards/ethical-framework-for-the-counselling-professions/ BABCP (2017). Standards of Conduct, Performance and Ethics. Available at: http://www.babcp.com/About/Documents.aspx BBC (2018). Beckton birthday acid attacker John Tomlin jailed for 16 years (20 April 2018). Available at: https://www.bbc.co. uk/news/uk-england-london-43838476 BBC (2018). Lincoln man admits sending ‘Punish a Muslim Day’ letters (12 October 2018). Available at: https://www.bbc.co. uk/news/uk-england-45838506 Beck A (2016). Transcultural Cognitive Behavioural Therapy for Anxiety and Depression: A Practical Guide. London, UK: Routledge. Brown B (2008). I Thought it was Just Me. New York: Random House. Butt J, Clayton K, Gardner Z, Huijbers K et al. (2015). Better practice in mental health for black and minority ethnic communities. Race Equality Foundation. Available at: raceequalityfoundation.org.uk/wp-content/ : : : /10/Better-practice- in-mental-health.pdf The Cognitive Behaviour Therapist 15 https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1754470X19000060 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. 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Addressing issues of race, ethnicity and culture in CBT to support therapists and service managers to deliver culturally competent therapy and reduce inequalities in mental health provision for BAME service users. The Cognitive Behaviour Therapist. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1754470X19000060 The Cognitive Behaviour Therapist 17 https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1754470X19000060 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. 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BAME therapist working with white service users with prejudicial views Therapists' own prejudices and implicit biases White therapist working with a service users from a BAME background: dealing with difficult emotions that may arise in the therapist The role managers of local services can play to support staff BAME therapists involved in BAME mental health development work Some steps towards addressing structural inequalities in CBT services Summary Further reading References 
work_4kim7mf5ijhi7l3iodedvhey34	----	[PDF] Street Harassment: Current and Promising Avenues for Researchers and Activists | Semantic Scholar Skip to search formSkip to main content> Semantic Scholar's Logo Search Sign InCreate Free Account You are currently offline. Some features of the site may not work correctly. DOI:10.1111/SOC4.12248 Corpus ID: 54596423Street Harassment: Current and Promising Avenues for Researchers and Activists @article{Logan2015StreetHC, title={Street Harassment: Current and Promising Avenues for Researchers and Activists}, author={Laura S. Logan}, journal={Sociology Compass}, year={2015}, volume={9}, pages={196-211} } Laura S. Logan Published 2015 Sociology Sociology Compass Research about street harassment indicates that the problem is far reaching in its effects and that most women and girls experience sexual harassment from men they do not know in public spaces. In recent years, an increasing number of activists, bloggers, and online media outlets have published pieces about street harassment, reflecting a growing and international anti-street harassment social movement. In this article, I discuss what scholars and activists tell us about street harassment… Expand View via Publisher sites.middlebury.edu Save to Library Create Alert Cite Launch Research Feed Share This Paper 33 CitationsHighly Influential Citations 3 Background Citations 13 Methods Citations 1 View All 33 Citations Citation Type Citation Type All Types Cites Results Cites Methods Cites Background Has PDF Publication Type Author More Filters More Filters Filters Sort by Relevance Sort by Most Influenced Papers Sort by Citation Count Sort by Recency Justice 2.0: Street harassment victims’ use of social media and online activism as sites of informal justice B. Fileborn Psychology 2016 32 PDF View 3 excerpts, cites methods and background Save Alert Research Feed Harassment in Public Spaces: The Intrusion on Personal Space Joyce A. Baptist, Katelyn O Coburn Psychology 2019 View 1 excerpt, cites background Save Alert Research Feed Naming the Unspeakable Harm of Street Harassment: A Survey-Based Examination of Disclosure Practices B. Fileborn Psychology, Medicine Violence against women 2019 11 Save Alert Research Feed Myths, masterplots and sexual harassment in Egypt N. Sadler Sociology 2019 2 PDF Save Alert Research Feed Street harassment is marketplace discrimination: The impact of street harassment on young female consumers’ marketplace experiences M. Rosenbaum, K. Edwards, Binayak Malla, Jyoti Regmi Adhikary, Germán Contreras Ramírez Sociology Journal of Retailing and Consumer Services 2020 Highly Influenced View 7 excerpts, cites background Save Alert Research Feed Contextualising street sexual harassment in Morocco: a discriminatory sociocultural representation of women Habiba Chafai Sociology 2017 6 View 2 excerpts, cites background Save Alert Research Feed Sexual harassment in public transport in Bogotá Lina Marcela Quiñones Political Science 2020 2 Save Alert Research Feed Contested gendered space: public sexual harassment and women’s safety work F. Vera-Gray, L. Kelly Sociology 2020 Save Alert Research Feed Street harassment experiences of female undergraduate students at a State University in Zimbabwe Daniel Mawere, Annah Y. Moyo Sociology 2019 View 3 excerpts, cites background Save Alert Research Feed The Harasser’s Toolbox: Investigating the Role of Mobility in Street Harassment A. C. F. Hutson, Julie Christine Krueger Psychology, Medicine Violence against women 2019 2 Save Alert Research Feed ... 1 2 3 4 ... References SHOWING 1-10 OF 48 REFERENCES SORT BYRelevance Most Influenced Papers Recency Experiencing the Streets: Harassment and Perceptions of Safety among Women Ross F. Macmillan, A. Nierobisz, S. Welsh Psychology 2000 160 Highly Influential View 4 excerpts, references background Save Alert Research Feed Sexual Harassment and Masculinity Beth A. Quinn Psychology 2002 160 Save Alert Research Feed Everyday Stranger Harassment and Women’s Objectification K. Fairchild, L. Rudman Psychology 2008 189 PDF Save Alert Research Feed Homophobic Violence and the Self 'At Risk': Interrogating the Boundaries E. Stanko, P. Curry Sociology 1997 36 Save Alert Research Feed Genderbashing: Sexuality, Gender, and the Regulation of Public Space K. Namaste Sociology 1996 164 Highly Influential PDF View 3 excerpts, references background Save Alert Research Feed The Fear of Rape: A Study in Social Control S. Riger, Margaret T. Gordon Psychology 1981 176 View 2 excerpts, references background Save Alert Research Feed Passing By: Gender and Public Harassment C. Gardner Psychology 1995 248 Save Alert Research Feed Cat-Calls and Culpability: Investigating the Frequency and Functions of Stranger Harassment Eric D. Wesselmann, J. R. Kelly Psychology 2010 38 Highly Influential View 3 excerpts, references background Save Alert Research Feed Theorizing Black Lesbians within Black Feminism: A Critique of Same-Race Street Harassment H. Fogg-Davis Sociology 2006 45 Highly Influential PDF View 4 excerpts, references background Save Alert Research Feed Lesbian and Gay Male Undergraduates' Experiences of Harassment and Fear on Campus A. D'augelli Psychology 1992 239 Save Alert Research Feed ... 1 2 3 4 5 ... 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work_4kti5g75jzgl7ictq54kjxqidq	----	No. 17-965 IN THE Supreme Court of the United States ____________________ DONALD J. TRUMP, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, ET AL., PETITIONERS, v. STATE OF HAWAII, ET AL., RESPONDENTS. ____________________ On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit BRIEF OF LABOR ORGANIZATIONS AS AMICI CURIAE SUPPORTING RESPONDENTS NICOLE G. BERNER DEBORAH L. SMITH LEO GERTNER SERVICE EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNION 1800 Massachusetts Ave., NW Washington, DC 20036 debbie.smith@seiu.org Attorneys for Amicus Curiae SEIU BARBARA J. CHISHOLM Counsel of Record KRISTIN M. GARCÍA ALTSHULER BERZON LLP 177 Post Street, Ste. 300 San Francisco, CA 94108 (415) 421-7151 bchisholm@altber.com Attorneys for Amici Curiae Additional Counsel on Inside Cover 49261_Ltrhd.indd 1 6/11/08 12:44:09 AM Mosaic - (301) 927-3800 - Cheverly, MD JUDITH RIVLIN AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE, COUNTY AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES 1101 17th St., NW, Suite 900 Washington, DC 20036 jrivlin@afscme.org Attorney for Amicus Curiae AFSCME NIRAJ R. GANATRA AVA BARBOUR INTERNATIONAL UNION, UNITED AUTOMOBILE, AEROSPACE AND AGRICULTURAL IMPLEMENT WORKERS OF AMERICA (UAW) 8000 E. Jefferson Ave. Detroit, MI 48214 nganatra@uaw.net abarbour@uaw.net Attorneys for Amicus Curiae UAW MARIO MARTÍNEZ MARTÍNEZ AGUILASOCHO & LYNCH, APLC 1527 19th St., Suite 332 Bakersfield, CA 93301 mmartinez@farmworkerla w.com Attorney for Amicus Curiae UFW NICHOLAS CLARK UNITED FOOD AND COMMERCIAL WORKERS 1775 K Street, NW Washington, DC 20006 nclark@ufcw.org Attorney for Amicus Curiae UFCW DAVID J. STROM AMERICAN FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, 555 New Jersey Ave., NW Washington, DC 20001 dstrom@aft.org Attorney for Amicus Curiae AFT JODY CALEMINE COMMUNICATIONS WORKERS OF AMERICA 501 3rd St., NW Washington, DC 20001 jcalemine@cwa-union.org Attorney for Amicus Curiae CWA ALICE O’BRIEN EMMA LEHENY LUBNA A. ALAM NATIONAL EDUCATION ASSOCIATION 1201 16th Street, NW, Suite 819 Washington, D.C. 20036- 3290 aobrien@nea.org Attorneys for Amicus Curiae NEA i TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ......................................ii INTERESTS OF AMICI CURIAE ............................. 1 INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT .............................................................. 7 ARGUMENT .............................................................. 8 I. The Challenged Proclamation Causes Irreparable Harm By Separating Citizens And Immigrants From Family Members Abroad ................................................................ 8 A. Compelled Family Separation Causes Negative Physical and Mental Health Consequences ................................................ 8 B. Amici’s Members Have Suffered the Harm of Forced Family Separation ........... 11 II. The Proclamation Sends A State- Sponsored Message That Promotes Anti- Muslim Hostility, Discrimination, And Stigma .............................................................. 18 A. The Muslim Travel Ban Has Led to Increased Violence and Discrimination Against Muslims ......................................... 19 B. Anti-Muslim Hostility and Discrimination Adversely Affects Mental and Physical Health....................... 22 C. Amici’s Members Have Suffered from the Proclamation’s Anti-Muslim Message ....................................................... 25 CONCLUSION ......................................................... 29 JUDITH RIVLIN AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE, COUNTY AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES 1101 17th St., NW, Suite 900 Washington, DC 20036 jrivlin@afscme.org Attorney for Amicus Curiae AFSCME NIRAJ R. GANATRA AVA BARBOUR INTERNATIONAL UNION, UNITED AUTOMOBILE, AEROSPACE AND AGRICULTURAL IMPLEMENT WORKERS OF AMERICA (UAW) 8000 E. Jefferson Ave. Detroit, MI 48214 nganatra@uaw.net abarbour@uaw.net Attorneys for Amicus Curiae UAW MARIO MARTÍNEZ MARTÍNEZ AGUILASOCHO & LYNCH, APLC 1527 19th St., Suite 332 Bakersfield, CA 93301 mmartinez@farmworkerla w.com Attorney for Amicus Curiae UFW NICHOLAS CLARK UNITED FOOD AND COMMERCIAL WORKERS 1775 K Street, NW Washington, DC 20006 nclark@ufcw.org Attorney for Amicus Curiae UFCW DAVID J. STROM AMERICAN FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, 555 New Jersey Ave., NW Washington, DC 20001 dstrom@aft.org Attorney for Amicus Curiae AFT JODY CALEMINE COMMUNICATIONS WORKERS OF AMERICA 501 3rd St., NW Washington, DC 20001 jcalemine@cwa-union.org Attorney for Amicus Curiae CWA ALICE O’BRIEN EMMA LEHENY LUBNA A. ALAM NATIONAL EDUCATION ASSOCIATION 1201 16th Street, NW, Suite 819 Washington, D.C. 20036- 3290 aobrien@nea.org Attorneys for Amicus Curiae NEA i TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ......................................ii INTERESTS OF AMICI CURIAE ............................. 1 INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT .............................................................. 7 ARGUMENT .............................................................. 8 I. The Challenged Proclamation Causes Irreparable Harm By Separating Citizens And Immigrants From Family Members Abroad ................................................................ 8 A. Compelled Family Separation Causes Negative Physical and Mental Health Consequences ................................................ 8 B. Amici’s Members Have Suffered the Harm of Forced Family Separation ........... 11 II. The Proclamation Sends A State- Sponsored Message That Promotes Anti- Muslim Hostility, Discrimination, And Stigma .............................................................. 18 A. The Muslim Travel Ban Has Led to Increased Violence and Discrimination Against Muslims ......................................... 19 B. Anti-Muslim Hostility and Discrimination Adversely Affects Mental and Physical Health....................... 22 C. Amici’s Members Have Suffered from the Proclamation’s Anti-Muslim Message ....................................................... 25 CONCLUSION ......................................................... 29 ii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Federal Circuit Court Cases Legal Assistance for Vietnamese Asylum Seekers v. Dep’t of State, 45 F.3d 469 (D.C. Cir. 1995) .............................. 18 Federal Rules, Regulations and Orders Executive Order 13769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Jan. 27, 2017) ..............................................passim Executive Order 13780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13209 (Mar. 9, 2017) ...............................................passim Presidential Proclamation 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45,161 (Sept. 27, 2017) ................................passim Other Authorities 2017 on Track to Becoming One of the Worst Years Ever for Anti-Muslim Hate Crimes, CAIR (Oct. 11, 2017), http://islamophobia.org/articles/ 209-2017-on- track-to-becoming-one-of-the-worst-years- ever-for-anti-muslim-hate-crimes.html ............. 20 Sawssan R. Ahmed et al., A Structural Model of Racial Discrimination, Acculturative Stress, and Cultural Resources Among Arab American Adolescents, 48 Am. J. Cmty. Psych. 181 (2011) ............................................................ 24 David K. Androff et al., U.S. Immigration Policy and Immigrant Children’s Well-being: The Impact of Policy Shifts, 38(1) J. of Soc. & Welfare 77 (2011) ................................................ 24 iii Anti-Muslim Activities in the United States, New America, https://www.newamerica.org/in- depth/anti-muslim-activity/ (last visited Mar. 22, 2018) .............................................................. 21 CAIR 3rd Quarter Civil Rights Report Shows Rise in Hate Crimes Over Same Period Last Year, Moderate Decline in Total Cases, CAIR (Oct. 25, 2017), http://cair.com/press- center/press-releases/14715-cair-3rd-quarter- civil-rights-report-shows-rise-in-hate-crimes- over-same-period-last-year-moderate-decline- in-total-cases.html .............................................. 20 CAIR Calls for Hate Crime Probe for Racist Harassment Targeting Tenn. Muslim Girls, Knife Attack on Father, Threat to Kill Entire Family, CAIR (Oct. 25, 2017), https://www.cair.com/press-center/press- releases/14735-cair-calls-for-hate-crime- probe-of-racist-harassment-targeting-tenn- muslim-girls-knife-attack-on-father-threat-to- kill-entire-family.html ........................................ 20 Rebecca A. Clay, Islamophobia: Psychologists Are Studying the Impact of Anti-Muslim Sentiment and Exploring Ways To Prevent It, 48(4) Monitor on Psychol. 34 (Apr. 2017) .............................................................. 19, 22 Karlijn Haagsman et al., Transnational Families and the Subjective Well-Being of Migrant Parents: Angolan and Nigerian Parents in the Netherlands, 38:15 Ethnic & Racial Stud. 2652 (2015) ............................................................ 9 Dena Hassouneh, Anti-Muslim Racism and Women’s Health, 26(5) J. of Women’s Health 401 (2017) ............................................................ 23 ii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Federal Circuit Court Cases Legal Assistance for Vietnamese Asylum Seekers v. Dep’t of State, 45 F.3d 469 (D.C. Cir. 1995) .............................. 18 Federal Rules, Regulations and Orders Executive Order 13769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Jan. 27, 2017) ..............................................passim Executive Order 13780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13209 (Mar. 9, 2017) ...............................................passim Presidential Proclamation 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45,161 (Sept. 27, 2017) ................................passim Other Authorities 2017 on Track to Becoming One of the Worst Years Ever for Anti-Muslim Hate Crimes, CAIR (Oct. 11, 2017), http://islamophobia.org/articles/ 209-2017-on- track-to-becoming-one-of-the-worst-years- ever-for-anti-muslim-hate-crimes.html ............. 20 Sawssan R. Ahmed et al., A Structural Model of Racial Discrimination, Acculturative Stress, and Cultural Resources Among Arab American Adolescents, 48 Am. J. Cmty. Psych. 181 (2011) ............................................................ 24 David K. Androff et al., U.S. Immigration Policy and Immigrant Children’s Well-being: The Impact of Policy Shifts, 38(1) J. of Soc. & Welfare 77 (2011) ................................................ 24 iii Anti-Muslim Activities in the United States, New America, https://www.newamerica.org/in- depth/anti-muslim-activity/ (last visited Mar. 22, 2018) .............................................................. 21 CAIR 3rd Quarter Civil Rights Report Shows Rise in Hate Crimes Over Same Period Last Year, Moderate Decline in Total Cases, CAIR (Oct. 25, 2017), http://cair.com/press- center/press-releases/14715-cair-3rd-quarter- civil-rights-report-shows-rise-in-hate-crimes- over-same-period-last-year-moderate-decline- in-total-cases.html .............................................. 20 CAIR Calls for Hate Crime Probe for Racist Harassment Targeting Tenn. Muslim Girls, Knife Attack on Father, Threat to Kill Entire Family, CAIR (Oct. 25, 2017), https://www.cair.com/press-center/press- releases/14735-cair-calls-for-hate-crime- probe-of-racist-harassment-targeting-tenn- muslim-girls-knife-attack-on-father-threat-to- kill-entire-family.html ........................................ 20 Rebecca A. Clay, Islamophobia: Psychologists Are Studying the Impact of Anti-Muslim Sentiment and Exploring Ways To Prevent It, 48(4) Monitor on Psychol. 34 (Apr. 2017) .............................................................. 19, 22 Karlijn Haagsman et al., Transnational Families and the Subjective Well-Being of Migrant Parents: Angolan and Nigerian Parents in the Netherlands, 38:15 Ethnic & Racial Stud. 2652 (2015) ............................................................ 9 Dena Hassouneh, Anti-Muslim Racism and Women’s Health, 26(5) J. of Women’s Health 401 (2017) ............................................................ 23 iv Sarah Horton, A Mother’s Heart Is Weighed Down with Stones: A Phenomenological Approach to the Experience of Transnational Motherhood, 33 Culture, Med., & Psychiatry 21 (2009) ................................................................ 8 Jeanne Miranda et al., Depression Among Latina Immigrant Mothers Separated from their Children, 56(6) Psychiatric Servs. 717 (2005) ..... 9 Mislabeled: The Impact of School Bullying and Discrimination on California Muslim Students, CAIR California (2015), https://ca.cair.com/sfba/wp-content/ uploads/2015/10/CAIR-CA-2015-Bullying- Report-Web.pdf ................................................... 24 Dalia Mogahed & Youssef Chouhoud, American Muslim Poll 2017: Muslims at the Crossroads, Institute for Social Policy and Understanding (2017), https://www.ispu.org/wp-content/ uploads/2017/06/AMP-2017_Full-Report.pdf ..... 21 Kevin L. Nadal et al., Subtle and Overt Forms of Islamophobia, VI(2) J. of Muslim Mental Health 15 (2012) ................................................. 19 Pew Research Ctr., The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2010-2050, 6 (Apr. 2, 2015), http://www.pewforum.org/2015/04/02/religious -projections-2010-2050 ........................................ 19 v Questions and Answers for Employees: Workplace Rights for Employees Who Are, or Are Perceived to Be, Muslim or Middle Eastern, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, https://www1.eeoc.gov//eeoc/publications/musl im_middle_eastern_employees.cfm (last visited Mar. 22, 2018) ......................................... 22 Sara Reardon, Health Toll of Immigration Policies Begins to Emerge, 544 Nature 148 (Apr. 13, 2017)..................................................... 10 Kristina Rizga, The Chilling Rise of Islamophobia in Our Schools, Mother Jones (Jan. 26, 2016), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2016/01/ bullying-islamophobia-in-american-schools/ ..... 21 Cecile Rousseau et al., Trauma and Extended Separation from Family Among Latin American and African Refugees in Montreal, 64(1) Psychiatry 40 (2001) .................................. 11 Dana Rusch & Karina Reyes, Examining the Effects of Mexican Serial Migration and Family Separations on Acculturative Stress, Depression, and Family Functioning, 35(2) Hispanic J. Behav. Sci. 139 (2012) ....................... 9 Muniba Saleem & Srividya Ramasubramanian, Muslim Americans’ Responses to Social Identity Threats: Effects of Media Representations and Experiences of Discrimination, Media Psychol. (Apr. 4, 2017), http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/1 5213269.2017.1302345 ....................................... 23 iv Sarah Horton, A Mother’s Heart Is Weighed Down with Stones: A Phenomenological Approach to the Experience of Transnational Motherhood, 33 Culture, Med., & Psychiatry 21 (2009) ................................................................ 8 Jeanne Miranda et al., Depression Among Latina Immigrant Mothers Separated from their Children, 56(6) Psychiatric Servs. 717 (2005) ..... 9 Mislabeled: The Impact of School Bullying and Discrimination on California Muslim Students, CAIR California (2015), https://ca.cair.com/sfba/wp-content/ uploads/2015/10/CAIR-CA-2015-Bullying- Report-Web.pdf ................................................... 24 Dalia Mogahed & Youssef Chouhoud, American Muslim Poll 2017: Muslims at the Crossroads, Institute for Social Policy and Understanding (2017), https://www.ispu.org/wp-content/ uploads/2017/06/AMP-2017_Full-Report.pdf ..... 21 Kevin L. Nadal et al., Subtle and Overt Forms of Islamophobia, VI(2) J. of Muslim Mental Health 15 (2012) ................................................. 19 Pew Research Ctr., The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2010-2050, 6 (Apr. 2, 2015), http://www.pewforum.org/2015/04/02/religious -projections-2010-2050 ........................................ 19 v Questions and Answers for Employees: Workplace Rights for Employees Who Are, or Are Perceived to Be, Muslim or Middle Eastern, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, https://www1.eeoc.gov//eeoc/publications/musl im_middle_eastern_employees.cfm (last visited Mar. 22, 2018) ......................................... 22 Sara Reardon, Health Toll of Immigration Policies Begins to Emerge, 544 Nature 148 (Apr. 13, 2017)..................................................... 10 Kristina Rizga, The Chilling Rise of Islamophobia in Our Schools, Mother Jones (Jan. 26, 2016), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2016/01/ bullying-islamophobia-in-american-schools/ ..... 21 Cecile Rousseau et al., Trauma and Extended Separation from Family Among Latin American and African Refugees in Montreal, 64(1) Psychiatry 40 (2001) .................................. 11 Dana Rusch & Karina Reyes, Examining the Effects of Mexican Serial Migration and Family Separations on Acculturative Stress, Depression, and Family Functioning, 35(2) Hispanic J. Behav. Sci. 139 (2012) ....................... 9 Muniba Saleem & Srividya Ramasubramanian, Muslim Americans’ Responses to Social Identity Threats: Effects of Media Representations and Experiences of Discrimination, Media Psychol. (Apr. 4, 2017), http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/1 5213269.2017.1302345 ....................................... 23 vi Goleen Samari, Islamophobia and Public Health in the United States, 106(11) Persp. from the Soc. Sci. 1920 (Nov. 2016) ................................... 24 Nina Shapiro, Aerospace Firm Electroimpact Agrees to Pay $485k After AG Finds ‘Shocking’ Discrimination Against Muslims, Seattle Times, Mar. 23, 2017, https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle- news/times-watchdog/aerospace-co- electroimpact-agrees-to-pay-485000-after-ag- finds-shocking-discrimination-against- muslims/ .............................................................. 22 Carola Suárez-Orozco et al., I Felt Like My Heart Was Staying Behind: Psychological Implications of Family Separations & Reunifications for Immigrant Youth, 26(2) J. of Adolescent Res. 222 (2010) ..................... 9, 10 David R. Williams et al., Health Effects of Dramatic Social Events—Ramifications of the Recent Presidential Election, 376(23) New Eng. J. of Med. 2295 (June 8, 2017) .....................................................21, 23, 24 1 INTERESTS OF AMICI CURIAE Amici curiae are the Service Employees International Union; American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees; American Federation of Teachers; Communications Workers of America; National Education Association; International Brotherhood of Teamsters; International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America; United Farm Workers of America; and United Food and Commercial Workers. Service Employees International Union (SEIU) is a labor organization of approximately two million working men and women in the United States, Canada, and Puerto Rico.1 SEIU’s members include foreign-born U.S. citizens, lawful permanent residents, and immigrants authorized to work in the United States. Many of SEIU’s members have mixed- status families. As described below, SEIU members are directly affected by the challenged Proclamation. American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME), AFL-CIO, is a union of 1.6 million members in the United States and Puerto Rico, both in the public and private sectors, who share a commitment to service. AFSCME is participating in this case to advance its mission of helping all working people, including immigrants and people of color, achieve the American dream regardless of their identity. AFSCME is proud to 1 All parties have consented to the filing of this brief. No counsel for a party authored any part of this brief and no counsel or party made a monetary contribution to its preparation or submission. Only the amici and their attorneys have paid for the filing and submission of this brief. vi Goleen Samari, Islamophobia and Public Health in the United States, 106(11) Persp. from the Soc. Sci. 1920 (Nov. 2016) ................................... 24 Nina Shapiro, Aerospace Firm Electroimpact Agrees to Pay $485k After AG Finds ‘Shocking’ Discrimination Against Muslims, Seattle Times, Mar. 23, 2017, https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle- news/times-watchdog/aerospace-co- electroimpact-agrees-to-pay-485000-after-ag- finds-shocking-discrimination-against- muslims/ .............................................................. 22 Carola Suárez-Orozco et al., I Felt Like My Heart Was Staying Behind: Psychological Implications of Family Separations & Reunifications for Immigrant Youth, 26(2) J. of Adolescent Res. 222 (2010) ..................... 9, 10 David R. Williams et al., Health Effects of Dramatic Social Events—Ramifications of the Recent Presidential Election, 376(23) New Eng. J. of Med. 2295 (June 8, 2017) .....................................................21, 23, 24 1 INTERESTS OF AMICI CURIAE Amici curiae are the Service Employees International Union; American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees; American Federation of Teachers; Communications Workers of America; National Education Association; International Brotherhood of Teamsters; International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America; United Farm Workers of America; and United Food and Commercial Workers. Service Employees International Union (SEIU) is a labor organization of approximately two million working men and women in the United States, Canada, and Puerto Rico.1 SEIU’s members include foreign-born U.S. citizens, lawful permanent residents, and immigrants authorized to work in the United States. Many of SEIU’s members have mixed- status families. As described below, SEIU members are directly affected by the challenged Proclamation. American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME), AFL-CIO, is a union of 1.6 million members in the United States and Puerto Rico, both in the public and private sectors, who share a commitment to service. AFSCME is participating in this case to advance its mission of helping all working people, including immigrants and people of color, achieve the American dream regardless of their identity. AFSCME is proud to 1 All parties have consented to the filing of this brief. No counsel for a party authored any part of this brief and no counsel or party made a monetary contribution to its preparation or submission. Only the amici and their attorneys have paid for the filing and submission of this brief. 2 represent members who have immigrated from Muslim-majority countries targeted by the illegal ban at issue, and/or who have family members who currently live in those countries, and staunchly opposes their being unconstitutionally subjected to the harms detailed in this brief. The public servants of AFSCME, and indeed all Americans, deserve better. The American Federation of Teachers (AFT), AFL- CIO, was founded in 1916 and today represents approximately 1.7 million members who are employed across the nation in K-12 and higher education, public employment, and healthcare. The AFT has a longstanding history of supporting and advocating for the civil rights of its members and the communities they serve. AFT members at a variety of institutions provide essential and necessary services, such as healthcare and education, to the public. Many of these members, especially those at institutions of higher education, are involved in global collaborations and in teaching and research duties that are being disrupted and threatened by the Proclamation. Additionally, a significant number of AFT members were born in, or have friends or family members in, countries named in the Proclamation. These members are directly impacted by the travel restrictions, which have affected their ability to work, travel, connect with, and care for their communities. The Communications Workers of America (CWA), AFL-CIO, is an international labor union representing more than 700,000 workers in the telecommunications, media, manufacturing, airlines, and health care industries and in a wide variety of public sector positions in the United States, Canada, and Puerto Rico. CWA represents and advocates on 3 behalf of workers of all creeds in the United States and abroad with respect to workplace rights and broader political and civil rights. In light of recent developments in U.S. domestic politics and federal policy that have targeted people of Islamic faith with discrimination, including those who may be members of the union or their family members, the CWA Convention resolved in 2017 to continue the union’s “fight against discrimination in all its forms, including the targeting of people of the Islamic faith,” and to “act in defense of and solidarity with those targeted by Islamophobia in our union, our workplaces, and our communities.” National Education Association (NEA) is the nation’s largest professional association of educators representing approximately three million members, the vast majority of whom serve as educators, counselors, and education support professionals in our nation’s public schools. NEA members work every day in their classrooms and schools to ensure that every student, no matter their race, religion, or national origin, receives a quality education that will allow them to grow into a productive member of our democratic society. The provision of a quality education depends on many factors but most fundamentally on ensuring that every student is treated equally and with respect. NEA members believe that discrimination and stereotyping based on religion must be eliminated in all educational settings, and therefore work every day to increase respect, understanding, acceptance, and sensitivity among students. The Proclamation has made that work harder, as it has fueled anti-Muslim hate speech and harassment in our nation’s schools. 2 represent members who have immigrated from Muslim-majority countries targeted by the illegal ban at issue, and/or who have family members who currently live in those countries, and staunchly opposes their being unconstitutionally subjected to the harms detailed in this brief. The public servants of AFSCME, and indeed all Americans, deserve better. The American Federation of Teachers (AFT), AFL- CIO, was founded in 1916 and today represents approximately 1.7 million members who are employed across the nation in K-12 and higher education, public employment, and healthcare. The AFT has a longstanding history of supporting and advocating for the civil rights of its members and the communities they serve. AFT members at a variety of institutions provide essential and necessary services, such as healthcare and education, to the public. Many of these members, especially those at institutions of higher education, are involved in global collaborations and in teaching and research duties that are being disrupted and threatened by the Proclamation. Additionally, a significant number of AFT members were born in, or have friends or family members in, countries named in the Proclamation. These members are directly impacted by the travel restrictions, which have affected their ability to work, travel, connect with, and care for their communities. The Communications Workers of America (CWA), AFL-CIO, is an international labor union representing more than 700,000 workers in the telecommunications, media, manufacturing, airlines, and health care industries and in a wide variety of public sector positions in the United States, Canada, and Puerto Rico. CWA represents and advocates on 3 behalf of workers of all creeds in the United States and abroad with respect to workplace rights and broader political and civil rights. In light of recent developments in U.S. domestic politics and federal policy that have targeted people of Islamic faith with discrimination, including those who may be members of the union or their family members, the CWA Convention resolved in 2017 to continue the union’s “fight against discrimination in all its forms, including the targeting of people of the Islamic faith,” and to “act in defense of and solidarity with those targeted by Islamophobia in our union, our workplaces, and our communities.” National Education Association (NEA) is the nation’s largest professional association of educators representing approximately three million members, the vast majority of whom serve as educators, counselors, and education support professionals in our nation’s public schools. NEA members work every day in their classrooms and schools to ensure that every student, no matter their race, religion, or national origin, receives a quality education that will allow them to grow into a productive member of our democratic society. The provision of a quality education depends on many factors but most fundamentally on ensuring that every student is treated equally and with respect. NEA members believe that discrimination and stereotyping based on religion must be eliminated in all educational settings, and therefore work every day to increase respect, understanding, acceptance, and sensitivity among students. The Proclamation has made that work harder, as it has fueled anti-Muslim hate speech and harassment in our nation’s schools. 4 The International Brotherhood of Teamsters (IBT) is a labor organization with more than 1.3 million members who are employed in a wide array of industries across the United States and Canada. Its members include immigrants and people with diverse backgrounds. The IBT, historically, has opposed all forms of invidious discrimination, including those described in this brief. The International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America (UAW), AFL-CIO, has nearly one million active and retired members throughout the United States, Canada, and Puerto Rico. Since its founding in 1935, the UAW’s membership has included immigrants from around the globe, and the UAW opposes any policies that discriminate against immigrants and non-immigrants alike based on their religion or national origin. The UAW and its affiliated Local Unions represent workers in diverse sectors, including over 40,000 academic student employees and post-doctoral researchers at universities in the United States. Many of these workers are foreign-born nationals of Muslim-majority countries targeted by the Proclamation and are naturalized U.S. citizens or hold valid visas permitting them to study, live, and work in the United States. The Proclamation has disrupted their ability to travel freely into and outside of the country to visit family and loved ones and to conduct research related to their university employment and course of study, and prevented their family members from traveling to the United States. United Farm Workers of America (UFW) represents thousands of migrant and seasonal farmworkers in various agricultural occupations 5 throughout the country and has members of diverse racial, ethnic, and immigration backgrounds throughout the United States. UFW seeks to improve the lives, wages, and working conditions of agricultural workers and their families through collective bargaining, worker education, state and federal legislation, and through public campaigns. Since its founding in 1962 by Cesar Chavez, UFW has been dedicated to the cause of eliminating discrimination against farmworkers, Latinos, and any other groups that have been the target of unfair or unlawful treatment. UFW members, their families, and other farmworkers represented by UFW are directly affected by the challenged Proclamation. United Food and Commercial Workers International Union (UFCW) is a labor organization that represents working men and women across the United States. UFCW’s 1.3 million members work in a range of industries, with the majority working in retail food, poultry and meatpacking, food processing and manufacturing, and non-food retail. UFCW’s objective is the elevation of its members through first- class wages, hours, benefits, and working conditions. And that objective extends to the uplift of the families of its members. UFCW and its predecessor unions have represented immigrants from around the world since the beginning of the last century, particularly workers in the packinghouses and stockyards. Immigrant workers continue to form a vital part of these and other workforces that UFCW represents. UFCW has members from the nations whose citizens are banned by the Proclamation. UFCW is aware that many of these workers experienced wrenching separation from their homelands due to war and 4 The International Brotherhood of Teamsters (IBT) is a labor organization with more than 1.3 million members who are employed in a wide array of industries across the United States and Canada. Its members include immigrants and people with diverse backgrounds. The IBT, historically, has opposed all forms of invidious discrimination, including those described in this brief. The International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America (UAW), AFL-CIO, has nearly one million active and retired members throughout the United States, Canada, and Puerto Rico. Since its founding in 1935, the UAW’s membership has included immigrants from around the globe, and the UAW opposes any policies that discriminate against immigrants and non-immigrants alike based on their religion or national origin. The UAW and its affiliated Local Unions represent workers in diverse sectors, including over 40,000 academic student employees and post-doctoral researchers at universities in the United States. Many of these workers are foreign-born nationals of Muslim-majority countries targeted by the Proclamation and are naturalized U.S. citizens or hold valid visas permitting them to study, live, and work in the United States. The Proclamation has disrupted their ability to travel freely into and outside of the country to visit family and loved ones and to conduct research related to their university employment and course of study, and prevented their family members from traveling to the United States. United Farm Workers of America (UFW) represents thousands of migrant and seasonal farmworkers in various agricultural occupations 5 throughout the country and has members of diverse racial, ethnic, and immigration backgrounds throughout the United States. UFW seeks to improve the lives, wages, and working conditions of agricultural workers and their families through collective bargaining, worker education, state and federal legislation, and through public campaigns. Since its founding in 1962 by Cesar Chavez, UFW has been dedicated to the cause of eliminating discrimination against farmworkers, Latinos, and any other groups that have been the target of unfair or unlawful treatment. UFW members, their families, and other farmworkers represented by UFW are directly affected by the challenged Proclamation. United Food and Commercial Workers International Union (UFCW) is a labor organization that represents working men and women across the United States. UFCW’s 1.3 million members work in a range of industries, with the majority working in retail food, poultry and meatpacking, food processing and manufacturing, and non-food retail. UFCW’s objective is the elevation of its members through first- class wages, hours, benefits, and working conditions. And that objective extends to the uplift of the families of its members. UFCW and its predecessor unions have represented immigrants from around the world since the beginning of the last century, particularly workers in the packinghouses and stockyards. Immigrant workers continue to form a vital part of these and other workforces that UFCW represents. UFCW has members from the nations whose citizens are banned by the Proclamation. UFCW is aware that many of these workers experienced wrenching separation from their homelands due to war and 6 famine. Accordingly, UFCW opposes religious and national origin discrimination and forced family separation. 7 INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT The issue in this case is whether Presidential Proclamation 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45,161 (Sept. 27, 2017) violates the Constitution or immigration laws of the United States. Like President Donald J. Trump’s two prior Executive Orders on the same subject, the Proclamation continues to single out predominantly Muslim countries and follows presidential campaign promises and post-election assurances of a “Muslim ban.”2 Amici submit this brief to demonstrate the devastating consequences of the President’s actions for individuals across the United States. The challenged Proclamation targets individuals from Muslim-majority countries, including Iran, Libya, Syria, Yemen, Somalia, and Chad. Like the two Executive Orders that preceded it, the Proclamation separates families, including by leaving family members stranded in war-torn countries, and preventing parents and children from visiting each other. The President’s most recent action also exacerbates discrimination and hostility by giving anti-Muslim intolerance the official imprimatur of the most important elected official in our democracy, and the Orders and Proclamation have been associated with increased anti-Muslim discrimination and violence. Myriad studies show that the forced separation of families and the religious intolerance countenanced by the Proclamation have concrete, 2 The prior Executive Orders are: Executive Order 13769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Jan. 27, 2017) (First Executive Order), and Executive Order 13780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13209 (Mar. 9, 2017) (Second Executive Order). 6 famine. Accordingly, UFCW opposes religious and national origin discrimination and forced family separation. 7 INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT The issue in this case is whether Presidential Proclamation 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45,161 (Sept. 27, 2017) violates the Constitution or immigration laws of the United States. Like President Donald J. Trump’s two prior Executive Orders on the same subject, the Proclamation continues to single out predominantly Muslim countries and follows presidential campaign promises and post-election assurances of a “Muslim ban.”2 Amici submit this brief to demonstrate the devastating consequences of the President’s actions for individuals across the United States. The challenged Proclamation targets individuals from Muslim-majority countries, including Iran, Libya, Syria, Yemen, Somalia, and Chad. Like the two Executive Orders that preceded it, the Proclamation separates families, including by leaving family members stranded in war-torn countries, and preventing parents and children from visiting each other. The President’s most recent action also exacerbates discrimination and hostility by giving anti-Muslim intolerance the official imprimatur of the most important elected official in our democracy, and the Orders and Proclamation have been associated with increased anti-Muslim discrimination and violence. Myriad studies show that the forced separation of families and the religious intolerance countenanced by the Proclamation have concrete, 2 The prior Executive Orders are: Executive Order 13769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Jan. 27, 2017) (First Executive Order), and Executive Order 13780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13209 (Mar. 9, 2017) (Second Executive Order). 8 negative effects on the physical and psychological well-being of targeted groups. Millions of employees nationwide are united in the amici unions, and many union members and their families have been harmed by the Muslim travel ban put in place by the Proclamation and the Executive Orders that preceded it. Amici’s members have been separated from their families, experienced the trauma and grief of this separation, and endured the hardship of ever-increasing hostility toward Muslims in the United States. The stories of twelve of these brave women and men, recounted below, are just some of the stories of the many union members and thousands of individuals across the country affected by the Proclamation. Their stories confirm the extensive research demonstrating the concrete harms, trauma, and stigma that the Proclamation inflicts on U.S. citizens and persons lawfully present in the United States. ARGUMENT I. The Challenged Proclamation Causes Irreparable Harm By Separating Citizens And Immigrants From Family Members Abroad. A. Compelled Family Separation Causes Negative Physical and Mental Health Consequences. Studies of transnational families document and explain how separation negatively affects parents and children as individuals as well as adversely affecting the bond between them. See, e.g., Sarah Horton, A Mother’s Heart Is Weighed Down with Stones: A Phenomenological Approach to the Experience of Transnational Motherhood, 33 Culture, Med., & Psychiatry 21, 21–40 (2009). The limits on physical 9 interaction imposed by geographic separation make intimate relations between parents and children challenging and, consequently, the parent-child bond suffers. See Karlijn Haagsman et al., Transnational Families and the Subjective Well-Being of Migrant Parents: Angolan and Nigerian Parents in the Netherlands, 38:15 Ethnic & Racial Stud. 2652, 2653– 54 (2015). “This loss of intimacy and frustrated efforts to maintain close bonds . . . can cause severe emotional distress for both parents and children who feel that the bond is deteriorating.” Id. at 2654. The pain of separation is long-lasting for parents. One study found that parents recalled the circumstances of their family’s migration process and “emotionally laden details of their family separations” even after living in the United States for ten years or more. Dana Rusch & Karina Reyes, Examining the Effects of Mexican Serial Migration and Family Separations on Acculturative Stress, Depression, and Family Functioning, 35(2) Hispanic J. Behav. Sci. 139, 151 (2012). The pain of separation is also often accompanied by feelings of guilt. Haagsman, supra, at 2654; see also id. (women separated from children “feel guilty, ashamed and stigmatized”); Jeanne Miranda et al., Depression Among Latina Immigrant Mothers Separated from their Children, 56(6) Psychiatric Servs. 717, 720 (2005) (finding that immigrant Latinas separated from their children are at greater odds for depression than women not separated). Not surprisingly, family separation inflicts serious harm on children as well. One 14-year-old girl described her experience this way: “The day I left my mother I felt like my heart was staying behind.” Carola Suárez-Orozco et al., I Felt Like My Heart Was 8 negative effects on the physical and psychological well-being of targeted groups. Millions of employees nationwide are united in the amici unions, and many union members and their families have been harmed by the Muslim travel ban put in place by the Proclamation and the Executive Orders that preceded it. Amici’s members have been separated from their families, experienced the trauma and grief of this separation, and endured the hardship of ever-increasing hostility toward Muslims in the United States. The stories of twelve of these brave women and men, recounted below, are just some of the stories of the many union members and thousands of individuals across the country affected by the Proclamation. Their stories confirm the extensive research demonstrating the concrete harms, trauma, and stigma that the Proclamation inflicts on U.S. citizens and persons lawfully present in the United States. ARGUMENT I. The Challenged Proclamation Causes Irreparable Harm By Separating Citizens And Immigrants From Family Members Abroad. A. Compelled Family Separation Causes Negative Physical and Mental Health Consequences. Studies of transnational families document and explain how separation negatively affects parents and children as individuals as well as adversely affecting the bond between them. See, e.g., Sarah Horton, A Mother’s Heart Is Weighed Down with Stones: A Phenomenological Approach to the Experience of Transnational Motherhood, 33 Culture, Med., & Psychiatry 21, 21–40 (2009). The limits on physical 9 interaction imposed by geographic separation make intimate relations between parents and children challenging and, consequently, the parent-child bond suffers. See Karlijn Haagsman et al., Transnational Families and the Subjective Well-Being of Migrant Parents: Angolan and Nigerian Parents in the Netherlands, 38:15 Ethnic & Racial Stud. 2652, 2653– 54 (2015). “This loss of intimacy and frustrated efforts to maintain close bonds . . . can cause severe emotional distress for both parents and children who feel that the bond is deteriorating.” Id. at 2654. The pain of separation is long-lasting for parents. One study found that parents recalled the circumstances of their family’s migration process and “emotionally laden details of their family separations” even after living in the United States for ten years or more. Dana Rusch & Karina Reyes, Examining the Effects of Mexican Serial Migration and Family Separations on Acculturative Stress, Depression, and Family Functioning, 35(2) Hispanic J. Behav. Sci. 139, 151 (2012). The pain of separation is also often accompanied by feelings of guilt. Haagsman, supra, at 2654; see also id. (women separated from children “feel guilty, ashamed and stigmatized”); Jeanne Miranda et al., Depression Among Latina Immigrant Mothers Separated from their Children, 56(6) Psychiatric Servs. 717, 720 (2005) (finding that immigrant Latinas separated from their children are at greater odds for depression than women not separated). Not surprisingly, family separation inflicts serious harm on children as well. One 14-year-old girl described her experience this way: “The day I left my mother I felt like my heart was staying behind.” Carola Suárez-Orozco et al., I Felt Like My Heart Was 10 Staying Behind: Psychological Implications of Family Separations & Reunifications for Immigrant Youth, 26(2) J. of Adolescent Res. 222, 240 (2010). The forced separation is damaging to children even though parents may try to maintain contact through letters, phone calls, and contributions to their children’s material well-being. Id. Children face difficult experiences not only when they are first separated from their parents but even later at reunification (if it occurs), when children can feel disoriented, estranged from their parents, mistrustful, and uncomfortable in their new family dynamic (sometimes including new siblings). Id. at 242–45. Children also experience a sense of loss all over again as they are separated from their interim caretakers. Id. Studies show that compelled family separation has meaningful physiological consequences as well. Family separation is almost inevitably accompanied by “[p]rolonged exposure to serious stress—known as toxic stress,” which the American Academy of Pediatrics has warned “can harm the developing brain and negatively impact short- and long-term health.” Sara Reardon, Health Toll of Immigration Policies Begins to Emerge, 544 Nature 148 (Apr. 13, 2017). Further, “[a] number of clinical studies . . . show that there are substantial negative psychological repercussions for immigrant children and youth who have been separated from their parents.” Suárez- Orozco, supra, at 227. Children who feel abandoned by their parents may respond with despair and detachment, id., and separated children are more likely to report symptoms of anxiety and depression in the initial years after migration than children who were not separated from their parents. Id. at 222. 11 For individuals who come to the United States fleeing persecution, civil wars, and bombings, the effects of family separation are particularly severe because “the family plays a central role in modulating the processes that influence the aftermath of trauma.” Cecile Rousseau et al., Trauma and Extended Separation from Family Among Latin American and African Refugees in Montreal, 64(1) Psychiatry 40, 57 (2001). The family is “an anchor for both emotion and identity” and aids those fleeing persecution and trauma, who otherwise “often feel estranged and alienated.” Id. For individuals able to stay together with family, the presence of close relatives can even “seem to transform adversity into a source of strength, perhaps by aiding in the rebuilding of a meaningful universe.” Id. By contrast, individuals who have fled their home countries and are separated from their loved ones feel “more disoriented than those living with at least part of their families” and “seem more overwhelmed by unspeakably painful memories.” Id. at 56. For individuals “who have had traumatic experiences, extended separation from family members may serve as a continuing link to an unbearable past . . . .” Id. at 41. These individuals are also “tormented daily by worry about what will become of the family members still overseas,” id. at 49, and feel significant guilt about having left their families behind with threats of reprisals looming over their family members, id. at 41. B. Amici’s Members Have Suffered the Harm of Forced Family Separation. Amici’s members have described the difficult psychological consequences of being separated from 10 Staying Behind: Psychological Implications of Family Separations & Reunifications for Immigrant Youth, 26(2) J. of Adolescent Res. 222, 240 (2010). The forced separation is damaging to children even though parents may try to maintain contact through letters, phone calls, and contributions to their children’s material well-being. Id. Children face difficult experiences not only when they are first separated from their parents but even later at reunification (if it occurs), when children can feel disoriented, estranged from their parents, mistrustful, and uncomfortable in their new family dynamic (sometimes including new siblings). Id. at 242–45. Children also experience a sense of loss all over again as they are separated from their interim caretakers. Id. Studies show that compelled family separation has meaningful physiological consequences as well. Family separation is almost inevitably accompanied by “[p]rolonged exposure to serious stress—known as toxic stress,” which the American Academy of Pediatrics has warned “can harm the developing brain and negatively impact short- and long-term health.” Sara Reardon, Health Toll of Immigration Policies Begins to Emerge, 544 Nature 148 (Apr. 13, 2017). Further, “[a] number of clinical studies . . . show that there are substantial negative psychological repercussions for immigrant children and youth who have been separated from their parents.” Suárez- Orozco, supra, at 227. Children who feel abandoned by their parents may respond with despair and detachment, id., and separated children are more likely to report symptoms of anxiety and depression in the initial years after migration than children who were not separated from their parents. Id. at 222. 11 For individuals who come to the United States fleeing persecution, civil wars, and bombings, the effects of family separation are particularly severe because “the family plays a central role in modulating the processes that influence the aftermath of trauma.” Cecile Rousseau et al., Trauma and Extended Separation from Family Among Latin American and African Refugees in Montreal, 64(1) Psychiatry 40, 57 (2001). The family is “an anchor for both emotion and identity” and aids those fleeing persecution and trauma, who otherwise “often feel estranged and alienated.” Id. For individuals able to stay together with family, the presence of close relatives can even “seem to transform adversity into a source of strength, perhaps by aiding in the rebuilding of a meaningful universe.” Id. By contrast, individuals who have fled their home countries and are separated from their loved ones feel “more disoriented than those living with at least part of their families” and “seem more overwhelmed by unspeakably painful memories.” Id. at 56. For individuals “who have had traumatic experiences, extended separation from family members may serve as a continuing link to an unbearable past . . . .” Id. at 41. These individuals are also “tormented daily by worry about what will become of the family members still overseas,” id. at 49, and feel significant guilt about having left their families behind with threats of reprisals looming over their family members, id. at 41. B. Amici’s Members Have Suffered the Harm of Forced Family Separation. Amici’s members have described the difficult psychological consequences of being separated from 12 their families and the harm that they have experienced as a result of the President’s travel bans.3 Dr. K.Z. and Dr. N.N. Dr. K.Z., a fourth-year internal medicine resident at a New York teaching hospital in Brooklyn, New York, and a member of SEIU’s Committee of Interns and Residents (CIR), fled persecution in Iran and entered the United States with refugee status in 1998. Although born in Iran, Dr. K.Z. became a naturalized U.S. citizen more than a decade ago. Now, as a resident, Dr. K.Z. serves low-income patients from diverse backgrounds, including Orthodox Jews and people of Arab, Chinese, Latin, Russian, Caribbean, and South and Southeast Asian descent. When Dr. K.Z. completes his residency, he intends to continue working in a U.S. hospital with a diverse group of patients providing critical care and treatment to patients suffering from cancer. One year ago, Dr. K.Z. married Dr. N.N., a gastroenterology fellow who works at the same hospital and is also a CIR member. Dr. N.N. is a citizen of Iran and a United States legal resident. As the couple planned their wedding, they did everything in their power to ensure that Dr. N.N’s Iranian father would be able to come to the United States and participate in the wedding ceremony. After issuance of President Trump’s Second Executive Order, Dr. N.N’s father was denied permission to enter the United States. The couple 3 The individuals whose stories are told here consented to having their experiences recounted in this brief, and records of the interviews conducted with them are on file with counsel. Some participants chose to maintain a measure of anonymity by using first names or initials only. 13 sought and received the assistance of their congressional representative, but even that did not help, and Dr. N.N’s father was unable to give his daughter away during the wedding ceremony. Dr. K.Z. says that his “wife was heart-broken that her father, the parent who had raised her, could not attend our wedding or participate in the wedding rituals that meant so much to her. Her father’s absence tainted what was to be one of the best days of our lives.” Dr. K.Z. was deeply disturbed and shaken by the travel ban’s effect on his life. “The United States welcomed and encouraged me and I truly believed that the words on the Statute of Liberty were meant for me.” But “[i]t has been a crushing personal disappointment to learn that the citizens of certain countries, people like my father-in-law, were no longer welcome.” Mohammad Al Zayed Mohammad Al Zayed was forced to leave behind his father and other relatives when he fled Syria. Mohammad currently works at O’Hare International Airport as a janitor and lives on the far North Side of Chicago with his wife and three children; he is also a member of SEIU’s Airport Workers United campaign. He has two young adult children and a son in elementary school. Before fleeing Syria, Mohammad and his family lived in a suburb outside Damascus. When unrest began to approach their community, the family fled into the capital. Eventually, the textile factory where Mohammad worked was destroyed in the fighting, and his children could no longer go to school because of the danger. Once the war reached Damascus, the 12 their families and the harm that they have experienced as a result of the President’s travel bans.3 Dr. K.Z. and Dr. N.N. Dr. K.Z., a fourth-year internal medicine resident at a New York teaching hospital in Brooklyn, New York, and a member of SEIU’s Committee of Interns and Residents (CIR), fled persecution in Iran and entered the United States with refugee status in 1998. Although born in Iran, Dr. K.Z. became a naturalized U.S. citizen more than a decade ago. Now, as a resident, Dr. K.Z. serves low-income patients from diverse backgrounds, including Orthodox Jews and people of Arab, Chinese, Latin, Russian, Caribbean, and South and Southeast Asian descent. When Dr. K.Z. completes his residency, he intends to continue working in a U.S. hospital with a diverse group of patients providing critical care and treatment to patients suffering from cancer. One year ago, Dr. K.Z. married Dr. N.N., a gastroenterology fellow who works at the same hospital and is also a CIR member. Dr. N.N. is a citizen of Iran and a United States legal resident. As the couple planned their wedding, they did everything in their power to ensure that Dr. N.N’s Iranian father would be able to come to the United States and participate in the wedding ceremony. After issuance of President Trump’s Second Executive Order, Dr. N.N’s father was denied permission to enter the United States. The couple 3 The individuals whose stories are told here consented to having their experiences recounted in this brief, and records of the interviews conducted with them are on file with counsel. Some participants chose to maintain a measure of anonymity by using first names or initials only. 13 sought and received the assistance of their congressional representative, but even that did not help, and Dr. N.N’s father was unable to give his daughter away during the wedding ceremony. Dr. K.Z. says that his “wife was heart-broken that her father, the parent who had raised her, could not attend our wedding or participate in the wedding rituals that meant so much to her. Her father’s absence tainted what was to be one of the best days of our lives.” Dr. K.Z. was deeply disturbed and shaken by the travel ban’s effect on his life. “The United States welcomed and encouraged me and I truly believed that the words on the Statute of Liberty were meant for me.” But “[i]t has been a crushing personal disappointment to learn that the citizens of certain countries, people like my father-in-law, were no longer welcome.” Mohammad Al Zayed Mohammad Al Zayed was forced to leave behind his father and other relatives when he fled Syria. Mohammad currently works at O’Hare International Airport as a janitor and lives on the far North Side of Chicago with his wife and three children; he is also a member of SEIU’s Airport Workers United campaign. He has two young adult children and a son in elementary school. Before fleeing Syria, Mohammad and his family lived in a suburb outside Damascus. When unrest began to approach their community, the family fled into the capital. Eventually, the textile factory where Mohammad worked was destroyed in the fighting, and his children could no longer go to school because of the danger. Once the war reached Damascus, the 14 family left Syria for Jordan to escape the violence and bombings. “We can’t even explain it,” Mohammad said of the violence and destruction he and his family witnessed in Syria. “Shelling. Killing. Street fighting. Nobody knows who’s fighting who, but everybody dying is innocent people.” Mohammad was relieved when he arrived with his family in the United States, where he hoped there would be more opportunity for his children. His eight- year-old son is in school, already speaks English, and claims math as his favorite subject. Mohammad’s adult son has joined him in working at O’Hare. Mohammad feels fortunate to work alongside colleagues at O’Hare who represent over 100 nationalities. He says it is “very nice” to be in a welcoming environment where he can observe his religion, as he did during the month of Ramadan. Mohammad, however, worries about relatives left behind and about whether he will see them again. Mohammad’s two brothers, father, and stepmother remain in Syria, and he has not seen them since 2012. His father is in his late eighties and has health problems. If the Muslim travel ban is upheld, Mohammad may never see his father again. Mohammad’s wife also has eleven sisters and four brothers, some of whom are in Syria and Jordan. Mohammad’s daughter is married to a Jordanian citizen, and she worries that if her new husband is not able to come to the United States, she may have to return to Jordan and then be barred from reentering the United States. Mohammad believes that the Trump Administration’s Muslim travel ban “is not right.” 15 Syrians are simply seeking a better life. He says: “It’s very sad. Who would want to leave their home if they don’t have to? People are running for their lives.” Abdi Abdi, a 33-year old worker at Minneapolis-St. Paul International Airport and member of SEIU’s Airport Workers United campaign, suffers from the daily torment of worrying about his family members in Somalia. Before coming to the United States, Abdi spent several years in refugee camps with his mother and siblings. While Abdi lived in the camps, his education was interrupted several times. But once Abdi arrived in the United States at the age of 18, he completed high school and earned a bachelor’s degree at Metropolitan State University in Minneapolis. Abdi eventually became a naturalized American citizen and was able to bring his wife and one of his three children to the United States. Unfortunately, visas for Abdi’s two eldest children were not granted when his wife’s visa was granted. As a result, they still live in Somalia with Abdi’s mother, who cares for them even though she is in her sixties. Abdi sends her money for their care, but he fears they will not be able to travel to the United States to reunite with him if the Proclamation is upheld. He says, “I can’t stop thinking about them. I have to be able to do this.” Abdi also worries about his and other relatives’ ability to travel as Somali-born United States citizens. One of his aunts, an American citizen, wants to travel home to visit a sick uncle but worries about being detained on her way back. He says, “What kind of American value is this, to keep families apart?” 14 family left Syria for Jordan to escape the violence and bombings. “We can’t even explain it,” Mohammad said of the violence and destruction he and his family witnessed in Syria. “Shelling. Killing. Street fighting. Nobody knows who’s fighting who, but everybody dying is innocent people.” Mohammad was relieved when he arrived with his family in the United States, where he hoped there would be more opportunity for his children. His eight- year-old son is in school, already speaks English, and claims math as his favorite subject. Mohammad’s adult son has joined him in working at O’Hare. Mohammad feels fortunate to work alongside colleagues at O’Hare who represent over 100 nationalities. He says it is “very nice” to be in a welcoming environment where he can observe his religion, as he did during the month of Ramadan. Mohammad, however, worries about relatives left behind and about whether he will see them again. Mohammad’s two brothers, father, and stepmother remain in Syria, and he has not seen them since 2012. His father is in his late eighties and has health problems. If the Muslim travel ban is upheld, Mohammad may never see his father again. Mohammad’s wife also has eleven sisters and four brothers, some of whom are in Syria and Jordan. Mohammad’s daughter is married to a Jordanian citizen, and she worries that if her new husband is not able to come to the United States, she may have to return to Jordan and then be barred from reentering the United States. Mohammad believes that the Trump Administration’s Muslim travel ban “is not right.” 15 Syrians are simply seeking a better life. He says: “It’s very sad. Who would want to leave their home if they don’t have to? People are running for their lives.” Abdi Abdi, a 33-year old worker at Minneapolis-St. Paul International Airport and member of SEIU’s Airport Workers United campaign, suffers from the daily torment of worrying about his family members in Somalia. Before coming to the United States, Abdi spent several years in refugee camps with his mother and siblings. While Abdi lived in the camps, his education was interrupted several times. But once Abdi arrived in the United States at the age of 18, he completed high school and earned a bachelor’s degree at Metropolitan State University in Minneapolis. Abdi eventually became a naturalized American citizen and was able to bring his wife and one of his three children to the United States. Unfortunately, visas for Abdi’s two eldest children were not granted when his wife’s visa was granted. As a result, they still live in Somalia with Abdi’s mother, who cares for them even though she is in her sixties. Abdi sends her money for their care, but he fears they will not be able to travel to the United States to reunite with him if the Proclamation is upheld. He says, “I can’t stop thinking about them. I have to be able to do this.” Abdi also worries about his and other relatives’ ability to travel as Somali-born United States citizens. One of his aunts, an American citizen, wants to travel home to visit a sick uncle but worries about being detained on her way back. He says, “What kind of American value is this, to keep families apart?” 16 Marwan Marwan, a senior organizer for SEIU, where he has worked for more than a decade, was born in Yemen and is a naturalized U.S. citizen. As a union organizer, he works to help airport employees at O’Hare International Airport. Every day he interacts with employees who, like him, came to the United States as immigrants, grateful for a better life and hopeful that they would be reunited with their families. The Muslim ban changed that. As he says: “This won’t make America safe, only tear families apart.” The first person in Marwan’s family to arrive in the United States was his father. Marwan’s father reunited the family by bringing his brothers, Marwan, Marwan’s mother, and Marwan’s siblings one by one to the Detroit area over the course of several decades. Marwan came to the United States in 1989 from Yemen and became a citizen in 1991. He is married with five children, aged 18, 13, 9, 6, and 5. Many members of Marwan’s and his wife’s extended families remain in Yemen, where a civil war is raging. One of Marwan’s brothers returned to Yemen before becoming an American citizen and lives in the capital of Sana’a with his wife and five children. About a year ago an airstrike hit a military compound 200 yards from his brother’s house, shattering all the windows in the neighborhood. Marwan’s nephew’s arm was injured in the blast. Marwan’s family’s ancestral village has also been the target of rebel activity and air strikes. Nine relatives, including two of his cousins, have been killed in the last several years. Marwan’s wife’s three brothers and three sisters also all live in Yemen. An elderly aunt in her eighties, who helped raise Marwan as his father 17 worked to bring him to the United States, remains there as well and requires care. Marwan worries for the safety of all his and his wife’s extended family members. He says: “I think about this every day and ask myself, ‘How do I bring them here?’” The challenged Proclamation will make it impossible for Marwan to reunite his family the way his father did in the past. “If my dad hadn’t come to the United States, I would be there right now and living under terror. I would be stuck.” Marwan now worries that more of his family members, for whom he feels responsible, will be hurt or harassed by the warring factions in his home country. Majd Majd is a homecare worker, member of SEIU Local 2015, and naturalized U.S. citizen. Majd lives in San Jose, California, with her husband, her two adult children, and her 90-year-old mother, all of whom are also U.S. citizens. Majd was born and educated in Syria, where she worked as an agricultural engineer until she came to the United States about 25 years ago. Most of Majd’s extended family emigrated from Syria to the United States, with the exception of a nephew who is in the midst of processing his application for legal permanent residency. Majd’s nephew lives alone in Damascus where he fears leaving his home. Although he is not affiliated with any political organizations, he was arrested, interrogated, and jailed for several weeks by Syrian government agents. Recently, he was arrested and pursued by government agents for a third time. Those experiences, combined with Syria’s brutal civil war 16 Marwan Marwan, a senior organizer for SEIU, where he has worked for more than a decade, was born in Yemen and is a naturalized U.S. citizen. As a union organizer, he works to help airport employees at O’Hare International Airport. Every day he interacts with employees who, like him, came to the United States as immigrants, grateful for a better life and hopeful that they would be reunited with their families. The Muslim ban changed that. As he says: “This won’t make America safe, only tear families apart.” The first person in Marwan’s family to arrive in the United States was his father. Marwan’s father reunited the family by bringing his brothers, Marwan, Marwan’s mother, and Marwan’s siblings one by one to the Detroit area over the course of several decades. Marwan came to the United States in 1989 from Yemen and became a citizen in 1991. He is married with five children, aged 18, 13, 9, 6, and 5. Many members of Marwan’s and his wife’s extended families remain in Yemen, where a civil war is raging. One of Marwan’s brothers returned to Yemen before becoming an American citizen and lives in the capital of Sana’a with his wife and five children. About a year ago an airstrike hit a military compound 200 yards from his brother’s house, shattering all the windows in the neighborhood. Marwan’s nephew’s arm was injured in the blast. Marwan’s family’s ancestral village has also been the target of rebel activity and air strikes. Nine relatives, including two of his cousins, have been killed in the last several years. Marwan’s wife’s three brothers and three sisters also all live in Yemen. An elderly aunt in her eighties, who helped raise Marwan as his father 17 worked to bring him to the United States, remains there as well and requires care. Marwan worries for the safety of all his and his wife’s extended family members. He says: “I think about this every day and ask myself, ‘How do I bring them here?’” The challenged Proclamation will make it impossible for Marwan to reunite his family the way his father did in the past. “If my dad hadn’t come to the United States, I would be there right now and living under terror. I would be stuck.” Marwan now worries that more of his family members, for whom he feels responsible, will be hurt or harassed by the warring factions in his home country. Majd Majd is a homecare worker, member of SEIU Local 2015, and naturalized U.S. citizen. Majd lives in San Jose, California, with her husband, her two adult children, and her 90-year-old mother, all of whom are also U.S. citizens. Majd was born and educated in Syria, where she worked as an agricultural engineer until she came to the United States about 25 years ago. Most of Majd’s extended family emigrated from Syria to the United States, with the exception of a nephew who is in the midst of processing his application for legal permanent residency. Majd’s nephew lives alone in Damascus where he fears leaving his home. Although he is not affiliated with any political organizations, he was arrested, interrogated, and jailed for several weeks by Syrian government agents. Recently, he was arrested and pursued by government agents for a third time. Those experiences, combined with Syria’s brutal civil war 18 and the departure of all of his family members, has plunged him into a severe depression. Majd and her elderly mother, her nephew’s grandmother, are desperate for her nephew to join them in the United States, especially in light of the health problems they face. Majd has been diagnosed with breast cancer, and her husband is being treated for prostate cancer. Majd’s mother suffers from diabetes, high blood pressure, heart problems, and arthritis. Because the travel ban permanently halts Syrian immigration, Majd’s mother fears that the travel ban will prevent her from seeing her grandson before she dies. Majd worries about both her nephew and the effect on her mother of his inability to travel to the United States. *** The result of the Muslim ban’s forced separation of families is the psychological harm documented in the social science literature and experienced by amici’s members like Dr. K.Z., Mohammad, Abdi, Marwan, and Majd. Such irreparable psychological harm is precisely what Congress sought to avoid when it enacted policies embodied in the Immigration and Nationality Act to preserve the family unit. See Legal Assistance for Vietnamese Asylum Seekers v. Dep’t of State, 45 F.3d 469, 471-72 (D.C. Cir. 1995). The District Court’s injunction is necessary to prevent this harm to amici’s members across the country. II. The Proclamation Sends A State- Sponsored Message That Promotes Anti-Muslim Hostility, Discrimination, And Stigma. In addition to causing harm through forced family separation, the challenged Proclamation, like the two Executive Orders that preceded it, promotes the 19 stigmatization of the Muslim faith and condones and encourages anti-Muslim hostility and violence. A. The Muslim Travel Ban Has Led to Increased Violence and Discrimination Against Muslims. A persistent theme in anti-Muslim discrimination is the allegation and assumption that Muslims are not “real” Americans—and are perpetual outsiders and aliens in their own land, despite viewing themselves as completely American. See, e.g., Kevin L. Nadal et al., Subtle and Overt Forms of Islamophobia, VI(2) J. of Muslim Mental Health 15, 22, 27–28 (2012). The anti-Muslim rhetoric used by President Trump both before and after his election has encouraged such erroneous claims, and the targeting of predominantly Muslim countries for disfavored treatment in the Proclamation, as with the two prior Executive Orders, furthers and deepens the portrayal of Muslims as unwelcome outsiders. Indeed, the Muslim travel ban has been seen by many as establishing a false and dangerous equivalence between Islam and violent terrorism, see generally Rebecca A. Clay, Islamophobia: Psychologists Are Studying the Impact of Anti-Muslim Sentiment and Exploring Ways To Prevent It, 48(4) Monitor on Psychol. 34 (Apr. 2017), even though Islam is one of the world’s major religions and the faith tradition of 23% of the world’s population.4 President Trump himself cited the September 11 attacks as justification for the Second Executive 4 Pew Research Ctr., The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2010-2050, 6 (Apr. 2, 2015), http://www.pewforum.org/2015/04/02/religious-projections- 2010-2050. 18 and the departure of all of his family members, has plunged him into a severe depression. Majd and her elderly mother, her nephew’s grandmother, are desperate for her nephew to join them in the United States, especially in light of the health problems they face. Majd has been diagnosed with breast cancer, and her husband is being treated for prostate cancer. Majd’s mother suffers from diabetes, high blood pressure, heart problems, and arthritis. Because the travel ban permanently halts Syrian immigration, Majd’s mother fears that the travel ban will prevent her from seeing her grandson before she dies. Majd worries about both her nephew and the effect on her mother of his inability to travel to the United States. *** The result of the Muslim ban’s forced separation of families is the psychological harm documented in the social science literature and experienced by amici’s members like Dr. K.Z., Mohammad, Abdi, Marwan, and Majd. Such irreparable psychological harm is precisely what Congress sought to avoid when it enacted policies embodied in the Immigration and Nationality Act to preserve the family unit. See Legal Assistance for Vietnamese Asylum Seekers v. Dep’t of State, 45 F.3d 469, 471-72 (D.C. Cir. 1995). The District Court’s injunction is necessary to prevent this harm to amici’s members across the country. II. The Proclamation Sends A State- Sponsored Message That Promotes Anti-Muslim Hostility, Discrimination, And Stigma. In addition to causing harm through forced family separation, the challenged Proclamation, like the two Executive Orders that preceded it, promotes the 19 stigmatization of the Muslim faith and condones and encourages anti-Muslim hostility and violence. A. The Muslim Travel Ban Has Led to Increased Violence and Discrimination Against Muslims. A persistent theme in anti-Muslim discrimination is the allegation and assumption that Muslims are not “real” Americans—and are perpetual outsiders and aliens in their own land, despite viewing themselves as completely American. See, e.g., Kevin L. Nadal et al., Subtle and Overt Forms of Islamophobia, VI(2) J. of Muslim Mental Health 15, 22, 27–28 (2012). The anti-Muslim rhetoric used by President Trump both before and after his election has encouraged such erroneous claims, and the targeting of predominantly Muslim countries for disfavored treatment in the Proclamation, as with the two prior Executive Orders, furthers and deepens the portrayal of Muslims as unwelcome outsiders. Indeed, the Muslim travel ban has been seen by many as establishing a false and dangerous equivalence between Islam and violent terrorism, see generally Rebecca A. Clay, Islamophobia: Psychologists Are Studying the Impact of Anti-Muslim Sentiment and Exploring Ways To Prevent It, 48(4) Monitor on Psychol. 34 (Apr. 2017), even though Islam is one of the world’s major religions and the faith tradition of 23% of the world’s population.4 President Trump himself cited the September 11 attacks as justification for the Second Executive 4 Pew Research Ctr., The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2010-2050, 6 (Apr. 2, 2015), http://www.pewforum.org/2015/04/02/religious-projections- 2010-2050. 20 Order even though none of the men behind those attacks (or any subsequent, fatal terrorist attack in the United States) hailed from the Order’s targeted countries. See id. The reference to September 11 makes sense only if one links Muslims generally with terrorism. Having that equivalence communicated by the White House and embodied in official policy gives people tending toward Islamophobia the permission to act on their biases. The 2017 second quarterly report of the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) shows that the number of anti-Muslim hate crimes in the first half of 2017 spiked 91% as compared to the same period in 2016; the third quarterly CAIR report also indicates a rise in hate crimes over the same period last year. See 2017 on Track to Becoming One of the Worst Years Ever for Anti-Muslim Hate Crimes, CAIR (Oct. 11, 2017), http://islamophobia.org/articles/ 209-2017-on- track-to-becoming-one-of-the-worst-years-ever-for- anti-muslim-hate-crimes.html; CAIR 3rd Quarter Civil Rights Report Shows Rise in Hate Crimes Over Same Period Last Year, Moderate Decline in Total Cases, CAIR (Oct. 25, 2017), http://cair.com/press- center/press-releases/14715-cair-3rd-quarter-civil- rights-report-shows-rise-in-hate-crimes-over-same- period-last-year-moderate-decline-in-total- cases.html. In addition to the rise in all hate crimes, there has been a noticeable escalation in anti-Muslim violence. Recent incidents of fires, Nazi graffiti, and broken glass at an Iraqi-American business in downtown Flagstaff, Arizona, followed the ripping up of copies of the Quran at a Tucson mosque in March of 2017, which followed broken windows at a Middle Eastern bakery in Phoenix shortly before that. See CAIR Calls 21 for Hate Crime Probe for Racist Harassment Targeting Tenn. Muslim Girls, Knife Attack on Father, Threat to Kill Entire Family, CAIR (Oct. 25, 2017), https://www.cair.com/press-center/press- releases/14735-cair-calls-for-hate-crime-probe-of- racist-harassment-targeting-tenn-muslim-girls-knife -attack-on-father-threat-to-kill-entire-family.html. Later in the year, Muslim girls in Tennessee suffered harassment, a knife attack on their father, and a threat to kill the entire family. Id. And in December of 2017, the FBI arrested a Florida man when he revealed his plans to “shoot up” the Islamic Center of Northeast Florida in order, in his words, to “give these freaking people a taste of their own medicine.” Anti- Muslim Activities in the United States, New America, https://www.newamerica.org/in-depth/anti-muslim- activity/ (last visited Mar. 22, 2018). Disturbingly, the Southern Poverty Law Center found that post-election incidents of harassment and intimidation have been commonly reported in K-12 schools. See David R. Williams et al., Health Effects of Dramatic Social Events—Ramifications of the Recent Presidential Election, 376(23) New Eng. J. of Med. 2295, 2296 (June 8, 2017). Overall, Muslim students report being bullied four times more than other students. See Dalia Mogahed & Youssef Chouhoud, American Muslim Poll 2017: Muslims at the Crossroads, Institute for Social Policy and Understanding at 4, 12 (2017), https://www.ispu. org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/AMP-2017_Full- Report.pdf. Incidents abound of Muslim and Middle Eastern students being called ISIS or terrorists, or being subjected to harassment such as having their hijabs (religious head coverings) pulled off by other students. See, e.g., Kristina Rizga, The Chilling Rise of Islamophobia in Our Schools, Mother Jones (Jan. 20 Order even though none of the men behind those attacks (or any subsequent, fatal terrorist attack in the United States) hailed from the Order’s targeted countries. See id. The reference to September 11 makes sense only if one links Muslims generally with terrorism. Having that equivalence communicated by the White House and embodied in official policy gives people tending toward Islamophobia the permission to act on their biases. The 2017 second quarterly report of the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) shows that the number of anti-Muslim hate crimes in the first half of 2017 spiked 91% as compared to the same period in 2016; the third quarterly CAIR report also indicates a rise in hate crimes over the same period last year. See 2017 on Track to Becoming One of the Worst Years Ever for Anti-Muslim Hate Crimes, CAIR (Oct. 11, 2017), http://islamophobia.org/articles/ 209-2017-on- track-to-becoming-one-of-the-worst-years-ever-for- anti-muslim-hate-crimes.html; CAIR 3rd Quarter Civil Rights Report Shows Rise in Hate Crimes Over Same Period Last Year, Moderate Decline in Total Cases, CAIR (Oct. 25, 2017), http://cair.com/press- center/press-releases/14715-cair-3rd-quarter-civil- rights-report-shows-rise-in-hate-crimes-over-same- period-last-year-moderate-decline-in-total- cases.html. In addition to the rise in all hate crimes, there has been a noticeable escalation in anti-Muslim violence. Recent incidents of fires, Nazi graffiti, and broken glass at an Iraqi-American business in downtown Flagstaff, Arizona, followed the ripping up of copies of the Quran at a Tucson mosque in March of 2017, which followed broken windows at a Middle Eastern bakery in Phoenix shortly before that. See CAIR Calls 21 for Hate Crime Probe for Racist Harassment Targeting Tenn. Muslim Girls, Knife Attack on Father, Threat to Kill Entire Family, CAIR (Oct. 25, 2017), https://www.cair.com/press-center/press- releases/14735-cair-calls-for-hate-crime-probe-of- racist-harassment-targeting-tenn-muslim-girls-knife -attack-on-father-threat-to-kill-entire-family.html. Later in the year, Muslim girls in Tennessee suffered harassment, a knife attack on their father, and a threat to kill the entire family. Id. And in December of 2017, the FBI arrested a Florida man when he revealed his plans to “shoot up” the Islamic Center of Northeast Florida in order, in his words, to “give these freaking people a taste of their own medicine.” Anti- Muslim Activities in the United States, New America, https://www.newamerica.org/in-depth/anti-muslim- activity/ (last visited Mar. 22, 2018). Disturbingly, the Southern Poverty Law Center found that post-election incidents of harassment and intimidation have been commonly reported in K-12 schools. See David R. Williams et al., Health Effects of Dramatic Social Events—Ramifications of the Recent Presidential Election, 376(23) New Eng. J. of Med. 2295, 2296 (June 8, 2017). Overall, Muslim students report being bullied four times more than other students. See Dalia Mogahed & Youssef Chouhoud, American Muslim Poll 2017: Muslims at the Crossroads, Institute for Social Policy and Understanding at 4, 12 (2017), https://www.ispu. org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/AMP-2017_Full- Report.pdf. Incidents abound of Muslim and Middle Eastern students being called ISIS or terrorists, or being subjected to harassment such as having their hijabs (religious head coverings) pulled off by other students. See, e.g., Kristina Rizga, The Chilling Rise of Islamophobia in Our Schools, Mother Jones (Jan. 22 26, 2016), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2016/ 01/bullying-islamophobia-in-american-schools/. Anti-Muslim discrimination and bias also has a significant impact on the workplace, and can lead to workers being fearful and distrustful of their employers. A rise in anti-Muslim harassment prompted the U.S. Equal Opportunity Employment Commission to issue guidance to workers who may be discriminated against because they wear a hijab, or who are called names like “the local terrorist,” “fanatic,” and “ISIS.” See Questions and Answers for Employees: Workplace Rights for Employees Who Are, or Are Perceived to Be, Muslim or Middle Eastern, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, https://www1.eeoc.gov//eeoc/publications/muslim_mi ddle_eastern_employees.cfm (last visited Mar. 22, 2018); see also Nina Shapiro, Aerospace Firm Electroimpact Agrees to Pay $485k After AG Finds ‘Shocking’ Discrimination Against Muslims, Seattle Times, Mar. 23, 2017, https://www.seattletimes. com/seattle-news/times-watchdog/aerospace-co- electroimpact-agrees-to-pay-485000-after-ag-finds- shocking-discrimination-against-muslims/ (describing Washington State findings that employer had equated Muslims and immigrants from predominantly Muslim countries with terrorists). Research further suggests that anti-Muslim discrimination is related to lower levels of job satisfaction, which also affects productivity. Clay, supra, at 34. B. Anti-Muslim Hostility and Discrim- ination Adversely Affects Mental and Physical Health. The hostility and discrimination encouraged by the Proclamation’s targeting of predominantly 23 Muslim countries also have negative physical and mental health consequences for those who feel targeted. As explained recently in the New England Journal of Medicine, “communities who feel vulnerable because they belong to a stigmatized, marginalized, or targeted group” can experience negative health effects as a result. Williams, supra, at 2295. With respect to people of Middle Eastern descent in particular, a post-September 11 study conducted in the Detroit area “found that experiences of discrimination and abuse . . . were positively associated with physiological distress . . . .” Id. at 2296. Another study found that Arab-American women in California experienced increased risk of low-birth-weight babies or pre-term births in the six months after September 11; women in other racial and ethnic groups did not experience any similar effects. Id. Anti-Muslim discrimination also has adverse effects on American Muslims’ mental health. Research has found an association between religious discrimination and depression in American Muslim women. See Dena Hassouneh, Anti-Muslim Racism and Women’s Health, 26(5) J. of Women’s Health 401 (2017). Another study of Muslim Americans found that those who reported experiencing discrimination were more likely to distrust, display negative attitudes, and avoid social interactions with the larger community. See Muniba Saleem & Srividya Ramasubramanian, Muslim Americans’ Responses to Social Identity Threats: Effects of Media Representations and Experiences of Discrimination, Media Psychol. (Apr. 4, 2017), http://www.tand fonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/15213269.2017.1302345. Moreover, children who are bullied or harassed due to their Muslim faith or Middle Eastern ancestry 22 26, 2016), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2016/ 01/bullying-islamophobia-in-american-schools/. Anti-Muslim discrimination and bias also has a significant impact on the workplace, and can lead to workers being fearful and distrustful of their employers. A rise in anti-Muslim harassment prompted the U.S. Equal Opportunity Employment Commission to issue guidance to workers who may be discriminated against because they wear a hijab, or who are called names like “the local terrorist,” “fanatic,” and “ISIS.” See Questions and Answers for Employees: Workplace Rights for Employees Who Are, or Are Perceived to Be, Muslim or Middle Eastern, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, https://www1.eeoc.gov//eeoc/publications/muslim_mi ddle_eastern_employees.cfm (last visited Mar. 22, 2018); see also Nina Shapiro, Aerospace Firm Electroimpact Agrees to Pay $485k After AG Finds ‘Shocking’ Discrimination Against Muslims, Seattle Times, Mar. 23, 2017, https://www.seattletimes. com/seattle-news/times-watchdog/aerospace-co- electroimpact-agrees-to-pay-485000-after-ag-finds- shocking-discrimination-against-muslims/ (describing Washington State findings that employer had equated Muslims and immigrants from predominantly Muslim countries with terrorists). Research further suggests that anti-Muslim discrimination is related to lower levels of job satisfaction, which also affects productivity. Clay, supra, at 34. B. Anti-Muslim Hostility and Discrim- ination Adversely Affects Mental and Physical Health. The hostility and discrimination encouraged by the Proclamation’s targeting of predominantly 23 Muslim countries also have negative physical and mental health consequences for those who feel targeted. As explained recently in the New England Journal of Medicine, “communities who feel vulnerable because they belong to a stigmatized, marginalized, or targeted group” can experience negative health effects as a result. Williams, supra, at 2295. With respect to people of Middle Eastern descent in particular, a post-September 11 study conducted in the Detroit area “found that experiences of discrimination and abuse . . . were positively associated with physiological distress . . . .” Id. at 2296. Another study found that Arab-American women in California experienced increased risk of low-birth-weight babies or pre-term births in the six months after September 11; women in other racial and ethnic groups did not experience any similar effects. Id. Anti-Muslim discrimination also has adverse effects on American Muslims’ mental health. Research has found an association between religious discrimination and depression in American Muslim women. See Dena Hassouneh, Anti-Muslim Racism and Women’s Health, 26(5) J. of Women’s Health 401 (2017). Another study of Muslim Americans found that those who reported experiencing discrimination were more likely to distrust, display negative attitudes, and avoid social interactions with the larger community. See Muniba Saleem & Srividya Ramasubramanian, Muslim Americans’ Responses to Social Identity Threats: Effects of Media Representations and Experiences of Discrimination, Media Psychol. (Apr. 4, 2017), http://www.tand fonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/15213269.2017.1302345. Moreover, children who are bullied or harassed due to their Muslim faith or Middle Eastern ancestry 24 perform worse academically and have higher rates of stress, depression, and anxiety. See Mislabeled: The Impact of School Bullying and Discrimination on California Muslim Students, CAIR California at 9-10 (2015), https://ca.cair.com/sfba/wp-content/uploads/ 2015/10/CAIR-CA-2015-Bullying-Report-Web.pdf; see also Sawssan R. Ahmed et al., A Structural Model of Racial Discrimination, Acculturative Stress, and Cultural Resources Among Arab American Adolescents, 48 Am. J. Cmty. Psych. 181, 186 (2011). In addition to studies specifically focused on Muslim communities, years of research confirms the negative health effects experienced by people who are the targets of discrimination. One 2015 study found an elevated risk of death among adults residing in communities where levels of racial prejudice were high, Williams, supra, at 2296, and immigrant children exposed to discrimination have been found to suffer adverse psychological consequences, David K. Androff et al., U.S. Immigration Policy and Immigrant Children’s Well-being: The Impact of Policy Shifts, 38(1) J. of Soc. & Welfare 77, 90 (2011). Everyday experiences of discrimination have been associated with coronary artery calcification, high blood pressure, poor sleep, and depression, distress, and anxiety. Goleen Samari, Islamophobia and Public Health in the United States, 106(11) Persp. from the Soc. Sci. 1920, 1921 (Nov. 2016). Research also indicates that the stress associated with discrimination adversely affects health not only through actual experiences but also because of rumination, vigilance, and worry over potential exposure to discrimination and harassment. See Williams, supra, at 2297. 25 C. Amici’s Members Have Suffered from the Proclamation’s Anti-Muslim Message. Amici’s members have been harmed by the Proclamation’s state-sponsored anti-Muslim message and the increased hostility and stigma that it has incited. Amici’s members, their families, and their communities have been placed in physical danger, lost their jobs, and struggled daily with the stress and fear of being seen as terrorists in their own homes. K.K. K.K., an Iranian citizen and F-1 visa holder currently working in the United States as a postdoctoral researcher, has experienced workplace discrimination as a direct result of the Muslim ban. In January 2017, K.K. was working at a prestigious American university, where she was part of a UAW campaign to organize postdoctoral researchers. After the First Executive Order was issued, K.K. was suddenly dismissed from her appointment. She had never received any negative performance reviews or feedback, and she was previously provided with a letter promising funding for her position through at least May 31, 2017. K.K.’s supervisor told her that the funding on the grant she was working on had dried up, but a colleague told K.K. that the supervisor confided the real reason for her dismissal was that the supervisor was concerned about having an Iranian citizen working on the research project after the issuance of the First Executive Order. Following her dismissal from the university, K.K. was able to secure a new position at a university in another state. However, she lost several months of work, which, in addition to causing financial strain, delayed her ability to complete her research. She 24 perform worse academically and have higher rates of stress, depression, and anxiety. See Mislabeled: The Impact of School Bullying and Discrimination on California Muslim Students, CAIR California at 9-10 (2015), https://ca.cair.com/sfba/wp-content/uploads/ 2015/10/CAIR-CA-2015-Bullying-Report-Web.pdf; see also Sawssan R. Ahmed et al., A Structural Model of Racial Discrimination, Acculturative Stress, and Cultural Resources Among Arab American Adolescents, 48 Am. J. Cmty. Psych. 181, 186 (2011). In addition to studies specifically focused on Muslim communities, years of research confirms the negative health effects experienced by people who are the targets of discrimination. One 2015 study found an elevated risk of death among adults residing in communities where levels of racial prejudice were high, Williams, supra, at 2296, and immigrant children exposed to discrimination have been found to suffer adverse psychological consequences, David K. Androff et al., U.S. Immigration Policy and Immigrant Children’s Well-being: The Impact of Policy Shifts, 38(1) J. of Soc. & Welfare 77, 90 (2011). Everyday experiences of discrimination have been associated with coronary artery calcification, high blood pressure, poor sleep, and depression, distress, and anxiety. Goleen Samari, Islamophobia and Public Health in the United States, 106(11) Persp. from the Soc. Sci. 1920, 1921 (Nov. 2016). Research also indicates that the stress associated with discrimination adversely affects health not only through actual experiences but also because of rumination, vigilance, and worry over potential exposure to discrimination and harassment. See Williams, supra, at 2297. 25 C. Amici’s Members Have Suffered from the Proclamation’s Anti-Muslim Message. Amici’s members have been harmed by the Proclamation’s state-sponsored anti-Muslim message and the increased hostility and stigma that it has incited. Amici’s members, their families, and their communities have been placed in physical danger, lost their jobs, and struggled daily with the stress and fear of being seen as terrorists in their own homes. K.K. K.K., an Iranian citizen and F-1 visa holder currently working in the United States as a postdoctoral researcher, has experienced workplace discrimination as a direct result of the Muslim ban. In January 2017, K.K. was working at a prestigious American university, where she was part of a UAW campaign to organize postdoctoral researchers. After the First Executive Order was issued, K.K. was suddenly dismissed from her appointment. She had never received any negative performance reviews or feedback, and she was previously provided with a letter promising funding for her position through at least May 31, 2017. K.K.’s supervisor told her that the funding on the grant she was working on had dried up, but a colleague told K.K. that the supervisor confided the real reason for her dismissal was that the supervisor was concerned about having an Iranian citizen working on the research project after the issuance of the First Executive Order. Following her dismissal from the university, K.K. was able to secure a new position at a university in another state. However, she lost several months of work, which, in addition to causing financial strain, delayed her ability to complete her research. She 26 estimates that moving to another university and another state cost her around $5,000 in out-of-pocket expenses. Safyia Yonis Safyia Yonis is a naturalized American citizen who was born in Somalia, and she fears that the violence incited by the Muslim ban will affect her family. She has lived in Minneapolis for more than 20 years, where she works as a janitor in a government building and is a member of SEIU Local 26. Safyia and her husband, who was also born in Somalia, have seven children under the age of 18 who were born in the United States. When civil war broke out in Somalia in 1991, Safyia fled to Kenya where she lived in a refugee camp. She says that life there was “very, very difficult,” with no access to education or healthcare. When Safyia arrived in the United States two years later, she felt safe and grateful she could go to see the doctor, attend school, and work. Since the Muslim ban was announced, however, Safyia has felt increasingly afraid of violence and harassment. Her sister and brother-in-law attend the mosque that was bombed on August 5, 2017 in the suburb of Bloomington. Safyia worries in particular that her daughter, who is in high school and wears a hijab, could be a target for harassment. Safyia feels her daughter should not have to live in fear: “She is an innocent; she has done nothing wrong.” A.G. and C.A. A.G. and C.A. are educators. A.G. is a teacher in Virginia, a member of NEA, and a parent of three children. She reports that all three of her children were bullied in school for being Muslim. Recently, she 27 has observed an increased level of fear among Muslim students at the school where she works. C.A. is a middle school teacher in Utah and a member of NEA. Since the first Executive Order was issued, she has had to confront anti-Muslim harassment at her school. Students have “ripp[ed] hijabs off the heads of Muslim girls in school,” and several of her female Muslim students have become “very quiet and withdrawn.” A.F. A.F. is a member of UAW Local 5810 and an Iranian citizen. A.F. came to the United States for graduate studies in 2011 and obtained his Ph.D. in chemical engineering in 2016 from a prestigious American university. He currently works as a postdoctoral researcher at the University of California’s Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL). After being offered the position at LBNL, A.F. underwent an extensive, nine-month-long background check conducted by the Department of Energy. Since the signing of President Trump’s First Executive Order, A.F. has suffered from chronic stress and has felt unwelcome in the country where he has successfully lived, worked, studied, and paid taxes for six years. A.F. applied for a green card under a national interest waiver and holds a single- entry visa. He fears that if he leaves the United States he will not be permitted to reenter. Prior to the issuance of the First Executive Order, A.F.’s parents visited him in the United States, but now A.F. fears it is impossible for them or other members of his family to obtain a visa to visit the United States. In addition, A.F.’s work is affected because he fears it is impossible for him to travel to attend annual 26 estimates that moving to another university and another state cost her around $5,000 in out-of-pocket expenses. Safyia Yonis Safyia Yonis is a naturalized American citizen who was born in Somalia, and she fears that the violence incited by the Muslim ban will affect her family. She has lived in Minneapolis for more than 20 years, where she works as a janitor in a government building and is a member of SEIU Local 26. Safyia and her husband, who was also born in Somalia, have seven children under the age of 18 who were born in the United States. When civil war broke out in Somalia in 1991, Safyia fled to Kenya where she lived in a refugee camp. She says that life there was “very, very difficult,” with no access to education or healthcare. When Safyia arrived in the United States two years later, she felt safe and grateful she could go to see the doctor, attend school, and work. Since the Muslim ban was announced, however, Safyia has felt increasingly afraid of violence and harassment. Her sister and brother-in-law attend the mosque that was bombed on August 5, 2017 in the suburb of Bloomington. Safyia worries in particular that her daughter, who is in high school and wears a hijab, could be a target for harassment. Safyia feels her daughter should not have to live in fear: “She is an innocent; she has done nothing wrong.” A.G. and C.A. A.G. and C.A. are educators. A.G. is a teacher in Virginia, a member of NEA, and a parent of three children. She reports that all three of her children were bullied in school for being Muslim. Recently, she 27 has observed an increased level of fear among Muslim students at the school where she works. C.A. is a middle school teacher in Utah and a member of NEA. Since the first Executive Order was issued, she has had to confront anti-Muslim harassment at her school. Students have “ripp[ed] hijabs off the heads of Muslim girls in school,” and several of her female Muslim students have become “very quiet and withdrawn.” A.F. A.F. is a member of UAW Local 5810 and an Iranian citizen. A.F. came to the United States for graduate studies in 2011 and obtained his Ph.D. in chemical engineering in 2016 from a prestigious American university. He currently works as a postdoctoral researcher at the University of California’s Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL). After being offered the position at LBNL, A.F. underwent an extensive, nine-month-long background check conducted by the Department of Energy. Since the signing of President Trump’s First Executive Order, A.F. has suffered from chronic stress and has felt unwelcome in the country where he has successfully lived, worked, studied, and paid taxes for six years. A.F. applied for a green card under a national interest waiver and holds a single- entry visa. He fears that if he leaves the United States he will not be permitted to reenter. Prior to the issuance of the First Executive Order, A.F.’s parents visited him in the United States, but now A.F. fears it is impossible for them or other members of his family to obtain a visa to visit the United States. In addition, A.F.’s work is affected because he fears it is impossible for him to travel to attend annual 28 conferences, including the International Conference on Thermoelectrics, which are crucial for scientists in his field. Because of the travel ban, A.F. fears that Iranian nationals like him are “doomed” to live in limbo. A.T. A member of UAW Local 4121, A.T. has been studying in the United States for the last four years and also works as an academic student employee. He holds a single-entry F-1 visa and fears that he may not be able to complete his studies in a Ph.D. program at the University of Washington because he is an Iranian citizen targeted by the Muslim ban. Even if he is able to remain in the United States, A.T. is also deeply concerned that the hostility generated by the travel ban will inhibit his ability to complete his Ph.D. in a timely manner and begin his professional career. A.T. was in Iran visiting family in January 2017 when the First Executive Order was issued. He was initially unable to secure a visa to return to his home and studies in the United States. A.T. contacted UAW Local 4121, which worked to assist him in getting back to the United States. As a result of assistance from Washington State’s governor, one of its senators, and a congressional representative, A.T. was lucky to be able to reenter the United States and resume his Ph.D. program while the First Executive Order was enjoined. He is currently unable to leave the United States again while he completes his studies; he has no family in the United States, and due to the Proclamation, his parents, who live in Iran, are unable to visit him here. *** 29 The experiences of amici’s members illustrate the wide-ranging harms inflicted by the anti-Muslim message sent by President Trump’s Proclamation, including discrimination and harassment in school, in the workplace, and in members’ daily lives. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm the preliminary injunction below, except as to its limitation to persons with a bona fide relationship with an individual or entity in the United States. Dated: March 27, 2018 Respectfully submitted, NICOLE G. BERNER DEBORAH L. SMITH LEO GERTNER SERVICE EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNION 1800 Massachusetts Ave., NW Washington, DC 20036 debbie.smith@seiu.org Attorneys for Amicus Curiae SEIU BARBARA J. CHISHOLM Counsel of Record KRISTIN M. GARCÍA ALTSHULER BERZON LLP 177 Post Street, Ste. 300 San Francisco, CA 94108 (415) 421-7151 bchisholm@altber.com Attorneys for Amici Curiae Counsel continued on next page. 28 conferences, including the International Conference on Thermoelectrics, which are crucial for scientists in his field. Because of the travel ban, A.F. fears that Iranian nationals like him are “doomed” to live in limbo. A.T. A member of UAW Local 4121, A.T. has been studying in the United States for the last four years and also works as an academic student employee. He holds a single-entry F-1 visa and fears that he may not be able to complete his studies in a Ph.D. program at the University of Washington because he is an Iranian citizen targeted by the Muslim ban. Even if he is able to remain in the United States, A.T. is also deeply concerned that the hostility generated by the travel ban will inhibit his ability to complete his Ph.D. in a timely manner and begin his professional career. A.T. was in Iran visiting family in January 2017 when the First Executive Order was issued. He was initially unable to secure a visa to return to his home and studies in the United States. A.T. contacted UAW Local 4121, which worked to assist him in getting back to the United States. As a result of assistance from Washington State’s governor, one of its senators, and a congressional representative, A.T. was lucky to be able to reenter the United States and resume his Ph.D. program while the First Executive Order was enjoined. He is currently unable to leave the United States again while he completes his studies; he has no family in the United States, and due to the Proclamation, his parents, who live in Iran, are unable to visit him here. *** 29 The experiences of amici’s members illustrate the wide-ranging harms inflicted by the anti-Muslim message sent by President Trump’s Proclamation, including discrimination and harassment in school, in the workplace, and in members’ daily lives. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm the preliminary injunction below, except as to its limitation to persons with a bona fide relationship with an individual or entity in the United States. Dated: March 27, 2018 Respectfully submitted, NICOLE G. BERNER DEBORAH L. SMITH LEO GERTNER SERVICE EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNION 1800 Massachusetts Ave., NW Washington, DC 20036 debbie.smith@seiu.org Attorneys for Amicus Curiae SEIU BARBARA J. CHISHOLM Counsel of Record KRISTIN M. GARCÍA ALTSHULER BERZON LLP 177 Post Street, Ste. 300 San Francisco, CA 94108 (415) 421-7151 bchisholm@altber.com Attorneys for Amici Curiae Counsel continued on next page. 30 JUDITH RIVLIN AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE, COUNTY AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES 1101 17th St., NW, Suite 900 Washington, DC 20036 jrivlin@afscme.org Attorney for Amicus Curiae AFSCME DAVID J. STROM AMERICAN FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, 555 New Jersey Ave., NW Washington, DC 20001 dstrom@aft.org Attorney for Amicus Curiae AFT JODY CALEMINE COMMUNICATIONS WORKERS OF AMERICA 501 3rd St., NW Washington, DC 20001 jcalemine@cwa- union.org Attorney for Amicus Curiae CWA ALICE O’BRIEN EMMA LEHENY LUBNA A. ALAM NATIONAL EDUCATION ASSOCIATION 1201 16th Street, NW, Suite 819 Washington, D.C. 20036-3290 aobrien@nea.org Attorneys for Amicus Curiae NEA NIRAJ R. GANATRA AVA BARBOUR INTERNATIONAL UNION, UNITED AUTOMOBILE, AEROSPACE AND AGRICULTURAL IMPLEMENT WORKERS OF AMERICA (UAW) 8000 E. Jefferson Ave. Detroit, MI 48214 nganatra@uaw.net abarbour@uaw.net Attorneys for Amicus Curiae UAW MARIO MARTÍNEZ MARTÍNEZ AGUILASOCHO & LYNCH, APLC 1527 19th St., Suite 332 Bakersfield, CA 93301 mmartinez@farmworker law.com Attorney for Amicus Curiae UFW 31 NICHOLAS CLARK UNITED FOOD AND COMMERCIAL WORKERS 1775 K Street, NW Washington, DC 20006 nclark@ufcw.org Attorney for Amicus Curiae UFCW 30 JUDITH RIVLIN AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE, COUNTY AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES 1101 17th St., NW, Suite 900 Washington, DC 20036 jrivlin@afscme.org Attorney for Amicus Curiae AFSCME DAVID J. STROM AMERICAN FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, 555 New Jersey Ave., NW Washington, DC 20001 dstrom@aft.org Attorney for Amicus Curiae AFT JODY CALEMINE COMMUNICATIONS WORKERS OF AMERICA 501 3rd St., NW Washington, DC 20001 jcalemine@cwa- union.org Attorney for Amicus Curiae CWA ALICE O’BRIEN EMMA LEHENY LUBNA A. ALAM NATIONAL EDUCATION ASSOCIATION 1201 16th Street, NW, Suite 819 Washington, D.C. 20036-3290 aobrien@nea.org Attorneys for Amicus Curiae NEA NIRAJ R. GANATRA AVA BARBOUR INTERNATIONAL UNION, UNITED AUTOMOBILE, AEROSPACE AND AGRICULTURAL IMPLEMENT WORKERS OF AMERICA (UAW) 8000 E. Jefferson Ave. Detroit, MI 48214 nganatra@uaw.net abarbour@uaw.net Attorneys for Amicus Curiae UAW MARIO MARTÍNEZ MARTÍNEZ AGUILASOCHO & LYNCH, APLC 1527 19th St., Suite 332 Bakersfield, CA 93301 mmartinez@farmworker law.com Attorney for Amicus Curiae UFW 31 NICHOLAS CLARK UNITED FOOD AND COMMERCIAL WORKERS 1775 K Street, NW Washington, DC 20006 nclark@ufcw.org Attorney for Amicus Curiae UFCW 
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work_4ltzr3vbcfetvondxezlgrpysq	----	Sexual health innovations in undergraduate medical education E Ferrara1*, MP Pugnaire1, JA Jonassen2, K O’Dell3, M Clay4, D Hatem5 and M Carlin1 1Office of Medical Education, Department of Family Medicine and Community Health, University of Massachusetts Medical School (UMMS), Massachusetts, USA; 2Department of Physiology, UMMS, Massachusetts, USA; 3Department of Obstetrics and Gynecology, UMMS, Graduate School of Nursing, Massachusetts, USA; 4Office of Ethics, UMMS, Massachusetts, USA; and 5Department of Medicine, UMMS, Massachusetts, USA Recent national and global initiatives have drawn attention to the importance of sexual health to individuals’ well-being. These initiatives advocate enhancement of efforts to address this under- represented topic in health professions curricula. University of Massachusetts Medical School (UMMS) has undertaken a comprehensive effort to develop an integrated curriculum in sexual health. The UMMS project draws upon the expertise of a multidisciplinary faculty of clinicians, basic scientists, a medical ethicist, and educators. This article describes the project’s genesis and development at UMMS, and reports on three innovations in sexual health education implemented as part of this endeavor. International Journal of Impotence Research (2003) 15, Suppl 5, S46–S50. doi:10.1038/ sj.ijir.3901072 Keywords: sexual health; human sexuality; undergraduate medical education Introduction This article will describe three innovative curricular components of the Sexual Health Initiative Project (SHIP) implemented at University of Massachusetts Medical School (UMMS) in AY 2001–02. UMMS was selected as one of seven schools in the US to receive a 2-y grant to develop and implement a comprehensive, integrated sexual health curriculum across the 4 y of medical education. The innovations described in this article are a representative sample of the comprehensive SHIP curriculum being im- plemented at UMass. Background In the US over the past 10 y, there has been a growing consensus to address sexual health as a critical aspect of individuals’ well-being. Most recently, Healthy People 2010, a federal program launched in 2000, designated ‘responsible sexual behavior’ as one of 10 priority health indicators for the US for the first decade of the new millennium. On a global level, the Pan-American Health Organi- zation (PAHO), World Health Organization (WHO) and World Association for Sexology (WAS) issued recommendations for action to promote sexual health, including the strategy to ‘provide education and training in Sexual Health for health and allied health professionals.’1 Despite the impetus of these national and global initiatives, recent studies indicate that sexual health topics are often not broached by physicians within the medical encounter. Among the barriers to communication about sexual health are: lack of provider comfort and knowledge; provider biases about sexual issues; fear of offending patients; and time constraints within the typical patient encoun- ter.2–4 These studies are all the more remarkable when juxtaposed with the fact that sexual health is overwhelmingly viewed by the general public as a ‘quality of life’ indicator. In a recent US poll of 500 adults 25 y or older, 94% stated that sexual enjoy- ment added to quality of life at any age.4 This same study indicated that 75% of those surveyed believed a doctor would dismiss sexual health concerns raised by a patient, and 68% believed they would embarrass their doctor by discussing sexual dys- function.4 Other studies have found that on average, only 25% of primary care physicians take a patient’s sexual history (range 11–37%), and that the reason most often cited for not taking a sexual history is a lack of training. 5–7 *Correspondence: E Ferrara, MA, Assistant Professor of Family Medicine and Community Health, University of Massachusetts Medical School, Office of Medical Educa- tion, 55 Lake Avenue North, Worcester, MA 01655, USA. E-mail: emily.ferrara@umassmed.edu International Journal of Impotence Research (2003) 15, Suppl 5, S46–S50 & 2003 Nature Publishing Group All rights reserved 0955-9930/03 $25.00 www.nature.com/ijir In a 1999 survey of 125 medical schools in the US, Canada, and Puerto Rico (72% response rate, conducted by Solarsh and Lewis, University of Virginia), authors found that 61% of medical students receive 10 h or less of training in human sexuality/sexual functioning, 17% receive 11–19 h, and 15%, 20 h or more. At UMass, students receive more than 20 h of sexuality education within their medical school curriculum. Prior to the Pfizer- funded curriculum development initiative, the core elements of UMMS’s 4-y curriculum included: * Year 1: sexual history as an element of the complete medical history and reproductive op- tions counseling; * Year 2: lectures on conducting sensitive gyneco- logic (GYN) and genitourinary (GU) examinations and practice sessions with standardized patients; lectures on human sexuality and sexual dysfunc- tion; small group case discussions, including assessing risk for HIV; * Year 3: ‘Communicating About Sexuality’ curri- culum integrated across five required clerkships in medicine, family medicine, psychiatry, pedia- trics, and ob–gyn. Despite this relatively extensive coverage of sexual health topics, in 2001 UMass students indicated on the Association of American Medical College’s Graduation Questionnaire that, although greatly improved as a result of a focus on sexual health communication skills through the Macy Initiative in Health Communication project (begun in 1999), 19% of graduating students at UMass (compared to 28% in 1999) continued to feel that instruction time in human sexuality was ‘inade- quate.’8 Project overview The UMMS was one of seven US schools to be selected to receive an unrestricted medical educa- tion grant from Pfizer, Inc., to promote sexual health as a core element of comprehensive health care, through the development of an integrated, 4-y medical school curriculum. The project is adminis- tered centrally through the school’s Office of Medical Education (OME), and draws on a multi- disciplinary committee of faculty experts. The support of several divisions of the OME, including Research and Evaluation, Standardized Patient Program, and Curriculum and Faculty Development, is integral to the project. Project leadership is provided by a family practice clinician and vice dean for undergraduate medical education, who is the Principal Investigator on the project; an educator based in the Office of Medical Education, who is Project Director; and a multidisciplinary executive committee including: a reproductive physiologist, a certified nurse midwife specializing in urogynecol- ogy, a general internist, and a medical ethicist. This leadership team developed the school’s curriculum plan, working in consultation with an advisory committee and key faculty members representing a range of perspectives in sexual health education including urology, obstetrics and gynecology, psy- chiatry, pediatrics, geriatrics, neurology, family medicine, and internal medicine. In a survey of 1st and 2nd year UMMS medical students, conducted in December 2001 during the first semester of the Pfizer project (response rate of approximately 32%), respondents identified the following challenges and barriers to discussing sexual health with patients: * societal attitudes toward sexuality as private; * student lack of knowledge; * patient discomfort and embarrassment; * student discomfort and embarrassment; * cultural differences, defined as differences in culture/ethnicity, language, gender, age, and sex- ual orientation. UMMS students identified the following topics as the most challenging sexual health issues they would face as practitioners: patients who engage in extramarital affairs, cheating and multiple partners, patients affected by domestic violence and sexual abuse, taking a sexual history from older patients, working with nonadherent patients in sexually transmitted disease (STD) high-risk groups. Many of these topics are highly charged, taboo subjects, with ethical implications. The UMass SHIP was designed to address the following areas of sexual health knowledge, skills, and attitudes in the medical school curriculum: core skills in sexual history-taking and physical exam, skills in self-awareness and reflective practice, and knowledge of population-specific sexual health, dysfunction, and treatment. The SHIP project builds on the legacy of the Macy Communication Skills Curriculum Initiative in sexual health topics implemented in academic year (AY) 1999–2000 that targeted the third year medical school curriculum. The Macy curriculum included coverage of the following topics: * Adolescent sexuality (family medicine) * Healthcare for gay/lesbian youth (pediatrics) * HIV risk reduction counseling (medicine) * Reproductive counseling (ob–gyn, medicine) * Lesbian healthcare (ob–gyn) * Ethical issues in women’s sexual health (ob–gyn) * Medication-related sexual dysfunction (medi- cine, psychiatry) Sexual health in UME E Ferrara et al S47 International Journal of Impotence Research * Post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) following rape (psychiatry) UMMS curricular innovations in sexual health The basic science interface: dissecting the pelvis A reflection session on ‘Dissecting the Pelvis: Sharing Thoughts, Questions and Reflections’ was offered as an adjunct to the Anatomy Course for first year students in AY 2001–02. Sponsored by the Office of Medical Education and the Office of Ethics, the goals of the session were to: (1) provide first year students with the opportunity to discuss the clinical importance of the knowledge being gained through dissecting the pelvic region in the Human Anatomy course; and (2) share ideas about coping strategies for dealing with intense emotional and physical reactions and feelings that dissecting the pelvis may evoke. The method utilized for this reflection session was facilitated discussion in small groups. Each small group was cofacilitated by a team of a physician–educator and a 4th year medical student. These facilitators were selected based on their level of teaching experience in sexual health topics, their comfort with and skill in facilitating discussion on sensitive topics in medical education, and their understanding of the value of reflection in medical education. Stimulus questions were provided to guide the discussion, and included: * What is the clinical importance of this region of the body? * Does the fact that you will be dissecting genitalia raise any issues for you? * How do physicians and medical students deal with sexuality when they have to touch intimate parts of a patient’s body? One-quarter of the class (25 students) opted to participate in this elective session. A post-session survey was administered to the entire class (totaling 100 students), including to those who did not elect to participate in the reflection session. In all, 66 responses were received (66% response rate); of these, 21 participated in the reflection session and 45 did not. Survey results indicated that when compared to those students who did not participate in the reflection session, the students who elected to participate reported a higher degree of apprehension prior to doing the pelvic dissection (14% reported that they were ‘very apprehensive,’ compared to 2% of the students who did not participate; and 19% reported that they were ‘not at all apprehensive,’ compared to 35% of the students who did not participate). In total, 48% of those who participated in the session indicated that participation reduced their apprehension about dissecting the pelvis ‘very much’ or ‘somewhat’; 48% reported ‘a little’ reduc- tion in apprehension as a result of the session, and 5% reported ‘not at all’. All respondents indicated that the session was an appropriate forum for talking about issues related to dissecting the pelvis, and 95% would attend activities like this in the future to discuss difficult issues and experiences. Cultural competence: caring for gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgendered (GLBT) patients In the third year of the medical school curriculum at UMass, the interclerkship program provided a ready venue for the integration of sexual health topics within existing 1-day intensive programs on im- portant topics not adequately covered in other parts of the curriculum. UMMS established the interclerk- ship program in 1995; since that time, an average of eight 1-day interclerkships are conducted each year, on topics such as domestic violence, multicultural- ism, end of life care, and complementary and alternative medicine. The interclerkship model provides a focused, intensive educational experi- ence using a CME-type format, which offers diverse program components including: plenary speakers, panel discussions, small group discussion, and skills-building workshops using standardized pa- tients. One of the SHIP innovations implemented within the interclerkship context was a 1-h workshop on ‘Medical Risks of the Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual and Transgendered (GLBT) Community’, offered as a component of the Interclerkship on Multicultural Issues. Topics covered included: introduction to GLBT community as a ‘multicultural’ group; the component strands of sexuality (orientation, biolo- gical anatomy, gender identity, and social sex role); the impact of homophobia and heterosexism in medicine; and general health risks of the LGBT community: psychiatric disorders, hate crimes, access to health care, substance use, and domestic violence. Following this overview, the particular health risks of the various segments of the GLBT populationFlesbians, gay men, GLBT and question- ing adolescents, and transgendered indivi- dualsFwere covered. The workshop, which highlighted evidence-based medical data where available and emphasized clinical implications, was developed and presented by the author (EF) in collaboration with a 3rd year medical student. Student advocacy for inclusion of sexual health topics in the curriculum has been critical to Sexual health in UME E Ferrara et al S48 International Journal of Impotence Research successful implementation, and served as the impetus for the Multicultural Interclerkship’s course directors to include GLBT health as a component of ‘cultural competence,’ most frequently associated only with racial and ethnic cultural differences. A total of 45 students, representing 45% of the total class of 100 students, attended the workshop. In all, 95% of those who attended this workshop evaluated it as ‘effective’ (51%) or ‘highly effective’ (44%). Of the eight presentations and workshops evaluated as part of the Multicultural Interclerkship Course, the ‘Medical Risks of the Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual and Transgendered Community’ workshop received the highest percentage of ratings in the ‘highly effective’ category. Comments from students included: ‘This is such an important topic that should have been addressed sooner,’ and ‘The GLBT issues program was great and should be required for all students.’ Women’s health mini-selective course Owing to the impact of gender on disease preven- tion, diagnosis, and treatment, a Women’s Health Course was developed as part of the medical school’s existing 4th year mini-selective course series. The UMMS Office of Medical Education has sponsored this series of 1-week mini-selectives since 1997, to provide intensive, focused teaching in particular content areasFlaboratory medicine, physician as teacher, emergency medicineFusing small group interactive learning methods, and emphasizing interdisciplinary approaches to teach- ing. The goal of the newly developed ‘Women’s Health’ course was to provide an overview of current issues from a range of disciplines and perspectives. As medical education addressing gender differences often lags behind newer research findings and treatment recommendations, this intensive, week- long mini-selective course emphasized new and interdisciplinary approaches to many women’s healthcare concerns and research issues. The course was taught by 19 multidisciplinary faculty and attended by seven fourth-year medical students and two graduate nursing students. Meth- ods of instruction included lectures, case studies, discussions, patient interactions, and independent student projects/presentations. The diverse topics covered in the course included: sexuality in health and disease, contraception, assisted reproduction, menopause, hormone replacement therapy, heart disease, pelvic floor health, reproductive cancers, transgendered sexuality, ethical issues in women’s health, and sexual health and the arts. To assess course efficacy, students’ pre- and post- course performances on a 25-item knowledge test and a 28-item confidence scale (7-point Likert) were compared. Also, students provided course feedback through anonymous post-course evaluations. The outcomes of the Women’s Health Course in the first year of its implementation (March 2002) included highly significant improvements in two areas: (1) knowledge about specific women’s health care issues and (2) confidence in counseling patients about these issues ((Po0.005); paired t-tests). A total of 100% of the students strongly agreed that this course enhanced their understanding of women’s health and would be useful in their care of patients; 100% also would recommend the course to other students. 9 The success of this pilot curriculum project in effecting statistically significant change in students’ knowledge and confidence in specific areas of women’s health has encouraged course directors to find ways to integrate key elements of the seminar series into the required curriculum for the entire student body in the future. Conclusion In order to prepare future physicians for effective practice, it is critical to develop and implement a comprehensive curriculum addressing a range of sexual health topics. Particularly relevant and critical areas of instruction include: assessment of high-risk behavior and counseling strategies; defin- ing of ‘normal’ sexual function inclusive of all sexual orientations; assessment and treatment of sexual dysfunction; and screening for sexual abuse and/or assault. Barriers to addressing sexual health in the healthcare context, both from the perspective of the patient and the physician must be taken into consideration when designing this curriculum, with emphasis on the clinical relevance of incorporating nonjudgmental, targeted screening for sexual health issues with all patients. Acknowledgements The following individuals enthusiastically provided expertise and guidance to SHIP curriculum devel- opment efforts described: William Conners MD, Diego Sanchez, Holly Ryan, Marjorie Safran MD, Susan Billings-Gagliardi PhD, John Cooke PhD, and Kate O’Hanlan MD. This content was initially presented in part at the Sexual Medicine Society of North America Annual Research Meeting, January 2003 in Boca Raton, Florida, and at the 113th Annual Meeting of the American Association of Medical Colleges, November 2002 in San Francisco, CA. The Sexual Health Initiative Project (SHIP) at University of Massachusetts Medical School is supported in part by an unrestricted medical education grant from Pfizer, Inc. Sexual health in UME E Ferrara et al S49 International Journal of Impotence Research References 1 Pan American Health Organization, World Health Organiza- tion, Promotion of Sexual Health Recommendations for Action, Guatemala, 2000. 2 Maheux B, Haley N, Rivard M, Gervais A. Do physicians assess lifestyle health risks during general medical examinations? A survey of general practitioners and obstetrician–gynecologists in Quebec. Can Med Assoc J 1999; 160: 1830 – 1834. 3 Epstein R et al. Awkward moments in patient–physician communication about HIV Risk. Ann Intern Med 1998; 128: 435 – 442. 4 Marwick C. Survey says patients expect little physician help on sex. JAMA 1999; 281: 2173 – 2174. 5 Council on Scientific Affairs, American Medical Association. Health care needs of gay men and lesbians in the United States. JAMA 1996; 275: 1354 – 1359. 6 Boekeloo BO et al. Frequency and thoroughness of STD/HIV risk assessment by physicians in a high-risk metropolitan area. Am J Public Health 1991; 81: 1645 – 1648. 7 McCance KL, Moser Jr R, Smith KR. A survey of physicians’ knowledge and application of AIDS prevention capabilities. Am J Prev Med 1991; 7: 141 – 145. 8 Association of American Medical Colleges Medical School Graduation Questionnaire Final School Report: University of Massachusetts Medical School, (1999–2001). 9 Jonassen JA, Ferrara E, O’Dell K. An intensive, multidisciplin- ary mini-selective course improves senior students’ knowledge and self-confidence about women’s healthcare and women’s health research. Presented at the 113th Annual Meeting of the Association of American Medical Colleges, San Francisco, CA, November 11, 2002. Sexual health in UME E Ferrara et al S50 International Journal of Impotence Research Sexual health innovations in undergraduate medical education Introduction Background Project overview UMMS curricular innovations in sexual health Conclusion Acknowledgements References 
work_4m2wzpojtjccriuc6eml3zdm7i	----	Veterinary Record - Wiley Online Library Skip to Main Content Working off-campus? 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work_4np46ncqfnhvzjfedxwu2tc4da	----	Microsoft Word - z501 Impact of Linguistic Exclusion on Corporate Hiring Decision International Journal of Trend in Scientific Research and Development (IJTSRD) Volume 3 Issue 5, August 2019 Available Online: www.ijtsrd.com e-ISSN: 2456 – 6470 @ IJTSRD | Unique Paper ID – IJTSRD27964 | Volume – 3 | Issue – 5 | July - August 2019 Page 2580 The Impact of Linguistic Exclusion on Corporate Hiring Decisions Madhuri Singh, Rohit Assistant Professor, Economics Department, Kalindi College, New Delhi, India How to cite this paper: Madhuri Singh | Rohit "The Impact of Linguistic Exclusion on Corporate Hiring Decisions" Published in International Journal of Trend in Scientific Research and Development (ijtsrd), ISSN: 2456- 6470, https://doi.org/10.31142/ijtsrd27964 Copyright © 2019 by author(s) and International Journal of Trend in Scientific Research and Development Journal. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY 4.0) (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by /4.0) ABSTRACT This paper explores the role of media, particularly, the quality of media content, in the formation of social prejudice against a group. Firstly, we try to explain the reasons behind social discrimination (usually conducted by 'haves') against marginalized groups ('have nots' of the society) using the theories from behavioral economics. Secondly, we come up with a simple probability model to frame the negative impact of linguistic exclusion by media (discriminatory media content) on corporate hiring decisions. Lastly we conclude with a discussion on economic losses due to the discriminatory practices while hiring employees in such institutions. KEYWORDS: heuristics, linguistic exclusion, social categorisation, stereotype threat 1. Introduction Media is a social domain where a ‘notion’ turns into a ‘social belief/opinion’. It’s where legitimacy of opinions is fabricated and then injected into a social psychology. As per the conclusions drawn by Uysal Ahmet in his study of Turkey’s media in 2009[1], the ideological and material interests of journalists play a significant role in shaping their attitudes towards a novel social notion. He observed that the framing of social issues such as environmental movement which are in direct conflict with the material interests of Turkish media platform(Media content developer) showed a cautious hesitation whereas the idea of feminism which does not involve material conflicts, was fully supported by them. Thus beliefs and material interests of media content developers are at the roots of social perception/beliefs and their words are strong enough to bring a social change (both positive and negative). In the June 27th, 2011 edition of U.S daily newspaper “Vest” an article titled “Junkies drink methadone in a bus” was published. The methadone therapy centre (Centres for Prevention and Treatment of Drug) was repeatedly referred to as “Day centers for junkies”. The journalist had refrained from using ‘patient” for persons on methadone therapy and used junkies and nacre-addicts throughout the text. The repeated use of the discriminatory term “junky” presents the ‘patients’ in a negative light and nourishes the existing social fear against drug-abuse patients[2]. The linguistic and rhetorical discrimination in the form of use of derogatory, offensive, humiliating and abusive words against a particular group or a person masks the real culprit for discrimination and exposes the victimized group or a person to consequent discriminatory practices. The linguistic exclusion of a marginalized group updates the social perception about that group and hence the existing social gap between haves and have-nots widens. It initiates a never ending cycle of discrimination. A person acts on its prejudice against a social group (usually marginalized social group) and discriminate once the discriminatory media content (linguistic exclusion of a particular group/ person) legitimizes its prejudice. We use statistical modeling to explain how linguistic exclusion can result in discrimination in corporate hiring decisions. The haves are people from White race and have- nots belong to Black race. The hiring decision is modeled as a function of media content. We will show that the probability of Black being hired is directly proportional to the quality of the media content. So if a bad quality (discriminatory) content is floated in the society then the have-nots are further marginalized resulting in a loop of discrimination and social marginalization. Figure1 Loop of Discrimination and Continuous Marginalisation 2. Social Discrimination-Answers lying in Social categorisation and Social Heuristics Human processes the complexities of the world using social categorization and social heuristics. Just as we categorize things into groups based on some commonalities (furniture, IJTSRD27964 International Journal of Trend in Scientific Research and Development (IJTSRD) @ www.ijtsrd.com eISSN: 2456-6470 @ IJTSRD | Unique Paper ID – IJTSRD27964 | Volume – 3 | Issue – 5 | July - August 2019 Page 2581 vehicles, jewellery etc.) we also have a spontaneous tendency to categorise a person we meet into a category- man or woman, Black or White, Hindu or Muslim, young or old, able bodied or disabled et cetera. Social categorisation is informative and useful as a heuristic (mental shortcuts) only when the stereotype about a social group is accurate. Being lost in a city can be avoided if a person acts upon its stereotype about a policeman (ask him about the directions) that is a policeman is a social category which ought to have a knowledge about the city but if a policeman is clueless about the city routes than use of this stereotype as a heuristic is uninformative. In experimental studies done by Tajfel and Wilkes (1963)[3] and Patricia Linville and Edward Jones(1980)[4] it was observed that humans have a tendency to see more similarities among people belonging to a same group and more differences among different social categories/groups. In other words, we humans experience out-group homogeneity-tendency to perceive more similarities among out-group members than we see in the in- group members (the group we think we belong to). Thus we are prone to exhibit out-group bias -negative categorisations, feelings or notions about people from an outgroup. Even when new information (through media, books or other communication means) are floated in the social arena human usually picks up those which either hardened the existing social categorisation and related beliefs or do not challenge the schemata. (the general principle of assimilation-world is perceived in a way to fit our existing beliefs; changes in beliefs fit to reality is difficult). “When we see members of social groups perform behaviors, we tend to better remember information that confirms our stereotypes than we remember information that disconfirms our stereotypes” (Fyock and Stangor, 1994) [5]. Let’s try to understand the differences between how we ought to (Bayesian updating of beliefs once a new piece of information surfaced) and how we usually process the available and new information. Once we are exposed to novel set of information we make judgements not by actually computing probabilities and utilities but by following heuristics- a rule of thumb or mental shortcut that can be used while making a decision or forming a judgement. Though heuristic reduces the time and effort required to solve everyday problems, the consistent application of heuristics often leads to bias. Let two cab companies operate in a city- Blue colour cabs (10 percent operability) (let it be event A) and Green colour cabs (90 percent operability)(event Ac). One of these two is involved in a hit-and-run case. Luckily there is an eye witness whose accuracy of identifying the colour of the car is 80 percent i.e out of 100 times he was able to identify 80 times the colour of the car shown correctly. He makes his statement that the car involved in a crime had blue colour. What is the probability that the witness is right (i.e. the colour of the car was in fact blue)? Most of us will say that there is a high probability that witness is correct (witness claims the color of the car to be blue/green given that the actual color of the car was blue/green) since witness is highly accurate (80 times out of 100). Let’s try some statistics! Using Bayes’ Theorem the conditional probability the cab being blue (A) on the statement of the witness (B) is the following: P (A|B) = P(the cab is blue| the eye witness says the colour is blue) = (0.8*0.1)/(0.8*0.1+0.2*0.90) =0.31 Notice that in spite of the fact that the witness is very reliable; the cab that was involved in the accident was more likely to be green colour than blue. The source of the mistake committed in such cases is the base rate fallacy or base-rate neglect fallacy. The base rate (number of green/ blue colour cars in a city, number of terrorists from a social group/ in a population) is often not properly accounted while making presumptions. Let us assume that in a city of 10 million at a given point of time only 10 are terrorists. The competency rate of police officers is 99 percent. The probability that somebody who has been identified as a terrorist is in fact a terrorist is not remotely equal to the accuracy of the police officer’s assessments but it is often mistaken to be nearly 99 percent. In this case we failed to account a near zero probability of terrorists in a city population (base rate). What can explain this fallacy? The answer lies in the availability heuristics. When we rely on availability heuristics we assess the probability of some event occurring by the ease with which the event comes to the mind i.e. X is more likely than Y if X comes to mind more easily than Y. It explains why there is mass hysteria about airplane crashes, terrorist attacks, nuclear radiation leaks and hate crimes against a community shortly after the occurrence of such events as they come to mind particularly easily. Stories have the power to communicate information to the masses but they can also bring harm. A broadcast story about a Black committing a heinous crime can generate a strong sentiments in spite of the fact that vicious criminals from both White and Black races are there in the society. In the hit-and-run case even if we know that witness can be incorrect i.e. 80 percent accuracy does not necessarily means that the colour of the car was that what witness is claiming to be, there is a strong likelihood that the cases of witness being correct will come to mind easily as compared to the cases when witness was incorrect. 3. Corporate Hiring Decision and Media Content- A Statistical Model A media firm produces two products- content (news or entertainment content) and audiences (it can be packaged, priced and sold to advertisers). The content is not only a commercial good but also ‘cultural ’good‘that is tied up with information or ‘messages’ (quality). It doesn’t get used up or destroyed in the act of consumption (non-rival nature). Once created it can be replicated at minimal cost i.e one news article can be reused on various media platforms.Thus media content has a high fixed production cost but near zero replication cost. The revenue of the media firm is coming from the advertisement fees paid by advertisers. The quality of the content will determine the audiences which will ensure the positive flow of revenue from the advertisers. We assume a space where there exists a single media platform acting as a monopoly ( media firm). Let the quality of the media content being captured by the continuous variable 𝜭 such that 𝜭L<𝜭<𝜭H . If a quality of the media content is below 𝜭L it will lose all its audience. The media content is considered discriminatory ( use of linguistic exclusion against a social group/person) if it lies between International Journal of Trend in Scientific Research and Development (IJTSRD) @ www.ijtsrd.com eISSN: 2456-6470 @ IJTSRD | Unique Paper ID – IJTSRD27964 | Volume – 3 | Issue – 5 | July - August 2019 Page 2582 𝜭Land 𝜭O ( cutoff quality varies from society to society ). The lower the quality of the media content higher the level of linguistic exclusion (higher the degree of discrimination). As discussed before the quality of the media content is majorly influenced by the materialist and ideological beliefs of the content developer. The schemata and biases of the content developer will be reflected in the quality of the content. In our set up there are two social categories based upon race- Blacks (socially marginalised group) and Whites (socially privileged group). An employer has some beliefs about the quality of members of these two social categories captured by a variable 𝛃ij. 𝛃ij =the probability that member of the ith group is of low quality= prejudice of jth employer against a social group 𝛃ij = f(𝜭)= 1/𝜭H -𝜭L i=Blacks, Whites j=1…..n employers In other words, it expresses the belief of an employer about the quality of a member of the out-group. The major source of information and ‘facts’ now days is media (especially social media). That is why 𝛃ij is taken as univariate function (uniform distribution over 𝜭) of quality of media content. There is a negative relation between social prejudice/ individual negative belief about a social group(category) of jth employer and the media content quality i.e. as the media content becomes more and more discriminatory towards a particular social group/ category the social prejudice deepens. If 𝜭L <𝜭<𝜭O i.e content quality is discriminatory then 𝛃ij =f(𝜭) = 1/( 𝜭O- 𝜭) (1) If 𝜭O <𝜭<𝜭H i.e. content quality is not discriminatory then 𝛃ij =f(x;) = 1/( 𝜭- 𝜭O) (2) Let the probability of a member belonging to ith social category being successful in a job interview when interviewed by jth employer be denoted by Pij (selection) = f (𝜶i,ij) . It is a joint probability function of two independent variables 𝜶i and 𝛃ij (negative belief about a social group/ prejudice) where 𝜶i is a catchall variable which captures all other factors affecting the hiring outcome of a member of ith social category. For our purpose we are assuming that 𝜶i is a constant for both the categories i.e 𝜶black=𝜶white= 𝜶. We also assume that Pij(selection) follows a normal distribution. Considering the case when media content is discriminatory against group i, Pij(selection)= f(𝜶,𝛃ij)=f (𝜶,1/(𝜭O- 𝜭))= 𝜶* [1/(2π)0.5𝜎] [e-(1/2*{(𝝱-μ)^2/𝝈^2}] (3) Where 𝝈 and μ are standard deviation and mean for 𝛃ij respectively. Mean of 𝛃ij is defined as prejudice against social group i , averaged over all j employers i.e. it's a social prejudice against ith group. Standard deviation of 𝛃ij tells us about how much individual employer's prejudice differs from social prejudice. Taking logarithms on both sides of the equation 3 ln Pij(selection)=ln𝜶+ln 1-ln𝝈-0.5 ln 2π- [{1/(2𝝈^2)}* (𝞫ij-μ)^2] (4) Taking a first order partial differentiation with respect to 𝞫ij , we get 𝜕 ln Pij/ 𝜕𝞫ij = -(𝞫ij-μ)/𝝈^2 (5) 𝜕 Pij /𝜕𝞫ij = -{Pij* (𝞫ij-μ)/𝝈^2} (6) Since Pij >0 and 𝝈^2>0 (probability and variance are non negative numbers) therefore by equation 6 it can be inferred that the partial rate of change in probability of member from ith group being successful in a job interview when interviewed by jth employer is a decreasing function of probability of member from ith group being perceived as of bad quality by the jth employer provided that the individual prejudice of jth employer is deeper than social prejudice i.e. 𝜕 𝜕 Pij /𝜕𝞫ij <0 => Pij∝ (1/𝞫ij) (7) We know that 𝞫ij is inversely proportional to (media content quality) i.e.𝞫ij ∝ (1/𝜭) (8) Combining (7) and (8) we get Pij∝𝜭 (9) I.e. the probability of member from ith group being successful in a job interview when interviewed by jth employer is directly proportional to the quality of the media content. Hence, lower the quality of the media content (more discriminatory media content) lower is the chance for ith group member being selected by a jth employer. 4. Prejudice-Stereotype-Discrimination Threats and Social Losses In a study done by Claude Steele and Joshua Aronson(1995)[6] it was found that the lower academic performance of Black Students on standardized tests as compared to White students was due to the negative expectation and fear created by stereotypes against Blacks- “Blacks are intellectually inferior to Whites”. When the students were asked to indicate their races before taking the math test Black students tend to perform poorer than White students. In literature this negative effect of stereotype is known as stereotype threat. In a similar study done by Brown et al (2003)[7] it was found that children with low socioeconomic status perform poorly in comparison to students from high socioeconomic status. Social prejudice-Stereotype- Social Discrimination brings welfare losses to a society. They reduce the social productivity and increase the dead -weight losses. Overall they are a costly business. In 1974, economists James Gartner and Charles Haworth in order to explore impact of discrimination on firm’s profits and performance investigated the recruitment process for baseball teams during late 1950s[8]. They found that those teams who avoided racial discrimination gained a competitve advantage over those teams who chose to racially segregate. ‘Low- discriminating’ teams performed better than ‘high- discriminating’ teams in following three aspects- quality of players, attendance of the team members, winning the games. Thus social discrimination against marginalised groups cripples employers ability to recruit genuine talents, International Journal of Trend in Scientific Research and Development (IJTSRD) @ www.ijtsrd.com eISSN: 2456-6470 @ IJTSRD | Unique Paper ID – IJTSRD27964 | Volume – 3 | Issue – 5 | July - August 2019 Page 2583 decrease retention rates, introduces turnover-related costs, stifles job performance and producitivity and limit access to consumer markets.In a real world experiment conducted by officials in Minnesota over how to nudge tax compliance an interesting result was found- the tax compliance rate increases for that group which was told that more than 90 percent of Minnesota already complied,in full. Clearly some taxpayers violate tax laws because of misperception based on the availability of media or other cheaters-that level of compliance is quite low. Humans are prone to social compliances and herd behaviour. The desirable social behavioral changes can be more effectively executed if media uses positive, injunctive norm rather than negative, informational one. Thus instead of focussing more on wrongdoings of handful members of certain social group it should highlight achievements of already marginalized social group. 5. Conclusion Media is an impactful tool through which changes in social ideas, social attitudes/behaviour and social relations can be achieved in no time. On one hand it's a voice of society and on the other hand it also stimulates the novelty into the society. It's a double edged sword which if not used judiciously will definitely cause social crisis. There is a rich literature on the role of the media in building the social beliefs. In this paper, we have reviewed some of the literature and presented the theory of linguistic exclusion and heuristics. We have also used simple statistics to show the impact of any media content on the updation of social beliefs and then we have developed a model to show how the content presented by the media to the public affect the social beliefs and then affect the hiring decisions of the corporates. The model explains how the content shown by media leads to the discrimination by corporates in hiring black citizens. We seek to do next empirical study to find out whether it supports our model or not. References [1] Uysal, Ahmet(2009), "The Language of Inclusion and Exclusion: Media and Social Movement in Turkey", Global Media Journal, volume 8 issue 14 [2] Trajanoski, Zara, "Media and Marginalised Communities", Report, Foundation Open Society Macedonia,2011 [3] Tajfel, Henri & Wilkes, A. L. (1963),"Classification and Quantitative Judgement", British Journal of Psychology volume 54 issue 2 [4] Linville, P. W., & Jones, E. E. (1980),"Polarized appraisals of out-group members" Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 38(5), 689-703. [5] Fyock, Jack & Stangor, Charles (1994), "The Role of Memory Biases in Stereotype Maintenance", British Journal of Social Psychology volume 33 issue 3 [6] Steele, C. M.& Aronson, J. (1995), "Stereotype threat and the intellectual test performance of Africa Americans", Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 69, 797-811 [7] Brown, R., Croizet, J.-C., Bohner, G., Fournet, M., & Payne, Al(2003),"Automatic category activation and social behaviour: The moderating role of prejudiced beliefs", Social Cognition 21(3):167-193 · June [8] Burns, Crosby, “Costly Business of Discrimination’, Report, Centre for American Progress report, March 22, 2012 
work_4o7muwvghfhlretq6gzjdrjcl4	----	Measuring police innovation 303 Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies & Management, Vol. 23 No. 3, 2000, pp. 303-317. # MCB University Press, 1363-951X Measuring police innovation: issues and measurement William R. King Health Center, Room 232, Bowling Green State University, Bowling Green, Ohio, USA Keywords Police, Innovation, USA Abstract This paper investigates conceptual and empirical issues in the study of police organizational innovation. In particular, previous studies of police innovation have rarely created measures of innovation that are in accord with established methods and theory employed in innovation studies of other organization types. To mitigate this oversight, this paper first describes four relevant issues in organizational innovation, and applies these issues to create a fivefold measure of police innovation with data on the 431 largest municipal US police departments. Second, the components of this fivefold typology of police innovation are factor analyzed, to assess their unidimensionality. The results of these analyses indicate that three of the five innovation types are, in themselves, multi-dimensional. Overall, police innovations do not adhere to the five innovation types suggested by theories of organizational innovation. Instead, the multi-dimensionality of police organizational innovation is demonstrated here. For much of their history American police departments have utilized innovative programs, tools, and methods of administration. In many instances one innovation has superseded another over time. For example, patrol has progressed from foot patrol, to horse-drawn patrol wagons (Harring, 1983), automobiles, aircraft, and in some cases back to foot patrol. Similarly, police management and administration have evolved from direct appointment by ward bosses, to Civil Service selection, training academies, and education requirements (Fogelson, 1977; Roe, 1890). Finally, police departments have often utilized specialized units and programs such as detective bureaux (Klockars, 1985), women's bureaux (Owings, 1925), juvenile squads, and hate crime units (Walker and Katz, 1995). Not surprisingly, police innovations continue to dominate current policing. Recent works have explored the adoption of community or problem oriented policing (Moore and Sparrow, 1988; Skolnick and Bayley, 1986; Sparrow et al., 1990; Weisburd and Uchida, 1993; Zhao, 1995), and technical innovations such as computers (Klug et al., 1992; Mullen, 1996; Peterson and Moore, 1995), or uniforms (Monkkonen, 1981). Others have described the impediments to, or the requirements for, changing departmental management (Guyot, 1979; 1991) and the diffusion of police innovation (Mullen, 1996; Spelman et al., 1992; Weiss, 1992, 1997). It is apparent that the police infatuation with innovation continues today. Unfortunately, the study of police innovation has not yielded a complete understanding of why some departments are more innovative than others. Indeed, this failure to reach a thorough understanding of police innovation is exemplified by a disagreement between two recent studies of police innovation. The current issue and full text archive of this journal is available at http://www.emerald-library.com PIJPSM 23,3 304 Zhao (1995) concludes that police innovations are primarily adopted due to environmental factors. However, Mullen (1996) concludes that police innovations are adopted due to internal, departmental factors. Such disagreements are certainly not unique to studies of the police. At first blush it would appear that the solution to this disagreement could be solved by turning to the extensive body of knowledge of innovation and non-police organizations[1]. Unfortunately, it is evident that disagreements about the causes and correlates of organizational innovation are not unique to the study of police departments; these disagreements also permeate the innovation literature on non-police organizations (Downs and Mohr, 1976; Fiol, 1996; Wolfe, 1994). For the past 20 years the literature on innovations in non-police organizations has wrestled with a failure to reach conclusions about the causes of innovations. Indeed, Downs and Mohr conclude, `̀ Factors found to be important for innovation in one study are found to be considerably less important, not important at all, or even inversely important in another study. This phenomenon occurs with relentless regularity'' (1976, p. 700). Some have claimed that this conclusion has not changed since 1976 (Fiol, 1996; Wolfe, 1994). Despite this empirical morass, the non-police innovation literature can provide guidance for the study of police innovation. Drawing upon the non-police, and police innovation literature, the present study will explore issues in the measurement of police innovation. Unfortunately, few prior studies of policing have fully discussed organizational innovation, nor simultaneously measured the five aspects of organizational innovation. This oversight makes it difficult for the findings from various police innovation studies to be compared with each other. Similarly, because it is difficult to compare previous findings, it is not clear where the state-of-the-art is currently in the police innovation research. Therefore, the present study first describes the general state of knowledge of organizational innovation and applies it to past police studies. Second, the present study creates and explores the unidimensionality of five measures of police organizational innovation. Defining and classifying organizational innovation Innovation means different things to different people. Likewise, the organizational innovation literature reveals that different authors conceptualize, study, and measure innovation in different ways. Explicating these differences is the first step in untangling the sometimes confusing body of organizational innovation research. Fortunately, a recent meta-analysis of organizational innovation studies not only identifies four major differences in the prior research, but also shows the contrasting results these differences produce (Damanpour, 1991). These four issues will be discussed below and applied to prior police innovation research. Measuring police innovation 305 Defining innovation As with much of the prior literature, there is a lack of consensus on what innovation is; therefore, definitions of innovation abound. Kimberly (1981) categorizes definitions into two groups, each with two possible focuses. The first definition defines innovation as a process which brings some new method into an organization. This view may either focus on just the implementation of an innovation, or may require that the implementation of an innovation results in `̀ a `fundamental' change in a `significant' number of tasks'' (Wilson, 1966, p. 196) in an organization. Either way, both these perspectives employ the criteria that something is an innovation only if it is a process that changes the manner in which an organization performs its task. The second definition sees innovation as a `̀ discrete product or program'' (Kimberly, 1981, p. 85) that an organization adopts. This second definition may either use the criterion that the innovation be `̀ state-of-the-art'' to the field of possible adopters (Baldridge and Burnham, 1975; Kimberly, 1981; Kimberly and Evanisko, 1981), or that the innovation merely be new to each adopting agency (Rogers and Shoemaker, 1971; Wilson, 1966; Zaltman et al., 1973). Research which uses the criterion that the innovations be `̀ state-of-the-art'' for possible adopters sometimes assesses innovativeness by measuring practitioners' opinion of what is `̀ new,'' or what has been touted as new in trade or academic journals. On the other hand, using individual adopters as the judges for what is new requires that each adopter assess the newness of each product or program. Generally, prior studies of police innovation have used the requirement that an innovation must be new to the field of policing, or `̀ state-of-the-art.'' Unfortunately, these same studies have not always been clear how `̀ state-of- the-art'' for policing was ascertained. Weiss's (1992) definition of police innovation required that the innovation be new to policing, but it is not clear how Weiss ascertains what is `̀ new to policing'' and why there are only seven such innovations (one radical, two administrative, and four technical). Likewise, Mullen (1996) appears to use the criterion that an innovation is `̀ state- of-the-art'' for policing, but like Weiss it is not clear who deemed some items as being innovative. Two recent studies of police innovation have described their process for determining state-of-the-art more carefully. Zhao (1995) conducted a review of the literature to ascertain what is `̀ state-of-the-art'' for policing. Likewise, Moore, et al. (1996) utilized panel interviews of police experts, a survey of practitioners, and literature review of journals to identify police innovations. The innovations identified by Moore et al. (1996) were subsequently used by Spelman et al. (1992) and King (1998). Different research types Three research types have been used to study innovation: diffusion studies, innovativeness studies, and process studies (Wolfe, 1994). Once again, the research technique used often results in different findings (cf. Mullen, 1996)[2]. PIJPSM 23,3 306 Diffusion of innovation studies generally describes and predicts the spread of an innovation or innovations across a group of adopters, over time. This research design attempts to explain who adopts first, who adopts later, and why. Diffusion of innovation has been used in four recent studies of American police innovation: uniforms with 57 police departments (Monkkonen, 1981); the spread of a mixed group of innovations to 134 departments (Weiss, 1992, 1997); the adoption of computers and software by 303 police agencies (Mullen, 1996); and the effect of some innovations on the later adoption of other innovations in an unspecified number of police departments (Spelman et al., 1992). Overall, most of these diffusion studies conclude that innovations in policing are adopted slowly (by a few departments) at first, and then, over time, the rate of departmental adoption increases. Usually, the adoption of innovation resembles an `̀ S'' shaped curve and larger police organizations adopt before smaller departments. Innovativeness studies are usually cross-sectional studies which quantify adopted innovations in each organization and then explain why some organizations adopt more innovations than others. Innovativeness studies have been used in three recent investigations of policing (Mullen, 1996; Weiss, 1992; Zhao, 1995). Mullen (1996) concludes that departments with more computers are larger and have adopted a greater number of other innovations. Zhao's (1995) analysis of the adoption of COP in 215 American police departments leads to the conclusion that more innovative departments are compelled to become innovative by external factors such as environment and social disorganization. Finally, process studies attempt to explain the manner in which an innovation is first discovered, learned about, first adopted, changed, and then employed by an organization. There have been a number of process studies of police innovations (although the authors sometimes fail to frame their analyses in terms of the innovation literature, such analyses are informative nonetheless). For example, Guyot (1991) details the impediments and facilitators of innovation faced by one police department when changing its management style. Similarly, a number of recent works have described the process of adopting COP (Skolnick and Bayley, 1986; Sparrow et al., 1990). Finally, Buerger (1993) suggested that some innovations may be more readily adopted by departments because they appeal to line officers' desire to be seen as crime fighters. Different organizations In a recent analysis of the organizational innovation literature, Damanpour (1990) highlights the different results achieved by studying different organizational types. In particular, Damanpour notes that research results differ between public and private organizations, and between organizations that provide a service as opposed to organizations that produce a product. This particular finding provides guidance for those seeking to apply findings from non-police organizations to the police. Researchers combing the non-police Measuring police innovation 307 innovation literature for findings applicable to policing would do well to limit their search to public, service organizations. Studies of other organizational types will provide useful guidance for research designs, theories, and measurement issues; however, it appears unwise to apply findings from general organizations to police organizations. Different innovation types Finally, previous works have often distinguished differences in innovations and tried to classify these types. This study uses a fourfold classification of innovations presented by Damanpour (1991) (and used by Moore et al., 1996) as the starting point for the data analysis on police innovation. Damanpour's classification of innovations as being radical, administrative, technical, and programmatic has been supported by a meta-analysis which indicates that there are different correlates of these four innovation types (1991)[3]. Unfortunately, prior police innovation studies have not always distinguished among different innovation types. In particular, innovativeness studies have sometimes resorted to summated scales to measure overall departmental innovativeness, by summing the total number of innovations each department had adopted (Weiss, 1992, 1997). Unfortunately, this crude summing process often lumps various innovation types together and may result in a single measure of innovativeness which is not unidimensional. Likewise, some researchers have included some innovative programs to create a summated measure of organizational structure (instead of innovation), thus confounding the relationship between organizational structure and innovation (cf. Mullen, 1996). Finally, it appears that none of the police-innovation studies using a summated index to measure innovation has checked the summated index for possible multi-dimensionality. Table I presents the various aspects of organizational innovation, which aspects have been studied by prior police-innovation research, and the focus of the present investigation. In comparison to the innovations and their typology presented in Table I, prior police innovation studies appear to have employed less than ideal measures of innovativeness. Of greatest importance to the present analysis, however, is to explore the unidimensionality of these five innovation types with data from US municipal police departments. Theoretically, an analysis of police innovations should cluster into these different innovation types. This clustering, however, is an empirical question which can be addressed in a number of ways. On the one hand, various measures of innovation could be analyzed as one group, via a data reduction technique (such as factor analysis) to see if these innovations cluster into different types, as the theory predicts. Unfortunately, such an exploratory analysis disregards the theoretical (and sometime empirical) conviction that different innovation types exist (Hurley et al., 1997). On the other hand, it could be assumed that these innovation types exist (because the theory predicts that they do), and searching for evidence of PIJPSM 23,3 308 their actual existence could be forgone. This second option blindly assumes that a typology of organizational innovation correctly mirrors police innovation and suggests that any confirmatory analysis be skipped. This `̀ blind faith'' is also inappropriate, for science is useful for refuting untrue statements. Therefore, the present analysis chooses a middle path between theory and empirical exploration, by assuming that these five innovation types exist. Therefore, the unidimensionality of each innovation type will be assessed in turn with factor analysis. Using factor analysis to produce different innovation types would trample the theory, while failing to check for evidence of these alleged innovation types would be an exercise in faith, not science. Data and methods This next section is composed of two parts. First, the two data sets are described, as are the five measures of police innovation. Second, the five measures of police innovation are subjected to data reduction (factor analysis) to explore each for unidimensionality. Table I. Police innovation: previous definitions, study types, stages of adoptions, and classifications Defining innovation (Kimberly, 1981) 1. Innovation is a process that is implemented 2. Innovation is process the requires massive change (Wilson, 1966). 3. Innovation is a product or program that is new to that organization (Rogers, 1971). 4. Innovation is a product or program that is state-of-the-art for possible adopters (Kimberly, 1981). This definition has been used in police research by Zhao (1995), Moore et al. (1996), and King (1998), and appears to have been used by Mullen (1996) and Weiss (1992). Type of study (Wolfe, 1994) 1. Process study. Study how an innovation changes as it is adopted and utilized. 2. Diffusion of innovation. Study how innovations spread across the population of possible adopters. Diffusion of innovation studies with police organizations include Monkkonen (1981); Mullen (1996); Spelman et al. (1992); and Weiss (1992). 3. Innovativeness study. Measure the overall innovativeness of police organizations by quantifying the number of innovations adopted. Police innovativeness studies include King (1998), Mullen (1996), Weiss (1992), and Zhao (1995). Stage of adoption (Damanpour, 1991) 1. Initiation. Is the organization cognizant that this innovation exists? 2. Implementation. Has the organization adopted this innovation? This stage of adoption has been used in prior police research (King, 1998; Monkkonen, 1981; Mullen, 1996; Spelman et al., 1992; Weiss, 1992; Zhao, 1995). Classifying innovation types (Damanpour, 1991; Moore et al., 1996) Radical innovations. Require massive restructuring or changes in the organization. Administrative. Change the management of the organization. Technical. Change the hardware used to produce a service or product. Program. New units or operations to meet an organizational goal. Note: The criteria used in the present study are italicized Measuring police innovation 309 The departments studied are the 431 municipal police departments in the USA with at least 100 sworn, full-time officers in 1993. This population of departments is studied for three reasons. First, a wealth of data is readily available for these departments which permits measurement of most aspects of innovation. This is not true of other police organizations (such as campus, special, state, private police agencies, sheriff's offices, and smaller police departments). Second, the previous police innovation literature has studied the large, municipal police departments (Monkkonen, 1981; Mullen, 1996; Weiss, 1992, 1997; Zhao, 1995). For the results of this study to be comparable to these previous works, the large municipals are studied. Finally, thanks to prior research we know more about the organization of large, municipal police departments than other police organizations (Langworthy, 1986; Maguire, 1997a). It seems likely that the increased task scope and different political environment of other organizations, such as sheriff's offices, would cause differences in both structure and the adoption of innovation (e.g. Falcone and Wells, 1995). Data Two data sources were used for this study. First, data from the 1993 wave of LEMAS, The Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics study, were used to construct some of the measures of police innovation (US DOJ, BJS, 1993). LEMAS is a comprehensive survey of American police departments conducted by the US Bureau of Census for the Department of Justice in 1993. Although LEMAS collected data from 831 police agencies with 100 or more sworn full-time officers, this study includes only the 431 large municipal agencies. The LEMAS data have been used before to measure various aspects of police department structure and functioning (cf. King, 1998, 1999; Maguire, 1997a, 1997b). Using a sampling technique similar to LEMAS, the Police Foundation conducted a survey of community police practices in over 1,600 police agencies in 1993 entitled A National Survey of Community Policing Strategies. Of the 431 municipal departments used in this analysis, 345 responded to the Police Foundation survey (for an availability rate of 80 percent). A number of measures of police innovation will be constructed from the Police Foundation data, such as radical and programmatic innovation. Measures Innovation. The present study first constructs a fivefold typology of police innovation and then tests the unidimensionality of these five innovation types. In accord with prior police innovation research, police innovation will be defined as something that is new and `̀ state-of-the-art'' to the field of policing. Fortunately, prior research has already asked experts, surveyed practitioners, and conducted a content analysis of journals to ascertain what is `̀ state-of-the- art'' for policing (Moore et al., 1996). The results of this study are classified (with one alteration) as the different innovation types, in Table II. PIJPSM 23,3 310 Whereas Moore et al. (1996) divide police innovations into four categories, recent work suggests a further division of police innovation. In particular, Buerger (1993) suggests that technical innovations, which are perceived by line police officers to enhance their law enforcement image, will be more readily adopted than technical innovations which do not enhance a law enforcement image. In short, the correlates of adoption of technical innovations will be different, depending upon their reception by line officer culture (Reuss-Ianni, 1983). The third column in Table II bifurcates technical innovations into those that appeal to line officers and those that do not. Assessing the unidimensionality of the five innovation types The following section describes how each of the following measures of innovation were constructed, and the results of the factor analyses. Radical innovations. Moore et al. (1996) conclude that only POP and COP are truly radical police innovations. Unfortunately, only information on the adoption of COP is provided by the present data. To construct a measure of the adoption of COP, two variables from the Police Foundation Survey of Community Policing Practices were combined. First, departments which reported that they had adopted community policing were tentatively counted as having community policing. Indeed, 304 of 345 (88.1 percent) respondents reported that they had or were implementing community policing. As an additional check on this question, a second question from the Police Foundation survey was used. Departments reporting that they had implemented, or were planning to implement, the permanent assignment of officers in certain areas (or areas with certain needs) were coded as implementing an important Table II. Types of police innovations Incremental Radical Management technical Line technicala Administrative Programmatic COP CAD 9mm handguns Hiring women Asset forfeiture POP AFIS Pepper spray Affirmative action Neighborhood watch Mobile phones Restraint devices Interagency communication Domestic assault DNA typing Non-lethal impact dev. Civilianization DARE MDTs Unmarked cars Participative mgmnt Call screening Armored cars Mission/values statements Victim assistance Choke holds Decentralization Street sweeps 10mm hand guns MPO rank Directed patrol Accreditation Crime analysis Hate crimes ROP Foot patrol Special populations Fear programs Notes: Adapted from Moore et al. (1996, Table 1). a The distinction between management- and line-technical innovations is not made by Moore et al. (1996). This distinction has been added here Measuring police innovation 311 component of COP. However, only departments which responded that they had adopted both of these requirements were counted as implementing COP[4]. A total of 246 departments satisfied this requirement and were thus counted as adopting COP (71.3 percent). Technical innovations. First, in accord with Buerger's (1993) prediction, technical innovations are initially composed of two types: those that appeal to police managers (called management-technical innovations), and those that appeal to street-officers (called line-technical innovations). The management- technical innovations are AFIS, CAD, MDTs, DNA testing, and mobile phones. LEMAS data record if departments have AFIS, CAD, and MDTs. Furthermore, LEMAS records if a department conducts its own lab testing, which is the closest proxy for DNA testing available. Unfortunately, neither LEMAS nor the Police Foundation survey asked about the presence of mobile phones, and therefore this innovation cannot be included in the present measure. Departments with one of these innovations received a `̀ one'' for each management-technical innovation they possessed, and a `̀ zero'' for each innovation they did not possess. Therefore, possible scores for management- technical innovation ranged from zero to four. The descriptive statistics for this variable are reported in Table III. When the four variables comprising the measure of management-technical innovation are subjected to a factor analysis, all four variables load on one factor (see Table IV). This result indicates that, with the present data, management-technical innovation is unidimensional. The second type of technical innovations are the line-technical innovations which are presumed to appeal to line-officers' sense of `̀ real'' police work. These innovations are teargas, restraint holds, armored cars, 9mm and 10mm handguns, non-lethal impact devices, Tasers, and unmarked cars. Departments received one point for adopting each of these innovations, and these points were summed to create an overall line-technical innovation score. When the line-technical innovations are subjected to a factor analysis, however, this measure bifurcates into two sub-categories. The first sub-category Table III. Descriptive statistics for innovation variables Dependent variable (innovation) (range) n Mean Median SD Radical (0-1) 345 0.71 1.00 0.45 Administrative (0-5) 335 1.92 2.00 1.29 Field oriented admin. (0-3) 341 1.26 1.00 1.02 Management oriented admin. (0-2) 423 0.63 1.00 0.65 Technical (0-10) 420 3.63 3.00 1.50 Management oriented technical (0-4) 431 1.77 2.00 0.99 Technical (line oriented tactical) (0-3) 431 0.66 0.00 0.79 Technical (line oriented weapon) (0-3) 420 1.19 1.00 0.71 Programmatic (0-10) 342 5.90 6.00 1.75 Program (crime oriented) (0-4) 342 1.04 1.00 1.18 Program (efficiency oriented) (0-3) 342 2.47 3.00 0.72 Program (COP oriented) (0-3) 342 2.39 2.00 0.67 PIJPSM 23,3 312 (composed of teargas, restraint holds, and armored cars) is composed of things which seem to extend an officer's use of force continuum. While armored cars are generally not placed on a use of force continuum, they are sometimes used Table IV. Factor analyses of four police innovation types Innovation type variable Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Management: Technical innovation AFIS 0.72630 CAD 0.43639 Lab testing 0.54311 MDT 0.62360 Administrative: Field oriented Sworn female officers 0.66704 0.23352 Sworn minority officers 0.73259 ±0.18039 Decentralized field services 0.64842 0.11784 Administrative: Management oriented Civilian employees 0.07493 0.70378 Accreditation 0.03855 0.79261 Line-Technical: Tactics Teargas 0.71337 0.03986 0.04671 ±0.00678 Restraint holds 0.52326 ±0.25826 ±0.13015 ±0.29574 Armored car 0.47822 ±0.43633 0.25346 ±0.34126 Line-Technical: Weapon 9mm handgun 0.00356 0.59948 0.25420 ±0.40418 10mm handgun ±0.29846 ±0.58930 0.21655 0.22267 Impact device 0.23753 0.51143 ±0.21648 0.20242 Unclassified Taser 0.46760 0.05377 0.16197 0.73624 Unmarked cars ±0.05348 0.17326 0.87931 0.03118 Programmatic: Crime oriented Domestic violence 0.69094 0.15282 ±0.02533 Victim assistance 0.70653 ±0.06043 0.18376 Hate crimes 0.69203 ±0.00207 ±0.13527 R.O.P. 0.50167 0.19261 0.30212 Programmatic: Efficiency Asset forfeiture 0.06604 0.59503 ±0.08455 Crime analysis 0.00569 0.76275 0.08204 Call screening 0.06373 0.52969 0.15369 Programmatic: Community Crime prevention 0.18913 ±0.02462 0.75913 School drug education 0.06177 0.16587 0.32737 Foot patrol 0.37953 0.05786 ±0.58784 Measuring police innovation 313 to intimidate people by their presence. For this reason (as well as the results of the factor analysis) armored cars are included with two other tactics which extend the use of force options available to a department. Three other innovations appeal to line officers (9mm and 10mm handguns, and the PR-24 baton); however, they allocate either deadly force, or the risk of serious bodily harm to suspects. These three innovations are called line-technical weapon innovations because they are loaded on the second factor, and imply a greater degree of force (compared to the tactically oriented line technical innovations). Finally, two technical innovations load on the third and fourth factors respectively. Unmarked police cars is the only line-technical innovation to load on the third factor, and is thus dropped from further analyses. Likewise, TASERs[5] load on the fourth factor, and are dropped from further analysis. Administrative innovations. The measure of administrative innovation is composed of five variables. The percentages of sworn female officers, sworn minority officers, and civilian employees were computed. Departments with greater than the national mean for these three innovations (8 percent for female officers, 19 percent for minority officers, and 22 percent for civilians) received a `̀ one'', while departments with less than the national mean received a `̀ zero.'' Departments reporting that they had decentralized field services received a `̀ one'', while those without received a `̀ zero.'' Finally, departments reported by CALEA (Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies, Inc.) to have achieved accreditation before January 1993 were coded as `̀ ones'' and departments without accreditation were coded as `̀ zeros''[6]. When submitted to a factor analysis, the five administrative innovations bifurcate. The first group (sworn female officers, sworn minority officers, and decentralized field services) are administrative innovations which seem most likely to appear on the street. In other words, these innovations, while administrative in nature, are likely to have their greatest impact on interactions between police officers and the public. For this reason, these three innovations are termed field-oriented administrative innovations. On the other hand, the other two administrative innovation types (civilian employees and accreditation) are more likely to alter the internal (or `̀ behind the scenes''), administrative operations of the department, and for this reason are called management oriented administrative innovations. Programmatic innovation. Moore et al. (1996) identify 14 programs considered to be innovative. Measures of ten of these are available from either LEMAS or the Police Foundation survey. The Police Foundation survey asked departments about their use of call screening, crime analysis, and foot patrol. As before, departments reporting the adoption of these innovations received `̀ ones'' while departments without were scored with `̀ zeros''. LEMAS collects data on departments' adoption of repeat offender and victim assistance programs, hate crime and domestic violence units, community crime prevention, asset forfeiture, and school drug education programs. Departments reporting a full-time unit for each of these innovations received a `̀ one''. PIJPSM 23,3 314 When subjected to a factor analysis, the ten programmatic innovations load on three factors. The first factor is composed of programs which target particular crimes (hate crimes and domestic violence), chronic offenders (ROP), or the products of crime (victim assistance). For this reason, these innovations are called crime oriented programmatic innovations. Three other programs load on the second factor. Crime analysis and call screening are programs adopted in order to improve the efficiency of a department. Likewise, asset forfeiture (a drug-related tactic) results in increased capital for a department, and is thus included with the efficiency-oriented programmatic innovations. Finally, three programs which target communities or community crime prevention load on the third factor. Neighborhood watch (crime prevention), foot patrol, and school drug education, are three innovative programs designed to combat crime, fear of crime, or drug use through closer contact with communities. For this reason, these last three programmatic innovations are called community-oriented programmatic innovations. Conclusion and discussion Three observations can be made from the present study. First, it is apparent that police organizational innovation is certainly not a unidimensional construct. Future studies of police innovation should address this finding by exploring their measures of innovation for multi-dimensionality. Unfortunately, there is also little evidence that there are four or five innovation types among US police organizations, for all but one of the innovation types splinter into smaller subgroups when factor analyzed. Further analyses of these data with MPLUS software was similarly unable to produce tidy, unidimensional factors within each innovation type (except for management- technical innovation)[7]. Overall, police innovation defies attempts to classify it into theoretically defensible categories. Second, although the innovations identified as being state-of-the-art by Moore et al. (1996) are becoming dated, the methods in the present study are not. Future research should be guided by the present dissection of previous methods and measurement issues. In other words, future police-innovation researchers must detail how they ascertain what is innovative, and such criteria must be in accord with the established methods present in the non- police innovation literature. Furthermore, future researchers should explore the dimensionality of their particular innovation measures. The present study's usefulness lies in its demonstration that police innovation is multidimensional, and should be treated thus in future studies. Finally, the present finding that police innovation splinters into at least ten sub-groups bolsters the findings of Spelman et al. (1992) who explored the ways in which some police innovations impede or facilitate the later adoption of other innovations. Again, the ways in which the different innovation types relate to each other is highlighted by the factor analyses, and these interactions should be explored further. Measuring police innovation 315 Notes 1. The literature on innovations and general organizations is extensive, with 351 dissertations and 1,299 published articles on organizational innovation being cataloged between 1989 and 1994 (Wolfe, 1994). 2. Mullen's diffusion of innovation study produces different correlates of early innovation compared to the results of his innovativeness study (1996, pp. i-ii). 3. Moore et al. (1996) use the term `̀ strategic'' instead of `̀ radical''. The latter term will be utilized in the present study. 4. Obviously, this is a weak measure of the implementation of COP. Others have used alternative measures of COP but unfortunately these measures have also included other innovation types (such as programmatic and administrative innovation). In order to keep the five innovation types distinct, the present study must use this measure of COP. Readers concerned with an alternative method of measuring COP as an organizational innovation should see Zhao (1995). 5. TASER: Tom A. Swift Electric Rifle (according to Kornblum and Reddy, 1991). 6. The data on accreditation were kindly provided by Edward Maguire, who collected the data from CALEA. 7. One reviewer suggested that factor analysis was inappropriate for analyzing dichotomous variables. MPLUS software uses tetrachoric correlations matrices to estimate the underlying structure of dichotomous variables, and this is considered superior to phi coefficients (used by factor analysis). For a further discussion of MPLUS see Maguire (2000) and Maguire et al. (2000). The analyses conducted with MPLUS (not shown) are similar to those produced by the factor analysis and neither technique is capable of producing four of five unidimensional innovation types. References Baldridge, V. and Burnham, R. (1975), `̀ Organizational innovation: individual, organizational, and environmental impacts'', Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 20, pp. 165-76. Buerger, M. (1993), `̀ The challenge of reinventing police and community'', in Weisburd, D. and Uchida, C. (Eds), with Green, L., Police Innovation and Control of the Police: Problems of Law, Order, and Community, Springer-Verlag, New York, NY. Damanpour, F. (1991), `̀ Organizational innovation: a meta-analysis of effects of determinants and moderators'', Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 34 No. 3, pp. 555-90. Downs, G. and Mohr, L. (1976), `̀ Conceptual issues in the study of innovation'', Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 21, pp. 700-14. Falcone, D. and Wells, L.E. (1995), `̀ The county Sheriff as a distinctive policing modality'', American Journal of Police, Vol. 14 No. 3/4, pp. 123-49. Fiol, M. (1996), `̀ Squeezing harder doesn't always work: continuing the search for consistency in innovation research'', Academy of Management Review, Vol. 21 No. 4, pp. 1012-21. Fogelson, R. (1977), Big City Police, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA. Guyot, D. 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(1988), `̀ Institutionalizing innovation in municipal police departments'', paper delivered at the 1988 APPAM Research Conference in Seattle, WA (October). Moore, M., Sparrow, M. and Spelman, W. (1996), `̀ Innovations in policing: from production lines to job shops'', in Altshuler, A. and Behn, R. (Eds), Innovation in American Government. Mullen, K. (1996), `̀ The computerization of law enforcement: a diffusion of innovation study'', Doctoral dissertation, State University of New York at Albany. Owings, C. (1925), Women Police: A Study of the Development and Status of the Women Police Movement, Fredrick H. Hitchcock, New York. Peterson, J. and Moore, J. (1995), `̀ The status of AFIS systems worldwide: issues of organization, performance and impact'', paper presented at the International Symposium on Fingerprint Detections and Identification, Ne'urim, Israel, June. Reuss-Ianni, E. 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work_4oa4altuenhhti75l4ivhquhqa	----	AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTISTPerry / DEFENDING THE COLOR LINE Defending the Color Line Racially and Ethnically Motivated Hate Crime BARBARA PERRY Northern Arizona University Drawing on structured action theory, the author examines the ways in which racially and ethnicallymotivatedhatecrimeemergesasaforcefulmeansofconstructingidentityanddif- ference within the institutional settings of culture, labor, sexuality, and power. The author summarizes the trends in racially and ethnically motivated violence nationwide and then explores hate crimes as a readily available means of doing difference. The author argues that racially motivated violence is not an aberration associated with a lunatic or extremist fringe. Instead, it is anormativemeansofasserting racial identity relative to thevictimized other; it is an enactment—of the racism that allocates privilege along racial lines. As with any human activity, hate crime takes its meaning and its impact from the broader array of social and institutional patterns. It is mediated by and enacted within culturally available forms. Each of us is held accountable to our race or ethnic category as we perform in diverse settings. Our identity performances “can be used to justify or discredit other actions; accordingly, virtually any action can be assessed in relation to its race category” (West & Fenstermaker, 1995, p. 22). So, for example, a Hispanic youth who excels in school is perceived by the majority to be crossing established racial boundaries. He is discredited to the extent that he has forgotten his place. Consequently, a White youth who vic- timizes this upstart will be justified and in fact rewarded for his efforts to reestab- lish the racialized boundaries between himself and his victim. Both actors have been judged for their actions, with predictable and reconstitutive consequences. Race and ethnicity—for both actors—have been (re)accomplished, the bound- aries preserved through the mechanism of hate-motivated violence. Therefore, hate crime can be seen as a coherent racial project (Omi & Winant, 1993) in that it connects the structural meanings and organization of race with the cultural construction of racialized identity. It occurs within the institutional contexts of what is known to be the appropriate place of victim and victimizer. In this article, 72 Author’s Note: The author wishes to thank the ABS special edition editors and reviewers for their valuable input and advice. AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST, Vol. 46 No. 1, September 2002 72-92 © 2002 Sage Publications I explore those structured patterns that tell us where we belong. I will address the racialized contours of culture, sexuality, power, and labor and their implications for “doing race” (Connell, 1987; Martin & Jurik, 1996; Messerschmidt, 1993) and how racially and ethnically motivated hate crime emerges as a supplemen- tary means of constructing identity and difference within those institutional set- tings. First, however, I will preface this analysis with a brief discussion of the trends in racially and ethnically motivated violence nationwide. In this article, I deal specifically with White violence against racial and ethnic minorities. It is important to recognize, however, that minority on minority vio- lence can also be viewed within the framework of doingdifference because it too reeks of hierarchical conflict. Interethnic violence among and between subordi- nate groups “becomes a ‘field of possibilities’ for transcending class and race discrimination” (i.e., a critical resource for doing race, in particular) (Messer- schmidt, 1993, p. 103). But it is important to interpret such violence within the master narrative of White, heterosexual, and masculine hegemony. As Ikemoto (1995) contended, “If you experience racism as one marginalized by it, then you may use racism to explain your relationship with other groups and their mem- bers” (p. 307). Even in their relationships with one another, members of subordi- nate groups are “dependent on the will and leftovers of a dominant group” (p. 308). Ultimately, hegemonic constructions of race or gender identity infuse the experiences and interactions of subordinate groups as well. Nonetheless, the dynamics of violent interactions differ substantially from White on non-White violence. So distinct are these patterns that I have taken them up separately in other contexts (see Perry, 2000, 2001) and will not address them here. Similarly, in this article I do not take up the issue of minority on majority vio- lence (i.e., violence perpetrated against White Euro-Americans) although that too must be understood within the context of the struggle for recognition and identity. Although statistics suggest that White racial victimization does occur (see below), there is reason to question these data. First, we do know that minor- ity group members dramatically underreport their bias-motivated victimization for reasons that range from fear to a lack of confidence in the likely response of law enforcement (Herek, Gillis, & Cogan, 1999). Second, and conversely, is the possibility that White victims are more likely to report what they perceive as racially motivated violence. From their perspective, it may be seen as a serious affront to their status and authority. Of course, these suggestions are speculative at best because there is virtually no scholarly literature on anti-White violence. COUNTING RACIAL AND ETHNIC VIOLENCE Although both academic and media reports make the claim that ethnoviolence represents a rising tide, the truth is we do not know whether in fact this is the case. For the most part, existing methodologies are both too new and Perry / DEFENDING THE COLOR LINE 73 too flawed to give us an accurate picture of changes over time. For example, because the hate crime data are collected in the same way as the other data from the Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) program, they are fraught with the same well-documented deficiencies (Bureau of Justice Assistance, 1997). In fact, some argue that hate crimes are even more dramatically underreported than other UCR offences (Berrill, 1992; Weiss, 1993). Reasons for underreporting are varied. The undocumented Mexican laborer may fear the repercussions of his or her status being revealed. Moreover, victims may well fear secondary vic- timization at the hands of law enforcement officials. At the very least, they may perceive that police will not take their victimization seriously. Moreover, the hate crime data collected by the FBI count only officially designated criminal offences, not other forms of violence and harassment, and thus those incidents go undocumented (e.g., racial slurs, pamphleteering, and so forth). In spite of the limitations, the UCR data are of some use. They represent the most comprehensive database in the country in terms of geographical coverage and in terms of the motivations they reflect. Although inaccurate in absolute numbers, the data may nonetheless be useful as a source of information on gen- eral trends and patterns. Table 1 provides a summary of UCR data from 1991 to 1998. The data seem to confirm a number of trends that anecdotal evidence has long suggested: 1. The most frequent motivation consistently is race. Racial bias typically accounts for nearly one third of all incidents; when ethnicity is included, the proportion rises to more than 70%. 2. African Americans are the most likely victims of racially motivated violence. Although making up less than 15% of the population, they represent approxi- mately one third of the victims of hate crime. 3. Jews are the second most frequently victimized cultural group, representing the vast majority of religious bias victims, and well over 10% of all victims. Turning to Table 2, we get a sense of the other side of the equation (i.e., char- acteristics of the suspected offenders). As one might expect, White offenders are in the majority. However, we must take these data with a grain of salt because such a large proportion of offenders are typically unknown. Table 3 reveals a number of trends associated specifically with racially and ethnically motivated violence. Most intriguing here are the disparities between crimes against the person and crimes against property. It is apparent that hate crime—relative to normal street crime—is much more likely to involve physical threat and harm to individuals rather than property. Overall, the UCR program provides a starting point for any discussion of hate crime. However, we are well advised to supplement this information with that available from the growing number of nongovernmental bodies devoted to tracking and responding to hate crime. Generally, these agencies tend to gather information specific to one target group, as is the case with the Anti-Defamation League (ADL), for example. 74 AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST TABLE 1: Hate Crime by Bias Motivation, 1991 to 1998 Description 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 Race 2,963 / 62.3 4,025 / 60.8 4,732 / 62.4 3,545 / 59.8 4,831 / 60.8 5,396 / 61.6 5,898 / 59.9 5,360 / 58.3 Anti-White 888 / 18.7 1,342 / 20.3 1,471 / 31.1 1,010 / 17.0 1,226 / 15.4 1,106 / 12.6 1,267 /12.9 989 / 10.8 Anti-Black 1,689 / 35.5 2,296 / 34.7 2,815 / 59.5 2,174 / 36.6 2,988 / 37.6 3,674 / 41.9 3,838 / 39 3,573 / 38.9 Anti-American Indian 11 / 0.2 26 / 0.4 27 / 0.5 22 / 0.4 41 / 0.5 51 / 0.6 44 / 0.4 66 / 0.7 Anti-Asian/Pacific islander 287 / 6.0 217 / 3.3 258 / 5.4 211 / 3.6 355 / 4.5 355 / 4.1 437 / 4.4 359 / 3.9 Anti-multiracial group 88 / 1.9 144 / 2.2 161 / 3.5 128 / 2.2 221 / 2.8 210 / 2.4 312 / 3.2 373 / 4.1 Ethnicity 450 / 9.5 669 / 10.1 697 / 9.2 638 / 10.8 814 / 10.2 940 / 10.7 1,083 / 11 919 / 10.0 Anti-Hispanic 242 / 5.1 369 / 5.6 472 / 6.2 337 / 5.7 516 / 6.5 564 / 6.4 636 / 6.5 595 / 6.5 Anti-other ethnicity 208 / 4.4 300 / 4.5 225 / 3.0 301 / 5.1 298 / 3.7 376 / 4.3 447 / 4.5 324 / 3.5 Religion 917 / 19.3 1,162 / 17.5 1,298 / 17.1 1,062 / 18.0 1,277 / 16.1 1,401 / 16.0 1,483 / 15.1 1,475 / 16.0 Anti-Jewish 792 / 16.7 1,017 / 15.4 1,143 / 15.1 915 / 15.4 1,058 / 13.3 1,109 / 12.7 1,159 / 11.8 1,145 / 12.5 Anti-Catholic 23 / 0.5 18 / 0.3 32 / 0.4 17 / 0.3 31 / 0.4 35 / 0.4 32 / 0.3 62 / 0.7 Anti-Protestant 26 / 0.5 28 / 0.4 30 / 0.4 29 / 0.5 36 / 0.5 75 / 0.9 59 / 0.6 61 / 0.7 Anti-Islamic 10 / 0.2 15 / 0.2 13 / 0.2 17 / 0.3 29 / 0.4 27 / 0.3 31 / 0.3 22 / 0.2 Anti-other religion 51 / 1.0 69 / 1.0 63 / 0.8 67 / 1.1 102 / 1.2 129 / 1.5 173 / 1.8 138 / 1.5 Anti-multireligious group 11 / 0.2 14 / 0.3 14 / 0.3 14 / 0.2 20 / 0.3 24 / 0.3 26 / 0.3 45 / 0.5 Anti-atheist/agnostic 4 / 0.1 1 / 0.0 3 / 0.1 3 / 0.1 1 / 0.0 2 / 0.0 3 / 0.0 2 / 0.0 Sexual orientation 425 / 8.9 767 / 11.6 860 / 11.3 685 / 11.5 1,019 / 12.8 1,016 / 11.6 1,375 / 14 1,439 / 15.7 Anti-homosexual 421 / 8.9 750 / 11.3 830 / 10.9 664 / 11.2 984 / 12.4 991 / 11.3 1,351 / 13.7 1,407 / 15.3 Male NA 557 / 8.4 516 / 8.1 501 / 8.4 735 / 9.2 757 / 8.6 912 / 9.3 972 / 10.6 Female NA 93 / 1.4 121 / 1.6 100 / 1.7 146 / 1.8 150 / 1.7 229 / 2.3 265 / 2.9 Anti-heterosexual 3 / 0.1 14 / 0.2 28 / 0.4 14 / 0.2 17 / 0.2 15 / 0.2 14 / 0.1 13 / 0.1 Anti-bisexual 1 / 0.0 3 / 0.1 2 / 0.1 7 / 0.1 18 / 0.2 10 / 0.1 10 / 0.1 19 / 0.2 Total 4,755 6,623 7,587 5,932 7,947 8,759 9,839 9,193 SOURCE: Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999. NOTE: The first number indicates total number of crimes reported in the United States. The second number indicates the percentage of the sample.75 ANTI-SEMITIC VIOLENCE Since 1979, the ADL has generated annual audits of anti-Semitic violence, not only in the United States but worldwide. The mandate of the ADL goes much further than does the FBI’s UCR program. ADL includes among its data 76 AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST TABLE 2: Reported Number of Incidents of Racially/Ethnically Motivated Violence by Suspected Offender’s Race, 1991 to 1998 Description 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 White 1,679 2,612 2,813 2,939 3,361 4,892 NA 2,988 Black 769 1,381 1,312 1,139 1,209 1,258 NA 759 American Indian 12 14 30 32 40 50 NA 55 Asian/Pacific islander 47 36 53 51 97 106 NA 61 Multiracial 77 98 133 135 98 177 NA 164 Other/unknown 1,974 1,773 3,246 2,966 2,377 2,211 NA 2,252 SOURCE: Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999. TABLE 3: General Trends in Racially/Ethnically Motivated Violence Description 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 Participating agencies 2,771 6,181 6,551 7,356 9,584 11,355 11,211 10,730 Total incidents 4,558 6,623 7,587 5,932 7,947 8,734 8,049 7,755 Incidents motivated by race/ethnicity Incidents 3,413 4,694 4,732 3,545 5,645 5,396 5,898 5,075 Offences NA 5,914 5,786 4,431 7,192 6,767 9,861 9,235 Victims NA 6,078 6,011 4,540 7,482 6,994 10,255 9,722 Known offenders NA 6,939 6,258 4,356 6,709 6,122 8,474 7,489 Crimes against person 3,321 4,695 4,415 3,382 5,539 4,953 6,873 6,305 Crimes against property 1,434 1,219 1,371 1,049 1,639 1,814 2,973 2,905 Racial/ethnic bias motivation Anti-White 888 1,342 1,471 1,010 1,226 1,106 1,267 989 Anti-Black 1,689 2,296 2,815 2,174 2,988 3,674 3,838 3,573 Anti-American Indian/Alaskan native 11 26 27 22 41 51 44 66 Anti-Asian/Pacific islander 287 217 258 211 355 355 437 359 Anti-Hispanic 242 369 472 337 516 564 636 595 Anti-multiracial group 88 144 161 128 221 210 312 373 Anti-other ethnicity 208 300 225 301 298 376 447 324 SOURCE: Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999. incidents that may not fit the traditional definition of crime. The ADL tracks murder, assaults, and arsons to be sure, but this is supplemented with attention paid to harassment, petty and serious vandalism, anti-Semitic slurs, and the dis- tribution of neo-Nazi literature. Looking at Table 4, one especially disturbing fact leaps immediately to the fore: Since 1991, anti-Semitic violence has been increasingly more likely to involve personal rather than property crimes. Historically, this has been a group victimized by crimes against property, such as synagogue or cemetery desecra- tions. However, the tide has turned in recent years. In addition, the decline in the number of anti-Semitic incidents beginning in 1995 has corresponded to an increase in the intensity of the violence associated with the incidents. In 1995, for example, an arson in New York City resulted in several deaths. In November of that year, the FBI fortunately stopped an attempt by the TriState Militia to bomb several ADL offices. RACIALLY MOTIVATED VIOLENCE In contrast to the case of anti-Semitic violence, there is no national, coherent audit of racially motivated violence in the United States. The Southern Poverty Law Center’s (SPLC) Intelligence Report includes “For the Record,” a catalog of bias incidents drawn from media sources, public reports, and initial police reports. The primary value of the SPLC report is that it offers brief narratives describing the incidents. The reports offer a qualitative supplement to the UCR data. There are some regional organizations committed to collecting hate crime data in their area or state—for example, North Carolinians Against Racist and Religious Violence and the Northwest Coalition Against Malicious Harassment. Perry / DEFENDING THE COLOR LINE 77 TABLE 4: Anti-Semitic Violence by Selected Offense Type, 1990 to 1998 Description 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 Anti-Defamation League Data Harassment, threats, assaults 758 950 874 1,079 1,197 1,116 941 898 715 Vandalism 927 929 856 788 869 727 781 673 896 Total 1,685 1,879 1,730 1,867 2,066 1,843 1,722 1,571 1,611 Campus anti- Semitic incidents 95 101 114 122 143 NA NA NA NA FBI (Uniform Crime Report) data NA 792 1,017 1,143 915 1,058 1,109 1,159 1,145 SOURCE: Anti-Defamation League, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999; Fed- eral Bureau of Investigation, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999. Alternatively, some local and national organizations have been involved in sur- vey research oriented toward hate crime. The National Institute Against Preju- dice and Violence has been at the forefront of these initiatives, publishing reports on workplace and campus ethnoviolence, for example. Indeed, the insti- tute has discovered that violence in both of those settings is more widespread than was anticipated. More narrowly, the Los Angeles County Office of Educa- tion recently released a research report documenting a 53% increase in racial hate crime between 1989 and 1992. Although valuable to their immediate con- stituents, such localized data are obviously limited in the extent to which their findings might be generalized. The Arab American Anti-Discrimination Committee and the National Asian Pacific American Legal Consortium (NAPALC) are two national organizations that have emerged in recent years as a response to the perceived increase in anti- Asian violence specifically. The annual audits of both agencies are veritable treasure troves of information. They provide summary numbers, synopses of cases, information on legal actions, analyses of regional and national trends, and extensive policy recommendations. The data uncovered by each confirm what anecdotal evidence and intuitive observations have suggested: Riding the wave of anti-immigrant and anti-Asian sentiment, anti-Asian violence was consis- tently on the rise in closing years of the 20th century (see Table 5). As the data provided here suggest, racially and ethnically motivated vio- lence, although relatively rare, is nonetheless a daily possibility for minority group members. Moreover, I posit that this violence is the physical expression of the endemic racism that pervades race relations in the United States. THE CULTURE OF RACISM Although racism constitutes a structured pattern of relationships between groups, it might simultaneously be understood as a cultural field of discourse in support of that structure. The practices of racism encompass exclusion, margin- alization, subordination, and not least of all, violence (Young, 1990). But these patterns are predicated on legitimating ideologies and images that mark the other, and the boundaries between self and other, in such a way as to normalize the corresponding inequities. Racist discourse, then, provides “a reservoir of procedural norms that not only tacitly inform routine activity, but are also able to legitimate more purposive, explicitly racist practices” (S. Smith, 1989, p. 150). It is within the cultural realm that we find the justifications for inequities and for ethnoviolence. At the heart of this cultural field of discourse, one discovers theAmerican—a deep seated (albeit often contested) presumption of what it is to be American. For the dominant majority, this invariably suggests Whiteness (Frankenberg, 1993; Wellman, 1993). Or perhaps Wellman’s (1993) characterization is more precise because he suggests that the American identity revolves around “a 78 AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST conception of America that defines what it is not” (p. 245). Culturally, White Americans construct themselves in negative relational terms. Their normative Whiteness is created on the backs of the other. The American is not raced, is not Black or Asian, is not even ethnic. Language reinforces this exclusive categoriz- ing to the extent that the norm of Whiteness is implicit in such terms as Black author, Pakistani doctor, or the distinction between White hired hands and Black servants. Simultaneously, White Americans stand on this self-perception as a means of both constructing their identity and marginalizing, even denigrat- ing, that of non-Whites. Ethnoviolence becomes understandable in this context as an arena in which the primacy of Whiteness can be recreated and in which the boundaries between what is and is not American can be reaffirmed. Xenophobic violence is espe- cially acute with respect to immigrants and their descendants. Chinese, Koreans, Indians, and other people of color are perceived as perpetualforeigners who will never assimilate and become American. They will forever be outsiders. The NAPALC (1995, p. 4) cited a talk show host’s complaints that world-class figure skaters Kristi Yamaguchi and Michelle Kwan—both second generation Ameri- cans—were not “real” Americans. A New York City police officer acted on these sentiments when he beat a Pakistani cab driver. The assault was accompa- nied by the exclamation that “You immigrants think we’re stupid. . . . This is my country, I’ll teach you a lesson” (NAPALC, 1995, p. 7). But what is the basis for such exclusionary conceptions of American-ness and belongingness? Why and how are the racialized others distinct from White America? We might look for a response to these questions in the realm of stereo- types and popular images. It is these portrayals that justify and underlie the hos- tile treatment of racial minorities. Stereotypes that distinguish the racialized other from White subjects are grounded in what are held to be the identifying features of racial minorities. Perry / DEFENDING THE COLOR LINE 79 TABLE 5: Anti-Asian Violence by Selected Offence Type, 1993 to 1998 Description 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 Total incidents (National Asian Pacific American Legal Consortium) 335 452 355 370 144 295 % Vandalism 17 9 16 29 32 31 % Threats/intimidation 9 5 13 16 17 15 % Police abuse 7 4 3 NA NA NA % Harassment 4 12 7 22 19 17 % Assault 28 26 28 33 31 32 FBI (Uniform Crime Report) data 258 211 355 355 437 359 SOURCE: National Asian Pacific American Legal Consortium, 1995, 1999; Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999. They help to distance White from not White. The latter are to be feared, ridi- culed, and loathed for their differences as recognized in the popular psyche. Almost invariably, the stereotypes are loaded with disparaging associations, suggesting inferiority, irresponsibility, immorality, and nonhumanness, for example. Consequently, they provide both motive and rationale for injurious verbal and physical assaults on minority groups. Acting on these interpretations allows dominant group members to re-create Whiteness as superiority, while castigating the other for their presumed traits and behaviors. The active con- struction of Whiteness, then, exploits stereotypes to legitimate violence. Individuals enter each social interaction carrying with them the baggage that holds these stereotypical images. Whether a particular member of a minority group corresponds to these is almost immaterial. It is assumed—via gross gener- alizations—that all Blacks are criminal, or all Asians are submissive, or all Jews are greedy. Violence motivated by these preconceptions becomes an effort to prove one’s Whiteness—racial solidarity—relative to the defiled other. It is a claim to superiority, which is meant to establish once and for all that the White perpetrator is not Black, is not Asian, is not Jewish. Rather, the perpetrator removes himself from the victim group by engaging in violence directed against it—surely one would not seek to harm the self, only the other. When the youths of Bensonhurst and Howard Beach, New York, attacked their victims, they did so within the context of a mind-set that distinguished us from them. The Black youths were to be excluded from the neighborhood because they were presumed to be looking for trouble. In contrast to the White defenders of the race, the Black victims were constructed as threats to the physi- cal and economic security of the White residents of the neighborhoods—of course, they had robbery or murder or sexual assault on their minds because “all Black men” are criminals. Again, attacking these youths provided the offenders with proof of their masculine role of defenders to be sure; but it also provided them with proof of their racial purity and solidarity. They were not like their vic- tims. Rather, they were the virtuous ones: Their actions were inscribed with the mark of the moral supremacy of Whiteness. As Fine (1997) commented in another context, Among these white adolescent men, people of color are used consistently as a foil against which acceptable moral, and particularly sexual, standards are established. The goodness of white is always contrasted with the badness of Black—blacks are involved in drugs, Blacks are unacceptable sexually, Black men attempt to “invade” white sexual space. . . . The binary translates in ways that compliment white boys. (p. 57) And violence is an important mechanism through which these translations are made. It helps to reestablish the natural hierarchy of goodness and evil, strength and weakness, morality and immorality. It ensures that Whites and peo- ple of color will inhabit their appropriate places in physical and cultural terms. 80 AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST RACIALIZED SEXUALITY As the preceding quote implies, from the perspective—historical and con- temporary—of White Americans, one of the most palpable realms of difference between us and them lies in sexuality. And it is in this context that people of color are often subject to the most vicious opprobrium and hostility precedent to racial violence. Non-White male sexualities are constructed as “dangerous, powerful, and uncivilized force[s] that [are] hazardous to White women and a serious threat to White men” (Daniels, 1997, p. 93). Consequently, people of color are most at risk when they visibly cross the racialized sexual boundaries by engag- ing in interracial relationships. On the basis of these controlling images of people of color, White women, and especially White men, are fearful and suspicious of the sexualities of the other. Speaking of the White fear of Black bodies in particular, West (1993) con- tended that this fear is rooted in visceral feelings about black bodies and fueled by sexual myths of black men and women . . . either as threatening creatures who have the potential for sexual power over whites, or as harmless, desired underlings of a white culture. (p. 119) In this context, hate crime functions to reinforce the normativeness of White sexuality while punishing people of color for their real or imagined sexual improprieties. It is a means of degrading the bodies of the other, with an eye to controlling them. Hate crime emasculates the sexual threat, thereby firmly establishing the essential boundaries between groups. Nowhere have White fears been more palpable than in their historical rela- tionship with Black males. No other group has been so narrowly defined by their sexuality than have Black males. This was clear under slavery, where bucks were valued for their breeding capacity, but also where Black male subordination was justified on the grounds of his savage and beastly nature. As Messerschmidt (1997) contended, Black masculinity was irrevocably defined in terms of Black sexuality, which in turn, was seen as “animalistic and bestial” (p. 23). Thus, the unrestrained instincts and desires of Black men could be reined in only through the use or threat of violence. The sexualized image of Black males was reproduced in postbellum culture. In fact, to the extent that Black sexual independence was correlated with their economic and political freedom, they presented an even greater threat to White masculine superiority. The fact that alleged Black rapists were as often castrated as lynched suggests an attempt to emasculate the “savage” by symbolically (and literally) erasing his identity—much as one would control a wild dog. The vicious forms of punishment meted out to Black males served to highlight their animal nature at the same time that it reinforced the power and hegemony of White males. Perry / DEFENDING THE COLOR LINE 81 The presumption of Black male as sexual predator continues to underlie racial difference and racial violence in the contemporary era. In fact, the myth of lascivious, rapacious, and insatiable Black sexuality is perhaps one of the most enduring themes in U.S. culture. It emerged in the 1988 Willie Horton ads; it was also evoked by Clarence Thomas’s claim that he was the victim of a “hi-tech” lynching; and it ensured Mike Tyson’s conviction for sexual assault. The image of the Black sexual predator is the cultural lens through which Whites perceive Blacks. As such, it provides the context for racially motivated violence: Violent people are worthy of violent repression. Fine and her colleagues (1997) uncovered contemporary evidence of this dichotomization in their interviews with White male high school students, who proclaimed both their right and duty to preserve the chastity of White girls for themselves. Much expressed racism centers on white men’s entitled access to white women, thus serving the dual purpose of fixing black men and white women on a ladder of social relations. . . . This felt need to protect white girls translates as a code of behavior for white male students. It is the fact that Black men are invading White women, the property of White men, that is at issue here. (pp. 57-58) In defending their White girls from the unrestrained sexuality of Black boys, the White boys are also defending themselves—that is, the sanctity of their own carefully restrained, “civilized,” normative sexuality. These youths are reacting to messages received from the broader culture. Moreover, these codes of behavior often rest on violence as a means of polic- ing the relative identities. Yusuf Hawkins, for example, was a proxy for 18-year- old Keith Mondello, evidently aggravated by the revelation that a former girl- friend had dated Black and Hispanic men. Mondello was further disturbed on the night he formed the group that killed Hawkins when the girl told him that she had planned to celebrate her birthday with a group of Black and Puerto Rican friends. The anger and hostility of Mondello and his predominantly Italian peers were so evident that the party was canceled. Deprived of direct targets of their wrath—the potential partygoers—Mondello and his friends turned their anger on three other, interchangeable Black youths who had happened into the neigh- borhood. One of Mondello’s accomplices is said to have exclaimed, “Let’s not club the niggers, let’s shoot them and show Gina,” presumably as a means of reminding Gina and any Black males with an interest in White women that their “unnatural” desires would not be tolerated. Boundary crossing is perceived as not only unnatural but threatening to the rigid hierarchies that have been built around these presumed differences. This sentiment is evident in a letter to the editor (cited in Mathabane & Mathabane, 1992) written in response to a photo of Black and White youths dancing together: Interracial marriages are unbiblical and immoral. God created different races of people and placed them amongst themselves. . . . There is nothing for white 82 AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST Americans to gain by mixing their blood with blood of other peoples. There will only be irreversible damage for us. (p. 186) The rhetoric of antimiscegenation is especially common among White supremacists. How else could the White race maintain its supremacy other than by maintaining its purity? Any “contamination” by non-White blood introduces into the White bloodline all of those reviled deficiencies characteristic of the “mud people.” Supremacists look with disgust and hostility on those race trai- tors who seek out non-White mates, as is the case for the Klansman overheard by Ezekiel (1995) at a Klan rally: “What is the worst, to see a couple—to see some White woman and some Black man—ugh! It just turns my stomach” (p. 10). For White racialists such as Alfred Strom, race mixing constitutes part of the genocidal agenda of non-White races. Strom (retrieved from www.com/ FREESP) links the rhetoric of White supremacy with that of antimiscegenation, arguing that the White race’s continued existence would undoubtedly [sic] be assumed by our superior intelli- gence and unmatched technology, if it were not for those who practice and pro- mote the genocide of our people through racial mixing. By their actions they are killing us. . . . They kill infinite generations of our future. Their crime—the crime of racial mixture—is far, far worse than mere murder. Race mixing is deemed to be yet another symptom of the loss of White power and identity because it violates the sacred order of the established hierarchy. It muddies the boundaries between the races in such a way that the politicized superiority of Whites is thrown into question. Consequently, miscegenation elicits calls for enforced racial purity as a means of correcting the emerging imbalance in the relationship between Whites and non-Whites. The latter must be put back in their place, by force, if necessary. (DIS)EMPOWERING RACE An obvious hallmark of racism as a structure of domination is the restriction of the power of non-White racial groups. To this end, racial minorities have his- torically been limited in terms of social, political, and economic power (the lat- ter will be explicitly addressed in the next section). The sorts of racial construc- tions and categorizations discussed earlier are the stuff of which social exclusions are built, to the extent that they legitimate discrepancies in access to opportunities and privilege. The power that is wielded—physically and socially— by Whites is exercised in such a way as to “develop, evolve, nurture, spread, impose, and enforce the very myths . . . that underlie racism” (Fernandez, 1996, p. 160). Historically in the United States, power has been cautiously guarded by imposing restrictions on citizenship and its correspondent rights. Whether Perry / DEFENDING THE COLOR LINE 83 through formal policy or informal practice, racialized minorities have consis- tently been disenfranchised as a means of limiting their voice and position in the United States. Although no ethnic or racial group is legally excluded from attaining U.S. citizenship at this time, it does not necessarily follow that all groups are able to enjoy the privileges associated with this status. Racial minori- ties continue to be marginalized by their inability to gain full access to political, civil, and social rights, such that inclusion is still constituted of and by White- ness, not color. Civil rights violations of an array of racial and ethnic groups are endemic. The 1992 beating of Rodney King, and the 1997 sodomization of Abner Louima—both by police officers—are but the tip of the iceberg. The 1997 sweep of Chandler, Arizona, constituted a dramatic breach of the civil rights and liberties of the dozens of apparently Hispanic citizens—people ran- domly stopped and ordered to produce their papers, solely on the basis of their presumed ethnicity. Similarly, housing and mortgage discrimination continues to be a determining factor in the persistence of racial and ethnic segregation (Hacker, 1995; R. Smith, 1995). And, although the political power of minorities has increased somewhat over the past couple of decades, all such groups are still underrepresented in the formal machinery of politics (Hacker, 1995; Young, 1990). Racially motivated violence is directly implicated in efforts to maintain these unequal relations of power. It is itself a mechanism of social power by which White males in particular assert a particular version of hegemonic Whiteness. It is not difficult to trace the history of racially motivated violence during periods when the power of Whites was perceived to be at risk—periods in which this identity was reconstructed through the exercise of violence as a resource for doing race. Nor is it difficult to identify contemporary illustrations. Violence is empowering for its users: Physical dominion implies a corre- sponding cultural mastery. Gunner Lindberg boasted in a letter of his killing of a Vietnamese man, Thien Minh Ly: Oh I killed a jap a while ago. I stabbed him to death at Tuslin High School . . . I walked right up to him and he was scared . . . he got happy that he wasn’t gona get jumped. Then I hit him . . . I stabbed him about 7 or 8 times. (Phan, “Another Senseless Hate Crime,” retrieved from www.avl.umd.edu/staff/nowk/hate_ crime.html) The murderer’s use of the derogatory label jap implies the racial distancing and animosity that underlie Lindberg’s motive. He signifies his dominant Whiteness by derogating Ly’s Asian identity. That Ly was in fact Vietnamese and not Japanese further confirms Lindberg’s presumption of superiority and hauteur. It is enough to know that Ly was Asian—no need to discern his true eth- nicity or national origin. Any Asian could be at risk. Thus, the entire community is put on notice. Moreover, Lindberg’s awareness that his racial identity was reinforced by his acts is clear in his pretentious statement within the letter: 84 AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST “Here’s the clippings from the newspaper we were on all the channels.” Lindberg assumes that his audience—on learning of his exploits in the media—will judge his Whiteness and not find him lacking. He is appropriately accountable to his race, given his eagerness to destroy the other. No race traitor there, rather Lindberg announces through his actions that he is in solidarity with the White race, thereby preserving White privilege and position. Such racial constructions, however, are dynamic and relational. Not only does this example illustrate how perpetrators empower Whiteness through vio- lence. It is also suggestive of the opposite: disempowering the victims’ commu- nities. Ly’s death—like other hate-motivated assaults—also represents an effort to render impotent the targeted group. Individual assaults are warning signs to others like the victim—you could be next. Richard Wright, in his now classic Black Boy, speaks to the vicarious experience of racial violence: The things that influenced my conduct as a Negro did not have to happen to me directly; I needed but to hear of them to feel their full effects in the deepest layers of my consciousness. A Black person or a Korean person or a Hispanic person need not have been a victim personally. Like Wright, they are all too aware of their consistent vulnera- bility because of their race. The immutability of their racial identity invokes hopelessness—they are victimized for reasons they cannot change. In the midst of the “Dot Busters” campaign of terror against Asian Indians in Jersey City, an open letter made clear the generalized vulnerability of a group: “If I’m walking down the street and I see a Hindu and the setting is right, I will just hit him or her” (cited in Harvard Law Review, 1993). Thus, hate crimes have the potential to throw an entire community into paralysis, forcing them to withdraw further into themselves. Marovitz (1993) observed that By making members of minority communities fearful, by making them suspicious of other groups and of the power structure that is supposed to protect them, these incidents can damage society and polarize our communities. (p. 50) Such violence reaffirms the subordinate status of minority communities. At its extreme, it discourages social and political participation by keeping potential victims off the streets and out of the public eye. Paradoxically, efforts to render minority communities impotent—whether through the mechanism of hate crime or other repressive means—can backfire. Rather than hobbling the victim group, they may in fact mobilize the commu- nity. This was the case in New York City, for example, in which Haitians, accom- panied by other Caribbeans, demonstrated angrily, vocally, and visibly against the racist violence represented by Louima’s brutal beating at the hands of police officers. Although innumerable victims had previously remained silent out of Perry / DEFENDING THE COLOR LINE 85 fear and intimidation, the publicity surrounding Louima’s victimization galva- nized the community into action. A decade earlier, other New York neighborhoods witnessed similar rallies. The racially motivated murders of Michael Griffith in Howard Beach and Yusuf Hawkins in Bensonhurst both resulted in flurries of organizing and demonstrat- ing. An organization created after the first murder—New York City Civil Rights Coalition—was still available to lend its support to those involved in prosecut- ing the Hawkins case. Both incidents inspired widespread demonstrations con- demning the racism of the perpetrators’ communities, as well as the racist cul- ture of New York City generally. Clearly these cases stimulated rather than disabled the communities. Unfortunately, this posture of empowerment is often seen as an affront to White dominance. The victim community is perceived to be violating the antici- pated rules of behavior. Instead of accepting their subordination, they resist it. In such a context, incidents of hate crime may escalate in retaliation. Consider the case of Farmington, New Mexico, in the mid-1970s. In response to the vicious murders of three Indian men, local Navajo activists established the Coalition for Navajo Liberation. Although the immediate purpose of the coalition was to see justice done in the prosecutions for the offense, it soon expanded to address the broader patterns of discrimination and victimization experienced by natives in the border town. As the coalition dug in its heels and intensified its demands for justice, the antagonism of the White community became clear. Rather than dis- courage anti-Navajo violence, the activism of the Coalition for Navajo Libera- tion seemed to inspire it, as evident in the increase in the number of drive-by shootings of Navajo people (Barker, 1992). This case typifies how activism—a sign of strength—can beget animosity. It may in fact elevate the level of hostility already existing in a community. Seen in this light, hate crime is a reactionary tool, a resource for the reasser- tion of Whiteness over color. It is a form of “resistance to any diminishment in the authorial claims of a particular White identity” (Hesse, Rai, Bennett, & McGilchrist, 1992, p. 172). Racially motivated violence, then, is available as an albeit violent and extreme response to the other who is out of control, who has overstepped his or her social or political boundaries, thereby challenging the entrenched hierarchies. THE ECONOMICS OF RACE The presumption of racial hierarchies has had, and continues to have, a pro- found impact on the place of minority groups within the labor process. In partic- ular, people of color have traditionally been marginalized and exploited as cheap and malleable labor (Young, 1990). Thus, although the political and social gains made by minorities in recent years threaten White cultural identity, economic 86 AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST gains represent a more direct and tangible threat to White economic security. People of color who presume to advance on the economic ladder are perceived as unfair and undeserving competitors and as takers of “White” jobs. People of color are seen to have overstepped the economic boundaries that have long con- tributed to their marginalization. Consequently, White fear and resentment are frequently and viciously translated into racial violence in the context of labor activities. Many White men now picture and present themselves as the new minority. They experience a sense of displacement and dispossession relative to people of color. This imagery of White-man-as-victim gives voice to the insecurity of White men in a weakened economy. It also provides an ideological rationale for re-creating people of color as legitimate victims. Thus, perpetrators of ethno- violence are akin to the young White men interviewed by Fine (Fine et al., 1997), who act or “speak for a gendered and racial group whose privilege has been rattled and whose wrath is boiling over” (p. 66). Where have all the jobs gone? From the perspective of many disaffected White workers, the answer is clear enough. They have not been relocated off- shore or replaced by technology. Rather, they have been stolen from them by lesser and unfit beings: Those uppity others who have won the ears of politicians and employers alike. The most visible manifestation of this inverted preference for minorities is the bogey of affirmative action. There is a widespread consen- sus emerging that affirmative action policies have resulted in the displacement of qualified White workers by unqualified minority workers (Fine et al., 1997). In a curious inversion of history, many White males imagine an array of signs stating “Whites Need Not Apply.” This is particularly frustrating in the context of the cultural constructions of Blacks, Hispanics, and Native Americans, for example, as lazy and undisciplined. Where White workers imagine themselves at the opposite pole—hardworking and dedicated—the backdrop is set for a vol- atile response. Perceptions of reverse discrimination provide the motive and rationale for harassment and assaults of minority workers. This has become evident in the studies of workplace ethnoviolence carried out by the Prejudice Institute (Ehrlich, 1989), which found relatively high rates of harassment and defamation of people of color (i.e., those who “don’t belong”). Successive reports of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights (1990, 1992a, 1992b) also reveal the links between hostility toward affirmative action and violence against minorities. For example, a 1990 Commission on Civil Rights summary report observed that most of the historical episodes of anti-democratic action occurred in times, in places, and among people who suffered from economic dislocation. . . . Their grievances in those circumstances tend to focus on the Federal government and on minorities . . . because they are believed to receive unfair advantage from Govern- ment programs. (pp. 15-16) Perry / DEFENDING THE COLOR LINE 87 Ethnoviolence is an attempt to reclaim the advantages of Whiteness. It is an assertion of racial superiority and, more important, proprietorship: To the White man belong the spoils, not some “third-world invader.” Violence motivated by the resentment of labor competition provides the perpetrator with the opportu- nity to publicly announce his indignation, and correspondingly, his right to work. This is the essence of White masculinity after all: the ability to provide. If he is to distinguish himself from minorities of color, he must forcibly resist the latter’s access to equitable conditions of employment. There is an abundance of examples to illustrate the link between job competi- tion and racially motivated violence. An especially brutal illustration of this connection occurred in Novato, California, in 1995. Robert Page attacked Eddy Wu, a Chinese American male, at a supermarket. Page stabbed Wu twice in the parking lot, then followed him back into the store where he stabbed him several times more. Wu was left with multiple injuries, including a punctured lung. Page later testified (NAPALC, 1995) that he had consciously set out to “kill me a Chinaman” because “they got all the good jobs” (p. 8). Regardless of their diversity and uneven performance in the United States, Asians are inscribed with the mantle of prosperity in spite of their perpetual for- eignness. Because they are not seen as Americans, Asians risk reprisal when they become viable, if not superior, competitors. The months of violence, harassment, and intimidation experienced by Vietnamese shrimpers in Texas illustrates the point. Supported by the KKK, local White shrimpers engaged in a campaign of violence from 1979 to 1980, which included sinking the boats belonging to the Vietnamese, cutting their fishing nets, assaults, and harass- ment. Gilbert Pampa (cited in U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, nd), then direc- tor of the federal Community Relations Service, observed that there was displeasure on the part of the other fishermen concerning the overindul- gence of refugees. [The American fishermen] did not feel that the refugees were competing in the American way. The refugees worked on Sundays, stayed longer hours on the bay, and sometimes caught shrimp outside certain demarcated areas of the bay. [The Americans] felt that this was unfair to them, and the competition turned to open conflict. (p. 51) It is not only individual immigrants and Americans of Asian descent who are held responsible for this loss of place. Asian nations (often interchangeable) rep- resent a global economic threat. The lengthy trade deficit with Japan has had serious repercussions on industry, employment, and intercultural relationships. In his statement to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights (nd), Congressman Robert Matsui argued that In recent years, most of the industries that have suffered the worst have been hurt by imports from countries in South East Asia. As anger develops against nations of Asia that anger is transferred to Americans of Asian ancestry who appear to be quick and “easy” targets. (p. 63) 88 AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST The 1982 murder of Vincent Chin in Detroit is but the most extreme in an ongoing series of such attacks on Asian Americans. Two White men engaged Chinese American Chin in an argument in a bar, referring to him as “nip” and “chink.” After leaving the bar, the men chased Chin with a baseball bat. When they caught up with him, they delivered a series of blows to his head, knee, and chest that resulted in Chin’s death 4 days later. That this example fits the pattern is evident in the following two facts of the case: The assailants were laid-off autoworkers, and one was reported to have said, “It is because of you that we are out of work” (U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, nd, p. 43). Fearing a loss of domestic and global hegemony, White perpetrators of racially motivated violence seek to redeem their status through repressive and retaliatory acts of violence. The viciousness of both the verbal and physical attacks attests to their rage at the loss of relative advantage. Rather than appear meek and accepting—the very antithesis of hegemonic White masculinity— White males assert themselves through misdirected violence. Better to be seen as active agents of their own destiny than victims of the encroachment of inferior others. CONCLUSION In a culture in which the color line is subject to increasing challenges and blurring, racial violence is a pervasive threat. Moreover, it is not the exclusive weapon of white-hooded or brown-shirted rednecks. Rather, it is shared by those without a rigid ideological dogma or without White supremacist group affilia- tion. In other words, racially motivated violence is not an aberration associated with a lunatic or extremist fringe. It is a normative means of asserting racial iden- tity relative to the victimized other; it is a natural extension—or enactment—of the racism that allocates privilege along racial lines. The cultural and structural contexts that condition hate crime are many and varied: Stereotypes, language, legislation, and differential employment prac- tices are but a few. Stereotyping Native Americans as savages, and excluding Asians from citizenship have served to maintain the stigmatized outsider iden- tity of these others. These same others have been defined negatively in terms of their relationship to some dominant norm—that is, Black is defined as inher- ently inferior to White, Jewish inferior to Christian. Racial violence has been described here as a primary site for enacting these differences, as well as acting on them. However, there is reason for hope: Because difference is socially constructed, it can also be socially reconstructed. In other words, as a society, we can redefine the ways in which difference matters. We can strive for a just and democratic society in which the full spectrum of diversity addressed here is reevaluated in a positive and celebratory light that would preclude violence motivated by racial or ethnic difference. Perry / DEFENDING THE COLOR LINE 89 We would do well to heed Young’s (1990) advice that we embrace a positive politics of difference. This would involve much more than efforts to assimilate others, or merely tolerate their presence. Rather, it challenges us to celebrate our differences. Of course, this requires that much of our current way of ordering the world would be radically altered. It means that we must cease to define different as inferior and see it instead as simply not the same. To engage in such a powerful politics is to resist the temptation to ask all oth- ers to conform to an artificial set of norms and expectations. It is to reclaim and value the natural heterogeneity of this nation rather than force a false homogene- ity. It is to refuse to denigrate the culture and experiences of Black people, Jews, or Native Americans. It is to learn and grow from the strength and beauty that alternate cultures have to offer. REFERENCES Anti-Defamation League. (1991). Hate crime laws. New York: Author. Anti-Defamation League. (1992). Hate crime laws. New York: Author. Anti-Defamation League. (1993). Hate crime laws. New York: Author. Anti-Defamation League. (1994). Hate crime laws. New York: Author. 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work_4ojgdx4kffcyno46dqge2d6ch4	----	AERA Open July-September 2015, Vol. 1, No. 3, pp. 1–7 DOI: 10.1177/2332858415604147 © The Author(s) 2015. http://ero.sagepub.com Creative Commons CC-BY-NC: This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 3.0 License (http://www.creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/) which permits non-commercial use, reproduction and distribution of the work without further permission provided the original work is attributed as specified on the SAGE and Open Access page (https://us.sagepub.com/en-us/ nam/open-access-at-sage). School violence is a subset of youth violence and is a broad public health problem (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention [CDC], 2010). Youth violence occurs between the ages of 10 and 24 years and is defined as the intentional use of physical force or power against another person or group, with the behavior likely to cause physical or psycho- logical harm (CDC, 2010). Youth violence can include ver- bal and physical aggression, threatening, and intimidating behaviors that are associated with short- and long-term adverse academic and psychological outcomes for perpetra- tors and victims (Cook, Williams, Guerra, Kim, & Sadek, 2010; Espelage, Low, & De La Rue, 2012; Low, Espelage, & Polanin, 2013). Bullying is a subtype of aggressive behavior among students that is repetitive and occurs among students of unequal power (Espelage, 2012). School vio- lence, such as student-to-student victimization and bully- ing, remains a national concern for schools and communities across the country (e.g., Robers, Kemp, & Truman, 2013). Violence against teachers has also received recent research attention as another cause for concern in our schools (Espelage, Anderman, et al., 2013). A recent National Center for Educational Statistics (NCES) report indicated that about a third of students in Grades 9 to 12 reported they had been in a physical fight at least one time during the previous 12 months anywhere, and 12% said they had been in a fight on school property during the previous 12 months (Robers et al., 2013). Rates of victimization were similarly high. Approximately 28% of 12- to 18-year-old students reported they had been bullied at school during the school year, and victimization was highest among sixth graders (37%), compared to seventh or eighth graders (30% and 31%, respectively). Also, approxi- mately 9% to 11% of youth report being called hate-related words having to do with their race, religion, ethnic back- ground, and/or sexual orientation (Robers et al., 2013). Although research on bullying and school violence has increased exponentially over the past decade, many ques- tions remain about these phenomena that require additional research. In order to guide future research, the objectives of this article are to (a) briefly review etiological underpinnings of bullying and school violence using a social-ecological framework, (b) describe survey items/scales in each NCES data set and publication that addresses bullying and school violence, and (c) discuss data needs for selected emerging issues in bullying and school violence research and how NCES can or cannot address these issues. In order to deter- mine how the data have been used by scholars (e.g., disserta- tions, peer-reviewed articles, chapters) across the disciplines of education, psychology, criminology, social work, and so on, I conducted searches in PsycINFO and MEDLINE. Given the space limitations here, none of these sections is exhaustive in nature, but each provides a brief commentary to provide guidance for scholars who might want to address their research questions with NCES data sets. Data Needs for Emerging Research Issues in Bully and Violence Prevention: Strengths and Limitations of the National Center for Educational Statistics Data Sets Dorothy Espelage University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign School violence and bullying are two public health concerns with consequences for youth in and out of school, for families, students, and community members. In this article, a social-ecological framework is briefly described as a way to understand bullying and school violence; then the National Center for Educational Statistics (NCES) longitudinal and cross-sectional data sets are described in detail. Data that assess bullying and/or school violence are described, and recommendations for additional items are proposed. In general, a longitudinal, multisite, multi-informant study is needed to address definitional and etiological issues related to school violence and bullying so that prevention efforts can be developed, implemented, and evaluated that incorporate multiple levels of the ecology, including peers, schools, communities, and neighborhoods. Keywords: adolescence, middle schools, peer interaction/friendship, curriculum, psychology 604147EROXXX10.1177/2332858415604147EspelageData Needs to Address Bully and School Violence Issues research-article2015 Espelage 2 Etiological Underpinnings of Bullying and School Violence: Social-Ecological Perspective School violence, bullying, aggression, and peer victimiza- tion are best understood from an ecological perspective in which individual characteristics of children interact with envi- ronmental factors to promote victimization and perpetration (Basile, Espelage, Rivers, McMahon, & Simon; 2009; Espelage, 2004, 2012; Hong & Espelage, 2012). An ecological framework has been used to explore the risk and protective factors of bullying and peer victimization whereby child and adolescent behavior is shaped by a range of nested contextual systems, including families, peers, and school environments (Bronfenbrenner, 1979; Espelage, 2015; Hong & Espelage, 2012). The ecological perspective provides a conceptual framework for investigating the independent and combined impact of these social contexts and dynamic, transactional influences on behavioral development. The microsystem includes structures with which children and adolescents have direct contact, such as families, peers, and schools. The meso- system, another component of the ecological framework, com- prises the interrelations among microsystems. This ecological framework has been applied to the conceptualization of bully- ing perpetration and victimization and school violence, and it highlights reciprocal influences on bullying behaviors among the individual (e.g., disability, race/ethnicity, immigrant status, biological sex, social skills), family (e.g., family violence, parental monitoring, family closeness), school (e.g., school cli- mate, discipline policies, teacher-student relations, poverty, bully policies, prevention efforts, classroom factors), peer group (e.g., norms supportive of aggression, gender-based bul- lying, delinquency), community (e.g., collective efficacy in neighborhoods, safety issues, exposure to violence), and soci- ety (e.g., legislative policies around school violence, media influences). For exhaustive reviews, please refer to Espelage (2015) and Hong and Espelage (2012). As detailed in this article, NCES data sets have been used to address several critical aspects associated with bullying and school violence (e.g., trends, immigrant populations, school safety issues). As it is becoming increasingly difficult to engage in school-based research, individual scholars are relying on nationally representative data sets to address many emerging issues in bullying and school violence. Thus, in order to understand how NCES data sets have informed and can inform (with proposed modifications) the social- ecological understanding of bullying and school violence, the next section will include a detailed discussion of the items/scales in each of the NCES data sets. NCES Data Sets and Publications NCES High School Data Sets and Publications NCES has produced two longitudinal high school studies, the Educational Longitudinal Study–2002 (ELS:2002) and the High School Longitudinal Study–2009 (HSLS:09). The ELS:2002 is the fourth in a series of school-based longitudi- nal studies. Approximately 52 dissertations and 40 peer- reviewed articles have included these data in studies on achievement and school success, and six of the dissertations examined school safety as predictors of school success. ELS:2002 was conducted with 10th graders in 2002 and then assessed them as 12th graders in 2004, and two additional assessments were performed in 2006 and 2012. In the 10th- grade assessment, the student survey included individual items that assessed school violence: (1) “In class I often feel ‘put down’ by my students,” (2) “I don’t feel safe at this school,” (3) “There are gangs in school,” and (4) “Fights often occur between different racial/ethnic groups.” A bul- lied victimization item was embedded in a larger school vio- lence scale: (1) “Had something stolen from me at school,” (2) “Someone offered to sell me drugs at school,” (3) “Someone threatened to hurt me at school,” (4) “I got into a physical fight at school,” (5) “Someone hit me,” (6) “Someone used strong-arm or forceful methods to get money or things from me,” (7) “Someone purposely damaged or destroyed my belongings,” and (8) “Someone bullied me or picked on me.” In addition, students were asked to name a few of their friends, and then they answered some questions about their friends’ behaviors, which would allow for studies on peer influence of behaviors, which are important in the socialization of bullying (Espelage, Holt, & Henkel, 2003). Only four of these items were included in the 12th-grade assessment (something stolen at school, someone offered to sell you drugs at school, someone threatened to hurt you, someone hit you at school). The parents’ assessment includes information about their child’s disability, questions related to language, and their level of school contact, and they also named some of their youth’s friends and asked questions about their friends. This data set has been used in cross-sec- tional analyses and published in peer-reviewed outlets to investigate victimization in after-school programs (Peguero, 2008; Ripski & Gregory, 2009), to examine violence and victimization experiences among children of immigrant par- ents (Peguero, 2009a, 2009b), and to examine school safety issues as predictors of teacher-rated academic achievement (Nelson & Gastic, 2009). Although this data set is limited in its measurement of bully victimization with one item at the 10th grade, additional longitudinal analyses could examine victimization and school safety issues and predicted adult outcomes. However, there is no assessment of sexual harass- ment or teen dating aggression—two phenomena that are particularly relevant for adolescence (Espelage, Low, Anderson, & De La Rue, 2013). The HSLS:09 is ongoing and includes a nationally repre- sentative, longitudinal study of over 23,000 ninth graders from 944 schools. Approximately six dissertations and three peer- reviewed articles have included these data with studies focused on math and science achievement. This data set includes sur- veys of students, their parents, math and science teachers, school administrators, and school counselors. Assessments were Data Needs to Address Bully and School Violence Issues 3 conducted in 2009 and 2012 (data available), and the second follow-up is scheduled for 2016. The 2009 and 2012 student assessments include one item related to school safety: Students were asked to respond to the statement, “I feel safe at school.” No other items related to school violence or bul- lying were assessed, and parents and counselors were not queried on these issues. NCES Early Childhood Data Sets and Publications NCES has three longitudinal studies within the Early Childhood Longitudinal Study (ECLS) program (http://nces. ed.gov/ecls) that examine early childhood experiences and later academic outcomes. The three longitudinal studies within the program include an ecological examination of how the home, school, and community environments shape the development of externalizing behaviors (e.g., disruptive, aggressive) in children. These studies are designed with a strong theoretical base and have allowed for the direct exam- ination of the potential mechanisms by which youth become involved in school violence or aggression (the kindergarten class of 2010–2011 [ECLS-K:2011], specifically). First, the birth cohort of the ECLS (born in 2001) study was followed from birth through kindergarten entry (at 9 months of age, 2 years, preschool, and kindergarten). Approximately 33 dis- sertations and 55 peer-reviewed articles have used these data to examine food security, math, literacy, externalizing behavior, attention-deficit disorder, school readiness, father involvement, and so on. This study included direct assess- ments of the children (nurse, behavioral observations), self- administered teacher surveys, parent interviews, and self-administered parent surveys. A wide range of constructs was assessed across the ecology of the child, including pre- natal care, developmental milestones (including social-emo- tional development), exposure to violence, community support, economic support, neighborhood quality, physical abuse of child, and relationship quality of parents. Teachers rated the child’s friendships (liked, annoys other children). Second, the kindergarten class of 1998–1999 (ECLS-K) cohort is a sample of children followed from kindergarten through eighth grade. This is a longitudinal study that allows researchers to study how a wide range of family, school, community, and individual factors affected school perfor- mance. Approximately 115 dissertations and 129 peer- reviewed journal articles have included these data focused on a range of academic outcomes, and two papers examined externalizing behaviors. Parents, teachers, and students completed measures in kindergarten and first, third, fifth, and eighth grades. The Social Skills Rating Scale (Gresham & Elliott, 1990) was modified and completed by multi-infor- mants to assess the youth’s social skills and problem behav- iors (externalizing, internalizing). Third, the ECLS-K:2011 cohort is a sample of children followed from kindergarten through fifth grade (each year). One dissertation used these data to examine externalizing behaviors among rural youth (Sisson, 2015). These youth are currently in the third grade and will be assessed as fourth graders and fifth graders in spring 2015 and 2016, respectively. Like the ECLS-K, in the ECLS-K:2011, parents, teachers, and students complete measures to assess home, school, and community influences on academic and social outcomes. Parents, teachers, and stu- dents report on peer victimization experiences (adapted from Espelage & Holt, 2001; e.g., “other students called names, other students made fun of, other students picked on child”), and social skills, externalizing, and internalizing behaviors are also assessed via the Social Skills Rating System (Gresham & Elliott, 1990). Teachers also report on parental involvement for each student. These three studies demon- strate excellent examples of the importance of studying how early childhood experiences at home, in school, and in the community all interact to influence later academic and social engagement. It would be important to keep the victimization scale in the 2015 and 2016 assessments. NCES Cross-Sectional Data Sets In addition to these longitudinal studies, NCES publishes the Indicators of School Crime and Safety every 2 years (see Robers et al., 2013, for more details), which includes a sum- mary of a series of cross-sectional surveys of students, teachers, and principals. Sources for this report include the School-Associated Violent Death Study, funded by the Department of Education, the Department of Justice, and the CDC; the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS; U.S. Department of Justice, 2011) and School Crime Supplement (SCS; http://nces.ed.gov/surveys/); the Youth Risk Behavior Survey (www.cdc.gov/yrbss); the Schools and Staffing Survey (SASS; http://nces.ed.gov/surveys/); and the School Survey on Crime and Safety (SSOCS; http:// nces.ed.gov/surveys/). SCS to the NCVS The SCS was created as a supplement to the NCVS and was codesigned by the NCES and Bureau of Justice Statistics. The SCS survey collects information about victimization, crime, and safety at school. The SCS is a national survey of approximately 6,500 students ages 12 through 18 in U.S. public and private elementary, middle, and high schools. The SCS was conducted in 1989, 1995, 1999, 2001, 2003, 2005, 2007, 2009, and 2011. Constructs include alcohol and drug availability; fighting, bullying, and hate-related behaviors; fear and school avoidance behaviors; gun and weapon carrying; and gangs at school. Approximately 25 peer-reviewed articles and six dissertations have used these data. A particular strength of this survey is the inclusion of promotive and protective fac- tors, including involvement in student government, clubs, and athletic teams; perceptions of school rules and equity; percep- tions of teacher-student relations; and neighborhood scales. The survey also assesses avoidance behaviors associated with http://nces.ed.gov/ecls http://nces.ed.gov/ecls http://nces.ed.gov/surveys/ http://nces.ed.gov/surveys/ http://nces.ed.gov/surveys/ http://nces.ed.gov/surveys/ Espelage 4 school safety issues, including locations (e.g., hallways, caf- eteria), activities, classes, and truancy. Nine items address security measures (e.g., metal detectors, code of conduct), and students are asked if they reported bullying to a teacher or some other adult. This survey also includes an assessment of gang activity or involvement with three questions: (1) “Are there any gangs at your school?” (2) “During this school year, how often have gangs been involved in fights, attacks, or other violence at your school?” (3) “Have gangs been involved in the sale of drugs at your school during this school year?” NCES should consider assessing gang membership and ask if students were recruited but did not join a gang to identify what protective factors might lead to resistance of gang membership (De La Rue & Espelage, 2014). Three items for cyberbullying were added to the 2009–2010 survey. This survey is limited in that it is cross-sectional and self- report, and data cannot be linked to school-level or commu- nity-level characteristics. In reality, these data are useful for surveillance of school violence and bullying only and offer little in the way of addressing some of the major pressing research issues in the fields of school violence and bullying. SSOCS The SSOCS was the primary source of school-level data on crime and safety for NCES. It includes a nationally repre- sentative cross-sectional survey of about 3,500 public ele- mentary and secondary public schools. SSOCS is administered to over 3,000 public primary, middle, high, and combined school principals in the spring of even-numbered school years. Data collection occurred in the spring of the 1999–2000, 2003–2004, 2005–2006, 2007–2008, 2009– 2010 (data not available yet), and 2011–2012 school years (questionnaire and data are not on website). The survey includes items related to school practices and programs; par- ent and community involvement at school; school security; staff training; limitations on crime prevention; frequency of crime and violence at school; frequency of incidents reported to police or law enforcement; frequency of hate crimes, gang- related crimes, and gang-related hate crimes; disciplinary problems and disciplinary actions; and so on. Approximately six peer-reviewed articles and five dissertations have used these data. Furthermore, the SSOCS includes an assessment of school security practices and policies related to technology use, and written plans and drills for violence incidents. Finally, detailed questions regarding the role and involvement of school resource officers, security guards, or sworn law enforcement officers are included. These data provide descrip- tive information about what schools are doing to address school safety and security efforts, and how the security offi- cers are involved in efforts to implement and enforce these efforts and how they are involved in teacher training efforts. Principals are provided with definitions of gang, hate crime, rape, sexual battery, sexual harassment, theft, and violence. No definition of bullying is provided, but cyberbullying is defined in the body of the survey. One item for bullying (“How often does student bullying occur at your school?”) is assessed. Again, this survey is limited by its cross-sectional nature, use of a single informant, and limited psychometric evidence for the constructs, including the one bullying item. NCES should consider how these data could be linked to other data sources. NCES SASS The SASS is a system of related questionnaires that pro- vides descriptive data on the context of elementary and sec- ondary education and provides policymakers a variety of statistics on the condition of education in the United States. It covers a wide range of topics, including teacher demand, teacher and principal characteristics, general conditions in schools, principals’ and teachers’ percep- tions of school climate, and problems in their schools. The four components are the School Questionnaire, the Teacher Questionnaire, the Principal Questionnaire, and the School District Questionnaire. It includes comprehensive assess- ments of training, professional development training, and violence directed toward teachers. Approximately 80 peer- reviewed articles and over 100 dissertations have used these data. The most recent data collection was for 2011– 2012, and it is now being changed to the National Teacher and Principal Survey. Of note is that the Teacher Questionnaire was instrumental in drawing national atten- tion to the substantial number of teachers and paraprofes- sionals who had experienced violence in their classrooms and schools, but it failed to uncover those aspects of schools, communities, or school leadership that predicted the prevalence of teacher violence. Thus, the American Psychological Association appointed a task force that used the prevalence data to design a national study of National Education Association members (Espelage, Anderman, et al., 2013). NCES should consider a longitudinal, multilevel examination of violence directed toward teachers, staff, and principals that would examine what factors predict vio- lence and what factors are associated with less violence, and it should consider developing interventions to reduce the growing teacher attrition that is linked to disruptive behaviors in the classroom. Selected Emerging Research Issues on School Violence and Bullying Whereas some research indicates that extreme forms of school violence are decreasing in prevalence (Robers, Zhang, & Truman, 2010), bullying and school violence in general and their aftermath continue to be significant prob- lems for students, teachers, staff, and schools. Thus, there continues to be many pressing issues in the research litera- ture on school violence and bullying, some of which are dis- cussed next. Data Needs to Address Bully and School Violence Issues 5 Definition of Bullying and Peer Victimization Almost four decades of research has been conducted on bullying and peer victimization, ranging from prevalence studies and etiological investigations to systematic reviews and evaluations of prevention and intervention programs (see Espelage & Holt, 2012, for review). However, a rigorous debate has only recently emerged about how best to define bullying and how to distinguish it from other forms of aggres- sion and/or peer victimization (American Educational Research Association, 2013; Rodkin, Espelage, & Hanish, 2015). This is an important issue to resolve as most states are required to have a bully definition, a policy, and a prevention plan. Definitions of bullying emphasize observable or nonob- servable aggressive behaviors, the repetitive nature of these behaviors, and the imbalance of power between the individ- ual or group perpetrator and the victim (Espelage & Holt, 2012; Ybarra, Espelage, & Mitchell, 2014). An imbalance of power exists when the perpetrator or group of perpetrators have more physical, social, or intellectual power than the vic- tim. In a recent examination of a nationally representative study, early and late adolescents who perceived that their per- petrator had more power than them reported greater adverse outcomes (e.g., hopelessness) than victims who did not per- ceive a power differential (Ybarra et al., 2014). Finally, rep- etition should be evaluated carefully, given that youth who are victims of bullying often change their behaviors in order to minimize the probability of it happening again (Batanova, Espelage, & Rao, 2014). For example, they might stop riding the bus, stop attending lunch, or avoid school and other places where the victimization is occurring. The SCS to the NCVS 2011 is the only source of data from students about their experiences of bullying. Students are presented with the following question to assess offline (face-to-face) bully victimization: “Now I have some ques- tions about what students do at school that make you feel bad or are hurtful to you. We often refer to this as being bullied. During this school year, has any student bullied you?” Then students respond yes or no to seven items: name calling, rumor spreading, threatened, physical, coer- cion, excluded, and destroyed property. Online bully victim- ization is assessed with the following item, to which the students respond yes or no: Now I have some questions about what students do that could occur anywhere and that make you feel bad or are hurtful to you. We often refer to this as being bullied. You may include events you told me about already. During this school year, has another student posted hurtful information; threatened by email, instant messaging, text messaging, or through games; or excluded? This assessment is not consistent with the national research definition of bullying. Of note, an expert panel convened in the fall of 2013 to provide suggestions for revisions of this supplement, and I suggested the following recommendations: (a) Assess the power differential between the perpetrator and victim (When you are bullied, is it by a person bigger, older, stronger, more popular?), (b) add response options to assess frequencies (never, one or two times, three or four times, and so on) for each item, and (c) make offline and online items parallel to allow direct comparisons of prevalence; perpetra- tion should be added across all constructs. Bullying, Peer Victimization, Academic Achievement, and Engagement Several national and international research studies rely- ing on cross-sectional data have documented that experi- ences of being victimized or bullying other students are associated with decreased academic achievement. Findings from a sample of seventh, ninth, and 11th graders in an urban public school district also revealed that for each one-point increase in grade point average, the odds of being a victim versus a bystander decreased by 10% (Glew, Fan, Katon, & Rivara, 2008). These associations are also found when stu- dents are followed over time in longitudinal studies (e.g., Juvonen, Wang, & Espinoza, 2011; Schwartz, Gorman, Nakamoto, & Toblin, 2005). Juvonen and colleagues (2011) documented that peer victimization can account for an aver- age 1.5-point letter grade decrease in one academic subject (e.g., math) across 3 years of middle school. Moreover, the researchers found that greater self-reported victimization was associated with lower grades and lower teacher-rated academic engagement. However, a recent meta-analytic review of 33 studies conducted by Nakamoto and Schwartz (2010) reported that empirical research on this association has produced an incongruent pattern of findings and modest correlations. Much more research is needed to understand how victimization impacts academic engagement, school avoidance, grades, and ultimately, career placement. The ELS:2002 could be used to examine some of these associa- tions because bully victimization, school safety issues, and school violence were assessed at baseline. Bullying Among Students With Disabilities Research indicates that students with disabilities are twice as likely to be identified as perpetrators and victims than stu- dents without disabilities (Rose, 2010; Rose & Espelage, 2012). Disability data were collected in the NCES longitudi- nal studies from parents and have been used in a limited way in the literature. NCES should create a mechanism for greater mining of these data, perhaps through a call for proposals to use these data or creating postdoctoral positions that require working with the NCES data on disability issues. Bullying and the Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual (LGB) Community A large percentage of bullying among students involves the use of homophobic teasing and slurs, called homophobic Espelage 6 teasing or victimization (Espelage, Basile, & Hamburger, 2012; Poteat & Espelage, 2005; Poteat & Rivers, 2010). Bullying and homophobic victimization occur more fre- quently among LGB youth in American schools than among students who identify as heterosexual (Espelage, Aragon, Birkett, & Koenig, 2008; Kosciw, Greytak, & Diaz, 2009; Robinson & Espelage, 2011, 2012). Some LGB youth report greater depression, anxiety, suicidal behaviors, and truancy than their straight-identified peers (Espelage et al., 2008; Robinson & Espelage, 2011). However, peer victimization does not appear to explain all of the mental health disparities between LGB and heterosexual youth (Robinson & Espelage, 2012). It is imperative that NCES conduct a longitudinal study of the experiences of victimization associated with sexual orientation, gender expression, or gender identity. Summary and Recommendations NCES has two longitudinal high school studies (ELS:2002 and HSLS:2009). The ELS:2002 data set includes an assess- ment of bully victimization (one item) and school violence (scale) at baseline. Papers have appeared in peer-reviewed outlets examining victimization experiences among children of immigrant parents and victimization experiences in after- school programs. Much more work could be conducted with this data set, but the single-item bully victimization assess- ment is a major limitation. The HSLS:2009 included only one item related to school violence: Students were asked how safe they felt at school. The three longitudinal studies within the ECLS program include an ecological examination of how the home, school, and community environments shape the development of externalizing behaviors in children. These studies are designed with a strong theoretical base and allow for the direct examination of the potential mechanisms by which youth become involved in school violence or aggres- sion (ECLS-K:2011 specifically). It would be important that NCES follow the ECLS-K:2011 youth and families into early and late adolescence. This would allow the addition of differ- ent types of violence (perpetration and victimization), includ- ing bullying with more precise measurement, teen dating violence, and sexual violence. Furthermore, other at-risk behaviors that have direct and indirect influences on aca- demic success (e.g., gang involvement, drugs and alcohol use, exposure to violence) as well as protective factors (e.g., extracurricular activities, positive youth activities, community support, and neighborhood collective efficacy) should be added to these later measurements. That said, many questions remain as NCES attempts to address the public health concerns of school violence and bul- lying. It would be important within the surveys used for sur- veillance and trend analysis to distinguish bullying (power dynamic) from student aggression. Additional items should be added to those available without compromising the ability to track trends over time. Perhaps, within these cross-sectional studies, multi-informant data could be collected that could be matched to determine how perceptions of teachers, schools, parents, and community members influence youth outcomes. 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(2015). Emerging issues in school bullying research & prevention science. In E. T. Emmer & E. Sabornie (Eds.), Handbook of classroom management: Research, practice, and contemporary issues (pp. 76–93). New York, NY: Taylor & Francis. Espelage, D. L., Anderman, E. M., Brown, V. E., Jones, A., Lane, K. L., McMahon, S. D., & Reynolds, C. R. (2013). Understanding and preventing violence directed against teach- ers: Recommendations for a national research, practice, and policy agenda. American Psychologist, 68(2), 75–87. Espelage, D. L., Aragon, S. R., Birkett, M., & Koenig, B. W. (2008). Homophobic teasing, psychological outcomes, and sexual orien- tation among high school students: What influence do parents and schools have? School Psychology Review, 37(2), 202–216. Espelage, D. L., Basile, K. C., & Hamburger, M. E. (2012). Bullying experiences and co-occurring sexual violence perpe- tration among middle school students: Shared and unique risk factors. 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Kosciw, J. G., Greytak, E. A., & Diaz, E. M. (2009). Who, what, where, when, and why: Demographic and ecological factors contributing to hostile school climate for lesbian, gay, bisex- ual, and transgender youth. Journal of Youth and Adolescence, 38(7), 976–988. Low, S., Espelage, D. L., & Polanin, J. (2013). Peer socializa- tion and relational aggression among middle school students. Journal of Youth and Adolescence, 42, 1078–1089. Nakamoto, J., & Schwartz, D. (2010). Is peer victimization asso- ciated with academic achievement? A meta-analytic review. Social Development, 19(2), 221–242. Nelson, I. A., & Gastic, B. (2009). Street ball, swim team and the sour cream machine: A cluster analysis of out of school time participation portfolios. Journal of Youth and Adolescence, 38, 1172–1186. Peguero, A. A. (2008). Bullying victimization and extracur- ricular activity. Journal of School Violence, 7(3), 71–85. doi:10.1080/15388220801955570 Peguero, A. A. (2009a). Opportunity, involvement, and student exposure to school violence. Youth Violence and Juvenile Justice, 7(4), 299–312. Peguero, A. A. (2009b). Victimizing the children of immigrants: Latino and Asian American student victimization. Youth & Society, 41(2), 186–208. Poteat, V. P., & Espelage, D. L. (2005). Exploring the rela- tion between bullying and homophobic verbal content: The Homophobic Content Agent Target (HCAT) Scale. Violence and Victims, 20(5), 513–528. Poteat, V. P., & Rivers, I. (2010). The use of homophobic language across bullying roles during adolescence. Journal of Applied Developmental Psychology, 31(2), 166–172. Ripski, M., & Gregory, A. (2009). Unfair, unsafe, and unwelcome: Do high school students’ perceptions of unfairness, hostility, and victimization in school predict engagement and achieve- ment? Journal of School Violence, 8(4), 355–375. Robers, S., Kemp, J., & Truman, J. (2013). Indicators of school crime and safety: 2012 (NCES 2013-036/NCJ 241446). Washington, DC: National Center for Education Statistics, U.S. Department of Education; Bureau of Justice Statistics, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice. Robers, S., Zhang, J., & Truman, J. (2010). Indicators of school crime and safety: 2010 (NCES 2011-002/NCJ 230812). Washington, DC: National Center for Education Statistics. Robinson, J. P., & Espelage, D. L. (2011). Inequities in educational and psychological outcomes between LGBTQ and straight students in middle and high school. Educational Researcher, 40(7), 315–330. Robinson, J. P., & Espelage, D. L. (2012). Bullying explains only part of LGBTQ–heterosexual risk disparities: Implications for policy and practice. Educational Researcher, 41(8), 309–319. Rodkin, P.C., Espelage, D.L., & Hanish, L.D. (2015). A rela- tional perspective on the social ecology of bullying. American Psychologist, 70, 311–321. Rose, C. A. (2010). Social-ecological factors related to the involvement of students with learning disabilities in the bul- lying dynamic (Doctoral dissertation). University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. Rose, C. A., & Espelage, D. L. (2012). Risk and protective factors asso- ciated with the bullying involvement of students with emotional and behavioral disorders. Behavioral Disorders, 37(3), 133–148. Schwartz, D., Gorman, A. H., Nakamoto, J., & Toblin, R. L. (2005). Victimization in the peer group and children’s academic func- tioning. Journal of Educational Psychology, 97(3), 425–435. Sisson, K. J. (2015). Teacher and school characteristics as protective factors: An investigation of internalizing and externalizing behav- iors among rural, at-risk children (Order No. AAI3636353). Retrieved from PsycINFO. (1692316316; 2015-99130-515) U.S. Department of Justice. (2011). National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS). Retrieved from http://www.bjs.gov/index. cfm?ty=dcdetail&iid=245 Ybarra, M., Espelage, D. L., & Mitchell, K. J. (2014). Differentiating youth who are bullied from other victims of peer-aggression: The importance of differential power and repetition. Journal of Adolescent Health, 55(2), 293–300. doi:10.1016/j.jado- health.2014.02.009 Author Dorothy Espelage, PhD, is an Edward William Gutgsell & Jane Marr Gutgsell Endowed Professor and Hardie Scholar of Education, in the Department of Educational Psychology at the University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign. She has con- ducted research on bullying, homophobic teasing, sexual harassment, and dating violence for the last 22 years. She is an author on over 130 peer-reviewed journal articles, 25 chap- ters, and has coedited five books. Her research focuses on translating empirical findings into prevention and intervention programming and informs national policy. She conducts large-scale clinical trials to evaluate social emotional learning prevention programs to reduce bullying and aggression. https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/246830.pdf https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/246830.pdf http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=dcdetail&iid=245 http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=dcdetail&iid=245 
work_4p6kkpcgwnf5bo3ifyonusjdse	----	Law and Collective Memory ANRV327-LS03-09 ARI 23 September 2007 16:10 Law and Collective Memory Joachim J. Savelsberg1 and Ryan D. King2 1 Department of Sociology, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minnesota 55455; email: savelsbg@atlas.socsci.umn.edu 2 Department of Sociology, University at Albany, SUNY, Albany, New York 12222; email: rking@albany.edu Annu. Rev. Law Soc. Sci. 2007. 3:189–211 First published online as a Review in Advance on July 23, 2007 The Annual Review of Law and Social Science is online at http://lawsocsci.annualreviews.org This article’s doi: 10.1146/annurev.lawsocsci.3.081806.112757 Copyright c© 2007 by Annual Reviews. All rights reserved 1550-3585/07/1201-0189$20.00 Key Words cultural trauma, atrocities, human rights, international law, transitional justice Abstract Law and collective memory are reciprocally associated. Law steers collective memory, directly but selectively, as trials produce images of the past through the production and presentation of evidence in ritual practices and public discourse. Law affects collective mem- ory indirectly by regulating the production, accessibility, and dis- semination of information about the past. Simultaneously, collective memory is preserved and activated by carrier groups to inform law- making and law enforcement; and memories of past atrocities serve as analogical devices that, under certain conditions, influence law. Such institutionalization of collective memory as law partly results from applied commemorations, lawmaking situations that invoke the past. The relevance of the reciprocal relationship between law and collective memory is highlighted by the international community’s responses to recent atrocities and regime transitions and by its new openness to intervention in national affairs. This article reviews past research and discusses avenues for future work on law and collective memory. 189 A nn u. R ev . L aw . S oc . S ci . 2 00 7. 3: 18 9- 21 1. D ow nl oa de d fr om a rj ou rn al s. an nu al re vi ew s. or g by S ta te U ni ve rs it y of N ew Y or k - A lb an y on 1 2/ 06 /0 7. F or p er so na l us e on ly . ANRV327-LS03-09 ARI 23 September 2007 16:10 Collective memory: knowledge about that past that is shared, mutually acknowledged, and reinforced by collectivities such as small informal groups, formal organizations, or nation states and global communities Transitional justice: legal proceedings and decisions in the transition between regimes, typically from authoritarian to democratic, especially as they address repression by the previous regime Institutionalization of collective memory as law: the transformation of collective memories into legal norms and enforcement practices, for example through applied commemorations INTRODUCTION The reciprocal relationship between law and collective memory is the theme of this re- view. To what extent does law influence how collectivities remember the past and, in turn, how do collective memories of the past inform the creation and enforcement of law? Our focus on collective memory is distinct from the well-established psychological literature on individual memory and law (see Monahan & Loftus 1982 for review), as illustrated in research on topics such as eyewitness testi- mony (Wells 1993, Loftus & Doyle 1997) or recovery after victimization (Herman 1992). Relative to that scholarship, the social nature of memory and its relationship to law are less frequently the subject of socio-legal inquiry. A recent upsurge in this line of scholarship and pressures toward legal intervention following massive human rights violations warrant a re- view of the current state of this research. The importance of understanding the im- pact of law on collective memory is recognized by practitioners and scholars alike. Landsman (2005, pp. 6f ) quotes Robert Jackson, head of the U.S. prosecutorial team during the Nuremberg Criminal Tribunal against lead- ing Nazi figures, who argued, “Unless we write the record of this movement with clar- ity and precision, we cannot blame the fu- ture if in days of peace it finds incredible the accusatory generalities uttered during the war. We must establish incredible events by credible evidence.” Jackson’s words find re- newed relevance in light of recent atrocities in Rwanda, East Timor, and Sudan’s Darfur region and in the former Yugoslavia and Iraq, and also following the end of dictatorial or autocratic regimes in East Central Europe, Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Law is cen- tral to new attempts at “breaking cycles of violence” (Minow 1998, 2002) and at pro- viding transitional justice during shifts from authoritarian regimes to democracy (Kritz 1995, Teitel 2000), and collective memory can be a central mediating force (Meierhenrich 2006). Law is an especially powerful institution for the creation of collective memory because it involves highly effective rituals (Durkheim 1984 [1893], Borneman 1997, Nino 1996) and its enforcement is backed by the coercive ap- paratus of states, churches, or other organized groups (Weber 1976). At the same time, law is subject to a particular set of institutional rules, such as those on the admission of evidence, that color the collective memory produced in legal institutions and through legal pro- cesses in ways that differ distinctly from mem- ories produced by historians or in the worlds of politics, art, and religion (Alexander 2004, pp. 16f; Osiel 1997). Whereas legal proceedings construct im- ages of the past directly, law affects collective memory indirectly when it regulates what in- formation can be collected or accessed and what can be said about the past. In some cases, information that could influence the memory of past events is restricted (Markovits 2001), and in other cases libel laws (Rose 1968, Smolla 1983) and criminal codes regulate the expression of opinions about the past, evi- denced by the prohibition of Holocaust denial in many countries. In reverse, we must consider collective memory if we seek to successfully understand and explain law on the books and law in action. Collective memories are activated in legislative and legal decision making, which Savelsberg & King (2005) refer to as the “institutionalization of collective memory as law.” In addition, collective memories also af- fect law enforcement practices (King 2005). We suggest in this review that the con- nection between collective memory and law represents a promising area of socio-legal in- quiry. At the same time, research in this vein is dispersed across multiple disciplines and spe- cialty fields, including anthropology, crimi- nology, history, jurisprudence, political sci- ence, social psychology, and sociology, that employ various theories and methodologies. We seek to identify common organizing con- cepts in this body of research and propose new 190 Savelsberg · King A nn u. R ev . L aw . S oc . S ci . 2 00 7. 3: 18 9- 21 1. D ow nl oa de d fr om a rj ou rn al s. an nu al re vi ew s. or g by S ta te U ni ve rs it y of N ew Y or k - A lb an y on 1 2/ 06 /0 7. F or p er so na l us e on ly . ANRV327-LS03-09 ARI 23 September 2007 16:10 directions for future research at the intersec- tion of memory and law. COLLECTIVE MEMORY AND CULTURAL TRAUMA— CENTRAL CONCEPTS Collective memory, a term coined in the classic work of French sociologist Maurice Halbwachs (1992), refers to knowledge about that past that is shared, mutually acknowl- edged, and reinforced by a collectivity—from small informal groups to formal organiza- tions to nation states and global communi- ties (for a review, see Olick & Robbins 1998). Halbwachs’s approach was novel in at least two respects. First, his work challenged the empiricist conception of the past associated with David Hume, according to which we, as enlightened subjects, have immediate ac- cess to the world and history. Second, it goes beyond Kantian apriorism, which posits that humans understand the world through a set of universally given categories. Instead, Halbwachs was inspired by Durkheim’s (2001 [1912]) insight that the categories through which we see the world are themselves so- cial constructions. More specifically though, Halbwachs maintained and sought to show that our understanding of the past is influ- enced by present-day interests, a perspective that Schwartz (1982) has labeled the “presen- tist approach.” Scholarly engagement of this theme has re- cently intensified. A search in Sociological Ab- stracts shows 183 publications with both the terms collective and memory in the titles; 72 of these appeared from 2000 through 2005. Some of this research supports Halbwachs’s presentist claim. Fine (2001), for example, shows that the memory of past presidents and other famous and infamous people is affected by the position and interest of present-day “reputational entrepreneurs.” This finding is in line with the insight that collective memory is always contested and subject to mnemonic struggles (Zerubavel 2004). Collective mem- ory is reflected and activated in the minds Applied commemorations: implicit or explicit commemorations in the context of decision-making situations such as legislative sessions or legal proceedings Cultural trauma: memory of an event or situation that is laden with negative affect, represented as indelible, and seen as threatening to a society’s existence or violating its cultural presuppositions (Smelser 2004) Carrier groups: groups that maintain or promote types of knowledge, here an image of history, often with the goal of controlling memory or advancing a cause of individuals and always in flux (Olick 2005, Schwartz & Schuman 2005). Collective memory is also dependent on previous ways of remembering history. Exam- ining a series of commemorations of May 8, the day of German capitulation after World War II, Olick (1999) finds that today’s com- memorative speeches have to take yesterday’s commemorations into account, at consider- able cost to those speakers who fail to do so. They run the risk of breaking taboos and suffering reputational and political damage. Olick thus speaks of the “path dependency” of collective memory. More recently, Savelsberg & King (2005) expanded this idea with the concept of “applied commemorations,” that is, commemorations not for the explicit sake of addressing historical events, but commem- orations in the context of decision-making de- bates that involve historic events, for example legislative sessions on hate crime and restric- tions on free speech. Cultural trauma is a closely related term, defined by Smelser (2004, p. 44) as “a mem- ory accepted and publicly given credence by a relevant membership group and evoking an event or situation that is a) laden with neg- ative affect, b) represented as indelible, and c) regarded as threatening a society’s existence or violating one or more of its cultural pre- suppositions” (for applications, see Alexander et al. 2004). Cultural trauma is a new con- cept anchored in Durkheim’s (2001 [1912]) classical idea of “religious imagination”—an imagination that forms “inchoate experiences, through association, condensation, and aes- thetic creation, into some specific shape” (Alexander 2004, p. 9). Alexander (2004) spells out basic elements of a theory of cultural trauma, drawing from different sociological traditions. The con- struction of cultural trauma, he argues, is a process that involves (a) claims-making by agents; (b) carrier groups of the trauma process (with material and ideal interests); (c) speech acts by carrier groups, who address an audience in a specific situation, seeking to project the trauma claim to the audience; www.annualreviews.org • Law and Memory 191 A nn u. R ev . L aw . S oc . S ci . 2 00 7. 3: 18 9- 21 1. D ow nl oa de d fr om a rj ou rn al s. an nu al re vi ew s. or g by S ta te U ni ve rs it y of N ew Y or k - A lb an y on 1 2/ 06 /0 7. F or p er so na l us e on ly . ANRV327-LS03-09 ARI 23 September 2007 16:10 and (d ) cultural classifications regarding the nature of the pain, the nature of the vic- tim, the relation of the trauma victim to the wider audience, and the attribution of respon- sibility. Importantly in this context, Alexan- der observes that linguistic action, through which the master narrative of social suffer- ing is created, is mediated by the nature of institutional arenas that contribute to it. It is in this sense that we examine the literature for insights on how institutional features of law, for example law’s focus on individuals as responsible actors, affect the construction of collective memory compared with other insti- tutional fields, while also being mindful that the varying shapes of law in cross-national and historical comparison warrant further specifi- cation of any generalization about the rela- tionship between law and knowledge (Savels- berg 1994), including collective memory. As we discuss the link between law and col- lective memory, we take a road that is not well traveled and on which many street signs are missing. When we enter collective, memory, and law as search terms, Sociological Abstracts shows only two entries for titles and thir- teen for article abstracts.1 Although the road that connects law and collective memory is not crowded, much literature is not captured through such a narrow search. Other work has not yet appeared in print at the time of our writing (e.g., Karstedt 20072). We set out to review available publications that connect these themes while also pointing to avenues 1 A search in CAS Worldwide Political Science Abstracts, using collective, memory, and law as combined search terms, re- sults in zero hits for titles and eleven for abstracts. A Crimi- nal Justice Abstracts search showed zero entries for titles and two for abstracts. 2 Susanne Karstedt, editor of this forthcoming volume of conference proceedings, generously made her introduc- tion available to the authors after the text of this article was drafted. Chapters cover the time span from World War II to the present. They include case studies on South Africa, Australia, South Korea, Norway, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Germany and diverse mechanisms from criminal jus- tice to lustration, truth and reconciliation commissions, constitutions, civil liberties, and property rights. A focus is on transitional justice. not yet taken. Traveling the road in one di- rection reveals scholarship on law’s influence on collective memory. In the other direction we find research on how collective memory affects the content and enforcement of law. HOW LAW SHAPES COLLECTIVE MEMORIES Direct Effects: Shaping History in Courts of Law Civil, administrative, and criminal law pro- ceedings (Landsman 2005, Osiel 1997) as well as administrative alternatives, such as truth and reconciliation commissions (TRCs) (Wilson 2003), contribute to the shaping of collective memory.3 Although law’s explicit principles do not traditionally include this purpose, sociologists have long looked beyond philosophical goals to examine conditions and functions of criminal punishment. Their in- sights align with a law and collective memory perspective. Garfinkel (1956), for example, interprets courtroom events as “degradation ceremonies,” leading to the ritual destruction of the persons on trial. Following the fall of a dictatorial regime that allowed or commit- ted massive human rights violations, the ritual destruction of former political leaders, possi- bly charismatic figures, through trial is likely to result in a revision of collective memories of the role those leaders played in history. Mead (1918) points to the emotional aspects of trials that contribute simultaneously to “re- spect for the law” and “hatred for the crimi- nal aggressor” and Durkheim (1984 [1893]) sees trials as ritual practices through which social sentiments maintain their force and 3 Another quasi-legal response is lustration, the exclusion from particular types of occupations of categories of people involved in previous regimes [see the special issue of Law and Social Inquiry (Siegelman 1995)]. For a brief compara- tive review of institutional responses such as trials, TRCs, lustration, compensation, naming and shaming, criminal- izing denial of the past, commemoration and memorializa- tion, reconciliation, and reconstruction as methods against denial, see Cohen (2001, pp. 222–48). 192 Savelsberg · King A nn u. R ev . L aw . S oc . S ci . 2 00 7. 3: 18 9- 21 1. D ow nl oa de d fr om a rj ou rn al s. an nu al re vi ew s. or g by S ta te U ni ve rs it y of N ew Y or k - A lb an y on 1 2/ 06 /0 7. F or p er so na l us e on ly . ANRV327-LS03-09 ARI 23 September 2007 16:10 vitality. Reconfirming respect for law chal- lenges the practices of a past lawless regime, and reconfirming social sentiments that might have conflicted with a past regime’s practices similarly strengthens a critical view of recent history. In addition to law’s facilitation of such emotionally colored reinterpretations of history and its actors, legal trials also serve as bookkeepers of history. President Franklin Roosevelt’s eventual support for the Nuremberg Tribunal was clearly motivated by this understanding, as Landsman (2005, p. 6) shows when he quotes a report by Judge Samuel Rosenman, Roosevelt’s confi- dant: “He was determined that the question of Hitler’s guilt—and the guilt of his gangsters— must not be left open to future debate. The whole nauseating matter should be spread out on a permanent record under oath by wit- nesses and with all the written documents” (see also quotation of Justice Robert Jackson, above). Roosevelt had come to believe that revisionist interpretations of World War I, challenging the doctrine of Germany’s pri- mary guilt, had contributed to isolationist ten- dencies in the United States, tendencies that Roosevelt strongly opposed (Landsman 2005, p. 6). His interest in documenting the Nazi regime’s aggression and atrocities through court proceedings was political and strategic, exemplifying Halbwachs’s (1992) claim of pre- sentist orientations in the construction of col- lective memory. Recent work addresses these affective and cognitive functions of trials and their con- tribution to law’s unconscious or conscious role in the construction of collective mem- ory. Arguing from a Durkheimian perspective, Carlos Santiago Nino (1996), an Argentinean jurist, former advisor to President Raúl Alfonsı́n, and strong proponent of criminal trials, argues that the prosecution of generals of the Argentinean military junta was neces- sary to impress on the collective conscience that the law is the ultimate force in soci- ety. Legal anthropologist Borneman (1997) takes a similar position regarding the treat- ment of members of the former East Euro- pean elites after the 1989 overthrow of com- munist regimes. Borneman considers trials as ritual performances of symbolic sacrifice. They engage in a process of internal cleansing and thus prepare the ground for a functioning democracy, the legitimacy of which depends on a system of accountability that is guaran- teed only through the principles of the rule of law. Osiel (1997), writing about the role of law in the construction of collective memories of mass atrocities, both supports and challenges the positions taken by such Durkheimian pro- tagonists of criminal trials (see also Osiel 1995). He stresses the importance of trials as places in which the poetics of storytelling bear out, with defense attorneys telling the story as a tragedy and prosecutors as a morality play. The courtroom drama is then recast “in terms of the ‘theater of ideas,’ where large ques- tions of collective memory and even national identity are engaged” (Osiel 1997, p. 3). Osiel suggests that “liberal show trials” are con- ducted by “moral entrepreneurs” and, quoting the Bulgarian philosopher Todorov (1996), by “activists of memory.” Yet, Osiel claims, Durkheimians expect too much from criminal law and overlook the lim- its of Durkheim’s approach: Durkheim under- estimated the role of reason and of the rational expression of dissenting opinions (i.e., con- flict) in court trials, and he underestimated how the strengthening of the public’s feel- ing may result in conflicting public sentiments and violence rather than social consensus. Osiel (1997, p. 35) suggests that Durkheim learned important lessons, but falsely gener- alized, from his experience of the Dreyfus trial (see also Coser 1971, pp. 158–59). Osiel offers an alternative understanding of trials that, he argues, overcomes limits of the traditional Durkheimian approach. In- stead of establishing mechanical or organic solidarity, legal proceedings manage to pro- duce “discursive solidarity” (Osiel 1997, p. 51) by providing a civil arena in which dissent- ing actors can tell their stories and have to www.annualreviews.org • Law and Memory 193 A nn u. R ev . L aw . S oc . S ci . 2 00 7. 3: 18 9- 21 1. D ow nl oa de d fr om a rj ou rn al s. an nu al re vi ew s. or g by S ta te U ni ve rs it y of N ew Y or k - A lb an y on 1 2/ 06 /0 7. F or p er so na l us e on ly . ANRV327-LS03-09 ARI 23 September 2007 16:10 Institutional logic of law: the distinct set of rules and scripts in legal proceedings concerning the presentation of evidence, the establishment of truth, and decision making listen to each other, thus contributing to solidarity through civil dissensus. In line with ideas developed by Simmel (1950) and later elaborated by Coser (1956), Osiel stresses the sociating consequences of conflict, in- cluding trials as arenas in which conflicts can be engaged (see also Garland 1990). He un- derstands trials, more specifically, as institu- tional arenas for the practice of communica- tive action (Habermas 1987), and he quotes John Dewey’s dictum that “democracy be- gins in conversation” (Osiel 1997, p. 45; for an excellent review and critique, see Power 1998). Although both Durkheimian and Haber- masian perspectives thus speak to the strength of law as a contributor to collective memory, literature also explores selectivities and limits of law. Selectivities in law’s construction of history. Trials follow particular institutional rules of law (Weber 1976) or, if translated through the habitus of the judicial field into practice, the particular logic of the legal field (Bourdieu 1987). Legal proceedings are bound by evidentiary rules that differ, for example, from those used in other institu- tional spheres such as science or religion. Further, they target individuals (collectivities only if these can be conceived of as artificial actors), not groups, social processes, or struc- tures. Actions they address are limited by le- gal classification systems. Trials also focus on defendants, with victims as tools in the pur- suit of justice (for the Demjanjuk trial, see Landsman 2005, pp. 110–72). Finally, follow- ing the binary logic of criminal law, the defen- dant is guilty or not guilty, a gross simplifica- tion compared with social scientific standards (Schumann 1989). A budding literature has begun to explore the consequences for collec- tive memory. Considering the individualizing effects of criminal law, Giesen (2004) writes about how Germans in the postwar era coped with the trauma of perpetrators. He ar- gues that German criminal trials against for- mer Nazis served a decoupling function: “In the narrative of individual criminal guilt, the German people . . . take the position of the third party . . . . The law court was the in- stitutional arena in which the demarcation of individual guilt was staged, ritually re- constructed, and reaffirmed” (Giesen 2004, p. 121). As individual perpetrators were rit- ually expelled, the majority of Germans were offered a chance to avoid acceptance of col- lective guilt. Osiel (1997, pp. 101f ) extends this insight to France, where, in line with President Charles De Gaulle’s urging, post– World War II trials were directed against a few top elite actors of the Vichy regime. Again, decoupling succeeded. By attaching guilt to some individuals through legal rit- uals, memory could be cleansed of the col- laboration of many, and attention could be redirected from questions about their past to the reconstruction of France following war and occupation. Accordingly, criminal trials focusing on a few elite actors contribute to re- moving from collective memory those larger social mechanisms that involve broader seg- ments of the population in the establishment and execution of dictatorial regimes and their atrocities. Although literature discusses implications of the individualizing nature of criminal law on collective memory, effects of the other as- pects of law’s institutional logic warrant ma- jor research efforts, including limits set by particular evidentiary rules, legal classification systems, the focus on defendants, and crimi- nal law’s binary logic. In addition, compara- tive work is needed on the shape of collective memories constructed through trials against human rights offenders and war criminals by diverse types of courts: domestic courts un- der successor regimes (e.g., Argentina, Chile, Iraq) versus international courts (e.g., The Hague); courts in countries that represent vic- tims (e.g., the Eichmann trial in Jerusalem) versus countries representing offenders (e.g., French courts against Nazi collaborators) ver- sus neutral countries; or by victors’ mili- tary tribunals (e.g., Nuremberg) versus courts 194 Savelsberg · King A nn u. R ev . L aw . S oc . S ci . 2 00 7. 3: 18 9- 21 1. D ow nl oa de d fr om a rj ou rn al s. an nu al re vi ew s. or g by S ta te U ni ve rs it y of N ew Y or k - A lb an y on 1 2/ 06 /0 7. F or p er so na l us e on ly . ANRV327-LS03-09 ARI 23 September 2007 16:10 run by third parties or international organi- zations. Such research can draw inspiration from disagreements such as Hannah Arendt’s (1963) critique of the “particularistic nature” of the Jerusalem trial against Adolf Eichmann and her related plea for international crimi- nal courts. That viewpoint challenged Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion, who sought to tell of the suffering and struggle of the vic- tims to a new generation and also to cor- rect the Nuremberg Tribunal’s focus on war- related crimes at the expense of the history of the anti-Jewish genocide (Douglas 2001, Landsman 2005). It evoked a heated debate and criticism by scholars such as Bell (1980), who recognized law’s embeddedness in so- cial life and challenged Arendt’s universalistic demands. Further, legal logic is historically vari- able. Evidentiary rules may change, and the individualizing and decoupling conse- quences of contemporary law are not eter- nal. Meierhenrich (2006) demonstrates how the individualizing consequences of law are the product of a rationalist response to a ro- manticist identification of the individual with collectivities. This rationalist response was manifested, for example, in the Nuremberg prosecutors’ failure to reach convictions of various Nazi organizations. Only individuals were found guilty. In response, Meierhenrich pleads for a cautious rehabilitation of the con- cept of collective guilt because, he argues, the practice of collective guilt, its attribution, acceptance, and rejection are social facts, at times even reflected in legal practice (e.g., U.S. conspiracy law). Most importantly, col- lective guilt is argued to interact in a dynamic relationship with collective memory and col- lective violence; disregarding it would deprive us of the ability to effectively interrupt what Minow calls “cycles of violence.” Finally, although some literature demon- strates the selective contribution of trials to collective memory, other work shows that le- gal logic must not be overrated. First, legal trials initiate the collection of evidence, not all of which may be admitted in the court of law, but evidence that will, nevertheless, be available for future historians or that may be directly communicated to the public through mass media. Hagan (2003) and Hagan & Levi (2005) document the diversity of extralegal ex- pertise of forensic scientists, victim workers, journalists, and social scientists mobilized by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) to uncover foren- sic and interview-based empirical evidence of the atrocities committed during the Yugoslav wars. Evidence such as recently opened mass graves reach a broad public through journal- istic reports, independently of the success of translating these materials into legal evidence in the ICTY’s legal proceedings. Investigatory evidence may also be used in future histori- cal documentations, independently of its legal status at the trial (Bass 2000, p. 302). Second, both legal proceedings and inves- tigatory work may be guided by nonlegal ra- tionales, especially political and ethical ones, in a substantivized type of law (Savelsberg 1992, Weber 1976). A substantive focus is particularly likely where legal institutions are not fully developed (see Hagan 2003 for the ICTY) and in cases of “victor’s tribunals” (as distinct from neutral international courts), as discussed by Landsman (2005, pp. 7, 9) for the Nuremberg Tribunal. (For tensions be- tween legal rules and practices and conse- quences for the construction of a genderized memory of atrocities in the Bosnian case, see Campbell 2002.) In addition, law enforcers’ actions may stray from legal logic when they act under political pressure. Landsman (2005, pp. 111ff ) describes the problematic work of the U.S. Office of Special Investigation (OSI) in the case against Ivan Demjanjuk, a man formerly of Ukraine who was suspected of being the infamous Ivan the Terrible from the Treblinka concentration and extermina- tion camp. Landsman (2005, p. 123) quotes the OSI’s deputy director: “The verdicts in our case went beyond the guilt or innocence of a particular defendant, each one helped to complete the historical record on what America had done [after the early years of www.annualreviews.org • Law and Memory 195 A nn u. R ev . L aw . S oc . S ci . 2 00 7. 3: 18 9- 21 1. D ow nl oa de d fr om a rj ou rn al s. an nu al re vi ew s. or g by S ta te U ni ve rs it y of N ew Y or k - A lb an y on 1 2/ 06 /0 7. F or p er so na l us e on ly . ANRV327-LS03-09 ARI 23 September 2007 16:10 inaction] in response to the Holocaust.” Landsman interprets the politicization and re- sulting missteps of the OSI in the context of a dramatic shift in American public opinion. Americans increasingly challenged how the United States treated the question of Nazi genocide as a “matter of foreign countries” (Landsman 2005, p. 111), an opinion shift that had motivated the foundation of the OSI in 1979 in the first place. Law’s interaction with other social in- stitutions: dependency, competition, and conflict. Law sometimes competes or con- flicts with other fields, and law’s impact may depend on other institutions. Hagan (2003) documents the intense competition between the legal and diplomatic fields in the Yu- goslav case. In addition, criminal courts are incapable of reaching large audiences directly (for the exception of strong states such as the People’s Republic of China, see Trevaskes 2004). Trials in democratic societies are open to the public, but the audience is small. No matter the ritual force of trials, courts depend on other institutions to communicate their proceedings and decisions to a broader public. Hagan (2003), in his simultaneous account of the atrocities committed in the Yugoslav wars and the building of the ICTY, describes how the charisma of the head prosecutors depends on mass media: “Even at Nuremberg, Justice Jackson needed . . . the cultivation of an ini- tially unengaged press corps to play his charis- matic role in the prosecution of Hermann Goering and his colleagues . . . . By the time of Ted Turner and CNN’s globalization of the news, the creation and consequences of charisma were even more important parts of international criminal practice” (Hagan 2003, p. 7). News media not only disseminate the court’s accounts of history; they also report selectively, in general (Gans 1979), and in the coverage of trials specifically (Wright et al. 1995). Kahn’s (2000) account of a Canadian Holocaust denial case illustrates how courts and media interact. Using a rebuttal strategy, prosecutors tried to disprove the defendant’s statements by calling experts and survivors to the stand. This strategy caused considerable public controversies and misleading newspa- per headlines, some of which focused on any element of doubt about selective pieces of ev- idence. After a conviction was overturned on procedural grounds, a second set of prosecu- tors used an unmasking strategy, seeking to show that the defendant, as a Nazi, had an interest in denying the Holocaust, a strategy not to give deniers the appearance of serious- ness by seeking to rebut their claims (Lipstadt 1993). This second trial, void of the presenta- tion of historical evidence, provoked neither public controversy nor problematic public- ity for deniers, illustrating how prosecutorial strategies, combined with media responses, matter even within a given legal institution. They may affect what narratives of history prevail and are communicated to a broader public. Complementary or alternative mecha- nisms such as truth commissions. Some 20 truth commissions (TCs) or TRCs have been at work since 1974, used primarily as alternatives or complements to criminal tri- als (Landsman 2005, p. 265). Such commis- sions are perceived as advantageous in light of the limits and selectivities of trials, spelled out above, especially when perpetrators and victims represent two distinct groups in soci- ety that must coexist in the post-atrocity era (Hayner 1994, Kritz 1995, Roche 2005; see also U.S. Inst. Peace 2006). Yet, the work of TRCs, like all construc- tion of historical memory, is selective. Crit- ics stress that TRCs are more concerned with collective well-being than with the fate of in- dividuals. Wilson (2003) cites Plato, for whom the interest of the state is the ultimate stan- dard, placing reconciliation proponents such as legal scholar Martha Minow (1998, 2002) and activist Desmond Tutu in this tradition. Especially where old power holders main- tain positions of authority (e.g., Pinochet in Chile, de Klerk in South Africa), amnesties 196 Savelsberg · King A nn u. R ev . L aw . S oc . S ci . 2 00 7. 3: 18 9- 21 1. D ow nl oa de d fr om a rj ou rn al s. an nu al re vi ew s. or g by S ta te U ni ve rs it y of N ew Y or k - A lb an y on 1 2/ 06 /0 7. F or p er so na l us e on ly . ANRV327-LS03-09 ARI 23 September 2007 16:10 are seen as a potentially necessary but problematic political compromise, at times paired with TRCs. Wilson (2003, p. 369) ar- gues for the South African TRC that “[a] cul- ture of human rights was constructed upon the quicksand of a culture of impunity.” Wilson identifies several discursive features of TRCs: the construction of a new notion of the national self; an organic model of na- tion; metaphors of illness and health; and a common good that excludes retribution and stresses reconciliation. Accordingly, Bozzoli (1998) characterizes the South African TRC as “‘the sequestration of experience’ when individual narratives were subordinated to community histories and new national nar- ratives on the experience of apartheid,” ex- emplified in Tutu’s dictum that “[s]ocial har- mony is for us . . . the greatest good” (quoted in Wilson 2003, p. 370). Wilson finds the latter position anchored in intellectual com- munities of lawyers, political scientists, moral philosophers, and cultural anthropologists (e.g., Hayner 2001, Ignatieff 2001, Minow 1998). In addition to the superordination of collective over individual concerns, specific mechanisms of narrating the truth about past atrocities color the collective mem- ory to which they contribute, as discussed by ethnographic researchers for the South African TRC. The TRC’s Information Man- agement System (Infocomm), for example, favors quantifiable forensic evidence: “In Infocomm’s view the only knowledge that matters is that which can be counted and measured” (Wilson 2003, p. 375). Relatedly, Buur’s (2000) work inside the TRC provokes an examination of the TRC’s bureaucratic mentality (Wilson 2003, p. 376). Wilson’s (2001) own work on the TRC in South Africa critiques the favoring of forensic truth over narrative truth. Statements were coded to be broken down to 48 recognized categories of violation, “called ‘the controlled vocabulary’, or the ‘Bible’ by data processors” (p. 377)— at the expense of subjectivities. Ethnographic researchers thus argue that the specific mech- anisms of the South African TRC privileged the memory of offenses that can be subsumed under bureaucratic categories at the expense of memories of victims as they experienced and gave meaning to their suffering. Despite such critiques, the South African TRC attracted widespread attention in the South African population, and it gained trust especially among blacks, as documented in extensive survey research by James Gibson (2004). In his examination of the TRC’s effect on collective memory, Gibson further diagnoses that, while many aspects of the apartheid past are still contested, the TRC seems to have had “some influence on creating a South African collective memory,” especially as it helped to “moderate views of the past” (Gibson 2004, p. 115). In short, while TRCs are meant to over- come institutional constraints of criminal courts, including their selective construction of history, TRCs themselves produce selec- tive, albeit effective, accounts of history. And, while they avoid some shortcomings of legal trials, they are themselves burdened by unin- tended and counterproductive consequences. Importantly, in practice, trials and TCs are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Where they interact, post-transition countries often show significantly better human rights records than countries with neither institutional response, at least in Latin America (Sikkink & Booth Walling 2007). The causality of this rela- tionship and the mediating role of collective memory in these processes warrant further investigation. Indirect Effects: The Regulation of Mnemonic Content by Law In addition to literature on law’s direct role in the production of collective memory, other research examines how law affects collec- tive memory indirectly by regulating what information can be produced, accessed, dis- seminated (and to whom), revealed, or kept secret. How and to what degree law inter- feres in the production and dissemination of www.annualreviews.org • Law and Memory 197 A nn u. R ev . L aw . S oc . S ci . 2 00 7. 3: 18 9- 21 1. D ow nl oa de d fr om a rj ou rn al s. an nu al re vi ew s. or g by S ta te U ni ve rs it y of N ew Y or k - A lb an y on 1 2/ 06 /0 7. F or p er so na l us e on ly . ANRV327-LS03-09 ARI 23 September 2007 16:10 knowledge, thereby influencing knowledge of the past, vary with the legal environment and especially with the political regime in which law is embedded. Structuring historical memories by con- trolling access to archival information. Not only do legal decisions and institutions, such as practices of Internal Review Boards (Feeley 2007) or legislative allocations to sci- ence budgets (Heydebrand 1990, Savelsberg et al. 2004), affect the construction of knowl- edge, including, potentially, knowledge about the past; law also regulates the maintenance of and access to archives in which a na- tion’s history is documented (see Cassin 2001, pp. 16–18 on France). Markovits (2001) ex- amines the history of such laws for Germany, reaching back to the 1934 Decree on Court Files (Aktenordnung), which established a hi- erarchy of durability where the majority of court documents must be destroyed after 30 years, with the exception of court decisions. Markovits sees in this hierarchy a “silencing of the voices of ordinary people” (p. 527). Later, the 1977 Federal Data Protection Act (Bundesdatenschutzgesetz), the “most perfec- tionist system of data privacy in the world” (p. 523), in combination with a 1993 decision by the Constitutional Court (Bundesverfas- sungsgericht) establishing a right to “informa- tional self-determination,” assured that court files would not be publicly accessible (except with permit); these actions thus constitute a further road block to data access. Subse- quently, the 1988 Federal Law on Archives (Bundesarchievgesetz) determined that files re- lating to “natural persons” can be viewed only 30 years after the person’s death. Public cri- tique that such a law would protect former Nazis from legal claims resulted in an exemp- tion of files relating to “office holders in the exercise of their duties.” Most recently, with the 1990 unification of two German states, the historical legacy of the German Democratic Republic (DDR) in the East posed new challenges. The 1992 es- tablishment of state archives with all DDR party records was exempted from the 30- year grace period, except where “unimpor- tant” people are concerned. In the case of the Gauck archives with six million files of the former secret police (Stasi), research was restricted by allowing access to event-related files but not to person-related files (with the exception of alleged perpetrators and victims themselves). Markovits’s empirical account feeds in- formed speculation about the causes and con- sequences of archival laws. Especially with regard to postunification rules, she sees in- terests at work that shape laws to selectively restrict access to information with the intent and effect of advancing elite-serving collec- tive memories. Markovits suggests that two forms of memory are favored. First, the fo- cus on event-centered files advances an insti- tutional approach to legal history, the central theme of which is the DDR judiciary’s lack of independence; this approach comes at the ne- glect of considering local actors who may have obstructed the smooth functioning of repres- sive law. Such interpretation may be in the interest of elites of the new unified Germany who seek to challenge the legitimacy of DDR justice. Second, the preferred access of vic- tims to archival records may advance “history as victims’ stories.” Such history, Markovits argues, results in historical accounts that are mixed with emotions and lose sight of the complexities of surrounding situations. Again, this selectivity would strengthen illegitimacy claims against the DDR justice systems, in line with the interests of elites of the new unified Germany. Markovits’s theoretical speculation raises additional questions for future research re- garding the conditions and consequences of restrictive record maintenance and access laws. No research empirically assesses the extent to which concealing versus revealing secrets of the past actually influences col- lective memory. There is also little work examining how laws that regulate knowl- edge of historical events, which Cohen (1995, p. 47) sees as a ripe subject for the study 198 Savelsberg · King A nn u. R ev . L aw . S oc . S ci . 2 00 7. 3: 18 9- 21 1. D ow nl oa de d fr om a rj ou rn al s. an nu al re vi ew s. or g by S ta te U ni ve rs it y of N ew Y or k - A lb an y on 1 2/ 06 /0 7. F or p er so na l us e on ly . ANRV327-LS03-09 ARI 23 September 2007 16:10 of social control, vary across socio-political context. The dissemination of knowledge. The construction of collective memories is further affected by laws that regulate the use of avail- able information. Justifications for such laws are typically based on concerns for the dig- nity of individuals or vulnerable groups (for the imposition of enforced silence about a past tyranny as part of an amnesty and for the sake of securing inner peace in ancient Athens, see Cassin 2001, pp. 10–12). The German crimi- nal code, for example, prohibits the dissem- ination of symbols of political parties pro- claimed unconstitutional (paragraph 86a) and the production, dissemination, exhibition, or making available to persons below the age of 18 writings that incite race hatred (paragraph 131). German law also dictates that insult or slander, if directed against a person who was persecuted during the Nazi regime, or against a deceased person who lost his or her life as a victim of the Nazi regime, can be prose- cuted without petition by the victim (as op- posed to insult and slander generally; para- graph 194). The latter norm is directed against the spreading of the “Auschwitz Lie”; that is, public denial of the existence of extermina- tion camps during the Nazi era. American law, by contrast, has traditionally stressed civil lib- erties more strongly than the protection of individuals or groups from offensive speech, and much printed neo-Nazi propaganda cur- rently distributed in Germany is produced in the United States (Savelsberg & King 2005). Libel law, meant to protect a person’s rep- utation, is a private law mechanism to control speech, including interpretations of a per- son’s involvement in historic events. Com- parative work highlights variations of the use of libel law to control interpretations of the past, as illustrated by work on libel suits by then Israeli Defense Minister Ariel Sharon against an American and an Israeli paper (Adler 1986, Dan 1987, McCormack 1985). In 1983, Time magazine published a report about Sharon’s role in the massacres com- mitted during the 1982 Lebanon war by the Phalangists, a Christian militia group, in the Palestinian communities of Sabra and Shatila, both of which had a history of training ter- rorist groups. Under political pressure, the Israeli government set up a commission to in- vestigate the charges, staffed with prominent members of Israel’s judiciary that included Yitzhak Kahan, chief justice of the Supreme Court, in addition to a retired general (Kahan Commission). The commission report was critical of Sharon and recommended his res- ignation. Time magazine’s story, based on the Kahan Commission report, however, inten- sified that critique, its cover reading “Ver- dict on the Massacre” and the story’s headline “The Verdict is Guilty.” Sharon sued the mag- azine for damages of $50 million. Although the American jury was critical of Time’s re- porting, it denied the charge of libel in light of American law’s strong focus on First Amend- ment rights, requiring that malicious intent be shown. In a similar trial in Tel Aviv against the daily newspaper Ha’aeretz, Sharon fared better. The Israeli court, like its European counterparts less focused on free speech rights, decided that Sharon had indeed been libeled. Past research has not systematically ex- plored the comparative effects of libel law on the construction of collective memory. The example of the Sharon case illustrates, how- ever, that such work is needed. Both criminal and civil law entail institutional mechanisms to steer information indirectly and thereby af- fect the construction of collective memory. Such research could be fruitfully guided by Simmel’s (1950) observations on the role of secrecy in society, as have been applied to “legal secrets” in private law by Scheppele (1988). Secrecy’s (and its challengers’) roles in the protection of individual rights, groups’ survival, the stability of transitional demo- cratic regimes, issues of government con- trol over the interpretation of history, and actor-specific access to information are at stake. www.annualreviews.org • Law and Memory 199 A nn u. R ev . L aw . S oc . S ci . 2 00 7. 3: 18 9- 21 1. D ow nl oa de d fr om a rj ou rn al s. an nu al re vi ew s. or g by S ta te U ni ve rs it y of N ew Y or k - A lb an y on 1 2/ 06 /0 7. F or p er so na l us e on ly . ANRV327-LS03-09 ARI 23 September 2007 16:10 Historical consciousness: awareness and discourse about the past in relation to the present, particularly as concerned with causes and consequences of historical eras or events Analogical device: a past event, typically one in which there exists a unified memory and a clear symbolic meaning, used for drawing a parallel to a current event to legitimate action or intervention HOW COLLECTIVE MEMORIES SHAPE LAW Law is not only fertile terrain for construct- ing collective memory. Memory, in turn, in- fluences the creation and behavior of law and legal institutions. Memory of past injus- tice, for instance, can influence our expecta- tion of what constitutes justice (Rosenblum 2002, p. 5). Booth (2001, p. 779) observes that “[a trial] is a venue for seeking the vic- tory of the memory of justice over the will to forget,” and he discusses various ways in which collective memory and law are inter- twined. Memory can spur feelings of retribu- tion, when law is called upon to dispense crim- inal punishment. Memories of past atrocity can also inspire related legal and quasi-legal institutions. TCs are created to recognize and publicize memories of wrongdoing, and amnesties are formalized to foster “civil for- getting” (Booth 2001, p. 778; Minow 1998).4 Others suggest that laws, themselves, are car- riers of the past into the present (Schudson 1997), as laws represent memorials dedicated to past wrongs (Macklem 2005). Yet, collective memory does not automatically beget legal recourse. Some perpetrators of mass atrocity are prosecuted, while others evade. Justice is sometimes dispensed rather quickly following atrocity (Nuremberg), whereas in other cases “righting old wrongs” is delayed (Galanter 2002). In some cases, “collective amnesia” limits the likelihood of legal redress for past injustice altogether (Balfour 2003). Such variability in the memory-law nexus raises questions of interest to socio-legal scholarship. In particular, how and under what conditions does collective memory influence law? Research germane to that question sug- gests multiple channels linking memory with the development, implementation, and en- forcement of law. We organize this section 4 Booth (2001) speaks to the connection between mem- ory and justice at a more philosophical level. Arguing that memory serves as “a face of justice itself” (p. 777), he dis- cusses the role, and limits, of collective memory as related to retribution, truth preservation, and amnesty. around three mechanisms that bridge these concepts, mindful that they are neither ex- haustive nor mutually exclusive of one an- other: (a) analogical narratives, (b) historical consciousness, and (c) carriers of memory. Collective Memory as Analogical Device Collective memory and cultural trauma may first influence law via analogy between contemporary social problems with past traumatic events. Research on analogical ref- erences to past atrocity in relation to legal in- stitutions represents a nascent and develop- ing line of scholarship, and to date research in this vein has largely focused on the legacy of the Holocaust. A working thesis derived from multiple theoretical lineages is that symbolic depictions of certain atrocities provide a cog- nitive and moral framework that can impel legal action. This notion is grounded in the sentiment that symbols stand for larger ideas and “evoke an attitude, a set of impressions, or a pattern of events associated . . . with the symbol” (Edelman 1985, p. 6; see also Geertz 1973). The Holocaust has arguably been con- structed as the universal symbol of evil in the Western world (Alexander 2002). It thus en- tails “metaphorical power” (Levy & Sznaider 2006, p. 5) that can inform national and inter- national legal institutions. Alexander’s (2002) work, in particular, links law with memory of past atrocity. In presenting his theory of collective trauma, Alexander expounds in detail the construction of the Holocaust narrative in the post–World War II era, when the Holocaust ultimately be- came a universal symbol of evil in the Western world. That moral universal, along with the linguistic and visual symbols thereof, are ca- pable of propelling legal and other (e.g., mili- tary) action through analogical reference (see also Levy & Sznaider 2004, 2006). For ex- ample, Alexander illustrates how memory of the Holocaust was used to propel American and European intervention in the conflict involving Serbian atrocities in Bosnia and 200 Savelsberg · King A nn u. R ev . L aw . S oc . S ci . 2 00 7. 3: 18 9- 21 1. D ow nl oa de d fr om a rj ou rn al s. an nu al re vi ew s. or g by S ta te U ni ve rs it y of N ew Y or k - A lb an y on 1 2/ 06 /0 7. F or p er so na l us e on ly . ANRV327-LS03-09 ARI 23 September 2007 16:10 Herzogovina in the early 1990s. The Balkan conflict coincided with a reinvigo- rated Holocaust discourse, exemplified by the construction of the Holocaust Museum in Washington, DC, and the release of the Spielberg film Schindler’s List (Levy & Sznaider 2004, Novick 1999). The choice to intervene in Bosnia was contested, and politicians were not uniform in their res- olutions. Some politicians made symbolic analogies between the Holocaust and the Balkan conflict to both motivate and jus- tify intervention, which ultimately took form in a peace settlement that included obliga- tions for all parties under international law.5 As Alexander (2002, p. 47) notes, “Senator Joseph Lieberman told reporters that ‘we hear echoes of conflicts in Europe little more than 50 years ago,’ and presidential nominee Bill Clinton added that ‘history has shown us that you can’t allow the mass extermina- tion of people and just sit by and watch it happen.’” European politicians made simi- lar pleas. Margaret Thatcher averred, “How many more echoes of horror do Western soci- eties need to hear? Sealed train cars . . . ethnic cleansing . . . concentration camps. Genocidal aggression and callous indifference did not end with the Nazis. The plague has risen with Serbia’s devastation of defenseless Bosnia” (NY Times 1992). Such political claims were accompanied and buttressed by pictures and descriptions of prisoners that served a simi- lar analogic purpose. One infamous reference depicted an emaciated prisoner named Fikret Alic reaching through barbed wire to shake hands with reporters. “With his rib-cage be- hind the barbed wire of Trnopolje, Fikret Alic had become the symbolic figure of the war, on every magazine cover and television screen in the world” (Alterman 1997). That picture 5 A part of the general framework of the agreement states that “[t]he parties agree to cooperate fully with all entities, including those authorized by the United Nations Secu- rity Council, in implementing the peace settlement and investigating and prosecuting war crimes and other violations of international humanitarian law” (Off. Spokesm., US State Dep. 1995, emphasis added). conjured up images of Nazi concentration camps, and analogies were made between the Balkan conflict and the years preceding the Holocaust to help mobilize international law. The Holocaust narrative not only im- pelled legal intervention in the Balkans. The Holocaust as analogical device also spurred a new vocabulary for human rights law. Al- though the memory of the atrocities per- petrated during World War II immediately brought about the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, more recent human rights mandates are also products of Holocaust memory. The end of the Cold War removed an obstacle to the lessons of the Holocaust, as Holocaust memory moved from a partic- ular act against those who were victimized to a universal symbol that referenced inhu- manity more broadly (Levy & Sznaider 2004). That change in discourse paralleled renewed calls for international law to address human rights violations. As Alexander (2002, p. 49) remarks, “Representatives of various organi- zations, both governmental and nongovern- mental, have made sporadic but persistent ef- forts to formulate specific, morally binding codes, and eventually international laws, to in- stitutionalize the moral judgments triggered by metonymic and analogic association with the engorged symbol of evil.” The Holocaust as analogical device in- forms other efforts to reform law as well. The 1970s and 1980s witnessed a new discourse on Japanese internment during World War II, in which internment camps became concentra- tion camps. Parallels between the Holocaust and the treatment of Japanese within the United States yielded formal apologies along with legal recourse in the form of mone- tary reparations (Alexander 2002, p. 46; see also Yamamoto 2002). With respect to repa- rations, Torpey (2001, pp. 337–38) further suggests that late-twentieth-century calls for monetary reparations for past injustices “share the common characteristic that the Holocaust is regarded as a standard for judging the seri- ousness of past injustices and [serves] as a tem- plate for claiming compensation for them.” www.annualreviews.org • Law and Memory 201 A nn u. R ev . L aw . S oc . S ci . 2 00 7. 3: 18 9- 21 1. D ow nl oa de d fr om a rj ou rn al s. an nu al re vi ew s. or g by S ta te U ni ve rs it y of N ew Y or k - A lb an y on 1 2/ 06 /0 7. F or p er so na l us e on ly . ANRV327-LS03-09 ARI 23 September 2007 16:10 Research on contemporary U.S. hate crime law also appears consistent with the the- sis that analogies to the Holocaust can effec- tively buttress calls for legislation. Consider the testimony of Kevin Berrill of the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force, who drew an analogy with the Holocaust to underscore his support for the pending hate crime law (cited in Jenness & Grattet 2001, p. 55): I would like to point out that many of the wit- nesses at this hearing will be wearing a pink triangle, which was the badge that identified homosexual inmates of Nazi concentration camps. Although it is an often overlooked fact, tens of thousands of gay persons were herded into the camps, and, along with the Jews, gypsies, and others, were gassed and incinerated. We wear the triangle to remem- ber them and to remind people of the terrible cost. In sum, an evolving body of scholarship suggests that symbols of past evil can serve as analogical references that bolster calls for legal (and other) intervention in conflict. Re- search to date largely relies on case studies to advance that argument. However, little work investigates negative cases, such as those in which the Holocaust was used as an analogical device to no significant end. The counterfac- tual is also difficult to estimate. That is, would international law respond to contemporary violent conflict in the absence of analogical links to the Holocaust? And to what end can other past atrocities be drawn upon to gener- ate support for current law and justice? These represent a sampling of unresolved questions that bear on the association between collective memory, analogies to past atrocity, and law. Collective Memory, Historical Consciousness, and Law The institutionalization of collective memory as law is further mediated by historical con- sciousness. By this we mean a society’s ex- ploration and evaluation of the past in light of the present (Balfour 2003) that, different from collective memory, does not imply a shared vision of the past. Law and law en- forcement, from a Durkheimian perspective, become tools to confront the past, reestablish moral boundaries, and provide an institution through which the public can express senti- ments concerning right and wrong (Mistzal 2003), similar to monuments and memorials as tangible representations of collective mem- ories (Schwartz 1982, Vinitzky-Seroussi 2002, Wagner-Pacifici & Schwartz 1991). Writing on Durkheim’s contributions to memory and law, Misztal (2003, p. 132) suggests that “lib- eral law realizes its potential to construct sol- idaristic collective memory. The past endures in the present in legislation.” Building on this Durkheimian framework, King (2005) investigates whether U.S. law enforcement responses to hate crime covary with differences in visible collective memo- ries of bigotry. This thesis does not proffer that physical commemorations such as mon- uments and memorials, themselves, directly cause legal action. Rather, the cultural senti- ments that give rise to symbolic commemo- rations of past atrocities designate a greater awareness, or historical consciousness, of the manifestations and consequences of hatred. In line with work on the cultural representation of collective memories (Schwartz 1982), com- memorations of past atrocity are indicative of a culture that is receptive and responsive to issues of hatred and violence. Three axioms are germane to that thesis. First, commemorations are imbued with meaning. They give tangible form to latent emotions and represent moral consciences, as symbolic commemorations of the past reflect contemporary culture (Schwartz 1982). Sec- ond, legacies of the past enable and constrain government decision making. That idea draws on Olick & Levy’s (1997) research on collec- tive memory and German political culture; they show that German politicians and promi- nent members of civil society are constrained in their public discussions and positions on Israeli and Jewish affairs. The past penetrates the social and political sphere, encouraging 202 Savelsberg · King A nn u. R ev . L aw . S oc . S ci . 2 00 7. 3: 18 9- 21 1. D ow nl oa de d fr om a rj ou rn al s. an nu al re vi ew s. or g by S ta te U ni ve rs it y of N ew Y or k - A lb an y on 1 2/ 06 /0 7. F or p er so na l us e on ly . ANRV327-LS03-09 ARI 23 September 2007 16:10 new voices and begetting recognition and de- mands for justice (Vinitzky-Seroussi 2002). In line with these arguments, legacies of past atrocities may enable and constrain not only political claims-making (Olick & Levy 1997), but also law and its implementation. Third, the role of collective memory and cultural trauma in contemporary life varies across social context (Mannheim 1952, Schuman & Scott 1989, Scott & Zac 1993, Weil 1987). Memorials of Martin Luther King, Jr., for instance, vary by region and corre- late with the socio-political terrain (Alderman 2000). Building on these characteristics of col- lective memory, King’s (2005) investigation into variations in hate crime law enforcement finds that Holocaust commemoration is pre- dictive of hate crime law enforcement. Ob- jective commemoration of a traumatic and hate-laden past, such as the Holocaust, is cor- related with legal responses to crimes mo- tivated by bigotry. Law, it appears, can le- gitimize and institutionalize collectively held sentiments about the past. Although an association exists between Holocaust commemoration and hate crime law enforcement, a less robust correlation is found when commemorations of the U.S. civil rights era and hate crime law enforce- ment are assessed (King 2005). One interpre- tation of that duplicity is that commemora- tions of foreign evil are channeled differently than remembrance of domestic wrongdoing (Savelsberg & King 2005). That argument is consistent with work on remembrance and collective memory in the American context. Kammen (1991) suggests an American ten- dency to depoliticize the past. That observa- tion aligns with Balfour’s (2003) theoretical work on historical consciousness and legal re- dress concerning U.S. slavery. Balfour draws heavily on the writings of W.E.B. Du Bois to suggest that a “willful national amnesia pre- vented black citizens from enjoying in fact the freedom and equality they were guaran- teed by law” (Balfour 2003, p. 33). Synthesiz- ing a wealth of Du Bois’s scholarship, Balfour rearticulates Du Bois’s thesis that the suppres- sion of an overt and critical reflection on slav- ery in the nation’s collective memory serves as an impediment to legal redress (e.g., repara- tions) for the legacy of slavery. To that end, such “unwillingness to confront the past is connected to the failures of formal equality as an antidote to the poison of racial injustice” (p. 33). Balfour illustrates how consciousness of the past parallels legal and policy debates concerning equality and civil rights. The ar- gument for reparations, she suggests, impli- cates “a structure of memory and critique” (pp. 39–40) whereby legal redress for slavery via reparations is “centrally a story of mem- ory’s suppression” (p. 40). In short, how a na- tion’s collective memory is constructed can limit possibilities for legal change. The distinction between commemoration of foreign and domestic evil with respect to law and law enforcement is further high- lighted in recent comparative work on col- lective memory and law. In their work on German and American laws concerning hate- inspired crime and violence, Savelsberg & King (2005) suggest that American memori- als rarely focus on domestic evil, but instead on great presidents and military accomplish- ments in combating foreign evil. In con- trast, national collective memories of hatred and domestic atrocity (e.g., the Holocaust) are “deeply historicized” (p. 599) in German commemorations. That distinction maps onto nation-specific differences in hate crime law and law enforcement. U.S. federal hate crime law, for instance, avoids references to domes- tic history in such legislation, although refer- ences to foreign atrocity were mobilized by interest groups in the hate crime law move- ment ( Jenness & Grattet 2001). The German equivalent of hate crime law, as evidenced in the Basic Law and criminal code, instead acknowledges Germany’s Nazi past and the Holocaust and explicates categories of vic- tims. Moreover, reflecting interpretations of the demise of the Weimar Republic, German law is simultaneously and overtly concerned with protecting the democratic state. www.annualreviews.org • Law and Memory 203 A nn u. R ev . L aw . S oc . S ci . 2 00 7. 3: 18 9- 21 1. D ow nl oa de d fr om a rj ou rn al s. an nu al re vi ew s. or g by S ta te U ni ve rs it y of N ew Y or k - A lb an y on 1 2/ 06 /0 7. F or p er so na l us e on ly . ANRV327-LS03-09 ARI 23 September 2007 16:10 Polletta’s (1998) research on commemora- tion of Martin Luther King, Jr., in the halls of the U.S. Congress raises additional questions about the context in which collective memo- ries are implicated in the lawmaking process and to what extent references to the domes- tic past, such as the civil rights era, are ef- ficacious in promoting legislation or related legal action. On the one hand, Polletta ac- knowledges that King’s name can be used to bolster calls for legislative action. References to King often surfaced in discussions of legis- lation to address intergroup conflict, such as federal legislation to assist with church arsons, or in calls for affirmative action (Polletta 1998, p. 486). King is invoked as a moral leader, and references to his teachings are used to legit- imate legislation. Yet, the manner in which King’s legacy can be employed is constrained, and the meaning of his legacy is contested. African Americans who invoke the memory of Martin Luther King, Jr., to call for redistribu- tive policies sometimes conflict with white speakers who emphasize progress that has al- ready been made (Polletta 1998, pp. 490–91). African American elected officials, in partic- ular, must balance their desire to legitimate themselves as champions of black interest via the lawmaking process with the limits of what they can say to a sometimes unsympathetic audience. In sum, collective memories both in- form and reflect a historical conscious- ness that is objectified in legal institutions. Savelsberg & King (2005) refer to applied commemorations—commemoration in the context of judicial, legislative, or executive decision-making situations—as opposed to commemorations for their own sake as one crucial mechanism through which such ob- jectification occurs. However, not all collec- tive memories of wrongdoing generate con- sensus, and contested memories are less likely reflected in law. The role of Holocaust com- memoration is markedly different from col- lective memories of U.S. slavery or civil rights abuses. The context of memory is thus conse- quential for law. Carriers of Collective Memory A line of neo-Weberian scholarship empha- sizes the role of carrier groups as intervening in the memory-law nexus. Carrier groups rep- resent bearers of social action (Weber 1976) that maintain a discourse on ideas and pro- mote social values (Kalberg 1994, pp. 58–62). Interest groups, for instance, can act as carrier groups by evoking collective memories to le- gitimate claims for legal change. The specific collective memories of the past that groups re- call, however, differ depending on which so- cial groups are recalling events (Schuman & Scott 1989). Socio-legal research identifies similar ten- dencies in the realm of criminal law. Savelsberg & King (2005) suggest that in Germany the state is the primary carrier of collective memory, whereas disparate groups in civil society largely act as carrier groups in the United States. That difference, in con- junction with nation-specific collective mem- ories and political institutions, partly accounts for variation in the framing of each nation’s respective laws concerning hatred. The pro- tection of the democratic state as a pro- nounced theme in Germany contrasts with American law’s emphasis on the protection of vulnerable groups. Where the state has been the prominent carrier of collective memory (Germany), laws dealing with hatred and ex- tremism have more directly institutionalized collective memory and protected groups that were victimized by the Holocaust. Differences are also apparent at the level of law enforce- ment. German law enforcement, in line with the state as carrier of collective memory, is embedded in the context of state protection units (Staatsschutzdezernate). By contrast, U.S. prosecutors’ working knowledge of hate crime maps onto their exposure to localized interest groups. Other work cites specific representatives of carrier groups, moral entrepreneurs, as mobi- lizing collective memory for purposes of law- making. Moral entrepreneurs occupy a cen- tral place in classic studies of social problems, 204 Savelsberg · King A nn u. R ev . L aw . S oc . S ci . 2 00 7. 3: 18 9- 21 1. D ow nl oa de d fr om a rj ou rn al s. an nu al re vi ew s. or g by S ta te U ni ve rs it y of N ew Y or k - A lb an y on 1 2/ 06 /0 7. F or p er so na l us e on ly . ANRV327-LS03-09 ARI 23 September 2007 16:10 and scholars of collective memory employ the related concept of “reputational en- trepreneurs” (Fine 2001), actors who frame and deploy images of society and history con- sonant with a specific agenda in efforts to partly determine or control the memory of individuals. In his discussion of “righting old wrongs,” Galanter (2002) bridges the ideas of moral entrepreneurs, collective memory, and law. He claims that a “proliferation of efforts to reform the past” (p. 108) has character- ized recent decades, particularly with respect to prejudicial and often violent injustices in the United States and abroad (see also Torpey 2001). Legal initiatives to right old wrongs in- clude reparations, formal government apolo- gies, and pardons.6 This apparent spike in redress for injus- tices that occurred decades or centuries ago raises numerous questions. Why, for instance, does such action arise at particular times and places? Why are some injustices redressed while others are not? For Galanter (2002), multiple characteristics of modern society ac- count for such institutionalization of collec- tive memory in law, including “the general extension of empathy in the late twentieth- century society” (p. 120), criticism of govern- ment power, and optimism about the efficacy of institutions. Still, states formally address some memories of injustice while remaining reticent on others. Galanter suggests that in- justices against ascriptive groups are more apt to be recognized through law or other government acts, such as formal apologies. Past wrongs based on ascriptive characteris- tics (caste, tribe, ethnicity, religion), he sug- gests, tend to inspire moral entrepreneurs, “organizers who devote themselves to inves- tigating, publicizing and campaigning about old wrongs” (p. 122; see Diner 2000, e.g., p. 233, and Torpey 2001, p. 339, for related 6 Galanter (2002) cites numerous examples, such as the Vatican’s pardoning of Galileo in 1984, Wisconsin’s for- mal apology in 1989 for the 1932 Bad Axe Massacre, or the 1974 class action lawsuit that compensated participants of the 1930s Tuskegee syphilis study. propositions). Memories of injustice against those with “primordial identities” (Galanter 2002, p. 122) are more easily mobilized for legal and other purposes. Other work suggests that carriers of col- lective memory are influential when they are representatives of the aggrieved group. For example, Izumi (2005) suggests that collec- tive memory of the Japanese American intern- ment influenced public support for the re- peal of the McCarran Internal Security Act of 1950 that limited due process rights con- cerning detention during a national emer- gency. Collective memory of internment, in concert with the presence of previously in- terned Japanese protesters, effectively added credence to the protest movement. Another body of research suggests that collective memory can inspire micromobili- zation—interactions among actors in which meanings of past events and identities are formed—which in turn motivates activism. Harris (2002), for instance, examines how collective memories are used as catalysts for an individual’s involvement in collective action. Stories of triumph and tragedy by elders who had witnessed civil rights abuses, such as the murder of Emmett Till, can motivate political participation among younger cohorts. As Dawson (1994, p. 51, cited in Harris 2002, p. 157) articulates, “the collective memory of the African American community continued to transmit from generation to generation a sense that race was the defining interest in individuals’ lives and that the well-being of blacks individually and as a group could be secured only by continued political and social agitation.” For Harris, collective memories of past injustice are used to cement loyalties to a movement, provide inspiration through stories of past successes, and ultimately foster activism. That activism, in turn, can potentially lead to legal change. The narrative of Emmett Till’s slaying reinvigorated a commitment to racial justice and ultimately inspired political activism among some African Americans. Collective memories of traumatic events can thus serve www.annualreviews.org • Law and Memory 205 A nn u. R ev . L aw . S oc . S ci . 2 00 7. 3: 18 9- 21 1. D ow nl oa de d fr om a rj ou rn al s. an nu al re vi ew s. or g by S ta te U ni ve rs it y of N ew Y or k - A lb an y on 1 2/ 06 /0 7. F or p er so na l us e on ly . ANRV327-LS03-09 ARI 23 September 2007 16:10 as catalysts for articulating grievances for purposes of political action and legal change. BRIEF CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS A new and growing body of literature on the reciprocal relationship between law and col- lective memory speaks to direct and indirect ways in which law and collective memory mu- tually affect and constitute each other. Legal trials evoke collective sentiments, and they may impress memories of past atrocities on groups and peoples. They do so selectively though, given the institutional constraints of law, and they depend on mass media that impose further selectivities, while simultane- ously competing with other fields of mem- ory production. A new body of literature also discusses the institutionalization of collective memory as law, specifically how collective memories affect the making and enforcement of law. Although case studies already dominate the field, more such studies are warranted, for cases of atrocities but also regarding other substantive terrain. One example is the cumu- lative effect of trials of everyday crimes on the collective representation of evil and of large cases in other areas such as corporate crime. Comparative research is also potentially fruit- ful, particularly studies that systematically an- alyze the conditions of trials and their conse- quences relative to their alternatives on col- lective memories as expressed in mass me- dia, political speeches on memorial days and in decision-making situations, memorial sites, history textbooks, works of art, and public opinion polls over time. The systematic col- lection of such data would also enhance future work on the effects of collective memories on law and its enforcement, through the use of recognized past evils as analogical devices, via historical consciousness, and through the presence of carrier groups. Future research should also empirically assess how different types of legal proceed- ings employed to confront the past—TCs, amnesties, trials, and types of punishments dispensed—influence attitudes and behaviors. That question has been the subject of prior re- search on what should occur following a con- flict (Minow 1998, Wilson 2003). Yet, there is less explanatory work on the impact of legal proceedings, and collective memories articu- lated therein, on subsequent outcomes such as intergroup violence or respect for attitudes to- ward law (save Gibson 2004, on South Africa). Especially needed is comparative research to assess how TCs, in comparison with trials, lus- tration procedures, or outright amnesties, af- fect attitudes concerning intergroup violence and retaliation and what the consequences are for future escalation or de-escalation of violence. SUMMARY POINTS 1. Law, through its ritual force, is an effective tool in the construction of collective memory. 2. Law, through its particular logic, contributes to the construction of narratives distinct from those produced in other institutional realms such as diplomacy, politics, religion, or social science. Narratives constructed through legal proceedings tend to focus on individual offenders at the neglect of historical trajectories, larger social and cultural forces, and collective responsibilities. 3. Narratives constructed through legal proceedings are typically mediated by other institutions such as scholarship and mass media before they affect collective memories. 4. Law may affect collective memory indirectly as it regulates the production of, access to, and dissemination of information about the past. 206 Savelsberg · King A nn u. R ev . L aw . S oc . S ci . 2 00 7. 3: 18 9- 21 1. D ow nl oa de d fr om a rj ou rn al s. an nu al re vi ew s. or g by S ta te U ni ve rs it y of N ew Y or k - A lb an y on 1 2/ 06 /0 7. F or p er so na l us e on ly . ANRV327-LS03-09 ARI 23 September 2007 16:10 5. Collective memory may become institutionalized as law through diverse mechanisms such as applied commemorations. 6. Carrier groups of collective memory are crucial contributors to lawmaking. 7. Participants in lawmaking processes make use of analogical devices and historical consciousness to affect their outcome. FUTURE ISSUES 1. More case studies are needed to explore the consequences of different types of legal proceedings and their alternatives for collective memory. 2. Research is needed, including systematic comparative research, to examine the con- struction of narratives created by different legal forms and alternative responses to atrocities. 3. Research is needed, including systematic comparative research, to examine the inter- action of legal narratives with other social and cultural forces in the construction of collective memories. 4. The role of law-induced collective memories as alternatives and contributors to classic functions of criminal law such as deterrence, retribution, rehabilitation, and compen- sation warrants future investigation. DISCLOSURE STATEMENT The authors are not aware of any biases that might be perceived as affecting the objectivity of this review. ACKNOWLEDGMENT Work toward this article was supported by the 2006 David Cooperman Summer Institute, Department of Sociology, University of Minnesota. LITERATURE CITED Adler R. 1986. Reckless Disregard. New York: Knopf Alderman DH. 2000. 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Chicago Press www.annualreviews.org • Law and Memory 211 A nn u. R ev . L aw . S oc . S ci . 2 00 7. 3: 18 9- 21 1. D ow nl oa de d fr om a rj ou rn al s. an nu al re vi ew s. or g by S ta te U ni ve rs it y of N ew Y or k - A lb an y on 1 2/ 06 /0 7. F or p er so na l us e on ly . AR327-FM ARI 1 October 2007 15:52 Annual Review of Law and Social Science Volume 3, 2007Contents Frontispiece Kitty Calavita � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � x Immigration Law, Race, and Identity Kitty Calavita � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �1 Accountability, Quantification, and Law Wendy Nelson Espeland and Berit Irene Vannebo � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 21 How Autonomous Is Law? Christopher Tomlins � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 45 Half Empty, Half Full, or Neither: Law, Inequality, and Social Change in Capitalist Democracies Robin Stryker � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 69 The Rule of Law John K.M. Ohnesorge � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 99 Islamic Constitutionalism Saïd Amir Arjomand � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 115 The Emergence, Content, and Institutionalization of Hate Crime Law: How a Diverse Policy Community Produced a Modern Legal Fact Valerie Jenness � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 141 Restorative Justice: What Is It and Does It Work? Carrie Menkel-Meadow � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 161 Law and Collective Memory Joachim J. Savelsberg and Ryan D. King � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 189 Law and Lawyers Preparing the Holocaust Michael Stolleis � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 213 The Death of Socialist Law? Inga Markovits � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 233 Legal Innovation and the Control of Gang Behavior Eva Rosen and Sudhir Venkatesh � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 255 v A nn u. R ev . L aw . S oc . S ci . 2 00 7. 3: 18 9- 21 1. D ow nl oa de d fr om a rj ou rn al s. an nu al re vi ew s. or g by S ta te U ni ve rs it y of N ew Y or k - A lb an y on 1 2/ 06 /0 7. F or p er so na l us e on ly . AR327-FM ARI 1 October 2007 15:52 Punishment Beyond the Legal Offender Megan Comfort � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 271 The Effectiveness of Correctional Rehabilitation: A Review of Systematic Reviews Mark W. Lipsey and Francis T. Cullen � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 297 The Socio-Legal Implications of the New Biotechnologies Alain Pottage � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 321 The Frontiers of Intellectual Property: Expanded Protection versus New Models of Open Science Diana Rhoten and Walter W. Powell � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 345 Personal Information, Borders, and the New Surveillance Studies Gary T. Marx and Glenn W. Muschert � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 375 Institutional Perspectives on Law, Work, and Family Catherine Albiston � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 397 Implicit Social Cognition and Law Kristin A. Lane, Jerry Kang, and Mahzarin R. Banaji � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 427 Indexes Cumulative Index of Contributing Authors, Volumes 1–3 � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 453 Cumulative Index of Chapter Titles, Volumes 1–3 � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 455 Errata An online log of corrections to Annual Review of Law and Social Science articles may be found at http://lawsocsci.annualreviews.org vi Contents A nn u. R ev . L aw . S oc . S ci . 2 00 7. 3: 18 9- 21 1. D ow nl oa de d fr om a rj ou rn al s. an nu al re vi ew s. or g by S ta te U ni ve rs it y of N ew Y or k - A lb an y on 1 2/ 06 /0 7. F or p er so na l us e on ly . 
work_4qos2sp4cbfvrjzsxsdhfnc7bi	----	Are Home Grown Islamic Terrorists Different? Some UK Evidence P R I F Y S G O L B A N G O R U N I V E R S I T Y Are Home Grown Islamic Terrorists Different? Some UK Evidence* By Yener Altunbas and John Thornton *Forthcoming in the Southern Economic Journal, 2011 P R I F Y S G O L B A N G O R U N I V E R S I T Y Are Home Grown Islamic Terrorists Different? Some UK Evidence • Introduction • UK homegrown terrorist acts • What makes a terrorist?• What makes a terrorist? o Conventional wisdom o Empirical evidence • Data on UK Islamic terrorists • Data on UK Muslims • Empirical results • Conclusions P R I F Y S G O L B A N G O R U N I V E R S I T Y Introduction • Shift in emphasis in terrorism literature from focus on poverty and lack of education as drivers of terrorist supply • Reflects results from survey-based and econometric studies of terrorism participationparticipation • This paper: o Focuses on UK homegrown Islamic terrorists o Uses a new dataset comparing UK Islamic terrorists with UK Muslims o Includes many demographic predictors of engaging in terrorism P R I F Y S G O L B A N G O R U N I V E R S I T Y UK Islamic Terrorist Acts • ‘Homegrown terrorist’ concept broadly defined--wide range of convictions o 2004 fertilizer plot o 2006 transatlantic aircraft terrorist plot o July 7, 2005 London Terrorist attacks o July 21 2005 London bombing o Planning Multiple bomb attacks o Conspiring to commit murder and launch radioactive or chemical attack o Conspiracy to cause explosions o Withholding necessary information P R I F Y S G O L B A N G O R U N I V E R S I T Y UK Islamic Terrorist Acts (continued) o Attempting to blow up a restaurant o Attempting to blow up a plane o Recruiting for terrorism o Inciting terrorismo Inciting terrorism o Possessing bomb making equipment o Fundraising for terrorism o Supplying military equipment to al-Qaeda training camps o Incitement to murder for terrorist purposes using the internet o Possessing details of how to fire mortar bombs and secret codes to facilitate terror attacks P R I F Y S G O L B A N G O R U N I V E R S I T Y Conventional Views on the Drivers of Terrorism • Poverty and lack of education are main drivers o Increased aid and educational assistance to end terrorism: former VP Gore (2002), President Bush (2002), Tyson (2001), Sokolsky and McMillan (2002)(2002), President Bush (2002), Tyson (2001), Sokolsky and McMillan (2002) o Economics of crime (e.g. Becker, 1968); low wage/education may lead to property crime (Freeman, 1996; Piehl, 1998) but not violent crime (Piehl, 1998; Ruhm, 2000) P R I F Y S G O L B A N G O R U N I V E R S I T Y Empirical Evidence on the Drivers of Terrorism • Evidence from 2 sources: o Survey-based profiles of terrorists: Russell and Miller (1983); Hudson and Majeska (1999); Sageman (2004); Bakker (2008); Gartenstein-Ross and Grossman (1999); Sageman (2004); Bakker (2008); Gartenstein-Ross and Grossman (2009) o Econometric-based studies: Krueger and Maleckova (2003); Berrebi (2007); Benmelech and Berrebi (2007); Krueger (2008) o Common finding: Terrorists with higher educational attainment and higher living standards are more likely to participate in terrorist activity � Exceptions: IRA-related studies by Hudson (1999); Paxson (2002); and leaked MI5 (Travis, 2008) P R I F Y S G O L B A N G O R U N I V E R S I T Y The Drivers of Terrorism Revised—Recent Theory • Seeks to explain terrorists coming from relatively privileged backgrounds in terms of a market for terror attacks (e.g. Bueno de Mesquita, 2005; Benmelech, Berrebi, and Klor, 2009; Iannaccone, 2006). o Supply function is the terrorists; demand function is organizations that select terrorists to commit attacks o Terrorist organizations want to succeed so they select the most educated terrorists o Poverty can play role—supply increases when economic conditions are poor • Summary: much survey-based and all econometric-based literature suggests terrorists not typically characterized by lack of education and poverty P R I F Y S G O L B A N G O R U N I V E R S I T Y Data on UK Homegrown Islamic Terrorists • Need predictors of individual Muslims participating in terrorism o Compare key characteristics of homegrown UK Islamic terrorists to those of UK Muslims • Terrorist sample: Muslims convicted in the UK for terrorist acts, or who died while participating in them during 2001-2009. • Sources: Gartenstein-Ross and Grossman (2009); Simcox, Stuart & Ahmed, (2010); publicly available UK Home Office documents, Wikipedia links, Google searches, press reports o We find 77 convicted Muslim terrorists with partial information on education, recent employment status, age, citizenship, sex, ethnicity, and residence o Unable to track down all the information for all the terrorists P R I F Y S G O L B A N G O R U N I V E R S I T Y Data on UK Muslims • Sample of UK Muslims (non-terrorists): Annual British Crime Survey (BCS) o Aims at measuring amount of crime in UK but contains information on religion, age, education level, citizenship, birthplace, employment, and marital status of those interviewedthose interviewed o Survey is designed to be representative of private households, and of adults aged 16 and over living in private households • Sample period: BCS surveys for 2001/02 and 2006/07, providing responses of 80,207 of which 1,363 stated that they were Muslims. • Pooled sample comprises the 1,363 Muslims that participated in the two surveys and the 77 terrorists (i.e homegrown terrorists are 5.3% of the pool) P R I F Y S G O L B A N G O R U N I V E R S I T Y Table 1 Sample averages for UK Muslims UK Muslims UK Islamic All Male terrorists p -value Education (years) 12.36 12.75 13.85 0.00 (3.46) (3.60) (2.33) Employed (percent) 48.26 65.6 37.66 0.07 Age (years) 32.84 33.12 26.35 0.00Age (years) 32.84 33.12 26.35 0.00 (9.71) (10.36) (6.26) Male (percent) 49.65 100.0 96.1 0.00 Married (percent) 57.08 55.12 37.66 0.00 UK citizen (percent) 56.48 55.2 79.22 0.00 Ethnic origin: Africa 8.64 8.19 29.9 0.00 Mixed South Asia-White 2.31 2.78 23.4 0.00 India 11.50 11.26 3.9 0.00 Pakistan 56.48 55.85 27.3 0.00 Other 10.80 11.70 3.9 0.00 Notes: Sample size is 1,440 UK Muslims, of which 77 were convicted homegrown Islamic terrorists. p -value is for test of the independence of the characteristics of homegrown Islamic terrorists versus those of all UK Muslims. Figures in parenthesis are the standard deviations of the respective sample averages. P R I F Y S G O L B A N G O R U N I V E R S I T Y 25 30 35 40 45 P er ce n t Terrorists UK Muslims 0 5 10 15 20 Graduate Undergraduate "A" Levels "O" Levels Other/none P er ce n t Figure 1. Educational attainment of homegrown Islamic terrorists versus UK Muslim population Chi-square test of independence: 12.53; p-value=0.014 P R I F Y S G O L B A N G O R U N I V E R S I T Y Table 2 Probit estimates for the likelihood of being a homegrown Islamic UK terrorist (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Mean values assigned to Weighted missing education probit Males only observations estimation Constant -1.4475*** -1.1888*** -0.1707 1.4261** -0.8866* -0.3139 (0.2641) (0.2837) (0.6082) (0.5916) (0.4840) (0.5522) Education 0.1270*** 0.1476*** 0.2009*** 0.2015*** 0.1265*** 0.2036*** (0.0281) (0.0296) (0.0434) (0.0449) (0.0330) (0.0404) Employment -0.4071** -0.5794*** -0.6501*** -0.6722*** -0.5172*** (0.1506) (0.1816) (0.1879) (0.1597) (0.1673) Age -0.0630*** -0.0567*** -0.0514*** -0.0560*** (0.0144) (0.0144) (0.0106) (0.0131) Male (1=yes) 1.6872*** 1.7589*** 1.5999*** (0.3317) (0.2777) (0.3063) Married (1=yes) 0.1706 0.1398 0.3372* 0.1100 (0.2102) (0.2194) (0.1797) (0.1928) UK citizen (1=yes) 0.5030*** 0.5413*** 0.5744** 0.5903*** 0.7192*** 0.5229** (0.1664) (0.1701) (0.2008) (0.2077) (0.1789) (0.1834) Ethnic origin Africa 0.6014** 0.6161** 0.4179 0.2436 0.6823** 0.3157 (0.2556) (0.2586) (0.3096) (0.3290) (0.2637) (0.2818) Mixed South Asia-White 0.9893*** 0.9528*** 0.5795* 0.6228* 0.7613** 0.5203* (0.2841) (0.2878) (0.3503) (0.3671) (0.3025) (0.3202) India -0.4332 -0.4037 -0.8711** -0.8884** -0.8771** -0.9096** (0.3106) (0.3164) (0.3897) (0.3998) (0.3561) (0.3602) Pakistan -0.3762* -0.4016* -0.8795** -0.8957** -0.8215*** -0.9119*** (0.2251) (0.2303) (0.2954) (0.3066) (0.2524) (0.2729) Other -0.4280 -0.5021 -0.6964 -0.7564* -0.6098* -0.7489 (0.3645) (0.3762) (0.4486) (0.4602) (0.3767) (0.4126) Pseudo R-square 0.199 0.215 0.421 0.338 0.418 0.390 Percent false negatives/positives 0.0/96.1 50.0/96.3 64.7/96.9 61.1/94.2 55.8/95.8 64.7/96.9 Chi-square 91.35 98.89 193.13 127.28 251.19 202.30 Sample size 1,416 1,416 1,416 734 1,439 1,416 Notes: Dependant variable equals 1 for convicted terrorists and 0 for others. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate statistical statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels. The estimates reported in column 4 are for the pooled subsamble of male Muslims. The estimataes reported in column 5 assign the sample mean number of years of education to the terrorists for whom there are missing values. The estimates reported in column 6 scale the number of non-terrorists in the pool by assigning a weight to them that reflects the number of Muslims in England and Wales, as indicated in the British Crime Survey. P R I F Y S G O L B A N G O R U N I V E R S I T Y P R I F Y S G O L B A N G O R U N I V E R S I T Y Conclusions • Dealing with terrorism requires understanding the determinants of the supply of terrorists. • Results consistent with survey-based & econometric based results of drivers of terrorist participation:terrorist participation: o Muslims with higher educational attainment are somewhat more likely to participate in terrorist activities • Reinforces the wisdom of shift in emphasis in the literature from poverty and lack of education to e.g. political objectives. • Little reason to believe that additional financial/foreign aid or improving educational circumstances would help reduce the desire to participate in terrorism P R I F Y S G O L B A N G O R U N I V E R S I T Y Future research • Same (updated) UK sample, more BCS waves, more explanatory variables (local area income, local politics, local hate crimes)(local area income, local politics, local hate crimes) • Evidence from European countries o Pooling US & European data • The quality of Islamic terror: relating terrorist characteristics to terrorist acts • Economic impact of terrorist acts 
work_4rarknin3vbppnka3u53rxr3lm	----	societies Article Victims, Criminal Justice and State Compensation David Miers Emeritus Professor of Law, School of Law and Politics, Cardiff University, Cardiff CF10 2AS, UK; davidmiers2@gmail.com Received: 22 February 2019; Accepted: 17 April 2019; Published: 24 April 2019 ���������� ������� Abstract: This article examines one element of the state’s responses to crime: the provision of a taxpayer-funded compensation scheme for victims of personal and sexual violence. The Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme 2012 sits within a political context that seeks to ensure that victims of crime are better served by the criminal justice system of England and Wales, the jurisdiction that is the focus of this article. The government’s fundamental policy is that this scheme exists to compensate only those victims who are ‘blameless’, either in terms of their character, criminal record, conduct at the time of the incident, or in their engagement with the criminal justice agencies. It is a policy that illuminates elements of two of the questions that the editors posed for this Special Issue of Societies. Reviewing the increased urgency in government policies concerning the treatment of victims of crime, the first section addresses the question of how, why and when victims came to shape political and criminal justice discourse and practice. The question of how, and to what end, cultural representations have shaped perceptions of victims is addressed in the second and third sections, which examine the notion of victim status and illustrate the ways in which eligible (‘ideal’) victims are perceived and their claims under this scheme are determined. Keywords: victims of crime; ideal victims; criminal justice; state compensation 1. Victims and the Criminal Justice System In any analysis of the criminal justice system (CJS) of England and Wales (but also of almost all other common-law Western systems),1 it has been a commonplace to remark on what some have described as ‘the rediscovery’ [1] (pp. 5–10), the ‘rebirth’ [2] (pp. 69–94), [3] (pp. 7–19), or the ‘re-emergence’ of the victim [4] (pp. 26–28) over the past 50 years, in contrast to their marginalised role as a third party to the criminal trial [5,6]. In truth, while their historical relationship with the CJS might have been more pronounced, victims had never gone away. Even as the state assumed a near-monopoly during the 19th century over the detection, detention, prosecution and disposal of those who break the criminal law [7] (pp. 127–158), victims played a legitimising role, at least in the sense that the unlawful infringement of their personal autonomy warranted state condemnation via the criminal trial. As these and other analyses have documented, this did not carry with it a corresponding stake in the outcome of the trial. Here the victim’s principal role was to give evidence in support of the Crown. Victims were little more than witnesses to the incident in which they were injured or their property stolen from them, and were, for the most part, subject to the same rules governing cross-examination by the defendant as was any other witness; conditions that, with the exception of child and rape victims, continue to apply. As third parties, they had no right to put their own case for recognition of the injuries or losses they had sustained, or for possible redress, as had been the case, notably, by 1 ‘CJS’ is the standard abbreviation used by the Ministry of Justice. Societies 2019, 9, 29; doi:10.3390/soc9020029 www.mdpi.com/journal/societies http://www.mdpi.com/journal/societies http://www.mdpi.com http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/soc9020029 http://www.mdpi.com/journal/societies https://www.mdpi.com/2075-4698/9/2/29?type=check_update&version=2 Societies 2019, 9, 29 2 of 13 means of prosecution for reward [8] (chs. 3–6). Any judicial satisfaction of these concerns became a matter for the victim’s civil action against the offender. As is also well documented, the government has, over the past half-century, made substantial changes to the relationship between victims of crime and the CJS. This victim focus gained traction as a predominantly state-led response to the collapse of the rehabilitative ideal [9] (pp. 9–10) and was designed to lead to what the government characterised as a ‘rebalancing’ of criminal justice policy in favour of the victim’s interests [10]. No longer marginalised, ‘the rising visibility of the victim’ in the 1960s and 1970s’ [11] (p. 24) [12] recast that relationship in a number of ways, intended to ‘make sure that the victim’s voice is heard at the heart of Government’ [13] (p. 8). This is a claim that for many critics remains unfulfilled, but which in practice presents a number of challenges to an even-handed criminal justice system [14,15]. These ideological concerns were coupled with an instrumental recognition that as gatekeepers to the CJS, victims’ willingness or otherwise to engage with it by reporting crime and supporting a prosecution is likely to be influenced by their perception of the extent to which the system both recognises their injuries and reliably produces the outcomes they reasonably expect. Those outcomes are ‘that offenders are caught, that they are punished, and that they are dealt with in a way that reduces the likelihood of their re-offending and creating more victims’ [16] (p. 8). These changes also implied an increasing degree of inclusiveness in which victims have, in a further extension of the marketplace analysis of the CJS, become consumers of its services [17] (pp. 24–25). Like the consumers of health care, financial, local authorities or legal services, victims of crime now have their own complaints procedures where the criminal justice agencies fail to deliver on their ‘key entitlements’ to be informed about the progress and the outcomes of those agencies’ decisions. First published in 1990 as the Victims’ Charter, these entitlements are detailed in the current Code of Practice for Victims of Crime (Victims’ Code) [18], restated in 2015 to give effect to Article 14 of the 2012 Victims Directive.2 However, it should be recognised that while the Victims’ Code comprises a formal recognition of the state’s obligations to engage with them and to provide for their security [19,20], its entitlements also carry with them a mutual obligation to engage with the CJS. Thus, victims of crime may, variously, and at different stages in the CJS, be characterised as: • both suppliers (e.g., to the police about an offence against them) and recipients of information (e.g., from the police concerning their response to that report); • partners in crime prevention (e.g., in target-hardening their homes, or taking personal safety measures); • the beneficiaries of remedial arrangements (e.g., concerning such matters as the giving of evidence in rape trials, or of the availability of state-funded, and where they are convicted, of offender compensation); and • as participants in the system (e.g., in particular via restorative justice). Modern concepts of social citizenship assert that where the state supports their rights to health and welfare provision, citizens have a corresponding responsibility to take care of their bodily (e.g., to keep fit and not to smoke) and economic (e.g., to seek employment) well-being, as conditions for their access to that provision [21,22]. In the same way, victims of crime may be said to have responsibilities to the CJS that correspond to their access to its entitlements [23] [24] (p. 57). As a judge of the Upper Tribunal put the matter when dealing with paragraph 23 of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme 2012 (CICS 2012), which provides that an award will be withheld unless the applicant has cooperated as far as reasonably practicable in bringing the assailant to justice, ‘a person who seeks compensation from 2 Directive 2012/29/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 establishing minimum standards on the rights, support and protection of victims of crime, and replacing Council Framework Decision 2001/220/JHA [2012] OJ L315. Societies 2019, 9, 29 3 of 13 the State in respect of a criminal injury ought, as a quid pro quo, to assist the State to prosecute the offender insofar as that may be appropriate’.3 The legislation that authorised the Victims’ Code also established the Victims’ Commissioner,4 whose role is to promote the interests of victims and witnesses and to encourage good practice in their treatment by the CJS. The implementation of victims’ entitlements under the Victims’ Code, which the Commissioner also regularly reviews, engages the full range of the CJS’s actors. It identifies 14 ‘service providers’, of whom the police, the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS), HM Courts and Tribunals Service, the National Probation Service and the Parole Board are some of the principals. In addition to these various initiatives, there have been important changes in substantive and adjectival law designed to secure more convictions by directly or indirectly addressing victims’ concerns, in particular in connection with their place in the criminal trial [25] (pp. 116–190). More recent changes include strengthened statutory duties on sentencing courts to order offenders to compensate their victims,5 and a new non-statutory procedure by which victims can challenge decisions by the CPS not to prosecute in their case.6 These changes are not uncontroversial, typically presenting normative and ideological tensions between the public and the private interest in what the state and the victim recognise as criminal ‘justice’. These tensions are illustrated, for example, by the continuing controversy concerning reform of the evidential rules governing the cross-examination of both adult and child victims of sexual offences,7 the CPS’ failure to disclose unused evidence of relevance to the defence [27], and individual victims’ concerns about what they perceive as the ‘injustice’ of potentially lenient sentences in their own cases.8 The success of these developments and the expectations that they have encouraged have faced two criticisms. The first is that while victims may, in other contexts, seek a judicial review of these service providers’ decisions,9 none of the entitlements in the Victims’ Code is of itself legally enforceable. Where they ‘feel’ that their ‘entitlements have not been met or that any service provider has not delivered their duties under the Code’, a victim may make a formal complaint to that provider. However, the provider’s response does not carry with it an obligation to take any further action or to provide any other redress. In its first review of service providers’ compliance with the complaints procedure, the Victims’ Commissioner found that most of the victims interviewed said they had not been made aware 3 R (RW) v First-tier Tribunal (as successor of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Appeals Panel) [2013] AACR 8 [24] (Judge Rowland). 4 https://victimscommissioner.org.uk/. The Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004 also established a Victims’ Advisory Panel for victims of crime and their families to have a say in the reform of the CJS. This was abolished in 2013 (The Public Bodies (Abolition of Victims’ Advisory Panel) Order 2013, 2013 No. 2853) but re-established as the Victims’ Panel with effect from 6 February 2017; Hansard, House of Commons, Written question 64616, Victims’ Panel, answered 27 February 2017 (Dr Philip Lee MP, Ministry of Justice); see also https://www.gov.uk/government/news/criminals-paying-more-than-ever-to- help-victims. 5 Section 130(2A) and (3) the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 now require a sentencing court to consider whether to make a compensation order when it has power to do so, and to give reasons where it does not do so. 6 Crown Prosecution Service, Reconsidering a Prosecution Decision, taking effect from June 2013; https://www.cps.gov.uk/legal- guidance/reconsidering-prosecution-decision. The CPS’ Victims’ Right to Review Scheme was introduced to give effect to Article 11 of the Victims’ Directive; it also responds to the Court of Appeal’s criticisms in Christopher Killick [2011] EWCA Crim 1608; and see R v DPP and Boyling [2018] EWHC 3508 (Admin). 7 Crown Prosecution Service, Special Measures; https://www.cps.gov.uk/legal-guidance/special-measures [26]. Similar criticism has been levelled at the current rules permitting personal cross-examination by the alleged abuser in family court proceedings concerning domestic abuse, currently being addressed in HM Government, Transforming the Response to Domestic Abuse: Consultation Response and Draft Bill (CP 15, January 2019). 8 Crown Prosecution Service, Unduly Lenient Sentences; https://www.cps.gov.uk/legal-guidance/unduly-lenient-sentences. 9 For example, the decision by the Parole Board where it was considering an offender’s early release from prison, R (DSD and NBV) v The Parole Board of England and Wales [2018] EWHC 694 (Admin) (John Worboys). Responding to this decision, the government is to introduce a new mechanism by which victims who believe a decision may be fundamentally flawed will be able to make a case for reconsideration by Ministry of Justice official, rather than having to resort to the courts and engage legal representation to argue their case; House of Commons Debates, vol 654, ws cols 5–6, (4 February 2019); https://hansard. parliament.uk/commons/2019-02-04/debates/19020414000011/ParoleBoardReconsiderationMechanismAndRulesReview. https://victimscommissioner.org.uk/ https://www.gov.uk/government/news/criminals-paying-more-than-ever-to-help-victims https://www.gov.uk/government/news/criminals-paying-more-than-ever-to-help-victims https://www.cps.gov.uk/legal-guidance/reconsidering-prosecution-decision https://www.cps.gov.uk/legal-guidance/reconsidering-prosecution-decision https://www.cps.gov.uk/legal-guidance/special-measures https://www.cps.gov.uk/legal-guidance/unduly-lenient-sentences https://hansard.parliament.uk/commons/2019-02-04/debates/19020414000011/ParoleBoardReconsiderationMechanismAndRulesReview https://hansard.parliament.uk/commons/2019-02-04/debates/19020414000011/ParoleBoardReconsiderationMechanismAndRulesReview Societies 2019, 9, 29 4 of 13 of the Victims’ Code or of their entitlements, and did not know what to do if they had concerns. Almost three quarters of those who had complained were unhappy with the response that they received.10 The second criticism, also illustrated by research conducted by the Victims’ Commissioner, is that the implementation of such other initiatives as offering victims the opportunity to engage in restorative justice with their offenders, and on offering them the opportunity to make a Victim Personal Statement when the court is considering its sentence on their offender, has been patchy.11 Against the background of increasing rates of recorded sexual offences and of crimes of violence against the person involving knives,12 the terms of reference for the Ministry of Justice’s review of CICS 2012 asserts that ‘compensation is an important part of government provision of end-to-end support for victims of violent crime’.13 However, there has been growing criticism that when dealing with their claims, the Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority (CICA), the statutory agency responsible for dealing with applications made under CICS 2012, is failing to recognise the impact of the offence on the victim. The Victims’ Commissioner ’s Review of the scheme, published in January 2019, found that the interviewed victims felt validated when the impact of the crime had been recognised by society in the form of an award of compensation, but the process of making their claim was often traumatic: ‘we have an overly complex transactional process, which pays insufficient regard to the complex needs of its users, many of whom are likely to be suffering from the effects of trauma.’14 Responding to what were, by 2015, long-standing criticisms, the Conservative Government indicated that it would bring forward measures ‘to increase the rights of victims of crime’, which would ‘build on the existing Victims’ Code to guarantee greater protections for victims and witnesses in the CJS, including that victims of crime have the right to make a Victim Personal Statement and read it out in court at sentencing and at the Parole Board.’15 No such measures were introduced, but in 2018, the government published its cross-departmental Victims Strategy, whose overarching aims are to consolidate the reforms that have been made and to strengthen them ‘to ensure victims have the right help in the aftermath of a crime and are properly supported in the process of seeing justice delivered’ [29] (p. 8). There are many specific proposals, notably ‘to introduce new guidance for criminal justice agencies to provide practical advice to assist when explaining the Victim Personal Statement process to victims’. Of potentially greater significance for the implementation of the Victims’ Code is the government’s proposed consultation on a Victims’ Law, which will address the procedural limitations to making sure that victims receive the services to which they are entitled, and to holding criminal justice agencies that fail to deliver them to account. 2. The Social Construction of Victims of Crime ‘What does it mean to be a victim? Why is it this status is conferred on some and denied to others?’ [30] (p. 45). Positivist victimology had sought to explain victimisation by an examination of those held (typically by formal criminal justice processes) to be victims, in particular by a concentration 10 Victims’ Commissioner, A Review of Complaints and Resolution for Victims of Crime (2015) p. 5; https://s3-eu-west-2.amazonaws. com/victimscomm-prod-storage-clhgxgum05k1/uploads/2015/01/A-Review-of-Complaints-and-Resolution-for-Victims-of- Crime_January20151.pdf. 11 On victim personal statements (alternatively called victim impact statements [28], see Victims’ Commissioner, Victim Personal Statements 2017/18 (2018); https://s3-eu-west-2.amazonaws.com/victimscomm-prod-storage-clhgxgum05k1/uploads/2018/10/ VPS-slide-pack-2017-18-FINAL.pdf; and on restorative justice, Victims’ Commissioner, A Question of Quality: A Review of Restorative Justice, Part 2—Victims (2016); https://s3-eu-west-2.amazonaws.com/victimscomm-prod-storage-clhgxgum05k1/ uploads/2016/11/VC-review-into-restorative-justice-services-part-2_November-2016.pdf. 12 Some of these increases are attributable to better recording; otherwise, there has been ‘no change in overall violent offences estimated by the CSEW (1,389,000). Office for National Statistics, https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/ crimeandjustice/bulletins/crimeinenglandandwales/yearendingseptember2018; Sections 2 and 6. 13 http://data.parliament.uk/DepositedPapers/Files/DEP2018-1283/terms_of_reference_CICS_Review.pdf. 14 Compensation without re-traumatisation (2019); https://s3-eu-west-2.amazonaws.com/victimscomm-prod-storage- clhgxgum05k1/uploads/2019/01/CIC-report-FINAL.pdf, p. 97. 15 Queen’s Speech 2015: Background Briefing Notes; https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/ attachment_data/file/430149/QS_lobby_pack_FINAL_NEW_2.pdf#page=94. https://s3-eu-west-2.amazonaws.com/victimscomm-prod-storage-clhgxgum05k1/uploads/2015/01/A-Review-of-Complaints-and-Resolution-for-Victims-of-Crime_January20151.pdf https://s3-eu-west-2.amazonaws.com/victimscomm-prod-storage-clhgxgum05k1/uploads/2015/01/A-Review-of-Complaints-and-Resolution-for-Victims-of-Crime_January20151.pdf https://s3-eu-west-2.amazonaws.com/victimscomm-prod-storage-clhgxgum05k1/uploads/2015/01/A-Review-of-Complaints-and-Resolution-for-Victims-of-Crime_January20151.pdf https://s3-eu-west-2.amazonaws.com/victimscomm-prod-storage-clhgxgum05k1/uploads/2018/10/VPS-slide-pack-2017-18-FINAL.pdf https://s3-eu-west-2.amazonaws.com/victimscomm-prod-storage-clhgxgum05k1/uploads/2018/10/VPS-slide-pack-2017-18-FINAL.pdf https://s3-eu-west-2.amazonaws.com/victimscomm-prod-storage-clhgxgum05k1/uploads/2016/11/VC-review-into-restorative-justice-services-part-2_November-2016.pdf https://s3-eu-west-2.amazonaws.com/victimscomm-prod-storage-clhgxgum05k1/uploads/2016/11/VC-review-into-restorative-justice-services-part-2_November-2016.pdf https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/crimeandjustice/bulletins/crimeinenglandandwales/yearendingseptember2018 https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/crimeandjustice/bulletins/crimeinenglandandwales/yearendingseptember2018 http://data.parliament.uk/DepositedPapers/Files/DEP2018-1283/terms_of_reference_CICS_Review.pdf https://s3-eu-west-2.amazonaws.com/victimscomm-prod-storage-clhgxgum05k1/uploads/2019/01/CIC-report-FINAL.pdf https://s3-eu-west-2.amazonaws.com/victimscomm-prod-storage-clhgxgum05k1/uploads/2019/01/CIC-report-FINAL.pdf https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/430149/QS_lobby_pack_FINAL_NEW_2.pdf#page=94 https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/430149/QS_lobby_pack_FINAL_NEW_2.pdf#page=94 Societies 2019, 9, 29 5 of 13 on the notion of victim-types, on victims of interpersonal crime and on those who contribute to their own victimisation. This approach signally failed to explain or advance an understanding of why and how some persons who sustain harm are regarded as victims of that harm, and others are not [31]. By contrast, it is now widely accepted that whether a person who has sustained harm is called a ‘victim’ is contingent on, and performs important social functions that follow from, the observer’s view of the world in which that harm has been sustained. In common with the label ‘offenders’, ‘victims’ are not a homogeneous subset of the population possessing certain characteristics by which they can be commonly identified and set apart from non-victims but are socially constructed, and constructed for different purposes and with different consequences. In short, ‘the very concept of victimhood can be viewed as an identity or status developed through a process of publicly validated construction’ [32] (pp. 179–180), [17] (pp. 22–24). As Nils Christie and others have observed, the concept ‘victim’ is complex, fluid and systemically contested [33], [17] (pp. 25–31), [34] (pp. 47–52), [35]. From the observer's standpoint, an initial and major problem in deciding whether to label a harmed person a ‘victim’ lies in the fact that social cues and signs may be vague or ambiguous. One response to this pervasive social phenomenon has been the development of conventions that stereotype certain instances of suffering as victimising events. Paradigm instances comprise elderly victims of robberies, burglaries and assaults, and children who are sexually abused. These are Christie’s ‘ideal victims’: Persons or categories of individuals ‘who—when hit by crime—most readily are given the complete and legitimate status of being a victim’ [33] (p. 18). Some of these conventions are formalised as legal, medical or psychiatric norms; others, such as those held within family or peer groups, may be less well defined. However well formalised, though, that response may well entail some expectations that the victim holds of those conferring the label; for example, sympathy and various forms of benign intervention designed to ameliorate the harm. The key point is that to label a person a ‘victim’ has significant resource implications for both private (emotional or other support) and public (medical and welfare provision) economies, as is the case with state compensation schemes where public funds are engaged [23] (p. 62). A corollary of the expectations that victims may have of those who have accorded them victim status is that those others may also have expectations of how victims should themselves conform to the accepted indicators of that status; to be a victim is also to occupy a social role. Ideal victims of crime do not provoke or instigate the violent encounter in which they are injured. However, as in the case of claimants to CICS 2012, discussed in the following section, drawing a normative (and in that case forensic) distinction between ideal and non-ideal victims can be highly contentious. ‘When victims are not faultless [ . . . ] They become much more problematic, both as an object of public empathy but also in terms of their entitlement to formal compensation on the part of the state’ [36] (p. 115), [37] (pp. 54–59). Victims may be expected, and be permitted, to voice anger against their offender. Nonetheless, there are limits, some legal, to what the role of a crime victim properly entails. Anger mediated through the CJS is acceptable (for example, in a victim personal statement), but not through vigilantism, where victims may, through their use of disproportionate force against the offender, themselves be labelled an offender [38]. One of victimology’s major weaknesses has been its failure to reflect on the foundational nature of criminal law [23] (pp. 49–68).16 The law does not talk of ‘victims’ but of ‘offences’, many of which, but by no means all, do contemplate harm (or its potential) to the interests of an identifiable person; that is, to their bodily or sexual integrity, or to a ‘protected characteristic’ recognised in law.17 Where such 16 It may be noted that the victim surcharge, a levy payable by offenders on conviction, applies to all offences, including those that can have no direct victim. The surcharge benefits all victims indirectly via its contribution to the government’s Victim and Witness General Fund, which supports services for victims of crime. 17 The nine ‘protected characteristics’ listed in section 4 of the Equality Act 2010 consolidate the grounds of unlawful discrimination that existed in a number of earlier enactments. See Equality and Human Rights Commission, Protected characteristics; https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/en/equality-act/protected-characteristics. https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/en/equality-act/protected-characteristics Societies 2019, 9, 29 6 of 13 characteristics were once largely confined to persons performing some official function (e.g., police officers, postal workers, the clergy), the criminal sanction now extends to offences against a wide range of personal, rather than functional, protected characteristics, notably, ‘hate crimes’ [39,40]. Some of these are discrete offences,18 while others, where they are motivated by hostility or demonstrate hostility towards the victim's disability, race, religion, sexual orientation (or transgender identity, constitute aggravating features of established offences;19 but they all may justify an uplift in sentence for those convicted of such an offence.20 Many of these extensions of the criminal sanction are the product only of the past decade or so and are symptomatic of the constant expansion of the boundaries of harm [34] (pp. 30–34), see also [35] (passim). A recent political critique identified what the author sees as the unwanted social consequences in a liberal democracy of an untrammelled notion of ‘victimhood’ [41],21 implicitly asking whether there can or should there be any limits to: • the kinds of subjects (persons/animals (warm or cold blooded)22/living/inanimate,23 environmental24), or; • the harms (bodily/mental/physical/economic/aesthetic25); • that are sustained directly or indirectly (relatives/viewers of those harms26); • at the hands of other persons (or by natural events27). Some of the examples cited in the footnotes use the label ‘victim’ to categorise the deleterious effects of the exploitation of the world’s natural resources. No doubt that exploitation deserves serious attention, but the question that they prompt is whether it is helpful or appropriate to label countries or destroyed artefacts as ‘victims’. We may recognise that the parameters that influence which harmed persons will be labelled victims and thus have a legitimate call upon society’s resources are fluid and uncertain, but there may also be a need to recognise the implications of yet broader victim paradigms. Does the promiscuous use of the word both dilute its use when applied to human suffering and raise expectations about benign interventions that cannot be met? The questions implicit in the ‘victimhood’ critique are important for the following reasons: 1. that to call someone a victim is to make a statement about our moral/ethical view of the world in which the harm was sustained; 2. that we would not normally use the label where the harm is trivial or fanciful because that devalues its use where we wish to regard seriously harmed persons as victims, for example, who have been raped or otherwise subject to unwanted sexual contact or exploitation; 3. that the use of the label carries with it a bundle of expectations that to a greater or lesser degree draw upon our private and public resources; 18 Racially or religiously aggravated offences; Crime and Disorder Act 1998, sections 28–32. 19 Criminal Justice Act 2003, sections 145–146. 20 Crown Prosecution Service, Hate crime; https://www.cps.gov.uk/hate-crime. Home Office, Hate Crime, England and wales, 2017/18; Statistical Bulletin 20/18, 16 October 2018, ISBN: 978-1-78655-706-3. 21 I also googled ‘victimhood’ and ‘we’re all victims now’, which yielded dozens of hits; ‘victimhood chic’ captures the flavour of many politically driven critiques. 22 ‘Plastic-bag-swallowing-sperm-whales-are-victims-of-our-remorseless-progress’, https://www.theguardian.com/environment/ shortcuts/2018/may/23/. 23 Archaeological Victims of ISIS Rise Again, as Replicas in Rome’, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/07/world/europe/rome- artifact-reconstruction-isis.html. 24 The Ivory Coast and Ghana are ‘the biggest victims of deforestation’, https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2017/sep/ 13/chocolate-industry-drives-rainforest-disaster-in-ivory-coast. 25 ‘Culturally the [Elgin marbles] are presented as abduction victims, forcibly separated from the Greek homeland’, F. Rose-Greenland, ’The Parthenon Marbles as icons of nationalism in nineteenth-century Britain’ (2013), doi:10.1111/nana.12039. 26 ‘We had to stand there and watch them burn to death’; https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/grenfell-tower- inquiry-victims-family-evidence-rania-ibrahim-a8363311.html. 27 ‘Philippines: Dozens killed by typhoon as rescuers rush to aid of victims in north’ https://edition.cnn.com/2018/09/16/asia/ typhoon-mangkhut-ompong-philippines-intl/index.html. https://www.cps.gov.uk/hate-crime https://www.theguardian.com/environment/shortcuts/2018/may/23/ https://www.theguardian.com/environment/shortcuts/2018/may/23/ https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/07/world/europe/rome-artifact-reconstruction-isis.html https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/07/world/europe/rome-artifact-reconstruction-isis.html https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2017/sep/13/chocolate-industry-drives-rainforest-disaster-in-ivory-coast https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2017/sep/13/chocolate-industry-drives-rainforest-disaster-in-ivory-coast https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/grenfell-tower-inquiry-victims-family-evidence-rania-ibrahim-a8363311.html https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/grenfell-tower-inquiry-victims-family-evidence-rania-ibrahim-a8363311.html https://edition.cnn.com/2018/09/16/asia/typhoon-mangkhut-ompong-philippines-intl/index.html https://edition.cnn.com/2018/09/16/asia/typhoon-mangkhut-ompong-philippines-intl/index.html Societies 2019, 9, 29 7 of 13 4. that the greater the number of persons included in (1), the higher the level of expectations under (3), and therefore, other things being equal, the fewer the persons in (3) whose expectations will be met; 5. that the greater the number of persons included in (1), the more likely it is that our concern for one group of victims will be displaced in favour of a more clamorous or better organised group; and 6. that the greater the number of persons included in (1), the more likely it is that the significance of the word ‘victim’ will be diluted. 3. The Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme and the Ideal Victim Much of the literature that discusses these aspects of the social construction of victims and of the implications of that construction for persons harmed by criminal offences focuses on the use of the label in victimological and broader social discourse. With the exception of the literature examining the notion of the ‘ideal’ (female) victim of rape and the consequent implications for the law of evidence and the conduct of a trial, there has been comparatively little discussion of that construction’s implications for a crime victim’s legal remedies, whether against the offender or the state.28 Given that they are generally impecunious, civil actions for damages against offenders are very rare, and even where ordered to pay compensation on conviction to their victims, the sums are usually less than what could have been ordered in civil litigation. The reason for this is that the sentencing court must, before making an order, take account of the offender’s means.29 By contrast, CICS 2012 is a compensation scheme that offers a realistic financial remedy for victims who sustain serious physical or mental injury as a result of a violent or a sexual offence. This statutory scheme was made in 1996, replacing a common law scheme that was first introduced in 1964. The 1996 Scheme, last revised in 2012, receives nearly 33,000 applications a year, of which approximately two-thirds are resolved in the victim’s favour, as either a full or a reduced award. Compensation for the victim’s injury (or death) is assessed by reference to a tariff, which applies fixed levels of awards (from £1000 to £250,000) that notionally correspond to the severity of the injury. CICS 2012 also compensates for loss of earnings assessed by reference to statutory sick pay, and for special expenses where the victim requires long-term care. The total award in any one case is capped at £500,000; around £150 million is paid out annually; see generally [42].30 The key difference between a civil action against the offender and a claim under CICS 2012 is that the scheme is publicly funded. Whereas the victim’s own ‘non-ideal’ behaviour may have some relevance in a civil action, the distinction between ideal (‘deserving’) and non-ideal (‘undeserving’) victims continues to be central to its political legitimacy. When setting its underlying policy in the first Scheme in 1964, the government considered that it would be inappropriate for those with significant criminal records, whose own conduct before, during, or after the incident led to their being injured, or 28 A person whose conviction has been quashed by the Court of Appeal as being ‘unsafe’ is, nevertheless, not necessarily an ideal victim for the purpose of state compensation, since that decision does not of itself contain any finding as to whether that person was in fact innocent of the crime. The government’s concern that public money should be sparingly used where there has been a miscarriage of justice led to further restriction in its statutory formulation. Since 2014, it has been the case that compensation may be paid only where the Secretary of State determines that the Court of Appeal quashed the conviction in circumstances where fresh evidence shows beyond reasonable doubt that the person did not commit the offence. In Hallam, and Nealon v Secretary of State for Justice [2019] UKSC 2, the Supreme Court found that ‘the words “did not commit the offence” can be read as synonymous in this context with the words “is innocent”. It also held that the imposition of the criminal standard of proof as a condition to the possible award of compensation was not incompatible with Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (presumption of innocence). 29 The total number of persons ordered in the 12 months ending June 2018 in all courts to pay compensation as the principal disposal on conviction of an offence was 4,975, of which 103 were for offences of violence against the person and 13 were for sexual offences (these numbers have declined over the past 10 years (11,058, 415 and 15 in 2008); the vast majority of orders are made for offences against property; Ministry of Justice, Overview Tables (January 2019), Tables Q5.1a and Q5.3; https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/criminal-justice-system-statistics-quarterly-june-2018?utm_source=28904e4e- dcb3-4296-a2df-6a25e72fa679&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=govuk-notifications&utm_content=weekly. 30 See Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority: Annual Report and Accounts 2017–2018 (House of Commons Paper 1337, July 2018). https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/criminal-justice-system-statistics-quarterly-june-2018?utm_source=28904e4e-dcb3-4296-a2df-6a25e72fa679&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=govuk-notifications&utm_content=weekly https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/criminal-justice-system-statistics-quarterly-june-2018?utm_source=28904e4e-dcb3-4296-a2df-6a25e72fa679&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=govuk-notifications&utm_content=weekly Societies 2019, 9, 29 8 of 13 who were otherwise of bad character, to receive compensation from public funds. The problem with ‘victims’ who have these kinds of personal histories is that they either resemble too closely, or were once themselves, offenders. These considerations continue to inform government policy, the structure, and the implementation of CICS 2012. It follows that not all victims succeed in their claims. Around 50% of the rejected claims fail because there was no crime of violence or the injury was valued at less than the £1000 minimum. The other 50% were rejected because they were not ‘ideal’ victims. In short, to be successful in an application to the CICA, the ideal victim is a (good) citizen who reported their injury to the police as soon as was reasonably practicable, co-operated with the criminal justice agencies in bringing their offender to justice and co-operated with the CICA,31 has no unspent convictions, did not contribute to their injuries, is of good character, and if applying for loss of earnings or special expenses (or in fatal cases, dependency) has a good work record. The following section deals more closely with three of these eligibility conditions. 3.1. The Victim’s Own Delinquent Behaviour Paragraph 25 of CICS 2012 provides that: ‘An award may be withheld or reduced where the conduct of the applicant before, during or after the incident giving rise to the criminal injury makes it inappropriate to make an award or a full award.’ CICA’s online Guide to the Scheme advises that ‘before making a payment we have to consider if your behaviour before, during or after the incident caused or contributed to the incident in which you were injured.’ It continues, ‘we will consider if you were acting in an aggressive or threatening way and provoked the incident in which you were injured; you intended to provoke an assault or fight; there was a history of violence between you and the assailant; or you were injured as a result of challenging someone over a previous incident.’32 CICA has always taken a strict view of the application of paragraph 25 and its predecessors. Where the applicant challenged or voluntarily agreed to fight their assailant but emerged the loser, their claim is likely to be wholly refused, even where the applicant was seriously injured. While their assailant’s retaliation may well be the direct result of the applicant’s own aggressive conduct, it would be wrong to conclude that paragraph 25 applies only when there is a causal link between the victim’s conduct and the criminal injury. There may, as the Guide indicates, be such a link, but the Guide is only advisory; it is not the law. As paragraph 25 makes clear, what is required is a temporal link: that the victim’s conduct occurs ‘before, during or after’ the incident. What is at issue for the scheme is not, as would be the case in a civil action against the assailant, whether it is ‘just and equitable’ to apportion financial responsibility as between the taxpayer and an applicant who caused or contributed in some way to the incident, but whether the applicant is a person whose moral worth, assessed according to strictly defined criteria, is such that their ensuing injuries should be compensated from public funds. As the judge hearing a claim that raised exactly this issue observed, ‘paragraph 25 does ‘not allow any general balancing out of the nature of a claimant’s conduct against the seriousness of the injury and other consequences’.33 Instead, given that the scheme is publicly funded, the determining question is whether it would be ‘inappropriate’ to make any award. These points are well illustrated by a comparison of the ways in which a civil court and the CICA deal with claims by offenders in respect of the injuries they receive at the hands of a householder defending their property. In Revill v Newberry, the plaintiff was a young man who had been seriously injured when shot in the chest by the householder from whose allotment shed he intended to steal some equipment. Because there had been similar incidents, the householder was lying in wait inside the shed; as he heard someone trying to break in, he discharged his shotgun through a small hole in the 31 ‘We propose that eligibility to claim from the Scheme should be tightly drawn so as to restrict awards to blameless victims of crime who fully co-operate with the criminal justice process’ [16] (p. 50). 32 https://www.gov.uk/guidance/criminal-injuries-compensation-a-guide. 33 R (SB) v First-tier Tribunal [2010] UKUT 250 (AAC), [2011] AACR 11 [27]–[31]. https://www.gov.uk/guidance/criminal-injuries-compensation-a-guide Societies 2019, 9, 29 9 of 13 door, injuring the plaintiff. In the subsequent civil action, the Court of Appeal agreed with the judge’s two-thirds reduction for the young burglar’s contributory negligence.34 By comparison, on similar facts, CICA’s then appeal body found that it would be ‘inappropriate’ that someone who was injured in the course of burgling someone’s home, and who struggled to escape and was injured when detained, should receive an award from public funds, agreeing that the claim should be entirely rejected.35 As Farmer observed of the Tony Martin case, one consequence of the contested and fluid nature of the label ‘victim’ was that the burglar whom Martin had shot in the legs while he was seeking to escape reinvented himself as a ‘victim’ of Martin’s unlawful use of force, and when he sought to sue him for his injuries, in turn relabelling the householder ‘victim’ an ‘offender’ [21] (p. 59).36 3.2. The Victim’s Criminal Record The administrative body responsible for the implementation of the pre-statutory (1964) scheme would refuse or reduce an award where the applicant had convictions that it regarded as being qualitatively or quantitatively ‘serious’, whether they were, or were not, causally related to the incident in which they were injured. This interpretation, which could include a ‘spent’ conviction under the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974, was at that time approved by the Court of Appeal.37 This specific possibility was omitted in the 1996 statutory scheme, which provided instead that the CICA ‘must refuse or reduce an award to reflect unspent criminal convictions’ unless there were ‘exceptional reasons not to do so’. In order to assist in answering the question whether an award was to be refused or reduced, CICA introduced a system of ‘penalty-points’. In essence, the more severe the sentence and the shorter the period of time between the date on which it was ordered, and the date on which CICA received the application, the greater the number of penalty points, and thus the greater the likelihood of the claim being refused or rejected. Conversely, the less severe the sentence and the longer the period of that time the fewer the resulting penalty points; an outcome that sought to give the applicant credit for going straight. This approach, however, did not satisfy the government’s stated objective that taxpayer ‘cash compensation should be focused on blameless victims of the most serious crimes’ [16] (p. 3). ‘The Scheme is a taxpayer-funded expression of public sympathy and it is reasonable that there should be strict criteria around who is deemed “blameless” for the purpose of determining who should receive a share of its limited funds. We consider that, in principle, awards should only be made to those who have themselves obeyed the law and not cost society money through their offending behaviour’ [16] (para 207). Accordingly, CICS 2012 introduced stricter criteria for determining when an award would be appropriate in these cases. By paragraph 26 and Annex D paragraph 3, no award will be made where an unspent conviction resulted, broadly speaking, in either a custodial sentence or a community order. Refusal of an award in these cases is mandatory. This applies to any unspent convictions the applicant has at the time of applying or that they receive before their claim is settled. The lawfulness of this exclusionary rule was challenged on a number of grounds that primarily engaged provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). It is a complex case whose issues cannot be detailed here [42] (pp. 129–133), but the conclusions of the High Court and of the Court of Appeal were that however those issues were answered, the rule was not unlawful: ‘There is plainly a legitimate aim in limiting eligibility for compensation to those who are morally deserving of it, namely, “blameless 34 [1996] QB 567 (CA). 35 Criminal Injuries Compensation Appeals Panel, Annual Report and Accounts for the year ended 31 March 1997 (Cm 3840, February 1998). 36 Following this case, the law governing the use of force in self-defence was amended so that in a ‘householder’ case, the degree of force used by the ‘victim’ may be regarded as having been reasonable in the circumstances as the householder believed them to be, unless it was grossly disproportionate in those circumstances; see Collins [2016] EWHC 33 (Admin), and Cheeseman [2019] EWCA Crim 149 (CA). 37 R v Criminal Injuries Compensation Board, ex parte Thompstone and Crowe [1984] 1 WLR 1234 (CA). Societies 2019, 9, 29 10 of 13 victims of crimes of violence”.’38 As a proportion of all resolved claims, the number rejected under paragraphs 22–28 is lower than was the case before the commencement of CICS 2012, but the underlying policy remains central to its purpose. 3.3. The Victim’s Bad Character A victim’s bad character is primarily evidenced by their unspent convictions, but earlier versions of CICS 2012 enabled CICA ‘to take account of ‘other evidence available’ when determining whether to reject or reduce an award. This evidence could relate to police reports but on which the CPS had decided not to prosecute,39 or to a police caution given to the applicant. This power is now set out in paragraph 27, which provides that an award may be withheld or reduced because the applicant’s ‘character’ makes it inappropriate to make an award or a full award.40 CICA’s Guide lists the kind of character evidence that can fall within this provision. It includes any association in illegal drugs or crime, tax evasion, benefit fraud, and, as previously, police cautions, but there does not have to be evidence of a crime; an applicant who has been made the subject of an Injunction to Prevent Nuisance and Annoyance in civil proceedings,41 or a football banning order made on application to a magistrates’ court,42 may be caught by this paragraph. Nor does the relevant aspect of the applicant’s character need to have any connection with the incident in which they were injured. The application by a foreign national who had lied about having leave to remain in the UK was refused on the ground of her unlawful status. The court held that the earlier scheme ‘did not place any limitations on the type of conduct which might justify the conclusion that an applicant’s character renders an award of compensation inappropriate’.43 This general point, which could in an application on facts such as those in that case engage the discrimination provisions of the ECHR, has not been tested under CICS 2012. 4. Conclusions: Non-Ideal Victims Negligent, reckless, or intentional injuries caused by an offender against another person are, aside from any criminal liability,44 theoretically remediable in an action for damages. Other injuries, such as those that are caused by road traffic accidents, industrial processes, or contaminated vaccines, may or may not be remediable in this way. The state’s response may be to place the burden of insuring against such injuries on those who engage in the relevant activity, as in the case of compulsory motor insurance, itself to directly assume the burden of providing financial support that may in part have been funded by those receiving that support, as in the case of national insurance contributions, or to create specific ex gratia taxpayer-funded compensation schemes, as in the case of vaccine damage and the variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease scheme. 38 R (McNiece) v (1) Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority (2) The Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice and R (1) A (2) B v (1) Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority (2) The Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice, [2017] EWHC 2 (Admin); A and B v Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority and Secretary of State for Justice [2018] EWCA Civ 1534 (CA). Unspent convictions carrying sentences not specified in paragraph 3 will result in refusal or rejection of the claim, unless there are exceptional reasons not to do so. 39 CPS has to apply its two-stage ‘full code test’, namely, there is sufficient evidence to provide a realistic prospect of conviction, and whether it is in the public interest to prosecute; https://www.cps.gov.uk/publication/code-crown-prosecutors#section4. A conviction would require proof beyond reasonable doubt; but the standard of proof in CICS 2012 is the balance of probabilities. 40 This does not apply to the separate provisions relating to unspent convictions. 41 IPNA; these replaced Anti-Social Behaviour Orders (ASBOs; Anti-Social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014, Part 1). 42 Football Spectators Act 1989 ss 14A and 14B. Under section 14B(2), it is necessary to show only that the person ‘has at any time caused or contributed to any violence or disorder in the United Kingdom or elsewhere’ but does not depend on a conviction, as does section 14A. 43 Andronati v Criminal Injuries Compensation Appeals Panel [2006] EWHC 1420 (Admin) [9]. 44 Negligence alone is generally insufficient for an offence against the person, but gross negligence may be sufficient basis for a conviction of manslaughter where the victim dies. https://www.cps.gov.uk/publication/code-crown-prosecutors#section4 Societies 2019, 9, 29 11 of 13 These instances by no means fully recognise these many alternative compensation systems,45 of which CICS 2012 is one such alternative. It does not substitute for a known offender against whom a remedy is possible, either via a civil action, or a compensation order on conviction. In both cases, any sums recovered are fully deductible from any CICA award; there is no double recovery at the taxpayer’s expense. However, as such sums are likely to fall short of what could be recovered from an insured defendant, or one with sufficient means, CICS 2012 stands as an additional source of compensation, and where, as is frequently the case, the offender is unknown or not brought to trial, it is the only source; a remedy of last resort. All taxpayer-funded schemes whose purpose is, as in the case of the instances above, to provide financial redress for injuries that public policy dictates should not fall unmitigated upon the individual, by definition specify those eligibility criteria with which the injured person must comply. These criteria may be characterised as a ‘payment trigger’ whose primary function is ‘to select worthy claimants from the less deserving and to make payments only to the former’ [44] (p. 640). In the case of CICS 2012, this measure of desert is implicitly achieved by drawing a line between ideal and non-ideal victims of violent and sexual crime, and explicitly so in the case of the various disentitling provisions discussed above. Unless they are applicants whose claims have been refused or any award reduced, there is probably very little wider societal awareness of the state’s restrictions on non-ideal victims’ access to this particular source of public funds. The point being made in this article is that CICS 2012 is an exemplar of the legal implications of an unsympathetic construction of an applicant’s possible social status as a victim of a violent or sexual crime. This construction in turn illustrates one consequence of the contested cultural representations that continue to shape perceptions of victims of crime [45]. It also, secondly, illustrates the inevitable legal difficulties that attend political and criminal justice discourse and practice, which are, similarly, a consequence of that contest. Funding: This research received no external funding. Conflicts of Interest: The authors declare no conflict of interest. References 1. Rock, P. On Becoming a Victim. In New Visions of Crime Victims; Hoyle, C., Wilson, R., Eds.; Hart Publishing: Oxford, UK, 2002; pp. 1–22, ISBN 1-84113-280-2. 2. Walklate, S.; Mawby, R. Critical Victimology; Sage Publications: London, UK, 1994; pp. 69–94, ISBN 0-8039-8512-6. 3. Doak, J. Victims’ Rights, Human Rights and Criminal Justice; Hart Publishing: Oxford, UK, 2008; ISBN 978-1-84113-603-5. 4. Kearon, T.; Godfrey, B. Setting the Scene: A Question of History. In Handbook of Victims and Victimology; Walklate, S., Ed.; Willan Publishing: Devon, UK, 2007; ISBN 978-1-84392-257-5. 5. Sebba, L. 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In Integrating a Victim Perspective within Criminal Justice; Crawford, A., Goodey, J., Eds.; Ashgate: Dartmouth, NH, USA, 2000; pp. 77–96, ISBN 1-84014-486-6. 39. Chakraborti, N. Victims of Hate. In Reconceptualizing Critical Victimology; Spencer, D., Walklate, S., Eds.; Lexington Books: Lanham, MD, USA, 2016; pp. 63–77, ISBN 978149851064. 40. Mason-Bish, H. Creating ideal victims in hate crime policy. In Revisiting the ‘Ideal Victim’; Duggan, M., Ed.; Policy Press: Bristol, UK, 2018; pp. 43–61, ISBN 978-1-4473-3876-5. 41. Green, D. We’re (Nearly) All Victims Now! How Political Correctness Is Undermining Our Liberal Culture; Civitas, Institute for the Study of Civil Society: London, UK, 2006; ISBN 9781903386538. 42. Miers, D. Criminal Injuries Compensation: State and Offender Compensation for Violent Crime; Oxford University Press: Oxford, UK, 2018; ISBN 978-0-19-880662-2. 43. Deakin, S.; Johnston, A.; Markesinis, B. Markesinis and Deakin’s Tort Law; Oxford University Press: Oxford, UK, 2013; ISBN 978-0-959198-5. 44. Macleod, S.; Hodges, C. Redress Schemes for Personal Injuries; Hart Publishing: Oxford, UK, 2017; ISBN 9781509916610. 45. Walklate, S. Victims: Needs Rights and Justice. In Routledge International Handbook of Criminology and Human Rights; Weber, L., Fishwick, E., Marmo, M., Eds.; Routledge: New York, NY, USA, 2017; pp. 71–79, ISBN 1-138-93117-6. © 2019 by the author. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/). http://creativecommons.org/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/. Victims and the Criminal Justice System The Social Construction of Victims of Crime The Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme and the Ideal Victim The Victim’s Own Delinquent Behaviour The Victim’s Criminal Record The Victim’s Bad Character Conclusions: Non-Ideal Victims References 
work_4rqpc3hcj5hqhncve6sg6ztyni	----	http://ccj.sagepub.com/ Justice Journal of Contemporary Criminal http://ccj.sagepub.com/content/27/3/278 The online version of this article can be found at: DOI: 10.1177/1043986211412560 2011 27: 278Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice Michele Stacey, Kristin Carbone-López and Richard Rosenfeld Immigration on Anti-Hispanic Hate Crime in the United States Demographic Change and Ethnically Motivated Crime: The Impact of Published by: http://www.sagepublications.com can be found at:Journal of Contemporary Criminal JusticeAdditional services and information for http://ccj.sagepub.com/cgi/alertsEmail Alerts: http://ccj.sagepub.com/subscriptionsSubscriptions: http://www.sagepub.com/journalsReprints.navReprints: http://www.sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.navPermissions: http://ccj.sagepub.com/content/27/3/278.refs.htmlCitations: What is This? - Jul 19, 2011Version of Record >> at SEIR on January 16, 2012ccj.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://ccj.sagepub.com/ http://ccj.sagepub.com/content/27/3/278 http://www.sagepublications.com http://ccj.sagepub.com/cgi/alerts http://ccj.sagepub.com/subscriptions http://www.sagepub.com/journalsReprints.nav http://www.sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav http://ccj.sagepub.com/content/27/3/278.refs.html http://ccj.sagepub.com/content/27/3/278.full.pdf http://online.sagepub.com/site/sphelp/vorhelp.xhtml http://ccj.sagepub.com/ CCJ412560CCJ27310.1177/1043986211412560Stacey et al.Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice 1Virginia Union University, Richmond, VA, USA 2University of Missouri, St. Louis, MO, USA Corresponding Author: Kristin Carbone-López, Assistant Professor, Department of Criminology and Criminal Justice, University of Missouri, St. Louis, 324 Lucas Hall, One University Boulevard, St. Louis, MO 63121, USA Email: carbonelopezk@umsl.edu Demographic Change and Ethnically Motivated Crime: The Impact of Immigration on Anti- Hispanic Hate Crime in the United States Michele Stacey1, Kristin Carbone-López2, and Richard Rosenfeld2 Abstract In recent years, Hispanic immigration to the United States has become a politically charged public issue, with significant consequences for immigration policies, communities, individual immigrants, and the U.S. residents who resemble them in language, customs, and appearance. We examine one possible collateral consequence of the fear and tension surrounding recent immigration trends, anti-Hispanic hate crime. Drawing on traditional theories of intergroup conflict—and particularly minority threat theory—we hypothesize that recent changes in Hispanic immigration are positively related to hate crimes targeting Hispanics. We find support for this hypothesis in a multivariate state-level panel analysis of anti-Hispanic hate crime from 2000 to 2004. Other predictions, however, are not supported. We conclude that the impact of immigration patterns on hate crime is an important area for continued criminological inquiry and that the notion of cultural threat should receive greater attention as studies of intergroup conflict move beyond the Black–White dichotomy. Keywords hate crime, immigration, Hispanics, social threat Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice 27(3) 278 –298 © 2011 SAGE Publications Reprints and permission: http://www. sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav DOI: 10.1177/1043986211412560 http://ccj.sagepub.com Article at SEIR on January 16, 2012ccj.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://ccj.sagepub.com/ Stacey et al. 279 Immigration patterns to the United States have changed considerably over the past century. While the beginning of the 20th century saw an influx of immigrants largely from European countries, by 2007 80% of the U.S. foreign-born population hailed from Latin American or Asian countries (Grieco, 2009). Recent changes in the ethnic com- position of immigrant populations coincide with increased public and political concern over U.S. immigration policy (particularly after the World Trade Center attacks of 2001) and have resulted in political lobbying for increased security and funding to build up border-control mechanisms. Immigration legislation and policy increasingly focus on the criminalization and deportation of undocumented individuals, and local and state law enforcement agencies have begun to vigorously enforce federal immi- gration laws and in some cases supersede them. For example, recent state legislation, such as the passage of Senate Bill 1070 in Arizona in 2010, aims to control illegal immigra- tion through stepped up enforcement of documentation requirements. Policies such as these are born out of and perpetuate an immigrant-as-threat narra- tive (Ibrahim, 2005) wherein immigrants are portrayed as threatening national security (through their supposed links to terrorist organizations), economic security (by “taking” jobs away from natural-born citizens), and cultural security (by bringing with them dif- ferent languages, customs, and religions). The extent to which these threat narratives have filtered down to relationships between individuals, however, is not certain. Immigration and the resultant anti-immigrant sentiment may contribute to increased intolerance of immigrants and even, in some instances, to crimes against them. Recent reports from civil rights advocacy groups, drawing on Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) data, as well as a handful of highly publicized cases of violent attacks on Hispanic immi- grants, provide initial anecdotal evidence of violent—even lethal—hostility directed toward immigrants (Leadership Conference on Civil Rights Education Fund [LCCREF], 2009; Southern Poverty Law Center [SPLC], 2008). In this article, we begin to empirically examine the question of whether population shifts and changes in immigration patterns are associated with ethnically motivated hate crime. Specifically, we ask, “To what extent is anti-Hispanic hate crime related to patterns of Hispanic immigration to the United States?” While research on hate crimes has increased substantially in the past decade, much of the focus has been on crimes against racial or sexual minorities. Less attention has been paid to the role of ethnicity, specifically with regard to Hispanics, who are often perceived to be foreigners in spite of their long history in the United States. Because crimes against immigrant groups are not considered to be “hate crimes”—immigrants are not a protected category in hate crime law—we focus on hate crimes against Hispanics, who are often assumed to be immigrants, and hypothesize that they may be targeted in response to fear over chang- ing immigration trends. Using the Uniform Crime Reports (UCR), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and Census data, we build on the existing knowledge base regarding bias moti- vated or hate crimes in a number of important ways. First, we examine the role of recent Hispanic-specific immigration to the United States as opposed to a more gener- alized immigration indicator or Census data on the percentage of the population that is at SEIR on January 16, 2012ccj.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://ccj.sagepub.com/ 280 Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice 27(3) “foreign-born.” Recent immigration trends have fundamentally changed the ethnic composition of the United States; Hispanics now represent the largest ethnic minority group at more than 15% of the total U.S. population (U.S. Census Bureau, 2009). The extent to which these population shifts—and the corresponding group conflict they engender—are related to the victimization experiences of group members, however, is unclear and our research begins to address such issues. Finally, while much hate crime research is confined to a particular geographic location, we examine state variation in the number of anti-Hispanic hate crimes using a population-averaged model to account for changes within and between states over time. Demographic Shifts: Changes in Hispanic Immigration to the United States and the Impact on Public Perceptions Changes in legislation, and particularly the abolition of national origins quotas through amendments to the Immigration Act of 1965, transformed the face of immigration in the United States by the end of the 20th century (Rumbaut, 1994). Historically, the majority of immigrants to the United States were from Europe, but most of the immi- grants arriving after 1970 were from countries in Latin America and Asia (Hirschman & Massey, 2009). By 2007, there were more than 38 million foreign-born persons in the United States, and more than 53% of the foreign-born came from Latin American countries. Immigration from Central America, including Mexico, accounts for more than two thirds of the foreign-born from Latin American countries and more than one third of the total foreign-born population (Grieco, 2009). Thus, in the past four decades, Hispanic immigration has been a major force in changing the ethnic composition of the U.S. population. At the same time, research on Hispanic immigration to the United States suggests that migration patterns have changed considerably over the past four decades. Settlement patterns have become more diverse and have been redirected in recent years away from the traditional resettlement or “gateway states” such as California, Texas, Florida, New York, and New Jersey where, until the 1990s, nearly three quarters of all immigrants settled (e.g., Schmidley, 2001). Newly arrived Hispanic immigrants began to settle not just in large cities along the coasts but also in small towns and in areas within the interior of the country that historically experienced very low immigration rates (Massey & Capoferro, 2009). The “virtual absence” of Hispanic immigrants in such regions prior to the 1990s means that even small increases in absolute numbers of new immigrants translate into huge relative growth in immigrant communities in these new destinations (Massey & Capoferro, 2009). What, then, are the consequences of Hispanic immigration for these new reception areas? An influx of immigrants changes the population structure of communities, transforms the ethnic makeup of social classes, and may also change local politics. The increased presence of Hispanics—and particularly Mexicans—means that certain at SEIR on January 16, 2012ccj.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://ccj.sagepub.com/ Stacey et al. 281 music and foods become more common and Spanish may be heard in public spaces. The arrival of these newcomers may also create new interethnic and linguistic tensions as suddenly communities grapple with questions of ethnic diversity and assimilation and with concerns over the availability and necessity of Spanish resources and educa- tion for residents (Cornelius, 2002; Hernández-León & Zúñiga, 2003). Increasing fears of the social, economic, cultural, and political impact of these newcomers—which some refer to as the “new nativism”—are fueled by the growing presence of immigrants in nongateway areas as well as the concentration of new immigrants in just a few states. Evidence from recent ethnographic studies suggests that the new nativism has found fertile ground in communities within these destination areas as newly arrived immigrants face anti-immigrant sentiment and struggle for acceptance (e.g., Montero- Sieburth & Meléndez, 2007). This ambivalent reception stems in part from concerns that crime rates rise as a result of the influx of immigrants. The public perception, often sustained by the media, is that immigrants, particularly those who are undocumented, are in large part respon- sible for crime rate increases (Rumbaut & Ewing, 2007). Yet, although it is true that immigrants struggle with acculturation and assimilation processes and often settle into communities that have structural characteristics (e.g., ethnic heterogeneity and increased rates of poverty) that are associated with crime (Martinez & Lee, 2000), there is little systematic evidence that immigrants themselves are more likely to be involved in criminal activity than U.S.-born individuals (e.g., Lee, Martinez, & Rosenfeld, 2001; Morenoff, Sampson, & Raudenbush, 2001). Indeed, research largely suggests the opposite conclusion, with recent studies finding that the reductions in violent crime in the United States in recent years are at least partly attributable to increasing immigra- tion rates (e.g., Stowell, Messner, McGeever, & Raffolovich, 2009). Studies of the relationship between immigration and crime commission, however, are not paralleled by research on the victimization experiences of immigrants. This may be due to insufficient information; it is impossible to determine immigration status using existing data sources such as the UCR and the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) and so it is unclear to what extent immigrants may be particularly vulnerable to victimization. While in recent years more attention has been paid to those crimes to which immigrants may be particularly vulnerable, including human smug- gling and labor exploitation, less attention has been paid to hate crimes against immi- grants.1 A potential collateral consequence of anti-immigrant sentiment—and one that has not been examined in any systematic fashion—may be that immigrants are targeted in racially or ethnically motivated crime, in other words, because of who they are. Importantly, anti-immigrant sentiment fueled by changing patterns of immigration also may put nonimmigrant Hispanics at risk of being victimized by hate crime. The fear surrounding immigration and its impact on communities is not necessarily focused solely on foreignness but also contains a strong racial and ethnic component. The fur- ther scrutiny triggered by foreignness presents a special problem for Hispanics (Chang & Aoki, 1997). Akin to racial profiling, the assumption exists that all Hispanics are immigrants (Perea, 1997). Therefore, the ambivalent reception and fear of immigrants at SEIR on January 16, 2012ccj.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://ccj.sagepub.com/ 282 Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice 27(3) likely affect Hispanics generally, even those who are U.S.-born. In sum, then, immigrants or individuals who are perceived to be immigrants (because of their skin color, their occupation, or their language) may be targeted by crime. Interethnic Relations and Mechanisms of Informal Social Control A prominent theory of intergroup relations is Blalock’s (1967) thesis on minority threat. Blalock argues that minority groups pose a threat to the majority group in times or situations of limited resources. As minority populations grow, and as minority members increasingly compete with majority members for scarce economic and political capital, group conflict may increase and strengthen incentives for the majority group to dis- criminate against members of the minority group, by both formal and informal means. When economic opportunities are scarce, a growing minority group competes with the established majority for jobs and income. Economic competition may breed animosity between the groups, which can manifest itself in many ways. Likewise, minority and majority groups compete for political power, presumed to be in limited supply. As minority groups grow in size, they gain access to greater political capital; as a conse- quence, majority groups may feel their own political strength is weakened, increasing animosity and possibly resulting in further conflict between the minority and majority groups. Empirical tests generally suggest that minority threat—an increasing minority population—is positively related to formal mechanisms of social control against minor- ity group members, in particular, control by the criminal justice system including arrest and prosecution (e.g., Eitle, D’Alessio, & Stolzenberg, 2002). While laws may act as instruments by which dominant groups “maintain power and exercise control over ‘threatening’ populations” (King, 2007, p. 195), there are alter- native ways by which control can be exercised. Indeed, scholars have recently noted that hate crimes can be conceptualized as a means of informal social control against minority group members (King, Messner, & Baller, 2009). From this perspective, such crimes are not merely crimes against individual victims but also serve as an effective (though illegal) means of controlling entire groups of persons through intimidation, fear, and even violence (King et al., 2009; Perry, 2001). In this manner, hate crimes serve both a symbolic and instrumental function (Craig, 2002). The redistribution of immi- grants into new destinations—and resulting concerns over the social, economic, cul- tural, and political impact of these new arrivals—may translate into increased intergroup animosity and conflict and, perhaps, to hate crime as a means of informal social control against members of the minority. Demographic Change and Hate Crime: What Do We Know? Over the past decade, hate crime research has focused increasingly on the social and ecological context in which hate crime occurs. Focusing on neighborhoods, prior at SEIR on January 16, 2012ccj.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://ccj.sagepub.com/ Stacey et al. 283 studies have found a relationship between demographic change and hate crime rates. Specifically, an influx of minority group members is related to increases in racially motivated hate crime. For example, Green, Strolovitch, and Wong, (1998b) found that crimes directed against racial and ethnic minorities in New York City were highest in predominantly White neighborhoods, particularly those that had experienced recent in-migration of minority groups. Likewise, Grattet (2009) found that changes in the minority population result in increased hate crime of all types in predominantly White neighborhoods in Sacramento, but decreases in hate crime against Blacks in pre- dominantly non-White neighborhoods. Such findings provide increasing support that demographic changes explain at least some of the variation in hate crimes across neighborhoods. Macroeconomic conditions and the “threat” posed by immigrants taking employ- ment opportunities from native-born citizens may also engender increased hostility toward those immigrants. Thus, an alternative explanation for the link between demo- graphic change and hate crime explored in prior research is that hate crimes directed at minority groups are related to economic conditions in the neighborhood. Research on the relationship between economic conditions and racially motivated hate crime provides mixed results. Lyons (2007) found that racially motivated hate crime was more prevalent in the more affluent neighborhoods in Chicago. However, Green, Glaser, and Rich (1998a) found that changes in economic conditions in New York, specifi- cally the unemployment rate, were not significantly related to monthly counts of hate crime incidents in the city. Although revealing, these studies focus on a single community and are unable to provide insight regarding the broader impact of demographic change on hate crime. Given the recent political attention to immigration in the United States, and particu- larly the focus on Hispanics, an important research task is to determine whether an association exists between immigration trends and hate crime victimization experi- ences of Hispanics. Scholars have reinvigorated research on the relationship between immigration and criminality, but less attention has been paid to the hate crime victim- ization experiences of immigrants and, particularly, of Hispanics. To address this gap in the literature, we draw on the minority threat perspective, typically used to describe Black–White relations, to examine the relationship between the Hispanic immigration rate and hate crimes directed against Hispanics in U.S. states. Research Hypotheses Given recent demographic shifts in immigrant populations and the sometimes inhos- pitable reception of new Hispanic immigrants, we hypothesize that Hispanic immigra- tion has a positive effect on anti-Hispanic hate crime.2 Specifically, taking into account recent formulations of the minority threat framework (e.g., King & Wheelock, 2007), we predict that hate crimes against Hispanics will be elevated when and where Hispanic immigration has grown. We also expect, in line with the traditional minority threat framework (Quillian, 1995), that the relative size of the Hispanic population in at SEIR on January 16, 2012ccj.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://ccj.sagepub.com/ 284 Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice 27(3) a state should be positively related to anti-Hispanic hate crime. But the threat frame- work also predicts that minority group size may have a nonlinear effect on social control. When the minority grows large enough to exert significant political power, it may be able to limit the majority group’s social control efforts. We test for such non- linear effects in our analysis. Finally, the minority threat thesis predicts that social control of minority groups should be related to their economic status relative to the majority group. To test this hypothesis, we examine the effect of the ratio of White to Hispanic unemployment on anti-Hispanic hate crime as well as the effect of general economic conditions on hate crime. In addition, we test for the presence of mediating and moderating effects of the White–Hispanic unemployment ratio and general economic conditions on the effect of Hispanic immigration and group size on hate crime, as explained below. Data and Method Data for the current study are drawn from five sources. The hate crime data come from the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports (UCR). The UCR is released annually and includes all criminal incidents, including hate crimes, reported to police for the previ- ous year. Data from the UCR’s Hate Crime Program for the years 2000-2004 are used in the current study. State characteristics, including population and unemployment rates, are drawn from the 2000 Decennial Census and the 2002-2004 American Community Survey (ACS); data for 2001 were interpolated from the two sources. The ACS is based on a sample of housing units in the United States and Puerto Rico and provides data on the majority of geographic areas with populations of 65,000 or more. In addition, a measure of overall economic growth is drawn from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). Finally, additional measures are drawn from the 2000 to 2004 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics produced by the Office of Immigration Statistics within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). This source provides estimates of the amount of legal immigration each year.3 Given our emphasis on recent immigration patterns during a period of heightened concern and tension regarding Hispanic immigrants, our analysis is limited to state immigration patterns from 2000 to 2004. Missing immigration data preclude the use of data prior to 2000. Although 5 years is a fairly short time span for assessing trends, it is suitable for analytic purposes because both Hispanic immigration and anti-Hispanic hate crimes exhibited marked year-to-year variability during this period (see Figures 1 and 2). States are a particularly salient unit of analysis for the examination of hate crime because hate crime policies (and, increasingly, policies related to immigration) are formulated at the state level. Data sparseness on the hate crime measure (see below) would make comparative analysis at the city or county level unreliable. Moreover, relevant immigration data (i.e., by country of origin) are not publicly available at lower levels of aggregation. Because states are highly heterogeneous units, we control for many state structural characteristics in our analysis that may be related to immigration or reflect differences in how states define and handle hate crime. at SEIR on January 16, 2012ccj.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://ccj.sagepub.com/ Stacey et al. 285 –2 1.5 –1 0.5 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2000 Hispanic Hate Crime Rate per 100,000 Immigration Rate per 100,000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Z -S c o re Figure 1. Hispanic hate crime rate by Hispanic immigration rate Dependent Variable The dependent variable in our analysis is the number of anti-Hispanic hate crimes known to the police in U. S. states and the District of Columbia between 2000 and 2004 (Hate crime count). The FBI defines hate crime as “criminal offenses that are motivated, in whole or in part, by the offender’s bias against a race, religion, sexual orientation, ethnicity/national origin, or disability and are committed against persons, property, or society” (FBI, 2004). An offense qualifies as a hate crime if, after careful investigation, there is “sufficient evidence to lead a reasonable and prudent person to conclude that the offender’s actions were motivated . . . by his or her bias” (FBI, 2004). On average, 9.9 anti-Hispanic hate crimes were recorded annually by the police in each state between 2000 and 2004, with a range from 0 to 206. Of these, approxi- mately 56% were personal crimes, with intimidation representing the majority of those offenses, closely followed by simple assaults and then aggravated assaults. The remain- ing 44% were property crimes, primarily acts of vandalism. Because of low counts in many states, we combine personal and property offenses in our analysis. Independent Variables and Controls The primary independent variable of interest is a measure of Hispanic immigration taken from the Yearbook of Immigration Statistics each year from 2000 to 2004. This at SEIR on January 16, 2012ccj.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://ccj.sagepub.com/ 286 Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice 27(3) –2 –1.5 –1 –0.5 0 0.5 1 1.5 –2 –1.5 –1 –0.5 0 0.5 1 1.5 Z -S c o re California Hispanic HC Rate Hispanic Immigration Rate Hispanic HC Rate Hispanic Immigration Rate Hispanic HC Rate Hispanic Immigration Rate Hispanic HC Rate Hispanic Immigration Rate Z -S c o re Texas –1.5 –1 –0.5 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 Z -S c o re Idaho –2 –1.5 –1 –0.5 0 0.5 1 1.5 Z -S c o re Illinois 2000 2000 2000 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2001 2002 2003 2004 2001 2002 2003 2004 2001 2002 2003 2004 Figure 2. Hispanic hate crime rate by Hispanic immigration rate for four states measure indicates the number of legal immigrants entering each state who originate from one of four countries of Hispanic origin (Mexico, the Dominican Republic, Cuba, and El Salvador).4 We divide this number by the number of foreign-born Hispanics in each state, and multiply by 100,000, to create the Hispanic immigration rate. This measure indicates the level and rate of growth in the Hispanic immigrant popu- lation between 2000 and 2004. To correct for skewness, we transformed the Hispanic immigration rate to its natural log. at SEIR on January 16, 2012ccj.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://ccj.sagepub.com/ Stacey et al. 287 The traditional indicator of minority group threat in prior research has been the relative size of the minority population. Therefore, the analysis also incorporates the percentage of the state population that is Hispanic (% Hispanic). The Hispanic immi- gration rate and the relative size of the Hispanic population may have independent effects on hate crime. Moreover, the two measures are not necessarily related and may trend in opposite directions, especially in “new destination” states with small Hispanic populations. For example, in 2004 Maine’s Hispanic population was less than 1% of the total population, and the Hispanic proportion of Maine’s population grew by 13% over the previous year. During the same period, however, the Hispanic immigration rate plunged by 83% from 4,755 immigrants per 100,000 foreign-born to 827 per 100,000 foreign-born. As indicated, the minority threat thesis predicts that the relationship between the social control of minority groups and their relative size may be curvilinear. To test for possible nonlinear effects of Hispanic immigration and group size on hate crime, we include squared terms for these measures in our analysis. We include as an indicator of economic threat the ratio of the non-Hispanic White unemployment rate to the Hispanic unemployment rate (W/H unemployment). According to the minority threat argument, economic threat may mediate or moderate the relation- ship between group size and social control. That is, increases in Hispanic immigration or group size may result in greater White unemployment relative to Hispanic unemploy- ment, which in turn may trigger more hate crime against Hispanics (mediation effect). Or, in states where the ratio of White to Hispanic unemployment is greater, the associa- tion between hate crime and immigration or group size may be strengthened (moderation effect). Finally, the White–Hispanic unemployment ratio may have an additive effect on hate crime. We examine each of these possibilities in our analysis. We also control for overall economic conditions in the state, reasoning that hate crimes against Hispanic immigrants (or those so perceived) may be elevated where general economic conditions are poor or deteriorating. We include Gross State Product per capita in chained dollars from the Bureau of Economic Analysis as a measure of state economic output and growth (Per capita GDP). We examine the additive effect of this measure on anti-Hispanic hate crimes and also the extent to which it may condi- tion the relationship between hate crime and Hispanic immigration or group size. As a measure of the size of the potential offending population, we include from the Census and ACS the percentage of the state population consisting of White males between the ages of 15 and 29 (% young White males). Because Hispanics are more heavily concentrated in the West than other regions, we include a binomial measure indicating whether a state is located in the West. A major source of heterogeneity among U. S. states is the extent to which they are urbanized. We therefore control for the percentage of the state population that resides in cities with populations of 100,000 or more (Urbanization). Additional sources of heterogeneity across the states are cap- tured by the state effects included in the models. Finally, we incorporate dummy indi- cators for Year to control for time-varying omitted variables that have common effects across the states. at SEIR on January 16, 2012ccj.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://ccj.sagepub.com/ 288 Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice 27(3) To ensure we are not simply picking up differences in the likelihood of police agen- cies and/or states reporting hate crimes to the UCR (i.e., adherence to the Hate Crime Statistics Act of 1990 that mandated data collection), two correlates of reporting are included, both taken from the UCR’s Hate Crime Reporting Program. The participa- tion of law enforcement agencies in the UCR’s Hate Crime Reporting Program has grown over time but was far from complete during the period under study. We there- fore control for the percentage of the state population covered by the agencies report- ing to the Hate Crime Reporting Program (% population covered). Many agencies report zero hate crimes against Hispanics in their jurisdictions, which may be accurate, especially in places with very small Hispanic populations, or may indicate a lack of fidelity with the Hate Crime Reporting Program and therefore constitute a source of measurement error. We therefore control for the percentage of agencies reporting non- zero hate crime counts (% nonzeros). Analytic Strategy To assess changes in anti-Hispanic hate crime over time, we use a generalized esti- mating equation with a first-order autoregressive correlation structure, log link func- tion, and negative binomial family of distributions. This approach allows us to estimate a population averaged negative binomial regression model for panel data while correcting for autocorrelation in the errors and overdispersion in the state hate crime counts, both of which are present in the data. Given the sparseness of anti- Hispanic hate crimes in many states, our dependent measure is the absolute frequency of anti-Hispanic hate crimes for each state-year. The logged Hispanic population size is included in the model as the indicator of exposure, with the coefficient constrained to 1. The population averaged model assesses average within-state change in the num- ber of anti-Hispanic hate crimes from one year to the next as a function of variation in the predictors. The model incorporates both the within and between unit variation in the covariance matrix. The outcome for this model is the mean response over time across all states. In other words, the coefficients for these models are interpreted as population averaged or marginal effects. Results Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the variables included in the analysis. The distributions are presented for all states and by region given the uneven regional dis- tribution of the U.S. Hispanic population. On average, states reported approximately 10 anti-Hispanic crimes each year between 2000 and 2004, but this varies consider- ably by region, with nearly twice as many hate crimes against Hispanics reported in the West as in the Northeast and four times as many as in the Midwest and South. Hispanic immigration, on the other hand, appears to be more evenly distributed across regions, with an average overall Hispanic immigration rate of 1,464 per 100,000 Hispanic foreign-born (not shown). On average, Hispanics constituted about 8% of at SEIR on January 16, 2012ccj.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://ccj.sagepub.com/ 289 T a b le 1 . D es cr ip ti ve S ta ti st ic s fo r V ar ia bl es in t he A na ly si s O ve ra ll W es t So ut h M id w es t N o rt he as t V ar ia bl e M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD H at e cr im e co un t 9 .9 45 21 .1 19 19 .9 69 43 .2 75 4 .5 06 8 .3 87 5 .5 17 6 .4 14 11 .6 44 14 .4 73 H is pa ni c im m ig ra ti o n (l n) 7 .2 89 0 .5 43 7 .4 04 0 .4 32 7 .1 16 0 .6 13 7 .4 33 0 .5 36 7 .2 56 0 .4 74 % H is pa ni c 8 .2 68 9 .1 48 15 .2 60 12 .1 79 6 .4 36 7 .9 53 4 .2 12 3 .2 21 7 .0 39 5 .4 74 W /H u ne m pl o ym en t 0 .7 21 0 .3 04 0 .6 80 0 .2 44 0 .7 73 0 .3 02 0 .6 92 0 .3 45 0 .7 24 0 .3 25 P e r ca pi ta G D P 35 ,0 46 12 ,1 04 33 ,7 28 5 ,1 73 36 ,1 53 19 ,7 62 33 ,2 54 2 ,5 87 37 ,2 48 3 ,1 63 % y o un g W hi te m al es 9 .5 29 0 .9 95 9 .8 31 1 .2 95 9 .4 68 0 .8 72 9 .9 71 0 .4 66 8 .6 18 0 .5 25 W es t 0 .2 55 0 .4 37 U rb an iz at io n 21 .5 36 19 .0 61 30 .1 37 20 .8 02 20 .3 71 23 .0 43 19 .0 46 9 .0 24 14 .6 34 13 .2 64 % p o pu la ti o n co ve re d 81 .3 97 28 .3 35 79 .3 33 30 .7 36 78 .9 49 34 .0 82 78 .6 44 23 .1 86 92 .6 70 12 .8 06 % n o nz er o s 21 .4 40 23 .9 43 24 .9 47 26 .1 47 17 .4 42 23 .5 60 21 .3 01 25 .9 88 24 .1 12 17 .1 28 N o te : L n = n at ur al lo g at SEIR on January 16, 2012ccj.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://ccj.sagepub.com/ 290 Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice 27(3) state populations during the period, with a strong concentration of Hispanics in west- ern states. The average White-to-Hispanic unemployment ratio was 0.721. The UCR’s Hate Crime Reporting Program covered about 81% of state populations, with somewhat higher coverage in the Northeast than other regions. Finally, about 21% of the reporting agencies reported nonzero anti-Hispanic hate crime counts, which underscores the importance of controlling for nonzero hate-crime counts in the multi- variate analysis. Figure 1, introduced earlier, presents the relationship between the average state trend in the anti-Hispanic hate crime rate and the Hispanic immigration rate between 2000 and 2004. To place them on the same scale, the two series have been expressed in units of standard deviation from their respective means. After rising through 2002, the Hispanic immigration rate dropped in 2003 and then rose in 2004. The hate crime rate fell through 2003 and also rose in 2004. Although suggestive, the nationally aggre- gated data conceal variation across the states in both trends. Figure 2 illustrates these state differences by comparing the hate crime and immigration trends (in stan- dard scores) in two traditional Hispanic immigrant “gateway” states (California and Texas) and two states with low rates of Hispanic immigration during the observation period (Illinois and Idaho). In each case, we observe a rough correspondence between the fluctuations in the hate crime and immigration trends. However, the question remains whether a significant relationship exists between Hispanic immigration and hate crime controlling for other state characteristics. The results of the multivariate analysis are shown in Table 2. Model 1 presents the effects of each of the predictors on anti-Hispanic hate crimes, excluding moderating and nonlinear effects. In this model, the effect of Hispanic immigration is significant and positive, consistent with the minority threat thesis. By contrast, the relative size of the Hispanic population is inversely related to anti-Hispanic hate crime, whereas minority threat theory would predict a positive effect of minority group size on hate crime. The ratio of White-to-Hispanic unemployment, the measure of economic threat, does not have a significant effect on anti-Hispanic hate crime, nor does per capita GDP, the measure of overall state economic conditions. Neither measure, therefore, mediates the relationship between hate crime and either Hispanic immigration or group size. Anti-Hispanic hate crime is not significantly related to the size of the young White male population or to the degree of urbanization in the state, but hate crime targeting Hispanics is more prevalent in western than nonwestern states. Finally, both of the reporting controls are significant and positive, suggesting as would be expected that states with a greater level of participation in the Hate Crime Reporting Program and fewer law enforcement agencies reporting zero hate-crime counts have more reported hate crime. Model 2 of Table 2 incorporates squared terms for the Hispanic immigration rate and the Hispanic percentage of the state population. In neither case do we observe a signifi- cant effect, suggesting that these measures do not have nonlinear effects on anti-Hispanic hate crime. Model 3 adds interaction terms for the immigration and group size variables and the measures of economic threat and overall state economic conditions, respectively. at SEIR on January 16, 2012ccj.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://ccj.sagepub.com/ Stacey et al. 291 Table 2. Regression Analysis of Anti-Hispanic Hate Crimes on Predictors, 2000-2004 (Robust SE) Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Coefficient SE Coefficient SE Coefficient SE Intercept −15.541** 1.128 −14.430* 7.346 −14.464 7.588 Hispanic immigration (ln) 0.366** 0.127 0.118 1.935 0.110 2.008 Hispanic immigration (ln)2 — — 0.015 0.130 0.012 0.134 % Hispanic −0.066** 0.009 −0.112** 0.038 −0.119** 0.040 % Hispanic2 — — 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 W/H unemployment 0.568 0.441 0.571 0.460 0.569 0.456 W/H unemployment × Immigration — — — — 0.003 0.028 W/H unemployment × % Hispanic — — — — −0.000 0.001 Per capita GDP −0.000 0.000 −0.000 0.000 −0.000 0.000 GDP × Immigration — — — — −0.000 0.000 GDP × % Hispanic — — — — −0.000 0.000 % young White males 0.040 0.062 0.029 0.062 0.047 0.074 West 0.457* 0.193 0.537* 0.212 0.539* 0.214 Urbanization −0.001 0.007 0.001 0.008 0.002 0.008 % population covered 0.026** 0.003 0.027** 0.003 0.027** 0.003 % nonzeros 0.016** 0.004 0.018** 0.004 0.018** 0.004 Exposure: Hispanic population — — — — — — Wald chi-square 265.19 236.91 353.35 Obs 255 255 255 Grps 51 51 51 Note: Year effects not shown. Obs = observations; grps = groups *p < .05. **p < .01. The interaction terms are introduced to determine whether the effects of Hispanic immi- gration and group size on anti-Hispanic hate crime are moderated by the economic indi- cators. The results reveal no support for the moderating hypotheses. at SEIR on January 16, 2012ccj.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://ccj.sagepub.com/ 292 Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice 27(3) Robustness of Results Consistent with expectations, we observe higher levels of anti-Hispanic hate crime in periods and places with higher levels of Hispanic immigration. Yet, contrary to expec- tations, we find less hate crime against Hispanics when and where Hispanics consti- tute a larger fraction of the population. To test the robustness of these results against reasonable modifications in the data and model specification, we conducted a number of sensitivity analyses. We first restricted the sample to those state-years with at least one anti-Hispanic hate crime. This resulted in 152 observations across 31 states. The immigration measure remains positive and significant and the group size measure remains negative and significant, and neither has a nonlinear effect on hate crime, when estimated on the restricted data. In addition, the White-to-Hispanic unemploy- ment ratio becomes significant (p < .05) in this model but, contrary to expectations based on the minority threat framework, its effect on hate crime is negative. In other words, anti-Hispanic hate crime is reduced as White unemployment grows in relation to Hispanic unemployment. Second, we reestimated Model 1 of Table 2 after dropping the nonsignificant predic- tors from the equation. This produced no change in the results for the immigration and group size measures. Third, it is possible that the level of economic deprivation in a state has greater relevance for hate crime than the measure of general economic condi- tions used in the analysis. We therefore substituted the state poverty rate for per capita GDP in our models. The poverty rate does not have a significant additive effect on hate crime nor does it moderate the effects of Hispanic immigration or group size. Finally, prior research reveals important similarities in patterns of hate crime and aggravated assaults not associated with a hate or bias motive (Messner, McHugh, & Felson, 2004). The majority of hate crimes against Hispanics are interpersonal while overall crime pat- terns (such as the index crime rate) tend to be heavily influenced by larceny offenses that rarely carry a bias motivation. This raises the possibility that our measure of hate crime may be confounded to some degree with state trends in interpersonal violence such as aggravated assault. We therefore controlled for the UCR rate of aggravated assaults per 100,000 state residents in our models. The aggravated assault rate is consis- tently nonsignificant in these estimations and our major findings remain unchanged.5 Conclusion Recent Hispanic immigration to the United States has become a politically charged public issue with significant consequences for immigration policy, the communities in which immigrants settle, and not least, the immigrants themselves. Although political conflict centers largely on illegal immigration, in practice legal and illegal immigrants are not easily distinguished, nor are immigrants readily distinguished from coethnic residents who resemble the new arrivals in language, customs, and appearance. Any Hispanic person, regardless of residency status, may be targeted by the new nativism. at SEIR on January 16, 2012ccj.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://ccj.sagepub.com/ Stacey et al. 293 Therefore, one collateral consequence of recent Hispanic immigration, we have hypoth- esized, is hate crime. The results of our analysis of anti-Hispanic hate crime reveal a positive relationship between state-level variation in anti-Hispanic hate crime and recent Hispanic immi- gration. This result is consistent with the minority threat framework, which implies that growth in a potentially threatening group will result in an increase in actions, informal as well as formal, to control that group. But other results do not support minority threat theory and are more consistent with the defended communities’ per- spective although that perspective, developed to explain bias crime at the neighbor- hood level, cannot be directly tested at the state level. We find a significant negative linear relationship, and no evidence of a nonlinear relationship, between anti-Hispanic hate crime and the relative size of the Hispanic population. Where Hispanics are more numerous, hate crimes against them are less frequent. Furthermore, we find little evi- dence that anti-Hispanic hate crime is triggered by economic threat to the majority Anglo population, another implication of minority-threat theory. Taken together, these results suggest that anti-Hispanic hate crime is a consequence of Hispanic immigra- tion, and arguably the fear and anger it produces in segments of the majority popula- tion, rather than the relative size or economic position of the Hispanic minority, which if anything may serve as protective factors. Our results withstand controls for several state characteristics, including the degree of urbanization, general economic conditions, the size of the potential offender popula- tion, unobserved state and period effects, and reasonable modifications to the sample and predictors. Nonetheless, we must acknowledge several limitations of the analysis. States are highly relevant policy units for an analysis of hate crime, but we cannot assume that similar research based on smaller, more homogeneous population aggre- gates, such as cities or neighborhoods, would have yielded the same findings. An important direction for future research, therefore, is to examine the relationship between Hispanic immigration and hate crime using different units of analysis. Our analysis is limited to the relationship between hate crime and legal immigra- tion, even though current political debates and public concerns focus on the control of undocumented immigrants. The validity of our analysis rests heavily on two assump- tions regarding the connection between legal and illegal immigration. The first is that undocumented immigrants have generally the same destination and settlement pat- terns as legal immigrants. The second is that, as a practical matter, potential hate crime offenders cannot reliably distinguish legal and illegal immigrants or, for that matter, immigrants and the longstanding residents who resemble them. Although both assump- tions appear reasonable, much more research is needed to validate them. Existing esti- mates of illegal immigration are imperfect and vary considerably depending on the source. Criminologists should be particularly concerned with understanding the factors affect- ing target selection by hate crime offenders. While the measurement of hate crimes has improved in the years since the FBI first began collecting data, many agencies consistently fail to report any hate crimes in their jurisdiction. The large number of zero counts in the hate crime data indicates the at SEIR on January 16, 2012ccj.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://ccj.sagepub.com/ 294 Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice 27(3) continuing need to improve hate crime reporting by both victims and law enforcement. Immigrant victims may fail to report hate crime incidents because they fear deporta- tion. Although Congress has created a number of special visa categories (the S, T, and U visas) to encourage and facilitate reporting of particular crimes by undocumented immigrants, it is unclear to what extent these efforts alleviate the underreporting prob- lem (Kittrie, 2006). There are strict limits on the number of such visas that can be extended each year and only victims of certain crimes (i.e., human trafficking or domestic violence, or victims who offer substantial assistance in the prosecution of a criminal or terrorist organization) are eligible. An alternative approach to increase reporting may be the implementation of “sanctuary policies” within law enforcement agencies to ensure that undocumented immigrant crime victims are not reported to federal immigration authorities (Kittrie, 2006). In addition, specialized training of police officers in hate crime identification and formal policies within police depart- ments on how to handle hate crime could improve the accuracy and integrity of hate crime statistics. In any case, further inquiry into such matters is crucial and, in particu- lar, greater attention should be paid to those crimes experienced by immigrants that go unreported to police. In summary, our analysis is based on strong assumptions regarding our key mea- sures. We therefore regard our results as provisional and encourage other researchers to evaluate the relationship between immigration and hate crime with alternative mea- sures, methods, and data. In particular, researchers should incorporate other important contextual characteristics such as gateway status (perhaps at lower levels of aggrega- tion) as well as both minority and majority political strength. If future research confirms our finding that anti-Hispanic hate crime is a consequence of immigration, we suggest several directions for policy and theory development. Assuming that Hispanic immigra- tion is a robust predictor of anti-Hispanic hate crime, immigration data may prove use- ful in forecasting such crime for law enforcement. Policy makers in the United States should also consider extending current hate crime statutes by including immigrants as a protected category. The response to immigration from policy makers has, in general, been to make it more difficult for immigrants to enter the country. Even policy makers who would toughen current immigration laws, however, should want to minimize vio- lence and other crimes motivated by bias against immigrants, or those who are per- ceived to be immigrants, and to make it easier to identify immigrant victims. Finally, the current research highlights the importance of continued development and, perhaps, modification, of the minority-threat framework by incorporating immi- gration and nationality as sources of threat to majority cultural identity. Our results imply that the primary threat posed by immigration may be cultural rather than economic. Prior research has shown that public views of immigration are shaped more by per- ceived cultural threats, especially to English language dominance, than by economic position or outlook, political ideology, or even fear of crime (Chandler & Tsai, 2001). In addition to moving beyond the Black–White dichotomy, a renewed focus on immi- gration would enrich minority-threat theory by directing attention to culture as a source of group conflict and social control. at SEIR on January 16, 2012ccj.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://ccj.sagepub.com/ Stacey et al. 295 Acknowledgments We wish to thank Elizabeth Aranda, the guest editors, and the reviewers for their feedback. Declaration of Conflicting Interests The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article. Funding The authors received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article. Notes 1. Although numerous media accounts exist of violent and lethal attacks on immigrants and a handful of reports highlight the “human faces” of anti-immigrant sentiment (see, for exam- ple, LCCREF, 2009; SPLC, 2008), the growth in anti-Hispanic crimes reported by the FBI has gone “relatively unnoticed” by policy makers (Martinez, 2010). There is evidence of such research elsewhere, however. For example, Bunar (2007) analyzes the increase from 1997 to 2003 in xenophobic crimes in Sweden. 2. Minority group threat predicts a positive relationship between minority population growth— in our case, immigration—and hate crimes against Hispanics. The defended communities’ perspective (Green et al., 1998b; Suttles, 1972) also proposes a positive relationship between minority population and the use of social control. The argument is that ethnically homoge- neous neighborhoods develop a sense of cohesion which, when threatened, will be defended through the use of mechanisms of informal social control. Thus, racially motivated crimes will occur most frequently in areas where the majority (Whites) have long dominated and in areas experiencing a rapid influx of minorities. Given the focus on community cohesion, we believe that this perspective is more suitable for analyses involving neighborhoods as the unit of analysis, yet we do consider it in the discussion of our results. 3. Although there is a considerable amount of “illegal” or undocumented immigration into the United States, there are a number of difficulties in determining a reliable estimate of the number of undocumented persons entering the country each year. The Census Bureau and other government agencies do not count the number of undocumented immigrants directly, but rather use a “residual method” to estimate the size and characteristics of the undocu- mented population (Passel, 2006). Such estimates rely on a number of assumptions that are difficult to verify. 4. Data from other Latin and South American countries are missing for a number of years and are excluded. The four countries of origin included in the analysis represent a large propor- tion of recent Hispanic immigrants to the United States. Specifically, with the exception of 2002 when Cuba contributed only 9,000 immigrants, each of these four countries contrib- uted more than 20,000 immigrants each year. Together, they account for about 70% of all Hispanic immigrants and about 25% of total immigration each year. 5. The results of the sensitivity analyses are available from the authors by request. at SEIR on January 16, 2012ccj.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://ccj.sagepub.com/ 296 Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice 27(3) References Blalock, H. M. (1967). Toward a theory of minority-group relations. New York NY: John Wiley. Bunar, N. (2007). Hate crimes against immigrants in Sweden and community responses. American Behavioral Scientist, 51, 166-181. Chandler, C. R., & Tsai, Y.-M. (2001). Social factors influencing immigration attitudes: An analysis of data from the General Social Survey. Social Science Journal,38, 177-188. Chang, R. S., & Aoki, K. (1997). Centering the immigrant in the inter/national imagination. California Law Review, 85, 1395-1447. Cornelius, W. A. (2002). Ambivalent reception: Mass public responses to the “new” Latino immigration to the United States. In M. Súarez-Orozco (Ed.), Latinos: A research agenda for the 21st century (pp. 165-89). Berkeley: University of California Press. Craig, K. M. (2002). Examining hate-motivated aggression: A review of the social psycho- logical literature on hate crimes as a distinct form of aggression. Aggression and Violent Behavior, 7, 85–101. Eitle, D., D’Alessio, S. J., & Stolzenberg, L. (2002). Racial threat and social control: A test of the political, economic, and threat of black crime hypotheses. Social Forces, 81, 557-576. Federal Bureau of Investigation. (2004). Hate crime statistics, 2003. 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Massey (Ed.), New faces in new places: The changing geography of American immigration (pp. 1-21). New York, NY: Russell Sage. Ibrahim, M. (2005). The securitization of migration: A racial discourse. International Migra- tion, 43, 163-187. King, R. D. (2007). The context of minority group threat: Race, institutions, and complying with Hate Crime Law. Law and Society Review, 41, 189-224. King, R. D., Messner, S. F., & Baller, R. D. (2009). Contemporary hate crimes, law enforce- ment, and the legacy of racial violence. American Sociological Review, 74, 291-315. King, R. D., & Wheelock, D. (2007). Group threat and social control: Race, perceptions of minorities and the desire to punish. Social Forces, 85, 1255-1280. at SEIR on January 16, 2012ccj.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://ccj.sagepub.com/ Stacey et al. 297 Kittrie, O. F. (2006). Federalism, deportation, and crime victims afraid to call the police. Iowa Law Review, 91, 1449-1508. Leadership Conference on Civil Rights Education Fund. (2009). Confronting the new faces of hate: Hate crimes in America. Retrieved from http://www.civilrights.org/publications/ hatecrimes/lccref_hate_crimes_report.pdf Lee, M. T., Martinez, R., Jr., & Rosenfeld, R. (2001). Does immigration increase homicide? Negative evidence from three border cities. Sociological Quarterly, 42, 559-580. Lyons, C. J. (2007). Community (dis)organization and racially motivated crime. American Journal of Sociology, 113, 815-863. Martinez, R., Jr. (2010). Crime and immigration. Criminologist, 35, 16-17. Martinez, R., Jr., & Lee, M. T. (2000). On immigration and crime. In G. LaFree (Ed.), The nature of crime: Continuity and change, Vol. 1: Criminal justice 2000 (pp. 485-524). Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice. Massey, D. S., & Capoferro, C. (2009). The geographic diversification of American immigra- tion. In D.S. Massey (Ed.), New faces in new places: The changing geography of American immigration (pp. 25-50). New York, NY: Russell Sage. Messner, S. F., McHugh, S., & Felson, R. B. (2004). Distinctive characteristics of assaults moti- vated by bias. Criminology, 42, 585-618. Montero-Sieburth, M., & Meléndez, E. (2007). The new nativism and Latinos in a changing soci- ety. In M. Montero-Sieburth & E. Meléndez (Eds.), Latinos in a changing society (pp. 3-33). Westport, CT: Praeger. Morenoff, J. D., Sampson, R. J., & Raudenbush, S. W. (2001). Neighborhood inequality, collec- tive efficacy, and the spatial dynamics of urban violence. Criminology, 39, 517-559. Passel, J. S. (2006, March 7). The size and characteristics of the unauthorized migrant popula- tion in the U.S.: Estimates based on the March 2005 Current Population Study. Pew His- panic Center. Retrieved from http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/61.pdf Perea, J. F. (1997). Introduction. In J. F. Perea (Ed.), Immigrants out: The new nativism and the anti-immigrant impulse in the United States (pp. 1-10). New York: New York University Press. Perry, B. (2001). In the name of hate: Understanding hate crimes. New York, NY: Routledge. Quillian, L. (1995). Prejudice as a response to perceived group threat: Population composition and anti-immigrant and racial prejudice in Europe. American Sociological Review, 60, 586-611. Rumbaut, R. G. (1994). Origins and destinies: Immigration to the United States since World War II. Sociological Forum, 9, 583-621. Rumbaut, R. G., & Ewing, W. A. (2007). The myth of immigrant criminality and the paradox of assimilation: Incarceration rates among native and foreign-born men. Washington, DC: Immigration Policy Center, American Immigration Law Foundation. Schmidley, A. D. (2001). Profile of the foreign-born population in the United States: 2000 (U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Reports, Series P23-206). Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. Southern Poverty Law Center. (2008). Hate crimes: Anti-Latino hate crimes up for fourth year. Retrieved from http://www.splcenter.org/get-informed/intelligence-report/browse-all-issues/ 2008/winter/hate-crimes at SEIR on January 16, 2012ccj.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://ccj.sagepub.com/ 298 Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice 27(3) Stowell, J. I., Messner, S. F., McGeever, K. F., & Raffalovich, L. E. (2009). Immigration and the recent violent crime drop in the United States: A pooled, cross-sectional time-series analysis of metropolitan areas. Criminology, 47, 889-928. Suttles, G. D. (1972). The social construction of communities. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. U.S. Census Bureau. (2009). Estimates of the Resident Population by Race and Hispanic Origin United States and States: July 1, 2008 (SC-EST2008-04). Retrieved from http://www.census .gov/popest/states/asrh/SC-EST2008-04.html Bios Michele Stacey is assistant professor of criminology and criminal justice at Virginia Union University. Kristin Carbone-López is assistant professor of criminology and criminal justice at the University of Missouri–St. Louis. Richard Rosenfeld is curators professor of criminology and criminal justice at the University of Missouri–St. Louis. He is a fellow and immediate past president of the American Society of Criminology and currently serves on the Science Advisory Board of the Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice. at SEIR on January 16, 2012ccj.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://ccj.sagepub.com/ 
work_4wpkpksze5cgzdfnkfe2jgbomm	----	ANTISEMITIC INCIDENTS Report 2017 Antisemitic messages posted on a popular dating app, London, September The text and illustrations may only be reproduced with prior permission of Community Security Trust. Published by Community Security Trust. Registered charity in England and Wales (1042391) and Scotland (SC043612). Copyright © 2018 Community Security Trust. Front cover: The front cover is a word cloud taken from web-based social media incidents recorded by CST in 2017. The size of each word indicates its frequency in this genuine sample of social media incidents and demonstrates the range of antisemitic language, and the most common antisemitic words, that offenders use. CONTENTS Executive summary ................................................. 4 Introduction ............................................................. 10 Antisemitic incidents in the United Kingdom in 2017 ....................................... 12 • Contexts and patterns ...................................... 12 Incident categories ................................................ 18 • Extreme violence .............................................. 18 • Assault ................................................................. 18 • Damage and desecration to Jewish property 20 • Threats ................................................................. 21 • Abusive behaviour ............................................ 22 • Literature ............................................................. 24 Information collection and suspicious behaviour ........................................... 26 Incident victims .................................................... 27 Incident offenders ............................................... 29 Discourse and motives ........................................ 30 Antisemitic or anti-Israel? .................................... 32 Geographical locations and differences ......... 34 Typology of incidents: Mission, opportunistic or aggravated? ............................. 36 Antisemitic incidents on social media .............. 39 • Categories of antisemitic incidents on social media .................................................. 39 • Types of antisemitic language online ............ 40 • Football-related online incidents ................... 41 Annual antisemitic incident figures ................... 42 • Antisemitic incident f igures by category, 2007–2017 ............................................................ 42 • Antisemitic incident f igures by month, 2007–2017 ............................................................ 42 • Antisemitic incident f igures, full breakdown, 2017 .......................................... 43 4 Antisemitic Incidents Report 2017 www.cst.org.uk • CST recorded 1,382 antisemitic incidents in 2017, the highest annual total CST has ever recorded.1 The total of 1,382 incidents is an increase of three per cent from the 2016 total of 1,346 antisemitic incidents, which was itself a record annual total. The third highest annual total recorded by CST was 1,182 antisemitic incidents in 2014.2 • There has been a 34 per cent increase in the number of antisemitic incidents recorded in the category of Assaults in 2017: 145 incidents in 2017, compared to 108 in 2016. As in 2016, CST did not classify any of the assaults as Extreme Violence, meaning an attack potentially causing loss of life or grievous bodily harm. This is the highest annual total of Assaults recorded by CST, surpassing the 121 incidents recorded in 2009. • Antisemitic incidents recorded by CST occurred more in the first six months of 2017 than in the second half of the year. The highest monthly total in 2017 came in January with 155 incidents; the second highest was in April with 142 incidents; and the third highest was in February with 134 incidents reported. Every month from January to October, CST recorded a monthly incident total above 100 incidents. This continued an utterly unprecedented sequence of monthly totals exceeding 100 antisemitic incidents since April 2016, a run of 19 consecutive months. There were 89 incidents recorded in November and 78 in December. There is no obvious reason why November and December 2017 saw an end to this sequence, although historically CST has usually recorded fewer antisemitic incidents in December in comparison to other months. It is too soon to predict whether this decline in monthly incident totals towards the end of 2017 marks the beginning of a downward trend from the sustained highs of the past two years. • Previous record high annual totals in 2014 and 2009 occurred when conflicts in Israel and Gaza acted as sudden trigger events that caused steep, identifiable ‘spikes’ in antisemitic incidents recorded by CST. In contrast, in 2017 (as in 2016) there was not a sudden, statistically outlying large spike in incidents to cause and explain the overall record high. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 2. The numbers given in this report for previous years’ incident totals may differ from those previously published as this report includes incidents reported to CST after the publication of previous reports, and reflects the re-categorisation of some incidents after publication due to the emergence of new information. As well as affecting the annual totals, these adjustments mean that some of the monthly, category and geographical totals for previous years cited in this report differ from previously published data. CST has been recording antisemitic incident statistics since 1984. MONTHLY INCIDENTS, 2017 150 100 50 0 JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC 155 134 109 142 117 124 112 155 109 109 104 89 78 1. CST takes reports of incidents from a range of sources, including members of the public, the Police and security guards at Jewish buildings. Variations in methods and percentage rates of reporting will therefore always influence the total number of incidents recorded by CST. (For more details see p.10 and p.11). http://www.cst.org.uk 5Antisemitic Incidents Report 2017 www.cst.org.uk • The factors that influenced the general, sustained high level of antisemitic incidents in 2017 appear to be a continuation of those that similarly affected the level of incidents during 2016. In general terms, there was a rise in all forms of hate crime following the referendum to leave the European Union in June 2016. Regarding Jews specifically, there was unprecedented publicity regarding controversies about alleged and actual antisemitism in the Labour Party. As would be the case for any form of hate crime, both issues are likely to have emboldened offenders, whilst also causing victims to be more aware of the need to report incidents. • The terrorist attacks at Westminster, Manchester, London Bridge and Finsbury Park, and the failed bomb attack on a tube train at Parsons Green in 2017 did not directly cause spikes in antisemitic incidents reported to CST (which would have been revealed in the timings and content of incidents and conversation with victims). However, these terrorist attacks may have contributed in a more indirect way. 2017 was a year in which the UK faced its most severe threat of terrorism for many years. Twice in 2017, after the Manchester Arena bombing and the Parsons Green bombing, the threat level was raised to its maximum level ‘Critical,’ meaning an attack was imminent. This understandably caused concern within the Jewish community, which may have encouraged victims and witnesses to be more aware of hate crime and report antisemitic incidents to CST. Following the terror attacks, there was also an increased police and CST presence in Jewish community areas, which may have made people more likely to report incidents. • There have been some improvements in the reporting of antisemitic incidents which may have contributed to the continued increase in incident numbers. These improvements include a higher percentage of incidents being reported from victims and witnesses of incidents as a result of growing communal concern about antisemitism; an increase in the number of security guards at Jewish buildings in recent years (many of these commercial guards are funded by a government grant to provide security at Jewish locations that is administered by CST); and ongoing improvements to CST’s information sharing with Police forces around the UK. The number of antisemitic incidents reported to CST by security guards or security officers at Jewish locations has increased in comparison to 2016 and 2015. • In addition to the 1,382 antisemitic incidents recorded by CST in 2017, a further 872 reports of potential incidents were received by CST but not included in the total number of antisemitic incidents, as there was no evidence of antisemitic motivation, targeting or content. This is a ten per cent increase from the 791 potential incidents that were reported to CST in 2016 but not included in the antisemitic incident statistics for that year. Many of these potential incidents involve suspicious activity or possible hostile reconnaissance at Jewish locations. These potential incidents play an important role in CST’s provision of security protection to the Jewish community, but they are not classified as antisemitic for the purposes of this report. In total, CST staff and volunteers recorded, processed and analysed 2,254 incidents and potential incidents in 2017, most of which required some element of victim support or security response. • Three-quarters of the 1,382 antisemitic incidents recorded in 2017 took place in Greater London and Greater Manchester, the two largest Jewish communities in the UK. CST recorded 773 antisemitic incidents in Greater London in 2017 compared to 835 during 2016, a decrease of seven per cent. In Greater Manchester, CST recorded 261 incidents in 2017 compared http://www.cst.org.uk 6 Antisemitic Incidents Report 2017 www.cst.org.uk to 206 in 2016, an increase of 27 per cent. This is the opposite pattern to that seen in 2016, when the number of recorded antisemitic incidents rose in London but fell in Manchester. It is not clear why the two cities have displayed different trends during these two years, other than natural variation over time. Beyond these two centres, CST recorded 348 antisemitic incidents in 80 locations around the UK in 2017, compared to 305 incidents from 96 different locations in 2016 (an increase of 14 per cent in the number of incidents). The 2017 total included 40 antisemitic incidents in Hertfordshire (of which 18 were in Borehamwood), 32 in Gateshead, 22 in Leeds, 15 in Brighton & Hove, 14 in Cambridge and 12 in Liverpool. • It is likely that there is significant under-reporting of antisemitic incidents to both CST and the Police, and that the number of antisemitic incidents that took place is significantly higher than the number recorded in this report. A 2013 survey of Jewish experiences and perceptions of antisemitism in the EU found that 72 per cent of British Jews who had experienced antisemitic harassment over the previous five years had not reported it to the Police or to any other organisation; 57 per cent of British Jews who had experienced antisemitic violence or the threat of violence had not reported it; and 46 per cent of British Jews who had suffered antisemitic vandalism to their home or car had not reported it (despite this, UK reporting rates were the highest of the eight countries polled). The same survey also found that, over the previous 12 months, 21 per cent of British Jews had suffered antisemitic harassment, three per cent had suffered antisemitic violence or the threat of violence and two per cent had experienced antisemitic vandalism to their home or car.3 Similarly, the Crime Survey for England and Wales estimates that around 40 per cent of all hate crimes come to the attention of the Police.4 • There were 145 violent antisemitic assaults reported to CST in 2017, an increase of 34 per cent from the 108 violent incidents recorded in 2016 and the highest number CST has ever recorded in this category. The previous record high was 121 antisemitic assaults in 2009. A wide spectrum of incidents falls within the category of Assault, from minor acts to more violent ones. None of the violent incidents recorded in 2017 were classified as Extreme Violence, which would mean incidents that involved grievous bodily harm (GBH) or a threat to life. CST did not record any Extreme Violence incidents in 2016, and recorded four incidents of Extreme Violence in 2015 and one in 2014. • Incidents of Damage and Desecration to Jewish property increased by 14 per cent, from 81 incidents in 2016 to 92 incidents in 2017. There were 65 incidents in this category in 2015 and 81 in 2014. • There were 95 incidents reported to CST in the category of Threats in 2017, which includes direct threats to people or property, rather than more general abuse. This is a decrease of six per cent from the 101 incidents of this type recorded in 2016, which was the highest total CST had ever recorded in this category. CST recorded 79 incidents in 2015 and 91 in 2014. • There were 1,038 incidents of Abusive Behaviour recorded by CST in 2017, just one fewer than the 1,039 incidents recorded in this category in 2016 and the second highest total CST has ever recorded in this category. Incidents of Abusive Behaviour include verbal abuse, hate mail, antisemitic graffiti on non-Jewish property and antisemitic content on social media. CST recorded 717 incidents in this category in 2015 and 899 in 2014. • There were 12 incidents recorded in the category of Literature in 2017, which comprises mass-produced antisemitic mailings and emails, rather than individual 3.Discrimination and hate crime against Jews in EU Member States: experiences and perceptions of antisemitism (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2013). 4.An Overview of Hate Crime in England and Wales (London: Home Office, Office for National Statistics and Ministry of Justice, 2013). http://www.cst.org.uk 7Antisemitic Incidents Report 2017 www.cst.org.uk hate mail. This is a decrease of 29 per cent from the 17 incidents recorded in this category in 2016. CST recorded 12 incidents in this category in 2015 and 30 in 2014. • The most common single type of incident in 2017 involved verbal abuse directed at random Jewish people in public, a form of antisemitism that is more commonly associated with anti-social behaviour or local patterns of street crime than with political activism or ideologies. In 356 incidents, the victims were Jewish people, male or female, attacked or abused while going about their daily business in public places. In at least 283 of these incidents, the victims were visibly Jewish, usually due to their religious or traditional clothing, school uniform or jewellery bearing Jewish symbols. A total of 670 antisemitic incidents out of the 1,382 incidents in 2017 involved verbal antisemitic abuse. • CST recorded 247 antisemitic incidents that involved the use of social media in 2017, which represents 18 per cent of the overall total of 1,382 antisemitic incidents. For comparison, CST recorded 289 incidents in 2016 that involved the use of social media, which was 21 per cent of the overall incident total that year. This shows that the number of social media incidents recorded by CST declined in 2017. However, this figure should not be taken as an absolute measure of the amount of antisemitism on social media platforms. CST does not proactively ‘trawl’ social media platforms to look for incidents of this type and will only record social media incidents that have been reported to CST by a member of the public, where the offender is based in the UK or the incident involves the direct antisemitic targeting of a UK- based victim. The decline in the number of antisemitic incidents on social media in 2017 may be a positive consequence of social media companies trying to improve the way they tackle hate speech online, which, combined with arrests and prosecutions, have removed some antisemitic users from social media platforms and restricted the activities of others. It could also be a result of CST’s ongoing efforts to identify where offenders are based in order to determine whether antisemitic content should be included in CST’s statistics: if neither offender nor victim is based in the UK, CST will not include antisemitic social media content in its figures. NUMBER OF INCIDENTS, 2012–2017 20162015201420132012 2017 1,500 1,000 500 0 535 650 1,182 960 1,346 1,382 http://www.cst.org.uk 8 Antisemitic Incidents Report 2017 www.cst.org.uk • Seventy-six antisemitic incidents in 2017 targeted synagogues, and a further 44 incidents targeted synagogue congregants on their way to or from prayers, compared to 64 and 25 incidents respectively in 2016. • In 141 incidents, the victims were Jewish community organisations, communal events, commercial premises or high-profile individuals, compared to 169 such incidents in 2016. • Eighty-eight incidents targeted Jewish schools, schoolchildren or staff in 2017, compared to 82 incidents relating to schools and schoolchildren in 2016. Of the 88 incidents of this type recorded in 2017, 40 affected Jewish schoolchildren on their journeys to or from school; 31 took place at the premises of Jewish faith schools; and 17 involved Jewish children or teachers at non-faith schools. • In 22 antisemitic incidents, the victims were Jewish students, academics or other student bodies, compared to 41 such incidents recorded in 2016. Of the 22 incidents recorded in this sector in 2017, 20 took place on campus, while there were two incidents that affected students, academics or student bodies off campus. Two of the 22 incidents recorded in this sector were in the category of Damage and Desecration, there was one Threat, 18 incidents in the category of Abusive Behaviour and one incident in the category of Literature. • Similar to the Police’s perpetrator description system of IC1, IC2, IC3, IC4, IC5 and IC6, CST will ask incident victims or witnesses if they can describe the person, or people, who committed the incident they are reporting. Interactions between perpetrators and victims may be crude and brief, leaving little reliable information and while it is often possible to receive reports regarding the apparent appearance or motivation of incident offenders, this is not absolute proof of the offenders’ actual ethnic or religious identity, nor of their motivation. In addition, many incidents do not involve face-to-face contact between offender and victim, so there is no physical description of the offender. With these caveats, CST does provide data regarding the ethnic appearance of incident offenders, and the discourse they use to abuse or threaten Jews. • CST received a physical description of the incident offender in 420, or 30 per cent, of the 1,382 antisemitic incidents recorded during 2017. Of these, 225 offenders (54 per cent) were described as ‘White – North European’; 13 offenders (three per cent) were described as ‘White – South European’; 77 offenders (18 per cent) were described as ‘Black’; 74 offenders (18 per cent) were described as ‘South Asian’; one offender (0.2 per cent) was described as ‘Far East or South East Asian’; and 30 offenders (seven per cent) were described as ‘Arab or North African’. • There were 221 antisemitic incidents which showed far right, anti-Israel or Islamist beliefs or motivations alongside antisemitism in 2017, making up 16 per cent of the overall total of 1,382 Antisemitic tweet sent to a Jewish charity, London, August http://www.cst.org.uk 9Antisemitic Incidents Report 2017 www.cst.org.uk antisemitic incidents, compared to 246 incidents showing such ideas or motivations in 2016 (18 per cent of the overall total for that year). Of the 221 antisemitic incidents in 2017 showing ideological motivation or beliefs as well as antisemitism, 140 showed far right motivation or beliefs; 67 showed anti-Israel motivation or beliefs; and 14 showed Islamist motivation or beliefs. • There is no straightforward correlation between the ethnicity of incident offenders and the antisemitic language they use; contemporary antisemitic incident offenders will select from a range of Jewish-related subjects, particularly insults related to the Holocaust or Israel, for language or imagery with which to abuse, insult or threaten their Jewish victims. • CST receives reports of antisemitic incidents from a range of sources, including directly from victims or members of their family; from witnesses; from CST’s own national volunteer structure; from security guards at Jewish buildings; and via incident data sharing programmes with Police forces around the UK. In 2015 CST signed a national information sharing agreement with the National Police Chiefs’ Council (under its former name of the Association of Chief Police Officers), that allows for the systematic sharing of antisemitic incident reports between CST and the Police, so that both agencies have sight of incidents that had not otherwise been reported to them. The incident reports are fully anonymised to comply with data protection requirements. This national agreement follows bilateral agreements with Greater Manchester Police (since 2011), the Metropolitan Police (since 2012) and Nottinghamshire Police (2014). • Five hundred and three of the 1,382 antisemitic incidents recorded by CST nationally in 2017 came to CST via information sharing agreements with the Police, representing 36 per cent of the incidents included in this report. A total of 394 incidents, or 29 per cent of the total, were reported directly to CST by the victims of antisemitic incidents, or by a friend or family member of an incident victim. In addition, 232 antisemitic incidents (17 per cent of the total) were reported to CST by people who had witnessed the incident but were not the direct victims of it. One hundred and thirteen antisemitic incidents were reported by CST staff or volunteers throughout the UK. CST received reports of 89 antisemitic incidents from security guards and security officers at Jewish buildings and organisations. Twenty-six antisemitic incidents were recorded by CST during 2017 on the basis of media reports. The remaining incidents were reported to CST by other Jewish community or hate crime monitoring organisations. • The 872 potential incidents reported to CST that were not included in the annual total for 2017 included 424 cases of potential Information Collection and Suspicious Behaviour at Jewish locations, compared to 327 such incidents in 2016. The 424 cases of potential Information Collection and Suspicious Behaviour recorded in 2017 included 139 incidents of photography or videoing of Jewish buildings, while in 65 cases suspicious people tried to gain entry to Jewish premises. These types of incidents are not categorised as antisemitic by CST as it is often not possible to determine their motivation, and many are likely to have innocent explanations. However, identifying and preventing the potential hostile reconnaissance of Jewish buildings or other potential terrorist targets is an important part of reducing the possibility of future terrorist attacks. http://www.cst.org.uk 10 Antisemitic Incidents Report 2017 www.cst.org.uk Definition of antisemitic incidents The statistics in CST’s annual Antisemitic Incidents Report include antisemitic hate crimes and antisemitic non-crime incidents. CST defines an antisemitic incident as any malicious act aimed at Jewish people, organisations or property, where there is evidence that the act has antisemitic motivation or content, or that the victim was targeted because they are (or are believed to be) Jewish. This is a narrower definition than that used by the criminal justice system, which defines an antisemitic hate incident as “Any non-crime incident which is perceived by the victim or any other person, to be motivated by a hostility or prejudice based on a person’s race/religion or perceived race/religion.”5 Antisemitic incidents can take several forms, including physical attacks on people or property, verbal or written abuse, hate mail (including antisemitic emails), antisemitic leaflets and posters or abuse on social media. CST does not include the general activities of antisemitic organisations in its statistics. CST does not record as incidents antisemitic material that is permanently hosted on internet websites or that is generated by mainstream media, nor does CST ‘trawl’ social media platforms to look for antisemitic comments. CST will, however, record antisemitic comments posted on internet forums or blog talkbacks, or transmitted via social media, if they have been reported to CST by a member of the public who fulfils the role of a victim or witness; if the comment shows evidence of antisemitic content, motivation or targeting; and if the offender is based in the United Kingdom or has directly targeted a UK-based victim. Examples of antisemitic expressions that fall outside this INTRODUCTION Community Security Trust Community Security Trust (CST) is a UK charity that advises and represents the Jewish community on matters of antisemitism, terrorism, policing and security. CST received charitable status in 1994 and is recognised by government and the Police as a best practice model of a minority- community security organisation. CST provides security advice and training for Jewish schools, synagogues and Jewish communal organisations and gives assistance to those bodies that are affected by antisemitism. CST also assists and supports individual members of the Jewish community who have been affected by antisemitism and antisemitic incidents. All this work is provided at no charge. An essential part of CST’s work involves representing the Jewish community to Police, legislative and policy-making bodies and providing people inside and outside the Jewish community with information to combat antisemitism. CST has recorded antisemitic incidents in the United Kingdom since 1984. 5. The Agreed Definition of ‘Monitored Hate Crime’ for England, Wales and Northern Ireland www. report-it.org.uk/ files/hate_crime_ definitions_-_v3_0. pdf Antisemitic graffiti sprayed onto the grounds of a synagogue, Leeds, October http://www.cst.org.uk http://www.report-it.org.uk/files/hate_crime_definitions_-_v3_0.pdf http://www.report-it.org.uk/files/hate_crime_definitions_-_v3_0.pdf http://www.report-it.org.uk/files/hate_crime_definitions_-_v3_0.pdf http://www.report-it.org.uk/files/hate_crime_definitions_-_v3_0.pdf http://www.report-it.org.uk/files/hate_crime_definitions_-_v3_0.pdf 11Antisemitic Incidents Report 2017 www.cst.org.uk definition of an antisemitic incident can be found in CST’s annual Antisemitic Discourse Reports, available on the CST website. Reporting antisemitic incidents Antisemitic incidents are reported to CST in a number of ways, most commonly by telephone, email, via the CST website, via CST’s social media platforms, by post or in person to CST staff and volunteers. CST staff have undergone specialist training, in order to provide the best possible response to incident victims and witnesses who contact CST. Incidents can be reported to CST by the victim, a witness, or by someone acting on their behalf. In 2001, CST was accorded ’Third Party Reporting’ status by the Police, which allows CST to report antisemitic incidents to the Police and to act as a go-between for victims who are unable or unwilling to report to the Police directly. CST works closely with Police services and specialist units in monitoring and investigating antisemitic incidents. CST regularly exchanges anonymised antisemitic incident reports with Police forces around the United Kingdom and compares antisemitic incident trends with analysts from the National Community Tension Team, which is part of the National Police Chiefs’ Council. The Crime Survey for England and Wales estimates that around 40 per cent of all hate crimes come to the attention of the Police.6 It is likely, therefore, that most antisemitic incidents go unreported either to CST or to the Police, and therefore the true figures will be higher than those recorded in this report. No adjustments have been made to the figures to account for this. It is likely that this non-reporting also varies from category to category: a 2013 survey found that 72 per cent of British Jews who had experienced antisemitic harassment over the previous five years had not reported it to the Police or to any other organisation; 57 per cent of British Jews who had experienced antisemitic violence or the threat of violence had not reported it; and 46 per cent of those who had suffered antisemitic vandalism to their home or car had not reported it.7 If an incident is reported to CST but shows no evidence of antisemitic motivation, language or targeting, then it will not be recorded as antisemitic and will not be included in CST’s annual antisemitic incident total. In 2017, CST received 872 reports of potential incidents that were rejected for this reason, and are not included in the total number of antisemitic incidents. These incidents involved criminal damage to, or theft from, Jewish property; criminal assaults on, or theft from, Jewish people that do not show antisemitic motivation; suspicious activity or potential information-gathering around Jewish locations; or anti-Israel activity which did not involve the use of antisemitic language or imagery and was directed at pro-Israel campaigners, rather than being directed at Jewish people, buildings or organisations chosen solely because they were Jewish. This is a ten per cent increase from the 791 potential incidents of this nature that were reported to CST in 2016, but not included in the antisemitic incident statistics for that year. CST always prioritises the needs of incident victims, both individuals and the heads of Jewish organisations or communal buildings. CST treats the issue of victim confidentiality as a top priority. If an incident victim chooses to remain anonymous, or wishes there to be no publicity about an incident, CST will respect their request whenever possible. 6. An Overview of Hate Crime in England and Wales (London: Home Office, Office for National Statistics and Ministry of Justice, 2013). 7. Discrimination and hate crime against Jews in EU Member States: experiences and perceptions of antisemitism (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2013). Antisemitic incident reported to CST via social media, Bournemouth, August http://www.cst.org.uk 12 Antisemitic Incidents Report 2017 www.cst.org.uk Contexts and patterns The 1,382 antisemitic incidents recorded by CST in 2017 continue the previous pattern of 2016 and reflect a general, sustained high level of recorded antisemitic incidents. The 2017 total of 1,382 antisemitic incidents were spread throughout the year with CST recording over 100 incidents in ten out of the twelve months. However, there was a gentle decline in recorded incidents towards the end of 2017 with the months in which CST recorded the highest number of incidents occurring in the first half of the year. November and December were the first months since March 2016 in which CST recorded fewer than 100 incidents, which may indicate the beginning of a downward trend from the sustained high levels seen throughout most of 2016 and 2017. As was the case in 2016, there is no obvious single cause for the high number of incidents recorded in 2017. CST recorded a record total of antisemitic incidents in 2017 without there being a specific ‘trigger event’ to cause a sudden ‘spike’ in the number of incidents reported. Often increases in antisemitic incidents have been attributable to reactions to specific trigger events that cause identifiable, short-term spikes in incident levels. However, this was not the case in 2017. Instead, it appears that the factors that led to a general, sustained high level of antisemitic incidents in 2016 have continued throughout much of 2017. These factors range from those affecting all hate crime, to factors specific to antisemitism. A general factor is the rise in all hate crime that followed the referendum to leave the European Union in June 2016. The Home Office figures show that hate crime across all the strands has increased following the EU Referendum. Moreover, hate crime levels were 44 per cent higher in July 2016 compared with the previous year.8 This does not mean that, for example, most people who voted to leave the EU are racist or antisemitic, and these figures should not be used as evidence for such a suggestion. Rather, it is that an atmosphere of heightened public discussion of antisemitism, racism, immigration, hate crime and other issues related to minorities can excite activity amongst those people who are already predisposed to carry out hate crimes, while also causing heightened concern about antisemitism amongst potential victims and witnesses of hate incidents. ANTISEMITIC INCIDENTS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM IN 2017 CST recorded 1,382 antisemitic incidents in the UK in 2017, the highest total that CST has ever recorded in a single calendar year. This is an increase of three per cent from the 1,346 antisemitic incidents recorded by CST in 2016, which was itself a record annual total. Before 2017 and 2016, the previous record high total came in 2014, when CST recorded 1,182 antisemitic incidents. Antisemitic tweet, January 8. https://www.gov. uk/government/ uploads/ system/uploads/ attachment_data/ file/652136/ hate-crime-1617- hosb1717.pdf http://www.cst.org.uk https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/652136/hate-crime-1617-hosb1717.pdf https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/652136/hate-crime-1617-hosb1717.pdf https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/652136/hate-crime-1617-hosb1717.pdf https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/652136/hate-crime-1617-hosb1717.pdf https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/652136/hate-crime-1617-hosb1717.pdf https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/652136/hate-crime-1617-hosb1717.pdf https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/652136/hate-crime-1617-hosb1717.pdf https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/652136/hate-crime-1617-hosb1717.pdf 13Antisemitic Incidents Report 2017 www.cst.org.uk Allegations of antisemitism in the Labour Party, which were widespread in 2016, have continued into 2017. Therefore, antisemitism has attracted public debate and been reported on extensively in the national media, while being a point of argument and contention amongst Labour Party supporters on social media and elsewhere. For example, the Labour Party disciplinary hearing into Ken Livingstone’s comments about Adolf Hitler and Zionism was held at the end of March 2017 and his suspension was announced during the first week of April 2017. These events generated a large amount of news coverage and commentary in mainstream and social media, which may help to explain why 142 antisemitic incidents were reported to CST in April, the second highest monthly total in 2017. Additionally, the issue of antisemitism on university campuses attracted commentary in the national media during this period. These factors have led to regular, high-profile discussion of antisemitism, racism and hate crime in general in mainstream media, politics and on social media during the year. Such discussions are likely to have contributed to more antisemitic incidents occurring and to a greater level of reporting of those incidents to CST and the Police. Another, less tangible, factor is that the prevalence of antisemitism in public debate can encourage more antisemitism, if people perceive that the taboo against expressing hostility or prejudice towards or about Jews is weakening. The more people hear and read antisemitic comments and views, the more likely they are to have the confidence to express such views if they hold similar attitudes themselves. CST did not record a significant increase in antisemitic incidents following the Westminster terrorist attack in March, the Manchester attack in May, the London Bridge and Finsbury Park attacks in June or the Parsons Green attack in September. Any correlation with those attacks would have been revealed in the timings and content of incidents, but no such ‘spike’ occurred (unlike other strands of hate crime). However, these terror attacks, and the subsequent increase in the UK threat level to its maximum level ‘Critical,’ may have increased the public’s awareness of racism and hate crime in general, resulting in better reporting of antisemitic incidents from CST’s various reporting sources. Home Office figures show hate crime rose by 29 per cent, with there being an immediate increase following the Westminster Bridge terrorist attack in March 2017.9 Therefore, even though the terror attacks did not act as a direct, sudden trigger causing a specific rise in antisemitic incidents in the UK, they may have contributed in a more indirect way. Antisemitic incidents recorded by CST occurred more in the first six months of 2017 than in the second half of the year. The highest monthly incident total in 2017 came in January, when CST recorded 155 antisemitic incidents. This followed directly on from a high figure of antisemitic incidents in December 2016, when CST recorded 145 antisemitic incidents, which was the highest monthly total of antisemitic incidents reported in 2016. CST recorded over 100 incidents in every month from April 9. https://www.gov. uk/government/ uploads/ system/uploads/ attachment_data/ file/652136/ hate-crime-1617- hosb1717.pdf Antisemitic graffiti “DEATH 2 JEWS” on the wall of a pub, London, February http://www.cst.org.uk https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/652136/hate-crime-1617-hosb1717.pdf https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/652136/hate-crime-1617-hosb1717.pdf https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/652136/hate-crime-1617-hosb1717.pdf https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/652136/hate-crime-1617-hosb1717.pdf https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/652136/hate-crime-1617-hosb1717.pdf https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/652136/hate-crime-1617-hosb1717.pdf https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/652136/hate-crime-1617-hosb1717.pdf https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/652136/hate-crime-1617-hosb1717.pdf 14 Antisemitic Incidents Report 2017 www.cst.org.uk 2016 to October 2017, an unprecedented run of 19 consecutive months. For context, in the decade prior to April 2016, CST had only recorded a monthly incident total of 100 or higher on six occasions. There was a gradual decline from August 2017 to the end of the year in the number of antisemitic incidents recorded in comparison to the earlier part of the year. November and December both recorded under 100 incidents, with 89 and 78 incidents respectively. These are still relatively high monthly totals: the total for November is the second-highest November total ever recorded, and the December figure is the third-highest December total. Historically, CST usually records lower numbers of antisemitic incidents in the month of December in comparison to the rest of the year. For example, in 2005, 2006, 2007, 2009, 2010, and 2012, CST recorded the lowest number of antisemitic incidents for that year in December. This could be for a number of reasons, not least the short hours of daylight and cold weather keeping people indoors. The 145 incidents recorded in December 2016 is the highest figure that CST has ever recorded for the month of December. There is no obvious reason why incident totals should have started to fall towards the end of 2017, if that is indeed what is happening. It is difficult to predict which direction 2018 will follow: whether the frequency of monthly totals below 100 incidents (as CST recorded before April 2016) will resume or whether 2018 will immediately return to the most recent pattern of recording over 100 incidents per month, thus rendering November and December 2017 as anomalies. This will be monitored as CST records antisemitic incidents into 2018. The monthly total of 78 antisemitic incidents in December is surprising for another reason. It may have been expected for CST to have recorded an increase in the number of antisemitic incidents reported in December 2017, considering the strong reactions to President Donald Trump’s announcement on his intention to move the American Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. This announcement caused political unrest in the Middle East and related activism in this country, and such political unrest has in the past acted as a catalyst for antisemitic incidents in the UK. For example, 2014 was dominated by a single, large spike in July and August, due to antisemitic reactions to the conflict in Israel and Gaza. Almost half of the 1,182 incidents recorded in 2014 came in July and August, the two months when that conflict occurred. However, this was not the case in December 2017 as there does not seem to have been any significant spike in reported antisemitic incidents. This is not to say that CST did not receive any incidents related to President Trump’s announcement or that it had no impact at all. There were street protests in major cities across the UK including Birmingham, Bristol, Cardiff, Edinburgh, London, Manchester, Nottingham and Sheffield. Whilst protesting against Israel is not automatically antisemitic and is not recorded as an antisemitic incident by CST, some of the rhetoric involved in these protests was targeted towards Jewish people. Antisemitic image shared on social media, Nottingham, December http://www.cst.org.uk 15Antisemitic Incidents Report 2017 www.cst.org.uk Specifically, on Friday 8th December, during a protest outside the United States Embassy in London, some of the protesters chanted, “Jews, remember the Khaybar, the army of Muhammad is returning.” This references the battle of Khaybar in the year 628, in which Jews were killed and expelled from a town of the same name. This specific chant was recorded as an antisemitic incident by CST and a complaint was accordingly made to the Police. There were other global events that, similarly to President Donald Trump’s announcement, did not cause a significant spike in reported antisemitic incidents but can be connected to a few incidents recorded by CST in 2017. The Unite the Right rally (also known as the Charlottesville rally), which occurred in Virginia, United States, from 11th-12th August 2017, and where protesters included white supremacists, white nationalists and neo-Nazis, does not seem to have caused a significant spike in antisemitic incidents recorded by CST, but did nevertheless have some impact. CST recorded two incidents in the category of Damage and Desecration a few days after the Charlottesville rally; two synagogues in London were vandalised with far right stickers connected with the Charlottesville rally. CST recorded 145 incidents in the category of Assaults during 2017, a 34 per cent increase from the 108 incidents in the category of Assaults recorded in 2016. This is the highest number of incidents in this category that CST has ever recorded. A significant proportion of this increase occurred in Greater Manchester. There was a spate of incidents, whereby fireworks were thrown at visibly Jewish people in public, in Greater Manchester in November. In 2017, CST recorded 53 Assaults in Greater Manchester, in comparison to 22 Assaults recorded in Greater Manchester in 2016. It should also be noted that whilst CST recorded its highest number of incidents in the category of Assault in 2017, there is a wide spectrum of what is classed as an Assault by CST. There were no incidents classified as Extreme Violence. Social media is a significant forum for the dissemination and reporting of antisemitism. Two hundred and forty-seven of the 1,382 antisemitic incidents recorded by CST in 2017 took place on social media. This amounts to 18 per cent of the overall incident total, compared to 289 incidents on social media recorded by CST in 2016 (21 per cent of the overall total for that year). This shows that the number of social media incidents recorded by CST declined in 2017. These numbers are only indicative, rather than being a guide to the actual number of antisemitic tweets, comments and posts, which is likely to be far higher. Nevertheless, CST still recorded more antisemitic incidents in public places in 2017 (356 incidents) than on social media, and many more incidents involved verbal abuse (670 incidents) than digital abuse. The decline in the number of antisemitic incidents on social media in 2017 may be a positive consequence of social media companies trying to improve the way they tackle hate speech online by removing content quickly and suspending accounts. A number of arrests and prosecutions have also helped to remove some prolific antisemitic accounts from social media platforms. Alternatively, it may reflect a variation in the amount and type of social media content being reported to CST, and CST’s ongoing efforts to identify where offenders are based (if neither offender nor victim is based in the UK, CST will not include antisemitic social media content in its statistics). 2018 will show whether this decline in recorded social media incidents is the beginning of a welcome trend or simply a short-term blip. Antisemitic tweet, London, January http://www.cst.org.uk 16 Antisemitic Incidents Report 2017 www.cst.org.uk It is always necessary, when analysing an increase in recorded antisemitic incidents, to investigate whether this increase reflects an improvement in the reporting of incidents as well as an increase in the actual number of incidents taking place. As stated above, the sustained public profile given to antisemitism in the media and politics in 2017 may have played a role in increasing the motivation and awareness of incident victims to report their experiences. It is also possible that an increased security presence at Jewish buildings since the middle of 2015 has contributed to the higher levels of antisemitic incidents recorded by CST. This increased security presence is partly a result of high Jewish communal concern about terrorism, and partly due to government funding for security guards at Jewish communal buildings that was made available from April 2015 and continued throughout 2016 and 2017.10 For instance, even though CST did not record a direct correlation between the terror attacks and antisemitic incidents reported to CST in 2017, CST did increase physical patrols in neighbourhoods with large Jewish populations in the periods immediately following those attacks, which may have encouraged the reporting of antisemitic incidents. It is likely that reporting is higher when there is an increased visible presence, as people can report incidents directly. Indirectly, it may well serve to remind or motivate people to report incidents to CST or the Police. Eighty-nine of the 1,382 antisemitic incidents recorded by CST in 2017 were reported by security guards or security officers at Jewish locations, compared to 59 in 2016 and 33 in 2015. Since 2011, CST has exchanged anonymised antisemitic incident data with Greater Manchester Police, and since 2012 CST has done so with the Metropolitan Police Service in London. These agreements allow for the systematic sharing of individual incident reports between CST and the Police to give both agencies sight of incidents that had not previously been reported to them. The reports are fully anonymised to comply with data protection requirements, and any duplicates – incidents that had been reported to both CST and the Police – are eliminated to ensure that there can be no ‘double counting’. In 2014, CST signed a similar information sharing agreement with Nottinghamshire Police and in 2015, CST signed a national information sharing agreement with the National Police Chiefs’ Council (under its former name of the Association of Chief Police Officers). As a result of this national agreement, CST now shares anonymised antisemitic incident data with several Police forces around the UK and intends to expand this area of its work further in 2018. In 2017, 503 antisemitic incidents were reported to CST by this method, which had not been reported directly to CST from any other source, compared to 482 in 2016 and 307 in 2015. The number of incidents reported to CST by the Police therefore increased by four per cent in 2017, roughly in line with the overall increase in antisemitic incidents. This may reflect the fact that CST is continuing to strengthen its relationship with the Police and information sharing with Police Forces in 2017, or it may reflect an improvement in reporting of antisemitic incidents to the Police, which has then filtered through to CST’s antisemitic incident statistics via the information sharing agreement. The number of antisemitic incidents reported to CST by the Police comprised 36 per cent of the overall incidents recorded by CST in 2017. Antisemitic incidents reported by the Police also comprised 36 per cent in 2016, compared with 32 per cent in 2015. Prior to the introduction of these information sharing agreements, antisemitic incidents had been shared by the Police with CST on an ad hoc basis, for operational or community engagement purposes; but most incidents reported to the Police would not have been shared with CST and therefore were not counted in CST’s antisemitic incident statistics. Consequently, these new and significant sources of antisemitic incident reports must 10. Government funding has been provided for security guards at voluntary aided faith schools since 2010 and was extended to other Jewish buildings in 2015. In 2016/17, government funding for security guards across the Jewish community amounted to £13.4m. The fund is administered by CST and the guards are supplied by commercial guarding companies. http://www.cst.org.uk 17Antisemitic Incidents Report 2017 www.cst.org.uk be taken into consideration when comparing CST’s antisemitic incident totals since 2011 with those from 2010 and earlier. The 1,346 antisemitic incidents recorded in 2016 differ from the figure (1,309 incidents) previously published in the 2016 Annual Incident Report. There is always the possibility of incident figures for a particular year changing after the report for that year is published, due the late reporting of some incidents to CST by incident victims, witnesses or other sources. The reason the 2016 incident figure has increased to 1,346 from 1,309 is because CST received a backlog of anonymised antisemitic incidents from British Transport Police (BTP) after the Antisemitic Incident Report 2016 was published. In January to June 2017, CST received 43 anonymised antisemitic incidents from British Transport Police, but unfortunately for resource reasons BTP was not able to continue sharing anonymised antisemitic incident reports in the second half of 2017. Whilst it is impossible to ascertain how many incidents are missing from CST’s 2017 overall figure as a result of this, it seems based on what CST received during the first half of this year that a similar number of antisemitic incidents from BTP may be missing for the second half of 2017. This may ultimately affect the total number of antisemitic incidents recorded in 2017. Despite improvements in reporting, it is to be expected that antisemitic hate crime and hate incidents, like other forms of hate crime, are significantly under-reported. This is particularly the case where the victims are minors; where the incident is considered of ‘lesser’ impact by the victim; and for incidents that take place on social media. Consequently, the statistics contained in this report should be taken as being indicative of general trends, rather than absolute measures of the number of incidents that actually take place. Answering the questions of why antisemitic incidents take place, who carries them out and who suffers from them is not always straightforward. Sometimes the evidence of victims or witnesses concerning what may have been a shocking, traumatic and brief experience can be vague and disjointed. Many antisemitic incidents, particularly those that take place on social media or via graffiti in public places, do not have a specific victim and the offender is often unknown. While allowing for all these caveats, it is still possible to analyse the data contained in the individual incident reports received by CST during 2017, and the picture they show is one of complexity. In short, there is no single profile of an antisemitic incident victim, nor of an antisemitic incident offender, nor is there a single explanation as to why antisemitic incidents take place. This is explained in more detail in the sections “Incident victims”, p.27; “Incident offenders”, p.29; and “Discourse and motives”, p.30. Antisemitic graffiti in a toilet on a university campus, Birmingham, March http://www.cst.org.uk 18 Antisemitic Incidents Report 2017 www.cst.org.uk Extreme Violence Incidents of Extreme Violence include any attack potentially causing loss of life or grievous bodily harm (GBH). GBH is the most serious form of assault that anyone can commit. There were no incidents of Extreme Violence in 2017, compared with none in 2016, four in 2015 and one in 2014. Assault Incidents of Assault include any physical attack against a person or people, which does not pose a threat to their life or causes GBH but instead may be considered actual bodily harm (ABH) or lower common assault. CST recorded 145 incidents of Assault in 2017, compared to 108 in 2016, an increase of 34 per cent. This is the highest number of incidents in this category that CST has ever recorded, surpassing the 121 assaults in 2009. It should be noted that a wide spectrum of incidents are categorised as Assault in keeping with the general legal meaning of the term. Eighty-five of the 145 incidents of Assault recorded in 2017 were random attacks on Jewish people in public places, of which 72 targeted people who were visibly Jewish, usually due to their religious or traditional clothing. Eight assaults targeted synagogue congregants on their way to or from prayers, five assaults targeted congregants or staff outside synagogues, 16 targeted Jewish schoolchildren away from school and three targeted Jewish schoolchildren on their way to or from school. CST received a description of the gender of the victims in 123 of the incidents of Assault. Of these, the victims were male in 88 incidents; in 22 incidents they were female; and in 13 they were mixed couples or groups of males and females. INCIDENT CATEGORIES CST classifies antisemitic incidents by six distinct categories: Extreme Violence; Assault; Damage and Desecration of Property; Threats; Abusive Behaviour; and Antisemitic Literature. The definitions of these categories, and examples of incidents recorded in each one during 2017, are given below.11 11. A more detailed explanation of the six antisemitic incident categories can be found in the CST leaflet “Definitions of Antisemitic Incidents”, available on the CST website: http://www.cst. org.uk INCIDENT CATEGORIES 1,038 Abusive Behaviour 12 Literature 145 Assault 95 Threats 92 Damage & Desecration 0 Extreme Violence http://www.cst.org.uk http://www.cst.org.uk http://www.cst.org.uk 19Antisemitic Incidents Report 2017 www.cst.org.uk CST received a description of the age of the victims in 102 of the incidents of Assault. Of these, in 55 incidents the victims were adults; in 40 incidents the victims were minors; and in seven incidents they were mixed groups of adults and minors. CST received a description of the gender of the offenders in 86 of the incidents of Assault, of which 67 involved male offenders, 13 involved female offenders and six involved male and female offenders acting together. CST received a description of the age of the offenders in 84 of the incidents of Assault. Of these, the offenders were adults in 46 incidents; in 37 incidents they were minors; and one incident involved adults and minors offending together. Seventeen of the incidents involved objects, usually eggs, being thrown at visibly Jewish people from passing cars. Particular targets for this kind of incident are the Strictly Orthodox communities in Salford and Bury in north Manchester; Golders Green, Hendon and Stamford Hill in north London; and in Gateshead. CASE STUDY Schoolchildren assaulted on bus, London, January A group of young Jewish schoolchildren were physically and verbally attacked on a bus coming home from school. They were sat on the top deck of the bus when they were confronted by a group of teenagers, who persistently asked the victims if they were Jewish, if they attended a Jewish school and why they were not wearing “those silly hats.” The attackers then hit, kicked and punched the Jewish schoolchildren who tried to get the attention of the bus driver but were ignored and remained trapped on the bus as the violence continued. The Jewish schoolchildren fled the bus at the next stop, but were followed and chased. The victims ran into a kosher shop at which point security intervened and reported this to the Police, who arrived shortly afterwards. Parents of the children who had been attacked subsequently reported this incident to CST, who supported the victims and their families through the police investigation and criminal justice process. One offender immediately pled guilty and therefore never went to court. Another received a 12-month youth rehabilitation order. These perpetrators were also sentenced to 60 hours of victim awareness and a Restorative Justice programme, which aims to make the offender realise the impact of their actions on the victim and the victim’s wider community; and nine months of supervised appointments with an officer who monitors the offender and supports them to ensure their behaviour remains in check. A relative of one of the victims gratefully told CST that they were assigned “a fantastic [Police] officer who was very supportive and helpful and conscientious all the way through.” ASSAULTS 2012–2017 108 2016 83 2015 69 2013 67 2012 145 2017 80 2014 http://www.cst.org.uk 20 Antisemitic Incidents Report 2017 www.cst.org.uk Other incidents in the category of Assault in 2017 included: • Manchester, June. Eggs were thrown at congregants outside a synagogue. • Manchester, July. A visibly Jewish man and his son were walking in a park when 15 youths shouted, “Jew” and threw stones at them. • London, August. A man hurled a glass bottle towards a group of visibly Jewish teenage girls. As the bottle smashed and the girls ran for cover, he chased after them and shouted, “Hitler is a good man, good he killed Jews.” • London, September. A visibly Jewish elderly man was walking to synagogue when a white man aggressively grabbed his prayer book and skullcap, and threw them both on the ground. • Hertfordshire, October. A visibly Jewish boy was confronted at his home by a group of boys who then proceeded to grab and push him on the ground whilst shouting abuse, including “F**king Jew” and “You’re different.” Damage and Desecration to Jewish Property This category includes any physical attack directed against Jewish-owned property, or property that is perceived to be connected to Jews, which is not life-threatening. This includes the daubing of antisemitic slogans or symbols (such as swastikas) – including fixing stickers and posters – on Jewish property; and damage caused to property where it appears that the property has been specifically targeted because of its perceived Jewish connection, or where antisemitic expressions are made by the offender while causing the damage. There were 92 incidents of Damage and Desecration in 2017, an increase of 14 per cent from the 2016 total of 81 incidents in this category. There were 65 antisemitic incidents recorded in this category in 2015 and 81 in 2014. Of the 92 incidents recorded in 2017, 46 affected the homes of Jewish people or vehicles parked at their homes, and 26 involved the daubing or graffiti of Jewish property. Nine involved desecrations of, or antisemitic damage to, synagogues. There were three incidents in 2017 that involved antisemitic damage to, or desecration of, a Jewish cemetery, eight that involved stones or bricks being thrown and eight incidents that involved eggs being thrown at Jewish property. Three incidents in this category involved the antisemitic hacking of websites of Jewish organisations and two involved the use of arson. CASE STUDY Synagogue daubed with antisemitic stickers, London, August Antisemitic stickers were found on the front doors of a synagogue. The stickers included an image of a Jewish person with a hook nose and a yellow Star of David. This incident was reported to CST, which rapidly identified that the stickers were from the Daily Stormer, an American neo-Nazi and white supremacist website linked to a far right rally that had taken place in Charlottesville, Virginia a few days previously. This rally had featured white supremacists, white nationalists and http://www.cst.org.uk 21Antisemitic Incidents Report 2017 www.cst.org.uk Other incidents of Damage and Desecration in 2017 included: • London, February. A Jewish woman found the words “Kill the Jews” scraped in the dust on the roof of her car. • London, April. Bacon was thrown over the wall of a synagogue and found in the grounds. • Manchester, June. A Jewish restaurant was vandalised in a targeted attack, by a man who smashed the window and threw in a home-made fire bomb. • Manchester, August. A visibly Jewish man heard shouting of an antisemitic nature from the alley behind his house. Upon closer inspection, the victim then found a swastika and “F**k Jews” graffiti written on his wall by a group of white children. • London, August. Graffiti that read “F**k Yids” was found on the entrance to a Jewish school. Threats This category includes only direct antisemitic threats, whether verbal or written. There were 95 incidents reported to CST in the category of Threats in 2017, a six per cent decrease from the 101 incidents of this type recorded in 2016. The 95 incidents recorded in this category in 2017 is the second highest total ever recorded by CST. There were 79 antisemitic incidents recorded in this category in 2015 and 91 in 2014. Twenty four of the 95 threats recorded in 2017 took place in public and eight threats took place at victims’ homes. Eleven threats targeted synagogues and seven targeted Jewish organisations and events. Fifty-three incidents in this category involved verbal abuse, eleven involved a vehicle being used as a weapon and seven included hate mail. neo-Nazis chanting racist and antisemitic slogans. CST reviewed CCTV footage of the synagogue and, with the Police, identified the apparent perpetrators as two white men. The following day, the same antisemitic stickers were found on the external noticeboard of another synagogue. CST reported this to the Police, and made the Police aware of the previous similar incident and both of the incidents’ connection to the Daily Stormer and the Charlottesville rally. The fact that the desecration of both synagogues with antisemitic stickers of neo-Nazi provenance immediately followed the Charlottesville rally strongly suggests a link between the two events, demonstrating how antisemitism is motivated and influenced by wider global politics and events, not just what is occurring in the UK. Antisemitic tweet, London, August “Kill the Jews” written into the frost of a car belonging to a Jewish person, London, November http://www.cst.org.uk 22 Antisemitic Incidents Report 2017 www.cst.org.uk Incidents in the category of Threats in 2017 included: • London, March. A Jewish couple received threatening hate mail through their door. A week before this occurred, in a separate incident, their mezuzah (Jewish prayer doorpost) had been removed from their front door and burnt. • London, June. A man shouted, “F**king Jews. Kill all the Jews” whilst wielding a crow bar in a Jewish neighbourhood. • London, July. A visibly Jewish woman was walking in public when a group of men acting in an aggressive and intimidating manner, shouted, “Let’s go after the Jews. Look there’s one.” • London, August. A Jewish organisation received an email that read, “You will be destroyed.” Abusive Behaviour This category includes verbal and written antisemitic abuse. The verbal abuse can be face to face or via telephone calls and voicemail messages. The category also includes antisemitic emails, text messages, tweets and social media comments, as well as targeted antisemitic letters (that is, one- off letters aimed at and sent to a specific individual), irrespective of whether or not the recipient is Jewish. This is different from a mass mailing of antisemitic leaflets, pamphlets or group emails, which is dealt with by the separate Literature category. Antisemitic graffiti on non-Jewish property is also included in this category. There were 1,038 incidents of Abusive Behaviour reported to CST in 2017, the second highest total CST has ever recorded in this category. This is one fewer than the 1,039 incidents of Abusive Behaviour that CST recorded in 2016, which is the record high in this category. There were 717 antisemitic CASE STUDY Elderly Jewish man harassed with threatening calls and emails, May, Oxford A Jewish man was harassed with antisemitic and aggressive phone-calls and emails from his plumber, who demanded to know when the victim was going to settle his invoice. The first phone-call included lots of shouting and swearing, including calling the victim a “F**king Jewish C**t.” Further calls included similar antisemitic and aggressive comments. On the fourth phone-call, the plumber threatened that he would come over to the victim’s house and would “F**king murder” him. The victim felt shaken and feared for his and his wife’s safety. He then discovered two emails from the plumber, one of which included similar threatening and antisemitic language. In the second email, the plumber admitted that he had in fact received the money that he had claimed was outstanding and attempted to apologise for his behaviour. Nevertheless, this apology was accompanied with further racially offensive language. The victim reported this incident to CST and to the Police, who arrested the plumber. The alleged offender was charged under the Malicious Communications Act (charges under this act cannot be racially or religiously aggravated). CST advised the victim on this charge and on his rights at court, and attended court with him. The offender received a fine of over £500 to be paid within 14 days and a Restorative Justice recommendation. A member of CST’s Incident Department who attended court with the victim explained the outcome to him and went through potential next steps, including Restorative Justice. http://www.cst.org.uk 23Antisemitic Incidents Report 2017 www.cst.org.uk incidents recorded in this category in 2015 and 899 in 2014. In 244 of the incidents of Abusive Behaviour recorded in 2017, the victims were random Jewish people in public places; in at least 189 of these, the victims were visibly Jewish. Verbal antisemitic abuse was used in 534 incidents in this category, 31 of which were by phone. There were 244 incidents of Abusive Behaviour recorded that took place on social media. Twenty-six incidents of Abusive Behaviour involved the use of paper hate mail and 13 occurred via email. One hundred and seventy-two incidents in this category involved antisemitic daubing, graffiti or stickers on non-Jewish property. Other incidents of Abusive Behaviour in 2017 included: • London, May. A Jewish man was on the underground when a group of men started chanting and shouting, “Jew boy,” “F**king Jew boy,” and “We’re running around Tottenham with our willies hanging out, I’ve got more foreskin than you, F**king Jew.” The group then made a prolonged hissing noise to mimic Nazi gas chambers. • London, June. A Jewish organisation received hate mail containing various Jewish conspiracy theories, including “The Rothschilds are extremely powerful and are one of the top ranking members of the illuminati. Do not let their appearance fool you, they are extremely evil people, and sacrifice children to Satan on a weekly basis.” • Gateshead, June. A man shouted, “Jews piss me off. Go back to Israel” at attendees at a Jewish funeral. • London, August. A Jewish organisation received a tweet that read, “The Holocaust is fake history.” CASE STUDY Persistent Holocaust denial graffiti, throughout 2017, multiple locations in London Holocaust denial graffiti using the same language and handwriting appeared over a prolonged period of time in the same location and then in neighbouring London boroughs. The graffiti included language such as “The Holocaust is a lie” and “Holohoax” as well as swastikas, a Star of David, and the words “Banks”, “media” and “9/11.” On one occasion, this graffiti was reported to CST along a canal in 20 different locations. CST ensured that the graffiti was removed by the council as and when it reappeared. CST also informed the Police of the connection between the multiple graffiti incidents and provided the Police with locations, documentation and images to help them with their investigation. Antisemitic graffiti “*BANKS*MEDIA*LAW* *911*HOLOHOAX*” found along a canal, London, October http://www.cst.org.uk 24 Antisemitic Incidents Report 2017 www.cst.org.uk Literature This category covers mass-produced antisemitic literature which is distributed in multiple quantities. This can involve a single mass mailing or repeated individual mailings, but it must involve the multiple use of the same piece of literature in order to fall into this category. This is different from one-off cases of hate mail targeted at individual people or organisations, which would come under the category of either Abusive Behaviour or Threats (depending on the hate mail’s content). This category includes literature that is antisemitic in itself, irrespective of whether or not the recipient is Jewish, and cases where Jews are specifically targeted for malicious distribution, even if the material itself is not antisemitic. This would include, for instance, the mass mailing of neo-Nazi literature to targeted Jewish organisations or homes, even if the literature did not mention Jews. This category also includes antisemitic emails that are sent to groups of recipients. The statistics for this category give no indication of the extent of distribution. A single mass mailing of antisemitic literature is only counted as one incident, although it could involve material being sent to dozens of recipients. Thus the number of incidents reflects the number of offenders, rather than the number of victims. There were 12 incidents recorded in the category of antisemitic Literature in 2017, a 29 per cent decrease from the 17 incidents recorded in this category in 2016. There were 12 incidents recorded in this category in 2015 and 30 in 2014. Ten of the Literature incidents recorded in 2017 involved the distribution of paper leaflets or pamphlets, one involved a mass message and one involved a mass email. Out of the 12 antisemitic incidents recorded in the category of Literature, five incidents targeted synagogues and five incidents involved Jewish organisations or events. CASE STUDY Holocaust denial leaflets distributed on UK university campuses, February At Cambridge, Edinburgh and Glasgow universities, the London School of Economics and University College London, leaflets denying and belittling the Holocaust were distributed on campus. These leaflets were found pinned onto students’ and academics’ cars, as well as inside university buildings. One leaflet entitled, “Who’s telling us our story?” denied the existence of gas chambers and cited the film ‘Denial,’ which portrays the libel trial from 2000 between Holocaust denier David Irving and historian Deborah Lipstadt. http://www.cst.org.uk 25Antisemitic Incidents Report 2017 www.cst.org.uk Incidents in the category of Literature in 2017 included: • London, February. Hate mail was sent to multiple Jewish organisations. The hate mail was 18 pages long and consisted of images and text relating to conspiracy theories about Jewish domination. • London, July. An email was sent to multiple Jewish organisations. It read, “Zionist Israel is an apartheid racist state and guilty of war crimes against the Palestinian populations. You people are acting as Zionist/racist stooges. Remember your ‘perennial victim’ six million Holohoax figure – reflect on the Palestinians Shoah – and be ashamed!’ Another leaflet, entitled “The Greatest Swindle of All Time,” referenced Professor Norman Finkelstein, who has argued that Holocaust survivors exploit the memory of the Holocaust. These leaflets were distributed during the promotional publicity of ‘Denial’ and a week before the film’s release into UK cinemas. This incident is an example of how an event, on this occasion the release of the film ‘Denial,’ can motivate and provoke potential incident offenders. As well as Holocaust denial leaflets, during the same week CST received reports of other incidents related to the release of ‘Denial.’ For instance, film posters for ‘Denial’ were found defaced with antisemitic markings at multiple stations on the London underground, including the actors being defaced with stickers to make them look like Hitler (this particular incident was recorded in the category of Abusive Behaviour). http://www.cst.org.uk 26 Antisemitic Incidents Report 2017 www.cst.org.uk One of the most important jobs CST does is to record and analyse incidents of potential hostile reconnaissance (categorised by CST as ‘Information Collection’) and Suspicious Behaviour around Jewish locations. Although these potential incidents are not included in CST’s antisemitic incident statistics, they still form a vital part of CST’s work. The recent tragic history of antisemitic terrorism against Jewish schools, synagogues, shops, museums and other buildings in Copenhagen, Paris, Brussels, Toulouse, Kansas City, Mumbai and elsewhere attests to the importance of this work. It is well known that terrorist actors often collect information about their targets before launching an attack. Identifying and preventing the gathering of this information is an integral part of CST’s work in protecting the UK Jewish community from terrorism. In order to do this, CST relies on information from the public and encourages the Jewish community to continue reporting suspicious activity to CST, as well as to the Police. Due to the terrorist attacks at Westminster, Manchester, London Bridge and Finsbury Park and the failed bomb attack at Parsons Green, 2017 was a year in which the UK faced its most severe threat of terrorism for many years. Twice in 2017, the threat level was raised to its maximum level, ‘Critical,’ meaning an attack was imminent. CST works in consultation with the Police to gather, record and investigate incidents of Information Collection and Suspicious Behaviour. CST does this in order to keep the Jewish community safe and allow it to carry on as normal. Jewish communities have long been the targets of terrorists of different and varied political and religious motivations. Since the late 1960s, there have been over 400 terrorist attacks, attempted attacks and foiled terrorist plots against Diaspora Jewish communities and Israeli targets outside Israel.12 In the UK, several terrorist plots targeting Jewish communities came to trial or were publicised via the media in recent years. Most recently, a family of three was convicted in 2017 of planning a terror attack and researching potential Jewish targets including Birmingham’s Central Synagogue. Ummarayiat Mirza was jailed for 16 years, his wife for ten years and his sister for 30 months. This planning is said to have occurred in the days following the Westminster Bridge terror attack. Cases of potential Information Collection and Suspicious Behaviour are not included in CST’s antisemitic incident statistics, as the motivation for many of them is not possible to determine. The vague and uncertain nature of many of these incidents means that they are easier to analyse if the two categories are combined, rather than treated separately. Taken together, there were 424 such incidents reported to CST in 2017 (327 in 2016). Of the 424 incidents of potential Information Collection and Suspicious Behaviour reported to CST in 2017, 139 involved the photography or videoing of Jewish buildings, while in 65 cases suspicious people tried to gain entry to Jewish premises. These incidents are not categorised as antisemitic by CST as many are likely to have innocent explanations and it is often not possible to determine their motivation. However, neither CST nor the Police underestimate the threat posed to Jewish communities by various terrorist organisations and networks. Identifying and preventing the potential hostile reconnaissance of Jewish buildings or other potential terrorist targets is an important part of reducing the possibility of future terrorist attacks and is integral to the work of CST. 12. For a full chronology and analysis of this history of modern anti-Jewish terrorism, see the CST publication “Terrorist Incidents against Jewish Communities and Israeli Citizens Abroad 1968–2010”, available at http:// www.cst.org.uk INFORMATION COLLECTION AND SUSPICIOUS BEHAVIOUR http://www.cst.org.uk http://www.cst.org.uk http://www.cst.org.uk 27Antisemitic Incidents Report 2017 www.cst.org.uk The most common single type of incident involved verbal abuse randomly directed at visibly Jewish people in public. Such incidents are more commonly associated with anti- social behaviour or local patterns of street crime rather than with political activism or ideologies: 16 per cent of all antisemitic incidents recorded in 2017 showed evidence of political motivations or beliefs, while 84 per cent did not. In 356 incidents, the victims were ordinary Jewish people, male or female, attacked or abused while going about their daily business in public places. In at least 283 of these, the victims were visibly Jewish, usually due to their religious or traditional clothing, school uniform or jewellery bearing Jewish symbols. Seventy-six incidents targeted synagogue property and staff, compared to 64 in 2016, and a further 44 incidents targeted congregants on their way to or from prayers, compared to 25 in 2016. There were 141 incidents that targeted Jewish community organisations, communal events, commercial premises or high-profile individuals, compared to 169 in 2016, while 89 incidents happened at people’s private homes (96 in 2016). Fifteen antisemitic incidents took place in the workplace or were work-related, compared to 56 in 2016. A total of 88 antisemitic incidents took place at schools or involved Jewish schoolchildren or teaching staff, compared to 82 in 2016. Of the 88 incidents of this type in 2017, 31 took place at Jewish schools, 17 at non-faith schools and 40 affected Jewish schoolchildren on their journeys to and from school. Twenty-one of the 88 school-related incidents were in the category of Assault; five involved Damage and Desecration of Jewish property; five were in the category of Threats; 56 were in the category of Abusive Behaviour and there was one in the category of Literature. There were 22 antisemitic incidents in which the victims were Jewish students, academics INCIDENT VICTIMS The victims of antisemitic incidents come from the whole spectrum of the Jewish community: from Strictly Orthodox to Liberal, Reform and secular Jews; from the largest Jewish communities of London and Manchester to small, isolated communities all over the United Kingdom; and from Jewish schoolchildren to Members of Parliament. WHO AND WHAT IS BEING TARGETED Jewish community organisations, communal events, commercial premises or high-profile individuals 141 Individuals in public 356 Visibly Jewish individuals 283 Homes, inc. people and vehicles at their homes 89 Synagogues 76 http://www.cst.org.uk 28 Antisemitic Incidents Report 2017 www.cst.org.uk or other student bodies, compared to 41 campus-related antisemitic incidents in 2016. Of the 22 incidents of this type reported to CST in 2017, 20 took place on campus and two off campus. Out of the 22 incidents involving students, academics or student bodies, two were in the category of Damage and Desecration of Jewish property, one of which occurred on campus; there was one incident in the category of Threats; 18 in the category of Abusive Behaviour and one incident in the category of Literature. There were no incidents involving students, academics or student bodies in the category of Assault. Of the 20 antisemitic incidents that took place on campus, 14 involved graffiti or other daubing on non-Jewish property; there were three incidents that involved verbal abuse and one that involved hate mail. Thirteen involved the use of language or imagery related to the Holocaust or the Nazi period. CST received a description of the gender of the victim or victims in 733 (53 per cent) of the 1,382 antisemitic incidents reported to CST during 2017. Of these, the victims were male in 436 incidents (59 per cent of incidents where the victim’s gender was known), female in 241 incidents (33 per cent) and groups of males and females together in 56 incidents (eight per cent). CST received a description of the age of the victim or victims of 640 (46 per cent) of the 1,382 incidents recorded during 2017. Breaking this down into adults and minors (while acknowledging the difficulty in accurately categorising incident victims who may be merely described by witnesses as “youths” or “teenagers”) shows that in 485 incidents, the victims were described to CST as adults (76 per cent of incidents where the victim’s age was described), in 114 incidents they were described as minors (18 per cent) and in 41 cases (six per cent) the victims were described as adults and minors together. Antisemitic graffiti on a sign at the entrance of a synagogue, Leeds, October http://www.cst.org.uk 29Antisemitic Incidents Report 2017 www.cst.org.uk While it is possible to collect data regarding the ethnic appearance of incident offenders, this data is not direct evidence of the offenders’ religious affiliations. The content of an antisemitic letter may reveal the motivation of the offender, but it would be a mistake to assume to know the ethnicity or religion of a hate mail sender on the basis of the discourse they employ. Social media platforms afford a level of anonymity to offenders, should they wish to hide their identity, but can also provide some personal details of offenders, such as their name, photograph or approximate location. Bearing in mind all these limitations regarding the availability and reliability of this data, a description of the ethnic appearance of the offenders was obtained in 420, or 30 per cent, of the 1,382 antisemitic incidents recorded by CST in 2017.13 Of these, 225 offenders were described as ‘White – North European’ (54 per cent); 13 offenders were described as ‘White – South European’ (three per cent); 77 offenders were described as ‘Black’ (18 per cent); 74 offenders were described as ‘South Asian’ (18 per cent); one offender was described as ‘Far East or South East Asian’ (0.2 per cent); and 30 offenders were described as being ‘Arab or North African’ (seven per cent). These figures partly reflect the fact that Britain’s Jewish communities tend to live in relatively diverse urban areas, and that street crime offenders (where the most common type of antisemitic incident takes place) make up a younger, and more diverse, demographic profile than the population as a whole. CST received a description of the gender of the offender or offenders in 662 (48 per cent) of the 1,382 antisemitic incidents recorded in 2017. Of these, the offenders were described as male in 554 incidents (84 per cent of incidents where the offender’s gender was known), female in 90 incidents (13 per cent) and mixed groups of males and females in 18 incidents (three per cent). CST received a description of the approximate age of the offender or offenders in 532 of the 1,382 incidents reported during the year (38 per cent). Of these 532 incidents, and allowing for the same caveats as when attempting to analyse the ages of incident victims, the offenders were described as adults in 421 antisemitic incidents (79 per cent of incidents where the offender’s age was estimated), minors in 108 incidents (20 per cent) and three incidents included adults and minors together (0.6 per cent). Younger antisemitic incident offenders appear to be more likely than adults to be involved in violent incidents (albeit usually using relatively limited violence): minors were responsible for 44 per cent of the incidents recorded by CST in the category of Assault in 2017 where an age description of the offender was provided, INCIDENT OFFENDERS CST is often asked by journalists and members of the public to identify the ethnic or religious background of incident offenders. This can be a difficult and imprecise task. CST will ask incident victims or witnesses if they can describe the person, or people, who committed the incident they are reporting, but many antisemitic incidents involve public encounters where the antisemitic abuse may be generic, brief and sometimes non-verbal. The evidence of victims of, and witnesses to, these antisemitic incidents may rely on their interpretation of the offender’s physical appearance, language or other indicators. Many other incidents do not involve face-to-face contact between offender and victim, such as graffiti or hate mail incidents, so it is not always possible to obtain a physical description of the offender. 13. CST uses the ‘IC1-6’ system, used by the UK Police services, for categorising the ethnic appearance of offenders. This uses the codes IC1, IC2, IC3, etc for ‘White – North European’; ‘White – South European’; ‘Black ’; ‘South Asian’; ‘East or South East Asian’; and ‘Arab or North African’. This is obviously not a foolproof system and can only be used as a rough guide. http://www.cst.org.uk 30 Antisemitic Incidents Report 2017 www.cst.org.uk but for only 16 per cent of the incidents in the categories of Abusive Behaviour (where an age description of the offender was provided). Similarly, minors were the victims of 39 per cent of Assault incidents recorded by CST where the age of the victim was obtained, but they were the victims of only 15 per cent of incidents of Abusive Behaviour (where the age of the victim was obtained). Analysing the content of incidents can help to identify the motives of incident offenders, although the link between the discourse used in an incident and the motivation of the offender or offenders is not always obvious. For example, consider these two incidents: • London, January. A Jewish charity that promotes and supports Holocaust Memorial Day was targeted online on Holocaust Memorial Day. The offender targeted this charity with Nazi imagery, messages in admiration of Adolf Hitler, such as “Hitler was right,” and quotes in German said by Adolf Hitler. • Scotland, November. Upon hearing a Jewish woman’s accent, the shopkeeper asked the Jewish woman where she was from and if she was from Israel to which she replied, “yes.” The shopkeeper then raised the price of the item, and said “I don’t usually serve you Zionist scum in my shop. Plus, Jews have got lots of money. You shouldn’t be bothered if I raise the price.” In the first case, a Holocaust commemoration charity’s online profile has been publicly targeted on Holocaust Memorial Day. The offender has picked that specific day to target the charity with expressions of support for Hitler and Nazism. The choice of date heightens the offence caused to people remembering the Holocaust who may decide to visit the charity’s online profile. This incident appears, therefore, to be motivated by neo-Nazi political beliefs. In the second incident, the offender seems to have initially targeted the victim due to their anti-Israel sentiment, upon hearing the victim’s accent. Upon finding out that the victim was from Israel, the offender then expressed overtly anti-Jewish attitudes to verbally abuse the victim, making antisemitic comments about Jewish people and money. It seems that in this case there is a connection between the initial anti-Israel motivation and the subsequent antisemitic discourse used. However, in other incidents the connection between the discourse used and any political motivation is not so clear. For example, consider this incident: • Hertfordshire, January. A visibly Jewish man was verbally attacked at a gym. The male offender said, “You lot think you own the world. Jews own all the banks. Jews own Hilary Clinton.” Then the offender shouted, “If I was Palestinian I would blow myself up. Free Palestine.” In this incident, even though the offender refers to Palestine whilst verbally abusing the victim, it is hard to tell whether the offender deliberately targeted the victim primarily because of their anti-Israel sentiment or whether their primary hostility was towards Jewish people, which was then expressed via reference to Palestine. The political motivation is also less clear because the offender accompanies his references to Palestine with other antisemitic language, regarding Jewish domination. DISCOURSE AND MOTIVES http://www.cst.org.uk 31Antisemitic Incidents Report 2017 www.cst.org.uk In other incidents, discourses relating to Jews are more indicative of a general conspiracist mindset than of a coherent political ideology. For example: • London, June. A letter reading “The problem is a movement called the New World Order, which is run by the very rich and powerful who are usually involved with the banking system and the other powerful institutions (eg. Rothschilds, who finance both sides in wars)…if you look at what is happening today in the world globally and compare it to certain theories, the Protocols of the Elders of Zion etc. The dots seem to connect, revealing a pretty bad picture” was delivered to a man’s home. • London, October. Graffiti reading “Banks, Media, Holohoax and 9/11” was found along a canal. In these incidents, fragments of political discourse are present, but they do not add up to a coherent, identifiable political outlook that would indicate the offender subscribes to one political viewpoint or another. Rather, both incidents reflect a belief in conspiracy theories on different parts of the political spectrum. Sometimes, different political discourses are mixed together in a way that reveals a more basic antisemitism: • London, January. A man posted messages on social media saying, “Hitler was right” and “you’re a baby sacrificing, blood drinking, economy ruining Zionist lord.” This particular incident is typical of contemporary antisemitic incident offenders, who will often select from a range of Jewish- related discourses or imagery with which to abuse, insult or threaten their Jewish victims. Sometimes the specific language used is of secondary importance, compared to the desire to insult or abuse Jews. Rather than being limited to prejudice rooted in traditional, far right beliefs, or fuelled exclusively by more contemporary extremisms or anti-Israel sentiment, the antisemitic incidents reported to CST in 2017 represent the multifaceted nature of contemporary antisemitism. In 277 of the 1,382 antisemitic incidents reported to CST in 2017, the offenders employed discourse based on the Nazi period, including swastikas and references to the Holocaust. Of these, 140 showed evidence of far right motivation or beliefs. For comparison, in 2016, Nazi-related discourse was used by offenders in 341 antisemitic incidents, of which 172 showed evidence of far right motivation or beliefs. In 2017, discourse relating to Israel or the Middle East was used in 104 antisemitic incidents, of which 67 showed evidence of anti-Israel motivation or beliefs; compared to 106 incidents using Israel-related discourse in 2016, of which 63 showed evidence of anti-Israel motivation or beliefs. In addition, language or images relating to Islam or Muslims was present in 27 antisemitic incidents in 2017, the same as 2016, while 14 incidents showed evidence of Islamist motivation or beliefs in 2017 (11 in 2016). Overall, 30 per cent of antisemitic incidents recorded in 2017 involved the use of political language alongside antisemitism, while 16 per cent of incidents in 2017 showed evidence of a particular ideological motivation or belief. This compares to 35 per cent in 2016 that used political language, and 18 per cent that showed political motivation. It is necessary for there to be evidence of antisemitic language, targeting or motivation, as well as any political or ideological motivation for the incident to be recorded by CST as antisemitic. Tweet including a range of antisemitic discourses, Cambridge, April http://www.cst.org.uk 32 Antisemitic Incidents Report 2017 www.cst.org.uk CST received reports of 872 potential incidents during 2017 that, after investigation, did not appear to be antisemitic and were therefore not included in the total of 1,382 antisemitic incidents. These 872 potential incidents included examples of anti-Israel activity directed at organisations involved in pro- Israel work, which did not involve explicitly antisemitic language or imagery and were therefore not classified by CST as antisemitic. Examples of anti-Israel incidents during 2017 that were reported to CST but were not recorded as antisemitic include the following: • London, August. A pro-Palestinian video was put on in a museum. • London, October. Anti-Israel posters were found in public nearby to the TLV in LDN celebration; a celebration of Tel Aviv culture in London. Sometimes the targeting of a particular incident can suggest an intention to intimidate or offend Jews on the part of the offender. For example, if the above example of the anti-Israel posters had been placed in close proximity to a synagogue or Jewish school, or in an area with a large, visibly Jewish population, or was handed out to visibly Jewish people, then it is likely that it would have been classified as an antisemitic incident. On the above occasion, however, it was not counted as antisemitic because these posters appeared to have been targeted towards the general public and not deliberately at Jews. The posters were found at the nearest underground station, and outside the entrance, to the Tel Aviv celebration. This occurred in Camden, which is not an area of London that is readily associated with the Jewish community. If anti-Israel material is sent unsolicited to a synagogue at random then it may well be recorded as an antisemitic incident (because the synagogue was targeted on the basis of it being Jewish and the offender has failed to distinguish between a place of worship and pro-Israel political activity). Similarly, if a synagogue receives hostile anti-Israel verbal abuse this may well be recorded as an antisemitic incident because the offender has intentionally targeted a Jewish place of worship. For example: • Brighton, September. A man approached a synagogue and shouted towards congregants, “Free Palestine.” If, however, anti-Israel material (containing no antisemitic slander) is sent unsolicited to specifically pro-Israel organisations then this incident would not be classified as antisemitic. Similarly, if a Jewish individual or group is engaging in public pro-Israel advocacy and ANTISEMITIC OR ANTI-ISRAEL? CST is often asked about the difference between antisemitic incidents and anti-Israel activity, and how this distinction is made in the categorisation of incidents. The distinction between the two can be subtle and the subject of much debate. Clearly, it would not be acceptable to define all anti- Israel activity as antisemitic; but it cannot be ignored that contemporary antisemitism can occur in the context of, or be accompanied by, extreme feelings over the Israel/Palestine conflict, and that criticisms of Israel may draw upon antisemitic rhetoric and conspiracy theories. Discourse relating to the conflict is used by antisemitic incident offenders to abuse Jews; and anti-Israel discourse can sometimes repeat, or echo, antisemitic language and imagery. Drawing out these distinctions, and deciding on where the dividing lines lie, is one of the most difficult areas of CST’s work in recording and analysing hate crime. http://www.cst.org.uk 33Antisemitic Incidents Report 2017 www.cst.org.uk subsequently receives anti-Israel material, this would most likely not be classified as antisemitic (again, unless it contains antisemitic slander). The political discourse used in an incident may also be the reason why the incident is accepted or rejected as antisemitic. In particular, incidents that equate Israel to Nazi Germany would normally be recorded as antisemitic because the comparison is so deeply hurtful and abusive. However, incidents that compare Israel, for instance, to apartheid South Africa, normally would not be recorded as antisemitic incidents. While the charge that Israel practises apartheid upsets many Jews, it does not contain the same visceral capacity to offend Jews on the basis of their Jewishness as does the comparison with Nazism, which carries particular meaning for Jews because of the Holocaust. CST received reports on 33 incidents (in the category of Abusive Behaviour) where a comparison was made between Israel and Nazis. For example: • London, September. A man targeted a Jewish charity online and posted the following message: “You lot are ZioNazis. Zionism equals Nazism.” Irrespective of whether or not these incidents are classified as antisemitic by CST, they are still relevant to CST’s security work as they often involve threats and abuse directed at Jewish people or organisations who work with, or in support of, Israel, and therefore have an impact on the security of the UK Jewish community. Antisemitic and anti-Israel tweet, London, November Antisemitic and anti-Israel tweet comparing Israel with Nazis, Scotland, February Antisemitic and anti-Israel tweet, London, May http://www.cst.org.uk 34 Antisemitic Incidents Report 2017 www.cst.org.uk A total of 282 antisemitic incidents, 36 per cent of the incidents in Greater London, were recorded in the borough of Barnet, which has the largest Jewish community of any local authority in the UK. There were 92 antisemitic incidents recorded in Hackney, 51 antisemitic incidents recorded in Westminster, 45 in Camden, 31 in Haringey, 26 in Harrow, 23 in Redbridge, 17 in Islington, 14 in Waltham Forest and 12 in Tower Hamlets. In Greater Manchester, 92 antisemitic incidents (35 per cent of the Greater Manchester total) were recorded in the Metropolitan Borough of Bury. There were 90 antisemitic incidents recorded in the Borough of Salford and 29 in the Borough of Manchester. Outside Greater London and Greater Manchester, CST received reports of 348 antisemitic incidents from 80 locations around the UK in 2017, compared to 305 incidents from 96 different locations in 2016. There were 40 antisemitic incidents in Hertfordshire (of which 18 were in Borehamwood), compared to 36 in 2016; 32 in Gateshead (16 in 2016), 22 in Leeds (21 in 2016); 15 in Brighton & Hove (nine in 2016), 12 in Liverpool (13 in 2016), and 12 in Birmingham (three in 2016). Going by Police region rather than specific locations, and in addition to the figures already given for London, Manchester and Hertfordshire, CST recorded 25 antisemitic incidents in West Yorkshire (28 in 2016), 39 in Northumbria (18 in 2016), 22 in Sussex (14 in 2016), 16 in Scotland (15 in 2016), 14 in Cambridge (13 in 2016), 12 in Merseyside (14 in 2016), 13 in the West Midlands (eight in 2016) and ten in Lancashire (eight in 2016). CST also recorded 50 incidents in places that fall under the jurisdiction of British Transport Police, which includes the national rail network, the London Underground, Docklands Light Railway, the Midland Metro tram system, Croydon Tramlink, Sunderland Metro, Glasgow Subway and the Emirates Air Line cable car (compared to 47 such incidents in 2016). Further differences between incident types in Greater London and Greater Manchester can be drawn out of the statistics. Taken broadly, and allowing for rough generalisations, the statistics show that antisemitic incidents in Greater Manchester are more likely to involve random street racism – what might be called antisemitic hooliganism – against individual Jews; while ideologically motivated antisemitism – which normally takes the form of hate mail, abusive phone calls or antisemitic graffiti – tends to be concentrated in Greater London where most of the Jewish community’s leadership bodies and public figures are based. For example, 47 per cent of antisemitic incidents recorded by CST in Greater Manchester targeted individual Jews in public, compared to 23 per cent of the incidents recorded in Greater London; whereas 16 per cent of incidents recorded in Greater London targeted Jewish organisations, events or communal leaders, compared to five per cent of the incidents in Greater Manchester. Incidents in Greater GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATIONS AND DIFFERENCES Seventy-five per cent of the 1,382 antisemitic incidents recorded by CST in 2017 took place in Greater London and Greater Manchester, the two largest Jewish communities in the UK. In Greater London, CST recorded 773 antisemitic incidents in 2017 compared to 835 during 2016, a decrease of seven per cent. In Greater Manchester, CST recorded 261 antisemitic incidents during 2017, an increase of 27 per cent compared to the 206 incidents recorded there during 2016. http://www.cst.org.uk 35Antisemitic Incidents Report 2017 www.cst.org.uk London are more likely to involve hate mail, abusive emails or online antisemitism: there were 179 such incidents in Greater London in 2017 (23 per cent of incidents in Greater London), compared to 30 in Greater Manchester (11 per cent of incidents in Greater Manchester). One hundred and thirty-two antisemitic incidents (17 per cent) recorded in Greater London showed some form of political motivation, compared to 34 incidents recorded in Greater Manchester (13 per cent). INCIDENT LOCATIONS 773 London 261 Greater Manchester 40 Hertfordshire 32 Gateshead 22 Leeds 22 Sussex 14 Cambridge 12 Liverpool 12 Birmingham http://www.cst.org.uk 36 Antisemitic Incidents Report 2017 www.cst.org.uk The Metropolitan Police Service study referred to above defined ‘mission’ incidents as those in which “the offender takes some premeditated action to instigate the incident by engineering their interaction with the victim. In addition, antisemitism seemingly drives the offender’s actions – as manifest by their language or symbols they use”. Applying this definition to the 1,362 antisemitic incidents categorised by CST in 2017 reveals that 1,111 incidents, or 82 per cent of those incidents that CST was able to categorise, showed evidence of being mission incidents. This does not mean that in every case the offender embarked on a lengthy and planned course of action in order to find a Jewish person or building to attack, although this did happen in several cases. Rather, it relates to incident offenders who, in the moments preceding an antisemitic incident, take some action to make contact with a person, organisation or property they believe to be Jewish, in order to express their bigotry. Examples of mission incidents recorded in 2017 include: • Hertfordshire, July. A group of visibly Jewish boys were followed by a group of boys and girls who shouted repeatedly, “I’m Hitler. I’m gonna gas you.” • Birmingham, August. A man approached a synagogue and shouted towards the security guards, “Is this the Jews’ place? Is this the place where the Jews are? Give us Palestine back. You’ve stolen our Palestine.” • Suffolk, August. A visibly Jewish man was followed into a pub by a man who made a gun gesture and shouted at him, “I’m going to kill you F**King Jews. I know where you are.” The 1,111 mission incidents recorded by CST in 2017 can be further broken down by type of incident. The three examples given above are all what can be referred to as ‘mission-direct’, which involves direct, face-to-face contact between offender and victim. Other incidents, which do not involve this face-to-face contact, TYPOLOGY OF INCIDENTS: MISSION, OPPORTUNISTIC OR AGGRAVATED? Antisemitic incidents take place in a range of contexts and for a variety of reasons. Sometimes the offender’s actions are premeditated; sometimes they are spontaneous; and sometimes they arise out of day-to-day conflicts that initially have nothing to do with antisemitism. Using a typology set out in a study of antisemitic hate crimes recorded by the Metropolitan Police Service from 2001 to 2004,14 it is possible to separate these into ‘mission’ incidents, ‘opportunistic’ incidents, and ‘aggravated’ incidents. CST received sufficient information to categorise 1,362 of the 1,382 antisemitic incidents recorded in 2017 by one of these three types. 14. Paul Iganski, Vicky Keilinger & Susan Paterson, Hate Crimes against London’s Jews (London: Institute for Jewish Policy Research, 2005). Swastika keyed into a Jewish person’s car, parked near a Jewish school, Essex, November http://www.cst.org.uk 37Antisemitic Incidents Report 2017 www.cst.org.uk can be classified as ‘mission-indirect’, of which these are examples: • London, March. Handwritten posters were put up on a Jewish location by a man of south Asian appearance, that read, “Jews are scum, die.” • London, May. A Jewish man’s home was hit with pork and eggs. • London, May. A Jewish man was called a “Jewish B***ard” on the phone. • London, June. A Jewish charity was targeted with the tweet, “The Holocaust is a lie.” Other mission incidents do not target a specific victim, but rather take place in a public area – where the victims can be any members of the public who happen to pass by – or on social media where the offending comments are publicly visible to many people. Examples of these ‘mission-indiscriminate’ incidents include: • London, January. Posters have been found in multiple underground stations covered in swastikas and the wording, “All Jews are rubbish,” “God loves Hitler,” and “No Jews.” • Manchester, February. A Twitter user posted the message, “The truth about this myth (and lies) is gradually coming out. People are questioning it now. Good having it looked into. I am aware it never occurred and that six million Jews were never gassed.” • London, July. Graffiti was found on a bus stop that read, “Adolf Hitler was right.” • London, August. Two men were standing in the street holding a poster that read, “Dictators of today: Rothschild” and a book with a red Star of David titled, “Synagogues of Satan.” • London, August. A man posted the following message on Twitter: “Every F**king Jew that died in the #Holocaust was a blessing. Imagine how bad the world would be now if six million more of them had survived.” • London, September. A white man walked down a street in a neighbourhood with a large Jewish population and shouted, “All these crazy Jews, they are all F**king yucks. They run the world.” The final type of mission incident that made up the 1,111 mission incidents in 2017 was ‘mission-inadvertent’, whereby the offender’s expression of antisemitism is inadvertently overheard or seen by somebody who the offender did not intend to directly abuse. Examples of this from 2017 include: • London, April. In a café, a Jewish man overheard a group of people in front of him making comments about the Jewish community, such as “they are all brain washed. It’s a disgusting religion.” • Hertfordshire, June. A woman in a supermarket was overheard saying, “This place is full of Jewish people. Best leave before the Jewish people come. I can’t walk past this street because it’s full of Jewish people.” Brick with antisemitic graffiti thrown through the window of a Jewish home, London, January http://www.cst.org.uk 38 Antisemitic Incidents Report 2017 www.cst.org.uk • London, September. A man in his local pub overheard a conversation between two men who denied the existence of gas chambers and the Holocaust. In contrast to these ‘mission’ incidents, 189 incidents, or 14 per cent of the 1,362 antisemitic incidents categorised in this way by CST in 2017, appeared to be ‘opportunistic’, whereby “the offender takes immediate advantage of an opportunity that presents itself to vent their antisemitism, rather than engineering the incident in a premeditated way” (Iganski, Keilinger & Paterson, 2005). Examples of opportunistic incidents from 2017 include: • London, April. A visibly Jewish man was walking when two white men on motorbikes shouted, “Hitler should have killed them.” • London, June. A visibly Jewish girl was standing on the pavement when a black man shouted from his car, “Jewish C**t.” • London, September. A Rabbi was walking in public when two men of Middle Eastern appearance shouted from their vehicle, “F**k off back to Israel, you Israeli C**t.” Sixty-two incidents, or five per cent of the 1,362 incidents CST was able to categorise by type, were what may be called ‘aggravated’ incidents, whereby “the offender and victim are caught up in a conflict situation that initially does not involve antisemitism. However, in the course of the conflict the offender’s bigotry emerges” (Iganski et al., 2005). Examples of aggravated incidents recorded by CST in 2017 include: • London, February. When a visibly Jewish man asked a man to move his vehicle that was blocking the way, the man shouted “G-d will kill you all.” • London, July. A black man had a problem with a transaction in a bank and started to shout and swear at staff and other customers, including a visibly Jewish boy who the man called a “F**king Jewish C**t.” • London, August. Following an argument between a woman and a white man over a parking space, the man shouted, “You f**king dirty Jew.” • London, October. A visibly Jewish man was at home when a white man came to his door and asked for a petition to be signed. Following the Jewish man apologising due to being in the middle of dinner, the white male looked at the mezuzah on the door and shouted that “You’re Jewish, so you’re greedy. The Jews are the greediest people in the world.” http://www.cst.org.uk 39Antisemitic Incidents Report 2017 www.cst.org.uk CST recorded 247 incidents during 2017 on social media, which represent 18 per cent of the overall total of 1,382 antisemitic incidents in 2017. This is a decrease from 2016 when CST recorded 289 antisemitic incidents on social media, representing 21 per cent of the overall total of antisemitic incidents in 2016. In 2015, CST recorded 185 antisemitic incidents on social media (19 per cent of the overall total of 959 antisemitic incidents recorded that year) and in 2014, CST recorded 235 antisemitic incidents on social media (20 per cent of that year’s overall total of 1,182 incidents). These numbers are only indicative, rather than being a guide to the actual number of antisemitic tweets, comments and posts, which is likely to be far higher. Nevertheless, CST still recorded more antisemitic incidents in public places in 2017 (356 incidents) than on social media, and more incidents involved verbal abuse (670 incidents) than digital abuse. The reason for the decline in the number of reported antisemitic incidents on social media may be because social media companies have improved the way they tackle hate speech online by removing content quickly and suspending accounts. There have also been a number of arrests and prosecutions that have helped to restrict the online activities of prolific antisemitic accounts. It may also be the result of CST’s ongoing efforts to identify where offenders and victims are based, in order to determine whether antisemitic content should be included in CST’s incident figures. If neither the offender nor the victim is based in the UK, CST will not include that incident in its statistics. Despite the apparent decline in the number of social media-based antisemitic incidents in 2017, antisemitism online is significantly under-reported, as is the case with all forms of antisemitism and hate crime in general. In addition, many users that post antisemitic tweets, which are then reported to CST, typically have a history of antisemitism on social media that far outweighs what is actually reported. Categories of antisemitic incidents on social media The majority of incidents on social media fall into the category of Abusive Behaviour. However, some users post threatening language indiscriminately or towards particular users, which would place those incidents in the category of Threats. ANTISEMITIC INCIDENTS ON SOCIAL MEDIA Social media users, protected by the anonymity of social media platforms, are able to directly threaten, abuse, harass and target Jews on social media, or post antisemitic content indiscriminately. http://www.cst.org.uk 40 Antisemitic Incidents Report 2017 www.cst.org.uk Types of antisemitic language online Just as with other forms of antisemitic behaviour, antisemitic incidents online include a variety of antisemitic language themes. These include: • Holocaust-related language such as Holocaust denial; • Comparisons between Nazis and Jews; • Conspiracy theories such as the notion that Jews run the world; • The Blood Libel, a medieval accusation that Jewish people kidnap and murder Christian children for Jewish practice and ritual; • Language including mentions of Zionism. Antisemitic private message sent directly to victim on social media, London, March http://www.cst.org.uk 41Antisemitic Incidents Report 2017 www.cst.org.uk Football-related online incidents Social media has become a way to disseminate information and voice opinions, and this is often done during and following football matches. CST receives many social media incidents related to football, often targeting Tottenham Hotspur FC; a club associated with having a Jewish fan base. “Yid” is often part of the language included in these football related antisemitic online incidents. “Yid” has a history of use as an antisemitic insult and whilst some Tottenham fans refer to themselves as “yids,” it is often deliberately used as an insult by other football fans, and in antisemitic incidents that are unrelated to football. When the term is used alongside discourse about the Holocaust, for example, it is done to upset and degrade Jews. CST works closely with Kick It Out, football’s anti-discrimination, anti-racism and equality organisation, to combat antisemitism in football, including on social media. Antisemitic tweet directed at fans of Tottenham Hotspur, London, July Football-related antisemitic tweet, Liverpool, April http://www.cst.org.uk 42 Antisemitic Incidents Report 2017 www.cst.org.uk Some of the numbers in the tables may differ from those previously published by CST, due to the late reporting of incidents to CST by incident victims and witnesses, or the recategorisation of some incidents due to new information. Antisemitic incident f igures by category, 2007–2017 Category 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Extreme Violence 1 1 3 0 2 2 0 1 4 0 0 Assault 116 87 121 115 93 67 69 80 83 108 145 Damage and Desecration 65 76 89 83 64 53 49 81 65 81 92 Threats 24 28 45 32 30 39 38 91 79 101 95 Abusive Behaviour 336 317 611 391 413 477 374 899 717 1,039 1,038 Literature 19 37 62 25 7 12 5 30 12 17 12 TOTAL 561 546 931 646 609 650 535 1,182 960 1,346 1,382 Antisemitic incident f igures by month, 2007–2017 Month 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 January 33 44 289 30 45 39 33 53 109 80 155 February 40 52 114 48 54 52 38 43 88 66 134 March 36 40 73 54 49 75 23 39 83 79 109 April 59 39 52 61 45 48 44 58 75 100 142 May 36 62 52 50 58 44 48 51 60 135 117 June 42 40 49 82 43 54 37 66 86 129 124 July 60 52 46 63 43 59 59 317 87 129 112 August 49 20 40 47 37 42 48 229 72 123 109 September 81 47 87 83 73 60 54 105 76 118 109 October 55 58 45 52 52 60 67 87 61 111 104 November 37 45 54 48 53 83 40 78 79 131 89 December 33 47 30 28 57 34 44 56 84 145 78 TOTAL 561 546 931 646 609 650 535 1,182 960 1,346 1,382 ANNUAL ANTISEMITIC INCIDENT FIGURES http://www.cst.org.uk 43Antisemitic Incidents Report 2017 www.cst.org.uk Antisemitic incident f igures, full breakdown, 2017 Category Month Extreme Violence Assault Damage and Desecration Threats Abusive Behaviour Literature MONTH TOTAL January 0 8 10 11 125 1 155 February 0 10 11 6 104 3 134 March 0 10 5 10 82 2 109 April 0 20 7 11 104 0 142 May 0 12 9 10 82 4 117 June 0 19 11 9 85 0 124 July 0 17 1 8 85 1 112 August 0 9 12 9 79 0 109 September 0 12 6 5 86 0 109 October 0 10 8 5 81 0 104 November 0 9 5 4 71 0 89 December 0 9 7 7 54 1 78 CATEGORY TOTAL 0 145 92 95 1,038 12 1,382 http://www.cst.org.uk Published by Community Security Trust. Registered charity in England and Wales (1042391) and Scotland (SC043612). TWITTER @CST_UK FACEBOOK Community Security Trust NATIONAL EMERGENCY NUMBER (24-hour) 0800 032 3263 LONDON (Head Off ice) 020 8457 9999 MANCHESTER (Northern Regional Off ice) 0161 792 6666 WEBSITE www.cst.org.uk YOUTUBE CSTmedia CST’S SUPPORT SERVICES • Third party report to the Police • Keep victims updated with the Police investigations • Advise on legal rights • Facilitate the removal of graffiti • Liaise with other agencies, including housing authorities, universities, schools, the Charity Commission, and Ofsted • Support victims with Victim Impact Statements and Community Impact Statements • Support victims navigate the Criminal Justice System, including attending court and explaining legislation • Facilitate the suspension of online accounts and removal of hate speech • Provide security and safety planning • Facilitate Restorative Justice services (volunteer practitioner with Restore: London) • Provide emotional and practical support • Provide referrals and signposting • Support victims who suffer multiple forms of hate crime through multi-agency meeting • Advocacy help to London-based victims via CATCH (Community Alliance to Combat Hate); working with other community organisations across all the hate crime strands http://www.cst.org.uk 
work_525tunakcfdjdivhdw55hv7bry	----	yayak_asli - 470 - Uluslararası Sosyal Araştırmalar Dergisi The Journal of International Social Research Cilt: 9 Sayı: 46 Volume: 9 Issue: 46 Ekim 2016 October 2016 www.sosyalarastirmalar.com Issn: 1307-9581 GÖÇMENLERİN NEFRET SUÇU DENEYİMLERİNİN İNCELENMESİ INVESTIGATING THE IMMIGRANTS' HATE CRIME EXPERIENCES Aslı YAYAK* İbrahim BALCIOĞLU ** Öz Bu çalışmanın amacı, Almanya'da yaşayan Türkiye kökenli göçmenlerin nefret suçu algılarını sosyal kimlik teorisi kapsamında incelemektir. Bu kapsamda, 12 ay süresince; Almanya’nın farklı şehirlerinde, 20-50 yaşarası, kadın/erkek Türkiye kökenli 101 gönüllü katılımcıyla yüz yüze görüşmeler yapılmıştır. Çalışmada, katılımcıların nefret suçu deneyimlerini öğrenmek için AB Azınlıklar ve Ayrımcılık Anketi kullanılmış olup niceliksel araştırma yönteminden yararlanılmıştır. Katılımcılara son 5 yıl içinde belirli alanlarda suç mağduru olup olmadıkları sorulmuştur. 29 kişi bir ulaşım aracının hırsızlık mağduru olduğunu; 9 kişi ev hırsızlığı mağduru olduğunu; 12 kişi bir yankesicilik olayının mağduru olduğunu; 9 kişi kişisel bir saldırıya uğradığını; 5 kişi bir kişi/grup tarafından rencide edici bir tartaklanma yaşadığını bildirmiştir. 64 olayın 40’ı son 12 ayda gerçekleşmiştir. 12 kişi olayları tamamen göçmen kimliğine, 7 kişi ise kısmi olarak göçmen kimliğine atfetmiştir. Erkekler kadınlardan daha fazla suç mağduru olmuşlardır. Anahtar Kelimeler: Nefret Suçu, Sosyal Kimlik Teorisi, Göçmen, Almanya. Abstract The purpose of this study is to investigate hate crime perceptions of Turkey origin immigrants living in Germany within the scope of social identity theory. In this context, it was conducted as face-to-face with 101 male/female volunteer participants ranging in age from 20 to 50, living in the four different cities of Germany within a period of 12 months. In this study, European Union Minorities and Discrimination Survey was used to determine hate crime experiences with using quantitative methods.Participants were asked whether they were victims of crime in specific areas in the last 5 years. 29 people reported that they were victims of vehicle theft; 9 people were victims of housebreaking; 12 of them were victims of pickpocketing; 9 people were being attacked personally and 5 people experienced offensive manhandling by a person/group. Only 40 of the 64 events took place in the last 12 months. 12 people completely and 7 people partly attributed events to the immigrant identity. Keywords: Hate Crime, Social Identity Theory, Immigrant, Germany. Giriş Ülkeler arası sınırların daha geçirgen hale gelmesiyle birlikte, her yıl değişik köken ve yerlerden gelen yüz binlerce insanın farklı nedenlerle çeşitli ülkelere göç ettiği bilinen bir gerçektir. Buna paralel olarak ortaya çıkan çok uluslu yeni oluşumlar, gruplar arası ilişkileri düzenlemekte ve yönlendirmektedirler. Ekonomik, siyasi ve sosyal birtakım nedenlerle bir araya gelen Avrupa ülkelerinin oluşturduğu Avrupa Birliği (AB), “öteki”ne yönelik önyargıların artmasıyla, yabancı düşmanlığı ve nefret suçu olgularına zemin hazırlamaktadır. Birbirinden uzak toplumsal grupların birlikte yaşadığı günümüzde, gruplar arası ilişkiler giderek karmaşık bir hal almakta ve birtakım çatışmalara neden olmaktadır. Çok kültürlü toplumlarda “öteki”ne karşı duyulan şüphe, yerini zamanla nefret suçu ve nefret söylemine bırakarak, gruplar arası ilişkilerde yeni açılımları beraberinde getirmektedir. Çalışmanın teorik zeminini oluşturan Sosyal Kimlik Teorisi (SKT), gruplar arası ilişkilere/çatışmalara odaklanmış bir teoridir (Hortaçsu, 2007). Gruplar arası çatışmaları ortaya çıkaran ve devam ettiren süreçlerin neler olduğu, bireylerin hangi süreçler dahilinde kendini bir grubun üyesi olarak gördüğü, gruplar arası farklılıkların nasıl algılandığı ve davranışlara nasıl yansıdığı gibi temel sorulara cevap arayan bir teoridir (Turner, 1975). Bu çalışmanın da amacı, Almanya'da yaşayan Türkiye kökenli göçmenlerin nefret suçu algılarını SKT kapsamında incelemektir. 1. Kavramsal Çerçeve Bünyesinde iki temel unsur olan ayrımcılık ve önyargıyı barındıran “nefret suçları”nı henüz uluslararası düzeyde tanımlayan ve yasaklayan bir sözleşme veya düzenleme bulunmamakla birlikte, bu suç tipine yönelik en kapsamlı tanım, bölgesel bir hükümetler arası organizasyon olan Avrupa Güvenlik ve İşbirliği Teşkilatı (OSCE) tarafından geliştirilmiştir. OSCE’nin tanımına göre; “Bir şahsa veya mülküne karşı işlenen herhangi bir suçun kaynağı, o kimsenin ırkı, rengi, etnik kökeni ya da uyruğu, dini, cinsiyeti veya cinsel yönelimi, cinsiyet kimliği, yaşı, fiziksel veya zihinsel engelleri yahut buna benzer bir durum ile ilgili ise, bu suç nefret suçudur" denilmektedir. Yani, bir kişi ya da gruba karşı beslenen önyargı nedeniyle, tanımda belirtilen özellikler sebep gösterilerek kişilere ve/veya mülklerine karşı işlenen suç türüdür. OSCE *Dr. Psk., Edirne Halk Sağlığı Müdürlüğü, yayakasli@yahoo.com **Prof. Dr., İstanbul Üniversitesi Cerrahpaşa Tıp Fakültesi Ruh Sağlığı ve Hastalıkları Anabilim Dalı, ibrahim.balcioglu@istanbul.edu.tr - 471 - tarafından önyargı suçları olarak da kabul edilen nefret suçları, iki noktadan referans alır. Bunlardan ilki, ceza kanunu dahilinde bir eylemin suç teşkil etmesi, diğeri bunun bir önyargı motivasyonuyla oluşmasıdır. Kanunlar ülkelere göre değişiklik gösterse de, söz konusu cezai eylemlerin ortak noktası, çoğu zaman bu eylemlerin şiddet içeren eylemler olmalarıdır. Nefret suçlarını öteki suçlardan ayıran diğer bir bileşen ise önyargıdır. Bu suç türünde hedef bir kişi ya da toplumsal bir grup olabileceği gibi, onlara ait olan bir mülkiyet de olabilmektedir (OSCE-ODIHR, 2009). Genelde sosyal bilimler, özelde ise sosyal psikoloji alanında “kimlik” üzerine geçmişte çok çeşitli araştırmalar yürütülmüş ve günümüzde de halen yürütülmeye devam etmektedir. Her bireyin bir kimlik sahibi olduğu göz önüne alındığında, insanoğlunun ilk ortaya çıktığı zamanlardan itibaren kimlik olgusunun var olduğu kabul edilirse, kavramın yeni olmadığı, ancak, modern toplumlarda daha çok ön plana çıkan/çıkartılan bir kavram olduğu kabul edilebilir. Kişinin hem kendisini hem de toplumdaki diğer bireyleri tanıma ve tanımlama aracı olan kimlik, bir algılama ve inşa sürecini kapsar. Kimlik kavramı, kişiyi toplum içinde belli konumlara yerleştirmeye yardımcı olur. Zamansal-mekansal farklılıklara ve ‘öteki’ ne bağlı olarak değişen kimlik algısı, bireyin hem kendisinin kim, ne, nerede olduğunu anlamasına, hem de diğerlerini tanımasına ve aradaki mesafeyi tahmin etmesinde yarar sağlar. Benlik ise, kişiyi diğerlerinden ayırt eden ve kişiler arası farklılıkları vurgulayan bir kavram olarak kişiyi özelliklerine göre tanımlar. Hem benlik hem de kimlik kavramları dinamik kavramlar olup, benlikte kişinin dış görünüşü ve davranışlarından çıkarsanan kişilik özellikleri ortaya konulurken, kimlikte ‘ben kimim’ sorusuna, kişinin bireysel özellikleri arka plana itilerek belli bir rol veya grubun özellikleri üzerinden yanıt verilir (Hortaçsu, 2007). OSCE tarafından yapılan tanımlamada ve ardından sunulan açıklamalarda da görüldüğü gibi, nefret suçları bireylerin kendilerini ve başkalarını tanımlama biçimlerine dayalı olarak işlenmektedir. Yine bu tanıma göre, grup üyelikleriyle ilgili “gerçek ya da varsayılan” bağlar, bireylerin bu tür suçların mağduru olmalarının temel nedenidir. Nefret suçlarının “gerçek” grup üyelikleri unsurundan ayrı tutulamayacak bir yapı sergilemesi, konunun sosyolojik bir analizle ele alınmasını gerektirmektedir. Buna ek olarak, konunun “varsayılan bağlar” ifadesiyle vurgulanmaya çalışılan bir öznel yanı da bulunmaktadır. Dolayısıyla, nefret suçları olgusu, hem toplumsal yapı faktörlerinin hem de bireysel algılarda beliren öznelliğin aynı anda inceleneceği bir analiz biçimini zorunlu kılmaktadır. Bireylerin grup üyeliklerinin hangi süreçlere bağlı olarak toplumsal ve psikolojik sonuçlar ürettiği konusunda birçok bulgu üretmiş olan sosyal psikoloji disiplini, özellikle bazı kuramsal yaklaşımlar sayesinde nefret suçları gibi karmaşık bir olguyu çözümlemede de yarar sağlayabilir. Sosyal psikoloji teorileri arasında bu açıdan öne çıkan teori ise, Tajfel ve Turner’in Sosyal Kimlik Teorisi (SKT)’dir. Bu teoriye göre, insan, hem bir grubun içinde yer alarak diğerlerine benzeme, hem de aynı zamanda biricikliğini açığa çıkarma ihtiyacındadır. Bu açıdan kimlik kavramı, benzerlik ve farklılık ikiliğini içinde barındıran bir kavram konumundadır. Birey, çevreden kendisine doğru gelen uyaranları bilişsel süreçler aracılığıyla düzenleyerek anlamlı hale getirmeye çalışırken, hem kendi kimliğini hem de çevresindekileri tanımlar. Diğer bir deyişle, birey, bu süreç içinde kendi sosyal kimliğini tarif eder. Bu kimlik inşası, bireyin dünyaya gelmesiyle başlayan ve hayatı boyunca devam eden bir süreçtir (Bilgin, 2001). 2. Araştırmanın Yöntemi Bu çalışmada, Almanya'da yaşayan Türkiye kökenli göçmenlerin nefret suçu algı ve deneyimleri incelenmiştir. Bu amaç doğrultusunda, söz konusu algıların sosyal psikolojik bir perspektiften hareketle saptanması hedeflenmiştir. Gruptaki göçmenlerin nefret suçu deneyimlerinin SKT kapsamındaki değişkenlerle ve bazı sosyo-demografik özelliklerle ilişkisinin incelenmesi ana hedeflerin başında gelmektedir. Bu doğrultuda çalışmada; yaş, cinsiyet, doğum yeri, kalış süresi, vatandaşlık gibi demografik değişkenler kontrol edildikten sonra, algılanan ve deneyimlenen nefret suçları ortaya konmaya çalışılmıştır. Bu kapsamda, Almanya'nın dört farklı şehrinde -Berlin, Hamburg, Bremen, Braunschweig- yaşayan, 20-50 yaş arası, kadın/erkek Türkiye kökenli 101 gönüllü katılımcı ile görüşülmüştür. Almanya'daki en büyük etnik grup olan Türkiye kökenli göçmenlere, orada aktif olarak faaliyet gösteren dernekler ve kişisel bağlantılar yoluyla ulaşılmıştır. Göçmenlerin nefret suçu algı ve deneyimlerini belirleyebilmek için, Avrupa Birliği Temel Haklar Ajansı tarafından hazırlanmış olan “AB Azınlıklar ve Ayrımcılık Anketi” kullanılmış olup nicel araştırma yönteminden yararlanılmıştır. 3. Araştırmanın Bulguları On iki aylık sürede***, toplam 101 gönüllü katılımcı ile görüşme yapılmıştır. Bu kişilerin 58'i kadın, 43'ü ise erkektir. Örneklemin yaş aralığı 21 ila 50 arasında değişmekte olup yaş ortalaması 39'dur. Katılımcılar içinde; Alevi, Zaza, Kürt, Azeri, Sünni gibi farklı etnik/dini gruplara mensup kişiler *** Bu çalışma kapsamında, Tübitak 2214-A Bursu ile 12 ay Almanya’da kalınmıştır. - 472 - bulunmaktadır. 74 kişi Türkiye doğumlu olup 27 kişi Almanya doğumludur. 101 kişiden 35'i Alman vatandaşı, 51'i Türk vatandaşı, 15'i ise çifte vatandaştır. Almanya'da kalış süresi ortalama yaklaşık 26 yıldır. Katılımcılara; son 5 yıl içinde belirli alanlarda suç mağduru olup olmadıkları sorulmuştur. 5 farklı suç tipini kapsayan sorularda: a) kişilerin kendisine ya da ev halkından birine ait herhangi bir ulaşım aracının çalınıp çalınmadığı veya bunlardan herhangi bir şey çalınıp çalınmadığı, b) evlerine birinin/birilerinin izinsiz girip girmediği ve bir şey çalıp çalmadığı, c) şiddet veya tehdidi kapsayan hırsızlıktan farklı olarak yankesicilik gibi kişisel mülkiyet hırsızlığının mağduru olup olmadıkları, d) kişileri gerçekten korkutacak bir şekilde birisi tarafından vurma, itme veya tehdit gibi kişisel bir saldırıya uğrayıp uğramadıkları, e) kişisel olarak bir grup ya da bir kişi tarafından ciddi anlamda üzen, rencide eden veya öfkelendiren bir tartaklanma yaşayıp yaşamadıkları sorulmuştur. Tartaklanmadan kast edilen; fiili şiddet veya şiddet tehdidi içermeyen, kişiye yönelik yapılan istenmeyen ve rahatsız edici davranışlardır. Yapılan görüşmelerde; 29 kişi kendisine/ev halkından birine ait bir ulaşım aracının çalındığını; 9 kişi evlerine hırsızlık amacıyla girildiğini; 12 kişi bir yankesicilik olayının mağduru olduğunu; 9 kişi kişisel bir saldırıya uğradığını; 5 kişi ise bir kişi/grup tarafından rencide edici bir tartaklanma yaşadığını bildirmiştir. Suç türleri arasında en büyük oran hırsızlık suçuna ait olup özellikle araç hırsızlığı kapsamında değerlendirilen bisiklet hırsızlığı ilk sırada yer almaktadır. Daha sonra özellikle toplu taşıma araçlarında yaşanan cüzdan ve telefon hırsızlıklarının dahil olduğu yankesicilik mağduriyeti ise araç hırsızlığından sonra 2. sırada yer almaktadır. Hırsızlık türleri arasında en az yaşanan ise eve girilerek hırsızlık mağduru olma olup bunu kişisel saldırı mağduru olma ve tartaklanma mağduru olma izlemektedir. Araç hırsızlığı, eve yönelik hırsızlık ve yankesicilik olayları dışında yaşanan kişisel saldırı ve tartaklanma olaylarında, katılımcılar her hangi bir gasp olayının yaşanmadığını beyan etmişlerdir. Bu da, yaşanan saldırı olaylarının direkt kişilere yönelik olduğunu ve mala yönelik yapılmadığını göstermektedir. Yaşanan 64 olayın 40’ı son 12 ay içinde gerçekleşmiştir. 12 kişi yaşadıkları olayları tamamiyle göçmen kimliğine, 7 kişi ise kısmi olarak göçmen kimliğine atfetmiştir. Kişisel saldırı ve tartaklanma olaylarının (totalde 14 olay) yarısı (7) tek failli, diğer yarısı (7) çok faillidir. Faillerin 12’sinin Alman kökenli, 1’inin farklı azınlık grubu üyesi, 1’inin ise mağdurla aynı etnik gruptan olduğu öğrenilmiştir. Kişisel saldırı ve tartaklanma olaylarında; 6 kişi ırkçı söylemle, 4 kişi küfürlü söylemle, 1 kişi dinine yönelik hakaretle karşılaşmıştır. Olayların 3’ü bildirilmiş, 11 olay bildirilmemiştir. Mağdurlar, yaşadıkları olayları birtakım gerekçelerle polise bildirmemişlerdir; olayları kayda değer bulmama, yaşadıkları sorunlarla kendi kendilerine baş etme düşüncesi, polisin olaya yaklaşımından duyulan güvensizlik gibi gerekçelerle kişiler olayları bildirmekten kaçındıklarını beyan etmişlerdir. Cinsiyet olarak bakıldığında ise; kadın ve erkek katılımcıların suç mağduru olma sıklıklarının ortalama ve standart sapma değerlerini belirlemek için ANOVA analizi gerçekleştirilmiştir. Erkeklerin suç mağduru olma sıklıklarının kadınlarınkinden yüksek olmasına karşın, analiz sonucu, bu farkın anlamlılık düzeyine erişmediğini göstermektedir (F(1,96) = .269; p > .05). Tablo 1: Kadın ve erkek katılımcıların suç mağduru olma sıklıklarının ortalama ve standart sapma değerleri. N Ort. Std. Sapma Minimum Maksimum Kadın 57 .61 .92 0 4 Erkek 41 .71 .81 0 3 Toplam 98 .65 .87 0 4 4. Sonuç Yukarıdaki tabloyu daha iyi kavrayabilmek adına, altında yatan tarihsel süreçleri de göz önünde bulundurmak gerekmektedir. Hiçbir ön hazırlık ve sosyal altyapı çalışması yapılmadan, kendilerine her anlamda yabancı bir topluma getirilen yüz binler hatta milyonlarca insanın geleceği, sosyal, kültürel ve dini hayatı göz ardı edilerek bundan tam yarım asır önce Almanya’ya Türk iş göçü başlatılmıştır. İlk gelen kuşağa sadece iş gücü olarak bakılmış ve bir gün kendi ülkelerine dönecekleri düşünülerek hiçbir göçmen politikası oluşturulmamıştır. Ancak, uzun bir zaman geçtikten sonra gelenlerin geri dönmeyecekleri anlaşıldıktan sonra oluşturulan politikalar, kemikleşmiş problemleri çözmeye yetmemiştir. Bu kapsamda, Almanya’nın yetersiz göç ve entegrasyon politikaları, Türkiye’den gelen göçmenlerin gettolaşma durumu, yaşadıkları sosyal-kültürel-dini problemler, hem Almanca hem Türkçe dillerinde görülen yetersizlik, eğitim ve buna bağlı olarak istihdam problemleri, bunların sonucunda yaşanan dışlanma, ötekileştirilme ve ayrımcılık gibi birçok sorunun devam etmesine yol açmaktadır. Bunun yanında, gerekli politikaların zamanında oluşturulmamış olması, tarihsel süreçte Türklere yönelik geliştirilen önyargılar, zaman zaman ırkçılığın tırmanarak nefret suçlarına yol açması, siyasette yabancıların arka planda bekletilen potansiyel bir problem olmasına neden olmaktadır. Almanya gibi çok kültürlü toplumların geleceğinin, içinde yaşayan sosyal gruplara bağlı olmasından dolayı, kimlik ve uyum konularında yaşanan sorunlarda Alman ve Türk toplumlarının ortak sorumlulukları vardır. - 473 - Almanya’da yaşayan Türkiye kökenli göçmenlerin Almanya’daki toplumsal yaşamda tam anlamıyla temsil edilmediği açıkça görülebilir. Göçmenler, nüfuslarıyla orantısız olarak çok az bir şekilde parlementoda temsil edilmektedirler. 2. hatta 3. nesil gençler ciddi bir işsizlik sorunuyla karşı karşıya kalmaktadır. Sosyal yardımlara bağlı olarak yaşayan bu kişiler, eğitim alanındaki başarısızlık sarmalı içinde fırsatlara eşit şekilde ulaşamamaktadır. Özellikle Türkiye kökenlilere yönelik çifte vatandaşlık uygulamasının kabul edilmemesi ve vatandaşlığa geçişin ağır şartlara bağlanması, vicdan testi gibi aşağılayıcı uygulamalar, temel yurttaşlık ve insan hakları konusunda da problemler yaşanmasına yol açmaktadır. Genelde Avrupa özelde ise Almanya’da göç politikaları kapsamında göçmenlere yönelik olan haklar eşitsiz ve birbirinden oldukça farklıdır. Almanya genelinde toplumsal hiyerarşi şu şekilde sıralanabilir: 1- Alman 2- Etnik Alman (kan bağı ile Alman olup zamanında Almanya’dan göç etmiş ve geri dönen kişiler) 3- AB vatandaşları 4- AB vatandaşı olmayanlar. Bu sistemde, oturum izninden hakların uygulanmasına kadar olan geniş yelpazede sahip olunan etnik köken bariyer olma özelliğini korumaktadır. Sonuç itibariyle, bazı belirli grupları kamusal alanlardan ve siyasal süreçlerden dışlama olarak karşımıza çıkan göçmen politikaları, yabancı düşmanlığını körüklemekte ve göçmenleri ötekileştirmektedir (Whitaker, 2005). KAYNAKÇA HORTAÇSU, Nuran (2007). Ben, siz, biz, hepimiz: Toplumsal Kimlik ve Gruplararası İlişkiler, Ankara: İmge Kitabevi. BİLGİN, Nuri (2001). İnsan İlişkileri ve Kimlik, İstanbul: Sistem Yayıncılık. OFFICE FOR DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS (2009). ODIHR-Hate Crime Laws: A Practical Guide, Warsaw: OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. WHITAKER, B. Elise (2005). “Citizens and Foreigners: Democratization and the Politics of Exclusion in Africa”, African Studies Review, S. 48 (1), ss. 109-126. TURNER, C. John (1975). “Social comparison and social identity: Some prospects for intergroup behaviour”, European Journal of Social Psychology, S. 5, ss. 5-34. 
work_54d5qbzw3badrcjo7z6roi5ihq	----	Audrey Osler & Hugh Starkey (2018) Extending the theory and practice of education for cosmopolitan citizenship, Educational Review, 70:1, 31-40 1 Extending the theory and practice of education for cosmopolitan citizenship Audrey Osler* University College of Southeast Norway and University of Leeds, UK *Corresponding Author Hugh Starkey Institute of Education, University College London 20 Bedford Way, London WC1H 0AL, UK Tel: +44 20 7911 5507 Email: h.starkey@ucl.ac.uk Audrey Osler & Hugh Starkey (2018) Extending the theory and practice of education for cosmopolitan citizenship, Educational Review, 70:1, 31-40 2 Extending the theory and practice of education for cosmopolitan citizenship Audrey Osler University College of Southeast Norway and University of Leeds, UK Hugh Starkey Institute of Education, University College London Abstract In 2003, citizenship education had recently been introduced to the national curriculum for England, and the model adopted was proving to be influential in a variety of settings worldwide. We sought to challenge a nationalist version of citizenship education by proposing ‘education for cosmopolitan citizenship’ (Osler and Starkey, 2003) arguing for citizenship learning founded in human rights, that recognises and builds upon cosmopolitan values at all scales. Building upon theories of cosmopolitan democracy (Held, 1997) we examined research data from young people living in communities characterized by diversity. We characterised them as emergent cosmopolitan citizens, who were negotiating daily their multiple loyalties and belongings. Nearly two decades later, many people are less optimistic about the global political climate. In the face of economic difficulties, demographic change and uncertainties, some welcome authoritarian and populist leaders whose rhetoric suggests easy solutions to complex problems, blaming the most vulnerable (e.g. refugees, foreigners) for society's ills. A politics of solidarity and hope is derided as those who have suffered the negative impact of globalization, economic crisis and austerity policies are urged to put 'our people' first. This paper examines various challenges confronting teachers who seek to educate young people for living together in democratic communities in which human rights, justice and peace prevail. We argue that education for human rights and cosmopolitan citizenship is more urgent than ever. Such an education can offer young people alternative narratives, empowering them to struggle for justice in their own lives and those of others. Keywords: human rights education, nationalism, cosmopolitan citizenship, populism, social justice, migration, Islamophobia Introduction Teachers in 2017 are working in a difficult climate in which populist ideas threaten human rights and democracy. Globalization and migration are presented as threats; intolerance appears to flourish. Today, across Europe, several political leaders, notably from the far right, emphasise the need to put ‘our people’ first, and to ‘take back control’ from international organizations, such as the European Union. The need to teach for human Audrey Osler & Hugh Starkey (2018) Extending the theory and practice of education for cosmopolitan citizenship, Educational Review, 70:1, 31-40 3 rights, human solidarity, peace and security in Europe has never been more urgent in any period since World War Two. Yet education policy frameworks rarely put human rights at the centre of education reforms (Osler, 2016). In 1948, when the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) was proclaimed, education was placed at the heart of the human rights project. As we face a crisis of human rights and democracy in Europe, we consider why we need to give greater emphasis to human rights in schools and how we might ensure that human rights are placed at the heart of schooling. We reflect on the potential of ‘education for cosmopolitan citizenship’ founded in human rights (Osler and Starkey, 2003; Osler and Starkey, 2005) to contribute to learning to live together in communities that promote justice and peace. Importantly, we consider concrete ways in which teachers can contribute to the development of schools as just communities in which all learners can flourish. We also discuss some dangers of education for an exclusive national citizenship, and consider why such education is inappropriate in a global age, where schools and communities are increasingly characterised by ‘super-diversity’ (Vertovec, 2007). We reassert the importance of education for cosmopolitan citizenship, that supports diversity at all scales, and that offers a means for strengthening democracy and enabling participation. We conclude with some approaches that might be most effective in strengthening democracy through education, and transforming students’ understandings of how they can be effective agents for change and social justice in their own communities, drawing on our more recent research and specifically on material from Human rights and schooling: An ethical framework for teaching for social justice (Osler, 2016). Human rights and democratic citizenship in troubled times We are living in difficult times. Some would suggest that we are living in dangerous times, since it is possible to draw several parallels between the current global economic/political climate and that of the 1920s and early 1930s. Are we in fact witnessing the Weimarization of Europe? The German Weimar Republic (1919-1933) was an experiment in democracy, in which cultural innovation and creativity at first flourished, with attempts made to create a fair, humane society. However, democracy proved fragile, with hyper-inflation and depression leading to conflict in which political violence and terrorism, racism, and antisemitism took hold. Processes of exclusion were set in train which eventually led to war and genocide. The 2008 global financial crisis was the worst since 1929 and threatened the collapse of large financial institutions, only prevented by national governments bailing out ailing banks. In the case of several European Union (EU) countries, efforts to refinance national banks or repay/ refinance national debt were only possible with the assistance of the European Central Bank (ECB), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), or other Eurozone countries. Audrey Osler & Hugh Starkey (2018) Extending the theory and practice of education for cosmopolitan citizenship, Educational Review, 70:1, 31-40 4 Across Europe, we have seen the growth of populist movements and far-right political parties. In Russia and certain Eastern European countries, it has been suggested that the transition to democracy has been shallow (Evans, 2011). In eastern Ukraine, following the 2014 Russian annexation of Crimea, some citizens, dependent on trade with Russia and experiencing the impact of austerity and economic hardship, have engaged in armed conflict with their government. In Hungary, the right-wing, populist government of Prime Minister Viktor Orban is hostile to refugees and has legitimized intolerance and Islamophobia. While Orban favours an ‘authoritarian’ style of government, critics, as reported on the BBC website, are concerned that a new 2012 constitution has weakened democratic checks and balances and strengthened the position of the ruling party. Citizens whose opinions differ from the government may grow cautious about asserting their views, and practise self-censorship. In such cases, it is relatively easy for authoritarian leaders to assert that democracy is not working, and to minimise public pressure on themselves. 2016 also saw two elections in which populist ideas caught the imagination of voters: the United Kingdom referendum on whether to remain or leave the EU and the US Presidential election. The UK referendum was instituted by a Prime Minister who hoped to appease the right-wing of his party, and who fully expected the electorate to vote to remain. The election took place with a prevailing anti-EU message: ‘take back control’ and in a much longer-term period of press hostility to EU. The result, requiring only a simple majority to vote leave, was just 48 percent voting to remain and 52 percent to leave. Populist, xenophobic messages initiated by the UK Independence Party were prominent in the Leave campaign. Immigration reporting was extremely negative: there were constant stories about immigrants ‘sponging’ off the welfare state, ‘bleeding’ the NHS dry, and of criminality (Berry, 2016). The effects of the 2008 financial crisis, coupled with the impact of government imposed austerity measures, were effectively linked in the popular imagination to ‘them’. The long-term impact of the Brexit vote on the EU and on the UK remains unclear, yet the election result triggered an increase in reported hate crime, in which minoritized groups were targeted. Just nine months after this negative referendum campaign, Kurdish-Iranian teenage asylum-seeker Reker Ahmed was left with life- threatening injuries after several youths, some as young as 15 years, set upon him in a brutal attack as he stood waiting for a bus in Croydon, South London (Khomami, 2017). The attack has disturbing echoes of the racist murder of Stephen Lawrence in 1993. The murder lead to official recognition of institutional racism in British society (Macpherson, 1999) which in turn spurred efforts to promote greater awareness of racist injustice through education and training programmes. There are parallels between the UK referendum campaign and the 2016 US presidential election campaign, in which Republican candidate Donald Trump forthrightly adopted anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim rhetoric. Following his success, the US has also seen an upswing in reported hate crime linked to the divisive election campaign and Audrey Osler & Hugh Starkey (2018) Extending the theory and practice of education for cosmopolitan citizenship, Educational Review, 70:1, 31-40 5 terrorism at home and abroad (Lichtblau, 2016), as well as a corresponding anxiety amongst vulnerable groups, notably Muslims, other religious minorities, and sexual minorities. Concerns about the impact of globalization, especially the impact of migration (itself a result of both conflict and economic vulnerability) have been magnified by the global refugee crisis of 2015/2016, in which millions of people have found themselves displaced or forced to flee as a result of the ongoing war in Syria and other conflicts. Public support and readiness to meet the needs of vulnerable migrants and refugees is frequently undermined by populist arguments that present a choice between helping ‘them‘ at the expense of ‘our people’, a theme that is likely to resonate at a time when austerity measures restrict access to public services and social security. Populist rhetoric links migrants to the threat of terror, so increasing anxiety and xenophobia. Fear of terrorism prevails in the second decade of the twenty-first century. In 2016, Turkey saw frequently reoccurring terror attacks. President Recep Erdogan’s immediate response to an attack in December 2016 was, the BBC’s website reported, the arrest and detention of 235 people for acting on behalf of the outlawed Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), including 11 law-makers. These detentions follow other restrictions on citizens’ rights, including a blanket withdrawal of the right to travel outside Turkey, applied to scholars and academics, and the sacking of senior university personnel across the country. While concerns about Islamist terror remain high on political agendas, it is worth remembering that 2011 saw one of the worst acts of violent extremism in Europe, in which 77 people in Norway died at the hands of a far-right, anti-Muslim, ethno-nationalist terrorist, who targeted children and young people (Osler and Lybaek, 2014). In France, a ‘temporary’ state of emergency was declared following the November 2015 terror attacks that has been extended five times, to continue beyond the completion of the French presidential election process (April/May) until July 2017 (as reported in The Guardian, 14 December 2016). It is not clear that the state of emergency has enabled the authorities to guarantee greater security, yet fear of terror causes law-makers to restrict human rights in the name of security. Challenges for teachers and schools 1 Super-diversity The unprecedented number of refugees and migrants arriving in Europe in the second decade of the twenty-first century means that the whole continent now faces the reality of ‘super-diversity’ (Vertovec, 2007). Mass migration is no longer connected primarily to countries with former colonial territories. Today’s migrants are drawn from a wider geographical range, with significant numbers migrating from Eastern and Central Europe to Western Europe. This impels a European-wide review of political and social policy responses, and corresponding awareness-raising and educational initiatives which encourage critical examination of migration. Importantly, migration needs to be understood as part of the human condition: people have always migrated looking for work and a better Audrey Osler & Hugh Starkey (2018) Extending the theory and practice of education for cosmopolitan citizenship, Educational Review, 70:1, 31-40 6 future, when resources such as water and food are scarce, and when conflict threatens security. One urgent need is for policy-makers to move from seeing migrants as a problem to recognizing them as an asset, particularly in a region such as Europe, with an aging demographic. Migration patterns mean that students in schools across Europe are frequently not nationals of the country in which they are being educated. Teaching for citizenship and human rights must address the needs of a diverse group of students who hold multiple and (often) flexible identities (Ong, 1999). A small proportion will be transnationals: such students are moving for a relatively short period of time to the country where their parents are working, often in well-paid professional roles. Others are longer-term migrants who have a citizenship status that works for them: EU citizens migrating from one member-state to another are typically in this category. Such students rarely aspire to be nationals of the country in which they are living, since their status as EU citizens guarantees their rights in their new country of residence. Economic migrants from other regions of the world are likely to aspire to become nationals of the country to which they have moved, as are refugees and stateless persons. In responding to super-diversity, teachers are increasingly recognising that traditional forms of citizenship learning which emphasize and privilege the nation-state and national citizenship are inappropriate and outdated (Osler, 2011). Citizenship education founded in human rights offers an alternative approach, since all students, regardless of their nationality and migration status, are holders of human rights. Teaching for citizenship needs to recognise many students and their families will gain citizenship status (nationality) by residence, rather than by descent. Governments, teachers and school curricula need to recognise both these means of becoming a national as equally valid. 2 Addressing Islamophobia and new forms of racism Public debates about diversity, integration and multiculturalism in European contexts, often include the role of education in promoting national identity and citizenship on the one hand, and solidarity between people within and beyond the nation on the other. Disturbingly, within such debates, Islam is frequently presented as the limiting case for multiculturalism (Osler, 2009), and either implicitly or explicitly, as in tension with European values, so-called national values, or even Christian values. Effectively, this serves to undermine freedom of religion. Public anxieties are fuelled by neoconservative and cultural conservative voices from within political and cultural elites. Such sources do not support the notion of a conspiracy to Islamize Europe, but their arguments are used by conspiracy theorists to justify their stance and sometimes violent actions (Feteke, 2012). Within this climate, it is difficult to secure recognition of Islamophobia as a form of cultural racism, posing a threat to a secure, inclusive and human rights-orientated Europe. Audrey Osler & Hugh Starkey (2018) Extending the theory and practice of education for cosmopolitan citizenship, Educational Review, 70:1, 31-40 7 As the attack on asylum-seeker Reker Ahmed (discussed above) reveals, it is the term ‘asylum-seeker’ itself, once associated with the legitimate process of seeking refuge from human rights violations, that has not only become a term of racist abuse amongst certain groups (Osler, 2017; Rutter, 2005) but effectively one where some see it as legitimate to engage in violent hate crime. This challenge, of addressing multiculturalism and national identity in education, is further complicated by political debate about the EU’s future, provoked by the growing influence of far-right parties in European politics; and by the UK’s Brexit vote. A space has opened in which the question: ‘Is it possible for diverse people to live together peaceably?’ has become a legitimate question, which far-right groups are exploiting for their own ends. 3 Securitization of education Austerity measures are having a direct impact on children’s lives, undermining their social, economic, cultural and political rights. For example, official data indicated that 3.9 million children were living in relative poverty in the United Kingdom in 2014-15. Two thirds of these children live in households where at least one adult is in work (Monaghan, 2016). Children’s political rights are also under threat, because of measures aimed at preventing violent extremism. In response to concerns about terror, the British government has published guidance for schools in England on ‘promoting fundamental British values’ (DFE, 2014). Within this guidance there is emphasis on democracy, the rule of law, freedom of belief, and mutual respect, but no mention of equality, justice, or the concept of human rights or children’s human rights. The teaching of these so-called British values must take place within the statutory curriculum framework of promoting students’ spiritual, moral, social and cultural development, since the initiative to promote citizenship education in schools in England, introduced in 2000, has been so marginalised and down-graded as to have disappeared from the curriculum of a significant proportion of schools. The emphasis is on developing a sense of national identity and of naming certain values as ‘British’ when they generally reflect agreed international standards. Schooling, which should be about extending the range of learners’ identities, focuses here on the national at the expense of other identities. Those who do not hold British citizenship may well feel excluded and marginalized. A concurrent development, the UK government’s Prevent programme, presented initially as a community-led approach to tackling violent extremism (DCLG, 2007) has, according to Kundani (2009), come to define relationships between government and Muslim communities. The UK Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 s26 imposed on local authorities, schools, and social services, a duty to have due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism. While efforts to prevent terrorism are essential, these measures may have unintended consequences of alienating the very young people they seek to protect, and undermining their human rights. Schools and other bodies must Audrey Osler & Hugh Starkey (2018) Extending the theory and practice of education for cosmopolitan citizenship, Educational Review, 70:1, 31-40 8 refer those they believe to be vulnerable to the police, who decide whether to refer them to a panel (‘Channel’) on which local authority and police representatives sit, to prepare ‘support packages’ to reduce their vulnerability. There is no legal duty to seek parents’ or guardians’ consent before a child comes before the panel. If parents refuse, this may be grounds for judging the child at risk, leading to the potential removal of the child from the family. Some 900 child referrals took place in the period 2012-2015. Of 796 referrals in June-August 2015, 312 (39%) were children (Webber, 2016). Multiple cases of how the Prevent agenda impacts on children and their schools are documented (Webber, 2016). The ways in which this duty, imposed on schools, negatively impacts on children’s political rights and on relationships between teachers and children have also been discussed (Coppock, 2014; Osler, 2017). The Prevent agenda is likely to inhibit children’s and young people’s freedom of speech at an age when they are developing their thinking: ‘There is a danger that school, a place where learners should have opportunities to discuss ideas and explore opinions, becomes one where students, particularly those of Muslim heritage, may be reluctant to express themselves’ (Osler, 2017). Learning for cosmopolitan citizenship We have sought to highlight how we are living in troubled times and that, in this context, certain educational initiatives which focus on national citizenship, or on combating terror and violent extremism, may at best be misguided and, at worst, are likely to contribute to the processes of exclusion that threaten cohesive societies. We now return to the possibilities of ‘education for cosmopolitan citizenship’ (Osler and Vincent, 2002; Osler and Starkey, 2003, 2005) in contributing to preparing young people to live together in increasingly diverse societies in which they feel empowered to make a difference. We suggest that when young people are equipped with the skills for political efficacy and the chance to practice those skills, we are more likely to be able to build cohesive societies and a more peaceful world. Strategies that focus on equipping students with such skills are urgently needed in an age of uncertainty and political disillusionment. As we have noted: ‘Education for citizenship is one response to the political and social realities of globalisation’ and can ‘provide the mechanism for transmitting the core shared values on which just and peaceful democratic societies may be built’ (Osler and Starkey, 2003, 243). Yet for this mechanism to be effective, citizenship teaching and learning needs to build on young people’s experiences, and in our global age, not have a unique focus of loyalty to a nation-state. In proposing the concept of ‘education for cosmopolitan citizenship’ we advocate citizenship learning that builds theories of cosmopolitan democracy (Held, 1997); that recognizes our complex, interconnected world; and draws on young people’s experiences of living in communities characterized by diversity, in which they negotiate multiple loyalties and belongings. Teachers do not have to ask their students to choose between local and national priorities on one hand and global concerns on the Audrey Osler & Hugh Starkey (2018) Extending the theory and practice of education for cosmopolitan citizenship, Educational Review, 70:1, 31-40 9 other. It is possible to prepare young people for interdependence and diversity at all scales: in the school community, neighbourhood, town or city, nation, and globe. Citizens today need more than formal access to the public sphere and to decision- making processes. They also need to understand the complex ways in which they can claim (or be denied) access to public resources and acquire the know-how to engage in political processes. When people feel excluded from these processes, they lose trust in elected representatives and in the political class. The shape of political communities has shifted in response to forces of globalization. More than ever, we have an intensely connected global economy, highly integrated global financial systems, and multinational companies dominating national and international transactions. In environmental politics, human rights, international law and security, and social media, people feel more closely connected than ever before. In this context, students need to understand the multifaceted patterns of economic factors, cultural processes, and social movements that shape their lives. Teachers need to devise programmes of study that help students acquire skills to engage in new and changing forms of politics. The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) 1989 has had a direct impact on policy-making in relation to children. In particular, the concept of the child’s ‘best interest’ needs to be taken into consideration on policy-making related to children’s education and social welfare. Article 12 guarantees the child the right to express his or her views freely ‘in all matters affecting the child’ and for these views to be ‘given due weight’ in decision-making processes (UN, 1989). Schools and other agencies serving children have an obligation to confirm to such standards and governments the responsibility to ensure them. Local authorities and local government leaders have an important role to play in enabling such an education. First, it is important to give students opportunities to play a role in political processes at the local level, and for students, including the youngest, to have a voice in decision-making processes that affect them. Teachers need the support of guidance and training them that enables them to conform to such standards in their everyday work. One starting point for such training is the CRC and the United Nations Declaration on Human Rights Education and Training (UN, 2011). Human rights education is helpfully defined in this latter document as encompassing learning about rights, through rights and for rights. As well as knowledge (learning about rights) there is an emphasis on learning through rights (democratic upbringing and school practices, such as student councils and a climate that promotes recognition and respect of difference). Finally, there is learning for rights. This involves empowering young people to be able to make a difference, and equipping them with skills for change. It involves seeing human rights education as a means of transformation (Osler and Starkey, 1996, 2010; Osler, 2016). In this way both teachers and students become agents for change, contributing to a more just society. At their core, human rights can be understood as ‘an expression of the human urge to resist oppression’ (Osler, 2016). When human rights and human rights Audrey Osler & Hugh Starkey (2018) Extending the theory and practice of education for cosmopolitan citizenship, Educational Review, 70:1, 31-40 10 education is seen through this lens its universal power and relevance becomes apparent. It is necessarily about supporting students to name inequality, challenge injustice, make a difference, and develop solidarities at local, national and global levels Schools and teachers are frequently constrained by curricula and examination demands, and need to be encouraged and supported in developing appropriate curricula. Local authorities can publicise and promote good practice in teaching for cosmopolitan citizenship. Another local authority contribution is to encourage the employment of teachers from diverse backgrounds, including those who themselves have experience of migration. Such teachers can help extend existing curricula and extend the narratives beyond those presented in standard text books (Osler, 2017). Schools cannot teach for cosmopolitan citizenship alone. They are reliant on various partners, including museums and other local institutions. Museums often work with schools to extend the curriculum so that students are able to build on their personal experiences and family histories, ensuring that new and inclusive collective histories reflect diverse local, national and global perspectives. Local authorities can support museums and other local organisations in guaranteeing students’ ‘right to narrate’ (Bhabha, 2003). Most importantly, local authorities can develop projects to ensure students have opportunities to learn about their human rights, in line with their obligations under the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989. Education for cosmopolitan citizenship is founded on human rights, encouraging students to build solidarities at all scales from the local to the global. Teachers and students need support when they challenge initiatives such as those described above, concerning securitization, which threaten students’ political rights. Listening to the needs of students, and their teachers, is a first step in offering support for a curriculum that aims to extend young people’s identities and equip them with the skills to work for greater justice. Some fifteen years after we articulated our first thoughts on the theory and practice of education for cosmopolitan citizenship in Educational Review, the need for learners to explore the possibilities for living together peacefully and equitably in communities characterised by diversity seems more urgent than ever. References Berry, M. 2016. “Understanding the Role of the Mass Media in the EU Referendum”. EU referendum analysis. Political Studies Association/ Loughborough University/ Centre for the Study of Journalism, Culture and Community Bournemouth University. http://www.referendumanalysis.eu/eu-referendum-analysis-2016/section-1- context/understanding-the-role-of-the-mass-media-in-the-eu-referendum/ Bhabha, H. J. 2003. “On Writing Rights”, in Globalizing Rights: the Oxford Amnesty Lectures, edited by M. Gibney, 162-183. Oxford: Oxford University Press http://www.referendumanalysis.eu/eu-referendum-analysis-2016/section-1-context/understanding-the-role-of-the-mass-media-in-the-eu-referendum/ http://www.referendumanalysis.eu/eu-referendum-analysis-2016/section-1-context/understanding-the-role-of-the-mass-media-in-the-eu-referendum/ Audrey Osler & Hugh Starkey (2018) Extending the theory and practice of education for cosmopolitan citizenship, Educational Review, 70:1, 31-40 11 Coppock, V. 2014. “Can you spot a terrorist in your classroom? Problematizing the recruitment of schools to the ‘war on terror’ in the United Kingdom”. Global Studies of Childhood 4 (2): 115-125. Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG) (2007) Preventing Violent Extremism: Winning Hearts and Minds. April. London: DCLG. 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(Eric). 2016. “U.S. Hate Crime Surge 6%, Fueled by Attacks on Muslims”. The New York Times, November 14. http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/15/us/politics/fbi-hate-crimes- muslims.html?_r=0 Macpherson, W. 1999. The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry. London, UK: Stationery Office. Monaghan, A. 2016. “Number of UK Children Living In Poverty Jumps by 200,000 in a Year”. The Guardian, June 28. https://www.theguardian.com/society/2016/jun/28/number-uk-children-living- inpoverty-jumps-200000 Mylovanov, T. 2016. “What is Causing the Conflict in Ukraine?” Open Democracy, May 25. https://www.opendemocracy.net/can-europe-make-it/tymofiy-mylovanov/security- policy-for-ukraine Ong, A. 1999. Flexible Citizenship: The Cultural Logics of Transnationality. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Osler, A. 2009. “Patriotism, Multiculturalism and Belonging: Political Discourse and the Teaching of History”. Educational Review, 61(1), 85-100. 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work_56bw5p2w7nehlhul4ldjf4gjwy	----	5 Novi trendovi u viktimološkoj teoriji i praksi: dileme i izazovi u zaštiti �rtava Protection against Violence and Discrimination: The Case of Roma Victims in Member States of the Council of Europe Axelle ReiteR* This article focuses on the key role and contribution of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in protecting the rights of Roma against systemic patterns of violence and discrimination. It investigates the suitability of individual applications in front of international monitoring organs as a litigation strategy to address structural problems emerging at the national level, such as widespread attacks against members of vulnerable minority groups, and puts forward that this strategy has demonstrated to be successful in the case of Roma. The analysis shows that complaints introduced before the ECHR have at the same time helped in providing redress to individual victims, uncovering patterns of systemic abuses, offering solutions to prevent their resurgence, effectively encouraging the adoption of protective measures domestically, and developing the competences of international supervisory mechanisms. As such, it constitutes the most effective avenue so far to right those societal wrongs. Keywords: ECHR case law, Roma victims, violence, discrimination. Introduction Roma are one of the most vulnerable minorities in Europe, as their human rights are violated on a regular basis and state authorities are often accomplice. Allegedly ‘neutral’ laws are used to marginalise, if not criminalise, their iden- tity and way of life. Economic insecurity further contributes to the exclusion of TEMIDA 2016, vol. 19, br. 1, str. 5-24 ISSN: 1450-6637 DOI: 10.2298/TEM1601005R Originalni naučni rad Primljeno: 8.2.2016. Odobreno za štampu: 11.5.2016. * Dr Axelle Reiter is lecturer (adjunct professor) of International Law at the Faculty of Economics of Verona University, Vincenza, Italy. E-mail: axelle.reiter@eui.eu. Axelle Reiter (2016) Protection against Violence and Discrimination: The Case of Roma Victims in Member States of the Council of Europe 6 Roma communities from effective participation in the broader society. In this general context of disrespect and ostracism, the efforts of the European Union have been largely redundant. Regrettably, the idiosyncrasies of the EU acce- ssion process involve the implementation of double-standards on an overwhel- ming scale between present member states and candidate countries. With res- pect to the rights of exposed minorities, chiefly including Roma communities, it results in exclusively imposing adequate standards of protection to new mem- ber states and totally ignoring the equally (and sometimes more) appalling situ- ation prevailing in many older member states, with devastating effects. Uncri- tically embracing double-standards as a matter of policy seriously undermines the credibility and efficiency of EU attempts at tackling the magnitude of the abuses suffered by Roma people across the union. Besides, it has resulted in conceptualising the whole question as an Eastern European problem, which Western states could loftily ‘solve’ outside of their national borders. The Italian and French governments exploited this wrongful presupposition to its limits. Both administrations adopted measures ordering the (illegal) mass expulsion Roma coming from other member states, respectively through the enactment of a decree for the deportation of European citizens and more individualised notices to leave the national territory. Institutionalised harassment, multiple acts of violence and the destruction of entire Roma camps accompanied the onslaught in the two countries. Moreover, the Common EU Framework for Roma Integration, which tries to remedy the shortcomings of the current legal structures by the endorsement of a shared strategy for all member states, lacks coercive bite and fails to include members of the Roma minority in the deci- sion-making process.1 In contrast, international human rights provisions protecting individual and minority rights offer a valuable path towards empowerment and equal- ity. As such, they have been increasingly resorted to by Roma people and non-governmental organisations representing their interests. While a decon- struction of the legal concept of national self-determination and the recogni- tion of a superseding notion of individual self-determination would greatly help in giving a voice to stateless minorities like the Roma (Acton, Gheorghe, 2001: 67), litigation and lobbying strategies based on a recognition of the interconnection and necessary complementariness of the human rights and 1 For a critical analysis of the shortcomings of the EU legal regime, including double-standards between member states and non-inclusion of Roma see Pusca, 2012. Temida, vol. 19, br. 1, str. 5-24 7 minority rights discourses allow to tackle a substantial part of the problems inherent to the current status quo (O’Nions, 2007). The transnational character of the Roma minority and the ominousness of the life conditions of its mem- bers call for an objective point of reference and free-standing assessment. In the face of the striking heterogenity of the national legislative and judicial responses to the plight of Roma communities, and the lack of suitable unify- ing efforts at the EU level, international avenues constitute a much needed factor of integration of European legal orders and provide an external bench- mark for the evaluation of practices whose comparison would otherwise be seriously hampered by their disparity. The pervasiveness and gravity of the abuses committed against Roma people in the majority of the Council of Europe member states is not due to a lack of appropriate legal protection, but to a violation of existing national provisions and breaches of international commitments. Membership in the Council of Europe is conditioned to the implementation of a comprehensive human rights regime that includes a wide-ranging system of protection of minority rights. In addition to the European Convention on Human Rights and the European Social Charter, the Council of Europe human rights structure comprises two treaties that specifically consecrate the rights of minority gro- ups in Europe: the 1992 European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages and the 1995 Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minori- ties, which integrate international obligations under pre-existing United Nati- ons agreements or declarations.2 Besides, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) has adopted several recommendations and resoluti- ons concerning the situation and rights of Roma.3 Article 6 § 2 of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities obliges states parties “to take appropriate measures to protect per- sons who may be subject to threats or acts of discrimination, hostility or vio- lence as a result of their ethnic, cultural, linguistic or religious identity”. It repli- cates nearly verbatim Article 40 § 2 of the Copenhagen document of the Con- ference for Security and Cooperation in Europe, in which context “the particu- lar problems of Roma (gypsies)” had been underlined (CSCE, 1990, article 40). 2 For an analysis of the limited contribution of the latter three treaties to the improvement of the situation of Roma, see Ignatoiu-Sora, 2010: 82-183. 3 Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, Recommendations Nos 563 (1969), 1203 (1993), 1557 (2002), 1633 (2003), 1924 (2010), 1941 (2010) and 2003 (2012); Resolutions 1740 (2010), 1760 (2010) and 1768 (2010). Axelle Reiter (2016) Protection against Violence and Discrimination: The Case of Roma Victims in Member States of the Council of Europe 8 Article 6 § 2 should be read in combination with Article 4 of the Framework Convention that provides equal protection of the law to members of national minorities. The personal scope of Article 6 is broader, in the sense that it pro- tects against discrimination and hatred toward people residing in states par- ties and not solely the members of minority groups, and it consecrates the negative and penalising aspect of complementary provisions. The Advisory Committee charged with monitoring the respect of the relevant international obligations demands that states prosecute and punish acts of discrimina- tion and hate crimes (Gilbert, 2005: 187-191). Institutionalised racism and dis- criminatory practices in police investigations run counter to states duties, and remedies against incitement to hatred must be effective.4 Likewise, a general recommendation of the Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination on discrimination against Roma prohibits impunity and com- mands the prompt investigation and punishment of discriminatory or violent attacks against Roma.5 Whereas one might have expected that respect for the rights of the Roma minority and its members would have substantially improved after the adop- tion of this extensive protection scheme, their living conditions and security have actually worsened over the last two decades. In 2012, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe adopted a Declaration on the Rise of Anti-Gypsyism and Racist Violence against Roma in Europe that stigmatises the recrudescence of the phenomenon. In effect, Roma people are the usual victims of relentless discrimination, brutal assaults, widespread civil violence and pogroms. In 2000, the (then) High Commissioner on National Minorities of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) already denounced that “these are not isolated incidents, but widespread practices – sometimes systematic and on occasion systemic”. Instead of preventing or repressing the attacks, national police forces contribute to the general climate of impunity and are often implicated in the abuses. Roma people “encounter police violence in almost any [...] everyday life situation” in most OSCE mem- ber states, cases of violence are hardly ever investigated or prosecuted and 4 Council of Europe, Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, Opinion on Slovakia, ACFC/INF/OP/I (2001) 001, 22 Sep. 2000, §§ 28-29; Opinion on Romania, ACFC/INF/OP/I (2002) 001, 6 Apr. 2001, §§ 40-42; Opinion on the United Kingdom, ACFC/INF/OP/I (2002) 006, 30 Nov. 2001, § 52. 5 CERD, General Recommendation No 27 (57) on Discrimination against Roma, 16 Aug. 2000, UN Doc. CERD/A/55/18, §§ 12-16. Temida, vol. 19, br. 1, str. 5-24 9 the victims do not have access to adequate legal redress (Van der Stoel, 2000: 3, 37-38 and 41-45). Subsequently, the OSCE adopted a comprehensive policy document in order to help states ensure the respect of the rights of Roma (OSCE Permanent Council, 2003: §§ 8-10 and 16-18). However, ensuing legisla- tive developments have not contributed to any significant improvement of the situation on the ground and it is still characterised by “a disturbing num- ber of hate crimes against Roma, the use of extremist anti-Roma rhetoric, and continuing reports of police ill-treatment” (Lenarčič, 2013: 10-11). The present contribution investigates the means and methods adopted by the ECHR to counter systemic patterns of anti-Roma violence and discri- mination. This special attention is motivated by the extreme gravity of the sheer barbaric abuses sanctioned in these cases, the fact that the violations they denounce are symptomatic of rampant and structural anti-Roma racism and prejudices in most European societies, the fundamental place occupied by the infringed rights at the top of the rights hierarchy and the novelty and activism of the related jurisprudence. In line with its acknowledgement of the defencelessness of Roma and the ensuing necessity to grant them special protection,6 the ECHR has elaborated a set of innovative techniques to inter- pret the terms of the Convention in a much more inclusive fashion than ori- ginally intended. This proactive attitude has, in turn, been extended to cover the basic rights of other individuals and more generally uphold fundamental freedoms and entitlements. The following two sections study violations of the rights to life and physical integrity of members of the Roma minority in several member states of the Council of Europe. In this respect, the ECHR has condemned deaths and ill-treatments at the hands of the police forces, the complicity of state officials and institutions in private hate crimes and the for- ced sterilisation of Roma women. The last section examines the jurisprudence of the ECHR related to the fight against discrimination, marginalisation and total exclusion of Roma people from all aspects of societal life. 6 DH et al. v. Czech Republic [Grand Chamber], 13 Nov. 2007, §§ 181-182; Muñoz Diaz v. Spain, 8 Dec. 2009, § 61; VC v. Slovakia, 8 Nov. 2011, §§ 146 and 177; Aksu v. Turkey [Grand Chamber], 15 Mar. 2012, §§ 44 and 75; NB v. Slovakia, 12 June 2012, §§ 96 and 121; IG, MK and RH v. Slovakia, 13 Nov. 2012, §§ 123, 143 and 165; Balázs v. Hungary, 20 Oct. 2015, § 53. Axelle Reiter (2016) Protection against Violence and Discrimination: The Case of Roma Victims in Member States of the Council of Europe 10 Fighting anti-Roma violence by the police Roma prisoners are brutally treated on a regular basis and even sum- marily executed when under arrest or in police custody (Ndiaye, 1996: §§ 81, 161, 406). The ECHR has been seized of numerous cases of police violence against Roma, including cases in which the national authorities participated in pogroms,7 burnt alive an entire family,8 assassinated a man in his courtyard,9 kicked a pregnant woman, leading to her miscarrying,10 and seriously injured a disabled teenager in a public place.11 In several instances, the victims were severely beaten, tortured12 or extra-judicially executed in police custody13 and army conscripts of Roma origin have been murdered during a military police attempt to arrest them.14 The monitoring organs of the Council of Europe have resorted to various strategies in order to counter instances of institu- tional racism and systemic complicity in these abuses, as well as in private hate crimes;15 some of which constitute innovative and proactive interpreta- tions of the terms of the treaty and have significantly helped in developing the ECHR case law. With respect to police brutality, the ECHR has been more willing to reco- gnise a material infringement of Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention in the absence of domestic investigations or in cases where they were inadequate. The burden of proof is switched, when a healthy person is found dead or suffers from a physical trauma right after being kept in police custody. The defending state is responsible under Article 2 or 3 of the Convention, unless it can clarify coherently the occurrence of the injuries. The same applies in other 7 Moldovan et al. v. Romania, 30 Nov. 2005. 8 Fedorchenko and Lozenko v. Ukraine, 20 Sept. 2012. 9 Cobzaru v. Romania (No 2), 25 June 2013. 10 Petropoulou-Tsakiris v. Greece, 6 Dec. 2007. 11 Stoica v. Romania, 4 Mar. 2008. 12 Assenov et al. v. Bulgaria, 28 Oct. 1998; Balogh v. Hungary, 20 Oct. 2004; Bekos and Koutropoulos v. Greece, 13 Dec. 2005; Cobzaru v. Romania, 26 July 2007. 13 Velikova v. Bulgaria, 18 May 2000; Anguelova v. Bulgaria, 13 Sep. 2002; Mižigárová v. Slovakia, 14 Dec. 2010. 14 Nachova et al. v. Bulgaria, 26 Feb. 2004; [Grand Chamber], 6 July 2005. 15 Šečić v. Croatia, 31 May 2007; Angelova and Iliev v. Bulgaria, 26 July 2007; Koky et al. v. Slovakia, 12 June 2012; Balázs v. Hungary, 20 Oct. 2015. Temida, vol. 19, br. 1, str. 5-24 11 suspicious cases, like when only the authorities can relate the circumstances of the events or the applicant “raises an arguable claim” that public agents have mistreated her. Secondly, the ECHR considers that Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention enshrine rights so primordial that their respect mandates a serious domestic investigation of all cases in which they might have been vio- lated. The procedural facet of both dispositions serves to fill the evidentiary gap when the ECHR faces difficulties in determining the occurrence of a sub- stantial breach of these provisions, due to a (partial) failure on the side of the national law enforcement or judiciary to treat the victims’ complaints adequ- ately and in a reasonable time. In cases of allegations of excessive use of force by the police, the inquest must assess and establish whether it was justified in the circumstances in hand. Public prosecutors have the obligation to start an enquiry proprio motu, as soon as they are aware of the risk that state officials participated in the extra-judicial execution or ill-treatment of persons under their supervision. States that fail to satisfy these supplementary obligations are then condemned for breach of the procedural aspects of Articles 2 and 3. Articles 2 and 3 read conjointly to Article 1 of the Convention entail “an effective official investigation […] capable of leading to the identification and punishment” of the guilty parties. Guarantees essential to its effectiveness include the “thorough, impartial and careful” nature of the investigation and the investigators’ independence from the alleged perpetrators.16 Thirdly, the importance of the inalienable rights enounced in Articles 2 and 3 justifies increased duties under Article 13 and imposes on states to undertake an objective and effective investigation of all claims of violations. The subsequent inquest must be capable of leading to the determination of the authors of the abuses (and their punishment) and it should involve the applicant. Whereas a monetary compensation of victims is compulsory, its payment cannot substitute the institution of criminal proceedings; civil acti- ons against the state and the indemnification of the victims or their fami- lies do not suffice. Although this prescription is not explicitly inserted in the 16 Assenov et al. v. Bulgaria, 28 Oct. 1998, §§ 101-106; Velikova v. Bulgaria, 18 May 2000, §§ 70 and 78-84; Anguelova v. Bulgaria, 13 June 2002, §§ 110-111, 136-140 and 149; Nachova et al. v. Bulgaria, 26 Feb. 2004, §§ 116-119; Balogh v. Hungary, 20 Oct. 2004, §§ 47-52; Nachova et al. v. Bulgaria [Grand Chamber], 6 July 2005, §§ 110-113; Bekos and Koutropoulos v. Greece, 13 Dec. 2005, §§ 47-48 and 53; Cobzaru v. Romania, 26 July 2007, §§ 74-75; Petropoulou-Tsakiris v. Greece, 6 Dec. 2007, §§ 39 and 43-54; Stoica v. Romania, 4 Mar. 2008, §§ 67-81; Mižigárová v. Slovakia, 14 Dec. 2010, §§ 84-104; Fedorchenko and Lozenko v. Ukraine, 20 Sept. 2012, §§ 41-49; Cobzaru v. Romania (No 2), 25 June 2013, §§ 55 and 71-76. Axelle Reiter (2016) Protection against Violence and Discrimination: The Case of Roma Victims in Member States of the Council of Europe 12 text of the Convention, the ECHR considers that the concept of an effective remedy necessarily implies that a simple financial indemnity does not consti- tute a sufficient compensation for the victims.17 The criteria that condition the adequacy of the inquest are alternatively (and unsystematically) subsumed under the procedural branch of Articles 2 and 3, Article 13 or both counts, in different judgements. Fourthly, these procedural duties produce additional effects when combined with Article 14 of the Convention. The obligation to effectively investigate arbitrary deprivations of life and ill-treatments without discrimination entails that the investigations must “unmask any racist motive” or possible causal link. When the responsible authorities do not exhaust all available means in order to determine the role of ethnic hatred, discrimina- tory attitudes and prejudices in the commission of (public or private) crimes, they fail to comply with their international obligations under Article 14. Here again, the Court may decide to draw negative inferences from state agents’ negligence in discharging their functions and switch the burden of proof, in its evaluation of the state’s liability under the procedural branch (and some- times also the substantial branch) of Article 14. In this respect, while non- governmental reports of systemic anti-Roma violence at the hands of state officials and notorious lack of redress against discriminatory attacks do not constitute sufficient evidence per se to ascertain that racism played a causal role in police abuses, this background compels the investigators to exercise more vigilance when they are investigating the motives of violent incidents against individual members of minority groups.18 The ECHR condemned Romania for its failure to provide redress and acceptable living standards to the victims of a 1993 anti-Roma pogrom. The ECHR judged that the government’s contribution to the continued feelings of insecurity of the applicants seriously violated Article 8 of the Convention, while the abysmal living conditions and official discriminatory attitudes to which they were subjected run counter to Article 3, as well as Articles 6, 8 and 17 Assenov et al. v. Bulgaria, 28 Oct. 1998, § 117; Velikova v. Bulgaria, 18 May 2000, §§ 89-90; Anguelova v. Bulgaria, 13 June 2002, §§ 161-162; Balogh v. Hungary, 20 Oct. 2004, § 62; Cobzaru v. Romania, 26 July 2007, §§ 82-83. 18 Nachova et al. v. Bulgaria, 26 Feb. 2004, §§ 157-163 and 169; Nachova et al. v. Bulgaria [Grand Chamber], 6 July 2005, §§ 157 and 161-168; Bekos and Koutropoulos v. Greece, 13 Dec. 2005, §§ 64-65 and 69-75; Angelova and Iliev v. Bulgaria, 26 July 2007, §§ 115-117; Cobzaru v. Romania, 26 July 2007, §§ 89-101; Petropoulou-Tsakiris v. Greece, 6 Dec. 2007, §§ 62-66; Stoica v. Romania, 4 Mar. 2008, §§ 118-132; Fedorchenko and Lozenko v. Ukraine, 20 Sep. 2012, §§ 64-71; Balázs v. Hungary, 20 Oct. 2015, §§ 52-55 and 69-76. Temida, vol. 19, br. 1, str. 5-24 13 14 combined.19 Later complaints concerning similar abuses were struck off the list of cases after the government acknowledged the breaches of the Conven- tion, compensated the victims and adopted general measures to remedy the prior failures of the system in providing redress for such abuses. The Com- mittee of Ministers has been monitoring, in its executive capacity, the effecti- veness of the reforms undertaken.20 Fighting anti-Roma violence by other (public or private) actors The widespread forced sterilisation of Roma women constitutes another grave assault on their rights to physical integrity, human treatment and dignity. Whereas the Czech ombudsperson and national courts have con- demned this abysmal practice,21 a series of complaints were brought in Strasbourg in relation to the forced sterilisation of Roma women in Slova- kia. The ECHR found a violation of Articles 6 and 8 of the Convention, due to the absence of legal safeguards protecting the reproductive rights of Roma women and shortcomings in the national proceedings. In particular, the inter- diction to obtain photocopies of their own medical records restricted dispro- portionally their capacity to defend their claims adequately in front of a tri- bunal.22 A comparable case against the Czech Republic was struck off pursu- ant to a friendly settlement.23 In addition, the ECHR condemned Slovakia for breach of Article 3. It castigates the paternalism of the involved doctors and medical personnel, in violation of the applicants’ autonomy of moral choice as protected under the terms of the Convention. It refers to the vulnerabi- lity of the Roma minority as a population group. It takes into account ostra- 19 Moldovan et al. v. Romania, 30 Nov. 2005, §§ 102-113 and 139-140. 20 Gergely v. Romania, 26 Apr. 2007; Kalanyos et al. v. Romania, 26 Apr. 2007; Tanase et al. v. Romania, 26 May 2009. 21 Ostrava District Court, Ferencikova v. Vitkovicka Hospital, 11 Nov. 2005; European Roma Rights Centre (2007) Submission to the United Nations Human Rights Committee Concerning Implementation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in the Czech Republic, § IV.3.7, referring to a decision adopted by a court in Plzen in 2000. 22 KH et al. v. Slovakia, 28 Apr. 2009, §§ 44-58 and 65-68; VC v. Slovakia, 8 Nov. 2011, §§ 140-142, 145 and 152-154; NB v. Slovakia, 12 June 2012, §§ 95-98; IG, MK and RH v. Slovakia, 13 Nov. 2012, §§ 142-145. 23 RK v. Czech Republic, 27 Nov. 2012. Axelle Reiter (2016) Protection against Violence and Discrimination: The Case of Roma Victims in Member States of the Council of Europe 14 cism by the Roma community as an aggravating factor of the lasting suffering caused by sterilisation and underlines that their inability to conceive children severely diminished the social position of women within Roma communities, causing them some mental distress. It concludes that, even though the medi- cal staff bore no ill intent, their gross disregard for the applicants’ “right to autonomy and choice as a patient” and their “human freedom and dignity” amounted to a substantive breach of Article 3.24 With respect to Slovakia’s procedural obligations under Article 3, the ECHR recalls the general princi- ples elaborated in cases of police violence and hate crimes, albeit with a nota- ble qualification. In relation to claims of medical negligence or malpractice, the positive duty of investigation and compensation does not automatically entail the availability of criminal remedies. In their stead, civil proceedings are appropriate where the medical personnel did not act in bad faith or with the intent to mistreat the applicant, as long as they ascertain the responsibility of the implicated doctors, award adequate damages to the victim and are publicised. In any event, both civil and criminal trials must meet “the require- ment of promptness and reasonable expedition”.25 In the absence of bad faith on the part of the physicians or evidence that the hospital staff acted out of racist motives, the Court considered that an organised policy of sterilisation of Roma women without their informed consent could not be established (even though they were predominantly affected by such abuses) and refused to further investigate the applicants’ claims under Article 14 of the Convention.26 The ECHR applies the same proactive judicial developments to cases of unsanctioned private abuses, through the imposition of a positive obligation for the state to guarantee the respect of human rights by all members of soci- ety. The ECHR defined the positive duties of public authorities in the face of hate crimes in a case introduced by Šemso Šečić against Croatia. The applicant was attacked by a gang of skinheads and seriously injured, during a wave of violent incidents targeting Roma people in and around Zagreb. In light of the delinquent circumstances that surrounded the beating, the ECHR developed that the conjunction of Articles 1 and 3 of the Convention imposes on states 24 VC v. Slovakia, req. No 18968/07, 8 Nov. 2011, §§ 106-119; NB v. Slovakia, 12 June 2012, §§ 74-80; IG, MK and RH v. Slovakia, 13 Nov. 2012, §§ 120-123 and 125. 25 VC v. Slovakia, req. No 18968/07, 8 Nov. 2011, §§ 123-128; NB v. Slovakia, 12 June 2012, §§ 84-87; IG, MK and RH v. Slovakia, 13 Nov. 2012, §§ 129-133. 26 VC v. Slovakia, 8 Nov. 2011, §§ 177-180; NB v. Slovakia, 12 June 2012, §§ 121-123; IG, MK and RH v. Slovakia, 13 Nov. 2012, §§ 165-167. Temida, vol. 19, br. 1, str. 5-24 15 parties to adopt “measures designed to ensure that individuals within their jurisdiction are not subjected to ill-treatment, including ill-treatment admi- nistered by private individuals”. In addition, positive procedural obligations under Article 3 (whether read or not in conjunction with Article 14) do not only pertain to the penalisation of public abuses but also apply in the frame of private offences. The formal police enquiry into the assault mostly amounted to a perfunctory exercise, lingered for years, did not examine the racial dimen- sion of the facts and never led to the identification of the culprits. As such, the Court judged that the Croatian authorities had violated the applicant’s rights under Article 3 and under Articles 3 and 14 combined of the Convention.27 In later judgements concerning infringements of Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention, the ECHR restated its condemnation of racially biased police inve- stigations into hate crimes and the failure to hold the culprits accountable for racially motivated crimes.28 In this context, it considers that the discontinuation of investigations into the racist motivation of an assault and ‘underqualifica- tion’ of the attack as disorderly conduct violate Article 14 read in conjunction with Article 3 of the Convention, even when the hateful intent could not be proven beyond reasonable doubt.29 In so doing, the Court oversteps the boun- daries of prosecutorial discretion at the cost of imposing upon municipal aut- horities its own assessment of the facts of the case, gathered evidence and individual guilt. As underlined in a dissenting opinion, this runs afoul of the presumption of innocence and established principles of criminal law.30 Finally, one must deplore the recent decision of the ECHR to condemn the inadequ- acy of police investigations into the verbal aggression and threatening of a Romani woman by armed members of a paramilitary formation as a breach of Article 8 of the Convention, rather than a violation of Articles 3 and 14 combi- ned, on account of the alleged lack of severity of the abuse. It minimises the degrading nature of racist violence and it cannot be reconciled with the ruling that the absence of redress against racially motivated intimidation failed to “provide adequate protection to the applicant against an attack on her inte- grity” [I underline], in contravention to states’ positive obligations under Article 27 Šečić v. Croatia, 31 May 2007, §§ 52-59 and 66-70. 28 Angelova and Iliev v. Bulgaria, 26 July 2007, §§ 93-105 and 116; Koky et al. v. Slovakia, 12 June 2012, §§ 213-215 and 239-240; Fedorchenko and Lozenko v. Ukraine, 20 Sept. 2012, § 41. 29 Balázs v. Hungary, 20 Oct. 2015, §§ 58-76. 30 Balázs v. Hungary, 20 Oct. 2015, J.F. Kjolbro, Dissenting Opinion, § 6. Axelle Reiter (2016) Protection against Violence and Discrimination: The Case of Roma Victims in Member States of the Council of Europe 16 8.31 Indeed, Article 3 of the Convention traditionally guarantees the respect of people’s physical and psychological integrity while Article 8 defends their right to private and family life. A separate opinion correctly criticises the majority for refusing to examine the merits of the application under Articles 3 and 14. It also judiciously recalls that enhancing the open texture of the notion of pri- vate life in the Convention, by subsuming ethnic identity under the scope of a disposition designed to protect individual autonomy and secrecy in personal affairs, undermines legal certainty and the international rule of law.32 In relation to the interaction between freedom of association and the protection of members of the Roma minority in Hungary, the ECHR judged that the dissolution of a paramilitary group did not violate Article 11 of the European Convention because its activities intimidated and harmed the Roma minority, even though no physical violence had been perpetrated. The Court did not consider that the application constituted an abuse of the right of petition under Article 17 of the Convention, since the dissolved association had been legally registered and did not aim for the destruction of protected rights or bear totalitarian ambitions. In contrast, its dissolution respected the conditions listed in Article 11 § 2 of the Convention. The organisation backed paramilitary demonstrations and rallies, where participants wore uniforms and insignias reminiscent of the Nazi movement responsible for the extermi- nation of the Hungarian Roma minority, and specifically targeted Roma peo- ple and so-called ‘gypsy criminality’. As such, its activities created anti-Roma social tensions and amounted to the intimidation of a particularly vulnerable minority group. The ECHR did not only ratify the decisions of the domestic courts, it further developed that the failure to disband the association could have been construed as an official legitimisation of the impending climate of violence.33 On this basis, national authorities might be held liable for breaches of their international duty to protect minorities against discrimination and threats of abuses when they omit to take actions against racist groupings. In this light, a concurring opinion emphasised the relation between the facts of the case, the existence of an international obligation to penalise hate speech and the special protection that the Court offers to the Roma minority under 31 RB v. Hungary, req. No 64602/12, 12 Apr. 2016, § 91. 32 RB v. Hungary, Wojtyczek, Dissenting Opinion. 33 Vona v. Hungary, 9 July 2013, §§ 33-39 and 63-72. Temida, vol. 19, br. 1, str. 5-24 17 Article 14 of the European Convention.34 However, the police benefits from a large margin of appreciation regarding operational choices about the main- tenance of public security and the dispersal of paramilitary demonstrations.35 In contrast, the ECHR dismissed a claim that government funded publicati- ons purportedly insulted the Roma minority in Turkey, as the publications as a whole did not intend to produce such a result but on the contrary to scientifi- cally depict prejudicial public perceptions of the Roma community. The natio- nal courts had not exceeded their margin of appreciation in striking a balance between the rights to private life and freedom of expression, even if the vul- nerability of Roma people justifies that special attention is given to allegations of discrimination and stereotyping.36 By opposition, a dissenting judge relied on reports from international organisations documenting the overwhelming exposure of Roma to exclusion and discrimination in order to sustain that the government’s support of the publications amounted to a breach of Article 8, and possibly of Articles 8 and 14 combined, of the Convention.37 Fighting anti-Roma discrimination Roma applicants have raised charges of unequal and discriminatory tre- atment in most instances brought in front of the ECHR. In addition to bre- aches of Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention, the ECHR has sanctioned patterns of discrimination in relation to the rights to a fair trial and punishment, edu- cation, recognition of marital arrangements and social security benefits and, finally, eligibility. The discriminatory refusal to suspend the execution of a criminal sentence owing to the ethnic Roma origins of the perpetrator was sanctioned as a bre- ach of Articles 6 § 1 and 14 of the Convention read in combination. The first instance judgement relied on the purported existence of a feeling of impunity among members of minority groups, for whom a suspended condemnation would not constitute an actual condemnation. The ECHR discarded the argu- 34 Vona v. Hungary, 9 July 2013, P. Pinto de Albuquerque, Concurring Opinion. 35 RB v. Hungary, 12 Apr. 2016, §§ 99-101. 36 Aksu v. Turkey, 27 July 2010, (Grand Chamber), 15 Mar. 2012, §§ 74-76 and 88. 37 Aksu v. Turkey, 27 July 2010, (Grand Chamber), 15 Mar. 2012 (Grand Chamber), A. Gyulumyan, Dissenting Opinion, §§ 8-10. Axelle Reiter (2016) Protection against Violence and Discrimination: The Case of Roma Victims in Member States of the Council of Europe 18 ments of the government according to which the litigious motivation targeted society as a whole and the ethnicity of the applicant only played a minimal role in the appreciation of the tribunal. Said tribunal had expressly mentio- ned her Roma origins from the start of its reasoning and connected the socie- tal feeling of impunity to minority groups, to which she personally belonged. The thesis of an arbitrary difference of treatment in the enjoyment of the right to a fair trial was corroborated in that the prosecutor favoured a suspended sentence and decisive evidence for the defence had been rejected on purely formal grounds. Moreover, higher courts failed to address the serious misgi- vings raised about the discriminatory character of the ambiguous motives set forth in first instance. In the process, the ECHR underlies that the eradication of racism constitutes a primary goal for multicultural societies.38 The ECHR addressed racial segregation in schooling, and the placement of Roma pupils in ‘special’ primary schools normally intended for children affected by learning disabilities, in a Grand Chamber judgement concerning a set of applications introduced against the Czech Republic in the so-called ‘Ostrava’ Case. Whereas the decision taken in first instance denied that the rights of the applicants had been violated, the Grand Chamber reversed this finding and condemned the government for a joint breach of Article 14 of the Convention and Article 2 of the First Protocol. In the process, it referred to related international obligations, including those arising under the Fra- mework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities. In relation to proven differences of treatment, the burden of proof is shifted and the government must provide a justification for any departure from the princi- ple of (formal) equality before the law. In addition, the utmost vulnerability of Roma people implies that “special consideration should be given to their needs and their different lifestyle both in the relevant regulatory framework and in reaching decisions in particular cases”. In this light, the ECHR adop- ted a number of path-breaking conclusions. Outstandingly, it recognised the existence of a pattern of systemic racial discrimination, as distinct from indi- vidual instances or acts of discrimination, and characterised segregation as a form of discrimination. Whenever an apparently neutral norm or policy pro- duces disproportionately prejudicial effects for people belonging to a given ethnicity, it constitutes an indirect form of discrimination against all members of that ethnic group even in the absence of discriminatory intent on the part 38 Paraskeva Todorova v. Bulgaria, 25 Mar. 2010, §§ 10 and 40-46. Temida, vol. 19, br. 1, str. 5-24 19 of the public authorities. In this respect, significant statistics represent a prima facie evidence of indirect discrimination and create a legal presumption in favour of the applicants. As a result, the ECHR denounced the state policy as a breach of the Convention without entering into the specifics of the indivi- dual cases in hand. Moreover, the crucial function and standing of the ban on racial discrimination imply that it protects a public interest and cannot be waived or renounced upon.39 Subsequently, the ECHR has systematically con- demned segregation policies in other member states, where they were pla- ced in ‘Roma-only’ classes or schools, special classes in annexes of the main school buildings and schools for mentally disabled students.40 The ECHR had to pronounce itself on the recognition of the validity of marriages celebrated according to traditional Roma rites in a case introduced against Spain. The ECHR judged that the refusal to grant a survivor’s pension to a widow because the national authorities did not recognise the civil effects of Roma marriages amounted to a disproportionate difference in treatment in violation of Article 14 of the Convention read in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No 1, which protects the individual right to property and social ben- efits. Besides, it reproached to the domestic courts their failure to take due account of “the specificities of the Roma minority”.41 Lastly, the ECHR found for the first time a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No 12 in relation to the ineligibility of members of minorities to positions in the tripartite presidency or the second chamber of the parliament at the fed- eral level in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It judged that applicants’ ineligibility to stand for election to the House of Peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina violated Article 14 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 3 of Protocol No 1, while their ineligibility to stand for election to the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina run counter to the requirements of Article 1 of Protocol No 12. The exclusion did not result directly from anti-Roma prejudices and similarly targeted Jews and other people not belonging to the three majority groups. The ECHR still judged that the challenged interdiction from standing for elec- tion was discriminatory, even though the disputed constitutional arrange- 39 DH et al. v. Czech Republic, req. 7 Feb. 2006; [Grand Chamber], 13 Nov. 2007, §§ 177 and 181-209. 40 Sampanis et al. v. Greece, 5 June 2008; Orsus et al. v. Croatia [Grand Chamber], 16 Mar. 2010; Sampani et al. v. Greece, 11 Dec. 2012; Horvath and Kiss v. Hungary, 29 Jan. 2013; Lavida et al. v. Greece, 28 May 2013. 41 Muñoz Diaz v. Spain, 8 Dec. 2009, §§ 50-70. Axelle Reiter (2016) Protection against Violence and Discrimination: The Case of Roma Victims in Member States of the Council of Europe 20 ments are an integral part of the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement that put an end to the Yugoslav conflict. The Framework Agreement establishes a frag- ile balance between the warring factions and makes a distinction between, on one hand, the political rights of individuals who declare their affiliation to one of the three ‘constituent peoples’ (Serbs, Croats and Bosnians) and, on the other hand, those of members of ethnic minorities or persons who did not opt for any affiliation. The ECHR neglected the historical background and general context in which the Bosnian constitution was adopted.42 Several individual opinions criticised this oversight and the fact that, by sowing ide- als totally divorced from the prevalent national reality in the country and the necessity to avoid the resurgence of an armed conflict in the region, the Court risks to harvest a new civil war and its accompanying cortege of atrocities and massacres.43 One cannot fail to acknowledge the wisdom and sagacity of these reproaches. Whereas the activism of most other decisions relating to the proscription of discrimination is commendable, the ECHR might have been well advised to rely on a more traditional understanding of the margin of appreciation left to state authorities in such a sensitive context. Conclusion To sum up, the rights of individual members of Roma minorities are seve- rely trampled upon on a daily basis in all European societies. The creation of an international legal framework protecting the fundamental freedoms and entitle- ments of individual and minority groups, at the level of the Council of Europe, permits to challenge these abuses from an external position shielded from the widespread adverse prejudices that permeate the municipal legislations and case law. While monitoring the respect of the relevant state obligations under the European Convention of Human Rights, the ECHR has relied on a set of inno- vative techniques and means of interpretation in order to bypass patterns of official complicity and impunity in front of domestic courts and tribunals. Its juri- sprudence finally succeeded in giving a voice to the claims of a traditionally vic- timised community and it is leading to the gradual improvement of the national 42 Sejdić and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina [Grand Chamber], 22 Dec. 2009, §§ 50-70. 43 Sejdić and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina [Grand Chamber], 22 Dec. 2009, G. Bonello, Dissenting Opinion; L. Mijović and K. Hajiyev, Partly Concurring and Partly Dissenting Opinion. Temida, vol. 19, br. 1, str. 5-24 21 legal orders, especially in the spheres of the fight against violence and discrimi- nation. As such, it constitutes the most effective avenue to right those societal wrongs and provide redress to the victims of systemic abuses. Bibliography Acton, T., N. Gheorghe (2001) Citizens of the World and Nowhere: Minority Ethnic and Human Rights for Roma during the Last Hurrah of the Nation-State. In: W. Guy (ed.), Between Past and Future: The Roma of Central and Eastern Europe. Hatfield: University of Hertfordshire Press, pp. 54-70. CERD, General Recommendation No 27 (57) on Discrimination against Roma, 16 Aug. 2000, UN Doc. CERD/A/55/18, §§ 12-16. Council of Europe Committee of Ministers (1 February 2012) Declaration on the Rise of Anti-Gypsyism and Racist Violence against Roma in Europe. Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, Recommendations Nos 563 (1969), 1203 (1993), 1557 (2002), 1633 (2003), 1924 (2010), 1941 (2010) and 2003 (2012); Resolutions 1740 (2010), 1760 (2010) and 1768 (2010). Council of Europe, Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, Opinion on Slovakia, ACFC/INF/OP/I (2001) 001, 22 Sep. 2002. Council of Europe, Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, Opinion on Romania, ACFC/INF/OP/I (2002) 001, 6 Apr. 2001. Council of Europe, Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, Opinion on the United Kingdom, ACFC/INF/OP/I (2002) 006, 30 Nov. 2001. CSCE (29 June 1990) Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE. European Roma Rights Centre (2007) Submission to the United Nations Human Rights Committee Concerning Implementation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in the Czech Republic. Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities Advisor y Committee, Opinion on Slovakia, ACFC/INF/OP/I (2001) 001, 22 September 2000; Opinion on Romania, ACFC/INF/OP/I (2002) 001, 6 April 2001; Opinion on the United Kingdom, ACFC/INF/OP/I (2002) 006, 30 November 2001. Axelle Reiter (2016) Protection against Violence and Discrimination: The Case of Roma Victims in Member States of the Council of Europe 22 Gilbert, G. (2005) Article 6. In: M. Weller (ed.) The Rights of Minorities in Europe: A Commentary on the European Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 177-191. Ignatoiu-Sora, E. (2010) La construction d’un régime juridique pour la protection des Roms. Florence: European University Institute. Lenarčič, J. (2013) Implementation of the Action Plan on Improving the Situation of Roma and Sinti within the OSCE Area: Renewed Commitments, Continued Challenges. Warsaw: OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. Ndiaye, B.W. (25 January 1996) Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions. UN Doc. E/CN.4/1996/4. O’Nions, H. (2007) Minority Rights Protection in International Law: The Roma of Europe. Aldershot: Ashgate. OSCE Permanent Council (27 November 2003) Action Plan on Improving the Situation of Roma and Sinti within the OSCE Area. OSCE Doc. PC. DEC/566. Ostrava District Court, Ferencikova v. Vitkovicka Hospital, 11 November 2005. Pusca, A. (2012) Eastern European Roma in the EU: Mobility, Discrimination, Solutions. New York: International Debate Education Association. Van der Stoel, M. (2000) Report on the Situation of Roma and Sinti in the OSCE Area. The Hague: OSCE. ECHR case law Aksu v. Turkey, 27 July 2010. Application no. 4149/04 and 41029/04. Anguelova v. Bulgaria, 13 Sep. 2002. Application no. 38361/97. Assenov et al. v. Bulgaria, 28 Oct. 1998. Application No. 90/1997/874/1086. Angelova and Iliev v. Bulgaria, 26 July 2007. Application no. 55523/00. Balázs v. Hungary, 20 Oct. 2015. Application no. 27970/12. Balogh v. Hungary, 20 Oct. 2004. Application no. 47940/99. Bekos and Koutropoulos v. Greece, 13 Dec. 2005. Application no. 15250/02. Cobzaru v. Romania, (No 2), 25 June 2013 and 26 July 2007. Application no. 48254/99. DH et al. v. Czech Republic (Grand Chamber), 13 Nov. 2007. Application no. 57325/00. Gergely v. Romania, 26 Apr. 2007. Application no. 57885/00. Fedorchenko and Lozenko v. Ukraine, 20 Sept. 2012. Application no. 387/03. Temida, vol. 19, br. 1, str. 5-24 23 Horvath and Kiss v. Hungary, 29 Jan. 2013. Application no. 11146/11. IG, MK and RH v. Slovakia, 13 Nov. 2012. Application no 15966/04. Kalanyos et al. v. Romania, 26 Apr. 2007. Application no. 57884/00. KH et al. v. Slovakia, 28 Apr. 2009. Application no 32881/04. Koky et al. v. Slovakia, 12 June 2012. Application no. 13624/03. Lavida et al. v. Greece, 28 May 2013. Application no. 7973/10. Moldovan et al. v. Romania, 30 Nov. 2005. Applications no. 41138/98 and 64320/01. Mižigárová v. Slovakia, 14 Dec. 2010. Application no. 74832/01. Muñoz Diaz v. Spain, 8 Dec. 2009. Application no. 49151/07. Nachova et al. v. Bulgaria, 26 Feb. 2004; [Grand Chamber], 6 July 2005. Application no. 43577/98 and 43579/98. NB v. Slovakia, 12 June 2012. Application no 29518/10. Orsus et al. v. Croatia (Grand Chamber), 16 Mar. 2010. Application no. 15766/03. Paraskeva Todorova v. Bulgaria, 25 Mar. 2010. Application no. 37193/07. Petropoulou-Tsakiris v. Greece, 6 Dec. 2007. Application no. 44803/04. RB v. Hungary, 12 Apr. 2016. Application no. 64602/12. RK v. Czech Republic, 27 Nov. 2012. Application no 7883/08. Sampani et al. v. Greece, 11 Dec. 2012. Application no. 59608/09. Sampanis et al. v. Greece, 5 June 2008. Application no. 32526/05. Sejdić and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina [Grand Chamber], 22 Dec. 2009. Application no. 27996/06 and 34836/06. Stoica v. Romania, 4 Mar. 2008. Application no. 42722/02. Tanase et al. v. Romania, 26 May 2009. Application no. 62954/00. VC v. Slovakia, 8 Nov. 2011. Application no. 18968/07 Velikova v. Bulgaria, 18 May 2000. Application no. 41488/98 VC v. Slovakia, 8 Nov. 2011, Application no. 18968/07. Vona v. Hungary, 3 Jully 2013. Application no. 35943/10. Šečić v. Croatia, 31 May 2007. Application no. 40116/02 Axelle Reiter (2016) Protection against Violence and Discrimination: The Case of Roma Victims in Member States of the Council of Europe 24 Axelle ReiteR Zaštita od nasilja i diskriminacije: sluèaj romskih �rtava u zemljama èlanicama Saveta Evrope Rad se fokusira na ključnu ulogu i doprinos Evropskog suda za ljudska prava u zaštiti prava Roma od sistemskog nasilja i diskriminacije. U radu se analizira podob- nost pojedinačnih zahteva podnetih međunarodnim monitoring telima kao pravna strategija za rešavanje strukturalnih problema na nacionalnom nivou, poput raspro- stranjenih napada na pripadnike ugroženih manjinskih grupa. U vezi sa tim, ukazano je da se ova strategija pokazala uspešnom u slučaju pripadnika romske populacije. Analiza pokazuje da su žalbe upućene Evropskom sudu za ljudska prava istovremeno pomogle u pružanju obeštećenja pojedinačnim žrtvama, ukazale na obrasce sistem- skih kršenja ljudskih prava i u vezi sa njima nude rešenja za njihovo dalje sprečava- nje, uz istovremeno efikasno podsticanje usvajanja zaštitnih mera na nacionalnom nivou i razvoj kompetencija međunarodnih mehanizama za nadzor. Kao takva, ova strategija predstavlja najefikasniji način da se isprave te društvene nepravde. Ključne reči: sudska praksa, Evropski sud za ljudska prava, Romi, žrtve, nasilje, diskriminacija. 
work_5atfzmfxjbfu3ktwbzle4vnbja	----	1   Hate Groups and Hate Crime Matt E. Ryan† Peter T. Leeson‡ Abstract This paper is the first to empirically investigate the relationship between hate groups and hate crime. We do so using panel data for the U.S. states between 2002 and 2008. Contrary to conventional wisdom, we find that hate groups have no influence on hate crime in the United States. Instead we find that economic hardship does. Unemployment and, to a lesser extent, poverty, are strongly associated with more hate crime, particularly crimes that are sexually, racially, and religiously motivated. Demographic variables aren’t significant determinants of hate crime in the United States. Taken together our results support the “frustration-aggregation thesis.” They suggest that economics, not hate groups or demographics, drive hate crime in America.                                                              † Email: RyanM5@DUQ.edu. Address: Duquesne University, Department of Economics and Quantitative Sciences, 802 Rockwell Hall, Pittsburgh, PA 15282. ‡ Email: PLeeson@GMU.edu. Address: George Mason University, Department of Economics, MS 3G4, Fairfax, VA 22030. 2   1 Introduction Hate groups are organizations of individuals whose “beliefs or practices . . . attack or malign an entire class of people, typically for their immutable characteristics,” such as race or sexual orientation, but sometimes for their mutable ones, such as religious beliefs (Southern Poverty Law Center 2010). They include organizations such as the Ku Klux Klan, neo-Nazi groups, white nationalist groups, neo-Confederate groups, and black separatist groups. Hate crimes are “crimes that manifest evidence of prejudice based on race, religion, disability, sexual orientation, or ethnicity” (DOJ and FBI 2004). The potential connection between hate groups and hate crime is obvious. Yet no one has explored it empirically.1 Indeed, very little work in economics has explored hate crime at all. Dharmapala and Garoupa (2004) examine various aspects of hate crime policy. But their analysis is theoretical and focuses on how the law influences hate crime. Medoff (1999) considers hate crime’s determinants empirically.2 But his study is based on a single cross-section meant to append a theory of hateful behavior and doesn’t consider hate groups. Gale, Heath and Ressler’s (2002) important paper, which is closest to ours, takes a more serious empirical approach to investigating hate crime’s determinants. But it, too, neglects the potentially important influence of hate groups. Our paper is a first step toward filling this lacuna. It empirically investigates the relationship between hate groups and hate crime using panel data on the U.S. states between 2002 and 2008. American hate groups grew significantly over the past decade. Between 2002 and 2008 the number of hate groups per capita increased 25 percent. But American hate crime didn’t. Between                                                              1 Two papers consider the determinants of hate groups (Jefferson and Pryor 1999 and Mulholland 2010). 2 Glaeser (2005) presents a more general theory of the political economy of hatred. 3   2002 and 2008 the number of hate crimes per capita actually decreased 1.3 percent. This stylized fact foreshadows a key result of our econometric analysis: contrary to conventional wisdom, the rise of American hate groups over the past decade hasn’t contributed to a rise in hate crime. In fact, in terms of hate crime, hate groups haven’t mattered at all. There are lots of reasons to loath hate groups. But their influence on hate crime isn’t one of them. This study considers two other types of potential determinants of hate crime in America: economic determinants, such as the extent of unemployment and poverty, and demographic ones, such as race and urbanism. In examining economic and demographic determinants of hate crime, this paper follows the small, existing literature that addresses hate crime empirically. That literature’s focus on economic variables derives from Dollard et al.’s (1939) “frustration- aggregation thesis.” According to that thesis, when people endure economic hardship they get frustrated. They take their frustration out on vulnerable social groups, such as ethnic, sexual, and religious minorities. Existing empirical support for the frustration-aggregation thesis is mixed. In their paper that examined the American South in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, Hovland and Sears (1940) found a strong relationship between lynchings of blacks and poor economic conditions. However, subsequent work showed their results to be very fragile (see Mintz 1946; Hepworth and West 1988; Beck and Tolnay 1990; Olzak 1990; Tolnay and Beck 1995; and Green, Glaser and Rich 1998). Krueger and Pischke (1997) find no relationship between economic conditions and racially motivated crime against foreigners in early 1990s Germany. However, Green and Rich (1998) find weak links between unemployment and assorted hate crimes in North Carolina between 1987 and 1993. Green, Glaser and Rich (1998) find no consistent relationship between the 4   unemployment rate and a range of racially motivated crimes in New York City between 1987 and 1995. But Gale, Heath and Ressler (2002) find evidence of a relationship between economic factors and hate crime in the United States. Our analysis finds that unemployment and, to a lesser extent, poverty, is strongly associated with more hate crime in America, particularly crimes that are sexually, racially, and religiously motivated. Unlike previous studies, ours disaggregates hate crime data. In doing so we find evidence for the frustration-aggregation thesis that previous work overlooks. The existing literature’s focus on potential demographic determinants of hate crime derives from the observation that crime tends to be higher in urban areas and that potential conflicts leading to, and opportunities for, hate crime are greater in areas that have a higher concentration of socially vulnerable groups, such as racial, sexual, and religious minorities. Gale, Heath and Ressler (2002) find that demographic determinants aren’t strong predictors of hate crime in America. Our disaggregated study confirms the unimportance of demographic variables. Take together our results support the frustration-aggregation thesis. They suggest that economics, not hate groups or demographics, drive hate crime in America. 2 Data We collect data on hate crime from the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Program’s Hate Crime Statistics (HCS) Program. The Hate Crime Statistics Act of 1990 brought these data into existence.3 That Act requires the Attorney General to collect annual data on “crimes that manifest evidence of prejudice based on race, religion, disability, sexual orientation, or ethnicity, including where appropriate the crimes of murder, non-negligent                                                              3 Hate Crime Statistics Act, 28 USC § 534, 1990. 5   manslaughter; forcible rape; aggravated assault, simple assault, intimidation; arson; and destruction, damage or vandalism of property” (DOJ and FBI 2004). The Department of Justice made these data available at the state level beginning in 1995. State hate-crime reporting to the HCS is voluntary. Within reporting states, local jurisdictional reporting is incomplete and varies by year. Because of this, hate-crime reporting is imperfect. Still, it’s very good. In our sample, which covers forty-nine U.S. states (Hawaii didn’t report hate crime activity) and the District of Columba from 2002 and 2008, the percentage of the American population covered by hate-crime reporting to the HCS ranges from 82.9 percent in the lowest-covered year to 88.6 percent in the highest-covered year.4 We return to the issue of imperfect hate-crime reporting and how we address this issue in our empirical model below. We collect data on the number of hate groups in each state between 2002 and 2008 from the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC). The SPLC provides these data in an annual report called “The Year in Hate.” The SPLC separates hate groups into the following categories: Ku Klux Klan, Neo-Nazi, White Nationalist, Racist Skinhead, Christian Identity, Neo-Confederate, Black Separatist, and General Hate. They also report the number of patriot groups in each state. Our empirical model uses three sets of key regressors. The first is our measure of hate crime, discussed above. This variable is unique to our analysis. It allows us to investigate the relationship between organizations such as the KKK, neo-Nazis, and so on, and hate crime. The other two sets of regressors focus on the hate crime determinants that previous studies of those determinants have examined. One of these is a set of economic variables. These variables allow us to investigate the frustration-aggregation thesis. They include the state unemployment rate for persons 16 years old and older (Unemployment), the percentage of the state’s population that                                                              4 Data are missing for five state-years in our sample: Alabama 2005; Arkansas 2002; Mississippi 2005, 2006, 2007. 6   lives in poverty as defined by the U.S. Census Bureau (Poverty), and gross state product per capita (GSPpc). The other set of regressors we consider includes demographic variables. These are the percentage of the state’s population living in a metropolitan area (Metro); the percentage of the state’s population that’s African-American (Black); the percentage of the state’s population that’s Jewish (Jewish); and percentage of children under 18 years old in the state who were victims of abuse or neglect (Abuse). Finally, though it’s not a demographic variable, we control for the percentage of state and local government spending devoted to police protection (Police). These regressors are same ones Gale, Heath, and Ressler (2002) use in their study of hate crime’s determinants.5 We collect data for these variables for each state and year in our sample. We get data for each of them from the Statistical Abstract of the United States. Table 1 provides summary statistics for all our variables. To account for the measurement problem that imperfectly reported hate crimes create, our empirical model also includes a variable that controls for the percentage of the population covered by crime-reporting statistics in each state in each year (PopShare). We get these data from the HCS reports. As noted above, hate-crime reporting covers a larger percentage of the population in some states and years than others. PopShare accounts for this.                                                              5 We omit one of their controls—a constructed ratio between white and black income—because it’s unavailable as a state-level annual metric. 7   3 Empirical Approach To identify the potential relationship between hate groups, economic determinants, demographic determinants, and hate crime, we estimate the following two-way fixed effects model with standard errors clustered by state:6 HateCrimei,t = α + β1HateGroupsi,t + β2Economici,t + β3Demographici,t + β4PopSharei,t + ϕi + ζt + εi,t (1) HateCrimei,t is the number of hate crimes per capita in state i in year t. HateGroupsi,t is the number of hate groups per capita in state i in year t.7 Economici,t is a matrix of economic variables discussed above. Demographici,t is a matrix of demographic variables discussed above. PopSharei,t is the percentage of the population covered by HCS hate-crime reporting in state i in year t. ϕi is a vector of comprehensive state-specific fixed effects. It controls for any time-invariant differences across states that might affect hate crime, such as a long-standing culture of certain kinds of prejudices or tolerance. ζt is a vector of comprehensive year-specific fixed effects. It controls for any features that are common across states but vary across time that might affect hate crime, such as the national population’s changing attitudes toward various racial groups, religious groups, and changing views about homosexuality. εi,t is a random error term. To see if different kinds of hate groups and our economic and demographic determinants are associated differently with different kinds of hate crimes, in addition to considering an aggregate measure of total hate crime, we disaggregate our HateGroups and HateCrime variables. We                                                              6 The Hausman test confirms the superiority of a fixed-effects model over a random-effects one. 7 Following Gale, Heath and Ressler (2002), the population figure we use to generate per capita measures is the population covered by hate-crime reporting. 8   consider a version of our HateGroups variable that measures all hate groups including patriot groups, a version that measures all hate groups excluding patriot groups, and a version that measures just the number Ku Klux Klan, Neo-Nazi, White Nationalist and Racist Skinhead groups. We consider a version of our HateCrime variable that measures the total number of hate crimes per capita, as well as versions that separately measure hate crimes based only on race, those based only religion, and so on for sexual orientation, ethnicity, and disability. One potential concern with our empirical model is that hate crime may be endogenous. Hate groups may influence hate crime’s prevalence. But hate crime’s prevalence may also influence the formation of hate groups. For example, hate groups may find it easier to form where hate crime is more common and thus there is a larger base of potential members to recruit. The potential for endogeneity is important in principle. But it turns out to be unimportant in practice. As we discuss below, hate groups and hate crime are uncorrelated: there’s no statistically relevant relationship between them at all. The absence of such a relationship precludes the possibility of endogeneity bias. 4 Results Tables 2, 3 and 4 present our estimates when HateGroups measures all hate groups including patriot groups, all hate groups excluding patriot groups, and the total number of Ku Klux Klan, Neo-Nazi, White Nationalist and Racist Skinhead groups respectively. 9   4.1 Hate Groups Column 1 presents hate groups’ relationship to total, aggregate hate crime. HateGroups has the expected sign in all three tables. But none of these regressions show a statistically (or economically) meaningful relationship to hate crime. The other columns in Tables 2-4 break aggregate hate crime activity into component crimes. Hate groups still don’t matter. This is true for every individual kind of hate crime. This (non-)result contradicts conventional wisdom, according to which hate groups matter for hate crime. For example, Levin (2007) argues that hate groups provide the “situational facilitator” needed to translate a latent, widespread dislike of minority groups into violence. Jenness et al. (2000) postulate that white supremacist movements encourage people to commit hate crimes. Levin and McDevitt (1993: 103) claim that hate groups actively foster aggressive behavior towards innocents and that, even when their members don’t themselves commit hate crimes, they persuade others to, who “are . . . inspired by the presence of such groups.” Berrill (1992: 31) sees hate groups as playing a similar role, providing potential offenders with “encourage[ment] by . . . rhetoric.” These scholars may be right. Hate groups may be interested in committing hate crimes and encouraging others to commit them. But, if they are, they’re exceptionally bad at doing so. Alternatively, hate groups, though populated by hateful people, may be a lot of hateful bluster. Hate group members may say they’re interested in harming the minorities. But, in practice, they may not actually commit hate crimes or convince others to. Either way our (non-)result is a happy one from the perspective of those who are concerned about the presence and growth of hate groups in the U.S. over the last decade. There are many reasons to be concerned about hate groups’ growth apart from their effect on hate crime. But the 10   most immediate and direct danger hate groups might pose—increasing hate crime’s prevalence—doesn’t seem to be a danger at all. 4.2 Economic Determinants Our model finds that hate groups don’t matter for hate crime. But it’s clearly capable of delivering strong, positive results. Consider the set of economic determinants we estimate in Tables 2-4: Unemployment and Poverty. Column 1 provides the closest match to the specification previous research uses to identify hate crime’s determinants. This column uses total hate crime as the regressand. Unemployment is an important determinant of hate crime. Higher unemployment is positively and significantly associated with more hate crime in all three tables. According to our estimates, a 1 percentage-point increase in a state’s unemployment rate increases the number of hate crimes in that state by between 3.66 to 3.86 crimes per million residents, depending on the specification one considers. This effect is large. In 2008 a one standard deviation increase in unemployment at the mean population value is associated with nearly 28 additional hate crimes over the course of the year. That represents an 18 percent increase in the number of hate crimes from the mean. Unemployment’s relationship to specific kinds of hate crime displays a pattern. Examining columns 4 and 5 in each table, it’s clear that unemployment’s positive association with hate crime overall stems from its positive association with hate crime relating to sexual orientation and ethnicity. When unemployment is higher, hate crimes against homosexuals and ethnic minorities are higher too and vice versa. 11   Our other measure of economic hardship—poverty—displays a positive relationship with hate crime as well. But one must disaggregate hate crime to find it. The hate crimes poverty is associated with are specific: those relating to religion. Our results indicate that where more of the population is impoverished, religiously motivated hate crime is more common and vice versa. Religiously motivated hate crimes aren’t a large enough fraction of total hate crime to make poverty a significant determinant of hate crime overall. However, at the disaggregated level, it’s clear that more poverty has an important and positive association with more religiously motivated hate crime. Average income is positively associated with religiously (see column 3 in Tables 2-4) and sexually (see column 4 in Tables 2-4) oriented hate crime. However, this isn’t a strike against the frustration-aggregation thesis. Lower income is associated with economic hardship. That suggests we should find a negative relationship between incomes and hate crime. But this overlooks the fact that many hate crimes are “crimes-for-profit” that happen to be directed at the members of a socially vulnerable group because of the perpetrator’s hatred. If this is true, we should expect to find more hate crime in richer states, not poorer ones. This may help explain the positive relationship we find between GSP per capita and hate crime. 4.3 Demographic Determinants Finally, consider our results for potential demographic determinants of hate crime, measured by the Metro, Black, Jewish, and Abuse variables in Tables 2-4. Consistent with existing research, we find that, in general, these variables don’t matter. None of them has a significant relationship to the overall level of hate crime, regardless of the specification we consider. Only two consistently produce significant estimates when we disaggregate hate crime. The percentage of 12   the population living in a metropolitan area is negatively related to religiously motivated hate crime: more rural areas have less religious hate crime. And the percentage of the population that’s black is negatively related to sexually motivated hate crime: states with higher concentrations of blacks have fewer hate crimes against homosexuals. Our results that consider the relationship between state and local government police funding and hate crime suggest that more police funding isn’t associated with less hate crime overall. With one exception it isn’t associated with less hate crime of any specific kind either. The single exception is for hate crime relating to sexual orientation. However, the coefficient on our police funding variable is positive rather than negative. Where police funding is higher, sexually motivated hate crime is too. We don’t interpret this as evidence that police funding leads to sexually motivated hate crime. Rather, it may reflect that police activity is especially concerned with sexually motivated hate crime. Thus, where such crime is higher, so is police funding. 5 Concluding Remarks This paper is first to explore the relationship between hate groups and hate crime empirically. Contrary to conventional wisdom, our analysis finds that hate groups have no influence on hate crime in the United States. Instead we find that economic hardship does. Our results suggest that unemployment and, to a lesser extent, poverty, are strongly associated with more hate crime, particularly crimes that are sexually, racially, and religiously motivated. Consistent with existing work, our findings suggest that demographic variables aren’t important predictors of hate crime in the United States. Taken together our results support the frustration-aggregation thesis. They suggest that economics, not hate groups or demographic factors, drive hate crime in America. 13   References Beck, E. M. and Stewart E. Tolnay. 1990. “The Killing Fields of the Deep South: The Market for Cotton and the Lynching of Blacks, 1882-1930.” American Sociological Review 55: 526-39. Berrill, Kevin T. 1992. “Anti-Gay Violence and Victimization in the United States: An Overview.” In Gregory M. Herek and Kevin T. Berrill (eds.), Hate Crimes: Confronting Violence against Lesbians and Gay Men. Newbury Park, CA: Sage. Department of Justice and Federal Bureau of Investigation. 2004. “Crime in the United States 2004.” Available at:  http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius_04/offenses_reported/hate_crime/index.html. Last accessed: 27 July 2010. Dharmapala, Dhammika and Nuno Garoupa. 2004. “Penalty Enhancement for Hate Crimes: An Economic Analysis.” American Law and Economics Review 6: 185-207. Dollard, J., L. Doob, N. Miller, O.H. Mowrer, and R.R. Sears. 1939. Frustration and Aggregation. New Haven: Yale Press. Gale, Lewis R., Will C. Heath, and Rand W. Ressler. 2002. “An Economic Analysis of Hate Crime.” Eastern Economic Journal 28: 203-15. Glaeser, Edward L. 2005. “The Political Economy of Hatred.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 120: 45-86. Green, Donald P., Jack Glaser, and Andrew Rich. 1998. “From Lynching to Gay Bashing: The Elusive Connection between Economic conditions and Hate Crime.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 75: 82-92. Green, Donald P. and Andrew Rich. 1998. “White Supremacist Activity and Crossburnings in North Carolina.” Journal of Quantitative Criminology 14: 263-82. Hepworth, Joseph T. and Stephen G. West. 1988. “Lynchings and the Economy: A Time-Series Reanalysis of Hovland and Sears (1940).” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 21: 296-301. Hovland, C. I. and R. R. Sears. 1940. “Minor Studies of Aggression: VI. Correlation of Lynchings with Economic Indices.” Journal of Psychology: 301-310. Jefferson, Philip N. and Federic L. Pryor. 1999. “On the Geography of Hate.” Economic Letters. 65: 389-395. Jenness, Valerie, Abby L. Ferber, Ryken Grattet, and James F. Short, Jr. 2000. Hate crime in America: What do we know? Washington, D.C.: American Sociological Association. 14   Krueger, Alan B. and Jorn-Steffen Pischke. 1997. “A Statistical Analysis of Crime against Foreigners in Unified Germany.” Journal of Human Resources 32: 182-209. Levin, Jack and Jack McDevitt. 1993. Hate Crimes: The Rising Tide of Bigotry and Bloodshed. New York: Plenum Press. Levin, Jack. 2007. The Violence of Hate. Boston: Allyn and Bacon. Medoff, Marshall. 1999. “Allocation of Time and Hateful Behavior: A Theoretical Analysis of Hate and Hate Crimes.” American Journal of Economics and Sociology 58: 959-973. Mintz, Alexander. 1946. “A Re-examination of Correlations between Lynchings and Economic Indices.” Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 41: 154-160. Mulholland, Sean E. 2010. “Hate Fuel: On the Relationship between Local Government Policy and Hate Group Activity.” Mimeo. Olzak, Susan. 1990. “The Political Context of Competition: Lynching and Urban Racial Violence, 1882-1914.” Social Forces 69: 395-421. Southern Poverty Law Center. 2010. “Hate Map.” Available at: http://www.splcenter.org/get- informed/hate-map. Last Accessed: 27 July 2010. Tolnay, Stewart E. and E. M. Beck. 1995. A Festival of Violence: An Analysis of Southern Lynchings, 1882-1930. Urbana: University of Illinois Press. 15     Variable Definition Mean S.D. HateCrime Total crimes attributed to all bias motivations per 1,000,000  covered population, by state 30.82 21.73 Total crimes attributed to race bias per 1,000,000 covered  population, by state 16.36 13.03 Total crimes attributed to religion bias per 1,000,000 covered  population, by state 4.74 5.17 Total crimes attributed to sexual orientation bias per  1,000,000 covered population, by state 5.86 7.69 Total crimes attributed to ethnicity bias per 1,000,000 covered  population, by state 3.55 3.00 Total crimes attributed to disability bias per 1,000,000  covered population, by state 0.32 0.90 HateGroups Total number of hate groups, including patriot groups, per  1,000,000 residents, by state 3.89 2.76 Total number of hate groups, excluding patriot groups, per  1,000,000 residents, by state 3.14 2.59 Total number of Ku Klux Klan, Neo‐Nazi, White Nationalist  and Racist Skinhead groups per 1,000,000 residents, by state 1.80 1.42 GSPpc Gross State Product per capita, in thousands of 2000 dollars 36.80 13.18 Unemployment State unemployment rate for individuals 16 years and older 5.04 1.16 Poverty Percentage of state population in poverty 12.58 3.24 Police Percentage of state and local government expenditures on  police protection 2.60 0.61 Popshare Percentage of state population covered by HCS reporting 82.38 26.35 Metro Percentage of state population residing within a  metropolitan statistical area (MSA) 85.51 12.84 Abuse Percentage of children under 18 years of age who were  victims of abuse or neglect 1.17 0.67 Black Black population as a percentage of state population 11.29 11.46 Jewish Jewish population as a percentage of state population 1.37 1.70 Data sources:  Hate Crime Statistics, Southern Poverty Law Center, Statistical Abstract of the United States. Table 1. Summary Statistics 16   All Hates Crimes Race Religion Sex. Orient. Ethnicity Disability 1 2 3 4 5 6 HateGroups 1.108 0.665 0.118 0.277 0.047 0.001 (0.870) (0.611) (0.146) (0.245) (0.135) (0.052) GSPpc 0.935 ‐0.304 0.445*** 0.581** 0.142 0.070 (0.877) (0.615) (0.147) (0.247) (0.136) (0.053) Unemployment 3.662** 1.300 0.305 1.539*** 0.481* 0.037 (1.771) (1.242) (0.297) (0.499) (0.274) (0.106) Poverty 1.491 0.603 0.410** 0.462 0.033 ‐0.017 (1.131) (0.794) (0.190) (0.319) (0.175) (0.068) Police 3.623 1.073 ‐0.228 2.491* 0.477 ‐0.188 (4.647) (3.260) (0.778) (1.310) (0.719) (0.279) Popshare ‐0.638*** ‐0.398*** ‐0.016 ‐0.157*** ‐0.058*** ‐0.009* (0.088) (0.062) (0.015) (0.025) (0.014) (0.005) Metro 0.136 0.195 ‐0.092** 0.004 0.034 ‐0.005 (0.230) (0.161) (0.039) (0.065) (0.036) (0.014) Abuse ‐1.039 ‐1.622 ‐0.033 0.848 ‐0.016 ‐0.216 (3.324) (2.332) (0.557) (0.937) (0.515) (0.199) Black ‐2.870 0.749 ‐0.410 ‐4.171*** 0.757 0.203 (3.116) (2.186) (0.522) (0.879) (0.482) (0.187) Jewish 3.225 ‐0.370 0.942 1.679 0.754 0.221 (8.042) (5.642) (1.347) (2.268) (1.245) (0.482) N 292 292 292 292 292 292 R 2 0.24 0.18 0.11 0.32 0.11 0.03 Table 2. Hate Groups' Relationship to Hate Crime: All Hate Groups, Including Patriot Groups Notes: All regressions include year‐ and state‐fixed effects (not reported) and robust standard errors  clustered by state (in parentheses). *** = 1%; ** = 5%; * = 10%.     17   All Hates Crimes Race Religion Sex. Orient. Ethnicity Disability 1 2 3 4 5 6 HateGroups 0.404 0.086 0.160 0.207 ‐0.053 0.004 (0.971) (0.681) (0.162) (0.273) (0.150) (0.058) GSPpc 1.158 ‐0.132 0.441*** 0.612** 0.168 0.069 (0.874) (0.613) (0.146) (0.246) (0.135) (0.052) Unemployment 3.858** 1.434 0.314 1.577*** 0.497* 0.036 (1.769) (1.241) (0.295) (0.498) (0.273) (0.106) Poverty 1.453 0.577 0.408** 0.454 0.030 ‐0.017 (1.134) (0.795) (0.189) (0.319) (0.175) (0.068) Police 3.719 1.134 ‐0.221 2.512* 0.482 ‐0.188 (4.661) (3.268) (0.778) (1.312) (0.719) (0.278) Popshare ‐0.639*** ‐0.400*** ‐0.016 ‐0.156*** ‐0.059*** ‐0.906* (0.088) (0.062) (0.015) (0.025) (0.014) (0.528) Metro 0.142 0.197 ‐0.090** 0.007 0.033 ‐0.005 (0.231) (0.162) (0.039) (0.065) (0.036) (0.014) Abuse ‐0.771 ‐1.408 ‐0.044 0.879 0.019 ‐0.217 (3.335) (2.338) (0.557) (0.939) (0.515) (0.199) Black ‐2.987 0.637 ‐0.391 ‐4.171*** 0.733 0.204 (3.131) ‐2.195 (0.523) (0.882) (0.483) (0.187) Jewish 3.408 ‐0.216 0.928 1.695 0.781 0.220 (52.456) (5.657) (1.346) (2.272) (1.245) (0.482) N 292 292 292 292 292 292 R 2 0.24 0.18 0.11 0.32 0.11 0.03 Table 3. Hate Groups' Relationship to Hate Crime: All Hate Groups, Excluding Patriot Groups Notes: All regressions include year‐ and state‐fixed effects (not reported) and robust standard errors  clustered by state (in parentheses). *** = 1%; ** = 5%; * = 10%.    18   All Hates Crimes Race Religion Sex. Orient. Ethnicity Disability 1 2 3 4 5 6 HateGroups ‐0.179 ‐0.069 0.077 ‐0.203 ‐0.007 0.022 (1.107) (0.776) (0.185) (0.312) (0.171) (0.066) GSPpc 1.252 ‐0.113 0.480*** 0.659*** 0.156 0.070 (0.843) (0.591) (0.141) (0.237) (0.130) (0.050) Unemployment 3.857** 1.427 0.349 1.549*** 0.49* 0.042 (1.788) (1.253) (0.299) (0.503) (0.276) (0.107) Poverty 1.438 0.572 0.409** 0.441 0.031 ‐0.016 (1.136) (0.796) (0.190) (0.320) (0.175) (0.068) Police 3.794 1.161 ‐0.245 2.592* 0.484 ‐0.196 (4.680) (3.280) (0.782) (1.318) (0.722) (0.279) Popshare ‐0.643*** ‐0.401*** ‐0.016 ‐0.159*** ‐0.058*** ‐0.009* (0.088) (0.062) (0.015) (0.025) (0.014) (0.005) Metro 0.137 0.196 ‐0.092** 0.005 0.034 ‐0.005 (0.231) (0.162) (0.39) (0.065) (0.036) (0.014) Abuse ‐0.575 ‐1.356 ‐0.016 1.017 0.004 ‐0.223 (3.341) (2.342) (0.558) (0.941) (0.516) (0.200) Black ‐3.030 0.639 ‐0.462 ‐4.153*** 0.750 0.195 (3.147) (2.206) (0.526) (0.886) (0.486) (0.188) Jewish 3.531 ‐0.188 0.970 1.763 0.766 0.220 (8.066) (5.654) (1.348) (2.271) (1.245) (0.482) N 292 292 292 292 292 292 R 2 0.24 0.18 0.11 0.31 0.11 0.03 Table 4. Hate Groups' Relationship to Hate Crime: KKK, Neo‐Nazi, White Nationalist and Racist Skinhead Notes: All regressions include year‐ and state‐fixed effects (not reported) and robust standard errors  clustered by state (in parentheses). *** = 1%; ** = 5%; * = 10%.   
work_5celvluepncrzmnt2esv4uam6y	----	Social Policy & Society (2017) 16:2, 305–314 C© Cambridge University Press 2016 doi:10.1017/S147474641600052X Social Security Reform and the Surveillance State: Exploring the Operation of ‘Hidden Conditionality’ in the Reform of Disability Benefits Since 2010 K a i n d e M a n j i Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Stirling E-mail: kainde.manji@stir.ac.uk The application of formal conditionality to address ‘dependence’ on social security has been an important trend since the 1990s. Reforms between 2010 and 2015 saw a renewed interest in this approach. This article will focus on conditionality in disability benefits in that period. It will present findings from a qualitative study of twenty-three disabled people living in the central-belt of Scotland, exploring the operation of surveillance as a form of ‘hidden conditionality’. It will find that this had a significant impact on participants’ daily lives, affecting who they interacted with, and what activities they felt they could take part in. The implications of this for disabled people’s ability to realise equal citizenship will be examined. Keywords: Social security, disability, conditionality, surveillance. I n t r o d u c t i o n The expansion of conditionality has been an important trend in UK social security reforms since the 1990s, and its application to benefits for sick and disabled people is well documented in the literature (Patrick, 2011a, 2011b; Wright, 2012; Patrick, 2015). This article contributes to these debates with a focus on the emergence of surveillance and self-surveillance as a form of ‘hidden conditionality’. Based on interviews with twenty- three disabled people living in the central-belt of Scotland between Autumn 2013 and Summer 2014, it will explore the operation of ‘hidden conditionality’ and its impact on disability benefit claimants since 2010. In particular it will focus on the ways in which expectations around how benefit recipients should behave have been internalised as a form of self-surveillance. This was evident in assessments for eligibility, but was also mediated by increased stigmatisation of the joint status of disability and benefit claiming. Behavioural narratives were prevalent in official discourses around social security reform, but were also increasingly normalised by debates in the mainstream media as well as by responses of fellow citizens. This resulted in a growing sense of resentment and even vindictiveness (Young, 2003) against people in receipt of disability benefits. The article will begin by outlining some of the debates surrounding citizenship, dependency and the reform of disability benefits, before examining the role of surveillance in conditional benefit systems. It will then briefly outline the methods employed in the research. Finally, it will explore the experience of participants living under ‘hidden conditionality’ and surveillance. It will find that this was having a significant impact, affecting who they interacted with and what activities they felt they could take part in. 305 https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S147474641600052X Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:35, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://doi.org/10.1017/S147474641600052X https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/S147474641600052X https://www.cambridge.org/core Kainde Manji The article will argue that this form of conditionality has created a mismatch between the rights and obligations of citizenship, preventing disabled people from participating in society on an equal basis. D e p e n d e n c y , c o n d i t i o n a l i t y a n d d i s a b i l i t y c i t i z e n s h i p Discourses concerned with the need to tackle dependency through the application of conditionality are based on a particular conception of ‘active citizenship’ (Dwyer, 2010). Dwyer (2010) discusses two theoretical underpinnings of these ideas. The first, emanating from a neo-liberal perspective, is based on the view that social citizenship rights introduced since 1945 have created perverse incentives leading individuals to act not as independent agents within the market, but as dependants on the state. These ideas have gained prominence through the work of American conservatives such as Charles Murray (1994) and Lawrence Mead (1997) who advocated measures to encourage or compel participation in the labour market either through reducing eligibility to benefits, or attaching conditions to their receipt. Embodied in so-called ‘workfare’ approaches (Wiggan, 2012), benefit recipients are increasingly expected to fulfil certain conditions, such as providing evidence that they are actively seeking work, or participating in work schemes, in return for receiving benefits. Failure to comply with these expectations can lead to sanctions, including the stoppage of benefit payments. The introduction of conditionality has also been influenced by communitarian approaches to citizenship, which prioritise the fulfilment of citizenship obligations before being able to enjoy the attendant rights (Lister, 2003; Dwyer, 2010). This conception was influential in policies adopted by the Labour Government of 1997–2010 (Lister, 2003). Reforms to disability benefits such as Incapacity Benefit (IB) involved restricting eligibility through new medical testing and the introduction of conditional elements such as work- focused interviews (Roulstone and Prideaux, 2012). The place of disabled people within mainstream understandings of citizenship and debates around the provision of income transfers have been the matter of some debate. Stone (1984) has argued that disability emerged historically as a category to identify those legitimately excused from the obligations of participating in the labour market. However, in being excused from these obligations, disabled people were expected to give up claims to citizenship. As a result, disability developed as a status located outside the bounds of citizenship in a form of ‘stigmatised social privilege’ (Soldatic and Meekosha, 2012: 199). Since the 1960s, the Disabled People’s Movement has called for the inclusion of disabled people as full citizens, through the articulation of the social model of disability (Barnes, 2012). Disability is created by the failure of society to consider the needs of disabled people, in itself a denial of citizenship (Dwyer, 2010). The increasing application of conditionality in the awarding of disability benefits has been the subject of considerable debate. Concerns have been raised that policies are based on unfounded assumptions that claimants act out of self-interest to maximise the amount of benefits they can claim (Wright, 2012). Beatty and Fothergill (2011) have argued that many historic IB claimants have faced significant labour market disadvantage in addition to experiencing barriers arising from impairment or long-term health problems. Disabled people also face multiple barriers to participation in paid work (Morris, 2005). Removing benefits or reducing their value will therefore make it harder for disabled people to meet their citizenship obligations. The priority given to work as the major 306 https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S147474641600052X Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:35, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/S147474641600052X https://www.cambridge.org/core Social Security Reform and the Surveillance State obligation of citizenship also serves to undermine other contributions, for example through volunteering (Barnes and Mercer, 2005). C o n d i t i o n a l i t y a n d t h e C o a l i t i o n The Coalition Government of 2010–15 came to power emphasising the need to reform social security in order to tackle cultures of dependency (Wiggan, 2012) and to reduce the structural deficit (Taylor-Gooby and Stoker, 2011). Their approach to tackling dependency was twofold: firstly reducing eligibility; and secondly incentivising or even compelling return to work. Reforms affecting disabled people have centred on changes to two key benefits: IB and the Disability Living Allowance (DLA). The reform of IB was initiated by the Labour Government of 1997–2010, but the increased focus on conditionality was supported by the new Coalition, who oversaw the reassessment of most existing claimants (Roulstone and Prideaux, 2012). An income replacement benefit, IB had been paid to individuals who were unable to participate in work due to sickness or disability (Burchardt, 1999). The impetus for reform of this particular benefit has been the subject of some debate. Roulstone and Prideaux (2012) have argued that the need for change derived from a crisis of legitimacy due to allegations that it was prone to fraud and had been used politically to disguise high levels of unemployment. Other perspectives however have suggested reform was part of a wider neo-liberal project to increase supply of labour (Grover and Piggot, 2005). IB was replaced by the Employment Support Allowance (ESA) from 2008. The new benefit is available in two categories, the Support Group and the Work Related Activity Group (WRAG). Eligibility is determined through ‘independent’ medical assessment in a continuation of the trend towards reliance on medical testing. However, the ability of the system to adequately assess fitness to work has been the matter of some debate (Baumberg et al., 2015). Those in the WRAG are subject to conditionality and expected to undertake activities that will bring them closer to the labour market. Failure to meet these conditions can result in the loss of benefits through sanctions. The reform of DLA has followed a similar pattern to that of ESA, through the introduction of a new third-party assessment to determine eligibility to the new Personal Independence Payment (PIP). However, DLA in contrast to IB is paid to cover additional costs rather than as income replacement and can be claimed by those either in or out of work. DLA was developed in the 1990s and was intended to compensate disabled people for some of the additional expenses they face in daily life, such as transport and personal assistance (Burchardt, 1999). Unlike ESA, claimants of DLA and PIP are not expected to meet conditions beyond being assessed for eligibility to the benefit, and do not face sanctions. However, the benefit was introduced with a significantly reduced budget compared to DLA (DWP, 2012). C o n d i t i o n a l i t y a n d s u r v e i l l a n c e The concept of surveillance is increasingly being applied in discussions around conditionality (Henman and Marston, 2008; Maki, 2011; Dee, 2013). Henman and Marston (2008) coin the term ‘welfare surveillance’ to describe the way in which conditionality is used by the state to exert power, or control, over citizens to bring about behavioural changes. Emanating from a perceived belief that people claiming benefits 307 https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S147474641600052X Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:35, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/S147474641600052X https://www.cambridge.org/core Kainde Manji will be doing so fraudulently, surveillance is employed to monitor whether recipients are deserving of assistance (Maki, 2011; Dee, 2013). Less widely applied in the literature around conditionality is the concept of ‘self-surveillance’. Building on the work of Foucault (1991), self-surveillance involves modifying behaviour to fit the expectations of society (or the state) (Vaz and Bruno, 2003). Importantly, self-surveillance is a conscious process that is carried out knowingly, even if this goes against the way an individual would wish to act (ibid). As a result, while surveillance is concerned with the state as an external power, self-surveillance is both an internal and external process. Power is mediated by external expectations from the state, and also internally reinforced through comparison between ourselves and the expected ‘norm’ (Henderson et al., 2010). In this sense, self-surveillance could be conceptualised as a subtle or ‘hidden’ form of conditionality, causing individuals to adapt their behaviour according to social norms about how benefits claimants should behave. Related to the concept of self-surveillance is ‘sousveillance’, which, unlike surveillance, is exercised from the bottom up, rather than from the top down (Dennis, 2008). This can have a positive and emancipatory application, but can also be manipulative, inciting communities to surveil each other and correct deviant behaviour through condemnation or vigilantism. In a similar vein, Young (2003) highlights the ways in which resentment against members of a community who are perceived to be receiving more favourable treatment, such as those in receipt of benefits, can spill over into vindictiveness against them. Such resentment can also be fostered in order to build public support for social policies. Hoggett et al (2013) point to the cultivation of ‘anti- welfare populism’ by the Coalition Government as an example of this. Self-surveillance as behavioural control can therefore be exercised internally by an individual, horizontally within a community and externally through the operation of government and media narratives that foster feelings of unfairness. There is growing evidence of such processes at work through the reform of social se- curity. Research has focused in particular on the co-construction of stigmatising identities within communities with high rates of claims as well as among benefit recipients them- selves (Garthwaite, 2011; Chase and Walker, 2012; Garthwaite, 2015; Baumberg, 2016). Resentment can run the risk of becoming vindictiveness when negative feelings of mistrust are directed at individuals rather than a faceless other. Quarmby (2011) argues that media narratives around social security reform have amounted to the scapegoating of disabled people. In exploring the motivations for hate crimes, she highlights disability having become synonymous with ‘scrounging’ as an important factor. M e t h o d s This paper reports findings from a doctoral research project looking at the impacts of reforms to social security for disabled people living in Scotland. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with twenty-three individual disabled people from across the central-belt of Scotland between November 2013 and July 2014.1 A thematic analysis was carried out using the qualitative data analysis software package NVivo. The findings presented in this paper emerged organically from the data rather than through a-priori enquiry. Participants were aged between twenty-eight and sixty-seven and included nine women, thirteen men and one person identifying as gender queer. Twenty-one were 308 https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S147474641600052X Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:35, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/S147474641600052X https://www.cambridge.org/core Social Security Reform and the Surveillance State claiming DLA at the time of their interview, but only one had been called to apply for PIP. Six of the participants receiving DLA were also claiming ESA, while a further three had used it in the three years immediately prior to the interviews. Two participants were claiming ESA but not DLA. The majority of participants had physical impairments, though a number also experienced mental health problems in addition to their primary impairment. Participants had a range of labour market experiences: seven were in work at the time of their interview, while a further seven had previously worked but had retired due to ill health. Seven were out of work but hoped to work again in the future. Only one participant had never worked. S u r v e i l l a n c e a n d s e l f - s u r v e i l l a n c e : a c a s e o f h i d d e n c o n d i t i o n a l i t y ? The majority of participants in this study were not subject to conditionality as a matter of policy, however their experiences indicate that debates around conditionality were nevertheless impacting on them. The threat of losing or being found ineligible for benefits was ever present, and did appear to have an impact on the way they behaved. These concerns were raised by just under half of participants. Behavioural expectations were most prevalent when applying and being assessed for eligibility to benefits, including feeling judged by assessors for demonstrating particular characteristics or lifestyle choices. One participant was angry at discovering that the assessor knew which brand of tobacco he smoked: Why do they put that down on the medical report? . . . They’re saying, ah he’s smoking, we’re giving him too much money. (Liam, 50) Interviewees also talked of feeling that they had to give particular emphasis to things that they could not do. At least four participants commented that this had gone against their natural inclination to focus on the positives of their situation. If someone were to ask me . . . how far can you walk without it being sore, I think I would probably exaggerate how far I could walk . . . And then I was confronted with a form where actually if you were to do that, that’s the difference between getting something and not getting something. (Catriona, 29) This was explicitly not indicative of an intention to cheat the system or to lie about the severity of their condition, but was seen by participants as a necessary requirement for demonstrating genuine eligibility. This was not only unpleasant, but also challenged the way participants viewed themselves and their impairments, impacting on their sense of self. One participant talked with dismay at being encouraged by a welfare rights advisor to alter her appearance ahead of an assessment: You feel as if you’re putting it on . . . I was told [don’t] be too smart in what you are wearing, and don’t make an effort with your hair . . . wear odd socks, literally look like you’re not well. (Fiona, 28) Fiona had gone along with the advice as she felt that it was necessary to prove her case, but described feeling degraded by the experience. 309 https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S147474641600052X Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:35, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/S147474641600052X https://www.cambridge.org/core Kainde Manji The feeling of being observed and judged was not restricted to agencies acting for or on behalf of the government. A small proportion of participants mentioned judgmental attitudes among members of their communities, and a fear that if they behaved inappropriately, members of the public would report them to the authorities. People in the town, I just don’t tell them . . . [because] people would then say ‘he’s claiming benefits you know, and look at him, he’s out on the hills or he’s gone off for the weekend somewhere’. (Adrian, 50) As a result, only their immediate families were aware that they claimed benefits. This was not because they felt that they were doing anything wrong that would lead them to be reported, but rather because they did not feel that they fitted in with the traditional understanding of what a disabled person should look like, and that they were therefore less likely to be seen as deserving. This echoes Garthwaite’s (2015) findings around the growing stigma associated with the benefit recipient identity. The feeling of living under ‘welfare surveillance’ (Hennman and Marston, 2008) had a significant impact on participants’ daily lives, affecting who they interacted with and what activities they felt they could take part in. One respondent had even decided to put off starting a family with her husband because she was worried that her benefits would be stopped if she came off her medication in order to conceive. She felt that this would be seen as a sign of recovery rather than a decision to exercise reproductive choices. Barr et al (2016) have found that far from improving recipients’ health, the testing regime has resulted in a decline in their reported mental health and an increase in suicide rates. As with formal conditionality, these expectations arose from assumptions within the benefits system about how recipients will act. Participants in this study were keen to distance themselves from the ‘scrounger’ narrative. They felt that they were all genuinely seeking support because their impairments were such that they were unable to work, or that they faced significant labour market disadvantages as a result of discriminatory attitudes. They also felt that they had gone to considerable lengths to meet the requirements to prove their eligibility, as evidenced in the granting of benefits. However, the assumptions underpinning and narratives around the reforms meant that many felt their eligibility remained in question. Participants had therefore adopted practices associated with self-surveillance in order to demonstrate their conformity with the rhetorical expectations about how benefit recipients should behave. R e s e n t m e n t a n d v i n d i c t i v e n e s s : t h e i m p a c t o f ‘ h i d d e n c o n d i t i o n a l i t y ’ ? Narratives surrounding how benefit recipients should behave had affected participants’ interactions with their wider communities, whether or not they chose to disclose their status. Many discussed being perceived as having stigmatised identities, both as disabled people and as benefit claimants. Several also described experiencing discrimination, bullying and harassment as part of their daily lives. This was often explicitly linked to having visible impairments, or living in supported accommodation, making them easily identifiable as ‘other’ within their communities. This experience of disability discrimination was increasingly becoming bound up with their status as benefit recipients too. In the past, disabled people may have felt more protected from ‘scrounger rhetoric’ (Garthwaite, 2011; Briant et al., 2013) as a result of being perceived as being more 310 https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S147474641600052X Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:35, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/S147474641600052X https://www.cambridge.org/core Social Security Reform and the Surveillance State deserving of state support (Roulstone and Prideaux, 2012). However, it appeared that as policy became more stringent in determining eligibility, this was being reflected in a greater sense of mistrust and resentment by the general public. Of the twenty-three individuals involved in this study, nine discussed feeling a hardening of attitudes towards them. These were being normalised and enforced by media narratives around scrounging, with participants facing a growing perception that they were not really disabled but rather trying to cheat the system. You see the general public are starting to believe all this [rhetoric] and thinking that aha, these people are at it, they’ve been getting an easy ride. (Anthony, 46) This is reflected in some of the informal and community elements of hidden conditionality discussed above. Participants with unseen impairments felt that they faced additional barriers to being believed. Because I look fine, that’s the worst thing about it. It’s a terrible thing to say but if I was in a wheelchair, it would be so much easier, because people would understand it a bit better. (Fiona, 28) The attitudes they faced were frustrating and often upsetting, particularly, as in one case, when they came from their own families. Again, this echoes Garthwaite’s (2015) findings around the stigma of benefit claiming. Mistrust over the legitimacy of disability status is also commonly reflected in incidences of hate crime (Sherry, 2010). Participants did not speak about experiencing disbelief in these terms, however several had experienced harassment and abuse that could be characterised as hate crime. Six respondents had faced incidences ranging from verbal abuse to physical assault. This was overwhelmingly the case for those with visible impairments or those whose disability status was more apparent. One couple were subjected to several months of intimidation from a gang harassing residents living in supported accommodation for people with learning disabilities. They felt that they were identifiable because of where they lived, making them an easy target. Those involved in this study exhibited a shared sense of mistrust in the ability or willingness of authorities to deal with problems of harassment and hate crime. Only two had made a report to the police, and neither felt that their concerns had been adequately addressed. The rest had seen little point in contacting the authorities, or feared repercussions if they did so. This was perhaps unsurprising given the poor success rates of prosecuting disability hate crimes (Sherry, 2010; Quarmby, 2011). However, it was clearly having a lasting impact, with four stating that they felt less able to go out in public as a result. I’ve been indoors a lot more, unless I’ve got support. I have got good support though, and they come and take me out, but it’s not the same. I like to be able to go out and just have a coffee. (Sophie, 47) This had a serious negative impact on participants’ ability to live independently and be recognised as a valued part of the wider community. Quarmby (2011) cites examples of neighbours articulating resentment against disabled people as a common 311 https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S147474641600052X Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:35, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/S147474641600052X https://www.cambridge.org/core Kainde Manji trend, due to the perception that they have certain privileges such as accessible housing and adapted vehicles. However, the targeting of disabled people through acts of violence within their own neighbourhoods suggests escalation from feelings of resentment to acts of vindictiveness (Young, 2003). C o n c l u s i o n s This article has examined the emergence of ‘hidden conditionality’ experienced by recipients of disability benefits following the expansion of conditionality since 2010. This was prevalent in assessments for eligibility to benefits, but was also notable in their daily lives. Recipients of disability benefits increasingly felt that they experienced ‘welfare surveillance’ (Hennman and Marston, 2008) by government agencies, as well as by their own communities. This was experienced as a form of control designed to bring about behaviour change. This was also evident in the adoption of elements of self- surveillance in order to conform to societal expectations about how they should behave. Resentment within communities was being driven by official and media discourses around benefit claiming, leading to the dual stigmatisation of both disabled people and benefit claimants. Examples of vindictiveness (Young, 2003) in discriminatory attitudes and even hate crimes (Quarmby, 2011) were also reported as a result of the operation of some of neighbourhood-level elements of hidden conditionality. The consequence of these processes was that participants felt more socially isolated and less able to participate in their communities on an equal basis. Conceptions of citizenship evident in dominant discourses around social security reform prioritise the obligations of citizenship as a prerequisite to the enjoyment of rights (Lister, 2003). This is evident in the expectation that benefit recipients will meet certain behavioural conditions in exchange for support. The findings of this study suggest that narratives supporting conditionality are serving to dissolve the bonds of social solidarity that are essential to citizenship (Lister, 2003). Disabled people are becoming more marginalised as a result. Those writing from a Disability Studies perspectives have stressed the importance of social security in enabling disabled people to meet their obligations as citizens, including participating in work (Morris, 2005). Conditionality has placed ever-harsher requirements on disabled people to meet their obligations, but without enabling them to enjoy the rewards of full citizenship in return. A c k n o w l e d g e m e n t s The research presented in this article was funded by an ESRC/Scottish Government Doctoral Studentship, the support of which is gratefully acknowledged. Thanks also to the two anonymous reviewers for their very helpful comments. N o t e 1 The project received ethical approval from the University of Glasgow College of Social Sciences Ethics Committee. Participants are referred to here by a pseudonym and any other identifying information has been removed or altered. 312 https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S147474641600052X Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:35, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/S147474641600052X https://www.cambridge.org/core Social Security Reform and the Surveillance State R e f e r e n c e s Barnes, C. and Mercer, G. 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Sherry, M. (2010) Disability Hate Crimes: Does Anyone Really Hate Disabled People?, Farnham: Ashgate. Soldatic, K. and Meekosha, H. (2012) ‘Disability and neoliberal state formations’, in N. Watson, A. Roulstone and C. Thomas (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Disability Studies, London: Routledge, 191–206. Stone, D. (1984) The Disabling State, Philadelphia: Temple University Press. Taylor-Gooby, P. and Stoker, G. (2011) ‘The Coalition programme: a new vision for Britain or politics as usual’, Political Quarterly, 82, 1, 4–15. Vaz, P. and Bruno, F. (2003) ‘Types of self-surveillance: from abnormality to individuals “at risk”’, Surveillance and Society, 1, 3, 272–91, http://ojs.library.queensu.ca/index.php/surveillance-and- society/article/view/3341 [accessed 20.05.2016]. Wiggan, J. (2012) ‘Telling stories of 21st century welfare: the UK Coalition Government and the neo-liberal discourse of worklessness and dependency’, Critical Social Policy, 33, 383–405. Wright, S. (2012) ‘Welfare-to-work, agency and personal responsibility’, Journal of Social Policy, 41, 2, 309–28. Young, J. (2003) ‘Merton with energy, Katz with structure: the sociology of vindictiveness and the criminology of transgression’, Theoretical Criminology, 7, 3, 388–414. 314 https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S147474641600052X Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:35, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at http://ojs.library.queensu.ca/index.php/surveillance-and-society/article/view/3341 http://ojs.library.queensu.ca/index.php/surveillance-and-society/article/view/3341 https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/S147474641600052X https://www.cambridge.org/core Introduction Dependency, conditionality and disability citizenship Conditionality and the Coalition Conditionality and surveillance Methods Surveillance and self-surveillance: a case of hidden conditionality? Resentment and vindictiveness: the impact of ‘hidden conditionality’? Conclusions Acknowledgements Note References 
work_5ddpwwhtfffjbevk5hr4uaeyni	----	1 Trust and Trustworthiness of Immigrants and Native-Born Americans * James C. Cox Noah Langdale Jr. Eminent Scholar Chair Experimental Economics Center and Department of Economics Georgia State University 14 Marietta Street NW, Atlanta, GA 30303 Email: jccox@gsu.edu Wafa Hakim Orman Assistant Professor Department of Economics, Accounting, and Finance University of Alabama in Huntsville 301 Sparkman Drive, Huntsville AL 35899 Email: wafa.orman@uah.edu Abstract: Trust and trustworthiness are crucial to amelioration of social dilemmas. Distrust and malevolence aggravate social dilemmas. We use an experimental moonlighting game with a sample of the U.S. population, oversampling immigrants, to observe interactions between immigrants and native-born Americans in a social dilemma situation that can elicit both benevolent and malevolent actions. We survey participants in order to relate outcomes in the moonlighting game to demographic characteristics and traditional, survey-based measures of trust and trustworthiness and show that they are strongly correlated. Overall, we find that immigrants are as trusting as native-born U.S. citizens when they interact with native-born citizens but do not trust other immigrants. Immigrants appear to be less trustworthy overall but this finding disappears when we control for demographic variables. Women and older people are less likely to trust but no more or less trustworthy. Highly religious immigrants are less trusting and less trustworthy than both other immigrants and native-born Americans. Keywords: experiment, trust, trustworthiness, religiosity, immigrants, native-born * This research was supported by the NSF-supported Time-Sharing Experiments in the Social Sciences (TESS). We are grateful to Knowledge Networks, Inc. for conducting the experiment and to referees for helpful comments and suggestions. © 2015. This manuscript version is made available under the Elsevier user license http://www.elsevier.com/open-access/userlicense/1.0/ 2 1 Introduction Trustworthiness of immigrants is an important political and security question. Trust in immigrants by native-born citizens is important for acceptance of immigrants’ participation in mainstream economic activities in their adopted country. The central purpose of this study is to elicit data on trust and trustworthiness between first-generation immigrants and native-born Americans. For comparison, we also elicit data on trust and trustworthiness among immigrants and among natives. We use an experimental moonlighting game (Abbink et al., 2000; Cox, et al., 2008b) to study behavior in a social dilemma situation and pair native-born Americans with first- generation immigrants. We chose the moonlighting game for our experiment rather than the investment (or trust) game (Berg et al., 1995; Glaeser et al., 2000; Carter and Castillo, 2002; Cox, 2004) because it allows first movers and second movers to both give and take money. It thereby makes possible observation of behavior with both positive motivations (such as altruism, trust and trustworthiness) and negative motivations (such as malevolence, distrust and untrustworthiness). Pew Research (2013) found that in terms of educational attainment, incomes, poverty rates, and many other characteristics, second generation immigrants to the United States closely resembled the full U.S. adult population. Rumbaut (2004) also foundinds significant evidence of second and third-generation immigrants moving closer to the U.S. population mean in terms of English proficiency, education levels, and occupational attainment. We therefore consider second-generation immigrants as native-born Americans for the purposes of this study. We combine the experiment with a survey to provide more data. The survey includes selected core questions from the World Bank’s questionnaire on social capital (Grootaert et al., 2004) as well as questions about demographic characteristics, income, education, life experiences, religious attendance, and membership in secular organizations. We examine the relationship between survey responses and experimental behavior. The experiment was conducted online by Knowledge Networks, a survey research firm. Subjects were randomly selected from the Knowledge Networks panel, which is a representative 3 sample of the American population. Our use of a random population sample of subjects, rather than student subjects, increases the representativeness of our findings. We oversampled immigrants for the purposes of this study. 2 Game and Experiment Setup 2.1 Game Form and Beliefs Elicitation The setup of the game is as follows. Each individual is randomly assigned to being either a first mover or a second mover. Each first and second mover is credited with a money endowment of $10. Each first mover is given the task of deciding whether she wants to give to a randomly paired second mover none, some, or all of her $10 endowment or take up to $5 from the paired person’s endowment. Any amounts given by the first mover are tripled by the experimenter, while any amounts taken by the first mover are not transformed. The second mover then decides how much to return to the first mover, and can also punish the first mover. If the first mover sends the amount F ≥ 0, the second mover’s endowment increases to $10 + $3F. If the first mover takes the amount F < 0, the second mover’s endowment becomes $10 − $|F|. The second mover decides whether to reward or punish the first mover. If the second mover rewards the first mover, she reduces her own payoff by $1 for each $1 that she increases the payoff of the first mover. If the second mover punishes the first mover, she reduces her own payoff by $1 for each $3 that she decreases the payoff of the first mover. The second mover’s choices are constrained so as not to give either person a negative payoff. All choices are required to be in integer amounts. The total payoff of a pair of first and second movers is maximized when the first mover sends his entire $10 endowment to the second mover; that choice increases the total payoff of a pair of subjects from the endowed amount of $20 to the maximum amount of $40. The first mover may send a positive amount to the second mover because of altruistic preferences or trust that the second mover will share the profits generated by the experimenter’s tripling of amounts sent or because of both motivations. A second mover may return a positive amount to the first mover because of altruistic preferences or positive reciprocity to the generous action of the first mover or because of both motivations (Cox, et al 2008b). If a first mover has self-regarding (homo economicus) preferences and believes that second movers also have such preferences, the 4 first mover will take the maximum amount of $5 from the second mover. A second mover with self-regarding preferences will neither punish nor reward a first mover because either of such actions cost the second mover money. Hence the subgame perfect equilibrium of the moonlighting game for a pair of agents with self-regarding preferences (and beliefs that the other has self-regarding preferences) is for the first mover to take $5 and the second mover to neither punish nor reward (i.e. choose the amount 0). A second mover, however, may not have self- regarding preferences; instead a second mover may be positively reciprocal towards a second mover who sends money and negatively reciprocal to a first mover who takes money (as modeled, for example, in Cox et al 2008a). If a first mover takes $5, which reduces the second mover’s endowment from $10 to $5, a negatively reciprocal or malevolent second mover may respond by spending her remaining $5 in order to take $15 from the first mover. In that event, the pair of subjects in this game has a total payoff of $0. In summary, the range of payoffs to a pair of subjects from more or less successful resolution of the social dilemma in the moonlighting game varies from $40 to $0. A cooperative pair of subjects can add (as much as) $20 in profit to their initial endowment of $20 while an uncooperative pair of subjects can destroy (as much as) the entire $20 endowment. The moonlighting game is particularly well-suited for researching interactions between immigrants and native-born citizens because it makes possible elicitation of a full range of both positive motivations (such as altruism, trust and trustworthiness) and negative motivations (such as malevolence, distrust and untrustworthiness). 2.2 Experimental Design and Protocol Respondents completed their questionnaires online at their convenience. Due to the nature of the survey, the strategy method (Falk et al., 2008) is the only feasible way to elicit responses from the second mover. The first mover indicates how much they wish to send or take. Each second mover decides, for each possible action of the first mover, whether she wants to give money to the paired first mover or take money from her. This has the added advantage of providing a full range of information on the second mover’s responses to each possible decision by the first mover. First and second mover responses were randomly matched ex-post. Following Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2000), beliefs about the behavior of the average 5 person were elicited from both the first movers and the second movers with a monetary reward for guessing correctly. Gächter and Renner (2010) show that incentivized beliefs are more accurate than beliefs that are elicited without a monetary incentive. First movers were asked to guess the behavior of the average second mover and second movers were asked to guess the behavior of the average first mover. This provides more information about their motivations and helps to distinguish between trust in anticipation of reciprocity (or reciprocity in response to trust) versus unconditional altruism. There are four types of pairings. Using I to represent an immigrant, N to represent a U.S. native, FM to represent the first mover and SM to represent the second mover, the pairings are: I (FM) - I (SM), I (FM) - N (SM), N (FM) - I (SM), and N (FM) - N (SM). The pairings were arranged using the respondents’ place of birth, which had been previously collected by Knowledge Networks. Subjects were randomly assigned to treatments and to first mover or second mover role. Subjects were informed whether the person they were going to be matched with was a U.S. native or an immigrant to the United States. For example, if a respondent who listed their own or their parents’ place of birth as Jordan was pre-assigned to the I (FM) - I (SM) treatment they were informed that they would be matched with another randomly selected individual from the Middle East, living in the U.S. If they were assigned to the I (FM) - N (SM) or the N (FM) - I (SM) treatment, they were informed that they would be matched with a randomly selected native-born American. A respondent listing their and their parents’ place of birth as the U.S. was informed that they would be matched with a randomly selected immigrant if they were assigned to the I (FM) - N (SM) or N (FM) - I (SM) treatment, or with a randomly selected native-borm American if they were assigned to the N (FM) - N (SM) treatment. Immigrants from any particular region were matched only with others from their own region in the I (FM) - I (SM) treatment. While interactions between different immigrant groups are an important topic of study, it is beyond the scope of this paper. Native-born Americans paired with immigrants were informed only of that fact; they were not informed about the country of origin of the immigrant. While (some or many) native-born Americans may discriminate between immigrants from different countries, study of that topic is beyond the scope of the present paper. Our focus is on the dichotomy, native-born vs. immigrant. Study of discrimination between immigrant groups 6 would require different treatment cells than we used and use of a subject sample size much larger than the 450 subjects in our study. Information about respondents’ religion was not used to match subjects. Data on income and educational background were collected in the standard set of demographic questions that preceded the survey. We also included selected core questions from the World Bank’s questionnaire on social capital (Grootaert et al., 2004) to test if answers to these questions are predictors of behavior in the moonlighting game. The survey included questions on whether the subject or anyone they knew had ever been a victim of a hate crime or prejudice, to ascertain whether these experiences made a person more or less likely to send money, take money, reward, or punish. In these ways, the survey together with the experiment provides a chance to see not just whether people punish or take money, but who does so, with respect to income, background, and life experiences. The experiment was conducted online by Knowledge Networks. There were 450 subjects, who were a random sample of the Knowledge Networks panel except that immigrants were oversampled. Since the experiment was played as a one-shot game, this implies that there were 225 unique subject pairs and 225 independent observations. Panel registrants had been given the hardware required to complete surveys online using their TV sets. They were all paid based on the outcomes of the moonlighting game. There was no separate participation fee; all panelists were already compensated by Knowledge Networks for being on the panel. The average first mover earned $20.42 from the experiment and $2.87 as a bonus for the incentivized belief elicitation. The average second mover earned $26.20 from the experiment and $2.07 as a belief elicitation bonus. Subjects received these payments over and above their normal participation fee. Subject instructions and the full list of survey questions are available online at: http://tinyurl.com/a58t6hw. 3 Results We separately identify the differences in behavior within immigrant and native-born communities, as measured by the I (FM) - I (SM) and N (FM) - N (SM) treatments, and between immigrant and native communities, as measured by the I (FM) - N (SM) and N (FM) - I (SM) http://tinyurl.com/a58t6hw 7 treatments. We aim to identify the demographic and other characteristics that make immigrants more or less likely than native-born Americans to give money, take money, reward, or punish. Subjects were randomly assigned to treatments. The numbers of subjects in each treatment cell are shown in Table 1. Table 2 shows the distribution of immigrants by region. INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 3.1 Statistical Tests Figure 1 shows the average amounts sent by first movers in the various treatments and the proportions of first movers who take money in the four treatments. A Kruskal-Wallis test of equality of distributions shows that the distributions of the amounts sent by first movers and the proportions of first movers who take money are significantly different across the four treatments (p-value = 0.037 for both). INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE A Mann-Whitney test provides support for what seems apparent from a visual inspection of Figure 1: amounts sent by first movers in the Immigrant-Immigrant (I-I) treatment are significantly different from all the others, pooled, at the 5% level (p-value = 0.047), and different from the Immigrant-Native (I-N) treatment at the 10% level (p-value = 0.077). Similarly, first movers in the I-I treatment are significantly more likely to take money from the second mover relative to all other treatments (p-value = 0.005) and even relative to the I-N treatment (p-value = 0.012). Immigrants are less generous towards other immigrants than towards native-born Americans. If we compare immigrant and native-born Americans as first movers facing an immigrant second mover, the native-born Americans send more ($2.38 vs. $1.14) but this difference is not significant (p-value is 0.15). When paired with a native-born American as a second mover, the amounts sent by immigrant first-movers are not significantly different from amounts sent by native-born Americans (p-value = 0.90). Immigrant first movers send more when facing native-born second movers than when facing immigrant second movers—$2.56 versus $1.14 (p-value = 0.07), and are also significantly more likely to take money from an 8 immigrant second mover than a native-born second mover (p-value = 0.08). Conversely, the amounts sent by native-born American first movers are not significantly different between the Native-Native (N-N) and Native-Immigrant (N-I) treatments (p-value = 0.65). It also appears that levels of ―complete trust‖ are lowest in the I-I treatment. 18.2% of first movers in the N-N treatment send the maximum amount of $10. 18.03% of first movers in the I-N treatment, 16.4% of first movers in the N-I treatment, and 7.14% of first movers in the I-I treatment send the maximum amount. The I-I treatment is marginally significantly different from all the others for observation of the maximum amount sent by first movers; the p-value from a Mann-Whitney test is 0.096. Beliefs elicited with the survey are good predictors of behavior by first movers in the experiment. The Spearman’s rank correlation between the amount the first mover sends and what the first mover believes the second mover will return is significant, with a p-value of 0.00 (Spearman’s rho = 0.3585). Figure 2 depicts the amount that second movers return for each possible amount sent by first movers in each treatment. A Kruskal-Wallis test shows that the amounts returned by second movers for each possible amount sent were significantly different between the four treatments (p-value = 0.0001). INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE Unless otherwise specified, all subsequent p-values reported are from Mann-Whitney tests. Trustworthiness appears to be lowest in the N-I treatment. 70.2% of second movers in the N-N treatment return at least the same amount that the first mover sent them. 65.4% of second movers in the I-N treatment, 62.8% of second movers in the I-I treatment, and 59.7% of second movers in the N-I treatment return at least the amount sent by the first mover. The N-N and N-I treatments are significantly different from pooled data for all the others (p-values are 0.00 for both). Looking at treatments individually, the N-I treatment is significantly different from the N- N treatment (p-value = 0.00) and the I-N treatment (p-value = 0.008) but not the I-I treatment (p- value = 0.2). The N-N treatment is also significantly different from the I-N treatment (p-value = 0.026) and the I-I treatment (p-value = 0.00). 9 The pattern of results we observe does not conform to subjects’ discriminating according to an in-group, out-group dichotomy for native-born and immigrant subjects. The native-born subjects do not cooperate less with immigrants in resolving the social dilemma in the moonlighting game. Inconsistency for immigrant behavior is not as clear because in the I-I treatment immigrants were paired with other immigrants from the same region but not from the same specific country of origin. As shown in Figure 3, we find that the first and second movers’ beliefs do not actually vary significantly between treatments based on whether the first and second movers do or do not belong to the same immigrant or native category. Although beliefs are lowest in the I-I treatment, this difference is not statistically significant. It appears that people send in an expectation of positive reciprocity but also out of a fear of negative reciprocity. The people who take money are more likely to believe that the second mover will return a lower amount (p-value = 0.00). INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE Nee and Sanders (2001) discuss the complex feelings that immigrants have towards their communities and the enclaves they find themselves in. They rely on other members of their own ethnic group extensively but are also apprehensive about their own dependence on them and sometimes afraid of being taken advantage of. This in turn may lead to significantly lower trust or altruism towards other immigrant communities and immigrants in general, which may be perceived as insular enclaves of their own. The different behavior of immigrants than natives can result from both the ―immigrant experience‖ and the characteristics of those subsets of foreign communities that self-select into emigration. An empirical study designed to disentangle these separate effects would necessarily involve paired experiments in the U.S. in a very large number of immigrant communities of origin. Looking back at Figure 2, we examine the amounts returned by second movers, on average, for each possible amount sent by first movers. Immigrant second movers return $3.13 on average across all possible first mover amounts; they return less than native-born Americans, 10 who return $3.92 on average (p-value = 0.00). There is no significant difference, however, between what immigrant second movers return to native-born Americans and what they return to other immigrants (p-value = 0.2). 3.2 Results for Hypothesis H3 The survey elicits membership in various types of voluntary associations, including religious, ethnic, professional, and neighborhood groups, which we use to measure social capital. We find that almost 42% of our subjects do not belong to any voluntary association, and that ―non-joiners‖ are significantly more likely to take money as first movers: 29.8% of them do, as compared to 16.4% of those who belong to at least one voluntary association (p-value = 0.018). 31.8% of native-born ―non-joiners‖ take money from a native-born second mover, and 26.9% take money from an immigrant second mover (p-value = 0.7). 26.7% of immigrant ―non- joiners‖ take money from a native-born second mover, while 37.5% take money from an immigrant second mover (p-value = 0.45). Therefore, while non-joiners are more likely to take money, this does not appear to be affected by whether or not the second mover belongs to the same immigrant or native category as the first mover. INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE As is clear from Figure 4 and columns 1 and 2 of Table 4, immigrant first movers who do not belong to any voluntary association are more likely to take money, and send significantly less than those who belong to at least one (p-value = 0.04). Second movers who do not belong to any association return less on average for each possible amount the first mover can send; they return $3.23 on average as compared to $3.80 for those who belong to at least one association (p-value = 0.007). INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE Religious attendance is another personal characteristic that may affect trust and trustworthiness. Garcia-Muñoz and Neuman (2012) survey the literature on whether religiosity serves as a bridge (increasing assimilation) or buffer (preventing assimilation) for immigrants, and describe a large body of literature arguing for both. They find some evidence that ―bridging‖ 11 dominates in the U.S. while ―buffering‖ dominates in Europe, but they do not explicitly examine the effects of differential levels of attendance within immigrant communities. Figure 5 shows distributions over levels of religious attendance of amounts sent or taken by immigrant and native-born first movers in our experiment. Immigrants who attend more than once a week take on average $1.45 from the second mover while those who don’t attend more than once per week send $2.39 on average (p-value = 0.02). Native-born first movers who attend more than once a week send $2.42 on average, in contrast to the taking behavior by highly religious immigrants (p-value = 0.036). INSERT FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE Immigrant second movers who attend more than once a week return $2.62 less than all other immigrant second movers (p-value = 0.00), and $3.35 less than immigrants who attend once a week (p-value = 0.00). Native-born second movers who attend more than once a week, on the other hand, return $0.23 less than all other native-born second movers (p-value = 0.9) and $0.97 more than native-born second movers who attend once a week (p-value = 0.11). Additionally, native-born second movers who attend more than once a week return, on average, $3.46 more than immigrants who attend more than once a week (p-value = 0.00). Very high religious attendance among immigrants is associated with lower levels of the sort of generic trust and trustworthiness that our experiment measures. At the same time, immigrants who attend weekly (as opposed to more than once weekly) send $2.05 less as first movers than native-born first movers who attend weekly (p-value = 0.12), but behave no differently as second movers (p- value = 0.6). Our results do not allow us to infer causality; it may be that very high religiosity reduces trust and trustworthiness with respect to broader society, or it may be that those less inclined to trust the broader population seek comfort in religion to a greater extent than most. Utilizing the ―community‖ versus ―society‖ (Gemeinschaft/Gesellschaft) framework originally developed by Tönnies (1957), one might argue that the immigrants who attend religious services more than once weekly are seeking the comfort and solace of their community and do not trust, or have chosen to reduce their relationships or interactions with, broader society. Glaeser et al. (2000) reported that standard survey questions about trust predicted second mover behavior but not first mover behavior in their trust game. From responses to the question: 12 ―On a scale of 1 to 5, do you believe that most people can be trusted (1), or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people (5)‖, we normalize the responses and construct a Z-score to measure trust. We also create a ―trusting‖ indicator which equals one if the individual responds with either 1 or 2. Answers to the survey question about trust are predictors of both first and second mover behavior in the moonlighting game. On average first movers who respond with a 1 or 2 send more (p-value = 0.078) and second movers who respond with a 1 or 2 return more (p-value = 0.043). Trust question answers are not significantly different between subjects who were randomly assigned to be first movers or second movers. However, immigrants report being significantly less trusting: 26.5% answered the trust question with a 1 or 2 as compared to 37.7% of native-born Americans (p-value = 0.012). The difference between our results and those of Glaeser et al. (2000) may be due to our use of the moonlighting game rather than the trust game, or it may be due to our use of a random population sample rather than undergraduate student subjects. Being a victim of a hate crime may potentially color one’s perceptions of the group that the perpetrator belongs to, or it may reduce trust in broader society. First movers who responded that they or someone they knew had been victims of a hate crime actually sent $2.25 more than those who did not (p-value = 0.015). However, immigrants who had been victims of a hate crime returned $1.20 less on average as second movers (p-value = 0.013), while it did not affect the behavior of native-born second movers. 10.4% of immigrants and 12% of native-born Americans answered that they personally had been victims of a hate crime, while 15.6% of immigrants and 19.2% of native-born Americans responded that someone they knew had been a victim of a hate crime. There was no significant difference between first and second movers. This is true even when we look exclusively at immigrants. 3.3 Regression Results We hypothesize that the amount sent by the first mover in a pair i is a function of their belief about the second mover’s action and their own characteristics: Si= f(X1i, χ1i, π12i) + ei (1) 13 where Si is the amount the first mover sends, X1i is a vector of observed individual characteristics, χ1i is a vector of unobserved individual characteristics, and π12i represents the first mover’s belief about the second mover’s action. Similarly, the amount returned by the second mover for each level of S is a function of their individual characteristics and their beliefs about the first mover: RiS= f(X2i, S, χ2i, π21i) + ei (2) where RiS refers to the amount the second mover returns for a given level of S, the amount sent by the first mover. Table 4 reports estimates of the determinants of amounts sent by first movers and amounts returned by second movers. There are fewer than 225 subjects in the first and second- mover regressions in columns (1) and (3) because some subjects did not complete the entire questionnaire. We see that women and older people are less likely to send positive amounts. Interestingly, the amount that the first mover believes the second mover will return is less important than the belief that the second mover will return some positive amount. INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE Ex ante, one might expect education to make people more cooperative. We find that, controlling for other factors, education does not seem to increase amounts sent by first movers although it does increase amounts returned by second movers (column 3, Table 4). 1 Religious attendance makes immigrants less likely to trust or be altruistic, but does not affect trustworthiness, partially corroborating results reported above. In each case we see that those who do not belong to any voluntary association at all are significantly less trusting or altruistic, but no less trustworthy. The moonlighting experiment is therefore able to capture an important element of cooperative behavior. For all second movers, those with a higher level of belief about the amount the first mover will send return higher amounts – their optimism appears to translate 1 Since income and education are positively correlated, we also ran the regressions with only income or only education as robustness checks. Dropping one lowers the p-value on the other for the regression in column 3, but does not change any of the other results. Neither income nor education is significant in any of the other regressions, whether included together or separately. 14 to higher levels of trustworthiness. Columns 2 and 4 of Table 4 look exclusively at immigrants and corroborate our earlier findings that as first movers they are less generous towards other immigrants than towards native-born Americans. However, there are no significant differences in their trustworthiness regardless of whether the first mover is another immigrant or not. There are strong regional effects, with immigrants from the Middle East and South Asia being the least trustworthy and those from East Asia and the Caribbean being more generous as first movers. Immigrants who reported having been victims of a hate crime were less trustworthy. 4 Concluding Remarks Some major findings stand out from all the results. Reported beliefs predict first movers’ actions: rank correlation between amounts first movers send and their reported beliefs about the amounts second movers will return is highly significant. Immigrants are treated less generously than native-born Americans, particularly by other immigrants. While at first glance immigrants appear less trustworthy, when we control for demographic variables and the amount sent by the first mover this is no longer the case. Immigrants who do not belong to any voluntary associations are less cooperative than other immigrants. An intriguing new finding was made possible by use of the moonlighting game, which allows taking as well as giving, and elicitation of level of religious participation, which allows discrimination between modal and high religiosity. We find that, when making the first mover decision, immigrants who attend religious services more than once a week take on average $1.45 from the second mover while those who don’t attend more than once per week give $2.39 on average (p-value = 0.02). Immigrant second movers who report being highly religious return $2.62 less than immigrants who attend less often (p-value = 0.00). The direction of causation is unclear, but high religiosity is strongly associated with failure by immigrants to cooperatively resolve the social dilemma in the moonlighting game. High religious attendance by native-born citizens is not associated with less cooperative behavior. 15 References Abbink, K., Irlenbusch, B., and Renner, E., 2000. The moonlighting game: An experimental study on reciprocity and retribution. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 42(2), 265–277. Berg, J., Dickhaut, J., and McCabe, K., 1995. Trust, reciprocity, and social history. Games and Economic Behavior 10(1), 122–142. Carter, M. R. and Castillo, M., 2002. The economic impacts of altruism, trust, and reciprocity: An experimental approach to social capital. Wisconsin-Madison Agricultural and Applied Economics Staff Papers 448, Wisconsin-Madison Agricultural and Applied Economics Department. Cox, J. C., 2004. How to identify trust and reciprocity. Games and Economic Behavior 46(2), 260-281. Cox, J. C., Friedman, D., and Sadiraj, V. 2008a. Revealed altruism. Econometrica 76(1), 31-69. Cox, J. C., Sadiraj, K., and Sadiraj, V., 2008b. Implications of trust, fear, and reciprocity for modeling economic behavior. Experimental Economics 11, 1-24. Dufwenberg, M. and Gneezy, U., 2000. Measuring beliefs in an experimental lost wallet game. Games and Economic Behavior 30(2), 163–182. Falk, A., Fehr, E., and Fischbacher, U., 2008. Testing theories of fairness – intentions matter. Games and Economic Behavior 62(1), 287–303. Gächter, S. and Renner, E., 2010. The effects of (incentivized) belief elicitation in public goods experiments. Experimental Economics 13(3), 364–377. García-Muñoz, Teresa and Neuman, Shoshana, 2012. Is Religiosity of Immigrants a Bridge or a Buffer in the Process of Integration? A Comparative Study of Europe and the United States. IZA Discussion Paper No. 6384. Glaeser, E. L., Laibson, D. I., Scheinkman, J. A., and Soutter, C. L., 2000. Measuring trust. Quarterly Journal of Economics 115(3), 811–846. Grootaert, C., Narayan, D., Jones, V. N., and Woolcock, M., 2004. Measuring social capital: An integrated questionnaire.World Bank Working Paper 18, World Bank, Washington, DC. Nee, V., & Sanders, J., 2001. Trust in ethnic ties: Social capital and immigrants. Trust in Society 2, 374-392. 16 Pew Research. 2013. ―Second-Generation Americans: A Portrait of the Adult Children of Immigrants.‖ Rumbaut, Rubén G. 2004. ―Ages, Life Stages, and Generational Cohorts: Decomposing the Immigrant First and Second Generations in the United States.‖ International Migration Review, volume 38(3). Tönnies, Ferdinand. 1957. Community and Society. (Charles P. Loomis, Trans.) Michigan State University Press, East Lansing, Michigan. 17 Figures Figure 1: First mover behavior by treatments 18 Figure 2: Amount returned by second mover for each level of first mover amount sent by treatments 19 Figure 3: First and second movers’ beliefs by treatments 20 Figure 4: Proportion of first movers who take money across membership in voluntary associations 21 Figure 5: Average amounts sent (or taken) by first movers across levels of religious attendance 22 Tables Table 1: Subjects per treatment Treatment Number Percent N-N 110 24% I-N 122 27% N-I 134 30% I-I 84 19% Total 450 100% Table 2: Immigrants by region Number Percent Northern/Western Europe 57 27% Eastern Europe 10 5% South Asia 12 6% East Asia 28 13% South-East Asia 20 9% Latin America 35 17% The Caribbean 9 4% North America 34 16% Middle East/Central Asia 7 3% Total 212 100% 23 Table 3: Group membership Native-born Immigrant Total Trade or business association 4.3% 3.3% 3.8% Professional association (doctors, teachers, veterans) 17.5% 14.8% 16.2% Trade union or labor union 15.3% 8.6% 12.1% Neighborhood committee 8.1% 8.1% 8.1% Religious or spiritual group (e.g. church, mosque, temple, etc) 37.9% 32.9% 35.5% Political group or movement 5.1% 4.3% 4.7% Cultural group or association (e.g. arts, music, theater, film) 7.2% 7.6% 7.4% Education group (e.g. parent-teacher association, school committee) 12.3% 9.1% 10.8% Sports group 10.6% 8.1% 9.4% Youth or student group 6.4% 3.8% 5.2% NGO or civic group (e.g. Rotary Club, Red Cross) 3.4% 1.9% 2.7% Ethnic-based community group 0.4% 4.8% 2.5% Other groups 3.4% 2.9% 3.2% None 38.7% 44.8% 41.6% Total 100% 100% 100% 24 Table 4: Regression Results (1) (2) (3) (4) FM Amount FM Amount: Immigrants Only SM Amount SM Amount: Immigrants Only Treatment I-I -1.161 -1.906** 0.731 0.801 (1.066) (0.887) (1.744) (1.001) Treatment N-I 0.537 0.0475 (0.857) (1.615) Treatment I-N 0.566 -0.809 (1.090) (0.831) Female -1.368** -1.217 -0.133 -0.935 (0.614) (0.933) (0.629) (0.903) Age -0.0527*** -0.0487 -0.0373 -0.0760 (0.0198) (0.0355) (0.0237) (0.0517) Amount FM believes SM will return -0.0924 -0.00777 (0.0568) (0.0848) FM belief > 0 3.442*** 2.785* (0.838) (1.533) FM amount 1.172*** 1.112*** (0.0489) (0.0732) Amount SM believes FM will send 0.378*** 0.133 (0.132) (0.184) SM belief > 0 -1.411 -0.0367 (1.124) (1.647) Income (in '000s) -0.00282 -0.0107 0.0112 -0.00676 (0.00798) (0.0136) (0.00756) (0.0111) Years of schooling 0.00169 0.118 0.261* 0.0299 (0.104) (0.179) (0.149) (0.174) Trusting 0.119 -0.640 0.565 0.704 (0.644) (0.922) (0.729) (1.207) Religious attendance percentile -1.902 -8.656*** -0.974 0.0723 (1.251) (2.028) (1.196) (1.849) Catholic -4.003*** -1.947 -2.643** -2.900 (1.371) (1.536) (1.321) (2.814) Baptist 1.209 -2.548 1.182 -2.806 (1.748) (2.577) (1.392) (2.103) Protestant (other) -2.765** -0.724 -2.548* -5.952** (1.389) (1.463) (1.316) (2.776) 25 (1) (2) (3) (4) FM Amount FM Amount: Immigrants Only SM Amount SM Amount: Immigrants Only Evangelical -6.228*** -0.678 -3.676** -4.029 (2.107) (1.692) (1.568) (2.944) Other Christian 3.133* 2.800* -1.182 -1.399 (1.594) (1.626) (1.744) (2.137) Jewish 0.542 3.542 -3.066 -6.075** (2.157) (3.927) (2.169) (2.970) Other religion -5.928*** -4.562*** -1.580 -1.679 (1.443) (1.705) (1.840) (2.639) Do not belong to any voluntary associations -2.145*** -5.60*** -0.393 -0.401 (0.793) (1.137) (0.682) (1.079) Region of origin: Western Europe -0.161 0.287 -1.632 -1.115 (1.173) (1.381) (1.689) (2.112) Eastern Europe 0.206 0.585 -3.339* -5.850** (1.333) (1.750) (1.895) (2.419) South Asia 2.326 3.204 -6.793*** -6.776** (2.181) (2.025) (2.599) (2.809) East Asia 3.604** 4.805** -3.399* -0.931 (1.780) (1.939) (1.907) (2.462) South-East Asia 1.689 2.167 -3.146 -3.358 (1.800) (2.180) (2.173) (2.198) Latin America -0.350 1.958 -3.486* -4.325** (1.254) (1.337) (1.946) (2.105) Caribbean 5.074 6.966** -1.335 -2.089 (3.626) (3.273) (2.248) (2.207) Middle East -4.865 -4.951 -9.009*** -7.424** (3.665) (3.539) (2.378) (3.098) Ever been victim of hate crime 0.858 2.544 -1.260 -2.824* (1.075) (1.742) (1.153) (1.686) Someone I know has been a victim of a hate crime 0.605 -0.210 1.436 0.844 (0.736) (0.999) (0.877) (1.221) Years as US citizen -0.0153 0.0191 (0.0273) (0.0301) Constant 8.350*** 10.37** 2.307 9.524** (2.447) (4.659) (2.412) (4.234) 26 (1) (2) (3) (4) FM Amount FM Amount: Immigrants Only SM Amount SM Amount: Immigrants Only Observations 184 81 2,997 1,437 R-squared 0.373 0.630 0.445 0.438 Overall F statistic 5.84 3.16 79.12 37.86 F statistic p-value 0.0 0.0002 0.0 0.0 Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by subject. Treatment N-N is the reference group in columns 1 and 3. Treatment I-N is the reference group in column 2, and Treatment N-I is the reference group in column 4. North America is the reference group for region of origin, and No Religion is the reference group for religion. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
work_5e2nvwyxmreq3itb7nti5mcqm4	----	‘Parallel Games’ and Queer Memories: Performing LGBT Testimonies in Northern Ireland Lehner, S. (2017). ‘Parallel Games’ and Queer Memories: Performing LGBT Testimonies in Northern Ireland. Irish University Review, 47(1), 103-118. https://doi.org/10.3366/iur.2017.0259 Published in: Irish University Review Document Version: Peer reviewed version Queen's University Belfast - Research Portal: Link to publication record in Queen's University Belfast Research Portal Publisher rights © 2017 Edinburgh University Press. This work is made available online in accordance with the publisher’s policies. Please refer to any applicable terms of use of the publisher. General rights Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Queen's University Belfast Research Portal is retained by the author(s) and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights. Take down policy The Research Portal is Queen's institutional repository that provides access to Queen's research output. Every effort has been made to ensure that content in the Research Portal does not infringe any person's rights, or applicable UK laws. If you discover content in the Research Portal that you believe breaches copyright or violates any law, please contact openaccess@qub.ac.uk. Download date:06. Apr. 2021 https://doi.org/10.3366/iur.2017.0259 https://pure.qub.ac.uk/en/publications/parallel-games-and-queer-memories-performing-lgbt-testimonies-in-northern-ireland(330a26d5-778f-4d8e-8daf-00f3adaa7608).html 1 ‘Parallel Games’ and Queer Memories: Performing LGBT Testimonies in Northern Ireland1 Stefanie Lehner In the recent performed queer archive (with video installations), Trouble, written by Shannon Yee and produced, designed, and directed by Niall Rea (the latter, with Anna Newell), Northern Irish actor Jimmy Kerr delivers a short monologue from a video screen, explaining to the audience the difficulty of living in Northern Ireland as a gay man: Staying in Northern Ireland…there is a sort of trauma that stays with you, someone in a battering relationship or poisonous relationship with alcohol, you know you should break away from it but you keep returning to it. That’s a problem. There’s a cognitive dissonance there for gay people. You want to be part of a family, you want to be part of a church, you want to be part of society but if they know you as you really are, they won’t accept you. But you really want to be accepted. So you play a parallel game in your life.2 Trouble, as apparent in its promotion poster (Figure 1), uses for its ‘o’ the symbol of a ‘pink triangle, rewind button’ to indicate its intention of recovering ‘the experiences of a generation of individuals from the LGBT [Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender] community that realised their sexuality while growing up during the Troubles in Northern Ireland’.3 Based on 46 interviews, it documents ‘individual’s private stories of cultural identity, sexuality and coming out, religion, feminism, sectarianism, racism, conversion therapy, paramilitaries, politics, the normalization of 2 violence and the effects of the Troubles on the psyche’ against the larger historical, political backdrop of the Northern Irish conflict.4 As such, it delineates a complex matrix of exclusions – but also a desire for inclusion – that define and regulate expressions of identity and sexuality in Northern Ireland, as suggested by the speaker above. His desire to belong to structures that oppress and discriminate against him force this man to ‘play a parallel game’: for him, this is a necessary strategy of survival in an extremely homophobic society. While the concept of playing a ‘game’ gestures here towards the rules, roles, and regulatory practices that define and confine expressions of identity (including gender and sexuality), it foregrounds at the same time their construction; the performative nature of all identities. The notion of parallelism suggests, on the one hand, the incompatibility of ethno-nationalism with LGBT issues in a deeply divided society such as Northern Ireland. The incommensurability between sectarian and queer politics is also addressed in Niall Rea’s Divided, Radical and Gorgeous (D.R.A.G.), which explores the personal experiences of a Belfast drag queen in the form of a testimonial monologue that recounts her relationship with a closeted ‘freedom fighter’. Furthermore, queer identities are used by both productions as an ‘analogous’ lens to deconstruct and disrupt sectarian divisions of difference.5 The notion of playing a ‘parallel game’ can, thus, be read as a meta-theatrical commentary that emphasises that while these plays, based on personal memories of the Troubles, are products of their socio-historical reality, they also provide an alternative, transformative realm, in which it is possible to rethink the conditions of the present through uncovering silenced and neglected voices and experiences of the past. Both plays do so by ‘queering’ memories of the Troubles that may otherwise be filtered through an ethno-nationalist lens. While in Northern Ireland, collective memory has congealed into two mutually exclusive 3 versions of history (namely, Protestant/unionist/loyalist and Catholic/nationalist/republican), ‘queer memory’, as David Cregan suggests, ‘is transformative in seeking to destabilise any particular version of the past. It offers a self-reflective and socially challenging voice in the midst of memory formation, queering marginalized memory as well as memory of the dominant.’6 This essay explores how the notion of ‘parallel games’ works to queer memory in two productions of Northern Ireland’s first publicly funded gay theatre company, TheatreofplucK, led by artistic director Niall Rea.7 Both plays have seen different versions as part of their development: Trouble saw its first incarnation in an invitation-only workshop at the Metropolitan Arts Centre (MAC) in Belfast in the summer of 2013,8 while there have been three iterations of D.R.A.G. to date: Rea initially worked with Gordon Crawford (who performs as the Belfast drag queen Trudy Scrumptious), who played in the first two versions in 2012, and was joined by Paul C. Boyd, who took over the role in 2012. This essay focuses on the world premiere of Trouble at the MAC in November 2015 as part of OUTBURST Queer Arts Festival, and the last, recorded version of D.R.A.G. at The Belfast Barge as part of the Belfast Pride Festival in July/August 2012. As post-conflict memory works, based on the testimonies of the interviewees, as in the case of Trouble, or autobiographical memories of both director and actors, as in the case of D.R.A.G., and conceived, developed, and produced after the 1998 Belfast Agreement, both plays directly engage with contemporary debates about how to deal with the legacy of the past in Northern Ireland. In publicly performing and thus giving voice to previously silenced and hidden stories of LGBT people during the conflict, both productions address the call of the 2014 Stormont House Agreement, that resulted from the series 4 of negotiations between Dr Richard Haass and Professor Meghan O’Sullivan in autumn 2013, for the establishment of ‘an Oral History Archive to provide a central place for people from all backgrounds (and from throughout the UK and Ireland) to share experiences and narratives related to the Troubles.’9 This endeavour promises plurality by including disparate and incommensurable stories; yet, there is also a danger within any archival project that certain experiences, voices, and stories find more representation and greater valorisation than others. Given the reluctance of certain groups, such as former police officers, to participate in such storytelling activities, and the high profile of other voices and stories, it seems difficult for such an archive to present proportionally who was affected by the Troubles in equal measure.10 In Archive Fever, Jacques Derrida points to the etymology of the term ‘archive’, which ‘names at once the commencement and the commandment’: that is, archives denote origins as much as they are products of authority, control, and power.11 As Ed Madden puts it, ‘they produce as much as they record and preserve’.12 As the promised multiplicity of stories will commence new understandings of the past, present, as well as the future, and thereby contribute to the ‘fresh start’ envisioned by the 1998 Agreement, the archival impulse displayed in its wake is, as Colin Graham notes, at the same time, suggestive of a desire ‘to cram all that glistens with the not- so-gold of the Troubles into a memory bank of material culture and traumatic non- recall.’13 In this regard, the establishment of an oral history archive seems a necessary step for ‘moving on’ from the legacy of the past; for moving beyond the trauma and residual sectarian legacies of the Troubles. In other words, the past is viewed through an educative prism and is closely connected to a progressive and purposive morality 5 that was perhaps most succinctly captured in the decision to use Margaret Fairless Barber’s words as an epigraph to the 2009 Report of the Consultative Group on the Past in Northern Ireland: ‘To look backward for a while is to refresh the eye, to restore it, and to render it more fit for its prime function of looking forward’.14 Given the effective institutionalisation of ethno-nationalist understandings of the conflict,15 the political imperative, then, seems to be double-edged: in one respect, it must entail, if not a suppression, then, at least a muting of memories that stand outwith the ethnic paradigm; and, in another, it ought to facilitate the implicit valorising of narratives that support a progressivist vision of contemporary Northern Irish society. Both D.R.A.G. and Trouble disturb such a progressivist understanding of ‘moving on’: instead of memories being harnessed to the ethno-nationalist template established by the Belfast Agreement, the plays ‘move’ memory work in different directions at the same time, giving rise to a diverse set of emotions. This movement, in other words, parallels the Agreement’s filtration of experience and belief into ethnicised modalities. The plays thus resonate with Michael Rothberg’s concept of ‘multidirectional memory’, which is based on a malleable, pluralist understanding of memory, considering it ‘as subject to ongoing negotiation, cross-referencing, and borrowing: as productive and not privative’.16 Whereas the focus of Rothberg’s model is on the articulation and performance of traumatic memories across transnational and intercultural contexts, the testimonies performed in both TheatreofplucK productions are ‘multidirectional’ insofar as they rupture the dominant perception of Northern Ireland as a ‘place apart’ – ‘a recalcitrantly regressive place somehow separate from the modern progressive world’17: for by focusing on the memories of LGBT people, they challenge (ethno and hetero)normative understandings of victimisation, 6 oppression, and isolations while, at the same time, recovering ‘new forms of solidarity and new visions of justice’.18 In this way, the productions could also be said to initiate ‘parallel games’ with their audiences: the past is dis/uncovered not just in terms of regionality, sectarianism and violence, but also in its containment of alternative forms of communality and togetherness. This creates not so much ‘moving memories’ in the sense of simply becoming emotionally involved through sympathy or empathy in identifying individually with the characters; instead, the use of memories in both productions produces quasi Brechtian Verfremdungseffekte that emphatically unsettle the spectators to make them adopt ‘an attitude of inquiry and criticism’ towards accepted and prescriptive readings of Troubles memories as well as contemporaneous approaches to dealing with the past along those lines.19 In line with several post-conflict theatre performances by companies such as Kabosh, Tinderbox, Big Telly, and Prime Cut, both D.R.A.G. and Trouble do so by harnessing experimental theatre techniques, such as the use of verbatim, improvisation, multi-media, and audience involvement, if to different extends. For instance, whereas Trouble is predominantly inspired by verbatim theatre, in the style of American playwrights Anna Deavere and Eve Ensler, whereby actors seek to carefully replicate the natural cadences, enunciation, silences, and emotions of the original voice recordings,20 D.R.A.G. used detailed autobiographical interviews with the performers to inspire games of improvisation. Both productions construct a bricolage of the different memories and testimonials, repeatedly challenging audience experience and expectation by creating parallel sensations of estrangement, exclusion, and isolation as well as connectedness, inclusion, and integration. 7 D.R.A.G. and Trouble self-consciously draw attention to their status as ‘games’ that ask for audience participation but also their awareness of what Al Head calls ‘the “Foolish” insight’ that ‘all the conventional ways of being are “only a game” and that the “masks” that we play can be picked up or put down at will.’21 Head suggests this as a queer strategy ‘to help us in our analyses of the dominant society and the way it “creates” stereotypes of gender and sexuality’ and other forms of identity, and, we might add, history; as such, it plays a crucial role in TheatreofplucK’s queer dramaturgy. Rea opens both productions with a short spiel introducing the spectators to what he calls ‘the rules of game’.22 For D.R.A.G., he asks each of them to write a queer ‘devotion’ on a small piece of black paper before entering the actual performance space, which they then place on the stage, itself already covered with hundreds of other identical pieces of paper. The significance of these papers is twofold: one the one hand, handwritten notes with directorial comments, often based on the autobiographical interviews held before each rehearsal with the actors, were used for the improvisations that shaped and developed the direction of D.R.A.G., and were also included in the final productions, which use the pieces of paper, apparently randomly picked up from the floor of the stage, to introduce different scenes, subjects and topics of the life of the main character ‘P’. On the other hand, by offering a personalised ‘devotion’, which was often a private memory, wish, or just a thought or a comment,23 the audience engaged through these papers in what Rea conceived of as a ‘community ritual’, resonant of the rag trees that dot the Irish landscape.24 As Rea explains, this ‘ritual’ was intended to offer each spectator ‘a kind of direct and personal queer connection to the onstage world; temporally disconnected from the “straight” outside world’, yet thereby suggesting their parallelism.25 D.R.A.G. itself opens with the performer, initially covered by these papers, rising naked, vulnerable, 8 and bruised from this heap; as Rea notes: ‘The performer here was born from the audiences[’] own engagement, queerly energised’.26 This, I want to suggest, is a truly queering and thus destabilising energy that creates intimacy at the same time as discomfort, drawing the audience in as much as keeping them at bay. Given that the performance uses the same black papers to mark its scenes, with each seemingly randomly selected paper shown to a camera so that its inscription is projected to the black backwall of the stage, there is an anxiety amongst the audience that their own personal ‘devotions’ will be revealed.27 At the same time, their ‘queer confessional’ creates what Rea calls a ‘public bond’28 with the performer, which is compounded by what a reviewer describes as ‘the cramped, claustrophobic surroundings of the Belfast Barge [where] the seating arrangements bring the audience challengingly close to Paul C. Boyd’s tormented, stripped down presence.’29 Rea’s thrust staging replicates the space dynamics of drag clubs, evoking both a dressing room as well as a nightclub stage. The white cubic set provides the audience with a sort of proscenium frame, which – together with the use of the camera, installed next to a vanity mirror, and projecting onto the backwall – raises awareness to the dynamics and power of the spectator’s gaze. This visual play with intimacy and exposure parallels the use of the papers and the way in which ‘P’ immediately distances himself from his own ‘confessions’ by asserting that ‘This is not a biography/ It has fuck all to do with me/ It’s just a bunch of stories that relate to each other – don’t try to read anything deep or meaningful into any of this … I am not gonna be sharing any of my inner most secrets – or confessing any sins.’30 Yet, he immediately appeals to (and thereby exposes) our desire as spectators to witness ‘Some dark, dirty sins that you will be shocked by … Some horrifying sins that make 9 you feel so much more superior to me’, while he puts on a ‘balaclava as a confessional – kneels’.31 The repeated emphasis on ‘sins’ together with the symbolism of the balaclava, a ‘hyperbolic symbol of terror’32 typically used by Northern Irish paramilitaries, speaks to the specific context of the Northern Irish Troubles in which the perceived ‘sin’ of homosexuality (by both unionism/loyalism, if to a larger extent, as well as nationalism/republicanism) could, when disclosed, easily lead to homophobic hate crimes and killings, as addressed in both D.R.A.G. and Trouble.33 The implication of the audience as potential voyeurs and consumers not only of his personal ‘sins’ but also ‘your sins … our sins’, furthermore, confronts them with their collusion in Northern Ireland’s ‘surveillance culture’, which, as Kathryn Conrad argues, while helping in the post-conflict context to make issues, such as sectarian hate-crimes, visible and bring them into the civic realm, still ‘impinges on privacy and bodily integrity as much as or more than the surveillance employed during the conflict.’34 This becomes evident in the following scene where we watch the performer carefully putting on make-up, slowly transforming him into ‘her’, thereby ‘highlighting the process of creating ‘roles’ of any type, whether theatrical or social.’35 Here, again, the intimacy of the moment is abruptly ruptured when the performer ‘threatens [the] audience’ with a gun, exclaiming ‘Freaks’ in reaction to the perceived intrusion of his personal space by the public gaze of the spectators. The confrontation and shock is somewhat deflated when he playfully ‘winks at one cute man in front row’. Both scenes work to ‘queer’ these paradigmatic symbols of hyper- masculine paramilitary sectarian identities through their subversive handling by a drag queen.36 However, both times these symbols are also used to expose the collusion of the audience with processes of voyeurism, making us, evocative of Seamus Heaney’s description in ‘Punishment’, complicit in ‘cast[ing] the stones of silence’.37 This 10 complicity is brought to the fore in the Brechtian interlude ‘An Ode to Our Silence’ in which Boyd stands directly in front of the camera so that his ‘accusatory face’ is magnified onto the back wall, while recounting the crimes of what Rea describes as ‘the serial killer of prejudice and bigotry within all humanity’.38 The last stanza directly addresses the present audience, thereby implicating them, as by-standers, in allowing violence against any kind of ‘other’ to continue to happen: ‘There is a serial killer loose in this town – he is killing people who go to strange experimental theatre shows in tiny venues.’39 Comparable to Frank McGuinness’ queer dramaturgy in Carthaginians, which offered Rea an important inspiration, D.R.A.G. repeatedly engages its audience with painful memories of the Troubles as well as their contemporary resonances. Yet, its use of both ‘camp aesthetic and a campy drag-queen’ unsettles our reaction, creating laughter in the face of distress, as apparent in the audience reaction to the last stanza of the ‘Ode’ above. As Cregan argues, ‘These contradictory characteristics of camp allow it to function as a performative praxis in the queer project of unsettling what has become the normative approach to either histories, ideologies, or subjectivities. […] In its queerness, camp has the capacity to hold together what otherwise might be considered antithetical: the authentic and the theatrical.’40 As such, it provides not just a sense of ‘identity and togetherness, fun and wit’, but, as Richard Dyer suggests, camp must be also seen as form of ‘self-mockery’ (or even ‘self-hating’).41 This becomes apparent in the exaggerated parody of different types of gays that the performer depicts in a more and more frantic dance around the small stage set. This scene becomes something of a ‘play-within-a-play’, a ‘parallel game’ to the stage reality, self-consciously foregrounding these different ‘types’ as ‘roles’ in a way in 11 which we recognise what Sontag calls ‘the metaphor of life as theatre.’42 At the end, the performer collapses on the heap of papers, expressing the ‘need write all this down –/ How we got here – got to be all these different people. Tell it the way it was – […] all the false turns and dead ends / All the abuse….and the laughs too’.43 Such an alternative historiography can be provided by a queer archive, to which Rea’s D.R.A.G. seeks to contribute. The pile of papers is intended to allude here to the many other untold stories that together show a potential to suggest ‘how things might start to be’.44 In this, D.R.A.G. evokes Derrida’s claim that the archive must involve ‘a question of the future, the question of the future itself, the question of a response, of a promise and of a responsibility for tomorrow.’45 Yet, in the play itself, the process of memory-mapping an alternative queer future is forestalled by P’s reminiscences of the breakup of her relationship with her ‘beautiful closeted freedom fighter’. While this liaison between a drag queen and a hyper-masculine terrorist could be read ‘a sexualized metaphor for reaching across sectarian division of difference’,46 his parting letter emphasises the apparent inhospitality of consociational Northern Irish politics with a queer agenda in his new role as peacemaker-politician: Dear P I’ve been doing a lot of reading in here. I wanted to sort out in my head what happened and where we fitted. […] I think you are brave in your skirt Looking for something different – some other way of being […] But we’re fighting with our words now Taking it up to that place on the hill You’re stronger than I am You don’t need to follow the rules I do Sure maybe sometime in the future….47 This incongruity is emphasised by the fact that in Rea’s play, it is this closeted gay lover who is imagined to be the killer of Darren Bradshaw, a police constable killed 12 by the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA) in May 1997. D.R.A.G. prepones the event so that the closeted killer can become part of the Agreement’s early release of prisoners scheme, effectively turning him from paramilitary to peacemaker – in effect, echoing the failure of the anti-discrimination legislation contained in section 75 of the 1998 Northern Ireland Act to inaugurate substantive changes in the political culture.48 At the time, the killing was justified by a member of the political wing, the Irish Republican Socialist Party, who was also gay in the following terms: ‘I have no problem with the attack.… He put on a police uniform and became part of a state which oppresses nationalists. His sexuality was irrelevant’.49 Yet, the murder happened in the leading gay club venue at the time, the Parliament (which is now Villa), which Bradshaw was known to frequent. At the time of the shooting, he had been suspended and his personal firearm had been taken away. The event caused a shock amongst the LGBT community in Northern Ireland, shattering the conception of gay bars as safe and neutral spaces. Notably, Bradshaw’s murder also marks the crucial turning point in Yee’s Trouble, emphasising their intertextuality. Like D.R.A.G., Trouble opens with Rea briefing the audience about its ‘rules’, which involve staying on the white lines on the floor and following the instructions of the ‘Pluckers’, a group of ushers who will direct the spectators to the different parts of the performance, the latter offering audience participation in a dance, which Rea suggests will be fun, thereby self-consciously setting us up for an unexpected ending. The set of the longer first part consists of a transparent cubic room, which is created out of scratched perspex – visually recalling an interrogation cell, as well as the iconic photograph of the ‘Soldier Behind Shield, Northern Ireland’ (1973) by Philip Jones Griffiths,50 thereby immediately situating the 13 piece in a Troubles memorial context. On each of the four sides of this cube three video screens are installed: on the main screen, the edited verbatim testimonies of over 46 LGBT people are performed by a high-profile cast of Northern Irish performers, including, amongst many others, Paul Boyd, Marie Jones, and Carol Moore, and these are juxtaposed on the other screens with images of the past, specifically the Troubles but also ‘gay life’ from magazines such as Gay Times or Spare Rib, and repeatedly a stone wall, in grey or rainbow colour, as an iconic reminder of LGBT history. The audience is divided out between these four sides and asked to stand very closely together on the white lines, resonating with the space dynamics of the seating arrangements for D.R.A.G. The feed opens on all monitors with a moving torch song version of ‘Dance Yourself Dizzy’ by Ross Anderson, pitted to evoke what Rea describes as a ‘community spirit’, which foreshadows what is yet to come.51 The screens then jump into different feeds, so that each side is listening to a different set of memories while the acoustics, however, enable an overhearing of fragments of those other stories. In his review, Chris McCormack describes this as a ‘rush of repressed histories, released at once, threatening an overload.’52 The spatial acoustics and visual stimuli, with the flickering images on the monitors mantled on the translucent cube, in which the figure of an almost naked man (Andrew Stanford) sits still on chair with a table, telephone, and microphone, indeed have an overwhelming and almost disorientating effect on the spectator, whose focus and attention shifts from the different screens and their stories to those of the other sides and the inside of the cube, trying to individually make sense of these sensations. 14 The testimonies on all sides are organised in a rough chronological order, addressing topics, issues, and experiences of religion; education; therapy; isolation; sectarian violence; organisations, such as Northern Ireland Gay Rights Association (NIGRA), Cara-Friend, and the Rainbow Project; queer clubs and discos; as well as HIV and AIDS. Together, these testimonies tentatively trace what Yee describes as a ‘journey’ from ‘violence, loneliness, fear, isolation and the unspoken’ to ‘a place of community, acceptance, friendship and confidence (for some, a salvation).’53 I suggest ‘tentatively’ because these stories refuse to be channelled into a clear and progressive trajectory that would provide a safe and stable memory. This movement has a spatial parallel in the way in which Belfast emerges in these memories from its traditional conception as a place of sectarian divisions as a possible space for alternative forms of togetherness, specifically through the reopened dance clubs in the 1980s. As one man (performed by Gordon Mahn) recalls: With it [the clubs] was a whole other culture, those on the periphery of society. You did get the punks, you got skinheads, you got the gays, you got the lesbians, the androgynous-y whatevers, all thrown into this mismash one Saturday night at the Delta. It was really alternative. And alternative cultures just grew from that, it was really really exciting. That was part of the reason you went to the Plaza or the Delta was to meet people from the other side, from everywhere, from all over Belfast, which was quite exciting.54 An ‘older, Belfast’ female voice (Katie Tumelty) confirms: I say the gay community was doing cross community then. They had the common the nominator [sic] was their sexuality. And as long as they were accepted for who they were didn’t matter about religion. Everybody was there and everybody was welcomed. Didn’t matter what tribe you came from. Even in the heart of the troubles, and I mean the heart of the trouble [sic] is, there wasn’t one tri-colour, not one union jack, nothing was brought into the gay community. That space. 15 That ‘queer’ space and its promise of alternative communality beyond sectarian politics is, however, brutally shattered by the killing of Bradshaw that is addressed in the live performance of the exposed man who has sat the whole time inside the cube, which ends the installation part. As he slowly and carefully dresses himself in the uniform of an RUC officer, he recounts his experiences of homophobia in the police force and his encounter with the ‘very vulnerable’ young officer, Bradshaw, stating: ‘I just thought that if the [police] had looked after Darren better, the Parliament wouldn’t have been the only place he felt he could go that he was safe. That changed my life. His death impacted on me deeply. Because I felt we, the organization all the way to the top, and I had failed him.’55 The scene ends in blackout in which the audience is led over to another part in the room and asked to keep between two white lines on the floor that create a circle. As the ushers turn into dancers, the lights and soundtrack transform the scene into a disco, with the crowded surrounding audience transmuted into the present spectators, fellow clubbers, part of the club community. As suggested by Rea at the beginning, several members of the audience (some more cautiously than others) start to move to the rhythm and interact with the performance in this way. Suddenly, we notice actor Stanford on stage, his white shirt illuminated by a pink beam, and at first timidly, then more confidently, he joins in the dance – before he is killed by an invisible member of the crowd, the gun shot reverberating through the space. While a white spotlight freezes his paralyzed body, the disturbed audience is ushered out by the Pluckers, with several spectators being severely shocked and traumatized, some (almost) crying and comforting each other. The unexpected recreation of Bradshaw’s murder creates parallel sensations of threat, isolation, and rupture - as well as connectedness and communality. Thus, Trouble 16 reproduces a ‘moving memory’, which, true to its multidirectional dynamics, does not endorse a progressivist vision to suggest how far we have ‘moved on’. Instead, the choice to conclude this testimonial work, which also evoked many redemptive memories, with this moment works to remind the audience of the current political dispensation in Northern Ireland – notably, the situation where, just prior to this premiere, the currently largest party in the Northern Irish Assembly, the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), vetoed a proposal for legislating same-sex marriage. When the installation part of Trouble transferred to Belfast City Hall in December to celebrate the tenth anniversary since the UK’s first civil partnership ceremony there – namely of Shannon Yee and her partner56 – it, arguably, managed to parallel this trauma with a more hopeful memory. The endings of both productions inspire a form of social activism in raising awareness of the challenge LGBT memories bring to the present political situation. Where the conclusion of Trouble alerts us to the continuous inability of ethno-nationalist politics to redress LGBT justice, D.R.A.G. closes with Boyd’s powerful rendition of a ‘Punk Torch Song’, dressed in a bejeweled balaclava that he then rips off – an image that was used in slightly modified form as the promotion poster (see Figure 2): We’re not invisible now We’re here to be counted You’ll not be pushed to the ground If you’re lost You’ll be found Do you hear me? I won’t forget who you are Just hold your head up I’ll be the freak that’s unique Be the Queer without fear Can’t you see me?57 17 As addressed here, both works trouble the invisibility, voicelessness, victimization, and oppression of the LGBT community in Northern Ireland. In performing previously silenced stories, the works under consideration unveil the parallel existence of hidden and marginalised memories within the ethnically structured polity and hetero-normative political culture of post-conflict Northern Ireland. Furthermore, in so doing, both problematise archival projects that, in an unintended way, may recycle the parallelism of exclusion and liminality. As such, the productions work to emphasise an archival and memorial responsibility to creating as well as commencing a different future. As Derrida reminds us: ‘as much as and more than a thing of the past, before such a thing, the archive should call into question the coming of the future’.58 1 I would like to express my deep gratitude to Niall Rea and TheatreofplucK for their kind support with this research by making scripts, recordings, photographs, and other information available to me and for permission to use this material for this article. I am also very grateful to Cillian McGrattan for invaluable feedback on an earlier draft of this paper. 2 Shannon Yee, Unpublished Script of Trouble, October 2015. 3 Shannon Yee, ‘Gay & Troubled?’ synopsis’, Shannonyee Blog 22 July 2011, shannonyee.wordpress.com/category/tr/ (assessed 23 May 2016). 4 Ibid. 5 ‘parallel, n., adj., and adv.’ OED Online. Oxford University Press, June 2016. Web: www.oed.com.queens.ezp1.qub.ac.uk/search?searchType=dictionary&q=parallel&_se archBtn=Search (assessed 18 July 2016). 6 David Cregan, ‘Remembering to Forget: Queer Memory and the New Ireland,’ in Memory Ireland, ed. by Oona Frawley (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2010), pp. 184-94 (p.193). 7 TheatreofplucK was originally known as ‘Pluck’ formed by Irish director/designer Niall Rea and American performers Karl Schappell, Robin Patchefsky and Jon Stark in 1998 in Philadelphia. As noted on the company’s website, ‘The name Pluck was chosen to honour the memory of Christopher Hawks who had lived with Rea and Schappell, but who died from AIDS shortly before the company was formed. Hawks would have undoubtedly been a core company member, and his catchphrase of "oh pluck!" when someone did or said something special or out of the ordinary or brave seemed to embody the ethos of our attitude to performance.’ After spending some time in Europe, Rea returned to Belfast in 2004, where the company changed its name to TheatreofplucK. In 2008, it was awarded a small grants award from the Arts 18 Council of Northern Ireland in 2008, making it the first publicly funded queer theatre company in Ireland. TheatreofplucK aims to produce ‘quality theatre for everyone, but with a queer slant’, especially ‘issues of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender identities in Ireland.’ To date, it has produced seven original full productions, details of which are on the website (see www.theatreofpluck.com/archive ). 8 For a detailed discussion of this workshop version, see Fiona Coffey, ‘Blurring Boundaries and Collapsing Genres with Shannon Yee: Immersive Theatre, Pastiche, and Radical Openness in the North, in Radical Contemporary Theatre Practices by Women in Ireland, eds. by Miriam Haughton and Maria Kurdi (Carysfort Press, Dublin, 2015), pp. 135-150. 9 The Stormont House Agreement (December 2014), available at www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/390672/Storm ont_House_Agreement.pdf (accessed on 3 April 2015). 10 See Cillian McGrattan, ‘The Stormont House Agreement and the New Politics of Storytelling in Northern Ireland’, Parliamentary Affairs (2015): 1-19. 11 Jacques Derrida, ‘Archive Fever: A Freudian Impression’, translated by Eric Prenowitz, diacritics 25, no. 2 (1995): 9–63 (p. 9). 12 Ed Madden, ‘Queering Ireland, In the Archives’, Irish University Review 43.1 (2013): 184-221 (p. 185). 13 The Agreement: Agreement Reached in the Multi-party Negotiations (Belfast/Good Friday Agreement), ‘Declaration of Support’, Paragraph 2, available at: www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/136652/agree ment.pdf (assessed 5 June 2016); Colin Graham, ‘Every Passer-by a Culprit?'’, Third Text 19: 5 (2005): 567 -580, (p. 667-8). 14 Report of the Consultative Group on the Past (23 January 2009), p. 4; available at http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/victims/docs/consultative_group/cgp_230109_report.pdf (accessed 1 May 2016). 15 See Robin Wilson, The Northern Ireland experience of conflict and agreement: A model for export? (Manchester: Manchester University press, 2010). 16 Michael Rothberg, Multidirectional Memory: Remembering the Holocaust in the Age of Decolonization (Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, 2009), p. 3. 17 Eamonn Hughes, ‘Introduction: Northern Ireland – border country’, in Culture and Politics in Northern Ireland 1960-1990, ed. Hughes (Milton Keynes: Open University Press), p. 1; see also George Boyle’s chapter in this collection, ‘Northern Ireland: a place apart?’, pp. 13-26. 18 Rothberg, Multidirectional Memory, p.5. 19 Berthold Brecht, ‘Short Description of a New Technique of Acting which Produces an Alienation Effect [1940]’, in Brecht on Theatre, ed. and trans. by John Willett (London: Methuen. 1964), pp. 136-147 (p. 136). Dominick La Capra’s concept of ‘emphatic unsettlement’ is also gestured to here, see LaCapra, Writing History, Writing Trauma (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 2001), p.78. 20 See Fiona Coffrey, ‘Burring Boundaries’, p. 140ff. 21 Al Head, ‘The queer fool,’ Sexualities, 15.1 (2012): 3-10 (p. 9). 22 Niall Rea, Unpublished interview with author, 13 July 2016. 23 See ‘Appendix IIIc: Secret Queer Devotions left by the Audience on the stage at the start of the show (all iterations)’, in Niall Rea, Queer Identity in Performance in Northern Ireland: Dissemination through Live Performance, with Attention to its Post-Conflict Context. PhD Thesis. Queen’s University, Belfast, 2016, pp. 343-350. http://www.theatreofpluck.com/archive http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/victims/docs/consultative_group/cgp_230109_report.pdf 19 24 Rag trees in Ireland are often Hawthorn trees, close to holy wells or other symbolic geographical landmarks, which are covered in scraps of fabric, ribbon or clothing, representative of wishes, dreams, hopes or problems that are believed will be fulfilled or overcome as the rag disintegrates. 25 Rea, Queer Identity, p. 200. 26 Rea, Queer Identity, p. 201. 27 In the post-show discussion at the Courtyard Theatre, Newtownabbey, on 6th August 2012, one audience member emphasised that he felt ‘terrified’ putting his piece of paper on stage but then became ‘curious as to how they would be used’ (Rea, ‘Appendix II: Transcripts of Post Show Discussions’, in Queer Identity, p. 314). 28 Rea, Queer Identity, p. 202. 29 Jane Coyle, Review of Divided, Radical, And Gorgeous, Irish Theatre Magazine (2012). Previously available at: www.irishtheatremagazine.ie/Reviews/Current/D-R- A-G----Divided--Radical-and-Gorgeous (website closed down in 2014). The review is reproduced in ‘Appendix V’ in Rea, Queer Identity, p. 422-24. 30 Rea, ‘Appendix I – Annotated Performance Script of Divided, Radical, And Gorgeous – Third Iteration’, in Niall Rea, Queer Identity, pp. 264-281 (p. 265). [In the following abbreviated with Script of D.R.A.G.]. 31 Ibid. 32 Joseph Pugliese, ‘Biotypologies of Terror,’ in Cultural Studies Review, 14.2 (2008), 49-66 (p. 61). 33 For a detailed exploration of homophobia in Northern Ireland, see Marian Duggan, Queering Conflict: Examining Lesbian and Gay Experiences of Homophobia and Northern Ireland (Farnham: Ashgate, 2012). 34 Kathryn Conrad, ‘“Nothing to Hide … Nothing to Fear”: Discriminatory Surveillance and Queer Visibility in Great Britain and Northern Ireland’, in Ashgate Research Companion to Queer Theory, ed. by Noreen Giffney and Michael O’Rourke (Farnham: Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 2009), pp. 329-46, (p. 342). 35 David Cregan, Frank McGuinness’s Dramaturgy of Difference and the Irish Theatre, (New York: Peter Lang, 2011), p. 141 36 See Caitriona O’Reilly, ‘Politics, Pride and Performance: TheatreofplucK’s Devised Queer Dramaturgies in Northern Ireland,’ in Devised Performance in Irish Theatre: Histories and Contemporary Practice ed. by Siobhan O’Gorman and Charlotte McIvor, (Dublin, Carysfort Press, 2015), pp. 243-259 (p. 254). 37 Seamus Heaney, North (London: Faber and Faber, 1975), p. 38. 38 Rea, Queer Identity, 155. 39 Rea, Script of D.R.A.G., p. 272. 40 Cregan, Frank McGuinness’s Dramaturgy, p. 127. 41 Richard Dyer, ‘It’s Being So Camp As Keeps Us Going’, in Camp: Queer Aesthetics and the Performing Subject, ed. Fabio Cleto (Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1999), p.110. 42 Susan Sontag, ‘Notes on “Camp”’, in Camp, p. 56. 43 Rea, Script of D.R.A.G., p. 279. 44 Ibid. 45 Derrida, ‘Archive Fever’, p. 27. 46 Cregan, Frank McGuinness’s Dramaturgy, p. 140. 47 Rea, Script of D.R.A.G., p. 279. 48 See also Stefanie Lehner, ‘Post-Conflict Masculinities: Filative Reconciliation in Five Minutes of Heaven and David Park’s The Truth Commissioner,’ in Irish http://www.irishtheatremagazine.ie/Reviews/Current/D-R-A-G----Divided--Radical-and-Gorgeous http://www.irishtheatremagazine.ie/Reviews/Current/D-R-A-G----Divided--Radical-and-Gorgeous 20 Masculinities: Reflections on Literature and Culture, ed. by Caroline Magennis and Raymond Mullen, (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 2011), pp. 65-76. 49 Cited in David McKittrick, Seamus Kelters, Brian Feeney, Chris Thornton and David McVea, Lost Lives: The Stories of the Men, Women and Children Who Died as a Result of the Northern Ireland Troubles (Mainstream: Edinburgh, 2012), p. 1407. 50 Exhibited in Northern Ireland: 30 Years of Photography by Belfast Exposed (in partnership with the MAC), 10 May - 7 July 2013. Photograph available on Maxim Surin, ‘Northern Ireland: 30 Years of photography. Belfast Exposed’, Blog: www.maximsurin.info/blog/northern-ireland-30-years-of-photography-bx (assessed 23 July 2016). 51 Rea, Unpublished interview with author. 52 Chris McCormack, Review of Trouble, Exeunt, 16 November 2016: http://exeuntmagazine.com/reviews/trouble/ (assessed 20 November 2016). 53 Yee, Unpublished Script of Trouble. 54 Ibid. 55 Ibid. 56 BBC News, ‘Gay weddings' first for Belfast’, 19 December 2005, www.news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/northern_ireland/4540226.stm (assessed 20 July 2016). 57 Rea, Script of D.R.A.G., p. 281. 58 Derrida, ‘Archive Fever’, p. 26. http://exeuntmagazine.com/reviews/trouble/ http://www.news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/northern_ireland/4540226.stm I think you are brave in your skirt 
work_5eoigtbp7bd6hpl26cupnllm7m	----	O R I G I N A L A R T I C L E Mental Health in Violent Crime Victims: Does Sexual Orientation Matter? Robert J. Cramer • Dale E. McNiel • Sarah R. Holley • Martha Shumway • Alicia Boccellari � American Psychology-Law Society/Division 41 of the American Psychological Association 2011 Abstract The present study investigates victim sexual orientation in a sample of 641 violent crime victims seeking emergency medical treatment at a public-sector hospital. Victim sexual orientation was examined as it: (a) varies by type of violent crime and demographic charac- teristics, (b) directly relates to psychological symptoms, and (c) moderates the relationship between victim and crime characteristics (i.e., victim gender, victim trauma history, and type of crime) and psychological symptoms (i.e., symptoms of acute stress, depression, panic, and general anxiety). Results showed that lesbian, gay, bisex- ual, and transgender (LGBT) victims were more likely to be victims of sexual assault. Heterosexual victims were more likely to be victims of general assault and shootings. LGBT victims demonstrated significantly higher levels of acute stress and general anxiety. Moreover, victim sexual orientation moderated the association of type of crime with experience of panic symptoms. Also, victim sexual orien- tation moderated the relation of victim trauma history and general anxiety symptoms. Results are discussed in relation to victimization prevalence rates, sexual prejudice theory, and assessment and treatment of violent crime victims. Keywords Sexual orientation � LGBT victim � Violent crime � Anxiety � Sexual assault Sexual orientation is an increasingly important character- istic receiving recent empirical attention in the victimology literature (e.g., Cramer, Chandler, & Wakeman, 2010; Rayburn, Mendoza, & Davison, 2003). The salience of sexual orientation appears to be due to both increasing rates of victimization among, and poor psychological outcomes for, lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) crime victims. The cumulative effect of increasing rates and research culminated in recent social psychological theory (e.g., Herek, Gillis, & Cogan, 2009; Hyman, 2009) and policy change (e.g., passage of the Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act; Human Rights Campaign, 2009). From a theoretical standpoint, sexual minority victim- ization experiences are hypothesized to be a function of society-induced stigma through person–environment interaction (Herek et al., 2009). Briefly, Herek’s collective work (e.g., Herek 2007, 2009; Herek et al., 2009) frames the experience of sexual stigma (i.e., anti-LGBT stigma) as a result of socially constructed definitions of acceptable and moral sexual orientations. Stigma is continually rein- forced through subtle and overt means such as anti-LGBT legislation (e.g., ‘‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’’) and violence (e.g., hate- or bias-motivated crimes), as well as altered behavior on the part of LGBT individuals in order to avoid being targets of discrimination. Potential results of self- and other-generated stigma include poor psychological health (Herek et al., 2009). Perhaps as a direct response to societal stigma, recent federal legislation has provided more protection for LGBT victims of hate crimes. For instance, sexual orientation was added to the list of demographic characteristics protected under the federal definition of a hate crime (HRC, 2009). Generally, offenders convicted of a hate crime are subject to an increased sentence under state or federal sentencing R. J. Cramer (&) Department of Psychology and Philosophy, Sam Houston State University, Huntsville, TX, USA e-mail: rjc021@shsu.edu D. E. McNiel � S. R. Holley � M. Shumway � A. Boccellari University of California San Francisco, San Francisco, CA, USA 123 Law Hum Behav DOI 10.1007/s10979-011-9270-8 guidelines (Department of Justice, 1994). Passage of the Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Pre- vention Act in 2009 also provided resources to local jurisdictions to prosecute anti-LGBT hate crimes (HRC, 2009). Despite these policy advances, LGBT victims of crimes that are not classified as hate crimes are subject to the same limited rights and resources as any other victim. However, unlike heterosexual crime victims, in the instance of non-hate crimes, LGBT victims may still feel enacted stigma. In short, for LGBT individuals, psycho- logical experience of any victimization may fall under Herek et al.’s framework, legislation does not afford such victims expanded rights or resources. Thus, the psycho- logical health of a LGBT crime victim may be particularly at risk for distress as a result of combination of a lack of perceived protection in instances of general victimization and heightened awareness of stigma. In light of the importance of LGBT victimization painted by recent legislative and theoretical work, the present study extends extant literature on LGBT crime victims’ mental health. This is accomplished by examining type of victimization and clinical characteristics of LGBT violent crime victims when compared to heterosexual counterparts. Moreover, victim sexual orientation is investigated as a moderator of the relationship between victim and crime characteristics with psychological out- comes. As a starting point, we review rates and clinical impact among LGBT crime victims. LGBT Victims: Rates of Victimization and Psychological Outcomes Anti-LGBT crimes have increased over the last decade, with particular increases in both sexual assault and mur- der (NCAVP, 2009). Likewise, a high degree (16.7 percent) of all bias-motivated crimes in 2008 was based on sexual orientation (FBI, 2009b). This number escalates (17.7 percent) among hate crimes (i.e., crimes motivated by actual or perceived group membership). The majority of total and physical bias- and hate-motivated LGBT victims were gay males (FBI, 2009b; Herek, 2009). A great deal of literature has specifically addressed rates of violent victimization within LGB samples only. This lit- erature generally lacks direct comparisons to heterosexual victims. Compared to population rates, physical assault rates are generally high (11–20 percent) among school- aged LGB individuals (D’Augelli, Grossman, & Starks, 2006; D’Augelli, Pilkington, & Hershberger, 2002; Pil- kington & D’Augelli, 2006). Sexual assault is only slightly more common (9–22 percent) in this age group (D’Augelli et al., 2006). Trends of interpersonal violence toward LGB persons are comparable in a young adult (D’Augelli, 1992) and older adult (D’Augelli & Gross- man, 2001) samples. Overall, LGB adults are more likely to experience interpersonal violence than heterosexual counterparts (Roberts, Austin, Corliss, Vandermorris, & Koenen, 2010). High rates of sexual minority victimization have coin- cided with a growing literature highlighting negative psychological outcomes for these victims (e.g., Cheng, 2004; Herek, 2007; Herek, Gillis, & Cogan, 2002). Col- lective findings by Herek and his colleagues (Herek, 2007; Herek, Gillis, & Cogan, 1999; Herek, Cogan, Gillis, & Glunt, 1997) indicate that, as with other populations, sexual minority victims are at increased risk for depression, anx- iety, post-traumatic stress, anger, general stress and fear of future harm compared to non-victimized LGB counter- parts. Further evidence by D’Augelli and colleagues (D’Augelli & Grossman, 2001; D’Augelli et al., 2002; D’Augelli, 2006) suggests high rates of PTSD and trau- matic stress among LGB victims, as well as poor mental health indicators of low self-esteem, loneliness, and sui- cidal ideation due to internalized homophobia in LGB older adults. The limited data available comparing gay male to hetersosexual male crime victims shows gay male adults aged 18–24 to suffer higher levels of suicidal idea- tion and depressive cognitions than heterosexual counterparts (Nicholas & Howard, 1998). Interestingly, most theories explicating elevated rates of psychological distress in LGBT individuals implicate the experience of stigma, internalized homophobia, or heterosexism as causal or contributory factors (e.g., Herek et al., 2009; Hyman, 2009; Kaiser, Vick, & Major, 2006). Sexual Orientation as a Moderator of Psychological Outcomes Three known risk factors for negative psychological out- comes among crime victims are victim gender, victim trauma history, and type of crime experienced. Existing data suggest that females are more likely to be victims of interpersonal or sexual crimes (e.g., Felix & McMahon, 2007; FBI, 2009a) and to experience higher rates of neg- ative clinical outcomes such as PTSD or depression (e.g., Koss, Bailey, Yuan, Herrera, & Lichter, 2003) than male counterparts. One’s prior exposure to traumatic events is also positively correlated with clinical syndromes such as depression, post-traumatic stress, and anxiety (Irish, Os- trowski, Fallon, Spoonster, van Dulmen, et al., 2008; Kilpatrick, Ruggiero, Acierno, Saunders, Resnick, & Best, 2003; Marmion & Lundberg-Love, 2008). Number of previous traumas has been noted as a particularly important predictor of development of post-trauma symptoms (Irish et al., 2008). Law Hum Behav 123 The relation between crime type and negative clinical symptoms is somewhat more obfuscated. There is a general positive link between violent crime victimization and psy- chological symptoms (see Hanson, Kilpatrick, Falsetti, & Resnick, 1995 for review). However, distinguishing types of violent crime as they relate to clinical symptoms can inform assessment and treatment of targeted symptoms. The Present Study Current knowledge on rates and characteristics of LGBT victimization is limited in several ways. First, there is a lack of direct comparison of victimization with hetero- sexual crime victims. Second, when examining types of crime, domestic violence is often absent from such litera- ture. We include this in our analysis of type of victimization and sexual orientation. Third, little is known in way of other demographic disparities between LGBT and heterosexual victims. Research Question 1 How do LGBT victims differ from heterosexual counterparts in terms of types of crime and demographic characteristics? Research Question 2 How does victim sexual orientation relate to trauma-associated clinical symptoms (i.e., acute stress, depression, panic, and general anxiety) after victimization? The present study builds on existing data by examining main effects of sexual orientation on a range of trauma-related clinical symptoms, including depressive, general anxiety, panic, and acute stress symptoms. Research Question 3 How does victim sexual orientation moderate the relations between victim and crime char- acteristics (i.e., victim gender, type of crime, and victim trauma history) and the above clinical symptoms? Given ample evidence that gender, trauma history, and crime type are well established risk factors for traumatic symptoms, a next logical step is to examine how sexual orientation moderates these relations. The present study broadly defines clinical symptoms as symptoms of acute stress, depression, panic, and general anxiety. Method Procedure Eligible participants were those who suffered a violent crime and subsequently sought emergency medical treat- ment from San Francisco General Hospital, a level-1 trauma center. These crime victims were originally recruited for potential participation in a demonstration project through the Trauma Recovery Center (TRC) in San Francisco, California. Eligible victims included adults who were aged 18 or older, English-speaking, and not currently receiving mental health treatment. A full description of selection criteria for the demonstration project is docu- mented in previous literature (see Alvidrez et al., 2008; Boccellari et al., 2007). The present study utilizes only cross-sectional baseline data from this project. Participants A total of 655 violent crime victims were assessed for medical health and psychiatric functioning post-victim- ization. Only the 641 participants with data on demographic and clinical variables of interest were used in analyses. Table 1 summarizes demographic information for the overall sample in this study, and by victim sexual orientation. Measures Demographic Information. During the baseline interview, participants were asked about their age, gender, sexual orientation, ethnicity, monthly income, and education level. Sexual orientation was dichotomized into heterosexual and LGBT groups to balance sample size concerns with examination of group differences. Type of Crime. The type of violent crime experienced by participants was classified in one of six categories during data collection: Domestic violence, sexual assault, shooting, stabbing, physical assault, and vehicular assault. If the crime was perpetrated by a current or former intimate partner, it was classified as domestic violence regardless of mechanism of violence (e.g., physical assault, stabbing, etc.). All six categories (i.e., sexual assault, domestic vio- lence, physical assault, shooting, stabbing, and vehicular assault) were used in the conceptualization of crime type where descriptive statistics or frequencies were appropriate analytic procedures (i.e., analysis of Research Question 1). Description of sexual orientation by crime type elaborates on current knowledge of whether LGBT victims differ in frequency of type of crime victimization. When crime type was used as an independent variable in the evaluation of sexual orientation as a moderator of clinical symptoms (i.e., multivariate analyses for Research Questions 2 and 3), it becomes necessary to reclassify or combine the six crime types. Statistical, legal, and inter- vention literature all inform the rationale for the need and method of reclassification. From a statistical standpoint, a minimum of five participants would be necessary in each cell for a univariate or multivariate (e.g., ANOVA, regression) procedure to be conducted (DeCoster, 2006). Law Hum Behav 123 Examination of two cells of crime type for LGBT indi- viduals in the shooting (n = 0) and vehicular assault (n = 1) categories displays failure to meet this criteria. Therefore, reclassification of crime type was necessary for multivariate analyses. We allowed legal and psychological literature to guide the method reclassification of crime type. Given, not all instances of sexual assault are perpetrated by intimate partners. However, a bevy of literature suggests that combining these subtypes is logical. For instance, there is definitional overlap between sexual assault and domestic violence in that approximately 41–76 percent of sexual assault/rape perpetrators are intimate partners, depending on the time period of data analysis (Kilpatrick, Resnick, Table 1 Demographic information by sexual orientation of victim Demographic variable Total sample Heterosexual victims LGBT victims Heterosexual vs. LGBT comparison Gender v2 = 5.15* Male 405 (63.3%) 370 (64.8%) 35 (50.7%) Female 236 (36.7%) 202 (35.2%) 34 (49.3%) Missing 0 0 0 Ethnicity v2 = 18.05* European American 154 (24.1%) 124 (21.7%) 30 (43.5%) African American 297 (46.4%) 276 (48.3%) 21 (30.4%) Hispanic/Latin American 81 (12.7%) 74 (13.0%) 7 (10.1%) Native American/Eskimo 10 (1.6%) 8 (1.4%) 2 (2.9%) Asian American 26 (4.1%) 24 (4.2%) 2 (2.9%) Mixed 62 (9.7%) 56 (9.8%) 6 (8.7%) Other 9 (1.4%) 8 (1.4%) 1 (1.4%) Declined to state 1 (0.1%) 1 (0.1%) 0 (0.0%) Missing 1 1 0 Physical abuse history v2 = 8.02* No 389 (60.8%) 358 (62.7%) 31 (45.0%) Yes 251 (39.2%) 213 (37.3%) 38 (55.0%) Missing 1 1 0 Sexual abuse history v2 = 23.24*** No 470 (73.4%) 436 (76.3%) 34 (49.3%) Yes 170 (26.6%) 135 (23.7%) 35 (50.7%) Missing 1 1 0 Type of crime v2 = 27.67*** Sexual assault 130 (20.3%) 86 (15.1%) 24 (34.8%) Domestic Violence 83 (12.9%) 74 (13.0%) 9 (13.0%) Shooting 97 (15.1%) 97 (17.0%) 0 Stabbing 89 (13.9%) 82 (14.4%) 7 (10.1%) Physical assault 238 (37.1%) 210 (36.8%) 28 (40.6%) Vehicular assault 23 (3.5%) 22 (3.9%) 1 (1.4%) Missing 1 1 0 Type of crime (reclassified) v2 = 11.46*** General assault 447 (69.8%) 411 (72.0%) 36 (52.2%) Relational assault 193 (30.2%) 160 (28.0%) 33 (47.8%) Missing 1 1 0 Mean age (years) 39.50 (SD = 11.3) 35.84 (SD = 11.5) 36.04 (SD = 9.9) t = -0.14 Mean monthly income (dollars) 1,184 (SD = 2,786) 1,094 (SD = 2,030) 1,953 (SD = 6,133) t = -2.41* Mean education (years) 12.23 (SD = 2.5) 12.19 (SD = 2.4) 12.59 (SD = 2.9) t = -1.27 Mean lifetime trauma events 4.56 (SD = 2.4) 4.46 (SD = 2.4) 5.40 (SD = 2.6) t = -3.07** N = 641; test statistics compare heterosexual victims to LGBT victims * p B .05, ** p B .01, *** p B .001 Law Hum Behav 123 Saunders, & Best, 1998; NVC, 1993). Indeed, literature cautions readers to dispel the misconception that most sexual assaults are perpetrated by strangers (Grothues & Marmion, 2006). Conceptually, domestic violence and sexual assault both fall under a broader umbrella of ‘‘relational violence’’ and often involve common themes of intimate interpersonal control (Grothues & Marmion, 2006). Perhaps as a result of the commonalities between sexual assault and domestic violence, law enforcement (e.g., Chen & Ullman, 2010; Felson & Pare, 2005) and victim services (e.g., Macy, Giattina, Parish, & Crosby, 2010; Martin, Coyne-Beasley, Hoehn, Matthew, Runyan, et al., 2009; Zweig & Burt, 2007) often pair sexual assault and domestic violence together as well. In accordance with these bodies of literature, we com- bined sexual assault and domestic violence under the category relational assault. Relational assault includes those with an intimate partner or of a sexual nature, namely domestic violence and sexual assault. The label general assault will be used throughout the rest of this article to denote a combination of crime subtypes falling outside the relational nature. General assault refers to a group of additional violent assaults, including shooting, stabbing, physical assault, and vehicular assault. Trauma History. Participants’ lifetime traumatic history was tabulated using a component of the Posttrau- matic Diagnostic Scale (Foa, Cashman, Jaycox, & Perry, 1997). The scale assesses a maximum of 12 types of trauma including adulthood experiences of natural disasters, accidents, life-threatening illness/sudden death, and physi- cal and sexual assault. The scale also incorporates childhood physical and sexual abuse during childhood. The present study used a total corrected count that did not include the current violent crime. Also, the physical and sexual assault items served as control variables in our analyses. Clinical Symptoms. Clinical variables were assessed using two types of self-report instruments during the baseline interview. General traumatic stress symptoms were measured using the Acute Stress Disorder Scale (ASDS; Bryant, Moulds, & Guthrie, 2000). It contains 21 items, each measured on a 5-point Likert scale, asking participants the degree to which they experienced each symptom over the last month. The present study used the ASDS total score (i.e., sum of all 21 items). Cronbach’s alpha for the total score was .91 for this sample. Depressive symptoms, general anxiety, and panic symptoms were assessed using the Patient Health Ques- tionnaire (PHQ; Spitzer, Kroenke, & Williams, 1999). PHQ subscales exist for levels of depression (nine items), general anxiety (seven items), and panic (20 items), among other diagnostic syndromes. Participants in the present study rated their depressive symptoms over the last 2 weeks, panic symptoms over the last 4 weeks, and general anxiety symptoms over the last 4 weeks. Total scores were used in the present study to capture severity of depressive, general anxiety, and panic symptomatology. Cronbach’s alpha for these subscales were as follows in the present sample: Depression (a = .87), panic (a = .73), and general anxiety (a = .86). Results RQ 1: How do LGBT victims differ from heterosexual counterparts in terms of types of crime and demographic characteristics? Table 1 summarizes results of demographic and crime comparisons by victim sexual orientation (N = 641). Overall, significant demographic differences were found by victim sexual orientation. LGBT victims were relatively equivalent by gender, whereas heterosexual victims were predominantly male. Ethnically, LGBT victims were more likely to be European American, and heterosexual victims displayed higher frequencies of being African American and Hispanic/Latin American. LGBT victims possessed higher mean monthly income, as well as greater rates of total, physical, and sexual trauma history, as compared to heterosexual victims. Age and education level were equivalent by victim sexual orientation. Regarding type of victimization, a chi-square analysis was conducted to evaluate the specific types of crime victimization. Results yielded significant differences in crime type distribution by victim sexual orientation. Het- erosexual victims fell into the following categories in descending order: physical assault, shooting, sexual assault, stabbing, domestic violence, vehicular assault, and one missing. LGBT victims reported crime type in descending order as: physical assault, sexual assault, domestic violence, stabbing, vehicular assault, and shoot- ing. By percentage within groups, LGBT victims were 2.3 times more likely to be victims of sexual assault than heterosexual victims. Percentages of victimization within groups also showed that, compared to LGBT victims, heterosexual victims were much more likely to be victims of shootings (there were no LGBT shooting victims). A second chi-square analysis was conducted for the same constructs, except using the reclassified definition of crime type (i.e., relational versus general assault; see Table 1). Within the LGBT subgroup, type of victimization was relatively equal. However, the ratio of victimization for heterosexual victims was nearly 3:1 with the majority being victims of general assault. RQ2: How does victim sexual orientation relate to trauma-associated clinical symptoms (i.e., acute stress, Law Hum Behav 123 depression, panic, and general anxiety) after victimization? RQ3: How does victim sexual orientation moderate the relations between common victimization risk factors (i.e., victim gender, type of crime, and victim trauma history) and the above clinical symptoms? Multivariate regression analyses were conducted to answer research questions two and three to take into account correlated dependent measures (Cohen, Cohen, West & Aiken, 2003). This approach also allows for evaluation of main and moderating effects in the presence of numerous control variables while decreasing concerns regarding Type I error (see Cohen et al., 2003). Only participants with complete data on all variables of interest were used (n = 627). Independent variables were victim sexual orientation (heterosexual versus LGBT), victim gender, victim trauma history, and type of crime (relational versus general). Control variables were victim age, eth- nicity, income, education, and history of previous physical and sexual assault (i.e., yes or no; see Hyman, 2009 for importance of assault history). Dependent measures were the total score for acute stress on the ASDS, as well as total scores on the PHQ for depression, panic, and general anxiety symptoms. Overall model effect sizes for each dependent measure were assessed using R2, while the magnitude of specific independent, control, and moderator variables were assessed using partial eta squared. Partial eta squared values are only reported for significant effects. Where reported, confidence intervals denote a 95 percent range. Table 2 summarizes the results of this analysis. Overall models were significant for all four dependent measures: acute stress (F [19, 608] = 7.22, p \ .001, R2 = .18, CI = .13 to .23), depression (F [19, 608] = 7.11, p \ .001, R 2 = .18, CI = .13 to .23), panic (F [19, 608] = 8.43, p \ .001, R2 = .21, CI = .15 to .26), and general anxiety (F [19, 608] = 7.41, p \ .001, R2 = .19, CI = .13 to .24). To clarify research question two, main effects of sexual orientation on the four dependent measures can be asses- sed. Results indicate that victim sexual orientation was associated with both acute stress and general anxiety symptoms. Specifically, LGBT victims reported signifi- cantly higher acute stress symptoms (M = 62.68, SD = 14.61, d = .45, CI = -2.99 to 1.87) and more anxiety symptoms (M = 16.34, SD = 3.59, d = .44, CI = -.41 to .74) than heterosexual victims (M = 55.07, SD = 17.05; M = 14.76, SD = 4.32, respectively). Other main effects of victim gender, victim trauma history, type of crime, ethnicity, and education are worth noting. Victim gender was significantly related to symp- toms of acute stress, depression, and general anxiety. Females reported higher levels of acute stress (M = 63.06, SD = 14.70, d = .70, CI = -1.20 to 2.35), depression (M = 23.04, SD = 6.60, d = .57, CI = -.28 to 1.25), and general anxiety (M = 16.51, SD = 3.80, d = .61, CI = .11 to 1.03) than male counterparts (M = 51.77, SD = 16.82; M = 19.15, SD = 6.91; M = 14.02, SD = 4.28, respectively). Victim past trauma history was positively associated with acute stress (b = .97, CI = -.53 to 2.47), depression (b = .35, CI = -.27 to Table 2 Multivariate regression model of independent variables on clinical symptoms Acute stress symptoms Depression symptoms Panic symptoms Anxiety symptoms F gp 2 F gp 2 F gp 2 F gp 2 Independent variables Sexual orientation 3.75* \.01 3.23 – 0.28 – 6.95** .01 Gender 6.32** .01 8.10** .01 2.33 – 9.22** .01 SO 9 Gender 1.52 – 0.23 – 2.98 – 0.02 – Trauma history 9.75** .02 9.84** .02 30.83*** .05 9.28** .01 SO 9 Trauma history 1.14 – 1.91 – 0.01 – 5.30* \.01 Crime type 0.16 – 0.03 – 2.43 – 0.46 – SO 9 Crime type 0.32 – 0.04 – 4.19* \.01 0.03 – Age 2.83 – 0.13 – 0.18 – 1.76 – Physical abuse history 3.28 – 0.19 – 1.97 – 0.47 – Sexual abuse history 0.33 – 1.16 – 0.21 – 0.26 – Ethnicity 1.22 – 0.94 – 2.03* .02 1.36 – Income 2.15 – 2.79 – 0.91 – 3.07 – Education 1.57 – 0.49 – 4.14* \.01 0.02 – Note: SO = sexual orientation; gp 2 = partial eta-squared value; bold values represent significant predictor variable * p B .05; ** p B .01; *** p B .001 Law Hum Behav 123 .97), panic (b = .56, CI = .22 to .90), and general anxiety symptoms (b = .11, CI = -.27 to .49). Crime type was significantly related to panic symptoms, such that victims of relational assault (M = 3.84, SD = 4.07, d = .43, CI = -.15 to .78) reported significantly higher degrees of panic symptoms than victims of general assault (M = 2.18, SD = 3.72). Education was significantly positively related with panic symptoms (b = .12, CI = .004 to .24). Finally, levels of panic symptoms by ethnicity emerged as follows from highest to lowest: Native American/Eskimo (M = 5.78, SD = 4.41), Other (M = 4.56, SD = 4.04), Mixed (M = 3.29, SD = 4.30), European American (M = 3.25, SD = 3.90), Asian American (M = 3.05, SD = 3.99), Hispanic/Latino American (M = 2.63, SD = 4.14), and African American (M = 2.06, SD = 3.61). To examine the moderating role of victim sexual ori- entation on other independent variables, the following interaction terms were included in the multivariate regression analysis: victim sexual orientation 9 victim gender, victim sexual orientation 9 victim trauma history, and victim sexual orientation 9 crime type. Only signifi- cant moderation effects are reported here (see Table 2 for all results). Victim sexual orientation moderated the relationship between crime type and panic symptoms (b = -2.28, CI = -4.46 to -.09, see Fig. 1). Overall, relational assault victims experienced more panic symptoms than general assault victims. Moreover, LGBT victims of relational assaults experienced the most panic symptoms compared to all other subgroups. Finally, victim sexual orientation moderated the rela- tionship between trauma history and general anxiety symptoms (b = .46, CI = .07 to .85, see Fig. 2). LGBT victims reported greater anxiety symptoms overall when compared to heterosexual victims. This disparity is clarified in that LGBT victims with low and high trauma histories experience relatively equivalent levels of anxiety symptoms. However, low trauma heterosexual victims experienced notably less anxiety symptoms than high trauma heterosexual counterparts. Discussion The present study was designed to identify victimization and demographic patterns among LGBT and heterosexual violent crime victims seeking emergency medical care. LGBT victims showed higher rates of sexual assault compared to heterosexual counterparts, a finding consistent with previous research highlighting generally high degrees of sexual assault victimization in LGB samples (e.g., D’Augelli et al., 2006). Of further importance is that het- erosexual victims were more likely to be victims of shootings and general assault, thereby demonstrating important differences between the specific types of crimes these respective populations are at greatest risk of suffering. Prominent demographic disparities emerged between LGBT and heterosexual victims. Noteworthy differences were that heterosexual victims were more likely to be male and of ethnic minority status, whereas LGBT victims had a greater presence of European Americans and even distri- bution by gender. Present hate crime and victim literature (e.g., Cheng, 2004; Cramer et al., 2010; Herek, 2009) tend to focus on a single minority group at a time. Provided the differences in how victim sexual orientation and ethnicity interface, there is apparent need for systematic examination of how subtypes of minority victims (e.g., African Amer- ican LGBT versus heterosexual) experience stigma and Interaction of Victim Sexual Orientation and Type of Crime Predicting Panic Symptoms 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 Heterosexual LGBT Victim Sexual Orientation P a n ic S y m p to m s Relational Assault General Assault Fig. 1 Interaction of victim sexual orientation and type of crime predicting panic symptoms. LGBT lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender Interaction of Victim Sexual Orientation and Trauma History Predicting Anxiety Symptoms 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Heterosexual LGBT Victim Sexual Orientation A n x ie ty S y m p to m s Low Trauma History High Trauma History Fig. 2 Interaction of victim sexual orientation and trauma history predicting anxiety symptoms. Note: High and Low Trauma Histories are defined by ±2 standard deviations from the mean; LGBT lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender Law Hum Behav 123 clinical symptoms. Also warranting attention is the higher frequency of trauma and abuse histories in LGBT victims. This finding is not entirely surprisingly given consistent findings of generally high rates of victimization for LGBT individuals (e.g., Pilkington & D’Augelli, 2006; Roberts et al., 2010). The knowledge that LGBT persons suffer more traumas reaffirms a need for careful assessment and intervention tailored toward such victims’ experiences in order to mitigate poor psychological trajectories. The second aim of the present study was to analyze sexual orientation as a direct and moderating variable on victim acute stress, depression, panic, and general anxiety. Although previous literature portrays a bevy of psychiatric concerns for bias and hate crime victims (e.g., D’Augelli, 2006; Herek, 2007; Herek et al., 1999), present findings extended this body of work in that victim sexual orientation shows a direct and indirect link to anxiety-related symp- toms in a sample of violent crime victims. In way of direct associations, sexual minority victims were more suscepti- ble to experiencing acute stress and general anxiety. Various explanations exist for the role of sexual orien- tation in the experience of increased anxiety-related symptoms for violent crime victims. For example, Hyman (2009) discusses a person–environment model causing poor mental health in lesbian women. Specifically, she postulates that individual and cultural heterosexism incul- cates negative self-views for lesbian women. Internalized homophobia then yields negative mental health outcomes such as stress and anxiety. Herek, Cogan and Gills (2009) offer another perspective of environmental and individual experiences that may influence manifestation of anxiety in this group. Specifi- cally, they identify heterosexist cultural influences as a contributing factor. They further outline three types of person-level stigma experienced by sexual minority per- sons: felt, enacted, and internalized. Enacted stigma may be particularly pertinent to understanding anxiety and LGBT victimization. Enacted stigma involves overt behavioral expressions of bias toward LGBT individuals (e.g., hate crimes, housing discrimination; Herek et al., 2009). Though not hate crimes per se, LGBT victims may experience violent crime as a form of enacted stigma, thereby yielding higher levels of anxiety-spectrum symptoms. Applied to mental health outcomes of LGBT crime victims, both Hyman’s, and Herek and colleagues’ per- spectives raise the possibility that LGBT victims experience crimes as a sexual identity-related interpersonal trauma. They may subsequently internalize negative self- views and experience psychological symptoms (i.e., anxi- ety and acute stress). Moreover, experiences of LGBT crime victims may interact with known risk factors linked to victimization to exacerbate anxiety-related symptoms. Alternatively, mental health may be negatively affected by increased attention to threat by sexual minority persons. Research on social-identity threat has shown that members of stigmatized groups develop belief systems about being devalued, and these expectations cause them to become especially alert or vigilant for signs of devaluation (e.g., Kaiser et al., 2006; Major, Quinton, & McCoy, 2002; Steele, Spencer, & Aronson, 2002). There is a great deal of empirical data showing a bias in attention toward threat- ening stimuli is associated with, and may maintain, anxiety (see review in Cisler, Bacon, & Williams, 2009). Research further suggests that such attentional biases may cause anxiety-spectrum symptoms (MacLeod, Rutherford, Campbell, Ebsworthy, & Holker, 2002; Mathews & Ma- cLeod, 2002). Therefore, because sexual minority persons are members of an oft-stigmatized minority group, they may be particularly vigilant for threat cues, which in turn may produce higher levels of anxiety and negatively impact mental health symptoms. Support for this notion can be seen in our findings that LGBT victims endorsed higher rates of general anxiety and acute stress over the past 4 weeks when compared to heterosexual counterparts. Victim sexual orientation is a relatively untapped moderating victim characteristic to date. The importance of present findings is therefore magnified by demonstrating the moderating role of sexual orientation with anxiety symptoms. Three trends emerged. First, in relation to vic- tim gender, heterosexual males experienced the least, and male sexual minority victims the most, levels of panic. Concerning type of crime, sexual minority victims of relational assault experienced the greatest amount of panic symptoms. Finally, regarding victim trauma history, LGBT victims experience high degrees of general anxiety irre- spective of trauma history, whereas heterosexual victims with little trauma history are buffered against experiencing general anxiety. By using a sample of crime victims presenting for emergency medical treatment (rather than those already enrolled in treatment), this study can inform initial assessment and mental health intervention in this popula- tion. Attention to anxiety-type symptoms is warranted for all sexual minority victims; however, assessment and treatment of these symptoms appears particularly pertinent for male sexual minority victims and LGBT victims of relational assault. Frontline mental and medical health staff such as psychotherapists or emergency department nurses and physicians may draw on these data for chief domains of clinical assessment in sexual minority victims of violent crime. Law pertaining to sexual orientation and victimization offers protection specific to hate crime victims (HRC, 2009). However, present findings indicate that LGBT vic- tims of violent crimes in general are at an elevated risk for Law Hum Behav 123 developing acute stress symptoms, general anxiety symp- toms (particularly if they have a history of trauma), and panic symptoms (particularly if they are victims of rela- tional assault). From a policy evaluation perspective, direct comparison of psychological health for hate crime and non- hate crime victims merits attention. Given the possibility that crimes not classified as hate crimes may be experi- enced as the latter due to internalized stigma, and given the findings that LGB victims experience greater psychological consequences of violent crime in general, there may be a need for extra protection for sexual minority non-hate crime victims. The present study possesses several strengths worth noting. Our results advance this literature through direct comparison to heterosexual victims. Moreover, a majority of the previous sexual orientation victimization literature pertains specifically to hate crimes. The present study broadened this focus to a general sample of violent crime victims. Several limitations of this study can inform future work. Although necessary for statistical reasons, our dichoto- mized definitions of sexual orientation and type of crime necessitate additional research to refine reported associa- tions in this study. Larger samples, and potential oversampling of LGBT victims, may solve these limita- tions. Also, generalizability of present findings cannot be extended to non-injured crime victims, or to injured crime victims who do not seek emergency medical treatment. Replication of our results would be beneficial in such a sample. Additionally, approximately one quarter (24.1 percent) of the present sample was European American. This portion is significantly less than the estimated 48 percent of violent crime victims who were European American in 2009 (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2009). Therefore, extrapolation of findings to predominantly European American samples must be made with caution until replication occurs. 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Abstract LGBT Victims: Rates of Victimization and Psychological Outcomes Sexual Orientation as a Moderator of Psychological Outcomes The Present Study Method Procedure Participants Measures Demographic Information Type of Crime Trauma History Clinical Symptoms Results Discussion Acknowledgment References << /ASCII85EncodePages false /AllowTransparency false /AutoPositionEPSFiles true /AutoRotatePages /None /Binding /Left /CalGrayProfile (Gray Gamma 2.2) /CalRGBProfile (sRGB IEC61966-2.1) /CalCMYKProfile (ISO Coated v2 300% \050ECI\051) /sRGBProfile (sRGB IEC61966-2.1) /CannotEmbedFontPolicy /Error /CompatibilityLevel 1.3 /CompressObjects /Off /CompressPages true /ConvertImagesToIndexed true /PassThroughJPEGImages true /CreateJobTicket false /DefaultRenderingIntent /Perceptual /DetectBlends true /DetectCurves 0.1000 /ColorConversionStrategy /sRGB /DoThumbnails true /EmbedAllFonts true /EmbedOpenType false /ParseICCProfilesInComments true /EmbedJobOptions true /DSCReportingLevel 0 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work_5kn7xtopvbexfa6fr7yam7rtwq	----	Ideologies of Language and Race in US Media Discourse about the Trayvon Martin Shooting Carnegie Mellon University From the SelectedWorks of Adam Hodges 2015 Ideologies of Language and Race in US Media Discourse about the Trayvon Martin Shooting Adam Hodges, Carnegie Mellon University Available at: https://works.bepress.com/adamhodges/58/ http://www.cmu.edu/ https://works.bepress.com/adamhodges/ https://works.bepress.com/adamhodges/58/ Ideologies of language and race in US media discourse about the Trayvon Martin shooting A D A M H O D G E S Carnegie Mellon University 5032 Forbes Avenue SMC 1070, Pittsburgh, PA 15289-1070, USA adamhodges@cmu.edu A B S T R A C T This article examines the discourse about race and racism that ensued in the US media after the shooting death of an African American youth, Trayvon Martin, by a neighborhood watch volunteer, George Zimmerman, in Febru- ary 2012. The analysis examines news programs from the three major cable television channels in the United States: CNN, Fox News, and MSNBC. The theoretical framework builds upon Hill’s (2008) discussion of the ‘folk theory of race and racism’ in contrast to critical race theory, and asks, to what extent does the mainstream media’s discourse about race remain embed- ded in folk ideas and to what extent (if at all) does the conversation move beyond those ideas? The paper aims to unpack the ideologies of race and lan- guage that underpin talk about race and racism in an effort to expose the hidden assumptions in the discourse that hinder more productive dialogue on the topic. (Critical race theory, folk theory of race and racism, George Zim- merman, ideology, language ideology, media discourse, race, race talk, racism, slurs, Trayvon Martin)* I N T R O D U C T I O N On the evening of February 26, 2012, Trayvon Martin, a seventeen-year-old African American high school student, was fatally shot by George Zimmerman, a twenty-eight-year-old neighborhood watch volunteer. The shooting occurred after Zimmerman had followed Martin through the neighborhood where he was staying and a confrontation ensued. Zimmerman claimed self-defense in the inci- dent and police let him go that night with no charge. After no further action was taken, Trayvon Martin’s family held a press conference to voice their frustrations over the lack of an arrest. A few days later, the story began to receive national media attention, which generated a great deal of nationwide discussion about race and racism through the summer of 2013 when Zimmerman faced trial and was ultimately acquitted of murder. In this article, I explore how race and racism factored into the mainstream media discourse that developed around the death of Trayvon Martin and trial of George © Cambridge University Press, 2015 0047-4045/15 $15.00 401 Language in Society 44, 401–423. doi:10.1017/S004740451500024X mailto:adamhodges@cmu.edu http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1017/S004740451500024X&domain=pdf http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1017/S004740451500024X&domain=pdf http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1017/S004740451500024X&domain=pdf http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1017/S004740451500024X&domain=pdf http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1017/S004740451500024X&domain=pdf http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1017/S004740451500024X&domain=pdf http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1017/S004740451500024X&domain=pdf http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1017/S004740451500024X&domain=pdf Zimmerman. I provide a case study that examines coverage from the three major cable channels in the United States: CNN, Fox News, and MSNBC. Although only part of the broader national conversation that took place, the reactions found on these networks provide important insight into mainstream views on race and racism. Many commentators have claimed that the United States entered a so- called ‘postracial’ era with the election of Barack Obama as the first African Amer- ican president. In addition, it is widely recognized that racial attitudes have shifted away from the overt prejudice that was the norm prior to the civil rights struggles of the 1960s. Today, most people denounce racism and publicly deny being racist (van Dijk 1992). Yet, as sociologists and race scholars have shown, racism—in its twenty-first century incarnation—remains a formidable barrier for African Ameri- cans and other minority groups in an American society that remains structured around white privilege (Bonilla-Silva 2013). Scholarship has examined the workings of this new form of racism—sometimes termed colorblind racism (Bonilla-Silva 2013) or racism 2.0 (Wise 2009)—from the perspective of social theory. In addition, language scholars have examined how everyday language supports this racism (van Dijk 1987; Bonilla-Silva & Forman 2000; Hill 2008), how attitudes toward language act as a proxy for attitudes about race (Lippi-Green 2011) and support discrimination (Baugh 2003), how lan- guage use as it varies by race impacts educational strategies and policy debates (Rickford & Rickford 2000; Alim & Smitherman 2012), and how discourse oper- ates in racializing practices (Dick & Wirtz 2011) and the construction of racial iden- tities (Bucholtz & Trechter 2001), including how racial identities intersect with other social categories (Alim & Reyes 2011). Much of this work endeavors to break down oversimplifications with a critical eye focused on ‘complicating race’ (Alim & Reyes 2011). Yet further work remains to integrate a discourse centered approach to race and racism with concepts from social theory in an effort to better inform the everyday understandings that impact public thinking. This article therefore bringstogether perspectives from critical race theory (Omi & Winant 1994; Feagin 2006; Bonilla-Silva 2013) with work in linguistic anthropology on language ideologies (Silverstein 1979; Woolard & Schieffelin 1994; Kroskrity 2004; Gal 2005; Bucholtz & Hall 2008; Hill 2008), and adopts the concern in critical discourse analysis with the ideological underpinnings of discourse (e.g. Fairclough 1989; van Dijk 1998) to explore the way ideologies of language and race underpin talk about race and racism. The aim of the analysis is to expose the hidden assump- tions in the discourse that hinder more productive dialogue. In particular, I draw from Hill’s (2008) discussion of the ‘folk theory of race and racism’ in contrast to critical theoretical concepts, and ask: To what extent does the mainstream media’s discourse about race after Trayvon remain embedded in folk ideas and to what extent (if at all) does the conversation move beyond those ideas? The discourse data that form the basis of the analysis come from a corpus of tele- vision show transcripts from CNN, Fox News, and MSNBC. The transcripts1 were collected using the LexisNexis database with the search terms ‘Trayvon Martin’. 402 Language in Society 44:3 (2015) AD A M HO D GE S The corpus covers a sixteen-month period that stretches from March 2012 through the end of July 2013. Trayvon’s shooting began to garner national media attention around March 12, 2012; and the verdict in Zimmerman’s trial was delivered on July 13, 2013. Thus, the corpus includes discussions that took place in the media from the time the nation became aware of the shooting through the post-trial period. In the analysis, I focus primarily on data during the first few months after the shooting as discussants worked to frame how race and racism factored into the incident. These same perspectives dominated the discourse through the end of the trial. The theoretical framework used in the analysis looks at racial and language ide- ologies in tandem, adopting an approach similar to the one used by Hill (2008) to examine the way language ideologies underpin the everyday language of racism. As Gal (2005:24) suggests, ‘language ideologies are never only about language’. Rather, they ‘provide insights into the working of ideologies more generally’. Before moving into the analysis, I lay out the theoretical groundwork. First, I con- trast the dominant racial ideology in American society, which is represented by what Hill (2008) terms the ‘folk theory of race and racism’, with ideas from critical race theory. Next, I discuss the role that the language ideology of ‘personalism’ plays in supporting the folk conception of racism. In the analysis, I examine how folk ideas impact the discourse as the media focus on the issue of an alleged slur uttered by Zimmerman on the night of the shooting, and struggle to understand the concepts of racial profiling and hate crimes. The analysis endeavors to provide greater clarity on the way hidden ideological assumptions—about both race and language—shape and constrain mainstream media discourse, resulting in a narrow and limited understanding of racism. I end by discussing implications of the analysis for mainstream understandings of race and racism. T H E O R E T I C A L B A C K G R O U N D In her analysis of the everyday language of racism, Hill (2008) contrasts what she terms the ‘folk theory of race and racism’ with the critical theory of race and racism. Hill borrows the concept of ‘folk theory’ from D’Andrade (1995), who defines a folk theory (similar to the companion term ‘folk model’) as an explanatory frame- work adopted by a society to provide everyday understandings of the world. All so- cieties employ folk theories, which may be quite complex. Yet folk theories differ from scientific theories in that they are not subject to falsification when met with contradictory evidence. In this way, ‘The folk model may have a good deal of truth to it, but it is not science’ (D’Andrade 1995:164). As Hill (2008) elaborates, folk theorizing often handles contradictory evidence through the process of ‘erasure’ or by employing ‘ad hoc’ or ‘stipulative’ explana- tions. Erasure, as discussed by Irvine & Gal (2000, inter alia), is an ideological process that renders contradictory evidence invisible through ‘forms of forgetting, denying, ignoring, or forcibly eliminating those distinctions or social facts that fail Language in Society 44:3 (2015) 403 I DE O LO GI E S O F L AN GU A GE A ND R AC E to fit the picture’ (Gal 2005:27). In this way, ‘Facts that are inconsistent with the ideological scheme either go unnoticed or get explained away’ (Irvine & Gal 2000:38). Thus, a folk theory may be a very powerful model for understanding the world, bolstered by a great deal of work and intellectual energy, yet it lacks the accuracy of rigorous academic theories. The power of folk theories derives from their close connection to everyday common sense thinking. Folk theories consist of taken-for-granted assumptions that people draw upon to interpret the world on a daily basis. Thus, like any hege- monic ideological system, folk theories can be difficult to dislodge from the collec- tive imagination. Folk theories are naturalized as self-evident, immutable, and undeniable facts about ‘the way things simply are’. As a racially based framework that explains and justifies the racial status quo in American society, the folk theory of race and racism represents what Bonilla-Silva (2013) terms a hegemonic racial ideology. The folk theory qua ideology provides a set of ingrained assumptions that structure understandings about race and racism. Its ideological assumptions may at times even underpin the discourse of committed anti-racists who share many of the ‘common sense’ assumptions that circulate in society. Where discourses about race and racism in the wake of Trayvon’s shooting draw from the folk theory’s ideas (even if unwittingly), those discourses further ra- tionalize the current racial structure. Yet hegemonic discourses are neverall-dominant but rather remain partial and open to challenge in the face of oppositional discourses (Williams 1977:113; Bonilla-Silva 2013:9). In contrast to the assumptions of the folk theory are the ideas and concepts of the critical theory, which draws upon scientific and social scientific research in an effort to understand the nature of race and how racism operates in society. Folk theory of race and racism vs. critical race theory The folk theory and critical theory differ markedly in how they conceptualize race and racism. Central to the folk theory’s understanding of race is an appeal to seem- ingly self-evident differences among people, such as skin color. These outward phenotypic differences are assumed to align with distinct clusters of genetic traits that developed during human evolution to form discrete types of people, or ‘races’. In contrast to the folk theory, the critical theory recognizes that what are taken to be biologically given categories are in fact socially constructed categories. Human genetic variation is much more continuous than the discrete categories of race imply. Deciding how to divide the continuum of human variation into groups is a historically situated social process; and different societies at different points in history have devised different classificatory systems. To say that race is socially constructed, as the critical theory claims, means that society provides an agreed-upon way to group people into categories. This process of racialization is supported by rules devised within the folk theory for how to sort people into those categories. Yet, as the critical theory points out, such rules are 404 Language in Society 44:3 (2015) AD A M HO D GE S social conceits rather than biological axioms. Nevertheless, to say that race is so- cially constructed does not mean that racial categories are any less real. It merely means that racial categories are real in a different way than if they were natural kinds. Namely, race is socially and politically real. It ‘produces real effects on the actors racialized as ‘black’ or ‘white’’ (Bonilla-Silva 2013:9). Since the folk theory sees racial differences as essential features of biology, it takes discrimination based on such differences to be a natural and inevitable aspect of the human condition. This does not justify racism, the folk theory holds, but it does provide the theory’s overriding explanation for why it exists: there will always be bigoted individuals who hate others because of their race, causing them to discriminate. Crucially, these assumptions lead the folk theory to locate racism in the individual. In this way, racism is reduced to ‘individual beliefs, intentions, and actions’ (Hill 2008:6). A great deal of discursive work is therefore undertaken by self-identified nonracists to call out and distance them- selves from individuals deemed to be ‘racists’. This ‘hunting for “racists”’, as Bonilla-Silva (2013:15) describes it, involves the ‘careful separation of good and bad, tolerant and intolerant Americans’. It is often accomplished by pointing to out- wardly racist behaviors and actions, such as the use of racial epithets or slurs (Hill 2008). Importantly, the folk theory’s reduction of racism to individual bigotry weakens the term, simply turning it into a synonym of prejudice. What is missing from the folk conception of racism, according to critical race theory, is consideration of its collective and institutional dimensions. Along with the recognition that race is socially constructed, it is important to recognize that racism is socially produced and reproduced. Although it includes individual acts of bigotry, it is larger than any single individual and depends upon a social system to support it. Racism is therefore viewed as a set of collective cultural pro- jects that create or maintain structures of domination based on categories of race (Omi & Winant 1994:71; Hill 2008:20–21). The systemic nature of racism (Feagin 2006) creates and perpetuates differential treatment of individuals by as- signing racial groups to different rungs of the social hierarchy. In this way, racism is integrally linked with the operation of power and tied to the way a society distributes resources. Although embodied, the workings of contemporary racism are much more insidious and invisible than during the Jim Crow era. Language ideologies, racial slurs, and the folk theory’s hunt for ‘racists’ As linguistic anthropologists have pointed out (Woolard & Schieffelin 1994; Gal 2005), language ideologies can serve to legitimate other types of ideologies, such as the dominant racial ideology represented by the folk theory of race and racism. Whereas ideology in the general sense of the term involves a system of thoughts and ideas that represents the world from the perspective of a particular social group, language ideologies involve sets of beliefs about language, language use or Language in Society 44:3 (2015) 405 I DE O LO GI E S O F L AN GU A GE A ND R AC E language users (Silverstein 1979; Kroskrity 2004; Bucholtz & Hall 2008). As Hill (2008:33–34) describes, language ideologies ‘represent themselves as forms of common sense’; they ‘rationalize and justify the forms and functions of text and talk’. They persist ‘because they have a certain internal coherence… they resonate with other cultural ideas’, and ‘because they support and reassert the interests… of [many, but not all of] those who share them’. Although language ideologies can sometimes rise to the level of conscious awareness, they typically operate as unrecog- nized premises or taken-for-granted assumptions (Kroskrity 2004:505; Hill 2008:39). These assumptions, as Hill (2008:33) notes, ‘shape and constrain discourse’. Of particular interest for the analysis that follows is the language ideology of ‘personalism’ (Rosaldo 1982), and, to a lesser extent, the language ideology of ‘referentialism’ (Silverstein 1976), and the related ‘baptismal ideology of meaning’. Personalism ‘holds that the most important part of linguistic meaning comes from the beliefs and intentions of the speaker’ (Hill 2008:38; see also, Rosaldo 1982; Duranti 1993; Hill 2000). Listeners must therefore calculate the speaker’s intentions to arrive at meaning (Johnstone 2008:235). When speakers communicate those intentions, they do so through words seen as stable carriers of meaning—an important element of referentialism’s view that language operates merely as a conveyor of information. As a result, words simply become containers of meaning, as Reddy (1979) points out in his critique of the ‘conduit metaphor’. In this way, words are assigned a single ‘correct’ meaning that can be traced ‘to an authoritative original source’ (Hill 2008:38) or baptismal moment. These language ideologies, particularly the ideology of personalism, provide support for the folk theory by enabling the ‘hunting for “racists”’ (Bonilla-Silva 2013). Since racist intentions lie at the heart of the folk theory’s conception of racism, personalism aids the uncovering of racists by matching words to an individ- ual’s true intentions and feelings, or ‘individual psychological dispositions’ (Bonilla-Silva 2013:7). As Hill (2008:65) describes, if a word ‘can be shown to be a slur that has ugly and pejorative meanings, then a person who uses it must be a racist who believes that the targets of the slur are ugly and deserving of the label and intends to communicate this fact’. In this way, uttering a slur—or con- versely, not uttering a slur—provides important evidence for determining whether racism, according to the folk theory, exists in a particular interaction. The ideologies of race and language therefore work in tandem to separate the good from the bad, the nonracists from the racists. As a consequence, the dominant racial ideology represented by the folk theory positions its limited view of racism (where to be a racist simply means to harbor hostility and ill feelings toward someone based on race) at the center of thinking about race. In the process, the com- plexities of (systemic and institutional) racism get erased from the discourse. The analysis that follows explores the way the issue of whether Zimmerman uttered a slur on the evening he killed Trayvon becomes central to the way the folk theory (supported by the language ideology of personalism) jockeys with the critical per- spective to shape views about how racism factored into the incident. 406 Language in Society 44:3 (2015) AD A M HO D GE S D I S C O U R S E O F R A C E A N D R A C I S M A F T E R T R A Y V O N ’ S S H O O T I N G In the discourse surrounding Trayvon’s shooting, arguably the most contentious aspect of the incident hinged on the different perceptions of the way race and racism factored into it. At the outset, the initial framing of the incident arose out of the frustrations expressed by Trayvon Martin’s family at the lack of an arrest in his shooting. As the story gained attention in the national media, these frustra- tions were voiced in the type of coverage seen in excerpt (1) from CNN. (1) Newsroom, CNN 1:00 PM EST, March 13, 2012 Malveaux: A family is calling for justice after a neighborhood watch captain shoots and kills an unarmed teenager. Seventeen-year-old Trayvon Martin was shot to death last month walking to his dad’s house. The shooter, George Zimmerman, claims he acted in self- defense. Zimmerman has not been charged. Which brings us to today’s ‘Talk Back’ question, what do you think should happen? Nazim says, “Outragous [sic]. If I, a black man, had done that to a white youth going home, just like this young man did, I would be in jail. Why did the block watch captain have a gun in the first place?” Central to the framing of the issue in this line of reporting is a lack of justice. Ques- tions are raised about why a teenager who is walking home, minding his own busi- ness, ends up being shot dead by a neighborhood watch volunteer who pursued him against the explicit advice of a police dispatcher. As can be seen in coverage like that in excerpt (1), these questions are intimately connected with race. The injustice res- onates with many as another instantiation of a long historical pattern in US society where nonblack killers of blacks have literally gotten away with murder. In excerpt (1), the viewer named Nazim quoted by CNN journalist Suzanne Mal- veaux points out what many in tune with historical patterns of racism in US society painfully recognize—namely, if the shooting had been done by a black man who followed a white person through the neighborhood, his claim of self-defense would have been met with a great deal more skepticism. As Childress (2012) sug- gests, such skepticism holds irrespective of whether a ‘stand your ground’ law is on the books, as it was in Florida.2 It is through this historical lens—where the race of the victim has all too often determined whether the killer would be further investi- gated or simply set free—that the issue of Trayvon’s shooting entered onto the na- tional stage. This initial framing of the case is conducive to a critical reading of the role played by race and racism, since it recognizes that racism consists of institutional biases that operate systemically. Where many questions existed about what happened and much doubt surrounded the circumstances of Trayvon’s death, the police, acting in line with a history of institutional bias, chose to give the benefit of the doubt to Zimmerman at the scene of the shooting. This is how racism operates. It provides Language in Society 44:3 (2015) 407 I DE O LO GI E S O F L AN GU A GE A ND R AC E default biases based on race that help decide who receives the benefit of the doubt in certain situations. At issue in this framing, therefore, is the lack of justice served by the police (and by the system) in holding a young black man’s shooter accountable. There is concern that this fits a historical pattern of systemic, institutional racism. Discourse surrounding racial slurs in the folk theory’s hunt for ‘racists’ Yet in its conceptualization of racism, the folk theory does not recognize its insti- tutional and systemic dimensions. For this reason, the initial framing of the incident does not accord well with the assumptions of the folk theory. According to the folk theory, racism on the institutional level is a thing of the past, supposedly having been overcome with the civil rights legislation of the 1960s. After leaving behind the Jim Crow era, the nation is viewed as having purged itself of institutional racism. Insofar as racism still exists, it is seen as merely existing in uneducated, backward individuals. Thus, if racism is an issue in Trayvon’s shooting, according to the logic of folk theory, then it could only be an issue insofar as the shooter was a racist—again, where a racist is defined as someone harboring hostility and ill intent toward Trayvon because of his skin color. The question of whether Zimmerman uttered a racial slur during a call to police on the night of the shooting therefore becomes central to establishing his racist cre- dentials. On March 21 and April 4, 2012, Anderson Cooper’s show on CNN ded- icated substantial air time to playing the 911 tape and trying to determine if Zimmerman uttered a slur. In excerpt (2), Cooper introduces the show on March 21. (2) Anderson Cooper 360 Degrees, CNN 10:00 PM EST, March 21, 2012 Cooper: … Up close tonight, what George Zimmerman said or did not say in the 911 call that he made moments before he shot Trayvon Martin. Did he use a racist slur? There’s a big debate raging over two words Zimmerman used in the call or may have used. Some hear an ugly racial insult and an expletive. Others hear nothing of the sort. … Now, before we tell you what the alleged slur is, we’re going to let you listen for yourself with fresh ears and make up your own mind what you hear. For that, we enlisted the help of one of CNN’s top audio engineers. We need to warn some of you, the language you’re going to hear is offensive, but we’re going to play it for you without bleeping anything, because it’s evidence, and if we bleep it, you’re going to have a harder time hearing what some believe is a racial slur. As he sets up the show in excerpt (2) Cooper asks, “Did he use a racist slur?” The answer to the question, underpinned by the language ideology of personalism, holds important weight within the framework of the folk theory; and the question forms the basis of the show’s featured report that night. Cooper frames the answer as an either-or response (much like the folk theory frames individuals as either racists or nonracists): “Some hear an ugly racial insult and an expletive. Others hear nothing of the sort.” As he prepares to play the tape, Cooper promises to 408 Language in Society 44:3 (2015) AD A M HO D GE S let the viewers “listen for yourself with fresh ears and make up your own mind”. To help the audience determine what was uttered, the show “enlisted the help of one of CNN’s top audio engineers”. The show then cuts to a prerecorded video that features CNN correspondent Gary Tuchman in an audio editing room with Rick Sierra, CNN’s audio design specialist. Excerpt (3) picks up as the videotape begins to play. (3) Anderson Cooper 360 Degrees, CNN 10:00 PM EST, March 21, 2012 Participants: Gary Tuchman, CNN correspondent; Rick Sierra, CNN audio design specialist; George Zimmerman, shooting suspect [Begin videotape] Tuchman: This is edit room 31 at CNN Center in Atlanta. This is one of the most sophisticated audio edit suites in the broadcast news business. Right here is Rick Sierra. He’s our audio design specialist. He’s one of the best audio experts in the business. Rick, if you can, I have not listened to this portion of the 911 tape at all. I just want to hear it raw right now, if you can play maybe ten seconds before it and let’s listen. Sierra: OK. Zimmerman: … down towards the entrance of the neighborhood. Unidentified male: OK. Which entrance is that that he’s headed towards? Zimmerman: The back entrance. [unintelligible] Tuchman: [voice-over] You may not have heard the moment in question, because it was so quick. [on camera] How long does that portion last that everyone is talking about? Sierra: A second, eighteen frames. Tuchman: Eighteen frames, so that’s about 1.6 seconds? Sierra: Correct. Tuchman: So let’s listen to it like ten times in a row if we can. Sierra: OK. Tuchman: [voice-over] What we’re listening for is the racial slur ‘coons’. It follows the ‘F’ word. Some people say they hear it. Others say they don’t. Zimmerman: Fucking coons. Fucking coons. Fucking coons. Tuchman: [on camera] It’s certainly a lot clearer when we listen to it this way. Sierra: Correct. Tuchman: Is there anything else we can do with that audio to make it even clearer? Sierra: Well, you can—I already did a little bit of boosting at 2.2 kilo hertz and at 4.6. It’s boosting the high end of the voice. When listening to the show, the utterance is undoubtedly difficult to decipher. In the written transcripts provided by CNN and shown in excerpt (3), the first pass of the utterance is even marked ‘unintelligible’. This is followed by Tuchman’s voice- over in which he states: “You may not have heard the moment in question, because it was so quick.” Tuchman and Sierra then determine that the segment in question amounts to “about 1.6 seconds”. Language in Society 44:3 (2015) 409 I DE O LO GI E S O F L AN GU A GE A ND R AC E From an intertextual perspective, the insertion of this clip from the 911 tape into the context of the news program provides a fascinating look at media recontextuali- zation. Obviously, the evidence is anything but self-evident and the journalists must do quite a bit of discursivework to both precontextualize and recontextualize the tape. As Oddo (2014) discusses, precontextualization involves a process whereby future words are previewed and evaluated before they are spoken. This goes hand in hand with the process of recontextualization whereby prior words are replayed with ‘varying degrees of reinterpretation’ (Bakhtin 1986:91; Bauman & Briggs 1990). Despite the promise to let viewers hear for themselves the tape, Cooper, in excerpt (2), and Tuchman, in excerpt (3), precontextualize the tape by providing a supportive context for hearing a slur. Notably, in excerpt (2), Cooper issues a warning for viewer discretion: “We need to warn some of you, the language you’re going to hear is of- fensive.” This both presupposes a possible slur and primes viewers to cognitively as- similate the sounds they hear into a slur. After the initial pass of the segment in excerpt (3), Tuchman directs Sierra to play it again: “So let’s listen to it like ten times in a row if we can.” In a subsequent voice-over, Tuchman directs the audience on what to hear: “What we’re listening for is the racial slur ‘coons’. It follows the ‘F’ word.” The tape then repeats the same 1.6-second segment several times in quick succession. This time, the CNN transcript provides intelligible words in line with the prompt from the journalist on what to hear: “Fucking coons. Fucking coons. Fucking coons.” Anderson Cooper’s show on April 4 revisited the topic. Again, the show featured a pre-record- ed segment inside an audio editing room with another expert audio engineer. This time, however, they determined that the word was ‘cold’ not ‘coons’. The key point of interest for the current analysis is not which interpretation is the ‘correct’ one. Rather, the point is to underscore how the media’s focus on whether or not a racist slur was uttered in a difficult-to-decipher 1.6-second clip relates to the dominant ideology. Namely, the exercise in accusing or absolving Zimmerman of uttering a slur provides meaning to the incident in line with the folk theory’s con- ception of racism. It directs participants in the conversation to engage in a binary debate over whether racism had anything to do with the incident, overlooking the complex ways subtle forms of racism undergirded the incident from the moment Zimmerman began following Trayvon to the police department’s response. Ander- son Cooper, like his CNN colleague Piers Morgan (featured later), arguably lean to the liberal end of the spectrum as opposed to journalists on the conservative Fox News channel. However, folk ideological assumptions run deeper than these ordi- nary political distinctions. To be clear, the issue of whether a racial slur was uttered does hold some import in that a violent act committed with racial animus constitutes a hate crime. More- over, for the FBI to get involved in the prosecution of a hate crime against Zimmer- man, they would have to show that he acted with overt racial bias against Trayvon. Thus, from a legal perspective, whether or not Zimmerman uttered a racist slur could help determine if he acted with racial animus and could be charged 410 Language in Society 44:3 (2015) AD A M HO D GE S accordingly. Historically, the struggle for civil rights has been marked by cases where the federal government has been able to pursue justice where local or state authorities have deliberately turned a blind eye toward crimes against African Americans. Given the apparent inadequacies of the local police department’s re- sponse, the federal government could potentially guarantee some justice if it could find evidence of a hate crime. Yet the conversation in the media struggled to provide the historical and social context for any potential federal involvement in the case. More importantly, rather than delving into a critically informed discussion of hate crime or, more critically, how the Sanford police department’s actions could be viewed through the lens of institutional racism, the media’s focus on the slur simply feeds the folk theory’s ob- session with hunting for racists and elides from consideration the subtle forms of racism that impacted the incident. It was as if Zimmerman could only be culpable for killing Trayvon if he were a ‘racist’ in the image of a Ku Klux Klan member. On the flip side, if Zimmerman could be proven not to be a racist (per the folk theory’s conception), then the killing could somehow be seen as defensible, or at least having nothing to do with race. The next excerpt illustrates the way the slur features into the discourse vis-à-vis the folk theory. Here, Sean Hannity of Fox News interviews George Zimmerman’s father, Robert Zimmerman. (4) Hannity: Interview with Robert Zimmerman, Fox 9:30 PM EST, April 4, 2012 Hannity: There have been implications of that been made. One was that on the 911 tape that we just played, that he might have used a racial slur. That has been countered by other people. Two stories that I recently read, and one is that is it true that your son would tutor African-American and minority children on the weekend. And is it also true that there was a case involving the Sanford police in which one of– a son of a police officer hit an African-American homeless man and he spoke out against the policeman. Is that true, too, sir? Zimmerman: It is true. Concerning the assault on the homeless man, he went around to churches and put flyers on people’s cars. He just felt sorry for this homeless man not having anyone to support him. And he– Hannity: Has he ever used any racial slur that you know of, sir? Zimmerman: None whatsoever. In the exchange in excerpt (4), Hannity begins his line of questioning with reference to the controversy surrounding the alleged slur. As noted earlier, finding a clear cut racial motive would satisfy the folk theory’s concern that the incident involved racism. Likewise, determining that George Zimmerman did not use a slur would absolve him from holding racist intentions and thereby dismiss racism as a concern in the incident. Hannity inquires, “Has he [George] ever used any racial slur that you know of, sir?” Robert Zimmerman responds, “None whatsoever”. Language in Society 44:3 (2015) 411 I DE O LO GI E S O F L AN GU A GE A ND R AC E The implication here is clear according to the logic of the folk theory—namely, George Zimmerman is not a racist. In Hannity’s preface to this question about the slur, he mentions two stories about George Zimmerman that further establish his nonracist credentials per the folk theory. The first is that he “would tutor African American and minority chil- dren on the weekend”. According to the folk theory, such a benevolent action lies at odds with racist practices. The second story involves the way he stood up for an African American homeless man who was unjustly treated by the police. Both these stories received ample discussion in the national media; and both imply that such actions are at odds with the folk theory’s conception of someone who would harbor racist intentions. The conclusion, therefore, is not only that Zim- merman is not a racist, but also, as a result, that race and racism have nothing to do with Zimmerman’s shooting of Trayvon. The reframing of the incident into an either-or question of whether Zimmerman is a racist simplifies the complexities of racism. It rejects the historical context pro- vided in the initial framing of the incident, and turns the discussion away from un- derstanding racism as systemic, institutional, and often invisible. It also works to uphold the racial status quo by denying the legitimacy of the critical perspective provided in the initial framing. Instead, it provides a reading of the shooting in line with the dominant ideology of the folk theory. Discourse surrounding ‘racial profiling’ and its confusion with ‘hate crimes’ The media discussion quickly began to focus on the issue of racial profiling. Al- though the concept of racial profiling requires critical concepts to fully understand and articulate, the folk theory nevertheless finds a way to handle it within its own framework. On the one hand, racial profiling strikes at the heart of the critical theory’s concern with systemic, institutionalized practices. On the other hand, the embodiment of racial profiling in the actions of individuals appeals to the folk theory’s focus on individual psychological dispositions. Crucially, under- standings of racial profiling depend upon understandings about race and racism, which vary considerably between the critical and folk perspectives. Thus, a situa- tion develops where everyone across the nation is ostensibly talking about the same topic—racial profiling—and yet operating with different working definitions of that topic. In this way, much of the discourse on racial profiling in relation to the case lacked a common ground starting point. Moreover, where the folk theory fails to recognize forms of racism beyond indi- vidual, racially motivated bigotry, the discourse surrounding racial profiling con- fuses the concept with racially motivated hate crimes. This focuses the discourse on the issue of racist intent per the folk theory’s focus on individual psychological dispositions (bolstered by the language ideology of personalism), and erases from 412 Language in Society 44:3 (2015) AD A M HO D GE S consideration forms of systemic and institutional racism recognized by the critical perspective. In the next excerpt, CNN’s Piers Morgan interviews George Zimmerman’s brother, and addresses the issue of the alleged racial slur introduced earlier. (5) Piers Morgan, CNN 9:00 PM EST, March 29, 2012 Morgan: I mean, CNN got that slowed down, replayed it ten times. I heard it. I’m pretty sure what I heard. I’m pretty sure it was a racial slur. What else could it have been? Zimmerman: It could have been anything. If we slowed– Morgan: You know your brother. Zimmerman: I do. Morgan: And you look like him, you sound like him. Zimmerman: Right. He speaks two languages fluently. Morgan: What do you think he’s saying? … Morgan: You know what, the reason I’m asking is that if he is saying what I and many others believe him to be saying, it adds a racial element to this. It adds fuel to the fire that this was a case of racial profiling, that your brother saw a young black boy in a hoodie and decided he had to deal with him. In excerpt (5), Morgan notes of the sound heard on the 911 tape (recall excerpt (3)), “I’m pretty sure it was a racial slur”. He then asks Zimmerman, “What do you think he’s saying?” After Zimmerman’s response (which unsurprisingly fails to confirm it was a slur), Morgan provides further context for understanding the import of the question: “the reason I’m asking… It adds fuel to the fire that this was a case of racial profiling.” Here, Morgan seems to conflate the notion of racial profiling with a hate crime. However, this makes sense within the bounds of the folk theory where subtle forms of systemic racism are erased from consideration and one is only left with racism in the form of individual animus and bigotry. The line of reasoning explicitly articulated by Morgan follows the folk theory’s premise that race could only have factored into the in- cident if Zimmerman was a ‘racist’ in terms of holding hostility and ill will toward Trayvon based on his race. Morgan returns to the issue of the slur on his April 5 show as he talks with his guest, Charles Blow from The New York Times. (6) Piers Morgan, CNN 9:00 PM EST, April 5, 2012 Morgan: Now, earlier on CNN, this was played repeatedly. Enough times, and, you know, again, this is changing every day. Yesterday, it appeared to be f-ing cold. Today, it seems to be more likely and this is the view being put forward by Zimmerman’s attorneys that actually the wording was ‘F-ing punks’. Now, whether it’s F-ing cold or F-ing punks, what it isn’t is a racist comment. … Language in Society 44:3 (2015) 413 I DE O LO GI E S O F L AN GU A GE A ND R AC E I mean, you know, there’s very little evidence if you actually study it. … Very little evidence to suggest that he is racist. There just isn’t any. … …the allegation that he’s racist and acting from a racially motivated intent with Trayvon Martin at the moment, I think, is unproven. Blow: Well, it’s not proven, however, that– setting it up that way, Piers, is a logical fallacy. You do not have to be a raging, you know, white sheet-wearing racist your entire life to act in a moment on a racial prejudice. And so I think we have to always separate those two things out. I can be involved with all sorts of people my entire life, treat them very nicely, and at the same time, at a point where I find myself feeling threatened, I can act on racial prejudice. Those things are not usually [mutually] exclusive. People have to really stop setting those things up to be opposites. Notably, in excerpt (6), the debate over what was thought to be heard on the 911 tapes—oscillating in the national conversation from ‘coons’ to ‘cold’ to ‘punks’— frames the segment. At this point, Morgan appears convinced that the alleged slur failed to materialize as such with the word now thought to be ‘cold’ or ‘punks’. Morgan spells out the consequences of this: “Now, whether it’s F-ing cold or F-ing punks, what it isn’t is a racist comment.” With the slur now withdrawn as evidence, the charge of racism falls away per the folk theory. Also in line with the folk theory, this absolves the incident of having anything to do with race or racism. In the exchange, Blow resists Morgan’s implication that racism is not an issue just because Zimmerman might be absolved from being a racist per the folk theory’s conception—which Blow poetically phrases as being “a raging, you know, white sheet-wearing racist your entire life”. Blow attempts to distinguish between a racially motivated act of violence (hate crime) and actions motivated by racially biased assumptions (racial profiling). As he explains, one can deny any outward racial animus but still “act on racial prejudice. Those things are not usually [mutually] exclusive. People have to really stop setting those things up to be opposites”. Here, Blow pushes the conversation away from the assumptions of the folk theory and attempts to introduce a more nuanced understanding of racism per the critical theory. Defined as casting suspicion upon someone as having committed an offense due to their race, the critical perspective views racial profiling as part of the systemic forms of racism that include stereotyped attitudes and discriminatory habits and actions (Feagin 2006:xii). Notably, racial profiling draws from negative stereotypes, such as the image of young black men as criminals, to cast suspicion on innocent individuals who fit that racial classification. This practice depends upon a racialized system that cultivates cultural stereotypes in line with the racial order. Those stereo- types then work to maintain the racial order. Although racial profiling can be con- scious, it need not be and often occurs as the result of unexamined assumptions that permeate quotidian interactions. Even racial minorities often internalize aspects of the dominant racial ideology (Bonilla-Silva 2013). 414 Language in Society 44:3 (2015) AD A M HO D GE S Work in social psychology has shown that the stereotype of blacks as violent and criminal is alive and well in American society (Eberhardt, Goff, Purdie, & Davis 2004:876, inter alia). But most importantly, studies demonstrate that this stereotype cannot be explained—as the folk theory would have it—simply as the conscious manifestation of an overt racist’s bigoted beliefs and actions. Rather, the consistent and frequent association between blacks and crime gener- ally occurs automatically. That is, the operation of such stereotypes is not subject to intentional control but is rather the result of internalized understandings that become ingrained as part of our habitual actions. In other words, such stereotypes become part of what Bourdieu (1977) terms the habitus—a set of predispositions for acting in the world. Note that one need not identify as a racist nor intend ill will toward someone based on race to trigger a racial stereotype. As Wise (2010:v) writes, ‘implicit racial biases (which often exist side-by-side with an outwardly non-racist de- meanor and persona) frequently influence the way we view and treat others’. This cannot be explained by the folk theory. Rather, one needs the critical theory to fully grasp the complexity of racist stereotypes. This requires recogniz- ing that racism not only operates in a visible manner, as it does in the overt words of hate hurled by bigots; but that it also operates much more invisibly, as it does in the habitual response to casting a young black man as ‘suspicious’ as he walks through a neighborhood at night. The fact that blacks are often racially profiled typically goes unnoticed and unacknowledged by those who have never had to experience such forms of racism themselves—such as the familiar Driving While Black (DWB) encounters widely recognized among African Americans. Feagin and Vera use the term social alexithymia to refer to ‘the inability of a great many whites to understand where African Americans and other people of color are coming from and what their racialized experiences are like’ (Feagin 2010:89). The folk theory does not have a way to handle such racialized experi- ences, including racial profiling. The next two excerpts illustrate the way understandings of racial profiling are refracted through the lens of the folk theory by reducing the concept of racial profiling to being a ‘racist’ and hence conflating racial profiling with a hate crime. (7) Piers Morgan, CNN 9:00 PM EST, April 4, 2012 Uhrig: … Let me suggest something to you. It is a terrible tragedy that Trayvon Martin is dead. His parents are suffering unimaginable grief. The grief is not being helped by people coming to town, telling falsehoods in order to raise racial strife. The morning of February 26th, we had a peaceful community where blacks and whites went to church together, stood in line at the grocery together, and didn’t think that we had a problem. After some folks came to town and had their little rallies and made irresponsible speeches about murder and racial profiling– he’s not a racist, it wasn’t profiling. Language in Society 44:3 (2015) 415 I DE O LO GI E S O F L AN GU A GE A ND R AC E (8) Hannity: Interview with George Zimmerman, Fox 9:00 PM EST, July 3, 2012 Hannity: What do you want to say to people that did rush to judgment, that suggested that there was racial profiling in this case, and that there was some other motivation in this case? Zimmerman: That I’m not a racist and I’m not a murderer. In excerpt (7), CNN journalist Piers Morgan is talking with Hal Uhrig, attorney for George Zimmerman. The topic of racial profiling has arisen and Uhrig responds to defend his client, saying: “he’s not a racist, it wasn’t profiling.” Likewise in excerpt (8), Fox News journalist Sean Hannity interviews George Zimmerman, and asks him: “What do you want to say to people… that suggested that there was racial profiling in this case…?” In his response, Zimmerman replies, “I’m not a racist.” Embedded in both of these responses is an implicit understanding of racial profiling based upon the folk theory’s conception of racism as something only prac- ticed by outwardly identifiable ‘racists’. In this way, racial profiling is stripped of its systemic, institutionalized aspects and focus is placed solely on the actions and in- tentions of the individual who must be labeled either a racist or not a racist. If Zim- merman is found not to be a racist, according to the folk theory, he therefore could not have racially profiled Martin. Importantly, the unconscious enactment of racial stereotypes that are shared by even outwardly nonracist individuals is elided from consideration. What is often lost in such discussions of racial profiling is an explicit articulation of how the term is defined. The next two excerpts feature instances where attempts are made by speakers to do just that from a critical perspective. (9) Special forum hosted by Soledad O’Brien, Beyond Trayvon: Race and Justice in America, CNN 10:00 PM EST, March 31, 2012 O’Brien: Do you have to be a racist, and sometimes I think we throw that word around a lot, but do you have to be a racist to racially profile somebody? Ogletree: No, not at all. … (10) Jane Velez-Mitchell, CNN 7:00 PM EST, April 12, 2012 Natalie Jackson, attorney for Trayvon Martin’s family Jackson: Well, first of all, no one said ‘racism’. That’s the jump that always gets made from racial profiling. Racial profiling means that you thought something negative of someone based on the way what [sic] they appeared in their race. That doesn’t mean that you’re a racist. In both of these excerpts, the assumptions of the folk theory are directly confronted and challenged. In excerpt (9), CNN journalist Soledad O’Brien queries Charles Ogletree, a professor at the Harvard Law School, on the nature of racial profiling. “Do you have to be a racist…to racially profile somebody?” asks O’Brien. In 416 Language in Society 44:3 (2015) AD A M HO D GE S response, Ogletree replies, “No, not at all.” Likewise, in excerpt (10) from another show on CNN, Natalie Jackson, the Martin family’s attorney, attempts to detach the concept of racial profiling from the folk theory’s fixation on hunting for racists. After defining racial profiling, she notes that it “doesn’t mean that you’re a racist”. That is, it doesn’t mean you’re a racist as the term is defined within the folk theory. Where the folk theory simply views racial profiling through the lens of individual bigotry, the critical perspective recognizes that the practices of nega- tive stereotyping and racial profiling are distributed across a wide range of individ- uals and institutions. In examples such as these, a few lessons might be drawn for those interested in shifting public understandings of race and racism. After all, dialogue about race that truly seeks to overcome racism requires the arduous task of supplanting folk ideas with critically informed understandings. Crucially, the chance must be seized to redefine terms that have taken-for-granted meanings, such as the term racism. As discussed earlier, definitions of racism differ markedly between the folk theory and critical theory. All too often, however, speakers attempting to insert a critical perspective into discussions simply accept the working definition provided by the dominant ideology. In excerpt (10), Jackson defines racial profiling but fails to redefine racism in critical terms. As a result, the move may fall short with those viewers that implicitly think ‘individual bigotry’ (per the folk theory) when they hear the term racism. Likewise, in (9), the exchange works to educate the audience about racial profiling; but again the move rests upon an understanding of racism, and racism in its unmarked form carries the narrow, unspoken meaning attributed to it by the folk theory. More could be done to explicitly redefine racism in institutional and systemic terms. This is an important part of a more general strat- egy that involves calling into question folk-theoretical assumptions when speakers use those assumptions as the basis for claims. Earlier in excerpt (6), for example, Charles Blow does this when he challenges the either–or binary of the folk theory’s conception of racism. In the mainstream media discourse shown here, it is no easy task to displace the assumptions of the folk theory with the understanding that racial profiling is part of the wider, systemic operation of racism. The discursive struggle between the folk and critical perspectives can be seen playing out in interactions like those seen in the two excerpts that follow. (11) Hannity, Fox 9:00 PM EST, July 17, 2013 Michael Bond, Former NAACP deputy director Hannity: … Here with reaction to this and more, professor of Pediatric Neurosurgery, Johns Hopkins University, Dr. Benjamin Carson and the former deputy director of the NAACP Michael Bond. Michael, welcome back. Can you cite… Bond: How are you doing, Sean? Language in Society 44:3 (2015) 417 I DE O LO GI E S O F L AN GU A GE A ND R AC E Hannity: … any evidence that there’s any racial antipathy in George Zimmerman, his life, his background, this case? The FBI looked in to sixteen months and found nothing. Do you know anything? Bond: Well, I don’t know anything specific. I don’t believe that George Zimmerman is a racist per se, but I do believe that George Zimmerman had prejudices that formed his assumptions about Trayvon Martin. Hannity: Do you have any evidence, though? Bond: To commit this horrendous act. Well, I think the killing that has taken place of Trayvon Martin is sufficient enough. You know, he was tried– Hannity: That has nothing to do– wait, sir. With all due respect, that has nothing to do with race. Bond: Well, it does have something to do with race and the assumptions that George Zimmerman made that particular night. George Zimmerman made a gross assumption about Trayvon Martin, that he was in that community up to no good and that predicated his actions. If he had not made those assumptions, he would have never have gotten out of the car, he would have never called the police. Hannity: Mr. Bond? Bond: And Trayvon Martin would still be alive. Hannity: Mr. Bond, you’re making assumptions here yourself because what we do know about the case is George Zimmerman, there was a crime ridden neighborhood. Had a lot of break- ins. He was part of a neighborhood watch. He saw somebody he didn’t know who lived there and that was very close to a home, seemingly looking in to a window. Now, does that not sound suspicious and transcend the issue of race? (12) The Ed Show, MSNBC 8:00 PM EST, March 29, 2012 Schultz: Here’s ‘The Daily Caller’s’ Tucker Carlson– was on Fox pushing the Hannity line of attack. [begin video clip] Carlson: For people to weigh in, for professional race baiters, like the ones you just saw on television, for the president himself to weigh in and make this a simple parable about white racism is very foolish, because it may not turn out to bolster that accusation, for one. For another, do you really want to have a conversation about who kills who in this country? Do you want to look at the statistics? I mean, this is not a conversation that we ought to be– that political figures ought to be weighing in on. [end video clip] Schultz: Doctor, what’s your response to that? Peterson: Mr. Carlson, once again, is kind of way off base here. Remember, he was behind some of the Breitbart crap that we have had to deal with in the past. This to me just smacks of the problem on the whole, is that these folks are engaged in trying to distract us from the mission of pursuing justice for Trayvon Martin. The bottom line here is institutional racism is an important thing for us to consider when we look at the ways in which he was profiled by Mr. Zimmerman, in the ways in which the Sanford Police Department historically has operated, and the ways in which the Sanford Police Department handled this particular case. We have to ask some of those big questions about institutions. You know what? They can accuse me of being a racist and accuse us of being race baiters as much as they want to. We are still going to pursue the case, pursue justice, and keeping talking about the things that are important for this particular. 418 Language in Society 44:3 (2015) AD A M HO D GE S In excerpt (11), Sean Hannity of Fox News is talking with former NAACP director Michael Bond. The back-and-forth between them exemplifies the differing assump- tions about racism and racial profiling. Whereas Hannity reduces racial profiling to ‘racial antipathy’ and challenges Bond to in effect prove to him that George Zim- merman is a racist, Bond replies, “I don’t believe that George Zimmerman is a racist per se”. Notably, the common operating definition of ‘racist’ that both draw from here is the folk theory’s conception of racists as backward and bigoted individuals. In excerpt (12) from MSNBC’s The Ed Show, a video clip of conservative com- mentator Tucker Carlson is played by the show’s host, Ed Schultz. In that clip, Carlson summarizes the case as “a simple parable of white racism”, and goes on to note that further evidence “may not turn out to bolster that accusation”. Again, the underlying conception of racism in Carlson’s comments derives from the folk theory’s definition of racism and its fixation on hunting for racists while denying the systemic nature of racism in a racially structured society. According to the assumptions of the folk theory, racism is an ‘accusation’ made of ‘racists’ rather than something everyone needs to confront in themselves. On the whole, the perspective undergirded by the folk theory works to remove consideration of race from the discussion and minimize racism. As Hannity notes in excerpt (11), Zimmerman’s killing of Martin “has nothing to do with race”. Like- wise, in excerpt (12), Carlson views talk of white racism as “foolish”. These moves represent one of the central frames of colorblind racism documented by Bonilla- Silva (2013:77) where the minimization of racism ‘suggests discrimination is no longer a central factor affecting minorities’ life chances’. In line with the folk theory’s assumptions, the nation is seen to have moved beyond race. Moreover, the only types of racism that are recognized include outward acts of racial bigotry. After all, it is easy to recognize overt hate crimes, like the murder of James Byrd Jr. by white supremacists,3 but more subtle forms of racism that fail to neatly accord with such cases are dismissed as having nothing to do with race. In excerpt (12), James Peterson, director of Africana Studies and associate pro- fessor of English at Lehigh University, reacts to Carlson’s comments by stating: “The bottom line here is institutional racism is an important thing for us to consider when we look at the ways in which he was profiled by Mr. Zimmerman, in the ways in which the Sanford Police Department historically has operated, and the ways in which the Sanford Police Department handled this particular case.” This statement provides a perfect synopsis of the way race and racism has been framed in relation to the Trayvon Martin incident from the critical perspective. At issue are the ways racism impacted how Trayvon Martin was perceived by George Zimmerman— namely, as a criminal suspect in accord with stereotypes that associate young black men with crime—and how the Sanford police affirmed Zimmerman’s suspi- cion and gave Zimmerman the benefit of the doubt after he killed an unarmed black teenager. In contrast, the folk theory dissolves the racial dimensions from the inci- dent by absolving Zimmerman from being an individual ‘racist’ and fails to Language in Society 44:3 (2015) 419 I DE O LO GI E S O F L AN GU A GE A ND R AC E empathize with the concerns of the Martin family and supporters over the historical patterns of injustice that surround the case. T H E F O L K T H E O R Y ’ S E N T R E N C H M E N T I N M A I N S T R E A M M E D I A D I S C O U R S E Although responses to Trayvon’s shooting across the nation were much more diverse than illustrated in this case study of cable news channels, the entrenchment of the folk theory across these three networks with decidedly different ideological proclivities (in ordinary political terms) illustrates how deep the assumptions of the folk theory run in mainstream thinking. Whereas one might expect the types of reactions seen in the examples from conservative Fox News hosts, even the more liberal leaning CNN hosts draw upon the premises of the folk theory and reproduce the dominant ideology. Only MSNBC stands out for entertaining the most pointed critical challenges to the folk theory, but those challenges mainly come from the guests. A key difficulty in moving America’s conversation about race forward is that focusing on the concrete, overtly racist actions of hate-filled individuals is much easier than understanding the way historical patterns of thought have contributed to a racialized society. Moreover, the format of cable television news, with its short sound bite segments and quick repartees, may lend itself to the easily under- stood either–or binaries and taken-for-granted assumptions that the folk theory offers. To understand the way subtle forms of racism permeate the social fabric demands critical reflection on the way racism has systemically and institutionally shaped the racial hierarchy. It demands reflecting on the assumptions that operate as unexamined ‘common sense’ in everyday interactions. Feagin (2006:xii) notes, ‘This truth about systemic racism in this society is not easy to communicate to many Americans, especially to most white Americans’. Moreover, it can be difficult to introduce into the generic framework of television news shows that strive to be as entertaining as informative, if not more so. Moving the conversation about race and racism forward nevertheless requires overcoming many entrenched ideas that have become naturalized as ‘common sense’ understandings. One of these is that racism is simply something that ignorant people do—and typically do overtly in a way that is easy to recognize so that they can be singled out as ‘racists’. As Hill (2008:181; see also, Bonilla-Silva 2013:15) argues, this exercise in hunting for racists is not useful, and functions largely to re- produce the dominant racial ideology. So she urges us ‘to move away from thinking of racism as entirely a matter of individual beliefs and psychological states’ (Hill 2008:7). In the case of Trayvon’s shooting, the emphasis placed on the alleged slur along with trying to brand Zimmerman as either a racist bigot or a humanitarian do-gooder led to a situation where holding Zimmerman accountable for the killing of Trayvon hinged on whether or not he was found to be acting with overt racial animus. This erased from discussion the more critical role race did play in the 420 Language in Society 44:3 (2015) AD A M HO D GE S incident, from encouraging Zimmerman to see in Trayvon a ‘suspicious’ character that he pursued, to the response of the police, and to the subsequent legal strategy and rulings in the trial that failed to hold Zimmerman accountable for his actions. As Bonilla-Silva (2013:xv) emphasizes, ‘The more we assume that the problem of racism is limited to the Klan, the Birthers, the Tea Party, or to the Republican Party, the less we understand that racial domination is a collective process (we are all in this game)’. To grapple with racism and racial profiling requires breaking down the ingrained prejudices and internalized images that even well-intentioned individuals who claim to reject racism carry around. Such a move can be daunting from the perspective of the folk theory because it challenges everyone, particularly in the dominant white racial group, to confront their own racism in the form of under-examined biases, prejudices, and beliefs. And by ‘racism’, I mean ‘racism’ in the critical sense of the role everyone plays (even if unconsciously) in perpetu- ating racial stereotypes and furthering the hegemonic structures that contribute to an inequitable society. As Wise (2010:v) argues, ‘Being aware of these biases and alert to their possible triggering gives us all a fighting chance to keep them in check’. He further argues that ignoring these realities of racism ‘makes it more difficult to chal- lenge those biases, and thus increases the likelihood of discrimination’. Ultimately, ignoring the biases that perpetuate a racialized system makes the killing of Trayvon Martin—and Sean Bell before him, and Amadou Diallo before him, and many others before them—possible while absolving the killer of any responsibility whatsoever. C O N C L U S I O N Central to the analysis in this article has been an attempt to unravel the ideological underpinnings of the mainstream media’s discourse on race and racism surrounding Trayvon Martin’s shooting. In the beginning of the article I asked: To what extent does the mainstream media’s discourse about race after Trayvon remain embedded in folk ideas and to what extent (if at all) does the conversation move beyond those ideas? The short answer is that, as the dominant racial ideology in US society, the folk theory of race and racism remains a guiding framework in much of the dis- course. As critical and minority perspectives attempt to shed light on the twenty- first century versions of racial injustice, those views are refracted through the lens of the folk theory’s obsession with hunting for racists. The effect is to lead the discourse away from an understanding of racism as systemic and institutional to a reduction of racism as something the US once dealt with but no longer needs to concern itself with since it supposedly only remains in the intentions and actions of a few individual bigots. Yet dominant ideological systems always remain partial and open to challenges from oppositional views. To the extent that critical perspectives on race and racism enter into the discourse and challenge the folk theory, there is evidence that the conversation progresses forward in small but important ways. Interestingly, the fact that two of the voices expressing the Language in Society 44:3 (2015) 421 I DE O LO GI E S O F L AN GU A GE A ND R AC E critical perspective in the excerpts featured in this article are university professors speaks to the need for scholars to consider the role we can play in making the tools and concepts from scholarship accessible to a wider public audience. After all, social scientific concepts—when fully articulated and understood—can play a role in reshaping folk theories that impede social justice. N O T E S *An initial version of this article was prepared for a colloquium at the 2014 American Association for Applied Linguistics conference. I am grateful to Sandra Silberstein and James Tollefson for organizing that colloquium and asking me to be a part of it. I also thank Sarah Vieweg, Jenny Cheshire, Angela Reyes, and anonymous reviewers for the invaluable feedback they provided on the manuscript. Any shortcomings that remain are my own. 1Examples throughout the article represent data as found in the transcripts provided by LexisNexis. The only exception is excerpt (4), which I edited for clarity after watching the video. 2Florida’s controversial ‘stand your ground’ law adds another layer to the discourse surrounding Tray- von’s shooting. Critically, any discussion of the ‘stand your ground’ law must consider the way it differ- entially impacts minorities in line with the historical patterns of institutional racism discussed here. 3James Byrd, Jr. was an African American who was brutally killed by white supremacists in a racially motivated murder in 1998. The murder spawned the passage of a hate-crimes law in Texas in 2001, and Byrd’s name became part of a federal law in 2009 known as the Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act. R E F E R E N C E S Alim, H. Samy, & Angela Reyes (2011). Introduction: Complicating race. 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(Received 12 May 2014; revision received 13 August 2014; accepted 22 September 2014; final revision received 3 October 2014) Language in Society 44:3 (2015) 423 I DE O LO GI E S O F L AN GU A GE A ND R AC E Carnegie Mellon University From the SelectedWorks of Adam Hodges 2015 Ideologies of Language and Race in US Media Discourse about the Trayvon Martin Shooting Ideologies of language and race in US media discourse about the Trayvon Martin shooting Introduction Theoretical background Folk theory of race and racism vs. critical race theory Language ideologies, racial slurs, and the folk theory's hunt for ‘racists Discourse of race and racism after trayvon's shooting Discourse surrounding racial slurs in the folk theory's hunt for ‘racists Discourse surrounding ‘racial profiling and its confusion with ‘hate crimes The folk theory's entrenchment in mainstream media discourse Conclusion NOTES References 
work_5lfvsukxnrfxzjdm37ovi2nxxu	----	Community safety under lockdown: early thoughts from isolation Vol.:(0123456789) Crime Prevention and Community Safety (2020) 22:305–312 https://doi.org/10.1057/s41300-020-00097-4 FOREWARD Community safety under lockdown: early thoughts from isolation Rob Mawby1 Published online: 9 September 2020 © Springer Nature Limited 2020 Introduction The coronavirus pandemic has had a profound effect on mortality rates, on the health and care systems and on the economy. It has led to an increase in suicides (Kawohl and Nordt 2020). But has it also led to a reduction in crime? To put it bluntly: are we safer, from crime at least, since the pandemic took hold? There has been a spate of research papers from sociologists, social and public policy specialists, educationalists and health care professionals, on the negative impact of COVID-19. However, of particular relevance to this journal is the relation- ship between the pandemic and crime. Personal movements have been constrained, particularly at the heart of the pandemic, due to either individual choice or govern- ment restrictions. This encouraged academics interested in situational influences on crime patterns to question the impact of changes in mobility on crime rates. For example, UCL (University College London) hosted an online symposium on Crime and COVID-19 on 16 July and has a webpage dedicated to the subject,1 and crimi- nologists across the world have been assessing changes in crime rates and patterns of offending. The theoretical basis for much of this analysis is derived from routine activity theory (Cohen and Felson 1979), rational choice theory (Cromwell et al. 1991) and crime pattern theory (Brantingham and Brantingham 1995). While varying in their emphases, essentially these focus on opportunities: offenders’ decisions to target specific property or persons, based on their knowledge and awareness of the target, and the availability and accessibility of an appropriate target. Three aspects of the situation that make a crime more or less likely—an avail- able victim; a motivated offender; and a lack of protection or guardianship—have been significantly affected by the pandemic, in terms both of individuals’ choices and government restrictions. Firstly, the availability of victims was in many respects * Rob Mawby professorrobmawby@hotmail.com 1 Harper Adams University, Newport, UK 1 See: https ://covid 19-crime .com/. http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1057/s41300-020-00097-4&domain=pdf https://covid19-crime.com/ 306 R. Mawby reduced. People were less likely to venture out in public, and since entertainment venues were closed, they were especially less likely to go out after dark. They were less likely to use public transport. This suggests that less victims would be available to steal from (e.g. pickpockets operate best in crowds, especially public transport), and public disorder offences linked to alcohol misuse would be lower. Secondly, potential offenders might have been less likely to go out, especially with co-offend- ers. Thirdly, there might have been more police around if other policing duties were reduced and if the police were actively enforcing the lockdown. Most importantly though is the question of self-guardianship and guardianship by passers-by or neigh- bours (Hollis-Peel and Welsh 2014; Reynald 2011). People spent more time at home which meant that their homes were better protected from burglars (who prefer empty houses), and they were better able to act as guardians of neighbours’ property. On the other hand, there were less ‘guardians’ around in public places: less people in city centres meant less potential victims and offenders, but also less available wit- nesses/guardians. Moreover, the closure of many factories, shops and offices in city centres, shopping malls and industrial estates meant that these were potentially ‘unguarded’ 24/7. Consequently, while we might see a reduction in many offences, other might be more common. Whether this is a matter of displacement (Johnson et al. 2014), i.e. offenders continued to offend but changed their modus operandi, or whether these ‘new’ crimes were committed by different offenders, is a moot point. Crime patterns at the height of the pandemic In many, but not all, respects, researchers hypothesised a fall in crime. However, there are at least four problems with testing out these possibilities. Firstly, official statistics are dependent on victims reporting crimes and the police recording them, and in many cases, like domestic violence or Internet crime, they may not be reliable because a majority of crimes are not reported or recorded. In these circumstances, criminologists generally turn to victim survey data, but these are unavailable in the short term and in any case may be less useful for measuring changes in crime over short periods. Secondly, up-to-date criminal statistics may be inaccessible. This will vary according to the country and within countries, but there are some ongoing stud- ies in the USA, Australia, Canada and the UK (see below). Thirdly, statistics are sometimes not detailed enough to allow us to identify subtle changes. For exam- ple, many police crime statistics fail to distinguish between domestic burglaries and break-ins to business premises, leading Felson, Jiang and Xu (2020) to compare bur- glaries by location (residential area or mixed use) rather than type. Finally, given that crime rates are subject to seasonal variation and may be subject to shifting pat- terns, it is necessary to include data covering ideally three or more years. Taking these limitations on board, researchers have found that some offences became less common, while a few increased. Burglary is a useful example of changing patterns. Since homes were less likely to be empty at the height of the pandemic, we might expect residential burglaries to decline because burglars tend to target empty property. But burglars who operate when householders are at home, notably distraction burglars (Thornton et al. 2005), 307Community safety under lockdown: early thoughts from isolation may be more active, using the emergency as an excuse to gain access. Further- more, where shops, offices, schools, etc., were closed for longer periods, we might expect burglaries of businesses, storage facilities, schools and other public build- ings to increase. These offences traditionally take place at night (Mawby 2001) but may have become more common in the daytime. Most of the research confirms this. Domestic burglary rates have been found to fall (Ashby 2020; Halford et  al. 2020; Payne et al. 2020), although this did not seem to be the case in Los Angeles (Cam- pedelli et al. 2020a). In contrast, commercial burglary rates have increased (Abrams 2020). Allied to this, Felson et al. (2020) found a shift from burglaries in residential areas to burglaries in mixed use areas of Detroit. In Vancouver, Hodgkinson and Andresen (2020) identified an initial rise in commercial burglaries that fell after police and business owners took counter-measures. As suggested above, if less people are on the streets, robberies and thefts from the person may decrease. This is especially so for offences that require stealth, but lack of other pedestrians and traffic might mean that bag-snatching and robbery from the person by force would increase. Also, if people rely on more home deliver- ies, robbery from delivery vehicles might increase. Despite this, many studies report a decline in robberies (Campedelli et  al. 2020a, b; Payne et  al. 2020), albeit there appears as yet little refinement vis a vis different types of robbery or any differences between theft from the person and robbery. With regard to other thefts, closure of many shops has resulted in a reduction in thefts from shops, a pattern found in various countries, including Australia (Payne et  al. 2020), the UK (Halford et  al. 2020) and the USA (Campedelli et  al. 2020a). Less use of cars may mean a reduction in car-related crime, given that cars parked in urban centres are more vulnerable than those in garages, drives and residential streets (Clarke and Mayhew 1994), but thefts of bicycles may rise, and where social distancing means goods are delivered and left on doorsteps, thefts from doorsteps may increase. There is less evidence on these offences, although Payne et al. (2020) and Halford et al. (2020) found a decrease in thefts from cars. In general, violence in public areas would be expected to fall, unless there are conflicts over shortages or social distancing around food shops, beaches, etc. Corre- spondingly, analysis of data for violent offences, especially in public places, suggests a decrease (Ashby 2020; Campedelli et al. 2020b; Payne et al. 2020), However, with more people confined at home, domestic violence would be expected to increase, involving not just women but also children and elderly parents. Strain theory sup- ports this assumption (Agnew 1992). Looking further at the relationship between those involved, we might expect domestic violence against those in the same house- hold to increase, but domestic violence against those from other households (for example, assaults by estranged or former partners) to decrease. The evidence for domestic violence is currently not detailed enough to take account of these distinc- tions. In Dallas, Piquero et  al. (2020) noted a short-term rise in police reports but no long-term trend. Other, less systematic, evidence suggests that while there is no clear pattern for violence in private residences, at least according to police figures, calls to Women’s Refuges and Helplines have risen dramatically, indicating that women attacked in their homes may feel trapped and unwilling to involve the police but more likely to seek alternative solutions (BBC News 2020a; Bradbury-Jones 308 R. Mawby and Isham 2020; Graham-Harrison et al. 2020; Townsend 2020; Usher et al. 2020; WHO 2020). While domestic violence is one offence that we might have anticipated would be intensified during the lockdown, another rather different example is Internet-based crime. With people confined at home, dependence on the Internet has increased. Correspondingly, frauds through phone and Internet would be expected to increase. These may be directly related to the pandemic (e.g. scams over selling face masks or COVID-19 testing kits), indirectly related to the pandemic (e.g. where custom- ers are more dependent on purchasing goods online and are conned, where crimi- nals offer government grants and loans, or where conmen prey on lonely women), or unrelated, as in the case of the plethora of money laundering scams that invite the reader to aid in the transfer of funds established by various former Asian or African leaders. Additionally, with schools closed and many working from home, children have been more likely to use the Internet unsupervised, putting them more at danger of grooming. While there has been far less research on online offending, UK and European sources also suggest an increase in online child abuse (BBC News 2020b; EUROPOL 2020). Additionally, impressionistic evidence from across the world also suggests a rise in Internet fraud and fraud linked to false claims by shadow busi- nesses applying for government grants (Barth 2020; Campbell 2020; Lynch 2020; Tett 2020). One piece of research in the UK, by Buil-Gil et al. (2020), seems to con- firm this. While only covering a 12-month period from May 2019–May 2020, and based on data from the website of Action Fraud, the UK National Fraud and Cyber- crime Reporting Centre, they found a significant increase in various manifestations of cybercrime, including fraud associated with online shopping. That said, the indications are that in general crime rates fell during the lockdown. However, this did not apply to all offence types nor indeed to all areas. Studies in the UK (Farrell 2020), Australia (Payne et  al. 2020) and the USA (Abrams 2020; Campedelli et al. 2020b) demonstrate marked variations by area. There is some sug- gestion here that lower crime, higher status areas might have seen a more marked decrease (Campedelli et al. 2020b), possibly indicating that offenders, who tradition- ally travel short distances to commit their crimes (Wiles and Costello 2000), have become even more reluctant to travel. In Lancashire, however, Farrell (2020) notes an increase in ASB offences in rural areas, which may indicate both an increase in fly-tipping when legal refuse sites were closed and problems caused by visitors/day trippers. My ongoing research in tourist hotspots also suggests that under the strict- est lockdown measures, crime fell in contrast to nearby nontourist areas. Tiptoeing out of lockdown Of course, there may have been a further increase in offending where people have been charged with breaking the laws restricting and controlling behaviour during the lockdown. Again there are variations between countries, both in the nature of the restrictions—travelling long distances, wearing facemasks, social distancing, etc.—and also on whether these restrictions are advisory or mandatory. However, as we tiptoe out of lockdown, the potential for interpersonal conflicts has increased. 309Community safety under lockdown: early thoughts from isolation In England, partial easing of the lockdown was met by hoards of day and overnight visitors to rural areas like the Lake District and coastal areas like Devon and Corn- wall, provoking a hostile reaction from local people who felt that population move- ment was increasing the risk of transmission from high-to-low rate regions (Gold 2020; Smallcombe 2020). This subsequently led to targeted vandalism of cars and second homes and in some cases violence. Antisocial behaviour and public disorder have also increased in tourist areas and areas catering for the NTE. We have also seen altercations over social distancing, wearing facemasks, etc., involving attacks on the transgressors or attacks by the transgressors on those attempting to enforce new regulations (Ng 2020; Simcox 2020; Robinson 2020; Willsher 2020). There is certainly the potential for intergenerational conflict or escalating hate crime. But what about the longer-term implications of the pandemic? On one level, increased unemployment and poverty might mean that the social impacts of the pan- demic outweigh situational shifts. Whether crime rates return to the pre-pandemic levels, however, also depends on situational factors, and the extent to which crime was reduced or displaced. Thus, during the pandemic: • Some would-be offenders found the opportunity to commit their crime-of-choice restricted and so did not offend. • Some would-be offenders found the opportunity to commit their crime-of-choice restricted, so offended in different ways, i.e. there was crime displacement. • Some people who would not otherwise have offended took advantage of the new opportunities available during the lockdown and committed crimes they would not otherwise have committed. The first perspective assumes that offenders are relatively specialised in their criminal behaviour. This is less likely among younger offenders and will vary according to offence type. The second perspective assumes that offenders are rela- tively flexible in their choice of crime. It is limited by offenders’ limited skill sets. The third perspective assumes that there is a pool of potential criminals who are deterred from offending under normal conditions but due to temptation, financial hardship, stress, etc. (all of which may be more evident at this time) offend when circumstances change. While the first perspective is true of some offenders, clearly perspectives 2 and 3 also applied during the pandemic. This change in offending patterns could, arguably, apply on at least five levels, or SPOTT. • Spatial context For example, crimes in real space were reduced, but crimes in virtual space (i.e. online or phonecalls) increased. Since these require different skill sets, the increases were generally by different offenders. • Physical location For example, violence committed in the home rather than in public places, in some cases by the same offenders but against mainly differ- ent victims, and a shift towards even more locally based crime, as the lockdown restricted travelling distances. • Offence type For example, household burglary was reduced and corporate bur- glary increased, probably due to displacement. 310 R. Mawby • Technique For example, burglary: if homes were more likely to be occupied, access might be gained by subterfuge rather than forced entry. Since such ‘dis- traction burglaries’ are often carried out by specialists and are unlike other bur- glaries, any increases would generally be by different offenders. • Target As noted above, this includes a shift from household burglary to break-ins to offices, shops, etc. Additionally, in holiday resorts where there were less tour- ists, there may be a shift towards breaking into unoccupied holiday accommoda- tion, especially second homes. How, then will crime readjust after the pandemic: will there be a ‘new normal’ for crime too? That is: • Will those would-be offenders who found the opportunity to commit their crime- of-choice restricted and so did not offend resume their pre-lockdown behaviour or not? • Will those would-be offenders who found the opportunity to commit their crime- of-choice restricted and responded by offending in different ways return to old habits, continue with the new or become more flexible in their offending pat- terns? • Will those who would not otherwise have offended but took advantage of the new opportunities available during the lockdown continue to offend? While COVID-19 has inspired a plethora of quantitative research into changing crime patterns, post-COVID is set to inspire further research, incorporating a more detailed and qualitative review of offenders’ career choices. References Abrams, D.S. 2020. COVID and crime: An early empirical look. In Paper to UCL Crime and COVID-19 Online Symposium, 16 July. Agnew, R. 1992. 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work_5mcaszsbsvewxlhyhrors34sry	----	Contemporary Religious Changes in the U.S.: Responses to the Fracturing of Religious Life religions Article Contemporary Religious Changes in the U.S.: Responses to the Fracturing of Religious Life Verna Marina Ehret Department of Religious Studies, Mercyhurst University, Erie, PA 16546, USA; vehret@mercyhurst.edu Received: 18 March 2019; Accepted: 23 April 2019; Published: 28 April 2019 ���������� ������� Abstract: The purpose of this essay is to explore the changing religious landscape of the United States in relation to social and political changes and how scholars of religion ought to respond to those changes. These changes are being evaluated through recent developments in theological narratives of the last 15 years in light of the data provided by the Pew Forum’s Religious Landscape Survey from 2007 and 2014. Special attention is paid to the impact of the 2016 election on social and political narratives and their impact on religious life and religious narratives. The essay argues that scholars of religion have an important voice in this changing landscape to provide tools for building community in diversity and challenging narratives of exclusion that seek to dominate the religious landscape of the United States. Keywords: religious landscape; immigration; United States; Narrative Theology 1. Introduction I teach Religious Studies in a small regional college in the North Eastern part of the United States. I have a very inquisitive student whose basic questions in almost every Religious Studies class are a variation on either “How do these theological or ideological shifts affect the people in the congregations?” or “Can we tell religious people they are wrong if what they are saying seems dangerous?” The questions always give me pause. What does the academy have to do with the people in the pews? What does the academy, if its goal is careful and thoughtful study and development of religious traditions, have to say about the way religion is taught and practiced in churches and homes? As a scholar of religion, a teacher, and a constructive theologian, this question the student raises has highlighted for me the importance of public scholarship to continually reshape the narratives of religion that guide personal, public, and political life in the United States. The question from the student reflects the questions of the American people that paraphrase Tertullian, “What does the academy have to do with the realities of human experience and religious life?” The goal of this essay is to move the scholar of religion beyond the classroom into the public domain in order to enhance the religious literacy of the general population of the United States and to respond to the theological and moral crises we face with the fracturing of religion as it changes in the contemporary world. As a constructive theologian by training, my approach to this move into the public domain is to find ways to continually revise and enhance the narratives of religion, given the ever changing religious landscape of the U.S. Addressing those changes requires recognition of the interconnection of religion, politics, and social life. While as a constructive theologian I am wary of reductionist views of religion that want to limit religion to its social or political functions, religion’s connections to these aspects of personal and public life cannot be ignored. The challenge, then, is to construct religious narratives in such a way that they invite community and belonging rather than create factions and fractionalizing of the American experience. The fractionalizing of attitudes about how one is a “true American” creates not only tremendous anxiety but also real harm to real people, the very people to whom religious communities Religions 2019, 10, 295; doi:10.3390/rel10050295 www.mdpi.com/journal/religions http://www.mdpi.com/journal/religions http://www.mdpi.com http://www.mdpi.com/2077-1444/10/5/295?type=check_update&version=1 http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/rel10050295 http://www.mdpi.com/journal/religions Religions 2019, 10, 295 2 of 13 globally claim to reach out. Religion in the United States is intimately tied to political and public life. Whether changes in religion are caused by certain political elements or political issues are driven by religion is difficult to tell. The United States is a secular nation, but it is also a deeply religious one. As William Cavanaugh has said in discussions of religion and violence, the secular-religious divide is a false dichotomy (Cavanaugh 2007). While the U.S. constitution guarantees in the first amendment both the freedom from religion (that there will be no established religion) and the freedom for religion (that one is guaranteed the free exercise of religion), it does not guarantee that religion has no place at all in public life. There is no formal religious test to hold public office, but that does not mean people do not use the perceived religion of candidates to determine whether or not they are worthy of public office. For example, people were concerned that John F. Kennedy would be more beholden to Rome than to the American people. Barak Obama was “accused” by many of being Muslim, an idea that in their eyes made him unfit to hold office. Representative Ilhan Omar, (Democrat from Minnesota) who wears a hijab, has become a lightning rod for anti-Islamic rhetoric in political and public domains (Rosenberg 2019). The contemporary changes in religion in the United States today are tied inextricably to changing demographics (immigration, refugees, and LGBTQIA persons) and politics, and the narratives used to frame specific events into either a crisis or an opportunity. If the question of this essay is how religion is changing in the United States, the answer may be that religion in the United States today can be seen as fractured, perhaps even broken and in need of the religious literacy scholars can provide. Religion is changing organically with cultural shifts, inorganically with intentional narratives about these shifts, and confrontationally as the narrative shifts become attacks on individuals and communities outside one’s narrative community. So the purpose of this essay is not only to look at the way the intermingling of religion with social and political life is changing religion, but also how scholars of religion might respond to some of these changes that can threaten the ability of the United States to function as a democratic collective that is made stronger rather than weaker by its diversity. As Lester Kurtz put it in his study of globalization and religion, “Sociologists should use their analytical tools to assess the role of religion in the global community and become involved in the lively debates about the future of humanity that will ensue” (Kurtz 2015). Scholars of religion, it may be argued, have a responsibility to guide community responses to the plurality of religious perspectives in the United States. These responses need to allow for constructive engagement with diversity, to protect the integrity of life, and to promote human flourishing rather than having religion be used as a weapon for the destruction of the “other.” 2. Narrative Construction and Performative Narratives of Reconciliation Constructive theology as I engage it is the continual reconstruction of religious narratives to meet the needs of an ever changing society. Narrative identity, as developed through the work of Paul Ricoeur (Ricoeur 1995), explains human engagement with the world through the process of story-telling. One lives not just as a series of events, but as a protagonist in the world that engages the stories of others. One’s story exists within a network of stories: family, community, nation, humanity, and cosmic or religious narratives. While in one sense these narratives are concentric circles, in another sense they are an ever evolving complex of narrative threads in which one lives. Beginning with individual narrative identity, one finds oneself always in the process of writing one’s story. But I construct my narrative in the tension between what is true and what I want to be true. I may add or subtract or otherwise alter my story in order to project to the world what I want others to see. My intentional narrative construction may direct, but is not fully in control of my whole narrative. Much of my narrative is impressed upon me externally, and my little narrative exists within a larger collective. In some sense, our encounters and interactions with others always have a narrative structure as we become plot points in each other’s stories and reflexively absorb elements of the other’s story into our own. Religions 2019, 10, 295 3 of 13 Communal identity is a part of individual identity. However, as Presser points out, the narrative of the other creates both connection and distance (Presser 2016). If I cannot somehow connect their story to my own, I cannot see them as a part of my community. Connection requires imagination. Elsewhere I have described this connection as a transcontextual narrative (Ehret 2014). This type of narrative is an alternative to the little narratives that divide us and the meta-narratives that invite some while excluding others. The goal of the transcontextual narrative is to build bridges between the narrative threads where my world view finds something familiar in yours. A frame is created in which we can co-exist not only despite some differences, but more importantly together with those differences. This engagement of a transcontextual narrative that speaks within the language of particular communities but also reaches beyond them is, I would argue, at the heart of the “American Values Religious Voices” project that developed in January of 2016. This project engaged what might be called “The American Narrative” in ways that creates connections across diverse perspectives to create reconciliation and belonging, a sense of being at home in the diversity of our narrative identities and threads. Social and political narrative identity is the frame through which the individual lives and communities act. Whether or not I can connect another’s story to my own, they are connected in that we are collectively apart of the larger society. The I and the you are integrated in a we whether I want them to be or not (Klemm and Schweiker 2008). Facing a shockingly divided population, it will require significant imagination to connect the individual stories into a whole that reconciles that distance. This is accomplished, I argue, through the performative quality of narrative. If I expand my thinking out far enough, my narrative intersects with every other narrative. Social, political, and theological change can be constructed and directed in ways that negate the other and in ways that affirm otherness. Narrative can create reality. Performative narrative is narrative that acts. For example, in a marriage ceremony the officiant declares the pair to be married and it is so. But of course it is not that simple. Two children playing at marriage cannot have a third friend declare them married and it be so. Performative language requires one to have the authority to speak. That authority is socially recognized, and without that authority the language is not performative. Recognition is a key aspect of performative narrative (Stumm 2014). One has to be recognized as someone who has the authority to make something happen by speaking. This is usually done by some kind of ceremony recognized within the social narrative as endowing the individual with the authority to shape the community through speech. In addition to authority and recognition, however, is also the context in which words are expressed. A minister at a party can jokingly “marry” two people, but that does not make them married. The context in which the words are spoken must also be agreed upon to be one in which the words become performative. So a president speaking not as a private citizen but as a president can say things that cause action because of the context and the nature of the office. The context in which language becomes performative can also change if the person speaking has a recognized authority to reshape the context. The President of the United States cannot shape policy by Twitter, or can they? Through his zealous use of Twitter, President Trump has reshaped the context in which presidential speech becomes performative. While Twitter cannot replace more commonly accepted contexts, it has been drawn into the domain of performative speech. In reading the tweets of the President, one sees him connect to the national narrative by shaping his description of that narrative to fit his own identity. His reactions to the world become the national identity, the “who we are” of patriotism. While it would be false to say that the rise in hate crimes and public hate speech is simply caused by Trump, his speech actively brings into being an environment that legitimizes these sub-narratives that have always been present. They no longer need to hide. They are welcome in public discourse as “free speech.” It is protected speech, and the assumption by the defenders of hate speech is that protected speech and moral speech are the same thing. The result has been that protesting these acts of free speech has become unprotected speech and a violation of “who we are,” as seen in the student protests at Columbia (Roll 2017). The national narrative has shifted to bring into Religions 2019, 10, 295 4 of 13 the light what has been repressed. In creating this environment of division, Presidential tweets become a performative narrative of exclusion that is reflected in religious narratives and the context in which reconciliation is needed. The rise in hate crimes tracked by organizations like the Southern Poverty Law Center and The Anti-Defamation League have shown a significant spike in the last two years, and often the perpetrators of hate speech or hate crimes invoke President Trump’s voice as one that has raised the profile and acceptability of such language and acts of exclusion. One can look at the specific example of U.S. Representative Ilhan Omar. President Trump has recently made tweets about her that actively call into question her loyalty (Itkowitz and Wagner 2019). Other leaders within the Republican Party have done the same because of comments she made about the impact of 11 September 2001 on American Muslims. While her comments can be read in multiple ways, it would appear her concern was with the way all Muslims have been held responsible for the actions of some. The speech becomes performative, creating a reality for their supporters where she represents the enemy, and the result has been a significant increase in death threats against her. But performative speech need not only fracture and exclude. As will be shown in a moment, the American Values Religious Voices Project will tap into the religious rhetoric of narratives of exclusion to see underneath them. The larger narratives of inclusion that underlie exclusionary narratives reflect the growing narratives of religious communities today as reconciliatory, inclusionary, and even pluralist. By drawing on the narratives of inclusion and more importantly pluralism (the active engagement with and embracing of difference), one can see the attempts at performative narratives that switch from exclusion to reconciliation. Reconciliation in this context is designed to bring people together in their diversity rather than exclude them because of it. Given this description of performative narrative, a performative narrative of reconciliation and inclusion is one that can cross boundaries, build bridges, and reconstruct the community as a whole community. A narrative of reconciliation fosters the common good by making room for the previously marginalized and reconciling those who are estranged. As performative narrative, the social narrative actively creates community. As an example of this process one can look at the American Values Religious Voices project (American Values Religious Voices 2017). A group of scholars of religion created this project where 100 religion scholars were asked to each write a letter, and one letter a day would be delivered to President Trump, Vice President Pence, select members of the cabinet, and members of the 115th congress for the first 100 days of Trump’s presidency. The goal of the project was to highlight certain components of what might be called the American Narrative Identity as an attempt to redirect the national narrative away from the destructive narratives that were rising to the surface. Each letter attempts to turn national narratives toward ones that embrace our diversity and the growing religious diversity that is the American religious landscape. According to the organizers, Words and actions during and after the election seemed to call into question fundamental values that have long defined our nation . . . at this time of transition many people appeared to long for guidance, inspiration, and a reaffirmation of what it means to be an American. Those observations sparked the idea that at this particular moment in our nation’s history, our elected officials and our fellow citizens might welcome the insights of scholars of religious texts and teachings, individuals with an important voice to contribute to our national discourse (Values and Voices 2017). The goal of the project was a redirecting of the national narrative to better reflect what the writers understand to be the American identity. Expressing one’s own identity by inserting one’s narrative into the national discourse creates space for recognition and belonging of the marginalized. But what does one do when the marginalized are not only the immigrants, the non-Christians, the non-white among us, but also those who feel deeply marginalized by the very multiculturalism that seeks to make space for these others? Religions 2019, 10, 295 5 of 13 A performative narrative of reconciliation and inclusion rejects the narratives of exclusion and brings together all members of American society in this multi-religious landscape. It addresses the fracturing of religion not by making a single religious voice but by building community in the diversity. And here lies the problem. Can reconciliation happen if it requires a fundamental shift in someone’s narrative identity? Perhaps reconciliation is not so much a bringing of all voices together but rather a choosing of a way of seeing humanity as an integrated we, rather than simply an I and a you. Reconciliation, then, is a transformational narrative to encourage people to abandon a narrative of exclusion in order to build this we. That would seem to be precisely the nature of the narrative of reconciliation and inclusion that unfolds in these letters. The letter writers are predominately Christian or Christian leaning from a wide variety of denominations. But there are also a significant number of letters from Jewish and Muslim authors and then a small number of letters from Buddhists, Hindus, Sikhs, and one Native American. The writers come from a variety of ethnic backgrounds and sexual orientations. They are immigrants, teachers, community leaders, lay leaders, ministers, nuns, rabbis, and non-profit presidents. They work in biblical studies, theology, comparative study, history, law, ethics, Islamic, Hindu, Buddhist, Sikh, and Jain studies. In our criteria for performative narrative, these letter writers have both recognized authority for talking about national identity, values, and narrative through a religious lens and the context to support their authority as they speak. Their concerns are centered around immigration, inclusivity based on gender, gender identity, sexual orientation, race and ethnicity, and environmental protection. They spoke from the union of academic discipline and personal identity as a part of the national identity. They spoke to the religious underpinnings of the narratives of the United States and the ways that narrative has made space for care of the stranger in our midst. Themes of love and inclusion dominate much of the writing alongside the particularly interesting writing of Hebrew Bible scholars, who were more likely to highlight not only the texts that require care for the stranger but also those that were critical of governments that ignore their obligations to their people. In particular, one can look to the letter by Beatrice Lawrence whose letter speaks to the deep structures of the “Judeo-Christian Tradition” of the United States that still dominates much of our national rhetoric. Looking specifically at Leviticus, Lawrence identifies the language that is so often repeated in churches, synagogues, and temples throughout the United States about the obligation to others. Her language is not foreign or outside. It is insider language seeking to expand the frame of inclusion that has been so severely restricted in contemporary social and political rhetoric. She says, The book of Leviticus takes this notion of Israel’s identification with the stranger even further. In the laws of the Jubilee, we read that once every fifty years, all land must be returned to its original owners . . . God explains why: “For the land is mine; you are but strangers and sojourners with me” (Leviticus 25:23). The land is not ours; we are but temporary residents on this earth—strangers and sojourners each and every one of us. The language of scripture fills contemporary discussions of belonging and exclusion. The idea of protecting a way of life that is distinctively American contains within it this notion of a Christian nation. While Lawrence is Jewish and speaking from a Jewish text, this language of Leviticus would be sacred text even to those seeking a Christian exclusive nation (Schleifer 2017). By reaching narratives of exclusion in their own language, transcontextual narratives can be built that reframe the way religious, political, national, and personal identity narratives are read and employed from exclusion to reconciliation. Most interesting, however, was the unity of the voices. Even as the tone and topic changed from one letter to another, one could read it as a single voice. That might be the most striking thing about it. These were not, it should be pointed out, all people from traditionally liberal or progressive leaning institutions. While there was certainly a great deal of that, there were also voices from traditionally conservative schools. Despite this, the letters read as if it were one person speaking. Looking at the themes, two others stand out as particularly representative. Religions 2019, 10, 295 6 of 13 • Uriah Kim (Kim 2017) writes, “Like my mother, I also believed in the American Dream; but I had my doubt as to whether I would ever be accepted and perceived as an American rather than as a perpetual stranger. It was during such a time of doubt in my youth when President Ronald Reagan shared a letter he received before he left office: “You can go to live in France, but you can’t become a Frenchman. You can go to live in Germany or Italy, but you can’t become a German, an Italian. He went through Turkey, Greece, Japan and other countries. But he said anyone, from any corner of the world, can come to live in the United States and become an American.” You can imagine how relieved and happy I was to know that the President of the United States agreed with the idea that the United States is where foreigners not only can be welcomed but also can become Americans” (Values and Voices 2017). Here is a moment of presidential performative narrative of inclusion. It is tied to a Republican President with whom so many exclusive narratives resonate, and yet the moment created inclusion and reconciliation. A bridge was built. • Judith Plaskow (Plaskow 2017) writes, “What would it mean for each of us—especially those charged with formulating immigration policy—to call to mind our own experiences of migration, or those of our families, and to empathize with a new generation of migrants and refugees trying to reach these shores? How might we use the memories of our families’ stories to create the welcome we wish our forebears had encountered? Instead of slamming the door on Syrian refugees and people from certain Muslim-majority nations, how can we use our own histories to forge a new relationship with the strangers among us” (Values and Voices 2017)? The letters engage the language of academia intermixed the “American Narrative.” They seek to connect yet critique, always respectfully, but often forcefully and with clear disapproval of the impact of both Trump’s language and policies. These letters are performative. They bring about a world through the narrative, one they themselves inhabit. But are they performative narratives of reconciliation and inclusion outside the world of the writers? On the one hand, no. The intended audience likely never read the letters. And reading through Trump’s tweets of the following two years indicates there was no impact at all at that level. In many ways, things are worse. But these letters were not designed for the narrow world of academia or the federal government alone. There is a power and authority assigned to the letters by the very act of sending them to the highest authorities in the nation. They are designed to speak to the broad, diverse, and ever-changing world of religion in the United States. The letters have since been turned into a book, easily available through the group website and on Amazon. The books is titled, American Values Religious Voices: 100 Days. 100 Letters edited by Andrea Weiss and Lisa Weinberger. It contains not only the letters but also essays on the creation and impact of the campaign. The website of the group offers links to news articles and groups who have used it as a part of religious study. I personally have used the work of this group in teaching adult religious education classes at local churches in order to slowly spread the narratives of these letters. The group has made extensive use of social media in order to make the letters widely available as they were being written as well. The narrative of reconciliation can become performative when it (a) comes from sources of authority people feel they can trust, (b) speaks in the language of these communities in ways that allow for discussion and re-engagement with religious narratives, and (c) is made available in forms people will encounter it. Social media has become an essential part of that narrative reframing. But one might ask why all of this work is necessary. The answer is the religious landscape of the United States is continually changing. As social and political realities change religious narratives must be able to respond to those changes or risk irrelevance. It is necessary for theology to be constructive. Theology must reconstruct itself in light of new social and political realities in order to speak to the needs of the whole people and the common good. I will therefore provide a brief look at the changing landscape of religion in America to more fully grasp the realities to which the American Values Religious Voices project and others are seeking to respond. Religions 2019, 10, 295 7 of 13 3. Changing Religion in the United States Religious life in the United States is fractured and fracturing around social, political, and theological issues. Among these issues are religious diversity, immigration, the rights of the LGBTQIA community, and the relationship of Christianity to U.S. political life and the world’s religions that are also American religions. There are a variety of conflicting concerns expressed in these issues. Religion in the United States today is a tense topic of discussion fraught with dangers. These perspectives arise out of the narrative frames in which these issues are presented, interpreted, and lived. But analysis of the narratives first requires some understanding of the American context. The Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life has been collecting and analyzing data on religion in the United States in order to track changes. In 2007 they ran the Religious Landscape Survey, conducted through phone interviews with people across the country. The data were compiled and analyzed and then the survey was run again in 2014 (Pew Forum 2014). What they learned through comparing the 2007 data with the 2014 data is not surprising. Religion in the United States is going through significant changes that can be connected to social, political, and theological shifts. As of 2014, 70.6% of Americans considered themselves to be some form of Christian. 5.9% of Americans identified as members of a non-Christian religion, 1.5% of Americans identified as “other religion,” and 22.8% identified as religiously unaffiliated, which includes the religious Nones, atheists, agnostics, and people who just don’t know. Comparing the 2007 and 2014 data, some interesting trends reveal themselves regarding religious shifts in the United States. The analysis of the study shows overall a decline in the percentage of the American population that identifies as Christian and growth in those who do not identify with any organized religion (Nones). While some Nones are atheist or agnostic, many simply do not identify with any specific tradition. The shift, according to the Pew study, is happening across age (adults only, but in different age brackets), ethnic, and educational markers. In 2007 78.4% of U.S. adults identified as Christian while in 2014 that number had gone down to 70.6%. In 2007 16.1% of the U.S. population was unaffiliated while by 2014 that number was up to 22.8%. And while in 2007 4.7% of the U.S. adult population identified as members of non-Christian religions, by 2015 that number had risen to 5.9%. While most of the decline in Christian affiliation among U.S. adults has been seen in Catholic and Mainline Protestants, there has also been decline in the overall percentage of U.S. adults identifying as Evangelical Protestant. However, according to the Pew study, while there is a decline in the overall percent of the U.S. adult population identifying as Christian, there is growth in the ethnic diversity of these traditions, particularly in Hispanic/Latinx participation across the diverse forms of U.S. Christianity (America’s Changing Religious Landscape 2015). This growth in ethnic diversity as well as the growth in non-Christian religions is in part due to immigration. Immigration is inseparable from religious life in the U.S., which means understanding the social, political, and theological shifts in religious communities is tied to the narratives about immigration. This is one of the primary places one can see the fracturing of religion in the United States, an issue we will return to in a moment. It is important to note that, according to the Pew study, while the percentage of the population identifying as Evangelical Christian is declining, the actual numbers of people who identify as Evangelical Christian is growing. The disconnect is in part due to the growth in the religious Nones, who are the fastest growing category and now the second largest category of religion after Evangelical Protestants. The Nones, according to the Pew study, have grown by approximately 19 million people in seven years (America’s Changing Religious Landscape 2015). As noted by one of the Pew Researchers, “One of the most important factors in the declining share of Christians and the growth of the ‘nones’ is generational replacement. As the Millennial generation enters adulthood, its members display much lower levels of religious affiliation including less connection with Christian Churches, than older generations” (America’s Changing Religious Landscape 2015). There has been growth within the Nones in the percent who identify as atheist or agnostic (25% in 2007 to 31% in 2014). But the report also notes that the growth rate of Nones is higher in whites than other racial/ethnic groups. The narratives around religion are shifting, but those shifts are not only dependent on age or general social attitudes Religions 2019, 10, 295 8 of 13 in the United States. The U.S. is made up of a multitude of subcultures that interpret and narrate religious experiences differently, which can account for why there is also a racial/ethnic difference in religious affiliation. In 2014, for example, the United Methodist Church (UMC) was the largest Mainline Protestant group in the United States. But in late February-early March 2019 a vote was held in the General Conference regarding the ordination and marriage of LGBTQIA members of the denomination. Those who opposed the “One Church” proposal in favor of the “Traditional Plan” that strengthened current policies of exclusion narrowly won the vote. While the evidence would indicate that the opposition vote was due heavily to international membership in the UMC, there was strong support of a sub-population of the American UMC who, it would appear, had significant influence on the vote (Steele 2019). The UMC in the United States is now in a state of crisis. United Methodist affiliated Colleges and Universities have increasingly come out against the vote and re-affirmed their values of inclusion, while individual UMC churches are doing the same (Redden 2019). While at this writing it is unclear what will happen, some Colleges and Universities may consider disaffiliating with the UMC and there could be a schism in the denomination itself. That will once again alter the landscape of religion in the United States and is a further example of how social and political issues are deeply tied to theological issues that are continually fracturing religion in the United States. Conflict, it would seem, is growing. Social and political conservativism has a strong correlation with Evangelical Protestantism, as will be shown in a moment. But the Pew study also noted that there is a growth in the number of Catholics, Orthodox Christians, and Mormons who consider themselves Evangelical or Born Again within their own traditions, a notion that strikes many scholars of religion as an odd pairing of language. What this may indicate is a shifting in narratives where “Evangelical” or “Born Again” reference attitudes about Christianity that transcend denominational lines and point more to social and political attitudes in a larger narrative of what it means to be a true Christian. It is to these narratives, then, that we must turn in order to gain a better understanding of these changes in religion in the United States. 4. Social, Political, and Theological Narratives of Exclusion Two of the clearest examples of the fracturing of religion in the United States are found around the social and political issues of inclusion of immigrants/refugees and LGBTQIA persons. Political and social narratives are often inseparable from the religious narratives. As people identify with a social or political narrative, they will also identify with a religious narrative. As politics and public life in the United States become more contentious around these issues, then, religion will too. Even within the Pew study, researchers noted that while the percentage of the population identifying as Christian or even as overall religious may be shrinking, those who do identify as religious may be becoming more overtly religious and more willing to share their personal brand of religiosity in the public sphere (U.S. Public Becoming Less Religious 2015). There is significant evidence to support this claim, particularly around the political and social voices of Evangelical Christians around these issues. A Religion Dispatches report describes “Project Blitz” an initiative to generate and promote bills that support a political agenda of the Christian Right. The bills are seemingly unrelated and range widely in content—from requiring public schools to display the national motto, “In God We Trust” (IGWT); to legalizing discrimination against LGBTQIA people; to religious exemptions regarding women’s reproductive health. The model bills, the legislative strategy and the talking points reflect the theocratic vision that’s animated a meaningful portion of the Christian Right for some time. In the context of Project Blitz’s 116-page playbook, however, they also reveal a sophisticated level of coordination and strategizing that echoes the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC), which infamously networks probusiness state legislators, drafts sample legislation, and shares legislative ideas and strategies (Clarkson 2018). Religions 2019, 10, 295 9 of 13 The political influence of the Christian Right, going back to the Reagan years when Jerry Falwell1 claimed to have helped put Reagan into the White House (Flory 2017) and later claims with the election of George W. Bush that God was back in the White House after the Clinton years, has been significant (Borger 2005). The close ties between Evangelical Protestantism, the Republican Party, and populist movements in the United States show a narrative of a holistic world view. To be a true Christian is to view the United States as a Christian Nation, and often more explicitly as a white Christian nation, where things like immigration/refugees and LGBTQIA persons threaten the power and privilege of that identity. To threaten that identity is to, in some sense, stand against the will of God. What is not clear, and perhaps cannot be made explicitly clear, is if the social and political attitudes are legitimized by or driven by religious narratives. They are inseparable, and perhaps the best way to address the religious shifts in the United States is to address them as a network of the social, political, and theological narratives. In the five years since the last Pew study, many things have changed politically that may make the next Pew study show even greater change. Most importantly, what has changed is the rise and election of Donald Trump as President of the United States. The narrative he is putting forth is not incompatible with previous narratives, but he is emphasizing the divide between a more nativist Christian approach to social, political, and theological diversity and a more progressive engagement with those ideas. University of Maryland’s Critical Issues Poll surveys spanning 2016–2017 display the effect of Trump’s nativist populist rhetoric on a range of issues relating to foreign policy. For example, an April 2017 poll shows a deep partisan divide over attitudes toward Muslim refugees, with 88 percent of Republicans supporting a Muslim ban and 86 percent of Democrats opposing one. In another example related to immigration, the survey found that 84 percent of Trump voters support a border wall with Mexico while 87 percent of Clinton voters oppose the wall. Thus, Trump supporters display nativist foreign policy attitudes while non-supporters’ attitudes appear in firm opposition (Kane and McColluch 2017). Even before the rise of President Trump, the link between nativism, Republicanism, and Evangelicalism in the context of a White Christian America were impacting views of immigration. According to a study by Jeremy Rehwaldt of Protestant and Catholic churches in the Midwest, In the churches I studied, the call to welcome the stranger often butts up against the ideology of Latino threat I described earlier. One person in an adult education class I visited put it this way: “I know that we are to care for the stranger, but immigrants are wasting my tax dollars in the emergency room and the schools. What am I supposed to do?” Moreover, the idea of “welcoming the stranger” has within it the idea that Latino immigrants are “strangers”—they are not like “us”. As noted earlier, many of the Protestant congregation members told me they believed that the Latinos in their community would never join their church, that they were “different” in ways that created a disconnection (Rehwaldt 2015). The narrative of Latin American immigrants as dangerous is a regular refrain of the Trump administration. The narratives pre-date his presidency, but he has made significant use of them and, in turn, certain Evangelical leaders have used his voice to promote these notions and the union of Evangelical Christianity with these political and social narratives. Hate groups, as noted by the Southern Poverty Law Center, are on the rise (Beirich 2019). Further studies have shown significant defection of Evangelical Christians in particular from the Democratic to the Republican Party related to the issue of immigration/refugees and LGBTQIA persons. 1 It should be noted that the vocabulary is fluid. While Falwell might better be described as Fundamentalist, indicating further distinction from what is referred to as Mainline Protestantism, the definitions are not set. In order to match the language of the Pew study, this essay will use the term Evangelical, acknowledging that there is more diversity of perspective in Evangelical Christianity than the Pew study is able to capture based on how it is using the term. Religions 2019, 10, 295 10 of 13 As the Democratic Party becomes more ethnically and religiously diverse and even embraces that diversity, people who formerly identified with the Democratic Party are becoming Republican precisely because of those narratives of inclusion (Ehrkamp and Nagel 2012). Some individuals recognize the conflict between theological concerns for the stranger and socio-political fear of outsiders. Yet for many, the socio-political narratives ultimately carry more weight, which will lead to a change in the theological narratives (Rehwaldt 2015). Given these narratives of exclusion, it is not surprising to find religious life fracturing in the United States. With the growth of non-Christian religions and the increased concerns with the value of immigrants, refugees, LGBTQIA persons, and diversity in general on the part of many Mainline Protestant, Catholic, and even some Evangelical Protestant communities, the narratives of religion in the United States are at a significant crossroads as the conflict becomes a crisis that affects people’s lives in very real ways. 5. Social, Political, and Theological Narratives of Inclusion All of this will mean that the counterpoint to narratives of exclusion are the narratives of inclusion, the attempts by individuals and groups to create communities where all feel both welcome and valued. Religious communities can provide a sense of social and even political belonging for immigrant and refugee groups (Rehwaldt 2015). The social belonging can give a voice to political participation that creates an even greater sense of being a part of the whole of American society among non-Christian communities (see for example the Center for American Islamic Relations and the Anti-defamation League among others). Nevertheless, the social and political narratives that allow a sense of belonging when tied to religious communities are also, as we have seen, reasons for their exclusion. They threaten a social order that allows privilege and supremacy to some over others and threaten the identity of many Evangelical Protestants. Looking at this conflict, scholars of religion must ask ourselves if we have a role in the conversation to reshape the conflicting narratives and create a space of reconciliation that brings people together while privileging a sense of pluralism over simple assimilation. The fractured nature of religious life in the United States is both a danger and an opportunity. While the risk of exclusionary rhetoric becoming performative in acts of hate and violence is real, there is also an opportunity to respond. Returning to the Pew poll, the growth in the Nones is largely among white Millennials, which at least for a while will dominate the political and social landscape as it grows in the religious one. The Nones are seemingly much more open to transcontextual narratives of both inclusion and reconciliation. The second important thing to note from the previous sections is the use of conflicted religious language. There is recognition even by those promoting a narrative of exclusion that inclusion and reconciliation are embedded in the tradition. The frame already exists, as does an opening into the conversation. As scholars of religion step through that opening into the frame, there is real possibility for reshaping the narratives. The transcontextual narrative does not come from the outside but a blending of the threads of people inside a variety of frames in a way that can speak to their needs and their theological concerns. There are certainly strong Evangelical Protestant voices in the academy that will choose, on extensive theological grounds, the path of exclusion (Moe 2017). However, one frequently also finds a concern from scholars of religion towards the ability of religion to embrace theological diversity in order to create social, political, and religious communities of inclusion. These narratives of religion reframe tradition to create reconciling spaces, and many scholars of religion (as noted by Kurtz in the introduction) see an obligation to address exclusion and call it out as theologically misguided. But the challenge for such scholars is to move out of the academic realm and into the public sphere to actually impact the lives of religious people across the United States. As noted by Penny Edgel, the election of Donald Trump as President of the United States has legitimized certain narratives of exclusion that require scholars of religion to engage in a more directive way than before. But there are challenges to this. She says, Religions 2019, 10, 295 11 of 13 Mr. Trump did not invent the link between White racial resentment and Whites’ economic fears (Anderson 2016); but he did take full advantage of it. He ran a campaign telling his largely White voters that “the establishment” has forgotten them because its elites have been too busy courting the votes of Black and Latino Americans, and too busy worrying about looking good in the eyes of sophisticated Europeans by championing open borders, to care about protecting the jobs of White Americans (Edgell 2017). The strong tendency in Mainline Protestant, Catholic, and even religious Nones toward narratives of inclusion respond to the dangers exclusive narratives pose to people. The recent declaration by President Trump of a national emergency at the U.S. border with Mexico led the U.S. Congress to vote against that declaration. President Trump was forced to veto that vote in order to get the “National Emergency” status he needed in order to get funding for the border wall. Many religious groups have come out against this declaration. Notable for the affiliation of my own institution is the statement by Sister Patricia McDermott, RSM, President of the Sisters of Mercy of the Americas who said, Neither the continued government shutdown nor a declaration of national emergency aimed at funding a wall will correct years of failed U.S. immigration policy, or ameliorate the U.S.’s role in the root causes of migration. Make no mistake, there is a humanitarian crisis on the border, but it is one of the Trump Administration’s own making. One where asylum-seekers are forced to wait in dangerous and unhealthy conditions for weeks while their asylum claims are assessed and decided. Let us be clear: This is not the time to close our borders or build walls. Now is the time to stop the fear mongering and demonstrate our shared humanity in how we respond to our sisters and brothers in Christ (Sisters of Mercy Respond to Oval Office Address 2019). When comparing this statement in its social, political, and theological implications to the earlier statements, the fracturing of religion in the United States becomes clear. The political and social narratives intertwined with religious narratives make these perspectives incompatible to the point of questioning whether they can all fit under an umbrella of “Christian.” The growth in non-Christian religions and religious Nones alongside concerns with immigrants, refugees, and LGBTQIA persons raise serious questions about the work of scholars of religion in addressing this fractured state. When real people are being affected by the ideological narratives, can scholars of religion sit idly by? Changes in the political and social make-up of the United States, for example the increasingly conservative Supreme Court with the addition of Brett Kavanaugh, changes the reality on the ground for the Christian Right and its political aspirations as well as the political hegemony it seeks. But to what end? Is it for the glory of God? Is it for the sake of saving souls? Is it just about winning an argument and controlling the country by controlling the demographics and the hearts and minds of the people? These are difficult if not impossible questions to answer. But the questions must still be asked and addressed. If the fracturing of religion and the potentially broken state of it in the United States today can be interpreted as the difference between protecting privilege and supporting inclusion (which is one potential interpretation of the situation), do scholars of religion dare to call out religious voices and narratives as broken? If the changing demographics are happening and cannot be stopped, which the Pew polls seem to suggest is the case, then the alienating narratives of exclusion cannot be left unaddressed. Religious narratives that cannot respond constructively to the social and political environments in which people live cannot survive. If scholars get involved, they cannot claim to be “unbiased” even though their bias may be based on good evidence. Then one must ask how it is possible for scholars to reach the people in religious communities, either in terms of support or in attempts to reshape potentially dangerous religious narratives. It is, therefore, with the framing of religious narratives that scholars of religion can enter the conversation and respond to the changing religious landscape of the United States in constructive and affirming ways. Reconciliation is needed Religions 2019, 10, 295 12 of 13 that recognizes and values diversity. Narratives that transcend particular contexts by creating liminal and mediating spaces may have the ability to respond to the always changing religious landscape that does not deny the value of diversity but instead reconciles with it in order to create communities of inclusion. 6. Conclusions Returning to the description of performative narrative, it seems that to reach the level of reconciliation and inclusion requires the narratives to inhabit the same social structures as the narratives of exclusion. Doing so can provide the foundations for such reconciliation because our narratives exists within larger narratives. These letters were written and edited up to the last minute in order to engage each other and the constantly evolving situation of the President’s narrative and the resurgence of long suppressed narratives of exclusion. They inhabit the same social space. They are performative of reconciliation in that they speak with each other. They build a community across a wide array of individuals by engaging each other’s letters and by the powerful quality of speaking as if there were one voice. The letters are available online and being used by church groups and schools to start or enhance conversations of reconciliation and inclusion. Imagination allows communal narratives to fill gaps, to build connections. I am reminded of the description in Jurassic Park of the reviving of the dinosaurs from extinction. DNA was extracted, but the strands were incomplete. Where they were missing pieces, frog DNA was put in to fill the gaps. Narrative imagination is like this. It is the ability to insert the connections into the broken strands of the story, to move from exclusion to reconciliation in a way that creates inclusion and diversity rather than fearing it. Funding: This research received no external funding. Acknowledgments: The author would like to acknowledge the assistance of students in the Evolving Religion class: Katelin Snable, Christian Copper, Vincent Marrazzo, Ella DiPietro, Grace Petron, and Harris Williams. Conflicts of Interest: The author declares no conflict of interest. References America’s Changing Religious Landscape. 2015. Pew Forum. Available online: http://www.pewforum.org/2015/ 05/12/americas-changing-religious-landscape/ (accessed on 15 March 2019). American Values Religious Voices. 2017. Available online: http://www.valuesandvoices.com/the-campaign/ (accessed on 15 March 2019). Beirich, Heidi. 2019. Rage against Change: White Supremacy Flourishes amid Fears of Immigration and Nation’s Shifting Demographics. Intelligence Report 166: 35–42. Borger, Julian. 2005. How Born-Again George Became a Man on a Mission. The Guardian. Available online: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2005/oct/07/usa.georgebush (accessed on 15 March 2019). Cavanaugh, William T. 2007. Does Religion Cause Violence? Behind the Common Question Lies a Morass of Unclear Thinking. Harvard Divinity Bulletin 35: 3. Available online: https://bulletin.hds.harvard.edu/articles/ springsummer2007/does-religion-cause-violence (accessed on 15 March 2019). 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Gods in the Global Village: The World’s Religions in Sociological Perspective, 4th ed. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications. Moe, David Thang. 2017. A Trinitarian Theology of Religions: Themes and Issues in Evangelical Approaches. ERT 41: 234–53. Pew Forum. 2014. Religious Landscape Survey. Available online: www.pewforum.org/religious-landscape-study/ (accessed on 15 March 2019). Plaskow, Judith. 2017. Letter 44. American Values Religious Voices. Available online: http://www.valuesandvoices. com/letter44/ (accessed on 15 March 2019). Presser, Lois. 2016. Criminology and the narrative turn. Crime Media Culture 12: 137–51. [CrossRef] Redden, Elizabeth. 2019. Dilemma for Methodist Colleges. Inside Higher Ed. Available online: https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2019/03/11/methodist-colleges-and-seminaries- react-church-vote-strengthening-prohibitions-gay?fbclid=IwAR3tgqx4w2h6cBvokg9SfulUy8QZTkI- t9f9WUSDHms5BlsUqvWjX6XzFrM#.XInLMMFHknO.facebook (accessed on 15 March 2019). Rehwaldt, Jeremy. 2015. Responses by White Christians to Recent Latino Immigration in the Rural U.S. Midwest. Religions 6: 686–711. [CrossRef] Ricoeur, Paul. 1995. Toward a Narrative Theology: Its Necessity, Its Resources, Its Difficulties. In Figuring the Sacred. Minneapolis: Fortress Press. Roll, Nick. 2017. 2 More Campus Speakers Shouted Down. Inside Higher Ed. Available online: https://www. insidehighered.com/news/2017/10/12/speaker-protests-continue-options-punishments-unclear (accessed on 15 March 2019). Rosenberg, Eli. 2019. Poster linking Rep. Ilhan Omar to 9/11 Sparks Outrage, Injuries in W.Va. State Capitol. The Washington Post. Available online: https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/03/02/poster- linking-rep-ilhan-omar-sparks-outrage-injuries-wva-state-capitol/?utm_term=.af05c443dd4a (accessed on 15 March 2019). Schleifer, Theodore. 2017. King Doubles Down on Controversial ‘Babies’ Tweet. CNN Politics. Available online: https://www.cnn.com/2017/03/13/politics/steve-king-babies-tweet-cnntv/index.html (accessed on 18 April 2019). Sisters of Mercy Respond to Oval Office Address. 2019. Available online: https://www.sistersofmercy.org/about- us/news-and-events/sisters-of-mercy-respond-to-oval-office-address/ (accessed on 9 January 2019). Steele, Jeremy. 2019. United Methodists Vote to Keep Traditional Marriage Stance. Christianity Today. Available online: https://www.christianitytoday.com/news/2019/february/united-methodist-lgbt-vote-conference-plan. html (accessed on 15 March 2019). Stumm, Bettina. 2014. Witnessing Others in Narrative Collaboration: Ethical Responsibility beyond Recognition. Biography 37: 762–83. [CrossRef] U.S. Public Becoming Less Religious. 2015. Pew Forum. Available online: www.pewforum.org/2015/11/03/u-s- public-becoming-less-religious/ (accessed on 15 March 2019). © 2019 by the author. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. 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Introduction Narrative Construction and Performative Narratives of Reconciliation Changing Religion in the United States Social, Political, and Theological Narratives of Exclusion Social, Political, and Theological Narratives of Inclusion Conclusions References 
work_5mtuexjnzvcojmmngwk2y6nypa	----	Allocation of Time and Hateful Behavior: A Theoretical and Positive Analysis of Hate and Hate Crimes American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Inc. Allocation of Time and Hateful Behavior: A Theoretical and Positive Analysis of Hate and Hate Crimes Author(s): H. Medoff Source: American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Vol. 58, No. 4 (Oct., 1999), pp. 959-973 Published by: American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Inc. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3488016 Accessed: 30/11/2010 10:38 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=ajesi. Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Inc. is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to American Journal of Economics and Sociology. http://www.jstor.org http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=ajesi http://www.jstor.org/stable/3488016?origin=JSTOR-pdf http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=ajesi Allocation of Time and Hateful Behavior: A Theoretical and Positive Analysis Of Hate and Hate Crimes By MARSHALL H. MEDOFF* ABSTRACT. This paper uses the rational-choice economic approach to analyze hateful behavior. The theoretical model predicts that hateful ac- tivity decreases with increases in (i) the market wage rate, (ii) the value of time, (iii) age, and (iv) law enforcement activity. The theory is tested on U.S. state hate crime data and the empirical results provide convincing support for the model. Three other factors (urbanization, low occupational status, and downward social mobility) thought to be causes of hateful activity are found not to be statistically significant determinants of hateful activity. Introduction MoRE THAN ANYTHING ELSE, the twentieth century may be remembered as an era in which the brutality of mankind erupted more expansively than ever before. Hatred reached genocidal proportions in Germany, Turkey, Indo- nesia, Bangladesh, Burundi, Nigeria, Cambodia, and elsewhere. The last decade of the twentieth century has seen an upsurge in hate. In Bosnia and Kosovo the Serbians have been systematically attempting to eliminate (ethnically cleanse) all traces of other ethnic groups from their territory. In Rwanda the majority Hutu tribe massacred at least 500,000 members of the minority Tutsi tribe. The Muslims in Iraq attempted to exterminate the Kurd tribespeople by using biological and chemical weapons. The United States during the twentieth century has been relatively immune from the destructive consequences of hate. While a troublesome problem today, however, hateful behavior has the potential to become a * Marshall H. Medoff is a professor of economics at California State University, Long Beach. Professor Medoffs research interests include the economics of abor- tion, racial and sexual discrimination, and the rankings of economists and economic departments. American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Vol. 58, No. 4 (October, 1999). C 1999 American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Inc. 960 American Journal of Economics and Sociology major social problem in the twenty-first century. America's future race/ ethnic/minority relations will, to some extent, depend upon understanding the forces that transform hate into acts of violence. A hate crime is defined as a crime directed against members of a particular group simply because of their membership in that group (U.S. Department of Justice, 1990). The basis for an attack may be a victim's race, ethnicity, religion, sexual orientation, or gender. The victim's individual personal characteristics (height, weight, hair color, etc.) are from the perpetrator's point of view irrelevant. All that matters is that the victim is perceived to be a member of the hated group. Recent research suggests that hate crimes have certain characteristics that distinguish them from other types of violent acts (assaults, robbery, homicide). Hate-motivated assaults tend to be initiated by individuals who are unknown to their victims, whereas most assaults involve people who know each other well-friends, spouses, neighbors (Bu- reau of Justice Statistics, 1985). Another characteristic of hate crimes is they are much more likely than other crimes to entail personal violence and tend to be excessively brutal (Levin and McDevitt, 1993). In most property crimes something of value is taken; in a hate crime something of value is more likely to be damaged or destroyed (Berk, 1990). Most perpetrators of hate crimes, in contrast to other violent offenders, have no prior history of criminal behavior (Harry, 1990). Haters must expend considerably more time and expense than other violent offenders to perpetrate their crime. Haters do not know the victim, live outside the area of the victim, and typically commit the crime near the residence of the victim. Haters must go out of their way to search for the victims in unfamiliar areas (Flannery, 1997). Various psychological and sociological theories of hatred have been proffered. Allport (1955) notes that hatred is an emotion of extreme dislike or aggressive impulses towards a person or group of persons. By its very nature hatred is extropunitive-the hater is sure the fault lies in the object of his hate. So long as the hater believes this, no guilt is felt. While hate does not necessarily lead to violence, it is part of the social and psycho- logical processes that makes violence an acceptable form of behavior. Fromm (1947) points out that it is essential to distinguish between two kinds of hate: "rational" and "character-conditioned." Rational hate arises when fundamental natural rights of persons are violated. One hates what- Allocation of Time and Hateful Behavior 961 ever threatens one's own or other's freedom, lives, and values. Character- conditioned hatred has little relation to reality. The hater carries a vague, temperamental sense of wrong which he wishes to polarize- he must hate something. The roots of the hatred are unclear, but the hater thinks up some convenient victim and a good reason to justify the hate. A hater chooses out-groups as the object of hate and aggression rather than individuals. A group is more abstract and impersonal. If the hater is convinced that a group is unworthy, subhuman, stupid, or immoral it helps justify sentiments of hate and hostility. Pettigrew (1959) argues that hatred is due to conformity. Individuals conform to the social norms that exist within their sphere of socialization (friends, neighborhood, or work). The pressure to conform can be rela- tively overt or simply due to the unavailability of accurate evidence. In either situation it can induce or condone haters to engage in aggressive behavior. Milgram (1974) argues that hate arises from the situation a person finds him- or herself in and not from a lack of values or character. This "obedience to authority" approach makes several claims. First, obedience rather than personal aggression lies at the heart of hate. Second, individuals are induced by the trappings of authority into performing hateful acts. Third, people who obey evil commands to commit hateful acts do so mainly because they are overwhelmed by the situation in which they find themselves. Olzak and Nagel (1986) maintain that hate manifests itself when any minority group attempts to secure the same resources, such as jobs or housing, as the majority group. Hate is exacerbated by the expansion of the previously segregated minority group into the same labor and housing markets that the majority group is occupying. Staub (1989) asserts that hate is a psychological manifestation. Individ- uals who hate have a poor self-image, are easily threatened, and have a constant need to enhance their ego. These characteristics set in motion the motivation to harm or reduce inhibitions against aggressive behavior. Diminishing others raises the hater's well-being. Harming others becomes a value in itself. Goldhagen (1996) insists that a necessary condition for hate to exist in a society is for state policy to sanction, tolerate, or participate in such behavior. Goldhagen argues that the Holocaust would not have occurred if it were not for the fact that the most virulent haters were organized and mobilized by the 962 American Journal of Economics and Sociology political leadership into a program of killing. The perpetrators, who degraded, tortured, and killed other people with zeal and enthusiasm, did so not only because they hated their victims but also because the state shared their belief that extermination was necessary and just. One of the problems with these psychological and sociological expla- nations of hateful behavior is that, while they yield insights into the motivations of individuals, they do not provide useful theories of hate since they fail to generate empirically verifiable hypotheses.1 Traditionally, economics has concentrated on the behavior of individuals in the mone- tary-market sector. The last three decades have seen economists increas- ingly extend the economic paradigm of individual rational-choice pio- neered by Becker (1965), to nonmarket activities (e.g., fertility, suicide, marriage, crime) and produce a better understanding of such behavior. This paper represents an effort to test the validity of the economic rational- choice approach to behavior as it applies to the phenomena of hateful activity. I examine the determinants of individual participation in hateful activities and empirically investigate the extent to which these factors contribute to hostile behavior towards various individuals or groups. II Theoretical Framework THE ECONOMIC OR RATIONAL-CHOICE APPROACH assumes individuals maximize well-being (utility) as they conceive it. Their behavior is forward-looking and their preferences are stable over time. An individual's action is con- strained by income, time, other limited resources, and the opportunities available in the marketplace. For simplicity, it is assumed that an individual's utility () depends on the consumption of antisocial hateful behavior (W) and all other commodities which are combined into an aggregate good (Z).2 The utility function becomes U = U(H, Z). [1] Goods H and Z are not perfect substitutes for each other in consumption and H is a more time-intensive consumption activity than Z. Hateful activity cannot be purchased in the market, but is self-produced using market goods and services and one's own time. Both commodities Hand Z are produced using a vector of market goods xi and a vector of its own Allocation of Time and Hateful Behavior 963 time t, within the context of a vector of environmental variables E in which production takes place.3 H = h(xh, th; E), Z = z(xz, tz; E). [2] An individual's available time Tis given by the time spent working, t", the time spent in producing H, th, and the time spent in producing Z, t2, given by the constraint T = tw+ th + tz. [3] An individual's income constraint is given by the equation wth + wtZ + PhXh + pzxz = M, [4] where w is the market wage rate, Pb and p, are the price of the respective market-good input used in producing H and Z, and M is the individual's potential full income. Maximizing the utility function (1) subject to the production function (2) and income (4) constraints yields the first-order condition. dU dth dxh dH w dH + Ph dH MCH [5] dU dtz dxZ MCZ dZ w dZ Pz dZ where the numerator (denominator) of the right-hand side of (5) repre- sents the marginal cost (MC) of commodity H(commodity Z) given by the sum of the opportunity cost of time plus the cost of producing a unit of commodity H (commodity 2). An increase in the value of an individual's time (w) would increase the marginal cost of both Hand Z, but especially H which is relatively more time-intensive, leading to a decrease in its consumption. Thus, equation (5) implies an increase in an individual's market wage will lead to a decrease in hateful activity. The value of market time in equation (5) changes at various points in a person's life cycle and these changes should induce substitution towards cheaper methods of production. At an early stage in the life cycle an individual's value of time is relatively low and the value of goods high. This 964 American Journal of Economics and Sociology suggests that one should observe relatively more consumption of time- intensive modes such as hate activity when individuals are young.4 A change in an environmental variable is represented by E in equation (2). A change in E changes the amounts of goods and time required to produce a given amount of either H or Z. The effect of a change in E on MCH is given by dMCH dth dw d2th d2xh =- + w ~ + PhdEdH. [6] dE -dH dE dEdH+PhdH[6 An increase in an environmental variable, such as education, in equation (6) dw will raise (i) the market value of time dE > 0 and (ii) the productivity of non-market consumption activity d~th < ?' dxh < 0? because edu- ( ddH 'dEdH / cation reduces the cost of producing H Thus, the impact of an increase in education on the marginal cost of hateful behavior depends on whether the magnitude of the substitution effect away from hateful behavior is greater than, equal to, or less than the productivity effect towards more hateful activity. If the environmental variable E in equation (6) refers to law enforcement activity, then a change in law enforcement will have no effect on the (dw market value of time -dE = ? . However, it will increase the amount of time or goods required to produce a given amount of hateful activity (dEdH > ?' dE > 0), thus increasing the marginal cost of hateful activity (d H > ) and discouraging its consumption. In sum, the theoretical model of rational-choice predicts that hateful activity decreases with increases in (i) the market wage rate, (ii) the value of time, (iii) age, and (iv) law enforcement activity. The effect of education on hateful activity is ambiguous. III Empirical Model To TEST THE THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE PREVIOUS SECTION the following equation was estimated5: Allocation of Time and Hateful Behavior 965 Hate Crimesi = bo + bi Wagei + b2 Unemployment1 + b3 Unemployment2i + b4 Age 15 - 19i + b5 Educationi + b6 Law Enforcement1 + b7 Religioni + b8 Ideology1 where the dependent variable is the number of hate crimes per 1,000 population in state i committed during the year 1995.6 The variable wagei is the full-time hourly wage rate in state i. The higher the opportunity cost of a person's time in non-market activities, the lower the hate crime activity (b1<O). The higher the unemployment rate in state i, the lower the opportunity cost of time for many persons, and the lower the marginal cost of engaging in hate activity (b2>0). The unemployment rate is entered with a squared term to allow for diminishing marginal returns in time value; beyond some point increases in unemployment lower a person's time value by smaller and smaller increments (b3<0). Age 15 - 19i is the percentage of a state's population that is between the ages of 15 to 19 years old.7 Individuals at the early stages of their life cycle tend to have a relatively low time value and concomitantly are more likely to engage in time-intensive hateful activity (b4>0). Education is the percent- age of state i's population 25 years or older that have at least a high school degree. Education increases both a person's market value of time and the productivity of non-market activity, thus its effect is ambiguous (b5=?). The variable law enforcement is the number of full-time law enforcement officers per 10,000 population and its expected impact is negative (b6<0).8 The remaining two independent variables are included to control for differential tastes across states. Durkheim (1951) contends that religious attitudes and beliefs are related to behavior. Religion, he argues, is able to deter unlawful or immoral behavior because its belief system legitimates social and individual values; its rituals reinforce commitments to these values; and its system of rewards and punishments ensure the embodiment of these values in actual behavior. The religion variable is the percentage of a state's population that are religious adherents and its expected impact is negative (b7<0). The other taste variable is a state's ideology. Ideology promotes shared 966 American Journal of Economics and Sociology values and goals. Through such institutions as schools, government, and media, ideology helps shape individual attitudes and acceptable behavior (Staub, 1989). The ideology variable is Medoff's (1997) numerical measure of a state's liberal predisposition (from 0 = extremely conservative to 100 = extremely liberal) and its hypothesized impact is unclear (b8=?).9 While the economic approach to behavior derives its theory based on individual choice, its implications are tested at the group or aggregate level. One might question the validity of making inferences about individ- ual behavior from aggregate data. Social scientists have increasingly rec- ognized that there are conditions in which individual behavior can be reasonably inferred from aggregate data. Grunfield and Griliches (1960) argue that individual data are subject to large errors compared to aggregate level data and that individual equations are more likely to be poorly specified than the aggregate equation. Hence a net gain will be realized using aggregate data rather than individual data. Zellner (1962) established that the use of data aggregated over individual units does not lead to aggregation bias if the parameters for each individual are all equal or if the distribution of each independent variable among the individuals is de- scribed by a stable linear function (e.g., the consumption function in Friedman's permanent income hypothesis model makes both assump- tions). Aigner and Goldfield (1974) point out that if the aggregate variables are more important in determining the individual variables, there is a specification error in the individual relations which is larger than the aggregation error. They show that in this case the aggregate equation is superior to the individual equations. Hanushek, Jackson, and Kain (1974) note that social scientists are interested in the regularities in human be- havior associated with the effects of various characteristics (e.g., the effect of income on consumption). They point out that since the objective of most empirical analysis is to determine the independent effects of some individual characteristics on the behavior of individuals possessing that characteristic, the use of aggregate data is appropriate. Irwin and Lichtman (1976) argue that aggregate data are of better quality than individual data. As a consequence estimates obtained from aggregate data will more accurately reflect individual behavior than estimates taken from a poorly specified and measured individual level equation. Firebaugh (1978) shows that the relations between variables for individuals can be correctly in- ferred from the relations between these variables for aggregates, provided Allocation of Time and Hateful Behavior 967 that the size of an independent variable has no effect on individual behavior. This suggests that aggregate hate crimes data can be used to empirically test the implications from the theory of individual hateful behavior. IV Empirical Results EQUATION (7) WAS ESTIMATED USING ORDINARY LEAST SQUARES and the empirical results appear in Table 1, Column 1.'0 As hypothesized, a higher market wage rate has a statistically significantly negative impact on hateful activity. Hateful activity increases with unemployment, but at a decreasing rate. The lower value of time of the 15 to 19 year old age group results in a higher incidence of hateful crimes. Law enforcement is found to have a statistically insignificant impact on deterring hateful consumption. The religion variable was negative but not statistically significantly different from zero. The result is consistent with the contention by some sociologists that religion plays no role in mitigating deviant behavior (Hirschi and Stark, 1969).1 The liberal ideology variable is statistically significantly positive suggest- ing that hate crimes are more likely to be committed in states where the population is liberally inclined. While this finding may seem perverse, it is consistent with the interpretation that liberal states, because they have more tolerant attitudes, have a lower search cost of identifying potential victims and hence a lower marginal cost of producing a unit of hateful activity. The education variable is statistically significantly positive. This does not mean that a greater degree of knowledge is positively associated with greater intolerance. Rather, it suggests that hateful activity occurs propor- tionately more in states with a better educated populace (who may tend to have more tolerant [liberal] attitudes). It is important to point out the meaning of the phrase "statistically significant" used above. It means that under the null hypothesis the probability of obtaining a Student's t value is <5 percent. Hence the conclusion must be either that the sample is extremely improbable or else, as in this paper, the null hypothesis that the partial regression coefficient bi is not significantly different from zero is rejected. However, as noted by 968 American Journal of Economics and Sociology Table 1 Hate Crimes Regressions* Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) Constant -12.9034-13.2533 -14.4550 -12.9271 (3.19) (3.28) (2.69) (3.21) Wage - .3136 -.2591 -.2840 -.3428 (3.48) (2.57) (2.52) (3.68) Unemployment 1.9862 1.9890 1.9934 1.9312 (2.46) (2.47) (2.44) (2.39) Unemployment2 -.1645 -.1629 -.1656 -.1560 (2.25) (2.24) (2.24) (2.14) Age 15-24 .1762 .1617 .1761 .1766 (2.13) (1.95) (2.11) (2.15) Education .0994 .1047 .1025 .1043 (3.43) (3.59) (3.40) (3.58) Law Enforcement 0.162 .0231 .0199 .0145 (.64) (.90) (.75) (.58) Religion -.0044 -.0016 .0038 -.0082 (.40) (.14) (.34) (.72) Ideology .0234 .0210 .0231 .0221 (3.80) (3.26) (3.69) (3.55) Urbanization ... -.0117 ... ... ... (1.18) ... ... % Blue Collar ... ... .0177 ... ... (.44) ... Downward Mobility ... ... ... -4.0732 (1.15) R2 .49 .51 .50 .50 * Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses. McCloskey and Ziliak (1996), the overwhelming majority of economic papers fail to distinguish between statistical significance and economic (or numerical) significance. An estimated coefficient may be statistically sig- nificant but economically insignificant. As McCloskey and Ziliak point out, in order to discern the economic impact of a coefficient it would be more Allocation of Time and Hateful Behavior 969 appropriate to report the coefficient in terms of a confidence interval, in elasticity form, or in some other interpretable form. In this paper the interest is not in the economic significance of the coefficient, but rather in the implications of theory-that is, rejecting the null hypothesis of no association (bi = 0) between an independent variable and the dependent variable. V Alternative Teories SOME PSYCHOLOGISTS HAVE ARGUED that hatred is more apt to be prevalent in urban areas which have more social disorganization (Newman, 1979). In terms of equation (6), a change in the environmental variable urbanization would result in more hateful activity if urbanization lowered the market dw value of time dE < 0 and/or lowered the amount of time or goods td2th d__2__ required to produce hateful activity (dEdH < 0' dEdH < 0) possibly by reducing the search costs of finding a potential victim or by reducing the probability of criminal apprehension. This hypothesis is tested by adding the variable, the percentage of state i's population living in an urban area, to equation (7). The empirical results appear in Table 1, Column 2. The urbanization variable is negative (contrary to psychologists' contention), but not statistically significantly different from zero. Hateful activity is not found to be more prevalent in urban areas. It also has been suggested that individuals at or near the bottom of the occupational classification are the ones most likely to resort to hate crime activity.12 Equation (5) implies this is due to a lower market value of time. This hypothesis is tested by adding to equation (7) the variable of the percentage of workers employed in blue-collar occupations in state i. The empirical results appear in Table 1, Column 3. The blue-collar occupation coefficient was positive, but not statistically significantly different from zero. There is no difference in the degree of intolerance by occupational status. Finally, it has been argued that hatred is a function of whether a person's social mobility is declining.13 Social scientists typically measure social mobility by changes in an individual's occupational position. This argu- 970 American Journal of Economics and Sociology ment suggests that as a result of a decline in social mobility an individual's value of time has decreased over time, lowering the marginal cost of hateful activity. This hypothesis is tested by adding to equation (7) the percentage change from 1980 to 1990 in the proportion of blue-collar workers in state i. The empirical results from Table 1, Column 4 shows the downward social mobility variable was negative (contrary to expecta- tions), but not statistically significantly different from zero. Hate activities do not increase as a result of a downward change in the social position of individuals over time. VI Conclusion THIS PAPER ANALYZES THE DETERMINANTS OF HATEFUL ACTIVITY using the economic or rational-choice approach to human behavior. A utility maximization model of individual allocation of time was developed. The model predicts that hateful activity decreases with increases in (i) the market wage rate, (ii) the value of time, (iii) age, and (iv) law enforcement activity. The effect of education on hateful activity is unclear. The theory is tested using 1995 statewide data on hate crimes. The empirical results provide strong support for the model. Hate crimes are positively related to the unemployment rate, percentage of the population between ages 15 to 19 years, the extent of a state's liberal ideology, and the educational level. Hate crimes are negatively related to the market wage rate. Law enforcement efforts and religious belief did not have a statisti- cally significant impact on hateful activity. The empirical model is used to test other factors hypothesized by social scientists to be causes of hateful activity. All three factors - urbanization, low occupational status, and downward social mobility - are found not to be significant determinants of hateful activity. Many implications follow from the theoretical and empirical results. First, as real wages increase over time, hateful activity should decrease as individuals shift towards less time-intensive forms of consumption. Sec- ond, if the unemployment rate rises over time, the opportunity cost of time falls for many people, leading to more consumption of the time-intensive hateful activity. Third, law enforcement efforts and appeals to spiritual beliefs will have little effect on hateful activity. Fourth, the empirical results Allocation of Time and Hateful Behavior 971 presented in the paper provide strong support for the rational-choice approach to behavior as it applies to hateful activity. Notes 1. All research must assume a theoretical framework; a body of hypotheses bearing on the phenomena under investigation. If the research produces significant results, these validate to some degree the hypotheses which were initially assumed. 2. Halleck (1967) has argued that aggression may be a rational choice, given the situation in which the person finds himself. He observes that there are a number of sources of hate which may be solved by criminal and aggressive behavior such as feelings of powerlessness, external oppression, and persecution by others. 3. For ease of exposition xi, ti, and E are treated as scalars. 4. This suggests that senior citizens, because of their relatively low market value of time, should have a comparatively high incidence of hateful activity. The fact that this group has a low rate of criminal offenses can best be explained by their physical problems and limitations. 5. All the socioeconomic data came from the Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1996 and the U.S. Bureau of the Census, State Reports. The data on hate crime came from the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Reports. The religious data was from Quinn et. al., Churches and Church Membership in the United States. 6. It has been suggested that the hate crime statistics are measured inaccurately due to underreporting. There is, however, no evidence to suggest that any errors in reporting are systematically related to any of the independent variables in equation (7). To the extent that any underreporting errors are normally distributed across all states, the empirical estimates of the parameters will be unbiased but the degree of explanatory power will be lower. 7. The percentage of a state's population between the ages of 20 - 24 and 15 - 24 were each entered separately into equation (7). The empirical results were virtually identical to those reported in Table 1, Column 1, except that the coefficient of both age variables was numerically smaller than the Age 15 - 19 variable, as hypothesized. 8. One might argue that the size of the hated groups should be included as an independent variable in equation (7). This is incorrect for two reasons. First, this is a study of an individual's allocation of time between hateful and market activity, given hated groups. It is not a study of why some groups are hated. Second, the inclusion of the size of the hated groups as an explanatory variable is to suggest that the very presence of hated groups causes hateful activity. 9. The mean and standard deviation (in parentheses) for the variables in equation (7) are Wage: 14.356(1.835); Unemployment: 5.16(1.079); Age 15 - 19: 9.475(.994); Educa- tion: 76.266(5.496); Law Enforcement: 21.822(5.126); Religion: 54.737(12.759); Ideology: 48.478(20.068). 10. A Breusch-Pagan test indicated that the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity could not be rejected. 972 American Journal of Economics and Sociology 11. One might argue that religious affiliation is not a valid measure of religious conviction. In order to analyze the association between religious conviction and hateful behavior the percentage of Christian Fundamentalists, Catholics, and Jews in state i were each entered separately into equation (7). In all three cases the religion variable was not statistically significant and the other variables were virtually identical to those reported in Table 1, Column 1. 12. Aronson (1992) asserts that an individual who is low on the socioeconomic hierarchy may need the presence of a downtrodden minority group in order to be able to feel superior to someone. 13. Bettelheim and Janowitz (1950) maintain that an individual is likely to experience a weakening of desire or ability to conform to society's demands as a result of downward social mobility. Downward mobility is positively associated with aggressive attitudes, intolerance, and increased hostility. References Aigner, Dennis J. and Goldfeld, Stephen M. 1974. "Estimation and Prediction From Aggregate Data When Aggregates Are Measured More Accurately Than Their Components," Econometrica, January, pp. 113-134. Allport, Gordon W. 1955. The Nature of Prejudice, New York: Addison-Wesley Publish- ing. Aronson, Elliot 1992. The Social Animal. New York: W.H. Freeman and Company. Becker, Gary S. 1965. "A Theory of Allocation of Time," Economic Journal, September, pp. 493-517. Berk, Richard A. 1990. "Thinking About Hate-Motivated Crimes," Journal of Interper- sonal Violence, September, pp. 334-349. Bettelheim, Bruno andJanowitz, Morris. 1950. Dynamics of Prejudice. New York: Harper and Brothers. Bureau of Justice Statistics. 1985. Criminal Victimization in the United States. Washing- ton, D.C.: Government Printing Office. Durkheim, Emile. 1951. Suicide: A Study in Sociology. New York: The Free Press. Firebaugh, George. 1978. "A Rule for Inferring Individual-Level Relationships From Aggregate Data," American Sociological Review, August, pp. 557-572. Flannery, Raymond B. 1997. Violence in America. New York: Continuum Publishing Company. Fromm, Erich. 1947. Man for Himself New York: Rinehart. Goldhagen, Daniel J. 1996. Hitler's Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust. New York: Knopf. Grunfeld, Yehuda and Griliches, Zvi. 1960. "Is Aggregation Necessarily Bad?," Review of Economics and Statistics, February, pp. 1-13. Halleck, Seymour. 1967. Psychiatry and the Dilemmas of Crime. New York: Harper and Row. Allocation of Time and Hateful Behavior 973 Hanushek, Eric, Jackson, John and Kain, John. 1974. "Model Specification, Use of Aggregate Data, and the Ecological Correlation Fallacy," Political Methodology, Winter, pp. 89-107. Harry, Joseph. 1990. "Conceptualizing Anti-Gay Violence," Journal of Interpersonal Violence, September, pp. 350-358. Hirschi, Travis and Stark, Rodney. 1969. "Hellfire and Delinquency," Social Forces, Fall, pp. 202-213. Irwin, Laura and Lichtman, Allan J. 1976. "Across the Great Divide: Inferring Individual Level Behavior from Aggregate Data," Political Methodology, Fall, pp. 411-439. Levin, Jack and McDevitt, Jack. 1993. Hate Crimes. New York: Plenum Press. McCloskey, Deirdre N. and Ziliak, Stephen T. 1996. "The Standard Error of Regressions," Journal of Economic Literature, March, pp. 97-114. Medoff, Marshall H. 1997. "The Political Implications of State Political Ideology: A Measure Tested," American Journal of Economics and Sociology, April, pp. 145- 158. Milgram, Stanley. 1974. Obedience to Authority: An Experimental View. New York: Harper Books. Newman, Graeme. 1979. Understanding Violence. New York: J.B. Lippincott Company. Olzak, Susan and Nagel, Joanne. 1986. Competitive Ethnic Relations. Orlando: Academic Press. Pettigrew, Thomas F. 1959. "Regional Differences in Anti-Negro Prejudice," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, January, pp. 28-36. Quinn, Bernard, Bradley, Martin, Goettinghall, Paul and Shriver, Peggy. 1993. Churches and Church Membership in the United States, Atlanta: Glenmary Research Center. Staub, Ervin. 1989. The Roots of Evil. New York: Cambridge University Press. U.S. Bureau of the Census. 1997. Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1996. Wash- ington, D.C.: Government Printing Office. U.S. Bureau of the Census. 1993. U.S. Census of the Population: 1990, State Reports, Social and Economic Cbaracteristics. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1993. U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation. 1997. Uniform Crime Reports: Hate Crime -1995. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office. U.S. Department of Justice. 1990. Hate Crime Data Collection Guidelines. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office. Zellner, Arnold and Huang, David S. 1962. "Further Properties of Efficient Estimators for Seemingly Unrelated Regression Equations," International Economic Review, Sep- tember, pp. 300-313. Article Contents p. [959] p. 960 p. 961 p. 962 p. 963 p. 964 p. 965 p. 966 p. 967 p. 968 p. 969 p. 970 p. 971 p. 972 p. 973 Issue Table of Contents The American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Vol. 58, No. 4 (Oct., 1999), pp. 551-1119+1-11 Volume Information [pp. 1-11] Front Matter [pp. 559-1073] Editor's Introduction [pp. 551-558] Origins and Historical Precedents for the Synthesis Max Weber as an Economist and as a Sociologist: Towards a Fuller Understanding of Weber's View of Economics [pp. 561-582] Economic Sociology in Retrospect and Prospect: In Search of Its Identity within Economics and Sociology [pp. 583-627] The Changing Relationship between Economic Sociology and Institutional Economics: From Talcott Parsons to Mark Granovetter [pp. 629-649] The Economic Sociology of Alfred Marshall: An Overview [pp. 651-667] Assessing the New Synthesis of Economics and Sociology: Promising Themes for Contemporary Analysts of Economic Life [pp. 669-696] Cooperation, Language, and the Division of Labor Market Evolution and Economic Development: The Evolution of Impersonal Markets [pp. 699-712] Discursive Rationality and the Division of Labour: How Cooperation Emerges [pp. 713-727] Katallactic Rationality: Exploring the Links between Co-operation and Language [pp. 729-747] Two Views on Social Stability: An Unsettled Question [pp. 749-780] Transaction Costs and Networks of Exchange Transaction Costs and the Structure of the Market: A Case Study [pp. 783-805] Towards a Synthesis of Transaction Cost Economics and a Feminist Oriented Network Analysis: An Application to Women's Street Commerce [pp. 807-827] Ethnic Solidarity and Black Business: The Case of Ethnic Beauty Aids Distributors in Chicago [pp. 829-841] Social Networks and Prestige Attainment: New Empirical Findings [pp. 843-864] Slapping the Grasping Hand: Correlates of Political Corruption in Emerging Markets [pp. 865-883] Rational Choice Economics Applied to Sociological Phenomena An Exploration of the Beckerian Theory of Time Costs: Symphony Concert Demand [pp. 887-899] All's Fair: War and Other Causes of Divorce from a Beckerian Perspective [pp. 901-922] A Household Production Analysis of Religious and Charitable Activity [pp. 923-946] The Economics of the Criminal Behavior of Young Adults: Estimation of an Economic Model of Crime with a Correction for Aggregate Market and Public Policy Variables [pp. 947-957] Allocation of Time and Hateful Behavior: A Theoretical and Positive Analysis of Hate and Hate Crimes [pp. 959-973] Norms, Markets and Culture Conceptualizing Professionalism: Why Economics Needs Sociology [pp. 977-998] The Social Norms of Discrete Consumer Exchange: Classification and Quantification [pp. 999-1018] The Consumption of Music and the Expression of VALUES: A Social Economic Explanation for the Advent of Pop Music [pp. 1019-1046] Enriching Exchange: Cultural Dimensions of Markets [pp. 1047-1071] Money, Emotion and Social Functions Money and Its Economic and Social Functions: Simmel and European Monetary Integration [pp. 1075-1090] Beyond Twin Deficits: Emotions of the Future in the Organizations of Money [pp. 1091-1118] Back Matter [pp. 1119-1119] 
work_5oaioidwfrfs7etnksrsmxq76a	----	AJur_(52)2011_04_02.indd 1216-2574 / USD 20.00 © 2011 Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest ACTA JURIDICA HUNGARICA 52, No 4, pp. 296–315 (2011) DOI: 10.1556/AJur.52.2011.4.2 LÍDIA BALOGH* Racist and Related Hate Crimes in Hungary – Recent Empirical Findings I. An overview of the situation concerning hate crimes in Hungary Affected communities In Hungary the Roma constitute the largest minority (the estimated number of the Roma population is 700 000,1 which is approximately 7% of Hungary’s total population), and practically the Roma are the only “visible” minority (given the small proportion of migrants in the population).2 Given that the Roma are often used as scapegoats for social and economic problems, and prejudices and negative attitudes against Roma are pervasive in the mainstream Hungarian society, hate crimes or hate speech as an issue might come up rst of all in the context of anti-Roma tensions in Hungary. Anti-Semitism is to be considered as a prevalent phenomenon in Hungary (including the political discourse), and there are numerous cases of attacks against the members of the Jewish community, which is estimated to be between 80 000 and 100 000,3 or vandalism against Jewish property. Other racist manifestations are not signi cant. The only known Islamophobic incident in 2009, when civil protesters, supported by local politicians, opposed the opening of a Muslim cultural centre in Budapest, might not be considered as an example for hate crime. Manifestations of hate crimes are reported against LGBT people in Hungary. Allegedly, a large proportion of homophobic hate crimes (including violent attack against persons and verbal abuses) is committed around the time of the annual Gay Pride March in Budapest. This trend started in 2007, and there was an enormous amount of violent attacks against the Pride March in 2008. * Ph.D. candidate, Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest. E-mail: lidia.balogh@gmail.com 1 Council of Europe’s data: http://www.coe.int/t/dg3/romatravellers/default_en.asp 2 According to the the Central Statistical Of ce, the proportion of foreigners is 1.7% in the whole population living in Hungary, among them a large proportion is of ethnic Hungarians, coming from the neighbouring countries. See details on the methods of measuring migrant population in Hungary: Hárs, Á.: A harmadik országokból Magyarországon tartózkodó külföldi állampolgárok a statisztikai adatok tükrében (The statistics of third-country nationals residing in Hungary). In: Bevándorlók Magyarországon. Az MTA Etnikai-nemzeti Kisebbségkutató Intézet ICCR Budapest Alapítvány által végzett kutatás zárótanulmányai (Immigrants in Hungary. Final report of the research implemented by the Institute for Ethnic and National Minority Studies of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences and the ICCR Budapest Foundation). Budapest, 2009, 28. 3 U.S. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor: 2009 Human Rights Report: Hungary, 2010, available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/eur/136035.htm 297RACIST AND RELATED HATE … Notable contexts of racist manifestations In 2009, during the EP election campaign, the National Election Commission held that the extreme-rightist Jobbik party’s slogan “Hungary belongs to Hungarians” is unconsti- tutional.4 However, no further sanctions were issued, and the slogan was continued to be used. Homophobic statements were also recurring themes in Jobbik rallies during the 2009 EP-elections campaign. A week after the MEP elections Jobbik announced at a press conference that they would work in close cooperation with other right-wing extremist political groups to stop the Gay Pride March by all means necessary. Also 2009, the Ethics Committee of the Association of Hungarian Journalists condemned a rightist weekly Magyar Fórum5 for portraying a prime minister candidate on its cover framed in a Star of David saying “Jewish Prime minister”. The Association held that the cover violates the constitution and human dignity and asked the Parliamentary Commissioner of Civil and Political Rights to investigate the case. Extremist news media releases6 often refer to crimes involving alleged Roma perpetrators, as “a crime of the Gypsies”, and the term is used even for cases when there is a lonely perpetrator, or when the ethnicity of the perpetrator(s) is unknown.7 Despite some governmental efforts aimed at combating racist incitement on the internet, extremist websites (in Hungarian language) are still operating. In June 2009, human rights NGOs led a report, with the National Police and the Capital Prosecutor’s Of ce, claiming investigation and indictment for inciting ethnic hatred, against a notorious and widely known right-wing extremist blogger (who posted to his blog that Roma people should be “subjugated, expelled from public and cultural life and any utterance of ethnic nature has to be eliminated without mercy. Their spines have to be broken”).8 Racist/intolerant manifestation in sports– rst of all verbal abuse, and banners displaying hate speech or holocaust denial on the grandstands–appears practically only in the context of football in Hungary. The Hungarian Football Federation9 regularly nes the violators of the regulations regarding “acceptable behaviour”. 4 OVB: Az országos választási bizottság 2009. június 3-án megtartott ülésének jegyz könyve. Budapest, 2009 (Record on the meeting of the National Election Commission held on 3rd of June, 2009), available at http://www.valasztas.hu/hu/ep2009/content/of/20090603.pdf 5 MÚOSZ: Etikai Bizottság: törvénysért a Magyar Fórum címlapja. 2009 (Ethics Committee: The front page of Magyar Fórum violatest the law) (27.03.2009) available at http://muosz.hu/cikk.php?page=bizottsagok&id=1908&fo=8&iid=5 6 For example the extreme rightist web page www.kuruc.info is operated from various international servers; it has been banned several times due to complaints, but is restarted again and again from a different server. 7 Balogh, L.: Etnikai adatok kezelése a magyarországi sajtóban (Ethnic data handling in the Hungarian media). In: Föld-rész, 2, (2009) 3–4, 89–90. 8 Jogi Fórum/Magyar Helsinki Bizottság: Jogvéd szervezetek feljelentést tettek a BRFK-n és a F városi F ügyészségen közösség elleni izgatás miatt (Human rights NGO led a complaint at the Budapest Police Headquarter and at the Budapest Chief Prosecutor’s Of ce on incitement against community). Jogi Fórum (26.06.2009) available at: http://www.jogiforum.hu/hirek/21009 9 Magyar Labdarúgó Szövetség: www.mlsz.hu 298 LÍDIA BALOGH Attention received by racist crime and other forms of hate crime In the last two years, apparently hate crimes against the Roma attracted the most signi cant media attention, compared to other forms of hate crimes. However, as a recent study shows,10 the media attention was signi cantly higher regarding those cases where allegedly Roma perpetrator committed violent crimes against non-Roma victims, compared to the attention regarding hate crimes against Roma victims. As for anti-Semitic and homophobic hate crimes, there are occasional reporting of such incidents in the media, however, according to NGO sources, a large proportion of hate crimes do not receive any media attention, because these incidents tend to remain unreported. Besides awareness raising activities and demonstrations organised by civil society actors responding to hate crimes affecting members of the Roma or Jewish communities,11 notable NGO actions, reacting to inappropriate police responses to hate crimes, took place. In 2009, three NGOs (European Roma Rights Centre, Legal Defence Bureau for National and Ethnic Minorities the Hungarian Civil Liberties Union) released a joint report12 about the misconducts of the relevant authorities regarding the investigation of the fatal attack against a Roma family in Tatárszentgyörgy. In 2010, the Hungarian Civil Liberties Union submitted a petition to the Head of the National Police and the Head of the Budapest Police Headquarters regarding an attack against the home of a Jewish family on Seder evening, which was considered and investigated by the police as “vandalism”, instead of “violence against members of a community”.13 Also in 2010, an open letter was sent to the Head of the Budapest Police Headquarters by the Hungarian Civil Liberties Union,14 regarding the attacks against the participants 2010 Gay Pride March in Budapest, which were considered and investigated by the police as “disorderly conducts” or “minor bodily injuries” instead of “violence against members of a community”. 10 Karácsony, G.–Róna, D.: A Jobbik titka. A széls jobb magyarországi meger södésének lehet- séges okairól (The secret of Jobbik Party: on the possible causes of the sweep of Right Wing on Hungary). Politikatudományi Szemle, 19 (2010) 1, 31–66. 11 For example on 23 February 2010, the Méltóságot Mindenkinek Mozgalom (Dignity for All Movement) organised a Remembrance Day on the anniversary of the double murder in Tatárszent- györgy, where a 27-year-old Roma man and his ve-year-old son were shot and killed; in April 2010, the Szabad Emberek Magyarországért (Free Persons for Hungary) organised a peaceful “walk in kipa or headscarf”, aimed at protesting against the inappropriate police response and showing solidarity towards religious Jews living in Hungary. 12 European Roma Rights Centre, Legal Defence Bureau for National and Ethnic Minorities and Hungarian Civil Liberties Union: Report on the circumstances of the double murder committed at Tatárszentgyörgy on 23 February 2009 and the conduct of the acting authorities (the police, ambulance and re services), 2009, available at http://www.errc.org/cms/upload/media/03/DA/ m000003DA.pdf 13 TASZ: Nem rongálás, közösség tagja elleni er szak–rend rséghez fordul a TASZ a Széder estet ünnepl k megtámadása ügyében (Not vandalism, but violence against members of a community– Hungarian Civil Liberties Union turns to the police regarding the attack against participants of a Seder Eve celebration). (01.04.2010), available at http://tasz.hu/szolasszabadsag/nem-rongalas-kozosseg- tagja-elleni-eroszak-rendorseghez-fordul-tasz-szeder-estet-unn 14 TASZ: A melegeket ért támadások miatt a BRFK-hoz fordultunk (We turned to the Budapest Police Headquarter because of the attack against gays). (06.07.2010), available at http://tasz.hu/hirek/ tasz-level-budapest-rendorfokapitanyanak 299RACIST AND RELATED HATE … As for the attention of international organisations, apparently the issue of anti-Roma hate crimes (committed in 2008–2009) received the most of attention. In June and July 2009, Andrzej Mirga, the Senior Advisor on Roma and Sinti Issues, Of ce for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe, led a nine-day eld assessment visit to Hungary to explore possible factors leading or contributing to the attacks on and killings of Roma and the responses of the authorities to these incidents. The delegation visited 12 localities in Hungary, and met with representatives of the central, regional and local government, of the police and of the civil society.15 The Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights visited Hungary in October 2009 to discuss issues related to ght against intolerance affecting members of minority groups.16 Regarding the Hungarian situation, the Commissioner “stressed the need to increase public awareness on the situation of minorities which suffer from systematic discrimination or intolerance, such as the Roma, the Jewish community and LGBT (lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender) people”.17 II. The legal context regarding hate crimes in Hungary Current legal framework on and recent developments Regarding the relevant time period (2005–2010), the Hungarian Criminal Code18 criminalised six types of behaviour that may fall under the racially/hate motivated category. These are: genocide;19 apartheid;20 violence against member(s) of a community;21 incitement against community;22 ban of using totalitarian symbols;23 ban of denying, doubting, or trivialising genocide or crimes against humanity committed by totalitarian regimes.24 The article of the Criminal Code on violence against member(s) of a community25 was amended in 2008.26 As a result, this article of the Criminal Code, governing previously “violence against a member of a national, ethnic, racial or religious group”, was extended to cover any group of the population. The name of the offence was also modi ed to “violence against member(s) of a community”. As a result of the amendment, individuals engaged in the preparation of violence against a member of a community shall also be held criminally 15 See ODIHR: E-newsletter. July-August 2009, available at http://archive.constantcontact.com/ fs026/1101200403519/archive/1102659952399.html 16 The focus of the discussions was on anti-Roma hate-crimes in Hungary. 17 Of ce of the Commissioner for Human Rights Communication Unit: Hungary: Commissioner Hammarberg recommends further action to eradicate intolerance and discrimination, 2009. (Press Release–762(2009), available at: https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=1520817&Site=DC 18 Act No. IV of 1978. 19 Ibid. Art. 155. 20 Ibid. Art. 157. 21 Ibid. Art. 174/B. 22 Ibid. Art. 269. 23 Ibid. Art. 269/B (since the amendment of the Criminal Code in 1993). 24 Ibid. Art. 269/C. 25 Ibid. Art. 174/B. 26 On 10 November 2008, the Hungarian National Assembly adopted Act No. LXXIX of 2008, on Certain Amendments Necessary to Protect Public Order and the Operation of the Judiciary, which modi ed Article 174/B of the Criminal Code, effective from 1 February 2009. 300 LÍDIA BALOGH liable.27 Based on the amendments, the new provision is the following: (1) Any person who assaults another person for being part, whether in fact or under presumption, of a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group, or certain groups of the population, or compels her/him by applying coercion or duress to do, not to do, or to endure something, is guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment for up to ve years. (2) The punishment shall be imprisonment between two to eight years if the act or crime is committed: a) by force of arms; b) with a deadly weapon; c) causing a considerable injury of interest; d) with the torment of the injured party; e) as part of a group; or, f) as part of a criminal conspiracy. (3) Any person who engages in preparing violence against a member of a community is guilty of a misdemeanour punishable by imprisonment for up to two years. The article of the Criminal Code on incitement against community28 provides with protection against non-violent conduct motivated by racism, xenophobia or other bias motive (e.g. homophobia29), according to which anyone publicly inciting hatred against the Hungarian nation or any national, ethnic, racial or other groups of the population shall face punishment for a felony offence with imprisonment for up to three years. The article of the Criminal Code on ban of denying, doubting, or trivialising genocide or crimes against humanity committed by totalitarian regimes30 originally dealt only with holocaust denial or trivialising (it came into force in February 2010). A few months later, as a result of legislative initiatives of the newly elected Hungarian government, this sub- paragraph was amended (entered into force in July 2010). The new version of this paragraph is extended to the crimes of both “national socialist” and “communist regimes”, and the term “holocaust” is no longer there in the text. Other relevant development is the amendment to Criminal Code in February 2010, which punishes participating in the leadership or in some cases the mere activities of banned associations (e.g. in extremist associations: consider the amendment of the Act on Petty Offences) with up to three years of imprisonment.31 Certain articles of the Criminal Code, such as those covering murder (homicide)32 or the causing of grievous bodily harm (battery)33 expressly grant judges the discretion to take into account “base motivations” when sentencing offenders, therefore judges in such cases may thus take racist or other bias motivation into account as an aggravating circumstance. Concerns and debates regarding legislation in the eld of racist and other hate crimes While judges may take racist or other bias motivation into account as a “base motivation”, however, racist or other bias motivation is not expressly listed in the relevant provisions of the Criminal Code. No general provision exists in Hungarian law under which racist or 27 Act No. LXXIX of 2008, Art. 2. 28 Act No. IV of 1978, Art. 269. 29 See the interpretation of the law regarding homophobic hate crimes on the website of the (former) Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour: Jogi hátter–Magyar jogszabályok (Legal background – Hungarian laws). available at http://szmm.gov.hu/main.php?folderID=21369&articleID=42416&cta g=articlelist&iid=1 30 Act No. IV of 1978, Art. 269/C. 31 Act No. XXXV of 2010 on the Amendment of the Criminal Code (Act No. IV. of 1978), amending Art. 212/A of the Criminal Code. 32 Act No. IV of 1978, Art. 166. 33 Ibid. Art. 170. 301RACIST AND RELATED HATE … other bias motivation constitutes an express aggravating circumstance in ordinary criminal offences. Concerning this situation, the ECRI recommends34 that the Hungarian authorities draft a “speci c provision that would make racist motivations aggravating circumstances for ordinary offences”, “as without such a systematic approach, the racial motivations of offenders are not assessed on a consistent basis”. As for the new provisions of the Criminal Code on the ban of denying, doubting, or trivialising genocide or crimes against humanity committed by totalitarian regimes,35 the Hungarian Civil Liberties Union expressed concerns in May 2010, stating that the (by that time, planned) measure curtails the rights to freedom of opinion and freedom of expression, and violates the principle of academic freedom as well.36 Although the Act on Assembly prohibits demonstrations that would violate criminal provisions,37 the same act only allows for the police to prohibit demonstrations if it would obstruct the functioning of crucial state institutions or would practically impede traf c.38 Thus, demonstrations obviously carrying the risk of foreseeable violence and the intimidation of a great number of people cannot be banned, only disbanded. (Consider the example of August 2009, when international neo-Nazi organisations were planning a demonstration in Budapest to commemorate the death of Hitler’s deputy, Rudolf Hess.)39 After the Gay Pride March in July 2008, former interpretation of relevant law, according to which throwing eggs at people appearing at public events was considered to be within the boundaries of the freedom of expression40 was changed, and throwing objects at participants at public events was considered as “infamation” by the Chief Prosecutor of Budapest, and later by the Supreme Prosecutor as well.41 Previously, the Pest Central District Court ruled that throwing eggs is protected by the right to freedom of expression. The judgement, was criticised by several human rights NGOs, along with a number of politicians and prominent members of the judiciary, concerned dozens of rightist protesters who threw eggs, bottles and rocks at the gay pride marchers and the police. 42 34 ECRI: Report on Hungary, fourth monitoring cycle. 2009, (adopted on 20 June 2008, published on 24 February 2009), 14, available at http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/ecri/country- by-country/hungary/HUN-CbC-IV-2009-003-ENG.pdf 35 Act No. IV of 1978, Art. 269/C. 36 TASZ: A Társaság a Szabadságjogokért jogvéd szervezet véleménye A büntet törvénykönyv módosítására vonatkozó T/25. számú törvényjavaslatról (The opinion of the Hungarian Civil Liberties Union on the proposal no. T/25. on the amandement of the Penal Code). 2010, available at http://tasz. hu/ les/tasz/imce/tasz_nemzetiszocialista_kommunista_bunok_btk2010.pdf 37 Act No. III of 1989, Art. 2. 38 Act No. III of 1989. 39 Pap, A. L.: Dogmatism, hypocrisy and the inadequacy of legal and social responses combating hate crimes and extremism–the CEE experience. Proceedings of the Conference: “Extremism and the Roma and Sinti in Europe: Challenges, Risks and Responses”. OSCE–ODIHR University College London, London, 10–11 Sept. 2009. (forthcoming). 40 See Resolution No. B.4488/2007/2-I, of the Prosecutor of the V. and XIII. district of Budapest. 41 MTV-információ: Becsületsért a tojásdobálás–ügyészi válasz a liberális politikusoknak (Throwing eggs constitutes defamation–the Prosecutor’s answer to liberal politicians). Jogi Fórum, 2008. available at http://www.jogiforum.hu/hirek/18311 42 TASZ: Reakció a PKKB tegnapi ítéletére (Reaction to the decision of the Pest County Central Court from yesterday). 2008, available at http://tasz.hu/gyulekezesi-jog/reakcio-pkkb-tegnapi- iteletere 302 LÍDIA BALOGH III. Data and information on racist and related hate crimes Assessment of available data and information regarding hate crimes Data on racist violence is limited as the police, prosecutors and courts do not usually recognise racial motivation. It is close to impossible to draw valid conclusions regarding the extent, trends and forms of racist violence and crime on the basis of of cial criminal justice data and information, due to the small number of cases that are actually recorded. This should by no means imply that racial crimes and violence are non-existent in Hungary. In Hungary no speci c legally binding instructions exist for the determination of racially motivated criminal activity. Another debate concerns the legal status of perceived ethnicity; however, some argue that collection and handling of data relating to one’s perceived ethnic origin is not explicitly prohibited by the law.43 It has to be mentioned that there are no monitoring system specialised for racist incidents in Hungary, although there are mechanisms aimed at monitoring the phenomena and racism and the situation of ethnic/national minorities, functioning in different international organisations’ frameworks (i.e. UN, CoE). Allegedly, a large proportion of anti-Rom and anti-Semitic incidents (e.g. verbal abuses, harassment) remain unreported to the police. Similarly, according to unof cial NGO-sources, majority of homophobic hate crimes remains invisible and perpetrators remain unpunished, because the victims often do not report the crime to the police due to fear of public exposure of their sexual orientation and of potential further discrimination, or in several cases the police refused to start an investigation or stopped the investigation for the lack of nding perpetrators. Initiatives aimed to establish an LGBT police organisation (which would not only empower the affected police of cers themselves, but allegedly improve the situation of the victims of homophobic hate crimes as well) has not been successful so far in Hungary. While there is no data or information on hate crimes against migrants or refugees, it should be noted that interviewees of a study about the social situation of third-country nationals living in Hungary opted not to answer the question about personal experiences about racist attacks or abuses.44 Categories of incidents and crimes Due to the already reported data collection restrictions, it is not possible to obtain of cial numbers beyond the statistics of the six listed types of criminal offences (genocide; apartheid; violence against a member of a community, incitement against community; using totalitarian symbols, denying, doubting, or trivialising genocide or crimes against humanity committed by totalitarian regimes) that might contain a racial or other bias element. For example, instances of aggravated bodily harm or ill-treatment in of cial proceeding may 43 The Hungarian Data Protection Law (Act No. LXIII of 1992) differentiates the concept of ‘sensitive data’ within the category of personal data. Sensitive data, among others data on race or membership in an ethnic community, constitute a type of personal data referring to an essential trait and thus a vulnerable part of the subject’s personal identity (Art. 2, Clause 2). 44 Bognár, K.: Kapcsolatok és er források, bevándorlók és befogadók (Relations, resources, immigrants and receivers). In: Bevándorlók Magyarországon. Az MTA Etnikai-nemzeti Kisebbségkutató Intézet ICCR Budapest Alapítvány által végzett kutatás zárótanulmányai. (Immigrants in Hungary. Final report of a research implemented by the Institute for Ethnic and National Minority Studies of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences and the ICCR Budapest Foundation). Budapest, 2009, 147. 303RACIST AND RELATED HATE … have racial or other bias motivations, but in the absence of relevant statistics on the aggrieved party, the patterns of racist or other bias motivations are impossible to trace.45 As for violent crimes against the person, out of the six offences, “violence against members of communities” may be drawn under this term. As it was mentioned above, potential racial or other bias motivations of other offences involving violence against the person (e.g. different degrees of bodily harm, homicide, etc.) are not recorded. In the Hungarian Criminal Cod, there is no offence separately sanctioning violence against property motivated by racism or other bias motivation. Therefore, no of cial statistics are available. In individual cases (e.g. vandalism in Jewish cemeteries) the judge may in theory assess potential bias motivations as an aggravating circumstance, as a form of “base motivation”, but such considerations will not appear in the court statistics, so without targeted research focusing on individual court cases no data can be provided in this respect. Concerning verbal threats and abusive behaviour, out of the six offences listed, “incitement against community” may be drawn under this term. (The term of “harassment”,46 which typically covers verbal manifestations, is used in the context of the law on equal opportunities.) Victim and offender characteristics: Data on the demographic features of the victims and offenders is scarce, and due to the mainstream interpretation of data protection rules, never contain any reference to ethnicity/race. Out of the six relevant offences, only “violence against members of communities” might have actual victims, however, the authorities do not collect data even on the citizenship of the victims of these offences. No data is gathered either on which community is concerned by speci c instances of “incitement against community”. Cases recorded by the police The source of the statistical data on cases registered by the police is the Uni ed Investigation and Prosecution Statistical Database.47 Data about cases is recorded in the system of Uni ed Investigation and Prosecution Statistical Database once the case is “ nished” from the aspects of investigation or prosecution: till the rejection of a report or till a charge is led, respectively. The database refers to the relevant laws, therefore the data is presented here by the categories of offences, as de ned by the Criminal Code. As mentioned above, the of cial data does not include a breakdown on the communities concerned, therefore no information is available on the actual proportion of anti-Semitic, Islamophobic or other hate motivated crimes among the cases. According to the available data, in 2008 and 2009 no cases were recorded regarding “apartheid”, or “denying, doubting, or trivialising genocide or crimes against humanity 45 The latest ODIHR report on hate crimes indicates as well, referring to the information provided by Hungarian authorities, that the data is not classi ed according to the types of crimes. See OSCE-ODIHR (2009) Hate crimes in the OSCE region–incidents and responses. Annual Report for 2008, 77, available at http://www.osce.org/odihr/item_11_41314.html 46 Act No. CXXV of 2003, Art. 10(1). 47 Egységes Nyomozóhatósági és Ügyészségi B nügyi Statisztika (ENYÜBS). 304 LÍDIA BALOGH committed by totalitarian regimes”.48 Concerning “genocide”, the two cases reported by the public in 2009 were rejected49 by the police. With respect to “violence against a member of an ethnic etc. group”, one out of 13 complaints was rejected in 2008, and two of 23 cases in 2009. The investigation resulted in the establishment of a petty offence in one case in 2009. Concerning “incitement against community”: 12 of the 24 cases were rejected by the police in 2008; and 24 out of 48 was rejected in 2009. The investigation resulted in the establishment of a petty offence in 2 cases, both in 2009. Regarding “use of totalitarian symbols”, only eight complaints were rejected out of 255 in 2008, and 5 out of 104 in 2009. As a result of the investigation, a petty offence was established in 3 cases (all in 2009). Cases recorded by the prosecution service The source of the statistical data on cases recorded by the prosecution service is also the Uni ed Investigation and Prosecution Statistical Database. According to the available data, in 2008 and 2009, no cases were recorded regarding “genocide”,”apartheid”, or “denying, doubting, or trivialising genocide or crimes against humanity committed by totalitarian regimes”.50 With respect to “violence against a member of an ethnic etc. group”, eight cases in 2008 and seven cases in 2009 were led with the prosecution service, out of which resulted in order for trial only in one case, in 2009. Concerning “incitement against community”, 1–1 cases were led in 2008 and 2009 (both resulted in indictments). Regarding “use of totalitarian symbols”, 156 charges were led in 2008, and 25 in 2009, out of which resulted in order for trial in 106 cases in 2008 and in only one case in 2009. Cases recorded by courts The source of the statistical data on cases recorded by courts is the Collection of Court Decisions,51 which refers to the relevant legislation.52 This database contains data and the text of anonymised53 court decisions that are to be made public according to the Act on the Freedom of Information.54 According to the accessible information in the database, between 2008 and 2010, no decision in the database refers to the Criminal Code concerning “genocide”, “apart heid”, 48 The relevant article of the Criminal Code rst came into force in February 2010 and then the amended version came into force in July 2010. 49 According to the Hungarian Criminal Procedure Code (Act No. XIX of 1998) on the Criminal Procedure Code, the police may reject a report if the reported behaviour is not a criminal offence or the suspicion of a criminal offence is absent (Art. 174). 50 The relevant article of the Criminal Code rst came into force in February 2010, and then the amended version came into force in July 2010. 51 The Collection of Court Decisions is available online at: http://www.birosag.hu/engine. aspx?page=anonim 52 The database is searchable by the referred articles of acts, or by the texts of the decisions. 53 The names of the parties are deleted. 54 Act No. XC of 2005 on the Freedom of Information, Sec. 4 on the Collection of Court Decisions. 305RACIST AND RELATED HATE … “incitement against community” or “denying, doubting, or trivialising genocide or crimes against humanity committed by totalitarian regimes”.55 Concerning the illegal “use of totalitarian symbols”, altogether six decisions in the database referred to the relevant part of the Criminal Code (2008: four decisions, one-one decisions in 2009 and 2010).56 Decisions show altogether nine defendants, out of which ve were not found guilty. In 2008, two perpetrators were sentenced to probation, and one perpetrator was reprehended57 by the court. In 2010 one perpetrator was reprehended by the court.cConcerning “violence against a member of an ethnic etc. group”, the database shows one-one cases in 2008 and 2009 (involving possible bias motivation against Roma victims, which was eventually not established by the court). Comments on developments by of cial sources with respect to hate crime in Hungary The reports and other documents issued by the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Rights of Ethnic and National Minorities provide with comments on trends and developments of racist hate crimes. The 2005 report58 of the Commissioner does not contain a special section on hate speech or hate crimes, and there is only one reference, mentioning that several complaints were led by parents of Roma origin about alleged physical abuse of pupils by teachers, motivated by anti-Roma hate. The report about 200659 contains some articles about the role of the media in stirring ethnic hatred,60 emphasizing that the responsibility of journalists is even larger “especially in such times burdened with tension”.61 A hate speech case is also mentioned: the Parliamentary Commissioner ex of cio reported a webpage with content (e.g. lyrics) explicitly inciting violence against the Roma.62 55 The relevant article of the Criminal Code rst came into force in February 2010 and then the amended version came into force in July 2010. 56 Actually, according to the available texts of the decisions regarding the illegal use of totalitarian symbols, all of these cases in the concerned period, 2008–2010, involved communist symbols ( ve-pointed red stars, etc.), therefore these cases would not qualify for genuine racist/bias motivated hate crimes. 57 “Reprehension” might be considered as the most moderate disciplinary measure, aimed at expressing disapproval of the issuing authority. 58 Parliamentary Commissioner for National and Ethnic Minority Rights of Hungary: A nemzeti és etnikai kisebbségi jogok országgy lési biztosának beszámolója a 2005-es évr l (Report of the Parliamentary Commissioner for National and Ethnic Minority Rights on the year 2005). Budapest, 2006, available at http://www.kisebbsegiombudsman.hu/word/04-29-2008_10_43_30/besz_2005.html 59 Parliamentary Commissioner for National and Ethnic Minority Rights of Hungary: Beszámoló a nemzeti és etnikai kisebbségi jogok országgy lési biztosának tevékenységér l a 2006-es évben (Report on the activity of the Parliamentary Commissioner for National and Ethnic Minority Rights in 2006). Budapest, 2007 available at http://www.kisebbsegiombudsman.hu/data/ les/145405078.pdf 60 Ibid. 63. 61 Ibid. 68. 2006 was the year when demonstrations broke out after leaking of an audio recording with a speech of the then prime minister Ferenc Gyurcsány held before a closed-door meeting of the Socialist Party, stating the party had lied to the public regarding the country’s economic status to win the 2006 Parliamentary elections and criticised the Socialist Party’s governing. The demonstrations involved occasional violent actions, as well as extreme rightist and anti-Semitic voices. 62 Ibid. 69. 306 LÍDIA BALOGH The report on 2007 presents developments regarding the sweep of the extreme rightist Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom (For a Better Hungary Movement)63 party, and its political rhetoric which associates Roma ethnicity with inherent criminality, by using the term “Gypsy criminality”. The report includes a chapter on hate speech issues.64 The 2008 report65 contains a comprehensive chapter on hate speech, mentioning that besides anti-Roma manifestations, anti-Semitism is also prevalent,66 and includes a section on the increase in physical violence against Roma as well. As for physical attacks against Roma (or property owned by Roma), the report mentions ten cases (noting that the media reported on an even larger number of cases).67 In November 2008, the Parliamentary Commissioner considered an attack against a Roma family in Pécs as a crime with “signi cant impact on public concerns over safety”, and expressed his worries because the police almost immediately dismissed the possibility of racist motivations.68 The Parliamentary Commissioner released a statement as well, concerning other attacks against Roma, following consultation with several Roma public gures, calling the authorities to pay special attention to exploring the possible bias motivation behind the crimes.69 The Parliamentary Commissioner’s report on 2009 calls on70 authorities to collect individual data of the perpetrators and victims of hate crimes, as well to establish a monitoring system regarding racist attacks and incidents. In a 2010 report on an investigation71 initiated ex of cio by the Parliamentary Commissioner, ineffective police response is criticised concerning an incident, involving a rural Roma community, which took place in the context of local ethnic tensions. 63 Hereinafter referred to as Jobbik. 64 Parliamentary Commissioner for National and Ethnic Minority Rights of Hungary: Beszámoló a nemzeti és etnikai kisebbségi jogok országgy lési biztosának tevékenységér l, 2007 (Report on the activity of the Parliamentary Commissioner for National and Ethnic Minority Rights in 2007). Budapest, 2008, 79, available at http://3ddigitalispublikacio.hu/media/ombudsman/beszamolo_2007.pdf 65 Parliamentary Commissioner for National and Ethnic Minority Rights of Hungary: Beszámoló a nemzeti és etnikai kisebbségi jogok országgy lési biztosának tevékenységér l, 2008 (Report on the activity of the Parliamentary Commissioner for National and Ethnic Minority Rights in 2008). Budapest, 2009, available at http://www.kisebbsegiombudsman.hu/data/ les/144644490.pdf 66 Ibid. 152. 67 Ibid. 166. 68 Parliamentary Commissioner for National and Ethnic Minority Rights of Hungary: Újabb romák elleni támadás (Another attack against Roma) (Press release, 19th of November, 2008), available at http://www.kisebbsegiombudsman.hu/hir-385-jabb-romak-elleni-tamadas.html 69 Parliamentary Commissioner for National and Ethnic Minority Rights of Hungary: Véletlen, sorozatos egybeesés vagy aggodalomra okot adó tendencia? (Accidental series of coincidencies or a worrisome tendency?) (Statement, 19th of November, 2008), available at: http://www. kisebbsegiombudsman.hu/hir-386-allasfoglalas-az-elmult-evben-tortent.html 70 Parliamentary Commissioner for National and Ethnic Minority Rights of Hungary: Beszámoló a nemzeti és etnikai kisebbségi jogok országgy lési biztosának tevékenységér l, 2009 (Report on the activities of the Parliamentary Commissioner for National and Ethnic Minority Rights in 2098).. Budapest, 2010, 40, available at http://www.kisebbsegiombudsman.hu/data/ les/185232828.pdf 71 Parliamentary Commissioner for National and Ethnic Minority Rights of Hungary: A nemzeti és etnikai kisebbségi jogok országgy lési biztosának jelentése a 2009. november 15–16-i sajóbábonyi eseményekr l és az azzal összefügg jogértelmezési problémáról (Report of the Parliamentary Commissioner for National and Ethnic Minority Rights on the incidents on 15–16 November 2009 in 307RACIST AND RELATED HATE … The last yearbook72 of the National Security Of ce, published in 2009,73 contains a detailed chapter devoted to extremist groups, focusing on the sweep of the extreme-rightist, anti-Roma political forces, the phenomenon of the paramilitary organisation Hungarian Guard (and its activities, e.g. marches aimed at intimidating Roma communities). The report indicates an increase in attacks against LGBT people as well (referring to the violent incidents around the 2008 Gay Pride March in Budapest). Unof cial data and information on anti-Roma hate crimes The reports published by the European Comparative Minority Research Foundation are a rich source of information on Roma issues, including hate crimes.74 Mainstream media also reported on hate crimes against Roma, especially concerning a series of nine attacks75 committed in 2008 and 2009, allegedly by an organised group of criminals. The media dealt rst of all with the above-mentioned nine attacks, resulted in deaths, injuries and loss of the properties of Roma people. These crimes were apparently targeted against the homes of Roma people living in the outskirts of rural settlements (in neighbourhoods with a signi cant Roma population). The perpetrators used self-made re- bombs (“Molotov cocktails”), to set the buildings on re, and handguns for the fatal attacks. Sajóbábony and the related problems regarding legal interpretation) (reg. no. 18/2010), available at http://www.kisebbsegiombudsman.hu/hir-550-jelentes-2009-november-15-16-i.html 72 NBH: A Nemzetbiztonsági Hivatal Évkönyve. 2008 (Yearbook of the National Security Of ce, 2008). Budapest, 2009, available at http://www.nbh.hu/oldpage/evk2008/001menu.htm. 73 The yearbook was last published in 2009. After the governmental changes in 2010, the National Security of ce was reorganised (and renamed to Constitution Protection Of ce). 74 Their latest report is EÖKK: Cigánynak lenni Magyarországon. Jelentés 2008 (To be a Roma in Hungary. Report 2008). Budapest, 2009. 75 The 1st attack in the series of nine took place in Galgagyörk, a village near Budapest, where shortly after midnight, 10–15 shots were red at three houses owned by Roma. No one was injured. The 2nd attack was committed in Piricse, where Molotov cocktails were thrown at two houses owned by Roma people. A woman was shot on her leg when she stepped out of one of the houses. The 3rd attack was perpetrated in Nyíradony, where gunshots were targeted at a house inhabited by Roma. No one was injured. The 4th attack took place in Tarnabod, where Molotov cocktails were thrown and gunshots red at three homes in a neighbourhood with a signi cant Roma population. No one was injured. On 3 November 2008, the 5th attack was committed in Nagycsécs, where a 43-year-old Roma man and a 40-year-old Roma woman were shot dead in their home in Nagycsécs. According to the of cial investigation, petrol bombs (Molotov cocktails) were thrown into the house before the perpetrators used rearms to kill the members of the family. On 15 December 2008, the 6th attack took place in Alsózsolca, where several shots were red at a 19-year-old Roma man and his partner in front of their home in Alsózsolca. The young man suffered life-threatening injuries. On 23 February 2009, the 7th attack was committed in Tatárszentgyörgy: a 27-year-old Roma father and his 5-year-old son were shot dead as they ran out of their burning home in Tatárszentgyörgy. The man’s wife and the couple’s two other children were also seriously injured in the attack and had to be treated for severe burns. On 22 April 2009, the 8th attack was committed in Tiszalök when an 54-year-old Roma man was shot in the chest outside his home. On 3 August 2009, the 9th –last–crime took place in Kisléta, where a 45-year-old Roma woman was shot dead, and her 13-year-old daughter seriously injured in an attack against their home in Kisléta. The girl, suffering life-threatening injuries, remained in hospital for several weeks. 308 LÍDIA BALOGH Besides these crimes, “sporadic” incidents, with alleged/possible anti-Roma motivation in the background, were reported by the media in numerous cases, especially in 2008 and 2009. Unof cial data and information on anti-Semitic hate crimes The Hungarian mainstream media provides with information on anti-Semitic incidents: violence against persons76 and property.77 The Alliance of the Jewish Religious Communities of Hungary collects information on anti-Semitic attacks and abuses. Unof cial data and information on other racist or other religiously motivated hate crimes There is no information about systematic collection of unof cial data regarding on other racist (e.g. against people of colour) or other religiously motivated (e.g. Islamophobic) hate crimes in Hungary. According to the available sources, no violent incidents against foreigners were reported during the last two years by migrants or refugees. However, according to 2009 research report on migrants living in Hungary, the interviewed third country nationals “preferred not to talk about any racist incidents experienced by them, however, during the conversations, some of them mentioned that radicalisation–in connection with recent the political tendencies–and the sweep of the right-wing is perceivable”.78 Unof cial data and information on homophobic hate crimes The sources of unof cial data and information on homophobic hate crimes provided in Hungarian context are: personal accounts of members of LGBT organisations; websites of LGBT organisations and human rights and NGOs providing legal support for victims;79 the “Háttér Archives” (maintained by Háttér Society);80 which is a rich source of media reports, press releases, legal and other documents; press releases, complaints and cases published by 76 The mainstream media dealt with two cases: in July 2009, three men abused a 27-year-old Jewish man in a neighbourhood of Budapest where a signi cant Jewish population lives (7th district, Dohány street), because he admitted his Jewish origin; in March 2010, the police warning came after a rabbi’s home was attacked by anti-Semitic vandals who smashed the windows with stones during a seder holiday meal. 77 The mainstream media reported the following cases: in December 2009, the day after a conference held in the Parliament, where Elie Wiesel, Nobel Prize winner novelist was present as a keynote speaker, unknown perpetrators vandalised 12 gravestones and a statue in the Jewish cemetery of Székesfehérvár, and painted on the wall of the Memorial Hall the words “We don’t need a Jewish Casino”; in July 2010 altogether 13 (150–200 years old) gravestones were vandalised by unknown perpetrators in the Jewish cemetery of Tolna. 78 Within the framework of a comprehensive research on migrants (third country nationals), 70 interviews were proceeded with migrants and experts (among the latter group there were migrants as well). The interviewees came altogether from 23 foreign countries (Vietnam, China, Turkey, Nigeria, Senegal, Gambia, Ghana, Iran, Libya, Russian Federation, Syria, Ukraine, Afghanistan, Benin, Egypt, The Emirates, Ethiopia, Iraq, Kenya, Mongolia, Peru, Romania, and Tibet). See Bognár: op. cit. 147. 79 Labrisz Lesbian Association, Háttér Society for LGBT People, Szimpozion Association: http://www.szimpozion, PATENT Human Rights Association, Amnesty International Hungary, Hungarian Civil Liberties Union. 80 Háttér Archívum, http://www.hatter.hu/hatter-archivum 309RACIST AND RELATED HATE … the above mentioned organisations; the mainstream media;81 the community media (LGBT news sites, Facebook and other community sites where LGBT and other human rights organisations are present); and blogs. Extremist websites in Hungary also regularly report homophobic hate crimes considered as “success stories’ and ‘acts of justice”.82 Information on anti-Roma hate crime from foreign sources and international organizations The European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI), the Council of Europe’s independent human rights monitoring body published its latest Report on Hungary83 in February, 2009, where it “urges the Hungarian authorities to intensify their efforts to ensure a more vigorous implementation of criminal law provisions relating to the ght against racism”,84 and “reiterates its recommendation that further human and nancial resources be allocated to measures aimed at ensuring that the investigation and prosecution of racist crimes are carried out in a thorough and systematic fashion”.85 According to the 2010 report of the Minority Rights Group,86 “Jobbik blames Jews and Roma for the social and economic problems facing Hungary post-transition and post- EU accession” and “It has also coined the term ‘Gypsy crime’ to denote certain types of crimes supposedly committed exclusively by Roma”. The U.S. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor87 provides with an assessment regarding the legal framework of hate crimes and hate speech, and of the implementation of the law as well: “Courts have failed to convict persons of inciting hatred when no physical assault followed. Under the civil code, a person speci cally targeted by hate speech may le a civil suit, but, as long as the speech remains abstract and does not 81 For example. the following cases were reported by mainstream media. In May, 2009, at the Heroes’Square in Budapest, a group of skinhead-looking people (one of them wearing the hat of the Hungarian Guard) verbally insulted the participants of a lm-shooting, preparing a video spot announcing the forthcoming Gay Pride, and spat at one of the participants, a young, foreigner woman. In 2009 (5 September), 41 extremists were arrested in relation to violent activities during the Gay Pride. Prosecution was started against 27 of them. Near the venue of the afterparty of the Pride extremists were gathering, and launching verbal attacks, and threw stones at one police car patrolling around the venue. Two men leaving the after-party on bicycles were attacked by extremists, the victims suffered serious injuries. After the Gay Pride March in 2009 (5 September), one woman wearing the organisers’ T-shirt was attacked on the street by two or three men on her way home. 82 About a week after the Gay Pride, in July 2010, a group of extremists announced on their website, using hate speech, that they “desecrated” the gravestone of Károly Kertbeny. (Károly Kertbeny was a 19th century Hungarian writer who invented the words “homosexuality” and “heterosexuality”. A gravestone was erected for him in 2002 by the LGBT community, and it is visited every year by participants of the LGBT Festival.) The extremists covered the memorial with a black sack and attached a quote from the Bible saying that men having sexual relations with men have to die. 83 ECRI: Report on Hungary, fourth monitoring cycle (adopted on 20 June 2008, published on 24 February 2009), available at http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/ecri/country-by-country/ hungary/HUN-CbC-IV-2009-003-ENG.pdf 84 Ibid. Para. 25. 85 Ibid. Para. 26. 86 MRG International: State of the World’s Minorities and Indigenous Peoples 2010. Events of 2009. London, 2010, 161, available at: www.minorityrights.org/download.php?id=840 87 U.S. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor: 2009 Human Rights Report: Hungary. 2010, available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/eur/136035.htm 310 LÍDIA BALOGH mention any speci c individual, there is no legal recourse”. The series of physical attacks against Roma (between June 2008 and 3 August 2009) are also reported, and the criticism raised among anti-racist activists by the shortcomings of the investigation, and that the police ordered an internal disciplinary proceeding to examine the alleged mistakes, and these resulted in sanctions against two police of cers. The report mentions that after the arrest of four suspects on 21 August 2009, “No additional attacks of this nature occurred”. The report provides with details regarding notable racist manifestations in the public life.88 The Amnesty International 2010 report89 states that violent attacks against Roma continued in 2009,90 presents details on three murder cases, and mentiones that: “In September, about 400 Romani women initiated legal proceedings against Oszkár Molnár, a Member of Parliament of the opposition FIDESZ party and Mayor of Edeleny, over his alleged defamatory remarks on Romani women”.91 The Freedom House reports92 “increasing violence against Roma led to four deaths in 2009, and rising insecurity forced Romany men to patrol their own neighbourhoods”, and mentions that “four men were arrested in August 2009 in connection with the murders”. 88 Ibid. [30 January 2009] “Albert Pásztor, the head of the Miskolc police headquarters, stated in a press conference, ‘Hungarians appear to rob banks or gas stations, but all the other robberies are committed by Gypsies’ [...] and that ‘cute Gypsy children often become rude and cruel perpetrators’. Upon the instruction of the minister of justice and law enforcement, the HNP [Hungarian National Police] initiated an inquiry into the incident, and Pásztor was suspended from his position. However, two days later the investigation concluded that Pásztor did not break any law, and the HNP terminated his suspension; the decision to reinstate Pásztor was approved by the minister of justice and law enforcement.”; [2 April 2009] “Parliamentary Commissioner for Civil Rights Szabó stated in an interview that ‘Gypsy crime’ existed and de ned it as a type of crime performed to earn a living. [...] He also presented himself as the parliamentary commissioner of the ‘majority’ rather than the parliamentary commissioner for the rights of national and ethnic minorities. Although he withdrew his statement the next day following strong criticism by human rights groups, Szabó’s professional acceptance greatly weakened following this incident.”; [3 September 2009] “Oszkár Molnár, the mayor of Edeleny and a FIDESZ parliamentarian, stated during a press conference that pregnant Romani women hit their bellies with rubber hammers and took harmful medicines to increase the chance their child would be born with disabilities in order to receive increased state nancial aid. Responding to the statement, FIDESZ party leaders initially labelled it as a ‘local issue’. However, in December the center-right FIDESZ party dropped Molnár from its slate for the April 2010 parliamentary elections.” 89 Amnesty International: Amnesty International Report 2010. The State of The World’s Human Rights, 2010, 166, available at http://thereport.amnesty.org/sites/default/ les/AIR2010_EN. pdf, “Robert Csorba and his son, aged ve, were killed in Tatárszentgyörgy in February. After an initial examination, the local police announced that they had been found dead after a re caused by an electrical fault in their house. Later that same day, however, the police acknowledged that evidence of gunshot wounds had been found on the bodies, but only opened a murder investigation 10 hours later.” “Jen Koka, a 54-year-old Romani man, was killed in Tiszalöks Roma neighbourhood in April. He was reportedly shot dead as he left his home to start the night shift in the local chemical factory where he worked.” “Maria Balogh, a 45-year-old Romani woman, was shot dead and her 13-year-old daughter seriously injured in the village of Kisléta in August”. 90 Ibid. 165–166. 91 Ibid. 92 Freedom House: Country Report, Hungary. 2010, available at http://www.freedomhouse.org/ template.cfm?page=22&year=2010&country=7838 311RACIST AND RELATED HATE … Information on anti-Semitic hate crime from foreign sources and international organizations The European Commission against Racism and Intolerance stated in its report, concerning the situation before June 2008,93 that “antisemitic attacks against persons appear to be rare, incidents of vandalism against synagogues and Jewish cemeteries are not uncommon”,94 and reports that for “Antisemitism has also been openly espoused by certain political parties, NGOs report that even some mainstream parties do little to distance themselves from such opinions. Overall, the sense is that the expression of antisemitic views is currently on the rise in Hungary”.95 The latest report of the U.S. Bureau of Democracy report on human rights96 states that during 2009 anti-Semitic incidents, including vandalism, continued, but the Federation of Jewish Communities in Hungary reported that anti-Semitism did not increase in the year compared with 2008: “According to police there were 124 reports of vandalism or destruction of Jewish and Christian properties (nine in houses of worship and 115 in cemeteries) during the rst ten months of the year compared with 365 cases reported in 2008”. Besides mentioning that anti-Semitism is present in the media, anti-Semitic incidents97 were also reported by the U.S. Bureau of Democracy. 93 ECRI: Report on Hungary (fourth monitoring cycle). Adopted on 20 June 2008, published on 24 February 2009, available at http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/ecri/country-by-country/hungary/ HUN-CbC-IV-2009-003-ENG.pdf 94 Ibid. Article 72. 95 Ibid. Article 73. 96 U.S. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor: 2009 Human Rights Report: Hungary. 2010, available at: http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/eur/136035.htm 97 [24 February 2009] “The World Jewish Congress joined MAZSIHISZ in criticising anti- Semitic comments made by a local government of cial, Attila Kiss from Rajka. Kiss called on other of cials to take up ‘sickles and swords’ and ‘exorcise’ the local synagogue. MAZSIHISZ lodged an of cial complaint against Kiss, which the Prosecutor’s Of ce subsequently rejected.”; [4 April 2009] “Jobbik, Magyar Garda, and the Hungarian National Front co-organised an event commemorating the 1882 ‘blood libel’ trial in which residents of Tiszaeszlar accused the local Jewish community of killing a 14-year-old Christian peasant girl in order to use her blood for a religious ceremony. The police ordered an investigation into the event after the media reported that the approximately 80 participants made anti-Semitic comments. On December 3, the police concluded the investigation due to the lack of evidence of the crime of ‘incitement against a community’.”; [18 April 2009] “A day before the March of the Living procession organised by the Jewish communities, far-right demonstrators marched to the German embassy in Budapest to deny the Holocaust and to raise their voices against ‘Zionist world-rule’. An estimated 250 persons, including 60 wearing Magyar Garda uniforms, held posters reading, ‘Down with the Holocaust doctrine’ and ‘the Third Reich strikes back’. Others wore shirts that said ‘Dare to be white’. MGA [Magyar Gárda–Hungarian Guard] Captain Istvan Dosa said in a speech that “nothing from the Holocaust is true”, and then he read a petition addressed to the German embassy. The Budapest police initiated legal procedures against Dosa and another speaker for “incitement against a community”. However, the participants also made an of cial complaint concerning police actions in connection with the march, which the prosecutor’s of ce supported. Consequently, the police dropped their investigation of the march.”; [30 June 2009] “Three men beat a 27-year-old Jewish man after asking if he was a Jew. The victim suffered minor injuries. The prime minister asked the minister of justice and law enforcement to supervise and accelerate the investigation and to present proposals on how to avoid similar incidents. On December 23 the police arrested two persons, one 16 years old and the other 18 years old, in connection with the attack and initiated an 312 LÍDIA BALOGH The Of ce for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe launched a report in June 201098 about the outcomes of a eld assessment visit in Jun–July 2009, aimed at exploring the context of the violent attacks against Roma in Hungary in 2008–2009. According to the report: “Convictions on charges of inciting hatred against a community are rare, as the relevant practice of the Constitutional Court requires the prosecution to show a direct causal connection between hate speech and an incident of violence. The delegation heard concerns that current hate- speech laws provide ‘unlimited’ free speech, leaving broad opportunities for the dissemination of racist propaganda”. The report mentions that there are apparently “no speci c instructions or guidelines on the investigation of hate motivation or its consideration as an aggravating circumstance in crimes.” The report contains detailed recommendations99 to the relevant Hungarian authorities, with regard to combating racist hate crimes and preventing further incidents. In Appendix,100 a comprehensive list is presented of 45 incidents with an alleged racist motivation, involving Roma victims (22 cases from 2008, 23 cases from 2009). As for 2010, the report states “in the rst quarter of this year, two new attacks against Roma were reported by civil society”.101 Information on other racist hate crime from foreign sources and international organizations The only information on “other” racist hate crime is reported by U.S. Bureau of Democracy: “Five Roma were charged with a racist assault after allegedly beating an ethnic Hungarian on September 23. The four men and a woman were placed in pre-trial detention. According to a police spokesman, this was the country’s rst racist incident in which the victim was not a member of a minority”.102 investigation of violence against a member of a community”; [5 September 2009] “During a pride parade, approximately 20 demonstrators whom police had pushed out of Városház Square began shouting ‘nasty Jews’ in the direction of Budapest’s largest synagogue. The demonstrators threw an empty beer bottle at the synagogue and tore down a hanging banner advertising the Jewish Summer Festival. They set the banner, along with a temporary reed fence near the synagogue, on re. Police quickly extinguished the re. They opened an investigation into the incident”; [26 October 2009] “A 22-year-old man smashed a memorial plaque dedicated to Armin Kecskeméti, chief rabbi of Mako for more than 40 years, who died in a concentration camp in 1944. The perpetrator also wrote ‘what six million?’ and “lying swine” on the wall. Two days later the police captured a suspect and initiated proceedings against him on vandalism charges.” 98 OSCE-ODIHR: Addressing Violence, Promoting Integration. Field Assessment of Violent Incidents against Roma in Hungary: Key Developments, Findings and Recommendations. June–July 2009. Warsaw, 15 June 2010, available at http://www.osce.org/documents/odihr/2010/06/44569 _en.pdf 99 Ibid. Chapter 7, “Recommendations”. 100 Ibid. Appendix 1, “Incidents and Violence against Roma in Hungary in 2008–2009”. 101 Ibid. 4. 102 U.S. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor: 2009 Human Rights Report: Hungary. 2010, available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/eur/136035.htm 313RACIST AND RELATED HATE … Information on homophobic hate crime from foreign sources and international organizations The latest Amnesty International report103 mentions that the 2009 LGBT Pride March in Budapest on 5 September 2009 was protected adequately by the police with and no incidents reported during the march, however “a young woman was allegedly attacked by two or three anti-gay protesters after the march; she suffered injuries on her head and arms”. The 2010 report of the U.S. Bureau of Democracy report on human rights104 states that “extremist groups continued to subject gay men and lesbians to physical abuse and attacks”, and reports the same attack (attack against a young woman), noting that after the Hungarian Civil Liberties Union complained to the national police chief that the reason for the assault was related to the woman’s membership in a societal group, police changed the legal grounds of the investigation to “violence against a member of a community”. The 2009 report of the Danish Institute for Human Rights on Hungary105 concludes that hate speech is only “covered by the law when it amounts to incitement to hatred against a community”. The report indicates that “No good practices have been identi ed in Hungary”106 in the eld of combating homophobia and discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity. As for the Hungarian legislation regarding homophobic hate crimes, the ILGA Europe’s107 Country Index108 emphasizes that the relevant criminal law does not refer explicitly to homophobia as a bias motive. IV. Positive initiatives aimed at preventing and hate crimes The regulation of operations, ethics, and procedures with respect to content providing (Code of Content Providing),109 issued by the Hungarian Association of Content Providers (last supervised in 2009) takes stance against hate speech, and provides editors with guidance regarding extremist manifestations and insulting expressions: “The Content Provider should strictly avoid expressions that are insulting to particular persons or groups of persons, as well as extremist manifestations of other kinds. Where it is appropriate, it may, however, give space to such views expressed by public persons: in such cases, it should be made 103 AI: Amnesty International Report 2010. The State of The World’s Human Rights, 2010, 166, available at http://thereport.amnesty.org/sites/default/ les/AIR2010_EN.pdf 104 U.S. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor: 2009 Human Rights Report: Hungary. 2010, available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/eur/136035.htm 105 Danish Institute for Human Rights, COWI: The social situation concerning homophobia and discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation in Hungary. March 2009, available at http://fra. europa.eu/fraWebsite/attachments/FRA-hdgso-part2-NR_HU.pdf 106 Ibid. Art. 43. 107 International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association, Europe, http://www. ilga-europe.org/ 108 ILGA (2010) Rainbow Europe Map and Country Index (May 2010), available at: http://www. ilga-europe.org/home/publications/reports_and_other_materials/rainbow_europe_map_and_country_ index_may_2010. 109 MTE: A Magyarországi Tartalomszolgáltatók Egyesületének a Tartalomszolgáltatásra Vonat- kozó M ködési, Etikai és Eljárási Szabályzata (Code of Conduct, Ethics and Procedures of Content Providing, issued by the Hungarian Association of Content Providers). 2009, (last supervised: 21 October 2009): http://www.mte.hu/etikaikodex.html 314 LÍDIA BALOGH clear that the Content Provider does not agree with this view, considering it incompatible with its own basic principles. It is the duty of the editors to determine the most appropriate way of noting this in every case”.110 As (racist or anti-Semitic) extremism among football fans is a prevalent phenomenon in Hungary, the Hungarian Football Federation implemented regulations, to prevent/ eliminate hate speech and racist incidents before/during/after matches. The contents of these documents are in accordance with the recommendations of the international football organisations (UEFA–Union of European Football Associations, FIFA Fédération Inter- nationale de Football Association), with a detailed regulation on the responsibility of sport organisations, on the tolerable behaviour of spectators, and on the applicable sanctions (including nes). According to the Security Regulations which regulated the rules and conditions of the participation at matches, it should be printed on the tickets that racist or ant-Semitic expressions are forbidden,111 and, in cases of racist or scandalous manifestations, the match might be interrupted or even closed.112 The Code of Discipline contains regulations on the “banner permission” (only those banners might be brought into the grandstands that are checked by a special commission–e.g. racist/anti-Semitic slogans are forbidden113 Racist/intolerant behaviour or expressions (and defamation as well) are considered as misdemeanours to be sanctioned.114 The Disciplinary Committee of the Federation regularly nes sport organisations those fans violate of the regulations.115 There are NGOs providing legal counselling and assistance to victims of hate crimes: e.g. the Hungarian Civil Liberties Union116 and the Háttér Society for LGBT People117 (the latter focuses on victims of homophobic attacks. The Háttér Society for LGBT People launched a project within the framework of the EU PROGRESS Programme118 aimed at providing police of cers with trainings regarding homophobic hate crimes. The project, started in May 2009, contains a module which 110 Ibid. Sec. V: “Separation of the public and private spheres”, Art. 1 “Protection of personality rights”. 111 Magyar Labdarúgó Szövetség Biztonsági Szabályzata (Security regulations of the Hungarian Football Federation) (adapted on 16 April 2009) http://www.mlsz.hu/anyagok/szabalyzat/2009-2010/ Biztonsagi_Szabalyzat.pdf, Appendix 8, Article 4.4. 112 Ibid. Appendix 8, Art. 5. 113 Magyar Labdarúgó Szövetség Fegyelmi Szabályzata (Code of Discipline of the Hungarian Football Federation) (came into force on 1 July 2009, last modi ed: 25 June 2010) http://www.mlsz. hu/anyagok/szabalyzat/2009-2010/Fegyelmi_Szabalyzat, Appendix 9. 114 Ibid. Disciplinary Sanctions, Sec. III, Art. 10. The Code sets the maximum limits of nes. In cases of such misdemeanours, players should be excluded at least 5 matches from participation, members of the audience might be banned from the stadium for 2 years. Clubs might be ned and/or ordered to organise closed-door matches because of the misdemeanour of their fans; or might be sanctioned with championship score reduction, or even with re-classi cation to a lower league. 115 In 2010, the media reported several disciplinary decisions against football clubs because of anti-Semitic/racist hate speech on the grandstands, involving nes of 100–400,000 HUF (approx. 400–1,600 EUR). 116 http://tasz.hu/jogsegely 117 http://www.hatter.hu/jog 118 The project is implemented within the framework of Hungarian programme “Együtt az egyenl ségért 2009–2010” (Together for Equality 2009–2010), co-funded by the EU PROGRESS Programme. The call for proposals was launched by the Hungarian Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour (applications were selected by public procurement procedure). 315RACIST AND RELATED HATE … addresses police of cers, and focuses on combating homophobic hate crimes and awareness- raising on LMBT issues. The training materials are prepared by expert groups, with the participation of researchers (Open Society Institute, Central European University, Max Planck Institute) and NGO activist (Háttér Society Legal Defence Bureau for National and Ethnic Minorities), and a member of the Advisory Committee of the Hungarian Equal Treatment Authority. V. Conclusions In the Hungarian context, it is almost impossible to draw valid conclusions regarding the extent, trends and forms of racist violence and other forms of hate crimes on the basis of of cial criminal justice data and information. Very few reports are led on criminal offences that contain a racial or other bias motivation element, and even fewer lead to indictment. Similarly, due to the small number of cases that are actually recorded as criminal offences by the prosecution no valid conclusions could be drawn with regard to the speci c characteristics of offenders. Data on the demographic features of victims are not collected by the Hungarian authorities. Given the lack of a speci ed monitoring mechanism on hate crimes, and appropriate of cial information, other sources like reports of NGOs and international organizations have to be considered as well. Regarding homophobic hate crimes, LMBT organizations report a decrease of the number of extremist homophobic offenders at the Pride March 2009 and 2010, compared to 2008, due to the police strategy (isolating the route of the March) and to a change in legislation. As for anti-Roma hate crimes, unof cial sources ( rst of all, the media and NGOs) agree on the perception of unprecedented sweep of violence against the Roma community in Hungary in 2008–2009. This tendency ended, apparently in August 2009, with the arrest of four suspects of a series of nine attacks against Roma. However, by the time of closing the manuscript of the present article, new forms of hate motivated hate crimes are emerging in Hungary, targeting especially certain Roma communities in rural areas. These worrisome tendencies are being followed by legislative changes and initiatives, however, there are still apparent shortcomings with implementation of the current laws to combat hate crimes. 
work_5oyfy563ibcerft2bkwgc26xkm	----	Hate speech and fake news – how two concepts got  intertwined and politicised  Kirsten Gollatz & Leontine Jenner    On 1 October 2017, the so-called Network Enforcement Act (Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetz,                    or NetzDG) came into force with a transitional regulation. The law applies to operators of                              social media platforms and their handling of the phenomena of hate speech and fake news.                              As the jury for the Anglicism of the Year 2016 award wrote, these two terms served as a                                    “crystallisation point for societal debates on how to deal with this phenomenon, which is                            not entirely new but has entered the public consciousness with force.” We ask: how did it                                come about that the debates around these terms actually led to a law in Germany?    To answer this question, we will first reconstruct the trajectories of the two discussions                            in the media. The debates on hate speech and fake news are first considered                            separately from each other; then, we examine how they came into contact with one                            another. We will subsequently turn our attention to the increasing politicisation of the                          discussions, which culminated at the end of the year in a convoluted discourse on the                              regulation of two very different phenomena. Our accounts here are based on an                          analysis of more than 900 articles published in the German-language media in 2016.   TRAJECTORY OF THE HATE SPEECH DISCUSSION IN 2016   At the beginning of 2016, Facebook itself shaped the media agenda by announcing                          several measures to combat hate speech, with a focus on Germany. At the end of May,                                the question of how to deal with hate speech also became an issue for European                              institutions. The European Commission reached an agreement with Facebook, Google,                    Microsoft and Twitter on a code of conduct on hate comments. In Germany, a local                              case of right-wing agitation against Green Party MEP Stefanie von Berg once again put                            the topic on the media agenda. Hamburg’s senator of justice, Till Steffen (Green Party),                            then pushed the discussion about a possible tightening of the law on hate crimes. Over                              the summer of 2016, the media interest was fuelled by a larger discussion broadening                            the scope of the issues to society as a whole. In these months, various actors initiated                                public campaigns against hate speech, and projects to observe hate speech on the                          internet were set in motion. The first figures and statistics based on scientific research                            were published. The wider public interest strengthened the drive to political action.  The enormous increase in reporting in November and December was primarily the                        result of the superimposition of another discourse onto this debate. The US                        presidential election and the question of how fake news on social media had                          influenced it reactivated the debate on online hate comments at the end of 2016 as                              just another category of unwanted content on the internet. As an overview, the                          following graph shows the trends on the hate speech discussion in 2016.     TRAJECTORY OF THE FAKE NEWS DISCUSSION IN 2016   At the beginning of 2016, reports of defamatory, false stories about refugees increased.                          Our analysis shows, however, that these false reports were not yet the focus of a                              separate discourse; instead, the lines of conflict were based more on positions in the                            refugee debate.  We again note an increased focus on false reports during the shooting spree in Munich                              on 22 July 2016. The term ​Falschmeldung ​(literally false report) used in this context                            primarily referred to rumours that were spread as purported facts during the chaos.                          Nevertheless, the killing spree in Munich marked an important point in the                        development of the fake news discussion in several respects. It was here that key                            subjects and objects of discourse formed: on the one hand, there was social media                            platforms, which is where false reports were primarily spread. On the other hand, there                            were traditional media organisations, which were accused of allowing an information                      vacuum to emerge, thus giving the false reports on Twitter or Facebook more                          opportunity to spread. Calls for state intervention were voiced for the first time with                            reference to the coverage of the killing spree, but considerations remained abstract.  The issue finally came to the public’s attention along with the entry of the English                              term fake news into the German language – this occurred when Facebook was accused                            of aiding President Trump’s election victory. While the debate had previously centred                        on concrete cases of false reports and problematised their dissemination, now                      Facebook’s handling (or non-handling) of fake news was the subject of discussion.                        There were calls for measures that would go beyond a mere voluntary commitment on                            the part of Facebook. In December, the problem was then also applied to the                            forthcoming federal elections in Germany in 2017. As the second visualisation on page                          67 shows, this resulted in yet another rise in reporting.  CONVERGENCE OF TWO DISCUSSIONS INTO ONE DISCOURSE   At the beginning of 2016, both phenomena arose simultaneously but individually in                        certain contexts: for example, there were increasing numbers of false reports against                        refugees that were deliberately being spread to incite hatred. However, in terms of                          terminology, the term that was being used was exclusively false reports with                        defamatory content ​(Falschmeldungen mit diffamierenden Inhalten)​.   By the end of the year, two Anglicisms had established themselves in the German                            language: hate speech and fake news. In this phase, the hate speech discussion almost                            never appears in isolation. The intermingling of the two discussions is particularly                        apparent in December. Of the 49 articles on hate speech published in December, 37                            articles also deal with fake news. The hate speech discussion was increasingly                        subsumed under the new fake news debate.  At the end of 2016, the factor that connected these two, previously separate                          discussions was not that they occurred simultaneously in relation to certain incidents,                        but that both phenomena arose in the same place. Social media platforms, especially                          Facebook, were seen as the breeding ground for fake news and hate speech and were                              increasingly criticised. Two distinct categories of unwanted content had now become                      the subject of the same regulatory efforts. The third visualisation on page 67 depicts                            the convergence of the discussions in 2016.  POLITICISATION OF THE DISCUSSION: A WAY STATION ON THE PATH TO THE LAW   The above explanations mark the way stations on the path to the Network                          Enforcement Act: platforms launched initiatives and made voluntary commitments                  regarding hate comments in early 2016, there was a broader societal discussion of the                            topic during the summer months, an increased focus on the role of digital platforms in                              spreading hate comments and false reports, and finally the election victory of Trump,                          which firmly anchored the English terms fake news and hate speech in the German                            discourse and united the two debates in their criticism of Facebook’s deletion practice.   The politicisation of these two discussions was fuelled in particular by three factors.                          First, politicians (e.g. Renate Künast, Stefanie von Berg) were themselves victims of                        false statements or hate tirades in social networks. Second, the initial measures in the                            fight against hate speech, which were mainly based on platforms’ own initiatives and                          voluntary commitment, were increasingly perceived as ineffective. And third and                    finally, the discourse about hate speech and fake news on social media platforms was                            situated in a relationship with other political issues, in particular the refugees, the                          killing spree in Munich, alleged disinformation campaigns by foreign governments, and                      finally, the federal parliamentary elections in Germany following the US elections.  These factors prompted a shift in the debate towards legislative solutions. At the same                            time, the emerging narrative of fake news as a threat to German democracy in the face                                of the forthcoming elections led to an increased sense of urgency within politics. In                            this context, the new fake news problem was quickly linked to the old hate speech                              issue. A longer discussion, of the kind that emerged on hate speech, in which                            participants first attempted to better understand, define and evaluate the problem, did                        not happen in the case of fake news. Because voluntary measures taken by platform                            operators against hate speech had purportedly led to disappointing results, politicians                      now sought to solve the fake news problem by directly legislating.   WHAT WILL REMAIN THE SAME, WHAT WILL CHANGE?  In the spring of 2017, these developments culminated in a draft law presented by then                              Justice Minister Heiko Maas. In June of the same year, despite harsh criticism, the draft                              was accepted by the Bundestag and finally implemented on 1 October 2017 – albeit in                              watered-down form. Supporters and critics of the law see the actual problem quite                          differently: while proponents see hate speech and fake news as a threat to German                            democracy and the law as a way of defending against this, critics see the law itself as a                                    threat to democratic opinion-formation. These critics fear that platforms may                    proactively delete content on a large scale to avoid fines. In addition, they are                            concerned that the law could be abused by governments. In both cases, there would be                              a threat of censorship and thus a restriction of freedom of expression. While our                            analysis is limited to the year 2016, based on these contradictory positions, we can                            predict that the NetzDG, its controversial norms and legality, and the concrete effects                          of the law will continue to be a subject for debate.               REFERENCES   Anglizismus des Jahres. (2016).​ Retrieved from  http://www.anglizismusdesjahres.de/anglizismen-des- jahres/adj-2016   Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetz vom 1. September 2017 ​(BGBl. I S. 3352) ​(Germany).  Retrieved from https:// www.gesetze-im-internet.de/netzdg/BJNR335210017.html    This piece is based on two articles published on 2 and 8 May 2017 on the Science Blog of Alexander von                                          Humboldt Institute for Internet and Society (HIIG).    Kirsten Gollatz is currently conducting research with a focus on the conditions for exercising freedom of                                expression on the internet and the relevance of private transnational governance, as well as online                              participation. Along this line, Kirsten is interested in how public discourses, for instance on hate speech and                                  fake news on digital platforms in Germany, manifests itself in institutions, new organisational processes or                              practices. Kirsten Gollatz is Project Manager at HIIG working at the interface between the institute’s research                                agenda and a growing international research community. Kirsten also coordinates the institute’s academic                          visitor programs. Since 2014 Kirsten has been writing her doctoral thesis at the University of Zurich. In her                                    thesis she investigates the evolution of transnational governance regimes that private social media companies                            apply to user content on their platforms.    Leontine Jenner is a student assistant for the Internet Policy and Governance research team at HIIG. She is                                    currently studying sociology at the Technical University of Berlin with an emphasis on sociological technology                              studies and computer science as her minor field. Prior to her studies she has worked in the games industry in                                        the field of game design. Leontine is particularly interested in new forms of digitally mediated interaction and                                  qualitative and digital research methods.    This post represents the view of the author and does not necessarily represent the view of the institute itself.                                      For more information about the topics of these articles and associated research projects, please contact                              info@hiig.de​.                      
work_5qr2to4f4ze6zflpmz5p2mtv5m	----	ADAMA SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING AND COMPUTING Department of Computer Science and Engineering Engineering Research and Development Methodology (CSE-4221) a Research Proposal on HATE SPEECH DETECTION ON ETHIOPIAN SOCIAL MEDIA TEXT USING SENTIMENT ANALYSIS Participants: 1. AREFAT HYEREDIN A/UR5082/09 2. GIRUM GETACHEW A/UR4045/09 3. BINIYAM GOSSAYE A/UR4861/09 4. GIZEALEW ENDESHAW A/UR3981/09 5. ABERHAM BEKELE A/UR4499/09 Submitted to: Mr. Anteneh Alemu Due Date: December 13, 2019 1 Hate Speech Detection on Ethiopian Social Media Text using Sentiment Analysis 1. INTRODUCTION In recent years, social networking has grown and become prevalent with every people, it is simpler for people to interact and share with each other. However, every problem has different sides. It also has some negative issues, hate speech is a crucial topic in the domain of social media. With the freedom of speech on social networks and anonymity on the world wide web, people are free to comment on hate, insults, fake news, and disinformation. Hate speech can have an adverse effect on human behavior and livelihood and it also affects societal queues. We can’t manually censor, delete or control all these comments, posts, news feeds, reviews and updates; which would be time-consuming, tedious and boring. This spurs research to build to build an automated system that detects, tags and eliminate such content. With said system, we would be able to detect and monitor the spread of hate speech and disinformation on social media and thus reduce the dangerous consequences of societal conflicts, displacement and civil war. With Ethiopian indigenous languages such as Amharic and Oromiffa, we can use sentiment analysis application on social media with other natural language processing methods for the detection. 2. PROBLEM STATEMENT A major obstacle for promoting use of computers and the Internet is that many languages lack the basic tools that would make it possible for people to access ICT in their own language. The status of language processing tools for European languages states that only English, French and Spanish have sufficient basic tools. Thus, the vast majority of the World’s languages are still under-resourced in that they have few or no language processing tools and resources which particularly true for sub Saharan African languages. However, the evolution of the Internet and of social media texts, such as Twitter, YouTube and Facebook messages, has created many new opportunities for creating such tools, but also many new challenges. Ethiopian languages are among the languages for which very few computational linguistic resources have been developed, and very little has been done in terms of making useful higher-level Internet or computer-based applications. This proposal is aimed to address the need for such high level computational linguistic model to combat hate speech from social media posts and comments. Recent advances in mobile computing and the Internet have resulted in an increase in use of social networks to communicate, express opinions, interact with other. While social media provides an important avenue for communication and sharing, it also acts as a means of spreading hate speech online. Inherent characteristics of the Internet largely contribute to the misuse of social networks to transmit and propagate hate speech. Hate messages are prevalent and challenging in the Ethiopian online community as individuals spread hate messages hiding behind their screens. The government of Ethiopia oversee and monitor content in social network in a bid to govern hate speech through one-time interruption of the internet service. Research conducted by Amnesty International and the Open 2 Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) between June and October 2016 shows that access to WhatsApp, Facebook and others was blocked, as well as at least 16 news outlets. It is an open secret that the recent widespread hate speech and call for violence particularly targets persons of a particular group. It is therefore, of critical importance to monitor and identify instances of hate speech, as soon as possible to prevent their spread and possible unfolding into acts of violence or hate crimes and destroys the lives of individuals, families, communities and the country. A recent study defines hate speech as speech which either promotes acts of violence or creates an environment of prejudice that may eventually result in actual violent acts against a group of people. In the case of Ethiopia, the use of hateful words with an intention to bring about hatred against a group of people based on their ethnicity, political attitude, religion and socio - economic are prevailing. The anonymity of social networks makes it attractive for hate speech to mask their criminal activities online posing a challenge to the world and in particular Ethiopia. With this ever- increasing volume of social media data, hate speech identification becomes a challenge in aggravating conflict between citizens of nations. The high rate of production, has become difficult to collect, store and analyze such big data using traditional detection methods. This paper proposed the application of sentiment analysis in hate speech detection to reduce the challenges. Sentiment analysis, also called opinion mining, is the field of study that analyzes people’s opinions, sentiments, appraisals, attitudes, and emotions toward entities and their attributes expressed in written text. The entities can be products, services, organizations, individuals, events, issues, or topics. 3. OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY The general and specific objectives of the study are given below: General Objective: the general objective of this research work is to design and develop a sentiment analysis or opinion mining model to detect hate speech content from social media textual contents. Specific Objective: the specific objectives of this research work are: • Analysis of the general structure of Amharic and Oromiffa statements related to opinions and sentiments such as identifying, negative, positive and neutral statements. • Analyze the semantics between opinion expressions across languages of Amharic and Oromiffa and their intensity. • Design a model for sentiment mining to classify social media texts • Develop necessary algorithms to realize the proposed model in developing a sentiment mining model to detect hate speech • Building domain specific and general-purpose lexicon of Amharic and Oromiffa language’s opinion terms where these terms are tagged accordingly. • Develop a prototype to demonstrate that the model design is valid. • Design an auto-tagging corpus for offensive hate speech content using third party APIs provided by the social network. • Evaluate the model designed on texts from social media 3 4. LITERATURE REVIEW Hate speech detection related researches are done for different language opinionated social media textual content such as English, Chinese and French using different techniques and approaches are reviewed. Different authors used different techniques such as machine learning, ontology-based approaches, rule-based approaches, sentiment analysis, lexicon-based approaches, feature-selection, cross-validation and others. In addition to the techniques, the employed approaches, goals, motivation, domain, target language, dataset source, procedures, experimental results, performance, and challenges are the main points given focus when going through the different works. This proposal introduces sentiment analysis techniques to detect hate speech from Ethiopian indigenous languages particularly Amharic and Oromiffa; which makes it ideal since the contents are mostly of sentimental value or opinion and also the speeches are analyzed from social media where sentiment analysis is widely practical upon social media analysis. After consulting those papers, we generalized that these dimensions of analysis model detection of hate speech into general-feature and specific feature approaches. Approaches from the literature reviews of related works are generalized as follows: Dictionaries and lexicons: The majority of the papers found try to adapt strategies already known in text mining to the specific problem of hate speech detection. The work categorizes the features as the features commonly used in text mining which is dictionaries and lexicons. This approach consists in making a list of words that are searched and counted in the text. In the case of hate speech detection this has been conducted using content words such as insult and swear words, reaction words, and personal pronouns, number of disrespectful words in the text, with a dictionary that consists of words for English language including acronyms and abbreviations, label specific features which consisted in using frequently used forms of verbal abuse as well as widely used stereotypical words. Bag-of-words (BOW): Another model similar to dictionaries is the use of bag-of-words. In this case, a corpus is created based on the words that are in the training data, instead of a pre- defined set of words, as in the dictionaries. The disadvantages of this kind of approaches is that the word sequence is ignored, and also, it’s syntactic and semantic content. Therefore, it can lead to misclassification if the words are used in different contexts. To overcome this limitation n-grams were implemented. N-grams are one of the most used techniques in hate speech automatic detection and related tasks. In study character n-gram features proved to be more predictive than to kenn-gram features, for the specific problem of abusive language detection. Part-of-speech (POS) approaches also make it possible to improve the importance of the context and detect the role of the word in the context of a sentence. These approaches consist in detecting the category of the word, for instance, personal pronoun (PRP), Verb non-third person singular present form (VBP), Adjectives (JJ), Determiners (DT), Verb base forms (VB). Part of speech has also been used in hate speech detection problem even though proved to cause confusion in the class’s identification. 4 Word Embedding: Deep learning techniques are recently being used in text classification and sentiment analysis with high accuracy. One of the approaches of this is word embedding which allows finding both semantic and syntactic relation of words, which permits the capturing of more refined attributes and contextual cues that are inherent in human language. This section reviewed different research’s perspective to tackle hate speech using sentiment mining for different languages. The review showed that machine learning, ontology based and lexicon- based are the commonly used approaches to deal with sentiment mining. The works reviewed indicated that the approaches except the machine learning rely on tagged list of positive or negative sentiment terms to identify the polarity of terms. The machine learning technique is based on the concept of training the machine to learn to classify opinionated texts into predefined categories of positive, negative or neutral. Ontology is employed particularly to extract feature of an object for the purpose of refining feature level sentiment analysis. The lexicon based approaches are based on the concept of counting the sentiment terms available in the opinionated texts. It can be summarized that sentiment analysis provides various methodologies and also ideal for this particular research case. 5. METHODOLOGY The primary research method for this study is literature review and conceptual modeling. Constraint identification and classification through a structured approach is productive way to test out different algorithms that are offered by Sentiment Analysis. This study will first review various types of text analysis to determine and distinguish the structure of hate speech in the model. A survey of different demography will be commenced in order to gain a perspective of hate speech from the public with questionnaires, and also a sample textual data collection from different social media like Facebook, Telegram from public pages, individual politicians, activists, News pages and various group pages; posts and comments from different timelines will be retrieved to build the corpus. These pages typically posts discussions spanning across a variety of political and religious topics. By doing so, authors could capture both casual conversations and politically hated posts and comments. A versatile Facebook crawler, which exploits the Graph API to retrieve the content of the comments from Facebook posts using Facepager would be employed. Facebook is selected to collect data from social media for the following reasons. Facebook is the most important platform for reaching out to online audiences, and especially the youth. Comparative studies have shown how in countries with limited Internet penetration, like Ethiopia, Facebook has become almost a synonym for the Internet, a platform through which users access information, services, and participate in online communications. A comprehensive model of sentiment analysis using one of the following algorithms: TI-IDF, Naïve-Bayesian, Random Forest, Logistic Regression and also string labeling algorithms like Conditional Random Field(CRF), Model Hidden Markov (HMM), Word2Vec, Bidirectional Long Short-Term Memory (Bi-LSTM) or Entropy. However, we have to choose the features 5 manually to bring the model with high accuracy. The model would undergo multiple tests for multiple text samples to classify them accordingly, and tag them as efficiently as possible. 6. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY With the advent information age, people are puzzled with vast amount of information from the Internet. Social media is a highly active platform which is challenged with different issues like hate speech and disinformation. Today, social media in Ethiopia is full of turmoil where hate is a concern at every turn and scroll. People are openly defaming, demeaning, or devaluing others which is inhumane. Hate speech detection implemented at feature level would create a monitored environment that no hate speech is tolerated and exercised; creating a safe and tolerable web environment where everyone respects and interacts peacefully. Hate speeches that are tagged would be investigated and people exercising it would become accountable for their actions which may create catastrophic results. In the long run, hate-free speech would build societal unity and peace for all people. It is also meant to create awareness about the seriousness of the action and its dangerous outcome. 7. DURATION AND PLAN OF ACTION This study upon approval of the proposal will be conducted between December 13, 2019 and January 3rd,2020. Due to the limited time for the research, all tasks and objectives may not be fulfilled. Dec 13 -18 Dec 19 – 23 Dec 24 – 27 Dec 30 – Jan 3 Deep Literature Review Survey Data Collection Design & Modelling Development Testing 8. BUDGET / COST There is no official budget analysis for this research. Yet, here is an estimate cost: Printing and Paper – Research and Survey papers = ETB 200 Professional NLTK Spark tools – Licensing fee (USD 20) = ETB 600 Internet connection – 10 hours = ETB 150 Miscellaneous cost – others = ETB 250 Total Cost = ETB 1200 6 9. REFERENCES [1] L. Bing, “Sentiment Analysis: Mining Opinions, Sentiments, and Emotions.,” University of Illinois at Chicago, pp 1-4, Cambridge University Press, 2015. [2] S. Gebremeskel, “Sentiment mining model for opinionated Amharic text,” Addis Ababa University, Dept of Computer Science, November 2010. [3] H. Thi-Thuy Do, H. Duc Huynh, K. Van Nguyen, N. Lu-Thuy Nguyen and A. Gia-Tuan Nguyen, “Hate Speech Detection on Vietnamese Social Media Text using the Bidirectional- LSTM Model,” University of Information Technology, VNU-HCM, November, 2019. [4] S. Rosenthal, A. Ritter, “SemEval-2014 Task 9: Sentiement Analysis in Twitter,” Columbia University, Johns Hopkins University, December, 2019. [5] Z. Mossie, J. Wang, “Social Network Hate Speech Detection for Amharic Language,” National Taipei University of Technolgy, Taipei, Taiwan, 2018. research front.pdf (p.1) Hate Speech Detection.pdf (p.2-7) 
work_5qvjkotduzbltm2xxfgbalvecy	----	Irene Zempi: Negotiating Constructions of Insider and Outsider Status in Research with Veiled Muslim Women Victims of Islamophobic Hate Crime 1.1 1.2 Negotiating Constructions of Insider and Outsider Status in Research with Veiled Muslim Women Victims of Islamophobic Hate Crime by Irene Zempi Nottingham Trent University Sociological Research Online, 21 (4), 8 <http://www.socresonline.org.uk/21/4/8.html> DOI: 10.5153/sro.4080 Received: 31 Mar 2016 | Accepted: 25 Oct 2016 | Published: 30 Nov 2016 Abstract This article presents a reflexive discussion of insider and outsider positions in a qualitative study researching Islamophobic hate crime with Muslim women who wear the niqab (face veil) in public in the United Kingdom (UK). As a non-Muslim woman, some aspects of my identity can be linked to insider positions while other aspects of my identity can be linked to outsider positions, with implications for the documentation of participants' lived experiences. Within the framework of 'critical reflexivity', this article considers the impact of my insider/outsider status at each stage of the research process, from deciding on the research topic, the research design, accessing participants through to data collection and analysis. This article re-articulates the importance of researcher reflexivity, particularly when both researchers and participants exhibit multiculturality (for example, in the context of having multicultural backgrounds), which has become more common in the globalised world. It will be concluded that engaging in critical reflexivity is important for producing reliable and ethical research as it enables researchers to be aware of their position in the 'space between' and be transparent how their positionality impacts on the entire research process. Keywords: Insider/outsider, Qualitative Research, Critical Reflexivity, Veiled Muslim Women, Islamophobic Hate Crime Introduction The positionality of the researcher as an insider or outsider in relation to the participants inevitably influences all aspects of the research process including research design, access, data collection and data interpretation. Positionality is determined ''by where one stands in relation to 'the other''' (Merriam et al. 2001: 411). Feminist scholars and those researching oppressed, marginalised and 'other' communities have highlighted the potential benefits of having researchers who are 'similar' to their participants (Lee 2008). An 'insider' is a researcher who belongs to the group to which their participants also belong based on characteristics such as religion, ethnicity, gender and sexual identity, while an 'outsider' is not a member of that group (Gair 2012). These polarised positions place researchers as either subjective, biased and generating questionable research outcomes or objective, accurate and credible, respectively (Savvides, Al-Youssef, Colin and Garrido 2014). The influence of modern philosophical paradigms such as post-modernism and post-structuralism means that traditional dichotomies, for example, self/other and insider/outsider, have been challenged as scholars have recognised the limitations of this approach (Savvides et al. 2014). Post-modernism highlights the importance of recognising the researcher's positionality as part of the narrative interpretation (Angrosino 2005). The researcher's positionality in relation to the participants is an epistemological matter because it influences the knowledge that is co-constructed between them (Griffith 1998). Post-structuralism argues that the researcher- researched dichotomy is flawed because their roles are neither fixed nor at opposite ends of the spectrum (Savvides et al. 2014). From this perspective, the simplistic insider/outsider binary is flawed because it does not take into account the multiple identities that both researchers and participants have. Rather, it is important to http://www.socresonline.org.uk/21/4/8.html 1 28/11/2016 http://www.socresonline.org.uk/21/4/8/zempi.html 1.3 1.4 2.1 2.2 2.3 adopt a reflexive methodological approach that considers how similarities and differences between the researcher and the researched shape the research process and the knowledge produced. Critical reflexivity emphasises the need for researchers to be open, accountable and ethical in the research process (Hellawell 2006). It stresses that the researcher must not only acknowledge how their beliefs, values and personal interests influence methodological decisions and knowledge claims, but should also challenge these continuously, particularly as these change as a result of interactions with the participants and the context within which they operate (Savvides et al. 2014). An understanding of the theoretical, conceptual and methodological opportunities and dilemmas of insider/outsider positions can enable qualitative researchers to better prepare for and tackle the challenges of producing reliable and ethical research findings (Savvides et al. 2014). Critical reflexivity impacts knowledge production as it demonstrates how different aspects of the researcher's identity influence the research process. Critical reflexivity is an integral part of this process as it enables researchers to be constantly aware of their position in 'the space between' (Corbin-Dwyer and Buckle 2009). The notion of the 'space between' considers qualitative researchers as 'multiple insiders and outsiders' (Labaree 2002: 102). By being both insiders and outsiders, qualitative researchers operate in a fluid space somewhere between the two. This paper begins with a review of the existing research and theory on conducting qualitative research from an etic or emic perspective. I then reflect on my own positionality in a study examining the lived experiences of veiled Muslim women who have been victims of Islamophobic hate crime. Within the framework of critical reflexivity, I consider the impact of my outsider/insider status at each stage of the research process, from gaining access to participants, the establishment of trust and rapport between researchers and participants to knowledge production. As we shall see, I oscillate between being an outsider because of my religious identity as an Orthodox Christian and being a 'partial' insider because of my gender identity as a heterosexual woman, whilst other aspects of my identity such as race, ethnicity and occupational identity also seem to influence the research process. This topic cuts across multiple categories of difference and thus it is important to recognise how these differences influence knowledge production, particularly in relation to a marginalised and under studied group – Muslim women who wear the niqab (face veil) in the UK. Thus, it is necessary to understand insider/outsider journeys and their influence on the research project in order to produce research that is reliable and ethical. Mapping the insider/outsider debate A common argument in the research literature is that insiders have unique methodological advantages in the research process, for example, in relation to developing research questions, designing interview schedules, accessing and recruiting participants, and during data collection and analysis (Labaree 2002). From this perspective, insider researchers are more likely to be able to understand and represent participants' experiences. This can be particularly important in research with groups that have been under-represented and socially or culturally marginalised. Similarly, participants might be more willing to share their experiences because there is an assumption of understanding and of shared distinctiveness; it is as if they feel, "You are one of us and it is us versus them (those on the outside who don't understand)'' (Corbin-Dwyer and Buckle 2009: 58). In comparison to outsiders, insider researchers are in a stronger position to conduct ethical research that keeps marginalised communities at the top of the research agenda and represents their voices (Corbin-Dwyer and Buckle 2009). At the same time though, insider researchers may face a number of challenges. A degree of commonality does not guarantee that an insider researcher will understand participants' views and experiences any more than an outsider researcher, because their lives are as different as they are similar through other personal, social, and situational characteristics which outweigh the shared positions (Bridges 2001). Researchers and participants might find themselves in non-shared social and cultural spaces including religion, ethnicity, age, gender, social class, language, education, marital status, customs, beliefs, to name but some examples. Also, there is a risk that the researcher might take for granted the participants' perspectives due to their shared positions and as a result overlook parts of the data during data analysis (Kitzinger and Wilkinson 1997). Some issues might not be mentioned by the participants because assumptions of shared knowledge (Turnbull 2000). According to Asselin (2003), the dual role can also result in role confusion when the researcher responds to the participants or analyses the data from a perspective other than that of researcher. This might result in an interview that is shaped and guided by the core aspects of the researcher's experience and not the participant's (Corbin-Dwyer and Buckle 2009). Some of the perceived benefits for the outsider researcher include the apparent objectivity that being detached provides, and the ability to stand back and find meanings not evident to the insider (Savvides et al. 2014). Outsiders may be able to make observations and draw independent conclusions that insiders might not, http://www.socresonline.org.uk/21/4/8.html 2 28/11/2016 2.4 3.1 3.2 3.3 4.1 4.2 for example, by asking 'naive questions' to explore topics in depth (Hellawell 2006). However, outsider researchers are accused of lacking understanding (Savvides et al. 2014). As such, outsiders cannot understand or represent accurately the experiences of their participants. This is a particularly salient topic when research is conducted with oppressed, marginalised and 'other' communities (Hayfield and Huxley 2015). Thus it is important that the outsider researcher addresses the psychological and social distance between themselves and the participants in an ethical way in order to gain valuable insights into their lived experiences (Sixsmith, Boneham and Goldring 2003). This discussion shows that there are costs and benefits to be weighed regarding the insider versus outsider status of the researcher. However, the distinction, the polarity, between the insider and the outsider researcher should itself be challenged (Bridges 2001). Groups or collectivities that claim insider status are not themselves homogeneous groups (Griffith 1998). For example, the collectivity 'Muslim women' is striated by a plurality of identities – such as race, ethnicity, age, language, class, education, sexual orientation and degree of practising Islam, to name but some examples. The different social, personal and situational characteristics that constitute their individuality may well outweigh the shared characteristics; and there may indeed be 'greater barriers to mutual understanding than there are gateways' (Bridges 2001: 373). It is important to acknowledge that identities are complex and multifaceted. It is not always easy or indeed possible to predict how one will be placed by the participants – how commonality or difference will be constructed, interpreted or experienced (Ryan and Golden 2006). The position both of the researcher and researched are not fixed but can be understood as 'potentially unstable and shifting' relationships within the research process (Song and Parker 1995: 244). Before reflecting on the impact of my insider/outsider status on the research process, it is first important to contextualise this discussion by offering a brief overview of the research study. The research study The study examined veiled Muslim women's experiences of Islamophobic hate crime in public in the UK. Islamophobic hate crime is defined as any criminal offence which is perceived, by the victim or any other person, to be motivated by a hostility or prejudice based upon a person's religion or perceived religion, that is, their Muslim faith (College of Policing 2014). Following terrorist attacks such as 9/11 in the USA and 7/7 in the UK, the vulnerability of perceived and actual Muslims to Islamophobic hate crime in the UK and elsewhere in the West is well documented (see, for example, Allen 2010; Esposito and Kalin 2011; Githens-Mazer and Lambert 2010; Poynting and Mason 2007). Islamophobic hostility towards Muslim women who are 'visible' due to their Muslim dress has also been empirically researched (Allen, Isakjee and Young 2013; Open Society Foundations 2011; Zempi 2014). This was a qualitative study, which included 60 in-depth interviews and 20 focus groups with veiled Muslim women who had experienced Islamophobic attacks in public in the UK. The fieldwork took place between 2011 and 2012. All the interviews were conducted in English, and the vast majority of participants were British citizens who were born in this country. In-depth interviews were designed to reveal the nature, frequency and impact of Islamophobic hate crime upon victims, as well as their coping mechanisms for dealing with this victimisation. Focus group interviews explored shared understandings, experiences and participant narratives concerning incidents of Islamophobic hate crime in public, and the role of formal and informal mechanisms in supporting victims in coping with such incidents. With respect to the researcher's positionality, it is important to outline all aspects of my identity that were in play including religion, gender, race, ethnicity, age, language, sexual orientation and occupational identity. Specifically, I was a heterosexual, white, Orthodox Christian woman. Additionally, I was a Greek immigrant who spoke with a foreign accent that marked me as 'different'. Also, I was a doctoral student at the University of Leicester with an occupation background in Victim Support. Lastly, I identified myself as a heterosexual, single woman in her thirties without children. Insider/Outsider Perspectives at Different Stages of Research In this section, I reflect on how different aspects of my identity influenced the research design, data collection, and analysis as a way of informing debate on how insider/outsider perspectives can shape the decisions that researchers make at different stages of the research process. Research Design As an Orthodox Christian woman, my research was primarily from an etic position. As will be discussed http://www.socresonline.org.uk/21/4/8.html 3 28/11/2016 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.6 later in more detail, having a practicing faith did provide me with a degree of commonality with these women; however, my research was primarily from an outsider position on the basis that Christianity and Islam are two different religions. My attention was drawn to the vulnerability of veiled Muslim women as victims of Islamophobic hate crime through my occupation identity as a victim support officer in Victim Support. Victim Support is an independent charity helping people cope with the effects of crime, by providing free and confidential support and information. In essence, I embarked on the research with some insider knowledge because I had worked with veiled Muslim women who had reported their experiences of Islamophobic hate crime to Victim Support. Insider knowledge meant that through these cases, I developed a good professional understanding of the nature, extent and impact of Islamophobic attacks upon veiled Muslim women, their families and the wider Muslim community. Additionally, I familiarised myself with reading about Islamophobic hate crime, racism and targeted victimisation in order to enhance my understanding and knowledge, both theoretically and empirically. With respect to designing the interview guide, it is argued that insiders hold an advantage over outsiders in terms of developing nuanced and meaningful research questions (Hayfield and Huxley 2015). In this regard, insiders are familiar with the types of issues that affect participants' lives and therefore may be aware of pertinent questions to ask that might not occur to an outsider when developing an interview schedule (Labaree 2002). My knowledge of Islamophobic hate crimes through cases in Victim Support coupled with drawing upon the hate crime literature helped me to easily construct an interview schedule. In other words, my familiarity with veiled Muslim women's Islamophobic hate crime experiences made it easy to identify relevant issues, and this formed the basis of my investigation through interviews. At the same time though, I engaged in an iterative process where I asked participants' feedback and revised the interview guide accordingly. I found this process very useful as I realised that I should avoid using any academic terminology that participants might not have been familiar with. The issue of language is not merely technical, but actually relates to two different frameworks for making sense of women's experiences – an academic, technical jargon and another language used by the women themselves. Using critical reflexivity, I recognised that although I had some insider knowledge, there could be hidden issues or ones, which I had not thought of since I were only a partial insider. Therefore questions and themes were added as the study progressed. For example, questions were added concerning the issue of intersectionality of identities based on the fact that some of the veiled Muslim women who took part in the study had experienced hostility based on different aspects of their identities such as religion, gender, race, ethnicity, age, body shape and size, mental health problems, physical disabilities and learning difficulties. Intersectionality is a sociological theory that holds that constructed notions of 'difference' impact upon a particular group simultaneously resulting in a cumulative effect (Yuval-Davis 2011). The term was coined by legal scholar Kimberle Crenshaw in 1989. It is not an abstract notion but a description of the way multiple oppressions are experienced. Indeed, Crenshaw (1989: 149) uses the following analogy, referring to a traffic intersection, or crossroad, to concretise the concept: Consider an analogy to traffic in an intersection, coming and going in all four directions. Discrimination, like traffic through an intersection, may flow in one direction, and it may flow in another. If an accident happens in an intersection, it can be caused by cars traveling from any number of directions and, sometimes, from all of them. Similarly, if a Black woman is harmed because she is in an intersection, her injury could result from sex discrimination or race discrimination?But it is not always easy to reconstruct an accident: Sometimes the skid marks and the injuries simply indicate that they occurred simultaneously, frustrating efforts to determine which driver caused the harm. Crenshaw (1989) argues that Black women are discriminated against in ways that often do not fit neatly within the legal categories of either 'racism' or 'sexism' – but as a combination of both racism and sexism. In the context of the present study, intersectionality can be understood as a nexus of identities that work together to render veiled Muslim women an 'easy' target to attack, especially in the minds of their abusers. This means that some veiled Muslim women may be targeted not just for their group membership (Muslim identity) but because they are stereotypically perceived as 'soft', 'easy' or 'convenient' targets by virtue of the fact that they are visibly 'different' (through markers of dress, skin colour or language) and because they seem vulnerable (because of their gender, race, ethnicity, age, disability or physical presence) in certain spaces and places. This is a point worth noting as it helps us to recognise that veiled Muslim women who have experienced Islamophobic hate crime will all have their own distinct individual experiences in addition to common patterns of this victimisation. This notion of intersectionality of identities was not known to me through my work in Victim Support. This points to the fact that reporting incidences of Islamophobic hate crime to formal agencies such as the Police and Victim Support only captures part of victims' experiences. Intersectionality is left out of these partial reports of http://www.socresonline.org.uk/21/4/8.html 4 28/11/2016 4.7 4.8 4.9 4.10 4.11 4.12 Islamophobic hate crimes as criminal justice agencies typically focus on religion when veiled Muslim women suffer hate crimes thereby ignoring the presence of multiple identity factors. Moreover, as the study progressed I developed the interview schedule to include other interesting and important areas that participants specifically wanted to talk about but were not initially part of the main research questions. Such issues included the reasons why Muslim women choose to wear the niqab (for example, as a form of public modesty, liberation and Islamic feminism), the experiences of converts to Islam, as well as the problem of Islamophobic hate crime within the private sphere, for example, where family members pressured women to take the niqab off. As such, participants led the discussions, empowering them to voice what was of importance to them. In this regard, participants insisted that I record the 'whole story' of their lives, and not just their experiences as victims of Islamophobic hate crime in public. This demonstrates the importance of reflexivity in the research process, and especially the fact that qualitative research is open to adaption, and having assumptions constantly challenged. Furthermore, key informants such as veiled Muslim women from the local community played an important role in designing the fieldwork. In light of my non-Muslim identity, they advised me to dress and behave in a religiously and culturally appropriate manner throughout the fieldwork, particularly when visiting mosques, Muslim schools and Islamic community centres. These spaces were highly gendered in the sense that women and men used separate rooms and often participated in different types of activities. The use of space was defined by strong ideologies of purdah (i.e. division of male and female space with the purpose of maintaining segregation between the sexes), and they advised me to abide by this by not using the male spaces in these premises. Also, they advised me to dress modestly, including wearing a long loose dress (preferably black) and covering my hair with a hijab (headscarf) when conducting focus group sessions at mosques. It was not appropriate to shake hands with men, to sit or stand next to them, or to talk to men unnecessarily. They also advised me to avoid eye contact with men in these premises. Thus, the process of becoming an insider involved learning about, and abiding by cultural and religious norms as well as codes of behaviour in Islam. The active involvement of veiled Muslim women helped to develop a great sense of trust with the local Muslim community that became the real strength of the access process, particularly since I conformed by the advice I was given in relation to my behaviour and dress. Researchers' bodily appearances and bodily actions, adaptations and interactions are important markers of their identity in the fieldwork (Zubair et al. 2012). Participants may perceive and judge researchers either positively or negatively and/or as insiders or outsiders based on their embodied identity (Ellingson 2006). Okely (2007: 71) argues that researchers often have to learn to adapt their bodily performances and actions – including the way they dress – in order to fit in with, and be accepted amongst, those they are researching, especially when they are closely scrutinised and instructed. Attempts to change, however clumsy, are usefully interpreted as signs of respect. This demonstrates the important role the researcher's body and behaviour may play in developing (or hindering the development of) trust and rapport with participants. This discussion shows that research design needs to take into account the religious and cultural context of the community. Without an understanding of the cultural and religious norms of practising Muslim men and women, access to mosques, Muslim schools and Islamic community centres could have been extremely difficult, and the relationship between researcher and researched one of suspicion and noncooperation. Awareness of cultural and religious norms is vital for negotiating insider/outsider dynamics through showing respect for culture and religion, particularly when working with minority communities. Participant Recruitment In a post-9/11 and 7/7 climate, Muslims in the UK have taken on the status of a 'suspect community' (Ryan, Kofman and Aaron 2010). This has created a general sense of mistrust towards people investigating issues concerning Muslims. The fear of being investigated by agents undercover from the secret services has made access to the community much more difficult for researchers (Bolognani 2007). Muslim communities have an additional cause of discomfort about participating in research studies: the fear of misrepresentation of their religion. Spalek argues that 'due to the verbal and physical abuse suffered by Muslims communities in the aftermath of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, interviewees may have distrusted my interest in their lives' (2005: 411). In light of my non-Muslim identity, access to potential participants was initially challenging. I found that participants were keen to establish my motivations for researching their lived experiences before agreeing to take http://www.socresonline.org.uk/21/4/8.html 5 28/11/2016 4.13 4.14 4.15 4.16 4.17 part in this study. This curiosity might simply reflect their suspicions about the motivation behind the research. It might also reflect their concerns that non-Muslim researchers might misinterpret their views, experiences and behaviours. I found that being open, authentic, honest and deeply interested in their lives encouraged openness and trust between the participants and myself, and helped to assuage any suspicions about my motives. Also, the fact that when interrogated about my faith, I answered that I was an Orthodox Christian seemed, in the majority of cases, to contribute towards the idea that I was a person with good morals who followed a religious code, and therefore, could be trusted. Therefore, I was a partial insider not as a Muslim but as someone who holds strong religious beliefs. My background in Victim Support and the fact that I was a doctoral student at the University of Leicester also afforded me a level of respect and recognition that I was a serious researcher with a genuine interest in understanding and reporting their experiences. At the same time, some participants told me that they were keen to talk to non-Muslims in order to dispel myths about Islam. In this regard, I found that many participants were concerned about the implications of what they had to say, as they felt they were seen as representatives of Islam. By answering my questions participants knew they were contributing in some way to outsiders' perceptions of Muslims. They felt the duty/burden of projecting a good image of Islam to non-Muslims. Whilst this question of individuals feeling representative of Islam at times affected the direction of the interviews, in some cases this was probably the trigger that convinced some participants to agree to participate in the study. As such, being perceived as an outsider has a value in terms of encouraging individuals to take part in the study. Finally, engaging with key local Muslim organisations and community leaders eased access to participants. Receiving their 'seal of approval' through publicising my project on their websites helped allay any doubts about the motivation behind the research. Berg (1999: 239) highlights the 'value of obtaining the support of community leaders when conducting research in minority communities'. Community gatekeepers have local influence and power to add credibility and validity to the project by their acceptance of it. Positive recommendations from gatekeepers provide the outsider researcher with social capital within the community, giving them a degree of credibility (Sixsmith et al., 2003). However, community leaders can also act to block access. Indeed, there were a couple of local Muslim organisations that declined any engagement with my project, and refused to introduce me to their members. Clearly, gatekeepers and local Muslim organisations have both afforded and impeded access to potential participants in this study. Although some veiled Muslim women might have agreed to take part in the study because of my validated identity and endorsement by certain Muslim organisations, others might have been discouraged from taking part due to my (perceived) non-credible status resulting from a lack of engagement with certain Muslim organisations. This discussion demonstrates that insider/outsider status can have a significant impact on the recruitment process and participants' motivations for taking part. Data Collection Hayfield and Huxley (2015) argue that when conducting qualitative research, researchers need to consider how they present themselves and their research to participants; providing specific information can influence how participants feel about and behave towards the researcher. Due to my non-Muslim identity, I knew that participants would automatically consider me an outsider to their religion, culture and context. My outsider status became even more evident when I interviewed Black and Asian women. On the one hand, it seemed inappropriate and irrelevant to think in terms of who is classed as 'us' (insiders) and 'them' (outsiders), as the boundaries of people's identities are blurred and constantly shifting. On the other hand, I was aware of my position as a white researcher and of the possibility that some participants might have seen me as the 'oppressor' on the basis of my racial identity. Adler and Adler (2001) highlight that if participants perceive themselves as marginalised and vulnerably positioned by the white society, they might be reluctant to share information with a researcher who is 'one of them'. Agreeing to be researched by a white researcher becomes a political decision which impacts upon the data made available to the outsider researcher (Shah 2004). This decision may not necessarily be based upon the colour divide but upon what 'white' represents for Black and South Asian communities that have been historically discriminated against and racially abused based on their perceived 'otherness' (Shah 2004). To complicate matters further many white, non-Muslim western social commentators and journalists have promoted false images of Islam and as a result some participants might have viewed me as being a part of this 'white, western, establishment' (Spalek 2005: 411). Although my religious and racial identity placed me as an outsider, as soon as I spoke with participants, they spotted my foreign accent, and questioned me about my ethnicity. I realised that my immigrant status played http://www.socresonline.org.uk/21/4/8.html 6 28/11/2016 4.18 4.19 4.20 4.21 4.22 a very important part in building rapport. In essence, I was perceived as an insider due to being 'different' myself. According to Harrington (2003), this could be the result of a sub-conscious strategic identity match. I was considered 'other' myself but also an outsider from the Muslim community, and thus I was trusted not to gossip within it. Being interviewed by an insider researcher may lead participants to have concerns about being judged by a peer, and despite assurances of confidentiality, may worry about breaches of privacy and local gossip (Ryan et al. 2010). Spalek (2005) and Song and Parker (1995) found that being placed as an outsider makes one easier and perhaps 'safer' to talk to. Also, the fact that I was Greek triggered discussions about the history of Ancient Greece, summer holidays and the more recent financial crisis in Greece, which helped to break down the researcher/researched boundary. As the research progressed, I came to realise that my whiteness and non- Muslim identity were secondary once my ethnicity emerged. I also realised that there were many insider elements to my (predominantly) outsider status including my gender. Although I was an outsider in terms of my religious and racial identity, I was a partial insider in that I was a heterosexual woman. This is important, first because it highlights one of the ways in which the categories insider and outsider are not necessarily clear-cut and fixed. Secondly, some feminist researchers have discussed the idea that there are often unequal power relations between 'researcher' and 'researched,' with participants answering questions, being analysed and presented in ways often largely determined by the researcher (Oakley 1981). When women interview women, rapport can be built and these hierarchies can (to some extent) be broken down due to their shared identities (Labaree 2002). The more 'like' your participants you are, the more opportunity there is for empathy, implicit understanding, and shared experience (Hellawell 2006). Despite explicit religious differences between me and the participants, I empathised with them through our shared identity as women. In this sense, I used my gender identity to establish rapport and trust with the veiled Muslim women who took part in the study. Similarly, in a study documenting Black Muslim women's experiences of victimisation and the management of their personal safety, Spalek (2002) drew upon her position as a woman in order to establish rapport since her racial and religious identity differed from those of the research participants. This approach is based on the argument that there is a special woman-to-woman connection between female researchers and female participants, thereby encouraging the latter to disclose sensitive information. Jeffery (1976) found that being female was advantageous as it provided her with access to areas that would have been denied to men because of purdah (gender segregation). Indeed, it is important to recognise that it would be problematic to employ a male interviewer in this study. Crucially, the principle of avoiding contact with 'non-mahram' (unrelated) men is pivotal for Muslim women who decide to wear the niqab (Hannan 2011). According to the Quran and the Sunnah (the way of life of Prophet Muhammad), free-mixing and socialisation between non-mahram men and women is strictly forbidden in Islam, at least as a general rule, unless a woman has a mahram in her presence such as her husband, father, brother, father-in-law, son and so forth. The presence of other male family members during the interview could potentially limit the extent to which participants could disclose their experiences of Islamophobic victimisation to a male interviewer. This provides evidence for the proposition that being a female researcher was crucial in the present study. However, it is important to acknowledge that although being a woman was a commonality with my research participants, there were many differences between my understanding of womanhood and femininity and that of my participants. This also challenges the aforementioned notion that a shared identity of gender ensures a 'special woman to woman connection'. This means that being a woman rendered me a 'partial insider' rather than a 'complete insider' researcher. As Pillow (2003) observes, researchers often choose to research their own cultural, sexualised and/or racialised communities but being part of the community does not automatically yield the research egalitarian. Being a woman gave me a degree of commonality on which to build rapport with these women, but other aspects of my identity namely sexuality, class, faith and lifestyle constructed more differences within the group of 'woman'. To illustrate this, it is important to reflect on the ways in which womanhood is not a unitary category. For example, in addition to being female, I was also an unmarried woman without children. Some participants were critical of my choice to be single in my thirties, whilst others sympathised with my 'situation' as they stated that it was not my fault that I could not find a good man to marry, hence they proposed introducing me to single Muslim men who would make a good husband. In this context, there was also an assumption that I was heterosexual; as such, it was deemed appropriate for participants to engage with me without wearing their niqab. In other words, women could be un-veiled with me as I was not a potential sexual partner (in light of my heterosexual status). In order to confirm my sexuality, some participants would ask me about it at the start of the http://www.socresonline.org.uk/21/4/8.html 7 28/11/2016 4.23 4.24 4.25 4.26 research whilst other participants would assume I was heterosexual. In either case, it is important to point out that this was not just a women-only space where veiled Muslim women would unveil themselves to other women; sexuality was key here. As mentioned earlier, covering the face with a niqab serves the purpose of concealing the beauty of the veil wearer, especially from non-mahram individuals (that is, people with whom Muslim women could have sexual relations). The definition of 'non-mahram' is a sex neutral definition whereby women would consider both males and females as being potentially sexually interested in them and thus they would keep the veil on if suspected that the individual was homosexual, regardless of gender. This discussion shows that different aspects of the researcher's identity can make it easier to gain participants' trust and build rapport; therefore they may become more fully engaged with the research resulting in rich and authentic accounts. However, it is not always easy or indeed possible to predict how researchers will be positioned by the participants, how commonality or difference will be constructed or perceived. Furthermore, it is important to reflect on and critically examine power relations during data collection. Specifically, I was often asked (especially by older participants) whether I wanted to convert to Islam. Since my answer was negative, I was questioned as to why I was interested in conducting research on the lived experiences of veiled Muslim women, given that I had no intention of converting to Islam. Such questions by the participants made me feel uncomfortable, and somewhat vulnerable. A couple of participants gave me booklets, which included information about the benefits of converting to Islam, or prayed for me (in order to convert to Islam). For me to ask them not to pray for me or refuse accepting these booklets would result in violation of the code of respect and courtesy thus jeopardising rapport and even their participation in the study. Thus I decided to accept the booklets and prayers. As Zubair et al. (2012) argue, research participants – including older individuals – are not necessarily a vulnerable and passive group vis-à-vis the researcher but can be active agents who exercise considerable power over the research process and research relationships. Data Analysis In comparison to outsiders, insider researchers are arguably more likely to be able to understand or represent participants' experiences, which can be particularly important in research with groups that have been marginalised or oppressed (Bridges 2001). In light of this, I had concerns about how my outsider status might affect the data analysis. On the one hand, I felt a strong responsibility to ensure that the research represented the voices of the participants. On the other hand, I was conscious of not simply replicating participants' stories but to look critically at the data. Correspondingly, I took steps to ensure that the data interpretation was more critical than descriptive. Within a Grounded Theory framework (Glaser and Strauss 1967), the analysis of the data in this study followed an inductive approach in the sense that themes were allowed to emerge from the data, thereby enabling theories about the nature of Islamophobic victimisation to be generated, tested and refined during the analytical process. As such, the data were allowed to 'speak for themselves' by the emergence of conceptual categories and descriptive themes. Inductive reasoning moved from a set of particular observations with reference to the lived experiences of participants as victims of Islamophobic hate crime to the discovery of a pattern of targeted victimisation of veiled Muslim women, which was theoretically based upon these observations. Verbatim quotes of what participants said were used to illustrate key themes and patterns in the data but also to enable readers to assess the validity of the analysis against what had been said. In this regard, transcript extracts not only constitute evidence for the current findings but also help readers to understand how women made sense of their victimisation, how they had been affected and how they coped with it. In this regard, I shared the data analysis with participants to verify its accuracy. Moreover, it is important to reflect upon how voice is given to the subjects, and also to demonstrate how power is shared by researcher and researched (Pillow 2003). This may include discussions of co-development of the research focus and analysis, use of extensive member checks, 'sharing the data' with the subjects, and co-writing (Pillow 2003). Correspondingly, I asked some of the veiled Muslim women who took part in the study to evaluate the interpretations and explanations pulled from the data (e.g. 'Does this represent your experiences?' or 'Have I captured the meaning of the niqab correctly?). Doing this also helped to overcome the power relationship in 'being the one who tells their stories'. Clearly, I was in a position of power in framing the research and findings but participants did influence all aspects of the study by giving me feedback, ranging from the interview guide to the data. However, as Trinh (1991: 67) points out, this share of power is 'given' to the research subjects, it is 'not taken'. Reflexivity then always occurs out of an unequal power relationship and, in fact, the act of reflexivity may perpetuate a colonial relationship while at the same time attempting to mask this power over the subject (Pillow 2003). http://www.socresonline.org.uk/21/4/8.html 8 28/11/2016 4.27 4.28 5.1 5.2 5.3 I found that my non-Muslim identity helped me to think critically about the research data. To illustrate this, some participants reported that Islamophobic victimisation was part of God's plan to 'test' their faith. In line with the belief that this victimisation was part of Allah's plan, participants felt confident that He would 'reward' them in the afterlife for not giving up their Muslim identity despite the abuse that they suffered in the present life. This contributes to the sense of resilience that some victims of Islamophobic hate crime might feel in light of the 'rewards' that they will receive in jannah (paradise). Initially, I did not challenge participants during interviews as I did not want to offend them by questioning how Allah, or any God for that matter, could cause suffering to His followers in order to 'measure' the degree of their religiosity and loyalty to Him. However, in retrospect this was something that I did challenge in the data analysis. Watts (2006) highlights how it may be problematic when researchers are keen to faithfully report and validate their participants' experiences. During analysis it is not necessarily realistic or appropriate to simply be a conduit for participants' stories, and at times it may be necessary to challenge or criticise their accounts rather than simply validate and legitimate them. This issue is one of epistemology and also applies to both insider and outsider researchers, who feel responsibilities toward their participants to produce meaningful research that benefits their everyday lives. Finally, I asked the participants about their feedback of the interview process and all of them stated that they found being able to talk about their experiences of Islamophobic victimisation 'cathartic'; they also felt 'that someone actually cared'. This indicates that both interviews and focus group discussions contributed to participants' sense of confidence and enhanced their notions of being valued by listening to disclosures of abuse, harassment and violence. The concept of Islamophobic hate crime was not familiar amongst the women who took part in the study but following the interviews and focus group discussions, the majority of participants stated that they felt empowered to seek support and report future incidents of Islamophobic victimisation to the police as a result of taking part in this study. Indeed, one of the reasons for employing qualitative interviewing was to empower veiled Muslim women to come forward and also, to raise awareness amongst actual and potential victims in the local community about access to relevant organisations that could support them. Conclusion The issue of the researcher's positionality has been at the forefront of much discussion and debate in terms of gaining access to participants and securing recruitment, as well as the establishment of trust and rapport and a non-oppressive relationship between researchers and participants, particularly when researching 'other', marginalised or vulnerable groups. In this article, I have discussed my experiences of being an 'outsider' and an 'insider', being different in some aspects of my identity while sharing similarities in other aspects of my identity. In particular, I utilised the concept of strategic occupation to analyse my insider/outsider status and its impact on the research process. In so doing, I analysed the complexity and multiplicity of identities, and examined the ways in which religion, race, ethnicity, gender, age, sexual orientation and occupational identity may impact on the research process. Throughout the study, critical reflexivity enabled me to work towards a deeper understanding and awareness of my own identity/positionality and how this interacted with the identity/positionality of my participants. Through the process of critical reflexivity, I regularly questioned my methodology and deconstructed my interactions with the veiled Muslim women who took part in the study. Similarly, I questioned my understanding and representation of veiled Muslim women's lived experiences. Critical reflexivity also helped me to continually re-evaluate methodological, analytical and ethical research processes as the research progressed. In this regard, I found it essential to engage in critical reflexivity during all stages of the research as it enabled me to deal with some of the challenges experienced as part of the shifting insider/outsider journeys and to make sense of them and their influence on the research process. The preceding discussion supported the view that qualitative researchers are not either/or insiders/outsiders; rather, they continuously negotiate their multiple identities and aspects of the research process by moving fluidly within 'the space between' (Corbin-Dwyer and Buckle 2009). The fluid, multiple, intersectional and context-dependant nature of identities means that in reality a researcher may hold multiple and shifting identities and positionalities in the field, as opposed to being a total 'insider' or a complete 'outsider' (Zubair et al. 2012). As Corbin-Dwyer and Buckle (2009: 60) point out 'The notion of the space between challenges the dichotomy of insider versus outsider status. To present these concepts in a dualistic manner is overly simplistic. It is restrictive to lock into a notion that emphasizes either/or, one or the other, you are in or you are out'. In order to fairly and accurately represent the researched community the crucial element is not whether the researcher is an insider or an outsider; rather, researchers need to recognise how their multiple identities influence the research process, and the ethicality of their actions and decisions. As such, critical reflexivity allows http://www.socresonline.org.uk/21/4/8.html 9 28/11/2016 5.4 for the development of changed perspectives that improve future practice. 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SONG M and Parker D (1995) Commonality, difference and the dynamics of disclosure in in-depth interviewing. Sociology 29(2): p. 241-256. http://www.socresonline.org.uk/21/4/8.html 11 28/11/2016 http://www.socresonline.org.uk/13/1/6.html SPALEK B (2002) Islam, Crime and Criminal Justice. Cullompton: Willan. SPALEK B (2005) A critical reflection on researching Black Muslim women's lives post September 11th. International Journal of Social Research Methodology 8(5): p. 405-418. TURNBULL A (2000) Collaboration and censorship in the oral history interview. International Journal of Social Research Methodology 3(1): p. 15-34. WATTS JH (2006) The outsider within: dilemmas of qualitative feminist research within a culture of resistance. Qualitative Research 6(3): p. 385-402. YUVAL-DAVIS N (2011) The Politics of Belonging: Intersectional Contestations. London: Sage. ZEMPI, I (2014) and Chakraborti, N. (2014) Islamophobia, Victimisation and the Veil, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. ZUBAIR M, Martin W and Victor C (2012) Embodying gender, age, ethnicity and power in 'the field': reflections on dress and the presentation of the self in research with older Pakistani Muslims. Sociological Research Online 17(3). http://www.socresonline.org.uk/17/3/21.html. http://www.socresonline.org.uk/21/4/8.html 12 28/11/2016 http://www.socresonline.org.uk/17/3/21.html Negotiating Constructions of Insider and Outsider Status in Research with Veiled Muslim Women Victims of Islamophobic Hate Crime Abstract Keywords: Insider/outsider, Qualitative Research, Critical Reflexivity, Veiled Muslim Women, Islamophobic Hate Crime Introduction Mapping the insider/outsider debate The research study Insider/Outsider Perspectives at Different Stages of Research Research Design Participant Recruitment Data Collection Data Analysis Conclusion References 
work_5rjew6qnfzalxkrrecwq5wbvxy	----	Suicide related ideation and behavior among Canadian gay and bisexual men: a syndemic analysis RESEARCH ARTICLE Open Access Suicide related ideation and behavior among Canadian gay and bisexual men: a syndemic analysis Olivier Ferlatte1,2*, Joshun Dulai2, Travis Salway Hottes2,3, Terry Trussler2 and Rick Marchand2 Abstract Background: While several studies have demonstrated that gay and bisexual men are at increased risk of suicide less attention has been given to the processes that generate the inherent inequity with the mainstream population. This study tested whether syndemic theory can explain the excess suicide burden in a sample of Canadian gay and bisexual men. Syndemic theory accounts for co-occurring and mutually reinforcing epidemics suffered by vulnerable groups due to the effects of social marginalization. Methods: This study used data from Sex Now 2011, a cross-sectional survey of Canadian gay and bisexual men (n = 8382). The analysis measured the extent to which anti-gay marginalization and several psychosocial health problems are associated with suicide related ideation and attempts. Since psychosocial health problems were hypothesized to have an additive effect on suicide related ideation and attempts, the analysis calculated the effect of accumulated psychosocial health problems on suicide behavior. Results: Suicide ideation and attempts were positively associated with each individual marginalization indicator (verbal violence, physical violence, bullying, sexual violence and work discrimination) and psychosocial health problems (smoking, party drugs, depression, anxiety, STIs, HIV risk and HIV). Furthermore, prevalence of suicide ideation and attempts increased with each added psychosocial health problem. Those who reported 3 or more had 6.90 (5.47–8.70) times the odds of experiencing suicide ideation and 16.29 (9.82–27.02) times the odds of a suicide attempt compared to those with no psychosocial health problems. Conclusions: This investigation suggests that syndemics is a useful theory for studying suicide behavior among gay and bisexual men. Moreover, the findings highlight a need to address gay and bisexual men’s health problems holistically and the urgent need to reduce this population’s experience with marginalization and violence. Keywords: Gay men, Bisexual men, Suicide, Syndemic, Homophobia, Violence, Canada Background It has been well established that gay and bisexual men experience disproportionately higher rates of suicide re- lated ideation and behavior. According to a meta-analysis conducted by King and his colleagues, gay and bisexual men are approximately four times more likely to attempt suicide over their lifetime in comparison to heterosexual men [1]. While evidence of this disparity has been accumulating, there has been less attention to the pro- cesses that have generated it [2]. Global theories of suicide, such as the interpersonal psychological theory [3] and clinical model [4], have been described as inadequate on their own for explaining the burden of suicide related ideation and behavior among gay and bisexual men [5]. Therefore, theories that expli- citly take into account the unique experiences of sexual minorities are critical to better understanding the pro- cesses that sustain this inequity. Thus far, minority stress model [6], psychological mediation model [7] and eco- logical systems models [8] have emerged in the suicide lit- erature as three theories that potentially address the * Correspondence: oferlatt@sfu.ca 1Faculty of Health Sciences, Simon Fraser University, Blusson Hall Room 11300, 8888 University Drive, Burnaby, BC V5A 1S6, Canada 2Community-Based Research Centre for Gay Men’s Health, Vancouver, Canada Full list of author information is available at the end of the article © 2015 Ferlatte et al. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly credited. The Creative Commons Public Domain Dedication waiver (http:// creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/) applies to the data made available in this article, unless otherwise stated. Ferlatte et al. BMC Public Health (2015) 15:597 DOI 10.1186/s12889-015-1961-5 http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1186/s12889-015-1961-5&domain=pdf mailto:oferlatt@sfu.ca http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/ http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/ unique vulnerabilities of sexual minorities to suicide re- lated ideation and behavior, though few of these have been tested with empirical data [5, 9]. Another conceptual framework that may help explain the excess rate of suicide related ideation and behavior among gay and bisexual men may be found in syndemic theory. The term syndemics was coined by medical anthropologist Merrill Singer in the mid-90s to describe how health problems tend to co-occur, overlap and fuel each other to create a mutually reinforcing cluster of epidemics [10, 11]. More so, according to syndemic the- ory, these intersecting epidemics are understood to be the consequences of social inequity and the unjust exer- cise of power [11]. Syndemic theory distinguishes itself from other theories that link marginalization to negative health outcomes by its holistic lens - rather than seeing health outcomes, such as suicide and suicide related ideation and behavior, in isolation from other health problems, syndemic theory illuminates the synergistic interactions of multiple health problems and how these co-occurring epidemics affect communities and there- fore degrade the overall health status of a population. Syndemic theory has gained momentum in the gay and bisexual men’s health literature in recent years. It was first applied to gay and bisexual men by Stall and colleagues in a random sample survey of nearly 3000 gay and bisexual men in four major US cities. That study found that polydrug use, depression, childhood sexual abuse, and intimate partner violence were highly corre- lated among gay and bisexual men [12]. Furthermore, the study showed that accumulations of these health problems were significantly associated with sexual risk and HIV infection. Since then several other public health studies have sup- ported the existence of syndemics among gay and bisexual men. Stall, Friedman and Catania have also proposed a theoretical framework of syndemic production for gay men-informed by minority stress theory that posits that syndemics are socially produce by early adolescence anti- gay violence and stresses associated with migration to large cities to so called “gay ghettos” [13]. Most syndemic studies, including the theoretical framework of Stall and colleagues, have focused on HIV transmission risks, not suicide [14–24]. One notable exception is the work of Mustanski and colleagues who examined suicide among young gay and bisexual men. That study found that the experience of victimization increased syndemic burden. Syndemic conditions appeared to increase the odds of sui- cide attempts [9]. Those findings suggest that syndemic theory may be a potentially useful framework for the study of suicide among sexual minorities. In this paper, the theory of syndemic will be applied to investigate suicide related ideation and behavior in a sam- ple of Canadian gay and bisexual adult men. Drawing on the theoretical and empirical work above, the excess suicide related ideation and behavior was hypothesized to be socially produced through exposure to multiple forms of violence and highly correlated with other mental health and psychosocial problems common in gay and bisexual men’s lives. The ultimate goal is to understand the factors contributing to higher rates of suicide related ideation and behavior in gay and bisexual men, in order to generate strategies for suicide prevention specific to these groups. Methods Sex Now is a serial cross-sectional survey of gay and bisex- ual men administered every 12–24 months since 2002 in the Canadian province of British Columbia. The survey has been offered anonymously online since 2007. The sampling frame was expanded to include all of Canada in 2010. This paper uses data from the 2011 edition of the survey collected from September 2011 to February 2012. The survey was offered in Canada’s two official languages, French and English. Sex Now 2011 was the first large-scale Canadian survey of gay men’s social determinants of health. The questionnaire was developed in collaboration with a group of young investigators, who participated in all phases of the study, including questionnaire develop- ment, pilot testing, recruitment, survey administration, data analysis, and communication of results (including the present report). The domains of Sex Now 2011 included: sexual behaviors, health measures, relationships, health care services, working conditions, community participa- tion, social support, and experiences of homophobia. Participants of Sex Now 2011 were recruited from dating/ sex-seeking websites (52.7 %), social media (23.1 %), an email database of previous survey participants (9.9 %), word of mouth (8.7 %), and other promotion activities (5.2 %). The survey protocol was reviewed by the independent Research Ethics Board of the Community-Based Research Centre for Gay Men’s Health. Measures Demographic factors Participants self-reported sexual orientation, partnerships status, education level, income, age, ethnicity, living envir- onment and their province of territory of residence. All variables were categorical with the exception of age which was collected as a continuous variable. Suicide related ideation and behavior Two indicators of suicide related ideation and behavior were drawn from the following questions: a) “have you ever thought about suicide?” hereafter referred to as sui- cide ideation; and, b) “have you ever attempted suicide?” hereafter referred to as suicide attempt. In both cases, participants could report these as having never occurred, as having occurred prior to the last 12 months, within Ferlatte et al. BMC Public Health (2015) 15:597 Page 2 of 9 the last 12 months, or both prior to and within the last 12 months. Marginalization indicators Data on lifetime experiences of anti-gay marginalization and violence were collected. Participants were asked if they had experienced: a) verbal violence and/or hate talk, b) physical violence, c) anti-gay bullying (i.e. harassment, cyber-bullying) d) sexual violence (i.e. unwanted sex), and e) workplace discrimination based on their sexuality. Psychosocial health problems Participants were asked if they had experienced the following in the last 12 months: a) frequent consumption of tobacco (regular/daily smokers), b) use of one or mul- tiple of the following party drugs: cocaine, crystal meth, ecstasy, GHB and ketamine, c) being on medication for depression, d) being on medication for anxiety, e) being diagnosed with one or more of the following sexually transmitted infections (STIs): gonorrhea, chlamydia, syph- ilis, herpes, HPV or hepatitis C, f) one or more episodes of condomless anal intercourse (insertive or receptive) with a partner (CAI-US), whose HIV status was unknown or discordant. We also asked participants to report whether g) they have ever been diagnosed with HIV. Analytic plan The analysis was guided by the syndemic production the- ory of Stall, Friedman and Cantania [13]. Consistent with this theory and previous syndemic studies [11, 17, 18], the accumulation of social stressors was hypothesized to lead to the development of psychosocial health problems, in- cluding suicide ideation and attempts. These health prob- lems were predicted to be interrelated and mutually reinforcing (independently associated) -a “snowball” effect in syndemic theory (as described in Fig. 1). The analytic plan for this study was modeled on a syndemic-based ana- lysis of HIV transmission risk in the 2010 version of the Sex Now survey [24]. First the relationships between lifetime indicators of anti-gay marginalization, suicide ideation and attempted suicide in the last 12 months were explored using logistic regression. Because the effect of marginalization was hypothesized to be additive, we calculated the per- centage of respondents who experienced suicide ideation and who attempted suicide in the last 12 months by number of marginalization indicators. These relation- ships were tested using Chi-Square test for trend with p < 0.05 considered statistically significant. Second, because suicide related ideation and attempt were hypothesized to be interrelated with and to have mu- tually reinforcing relationships with other psychosocial health problems, we examined correlations between all psychosocial health problems, including suicide ideation and suicide attempts in the last 12 months. Since those who experience multiple psychosocial health problems (those caught in syndemics) were hypothesized to be at in- creased risk for suicide ideation and attempts, the percent- age of those who reported suicide ideation and attempted suicide in the last 12 months was calculated for each expanding number of psychosocial health problems. Lastly, associations between individual psychosocial health problems and the count of those problems associ- ated with suicide ideation or having attempted suicide were explored in logistic regression. All multivariable models were adjusted for demographic variables including sexual orientation, as some researchers have found differences in suicide related ideation and behavior between gay and bisexual men [25]. Ninety-five percent confidence intervals (CIs) were calculated for all odds ratios; 95 % CIs which excluded 1 (p < 0.05) were considered statistically significant, though in interpreting results, emphasis is placed on the magnitude of effect. All analyses were performed using SPSS 20.0. Results 8382 Canadian men participated in Sex Now 2011 and all were included in the analysis. The demographic character- istics of the sample are described in Table 1. Among par- ticipants, 49.9 % (n = 4,180) reported lifetime experience of suicide ideation, while 12.5 % (n = 1,050) reported having attempted suicide in their lifetime. When asked Fig. 1 Conceptual Framework of Suicide Risk within Syndemic Production Ferlatte et al. BMC Public Health (2015) 15:597 Page 3 of 9 about these experiences in the last 12 months, 17.0 % (n = 1,427) reported experiencing suicide ideation, while 1.7 % (n = 145) reported a suicide attempt. 63.13 % (n = 901) of those who reported suicide ideation in the last year reported similar experiences over a year ago, while 71.7 % (104) of those who attempted suicide in the last 12 months also reported a previous attempt over a year ago. Table 2 shows the bivariate relationships between anti- gay marginalization indicators and suicide ideation or having attempted suicide in the last 12 months. All indi- cators were positively associated and statistically signifi- cant (p < 0.05) when adjusted for demographics (OR range from 1.30 to 3.94). The effects of all variables diminished in the multi-indicator model (i.e. with adjust- ment for all indicators of marginalization), though most remained statistically significant with odds ratios in the range of 1.30 to 2.81, among those which remained sta- tistically significant. When adjusted for the other forms of marginalization, the associations between sexual vio- lence and suicide ideation and bullying and suicide at- tempts were no longer statistically significant, and the association between verbal violence and suicide attempts was removed. The cumulative effects of marginalization, suicide ideation and having attempted suicide in the prior 12 months are presented in Fig. 2. For each add- itional form of marginalization reported, there was an increased risk of both ideation and attempted suicide (Chi-square test for trend p < .001). People who reported three or more forms of anti-gay marginalization had twice the rate of suicide ideation compared to those with no marginalization (27.3 % vs 12.6 %), and over 4 times the rate of attempted suicide (3.9 % vs 0.9 %). Table 3 shows that all psychosocial health problems were positively associated and statistically significant (p < .005) with the marginalization indicators at the exception of STIs with sexual violence. The correlations between psychosocial health problems are presented in Table 4; all were correlated with the exception of smok- ing and STI (which did not achieve statistical signifi- cance at p < 0.05). 76.6 % (n = 111) of the 145 men who attempted suicide in the last 12 months reported at least one other health problem while 38 % (n = 55) reported 3 or more psychosocial health problems. Similarly, 66.4 % Table 1 Characteristics of study participants (N = 8382) Characteristics No. (%) Sexual orientation Gay 5406 (64.5) Bisexual 2720 (32.5) Straight 175 (2.1) Other 81 (1.0) Relationship status Single 3675 (43.8) Partnered with a man 2215 (26.4) Partnered with a woman 1798 (21.4) Divorced/Separated/Other 694 (8.3) Age Under 30 1866 (22.43) 30–45 years old 2518 (30.0) Over 45 3998 (47.7) Ethnicity Caucasian 7310 (87.2) Asian 212 (2.5) South Asian 74 (0.9) African/Caribbean 76 (0.9) Latino/Hispanic 112 (1.3) Aboriginal (First Nation/Inuit/Metis) 168 (2.0) Middle Eastern 53 (0.6) Mixed 229 (2.7) Other 136 (1.6) Income (annual, CAD) <10,000 739 (8.8) 10,000–29,9999 1653 (19.7) 30,000–49,9999 1847 (22.0) 50,000–69,0000 1698 (20.2) >70,0000 2444 (29.2) Highest level of Education Completed Some high School 348 (4.2) High School 1131 (13.5) Some College or University 2116 (25.2) College 1607 (19.2) University 3180 (37.9) Province/Territories British Columbia 1804 (21.5) Alberta 1064 (12.7) Saskatchewan 289 (3.4) Manitoba 342 (4.1) Ontario 3366 (40.2) Quebec 1048 (12.5) New-Brunswick 105 (1.3) Table 1 Characteristics of study participants (N = 8382) (Continued) Nova Scotia 223 (2.7) Prince Edward Island 33 (0.4) Newfoundland and Labrador 85 (1.0) Yukon 8 (0.1) Norwest Territories 11 (0.1) Nunavut 4 (0.0) Ferlatte et al. BMC Public Health (2015) 15:597 Page 4 of 9 (n = 948) of the men who reported suicide ideation re- ported at least one co-occurring issue in the prior 12 months, while 15.1 % (n = 216) reported three or more. The associations between psychosocial health prob- lems and suicide ideation and attempts are presented in Table 5. While all associations but one were statistically significant in single indicator models, when entered into a multiple indicator model only some associations remained significant. For suicide ideation, depression [AOR 5.37 95 % CI 4.44 -6.49], anxiety [AOR 1.56 (1.27–1.92)], and sexual risk (CAI-US) [AOR 1.36 (95 % CI 1.18–1.57)] remained significant while for attempted suicide only depression [AOR 4.73 (95 % CI 2.84–7.88)] and anxiety [AOR 2.79 (95 % CI 1.67–4.65)] were significant. Models in Table 6 demonstrate the additive relation- ship between psychosocial health problems and suicide related ideation and suicide attempts. Compared to those reporting no problems, those reporting one [AOR 1.69 (95 % CI 1.44–1.97)], two, [AOR 3.36 (1.44–1.97)] and three or more issues [AOR 6.90 (95 % CI 6.90–5.47– 8.70)] were at increased odds of reporting suicide ideation. Similarly, those experiencing one [AOR 1.25 (0.70–2.23)], two [AOR 3.67 (95 % CI 2.15–6.28)] and three or more issues [AOR 16.29 (95 % CI 9.82–27.02)] were at increased odds of attempted suicide. The same trends were found, though the magnitude of ORs decreased and their confi- dence intervals overlapped, when we removed the two psychosocial health problems (depression and anxiety) which had the strongest individual effect on attempted Table 2 Correlation between anti-gay marginalization and suicide related ideation and attempts (N = 8382) % reporting suicide ideation or attempts No. (%) reporting marginalization indicator Among those with indicator Among those without indicator Single indicator models AOR (95 % CI)a Multi-indicator model AOR (95 % CI)b Suicide ideation in the last 12 months Verbal Violence 3920 (46.8 %) 21.6 % 13.0 % 1.77 (1.55–2.01) 1.30 (1.11–1.51) Physical Violence 1044 (12.5 %) 27.0 % 15.6 % 1.90 (1.62–2.21) 1.36 (1.14–1.61) Bullying 3495 (41.7 %) 22.1 % 13.4 % 1.73 (1.53–2.00) 1.30 (1.12–1.50) Sexual Violence 985 (11.8 %) 20.1 % 16.6 % 1.30 (1.10–155) 1.13 (0.95–1.35) Work Discrimination 1353 (16.1 %) 25.3 % 15.4 % 1.91 (1.65–2.20) 1.47 (1.26–1.71) Attempted suicide in the last 12 months Verbal Violence 3920 (46.8 %) 2.3 % 1.2 % 1.95 (1.35–2.83) 0.95 (0.60–1.53) Physical Violence 1044 (12.5 %) 5.3 % 1.3 % 3.94 (2.76–5.61) 2.81 (1.84–4.31) Bullying 3495 (41.7 %) 2.5 % 1.2 % 2.06 (1.44–3.00) 1.24 (0.80–1.92) Sexual Violence 985 (11.8 %) 4.1 % 1.4 % 2.92 (2.01–4.26) 2.20 (1.48–3.25) Work Discrimination 1353 (16.1 %) 3.5 % 1.4 % 2.71 (1.88–3.90) 1.63 (1.08–2.45) aAdjusted for age, ethnicity, income, education, sexual orientation, living environment and province of residences bAdjusted for the demographic variable above and all other marginalization indicators Fig. 2 Prevalence of suicide related ideation or attempts by number of anti-gay marginalization indicators Ferlatte et al. BMC Public Health (2015) 15:597 Page 5 of 9 suicide (data not shown). The AOR for continuous count of psychosocial health problems was 1.88 (95 % CI 1.76–2.00) for suicide ideation and 2.63 (95 % 2.20–3.14) for attempted suicide. Discussion Our results add further evidence to the existing literature that shows that gay and bisexual are at increased risk of suicide related ideation and behavior as compared with heterosexual men. Lifetime experience of suicide related ideation and behavior was reported by 49.9 % of our sam- ple; this is over 6 times what has been reported among Canadian heterosexual men (7.4 %) [26]. More so, findings of this investigation strongly suggest that experiences of anti-gay violence and marginalization increase suicide ideation and suicide attempts among Canadian gay and bisexual men. Moreover, health problems in our sample were associated with each other and with suicide behavior. This study therefore adds to the growing body of literature showing that health disparities occur in clusters among gay and bisexual men. These results, like those of Mustanski [9], support the notion that syndemic theory has the potential to advance research, theory, and inter- ventions related to suicide in this population. There are some limitations that need consideration when interpreting these results. First of all, since the study relies on an Internet convenience sample it is difficult to know how representative it is of the Canadian gay and bisexual men’s population. Moreover, because the survey was cross- sectional and reliant on self-reported retrospective data, conclusions cannot be drawn about the causality of out- comes, including the relation between marginalization and negative health outcomes. Because these outcomes (both psycho-social mediators and suicide-related out- comes) were measured as currently prevalent (within last 12-months), we may have underestimated the true burden of these issues resulting from early-life marginalization experiences (e.g., if some respondents experienced depres- sion or suicide ideation/attempts after encountering anti- gay bullying/harassment during adolescence but then adapted and recovered from these mental health condi- tions). This misclassification of psychosocial and suicide- related outcomes would result in under-estimation of the associations we present. More so, we modeled our analysis according to Stall’s theory of syndemic production [13] but were unable to account for all the factors that may produce or mitigate negative health outcomes such as internalized stigma and protective factors such a social support. We also combined gay and bisexual men in our analysis; how- ever, experiences of oppressions and syndemics may differ between these groups and should be investigated in future studies. Finally, the cross-sectional survey involved people Table 3 Correlation between marginalization and psychosocial and health issues Unadjusted Odds Ratio (95 % Confidence Interval) N (%) Verbal Violence Physical Violence Bullying Sexual Violence Work Discrimination Smoking 2061 (24.6) 1.20 (1.09–1.33) 1.52 (1.32–1.75) 1.19 (1.08–1.31) 1.68 (1.46–1.94) 1.24 (1.09–1.41) Party Drugs 1279 (15.3) 2.24 (1.98–2.54) 2.28 (1.96–2.66) 2.00 (1.77–2.56) 1.61 (1.37–1.91) 1.50 (1.29–1.74) Depression 945 (11.3) 1.88 (1.65–2.14) 1.97 (1.67–2.32) 1.83 (1.61–2.09) 1.41 (1.18–1.69) 1.90 (1.63–2.21) Anxiety 1081 (12.9) 2.05 (1.78–2.36) 2.26 (1.91–2.68) 2.09 (1.82–2.40) 1.48 (1.22–1.79) 2.13 (1.82–2.50) STIs 661 (7.9) 1.41 (1.20–1.65) 1.80 (1.47–2.21) 1.40 (1.20–1.65) 1.17 (0.92–1.48) 1.59 (1.31–1.93) CAI–US 2515 (30.0) 1.47 (1.34–1.62) 1.65 (1.44–1.88) 1.43 (1.31–1.58) 1.57 (1.37–1.80) 1.59 (1.41–1.80) HIV Positive 667 (8.0) 2.56 (2.16–3.02) 2.58 (2.14–3.12) 2.04 (1.73–2.39) 1.94 (1.58–2.38) 2.71 (2.27–3.22) Table 4 Correlation between psychosocial and health issues Unadjusted Odds Ratio (95 % Confidence Interval) N (%) Party Drugs Depression Anxiety STIs CAI-US HIV Positive Smoking 2061 (24.6) 2.47 (2.18–2.80) 1.39 (1.21–1.60) 1.51 (1.30–1.75) 1.08 (0.90–1.29) 1.14 (1.03–1.27) 1.26 (1.06–1.51) Party Drugs 1279 (15.3) 1.38 (1.17–1.62) 1.58 (1.33–1.87) 2.87 (2.41–3.43) 2.75 (2.43–3.11) 3.45 (2.91–4.10) Depression 945 (11.3) 29.28 (24.84–54 .50) 1.76 (1.44–2.16) 1.35 (1.18–1.54) 2.49 (2.06–3.00) Anxiety 1081 (12.9) 1.88 (1.52–2.31) 1.18 (1.02–1.36) 1.92 (1.56–236) STIs 661 (7.9) 2.58 (2.20–3.03) 3.96 (3.23–4.86) CAI-US 2515 (30.0) 3.48 (2.96–4.09) HIV Positive 667 (8.0) Ferlatte et al. BMC Public Health (2015) 15:597 Page 6 of 9 who had attempted suicide and survived. They may have somewhat different characteristics than those whose sui- cide attempt was fatal. This paper adds to the plea of other syndemic re- searchers, as well as that of community activists, to address gay and bisexual men’s health holistically and to create bet- ter living conditions for sexual minorities. Since many of the health disparities experienced by gay and bisexual men (such as HIV, depression, anxiety, polydrug use, suicide) happen synergistically, it is unlikely that any of these conditions would improve without attending to the others. This is concerning in the current context where HIV and STIs are generally the health issues of gay and bisexual men that receive the most public health atten- tion, while other issues, particularly those related to mental wellbeing, are largely ignored. Suicide preven- tion is notably absent from gay and bisexual public health and community programming. In exploring the particular psychosocial health problems that constitute this syndemic, we found that each was as- sociated with suicide related ideation and behavior, but the largest effect was found in evaluating the cumulative number of problems—as predicted by syndemic theory. It is striking that men who experienced three or more psy- chosocial health problems had approximately seven times the odds of suicide ideation and sixteen times the odds of attempted suicide, compared to those with no problems. When all health problems were included in a single model (multi-indicator), the association with suicide ideation and attempts was removed for most but remained strongest for depression. This should not be surprising, considering that mood disorders are known to convey the highest risk for suicide related ideation and behavior in general popu- lations [27]. This study helps identify some of the potential root causes of suicide related ideation and behavior among gay and bisexual men. The five marginalization indicators Table 5 Association between psychosocial and health issues and suicide related ideation and attempts % with psychosocial or health issue No. (%) reporting health Issues Among those reporting suicide behavior Among those not reporting suicide behavior Single indicator models AOR (95 % CI)a Multi-indicator model AOR (95 % CI)b Suicide ideation in the last 12 months Smoking 2061 (24.6 %) 28.5 % 23.8 % 1.20 (1.04–1.38) 1.06 (0.91–1.24) Party Drugs 1279 (15.3 %) 20.7 % 14.1 % 1.38 (1.17–1.62) 1.19 (0.99–1.43) Depression 1081 (12.9 %) 36.6 % 8.0 % 6.87 (5.88–8.02) 5.37 (4.44–6.49) Anxiety 945 (11.3 %) 27.8 % 7.9 % 4.22 (3.39–4.96) 1.56 (1.27–1.92) STIs 661 (7.9 %) 10.6 % 7.3 % 1.42 (1.15–1.75) 1.11 (0.88–1.40) CAI-US 2515 (30 %) 37.6 % 28.4 % 1.45 (1.27–1.65) 1.36 (1.18–1.57) HIV Positive 667 (8.0 %) 7.5 % 10.2 % 1.37 (1.10–1.70) 0.94 (0.74–1.20) Attempted Suicide in the last 12 months Smoking 2061 (24.6 %) 37.2 % 24.4 % 1.62 (1.10–2.38) 1.27 (0.84–1.92) Party Drugs 1279 (15.3 %) 29 % 15 % 1.95 (1.29–2.94) 1.51 (0.94–2.41) Depression 1081 (12.9 %) 55.9 % 12.1 % 9.13 (6.22–13.39) 4.73 (2.84–7.88) Anxiety 945 (11.3 %) 49.7 % 10.6 % 8.05 (5.50–11.79) 2.79 (1.67–4.65) STIs 661 (7.9 %) 16.6 % 7.7 % 2.21 (1.34–3.65) 1.68 (0.96–2.92) CA-US 2515 (30 %) 40.0 % 29.8 % 1.51 (1.04–2.19) 1.27 (0.85–1.91) HIV Positive 667 (8.0 %) 7.9 % 9.7 % 0.97 (0.51–1.87) 0.57 (0.28–1.16) aAdjusted for age, ethnicity, income, education, sexual orientation, partnership status, living environment and province of residence bAdjusted for the demographic variable above and all other health issues Table 6 Association between the cumulative number of psychosocial issues and suicide related ideation and behavior Number Percent AOR (95 % CI)a Suicide ideation in the last 12 monthsb No issue 4465 53.3 Reference One 2372 28.3 1.69 (1.44–1.97) Two 1098 13.1 3.36 (2.82–4.01) Three or More 447 5.3 6.90 (5.47–8.70) Attempted suicide in the last 12 monthsb No issue 4465 53.3 Reference One 2372 28.3 1.25 (0.70–2.23) Two 1098 13.1 3.67 (2.15–6.28) Three or More 447 5.3 16.29 (9.82–27.02) a Model adjusted for age, ethnicity, income, education, sexual orientation, partnership status, living environment and province of residence b Cumulative effect of depression, anxiety, smoking, party drugs, and STIs Ferlatte et al. BMC Public Health (2015) 15:597 Page 7 of 9 investigated were positively associated with suicide idea- tion and behavior in our sample, and the majority of gay and bisexual men (56.1 %) experienced at least one form of marginalization or anti-gay violence in their lifetime. A previous edition of the Sex Now survey (2010) showed that prevalence of physical violence, sexual assault and workplace discrimination was similar across all age co- horts, but the younger cohort experienced higher levels of sexist harassment than any previous generation [24]. Some of the marginalization indicators this study exam- ined (i.e., physical violence, harassment) were also found associated with suicide related ideation and behavior in previous studies [9]. Workplace discrimination was, how- ever, a novel contribution of this study. Together these findings suggest that, despite the re- cent legal gains such as the availability of gay marriage, adoption and protection from discrimination under the constitution, a substantial number of gay and bisexual men still face homophobia. This is consistent with other data sources such as Statistics Canada research which shows that while hate crimes appear to be on the decline in Canada in general, it is not the case for hate crimes committed against sexual minorities [28]. In addition, hate crimes committed against sexual minorities are more likely to be violent and to result in injuries. Another study of Canadian youth found that 20.4 % s of sexual minority men were verbally harassed weekly because of their sexuality, while 17 % reported being physical assaulted at school [29]. These trends are concerning as those who experienced physical violence had nearly 3 times the odds of attempted suicide in the survey. Efforts to prevent physical assault against gay and bisex- ual men, as well as other forms of violence and discrimin- ation, are therefore urgently needed to ameliorate the social and health condition of this population, including re- ducing the incidence of suicide attempts. However, policies and interventions can be made to increase the safety of sexual minorities. For example a school-based survey in the Canadian province of British Columbia demonstrated that gay and bisexual students attending schools with anti- homophobia policies and gay-straight alliances (GSAs) had lower odds of discrimination, as well as lower odds of sui- cide ideation and attempts [30]. Conclusions This study’s findings suggest that syndemics, that in- clude suicide related ideation and attempts, are occur- ring among Canadian gay and bisexual men. This study also showed that psychosocial health problems have an additive effect on suicide, increasing the odds of suicide ideation and suicide attempts. Those who reported 3 or more psychosocial health problems had 6.9 times the odds of suicide ideation and 16.29 times the odds of a suicide attempt compared to those with no problems and these effects are driven in particular by experiences of depression and anxiety. These results highlight the import- ance of addressing gay and bisexual men’s health problems in a holistic manner rather than addressing each in isola- tion. Since all marginalization indicators increased the odds of suicide ideation and attempts, interventions to reduce social exclusion and violence are urgently needed. These results concur with those of Mustanksi and col- leagues which demonstrated that syndemic is a useful the- ory to advance understanding of suicide among gay and bisexual men. While both studies illuminate some of the pathways and social factors that produce suicide related ideation and behavior in this population, such influences have generally been inadequately attended to in research and remain poorly understood. Therefore suicide re- searchers ought to pay more attention to the pathways of suicide ideation and behavior, as they may be critical to the development of effective prevention interventions. Since the majority of gay and bisexual men experienced violence in our survey but only a small minority reported syndemics, suicide ideation and suicide attempts, an array of protective factors may exist. Identifying those would also be key to prevention and health promotion efforts. Furthermore, as the population of gay and bisexual men is diverse along axes of class, geography, education attain- ment, and ethnicity, researchers should also look at how suicide is experienced and distributed among differently positioned gay and bisexual men. Competing interests The authors declare they have no competing interests. Authors’ contributions OF and JD conceived the research question, performed the analysis and co-authored the first draft of the manuscript. TSH provided support for the statistical analysis and helped developed the manuscript. TT and RM designed and coordinated the Sex Now survey and revised the manuscript. All authors read and approved the final manuscript. Authors’ information OF is a PhD candidate in the Faculty of Health Sciences at Simon Fraser University and Research Education Director at the Community-Based Research Centre for Gay Men’s Health (CBRC). JD is a research assistant at the CBRC. TSH is a doctoral student at the Dalla Lana School of Public Health at the University of Toronto and a board member of the CBRC. TT is research director at CBRC. RM is managing director at CBRC. All the authors are members of the gay community. Acknowledgements The authors thanked the young Investgaytors who helped with the recruitment for this study: Keith Reynolds, Darren Ho, Alex Chen and Daniel Wexel. This study was made possible through a grant from the Vancouver Foundation. Author details 1Faculty of Health Sciences, Simon Fraser University, Blusson Hall Room 11300, 8888 University Drive, Burnaby, BC V5A 1S6, Canada. 2Community-Based Research Centre for Gay Men’s Health, Vancouver, Canada. 3Dalla Lana School of Public Health, University of Toronto, Toronto, Canada. Received: 17 March 2015 Accepted: 22 June 2015 Ferlatte et al. BMC Public Health (2015) 15:597 Page 8 of 9 References 1. King M, Semlyen J, Tai S, Killaspy H, Osborn D, Popelyuk D, et al. A systematic review of mental disorder, suicide, and deliberate self harm in lesbian, gay and bisexual people. BMC Psychiatry. 2008;8(1):70. 2. Haas AP, Eliason M, Mays VM, Mathy RM, Cochran SD, D’Augelli AR, et al. 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Submit your next manuscript to BioMed Central and take full advantage of: • Convenient online submission • Thorough peer review • No space constraints or color figure charges • Immediate publication on acceptance • Inclusion in PubMed, CAS, Scopus and Google Scholar • Research which is freely available for redistribution Submit your manuscript at www.biomedcentral.com/submit Ferlatte et al. BMC Public Health (2015) 15:597 Page 9 of 9 http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/85-002-x/2013001/article/11822-eng.htm http://egale.ca/wpcontent/uploads/Egale%20Publications/Every%20Class%20In%20Every%20School.pdf http://egale.ca/wpcontent/uploads/Egale%20Publications/Every%20Class%20In%20Every%20School.pdf http://egale.ca/wpcontent/uploads/Egale%20Publications/Every%20Class%20In%20Every%20School.pdf Abstract Background Methods Results Conclusions Background Methods Measures Demographic factors Suicide related ideation and behavior Marginalization indicators Psychosocial health problems Analytic plan Results Discussion Conclusions Competing interests Authors’ contributions Authors’ information Acknowledgements Author details References 
work_5rqqu6wnkrb4tdnghp5vgjckla	----	For Peer R eview 'I felt that I deserved it'- Experiences and Implications of Disability Hate crime. Journal: Tizard Learning Disability Review Manuscript ID TLDR-03-2015-0010.R2 Manuscript Type: Research Feature Keywords: Harassment, Hate crime, Learning disabilities, Autism, Community living, Police Tizard Learning Disability Review For Peer R eview 1 ‘I felt that I deserved it’-Experiences and implications of Disability Hate crime Introduction: With the move from institutionalisation to supporting people with learning disabilities and autism to live in the community, personal safety has become a concern and individuals have been speaking out about how they have been badly treated by strangers, neighbours and others they regard as friends (Gravell, 2012; Landman, 2014). This bad treatment can, over time, escalate into more serious victimisation that sometimes leads to tragedies - the deaths of Fiona Pilkington and daughter Francesca Hardwick are one case in point (IPCC, 2011). Such victimisation has been highlighted by a number of sources, including the Equality and Human Rights Commission (Sin et al., 2009), official enquiries and campaigns like ‘Stand by me’ from Mencap in 2011. Where disabled people are targeted because of a perpetrator’s prejudice towards their disability, this ‘discriminatory, oppressive or abusive behaviour’ may be referred to as ‘disablism’ (Quarmby, 2008, p9). ‘Disability hate crimes’ are one manifestation of disablism, and were introduced into the Criminal Justice Act (CJA) in 2003, becoming law in 2005. Section 146 of the CJA creates a sentencing provision that puts a duty on courts to increase the sentence of any offence where there is evidence of hostility towards the victim because Page 1 of 22 Tizard Learning Disability Review 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 For Peer R eview 2 of disability. As such, a ‘disability hate crime’ is not a separate offence in law and the police also refer to and record some cases as ‘hate incidents’ (usually where there is not an identifiable criminal offence). Disability is one of five centrally monitored strands of hate crime, the others being race, religion/faith, sexual orientation and gender identity. The definition used by the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS, 2010, p2) of a disability hate crime is: “any criminal offence, which is perceived, by the victim or any other person, to be motivated by hostility or prejudice based on a person’s disability or perceived disability.” This paper deals not only with those incidents that are ultimately recorded (or would be if reported to the police) as hate crimes but with a wider range of incidents; as such the more general term ‘victimisation’ will also be used to refer to where people have been the target of negative behaviour and treatment, such as bullying and harassment. These are terms commonly used by people with learning disabilities and autism and which have been utilised in previous research (Mencap, 2000). High rates of victimisation amongst people with learning disabilities have been highlighted in both charity and academic research (Mencap, 2000; Gravell, 2012; Emerson and Hatton, 2008; Chakraborti et al., 2014). In a recent report, Page 2 of 22Tizard Learning Disability Review 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 For Peer R eview 3 the National Autistic Society (NAS, 2014) highlighted how people with autism were affected by similar issues. Official data shows that approximately 1% of all crimes in England and Wales are hate crimes. In 2013/14 the police recorded 44,480 hate crimes of which 1,985 were disability hate crimes. This represents a rise in all types of hate crime since 2012/13 and, for disability, represents a broader range of offences (Creese and Lader, 2014). It is not clear if this represents an increase in incidents as well as an increase in the reporting of incidents. As yet, official data does not record separately the number of disability hate crimes where people with learning disability or autism are victims. Where victimisation is reported there has been a ‘culture of disbelief’ and ‘systemic institutional failures’ that prevent such incidents from being dealt with effectively (EHRC, 2011, p8 and p112). In 2013 the Criminal Justice Joint Inspection report (HMCPSI, HMIC and HMI, 2013) found the practice of the Police and Crown Prosecution Service to be lacking in relation to obtaining the evidence which would be required in order to regard a defendant’s behaviour as an aggravating feature (e.g., providing evidence of hostility relating to disability). The recent follow up inspection reported no substantial improvements (HMCPSI, HMIC and HMI, 2015). Researching victimisation of people with learning disabilities and autism in Kent Page 3 of 22 Tizard Learning Disability Review 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 For Peer R eview 4 A collaboration was formed in 2010 in Kent, between the Tizard Centre, Kent Police and mcch (a registered charity providing a range of care and support services in London and the South East). mcch also incorporates Autism London, a charity focussed particularly on people with autism and Asperger syndrome. With Big Lottery Funding, the three year research project explored the victimisation experiences of adults with learning disabilities and autism. We were interested in any victimisation that was thought to be a response to someone’s disability, whether and how incidents were reported, and the impact they had on the individuals’ lives. The project also involved the police in Kent and considered their understanding of learning disabilities, autism, hate crime definitions and their perceived ability to identify and respond to cases of hate crime where people with learning disabilities or autism were victims. This paper draws together some of the key findings from across different elements of the project – further detailed findings are available in the main report (Beadle- Brown et al., 2014) and will be the subject of other papers. Methodology The project methods and sample have been described in detail elsewhere (Beadle-Brown et al., 2014). The project included a postal survey of 255 people with learning disability and/or autism predominantly living in the Medway towns and surrounding areas of Kent. The 2011 Census showed the population of Kent and Medway to be 1,727,800 people. Medway is a Page 4 of 22Tizard Learning Disability Review 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 For Peer R eview 5 conurbation and, in 1998, became a unitary authority. Over half of its geographical area comprises small parishes and rural areas, such as the North Kent Marshes. Medway is home to three Universities and forms part of the Thames Gateway. Responses to the survey included carer responses for those with more severe or profound learning disabilities (n=35). The design of the survey was based on a previous thematic analysis of 7 focus groups involving people with learning disability and/or autism (n=31) and 4 groups with carers (n=33). The survey was distributed through local support organisations, adverts in newspapers, community centres and sent out by housing associations and the local authority. Twenty four survey participants consented to a follow up, semi- structured interview. Secondly, an electronic survey focused on the knowledge and experiences of 459 police staff. The survey was designed following a thematic analysis of 4 focus groups with over 40 staff from Kent Police and Medway’s Community Safety Partnership. The invitation to participate was sent by Kent Police through its internal e-mail system. Results Experiences of people with learning disabilities and autism Page 5 of 22 Tizard Learning Disability Review 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 For Peer R eview 6 How many people are affected? Considering our whole sample of survey responses, just under half (46%) of participants in our sample said they had been victimised and many also alluded to historical bullying or abuse. When surveys from only people in Medway were considered, 36% reported examples of victimisation of some description. All individuals sent the survey were asked to complete and return at least part one of the survey, which collected data on individual characteristics, support and asked whether they had experienced victimisation or not. The sample of individuals with learning disabilities from Medway, who returned the survey, was broadly representative of national surveys of people with learning disabilities (Emerson and Hatton, 2008), in terms of gender, ethnicity, and the proportion with severe and profound disability. Furthermore, the proportion of people reporting having experienced some form of victimisation was similar (32% in the National Survey compared to 36% from our Medway sample). The pattern of experiences in terms of more able people experiencing more serious incidents was also similar. Using Medway’s Joint Strategic Needs Assessment, it was estimated that, given the proportion of people with learning disabilities that the survey identified as experiencing victimisation, it was likely there would be somewhere between 243 and 1780 people with learning disabilities experiencing victimisation in Medway. The former (lower) figure refers to the number of people with learning disabilities receiving social care or similar services while Page 6 of 22Tizard Learning Disability Review 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 For Peer R eview 7 the latter (higher) figure includes the many people with mild learning disabilities who either do not seek support or are not regarded as eligible for support. Due to the low return rate of surveys from people with autism who did not have a learning disability, it was not possible to calculate the prevalence for this specific group. Nature of experiences Incidents ranged from intimidating stares and name calling to physical and sexual assault. Multiple incidents were common, sometimes occurring over a long period of time, whereas others were one off incidents. Frequently, teenagers (61%) were the instigators, but younger children and adults were also implicated. Half of the respondents said the perpetrator was somehow known to them, with 48% being ‘so-called’ friends. Those who were younger, reported themselves to have mental health problems, or had less support appeared most at risk and were also more likely to experience a broader range and more serious forms of victimisation. The presence of carers supporting people in their community did not mean people were immune to victimisation, but they were more likely to experience low level name calling or intimidating stares. Reported police responses to incidents were mixed; some victims and carers said the police were unsympathetic, ineffective and even unkind, while others said the police were understanding, tried to help or resolved the Page 7 of 22 Tizard Learning Disability Review 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 For Peer R eview 8 problems. Of particular help was when people perceived that the officer had an understanding or experience of their condition. Common reasons for not reporting incidents included not knowing it was a police matter, fear of reprisal or not being believed and previous poor experiences of reporting. The impact of victimisation was expressed most clearly in the interviews and for some people was extensive and ongoing. The onus seemed to be on people with learning disability or autism to change their behaviour, often involving avoiding people, places and times associated with the occurrence of victimisation. This could then impact on other areas of their lives such as reduced access to work, college or day centres or an impact on their ability to maintain friendships. That people felt they ‘deserved it’ was also a common theme. Participants’ acceptance that these events were part of their lives and, to some extent, ‘to be expected’ may have made it difficult to discover whether or not they saw the events as being motivated by a prejudice based on their disability. Carers’ views and experiences Carers saw disability hate crime as not just a policing matter, but a social issue, highlighting that we live within a bullying culture where the media plays a part in how individuals with disabilities are viewed; the damaging discourse of people with disabilities as ‘scroungers’ was one example they gave. It was also their feeling that an absence of community cohesion led to incidents becoming Page 8 of 22Tizard Learning Disability Review 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 For Peer R eview 9 ‘accepted’ both by individuals and by the wider society; where acceptance and valuing of ‘difference’ is absent and bystander apathy is rife. Carers suggested the people they supported could be particularly ‘vulnerable’ due to the way they may look or behave, but also due to unsuitable housing, such as clustered housing within a block of flats. Family carers were sometimes victims by proxy (e.g., neighbours throwing bricks into their garden). They also reported indirect impact, as a result of having to support the individual after incidents. Families also made significant changes to their lives, and stress and ill health were common, including depression and anxiety. Paid carers spoke of having to be extra vigilant, of being anxious when individuals (rightly) went out unsupported and of not really knowing enough about what constitutes a hate crime and how best to respond. Police experience of learning disability, autism and responding to hate incidents and crime The majority (94%) of police survey respondents had some experience of people with learning disabilities or autism either personally or professionally. The majority also reported not having relevant training and this was evident in some areas of their understanding. Of concern were gaps in knowledge Page 9 of 22 Tizard Learning Disability Review 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 For Peer R eview 10 important to achieving best evidence, such as how an individual’s disability or associated conditions could impact on responses when questioned. Police personnel expressed mixed views about hate crime legislation, saying that the CPS definition was helpful but had some grey areas. This included the definition relying on a perception of hostility towards the victim, that a motivation of hostility could be difficult to identify for both victim and police and that gathering evidence of hostility was complex. Both training and direct experience influenced self-perceived police confidence and competence at effectively managing disability hate crimes, including detecting whether a person had a learning disability or autism, working out if an incident was motivated by hostility, responding effectively to incidents, being able to communicate effectively, meeting the communication needs of the victims and acquiring sufficiently detailed evidence to investigate and charge individuals. A case study example The following case study of Ben illustrates several of the research findings and will later be discussed in relation to the implications of the research. Ben is not the individual’s real name, although his consent has been obtained to share this example as a published case study. Ben has Asperger’s Syndrome and lives alone. For many years he had support from a social care provider contracted by the local authority. He Page 10 of 22Tizard Learning Disability Review 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 For Peer R eview 11 maintains contact with his family. He had been bullied in secondary school and was harassed and assaulted occasionally after he left school, by youths who targeted him in the streets. His first move to his own accommodation was not successful. He experienced difficulties with neighbours he described as unreasonably noisy and involved in drug taking and trafficking, with streams of visitors coming in and out the building, by day and night. He complained to the Local Authority. On several occasions when Ben was out and about in the street, he was verbally abused by people he recognised as being among those who had visited his neighbours. His support worker reported the problems to the police who told him that the neighbours were known to them as problematic drug users. He was very unhappy living there. Some months later Ben was supported in moving to a new tenancy. Difficulties began one day when youths living nearby shouted at him using terms such as ‘paedophile’ and ‘gay’. They were objecting to him looking out of his window overlooking an area where children played. Objects were thrown at his window. Sometimes the verbal abuse and harassment continued when he left the flat. The youths would follow him and call out ‘There’s that weirdo guy, he’s gay’ and ‘There’s that gay man who looks out the window’. When the harassment and verbal abuse continued, even though he avoided looking out of his window, he felt that it had become a campaign about his living there. Page 11 of 22 Tizard Learning Disability Review 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 For Peer R eview 12 Ben discussed the harassment with his support worker and decided to report it to the police who visited him at his support provider’s offices and later at home. He showed the police his Autism Alert card. The police response was coordinated by a specialist officer working in a hate crime team. He was able to have conversations with PCSOs (Police Community Support Officers) who made visible patrols around the area. Another police officer was especially helpful, telling him that he understood his difficulties as he had a son with Asperger syndrome. He gave Ben his business card telling him he should call whenever there was an incident as it was hate crime he was experiencing. Sometimes, with later incidents, the police came the next day and other times straight away. The harassment ended and he believes that came about following multi-agency working resulting in some perpetrators moving away from his road. Throughout this period of time he found the day-to-day contact with his support worker vital in helping him manage his contact with the Police, his tenancy and relations with neighbours. Following a local authority assessment of Ben’s support needs, funding for his support was stopped. Shortly afterwards he was befriended by somebody who visited his home. Ben agreed to lend money to the person, who on occasion accompanied him to the cash point. Ben later discovered that his cash card had been taken and money removed from his account. He reported the theft to the Page 12 of 22Tizard Learning Disability Review 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 For Peer R eview 13 police but decided not to press charges as he felt he would find the process too stressful. Discussion Ben, like many others, mentioned being bullied on an ongoing basis. This history of victimisation appeared, for some people, to lead to feelings that victimisation is just what happens for a person with learning disabilities or autism. Such resignation and acceptance is likely to present an obstacle to reporting (which the police identified as an issue). Victims need to be empowered and helped to understand that what happened to them is wrong and that they need not and should not put up with victimisation. Schools and colleges all have a role here in challenging such assumptions and reinforcing this through effective policies for responding to bullying or hate related incidents and to offer support for reporting these. Many advocacy organisations are already doing good work in this area. The fact that many people (including Ben) reported children and teenagers as those who were carrying out the victimisation highlights a need to work closely with this group to prevent them from becoming perpetrators of hate crimes. Direct contact with marginalised groups has been shown to be one Page 13 of 22 Tizard Learning Disability Review 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 For Peer R eview 14 of the most effective approaches to attitude change (Scior and Werner, 2015) and, within Kent, the follow-on ‘Jigsaw project’ led by mcch has been taking this and other research findings forward. Other schemes like Dementia Friends (which offers information sessions about dementia, helping to create communities in which people living with dementia feel more understood and included) might provide a model for similar schemes that could be set up by learning disability and autism organisations to reach individuals beyond school age. The nature of what happened to Ben and others highlights the importance of reporting what may appear on the surface to be minor incidents or low level anti-social behaviour. Ben’s case shows how a number of events put together could be seen by the police as a ‘course of conduct’, something that may allow them to work preventatively or to respond to the perpetrators. Within current definitions there is a need for someone (the person, a witness or the police) to detect that what is happening may be based on hostility related to an individual’s disability. In Ben’s case his disability was not visibly obvious, which, combined with the ‘gay’ and ‘paedophile’ name calling, may have muddied the waters when looking to detect hostility related to disability. The lack of a clear, common definition of disability hate crime and use of the term “hate” (which requires assumptions or perceptions about the feelings or motives of perpetrators), are difficult for many people with learning disabilities Page 14 of 22Tizard Learning Disability Review 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 For Peer R eview 15 or autism. Many of the individuals we spoke to as part of the research did not recognise or use the term ‘hate crime’ to refer to their experiences, but talked about the ‘bad experiences’ they had in the community. Others may simply talk about how they feel or mention someone being ‘not nice’ to them. Individuals and their carers need to be informed about what a hate crime is within the law, possible prevention strategies and where to go to report and get support after an incident, something which some carers were unclear about. People with learning disability or autism may rely on carers or others much more to notice changes or comments, to ask the right questions and explore whether an individual has been a victim of a hate crime. If a police officer, however concerned and conscientious, is unable to identify learning disabilities and autism or understand and apply the complicated law of disability hate crime, there will be potential for further tragedies, where appropriate responses are not given soon enough. The research showed that police respondents’ self-reported confidence in detecting if an incident was hate related was significantly higher for those who had experience and contact with people with intellectual disabilities or autism. This was a factor Ben felt helped in the management of his case. This has implications for the training of police staff where an element of direct contact is likely to be very important. In Kent, the Jigsaw project has approached this by providing autism and learning disability awareness-raising sessions (facilitated by people with Page 15 of 22 Tizard Learning Disability Review 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 For Peer R eview 16 learning disabilities or autism) targeted chiefly at police, victim support, transport, housing, health, education and social care agencies. Ben highlighted that, during both of his tenancies, he had problems in the community. It was clear that initially he was given somewhere to live that was known to authorities for criminal activities and anti-social behaviour. This raises important implications for Care Managers and others supporting people to find a home. Placing people in areas where there is known deprivation or anti- social behaviour risks individuals becoming, at best, isolated, or, at worst, targeted. Ben’s case highlighted the support he had to report his victimisation experiences. The later loss of this support may have played a role in his decision not to pursue the case where his money was stolen, as he no longer had a key point of contact to support him with the process. Individuals like Ben (who have very little support) need more effective ways to report incidents, such as more easily accessible helplines and third party reporting systems. There has been some work toward this. For example, True Vision’s online reporting centre and the introduction of third party reporting hubs, which, for Kent are currently being set up by the Jigsaw project. Ultimately, following any report, the police may need to become involved. In Kent, changes within police systems have resulted in the requirement for all members of Neighbourhood Policing teams and Community Liaison Officers to deal with disability-related incidents. Given Page 16 of 22Tizard Learning Disability Review 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 For Peer R eview 17 this move away from the previous specialist roles, there is a greater need for a reliable method of establishing whether or not people reporting victimisation have a learning disability or autism, whether they are repeat victims and whether there is evidence of hostility. All police services will need to develop consistent practices for eliciting best evidence so that prosecutions of perpetrators can follow. Any increased awareness and understanding of learning disability and autism needs to extend to other criminal justice agencies, so that improvements in the police response are in turn supported and followed through in prosecuting and sentencing policies and practices. After an assessment by the local authority stopped Ben’s funding, he experienced further incidents of victimisation for which he received very little support. The impact on Ben, and for others in the research, was to change where they go and when. This makes goals around access to the community (Valuing People Now, 2009) unattainable for some, unless positive steps are taken to make their communities safer for them. Considering many incidents are not reported to the police, it is unlikely thatSocial Services would necessarily be aware of them either. Given the evidence that those who are more able and get less support are more likely to experience victimisation (Beadle-Brown et al., 2014), and that these experiences impact on community participation and well- being more generally, care assessments should take into account previous and future vulnerability to victimisation. During annual health checks or routine appointments, GPs and practice nurses could also ascertain whether their Page 17 of 22 Tizard Learning Disability Review 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 For Peer R eview 18 patients with learning disabilities or autism have been subjected to or fear abuse or victimisation. More is needed to help enable victims to access other types of support. Specialist victim support, counselling and therapies for victims with autism and learning disabilities are scarce. With effect from October 2014, Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs) became responsible for planning and commissioning Victim Support Services. Kent’s PCC has agreed to fund two specialist Victim Support officers with autism and learning disability expertise, who will work closely with Kent Victim Support. In summary, a wider approach to prevention and support is needed involving a number of agencies in addition to the police. Vision and leadership will be needed to tackle all types of hate incidents and crimes and provide effective support to victims and families. Within the U.K, the responsibility for taking the lead in developing a comprehensive, all-agency approach to prevention sits most clearly within the remit of Community Safety Partnerships (CSPs). The statutory basis of CSPs gives them the necessary authority to influence other agencies in taking action, as well as in sharing information where it is appropriate to do so. Unlike the police, CSPs can also include in their remit abuse and harassment that does not amount to crime or anti-social behaviour, or where victims do not want to involve the police but simply want the abuse to stop. Inspiration for this work can be taken from partnership Page 18 of 22Tizard Learning Disability Review 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 For Peer R eview 19 working in Leicestershire where a Hate Crime Care pathway is being developed (Sin, 2014). Finally, schemes such as the mcch Jigsaw Project offer a very low cost approach that could work anywhere, demonstrating that, with sufficient will, recommendations outlined here and elsewhere can be implemented. While much can be achieved locally, Government departments including the Home Office and Department for Education, as well as professional and regulatory bodies such as Skills for Care and the College of Policing also need to demonstrate leadership and make their expectations of improved accountability and performance clear. Conclusion Many survey respondents told us they experienced victimisation in the community. Whether the incidents were serious and criminal or lower level, repetitive harassment, they all had a long lasting and powerful impact on the quality of life of the people concerned. Most commonly, people changed their lives in some way to avoid incidents occurring again, rather than the situation being dealt with so that people could feel safe. This study was conducted in testing financial times for public and third sector agencies, conditions that are likely to continue. However, doing nothing to tackle victimisation is not an option. Public agencies have a statutory obligation to take reasonable steps to protect all citizens and financial pressures should not be seen as obstacles to tackling victimisation. Some measures may Page 19 of 22 Tizard Learning Disability Review 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 For Peer R eview 20 incur new costs, while others may be achieved at little or no cost through partnerships, pooling resources such as training, changing attitudes through example, and developing different ways of working. The mcch Jigsaw project is one such example. Leaders should also assess the potential social and economic benefits of bringing an end to the isolation and exclusion of people with learning disabilities or autism. Page 20 of 22Tizard Learning Disability Review 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 For Peer R eview 21 References Beadle-Brown, J., Richardson, L., Guest, C., Malovic, A., Bradshaw, J. and Himmerich, J. (2014), “Living in Fear: Better Outcomes for people with learning disabilities and autism. Main research report”, University of Kent Canterbury: Tizard Centre. Chakraborti, N., Garland, J. and Hardy, S.J. (2014), “The Leicester Hate Crime Project. Briefing Papers 1: Disablist Hate Crime”, University of Leicester, Leicester. Creese, B. and Lader, D. (2014), “Hate Crimes, England and Wales, 2013/14. Home Office”, available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/3 64198/hosb0214.pdf (Accessed 1st February 2015). Crown Prosecution Service (2010), “Disability Hate Crime: Policy for Prosecuting Cases of Disability Hate Crime”, Blackburns of Bolton, Bolton. Department of Health (2009), “Valuing People Now: a new three-year strategy for people with learning disabilities.'Making it happen for everyone'”, Department of Health, London. Emerson, E. and Hatton, C. (2008), “People with learning disabilities in England”, Centre for Disability Research, Lancaster University, Lancaster. Equality and Human Rights Commission (2011), “Hidden in Plain Sight . Inquiry into disability-related harassment”, Equality and Human Rights Commission, London. Equality and Human Rights Commission (2012), “Out in the Open. Tackling disability related harassment: A manifesto for change”, Equality and Human Rights Commission, London. Gravell, C. (2012), “Loneliness and Cruelty. People with learning disabilities and their experience of harassment, abuse and related crime in the community”, Lemos and Crane, London. HMCPSI, HMIC and HMI Probation (2013), “Living in a Different World: Joint Review of Disability Hate Crime”, HMCPSI. HMIC and HMI Probation, London. Page 21 of 22 Tizard Learning Disability Review 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 For Peer R eview 22 HMCPSI, HMIC and HMI Probation (2015), “Joint review of Disability Hate Crime follow up”, HMCPSI. HMIC and HMI Probation, London. Independent Police Complaints Commission (2011), “IPCC report into the contact between Fiona Pilkington and Leicestershire Constabulary 2004-2007. Independent Investigation Final Report”, IPCC Reference: 20009/016872. Landman, R. (2014), “A counterfeit friendship”: mate crime and people with learning disabilities, The Journal of Adult Protection, Vol.16 No.6. pp. 355- 366. Mencap (2000), “Living in Fear”, available at: http://www.mencap.org.uk/blogs/four-things-you-probablydidnt-know-about- disability-hate-crime (accessed 1 January 2014) National Autistic Society, available at: http://www.autism.org.uk/news-and- events/news-from-the-nas/autism-hate-crimestatisticsaspx (accessed January 2014). Scior, K. and Werner, S. (2015), “Changing attitudes to learning disability. A review of the evidence”, Royal Mencap Society, London. Sin, C., H., Hedges, A., Cook, C., Mguni, N. and Comber, N. (2009), “Disabled people’s experience of targeted violence and hostility”, Office for Public Management, London. Sin, C., H. (2014), “Hate Crime: new insights, new solutions”, available at: http://www.internationalhatestudies.com/hate-crime-health-services/ (accessed 1 st December 2014). Quarmby, K. (2008), “Getting away with murder. Disabled people’s experience of hate crime in the UK”, Scope, London. 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work_5v7wxkf4enb5fmhxufizs4pkg4	----	coet1-1611.docx AMA Journal of Ethics, November 2016 1095 AMA Journal of Ethics® November 2016, Volume 18, Number 11: 1095-1097 THE CODE SAYS The AMA Code of Medical Ethics’ Opinions Related to Discrimination and Disparities in Health Care Danielle Hahn Chaet, MSB It is recognized that members of the transgender community suffer from disparities in health care [1]. Although lack of access to appropriate care (due to lack of clinicians knowledgeable about transgender patients’ specific needs and vulnerabilities) is the biggest barrier, other barriers include financial and socioeconomic obstacles, physicians’ lack of awareness or education about physicians’ roles in transgender health care, and discrimination [1]. The Code of Medical Ethics is far from silent on matters of discrimination and disparities in health care. Ensuring Basic Rights Opinion 11.1.1, “Defining Basic Health Care” [2], does just that. The opinion recognizes health care as a fundamental human good, and acknowledges that “physicians regularly confront the effects of lack of access to adequate care and have a corresponding responsibility to contribute their expertise to societal decisions about what health care services should be included in a minimum package of care for all.” Opinion 8.5, “Disparities in Health Care,” recognizes that physicians’ attitudes can exacerbate variations in patients’ access to health care services or the quality of health care patients receive. Stereotypes, prejudice, or bias based on gender expectations and other arbitrary evaluations of any individual can manifest in a variety of subtle ways. Differences in treatment that are not directly related to differences in individual patients’ clinical needs or preferences constitute inappropriate variations in health care. Such variations may contribute to health outcomes that are considerably worse in members of some populations than those of members of majority populations [3]. The opinion calls on physicians to examine their own practices to ensure that stereotypes and biases against patients’ traits (including gender identity) do not affect their clinical judgment or affective demeanor toward patients. Physicians’ Choices and their Limits Opinion 1.1.2, “Prospective Patients” [4], explains that while physicians may choose their patients in nonemergency settings, they may not discriminate against a patient on the http://journalofethics.ama-assn.org/2014/06/coet1-1406.html http://journalofethics.ama-assn.org/2014/06/coet1-1406.html http://journalofethics.ama-assn.org/2011/10/oped2-1110.html http://journalofethics.ama-assn.org/2016/11/pfor3-1611.html http://journalofethics.ama-assn.org/2008/07/ccas2-0807.html http://journalofethics.ama-assn.org/2015/03/medu1-1503.html www.amajournalofethics.org 1096 basis of gender identity, sexual orientation, or other nonclinical characteristics. Opinion 1.1.7, “Physician Exercise of Conscience” [5], explains that while there is some leniency regarding practices that contradict physicians’ “well-considered, deeply held beliefs that are central to their self-identities,” this latitude is not unlimited. Physicians still must “respect basic civil liberties and not discriminate against individuals in deciding whether to enter into a professional relationship with a new patient” and “take care that their actions do not discriminate against or unduly burden individual patients or populations of patients and do not adversely affect patient or public trust.” This sentiment is echoed in discussions of reproductive medicine. Opinion 4.2.1, “Assisted Reproductive Technology” [6], is particularly relevant; it notes that physicians who offer these services should “not discriminate against patients … on the basis of race, socioeconomic status, or sexual orientation or gender identity.” Protecting Patients Physicians’ obligations are not limited to an injunction against discrimination on the basis of gender identity or other nonclinical criteria. They also have responsibilities to protect their transgender patients as they would any other patient. Examples of opinions in the Code that address common patient protections include Opinion 3.2.2, “Confidentiality Post Mortem” [7], which states that “patients are entitled to the same respect for the confidentiality of their personal information after death as they were in life,” and Opinion 4.1.3, “Third-Party Access to Genetic Information” [8], which explains that “patients who undergo genetic testing have a right to have their information kept in confidence.” Importantly, Opinion 8.10, “Preventing, Identifying and Treating Violence and Abuse” [9], is pertinent for physicians who care for lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) patients, who are among the most likely targets of hate crimes [10]. Violence is widely regarded as a public health issue [11], and violent hate crimes certainly fall under that rubric. A critical part of the American Medical Association mission is dedication to the betterment of public health [12]. This opinion comprehensively outlines what physicians should do to recognize signs of abuse and protect a patient’s well-being. All opinions referenced in this article can be found here. References 1. Safer JD, Coleman E, Feldman J, et al. Barriers to healthcare for transgender individuals. Curr Opin Endocrinol Diabetes Obes. 2016;23(2);168-171. 2. American Medical Association. Opinion 11.1.1 Defining basic health care. Code of Medical Ethics. 3. American Medical Association. Opinion 8.5 Disparities in health care. Code of Medical Ethics. 4. American Medical Association. Opinion 1.1.2 Prospective patients. Code of Medical Ethics. http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-ethics/code-medical-ethics.page? AMA Journal of Ethics, November 2016 1097 5. American Medical Association. Opinion 1.1.7 Physician exercise of conscience. Code of Medical Ethics. 6. American Medical Association. Opinion 4.2.1 Assisted reproductive technology. Code of Medical Ethics. 7. American Medical Association. Opinion 3.2.2 Confidentiality post mortem. Code of Medical Ethics. 8. American Medical Association. Opinion 4.1.3 Third-party access to genetic information. Code of Medical Ethics. 9. American Medical Association. Opinion 8.10 Preventing, identifying and treating violence and abuse. Code of Medical Ethics. 10. Park H, Mykhyalyshyn I. LGBT people are more likely to be targets of hate crimes than any other minority group. New York Times. June 16, 2016. http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/06/16/us/hate-crimes-against- lgbt.html?_r=0. Accessed August 5, 2016. 11. Dahlberg LL, Mercy JA. History of violence as a public health issue. Virtual Mentor. 2009;11(2):167-172. 12. American Medical Association. AMA mission & guiding principles. http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/about-ama.page?. Accessed September 6, 2016. Danielle Hahn Chaet, MSB, is a research associate for the American Medical Association Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs in Chicago. Her work involves researching, developing, and disseminating ethics policy and analyzing current issues and opinions in bioethics. She earned a master of science degree in bioethics, with a focus on clinical policy and clinical ethics consultation, from the joint program of Union Graduate College and the Icahn School of Medicine at Mount Sinai. Related in the AMA Journal of Ethics The AMA Code of Medical Ethics’ Opinion on Disparities in Health Care, June 2014 Doctors’ Responsibility to Reduce Discrimination against Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual, and Transgender People, October 2011 Lessons from a Transgender Patient for Health Care Professionals, November 2016 Transgender Rights as Human Rights, November 2016 The viewpoints expressed in this article are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views and policies of the AMA. Copyright 2016 American Medical Association. All rights reserved. ISSN 2376-6980 http://journalofethics.ama-assn.org/2014/06/coet1-1406.html http://journalofethics.ama-assn.org/2011/10/oped2-1110.html http://journalofethics.ama-assn.org/2011/10/oped2-1110.html http://journalofethics.ama-assn.org/2016/11/mnar1-1611.html http://journalofethics.ama-assn.org/2016/11/pfor3-1611.html 
work_5xgbkz2xrzdo3flgfcsn4krch4	----	Slobodan Antonić1 Filozofski fakultet Univerzitet u Beogradu Izvorni naučni članak UDK: 316.812.34 Primljeno: 02. 08. 2011. DOI: 10.2298/SOC1203437A LGBT ORGANIZACIJE U SAD KAO INTERESNE GRUPE: OSOBINE I UTICAJ LGBT Organizations in USA as Interest Groups: Characteristics and Influence ABSTRACT This paper provides an overview of the major LGBT organizations in the U.S., their organizational resources, and ways to influence politicians and the media. LGBT movement during the 1990s, completed its transition from liberationist and the system outside position, to the lobbyist and system insider position. The paper discusses the criticism dissidents from LGBT movement consider the alienation of LGBT establishment of the true interests of its membership. At the end of the article LGBT movement and its organizations are considered from the point of success in achieving the goals and compared with the achievements and impact of counter-movement of Christian traditionalists. KEY WORDS LGBT movement, lobbying, political correctness, social struggle, power APSTRAKT U radu se daje pregled najvećih LGBT organizacija u SAD, njihovih organizacionih resursa, kao i načina uticaja na političare i medije. LGBT pokret je, tokom 1990-ih, završio tranziciju iz oslobodilačkog i sistemski autsajderskog, u lobistički i sistemski insajderski. U članku se iznose kritike disideneta LGBT pokreta na račun otuđenosti lidera LGBT establišmenta od istinskih interesa članstva. Na kraju se LGBT pokret i njegove organizacije sagledavaju sa stanovišta uspešnosti u ostvarivanju zadatih ciljeva i porede sa uspešnošću i uticajem kontra-pokreta hrišćanskih tradicionalista. KLJUČNE REČI LGBT pokret, lobiranje, politička korektnost, društvene borbe, moć Teorijski okvir LGBT pokret je „jedan od najaktivnijih društvenih pokreta devedesetih“ (Gamble, 1997: 252) i „jedan od najuspešnijih društvenih pokreta u ovom (dvadesetom – S. A) veku“ (Herman, 1996: 358). Reč je o tipičnom identitetskom pokretu (identity movement), koji „teži da preobrazi dominantne kulturne obrasce ili teži da zadobije priznanje za nove društvene identitete“ (Bernstein, 1997: 533) – što je osobina koja odlikuje većinu „novih društvenih pokreta“ (Broad, 2002: 319). LGBT pokret je uticao i na stvaranje tipičnog kontrapokreta (countermovements): onog hrišćanskih tradicionalista (Werum and Winders, 2001: 390). Ta dva pokreta u SAD, u političkim i kulturnim borbama tokom devedesetih, izrasla su u „najbolje neprijatelje“ (Gallagher and Bull, 1996). ———— 1 santonic@f.bg.ac.rs 438 SOCIOLOGIJA, Vol. LIV (2012), N° 3 LGBT pokret je u SAD, tokom devedesetih godina prošlog veka, postao institucionalizovan (Fleischmann and Hardman, 2004: 408). Može se reći da je tada došlo do okončanja njegove tranzicije iz „oslobodilačkog“ i sistemski „autsajderskog“, u „lobistički“ i sistemski „insajderski“ (Engel, 2007: 70-71). Reč je o uobličavanju „industrije društvenog pokreta“ (social movement industry), s mnoštvom jakih, diferenciranih i specijalizovanih organizacija, koje sarađuju, ali se i nadmeću za članstvo i resurse, a čiji je osnovni cilj uticaj na političke i medijske strukture (McCarthy and Zald, 2002: 538). U središtu ovog, kao i svakog drugog visoko „industrijalizovanog“ pokreta nalaze se „organizacije društvenog pokreta“ (social movement organizations; Carroll and Ratner, 1999) kao nosioci karakteristične „interesno-grupne politike“ (Bernstein, 1997:532). U novijoj sociološkoj literaturi, LGBT organizacije se često tretiraju kao interesne grupe (Engel, 2007; Haider-Markel, 2006; Nownes and Lipinski, 2005; Nownes, 2004; Haider-Markel and Meier, 2003; Epstein and O'Halloran, 1995). Načelno se smatra da su „interesne grupe i njihovi napori da lobiraju vlade (...) sastavni deo američke demokratije“ (Lieberman, 2009). Otuda, praktično, kad god imamo interesne grupe, imamo i lobiranje (Epstein and O'Halloran, 1995). Zato se LGBT organizacije često posmatraju kao interesne grupe koje lobiraju u institucijama sistema (Johnson, 2008; Lyons, 2008: 108; Engel, 2007: 88; Haider- Markel, 2006: 101; Nownes and Lipinski, 2005: 307; Bernstein, 2003: 367; Croucher, 2002: 319; 324; 328). Posledica je da se ne samo u publicistici hrišćanskih tradicionalista, već i u naučnoj literaturi koriste izrazi kao što su „LGBT lobi“ (Mck. Norrie, 2008: 414), „lezbejski i gej lobi“ (Bell, 2000: 594), „lobi za gej prava“ (Dey, 2005), „gej lobi“ (Ashbee, 2001: 522; Berridge and Strong, 1991), „gej/lezbejske grupe za pritisak i politički lobi“ (Beger, 2000: 254), „gej i lezbejski pravni lobi“ (Auchmuty, 2003: 163; 166; 177; 180; 188), „LGBT lobisti“ (Engel, 2007: 84), “gej i lezbejski lobi establišment“ (Vitulli, 2010: 159), „pro-kvir lobi“ (Humphrey, 1999), „lobi grupa gej biznismena“ (Sibalis, 2004: 1746) itd. Neke LGBT organizacije van SAD i same se nazivaju lobi grupama (recimo, Gay and Lesbian Rights Lobby iz Australije), a ovaj izraz u naučnoj literaturi koristi se i prilikom opisivanja uticaja LGBT pokreta na zvanične strukture EU (Beger, 2000). Zapravo, moderna pluralistička politika, i to ne samo u SAD, počiva na „politici interesnih grupa“ (interest group politics), odnosno lobi grupa ili grupa za pritisak (lobby or pressure groups) koje se bore za uticaj kako na državu (zakonodavnu, izvršnu i sudsku vlast), tako i na javnost (na birače i na medije; Truman, 1951). Delovanje interesnih grupa unutar političkih i medijskih struktura naziva se „insajderskom“ strategijom, a ono prema biračima „autsajderskom“. Prva podrazumeva stalne formalne i neformalne kontakte s političarima i državnim službenicima, te urednicima i novinarima, radi stavljanja nekog problema na dnevni red i obezbeđenja podrške za odgovarajuće rešenje (vidi uobičajenu listu aktivnosti u Schlozman and Tierney, 1983: 357). Druga strategija podrazumeva prvenstveno rad na akcionoj ili finansijskoj mobilizaciji interesnih pristalica (grassroots lobbying). Karakterističan način je pozivanje pristaša da pišu pisma ili upućuju telefonske pozive na određene političke ili medijske adrese (Schlozman and Tierney, Slobodan Antonić: LGBT organizacije u SAD kao interesne grupe: osobine i uticaj 439 1983: 363-364). Kada je reč o LGBT organizacijama, videćemo da su se neke od tih interesnih grupa u SAD više specijalizovale za insajdersko lobiranje (recimo, Human Rights Campaign), a neke za mobilizacijsko delovanje (recimo, The Task Force; Engel, 2007: 76). Interesne grupe ne samo da deluju u pravcu uže grupe političara, kako bi uticale na zakonodavstvo, već one deluju i prema širokoj grupi činovnika (bureaucrats, bureaucratic agents) kako bi obezbedile da se zakonodavne i sudske odredbe, u svakodnevnom životu, najpre protumače, a onda i sprovode, na za njih najpovoljniji način (Haider-Markel, 2006). Ovo je posebno važno kod pitanja za koja interesne grupe ocenjuju da mogu imati simbolički značaj po normativnu senzibilizaciju javnosti (Haider-Markel, 2006: 97). Prema nekim procenama čak 85 posto aktivnosti interesnih grupa tiče se upravo sprovođenja zvanično usvojene politike (Haider-Markel, 2006: 98). Glavno sredstvo pritiska interesnih grupa na tom polju jeste paljenje „signalne crvene lampice za uzbunu“, tj. pozivanje medija u pomoć. Ukoliko su interesne grupe dovoljno moćne da mogu ozbiljno da mobilišu medije, činovnici, jednako kao i političari, stiču zazor od negativnog publiciteta u pojedinim pitanjima. Stoga oni unapred prihvataju tumačenje moćnih interesnih grupa kao relevantno. Tako se stvara vrsta postojane neformalne sprege činovnika/političara i rukovodstva interesnih organizacija (Haider-Markel, 2006: 97- 98). Uspešnost neke grupe za pritisak se i ogleda u njenom sistemskom pounutravanju, tj. u tome da donosioci odluka tu interesnu grupu uredno konsultuju kad god je dotaknuto pitanje od njenog glavnog interesa (Smith, 1999: 23). Predmet analize ovog rada prvenstveno su LGBT organizacije u SAD. LGBT pokret u SAD se i inače smatra ne samo organizaciono najrazvijenijim od svih LGBT pokreta u svetu, već i kulturno hegemonim u globalnim razmerama. On je ne samo uzor za način organizovanja, raspoloživost resursa i uspešnost institucionalnih akcija, već je i glavni izvor kulturno-identitetskih simbola za LGBT zajednice u svim ostalim zemljama sveta (od samog imena „gej“, preko zastave duginih boja, do načina oblačenja; Nardi, 1998: 568). Globalizacija LGBT pokreta, čega smo svedoci u poslednjim decenijama, zapravo je amerikanizacija pojedinih nacionalnih „kvir“ kultura (Nardi, 1998). Sa druge strane i kontrapokret LGBT programu – onaj hrišćanskih tradicionalista, takođe je najrazvijeniji u SAD (Nardi, 1998: 573) i u mnogo čemu predstavlja uzor sličnim pokretima u drugim zemljama. Sve to nije iznenađujuće ako imamo u vidu da su SAD središnje (ili vodeće) društvo svetskog kapitalističkog sistema. Otuda i nastojanje u ovome radu da se jedan društveni fenomen posmatra u njegovom središnjem i najrazvijenijem obliku. Osobine organizacija Osobine LGBT organizacija koje ću izložiti u ovom odeljku rada su: brojnost članstva, veličina godišnjeg budžeta, brojnost plaćenog osoblja (službenika i konsultanata), proklamovani ciljevi i metodi delovanja, kao i reputacija u javnosti. Osnovni izvori podataka biće zvanične mrežne stranice ovih organizacija, kao i naučna, LGBT i ostala periodika. Nažalost, o nekim organizacijama neće se moći 440 SOCIOLOGIJA, Vol. LIV (2012), N° 3 dati svi podaci, prvenstveno zbog ograničenosti izvora. U odeljku koji sledi nakon ovog (Način uticaja), a kroz različite primere, daću potpuniji pregled osnovnih metoda društvenog i političkog delovanja LGBT organizacija. Sve LGBT interesne grupe možemo, po njihovim organizaciono-formalnim karakteristikama, podeliti u tri vrste: 1. organizacije sa jasnim LGBT identitetom; 2. organizacije opšteg tipa, čiji važan (a nekad i ključni) deo delatnosti predstavlja zastupanje nekog LGBT interesa; u nekim od ovih organizacija formiraju se posebne organizacione jedinice koje su specijalizovane za LGBT pitanja; i 3. formalne LGBT lobi grupe, koje postoje unutar neke partije ili državne institucije. S druge strane, po oblasti delovanja, LGBT interesne grupe možemo podeliti na one koje dejstvuju: 1. prema političkim institucijama; 2. prema medijima; 3. prema sudskim instancama; 4. prema obrazovnom sistemu; i 5. u ostalim oblastima društva. U pregledu datom na narednim stranicama, LGBT interesne grupe će biti razvrstane prema polju njihovog delovanja. Kada je reč o politici, najznačajnija i najmoćnija organizacija sa jasnim LGBT identitetom je Kampanja za ljudska prava (Human Rights Campaign, HRC). Smatra se, uopšte, da je HRC najveća LGBT organizacija u SAD (HRC, 2011; Green, 2007: 4), odnosno najmoćnija LGBT interesna grupa (Engel, 2007: 67) i najuticajniji LGBT lobi u Vašingtonu (Vitulli, 2010: 162; Barth and Parry, 2009: 34; Lublin, 2005: 241). Diči se sa 750.000 članova (HRC, 2011), a njen budžet je u 2005. iznosio 36 miliona dolara (CU, 2011). Ima 130 zaposlenih (Engel, 2007: 67). Sastoji se od dve NVO: HRC Fondacije (HRC Foundation), koja je više usmerena na javnu, pravnu i obrazovnu delatnost, i HRC Komiteta za političku akciju (HRC Political Action Committee), koji je više usmeren na lobiranje zvaničnika u Kongresu, odnosno na pomoć kampanjama političkih kandidata koji daju podršku takvim zakonima. U kampanji za izbore 2008, HRC je aktivno podržao Obamu, za koga je prikupio 2 miliona dolara priloga, dok je za ostale pro-LGBT kandidate za zakonodavne položaje skupio još 5 miliona dolara (HRC, 2008). Takođe je angažovao članove i simpatizere u mobilizaciji i motivaciji birača da izađu na izbore i glasaju za određene kandidate (Isto). HRC sačinjava i objavljuje godišnju rang listu svih kongresnika i senatora na osnovu njihovog pojedinačnog glasanja o LGBT pitanjima (HRC, 2010). Ova lista se od strane američkih politikologa uzima kao merilo stvarnog uticaja LGBT lobija u Kongresu i Senatu (Lublin, 2005). HRC sačinjava i rang listu velikih korporacija po njihovoj naklonjenosti za LGBT pitanja (Corporate Equality Index; WB, 2010f). Smatra se da je HRC odigrao ključnu lobističku ulogu prilikom proširenja zakona o zločinu iz mržnje (Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act, 2009), kojim su obuhvaćeni i zločini prema pripadnicima „seksualnih manjina“. Takođe je, početkom devedesetih godina prošlog veka, HRC odigrao važnu ulogu u lobiranju za zakon protiv diskriminacije bolesnih od AIDS-a. Danas je HRC ključni lobista za zakon protiv diskriminacije zaposlenih na osnovu seksualne orijentacije (Employment Non-Discrimination Act, ENDA; Wk, 2011d). Slobodan Antonić: LGBT organizacije u SAD kao interesne grupe: osobine i uticaj 441 Nacionalna gej i lezbejska operativna grupa (National Gay & Lesbian Task Force, NGLTF), takođe je jedna od najmoćnijih LGBT organizacija u SAD, sa godišnjim budžetom od 10 miliona dolara (Eleveld, 2009), 24 zaposlena i 40.000 članova (Engel, 2007: 67). Uglavnom deluje kao mobilizacijska organizacija (grassroots organization), odnosno kao nacionalna kapa mnogobrojnih manjih LGBT organizacija. Obučava njihove lidere i aktiviste kako da politički deluju, ojačaju organizacionu strukturu, prikupljaju sredstva, prepoznaju simpatizere među biračima, mobilišu aktiviste i suprotstavljaju se referendumima kojima se zaustavlja sudsko ili zakonsko uvođenje istopolnog braka (TF, 2011). Gej i lezbejski fond za pobedu (Gay & Lesbian Victory Fund) obezbeđuje finansijsku i drugu pomoć za LGBT kandidate za Kongres, zakonodavna tela država ili lokalne funkcije (Victory, 2011a) i pomaže zapošljavanje LGBT službenika u saveznoj administraciji (Victory, 2011b). U 2009. godini, od 79 kandidata koje je pomagao ovaj fond 54 je dobilo izbore. Na različitim izborima, tokom 2010. godine, bilo je više od 350 LGBT kandidata, a Fond za pobedu je obezbedio pomoć za njih 164 (Dison, 2011). Prema izveštaju za 2009, godišnji prihod Fonda bio je 2,3 miliona dolara (Victory, 2009: 11). Kada je reč o LGBT lobi grupama unutar političkih stranaka i institucija, najuticajnija je ona unutar Demokratske stranke. Zove se Nacionalne Stounvol demokrate (The National Stonewall Democrats), a sebe vidi kao „široku mrežu koja povezuje LGBT aktiviste Demokratske stranke“ (NS, 2011). Njen osnovni cilj je da mobiliše LGBT birače da glasaju za kandidate ove partije (isto). Sa druge strane, NSD omogućava i da LGBT zajednica utiče na zakonodavna i druga tela, u kojima većinu imaju Demokrate, kao i da se „preko lokalnih školskih odbora, okružnih komisija (county commissions) i zakonodavnih tela država-članica (state legislatures), potreban broj puta donose propisi u prilog jednakosti“ (isto). Ova organizacija omogućava i direktan uticaj LGBT zajednice na političare izabrane sa liste Demokratske stranke. „Dok kao demokrati nastavljamo da se zalažemo za LGBT porodice, mi takođe moramo da nastavimo da objašnjavamo našoj stranci zašto demokrati moraju da se pridruže borbi naše zajednice za jednaki brak“ (isto). Demokratski kandidati izabrani u Kongres, a koji podržavaju LGBT programe, okupljeni su u Kokusu za LGBT jednakost (LGBT Equality Caucus). U programu ovog kokusa stoji da je „sastavljen od članova Kongresa koji su snažno posvećeni postizanju punog ostvarenja ljudskih prava za LGBT osobe u SAD, kao i širom sveta“ (EC, 2011b). Iako na zvaničnoj internet prezentaciji stoji da je kokus „dvopartijski“ (EC, 2011b), zapravo je od 88 članova samo jedan republikanac (kongreskinja Ileana Ros-Lehtinen; EC, 2011a). Otuda se on i može posmatrati kao deo pro-LGBT struktura Demokratske stranke. Među republikancima, najpoznatija LGBT lobi grupa je Republikanska brvnara (Log Cabin Republicans)2. Za sebe kažu da su „jedina nacionalna organizacija republikanaca koja podržava pravdu, slobodu i jednakost za gej i ———— 2 Brvnara (log cabin) je, inače, simbol za prvog republikanskog predsednika SAD, Abrahama Linkolna (Abraham Lincoln), koji je rođen u brvnari. 442 SOCIOLOGIJA, Vol. LIV (2012), N° 3 lezbejske Amerikance“ (LCR, 2011). Smer njihovog delovanja je dvostruk. S jedne strane, oni žele da utiču na to „da Republikanska stranka postane u većoj meri inkluzivna, naročito kada je reč o gej i lezbejskim pitanjima“. Sa druge strane, „Brvnara postoji i kao glas za republikanske vrednosti među pripadnicima gej i lezbejske zajednice“, kako bi se, za Republikansku stranku, regrutovali „novi saveznici u gej i lezbejskoj zajednici“ (LCR, 2011). Kada je reč o LGBT lobi grupama u političkim institucijama, u Stejt departmentu deluje jaka LGBT organizacija – Gejevi i lezbejke u agencijama za spoljne poslove (Gays & Lesbians in Foreign Affairs Agencies). To se vidi iz izvešataja sa sastanka državne sekretarke Hilari Klinton (Hillary Clinton) i više od 400 članova tog udruženja, održanog 22. juna 2010. Tom prilikom Klintonova je rekla da njeno ministarstvo naročitu pažnju poklanja zaštiti LGBT zajednice u drugim zemljama, jer su „ljudska prava gej prava, a gej prava ljudska prava“. U tu svrhu ona je od svakog regionalnog biroa Stejt deprtmenta zatražila "da to pitanje postane prioritet" (Johnson, 2010c). Stoga je Klintonova, još 2009, zatražila saglasnost Kongresa za povećanje budžeta Ministarstva, kako bi se zaposlili novi službenici u Birou za ljudska prava (Human Rights Bureau) Stejt departmenta. Njihov zadatak bio bi upravo praćenje stanja ljudskih prava LGBT zajednice u drugim zemljama (Johnson, 2010d). To zakonsko povećanje budžeta konačno je odobreno u 2010. godini (Johnson, 2010i). Sada prelazim na oblast medija i na LGBT organizacije koje deluju u tom polju. Gej i lezbo alijansa protiv kleveta (Gay & Lesbian Alliance Against Defamation, GLAAD) medijski je svakako najuticajnija LGBT organizacija u SAD. Specijalizovala se za javnu borbu protiv uvredljivog ili neodgovarajućeg pisanja o LGBT zajednici. GLAAD ima budžet od preko 10 miliona dolara (GLAAD, 2009) i 48 zaposlenih (Chibbaro, 2010c). Proklamovani cilj GLAAD-a je da učini medije „odgovornim za reči ili slike koje koriste“, i da „promoviše razumevanje, povećanu prihvaćenost i unapređenje jednakosti“ za LGBT osobe (GLAAD, 2011). GLAAD je posebno aktivan u Holivudu (Chibbaro, 2010d), gde je, od 1997, preuzeo programe organizacije Holivudska podrška (Hollywood Supports), koja je do tada bila glavna LGBT interesna grupa u filmskoj industriji (Wk, 2011c). Načine uticaja GLAAD-a i pojedine primere njegovog uspešnog delovanja opširnije ću izneti u sledećem odeljku. Ovde ću samo pomenuti da GLAAD sačinjava godišnju rang listu medija po pozitivnim GLBT likovima i njihovoj zastupljenosti (Network Responsibility Index). Prošle godine, recimo, prvo mesto je zauzela televizijska mreža MTV, u kojoj je „od 207,5 časova originalnog prime-time programa, 42 posto uključivalo sadržaj koji je odražavao život gej, biseksualnih i transrodnih ljudi“ (WB, 2010g). Slede CW sa 35 posto, Fox sa 30, ABC sa 26 posto, NBC sa 13, dok je CBS sa 7 posto označen kao TV kanal koji „nije zadovoljio“ (“Failing”; WB, 2010e). Mediji su važni za Ameriku (Media Matters for America) nije LGBT organizacija, ali svojim delovanjem snažno pokriva i LGBT pitanja. Reč je o velikoj i jakoj organizaciji koja upošljava oko 100 ljudi, a godišnje prikupi i do 23 miliona dolara donacija (Chibbaro, 2010d). Uz nastojanje da se uspostavi retorika političke Slobodan Antonić: LGBT organizacije u SAD kao interesne grupe: osobine i uticaj 443 korektnosti na svim temama, ova organizacija posebnu pažnju posvećuje LGBT pitanju. Ona aktivno interveniše u svakom slučaju kada se u medijima na neodgovarajući način tretira LGBT tematika. Recimo, MMA oštro kritikuje konzervativni The Washington Times zbog stavljanja „gej braka“ pod navodnike (MM, 2010b). Kritikovala je i Bilija O`Rajlija (Bill O'Reilly), jednog od najpoznatijih voditelja i političkih komentatora sa Foks televizije (Fox News Channel), zato što je u jednoj raspravi postavio pitanje zašto se, ako je već brak samo javno priznanje nečije ljubavi, onda ne bi mogla dozvoliti poligamija ili brakovi između čoveka i kornjače (MM, 2009). I sama Foks televizija je bila kritikovana jer je deo najave za jednu Rajlijevu emisiju glasio: „Da li mediji slave gej kulturu? Iza TV krstarenja jedne gej porodice“ (MM, 2008). U 2010. godini obrazovana je i posebna organizaciona grana MMA koja se bavi isključivo LGBT tematikom – Jednakost je bitna (Equality Matters). Ova organizacija je nastavila tamo gde je MMA stala: Fox News je već kritikovan zbog komentara spoljnog saradnika ove televizije, Takera Karlsona (Tucker Carlson). On je, naime, tokom razgovora sa voditeljem, doveo u pitanje propis iz Kalifornije koji zahteva uključivanje LGBT istorije u udžbenike (snimak komentara: MM, 2010a; prepis i kritika EM, 2010). Ova organizacija je imala primedbu čak i na najavu ovog kratkog razgovora (trajao manje od tri minuta) koja je glasila: „Sledeće na programu: nove lekcije dodate nastavnom planu u osnovnim školama. Gej prava? Ali, zašto s tim ne bismo započeli već u obdaništu?“ (snimak: MM, 2010c). U oblasti sudstva i advokature, odnosno na planu vođenja postupaka sa precedentnim značajem, ističe se nekoliko LGBT organizacija. Lambda fond za pravnu zaštitu i obrazovanje (Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund) je organizacija prvenstveno usmerena na vođenje sudskih postupaka kojima se uspostavljaju pravni presedani u korist LGBT osoba (Lambda Legal, 2007). Vodili su, recimo, slučaj Lorens protiv Teksasa (Lawrence v. Texas, 2003), kojim je oboren teksaški zakon protiv sodomije, Kolin protiv Školske uprave Orandža (Colín v. Orange Unified School District, 2005), kojim je uspostavljeno pravo na organizovanje gej udruženja u školama, a pomogli su i u procesu pred Vrhovnim sudom Havaja (Hawaii Supreme Court, 1999), kojim je ozvaničen gej brak u ovoj državi. Njihov godišnji budžet iznosi preko 14 miliona dolara (Lambda Legal, 2009: 2). Gej i lezbejski advokati i zaštitnici (Gay & Lesbian Advocates & Defenders, GLAD) takođe vode sudske sporove o LGBT pitanjima. Njihov najpoznatiji slučaj je Gudridž protiv Ministarstva zdravlja (Goodridge et al. v. Dept. Public Health, 2003), kojim je, precedentnom sudskom odlukom, u Masačusetsu uveden gej brak. Imaju 35 stalno zaposlenih (GLAD, 2011). Američka unija za građanske slobode (American Civil Liberties Union, ACLU), osnovana je još 1920. sa idejom da brani slobodu govora i privatnost građana u odnosu na državu. Budžet ove moćne organizacije iznosi preko 110 miliona dolara (ACLU, 2011v), uz 200 zaposlenih i 500.000 članova (ACLU, 2011a). Ovo nije LGBT organizacija, ali, između ostalog, vodi sudske sporove i javnu kampanju za GLBT prava: za istopolni brak, za slobodno obrazovanje klubova Gay-Straight Alliances u školama, itd. (ACLU, 444 SOCIOLOGIJA, Vol. LIV (2012), N° 3 2011b). ACLU je, recimo, tokom 2010, zastupao učenicu Konstans Mekmilen (Constance McMillen) kojoj uprava škole nije dozvolila da na matursku promotivnu svečanost dođe obučena u muško odelo i u pratnji partnerke. Škola je morala da isplati 35.000 dolara odštete, plus advokatske troškove, kao i da se izvini zbog „diskriminacije zasnovane na seksualnoj orijentaciji“ (WB, 2010d). Kada je reč o obrazovanju, onda je glavna GLBT organizacija koja deluje u prosveti svakako Gej, lezbejska i strejt obrazovna mreža (Gay, Lesbian, Straight Education Network, GLSEN). „Budući da homofobija i heteroseksizam podrivaju zdravu atmosferu u školi“, kaže se u programu ove organizacije, „mi radimo na edukaciji nastavnika, učenika i javnosti o štetnosti koje ove pojave imaju kako na mlade, tako i na odrasle“ (GLSEN, 2011b). U tu svrhu ova organizacija, između ostalog, pomaže otvaranje učeničkih klubova Gej-strejt savezništva (Gay-Straight Alliances), po školama. Do sada je otvoreno oko četiri hiljade takvih klubova (GLSEN, 2011a). Budžet GLSEN-a je oko 7 miliona dolara (GLSEN, 2009), a zapošljava oko 40 radnika (Wk, 2011f). Klubovi Gej-strajt savezništva novčano su podržani od strane pojedinih saveznih država, kao način da se predupredi ili ograniči međusobno kinjenje dece. Samo Masačusets je u jednoj godini dodelio 1,5 miliona dolara ovim klubovima (Heineman, 2000). GLSEN je, tokom devedesetih, sedam godina dobijao pomoć iz budžeta, za ovu namenu (Hayward, 2000). Po dolasku Obame na čelo administracije, jedan od osnivača GLSEN-a, Kevin Dženings (Kevin Jennings), imenovan je, za pomoćnika ministra obrazovanja (Department of Education, Assistant Deputy Secretary), upravo za program „Bezbedne škole“ (Safe and Drug-Free Schools). To je izazvalo seriju napada konzervativnih medija, koji su Dženingsovo imenovanje videli kao opasnost od „promocije homoseksualizma u školama“ (WT, 2009a) i „propagande seksualne prljavštine“ (WT, 2009b). Jedna od najupečatljivijih akcija GLSEN-a bio je „Dan tišine“ (Day of Silence), upriličen 10. aprila 2002, u srednjim školama širom SAD. Učenički klubovi Gej-strejt savezništva pozvali su, naime, sve đake da toga dana protestno ćute, te da na sva pitanja nastavnika odgovaraju tako što će im pokazati karton na kom piše: “Molim Vas da razumete moje razloge zašto danas ne govorim. Ja sam učesnik Dana tišine, kojim nacionalni omladinski pokret protestuje protiv ćutanja s kojim se suočavaju lezbejke, gejevi, biseksualne i transrodne osobe i njihovi saveznici. Moje namerno ćutanje je odjek te tišine, koja ide uz uznemiravanja, predrasude i diskriminaciju. (...) Šta ćete da uradite da biste prekinuli tišinu?“ (Stefanakos, 2002). Konzervativni kritičari ove akcije optuživali su GLSEN da je podsticao đake da prave spiskove nastavnika, druge dece i ostalih koji negoduju ili odbijaju da se solidarišu s ovakvim načinom protesta (Betsch, 2002). Savet za jednakost porodica (Family Equality Council) zalaže se za "punu socijalnu i pravnu jednakost u ime oko milion lezbejskih, gej, biseksualnih, i transrodnih porodica koje podižu dva miliona dece" (FEC, 2011). Ova organizacija posebnu pažnju posvećuju prihvaćenosti LGBT porodica u školi. Od nastavnika se zahteva „da, prilikom prikazivanja porodičnog života uopšte, uključe slike, knjige i razgovore o LGBT porodicama“ (FEC, 2008: 21). Njihov budžet je u 2009. godini iznosio 1,5 miliona dolara (Eleveld, 2009). Slobodan Antonić: LGBT organizacije u SAD kao interesne grupe: osobine i uticaj 445 Način uticaja Dva su razloga zašto političari u SAD vode računa o stavu LGBT zajednice, koji im se saopštava kroz različite interesne grupe. Prvi je brojnost LGBT birača. Procenjuje se da od 125 miliona birača, koliko je glasalo na poslednjim predsedničkim izborima u SAD (4. novembra 2008), oko 5 miliona (ili 4 posto) jesu LGBT birači (Keen, 2008). Pošto je Obama imao čak 7 posto indeksnih poena prednosti u odnosu na Mekejna, to glasovi ovog biračkog tela nisu mogli biti presudni. Ali, nekada su predsednički izbori daleko neizvesniji. Recimo, 2004. razlika je bila manja od 3 posto u korist pobednika, a na izborima 2000. oba glavna kandidata su dobila po 48 posto glasova (pa je odlučila veličina elektorskog tela). Otuda biračko telo od 4 posto ne može da se tretira kao zanemarljivo. Istraživanja rađena na dan glasanja (Exit poll) pokazuju da su demokratski predsednički kandidati dobijali uverljivu većinu među LGBT glasačima. Bil Klinton (Bill Clinton) je dobio 71 posto LGBT glasova (1996), Al Gor (Al Gore) 70 posto (2000), Džon Keri (John Kerry) 77 posto (2004), a Obama 70 posto (2008; Keen, 2008). Republikanski predsednički kandidati, pak, u LGBT populaciji su dobijali: Bob Dol (Bob Dole) 16 posto (1996), Džordž Buš (George W. Bush) 25 posto (2000), ponovo Buš 23 posto (2000) i Džon Mekejn (John McCain) 27 posto (2008; Keen, 2008). Stoga demokratski, ali i republikanski političari, vode računa o stavu lidera LGBT organizacija prema njihovoj kandidaturi. Drugi razlog ovog uticaja jeste novac, koji za pro-LGBT kandidate u izbornoj kampanji obezbeđuju LGBT organizacije. Recimo, na izborima za Predstavnički dom, 2009, Dejvid Sislajn (David Cicilline) je – kao „otvoreni gej“ (openly gay) – pobedio svog protivkandidata Džona Laflina (John Loughlin) između ostalog i zato što je uspeo da skupi gotovo tri puta više donacija. Dok je Laflin skupio 0,6 miliona dolara, Sislajn je namakao čak 1,7 miliona (Johnson, 2010l). „Sislajn je uživao podršku mnogih nacionalnih LGBT organizacija, između ostalog i Kampanje za ljudska prava (Human Rights Campaign) i Fonda za pobedu (Victory Fund)“ (Johnson, 2010a). U predizbornoj kampanji političari (naročito iz Demokratske stranke) spremni su da daju različita obećanja kako bi privukli LGBT birače. Ali, ukoliko bi bili izabrani, LGBT organizacije su tu da ih podsećaju na ta obećanja i da vrše stalni pritisak na njih da ispune ono što su rekli. Dobar primer je današnji predsednik SAD Barak Obama. Još u vreme kada se kandidovao za Senat Ilinoisa (1996), Obama je u jednoj anketi rekao da "nedvosmisleno podržava gej brak“, da se "zalaže za legalizaciju istopolnih brakova i da će se suprotstaviti nastojanjima da se zabrane takvi brakovi" (WCT, 1996). Kada je, pak, počeo da vodi izbornu kampanju za mesto predsednika SAD, on je štampao poseban letak namenjen LGBT zajednici (Obama, 2008). U tom letku obećao je sledeće:  proširenje zakona o zločinu iz mržnje (Hate Crimes) iz 2004. i na zločine iz mržnje nad LGBT osobama; 446 SOCIOLOGIJA, Vol. LIV (2012), N° 3  proširenje zakona o zabrani diskriminacije na poslu (Employment Non- Discrimination Act) i na seksualnu orijentaciju;  podršku uvođenju ustanove pune građanske zajednice (Civil Unions) koja daje istopolnim parovima jednaka zakonska prava i privilegije kao što ih imaju i bračni parovi;  ukidanje Zakona o odbrani braka (Defense of Marriage Act, DOMA), tj. saveznog zakona donetog 21. septembra 1996, koji definiše brak kao zakonsku zajednicu između muškarca i žene (član 3) i prema kome ni jedna država ne mora da prizna kao brak istopolnu zajednicu registrovanu u drugoj državi (član 2);  donošenje propisa kojima bi se obezbedilo da se više od 1.100 prava i povlastica koje proizlaze iz bračnog statusa, a koji su dati saveznim zakonima, prošire i na istopolne parove koji su u građanskoj zajednici ili u nekom drugom pravno priznatom obliku zajednice;  protivljenje ustavnoj zabrani istopolnih brakova, odnosno ustavnih amandmana, koji definišu brak isključivo kao zajednicu muškarca i žene (što sprečava sudsko proširenje prava iz braka na istopolne parove);  zalaganje za ukidanje politike „ne pitaj, ne reci“ (Don’t Ask-Don’t Tell) u vojsci SAD, tj. politike da se prilikom regrutacije ne ispituje seksualna orijentacija kandidata, ali da se od vojnika, zauzvrat, očekuje da ni oni sami ne objavljuju svoju seksualnu orijentaciju;  podršku borbi protiv AIDS-a i povećanje zdravstvenih fondova za tu namenu (Obama, 2008). Kada je postao predsednik, Obama je nastojao da zadrži dobre odnose sa LGBT zajednicom i redovno ih je izveštavao o svom radu na ispunjavanju datih obećanja. To je najčešće radio tako što je, u njegovo ime, službenik Bele kuće držao specijalne konferencije za štampu (briefing for the press) samo za predstavnike LGBT medija (Chibbaro, 2010b), zatim kroz predsedničke proglase povodom „Meseca ponosa“ (Pride month; koji se obeležava u junu), a naročito tako što je, jednom godišnje, Predsednik lično primao predstavnike LGBT zajednice i sa njima razgovarao. Takođe je pod Obaminom administracijom došlo do proširenja zakona o zločinu iz mržnje (Hate Crimes) iz 2004. i na zločine iz mržnje nad LGBT osobama. Taj akt o proširenju (Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act, 2009) usvojen je u Kongresu 22. oktobra 2009, a Obama ga je potpisao šest dana docnije. Obama je objavio i da njegova vlada (tačnije Ministarstvo pravde), za razliku od Bušove, neće pred sudom braniti ustavnost Zakona o odbrani braka (Defense of Marriage Act, DOMA), iz 1996. Stoga je Džo Salmoneze (Joe Solmonese), predsednik HRC, i mogao da istakne da je Obama „učinio više za LGBT ljude nego bilo koji drugi američki predsednik u istoriji“ (Johnson, 2010g). Međutim, Obama je i dalje pod snažnim pritiskom LGBT zajednice da ispuni ono što je obećao u kampanji 2008. Njemu se, recimo, prebacuje da su „dva glavna obećanja, data LGBT zajednici 2008, ostala neispunjena. To je usvajanje Zakona o Slobodan Antonić: LGBT organizacije u SAD kao interesne grupe: osobine i uticaj 447 zabrani diskriminacije na poslu (Employment Non-Discrimination Act) i potpuno zakonodavno povlačenje Zakona o odbrani braka (Defense of Marriage Act)“ (Johnson, 2011a). Od njega se takođe zahteva da i u kampanji za izbore 2012. iznese sličnu listu obećanja, koja je dao i 2008, kako bi ga LGBT zajednica i u narednom mandatu (ukoliko ga osvoji) mogla držati za reč (Isto). Predstavnik HRC je, u tom smislu, rekao da njegova organizacija još nije donela odluku kog će predsedničkog kandidata podržati na izborima 2012. (Johnson, 2011b). Ako pritisak LGBT organizacija na političare počiva na snazi novca i mobilizaciji birača, onda pritisak ovih interesnih grupa na medije počiva na pretnji da će se odvratiti glavni oglašivači od namere da u njima objavljuju reklame, kao i na pretnji bojkotom samog medija. Dobar primer je način na koji je GLAAD-a uspeo da ukine TV emisiju Lore Slezindžer (Laura Schlessinger), 2001. godine. Slezindžerova je diplomirala biologiju, odbranila master rad iz fiziologije, a zatim i doktorirala fiziologiju na Univerzitetu Kolumbija (Columbia University, 1974). Završila je i postdoktorske studije za savetovanje u oblasti braka, porodice i dece i, kao licencirani psihoterapeut, 12 godina radila u privatnoj praksi. Krajem sedamdesetih godina 20. veka počela je da vodi radio emisiju, u kojoj je razgovarala sa slušaocima o njihovim emocionalnim problemima. Njena emisija je ubrzo postala toliko popularna, da je išla svaki dan na KFI radiju, tada najslušanijoj radio stanici u SAD. Lorinu emisiju je prenosilo 450 drugih radio stanica, i bila je druga po slušanosti u SAD. Njen uspeh kod publike doveo je do toga da je 2000. godine potpisala ugovor da počne da radi i televizijsku emisiju za TV mrežu CBS. Međutim, Slezindžerova nije imala „prijateljski“ stav prema gej pitanju. Ona je homoseksualno ponašanje smatrala „disfunkcionalnim“ i „devijantnim“, „biološkom greškom“, bila je odlučno protiv toga da gej parovi usvajaju decu, i tvrdila je da je „dobro finansiran i dobro povezan pokret homoseksualnih aktivista postao makartizam 21. veka“ (WDL, 2000). Još pre nego što je Lorina TV emisija i počela da se emituje, u septembru 2000, gej grupe su povele kampanju protiv nje, nastojeći da spreče Slezindžerovu da proširi svoj uticaj i na TV publiku. Pokrenut je sajt StopDrLaura.com, uz pomoć besplatnog hostinga GAYBC.com, a uz obilati novčani prilog HRC (Rondeau, 2002: 472). GLAAD je na svom sajtu otvorio rubriku „Gledamo dr Loru“ ("Dr. Laura Watch"). Tu je publikovana svaka reč koju bi Slezindžerova izgovorila u vezi gej pitanja. Takođe, svaki dan su objavljivani brojevi telefona i elektronske adrese direktora kompanija koje se reklamiraju u TV emisiji Slezindžerove, i ti spiskovi su slati na adrese različitih gej sajtova, sa pozivom da se upućuju protesti i pretnje da će kompanija biti bojkotovana. Ovi protesti su zaista uplašili oglašivače. Načelno se smatra da su LGBT osobe dobri, tj. platežno sposobni kupci. Prema popisu iz 2000, gej parovi zarađuju više od nevenčanih heteroseksualnih parova, a lezbejski parovi više i od venčanih (Antecol, Jong and Steinberger, 2008). Pri tome se procenjuje da ne-otvoreni gejovi (nonopen gays) zarađuju više od otvorenih (Harry, 1993: 34). Procena je da ukupna kupovna moć LGBT zajednice u SAD iznosi 610 milijardi dolara (Balon, 2007: 208). Istraživanja pokazuju da je gotovo 90 posto gej populacije spremno da bojkotuje „antigej korporacije“ (Knoebel, 1992: 10). Stoga su oglašivači shvatili 448 SOCIOLOGIJA, Vol. LIV (2012), N° 3 veoma ozbiljno upozorenja GLAAD-a da mogu biti bojkotovani ukoliko nastave da se reklamiraju u emisijama Lore Slezindžer. Tako su svoje reklame iz TV emisije Slezindžerove povukli Proctor and Gamble, AT&T, Sears, Robuck & Co., Xerox i još desetak velikih oglašivača. Devet GLAAD-ovih objava na sajtu ove organizacije, tokom novembra i decembra 2000, donosilo je izveštaje o pogoršanju rejtinga Lorine emisije, o sve manje reklamnih spotova i o brzom padu prihoda od oglašavanja. GLAAD je nastavio da poziva članove da ne posustaju s akcijom pritiska, a „gej prijateljski“ mediji, poput Vašington posta, donosili su negativne kritike emisije, uz poseban naglasak da se kod Slezindžerove reklamni blok sastoji još samo od „depresivnog asortimana reklamnih otpadaka – oglasa za auto školu, TV-šop đubreta, lekova za uklanjanje ćelavosti i oglasa prevaranata koji preko telefona gataju u tarot karte“ (Shales, 2000). Konačno, 30. marta, 2001, GLAAD je sa oduševljenjem objavio vest o ukidanju emisije Slezindžerove. Ovo je došlo, kaže se u saopštenju, kao učinak GLAAD-ove „trogodišnje kampanje obrazovanja javnosti... protiv [Lorinih] kleveta i anti-gej tolerancije"3. GLAAD je pokazao svoju snagu uticaja na medije. Posebno je značajan rad GLAAD-a na uvođenju jezika političke korektnosti u glavne medije. U tu svrhu, GLAAD objavljuje Vodič za medije (Media Reference Guide), sa spiskom pojmova koji se smatraju napadnim (offensive terms) ili uvredljivim (defamatory language) za LGBT zajednicu. U prve spada, recimo reč „homoseksualan“, koji se medijima ne preporučuje, već im se savetuje da koriste reč „gej“. Baš zahvaljujući nastojanjima GLAAD-a, po tvrdnjama same ove organizacije, ugledni Nujork Tajms (New York Times), 1987. godine, reč „homoseksualan“ zamenio je rečju „gej“ (navedeno u; Rondeau, 2002: 469). Ipak, aktualni GLAAD-ov Vodič za medije i dalje dozvoljava korišćenje pojma „heteroseksualan“ (GLAAD, 2010: 6). Takođe, novinarima se savetuje da izbegavaju izraz „seksualne preferencije“, budući da sugeriše da je biti gej stvar izbora. Kao uzor se navodi rečnička praksa Njujork Tajmsa koji čak savetuje svojim novinarima da načelno izbegavaju i izraz „gej prava“ (gay rights), budući da on asocira na „naročita prava“ (special rights), preporučujući im izraze „jednaka prava“ (equal rights) ili „građanska prava za gej ljude“ (civil rights for gay people; GLAAD, 2010: 16). Takođe se kao dobra praksa navodi i stil Vašington Posta (Washington Post), koji svojim novinarima savetuje da izbegavaju termin „gej aktivista“ (gay activist), već da upotrebljavaju izraz „borac za gej prava (gay rights activist; GLAAD, 2010: 17). GLAAD-ov Vodič takođe savetuje novinarima da izbegavaju izraz „gej brak“, zato što implicira da je brak gej osoba drugačiji od braka muškarca i žene, i da se koristi samo „brak“ ili, eventualno, „brak za gej i lezbejske parove“ (GLAAD, 2010: 21). Ovakvo GLAAD-ovo instruisanje medija, na koje najveća javna glasila pristaju, izazivaju oštre i gorke komentare konzervativnih i tradicionalističkih ———— 3 „GLAAD applauds Cancellation of Dr. Laura“, Mar. 30, 2001, GLAAD, http://www.glaad.org/org/press/index.html?record=2737; ovaj post se više ne nalazi na GLAAD-ovom sajtu, pa ga navodim prema Rondeau, 2002: 473. Slobodan Antonić: LGBT organizacije u SAD kao interesne grupe: osobine i uticaj 449 krugova (recimo, Sears and Osten, 2003: 40). Oni se pitaju šta bi bilo kada bi neka velika hrišćanska organizacija slala uputstva medijima koje reči da koriste, a koje da izbegavaju. Šta bi bilo, pitaju se oni, ukoliko bi Američki porodični savez (American Family Association) ili Hrišćanski antiklevetnički odbor (Christian Anti-Defamation Commission), izdali uputstvo u kome se od medija traži da, kad govore o hrišćanima, ne smeju da upotrebljavaju reči kao što su „fundamentalista“ (fundamentalist), „fanatik“ (bigot) ili „biblijski dobošar“ (Bible thumper)? „Možemo samo da zamislimo kakva bi se uzbuna digla, zavijanje o cenzuri čulo bi se od obale do obale“ (Sears and Osten, 2003: 40). Onaj ko definiše, kontroliše ili uređuje dominantni diskurs svakako da ima moć, opšte je mišljenje (post)modernih teoretičara (Batler, 2010). Stoga navedena vajkanja hrišćanskih tradicionalista jasno pokazuju srazmeru uticaja ova dva pokreta u medijskoj eliti. Veća moć LGBT pokreta – uz blagonaklonost medija – može se uspešno razaznati i na nivou Fukoove (1997: 32-33) mikrofizike moći: u svakodnevnim odnosima, pre svega u događajima tokom zaoštrenih političkih okolnosti, u simbolički važnim pitanjima i na mestima gde LGBT zajednica ostvaruje prednost. Na sledećim stranicama navešću nekoliko takvih primera. U njima se vidi snaga socijalnog pritiska LGBT pokreta, uz blagonaklonost ili odsustvo ozbiljnije kritike u vodećim medijima. Iako se, često, ne mogu identifikovati konkretne organizacije koje iza tog pritiska stoje, taj pritisak se najčešće završavao uspehom. Karakterističan je slučaj Skota Ekerna (Scott Eckern), umetničkog direktora Muzičkog pozorišta Kalifornije (California Musical Theatre), u Sakramentu. On je, uoči referenduma, iz 2008, o dopuni ustava Kalifornije odredbom o braku kao zajednici muškarca i žene (Prop. 8), dao prilog od 1.000 dolara za kampanju podrške takvoj dopuni. Kada se, međutim, saznalo za ovu donaciju, Ekern je postao predmet snažnih javnih i privatnih napada gej grupa i pojedinaca, a stavljen je i na vebsajt Antigej-crna-lista-tačka-kom (antigayblacklist.com). Džef Viti (Jeff Whitty), pisac predloška za popularni mjuzikl Avenija Kju (Avenue Q) koji je Muzičko pozorište Kalifornije trebalo uskoro da izvede, i otvoreni gej (Whitty, 2011), objavio je da će zbog Ekerna bojkotovati ovu kuću (Boehm, 2008b). Pošto mu se Ekern obratio i dao, kako je Viti rekao, „ubedljivo i iskreno izvinjenje“, Viti je svoju odluku o bojkotu ipak povukao. Ali je Mark Šejmen (Marc Shaiman), kompozitor mjuzikla Lak za kosu (Hairspray), koji izvodi ovo pozorište, i takođe gej (Rapp, 2004), najavio dalji bojkot Ekerna rečima da je „jasno da anti-gej stavovi neće biti prihvaćeni u ovoj pozorišnoj zajednici“. Ričard Luis (Richard Lewis), u ime uprave pozorišta, rekao je da su „Ekernovi stavovi samo njegovi“, pozvao da se „ne kažnjava pozorište za ono što je Skot odlučio da uradi“ i izrazio još jednom "zahvalnost ... [LGBT] zajednici koja je odigrala ključnu ulogu u našem uspehu" (Boehm, 2008b; umetak je izvorni). Zatim je Ekern, da bi koliko toliko popravio štetu, dao drugu donaciju od 1.000 dolara HRC-u, još jednom se „najdublje izvinio“ što je „postupanje po verskim uverenjima toliko pogodilo sve one koje voli i kojima se divi“ i napomenuo da je njegova sestra takođe lezbejka koja živi s partnerkom u istom domaćinnstvu (Boehm, 2008b). Međutim, ni to nije bilo dovoljno. Ekern je 450 SOCIOLOGIJA, Vol. LIV (2012), N° 3 već sutradan ipak bio prinuđen da podnese ostavku (pismeni otkaz), koja je odmah prihvaćena (Boehm, 2008c). Odmah po prijemu otkaza, Ekernova biografija je uklonjena sa sajta pozorišta (Boehm, 2008c). I dok se u prethodnom primeru socijalnog pritiska nisu u prvom planu pojavljivali predstavnici LGBT organizacija, u slučaju glumca Isaije Vašingtona (Isaiah Washington) imali smo i njih na pozornici. Vašington je, naime, prilikom snimanja popularne serije Grey's Anatomy, dobacio jednom kolegi da je „peder“ (faggot). On se posle toga javno izvinio, ali ga je NBC odmah otpustio. Kako bi mogao ponovo da dobije posao, morao je da prođe kroz posebnu proceduru. Najpre je otišao na razgovor sa "liderima gej-zajednice" – Nejlom Đulijanijem (Neil G. Giuliano), predsednikom GLAAD-a i Kevinom Dženingsom, osnivačem GLSEN-a, te pred njima „priznao štetu koju je prouzrokovao“ (Fleeman, 2007). „Isaija shvata da njegovo izvinjenje nije dovoljno“, rekao je predsednik GLAAD-a. "On zna da će tek njegovi budući postupci, uključujući i prvi pravi korak – koji predstavlja današnji sastanak, pokazati koliko je iskrena njegova namera da postane deo rešenja za antigej fanatizam", rekao je Đulijani. Sledeći korak je bio odlazak Vašingtona na "specijalni tretman za rehabilitaciju ponašanja". Reč je o naročitom psihoterapijskom tečaju, „kako bi shvatio šta je uradio i da se ista stvar više nikada ne bi ponovila“ (Nudd and Keith, 2007). „Zahvalan sam na činjenici da mi je pružena još ova prilika“, pokajnički je izjavio Vašington, najavljujući svoj odlazak na psihoterapijski tečaj, „i posvetiću se pretvaranju mojih rđavih dela u pozitivne rezultate, lične i profesionalne“ (Isto). Nakon završetka tečaja, NBC studio je odlučio da Vašingtonu ipak da „i drugu šansu“ (Ingrassia, 2007). Ako imamo u vidu da je, prethodno, i popularni bejzbol igrač Džon Roker (John Rocker), zbog jedne „homofobne“ rečenice4, bio upućen kod psihijatra (Gottfried, 2004: 72), teško je ne zaključiti da je uspostavljanje nove definicije „normalnosti“ i „patologije“ (tj. zamena „homoseksualnosti“ sa „homofobijom“, u dijagnostičkim priručnicima američkih psihijatara; Stojnov, 2005: 266), došlo upravo kao učinak promene u strukturama moći (naročito tokom devedesetih). I kao što su strukture moći u nekadašnjem SSSR imale svoj izraz u dijagnozi metafizička intoksikacija – za adolescente zatečene u religioznoj ili aksiološkoj (samo)refleksiji, ili pak u dijagnozi socijalna šizofrenija – za disidente koji poriču da je socijalizam najbolje društveno uređenje (Stojnov, 2005: 267), tako je, čini se, i sada na delu osobeno upravljanje javnim (i medicinskim) diskursom. „Homofobija“ je postala šifra moći, etiketa koja socijalno stigmatizuje onoga na koga je nalepljena i, istovremeno, pokazuje kratološki status onoga ko je ovlašćen da etiketu stavlja. Malo je sumnje da upravo LGBT organizacije u SAD smatraju da imaju javno ovlašćenje za finalno korišćenje ove etikete. ———— 4 Roker je izjavio da nikada ne bi igrao za njujorške klubove zato što je Njujork „grad koji je preterano grozničav, koji razdražuje. Zamislite da se vozite linijom 7 do stadiona, to je kao jahanje kroz Bejrut, morate najpre da prođete pored nekog klinca sa ljubičastom kosom, pa pokraj nekog kvira sa AIDS-om, pa pored nekog tipa koji je upravo izašao iz zatvora po četvrti put, pa pored nekih dvadesetogodišnjih majki sa četvoro dece. To je depresivno...“ (Pearlman, 1999). Slobodan Antonić: LGBT organizacije u SAD kao interesne grupe: osobine i uticaj 451 Kritike Naravno da najoštrije kritike LGBT organizacija i njihovog uticaja na američke političare i medije dolaze od hrišćanskih tradicionalista. Međutim, u ovom odeljku se neće izlagati njihova kritika LGBT organizacija, već ona koju iznose disidenti unutar samog LGBT pokreta, kao i pojedini društveni naučnici. Tako, recimo, disidenti (Malebranche, 2006; Raimondo, 2001) smatraju da su vođe LGBT pokreta, naročito tokom njegove institucionalizacije devedesetih, izdale ideju oslobađanja ličnosti i proizvele novu, porobljavajuću praksu politički korektnog identiteta, društvenih uloga i socijalnih normi („homonormativnost“). Džek Donovan (Jack Donovan; pseudonim Jack Malebranche) smatra da su vođi LGBT pokreta izdvojili jedan deo homoerotske potkulture („gej kulturu“), i od nje napravili „gej ideologiju“ (Malebranche, 2006: x), te da pomoću nje žele da sve muškarce koji vole muškarce, ili imaju seks sa drugim muškarcima, pretvore u „gejove“ – tipizovane članove kvazietničke zajednice (Malebranche, 2006: 18). Prava je „kosmička ironija“, kaže Donovan, da kulturu muške ljubavi danas zastupa pokret koji je duboko feminizovan – od naziva ljubavnika („partner“ je lezbejski izraz, muškarci imaju „druga“ (compadre) i prihvatanja feminističkog modela društvene žrtve (oppressed group), preko pristanka na medijsku sliku geja kao feminizovanog muškarca, do zastupanja ženskog, malograđanskog koncepta braka i porodice (Malebranche, 2006: 115). Ahilej i Patroklo se vole kao muškarci, oni ne idu unaokolo sa duginom zastavom na kočijama, zahtevajući da mogu da stupe u brak i gaje decu, upozorava Donovan. Zbog ove suštinske greške u identitetu, „pokret za gej prava se okrenuo koještarijama“ (Malebranche, 2006: 33). Takva koještarija (nitpicking) je „gej brak“. Brak je institucija stvorena da zaštiti ženu i decu, zato ona nema veze sa muškom ljubavlju (Malebranche, 2006: 127). Zašto bi „androfilija“ Ahileja i Patrokla, pita se Donovan, morala da bude društveno priznata jedino ako bi država dala saglasnost da se i oni mogu obući kao mladoženje i razmeniti prstenje pred sveštenikom i obe porodice? Zašto bi muškarci koji vole muškarce morali da obrazuju udruženja, skupljaju novac i drže mitinge kako bi se za to borili? Drugi disident, Džastin Rajmondo (Justin Raimondo) zamera vođama LGBT pokreta ne samo stvaranje separatnog pseudoetničkog identiteta, već i korišćenje državne birokratije kako bi se celo društvo nateralo da prihvati određeni normativni obrazac. „Nekada su gej aktivisti tražili da vlada izađe iz spavaće sobe“, piše Rajmondo. „Danas nova generacija gej lidera poziva vladu da se tamo vrati“ (Raimondo, 2001). Od države se traži, kaže Rajmondo, ne samo „donošenje zakona koji bi štitili homoseksualce od navodne diskriminacije u oblasti stanovanja i zapošljavanja“, već i afirmativnu akciju u oblasti tzv. javnih vrednosti – u medijima, školstvu i humanističkim i društvenim naukama, odnosno „proširenje državne vlasti na gotovo svaki aspekt našeg života“, a naročito „u školama i u umetnosti. Kako u obe od ovih oblasti dominira vlada, one su postale bogato lovište za različite žrtvoslovne grupe koje polažu pravo na svoj `pošteni deo` kolača“ (Raimondo, 2001). 452 SOCIOLOGIJA, Vol. LIV (2012), N° 3 Što je najgore, „svakome ko dovede u pitanje ovaj program odmah se nalepljuje etiketa ’homofobičan’, koja ga ne samo obeležava, već i pretvara u metu progona do kraja vremena“. Kao što se nekada homoseksualnost proglašavala duševnim poremećajem, kaže Rajmondo, tako se sada to isto čini sa „homofobijom“. „U praksi, homofobiju izgleda čini svaka akcija i govor koji se ne sviđaju određenim homoseksualcima. I to ne običnim gejovima, našim komšijama, već članovima organizovanog gej lobija“ (Raimondo, 2001). Kao deo tog lobija Rajmondo posebno navodi GLAAD, organizaciju koja je „uzela na sebe ulogu gej zaštitnika i ocenjivača slike gej zajednice u javnosti“. „GLAAD-ove hipersenzitivne antene“, ironičan je Rajmondo, „pretražuju nebo u potrazi za znacima homofobije u medijima“ (Raimondo, 2001). Ni naučnici se više ne usuđuju da se bave istraživanjima koja bi mogla dovesti u pitanje dogmu o „urođenosti“ kao jedinom izvorištu homoseksualnosti. Rajmondo kao primer navodi (već pominjano GLAAD-ovo) nastojanje da se eliminiše čak i upotreba sintagme „seksualne preferencije“ (budući da asocira na mogućnost, ili slobodu, izbora). „U svojim neprestanim nastojanjima da zastraši urednike, pisce, izdavače i filmske producente, GLAAD je predstavnik one neobične anomalije novog milenijuma: neliberalnih liberala. Ironično je, a još više opasno, da GLAAD podržavaju i subvencionišu upravo navodni zagovornici `slobodnog izražavanja` i otvorenosti - čiji će novac poslužiti za potporu neke nove, politički korektne verzije Bibliotečke policije“ (Raimondo, 2001). Kada je reč o naučnicima, oni kritikuju vođe LGBT organizacija prvenstveno zbog zanemarivanja interesa svog članstva zarad novca od reklama koji stiže od kompanija za proizvodnju alkohola i cigareta. Komercijalizacija LGBT događaja (poput gej parada) i profesionalizacija LGBT organizacija, dovela je do značajnog porasta fondova koji se pune reklamama (Chasin, 2000; Richardson, 2005). Organizatori LGBT događaja i urednici LGBT časopisa rado objavljuju reklame za alkoholna pića (recimo za Absolut Vodka; Richardson, 2005: 526) ili za cigarete (Offen, Smith and Malone, 2008). Sociolozi postavljaju pitanje etičnosti takvog „fandrejzingovanja“, imajući u vidu podatak da, recimo, gej ili biseksualni muškarac puši 50 posto više nego prosečan muškarac, a lezbejska ili biseksualna žena čak tri puta više od prosečne žene (Bye et al. 2005; prema Offen, Smith and Malone, 2008: 144). Tri naučnice, Ofen, Smit i Malon, upriličile su intervjue sa 74 vođe LGBT organizacija u SAD baš u vezi reklamiranja cigareta. Pokazalo se da „LGBT vođi nisu univerzalno usvojili redefiniciju `duvanskog problema`, koju daje pokret za kontrolu pušenja, kao problema koji je izazvan delatnošću duvanske industrije. Štaviše, oni smatraju da je to pitanje donošenja ličnih odluka među vršnjacima, a ne suočavanja sa spoljnim izvorom koji nanosi štetu zajednici“ (Offen, Smith and Malone, 2008: 145). Tako, direktor jedne LGBT organizacije izjavljuje da je za njega prihvatljiva svaka kompanija sve dok ne počne da vodi anti-LGBT politiku. Sledi da, pošto duvanske kompanije ne vode antigej politiku, problem pušenja za ovu LGBT organizaciju praktično ne postoji. Organizator jednog festivala ponosa primećuje da se „mi ionako zalažemo da ljudi prihvate ono što jesu, i da na to budu ponosni“, pa zato nije stvar LGBT vođa „da određuju (ljudima) šta treba da rade, šta Slobodan Antonić: LGBT organizacije u SAD kao interesne grupe: osobine i uticaj 453 da puše, da li da ne puše, šta da piju, da li da ne piju“. Izdavač jednog LGBT časopisa smatra da je njegovo da objavljuje reklame za različite proizvode, a "naši čitaoci su dovoljno pametni da sami odluče da li žele da ih koriste". Iz te optike, upozoravaju ove tri sociološkinje, „upotreba duvana gotovo da postaje pitanje patriotizma, pitanje ljudskih prava i sloboda, a ne zdravstveni problem zavisnosti i bolesti“ (Offen, Smith and Malone, 2008: 151). Ovakva otuđenost LGBT vođa od stvarnih interesa sopstvenog članstva, pa i izvesna neodgovornost prema njihovoj sudbini, može se oceniti samo kao tamna strana procesa koji Ričardsonova naziva „profesionalizacijom lezbejske i gej kulture i politike“ (Richardson, 2005: 525). Ulaskom velikog novca (big-money) u LGBT pokret, tokom devedesetih, i profesionalizacijom njegovog rukovodstva, došlo je i do određene promene njegove naravi. „Tokom protekle decenije, politika pokreta na nacionalnom nivou se drastično transformisala. Njegovim licem u javnosti sada dominira mala grupa nacionalnih organizacija i jednako mala grupa medijskih zvezda, a svi su priključeni na mrežu politike velikog novca koja se vrti oko savetnika za javnost, profesionalaca za vođenje kampanje i advokata koji vode sporove“ (Warner 1999:67; prema Richardson, 2005). Međutim, smatraju pojedini naučnici, nije reč samo o „profesionalizaciji seksualne politike“, već i o „novim oblicima socijalnog vladanja povezanim s neoliberalizam“ (Richardson, 2005: 523; 516). Neoliberalizam, naime, podrazumeva povlačenje države ne samo iz ekonomije, već i iz sfere društvene brige za građanina i ulazak privatnog preduzetništva u sve oblasti. Građanin postaje kupac, koji samo treba slobodno da sledi svoje individualne preference, a sve potrebne robe i usluge će mu već obezbediti profesionalci-specijalisti. Tako je u ekonomiji (pa i industriji seksa), tako je u politici (pa i u politici seksualnosti), tako je i u kulturi (pa i u gej- kulturi). Pražnjenje društva od države, „oslobađanje“ ekonomije, politike i kulture od brige zajednice za sudbinu pojedinca, i prepuštanje individualizovanog i usamljenog građanina staranju specijalizovanih preduzetničkih družina (company), nije, međutim, praćeno povećanjem pojedinačne slobode. Zapravo, popuštanje u državnoj reglementaciji i birokratskoj kontroli išlo je uporedo sa jačanjem normativnih stega i profilisanjem novih, ali jednako čvrstih socijalnih uloga. Pojedinac jeste postao nešto više slobodan da bira, ali ipak samo između nekoliko već ukonačenih društvenih rola. Stereotipizovana i kljašteća „heteronormativnost“ dobila je svoj pandan u jednako stereotipizovanoj i kljaštećoj „homonormativnosti“ (Vitulli, 2010; Duggan, 2002). I dok na jednoj strani svakako da imamo izvesnu pluralizaciju dopuštenih oblika (konzumerističkog) življenja, na drugoj strani ne može a da se ne primeti tendencija povećanja kontrole nad društvom baš preko monopola nad definisanjem i propisivanjem „inkluzivnosti“ i „diverziviteta“ (Gottfried, 2004: 79). „Kostretni“ jezik političke korektnosti samo je jedan od pokazatelja tih novih oblika dominacije. Verski pluralizam u ranim američkim kolonijama 17. veka bio je, isto tako, praćen pojačanim puritanizmom u govoru i ponašanju. I kao što su stari protestantski pastori tvrdili da svaki neprikladni govor pojedinca neminovno ugrožava celu 454 SOCIOLOGIJA, Vol. LIV (2012), N° 3 zajednicu, tako i sada klerici neoliberalizma tvrde da svaka pogrešna reč ugrožava vrednosti „multikulturne zajednice“, te direktno dovodi u opasnost neku od „ranjivih grupa“ (Gottfried, 2004: 73). Ali, praksu pristojnog govora treba razlikovati od političke korektnosti, koja je deo (neo)liberalne „multikulti“ ideologije (Nannery, 1995: 85). Politička korektnost je želja da se vlada društvenim mišljenjem, da se preko uvođenja jedne vrste orvelijanske „zlomisli“ (thoughtcrime) ograniče alternative u mišljenju, vrednovanju i ponašanju (Schmidt, 1997). Tako se „homofobija“, kao jedna od ključnih etiketa „zlomisli“, može zaraditi i zbog akademske kritike gej braka. Čak i ako ste vrhunski stručnjak za neku oblast – recimo, za egipatske hijeroglife Druge dinastije – dovoljno je da izrazite sumnjičavost prema „istopolnom braku“, pa da budete ocenjeni kao „homofob“, i zbog toga ne dobijete mesto na univerzitetu (Scruton, 2006: 28). Uloga LGBT organizacija i njihovih vođa u ovom procesu birokratske kolonijalizacije seksualnosti i javnog diskursa nije zanemarljiva. Oni su izgradili svojvrsni „homonormativni establišment“ (Vitulli, 2010: 156) koji je u SAD postao deo elitnih struktura što vladaju „svetom života“ (Lebenswelt). Njihov način kontrole i vladavine tim životom, očigledno, nije mnogo drugačiji od onog koji upražnjava „heteronormativni“ deo tog establišmenta. Zaključak Moć i uspešnost nekog pokreta i njegovih organizacija može se meriti na dva načina: poređenjem proklamovanih sa ostvarenim društvenim ciljevima, kao i poređenjem uticaja i snage samog pokreta sa onim koje ima kontrapokret. Strateški ciljevi LGBT pokreta u SAD, krajem 20. veka, bili su: ukidanje zakona o kažnjavanju homoseksualnog odnosa, zakonsko priznanje istopolne veze, mogućnost zakonskog usvajanja dece (ili davanja dece u hraniteljstvo) za istopolne parove, dobijanje statusa „ranjive grupe“ u okviru zakona o „zločinu iz mržnje“, zabrana diskriminacije na poslu, i prestanak omalovažavanja, te prihvatanje različitosti, u javnom diskursu (tj. u glavnim medijima). Ako iz ugla tih ciljeva posmatramo današnje stanje, mogli bismo da kažemo da je uspeh LGBT pokreta u SAD svakako nesumnjiv (mada ne i potpun). Do 1962. u svim državama SAD „sodomija“ je zakonski kažnjavana (čak i doživotnim zatvorom). Takvi zakoni su, međutim, do 2002. ukinuti u 36 država, a 2003. Vrhovni sud ih je proglasio neustavnim i u preostalih 14 država. Sklapanje punopravnog istopolnog braka dozvoljeno je danas u 5 država, a „građanska veza“ (civil unions), „partnersko domaćinstvo“ (domestic partnerships), ili neki drugi oblik zakonskog priznanja istopolne veze (s pravima sličnim onim koja dolaze iz braka), postoji još u 12 saveznih država. Lezbejski ili gej par u 42 države zakonski može da usvoji dete, a u 48 da bude njegov hranitelj (Redding, 2008: 127). Usvojena je dopuna Zakona o zločinu iz mržnje, koji i LGBT osobe ubraja u „ranjive grupe“, a u toku je i usvajanje Zakona o zabrani diskriminacije na poslu, koji će LGBT osobe na sličan način da zaštiti i u sferi rada. U glavnim medijima danas nema Slobodan Antonić: LGBT organizacije u SAD kao interesne grupe: osobine i uticaj 455 omalovažavanja LGBT osoba, štaviše, postoji veoma blagonakloni odnos medijske (i akademske) elite prema LGBT pitanju. S druge strane, taj uspeh je bio praćen narastanjem kontrapokreta hrišćanskih tradicionalista, koji je danas uspešno blokirao dalje širenje priznanja istopolnog braka, i koji se sada aktivno suprotstavlja u svakoj tački borbe za LGBT interese. Naime, LGBT pokret je, tokom osamdesetih i devedesetih godina, bio veoma uspešan u uticaju na sudsku, pa i zakonodavnu i izvršnu vlast da promeni neke norme koje pogađaju LGBT interese. Baš zahvaljujući sudskim odlukama, ne samo da su ukinuti zakoni o „sodomiji“, već je, iz države u državu, krenulo i priznanje prava lezbejskim i gej parovima na sklapanje braka. Međutim, kontrapokret je uspeo da mobiliše biračko telo i da preko referenduma u 28 država postigne donošenje ustavnih amandmana kojima se brak definiše isključivo kao veza muškarca i žene (pa takva zakonska definicija danas postoji u 41 državi SAD). Tako je proces sudskog širenja istopolnog braka zaustavljen. Uopšte, analiza državno-normativnih odluka vezanih za „gej pitanja“ pokazuje da je LGBT pokret u SAD, u razdoblju 1974-1994, ostvario srazmeru povoljnih i nepovoljnih odluka (po svoje ciljeve): u sferi zakonodavne vlasti 236:10, u sferi sudske vlasti 50:31, u sferi izvršne vlasti 22:0, dok je ishod u sferi narodnih referenduma bio 1:27 (Werum and Winders, 2001: 396). Stoga se može reći da je LGBT pokret bio veoma uspešan u političkim i društvenim procesima u kojima dominira elita (sudska, politička, medijska ili akademska), ali i neuspešan u sferi referenduma i drugih oblika masovne demokratije. Reklo bi se da je LGBT pokret „osvojio“ elitu, ali ne i narod. A u sistemima koji hoće da budu demokratski, takav učinak ne obezbeđuje trajnu zaštitu postignutih ciljeva. Uticaj i snaga LGBT pokreta su, takođe, nesumnjivo veliki. Ali, oni mu, ipak, ne daju „odlučujuću premoć“ u odnosu na kontrapokret hrišćanskih tradicionalista. Videli smo da se budžeti LGBT organizacija računaju u desetinama miliona dolara i da one zapošljavaju na stotine profesionalaca. Procenjuje se da godišnji fondovi LGBT organizacija u SAD iznose oko 100 miliona dolara (Green, 2007: 4). Međutim, velike organizacije hrišćanskih tradicionalista po budžetu i zaposlenima ne zaostaju za LGBT pokretom. Naprotiv. Recimo, Fokus na porodicu (Focus on the Family, FOF) upošljava 1.300 ljudi, a budžet za 2000. mu je bio 129 miliona dolara (Irvine, 2005: 19). Savet za istraživanje porodice (Family Research Council), zapošljava 120 ljudi, ima 455.000 članova, a budžet mu je u 2000. bio 10 miliona dolara (Isto). Američki porodični savez (The American Family Association) upošljava nekih 100 ljudi, ima 500.000 članova, a budžet mu je bio 11,4 miliona dolara u 2000. godini (Irvine, 2005: 20). Zabrinute žene Amerike (Concerned Women for America) imaju 500.000 članova i budžet od 13 miliona dolara u 2000. godini (Isto). Smatra se da su dva najvažnija resursa interesnih grupa članstvo i novac (Haider-Markel and Meier, 1996: 336). Ako po ova dva resursa uporedimo LGBT pokret sa kontrapokretom hrišćanskih tradicionalista, mogli bismo da kažemo da ovaj drugi pokret ima prednost. Ali, LGBT pokret ima ogromno prevashodstvo po uticaju na elitu. Američka elita se, u osnovi, postavlja kao „supergarant“ u zaštiti LGBT interesa i tretira ih kao 456 SOCIOLOGIJA, Vol. LIV (2012), N° 3 ljudsko pravo koje je i ona dužna da brani. Reč je o tome da u američkoj sudskoj, političkoj, medijskoj ili akademskoj eliti LGBT zajednica uživa status ugrožene manjine. Upravo to objašnjava potpuno nejednak medijski (javni) tretman istih slučajeva – a na koji se neprestano žale hrišćanski tradicionalisti. I zaista, dok deklarisanih LGBT osoba u SAD ima manje od 3 posto (Laumann et al., 1994; Leigh et al., 1993), deklarisanih hrišćana je 76 posto (Kosmin and Keysar, 2008). 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work_5xr6bxbhunc73g3bb2r3lbwfyy	----	Growing up Muslim: The impact of islamophobia on children in a Canadian community This is a repository copy of Growing up Muslim: The impact of islamophobia on children in a Canadian community. White Rose Research Online URL for this paper: http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/140895/ Version: Published Version Article: Elkassem, S, Csiernik, R, Mantulak, A et al. (5 more authors) (2018) Growing up Muslim: The impact of islamophobia on children in a Canadian community. Journal of Muslim Mental Health, 12 (1). pp. 3-18. ISSN 1556-4908 https://doi.org/10.3998/jmmh.10381607.0012.101 This is an open access article under the terms of the CC BY-NC-ND licence. (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/legalcode) eprints@whiterose.ac.uk https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/ Reuse This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs (CC BY-NC-ND) licence. This licence only allows you to download this work and share it with others as long as you credit the authors, but you can’t change the article in any way or use it commercially. More information and the full terms of the licence here: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/ Takedown If you consider content in White Rose Research Online to be in breach of UK law, please notify us by emailing eprints@whiterose.ac.uk including the URL of the record and the reason for the withdrawal request. mailto:eprints@whiterose.ac.uk https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/ 3 Journal of Muslim Mental Health ISSN1556–4908 Volume 12, Issue 1, 2018 http://dx.doi.org/10.3998/jmmh.10381607.0012.101 Growing Up Muslim: The Impact of Islamophobia on Children in a Canadian Community Siham Elkassem, MSW Vanier Children’s Services, London, Ontario Rick Csiernik, PhD School of Social Work, King’s University College, London, Ontario Andrew Mantulak, PhD School of Social Work, King’s University College, London, Ontario Gina Kayssi Muslim Resource Centre for Social Support and Integration, London, Ontario Yasmine Hussain Muslim Resource Centre for Social Support and Integration, London, Ontario Kathryn Lambert, MSW Vanier Children’s Services, London, Ontario Pamela Bailey MSW Vanier Children’s Services, London, Ontario Asad Choudhary London Islamic School, London, Ontario Abstract With the increase of anti- Muslim bigotry in the current political and societal cli- mate, ethnic minority children in western nations may experience increased nega- 4 Siham Elkassem, Rick Csiernik, Andrew Mantulak, Gina Kayssi, Yasmine Hussain et. al tive attention fueled by Islamophobia. Islamophobia is defined as the dislike of or prejudice against Islam, and individuals who are Muslims. A literature review yielded little research that examines the experience of Muslim children and their experiences with Islamophobia, particularly in the Canadian context. However, studies on the overall issue reveal Islamophobia is a phenomenon that has im- pacted Muslims around the world. This community- based study explored the di- chotomous experiences of Muslim school- aged children who are taught theirs is a faith of peace and yet who regularly experience microaggressions and overt hostil- ity because of their beliefs. Keywords: Islam, Muslim, Islamophobia, bigotry, prejudice, discrimination, stu- dents, children Experts claim that ethnic minorities who are thought of as being Muslim are experiencing increased negative attention fueled by Islamophobia (Council on American- Islamic Relations (CAIR), 2013; Lean, 2012; Poynting & Perry, 2007). his claim has sadly been airmed in Canada: “6 dead, 8 injured in terrorist attack at Quebec City mosque” Montreal Gazette, January 30, 2017 “Enormous’ spike in hate crime reports in Montreal since mosque attack” National Post February 1, 2017 “Liberal MP swamped by hate mail, threats over anti- Islamophobia motion in Commons” he Star, February 16, 2017 “Anti- Islamic protesters demonstrate outside Toronto mosque calling for ban on Islam” Global News, February 17, 2017 “Voters reject Quebec City- area Muslim cemetery project” CTV News Montreal, July 16, 2017 hese contemporary events indicate that despite outpourings of public support by many Canadians there is a distinct sense of Islamophobia, which is deined as the dislike of or prejudice against Islam, Muslims, and individuals especially as a political force (Oxford Dictionary, 2015) in Canada. Colleen Lundy, pro- fessor emeritus at Carleton University, wrote that during this overt systemic discrimination against Muslims, the social work profession in Canada has been ominously silent in the way they respond to clients who may be impacted by Growing Up Muslim: The Impact of Islamophobia on Children in a Canadian Community 5 Islamophobia (2011). his is despite the fact that social workers are obligated to continuously challenge inequality, exploitation, and discrimination, and to relect upon the impacts these injustices have on all clients (Canadian Associa- tion of Social Workers, 2016). herefore, social work practitioners should be both professionally and morally concerned with the impact of Islamophobia on Muslim children and youth, and any victims of discrimination because of a “Muslim- like” appearance. Literature Review Currently, there exist few studies that look at the impact of Islamophobia on Muslim children (Arioan, 2012; CAIR- California, 2015) particularly within social work research1. he limited research that exists outside of social work suggests that Muslim children in public and non- Islamic private schools regu- larly encounter discrimination from school administrators, peers, and teachers (Arioan, 2012; CAIR- CAN, 2015; Maes, Stevens, & Verkuyten, 2014). Islamophobia he contemporary deinition of Islamophobia is connected with the concept of Orientalism, a term coined by the founder of Postcolonial Studies, Edward Said (Mason & Poynting, 2007; Said, 1979). his word is deined as the asso- ciation of Islam and Arabs with negative images, stereotypes, and sentiments (Said, 1979). he Council on American- Islamic Relations, a civil liberties and advocacy organization, views Islamophobia as a prejudice against or hatred of Islam and Muslims (CAIR, 2013). CAIR also describes an Islamophobe as an individual who holds a closed- minded view of Islam and promotes prejudice against or hatred of Muslims (2013). However, Islamophobia does not pertain to questioning Islam or Muslims about their faith or how they practice; it is not Islamophobic to denounce crimes committed by individual Muslims or those claiming Islam as a motivation for their actions (CAIR, 2013). Since the beginning of the 21st century, there has been a disturbing rise of anti- Muslim sentiment in Europe, the United States, and Canada that has increased as hundreds of thousands of refugees lee the Syrian civil war. Anti- Muslim prejudice was already signiicantly higher than the corresponding lev- els of anti- immigrant prejudice in Europe (Listhaug & Strabac, 2007). A Time magazine poll released in August 2010 found 28% of American voters did not believe Muslims should be eligible to sit on the United States Supreme Court, 1. A literature search was undertaken that included Google Scholar, Social Work Ab- stracts, SAGE, JSTOR, ProQuest using the following keywords: Islamophobia, anti- Muslim big- otry, Muslim, discrimination, school- aged children, and bullying. 6 Siham Elkassem, Rick Csiernik, Andrew Mantulak, Gina Kayssi, Yasmine Hussain et. al and nearly one- third believed that anyone who believes in Islam should be barred from running for President (Altman, 2010). A Canadian poll conducted by Angus Reid Public Opinion found that 68% of Quebecers, and 46% of the rest of Canada held an unfavorable opinion of Islam (Geddes, 2013). Regular discourse of politicians, sensational news media coverage and en- tertainment helps to fuel discrimination, and provides a legitimate platform for anti- Muslim fear- mongering and Islamophobia. According to CAIR, Islam is the most ot- mentioned religion in news coverage, and a substantial portion of that coverage is negative (2016). According to a report issued by Gallup in 2009, media coverage of Islam had a negative tone 40% of the time, and two- thirds of the television coverage about Islam associates extremism with Mus- lims. Politicians in the United States and Canada use Islamophobic speech and legislation to advance their own agenda. During his campaigning, American President Donald Trump proposed a ban on Muslim migration, and then upon gaining the presidency twice attempted to implement an overt Muslim travel ban as one of his irst executive orders. In Canada, MP Kelly Leitch champi- oned the idea of screening immigrants and refugees on Canadian values, dur- ing her unsuccessful campaign to become leader of the Conservative Party. During an event unveiling measures of the Canadian government’s new anti- terrorism legislation Bill C- 5, when asked how they would distinguish between youth who are radicalized and those who are just “messing around,” former Ca- nadian Prime Minister Steve Harper stated: “it doesn’t matter what the age of the person is, or whether they’re in a basement, or whether they’re in a mosque or somewhere else,” (Payton, 2015) reinforcing yet again the idea that anyone engaged in terrorism may be a person who attends a mosque or is a practicing Muslim. Islamophobia can fuel the incidence of hate crimes against any person as- sociated with Islam. Interestingly, victims of discrimination and hate crimes arising from Islamophobia are not just Muslims (Poynting & Perry, 2007). Sub- jects of acts of prejudice and violence have been anyone who looked like they may be from somewhere in the “Middle East”, or “looks Muslim.” his could include dark- skinned, bearded men who wear turbans or women who have their hair wrapped. As a result of these factors, a number of the victims of anti- Muslim violence have not been Muslim, but Sikhs and individuals of Indian, Lebanese Christian, and Greek descent (Poynting & Perry, 2007). In one case in the United States, a Hindu temple was confused with a mosque and targeted by arson (Poynting & Perry, 2007); in Hamilton, Ontario, a Sikh temple was burned down in response to the 9/11 attacks in the United States. In 2014, ater the tragic killings of two Canadian soldiers at the hands of individuals linking themselves to violent extremism, there was an immediate increase in anti- Muslim incidents and hate crimes reported to the National Council of Canadian Muslims (NCCM, 2014). he NCCM received reports of 48 diferent Growing Up Muslim: The Impact of Islamophobia on Children in a Canadian Community 7 hate crime incidents, as follows: 11 physical attacks on individuals or groups of individuals; 34 property attacks on Muslim institutions; and 3 threats against Muslim institutions (NCCM, 2014). Impact on Children Islamophobia has potentially even greater negative impact on Muslim school- aged children, and the consequences of encountering discrimination in the public and at school are numerous and substantive (Arioan, 2012; CAIR- CA, 2015; Zinn, 2001). Mae and colleagues reported that in almost all cities across the world, children from immigrant groups are confronted with stigmatization, discrimination, and unfavorable images of their own group (2013). A study conducted in California involving 621 students enrolled in public and non- Muslim private schools found that these young people routinely faced verbal assaults, speciically those referencing bombs or calling American Muslim stu- dents terrorists. he study also reported that 55% of Muslim students had been bullied; 29% of hijab- wearing students experienced ofensive touching or pull- ing of their hijab; and 19% of the respondents report experiencing cyberbul- lying because of their religion (CAIR- CA, 2015). Studies report Islamophobia manifests at school in the form of teasing, bullying, name- calling, taunting, and physical assaults. Experts have identiied Muslim girls as at risk for harassment by strangers because of headscarves or other identiiable clothing (CAIR- CA, 2015). he majority of the discriminatory incidents reported in these studies occurred in school settings, and are oten perpetrated by students and, in some instances, teachers as well (Arioan, 2012; Maes, Stevens, & Verkuyten, 2013). In 2015, the world witnessed an extreme example of how Islamophobic stereotypes seeped into the school environment. In Irving, Texas, a 14- year- old American Muslim boy, Ahmed Muhammed, was arrested for bringing a home- made clock to school. Many believe because of his religion and race, school authorities assumed the project was a bomb and called law enforcement (Fantz, 2015). Exposure to this type of discrimination may leave children feeling mar- ginalized and disempowered; this could lead to the internalization of negative stereotypes associated with Islam. Students who feel alienated from the school environment may sufer academically, have a low self- concept, and may fail to fully invest in their future (Aroian, 2012; CAIR- CA, 2015). Experts believe that sustained exposure to discrimination has efects that adversely impact mental and physical health and child development (Arioan, 2012). Islamophobia is a phenomenon that has impacted Muslims around the world. It is a form of discrimination that has the potential to manifest into bul- lying and hate crimes among children in schools and adults in broader society. However, little is known in Canada of the lived experience of Muslim children and the impact that Islamophobia has had upon them. he goal of this explor- 8 Siham Elkassem, Rick Csiernik, Andrew Mantulak, Gina Kayssi, Yasmine Hussain et. al atory study is to begin to ill the gaps in the existing body of formal knowledge on this topic in order to build an informed response. Methodology Procedure A letter of information outlining the study and its goals was sent home to the parents of all students in grades six, seven, and eight at a Muslim day school in southwestern Ontario; the letter invited their children to participate in a grade- speciic focus group examining what it is like to grow up Muslim in the community. Students and their parents needed to consent in order to be con- sidered for the study. Focus groups consisting of students in grades six, seven, and eight were conducted at the Muslim day school ater classes were concluded for the day. here were two facilitators in each focus group, at least one of which was a registered social worker with a graduate degree who belonged to the Ontario College of Social Workers and Social Service Workers. At least one member of the interview team was themselves also a self- identiied Muslim. his protocol was established given the topic and the potential emotional responses that may have arisen during the focus group sessions. Students were asked eight open- ended questions (Appendix A). Population A total of 25 students participated in this study; twelve male and thirteen fe- male students divided in the three age- oriented focus groups: six from grade six, nine from grade seven, and ten from grade eight. Data Collection and Analysis Focus group discussions were voice recorded and transcribed verbatim. Tran- scription sotware was not used based upon the assumption that that sotware may not pick up the potential cross- cultural language used by members of the population, particularly that related to Arabic and Islamic faith tradition ter- minology. Transcripts were reviewed for themes by the eight members of the research team, four researchers being Muslim, and then compared. Exemplars supporting each theme were used as a cross- reference mechanism. Growing Up Muslim: The Impact of Islamophobia on Children in a Canadian Community 9 Ethics Ethics approval was granted by the King’s University College Research Ethics Review Committee. Results he Disconnect: How We See Ourselves and Others See Us he most prominent theme that arose from the focus groups was the divide between how the Muslim youth saw themselves, their faith, and their commu- nity and how they viewed non- Muslims perceptions of themselves. Obviously, faith was of great importance to them and being Muslim gave them purpose, pride, and “something to hang on to” (7FV3). Participants indicated that being Muslim kept them out of harm, gave them a sense of compassion and provided guidelines for daily living. Among the most introspective comments was that being Muslim “provided a means to serve God and in this process to serve the community” (8MV3), for the traditional Muslim greeting is one that wishes peace and the mercy of God upon everyone, regardless of faith. Comments made by these pre- teen and teenage participants relected ap- preciation for the sense of respect and community in Islam: I like the amount of respect in our religion . . . I feel like we show respect to ourselves and we show respect to others . . . me and my friend were watch- ing a movie and cashier was Muslim and we just said asalaamu- alkium (may the peace and blessings of God be upon you) and it just makes you feel united. (8FV4) Not surprisingly, this was a media- savvy group and they were well aware of how media portrayed them: he media makes it too hard on Muslims . . . one small mistake and they make a huge deal. (6FV2) I feel angered, to the point where I just turn of the TV and I’ll walk away because I feel like there’s nothing we can do anymore. (8FV4) Also unsurprising were feelings of being continually judged: 10 Siham Elkassem, Rick Csiernik, Andrew Mantulak, Gina Kayssi, Yasmine Hussain et. al A lot of people are scared of us being diferent so they automatically as- sume that it’s bad . . . then they make it seem like we’re weird . . . you don’t drink? hat’s weird. Why don’t you want to get drunk? (7FV3) It’s hard because you cannot give them a good picture of yourself because they already have their own picture that they got from the media. (8MV1) Participants from each of the three grades discussed at length the double standards found in media portrayals and presentations of Muslims: here are people from diferent races that have done so many bad things, yet nobody’s going to go and say oh, you did this and then all of your race is bad, but one Muslim goes and does something and then they’re like oh, this person did this now all Muslims are bad, I don’t know, I may be wrong. Everybody’s looking at me like I’m wrong or something (7FV1) And every participant knew that those around them only thought of Muslims as terrorists: hey’ve portrayed as, in most media, as terrorists and people you have to stay away from. (7MV3) We are portrayed as the villains of this world. (7FV3) If you hear ‘terrorist’, you don’t think of a Mexican or a Canadian, you au- tomatically think of a Muslim. (7MV1) he inluence of the America’s verbose president was also evident on Ca- nadian grade- school- aged children, as comments included that “the president of the United States is against us” (8MV5), “he shows us so much hate” (8FV5), and “he just wants to make people believe that Muslims are not good at all” (7MV1). However, what was surprising was how this message already begins to be internalized at a young age: . . . to be honest, when I think of a terrorist I think of an old Arab guy with a massive beard (7FV2). his fear and negativity culminated in discussions examining Islamopho- bia. Despite all that being Muslim brings and what Islam represents and strives to embody among its adherents, the youth felt that many outside of their faith, outside their community, not only feared them but hated them, even though they were still only children. Growing Up Muslim: The Impact of Islamophobia on Children in a Canadian Community 11 A lot of people are scared of . . . or, like, they’re afraid of us being diferent. So they would automatically assume that, you know, we’re diferent, we’re bad, we’re not good people. (7FV3) Implications of the disconnect here was expression of fear by the youth in every focus group and why this is happening to them: “You feel unsafe because you are a Muslim” (8FV2). Enter- ing into adolescence is a time of uncertainty regardless of who you are, but for this group there was the additional issue of fear of being who they are. his was discussed at several levels beginning with just trying to it in: We all went to a tournament and we had to go pray . . . four or ive of us found a spare room . . . I heard a bunch of guys start coming up and I just remember being so scared  .  .  . like please don’t do anything, please just leave. Please just leave. Please just leave. And aterwards I was like, why on earth was I so scared? (7FV2) Or having to counter misbeliefs about Islam: . . . “but aren’t Muslims sexist?” . . . “Aren’t they transphobic,” and “aren’t they homophobic,” and aren’t they against this and that . . . (7FV2) and dealing with crucial peer- to- peer relationships: I’m also afraid of being judged by people who are Muslim, because there are a couple controversial topics and I feel that people focus more on that than actually what’s haram (forbidden). (8FV4) What was most profound however were the microaggressions participants reporting occurred on a regular (if not daily) basis, that can lead to feelings of being overwhelmed and targeted: I was at Victoria Park and then some guy came by and he started swearing at us . . . and saying you guys are horrible, get out of here, you suck.(6FV5) . . . we sat down somewhere and there were people there they would move away. (6FV3) 12 Siham Elkassem, Rick Csiernik, Andrew Mantulak, Gina Kayssi, Yasmine Hussain et. al In a basketball game when we beat them and we wear hijabs and one of the parents said well at least they didn’t bomb us. (7FV3) Once we were driving . . . there was this one guy . . . and he started scream- ing at us . . . Muslims don’t know how to drive, go back to your own coun- try. (8MV2) Whenever we’re walking around, like me and my mom, you can see peo- ple’s eyes on us . . . just the dirty looks. (8FV4) Microaggressions seem to be experienced more by young Muslim girls than boys, as they are more easily identiiable from afar if they wear hijab: Wearing the hijab can be hard. People might bully you and make fun of you. Like what are you wearing? What is that piece of garbage on your head? (7FV1) I get a lot of points and stares for my hijab during games  .  .  . they were pointing at me and laughing, pointing at my hijab. (7FV3). However, there was also a serious impact on the Muslim boys in the groups who felt powerless to defend their mothers when they are harassed in public because of their appearance. his all contributes to an overall sense of power- lessness, which in turn made these young people feel that they are always on display. hus, there is a sense that they must always be on their best behavior, as they have a greater accountability not only to themselves and their families but to their entire community and religion: Around people we kind of, like, are obliged to be good and everything and set good examples because when a white person does something not that good they think okay . . . but then when a Muslim does something, they think, oh they’re a terrorist. (8FV6) People tend to judge negatively . . . so when you’re walking in the streets you have to try to be your best because if you do something wrong people will be like, oh, see, I told you Muslims are always terrible . . . people are watching you. hey want you to do something wrong. (8MV3) he focus groups occurred shortly ater the February 2017 Quebec City mosque shooting, and this event crystallized the larger macro issues that im- pact Muslim youth: Growing Up Muslim: The Impact of Islamophobia on Children in a Canadian Community 13 Now we’re not allowed to pray in the mosque anymore, for our safety. (6FV2) Our school’s right beside a mosque. I was scared I didn’t want to go to the mosque . . . they killed so many people . . . they were praying. (8MV4) . . . it’s just always in the back of your head . . . am I going to pray peacefully and leave? Is something going to happen? Am I going to die? (8FV4) Resiliency and Hope However, being raised Muslim allows for resiliency in that there is a sense of belonging and community that pervades their lives as they begin to make the transition from childhood to adolescence: here are a lot of Muslims in London, so wherever you go you kind of feel welcome, like even if you go to the randomest place ever and you just see, like a Muslim girl . . . you just kind of smile. (8FV4) I like our religion because most of the acts are toward making the world a better place. (6FV3) he youth also discussed themes of hope and provided examples of how those outside their community have reached out to them and their families spontaneously to show support, that they belong to a larger community and have supportive allies: I play hockey and all my friends . . . my teammates aren’t Muslim but when they ask me what religion I am I tell them and then they’re like, oh nice, and then I tell them we have fast and they’re like, or really? And some of them try to fast a day . . . so it makes me happy. Like they actually care and they don’t take it from the media . . . they actually believe that we’re good. (6MV1) Ater that day (Quebec City mosque shooting), lots of people in London, like from all ethnicities, they came out to the mosque . . . some girl told me how she sympathizes with us and I just felt that was, like really nice. (8FV5) hey say behind every shadow there’s light. he Quebec shooting may have seemed like a terrible event, you might ind no good from it, but you could see that people sympathized for us ater that. hey were kinder to 14 Siham Elkassem, Rick Csiernik, Andrew Mantulak, Gina Kayssi, Yasmine Hussain et. al us. It shows us that there are still people who care. Not everything is dark. (8MV3). Discussion his exploratory study has conirmed what little is already known while gaining new insights with regards to the experience of Muslim children and the impact that Islamophobia has upon them in one Canadian community. he indings are consistent with the existing literature describing how Muslim school- aged children are living within their communities amid discrimination and stigma- tization. Feedback from the participants support the literature related to the rise of Islamophobia, the impact of media including the ‘Trump’ efect, being victims of hateful comments in the community, and experiencing safety issues at school. Children were regularly subjected to oppression, and expressed fear due to being Muslim. Islamophobia is present in their daily living and has a direct impact upon them. However, what the existing literature did not fully relect was an apprecia- tion of the multi- layered impact Muslim children currently face. he impact is felt in how the children saw themselves, their community, and particularly in the fears regarding their personal safety. his study revealed new insights around the disconnect between how Muslim youth see themselves, their faith, and their community and how they perceive non- Muslims’ perceptions of themselves. We learned that these processes happen on several levels for these children, individually as they experience bullying and Islamophobia in their daily lives, but also in the witnessing of micro- and macroaggressions against friends and family. his is coupled with the umbrella Islamophobia that is com- monplace in media that the children were already internalizing. Exposure to this type of discrimination let participants feeling marginalized and disem- powered. Although this disconnect contributes to frustration for Muslim chil- dren, it also provides a space for relection around how their faith is of great importance to them during and because of the turbulent times they live in. heir faith brings them peace despite the oppression they experience due to their beliefs. Many children described their religion as a source of pride and strength, providing them with a sense of respect and community along with a degree of resiliency and guidance on how to live in the world. Analysis of the transcripts relected some of the participants’ awareness of a sense of being ‘cautious’ with non- Muslims, gauging whether they fell into a group that was sensitive to Muslim issues or those who outwardly were dis- criminatory. Participants discussed how media portrayed them negatively, and feelings of being continually judged and stereotyped. he children felt that de- spite all that being Muslim brings and what Islam represents and strives to Growing Up Muslim: The Impact of Islamophobia on Children in a Canadian Community 15 embody among its adherents, that many outside of their faith, outside their community, not only feared them but hated them, even though they were still only children. How challenging this must be as one navigates work, social, and community relationships when you are never sure how you will be received and perceived. here are distinct limitations with this study, as there are with any explor- atory qualitative analysis. he study only involved children from one school in one community who were known to each other. Interviewers were not all Mus- lim, which may have impacted what was and was not shared during the focus groups. he sessions also took place soon ater a major tragedy had befallen the Canadian Muslim community, and thus there was a greater heightened sense of being the other when the focus groups were held. At risk of being too simplistic, much of what is experienced by Muslims from the non- Muslim community is the result of ignorance and lack of educa- tion. Time and again, ignorance has been shown to breed phobias and hate rather than acceptance, especially when individuals in positions of power and dominance are the ones perpetuating the ignorance and fear. In these instanc- es, more of society tends to follow and is even emboldened in their actions. hus, strategies for education need to happen at all levels of intervention, mi- cro, mezzo, and macro. In addition, there needs to be a willingness and con- certed efort to speak out against the discrimination at all levels of society, from the school environment to the larger political arena. he indings of this study can provide an impetus to bring the community at large to talk about the im- plications of the efects of Islamophobia on children and also give parents an opportunity to discuss the issues and the concerns they have for their children and themselves in the current environment of fear and hate. On the micro level, school- aged children who are Muslim would beneit from opportunities to have ongoing conversations about their experiences out- side of their family unit; some participants indicated reluctance to ask certain questions of family members or tell them of all that they experience on a regu- lar basis. Teachers, school staf, and other caregivers would beneit from train- ing related to how to support and respond to children when they face both critical incidents and daily microaggressions and discrimination they currently endure. At a community level, engaging in discussion about the impact Islamo- phobia has on school- aged children, and how to support this community is needed. he challenge for the Muslim community as a whole will be inding a way to bridge this disconnect and navigate the tension in a Canadian context; while there are many supporters and allies, there are communication obstacles in describing the realities of being subject to discrimination and negative ste- reotypes that have an ongoing efect upon their children. 16 Siham Elkassem, Rick Csiernik, Andrew Mantulak, Gina Kayssi, Yasmine Hussain et. al References Altman, A. (2010). TIME poll: Majority oppose mosque, many distrust Muslims. Re- trieved from: http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0, 8599(2011799), 00. Aroian, K. J. (2012). Discrimination against Muslim American adolescents. he Jour- nal of School Nursing, 28(3), 206- 213. https://doi.org/10.1177/1059840511432316 Barbera, R. A. (2008). Relationships and the research process: Participatory action re- search and social work. Journal of progressive human services, 19(2), 140- 159. https://doi.org/10.1080/10428230802475448 Bayrakli, E & Hafez, F. (2015). European Islamophobia Report. SETA/Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research. Retrieved from: http://www.islamopho- biaeurope.com/ reports/2015/en/EIR_2015.pdf CAIR California (2015) MISLABELED: he Impact of School Bullying and Discrimi- nation on California Muslim Students. Retrieved from: https://ca.cair.com/sba/ wp- content/uploads/ 2015/10/CAIR- CA- 2015- Bullying- Report- Web.pdf Diamond, J. (2015). Cable News Network (CNN). Donald Trump: Ban all Muslim travel to U.S. Published Dec. 8, 2015. 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Re- trieved from: http://www.gallup.com/poll/157082/islamophobia- understanding- anti- muslim- sentiment- west.aspx Geddes, J. (2013) Canadian anti- Muslim sentiment is rising, disturbing new poll re- veals. Retrieved from: http://www.macleans.ca/politics/ land- of- intolerance/ Global News. (2017). Anti- Islamic’ protesters demonstrate outside Toronto mosque calling for ban on Islam. Retrieved from: http://globalnews.ca/news/3257296/ anti- islamic- protesters- demonstrate- outside- toronto- mosque- calling- for- ban- on- islam/ Lean, N. (2012). he Islamophobia industry: How the right manufactures fear of Mus- lims. London: Pluto Press. London Census Fact Sheet. (2011) Retrieved from: https://www.london.ca/About- London/ community- statistics/population- characteristics/Documents/4- %20eth- noculturalJune21.pdf Maier, H. W. (Ed.). (1969). hree heories of Child Development: he Contributions of Erik H. Erikson, Jean Piaget and Robert R. Sears, and heir Applications. 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Retrieved from: http:// www.nccm.ca/wp- content/uploads/2015/11/Hate- Crime- Report- 2014- National- Council- of- Canadian- Muslims.pdf National Post. (2017). Enormous’ spike in hate crime reports in Montreal since mosque  attack Retrieved from http://news.nationalpost.com/news/canada/ montreal- man- accused- of- uttering- threats- and- inciting- hatred Ontario Human Rights Commission. (2012) Discrimination experienced by Muslims in Ontario. Retrieved from: http://www.ohrc.on.ca/en/creed- freedom- religion- and- human- rights- special- issue- diversity- magazine- volume- 93- summer- 2012/ discrimination- experienced- muslims- ontario. Oxford Dictionary. (2015). Islamaphobia. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Pyles, L. (2014). heories and ideas for progressive organizer. In L. Pyles (Ed.), Pro- gressive community organizing: Relective practice in a globalizing world (second ed.) (pp. 34- 52). New York: Taylor & Francis Group. Payton, L. (2015). he Canadian Broadcasting Company (CBC). Muslim groups ‘troubled’ by Stephen Harper’s mosque remark. Retrieved from : http://www. cbc.ca/news/politics/muslim- groups- troubled- by- stephen- harper- s- mosque- remark- 1.2940488 Pew Research Centre (2009). Mapping the Global Muslim Population: A report on the size and distribution of the world’s Muslim population. he Pew Forum on Reli- gious and Public Life. Retrieved from: http://www.pewforum.org/iles/2009/10/ Muslimpopulation.pdf Poynting, S., & Perry, B. (2007). Climates of hate: Media and state inspired victimiza- tion of Muslims in Canada and Australia since 9/11. Current Issues in Criminal Justice, 19(2), 150- 171. Said, E. (1979). Orientalism. 1978. New York: Vintage, 1994. Said, E. (2008). Covering Islam: How the media and the experts determine how we see the rest of the world (Fully revised edition). Random House. Strabac, Z., & Listhaug, O. (2008). Anti- Muslim prejudice in Europe: A multilevel analysis of survey data from 30 countries. Social Science Research, 37(1), 268- 286. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssresearch.2007.02.004 Strauss, A., & Corbin, J. (1994). Grounded theory methodology. Handbook of qualita- tive research, 273- 285. he Star. (2017). Liberal MP swamped by hate mail, threats over anti- Islamophobia motion in Commons. Retrieved from: https://www.thestar.com/news/ canada/2017/02/16/liberal- mp- swamped- by- hate- mail- threats- over- anti- islamophobia- motion- in- commons.html Walker, D., & Myrick, F. (2006). Grounded theory: An exploration of pro- cess and procedure. Qualitative health research, 16(4), 547- 559. https://doi. org/10.1177/1049732305285972 18 Siham Elkassem, Rick Csiernik, Andrew Mantulak, Gina Kayssi, Yasmine Hussain et. al Zinn, J. (2001). Muslim youth in Canadian schools: Education and the politics of reli- gious identity. Anthropology and Education Quarterly, 32(4), 399- 423. https://doi. org/10.1525/aeq.2001.32.4.399 Appendix A: Youth Instrument What do you like about being Muslim? What do you dislike about being Muslim? Have you ever been treated diferently because you are Muslim compared to non- Muslims you know? How do you see Muslims in the media? How do images of how Muslims are shown impact you? Have there been any incidents that you witnessed or heard of that have made you feel unsafe because you are Muslim? When I say “Islamophobia” what does it mean to you? Is there anything else that you would like to talk about on this subject that I haven’t asked you? 10381607.0012.101 
work_62flh5fadrbzlmsehqzqngptiq	----	Emotions and criminal justice S U S A N N E K A R S T E D T Keele University, UK Abstract During the last decade, a process of ‘emotionalization of law’ has spread around the globe, changing the criminal justice system in many ways. Anger, disgust and shame are perceived as ‘valuable barometers of social morality’ and brought back to criminal procedures. The ‘return of emotions’ to penal law and criminal justice is linked to and illuminates the moral imagination of late modern societies. This article seeks to address two facets of the ‘return of emotions’ to criminal justice. The first part explores the changes in the public sphere and in the pattern of emotional culture in late modern societies that are responsible for the re- emotionalization of the penal realm. In the second part, problems that emerge in the criminal justice system are addressed. Bringing emotions back involves profound problems that go beyond the mere instrumental use of emotions in criminal justice, or a restricted perspective of ‘what works’. Three ‘core’ problems—and associated—questions are discussed: first, are emotional reactions towards crimes ‘natural’ or ‘primordial’ such that they should occupy a prominent place in criminal justice that has been unduly ignored? Second, and relatedly, do emotions constitute our moral principles? Finally, should institutions elicit or even require ‘authentic emotions’ from individuals? These questions are addressed within the framework of contemporary emotion theory and the consequences of this perspective for the ‘use’ of emotions in criminal justice are discussed. Key Words emotion • emotionalization • emotion theory • late modernity • penal law Theoretical Criminology © 2002 SAGE Publications London, Thousand Oaks and New Delhi. 1362–4806(200208)6:3 Vol. 6(3): 299–317; 026025 299 http:\\www.sagepublications.com Emotions and penal law Emotions pervade penal law and the criminal justice system. Offenders, victims and witnesses bring their emotions to the courtroom, criminal courts deal with crimes of passion, and their decisions can occasion public outrage and anger, or feelings of vengeance among victims. Offenders feel shame and remorse when they have transgressed the laws, and offences provoke feelings of moral disgust. At the same time, victims as well as offenders elicit our compassion and sympathy. Law has by no means been blind to this invasion of emotions into its very realm. It explicitly references and grants legitimacy to emotions through legal defences (as in crimes of passion); by establishing specific categories of behaviour like ‘hate crimes’, or by restricting the admission of evidence that might influence the emotions of jury members and judges (as, for example, in victim statements—see Posner, 2000). Legal institutions and in particular the criminal justice system are the very institutions in society that are designed to deal with the most intense emotions and emotional conflicts, with individual as well as collective emotions. The criminal courts and procedures are a prominent institutional space and institutional mechanism for emotions in society.1 The particular position of penal law and the criminal justice system in the emotional space delineated by societies has long since captured the imagination of social theorists, and figures prominently in the work of Durkheim and Elias. Both realized that penal law was deeply embedded in the emotional culture of societies, and intricately linked to the structural and institutional patterns of society. Consequently, decisive changes in the ‘morality’ (Durkheim) and ‘mentality’ (Elias) of societies are at the roots of the historical development of penal law and punishment, and criminal justice illuminates—or more technically, indicates—subterranean shifts in the emotional culture of societies. Interestingly, both of these theorists interpreted the historical change from traditional to modern society as a pathway that continuously and consistently limited and changed the role of emotions in the public sphere, and, as a result, modes of penal law and punishment. Modern societies, highly differentiated and interdependent, rely on other and more subtle mechanisms to ensure compliance with norms than the crude and simple arousal of moral and collective emotions by criminal proceedings and the (public) execution of sanctions. In jurisprudence, the history of penal law and criminal justice is in fact cast as a process that has more strictly confined and more precisely outlined the space of emotions, and limited the amount of emotionality that is admitted in courts. The conventional story of modern penal law portrays a narrowly delineated list and proper roles for emotions in the legal realm, so that emotions do not intrude into the true preserve of law: reason (Bandes, 1999a: 2). Such a juxtaposition of reason and emotion, one deeply embedded in modern thought, seems within the normative framework of Theoretical Criminology 6(3)300 jurisprudence to ignore vital facets of the actual role of emotions in law and legal procedures (see Douglas, 1993). The edifice of penal law itself is erected on a strong undercurrent of emotions: the fear of sanctions, that should instil compliance, or vengeance that is to be channelled by legal procedures (Elster, 1999). Popular wisdom as well as criminological theory have both established fear of sanctions as a cornerstone and powerful mechanism of the criminal justice system, the thing that makes it work. Far from precluding rational action, emotions may facilitate a ‘rational response’—for example, to the experience of injustice. The ‘handling of emotions’ within the criminal justice system is not a priori ‘rational’, neither in its procedural arrangements nor with regard to its final out- comes, but designed according to specific functions. Both offenders and victims react by no means in principle emotionally, but make ‘rational decisions’ when dealing with the criminal justice system: offenders try to find ways of beating the system, or victims weigh the advantages and disadvantages of invoking the law (Poletta, 2001).2 During the last decade, the secular process of restricting the space of emotions in the penal realm seems to have taken a turn towards bringing emotions back in. A process of ‘re-emotionalization of law’ or the ‘reasser- tion of emotionality in law’ (Laster and O’Malley, 1996) spread around the globe, and has changed the criminal justice system in many ways. The ‘return of emotions’ to criminal justice and penal policies has occurred in two arenas: the emotionalization of public discourse about crime and criminal justice, and the implementation of sanctions in the criminal justice system that are explicitly based on—or designed to arouse—emotions. Both developments corresponded to the changing space of emotions and the emotional culture of late modern societies, and it can be assumed that these processes have fuelled one another. This article seeks to address both these facets of the ‘return of emotions’ to criminal justice. In the first part, I argue that changes in the public sphere and emotional culture of late modern societies are responsible for the re- emotionalization of the penal realm. In the second part, I address the problems that consequently emerge in the criminal justice system. Bringing emotions back involves profound problems that go beyond the mere instrumental use of emotions in criminal justice, or a restricted perspective of ‘what works’. I will discuss three ‘core’ problems and a series of associated questions: first, are emotional reactions towards crimes ‘natural’ or ‘primordial’, such that they need not only a proper but a prominent place in criminal justice which has been unduly ignored? Second, and relatedly, do emotions constitute our moral principles? Finally, I deal with a series of questions concerning the invisibility of emotions; should institu- tions elicit or even require ‘authentic emotions’ from individuals? What is the different role and impact of emotions in criminal justice in a culture which ritualizes emotional expression or promotes individualistic, Karstedt—Emotions and criminal justice 301 authentic expression? These questions will be addressed within the frame- work of contemporary emotion theory. The ‘return of emotions’ ‘The Return of Shame’—as described in a Newsweek article in 1995—has brought back an emotion to the criminal justice system that had been dismissed as hopelessly old-fashioned during previous decades. Judges in the United States were the first to remake the courts and the criminal justice system as a public space of emotions. Offenders were ordered by courts to wear T-shirts in public that identified them as thieves. Young offenders had to apologize on their knees to their victims with members of the community present. Sexual offenders had to erect signs on their front lawn warning the public about the inhabitant; another court order sent the victims of a burglary to the house of the offender to take from it what they liked (see Massaro, 1991, 1997; Anderson, 1995; Karstedt, 1996). What is striking about these sentences, is not only the explicit use of emotion, but the way it is done, the great emphasis placed on their publicness. The thin line between shame, humiliation and stigmatization was consistently ignored, and the question of whether shame has the impact intended if imposed in such ways never asked (see Elster, 1999: 145). The effects of constant and public terrorization of norm-violators by an emotional mechanism (which the judges assumed to be shame) on the offender and/or watching specta- tors was never questioned in these cases. The revival of shame in the first instance came with ‘episodic, almost whimsical bursts of judicial, legislative or prosecutorial inspiration’ (Massaro, 1991: 1940), which were nonethe- less the first and most visible signs of the return of emotions. The influential movement of restorative justice in criminology and criminal justice is based in contrast on a theoretical concept. In his book Crime, Shame and Reintegration (1989), Braithwaite carefully developed a theoretical argument to the effect that shaming the offence, but not the offender, will reintegrate the offender into the community. In indigenous procedures of ‘conferencing’ from New Zealand and Australia he found settings in which shaming and reintegration could simultaneously work.3 In particular, he gave the victims a strong role and presence in these procedures. Their participation should make the process of shaming powerful and lasting. The conferences were designed to allow for emotional experiences and expressions of shame, remorse, guilt and anger, but also of sympathy and forgiveness. The fact that procedures of re- storative justice have become the most successful reform movement in criminal justice world-wide shows that the return of emotions has struck a cord in the criminal justice system and with the public. In instances as diverse as drunk driving, teenage shoplifting and domestic violence (as well as in the Truth and Reconciliation Commissions for perpetrators of past regimes) emotions were brought back into legal procedures and made an Theoretical Criminology 6(3)302 essential part of them. While restorative justice brought victims to centre- stage, it made it perfectly clear that justice is relational, something that establishes an emotional connection between the victim, the offender and the often neglected actors who actually impose the punishment (see Elster, 1989; Karstedt, 1993). Criminology and jurisprudence have rediscovered both individual and collective emotions (Skillen, 1980; Pratt, 2000; Freiberg, 2001). Leading figures in the economic analysis of law (Posner, 2000) have turned to emotions, and discovered that ‘the violation of norms triggers strong, emotional reactions, in the offender as well as in others’ (Elster, 1989: 100). But it comes as a striking fact that the ‘moral sentiments’ identified by most of these authors as the foundations of law are what can be termed ‘negative emotions’ (Solomon, 1990; Bandes, 1999b; Kahan, 1999; Posner, 2000). Moral disgust, revulsion and feelings of vengeance are found to be ‘valua- ble barometers of societal morality’ (Bandes, 1999a: 4), serving as a legitimate foundation for law and legal procedures. This stands in stark contrast to early theories on moral sentiments found in the writings of Adam Smith, Hume and Hutcheson. These authors embedded the moral bond in emotions of sympathy and empathy, wherein the ‘strong senti- ments of morals’ are based on ‘indignation’ as well as ‘tender-heartedness’ (see, for a discussion, Solomon, 1990, 1994; Boltanski, 1999). These developments are in line with changes in public and political discourse about crime, and take up the process of emotionalization that is characteristic of the public sphere of late modernity. The return of shame, restorative justice and the emotionalization of public discourse about crime and law, are responding to changes in wider emotional culture, and changing the moral imagination of these societies. The media engage their public in ‘distant suffering’ (Boltanski, 1999)—compassion and sympathy with victims, expressions of moral disgust towards offences and the perpetrators. An intensely emotional discourse about crime thus comes to be fuelled by the most recent and most heinous offence. Crime policies are explicitly based on the expression of collective emotions of fear and anger about crime. Politicians compete with each other in addressing the ‘emo- tional’ needs of the public, and in turn mirror these emotions back to the audience and the electorate. National and even global audiences become highly emotionalized ‘moral spectators’ in the spectacles of distant suffer- ing of victims and perpetrators. In a public sphere constituted by distant suffering, and the emotions it arouses and the moral commitment it induces, the task of criminal justice is extremely simplified: justice for victims means making offenders suffer the harshest punishment available. But as Boltanski shows, social distance and what Hirschman calls ‘benevolent disinterest’ are nonetheless required from truly moral spectators. They have to show a certain amount of impartiality and even, paradoxically, indifference if their emotions and moral commitment are to become authentic (Boltanski, 1999; Karstedt, 2000). The emotionalized discourse about crime and criminal justice in the Karstedt—Emotions and criminal justice 303 public sphere is defined by the absence of such indifference and impartial- ity. Even if we do not agree with Charles Taylor (1992) that ‘victimization’ is the defining feature of public discourse in late modernity, a certain imbalance of public interest, moral commitment and compassion towards the victim is obvious.4 In Britain, public demands for representation of the emotions of victims in the criminal justice system have been widely supported. Their sorrow, rage and anger, and feelings of vengeance need to be voiced, and ‘healed’ by the sanction imposed on the offender. This imbalance in the collective emotional mood thus easily intrudes in- to the criminal justice system, where decisions disadvantage actual offenders. The social context in which these developments take place is the increas- ingly emotionalized cultures of late modern societies (see Wouters, 1986; Vester, 1991; Barbalet, 1998; Neckel, 1999; Williams, 2001).5 Modern societies clearly stress individual autonomy and individual self-representa- tion. This includes the open display of emotions and the claim that these have to be considered as singular and authentic expressions of the auton- omy and identity of the individual. The significance of the expression of emotions corresponds to the importance of emotional experiences and fulfilment. Cross-cultural research shows that individuals are more risk- taking and thrill-seeking—both intense emotional experiences—in modern societies than in more traditional ones (Triandis, 1994; Karstedt, 2001). At the same time, individualization in the display of emotions and emotionality is juxtaposed by an extremely distant emotionality that characterizes the public sphere, the aforementioned feature of ‘distant suffering’. The media bring home the ‘spectacle’ of suffering to very diffused spectators, and elicit strong emotional reactions like sorrow, rage, anger and compassion.6 Social movements and organizations try to convert these emotions into participation in their tasks and targets. Such distant moral sentiments are no longer embedded in direct interactions between individuals or in the social space of communities. As such they lack mutuality and duration, and become more fleeting and volatile. The objects of our compassion, anger and fear change quickly, the media operating with a keen sense of the half-life of emotional arousal in the public sphere. Between the individualization of emotionality on the one hand, and distant emotionality on the other, the emotional space of groups seems to have been eroded. Joint experiences of emotions, emotions which are embedded in group rituals and the display of collective identity are not common in late modern societies. More often they take the form of deviant reactions—such as rioting or football hooliganism—when rage and anger is vented (see Dunning et al., 1986; Dunning, 1992; Frijda, 1996). The criminal law and criminal justice system respond to the bi-partite nature of emotionality in modern societies, on the one hand by opening up more space for the expression of individual emotions, on the other by increas- ingly responding to public and collective emotions. It comes as no surprise Theoretical Criminology 6(3)304 that shame has played a prominent role in this process, since this emotion establishes a link between the individual and the public sphere. Three core problems I want to explore the core problems and questions I outlined earlier using three exemplary ‘stories’. The first two of these illuminate problems and questions related to the nature of the link between emotions, law and morality. Is the criminal justice system linked to and founded on basic emotional reactions towards crimes and offenders, and are such basic emotions constitutive of morality? When I came to the UK in June 2000, I was soon confronted with a tabloid-led campaign of ‘naming and shaming’ paedophiles that followed the abduction and murder of 8-year-old Sarah Payne. The public reacted with an extreme display of emotions: strangers left flowers and teddy bears at the site where Sarah Payne’s body had been found, the service became a media spectacle of outbursts of emotions, and vengeful groups gathered before the houses of those who had been named in a newspaper campaign as paedophiles. This differed considerably from what had taken place in Germany in a very similar case only a year before. Thousands of men had (more or less) voluntarily enlisted for a genetic test (by which route the offender was ultimately found), but the public display of emotional reac- tions was not comparable to what had taken place in Britain. Emotional practices in public reactions towards crime are obviously and decisively shaped by specific emotional cultures and their institutional settings (such as modal national character, specific models, or characteristic features of the legal and political system), even if the cultures are otherwise very similar—as is the case with Britain and Germany—in their general emotional reactions (Mesquita et al., 1997; Mikula et al., 1998). This suggests that criminal justice is not based on specific basic emotions that are ‘primordial’ to its existence, but, rather, that the specific institutional and cultural pattern in which these emotions are embedded constitute and define the emotional reaction. Emotions seem to be only loosely coupled to the institutional framework which gives space to a diversity of emotions and emotional practices. The spontaneity of the public’s emotional reaction in Britain confirms more a well-established cultural pattern than a col- lective ‘natural response’. My second exemplary story explores further the problem of basic emotions and their constitutive role in criminal justice. It was written by Plato in his Socratic dialogue ‘Protagoras’ (1987) nearly 2400 years ago. At the dawn of humankind, human beings were incapable of living together, their cities torn with violence and strife. Thus, Zeus feared that humankind was in danger of utter destruction. He sent his messenger who was, Karstedt—Emotions and criminal justice 305 remarkably, the god both of merchants and thieves, down to earth with two gifts that should enable humankind successfully to establish commu- nities and live together safely and amicably. These two gifts were shame and law, and Zeus gave orders to his messenger to distribute them equally among human beings. Thus, they were equally endowed with a ‘moral sense’ which was based on a strong emotion and gave them the capacity of autonomous moral judgements and, simultaneously, with a framework of common norms and principles. It is clear that Plato posits a basic emotion—shame—as the foundation of morality and law, exactly the one that has figured prominently in the late modern return of emotions. Nonetheless, the link is not clear, and there are several types. Braithwaite adopts a position which can be described as ‘functionalist’, as for him shame as a moral sentiment has two functions in producing compliance: it inhibits people from transgressing the moral norms and laws, and it establishes the self as a moral self in one’s own and others’ eyes. According to the ‘constitutive’ position (Taylor, 1987) moral sentiments provide the motivation to comply with moral norms. Morality is based on the capacity of individuals to feel shame after having trans- gressed the norms, and accordingly the moral sentiment constitutes moral action. The ‘indicative’ link between emotions and morality establishes a relationship in which emotions are only the consequence or expression of moral engagement in one’s own actions or those of others, and of moral principles which have been accepted. Moral sentiments are neither con- stitutive nor a motivation for moral action, but are attached to a moral principle and judgement (see Nunner-Winkler, 1998). This is essentially the position of Durkheim, that strong moral sentiments indicate strong moral norms, and reinforce these norms following their violation. My final exemplary story explores a problem, one that becomes im- portant when emotions return to criminal justice in an emotional culture, concerning the authenticity of emotions: their invisibility.7 In 1517, Martin Luther started Reformation in Germany by hammering his 95 propositions to the door of the church in Wittenberg. In about one-third of them, Luther argued that no institution could and should interfere with individual repentance, and feelings of shame and guilt, let alone use or exploit them for institutional purposes. Interestingly, in some of his main arguments he contended that only God—not even always the offender—could know if these feelings were authentic and truthful (Luther, undated). What is important here is not that this was one of the many steps on the way towards individualism and modernity, but that Luther was aware of the invisibility of emotions and the problems this fact causes for any social institution that deals with them. How can we know that offenders really feel shame and remorse in restorative justice conferences? How ‘true’ are expressions of anger voiced by victims? Would we rate a restorative justice conference less successful if everyone present only pretended his/her feel- ings, or would we rely on their actions, or the final outcome? How fearful Theoretical Criminology 6(3)306 or angry are victims really, or do emotional public responses to, and demands for action against, crime (as witnessed in the campaign for ‘Sarah’s Law’) merely indicate a public caught up in media and political scripts?8 Obviously, the quest for authentic emotions in late modern societies and the fact that they are ‘invisible’ contradict each other, and even in societies where the authentic display of emotions is demanded and rewarded, people will hide many if not most of them. Significantly, shame cultures have ritualized and formalized the expression of shame, authenticity is not requested and the strength of emotions is not relevant. It is hard to discern if that has an impact on the intensity of the emotion. In the absence of such formalized emotional practices, the return of shame resulted in sentences and practices which tried to elicit an intense and authentic feeling of shame, and there were few restrictions on how that was achieved. Answers to these questions and solutions to these problems will define the role and the space of emotions in criminal justice. Contemporary psychological theory has in particular addressed the problems of basic and universal emotions, how emotions are linked to social settings and the way cultural practices influence, regulate and define emotions. Perspectives from contemporary emotion theory Though an extremely diverse field, contemporary emotion theory does not conceptualize emotions as ‘unitary, elementary entities’ but instead as ‘multi-componential phenomena’.9 Rather than assuming homogenous emotional states and a definite number of basic and universal emotions, emotion processes consisting of ‘concurrent changes in several different components’ are of central importance, thus making emotions dynamic. Such a perspective is based on the notion that human beings have a universal emotional potential, but that this is realized in actual emotional practices, and in concrete social and cultural settings. Across cultures, emotions like anger and fear, or disgust and shame therefore simultane- ously can be similar in some respects, and different in others. Expressions of emotions will vary from culture to culture even if they have a universal base. Thus, universal recognition of a particular facial expression as depicting anger, or blushing as a sign of shame, does not rule out the possibility that the counterparts of both emotions in other cultures may be different in those events that arouse them, and with regard to the actual emotional practices in which they are embedded. This applies equally to different contexts within a culture. The components of an emotion do not automatically follow from each other or from context-specific character- istics. A procedure explicitly designed to arouse shame may equally arouse feelings of humiliation and anger. Universality of emotions therefore can be Karstedt—Emotions and criminal justice 307 ‘established only for components of emotions rather than for emotions as a whole’ (Mesquita et al., 1997: 259–60). The emotion process (see Figure 1) includes the following components: an antecedent event, an emotional experience and an appraisal of the event, physiological change and change in action readiness, a specific behaviour or emotional practice, a change in cognitive functioning and beliefs and a regulatory process which determines its course. The intensity and ‘power’ of emotions (Frijda, 1996), drastic action impulses, long duration of feelings as in revenge (Frijda, 1994) or profound changes in beliefs, are caused by the interaction of these components and the strength of emotions built up during the process. Emotions result from individual concerns that are essential in the definition and appraisal of a situation. In particular, individual goals, motives and values that relate individuals with social and common con- cerns emerge when an event is appraised as harming or threatening. Concerns like prestige and self-esteem, or the sense of belonging are linked to emotions of pride and shame. Concern for identity and autonomy arouses intense feelings of anger if not treated with respect and recognition, and being shamed is a most powerful source of rage and feelings of revenge. Research on ghetto youths has established the close link between violent behaviour and the ‘search for respect’ (Bourgois, 1995). Most important here is the fact that individual concerns are derived from social values and common or even universal concerns, and thus link Figure 1 Component-process-model of emotions Source: Adapted from Frijda (1996) Theoretical Criminology 6(3)308 individual and collective emotions. Concerns arise from social and moral values of justice and fairness, which are universal to all cultures (see Schwartz, 1992, 1994; Schwartz and Sagiv, 1995). Concerns about basic moral principles are affected when these are injured. The collective nature of such concerns implies that not only individual experiences but equally experiences of others are events that are linked to emotions of anger as well as sympathy and compassion. Regulation rules are a component of the emotion process that are particularly important for the development of shared emotional practices. They control and inhibit the display of emotions, they define the proper social space for emotions, and they restrict emotional action. The role of regulation rules becomes obvious when control is lifted within the social environment: when collective expressions of anger and disgust are en- couraged, articulation of hatred is rewarded, or revenge is subtly praised (Frijda, 1996: 20). Regulation rules define the importance of emotions of victims, and the amount of display in social space, and they equally restrict the emotional space of offenders. Legal procedures provide an elaborately regulated space for emotions. What then are the implications of contemporary emotion theory for the core problems of primordial emotions, basic emotions and the link between emotions, morality and the law? One of the most important conclusions from contemporary emotion theory is that penal law and legal procedures are not built on ‘basic emotions’, but are part of the emotion process. They establish an institu- tional context and regulatory processes for a diversity of emotional compo- nents. In particular, legal procedures have the task of establishing those rules of justice and fairness that prevent additional arousal of emotions of anger and feelings of revenge, and that enhance the acceptance of the legal and moral judgment by the offender and the victim. Evidence from research on procedural justice shows that violations of these basic rules arouse those feelings, and as a consequence, decrease the readiness of offenders to accept the judgment and the moral rationale behind it (Tyler, 1990). Resulting feelings of anger and revenge might change beliefs about the fairness and legitimacy of these institutions profoundly. The most important compo- nents of fairness rules are that offenders can tell ‘their stories’, that they are not humiliated before their own peer group and that their self-esteem is not stripped from them. Cross-cultural research has provided evidence of the universality of these values as well as of their importance in legal proce- dures (Schwartz, 1992). It is highly probable that the ‘return of shame’ to the courtrooms will violate these rules, and arouse much more anger and revenge in those who are treated in this way. Contemporary emotion theory suggests that legal procedures and pun- ishment fulfil different tasks and are linked to different emotion processes. The secular changes of penal sanctions during the last centuries provide ample evidence from history that penal punishments are not linked to Karstedt—Emotions and criminal justice 309 universal and basic moral sentiments, but are embedded into the moral imagination of societies and the context of imagined communities (Ander- son, 1983). The spectacle of public executions obviously aroused thrill and excitement among the crowds, and it took some efforts during the 19th century to make it a more sombre event until they were finally banned from public view (Pratt, 2000). The theory would imply further that a diversity of emotions is involved in the process of punishment, and that different emotions restrict and balance each other. It stresses the situational pattern in which emotions are aroused, and the importance of appraisal processes. Punishment is rarely imposed by those who were victims of the offence, and the emotions involved on the side of those who punish have barely got consideration (but see Elster, 1989). Parents or teachers mostly punish children for what they did to others. The type and severity of the punishment imposed by them therefore results from the social bonds that are established and the emo- tions of love and sympathy attached to them; these function as inhibitors to extremely severe reactions. Research on the expectations and experiences of sanctions by juvenile offenders shows that parents normally do not react in a way that would endanger those bonds, but try instead to secure and confirm these bonds in their reactions to an offence committed by their children (Karstedt, 1989, 1993). Courts and juries that are embedded in communities have hesitated to give death sentences, as in the case of a young woman who had murdered her two children. As long as victims were directly involved in the punishment of offenders, practices of restorative justice prevailed (Braithwaite, 2001). In the present context of the spectacle of ‘distant suffering’ where such bonds do not exist, the lack of inhibiting emotions of sympathy and empathy seems to give way to excessive demands for punishment by ‘moral spectators’. Contemporary emotion theory clearly refutes the notion that moral principles and the edifice of law are erected on basic and universal sentiments, and that the latter constitute these principles. Instead, moral principles and axioms of justice and fairness define the concerns, and thus the events that arouse ‘moral sentiments’. Consequently, emotions like anger and disgust and shame are ‘indicators’ of our moral beliefs and convictions—they do not constitute them. ‘Once established, justice is naturally attached with a strong sentiment of morals’ (Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, cited in Solomon, 1990: 198), but justice needs to be established first. Evidence from longitudinal research on the moral develop- ment of children shows that very young children understand moral princi- ples (right versus wrong) but do not attach moral sentiments to them. These are developed at a later stage, the process of attachment being mostly finalized at the age of 10 (Nunner-Winkler, 1998). In particular, historical change and cultural diversity of emotions of moral disgust show that these emotions are linked to antecedent moral judgments and do not constitute them, as I will discuss in the following section. Theoretical Criminology 6(3)310 Disgust, anger, shame: some cautious notes on the use of emotions in criminal justice The recent discourse about law and emotions has been dominated by three emotions—disgust, anger and shame. Though this discourse lingers between constructionist perspectives and assumptions about ‘primordial’ emotions, between a constitutive, functionalist and indicative role of emotions for law and morality, there is nonetheless a strong consensus that emotions could and should be used in the legal sphere and in lawmaking more than in the past. As noted above, legal theorists have identified disgust as a legitimate and valuable barometer of societal morality (Bandes, 1999a: 4; Kahan, 1999; Posner, 1999, 2000). Disgust should and could have a legitimate place in the legal arena. It has been argued that law should shape the cognitive contents of the emotion by leading us to feel disgust for heinous but not sufficiently punished acts like racial violence or hate crimes (Kahan, 1999; see Poletta, 2001 for a critique). In particular, the latter—more con- structionist—perspective is in line with conclusions from emotion theory. Nonetheless, it has to be stressed here that universal components in the emotion process are embedded into concrete cultural settings which define the content of moral rules, and thus the situations when disgust is elicited. Cross-cultural studies in more than 35 countries show that feelings of disgust are mostly and universally related to moral evaluations and events of violation of moral norms, in contrast to anger, which is related to experiences of injustice (Scherer, 1991, 1997). However, the fuelling of emotions of disgust has led societies to treat marginalized groups as if they were less than human, and in particular has instigated racial violence amounting to genocide (Nussbaum, 1999). In his book Ordinary Men, Browning (1992) shows how the members of a police battalion in occupied Poland voiced their disgust about the Jewish popula- tion, and how they used this emotion in their moral legitimation of the mass murder in which they participated.10 These emotions had been consistently fuelled among the population during the Nazi Regime (and before), and this process was related to laws that step-by-step deprived the Jewish population in Germany of their civil and finally human status. Most infamous in this process were the Nuremberg Laws issued in 1936, which prohibited marriages between Jews and other Germans, and barred Jews from employing German girls in their households and businesses with accompanying propaganda that Jews were paedophiles. Existing moral norms and the emotions attached to them were thus used to direct emotional reactions of disgust towards the marginalized group. Disgust is ‘brazenly and uncompromising judgmental’ (Nussbaum, 1999: 21) and therefore comes with a powerful potential for disruptive and violent consequences. As much as it might be ‘necessary . . . for perceiving and motivating opposition to cruelty’ (Nussbaum, 1999: 21), disgust is also heavily implicated in the commission of cruelty. Using it in the legal realm Karstedt—Emotions and criminal justice 311 as a ‘barometer of social morality’ deprives the law of much of its own potential of establishing justice and fairness. Anger is the emotion most clearly linked to concerns and values about justice and fair treatment (Frijda, 1996; Mesquita et al., 1997; Scherer, 1997). Notwithstanding cultural differences with regard to the intensity and the display of anger, the emotional link seems to be universal. We get angry when we and others are not treated fairly, or are humiliated, or when our social position and self-esteem are hurt. Legal procedures have a central role in society as they provide justice, both channelling such feelings and simultaneously arousing them. Anger of victims of crime might be linked to such a sense of ‘unfair’ treatment by fellow citizens. But it is much less clear how ‘anger about crime’ is aroused in those who have not been a victim and who have no personal experience of crime (Farrall, 2001). What kind of concerns and emotional experiences are involved, and what are the underlying emotion components and processes, when a majority of the population declares that they are ‘angry about crime’? Before designing ‘affective crime prevention policies’ (Freiberg, 2001) that take into account such emotional processes, we need to establish which kind of emotion and emotion process are involved, if at all. Shame, remorse and guilt are emotions most closely linked to the criminal justice system and the community it represents. Among them shame is defined as the emotion that is embedded in the bonds to groups and communities, and therefore a visible physiological reaction—blush- ing—is attached to it. Shame is a tremendously complex emotion, depend- ent on specific contexts, related to a range of other emotions, and actions (Lewis, 2000). Violations of self-esteem, humiliation and stigmatization cause shame as well as anger, varying with the context and the concerns. Obviously, legal procedures have the potential to evoke shame in offenders, but like other modern institutions they do not require particular emotional reactions.11 The return of shame might have counterproductive conse- quences when shame interferes with procedural justice and fairness, and causes anger and defiance. Legal institutions are not based on a small number of basic emotions, but on different and contradictory ones. Processes of punishment are linked to feelings of disgust as well as being embedded in emotions of sympathy. Any efforts to bring one of these to the forefront, and make it the foundation of criminal justice procedures, will necessarily ignore the range of moral sentiments which are involved in the individual as well as in the collective. The fact that emotional reactions are attached to moral norms does not necessarily imply the strategic use of emotions in, for example, defining laws against hate crimes or violations of human rights. The complex and complicated role and space of emotions within the legal system does not allow for easy solutions. Theoretical Criminology 6(3)312 Notes 1. The place of emotions is not assigned exclusively to the criminal court. Tort laws and family courts similarly deal with intense emotions. 2. Research consistently shows that victims mostly want to have their damage restored, and that they are rarely vengeful in their demands for punishment for the offender (Sessar, 1992). Victims seem to be, in particular, sensitive to the impact of legal action within their social networks. 3. See, for revisions of the theory and practice, Ahmed et al. (2001). 4. At the turn of the 18th to the 19th century, public emotions and compas- sion started to be directed towards the offender, in particular those who were imprisoned. The attack on the Bastille during the French Revolution was driven by public outrage about innocent prisoners (though they were actually quite comfortably accommodated); operas like Beethoven’s Fidelio show how public emotions were expressed in the arts. The ‘longue durée’ of compassion with the offender as a victim of society, which lasted through the 19th and 20th century, seems today to have come to a halt. 5. In terms of Elias’ theory of the civilization process, these developments are often analysed as ‘de-civilization’ (Fletcher, 1995, 1997; Pratt, 2000). Nonetheless, this perspective only grasps the regulation or de-regulation of the expression of emotions, and implies a strong bias towards processes of social control. 6. When I asked a movie director why people cry in the cinema, but not in the theatre, his answer was clear and to the point: ‘Close-ups’. 7. See Katz (1999: 316) for a more detailed discussion. 8. See Farrall (2001) for an exploration of ‘anger’ about crime. His results show that ‘anger about crime’ seems to be more an emotional reaction that people feel they ought to have than an actual emotional experience. Jones and Newburn (2002) show that notwithstanding public outrage and support for ‘Sarah’s Law’, its final failure in Britain shows it not to be a solely emotionalized public issue. 9. Ekman and Davidson (1994), and Lewis and Haviland-Jones (2000) provide excellent overviews. 10. Since Browning analysed the files of the investigation and ensuing inter- rogation that took place some 10 years later, these are memories of emotions, which nonetheless seemed to be still extremely vivid at that time. These emotions of disgust were expressed at a time when the moral code had been definitely changed, at least officially and in public. 11. We are not required to feel emotions about our work, or our superiors, or what we produce. Nonetheless, in a recent case in Britain the lack of display of shame and remorse by the offender was the reason explicitly given for a severe sanction. Karstedt—Emotions and criminal justice 313 References Ahmed, Eliza, H. Nathan, J. Braithwaite and V. Braithwaite (2001) Shame Management through Reintegration. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Anderson, Benedict (1983) Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism. 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work_65wg35be7bgvvgh5fb7vyteetq	----	Comparative study of attitudes to religious groups in New Zealand reveals Muslim-specific prejudice Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=tnzk20 Kōtuitui: New Zealand Journal of Social Sciences Online ISSN: (Print) (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/tnzk20 Comparative study of attitudes to religious groups in New Zealand reveals Muslim-specific prejudice Lara M. Greaves , Aarif Rasheed , Stephanie D’Souza , Nichola Shackleton , Luke D. Oldfield , Chris G. Sibley , Barry Milne & Joseph Bulbulia To cite this article: Lara M. Greaves , Aarif Rasheed , Stephanie D’Souza , Nichola Shackleton , Luke D. Oldfield , Chris G. Sibley , Barry Milne & Joseph Bulbulia (2020) Comparative study of attitudes to religious groups in New Zealand reveals Muslim-specific prejudice, Kōtuitui: New Zealand Journal of Social Sciences Online, 15:2, 260-279, DOI: 10.1080/1177083X.2020.1733032 To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/1177083X.2020.1733032 © 2020 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group Published online: 01 Mar 2020. Submit your article to this journal Article views: 1726 View related articles View Crossmark data Citing articles: 2 View citing articles https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=tnzk20 https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/tnzk20 https://www.tandfonline.com/action/showCitFormats?doi=10.1080/1177083X.2020.1733032 https://doi.org/10.1080/1177083X.2020.1733032 https://www.tandfonline.com/action/authorSubmission?journalCode=tnzk20&show=instructions https://www.tandfonline.com/action/authorSubmission?journalCode=tnzk20&show=instructions https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/mlt/10.1080/1177083X.2020.1733032 https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/mlt/10.1080/1177083X.2020.1733032 http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1080/1177083X.2020.1733032&domain=pdf&date_stamp=2020-03-01 http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1080/1177083X.2020.1733032&domain=pdf&date_stamp=2020-03-01 https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/citedby/10.1080/1177083X.2020.1733032#tabModule https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/citedby/10.1080/1177083X.2020.1733032#tabModule RESEARCH ARTICLE Comparative study of attitudes to religious groups in New Zealand reveals Muslim-specific prejudice Lara M. Greaves a, Aarif Rasheedb, Stephanie D’Souzac, Nichola Shackleton c, Luke D. Oldfield a, Chris G. Sibley d, Barry Milnec and Joseph Bulbuliae aPolitics and International Relations, School of Social Sciences, University of Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand; bJustCommunity, Auckland, New Zealand; cCentre of Methods and Policy Application in the Social Sciences, University of Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand; dSchool of Psychology, University of Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand; eSchool of Humanities, University of Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand ABSTRACT The March 15th terrorist attack started a national dialogue about prejudice in New Zealand. Previous research has investigated attitudes towards Muslims in comparison to ethnic minorities. However, presently, there are no nationally representative studies in New Zealand systematically comparing attitudes to Muslims with attitudes to other religious groups. Here, we present evidence from the New Zealand edition of the International Social Survey Programme module on religion, a national postal survey (N = 1335) collected between September 2018 and February 2019. We assess perceived threat and negativity towards Christians, Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists, Jews, and Atheists. We find substantially greater perceived threat and negativity towards Muslims compared with other groups. In particular, older people, New Zealand Europeans, men, and those with more right-wing attitudes report greater threat and negativity towards Muslims. In line with previous studies, higher religious identification and higher education predict greater acceptance. Taken collectively, these results reveal that the Muslim Acceptance Gap in this country is substantial, and greater challenges for acceptance are evident among lower-educated, right-wing, older, secular, and male populations. The magnitude of this gap reveals a substantial challenge to the future of New Zealand where religious and secular people can live without evoking prejudice. ARTICLE HISTORY Received 4 October 2019 Accepted 18 February 2020 KEYWORDS Muslims; ISSP; religion; religious prejudice; threat Introduction On 15th March 2019, a white supremacist attacked two mosques in Christchurch New Zealand, killing 51 Muslims engaged in worship. Many, including New Zealand’s Prime Minister, expressed their solidarity with the victims by adopting phrases such as ‘this is not us’ and ‘they are us, we are them’. Some left flowers at memorials, donated money, © 2020 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, and is not altered, transformed, or built upon in any way. CONTACT Lara M. Greaves lara.greaves@auckland.ac.nz, Joseph Bulbulia j.bulbulia@auckland.ac.nz KOTUITUI: NEW ZEALAND JOURNAL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES ONLINE 2020, VOL. 15, NO. 2, 260–279 https://doi.org/10.1080/1177083X.2020.1733032 http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1080/1177083X.2020.1733032&domain=pdf&date_stamp=2020-04-24 http://orcid.org/0000-0003-0537-7125 http://orcid.org/0000-0001-5570-3617 http://orcid.org/0000-0002-1216-0701 http://orcid.org/0000-0002-4064-8800 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ mailto:lara.greaves@auckland.ac.nz mailto:j.bulbulia@auckland.ac.nz http://www.tandfonline.com wore headscarves, or joined in the Muslim call to prayer (One News 2019). Though the attacks caught many New Zealanders by surprise, evidence had long been mounting for a substantial Muslim Acceptance Gap in New Zealand, that is, for a substantial difference in discrimination against Muslims compared with discrimination against other groups (Shaver et al. 2016). The Islamic Women’s Council had repeatedly lobbied government for support against discrimination and hate crimes (Rahman 2019). After the attack, critics pointed to wider issues of colonisation and European domination, pointing out that the name of Christchurch’s local rugby team: the Crusaders, belies widespread accep- tance of prejudice in this country (One News 2019; Radio New Zealand 2019; Waitoki 2019). Quantitative studies of anti-Muslim prejudice in New Zealand had been published in high profile peer-reviewed science journals (Shaver et al. 2016, 2017). Put simply, the Muslim Acceptance Gap was clearly evident prior to the attacks. To identify meaningful pathways for reducing anti-Muslim prejudice requires a clear diagnosis of the problem. However, previous studies have yet to disentangle religion-specific prejudice from generic anti-religious prejudice. Understanding the basis of anti-Muslim prejudice, as well as of the sources of Muslim acceptance, thus remain key challenges for New Zealand. Previous attempts to systematically quantify Muslim acceptance and prejudice in New Zealand were obtained against the backdrop of ethnic-specific prejudice. In line with this conjecture, previous research shows a conflation of anti-Muslim prejudice and anti-Arab prejudice, and that both forms are predicted by media exposure (Shaver et al. 2017). This suggests that prejudice against Muslims arises from tendencies to conflate Muslims with Arabs. In reality, however, though Muslims share a common faith, Muslims in New Zealand are ethnically and culturally diverse (Shaver et al. 2016; Nisa and Saenong 2019). If the ethnic-religion confusion conjecture is on the right track, the practical task would be to educate people about the diversity of New Zealand’s Muslim community. A second, and compatible conjecture is that anti-Muslim sentiments are amplified by anti-religious sentiments: specifically anti-Muslim prejudice in New Zealand is a manifes- tation of general anti-religious prejudice. Notably, New Zealand has become increasingly secular (Hoverd et al. 2015). Recent research shows reduced prejudice against Muslims from highly identified religious non-Muslims (Shaver et al. 2016). Muslims tend to be out- wardly religious in their practice and piety. Thus, it possible that anti-Muslim prejudice in New Zealand is not merely the result of a conflation of Islam with Arab ethnicity and a prejudicial confusion about the threats radical Islam, but also, in part, a manifestation of general anti-religious prejudice. In line with this prospect, recent research shows reduced prejudice against Muslims from highly identified religious non-Muslims (Shaver et al. 2016); though such reduced prejudice might arise from many sources, such as religious injunctions for toleration, it is possible that people of the faith exhibit greater acceptance of Muslims because religious affiliation, in general, is increasingly mar- ginalised in New Zealand. Here, we seek to better identify the demographic and political indicators of the Muslim Acceptance Gap by systematically comparing anti-Muslim prejudice with other types of anti-religious prejudice. In the months before the 15th March 2019 attack (September 2018–February 2019), we collected data on attitudes towards religion as part of the Inter- national Social Survey Programme (ISSP) module on religion. The ISSP is a 42-country national probability-sampled survey of different topics, which rotate over time. The reli- gion module includes positivity and threat felt towards five religious groups: Muslims, KOTUITUI: NEW ZEALAND JOURNAL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES ONLINE 261 Christians, Hindus, Buddhists, Jews, and ‘Atheists or non-believers’. This dataset enables inference about religion-specific qualities of Muslim prejudice, in the form of negativity towards Muslims and perceived threat from Muslims. Background: previous studies on anti-Muslim prejudice in New Zealand After the March 15th attack, several media commentators looked to find data on prejudice towards Muslims using NZ samples (Chapple 2019; Hall 2019; Morton 2019). In particu- lar, Chapple (2019) warned that we should not rely on anecdotes of discrimination and intolerance. To remedy this, Chapple provided analyses of the 2016–17 General Social Survey by Statistics NZ and pointed to the fact that a minority of people reported experi- encing discrimination in the past year (16.9%), with slightly more than a quarter of migrants (25.7%) reporting discrimination over the same period. The piece also generally emphasised the smallness of any effects. Additionally, Chapple made the specific point that there was no data available from any study comparing attitudes towards religious groups in a national sample, so it was not clear the extent to which any effects were Muslim-specific. In response, Hall (2019) pointed out that the majority of the migrants surveyed (by Statistics NZ) were likely to be from Australia, Europe, and the US, and dis- cussed the limitations of taking group averages on such measures. Furthermore, prior to the Christchurch attack, drawing on nationally diverse samples from the longitudinal New Zealand Attitudes and Values Study (henceforth ‘NZAVS’, N = 31,463). Shaver and colleagues (Shaver et al. 2016, 2017) published two articles demon- strating widespread prejudice against Muslims in NZ, what the authors described as a ‘Muslim Acceptance Gap’. The NZAVS includes the levels of warmth and anger towards different groups, where a higher level of warmth, and a lower level of anger indi- cates less prejudice towards a group (Sibley et al. 2019). In the first study, Shaver et al. (2016) showed that compared to the non-religious, non-Muslim religious people (those who identified with a religion and/or spiritual group, those who found religion as more important to how they saw themselves, and those who attended church or a place of worship more) expressed greater warmth towards Muslims. In the second study, Shaver et al. (2017) showed that greater overall news media exposure (measured as the total hours of self-reported news media consumed per week) predicted prejudice towards Muslims. Both studies identified large shortfalls in the acceptance of Muslims relative to ethnic minorities, and a relatively high correlation of anti-Muslim prejudice with anti-Arab prejudice when compared with prejudice to other ethnic minorities. Research from the NZAVS uses a classic ‘feeling thermometer’ scale (Kinder and Drake 2009) including measures of warmth and anger towards Muslims among several ethnic groups including Arabs, Asians, Māori, Pacific, and ‘immigrants in general’. The averages for anger and warmth towards Muslims and Arabs were substantially lower than for other groups. As reported by Shaver et al. (2017), on a 1 (no anger or least warm) to 7 (anger or most warm) scale, the average level of anger towards Muslims was 2.89 (compared to 2.82 for Arabs and 2.51 for Asians) and warmth was 3.79 (compared to 3.84 for Arabs and 4.54 for Asians). Furthermore, when observing the frequency of responses above the neutral mid-point of the scale 17.3% showed high levels of anger towards Muslims compared to 9.1% for anger towards Asians. Shaver et al. (2016) showed that older people, those with lower levels of education, the unemployed, men, the non-religious, those who did 262 L. M. GREAVES ET AL. not attend church, and those with higher political conservatism had lower warmth towards Muslims and Arabs. In addition, participants of European descent had lower warmth towards Muslims. A month after the attack, the New Zealand Journal of Psychology published a rapid- response issue to provide more research on this problem. The issue included many review-style articles written in response to the attack (Khawaja and Khawaja 2019; Mirnajafi and Barlow 2019; Waitoki 2019; Wetherell 2019), alongside several further ana- lyses of NZAVS data exploring the predictors of anti-Muslim prejudice (Hawi et al. 2019; Highland et al. 2019; Yogeeswaran et al., 2019), and data from a community sample exploring prejudice towards different religions (Wilson 2019). Of particular relevance was subsequent work by Sibley et al. (2019) which reported rates of reported warmth and anger to the different groups the NZAVS measured, the predictors of anti-Muslim prejudice, and change in attitudes over time. The findings broadly reinforced Shaver et al. (2016; 2017) by showing the Muslim Acceptance Gap and predictors. What was notable were the differences in the distribution of scores by group. Relatively more partici- pants had scores in the less warm/more angry part of the distribution when evaluating Muslims (and Arabs), something obscured by simply taking average scores. Looking at these NZAVS results, the following groups tend to exhibit greater prejudice toward Muslims: men, participants who rate themselves as more politically conservative, non-religious people, those with lower formal education, rural dwellers, and older people (Shaver et al. 2016, 2017; Sibley et al. 2019). What factors might explain these differences? The greater prejudice of men towards many different outgroups has been attributed to a variety of factors, both biological and social, including the desire to maintain the current social hierarchy (which benefits men as group) and express dominance tendencies (Sida- nius et al. 1994). Political conservatism (measured in the current study as whether someone rated themselves as more politically right-wing) is another variable generally related to increased prejudice toward outgroups, a finding which links back to the person- alities of conservatives, the level of threat in their environment, and the general definition of political conservatism (and in the NZ context, to a lesser extent, being right-wing) as opposition to social change (Sibley and Duckitt 2008; Duckitt and Sibley 2010; Sibley et al. 2012). Rural people, on average, may be more prejudiced as rural geographic areas are less diverse, thus people lack exposure to, or contact with, people from different religious groups, ethnic backgrounds, and lifestyles (Pettigrew 1998). In terms of religion, Shaver et al. (2016) explained their results by positing that religious people may be unified by their religious commitment, and that this transcends any affiliation or denomination-based differences. In addition, Highland et al. (2019) found that greater acceptance of religion was associated with greater acceptance of Muslims, and that including this variable explained the variance previously explained by high religious identification and church attendance in the acceptance of Muslims. Though previous studies on anti-Muslim prejudice in New Zealand points to a distinc- tion between religious and ethnic prejudice/acceptance, the NZAVS does not have vari- ables capable of assessing the relative strength of prejudice against different religious groups, as the study largely only contains measures of prejudice towards different ethnic groups. Thus, put simply, very little is known about prejudice (or acceptance) towards different religious groups in New Zealand. As such, a context is lacking in which to evaluate whether higher levels of prejudice toward Muslims in New Zealand is KOTUITUI: NEW ZEALAND JOURNAL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES ONLINE 263 unique to Muslims or whether past findings have been an expression of general anti-reli- gious sentiment. Here, we contribute to previous studies by measuring negativity/positivity toward different religious groups, and also perceived threat toward different religious groups. It is particularly important to investigate threat in the context of religious prejudice, and prejudice toward Muslims in particular, because Muslims are portrayed in the media as threatening (Kabir and Bourk 2012). More specifically, portrayals of Muslims show them as more likely to commit terror attacks or to have far different cultural values to the majority of the population (Saeed 2007; Kabir and Bourk 2012; Rahman and Emadi 2018). Therefore, probing both anti-religious sentiments and perceived threat affords a greater clarity about the mechanisms that underpin anti-religious prejudice than can be obtained from affective thermometer measures such as those found in the NZAVS. We emphasise that, as the authors of the Chapple analysis state, their group had no data prior to the Christchurch Mosque attacks comparing attitudes towards religious groups, which confounds their post-attack analysis about the psychological and cultural mechan- isms anti-Muslim prejudice in New Zealand. By contrast, our ISSP survey was adminis- tered prior to the Christchurch attacks. Aims and hypotheses We first investigate the prevalence of anti-Muslim prejudice in NZ by focusing on (1) nega- tive perceptions towards Muslims other religious groups, and (2) the perceived threat from Muslims and other religious groups. We compare responses to Muslims in these domains with responses to Christians, Hindus, Buddhists, Jews, and Atheists or non-believers as reference groups in order to explore the specific predictors of anti-Muslim sentiment, rather than a general dislike of diverse religious groups. We utilise data from the 2008 and 2018 ISSP surveys on religion, which also assessed negativity toward the different reli- gious groups. Generally, following work from the NZAVS (Shaver et al. 2016, 2017; High- land et al. 2019; Sibley et al. 2019), we expect to find higher rates of both negativity and threat towards Muslims, relative to the other religious groups. We compare 2008 results to 2018, to explore whether attitudes towards different religious groups are becoming more positive over time. We expect that attitudes toward religious minorities would have become more favourable over the past decade, as Sibley et al. (2019) have shown that warmth towards Muslims has increased between 2012 and 2018. We also expect to find more negativity towards Muslims and perceived threat from Muslims among men, those who rated them- selves as more right-wing, New Zealand Europeans, non-religious people, those with lower levels of education, rural dwellers, and older people. Method Sample and procedure Data were drawn from the New Zealand edition of the 2018 and 2008 International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) religion surveys. A more detailed overview of the ISSP, how datacan beaccessed, survey sampling,methods, andweighting can be found in the Appendix. In short, in 2008, the survey was mailed to a random sample of 2040 people from the NZ 264 L. M. GREAVES ET AL. Electoral Roll. This produced 1027 responses, a reported response rate of 52% (Gendall and Healey 2009).For the 2018editionof the survey,between10September 2018and17February 2019, 1335participants respondedout ofthe total 5700, giving a standardised responserate of 27.9%. Before analyses, to ensure representativeness, both waves were weighted for nonre- sponse based on characteristics available on the electoral roll (D’Souza et al. 2019). Participants and measures There were two sets of questions on prejudice towards different religious groups. The first asked in 2008 and 2018, was: ‘What is your personal attitude towards members of the follow- ing religious groups?’ The question presented the following groups for participants to rate on a scale: Christians, Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists, Jews, and Atheists or Non-believers. The options where: 1‘very positive’, 2 ‘somewhat positive’, 3 ‘neither positive not negative’, 4 ‘somewhat negative’, and 5 ‘very negative’, with an option for ‘can’t choose’ (responses to the ‘can’t choose’ option were coded as missing responses). The next question, only asked in 2018, was: ‘Do you consider people belonging to the following religious groups to be threa- tening?’Itaskedparticipantstoratethesamesixgroupsonafourpointscaleincluding:1 ‘very threatening’, 2 ‘somewhat threatening’, 3 ‘not very threatening’, and 4 ‘not threatening at all’. The question also included a ‘can’t choose’ option, which we coded as a missing response. Table 1 presents summary statistics for the 2018 participants. Age was measured by asking for year of birth. The average age of the sample was 49.1 (SD = 16.7, Min = 18, Max = 83, missing n = 37; 2.8%). In the regression models, we centered age at the sample mean of 49 years old and divided this indicator by 10 to recover a decade of age unit for assessing expected associations of age and attitudes. We did this to recover a predictor that was both interpretable and on the scale of other predictors. Gender was asked with an open-ended question and 46.3% (n = 618) of the sample identified as male, whereas 53.7% (n = 717) of the sample identified as female, another gender, or did not answer. In our regression models, a factor variable was created where male was coded as 1, and the default condition of not-male was coded as 0. Education was assessed by asking for the par- ticipant’s highest qualification. The sample mean was 3.91 (SD = 2.38, missing n = 34, 3.2%; a 4 is equivalent to the trade or professional certificate level), the sample median was 4, ranging from 0 (no qualification) to 7 (postgraduate or higher). For the regression analysis, we centered this variable at the sample mean, to recover an interpretable estimate. Thus, the regression coefficients for this indicator represent the changed in expected response for a one unit change in education level from the baseline score of 3.91. Religious affiliation was assessed with the question ‘Which one of these categories describes your current religion or religious denomination?’ and options were provided for no religion (n = 572 or 42.8% of participants), Christian (with a range of denomina- tions to select from in a second question; n = 578, 43.3%), Buddhist (n = 38, 2.8%), Hindu (n = 52, 3.9%), Muslim (n = 30, 2.2%), Jewish (n = 2, 0.1%), or an open-ended option for ‘Other Religion’ (n = 33, 2.5%; in addition, there were 30 missing responses; 4.6%). Participants were asked to rate their level of religious identification on a scale 1 (‘extremely religious’) to 7 (‘extremely non-religious’). To enable inference across both secular and religious people, following the method of Shaver et al. (2016) we created a reli- giosity variable by assigning all those who did not identify as religious a 0 on this scale. The sample mean was 1.75 (SD = 1.81, missing n = 62, 4.6%), the sample median was 2 KOTUITUI: NEW ZEALAND JOURNAL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES ONLINE 265 (ranging from 0 to 7). We centered and scaled this variable, so that the baseline expec- tation for response represents the sample mean of 1.75 on the religiosity scale. Thus, the regression coefficients for this indicator represent the changed in expected response for a standard deviation difference in religiosity at the population level. Participants were asked: ‘In politics, people sometimes talk of left and right. Where would you place yourself on the following scale, where 0 means left and 10 means right?’. The sample mean was 5.04 (SD = 1.97, missing n = 87, 6.5%), and the sample median was 5. Thus, the regression coefficients for this indicator represent the change in expected response for a standard deviation difference in right-wing orientation at the population level. In addition, n = 885 (64.0%) of the sample identified as living outside a rural area, whereas n = 441 (33.0%) of the sample indicated they lived in a rural area. In our regression models, a factor variable was for rural, which was coded as 1, and the default condition of not-rural was coded as 0. Analysis procedure We first analysed descriptive statistics (frequencies of different responses) across the 2008 and 2018 data. Next, we conducted multiple regression models. These allowed us to see which variables correlate with prejudice towards the different religious groups, while con- trolling for the effects of other variables. For example, it is necessary to adjust for the effects of age or education level when exploring whether rural people are more or less prejudiced, Table 1. Summary statistics for the sample. Variable N (%) Unless otherwise stated Age Mean (SD) 49.1 (16.7) Median [Min, Max] 51.0 [18.0, 83.0] Missing 37 (2.8%) Man Not Male 717 (53.7%) Male 618 (46.3%) Highest educational qualification Mean (SD) 3.91 (2.38) Median [Min, Max] 4.00 [0.00, 7.00] Missing 43 (3.2%) NZ European Not NZ European 527 (39.5%) NZ European 808 (60.5%) Religious Not Religious 571 (42.8%) Religious 734 (55.0%) Missing 30 (2.2%) Religiosity Mean (SD) 1.75 (1.81) Median [Min, Max] 2.00 [0.00, 7.00] Missing 62 (4.6%) Right-wing Mean (SD) 5.04 (1.97) Median [Min, Max] 5.00 [0.00, 10.0] Missing 87 (6.5%) Rural Not Rural 855 (64.1%) Rural 441 (33.0%) Missing 39 (2.9%) 266 L. M. GREAVES ET AL. as younger people, and those with more education tend to live in cities. A multiple regression allowed us to isolate the specific effects of each variable. These regressions also allowed us to model the independent effects of prejudice towards Muslims over- and-above the prejudice towards other religious groups by adjusting for the residual cor- relations of prejudice towards other religious groups in each model. To handle missingness, we employed a multiple imputation strategy using the Amelia package in R (Honaker et al. 2011). Five datasets were imputed using Amelia’s EM algor- ithm, and the imputed datasets were passed to the BRMS (Bürkner 2016) package in R version 3.61 (R Core Team 2019); plots were generated using the sjPlot package (Lüdecke 2015). The BRMS package has several features suited to our inquiry. First, we were able to employ Bayesian estimation (BRMS is a wrapper over Rstan). Bayesian esti- mation efficiently pools uncertainty created by the multiply imputed datasets, leading to probabilistic inferences for the coefficients of theoretical interest. Second, we were able to simultaneously estimate all five outcome variables for each of the two domains of inter- est – negative attitudes to religious groups and perceived threat of religious groups – fol- lowing the method described in Shaver et al. (2017). Thus, instead of requiring 10 models we only needed two multivariate outcome models, one for each of the attitudes (negativity, threat) and by modelling correlations in the residual components of the model, we were able to estimate the correlation between the different prejudice types conditional on the predictor variables in the model. We modelled responses using both informative and non-informative priors, however, the size of our dataset and the consistency of responses rendered results robust to either strategy, and we report results with non-informative priors. Results Descriptive analysis and time comparison within New Zealand Table 2 presents the percentage of participants who gave each response to the religious prejudice questions. For comparability, we removed the scores for those over 76 in the 2008 sample (n = 77).1 We also conducted a series of independent samples t-tests, and gen- erally, religious prejudice decreased significantly between 2008 and 2018. Muslims had the highest rate of both ‘somewhat’ and ‘very’ negative ratings in both 2008 (22.5%) and 2018 (19.5%; t(1788) = −3.01, p = .003; M2008 = 2.91, M2018 = 2.75), followed by Hindus (2008 = 10.9%, 2018 = 8.4%; t(1769) = −3.55, p < .001; M2008 = 2.68, M2018 = 2.52), and Atheists or non-believers (2008 = 8.1%, 2018 = 5.9%; t(1735) = −2.30, p = .022; M2008 = 2.62, M2018 = 2.52). The lowest rate of negativity was towards Buddhists in 2018 (4.9%, 2008 = 7.1%; t (1777) = −3.38, p = .001; M2008 = 2.52, M2018 = 2.37). The exceptions being that negativity against Jews did not decrease across the decade (7.7%; p = .072), and more people were negative towards Christians in 2018 (8.5%) than in 2008 (7.3%) although this difference was not significant (p = .136). The results for threat (collected only in 2018) showed clear differences between Muslims and other groups. Over a third of the sample (35.4%) found Muslims to be ‘somewhat’ or ‘very’ threatening, compared to 10% for Christians, 9.8% for Jews, and a sample low of 4.4% for Buddhists. Overall, 36.9% of participants found Muslims to be ‘not threatening at all’, compared to the next lowest frequencies of 51.8% for Hindus and 53.7% for Jews. KOTUITUI: NEW ZEALAND JOURNAL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES ONLINE 267 Table 2. Percentage of participants who selected the various options for negativity (2008 and 2018) and threat (with sample weighting applied). Note that this is restricted to a maximum age of 76 in 2008 to aid comparability between samples. Very positive Somewhat positive Neither Somewhat negative Very negative Not threatening at all Not very threatening Somewhat threatening Very threatening % (n) % (n) % (n) % (n) % (n) % (n) % (n) % (n) % (n) Christians 2008 25.0% (231) 30.5% (282) 37.1% (343) 6.2% (57) 1.1% (11) 2018 24.0% (303) 29.3% (369) 38.1% (480) 5.3% (67) 3.2% (40) 55.1% (664) 34.9% (420) 8.5% (102) 1.5% (19) Muslims 2008 11.5% (103) 17.4% (156) 48.6% (436) 14.1% (127) 8.4% (76) 2018 13.5% (163) 20.9% (253) 46.0% (557) 13.2% (160) 6.3% (76) 36.9% (428) 27.7% (322) 28.0% (325) 7.4% (86) Hindus 2008 12.9% (113) 21.1% (186) 55.1% (485) 6.9% (61) 4.0% (36) 2018 16.1% (193) 24.7% (296) 50.8% (609) 5.6% (67) 2.8% (33) 51.8% (592) 39.8% (455) 7.4% (84) 1.1% (12) Buddhists 2008 15.7% (139) 27.3% (242) 49.8% (441) 4.1% (37) 3.0% (27) 2018 20.3% (243) 27.4% (329) 47.4% (568) 2.4% (29) 2.5% (30) 62.0% (713) 33.7% (387) 3.6% (41) 0.8% (9) Jews 2008 13.9% (122) 24.3% (214) 54.0% (475) 5.3% (46) 2.4% (21) 2018 15.8% (187) 25.1% (296) 51.5% (609) 4.4% (52) 3.3% (39) 53.7% (609) 36.6% (415) 8.1% (92) 1.7% (19) Atheists or non- believers 2008 13.6% (122) 22.2% (198) 56.1% (501) 4.9% (44) 3.2% (28) 2018 18.4% (216) 26.3% (310) 49.4% (581) 3.5% (41) 2.4% (29) 58.1% (646) 33.4% (371) 7.3% (82) 1.3% (14) 2 6 8 L.M .G R E A V E S E T A L. Patterns of missingness The left (‘Overall’) column in Table 3 presents summary statistics for negative attitudes to religious groups. Notably, missing or ‘can’t choose’ responses were twice as frequent for non-Christian groups as compared with the Christian group. To investi- gate religion-specific bias we assessed whether missingness was related to participant religious affiliation. Table 3 also presents summary statistics for negative attitudes to religion comparing participants who reported a religious affiliation with those who did not. Religiously affiliated participants presented a much higher missing response rate for all but the Christian groups, where missingness was lower. There are several possible explanations for this. Christian participants might not have responded to this question because they do not have contact outside their religious groups, and as such, have no basis for offering a response. Alternatively, Christian participants might tend to avoid reporting to conceal a negative bias towards other reli- gious groups. Additionally, Table 4 presents summary statistics for perceived threat of religious groups and breaks missingness down by religious affiliation. There was substantially greater missingness for perceived threat ratings as compared with general negative attitude ratings, and missingness was substantially higher among religious as compared with non- religious participants. Indeed, for the atheist group, almost a quarter of religious partici- pants did not state a response. Rather than speculating, we adopted a multiple imputation strategy in which missing responses were predicted as random conditional on other infor- mation in the dataset. Table 3. Negative attitudes to religious groups both overall, and broken down by religious affiliation (no/yes). Overall (n = 1335) Not religious (n = 571) Religious (n = 734) Negative to Christians Mean (SD) 2.25 (0.963) 2.76 (0.854) 1.86 (0.857) Median [Min, Max] 2.00 [1.00, 5.00] 3.00 [1.00, 5.00] 2.00 [1.00, 5.00] Missing 86 (6.4%) 35 (6.1%) 38 (5.2%) Negative to Muslims Mean (SD) 2.79 (1.05) 3.02 (0.938) 2.61 (1.10) Median [Min, Max] 3.00 [1.00, 5.00] 3.00 [1.00, 5.00] 3.00 [1.00, 5.00] Missing 160 (12.0%) 44 (7.7%) 103 (14.0%) Negative to Hindus Mean (SD) 2.56 (0.912) 2.79 (0.808) 2.37 (0.953) Median [Min, Max] 3.00 [1.00, 5.00] 3.00 [1.00, 5.00] 2.00 [1.00, 5.00] Missing 169 (12.7%) 49 (8.6%) 107 (14.6%) Negative to Buddhists Mean (SD) 2.41 (0.909) 2.58 (0.833) 2.27 (0.948) Median [Min, Max] 3.00 [1.00, 5.00] 3.00 [1.00, 5.00] 2.00 [1.00, 5.00] Missing 165 (12.4%) 44 (7.7%) 109 (14.9%) Negative to Jews Mean (SD) 2.53 (0.911) 2.79 (0.803) 2.32 (0.938) Median [Min, Max] 3.00 [1.00, 5.00] 3.00 [1.00, 5.00] 2.00 [1.00, 5.00] Missing 186 (13.9%) 54 (9.5%) 117 (15.9%) Negative to Atheists Mean (SD) 2.52 (0.948) 2.43 (0.814) 2.61 (1.05) Median [Min, Max] 3.00 [1.00, 5.00] 3.00 [1.00, 5.00] 3.00 [1.00, 5.00] Missing 193 (14.5%) 51 (8.9%) 128 (17.4%) KOTUITUI: NEW ZEALAND JOURNAL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES ONLINE 269 Statistical models Negative attitudes to religious groups The results for the regressions for negativity towards the different religious groups are pre- sented in Table 5, residual correlations between groups are presented in the Appendix. Consistent with previous research, we found that males tended to be more prejudiced towards Muslims, a pattern that generalises to all other religious groups except atheists. NZ Europeans tended to be more negative to Muslims than non-Europeans, a pattern that also held for Christians, but was reversed for atheists. Also consistent with previous studies, younger people and more educated people were more positive toward Muslims. This finding generalised to other religious groups, including atheists. Consistent with previous research, a key predictor of Muslims acceptance was level of religious identification. However, this association held for all religious groups except athe- ists, where there were no reliable differences between religiously identified people and others. This suggests that the greater acceptance of Muslims among highly identified reli- gious people in New Zealand is part of a general inclination among the highly religious in this country to be more accepting of traditional religions. A more right-wing political self- rating was associated with lower acceptance of Muslims. This association extended to all religious groups except Christians, the dominant religious tradition in New Zealand, in which case political orientation was not a reliable predictor of negativity. Perceived threat of religious groups Table 6 presents the regressions for threat, the residual correlations across groups are pre- sented in the Appendix. Older people expressed greater perceived threat. Consistent with previous research (e.g. Sibley et al. 2019 and other NZAVS work), educated people and Table 4. Perceived threat at religious groups broken down by religious affiliation (no/yes). Overall (n = 1335) Not religious (n = 571) Religious (n = 734) Threatened by Christians Mean (SD) 1.52 (0.715) 1.68 (0.760) 1.40 (0.655) Median [Min, Max] 1.00 [1.00, 4.00] 2.00 [1.00, 4.00] 1.00 [1.00, 4.00] Missing 148 (11.1%) 58 (10.2%) 73 (9.9%) Threatened by Muslims Mean (SD) 2.06 (0.993) 2.08 (0.969) 2.05 (1.01) Median [Min, Max] 2.00 [1.00, 4.00] 2.00 [1.00, 4.00] 2.00 [1.00, 4.00] Missing 213 (16.0%) 66 (11.6%) 130 (17.7%) Threatened by Hindus Mean (SD) 1.57 (0.693) 1.59 (0.682) 1.55 (0.703) Median [Min, Max] 1.00 [1.00, 4.00] 1.00 [1.00, 4.00] 1.00 [1.00, 4.00] Missing 228 (17.1%) 70 (12.3%) 141 (19.2%) Threatened by Buddhists Mean (SD) 1.42 (0.614) 1.42 (0.593) 1.42 (0.635) Median [Min, Max] 1.00 [1.00, 4.00] 1.00 [1.00, 4.00] 1.00 [1.00, 4.00] Missing 219 (16.4%) 64 (11.2%) 138 (18.8%) Threatened by Jews Mean (SD) 1.55 (0.713) 1.62 (0.728) 1.50 (0.698) Median [Min, Max] 1.00 [1.00, 4.00] 1.00 [1.00, 4.00] 1.00 [1.00, 4.00] Missing 237 (17.8%) 77 (13.5%) 143 (19.5%) Threatened by Atheists Mean (SD) 1.52 (0.699) 1.42 (0.577) 1.61 (0.782) Median [Min, Max] 1.00 [1.00, 4.00] 1.00 [1.00, 4.00] 1.00 [1.00, 4.00] Missing 264 (19.8%) 76 (13.3%) 170 (23.2%) 270 L. M. GREAVES ET AL. Table 5. Estimates for coefficients predicting negative attitudes to religious groups (Bayesian Highest Posterior Density intervals are set to 90%). Predictors Christians Muslims Hindus Buddhists Jews Atheists Estimates HPD (90%) Estimates HPD (90%) Estimates HPD (90%) Estimates HPD (90%) Estimates HPD (90%) Estimates HPD (90%) Intercept 1.95 1.86–2.03 2.59 2.50–2.69 2.45 2.36–2.53 2.28 2.19–2.37 2.39 2.30–2.47 2.61 2.52–2.70 Right-wing −0.01 −0.05–0.03 0.16 0.11–0.21 0.09 0.05–0.14 0.10 0.06–0.14 0.05 0.01–0.09 0.09 0.05–0.13 Religiosity −0.22 −0.27 – −0.18 −0.14 −0.19 – −0.09 −0.15 −0.19 – −0.10 −0.11 −0.15 – −0.07 −0.17 −0.21 – −0.12 0.01 −0.03–0.06 Age −0.01 −0.04–0.01 0.09 0.06–0.12 0.05 0.02–0.08 0.06 0.03–0.09 0.05 0.02–0.07 0.08 0.06–0.11 NZ European 0.28 0.19–0.37 0.15 0.05–0.25 0.07 −0.02–0.16 0.07 −0.02–0.16 0.05 −0.04–0.14 −0.20 −0.30 – −0.11 Education −0.02 −0.04 – −0.00 −0.03 −0.05 – −0.01 −0.04 −0.06 – −0.03 −0.06 −0.07 – −0.04 −0.04 −0.06 – −0.02 −0.03 −0.05 – −0.01 Man 0.11 0.02–0.19 0.16 0.07–0.26 0.08 −0.00–0.17 0.09 0.00–0.17 0.12 0.03–0.20 0.02 −0.07–0.11 Rural 0.22 0.13–0.32 0.09 −0.02–0.19 0.11 0.02–0.20 0.17 0.08–0.26 0.14 0.05–0.24 0.10 0.01–0.20 K O TU IT U I:N EW Z E A LA N D JO U R N A L O F SO C IA L SC IEN C ES O N LIN E 2 7 1 Table 6. Coefficients for estimates for perceived threat of different religious groups. Christians Muslims Hindus Buddhists Jews Atheists Predictors Estimates HPD (90%) Estimates HPD (90%) Estimates HPD (90%) Estimates HPD (90%) Estimates HPD (90%) Estimates HPD (90%) Intercept 1.47 1.40–1.54 2.05 1.96–2.15 1.60 1.53–1.67 1.44 1.37–1.50 1.54 1.47–1.62 1.61 1.54–1.68 Right-wing −0.04 −0.08 – −0.01 0.15 0.10–0.20 0.03 −0.00–0.07 0.00 −0.03–0.03 −0.01 −0.04–0.03 0.05 0.01–0.08 Religiosity −0.10 −0.13 – −0.06 −0.05 −0.10 – −0.01 −0.03 −0.07–0.00 −0.01 −0.04–0.02 −0.05 −0.09 – −0.02 0.05 0.02–0.09 Age −0.01 −0.04–0.01 0.09 0.07–0.12 0.03 0.01–0.05 0.03 0.01–0.05 0.03 0.00–0.05 −0.01 −0.03–0.02 NZ European 0.03 −0.04–0.10 −0.02 −0.11–0.08 −0.03 −0.10–0.04 −0.03 −0.10–0.03 −0.04 −0.11–0.03 −0.11 −0.18 – −0.04 Education 0.00 −0.01–0.02 −0.01 −0.03–0.01 −0.01 −0.03–0.01 −0.02 −0.03 – −0.01 0.00 −0.01–0.02 −0.00 −0.02–0.01 Man 0.03 −0.04–0.10 0.09 −0.00–0.18 −0.01 −0.08–0.06 0.03 −0.03–0.09 0.06 −0.02–0.13 −0.02 −0.09–0.05 Rural 0.07 −0.00–0.14 −0.00 −0.11–0.10 0.06 −0.01–0.14 0.07 0.01–0.14 0.12 0.04–0.19 0.04 −0.03–0.12 2 7 2 L.M .G R E A V E S E T A L. younger people tended to express lower prejudice in this domain in New Zealand, though education’s effects here were notably much less pronounced than observed in the negative- attitudes analysis. Notably, rural people tended to perceive all religious groups, except Muslims, as more threatening. This suggests that prior to the March 15th attack on Muslims, the perceived threat of Muslims in NZ was a general phenomenon among rural and urban people. In terms of religiosity, highly identified religious people tended to perceive Muslims as less threatening than weakly religious or non-religious people. This effect held even after multiply imputing 20 datasets for missing response – which would have attenuated this signal in the data were it not evident. Politically right-wing people tended to perceive Muslims as more threatening, and this pattern extended to all other religious groups except Christians. Table 7 presents the correlation of prejudice/acceptance ratings for the different target groups, as modelled by in the residuals of our multivariate regression model (the results for negativity are presented in the Appendix). As expected, perceived threat tends to be correlated, across the groups, Perceived threat against Muslims is less strongly correlated with the perceived threat of Christians, Buddhists than it is with the perceived threat of Hindus and Jews. This pattern is indicative of minority group prejudice rather than a general anti-religious prejudice. As expected, anti-Atheist prejudice was generally weakly correlated with other religious group prejudices. The relatively higher correlation of atheist acceptance/prejudice with Buddhist acceptance/prejudice is consistent with media portrayals of Buddhism as a religion compatible with secular ideologies. We return to this observation in the discussion below. Discussion This paper had two aims. First, we aimed to establish the extent to which a representative New Zealand sample views Muslims, and other religious groups, as threatening and in a negative light. We also compared negative views of religious groups to data from the equivalent sample in 2008. It is encouraging that negativity has generally decreased over time and is present in a smaller proportion of the sample than perceived threat. However, just over a third of the New Zealanders sampled perceived no threat from Muslims in the months leading up to the terrorist attack. While there was a lower rate Table 7. Residual correlations of perceived threat from the different religious groups (‘rescor’). Estimate Est. error l-95% CI u-95% CI rescor(ThreatenedMuslims,ThreatenedHindus) 0.64 0.02 0.61 0.67 rescor(ThreatenedMuslims,ThreatenedBuddhists) 0.48 0.02 0.44 0.53 rescor(ThreatenedHindus,ThreatenedBuddhists) 0.78 0.01 0.76 0.80 rescor(ThreatenedMuslims,ThreatenedJews) 0.60 0.02 0.56 0.64 rescor(ThreatenedHindus,ThreatenedJews) 0.70 0.02 0.66 0.73 rescor(ThreatenedBuddhists,ThreatenedJews) 0.67 0.02 0.64 0.70 rescor(ThreatenedMuslims,ThreatenedAtheists) 0.46 0.02 0.41 0.51 rescor(ThreatenedHindus,ThreatenedAtheists) 0.56 0.02 0.52 0.60 rescor(ThreatenedBuddhists,ThreatenedAtheists) 0.61 0.02 0.57 0.65 rescor(ThreatenedJews,ThreatenedAtheists) 0.55 0.02 0.51 0.59 rescor(ThreatenedMuslims,ThreatenedChristians) 0.48 0.02 0.43 0.52 rescor(ThreatenedHindus,ThreatenedChristians) 0.54 0.02 0.50 0.59 rescor(ThreatenedBuddhists,ThreatenedChristians) 0.51 0.02 0.46 0.55 rescor(ThreatenedJews,ThreatenedChristians) 0.62 0.02 0.59 0.66 rescor(ThreatenedAtheists,ThreatenedChristians) 0.48 0.02 0.43 0.52 KOTUITUI: NEW ZEALAND JOURNAL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES ONLINE 273 of ‘somewhat’ or ‘very’ threatening responses (around a third again), these results were particularly startling when comparing rates of perceived threat and negativity to other reli- gious groups. The results show that before the attack there was a relatively high level of perceived threat from Muslims, keeping in mind that these are attitudes that participants are: (a) conscious of, and (b) willing to write on a (de-identified) questionnaire. Our inference that people in New Zealand express greater perceived threat towards Muslims, and that threat-attitudes are uniquely higher for Muslims in this country merits consideration. In the first instance, these results suggest that general psychological measures of positivity/negativity might underestimate the higher perceived risk that people attribute to Muslims as a group. The past research on anti-Muslim prejudice in New Zealand has focussed on anger and warmth toward Muslims, which are likely to miss the qualities of perceived threat in Muslim group stereotypes. We think it is impor- tant to measure these more specific views of Muslim threat, and other groups in New Zealand going forward. Such work could also include the specific types of threat, for instance, whether it is for economic or cultural reasons, or both (e.g. Duckitt and Sibley 2007). We think that it is especially important to monitor attitudes towards minority reli- gions in depth, as many nations around the world are struggling with the presence of far- right political parties, and associated upswings in exclusionary populism and negative rhetoric targeted at Muslim and immigrant populations (Norris and Inglehart 2019). Thus far, New Zealand has seemingly missed this ‘populist wave’, at least comparatively, but this does not mean that we will be immune to it in the future. Encouragingly, negativity towards Muslims and other groups (except Christians and Jews) has decreased over the decade between measurements. This finding is consistent with longitudinal results from Sibley et al. (2019) which tracked attitudes within the same New Zealand participants over time. Although this question needs further testing, it is possible that both negativity towards Muslims, and perceptions that Muslims are threatening, might have decreased further in 2019, especially following the increased exposure to Islam after the attack. That is, whereas past research has found that media cov- erage of Muslims in New Zealand is generally negative (Kabir and Bourk 2012; Rahman and Emadi 2018), positive press in the wake of the attack might have moderated anti- Muslim prejudice. Additionally, an analysis of the differences between those who have become more or less prejudiced after the attack, and in response to the trial, would be a worthy avenue for future work. Another research question could be whether any decreases (or increases) are uniform across the different characteristics tested here (e.g. education, gender, age, and so on). One plausible explanation for the patterns revealed in our results is media effect: preju- dice arises from the perceived threat of Muslim radicals. Indeed, Shaver et al. (2017) found that greater media exposure predicted greater anti-Muslim prejudice. To illustrate the problem, it is useful to focus on the different portrayals of Muslims and Buddhists in Western nations (Eisenlohr 2012). While both religious groups have been portrayed nar- rowly, Muslims are generally presented as physically threatening (terrorists) and symbo- lically threatening (they hold different values from the majority). By contrast, Buddhists – the group that participants rated most positively/had the lowest perceptions of threat from – are generally portrayed in Western media as peaceful and symbolically supportive of secular ideals such as inclusivity and tolerance of disbelief (Moore 2008). As indicated in our statistical models, and consistent with the relatively positive portrayals of Buddhism 274 L. M. GREAVES ET AL. in secular New Zealand, we find that the acceptance/prejudice of Buddhism and Atheism is strongly correlated. The importance of the media’s role in strengthening or weakening prejudice is likely exacerbated by a general lack of knowledge and education on different religions, and a lack of contact between most New Zealanders and diverse religious groups: Muslims comprise only 1.3% of the population and Buddhists 1.1% (Statistics New Zealand 2019). This means that for many New Zealanders the media provides their only exposure to religious diversity. Our second objective was to systematically assess the relative strength of anti-Muslim prejudice compared to the other types of religious prejudice in New Zealand, and the pre- dictors of this prejudice. Our findings replicate previous studies from the NZAVS (Shaver et al. 2016, 2017; Hawi et al. 2019; Highland et al. 2019; Sibley et al. 2019; Yogeeswaran et al. 2019), as well as a community sample study (Wilson 2019), revealing a substantial Muslim Acceptance Gap in New Zealand. This past work has shown that politically right-wing attitudes positively correlate with anti-Muslim prejudice, and that education, and religious identification are negatively associated with anti-Muslim prejudice. In the current study, we further find that younger people are less prejudiced against Muslims than older people. Notably, religious identification was associated with lower prejudice towards all religious groups except non-believers, where there is no relationship. This finding holds even after adjusting for a greater frequency of missing responses among reli- giously identified people by using a conservative multiple-imputation strategy. The dimin- ished effect of education on perceived threat in the regression analyses suggests a possible entrenchment of this attitude: that is, education only weakly reduces perceptions of threat from Muslims. The mismatch between reality and perceptions reveals substantial head- room for improving the acceptance of Muslims in New Zealand. Thus, fear of Muslims appears to be pervasive in the NZ population, and unique to views of the Muslim population. These analyses raise a number of future research directions and limitations. One limit- ation was the age restriction on our sample. We found that older people are more preju- diced, and the 2018 survey did not sample those over 76. Arguably, a limitation of our study is its reliance on self-reported prejudice towards religious groups. Though the self- report measures are imperfect, it is important to note that we simultaneously assessed prejudice against five religious groups, while also adjusting for within-participant corre- lations of responses across the five domains, yet we still found a Muslim Acceptance Gap present in the data. However, with these limitations in mind, we are likely underes- timating the actual level of prejudice present in New Zealand. One way to get around self- report biases is to monitor more concrete outcome data. It is important to monitor hate crimes against Muslims in New Zealand. Many organisations, including the Human Rights Commission, have campaigned for better hate crime statistics, both before and after the attack (Mok 2019). Future research could also explore the costs of this prejudice to Muslim New Zealanders, for example, how their health, well-being, and employment outcomes compare to other groups. However, from our results, we have no doubt that the relative magnitudes of perceived threat and greater negativity toward Muslims poses a challenge to New Zealand’s ambition to provide equal opportunities for all New Zealan- ders regardless of their creed and faith. Looking ahead, our findings point to younger people, religious people, politically mod- erate/liberal, and educated people as potential sources for Muslim acceptance. On the KOTUITUI: NEW ZEALAND JOURNAL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES ONLINE 275 other hand, the greatest challenges to improving prejudice arise for those with lower edu- cation, those who are more right-wing, and NZ European, male, and secular parts of the population. Despite evidence of improving attitudes to NZ Muslims over time, the mag- nitude of the Muslim Acceptance Gap suggests that anti-Muslim prejudice in New Zealand will not abate on its own. Indeed, the Muslim Acceptance Gap presents a serious challenge to the future health of New Zealand as a rights-based democracy where all people can worship freely, or not, after their traditions and conscience, without fear or prejudice. Note 1. As an aside, we conducted independent samples t-tests to see if those over age 76 were more negative towards different groups. They were significantly more positive towards Christians (t(85.8) = 2.22, p = .029; M > 76 = 2.25, M ≤ 76 younger = 2.01), and significantly more nega- tive towards Muslims (t(939) = –4.26, p < .001; M > 76 = 3.49, M ≤ 76 younger = 2.91), Hindus (t(927) = –4.70, p < .001; M > 76 = 3.25, M ≤ 76 younger = 2.69), Buddhists (t(929) = −4.47, p < .001; M > 76 = 3.07, M ≤ 76 younger = 2.52), and Atheists or non-believ- ers (t(66.38) = –5.11, p < .001; M > 76 = 3.40, M ≤ 76 younger = 2.64). The difference for negativity towards Jews was not significant (p = .429). Acknowledgements The Funders played no role in the design or analysis of this study. The authors would like to thank Cinnamon Lindsay, Marvin Wu, and Martin von Randow for their efforts in survey administration. Disclosure statement No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s). Funding Data collection was supported by the Templeton Religion Trust [grant number 0196]. ORCID Lara M. Greaves http://orcid.org/0000-0003-0537-7125 Nichola Shackleton http://orcid.org/0000-0001-5570-3617 Luke D. Oldfield http://orcid.org/0000-0002-1216-0701 Chris G. Sibley http://orcid.org/0000-0002-4064-8800 References Bürkner PC. 2016. brms: Bayesian regression models using Stan. https://paul-buerkner.github.io/ brms/. Chapple S. 2019 Apr 8. Editorial: how discriminatory and intolerant are New Zealanders? http:// schoolofgovernment.cmail20.com/t/ViewEmail/d/8F6D33EBA057F2CD2540EF23F30FEDED/ F5A7EF803686760D05AF428974F65BCD. 276 L. M. 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Appendix Survey methodology Data were drawn from the New Zealand edition of the 2018 and 2008 International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) religion surveys. The ISSP is an organisation of 42 nations who run national surveys on different social science topics annually. The topics of these surveys rotate across years, for instance, the religion module also ran in 1991, 1998, and 2008 (note that the 1991 and 1998 surveys do not include attitudes towards different religious groups). Data from the New Zealand surveys is available open-access through the FigShare data repository (Gendall and von Randow 2018) and international data is accessible through the GESIS archive (GESIS 2019). In 2008, the survey was mailed to a random sample of 2040 people from the NZ Electoral Roll, which is available to scientific and health research on a case-by-case basis. This produced 1027 responses, a reported response rate of 52% (Gendall and Healey 2009). Participants in the 2018 edition were also sampled from the NZ Electoral Roll, but different strategies were adopted to 278 L. M. GREAVES ET AL. https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/sport/385751/rugby-crusaders-name-change-discussions-already-underway https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/sport/385751/rugby-crusaders-name-change-discussions-already-underway https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/on-the-inside/384911/islamic-women-s-council-repeatedly-lobbied-to-stem-discrimination https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/on-the-inside/384911/islamic-women-s-council-repeatedly-lobbied-to-stem-discrimination https://www.R-Project.org https://www.R-Project.org https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0150209 https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0150209 https://www.stats.govt.nz/information-releases/2018-census-totals-by-topic-national-highlights https://www.stats.govt.nz/information-releases/2018-census-totals-by-topic-national-highlights help remediate differential response rates across groups. Sampling followed a strategy devised across multiple mailings of the ISSP in order to maximise responses in strata with low response rates and bring them more in line with population estimates to allow for more reliable estimates (e.g. Māori, ethnic minorities, and young people are less likely to respond; see D’Souza et al. 2019). As a result, there were 32 strata derived from electoral roll characteristics: 4 based on ethni- city (Māori descent, meshblocks with a relatively high [>15%] Pacific population, meshblocks with a relatively high [>25%] Asian population, and the remainder) × 2 gender (male, female) × 4 age (18–30, 31–45, 46–60, 61–75). Note that we cut off age at 75 in order to provide a pilot test for another longitudinal panel project (Greaves 2017), although in practice, some participants had turned 76 by the time they completed the survey and one participant was aged 83. An initial mail out went to 4800 participants in September, with a later booster mail out of 900 sent in November in order to achieve the minimum 1200 participants required by the ISSP secretariat (these participants only received a survey and no reminders). The initial mailing consisted of a cover letter, survey, a return envelope, and a pen. The materials gave the participants the option of completing the survey online via Qualtrics (13.9% completed the survey online). Approximately one month after the initial mailing those who had not responded were sent a reminder postcard, and six weeks later they received another cover letter, survey, and return envelope. As an incentive, participants were entered into a draw to win one of four NZ$100 gift vouchers. Between 10 September 2018 and 17 February 2019, 1335 participants responded out of the total 5700, giving a raw response rate of 23.4%, and a standardised response rate of 27.9% (i.e. the response rate that would have been achieved had each stratum been mailed surveys proportional to their share of the population). Before analyses, to ensure representativeness, both waves were weighted for nonresponse based on characteristics available on the electoral roll. For 2008 this included gender and age. For 2018 this included: age group, Māori descent, region, NZ Deprivation Index quintiles, urbanicity and occupation, (D’Souza et al. 2019). Thus, the sample can be considered broadly nationally represen- tative, at least for those aged 18–75, though assessment of voting patterns revealed a slight overre- presentation of Labour party voters, relative to National, Green, and NZ First voters. Table A1. Residual correlations of negative attitudes across religious groups. Estimate Est. error l-95% CI u-95% CI rescor(NegativeMuslims,NegativeHindus) 0.72 0.01 0.70 0.75 rescor(NegativeMuslims,NegativeBuddhists) 0.62 0.02 0.59 0.66 rescor(NegativeHindus,NegativeBuddhists) 0.85 0.01 0.83 0.87 rescor(NegativeMuslims,NegativeJews) 0.69 0.02 0.65 0.72 rescor(NegativeHindus,NegativeJews) 0.76 0.01 0.74 0.79 rescor(NegativeBuddhists,NegativeJews) 0.72 0.01 0.69 0.75 rescor(NegativeMuslims,NegativeAtheists) 0.43 0.02 0.39 0.48 rescor(NegativeHindus,NegativeAtheists) 0.54 0.02 0.50 0.58 rescor(NegativeBuddhists,NegativeAtheists) 0.57 0.02 0.52 0.61 rescor(NegativeJews,NegativeAtheists) 0.51 0.02 0.46 0.55 rescor(NegativeMuslims,NegativeChristians) 0.51 0.02 0.46 0.55 rescor(NegativeHindus,NegativeChristians) 0.52 0.02 0.48 0.57 rescor(NegativeBuddhists,NegativeChristians) 0.48 0.02 0.43 0.53 rescor(NegativeJews,NegativeChristians) 0.61 0.02 0.58 0.65 rescor(NegativeAtheists,NegativeChristians) 0.28 0.03 0.23 0.33 KOTUITUI: NEW ZEALAND JOURNAL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES ONLINE 279 Abstract Introduction Background: previous studies on anti-Muslim prejudice in New Zealand Aims and hypotheses Method Sample and procedure Participants and measures Analysis procedure Results Descriptive analysis and time comparison within New Zealand Patterns of missingness Statistical models Negative attitudes to religious groups Perceived threat of religious groups Discussion Note Acknowledgements Disclosure statement ORCID References Appendix Survey methodology << /ASCII85EncodePages false /AllowTransparency false /AutoPositionEPSFiles false /AutoRotatePages /PageByPage /Binding /Left /CalGrayProfile () /CalRGBProfile (Adobe RGB \0501998\051) /CalCMYKProfile (U.S. Web Coated \050SWOP\051 v2) /sRGBProfile (sRGB IEC61966-2.1) /CannotEmbedFontPolicy /Error /CompatibilityLevel 1.3 /CompressObjects /Off /CompressPages true /ConvertImagesToIndexed true /PassThroughJPEGImages false /CreateJobTicket false /DefaultRenderingIntent /Default /DetectBlends true /DetectCurves 0.1000 /ColorConversionStrategy /sRGB /DoThumbnails true /EmbedAllFonts true /EmbedOpenType false /ParseICCProfilesInComments true /EmbedJobOptions true /DSCReportingLevel 0 /EmitDSCWarnings false /EndPage -1 /ImageMemory 524288 /LockDistillerParams true /MaxSubsetPct 100 /Optimize true /OPM 1 /ParseDSCComments false /ParseDSCCommentsForDocInfo true /PreserveCopyPage true /PreserveDICMYKValues true /PreserveEPSInfo false /PreserveFlatness true /PreserveHalftoneInfo false /PreserveOPIComments false /PreserveOverprintSettings false /StartPage 1 /SubsetFonts true /TransferFunctionInfo /Remove /UCRandBGInfo /Remove /UsePrologue false /ColorSettingsFile () /AlwaysEmbed [ true ] /NeverEmbed [ true ] /AntiAliasColorImages false /CropColorImages true /ColorImageMinResolution 150 /ColorImageMinResolutionPolicy /OK /DownsampleColorImages true /ColorImageDownsampleType /Bicubic /ColorImageResolution 300 /ColorImageDepth -1 /ColorImageMinDownsampleDepth 1 /ColorImageDownsampleThreshold 1.50000 /EncodeColorImages true /ColorImageFilter /DCTEncode /AutoFilterColorImages false /ColorImageAutoFilterStrategy /JPEG /ColorACSImageDict << /QFactor 0.90 /HSamples [2 1 1 2] /VSamples [2 1 1 2] >> /ColorImageDict << /QFactor 0.40 /HSamples [1 1 1 1] /VSamples [1 1 1 1] >> /JPEG2000ColorACSImageDict << /TileWidth 256 /TileHeight 256 /Quality 15 >> /JPEG2000ColorImageDict << /TileWidth 256 /TileHeight 256 /Quality 15 >> /AntiAliasGrayImages false /CropGrayImages true /GrayImageMinResolution 150 /GrayImageMinResolutionPolicy /OK /DownsampleGrayImages true /GrayImageDownsampleType /Bicubic /GrayImageResolution 300 /GrayImageDepth -1 /GrayImageMinDownsampleDepth 2 /GrayImageDownsampleThreshold 1.50000 /EncodeGrayImages true /GrayImageFilter /DCTEncode /AutoFilterGrayImages false /GrayImageAutoFilterStrategy /JPEG /GrayACSImageDict << /QFactor 0.90 /HSamples [2 1 1 2] /VSamples [2 1 1 2] >> /GrayImageDict << /QFactor 0.40 /HSamples [1 1 1 1] /VSamples [1 1 1 1] >> /JPEG2000GrayACSImageDict << /TileWidth 256 /TileHeight 256 /Quality 15 >> /JPEG2000GrayImageDict << /TileWidth 256 /TileHeight 256 /Quality 15 >> /AntiAliasMonoImages false /CropMonoImages true /MonoImageMinResolution 1200 /MonoImageMinResolutionPolicy /OK /DownsampleMonoImages true /MonoImageDownsampleType /Average /MonoImageResolution 300 /MonoImageDepth -1 /MonoImageDownsampleThreshold 1.50000 /EncodeMonoImages true /MonoImageFilter /CCITTFaxEncode /MonoImageDict << /K -1 >> /AllowPSXObjects true /CheckCompliance [ /None ] /PDFX1aCheck false /PDFX3Check false /PDFXCompliantPDFOnly false /PDFXNoTrimBoxError true /PDFXTrimBoxToMediaBoxOffset [ 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 ] /PDFXSetBleedBoxToMediaBox true /PDFXBleedBoxToTrimBoxOffset [ 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 ] /PDFXOutputIntentProfile (None) /PDFXOutputConditionIdentifier () /PDFXOutputCondition () /PDFXRegistryName () /PDFXTrapped /False /Description << /ENU () >> >> setdistillerparams << /HWResolution [600 600] /PageSize [595.245 841.846] >> setpagedevice 
work_6767bfrcivgh5if5czdqfixwnq	----	Council on American-Islamic Relations 453 New Jersey Ave S.E. Washington, D.C. 20003 Tele (202) 488-8787 Fax (202) 488-0833 info@cair.com |www.cair.com Civil Rights Data Quarter Two Update: Anti-Muslim Bias Incidents April – June 2017 CONTENTS • Total Incidents • Case Profiles o Type of Abuse o Location of Incident o Trigger Factor o Federal Agencies • Victim Profiles o Ethnicity/National Origin o Sex o Age Range o Education • Methodology and Limitations TOTAL INCIDENTS • For the second quarter of 2017, from April 1 through June 30, CAIR received 946 reports of potential bias incidents. • Staff determined that 451 of these reports contained an identifiable element of anti-Muslim bias. Other Incidents 52% Anti-Muslim Bias Incidents 48% 946 TOTAL RECORDED INCIDENTS CASE PROFILES Type of Abuse Of the total number of 451 bias incidents, the most frequent type of abuse was harassment, defined as a non-violent or non-threatening incident, at 16 percent of the total. This was followed by hate crimes at 15 percent. Incidents during which the complainant was inappropriately targeted by the FBI made up 12 percent of cases. Instances of intimidation, defined as behavior calculated to produce fear of violence, also consisted of 12 percent of total bias incidents. Cases that involved Customs and Border Protection (CBP) accounted for 8 percent. Location of Incident Home/Residence 68 Highway/Road/Alley/ Street 58 Air/Bus/Train Terminal 55 Elementary/Secondary School 37 Mosque/Islamic Center 33 TOP 5 INCIDENT LOCATIONS 72 69 56 55 37 Harassment Hate Crime FBI Intimidation CBP TOP 5 TYPES OF ABUSE Of the 409 incidents for which a location was identified, 17 percent occurred at a victim’s home or residence, making this the most likely location of an incident by far. At 14 percent, the second most frequent location was a highway/road/alley/street. Air/bus/train terminals were the third most common location at 13 percent. This was followed by incidents at an elementary/secondary school at 9 percent, and those that occurred at a mosque or Islamic center at 8 percent. Trigger Factor Of the 358 incidents for which a trigger was identified, a victim’s ethnicity/national origin was the most prevalent, at 32 percent. This was followed by the victim being perceived as Muslim at 20 percent. At 15 percent, headscarf/hijab was the third most common trigger. The fourth most common trigger was the target being a place of worship, which calculated to 9 percent of the total. The expression of a political opinion being a trigger for an incident of bias constituted an additional 4 percent. Federal Agencies 13 3 5 12 37 56 Other/Multiple Agencies TSA USCIS ICE CBP FBI 126 TOTAL INCIDENTS INSTIGATED BY FEDERAL AGENCIES 114 71 53 32 13 Ethnicity/National Origin Perceived as Muslim Headscarf/Hijab Place of Worship Political Opinion TOP 5 TRIGGER FACTORS Of the 126 total incidents for which federal government entities were identified as the instigator, the FBI accounted for 44 percent, CBP accounted for 30 percent, Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE) accounted for 10 percent, United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) accounted for 4 percent, and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) accounted for 2 percent. In 10 percent of cases, other or multiple federal government agencies were involved. VICTIM PROFILES Ethnicity For the 290 cases in which a victim’s ethnicity/national origin was identified, the most frequent was Middle Eastern/North African at 46 percent. The second most common was South Asian at 20 percent. Those who identified as African were targets 10 percent of the time. At 7 percent, Central Asian was the fourth most commonly targeted ethnicity and Caucasian/European made up 6 percent. Sex Males were targets in 57 percent of the 347 cases in which the victim’s sex was identified. Females were targets 43 percent of the time. 134 58 28 21 18 16 Middle Eastern/North African South Asian African Central Asian Caucasion/European Black/African-American VICTIM'S ETHNICITY/NATIONAL ORIGIN Male 198 Female 149 SEX OF VICTIM Age Of the 201 cases in which age was determined, 41 percent of incidents targeted those in the age range of 30-49. This was followed by those falling in the 18-29 range at 25 percent. Individuals in the age range of 50-64 accounted for 11 percent of victims. Those falling between the ages of 14-17 and 6-13 and constituted 9 and 8 percent of the total respectively. Education A victim’s education level was identified in 147 cases. Of these, individuals who had received a college education accounted for 44 percent of incidents. In 23 percent of the cases, victims had received some college education. Those who has had below a high school level of education made up 18 percent and those who had completed high school constituted 14 percent. 1 16 18 51 83 22 10 >6 6 ̶ 13 14 ̶ 17 18 ̶ 29 30 ̶ 49 50 ̶ 64 65+ AGE RANGE OF VICTIM 27 21 34 65 Less Than High School High School Some College College Plus EDUCATION LEVEL METHODOLOGY AND LIMITATIONS This April through June 2017 update contains just a snapshot of the experiences of the American Muslim community. CAIR knows that bias incidents targeting the community are underreported to both law enforcement and community institutions, a problem also recognized in a 2017 report from the Bureau of Justice Statistics.1 This data is preliminary and subject to change based on the discovery of new incidents of bias or new facts about prior incidents. Each year, thousands of complainants contact CAIR through a variety of channels, including telephone, email, CAIR’s mobile app, and the online complaint system. When possible, CAIR staff may also reach out to offer their services to individuals whose incidents were reported in news sources and not directly to CAIR. Irrespective of the fact that not all cases contain evidence of religious discrimination, each case passes through the investigative stage in order to determine whether CAIR is able to assist the complainant. Each case is fed through the preliminary intake and categorization process that requires a minimum of three to four hours of staff time to address, regardless of whether it is actionable. Therefore, it is conclusive that any case listed in this report as containing an element of religious discrimination has undergone a vetting process which seeks to ensure the highest possible form of accuracy. For the purposes of extracting meaningful information from the data, incidents in which the location or trigger were identified as “irrelevant,” “other” or “unknown” are excluded when determining percentages of categories. 1 https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/hcv0415.pdf 
work_6awl6s6mw5h5vf4gcrelf5rese	----	International tourism and racism Encounters with racism and the international student experience Dr Lorraine Brown and Dr Ian Jones Dr Lorraine Brown is senior lecturer in Tourism Education at Bournemouth University. Her research interests include cross-cultural interaction, the impact of prejudice on the sojourn experience and the outcome of culture contact. She is interested in qualitative methods generally. Author for Correspondence: Bournemouth University School of Services Management Talbot Campus Fern Barrow, Poole Dorset BH12 5BB UNITED KINGDOM 01202 961889 <lbrown@bournemouth.ac.uk> Dr Ian Jones Ian Jones is Associate Dean for Sport and acting director of the Centre for Event and Sport Research at Bournemouth University. His research interests are in the areas of sport fans and spectators, and the concept of ’serious leisure’. Abstract This article makes a contribution to the existing and extensive literature on the international student experience by reporting on the incidence of racism and religious incidents experienced by international students at a university in the south of England. Out of a survey of 153 international postgraduate students, 49 had experienced some form of abuse. In most cases, this took the form of verbal abuse though racism manifested physically for nine students. Strong emotional reactions were reported, including sadness, disappointment, homesickness and anger. There was a consequent reluctance to return to the UK as a leisure tourist or to offer positive word of mouth to future students. This article offers a portrait of the reception offered to international students against a backdrop of increased racism in the UK. A link is thus made between the micro experience and macro forces. Implications of racist abuse for student satisfaction and future international student recruitment are drawn. Key words Britain racism impact reaction international student recruitment Introduction International education is a major export industry at university level, with fierce competition among the key markets of the UK, the US, Canada, New Zealand and Australia (Marginson et al. 2010). Within the UK context, international students make up 16% of the total student population, with the percentage varying across institutions (Higher Education Statistics Agency 2011). The relationship between income generation and overseas recruitment in higher education has been well documented: income from international students plays an important role in the financial health of the higher education sector, representing almost a third of the total fees income for universities and higher education colleges in the UK (Ryan and Carroll 2005). Accompanying the steady rise in the number of international students in higher education has been a growth in the research dedicated to the international sojourn, defined by Ward et al. (2001) as temporary between-culture contact. Given the economic dependence of universities on the fees from international students, it is important that there is a clear understanding of the issues facing them if an optimum service is to be delivered, so that student retention is improved and positive word of mouth helps to increase recruitment. Increased numbers of international students in British higher education and intensified competition for their recruitment both nationally and internationally have put pressure on institutions to improve their product. Ryan and Carroll (2005) argue that responsible recruitment demands that adequate provision is made to cater for the special needs of international students: welfare provision should not be confined to crisis management. If institutions do not consider international students’ needs, it is possible that their future recruitment will be endangered (Brown and Holloway 2008; Ryan and Carroll 2005). Host receptivity towards international students is an important ingredient in international student satisfaction; however, successive studies of international education in the UK have pointed to an unfriendly and indifferent host community, with whom contact is hard to achieve (Brown 2009a). In the Australian context, loneliness and racism are cited as two factors in international student dissatisfaction (Marginson et al. 2010; Ward et al. 2005). The literature on migration also reveals an unapproachable host community (Brown, 2003; Ryan 2010; Spencer et al., 2007). Similarly, a 2007 survey found that the UK is seen to be unwelcoming by tourists from non English-speaking countries (People 1st 2007): the welcome received by overseas tourists has long been recognised as a weakness for the British tourism industry, both by those charged with promoting Britain overseas, and also by private sector industry leaders (VisitBritain 2009). Indeed, the receptivity of the host community was identified in a report by the Department for Culture, Media and Sport (2007) as a key issue to be addressed in the tourism strategy for 2012 and beyond, and the Welcome to Britain campaign was set up in 2009 to improve the welcome to all tourists, including international students (VisitBritain 2009). Though some research has focused on the extent of host contact enjoyed by international sojourners, there has been little research into the incidence and impact of discrimination against international students, either racial or religious, which is described by Pai (2006) as a hidden problem. This article addresses this shortcoming in the literature by reporting findings from a mixed-method investigation into the incidence of racist and religious incidents among a 149-strong cohort of international postgraduates. This study will show what happens when international students suffer racial abuse; it will point out the impact of abuse and the strategies adopted by victims in order to cope with their experiences. Finally, the implications of their experiences for the future recruitment of international students are drawn. Racism in the UK It is important to understand the sociocultural context of the country in which participants were studying, in this case, the UK. This allows the reader to locate the findings and permits a link between the macro setting and the micro experience of international students that is often lacking in the study of the international sojourn (Kim 2001). As Brewer (2000) observes, small-scale micro settings can have common features with the broader social world, with the effect that individuals reluctantly come to represent greater social and national forces. The population of the United Kingdom stands at just over 60 million, of whom approximately 4.6 million (8%) come from an ethnic minority background (Office for National Statistics 2009). This includes 2.3 million people who describe their background as Asian, 1.1 million who are Black Caribbean or Black African, and nearly 700,000 of mixed race (Morris and McSmith 2007). However, racial segregation remain an important problem; Trevor Phillips, chairman of the UK’s Commission for Racial Equality, has described many British cities as fully-fledged ghettos with a clear racial divide. He has accused the United Kingdom of "sleepwalking toward apartheid" as it fragments increasingly into isolated racial communities: "literal black holes into which no one goes without fear and trepidation and nobody escapes undamaged" (Leppard 2005, online). Furthermore, racism is on the rise. A race crime is any incident which is perceived to be racist by the victim, to be motivated by prejudice or hostility against victim’s race or perceived race (Crown Prosecution Service 2004; 2010; Office for National Statistics 2002). Religiously aggravated crime was introduced late in 2001, and the Crown Prosecution Service is now asked to indicate whether an incident was a religious or a racist incident (Crown Prosecution Service 2010). In an era of growing tension between Islam and the West and of increasing Islamophobia, this is an important distinction, though there is often an overlap. This was revealed in a series of attacks on Muslim students at City University in central London in 2009, which were motivated by both racial and religious hatred, according to the Federation of Student Islamic Societies (Bates 2009). In 1999, the risk of being the victim of a racially motivated incident was considerably higher for members of minority ethnic groups than for white people. The highest risk was for Pakistani and Bangladeshi people at 4.2%, followed by 3.6% for Indians and 2.2% for black people. This compares with 0.3 % for white people. Racially motivated incidents represented 12% of all crime against minority ethnic people compared with 2% for White people (Office for National Statistics 2002). A similar situation pertained in 2002/03 (Office for National Statistics 2005). The British Crime Survey, a systematic victim study, carried out by the Home Office, revealed an increase in race crime by 12% in the year 2003/4, including religious aggravated crimes (Crown Prosecution Service 2004) and figures showed an increase in subsequent years. After the London bombings in July 2005, the Metropolitan Police reported a six-fold rise in faith hate crime though levels returned to pre-7 July levels by 3 August (BBC 2005a). There were 269 religious hate crimes in the three weeks after 7 July, compared with 40 in the same period of 2004. Most were verbal abuse and minor assaults, but damage to mosques and property also occurred, carrying a great emotional impact (BBC 2005b). During the following year, the Crown Prosecution Service revealed statistics pointing to an increase in race- related crime, with prosecutions for racially or religiously aggravated offences up by more than a quarter (28%) on the previous year (Morris and McSmith 2007). A similar picture pertains in 2009, when the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (2010) reported an increase in racist incidents and offences. This was attributed in part to the economic downturn, which has led to an increased hostility towards migrants (European Commission against Racism and Intolerance 2010). This is particularly acute, according to the Federation of Poles in Great Britain, in small towns without a history of migrants where resources are stretched (Lojek-Magdziarz 2009; Rogers et al. 2009). Furthermore, a Financial Times survey for 2008-09 showed that negative attitudes towards immigration were not softening, as the number of people who want a cut in immigration remains stable at more than three-quarters (Boxell 2010). A large-scale qualitative study of the incidence of racism in the UK, commissioned by the BBC in 2010, also reveals that 60% of blacks, 59% of Asians and 21% of whites had personally experienced racial abuse. Of these, a third of incidents involved physical abuse (BBC 2010). According to the Crown Prosecution Service (2009), perpetrators are white in 80% of cases. Worryingly there has been an increased number of white supremacist groups in Britain’s towns and cities, described by Hope (2009, online) as ‘the spectre of rising white racism’. The success of one such group, the British National Party, formed in 1982 through drawing on members of various right wing groups such as the National Front, is indicative of this trend. The British National Party has, in recent years, attempted to portray itself as a mainstream (although far right) party, a strategy leading to a number of electoral successes, such as the election in June 2009 of two British National Party MEPs, a disquieting sign to the European Parliament (European Commission against Racism and Intolerance 2010). Notwithstanding the above increase in race crime, all official recording and monitoring bodies acknowledge that their statistics may not represent the actual levels of racist crime. Though more defendants are being charged, race crime reporting is still weak (Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service 2009; Crown Prosecution Service 2009; 2010; European Commission against Racism and Intolerance 2010). This is also noted in a report on anti-Muslim hate crime in London by Githens-Mazer and Lambert (2010). The above figures indictate that Britain is a racist society, an assertion made by half of the BBC (2010) survey’s participants. This is revealed in its differing treatment of ethnic groups in the penal and education system and in the workplace. It is also reflected in and encouraged by media and political discourse. Blacks are six times more likely than whites to be stopped and searched, and Asians are twice as likely (Morris and McSmith 2007). The police’s Stop and Search policy is also more likely to target Muslim men, leading to feelings of stigmatisation (European Commission against Racism and Intolerance 2010). Black and Asian people are also more likely to be imprisoned than white defendants - and, if found guilty, receive longer sentences than whites. Meanwhile the proportion of non-white people whose details have been added to the national DNA database lies at 10%, compared to only 5% of white people. Furthermore, blacks are 4.5 times more likely and Asians 1.7 times more likely to be victims of manslaughter or murder (European Commission against Racism and Intolerance 2010). The BBC survey (2010) also probed in depth participants’ perceptions of racial discrimination in education and at work, and revealed that almost one-third of blacks and Asians said they had faced racial discrimination at school, college or university, compared with 1% of whites. Similar proportions of black and Asian respondents said they had faced discrimination at work, compared with 3% of whites. Whilst 28% of whites thought colour affected how individuals are treated in education, 48% of blacks and 42% of Asians subscribed to that view. When it came to work, half of black and Asian respondents thought colour made a difference to how they were treated, compared with one-third of whites. According to the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (2010), media and popular political discourses of certain ethnic groups (in particular Muslims and Jews) pose a problem, tacitly encouraging racist views (Anderson and Clark 2009). Furthermore, the debate in public discourse on immigration verges on xenophobic and racist, thus stigmatising groups including migrants, refugees and asylum seekers. The Federation of Poles in Great Britain has also condemned media misrepresentaion of Polish migrant workers and has linked it with an increase in racist incidents in 2008 (Anderson and Clark 2009). Since 2000, two thirds of reports in the media on Muslims have portrayed them as either a threat or a problem. Brown’s (2009b) study of Muslim international students found that geopolitical tension impacted on the everyday life of Muslim students, who saw a clear link between their safety and the September 11 terrorist attack, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan the growth in Islamic fundamentalist terrorism and negative media reporting. Tension between a suspicious non-Muslim population and a vilified and vulnerable Muslim community clearly makes for an insecure living environment for those tourists caught up in this unresolved struggle, and has led Omar (2006) to claim that being Muslim in a Western country is characterised by inner turmoil and a drive to protect a vulnerable self-esteem. If Britain is a racist society with a growing problem of racist and religious hate crime, it is perhaps logical to expect that international sojourners might be caught up in national unresolved tensions, that they may fall victim to racist or religious abuse. This article explores the experiences of a sample of international students who do encounter incidents of racist abuse. Methodology The aim of this study is to gauge the incidence of racism visited on a cohort of international students in England and to explore its impact on the student experience. A two part design was adopted in order to fulfill both aims. For the first part of the study, it was decided to use a short questionnaire; for the second part, unstructured interviews were conducted, offering the researchers the chance to delve deeply into participants’ feelings (Daymon and Holloway 2010). The research setting was the Graduate School of a university in the south of England whose annual intake of international postgraduates is high. The university itself is located within a medium sized town, with approximately ten per cent of the population being of black or ethnic minority status. Official statistics suggest that the town itself does not have a particular issue with racism, with the local Police Authority identifying 324 racially related crimes and 273 incidents in the year in the county as a whole (Dorset Police Authority 2009), although the key issue of racism being generally under-reported means that caution is needed (Karlsen and Nazroo 2006). These official figures are, for example, on a par with those reported in Plymouth, a town which, according to the local Race Equality Council, experiences fifty race related incidents a day (Burnett 2011). Access to the 153-strong cohort of postgraduate students (academic year 2009/10) was permitted via the gatekeepers, the head of school and the framework leader for postgraduate study. The cohort is made up of a diverse range of nationalities, the most prominent groups being from China, Taiwan, Thailand and India. This reflects the national pattern (United Kingdom Council for International Student Affairs 2010). At the end of a mass lecture (belonging to a core unit attended by all students in the cohort, the vast majority (150) of which was international), the research topic was presented and all students present (153) agreed to complete a short questionnaire. This was designed to gauge the incidence of racism and to discover the following: gender, age, nationality, religion, location, nature and perpetrator of the assault. At the end of the questionnaire, which took only a few minutes to complete, students were asked to indicate whether or not they were willing to be interviewed about their experience and if so to provide their name and email address. Out of 153 students, 49 stated that they had experienced racism; however it is noteworthy that fifteen students refused to be interviewed, commenting that they felt too distressed, angry or uncomfortable to talk about their painful experiences. This points to the sensitive nature of the subject, which would require care and empathy from the interviewer, as is common in qualitative research into sensitive topics (Holloway and Wheeler 2010). This was particularly noted in the interview with the German participant whose suffering was reflected in her demeanour: she was nervous and jumpy, there was pain in her eyes, and throughout the interview, there was nervous laughter. Willing interviewees (33) were contacted by email and a mutually agreeable time was arranged to conduct the interview. Interviews took place in May and June 2010 in one of the researchers’ offices, and were recorded by digital recorder. As advised by Mason (2002), interviewees’ physical comfort was attended to: lighting was not too bright, seating was comfortable, a hot or cold drink was supplied, the phone was taken off the hook, and a ‘do not disturb’ sign was put on the door. The demeanour of the researcher has an impact on the quality of the data generated as well as on the emotional comfort of the interviewee (O’Reilly 2005), thus we made sure that we were friendly and attentive, and that eye contact was maintained. O’Reilly (2005) advises that the interview should feel like a conversation with a friend, but as Mason (2002) mentions, the effort needed to sustain conversation in an interview can be tiring; this was particularly pertinent in this study as all interviews lasted between 60 and 90 minutes. An unstructured approach was adopted: each interview started with the same question, ‘tell me about your experience’. The evolution of the interview depended on the topics raised by interviewees. Each interview thus reflected the biases of the participant, though there was much commonality in the themes that were generated by analysis. All interviews were transcribed in full by the researchers: this has the advantage of bringing them close to the data, allowing them to recall incidents from the day of the interview and permitting initial analysis to take place during transcription when nascent ideas may form (Daymon and Holloway 2011). Subsequently, transcripts were printed and repeatedly read, in order to get a sense of the whole. Then we began to code the interview data: coding entailed separating and labelling the data, which were placed into broader categories. The research categories that emerged from the data therefore reflect participants’ priorities. The literature review was processual, conducted at the start of the research and throughout in response to emergent themes. With regard to the generalisability of findings, qualitative researchers acknowledge that a small sample and the selection of one case makes it difficult to move to general classifications (Mason 2002). Nevertheless, they often claim that similar settings should produce similar data, such that theory-based generalisation, involving the transfer of theoretical concepts found in one situation to other settings and conditions, is possible (Daymon and Holloway 2010). As Hammersley (1992, p. 16) argues, it is possible to produce research that identifies generic features: ‘to find the general in the particular; a world in a grain of sand.’ The setting for this research permits the transfer of the findings to similar settings, namely, higher education institutions in the UK that recruit international students. the findings may also resonate with those working with international students in countries other than the UK where racism is also a feature of society that may impact on the international student experience. Findings The incidence of racist abuse The short questionnaire administered to 153 international students revealed that 104 reported NO experience of racism: of these, 62 were non-EU and 42 were EU students. In particular, just one out of 22 Thai students experienced racism. A similar number of Chinese, Taiwanese and Indians did experience racism as didn’t. Thus, almost one third (49) of students experienced racism, and some experienced multiple incidents. The breakdown is as follows: Anonymous – 1; Bangladeshi – 2; Barbadian – 1; Chinese – 11; Cypriot – 1; German – 3; Ghanaian – 1; Indian – 11; Japanese – 2; Korean – 4; Nigerian – 1; Polish – 2; Syrian – 2; Taiwanese – 6; Thai – 1. In terms of religion, 19 classified themselves as having no religion (from China, Korea, Taiwan and Japan); 11 were Buddhist; nine were Christian, three were Muslim, one was Sikh; six were Hindu. The age profile of participants was as follows: early thirties (9); between 21 and 29 (40). This reflects the age range of the whole cohort. Finally, there were 19 men and 30 women: this also reflects the gender profile of the cohort under study, which in turn is indicative of national trends (UKCISA 2010). Skin colour is an important indicator of susceptibility to racist abuse: according to McDowell (2009), the whiteness of immigrants offers some protection against abuse: sojourners are less vulnerable if their separateness isn’t reflected outwardly (Brown 2009a). Brown (2003) supports this association, as she found that their whiteness protected Polish economic migrants from attack in the UK. In the Australian context, this is reinforced by Marginson et al. (2010), who state that non-white international students experience exclusion and are more vulnerable to attack than their white counterparts. It is important then to record that 43 of the above students were from non-EU countries and were non-white, whilst 6 out of 48 (white) EU students did experience racism (this related to economic migration and to unresolved post-war hostility towards Germany). This study therefore confirms that physical distinctiveness from the host community increases a sojourner’s vulnerability to abuse. The nature of the abuse The data have led to the creation of a typology of racist abuse, which distinguishes between the physical (assault and the throwing of objects) and the verbal (swearing, laughter and negative comments). A breakdown of the type of assault experienced by participants is as follows: swearing (28), being told to go back to their own country (12), missiles thrown (10), physical assault (3), pejorative comments about the home country (13), and aggressive laughter (6). Some students had experienced multiple incidents. The majority of racist incidents were verbal assaults; there was however physical abuse, including throwing bottles, stones, eggs and water (10). On three occasions, students were physically manhandled. It is important to record that none of these incidents were reported officially. Similarly, in Brown’s (2009a; 2009b) studies of racist and religious abuse of international students, no incident had been officially reported either to the police or to the university authorities. This study therefore tends to support the claim that the real incidence of racism in the UK is higher than official figures suggest, given a general trend of non-reporting of racist crime (Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service 2009; Crown Prosecution Service 2009; 2010; European Commission against Racism and Intolerance 2010). A challenge faces the management of higher education institutions if better reporting mechanisms are to be put in place, so that the incidence of abuse can be gauged and pastoral support can be offered to victims. Personal accounts of the incidents encountered by students are offered below, bringing life to the data provided: There was this group of boys outside of the pub, about 25 boys wearing sporty clothes. They started shouting ‘go away’. They had bottles. They said ‘al-Qaida’ two or three times. I was nervous because my wife was with me. I thought they might have got vicious and push and shove. Bangladeshi student I was walking back home when it was starting to get dark. I heard some swearing and shouting and then at the same time I was hit by something. Then this car passed and someone throwed something from the car. It was a hard object, really hard. In another case, people were shouting ‘go back home’; horrible word violence. Japanese student (this student faced multiple incidents) There was this aged man I think he was drunk. He saw me in the bus and he said ‘hey you Nigger, you black man. Do you have some weed on you?’ I just looked away and everyone had their eye on me. He kept on asking and shouting on me. Ghanaian student I had a terrible experience two times. Some young guys like only 20 they called me and my friend ‘hey!’ and then threw their apple what they eaten. They shouted ‘dirty Chinese’ and ‘yellow monkey go back to your country’. The second incident happened in the library, I was using the copy machine. Two boys were standing behind me and one guy said ‘dirty China’. Korean student As the above interview excerpts reveal, much of the abuse suffered was verbal and included pejorative comments about students’ perceived race; however these comments also involved physical assault, albeit at a low level. The perpetrators of the racist assault were always white, mostly male (in five incidents they were female): they included teenagers (16), men in their twenties (12) and thirties (3), undergraduates (3), old couples (3), and young boys, aged around ten (2). In two incidents, the perpetrator used a vicious dog to threaten their victim; in many incidents (18), the perpetrators were in a group, or a ‘gang’, as a Japanese participant recalled. The profile of perpetrator fits that identified by the Crown Prosecution Service in its report on race crime (2009), underscoring the notion that the sojourner may become embroiled in existing tensions between host and diverse ethnic groups (Brown 2009b). Being suspicious and fearful It is important to remember that the Crown Prosecution Service (2010) defines a race crime as any incident which is perceived to be racist by the victim, to be motivated by prejudice or hostility against the victim’s race or perceived race. For many participants, racism was suspected to lie at the root of negative incidents, such as physical assault or perceived menacing staring, as encapsulated in the following comment by an Indian student: I’ve had glimpse in the pub, glimpses that they’ve acknowledged me in a negative manner maybe. I notice that they make eye contact and their eye contact doesn’t give positive aura. I assume it’s because of my colour. There is some research that says if colour is the same you are more easily accepted in England. Participants’ explanation for a high level of suspicion was that it was borne of personal and word of mouth stories of negative experience. Indeed, a pronounced number of participants talked about their friends’ experiences, which only fuelled their anxiety. All of my friends had an experience of racism; everyone had one time a bad experience. Korean student My sister lost her first baby inside her womb after she was punched and thrown to the floor in Birmingham. She was going to meet her husband. My other sister was verbally abused by some boys. Indian student I heard so many stories from my friends, like one had someone throw eggs at her. I think half of them have had a bad experience, either physical or just shouting. Japanese student I have a friend who was abused. He went back home. I think most of them when they have this issue they can’t stand it. Ghanaian student Even if they had not suffered racial abuse directly, students were disturbed by stories of mistreatment. Brown (2009a) argues that the experience of racism feeds suspicion that discrimination by nationality is routine. Furthermore, visible distinctiveness is an added source of vulnerability and threat, aiding the detection of difference and increasing the fear of attack. In this study, a combination of personal and word of mouth accounts of racism impacted negatively on students’ sense of personal safety. This has consequences for future recruitment, if students pass on their fears. As Chen and Zimitat (2006) note, security is an important factor in choice of university. The impact of racism on the victim Emotional reactions to racially motivated incidents are generally more severe than for non-racially motivated incidents (Office for National Statistics 2002). Indeed, according to the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (2010), racism severely affects both victim and community well-being. In this study, a strong emotional reaction to abuse was also noted. The first reaction to the confrontation with racism was shock, as expressed by the following typical comments: I was really surprised because I expected something different especially because the UK is so close to Germany. Shocked, but after third time, I got used to it. German student I was so upset, because I never think somebody was going to say that in the university. I mean outside some teenagers or uneducated people who are not that open minded, they can make a mistake. But in this case, they are intelligent, they are at university, they are smart, they study many things and they see so many international students here. Korean student I was so surprised, and I felt, why do people know so little about Muslim countries? Syrian student Students were therefore unprepared for the treatment they had received, especially when the perpetrator was in education and arguably more open to diversity. The importance of preparedness for the new culture has been noted in previous research (e.g. Kim 2001; Brown and Holloway 2008), but it is clearly not in the interest of higher education institutions to refer to the prospect of racist abuse. Indeed, Marginson et al. (2010) point to a marked silence on the part of educational authorities in Australia about racial attacks against international students. Having said that, the importance of the internet is highlighted as an important source of pre-travel information among student travellers by Wong and Yeh (2009), Brown and Holloway (2008) and Xu et al. (2009), and participants spoke of using online fora to warn prospective students from their national group about risks of studying in the UK. Once their shock had worn off, students experienced strong and lasting emotional reactions of sadness, depression and disappointment, as indicated below: I felt belittled, nothing. Barbadian student It was upsetting, ‘why people do that?’ I wanted to go home. Japanese student For two days I was crying in my room. I felt like just running back to Ghana. What I realise is that they saw me not to be part of them. I don’t belong with them. They didn’t want to see me. They don’t like my presence. Ghanaian student Racism had a strong and lasting impact on well-being. This can carry implications for interaction strategy, according to Brown (2009a), who notes that the demoralisation brought by racist abuse can lead to ghettoisation, as collective defensiveness and an urge to find safety in numbers strengthen group identification. An emotion commonly expressed was anger over their treatment, as well as resentment over their decision to choose England as their study destination: I paid more than them, I flew from quite far. I stopped my career, I spent a lot of money here, I can’t see my friends or family. I want to study here and not have the experience of racism! I deserve better than that and I’m treated like not the right person or below them. Korean student I am shocked, angry and disappointed in England! They should be friendly – if they were in my country I should be friendly to them! I think a lot of Chinese come here to study and they bring a lot of money to that city. They bring a lot of benefits so why would they think like that? It’s strange. Chinese student We pay a lot of money to study here. Sometimes if you’re treated with violent words you think, ‘I can go anywhere, some different country if I’m treated better. Why am I here?’ Japanese student This is a pertinent question, and one which the government, both nationally and locally, would do well to consider if the consequences of negative word-of-mouth for international student recruitment are to be avoided. The Prime Minister’s Initiative for International Education (PMI) initiatives (1 and 2) was a scheme designed to ensure the growth of UK international education delivered both in the UK and abroad, focusing on long-term relationships overseas with a number of intended outcomes. These include increasing overseas student numbers, improving international student satisfaction in the UK and positive change in perceptions of students considering the UK as a study destination. This demonstrates Government awareness of the contribution of international students to the local and higher education economy, but host education on the benefits of international education is clearly lacking. Students showed a strong awareness of the contribution they make to the local and higher education economy and of their consumer power. As Smith (2006) and Brown (2009a) claim, an increasingly assertive attitude is visible among many international students who are now aware of the contribution they make. Several students went as far as to avow that they wouldn’t recommend or visit England again: I don’t feel very comfortable in the country I must say. It’s shocking because I actually thought that England was a really nice country and that I could settle here. I would tell German friends that England is really prejudiced against Germans because I think it is an important thing. German student I feel that England made me disappointed; I have to say be careful otherwise they will have a similar experience like me and they could blame. Korean student The above comments show a clear link between mistreatment and word-of-mouth marketing, which is recognised as an important recruitment tool (Goldblatt 2007). There would also be a negative impact on repeat visitation to the UK as leisure tourists. As Gursey et al. (2002) point out, anger, apathy, or mistrust on the part of the host will result in a reluctance to repeat visit, and it will impact negatively on destination image. The economic dependence of British universities on full-fee paying international students means that institutions have to work hard to improve the international student experience. The contribution made by international students to the local economy and to the local, regional and national tourism industry should not be underestimated either (Llewellyn-Smith and McCabe 2008). Therefore, it is important that higher education institutions work together with local authority bodies to address the student experience both on and off campus. Keeping a perspective For some students, the severity of their emotional response to racism was a function of the conditions in the home country; a contrast was made between violence that can occur at home and abroad, as pointed out by the following two students: With respect, you have made a big issue out of racism. In my country, everyday people are dying so racism is irrelevant to me. People are much discriminated against at home. Bad experiences like this are nothing. The reason I am so cool about it is because other countries like Bangladesh are more violent. You have justice in your country. We are used to violence in our country. In England it’s paradise, attacks are not personal. I appreciate things. I have met loads of people who have acknowledged me positively. We count our blessings. We know the goodness of a first world country. There is order here that is not available in our country. Bangladesh student I think this society is not so bad, I think students will have more guarantees of safety than in developing countries. Especially in China there are a lot of bad things happen every day. I think Britain basically is safer. Chinese student Downward social comparison theory can be used to understand this drive to obtain succour by drawing attention to a worse situation or experience elsewhere: people tend to make such comparisons when they want to feel better off than another person whose problems are perceived to be more serious than their own (Suls et al. 2002). There was also recognition that racism is a universal problem: In every house there is one good person, even if the family is bad. Ghanaian student Racism is not only a problem here; it’s in many other countries as well. It’s a big problem. Korean student Every country there is a bad man and a worse man but in Britain the better is more than the worse. A lot of people here are so nice and so friendly. Most days good things overtake the bad things. Chinese student A similar position is adopted by British race relations expert, Gilroy (2007), who argues that Britain is despite its level of race crime still the safest place for immigrants in the western world, given its comparatively high level of tolerance. This is supported in a report released by the organisation, Equality and Human Rights in 2010, entitled How fair is Britain?, in which a portrait is offered of growing tolerance alongside a rise in racism. Thus, for some students, their encounter with racism, though unpleasant, did not do lasting damage to their well-being or to their judgement of the receiving country. Understanding the underlying causes An attempt was made by many students to understand the root of their mistreatment. It can be construed that this would alleviate their distress; empathy with host attitudes might act as a compensatory mechanism to protect a vulnerable self-esteem. The most common cause of racism was deemed to be the pressure placed on the host society by increased immigration: We have taken your jobs; you have too many immigrants; it’s time to say ‘no’. Taiwanese student They think that international people are taking all the jobs so some people have got negative feelings towards them. Though we are taking the jobs that English people don’t want to do! Japanese student It makes sense because these guys are not getting work. When I’m coming here I’m taking over the employment of some other people. This is a small island and we have saturated it. We have come and we have taken your food and employment. Bangladeshi student The insider view was that tension over immigration to the UK caused racist behaviour. Indeed, there was sympathy with host feelings of resentment of migrants, particularly during a time of economic recession. This link is also made by Anderson and Clark (2009), whose particular focus is on Polish migration. Migrants constitute a source of community tension, if they are perceived to be a burden on community resources, to represent competition for jobs or if they do not integrate into the host society and thus seem to challenge social norms (Rogers et al. 2009).This is also an understanding found in government discussions of migration and increased acts of racist abuse (see European Commission against Racism and Intolerance 2010). Nevertheless, some students commented that they might avoid studying in a destination that is not ethnically diverse, believing it to be less safe for non-white visitors: I wouldn’t recommend the south to my friends because living there is very difficult. You will never feel confident because you are the minority. Not like London or the midlands or the north. Ghanaian student Whilst host resentment of increasing immigration was blamed for incidents of racism, a diverse ethnic mix might offer the promise of safety in numbers. Withdrawal from danger There was understandable fear among those who had experienced racism that such incidents would recur, and withdrawal from a situation of perceived risk was a noted response to fear for their safety: Racism made me stay at home and not want to go outside. I’m afraid if somebody chased me. Any one I see who is not Asian I feel that way. That experience made me just afraid, so I don’t go out on my own. Korean student I felt unwelcome, threatened. I don’t walk alone in the night because of these incidents and because of my friends’ experiences. Chinese student I am vulnerable because of my skin colour, because I’m Muslim so I stay in. Pakistani student Apprehension towards strangers was strong; being outwardly distinct from mainstream society intensified fear to the degree that some students adopted a strategy of withdrawal from society. Deviance is shown in the person of a Taiwanese student, who having been attacked and chased by a gang of teenagers, learned kung fu in his refusal to be dominated by fear: I didn’t want to be nervous again. Now I no longer cross the street to avoid a gang of men. I can walk with confidence, I walk straight ahead. Meanwhile a German student adopted as a strategy for avoiding racism denial of her national identity, as shown below: What I started doing, I don’t like doing it but I started saying I’m not from Germany, I started saying I’m Italian. Most people anyway think that I am Latin but I would prefer to say I’m German and not get the bad reaction. I sometimes think afterwards, ‘what would happen if I said I was German?’ I get such a bad reaction that I don’t want to say it anymore. Thus, in a climate of anti-German feeling, safety was guaranteed by a false identity. It can be construed that the creation of an alternative identity is the last resort, a stage further along the continuum of avoiding danger. The first stage is avoiding places of danger; the second is withdrawal to the confines of the home; the final stage is to assume a more secure national identity. Negative bias theory can be used to understand most students’ fears and self-protecting avoidance of possible situations of danger. When assessing a situation, Baumeister et al. (2001) argue that negative information and negative events predominate, that trauma and the risk of trauma hold greater power over individuals than positive occurrences ones. Conclusion This study shows that one third of an international student cohort of around 150 postgraduate students experienced some form of racism. The emotional impact of such abuse was shown to be strong, and in many cases, the encounter with racism led to behavioural change and left negative impressions of the host country. By documenting students’ exposure to bigotry, this study asks questions about the receptivity offered by the UK to its growing number of international students. The UK is often cast as a tolerant multicultural society (Equality and Human Rights 2010; Gilroy 2007), an image that clashes with a portrait of racial abuse offered by this and other research that suggests a growing antipathy towards the outsider (e.g. European Commission against Racism and Intolerance 2010). Community attitudes are an important ingredient in the welcome extended and thereby in the visitor experience and impression of a country, however Brown (2009a) argues that they are hard to influence as they belong to the private sphere. Furthermore, behaviour towards international visitors can be mixed up in community attitudes towards immigration and tension between different ethnic groups (European Commission against Racism and Intolerance 2010). International visitors can thus be caught up in unresolved conflict between residents and government policies on migration. They can also become victims of misguided stigmatisation and harassment by host nationals of countries associated with terrorism (European Commission against Racism and Intolerance 2010). Whilst it is therefore beyond the remit of education sector bodies to resolve the problem of increased race crime, which afflicts the sojourner as well as the resident, the topic of racism is clearly one that must be addressed by a number of stakeholders. At an institutional level, the management of higher education institutions need to consider measures must be put in place so that students feel that they can confide in staff at their university and receive pastoral support if needed. An increase in the reporting of race crime (to police and/or educational authorities) will allow higher education institutions to build a picture of the reception offered to this important segment of the student population and to use this information to start a dialogue with the relevant authorities in the receiving town. After all, the economic contribution made by international students benefits both the university and the host community (Llewellyn-Smith and McCabe 2008). International student recruitment is a competitive business and a negative student experience may well impact on the ability of higher education institutions to sustain their competitive advantage. A downturn in international student recruitment would have a deleterious impact on both the higher education institution and the local economy. At a broader level, there seems a clear need for stakeholders such as The UK Council for International Student Affairs and the National Union of Students to take an active role in identifying solutions. Both UKCISA and the National Union of Students have an explicit role in enhancing the student experience, in raising awareness of the values and benefits of international students, in reducing barriers to mobility, and in encouraging institutional support for international students. They would therefore make a valid contribution to the development of models of good practice, the provision of appropriate resources and other supporting mechanisms. The National Union of Students, especially, through its network of institutional unions, would seem to be a logical choice of institution to identify such resources. Financial incentives notwithstanding, from an ethical point of view, it is important that the problem of racism is addressed by all stakeholders, affecting as it does both society at large and international visitors. To echo the passionate call made by Marginson et al. (2010), it is the ethical duty of higher education institutions to work to protect the international students it has worked so hard to recruit. References Anderson, B. and Clark, N. (2009) Recession, vulnerable workers and immigration London, Centre on Migration, Policy and Society Bates, S. (2009) Police investigate gang attack on Muslim students in London The Guardian, 9 November Available from: http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2009/nov/09/racist-attacks-students-city-university Accessed 9/11/2009 Baumeister, R., Bratslavsky, E.,Finkenauer, C. and Vohs. K. (2001). "Bad Is Stronger Than Good." Review of General Psychology 5:323-70. 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work_6bckjtizn5f55c62asufgqewwy	----	David Roediger American Quarterly, Volume 64, Number 2, June 2012, pp. 337-343 (Article) Published by The Johns Hopkins University Press DOI: 10.1353/aq.2012.0018 For additional information about this article Access provided by University of Kansas Libraries (24 Sep 2014 10:04 GMT) http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/aq/summary/v064/64.2.roediger.html http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/aq/summary/v064/64.2.roediger.html | 337Freedom Breaks ©2012 The American Studies Association Freedom Breaks David Roediger Freedom with Violence: Race, Sexuality, and the US State. By Chandan Reddy. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2011. 320 pages. $84.95 (cloth). $23.95 (paper). Strange Affinities: The Gender and Sexual Politics of Comparative Ra- cialization. Edited by Grace Kyungwon Hong and Roderick A. Ferguson. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2011. 384 pages. $94.95 (cloth). $25.95 (paper). Represent and Destroy: Rationalizing Violence in the New Racial Capitalism. By Jodi Melamed. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2011. 288 pages. $75.00 (cloth). $25 (paper). I sometimes wish that American studies contemplated its own cutting edge less insistently. The love of innovation and the thrill of timeliness are all to the good, but there are costs, too. Some are not our fault, as when young scholars rightly convinced that they are pushing boundaries just as they should within our field encounter collegewide tenure committees for whom the cutting edge is anathema. But even in matters over which we exercise some control, too insistent searches for the next big thing risk being counterproductive. At times a certain self-policing undoubtedly leads scholars doing important work to hesitate to submit it to leading American studies venues if it seems somehow not “cutting edge” enough. In an interdiscipline often raising profound, enduring questions requiring sustained inquiry from many angles, we can be too ready to move on and too self-effacing when we do not. Still, if pushed to define a body of scholarship currently making the most exciting and generative impact in our field, I would focus precisely on the area defined by the three books under review here. To say as much is not to fetishize the cutting edge, as the books assert their connections to long-standing concerns within the field. The authors, in refusing to simply be the next thing, draw powerfully and respectfully on older traditions, including even those that they revise. It is true that two of the authors reviewed here, Roderick Fergu- son and Chandan Reddy, helped recently to initiate and popularize “queer | 338 American Quarterly of color critique.” However, in doing so they insisted that their innovation drew inspiration from a long tradition of women of color feminism, a tradi- tion animating all the works considered here. Likewise generative are supple engagements with historical materialism, and specifically with what Cedric Robinson termed “Black Marxism,” as well as critical deployments of the ideas of Gayatri Spivak, Michel Foucault, and Frantz Fanon. The three books cohere around networks of scholars exchanging ideas. Their writers are in sustained dialogue with each other’s work. Two of the books are in Duke University Press’s Perverse Modernities series and the third, Jodi Melamed’s Represent and Destroy, is part of the newer Difference Incorporated series at University of Minnesota Press, under the coeditorship of Ferguson and of Grace Kyungwon Hong. Reddy and Melamed both contribute essays to Strange Affinities. Thus this review discusses not just exciting new work but an exciting new body of work. The phrase “difference incorporated” especially signals how this body of work draws from the generative insights of the literary scholar Lisa Lowe, who coedits the Perverse Modernities series. In introducing her 1996 classic Immigrant Acts, Lowe demonstrated an appreciation of Marxism that none- theless challenged the notion that capital’s desire was always and everywhere to make labor homogeneous, interchangeable, and abstract. Instead in U.S. history, she argued, “capital has maximized its profits not through rendering labor ‘abstract’ but precisely through the social productions of ‘difference,’. . . marked by race, nation, geographical origins, and gender.”1 While the call for a more-sophisticated materialism was profound, Lowe’s equally sharp challenge to how we write about diversity is what most animates the books reviewed here. Far from simply standing on the side of the angels, multiculturalism could, as Lowe showed, underpin celebrations of difference useful to capital and empire. Such celebrations helped reproduce not only identity categories but also continued oppression along lines of race, gender, and nation. In their varied ways all of the books considered here, and Ferguson’s scintil- lating forthcoming study The Reorder of Things, explore complex and sometimes unexpected connections between difference and power. Melamed and Reddy especially insist that the period after what Michael Omi and Howard Winant call the “racial break,” the adoption of formal racial equality and nationalist celebration of racial progress, saw the strategic embrace of some forms of diversity by elites who were not just striking poses but acting on their own interests. Nonetheless, the analyses of Melamed and Reddy utterly avoid the Left-sounding antimulticulturalism of fools exemplified by the recent work of Walter Benn Michaels, who argues that race no longer functions as a central | 339Freedom Breaks axis of exploitation but rather as a strategy of rulers—and of complicit aca- demics and activists—to derail and deflect struggles over economic inequality.2 Melamed expresses the convincing counterposition running through queer of color critique by insisting that turns to diversity take place within an order she describes as a “new racial capitalism.” Thus, as the geographer Ruth Wilson Gilmore writes on the book’s cover, “official antiracism has steadied, rather than dissolved, race as a structuring force of capitalism.” Because these books so cohere, my remarks adopt a thematic approach after a discussion of the parameters and arguments of each work individually. Reddy’s previous work brilliantly spilled over disciplinary boundaries in ways that have made Freedom with Violence one of the most widely awaited first books in my memory. George Lipsitz’s back cover assessment of it as “one of the most important books of our times” captures both the import and the timeliness of Reddy’s contribution. Reddy uses texts that range from laws and court opinions to political speeches, the novels of Nella Larsen, and W. E. B. Du Bois’s castigations of the “car window” social scientists who pronounced on the “Negro problem” based on glimpses they gleaned as trains shuttled them to southern vacations. Freedom with Violence positions itself in a long history of challenges to how race is known, placed, naturalized, and used. In discussions of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Reddy shows how racial knowledge glorified the nation, in no small measure around its most brutal, racially inflected projects. In the period after the racial break, Reddy demonstrates how the state’s claims to be a guarantor against racist violence underpin its power to decide who, at home and abroad, ought to be without rights and protections. Melamed’s Represent and Destroy complements Reddy’s book aptly. It ana- lyzes three successive political and representational regimes about race in the post–World War II U.S. past: racial liberalism, liberal multiculturalism, and neoliberal multiculturalism. A literary scholar, Melamed situates literary texts in changing moments, arguing that they did not merely bespeak changing configurations of difference and power but were and are deployed to teach new forms of hegemonic racial knowledge. In the period of racial liberalism, for example, fiction and social science dovetailed to emphasize the reparative possibilities of modern racial knowledge, the long-term association of the U.S. state with freedom, the premodern ignorance of bigots, and the damage supposedly done by history to African American psyches. Highly constrained “protest novels” stood as the prescribed form of black creative writing. After the legislation of formal equality in the 1960s, and for a time with the pressure of mass movements, university-based struggles for equality matured. Liberal | 340 American Quarterly multiculturalism often narrowed these insurgencies into attempts to expand the canon, so that integration and antiracism could be seen, as Hazel Carby observed, to center on constructing reading lists and on “knowing each other through cultural texts” (91). In the twenty-first century, Melamed finds neo- liberal multiculturalism championing fiction that valorizes commodity flows and Western ideals, even and especially when those ideals rationalize violence. Her provocative discussion of the push to elevate Azar Nafisi’s Reading “Lolita” in Tehran might be productively paired with Ruth Tapia’s deeply interesting reflections in Strange Affinities on Quentin Tarantino’s Kill Bill films in which residual and emergent racisms, fully tied to commodity forms and to histories of violence, sell images of liberation that never stray far from their opposites. Strange Affinities, with more than a dozen contributors, lends itself less well to easy summary. Its exciting essays take up another theme of Immigrant Acts and of women of color feminism generally, that of difference within difference. In an essay in this volume, Kara Keeling quotes Audre Lorde as saying that “our place” is in “the very house of difference rather than the security of any one particular difference”; if so, the challenges of making such a home safe, adventuresome, and findable are profound (53). Strange Affinities considers threats to such a house and assesses strategies deployed for building it, past and present. While it is impossible in a short review essay to mention all of the contributors, their many pieces convey both an astonishing range of insights and a tone that takes differences within difference as salutary, if not always comfortable. Care to historical detail often matters greatly in the essays, as in Helen Jun’s fine study “Black Orientalism: Nineteenth Century Narratives of Race and U.S. Citizenship.” Jun notes that a post–Civil War acceptance of orientalist tropes by some African Americans at times gave way to opposition to state policies of Chinese exclusion by black Americans who had their own recent and ongoing experiences of statist coercions about race. Likewise won- derful, for its ability to show not just a gap in the scholarship but how filling that gap changes the whole story, is Martha Chew Sánchez’s “Deconstructing the Rhetoric of Mestizaje through the Chinese Presence in Mexico.” Ferguson’s own Strange Affinities essay, “Lateral Moves of African American Studies in a Period of Migration,” systematically engages Lorde and the possibility of coalition. It asks us to imagine the subject of black studies as personified by someone young, immigrant, and queer. Such a subject, facing what Reddy and Natalie Bennett jointly write of as the combined pressure of family-based immigration policies and limitations on welfare benefits of racialized workers who are not citizens, necessarily struggles to locate a habitable house of dif- ference and, indeed, to find housing. | 341Freedom Breaks Lisa Cacho’s “Racialized Hauntings of the Devalued Dead,” the arresting lead article in Strange Affinities, mourns the death of a cousin, Brandon Jesse Martinez. Martinez was killed in a car wreck in San Diego, and for Cacho, all of our theoretical brilliance offered too little to frame a tragic ending to his un- settled life. Neither a “race rebel” nor a “bad subject,” he was a citizen, and not without economic advantages. However, he remained displaced, uninterested in middle-class strivings or the world of couples. Martinez could not be easily slotted into a “queer of color” category, but Cacho, drawing on the work of Judith Halberstam, experiments with placing him in a “queer time and space” (Strange Affinities, 47) outside the logics of production and reproduction. Not surprisingly, writing profoundly about differences within difference and about a society structured by race and simultaneously also by disavowals of racism requires that a productive sense of contradiction runs through much of the work under review. Although none of the writers represented teach in a history department, they are strikingly attentive to change and continuity over time in addressing these contradictions. Reddy, for example, begins and ends Freedom with Violence with close attention to contradiction. He details how legal protections against homophobic hate crimes came to be attached to the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) covering 2010. Thus victims of domestic violence Matthew Shepard and James Byrd Jr. had their names connected to legislation that expanded the funding for U.S. state violence in the “global war on terror” to unprecedented levels. This contradiction becomes more explicable, and unsettling, when placed by Reddy in long patterns of nation-making on frontiers, of U.S. desires for Cold War hegemony, and of torturous post-9/11 imperial logics. Similarly, drawing on the examples of Siobhan Somerville and George Chauncey, Reddy offers meticulous renderings of complex histories as one key to avoiding loose, triumphalist, and statist analogies between the 1967 Loving case in which the Supreme Court overturned Virginia’s bans on inter- racial marriage and contemporary struggles for the rights of sexual minorities to marry. Melamed, meanwhile, is as productively attentive to periodization as any historian in seeking to explore the coproduction of antiracism as ideology and racial capitalism as political economy. An emphasis on the transnational, and its place as both refuge from U.S. realities for those aspiring to construct counterhegemonies and as a realm in which capital plays out its market-based fantasies, is likewise shared by many of the authors. In the best moments of Reddy’s book, home and away fasci- natingly interpenetrate. Some of the analysis is rightly committed to applying to contemporary Western nations, especially the United States, John Stuart | 342 American Quarterly Mill’s commentary on nineteenth-century England—“a democrat at home and a despot abroad” (quoted in Freedom with Violence, 244). However, there is likewise a realization that any domestic democracy dialectically shaped by imperial violence carries its own limitations and miseries, even on the home front. Thus the budget priorities described in the NDAA deliberations simul- taneously inflict violence on the neglected, often racialized poor at home and those on the receiving end of U.S. bombs abroad. Reddy apprehends Larsen’s novel Quicksand as turning to the Pacific to explore difference within difference, assembling Orientalist objects in tab- leaux that recur in the novel, and making a precocious contribution to queer of color critique from a vantage of old constraints and new possibilities. This reading meshes well with the sympathetic and rigorous explication of Du Bois’s romance of South Asia in his novel Dark Princess that Sanda Mayzaw Lwin contributes to Strange Affinities. Lwin’s essay ends with vital reflections on Du Bois’s realization of the inescapability of the U.S. nation even when the frame of the narrative becomes global. The ways in which all of these works draw energy from contemporary activist campaigns and from longer histories of struggles for more justice and less violence can hardly be overstated. The books potentially tell a bleak set of stories in which even the most glorious freedom movement triumphs get pressed rapidly into the service of empire, the reproduction of inequality, and even the accumulation of capital. The very conception of multiculturalism is constituted by such tawdry concerns. Very early in Freedom with Violence Reddy appropriately registers concern over matters of tone. He laments, “Even as I write these words the United States continues its assaults,” causing “griev- ous and unimaginable loss of life” and making it potentially “seem like little more than an intellectual exercise to speak of the limits of violence” (ix–x). However, the reader is quickly reminded that resistance is also ubiquitous, and Reddy’s sprawling chapter on the coincidence of the election of Barack Obama in 2008 and the referendum results assaulting gay marriage in California that same election day insists on avoiding both any claiming of easy victories and any imagining of ourselves as destined to lose forever. Melamed likewise balances description of an extremely agile ruling class able to make the racial break pay off for empire and capital with attention to a powerfully important “race radical” tradition that refuses to be tied to the formulas of protest novels, to ornamenting a more marketable canon, or to applauding military adventure. She offers exceptionally challenging and hope- ful readings of Chester Himes’s End of a Primitive, of Tony Cade Bambara’s Those Bones Are Not My Child, and of the edited anthology This Bridge Called | 343Freedom Breaks My Back by Cherríe Moraga and Gloria Anzaldúa in this connection. More remarkable still is a full chapter on the challenges presented to regimes of representation and of property being mounted internationally by indigenous people’s movements. I share this striving for an optimism of the will even when a pessimism of the intellect is inescapable. However, it does seem apposite to offer a closing comment on how we might build on this exciting new scholarship to ground meaningful further optimism. It may be that Lowe’s continuing emphasis on the labor process is yet another area into which scholars might follow her lead. In a recent essay on transnationalism, for example, she framed matters in terms of the consideration of “the global intimacies out of which emerged not only modern humanism but a modern racialized division of labor” (quoted in Strange Affinities, 190), continuing a long emphasis in her writing on work. In referring to this fruitful part of Lowe’s emphases, I am not (only) wishing that my own research specialization on labor were a concern more widely shared but am arguing that the point of production is critical in race-making. It is a site where soaring rhetoric about freedom starkly confronts cold, hard facts of exploitation. Capital’s contradictory, understandable desire is to produce, as the anthropologist Paul Silverstein has written, “socially disunited abstract labor.” Its brutality in doing so unmasks neoliberal multiculturalism spectacularly in the pork processing plants of the U.S. countryside, the galleys of cruise ships, the sweatshops of many continents, the hotels of the overdeveloped world, the provisioning of U.S. war zones and beyond.3 Notes 1. Lisa Lowe, Immigrant Acts: On Asian American Cultural Politics (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1996), 27–28; see also Grace Hong, The Ruptures of American Capital: Women of Color Feminism and the Culture of Immigrant Labor (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2006). Thanks to Elizabeth Esch and Jennifer Pierce for comments on this review essay. 2. Walter Benn Michaels, “Against Diversity,” New Left Review 52 (2008): 33–36; Benn Michaels, “What Matters,” London Review of Books, August 27, 2009, 11–13. Cf. David Roediger, “The Retreat from Race and Class,” Monthly Review, July–August 2006, 40–51. 3. Paul A. Silverstein, “Immigrant Racialization and the New Savage Slot: Race, Migration, and Immi- gration in the New Europe,” Annual Review of Anthropology 34 (2005): 364. See also Elizabeth Esch and David Roediger, The Production of Difference: Race and the Management of Labor in U.S. History (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012). 
work_6cisneo3grbzpmjicun24ikosq	----	Chapter 5 1 The Politics Behind the Introduction of Stirring Up Religious Hatred Offences in England and Wales Alexander Brown (UEA) Introduction The Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006 amended the Public Order Act 1986 to create new stirring up religious hatred offences in England and Wales, making it an offence, amongst other things, to use threatening words or behaviour or publish threatening words or distribute threatening materials, recordings or videos with the intention of stirring up hatred against people on grounds of their religion, albeit with a freedom of expression proviso protecting discussion, criticism and ridicule of religious beliefs and practices.1 But what was and is the real function of the new stirring up religious hatred offences in England and Wales from the perspective of government, parliamentarians and the judiciary? This question has already attracted some attention from legal scholars, and the most common conjecture is that the real driving force behind the Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006 was for the Labour government to provide a sop to Muslims: to take with one hand from British Muslims, in the shape of draconian anti-terrorism laws, but give back with the other, in the form of protection against the stirring up of religious hated.2 Yet there has also been a lack of systematic, historical analysis of the question: both in terms of testing the validity of the sop explanation and in terms of identifying and assessing rival explanations. This article is in some small way an attempt to put that right. I am partly engaged, therefore, in a critique of the explanations found in the existing literature on this subject, but also partly concerned with evaluating potential explanations identified for the purposes of this inquiry. Why does an inquiry into events of more than a decade ago matter? I believe that it is inherently important to try to understand something of the politics behind the introduction of the new offences as an exercise in political history. But no doubt this investigation has other potentially significant implications, including gaining a better understanding of the true scope of anti-terrorism policy agendas in England and 2 Wales, re-evaluating the nature of the New Labour project, uncovering inconsistencies in the Prevent strategy, shedding light on the political position of the Muslim community in England and Wales, or even testing general theories of public policy and the dynamics of legislative change. However, my own particular interest is in teasing out how the best explanation of the true purpose behind the stirring up religious hatred offences bears on the many normative arguments that have been made about the rights and wrongs of these laws, including arguments about further extensions covering transgender identity and disability. I shall argue that although it might be perfectly possible to normatively evaluate these laws without understanding the real functions they were and are supposed to serve, it is much harder to do so in ways that stand a decent chance of impacting future governmental, parliamentary and judicial decisions. This article tries to explain the politics behind the introduction of the new stirring up religious hatred offences by examining not only the justifications provided by elected politicians, government ministers and peers at the time but also the wider context of legislation and the political environment, including the strategic aims of the Labour Party as set against the de facto power of members of the House of Lords to slow the passage of legislation, and also how the legislation has actually been used in practice by courts in England and Wales. In casting the evidential net so widely I do not mean to ignore or blur the distinction between the point of the Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006 as seen from the government’s perspective, parliament’s perspective and a judicial perspective. Clearly such perspectives can, and often do, come apart. So where I do draw on evidence from post-enactment events (court decisions, political speeches made later on), I do so only in highly qualified ways. Nevertheless, one general point worth emphasising here is that since any public policy, including public policy on hate speech, is constituted not only by legislative acts that implement the will of the government but also by constitutional protections embedded in the principles of parliamentary supremacy and by judicial decisions applying those legislative acts to the circumstances of actual cases, it would be impossible to fully understand the politics behind the introduction of the stirring up religious hatred offences without knowing something of the perspectives of government, parliamentarians and the judiciary. Indeed, it is also important to note that under s. 29L of the Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006 it is the Attorney General, a position appointed by the sovereign on the advice of the Prime Minister, 3 who must approve all prosecutions, and this fact alone inevitably brings some of the government’s intent into the courtroom. In other words, my aim is not merely to explain the Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006 but also to explain the broader and ongoing public policy on incitement to hatred in England and Wales. Drawing on this evidence I identify five possible accounts of the real function of, and true explanation for, the introduction of the new stirring up religious hatred offences. One of these accounts (the sop explanation) has already gained traction among academics as well as among some journalists and social commentators, but I seek to see how far it, along with alternative rival accounts, can be substantiated based on the available evidence. First, the public order explanation is that the government introduced laws banning the stirring up of religious hatred in response to mass disturbances and riots that had taken on more complex racial, ethnic and religious dimensions since the Race Relations Act 1965. Second, the sop explanation is that the government only developed a serious interest in the problem of the stirring up of religious hatred after the 9/11 twin towers attack in 2001 and the 7/7 London bombings in 2005 respectively, and only legislated new stirring up religious hatred offences as a way of sweetening the pill of anti-terrorism legislation for the Muslim community affected by it. Third, the anti-terrorism explanation puts the existence of the new stirring up religious hatred offences squarely down to the fight against Islamist terrorism, and security concerns over the potential for further atrocities like 9/11 and 7/7 off the back of radical Muslim clerics and extremist Islamist activists stirring up religious as well as racial hatred. Fourth, the client politics explanation shifts the focus from Muslims as stirring up religious hatred to Muslims as the victims of the stirring up of religious hatred; the idea being that a concentration of the burden of hate speech on Muslims produced a highly motivated, mobilised and persuasive lobbying group. Fifth, the parity of protection explanation points to the more basic point that, due to the way legal authorities defined ‘race’, Muslims did not enjoy legal protection against the stirring up of racial hatred at a time when other groups that also partly identified themselves in religious terms, namely, Jews and Sikhs, did enjoy such protection. In what follows I present and critically evaluate each of the aforementioned explanations in turn. In the end I come down on the side of a pluralistic approach, one that combines the public order explanation with the client politics explanation in conjunction with the parity of protection explanation, whilst deemphasising the sop 4 explanation and the anti-terrorism explanation. Finally, I try to spell out some implications of this largely historical analysis for how legal scholars today argue about and seek to normatively reject or defend incitement to hatred laws and the extension thereof to new categories of people. Before I begin, however, I also want to make the crucial methodological point that when it comes to the interpretation of events dating back over a decade we are certainly not in the terrain of incontrovertible evidence. That is why I shall not say that the public policy on incitement to religious hatred we have in England and Wales cannot possibly have the chief purpose that a given explanation claims for it based on the available evidence. It is more a matter of sifting through the evidence and taking it as a whole. There are no smoking guns here, merely a balance of probabilities. The public order explanation The public order explanation draws strength from the history surrounding the introduction of the racial hatred offences. Following the end of the Second World War Britain saw a significant increase in immigration from the West Indies, India, Bangladesh and Pakistan. This was partly Britain’s recognition of the role played by the Commonwealth in the war effort, partly Britain’s post-colonial settlement, and partly a response to the need for labour in building British infrastructure and public services. By 1958, however, some parts of Britain, most notably Notting Hill in London, were the scene of racial violence and riots between whites and West Indian blacks. Latent tensions were sparked when a white Swedish woman who was married to a West Indian man was assaulted by a group of white men. These events fed into a larger national conversation about race relations in Britain. It was a conversation that would go on to encompass Enoch Powell’s infamous ‘rivers of blood’ speech in the summer of 1968, in which he issued dark warnings about threats to public order if questions of immigration and integration were not satisfactorily resolved. Against this backdrop, the Race Relations Act 1965 sought to provide a framework of fair expectations between divided sections of British society, and included the introduction of new stirring up racial hatred offences. At the time several parliamentarians suggested the idea of incorporating religion as well as racial hatred 5 within the scope of the offences, but Dingle Mackintosh Foot, then Solicitor-General, rejected the idea. He claimed that it would be undesirable on free speech grounds. Both the tenets and the practices of various religious denominations are the subject of violent differences and of perfectly legitimate controversy. There is all the difference in the world between attacking a section of the public because of the colour of their skins and attacking them because, say, they subscribe to the Thirty-Nine Articles.3 He also claimed that it would be unnecessary. I agree − we all agree − that nothing is more loathsome and more contemptible than expressions of anti-Semitism. But those expressions are not, at any rate in 99 cases out of 100, based on theological considerations. When there are attacks upon the Jews […] they are not directed merely against those who observe the Mosaic law. They are directed against Jews as a race.4 In fact, the idea of including religion within the scope of the stirring up hatred offences never disappeared entirely from parliamentary debates on issues of race relations for the next two decades.5 But the idea continuously butted up against the sorts of objections articulated above by Dingle Mackintosh Foot. In the meantime, Britain continued to see mass disturbances and riots. In 1995, a district of Bradford, West Yorkshire, was the scene of three days of rioting, including violence between the police and South Asian residents. Then again, in 2001 both Bradford and Burnley saw conflict between the city’s British Asian population and its white British residents, fuelled by the activities of far right groups including the British National Party and the National Front. In 2005, in Birmingham, there was conflict between people with Afro-Caribbean origins and people of South Asian descent, triggered by unsubstantiated allegations of the gang rape of a black teenage girl by a group of South Asian men. What had previously been public disorder based on racial tensions and rooted in economic deprivation, now took on complex racial, ethnic and religious dimensions, relating not merely to poverty but also in some 6 instances to minority religious identities (Muslim, Sikh, Hindu) that people felt they needed to assert. During this period the Labour government made a series of attempts to introduce new legislation making it an offence also to stir up hatred on grounds of religion. It tried unsuccessfully via the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Bill in 2001 and the Serious Organised Crime and Police Bill in 2004, introduced by Jack Straw’s successor as Home Secretary, David Blunkett. Then it succeeded via the Racial and Religious Hatred Bill in 2005 and, ultimately, the Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006, introduced by David Blunkett’s successor as Home Secretary, Charles Clarke. According to the public order explanation, the introduction of the legislation was a direct response to, and triggered by, the fact that mass disturbances and riots were not going away and were becoming increasingly more complex, meaning religion could no longer be left out of the equation in understanding them. Moreover, the inclusion of the stirring up religious hatred offences within the Public Order Act 1986 was not mere convenience but went to the heart of the real function of the offences. From the perspective of process tracing, it is difficult to argue with the timings of the various events described above, with the putative causes and effects in their correct temporal sequences. On this explanation, one looks at these events in terms of an evolving public policy response to an evolving problem: as mass disturbances and riots (public disorder) became more complex, so did the public policy response, in the shape of new public order offences. In addition, the speeches of successive Home Secretaries clearly indicate a concern with public order. As David Blunkett put the matter when addressing the House of Commons in November 2001, ‘[t]his is a public order Act, and it is the order that we are talking about.’6 Or, consider the words of Charles Clarke during the second reading debate on the Racial and Religious Hatred Bill in June 2005. I [...] begin by emphasising that the Bill deals with hatred and incitement to hatred. It is about the nasty and extreme behaviour that drives people to hate others and sometimes, as the recent desecration of Jewish cemeteries shows, to turn that hatred against people and property. It is about behaviour that destroys individuals’ lives and sets one community against another. In evidence to the House of Lords Select Committee on religious offences, the Association of Chief Police Officers said that hatred stirred up by extremist 7 groups contributed to the Bradford and Burnley riots in 2001. The Bill is intended to help tackle that sort of hatred − I emphasise “hatred”.7 Of course, it might be countered that just because the Home Secretary referred to the public order nature of these offences it does not prove that the government definitely did not see these offences as also potentially being used to prevent the spread of extremist ideologies or acts of terrorism, for example. Indeed, the very concept of public order is not necessarily limited to mass disturbances and riots. I take the point. This bit of evidence is not conclusive. But the real issue is whether or not the evidence as a whole suggests that public order was the primary concern. The aforementioned evidence suggests that it was. The public order explanation is also borne out in some of the ensuing case law. One interesting case involved the stirring up of religious hatred by Sikhs against Muslims. In R. v. Singh, Singh Athwel, Singh, Baning, and Singh8 three of the defendants pleaded guilty to publishing material intended to stir up religious hatred against Muslims, contrary to section 29C of the Public Order Act 1986. This related to contributions they made to a Facebook page they had set up for the purposes of discussing the need to be mindful of atrocities committed by Muslims, to prevent sexually motivated attacks by Muslim men on Sikh women and generally to beware the threat posed by Muslims. In her sentencing remarks Judge Dean described the general ‘tone of the conversation’ on the Facebook page as ‘one of an immediate wish to use gratuitous violence against Muslims, effectively, for the simple reason that they are Muslims and Muslims were being regarded in the conversation as deserving of violence.’9 Judge Dean also made four references to ‘tensions’ between Sikh and Muslim communities in Leicester. At heart, this case was about a concern on the part of the police, the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS), the Attorney General and Judge Dean about public order − a concern that the use of threatening words on Facebook could further heighten tensions between these ethno-religious groups and lead to violence and mass disturbances. Indeed, it is notable that the defendants were also convicted of various offences relating to the importing and possession of dangerous weapons including knives, knuckledusters, Tasers, pepper sprays, and batons, and to persuading people to travel to various locations around Leicester carrying these weapons. The two groups were gearing up for a mêlée on the streets of Leicester during which they and innocent members of the public could get hurt. That the court 8 treated the problems being tackled by the offences as principally public order problems tells us something of the real function of the wider public policy on incitement to religious hatred. Despite all this, however, the public order explanation is not the dominant explanation in the literature. In fact, it hardly receives a mention next to the explanation which is dominant, to which I shall now turn. The sop explanation The dominant account of the real function of, or explanation for, the new stirring up religious offences runs as follows. In the 1960s the government set out to restrict immigration – as a response to concerns about the threat to social cohesion posed by excessive immigration – but to balance off the negative impact of these restrictions on existing immigrant families it also created the stirring up racial hatred offences, as a way of protecting these groups. Similarly, in the 2000s the government wished to introduction tough new anti-terrorism laws10 – to respond to concerns about the threat to security posed by Muslim extremism – but to offset the negative impact of these laws on the Muslim community it introduced new stirring up religious hatred offences (the existing stirring up racial hatred offences protected Jews and Sikhs as racial or ethnic groups but not Muslims as a religious group). This is the sop explanation: a strategy, or ploy, devised by the Labour government to take with one hand from British Muslims but to give back with another.11 (Of course, among the implicit factual premises built into the sop explanation is that anti-terrorism legislation was and is specifically targeted against the Muslim community, whether by design or effect; which is, of course, something governments may deny.) One way of motivating the sop explanation is to consider the timing of the Labour government’s attempts to introduce new stirring up religious hatred offences, first via the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Bill in 2001 and then again via the Serious Organised Crime and Police Bill in 2004-5 and, finally, via the Racial and Religious Hatred Bill in 2005-6. It is no coincidence (the argument goes) that these bills were introduced in the wake of extremist Muslim terrorist atrocities, 9/11 and 7/7, and at times when the government was also introducing new anti-terrorism legislation in response to those atrocities. This timing at least seems to bear out the sop explanation. 9 If the Labour government had independent reasons to provide Muslims with new laws protecting them from the stirring up of religious hatred − reasons that had nothing to do with ameliorating the negative impact of anti-terrorism laws on the Muslim community − then one could have reasonably expected the Labour government to have been minded to provide these protections before its plans for anti-terrorism laws were developed. Yet prior to 9/11 the Labour Government had not clearly signalled any intention to introduce new stirring up religious hatred offences.12 The facts are that the introduction of new stirring up religious hatred offences did not make an appearance in the Queen’s Speech until 2004 (and then again in 2005),13 and did not figure in a Labour Party general election manifesto until 2005.14 This timing was certainly not lost on certain members of the House of Lords when it came to debating the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Bill in November 2001. In the words of Lord Waddington, ‘[draft legislation on the stirring up of religious hatred] has precious little to do with the events of September 11th, except in the sense that after September 11th it was offered to the Muslim community as a kind of sop to buy support for the war against terrorism.’15 Then again, not all the evidence stacks up for the sop explanation. In 2005, for example, Charles Clarke allegedly wrote to several mosques to explain that on the 5th of April, against the wishes of the Labour government, an amendment had been passed in the Lords that removed stirring up religious hatred offences from the Serious Organised Crime and Police Bill.16 Yet the letter makes no mention whatsoever of security and terrorism, anti-terrorism measures or the negative impact of such measures on the Muslim community. If the real function of the new offence had been to placate the Muslim community, perhaps the letter would have said something along these lines “We recognise the special role that the Muslim community is playing in tackling extreme Islamist ideology and terrorism, and that the burden of anti-terrorism measures have often fallen on Muslims, but we want to reassure you that we take the interests of the Muslim community extremely seriously, and so we are finally introducing new stirring up religious hatred offences.” Of course, it might be argued that if the Labour government was attempting to soften the blow or in some sense compensate the Muslim community for anti- terrorism measures − measures which the Muslim Council of Britain, for example, argued were targeted at the Muslim community − maybe the wise move would be not to make this explicit to Muslims. It might backfire on the government to admit that its 10 anti-terrorism measures are most likely curb and restrict the activities and freedoms of people from the Muslim community. Then again, if a group in society perceives that is facing burdens from anti-terrorism laws, and is alienated, disillusioned, and angry partly because of that perception, and one wishes to make amends, it might be a missed opportunity not to point out that introducing new stirring up religious hatred offences is designed to offer them something that improves their position. There is another version of the sop explanation that is perhaps even weaker. It is that the introduction of the new stirring up religious hatred offences in 2005 was supposed to be compensation for the fact that the Labour government had pursued the war in Iraq − a war that was waged in a country populated by Muslims and, therefore, a war that Muslims might view unfavourably either simply as causing the unnecessary deaths of Muslims or as a declaration of war against the entire Islamic Ummah. This version of the sop explanation, however, is severely undermined by the fact that the Racial and Religious Hatred Bill was not the first attempt made by the Labour government to introduce the new offence. In the words of the then Labour MP (now Mayor of London) Sadiq Khan, during the second reading debate on the Racial and Religious Hatred Bill in the House of Commons in June 2005: The third objection is that this is a sop to the Muslim community, giving them preferential treatment because of the Iraq war. [But] the first time the then Home Secretary, my right hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield, Brightside (Mr. Blunkett) tried to introduce this legislation was in winter 2001 − more than a year before the war with Iraq − so I am afraid that the chronology of those who make that point is simply wrong. If British Muslims really were as powerful and influential as the hon. Member for Henley (Mr. Johnson) suggests, one would have thought that they could have persuaded the Government not to fight the Iraq war in the first place.17 A more plausible argument, at least in terms of the sequence of events, might be to argue that the legislation was a sop to the Muslim community for the government’s failure to intervene to prevent the genocide and ethnic cleansing carried out against Bosniak citizens (Muslims) during the Bosnian war from 1992-1995. This, at least, predates the various attempts to legislate mentioned above. But here it is arguable that if the genocide was relevant to the creation of new stirring up religious hatred 11 offences, it was less likely to be because the new offences amounted to paying a debt to the Islamic Ummah and more likely to be because the government recognised patterns in history in which speech that stirs up ethnic or religious hatred ends in acts of genocide. In other words, the government could be interpreted as learning the lessons of the Bosnian genocide, along with the Rwandan genocide and, going further back, the Holocaust, about the sometimes devastating effects of incitement to hatred and the creation of a climate of hatred. I shall return to these ideas below. In summary, it is arguable that the evidence which exists for the sop explanation is weak, and the counter evidence relatively strong. It is intriguing, therefore, that this has been the dominant explanation in the literature, even to the exclusion of other rival explanations. Perhaps one reason for this dominance might be the sort of literature involved. With the exception of Erik Bleich, the sop explanation has almost always popped up in articles and books written by legal scholars, as opposed to historians, political scientists and political theorists. A second, related reason may be that, within the relevant literature, the project of explaining why Britain introduced stirring up religious hatred offences tends to be of secondary, or minor importance, compared to the primary goal of critiquing the legislation. If an author is of the view that the legislation is bad legislation − perhaps because the author believes the law is badly drafted, unnecessary, ineffective, or has unjustified implications for freedom of expression − it is perhaps a convenient, similarly negative conclusion to draw that the motivations for the legislation were also compromised in some way. Among some social commentators, the sop explanation might also feed into a broader scepticism about ideas of multiculturalism and the New Labour project more generally. To embrace the sop explanation is to embrace the idea that attempting to recognise the special grievances of religious minorities, most notably Muslims, inevitably gets mired in difficult policy dilemmas and may cause the sacrifice of liberal freedoms; or belies a highly cynical strategy on the part of an electorally unsuccessful political party to assiduously accumulate a winning coalition of voters, whatever the cost. The anti-terrorism explanation A third explanation of the introduction of the new stirring up religious hatred offences makes a direct appeal to matters of terrorism and national security. Whereas the sop 12 explanation plays up the fact that the new offences prohibit the stirring up of religious hatred against Muslims, the anti-terrorism explanation instead highlights the fact that the new offences prohibit the stirring up of religious hatred by Muslims. In short, the new offences were introduced in the wake of 9/11 and 7/7 in an attempt to prevent radical Muslim clerics and extremist Islamist activists from engaging in incitement to hatred against Jews, Christians, and non-believers in general, of a sort that could ultimately lead to the spread of extremist Muslim ideology and terrorist atrocities. According to the anti-terrorism explanation, it is no coincidence that the Labour government initially sought to introduce the new stirring up religious hatred offences via the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Bill in 2001. In other words, its place in the Bill is not to be explained merely by the fact that adding new offences would be more efficiently achieved by adding the necessary amendments into an omnibus or bundle legislative bill − given that parliamentary time to pass new legislation is an incredibly scarce resource for any government − or by the fact that the Labour government anticipated that introducing the new offences would be controversial so it chose to hide the amendments in an high-profile bill and it just so happened to be an anti-terrorism bill. Rather, the introduction of the new stirring up religious hatred offences by means of the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Bill reveals something about how the Labour government viewed the true purpose of the offences, the real problems the offences were intended to address. If the real function of the new offences was to tackle threatening speech that stirs up religious hatred in ways that pose a threat to national security, this implies that the government believed this function was not being adequately fulfilled or could not be adequately fulfilled by the existing stirring up racial hatred offences. Given the value of parliamentary time as a scarce resource for implementing the government’s policy agenda, and assuming that senior civil servants in the Ministry of Justice, the Home Office and the CPS would have fully briefed both the Minister of State and the Home Secretary about the current state of incitement to hatred law, including successful and unsuccessful prosecutions under the law, then the current explanation only makes sense if the government had seen loopholes in the current offences as far as the protection of security is concerned. Here, at least, there is some evidence to support the explanation. The evidence comes directly from the case law. It is certainly true that the existing stirring up racial hatred offences had been put to use in the name of security, not merely from the 13 government’s perspective but also from the perspective of judges at the coal face. Consider R. v. El-Faisal.18 In this case police investigating possible al-Qaeda links in the UK found tape recordings of speeches given by the Jamaican-born Muslim cleric, Abdullah el-Faisal, labeled ‘No peace with the Jews’ and ‘Jewish Traits’. He was convicted inter alia of two counts of distributing threatening recordings with intent to stir up racial hatred − the first Muslim cleric to be convicted of such offences in England and Wales. For each of the two counts El-Faisal received a sentence of twelve months imprisonment. In his sentencing remarks Judge Beaumont seemed clear that the offence is taken extremely seriously due in large measure to the threat that the stirring up of racial hatred will lead impressionable people to take up arms. As he put it: In my judgment, your offending was aggravated by the fact that as a cleric you were sent to this country to preach and minister to the Muslim community in London, and so had a responsibility to the young and impressionable within that community at times of conflict abroad and understandable tensions in the communities here over the period which is spanned by the indictment. Instead of calming fears, you fanned the flames of hostility, and furthermore, as I have said already, your words were not confined to the study circles you addressed but recorded to be distributed to bookshops for sale to the public, packaged as they were in the tape covers which were exhibited in the course of this trial, and to me it rang hollow for you to say in evidence that none of the young men to whom you preached went off to fight in Afghanistan or Chechnya or Kashmir. No-one, least of all you, will ever know.19 This is far from being an isolated case. Consider also R. v. Iftikhar Ali,20 R. v. Hamza,21 R. v. Rahman,22 R. v. Javed,23 R. v. Saleem24 − all of which involved successful prosecutions of either radical Muslim clerics or extremist Islamist activists for stirring up racial hatred offences − the last three of which concerned the Danish embassy demonstrations in February 2006 and all of which involved parallel convictions for terrorism related offences. More importantly, although there have been far fewer convictions under the new stirring up of religious hatred offences, these offences certainly have been used in some instances for the purpose of tackling 14 extremist Islamist ideology and potential seeds of terrorism. In R. v. Ahmad,25 for example, a dual nationality British-Pakastani business information technology graduate using the pseudonym Abu Jahiman engaged in an on-line discussion via the website IslamicAwakenings.com concerning a college in India that had allegedly banned its students from wearing the Burka. Mr. Ahmad wrote that ‘[Muslims] should storm these filthy rabid sub-monkeys and stomp on their jaws until they hear the sweet crack sound and then some.’ For this he was found guilty on one count of publishing written material with intent to stir up religious hatred and given a one year sentence. In his sentencing remarks Justice Royce was not explicit about members of which religious group were having hatred stirred up against them by Mr. Ahmad, but the facts of the case suggest members of the Hindu faith. Mr. Ahmad was also convicted for various other serious terrorist and criminal offences relating to the publication of extremist Islamist views on the Internet. The total sentence was 17 years. In passing sentence Justice Royce used phrases such as ‘your views were corrosively dangerous’, ‘a significant risk to members of the public’, ‘public protection’, ‘a viper in our midst willing to get as many as possible to strike at the heart of Parliament and of our system’.26 Whilst many of these phrases were clearly aimed at the more serious offences, the judge does not explicitly exclude the stirring up religious hatred offences from the scope of these phrases, nor does the overall thrust of the sentencing remarks point toward that restriction of scope. What all of this shows is that there was indeed potentially a gap in the law which meant that prior to 2006 a radical Muslim cleric or extremist Islamist activist could in theory stir up hatred against Hindus or Christians, say, without fear of prosecution, and in so doing pose a potential threat to national security. Indeed, the anti-terrorism explanation might also draw strength from other similar measures taken by the Labour government, and continued by the Conservative government, to prevent radical Muslim clerics and extremist Islamist activists from peddling hatred in England and Wales, the justifications for which make explicit reference to terrorism and threats to national security. For example, Art. 320(6) of the Immigration Rules sets out the following grounds on which entry clearance or leave to enter the country can be refused: ‘where the Secretary of State has personally directed that the exclusion of a person from the UK is conducive to the public good.’ In August 2005, in the wake of the 7/7 London bombings, Charles Clarke set forth an 15 indicative list of ‘unacceptable behaviours’ to be used as bases for such exclusions, including the following: – Writing, producing or distributing material; – Public speaking including preaching – Running a website; or – Using a position of responsibility such as teacher, community or youth leader To express views which: – Format, justify or glorify terrorist violence in furtherance of particular beliefs; – Seek to provoke others to terrorist acts; – Foment other serious criminal activity or seek to provoke others to serious criminal acts or; – Foster hatred which might lead to inter-community violence in the UK.27 The then Prime Minister, Tony Blair, explicitly linked these new measures to ‘the terrorist threat in Britain’ and to ‘national security’.28 Interestingly, this list of ‘unacceptable behaviours’ has been tested and upheld as lawful by the courts in subsequent cases. In Naik v. The Secretary of State for the Home Department,29 for example, the High Court of Justice (Admin.) upheld a decision taken in June 2010 by the then Home Secretary (and now Prime Minister), Theresa May, partly on the advice of the director general of the Office for Security and Counter Terrorism (“OSCT”), Charles Farr, to exclude an Indian national and Muslim writer and orator from entering the UK. The letter stated that Dr. Naik was to be excluded ‘for engaging in unacceptable behaviour by making statements that attempt to justify terrorist activity and fostering hatred.’ The Court accepted that the exclusion order was ‘necessary for, and proportionate to, the legitimate aims of protecting national security, preventing crime and protecting the rights of others.’30 This decision was subsequently upheld by the Court of Appeal (Civ.). Notably, the higher judgement contains 15 references to ‘national security’ but only 4 references to ‘public order’.31 Advocates of the anti-terrorism explanation might suggest that the real function of the public policy on incitement to religious hatred − although not the proximate cause of the Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006 itself − has continued to reveal itself 16 over time as politicians have in their speeches, wittingly or unwittingly, combined discussion of anti-terrorism measures, such as the encouragement of terrorism and the glorification of terrorism offences, with discussion of the offences. One such example is a statement on national security issued by the office of the then Prime Minister, Gordon Brown, in November 2007 which talks in the main about the threat of terrorism and various anti-terrorism measures, including tackling those who use the Internet for the purposes of the encouragement of terrorism, but also mentions in passing that ‘the Home Secretary is inviting the largest global technology and internet companies to work together to ensure that our best technical expertise is galvanised to counter online incitement to hatred.’32 The discursive linking together of the stirring up hatred offences with issues of terrorism and national security has to some extent continued with the Conservative government through its reinvention of the Prevent Strategy, a set of policy measures aimed at challenging the ideological roots of terrorism as much as tackling the threat of terrorist atrocities themselves. Interestingly, in her Foreword to the publication of the new Prevent Strategy document in June 2011, Theresa May stated boldly: The Prevent programme we inherited from the last Government was flawed. It confused the delivery of Government policy to promote integration with Government policy to prevent terrorism.33 Given this statement, it could seem indicative that, as well as discussing a range of anti-terrorism measures, this same Prevent Strategy document also throws into the mix the stirring up offences. ‘Powers derived from public order-related legislation, for example, can address activity which contributes to stirring up racial or religious hatred or hatred on grounds of sexual orientation.’34 The implication here (so defenders of the anti-terrorism explanation might argue) is that the Conservative government views the stirring up of hatred as part of government policy to prevent terrorism rather than policy to promote integration. The anti-terrorism explanation faces some not insignificant problems, however. One problem concerns the idea that the Labour government’s attempt to introduce new stirring up religious hatred offences via the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Bill in 2001 revealed something of the true purpose of those offences. One problem with this idea is that the Labour Government made no appeal to security issues during 17 the key House of Commons debates. Thus, in the second reading debate in the Commons the then Home Secretary, David Blunkett, explained the rationale behind the new offence in terms of responding to requests from Muslim leaders and achieving parity of protection among Jews, Muslims, Sikhs and Christians alike.35 Now it is also true that in his comments Blunkett made the following additional argument. It has been suggested − I heard people say this as recently as this morning on the radio − that it might be used against Muslims. That is true; it might, because Muslims are no less subject to the law than Christians, Hindus, Jews or anyone else.36 What this tells us about the underlying purpose of the legislation is open to interpretation, however. Conceivably Blunkett was making an implicit admission that the government really did intend the legislation as a way to help the police fight extremist Islamist ideology and terrorism. But this interpretation could also smack of historical revisionism. At the time several journalists, community leaders and to some extent the wider public were concerned that history could repeat itself in the sense that some of the early successful prosecutions under the Race Relations Act 1965 were against black people.37 Blunkett’s response was to grasp the nettle: to insist that if one does introduce laws banning the stirring up of religious hatred then it is only right that these laws are applied to everyone. Then again, those who favour the anti-terrorism explanation might simply say that Blunkett was using arguments about equity in the application of law simply as a smokescreen. Admitting that the new offences might also be used against Muslims was a way of preparing the public for the fact that the police would target their use of the laws particularly against extremist Islamist speakers, the real function of the laws. But this interpretation faces a dilemma. On the one hand, if the chief purpose was anti-terrorism and tackling extremist Islamist speakers, why did Blunkett not explicitly mention this intention at the time? On the other hand, if this was the chief purpose but nevertheless Blunkett took the view that it was more strategic not to reveal this purpose to the public, why say anything about Muslims at all? Why draw attention to a purpose that he wanted to remain hidden? Now it is also true that during the House of Lords debate on the Racial and Religious Hatred Bill in October 2005 Lord Ahmed, a Labour member, declared, ‘My 18 Lords, the Bill is intended to give faith communities the levels of safety and security to which they are entitled in a diverse, civilised and democratic society.’38 However, there is reason to think that he meant ‘safety and security’ in the public order sense rather than in the security and terrorism sense. During the House of Lords debate on the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Bill in November 2001, for example, Lord Ahmed had himself argued that the inclusion of the new offence within an anti- terrorism law was not merely a red-hearing but could unwittingly create a pernicious association in the minds of people about terrorism and religion that ought to be avoided. In his words: The British Muslims are wary that they will be segregated from society because of their religious beliefs, especially in the light of recent world events. If we are to include religion under the same umbrella as terrorism, then it is inevitable that some people may consider certain religious beliefs to be a form of terrorism. We do not want to see that happen. While I strongly support religious discrimination laws, I propose that that should be a separate Bill. This is necessary to avoid any misunderstanding between the two issues and to emphasise that the Government are wholly supportive of the need to improve religious relations.39 In a similar vein, Lord Dholakia suggested to his colleagues during the same debate that even the coincidental inclusion of new stirring up religious hatred offences with an anti-terrorism law could potentially undermine an important distinction. There is also concern about the security of all communities in Britain. The Government have rightly recognised that, but they have done so in the wrong context. Religious hatred, particularly when it is directed at minorities, has existed from the time when minorities set foot in this country. The events of 11th September are not required to recognise that. We on these Benches find it difficult to accept that the Bill is the right place for such legislation. We are not alone in that − even the Commission for Racial Equality argues that a distinction can be made between anti-terrorism measures that can be justified as necessary in the current emergency situation and those that have wider implications and which should be given greater consideration in Parliament.40 19 Thus, not only did the Labour government make no appeal to terrorism and national security issues when attempting to introduce the new stirring up religious hatred offences in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 but also the House of Lords successfully removed the new offence from the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Bill at that time partly because several peers argued persuasively that the new offence clearly could not be appropriately considered an anti-terrorism measure. A second problem has to do with the fact that around the time that the Labour government was finally able to introduce the new stirring up religious hatred offences through the Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006 it also introduced other offences the stated purpose of which was made explicit, to clamp down on so-called preachers of hate. Charles Clarke pushed through the Terrorism Bill in 2006, which, amongst other things, introduced new encouragement of terrorism and glorification of terrorism offences. The wider context was that the Labour government had been criticised over the failure of police to immediately arrest Muslim demonstrators who, in response to cartoons mocking the Prophet Mohammed published in a Danish newspaper, had, in February 2006, marched through London and stood in front of the Danish embassy wielding placards, amongst other things, praising the 7/7 bombings and calling for beheadings. Clarke was unequivocal about the point of introducing the new encouragement of terrorism and glorification of terrorism offences. The Government believes that the glorification of terror is an essential − I emphasise that word − method that is used by individuals and organisations that pursue terrorist ambitions and wish to get individuals such as the 7/7 bombers to commit to their suicidal and destructive ends.41 That the Labour government introduced in 2006 bespoke offences to deal directly with so-called preachers of hate casts doubt on an interpretation that says the stirring up religious offences, introduced around the same time, were also principally aimed at curbing the activities of extremist Islamist speakers. A third problem is that if the government wanted to introduce new stirring up religious hatred offences under the banner of anti-terrorism, why did it choose to introduce the offences within the existing framework of public order legislation? Why not insert the offences into other, anti-terrorism legislation? After all, the courts, 20 whose job it is to implement the new offences, were always likely to take their lead from the fact that government was amending the Public Order Act 1986, a piece of public order legislation. Now it is certainly true that in some cases involving the new stirring up religious hatred offences courts have used the discourse of security and anti-terrorism in their sentencing remarks. But in other cases the courts have treated the problems being tackled by the offences as public order problems. Consider once again Singh. In her sentencing remarks Judge Dean gave no hint that the offences were being used to address issues of security and terrorism, as evidenced by the fact that the words ‘security’ and ‘terrorism’ simply do not figure in the sentencing remarks. In this case the stirring up religious hatred offences − public order offences in legal doctrine or classification − were being used to tackle a local ethno-religious public order problem. A final problem relates to the anti-terrorism explanation not as an explanation of the Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006 as such but as an explanation of the ongoing point and purpose of the stirring up religious hatred offences in England and Wales. It has to do with the above-discussed combining, within the discourse of some politicians, of statements about anti-terrorism measures with statements about the stirring up of hatred, especially in relation to iterations of the Prevent Strategy. The anti-terrorism explanation takes this correlation at face value, as telling us something about the shared purpose of encouragement of terrorism and glorification of terrorism offences, on the one hand, and stirring up hatred offences, on the other. But this explanation belies the nuanced nature of the correlation. For example, speaking in November 2014 about the Conservative government’s anti-terrorism measures, Theresa May stated: Since I became Home Secretary, I have excluded hundreds of people in total from Britain. I have excluded 61 people on national security grounds and 72 people because their presence here would not have been conducive to the public good. In total, I have excluded eighty-four hate preachers.42 Perhaps insufficient care is taken here to make the point that some “hate preachers” were excluded on national security grounds whereas other “hate preachers” were excluded because their presence here would not have been conducive to the public good, such as if they posed a risk to public order, say. But nevertheless the fact that 21 these two grounds for exclusion are separated gives a strong indication that the real function, as well as the actual practice, of immigration rules allowing the Home Secretary to exclude people who stir up hatred, cannot be exclusively related to the prevention of terrorism. Put crudely, if 61 people were excluded on national security grounds but 84 “hate preachers” were excluded, it stands to reason that at least some “hate preachers” must have been excluded for reasons other than national security. The client politics explanation Yet another explanation appeals to the idea of client politics.43 Put crudely, a client politics approach to explaining the introduction of new stirring up religious hatred offences back in 2006 highlights the patterns of benefits and burdens faced by different groups in society as a predictor of changes in legislation serving or not serving the interests of those groups. Where the stirring up of religious hatred, and the burdens associated with the climates of hatred and fear to which this sort of speech contributes, is concentrated on a particular group, one can expect that group to be more likely to mobilise to request laws that offer some protection against this hate speech than is the case if the burdens are dispersed across society. On this explanation, the basic reason why we ended up with new stirring up religious hatred offences was the fact that Muslim groups were being disproportionately burdened by this sort of hate speech. Indeed, the client politics explanation is also consistent with the putative fact that the introduction of new stirring up religious hatred offences happened at a time when there was an increase in the stirring up of hatred against Muslims in the wake of after high-profile extremist Islamist terror attacks. It can be pointed out, in support of this explanation, that although the new stirring up religious hatred offences would also provide protection to Christians, Hindus, and Buddhists, for instance, most of the debate in public life concentrated on Muslims. So, for example, as early as 2003 the House of Lords Select Committee on Religious Offences in England and Wales recognised that the government’s proposal to introduce new stirring up religious hatred offences via the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Bill in 2001 ‘proceeded from threats to the Muslim communities and their members, following the events of 11th September 2001 in New York, and other acts 22 of terrorism elsewhere.’44 And, in the words of David Blunkett during the House of Commons debate on the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Bill in November 2001: We were approached by leaders of the Muslim community − it was a representative leadership group − who thought that it was only right, fair and protective to include religion with race in terms of avoiding incitement to hate using the Public Order Act 1986. I considered that and decided that their point was fair and reasonable.45 Subsequently, in a speech to the Institute of Public Policy Research in July 2004 Blunkett stated that ‘[i]f anything the arguments for this extension of the law have grown stronger since 2001’.46 He did not on that occasion pause to explain why the argument had ‘grown stronger’, but it may be plausible to read this statement as a response to civil society research being undertaken at the time on the rise of islamophobia since 2001. Take, for instance, a report by the independent Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia in June 2004 setting out the impact of 9/11 and the ensuing wars in Afghanistan and Iraq on the experiences of British Muslims, including experiences of anti-Muslim hostility and its manifestation in verbal as well as physical attacks on Muslims in public places.47 A central claim of the client politics explanation is that if the burdens of the stirring up of religious hatred are disproportionately imposed on a particular group rather than being spread evenly across society, one can explain and would expect the affected groups to lobby governments to bring about legislation even at the expense of the interests of the general public. Putting this another way, even if the relevant incitement to hatred laws are not in the interests of the general public (e.g., speaker and audience interests in free public discourse on matters concerning religious believers as well as religious beliefs), minority religious groups would be acutely aware of the cost of other people enjoying the freedom to stir up hatred against them and so would be particularly motivated to persuade politicians to legislate. In that sense the real function of, and true explanation for, the new stirring up religious hatred offences was to serve the interests of Muslim clients and thereby to serve the interests of politicians standing for election in constituency containing these clients. Two factual premises need to be substantiated, therefore. The first is that Muslims did lobby the government for a change in the law. This premise seems entirely 23 unproblematic. The evidence suggests, not least from the testimony of parliamentarians, that a many Muslim groups and leaders did assert that they were suffering from an increase in hate speech post 9/11 and 7/7 and did lobby their MPs and the government for new stirring up religious hatred offences as part of the solution. Of course, it is also the case that some Muslims argued against the introduction of the new offences precisely because they seemed to be another way of putting Muslims to the forefront of the public’s consciousness, and not in a good way. But this need not in itself undermine the client politics explanation. It is enough that some Muslim groups did mobilise in favour of the legislation because it represented a net benefit to them. The second premise is that this lobbying resulted from the facts on the ground. For the client politics explanation to work it must actually be the case that there was a disproportionate burden of incitement to hatred on a particular group (Muslims), as well as a concentrated benefit to be had from legal protection also for that group, with costs in freedom expression diffusely distributed across the general population. With regards to this premise, however, the main problem for the client politics explanation is a lack of tailored evidence. Official hate crime statistics, in the form released to the public, tend to be broken down by broad categories, including religion, but not disaggregated into particular religions. From time to time supplementary official reports are released which do provide this level of information. For example, in its 2012 report Anti-Muslim Hate Crime: Learning From Casework, the CPS stated that ‘[t]he majority of the religiously aggravated hate crime cases sampled (62%) involved an element of anti-Muslim sentiment’.48 Similarly, in its 2013 report An Overview of Hate Crime in England and Wales the Home Office, Office for National Statistics and Ministry of Justice stated that ‘the 2011/12 and 2012/13 ‘[the Crime Survey for England and Wales] showed that Muslim adults were the most likely to be a victim of religiously motivated hate crime’49 So in theory one could postulate for the purposes of the explanation that these figures would not have changed significantly from around 2005-6. Nevertheless, although these statistics are broken down by broad category of offence, such as public order offences, they are not broken down by specific type of offence, such as a particular public order offence. This means that even hate crime statistics on religiously motivated public order hate crimes will typically include public order hate crimes that are not essentially speech-based, public order hate crimes that are speech-based but are not the stirring up offences, and, 24 finally, the stirring up hatred offences.50 So it is quite possible that both hate crime statistics and the experiences of those Muslims who lobbied the government were based on a blurring of different kinds of incidents involving islamophobic hate speech. It is quite possible that what Muslims were actually experiencing was an increase in the incidence of the religiously motivated public order offence of intentional harassment, alarm or distress − for example, person A, who is non- Muslim, uses threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour or displays a sign that is threatening, abusive or insulting, with intent to cause harassment, alarm or distress and thereby caused harassment, alarm or distress to person B who was Muslim or perceived to be Muslim, aggravated by religious hostility.51 But not necessarily an increase in the incidence of the stirring up of religious hatred − for example, person A, who is non-Muslim, uses threatening words or behaviour with the intention of stirring up hatred against Muslims, perhaps to an audience of fellow non- Muslims. Of course, none of this proves that Muslims did not suffer a burden of increased incidence of the stirring up of religious hatred against them post 9/11 and 7/7. But nevertheless the client politics explanation runs hollow if the disproportionate burden premise cannot be substantiated with evidence. Now it might be pointed out at this stage that non-governmental organisations are also a source of tailored information about hate crimes. Tell MAMA, for example, provides self-identifying victims or witnesses of hate crimes and incidents an opportunity to self-report their experiences, and provides annual data on self-reports of anti-Muslim hate crimes and incidents. In 2014 academic researchers from the Centre for Fascist, Anti-Fascist and Post-Fascist Studies at Teesside University conducted a study of the methods and findings of Tell MAMA and found that ‘[w]ithstanding the necessary caveats of self-reported data […] − now minimised as far as possible by the tightening of data collection processes – the data collected by Tell MAMA is reliable.’52 Both in the Tell MAMA annual reports investigated by Teesside University, and in Tell MAMA’s subsequent annual reports, the organisation identifies a clear correlation in the data: namely, spikes in the rate of self-reports of anti-Muslim hate crimes and incidents after high profile public events involving Islamistist extremism, such as after the killing of Lee Rigby, the Charlie Hebdo attack in Paris, the story of three Muslim schoolgirls leaving Britain to join ISIS, the attack in the tourist resort in Tunisia, and the November 2015 Paris attacks.53 Once again, perhaps one could postulate that spikes that are in evidence now would have also 25 occurred back in 2001 after 9/11 and in 2005 after the 7/7 London bombings. However, there remains a difficulty with the Tell MAMA data coding, at least as far as the client politics explanation is concerned. Tell MAMA caseworkers sub-divide self-reported anti-Muslim hate crimes and incidents as follows: for online incidents, the categories are ‘abuse’, ‘anti-Muslim literature’ and ‘threat’; for offline incidents, they are ‘property damage’, ‘assault’, ‘threat’, ‘extreme violence’ and ‘anti-Muslim literature’.54 But it cannot just be assumed that reports coded as ‘threat’ and ‘anti- Muslim literature’ together amount to the use of threatening words or behaviour with the intention of stirring up of hatred against Muslims. Even if this is an imperfect, but workable proxy, there is also the problem of comparing this data, which focuses exclusively on Muslims, with the situation faced by other religious groups. If there is no comparable data on the extent of incitement to hatred against, say, Jews, Sikhs, Hindus, for example, or indeed, against the LGBT community or people with disabilities, the premise that Muslims were disproportionately burdened by incitement to hatred cannot vindicated. Then, of course, there is the problem that the data does not extend back to 2001 and 2005. It might be tempting at this stage, therefore, to see if the case law can provide falsifying or corroborating evidence for the client politics explanation. But once again this evidence is inconclusive. If Muslims really were being disproportionately burdened by the stirring up of hatred, then, other things remaining equal, one might have expected to see a slew of convictions for people stirring up religious hatred against Muslims once the Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006 came into force. But this did not happen. This author knows of only one such example, Singh. Compare the situation with the steady stream of convictions for the stirring up of racial hatred against Jews, for example. I have already mentioned R. v. Iftikhar Ali, R. v. Hamza, R. v. Rahman, R. v. Javed, and R. v. Saleem. To this list one can also add R. v. Birdwood,55 R. v. Atkinson, Piggins, Hill, Bostock, and Denis,56 R. v. Sheppard and Whittle,57 R. v. Heaton and Hannington,58 and R. v. Bonehill-Paine.59 On the other hand, it is clear that other things are not equal, meaning that other factors might explain the disparity. One is the willingness of members of different religious communities to report cases to the police. Another, more important factor is that the basic elements of the stirring up religious hatred offences are importantly different to the stirring up racial hatred offences. When it comes to the former offences, the legislation includes the intention clause, the threatening language clause, and the 26 Freedom of Expression clause − all of which have set the bar for successful prosecution so high that very few cases can pass muster. But when it comes to the latter offences, the test is intention or likelihood, threatening, abusive or insulting language, and no freedom of expression clause − all of which makes for a greater number of prosecutable cases, albeit still relatively few compared to other public order offences.60 It is also relevant here that the Freedom of Expression clause61 was introduced by the Lords, not by the government. The government took that view that the legislation offered adequate protections of free speech already, and so the clause was redundant. But the government did not succeed in overturning the Lords amendment in the commons. In short, the will of the government and the will of the Houses of Parliament pointed in different directions and the government did not get its way.62 All of these mitigating factors working together could mean that the client politics explanation is not undermined by the low conviction rates, after all. Since the hate crime statistics and the case law neither establishes nor discredits the premise that Muslims were disproportionately burdened with incitement to hatred, however, it does remain a possibility that at the time Muslims were merely one group among many others who experienced a similar burden from incitement to hatred. In fact, some other relevant evidence points to exactly this situation. If the burden of incitement to hatred was actually diffusely distributed among numerous minority groups, then this suggest that numerous, well-organised interest groups would be motivated to persuade the government to adopt a much broader strategy on tackling the stirring up of hatred, such as by enacting legislation that banned the stirring up of hatred on the basis of a long list of protected characteristics. This is precisely what happened. At the time of the Racial and Religious Hatred Bill 2005, some gay rights campaigners were also calling on government to extend the stirring up hatred offences to include sexual orientation as well as religion. Some Liberal Democrat MPs were making similar suggestions in the 2005 General Election. This public influence was also clearly reflected in the parliamentary exchanges on the Racial and Religious Hatred Bill, where sexual orientation was also discussed and the case made for its inclusion.63 Likewise, only a year after the Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006, the leading gay rights interest group, Stonewall, presented its argument for new offences covering sexual orientation during the Committee Stage of Criminal Justice and Immigration Bill in 2007.64 (In fact, there are signs that this is now starting to happen with disability. Consider the recent electronic petition calling on the government to 27 extend the stirring up hatred offences to cover disability.65) That Muslims were not alone in pushing for protection contradicts the client politics explanation. Instead, it points toward something like an umbrella of interest groups explanation.66 The parity of protection explanation This final explanation of the government’s introduction of the stirring up religious hatred offences builds on the client politics narrative about Muslims being in an especially difficult situation, but redirects that narrative towards the more basic point that Jews and Sikhs did, but Muslims did not, enjoy protect against the stirring up of racial hatred under the Public Order Act 1986, due to the way courts in England and Wales interpreted the meaning of the words ‘race’ and ‘ethnicity’. According to this explanation, the real function of the Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006 was simply to achieve parity of protection for similar groups, quite apart from whether or not Muslims were in fact disproportionately burdened by incitement to hatred. According to the parity of protection explanation, the key turning point for an eventual change in the law can also be traced back to 1998 when the Runnymede Trust launched its Commission on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain (funded by the Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust). Following the landslide victory of the Labour Party in the 1997 general election, the new Home Secretary and MP for Blackburn (another northern British town with a significant South Asian population and one of the highest proportions of Muslims in the country), Jack Straw, attended the launch event on behalf of the government. In October 2000, the Commission, now chaired by the scholar of British identity and multiculturalism, Bhikhu Parekh, published its report. At the time The Telegraph published a series of critical responses to the Parekh Report, falsely accusing it of declaring the term “British” a ‘racist’ term. Jack Straw sought to partially distance the Labour government from what was being portrayed in the media as the extreme multiculturalist ideology of the Parekh Report. Nevertheless, in the Report the Commission briefly touched on the problem of incitement to hatred. It made two crucial points: first, that the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) itself provided a broad framework for a new settlement between the diverse racial, ethnic and religious communities of Britain, including a balance between ‘the right to free speech and the right to freedom from incitement to 28 racial hatred’;67 second, that Jews in Britain had benefited from the strengthening of countervailing forces against anti-Semitism, including laws banning the stirring up of hatred on grounds of race, ethnicity and national origin, but also that ‘[i]t would be perverse […] not to acknowledge that, however deeply wounding and painful expressions of antisemitism are in Britain today, the racism experienced by Asian, black, Gypsy and Irish communities demands primary attention.’68 The Parekh Report was a high water mark of a type of public intellectual work on multiculturalism which enjoyed the ear of the Labour government. On the issue of stirring up religious hatred, its ideas echoed recommendations that had also been made back in 1992 by the Commission for Racial Equality in its Second Review of the Race Relations Act 1976: namely, that the government should introduce new stirring up religious hatred offences.69 The Commission for Racial Equality’s Review spoke of the doubly ‘anomalous’ situation that whilst Jews and Sikhs (in the wake of Mandla v. Dowell- Lee70) but not Muslims enjoyed protection against the stirring up of racial hatred in England and Wales, in Northern Ireland the law covered race and religion, and so Jews, Sikhs, Muslims, Christians and Hindus alike.71 Together these commissions seemed to have cleared a pathway for a change in the law, removing obstacles that had been laid down by Dingle Mackintosh Foot back in 1965. They addressing concerns over free speech and they motivated the necessity of the legislation to address lack of parity. Evidence for the parity of protection explanation is also not hard to find in the relevant parliamentary debates of 2005. Consider the words of Charles Clarke during the second reading debate on the Racial and Religious Hatred Bill in the House of Commons in June 2005. The Bill seeks to address the anomaly that means that Jews and Sikhs are protected under the existing law, but that other faith groups, and people of no faith, are not protected. I think that that is simply not right and that the problem needs to be addressed.72 It is also appropriate to consider some of the arguments made in the House of Lords, who in the end would not oppose the Racial and Religious Hatred Bill once the Freedom of Expression clause had been added. During a House of Lords debate in October 2005, for example, several Lords defended the Bill on grounds of parity. 29 Lord Ahmed said: ‘Put simply, it is about preventing people inciting hatred and providing all communities with equal protection.’73 Or, as Baroness Ramsay put it, the provision will ‘remove the anomaly whereby mono-ethnic faith groups such as Sikhs and Jews are protected under the incitement to racial hatred provision, whereas multi-ethnic groups, such as Muslims and Christians, are not.’74 Lord Avebury then offered up the following example of the anomaly at work in English courts. A cleric who urged followers to kill non-believers, Americans, Hindus and Jews was jailed, first, for seven years for incitement to commit murder, and then an extra two years were added for incitement to racial hatred. If he had chosen his words more carefully and excluded Jews from this incitement, he would have been given only seven years and not nine.75 Although Lord Avebury did not specify, it is highly likely from his description of the case and the sentence handed down that he was referring to El-Faisal. Another potential advantage of the parity of protection explanation is that it can point to a coherent strategy pursued by the government in dealing with issues of religion and hatred. After all, the Labour government back in 2001, via the Anti- Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 (s. 39), successfully amended existing hate crime legislation (the Crime and Disorder Act 1998), so as to include sentence- enhancement provisions for offences that are racially or religiously aggravated. This was an omnibus act which included both hate crime and anti-terrorism measures. But the legislative intention was, arguably, transparent: namely, to achieve parity of protection for victims of hate crime. The aim of removing the anomaly of unequal protection against hate crimes across all faith communities in England and Wales could be seen in the arguments put forth by various Lords during debates.76 Significantly, this policy also had a bearing on instances of hate speech covered by public order offences other than the stirring up of racial hatred offence. Consider cases of religiously aggravated harassment, alarm or distress,77 such as Norwood v. DPP,78 in which the defendant displayed a poster that read ‘Muslims out of Britain’. The parity of protection explanation might also be used to explain further extensions of the stirring up hatred family of offences to other groups. In 2007, for example, during the second reading debate on the Criminal Justice and Immigration Bill, Chris Bryant declared that it was high time to introduce an offence of stirring up 30 hatred on grounds of sexual orientation in order to ‘overcome anomalies’ in the relevant laws.79 Likewise, in 2011 the Equality and Human Rights Commission defended the creation of a new offence of stirring up hatred on grounds of disability for the sake of ‘parity’.80 More recently, a significant number of the individuals and stakeholder organisations who took part in the Law Commission’s consultation exercise allied to its report, Hate Crime: Should the Current Offences be Extended?, argued on the basis of parity for the creation of new stirring up hatred offences for both disability and transgender identity.81 The Commission itself ultimately did not recommend this extension for mainly practical reasons (they took the view that there was insufficient evidence that the kind of conduct that would be caught by the act is actually occurring). However, in 2015 the House of Commons Women and Equalities Committee also heard evidence from a number of expert witnesses on the need for parity of protection for people with transgender identities given facts on the ground.82 Pace the Law Commission, the Women and Equalities Committee recommended that ‘[t]he Government should introduce new hate crime legislation which extends the existing provisions on [...] stirring up hatred so that they apply to all protected characteristics, as defined for the purposes of the Equality Act 2010.’83 Nevertheless, I must also address four potential problems even with the parity of protection explanation. One problem is that by itself the explanation may struggle to explain why politicians and peers accepted the introduction of the new stirring up religious hatred offences as the appropriate response to anomalies in the protection of groups. The parity of protection explanation highlights the fact that courts in England and Wales have on occasions convicted radical Muslim clerics or extremist Islamist activists for inciting racial hatred against Jews − for example, Iftikhar Ali and El- Faisal − but at the same time the courts have not regarded Muslims as belonging to a racial, ethnic or national group for the purposes of interpreting the stirring up racial hatred offence − a view consistent with a leading case in the field of anti- discrimination law, Nyazi v. Rymans Ltd.84 And so, in 2005 a rabbi could not be convicted for stirring up racial hatred against Muslims. Yet, it would have been perfectly consistent with the principle of parity of protection to remove the protections offered to Jews and Sikhs by repealing s. 3 of the Public Order Act 1986, say, as opposed to retaining those protections and extending them to Muslims via s. 3A.85 A second problem is that even if the parity of protection explanation can account for the introduction of new stirring up hatred offences covering religion and sexual 31 orientation, it does not at the present time seem to be a basis for making safe bets about the introduction of yet further offences covering transgender identity and disability, still less age or physical appearance. For example, in July 2016 the government published its long awaited plan for addressing the problem of hate crime, Action Against Hate: The UK Government’s Plan for Tackling Hate Crime. In response to recommendations from disability rights groups, academics including myself, and the Women and Equalities Select Committee, that the existing stirring up hatred offences should be extended to cover transgender identity and disability, the government’s new plan of action is to take no action. That is, ‘[g]overnment will consider these [recommendations].’86 In fact, the government had already been considering these recommendations (or kicking them into the long grass) since the Law Commission recommended against extending the stirring up hatred offences back in 2014.87 Not merely the Conservative government but parliament as a whole seems ambivalent at best about the extension project. At first blush, this might seem difficult to square with the idea that what tends to drive the introduction of new stirring up hatred offences is a concern with parity of protection. A third problem is that at least in 2005 the government had permitted other anomalies in the area of free speech and religion to continue − not least blasphemy laws protecting Christians but not Jews, Muslims, Sikhs, or Hindus, for example. So if the government’s core motivation when dealing with these policy issues really was to provide parity, then why did it allow uneven protection on this other matter?88 Finally, the parity of protection explanation cannot explain why the stirring up racial hatred offence was introduced in the first place. No doubt it is easier to reply to some of these problems than to others. The point about blasphemy laws, for example, is straightforwardly undercut by the fact that the Labour government fairly swiftly moved to also abolish common-law offences of blasphemy and blasphemous libel in England and Wales via the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008. The other problems are trickier. Nevertheless, the problem about the anomaly being resolved through repeal rather than extension might be countered by saying that although the real driving force is a concern for parity of protection, that principle itself is likely to be embedded in a deeper principle of good administration, whereby governments seek higher-order consistency in the enactment of criminal law, that is, the principle of treating like reasons alike (and unalike reasons unalike). For example, one possible reason for 32 banning incitement to racial hatred is that certain kinds of racist hate speech can contribute to climates of hatred and fear. Applying this same rationale to the case of Muslims could justify the course of action of extending hate speech law to cover religion, based on a parallel concern that stirring up hatred against Muslims can contribute to climates of hatred and fear, rather than the course of action of repealing law.89 Alternatively, it might be that concern for parity of protection is actually derivative of a commitment to a more fundamental principle of showing equal respect for the ethnic and cultural identities of all human beings.90 This would certainly chime with other aspects of the multiculturalist vision set out in the Parekh Report 2000, assuming that the Report either echoed or influenced the Labour government’s thinking. The point about the Conservative government’s failure to extend the stirring up offences still further in the name of parity can also be countered as follows. Just because history tells us that when extensions of the stirring up hatred offences have occurred they have probably been driven by parity of protection; it does not mean that whenever parity of protection considerations are in play, then inevitably new extensions occur. Legislative change does not work like that. There are innumerable forces blocking the introduction of new legislation at any given time. The government is focused on Brexit at present; and it is considering a new British Bill of Rights. The latter especially would need to be dealt with as part of considering any further limits on free speech. This is in addition to the government’s contention that there is insufficient evidence of a serious problem of incitement to hatred on grounds of transgender identity or disability. So the parity of protection explanation cannot be expected to forecast future extensions even if it can explain past extensions. Or, if the explanation can make forecasts, maybe these need to be framed in the longer term, thus controlling for other variables. Or perhaps the parity of protection explanation needs to be combined with other explanations in order to explain why future extensions have not occurred. In any event, it will need to be augmented with other explanations in order to explain why the stirring up racial hatred offences were introduced in the first place. Following on from this, it seems to me that surely the correct response to these problems, and the best approach full stop, is to explain the real function, and true explanation for, the new stirring up religious hatred offences in a pluralistic way. 33 A pluralistic explanation A pluralistic explanation of the rise and purpose of the stirring up religious hatred offences proceeds on the basis that there is nothing inconsistent in explaining the original creation of the stirring up racial hatred offences in one way, explaining the stirring up religious hatred offences in a different, more complex way, and explaining the failure of government to introduce yet more stirring up hatred offences in another way again. The pluralistic explanation might run thusly. First, a significant part of the impetus for the creation of the stirring up racial hatred offences was ethnic tensions and race riots following a period increased immigration (the public order explanation). Second, the Labour government introduced the stirring up religious hatred offences partly because it had concerns about public order in the wake of increasingly complex racial, ethnic and religious mass disturbances and riots (the public order explanation). Another part had to do with how Muslims, in particular, had mobilised as lobbyists, not necessarily because they were disproportionately burdened by hate speech, but instead because of an acute awareness that they did not enjoy the same legal protections as other groups (the client politics explanation combined with the parity of protection explanation). In other words, the relevant burden partly consisted in the fact that Muslims were being treated, and believed that they were being treated, as second-class citizens by the law. Consider, once again, the letter that was allegedly sent by the office of Charles Clarke to several mosques in 2005. The letter includes the statement, ‘[w]e cannot see why it is right to have protection in law for Jews and Sikhs, but wrong to extend it to other communities like the Muslim community.’ This foreshadows what Charles Clarke said in parliament on the matter. But it is also important to understand that the letter was on Labour Party headed paper, around election time, explicitly laying blame at the door of members of the Liberal Democrats Party and the Conservative Party for the removal of the stirring up religious hatred offences from Serious Organised Crime and Police Bill. So in that sense the letter − assuming it did exist, and was in fact sent to mosques − was making an appeal to Muslim clients. But the crucial point here is that the burden it acknowledged was not an increase in anti-Muslim hate speech post 9/11 but instead 34 an appreciation that Muslims were being treated differently than Jews and Sikhs when it came to legal protections against the stirring up of hatred (the client politics explanation combined with the parity of protection explanation). Third, when questions emerge about why other stirring up hatred offences have yet to be introduced, such as for transgender identity and disability, these questions require complex answers. It is may be true that currently the burden of incitement to hatred is diffusely distributed among numerous minority groups, and this has created a number of interest groups seeking further extensions of the stirring up hatred offences (the umbrella of interest groups explanation). And it may also be true that the government is inclined to want to undo anomalies in the cover provided by the existing offences (the parity of protection explanation). However, actual mass disturbances and riots in England and Wales have not evolved, yet, to include dimensions relating to transgender identity and disability (the public order explanation), and various other factors relating to Brexit mean that the government’s attention is currently taken up elsewhere (endogenous explanations). Implications I have argued that the best explanation not merely of why we ended up with the Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006 but also the ongoing point and purpose of the stirring up hatred offences is likely to be pluralistic, and that our understanding is hindered rather than helped by the terrorisation of these offences, so to speak. In this section I want to briefly explore the implications of this conclusion for normative debates about hate speech laws and freedom of expression going forward. The main point I want to make is that it matters what types of normative arguments academics and others are presenting to governments about why they should retain the stirring up hatred offences or even extend them further. The wrong types of arguments are those which are in tension with the best explanations of governmental intentions in this field of policymaking, potentially making them doomed to failure. Of course, one possible response to the tension is simply to deny that it matters: the right arguments are the right arguments and so it is up to those people who believe that the stirring up hatred offences should be extended, say, to convince governments to embrace their way of thinking. A second response, to which 35 I more sympathetic, is that legal and political theorists, if they want to change the world, have every reason, when presenting normative arguments to governments, to present whichever, already good arguments best match the government’s way of thinking. So what normative arguments could potentially play well with the Conservative government on the issue of extending the stirring up hatred offences to include transgender identity and disability? Predictably, one potential argument would emphasise people’s right to parity of protection. Put simply, if two similar groups of people are subject to similar forms of incitement to hatred, but one of the groups enjoys legal protections against such speech whereas the other group does not, then the other group has a prima facie right to similar protection also.91 As Alon Harel puts it, ‘treating the victims of racist speech more favorably than victims of sexist, homophobic, or other forms of abhorrent speech is itself a form of discrimination.’92 Another potentially important argument combines the right to parity of protection with an argument based on the public assurance of civic dignity. According to Jeremy Waldron, certain sorts of group libel and incitement to hatred laws could be warranted if they help to protect people’s sense that they are members of society in good standing, the sort of assurance that can be undone when they are confronted by public hate speech which downgrades or denigrates them.93 It strikes me that the threat to assurance could be especially high where certain groups realise that they lack the legal protections against incitement to hatred that other groups enjoy. If people with transgender identities or disabilities, for example, see that they lack the legal protections that various faith communities and gays and lesbians have benefited from, then this may compound the harmful effects of the incitement to hatred they endure. Both the incitement to hatred and the failure of parliament to act against it could leave people with transgender identities or disabilities feeling that they are second-class citizens. In other words, lack of parity of protection could be particularly devastating for their sense of assurance that they are members of society in good standing.94 However, anyone who wants to persuade the government to extend the stirring up hatred offences must also clear away barriers that the government currently recognises, as previous governments have recognised, for not extending these offences. First among these barriers is freedom of expression. Examples of laws banning incitement to hatred can be found not just in England and Wales but also in domestic penal codes and various other legal instruments in countries across the 36 globe.95 Yet these laws continue to be subject to fierce criticism, especially, although not exclusively, among US scholars who defend freedom of expression based on values of autonomy, democracy and legitimate government.96 (Note, laws banning incitement to hatred cannot be found at either the federal or state levels in the US due to the way in which courts have interpreted the First Amendment over the past half century.) When the Labour government introduced the Racial and Religious Hatred Bill in 2005, several legal scholars raised objections, based on what they viewed as inherent differences between race and religion which made the former but not the latter worth of protection under incitement to hatred legislation, and on their perception that the latter posed a special threat to freedom of expression.97 Others, myself included, tried to make the counter case for the extension.98 Nevertheless, what nearly all sides in this debate agree about is that if a plausible case is going to be made for extending incitement to hatred laws still further, then only the strongest, principled arguments will do; anything less would be easily defeated by principled arguments on the side of free speech. But what are the strongest arguments? More importantly, are any of the strongest arguments likely to chime with the best explanations of why governments have in the past extended the stirring up hatred offences and why the Conservative government might do so in the future? One potential argument is that laws banning the stirring up of hatred on grounds of transgender identity or disability can be warranted insofar as the stirring up of hatred against these groups contributes to a climate of hatred in which hate crimes are more likely, and to a climate of fear, in which individual members of these groups suffer debilitating fear that they could become the victims of hate crime.99 This sort of argument might chime with the umbrella of interest groups explanation. In the event that the burden of incitement to hatred is diffusely distributed among numerous minority groups, including people with transgender identities or disabilities, this could create a number of interest groups seeking further extensions of the stirring up hatred offences. The present argument speaks to the sort of burdens faced by members of these minority groups. It could also be useful to the relevant interest groups in putting their case to government; provided, that is, evidence can be found that substantiates the arguments linking incitement to hatred with climates of hatred and fear and linking those climates with hate crimes, say. I also do not think that arguments which speak to public order, and therefore, march in step with the public order explanation, are out of the question. No doubt 37 defenders of the status quo could react by saying that our society has experienced religious wars and race riots, but not violent public explosions of simmering tensions between cisgender and transgender people, and not rioting by people with disabilities. In other words, it may be that mass disturbances and riots in England and Wales have yet to evolve to include the dimensions of transgender identity and disability, along with the dimensions of race, ethnicity and religion. However, arguably this was also not the case with sexual orientation. Yet the government did not wait for mass disturbances to occur involving violence between religious conservatives and homosexuals, say, before extending the legislation to cover sexual orientation. The risk was enough. This is also borne out in the case law. In R. v. Ali, Javed, and Ahmed,100 for example, three Muslim men became the first people to be successfully prosecuted for offences relating to the stirring up of hatred on grounds of sexual orientation in England and Wales. Acting together the men distributed leaflets on the streets of Derby titled ‘Turn or Burn’, ‘GAY – God Abhors You’, ‘Death Penalty?’ as a protest to the Gay Pride Festival taking place that day. In his sentencing remarks Judge Burgess used the language of public order: ‘the vast majority of us get along together very well’, ‘the greatest freedom that we all enjoy is to live in peace and without fear’, ‘It was clearly perceived by parliament that people of a particular sexual orientation needed protection from that minority who wished to stir up hatred against them’, ‘your intention was to do great harm in a peaceful community’.101 According to a more subtle version of the public order explanation, therefore, the government will, under the right circumstances, introduce laws banning the stirring up of hatred in response to the risk of mass disturbances and riots that have taken on more complex dimensions. So one potentially impactful line of normative argument might be that the stirring up of hatred against people with transgender identities or disabilities has the potential to become tomorrow’s Bradford riots, in any parts of the country with significant proportions of such people, and taking a precautionary approach to the avoidance of such public disorder can warrant a change in the law.102 Acknowledgments 38 I would like to thank Sally Broughton Micova, Charles Clarke, Michael Frazer, Chris Hanretty, and Adriana Sinclair for useful feedback on an early draft. I am also very grateful to the journal’s two anonymous reviewers for their insights and suggestions. Disclosure statement No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author. Notes on contributor Alexander Brown is Senior Lecturer in Contemporary Social and Political Theory at the University of East Anglia (UEA). He is the author of Hate Speech Law: A Philosophical Examination (New York: Routledge, 2015). 1 In response to the Labour government’s introduction of the Racial and Religious Hatred Bill in 2005 Lords Lester and Lucas argued in a House of Lords debate that that legal professionals tasked with enforcing laws banning incitement to religious hatred would have an especially hard time distinguishing between speech that stirs up hatred against religious believers and speech that stirs up hatred against religious beliefs (such as through criticism, ridicule and satire). Hansard (HL), October 11, 2005, vol. 674, cols. 173-5 and 203-204. The same worry was expressed by several high-profile writers, actors, and legal commentators. See, e.g., Rowan Atkinson, ‘The Opposition’s Case’, in L. Appignanesi (ed.) Free Expression is No Offence (London: Penguin, 2005); Philip Pullman, ‘Against “Identity”’ in L. Appignanesi (ed.) Free Expression is No Offence (London: Penguin, 2005); Gareth Crossman, ‘Religious Hate: A Criminal Offence? Liberty Says No’, Legal Action (March) (2005): 9; Joshua Rozenburg, ‘Now you face jail for being nasty to Satanists’, Daily Telegraph, June 10 (2005). In October 2005 Lords Hunt, Lester, Carey, and Plant succeeded in persuading their colleagues to accept an amendment to the Racial and Religious Hatred Bill that addressed the problem, specifically, by inserting s 29J, ‘Protection of freedom of expression: Nothing in this Part shall be read or given effect in a way which prohibits or restricts discussion, criticism or expressions of antipathy, dislike, ridicule, insult or abuse of particular religions or the beliefs or practices of their 39 adherents, or of any other belief system or the beliefs or practices of its adherents, or proselytising or urging adherents of a different religion or belief system to cease practising their religion or belief system.’ 2 See, e.g., Peter Cumper and Peter W. Edge ‘Muslims, counter-terrorism, and human rights in the United Kingdom’, Research Papers, Research Papers, Human Rights Conflict Prevention Centre (HRCPC) 1-2 (2005), 595-616, reprinted in N. Bašić and A. H. Siddiqui (eds.) Rethinking Global Terrorism (Islamabad: International Islamic University Press, 2009); Alan Thornett, ‘Racial and Religious Hatred Bill - A Serious Threat to Free Speech’, International Viewpoint, November 9 (2005), www.internationalviewpoint.org/spip.php?article903; Shami Chakrabarti, Comments cited in ‘Satanists to be protected under Religious Hatred Bill’, Times Online, June 9, 2005; Erik Bleich, ‘Faith and State: British Policy Responses to “Islamist” Extremism’, in R. Eatwell and M. Goodwin (ed.) The New Extremism in 21st Century Britain (London: Routledge, 2010), p. 79; The Freedom to Be Racist? How the United States and Europe Struggle to Preserve Freedom and Combat Racism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 26; Clive Walker, Terrorism and the Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 382. 3 Hansard (HC), May 3, 1965, vol. 711, col. 1043. 4 Ibid. 5 For a summary, see Law Commission, Hate Crime: The Case for Extending the Existing Offences, Appendix B: History of Hate Crime Legislation (London: The Stationery Office, 2013), pp. 31-33. 6 Hansard (HC), November 19, 2001, vol. 375, col. 35. 7 Hansard (HC), June 21, 2005, vol. 435, col. 668. 8 No. T20147226, Leicester Crown Court, February 6, 2015 (unreported). 9 Transcript obtained from Margaret Wort & Co. 10 Consider, for example, the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, and the Terrorism Act 2006. 11 See footnote 2 above. 12 For example, when in 1994 two Lords suggested amendments to the Criminal Justice and Public Order Bill to include new stirring up religious hatred offences, the then Labour Party Shadow Home Secretary, Tony Blair, neither came out in support 40 of these Lords Amendments nor tabled his own similar amendment in the House of Commons. During one commons debate on the Criminal Justice and Public Order Bill in January 1994 Blair rose to interrupt the then Home Secretary, Michael Howard, on so many occasions that the latter ultimately resorted to instructing Blair to ‘Sit down’. Hansard (HC) January 11, 1994, vol. 235, col. 30. In that debate Blair tabled an amendment consisting of a list of ten additional measures including ‘measures to strengthen the law on racial harassment and violence’, but the list did not include a new stirring up religious hatred offences. Ibid., cols. 34-35. Moreover, as Prime Minister, Tony Blair made no mention of introducing this new offence in his ‘Britain is stronger together’ speech in 2000. Tony Blair, Speech to the Association of Regional Newspaper Executives, March 28, 2000. Nor in his ‘Values and the power of community’ speech in 2000. Tony Blair, Speech to the Global Ethics Foundation, Tübigen University, Germany, June 30, 2000. 13 Evidence from the UK policy agendas dataset, available at: www.policyagendas.org.uk. The Queen’s Speech (or Speech from the Throne) sets out the executive and legislative priorities of the government in the forthcoming session. This supplies a powerful signal of the intentions of the executive to the public and acts as a means of setting out the political agenda for the forthcoming year. 14 No mention of introducing such an offence appeared in either the 1997 or the 2001 Labour Party general election manifestos. 15 Hansard (HL), November 27, 2001, vol. 629, col. 189. 16 A blank version of Clarke’s letter appears on the following website: http://www.civitas.org.uk/pdf/ClarkeLetter.pdf. 17 Hansard (HC), June 21, 2005, vol. 435, col. 737. 18 No. T20027343, Central Criminal Court, March 7, 2003 (unreported). 19 Transcript obtained from Smith Bernal Reporting Ltd. 20 No. T20010599, Southwark Crown Court, May 3, 2002 (unreported). 21 No. (unknown), Central Criminal Court, February 7, 2006 (unreported). 22 No. T20150244, Central Criminal Court, July 5, 2007 (unreported). 23 T20067103, Central Criminal Court, January 5, 2007 (unreported). 24 No. T20077199, Central Criminal Court, February 1, 2007 (unreported). 25 No. T20107575, Bristol Crown Court, July 29, 2011 (unreported). 41 26 Transcript obtained from Mendip-Wordwave Partnership. 27 Charles Clarke, Secretary of State for the Home Office, Press Release: Tackling Terrorism-Behaviours Unacceptable in the UK, August 24, 2005. 28 See, e.g., Prime Minister’s Press Conference, August 5, 2005. 29 [2010] EWHC 2825 (Admin.). 30 Ibid., para. 71. See also para. 83. 31 R (Naik) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] EWCA (Civ.) 1546. 32 Gordon Brown, National Security Statement, November 14, 2007. 33 The Secretary of State for the Home Department, Prevent Strategy (London: The Stationary Office, 2011), p. 1. 34 Ibid., p. 27. 35 Hansard (HC), November 19, 2001, vol. 375, cols. 34-35. 36 Ibid. 37 Consider the conviction of the Black Liberation Movement leader Michael Abdul Malik in R. v. Malik [1968] 1 All ER 582 (CA). 38 Hansard (HL), October 11, 2005, vol. 674, col. 229. 39 Hansard (HL) November 27, 2001, vol. 629, col. 194. 40 Ibid., col. 211. 41 Hansard (HC) February 15, 2006, vol. 442, col. 1429. 42 Theresa May, Speech to The Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), London, November 24, London. 43 Cf. Gary P. Freeman, ‘Modes of Immigration Politics in Liberal Democratic States’ International Migration Review 29 (1995): 881-902. 44 House of Lords Select Committee on Religious Offences in England and Wales, Report, April 10, 2003, para. 95. 45 Hansard (HC), November 19, 2001, vol. 375, col. 34. 46 David Blunkett, Speech to the Institute of Public Policy Research, July 7, 2014. 47 Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia, Islamophobia issues, challenges and action (Stoke on Trent: Trentham Books, 2004). 48 Crown Prosecution Service, Anti-Muslim Hate Crime: Learning From Casework (London: Equality and Diversity Unity, 2012), p. 17. 42 49 Home Office, Office for National Statistics and Ministry of Justice, An Overview of Hate Crime in England and Wales (Titchfield: Office for National Statistics, 2013), p. 23. 50 Ibid., p. 20. 51 s. 4A of the Public Order Act 1986, along hate crime provisions in the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (as amended by s. 39 of the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001) or in the Criminal Justice Act 2003. 52 Matthew Feldman and Mark Littler, Tell MAMA Reporting 2013/14: Anti-Muslim Overview, Analysis and ‘Cumulative Extremism’ (Middlesbrough: Teeside University, 2014), Para. 2.4. 53 See, e.g., The Geography of Anti-Muslim Hatred: Tell MAMA Annual Report 2015 (London: Faith Matters, 2016), pp. 21-23. 54 Feldman and Littler, Tell MAMA Reporting 2013/14, para. 2.4. 55 No. 94/2421/X2, Court of Appeal, April 11, 1995, 6 Archbold News 2. 56 No. (unknown), Central Criminal Court, November 4, 2005 (unreported). 57 No. T20080094, Leeds Crown Court, July 10, 2009 (unreported). 58 No. T20107203, Liverpool Crown Court, June 25, 2010 (unreported). 59 No. (unknown), Southwark Crown Court, December 2015 (unreported). 60 Compare Parts 3 and 3A of the Public Order Act 1986. 61 s. 29J of the Public Order Act 1986. 62 In line with the Salisbury Convention the House of Lords is expected to avoid opposing out of hand legislation promised in the government’s election manifesto. For the first time, the 2005 Labour Party Manifesto included ‘a firm and clear intention to give people of all faiths the same protection against incitement to hatred on the basis of their religion.’ www.politicsresources.net/area/uk/man.htm. Nevertheless, the House of Lords exercised its prerogative − arguably its central function − to dissect proposed legislation and put forward amendments designed to improve that legislation based on the insights of relevantly experienced peers. Whilst under the Parliament Acts the House of Lords cannot block indefinitely government legislation, it can slow it down sufficiently to make it extremely difficult for a government to have its own way on the finer details of legislation, because of the scarcity of parliamentary time. In that sense it is not simply a case of the government of the day introducing new 43 legislation but both Houses of Parliament working in conjunction under a multi- layered system of majority voting, with a government, even one that has a healthy majority in the House of Commons, sometimes winning, sometimes losing. 63 See Law Commission, Hate Crime: The Case for Extending the Existing Offences, Appendix B, p. 45. 64 Hansard (HC) Criminal Justice and Immigration Bill, Public Bill Debate (Afternoon), October 16, 2007, cols. 74-85. 65 https://petition.parliament.uk/petitions/163896. 66 See, e.g., Gary P. Freeman, ‘National Models, Policy Types, and the Politics of Immigration in Liberal Democracies’, West European Politics 29 (2006): 227-247. 67 Bhikhu Parekh, The Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain: Report of the Commission on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain (London: Profile Books, 2000), p. 90. 68 Ibid., p. 61. 69 Commission for Racial Equality, Second Review of the Race Relations Act 1976 (London: Commission for Racial Equality, 1992). 70 [1983] UKHL 7. 71 Commission for Racial Equality, Second Review of the Race Relations Act 1976. 72 Hansard (HC), June 21, 2005, vol. 435, col. 678. 73 Hansard (HL), October 11, 2005, vol. 674, col. 229. 74 Ibid., col. 209. 75 Ibid., col. 219. 76 See Law Commission, Hate Crime: The Case for Extending the Existing Offences, Appendix B, p. 10. 77 s. 5 of the Public Order Act 1986, along with the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (as amended by s. 39 of the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001). 78 [2003] EWHC 1564 (Admin.). 79 Hansard (HC) October 8, 2007, vol. 464, col 59. 80 Equality and Human Rights Commission, Hidden in Plain Sight (London: Equality and Human Rights Commission, 2011) at p. 154. 81 The Law Commission, Hate Crime: Should The Current Offences Be Extended? (Paper No 348) (London: The Stationery Office, 2014), paras 7.12 and 7.17. 44 82 House of Commons Women and Equalities Committee, Transgender Equality, First Report of Session 2015–16, January 14, 2016, at paras. 269-72. 83 Ibid., para 275. 84 (1988) IRLIB 367. 85 See Ivan Hare, ‘Crosses, Crescents and Sacred Cows: Criminalising Incitement to Religious Hatred’, Public Law (2006): 521-537, p. 533; Alexander Brown, ‘The “Who?” Question in the Hate Speech Debate: Part 1: Consistency, Practical, and Formal Approaches’, Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 29 (2016): 275- 320, pp. 283-4, pp. 287-92. 86 Home Office, Action Against Hate: The UK Government’s Plan for Tackling Hate Crime (London: Home Office, 2016), para. 111. 87 Law Commission, Hate Crime: Should The Current Offences Be Extended?. 88 See Hare, ‘Crosses, Crescents and Sacred Cows: Criminalising Incitement to Religious Hatred’, p. 533. 89 Brown, ‘The “Who?” Question in the Hate Speech Debate: Part 1’, pp. 284, 288-90. 90 See, e.g., Bhikhu Parekh, Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and Political Theory, Second Edition (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2006), ch. 10; Alexander Brown, Hate Speech Law: A Philosophical Examination (London: Routledge, 2015), ch. 6. 91 See Brown, ‘The “Who?” Question in the Hate Speech Debate: Part 1’, pp. 283-93. 92 Alon Harel, ‘Bigotry, Pornography, and the First Amendment: A Theory of Unprotected Speech’, Southern California Law Review 65 (1992): 1887-1931, p. 1906. 93 Jeremy Waldron, ‘Dignity and Defamation: The Visibility of Hate’, Harvard Law Review 123 (2010): 1596-1657. 94 See Brown, Hate Speech Law, pp. 152-6; Alexander Brown, ‘The “Who?” Question in the Hate Speech Debate: Part 2: Functional and Democratic Approaches’, Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 30 (2017): 23-55, pp. 29-30. 95 See Brown, Hate Speech Law, pp. 26-27. 96 See, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, ‘Hate Speech’, in M. Herz and P. Molnar (eds.) The Content and Context of Hate Speech: Rethinking Regulation and Responses (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Ronald Dworkin, ‘Reply to Jeremy 45 Waldron’, in M. Herz and P. Molnar (eds.) The Content and Context of Hate Speech: Rethinking Regulation and Responses (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Robert Post, ‘Interview’, in M. Herz and P. Molnar (eds.) The Content and Context of Hate Speech: Rethinking Regulation and Responses (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Nadine Strossen, ‘Interview’, in M. Herz and P. Molnar (eds.) The Content and Context of Hate Speech: Rethinking Regulation and Responses (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Eric Heinze, Hate Speech and Democratic Citizenship (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016); James Weinstein, ‘Hate Speech Bans, Democracy and Political Legitimacy’, Constitutional Commentary, forthcoming. 97 See, e.g., Susannah C. Vance, ‘The Permissibility of Incitement to Religious Hatred Offences Under European Convention Principles’, Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems 14 (2004): 201-251; Hare, ‘Crosses, Crescents and Sacred Cows: Criminalising Incitement to Religious Hatred’; Ivan Hare, ‘Blasphemy and Incitement to Religious Hatred: Free Speech Dogma and Doctrine’ in I. Hare and J. Weinstein (eds.) Extreme Speech and Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); Peter Cumper, ‘Outlawing Incitement to Religious Hatred: A British Perspective’, Religion and Human Rights 1 (2006): 249-268; David Nash and Chara Bakalis, ‘Incitement to Religious Hatred and the ‘Symbolic’: How will the Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006 work?’, Liverpool Law Review 28 (2007): 349-375; Kay Goodall, ‘Incitement to Religious Hatred: All Talk and No substance?’ Modern law review 70 (2007): 89-113; Eric Barendt, ‘Religious Hatred Laws: Protecting Groups or Belief?’ Res Publica 17 (2011): 41-53. 98 See, e.g., Alexander Brown, ‘The Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006: A Millian Response’, Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 11 (2008): 1-24; Simon Thompson, ‘Freedom of Expression and Hatred of Religion’, Ethnicities 12 (2012): 215-232. 99 See, e.g., Brown, ‘The Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006’, pp. 13-14; Brown, Hate Speech Law, pp. 66-75; Brown, ‘The “Who?” Question in the Hate Speech Debate: Part 2’, pp. 27-29. Of course, some people argue that even though security is the sort of value that has the normative stature to hold its own against arguments for freedom of expression based on autonomy and democracy, the threat to security from 46 the stirring up of hatred is not sufficiently imminent to justify the cost to freedom of expression. See, e.g., Peter Molnar, ‘Responding to “Hate Speech” with Art, Education, and the Imminent Danger Test’, in M. Herz and P. Molnar (eds.) The Content and Context of Hate Speech: Rethinking Regulation and Responses (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012). Other people claim that allowing such arguments inevitably creates a slippery slope to hate speech laws that cover every protected characteristic going, which is devastating for free speech. See, e.g., Eric Heinze, ‘Cumulative Jurisprudence and Hate Speech: Sexual Orientation and Analogies to Disability, Age, and Obesity’, in I. Hare and J. James Weinstein (eds.) Extreme Speech and Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). And some people also maintain that the preponderance of evidence would suggest that laws banning the stirring up of hatred are ineffective at best at reducing this sort of speech and the security threats associated with it. See, e.g., Eric Heinze, Hate Speech and Democratic Citizenship (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016). For counters to all of these arguments, see Brown, Hate Speech Law, pp. 66-75, 239-242; Brown, ‘The “Who?” Question in the Hate Speech Debate: Part 2’, esp. p. 54. 100 No. T20110109, Derby Crown Court, February 10, 2012 (unreported). 101 Transcript obtained directly from Judge Burgess. 102 Brown, ‘The “Who?” Question in the Hate Speech Debate: Part 2’, pp. 30-31. 
work_6edn4g5tnnbwvmjtbsgnhzg2jy	----	[PDF] The Prevalence of Sexual Assault Against People Who Identify as Gay, Lesbian, or Bisexual in the United States: A Systematic Review | Semantic Scholar Skip to search formSkip to main content> Semantic Scholar's Logo Search Sign InCreate Free Account You are currently offline. Some features of the site may not work correctly. DOI:10.1177/1524838010390707 Corpus ID: 30180804The Prevalence of Sexual Assault Against People Who Identify as Gay, Lesbian, or Bisexual in the United States: A Systematic Review @article{Rothman2011ThePO, title={The Prevalence of Sexual Assault Against People Who Identify as Gay, Lesbian, or Bisexual in the United States: A Systematic Review}, author={E. Rothman and D. Exner and A. Baughman}, journal={Trauma, Violence, & Abuse}, year={2011}, volume={12}, pages={55 - 66} } E. Rothman, D. Exner, A. Baughman Published 2011 Psychology, Medicine Trauma, Violence, & Abuse This article systematically reviews 75 studies that examine the prevalence of sexual assault victimization among gay or bisexual (GB) men, and lesbian or bisexual (LB) women, in the United States. All studies were published between 1989 and 2009 and report the results of quantitative research. The authors reviewed the reported prevalence of lifetime sexual assault victimization (LSA), and where available, childhood sexual assault (CSA), adult sexual assault (ASA), intimate partner sexual… Expand View on SAGE europepmc.org Save to Library Create Alert Cite Launch Research Feed Share This Paper 337 CitationsHighly Influential Citations 18 Background Citations 68 Methods Citations 3 Results Citations 10 View All Tables and Topics from this paper table 1 table 2 table 3 table 4 Physiological Sexual Disorders Estimated Censuses Lichen Sclerosus et Atrophicus Female Homosexuality Scientific Publication Paper Mentions News Article How yoga is helping girls heal from trauma Health Medicinet 1 June 2017 Blog Post Sexual orientation versus behavior—different for men and women? The Society Pages: All Blogs 29 February 2016 Blog Post Nice Work: Queer Eye for the…Affirmative Consent Debate? The Society Pages: All Blogs 5 August 2015 337 Citations Citation Type Citation Type All Types Cites Results Cites Methods Cites Background Has PDF Publication Type Author More Filters More Filters Filters Sort by Relevance Sort by Most Influenced Papers Sort by Citation Count Sort by Recency Differences in Lesbian, Bisexual, and Heterosexual Women's Experiences of Sexual Assault and Rape in a National U.S. Sample. Sasha N Canan, Kristen N Jozkowski, Jacquelyn D. Wiersma-Mosley, Mindy Bradley, Heather D Blunt-Vinti Psychology, Medicine Journal of interpersonal violence 2019 3 Save Alert Research Feed A Mixed-methods Study of Sexual Assault in Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual Adults in the U.S. Sasha N Canan Psychology 2017 Highly Influenced View 28 excerpts, cites background, results and methods Save Alert Research Feed Sexual assaults on gay and bisexual men: Barriers to reporting to the police Peter Patlakas Psychology 2013 Highly Influenced View 3 excerpts, cites background Save Alert Research Feed Sexual Victimization and Subsequent Police Reporting by Gender Identity Among Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, and Queer Adults Lisa Langenderfer-Magruder, N. E. Walls, S. K. Kattari, Darren L Whitfield, D. Ramos Psychology, Medicine Violence and Victims 2016 28 View 2 excerpts, cites background and results Save Alert Research Feed A social ecological approach to understanding correlates of lifetime sexual assault among sexual minority women in Toronto, Canada: results from a cross-sectional internet-based survey. C. Logie, R. Alaggia, M. Rwigema Psychology, Medicine Health education research 2014 23 PDF Save Alert Research Feed Sexual Assault Risks Among Gay and Bisexual Men Amy L Hequembourg, K. Parks, R. Collins, T. Hughes Medicine Journal of sex research 2015 21 Save Alert Research Feed Prevalence of Past-Year Sexual Assault Victimization Among Undergraduate Students: Exploring Differences by and Intersections of Gender Identity, Sexual Identity, and Race/Ethnicity Robert W S Coulter, C. Mair, Elizabeth Miller, J. Blosnich, D. Matthews, H. McCauley Psychology, Medicine Prevention Science 2017 77 PDF View 1 excerpt, cites background Save Alert Research Feed A mixed methods investigation of sexual victimisation and coping among sexual minority compared to heterosexual women Amy L Hequembourg, J. Blayney, J. Livingston, Wendy B Bostwick, S. Auerbach Psychology 2019 1 Save Alert Research Feed Young Bisexual People’s Experiences of Sexual Violence: A Mixed-Methods Study Corey E. Flanders, RaeAnn E Anderson, L. Tarasoff Psychology 2020 Highly Influenced View 1 excerpt, cites background Save Alert Research Feed Campus Sexual Assault: A Systematic Review of Prevalence Research From 2000 to 2015 L. Fedina, J. Holmes, Bethany L. Backes Medicine Trauma, violence & abuse 2018 232 Save Alert Research Feed ... 1 2 3 4 5 ... References SHOWING 1-10 OF 99 REFERENCES SORT BYRelevance Most Influenced Papers Recency Predicting Self-Protection Against Sexual Assault in Dating Relationships Among Heterosexual Men and Women, Gay Men, Lesbians, and Bisexuals C. Moore, C. K. Waterman Psychology 1999 44 Highly Influential View 15 excerpts, references background Save Alert Research Feed Sexual intercourse, abuse and pregnancy among adolescent women: does sexual orientation make a difference? E. Saewyc, L. Bearinger, R. Blum, M. Resnick Psychology, Medicine Family planning perspectives 1999 178 PDF View 3 excerpts, references background Save Alert Research Feed Dating violence among gay, lesbian, and bisexual adolescents: results from a community survey. N. Freedner, L. H. Freed, Y. Yang, S. B. Austin Psychology, Medicine The Journal of adolescent health : official publication of the Society for Adolescent Medicine 2002 178 Highly Influential PDF View 14 excerpts, references background Save Alert Research Feed History of childhood sexual abuse and HIV risk behaviors in homosexual and bisexual men. D. Brennan, W. Hellerstedt, M. Ross, S. Welles Medicine American journal of public health 2007 112 Highly Influential PDF View 4 excerpts Save Alert Research Feed Understanding childhood sexual abuse as a predictor of sexual risk-taking among men who have sex with men: The Urban Men's Health Study. J. Paul, J. Catania, L. Pollack, R. Stall Medicine, Psychology Child abuse & neglect 2001 262 Highly Influential View 1 excerpt Save Alert Research Feed Sexual orientation, sexual behaviors, and pregnancy among American Indian adolescents. E. Saewyc, C. Skay, L. Bearinger, R. Blum, M. Resnick Psychology, Medicine The Journal of adolescent health : official publication of the Society for Adolescent Medicine 1998 50 PDF Save Alert Research Feed Disparities in child abuse victimization in lesbian, bisexual, and heterosexual women in the Nurses' Health Study II. S. B. Austin, Hee-Jin Jun, +4 authors Rosalind J Wright Medicine Journal of women's health 2008 133 Highly Influential PDF View 6 excerpts, references background Save Alert Research Feed Victimization over the life span: a comparison of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and heterosexual siblings. K. Balsam, E. Rothblum, T. Beauchaine Psychology, Medicine Journal of consulting and clinical psychology 2005 614 Highly Influential PDF View 2 excerpts, references background Save Alert Research Feed Lesbian and Bisexual Women's Experiences of Victimization: Mental Health, Revictimization, and Sexual Identity Development J. F. Morris, K. Balsam Psychology, Medicine Journal of lesbian studies 2003 93 Highly Influential View 15 excerpts, references background Save Alert Research Feed Sexual Abuse in Lesbian and Bisexual Young Women: Associations with Emotional/Behavioral Difficulties, Feelings About Sexuality, and the “Coming Out” Process J. Robohm, B. Litzenberger, L. A. Pearlman Psychology, Medicine Journal of lesbian studies 2003 37 Highly Influential View 12 excerpts, references background Save Alert Research Feed ... 1 2 3 4 5 ... Related Papers Abstract Tables and Topics Paper Mentions 337 Citations 99 References Related Papers Stay Connected With Semantic Scholar Sign Up About Semantic Scholar Semantic Scholar is a free, AI-powered research tool for scientific literature, based at the Allen Institute for AI. 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work_6gmvg3xpizg4dcn6ytat4le35e	----	A critical portrait of hate crime/incident reporting in North East England: The value of statistical data and the politics of recording in an age of austerity Geoforum 75 (2016) 64–74 Contents lists available at ScienceDirect Geoforum journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/geoforum A critical portrait of hate crime/incident reporting in North East England: The value of statistical data and the politics of recording in an age of austerity http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2016.07.001 0016-7185/� 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/). ⇑ Corresponding author. E-mail address: john.clayton@northumbria.ac.uk (J. Clayton). 1 In the UK, a ‘Hate Incident’ is any incident which the victim, or anyone else, thinks is based on someone’s prejudice towards them because of their race, religion, sexual orientation, disability or because they are transgender. Not all hate incidents will amount to criminal offences, but those that do become Hate Crimes. We use the term ‘hate crime/incident’ in this paper to indicate that we refer here to incidents which may or may not amount to or in time become criminal offences. John Clayton a,⇑, Catherine Donovan b, Stephen J. Macdonald b a Department of Geography, Northumbria University, UK b Department of Social Sciences, University of Sunderland, UK a r t i c l e i n f o Article history: Received 13 January 2016 Received in revised form 28 June 2016 Accepted 3 July 2016 Available online 15 July 2016 Keywords: Hate crime/incidents Third party reporting Data collection Politics of recording Austerity a b s t r a c t This paper contributes to research on the reporting of hate crime/incidents from a critical socio-spatial perspective. It outlines an analysis of third party reporting of hate crimes/incidents in the North East of England, based upon the work of Arch (a third party hate crime/incident reporting system). The data set is one of the largest of its kind in the UK and therefore presents a unique opportunity to explore pat- terns of reporting across different types of hate crimes/incidents through a system designed to go beyond criminal justice responses. Whilst not downplaying the significance of the harmful experiences to which this data refers, we are very aware of the limitations of quantitative and de-humanised approaches to understanding forms of discrimination. Therefore the paper adopts a critical position, emphasising that interpretation of the data provides a partial, yet important, insight into everyday exclusions, but also cul- tures and politics of reporting. While the data records incidents across the main ‘monitored strands’, anal- ysis here particularly focuses on those incidents recorded on the basis of ‘race’ and religion. Our analysis allows us to both cautiously consider the value of such data in understanding and addressing such dam- aging experiences - but also to appreciate how such an analysis may connect with the changing landscape of reporting and the politics of austerity. � 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http:// creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/). 1. Introduction This paper considers the value and limits of third party record- ing of hate crimes/incidents1 and its fit with an approach which takes seriously both the social construction of knowledge and the human damage wrought by such incidents. We adopt a post- positivist, critical approach to quantitative data and draw upon recent action research carried out with a third party reporting agency in the North East of England (Arch). Comparatively speaking, the data referred to is substantial; 3908 incidents over the period 2005–2015. The data also references experiences not captured through other data sources. As such it offers a unique opportunity to explore cultures of reporting through an analysis of the patterns in and between different categories of reported incidents in this geographic context. However, we argue that interpretation of such data also needs to be treated with caution given the limitations of quantitative approaches in appreciating the complex socio-spatial dynamics that surround these incidents. We also argue that such data collection, as a standalone exercise loses value if not developed in tandem with more pro-active approaches that look to directly tackle and respond to these incidents. The paper therefore begins to think through how the political context of austerity influences such activity in relation to both the problematisation of hate crime/incidents and possible responses. The paper begins by setting the conceptual scene of ‘hate stud- ies’ and by taking seriously the complex social and spatial charac- ter of such exclusionary practices. We then outline the historical context of third party recording more broadly and in relation to our case study area/project, before setting out our critical approach to the data collected through Arch. Following this we provide an analysis in two forms. Firstly, we outline what our statistical anal- ysis might tell us about hate crimes/incidents in this part of the world by highlighting key patterns, relationships and trends in http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1016/j.geoforum.2016.07.001&domain=pdf http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2016.07.001 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ mailto:john.clayton@northumbria.ac.uk http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2016.07.001 http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/00167185 http://www.elsevier.com/locate/geoforum J. Clayton et al. / Geoforum 75 (2016) 64–74 65 relation to police involvement, incident types, geography, and reporting agencies involved. We then consider how the data may point towards, not just an indication of cultures of reporting, but also the politics of recording. In conclusion we suggest that our research is one illustration of a broader trend to downplay or shift the terms of data collection around issues of inequality and social justice. It is contended that the implications of this go beyond just a more accurate appreciation of societal trends. 2. Approaching hate socially and spatially Whilst more established within a US context of ongoing civil rights struggles (Green et al., 2001), ‘hate studies’ is a relatively new area of enquiry within the UK (Chakraborti and Garland, 2015). The field broadly recognises the unique character of crimi- nal offences (but also non-criminal incidents) committed against individuals on the basis of ascribed identities in the context of historical power imbalances, what Perry (2001:10) describes as ‘‘violence and intimidation toward already stigmatised and mar- ginalised groups”. While the experience of such violence is far from new, the establishment of a hate crime paradigm has emerged in response to more recent high profile events and political/legisla- tive change. In relation to racist hate crime for example, landmark legislation such as the Crime and Disorder Act (1998) established racially aggregated offences and the Macpherson Inquiry (1999) into the murder of Stephen Lawrence (1993), set out the terms of an institutional response. In addition, other notable events such as the neo-Nazi inspired nail bombing campaign in April 1999 by David Copeland, targeting several minority communities in Lon- don, drew attention to the victimisation of other historically stig- matised and marginalised groups. The remit of legislation and police powers, as well as the scope of the academic field, has there- fore expanded across what are known as the ‘monitored strands’ of religion (Anti-terrorism Crime and Security Act 2001), sexuality and disability (section 146 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003), in recognition of the breadth of victimisation.2 Contentiously, some have argued for a consideration of hate crime beyond these ‘over- generalised’ groups (Chakraborti and Garland, 2012), illustrating the contested nature of this inter-disciplinary field in both concep- tual and more practical terms (Ardley, 2005). A related feature of ongoing debate is that of conceptual defini- tion and the language of ‘hate’ (Perry, 2006). One dominant cri- tique has been to suggest that the term ‘hate crime’ presents offences as psychological matters of personal prejudice or bias, thus pathologising offenders and their actions (Ray and Smith, 2001). This seems to be a consequence of the prevailing liberal legal discourse where the focus remains on the perpetrator as ‘ra- tional, autonomous, self-contained, self-possessed, self-sufficient’ (Hunter, 2013:13). Seen in such a way, hate is possessed and then expressed by those who hold extreme views and whose actions are de-contextualised from both society and space. Another of the key challenges to the language of hate crime is that it can be seen as experienced in a generic sense, rather than differentiated across the experiences of different social groups (Sherry, 2010). Such a blanket term may also work to obscure the wide spectrum of vio- lence that might constitute hate crimes/incidents (Bufacchi, 2005); but also the contingent and dynamic sense of what counts as a hate crime over time and space (Perry, 2003). 2 The term ‘monitored strands’ is used to refer to those offences targeting specific groups, which under UK legislation are monitored by criminal justice agencies. These include offences targeting any racial group or ethnic background or national origin, any religious group, including those who have no faith, any person’s sexual orientation, any disability, including physical disability, learning disability and mental health and people who are transsexual, transgender, transvestite and those who hold a gender recognition certificate. Whilst appreciating these critiques, there have also been efforts to understand the utility of such a term. As Perry (2003: 8) has argued, it is ‘‘possible to construct a conceptual definition which allows us to account for the predominant concerns of historical and social context; relationships between actors; and relationships between communities”. This includes recognition of multiple forms of violence which are not necessarily limited to acts commit- ted by ‘extreme’ individuals or even to illegal acts. In this sense violence, through the lens of hate crime, can be viewed as both extreme and shocking but also everyday and pervasive (Iganski and Sweiry, 2016). Perry (2003) also contends that despite the complexities and contingencies of experiences found under the banner of hate crime, there is uniqueness to such incidents which sets them apart. She suggests that the social relations and ‘damage’ which constitute these experiences go well beyond the incident itself and beyond the individual victims and perpetrators involved. Perry thus conceptualises hate crimes as a social means of not just reflecting differences, but actively constructing difference through a range of affective registers. She therefore refers to hate crimes as ‘message crimes’: Its dynamics both constitute and are constitutive of actors beyond the immediate victims and offenders. It is implicated not merely in the relationship between the direct ‘‘participants,” but also in the relationship between the different communities to which they belong. The damage involved goes far beyond physical or financial damages. It reaches into the community to create fear, hostility and suspicion. [Perry, 2003, 9] Scholars have extended these arguments to consider how hate crimes/incidents, particularly in relation to ‘race’, may also have key spatial dimensions. In addition to work which emphasises diverse national legislative cultures (Garland and Chakraborti, 2012), the spatial unevenness of recorded incidents in relation to demographic and socio-economic dimensions (Iganski, 2008) and the situational contexts in which hate crimes/incidents emerge (Clarke, 1995), others have set out in more theoretical terms the socio-spatial dynamics of ‘hate’. Ahmed (2001), for example, high- lights how hate as an emotion does not reside within the minds or bodies of individual perpetrators, but rather is part of an unstable emotional economy. As such, hate circulates and gains currency in particular space-times through attachment to particular bodies. In a similar vein to the idea expressed by Hesse (1993) that ‘racism is spacism’, she suggests that through dominant discourses of nation- hood and belonging hate works to actively and affectively organise bodies in space. Figures of hate, such as the asylum seeker in Ahmed’s account, are constructed through the stories we are told (by politicians and the media for example) about me/you and against us/them. She argues that ‘‘words work to produce ripples that seal the fate of some others, by enclosing them into figures that we then recognise as the cause of this hate” (Ahmed, 2001: 364). While such distinctions are re-produced and may become most apparent through inter-personal and hostile everyday encounters, they are also given legitimacy temporally and spatially beyond such events – those events which may be recorded as hate crimes. 3. A critical approach to hate/crime incident recording The spatial, discursive and emotional dimensions outlined by Ahmed (2001) suggest a need to engage in theoretically informed qualitative approaches that focus on the re-production of stigmati- sation and marginalisation through discourse and embodied expe- rience. However, much of the research across the social sciences, as well as criminal justice and policy responses are based on what 66 J. Clayton et al. / Geoforum 75 (2016) 64–74 Bowling (1999) has referred to as an ‘events orientation’ – a con- ceptualisation of hate crimes as isolated incidents with little life outside the event itself. He suggests that such an approach ‘‘fails to capture the experience of repeated or systematic victimization; the continuity between violence, threat, and intimidation, or the complex relationships between all the social actors involved.” (Bowling, 1999, p. 18). Arguably, in turning to quantification we move further from the complexity of experiences and the signifi- cance of power relations that define such exclusionary practices. In addition it may also distract us from the manner in which experiences operate outside the scope of formal data collection practices and have implications that lay outside of the remit of the criminal justice system. Browne et al. (2011), for example, sug- gest that reporting and recording are blunt tools in combatting the normalised abuse experienced by LGBTQ communities in Brighton, England. They argue that the treatment their participants receive in their everyday lives is better combatted through a range of more informal techniques of avoidance, collective security and commu- nity safety. Given that we support an understanding of hate which empha- sises such socio-spatial dynamics, yet through this research were grappling with the potential of statistical data, we were presented with a methodological challenge, but one which allowed us to think through the extent to which the statistical, the experiential and the political are connected. Kwan and Schwanen (2009) set out some of the past and future intersections between quantitative approaches and those, typically more qualitative approaches, which adopt a critical stance towards politics, power and space. Whilst acknowledging the conservative, de-humanised, disembod- ied and universalising tendencies of the quantitative tradition in human geography, they argue that the conflicting binary between critical and quantitative geography has been falsely constructed. What is required, they suggest, is a re-consideration of the poten- tial for criticality and a progressive politics through the use of quantitative data and methods. From a contrasting feminist and post-structuralist perspective, Lawson (1995) re-considers the dominant qualitative/quantitative binary, whilst distancing herself from the masculinist and positivist tendencies that fail to appreci- ate the situated nature of knowledge. Lawson argues that while quantitative techniques inevitably ‘freeze’ (1995: 456) the identi- ties of research participants, for certain research questions the value of such approaches lies in revealing something about the pervasiveness of oppression, the construction of difference and the manner in which power relations are embedded within such processes. More recent debates under the banner of ‘critical data studies’ (Dalton and Thatcher, 2014), have focussed on the opportunities and dilemmas thrown up by the increasing proliferation of ‘Big Data’. However, as Dalton and Thatcher (2014) recognise, these concerns stretch beyond this narrow empirical focus. What is at stake is how we approach any kind of statistical data from a post-positivist vantage point. As Kitchen (2014a) outlines, there seems to be a renewed energy to: . . .fully appreciate and uncover the complex assemblages that produce, circulate, share/sell and utilise data in diverse ways and recognize the politics of data and the diverse work that they do in the world. The socio-spatial contexts of data construction, production and interpretation therefore remind us that ‘raw data is an oxymoron’ (Gitelman, 2013). In relation to the field of hate studies, Hall’s (2013) discussion of differences in reporting patterns between London and New York is illustrative of this. Despite similarities across a wide range of demographic measures, the numbers of recorded hate crimes in New York are significantly lower than in London. He suggests that this can in part be accounted for by the varying definitions employed in these different national and urban contexts, as well as the divergent reporting and recording practices that piece together such statistical profiles. Recorded figures are not an unproblematic and ‘accurate’ reflection of the ‘reality’ of hate crime/incidents, but more a reflection of contexts of reporting, the way in which the boundaries of data collection are established, the manner in which data is mobilised and the processes of trans- formation that such data goes through before it is ‘put to use’. Our approach to the study of third party hate crime/incident reporting is that we view the data produced through such practices as constructed, fallible and a broad brush portrait of the experience of these incidents. However, as emphasised above, this does not mean that we in any way dispute the existence and seriousness of hate incidents/crimes or the fact that under particular circum- stances the likelihood of becoming victimised increases. For exam- ple, we do not subscribe to the view of Jacobs and Potter (2000) who dismiss the significance of increasing levels of hate crime in the US because those statistics have partly been generated through pressure applied by various ‘interest groups’. Recognising both how data comes to be and the work to which it can be put is part of addressing the damage inflicted by hate crimes/incidents. 4. Third party reporting/recording Despite some of the contributions mentioned above, a key con- cern of hate studies continues to be a desire to generate more accu- rate understanding of the extent and patterning of hate crimes. This is primarily driven by requirements to illustrate the gravity of the problem and to allow for explanation and therefore possible solutions (Green et al., 2001; McDevitt et al., 2002). The recording of hate crime/incidents is not then de-humanised or apolitical, but rather part of broader historical struggle for recognition and prob- lematisation of forms of inequality and oppression (McLaughlin, 2002). As such there are multiple emotional and political invest- ments in this endeavour. While such acts of recording, which always involve forms of simplification, may not straightforwardly represent the lived realities and nuances of what it means to be victimised on the basis of an ascribed social identity, establishing the existence of the problem appears to be an important starting point (Lawson, 1995). In the UK context researchers have sought to examine data relating to all monitored strands from three main sources: those reported to and recorded by the police, those logged by the Crown Prosecution Service and data collected through victim surveys (Bri- tish Crime Survey (BCS)/Crime Survey of England and Wales (CSEW)). While the latter source is particularly revealing in high- lighting the underestimations of prevalence found through other sources, across the board there are low rates of reporting. Accord- ing to the BCS approximately half of incidents go unreported (Copsey et al., 2013). This raises the question of the accuracy of this data, but perhaps as important, the basis upon which people are unwilling or unable to come forward concerning such experiences. The literature suggests there are a number of reasons as to why this may be the case. These include: perceptions of seriousness by those constantly targeted on the basis of their presumed/ ascribed identities (James, 2014); not naming such violence as a means of coping with normalised abuse (Browne et al., 2011); issues of (mis)trust especially with the police (Hall, 2013); fear of reprisal and making oneself visible (Perry, 2003); credibility of claims doubted (Sin et al., 2009; Your Homes Newcastle, 2010) and reasonable expectations of limited outcomes for victims (Wong and Christmann, 2008). As Iganski and Sweiry (2016) also recognise, hate incidents are not just matters for the criminal jus- tice system, which often lacks the expertise and/or resources to J. Clayton et al. / Geoforum 75 (2016) 64–74 67 support victims emotionally and legally. In addition ‘everyday vio- lence’ may not be reported as criminal offences or classified as such by the state. This is where the value of third party reporting schemes involv- ing trusted and embedded community based agencies is seen to lay (Chakraborti, 2010); a legacy of MacPherson Report (1999) recom- mendations, that: ‘‘all possible steps should be taken by police ser- vices at local level in consultation with local government and other agencies and local communities to encourage the reporting of racist incidents and crimes”. Whilst the effectiveness of this form of reporting has been questioned, largely on the basis of lack of public awareness (Chakraborti and Garland, 2015: 119), third party reporting allows individuals to report incidents to known organisa- tions with a degree of agency over whether they wish that incident to be passed onto the police. It also allows those individuals to access more specialised forms of support outside of and prior to criminal justice processes. In the UK these have taken various forms, from national schemes that are more directly linked to the work of the police (True Vision), to national independent cam- paigning organisations (Stop Hate UK) under which operate more devolved contacts in some parts of the UK, through to more loca- lised networks of reporting centres across the public and third sec- tors (such as Arch). 5. Arch, data production and data analysis We draw here upon an analysis of hate crime/incidents as recorded by Arch – a third party hate crime/incident reporting agency based in the North East of England. The Arch project is funded by four of the local authorities3 in the Tyne and Wear area of the region (see Map 1). In 2002 the project began as a 24-hour racist incident reporting phone line, but in 2004 partnerships were developed with Northumbria Police, Victim Support and locally based charities to increase the reporting scope. In 2005 ARCH (Agen- cies against Racist Crime and Harassment) came into being and developed into a community engagement and community intelli- gence agency with an underlying ethos of identifying areas where incidents were concentrated and developing training around conflict management to deal with this. By 2006 there were 93 reporting cen- tres established regionally. This figure grew from this point to a peak of 140 organisations resulting in a multi-agency team working in partnership with organisations including the police, employment agencies, local councils, schools/colleges/universities, Victim Sup- port, housing associations and locally based third sector organisa- tions. Up until this point the focus for Arch remained racism, but in 2008 the project started to collect information on incidents direc- ted towards those from lesbian, gay bisexual, trans gender and queer (LGBTQ) and disabled communities. Further changes meant that by 2009 ‘Religion’ was also considered as a separate monitored strand recorded by the project. As part of an ‘‘action-orientated” piece of research (Pain, 2003), in partnership with Arch, our study sought to inform the manner in which future data collection could be directed. We were given access to the ‘raw’ data collected by Arch across two of the cities in the region – Sunderland and Newcastle – for all monitored strands over the period 2005–2015. While theoretically there were other local authorities involved with Arch, these two city councils were the only authorities to pro-actively capture and collate this data. Despite this partial and spatially uneven engagement, what emerged was one of the largest data sets of its kind in the UK, comprising 3908 incidents in total. In addition, 22% of reported 3 Gateshead, City of Newcastle upon Tyne, North Tyneside, South Tyneside, City o Sunderland. f incidents were repeat incidents – giving us some sense of the scale of the problem in these two cities. In transforming this data to allow for statistical analysis, there were a number of challenges. One such challenge is illustrated through the decision to re-categorise ‘race’ based and religious based incidents together as one category. This was made for con- ceptual, processual and practical reasons and reveals the role that the research team played in re-working the data. Conceptually, Chakraborti and Garland (2015) contend that one of the key limi- tations of available data is that it does not distinguish in detail the identities of victims and portrays them as a homogenous group. There is certainly a danger here in terms of the invisibility of those subjected to religious based incidents, and more generally this was a limitation of the data set due to a lack of data regarding victim identity. However, it is also increasingly recognised that Islamophobia and other forms of religious based discrimination constitute a form of racism (Meer and Modood, 2012), whereby the distinction between ‘race’ based and religious based violence has become considerably blurred (Copsey et al., 2013). Indeed, there is no way of telling from our data whether those incidents interpreted and recorded as ‘race’ based had any element of reli- gious motivation involved. On a processual level, due to the nature of the reporting system, all religious incidents were also classified as ‘race’ based – indicating this intersection and making it difficult to separate out these two categories. Lastly on more practical terms, religious incidents were only collected from 2009 onwards and formed only 4% of all data. As we were interested in examining data found to be statistically significant, combining these cate- gories allowed for such an analysis to take place. Those overseeing the data collection process in these two cities recognised that they were not specialists in dealing with statistical data, nor were they particularly focussed on that aspect of their work. Although these perceptions did begin to shift over the course of the research, there was an admission, as one member of the Arch team stated that they didn’t ‘‘do counting”. While this commitment to systematic data collection did vary between Sunderland and Newcastle, it also reveals the underlying principles of the work that Arch were engaged in from 2005 onwards. The data was in a sense an important bi-product of other processes, concerns and agendas. The primary focus for those still working as part of Arch in 2015 was that of building relationships with communities and enabling the buy in of those communities into the Arch process. On the one hand this mean that Arch were responding to incidents by ensuring that appropriate support and conflict resolution mea- sures were put in place. On the other it meant that the data we worked with suffered from inconsistencies, a lack of standardisa- tion and also a lack of detail. For Sunderland our data was restricted to 3 years (2009–2012), while for Newcastle there was data for all 10 years (2005–2015). While Sunderland’s team col- lected much more detail on the identity of the victimised person, Newcastle was more concerned with information about the inci- dent itself. This also meant that for Newcastle there were crucial variables, including gender, which were absent as well as other variables such as sexuality and faith that were absent across the whole data set. This made ‘cleaning’ the data more challenging and also limited some of the conclusions we could draw. However, as we will return to later, this context did not just allow us to think through the value of the data itself, but also what we might learn about the contexts through which this data (and our analysis) was being produced. After ‘cleaning’ the data into a legible form, we used SPSS and employed a range of descriptive statistics to try and assess similar- ities and differences for reporting between monitored strands across all available variables. In particular, there was a focus on victims, incident types, the space-times of recorded incidents and reporting agencies. Statistical techniques employed included 68 J. Clayton et al. / Geoforum 75 (2016) 64–74 cross-tabulation tests to examine the frequency distribution of cases when examining the correlation between two or more vari- ables. Two or more variable frequency distributions were analysed using a chi-square statistic (X2) to discover whether variables were statistically independent or whether they are associated (P 6 0.05). In those cases where two or more frequency distributions were examined, only statistically significant data was used. Whilst these techniques were adopted, we were very aware of the dangers of inferring particular sets of generalizable social relations from the outcome of such calculations. As Lawson (1995, p. 454) suggests ‘‘for researchers employing a relational ontology and focussing on questions of process, counting can only be descriptive of care- fully contextualised relations”. In this vein, the conclusions drawn from the analysis were guarded, partial and interpreted in the light of other existing research, as well as in direct consultation with the remaining members of the Arch team. Having their perspective to help make sense of what the data analysis presented, was not seen as an added bonus – but as a crucial aspect of appreciating the data collection process. 6. Some findings and reflections on the utility of the data In what follows we outline some key findings to emerge from analysis of the data, but also point towards what the data may tell us in terms of the context of data collection. While all monitored strands are considered, due to restrictions on space, the main focus will be around those incidents reported on the basis of the ‘race’ and religion of the victimised person. As with the UK Police hate crime figures (Home Office, 2013), the vast majority of incidents reported across the period were ‘race’ based (82%). 6.1. Police involvement One of the primary findings that came through our analysis was related to the level of police involvement in reported incidents for all strands. When reporting through Arch, victimised persons have the choice of whether they want the police to be informed - to fol- low up and investigate the incident – or not. As stated above, this non-criminal justice system approach is seen as one of the defining principles of this form of reporting. This appears to be important for those reporting through organisations connected through Arch. As is shown in Graph 1, while many incidents were reported to the police (‘Record/information’ category) and a much smaller number Graph 1. Forms of police involvement in reported i were either investigated (‘Investigation’ category) or formed the basis for intelligence gathering (‘Intelligence’ category), for all three strands, a considerable proportion were neither reported to or followed up by the police (‘No’ category). This is particularly the case for homophobic/transphobic (36.5%) and racist incidents (36.3%) and slightly less so for disablist incidents (29.5%). Specifi- cally in relation to ‘race’ and religion based incidents, under- reporting to the police continues despite the fact that such incidents are more likely to be followed up with an investigation when compared to incidents for the other strands. Nationally, we know that a considerable proportion of incidents are not picked up by official statistics due under-reporting (Copsey et al., 2013), but we can see here that some of these incidents are deemed to be serious enough to report to other locally based organisations. We were interested to find out what kinds of abuse, threat or violence were involved in those incidents that were either not ini- tially entered into the system by the police or not passed onto the police from Arch due to the wishes of the victimised person. Over- all, a considerable proportion of these ‘not reported to the police’ incidents (43.7%) involved offensive and abusive language, while 18.1% involved coercive and threatening behaviour – together con- stituting 61.8% of these incidents. These were then mostly (although certainly not all) non-physical or non-material forms of violence that had by-passed the criminal justice system. While cautious not to go beyond our data without sufficient supporting evidence, it seems that these are the kinds of incidents which, without such reporting systems in place, would perhaps not come to light. Contributing to the established literature on less overt forms of discrimination such as the significance of persistent ‘micro-aggressions’ outlined by Sue et al. (2007) and re-considerations of established hierarchies of the ‘seriousness’ of different forms of violence (Morgan and Björkert, 2006), this data seems to highlight the importance of what Iganski (2008) refers to as the ‘everyday’ non-criminalised nature of incidents. 6.2. Types of incident Across the data, reported incidents were evident in a variety of forms. In ‘cleaning up’ we adopted a system of categorisation dis- tinguishing between offensive and abusive language, coercive and threatening behaviour, mediated threats, physical attacks, criminal damage and incitement. The results of this and cross- tabulation with the three strands can be seen in Graph 2, which outlines the proportion of incident type for each of these. ncidents across monitored strands 2005–2015. Graph 2. Incident types across monitored strands 2005–2015. J. Clayton et al. / Geoforum 75 (2016) 64–74 69 Across the strands, the majority of incidents (54%) fall under either ‘offensive/abusive language’ (29.9%) and ‘coercive/threaten- ing behaviour’ (24.1%), to some extent matching the large propor- tion of non-police reported incidents falling under these incident types (Graph 1). Again, those acts which may not be criminal, may not be perceived as ‘violent’ or perhaps assumed not to be crim- inal are those that are most often reported.4 However, at the same time it is clear that in relation to ‘race’ and religion, it is more likely for incidents to fall under more overtly violent and criminal offences such as ‘material damage’ (18% of incidents for this strand). There are then commonalities across strands, but also some important distinctions. A few further observations should be made in relation to Graph 2. Firstly the significance of the ‘other’ category should not be dis- missed. While only constituting 5% of overall incidents, the fact that some incidents did not fit strict categorisation, shows both the limits of quantification of experience, but also that the Arch system was an evolving and live tool for monitoring the incidents reported, rather than a static snapshot. For example, where details were recorded such incidents included bullying, being turned away from clubs and services, objects being thrown and offensive ges- tures. Secondly, while the levels of ‘mediated incidents’ appears relatively low, it is worth emphasising that for the ‘race’ and reli- gion strand, this incident type has seen a dramatic rise in reporting between 2012 and 2015 from 5.7% to 18.2%. This relates to posters, leaflets and graffiti, but also online activity and seems to connect to other trends for the increasing tendency at the national (Copsey, 2003) and global scale (Perry and Olsson, 2009) for online expres- sions of racism in more and less organised forms. The importance of mediated threats is particularly noticeable when the relatively 4 Under the Public Order Act (1986) and latterly the Criminal Justice and Police Order Act (1994) and Racial and Religious Hatred Act (2006), a criminal offence is committed if the perpetrator stirs up racial (or religious) hatred or the victim is subject to harassment, alarm or distress. small number of religion based (also classified as ‘race’ based) inci- dents are separated out – representing 38% of these incidents. However, the extent to which this is related to societal shifts or the fact that such incidents have only been recorded in more recent years (in line with increased use of the internet), is disputable. Thirdly, the greater predominance of ‘material and criminal dam- age’ for the ‘race’ and religion strand helps us to think through the geography of different incidents for different groups of victims. Such incidents seem to be more often property based and therefore more likely to also be residence based (Iganski, 2008). Other recent research with newly arrived refugees conducted by a housing asso- ciation in Newcastle also highlights the close to home nature of many experiences of racism, including many experiences of attacks while the victimised person was at home (Your Homes Newcastle, 2010). As Pain (2000) suggests in relation to gendered violence, and Valentine et al. (2003) in relation to family violence towards LBGT people, the home and the neighbourhood, can be far from the safe spaces they are often presented as. 6.3. Geography of incidents The geographical resolution of the available data from Arch for the ‘race’ and religion strand was not as detailed as data from pub- lished police statistics, where more specific location incidents and space typologies can be more clearly discerned (see Craig et al., 2012 for this more fine grained spatial analysis of racist incidents in the North East). In our study, data was made available at ward level across the two cities, and in line with other studies looking at variations within specific cities (see Iganski, 2008 for a study of London boroughs), concentrations of reported incidents were spatially uneven. However, it is also important to note that these incidents were also geographically pervasive – recorded in all wards across the time frame in both cities. To take account of the differences in data collection periods between Newcastle and Sun- derland, we calculated proportions of these incidents within rather Map 1. 5 The EDL (English Defence League), formed in 2009, are a far-right overtly anti- Muslim street protest organisation. It has held a number of ‘demonstrations’ in Newcastle in 2010, 2012 and 2103. They have also held one demonstration in Sunderland in 2012. 70 J. Clayton et al. / Geoforum 75 (2016) 64–74 than across the cities. The results are illustrated in Map 1. Within Newcastle higher concentrations of reported incidents were iden- tified in Byker (14%), Walker (13%), Elswick (12.3%) and Benwell & Scotswood (12.8%). For Sunderland the primary concentrations were in Millfield (city centre) (16%) and Hendon (14.6%). This pat- terning allowed us to think about the relationship of these trends with other socio-economic indicators, and in conversation with Arch to reflect upon the data in relation to the profiles and histories of these areas. What these areas primarily share is a history of economic decline and subsequently higher than average levels of depriva- tion. In Newcastle to the east and west of the city centre along the north bank of the River Tyne, these are areas of former indus- trial activity and home to working class communities that suffered disproportionality from the traumatic transition to a post- industrial economy. The same is true of Hendon in Sunderland which was once the epicentre of thriving port and shipbuilding industries until the 1980s (Ville, 1990), but now suffers dispropor- tionately from a range of socio-economic pressures. Ethnic minority populations are disproportionately exposed to hate crime/incidents in these areas of higher deprivation. However, it is also the case that there is not a perfect correlation with depri- vation. For example, while Walker has an average Indices of Multi- ple Deprivation (IMD) score of 62.2 and Byker 55.8 (2010, IMD) it has a slightly lower recorded level of incidents (see above). We are wary of equating poverty with hate incidents in a mechanistic and sweeping causal relationship that lazily characterises those living in such areas as directly and solely responsible for the pat- terns outlined, as well as appreciating that data may ‘actually pro- duce spaces, places and landscapes’ (Kitchen and Dodge, 2011). As Poirier (2010) argues, the patterning of such incidents can only be explained through a multi scalar and relational approach. While levels of deprivation and the pressures that come with that are clearly a factor in exacerbating hostility, there also needs to be recognition that these are tensions thrown up when demographic changes occur alongside the ongoing social, economic and cultural marginalisation of these neighbourhoods. In some cases cheaper private sector housing and forced movement into specific housing provision, for example through the dispersal system for those seek- ing asylum (Bloch and Schuster, 2005), means that newer arrivals in the region have moved into poorly resourced and historically damaged neighbourhoods. The role of external influences includ- ing media portrayals of ‘race’ and migration (van Dijk, 1991), the approaches adopted towards these issues by mainstream politi- cians (Ahmed, 2001), as well as the role and spatially uneven pen- etration of far-right organisations such as the EDL5 all contribute to the normalisation of a multitude of racisms in a variety of forms (Frost, 2008). There are also many differences between and within these areas that need to be highlighted. For example, the central wards of Westgate (11.2%) in Newcastle and Millfield in Sunderland, contain both more deprived residential areas and parts of the commercial city centres. These are levels of complexity not captured here. In addition some wards are far more ethnically and religiously diverse than others. For example, some wards such as Elswick have populations classified as 46.9% ‘non-white’, while others such as Walker have a far less diverse population (7.3% ‘non-white’) result- ing in very different dynamics and community relations. In addi- tion, it is worth noting that when compared against the spatial analysis for other strands, there is far less correlation with depriva- tion (particularly for homophobic and transphobic incidents), suggesting different processes and experiences at work. J. Clayton et al. / Geoforum 75 (2016) 64–74 71 Additionally it should be recognised that these are the more vis- ible and overt expressions of violence. In contrast to more institu- tionalised forms (Bowling, 1999) or those more carefully hidden from view through ‘respectable’ racist narratives (Millington, 2010), these are the incidents that are more often counted. There is a danger therefore of assuming that racism has a set of easily identifiable co-ordinates. While this data does tell us something interesting about where the pressure points may be and therefore form a basis for local intervention and community engagement work, it would be grossly misleading to say that these are the only forms of hate being expressed. 6.4. Reporting agencies Looking at the agencies to which individuals have reported allows us to assess the role of trust but also knowledge as a defining feature of third party reporting. Graph 3 indicates how for different strands, different types of organisations were important. For those incidents reported on the basis of ‘race’ and religion, local council services are considerably more significant that other agency types (37.1%). Unsurprisingly perhaps, given that Arch was originally set up through local authorities as a racist incident recording system, there has, over time, been an increasing engagement by those experiencing racist incidents in this way. Further explanation may be connected to the visibility of local council services – ser- vices which are widely drawn upon by those in marginal social groups, such as those from ethnic minority groups (Runnymede, 2015). In the categorisation of reporting agencies we were also able to make observations about where particular agencies fit. For example, although Arch itself may be presumed by many to be a third sector organisation, it is, in fact directly funded by local authorities and therefore is recorded here as a local council service. 14.3% of ‘race’ and religious based incidents were reported directly to Arch. Considering that third party reporting presents alternative non-criminal justice based opportunities for reporting, the level of Graph 3. Type of reporting agencies to Arch police involvement still remains important (16.3%); a higher pro- portion than for those reporting homophobic and transphobic inci- dents. Again this may be connected to the visibility of the police, or the relationship of trust with the Police, but given some of the find- ings outlined above, may also relate to the presumed seriousness of the incidents being reported. What became apparent was a reliance on a group of agencies based around key public services such as the local council, police, education and housing (particularly social housing and those agen- cies supporting the needs of asylum seekers and refugees). Despite the focus and efforts of Arch, the role of third sector agencies was limited, especially for incidents reported on the basis of ‘race’ and religion and disability. This can be seen as one area which needs to be developed if there is to be enhanced buy-in and the develop- ment of trust amongst communities to come forward. In addition, it is also clear that Victim Support (VS) – an inde- pendent national charity providing advice and support - has played a key role in recording incidents across the strands (18.5% of all incidents), particularly for those reporting homophobic and trans- phobic incidents (24.2%). Despite this indication of ‘success’, we became aware during the latter stages of the study that VS were increasingly exposed to some of the changes brought about by political changes, in particular the introduction of Police Crime Commissioners (PCCs) in England from 2013. Under devolved powers, decisions over the commissioning of such services were transferred to Commissioners. Controversially, the PCC for the Northumbria Police area chose to commission her own charity ‘Victim’s First’ instead of continuing to fund the work of VS. Not only have questions been raised locally regarding the ethics and credibility of this approach (The Chronicle, 2015a), but also con- cerning the lack of independence from the PCC and police and the loss of staff, knowledge and experience that this move has entailed (The Chronicle, 2015b). The future existence of some agencies, but also participation in Arch was also increasingly affected by ongoing conditions of austerity in the region. across monitored strands 2005–2015. 72 J. Clayton et al. / Geoforum 75 (2016) 64–74 An ‘age of austerity’ commenced with the arrival of the global economic crisis in the UK in 2008 and policy responses focused around the narrative of an unbearable deficit caused by excessive government spending. In the UK this encompasses unprecedented cuts to state welfare services and funding for local authorities and the voluntary and community sector, alongside periods of increased un(der)employment and reductions in public and private sector pay, pensions, benefits and conditions. From previous research in the region examining the impact of austerity on the public and third sectors (Clayton et al., 2016) and in our work with Arch, it was clear that the ability of organisations (including local authorities) to play an active role was being considerably compro- mised. We started to then think about how this reporting system was not only a reflection of cultures of reporting and harmful expe- riences, but also illustrative of the changing landscape of service provision and evolving political agendas. 7. The politics of reporting When analysing changes in incidence counts over time a dis- cernible pattern in the rise and fall of reporting became apparent. While numbers are very different, for all strands the variation in levels of reporting follows a broadly similar trend as shown in Graph 4. By 2012 the number of incidents being reported through Arch had risen to 816 per year from a figure of 133 a year in 2005. From 2012, the number of incidents reported declined rapidly to 64 a year in 2015. By adopting a multi-scalar approach, we can begin to account for some of these trends. For example, changing legislation and policy discourse around hate crime is not static. In response to some of the changes mentioned at the outset of the paper, Arch only began to count homophobic, transphobic and disablist hate crimes/incidents from 2008 onwards and religious based incidents from 2009. Graph 4 is then partially a reflection of such recording practices as well as indicating the manner in which individuals became increasingly aware that they could report under these cat- egories of hate crime/incident. Cultures of reporting also clearly respond to contexts of increased victimisation, as well as climates that may well discourage individuals from coming forward. These may be localised, but can also be broader in scale and more high profile. For example, the brutal murder of Drummer Lee Rigby in Woolwich in 2013 is a case in point, following which the national anti-Muslim hate crime reporting service Tell MAMA witnessed a 373% increase in one week (Feldman and Littler, 2014). However, more detailed analysis of the data presented in Graph 4 indicates Graph 4. Hate incidents as a count fo that such a spike is not so clearly observable. Where spikes were observed, for example on 21/10/14 when 12 ‘race’ and religion based incidents were recorded, there are plausible links which could be made to the release of ISIS videos at that time (The Chronicle, 2014). However, attributing such short term trends to particular events is not straightforward and assumes that all inci- dents can be viewed as rapid reactions to a particular set of exter- nal influences. While these elements are important in framing an interpreta- tion of this data, in conversation with Arch the impact of other fac- tors influencing the level of recording, as opposed to levels of incidence, become significant. These factors in particular, began to help us account for the rapid decline in reporting to Arch since 2012. The local impact of funding changes brought about by the austerity politics of the UK Coalition Government since 2010 seem to offer a more satisfactory account for what is seen here. From this perspective there are two key issues at play. Firstly, in terms of community engagement - without the buy in from external agen- cies there is no third party reporting system. Although precise fig- ures are not available we know that from a peak of 140 organisations involved in the network that this declined rapidly in the post-2010 era. We also know that the impacts of reduced funding (in the form of local authority funding, but also grants available to the third sector) have had huge implications for service provision. Not only have organisations and individuals disappeared from the service provision landscape, but their capacity to engage in partnership working of all kinds has also been seriously compro- mised (Clayton et al., 2016). The other key element is the changing nature of both Arch teams based within Newcastle and Sunderland City Councils, as well as the manner in which Arch is being used in the face of bud- get constraints at local authority level. At its height in 2011 Arch in Newcastle was comprised of three members of staff, one of whom was solely dedicated to community engagement, to maintain rela- tionships with communities and those agencies involved in report- ing and to support them through the conflict management work. In 2011, due to budgetary changes this outreach element was ended with the loss of this member of staff. For similar reasons in 2013 the Sunderland branch of Arch ceased with the loss of the sole member of staff involved in recording incidents there. The overall team across the two cities therefore contracted by 50% in 2 years, radically influencing the capacity of the team as well the model of practice they had honed since 2005. Furthermore, in 2015, the prior expertise, knowledge and emotional investments of the established team have been disposed of completely and replaced to a limited extent with staff from within Newcastle local r monitored strands 2005–2015. J. Clayton et al. / Geoforum 75 (2016) 64–74 73 authority. These staff already have other existing and often unre- lated roles and are therefore unable to continue delivering the sys- tem in its established form. Arch will now become only a monitoring tool and a database. Similar models, whereby commu- nity engagement is removed from the ethos of the work, and data collection becomes central, have already been put in place in other local authorities in the region and the partial evidence thus far sug- gests that recording rates are extremely low. What this seems to suggest is the distinction between statistical data collection and deep seated affective commitment to these activities is not as clear cut as a simplistic dichotomy between quantitative and qualitative research methodologies would imply. The experience of researching alongside a group of passionate individuals going through the last throes of their occupation has enabled us not only to see the value in the process of data collec- tion which goes well beyond the bars on the graphs presented above, but also the emotional investments put into this work over the last 10 years. The expressions of sadness and frustration which has come through in these engagements and the sense of loss has been tangible. Although not the primary focus of this discussion – the emotional politics involved here (Clayton et al., 2015) – cannot be ignored. The fact that this data can no longer be collected and used in the same way again caused a level of concern, alarm and upset that revealed a great deal about the damage done by tight- ened budgets and narrowing priorities. 8. Conclusion The use of quantitative approaches in understanding experi- ences of violence that are categorised as hate crimes/incidents is problematic in that through categorisation we achieve simplifica- tion. Crucially, our discussion above was far from just a statistical exercise. We made sense of the data in relation to both our wider reading and understanding of the topic, but most significantly in relation to the experiences of those working within Arch and the changing funding landscape. It was this dialogue between the sta- tistical, the experiential and the political which we wish to stress here. While there certainly are limitations to such data and its interpretation, from a critical and post-positivist perspective, the value of both this form of data collection and the analysis we helped to conduct lies in a number of areas. Firstly, our analysis has helped to assess the reporting land- scape in these places by identifying some of the broader patterns of cultures of reporting. This has included an appreciation of sim- ilarities and differences between the experiences of different vic- timised communities, but also who is reporting to whom on the basis of what kind of incident. There are clearly implications here in relation to specialist services and resistance to more generic forms of third party reporting, such as that recently suggested by the previous London Mayor.6 Secondly, this analysis as a piece of ‘action orientated research’ has been of direct use to Arch and allowed them to think about how they could more effectively under- stand these incidents through improved recording practices. This includes the now standardised collection of identity based variables such as sexuality and faith that were absent from the original data- base. Thirdly, this analysis has illustrated the value of this model of response to hate crimes/incidents. While it is acknowledged that there are areas which could be further developed, such as the greater involvement of third sector organisations, it is clear that Arch have helped to support individuals and communities, including (but not limited to) those who do not want to report incidents to the police. Fourthly, value is seen, not just in the data itself, but how the data 6 See http://www.theguardian.com/society/2015/aug/01/jewish-muslim-lgbt- communities-hate-crime-hotline-boris-johnson-london. has been used by those involved in its collection. That is, as a stan- dalone exercise the recording of this statistical data may become not only meaningless, but also ineffective. Without the outreach and engagement work which has mirrored the collection of the data, the problematisation of various forms of violence targeting stigma- tised and marginalised communities may risk disappearing off the local radar. What this discussion has therefore allowed us to see is a relationship and co-dependence between the need for recording and more pro-active, engaged and sustainable responses to hate crimes/incidents. This has led us onto a discussion of the politics of data collection – and the clear threat that declining resource and political change is posing. The role of the PCC in dictating the terms of support put in place for victims and the decisions by previ- ously pro-active local authorities in re-directing resources away from these activities will have an impact on the profile of this agenda and on the kinds of work that can be done to tackle violence and sup- port victims. Statistics, can be designed, collected, analysed and used for all sorts of purposes – they are never politically neutral (Kitchen, 2014b). Increasingly comprehensive commercial and governmen- tal data collection for purposes of control can be overbearing, step on the toes of various freedoms and be employed as surveillance rather than forming the basis for progressive change. However, at the same time in the UK there are worrying moves to alter the data collection landscape around issues of inequality and social justice. In particular, a problematic move away from data collection as a tool to appreciate to the scale and extent of specific social prob- lems has been highlighted (Radical Statistics Reduced Statistics Working Group, 2012). Recent controversies over the future of the census (Dorling, 2013), possible scenarios for the indices of multiple deprivation as well as changing thresholds for the mea- surement of poverty are all cases in point. 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http://refhub.elsevier.com/S0016-7185(16)30015-X/h0280 http://refhub.elsevier.com/S0016-7185(16)30015-X/h0280 http://refhub.elsevier.com/S0016-7185(16)30015-X/h0280 http://refhub.elsevier.com/S0016-7185(16)30015-X/h9015 http://refhub.elsevier.com/S0016-7185(16)30015-X/h0285 http://refhub.elsevier.com/S0016-7185(16)30015-X/h0285 http://refhub.elsevier.com/S0016-7185(16)30015-X/h0290 http://refhub.elsevier.com/S0016-7185(16)30015-X/h0290 http://refhub.elsevier.com/S0016-7185(16)30015-X/h0295 A critical portrait of hate crime/incident reporting in North East England:�The value of statistical data and the politics of recording in an age of�austerity 1 Introduction 2 Approaching hate socially and spatially 3 A critical approach to hate/crime incident recording 4 Third party reporting/recording 5 Arch, data production and data analysis 6 Some findings and reflections on the utility of the data 6.1 Police involvement 6.2 Types of incident 6.3 Geography of incidents 6.4 Reporting agencies 7 The politics of reporting 8 Conclusion References 
work_6ir2yhkhqrgbxphm2dzjo6fb5a	----	Criminal Justice Studies, Vol. 17, No. 1, March 2004, pp. 91–105 ISSN 1478–601X (print)/ISSN 1478–6028 (online) © 2004 Taylor & Francis Ltd DOI: 10.1080/08884310420001679361 Learning to See Hate Crimes: A Framework for Understanding and Clarifying Ambiguities in Bias Crime Classification James J. Nolan III, Jack McDevitt, Shea Cronin & Amy Farrell ; Taylor and Francis LtdGJUP041007.sgm10.1080/08884310410001679361Criminal Justice Studies1478-601X (print)/1478-6028 (online)Original Article2004Taylor & Francis Ltd1710000002004JamesNolanDept. of Sociology and Anthropology, School of Applied Social SciencesWest Virginia University316 Knapp HallMorgantownWest Virginia 26506USA(304)293—5801 ext. 3210jim.nolan@mail.wvu.edu. Recent empirical research has identified ambiguity in bias crime reporting as a source of confusion and frustration in law enforcement agencies and as a source of error in the national hate crime statistics. The authors develop a framework for understanding and clarifying these ambiguities based on John Dewey’s conception of intension and extension and their own application of mathematical set theory to the issue. The authors discuss the implications of their model for helping law enforcement officials see bias crimes for varied purposes, including prevention, statistical reporting, and criminal prosecution. Keywords: Hate crime; bias crime; hate crime statistics; bias crime reporting Introduction A bias crime1 is defined by the FBI as a ‘… criminal offense committed against a person or property which is motivated, in whole or in part, by the offender’s bias against race, religion, disability, ethic/national origin group, or sexual orientation group’ (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1997, p. 4). What seems at first to be a clear and well-articulated definition becomes much more complicated when applied to real-life events. James J. Nolan III is an Assistant Professor in the Division of Sociology and Anthropology at West Virginia Univer- sity. Jack McDevitt is an associate Dean of Research and Graduate studies at the College of Criminal Justice, Northeastern University. Shea Cronin is a Senior Research Associate at the Center for Criminal Justice Policy Research, Northeastern University. Amy Farrell is a principal research scientist and Associate Director of the Insti- tute on Race and Justice at Northeastern University. Correspondence to: James Nolan, Division of Sociology and Anthropology, School of Applied Social Sciences, West Virginia University, 316 Knapp Hall, Morgantown, West Virginia 26506, USA. Tel: (304)293-5801 ext. 3210; Email: jim.nolan@mail.wvu.edu. 92 J. J. Nolan III et al. Consider, for example, the case of J. R. Warren a 26-year-old gay black man from rural Grant Town, West Virginia. On July 3, 2000, Warren met with three white teens at a vacant house in this predominately white rural town. The teens had been painting the house that day and, prior to their meeting with Warren, had also been ‘drinking beer, huffing gasoline, and snorting tranquilizers’ according to official sources (Smith, 2001). Shortly after he arrived at the house, Warren became engaged in an altercation with the group. The three teens took $20.00 from Warren then beat him until he was unconscious – and believed dead. Two of the youths put Warren’s body into the trunk of a Camaro and drove to a remote area to dump it. While en route to the dump site, the teens discovered that Warren was still alive. Surprised, they stopped the car in a secluded spot alongside a remote rural road, dragged Warren’s body out of the trunk, and while he was still conscious, the teens repeatedly drove their vehicle over his slen- der body crushing him to death. The murder of J. R. Warren brought national attention to the small community of Grant Town. The case was popularly considered a hate crime in the minority commu- nity and by the local media because it had all the right elements: the victim was black, slightly built, and openly gay while the offenders were young white males from a rural southern town. Immediately following the crime the community held peace vigils, while advocacy groups like the Marion County NAACP and the West Virginia Lesbian and Gay coalition called on the police to investigate the incident as a hate crime (Fischer, 2000; Smith, 2000). The police refused to recognize the incident as a hate crime because they had uncovered an alternative explanation for the crime. The police explained the crime as the result of a ‘drug- and alcohol-fueled rage,’ that was brought on by the belief on the part of one of the defendants that Warren had told others of a ‘long-standing sexual relationship that the two had shared’ (Smith, November 25, 2002). It appears that ambiguous situations like the Warren case may be more the rule than the exception when it comes to identifying bias crimes. The Center for Criminal Justice Policy Research at Northeastern University recently completed a study of bias crime reporting practices in a sample of law enforcement agencies from across the United States. The findings revealed that there are many crimes, like the Warren case, that first appeared to be bias motivated, but under closer scrutiny revealed alternative explanations (McDevitt, Cronin, Balboni, Farrell, Nolan, & Weiss, 2003). For example consider the following two accounts from the Northeastern University study: While driving on a state highway, a white male cut in front of a car driven by a Hispanic male. In response the Hispanic male pursued the car driven by the white male and followed it to a local fast food restaurant. The Hispanic male exited his car and approached the white male driver and his female passenger while yelling ‘You shouldn’t mess with Mexicans.’ He then proceeded to assault the white male. While playing in a local neighborhood, a young white child accidentally knocked over the soda can of an African American child spilling its contents. The mother of the white child approached the mother of the African American child to explain the incident and apologize for the mishap. The African American woman yelled at the white woman ‘Get your white ass out’ and ‘I will kick your white ass.’ The white women said she Criminal Justice Studies 93 did not want any trouble and would not fight back. The African American women then proceeded to assault the white woman. The investigating officers reported that the African American woman had a history of ‘causing trouble’ in the neighborhood. (McDevitt, et al., 2003) In both of these incidents, the police recognized that indicators of bias motivation were present, i.e., the victims and offenders were from different groups and their differ- ences were highlighted in the aggressive language used by the offenders. However, the police were also able to explain both of these crimes in another way: as violent responses to some other ‘triggering’ event. In the first incident described above, the violent behavior was triggered by an unexpected traffic maneuver. In the second incident, the violent act was initiated by the accidental spilling of a drink. Because these crimes could be explained as a response to or retaliation for some other event, they were not consid- ered bias crimes by the police. Recent empirical research identified ambiguity in bias crime reporting as both a source of confusion and frustration within law enforcement and as a source of classification error in the national statistics (Bell, 2002; Boyd, Berk, & Hamner, 1996; Jenness & Grattet, 2001; Martin, 1995; McDevitt, J., Balboni, J. Bennett, S., Weiss, J., Orchowsky, S., & Walbolt, L., 2000; McDevitt, et. al, 2003; Nolan & Akiyama, 1999; Nolan & Akiyama, 2002). From these studies emerged a number of insights and recom- mendations, including the need for new policies, procedures, and enhanced training within the law enforcement community that would ensure that hate crimes are prop- erly identified, recorded, investigated, prosecuted, and prevented. However, there are limits to what we can know about this issue from empirical research. Clearly, the fact that bias crimes are often ambiguous has been confirmed by way of empirical study. Clearing up the ambiguity in bias crime reporting is a different issue, one that will require application of a rational thought process. In a sense the task to be accomplished is the creation of an organized way for law enforce- ment and others in the criminal justice system to recognize and comprehend certain events within their domain of interest relating to inter-group conflict and violence. Goodwin (1994) calls this ability to see objects of interest in a certain way the ‘profes- sional vision.’ He argues that the ability to see is not a transparent psychological process (as if everyone sees certain events in the same neutral and objective way), but one that is socially situated and the result of discursive practices. In fact, Goodwin writes ‘All vision is perspectival and lodged within endogenous communities of prac- tice’ (p. 606). To make his point clear, he compares the professional vision of the farmer with that of the archeologist while both are looking at the same patch of dirt. Where the farmer sees in the dirt the ability to support certain types of crops, the archeologist sees ‘stains, features, and artifacts that provide evidence of human activity at this spot’ (p. 606). In the same way the farmer and the archeologist learn to see the soil, law enforcement officials must learn to see bias crimes. The purpose of this paper is to add clarity to bias crime reporting by adjusting the professional vision of law enforcement in regards to these types of events. By learning to see hate crimes, law enforcement will be better able to identify and address them. 94 J. J. Nolan III et al. How Terms Take on Meaning: Intension and Extension One way to frame the problem at hand is to consider how words and terms (like hate crime) take on shared meaning. John Dewey (1910/1997) identified two distinct steps through which words and terms acquire distinct meaning. The first step is ‘intension,’ or simply defining the term so as to single it out. The second step is ‘extension,’ mean- ing to mark off certain groups of things that do and do not fit the definition. Using Dewey’s example to explain this process, we consider the word ‘river.’ The word clearly has a distinct meaning as set forth in its definition. As a test of its ‘distinct- ness’ it must set off a group of things that exemplify this meaning from things that do not. He writes: ‘The river-meaning (or character) must serve to designate the Rhone, the Rhine, the Mississippi, the Hudson, the Wabash, in spite of their varieties of place, length, quality of water; and must be such as not to suggest ocean, currents, ponds, or brooks’ (p. 130). This application of meaning to distinguish what is and what is not meant by the word ‘river’ is extension. Where ‘intension’ is the meaning in principle, ‘extension’ is the group of things that are being separated and distinguished. Based on current and previous research, we contend that in order to reduce the ambiguity relating to the term ‘bias crime’ this same process of intension and extension must occur. Clarifying the meaning of the term bias crime is an essential first step in developing the ability to effectively identify and respond to this social phenomenon. Through the dual process of intention and extension (defining and division), events that fit the definition of bias crimes will begin to take on shared meaning. Intension and the Ambiguity Arising from the Official Definition of Hate Crime In response to the passage of the Hate Crime Statistics Act of 1990, the FBI was charged with developing a national program for the collection of bias crime statistics. What evolved, and is still evolving, is the National Hate Crime Data Collection Program. This program involves the collection, compilation, and publication of bias crime statistics from state and local law enforcement agencies. In order to establish this national program the FBI had to first define the types of activities that it wanted to collect. The definition of bias crime that was developed by the FBI in collaboration with national law enforcement groups is provided at the outset of this paper. This ‘official’ definition serves to mark off the types of events law enforcement should consider as bias crimes. Although the FBI definition provides some clarity on the issue of bias crime, it also contributes to its ambiguity. In particular the phrase ‘… motivated, in whole or in part, by the offender’s bias …’ causes confusion, leads to errors, and can become a barrier to the full acceptance of bias crime as a legitimate crime category. In order to deal with the ambiguity resulting from this definition—and its applica- tion to real-world events—the police sometimes develop routines that help them sort things out. Bell (2002) discovered this situation in her study of the bias crime reporting practices of detectives in a large urban department. Although the official definition does not require this, Bell found that detectives had two basic requirements for bias crimes: 1) the victim and the offender had to have different identities, e.g., race, Criminal Justice Studies 95 ethnicity, sexual orientation and 2) the context in which the crime occurred must suggest a bias motivation rather than some other emotion such as anger or jealousy. In determining whether the context suggested a bias motivation, detectives looked for evidence to suggest some other motivation. They developed what Bell called the ‘typical non-hate crime,’ i.e., cases involving drugs, fights, retaliations for earlier fights, traffic accidents, and neighbor disputes. Detectives viewed these types of cases as being ‘less than 51 percent bias-motivated.’ One detective offered the following as an example of a typical non-hate crime: ‘A traffic accident between someone Asian and someone White. Racial epithets, slurs are exchanged’ (p. 144). McDevitt, et al. (2003) had similar findings. For example, in one focus group held in a large Midwestern city police department, several detectives shared an account of crimes occurring outside a local gay bar where patrons had been targeted for robbery. The detectives argued that bias was not the motivation for the robberies and that the offenders selected mostly gay male victims because 1) they were not likely to call the police and 2) they were likely to have lots of money. In another example in the same department, detectives told the researchers that a series of robberies targeting East Africans was probably not related to hate or bias. These detectives seemed convinced that the real reason the offenders targeted this population of people was the fact that these particular victims were not likely to call the police. The findings from both of these studies reveal how limited ‘intension’ can be in terms of helping law enforcement see bias crimes. Clarity of professional vision in regards to bias crimes will come only through ‘extension.’ Preparing for Extension: Examining the Domain of Possible Hate Events In preparing to extend the definition of bias crimes to real-life events, it is important to first identify the domain of all possible hate crime events2. For our purposes, we define the universal set {U} of possible hate crimes as the set of all police reports maintained within a police department (see Figure 1).3 The Universal Set {U}: The Domain of Possible Bias Crimes Figure 1 The Universal Set {U}: The Domain of Possible Bias Crimes 96 J. J. Nolan III et al. Within the universal set of all records in a police department, there are two types of reports: 1) crime reports, and 2) non-criminal incident reports. As the name implies, crime reports are written documents describing criminal activities that have been reported to and recorded by the police. Here we denote the set of crime reports as {R}. The set {R} contains all reports of criminal activity that occurred in a particular juris- diction including reports of UCR index crimes4. The set of non-criminal incident reports, denoted here as { }, includes all types of police reports that are non criminal in nature. These reports include such things as neighborhood disputes, suspicious persons, dangerous intersections, traffic violations, and much more. The union of {R}, the set of crime reports, and { }, the set of non-criminal incident reports, makes up the universal set {U}, i.e., the domain under consideration ({U} = {R Y }). There are initially three sets of police reports within this domain that must first be identified and considered (see Figure 2): Three Types of Reported Bias Events {A} = {police reports that document some confirmed or suspected bias-related activity {B} = {police reports that document bias crimes as defined by state and federal definitions for statistical purposes {C} = {police reports that document bias crimes defined by state and local criminal statutes. Set {A} contains all police reports, both criminal and non-criminal, which have some bias indicators present. Police reports in {A} include such activities as cross burnings; bias-motivated murders, assaults, and vandalisms; white supremacist rallies and recruitment (e.g., KKK); racist graffiti; neighborhood disputes involving different racial groups, etc. Reports in this set do not necessarily need to be confirmed bias crimes, but there must be some indication that they could be motivated by bias5. False reports of bias crimes (e.g., for insurance fraud) and crimes motivated by the victim’s bias are also included in this set. The set of reports that document bias crimes as defined by the federal and state definition for statistical purposes, {B}, include only those prescribed crimes and bias R̂ R̂ R̂ Figure 2 Three Types of Reported Bias Events Criminal Justice Studies 97 categories set forth in the official FBI definition6. Set {C} contains reports of crimes defined by state and local criminal statutes. Figure 2 depicts the relationships between these three sets within the universal set. Notice that {B} is a proper subset of {A}, in that all of the elements of {B} are also elements found in {A}. Likewise, {C} is a proper subset of {A}, but it is not a proper subset of {B}. In other words, all crimes that fit the statistical definition of bias crime do not necessarily fit the criminal definition. In some cases, the state and local criminal statute will include different bias or crime types. In the McDevitt, et al. (2003) study, one jurisdiction had a local criminal statute called “ethnic intimidation” which included acts of intimidation aimed at individuals and groups because of their ethnic- ity. To the police officers in this department, a violation of this criminal statute meant a violation of the hate crime law. So when asked to consider a situation in which someone was murdered because of his or her race, the officers had a difficult time determining whether this would constitute a hate crime in their jurisdiction. By viewing hate crime reporting in this way, one can begin to see why certain events are clearly hate crimes while others are not. The clearest hate crimes are those that fit the compound event denoted by {A B C}, i.e., ones that have bias indicators and fit both the federal statistical and the state criminal definitions. Dealing with Bias as a Partial Motivation Similar to what Bell (2002) found in her study of a single city police department, the researchers in the McDevitt, et al. (2003) study uncovered many reported crimes in which the offender’s behavior was motivated only in part by bias. Their findings reveal two main categories of these partially bias-motivated crimes: 1) Response/Retaliation crimes and 2) Target-Selection crimes. Response/Retaliations Events Response/Retaliation crimes are a subset of Response/Retaliation events. These events are defined as situation in which the offender’s actions are prompted by some other ‘trig- gering’ incident. The descriptions of the two ‘ambiguous’ bias crimes provided in the Introduction section of this paper are examples of Response/Retaliation crimes. The actions of the offender in response to or retaliation for some other triggering event may or may not be exacerbated by the victim and offender difference. In some cases a criminal response to some triggering event might occur even when the victim and offender are from the same group. Also, there are situations where response or retaliation actions of the offender may not even constitute a crime, as in the case of a person giving an obscene hand gesture in response to some unexpected traffic maneuver. But, there are instances in which the offender’s bias against the victim’s group does in fact become a motivating factor in his or her actions. When these actions become criminal, they may be considered as bias crimes. Applying our conceptual model to Response/Retaliation events, the set of police reports that describe events in which the offender’s behavior was a response to or retaliation for some other ‘triggering’ event is represented by {D}. See Figure 3. 98 J. J. Nolan III et al. Two Sets of Events With Ambiguous Motivation: Response Retaliation {D} and Target Selection {E} Conceptualizing Response/Retaliation events in this way, one can easily see that some of these events are criminal actions {RD} and others are not { D}. It is also clear that some of these actions fit the official statistical definition, {DB}, some fit the state and local criminal statute {DC}, and some fit both definitions {DBC}. Finally, there are, of course, Response/Retaliation crimes that have no bias indicators at all, denoted here as {R D}. Target-Selection Events Target-Selection events are those documented situations in which offenders had been motivated to commit certain acts, either criminal or non criminal, for reasons other than bias. The offender(s), then, select as the target of their action particular persons, places, or objects based on some other reason. In other words, the motivation for the behavior is considered separate from the motivation for selecting the victim. Target- Selection events are different from Response/Retaliation events in that they are not actions in direct response to some other ‘triggering’ incident. Instead, they result from some rational process by the offender. For instance, an individual may be motivated to commit a robbery and, after careful consideration, he or she selects a particular bank as the target of the crime. The factors the offender considers in selecting this particular bank may include the number of visible security officers present on particular days, the quality of security system, and the anticipated quantity of cash available to steal. There are two types of Target Selection events: 1) rational choice and 2) bias moti- vation. As in the above example, rational-choice events involve the offender choosing the target (or recipient of his or her actions) for any number of reasons. Other exam- ples of rational choice target selection include some of the situations presented earlier from the McDevitt, et al. (2003) study, including the targeting of gay men and East Africans for robbery because they were not likely to call the police7. Bias motivated Target Selection events are those situations in which the target of the action is selected R̂ A Figure 3 Two Sets of Events With Ambiguous Motivation: Response Retaliation {D} and Target Selection {E} Criminal Justice Studies 99 because of the offender’s bias. As an example of this type of event, consider the situa- tion described by McDevitt, et al. (2003). The police reported that several intoxicated white males went out looking for a fight one night in order to demonstrate their phys- ical prowess. While driving around the community in their vehicle, the group noticed a black male pumping gas and decided to attack him. The police determined that although the primary motivation for this incident was simply to get into a fight, the offenders selected a black male target because of their hatred for African Americans. Applying our conceptual model to Target Selection events, we designate this set of events as {E} (see Figure 3). Presented in this way one can easily see that there are Target Selection events that are either crimes {RE} or non criminal incidents { E}. Some of these events involve bias indicators {AE}, while others do not { E}. Some of these events fit the official definition of bias crime {BE}, some fit the local criminal definition {CE}, and some fit both the criminal and statistical definitions {EBC}. Extension of the Term ‘Bias Crime’ Once again, where ‘intension’ is the meaning of the term in principle, ‘extension’ is the group of things that are being separated and distinguished. The conceptual model presented here is helpful in that it subdivides the universal set of possible bias crime events into 21 different categories of events to consider (see Figure 4). Each region created by the overlapping sets is given a number that corresponds to descriptions and examples provided in Table 1. Types of Police Reports In our model, unambiguous bias crimes—those in which bias is the sole motiva- tion—are events that fit into regions 16, 17, and 18. In region 16 one would find bias- motivated crimes that meet the requirements for statistical reporting (according to the official definition), but not for criminal prosecution. Crimes that fit both the statistical and state criminal definitions are found in region 17. And, in region 18 one would find crimes that fit the definition of local criminal prosecution, but not for statistical reporting. R̂ A Figure 4 Types of Police Reports 100 J. J. Nolan III et al. Table 1 Types of Police Reports Relating to Bias Crime Reporting (See Figure 4) TYPE OF OFFENSE EXAMPLES (1) Response/Retaliation crime that is not bias motivated. A white male assaults another white male in response to a neighborhood dispute. No inter-group bias involved. (2) Response/Retaliation crimes that have some bias indicators, but for which bias motivation either is not or cannot be confirmed. A white male assaults an Asian male in response to a neighborhood dispute. Officers determine the racial difference did not motivate the assault. (This is also the category of intergroup crime where the bias cannot be confirmed because the offenders’ identities are unknown.) (3) Response/Retaliation bias crimes that fit the statistical reporting definitions, but not those set for criminal prosecution. A white male threatens to kill a lesbian couple in response to an ongoing neighborhood dispute. Officers determine that the threat was motivated by the offender’s bias against lesbians. The state hate crime law does not protect against anti-sexual orientation crimes. (4) Response/Retaliation bias crimes that fit definitions for statistical reporting and criminal prosecution A black male assaults a white male in response to an ongoing neighborhood dispute. Officers determine that the racial difference was a motivating factor for the crime. (5) Response/Retaliation bias crimes that fit definitions for prosecution, but not statistical reporting A female driver cuts in front of a male driver in a line of heavy traffic. The male forces the female off the road and assaults her. Police determine that the crime was motivated by the male’s hatred for women. The state criminal code covers gender-bias crimes, but the statistical definitions do not. (6) Response/Retaliation incident that has some bias indicators An Asian male driver cuts in front of a black male driver in a line of heavy traffic. The black male yells a racial epithet at the Asian driver. (7) Response/Retaliation incident that has no bias indicators Two white females get into an argument over a parking space. One of the females calls the other a “bitch.” (8) Target-Selection (bias-motivated) crime that fits definitions for statistics and prosecution A white male commits a series of robberies to get cash in order to buy illegal drugs. He decides to target black- owned businesses because of his hatred for all non white races. (9) Target-Selection (bias-motivated) crimes that that fit statistical definitions but not those set for criminal prosecution. A white male commits a series of robberies so that he is able to buy illegal drugs. He targets males coming out of gay bars because he hates gay people. The state criminal code does not cover anti-sexual orientation bias crimes but the definition for statistical purposes does. (10) Target-Selection (rational choice) with some bias indicators. A white male commits a series of robberies so that he is able to buy illegal drugs. He targets people with gay men because he thinks they will have money and are unlikely to tell. (11) Target-Selection (rational choice) crime. A white male commits a series of robberies so that he is able to buy illegal drugs. He targets rich people because they have the most money. (12) Target-Selection (rational choice) incident A female makes several unwanted advances to a male colleague. She follows him home one day to try one more time. The male notifies the police who warn the female not to continue her behavior. (13) Target-Selection (bias motivated) incident A white racist organization targets a black neighborhood to distribute fliers containing false and inflammatory information about African Americans. Criminal Justice Studies 101 The ambiguous bias crimes—those in which bias is not the primary motivation—fit into regions 3, 4, 5, 8, 9, and 14. Response/Retaliation bias crimes that meet the definition for statistical reporting are found in regions 3 and 4, while Response/Retaliation bias crimes that meet the requirements for local criminal prosecution are found in regions 4 and 5. Events that fall into regions 8 and 9 are Target Selection bias crimes that meet the definition for statistical reporting. Events in regions 8 and 14 are Target Selection bias crimes that would meet the definitional requirements for criminal prosecution. Through our process of extension, events that would not be included under the term bias crime would be those found in region 15, i.e., crimes that have some bias indicators but whose motivation cannot really be confirmed. Victim-precipitated bias and false reports of bias are events that would be included in this region. Bias motivated non- criminal incidents, region 19, also would not be considered a bias crime. Crimes in which bias is a secondary or partial motivation, but which cannot be confirmed (regions 2 and 10), would also be excluded from our consideration as a bias crime. So too would non-criminal bias incidents, i.e., those that fit into regions 6, 19, and 13. Table 1 Continued TYPE OF OFFENSE EXAMPLES (14) Target-Selection (bias-motivated) crimes that fit definitions set for criminal prosecutions, but not statistical reporting A white male commits a series of robberies so that he is able to buy illegal drugs. He targets women only because he thinks they “deserve to pay.” The criminal code covers anti- gender bias crimes, but the statistical definitions do not. (15) Crimes with bias indicators, but do not meet requirements for statistical reporting or criminal prosecution A black male is assaulted by a white male. After punching the victim, the offender runs away. Although bias is suspected, it cannot be confirmed. (Victim-precipitated bias and false reports of bias are also included in this category.) (16) Bias-motivated crimes that meet requirements for statistical reporting but not for criminal prosecution A group of white males assault patrons of a gay bar as they exit. Although clearly a bias crime for statistical purposes, the state criminal code does not cover anti sexual- orientation crimes. (17) Bias-motivated crimes that meet requirements for statistical reporting and criminal prosecution A group of white males assault patrons of a gay bar as they exit. Anti sexual-orientation crimes are covered both in the statistics and in the states criminal code. Cross burnings on the property of a black family new to a white neighborhood would also be included here. (18) Bias-motivated crimes that meet requirements for criminal prosecution but not statistical reporting A man who hates all women goes on a killing rampage. At a mall, he shoots 5 women who were selected at random. Although this state includes gender bias crimes in its criminal statutes, it is not included in the statistical reporting definitions. (19) Bias-motivated incident (non criminal) A black man calls an Asian man a racial epithet. No threat is made to the victim. (20) Non-criminal incident that has no bias motivation A woman arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol (21) Non Bias crime A group of juveniles engaged in underage drinking of alcohol. 102 J. J. Nolan III et al. Discussion At the outset of this paper, we defined our purpose as being to help law enforcement officials learn to see bias crimes. We recognized the concept of ‘professional vision’ and committed to a rational process for improving that vision—at least as it pertains to the concept of bias crimes. The methods we used for increasing the clarity of professional vision included the dual process of ‘intension’ and ‘extension’ described by John Dewey. In the present situation, intension means the marking off of certain behaviors that constitute a bias crime. Therefore, the “official” definition of bias crime provided by the FBI as part of the National Hate Crime Data Collection Program became our starting point. By extension, we refer to the identification of events that do and don’t fit this definition. We applied set theory to our task which helped us identify categories of events for our consideration (Setek, 1983). Now, what remains for us to do is to make some sense of our findings. To begin we pose two important questions that must be answered in the order that they are presented: 1) Why do police keep records? and 2) How does our inquiry sharpen law enforcement’s professional vision in regards to bias crimes? We begin with a discussion of why police keep records in the first place. We posit that there are three primary reasons why the police keep official records: 1) to document community problems, 2) to compile crime and other administrative statistics, and 3) to prepare for and support the successful prosecution of criminal laws. Police officers often respond to community disturbances that do not rise to the level of criminal activity, but may be of interest for other reasons. The police may document these types of incidents in order understand the nature and extent of community problems as part of their ‘order-maintenance’ function (Kelling and Coles, 1996). It is often the case that non-criminal incidents can become precursors to criminal behavior and so the police may find value in documenting these situations for purposes of crime-prevention or problem solving. The police also keep records for statistical purposes, which is often the least popular reason for police to write reports. However, accurate and reliable crime statistics can be of significant value to investigators, administrators, researchers, and public policy offi- cials. Today, nearly all police agencies in the United States participate in the national UCR program that is managed by the FBI. Local police records of reported arrests and criminal offenses are the source of these national statistics. In addition to their value on the state and national levels, local crime statistics can also have significant operational value too. These statistics are used for crime analysis, crime mapping, problem solving, research, and program evaluation. The third and final reason why police officers keep records is to prepare for success- ful criminal prosecutions. Most police officers know that their crime reports will be presented in court as their ‘official memory’ of events. Therefore, it is important for officers to clearly and accurately document the elements of the investigation so that a conviction in the case is possible. The reasons for (and utility of) police-generated crime reports also applies to bias crime reporting. The police may want to document non-criminal incidents that have Criminal Justice Studies 103 certain bias elements in order to assess and/or prevent inter-group conflict in a community. They may also want to maintain reports of bias crimes for statistical purposes for their own administrative and operational purposes as well as to support state and national statistical efforts. Finally, the accurate documentation of bias crimes is essential toward assuring successful prosecutions. Our answer to this first question provides a context for the, arguably more impor- tant, second question: How does our inquiry help improve law enforcement’s profes- sional vision in regards to bias crimes? We believe our model helps law enforcement see bias events very differently. Through the rational process of differentiating types of bias events, we hope to introduce some clarity. In response to the first question, we argued that the police keep records for different purposes. Disentangling the term hate crime may help officers see utility in bias crime reporting in response to these purposes. As it applies to crime prevention and problem-solving, perhaps what law enforce- ment officials really want (and need) to know is more than the nature and extent of events that fit the statistical or criminal definitions of bias crimes, {B} and {C}. In fact, they may find more value in identifying events, both criminal and non-criminal, which have some bias indicators, i.e., the set {A}. In regards to improving the accuracy of their bias crime statistics, law enforcement officers might want to consider the data collection methods prescribed by the FBI. That agency refers to a two-step process in which the first step is the identification of ‘suspected bias crimes’ by the initial responding officer. The second step in the process is the verification of both the bias motivation and the crime classification by trained specialists such as a detective or bias-crime investigator. According to our model, first responders might want to identify all events with some bias indicators, i.e., {A}, as ‘suspected bias crimes.’ Once identified in this way, trained specialists can review and follow-up these cases in order to confirm which events actually fall under the statistical definition and which fit the local criminal statute. Our model may also help law enforcement agencies develop training strategies for identifying and classifying different variations of events that fit the statistical and crim- inal definitions of bias crime. For example, training officials might want to focus on what a crime in region 4 (of Figure 4) would look like and how it might be different from events in region 5? Along the same lines, our model may assist law enforcement agencies develop decision-making strategies for verifying different types of offenses for statistical purposes, particularly those that fall in the regions of the ambiguous bias motivation, i.e., regions 3, 4, 8, and 9 (of Figure 4). For example, law enforcement offi- cials might work on developing questions a detective would want to ask to determine if the bias crime should fit in region 3, which would be reportable for statistical purposes, or regions 2 or 5 which would not. Finally, this model provides a foundation for improving bias crime training for criminal investigators. Investigators may want to know what types of information they need to collect to make sure their case fits the criminal definition, i.e., set {C}. For example, they may be able to develop strategies for identifying Response/Retaliation crimes that fit the criminal definitions, i.e., regions 4 and 5, and those that don’t, i.e., regions 2 and 3. 104 J. J. Nolan III et al. Conclusions All professions learn to see events according to their particular set of interests. This is referred to here as the ‘professional vision.’ Recent empirical research has identified bias crimes as a category of crimes that are ambiguous. This lack of clarity creates problems for law enforcement officials who seek to identify and record bias crimes for purposes of crime prevention, community problem-solving, statistical reporting, and criminal prosecution. Our goal has been to reduce the ambiguity in bias-crime reporting so that law enforcement officials can be better prepared to identify and respond to them. We assume that, like other terms, ‘bias crime’ will take on a shared meaning through a process of intension and extension—first defining, then extending it to certain groups of events that do and don’t fit this definition. Our model presents a rational way of thinking about bias crimes and extending the definition for different law enforcement purposes. Notes 1. [1] Throughout this paper the terms bias crime and hate crime are used interchangeably. 2. [2] In this section we will use the standard symbols for set notation: e.g., {AB} represents the intersection of sets {A} and {B}, { } is the compliment of set A – i.e., {not A}, and {A U B} is the union of sets {A} and {B}. 3. [3] We acknowledge that many bias crimes do not even get reported to the police. We are simply limiting our argument to the group of events that get reported to and recorded by the police. 4. [4] Index crimes include murder and non-negligent manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery, aggra- vated assault, burglary, theft, motor vehicle theft, and arson. Also included here are other crimes for which reports were taken and/ or arrests were made. 5. [5] The FBI provides a list of bias indicators in their Training Guide for Hate Crime Data Collection. If any of these indicators exist, the report would be included in {A}. 6. [6] The federal definition of bias crime includes only 11 crime categories and 5 bias types. 7. [7] In situations like these, rational choice target selection crimes might have the same effect as a bias crime on victims and communities even though the intention of the offender is not to ‘send a message’ as is often the case in bias crimes. References Bell, J. (2002). Policing hatred: Law enforcement, civil rights, and hate crime. New York: New York University Press. Dewey, J. (1910 1997). How we think. Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, Inc. Federal Bureau of Investigation (1997). Hate crime data collection guidelines. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office. Fischer, K. (July 20, 2000). Parents request action: Washington vigil set to remember slain Marion man. Charleston Daily Mail. Goodwin, C. (1994). Professional vision. American Anthropologist, 96(3), 606–633. Jenness, V. & Grattet, R. (2001). Making hate a crime: From social movement to law enforcement. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. Martin, S. E. (1995). A cross burning is not just an arson: Police social construction of hate crimes in Baltimore County. Criminology, 33(3), 303–326. A Criminal Justice Studies 105 McDevitt, J., Balboni, J., Bennett, S., Weiss, J., Orchowsky, S. & Walbolt, L. (2000). Improving the quality and accuracy of bias crime statistics nationally. Washington, DC: United States Department of Justice. McDevitt, J., Cronin, S., Balboni, J., Farrell, A., Nolan, J. & Weiss, J. (2003). Bridging the information disconnect in national bias crime reporting. Washington, DC: US Department of Justice. Nolan, J. & Akiyama, Y. (1999). An analysis of factors that affect law enforcement participation in hate crime reporting. Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice, 15(1), 111–127. Nolan, J., Akiyama, Y. & Berhanu, S. (2002). The hate crime statistics act of 1990: Developing a method for measuring the occurrence of hate violence. American Behavioral Scientist, 46(1), 136–153. Setek, W. M. (1983). Fundamentals of mathematics (3rd Ed.). New York: McMillan Publishing Co. Smith, V. (July 8, 2000). Groups want answers on death: Gay-rights activists demand to know if case is hate crime. Charleston Daily Mail. Smith, V. (November 25, 2002). Warren family settles wrongful death case before trial. The Associated Press. 
work_6k4uelo3gzagljria4yrumyr6q	----	rec3_289 427..438 Capturing Hindutva: Rhetorics and Strategies Deepa Reddy* University of Houston-Clear Lake Abstract This article is the second of three in a series surveying research on Hindutva (Hindu nationalism or political Hinduism). Here I review prominent rhetorical characterizations and strategies that scholars have used to come to terms with and politically oppose Hindu religious politics, both in India and transnationally. The essay suggests that this literature represents a distinct approach to the study of hindutva that needs to be separated from other, less politically oriented studies. (The first essay in the series surveyed literature on seminal articulations of hindutva, both historical and contemporary; the third examines writings that take hindutva as a form of practice). Introduction The term ‘hindutva’ is all but commonplace in the scholarly literature on South Asian politics. Works on the factors involved in communal violence, the gendered dimensions of hindutva praxis, the percolation of hindutva ideologies into local and grassroots initia- tives, and more abound—and yet the task of finding the tools to theorize ‘hindutva’ sys- tematically remains ironically untackled. Indeed, the vast length and breadth of the existing research can at times have the ultimate effect of ‘‘fool[ing] us into thinking we know what Hindutva is’’, while ‘‘reifying and homogenizing it and to some extent by using the same encompassing framework as its proponents’’ (Simpson 2004, p. 136). For many scholars, it almost goes without saying, studying hindutva has very largely involved studying the ‘other’, or a politics so disconcerting that it demands not merely description, but also outrage, degrees of revulsion and critique. Academic as well as more public descriptions of Hindu nationalism or Hindutva in India have been dominated by such words as ‘medievalism’, fundamentalism’, ‘xenophobia’, ‘fanaticism’, and of course ‘com- munalism’. Whether directly or tangentially, these studies of hindutva underscore the need for a progressive politics that stands as a bulwark to hindutva’s perceived threat. The task of knowing what hindutva definitively is, is consequently complicated by the fact that any attempt at understanding this phenomenon must necessarily navigate a crowd of prior appraisals oriented around the need to assume alternative political positions. The prior essay in this series of three surveyed accounts of hindutva’s ideological ori- gins: from pre-independence racialist articulations to the humanist emphases of post-inde- pendence years, to the strident culturalism of the 1990s. The present article continues the survey of research on hindutva, here using three prominent critical characterizations as benchmarks to track the major analytical shifts in this field of study. My purpose here is to collate those rhetorical constructions of hindutva that marry scholarly analysis with an increasingly outraged political critique, as these have been particularly influential in setting the terms of discussion. I begin by discussing the early debates on hindutva as a patholog- ical response to the failures of the modernist state. These more-or-less diffuse assessments give way, in the wake of the demolition of the 16th century Babri Masjid (mosque) by Religion Compass 5/8 (2011): 427–438, 10.1111/j.1749-8171.2011.00289.x ª 2011 The Author Religion Compass ª 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd hindutva followers in 1992, to the far more certain representation of hindutva as ‘fascist’. 1 The fascist characterization, in turn, is supplanted by a view of hindutva as quintessential- ly a form of ‘hate politics’, following horrific riots in Gujarat State (in Western India) almost exactly a decade later. 2 Each of these characterizations speak to progressively more outraged responses to Hindutva; each is directed by the compulsion to identify hindutva in shifting rhetorical terms that most effectively consolidate ethico-moral and even juridi- cal opposition to it. What we understand hindutva to be through this discourse, there- fore, is fundamentally inflected by the political imperative to capture it—conceptually, morally, and even legally. ‘Hindutva’ becomes the ‘‘essentialized pariah’’ of contemporary politics, and an instance of what Doug Holmes has termed ‘‘illicit discourse’’ (Holmes 1993, p. 255). Modern(ist) Pathologies Scholarly observers of late 1980s and early 1990s hindutva tended to characterize by anal- ogy, placing Hindu nationalism quite easily amidst other resurgent religious nationalisms and fundamentalisms worldwide. For instance, Daniel Gold’s argument in the inaugural volume of Marty and Appleby’s Fundamentalisms Project was that ‘‘organized Hinduism’’ was necessarily equivalent to ‘‘fundamentalist Hinduism’’ since both represented ‘‘resolute religious reaction[s] to forces of modernity’’ (1991, p. 533). The characteristic features of hindu nationalism were identical to that of Western Protestant fundamentalisms or, indeed, fundamentalisms everywhere; ‘‘group assertiveness, defiance, and proclivities to sporadic violence’’ (Gold 1991, pp. 275–6) and ‘‘the increasing tendency[ies] … toward absolutism, intolerance and militancy’’ (Smith 1996, p. 125) therefore justifiably rational- ized the application of the ‘fundamentalist’ label. Being thus focused on generalizing hindutva as fundamentalism, however, these read- ings fail to account for its cultural specificity. Other scholars have therefore preferred looked to Indian historical experiences, rather than Western protestant or other models, to explain the emergence of Hindu nationalism. Chandra (1984) and Chatterjee (1986, 1992), for example, regard contemporary hindutva as a specific contortion produced by Indian nationalism, as part of the natural growth and development of the nation-state idea. Chatterjee, for example, suggests that the ‘‘historical imagining in the nineteenth-century of ‘India’ as a nation’’ is itself a distortion for it is based on a politics of exclusion (1992, p. 112). His arguments directly link Hindu nationalism with 19th century Indian national- ism: the idea of ‘‘nationness’’, says Chatterjee, has always been exclusively (or at least pre- dominantly) Hindu, beginning with 19th century nationalist rhetoric and continuing into contemporary Hindu extremist discourse. Hindutva, in this view, is inherently a process of exclusion and distortion carried out in the name of modernist nationalism (cf. also van der Veer 1994, pp. 193–202; Sarkar 2001). Extending these arguments, Nandy (1998) treats hindutva somewhat more broadly as a particular distortion of Indian modernity. Separating religion-as-faith from religion-as-ide- ology, he writes that ‘‘[i]f [a traditional] religious way of life cannot find normal play in public life, it finds distorted expression in fundamentalism, revivalism, and xenophobia’’ (1990, p. 70; 1998, p. 291). Madan similarly regards the ‘‘excess[es] of ideological secular- ism and its emergence as dogma’’ as the prime cause for the ‘‘perversion of religion’’, which then has ‘‘less to do with the purity of faith and more with the acquisition of political power’’ (1995, pp. 260–1). The Indian psychoanalyst Sudhir Kakar, too, treats hindutva as a psychological pathology of modernity: a narcissism that has itself become deviant (a ‘‘miscarriage of narcissism’’) and a dangerous ‘‘stoking of persecutory 428 Deepa Reddy ª 2011 The Author Religion Compass 5/8 (2011): 427–438, 10.1111/j.1749-8171.2011.00289.x Religion Compass ª 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd fantasies’’ through which ‘‘feelings of absolute helplessness’’ are transformed into ‘‘group aggression, which takes on, overtly and covertly, the flavor of narcissistic rage’’ (1996, pp. 167–8). Each of these narratives implicitly or otherwise point to a host of issues that have noth- ing per se to do with religion, but with political machinations of various sorts, simmering discontents over the ‘‘failure of India’s bureaucratic rationality, of its capitalist productiv- ity, [and] of its secular progress,’’ all undergirded by the complex inter-relationships of caste, class, religion, and ethnicity in the subcontinent (Fox 1996, p. 249). The ‘‘inherent infirmit[ies] and constitutional weakness[es]’’ of modernity thereby give rise to ‘‘national- ist chest-beating, multicultural stereotyping, sectarian soul-thumping, race-bashing and gender-plundering [that] are the major new forms of enchanted community’’ (Fox 1996, p. 244). Hindutva is therefore not merely ‘‘one of those pathologies that periodically afflict a faith’’, as in Nandy’s reckoning (1998, p. 295), but it is the failure of the modern world, to which not even a ‘‘troglodyte Nazism’’ (Fox 1996, p. 241) can compare. Overall, such focus on hindutva as a home-grown modernist creed not only empha- sizes its Indian historical roots, it is also self-consciously anti-Orientalizing: concerned with establishing hindutva’s historical specificity while also undoing the notion that ‘‘[o]nly India, after all, has vicious communalism’’ (Nandy 1998, p. 291; Fox 1996, p. 241; cf. Lal 1995). Following the demolition of the Babri Masjid on December 6, 1992, however, the tenor of the discourse on hindutva begins to shift. For a few writers, the events leading up to and the violence accompanying the demolition of the 16th cen- tury mosque by Sangh Parivar kar sevaks (volunteers) simply reaffirm the accuracy of the ‘fundamentalist’ characterization (e.g. Smith 1996; Wolpert 1993)—which, Juergensmeyer points out, is ‘‘less descriptive than it is accusatory’’ (1993, p. 86). For many others, however, the demolition comes as a jolt that demands newer vocabularies by which to comprehend the forces that hindutva can apparently unleash. Scholarly critique becomes far less general, far less anxious about the Orientalizing tendencies of analysis, and far more directed at identifying condemnatory vocabularies that rally opposition to hindutva, as the next sections demonstrate. Fascism In an influential essay that sparked much debate on the characterization of hindutva, historian Sumit Sarkar builds a case for the ‘Fascism of the Sangh Parivar’ (1993), on the evidence of the Babri Masjid demolition. 3 The mosque, he argues, was razed to rubble in a matter of hours, a task which could never have been completed, first, without consider- able planning, and, second, without the connivance of the authorities. The demolition was thus not a spontaneous act carried out by a raging crowd but a pre-meditated under- taking in direct violation of a Supreme Court order. Not only were the police and state officials ineffectual in preventing both demolition and the riots that followed, but the state actually incited violence in cities like Mumbai, and that with Muslims as its main target. The demolition and its aftermath, writes Sarkar, make the analogy with fascism clear: in Germany and Italy too fascism had come to power through a combination of street violence (carefully orchestrated from above but still undeniably with great mass support), deep infiltration into the police, bureaucracy and army, and the connivance of ‘centrist’ political leaders. Crude violations of laws and constitu- tional norms consequently had alternated in Fascist and Nazi behavior with loud protestations of respect for legality. (p. 163) Capturing Hindutva 429 ª 2011 The Author Religion Compass 5/8 (2011): 427–438, 10.1111/j.1749-8171.2011.00289.x Religion Compass ª 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd Having established this basic analogy, Sarkar then substantiates it with a series of lesser comparisons: in India the ‘‘classically Muslim target-area steadily expands’’ just as in Germany Hitler extended his antipathy beyond Jews and communists ‘‘to cover social- democrats, liberals, Catholics, [and] everyone who dared to think with any independence’’; in India the Sangh Parivar made clever and efficient use of the latest audio-visual technol- ogy in their campaigns, just as in Germany Hitler ‘‘had also been a bit of a pioneer in these matters … fully realizing the importance of spoken propaganda through the then relatively new techniques of the loudspeaker and radio’’ (pp. 163, 164). There is also an economic analogy, one which likens economic re-structuring in fascist Italy to the Congress govern- ment’s wide-ranging changes in economic policy in the early 1990s, a self-conscious move- ment away from Nehruvian socialism more popularly known as liberalization (For a more detailed reading of the links between liberalization and the growth of fascism, see Ahmed 1993, 1996). And finally there is the analogy of intellectual critique. Pointing to the ‘‘molecular permeation’’ of communal myths and assumptions into commonsensical truths, Sarkar recalls once again the German parallel: ‘‘[f]ascist ideology in Europe had combined already quite widespread, crudely nationalist, racist, and in Germany anti-Semitic, preju- dices with fragments from much more sophisticated philosophies.’’ (pp. 164–5). The threat as far as India is concerned is not German Romanticism but perhaps a likeness of it: post- modernism. Sarkar’s argument here may be reduced to two points: the unspoken assump- tion that Hindutva needs to be fought with every available weapon; and that ‘‘academic fashions’’ like post-modernism are dangerous because they ‘‘can reduce the resistance of intellectuals to the ideas of Hindutva’’ by ‘‘stimulat[ing] forms of indigenism not easy to distinguish from the standard Sangh Parivar argument’’ (p. 165). 4 Sarkar’s initial essay on the ‘‘Fascism of the Sangh Parivar’’ prompted some lengthy rejoinders and much heated debate, all focused largely on finessing the analogy and harnessing it appropriately toward political opposition. Achin Vanaik takes issue with Sar- kar’s use of the word ‘fascism’, establishing approximately what he calls a ‘‘fascist mini- mum’’, and arguing essentially that ‘‘the fascist paradigm itself is inappropriate or of very limited value for situating … Hindu communalism’’ (p. 1740). He continues to say that without an accepted theory of fascism, ‘‘the assignment of ‘fascist’ emphasis and weight must remain arbitrary, the method a solipsism’’ (p. 1740). In this context, the rhetorical use of the word ‘fascism’ could become misleading, even counter-productive, suggesting ‘extreme’ outcomes … [rather than] the longer menu of options that would presumably be the truer and more open-ended reality on the ground. This could disorient the organization of opposition to the Hindu communal Right (p. 1743). In spite of his rejection of the fascist paradigm for the Indian context, however, Vanaik does not completely let go of the fascist idea as one that is potentially relevant to India. He writes: ‘‘In post-colonial societies, the political vehicles of religious fundamentalism or religious nationalism are not fascist formations, but … potential fascist formations’’ (p. 1740, emphasis added). So the rise of present-day communalism may be evidence only of a failed Nehruvian post-colonial project and not of fascism, but this greater threat is always waiting in the wings, always a potential danger within ethnicism itself. Further, given Vanaik’s doubts on the rhetorical value of words like ‘fascism’, witness with what a loom- ing sense of danger he leaves us: If [the Sangh Parivar] appropriates the Indian state, … [the] task for secularists, democrats and socialists will become immeasurably more difficult as the dark night of an authoritarian and communal Hindu state descends upon us (p. 1745). 430 Deepa Reddy ª 2011 The Author Religion Compass 5/8 (2011): 427–438, 10.1111/j.1749-8171.2011.00289.x Religion Compass ª 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd We in India may not have a full-blooded fascism on our hands, then, but we do have something very close to it in form—‘‘a dangerous and pernicious phenomenon … responsible for barbarous actions akin to those perpetrated by fascists of the past’’ (p. 1742, emphasis added)—which is only slightly less frightening. The political position delineated by Sarkar remains, even after Vanaik’s essay, more or less intact. Still, stopping just short of naming fascism is not enough for Rustom Bharucha. If Vanaik was searching for a ‘‘good social science theory or paradigm [that] must above all explain and understand things better’’ (1994, p. 1742), Bharucha, like Sarkar, is more concerned with political positioning. In his view Vanaik ‘‘minimizes, if not elides alto- gether the very real features of fascism that are echoed uncannily in the activities and phi- losophy of the Hindu communal and fundamentalist combine’’ (1998, p. 117). One must name fascism, says Bharucha, with the ‘‘forthrightness’’ and ‘‘boldness’’ of a Sumit Sarkar or an Aijaz Ahmed. And, following Ahmed, who held the distinction between fascism and rightwing authoritarianism as ‘‘surely academic’’ (1996, p. 1338), Bharucha too writes that while the discrimination of ‘fascism proper’ from ‘xenophobia’ and ‘cultural relativism’ needs to be kept in mind, it should not be so fetishized that it prevents one from reading the ‘writing on the wall’; the very real signs of violence and brutality by which the boundaries between ‘xeno- phobia,’ ‘exclusivism,’ and ‘fascism’ are blurred if not obliterated. Only the most pedantic and self-defeating scholarship would insist on such a discrimination. (1998, p. 118) What is at stake in the characterization of hindutva as fascism, then, is not merely effec- tive analysis, but the increasingly urgent political need, in Raychaudhuri’s words, to keep the hindu swastika, a traditional symbol of bliss and well-being, from tilting right into dreaded Nazi form (2000, p. 278). ‘‘Staying aloof’’, Witzel avers, just as ominously invoking the Nazi German commitment to ‘‘Ein Volk, Ein Reich …’’, is ‘‘not a responsi- ble stance’’ (2006, pp. 225, 226; cf. also Smith 1996). Aijaz Ahmed reminds us that until the Babri Masjid was demolished ‘‘in a fascist spectacle of gigantic proportions … liber- al ⁄ Left intellectuals, among whom I too belong, [were] a bit too sanguine about what we took to be the chances of Hindutva prevailing’’ (1996, p. 1331). Naming fascism is thus a call to action born of the realization that Hindutva might well prevail over the discourses of Marxism or liberal multiculturalism. So, although other scholars take issue with Sar- kar’s argument on different levels, there is broad consensus on the need for intellectual and political opposition. For instance, Achin Vanaik argues that without knowing exactly what constitutes a ‘‘fascist minimum’’, ‘‘the assignment of ‘fascist’ emphasis and weight must remain arbitrary, the method a solipsism’’ (1994, p. 1740). And yet his concern about likening hindutva to fascism is simply that it might ‘‘disorient the organization of opposition to the Hindu communal Right’’ (1994, p. 1743). Ahmed is far more matter- of-fact: making analytical distinctions between fascism and rightwing authoritarianism is ‘‘surely academic’’, he writes (1996, p. 1338). The point is echoed strongly by Bharucha (1998): distinctions between fascism, xenophobia, and cultural relativism are obliterated by violence and thus should not be academically ‘‘fetishized’’ by ‘‘self-defeating scholar- ship’’ (1998, p. 118). As if to rescue the fascist label from pedantry once and for all, Mar- zia Casolari offers a lengthy and detailed account of early hindutva leaders’ actual engagements with fascists in the 1920s and 1930s so as to be able to ‘‘legitimate[ly] con- clude that such influence[s are] still alive in today’s militant Hinduism’’ (Casolari 2000, p. 227; cf. also Udayakumar 2005). By resting thus on irrefutable ‘fact’ and not merely conceptual analogy, Casolari’s narrative about hindutva in a particular period provides renewed justification to rally in contemporary opposition to it. Naming fascism, in words Capturing Hindutva 431 ª 2011 The Author Religion Compass 5/8 (2011): 427–438, 10.1111/j.1749-8171.2011.00289.x Religion Compass ª 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd often used with reference to the Sangh Parivar, becomes ironically about ‘‘constructing the enemy’’, defining the ‘‘target-area’’, moving away in alignments of clear opposition from the ‘‘suicidal wobbling’’ (Sarkar 1993, p. 164) of intellectual critique. Hate Such scholarly characterization of hindutva as incontrovertibly fascist marks a unique moment: when the profound sense of hindutva outrage that expresses itself in the Ram- janmabhumi movement begins to be matched by an equally profound sense of intellectual outrage that India’s secular polity could be thus claimed by identitarian religiosity. Lesser disagreements on what constitutes a fascist minimum or where hindutva does not exactly fit a fascist mould (Basu et al. 1993; Nanda 2004, pp. 10–1; Sarkar 2005, p. 205) notwith- standing, the normalization of hindutva logics in the decades since the Babri Masjid demolition has gone ironically hand-in-hand with the normalization of the fascist desig- nation—now a virtually commonsensical categorization of hindutva (cf. Raychaudhuri 2000, p. 268). And yet another significant rhetorical switch seems to occur in the wake of the 2002 Gujarat riots, giving form to outrage in another idiom. Several writers have pointed out that BJP ministers in Gujarat and at the Center were quick to label the attack on kar sevaks in the Sabarmati Express as a ‘‘pre-planned act of collective terrorism’’, with other terms like ‘atrocity’ and ‘massacre’ thrown in for good measure (Sundar 2004, p. 154; emphasis added). Such descriptions make obvious use of dominant, U.S.-mobilized, national and international discourses of terror to simultaneously characterize and condemn (Varadarajan 2002). Descriptions of the riots, in turn, which left an estimated 2000 dead and an additional 150,000 homeless, have hardly invoked ‘fascism’—in spite of the fact that here, too, by most accounts, violence was meticulously orchestrated, Muslim residen- tial areas and even individual homes specifically targeted, all with at best complicity, at worst active participation of law enforcement and the political establishment (cf. Nuss- baum 2007; Spodek 2008; Varadarajan 2002). Instead, the Gujarat riots have been almost universally classified as ‘pogrom’, ‘genocide’, and ultimately a ‘crime against humanity’ in its egregious expression of undiluted hatred (Brass 2004; Communalism Combat 2002; Concerned Citizens Tribunal 2002; Jaffrelot 2007). 5 Such new terminologies re-locate hindutva in a genealogy akin to, but distinct from, fascism by equally drawing upon a dif- ferent, but also increasingly universal ‘‘language of condemnation’’ (Visvanathan 2001, p. 2513) in order to define alternative, critical political stances. Tellingly, the intellectual and activist response to hindutva in Gujarat has been articulated as much by citizen’s groups within India as by South Asian groups in the United States and Europe. There is therefore a distinctly trans-national or even supranational (Hardt & Negri 2000, p. 5) dimension to this new expression of outrage, which cuts across national boundaries in the mobilization of both communities and rhetorics. The Campaign to Stop Funding Hate (CSFH) is a case in point. The CSFH was spear- headed by Indian-American professionals, scholars, and students associated with Forum of Indian Leftists (FOIL)—a self-described ‘‘a clearinghouse for radical Indian activists in the United States, Canada and England’’ (http://www.proxsa.org/resources/foil/foilpg. html)—in the aftermath of the Gujarat riots, with the explicit goal of ‘‘exposing to public scrutiny the activities of the Sangh Parivar in the U.S.’’ 6 The CSFH’s 2002 report, The Foreign Exchange of Hate, was evidently a trans-national collaborative effort, conceptualized by FOIL activists in the U.S., but published jointly by the South Asia Citizen’s Web (sacw. org, a ‘citizen’s group’ and information repository, hosted in France) and Sabrang 432 Deepa Reddy ª 2011 The Author Religion Compass 5/8 (2011): 427–438, 10.1111/j.1749-8171.2011.00289.x Religion Compass ª 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd Communications (www.sabrang.com, an organization based in India that publishes the Communalism Combat magazine). The report is an exposé that focuses on a new set of ‘‘foreign tie-ups’’: those of the India Development and Relief Fund (IDRF, a Maryland- based registered charity). It holds the IDRF to be ‘‘not a secular and non-sectarian organi- zation as it claims’’, but ‘‘a major conduit of funds’’ that eventually support ‘‘violent and sectarian Hindu supremacist organizations in India’’ (CSFH 2002, pp. 1–2; emphasis added). CSFH’s burden is then to locate the Maryland charity with its avowed commit- ment to development firmly under the wing of the ‘‘Sangh Parivar and the Hindutva movement in India’’, by pointing to the affiliations of its office-bearers and sources of its organizational support (CSFH 2002, p. 10). 7 The report therefore systematically sets out to uncover the ties of all major IDRF office-bearers and all major IDRF-funded projects to ‘hindutva’ (loosely defined)—the final implication being that any association with hin- dutva or the Sangh Parivar is invariably complicit in supremacist violence against India’s minorities (an argument more formally presented by two of the report’s authors in Ma- thew & Parshad 2000). Outrage is integral to the CSFH’s undertaking on multiple levels. Clearly the commu- nal violence in Gujarat and the association of hindutva organizations with violence in general evokes great anger and upset, and is a spur to activism. But there is also another sort of building outrage about the co-optation of ‘development’ to provide a ‘‘cover of respectability for funding organizations engaged in hate campaigns’’ (http://stopfunding- hate.org/resources/FAQ.htm). Left organizations in India have long complained that the terms of secular discourse were being claimed by hindutva—so much so that women’s groups were compelled to rethink their positions on everything from pornography to street harassment to the Uniform Civil Code, simply because they found themselves strangely allied with the BJP on these issues. The CSFH seems similarly troubled by the apparent communalization of development, or the deployment of the ostensibly non-sec- tarian for decidedly sectarian ends. Even further, it seeks to evoke a sense of betrayal on the argument that those organizations and individuals who gave willingly to the IDRF are, in fact, duped innocents who have unwittingly supported hate and violence. 8 One metaphor seems to capture all these different levels of outrage, providing both a rationale for hindutva and the vocabulary by which to oppose it: hate, with ‘pogrom’, ‘genocide’, and ‘crimes against humanity’ becoming the methods of the violent enactment of hatred. A 2004 report by the British organization Awaaz—South Asia Watch, also concerned with tracking how British humanitarian charity is used to raise funds for hindutva organizations, establishes hindutva straightforwardly as a ‘politics of hate’, its activities all incontrovertibly hate-driven. The CSFH and Awaaz reports are significant in that they, too, like the literature on fascism and fundamentalism before, seek to under- stand hindutva by analogy. The CSFH report calls the IDRF’s professed non-sectarianism ‘‘disingenuous at best’’, a ploy to invoke goodwill and make the IDRF a ‘‘charity of choice’’ within a diasporic cultural milieu (CSFH 2002, p. 2). And yet, CSFH’s own strategy to cast the problem of hindutva’s foreign funding as a ‘‘foreign exchange of hate’’, draws on distinctly North-American ⁄ European outrage at, and history of legislating against, hate crimes and hate speech. Awaaz, too, is a project of The Monitoring Group (TMG), a civil rights and anti-racist organization concerned with (among other things) the monitoring of hate crimes in the UK. The point is not just to oppose hindutva by whatever means available, it is to provide the analogies that make such opposition mean- ingful within local contexts—which now extend to the United States and the UK. If the fascist label piggy-backs 1990s hindutva onto the histories of Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy, the association with ‘hate’ pins hindutva to the histories of racism, anti-Semitism, Capturing Hindutva 433 ª 2011 The Author Religion Compass 5/8 (2011): 427–438, 10.1111/j.1749-8171.2011.00289.x Religion Compass ª 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd and bigotry in the United States and Europe. Such rhetorical moves generalize hindutva so as to render it analogous to these other established, already recognized forms of discrimination that naturally demand (and thus easily attract) wide censure. But the rhetorical switch from fascism to hate has a further significance that cannot be ignored: the classification of hindutva as hatred lays the ground for opposition not just in moral terms, but also legalistically. News of the Babri Masjid’s demolition was met with the shocked realization that hindutva could prevail. News of the Gujarat riots has been met with a further sense of outrage that the state (under the BJP’s Narendra Modi) was not only complicit in the violence, but would ‘‘penaliz[e] or demot[e]’’ anyone within its ranks trying to stop it (Nussbaum 2007, p. 22; Spodek 2008, pp. 8–11). In the face of not merely state failure, but state orchestration of religious violence, the need for suprana- tional condemnation is all the more urgent, and it calls for analogies that render complex local realities not only internationally recognizable but also operational within an interna- tional juridical framework. For the ‘‘processes of globalization are no longer merely a fact’’, as Hardt and Negri write, but also a ‘‘source of juridical definitions’’ that circum- vent the nation-state and thus herald the ‘‘coming of Empire’’ (2000, pp. 9, xii). Fully convinced of the withering of civil society, and cognizant of the decline of national boundaries brought on by the ascendance of international law, local groups thus take their outrage directly to supranational bodies like the United Nations or the International Criminal Court for more universalist frameworks of adjudication (Hardt & Negri 2000, pp. 336–7, 9; Reddy 2005; Tisdall 2009). ‘‘[N]othing is more global than modern language and its categories’’, avers Lal (2005, p. 235), and Sundar deploys both in no uncertain terms when she reminds us that [w]hat happened in Gujarat from February 28 until at least mid-April fits most of the provisions of the definition of genocide provided by the 1948 UN Convention on Genocide, to which India is a signatory (2004, p. 154). In the context of ‘Empire’, local and cultural particularities matter only insofar as they illuminate generalized classifications. Naming thus becomes a specific manifestation of outrage: a strategy to create analogies, place hindutva within identifiable genealogies, and thus enable access to international ⁄ universal frameworks of condemnation. The move uses the threat of legal redressal to embarrass the Indian state at just the moment when its agreement with the United States on civil nuclear co-operation and emergence as a humanitarian donor in its own right give it a certain stature in the international community. 9 Capturing Hindutva There are a few things to observe about the shifting rhetorics harnessed to capture ‘hindutva’, in conclusion. First, that initial assessments of hindutva as generalized modern pathology give way to much more specific constructions that pinpoint its essential fascist or hate-based orientations. Second, as the ethnicist violence associated with hindutva becomes all the ‘‘more impersonal, organized, rational and calculative’’, it comes not merely to represent ‘‘a pathology of rationality’’ (Nandy 1998, p. 290), but now fully demands national, moral and above all supranational legal censure. In other words, as out- rage intensifies, so also does the urgency, mode, and scope of opposition. This implies that, third, by the time hindutva is classified as a form of ‘hate politics’, of course, it is far from being a localized phenomenon. Indeed, the argument of the CSFH is that fundrais- ing and other development-related operations associated with Hindu nationalism have 434 Deepa Reddy ª 2011 The Author Religion Compass 5/8 (2011): 427–438, 10.1111/j.1749-8171.2011.00289.x Religion Compass ª 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd grown trans-nationally so dispersed that they are no longer so easy to identify in singular terms, as hindutva. Funding flows then represent the only means by which to track hin- dutva organizationally—itself a distinctly post-9 ⁄ 11 global strategy.10 The strategies, rhet- orics, and analogies used to assess hindutva in this phase are thus apparently also derivatives of a post-9 ⁄ 11 context. Early concerns over the need to account for the cul- tural specificity of hindutva (even in diaspora) or to work against Orientalizing analytical tendencies are replaced by a greater concern with capturing hindutva—conceptually and criminally. As such, this body of literature under review here needs to be separated from other studies of hindutva that focus less on political opposition, and more on the multiple and complex processes by which national(ist) ideologies like hindutva comes to inflect local, regional, vernacular politics, even in diasporic contexts (which will be the focus of the third and last essay in this series, ‘‘Hindutva as praxis’’). The tools used to critique and oppose hindutva altogether too easily become shorthand reifications: sound bites that slip easily from essays to newspapers and world-in-a-minute media reporting, flattening the complexities of the massive contest over rights and representation that hindutva metony- mically represents. Scholarly purposes might be better served by reading hindutva through less politically tinted glasses, as a sometimes troubling but always insightful commentary on the present forms of democratic debate. The third and last paper in this series of three reviews literature that, although still often opposed or ambivalent, nonetheless regards hindutva as a form of praxis, whose considerable grassroots impact makes it near-impossi- ble to cordon or unilaterally oppose. Acknowledgement My colleagues on the ‘Public Representation of a Religion called Hinduism’ network project, funded by the Arts and Humanities Research Council in the UK—John Zavos, Maya Warrier, Raymond Williams, Pralay Kanungo, and Madhu Kishwar—and partici- pants in our project seminars deserve first thanks for providing years of intellectual stimu- lus to gather and develop my thoughts on ‘Hindutva’ as a public form of Hinduism. I thank Maya Warrier especially for her support, encouragement, friendship, and immense patience with the process of writing the three papers that comprise the present review of literature on Hindutva. Gratitude also to the anonymous reviewer for very helpful com- ments, and to Neelima, whose wholehearted friendship and unfailing help with childcare afforded me the luxury of clear time and space to write. Short Biography Deepa S. Reddy received her B.A. in Anthropology and English Literature from the University of Toronto, and her Ph.D. in Anthropology from Rice University. She tea- ches anthropology and cross-cultural studies at University of Houston-Clear Lake and serves as Director of India Outreach Programs for the University of Houston System. Between 2002 and 2004, she directed the Women’s Studies program at the University of Houston-Clear Lake. From 2004 to 2008, she was co-investigator on a National Institutes of Health-funded research initiative that sought to understand Indian cultural perspectives on genomics and the International HapMap Project. She has also been a member of the steering group for the ‘‘Public Representation of a Religion called Hinduism’’ network project (funded by the Arts and Humanities Research Council in the UK), from 2008 to 2010. Her book, Religious Identity and Political Destiny: Hindutva in the Culture of Ethnicism Capturing Hindutva 435 ª 2011 The Author Religion Compass 5/8 (2011): 427–438, 10.1111/j.1749-8171.2011.00289.x Religion Compass ª 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd was published in 2006. She has also written on the internationalization ⁄ globalization of ‘‘caste’’ through the discourses of race and human rights, as also about ‘‘blood’’ donation and sample collection in the context of sample collection for genetic research. Notes * Correspondence address: Deepa Reddy, 2700 Bay Area Blvd., Houston, TX 77058-1098, USA. E-mail: reddy@ uhcl.edu 1 The Babri Masjid in Ayodhya was built in the 16th century by a general of the Mughal emperor Babur, on what is believed to be the site of a temple marking the birthplace of the Hindu deity, Rama (Ramjanmabhumi). The leg- end of the temple and its destruction, and stories of the use of the disputed site by Hindus and Muslims alike over the years were well known in the colonial period, and may even have been a product of colonial historiography (Gopal 1991; van der Veer 1994, pp. 152–62). The movement to demolish the mosque and replace it with a Rama temple gathered momentum in 1990, and despite a Supreme Court injunction barring any action on the site of the mosque, kar sevaks (volunteers) associated with various hindutva organizations succeeded in demolishing the struc- ture on December 6, 1992. 2 The 2002 Gujarat riots are really a subsequent chapter of the still-unresolved Ramjanmabhoomi dispute. In February 2002, an altercation at the Godhra train station in Gujarat State between kar sevaks returning from Ayod- hya and local Muslims resulted in a compartment of the Sabarmati Express being set on fire, killing 59. I refer to the ‘post Godhra’ violence as the Gujarat riots: a period of wide-spread and at times intense violence that targeted primarily Muslim residential areas and businesses, ostensibly with the complicity and sometimes active participation of police and state representatives. Official estimates suggest that 1000 were killed and many more left homeless, but unofficial estimates are roughly twice as high. 3 Parts of this section are revisions of arguments originally presented in Chapter 2 of my book, Religious Identity and Political Destiny (2006), which offers a more detailed critique of the implications of the fascist characterization. 4 Other scholars have similarly held the commitment to cultural relativism responsible for weakening intellectual stances of opposition to hindutva: Ahmed 1993, pp. 51–5; Balagopal 1993, p. 790; Nanda 2004; Smith 1996. 5 Paul Brass’ work is to be distinguished from others in that it interrogates the processes of classification and the discursive contests over the meanings of the riot before offering its own assessment (2003). 6 http://www.stopfundinghate.org/about.html. There is also the Coalition Against Genocide: ‘a spectrum of [some 30 mostly South Asian] organizations and individuals in the United States and Canada’ that claims to have formed ‘in response to the Gujarat genocide to demand accountability and justice’, but seems to have rallied mainly in opposition to the visit of Gujarat Chief Minister Narendra Modi, under whose watch the riots occurred, in 2005. (http://www.coalitionagainstgenocide.org/about.php). 7 CSFH’s strategies are mirrored by those of Awaaz, a British watch group that produced a report on the fund- raising operations of Sewa International and its links to ‘hindu extremism’ (2004). 8 Readers will recall here that the figure of the ‘duped innocent’ appears not infrequently in debates on hindutva, particularly in the claim that conversion to Christianity surely involves trickery of the innocent and ignorant (Menon 2003). 9 Interestingly, it is only at this juncture is the term ‘genocide’ applied to partition violence (e.g. Hansen 2002) and ‘pogrom’ get retrospectively applied to the anti-Sikh riots that followed the assassination of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi by her two Sikh bodyguards in late 1984 (Grewal 2007), though, as even Nussbaum points out, there were significant differences between that episode of targeted violence and the events in Gujarat (2007, p. 23). Finally, it is not only critics of hindutva who call upon analytical analogies to create recognition in non-Indian contexts; Kuri- en notes that American Hindu groups have likened Islamic invasions into Northern India to a ‘holocaust’ that rivals that perpetrated on Jews in Nazi Germany (2007, pp. 150–1). 10 As the (Hindu) critics of the CSFH report point out, ‘‘the intense campaign against the IDRF started only after 9 ⁄ 11 when the U.S. government began worrying about Islamic charities being used as fronts by terrorist groups’’ (http://www.letindiadevelop.org/indiaabroad041803.shtml). Works Cited Ahmed, Aijaz (1993). Fascism and National Culture: Reading Gramsci in the Days of Hindutva, Social Scientist, 21 (3 ⁄ 4), pp. 238–67. ——. (1996). In the eye of the storm: The Left chooses, Economic and Political Weekly, 1 June, pp. 1329–43. 436 Deepa Reddy ª 2011 The Author Religion Compass 5/8 (2011): 427–438, 10.1111/j.1749-8171.2011.00289.x Religion Compass ª 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd Awaaz—South Asia Watch (2004). In bad faith: British charity and Hindu extremism. [Online]. Retrieved on 10 October 2009 from: http://www.awaazsaw.org/ibf/index.htm Balagopal, K. (1993). Why did December 6, 1992 happen?, Economic and Political Weekly, 24 April, pp. 790–2. Basu, Tapan, Datta, Pradip, Sarkar, Sumit, Sarkar, Tanika & Sen, Sambuddha (1993). Khaki Shorts and Saffron Flags: A Critique of Hindutva Today. Tracts for the Times. Delhi: Orient Longman. Bharucha, Rustom. (1998). In the Name of the Secular: Contemporary Cultural Activism in India. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Brass, Paul (2003). The Production of Hindu-Muslim Violence in Contemporary India. Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press. ——. (2004). The Gujarat pogrom of 2002. [Online]. Retrieved on 19 May 2011 from: http://concon- flicts.ssrc.org/archives/gujarat/brass/ Campaign to Stop Funding Hate (CSFH) (2002). The Foreign Exchange of Hate: IDRF and the American Funding of Hindutva. Mumbai: Sabrang Communications and South Asia Citizen’s Web, France. [Online]. Retrieved on 1 May 2010 from: http://www.proxsa.org/newsflash/downloads/sabrang_sacw.pdf Casolari, Marzia (2000). Hindutva’s foreign tie-up in the 1930s: Archival evidence, Economic and Political Weekly, January 22, pp. 218–28. Chandra, Bipan (1984). Communalism in Modern India. New Delhi: Vikas. Chatterjee, Partha (1986). Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse? London: Zed Books. ——. (1992). History and the Nationalization of Hinduism, Social Research, 59 (1), pp. 111–49. Communalism Combat. 2002. Special Issue on Genocide. 8 (76; March–April). Concerned Citizens Tribunal (2002). Crime against humanity: An enquiry into the carnage in Gujarat. Volumes 1–3. [Online]. Retrieved on 19 May 2011 from: http://www.sabrang.com/tribunal/ Fox, Richard (1996). Communalism and Modernity. In: David Ludden (ed.), Contesting the Nation: Religion Commu- nity and the Politics of Democracy in India, pp. 235–49. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. Gold, Daniel (1991). Organized Hinduism: From Vedic Truth to Hindu Nation. In: Martin Marty and R. Scott Appleby (eds.), The Fundamentalisms Project, Volume 1, Fundamentalisms Observed, pp. 531–93. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Gopal, Sarvepalli (1991). Anatomy of a Confrontation: Ayodhya and the Rise of Communal Politics in India. New Delhi: Penguin. Grewal, Jyoti (2007). Betrayed by the State: The Anti-Sikh Pogrom of 1984. New Delhi: Penguin Books. Hansen, Anders Bjørn (2002). Partition and Genocide: Manifestation of Violence in Punjab, 1937–1947. New Delhi: India Research Press. Hardt, Michael & Negri, Antonio (2000). Empire. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Holmes, Douglas R. (1993). Illicit Discourse. In: George E. Marcus (ed.), Perilous States: Conversations on Culture, Politics and Nation, pp. 255–81. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Jaffrelot, Christophe (2007). The 2002 Pogrom in Gujarat: The Post-9 ⁄ 11 Face of Hindu nationalist Anti-Muslim Violence. In: John R. Hinnells and R. King (eds.), Religion and Violence in South Asia: Theory and Practice, pp. 172–92. New York: Routledge. Juergensmeyer, Mark (1993). Why Religious Nationalists are not Fundamentalists, Religion, 23(1), pp. 85–92. Kakar, Sudhir (1996). The Colors of Violence: Cultural Identities, Religion, and Conflict. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Kurien, Prema (2007). Who Speaks for Indian Americans? Religion, Ethnicity, and Political Formation, American Quarterly, 59(3), pp. 759–83. Lal, Vinay (1995). Hindu ‘Fundamentalism’ Revisited, Contention, 4(2), pp. 165–73. ——. (2005). The Tragi-Comedy of the New Indian Enlightenment: An Essay on the Jingoism of Science and the Pathology of Rationality, Social Epistemology, 19(1), pp. 77–91. Madan, T.N. (1995). Modern Myths, Locked Minds: Secularism and Fundamentalism in India. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Mathew, Biju & Parshad, Vijay (2000). The Protean Forms of Yankee Hindutva, Ethnic and Racial Studies, 23(3), pp. 516–34. Menon, Kalyani Devaki (2003). Converted Innocents and their Trickster Heroes: The Politics of Prosyletizing in India. In: Andrew Buckser and Stephen D. Glazier (eds.), The Anthropology of Religious Conversion, pp. 43–54. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield. Nanda, Meera (2004). Prophets Facing Backward: Postmodernism, Science, and Hindu Nationalism. New Delhi: Permanent Black. Nandy, Ashis (1990).The Politics of Secularism and the Recovery of Religious Tolerance. In: Veena Das (ed.), Mirrors of Violence: Communities, Riots and Survivors in South Asia, pp. 69–93. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. ——. (1998). The Twilights of Certitudes: Secularism, Hindu Nationalism, and Other Masks of Deculturation, Postcolonial Studies, 1(3), pp. 283–98. Capturing Hindutva 437 ª 2011 The Author Religion Compass 5/8 (2011): 427–438, 10.1111/j.1749-8171.2011.00289.x Religion Compass ª 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd Nussbaum, Martha Craven (2007). The Clash Within: Democracy, Religious Violence, and India’s Future. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Raychaudhuri, Tapan (2000). Shadows of the Swastika: Historical Perspectives on the Politics of Hindu Commu- nalism, Modern Asian Studies, 34(2), pp. 259–79. Reddy, Deepa S. (2005). The Ethnicity of Caste, Anthropological Quarterly, 78(3) pp. 543–84. ——. (2006). Religious Identity and Political Destiny: Hindutva in the Culture of Ethnicism. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. Sarkar, Sumit (1993). The fascism of the Sangh Parivar, Economic and Political Weekly, 28 ⁄ 5, 30 January, pp. 163–7. Sarkar, Tanika (2001). Hindu Wife, Hindu Nation: Religion, Community, Cultural Nationalism. New Delhi: Permanent Black. ——. (2005). Educating the Children of the Hindu Rashtra: Notes on RSS Schools. In: Christophe Jaffrelot (ed.), The Sangh Parivar: A Reader, pp. 197–206. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Simpson, Edward (2004). ‘Hindutva’ as a Rural Planning Paradigm in Post-Earthquake Gujarat. In: John Zavos, Andrew Wyatt and Vernon Hewitt (eds.), The Politics of Cultural Mobilization in India, pp. 136–65. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Smith, Brian (1996). Re-envisioning Hinduism and Evaluating the Hindutva Movement, Religion, 26(2), pp. 119– 28. Spodek, Howard (2008). In the Hindutva Laboratory: Pogroms and Politics in Gujarat, 2002. Modern Asian Studies. Published online by Cambridge University Press 19 Aug 2008, pp. 1–51. DOI: 10.1017/S0026749X08003612. Sundar, Nandini (2004). Toward an Anthropology of Culpability, American Ethnologist, 31(2), pp. 145–63. Tisdall, Simon (2009). The rise of international law, The Hindu, 3 April. [Online]. Retrieved on 19 May 2011 from: http://www.hindu.com/2009/03/04/stories/2009030455100900.htm Udayakumar, S. P. (2005). Presenting the Past: Anxious History and Ancient Future in Hindutva India. Westport, CT: Praeger. Vanaik, Achin (1994). Situating the threat of Hindu nationalism: Problems with the fascist paradigm, Economic and Political Weekly, 9 July, pp. 1729–48. Varadarajan, Siddharth (2002). Chronicle of a Tragedy Foretold. In: Siddharth Varadarajan (ed.), Gujarat: The Making of a Tragedy, pp. 1–41. New Delhi: Penguin Books India. van der Veer, Peter (1994). Religious Nationalism. Berkeley: University of California Press. Visvanathan, Shiv (2001). The race for caste: Prolegomena to the Durban conference, Economic and Political Weekly, 36, 7 July, pp. 2512–6. Witzel, Michael (2006). Rama’s Realm: Indocentric Rewritings of Early South Asian Archaeology and History. In: G. G. Fagan (ed.), Archaeological Fantasies: How Pseudoarchaeology Misrepresents the Past and Misleads the Public, pp. 203–32. New York: Routledge. Wolpert, Stanley (1993). Resurgent Hindu Fundamentalism, Contention, 2(3), pp. 9–18. 438 Deepa Reddy ª 2011 The Author Religion Compass 5/8 (2011): 427–438, 10.1111/j.1749-8171.2011.00289.x Religion Compass ª 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd 
work_6ksqocypujalfi4jfjllvxfq6u	----	[PDF] Just starting out. | Semantic Scholar Skip to search formSkip to main content> Semantic Scholar's Logo Search Sign InCreate Free Account You are currently offline. Some features of the site may not work correctly. DOI:10.7748/ns.32.1.30.s30 Corpus ID: 37071364Just starting out. @article{Stone2017JustSO, title={Just starting out.}, author={Karen L. Stone}, journal={Nursing standard (Royal College of Nursing (Great Britain) : 1987)}, year={2017}, volume={32 1}, pages={30} } Karen L. Stone Published 2017 Medicine Nursing standard (Royal College of Nursing (Great Britain) : 1987) Being a nurse is all I ever wanted to do. It's the best job in the world.  View on PubMed files.eric.ed.gov Save to Library Create Alert Cite Launch Research Feed Share This Paper 1 CitationsBackground Citations 1 View All Supplemental Presentations Presentation Slides Just starting out. One Citation Citation Type Citation Type All Types Cites Results Cites Methods Cites Background Has PDF Publication Type Author More Filters More Filters Filters Sort by Relevance Sort by Most Influenced Papers Sort by Citation Count Sort by Recency Collective realism: Exploring the development and the outcomes of urban housing collectives. Thomas Archer Political Science 2016 2 PDF View 3 excerpts, cites background Save Alert Research Feed Related Papers Abstract Supplemental Presentations 1 Citations Related Papers Stay Connected With Semantic Scholar Sign Up About Semantic Scholar Semantic Scholar is a free, AI-powered research tool for scientific literature, based at the Allen Institute for AI. Learn More → Resources DatasetsSupp.aiAPIOpen Corpus Organization About UsResearchPublishing PartnersData Partners   FAQContact Proudly built by AI2 with the help of our Collaborators Terms of Service•Privacy Policy The Allen Institute for AI By clicking accept or continuing to use the site, you agree to the terms outlined in our Privacy Policy, Terms of Service, and Dataset License ACCEPT & CONTINUE 
work_6ktrb2wdh5ealh6cgi4ggkkctu	----	[PDF] A Simple Model of Optimal Hate Crime Legislation | Semantic Scholar Skip to search formSkip to main content> Semantic Scholar's Logo Search Sign InCreate Free Account You are currently offline. Some features of the site may not work correctly. DOI:10.1111/j.1465-7295.2009.00281.x Corpus ID: 53474882A Simple Model of Optimal Hate Crime Legislation @article{Gan2004ASM, title={A Simple Model of Optimal Hate Crime Legislation}, author={Li Gan and R. Williams and Thomas Wiseman}, journal={Wiley-Blackwell: Economic Inquiry}, year={2004} } Li Gan, R. Williams, Thomas Wiseman Published 2004 Economics, Political Science Wiley-Blackwell: Economic Inquiry We present a simple model of the effects of hate crime legislation. It shows that even if the direct harm to victims of hate crime is the same as for other crimes, because of other differences in the effects it may still be optimal to exert more law-enforcement effort to deter or prevent hate crime. These differences also have previously unrecognized effects on the optimal level of effort by potential hate crime victims to avoid being victimized, thus affecting the efficiency of government… Expand View on SSRN nber.org Save to Library Create Alert Cite Launch Research Feed Share This Paper 15 CitationsHighly Influential Citations 2 Background Citations 6 Methods Citations 1 View All 15 Citations Citation Type Citation Type All Types Cites Results Cites Methods Cites Background Has PDF Publication Type Author More Filters More Filters Filters Sort by Relevance Sort by Most Influenced Papers Sort by Citation Count Sort by Recency The Effects of Hate Groups on Hate Crimes Ken Yahagi Economics 2019 PDF View 2 excerpts, cites background and methods Save Alert Research Feed The Just World Bias and Hate Crime Statutes D. Dharmapala, Nuno M. Garoupa, R. McAdams Political Science 2006 4 Save Alert Research Feed Attitudes toward hate crime laws S. Johnson, B. Byers Psychology 2003 31 Save Alert Research Feed Less Crime, More (Vulnerable) Victims: Game Theory and the Distributional Effects of Criminal Sanctions Ehud Guttel, Barak Medina Economics 2007 1 Highly Influenced PDF View 3 excerpts, cites background Save Alert Research Feed A law and economics perspective on terrorism Nuno M. Garoupa, J. Klick, F. Parisi Economics 2006 33 PDF View 1 excerpt, cites background Save Alert Research Feed Belief in a Just World, Blaming the Victim, and Hate Crime Statutes D. Dharmapala, Nuno R. Garoupa, R. McAdams Sociology 2009 20 Save Alert Research Feed On Hatred T. Klumpp, Hugo M. Mialon 2011 PDF View 2 excerpts, cites background Save Alert Research Feed The internet and racial hate crime: offline spillovers from online access Jason Chan, Anindya Ghose, Robert C. Seamans Sociology 2016 53 PDF Save Alert Research Feed On Hatred * Tilman Klumpp † ‡ T. Klumpp, Hugo M. Mialon 2013 PDF Save Alert Research Feed Risk Factors for Victimization and the Impact of Victim Status on Perceptions of Police Legitimacy in Australia Susann Wiedlitzka Political Science 2020 Save Alert Research Feed ... 1 2 ... References SHOWING 1-10 OF 27 REFERENCES SORT BYRelevance Most Influenced Papers Recency Penalty Enhancement for Hate Crimes: An Economic Analysis D. Dharmapala, Nuno R. Garoupa Psychology 2001 34 Highly Influential PDF View 6 excerpts, references background and results Save Alert Research Feed An Economic Analysis of Hate Crime L. Gale, W. Heath, Rand W. Ressler Sociology 2002 32 Highly Influential View 4 excerpts, references background Save Alert Research Feed The Economic Epidemiology of Crime T. Philipson, Richard A. Posner Economics The Journal of Law and Economics 1996 80 Save Alert Research Feed Attitudes toward hate crime laws S. Johnson, B. Byers Psychology 2003 31 View 1 excerpt, references background Save Alert Research Feed Blaming the Victim: Optimal Incentives for Private Precautions against Crime O. Ben-Shahar, Alon Harel Business 1995 56 View 2 excerpts, references background Save Alert Research Feed The economics of crime R. Freeman Economics 1999 576 PDF View 1 excerpt, references background Save Alert Research Feed Hate Crimes Hurt More Paul Iganski Psychology 2001 150 View 1 excerpt, references background Save Alert Research Feed The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law A. Polinsky, S. Shavell Economics, Business 1998 1,095 PDF View 1 excerpt, references background Save Alert Research Feed Sentencing in Homicide Cases and the Role of Vengeance E. Glaeser, Bruce I. Sacerdote Economics The Journal of Legal Studies 2003 50 View 1 excerpt, references background Save Alert Research Feed Hate Crime Offenders: An Expanded Typology J. McDevitt, Jonathan Levin, S. 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Enquiries For any further enquiries regarding the licence status of this document, please contact: researchsupport@kent.ac.uk If you believe this document infringes copyright then please contact the KAR admin team with the take-down information provided at http://kar.kent.ac.uk/contact.html Citation for published version Wood, Jane L. and Edwards, Kim S.S. (2005) Victimisation of Mentally Ill Patients Living in the Community: Is it a Lifestyle issue? Legal and Criminological Psychology, 10 (2). pp. 279-290. ISSN 1355-3259. DOI https://doi.org/10.1348/135532505X40836 Link to record in KAR https://kar.kent.ac.uk/26034/ Document Version Pre-print MENTALLY ILL PATIENTS, VICTIMISATION, LIFESTYLE RISK Victimisation of Mentally Ill Patients living in the Community: is it a lifestyle issue? Jane L Wood Department of Psychology University of Kent Canterbury Kent CT2 7NP Kim Edwards University of East Anglia Norwich Norfolk U.K. Author note: We would like to thank the participants for their time and for making the effort to complete the questions we asked. We should also like to thank the numerous charitable organisations for their insight and for helping us to contact participants. Without this valuable assistance the study would not have been possible. Email: J.L.Wood@kent.ac.uk kimssedwards78@yahoo.co.uk Any correspondence, requests for reprints or proofs should be directed to the first author. Abstract Purpose. Although crimes against mental health patients has been the little research there is focuses on inpatient samples (e.g. Silver, 2002). This study aimed to compare crimes against mental health patients living in the community with crimes against students who have a high lifestyle risk of victimisation (e.g. Barberet, Fisher, Farrell & Taylor, 2003). mailto:J.L.Wood@kent.ac.uk mailto:kimssedwards78@yahoo.co.uk Victimisation and Mental Illness 2 Methods. The samples were selected via community-based mental health services and a university population. Forty participants with mental health problems and eighty students reported experiences of victimisation in the previous 12 months and attitudes towards the police. Results. Female mental health patients, reported the highest victimisation, but both male and female patients reported more victimisation than did students. Mental health patients also held more negative opinions of the police. Conclusions. The results show that mental health individuals experience more victimisation when compared to a similar lifestyle risk group. Discussion focuses on the implications for mental health patients living in the community, the support networks available to them and relations between the police and mental health individuals. Victimisation and Mental Illness 3 The Mental Health Act (1959) spawned the beginnings of Community Care leading to the de-institutionalisation of individuals suffering from mental illness (Dobson, 1998). One aim of the act was to enable patients to live in the community with the support of social and other health care workers. Another was also to extinguish the stigma that has often surrounded mental illness (Dobson, 1998). Research has focused on the risk, usually of violence, posed by the mentally ill to the community (Hiday, 1997; Silver, 2002; Steadman, Mulvey, Monahan, Clark Robbins, Appelbaum, Grisso et al, 1998; Swanson, 1994). Scant attention has been paid to the criminal victimisation of people suffering from mental illness (Marley & Buila 2001; Silver, 2002). Even victimisation surveys, thought to capture the hidden figures of unreported crime (Hollin, 1992; Sparks, Genn & Dodd, 1977) do not assess the victimisation of the mentally ill. The largest and most regular of these, the British Crime Survey, excludes residents of supported community-based accommodation by regarding their accommodation as an ‘institution’ (Williams, 1993). This is surprising since the vulnerability of individuals may explain observed variations in victimisation rates, (Clarke and Felson, 1993). Certain social factors relate to increased vulnerability of victimisation e.g. low socio-economic status (Wohlfarth, Winkel, Ybema & van den Brink, 2001), living in urban areas (Hope et al, 2001) and unemployment (Laub, 1997). Mental illness can result in low socio-economic status (Hiday, Swartz, Swanson, Borum, & Wagner, 1999; Wilton, 2003) and unemployment due to the stigma of mental illness (Hiday et al, 1999) Visible symptoms may exacerbate this vulnerability (Hiday et al, 1999). Bizarre or ‘strange’ behaviour may result in hostile responses from others (Agnew, 1992; Silver, 2002). The current study aimed to redress some of this imbalance by examining the extent and nature of victimisation of individuals with mental health problems. Some studies have reported the victimisation of individuals who are mentally ill (Jacobson & Richardson, 1987; Marley & Buila, 2001). In particular, individuals with mental illness are more likely to be violently assaulted than are the general public (Hiday et al, 1999; Jacobson, 1989; Silver, 2002). Hiday et al (1999) revealed that although property crimes experienced by people with severe mental illness was comparable with the general population, the risk of violent victimisation was 2.5 times greater for the mentally disordered group than for the general population. Women with mental illness have also been found to be more at risk from sexual victimisation than general population females (Darves-Bornoz, Victimisation and Mental Illness 4 Lemperiere, Degiovanni & Gaillard, 1995; Jacobson & Richardson, 1987; Marley & Buila, 2001). Similarly, mentally ill males were more frequent victims of robbery or assault than general population males (Lehman & Linn, 1984; Marley & Buila). These findings reinforce arguments that those with mental illness are particularly vulnerable to victimisation. Hiday, (1995) suggested that this vulnerability stems from being mentally ill and the lifestyle or social context mentally ill people experience. The vulnerability of those with mental illness need not result solely from strangers. Cascardi, Mueser, DeGiralomo and Murrin (1996) looked at violence and physical aggression directed at psychiatric patients by family members or partners. They found nearly half (45.8%) reported being physically victimised by a relative and more than half (62%) by a partner. Jacobson and Richardson (1987) found 81% of their sample of psychiatric inpatients had at some point, been the victim of serious physical or sexual assault. The current study There are limits to the conclusions that can be drawn from victimisation research conducted on populations with mental illness. Many studies are based on data gathered from clinical populations (Hiday et al, 1999; Jacobson, 1989; Silver, 2002; Steadman et al, 1998) often recruited from psychiatric hospitals, which are a highly selective homogenous population, so may not be representative of people with mental illness. Walsh, Buchanan and Fahy (2002) point out that the research is ‘dominated by data on hospitalised/discharged patients, but most individuals with mental disorder are not hospitalised’ (Walsh et al, 2002, pp.493). It is likely that those in hospital represent the extreme end of the mental illness continuum and this may make them unrepresentative of the majority of people who suffer from some form of mental illness. Also, individuals recently discharged are likely to be less experienced and consequently more vulnerable than those who live solely in the community. Also, much of the research has been conducted in the U.S. (e.g. Cascardi et al, 1996; Hiday et al, 1999; Marley & Buila, 1999). This may not be representative of the experiences people with mental illnesses have in the U.K. Bearing this in mind, the current study aimed to assess the experiences of a community-based sample of people with mental illness in the U.K. The present study further explored the reporting rates of those with mental illness. This issue has received little consideration and so little is known about mental health victims’ disclosure of their victimization to the police or others (Marley & Buila, 1999). To the current authors’ knowledge, only one study (Marley & Buila, 1999) has looked at disclosure of victimization by individuals with mental illness. This may be an important Victimisation and Mental Illness 5 issue relating not only to assessing the action taken by the victims, but also the responses and actions taken by those to whom the victimization was disclosed. If people with mental illness receive negative responses from the police, this may affect future disclosure of victimization. This may have long-term consequences particularly if the victimization is ongoing (Sparks et al, 1977). Also, many studies have focused on specific aspects of victimization, such as frequency or type (Marley & Buila, 1999). To gauge a broader picture of this form of crime, the current study examined frequency of victimization, repeat victimization, specific types of victimization and the relationships between the victim and the offender. Past research has compared the victimisation of mentally ill individuals with the general population (e.g. Hiday et al, 1999; Jacobson, 1989; Silver, 2002; Darves-Bornoz, Lemperiere, Degiovanni & Gaillard, 1995; Jacobson & Richardson, 1987; Marley & Buila, 2001; Lehman & Linn, 1984). However, people suffering from mental illnesses are often from low socio-economic backgrounds, leaving them vulnerable to victimisation through lifestyle (Hiday, 1995; Silver, 2000). The current study compared mental health individuals with a sample of undergraduate students. Students often experience low socio-economic status and a lifestyle, which leads them to be more at risk from victimisation through exposure. Indeed, studies have found that students experience high victimisation relative to the general population (Barberet, Fisher, Farrell & Taylor, 2003). Consequently, it is necessary, to gauge a meaningful assessment of the victimisation of mental health individuals, to compare them to others with similar lifestyle risks. Research Questions The study focused on a number of research questions: 1. Do mental health and student samples differ in rates of victimisation? It may be expected that people with mental illness experience more victimisation than others (e.g. Jacobson, 1989; Silver, 2000). Few studies have looked at this within a community sample and no other studies known to the researchers have compared a mental health population with another ‘lifestyle risk’ group. 2. Do mental illness individuals and students experience different forms of victimisation? Research suggests mental health samples experience more personal victimisation than the general population (Hiday et al, 1999; Jacobson & Richardson, Victimisation and Mental Illness 6 1987). Nevertheless, these levels might not differ from other ‘lifestyle risk’ individuals. 3. Are there gender differences in rates and types of victimisation between the two samples? Previous work reveals women with mental illness are more at risk from sexual assault than the general population, and that men are more at risk from assault than the general population (Jacobson, 1989; Marley & Buila, 2001). However, these differences may not occur between ‘lifestyle risk’ groups. 4. Do mental health individuals and students differ in attitude to the police? If those with mental illness display more negative attitudes to the police than the student sample, they may be less likely to report victimisation (Sparks et al, 1977). 5. Do mental health individuals and students differ in reporting their victimisation to the police? This question has implications for the perceived levels of victimisation experienced by individuals with mental illness. Method Participants: One hundred and twenty participants participated in this study. The mental health sample consisted of 40 participants (22 female and 18 male). The student sample consisted of 80 participants (46 female and 34 male), none of who had mental health problems. The mental health participants were service users from 21 national charities and organisations and had a mean age of 42.28 years (SD = 11.27). Of the sample 32.5% suffered from depression, 15% suffered manic depression, 12.5% suffered schizophrenia and 12.5% had a dual diagnoses. Individual diagnoses included personality, anxiety and eating disorders. The mental health participants were mainly white (97.5%) the remainder were Black (2.5%). The student sample was recruited by opportunity sampling at a university campus. The mean age of the students was 22.14 years (SD = 2.74) and they were predominately white (87.5%). Other ethnic backgrounds included, Asian (5.1%), Black (2.5%), and Other unspecified (4.9%). Materials A fifty-five-item victimisation questionnaire was adapted from the British Crime Survey (BCS, 2000) and the National Crime and Victimization Survey (NCVS, 2000). Reliability Victimisation and Mental Illness 7 analysis revealed the scale had a high internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha= .82). The scale had four sections. The first two focused on property and personal crime experiences in the previous 12 months and included quantitive and qualitative items. Six property offences and five personal offences required ‘yes’/’no’ responses. If participant responded ‘yes’ to any item they were asked to complete four follow-up questions. The frequency of each crime was also assessed. An open-ended response revealed if they knew the perpetrator. Other items included whether the crime had been reported to the police and satisfaction with the police response. The third section was a quantitive assessment adapted from the National Crime and Victimization Survey (NCVS, 2000). Reliability analysis revealed the scale had high internal validity (Cronbach’s alpha = .87). It measured perceptions and experiences of the police by asking participants how much they agreed with statements such as, ‘I think that the police are never around when you need them. Questions in the first half were positively worded and items in the second half negatively worded to control for acquiescence biases. The final section consisted of ten demographic items assessing age, sex, occupation and ethnicity. Procedure A pilot study conducted using 20 students revealed no comprehension problems with the scales. The materials were then sent to service users via the 21 mental health organizations. Participants were given an information sheet about the study, an informed consent form, a de-briefing sheet and a participant number, which could be used to identify the questionnaire should the participant decide to withdraw from the study. The mental health sample was supplied with pre-paid envelopes to return completed questionnaires. The students were approached directly by the researchers and after consenting to take part in the study completed the questionnaires alone returning them directly to the researcher when complete. Ethical considerations Several ethical issues had to be considered in conducting this study due to its sensitive nature and the potential vulnerability of participants. The voluntary nature of participation was made clear throughout the information, consent forms and debriefing sheets. Participants were fully informed of their rights to withdraw at any time. Informed consent was sought from all participants. To ensure confidentiality and anonymity, questionnaires were Victimisation and Mental Illness 8 numbered and kept separate from consent forms. Respondents were given the researchers details should they want to withdraw or ask any further questions Results Demographic data: Demographic data showed that 86.95% of the mental health sample was not employed. Of these 32.5% claimed they were unable to work because of their illness. A further 10.5% were in part-time employment and 2.6% claimed to be studying. and none were employed full- time. In contrast, 16.3% of students had full time jobs and 3.8% had part time jobs. Of the mental health sample 40% rented property from the council and 15% lived in residential homes or units. Most of the student sample (62.6%) rented a house or flat from a private landlord and a further 26.3% lived in halls of residence. Nearly a third of the mental health participants (32.5%) and 61.3% of students owned either a car or bicycle. Victimisation rates: Of the total sample 42.5% had experienced victimisation in the previous 12 months (N = 51). Half (50%) the mental health sample and just over a third (39.7) of students reported being victimised at least once. Repeated victimisation: Of those who reported victimisation, 25.8% were victimised more than once (N = 31). Of these, 9 (5.8%) reported being victimised more than four times in the previous 12 months. An Independent t-test revealed that mental health participants experienced more repeat victimisation (M= 5.56) than students (M=3.27), t(21.57) = 2.624, p < .05. Victim offender relationship: Of the repeat victim students 14% were victimised by their friends or partners, 52% were victimised by strangers and 4.8% were victimised by people they knew by sight, such as neighbours. None of the student sample reported being victimised by a family member. Of the mental health repeat victims 23.8% were victimised by family members, 19% by friends or partners, 33.3% by strangers and 19% by people they knew by sight. Research Questions: 1. Do mental health and student samples differ in rates of victimisation? Victimisation and Mental Illness 9 An Independent t-test with equal variances not assumed, revealed that mental health participants experienced higher rates of victimisation in the previous 12 months (M= 1.89, SD= 2.82) than did students (M=0.81, S=1.44), t(46.4) = 2.23, p < .05, さ=.06, power=.78. 2. Do mental illness individuals and students experience different forms of victimisation? The forms of victimisation were collapsed into either ‘personal’(e.g. physical and sexual assault) or ‘property’ victimisation. An Independent t-test using equal variances not assumed revealed that mental health participants experienced more personal victimisation (M=1.03, SD=1.97) than students (M=.35, SD=.90), t(44.5)=2.02, p<0.05, さ=.05, power=.72. There was no difference between the mental health groups’ (M=.92, SD=1.34) and students’ (M=.46, SD=1.01)experiences of property victimisation, t(57.93) = 1.87, p = .0.067, さ=.03, power= .78. 3. Are there gender differences in rates and types of victimisation between the two samples? To examine gender differences in rates of victimisation a 2(Gender: male, female) x 2 (mental health group, students) ANOVA was conducted on victimisation scores. Results revealed a main effect of gender, F(1, 117) = 8.48, p < .005, さ=0.07, power=.82 and a main effect of the two groups F(1,117) = 7.20, p < .01, さ=.06, power=.76. There was an interaction between gender and the two groups, F(1,117) = 13.33, p < .001, さ=.10, power=.95. revealing that mental health females experience higher levels of victimisation than mental health males or students of both genders (see Figure 1). ………………………………………………………………………………………. FIGURE 1 TO GO HERE ……………………………………………………………………………………….. Victimisation and Mental Illness 10 A further 2(Gender: male/female) x 2(Mental health group/students) x 2(Personal/property victimisation) ANOVA was conducted to examine if type of victimisation was relevant. However, no main effects of victimisation type, F(1, 114) = .02, p=0.89, さ=.008, power= .052, or interactions between victimisation type and group, F(1,114)=.52, p=.47, さ=.005, power=.11, or victimisation type and gender, F(1,114)=2.31, p=.47, さ=.02, power=.33, were found. 4. Do mental health individuals and students differ in attitude to the police? An Independent t-test revealed that mental health participants (M=33.42, SD=7.54) had more negative perceptions of the police than did students (M=26.12, SD=6.49), t(116)=3.25, p<0.005, さ=.084, power=.89. 5. Do mental health individuals and students differ in reporting their victimisation to the police? An Independent t-test was used to examine differences between the two groups in reporting victimisation to the police. Results showed that mental health participants (M=1.08, SD=1.30) did not differ from students (M=.79, SD=.1.13), t(116)=1.24, p=.21, さ=.01, power=.23. Participants who reported crimes to the police were asked how dissatisfied they were with the police response. An Independent samples t-test using equal variances not assumed revealed mental health participants (M=5.18, SD=2.89) were more dissatisfied with police response than were students (M=2.41, SD=1.31), t(21)=2.91, p<.05, さ=.30, power=.82. Dissatisfied participants were asked to state why they felt this way. Typical reasons offered by students included: ‘They just filed the incident and didn’t follow it up’ (Student, 15) ‘They said they could not do anything as there was not enough officers, they said that they had too many officers in the office being pen pushers’ (Student, 71) Although both groups expressed dissatisfaction with the speed with which the police responded, or their ability to help at all, only mental health participants expressed dissatisfaction with the way that the police responded to them on a personal level. For example: Victimisation and Mental Illness 11 ‘They don’t take action or take you seriously if you suffer from mental health problems’ and ‘they were very bullying towards me’ (Mental health participant, 112) ‘They didn’t really believe me and couldn’t do anything’(Mental health participant, 140) Discussion The aim of this study was to compare victimisation experiences of mental health individuals recognised as facing a lifestyle risk of victimisation (Hiday, 1995), with students, who also face lifestyle risk of victimisation (Barberet, 2003). The first research question this study addressed was whether mental health and student samples differ in rates of victimisation. Results showed that mental health participants reported higher rates of victimisation than did students. The mental health sample also experienced more repeated victimisation . These results support previous findings comparing mental health individuals with the general population (e.g. Hiday et al, 1999; Marley & Buila, 1999; Silver, 2002). Although the student sample and the mental health sample were arguably equally vulnerable to lifestyle risk, there were some fundamental differences between the two groups. None of the mental health sample had full time occupations and most received some form of State Benefit. Most mental health participants rented property from the local council. In contrast, many students worked full or part time and either rented property from private landlords, or lived in university halls of residence. Consequently, the mental health sample may have encountered additional social factors associated with risk of victimisation, such as, unemployment (Laub, 1997; Wohlfarth, 2001) and renting from a local council (Hope et al, 2001). Nevertheless, the mean age of students was considerably lower than the mental health sample. Research reveals that age is negatively related to victimisation (Laub, 1997; Mawby, 1988) and so it could be expected that students’ risk of victimisation would be increased because they were younger. If students’ age risk and lifestyle risk are taken into consideration, the higher rate of victimisation experienced by mental health individuals is particularly surprising. The second research question addressed by this study examined the type of victimisation experienced by the two groups. Results revealed mental health participants experienced higher levels of personal victimisation than did students. This also supports earlier findings that individuals with mental illness experience more personal victimisation Victimisation and Mental Illness 12 than the general population (Hiday et al, 1999; Jacobson, 1989; Silver, 2002). Previous work employed participants with severe mental illness, or psychiatric inpatients (Cascardi et al, 1996; Hiday et al, 1999; Jacobson, 1989). In contrast, participants in the current study lived in the community and suffered from less severe illnesses. Previous work suggests that visible symptoms (e.g. Hiday et al, 1999) or bizarre behaviour (e.g. Agnew, 1992; Silver, 2002) increases chances of victimisation. For instance, someone who is suffering from active psychosis may be more vulnerable to personal victimisation than someone with depression. The current study’s results dispels this possibility by revealing that all forms of mental ill health result in vulnerability to personal victimisation by others and that this applies as much to community-based individuals as it does to hospitalised patients. The third research question examined gender differences between and within the two groups. Results showed that women in the mental health group were victimised more frequently than any other sub sample. Mental health men and male and female students did not differ from each other on rates of victimisation. This is consistent with previous research (e.g. Darves-Bornoz et al, 1995; Marley & Buila, 2001). This finding gives cause for concern especially if it is considered in light of consistent findings that, except for sexual abuse, men experience higher personal victimisation than women (Laub, 1997; Lauritsen, 2001). The finding that mental health men and women and male and female students did not differ across type of victimisation would suggest that mental health females’ overall victimisation stands out. If these results are considered together with the high levels of family victimisers cited by the mental health participants, it could be suggested that mental health females are particularly vulnerable to victimisation in a personal and material sense perhaps by family as well as friends and strangers. Clearly, the results indicate that women with mental health problems living in the community are especially vulnerable to victimisation in a way that mental health men and male and female students are not. This finding may also be an underestimation, since domestic or sexual abuse, crimes often committed by a partner or family members, frequently remain unreported (Cascardi et al, 1996; Kilpatrick et al, 1987; Young, 1988). However, it must be borne in mind that men are less willing to report victimisation than women (Walklate, 1997). Perhaps, the men in the current study were also reluctant to reveal the extent of victimisation they experienced and this shaped the results. Nevertheless, the high levels of victimisation experienced by mental health females reveal a vulnerability that warrants further examination. Victimisation and Mental Illness 13 The fourth research question addressed in this study concerned attitudes to the police. The mental health group held more negative attitudes to the police than did the students. Interestingly, previous research shows that people of all ages, including adolescents (Murray & Thompson, 1985) often hold favourable attitudes to the police (Aye Maung, 1995; Sparks et al, 1977). However, victims of crime tend to express more negative opinions of the police than non-victims (Sparks et al, 1977) as do people living in high crime areas (Mawby, 1980). As a result, the higher crime rates experienced in the mental health sample and the areas in which they live could explain the negative attitudes expressed. A further point to consider could be the experiences mental health individuals had of the police. Some claimed to be continually stopped by the police for no obvious reason. Other mental health individuals claimed that because they had a mental health problem the police were unhelpful. In contrast students, who were dissatisfied with the police did not claim the police were unhelpful. Instead, they felt the police were hindered by lack of resources resulting in an inefficient service. This requires further attention. Poor relations between the police and individuals with mental illness may affect reporting of crimes by this group (Sparks et al, 1977). Finally, the present study investigated differences between the two groups in reporting victimisation to the police. No differences were found. This is surprising given the more negative attitudes to the police held by mental health individuals. However, if an offence is perceived as serious, it is more likely to be reported to the police (Laub, 1997). For instance, all the women in the mental health sample who reported that they had been the victim of sexual assault maintained that they had been raped and reported the offence to the police. In contrast, female students who reported being sexually assaulted did not mention rape and many claimed the incident was too trivial to report. Thus, it seems mental health individuals often experience more serious crimes they feel compelled to report. Other than to speculate on this possibility is beyond the scope of the current study, however, this is an area that clearly requires further attention. Implications of this study The findings reported in this study have wider implications. The high level of victimisation reported by the mental health sample is cause for concern. Currently it is not clear if those who live in supported housing are included in the British Crime Survey. If they are not then the victimisation of these individuals will remain a hidden figure. Even if they Victimisation and Mental Illness 14 are they are not considered as a distinct group and so the issue of their victimisation remains cloudy at best. A further implication concerns the negative perceptions of the police evident in the mental health sample. This finding points to the importance of improving police relations with mental health individuals. One of the main ways in which police are alerted to criminal activity is through reporting (Greenberg, Ruback & Westcott, 1982). However, if the police fail to take seriously the complaints of those with mental health problems then they are likely to remain oblivious to at least some crimes. A further consequence could be that mental health patients stop reporting to the police with obvious consequences for the clean-up rates of crimes against this particular group. Similarly, perpetrators of crimes against mental health individuals may be aware of police responses and be encouraged to select victims with mental health problems as easy targets. In this way, mental health individuals are doubly vulnerable: perpetrators target them and the police doubt them. Awareness of this group’s vulnerability should also be a focal point for those working with mental health individuals. Training on how to assist victims may help the way victimisation is dealt with. Recognising the vulnerability of individuals with mental health problems may help challenge the stigma that those with mental illness are a danger to the public by pointing out the less obvious contrary position. Methodological Limitations There are several limiting factors associated with the present study. Methodological limitations of self-report studies must be borne in mind. Instances such as forgetting and telescoping, or recalling incidents that happened more than 12 months ago, may have influenced results (Wohlfarth et al, 2001). Schneider (1981) underlines that minor offences are less likely to be telescoped than major offences and this could mean a larger proportion of serious victimisation was reported compared to less serious offences. An interesting point suggested by Winkel et al (2003), concerns mood congruence effects. This suggests unhappy individuals may be more inclined to recall negative events (Winkel et al, 2003). In the current study many individuals in the mental health sample were suffering from depression that may have shaped their responses according to their mood. Nevertheless, although such possibilities need to be considered there was nothing in the current study to suggest that mental health patients’ responses were influenced by anything other than facts. A further limitation could be that individuals may have agreed to take part in the study because they had experienced victimisation. This may have biased the results to Victimisation and Mental Illness 15 include a higher proportion of victims of crime. Coleman and Moynihan (2000) state that the ‘incentive to participate in a victimisation survey could have been stronger for victims than non-victims’ (pp. 76). On the other hand, it could also be suggested that victims are less inclined to participate (Mayhew, Aye Maung, & Mirrlees-Black, 1993). Nonetheless, such response biases would apply to both mental health individuals and students and so comparisons are still justified. Finally, the present study required respondents were literate in order to complete the questionnaire. This may mean individuals who were less literate did not take part. To overcome this problem, future studies should, perhaps, adopt an interview design, such as that used in the British Crime Survey. Future Research There are a number of promising avenues for future research. Future studies should perhaps focus on the outcomes of victimisation for people with mental health problems. Future studies could broaden the issues raised in this study by examining victims’ perceptions not only of the police, but also of other areas in the Criminal Justice System. A larger sample size would allow more detailed analysis and to separate out different mental health problems to see if levels of victimisation relate to specific mental health problems. It may be possible also to examine perpetrators of crime to see if people with mental health problems are targeted because of their illness, and if so could these be classed as hate crimes. Hate crimes are defined as ‘harm inflicted on a victim by an offender whose motivation derives primarily from hatred directed at some apparent characteristic of the victim’ (Garofalo, 1997). To conclude, the present study has examined victimisation experienced by individuals with mental health problems in comparison to a student sample. It found that individuals with mental health problems are frequently the victims of crime and experience higher victimisation rates than a student population. Women in the mental health sample experienced the highest victimisation rates in the study. The mental health sample held more negative attitudes to the police than did students. Clearly, victimisation of people with mental health problems requires more attention. This may lead to improving services for victims of crime with mental health problems and ultimately a reduction in the levels of crime this vulnerable group of people experience. Victimisation and Mental Illness 16 References Agnew, R. (1992). Foundation for a general strain theory of crime and delinquency. Criminology, 30, 47-87. Aye Maung, N. (1995). Young people, victimisation and the police: British Crime Survey findings on experiences and attitudes of 12 to 15 year olds. London: HMSO (HORS No. 140). Barberet, R., Fisher, B.S., Farrell, G., & Taylor, H. (2003). University student safety. London: HMSO (HORS No. 194). BBC News (2003, 17 June) South East is ‘safest place’. http://newsa.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/england/3073787.stm. Berliner, L., & Conte, J.R. (1990). 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The 1992 British Crime Survey. London: HMSO (HORS No. 132). McDevitt, J., Levin, J., & Bennett, S. (2002). Hate crime offenders: An expanded typology. Journal of Social Issues, 58 (2), 303-317. Victimisation and Mental Illness 19 Miethe, T.D., Stafford, M.C., & Sloane, D. (1990). Lifestyle changes and risks of criminal victimisation. Journal of Qualitative Criminology, 6 (4), 357-376. Mirowsky, J., & Ross, C.E. (1983). “Paranoia and the structure of powerlessness.” American Sociological Review, 48, 228-239. Murray, C., & Thompson, F. (1985). The representation of authority: An adolescent viewpoint. Journal of Adolescence, 8, 217-229. Schneider, A.L. (1981). Methodological problems in victim surveys and their implications for research in victimology. The Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology, 72 (2), 818-838. Shelter (1999) Mental health and homelessness. Shelter Fact Sheet. http://www.shelter.org.uk/housing/factsheets/index.asp. Silver, E. (2000). 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(1998) Violence by people discharged from acute psychiatric inpatient facilities and by others in the same neighbourhoods. Archives of General Psychiatry, 55, 393-401. Stephenson, G.M. (1992). The psychology of criminal justice. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd. Swanson, J.W. (1994). Mental disorder, substance abuse, and community violence: An epidemiological approach. In J. Monahan & H.J. Steadman (Eds.). Violence and mental disorder (pp. 101-136). Chicago: University of Chicago press. Van Dijk, J.J.M. (1994). Understanding crime rates: On the interactions between the rational choices of victims and offenders. British Journal of Criminology, 34 (2), 105-120. http://www.shelter.org.uk/housing/factsheets/index.asp Victimisation and Mental Illness 20 Walklate, S. (1997). Risk and criminal victimisation: A modernist dilemma? British Journal of Criminology, 37 (1), 35-45. Walsh, E., Buchanan, A., & Fahy, T. (2002). Violence and schizophrenia: Examining the evidence. British Journal of Psychiatry, 180, 490-495. Weaver, F.M., & Carroll, J.S. (1985) Crime prevention in a natural setting by expert and novice shoplifters. Social Psychology Quarterly, 48, (4), 349-359. Williams, C. (1993) Vulnerable Victims? A current awareness of the victimisation of people with learning disabilities. Disability, Handicap & Society, 8 (2), 161-171. Wilson, C. & Brewer, N. (1992). The incidence of criminal victimisation of individuals with an intellectual disability. Australian Psychologist, 27 (2), 114-117. Wilton, R.D. (2003). Poverty and mental health: A qualitative study of residential care facility tenants. Community Mental Health Journal, 39 (2), 139-156. Wohlfarth, T., Winkel, F.W., Ybema, J.F., & van den Brink, W. (2001). The relationship between socio-economic inequality and criminal victimisation: A prospective study. Social Psychiatry and Psychiatric Epidemiology, 36, 361-370. Young, J. (1988). Risk of crime and fear of crime: A realist critique of survey-based assumptions. In M. Maguire, & J. Pointing (Eds.), Victims of crime: A new deal (pp.164- 176). Milton Keynes: Open University Press. Victimisation and Mental Illness 21 Figure Captions Figure 1: Victimisation by group and gender. 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 Mental Health Sample Student Sample M ea n v ic ti m is at io n s co re Male Female 
work_6pld74uu2reuznlozodkyrsfeq	----	Durham Research Online Deposited in DRO: 01 March 2011 Version of attached �le: Accepted Version Peer-review status of attached �le: Peer-reviewed Citation for published item: Pain, R.H. (2010) 'The new geopolitics of fear.', Geography compass., 4 (3). pp. 226-240. Further information on publisher's website: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1749-8198.2009.00295.x Publisher's copyright statement: The de�nitive version is available at wileyonlinelibrary.com. 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Durham University Library, Stockton Road, Durham DH1 3LY, United Kingdom Tel : +44 (0)191 334 3042 | Fax : +44 (0)191 334 2971 https://dro.dur.ac.uk https://www.dur.ac.uk http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1749-8198.2009.00295.x http://dro.dur.ac.uk/7379/ https://dro.dur.ac.uk/policies/usepolicy.pdf https://dro.dur.ac.uk 1 The new geopolitics of fear Abstract This century, linked to a series of geopolitical events and phenomena, an array of new fears have come to prominence. A number of academic and popular commentators have named and analysed these fears, and predicted their reach and effects on people in western countries. However, these accounts have often lacked grounding in evidence that is mounting elsewhere on the everyday sites where emotions and geopolitics meet. This paper brings together a range of evidence from social research about western fears connected to the war on/of terror. First, through examining survey evidence since 2001, I suggest that fear of terrorism in the west tends to be overblown, and that fear close to the sites of terrorism should be viewed as exceptional rather than routinised or dispersed. Second, I explore a growing body of research that shows those most affected by fear in the current geopolitical climate are marginalised minority groups. Finally, I identify recent writing on alternative geopolitics which points to some original and hopeful directions for conceptual and empirical work on fear. The new geopolitics of fear This century, linked to a series of geopolitical phenomena including the war on/of terror 1 , immigration, the potential of global disease epidemics, and environmental and financial crises, an array of new fears have come to prominence (Bauman 2006; Beck 2002; Furedi, 2006, 2007; Hartmann et al 2005; Hujsmans 2006; Isin 2004; Robin 2004; Svendsen 2008). Commentators writing from a range of disciplines have named these fears, analysed them, and made predictions about the effects they have on domestic and foreign policy and community relations in western countries (in human geography, see for example Bialasiewicz et al 2007; Graham 2001, 2004; Gregory and Pred 2007; Ingram 2008; Katz 2007; Pain and Smith 2008a; Sparke 2007). This has constituted a relatively large scale and rapid shift in the political and social sciences - especially since 2001 – so that the language of emotions, particularly fear, is now popularly deployed in analyses of global events. 2 Much of this literature has been valuable in highlighting the oppressive and inequitable effects of globalization, securitization and the war on/of terror. But academic research is sometimes also complicit in contributing to a wider public and political discourse which elsewhere I discuss as ‘globalised fear’ (Pain 2009). Critiquing the explanations and processes commonly cited in the new geopolitics of fear literatures, I describe their treatment of fear as ‘global’ in two senses. First, in that emotions are positioned as primarily being produced and circulating on a global scale, rather than rooted in the existing biographies of places and their social relations; and second, in that they tend to be discussed as though they apply to everyone all of the time. Globalised fear is a ‘metanarrative *that+ tends to constitute fear as omnipresent and connected, yet at the same time analyses it remotely, lacking grounding, embodiment or emotion’ (Pain 2009, 467). Earlier critiques within feminist international relations and political science raised related concerns, noting that theories of international politics and security make unfounded, damaging and unproblematized assumptions about the pattern and causality of people’s emotions (Crawford 2000; see also Bleiker and Hutchison 2008). More broadly, for Ling (2000), the narratives still present in globalization research construct subjects in hierarchical and disempowering ways that echo colonial relations. In geography, most of the analysis by political geographers has been ploughing a furrow that runs parallel, but is completely separate, to recent interest in the rich texture and implications of emotional geographies (Anderson and Smith 2001; Davidson and Milligan 2004; Davidson et al 2005). There are a handful of exceptions, including Pain and Smith’s (2008a) collection, and work on affective geographies and the war on/of terror (e.g. Lim 2007 and Thrift 2007). The latter tends to be speculative rather than examining people’s grounded experiences with them (see Pain 2009 for a fuller critique). Elsewhere in the social sciences, spanning geography, sociology and criminology, much longer standing bodies of work on fear of crime have significant implications for understanding the ‘new’ global fears that are largely untapped (Altheide 2003; Koskela 2009; Mythen and Walklate 2006; Pain 2008, 2009). 3 Focusing on western fears in relation to the war on/of terror, this paper brings together a range of research evidence in order to evaluate political scientists’ recent claims about the reach and nature of geopolitical fear, and to act as a springboard for alternative conceptual framings. Much of the empirical evidence tells a story that diverges from recent high profile texts on the new geopolitics of fear. For example, Bauman (2006) and Furedi (2007) provide carefully drawn accounts of how risk may be constructed in modern societies, but are problematic in assuming whether and how people experience and deal with fear. Both view fear as a constant, ubiquitous condition of modern societies, but it is diffuse and imprecise: ‘’fear’ is the name we give to our uncertainty: to our ignorance of the threat and what is to be done‘ (Bauman 2006, 2). However, neither references empirical work in making assertions about fear of terrorism in the west. From a view of the risk society that, like Beck’s and Bauman’s, foregrounds individualization, Furedi suggests that twenty-first century fear is new, in that ‘we fear alone because of the difficulties we have in constructing a moral consensus’; this has ‘forced individuals to look for their own systems of meaning’ (100-101). He does not reflect on the inequalities between social groups living in the west in their relation to fear, which significant and longstanding bodies of knowledge about other fears strongly suggests. This paper unashamedly focuses on a range of empirical evidence which casts light on the new geopolitics of fear (a more detailed conceptual argument is given in Pain 2009). I want to avoid falling into a ‘theory versus empirics’ trap: theory and empirical work should have a complementary and reflexive relationship. But in this field, there are some sharp disparities between work taking different approaches. Some of the empirical studies I review here are limited in taking an uncritical and atheoretical approach to the issue of global fear, while some recent theorisations of fear are limited by their authors’ preference for speculation when strong empirical evidence is available. There are political as well as conceptual imperatives for more grounded analyses of fear, in considering what those so rapidly labelled ‘fearful’ have to say about their own condition, and opening up to the possibilities of resistance, hopefulness and self action. Despite this empirical focus, in the last section of the paper I draw together some of the conceptual threads encountered 4 throughout, and end on some more hopeful approaches that promote the scholarly integration of theory, politics and social action. These alternative approaches within geopolitics are contributing to a new empirical, conceptual and political agenda around fear. First, I consider two divergent bodies of work which have examined fear in the war on/of terror empirically. Through examining survey evidence in western countries since 2001, I show that fear of terrorism is nowhere near as widespread among majority populations as is sometimes implied. I suggest that fear close to the sites of terrorism is exceptional rather than becoming routinised or dispersed. I then explore a growing body of research with a stronger conceptual basis, which is showing that those most affected by fear in the current geopolitical climate are marginalised minority groups. ‘Burning with fear, terror and panic’ 3 ? Fear among majority western populations during the war on/of terror The manipulation of fear is prominent in recent analyses of the war on/of terror (Bauman 2006; Furedi 2007; Gregory and Pred 2007; Robin 2004; Sparke 2007). Al- Qaeda statements following the Madrid bombings in March 2004 2 and the London bombings in July 2005 made it clear that widespread fear among the population was one of the goals of the attacks. In reporting the aftermath of terrorist attacks, the media validated the suggestion that western fears of terrorism are widespread (Altheide 2003), and government leaders have both sought to reflect this fear, and instil it further, in speeches and election campaigns. There have been remarkably few challenges from critical academics to the assertion that western countries are ‘burning with fear, terror and panic’. This is despite previous research on fear in criminology, sociology and geography strongly suggesting that events and discourses do not automatically breed fear, and that populations reflect on, put into perspective and resist threatening phenomena (Pain 2009). To be fair, evidence on the question of terrorism-related fears has emerged only slowly since 2001. We should be cautious, too, in accepting empirical evidence 5 as providing a somehow ‘truer’ account, given the methodological problems inherent in many of the studies I discuss in this section. Emotions are slippery when attempts are made to measure them at a point in time and space (Bleiker and Hutchison 2008; Lupton and Tulloch 1999). Importantly, in relation to terrorism, there is a difference between fear and trauma. All the evidence shows what we might expect: that being caught up in a terrorist attack, or living or working close to where one occurs, is a hugely traumatic experience. For example, on human suffering during and after the London bombings, see the London Assembly (2006) report, John Tulloch’s (2006) account of his own experience, and Jenny Edkins’ accounts of relatives searching for casualties after the New York and London attacks (2007, 2008). But what happens in the medium and long term, in terms of emotions among the wider population? Have western populations in general become more fearful, in the way that prominent commentators such as Bauman (2007), Furedi (2007), Isin (2004) and others writing the new geopolitics of fear literature have implied? Answering this question is not straightforward, because there is relatively little intensive research on public emotions and terrorism. The studies reviewed in this section largely use opinion surveys, and some of their findings are contradictory. Many are located within medical and psychological paradigms, which inevitably tend to clinicalise emotions and reactive behaviour. Fear is sometimes measured against a benchmark of ‘rational’ or ‘reasoned’ behaviour/feeling, a dichotomy that elsewhere in the social sciences is widely viewed as unrealistic (see Lupton and Tulloch 1999; Sparks 1992). Many studies use the types of question which, when used to measure fear of crime in the past, have been subject to swingeing critiques for inviting over- simplistic and problematic assumptions about process and causality, given the complexity and situation of emotions in particular biographies, places and time (Pain 2000). As Bleiker and Hutchison (2008) argue, a much wider array of methods are needed if we are to scratch beneath the surface of the relation between world politics and emotion. These might include, for example, qualitative methods such as interviews or ethnographies, or different approaches including activist and 6 participatory research where knowledge is co-produced with those traditionally seen as research subjects. I return to some of these issues at the end of this paper. Nonetheless, studies of fear have followed recent terrorist attacks on targets in New York (2001), Bali (2002), Madrid (2004) and London (2005). Taking the evidence as a whole at face value, five main findings emerge which have relevance to this paper. First, fear is only one of several emotions engendered by terrorism. Reporting on the emotions experienced by the general population in the two months following the Madrid bombings, Conejero and Etxebarria (2007) found emotional reactions among the population including sadness, disgust, anger and contempt, but fear to a lesser degree. Fischhoff et al (2003) and Small et al (2006) also identify a range of emotions among Americans after the New York attacks. Secondly, fear is relatively high in the short term aftermath and geographically close to attack sites, but declines sharply with time and distance. Rubin et al (2005) found substantial stress amongst Londoners within the fortnight following the bombings, especially but not confined to those who had been directly affected in some way, and a stated intention to travel less by public transport. However, three months later, a larger government survey found that the vast majority of respondents had not changed their travel behaviour (Department for Transport 2006). Clearly, some people do not have any choice about how they travel, but the findings still substantiate very little evidence of fear in terms of changes in behaviour. In New York, higher levels of fear seem to have persisted for longer: Boscarino et al (2003) report that one year later New Yorkers were still very concerned about further terrorist, biological or nuclear attacks. Those living downstate (closer to the bombing site) were most fearful. Across the United States, Stein et al (2004) report that two months after the attacks, 16% reported persistent terrorism-related psychological distress. Huddy et al’s (2002) study showed that while a substantial number of Americans appraised the risk of further attacks as high, only a small minority had significant levels of fear and anxiety after six months. Murray and Stein (no date, cited in West and Orr 2005) report that people in Houston were far less concerned about terrorism than people in New York, while Fischhoff et al. (2003) report that 7 after one year had elapsed, respondents thought that future bombings were considerably less likely to happen. In a comparison of British and Australian fears about terrorism during the Iraq war, British fears were initially higher, but declined significantly after the end of the war (Todd et al 2005). Thirdly, insofar as comparisons are meaningful, the proportions who say that they are scared of terrorist attacks happening in these surveys are low; generally it is only small minorities of the population who report being very fearful compared with common responses to crime surveys about fear of crime, especially in high risk areas (BCS 2007). Fourthly, to date, fear as measured in these surveys has been considerably higher in the US than elsewhere, which may be explained by the scale of the loss of life in the New York attacks; a greater sense of panic among the media (Debrix 2008); or a combination of factors which underlie the particular ways American feelings (to generalise for a moment) interact with global events. Such findings provoke much informal speculation, but have not been subject to detailed research. Fifthly, although the implications are rarely drawn out by these authors, fear is higher among certain social groups. These include, in particular, those who are socially and economically marginalised, and racialized and religious minorities. After the London bombings, Muslims felt more fearful than other groups (Rubin et al 2005). In New York, it was women, those on lower incomes and those from non- white ethnic groups (Boscarino et al 2003). In West and Orr’s (2005) study in Providence, three hours away from New York, older people and those with low levels of educational attainment were more afraid of future attacks. Several studies also compare levels of fear with political and ideological leanings: West and Orr (2005) found conservatives and Republicans to be more fearful. In contrast, others have found that those who are more fearful do not support recent US military interventions (Boscarino et al 2003) and are more pessimistic about the state’s ability to cope with the risk of terrorism (Fischhoff et al 2003). 8 Geography has a fundamental role to play in understanding these patterns and, in so doing, rethinking ‘globalised’ fear. After all, it is well known that terrorism is an extremely rare occurrence in western countries. Further, we know that the extent and nature of fear is highly dependent on the context, details and broader structural relation of people’s lives, which shape how they relate and respond to more visible incidents. For example, the fear of crime literature suggests that when single frightening incidents occur in places which are otherwise relatively safe and privileged, the long term outlook for fear is negligible, and people are far better equipped to cope with its effects. Terrorist activity and government brutality in countries where they are more commonplace, and where everyday life is more violent and precarious, understandably create far more fear among the wider population, as a number of geographers have outlined (see for example Abu Zhara 2008; Hyndman 2007; Megoran 2008; Oslender 2007; Wright 2008). However, socio- cultural gulfs between London or New York and other locations in the UK or US affect any scaling up or generalisation about how bomb attacks might affect the wider population (see for example Pain et al 2009). Overall, notwithstanding the methodological difficulties of these studies, they suggest that fear of terrorism is nowhere near as widespread among majority populations as the media and parts of the geopolitics literature have implied. There is even a muted sense of disappointment in some of their conclusions. A study of African-American teenagers in Georgia three months after 2001 New York attacks found they were ‘not overly stressed…perhaps owing to the temporal, social and/or geographical distance from the event’ (Barnes et al 2005, 201). Those teenagers who were stressed were found to have existing clinical dispositions or conditions. Beyond such general statements in this section of the literature, there is little attempt at interpretation; as human geographers we might want to ask searching questions about emotions, place and identity in relation to the lives of these Georgian teenagers, and develop methods commensurate with this task. Yet, as the few studies show that have been conducted away from bombing sites and away from the geopolitical core show, there is a case for considering fear of 9 terrorism in the west as exceptional, rather than routinised or diffused. If we left it there, we might argue for the decentring of the terrorist threat against the west in theorisations of fear. Global risks and threats do not map neatly onto local fears; it is a much more complex relationship, deserving of more intensive research. Unequal fears: fear among minority western populations during the war on/of terror The second body of evidence around fear and the war on/of terror is considerably more nuanced, methodologically and conceptually. Several of the studies reviewed below aim to give voice to the objects and subjects of fear. This is an important intellectual, empirical and political strategy to augment – and sometimes counter - the conclusions of the disparate bodies of literature I have considered so far. A pertinent question for critical geographers is who might have become a more fearful subject where during the war on/of terror. Indeed these questions are indicated, if obliquely and accidentally, by some of the studies in the previous section. Any assumption of widespread fear tends to homogenise populations, but globalised fear is constructed and perceived as part of the condition of whiteness (Pain 2009). In contrast, many scholars have suggested that the war on/of terror has actually had most impacts on marginalised groups in the west, especially visible minority groups (see Askins 2008) identified on the grounds of race, ethnicity or religion. Poynting et al (2004) ask what preconditions have allowed the emergence of a ‘culture of fear’ in western societies and its deployment to further certain political agendas; they suggest it has close relation with and contingency upon particular nations’ anxieties about racial and ethnic dimensions. Locating fear within those populations who are commonly demonised and feared themselves is one way of exposing this. In so doing, it is important to be aware of the disempowering effects of labelling certain people fearful; it can reinforce the association with victimhood, and overlook agency, resistance and self-action. I now examine some of this work, which tends to be more theoretically informed, locally based, and uses nuanced qualitative techniques of investigation, before sounding a note of caution. 10 Some care is needed here, as much of this work examines experiences of violence, abuse, harassment and discrimination without exploring fear itself; while some also focuses explicitly on fear. Many studies document increased violence against Muslims and Arabs in the west in the aftermath of terrorist attacks (Dunn et al 2007; Hopkins 2004, 2007c; Human Rights First 2008; Kwan 2008; Poynting and Noble 2004; Sander 2006; Sirin and Fine 2007. For example, Ahmad (2002, 101) charts ‘unrelenting, multivalent assault on the bodies, psyches, and rights of Arab, Muslim and South Asian immigrants’ across the United States immediately after the 2001 New York attacks. Islamophobia peaks at particular times, especially during the series of ‘security scares’ which the UK has experienced before and since the 2005 London bombings, and at these moments Muslims feel more fear both of the possibility of terrorist attacks, and of everyday abuse. Yet a longer term process of the racialization of Islam in a number of western countries has set in since 2001 (Dunn et al 2007; Hopkins and Smith 2008), leading to a malaise of routinized, normalized harassment and discrimination (Pederson et al 2006; Poynting and Noble 2004). As well as physical or verbal incidents, many researchers have documented a generalized feeling of insecurity and discomfort. Noble (2005) discusses the cumulative impact of the ‘small things’; uncivil behaviour towards Muslim and Arab Australians from neighbours, police, fellow workers or students, drawing on Giddens’ notion of ontological security to develop a notion of comfort. This echoes feminists’ analysis of the spectrum of systemic violence, where small acts relate to violence through engendering a sense of ‘structural vulnerability’ (Stanko 1990; Young 1990). Bodily markers that are perceived to denote Muslimness, such as men’s beards or women’s veils, speech, and markers in the visual landscape such as mosques determine targets and places for attacks and abuse (Hopkins 2004; Poynting and Noble 2004; Sander 2006). This emphasis on visual cues means that it is not just Muslims who suffer ‘anti-Muslim’ racist acts (see Puar 2007). These ‘new’ hate crimes reflect a much wider and longstanding racism (McAuliffe 2007), and enter already multiply-layered experiences of fear and associated constraint for particular groups, as Green and Singleton’s (2007) study of young South Asian women 11 demonstrates. Recognising diversity among Muslims is crucial in these analyses. There is much evidence that women suffer most abuse on the streets (Poynting and Noble 2004), partly because those who wear a veil become more visibly ‘Islamic’ (Ang 2002; Hopkins 2004; Kwan 2008; Sander 2006). Although there may be ‘a stunning lack of curiosity about masculinities’ in academic narratives about terrorism in the west (Enloe 2006; and see Hunt and Rygiel 2006 on the absence of gendered analysis more generally in the war on/of terror), important recent work such as Dwyer et al (2008), Hopkins (2006), Mohammed (2005) and Noble (2007) has explored the texture of Muslim masculinities and femininities in a changing geopolitical climate. Fear itself becomes materialised in different ways (Pain and Smith 2008b), one of which is the effects that it has on mobility, behaviour and lifestyle as well as emotional disposition. Fear engendered by the war on/of terror and associated hate crimes can be charted through a series of actions and adaptations of targeted communities, ranging from avoidance of certain spaces, constraining one’s appearance and behaviour in public space to cultural and political accommodation (Ahmad 2002; Kwan 2008). Fear cuts across different places, resulting in self- and forced exclusion. In a nuanced study, Hopkins (2004, 2007c) describes significant effects on young Scottish Muslim men’s emotional geographies and use of public spaces, while for young American Muslims the war on/of terror and the volatile geopolitical climate has conscientized the daily active negotiation of multiple identities (Sirin and Fine 2007). Such strategies echo those of other marginalised groups in the west who experience higher than average levels of fear of crime (Pain 2000; Stanko 1990). The geographical bounding so clear in studies of fear of terrorism on majority populations is noticeably absent: in Australia, Poynting and Noble (2004, 18) have identified ‘a pervasive landscape of fear and incivility fundamentally alters the social opportunities for Australian Arabs and Muslims to function as citizens’. Meanwhile, while growing spatial segregation between Muslims and majority white populations in western cities may be popularly identified as evidence of growing fearfulness or wish to be separate, it is more a product of discrimination and Islamophobia (Phillips 2006; see also Hopkins and Smith 2008). 12 Anti-terrorism and anti-Muslim feelings in the west have collided with growing unease about the consequences of international migration from poorer countries, and especially the demonization of asylum seekers and refugees (Ang 2002; Haldrup et al 2008; Noble 2005; Poynting et al 2004). Anti-Islamic media coverage in Europe and US after terrorist attacks has been partly to blame for increased hate crimes (Sander 2006). As Poynting et al (2004) put it, the Arab Other has become a contemporary folk devil, and the media racialize particular neighbourhoods, construct them as Muslim and places of violence/crime (Dunn et al 2007). Strong antipathy towards asylum seekers, and especially those from Muslim countries, has grown since late 1990s and has been encouraged by government statements and policy (Dunn et al 2007). It undoubtedly feeds into commonplace violence and abuse against these groups (Amas and Crosland 2006). Immigration, terrorism and racism become conflated in people’s own interpretations of their experiences of violence in public space (Pain et al 2009; Poynting and Noble 2007). Moreover, the political and social landscape that sexual minorities in the US navigate has shifted, as heteronormative discourses about home and family emerge from government strategies that produce and reproduce fear in the war on/of terror (Cowen and Gilbert 2008; see also Puar 2007). When it comes to the very tangible fear effects of the war on/of terror on racialized and religious minorities, western governments fail to protect the vulnerable, and enact policies that further victimize them. For the Arab immigrant communities in Staeheli and Nagel’s (2008) study, government securitization strategies have increased fear. Western government policies are failing to keep pace with the rising violent hate crime documented above (Human Rights First 2008). Terrorism and racism have become implicated in the detail and justification of migration restrictions (Hujsmans 2006; Hyndman and Mountz 2007), as has targeting under stop and search laws. State actions including increasingly harsh restrictions on ‘Muslim-looking’ people (Olund 2007; Robin 2004) further increase hate crimes. Meanwhile, anti-terrorist legislation is widely regarded as deleterious to the civil 13 liberties of Muslims in the west (for example, see Robin 2004 on the US context), which also increases rather than allays fear for these groups. Historicising, spatialising, scaling fear The note of caution here is not about these findings, which chart but most likely underplay the effects of racism and xenophobia in the west. It is rather to resist the temptation to identify them primarily in relation to recent geopolitical phenomena such as the war on/of terror, which longstanding racism in these countries and places long pre-dated. There is nothing new about these twenty-first century hate crimes, although that is not to say that these fears can not be viewed as geopolitical. An historicized view sees recent everyday-global violences in relation to the west’s colonial past as well as its recent political relations with other countries (Ahmad 2002; Ang 2002; Appadurai 2006). Flint (2004), for example, is careful to place his analysis of organized racial hate groups within the ‘geohistorical context of US hegemony’ (165). These entrenched forms and effects of fear do undergo constant subtle shifts; Hopkins and Smith’s (2008) exploration of the recent recasting of relations of race and religion shows how religion is becoming increasingly racialized and the politics of fear consequently rescaled, retrenching segregation in the west. Likewise, Ahmad (2002) noted a possible shift in US race relations after the New York attacks, with some signs of greater unity and cohesion among white and black communities but greater exclusion of Arabs, Muslims and South Asians. Attention to the longevity of globalised fears does, however, place current day (re)discoveries of the spatiality, form and nature of these emotions in some perspective. Most authors cited in the previous section are not shortsighted in relation to this. At a conceptual level, what this literature contributes is movement between the global and everyday in a way that collapses their artificial scaling (Pratt and Rosner 2006). As Pain and Smith (2008b) have suggested elsewhere, it is more useful to see fear as made up of a range of multiscalar influences constituting an assemblage, rather than assuming the spatial hierarchy where global processes have local impacts on feelings. For example, Pederson et al (2006), in their examination of resurgent Orientalism in Denmark, locate fear in broader political relations between East and 14 West, but as manifested in sensuous everyday encounters between immigrants and ethnic Danes. In a study of young people’s fears in England and New Zealand, Pain et al (2009) find that their geopolitical concerns are relatively insignificant compared to longer-standing everyday concerns. Their participants were not worried about terrorism, and black and minority ethnic young people did not view the effects of the war on/of terror on everyday racism as new. Horschelmann’s work with young people (2008) demonstrates the inadequacy of the global/local binary as a way of framing emotional geographies, and Hopkins (2004, 2007a) identifies how constructions of nation, region and local community together make the experiences of young Muslim men in Scotland unique. Overall, the evidence is overwhelming that those most affected by fear in the current geopolitical climate are marginalised minority groups. Since 2001 we have not seen a new landscape or architecture of fear, nor a seachange in the relations between geopolitics and emotions. Rather, the research reviewed above suggests more of the same – unequal, excluded and hidden fears – being remade and reinscribed. The research that has been done also suggests that issues other than terrorism continue to be more important. The lesson for geopolitical analysis is that we need to place new (terrorist) threats carefully in time and space, and within existing conceptual work on social and spatial inequality. A number of geographers have explored issues relevant to fear in diverse parts of the global south (for example Abu Zhara 2008; Gregory 2004; Hyndman 2007; Megoran 2008; Oslender 2007; Wright 2008) where everyday life is more precarious and risky. Such research might be drawn into productive conversation with research on fear in the global north, as many parallels exist. Alternative geopolitics: new directions for conceptualising and researching fear ‘Just as the formal actors of international politics have been disembodied, offering a ‘spectator’ theory of knowledge, so too are their critical geopolitical commentators undifferentiated by the marks of gender, race, class, sexuality or physical ability. Critics stand at an ironic distance…without having to 15 disclose their own location. The language of critical geopolitics is presented as being as universal as that which it seeks to create, and yet it is a western form of reasoning, dominated again by white, male academics.’ (Dowler and Sharp 2001, 167). I have argued that while the mainstream critical geopolitics literatures have deployed the language of fear, they have often done so with an empirical base that is shaky or absent. Fear is largely referenced by experts rather than those feeling fear. The resulting assumptions about fear in some ways reflect aspects of the state discourses they critique. Geographers have not assumed widespread western fears to the same problematic extent as writers such as Bauman (2006) and Furedi (2007), but the evidence reviewed here underlines the importance of continuing to divert attention to the fears of the marginalised, whether in the global north or south. Alternative approaches exist which are beginning to address this need: tackling conceptual and empirical work and, often, political praxis, in ways that avoid some of these traps. In particular, four closely connected approaches have been forwarded in recent years that provide promising directions for conceptualising and researching the geopolitics of fear. First and most longstanding, a feminist geopolitics has been alive and well for a number of years. Clear manifestoes were written by Dowler and Sharp (2001) and Hyndman (2001); in critiquing mainstream critical geopolitics, they suggested that future research should work harder to embody, locate and ground geopolitical events and processes. A well-established body of work has connected the geopolitical with the everyday (Enloe 1989; Hopkins 2007a; Hyndman 2003; May 1999; Secor 2001) and challenges the idea that the two are discrete scales (Pain and Smith 2008b; Pratt and Rosner 2006). Writers such as Katz (2004) and Secor (2001) also insist on the potency of a ‘microscale’ geopolitics of the everyday, which relates closely to my arguments about fear here. Feminist standpoints, then, are helpful in identifying some principles in approaching emotions in relation to geopolitical phenomena and events (see Ahmed 2004). Feminist approaches might also promote more grounding of theories about fear in a shifting geopolitical climate, to counter 16 the tendency for fear to be referenced by experts, and instead uncovering and prioritising the perspectives of those who are supposed to be fearful/feeling. A central tenet – while one not always adhered to by feminist researchers (see Stanley and Wise 2000) – is the integration of theory and practice, either at individual or collective levels, but always explicitly. Emotions inform, justify and figure in some studies in feminist critical geopolitics (in particular, see Jennifer Hyndman’s work, 2003, 2007), although in general there has been relatively little attention to fear, especially in western locations. Peter Hopkins’ work (2004, 2007b) is one exception, interrogating the masculinities of young Muslim men as expressed in their use of space and feelings of security in Glasgow. Second, Sara Koopman (2008) has argued for a perspective she calls ‘alter- geopolitics’: new proposals and practices that challenge hegemonic geopolitics and create new geopolitics. She draws attention to grassroots movements that build international relations of solidarity in opposition to dominant forms of geopolitics, arguing that academics might become involved in struggles where the principles of feminist geopolitics are already being translated into political reality. In relation to geopolitical fears, activist movements and new coalitions that are emerging in response to terror, hate crimes and community fears are materializing varied geographies of hope (Ahmad 2002; Oslender 2007; Weber 2006; Wright 2008). Koopman (2007) herself has explored contradictions between activist stances on the major geopolitical issues and the micropolitics within activist worlds, in which there may also exist inequality, fear and violence. Like Hyndman (2003), she urges more attention to the body in reformulating understanding of the linking of these scales, and as a site of resistance. Third, Kye Askins (2008) has recently used the term ‘transformative geopolitics’ in arguing for a new (grounded, microscale) sense of geopolitics that challenges hegemonic relations and promotes more positive interactions, emphasising that difficult encounters laden with problematic histories still hold the potential for positive change. Such transformative social interaction, in and across places of encounter, is also illustrated by the work of Michelle Fine (Fine et al 2007; Sirin and 17 Fine 2007), whose research combines scholarship with activism through which marginalised communities draw immediate gains. Askins and Pain (2009) discuss the messiness of interactions on a long term participatory action research project on geopolitical change. Elsewhere, Askins outlines the personal and emotional dimensions of her local/global activism situated as an academic (Askins 2009). Fourth, I have called for an emotional geopolitics (Pain 2009), with three suggestions for academic research. First, we might rework our understanding of geopolitics conceptually, to understand how emotions are deployed, played out and felt in geopolitical events and phenomena. For example, Staeheli and Nagel (2008) show how a grounded assessment of ‘security’ forces a rethinking of the concept. Second, a wider band of researchers might take up epistemological challenges that feminist researchers have laid down for decades, around politically involved, reciprocal research relations with groups on the sharp end of fear. Third, I argue for a commitment to praxis among geopolitical writers that refocuses attention on resistance, agency and action; again, moving out of isolation in ivory towers and collaborating with social movements. In methodological terms, further qualitative research will greatly improve knowledge about fear in relation to the war on/of terror; but the shift to participatory research also offers to change the terms of knowledge production by approaching this jointly. Freire’s (1972) concept of conscientization is a useful tool which underpins these three related goals. Geographical research through this lens might focus on people’s strategies for resisting or contesting globalized fear in everyday life, as our study of young people’s ‘global’ and everyday fears has suggested (Pain et al 2009). The ongoing research discussed earlier into unequal fears reviewed earlier provides further examples of grounded experiences of geopolitical hate among racialized and religious minorities in the west (e.g. Haldrup et al 2008; Pederson et al 2006; Poynting et al 2004). Deploying the notion of conscientization directly, Cahill has pursued participatory action research with young people of colour in sites in the USA affected by geopolitical change that exemplifies ‘focusing on the quotidian to demonstrate how our subjectivities are inextricably connected with global processes such as economic restructuring and immigration’ (Cahill and Katz 2008, px), as well highlighting and 18 encouraging young people’s potential to affect political change at different scales themselves (see Cahill 2007 and forthcoming). As well as fear, then, these alternative approaches to geopolitics forefront hope, in the capacity to contest hegemonic geopolitics and struggles for positive social change, both in individual lives and collective movements. Emotions, in the face of geopolitical issues, are not necessarily passive, negative and disempowering; they already lead to individual and collective action (Wright 2008). This constitutes perhaps the most important message for future research on the new geopolitics of fear. And, just as anyone who deals with emotions acts on them in one way or another, we as scholars also have the capacity – and some responsibility – for acting on our findings, and discovering new ways to contribute to communities’ own processes of challenging and changing hegemonic geopolitics. In terms of the current knowledge gaps identified in this paper, this might also fundamentally shift what we think we know about the new geopolitics of fear. Acknowledgements A Philip Leverhulme Prize which supported this work is gratefully acknowledged. I would like to express thanks to two anonymous reviewers, to Joanne Sharp, and to Peter Hopkins for his generous support. Notes 1 The ‘war on terror’ which was declared by George Bush after the 2001 New York attacks is equally considered a war of terror by many left scholars. 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work_6qjmoqshbrfu5nzq4jrnfpu6ku	----	Social Factors Predicting Women’s Consideration of Adoption Violence Update Michigan Family Review, 20(1), 1-6, 2016. DOI: 10.3998/mfr.4919087.0020.102 This article is protected by a Creative Commons BY-NC-ND license. 1 Update on Social Understandings of Violence Thomas W. Blume Oakland University * Please address correspondence to Thomas Blume, Ph.D., LMFT, LPC, Oakland University, Department of Counseling, 456 Pioneer Drive, Rochester MI 48309- 4482. E-mail: blume@oakland.edu. Abstract In a 1996 Michigan Family Review article I explored ways of understanding violence in social context. That article was written during a time of escalating increased community violence in the U.S. -- and heightened public concern with public safety. I applied three socially oriented perspectives to understanding community violence and its prevention: functional analysis, social constructionism, and systems theory. In this update I reflect on 20 years of changing patterns of violence, changing social understandings of violence, and implications for prevention as well as treatment. Keywords: violence, social context, social construction, theory, patterns, prevention My 1996 article, Social Perspectives on Violence, was an optimistic paper. In Michigan Family Review’s special issue, “Attacking violence: Prevention and Intervention in the late 20th Century,” other authors were addressing domestic violence, post-divorce conflicts, and elder abuse. Although and one author proposed an evolutionary understanding of violence, I chose to focus on the community violence that was dominating news stories and public consciousness in the 1990s. I took the position that human violence is not universal and therefore it should be possible to study its variations, learn how to work with the contexts where violence is more common, and thereby promote conditions in which violence will be less likely. When the current editor invited me in 2016 to revisit that article and the topic of violence, I expected that I might need to revise many of my assumptions. At the time of my earlier writing, the killing of 12 students and wounding of 21 others at Columbine High School had not yet happened. The World Trade Center attacks had not yet taken place, and police violence was generally seen as a rare occurrence. At the same time I also expected that the theoretical resources I used https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ https://quod.lib.umich.edu/m/mfr/4919087.0002.102/--social-perspectives-on-violence?rgn=main;view=fulltext Violence Update Michigan Family Review, 20(1), 1-6, 2016. DOI: 10.3998/mfr.4919087.0020.102 This article is protected by a Creative Commons BY-NC-ND license. 2 in 1996 could prove to be seriously outdated when applied to current patterns of family and community violence. Given that I had emphasized the potential for change, some of the trends I found were encouraging. I found data indicating that Community Violence and Intimate Partner Violence have become much less prevalent. In the theoretical realm, I was pleased to see more attention being given to social perspectives. But I found other changes that I found disturbing. In this update I will address some changes in the social context of violence that have occurred since 1996 and some significant innovations in the various branches of professional literature that apply to violence. The Social Context of Violence The 1980s and 1990s were a period in which street violence—often attributed to the epidemic of crack cocaine addiction—led to a constant level of fear among residents of U.S. cities (Koop & Lundberg, 1992). It was my contention in 1996 that this community violence could best be understood in light of social conditions and social forces. I argued that economic disparities and power differences based on gender, race, and ethnic identification were so great that people were unable to understand each other and saw violence as their best option. I also noted that the climate of fear seemed to be feeding a new pattern of mass incarceration. Levels of community violence in the U.S. have dropped considerably. Lurigio (2014) summarized data based on both police reports and household surveys, showing dramatic decreases in violent crime rates beginning in the early 1990s. The reductions were so great that homicides reached a 60-year low point in 2010. Furthermore, other data show a decline of reported violence in intimate relationships. The U.S Department of Justice (2015) reported an overall 64 per cent decline in intimate partner violence from 1994 to 2010 and noted an even higher decline for Hispanic females. But these changes do not necessarily indicate that U.S. society has become less violent. Sylvia Walby (2012), a leader in the emerging sociology of violence, notes that many countries have experienced declines in interpersonal violence committed by disadvantaged individuals: robbery, homicide, and some kinds of domestic violence. The growth of state control, she says, may be credited to some extent with having suppressed these offenses against the public order. But Walby observes that greater attention is now being given to “forms of violence that had previously been unseen, buried, disguised and otherwise denied, which are directed from the more powerful to the less powerful.” (p. 98). In 2016, consistent with Walby’s observation, public and professional attention in the U.S. was shifting to kinds of violence that may have been common but were overlooked because the victims lacked a voice. For example, sexual violence on campuses— in many cases committed by privileged members of athletic teams and fraternities—has become the object of intensive prevention and intervention programs. Hate crimes against LGBTQ individuals have been rising dramatically, mass shootings in schools and churches have become more common, and a horrendous escalation of police violence toward African American males is raising concerns about the culture of law enforcement. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ Violence Update Michigan Family Review, 20(1), 1-6, 2016. DOI: 10.3998/mfr.4919087.0020.102 This article is protected by a Creative Commons BY-NC-ND license. 3 The 2016 U.S. Presidential campaign offered an opportunity to hear politicians and voters talk about the current state of violence. Those public conversations rarely mentioned violence in the family. Instead, elected officials and candidates for office talked about terrorist attacks, often attributing them to immigrant populations. At the same time, trends in U.S. violence may have been overshadowed to a great extent by international news stories of gender-based violence, genocide, and warfare (Lee, 2016). In 1996 it was hard to know how much real increase had occurred in rates of violence and how much of the apparent increase was the result of violence becoming more visible. In 2016 the question of increased visibility has new meanings. As Collins (2008) observed, security video systems and smart phones held by participants and onlookers are providing documentation of violence that many people find shocking. Social Contexts The pervasive street violence of the late 20th Century in the United States has diminished, but the reasons for this change are not entirely clear. Zimring (2006) attributed much of the decline in violent crime to changing patterns of law enforcement. Lurigio (2014) acknowledged changes in law enforcement but also suggested that fluctuations in crime rates—increases as well as decreases—may have resulted from economic changes, changes in markets for street drugs, and changes in age distribution. But he hesitated to draw conclusions, writing “The only constants in the ever-fluctuating criminal victimization rates are the over- representation among victims and offenders of youth, minorities and the most impoverished residents of urban areas.” (p. 5) At the international level, acts of terrorism in many parts of the world include massive attacks on ethnic minorities and women. Open warfare seems to be growing as some leaders exploit divisions in their own populace and conflicts with neighboring states. In a parallel with local processes, national leaders find that institutionalized violence is accepted by citizens who fear other kinds of violence. Conditions that contribute to stress and conflict are not diminishing in the United States. In many rural as well as urban communities, unemployment is unevenly distributed; polarized groups view themselves as competing for resources and portray each other negatively. Gender relations continue to undergo significant change, with women outnumbering men on many college campuses and approaching equal representation in some professions that were historically male. At the level of family life, alternative family forms, including single-parent and multigenerational households, are increasing, and Browning (2002) has suggested that violence may be more likely when social structures are less consistent. Sociologists are sensitive to group conflicts, especially when power differentials exist, and changes on this dimension over the past 20 years seem to be negative. Social media seem to offer safe havens for hate groups to recruit new members and organize their threats. Mass shootings and other terrorist acts are becoming more common in the last 20 years, and it is not unusual to find that the perpetrators were encouraged by extremist groups. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ Violence Update Michigan Family Review, 20(1), 1-6, 2016. DOI: 10.3998/mfr.4919087.0020.102 This article is protected by a Creative Commons BY-NC-ND license. 4 Social Theory and Practice My 1996 article proposed that social theories of violence offered hope of at least two kinds. First, greater understanding the conditions that foster violence might point to changes that families, communities, institutions, and larger political systems could make so that levels of violence would decrease. Second, increased understandings of violence might promote the development of approaches that could help individuals, families, communities, institutions, and larger political systems recover from traumatic experiences and become more resilient. Twenty years later, these two goals continue to motivate theorists and practitioners. The following examples of innovation are intended to be illustrative, not comprehensive. The past 20 years have seen the development of new bodies of literature in which theorists and researchers describe violence in systemic terms that include not only larger systems surrounding violent episodes but also subsystems including the neurological responses of participants themselves. Hamby (2011), for example, in the first edition of a new journal, Psychology of Violence, announced a “second wave of violence scholarship” distinguished by an effort to understand how individual, family, and social factors intersect in producing violence. To some extent this new literature has been driven by new technology and advances in neurobiological research into arousal. But examinations of micro and macro processes also are proliferating, focusing on the intersections of elements as diverse as individual cognition and personality, safety planning, bystander effects, relational processes such as attachment, and food and water shortages. Chan, Hollingsworth, Espelage, and Mitchell (2016) have adapted ecological systems theory to describe the ways in which culture intersects with sociopolitical realities and community structures in creating settings for violence. They describe pilot violence prevention programs that operate at multiple levels, focus on individuals in communities, and attend to culture. Collins’ (2008) micro-sociology of violence focused on interpersonal elements in violent situations, questioning how some situations are managed in ways that lead to violent acts or to the avoidance of violence. He noted that the micro-level study of violent situations has been enhanced by the rapid expansion of video data sources from actual violent encounters, observing that new data sources increase the ability to observe and theorize about “the intertwining of human emotions of fear, anger, and excitement.” (p.4). Collins examined norms, strategies, the presence of intermediaries, and audience effects that shape “Pathways around confrontational tension and fear” (p. 9), Social constructionist frameworks have also become more prominent in the violence literature. In 1996 my application of social construction theory was focused on gender messages: masculine discourse, its hegemonic assumption of dominance over women, and its glorification of violence. This theme continues to be highly relevant; a U.S. Department of Justice (2015) report showed that boys and men are still more likely to be aggressors than victims of intimate violence. However, approaches to intimate partner violence (IPV) are changing. Rejecting the assumption that all men involved in couple violence are “patriarchal https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ Violence Update Michigan Family Review, 20(1), 1-6, 2016. DOI: 10.3998/mfr.4919087.0020.102 This article is protected by a Creative Commons BY-NC-ND license. 5 terrorists,” some professionals are developing more complex descriptions of interactions that include reciprocal violence (Johnson, in press). Gender discourses appear to be responsive to interventions that are focused on the social group or the relational unit rather than the individual. Newer IPV intervention programs (e.g., Stith, McCollum, Amanor-Boadu, & Smith, 2012) focus less on stereotyping and more on helping partners overcome alienation and increase mutual respect. The group focus is proving effective in challenges to rape culture, a shared posture among young men who bond through their mutual disrespect for women (Swartout, 2013). At the same time, the past 20 years have seen the increasing impact of another gendered theme in contemporary violence: assaults on those who challenge traditional assumptions about gender and sexuality. With heightened visibility, many LGBTQ individuals are encountering hate violence at home and in the community. Such targeted violence toward specific groups – including racial and national groups and those who differ on characteristics such as age, abilities, and body types – may be understood using social constructionist frameworks. Increasing use of social media and the growth of specialized media sources seems to feed perceptions of difference with the dual effects of emboldening more aggressive groups and increasing fear levels among those who lack the skills or the tools for violence. Conclusion Over the last 20 years, violence has continued to be a major topic for scholarship and community attention in the U.S. and around the world, but the focus has shifted. From a time when street crime was the primary concern, apparently driven by economic stresses and social polarization, intimate partner violence and police violence now share attention with terrorism and war. Social constructionist models have been applied to community-level conflict with the goal of reducing alienation and increasing empathy. The Public Conversations Project (Gergen & Gergen, 2006), for example, trains facilitators for the role of bringing people together to discuss such hotly contested issues as abortion, immigration, and gun ownership. Another social constructionist effort, the Restorative Justice movement (Umbreit & Armour, 2011), works with victims and perpetrators of violence to overcome polarization and work toward a shared commitment to nonviolence. As theorists have made progress in their use of social perspectives to understand different kinds of violence, newer understandings are being applied in prevention activities and programs designed to help survivors of trauma. References Blume, T. W. (1996). Social perspectives on violence. Michigan Family Review, 2(1), 9-23. Browning, R. (2002). The span of collective efficacy: Extending social disorganization theory to partner violence. Journal of Marriage and Family, 64, 833-850. DOI: 10.1111/j.1741-3737.2002.00833.x https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ Violence Update Michigan Family Review, 20(1), 1-6, 2016. DOI: 10.3998/mfr.4919087.0020.102 This article is protected by a Creative Commons BY-NC-ND license. 6 Chan, W. Y., Hollingsworth, M. A., Espelage, D. L., & Mitchell, K. J. (2016). Preventing violence in context: The importance of culture for implementing systemic change. Psychology of Violence, 1(6), 22-26. DOI: 10.1037/vio0000021 Collins, R. (2008). Violence: A micro-sociological theory. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Gergen, M. M., & Gergen, K. J. (2006). Narratives in action. Narrative Inquiry, 16, 112-121. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1075/ni.16.1.15ger Hamby, S. (2011). The second wave of violence scholarship: Integrating and broadening theories of violence. Psychology of Violence 1(3), 163–165. DOI: 10.1037/a0024121 Johnson, M. P. (in press). A personal social history of a typology of intimate partner violence. Journal of Family Theory and Review. Koop, C. E., & Lundberg, G. D. (1992). Violence in America: A public health emergency. Journal of the American Medical Association, 267 (222), 3075-3076. DOI: 10.1001/jama.1992.03480220093036 Lee, B. X. (2016). Causes and cures V: The sociology and anthropology of violence. Aggression and Violent Behavior, 27, 158-163. DOI: 0.1016/j.avb.2016.03.001 Lurigio, A. J. (2014). Violent victimization in the United States: Major issues and trends. (White paper.) Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Justice. Stith, S. M., McCollum, E. E., Amanor-Boadu, Y., & Smith, D. (2012). Systemic perspectives on Intimate Partner Violence treatment. Journal of Marital and Family Therapy, 38(1), 220-240. DOI:10.1111/j.1752- 0606.2011.00245.x Swartout, K. M. (2013). The company they keep: How peer networks influence male sexual aggression. Psychology of Violence, 3(2), 157-171. Umbriet, M., & Armour, M. P. (2011). Restorative justice dialogue: An essential for research and practice. New York: Springer. United Nations (2015). Transforming our world: The 2030 agenda for sustainable development. New York: United Nations. Downloaded from https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/post2015/transformingourworld/pu blication U.S. Department of Justice (2015). Intimate partner violence, 1993-2010. Downloaded from https://www.ncjrs.gov/bjsreleases/ipv10914.html Walby, S. (2012). Violence and society: Introduction to an emerging field of sociology. Current Sociology, 61(2), 95-111. DOI: 10.1177/0011392112456478 Zimring, F. E. (2006). The great American crime decline. New York: Oxford. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/post2015/transformingourworld/publication https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/post2015/transformingourworld/publication https://www.ncjrs.gov/bjsreleases/ipv10914.html The Social Context of Violence Social Contexts Social Theory and Practice Conclusion 
work_6se3d7qaivhprl6sk4zn44sgbq	----	N O E M I D E R Z S Y How does the online hate ecosystem persist on social-media platforms, and what measures can be taken to effectively reduce its presence? On page 261, Johnson et al.1 address these questions in a captivating report on the behaviour of online hate communities that reside on multiple social-media platforms. The authors shed light on the structure and dynamics of online hate groups and, informed by the results, propose four policies to reduce hate content on online social media. We live in an age of high social inter- connectedness, whereby opinions shared in one geographical region do not remain spatially localized, but can spread rapidly around the globe thanks to online social media. The high speed of such diffusion poses problems for those policing hate speech, and creates opportunities for nefarious organiza- tions to share their messages and expand their recruiting efforts globally. When the policing of social media is inefficient, the online eco- system can become a powerful radicalizing instrument2. Understanding the mechanisms that govern hate-community dynamics is thus crucial to proposing effective measures to combat such organizations in this online battleground. Johnson et al. examined the dynamics of hate clusters on two social-media platforms, Facebook and VKontakte, over a period of a few months. Clusters were defined as online pages or groups that organized individuals who shared similar views, interests or declared purposes, into communities. These pages and groups on social-media platforms contain links to other clusters with similar content that users can join. Through these links, the authors established the network connections between clusters, and could track how members of one cluster also joined other clusters. Two clusters (groups or pages) were considered connected if they contained links to one another. The authors’ approach had the advantage of not requiring individual-level information about users who are members of clusters. Johnson et al. show that online hate groups are organized in highly resilient clusters. The users in these clusters are not geographically localized, but are globally interconnected by ‘highways’ that facilitate the spread of online hate across different countries, conti- nents and languages. When these clusters are attacked — for example, when hate groups are removed by social-media platform adminis- trators (Fig. 1) — the clusters rapidly rewire and repair themselves, and strong bonds are made between clusters, formed by users shared between them, analogous to covalent chemi- cal bonds. In some cases, two or more small clusters can even merge to form a large cluster, in a process the authors liken to the fusion of two atomic nuclei. Using their mathematical model, the authors demonstrated that banning hate content on a single platform aggravates online hate ecosystems and promotes the creation of clusters that are not detectable by platform policing (which the authors call ‘dark pools’), where hate content can thrive unchecked. O n l i n e s o c i a l - m e d i a pl at for ms are challenging to regulate, and policymakers have struggled to suggest practicable ways of reducing hate online. Efforts to ban and remove hate-related content have proved ineffective3,4. Over the past few years, the incidence of reports of hate speech online has been rising5, indicating that the battle against the diffusion of hateful content is being lost, an unsettling direction for the well-being and safety of our society. Furthermore, exposure to and engagement with online hate on social media has been suggested to promote offline aggression6, with some perpetrators of violent hate crimes reported to have engaged with such content7. Previous studies (for example, ref. 8) have considered hate groups as individual net- works, or considered the interconnected clusters together as one global network. In their fresh approach, Johnson and colleagues studied the interconnected structure of a community of hate clusters as a ‘network of networks’9–11, in which clusters are networks that are inter connected by highways. More- over, they propose four policies for effective intervention that are informed by the mecha- nisms their study revealed govern the structure and dynamics of the online-hate ecosystem. Currently, social-media companies must decide which content to ban, but often have to contend with overwhelming volumes of content and various legal and regulatory S O C I A L S C I E N C E The dynamics of online hate An analysis of the dynamics of online hate groups on social-media platforms reveals why current methods to ban hate content are ineffective, and provides the basis for four potential strategies to combat online hate. See Letter p.261 this second excited state: 29.19 keV. Finally, the nucleus decayed directly to the isomeric state. The approach of Masuda et al. could enable this state to be produced more effi- ciently than was previously possible. In Seiferle and colleagues’ experiment, a beam of thorium-229 ions was generated from the natural decay of uranium-233 ions. About 2% of the thorium ions were in the iso- meric state. These ions were then neutralized to allow them to decay to the ground state through a process called internal conversion. In this process, a nuclear decay that would typically produce a γ-ray instead causes the neutral atom to emit an electron (Fig. 1). However, internal conversion is complicated, because the electron can originate from many different energy levels in the neutral atom. To observe the ejected electrons from internal conversion, Seiferle and co-workers used a magnetic field to bend the trajec- tory of these particles towards an electron detector. They applied an electric field to the electrons until the voltage associated with this field was large enough to stop the electrons. The final voltage was equal to the initial energy of the electrons. Seiferle et al. then used a theoretical model to interpret the electron energy spectrum, which is the first energy spectrum observed from the decay products of the isomeric state. Their analysis indicated that the energy of the isomeric state is 8.28 ± 0.17 eV. Although the ultimate and groundbreaking goal of directly observing the thorium-229 isomeric transition remains elusive, sub- stantial progress continues to be made. The results of Masuda et al. and Seiferle et al. are key steps forward. Hopefully, the observation is not too far off, as teams of scientists race to make the world’s first nuclear clock, which would offer unprecedented precision. This finding would enable a whole host of experi- ments and discoveries in the decades to fol- low. For instance, a nuclear clock could have applications in dark-matter research8 and in the observation of possible variations in the fundamental constants of physics9. ■ Jason T. Burke is in the Nuclear and Particle Physics Group, Nuclear and Chemical Sciences Division, Physical and Life Sciences Directorate, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, California 94550, USA. e-mail: burke26@llnl.gov 1. Masuda, T. et al. Nature 573, 238–242 (2019). 2. Seiferle, B. et al. Nature 573, 243–246 (2019). 3. Lyons, H. Instruments 22, 133–135 (1949). 4. Brewer, S. M. et al. Phys. Rev. Lett. 123, 033201 (2019). 5. Campbell, C. J. et al. Phys. Rev. Lett. 108, 120802 (2012). 6. Peik, E. & Tamm, C. Europhys. Lett. 61, 181–186 (2003). 7. Beck, B. R. et al. Phys. Rev. Lett. 98, 142501 (2007). 8. Derevianko, A. & Pospelov, M. Nature Phys. 10, 933–936 (2014). 9. Flambaum, V. V. Phys. Rev. Lett. 97, 092502 (2006). 1 2 S E P T E M B E R 2 0 1 9 | V O L 5 7 3 | N A T U R E | 2 0 3 NEWS & VIEWS RESEARCH © 2019 Springer Nature Limited. All rights reserved. © 2019 Springer Nature Limited. All rights reserved. constraints in different countries. Johnson and co-workers’ four recommended inter- ventions — policies 1 to 4 — take into account the legal considerations associated with banning groups and individual users. Nota- bly, each of the authors’ suggested policies could be implemented independently by indi- vidual platforms without the need for sharing sensitive information between them, which in most cases is not legally allowed without explicit user consent. In policy 1, the authors propose banning relatively small hate clusters, rather than removing the largest online hate cluster. This policy leverages the authors’ finding that the size distribution of online hate clusters follows a power-law trend, such that most clusters are small and only very few are large. Banning the largest hate cluster would be predicted to lead to the formation of a new large cluster from the myriad small ones. By contrast, small clus- ters are highly abundant — meaning that they are relatively easy to locate — and eliminating them prevents the emergence of other large clusters. Banning whole groups of users, regardless of the size of the groups, can result in out- rage in the hate community and allegations against social-media platforms that rights to free speech are being suppressed12. To avoid that, policy 2 instead recommends banning a small number of users selected at random from online hate clusters. This random- targeting approach does not require users to be spatially located or the use of sensitive user-profile information (which cannot be applied to target specific users), thus avoid- ing potential violations of privacy regulations. However, the effectiveness of this approach depends heavily on the structure of the social network, because the topological characteris- tics of networks strongly shape their resilience to random failures or targeted attacks. Policy 3 leverages the finding that clusters self-organize from an initially disordered group of users; it recommends that platform administrators promote the organization of clusters of anti-hate users, which could serve as a ‘human immune system’ to fight and coun- teract hate clusters. Policy 4 exploits the fact that many hate groups online have opposing views. The policy suggests that the platform administrators introduce an artificial group of users to encourage interactions between hate clusters that have opposing views, with a view to the hate clusters subsequently battling out their differences among themselves. The authors’ modelling demonstrated that such battles would effectively remove large hate clusters that have opposing views. Once put into action, policies 3 and 4 would require lit- tle direct intervention by the platform admin- istrators; however, setting opposing clusters against each other would require meticulous engineering. The authors recommend caution in assess- ing the advantages and disadvantages of adopting each policy, because the feasibility of implementing a policy will rely on available computational and human resources, and legal privacy constraints. Moreover, any decisions about whether to implement one policy over another must be made on the basis of empirical analysis and data obtained by closely monitor- ing these clusters. Over the years, it has become apparent that effective solutions to dealing with online hate and the legal and privacy issues that arise from online social-media platforms cannot arise solely from individual industry segments, but instead will require a combined effort from technology companies, policymakers and researchers. Johnson and colleagues’ study provides valuable insights, and their proposed policies can serve as a guideline for future efforts. ■ Noemi Derzsy is in the Data Science and AI Research Organization, AT&T Labs, New York, New York 10007, USA. e-mail: noemiderzsy@gmail.com 1. Johnson, N. F. et al. Nature 573, 261–265 (2019). 2. Hernandez, D. & Olson, P. Wall Street J. (5 July 2019); available at go.nature.com/2oxoqdw 3. Wakefield, J. BBC News (15 March 2019); available at go.nature.com/2kabi2p 4. O’Brien, S. A. CNN Business (28 February 2019); available at go.nature.com/31c2nny 5. BBC News (17 March 2018); available at go.nature. com/2h04gci 6. SELMA (23 April 2019); available at go.nature. com/2ygkhs1 7. Benner, K. & Spencer, H. New York Times (27 June 2019). 8. Mathew, B., Dutt, R., Goyal, P. & Mukherjee, A. Proc. 10th ACM Conf. Web Sci. 173–182 (2019). 9. Havlin, S., Kenett, D. Y., Bashan, A., Gao, J. & Stanley, H. E. Eur. Phys. J. Spec. Top. 223, 2087–2106 (2014). 10. Palla, G., Barabasi, A. L. & Vicsek, T. Nature 446, 664–667 (2007). 11. Jarrett, T. C., Ashton, D. J., Fricker, M. & Johnson, N. F. Phys. Rev. E 74, 026116 (2006). 12. Coaston, J. Vox (14 May 2019). Noemi Derzsy contributed to this article in her personal capacity; the views expressed are her own and do not necessarily represent the views of AT&T. This article was published online on 21 August 2019. Figure 1 | Facebook moderators removing hate-related content. Johnson et al.1 examined the dynamics of online hate groups on Facebook and another social- media platform, VKontakte, and used their results to propose four policies to tackle online hate. G O R D O N W E LT E R S /N YT /R E D U X /E Y E V IN E 2 0 4 | N A T U R E | V O L 5 7 3 | 1 2 S E P T E M B E R 2 0 1 9 NEWS & VIEWSRESEARCH © 2019 Springer Nature Limited. All rights reserved. 
work_6skjix753rahpdlpk7bfptuox4	----	First-generation migrants’ use of psychotropic medication in Northern Ireland: a record linkage study First-generation migrants' use of psychotropic medication in Northern Ireland a record linkage study Bosqui, T., O'Reilly, D., Väänänen, A., Patel, K., Donnelly, M., Wright, D., Close, C., & Kouvonen, A. (2019). First-generation migrants' use of psychotropic medication in Northern Ireland a record linkage study. International journal of mental health systems, 13, 77. https://doi.org/10.1186/s13033-019-0334-3 Published in: International journal of mental health systems Document Version: Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record Queen's University Belfast - Research Portal: Link to publication record in Queen's University Belfast Research Portal Publisher rights Copyright 2019 the authors. This is an open access article published under a Creative Commons Attribution License (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the author and source are cited. General rights Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Queen's University Belfast Research Portal is retained by the author(s) and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights. Take down policy The Research Portal is Queen's institutional repository that provides access to Queen's research output. Every effort has been made to ensure that content in the Research Portal does not infringe any person's rights, or applicable UK laws. If you discover content in the Research Portal that you believe breaches copyright or violates any law, please contact openaccess@qub.ac.uk. Download date:06. Apr. 2021 https://doi.org/10.1186/s13033-019-0334-3 https://pure.qub.ac.uk/en/publications/firstgeneration-migrants-use-of-psychotropic-medication-in-northern-ireland-a-record-linkage-study(83595361-8e36-494f-9fcc-51f3b4955a1b).html Bosqui et al. Int J Ment Health Syst (2019) 13:77 https://doi.org/10.1186/s13033-019-0334-3 R E S E A R C H First-generation migrants’ use of psychotropic medication in Northern Ireland: a record linkage study Tania Bosqui1,2* , Dermot O’Reilly2,3, Ari Väänänen4,5, Kishan Patel2, Michael Donnelly2, David Wright2, Ciara Close3 and Anne Kouvonen2,6,7 Abstract Purpose: There is a recent and growing migrant population in Northern Ireland. However, rigorous research is absent regarding access to mental health care by different migrant groups. In order to address this knowledge gap, this study aimed to identify the relative use of psychotropic medication between the largest first generation migrant groups in Northern Ireland and the majority population. Methods: Census (2011) data was linked to psychotropic prescriptions for the entire enumerated population of Northern Ireland using data linkage methodology through the Administrative Data Research Centre Northern Ireland (ADRC-NI). Results: Lower prescription dispensation for all psychotropic medication types, particularly antidepressants (OR = 0.35, CI 95% 0.33–0.36) and anxiolytics (OR = 0.42, CI 95% 0.40–0.44), was observed for all migrant groups with the exception of migrants from Germany. Conclusions: It is likely that the results reflect poorer access to services and indicate a need to improve access and the match between resources, services and the health and social care needs of migrants. Further research is required to identify barriers to accessing primary care and mental health services. Keywords: Mental health, Migrants, Northern Ireland, Psychotropic prescription, Access © The Author(s) 2019. This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence, and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this article are included in the article’s Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the article’s Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder. To view a copy of this licence, visit http://creat iveco mmons .org/licen ses/by/4.0/. The Creative Commons Public Domain Dedication waiver (http://creat iveco mmons .org/publi cdoma in/ zero/1.0/) applies to the data made available in this article, unless otherwise stated in a credit line to the data. Background In multicultural societies across Europe, research has highlighted substantial and pervasive inequalities in mental health and wellbeing amongst first generation migrant groups compared to the settled majority [1, 2] though there are mixed findings in relation to country of origin, receiving society and the migration context. Compared to the settled majority, worse mental health outcomes have been found for migrants from the Carib- bean [3, 4], Ethiopia [5], Surinam [6], Morocco [7], South Asia [8] and the former Soviet Union [5]; and compara- ble outcomes for migrants from northern to southern Europe, East Asia [3], North America, Australia, South America [5] and Turkey [7]. This pattern of results may be due to some migrant populations experiencing dispro- portionate levels of discrimination, isolation and social disadvantage—major risk factors for mental ill-health [9]. Migrants to low income countries [10] and asylum seekers [11] have also experienced worse outcomes. These health and well-being outcomes for migrants from low income countries tend to be associated with poorer living conditions, unemployment, limited access to schools and health care, and discrimination. The uncertainty and stress of the asylum seeking process, an increased exposure to traumatic events prior, during, and Open Access International Journal of Mental Health Systems *Correspondence: tb33@aub.edu.lb 1 Department of Psychology, American University of Beirut, Beirut, Lebanon Full list of author information is available at the end of the article http://orcid.org/0000-0002-7376-5405 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/ http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/ http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1186/s13033-019-0334-3&domain=pdf Page 2 of 9Bosqui et al. Int J Ment Health Syst (2019) 13:77 post-migration, and frequent experiences of discrimina- tion for people who seek asylum in high income coun- tries contributes to poor outcomes for this vulnerable group [12]. Other contextual factors, such as downward social mobility after migration, poor working conditions and unemployment [13–15], and living in an urban high deprivation neighbourhood [16], have been linked to poorer migrant mental health. Despite the higher risks and multitude of risk factors, migrants face greater challenges in accessing mental health care than the settled majority population. These challenges include low proficiency of the majority lan- guage, fear and shame associated with disclosing men- tal health difficulties, lack of knowledge about how to access services, and greater distances and higher asso- ciated costs to travel to services [17]. These challenges are compounded by widespread institutional racism and discrimination in services and low cultural competence of health care staff [18]. Register-based studies found an overall lower uptake of mental health treatment by migrant groups. In Sweden, psychotropic prescription dispensations were lower for refugees than Swedish-born residents, with a comparable level reached after 10 years of residence [19]; and in Denmark, antidepressant uptake after hospitalisation for depression was found to be lower for migrant groups compared to Danish-born residents [20]. In tertiary care, however, migrants were found to have a higher risk of hospital admission compared to the Swedish born majority [21]. These contrasting findings have been explained by a greater use of emergency and involuntary health care by migrants, and an underuse of primary care and voluntary services [11]. Northern Ireland, once a region of high outward migra- tion to other parts of the world, has seen a rapid increase in international inward migration since the accession of eight Eastern European countries to the European Union (EU) in 2004; 4.4% of all Census respondents in 2011 were born outside the United Kingdom (UK) and Repub- lic of Ireland (RoI), compared to only 1.8% in 2001 [22]. Research is sparse regarding the mental health needs of first generation migrants living in Northern Ireland despite the increasing migrant population size and the potentially serious implications for mental health policy and service provision. Additionally, the unique context of Northern Ireland, with ongoing sectarian tensions and a high level of psychiatric disorders related to the 30  year civil conflict [23] as well as dramatic increases in racially motivated hate crimes [24], makes the generalisation of findings from other European countries and regions even more difficult. The few studies conducted so far in Northern Ireland indicated a mixed picture about the mental health of migrant groups. For example, a small- scale qualitative study found high levels of depression among the Polish-born population of Northern Ireland [25], whilst a Census-based study found lower levels of self-reported mental health problems compared to the Northern Ireland-born population [26]. This finding is in direct contrast to multiple studies in other countries that founder higher levels of self-reported mental health problems [1, 2], and was explained by a higher degree of stigma that affected the reporting of mental illness by migrant groups, and by the pre-existing high level of mental ill-health in Northern Ireland. This study investi- gates for the first time the level of mental health care use, measured by psychotropic medication prescriptions, by migrant groups in this Northern Ireland context. The formation of the Administrative Data Research Centre—Northern Ireland (ADRC-NI) [27] has provided opportunities to research the mental health needs of first generation migrants on a large scale, using the entire population of Northern Ireland enumerated in the 2011 Census, linked anonymously to dispensed psychotropic prescriptions. This research capacity afforded an oppor- tunity to accurately estimate the use of psychotropic medication by the migrant population of Northern Ire- land and, in turn, to inform statutory and third sector ser- vices designed to improve the population’s mental health and enhance societal equality. Previous record-linkage research in other countries and regions have yielded large sample sizes and high data accuracy, thereby addressing the limitations of other research methodologies in the field of migrant mental health [11]. This study used large-scale administrative linked datasets to determine the relative use of psychotropic medication (antidepressants, anxiolytics and hypnot- ics, and anti-psychotic drugs) between the largest first generation migrant groups in Northern Ireland and the UK and RoI-born majority. Based on findings from Swe- den to Denmark on low migrant psychotropic use, and the documented barriers for migrants to access men- tal health care in Northern Ireland [28], we expect that this study will find; (a) that migrants will use significantly less prescribed psychotropic medication than the set- tled majority; (b) that there will be within-group differ- ences dependent on region of migration; and (c) that differences will narrow after adjustment for individual and neighbourhood socio-economic and demographic characteristics. Methods Data Sources Through the ADRC-NI, this population-based study linked the entire enumerated population of Northern Ireland in the 2011 Census to individual psychotropic prescriptions using data from the Enhanced Prescribing Page 3 of 9Bosqui et al. Int J Ment Health Syst (2019) 13:77 Database (EPD) held by the Business Services Organisa- tion (BSO). The 2011 Census of Northern Ireland holds compre- hensive and robust de-identified data on demographic and socio-economic characteristics (e.g. age, sex marital status, employment status, home ownership); migration characteristics (e.g. country of birth); and neighbourhood factors (e.g. urbanicity). The latter is maintained by the Northern Ireland Neighbourhood Information Service (NINIS). The completion of the Census is mandatory for all households in Northern Ireland, accurate on the day of the Census (27 March 2011), and is subjected to rigorous quality assurances. Just under 92% of residents adequately completed the Census, an additional 4% were captured through Health Card Registers and the remain- ing were imputed through a coverage and assessment process, totalling a population of 1,810,900 residents [29]. Prescription data, held by BSO, has data on prescrip- tions dispensed from pharmacists or dispensing doctors, including the BNF (British National Formulary) code. This study obtained information of individual prescribed medications for antidepressants, hypnotics and anxiolyt- ics, and drugs used to treat psychoses and related dis- orders for a time period that contains the Census date, from 01 January 2011 until 31 December 2011. General Practitioner (GP) appointments and prescrip- tion medications are free of charge for all those entitled to register in the Health and Social Care (HSC) system of Northern Ireland, including those seeking asylum that are supported by the National Asylum Support Service (NASS). However, asylum seekers at the time of data col- lection who had their asylum application refused were no longer entitled to access primary health services regard- less of whether they remained in the country [30]. Population description The population included in this study was all non-insti- tutionalised residents of Northern Ireland enumerated in the 2011 Census (1,672,552 records) matched to BSO data (1,587,627 records). Children and older adults (< 16 and > 64) were excluded as their use of psychotropic medication may be confounded by other health factors (567,868 records removed). All non-response (missing/ edited) data were excluded prior to obtaining the dataset from NISRA as part of the data protection agreement. In total, 1,019,759 records were included in the final sample. Variable preparation Migrant status and origin For the purposes of this study a first-generation migrant was defined as a person resident in Northern Ireland who was born outside of Northern Ireland, the rest of the UK, and RoI. Given the unique socio-political context of Northern Ireland, a sensitivity analysis was also con- ducted using an alternative definition of the settled majority. In this definition, the settled majority included only those born in Northern Ireland, therefore creating a separate category for those born in the rest of the UK and RoI. Due to small numbers from some countries of ori- gin, only the largest migrant groups were included based on a single country of birth, while the other countries were combined into larger regional categories. In total, 16 categories of migrant country or region of birth were included; Poland, Lithuania, India, USA, Germany, North Africa and Middle East, Central/Eastern/Western Africa, Southern Africa, Americas/Caribbean, China and Hong Kong, Central/Eastern/South Eastern Asia and East- ern Europe (non-EU), Southern Asia, Central/Eastern Europe (CEE), Southern Europe, Northern and Western Europe, and Oceania (for a list of included countries see Additional file 1: Table S1). Psychotropic prescriptions Psychotropic prescriptions were categorised as indicated for common mental disorders; (a) antidepressants (BNF code 4.3), and (b) anxiolytics and hypnotics (BNF code 4.1); and for psychotic disorders; c) antipsychotics includ- ing all drugs used in psychoses and related disorders (BNF code 4.2). Individuals were coded as having used a psychotropic medication if they had accessed at least one prescription in 2011, the same year as the Census. Individual characteristics Individual socio-demographic characteristics relevant for mental health were derived from the Census. These include gender (male/female), age (16–24, 25–34, 35–44, 45–54, 55–64), marital status (married, never married, separated/divorced/widowed), employment status (man- agerial, intermediate, small employers, routine/semi- routine, never worked/long-term unemployed, students, home ownership (owners, private renters, social rent- ers), car ownership (0, 1, 2+) and chronic physical health problems (yes/no for at least one of: breathing difficul- ties, mobility difficulties, or long term pain). Area characteristics Urbanicity was measured by settlement band (urban: Bel- fast and Derry; intermediate; rural) based on Super Out- put Areas (SOA) derived from the Census. Data linkage Census and prescription data were linked using anony- mous one-way encryption methods by the data cus- todians at BSO and the Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency (NISRA). Anonymous de-identified data was made available to the accredited research team Page 4 of 9Bosqui et al. Int J Ment Health Syst (2019) 13:77 in a secure setting located in NISRA. All output was screened by Research Support Officers in NISRA for non-identifiability before being approved for release. Ethical approval was obtained from the Office for Research Ethics Committee Northern Ireland (ORECNI; Ref: 15/WM/0212), the Research Ethics Committee for the School of Medicine, Dentistry and Biomedical Sci- ences at Queen’s University Belfast (Ref: 14/54), and the Administrative Data Research Network (ADRN) Approv- als Panel (Ref: 2014/008); and conform to the principles embodied in the 1964 Declaration of Helsinki and its later amendments. Statistical analysis Descriptive analyses of the sample included compari- sons (frequencies) of socio-demographic characteris- tics between migrant groups and the settled majority, and the testing of any differences between groups (using χ2). The logistic regressions (with CIs at 95%) were run for all psychotropic medications and all migrant groups compared to the settled majority, using four models. The first model was unadjusted, the second was adjusted for demographic factors (age, gender, and marital status), the third was adjusted for physical health, and the final model was adjusted fully for socio-demographic fac- tors (employment, car availability, housing tenure, and urbanicity). These models provided an overall analyti- cal picture of differences in prescriptions and the impact of socio-demographic and economic factors. Next, the adjusted models were applied to different psychotropic medication types broken down by migrant group in order to observe any group differences, and prescription type differences, in the use of psychotropic medications. A sensitivity analysis was conducted that included only people who were born in Northern Ireland in the settled majority group. No significant difference was found in the number of psychotropic prescriptions between differ- ent definitions of the settled majority (p = 0.10). Results Population characteristics A total of 1,019,759 people were included, 49,342 of whom were born outside of the UK and RoI (4.8%). Table  1 shows that migrants had a higher proportion of employment in routine work and of private renting than the majority settled population. A breakdown by migrant group (see Additional file  1: Table  S2), showed that migrants from Poland, Lithuanian and other Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries had the highest proportion of routine work and private renting, whilst migrants from Germany, the USA, Americas/Caribbean, and Northern and Western Europe had the highest pro- portion of home ownership after the settled majority. Prescription of psychotropic medication In total, 11.8% of migrants were prescribed a psycho- tropic medication compared to 24% of the settled major- ity. A breakdown of prescription type by migrant group is displayed in Additional file  1: Table  S3. In both migrant and settled populations, prescriptions were higher for females (settled population = 30.3%, migrants = 14.9%) than males (settled population = 17.4%, migrants = 8.2%). An interaction effect was tested for a modifying effect of gender on the association between region of birth and psychotropic medication use. No significant interaction effect was found (p = 0.08) and therefore logistic regres- sion models were not stratified by gender. The results showed a lower likelihood of prescriptions for migrants compared to the settled majority in North- ern Ireland; with migrants almost 60% (OR = 0.42, CI 95% 0.41–0.43) less likely to have a prescription in the unad- justed model (see Table  2). The likelihood reduced fur- ther after adjustment for socio-demographic, economic, and health covariates (OR = 0.37, CI 95% 0.36–0.38). A breakdown by migrant group (see Table  3) showed that the lower likelihood is consistent across migrant groups, with the exception of a comparable likelihood for migrants from Germany (OR = 0.95, CI 95% 0.86–1.04). The lowest use of psychotropic medication was found for migrants from Central to Eastern Europe (OR = 0.19, CI 95% 0.17–0.21), Lithuania (OR = 0.20, CI 95% 0.18–0.22), and India (OR = 0.21, CI 95% 0.18–0.24). In terms of prescription type Table  3 also shows that all psychotropic types were prescribed less for migrants than the settled majority (anxiolytics OR = 0.42, CI 95% 0.40–0.44; antidepressants OR = 0.35, CI 95%0.33–0.36; and antipsychotics OR = 0.37, CI 95% 0.34–0.41). For prescription type broken down by migrant group, the same pattern was found for anxiolytics and antide- pressants as for psychotropic medication in general. However, for antipsychotics there are some notable dif- ferences. Unlike for anxiolytics/hypnotics and antide- pressants, migrants from the USA, Southern Africa, the Americas/Caribbean, Southern Asia, and Oceania had a comparable likelihood of having an antipsychotic pre- scription dispensed. Migrants from Poland, Lithuania and other Central and Eastern European countries, were over 80% less likely to be prescribed antipsychotic medi- cation compared to the settled majority (OR = 0.18, CI 95% 0.14–0.24; OR = 0.19, CI 95% 0.13–0.29; OR = 0.16, CI 95% 0.10–0.24; respectively). Discussion This is the first population-based administrative-linked data study to examine access to mental health care by analysing psychotropic prescriptions for first genera- tion migrants resident in Northern Ireland. The results Page 5 of 9Bosqui et al. Int J Ment Health Syst (2019) 13:77 showed a consistently lower level of dispensation of psy- chotropic drugs for migrants compared to the settled majority, with the exception of a comparable dispensa- tion level for migrants from Germany, and the dispensa- tion specifically of antipsychotic drugs for a number of other groups. These findings are in keeping with studies in Sweden and Denmark [19, 20] and may indicate that similar barriers to accessing mental health treatment exist in Northern Ireland. The lower use of psychotropic medication by most migrants groups, particularly regarding antidepressants and anxiolytics/hypnotics, is likely to reflect poorer access to services. Barriers to care may include poorer knowledge about how to access services, greater stigma in relation to help-seeking for mental distress, more neg- ative beliefs about medication [31], and diverse cultural and religious conceptualisations of mental distress and treatment [32], as well as structural barriers to accessing services such as poor cultural competencies among ser- vice providers, discrimination and prejudice at the point of access [33], limited availability of translators [34], and overall poor service provision [31]. According to Polish migrants in Northern Ireland who were interviewed as part of a qualitative study, language barriers and stigma were the key challenges to accessing mental health ser- vices [25]. Socio-economic factors per se do not appear to contribute to explanations about lower psychotropic medication use. Adjustment for these factors did not affect the differences between migrant and non-migrant groups. The improved accessibility for antipsychotic medica- tion compared to antidepressants and anxiolytics for many migrant groups is likely to reflect the severity and easier ‘visibility’ of the illness that requires this treat- ment. However, the comparable level of psychotropic prescription dispensation, of all types, for migrants from Germany may reflect higher social and economic status and opportunity in the group, including higher home ownership than other migrant groups. It may also indi- cate lower stigma and greater belief in the effectiveness of medication for mental distress in this group. This inter- pretation is supported by the results of research about stigma [35] and negative beliefs about medication [36], both of which tend to be associated with less access and use of mental health services. In the context of Northern Ireland, these findings are of particular importance. Migration from countries out- side Great Britain and RoI is a relatively new, and grow- ing, phenomenon for Northern Ireland. Migrants join a post-conflict society that continues to struggle with the challenges of healing hurts and divisions. Often, available housing and accommodation for migrants is located in divided and polarised community settings that are rela- tively impoverished. Some migrants have been the target of increasing racist hate crimes [24] and there is a degree of anti-migrant discourse that is fuelled by ongoing sec- tarianism and the fallout of the 2007–2008 economic cri- sis. Qualitative evidence indicates that many migrants do not feel they ‘belong’ in Northern Ireland [25, 28], which affects all aspects of their lives, including health and health care. The lower use of psychotropic drugs found in this study may reflect a degree of disaffection from Table 1 Population characteristics for  all migrants compared to the settled majority Northern Ireland Great Britain and Republic of Ireland Migrants Number of persons (%) 898,945 71,472 49,342 88.2 7.0 4.8 Sex Male 48.7 46.2 47.1 Female 51.3 53.8 52.9 Age 16–24 19.1 11.7 13.1 25–34 19.6 16.1 37.9 35–44 20.8 25.1 26.9 45–54 22.5 26.7 15.6 55–64 18.0 20.4 6.5 Marital status Never married 43.1 32.4 38.5 Married 45.7 53.4 51.1 Separated/divorced/ widowed 11.2 14.2 10.4 NS – SEC Managerial 29.0 36.5 28.1 Intermediate 13.0 12.8 8.3 Small employers 9.2 7.8 5.8 Routine/semi-routine 29.5 27.4 42.2 Never worked/unem- ployed 9.2 8.2 7.7 Students 10.1 7.3 8.0 Car availability 0 13.2 14.4 22.5 1 32.0 35.2 45.9 2 or more 54.8 50.4 31.6 Housing tenure Owns outright 75.5 68.2 35.7 Private renting 11.5 19.1 54.3 Social renting 13.0 12.7 10.1 Settlement band Urban 19.8 19.9 15.2 Intermediate 46.5 48.6 59.3 Rural 33.7 31.5 15.5 Page 6 of 9Bosqui et al. Int J Ment Health Syst (2019) 13:77 Northern Irish civil society. These findings highlight the need for further examination of the challenges and fac- tors that affect migrant health and wellbeing in Northern Ireland as well as avenues to address them. Strengths and limitations This study uses data linkage methodology and draws on robust and comprehensive administrative data about the whole enumerated population of Northern Ireland in the 2011 Census. It is the first study to use these data to identify psychotropic prescription utilisation between migrant groups in comparison to the settled majority population. Despite its large population-based sample and high quality real-world data, the study has a number of limitations. The dataset assumes that migrant groups had an opportunity to respond to the Census, and that they filled out the Census to the same extent as the set- tled majority. No undocumented migrants are included in the data, and it is unclear to what extent this may affect the results as little is known about the number of undocumented migrants in Northern Ireland. However, given the already poor access to services, undocumented migrants are likely to have even poorer access to ser- vices than documented migrants. This is supported by European data on poor access to primary care services for irregular or undocumented migrants [37]. There is also some indication that, given the structural barriers to care, migrants from nearby countries in the EU may Table 2 Logistic regression for dispensation of any psychotropic medication Model 1: Unadjusted Model 2: Adjusted for demographic factors Model 3: Plus adjustment for poor physical health Model 4: Plus adjustment for socioeconomic factors OR odds ratio, CI confidence intervals Model 1 OR (CI) Model 2 OR (CI) Model 3 OR (CI) Model 4 OR (CI) Migrant status (ref: settled) All migrants 0.42 (0.41–0.43) 0.45 (0.43–0.46) 0.47 (0.46–0.48) 0.37 (0.36–0.38) Age (ref: 16–24) 25–34 – 2.69 (2.63–2.74) 2.68 (2.62–2.73) 2.14 (2.09–2.19) 35–44 – 4.51 (4.42–4.61) 4.26 (4.17 – 4.35) 3.38 (3.29 – 3.46) 45– 4 – 5.83 (5.71–5.96) 5.10 (4.99 – 5.21) 4.04 (3.94 – 4.14) 55–64 – 6.68 (6.53–6.83) 5.08 (4.96 – 5.20) 3.93 (3.82 – 4.03) Sex (ref: male) Female – 2.06 (2.04–2.08) 2.12 (2.10 – 2.14) 2.11 (2.09 – 2.14) Marital status (ref: married) Never married – 1.55 (1.53–1.57) 1.46 (1.44–1.48) 1.03 (1.02 – 1.05) Separated/divorced/widowed – 2.33 (2.30–2.36) 2.15 (2.12–2.18) 1.47 (1.45 – 1.49) Poor physical health (ref: no) Yes – – 2.99 (2.96–3.03) 2.62 (2.58–2.65) NS – SEC (ref: managerial) Small employers – – – 1.25 (1.23–1.27) Intermediate – – – 1.11 (1.10–1.14) Routine/semi-routine – – – 1.42 (1.40–1.43) Never worked/unemployed – – – 1.53 (1.50–1.56) Students – – – 0.72 (0.71–0.76) Car availability (ref: 2 +) 1 – – – 1.31 (1.29–1.32) 0 – – – 1.71 (1.68–1.74) Housing tenure (ref: owns) Private renting – – – 1.33 (1.31–1.36) Social renting – – – 1.69 (1.66–1.72) Urban–rural living (ref: urban) Intermediate – – – 0.97 (0.95–1.00) Rural – – – 0.89 (0.88–0.90) Page 7 of 9Bosqui et al. Int J Ment Health Syst (2019) 13:77 return home to access medical treatment [25] and this may contribute to lower levels of uptake in Northern Ire- land. Finally, additional characteristics of time since most recent arrival in Northern Ireland, reason for migration, and proficiency in English could not be included due to low response rate, insufficient sample sizes, and no sig- nificant effect respectively. Exploration of different rea- sons for migration (such as asylum seeking and economic migration) was particularly difficult in the administrative data set due to small numbers in some groups. In terms of defining access to mental health care, prescriptions of psychotropic medications may reflect a range of dif- ferent difficulties and are not synonymous with mental health care. Some migrant groups may be more likely to seek treatment in other service types, such as psychologi- cal therapy, family and community support, or religious healers [38]. Antidepressant medication can also be pre- scribed for related health conditions such as chronic pain and sleep problems [39]. This study is therefore reflec- tive only of medical treatment of distress and not of other forms of mental health care or specific psychiatric conditions. Implications The consistent findings of lower use of psychotropic medications for most migrant groups in Northern Ire- land is likely to be a result of poorer access to services. Improved access to care is imperative in order to improve the wellbeing of these groups. Improving access may involve additional training for staff in providing cultur- ally sensitive care, provision of cultural mediators and translators, recruiting a diverse health practitioner team, creating partnerships with community migrant groups, and implementing preventative interventions for at-risk groups such as refugees and asylum seekers. Improve- ment can also be made at a social level, such as interven- tions that address the disproportionate disadvantage and acculturation stress affecting first generation migrants [39]. Attention is needed at the policy level in order to ensure that these research-informed ways of improv- ing access to services by migrants are implemented and delivered. The need to improve access to mental health care is particularly important given the growing num- ber of migrant populations, and the toll that this may take on the health and social care system in the future, if the needs-services gap is not met. Further research is required to understand the barriers to care, in order to address this inequality in service provision. Conclusions This large study linked Census data to psychotropic prescriptions for the entire enumerated population of Northern Ireland and found lower dispensation of psy- chotropic medication, particularly antidepressants and Table 3 Fully adjusted model for different psychotropic medications by migrant group C central, CI confidence intervals, E eastern, OR odds ratio, SE south eastern, W western All prescriptions OR (CI) Anti-depressants OR (CI) Anxiolytics and hypnotics OR (CI) Anti-psychotics OR (CI) Migrant status (ref: settled) All migrants 0.37 (0.36–0.38) 0.35 (0.33–0.36) 0.42 (0.40–0.44) 0.37 (0.34–0.41) Poland 0.24 (0.23–0.26) 0.21 (0.20–0.23) 0.29 (0.26–0.31) 0.18 (0.14–0.24) Lithuania 0.20 (0.18–0.22) 0.18 (0.16–0.21) 0.22 (0.19–0.26) 0.19 (0.13–0.29) India 0.21 (0.18–0.24) 0.16 (0.13–0.19) 0.28 (0.23–0.34) 0.29 (0.18–0.49) USA 0.79 (0.71–0.89) 0.78 (0.68–0.88) 0.66 (0.56–0.77) 0.94 (0.68–1.29) Germany 0.95 (0.86–1.04) 0.91 (0.83–1.01) 1.00 (0.89–1.12) 0.91 (0.71–1.16) North Africa and Middle East 0.59 (0.49–0.70) 0.55 (0.46–0.67) 0.56 (0.44–0.71) 0.47 (0.27–0.82) C/E/W Africa 0.54 (0.47–0.62) 0.49 (0.42–0.56) 0.59 (0.50–0.70) 0.65 (0.46–0.93) Southern Africa 0.83 (0.71–0.96) 0.73 (0.62–0.87) 0.82 (0.67–1.00) 0.89 (0.58–1.38) The Americas/Caribbean 0.79 (0.71–0.88) 0.79 (0.70– 0.89) 0.81 (0.71–0.93) 0.72 (0.52–1.01) China and Hong Kong 0.23 (0.20–0.26) 0.19 (0.16–0.23) 0.30 (0.24–0.36) 0.29 (0.18–0.47) C/E/SE Asia and E. Europe 0.23 (0.20–0.26) 0.19 (0.16–0.22) 0.32 (0.27–0.37) 0.21 (0.13–0.32) Southern Asia 0.54 (0.45–0.65) 0.45 (0.37–0.56) 0.55 (0.43–0.71) 0.89 (0.56–1.40) C/E Europe (CEE) 0.19 (0.17–0.21) 0.17 (0.15–0.19) 0.19 (0.16–0.23) 0.16 (0.10–0.24) Southern Europe 0.60 (0.54–0.66) 0.60 (0.54–0.68) 0.61 (0.53–0.70) 0.48 (0.35–0.66) Northern and Western Europe 0.49 (0.42–0.57) 0.49 (0.41–0.58) 0.53 (0.43–0.66) 0.39 (0.22–0.69) Oceania 0.75 (0.65–0.86) 0.70 (0.60–0.82) 0.79 (0.66–0.96) 0.92 (0.63–1.36) Page 8 of 9Bosqui et al. Int J Ment Health Syst (2019) 13:77 anxiolytics, for first generation migrants compared to the settled majority. It is likely that the results reflect poorer access to services and indicate a need to improve access and the match between resources, services and the health and social care needs of migrants. Supplementary information Supplementary information accompanies this paper at https ://doi. org/10.1186/s1303 3-019-0334-3. Additional file 1: Table S1. Country categories. Table S2. Popula- tion characteristics by migrant group compared to the settled major- ity. Table S3. Prescriptions by migrant group compared to the settled majority. Abbreviations ADRC-NI: Administrative Data Research Centre Northern Ireland; BNF: British National Formulary; BSO: Business of Organisation; CEE: Central and Eastern European; CI: confidence intervals; EU: European Union; GP: general practi- tioner; HSC: health and social care; NASS: National Asylum Support Service; NINIS: Northern Ireland Neighbourhood Information Service; NISRA: Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency; OR: odds ratio; RoI: Republic of Ireland; SOA: Super Output Areas; UK: United Kingdom. Acknowledgements The Administrative Data Research Network takes privacy protection very seriously. All information that directly identifies individuals will be removed from the datasets by trusted third parties, before researchers get to see it. All researchers using the Network are trained and accredited to use sensitive date safely and ethically, they will only access the data via a secure environment, and all of their findings will be vetted to ensure they adhere to the strictest confidentiality standards. The help provided by the staff of the Administrative Data Research Network Northern Ireland (ADRC-NI) and the Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency (NISRA) Research Support Unit is acknowl- edged. The ADRC-NI is funded by the Economic and Research Council (ESRC). The authors alone are responsible for the interpretation of the data and any views or opinions presented are solely those of the author and do not neces- sarily represent those of the ADRC-NI. The Census and BSO data has been supplied for the sole purpose of this project. The help provided by the staff of the NILS Research Support Unit is acknowledged. The NILS-RSU is funded by the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) and the Northern Ireland Government. The authors alone are responsible for the interpretation of the data and any views or opinions presented are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of NISRA/NILS.. Authors’ contributions AK, DO’R, MD, DW, and TB designed and conceptualized the study. TB drafted the article. KP and TB analysed the data with support from all other authors. All authors contributed to the study design, interpreting findings, reviewing the article and revising it critically for important intellectual content. All authors read and approved the final manuscript. Funding The study was funded as part of an Administrative Data Research Centre Northern Ireland (ADRC-NI) research programme, funded by the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) (Grants ES/L007509/1 and ES/S00744X/1). DOR, MD, and AK were also supported by the Medical Research Council (MRC) (Grant MR/K023241/1). AK was additionally supported by the Academy of Finland (Grant 312310 for the Centre of Excellence for Research on Ageing and Care, RG 3 Migration, Care and Ageing). Availability of data and materials The datasets generated and analysed during the current study are not publicly available as they are protected by the Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency and can only be provided with their review and permission. Ethics approval and consent to participate Ethical approval was obtained from the Office for Research Ethics Committee Northern Ireland (ORECNI; Ref: 15/WM/0212), the Research Ethics Commit- tee for the School of Medicine, Dentistry and Biomedical Sciences at Queen’s University Belfast (Ref: 14/54), and the Administrative Data Research Network (ADRN) Approvals Panel (Ref: 2014/008); and conform to the principles embodied in the 1964 Declaration of Helsinki and its later amendments. Consent for publication Not applicable. Competing interests The authors declare that they have no competing interests. Author details 1 Department of Psychology, American University of Beirut, Beirut, Lebanon. 2 Administrative Data Research Centre Northern Ireland, Centre for Public Health, Queen’s University Belfast, Belfast, UK. 3 UKCRC Centre of Excellence for Public Health (Northern Ireland), Queen’s University Belfast, Belfast, UK. 4 Finnish Institute of Occupational Health, Helsinki, Finland. 5 School of Social Policy, Sociology and Social Research, University of Kent, Canterbury, UK. 6 Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Helsinki, Helsinki, Finland. 7 SWPS University of Social Sciences and Humanities in Wroclaw, Wroclaw, Poland. Received: 22 May 2019 Accepted: 20 December 2019 References 1. Close C, Bosqui T, Donnelly M, O’Reilly D, Kouvonen A. Migrant mental health and representation in routine administrative registers. Globaliza- tion Health. 2016;12:47. 2. Mindis I, Boffetta P. Mood disorders in first- and second-generation immigrants: systematic review and meta-analysis. 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Publisher’s Note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in pub- lished maps and institutional affiliations. http://www.psni.police.uk/general_don%e2%80%99t_turn_your_back_on_hate_crime http://www.psni.police.uk/general_don%e2%80%99t_turn_your_back_on_hate_crime https://adrn.ac.uk/about/network/n-ireland/ https://adrn.ac.uk/about/network/n-ireland/ First-generation migrants’ use of psychotropic medication in Northern Ireland: a record linkage study Abstract Purpose: Methods: Results: Conclusions: Background Methods Data Sources Population description Variable preparation Migrant status and origin Psychotropic prescriptions Individual characteristics Area characteristics Data linkage Statistical analysis Results Population characteristics Prescription of psychotropic medication Discussion Strengths and limitations Implications Conclusions Acknowledgements References 
work_6tc2iujqqvenlawbtsldcncjse	----	Lodz Papers in Pragmatics 14.1 (2018): 45–68 Special issue on Narrating hostility, challenging hostile narratives https://doi.org/10.1515/lpp-2018-0003 Majid KhosraviNik Newcastle University Eleonora Esposito University of Navarra ONLINE HATE, DIGITAL DISCOURSE AND CRITIQUE: EXPLORING DIGITALLY-MEDIATED DISCURSIVE PRACTICES OF GENDER-BASED HOSTILITY Abstract The communicative affordances of the participatory web have opened up new and multifarious channels for the proliferation of hate. In particular, women navigating the cybersphere seem to be the target of a disproportionate amount of hostility. This paper explores the contexts, approaches and conceptual synergies around research on online misogyny within the new communicative paradigm of social media communication (KhosraviNik 2017a: 582). The paper builds on the core principle that online misogyny is demonstrably and inherently a discourse; therefore, the field is envisaged at the intersection of digital media scholarship, discourse theorization and critical feminist explications. As an ever-burgeoning phenomenon, online hate has been approached from a range of disciplinary perspectives but has only been partially mapped at the interface of meaning making contents/processes and new mediation technologies. The paper aims to advance the state of the art by investigating online hate in general, and misogyny in particular, from the vantage point of Social Media Critical Discourse Studies (SM-CDS); an emerging model of theorization and operationalization of research combining tenets from Critical Discourse Studies with scholarship in digital media and technology research (KhosraviNik 2014, 2017a, 2018). Our SM-CDS approach to online misogyny demarcates itself from insinuation whereby the phenomenon is reduced to digital communicative affordances per se and argues in favor of a double critical contextualization of research findings at both digital participatory as well as social and cultural levels. Keywords digital discourse, online misogyny, digital hate, Critical Discourse Studies, Social Media CDS Brought to you by | Newcastle University Authenticated Download Date | 9/25/18 1:17 PM 46 Majid KhosraviNik and Eleonora Esposito Online hate, digital discourse and critique: Exploring digitally mediated discursive practices of gender-based hostility 1 Hating in the cyber sphere: New affordances and practices The fast-emerging technologies of the participatory web have brought about an authentic socio-communicative revolution that has transformed the way we communicate, explore and connect to the world forever. “Constant connectivity”, the immediate and on-going access to global news, interests, contacts and different modes of expressions, has become a taken for granted part of life in most Western societies (Keipi et al. 2017: 2). Social media, as a paradigm of communication (rather than the platforms or digital interfaces themselves) and as a central notion in digital participatory revolution, has not only provided digital counterparts for all forms and genres of daily offline communications, but has also created a range of indigenous genres and communicative contents and practices. Social media communication paradigm is characterized by the communicative affordance that digital interfaces provide, at the intersection of mass and interpersonal communication (KhosraviNik 2017a). As such, a social media communicative practice and space pertains to any “electronically mediated communication across any electronic platforms, spaces, sites, and technologies in which users can: (a.) work together in producing and compiling content; (b.) perform interpersonal communication and mass communication simultaneously or separately – sometimes mass performance of interpersonal communication and; (c.) have access to see and respond to institutionally (e.g. newspaper articles) and user-generated content/texts” (KhosraviNik 2017a: 582). Within such qualifying conditions, a wide range of digital forms and spaces would be deemed as social media communication, including the obvious Social Networking Sites (SNSs) e.g. Instagram and Facebook, Micro/blogging sites such as Twitter and tumblr, content aggregators such as Wikipedia, link-sharing sites such as Digg, various discussion forums and Instant Messaging Apps with the possibility of creating group communication such as WhatsApp and Telegram. In contrast to restrictions on time and place in offline social communications, the social media communication in the cyberspace affords an always-on availability for such practices, allowing for constant pursue of personal interests in a shared scenario as well as for the creation and maintenance of global relations that validate and support identities and behaviors (Allen, Szwedo and Mikami 2012; Davidson and Martelozzo 2013). As an interactive, pluri-directional and multimodal realm, the cybersphere is also characterized by the incessant production and sharing of information content, with an ever-growing number of bottom-up discourse formations and disseminations. Social media “technologies have broken the uni-directionality of content flow from producers to consumers via (gated) mass media practices; and, at least on the face of it, have empowered ordinary users by having the option to participate in text production and distribution” (KhosraviNik 2014: 291). Social media communicative space is characterized by a constant potential for ordinary (rather than élite) media performance (and its relative consequences in terms of mass contribution, engagement and impact), contributing to the gestation of a modern cyberculture. Brought to you by | Newcastle University Authenticated Download Date | 9/25/18 1:17 PM Lodz Papers in Pragmatics 14.1 (2018): 45–68 47 Special issue on Narrating hostility, challenging hostile narratives https://doi.org/10.1515/lpp-2018-0003 One of the most significant and complex drawbacks of the proliferation of user- generated content, and the so-called democratization of access to symbolic recourses, is the acutely increasing incidence of online hate or cyberhate. The very global, immediate and participatory nature of social media communication paradigm has made the cybersphere a breeding ground for the expression and dissemination of a range of exclusionary, intolerant, and extremist discourses, practices and beliefs (Kopytowska 2017). Cyberhate is generally defined as any digital act of “violence, hostility, and intimidation, directed towards people because of their identity or ‘perceived’ difference” (Chakraborti et al. 2014: 6). In a broader sense it is viewed as “any use of electronic communications technology to spread anti- Semitic, racist, bigoted, extremist or terrorist messages or information”1 (Anti-Defamation League 2010: 4). In other words, within a widely unregulated, free cyber sphere, the Internet has become “the new frontier for spreading hate” (Banks 2010: 234). One of the key scholarly assumptions on how and why such electronic discourses are on the rise is that social media affordances act as a force multiplier, both in terms of sheer quantity and vitriolic quality of interactions. Some of these digital features and communicative affordances have been specifically flagged by scholars in Social Psychology, Criminology, as well as Media and Communication Studies, as playing crucial functions in the unique spread, consolidation and salience of digital discourses of hate. Anonymity, or in actual fact, perceived anonymity, is one of the most widely recognized factors boosting online hostility. It is regarded to play a major role in freeing people from following social norms and conventions as they do not feel the threat of a sanction or accountability for their acts (Wallace 2016). The assumption of anonymity results in disinhibition, i.e. the “apparent reduction in concern for self-presentation and the judgement of others” (Johnson 1998: 44 cited in Thurlow et al. 2009: 62). The disinhibited behavior is also referred to as the Gyges effect (Hardaker 2013), in reference to Plato’s myth of the Ring of Gyges. The myth tells the story of a man with a magical ring, which brings him the power of invisibility; being invisible, he commits a number of immoral acts to seize the throne of Lydia. The Gyges effect has come to indicate the role of online anonymity and its social repercussions, e.g. the disinhibition of users online in unleashing unrestrained (and harmful) interactions on social media spaces that would not be replicated in face-to-face contact. The notion of anonymity is here viewed loosely, on a spectrum ranging from absolute anonymity to a perception of it, merely as communication on virtual spaces. Anonymity online is related to the assumption that cyberspaces are intrinsically different from real interactions, i.e. less important, freer and differently valued. This is one of the main reasons why an overall feeling of anonymity influences how people act online (Joinson 2003), despite the fact that they often reveal their names, pictures, and affiliations when joining social networks, creating video blogs, or sending e-mails (McKenna and Bargh 2003). Part of this perception is due to physical separation, which is also regarded 1 The absence of gender in this definition is very relevant to this study and will be discussed in Section 3. Brought to you by | Newcastle University Authenticated Download Date | 9/25/18 1:17 PM 48 Majid KhosraviNik and Eleonora Esposito Online hate, digital discourse and critique: Exploring digitally mediated discursive practices of gender-based hostility as a factor for the exacerbation of incivility and violent behavior online (Lewandowska- Tomaszczyk 2017). On the one hand, the lack of a face-to face context, and the related acknowledgement of each other’s humanity, may play a role in the increase of aggressive impulses online (Weisband and Atwater 1999). On the other hand, the lack of non-verbal cues (e.g. facial expressions, body language, etc.) in online communication (Amichai- Hamburger and McKenna 2006) has been linked to an overall augmented perception and impact of online aggression, as the message salience is entirely concentrated in the text (Guadagno and Cialdini 2002; Epley and Kruger 2005). Closely linked to anonymity is an overall sense of de-individuation in the cybersphere, i.e. “a subjugation of the individual to the group and a concomitant reduction in self-focus” (Thurlow et al. 2009: 63). De-individuation, therefore, reduces self-awareness and fosters a sense of we-ness and group identity even by means of “weak ties” (Granovetter 1973; Baider and Constantinou 2014).), such as a single shared interest or hobby. Millions of people can be reached through an “inexpensive and unencumbered social network that has enabled previously diverse and fragmented groups to connect, engendering a collective identity and sense of community” (Banks 2010: 234). Related to the depersonalizing effect of online de-individuation are group salience and polarization. Online communication can foster the acceptance of group norms over individual standards of behavior (Postmes et al. 2002). This loss of individuality is deeply linked to the loss of personal responsibility and allows for the formation of “cyber mobs” (Citron 2009) and the spread of mob dynamics and mob mentality online, often resulting in an ever-escalating competition to attack people online because of their perceived difference. The aforementioned dynamics of de- individuation and group salience often result in the absence of contradicting or moderating voices, paralleled by an exaggeration and polarization of common divergences between opinions, visions and segments of society (Wallace 2016). Such digital characterization, together with psychological explorations on the mechanism of cyberhate, constitutes the theoretical and technological context of the manner, range and extent of these discursive practices. The recognition of strong psychological features in antisocial behaviors like hate speech is basically entrenched in the differences between face-to-face communication and online interactions. However, it is important to note that humans have always been interacting with each other and appropriating mediation technologies in their social communication. While it is reasonable to say that the digital affordances and specifications may have a lot to do with the range and quality of certain norm of communication, nevertheless, the construction, perception and communication of hate is primarily a social construct, i.e. constituted in the socio-cultural, socio-political and socio-economic context of the society. The social context, or, in Couldry’s (2012) terms, the “thick context” is the forbearer of what is referred to as the network of discourses-in-place which constitutes the culture and social perspective on the backdrop of a diachronic build-up of knowledge/stance accumulation (KhosraviNik 2015a; 2015b). Brought to you by | Newcastle University Authenticated Download Date | 9/25/18 1:17 PM Lodz Papers in Pragmatics 14.1 (2018): 45–68 49 Special issue on Narrating hostility, challenging hostile narratives https://doi.org/10.1515/lpp-2018-0003 As such, an analysis of a digital communicative phenomenon such as discourses of hate is contingent upon the two levels of horizontal (industrial) contextualization on top of a vertical (social) contextualization (KhosraviNik 2017a). On the horizontal level, the specific communicative affordances and possible repercussions are accounted for, while in the vertical level the discursive practices are positioned and explicated within the cultural and social norms (or big D discourses) and Foucauldian networks of knowledge in society. Any social media communicative phenomenon is shaped and scaffolded both by the digital and social contexts. Such an approach would deliberately steer away from media determinist accounts as well as from universalist understandings of social media effect (KhosraviNik and Kelsey, forthcoming). Similarly, it would prevent any dilution and trivialisation of online hate as a normal feature of the Internet, considered as a self- regulated, independent realm. Communication is to be seen as a human endeavor, regardless of the sophistication of the medium used. Therefore, its critical investigation will focus on the human as member of a specific social construct, not merely on the technology of mediation. 2 Online hate as communication and practice: Beyond flaming and trolling We have seen how the interactive and intertextual nature of the cyberspace allows groups and individuals with similar (often radical) ideas to connect and express explicit manifestations of hate, which, supported and further inflamed by other Internet users, often result in the emergence of a “discursive spiral of hate” (Kopytowska et al. 2017: 68). The international debate on the viral nature of online harassment has largely been envisaged around the notions of trolling and flaming, too often employed as umbrella terms for several and extremely different negative online behaviors related to uninhibited online communication. In early definitions, flaming has been regarded as a general expression of “strong and inflammatory opinions” (Siegel et al. 1986: 161) as well as “expressing oneself more strongly on the computer than one would in other communication settings” (Kiesler et al. 1984: 1130). However, these general definitions do not seem to fully account for the “aggressive, hostile, profanity-laced” nature of the phenomenon (O’Sullivan and Flanagin 2003: 70). In fact, flaming is usually characterized by “profanity, insults, negative affect, and ‘typographic energy’ such as capital letters and exclamation marks” (Jane 2015: 66; see also Lea et al. 1992), and entails “swearing or using otherwise offensive language” (Moor et al. 2010: 1536). In a broader perspective, flaming can be seen as a natural part of the techno-discursive design of social media and the shift in digital communication prioritizing affective expressionism over rational resonance (KhosraviNik 2018). Trolling is another recurrent catch-all term to describe everything from “playground insults, sick jokes, and deliberate insensitivity right through to threats of violence, rape and Brought to you by | Newcastle University Authenticated Download Date | 9/25/18 1:17 PM 50 Majid KhosraviNik and Eleonora Esposito Online hate, digital discourse and critique: Exploring digitally mediated discursive practices of gender-based hostility murder” (Hardaker 2013). What seems to characterize trolling is the deliberate act of luring others into useless circular discussion, with the result of interfering with the positive and useful exchange of ideas in a given environment (such as an online forum), shifting the dialogue into a confusing, unsuccessful and unproductive exchange (Herring et al. 2002: 372). This is often achieved by posting meaningless and incendiary comments with the exclusive goal of fueling an equally aggressive reaction, enjoying the resulting disharmony and conflict (Fichman and Sanfilippo 2016). Despite the widespread (and often overlapping) use of these two terms, the utmost complexity of the discursive practices and behaviors of online hostility has somehow managed to hinder the development of principled definitions and univocal terminology. Far from being a trivial aspect, terminology is part and parcel of the conceptual, methodological, and epistemological challenge posed by cyberhating. In fact, the early concerns with the issue of digital hostility have arisen since the very initial development of forums and chatrooms, as the early versions of social media communicative spaces. However, in the “first wave” of studies on online hostility (Jane 2015; see also Jane 2017), throughout the late 1980s and 1990s, scholarly research got quickly stuck in a polarized debate on the actual nature of Computer Mediated Communication (henceforth, CMC). On the one side framed as a “rational, efficient and productive” way of communication, CMC was also quickly labelled as “irrational, deficient and disruptive” due to the proliferation of “uninhibited behaviour” (Lea et al. 1992: 91). This resulted also in a polarized, sterile conceptualization of flaming, mainly either foregrounding the role of society over technology or vice versa in the origin of the phenomenon (Jane 2015: 67). The “second wave” (Jane 2015: 68) of research on flaming employed complex working definitions and theoretical models aimed at classifying user-generated content (see Turnage 2007; Kaufer 2000). Grounded in a more balanced attention for both message content and context, O’Sullivan and Flanagin’s (2003) approach aimed at developing “precise conceptual and operational definitions” (p. 69) and a system for the identification of “true flames” (p. 82) in forums and emails. However, their application to the more recent digital interfaces proves to be practically, epistemically and conceptually difficult (Jane 2015:70), complicated by the evolving Web communication and its growing intricacy and virality. In the meantime, the super connectivity, integration and divergence of digital practices, outlets and devices also enhances the impact of digital cyberhate, turning it into a socially relevant discursive practice rather than an isolated online dynamic. Within a saturated context of social media spaces and their unprecedented diversity and intensity of use, the “third wave” (Jane 2015: 69) of research has questioned the available theories, methods and terminologies related to online hate. Topics like flaming and trolling are absent in the most recent handbooks on Internet Studies (Hunsinger et al. 2010; Consalvo and Ess 2011; Dutton 2013), however according to Jane (2015: 69) this has too often resulted in scholars overlooking the phenomenon for the simple fact that they were not able to grasp it in its complex entirety. Third wave scholars like Lange (2006) have claimed that the term flaming is “exhaustively oversaturated” and the solution to the debate Brought to you by | Newcastle University Authenticated Download Date | 9/25/18 1:17 PM Lodz Papers in Pragmatics 14.1 (2018): 45–68 51 Special issue on Narrating hostility, challenging hostile narratives https://doi.org/10.1515/lpp-2018-0003 would lie “not with finding a more precise definition for flaming” but with “extinguishing the term ‘flaming’ itself”. At the face of the impossibility of developing a systematic and infallible methodology for the definition and identification of what constitutes (or does not constitute) a “true flame” (O’Sullivan and Flanagin 2003: 82), a more ethnographic, less taxonomic approach to online hostility would potentially represent a more useful and relevant insight into how participants in CMC “maintain, challenge and negotiate” cultural norms which are “constantly in flux and potentially at odds”, both “into and out of existence” (Lange 2006). Some considerations are to be taken on-board in the development of a critical research to online hostility as a “full-blown set of cultural norms and set of linguistic practices” (Coleman 2002: 109). To start with, Lange’s (2006) call for academics to avoid “engaging in a moral categorization that takes sides” may easily risk derailing in “a moral relativism and scholarly detachment” (Jane 2012: 539), which ignores the tangible social impact of online hate and may result in an underestimation and trivialization of the phenomenon. A crucial point here, probably a lesson to be learned from the three waves of studies on online hostility, is not to dilute a socially relevant and serious phenomenon into a cybernetic (playful?) game/dynamic. Too often a recreational undertone in flaming and trolling-related literature has hindered framing the issue within a narrative of criminal aggression having a social, material and ethical relevance. Similarly, it has hindered the acknowledgement of online hostility as an actual strategy to silence and exercise control over disadvantaged groups who may benefit from the participatory potential of the cyber sphere more, especially those who have historically challenged the unequal distribution of power within society (i.e. women, see Section 3). According to Sarkeesiaan (2015), assigning a juvenile and goliardic nature to the phenomenon of trolling, reinforced by comments like “don’t feed the trolls,” “it’s just boys being boys,” and “it’s just the Internet,” has contributed to the normalization of online harassment as an integral act of digital citizenship. The definitive abandonment of the terms flaming and trolling in favor of other less saturated and loaded alternatives, such as cyberhate and “hate speech” (Citron and Norton 2011) or “e-bile” (Jane 2014), could be a viable starting point to foster a more mindful approach to the violent and exclusionary nature of online hostility, rather than edulcorating the issue by focusing on its playful and communally participative aspects. Furthermore, the refusal to acknowledge flaming as a result of “cultural norm violations” (Lange 2006) may make matters worse. On the one hand, it may translate into an exculpatory narrative, framing online hate as a legitimate user “retaliation against a community that they feel has stripped away their identity and alienated them” (Suler and Phillips 1998: 277). On the other hand, it may foster an upfront celebration of flaming as a liberating, anti-hegemonic act of free speech, a “laudable and savvy resistance to mainstream media norms” (Jane 2012: 539, see also Phillips 2011; 2012). On a broader level of analysis, we must acknowledge that the obsession over the methodological framing of the phenomenon, entangled with exhilaration over newly found communicative affordances both on the side of the users and researchers, has too often swayed the academic Brought to you by | Newcastle University Authenticated Download Date | 9/25/18 1:17 PM 52 Majid KhosraviNik and Eleonora Esposito Online hate, digital discourse and critique: Exploring digitally mediated discursive practices of gender-based hostility discourse away from the important social, ethical, and political aspects of this phenomenon. Lack of interdisciplinary synergization between media and technology approaches and more established (traditional?) social sciences have contributed to rifts in interpretations at the cost of critical socially relevant research (KhosraviNik 2017a; 2017b) This type of technological preoccupation is a recurring pitfall in analysis of any socially, politically relevant topic, e.g. the digital politics of protesting, representation etc. (KhosraviNik 2017a; 2017b; KhosraviNik and Unger 2016; KhosraviNik and Sarkhoh 2017). 3 Towards a critical definition of online misogyny Although misogynistic violence represents a compelling social problem, both institutional and scholarly research have often dismissed or neglected the recognition of misogyny as a form of gender-based hate speech. The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OCSE) has defined “hate speech” as the expression of hatred towards an individual or group of individuals on the basis of “protected characteristics”, such as “membership to some specific social group that could, on its own, trigger discrimination” (OSCE 2009: 37– 46). The taxonomy of these characteristics, and whether these include gender, remain very much open to interpretation (see Kopytowska and Baider 2017: 139). In line with the 2010 definition of the Anti-Defamation League (see Section 1), also the No Hate Speech Movement campaign launched by the Council of Europe in 2013 makes a very clear reference to “nationalism and ethnocentrism, discrimination and hostility against minorities, migrants and people of immigrant origin” as the main sources of hate and discrimination (Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers’ Recommendation 97 (20); cf. Weber 2009), essentially leaving out of the equation such characteristics as gender, gender identity and sexual orientation. Entries such as misogyny or sexism also fail to appear in the online glossary of terms developed in the context of the same campaign. The relative absence of gender from most institutional definitions of hate speech represents a clear sign of a blind spot and epitomizes the institutional failure to acknowledge gender as a social factor that, per se, suffices to trigger hate (see also Titley 2012). Many factors are at play in this respect, as identified by Lillian (2007). To start with, the widespread assumption that gender equality has been substantively achieved, leaving nothing but a residue of sexism in popular culture, may account for the reluctance to discuss sexist speech in terms of hate speech. Another reason for the exclusion of gender as a hate factor is that while hate speech targets “members of vulnerable minorities” (Waldron 2012: 5) with racial and xenophobic aggressions aimed at their complete elimination from a given community, the same cannot be argued for women (Lillian 2007). These assumptions, however, fail to account for the numerous ways in which women are targeted by sexist and sexually violent speech and denigrated within moralizing, patriarchal frameworks in what can be regarded as one of the “most complex and pervasive system[s] of oppression” (Lazar 2007: 143). Brought to you by | Newcastle University Authenticated Download Date | 9/25/18 1:17 PM Lodz Papers in Pragmatics 14.1 (2018): 45–68 53 Special issue on Narrating hostility, challenging hostile narratives https://doi.org/10.1515/lpp-2018-0003 Feminist scholarship, on the one hand, has framed online (and offline) misogyny as strategies for perpetuation of patriarchal social hierarchy and, on the other hand, has substantiated a direct link between online harassment and the gendered nature of digital contexts (see Jane 2016; 2017). A critical approach to online misogyny draws on feminist studies for a full and systematic acknowledgement of misogyny as a form of hate speech. In so doing, it further problematizes the social and cultural mechanisms of misogyny and the role of gender-based harmful speech in gendered social orders. While a discussion of the vast array of feminist theories on the issue is beyond the scope of this paper, two aspects require particular attention in a critical outlook to online misogyny. Firstly, the acknowledgement of women’s precarity in the cybersphere, as generated by the adherence of its users to gendered social norms (Butler 2009). Starting from the assumption that conformity to these social norms creates a “differential allocation of recognizability” (2009: ii), and any violation attempt entails becoming “differently exposed to injury [and] violence” (2009: ii), women, unlike men, are to be regarded as inhabiting the cybersphere as precarious subjects. Being less recognizable and, therefore, less powerful, their active participation in the online public sphere may easily translate into a non-compliance with the social norms of gender ideology, and trigger harmful, sexualized speech to restore the order. Secondly, an awareness that the subordination of women as precarious subjects in the cybersphere is largely achieved and maintained by means of harmful speech acts (Langton 2012: 80) with a precise illocutionary and perlocutionary force aimed at annihilating certain groups, legitimating their discrimination, advocating violence and hatred and producing changes in attitudes and behaviors. Not only targeted by an exceptional amount of hostility, women’s voice online is also silenced by the very asymmetry in the ability to perform certain illocutionary acts, as measure of authority and power (Langton 1993). Moreover, the affordances of the participatory web promote an exponential augmentation of the illocutionary and perlocutionary dimensions of online misogyny, performed within a “collapsed context model” (Marwick and Boyd 2014) which is potentially boundless, and hence enhances exponentially the effect on behaviors and beliefs of a limitless number of people. 4 Social media discourse and critique The disciplinary boundaries between social sciences and media and technology scholarship partly stem from epistemological distinctions informing the fields as well as from the perceived incompatibilities of a viable merger. This is the same lack of interdisciplinarity, which, on the one hand, could hinder flaming-related studies from making meaningful critical social contextualization of the issue and on the other hand, could outdate discourse theory in engaging with digital media contexts. This is because the interactive affordances provided by the social media communicative paradigm have posed serious challenges to the bulk of theories in mass media communications, e.g. around the notion of discursive Brought to you by | Newcastle University Authenticated Download Date | 9/25/18 1:17 PM 54 Majid KhosraviNik and Eleonora Esposito Online hate, digital discourse and critique: Exploring digitally mediated discursive practices of gender-based hostility power and the way audiences have been defined within decades of theorization (KhosraviNik 2014). The traditional gatekept, unidirectional, one-to-many interface of mass media is now replaced with what appears to be a (potential for) many-to-many dynamic of discursive practice hence mass media’s grand discourse and their concentrated power to push content onto audience is replaced by new forms of participatory communication. This could be viewed as a form of de-monopolization of access to discursive power in social media. The notion of power behind discourse, i.e. established discourses-in-place in society in Foucauldian sense, has always been the center of theorizing the role of semiotic resources in society. This explains the traditional preoccupation of Critical Discourse Studies (CDS) (Wodak and Meyer 2016; Fairclough 2003) with mass media as an obvious powerful site where discursive power is exploited to (re)construct and (re)define social realities. From CDS vantage point, culture is nothing but a network of (more or less resident) discourses-in-place in a given society within a synchronic and diachronic architecture (see KhosraviNik 2015a; 2015b). As such, collective identities including gender related constructs are inherently envisaged through discursive processes where boundaries of difference, uniqueness, and distinctiveness are constituted/marked/represented. In line with the increasing and multifaceted use of social media model of communication as new cultural forces of identity performances, the participatory web provides exciting new opportunities for studies on various collective representations (KhosraviNik and Sarkhoh 2017). In Susan Herring’s (2001: 625) words, “the discursive negotiation and expression of social relations in cyberspace including asymmetrical relations, constitutes to be one of the most promising areas of future investigation”. As “a socially committed, problem-oriented, textually based, critical analysis of discourse (manifested in communicative content/practices)” (KhosraviNik 2017a: 586), CDS is bound to include and account for recent shifts in the concentration of discursive practices on digitally facilitated spaces, i.e. there is discursive power where there is communication concentration. Yet, CDS is indispensably in need of making substantial new interdisciplinary synergies with social media theory and scholarship (KhosraviNik and Unger 2016) to be able to account for new techno-discursive architecture of new media (KhosraviNik 2018). It is important to note that, as necessarily as the new transdisciplinary engagements are, such an endeavor “should not (a.) cause an epistemological overhaul for social orientation of CDS, e.g., shades of media determinism and dilution of critique and (b.) force CDS into substantial tired defensive debates on old issues, e.g., why the descriptive level of analysis needs a critical explication” (KhosraviNik 2017a: 586). A critical digital discourse analysis of identity construct maintains a strong connection with social theory although it has to incorporate a significant interdisciplinary knowledge and conceptualization around nuances of digital practices and techno-discursive intricacies of cyberspace discursive practices (KhosraviNik 2018). Such a social media approach to CDS (SM-CDS) would Brought to you by | Newcastle University Authenticated Download Date | 9/25/18 1:17 PM Lodz Papers in Pragmatics 14.1 (2018): 45–68 55 Special issue on Narrating hostility, challenging hostile narratives https://doi.org/10.1515/lpp-2018-0003 then fill crucial gaps in scholarship on socially relevant but digitally mediated discourses, e.g. digital misogyny discourses. Another crucial caveat is to guard against digital determinism (KhosraviNik and Kelsey forthcoming). Just because every individual can (apparently) perform his or her own identity online, it does not mean that the society as a structure is not relevant anymore. Neutralizing (problematic) social structures and histories by drawing on (arguable) digital access to representations is undoubtedly reducing life worlds in unproductive ways and vice versa (KhosraviNik 2017a). In line with issues such as digital divide (Ragnedda and Muschert 2013), and despite difficulties in demographic and geographic accounting of online communities, macro-contextual qualities of a given society including materialities of class, ethnicity, gender, agency, cultural capitals, as well as cultural positioning, stereotypes, power structures, histories etc. should not be “distilled into a bland cybernetic metaphor” (Couldry 2012: 117). Social Media Critical Discourse Studies approach (SM-CDS) deals with discourse as its central object of analysis –not the technology, i.e. it is not only interested in what happens in the media per se as a closed loop but also in how it may shape and influence the social and political sphere of our life worlds and vice versa (KhosraviNik 2014; 2017a). In other words, the media specific (horizontal) context of participatory web should not be taken as an equivalent of the vertical social context. As such, digital performances of identity, conflict, and misogyny are to be interpreted within a wider socio-political context, which embeds the digital mediation. The guiding bottom line here is that meanings are negotiated at the intersection of individuals, culture, and media technology (KhosraviNik 2017b, see also Kopytowska 2013, 2015; Kopytowska and Chilton, this Special Issue). At the intersection of resident cultural norms, technological affordance and the given individual, digital critical discourse studies would be interested in both micro communicative patterns as well as the macro-discursive regimes which constitute the culture. 5 For a critical analysis of misogyny discourse online: The Janus Effect Hostility is a complex social, cultural and psychological phenomenon, whose utmost multi- facetedness has been amplified by the new affordances of the participatory web. Motives behind people’s hate are various, different and often obscure, and the very fluid nature of the cybersphere adds to further complicate an already thorny matter. Digital multivocality and virality contribute to guarantee cyberhate a potentially infinite resonance, both online and offline. At the same time, gender has not received sufficient institutional and academic attention as a source of hate in its own right. While the dangers and risks of the digital world are well acknowledged, we still lack a clear grasp of what it actually entails being a woman navigating the cyberspace, and which specific threats and troubles this journey can bring about. Brought to you by | Newcastle University Authenticated Download Date | 9/25/18 1:17 PM 56 Majid KhosraviNik and Eleonora Esposito Online hate, digital discourse and critique: Exploring digitally mediated discursive practices of gender-based hostility As we approach online misogyny from a critical perspective, we are faced with too many epistemic battlefronts, a phenomenon that we refer to, metaphorically, as the Janus effect. The Roman god of beginnings and ends was, in fact, at an advantage compared to us: he only had two directions to look at, forwards and backwards. As we tackle misogyny in the cybersphere, we are compelled to look in different, and intricate directions, none of which can be regarded any more or less important or urgent. This is in line with the breakdown in the linearity of textual flow and foci of production and consumption of meaning making artefacts. The dynamic of one-to-many communication, which has been the hallmark of textual practice in mass media and elite discourses, is now changed into a potential for many-to-many dynamic of textual practices by countless number of ordinary prosumers in a fluid, circular and unpredictable manner (KhosraviNik 2014). In essence, the opportunities for identity performance are endless and extremely individualized (KhosraviNik 2018), but so are the dynamic of power for harassment, hate and misogyny. As it is the case for classic CDS approach, theoretical and methodological aspects of research are intertwined in the technological fabrics of the media(tion) under investigation. While in the case of mass media the discursive power has been identifiably concentrated in the hands of media elites (owners, editors, gatekeepers), the new social media communicative spaces (seem to) afford an individuated potential for expression of identity, conflict and affects with little or no direct accountability. Despite the ontological changes in the media landscape, which automatically calls in new epistemologies for research, the media technology is not to be taken as the definitive formidable force for shaping the processes of discourse formation and perception. That is, misogyny, like other discriminatory practices, is rooted in social conditions, constructions and genealogies of knowledge structures (Foucault 1971). Nevertheless, the technological changes at the intersection of discourse and society, i.e. digital media(tion) industries, play a crucial role in the scale, characteristics and mechanism of new digital discursive practices of symbolic violence, discrimination and hate. In this section, we sketch what we believe are some of the main aspects to take into account when approaching online hostility, around two main themes to be discussed below: interdisciplinarity and empirical text-based approach. Only by putting all these considerations together, in the context of contemporary participatory web, we could attempt at highlighting the demarcations, assumptions and identities around online misogyny discourses in new media ecologies. 5.1 Interdisciplinarity As a general key argument, we believe that audacious, substantial, invasive interdisciplinarity is the sole way forward to make fresh contributions both for the fast- developing scholarship in Social Media Discourse Studies as well as for studies on digital misogyny, hate and harassments. Much of the useful theorizations of the analysis of language on social media or CMC have been produced by scholars who are firmly positioned either within a sociolinguistic frame (Androutsopoulos 2008) or (rather Brought to you by | Newcastle University Authenticated Download Date | 9/25/18 1:17 PM Lodz Papers in Pragmatics 14.1 (2018): 45–68 57 Special issue on Narrating hostility, challenging hostile narratives https://doi.org/10.1515/lpp-2018-0003 descriptive) discourse analysis (Herring 2004). Both these approaches, in fact, have taken important steps in accounting for new digital dynamic of communication by arguing for adaptations to established practices in the field in terms of methodological approaches and genre specific features of the data online. A Social Media CDS approach to misogyny would build on these contributions, i.e. to account for the horizontal digital media context elaborated by digital ethnographic proposal of Androutsopoulos (2008) and dealing with pragmatics of meaning making and discourse analysis of digitally tailored communication genres of Herring (2004). At the same time, SM-CDS theory and method borders a range of influential approaches and debates in the wider field of social media theories and digital communication. In addition to the micro issues of data analysis and incorporation of observational ethos, there is a major synergic critique that SM-CDS identifies with, i.e. the integration of analysis of discursive practice online with the social contexts. Moreover, applying a SM-CDS to the study of online hate against women also means keeping strong references to Gender Studies and Feminist Critique. In approaching online misogyny, we would always start from the assumption that any online form of gendered violence replicates and extends the gender and power relations that pre-exist digital communications technologies and vice versa. In other words, the assumption that discourse, regardless of the its technology of media(tization), is constitutive as well as constituting the society (Fairclough and Wodak 1997). As a form of digital discourse targeting women on the specific basis of their gender, misogynistic speech would be deemed as a purposeful discursive strategy to maintain a gendered asymmetry of power by threatening, discrediting and ultimately silencing women in a way that it has historically been regimented2. When translated in the cybersphere, gender-based discrimination becomes a new, subliminal form of digital divide, having the potential to reduce the equality and inclusivity of both on- and off-line cultures. Only a feminist social critique of online misogyny would allow and be capable of accounting for gender-based inequality, bias and stereotyping in institutional, public and media discourses as the humus of online misogyny. Critique per se can be regarded as an interdisciplinary effort. An integrated critical approach is needed to highlight the existing links between the new online discursive practices and the socio-political context of the offline world and its established power relations. The CDS notion of critique allows us to consider the wider socio-political conditions, which shape discourse and making visible the “interconnectedness of things” (Fairclough 1995: 747). The systematic analysis of discourse reveals structures of power and unmasks ideologies (socio-diagnostic critique), with the ultimate aim of contributing towards the betterment of society (prognostic critique) (Reisigl and Wodak 2001). Starting from the analysis of discourse-internal structures and strategies (and a relative, discourse- immanent, critique) entails a strongly text-based approach, to be discussed below. 2 See Baider (this Special Issue) who draws the same conclusion related to the reinforcement of the asymmetry of power in her study focused on homophobic discourse. Brought to you by | Newcastle University Authenticated Download Date | 9/25/18 1:17 PM 58 Majid KhosraviNik and Eleonora Esposito Online hate, digital discourse and critique: Exploring digitally mediated discursive practices of gender-based hostility 5.2 Empirical text-based approach Both social psychologists and criminologists, authors of the bulk of studies on online hate, have attempted at sketching haters’ underlying motivations and strategies by drawing on psychological theories and research. As we have seen, these studies have provided good insights into disinhibited online behavior, highlighting how some features inherent to CMC (e.g. perceived anonymity and physical separation) contribute to trigger social practices online (e.g. de-individuation, polarization, mob dynamics). One of the dangers of relying on these scholarly interpretations is the relatively straightforward establishment of a cause- effect relation between the affordances of the participatory web and practices of hostility online, highlighting the role of the medium and downplaying socio-political structures and power hierarchies. One major, taken-for-granted assumption is that misogyny is demonstrably and inherently a discourse. On the conceptual level, this means that it is a social phenomenon scaffolded by collective communication and processes of representation and knowledge formation. In other words, it has antecedents and consequences. It also means that there is a level of social power at work, which can contribute to the normalization of unequal social structures and norms. Therefore, the very assumption that online misogyny is a discourse enforces the requirement of critique, engagement and contextualization. On the methodological level, this assumption indicates that the study follows a combination of inductive empirical observation, analysis and interpretation based on concrete set of communicative content (or texts, to use classic CDA terminology), as well as being deductive when it comes to explicating the findings of the textual analysis within the wider social theory3. This would then serve a double purpose for the approach. Firstly, in contrasts to speculative approaches, a SM-CDS study of online misogyny engages with various levels of data (including various forms of meaning making and practices as well as a variety of semiotic resources), i.e. the study would have details of communicative patterns and meaning makings as they occur. Secondly, it affords a requirement of critical engagement and social theorization for the study, i.e. power relations are discursive hence a study as such needs to integrate critical social theory. In essence, the assumption that misogyny is a discourse equips the approach with both methodological rigor at the micro analytical level and emancipatory mission at the macro societal level. In the meantime, it guards against the media deterministic understanding of gender based online harassments as a collective feature of digital technologies of mediation. If “hate speech seeks to move an audience by creating a symbolic code for violence” (Whillock 1995: 32), then only a text-based analysis can capture the complex nuances of the code itself. Similarly, the approach maintains that misogyny is foremost a communicative event rather than a neutral digital event, i.e. it is nurtured by the materiality of life worlds and lived experiences of online prosumers as 3 Within a SM-CDS approach, the term text is replaced by communicative content and practices to capture the dynamic nature of meaning making in social media communication (see KhosraviNik 2017a; KhosraviNik and Kelsey, forthcoming). Brought to you by | Newcastle University Authenticated Download Date | 9/25/18 1:17 PM Lodz Papers in Pragmatics 14.1 (2018): 45–68 59 Special issue on Narrating hostility, challenging hostile narratives https://doi.org/10.1515/lpp-2018-0003 communicative via the new digital affordances. As a communicative event, the analysis of discursive practices of misogyny online is about engagement with styles, the relevancies, the horizontal and vertical context intertextualities, patterns, etc. of the communication itself. At the same time, the SM-CDS approach to online misogyny is also acutely aware of the specificities of the digital dynamic of communication. The critical demarcation against media determinism in no way entails a downplay of the intricacies of the digital technologies and the ways they may promote certain styles of communication. In fact, as part of its feature interdisciplinary approach, SM-CDS has explored issues around political economy of social media, the function of algorithmic regimentation of content, corporate valorization of interaction online and affective stylization of communication on social media spaces (KhosraviNik 2017b; 2018; KhosraviNik and Kelsey forthcoming). To be able to capture the ethos of interactivity, connectivity and always-on nature of social media communication (Hine 2000), one major trajectory is to adopt immersive, digital ethnographic/observational approaches in SM-CDS. This would allow the approach to account for communicative intricacies on the digital ground, with the ideal aim of capturing the various psychological, communicative, technological and affective dynamics around digital misogyny. The main caveat, and indeed a major challenge, is to maintain a healthy balance between theory and practice, between speculation and inductive analysis and, most importantly, between the social theory of discourse and new ontologies of dataism and extreme individualization. Studying social media means dealing with new time, new technology, new industry, new discursive power, new affordance, new genres and new practices, so major interdisciplinary leaps would have to be made by drawing on new research domains in digital technologies. However, it is still the society, its discursive structures, cultural contexts, genealogies of knowledges, discourses-in-place and issues around discrimination and inequalities to represent the core object of study. Accounting for communicative structures and norms of new media technologies should not result in reducing the notion of society into a cybernetic space (KhosraviNik 2014; 2017a). Logistical issues around selection and sampling of cases and areas of relevant discursive concentrations are among the meso-level operationalization considerations. Specifically speaking, the selection of case studies for analyses of online misogyny can be potentially guided by the many various taxonomies of online hostility available in literature. These include gender-specific one, such as the typology recently outlined by Powell and Henry (2017), to include instantiations of: a) gender-based hate speech; b) rape threats; c) image-based harassment; d) sexual solicitation. Other types of online hate are not necessarily gender-specific (such as cyberstalking, cyberbullying, impersonation and doxxing), but they often see women as victims and should be taken into account as different, and more devious, forms of “Technology-Facilitated Sexual Violence” (Henry and Powell 2018). However, these categorizations would not necessarily restrict the focus of the analysis but may only work as general references to support the researcher navigate Brought to you by | Newcastle University Authenticated Download Date | 9/25/18 1:17 PM 60 Majid KhosraviNik and Eleonora Esposito Online hate, digital discourse and critique: Exploring digitally mediated discursive practices of gender-based hostility through considerable amount of data and help them to recognize the recurring patterns that contribute to the viral impact of the phenomenon. As the cybersphere represents an infinite set of data, the adoption of specific social media research software for collection, analysis and visualization of digital data can offer a valid data and method triangulation to the study. An important interdisciplinary overhaul would also entail incorporating the increasing range of emerging methods in social media studies such as big data, data visualization, data mining software, network analysis etc. as well as various adaptations of situated communication analysis, linguistic and multimodal analyses. Software choice depends largely on the focus of the analysis, as well as on the available scale and scope of the projects as they would normally require additional funding. The software will be able to collect data or will operate on datasets, performing few specific analyses (e.g. content, context, co-link, snowball, inter-actor, network, sentiment analyses). While some software is designed for multi-platform analyses, others are most specific in their concentration of operations and design e.g. tweepy for Twitter and netvizz for Facebook. Most available software has been developed for business and marketing needs, nevertheless, they could function as important tools and have been widely employed in peer-reviewed academic research (e.g. Gephi, NodeXL, Datasift). Further supporting corpus-based software (e.g. Wordsmith Tools) can allow a preliminary, quantitative text-based analysis as a starting point for identifying patterns (see Baker and Egbert 2016) and could focus on key-keywords (words with higher or lower frequencies), collocations (frequent co-occurrence of words) and semantic prosody (consistent aura of meaning of a given collocate). As customary in CDS, the quantitatively analyzed corpus can be systematically down-sampled for close qualitative, manual and critical analysis. This will allow to map the vast number of discursive strategies (e.g. referential, predicational, argumentative, perspectivization, mitigation, intensification etc.) and rhetorical devices through which online misogyny is realized (Reisigl and Wodak 2001; Reisigl 2014). Four different heuristic levels of context would be taken into account, ranging from: 1) the immediate co-text; 2) the intertextual and interdiscursive relationship between utterances, texts, genres and discourses; 3) the extralinguistic social/sociological variables and institutional frames of a specific context of situation; 4) the broader sociopolitical and historical contexts, which the discursive practices are embedded in and related to (see Reisigl and Wodak 2009). Multimodal discourses of gender-based symbolic violence and discrimination represent an established core in socio-cultural regimentation of gender inequality in society (see, for example, the plethora of research in women and advertising both in the past and present). Multimodal digital channels of online hate in general (and misogyny in particular) are now an indispensable aspect of research on digital misogyny. Specifically, image-based sexual harassment and exploitation is a common strategy of online misogyny, entailing “the creation, distribution, or threat of distribution, of intimate or sexually explicit images of another person without their consent (also known as revenge pornography)” (Henry and Powell 2018: 201). As far as the CDS of social media is concerned, multimodality is now Brought to you by | Newcastle University Authenticated Download Date | 9/25/18 1:17 PM Lodz Papers in Pragmatics 14.1 (2018): 45–68 61 Special issue on Narrating hostility, challenging hostile narratives https://doi.org/10.1515/lpp-2018-0003 at the forefront of discursive practice. In fact, multimodality has always been the core perception of discursive formation and perception for members of society but for a variety of reasons including the roots and disciplinary foundation of early discourse analysis, the (verbal) language has been considered as the core communication modality in (classic) CDA literature. In the meantime, while working within similar theoretical and conceptual understanding, the analysis of other channels of communication including images, music, architecture etc. has traditionally been bundled together as multimodal discourse analysis (Kress and van Leeuwen 2006; Machin and Mayr 2012). The case in point is the fact that all the recent works on language of new media would feel compelled to acknowledge the multimodal aspect of online communication (e.g. Page et al. 2014; Herring 2004). It is also important to note that, given the new-ness of the communication technologies and the creative ways the users of various socio-cultural backgrounds use these discursive interactive spaces, a host of indigenous, innovative, unique forms and mechanism of meaning makings is available on social media which would not easily conform to the traditional definitions for multimodal communication, i.e. mainly focused on images and music. Hence, if the multimodal approach is to be taken as accounting for all channels of communication other than verbal language, then the approach is also facing challenges in terms of describing the new communicative genres beyond the usual modalities of audio and visual channels. The participatory web is constantly affording new communicative resources unique to these spaces e.g. tagging, likes, annotation, sharing, hyperlinks, etc. (KhosraviNik 2017a; KhosraviNik and Zia 2014). 6 En-route to a SM-CDS of online misogyny The domain of online misogyny as a digital discursive practice would be at the intersection of digital media scholarship, discourse theorization and critical feminist explication. In doing CDS on social media, the procedure should take into account the new context of interaction i.e. its norms of practice, its indigenous genres and meaning making resources etc. while maintaining the core principles in doing critical social sciences. Drawing on earlier theoretical contributions and major case study carried out within the domain of Social Media Critical Discourse Studies (KhosraviNik 2014, 2017a; KhosraviNik and Unger 2016; KhosraviNik and Sarkhoh 2017), a tentative overall operational procedure for such study is envisaged. Firstly, a critical discourse study on digital misogyny would clarify the macro contextual elements around both the use of the media technology as well as the socio- cultural context of society. The media technology characterization is about the ways the users are discussed as a member of digital world, i.e. the fabrics of the digital reality users would experience. The socio-cultural characterization is about the ways users are discussed as a member of (real) society. The first level would be delineating social media use and technology in that given society, range, size, power, penetrability, norms of use, infrastructures, etc. with specific focus on gender related information, e.g. gender mark up Brought to you by | Newcastle University Authenticated Download Date | 9/25/18 1:17 PM 62 Majid KhosraviNik and Eleonora Esposito Online hate, digital discourse and critique: Exploring digitally mediated discursive practices of gender-based hostility of users in different platforms, the background on possible differences in popularity, quality, purpose, and characteristics of use between males and females etc. The second level is the social and cultural fabrics in relation to the use of social media in society with specific focus on gender issues, e.g. quality of already available public sphere and access to it for men and women, range of emancipatory discourses, impetus for gender equality, issues of overall politics, women in power (gender equality in pay, representation, economy, politics etc.). After a general context setting, the specific context of the chosen platform, site or any other social media space would be detailed (e.g. online forums, Twitter etc.), along with any specific use and suitability for deliberation on gender issues. The next step would be description of discursive event(s) selected, the rationales, range, relevance, background and significance of the data concentration selected including, if possible, information gained through Big Data methods, Network Analysis, Social Media Analysis etc. as they may fit the purpose. A major, time consuming and substantial part of SM-CDS is the textual analysis (or a range of communicative content e.g. visual, verbal, memes, etc. and meaning making practices regimes of Likes, Tags, RTs, digital stance making, Mentions, orthographic representations etc.), i.e. the systematic analysis of representational resources and behaviors, categorization of themes, identification of salient representations, arguments, manipulations, visual metaphors etc. This would mean analysis of language and other modalities of meaning making, in addition to indigenous technological semiotic resources/practices. The analysis of the communicative content and practices at this stage could draw on various linguistic, visual, semiotic, multimodal etc. methods within the stipulated overall aims of discourse analysis, i.e. to account for What, How and Why questions (KhosraviNik 2010). In a similar vein, Kopytowska (2013) illustrates how the Media Proximization Approach can be applied to computer-mediated communication. The research enters the analysis of case study communicative content and practices via accounting for the context of technology and society first. Similarly, the findings of the detailed analysis of the communicative content are gradually positioned, examined and extrapolated within the immediate and wider contextual levels. That is, the analysis firstly examines the connection between the new findings with other similar research on digitally mediated communicative content, and secondly explicates the findings within the wider social context on the topic, i.e. scholarship on misogyny discourses in society, mass media, workplace, politics, business etc. The conclusions of such research would consider findings from micro aspects of the analysis spiraling out to immediate and wider context levels. This would include the emerging trends arising from the data analyzed and the specific features, qualities and themes analyzed; the social media spaces, the network and connectivity afforded by the digital technology, the application of the new affordances, the functionality of the platform(s) etc. Relevant levels of concluding extrapolations would entail the wider discussions on impacts of social media communication around hate speech and misogyny Brought to you by | Newcastle University Authenticated Download Date | 9/25/18 1:17 PM Lodz Papers in Pragmatics 14.1 (2018): 45–68 63 Special issue on Narrating hostility, challenging hostile narratives https://doi.org/10.1515/lpp-2018-0003 discourses in society including explication of new trends, changes, complications around the issue, degrees of intensification or alleviation and possible new ways of discourse formation and communication and perceptions on social media space. 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Reisigl, Martin & Ruth Wodak. 2001. Discourse and Discrimination: Rhetoric of Racism and Anti- Semitism. London: Routledge. Reisigl, Martin & Ruth Wodak. 2009. The Discourse-Historical Approach. In Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer (eds.), Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis, 2nd edn, 87–121. London: Sage. Sarkeesiaan, Anita. 2015. “Stop the Trolls. Women Fight Back Online Harassment”. Women in the World. Retrieved from: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v= BGrlk8_kevI (accessed 12/4/2018). Siegel, Jane, Vitaly Dubrovsky, Sara Kiesler & Timothy W. McGuire. 1986. Group processes in computer-mediated communication. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 37(2). 157–187. Suler, John & Wende Phillips. 1998. The Bad Boys of Cyberspace: Deviant Behavior in a Multimedia Chat Community. CyberPsychology & Behavior 1(3). 275–294. Thurlow, Crispin, Laura Lengel & Alice Tomic. 2009. Computer Mediated Communication: Social Interaction and the Internet. London: Sage. Titley, Gavan. 2012. Hate Speech Online: Considerations for the Proposed Campaign. Starting Points for Combating Hate Speech Online. Strasbourg: Council of Europe. Retrieved from: https://rm.coe.int/1680665ba7 (accessed 12/4/2018. Turnage, Anna. 2007. Email flaming behaviors and organizational conflict. Journal of Computer- Mediated Communication 13. 43–59. Waldron, Jeremy. 2012. The Harm in Hate Speech. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Wallace, Patricia. 2016. The Psychology of the Internet. New York: Cambridge University Press. Weber, Anne. 2009. Manual on hate speech, Council of Europe Publishing. Retrieved from: https://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/hrpolicy/ Publications/Hate_Speech_EN.pdf (accessed 12/4/2018). Weisband, Suzanne & Leanne Atwater. 1999. Evaluating Self and Others in Electronic and Face- to- Face Groups. Journal of Applied Psychology 84. 632– 639. Whillock, Rita Kirk. 1995. The use of hate as a stratagem for achieving political and social goals. In Rita Kirk Whillock & David Slayden (eds.), Hate Speech, 28–54. London: Sage. Wodak, Ruth & Michael Meyer. 2016. Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis, 3rd edn. London: Sage. Brought to you by | Newcastle University Authenticated Download Date | 9/25/18 1:17 PM https://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/hrpolicy/ 68 Majid KhosraviNik and Eleonora Esposito Online hate, digital discourse and critique: Exploring digitally mediated discursive practices of gender-based hostility About the Authors Majid KhosraviNik is Senior Lecturer in Digital Media & Discourse Studies at Newcastle University. He teaches modules on Digital Discourses & Identity and Politics, Power & Communication at the School of Arts & Cultures while supervising a number of doctoral and post-doctoral projects. He has published widely on critical discourse studies including immigration discourses, self and other representation, national identity, right wing populism, and regional identities in the Middle East. He is specifically interested in digital media discursive practices. Majid researches the intersection of participatory web, discourse and politics by investigating the impact, dynamic and challenges of social media technologies within a Social Media Critical Discourse Studies (SM-CDS) model. Majid is a founder of Newcastle Critical Discourse Studies, sits on editorial board of Critical Discourse Studies (Routledge) and Journal of Language & Politics (John Benjamins) while acting as an expert evaluator and moderator for a range of leading international publishers and research grant organizations including the EU commission. Address Media, Culture, Heritage, School of Arts and Cultures Armstrong Building University of Newcastle Newcastle upon Tyne, NE1 7RU UK e-mail: majid.khosravinik@newcastle.ac.uk Eleonora Esposito is Marie Skłodowska-Curie Research Fellow at the University of Navarra (Spain). She holds a M.A. in Cultural and Postcolonial Studies (University of Naples L’Orientale, 2010) and a PhD / Doctor Europaeus in English Linguistics (University of Naples Federico II, 2015). Her research interests are in the field of Language, Politics, Gender and Society in the European Union and in the Anglophone Caribbean, investigated in the light of Critical Discourse Studies, Multimodal Studies and Translation Studies. Currently, Eleonora is exploring new theoretical perspectives and integrated methodologies for the critical investigation of Social Media Discourses, with a focus on online hostility and misogyny. Address Institute for Culture and Society (ICS) University of Navarra Calle Universidad 6 31009 Pamplona Spain e-mail: eleonora.esposito84@gmail.com Brought to you by | Newcastle University Authenticated Download Date | 9/25/18 1:17 PM 
work_6u7e3igmlngipiq7m2l6jlkaie	----	Asian-Americans and Pacific Islanders in COVID-19: Emerging Disparities Amid Discrimination Asian-Americans and Pacific Islanders in COVID-19: Emerging Disparities Amid Discrimination Daniel Wang, MD1, Gilbert C. Gee, PhD2, Ehete Bahiru, MD3, Eric H. Yang, MD3, and Jeffrey J. Hsu, MD, PhD3 1Department of Medicine, David Geffen School of Medicine at UCLA, University of California, Los Angeles, CA, USA; 2Department of Community Health Sciences, Fielding School of Public Health, University of California, Los Angeles, CA, USA; 3Division of Cardiology, Department of Medicine, David Geffen School of Medicine at UCLA, University of California, Los Angeles, CA, USA. Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) is a global pan- demic. In the USA, the burden of mortality and morbidity has fallen on minority populations. The understanding of the impact of this pandemic has been limited in Asian- Americans and Pacific Islanders (AAPIs), though disaggre- gated data suggest disproportionately high mortality rates. AAPIs are at high risk for COVID-19 transmission, in part due to their over-representation in the essential workforce, but also due to cultural factors, such as inter- generational residency, and other social determinants of health, including poverty and lack of health insurance. Some AAPI subgroups also report a high comorbidity bur- den, which may increase their susceptibility to more se- vere COVID-19 infection. Furthermore, AAPIs have en- countered rising xenophobia and racism across the coun- try, and we fear such discrimination only serves to exac- erbate these rapidly emerging disparities in this commu- nity. We recommend interventions including disaggrega- tion of mortality and morbidity data, investment in community-based healthcare, advocacy against discrim- ination and the use of non-inflammatory language, and a continued emphasis on underlying comorbidities, to en- sure the protection of vulnerable communities and the navigation of this current crisis. J Gen Intern Med 35(12):3685–8 DOI: 10.1007/s11606-020-06264-5 © Society of General Internal Medicine 2020 INTRODUCTION Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) is a global pandemic.1, 2 In the USA, the burden of COVID-19 morbidity and mortality has disproportionately fallen on minority and immigrant popu- lations, exacerbating existing societal biases and longstanding racial/ethnic disparities in health.3, 4 Understanding these dispar- ities in risk and outcome is of paramount importance. However, the understanding of the impact of this pandemic in Asian- Americans and Pacific Islanders (AAPIs) has been limited by inadequate data disaggregation, posing significant difficulties in the identification of vulnerable populations by ethnicity and socioeconomic group, and the subsequent allocations of re- sources for prevention and treatment.5 COVID-19 INFECTION AND MORTALITY IN ASIAN- AMERICANS In aggregate, Asian-Americans represent 4.4% of deaths across the USA in the COVID-19 pandemic, below their population share of 5.7%.6 However, disaggregated data sug- gest far more complexity. In New York City, Asian- Americans account for 7.9% of deaths from COVID-19, while comprising 13.9% of the population.7, 8 Similarly in Califor- nia, Asian-Americans make up 13.2% of deaths compared with 14.5% of the population.6 Yet disproportionate mortality rates have been noted in in Nevada (15.4% of deaths versus 8.1% of the population), Utah (5.5% versus 2.4%), and Ne- braska (5.9% versus 2.4%).6 From the mixed picture above, it is clear that disparities vary by location; AAPIs are not uniformly spread across the USA. Further, AAPIs are not a homogeneous population, representing as many as 43 distinct ethnic groups, each with its own linguistic, cultural, and sociodemographic back- grounds and immigration histories.9, 10 Therefore, disparities at the subgroup level may be obscured by the blanket classi- fication of “AAPI” and further hidden by poor reporting: Asian-American deaths are unknown in states such as Florida, Mississippi, Missouri, and South Carolina, where Asians are classified as “Other” in publicly available statistics.6, 11 COVID-19 AND PACIFIC ISLANDERS A further complication relates to aggregation of Pacific Is- landers along with Asians. In 1997, the U.S. Office of Man- agement and Budget began recognizing Pacific Islanders (PIs) as a population separate from Asian-Americans, due to advo- cacy efforts from the PI community and the recognition of sociodemographic differences between Asian-Americans and PIs.12 Yet during this pandemic, disaggregated data on PIs remain particularly scarce. Within New York City, PIs were grouped under the “Other” category until late April in the Received June 3, 2020 Accepted September 21, 2020 Published online October 2, 2020 3685 mortality reports stratified by race/ethnicity, and subsequently under the aggregate of “AAPI.”8 Yet clear disparities are evident in the few instances where PI-specific data are found. Within California, PIs are dying at a rate that is fourfold their population share and the most dis- proportionate of any population within the state.13 Similarly, within Los Angeles County, PIs represent only 0.4% of county residents yet account for 1% of COVID-19 deaths, a 2.5-fold discrepancy and the largest of any group.14 Other estimates suggest that the PI case rate is 217.7 per 100,000 in California, more than 3-fold higher than the 62.43 per 100,000 for the state population as a whole.15 Disproportionate rates were also observed in Colorado, where PIs represent 0.1% of the popu- lation but account for 0.6% of cases and 1.6% of deaths.16 These disparities have spurred calls to increase access for PI testing and reporting of PI-specific data.15 ESSENTIAL WORKERS, INTERGENERATIONAL CO- RESIDENCE, POVERTY, AND LANGUAGE Risks for AAPIs exist due to occupational exposures: accord- ing to the Asian Pacific American Labor Alliance, more than two million AAPIs work in healthcare, transportation, and service industries.17 Minority communities are known to be more exposed to the virus, due to their over-representation in the low-wage, essential workforce at the front lines.5, 18, 19 They too face challenges once away from work, such as inability to socially distance due to housing density and over- crowding.4, 5, 19 Among these frontline workers, Filipino-Americans are at increased risk due to their outsized proportion in the nation’s nursing force. Filipino-American nurses have a lengthy histo- ry in the USA, and though they account for 4% of the total nursing workforce, they comprise up to 20% of registered nurses in states such as California.20 They are more likely to work in acute care, medical/surgical, and intensive care units, thus serving on the front lines of care for patients with COVID-19.20 Cultural practices among AAPIs may also place them at risk for COVID-19 transmission, such as a prevalence of intergen- erational co-residence. Chinese-Americans, Japanese- Americans, and Filipino-Americans, for instance, are more likely than their white counterparts to live in three- generational households.20, 21 Similarly close-knit familial social structures are found in PIs.15 An AARP survey also found 43% of AAPIs providing support to elderly family members, compared with 19% of white Americans.9 Though the reasons behind this are diverse, encompassing filial obli- gation, financial resources, family composition, and immigra- tion history, these high rates of intergenerational contact indi- cate a risk that requires culturally competent care.15, 21 Further, other socioeconomic determinants of health can pres- ent barriers to healthcare for many AAPIs, even outside of the COVID-19 pandemic.19 A paucity of data exists on the subject, with Asian-Americans remaining one of the most under-studied groups in terms of health status and service use.22 In regard to financial status, Asian-Americans are over-represented on both ends of the economic scale, though those whose family incomes are below the federal poverty level are poorer than any other group.23 Strong subgroup variation exists, with Japanese and Filipino-Americans having lower poverty rates than white Amer- icans, while Hmong, Khmer, Laotian, and Vietnamese- Americans have higher poverty rates.23, 24 For instance, one study found that 93.7% of Hmong-Americans and 57.1% of Vietnamese-Americans live under the poverty level.23 Low so- cioeconomic status alone has been found to be an independent risk factor for total mortality.25 Vietnamese, Korean, and Chinese-Americans, as well as PIs, are also more likely to be uninsured than white Americans.22, 26, 27 Yet for those who do access healthcare, a national survey by the Commonwealth Fund found that Asian-Americans were less likely than white Americans to be satisfied with the care received, or state that their doctors understood their backgrounds and values, involved them in decisions, or discussed lifestyle issues such as exercise and smoking.22, 28 Another major issue relates to language. Approximately 1- in-3 AAPIs have limited English proficiency (LEP), although this varies tremendously by subgroup.29 For example, 78% of Bhutanese-Americans have LEP. Poor English proficiency is a risk factor for illness, serves as a social determinant because it affects employment, amplifies health problems related to ra- cial discrimination, and restricts access to services.30, 31 For instance, 57% of Cambodian-American women report diffi- culty accessing care due to a scarcity of interpreters.26 Not surprisingly, a recent survey found that 9 of 10 of AAPI- serving community organizations cited the dire need for COVID-19 resources in AAPI languages.32 Websites such as translatecovid19.org have surfaced to meet this need, but such efforts require greater support and development. CARDIOVASCULAR RISK FACTORS Even before the outbreak of COVID-19, evidence suggested that acute coronary events and strokes could be triggered by common infections, such as influenza.33 Epidemiological ev- idence for COVID-19 has shown infection to be particularly severe in hospitalized patients with underlying cardiovascular disease.33, 34 Further, older adults with conditions such as hypertension, diabetes, obesity, chronic lung disease, and cardiovascular disease are more vulnerable to COVID-19.35– 37 In particular, a history of coronary artery disease was more common in those with severe (5.8%) than non-severe disease (1.8%).37 Thus, there appears to be a predisposition to a more severe course with COVID-19 infection among those with cardiovascular comorbidities. This epidemiological data on COVID-19 is particularly relevant to AAPIs. Around 20% of native Hawaiians and PIs have heart disease, and 6.9% have coronary artery disease.38 3686 Wang et al.: Asian-Americans and COVID-19 JGIM http://translatecovid19.org OTHER IMPACTS OF COVID-19—DISCRIMINATION AND XENOPHOBIA AAPIs have had a long history of being scapegoated and mar- ginalized during public health crises in US history. From the 1900 quarantine of San Francisco’s Chinatown due to a purport- ed fear of the bubonic plague, to the 2003 severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) pandemic that was associated with Chinese- Americans, racism and xenophobia were not only expressed but also institutionalized into law. In 1882, the Chinese Exclusion Act was passed, the first immigration law to bar an entire ethnic- ity from immigrating to the USA, and one not repealed until six decades later.41 Amidst the current COVID-19 pandemic, a similar fear of AAPIs has taken hold, targeting a population seen as “forever foreigners.”41 This xenophobia exists even among government leaders, who refer to COVID-19 as the “Chinese virus” and “Wuhan virus.”42 This terminology goes against the recommendations of the World Health Organization, which released a statement in 2015 discouraging the practice of naming diseases after geographical locations, individuals, culture, population, indus- try, or occupation.43 Around the USA, many reports of racially motivated violence against AAPIs have surfaced and are seemingly escalating both in frequency and severity; these range from racist tirades, rants, and assaults, to a brutal stab- bing in New York and the murder of a family in Texas.44–46 Even healthcare workers are not immune, raising separate concerns on the potential impacts of such racism on healthcare delivery.47 The frequency of these incidents and the lack of support in official venues have spurred the development of websites such as standagainsthatred.org to permit the reporting of hate crimes.48 The OCA-Asian Pacific American Advo- cates, a national non-profit, have called upon the President and US Attorney General to create a task force dedicated to hate crimes against AAPIs.49 To date, however, there have not been any major efforts to prevent the public targeting of Asians.50 It is incumbent upon healthcare and governmental leaders to combat the spread of hate and racism that has been exacerbated by COVID-19, and to prevent the advent of scapegoating and fear mongering that will only serve to prop- agate the rapidly emerging disparities among ethnic groups.51 PATHS AHEAD—TARGETED RESEARCH AND INTERVENTIONS To combat the disparities emerging during the COVID-19 pan- demic, multi-level interventions are required. Policy makers and healthcare leaders must heed calls to release racial/ethnic demo- graphic data on COVID-19 infection and mortality.19, 52 For those states, counties, and cities that have already released them, the completeness and accuracy of the data must be ensured; in Texas, for instance, only a third of deaths have associated racial/ ethnic data.6 We also recommend the identification of PIs as a distinct group within both national and local data, and to similarly do so for all other AAPI ethnic groups. Data should be stratified by socioeconomic status as well as by the primary languages of communities. Only after we identify at-risk populations can further steps be taken, such as outcome monitoring and differen- tial assistance.19 Further, government and healthcare leaders should invest in community-based care. By empowering community advo- cates in key positions, meaningful community and shared governance can be achieved and, thus, promote long-term health equity and self-determination among the hardest hit populations. Multilingual public service announcements are also important for immigrant communities, to ensure access to information on healthcare services and public health measures such as social distancing.19 Similarly, research must incorpo- rate minority individuals for whom English is not their prima- ry language. Research that excludes non-English speakers leads to a biased sample that over-represents AAPIs who have high levels of education and income. Such bias contributes erroneously to the “model minority” stereotype.24 Finally, we must address the prevention and treatment of comorbidities, such as cardiovascular and metabolic conditions, that are rampant within minority communities and are major contributors to their morbidity and mortality during COVID- 19.4 In the multi-ethnic USA, diversity is key to our strength. To focus on minority communities is thus essential, both to mitigate the damage of COVID-19 on these vulnerable popula- tions and to ensure the weathering of this devastating pandemic. Corresponding Author: Jeffrey J. Hsu, MD, PhD; Division of Cardiology, Department of Medicine, David Geffen School of Medicine at UCLA, University of California, Los Angeles, CA, USA (e-mail: jjhsu@mednet.ucla.edu). Compliance with Ethical Standards: Conflict of Interest: The authors declare no conflicts of interest relat- ed to the topic discussed in this article. REFERENCES 1. Fauci AS, Lane HC, Redfield RR. 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Available at: 3687Wang et al.: Asian-Americans and COVID-19JGIM South Asians have also been identified as being high risk for cardiovascular disease.39 Older Chinese and Koreans have poorer health statuses than national norms.10 One study found that Filipino-Americans have the highest prevalence of hyper- tension among Asian-Americans and the highest comorbidity rate, at risk for coronary artery disease, diabetes, and other metabolic issues.10 Asians were also less likely than other groups to have received care for their chronic conditions.28, 40 The socioeconomic disadvantages discussed in the previous section have been linked to these findings of poor health.10 http://standagainsthatred.org https://www.sgo.org/clinical-practice/management/covid-19-re- sources-for-health-care-practitioners/promoting-health-equity-in-the- covid-19-era/. Accessed May 5 2020. 4. Bibbins-Domingo K This time must be different: disparities during the COVID-19 pandemic. Ann Intern Med 2020. 5. 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Racist assaults and ignorant attacks against Asians. CNN. Available at: https://www.cnn.com/2020/02/20/us/coronavirus-racist- attacks-against-asian-americans/index.html. Accessed May 5, 2020. 45. OCA-Asian Pacific American Advocates. OCA demands apology for Trump tweets that stoke anti-Asian sentiment [press release]. Available at: https://www.ocanational.org/oca-demands-apology-for-trump-tweets- that-stoke-anti-asian-sentiment. Accessed May 5, 2020. 46. Ramirez M. FBI says Texas stabbing that targeted Asian-American family was hate crime fueled by coronavirus fears. The Dallas Morning News. March 31 2020. 47. Loffman M. Asian Americans describe ‘gut punch’ of racist attacks during coronavirus pandemic. PBS News Hour. April 7 2020. 48. Asian-Americans Advancing Justice. About. Available at: https://www. standagainsthatred.org/about. Accessed May 7, 2020. 49. Ahrens RP. [press release]. OCA-Asian Pacific American Advocates. Available at: https://drive.google.com/file/d/1iF6XYlk5XOjP_Sey_ TYnfOZqMzMmLuXN/view. Accessed May 5, 2020. 50. Campbell AF, Ellerbeck A. Federal agencies doing little about the rise in anti-Asian hate. Available at: https://publicintegrity.org/health/corona- virus-and-inequality/federal-agencies-are-doing-little-about-the-rise-in- anti-asian-hate/. Accessed May 7 2020. 51. Gee G, Ro M, Rimoin A. Seven reasons to care about racism and COVID- 19 and seven things to do to stop it. Am J Public Health [forthcoming]. 52. Essien UR, Venkataramani A. Data and policy solutions to address racial and ethnic disparities in the COVID-19 pandemic. Insights: COVID-19. Available at: https://jamanetwork.com/channels/health-fo- rum/fullarticle/2765498. Accessed May 5, 2020. 3688 Wang et al.: Asian-Americans and COVID-19 JGIM Publisher’s Note: Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. http://dx.doi.org/https://www.sgo.org/clinical-practice/management/covid-19-resources-for-health-care-practitioners/promoting-health-equity-in-the-covid-19-era/ http://dx.doi.org/https://www.sgo.org/clinical-practice/management/covid-19-resources-for-health-care-practitioners/promoting-health-equity-in-the-covid-19-era/ http://dx.doi.org/https://www.sgo.org/clinical-practice/management/covid-19-resources-for-health-care-practitioners/promoting-health-equity-in-the-covid-19-era/ http://dx.doi.org/https://www.apmresearchlab.org/covid/deaths-by-race#other http://dx.doi.org/https://www.apmresearchlab.org/covid/deaths-by-race#other http://dx.doi.org/https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/newyorkcitynewyork http://dx.doi.org/https://www1.nyc.gov/site/doh/covid/covid-19-data.page http://dx.doi.org/https://www1.nyc.gov/site/doh/covid/covid-19-data.page http://dx.doi.org/https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/omb/fedreg_1997standards http://dx.doi.org/https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/omb/fedreg_1997standards http://dx.doi.org/https://mk0picopce2kx432grq5.kinstacdn.com/wp-content/uploads/2020_0424-PICOPCE-COVID19-Press-Release.pdf http://dx.doi.org/https://mk0picopce2kx432grq5.kinstacdn.com/wp-content/uploads/2020_0424-PICOPCE-COVID19-Press-Release.pdf http://dx.doi.org/https://mk0picopce2kx432grq5.kinstacdn.com/wp-content/uploads/2020_0424-PICOPCE-COVID19-Press-Release.pdf http://dx.doi.org/https://www.apalanet.org/covid19.html http://dx.doi.org/https://www.apalanet.org/covid19.html http://dx.doi.org/https://www.minorityhealth.hhs.gov/omh/browse.aspx?lvl=3&lvlid=65 http://dx.doi.org/https://www.minorityhealth.hhs.gov/omh/browse.aspx?lvl=3&lvlid=65 http://dx.doi.org/https://www.apiahf.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/2020.07.16_CBONeedsAssessment_Factsheet_v4.pdf http://dx.doi.org/https://www.apiahf.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/2020.07.16_CBONeedsAssessment_Factsheet_v4.pdf http://dx.doi.org/https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/163636/WHO_HSE_FOS_15.1_eng.pdf;jsessionid=B646C7585BC8F003CBD121B8C513B0F7?sequence=1 http://dx.doi.org/https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/163636/WHO_HSE_FOS_15.1_eng.pdf;jsessionid=B646C7585BC8F003CBD121B8C513B0F7?sequence=1 http://dx.doi.org/https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/163636/WHO_HSE_FOS_15.1_eng.pdf;jsessionid=B646C7585BC8F003CBD121B8C513B0F7?sequence=1 http://dx.doi.org/https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/163636/WHO_HSE_FOS_15.1_eng.pdf;jsessionid=B646C7585BC8F003CBD121B8C513B0F7?sequence=1 http://dx.doi.org/https://www.cnn.com/2020/02/20/us/coronavirus-racist-attacks-against-asian-americans/index.html http://dx.doi.org/https://www.cnn.com/2020/02/20/us/coronavirus-racist-attacks-against-asian-americans/index.html http://dx.doi.org/https://www.ocanational.org/oca-demands-apology-for-trump-tweets-that-stoke-anti-asian-sentiment http://dx.doi.org/https://www.ocanational.org/oca-demands-apology-for-trump-tweets-that-stoke-anti-asian-sentiment http://dx.doi.org/https://www.standagainsthatred.org/about http://dx.doi.org/https://www.standagainsthatred.org/about http://dx.doi.org/https://drive.google.com/file/d/1iF6XYlk5XOjP_Sey_TYnfOZqMzMmLuXN/view http://dx.doi.org/https://drive.google.com/file/d/1iF6XYlk5XOjP_Sey_TYnfOZqMzMmLuXN/view http://dx.doi.org/https://publicintegrity.org/health/coronavirus-and-inequality/federal-agencies-are-doing-little-about-the-rise-in-anti-asian-hate/ http://dx.doi.org/https://publicintegrity.org/health/coronavirus-and-inequality/federal-agencies-are-doing-little-about-the-rise-in-anti-asian-hate/ http://dx.doi.org/https://publicintegrity.org/health/coronavirus-and-inequality/federal-agencies-are-doing-little-about-the-rise-in-anti-asian-hate/ http://dx.doi.org/https://jamanetwork.com/channels/health-forum/fullarticle/2765498 http://dx.doi.org/https://jamanetwork.com/channels/health-forum/fullarticle/2765498 This link is 10.1007/s11606-06259-,", Asian-Americans and Pacific Islanders in COVID-19: Emerging Disparities Amid Discrimination Abstract INTRODUCTION COVID-19 INFECTION AND MORTALITY IN ASIAN-AMERICANS COVID-19 AND PACIFIC ISLANDERS ESSENTIAL WORKERS, INTERGENERATIONAL CO-RESIDENCE, POVERTY, AND LANGUAGE CARDIOVASCULAR RISK FACTORS OTHER IMPACTS OF COVID-19—DISCRIMINATION AND XENOPHOBIA PATHS AHEAD—TARGETED RESEARCH AND INTERVENTIONS References 
work_6xz26227c5eopcdje2puam3ube	----	Correction to: When Might Heterosexual Men Be Passive or Compassionate Toward Gay Victims of Hate Crime? Integrating the Bystander and Social Loafing Explanations Vol.:(0123456789)1 3 Archives of Sexual Behavior (2020) 49:1711 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10508-020-01687-x CO R R E C T I O N Correction to: When Might Heterosexual Men Be Passive or Compassionate Toward Gay Victims of Hate Crime? Integrating the Bystander and Social Loafing Explanations Chuma Kevin Owuamalam1  · Andrea Soledad Matos2 Published online: 4 April 2020 © Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2020 Correction to: Archives of Sexual Behavior https ://doi.org/10.1007/s1050 8-019-01592 -y The following errors were present in this article as originally published: A question mark was missing from the end of the first sentence under the “General Discussion” section. The fifth sentence in the “Theoretical Opportunities” sec- tion read (incorrectly): This is because (1) the common-in-group bond is likely weakened as a result of the of lesbian women who are so inclined… Instead of (correctly): This is because (1) the common-in-group bond is likely weakened as a result of lesbian women who are so inclined… In the last sentence in the “Theoretical Opportunities” section read (incorrectly): So, although the current findings provide a promising start, future studies could aim to test the derived assump- tions directly, by, for example, extending our propositions to reactions toward lesbians and transgendered victims of hate crime such studies could also examine reactions toward norm conforming versus norm-deviating heterosexual victims. Instead of (correctly): So, although the current findings provide a promising start, future studies could aim to test the derived assump- tions directly, by, for example, extending our propositions to reactions toward lesbians and transgendered victims of hate crime. Such studies could also examine reactions toward norm conforming versus norm-deviating heterosexual victims. The original article has been corrected. Publisher’s Note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. The original article can be found online at https ://doi.org/10.1007/ s1050 8-019-01592 -y. * Chuma Kevin Owuamalam chuma.owuamalam@nottingham.edu.my 1 Division of Organizational and Applied Psychology, University of Nottingham Malaysia, Jalan Broga, 43500 Semenyih, Selangor, Malaysia 2 School of Psychology, University of Nottingham Malaysia, Semenyih, Selangor, Malaysia http://orcid.org/0000-0001-8219-7975 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10508-019-01592-y http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1007/s10508-020-01687-x&domain=pdf https://doi.org/10.1007/s10508-019-01592-y https://doi.org/10.1007/s10508-019-01592-y Correction to: When Might Heterosexual Men Be Passive or Compassionate Toward Gay Victims of Hate Crime? Integrating the Bystander and Social Loafing Explanations Correction to: Archives of Sexual Behavior https​:doi.org10.1007s1050​8-019-01592​-y 
work_72aj4a52eraznaufcrj2kszxqe	----	Regulating hate speech online BANKS, James <http://orcid.org/0000-0002-1899-9057> Available from Sheffield Hallam University Research Archive (SHURA) at: http://shura.shu.ac.uk/6901/ This document is the author deposited version. You are advised to consult the publisher's version if you wish to cite from it. Published version BANKS, James (2010). Regulating hate speech online. International Review of Law, Computers and Technology, 24 (3), 233-239. Copyright and re-use policy See http://shura.shu.ac.uk/information.html Sheffield Hallam University Research Archive http://shura.shu.ac.uk http://shura.shu.ac.uk/ http://shura.shu.ac.uk/information.html Regulating Hate Speech Online May 2010 Dr James Banks Department of Criminology and Community Justice Faculty of Development and Society Sheffield Hallam University Whitehouse Southbourne Collegiate Crescent Campus Sheffield S10 2BP 0114 225 5362 or 07805156121 j.banks@shu.ac.uk James Banks is a Lecturer in Criminology and an Associate Researcher at the Hallam Centre for Community Justice, Sheffield Hallam University. The exponential growth in the Internet as a means of communication has been emulated by an increase in far-right and extremist web sites and hate based activity in cyberspace. The anonymity and mobility afforded by the Internet has made harassment and expressions of hate effortless in a landscape that is abstract and beyond the realms of traditional law enforcement. This paper examines the complexities of regulating hate speech on the Internet through legal and technological frameworks. It explores the limitations of unilateral national content legislation and the difficulties inherent in multilateral efforts to regulate the Internet. The paper develops to consider how technological innovations can restrict the harm caused by hate speech whilst states seek to find common ground upon which to harmonise their approach to regulation. Further, it argues that a broad coalition of government, business and citizenry is likely to be most effective in reducing the harm caused by hate speech. Key words: Hate Speech, Internet, First Amendment, Additional Protocol to the Convention on Cybercrime. Introduction As a globalised, decentralised and interactive computer network, the Internet was heralded by first generation Internet critics for its ability to cross borders, destroy distance and break down real world barriers. 1 Envisaged as an egalitarian communications medium, many commentators advocate a technological landscape unfettered by governmental regulation. Such a libertarian ethos stresses the transnational and borderless nature of the Internet, questioning both the legitimacy and ability of states to govern cyberspace. Cyber-libertarians also support the fundamental right of freedom of expression, arguing against the regulation and censorship of Internet content which could obstruct the free flow of knowledge, ideas and information. Yet the anonymity, immediacy and global nature of the Internet has also made it an ideal tool for extremists and hatemongers to promote hate. Alongside the globalisation of technology, there has been an incremental rise in the number of online hate groups and hate related activities taking place in cyberspace. Unsurprisingly: As computers become less expensive, simpler to use and consequently more common in ... homes (and workplaces), as the barriers to disseminating information through computers fall, bigots of all kinds are rushing to use the power of modern technology to spread their propaganda. 2 Whilst the itinerant nature of hate sites makes accurate quantification virtually impossible, the general consensus amongst monitoring organisations and scholars is that the number of sites has grown exponentially. The first extremist website, Stormfront.org, was launched by white nationalist and former Ku Klux Klan member Donald Black in April 1995. By the turn of the century, it was recorded that the number of bigoted websites had soared to around 400. 3 The most recent estimate, from the Simon Wiesenthal Center, suggests that there are currently around 8,000 hate sites in existence. 4 Social networking sites such as Facebook and Myspace have also become breeding ground for racists and far-right extremist groups to spread their propaganda. Accessed by more than 200 million users, such websites, which attract thousands of new members every day, have become a key conduit through which extremists can educate others, transmit ideas and beliefs, and mobilise for demonstrations and rallies. The Internet has become the ‘new frontier’ 5 for spreading hate, as millions can be reached through an inexpensive and unencumbered social network that has enabled previously diverse and fragmented groups to connect, engendering a collective identity and sense of community. Perry and Olsson suggest that previously isolated and atomised members of far-right groups have been replaced by a ‘global racist subculture’ 6 who share values, ideologies and fears. 7 Technological innovation has enabled extremists and hatemongers to propagate their rhetoric and strategies, recruit, organise and unify through websites, private message boards, listservs and email. The growth in online hate groups has been mirrored by the rise in web-based hate speech, harassment, bullying and discrimination, targeted directly and indirectly through forums, blogs and emails. This rise in hate speech online is compounded by difficulties in policing such activities which sees the Internet remain largely unregulated. Criminal justice agencies are unlikely to proactively dedicate time and money to investigate offences that are not a significant public priority. Consequently, the police will rarely respond to online hate speech unless a specific crime is reported. Yet despite such shortcomings, more and more nation states have sought to combat the publication of hate propaganda. This paper examines the complexities of regulating hate speech on the Internet through legal and technological frameworks. It explores the limitations of unilateral national content legislation and the difficulties inherent in multilateral efforts to regulate the Internet. The paper develops to consider how technological innovations can limit the harm caused by hate speech whilst states seek to find common ground upon which to harmonise their approach to regulation. Further, it argues that a broad coalition of government, business and citizenry is likely to be most effective in limiting the harm caused by hate speech. Unilateral Regulation of Hate Speech States’ criminalisation of the publication of hate propaganda has been followed by more recent efforts to prosecute individuals for the dissemination of racist and xenophobic material online. Despite the geographic indeterminacy of the Internet, political and technological developments have seen states seek to impose virtual borders onto cyberspace in order to regulate online hate speech. Yet unilateral efforts to legislate against offensive material have been stymied by limited jurisdictional reach and conflict that has occurred when states have sought to enforce laws extraterritorially into other jurisdictions. This is unsurprising given that national laws on hate diverge so widely, as a consequence of countries ‘unique socio- political responses to unique problems’. 8 In particular, the US First Amendment affords considerable protection to those espousing hate from American websites, in direct contrast with many other nations approach to hate speech. The case of Yahoo! demonstrates the drift towards nation states imposing geographical demarcations onto the virtual world and more pertinently highlights the difficulties inherent in European countries seeking to extend their jurisdiction extraterritorially, enforcing their content laws against material uploaded beyond national boundaries. In the landmark case of Yahoo!, Inc v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L’Antisemitisme, two French student organisations sought to prosecute Internet Service Provider (ISP) Yahoo! for contravening a French law forbidding the offering for sale of Nazi merchandise. Article R. 645-1 du Code Penal outlaws the wearing or public display of insignia, emblem or uniform of an organisation or individual responsible for crimes against humanity, as such behaviour is deemed to be a serious crime ‘against the people, the state and public safety’. 9 It was alleged that Yahoo! had violated this law by displaying Nazi memorabilia on its auction website. Although the content originated in the United States, the French court ruled that Yahoo! was liable and should seek to eliminate French citizens’ access to the sale of Nazi merchandise. Yahoo! argued that its actions lay beyond French territorial jurisdiction, as the material was uploaded in the US where such conduct is protected by the First Amendment. Dismissing this claim, Judge Jean-Jacques Gomes applied an effects-based jurisdictional analysis and granted prescriptive jurisdiction, describing the sale of Nazi paraphernalia as an ‘insult to the collective memory of a country profoundly wounded by the atrocities committed by the Nazi Enterprise’. 10 The court ruled that intentional transmission, in addition to the local impact of the visualisation of Nazi memorabilia, provided sufficient grounds for finding jurisdiction. Recognising that the application of geo-location technology, combined with a declaration of nationality from service users, would filter out 90 per cent of French citizens, the court ruled that Yahoo! apply such mechanisms in order to seek to reduce access to the sale of Nazi merchandise. Failure to comply with the court order within three months would result in Yahoo! becoming subject to a penalty of 100,000 francs per day. Yahoo! subsequently sought and received, from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, a judicial ruling that the enforcement of the French authorities would breach the First Amendment of the Constitution. The US court made it clear that whilst hate speech is odious, it will be protected under the First Amendment unless it can be demonstrated that such speech contains a direct, credible ‘true’ threat against an identifiable individual, organisation or institution; it meets the legal test for harassment; or it constitutes incitement to imminent lawless action likely to occur. 11 District Judge Jeremy Fogel ruled that whilst the enforcement of foreign judgement is founded upon a “comity of nations”, the court could not put into effect a policy which would undermine its own fundamental interests: The French order’s content viewpoint-based regulation, whilst entitled to great deference as an articulation of French law, clearly would be inconsistent with the First Amendment if mandated by a court in the United States. What makes this case uniquely challenging is that the Internet in effect allows one to speak in more than one place at a time. Although France has the sovereign right to regulate what speech is permissible in France, this Court may not enforce a foreign order that violates the protections of the United States Constitution by chilling protected speech that occurs simultaneously within our borders. 12 The judicial impasse of the Yahoo! case exemplifies the cultural tension inherent in attempts to regulate online speech extraterritorially. Whilst nation states are able to successfully prosecute hate crime that takes place within their own territorial boundaries, they have not been able to extend their reach beyond their borders. Consequently, online hate speech which originates in one jurisdiction, but whose effects are felt elsewhere, continues to go unregulated. As Kaplan, Moss, Lieberman and Wessler recognise, the protection afforded by the Internet means that ‘a perpetrator of a threat or harassing speech need not be at the actual scene of the crime (or within 5,000 miles, for that matter) to prey on his or her victim.’ 13 With states unable to overcome the obstacles of the Internet’s anonymity and multijurisdictionality, hate crime offenders are free to thwart the somewhat piecemeal and arbitrary assemblage of national laws. In light of such inadequacies, the Council of Europe introduced a protocol aimed at harmonising national legal system’s computer related offences in order to reach a common minimum standard of relevant offences and enable cooperation in the prosecution of those committing hate crimes in cyberspace. Discussion now turns to assess the efficacy of this provision. Multilateral Regulation of Hate Speech With unilateral attempts to regulate hate speech originating in foreign territories falling foul to jurisdictional and cultural conflict, the application of national law to foreign entities has serious limitations. Consequently, an international system governed by compacts and supranational decision making would appear to offer an appropriate means through which to obviate regulatory conflict between nation states. However, such a collaborative enterprise has been seriously undermined by the US’s commitment to free speech. So whilst the US approach to regulation has become a minority view, its indirect unilateralism detracts from European efforts to construct a truly international regulatory system. The Council of Europe’s Convention on Cybercrime is the first multilateral compact that seeks to tackle computer based crime by increasing the cooperation amongst nations, harmonising national laws and investigatory techniques. Although the United States is not a member of the Council of Europe they do have observer status. Non-European countries may also be invited to sign and ratify council treaties in order to broaden the scope and impact of agreements. The US has both signed and ratified the Convention on Cybercrime which provides a multilateral framework for tackling a variety of Internet crimes, including child pornography, copyright infringement and fraud. However, the US’s signature was only obtained after an Internet hate speech protocol, which was initially included in the Convention on Cybercrime, was removed at their behest. In response, the Council of Europe introduced a separate protocol to address hate speech online. Under the Additional Protocol to the Convention on Cybercrime, parties are required to criminalise acts of a racist and xenophobic nature committed through computer systems. By the start of 2010, the additional protocol had been signed by 32 member states and ratified by 15. The US has, however, informed the Council of Europe that it will not be party to the protocol as it is inconsistent with their constitutional guarantees. So whilst the European compact has undoubtedly increased coordination and cooperation in combating hate crime, the US’s commitment to indirect unilateralism is extremely problematic. This is because most hate sites originate in the US and although many target an American audience, leakage is inevitable. Alongside criminalisation, the protocol extends the scope of the Convention’s extradition provision to include those sought for Internet hate speech crimes. Yet the US has no bilateral extradition treaties with European countries and therefore no commitment to deliver defendants to be charged with committing hate speech offences. Consequently, European countries are left in a double bind being both unable to enforce civil judgements in American courts and unable to extradite American offenders for criminal prosecution. This is likely to result in the US increasingly becoming a safe haven for propagators of hate speech: Given that the US with our First Amendment essentially is a safe-haven for virtually all Web content, removing content or shutting down a Web Site in Europe or Canada through legal channels is far from a guarantee that the contents have been censored for all time. The borderless nature of the Internet means that, like chasing cockroaches, squashing one does not solve the problem when there are many more waiting behind the walls – or across the border. Many see prosecution of Internet speech in one country as a futile gesture when the speech can re-appear on the Internet, almost instantaneously, hosted by an ISP in the United States. 14 Whilst the Additional Protocol is a laudatory endeavour, it is undoubtedly limited in its ability to bring together real differences in the ways in which states envisage hate speech and construct a legal framework through which hate based conduct may be counteracted. In particular, European nations’ commitment to combating the growth of online hate is undermined by the US First Amendment which provides a refuge for many of those propagating hate. Increased cooperation between European countries may simply result in an increase in the number of bigoted websites originating in the US as racists and extremists seek to avoid prosecution by moving their operations to America. Accordingly, transference rather than prevention is the likely outcome of increased legal regulation by the European community. Technological Regulation of Hate Speech With clear difficulties inherent in unilateral and multilateral legislative approaches to regulation, it is fair to question whether the law alone is the most appropriate means through which to counteract cyberhate. Recourse to technological regulation at both user and server ends may offer an effective avenue through which to minimise the transmission and reception of online hate speech. Internet Service Providers can play a crucial role in reducing the level of online hate available to Internet users. Codes of conduct or Terms of Service (TOS) agreements enable ISPs to remove offensive web material that breach their policies. Voluntary codes of conduct to which customers must consent offer an important mechanism through which to regulate websites originating in the US as they circumvent the First Amendment. This enables ISPs to delete content or cancel their service if TOS agreements are broken. Some ISPs have actively sought to regulate hate speech by removing offensive content. For example America Online removed the neo-Nazi Website, the Nationalist Online, from its server for violating its terms of service agreement, which prohibits content that is racially or ethnically offensive. Furthermore, in countries such as the UK, ISPs have formed industry associations, which enforce codes of conduct prohibiting hate speech. In the UK, these codes have been produced despite The Electronic Commerce Directive (Hatred against Persons on Religious Grounds or the Grounds of Sexual Orientation) Regulation 2010 absolving ISPs and other digital service providers from liability for hate speech communicated across their networks. Yet problematically, the vast majority of the many thousands of access providers in the US do not regulate against hate speech per se. Many TOS agreements are extremely narrow in focus, so whilst libellous or defamatory speech is prohibited, such codes of conduct do not extend to those acts that fall within the First Amendment’s free speech protections. This is because Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act specifically states that ISPs will not be held criminally responsible for the speech of their users. Accordingly, there is little motivation for ISPs to self regulate. Curiously, many companies defend their hosting of hate sites through recourse to the First Amendment despite the fact that they are not bound by its protections. Nevertheless, monitoring organisations, such as the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) and Simon Wiesenthal Center, continue to work closely with ISPs in identifying and removing hate based websites and messages and materials that contravene TOS contracts. ADL also seek to highlight material that is harmful in content and have been particularly successful in providing the public with information concerning online hate materials. In 2004, Google responded to a ADL’s concerns about access to anti-Semitic Website ‘Jew Watch’ by introducing an ‘offensive search results’ link that explains why some extremist websites appear in users search findings. More recently, YouTube has introduced an ADL authored guide on tackling hate speech in its Abuse and Safety Centre. Undoubtedly, there are serious limitations to ISP based technological regulation. With removal contingent on commerciality and cost, many ISPs do not have the desire or means through which to address harmful content. Alternatively, governments can seek to block extraterritorial websites that do not comply with national laws. Geographic location technology can further enable both servers and states to control the flow of information on the Internet. Geo-location tools can identify the users IP address and, in turn, their location, in order to restrict access and filter out odious material. Web users can also employ software, such as firewalls, to filter out sites containing certain speech. Numerous commercial Internet filtering software packages are readily available and can easily be installed on home computers. In 1998, ADL introduced Hatefilter, a filtering software product that not only prevents access to websites that promote hate, but also educates users about the nature of bigotry and why such sites should be rejected. Individual responses to online hate may only have a limited impact on access to online material, but the responsibilisation of individual users can both promote a culture of intolerance towards online hate and contribute to efforts to ‘reclaim’ the web. Users can also play an important role in monitoring Internet content and alerting relevant authorities to incidents of cyberhate which may warrant law enforcement intervention. Hate speech hotlines have become an effective means through which citizens can alert ISPs to material that breaks their codes of conduct or law enforcement agencies to sites or incidents of cyberhate which may warrant investigation and prosecution. As Bailey neatly summarises, ‘broad-based efforts involving strategic alliances among citizens, citizen coalitions, industry and government provide a strong foundation from which to engage in visible, publicly accountable action against cyberhate.’ 15 For such an alliance to operate effectively, governments, businesses and citizenry must all engage in individual and collective solutions to minimising online hate speech. Conclusion The exponential growth in the Internet as a means of communication has been emulated by an increase in far-right and extremist web sites and hate based activity in cyberspace. The anonymity and mobility afforded by the Internet has made harassment and expressions of hate effortless in a landscape that is abstract and beyond the realms of traditional law enforcement. States have sought to regulate the domain of the Internet through the conventional strategy of national law. However, the multi-jurisdictionality of the Internet has undermined states efforts to place geographical demarcations onto cyberspace. Furthermore, European efforts to harmonise national laws have been undermined by the US’s commitment to the First Amendment, which provides a substantial safe haven for many of those transmitting hate. Unilateral and multilateral efforts to regulate online through criminal law alone will not be enough to reduce the effects of online hate. The episodic prosecution of individual web users is unlikely to deter others from posting hate speech online. Web sites that are closed in one jurisdiction may simply re-open in another thus remaining available to Internet users worldwide. Furthermore, the global nature of the Internet makes the total legal regulation of cyberspace impossible. Consequently, it is necessary to seek alternatives through which to both limit the publication of hate speech online and minimise the harm caused by such behaviour. By combining legal intervention with technological regulatory mechanisms – monitoring, IPS user agreements, user end software and hotlines – the harm caused by online hate can be diminished. Moreover, through the careful integration of law, technology, education and guidance, a reduction in the dissemination and impact of online hate speech can be achieved without adversely affecting the free flow of knowledge, ideas and information online. 1 D. R. Johnson and D. Post, ‘Law and Borders: The Rise of Law in Cyberspace’, Stanford Law Review, 48 (1996), 1367-1402; J. R. Reidenberg, ‘Governing Networks and Rule-making in Cyberspace’, Emory Law Journal, 45 (1996), 911-929; J. T. Delacourt, ‘The International Impact of Internet Regulation’, Harvard International Law Journal, 38 (1997), 207-235. 2 Anti-Defamation League, Hi-tech hate: Extremist use of the Internet (New York: ADL, 1997). 3 B. Levin, ‘Cyberhate: A Legal and Historical Analysis of Extremists’ Use of Computer Networks in America’, American Behavioural Scientist, 45, no.6 (2002), 958-988. 4 Simon Wiesenthal Center, Digital Terrorism and Hate 2.0 (Los Angeles: SWC, 2008). 5 Anti-Defamation League, Combating Extremism in Cyberspace: The Legal Issues Affecting Internet Hate Speech (New York: ADL, 2000). 6 L. Back., M. Keith and J. Solomos, ‘Racism on the Internet: Mapping neo-fascist subcultures in space’, in Nation and Race, ed. J. Kaplan and T. Bjorgo (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1998), 73-101. 7 B. Perry and P. Olsson, ‘Cyberhate: the globalization of hate’, Information and Communications Technology and Law, 18, no. 2 (2009), 185-199. 8 Harris et al. suggest that each country’s hate speech laws are rooted in historical and philosophical and constitutional traditions in relation to freedom of expression. C. Harris., J. Rowbotham, K. Stevenson, ‘Truth, law and hate in the virtual marketplace of ideas: perspectives on the regulation of Internet content’ Information and Communications Technology and Law, 18, no. 2 (2009), 155-184. 9 La Ligue Contre La Racisme et L’Antisemitisme (LICRA) and Union Des Etudiants Juifs De France (UEJF) v. Yahoo! Inc. and Yahoo France. English translation available at http://www.juriscom.net/txt/jurisfr/cti/yauctio ns20000522.htm (5 February 2010). 10 Ibid. 11 C. D. Van Blarcum, ‘Internet Hate Speech: The European Framework and the Emerging American Haven’, in Computer Crime, ed. I. Carr (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2009), 327-376. 12 Yahoo! Inc. V. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L’Antisemitisme, 169 F. Supp. 2d at 1192(“The extent to which the United States, or any state, honours the judicial decrees of foreign nations is a matter of choice, governed by ‘the comity of nations.’” (quoting Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163 (1895))). 13 J. E. Kapplan., M. P. Moss., M. L. Lieberman and S. Wessler, Investigating hate crimes on the Internet (Washington: Partners Against Hate, 2003). 14 C. Wolf, ‘Hate speech on the Internet and the law’, available at http:adl.org/osce/osce_legal_analysis.pdf (5 February 2010). 15 J. Bailey, ‘Strategic Alliances: The inter-related roles of citizens, industry and government in combating Internet hate, Canadian Issues, Spring (2006), 56-59. 
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work_744e7rzzezd35psyv6xil36doi	----	When “Patient-Centered” is Not Enough: A Call for Community-Centered Medicine A N NA L S O F FA M I LY M E D I C I N E ✦ W W W. A N N FA M M E D . O R G ✦ VO L . 1 7 , N O. 1 ✦ JA N UA RY / F E B RUA RY 2 0 1 9 82 REFLECTION When “Patient-Centered” is Not Enough: A Call for Community-Centered Medicine ABSTRACT Before entering medicine, I was inspired by community organizing as a model for driving social change and improving public health. As a clinician, I remain inspired by this approach; however, I find that it has been more challenging to integrate into my day-to-day work than I expected. In this essay, I describe my journey from community organizer to primary care clinician and reflect on the lessons I’ve learned about the value of community organizing and ways that it can be incorporated into clinical practice. Ultimately, I propose a model for how clinicians and health centers can proactively partner with community organizing groups and facilitate referrals to help patients directly engage in transforming the root causes of their health challenges. This model shifts the focus from the patient as an individual agent of change to the community, and offers important lessons to clinicians interested in community health equity. Ann Fam Med 2019;17:82-84. https://doi.org/10.1370/afm.2335. I was elbow-deep in my Step One boards review book when I received the call. “The state senate just added a bunch of anti-immigrant amendments to the budget,” Roberto told me, “They want to slash our access to health care, employment, decent housing… will you come down to the State House right now? We have to fight this.” I looked down at the recently highlighted paragraphs on amino acid metabolism. “I can study this later tonight,” I thought. I threw on my t-shirt with the logo of our youth-led immigrant rights group and headed out the door. Dozens of people had already gathered at the State House by the time I arrived, filling the wide sidewalk in front of the iron-gated perimeter. I made my way toward the front of the crowd and greeted Roberto and other friends, who were putting the finishing touches on the rally chant sheets and signs. “How’s school?” Roberto asked, “Are you ready yet to be the doctor for the movement?” I laughed, “Not quite, barely finished second year.” He smiled and handed me a sign, “Don’t Cut Our Futures.” I held it up proudly and joined the ranks of the chanting crowd. A few speakers later, my friend Daniela was up at the podium, clasping the microphone with both hands. Her long brown hair blew in the wind and she squinted into the sunlight as she began, “When I was 12 years old, my family and I arrived to the United States from Chile. I started going to school, learning English. I worked hard. But then, it hit me. I mean, I was about to graduate from high school and after putting in all that work, I found out I didn’t have the possibility of going to college, or pursuing my dream job.” I sucked in air and felt my chest and jaw tighten. Even though I had heard her story dozens of times, each time it brought me back to when she had first confided in me months before in the back of a dim cof- fee shop; to that moment when, with my faced flushed with indignation, I realized that, while I was already in graduate school, Daniela, just 2 years Juliana E. Morris, MD, EdM Department of Family and Community Medicine, University of California, San Francisco, California Conflicts of interest: author reports none. CORRESPONDING AUTHOR Juliana E. Morris, MD, EdM Department of Family and Community Medicine, University of California 1001 Potrero Ave, Ward 83 San Francisco, CA 94110 juliana.morris@ucsf.edu WWW.ANNFAMMED.ORG https://doi.org/10.1370/afm.2335 mailto:juliana.morris@ucsf.edu A C A L L F O R CO M M U N I T Y- C E N T E R E D M E D I C I N E A N NA L S O F FA M I LY M E D I C I N E ✦ W W W. A N N FA M M E D . O R G ✦ VO L . 1 7 , N O. 1 ✦ JA N UA RY / F E B RUA RY 2 0 1 9 83 A N NA L S O F FA M I LY M E D I C I N E ✦ W W W. A N N FA M M E D . O R G ✦ VO L . 1 7 , N O. 1 ✦ JA N UA RY / F E B RUA RY 2 0 1 9 82 younger than me, had to fight for years just to make it to college. Everything was off limits because I was undocumented,” she continued, “I became severely depressed, and my sugars—I have type 1 diabetes—were getting out of control. So one day, I was at my doctor’s office, telling her about these strug- gles for probably the hundredth time. She seemed almost as frustrated as I was. We had tried every pill, therapy, dose adjustment; we were pretty much out of options. Finally, in a moment of desperation, she opened a Google search page and typed in, ‘undocumented youth organization.’ A few weeks later, I went to my first meeting. As Daniela described her early days in youth orga- nizing, I reflected on my own journey into immigrant rights work: the stories of my grandfather arriving at Ellis Island as a teenager, the marches and protests in my community against hate crimes and harmful anti- immigrant bills, and the years I volunteered in migrant shelters and free clinics. I eventually decided to pursue a career in medicine, to serve and continue learning from and working in solidarity with immigrant com- munities. I joined the youth immigrant rights group after relocating for medical school, to stay connected to that mission. “I found community in our organizing work,” Dan- iela continued, I met people who were also undocumented, going through the same struggles as I was, and didn’t feel alone anymore. I got connected to other people in my community who were willing to put their privilege on the line to fight for our rights. Together, we have been able to fight for access to education and win other changes to help our community. Through a combination of gaining more opportunities and feeling more supported, my health has gotten a lot better in the process. She paused, and I took a deep breath, thinking about the impact of Daniela’s doctor’s intervention. This journey had helped Daniela so much, and the rest of us had gained an amazing community leader in the process. Daniela finished off her testimonial with her fist in the air, and the crowd erupted in applause. I placed my sign in the crook of my arm and clapped loudly. Daniela scanned the crowd, caught my eye for the first time that day, and smiled. I smiled back and nodded, knowing that we were in this fight together. Four years later, across the country in my first year of family medicine residency, I donned my white coat and stepped into the exam room at my afternoon clinic. My first patient of the day was Martin, a young father in his late 20s whom I had just started treating for irritable bowel syndrome. That day, he confided his mounting anxiety in the face of a recent Immigra- tion and Customs Enforcement raid near his workplace. He was undocumented, had 2 citizen children, and was terrified that deportation would tear his family apart. The month before, I had referred him to a pro bono lawyer, but that had yielded no results. Now, I thought about encouraging him to join one of the local immigrant rights committees, as Daniela’s doctor had done, but I hesitated. I knew Martin worked 2 jobs to support his family; his long workdays and resulting lack of sleep were already contributing to his stress. I was worried it would seem like I was asking too much, or that he would feel it wasn’t my place to make this type of suggestion. And, frankly, I wasn’t sure exactly how to do it. In my medical training, I had seen plenty of my attending physicians make referrals to service- oriented organizations and had been taught how to do so myself, but I had never seen anyone directly refer to a community organizing committee. And yet, from my experience as an organizer, I knew that Martin’s participation in movement work, even in small ways, could make a real difference in helping him combat his anxiety and change the mate- rial conditions of his life. I also knew that, like Daniela, he had skills and expertise that could be harnessed to transform his community. Of course, I couldn’t know for sure whether com- munity organizing would be the best fit for him as an individual. But, just like when I recommend a home exercise regimen or deep breathing exercises, because I believed this intervention could make a difference in his health, it was my job to provide him with the infor- mation and a listening ear to help him make his own decision. I hesitated that day when Martin first opened up to me; but at our next visit I asked him more about his interests and group affiliations and provided infor- mation on several community organizing groups for him to consider. This is just one example. There are many ways that a community organizing perspective can be integrated into primary care clinics. Clinicians can investigate and make referrals themselves, as I did, or provide warm handoffs to local community organizers. Clinics can hire their own staff community organizers, who discuss issues with patients in the waiting areas or exam rooms and connect them to local groups. Organizational policies can be put in place to maintain active connec- tions with organizing groups and commit to mobilizing clinic resources to support local organizing initiatives. In achieving this integration, we as clinicians can expand our practice of patient-centered care to include an additional focus on community-centered medicine. This approach helps us think outside the clinic walls and to learn from community-driven solutions to prob- WWW.ANNFAMMED.ORG WWW.ANNFAMMED.ORG A C A L L F O R CO M M U N I T Y- C E N T E R E D M E D I C I N E A N NA L S O F FA M I LY M E D I C I N E ✦ W W W. A N N FA M M E D . O R G ✦ VO L . 1 7 , N O. 1 ✦ JA N UA RY / F E B RUA RY 2 0 1 9 84 lems, which can help us be more effective clinically and also ward off burnout. It honors the incredible power that our patients possess to transform their own health through leadership and collective action. And it clarifies the roles we all can play in improving commu- nity health; after all, health care workers are also com- munity members, striving along with our neighbors for a healthier future. In family medicine, we are well equipped to take on a call for community-centered medicine. Approaches grounded in community are fundamental to the ethos of our profession. Thus far, however, only scat- tered clinics have implemented dedicated community organizing initiatives and referral systems. To more robustly and widely implement these programs, and fully take advantage of the benefits they can offer patients, clinicians, and health systems will take com- mitment and vision. We need clinics where offering and supporting community organizing resources is streamlined, not an awkward afterthought; where patients like Daniela and Martin will be supported and treated with loving care, while also being recognized for their strengths and expertise. In building up the practice of community-centered medicine, we can move closer toward realizing this vision, and nurturing improved health for all as “doctors for the movement.” To read or post commentaries in response to this article, see it online at http://www.AnnFamMed.org/content/17/1/82. Key words: community participation; social change; emigrants and immigrants; health equity; social determinants of health; community health services Submitted August 6, 2018; submitted, revised, October 3, 2018; accepted October 18, 2018. Acknowledgment: Thank you to Daniela Bravo for her role in inspiring these reflections and her thoughtful review of the manuscript. CHANGE-OF-ADDRESS FORM Please complete this form and mail to the following address or fax to Annals Circulation at 913-906-6080: Annals of Family Medicine, Circulation Department, 11400 Tomahawk Creek Pkwy, Leawood, KS 66211-2680 Check if member of sponsoring organization: ❏ AAFP ❏ ABFM ❏ STFM ❏ ADFM ❏ AFMRD ❏ NAPCRG ❏ CFPC ID number from label on your journal cover __ __ __ __ __ __ __ ® OLD Information (Please print.) Name Company (if applicable) Address (Street plus Apt or Ste) City State Country Postal Code (9-digit ZIP for US) Telephone Fax E-Mail NEW Information (Please print.) Name Company (if applicable) Address (Street plus Apt or Ste) City State Country Postal Code (9-digit ZIP for US) Telephone Fax E-Mail WWW.ANNFAMMED.ORG http://www.AnnFamMed.org/content/17/1/82 
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work_75gjyuyy5ng63pssvfgo5k637m	----	87 The Greek Elections of 2012: The Worrisome Rise of the Golden Dawn Michal Navoth Michal Navoth is an Israeli attorney and Chief Editor of Justice, the magazine of the International Association of Jewish Lawyers and Jurists. She specializes in international law and is a frequent commentator on events in Greece. On June 17, 2012, eighteen members of Chrysi Avgi [Golden Dawn] were sworn into the Boule ton Ellenon [Greek parliament] (in comparison to the twenty-one seats in the 300-member parliament that it won in the first round of Greek elections six weeks earlier on May 6, 2012). In so doing, it has arguably become not only the most extreme right-wing political party to have won parliamentary seats in Europe in recent years, but also among the most extreme to have entered a European national legislature since Nazi-era Germany.1 Golden Dawn was a fringe movement when founded in the early 1980s and remained so until three years ago. In the 2009 elections, it garnered a meager 0.23 percent of the vote (below the 3 percent threshold required to enter parliament). In 2010, it won a seat on the Athens City Council and in the June 2012 election it received 6.92 percent of the national vote—thus becoming the fifth largest party currently in the parliament.2 Its popularity has soared ever since. A September 2012 poll indicated that 22 percent of Greeks had positive views of Golden Dawn, up from 12 percent in May. According to an October poll, if elections were held soon, Golden Dawn would gain no less than 14 percent of the vote, making it Greece’s third-largest party.3 Greek Prime Minister Antonis Samaras described Golden Dawn as “a right-wing extremist, one might say Fascist, neo-Nazi party.”4 The rise of the party parallels the rise of other such groups in twentieth-century European history—which makes it all the more worrisome. The purpose of this survey is to explain the threat posed by Golden Dawn not only to the democratic stability of Greek society, embroiled as it is in a financial crisis the likes of which no EU member-state has ever witnessed, but why it should be of concern to Europe as a whole. The near collapse of the Greek state’s socioeconomic credibility enabled a marginal group to move to the center of the political scene. Moreover, it exploited the security void and presented itself as a support network for Greeks at a time Israel Journal of foreign Affairs VII : 1 (2013) 88 when national institutions were receding or even totally absent. For years, the Greek political system ignored the issue of illegal immigration until there were so many foreigners that the confrontation with locals and a wave of crime became inevitable.5 Acts of violence have become systematic and organized. Golden Dawn targeted foreigners under the pretext of guaranteeing public safety. Brutal attacks and hate crimes, which are racially motivated, have become a common phenomenon. As of August 15, 2012, the Greek criminal justice system has not convicted a single perpetrator of any violent racial attack. This, combined with the victims’ own fears (they often lack documents legalizing their presence in the country), their reticence to file complaints with the competent police authorities, and the inability of the law enforcement authorities to carry out arrests contribute to the vicious cycle of violence.6 Worse still is that Golden Dawn is increasingly assuming the role of law enforcement on the streets. There is growing evidence that Athenians are being openly directed by police to seek help from that party.7 Golden Dawn has established an expansive social outreach program that provides services to the elderly in crime-ridden areas and distributes food and clothing to the needy. It also set up branches among diaspora Greek communities and opened offices in New York, Montreal, and, recently, Italy. The branches send aid to the party headquarters in Athens, which distributes it to local citizens. But that assistance comes at a price: allegiance to Golden Dawn. Victims of crime who were told by the police that they should turn to the party felt obliged to support Golden Dawn, even if they did not wholeheartedly support its ideology. Similarly, a Greek political analyst explained the relationship between the police and Golden Dawn, saying that many of the policemen are apolitical and consider Golden Dawn supporters to be their allies in clashes with leftists and anarchists. In the two rounds of elections, as much as 50 percent of the police force voted for Golden Dawn.8 In an interview published in the Greek newspaper To Vima in mid-July 2012, the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, Nils Muiznieks, called for close scrutiny of the alleged links between the police and Golden Dawn. When referring to the party, he said it was the “most overtly extremist and Nazi party in Europe.”9 While advocating an anti-immigrant platform, Golden Dawn has been engaged in anti-immigrant actions in downtown Athens, where the number of illegal immigrants, mainly from South Asia, Albania, Africa, and now Syria, has skyrocketed. With its aim of expelling foreigners from Greece, the party adopted the slogans: “Rid this land of filth” and “Greece for Greeks,” and has even proposed planting mines along Greek borders to prevent the entry of immigrants. The more than 1.5 million immigrants presently in Greece account for approximately 89 Michal Navoth 10 percent of its population.10 With extensive coastlines and easily crossable borders, Greece has become a gateway to the European Union. Eighty percent of the refugees arriving in the European Union pass through Greek ports, making it the EU’s busiest transit point for illegal immigration.11 Greece’s geography, along with the EU regulation that allows member states to return illegal immigrants and asylum seekers to the country in which they first entered Europe, “have turned Greece into the ‘storehouse’ of illegal immigration to Europe.”12 Golden Dawn campaigned on the streets, something that mainstream politicians avoided for fear of a hostile reaction from the public, which blames them for the country’s economic ills. According to economists, illegal immigrants bear little or no responsibility at all for the Greeks’ economic woes, yet the newcomers become easy scapegoats for politicians. The economic collapse has empowered fringe groups on the one hand and eroded the political mainstream on the other. Some Greek news outlets compare the situation to Weimar Germany. A Greek political scientist described contemporary Greek society as “a laboratory of extreme right- wing evolution.”13 Ken Matziorinis, an economics professor at McGill University, referred to the party’s popularity and said that the situation was similar to the socioeconomic situation in Germany in the 1920s, which led to the rise of Fascism and Nazism.14 Indeed, many parallels have been drawn between the rise of a far- right party in a country caught in the throes of a severe, even hopeless, financial crisis and the rise of the Nazis in Weimar Germany, a country whose economy had been crippled by inflation. These comparisons are not mere academic theories, but are corroborated by the present reality. With its violence against immigrants, swastika-like emblem and Nazi salute, its aggressive rallies, and unabashed references to Mein Kampf, as well as its propagation of literature touting the racial superiority of the Greeks, promoting Aryan supremacy, racist and antisemitic ideology, and Holocaust denial, the party is the linear heir of the German National Socialists. In an interview on Greek television in mid-May 2012, before the elections, Golden Dawn leader Nikos Mihaloliakos denied the existence of gas chambers in Nazi death camps. When asked about Auschwitz, he responded: What about Auschwitz?… I have not been to Auschwitz …What happened [there]? Were you in Auschwitz?… I have read many books questioning the number of six million Jews. This exaggeration was fabricated… There were no ovens. This is a lie… nor did gas chambers [exist]…15 When asked about his future as a parliamentarian, he replied, “Of course I will respect the rules of the parliament… But if they start with the fairy tales about Hitler… I believe that he was a great historical figure of the twentieth century.”16 Israel Journal of foreign Affairs VII : 1 (2013) 90 Mihaloliakos also said the Nazi salutes used by Golden Dawn members were not official policy, although he himself was caught on video giving such a salute shortly after his election to the City Council in 2010. According to the September poll, his popularity shot up by 8 points, much more than any other party leader’s.17 Although Holocaust denial does not constitute a penal offense in Greece,18 Mihaloliakos was condemned by the Greek government. According to its spokesman, his comments”… constitute a distortion of history… The Greek people have not forgotten that they mourned hundreds of thousands of victims of Nazism, including tens of thousands of Greek Jews.”19 Political uncertainty engulfs Greece and it is not at all certain how it will emerge from the current crisis. However, one thing is clear: Historical memory tends to be very short, even when it pertains to the darkest ideology of European history. In the May elections, forty-four people of the district of Distomo voted for Golden Dawn—sixty-eight years after Waffen-SS troops massacred 218 men, women, and children in the village of Distomo on June 10, 1944. In the June elections, two small villages, each with 500 people, where men were murdered and their homes burned by the Nazis, voted for Golden Dawn.20 To be sure, Golden Dawn does not regard itself as a Nazi or even neo-Nazi party, but simply as a nationalist formation, the members of which seek to rescue Greece for the Greeks. With its nationalist rhetoric, the party appeals to Greek pride— to Greeks who see their country as having surrendered to the diktats of foreign lenders. Of course Greek nationalist sentiment is strongly anti-German. Greeks see Germany as both the political leader of the EU and and its economic engine. Greeks feel hostile to their Euro zone lenders in much the same way that Germans felt humiliated between the world wars.21 Golden Dawn can now legitimately win votes while openly promoting hate speech and encouraging bigotry, racism, and antisemitism in the parliament. In an address to parliament on October 23 2012, in the context of discussions on lifting his immunity in connection with suspicions of assault, Golden Dawn spokesperson Ilias Kasidiaris read out a passage from the antisemitic forgery The Protocols of the Elders of Zion. There was no condemnation for that act and that silence was “doubly worrisome.”22 Even if the party is not a member of the governing coalition, it can certainly have an impact on the government, normalizing racist and antisemitic speech and placing its views into mainstream politics along the way.23 There is no doubt that Golden Dawn aims to influence the broader political discourse. Eleni Zaroulia, wife of party leader Mihaloliakos, became a member of the Greek parliamentary delegation to the Council of Europe and joined its Committee on Equality and Non-Discrimination on October 1, 2012. Officials 91 Michal Navoth at the Council of Europe, a body established to promote democracy and protect human rights and the rule of law in Europe, explained that the formal process for her inclusion was respected. It is up to the Greek political leaders to change the composition of their national delegation to include only elected representatives from democratic parties.24 Similarly, they are required to follow statutory procedure in order to remove Zaroulia from her position.25 Failing to remove her would be “an affront to concepts of equality and non-discrimination” as Anti-Defamation League Director Abraham Foxman called it.26 While preparing this article for publication, a press release was published by the European Grassroots Antiracist Movement (EGAM) on December 17, 2012. It reads as follows: “EGAM congratulates itself of the decision announced by Greek Prime Minister Antonis Samaras during his meeting with Benjamin Abtan, the President of EGAM, today in Athens: ‘New Democracy is in favor of a new composition of the Greek parliamentary delegation to the Council of Europe without the neo-Nazis of Golden Dawn.’”27 It remains to be seen how the Greek government will live up to what it has advocated. Golden Dawn should no longer be treated as a legitimate political party. The fact that it was provided with a parliamentary platform was wrong in the first place, but now it has to be banned. The idea of outlawing the party is not new. Back in May 2012, following Golden Dawn’s first electoral victory, European Jewish Congress President Moshe Kantor called for a ban on European extremist groups.28 In September of that same year, Muiznieks also called upon the Greek government to investigate whether Golden Dawn should be outlawed. On August 25, resorting to the populist rhetoric common to far-right parties, Mihaloliakos gave a speech in which he declared, “If they want us to, we can abandon it [the parliament] at any given moment and take to the streets.” For the time being, however, Golden Dawn prefers to take advantage of the privileges afforded them as Greek MPs—including immunity from prosecution. In October 2012, parliamentary immunity for two Golden Dawn legislators was lifted as part of limited attempts to investigate the party.29 Greek Justice Minister Antonis Roupakiotis, who condemned Golden Dawn attacks and said that his ministry would consider tougher penalties for racist violence,30 has stated that the best solution to the problem of extremism is to improve social conditions in Greece rather than ban a party. An amelioration of the difficult conditions would undermine Golden Dawn’s strength.31 However, as the socioeconomic crisis worsens, the popularity of Golden Dawn is soaring. Israel Journal of foreign Affairs VII : 1 (2013) 92 In its concluding observations on Greece in August 2009, the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) recommended that Greece “…ban Neo-Nazi groups from its territory and take more effective measures to promote tolerance towards persons of different ethnic origins.”32 It remains to be seen what measures undertaken by Greece are to be included in its forthcoming periodic report, due on July 18, 2013. One thing is clear, however: Today, unlike 2009, Greece has to confront not a neo-Nazi group, but a poltical party that is represented in the parliament and is enjoying a surge in popularity. Only political awareness on the part of the state and its institutions, which were blamed for the lack of a decisive response to social and economic problems, can effectively reign in Golden Dawn. The law must be applied.33 The police have to demonstrate zero tolerance for criminal acts and racially motivated violence. The authorities have to use all available means to arrest and to bring to justice the perpetrators of such behavior. In recognition of its political power, the state must have the means to democratically regulate and control immigration influx. The purposes of such policy are twofold: exposing the real face of Golden Dawn while also strengthening the institutions that are required to fight it.34 While efforts are being made by the Greek government to retain its pro-European bailout coalition, the rise of Golden Dawn makes a mockery of the great traditions of Greece—the cradle of civilization. It does this by disrespecting every democratic principle that the Greeks, as a nation, should be proud to uphold. The Greek government faces a financial crisis. But it also faces another formidable challenge—to preserve the cherished principles of equality and democracy and to save the country not only from economic bankruptcy, but from social, political, and, above all, moral bankruptcy as well. Notes Some of the findings in this article were presented at the Tel Aviv University Kantor Center 11th International Seminar on Antisemitism held in Warsaw on October 15–17, 2012. 1 Vanessa Gera, “Greek party most extreme of Europe’s far right,” Salon, May 17, 2012, www.salon.com/2012/05/17/greek_party_most_extreme_of_europes_far_right. 2 Daniel Dale, “In Greece: Anti-immigrant Golden Dawn party rides wave of xenophobia,” The Toronto Star, June 29, 2012, www.thestar.com/news/world/article/1219772--in- greece-far-right-golden-dawn-party-rides-wave-of-xenophobia; William Wheeler, “Europe’s New Fascists,” The New York Times, November 17, 2012, www.nytimes. com/2012/11/18/opinion/sunday/europes-new-fascists.html?pagewanted=all. 3 Gavin Rabinowitz, “As Golden Dawn gains popularity, Greek Jews strategize on how to combat neo-Nazi party,” JTA, November 1,2012, www.jta.org/news/ 93 Michal Navoth article/2012/11/01/3110791/as-golden-dawn-gains-popularity-greek-jews-strategize- on-how-to-combat-neo-nazi-party. 4 Gordon Fairclough, “Far-Right Party Taps Greek Anger,” The Wall Street Journal, October 16, 2012, www.online.wsj.com/article/SB100008723963904436242045780566 61472836612.html. 5 Nikos Konstandaras, “Poverty can be beaten, hate cannot,” Ekathimerini.com, April 12, 2012, http://www.ekathimerini.com/4Dcgi/4dcgi/_w_articles_ wsite3_22710_14/04/2012_437706 (The article appeared in the English version of Kathimerini, a daily newspaper published in Athens). 6 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the National Commission for Human Rights (NCHR)’s press release, August 15, 2012. 7 Helena Smith, “Greek police send crime victims to neo-Nazi ‘protectors.’” The Guardian, September 28, 2012, www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/sep/28/greek-police-victims- neo-nazi. 8 Katerina Nikolas, “Half of Greek police force voted for Golden Dawn,” digitaljournal. com, June 21, 2012, http://digitaljournal.com/article/326980. See also, Laurie Penny, “It’s not rhetoric to draw parallels with Nazism,” The Independent, August 30, 2012, www.independent.co.uk/voices/commentators/laurie-penny-its-not-rhetoric-to-draw- parallels-with-nazism-8092591.html. 9 Rachel Hirshfeld, “Europe Urges Greece to Probe Legality of Neo-Nazi Party,” Arutz Sheva website, July 16, 2012, www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/157898. 10 Liz Alderman,”Right Wing Extremists’ Rising Rapidly in Greece,” The New York Times, September 30, 2012, www.nytimes.com/2012/10/01/world/europe/amid-greeces- worries-the-rise-of-right-wing-extremists.html?pagewanted=all. 11 Penny, op. cit. 12 Charalambos Kasimis, “Greece: Illegal Immigration in the Midst of Crisis,” Migration Information Source website, March 2012, www.migrationinformation.org/Profiles/ display.cfm?ID=884. Dublin II Regulation (2003/343/CE) provides for the processing of asylum applications in the initial EU country of entry. See: ibid. 13 Rachel Donadio, Dimitris Bounias, “Hard Times Lift Greece’s Anti-Immigrant Fringe,” The New York Times, April 12,2012, www.nytimes.com/2012/04/13/world/europe/far- right-golden-dawn-sees-opening-in-greeces-woes.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 14 “New Greek national party puts Montreal community on edge,” CBC News website, October 13, 2012, www.cbc.ca/news/canada/montreal/story/2012/10/13/golden-dawn- greek-montreal.html. 15 Greek Neo Nazi leader denies the Holocaust,YouTube, May 13, 2012, www.youtube. com/watch?v=yXy7f17GXtQ. 16 Ibid. 17 Rachel Donadio, Dimitris Bounias, op.cit; Helena Smith, op.cit. 18 Michal Navoth, “Antisemitism in Greece: the trial of Konstantinos Plevris,” Stephen Roth Institute for the Study of Contemporary Antisemitism and Racism Topical Brief No. 8, Tel Aviv University, 2011, p. 8, www.tau.ac.il/Anti-Semitism/articles/ Israel Journal of foreign Affairs VII : 1 (2013) 94 topicalbrief8.pdf. 19 “Greek Government, Jews Slam Golden Dawn chief for Holocaust denial,” JTA, May 15, 2012, www.jta.org/news/article/2012/05/15/3095476/greek-neo-nazi-head- condemned-for-holocaust-denial; 70,000 Greek Jews, out of a prewar community of some 78,000, perished in the Holocaust. There are currently 5,000 Jews in Greece. Ibid. 20 Haaretz, May 11, 2012; June 19, 2012. 21 Natalie Savaricas, “Golden Dawn: The alarming rise of Greece’s far right,” The Independent, October 6, 2012, www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/golden- dawn-the-alarming-rise-of-greeces-far-right-8200183.html. 22 “Protocols of the Elders of Zion read aloud in Greek Parliament,” Haaretz, October 26, 2012, www.haaretz.com/jewish-world/jewish-world-news/protocols-of-the-elders-of- zion-read-aloud-in-greek-parliament-1.472552. 23 Benjamin Abtan, Bernard-Henri Lévy, Elie Wiesel et al., “Open letter: we are all Greek Jews,” The Guardian, May 28, 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2012/ may/28/open-letter-greek-jews. 24 Benjamin Abtan ,“No, Mr. Samaras, ‘Golden Dawn’ is not a party like any other!” October 27, 2012, www.e-balkan.net/engleski/17127-no-mr-samaras-l-golden-dawn-r- is-not-a-party-like-any-other-.html. 25 KIS, The Central Board of Jewish Communities in Greece, “An update on the issue of E. Zaroulia to a Council of Europe Committee,” November 7, 2012 (including an attached letter from Chairwoman of the Committee on Equality and Non-Discrimination, Mrs. Tina Acketoft, to KIS, October 23, 2012). 26 “Greek neo-Nazi party welcomed into anti-discrimination body,” JTA, October 5, 2012, www.jta.org/news/article/2012/10/05/3108661/greek-neo-nazi-party-welcomed- into-anti-discrimination-body. 27 www.keeptalkinggreece.com/2012/12/17/egam-greek-pm-to-exclude-golden-dawn- mps-from-council-of-europe/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=twitter&utm_ca mpaign=Feed%3A+KeepTalkingGreece+(Keep+Talking+Greece). 28 Katherina Nikolas, “Greek ministers debate outlawing Golden Dawn,” digitaljournal. com, September 25,2012, http://digitaljournal.com/article/333527. 29 Yiannis Baboulias, “Greece’s Golden Dawn isn’t a political party—it’s more like a criminal gang,” The Guardian, September 4, 2012, www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2012/ sep/04/greece-golden-dawn-not-political-party. 30 Alderman, op.cit. 31 Anthony Faiola, “Anti-immigrant Golden Dawn rises in Greece,” The Washington Post, October 20, 2012. 32 http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G09/448/55/PDF/G0944855. pdf?OpenElement. 33 Navoth, op.cit., p. 8. 34 Andreas Pantazopoulos, “Fight neo-nazis with ideas,” Press Europe, September 5, 2012, www.presseurop.eu/en/content/article/2642041-fight-neo-nazis-ideas. 
work_77gu5bynpvbfzfcdpkh7hy3c3u	----	Hate Fuel: On the Relationship Between Local Government Policy and Hate Group Activity | SpringerLink Advertisement Search Log in Search SpringerLink Search Hate Fuel: On the Relationship Between Local Government Policy and Hate Group Activity Download PDF Download PDF Article Published: 22 September 2010 Hate Fuel: On the Relationship Between Local Government Policy and Hate Group Activity Sean E Mulholland1  Eastern Economic Journal volume 36, pages480–499(2010)Cite this article 869 Accesses 4 Citations 1 Altmetric Metrics details Abstract Although often joined for ideological reasons, hate groups provide services for their members that may substitute for government services. Therefore, increases in the quality or quantity of government-provided substitutes may lower the marginal benefit of participating in an active hate group. Conversely, government supplied services may sustain active hate groups by offsetting the reduced labor market opportunities associated with signaling membership. Fixed effect logistic panel estimation results suggest that lowering the poverty rate reduces hate group activity. However, using welfare as a means to ease the plight of those less fortunate is associated with an increase in hate group activity. INTRODUCTION The Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC), an authority on hate group activity, declared that the number of active hate group chapters in the United States increased from 474 in 1997 to 888 in 2007.Footnote 1 Some types of hate groups have experienced a decline in the number of active chapters, while others have experienced an increase. Figure 1 depicts the slow and steady increase in the total number of active Ku Klux Klan (KKK), neo-Nazi, and Racist Skinhead chapters and Christian Identity Churches across the United States. Although previous studies have focused on economic conditions, demographics, and history as reasons for hate group activity, few have addressed the possible link between government provided services and the choice to form or join a hate group.Footnote 2 Figure 1 Number of Ku Klux Klan, neo-Nazi, Skinhead, and Christian identity chapters in the US: 1997–2007. Full size image Hate groups share many characteristics with social clubs. Members must sacrifice private consumption to be eligible for goods and services produced by the club. While it is clear that those seeking to join such groups often do so for ideological reasons, hate group membership provides services that may substitute for various government services. Therefore, increases in the quality or quantity of government-provided services may lower the marginal benefit of participating in an active hate group. However, government supplied goods and services may also serve to sustain and encourage hate group activity by reducing the negative wage effect of signaling membership. This paper seeks to determine if changes in local government policy are associated with changes in the presence of hate group activity. Using county-level panel data from the United States for 2002 and 2007 and controlling for unobserved county-level time-invariant heterogeneity, I show that active hate groups are more likely to be present when the percent of households below the poverty line increases. Attempting to reduce the impact of poverty through welfare payments does not, however, appear to reduce the likelihood that a hate group is present. In fact, it appears to increases it. The following section discusses past research on the general dynamics of group formation and on hate groups and hate crime. The next section discusses possible reasons why individuals join hate groups. The subsequent section presents general facts about the number of hate groups across the counties of the United States. The section after that discusses the fixed effects logistic estimation methodology in more detail. The estimation results are introduced and discussed in the penultimate section. Conclusions and possible extensions are presented in the final section. PAST RESEARCH In the 1940s, psychologists and sociologists sought and found links between macroeconomic conditions, such as the price of cotton and the unemployment rate, and the number of lynchings in the south [Hovland and Sears 1940].Footnote 3 Recently, sociologists have reexamined these data using robust statistical techniques and extending the time frame to find no relationship between economic conditions and the number of racially motivated lynchings [Green et al. 1998]. Searching for the sources of racial and ethic prejudices, sociologists have found a link between demographics and demographic change and racial harassment [Green et al. 1998]. Economists initially entered this arena by analyzing why certain goods are provided through clubs instead of private markets [Buchanan 1965; Cornes and Sandler 1986]. The results of these inquiries generated rational choice models of group formation. As research evolved, economists began to incorporate the impact that social setting or interactions can have on individual decisions. Iannaccone [1992] and Berman [2000; 2003] demonstrate why rational, utility-maximizing individuals voluntarily sacrifice to join religious organizations, fraternities and sororities, communes, and political parties. Religious prohibitions discussed in Iannaccone [1992] come in many forms: Christian Scientists refuse medical care; Jehovah Witnesses do not celebrate birthdays or vote; and Orthodox Jewish males do not shake women's hands. Membership prohibitions also occur in various non-religious groups, including hate groups: skinheads, by definition, have shaved heads; during sorority rush members are not allowed to talk with incoming freshmen; and in the gang world the rival Crips and Bloods gangs do not use the first letter in the other group's name, so Crips will not speak the letter “B”; Bloods will not use the letter “C” and will replace it with a “B.”Footnote 4 The participation in such prohibitions reveals to other members that the individual is committed to the organization, and as such, grants an active member certain privileges and benefits. Joining reveals that these benefits of membership are greater than the cost associated with signaling commitment to the group. Looking at hate groups directly, Jefferson and Pryor [1999] use SPLC data for 1997 to analyze whether economic or sociological conditions can explain the existence of a hate group in a county. Because these data measure the number of groups, and not the number of members, they consider factors that might influence the level of intolerance in a county. Relying on cross-sectional variation, they proxy the influence of history and geography, government interference, frustration, status, anxiety, and social disintegration on whether a hate group is present in a county. Using a dichotomous dependent variable, they classify counties as either having or not having a hate group present as a sign of intolerance. Their results suggest that counties that are part of an MSA and within a state that was once a member of the Confederate States of America (CSA) are more likely to be home to an active hate group. They conclude that economic and sociological explanations “are far less important than adventitious circumstances due to history and particular condition.” This final conclusion gives communities little in the way of suggestions on how local governments might alter policy to reduce hate group activity. Jefferson and Pryor's logistic estimates report “coefficients [that] are statistically significant, but with the ‘wrong’ sign.” For instance, they find that a one standard deviation increase in the local property tax per capita in 1987 lowers the probability a hate group is present in 1997 by 3.5 percent. Thus their results suggest that, in the cross-section, a county with higher property taxes per capita is associated with fewer hate groups. This “wrong” property tax result suggests three possibilities (a) that the relationship is spurious, or (b) that local communities with greater tolerance also have higher property taxes, or (c) that local communities with higher property taxes also fund programs that improve the level of tolerance or at least reduce the benefit of hate group activity. More importantly this raises the possibility that local communities may not be hamstrung by historical condition. Policymakers may be able to alter the level of hate group activity within their local communities by altering their local fiscal policy. POSSIBLE REASONS FOR HATE GROUP FORMATION Often cited reasons for hate group formation include peer validation, frustration, scapegoating, and boredom. Groups form when a small number of like-minded individuals believe they have been wronged in a similar manner and are searching for ways to right perceived wrongs. Group formation provides its members with a sense of belonging, security, and empowerment. One hypothesis put forth by McDevitt and J. Levin [1993] is that the impetus for organizing is often based on turf issues. Much like Green et al. [1998], McDevitt uses Boston data and observes that many hate crimes involved violence directed at dissimilar others moving into a previously segregated area. Changes in demographics may be an important component of hate group formation, however, this conclusion again leaves local governments little guidance on how they might craft policy to reduce such conflicts. Individuals commonly cite the thrill associated with the victimization [Levin 1993]. By forming a group, these individuals validate themselves by “committing an act that enhances one's image internally, with a peer group, and with society at large” [Levin 1993]. In this sense, hate groups are much like gangs. In his work on gangs, Klein [1995] summarizes the psychological factors in his statement that “the gang is seen as an aggregate of individuals held together more by their own shared incapacities than by mutual goals. Primarily, group identification is important as it serves individual needs; it leads to delinquent group activity only secondarily and only in the absence of pro-social alternatives.” Although often established for ideological reasons, membership may also serve as a social safety net. The benefit of this security network is threefold: protection from violence imposed by other groups; transfers of resources in time of need; and a source of employment for those with limited skills. A hate group that is able to insure its member's safety and financial security, or at least provide financial support through unemployment spells, will have more active members willing to sacrifice in order to stay on good terms with their fellow members. If a member faces financial difficulty, he or she may first turn to their fellow members for assistance before seeking local government assistance. However, if the benefits provided by the local government agencies are large enough, or if law enforcement is able to maintain a high level of safety, or the local government's development efforts increase the number of job opportunities, then even those individuals who may consider joining a hate group in response to a feeling of being wronged, may find alternative ways to overcome their challenges. For example, schooling is both a function of quality and content. Parents who disagree with much of the public school content may not remove their child if they believe the overall quality is sufficiently high. However, as public school quality declines, the net benefit of removing their child increases.Footnote 5 This is especially true for parents who believe the content is inappropriate. Thus, these families do not interact with those who hold differing views and these biased views of the parents are more likely to be maintained and passed on. Disagreeing with many public school teachings, most neo-Nazis and many Christian Identity members choose to home school their children or send their children to private schools.Footnote 6 Therefore, ceteris paribus, as the quality of public schools increases, the likelihood that these biased views are maintained declines. Government programs, such as welfare, may enhance the net benefit of joining an active hate group. Hate group membership often requires certain prohibitions and costly signals, such as tattoos, piercings, and the like, that reduce labor market opportunities. Fewer labor market options manifest themselves through lower wages and possibly through reduced access to non-government assistance. Government supplied goods and services may serve to sustain active hate groups by reducing the net negative impact membership may have on labor market opportunities. For instance, government medical assistance may serve to offset the negative effect a costly signal may have on a member's access to employers that provide health insurance. GENERAL FACTS ABOUT HATE GROUPS The SPLC tracks hate groups by “using hate group publications and websites, citizen and law enforcement reports, field sources and news reports” Southern Poverty Law Center [SPLC]. Initiated in 1981, 1997 marks the first year the SPLC attempted to gather data for all known active hate group chapters by city.Footnote 7 Although the SPLC now tracks many types of organizations only the KKK, neo-Nazi, Racist Skinhead, and Christian Identity groups are available for every year from 1997 to 2007.Footnote 8 Hate groups are by no means identical. Each organization, as shown in Table 1, has different levels of prohibitions and goals. Racist Skinhead and neo-Nazi members, unlike KKK and Christian Identity members, often display tattoos or wear distinctive clothing to signal membership. Table 1 Hate group characteristicsFull size table Between 1997 and 2007, 793 US counties, or approximately 25 percent, were home to at least one active hate group.Footnote 9 Figure 2 shows the maximum number of KKK, neo-Nazi, Racist Skinheads, and Christian Identity chapters by county reported during any calendar year from 1997 to 2007. Between 1997 and 2007, Harris County, Texas, with seven chapters in 2006, and Cook County, Illinois, with seven chapters in 1997, 2005, and 2006, were home to the largest number of active hate group chapters during a single calendar year. Counties located in states that were part of the CSA are well represented and make up 43.4 percent of those reporting an active hate group throughout the period. However, over half of the counties reporting an active hate group were located outside the former CSA. In fact, of the 12 counties that report five or more active hate group chapters during a calendar year, only three: Harris, Texas in 2006 and 2007, Tarrant, Texas in 1998, and Spartanburg, South Carolina in 2005 and 2006 are located in states that were part of the CSA. Figure 2 Maximum annual number of active hate group chapters present in between 1997 and 2007. Full size image Figure 3 depicts the change in the number of active KKK, neo-Nazi, Racist Skinheads, and Christian Identity chapters present in 2007 compared to those active in 1997. Forty-one states are home to counties that experienced either an increase or decrease in the number of active hate group chapters. This suggests that, while history may be important, other more recent factors may also play a role in hate group activity. Ocean, New Jersey and Harris, Texas experienced the largest increase in the number of active hate groups with an increase of five. Four other counties: Dallas, Texas; Maricopa, Arizona; Davidson, Tennessee; and Forrest, Mississippi each witnessed an increase of three hate group chapters. According to the SPLC data, the two counties that had the greatest reduction in the number of active hate groups, San Diego County, California and Los Angeles County, California were home to four fewer hate groups in 2007 relative to the initial year of collection in 1997. Figure 3 Change in the number of active hate group chapters present between 1997 and 2007. Full size image Over the 10 years observed, 8.3 percent of the county-year observations report the presence of at least one active KKK, neo-Nazi, Racist Skinhead, or Christian Identity chapter, while 99 percent of counties reported no active hate group for at least one year. Counties reporting no active hate group for at least one year did so about 92 percent of the time. Counties reporting an active hate group for at least one year, were home to an active hate group about 33 percent of the time. Looking at the individual hate group types, 3.8 percent of the county-year observations report the presence of at least one active KKK chapter. Counties reporting an active KKK chapter for at least one year, were home to an active KKK chapter about 26 percent of the time. Neo-Nazi chapters look similar to KKK chapters with 4.1 percent of county-year observations reporting the presence of a neo-Nazi chapter. Only about 2 percent of counties were home to a neo-Nazi organization over the 10-year period. Because Racist Skinheads are much more transient than most other type of hate groups, counties that were home to a Racist Skinhead chapter reported an active chapter only 15 percent of the time. Christian Identity Churches were present in 3.5 percent of the counties. Christian Identity Churches were the least likely to disband. Counties that were home to a Christian Identity Church for at least one year, were home to an active church 34 percent of time. ESTIMATION METHOD While anecdotal evidence suggests that the number of chapters is positively correlated with the number of members, the SPLC does not report the number of members per chapter.Footnote 10 Therefore, changes in the number of chapters may be a poor measure of the level of activity. The formation of additional active hate group chapters from one year to the next may simply be a result of the splintering of one large group; the reduction in the number of groups may be the result of a merger. Following Jefferson and Pryor [1999], this analysis will focus on whether a county is home to any active hate group chapter and not the total number of active hate group chapters. In addition, because the SPLC uses “group publications and websites, citizen and law enforcement reports, field sources and news reports,” it is possible that a county is home to a hate group even though it is not reported as present for that calendar year. Therefore, using year-to-year variation may result in false negatives.Footnote 11 Furthermore, changes in government policy take time to affect individual's choices and behavior so that annual estimations using one-year lags may not capture the medium run effects of changes in government policy on hate group activity. To address these issues, I first construct a dichotomous variable: where yi,t equals one if an active hate group chapter is present in county i at time t and zero if no active hate group chapter is reported. I then estimate the effects of economic and social stability, demographics, and county government taxation and expenditures on the probability any hate group chapter is active in a county using the following equation: where yi,t is the presence of an active hate group, x i,t−lag is the vector of explanatory variables for county i in time period t−lag and β is the vector of parameters to be estimated. The time-invariant, county-specific effects represented by α i control for omitted variables that differ between counties but are constant over time and ɛi,t is assumed to be logistically distributed and independent of (xi,t−lag, α i ).Footnote 12 The year dummies, η t , control for omitted changes over time that affect all counties similarly. This fixed effects, or conditional, logistic estimation methodology relies on within county variation to estimate if a change in local government policy is associated with a changes in hate group activity within that county. Although this method reduces the variation in the measured magnitude of hate group activity, it focuses on whether any hate group was active and minimizes any errors associated with measuring the level of activity. To reduce the possibility of false negatives, the logistic estimation only looks at the presence of hate groups every 5 years. If a county is still home to an active hate group after 5 years, the likelihood of a false positive is unlikely. Conversely, if a county does not report an active hate group at either end of the 5-year interval, the probability that this results from a false negative is also quite small.Footnote 13 In addition, using 5-year intervals removes the possibility of first-order autocorrelation. Local government agencies may have little control over long-term economic stability, demographic changes, and those “circumstances due to history and particular condition.” However, local government officials may be able to alter policies so as to reduce the net benefit of starting or joining such an organization. Behavioral responses to government policy often take time to filter through the economy. Individuals must first realize and understand the policy change. Then, they must respond to the new government policies. I lag government policy variables by 10 years so that the estimation is more likely to capture any medium run effects these policies may have on hate group activity.Footnote 14 Following Honoré [2002], with T=2 and in the case for d2000 and d2007 equal to zero if no active hate group is present or one if an active hate group is present, the estimator used in this analysis is: Reducing this equation reveals that a fixed effect estimator does not rely on α i , Because the estimator considers counties where yi, 2002+yi, 2007=1, this method only considers counties that switch from being home to an active hate group to not or vice versa.Footnote 15 As stated by Honoré [2002], “[i]t is intuitively appealing that the individuals who do not switch, are not used to estimate β, those [counties] can be rationalized either by extremely large or by extremely small values of α i .” Counties that are always home to an active hate group, and thus report all ones, or are never home to an active hate group, and thus report all zeros for 2002 and 2007 are unused by this estimator. Fixed effects estimation relies on within county variation, or stated less generally, counties that realize a change in hate group activity. Figure 4 maps the location of these counties that realized a change in presence of hate group activity from 2002 to 2007. In 2002, 286 counties were home to at least one active KKK, neo-Nazi, Racist Skinhead, or Christian Identity chapter. Shown in blue, 168 counties, or about 58.7 percent of those reporting an active hate group in 2002, were no longer home to any active hate groups by 2007. One hundred and eighteen counties were home to active hate groups in both 2002 and 2007. By 2007, 263 counties reported an active KKK, neo-Nazi, Skinhead, or Christian Identity chapter and included 145 “red” counties that had reported no active hate groups in 2002. For both 2002 and 2007, 2,712 counties were never home to an active hate group. Figure 4 Change in hate group activity from 2002 to 2007. Full size image Table 2 displays the county-level summary statistics for each explanatory variable. To account for local levels of economic and social stability, the xi,t−lag vector includes the crime index, real median household income, the unemployment rate, and the poverty rate at the county level. Because levels and changes in demographic heterogeneity are often associated with increases in social tensions, I include sex and age measures, the percentage of blacks and Hispanics, and the population density. Each of these stability and demographic measures are lagged 2 years. Finally to determine the effects of local government policies, I include the real per capita property taxes and expenditures on education, library, welfare, hospital services, health care, highway, transportation, police, fire, corrections, housing and development, and utilities.Footnote 16 Because state and local government policy changes often take time to filter throughout the locality, each measure of local property taxes and expenditures is lagged 10 years. Table 2 Summary statisticsFull size table ESTIMATION RESULTS The results of the Hausman test supporting the use of fixed effects is reported in Table 3. The Hausman test reveals that the random effects estimator, although more efficient, violates one or more assumptions, and returns estimators significantly different from the fixed effects estimation. Therefore the results of the fixed effects logistic estimation are reported in Table 4. The results report standard errors clustered by county in order to account for non-random errors within each panel [Rogers 1993; Williams 2000; and Wooldridge 2002]. Table 3 Hausman testFull size table Table 4 Fixed effects logit estimationFull size table Controlling for unobserved heterogeneity across counties results in an imprecisely estimated effect of a change in per capita property taxes. This result differs from the negative cross-sectional relationship found by Jefferson and Pryor [1999]. Although higher property taxes are associated with less hate group activity in the cross-section, an increase in property taxes is not associated with any change in hate group activity within a county. Reinforcing Green et al. [1998], the results show no relationship between the unemployment rate and median income and the presence of an active hate group. However, economic welfare, as measured by the poverty rate, suggests a slightly different story. A one percentage point increase in the poverty rate, or an increase of about one-fifth of a standard deviation, is associated with a 17.5 percent increase in the probability that an active hate group is present.Footnote 17 Those households falling below the poverty line are likely to seek out reasons for their welfare loss. Looking for a scapegoat, individuals may be attracted to organizations that are more extreme, including hate groups. These results differ from the individual level analysis of Hezbollah and Israeli Jews by Krueger and Maleckova [2003]. They find a positive relationship between living above the poverty line or exposure to secondary education and participation in Hezbollah. In addition, they show that Israeli Jews who attack Palestinians are “overwhelmingly from high-paying occupations.” The difference may lie in the level of estimation. It may also point to a difference between domestic hate groups and international organizations such as Hezbollah. Hate groups in the United States may have fewer resources with which to carry out their plans. More research is needed to determine differences between these domestic and international organizations. Attempting to reduce the impact of poverty through welfare payments does not, however, appear to be associated with a reduction in hate group activity. In fact, the reverse is true. A one standard deviation increase in per capita welfare spending, just over $126, is associated with a 50.5 percent increase in the likelihood that an active hate group is present. By granting a greater amount of welfare payments, policymakers may reduce the net costs of signaling membership. Moreover, for groups that are more mobile, like Racist Skinheads and neo-Nazis, these higher welfare benefits may actually attract these individuals to local communities that provide greater welfare benefits. Unfortunately, policymakers searching for ways to help those in need, while at the same time seeking ways to reduce hate group activity, may need to look for other ways to improve the lives of those at or below the poverty line. Transportation expenditures also appear correlated with reductions in hate group activity. A $1 per capita increase in transportation expenditures is associated with a 0.7 percent reduction in the probability that a hate group is present. Although further research is needed, one possibility is that funding public transportation may provide a public good that lowers the cost of daily commutes from areas with few job opportunities to areas with greater job opportunity. Greater provision of public transportation may reduce the costs of searching for a job and switching jobs. Other measures of government policy included do not appear to be associated with hate group activity. Although race is not associated with hate group activity, the percent of a county that is female between the ages of 5 and 14 is positively correlated with the likelihood that a hate group is present. A county experiencing a one percentage point increase in the portion of its female population between 5 and 14 years of age is almost four times more likely to be home to an active hate group. While an increase in males between the ages of 5–14 years reduces the probability that an active hate group is present. CONCLUSION Although economic and sociological explanations may be less important than history or particular condition, government officials may be able to craft policies that reduce hate group activity. Local and state policymakers looking for a fiscal tool to reduce the presence of active hate groups may wish to look toward polices that target poverty and transportation. Unfortunately, the results suggest that enhanced welfare payments that lower the burden of those below the poverty line may exacerbate the problem of hate group activity. Welfare payments may serve to reduce the net loss in labor income associated with hate group membership. However, it may also be the case that poverty and welfare payments capture some other omitted factor not controlled for in the logistic estimation. These results differ from those found by Krueger and Maleckova [2003] and may speak to subtle differences between domestic hate groups and international organizations. There may be other avenues for policymakers seeking to reduce the incentives to create and join hate groups. Various policies, such as hate crime legislation and enforcement, that focus directly on hate group activities may further reduce their presence. Further research is needed in this area if we are to reduce or eliminate the desire of individuals to express their frustrations through organizations that are built on extreme ideological grounds. Notes 1.The number of groups and the number of affiliations have changed over time. The analysis below includes the KKK, neo-Nazis, Skinheads, and Christian Identity Churches from 2002 to 2007. 2.For a discussion of historical literature and a fresh look at old analyses, see Green et al. [1998]. 3.For a detailed survey on the sociology of social interactions see Weber [1978]. 4.So instead of using the word cigar they will say “bigar.” 5.Hoxby [1998] shows that as per pupil school spending decreases, drop-out rates increase. Accounting for both the possible endogeneity of private enrollment and public expenditures — switching endogeneity — as well as possible Tiebout sorting, Goldhaber [1999] finds that increases in public school expenditure per pupil significantly reduces private school enrollment. 6.In 1999, before the Aryan Nations lost their Idaho compound, Salon writer and associate editor, Amy Benfer, discussed her daughter's public schooling experience with one of the Neo-Nazi women: “They taught her that the Indians saved the Pilgrims’ lives,” Christian [a neo-Nazi mother] says. Then came Black History Month, when the children learned about Martin Luther King Jr. Says Christian: “My daughter is not black. My daughter has no need to know about a black activist.” 7.Although the SPLC reports hate group location by city or town, the analysis is performed at the county level for both theoretical and empirical reasons: First, many hate groups chapters hold rallies and recruitment meetings outside their home towns in locations nearby and thus have members from the surrounding towns and townships. Second, because many of these towns are not in Metropolitan Statistical Areas, county level data represent the least aggregated measures of crime, schooling, unemployment, and the like that are available. 8.In 2000, the SPLC began monitoring Neo-Confederate organizations. This study does not include those organizations because of their initial omission by the SPLC, nor does it include Black Separatists. 9.Not all active hate groups can be assigned to a single county. For instance the SPLC reports an active chapter of the Knights of the White Kamellia (KKK) present in NC, but does not list a city. When no city is reported, the hate group is not included in the analysis. The portion of active groups not included ranges from 1.2 percent in 1998 to 12.8 percent in 2007. 10.For two discussions on the correlation between number of active chapters and membership see Intelligence Report [2000] and The Stephen Roth Institute [2004]. 11.An anonymous referee is responsible for this helpful point. 12.Assuming that hate groups did not alter their voting behavior over this time period, using fixed effects partially addresses any worry that hate groups “may vote for policies that reduce the local government provision of services” [Glaeser 2005]. 13.Given the SPLC's data collection method, a county reporting no active hate groups may still be home to a hate group. It is possible that the hate group chapters simply did not draw attention to themselves for that calendar year. In order to determine the effects of this possibility, I construct alternative measures that assumed a county was hate group free only if that county witnessed no hate group activity over multiple years. If an active hate group is present during any one of these years, I assume that the hate group was simply silent during the others and continued to be present over the entire time period.Using this methodology, I construct three alternative dependent variables: one that assumes a hate group must be silent for 2 years before I consider it disbanded; one for 3 years; and one for 4 years. Repeating the estimation in Table 4 using these three alternative dependent variable measures reveals qualitatively and quantitatively similar results. Results are available from the author upon request. 14.Lagging the taxes and expenditures by 10 years follows Jefferson and Pryor's [1999] methodology. 15.Because 1997 was the first year the SPLC attempted to collect data on all known hate groups, the SPLC's methodology may still have been in its infancy. The SPLC may have found fewer groups in 1997 simply because they were learning how to locate these various types of organizations. Therefore, comparing the growth from 1997 to any following year may simply be due to improved methodology and not an actual increase in the number of existing groups. To avoid this possibility, I chose to analyze hate group activity (a) a few years after their initial collection of 1997 so that much of the initial learning process had occurred and (b) for years when the Census of Governments, reported every 5 years on the 2s and 7s, is available. 16.Though measured at the county level, the expenditures reported include those by sub-county, county, sub-state, and some state-wide agencies. “Most local governments [or sub-state agencies] in the United States operate entirely within a single county area, but there are some units whose territory extends into two or more county areas. Each of these inter-county governments is counted only once in this report and has been assigned for the purposes of enumeration to the county area where its headquarters is located, or in the case of municipal governments, to the county area having the largest share of its population” [Compendium of Government Finances 1997].Local expenditures measured at the county level are also a function of intergovernmental transfers of revenue both to and from federal and state governments. Those programs that are directly administered by the state are not included in the county-level data. 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Google Scholar  Download references Acknowledgements Beneficial suggestions were received from seminar participants at the 2005 Eastern Economic Association Meetings, the 2005 Mid-west Economic Association Meetings, the 2005 Southern Economic Association Meetings, College of the Holy Cross, Lebanon Valley College, Macon State College, Mercer Univerisity, and Stonehill College. I extend my gratitude to Scott L. Baier, Scott A. Beaulier, Barry R. Chiswick, Angela K. Dills, Rey Hernandez-Julian, Robert Tollison, the editor, and anonymous referees for their valuable comments. Errors or deficiencies that have to this point survived this counsel are most assuredly mine alone. Author information Affiliations Department of Economics, Stonehill College, 320 Washington Street, Easton, 02357, MA, USA Sean E Mulholland Authors Sean E MulhollandView author publications You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar DATA APPENDIX DATA APPENDIX crime comes from the Uniform Crime Reports County Data. 1997–2005. (Retrieved June 20, 2006), from the University of Virginia, Geospatial and Statistical Data Center: http://fisher.lib.virginia.edu/collections/stats/crime/. income is the median household income in thousands ($1000s) of 2006 dollars by county as reported by the US Census Bureau, State and County Income and Poverty Estimates (SAIPE) from 1997 through 2005. http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/saipe/county.html (viewed July 10, 2008). unemployment rate is the annual average percent of county residents who are unemployed and looking for a job as reported by the United States Department of Labor: Bureau of Labor Statistics. Labor Force Data by County, Annual Averages (viewed July 10, 2008): ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests/la/laucnty97.txt ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests/la/laucnty98.txt ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests/la/laucnty99.txt ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests/la/laucnty00.txt ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests/la/laucnty01.txt ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests/la/laucnty02.txt ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests/la/laucnty03.txt ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests/la/laucnty04.txt ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests/la/laucnty05.txt poverty is the portion of a county's residents that are below a household income threshold as reported by the US Census Bureau, State and County Income and Poverty Estimates (SAIPE) from 1997 through 2005. http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/saipe/county.html (viewed July 10, 2008). adult male is the percentage of the county population that is male and between the ages of 15 and 44. US Census Bureau, Population Division: County estimates by demographic characteristics — age, sex, race, and Hispanic Origin. http://www.census.gov/popest/datasets.html (viewed July 15, 2008) US Census Bureau, Population Division. adult female is the percentage of the county population that is female and between the ages of 15 and 44. US Census Bureau, Population Division: County estimates by demographic characteristics — age, sex, race, and Hispanic Origin. http://www.census.gov/popest/datasets.html (viewed July 15, 2008). male youth is the percentage of the county population that is male and between the ages of 5–14 (1997–1999) or 5–13 (2000–2005). US Census Bureau, Population Division: County estimates by demographic characteristics age, sex, race, and Hispanic Origin. http://www.census.gov/popest/datasets.html (viewed July 15, 2008). female youth is the percentage of the county population that is female and between the ages of 5–14 (1997–1999) or 5–13 (2000–2005). US Census Bureau, Population Division: County estimates by demographic characteristics — age, sex, race, and Hispanic Origin. http://www.census.gov/popest/datasets.html (viewed July 15, 2008). black is the percentage of county population that is black. US Census Bureau, Population Division: County estimates by demographic characteristics — age, sex, race, and Hispanic Origin. http://www.census.gov/popest/datasets.html (viewed July 15, 2008). hispanic is the percentage of the county population that is Hispanic. US Census Bureau, Population Division: County estimates by demographic characteristics — age, sex, race, and Hispanic Origin. http://www.census.gov/popest/datasets.html (viewed July 15, 2008). msa is the Metropolitan Statistical Area reported by the Population Division, US Census Bureau in 1999 and updated in 2003: http://www.census.gov/population/estimatecity/99m.ps.txt (viewed January 29, 2007). population density is calculated from the county population in US Census Bureau, Population Division: County estimates by demographic characteristics — age, sex, race, and Hispanic Origin (viewed July 15, 2008) divided by the land area in square miles from the US Census Bureau (viewed January 29, 2007). hate group total is the total number of hate group chapters active in a county. This variable is the sum of all Ku Klux Klan (KKK), neo-Nazi, Racist Skinheads, and Christian Identity chapters active at the county level. These data are reported annually at the city level by the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC) in their quarterly publication the Intelligence Report. Each annual report reports activity for the previous year. The Southern Poverty Law Center [1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008]. kkk is the total number of KKK chapters active in a county. These data are reported annually at the city level by the SPLC in their quarterly publication of the Intelligence Report, Issues 85, 89, 93, 97, 101, 105, 109, 114, 117, 121, 125, 129. nazi is the number of neo-Nazi chapters active in county. These data are reported annually at the city level by the SPLC in their quarterly publication of the Intelligence Report, Issues 85, 89, 93, 97, 101, 105, 109, 114, 117, 121, 125, 129. skinheads is the number of Racists Skinhead chapters active in a county. These data are reported annually at the city level by the SPLC in their quarterly publication of the Intelligence Report, Issues 85, 89, 93, 97, 101, 105, 109, 114, 117, 121, 125, 129. identity is the number of Christian Identity Churches active in a county. These data are reported annually at the city level by the SPLC in their quarterly publication of the Intelligence Report, Issues 85, 89, 93, 97, 101, 105, 109, 114, 117, 121, 125, 129. consumer price index is from the United States Department of Labor: Bureau of Labor Statistics: Consumer Price Index. Washington, D.C. ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests/cpi/cpiai.txt (viewed July 10, 2008). property tax are “taxes conditioned on ownership of property and measured by its value. Includes general property taxes related to property as a whole, real and personal, tangible or intangible, whether taxed at a single rate or at classified rates, and taxes on selected types of property, such as motor vehicles, or on certain or all intangibles.” These measures come from the United States Census. Census of Government. Volume 4. Government Finances. Number 5, Compendium of Government Finances. education expenditures includes “schools, colleges, and other educational institutions (e.g., for blind, deaf, and other handicapped individuals), and educational programs for adults, veterans, and other special classes.” These measures come from the United States Census. Census of Government. Volume 4. Government Finances. Number 5, Compendium of Government Finances. library expenditures are “provision and support of public library facilities and services.” These measures come from the United States Census. Census of Government. Volume 4. Government Finances. Number 5, Compendium of Government Finances. welfare expenditures “includes institutional and noninstitutional assistance to the needy, plus the administration of such assistance.” These measures come from the United States Census. Census of Government. Volume 4. Government Finances. Number 5, Compendium of Government Finances. hospital expenditures consists of “financing, construction acquisition, maintenance or operation of hospital facilities, provision of hospital care, and support of public or private hospitals.” These measures come from the United States Census. Census of Government. Volume 4. Government Finances. Number 5, Compendium of Government Finances. health expenditures includes “outpatient health services, other than hospital care, including public health administration; research and education; categorical health programs; treatment and immunization clinics; nursing; environmental health activities such as air and water pollution control; ambulance service if provided separately from fire protection services, and other general public health activities such as mosquito abatement. School health services provided by health agencies (rather than school agencies) and included here.” These measures come from the United States Census. Census of Government. Volume 4. Government Finances. Number 5, Compendium of Government Finances. highway expenditures include “construction, maintenance, and operation of highways, streets, and related structures, including toll highways, bridges, tunnels, ferries, street lighting and snow and ice removal. However, highway policing and traffic control are classed under Police Protection.” These measures come from the United States Census. Census of Government. Volume 4. Government Finances. Number 5, Compendium of Government Finances. transportation expenditures “comprises the functions of Highways, Air Transportation, Parking Facilities, Water Transport and Terminals, and Transit Subsidies.” These measures come from the United States Census. Census of Government. Volume 4. Government Finances. Number 5, Compendium of Government Finances. police expenditures consists of “[l]ocal government payments for police and traffic safety activities amount to the most significant part of police protection.” These measures come from the United States Census. Census of Government. Volume 4. Government Finances. Number 5, Compendium of Government Finances. fire expenditures includes “fire fighting organization and auxiliary services; fire inspection and investigation; support of volunteer fire forces; and other fire prevention activities. Includes cost of fire fighting facilities, such as fire hydrants and water, furnished by other agencies of the government.” These measures come from the United States Census. Census of Government. Volume 4. Government Finances. Number 5, Compendium of Government Finances. corrections expenditures consists of “state prisons, reformatories, houses of correction, and other state institutions for the confinement and correction of convicted persons and juveniles. Includes only state-operated facilities; excludes cost of maintaining prisoners in institutions of other governments.” These measures come from the United States Census. Census of Government. Volume 4. Government Finances. Number 5, Compendium of Government Finances. housing and development expenditures “comprises the functions Natural Resources, Parks and Recreation, Housing and Community Development, Sewerage, and Sanitation Other Than Sewerage.” These measures come from the United States Census. Census of Government. Volume 4. Government Finances. Number 5, Compendium of Government Finances. utilities expenditures includes “government owned and operated water supply, electric light and power, gas supply, or transit system.” These measures come from the United States Census. Census of Government. Volume 4. Government Finances. Number 5, Compendium of Government Finances. Rights and permissions Reprints and Permissions About this article Cite this article Mulholland, S. Hate Fuel: On the Relationship Between Local Government Policy and Hate Group Activity. Eastern Econ J 36, 480–499 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1057/eej.2009.38 Download citation Published: 22 September 2010 Issue Date: 01 September 2010 DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/eej.2009.38 Keywords clubs hate groups poverty welfare JEL Classifications I3 R5 Download PDF Advertisement Over 10 million scientific documents at your fingertips Switch Edition Academic Edition Corporate Edition Home Impressum Legal information Privacy statement California Privacy Statement How we use cookies Manage cookies/Do not sell my data Accessibility Contact us Not logged in - 128.182.81.34 North East Research Libraries (8200828607) - LYRASIS (3000176756) - Carnegie Mellon University (3000133174) - Carnegie Mellon University Hunt Library (1600047252) Springer Nature © 2021 Springer Nature Switzerland AG. Part of Springer Nature. \ 
work_7boxkwjiijcbtjqtpancl3y4pa	----	1 Misogyny, Racism, and Islamophobia: Street Harassment at the Intersections Hannah Mason-Bish & Irene Zempi Abstract Veiled Muslim women are at an increased risk of street harassment in the current political and economic climate. Their visibility, combined with their popular portrayal as culturally dangerous or threatening means that they are vulnerable to receiving verbal and physical threats, which can be misogynistic and Islamophobic in nature. Drawing on 60 individual and 20 focus group interviews with Muslim women in the United Kingdom who wear the niqab (face veil) and had experienced harassment in public, this qualitative study details their lived experiences. It argues that an intersectional analysis is crucial to understanding the nuances of their lived experiences and the impact street harassment has on their lives. The findings demonstrate that street harassment can produce a hostile environment for veiled Muslim women, which can have a terrorizing effect, limiting their full participation in the public sphere. Introduction Within the current post-Brexit climate, veiled Muslim women are facing increased risks of attacks in the United Kingdom. The anti-Muslim hate monitoring group Tell MAMA reported in their annual survey for 2016 that there was a significant rise in hate crimes against Muslims being reported to them after the vote to leave the European Union. Research found that not only are Muslim women more likely to be attacked than Muslim men but also their experiences demonstrate misogynistic and Islamophobic undertones (Zempi & Chakraborti, 2014). The number of people 2 identifying as Muslim has increased by 1.2 million between the 2001 and 2011 census sweeps (Casey, 2016). Our research took place at a time when Muslims are having their faith and beliefs questioned more vocally by some sections of society. A 2016 ComRes poll noted that 43% of 2,000 adults surveyed felt that Islam was a negative force in the United Kingdom. A recent government report suggested that this was partly caused by concerns over integration, immigration, and perceptions of backward religious practices (Casey, 2016). Certainly, not all Muslim women wear the headscarf and/or face veil, and some are not covered at all. However, as Perry (2014) points out, Muslim women and girls are extremely vulnerable to street violence motivated by their visible status as Muslims. This also has to do with the controlling images of veiled Muslim women that render them especially attractive and available targets. Bullock and Jafri (2002) highlight three “personas” that Muslim women are perceived to occupy in the popular imagination, and, thus, define what Muslim women “are supposed to be and do”: The first is the “harem belly-dancer character,” the mysterious and sexualized woman of the “Orient”; the second is “the oppressed Muslim woman,” often represented as the hijab (headscarf) wearer or the woman who is unable to drive; and, finally, there is the “militant Muslim woman,” often shown in hijab with a gun and military clothes. (p. 36) Along similar lines, Zempi & Chakraborti (2014) point out that veiled Muslim women are routinely portrayed as oppressed, “culturally dangerous,” and “threatening” to the Western way of life and to notions of public safety and security by virtue of being fully covered in the public sphere. Correspondingly, the visibility of veiled Muslim women must also be understood in the current climate of international legal reforms, which 3 have attempted to criminalize wearing the niqab in public places. France was the first to ban face covering, when, in 2009, then president Nicolas Sarkozy said that such clothing was “not welcome” and that legislation would protect women who were being forced to wear it. There have been calls by some members of parliament (MPs) to ban the niqab in Britain, following recent bans in other European countries such as Belgium, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Italy, and Bulgaria. Such legislation alludes to a need to protect Muslim women from an oppressive male family member, which infantilizes them and makes them appear weak. Furthermore, it promotes a message of intolerance and indicates that Muslim women who wear the niqab do not belong in secular Western countries. Both messages have a similar impact which is to encourage Muslim women to stay home and out of public view. Although there is increasing literature on street violence against women generally, there is relatively little scholarly work examining the experiences of Muslim women who wear the niqab. Allen’s (2015) study provided a significant contribution to this gap by interviewing veiled Muslim women about their experiences and concluding that incidents were often at the intersection of religion and gender. However, there still exists a lack of engagement with wider literature on street harassment, which draws out more general gendered experiences. Drawing on 60 individual and 20 focus group interviews with Muslim women who wear the niqab, this article reflects upon their lived experiences in public spaces. We argue that it is essential to take an intersectional approach by looking at how they are victimized along Islamophobic and misogynistic lines. Our aim with this article is to demonstrate the religious and gender dimensions of veiled Muslim women’s experiences in public. This does not just mean acknowledging that Muslim women have different experiences, but 4 thinking more critically about how key aspects of their identity intersect to define their place in the social world. Understanding street harassment and intersectionality In this article, we employ the term “street harassment” because it is inclusive in terms of capturing different forms of harassment of women in public (rather than merely sexual harassment). As Davis (1994) points out, there are three certain key characteristics associated with street harassment: the locale, the gender of and the relationship between the harasser and the target, and the reference to body parts. Typically, the targets of street harassment are female, whereas the harassers are male; the harassers are unacquainted with their targets, and the forum is a public one (although the content of the speech, if any, is not intended as public discourse; Bowman, 1993). From this perspective, street harassment is defined as “the unsolicited verbal and/or nonverbal act of a male stranger towards a female, solely on the basis of her sex, in a public place” (Laniya, 2005, p. 100). Both men and women can experience street harassment; however, most victims are women. Vera-Gray (2016) argues that empirical studies of street harassment, its prevalence, manifestations, effects, and the meanings it holds for both, the men who practice it and the women who experience it, are limited. Reasons for the “invisibility” of women’s experiences of street harassment include trivialization (Tuerkheimer, 1997), normalization (Bowman, 1993; Larkin, 1997), and the ways in which practices in public or semipublic places do not receive the same scrutiny as practices in private places (Gardner, 1995; Goffman, 1990). With the exception of Kelly (1988), Randall (1987), and Wise and Stanley (1987), public space as an arena, and everyday life as the context, are largely absent from mainstream work on sexual harassment. 5 Furthermore, scholarship on street harassment has tended to overlook the issue of intersectionality in relation to victim experiences. Coined by Crenshaw (1989), the concept of intersectionality was introduced to explain the way that multiple systems of oppression construct our identities and also our access to power and privilege. In relation to violence and hostility, difference is obscured both in an attempt to understand the victim experience and in relation to how campaigners and policy makers might exclude issues of gender, religion, or other identity characteristics. This is particularly the case for the lived experiences of “other” women such as Muslim women who wear the niqab in public in the United Kingdom. Against the backdrop of the “War on Terror” and the popular perceptions of gender oppression in Islam, the visibility of the niqab renders Muslim women the “ideal” target for street harassment (Zempi & Chakraborti, 2014). In this regard, wearing the niqab marks Muslim women more readily visible as “soft,” “easy,” and “convenient” targets to attack. Veiled Muslim women often occupy intersecting positions in terms of religion, gender, and appearance coupled with other aspects of their identities, and this defines their experiences of street harassment. Abu-Ras and Suarez (2009) highlight the complexity of Muslim women’s identities: (a) their gender status as women, who generally face more discrimination in access to educational, financial, health, and social resources; (b) their cultural identity that is shaped by structural social and cultural constraints provided by gender socialization and patriarchal processes; (c) their status as immigrants and minorities in a Western country, and the resulting social and economic marginalization; and finally (d) their Muslim dress code that symbolizes modesty and physical integrity, and identifies them from non- Muslims, marking them as targets for hate crimes, discrimination, and possible violations of their bodily integrity. 6 At the same time though, this does not mean that street harassment has one meaning for veiled Muslim women and a different meaning for all other women; rather, veiled Muslim women can experience street harassment in ways that are both similar to and different from that experienced by all other women. According to Davis (1994), truly to understand any woman’s experience, it is crucial to think of her as embodied and not as an individual experiencing street harassment on various, nonintersecting axes. It is argued that “we cannot hope to understand the meanings of a person’s experience, including her experiences of oppression, without first thinking of her as embodied, and second thinking about the particular meanings assigned to that embodiment” (Davis, 1994, p. 214). To illustrate this, Lloyd (2005) points out that Black women do not experience racism because they are Black, and sexism because they are women; they experience both simultaneously on the basis that “racism and sexism interlock, they modulate and inflect one another” (p. 45). Taking a similar position, Spelman (1990) states that “sexism and racism do not have different objects” (p. 12). Such insights can be revealing, for example, the work of Fogg-Davis that examined the victimization of Black lesbians. He noted that it was important to question the “interplay between civic behaviours and intersection structural inequalities” and that their victimization drew upon heterosexism, colonialism, and slavery (Fogg-Davis, 2006, p. 57). Such a detailed examination has not been carried out in relation to the experiences of veiled Muslim women. For Muslim women, their experiences can sit at the intersection of religion and gender coupled with other aspects of their identity. In essence, these aspects of identity define not only their everyday life experiences but also specifically their experiences and responses to street harassment. For many, the niqab itself is a 7 symbol of gender oppression and “extreme” Muslim values, meaning that perpetrators feel emboldened to enact both their Islamophobic and misogynistic feelings on Muslim women (Zempi & Chakraborti, 2014). Literature on street harassment demonstrates that it is commonplace for women to take safety precautions in public such as altering their appearance or clothing (Bowman, 1993). For Muslim women, this gendered approach takes on an added dimension because it might mean removing their niqab, which has implications for their religious sense of self and practicing their religion. Methods Overview of research design The research took the form of a qualitative study based on semi-structured interviews carried out between 2011 and 2012 with Muslim women who wear the niqab. The research took place in Leicester. Specifically, the study comprised 60 individual and 20 focus group interviews with veiled Muslim women who had experienced anti-Muslim hostility in public places. The topics covered in the interviews and focus groups included (a) nature and frequency of harassment; (b) impact of harassment on victims, their families, and wider communities; (c) women’s coping mechanisms; and (d) effectiveness of criminal justice responses to this problem. The interviews, undertaken by the second author, typically ranged from 1 to 2 hours, with an average interview length of 1 hour. Participation in the study was voluntary. All the women who took part in the study wore the niqab at the time of fieldwork. There was no overlap between the women who participated in the interviews and in the focus groups. Of the 60 veiled Muslim women who took part in individual interviews,1 83% (n = 50) were born into Islam and 17% (10) had converted to Islam. The largest ethnic group of participants classified themselves as 8 Asian (Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi, and Asian other—70%, 42), followed by Black (either Black Caribbean, Black African, and Black Other—13%, eight), and White (British, Irish, and Other—17%, 10). The majority of participants had lived in Leicester for 5 years or more (67%, 40). Sampling Women were invited to participate in the study based on the premise they had experienced harassment in public. Using convenience sampling, prospective participants were identified through local Muslim organizations including mosques, Muslim schools, and Islamic centers, as well as local Muslim university student societies, and Muslim women’s groups. The study was advertised through these organizations, and women could contact the researcher (that is, the second author) directly to arrange for an interview (the researcher’s contact details were included in the call for participants) on the basis that they had experienced harassment in public. Prior to conducting the interviews, the researcher explained to prospective participants the scope of the study, that is, examining their experiences of harassment in public. Participants who had not experienced harassment in public would be excluded from the study; however, this was not the case as all the participants did report some form of harassment, whether anti-Muslim, racist, and/or misogynistic. An advantage of employing these organizations for participant recruitment was that individuals were introduced to the study by a familiar, trusted organization. This alleviated any concerns that participants might have had about taking part in the study, thus potentially increasing participation in the study. Participants unaffiliated to any local Muslim organizations or groups were also recruited through snowball 9 sampling. As with convenience sampling, snowball sampling is a type of nonprobability method, which is particularly appropriate when the population of interest is “hidden” or “hard to reach” and there is a lack of sampling frame of the target group (Patton, 1987). Individual interviews took place at women’s homes or at the university where the researcher was working at the time of the fieldwork. Conducting interviews at the university was offered as an alternative to participants who did not wish for the interview to take place at their home. The university was a safe, private location to conduct the interviews, for both the researcher and the participants (when arranging an interview at the university, a room was booked to ensure privacy and to minimize interruptions). Conducting interviews at women’s homes was useful for some participants as it minimized the inconvenience of leaving the house as some women had caring responsibilities of young children and/or elderly family members. However, some women chose the university as their preferred location for the interviews as they might not have been able to fully disclose their experiences of victimization if other family members were present in their home during the interview. Focus group interviews were conducted at local Muslim organizations such as mosques, Islamic centers, and Islamic educational institutions. The focus group participants were already at these premises for religious purposes such as praying and learning or teaching the Quran. Most groups were already established in certain classes, and participants either would take some time off their classes to participate in a focus group interview or would join in the next session as soon as they finished their activities. It is likely that participants felt comfortable and secure because they were interviewed in environments that they were mostly familiar with. This approach reinforced notions of good interview rapport and trusting relationships between the 10 researcher and the researched (Curtis & Curtis, 2011). It also encouraged openness and honesty from the women, particularly because of the sensitive nature of the discussion. Data analysis, authenticity and reflexivity With the exception of one individual, the rest of participants consented to their interviews being audio recorded, and the material was subsequently transcribed and analyzed using grounded theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). Grounded theory, which is based on an inductive approach, involves developing a “story” that emerges from the data. Within this framework, participants’ responses are construed as evidence of what they think and feel and how they interpret the social world (Glaser, 1992). In this case, verbatim transcripts are essential for grounded theory analysis as they capture information in participants’ own words, phrases, and expressions as well as providing “rich” detail. Within a grounded theory framework, the data were reviewed and coded to produce categories consistent with issues of thematic interest. Nvivo 9 was used to code the data under broad themes of women’s victimization, and then patterns and subthemes were identified within broad themes such as the nature, frequency, and impact of victimization; women’s coping mechanisms; and prevention of victimization. As Payne (2004) points out, the terms and concepts used to demonstrate rigor in quantitative research—including reliability, validity, representativeness, generalizability, and objectivity—are problematic for qualitative research. Because most qualitative research methods of analysis are concerned with the interpretation of data and the researcher’s role in this is explicitly acknowledged, the dichotomy between subjectivity and objectivity is not supportable. Rather, qualitative 11 researchers must demonstrate the methodological rigor of their work, and be clear and explicit in the claims made when research is written up or presented. This indicates that researchers need to use reflexivity throughout the research process to recognize the potential influence of the researcher(s) on the research design, participant selection, as well as data collection and interpretation (Hennink, Hutter, & Bailey, 2011). Indeed, as an orthodox Christian female individual,3 the researcher was sometimes perceived as an “outsider” by her participants due to her religion. To gain an insider’s perspective, the researcher used different techniques such as using a semistructured interview guide to prompt the data collection; employing careful listening skills; establishing rapport and trust with participants; creating a safe, comfortable environment for participants; asking questions in an open, unthreatening way and in a friendly colloquial manner; showing empathy toward participants; and motivating them to tell their stories in detail by using probes. For example, asking questions in a nonthreatening, friendly way included framing questions in a manner that was nonleading, using neutral language (rather than using emotive language) and using open-ended questions. In addition, throughout the research cycle, the researcher asked for feedback from the participants, and received critical remarks on the research design, which were implemented, thus enhancing the quality of the study. For example, the researcher found that interview questions posed in a more academic language were not immediately understandable by some participants and, thus, she decided to pose questions in colloquial language. Amending the language of the questions posed was important to get an insight into participants’ perceptions, emotions, feelings, and beliefs, and, thus, truly understand their experiences. Other aspects of the researcher’s identity also contributed to her “outsider” status 12 such as her Western style of dress. In this case, the leaders of the mosques, Muslim schools, and Islamic community centers (that the researcher visited to conduct the focus group interviews) advised her to dress and behave in a religiously and culturally appropriate manner when visiting these places. For example, the researcher was asked to dress modestly, including wearing a long loose dress (preferably black) and covering her hair with a hijab (headscarf) when conducting focus group sessions at mosques. The fact that the researcher conformed to this advice eased access to participants, and helped to develop trust and rapport with them. As Zubair, Martin, and Victor (2012) point out, researchers’ bodily appearances and bodily actions, adaptations, and interactions are important markers of their identity in the fieldwork. Okely (2007) suggests that researchers often have to learn to adapt their bodily performances and actions—including the way they dress— to fit in with, and be accepted among, those they are researching, especially when they are closely scrutinized and instructed. This demonstrates the important role the researcher’s body and behavior may play in developing (or hindering the development of) trust and rapport with participants. This discussion shows that research design needs to take into account the religious and cultural context of the community. Awareness of cultural and religious norms is vital for negotiating insider/outsider dynamics through showing respect for participants’ culture and religion. Street harassment Nature and extent 13 All the participants reported feeling unsafe in public spaces because of concerns that they were likely to be approached, intimidated, threatened, or attacked. Such concerns were based on previous experiences ranging from verbal and nonverbal street remarks to serious incidents of stalking and physical assaults. In particular, participants experienced verbal and nonverbal sexual harassment in public spaces. Participants reported that unknown men on the street made sexual comments and/or sexual noises at them (often accompanied by sexual gestures). In some cases, individuals asked them questions about their sexual life and/or their sexuality. Also, participants were subjected to wolf whistling, catcalling, and sexist jokes. The visibility of the niqab confounds public norms, partly because of the niqab’s message of sexual unavailability (Zempi & Chakraborti, 2014). This symbolism brings the veiled Muslim woman very visibly into the public sphere where she simply cannot walk by unnoticed. In this context, the niqab symbolizes the sexual “nonavailability” of Muslim women. As a result, men may find it difficult to forgive those who “disrupt” the “pattern of the masculine gaze” (Franks, 2000). Correspondingly, unknown men on the street often “demanded” that participants unveiled themselves by taking the niqab off, as indicated in the comments below. I want to cut that black thing off your face! (Halimah) Show me what you’re wearing under there! (Ruqiia) Give us a flash! (Alima) In the eyes of their harassers, veiled Muslim women participated in the public sphere to entertain and please men (Kissling & Kramarae, 1991). This led to participants feeling objectified and reduced to their body parts. As Kissling (1991) points out, 14 street harassment remarks often refer to parts of the body not available for public examination. Accordingly, participants were sometimes “challenged” by unknown men walking by on the street, who often assumed that women wore the niqab because they were “ugly,” as the following quotes demonstrate. What’s that on your face? Why are you covering it? (Sarah) Why do you have a mask on? Are you really ugly under there? (Focus group participant) If participants were traveling with their children, it was also common for unknown individuals to make comments such as, “Why are you covered up and your children are not covered up?” Performance of Gender Participants felt that performing gender inappropriately was key to triggering such comments, as indicated in the following focus group discussion. Participant A: We are very different to the average non-Muslim woman. We are doing everything that the media tells us we shouldn’t be doing in terms of how women should dress and behave. Participant B: In Western societies men are used to seeing women in all their glory really, aren’t they? I think men appreciate the fact that they can see a woman’s face and that they can see her figure. They probably feel deprived of this opportunity because they 15 can’t assess a Muslim woman in the same way that they can assess a Christian, Sikh or Hindu woman. Participant C: They just don’t want this image [of the veiled Muslim woman] to be out there because that image is not “pleasant” to the Western world, that image is not a symbol of the sexual exploitation of women. Participants also argued that performing gender “inappropriately” coupled with practicing Islam as pious Muslim women was seen as a symbol of segregation and unwillingness to “integrate” into British society. To this end, street harassers “punished” veiled Muslim women for their deviant behavior and assumed that veiling represented a rejection of Western values. It would be interesting to explore in a further study the extent to which other Muslim women experience this perception. Relatedly, this issue was debated in a focus group interview at an Islamic center. Participant A: If they get rid of Muslims then they will have a white Christian England. Participant B: I don’t think it is about being Christian. I think it’s about being like them. Hindu and Sikhs are brown. They are Asians but they drink, they go clubbing, women wear short skirts. They’ll do everything like them. It’s about socialising so they feel more integrated with them. They feel they are the same. Participant C: 16 You’re right, especially the drinking thing kind of unites them. They think “We might be different colours but we are the same, we drink, we club, we dress the same, we are mixing” but we as Muslims don’t do what they do. We dress differently. We say no to drinking. We won’t go clubbing. Yeah there are Muslims that do go but generally you won’t see that many Muslims going to clubs. Even if they go, you can’t tell that they are Muslim. Even we as Muslims can’t recognise them. If someone is not dressed as a Muslim you can’t tell if they are Muslim or not. In their research with veiled Muslim women, both Bullock (2002) and Abu-Lughod (2013) highlight Muslim women’s perceptions of the hijab and/or niqab as a form of emancipation and agency. Bullock (2002) states that Muslim women “whose grandmothers and mothers may have fought to uncover, started wearing the hijab and niqab” (p. 85). However, although freedom of choice and individual agency are among the most cherished values in contemporary Western societies, the woman who freely chooses to wear the niqab often provokes public hostility (Zempi & Chakraborti, 2014). The “refusal” of veiled Muslim women to conform to the expectation of being “the object of the gaze” constitutes a disruption of power relations in the public sphere. In this context, veiled Muslim women’s bodies become a medium on which to inscribe hostility and enmity (Perry, 2014). And, the body is, in the words of Eisenstein (2006), “a horribly powerful resource for those who wish to conquer, violate, humiliate, and shame” (p. 186). Like many women of color, Muslim women are sexualized, such that they are reduced to their bodies (Perry, 2014). This reflects a familiar dichotomy that characterizes their perceived identities. For White women, there is the Madonna/whore duality; for Black women, there is the Jezebel and Mammy distinction; whereas, for Muslim women, there is distinction between the 17 sexual belly dancer and the oppressed woman who is in need of saving (Perry, 2014). Furthermore, participants reported being subjected to name-calling, which would be difficult to define as sexual harassment per se; yet, this type of harassment is part of some Muslim women’s lived experiences of wearing the niqab in public places in the United Kingdom. To illustrate this, participants reported being used as a form of “entertainment.” For example, they were called names such as “Ninja,” “Catwoman,” “Batman,” “Darth Vader,” “Ghost woman,” “Bin bag,” “Letterbox,” “Postbox,” “Witch,” and “Walking Coffin.” Moreover, participants noted that they had been subjected to swearing such as “Fucking freak,” “Muslim bitch,” and “Muslim whore.” In addition, a couple of participants reported that people on the street sometimes took photographs of them (without asking their permission), whereas others revealed that they had been followed and/or stalked, illustrations of which are presented below. I was walking on the street [in London] and this guy was following me. He was saying “Come on show me your face, show me your face” and after a few streets I took my niqab off and showed him my face. I was so scared that I took it off. After a couple of streets down I put it back on again. (Salimah) I was walking in town [Leicester city centre] and this man followed me home. He saw I was a single woman in the house with a child. I didn’t have money to buy the curtains. He used to come and knock on the door. I told the Council what was going on and they gave me a house in another estate. (Johara) The Niqab as a Terrorist “Threat” 18 Veiled Muslim women not only are characterized as exotic and/or as oppressed but also are represented as mysterious, dangerous, and threatening (Perry, 2014). To this end, veiled Muslim women are perceived as “agents” of terrorism or as tools of Islamist terrorism aiming to infiltrate the West (Freedman, 2007). Participants were often perceived as a security or terrorist “threat.” In some cases, they were being called names such as “mothers of suicide bombers.” Also, the following comments demonstrate that veiling was perceived as a camouflage for a terrorist. Are you carrying belts full of explosives? (Jahidah) When are you going to blow us up? (Shelina) Why are you dressed like that? Are you a suicide bomber? (Amtullah) Physical Harm A minority of participants were victims of serious physical harm. They reported being pushed, slapped, spat at, shoved or had their niqabs pulled off by unknown men on the street. In some cases, they had things thrown at them (such as alcohol, water bombs, bottles, eggs, take-away food, rubbish, and stones) or they had a weapon (such as a knife) being used against them. Such incidents were demonstrated in Armstrong’s (2016) study of sex workers, which found that while they experienced the common forms of “low level” street harassment, they were more vulnerable to escalating abuse, which had more “sinister undertones” (p. 292). Armstrong’s research has connections with the current study because it also features women facing specific forms of street harassment because of what they represent. They share experiences of hostility and dehumanization as well as being at risk when in certain public spaces. Participants in the present study also reported incidents where 19 passing vehicles attempted to run them over. These findings show very strong similarities with qualitative research into the experiences of Muslim women who wear the niqab in other European countries, namely, Belgium, Denmark, France, and the Netherlands (Brems, 2014). For example, veiled Muslim women in the Netherlands reported regularly being confronted with people who scolded, insulted, or spat at them (Moors, 2009, 2014). Echoing these experiences, veiled Muslim women in France described a stream of violent insults in public places including being violently pushed, spat on, and having their niqab pulled off (Bouteldja, 2011). Participants noted that the typical perpetrator was male (and unknown to them). Specifically, participants’ accounts suggested that perpetrators were usually White men, aged between 16 and 25 years. However, participants argued that they were sometimes targeted by members of ethnic and racial minorities (including EU nationals) as well as from fellow Muslims. In the latter case, the abuse came from members of the Muslim community, who were “Westernized” or “nonpracticing” Muslims. However, it is important to note that Muslim women who do not veil are also subject to discrimination on the streets (Zempi & Chakraborti, 2014). In very few cases, where street harassers were female, this involved cases of verbal abuse and name-calling rather than physical violence or stalking. For Davis (1994), although women can and do in fact make comments to other women, a qualitative difference exists; women’s comments directed toward other women are not situated in the same place of power as are men’s comments. However, they do demonstrate an interesting perception of veiled Muslim women as performing gender differently and, perhaps, in a way that some female perpetrators do not like. The same situation was found in Armstrong’s (2016) study where sex workers reported some attacks from women, which might be evidence of an internalized misogyny and also a public 20 scolding of them “for stepping outside of the boundaries of acceptable female behavior” (p. 291). Finally, it is important to point out that such experiences were not one-off, discrete, or isolated incidents; rather, they were part of a process of being targeted in public. Relatedly, very few participants reported these experiences to the police. Participants gave a range of reasons for not reporting but the most popular reason was that they did not think it was serious enough to report. This was followed by concerns about being blamed and feeling ashamed/embarrassed about what had happened to them. Finally, some participants did not think that what had happened to them could be classed as a crime per se. Similarly, Larkin (1997) found that everyday incidents of street harassment were so normalized that they were rarely seen as “harassment.” Vera-Gray (2016) highlights the limitations of criminalizing behaviors that are extensions of commonly accepted gender relations. Street harassment: Impacts Geography and boundaries of safety The most significant impact on the lives of veiled Muslim women in the research was the increased level of fear or vulnerability that they felt. Sometimes, this fear would happen before even leaving the home and in the anticipation of going outside. Such experiences concur with other academic studies on street harassment, for example, the work of Ilahi who noted that the women described having to “psychologically prepare yourself to go out and run a simple errand” (Ilahi, 2009, p. 62). This level of preparation was commonly noted among participants in this study, who would evaluate the likelihood of attack based on a number of factors. Many identified that being in a non-Muslim area might make them more likely to be targeted because of 21 their visibility as practicing Muslim women. Some felt safer nearer home, although this depended upon previous experience of localized harassment. For example, one focus group participant noted that she had experienced criminal damage of her home and also threats of eggs being thrown at her when she left the house. So, for her, the immediate area surrounding her home was where she felt less safe. This awareness of geography and boundaries of safety has much in common with wider experiences of street harassment. Ilahi describes this as a “discursive negotiation” of urban space and this has the effect of excluding women from certain public spaces or at least impinging upon their free movement (Ilahi, 2009, p. 56). According to Davis (1994), street harassment genderizes the street by institutionalizing male privilege in, and “ownership” of, the public street, thereby excluding women. From this perspective, street harassment allows men to establish the boundaries that define women’s participation in the street. As such, street harassment excludes women by demarcating the street as “male space,” which maintains and perpetuates the public/private distinction in a gendered form (Davis, 1994). Bowman (1993) notes that street harassers create a hostile environment on the street, implicitly informing their targets that they are not “welcome.” From this perspective, to be a woman in public is to be available for men’s comments. Street harassment genderizes the street by distributing power in such a way that perpetuates and reinforces the gender hierarchy (MacKinnon, 1987). In light of this, the psychological pressures of running even a simple errand were significant (Ilahi, 2009). The participants in this study took safety seriously, but not only because of the fear of attack. A number of women felt that it was a central part of their religion. In one focus group, it was noted that “In Islam you have to look after yourself” and that “In our religion, we are supposed to keep ourselves safe.” This imperative 22 placed added pressure on the women as they weighed up how they might negotiate safe areas while honoring the tenets of their faith. Sexual Terrorism The findings show that street harassment produced an environment of sexual terrorism. This refers not only to the visibility of the Muslim woman wearing a niqab but also about perceived issues of vulnerability that women generally might possess. These perceptions were often connected to their feeling that attacking or removing the niqab was a form of sexual assault. As Maha notes, Taking the veil off is equal to rape really. I was walking down the street in the local area [Highfields, Leicester] and there were three white men in their early 20s. They took my niqab off from behind. I tried to conceal my face with my scarf and then when I tried to retrieve my niqab they wanted to take a look at me. They bent down to see what I looked like and then they chucked it on the floor. It is important to recognize that street harassment mirrors a larger system of sexual terrorism. Kissling (1991) defines sexual terrorism as a “system by which males frighten and, through fear, control and dominate females” (p. 456). As Davis (1994) points out, recognizing street harassment’s role in sexual terrorism is crucial to understanding its potential to harm. From this perspective, street harassment provokes in women a fear of rape, acting as a salient warning of the omnipresent threat of physical and/or sexual violence (Kissling, 1991). Regardless of whether there is the possibility of actual rape, street harassment reminds women of their vulnerability to sexual violence in general, and intensifies the fear of the possibility of rape (Davis, 1994). As a precursor to rape and an escalator of the fear of rape, street 23 harassment entraps women in a sexually terroristic environment (Davis, 1994). Iman concurred, suggesting that Although I don’t have any bruises to show from the assault, I am damaged and harmed inside as if I have been sexually assaulted. These comments demonstrate how important an intersectional understanding of women’s experiences is. In his study of Black lesbian experiences of street harassment, Fogg-Davis (2006) observes that street harassment, like rape, is about asserting male dominance over women in “situations where women appear vulnerable” (p. 65) and that it indicates an imbalance of power, which is “connected to systems of patriarchy, racism and homophobia” (Fogg-Davis, 2006, p. 74). For the women in the present study, the forced removal of the niqab was often tied to male entitlement—or the perpetrator’s frustration at the inability to visualize the female body. As mentioned earlier, participants spoke of men demanding “show me your face,” “give us a flash,” or “show me what you’re wearing under there.” Bowman (1993) writes that such invasions are like a rape, where someone is forced into your private space. Comments were often accompanied by catcalls, wolf whistles, and sexual noises. These inherently sexual and misogynistic incidents when accompanied by a physical removal of clothing demonstrate the intersections of religion and gender in the experiences of veiled Muslim women. As Fogg-Davis (2006) also notes, this simultaneous embodiment can mean that women are between categories of religion and gender and the complex psychological impacts are rarely attended to in policy or practice. We would suggest that the gendered nature of much hate crime is often overlooked by policy makers and practitioners, meaning that the nuances of the victim experience and their relative impacts can be missed. 24 Street harassment: Strategies Safety work In classic studies of street harassment, scholars have noted the myriad strategies that women employ in their attempts to avoid being victimized. Liz Kelly (1988) coined the phrase “safety work” to describe the preparations and coping strategies that all women employ when negotiating public space. Our participants invested considerable thought into their geographic movements. This was partly based on previous experience, demonstrating again how women bring their biographic experiences to their current fears of street harassment. Some participants decided to drive or take a bus or taxi (instead of walking) to avoid street harassment. In some cases, participants changed traveling routes and made decisions not to venture into the public on certain days/times. Some participants chose not to go out at all. The women interviewed for this research expressed strongly how their sense of identity was harmed not just by the incidents but by feeling compelled to unveil themselves. This had a very real impact on many women’s sense of self and identity. For example, a participant who advised her daughter not to wear the niqab on a trip to Paris said that it made her daughter “feel bad.” Another noted that the niqab is supposed to be a symbol of protection, but ironically to protect herself, she sometimes removed it. Participants did feel that they had committed a “sin,” which increased their feeling of self-blame and guilt. Tashia said, Since I took it off, it feels like I’ve committed a really big sin . . . I should have fought back, I shouldn’t have removed it. 25 As Laniya (2005) points out, a member of a minority group that is consistently marginalized, blamed, and victimized may be more likely to attribute the occurrence of street harassment to herself and see herself as the cause of such harm. Thus, this woman may internalize the blame that a dominant group has placed on her. When a person blames herself, she is less likely to identify an experience as injurious, and even if she does recognize the experience as injurious, she is less likely to externalize the harm and blame someone other than herself (Laniya, 2005). That stated, some participants felt judged from within their community for deciding to take it off as a safety measure. Yara expressed this sentiment: The ladies who wore niqabs were quite horrible to me. They judged me for taking it off. They said, “Oh that’s come off, so does that mean that everything else is coming off?” Such a sense of shame or lack of community support is not uncommon from women who alter their clothing to avoid street harassment. They too might feel a sense of letting their Muslim sisters down, or of being judged by others. As Bowman (1993) writes, the intent of street harassment is to remind women of their gender identity and this is achieved by teaching women to “associate their bodies with shame, fear and humiliation” (p. 541). For Muslim women, this is tied to decisions over where and when to wear the niqab, and what response this might glean from members of the public, their own family, or community. As such, it adds layers of complexity to their harm. As Ilahi (2009) has suggested, their social positions are interwoven into their experiences of negotiating public space. Managing Presentation of Self 26 Other strategies employed by participants included altering the niqab to manage the presentation of self. One focus group participant suggested that she would use a range of colors and sizes in her niqabs, so as not to appear “too black in the face.” Another said that she would use color because it looked “more friendly” and less “hostile.” In this regard, they were grappling with concerns not only over their desire to veil but also to avoid being attacked. For Davis (1994), street harassment forces women to alter their behavior, thus further oppressing women by denying them the opportunity to make an authentic choice of self. The denial of a woman’s “authentic choice of self” by externally imposing on her the conditions in which she lives is also perpetuated by the existence of stereotypes. For some White British Muslims, they would in fact cover more of their body to avoid being perceived as a “traitor” for supposedly “betraying” British values and Christianity by converting to Islam. Some participants noted that they would wear an additional eye veil and/or gloves to cover the color of their skin. A common practice among participants was to ignore, or pretend not to hear, a street harasser’s comments. Specifically, some participants, especially the young women who took part in the research, wore headphones to avoid hearing these comments. But as Davis (1994) points out, normally, when people talk to you, you do not ignore them. Thus, street harassment forces women to act in ways they would not otherwise act. Street harassment does not allow women to be themselves and to enjoy even the basic pleasures of everyday life (Rushin, 1983). A further strategy employed by many participants was the use of a male companion when in a public space. Griffin (1971) describes this as a “male protection racket,” with Bowman (1993) concurring that women are often actively encouraged to seek a male escort when moving about in public spaces. Our participants certainly demonstrated this, 27 with some saying “I never go to town alone” or “I prefer my husband to be with me” and “I don’t think I would go anywhere without my husband.” However, in some situations, this would exacerbate the abuse, especially if their husband was visibly Muslim, for example, by wearing a beard, Islamic cap, and jubba (Islamic dress for men). This need for a male companion has negative repercussions, in that it limits freedom of movement. One participant noted “I have to wait for my husband to come home from work to go somewhere.” Another expressed this feeling of “imprisonment” in the starkest terms: It feels like we are under house arrest. People have locked us up without realising it. Another participant now has agoraphobia, and so does not leave the house. What was evident was the acute irony of the situation. As one noted, People are being hypocritical in their argument that women in veil are oppressed because they oppress us. We are stuck at home all day. This theme of “imprisonment” is commonplace in literature on the impact of street harassment. Bowman describes this as the ghettoization of women that effectively confines women to the “private sphere of hearth and home” (Bowman, 1993, p. 520). Street harassment excludes women from public space, which they are entitled to share with men as equal citizens of the state (Laniya, 2005). As mentioned earlier, public places are designated as male space, and women must negotiate the terms and conditions upon which they may enter these spaces. This means that street harassment infringes upon the rights of veiled Muslim women as citizens in the United Kingdom. To escape harassment, they often must travel with a male companion or in groups; this restricts a woman’s autonomy by limiting her ability to 28 go to a place by herself if she so desires and further reaffirms the notion that men control women’s “rights to passage through public space” (Bowman, 1993, p. 30). Oppression is the “absence of choices”; street harassment oppresses veiled Muslim women by restricting their physical and geographical mobility, thereby denying them a right guaranteed to all citizens—the freedom of movement, a fundamental liberty of freedom (Bowman, 1993). Indeed, a fundamental aspect of liberty is mobility; yet, free exercise of mobility is denied to veiled Muslim women. This also harms them economically because it dissuades them from venturing into occupations that require them to work outside (Laniya, 2005). It also forces behavioral change and reduces women’s quality of life. Kissling (1991) argues that this is in fact the goal of street harassment, in that it acts as a form of social control. We would suggest that it acts on a number of levels. First, Muslim women think about modifying their clothing in public because they might want to feel that they “belong,” not just avoid being attacked. One participant discussed how her family disproves of the niqab anyway, and so, she did not wear it when visiting them because she did not want to be an outcast everywhere. In this sense, the home might not be a place where the women are not judged or harassed because family might reinforce the public negative views of the niqab. So they feel a double sense of judgment as Muslim women. Furthermore, their recourse to go out with a male companion not only makes them reliant on men but also does not always mean that they will not face abuse. If the man is wearing a traditional Islamic dress, then they might still face abuse. So the social control that is experienced by Muslim women exists along misogynistic and Islamophobic lines. As Neilsen has observed, members of different groups and backgrounds “face a strikingly different reality on the street than do members of privileged groups” (Neilsen, 2002, p. 279). As such, they have to “prioritise social 29 identities that are integral to their self-concepts and life experience” (Fogg-Davis, 2006, p. 59). Concluding thoughts – What next? The preceding discussion shows how street harassment, a seemingly “invisible” harm, hinders veiled Muslim women’s mobility, infringes on their access to public spaces, and even forces them to alter their behavior. To this end, veiled Muslim women feel excluded, dominated, oppressed, and violated. Acting as “public gatekeepers,” men establish the rules of veiled Muslim women’s participation in the public sphere, which further genderizes the street. In this respect, street harassment “punishes” veiled Muslim women who participate in the street for not performing gender appropriately. Typically, most men view the occurrence as harmless and even desired by women, whereas most women resign themselves to the inevitability of the acts and the absence of a vehicle to remedy such harm (Laniya, 2005). Nevertheless, there is potentially hope to address this problem. Policy has an important role to play in tackling street harassment. Nottinghamshire Police became recently the first force in the country to record harassment of women as a hate crime to tackle misogyny and street harassment. Since then, three police forces have agreed to begin recording misogyny as a hate crime and a number of other forces are looking into this. The video, Because I Am A Woman, which was launched by Nottingham Women’s Center and Nottinghamshire Police, includes testimony from Muslim women about their experiences of street harassment and has been used to raise awareness and as a training aid. There is now an emerging body of academic research that points toward the importance of recognizing intersectionality and multiple oppressions in victim experiences of hate crime (Zempi & Chakraborti, 2014). It is crucial that research that engages with the lived experience of intersectionality and street harassment continues. However, policy and research alone can only do so much to challenge Islamophobia and misogyny. It is crucial that continuing efforts include the involvement of Muslim women themselves and are culturally appropriate and sensitive. As Strid, Walby, and Armstrong (2013) note, multiple inequalities are only made more visible when minoritized women are involved in the policy-making process. This means 30 government and policy officials engaging with women themselves and for local community-based organizations to have a voice. Therefore, it is vital that policy makers and practitioners do not further the “othering” of Muslim women, but instead ensure their involvement at every stage. Future research should further examine the intersectionality between misogyny and Islamophobia, and inform policy accordingly. References Abu-Lughod, L. (2013). Do Muslim Women Need Saving? Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Abu-Ras, W. & Suarez, Z. (2009) ‘Muslim Men and Women’s Perception of Discrimination, Hate Crimes, and PTSD Symptoms Post 9/11’, Traumatology, 15(3), 48-63. Allen, C. (2015). ‘People hate you because of the way you dress’. Understanding the invisible experiences of veiled British Muslim women victims of Islamophobia. International Review of Victimology, 21(3), 287-301. Armstrong, L. 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(2016). The Casey Review: A Review into Opportunity and Integration. London: Crown. 31 ComRes. (2016). Ahmadi Muslims – Perceptions of the Caliphate, ComRes: Surrey. Retrieved from http://www.comresglobal.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/Ahmadi- Muslims_Perceptions-of-the-Caliphate.pdf Crenshaw, K. (1989). Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics. University of Chicago Legal Forum, 138-67. Crenshaw, K. (1991). Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence against Women of Color, Stanford Law Review, 43(6), 1241-1299. Curtis, B. & Curtis, C. (2011). Social Research. London: Sage. Davis, D. (1994). The Harm That Has No Name: Street Harassment, Embodiment, and African American Women. UCLA Women’s Law Review, 4, 133–78. Eisenstein, Z. (2006). Hatred written on the body. In P. Rothenberg (Ed.), Beyond borders (pp. 180–194). New York, NY: Worth Fogg-Davis, H. (2006). Theorizing Black Lesbians with Black Feminism: A Critique of Same-Race Street Harassment. Politics & Gender, 2, 57-76. Franks, M. (2000). Crossing the Borders of Whiteness? White Muslim Women who Wear the Hijab in Britain Today. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 23(5), 917-929. Freedman, J. (2007). Women, Islam and rights in Europe: Beyond a universalist/culturalist dichotomy. Review of Internationalist Studies, 33(1), 168–182 Gardner, C. B. (1995). Passing by: Gender and public harassment. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Glaser, B.G. (1992). Emergence vs Forcing: Basics of Grounded Theory Analysis. Mill Valley, CA: Sociology Press. Glaser, B. & Strauss, A. (1967). The discovery of grounded theory. Chicago: Aldine. Goffman, E. (1990). The presentation of self in everyday life. London: Penguin. Griffin, S. (1971). Rape: The All-American Crime. Oz, issue 41, pp28. Harris, A. P. (1990). Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory. Stanford Law Review, 42(3), 581-616. Hennink, M., Hutter, I. & Bailey, A. (2011). Qualitative Research Methods. London: Sage. Ilahi, N. (2009). Gendered Contestations: An Analysis of Street Harassment in Cairo and its Implications for Access to Public Spaces. Surfacing, 2(1), 56-69. http://www.aucegypt.edu/ResearchatAUC/rc/IGWS/GraduateCenter/Documents/Surfacing_Vol2-No1_05Ilahi.pdf http://www.aucegypt.edu/ResearchatAUC/rc/IGWS/GraduateCenter/Documents/Surfacing_Vol2-No1_05Ilahi.pdf 32 Kelly, L. (1988). Surviving sexual violence. Oxford: Polity Press. Kissling, E. (1991). Sexual harassment: The language of sexual terrorism. Discourse & Society, 2, 451-460. Kissling, E. & Kramarae, C. (1991). Stranger Compliments: The Interpretation of Street Remarks. Women’s Studies in Communication, 77-95. Laniya, O. (2005). Street Smut: Gender, Media, and the Legal Power Dynamics of Street Harassment, or Hey Sexy and Other Verbal Ejaculations. Columbia Journal of Gender and Law, 14(1), 91-142. Larkin, J. (1997). Sexual terrorism on the street: The moulding of young women into subordination. In A. M. Thomas, & C. Kitzinger (Eds.), Sexual harassment: Contemporary feminist perspectives (pp. 115-130). Buckingham: Open University Press. Lloyd, M. (2005). Beyond Identity Politics: Feminism, Power and Politics. UK: Sage. MacKinnon, C. (1987). Feminism Unmodified. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Moors, A. (2009). The Dutch and the Face-Veil: The Politics of Discomfort. Social Anthropology, 17(4), 393-408. Moors, A. (2014). Face veiling in the Netherlands: public debates and women’s narratives. In E Brems (Ed.), The Experiences of Face Veil Wearers in Europe and the Law (pp. 19-41). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Neilsen, L. (2002). Subtle, Pervasive, Harmful: Racist and Sexist Remarks in Public as Hate Speech. Journal of Social Issues, 58(2), 265-280. Okely, J. (2007). Fieldwork Embodied. In C Shilling (Ed.), Embodying Sociology: Retrospect, Progress and Prospects. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. Payne, S. (2004). Designing and conducting qualitative studies. In S. Michie, & C. Abraham (Eds.), Health psychology in practice (pp. 126-149). London: Routledge. Perry, B. (2014). Gendered Islamophobia: hate crime against Muslim women. Social Identities, 20, 74-89. Randall, M. (1987). Sexual harassment. Toronto: Ontario Women's Directorate. Rushin, D. K. (1983). The Tired Poem Last Letter from a Typical Unemployed Black Professional Woman. Cond, 79(5), 72-76. Sallah, M. (2010). The Ummah and Ethnicity: Listening to the Voices of African Heritage Muslims in Leicester. Leicester: Leicester City Council. Spelman, E. V. (1990). Inessential Woman. London: The Women’s Press. 33 Strid, S., Walby, S. & Armstrong, J. (2013). Intersectionality and Multiple Inequalities: Visibility in British Policy on Violence Against Women. Social Politics, 20(4), 558- 581. Tuerkheimer, D. (1997). Street harassment as sexual subordination: The phenomenology of gender-specific harm. Wisconsin Women's Law Journal, 12, 167- 206. Vera-Gray, F. (2016). Men’s Stranger Intrusions: Re-thinking Street Harassment. Women’s Studies International Forum, 58, 9-17. Wise, S., & Stanley, L. (1987). Georgie Porgie: Sexual harassment in everyday life. London: Pandora Press. Young, I. M. (1990). Justice and the politics of difference. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Zubair, M., Martin, W. & Victor, C. (2012). Embodying gender, age, ethnicity and power in 'the field': reflections on dress and the presentation of the self in research with older Pakistani Muslims. Sociological Research Online, 17(3). http://www.socresonline.org.uk/17/3/21.html. http://www.socresonline.org.uk/17/3/21.html 
work_7btcetgqefeljgluigyyv5se3i	----	CJHE / RCES Volume 49, No. 2, 2019 Book Reviews / Comptes Rendus 118 Book Reviews / Comptes Rendus Stead, Virginia (Ed.) (2017). A Guide to LGBTQ+ Inclusion on Campus, Post-PULSE. New York: Peter Lang. Pages: 340. Price: 54.95 USD (paper). Reviewed by Kristin Hocker, Assistant Professor of Clinical Nursing, University of Rochester School of Nursing. On June 12, 2016, the world awoke to news of the mass shooting at PULSE nightclub, a haven for the LGBTQ+ community in Orlando, Florida, and attempted to make sense of the senseless through their collective grief, fear, and outrage. In A Guide to LGBTQ+ Inclusion on Campus, Post-PULSE, volume seven in Virginia Stead’s Equity in Higher Education series, the authors make sense of tragedy by contributing personal stories and strategies to inspire colleges and universities to incorporate LGBTQ+ inclusive practices on their campuses. While the title refers to post-PULSE LGBTQ+ inclusion, the book’s premise is to “transform LGBTQ+ exclusion into inclusion” (p.1). This call to action recognizes that exclusion has existed before PULSE occurred and is symptomatic of the persistent influences of heterosexism, homophobia, genderism, and racism that culminate both in monumental tragedies such as the PULSE shooting, as well as daily experiences of marginalization that contribute to an ongoing uncertainty of safety and sense of belonging. A Guide to LGBTQ+ Inclusion on Campus, Post-PULSE responds to this Canadian Journal of Higher Education Revue canadienne d’enseignement supérieur Volume 49, No. 2, 2019, pages 118 - 122 Book Reviews / Comptes Rendus 119 CJHE / RCES Volume 49, No. 2, 2019 call for action with a blend of autoethnographic narratives, case studies, and equity-conscious strategies that address the systemic and interpersonal manifestations of oppression and build inclusive practices. The book divides 24 chapters into six major sections, including an afterword and the authors’ profiles. Given the number of chapters, in this review I will highlight the chapters that best reflect each section’s theme. The book begins with a moving memorial to the 49 souls whose lives were taken in the PULSE tragedy, grounding the book’s purpose and urgency for action. Warren Blumenfeld then provides a brief, historical landscape in the book’s forward, using his personal coming out story to illustrate significant changes of LGBTQ+ inclusivity over the past 50 years. Ending on a hopeful note, he acknowledges the need for solidarity in the struggle for advancing LGBTQ+ equity. The first section (Chapters 1-4) expands the idea of campus beyond classrooms, quads and resident halls to include often overlooked areas that also compose a campus, including its neighboring community. Robin Fox and Erica Schepp (Chapter 2) consider the impact of incorporating LGBTQ+ inclusive topics within a campus children’s center curriculum as a means of affirming and normalizing the experiences of children whose families identify along the spectrum. Dominic Grasso and Traci Baxley (Chapter 3) propose that LGBTQ+ inclusive curriculum in early children’s education could encourage children to become more self-reflective and engaged in their communities while developing strategies to disrupt bullying. The authors imagine the impact of inclusive early education on families and the capacity to generate a widespread cultural practice of disrupting inequity. Section Two (Chapters 5-8) examines the multiple ways exclusion occurs on campus and the ideological underpinnings of exclusion. Both valerie guerrero and Kari Dockendorff (Chapter 5) and S. Gavin Weiser and Travis Wagner (Chapter 6) reveal the power dynamics that emerge between institutional decision makers and the institutional community members when universities fail CJHE / RCES Volume 49, No. 2, 2019 Book Reviews / Comptes Rendus 120 to support their stakeholders’ interests for inclusion. Using cases such as bestowing honorary degrees on individuals associated with hate groups, the authors caution institutions to consider how such actions can contradict their commitment for inclusion, and instead maintain the status quo of heteronormativity. Wahinkpe Topa (Chapter 7) highlights the ideological underpinning of discrimination by challenging the religious doctrines that instigate the idea that LGBTQ+ identities are unnatural. He provides a counter-narrative using an Indigenous worldview to describe the existence of two-spirit as a reflection of nature’s balance that embraces alternative sexual identities. The authors in Section Three (Chapters 9-12) use autoethnography to share their narratives of exclusion, while reflecting on their multiple identities and their ability to be authentically present within the spaces they occupy, specifically noting their shifted sense of safety and belonging in their immediate communities after PULSE. Sarah Pickett (Chapter 9) explores the political nature of her queer identity in relation to being a parent and educator, while reflecting on her need for her children’s school and the campus where she is employed to have demonstrated an “ethics of care” (p. 99) by acknowledging the tragedy the morning after, thus signaling her visibility. Karen Huchting, Jill Bickett, and Emily Fisher (Chapter 13) and Angela Clark-Taylor, Kaitlin Legg, Carissa Cardenas, and Rachael Rehage (Chapter 14) contribute to Section Four’s focus on building LBGTQ+ inclusive leadership education and training. In Chapter 13, the authors suggest incorporating curricular approaches to teach about heterosexism and how it operates, as a means for educational leaders to deconstruct heterosexual privilege in their work and lives. The authors in Chapter 14 introduce a new acronym, “minortized identities of sexuality and gender” (MIoSG) (p. 157), and champion for integrating MIoSG topics into student affairs education programs, preparing professionals to better serve students along the spectrum. Section Five (Chapters 15-18) transitions from investigating Book Reviews / Comptes Rendus 121 CJHE / RCES Volume 49, No. 2, 2019 personal experiences with exclusion towards focusing on institutional practices of inclusion by exploring the external and internal influences that motivate institutions to adopt LGBTQ+ inclusive policies. Using the case of George Washington University’s (GW) response to hate crimes, Carol Kochhar-Bryant (Chapter 15) applies an equity-minded conceptual framework to describe GW’s efforts in revisiting and fixing their practices, policies, and expectations to remedy the effects of hate crimes on their community (p. 185). The adoption of inclusive policies in turn contributed to increasing resources for student support, and the incorporation of academic programming. For Nicole Bedera and Kristjane Nordmeyer (Chapter 17) equity occurs when colleges adopt a victim-centered approach to providing support to queer survivors of sexual assault by focusing on the students’ needs while restructuring practices, resources, and spaces that could ensure safety for LGBTQ+ survivors. Lastly, the authors in Section Six (Chapters 19-24) provide examples of incorporating LGBTQ+ inclusive pedagogy with the goal of eradicating marginalization. Brandon Beck, Katherine Lewis, and Susan Croteau (Chapter 20) propose using critical pedagogy to frame gender-complex education that can render transgender identities visible. In Chapter 21, Laura Gentner and Kristen Altenau Keen promote incorporating activities within ally training in which participants practice active allyship, shifting from the passive notion of ally as identity, toward ally as a verb. Pamela Ross McClain (Chapter 24) concludes the section reminding readers of the book’s purpose by listing the names and ages of the 49 who were killed. This book serves as a useful resource for professionals in higher education seeking to transform exclusion into inclusion on their campuses, either as scholar-practitioners, staff who coordinate programming or services, or student leaders seeking ways to be inclusive. The use of personal narratives emphasizes that the personal is political and that inclusive practices provide members of our institutional community a sense of safety in spaces where they can thrive. CJHE / RCES Volume 49, No. 2, 2019 Book Reviews / Comptes Rendus 122 While the book was expansive in its diverse range of voices, there is always the risk in knowing that not all identities and their perspectives are included. Subsequent volumes might consider which identities still need to be heard. This may include addressing the absence of identities along the acronym who tend be overlooked, with consideration to how their narratives might contribute to the wealth of knowledge needed to transform campuses. Regardless of the gaps, A Guide to LGBTQ+ Inclusion on Campus, Post-PULSE is a beneficial resource for anyone eager to enact LGBTQ+ inclusion on their campus. 
work_7d6zifylezd2nihqezbczuloie	----	Relation between College Students’ Conservatism and Negative Stereotypes about Social Groups $ € £ ¥ social sciences Article Relation between College Students’ Conservatism and Negative Stereotypes about Social Groups Sylvia Beyer Department of Psychology, University of Wisconsin-Parkside, Kenosha, WI 53141, USA; beyer@uwp.edu Received: 22 October 2020; Accepted: 1 December 2020; Published: 4 December 2020 ���������� ������� Abstract: This study examined the interrelations among political attitudes and negative stereotypes in U.S. undergraduates. Participants answered questions measuring conservatism, social dominance orientation, Global Belief in a Just World, and religiosity. This research employed two measures of stereotypes: modern sexism and feelings about 15 social groups. It was hypothesized that conservatives would show more evidence of negative stereotypes than liberals would. The study revealed that indeed conservatives show stronger evidence of negative stereotypes, but that liberals also harbor some biases. Importantly, the social groups against whom conservatives and liberals are stereotyped differed greatly. Conservatives showed considerably more negative stereotypes against racial and religious minorities, and particularly against those who do not identify with the cis-gender, heterosexual norm. Thus, the targets of conservatives’ stereotypes were groups that have traditionally been subject to discrimination. Liberals held stronger stereotypes against groups that are more politically powerful, such as Caucasians and Christians. Keywords: stereotypes; prejudice; political attitudes; conservatism 1. Relation between College Students’ Conservatism and Negative Stereotypes about Social Groups The USA is currently experiencing strong political polarization with increasing tensions among social groups from different racial or ethnic backgrounds, political affiliations, religions, or sexual orientations and identities (e.g., Crandall et al. 2018). Furthermore, “fake news” has become a buzzword amid justified concerns about the weaponizing of social media by governments and political groups. This provides fertile ground for social psychological research on the relation between political attitudes and negative stereotypes in U.S. undergraduates. This paper examines the relations among political attitudes, personality variables, and negative stereotypes. The Relation between Political Attitudes and Negative Stereotypes about Social Groups Much social psychological research immediately after World War II focused on the dangers of right-wing authoritarianism’s relation to cognitive biases and prejudice (e.g., Adorno et al. 1950). After the cognitive revolution in psychology, this area of research lay dormant for several decades. During this millennium, there has been a resurgence of interest in psychology in the relation between political attitudes and prejudice. Recent research in the U.S. has found that conservative compared to liberal political views are associated with greater prejudice, a phenomenon referred to as “prejudice gap” by Chambers et al. (2013). For example, social conservatism, i.e., holding conservative views of social issues such as abortion or lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, or queer (LGBTQ) rights, correlates with higher levels of racial prejudice and homophobia (Hodson and Dhont 2015). According to Jost et al. (2018, p. 69) “conservatives engage in more heuristic, automatic, stereotypical [ . . . ] thinking, whereas liberals engage in more systematic, controlled, effortful [ . . . ] thinking.” Conservatives’ cognitive shortcuts in information processing could then lead to biases towards social groups. Soc. Sci. 2020, 9, 224; doi:10.3390/socsci9120224 www.mdpi.com/journal/socsci http://www.mdpi.com/journal/socsci http://www.mdpi.com https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5697-7636 http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/socsci9120224 http://www.mdpi.com/journal/socsci https://www.mdpi.com/2076-0760/9/12/224?type=check_update&version=2 Soc. Sci. 2020, 9, 224 2 of 15 Related to conservatism is social dominance orientation (SDO), which is conceptualized as a “general attitudinal orientation toward intergroup relations, reflecting whether one generally prefers such relations to be equal, versus hierarchical” (Pratto et al. 1994, p. 742). SDO predicts prejudice towards outgroups as those high in SDO value power and dominance and who see the social world as replete with competition (Hodson and Dhont 2015). Conservatism also correlates with Global Belief in a Just World (GBJW; Dittmar and Dickinson 1993), the notion that good things happen to good people and bad things to bad people. In a nutshell, GBJW serves to justify the status quo; for example, poor people are perceived as lazy and hence deserving of their lot, and shootings of people of color are deemed justified when people of color are perceived to be innately aggressive. In summary, researchers have found evidence that politically conservative individuals and those high in SDO and GBJW tend to hold unempathetic, domineering, and negative stereotypical attitudes towards racial and sexual minorities. However, more recently, the view that political conservatives, more so than liberals, display information processing biases and negative stereotypes against social groups, has been challenged. A meta-analysis by Ditto et al. (2018) found that liberals and conservatives showed similar information processing biases (but see the critique of this study by Baron and Jost 2019). Similarly, according to Brandt et al. (2014) and Chambers et al. (2013), conservatives and liberals show similarly negative stereotypes, which tend to be directed against those with opposing viewpoints. For example, Crawford and Brandt (2019) demonstrated that in the US liberals were also biased, viz., against conservatives. Furthermore, conservatives and liberals alike supported discrimination against individuals who violated their values (Wetherell et al. 2013). Thus, this strand of research suggests that individuals with strong political convictions, regardless of their specific political leanings, are biased against those with opposing viewpoints, i.e., outgroups. Brandt et al. (2014) labeled this the “ideological-conflict hypothesis.” This in-group bias would also be predicted by social identity theory (e.g., Tajfel 1982). Similarly, the similarity-liking principle (Byrne 1971) also posits that we like those who hold similar values to our own and dislike those who hold values that do not coincide with our own. Thus, according to one research strand, political conservatism more so than liberalism brings with it an inclination to view outgroups negatively. An opposing strand of research claims that negatively viewing outgroups is not a hallmark of conservatism, but rather a phenomenon to which liberals fall prey as well, since it represents the general phenomenon of in-group bias. In a nutshell, the question is whether ingroup bias is equally prevalent in conservatives and liberals or whether it mostly falls within the province of conservatism. Much of the previous research only examined political groups’ stereotypes against a few groups (for an exception see Chambers et al. 2013), which can easily lead to confounding stereotypes against a social group (e.g., a racial minority) with antipathy towards that group’s supposed political ideology (e.g., African Americans’ liberalism) (see Brandt et al. 2014). The present research was designed to address whether conservatives and liberals show similar levels of negative stereotypes, only differing in the social groups against which they are biased, viz., those most at odds with their beliefs, by examining stereotypes against 15 different social groups. The goal was to include a variety of social groups that align with either conservative or liberal ideologies. Furthermore, this study assessed whether SDO and GBJW also correlate with stereotypes about certain social groups. Religiosity may also be tied to negative feelings about certain social groups (Hodson and Dhont 2015). To further our understanding of the relations among political attitudes, religiosity, and stereotypes of social groups, this study also assessed college students’ religiosity and religious affiliations. Recent research on the relation between political attitudes and the Big Five personality factors has found that conservative individuals tend to score lower on openness to new experiences and higher on conscientiousness, whereas liberals tend to be higher on openness and lower on conscientiousness (Carney et al. 2008; Crawford and Brandt 2019; Hirsh et al. 2010; Jost et al. 2007). Do these personality factors also correlate with holding negative stereotypes of social groups? One Big Five personality factor has recently come under scrutiny for its possible role in stereotyping. Research suggests that those Soc. Sci. 2020, 9, 224 3 of 15 who are low in agreeableness tend to hold generally prejudiced views against several social groups (Brandt and Crawford 2019; Crawford and Brandt 2019; Sibley and Duckitt 2008). A meta-analysis has also linked low openness to new experiences to prejudice (Sibley and Duckitt 2008). The connection between political attitudes, negative stereotypes about social groups, and personality is far from settled. For this reason, this study endeavored to assess the relation between political attitudes, the Big Five, and stereotyping. It was hypothesized that conservative individuals would display more negative stereotypes than liberal individuals, especially towards disadvantaged social groups. Furthermore, the study also predicts that individuals high in SDO, GBJW, and religiosity show more negative stereotypes. The study also endeavored to examine the relation between Big Five factors and stereotypes, predicting that those lower in agreeableness would hold more negative stereotypes about certain social groups. 2. Method 2.1. Participants A total of 115 introductory psychology students from a small, public university in the Midwest of the US participated during the fall 2017 and spring 2018 semesters. The students’ average age was 19.9 (range of 18 to 49) years. Gender identification was reported by 114 students (67 females, 46 males, 1 other) and race identification by 115 students (64 Caucasian, 17 Multi-racial, 16 African American, 9 Hispanic1, 6 Asian, 2 Native Americans, and 1 other). Students also reported their religious affiliations (73 Christian, 21 Atheist or Agnostic, 10 non-religious, 7 other, and 3 Muslim). Participants received course credit for their participation. 2.2. Materials Measures of conservatism, SDO, GBJW, religiosity, and personality. The Social and Economic Conservatism Scale (SECS) contains 12 items (Everett 2013). It allows participants to rank their feelings on social issues on a scale from zero (greater negativity) to 100 (greater positivity). The SECS is subdivided into two subscales: social and economic conservatism. Social conservatism items include attitudes toward abortion, military and national security, religion, traditional marriage, traditional values, the family unit, and patriotism. Items measuring economic conservatism relate to attitudes toward limited government, welfare benefits, gun ownership, fiscal responsibility, and business. Reliabilities of the SECS range from 0.70 to 0.87 (Everett 2013). The scale measuring social dominance orientation (SDO; Ho et al. 2015) is also split into two subscales; dominance and anti-egalitarianism. Each subscale consists of eight statements. For this study, participants responded on a scale from zero (strongly disagree) to seven (strongly agree). The dominance subscale includes statements such as “some groups of people must be kept in their place” and “an ideal society requires some groups to be on top and others to be on the bottom” (Ho et al. 2015). The anti-egalitarianism subscale includes statements such as “we should not push for group equality” and “it is unjust to try to make groups equal” (Ho et al. 2015). Reliabilities for the dominance portion of the SDO scale range from 0.59 to 0.80, and for the anti-egalitarianism portion from 0.68 to 0.86 (Ho et al. 2015). Because the results for the two sub-scales were almost identical, the two sub-scales were averaged into an overall SDO score. A Likert scale was used to assess “self-identified conservatism”, ranging from 1 (very liberal) to 7 (very conservative). Religiosity was assessed on a Likert scale from 1 (not religious) to 7 (very religious). Both of these items were at the very end of the survey, embedded among the demographic questions. 1 Although Hispanic is officially considered an ethnicity rather than a race, so many of our participants spontaneously typed in “Hispanic” under the racial category “Other” that I decided to honor this self-categorization. Soc. Sci. 2020, 9, 224 4 of 15 Global Belief in a Just World (GBJW; Lipkus 1991) is a seven-item scale where participants rank their feelings about statements on a scale from one (strongly disagree) to six (strongly agree). Statements on the scale include “I feel that people get what they are entitled to have” and “I feel that the world is a fair place” (Lipkus 1991). Reliabilities for GBJW range from 0.79 to 0.82 (Lipkus 1991). The Big Five Inventory (BFI) was used to assess participants’ extraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, neuroticism, and openness to new experiences (John et al. 2008). It consists of 44 trait self-descriptors, such as “talkative”, “does a thorough job”, and “is a reliable worker”. For our purposes, participants indicated the extent to which they agreed or disagreed with each statement on a scale from zero to five. Reliabilities for the BFI range from 0.79 to 0.87 (John et al. 2008). Measures of stereotypes towards social groups. The study employed two separate measures of stereotypes. One measure was the Modern Sexism Scale, which consists of eight statements that assess participants’ level of sexism (Swim et al. 1995). Participants used a scale of zero (strongly disagree) to five (strongly agree). Examples of statements are “discrimination against women is no longer a problem in the U.S.” and “women often miss out on good jobs due to sex discrimination” (reverse scored) (Swim et al. 1995). Reliabilities for the modern sexism score range from 0.75 to 0.84 (Swim et al. 1995). A second measure of stereotypes involved asking participants about their feelings about 15 social groups (African Americans, Asians, atheists, Catholics, Caucasians, Democrats, female homosexuals, fundamentalist Christians, Hispanics, Jews, male homosexuals, men, Muslims, Republicans, and women). This study endeavored to use a variety of social groups representing individuals from different political, gender, racial, religious, and sexual orientation groups. Furthermore, this study included social groups that may be viewed positively or negatively by liberals and conservatives. Participants were asked to rate their feelings about each group from 0 (very cold and negative) to 100 (very warm and positive). Demographic questions. Participants answered demographic questions about their gender, race, ethnicity, age, political identification, and religious affiliation. For the non-US reader, it should be noted that the U.S. is mostly a two-party country, with Democrats being more liberal and Republicans more conservative. University students tend to be more liberal than the general population. 2.3. Procedure Participants were informed that their responses would be anonymous. They filled out a hard copy of the informed consent form prior to beginning the survey on computers, ensuring that they believed assurances about anonymity, as there was no way to link their identity to their responses. Each participant completed the Qualtrics survey on a computer in a group setting. The survey took about 35 minutes to complete. Students were allowed to discontinue their participation at any time. After completing the survey, participants were thanked and awarded class credit. 3. Results To facilitate presentation of the results, some statistical information (such as degrees of freedom or F-values) are not included in the paper, but are available upon request. 3.1. Political Affiliation The two most common political identifications were Democrat (33%) or no political affiliation (33%), followed by Republican (18.3%), Other (7.8%), Libertarian (6.1%), and Green party (1.7%). To determine if there was a gender gap in political affiliation, a chi-square analysis by gender and the three most prevalent party choices (Democrat, no party affiliation, Republican) was conducted. This analysis was not significant. Women compared to men were equally likely to identify as Democrat (37.9% vs. 41%), Republican (22.4% vs. 20.5%), or to have no party affiliation (39.7% and 38.5%). Soc. Sci. 2020, 9, 224 5 of 15 3.2. Intercorrelations among Conservatism, Religiosity, GBJW, SDO, and the Big Five See Table 1 for correlations among conservatism, religiosity, GBJW, SDO, and the Big Five. Self-identified conservatism (the one-item Likert scale item) was correlated with both social and economic conservatism, religiosity, GBJW, SDO, and neuroticism. Social conservatism was correlated with economic conservatism, religiosity, GBJW, and SDO. Economic conservatism was correlated with religiosity and extraversion. Religiosity was correlated with SDO. GBJW was correlated with SDO and conscientiousness. All Big Five dimensions were highly intercorrelated. 3.3. Interrelations among Measures of Stereotypes: Modern Sexism and Feelings about Social Groups Individuals were asked about their feelings about 15 social groups (African Americans, Asians, atheists, Catholics, Caucasians, Democrats, female homosexuals, fundamentalist Christians, Hispanics, Jews, male homosexuals, men, Muslims, Republicans, and women). As Table 2 shows, feelings for 14 of the 15 groups were significantly intercorrelated, indicating that participants who rated one social group positively tended to rate the other social groups positively as well. The only exception was for participants’ feelings about Republicans, which did not correlate with feelings about African Americans, Democrats, female or male homosexuals, or women. Participants who scored high on modern sexism tended to have more negative feelings about Democrats, Hispanics, female and male homosexuals, and women, but rated Republicans more favorably. 3.4. Interrelations among Conservatism, Religiosity, GBJW, SDO, Big Five, and Measures of Stereotypes See Table 3 for correlations among conservatism, religiosity, GBJW, SDO, Big Five, and the two measures of stereotypes (modern sexism and feelings about social groups). Self-identified conservatism. Participants high in self-identified conservatism compared to those who self-identified as more liberal scored much higher on modern sexism. They also had more negative feelings for African Americans, atheists, Democrats, female and male homosexuals, Hispanics, and Muslims, but felt more positively about Republicans. Social conservatism. Participants who scored high on social conservatism scored higher on modern sexism. They also had more negative feelings for atheists, Democrats, and female and male homosexuals. Conversely, participants who scored high on social conservatism rated Catholics, Caucasians, fundamentalist Christians, and Republicans more favorably than did participants low in social conservatism. Economic conservatism. Participants who scored high rather than low on economic conservatism had more negative feelings about atheists and female and male homosexuals. Conversely, participants who scored high on economic conservatism felt more positively about Catholics, fundamentalist Christians, and men. Religiosity. Participants high in religiosity were higher in modern sexism and had less favorable feelings for atheists, Democrats, and female and male homosexuals. GBJW. Those high in GBJW had much higher modern sexism scores. Participants who scored high on the GBJW scale also felt more negatively about African Americans, Democrats, female and male homosexuals, Hispanics, Muslims, and women, but rated Republicans more favorably. Social Dominance Orientation (SDO). Individuals high in SDO scored higher on modern sexism. SDO correlated negatively with feelings about African Americans, Asians, atheists, Democrats, female and male homosexuals, Hispanics, Jews, Muslims, and women. Big Five. Modern sexism was correlated with conscientiousness. Agreeableness correlated with feelings about Asians, Caucasians, men, and women. Conscientiousness correlated with feelings about men and women. Neuroticism correlated with feelings about Jews and Muslims. Soc. Sci. 2020, 9, 224 6 of 15 Table 1. Correlations among modern sexism, conservatism, religiosity, Global Belief in a Just World (GBJW), social dominance orientation (SDO), and the Big Five Self-Identified Con. 0.45 *** Social Conservatism 0.38 *** 0.63 *** Economic Conserv. 0.09 0.31 ** 0.64 *** Religiosity 0.24 * 0.32 ** 0.41 *** 0.41 *** GBJW 0.45 *** 0.46 *** 0.31 ** 0.08 0.04 SDO 0.28 ** 0.43 *** 0.25 ** 0.04 0.20 * 0.49 *** Agreeableness −0.03 0.03 −0.01 −0.01 −0.04 0.02 −0.05 Conscientiousness 0.20 * 0.15 0.15 0.13 0.02 0.34 *** 0.03 0.39 *** Extroversion 0.04 0.17 0.16 0.22 * 0.10 0.07 0.01 0.38 *** 0.36 *** Neuroticism −0.09 −0.26 ** −0.12 0.13 0.04 0.00 −0.06 0.43 *** 0.21 * 0.26 ** Openness New Ex. 0.07 0.03 0.13 0.12 0.10 0.04 0.00 0.35 *** 0.20 * 0.49 *** 0.50 *** Modern Sexism Selfidentified Conservatism Social Conservatism Economic Conservatism Religiosity GBJW SDO Agreeableness Conscientiousness Extroversion Neuroticism Notes. * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.0001. Table 2. Correlations among the stereotype measures, feelings about social groups and modern sexism. Asians 0.80 *** Atheists 0.50 *** 0.53 *** Catholics 0.44 *** 0.66 *** 0.29 ** Caucasians 0.51 *** 0.66 *** 0.40 *** 0.56 *** Democrats 0.51 *** 0.39 *** 0.49 *** 0.26 ** 0.22 * Lesbians 0.53 *** 0.57 *** 0.67 *** 0.22 * 0.33 *** 0.59 *** Fundamentalist Christians 0.41 *** 0.49 *** 0.22 * 0.67 *** 0.46 *** 0.23 * 0.25 ** Hispanics 0.78 *** 0.79 *** 0.54 *** 0.57 *** 0.66 *** 0.50 *** 0.57 *** 0.47 *** Jews 0.67 *** 0.78 *** 0.52 *** 0.58 *** 0.69 *** 0.46 *** 0.55 *** 0.50 *** 0.78 *** Male homosexuals 0.58 *** 0.51 *** 0.68 *** 0.22 * 0.33 *** 0.62 *** 0.89 *** 0.26 ** 0.59 *** 0.58 *** Men 0.56 *** 0.58 *** 0.23 * 0.42 *** 0.67 *** 0.31 ** 0.33 *** 0.45 *** 0.64 *** 0.59 *** 0.31 ** Muslims 0.72 *** 0.74 *** 0.55 *** 0.50 *** 0.47 *** 0.55 *** 0.66 *** 0.43 *** 0.75 *** 0.80 *** 0.70 *** 0.55 *** Republicans 0.17 0.35 *** 0.20 * 0.56 *** 0.59 *** −0.08 0.08 0.60 *** 0.30 *** 0.37 *** 0.07 0.47 *** 0.24 * Women 0.71 *** 0.66 *** 0.33 *** 0.34 *** 0.46 *** 0.40 *** 0.49 *** 0.34 *** 0.66 *** 0.66 *** 0.46 *** 0.64 *** 0.67 *** 0.13 Modern Sexism −0.15 −0.04 −0.07 0.10 0.16 −0.22 * −0.22 * 0.03 −0.04 −0.11 −0.27 ** 0.08 −0.16 0.29 ** −0.23 * African Americans Asians Atheists Catholics Caucasians Democrats Female Homosexuals Fundamentalist Christians Hispanics Jews Male Homosexuals Men Muslims Republicans Women Notes. * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.0001. Soc. Sci. 2020, 9, 224 7 of 15 Table 3. Correlations among the stereotype measures, conservatism, religiosity, GBJW, SDO, and the Big Five. Modern Sexism −0.15 −0.04 −0.07 0.10 0.16 −0.22 * −0.22 * 0.03 −0.04 −0.11 −0.27 ** 0.08 −0.16 0.29 ** −0.23 * Self-identified Conservatism −0.22 * −0.14 −0.33 *** 0.12 0.11 −0.59 *** −0.44 *** 0.17 −0.22 * −0.17 −0.47 *** 0.11 −0.28 ** 0.45 *** −0.17 Social Conservatism −0.05 0.04 −0.30 ** 0.35 *** 0.18 * −0.38 *** −0.41 *** 0.27 ** 0.04 0.00 −0.40 *** 0.15 −0.10 0.43 *** −0.03 Economic Conserv. 0.06 0.08 −0.31 ** 0.27 ** 0.04 −0.04 −0.28 ** 0.21 * 0.03 0.13 −0.24 * 0.22 * 0.14 0.14 0.13 Religiosity −0.07 −0.01 −0.39 *** 0.08 −0.05 −0.23 * −0.41 *** 0.12 0.14 −0.02 −0.38 *** 0.08 −0.11 0.11 −0.09 GBJW −0.22 * −0.16 −0.16 0.02 0.11 −0.35 *** 0.11 −0.28 ** −0.20 * −0.16 −0.23 * 0.00 −0.24 ** 0.30 ** −0.27 ** SDO −0.36 *** −0.31 ** −0.35 *** −0.06 −0.10 −0.42 *** −0.47 *** −0.10 −0.32 ** −0.32 ** −0.43 *** −0.10 −0.38 *** 0.10 −0.26 ** Agreeableness 0.13 0.22 * 0.08 0.14 0.22 * −0.03 0.08 0.08 0.05 0.18 0.00 0.24 * 0.15 0.13 0.20 * Conscientious-ness 0.08 0.15 0.07 0.08 0.12 0.00 0.06 0.05 0.01 0.13 −0.02 0.21 * 0.09 0.09 0.21 * Extroversion 0.10 0.04 −0.06 0.06 −0.07 0.01 −0.03 0.07 −0.05 0.06 −0.04 0.07 0.11 0.02 0.18 Neuroticism 0.04 0.17 0.05 0.10 0.03 0.12 0.14 0.08 0.05 0.21 * 0.14 0.01 0.19 * −0.13 0.04 Openness to New Experien. 0.00 0.13 0.04 0.13 0.09 0.03 0.07 0.14 −0.05 0.16 0.02 −0.02 0.10 0.10 0.04 African Americans Asians Atheists Catholics Caucasians Democrats Female Homosexuals Fundamentalist Christians Hispanics Jews Male Homosexuals Men Muslims Republicans Women Notes. * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.0001. Soc. Sci. 2020, 9, 224 8 of 15 3.5. Absolute Positivity and Negativity of Feelings about Social Groups Correlations only show the direction of the relation between two variables, but cannot elucidate if feelings about social groups are positive or negative at an absolute level. To get closer to the question of whether conservatives or liberals have more positive or negative feelings about the social groups tested, ANOVAs were conducted by comparing individuals who identified as either Democrats (38) or Republicans (21), excluding other participants from this set of analyses. Table 4 reveals that there are a few consistencies in how Democrats and Republicans rated the 15 social groups. They both rated women and Asians highly positively and members of the other political party and atheists most negatively. Aside from this overlap, Democrats rated the following groups significantly more positively than Republicans did: atheists, Democrats, female and male homosexuals, and Muslims. The social groups that Republicans rated significantly more positively than Democrats did were Catholics, Caucasians, and Republicans. Table 4. Mean Ratings of Liking for 15 Social Groups. Social Group Entire Sample Democrats Republicans Women 82.2 83.7 83.4 Hispanics 75.0 78.3 74.7 Asians 74.6 74.7 78.2 Men 73.7 74.0 83.0 African Americans 73.1 77.6 72.0 Caucasians 70.9 66.3 ** 84.3 Jews 70.5 69.9 71.6 Catholics 66.9 65.6 * 79.6 Muslims 66.3 70.9 * 58.7 Female homosexuals 63.5 71.6 ** 45.9 Fundamentalist Christians 62.3 62.4 73.5 Male homosexuals 61.3 71.8 *** 41.8 Democrats 59.6 76.1 *** 33.2 Republicans 55.9 47.1 *** 81.6 Atheists 55.7 62.1 * 43.3 Notes. Ratings can range from 0–100, with 100 being the most favorable. Denotes significant differences between Democrats and Republicans: * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.000. Republicans scored significantly higher than Democrats on modern sexism, self-identified conservatism, social conservatism, SDO, GBJW, and religiosity. 4. Discussion 4.1. Intercorrelations among Conservatism, Religiosity, GBJW, SDO, and the Big Five The three measures of conservatism (self-identified, social, and economic conservatism) were intercorrelated, and all three also correlated with religiosity. Both self-identified conservatism and social conservatism, but not economic conservatism, were also correlated with GBJW, and SDO. Economic conservatism thus appears to tap into a somewhat different aspect of conservatism. This constellation of positive correlations among self-identified and social conservatism on the one hand, and religiosity, GBJW, and SDO on the other hand, reveals that conservatives tend to be more religious, more likely to believe that bad things happen to bad people, and more likely to believe in the importance of dominance and inequality, than liberals. Dittmar and Dickinson (1993) also found a correlation between GBJW and political conservatism. Interestingly, this study did not replicate the relation between political conservatism and conscientiousness found by Carney et al. (2008), openness to new experiences (DeYoung et al. 2007), or lower agreeableness (Hirsh et al. 2010). Instead, conservatives scored lower on neuroticism than Soc. Sci. 2020, 9, 224 9 of 15 liberals did. Thus, the findings for the relation between the Big Five personality dimensions and political attitudes were inconclusive. 4.2. Interrelations among Measures of Stereotypes: Modern Sexism and Feelings about Social Groups Feelings about social groups. Individuals’ feelings for 14 out of the 15 social groups were significantly intercorrelated. In other words, participants who rated one social group positively tended to rate the other social groups positively as well, which replicates findings by Chambers et al. (2013); see Table 2. The one exception was for people with highly positive feelings for Republicans, who did not have positive or negative feelings for African Americans, Democrats, female or male homosexuals, or women. Given the highly positive relations among feelings for all other social groups, this lack of a positive correlation between feelings for Republicans, on the one hand, and African Americans, Democrats, female and male homosexuals, and women, on the other hand, is noteworthy, a point which will be examined in more detail below. Furthermore, positive feelings for Republicans were correlated with modern sexism. Participants high in modern sexism had more negative feelings for 5 of the 15 social groups—Democrats, Hispanics, female and male homosexuals, and women—but rated Republicans more favorably. Thus, modern sexism, despite its name, appears to relate not only to negative stereotypes about women, but rather extends to several other social groups as well. It is possible that holding strong negative stereotypes about one social group increases the likelihood that one holds negative stereotypes of other groups as well. In fact, prejudice towards different social groups tends to be highly intercorrelated, at least for explicit measures (Bergh et al. 2012). Individuals who score high in sexism typically deny that women are on the receiving end of discrimination. This lack of awareness of gender discrimination actually contributes to gender discrimination (Begeny et al. 2020). Thus, if individuals high in modern sexism hold negative stereotypes against social groups besides women, this has troubling implications for social justice and economic opportunities for racial, ethnic, religious, and sexual orientation minorities. 4.3. Conservatism and Stereotypes Self-identified conservatism was among the variables most closely related to negative feelings about social groups (see Table 3). Participants high in self-identified conservatism had less positive feelings about racial, religious, and sexual minorities and about those with opposing political viewpoints (such as atheists and Democrats) than self-identified liberals did. Participants high in self-identified conservatism showed less favorable feelings about individuals who are often on the receiving end of discrimination such as African Americans, Hispanics, female and male homosexuals, and Muslims, while feeling more positively about Republicans. Furthermore, self-identified conservatism correlated with modern sexism. Individuals high in social conservatism were similar to individuals high in self-identified conservatism in their negative feelings about atheists, Democrats, and female and male homosexuals, but did not show more negative feelings about African Americans and Muslims. Individuals high in social conservatism were similar to individuals high in self-identified conservatism in their positive feelings about Republicans, but they also held more positive feelings about Catholics, Caucasians, and fundamentalist Christians. These feelings may be due to both liberals and conservatives liking individuals more when they assume that members of social groups have politically similar, and less if they have politically opposite attitudes (Mallinas et al. 2018). Social conservatism was also correlated with modern sexism. Those high in economic conservatism held more negative feelings about atheists, female and male homosexuals, and positive feelings about Catholics, fundamentalist Christians, and men. Interestingly, unlike self-identified and social conservatism, economic conservatism was not correlated with modern sexism. Soc. Sci. 2020, 9, 224 10 of 15 In summary, the social groups that were viewed negatively when assessed using any of the three operationalizations of conservatism (self-identified, social, or economic) were atheists and female and male homosexuals. Overall, those high in self-identified conservatism held more negative feelings about seven social groups, while those high in social conservatism about five groups. Of the three measures of conservatism, economic conservatism showed the lowest level of negative feelings towards three groups, and this was the only measure of conservatism that did not correlate with modern sexism. This does indicate that despite the fact that the three operationalizations of conservatism are interrelated, they do tap into distinct types of conservatism, with self-identified conservatism relating to the most negative feelings about social groups. It bears pointing out that liberals also harbored negative feelings about certain social groups. Those who scored low on self-identified conservatism and hence were more liberal had more negative views of Republicans. Those low in social conservatism had more negative feelings for Catholics, Caucasians, fundamentalist Christians, and Republicans, and those low in economic conservatism had more negative feelings about Catholics, fundamentalist Christians, and men. Thus, liberals did hold more negative feelings about certain social groups than conservatives did. However, overall, liberal individuals showed less negative feelings about social groups than conservatives did. This does suggest that both conservatives and liberals hold negative stereotypes, but that the social groups associated with those stereotypes differ. Not surprisingly, negative feelings are strong against those who have opposing viewpoints; both conservatives and liberals reserved their most negative feelings for their political opponents i.e., Democrats and Republicans, respectively. However, beyond that, conservatives held more negative feelings about racial, religious, and sexual minorities and more positive feelings about the “White majority”, e.g., Caucasians and Christians, than liberals did. A similar result was also obtained by Chambers et al. (2013) and interpreted as evidence that liberals are just as prejudiced as conservatives. This interpretation is not entirely justified. While it is clear that liberals are not immune to negative stereotypes, the effect of negative stereotypes held against disadvantaged versus advantaged groups is far from equivalent. Liberals’ negative stereotypes of those in power, such as Caucasians and Christians (groups to which many liberals actually belong) are unlikely to have the same detrimental effects on those advantaged groups as conservatives’ negative stereotypes of groups that have been disadvantaged or discriminated against, such as racial and religious minorities and members of the LGBTQ community. The latter groups are the ones that still suffer from employment, housing, and other forms of discrimination and are more frequently targets of hate crimes (e.g., see the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s [FBI] Uniform Crime Reports’ most recent data). According to Jost et al. (2018, p. 58) “liberals and leftists are motivated by (humanistic) concerns for equality (and social justice), and this leads them to embrace social change, whereas conservatives and rightists are motivated by the (normative) desire to preserve tradition (and social order), and this is what leads them to defend and justify inequalities in the social system.” Similarly, Graham et al. (2009) found that liberals valued harm/care and fairness/reciprocity more than conservatives did, whereas conservatives valued all five foundations (harm/care, fairness/reciprocity, ingroup/loyalty, authority/respect, and purity/sanctity) equally, revealing a difference in the value systems of conservatives and liberals. It must be noted that the greater negativity of conservatives to social groups could be a function of the particular social groups included in this survey. This problem does not apply to the second measure of stereotyping, modern sexism. Individuals high in self-identified or social conservatism scored higher in modern sexism. Overall, this provides some evidence for greater stereotyping among conservatives than liberals. 4.4. Religiosity and Stereotypes Participants high in religiosity indicated less favorable feelings about atheists, Democrats, and female and male homosexuals. Furthermore, religiosity was correlated with modern sexism. The distinguishing feature for highly religious compared to highly conservative individuals was Soc. Sci. 2020, 9, 224 11 of 15 that while both demonstrated negative feelings about sexual minorities and those with opposing viewpoints (atheists and Democrats), highly religious individuals did not have negative feelings for racial minorities or Muslims. This is in contrast to Hodson and Dhont’s (2015) results that individuals high in religiosity held homophobic AND racist views. Like conservatives, highly religious individuals are generally resistant to change, which predicts negative attitudes toward sexual minorities (Van der Toorn et al. 2017). Jones (2010) reports that religiosity correlates with opposition to same-sex marriage. 4.5. GBJW and Stereotypes A high score on GBJW means that one believes that people tend to get the rewards and punishments they deserve. GBJW related to stereotypes in several ways. First, it was very strongly correlated with modern sexism. Furthermore, participants high in GBJW rated African Americans, Democrats, Hispanics, female and male homosexuals, Muslims, and women less favorably, but rated Republicans more favorably. Individuals high in GBJW were very similar in their feelings about social groups as self-identified conservatives, with the exception of a lack of more negative feelings about atheists, but instead more negative feelings about women. This is consistent with previous research, as political conservatism is known to correlate with GBJW (Dittmar and Dickinson 1993). In summary, high GBJW related to more negative feelings about seven of the 15 social groups and more positive feelings for one group. GBJW also correlates with belief in racial wealth equality and the perception that inequality is due to personal traits, such as laziness (Kraus et al. 2019). Hence future research should further examine the role of GBJW in negative stereotypes. 4.6. Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) SDO, which refers to valuing power and dominance, correlated with modern sexism. It also was related to more negative feelings about ten of the 15 social groups: African Americans, Asians, atheists, Democrats, female and male homosexuals, Hispanics, Jews, Muslims, and women. In fact, SDO emerged as the variable most closely related to negative feelings about social groups that have been subject to discrimination: racial, gender, sexual, and religious minorities. The negative orientation towards Asians is noteworthy given that no other measure yielded a negative correlation with feelings about Asians. (Note that this study predates the COVID-19 pandemic and the associated increased negative stereotypes about Chinese and other Asian individuals.) Thus, individuals high in SDO seemed to hold more negative views of many social groups, although they disliked some groups more than others. This suggests a certain disagreeable disposition, and yet, SDO was not correlated with agreeableness. A previous meta-analysis had found a negative correlation between SDO and agreeableness (Sibley and Duckitt 2008). Persons high in SDO have been found to dislike social groups that are either low in power or compete with them (Duckitt 2001, 2015; Duckitt and Sibley 2009; Sibley and Duckitt 2008). They are also more inclined towards aggression, intergroup hostility, and political violence (Bartusevičius et al. 2020). A meta-analysis by Sibley and Duckitt (2008) also found that SDO predicts prejudice. Thus, SDO appears to be an even stronger predictor of negative stereotypes than political conservatism is. 4.7. Big Five and Stereotypes There were only a few significant correlations between the Big Five dimensions and feelings about social groups. There were positive correlations between agreeableness on the one hand and feelings about Asians, Caucasians, men, and women on the other hand. Neuroticism was positively correlated with feelings about Jews and Muslims. High levels of conscientiousness were positively correlated with feelings about men and women, and it also correlated with modern sexism. The hypothesis that measures of stereotyping would negatively correlate with agreeableness was not confirmed. These results do not show a consistent pattern and do not replicate research on the relation between low agreeableness and negative stereotypes (Brandt and Crawford 2019; Soc. Sci. 2020, 9, 224 12 of 15 Crawford and Brandt 2019; Sibley and Duckitt 2008) and low openness to new experiences and negative stereotypes (Sibley and Duckitt 2008). 4.8. Democrats, Republicans, and Stereotypes To address the absolute level of negative or positive feelings about social groups, conservatives and liberals were dichotomized into two groups based on their identification as Republican or Democrat. Individuals who did not identify with either of the two major parties were not included in this analysis. Note that this invariably reduces sample size and thereby statistical power. As Table 4 illustrates, Democrats and Republicans rated women and Asians very positively and atheists and particularly members of the other political party most negatively, revealing the huge chasm between the two political groups. Aside from this overlap, Democrats rated atheists, Democrats, female and male homosexuals, and Muslims significantly more positively than Republicans did. The social groups Republicans rated significantly more positively than Democrats did were Catholics, Caucasians, and Republicans. Thus, Democrats rated groups that have traditionally been subjected to racial, religious, or sexual discrimination more positively than Republicans did. Overall, Democrats rated five social groups more positively than Republicans did, while Republicans rated three groups more positively than Democrats did. In terms of outcomes for society, what is more important than the absolute number of social groups for whom one holds negative stereotypes, is the type of social groups against which stereotypes are held. Democrats rated groups that have traditionally been subjected to racial, religious, or sexual discrimination and disenfranchisement more positively than Republicans did, while Republicans favored groups that are associated with the “White majority”. This replicates our findings for conservatives versus liberals discussed above. The other operationalization of stereotypes was modern sexism. This measure provided clear evidence that Republicans scored higher than Democrats. Republicans also scored higher on self-identified conservatism, social conservatism, SDO, GBJW, and religiosity. The picture that emerges from this constellation of interrelations is that of a particular worldview that emphasizes the status quo and views those who challenge it, such as racial or religious minorities or those outside of the heterosexual norm, with suspicion. It is noteworthy that the most consistently negative feelings against the social groups were towards atheists and female and male homosexuals (see Table 2). Attitudes towards homosexuality have undergone a recent monumental shift (e.g., Charlesworth and Banaji 2019). However, while in the US support for issues such as same-sex marriages had risen to 70% in 2020, clearly many negative attitudes remain, especially among Republicans, a group where only about half support same-sex marriage (PRRI Staff 2020, 19 October 2020). Prusaczyk and Hodson (2020) found that individuals high in conservatism showed more prejudice toward gender non-conformists, a pattern replicated in this study. According to Hodson and Dhont (2015), homosexuals and gender non-conformists are perceived as threatening the status quo of traditional marriage and parenthood. Indeed, individuals outside the heterosexual, cisgender norm tended to be among the most disliked social groups of conservatives and Republicans (see Table 4). Thus, the hypothesis that conservatives hold more negative stereotypes than liberals received support. However, Democrats did have more negative feelings about Catholics, Caucasians, and Republicans than Republicans did. Thus, they are not immune to stereotyping. However, it is noteworthy that Democrats had more positive feelings for disenfranchised groups than Republicans did and also scored lower in modern sexism. 4.9. Limitations of This Research and Directions for the Future One limitation of this research is the small sample size inherent in conducting research at smaller institutions. Furthermore, the research was conducted at one small, public university in the Midwest of the US. Hence generalizability may be limited. Critics may also find fault with the particular social Soc. Sci. 2020, 9, 224 13 of 15 groups selected as targets in this research. However, several of the groups were specifically selected because they represent groups that have traditionally been the targets of discrimination and hate crimes. Understanding who may hold negative stereotypes against such groups is important. With 20/20 hindsight, the original hypothesis that conservatives show more negative stereotypes than liberals seems simplistic. Clearly, this research has found that liberals also display negative stereotypes, e.g., against Republicans and Caucasians. In terms of relevance for our troubled times where negative stereotypes and hate crimes have seen a resurgence (Federal Bureau of Investigation 2020), what may be more important than whether a particular group is more biased than another, is what the consequences of such negative stereotypes are for various social groups. What are the consequences of holding negative stereotypes of advantaged versus disadvantaged social groups? And exactly why do conservatives and liberals differ in the social groups about whom they feel negatively? And how do SDO, GBJW, religiosity, and other individual difference variables affect negative stereotypes? These are questions that require further study. 5. Conclusions This research found that individuals with strong political convictions appear to be biased against those with opposing viewpoints. In fact, some of the strongest negative stereotypes were held by members of the two major US political parties about members of the other political party. While there was evidence that we tend to dislike those whose views conflict with our own, the picture that emerges from this study is that conservatism, SDO, and GBJW often go along with stereotypical views of others (such as modern sexism) and negative feelings about groups that have been stigmatized (such as racial or religious minorities and individuals outside of the heterosexual norm). Thus, it does not appear to be a case of one group being biased and another group being devoid of bias; instead, different groups’ biases are directed against different types of social groups, some of whom (e.g., certain racial groups or those outside of the heterosexual norm) are more vulnerable to being targets of negative stereotypes and discrimination. To better understand what predicts negative stereotypes against disadvantaged social groups and what we can do to counteract them is a worthwhile endeavor for future research. Funding: This research received no external funding. 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This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/). http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0191-8869(91)90081-L http://dx.doi.org/10.5964/jspp.v6i1.747 http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.67.4.741 https://www.prri.org/research/amid-multiple-crises-trump-and-biden-supporters-see-different-realities-and-futures-for-the-nation/ https://www.prri.org/research/amid-multiple-crises-trump-and-biden-supporters-see-different-realities-and-futures-for-the-nation/ http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11199-019-01069-1 http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1088868308319226 http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/18641385 http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.68.2.199 http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev.ps.33.020182.000245 http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0146167217718523 http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1948550613476096 http://creativecommons.org/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/. Relation between College Students’ Conservatism and Negative Stereotypes about Social Groups Method Participants Materials Procedure Results Political Affiliation Intercorrelations among Conservatism, Religiosity, GBJW, SDO, and the Big Five Interrelations among Measures of Stereotypes: Modern Sexism and Feelings about Social Groups Interrelations among Conservatism, Religiosity, GBJW, SDO, Big Five, and Measures of Stereotypes Absolute Positivity and Negativity of Feelings about Social Groups Discussion Intercorrelations among Conservatism, Religiosity, GBJW, SDO, and the Big Five Interrelations among Measures of Stereotypes: Modern Sexism and Feelings about Social Groups Conservatism and Stereotypes Religiosity and Stereotypes GBJW and Stereotypes Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) Big Five and Stereotypes Democrats, Republicans, and Stereotypes Limitations of This Research and Directions for the Future Conclusions References 
work_7d7spzzv4nb2faka4x3kvfzsiu	----	Journal of Forensic Practice Examining the portrayal of Homophobic and Non Homophobic Aggression in print media through an Integrated Grounded Behavioural Linguistic Inquiry (IGBLI) approach Journal: Journal of Forensic Practice Manuscript ID JFP-02-2017-0003.R1 Manuscript Type: Brief literature/discussion Paper Keywords: Homophobic aggression, Heterosexual aggression, Print media, Integrated Grounded Behavioural Linguistic Inquiry (IGBLI) approach, Homophobia, LGBTI discrimination Journal of Forensic Practice Journal of Forensic Practice Introduction. This brief report recognises that the media creates an understanding of the social world for individuals and wider society. As such this social institution can impact on homophobia in society through its portrayal of the LGBTI community. By utilising a new and innovative qualitative research method, an Integrated Grounded Behavioural Linguistic Inquiry (IGBLI) approach devised by the co-authors Ireland and Birch, newspaper articles from four daily newspapers in circulation within the USA, Canada, the UK and Australia are examined. This cross-cultural examination illustrates differences in the themes contained in reports of homophobic aggression when compared to reports of non homophobic aggression. This article first begins by considering the nature and extent of homophobia. Nature and extent of Homophobia: An overview. According to the Anti-Defamation League, homophobia can be understood as: ‘…the hatred or fear of homosexuals - that is, lesbians and gay men - sometimes leading to acts of violence and expressions of hostility. Homophobia is not confined to any one segment of society, and can be found in people from all walks of life. Organized hate groups have viciously attacked homosexuals and have used especially violent language in attempting to persecute and intimidate them’. (Accessed at: http://archive.adl.org/hate-patrol/homophobia.html#.VdFkVUsqu0s on 17 th August, 2015). The Australia Human Rights Commission (2014) reported on the everyday types of discrimination, harassment and hostility LGBTI people face, including verbal and physical forms of abuse, with approximately 50% of LGBTI community members admitting to hiding their sexuality due to fear of exposure to discrimination (Australia Human Rights Commission, 2014). As a consequence of this discrimination, harassment and hostility LGBTI people have experienced over time, and continue to experience, it is important to explore and understand the effects of homophobia. The portrayal of the LGBTI community in the media. Page 1 of 9 Journal of Forensic Practice 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 Journal of Forensic Practice According to Couldry (2009), the media contributes to and sustains unequal power within the social world. This has previously been illustrated through the work of Bourdieu (1991) who recognised that the media has the power to ‘construct reality’ (pp. 166), which can also be termed as symbolic power. The role of the media, in particular print media, in contributing to the outcome of policy issues, such as same sex marriage, is also well documented and evidenced through the theory of ‘agenda setting’ (Hester and Gibson, 2007). Poole (2014) examined the way in which gay males have been represented in the media over a 10-year period, finding that hetero-normative identities dominate the media. Poole’s research recognises how the media is prone to stereotyping and communicating negative consequences for those who do not fit conventional norms and values. The implication of this work resonates with Bourdieu’s (1991) observations considered above. The findings of Poole (2014) are illustrated through the earlier work of Padva (2007) who reviewed films depicting members of the LGBTI community. Padva noted that homosexuals were often portrayed in the media as ‘confused youths’ up until the late 1980s, and since then have been shown as individuals who did not conform to gender identities and who were often bullied. The conclusions drawn from this type of research is that the media, in a large part, is driven by heterosexuality and its dominance in society, which can engender homophobia in society. This implies the media can contribute to addressing the types and levels of discrimination experienced by the LGBTI community, including that of homophobia. The language used by the media, and how it influences society has been examined in the work of Henley et. al. (2002), who conducted a content analysis of newspaper articles covering anti-gay attacks. While variation was found amongst these newspaper reports, the researchers noted that in one newspaper there were both fewer and less specific nominalisations, which are claimed to obscure agency when describing an anti-gay crime as opposed to anti-straight violence. It was concluded by Henley et. al. (2002) that language can influence how readers perceive the amount of harm done to a victim. Analysis of media content, especially with regards to print media, commonly drawn upon content analysis, the use of any type of behavioural assessment to examine media content, however, has been neglected within the Page 2 of 9Journal of Forensic Practice 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 Journal of Forensic Practice empirical research, especially with regards to the portrayal of individuals and groups. Therefore any consideration of antecedents and reinforcing factors surrounding behaviours of interest from being understood, the core aims of a behavioural assessment (see Lee-Evans, 1994) do not feature within this type of research. The current article, therefore, contributes to redressing this neglect by developing a new and innovative research method in order to analyse the portrayal of homophobic aggression and non homophobic aggression in print media. By doing so, the following analysis incorporates a behavioural assessment framework. Methodology Sample One homosexual aggressive incident newspaper report and one heterosexual aggressive newspaper report was selected from a daily newspaper in the USA, Canada, the UK and Australia, over a 5-year period, between November 2011 and August 2016. Of the four print newspapers selected from each of the named countries, the print newspaper was chosen due to the fact it was one of the most circulated papers in their respective countries. A total of eight articles were therefore selected, based on a purposive strategy (n=4 articles containing homophobic aggression; n=4 articles containing non homophobic aggression). Analytical approach Three distinct, yet complimentary qualitative research methods were adopted in the analysis: 1) a grounded theory approach to analysis, 2) a behavioural assessment framework in the form of a SORC (see Lee-Evans, 1994) and 3) the Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count method (Tausczik & Pennebaker, 2010). These three components are brought together in order to develop a new and innovating qualitative research method entitled an Integrated Grounded Behavioural Linguistic Inquiry (IGBLI) devised by the co-authors Ireland and Birch. This approach was adopted to allow for the content to be captured and explored without prejudice (through the use of a grounded theory approach), interpreted (through the use of a SORC framework) allowing for an exploration in how the report was being expressed through language Page 3 of 9 Journal of Forensic Practice 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 Journal of Forensic Practice (through the use of a linguistic inquiry and word count analysis). The findings are presented below. Findings Component 1 of the IGBLI: Grounded Theory analysis component A grounded theory approach was the first step of the IGBLI. The process was conducted using the stages of the approach as noted by Schroth (2013), namely generating categories, by noting key points in the data and grouping similar content to produce concepts. By grouping concepts together broader categories emerged, which also contained sub themes. The categories and sub themes were scrutinised by a second researcher to ensure inter-rater reliability in which six broad categories of effects to victims, responses from others, motivation for the assault, perpetrator behaviour, characteristics of those involved and Criminal Justice issues arose from this analysis. Overall, while the categories that emerged from the first stage analysis offers some similarities in terms of how the media portrays both homophobic and non homophobic aggression, the nature and extent of this portrayal is different between the two cohorts. This is reflected through various categories and sub themes, which emerged from this analysis such as effects to victims and motivation for the assault. For example, the focus of the news reports for homophobic aggression significantly focussed on the emotional impact of the incident and the severity of the injury, compared to non homophobic aggressive reports. Reports of non homophobic aggression appeared to focus more on facts such as the time of the attack and perpetrator characteristics. These results are clearly tentative but they do suggest some emerging themes worthy of further study. The next step of the Integrated Grounded Behavioural Linguistic Inquiry (IGBLI) approach aimed to examine this in more detail using a behavioural [functional] assessment. Page 4 of 9Journal of Forensic Practice 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 Journal of Forensic Practice Component 2 of the IGBLI: Behavioural analysis component: The SORC The SORC analysis, a behavioural assessment, as noted earlier in this chapter, accounts for the antecedents and reinforcing factors surrounding behaviours of interest (Lee-Evans, 1994). A SORC comprises four components: S – setting/antecedent, O – organism variables, R – response and C – consequences, namely reinforcers (Lee-Evans, 1994: 20). It allows for further interpretation of the aggression reported on in the print media reports as opposed to a simple description of categories and themes that emerged through the grounded theory analysis. The SORC attempts to offer a function of the behaviour, in this instance aggression, through an interpretation of antecedents, background factors and potential reinforcers. SORC analyses were conducted across 8 articles in total, with an example of SORC presented below to illustrate this process. This article captures a homophobic aggressive incident. Example SORC: Newspaper Report 1 - The United States, USA Today Report: Homophobic aggressive incident (The Associated Press, 2013); This reported on a fatal shooting in New York City. It was reported as an ‘anti-gay hate crime’. The victim was walking with his companion. The perpetrator reportedly used homophobic slurs before shooting the victim in the cheek. (S) Setting: The offence took place in a busy city, in the middle of a ‘weekend midnight crowd’ in a busy public place known as the ‘bed rock of gay rights’. The perpetrator looked for confirmation that the two men were a couple before shooting, suggesting the possible importance of their homosexuality (i.e. specific trigger). Reports suggest the perpetrator may have felt slightly disinhibited at the time, supported by his actions prior to the crime when threatening individuals in a restaurant after urinating outside it. Homophobic slurs were used by the perpetrator and he confirmed the relationship between the victim and his partner before shooting. (O) Organism variables: The perpetrator had been previously arrested for attempted murder, though little of this arrest was known. The use of homophobic slurs suggests Page 5 of 9 Journal of Forensic Practice 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 Journal of Forensic Practice a pre-existing negative belief system. (R) Response: High intense violent response (i.e. shooting of the victim). (C) Consequences: Potential positive reinforcement for the perpetrator through gaining notoriety by committing the crime in public and negative reinforcement through the remove of negative emotion/feelings of hate towards the victims. Hypothesised function(s): To express homophobic views. The SORC analysis of newspaper articles, illustrated by the example above, reflects differences in the way aggression towards homosexual and heterosexual people is portrayed in the media. Through the analysis of the aggression reported within print media amongst the four countries of the USA, Canada, the UK and Australia, the description with regards to the antecedents and what triggers an incident of homophobic aggression compared to a non homophobic aggression incident differ in terms of the amount of detailed offered. This difference is also found to be a feature in the SORC with regards to background factors and potential reinforcers, which are both more detailed features in the homosexual aggressive news reports than in the non homosexual incidents. While such findings preliminary and small scale, they do suggest the application of a behavioural assessment for analysing media content is worthy of further study. Component 3 of the IGBLI: Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC) analysis component A Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count analysis (Tausczik & Pennebaker, 2010) was used to examine the choice of words employed in these 8 articles consider in this IGBLI. The LIWC allowed for considering the news reports separately for the aggression towards homosexuals and the aggression towards non homosexuals. Pictures, adverts, unrelated words (such as date of publication and authors’ name) were removed from the article prior to analysis, although titles of articles were Page 6 of 9Journal of Forensic Practice 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 Journal of Forensic Practice retained. Text was checked from slang and abbreviations, as instructed (Pennebaker, Booth, Boyd, & Francis, 2015). The results are presented in table 1 below in which the output from the LIWC text analysis is reported, this output also includes total word count as well as positive and negative words reflecting emotions. <<TABLE 1 HERE>> To explore if these were significant, Mann-Whitney tests were conducted using SPSS. The only significant difference was for overall cognitive words (U=.00, p=.021), which were higher for the homophobic aggression articles. This suggests that overall there was not a great difference in the way in which the reports of homophobic and non homophobic articles that were included in this study were communicated via written lanaguage. Although when reporting on homophobic aggression word selection indicates greater active thinking (i.e. cognitive words), suggesting these reports may be more reflective. Conclusion. In conclusion the variations in reporting styles and content presented in this study reflect the observations offered by existing research. For example, in research such as that by Poole (2014) it was noted that the media commonly treat certain individuals and groups such as the LGBTI community differently when compared to other individuals and groups. While scholars have argued that the way in which individuals are portrayed in the media has the potential to impact on the audience’s acceptance of stereotypes, which ultimately may lead to discrimination such as homophobia. The media, therefore, has a duty to report and represent individuals and groups, such as those in the LGBTI community, in a fair and accurate way, and without prejudice. By engaging in such practice the media can contribute to a reduction and prevention in homophobia and help improve the health and wellbeing of the LGBTI community. References. ABC News (2016, March 9) Same-sex marriage: Let's get it sorted and move on. ABC News. Accessed at: http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-03-09/barnes-let's-get-it-sorted- and-move-on/7231770 on 29th September, 2016. Page 7 of 9 Journal of Forensic Practice 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 Journal of Forensic Practice Anti-Defamation League (n.d.). Defining Homophobia. Accessed at: http://archive.adl.org/hate-patrol/homophobia.html#.VdFkVUsqu0s on 17 th August, 2015. Australian Human Rights Commission (2014). ‘Face the facts: Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex People. Sydney: Human Rights Commission. Bourdieu, P. (1991). Language and symbolic power. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Couldry, N. (2009). Does ‘the media’have a future? European journal of communication, 24(4), 437-449. Henley, N. M., Miller, M. D., Beazley, J. A., Nguyen, D. N., Kaminsky, D., & Sanders, R. (2002). Frequency and specificity of referents to violence in news reports of anti-gay attacks. Discourse & Society, 13(1), 75-104. Hester, J. B., & Gibson, R. (2007). The agenda-setting function of national versus local media: A time-series analysis for the issue of same-sex marriage. Mass Communication & Society, 10(3), 299-317. Lee-Evans, J.M. (1994). Background to behaviour analysis. In M. McMurran and J. Hodge (eds), The Assessment of Criminal behaviours of Clients in a Secure Setting. London: Jessica Kingsley. Padva, G. (2007). Media and popular culture representations of LGBT bullying. Journal Of Gay & Lesbian Social Services: Issues In Practice, Policy & Research, 19(3-4), 105-118. Pennebaker, J. W., Booth, R. J., Boyd, R. L., and Francis, M.E. (2015). ‘Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count: LIWC2015’. Austin: Pennebaker Conglomerates. Poole, J. (2014). Queer Representations of Gay Males and Masculinities in the Media. Sexuality & Culture, 18(2), 279-290. Schroth, S. T. (2013).‘Grounded theory’. New York: Salem Press Encyclopaedia. Tausczik, Y. R., and Pennebaker, J. W. (2010). The psychological meaning of words: LIWC and computerized text analysis methods. Journal of Language And Social Psychology, 29(1), 24-54. The Associated Press. (2013, May 19). Police: Fatal NYC shooting an anti-gay hate crime. USA Today. Accessed at: http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/05/18/nyc-shooting-gay-hate- crime/2323175/ on 26th June, 2016. Page 8 of 9Journal of Forensic Practice 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 Journal of Forensic Practice Table 1: Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count text analysis of homophobic agression and non homophobic aggression in print media reports. Articles referring to homophobic agression Articles referring to non homophobic aggression USA Canada UK Australia Total USA Canada UK Australia Total Self- references (I, me, my) 0.34 2.25 1.35 1.26 1.13 1.63 0.00 0.36 0.00 0.94 Social words 10.74 12.13 9.03 12.63 10.78 11.44 8.76 10.43 8.66 10.53 Positive emotions 0.34 1.35 0.40 0.25 0.53 1.34 0.52 0.36 0.00 0.86 Negative emotions 2.94 2.25 3.77 2.27 2.96 1.49 4.12 6.12 3.15 3.07 Overall cognitive words 4.52 5.17 3.64 3.79 4.26 2.53 3.61 3.24 1.57 2.75 Articles (a, an, the) 11.09 6.07 9.97 8.33 9.40 11.44 7.73 10.07 14.17 10.85 Big words (> 6 letters) 19.57 16.18 18.60 19.95 18.73 19.91 25.77 20.86 19.69 20.99 Total word count 884 445 742 396 2467 673 194 278 127 1272 Page 9 of 9 Journal of Forensic Practice 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 
work_7eh67fgpvbcd5inb4wmxfusaae	----	ARTICLES 248 — AltLJ Vol 34:4 2009 A BLUE WRISTBAND VIEW OF HISTORY? The death of Mulrunji Doomadgee and the illusion of postcolonial Australia SARAH KEENAN O n 27 August 2009 at a Canberra book launch, Prime Minister Kevin Rudd called for an end to the history wars.1 He declared ‘the time has now come to move beyond the arid intellectual debates’ over the interpretation of Australian history and in particular, the impact colonisation has had on indigenous Australia.2 The ‘arid debates’ he refers to are between those who wear a ‘black armband’ to mourn the unspeakable damage colonisation has done to indigenous Australia, and those who think modern Australia has nothing to apologise for. Both the radicals and the pioneers championed by each side are, he claimed, ‘part of the rich fabric of our remarkable story called Australia’.3 In declaring it safe to call a truce in the history wars, Rudd is implying democratic liberal Australia has reached a moment in its history where we can agree to disagree and move forward together.4 The implication is we are now living in thoroughly post-colonial times, and the proponents of the history wars have become irrelevant. But if Rudd rejects both historical views, what view is he putting forward? Now that Australia has a native title regime, a permanent human rights and equal opportunity commission, various laws against discrimination, and has even had a national apology, has the nation indeed reached a point where it can leave its antagonistic colonial history behind and move onto a neutral, multicultural present? Two months earlier, the Queensland Court of Appeal ordered that the coronial inquest into the death of Cameron Mulrunji Doomadgee5 be re-opened. It has been five years since Mulrunji died in a Palm Island holding cell, and this most recent legal decision was barely noticed by the media. Immediately after Mulrunji’s death in November 2004 there had been a frenzy of media attention. Half a decade later and no one is yet to be held responsible for Mulrunji’s death. This new inquest is likely to take years and means the Doomadgee family and Palm Island community will have to re-live, once again, the details of losing their brother. In this article I examine the Mulrunji case in the context of the liberal, postcolonial view of history that I argue is not only being promulgated by the prime minister, but is also being taken up by wider Australia. Drawing on the work of critical geographer Doreen Massey, I define place as a process and Australia as a colonial process rather than a static area or bounded nation-space. Contrary to the postcolonial image suggested by Rudd’s call for an end to the history wars, and liberal reforms such as limited land rights, anti-discrimination laws, equal opportunity commissions and the long-awaited apology, the Mulrunji case demonstrates that Australia today is still very much a colonial place. What is now emerging is a view of history that acknowledges the wrongs done to indigenous Australians in the past but that sees itself as having meaningfully departed from this time of colonial violence. Distinct from both the ‘black armband’ and unreservedly celebratory views of history that competed throughout the Howard years, what is emerging now is a ‘blue wristband’ view of history which denies the existence of colonial power relations while actively reproducing them. Death in custody of Mulrunji Doomadgee Aboriginal deaths in custody are not a new issue for Australia. What was outstanding about the death in custody of Mulrunji Doomadgee was the fact that the arresting officer Senior Sergeant Chris Hurley was actually charged with an offence. Palm Island lies off the northeast coast of Queensland and is home to around 3000 residents, almost all of them indigenous. Located 50 kilometres from the mainland, it is accessible only by a two hour ferry ride that does the return trip three times per week, or a far more expensive 40 minute charter flight. On his way to go fishing on the morning of 19 November 2004 Mulrunji walked past Hurley and Indigenous Police Liaison Officer Lloyd Bengaroo, who were in the process of arresting a young man, Patrick Bramwell, for a public nuisance offence. Mulrunji, who knew Bengaroo, said to him something to the effect of ‘you’re a black man too, why can’t you help the blacks?’6 Seemingly unworried by the comment, Bengaroo told Mulrunji to keep walking, which he did. Hurley took an interest in it and asked Bengaroo what Mulrunji had said. What happened from that point is subject to competing claims. According to Hurley, Mulrunji then turned around and swore at the two police officers. Community witnesses say Mulrunji neither swore nor turned around, but was simply singing as he continued walking down the street.7 At any rate, Hurley drove a police van down to Mulrunji and arrested him. Protesting that he had done nothing wrong, Mulrunji resisted getting into the van and Hurley grabbed him by both legs and forcibly pushed him in.8 When Hurley opened the van upon their arrival at the police station, Mulrunji punched Hurley on the jaw and the two men had what Hurley later described as ‘a struggle’.9 Less than an hour later, Mulrunji was dead in a holding cell. He bled to death from a severe compressive force REFERENCES 1. The history wars famously involved the ‘black armband view of history’; a pejorative phrase used by conservatives to attack historians who they thought focussed too much on the negative impact of colonisation on Australia’s indigenous population, contrasted with the ‘three cheers’ view, which saw Australian history as predominantly something to cheer about. See Graeme Davison, The Use and Abuse of Australian History (2000) and Stuart MacIntyre and Anna Clark, The History Wars (2004). 2. David Mark, ‘Rudd calls for end to “history wars” ’, ABC News online (27 August 2009) <abc.net.au/news/ stories/2009/08/27/2669177.htm> at 27 August 2009. 3. Ibid. 4. Ibid. 5. Hurley v Clements [2009] QCA 167. It is a custom in some indigenous communities to avoid directly naming a deceased person for a period of time after the death, as a mark of respect. Mulrunji was the name nominated by the family and means ‘the departed one’, see footnote 1 of Boe Lawyers Final Submission on behalf of the Palm Island Aboriginal Council (16 August 2006 [query date and web reference]) <boelawyers. com.au/current%20focus.html> at 30 October. Chloe Hooper notes that in fact the indigenous witnesses in the Palm Island case continued to refer to the dead man as Cameron, with only the lawyers and journalists using Mulrunji, which she claims was consistently mispronounced. See Chloe Hooper, The Tall Man: Death and Life on Palm Island (2008). This claim is consistent with the family-supported memorial website for Mulrunji <myspace.com/mulrunji> at 30 October 2009, which directs that the name is pronounced ‘moordinyi’. 6. Boe Lawyers, above no 5, 21–22. 7. Ibid 23. See also Jeff Waters, Gone for a Song: A Death in Custody on Palm Island (2008). 8. Ibid 22. See also evidence of Christopher Hurley in R v Christopher James Hurley, Indictment No. 4/2007 as reproduced in Hooper, above n 5, 229. AltLJ Vol 34:4 2009 — 249 ARTICLES which cleaved his liver in two and ruptured his portal vein. He also had four broken ribs and a black eye.10 A couple of hours after his arrest, members of Mulrunji’s family went to the police station to ask after him. Knowing that Mulrunji was dead, Hurley told the family that he was asleep and that they should come back later.11 Hurley had already notified his superiors in Townsville about the death and two detectives, Darren Robinson and Raymond Kitching, were on their way over to Palm Island. Both knew Hurley as a colleague and it was common knowledge that Hurley and Robinson were close friends. Hurley picked them up at the airport and had them over for dinner at his house that evening.12 Over the course of the following week the detectives conducted an investigation that concluded that Hurley and Mulrunji had had ‘a tussle’ in between the police van and the station; that Mulrunji had accidentally fallen up the single step leading into the police station, and that this fall alone had caused his death.13 It was this version of events that, when it was announced to the community, sparked a riot on Palm Island. A drawn out coronial inquiry eventually led14 to a lengthy and damning report that concluded that Hurley’s actions had caused Mulrunji’s fatal injuries. The report also found that Mulrunji’s arrest was an inappropriate exercise of police discretion, the police investigation was unsatisfactory and deficient, and that Hurley had lied about falling next to Mulrunji and had in fact punched Mulrunji several times while he lay on the floor of the police station.15 Despite the report, it took a significant political battle for Hurley to be charged with manslaughter and assault in February 2007, becoming the first police officer in Australian history to be charged with an indigenous death in custody. The Queensland Police Union (QPU) reacted with vitriolic outrage, threatening to strike16 and launching a huge public campaign in Hurley’s support including radio advertisements, press releases, and the sale of blue awareness wristbands, imprinted with Hurley’s police number, 6747. Hurley stood trial in June 2007 before an all-white jury in Townsville and was found not guilty on both charges. He was immediately welcomed back to policing at a station on the Gold Coast.17 In 2008 Hurley won an unprecedented appeal against the2006 coronial report that had held him responsible for Mulrunji’s death The decision included an order that the costs of Hurley’s appeal be paid by the Doomadgee family and Palm Island community.18 In June 2009 the Court of Appeal overturned parts of the decision. The court subsequently made a costs order granting indemnity certificates to both parties.19 Australia as a colonial process Mulrunji’s death and its legal and political aftermath were not isolated, local issues for Palm Island or for the state of Queensland, but were part of the ongoing, colonial process that is Australia. Geographer Doreen Massey understands place as a process rather than something that is fixed in time.20 Massey uses a diversity of examples to show how place is both spatially and temporally contingent — it changes from moment to moment, constantly evolving into something new. This is an obvious departure from thinking of places as static, bounded areas. The process that is Australia today implicates not only the police officers who work in indigenous communities, but all non-indigenous Australians, whose ‘settled’ lifestyles could not be maintained without the ongoing dispossession of indigenous Australians from their culture and their land. That dispossession has always been and continues to be violent — the popularly- sanctioned violence of the law is what keeps the white Australian state safe from indigenous otherness. It is not a coincidence that indigenous Australians are arrested and imprisoned at wildly disproportionate rates to the rest of the population, nor is it due to the legacy of colonialism. Rather, the over-policing and imprisonment of indigenous Australians is an integral part of today’s Australia. That this process continues unabated at a moment in history when the Australian state has embraced a rhetoric of equality and postcoloniality makes the process all the more harmful and problematic. Further to her understanding of place as a process, Massey understands space as heterogenous and dynamic rather than as essential and static in meaning. Space is embedded in power relations — individuals and social groups are placed in distinctly different positions of power depending on where they are.21 The spatialised power relations within which Palm Island is located are severely colonial. The island was first gazetted as an indigenous reserve in 1914. It functioned as an open-air prison for indigenous persons who were considered dangerous, including ‘half-castes’, who were regarded as not only a social problem, but also a biological threat to the white race.22 Palm Island was seen by the Queensland government as a particularly attractive location to place indigenous people because it isolated them from white people.23 Indigenous people 9. Christine Clements, Findings of Inquest into the Death of Mulrunji Townsville: Office of the State Coroner 27 September 2006 p 14, <austlii.edu.au/au/journals/ AILR/2006/81.html> at 30 October 2009. Note that this decision has been overturned but the second inquest has not yet begun. 10. Ibid, 7–9. 11. Boe, above n 5, 48. 12. Clements, above n 9, 10–11. 13. Waters, above n 7, 73. 14. Almost two years later on 27 September 2006. 15. Clements, above n 9, 10–11. 16. Renee Viellaris, Cameron Atfield and Amanda Watt, ‘Police strike threat in support officer’, Courier Mail (Brisbane) 27 January 2007. 17. Sarah Volger and AAP, ‘Officer welcome back on Coast duty’, Gold Coast Bulletin (Gold Coast) 22 June 2007. 18. Ibid. 19. Hurley v Clements & Ors (No 2) [2009] QCA 207. 20. Doreen Massey, ‘Power-geometry and a progressive sense of place’ in Barry Curtis Jon Bird, Tim Putnam George Robertson and Lisa Tickner (ed), Mapping the Futures: Local Cultures, Global Change (1993), 66. 21. Ibid, 61. 22. Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody 1991, Regional Report of Inquiry into Queensland Appendix 1(a): The Aboriginals in Colonial Society 1840–1897, <austlii.edu.au/au/other/ IndigLRes/rciadic/regional/qld/ch5. html#Heading22> at 10 December 2008. 23. Ibid. The blue wristbands denied the ongoing occurrence of colonial violence (by insisting on Hurley’s innocence) at the same time as they implicitly asserted the need for such violence in the maintenance of the nation. ARTICLES 250 — AltLJ Vol 34:4 2009 from at least 57 different language groups were sent to Palm Island during its life as a penal colony.24 Families sent to the island were separated and only allowed to see each other with permission from a white superior.25 In 1986 the Queensland government relinquished direct control over Palm Island and passed it onto the newly formed community council, which was given title to the land under a ‘deed of grant in trust’26 — a species of land title created specifically for the self-administration of former missions and reserves. Under such a deed the land must be used for the benefit of the community, meaning that private ownership of land is unlawful.27 While these legal moves were positive in terms of indigenous self-government, they were accompanied by a swift withdrawal of government infrastructure from the island.28 The physical isolation of Palm Island combined with the cumbersome legalities of its land tenure scheme have made it very difficult to attract any kind of investment.29 As the residents on Palm Island are either former reserve inmates or their children, there is also no economic base upon which to begin local industry. Palm Island today is a place of severe poverty. Houses are badly overcrowded (averaging 17 people per house),30 run-down,31 and unemployment is over 90%.32 Suicide and domestic violence rates are disproportionately high.33 The persistent conditions of poverty and despair on Palm Island can be attributed in part to the island’s isolation and lack of infrastructure, but in larger part to the fact that the networks of social relations and understandings that constituted Palm Island as a penal colony in the early 1900s have not shifted. For Palm Island to move from being a place of coloniality to one of postcoloniality will require more fundamental and wide-ranging shifts than the granting of limited civil and land rights to indigenous Australians. Those shifts need to be wide-ranging not just in the sense that significant change needs to occur on Palm Island, but also throughout Australia today. Spatialised power relations are not just about certain places being more violent or more impoverished than others. They are about the power and prosperity of some places actively weakening the power and prosperity of others. If place is understood as an ongoing process constructed through networks of social relations and understandings, then it is contingent on and interconnected with that outside of itself. In terms of Australian geography, it is not simply that remote indigenous communities are worse off and subject to greater control than regional towns and cities, but that those towns and cities could not continue to exist as they do without the ongoing displacement and control over remote indigenous communities. Geographies of irresponsibility Spatialised power relations and the inter-connectedness of places of poverty and prosperity suggest a corresponding politics of inter-connectedness which Massey labels geographies of responsibility.34 Embracing such politics would mean recognising the multiple networks of understandings, relations, processes and experiences that intertwine to form place, and drawing lines of responsibility along the multiple trajectories of the networks that extend out from it. Such a model has yet to be widely embraced in Australia. Scott Veitch argues that Australian common law organises irresponsibility, legitimating the ongoing dispossession of indigenous people and the effective disavowal of Australia’s racially violent past on the grounds of equality, freedom and formal justice.35 While the legal system has incrementally moved away from the now unacceptable policies of racial discrimination and genocide, the Australian state still depends on the continued dispossession of indigenous people from their land and their culture. While legal measures such as Mabo, anti-discrimination laws, the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission and the apology do represent movement away from the blatant racism of Australia’s colonial foundations, they also reiterate, as Stewart Motha has argued, that the law of the coloniser is the only valid normative system.36 Indigenous ‘rights’ are recognised only within the white legal system and on terms defined by it, thereby reinforcing the hegemony of that system, the subordination of indigenous laws and the un-thinkability of it being any other way. In recognising indigenous rights, the colonial state is attempting to redefine itself and its legal system as postcolonial. But the legal system that grants indigenous land rights and prohibits racial discrimination37 is the same legal system that incarcerates indigenous Australians at over 15 times the rate of non-indigenous Australians,38 undermines and belittles indigenous ways of knowing,39 and refuses to acknowledge that its foundations lie in violent conquest.40 The Commonwealth government that apologised to the Stolen Generations is the same government that not only maintained but extended the policies of the Northern Territory Intervention41. The Australian government boasts about (some) families in remote communities feeling more safe and secure with increased police presence, but fails to recognise the systemic reason those communities are unsafe and insecure in the first place.42 As Andrea Smith has argued in regards to hate crime law, when a state founded on genocide purports to protect or support racial minorities, it reproduces white supremacy by masking the racism of the state itself.43 The legal reforms ostensibly made in the interests of indigenous Australia have an effect of entrenching the relation of irresponsibility from non-indigenous Australians towards indigenous Australians, by creating the illusion that the law protects or even promotes indigenous interests. Purportedly postcolonial legal measures might be classified as non-performative anti-racism. While there is no doubt that such measures do achieve anti-racist results for particular individuals, they fail to change the fundamentally racist structure of the space in which those individuals live. The stark colonial Australian landscape of prosperous white cities and severely impoverished black areas has not significantly changed since these measures have been instituted. Sara Ahmed explains how acts that acknowledge the existence of 24. Palm Island: Future Directions, Resource Officer Report, State of Queensland (January 2006), 27. 25. RCIADIC, Regional Report of Inquiry into Queensland, Appendix 1(a). 26. Now governed by chapter 3 of the Land Act 1994 (Qld). 27. s 35 Land Act 1994 (Qld). 28. Waters, above n 7, 41. 29. Andrew Boe, ‘Palm Island — Something is very wrong’ Australian National University Public Lecture Series 2005 (28 September 2005), 8. 30. Ibid, 5. 31. Waters, op cit, 150–165. 32. Palm Island: Future Directions, op cit, 35. 33. Boe, above n 5. 34. Doreen Massey ‘Geographies of Responsibility’ (2004) 86B(1) Geografiska Annaler Series B, Human Geography 5. 35. Scott Veitch, Law and Irresponsibility: On the Legitimation of Human Suffering (2007), 99–114. 36. Stewart Motha, ‘The Failure of “Postcolonial” Sovereignty in Australia’ (2005) 22 Australian Feminist Law Journal 107. 37. In certain circumstances. See especially the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) is excluded from the Northern Territory Emergency Response Act 2007 (Cth): s132(2). 38. ‘A statistical overview of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander People in Australia’ (August 2006) Australian Human Rights Commission <hreoc.gov.au/Social_Justice/ statistics/index.html#toc9> at 14 December 2008. 39. See for example the Hindmarsh Island Bridge affair, critiqued in Diane Bell, Ngarrindjeri Wurruwarrin: a world that is, was, and will be (1998). 40. Irene Watson, ‘Illusionists and Hunters: Being Aboriginal in this Occupied Space’ (2005) 22 Australian Feminist Law Journal 15. 41. Northern Territory National Emergency Response Act 2007 (Cth). Section 132 excludes the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) from operation in certain areas of the Northern Territory. AltLJ Vol 34:4 2009 — 251 ARTICLES racism in order to overcome it are generally non-performative, meaning that they do not do what they say.44 Gestures that declare racism has been overcome do not actually overcome racism if the wider space in which that gesture is situated is still embedded in racism. Non-performative anti-racist gestures effectively announce that ‘we know racism exists, and now that we have acknowledged its existence, it doesn’t really exist anymore’.45 Legal anti-racist gestures such as anti-discrimination legislation implicitly assert this message, instituting state mechanisms to address racism and in turn suggesting that racism is something that exists in less enlightened individuals or institutions and not in the state itself. Non-performative anti-racist gestures make white Australians feel better about themselves and their state while both maintaining and hiding the ongoing colonial process. They create the illusion that the state is taking responsibility for racist injustices while in fact entrenching the relation of irresponsibility that exists towards indigenous Australia. Part of police anger over Hurley being charged was that members felt betrayed by the Australian community, particularly those who live in the cities and celebrate non-performative anti-racist gestures, but who are far removed from the indigenous despair that police in indigenous communities face on a daily basis. The Queensland police establishment argued on numerous occasions that Hurley and all police working in indigenous communities are doing it for the rest of us46 — they are out there on our behalf, enforcing our laws, doing our dirty work, taking responsibility for the maintenance of our nation. And this argument has great weight if the collective ‘we’ being assumed in these statements is white Australia. For as long as Australians like Hurley join the police force and are posted to remote places that are sites of indigenous poverty, despair and dysfunction, non-indigenous Australians in settled towns and cities can forget about that despair. The everyday reality of indigenous dispossession is far from the view of most Australians, and is only further obscured by the existence of very public non-performative anti-racist gestures. This is not to deny that there is also support for anti-racist gestures and for increased police presence in remote communities from indigenous Australians — the issue is by no means a settled or straightforward one for indigenous communities.47 But in terms of how these measures relate to non-indigenous Australia, while men like Hurley go to the remote frontiers to deal with the ongoing dispossession, non-indigenous Australians, whose lifestyle depends on ongoing indigenous dispossession, can take comfort in their government’s ‘postcolonial’ reforms and get on with their lives. A blue wristband of history Awareness wristbands have been used in various colours and styles for a range of causes including several incurable diseases, anti-bullying and human rights. The QPU released the first batch of 4000 wristbands imprinted with Hurley’s police number on 8 February 2007, two weeks after it was announced Hurley would face trial for manslaughter. Sold for $5 each at police stations throughout Queensland, the initial 4000 sold out in a day.48 The funds raised from the blue wristbands were put towards meeting Hurley’s legal costs, but QPU vice-president Denis Fitzpatrick stated ‘It’s not a significant amount of money we’re trying to raise. It’s more an issue with regards of support and solidarity of our member’.49 Fitzpatrick called the wristbands ‘a silent protest’.50 The wristbands were silent in the sense that they did not produce an audio sound, and also in that their message was not clearly articulated. In media interviews and advertisements that accompanied the release of the wristbands, QPU representatives spoke about the need for increased police numbers, for better video monitoring in cells and for resources to implement the recommendations of the Royal 42. Jenny Macklin MP, ‘Australian Government Response to the NTER Review’ (23 October 2008) available at <jennymacklin.fahcsia.gov.au/internet/ jennymacklin.nsf/content/nter_measure_ 23oct08.htm> at 12 June 2009. 43. Andrea Smith, ‘Unmasking the State: Racial/Gender Terror and Hate Crimes’ (2007) 26 Australian Feminist Law Journal 47. 44. Sara Ahmed, ‘Declarations of Whiteness: The Non-Performativity of Anti-Racism’ (2004) 3(2) borderlands e-journal. 45. Ibid. 46. See for example the statement of Queensland Police Minister Judy Spence on ‘The Law Report’ (11 November 2008) ABC Radio National <abc.net.au/rn/ lawreport/stories/2008/2416076.htm> at 12 November 2008. 47. Marcia Langton, ‘Trapped in the Aboriginal reality show’ (2007) 19 Griffith Review 145 and ‘It’s time to stop playing politics with vulnerable lives’ The Age (Melbourne) 30 November 2007. 48. Ibid. 49. ‘Police wear colours for colleague: Bands of support’ Cairns Post (Cairns) 10 February 2007. 50. Ibid. Photo by Glenn Hampson, reproduced with permission from News Limited. The blue wristband view of history is dangerous because it creates the illusion that Australia has addressed or is in the process of addressing the wrongs of the past and is now building an anti-racist, socially just postcolonial nation. ARTICLES 252 — AltLJ Vol 34:4 2009 Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody (RCIADIC).51 These claims are both vague and contradictory — the RCIADIC did not recommend increased police numbers. There was video monitoring in Mulrunji’s cell — it showed Mulrunji dying and a junior police officer later kicking his body to see whether he was conscious.52 Yet while the message of the QPU’s ‘silent protest’ was not clearly expressed, it was loudly broadcast — as well as a front page spread on the Gold Coast Bulletin, articles about the wristbands appeared in newspapers across Queensland.53 The tactics, tone and imagery of the campaign expressed a strong set of emotions — an indignant outrage, angry, threatening, and self-righteous. The image of the young white woman54 holding up her bent arm to display her blue wristband resonates strongly with imperial representations of the nation’s woman fighter, who stands in solidarity with her male colleagues but also needs protection from the racialised and sexualised other. White colonising cultures are deeply misogynistic, and as Irene Watson has argued, those cultures administer and police themselves entirely within a patriarchal horizon.55 The use of a young woman as the central image of the QPU campaign denies the patriarchal aspect of colonial violence. Using a male police officer for the publicity would not have achieved this effect — the image of a policeman holding up his bent arm and glaring militantly at the camera would have displayed the patriarchal violence that the use of the woman denied, and would not have had the same affective connotations of the woman as representative of nation. This highly emotive assertion of white nationalism in the context of a white police officer being charged with the assault and manslaughter of an indigenous man intimated the deeper and more unspeakable message that Mulrunji’s death was not a crime, but a necessary part of the maintenance of the nation. The wristband campaign asserted that Hurley was so innocent that it was an outrageous injustice that he should even go to trial; what he was doing that morning was not just innocent, it was a necessary part of the ongoing process that is Australia today. Although a formal complaint was entered with the Queensland police force when police prosecutors wore the blue wristbands to an opening ceremony of an indigenous court,56 the wristband campaign was not met with widespread condemnations of white nationalism or fascism. Of course, not every non-indigenous Australian bought a blue wristband and no doubt many would have been critical of Mulrunji’s death and the QPU’s response. But the fact that there was very little popular outcry suggests that the difference in attitude towards white-indigenous relations in Australia today between those buying the wristbands and those who were indifferent or even quietly critical of the wristband campaign is in practice not as wide as those who celebrate Australian post-coloniality might like to think. The banal liberalism promulgated by postcolonial legal reforms has successfully encouraged most non- indigenous Australians to believe that the mistreatment of indigenous people today is not their responsibility. Against the landscape of severely impoverished indigenous communities and the relatively prosperous white majority, the attitude that indigenous oppression is ‘not my responsibility’ is not that far from the attitude that that oppression is necessary. The blue wristbands denied the ongoing occurrence of colonial violence (by insisting on Hurley’s innocence) at the same time as they implicitly asserted the need for such violence in the maintenance of the nation. Such contradictory and hypocritical politics are consistent with a broader view of Australian history that sees Australia as postcolonial, while actively reproducing colonial power relations. Unlike either the ‘black armband’ view of history or its opponent, which unreservedly celebrated colonisation, this ‘blue wristband’ view of history acknowledges the harm done to indigenous Australians in the past but insists that postcolonial justice is now on its way to being achieved. The blue wristband view of history is dangerous because it creates the illusion that Australia has addressed or is in the process of addressing the wrongs of the past and is now building an anti-racist, socially just postcolonial nation. That illusion is what allows the prime minister to argue that the nation can now safely draw a truce in the history wars, and is part of what prevents the emergence of a resistance movement that is willing to challenge the fundamental racist underpinnings of the Australian state. As the Doomadgee family continue battling the legal system, and indigenous communities around the country continue to live in poverty, the blue wristband view of history not only provides the context in which the Australian landscape of colonial violence and severe inequality continues to occur, but is part of what enables that violence and inequality to continue. SARAH KEENAN is a PhD candidate from the Centre for Law, Gender and Sexuality at the University of Kent, UK. © 2009 Sarah Keenan 51. Ben Dillaway and Geoff Chambers, ‘Copping it on the radio’ Gold Coast Bulletin (Gold Coast) 1 February 2007. 52. Clements, above n 9. 53. Newspapers with articles on the wristbands include the Courier Mail, Townsville Bulletin and Cairns Post. Each article is archived on the QPU website at http://www.qpu.asn.au.unionnews. php#_2007. 54. The QPU did not give copyright permission for the photo described to be reproduced in this article. It can however be accessed online at page 12 of the February 2007 union journal. See http:// www.qpu.asn.au/journal07.php. 55. Irene Watson ‘Aboriginal Women’s Law and Lives: How Might We Keep Growing the Law?’ (2007) 26 Australian Feminist Law Journal 95 at 99. 56. Michael McKenna, ‘Up in arms over thin blue line’ The Australian (Sydney), 26 May 2007. 
work_7ekttefchjfajdddibq4avsy4m	----	Microsoft Word - 19ar020007[4]  Abstract—The issue of social and legal recognition of LGBTQ families is of high importance when exploring the possibility of a family. Of equal importance is the fact that both society and the individual contribute to the overall recognition of LGBTQ families. This paper is a conceptual discussion, by methodology, of both sides; it uses a method of constructive analysis to expound on this issue. This method’s aim is to broaden conceptual theory, and introduce a new relationship between concepts that were previously not associated by evidence. This exploration has found that LGBTQ realities from an international perspective may differ and both legal and social rights are critical toward self-consciousness and the formation of a family. This paper asserts that internalised and historic oppression of LGBTQ individuals, places them, not always and not in all places, in a disadvantageous position as far as engaging with the potential of forming a family goes. The paper concludes that lack of social recognition and internalised oppression are key barriers regarding LGBTQ families. Keywords—Family, gay, LGBTQ, self-worth, social rights. I. INTRODUCTION HE starting point of this paper is that recognition of LGBTQ identified people is not at all universal; neither is legislation that safeguards LGBTQ rights. For example, the death penalty for LGBTQ individuals is still effective in five countries in the world, while over 70 countries impose imprisonment to individuals who identify as or are suspected to be of LGBTQ identity [1]. These international perspectives are very important to highlight in order to set the scene for what we want to explore here; LGBTQ identities, perceptions and families. This reality is imperative to the concept of a family [2], [3]; how lesbians, gays, bisexuals, transgenders or people who identify as queer comprehend their place in relation to having a family in the future and what that family will look like is vastly different from one place of the world to the next. For some, a family is a reality, a possibility that needs pursuing. For others, however, this is utopian to even think of. And that is where this paper will take us next. We will explore these two concepts; the binary between reality and utopia, and what makes it real as opposed to utopian. II. DEFINITIONAL INQUIRIES One of the most controversial concepts in the 21st century is the term ‘family’. Throughout modern human history, family would be a traditional term, which would describe the union P. Pentaris is with the Department of Psychology, Social Work and Counseling, University of Greenwich, London, UK. He is also with the Faiths & Civil Society Unit, Goldsmiths, University of London, London, UK (e- mail: p.pentaris@gre.ac.uk). between a man and a woman by marriage, as well as the birth of biological children [4]. However, this concept has shifted tremendously over the last decades to include the variety of types of families which we recognise nowadays [5]. Some families consist of two people; whether heterosexual, homosexual, bisexual and so on. Also, a single person raising a child is a family; again, regardless of sexual orientation or gender reassignment. Some families also have children whereas others do not. One of the most important types of family, which we see more often in relation to LGBTQ people, are the families that are chosen [6]; close friends and allies become a close-knit family system for many people around the world, and are recognised as a family a lot more as societies progress. That said, signs of direct and indirect discrimination toward LGBTQ families pertain as Haines et al. [7] suggest. Specifically, Haines and her colleagues found that LGBTQ families continue to be targeted in a subtle way for reasons including the legitimacy of their family, conflicts with family values, and gender violation within families. Altogether, Trost [8] claimed the diversification of the concept of family, which applies to today’s circumstances. Trost suggests that more than often what one means by the use of the term ‘family’ differs from another person’s way of use. This is significant and is taken into consideration when appraising this subject. With this in mind, it is necessary to specify who the paper refers to by the use of the term ‘LGBTQ family’ in this paper. The term is used to talk about the union between people who identify as LGBTQ, whether they have children or not, with applicability to single persons who may be adopting children or being foster parents. Yet, family is not the only controversial term used in this paper. The acronym LGBTQ (also popular as LGBTQI, LGBTQ+ or LGBT) is equally contentious. To start with, it is important to acknowledge the internationality of the acronym LGBTQ; it is indeed, and generally, used to refer to a set of people whose sexual or gender identities can stir social and political concerns [9]. The term is used widely, across the world, and sometimes there may be some differentiations. L stands for lesbian, G for gay, B for bisexual, T for transgender and Q for queer. In other contexts, Q may also stand for questioning; the acronym may use a second Q or the symbol + to include aspects of sexual and gender identities not covered with the other acronyms. Even though Q stands for queer in this paper, the term queer is used to identify everyone who may feel they do not fit under any of the other categories (for lack of a better word), and apologises in advance if this offends someone. Panagiotis Pentaris A Constructive Analysis of the Formation of LGBTQ Families: Where Utopia and Reality Meet T World Academy of Science, Engineering and Technology International Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences Vol:13, No:1, 2019 60International Scholarly and Scientific Research & Innovation 13(1) 2019 ISNI:0000000091950263 O pe n S ci en ce I nd ex , H um an it ie s an d S oc ia l S ci en ce s V ol :1 3, N o: 1, 2 01 9 w as et .o rg /P ub li ca ti on /1 00 09 96 4 III. LGBTQ WORLDWIDE Attitudes, perspectives, conceptions and misconceptions about LGBTQ identities vary across the world – for example [10]-[12]; and, to appreciate how those impact on LGBTQ families or the potentiality of having a family, it is imperative to examine how these identities are perceived legally and socially, across the world. LGBTQ rights became more and more part of public dialogues after the 1950s [13]. Or, perhaps gay and lesbian rights became more pertinent to public conversations. If one looks deeper into the history of gay and lesbian rights or the transgender movement since the mid-20th century, they will become more familiar with the social acknowledgement of human rights related to LGBTQ identities overall. The ever- growing public awareness and identification of sexual identities coincided with the aftermath of decriminalising and legalising homosexuality as an identity – for example [14]. Many nations abided by this to date, while others opposed it for various reasons. For example, in Turkmenistan, male-to- male sexual relationships remain illegal on the basis of skewing the social role of men. Qatar and Saudi Arabia are two other examples where homosexuality remains illegal due to social and religious reasons. In the 1990s, gay marriage between same-sex partners was not legally recognised anywhere in the world [15]. In September 2000, in the Netherlands, gay marriage was legalised. This started a decade of great dialogue and emphasis on legal rights of LGBTQ. Following the Netherlands, Belgium, Norway, Sweden, Spain, South Africa, Canada, Mexico City and some states in the US [16] also legalised gay marriage in the 2000s. Biblarz and Savci [17] extensively reviewed the research trends in LGBTQ families during the 2000s; inclusive of their explorations was a discussion about the emergence of legal rights regarding gay marriage, and subsequently the potentiality for a family, across several countries. Many countries, including France, legalised gay marriage in 2013, while others, e.g., Germany, joined in only recently (2017 October). Since December 2017, approximately 20 countries worldwide have legalised gay marriage (Austria legalised it on January 1st, 2019), and many others (like Greece, Andorra, Switzerland and Austria) have legalised civil unions. A. Legal and Social LGBTQ Rights Legal and social LGBTQ rights do intertwine (also see [18]); hence, it is necessary to look at both and examine their relationship. This section will look at a few examples, but it is worth noting that one does not need to cross the globe to find different rights; within same continents there might be opposing views about the same subject. One good example is Africa [19]. Africa is a continent with a vast experience of the LGBTQ community. From civil marriage rights in South Africa to criminalisation and death penalty in Sudan; when dialoguing about social belongingness, which this paper explores later, and social rights, the appreciation of how single societies diversify on the same subject is crucial. Criminalisation is not only evident in Sudan though, and the reasons differ from country to country, as mentioned earlier in this text. Bangladesh is an example of how LGBTQ identities are criminalised through a religious lens; religion suggests that people with LGBTQ identities are sinners and, therefore, are socially denied, or denied social engagement. Of course, the religious lens through which members of the LGBTQ community may be oppressed is not a new finding; it has been discussed extensively since before the 20th century [20]-[23]. Germany is another nation with progressive changes evident in its recent history. Despite its liberal character, Germany presents itself with evidence of covert discrimination as well; an example is Baden-Württemberg’s proposed curriculum which would include sexual diversity in education; this was met with a lot of resistance and tremendous argument [24]. In the UK, there have also been increased changes in social attitudes, as well as legal rights; however, social discrimination continues, in a casual fashion (e.g. [25]). Japan is another nation that has not legalised gay marriage; only since 2017, a few cities in Japan have legally accepted civil partnership between same-sex partners. Generally, Japan is a nation which promotes human rights on the whole, but remains conservative on the ideas of marriage and union [26]. Also, Japan is one of the countries that legalises homosexuality by law; an ambiguous act as other sexual orientations (e.g., heterosexuality) do not need to be legalised. The latter is not simply the case with Japan but other countries as well. The situation is very similar to Greece; despite the recent changes towards improving social and legal rights of the LGBTQ community (e.g., civil union in December 2015), individuals still face major prejudice and discrimination, while the Greek Orthodox Church teaches, not dissimilar to many other beliefs across the world, that homosexuality is a diversion from life; an abnormality. Argentina is another nation that has seen recent changes on the subject; gay marriage was legalised in 2010, making Argentina the 10th country in the world to legalise gay marriage, and the legal and social circumstances for transgender people are increasing since the Argentina’s Gender Identity Law in 2012. Uruguay and Mexico City have also legalised gay adoption, while remaining openly supportive to the advancement of social belongingness of LGBTQ identified individuals. Colombia has as well legalised gay marriage in 2013; and, France, Brazil, Denmark and New Zealand followed with similar responses to legally identifying LGBTQ rights. Meanwhile, while LGBTQ rights are more and more recognised in some countries in the world, many others continue to criminalize homosexuality; same-sex relationships and sexual contact. The punishment varies from mild imprisonment to death. Russia is a country which has promoted misconceptions about the LGBTQ community and fostered hatred towards it. Many individuals who identify as LGBTQ live in fear that someone will find out about their identity and experience prejudice generally [27]. Other nations, like Trinidad and Tobago, have banned homosexuality and criminalise it. Malawi is another example World Academy of Science, Engineering and Technology International Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences Vol:13, No:1, 2019 61International Scholarly and Scientific Research & Innovation 13(1) 2019 ISNI:0000000091950263 O pe n S ci en ce I nd ex , H um an it ie s an d S oc ia l S ci en ce s V ol :1 3, N o: 1, 2 01 9 w as et .o rg /P ub li ca ti on /1 00 09 96 4 of where homosexuality is criminalised. In other nations, homosexuality is punished by death; e.g., Iran. Also, in Cameroon, homosexuality is penalised and criminalised, while the nations hold anti-gay laws. A very similar situation is seen in Nigeria and Uganda [19]; for Ugandan anti-gay law, see [28]. Yemen is another example of the death penalty in cases, where if the person engaged in a homosexual activity is married, where if unmarried, the punishment is whipping and imprisonment. Mauritania, Saudi Arabia and Afghanistan are also nations where homosexuality is punished by death, in this case stoning [29]. This section has, so far, looked at several examples regarding legal rights; the criminalisation and decriminalisation of homosexuality and transgender identified individuals. However, do these rights or lack of always match the social rights of LGBTQ across the world? Is the legal right to marry a partner also socially recognised and accepted? For example, despite the liberal approach to homosexuality in the Netherlands and the legal rights established for more than 15 years, research by Keuzenkamp and Kuyper [30] recommends that in Holland there is still ambiguity with gay adoption, led by social attitudes. Before discussing some thoughts and facts about social rights across the word, it is worth highlighting that gay men and lesbian women or transgender people have a more concrete experience of legal rights or lack of than bisexual individuals; people who identify as bisexuals have been widely criticised by both heterosexual and homosexual individuals [31]. When discussing bisexuality, or asexuality as another identity, we can primarily focus on social rights; recognition and acceptability. The US has seen progressive changes in the 21st century [32]. A shift in attitudes toward LGBTQ families, to be specific [32]; today, 60% of Americans endorse gay marriage. Despite the positive remark here, however, it raises questions of whether LGBTQ families formed outside of marriage are also accepted or accounted for. The European Region of the International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association ran a study published in 2006, led and authored by Takács [33], which explored social exclusion of young LGBT people in Europe. This study found that more than 85% of the young people who participated in the study have experienced, or are experiencing social exclusion in various forms and in various settings because of their sexual orientation or gender identification. The first place where young people experience social exclusion is their home. Community and circle of close friends came next. Also, approximately 75% of the respondents suggested that they feel that prejudice is expressed in the media. The association of LGBTQ (especially gay men) with AIDS/HIV enhances or perpetuates thoughts and attitudes in societies. The AIDS epidemic in the 1980s was otherwise recognised as the gay cancer – unquestionably a stigmatising approach to gay men of the LGBTQ community, but also other members of the community (lesbians, transgender people, and bisexuals). Socially, such recognition has a much more hurtful impact on the LGBTQ communities across the world; in the long run, the public associated AIDS and HIV with LGBTQ people, which shift the public’s attitudes towards LGBTQ people [34]. Also, children and youth that have experienced bullying at school are more likely to carry long-term effects. Bullying projects general discrimination and long-term effects, in which situations people may withdraw or socially isolate [35]. The latter influences the individual and impacts on self-worth, equally. Despite the positive progressions towards social recognition and acceptance of LGBTQ identities and gender identifications, in many countries, people from these communities still experience discrimination and are often victims of hate crimes [36]. We need not look far for examples, especially drawing on the last three years; however, this paper does not name any of those as they can often be interpreted as general crime and not done on the grounds of prejudice and discrimination (e.g. Orlando shootings in the US – [37]). Worth noting, however, is a very recent Stonewell study with LGBTQ people in the UK [50]; the study explored LGBTQ people’s experiences of hate crime and discrimination in the UK in 2017. General findings suggest that one in five LGBTQ people have experienced hate crime due to their sexual orientation and/or gender identity. The percentages increase when looking at transgender people specifically (two in five). The number of people who experienced discrimination and hate crime in 2017 has increased by 78% since 2013. This is an incredibly worrying fact which should be looked at very carefully in future work. Many reasons hide behind such attitudes, and even though this paper is not focused on that, it is worth highlighting two which have subtly been introduced this far; first, contestations of gender and family norms influence homophobia [38]. The idea of normality and its contextual construction are great factors that inform people’s beliefs and attitudes. Religion has often been considered another reason behind discrimination and prejudice [39]. Examples were discussed earlier (e.g., Bangladesh). In conclusion, the relationship between legal and social rights is uneven; legalisation of gay marriage does not constitute social and unifying acceptance of the right or does not secure fair and honest treatment, free from hate crime, prejudice and discrimination. The latter opposes the idea of citizenship as described by Bellamy [40]. The constitution of citizenship includes freedom of expression and the right to social engagement as well responsibility for advocacy and public action. The information presented in this section, however, seem to contest the true nature of citizenship or at least challenge the applicability of the right to citizenship. IV. IMPACT OF LGBTQ RIGHTS, OR LACK OF Social and legal rights and/or lack of impact on the individual; Honneth [41] recognised this when discussing equity and social justice. In his words, ‘even if conflicts over interests were justly adjudicated, a society would remain normatively deficient to the extent to which its members are systematically denied the recognition they deserve’ [41, p.1]. A most important way in which individuals who identify as World Academy of Science, Engineering and Technology International Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences Vol:13, No:1, 2019 62International Scholarly and Scientific Research & Innovation 13(1) 2019 ISNI:0000000091950263 O pe n S ci en ce I nd ex , H um an it ie s an d S oc ia l S ci en ce s V ol :1 3, N o: 1, 2 01 9 w as et .o rg /P ub li ca ti on /1 00 09 96 4 LGBTQ are influenced is self-worth. Recognition of self by the others is a most important factor of self-worth. Those individuals who experience a lack of social rights specifically, may suffer from a sense of worthlessness. Equally, another way in which LGBTQ people may be influenced by the lack of social rights, and legal, is self-denial. Oppressive behaviours and attitudes towards the person tend to be internalised [42] and the individual starts acting out the oppressive behaviour by the other; if the other is denying the person’s existence, social and sexual identity, the person starts acting that attitude out. It is the process of normalising behaviour or lack of. Wolfensberger [43] discussed this in the terms of social role valorisation theory. His accounts were specific about how the lack of recognition of one identity and enablement of another gave value to the latter and pushed it towards normalisation. Similarly, the lack of social recognition of sexual identity logically solidifies the opposite, and, therefore, internalises the normality of the opposite. Further, the rights to social recognition and engagement impact on the person’s sense of belonging and sense of identity. It is imperative to understand the long-term effects of social isolation [44], disenfranchisement [45] and stigma [46] to better appreciate LGBTQ families or the potentiality for one. Drawing on Doka’s [45] work about disenfranchised grief, we can appreciate how lack of social recognition and acceptance of other than grief experiences can also be impactful to the individual. Self-denial, internalised stigma and oppression, lack of self-worth, are all factors toward social isolation and disengagement. Equally, Honneth [41, p.2] approached the issue of social recognition as follows: ‘The possibility for sensing, interpreting, and realizing one’s needs and desires as a fully autonomous and individuated person – in short, the very possibility of identity-formation – depends crucially on the development of self-confidence, self-respect, and self-esteem’. The lack of recognition of one’s identity more than often leads individuals into constructing a double life strategy [33]. Due to social denial, individuals start leading a secret life in which they express themselves freely, and a more conservative one, which meets the expectations of own family of origin, peers, and communities. Such ‘strategy’ further influences self-denial and lack of self-worth; leading a secret life rationalises social attitudes and solidifies to the individual that their lifestyle is not simply different but incompatible and, therefore, unacceptable to the wider society. Also, LGBTQ people who have faced oppressive attitudes and general lack of legal and social recognition are likely to disengage from their family [33]; in other words, they are leaving their family home and distance themselves from everyday interactions. This is a much more important issue than we have considered thus far, as such actions impact on how individuals appreciate family, family values and their worth of being a member of a family. This idea is subtly presented, but not intentionally, in Chambers’ [5] work. Stigma, as discussed by Goffman [46], is a most apparent result from the disenfranchisement of sexual orientation and gender identification. The individuals may experience negative attitudes in society. In his work, Goffman, describes all individuals who have characteristics outside of the norm, as socially ‘abnormal’. Mind this is a work from the 1960s, when political correctness was not a hot topic and ‘abnormal’ was the normal way of referring to difference. Nevertheless, Goffman’s suspicions are not far from today’s society. For example, lesbian women who start a family, continue to experience stigma as an abnormal family [47]. Yet another aspect of stigma is the following. Fear of social stigmatisation of the other is an additional impact on LGBTQ people who have or are experiencing lack of recognition of their identity and its meaning [33]. To explain this, further, Takács [33] found that often, LGBTQ people would blame themselves for their families’ and friends’ reactions to their sexual orientation and/or gender identification; they would see the reaction as stigma in response to their identity, which leads them, sometimes, to develop fear of stigmatising others because of their identity. Again, this links with self-worth, self-denial and sense of identity. V. LGBTQ FAMILIES: REALITY VERSUS UTOPIA It has probably, and hopefully, become evident by now that legal rights may be easier to overcome. Of course, this is not to undermine the importance of legal rights and equitable treatment between all members of society. However, it is human mentality that informs the potentiality of an LGBTQ family more than anything else; of course, this is in the proviso that one needs not get married to run a family. It was mentioned earlier that approximately 20 countries worldwide have legally recognised in one way or another the rights of LGBTQ people to either marry or be in a civil union/ partnership. What about all the individuals in the rest of the world; aside from those 20 countries? Well, the straightforward answer is behind globalisation [48]; large waves of migrants have moved across the world for decades, and continue to do so. Many LGBTQ couples would either move to a different country in which they can enjoy the benefits of fairness or even visit a country in which they could get married, even if the marriage would be invalid upon return to their home nation, except for all members of the European Union, since very recently (i.e., 2018) that are legally bound to recognise any marriage. In 2000, when gay marriage was legalised in the Netherlands, for example, many couples flew to the country to get married but with no intention of staying. Of course, in the 2010s, the scenario of migration is much more common. That said, when LGBTQ families are not a reality in one place, individuals move to another, in which they can enjoy the benefit. However, there are two concerns with this. First, not all individuals may have the opportunity for movement; whether this relates to the capacity (e.g., financial) and strength to do so, or the ability and freedom (e.g., victims of war, victimisation), neither of which is the focus of this paper. We do need, nonetheless, to highlight the diversification of experience in this perspective. This has been highlighted most constructively since the 1980s by Nungesser [49], who identified the diverse range of identity and homosexuality in a World Academy of Science, Engineering and Technology International Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences Vol:13, No:1, 2019 63International Scholarly and Scientific Research & Innovation 13(1) 2019 ISNI:0000000091950263 O pe n S ci en ce I nd ex , H um an it ie s an d S oc ia l S ci en ce s V ol :1 3, N o: 1, 2 01 9 w as et .o rg /P ub li ca ti on /1 00 09 96 4 single space. Moving beyond the technicalities of marriage and civil unions, we ought to pay close attention to the impact of lack of social rights in the long run, as discussed earlier. Lack of self- worth, sense of belonging, sense of identity and the self- victimisation and self-blame are all internalised processes which feed the individual with negative feelings about the self. The culmination of all these feelings leads to the most important questions of all, when considering LGBTQ families: Is the individual considering themselves worthy of a family? Does the individual allow themselves to have a family? In other words, for some people, a family may be a reality, perhaps because of legal benefits or their sense of worth and self-sufficiency. However, for others, an LGBTQ family is a utopia; an unreachable dream which has no chance of materialising; whether that has to do with legal or social barriers and their impact. VI. CONCLUSION We have looked at some definitional issues in the beginning of this paper, reflections and facts about legal and social rights of people who identify as LGBTQ, as well as the contested notion of an LGBTQ family; dependent on emotional, social, psychological, environmental, legal, economic and experiential factors. This leads to few concluding thoughts, as follows. 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Hochstein, “Institutional religion and gay/lesbian oppression,” Marriage & Family Review, vol.14(3-4), 1989, pp.265-284. [23] E. Dussel, “Popular religion as oppression and liberation: hypotheses on its past and present in Latin America,” Concilium, vol.186, 1986, pp.83- 85. [24] M. Gardner, “Baden-Württemberg's Science Policy: Boosting International Competitiveness,” Industry and Higher Education, vol.4(2), 1990, pp.113-118. [25] N. Drydakis, “Sexual orientation discrimination in the United Kingdom’s labour market: A field experiment,” Human Relations, vol.68(11), 2015, pp.1769-1796. [26] R. Ronald, and A. Alexy, eds., Home and family in Japan: continuity and transformation. London, UK: Routledge, 2017. [27] C. Wilkinson, “Putting traditional values into practice: Russia’s anti-gay laws,” Russian analytical digest, vol.138, 2013, pp.5-7. [28] M. Hollander, “Gay rights in Uganda: seeking to overturn Uganda's anti- sodomy laws,” Virginia Journal of International Law, vol.50, 2009, pp.219-266. [29] A. Karimi, and Z. Bayatrizi, “Dangerous positions: Male homosexuality in the new penal code of Iran,” Punishment & Society, 2018, pp.1-18. Published online http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1462474518787465. [30] S. Keuzenkamp, and L. Kuyper, Acceptance of lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender individuals in the Netherlands 2013. The Netherlands Institute of Social Research: Report, 2013. [31] B. A. Firestein, Bisexuality: The psychology and politics of an invisible minority. London, UK: Sage, 1996. [32] A. E. Goldberg, and K. R. Allen, eds., LGBT-parent families: Innovations in research and implications for practice. New York, NY: Springer, 2012. [33] J. Takács, Social exclusion of young lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) people in Europe. Brussels, Belgium: ILGA Europe, 2006. [34] G. M. Herek, and J. P. Capitanio, “AIDS stigma and sexual prejudice,” American behavioral scientist, vol.42(7), 1999, pp.1130-1147. [35] R. Martin, On the justification of rights. In F. Stoutland, Philosophy of action/Philosophie de l’action. Springer, Dordrecht, 1982, pp.153-186. [36] N. Chakraborti, and J. Garland, eds., Responding to hate crime: The case for connecting policy and research. Bristol, UK: Policy Press, 2015. World Academy of Science, Engineering and Technology International Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences Vol:13, No:1, 2019 64International Scholarly and Scientific Research & Innovation 13(1) 2019 ISNI:0000000091950263 O pe n S ci en ce I nd ex , H um an it ie s an d S oc ia l S ci en ce s V ol :1 3, N o: 1, 2 01 9 w as et .o rg /P ub li ca ti on /1 00 09 96 4 [37] N. Walter, T. J. Billard, and S. T. Murphy, “On the boundaries of framing terrorism: Guilt, victimization, and the 2016 Orlando shooting,” Mass Communication and Society, vol.20(6), 2017, pp.849-868. [38] G. M. Herek, ed., Stigma and sexual orientation (Vol. 4). London, UK: Sage, 1998. [39] C. H. Rosik, L. K. Griffith, and Z. Cruz, “Homophobia and conservative religion: Toward a more nuanced understanding,” American Journal of Orthopsychiatry, vol.77(1), 2007, pp.10-19. [40] R. Bellamy, Citizenship: A very short introduction (Vol. 192). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2008. [41] A. Honneth, The struggle for recognition: The moral grammar of social conflicts. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996. [42] E. J. R. David, ed., Internalized oppression: The psychology of marginalized groups. New York, NY: Springer Publishing Company, 2013. [43] W. Wolfensberger, “Social role valorization: A proposed new term for the principle of normalization,” Mental retardation, vol.21(6), 1983, p.234. [44] R. S. Weiss, Loneliness: The experience of emotional and social isolation. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1973. [45] K. J. Doka, Disenfranchised grief: New directions, challenges, and strategies for practice. Champaign, IL: Research Press, 2002. [46] E. Goffman, Stigma: Notes on a spoiled identity. Buckingham, UK: Jenkins, 1963. [47] H. M. Bos, and F. Van Balen, “Children in planned lesbian families: Stigmatisation, psychological adjustment and protective factors,” Culture, Health & Sexuality, vol.10(3), 2008, pp.221-236. [48] D. L. Bevan, and A. K. Fosu, “Globalisation: An overview,” Journal of African Economies, vol.12(suppl_1), 2003, pp.1-13. [49] L. G. Nungesser, Homosexual acts, actors, and identities. Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger Publishers, 1983. [50] Stonewall, LGBT in Britain: Hate crime and discrimination. London, UK: Stonewall, 2017. Panagiotis Pentaris is a Senior Lecturer for the Department of Psychology, Social Work and Counselling at the University of Greenwich. He is also a Postdoc Research Fellow for the Faiths & Civil Society Unit at Goldsmiths, University of London. Panagiotis is a thanatologist, as well as a qualified social worker (nationally and internationally) with specialty in hospice social work, as well as clinical social work in end of life care. His research stretches from death policies to professional practice, while he has recently completed a large-scale UK-national project about religion, belief and spirituality in end of life care practice; he has devised a model of religious literacy in end of life care, which is currently being introduced to policy makers, while it already informs training and development of palliative professionals in hospice care. Panagiotis has written widely about the intersection of religion and death and is focusing on professional practice and policy in these areas. He is also a Trustee Member for the Independent Academic Research Studies (IARS) International Institute, and a Country Representative for the International Peace Centre Africa, while he acts as an international advocate for LGBTQ rights and dying and grief. World Academy of Science, Engineering and Technology International Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences Vol:13, No:1, 2019 65International Scholarly and Scientific Research & Innovation 13(1) 2019 ISNI:0000000091950263 O pe n S ci en ce I nd ex , H um an it ie s an d S oc ia l S ci en ce s V ol :1 3, N o: 1, 2 01 9 w as et .o rg /P ub li ca ti on /1 00 09 96 4 
work_7ewzuctlpjf33od663glfbhbqa	----	Microsoft Word - TheCriminalSex.doc The Criminal Sex: Criminal Law and Transsexuality within the United States, Japan, and Iran Zachary Shemtob Introduction The purpose of this paper is to explore the issue of transsexuality within the legal and criminal frameworks of the United States, Japan, and Iran. While the cultural and historical aspects of transsexuality have been broadly scrutinized within academia, a comparative criminal justice perspective has yet to be constructed. This paper is not meant to provide a definitive account on this subject matter, but to rather shed some light on a substantially underdeveloped topic. I have chosen to look at the United States, Japan, and Iran for two primary reasons. First, each nation has a distinct cultural and historical background. Whereas countries like the United States and Britain largely developed from the same legal tradition, the U.S., Japan, and Iran have fundamentally disparate judicial and social philosophies. Second, all three countries have recently considered the issue of transsexuality, and come to dramatically different conclusions. These conclusions will likely be surprising to anyone who views the United States as overly litigious, Japan as comparatively enlightened, or Iran as purely repressive. This failure to conform to expectations not only highlights the complexity of comparative criminal justice, but also reveals the existence of seemingly contradictory narratives within even a single national discourse. 1 Although often confused, the phrases transgender and transsexual have two distinct meanings. A transgendered individual is someone whose physical gender (male or female) diverges significantly from his or her ‘gender identity’ (Ryan and Futterman, 1998). Many transgendered individuals will refuse to look, act, or generally conform to a specific traditional gender, while others will adopt the role of their gender opposite. If acting according to the latter, an individual is generally regarded as a transsexual. Transsexuals literally feel born in the wrong sexual body, and (clinically) are said to suffer from gender dysphoria or Gender Identity Disorder (www.behavenet.com). Not all transsexuals undergo sexual reassignment surgeryi, but those who go from male to female I shall abbreviate as MtFs and those from female to male as FtMs. Admittedly, I have oversimplified an extremely complex phenomenon; the terms ‘gender’ and ‘sex’ should not be used interchangeably, and debate still exists on whether transsexuality is a genetic or psychological condition (or even a ‘condition’ at all)ii. Aspects of transsexualism have been observed within nearly every country, and there thus exist a variety of methodological sources. The vast majority of my information was gathered through books, periodical articles, LGBT (Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgendered) reports, academic studies and criminal statistics. In the course of my research I encountered many documents written in only Japanese or Farsiiii, and I can therefore make no claim to have conducted an entirely comprehensive academic review. Transsexuality is truly a global phenomenon, and as we shall see, this has resulted in a great variety of domestic responses. 2 The United States of America The United States government has long adopted a marginal stance towards transsexuality. This is likely due to the nation’s federalist tradition, granting (partial) state jurisdiction regarding the criminal law. Interestingly, most states have generally taken a hands-off approach as well, valuing medical discretion over legal prohibition. While transsexuals can freely undergo sexual reassignment surgery, such state disregard has ultimately proven a double-edged sword: transsexuals need not fear criminal punishment, but also enjoy little government protection or statistical recognition. The first case of transsexualism to garner widespread attention within the United States (and indeed much of the world) was that of Christine Jorgensen (Meyerowitz, 2002). In March of 1959 Jorgensen, who had undergone hormonal treatment in order to physically alter her body from female to male, applied for a marriage licenseiv at the New York City Municipal Court Building. While the license was eventually refused, the case almost immediately became a sensation within the nation’s tabloids. Recognizing Jorgensen’s situation, a number of other males and females began openly asking doctors to alter their sex, and reassignment surgeries found a growing American market. The matter of transsexuality has traditionally proven a challenge within both American civil and criminal law. Particularly complicated is the United State’s federalist structure, and states’ ability to formulate their own discrete policies. While post-op transsexuals may legally have their passport and Social Security Records revised by federal agencies, many of the most vital records are principally governed by the states (www.transgenderlaw.org). Birth certificates have proven a particular challenge; 3 although nineteen states currently allow sexual revisions, most refuse to grant this pivotal ‘privilege’. A variety of state courts have further reached very different and even contrary rulings, and no larger precedent thus currently exists (Meyerowitz, 2002). Transsexual voices have proven even more muffled within the American criminal law. As one scholar has noted, the recent past saw ‘nothing less than widespread legislative avoidance’ of this issue (Meyer, 1999). Indeed, this avoidance of transsexual- related criminal law has likely arisen from a number of interrelated factors. First, the ‘small size and closeted existence’ of the transsexual community makes this group invisible to many politicians, the media, and the general public. Second, transsexuals have neither the national solidarity nor the political influence to affect the ‘rational election-seeking behavior’ of legislators. While they have recently aligned with more mainstream gay advocacy groups, transsexuals continue to occupy only a small fraction of the larger LGBT community. They therefore have little voice within state and federal legislatures, and have yet to gain a forceful advocatev within higher office. It is unknown how many sexual reassignment surgeries have actually been performed within the United States, but unlike in Japan and Iran (as we shall see), conducting such procedures has never led to criminal prosecution (Meyerowitz, 2002). Some doctors have nevertheless invoked ‘mayhem statutes’, or an obscure eighteenth century clause legally forbidding male to female operations (p. 121). Such statutes originally arose from English common law, and explicitly banned men from castrating themselves or being aided by others in order to do so. Although originally put into effect to disallow soldiers from escaping army duty, mayhem clauses remain ingrained within federal and many state statutes. Why these statutes have never been legally enforced 4 remains somewhat of a mystery; while some assert legislators hesitation to anger the medical community, others believe such laws too out-dated to ever survive due process. Indeed, mayhem statutes are more likely invoked by doctors not out of fear of prosecution, but to mask larger ethical and practical issues. Such physicians may react negatively to sexual reassignment surgery for a number of reasons, whether in ‘mutilating’ purely healthy organs, believing transvestites to be mentally ill, or fearing the public scrutiny that sex-change operations could potentially bring to their medical institutions (Bridy, 2004). As the transsexual community has became more and more recognized, however, many doctors have undoubtedly recognized the profit potential in catering towards this particular clientele. Although doctors have never been prosecuted for the surgery itself, (pre and post) transsexuals have faced a long history of arrest for simply going out in public. Throughout the 1960s cross-dressing laws were widely in effect, and transsexuals could be penalized under vagrancy or obscenity statutes (Bridy, 2004). Such arrests became more rare as the 60s progressed, and many obscenity laws gradually invalidated by the growingly liberal courts. Further, state judges began to become increasingly annoyed by police crowding their courts with alternative unisex stylists, and (for the most part) successfully demanded an end to cross-dressing prosecutions. The most serious criminal issues affecting transsexuals have resulted more from a lack of government attention than an excess of it. Although continually victimized, transsexuals have remained conspicuously absent from many state and federal hate crime statutes. Even more remarkably, there are no reliable statistics on the actual amount of crimes committed against transsexuals, and they have thus been labeled “hidden victims” 5 (Meyer, 1999). The relative obscurity of transsexual victimhood is perhaps best reflected by this group’s total absence within the Federal Hate Crime Prevention Act, passed through Congress in 1994 and renewed on a number of subsequent occasions (www.adl.org). Although various congressmen have vocally protested this omission, they have also acknowledged too much protest may put the act itself in jeopardy (Lochhead, 2007). Regardless, on May 3, 2007 the Matthew Shepard Act was passed in the House of Representatives, and subsequently pushed through the Senate in September of 2007 (Stout, 2007). Not only does this Act expand upon the initial definition of a hate crime, but also adds a separate provision explicitly including the transgendered (which presumably includes transsexuals). While the Act’s congressional passage is groundbreaking, President Bush has promised to veto it if it comes before his desk (Executive Office of the President, 2007). The states have been only selectively more progressive. Although Minnesota passed the first transgender-inclusive hate crime law as early as 1988, most other states have proven relatively slow to follow (www.outfront.org). Currently, eight states (California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Minnesota, Missouri, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, and Vermont) explicitly include the transgendered within their standing hate crime legislation (www.hrc.org). Maryland and Colorado have recently revised the definition of sexual orientation in order to include the transgendered, and therefore also offer technical protection through this more indirect route. And while a number of other state proposals have been advanced, these have yet to gain enough political support for passage. 6 Despite their absence within federal and many state hate crime legislation, a number of horrible acts have been reportedly committed on transgendered and transsexual individuals. Although the most well known of these was the brutal 1993 rape and murder of FtM Brandon Teenavi, this was hardly an isolated event. The amount of similar offenses ultimately remains speculative, however; while the FBI keeps statistics of hate crimes committed against homosexual males and females on record, it does not specify any separate category for transgendered and transsexuals (United Crime Report, 2006). Indeed, the gay-rights magazine The Advocate was even drawn to label violence against this group a ‘hidden hate epidemic’ (Meyer, 1999). Within non-governmental studies the number of abuses are also hard to determine. Although some have attributed this lack of data to conscious social biases, others have expressed more nuanced rationales. First, police officers may often report such victims as simply gay, and thus unworthy of being grouped within a separate statistical category. Secondly, many relevant individuals may want to remain under the radar, and therefore purposely fail to report their own or a friend’s victimhood. Throughout the past decade the number of reported offenses has significantly heightened (Witten, 1999). The National Coalition of Anti-Violence Programs reported in 2006 that while the amount of FtM victims remained indeterminable, the percentage of MtF victim reportage had increased by 20 percent (although the reason for this disparity remains unclear) (2006). A 1997 sample of 402 transsexuals further found that over half had experienced ‘some form of harassment’, ‘with a quarter experiencing a violent incident’ (Moran and Sharpe, 2004: 41). The archivist Gwendolyn Ann Smith has also 7 recently recorded the names of over two hundred transsexuals murdered since the early 1970s, although she does not specify if their deaths were all hate relatedvii. Transsexual needs have also begun to gain notice in prison. Currently, inmates are segregated based upon genitals alone, and many transsexuals may therefore face particular abuse or harassment (Brooks, 1999). In Merriwether v. Faulkner (1987), the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals held that transsexual prisoners have a right to ‘some sort’ of medical therapy, but did not specify what this would entail (nor was the issue of special protection explicitly addressed) (www.transgender.org). Although the more recent case of De’Lonta v. Angelone (2002) extended this decision, calling the plight of transsexuals in prison a ‘medical necessity’, the effects of this judgment also remain to be practically seen. Transsexuals therefore encounter minimal government harassment within the United States, but strikingly little state protection either. While the recent advancement of the Matthew Shepard Act has highlighted transsexual rights to an unprecedented degree, it is unlikely to overcome a presidential veto. Further, the records on transsexual assaults remain sketchy at best, and there has been no popular movement to report them more accurately. Although the nation’s current transsexuals rarely face the illusion of mayhem statutes or threats of arrest under vagrancy or obscenity charges, the United State’s criminal justice system has yet to fully meet the needs of this oft-ignored group. The American transsexual ultimately remains a hidden victim, who many would rather ignore entirely than discomfortingly face. 8 Japan Although transsexuals have played a traditionally more open role within Japanese society than that of the United States’, Japan’s government has proven considerably more repressive. While violence against the estimated 70,000 transgendered is virtually unheard of, sexual reassignment surgery was strictly illegal until the ‘discovery’ of Gender Identity Disorder in the late 1990s (Larkin, 2007). The largest battles have now switched from criminal to civil law, as Japanese advocates continue to fight for legal and political recognition. Throughout Japanese history, Kabuki shows thrived on males assuming female roles (Compton, 2003). While many individuals resumed their ‘masculine’ identity after the show’s finale, others publicly refused to ever adopt a fixed sex. Rising to power in the late nineteenth-century, the autocratic Meiji government dramatically and ruthlessly disparaged such ‘perverse’ individualsviii. Intimidating and imprisoning any supposed sexual deviant, state officials aggressively removed transsexual (and transgendered) figures from the public sphere. While restrictions were again loosened in the late 1940s, transsexual individuals became largely limited to bar shows, clubs, and massage parlors (McLelland, 2004). Largely relegated to the entertainment industry, such ‘sexual outlaws’ thus occupied a relatively circumscribed and limited role within early post- World War II Japanese society. As sexual reassignment surgery became more known, Japanese transsexuals began to demand their own domestic physicians. This became legally unfeasible, however, as Clause 28 of the 1948 Eugenic Protection Act strictly prohibited the 9 ‘unnecessary’ sterilization of healthy sexual organs (Hiroyuki, 2006). While its motives have been much disputed, the Act is believed to have arisen out of Japanese demoralization following World War II (Mackie, 2001). Hoping to insure a brighter future, Japanese officials sought to create an archetypal citizen and ensure a healthy new generation. Those who hoped to modify or transform their reproductive capabilities thus intrinsically violated the goals of this new national ethos. Along with a strict abortion ban and recommended sterilizations for hereditary bodily diseases, the Eugenic Protection Act ultimately sought to grant considerable state control over the Japanese populations’ manner and ability to reproduce. Unlike the false threat of U.S. mayhem statutes, Japanese doctors could actually face serious prosecution for performing sexual reassignment surgery (and thereby sterilizing healthy genital organs). In the famous ‘Blue Boy Trial’ix of 1965, a Japanese surgeon was arrested and prosecuted for performing a sex change on three male prostitutes (Hiroyuki, 2006). Eventually found guilty of violating Clause 28 of the Eugenic Protection Law, the surgeon’s resulting detention almost universally deterred Japanese doctors from performing further sexual reassignment surgeries. Of course, Japanese transsexuals did not disappear entirely, as they were able to get surgery abroad or undergo a variety of hormonal treatments. Flying to Thailand or the United States was restricted only to the wealthier citizens, however, and black-market hormonal ‘solutions’ were often rife with dangerous side effects (Mackie, 2001). It took over three decades for clause 28 of the Eugenic Protection Act to be legally overturned. This resulted from a number of gradual but distinct events. Firstly, the tojisha (‘the party concerned’) movement began to gain political prominence 10 throughout much of Japan in the early to mid 1990s (Lunsing, 2005). Founded by the Japan International Lesbian and Gay Association, the tojisha hoped to popularize queer normalcy and solicit mainstream acceptance. Within two years a group called Occur emerged, which proved especially influential. Containing a number of prominent Japanese figures and wealthy backers from the business world, Occur pushed for expanded gay, lesbian, transgender, and transsexual rights. Focusing specifically on the Eugenic Protection Act, this organization was able to muster and maintain considerable mainstream criticism of it. Even more importantly, however, was the popularization of the ‘medical model of transgender’ (Ellis, 2000: 72). In this changing paradigm, transsexual individuals were no longer viewed as deliberate social misfits, but people with a serious and potentially curable medical disorder. Notions of Gender Identity Disorder thus started to permeate the academic literature, and transsexuality was linguistically transformed from a ‘choice’ into a ‘condition’. Following an upsurge of tojisha lobbying and accepting a medicalized discourse on transsexuality, in 1996 four doctors at the Saitama Medical College asked an ethics committee if they could perform sexual reassignment surgery on two (newly-labeled) GID patients (Hiroyuki, 2006). Similarly influenced by the growing medical literature and political pressure from Occur, the Japanese Society of Psychiatry and Neurology formally allowed the operations to commence. Claiming the patients to have been ‘cured’ of their previous ‘affliction’, a number of medical and tojisha activists subsequently lobbied the Japanese diet to fully legalize sexual reassignment surgery. Acknowledging clause 28 to be medically outdated, the diet did so in 1998, but with the stipulation that surgery only be performed on patients diagnosed with GID by two 11 separate physicians. While most advocates have fervently praised the diet’s action, others have pointed out the bizarre ‘contract of future promises’ that pre-ops must sign. Among other things, this contract supposedly contains a pledge not to work in the entertainment industry, a profession in which many transsexual people have traditionally found employmentx (Lunsing, 2005: 147). While sexual reassignment surgery can no longer result in criminal prosecution for the doctor or patient, a number of civil issues still remain. In 2003 the diet passed the Exceptional Treatment Act for People with GID, allowing transsexuals to bindingly change their legal (and not just physical) sex. Five strict conditions need to be met, however, in order for an individual to successfully complete this process: (1) the individual must be over twenty years old, (2) not be married (to supposedly avoid coercion), (3) be childless, (4) have no gonad function, and (5) have genitals similar to ‘other members of the sex’ to which they were reassigned (Hiroyuki, 2006: 4). While the Act was easily passed in the diet, many tojisha groups have derided it as needlessly strict and socially repressive. More recent debates have revolved around employment discrimination towards transgendered and transsexuals, and whether office managers have the right to know this feature of a person’s history (Lunsing, 2005). Unlike in the United States, physical violence against Japan’s transsexual community is considerably uncommon. As one author remarked, ‘drag queens as well as transvestites live openly and in public places without problems’ (Lunsing, 2005). This is likely both a reflection of the nations comparatively low violent crime rate, and the traditional prevalence of cross-dressers within Japanese society. Of course, no larger empirical studies have been conducted (that I am aware of), and the possibility of a 12 hidden victimhood therefore undoubtedly remains. There have been no major studies conducted on Japan’s transsexual prison population either, and it is thus unknown whether they face similar harassment to that in the United States. Although generally safe from street-level crime, until recently Japan’s transsexuals were legally handcuffed by a demoralized nation’s medico-rational ideology. Espousing primitive notions of motherhood and upholding a classic eugenic discourse, the Japanese government sought to actively restrict one’s control over his or her body. Transsexuals were thus rarely viewed as inherently obscene (as in the United States), but rather as threats to a larger communal future. Only when the medical narrative was transformed, and this group viewed as sick rather than defiant, could the desired physical alteration be magnanimously granted. Iran In a nation generally considered to be among the most repressive on Earth, it is difficult to imagine an open or liberal policy regarding transsexuality. Yet despite communally stoning adulterers and publicly hanging male homosexuals, Iran has been called ‘the sex change capital of the world’ (Tait, 2005). Blessed by the Grand Ayatollah himself, sexual reassignment surgery is both fully legal and even federally funded. Indeed, similar to the United States, the greatest threat against Iranian transsexuals comes not from the state but from the streets. Unlike Japan, Persia does not have a long history of transsexual performances or gender subversive literature. While homoerotic tales were relatively common, few 13 stories (that I could locate) challenge or transform traditional gender roles (www.GLBTQ.com). Although historically indeterminable, transsexuality is thus considered a relatively novel phenomenon within Iranian culture. Indeed, during the Shah’s regime there was no legal mention of transsexuality at all, and while such procedures were therefore not expressly illicit, it is unclear whether they were allowed; no early Iranian advocates of transsexuality have come forward, and there is no record (at least in English) of pre-1979 transgendered cases. In 1963 the future founder of the Islamic Iranian nation, Ayatollah Khomeini, wrote a popular book discussing contemporary scientific ethics (Harrison, 2005). Determining that there were no Koranic prohibitions against sexually corrective surgery, Khomeini declared such procedures to be religiously permissible. While this passage has been held up as early proof of Khomeini’s tolerance towards sexual reassignment surgery, transsexuality was not actually addressed in his book. Khomeini had exclusively considered the issue of hermaphrodites, and made no specific mention of transsexuality (Tait, 2005). It is unlikely that Khomeini had ever even heard of such a concept at the time, and therefore certainly had little opinion regarding this issue. Upon coming to power, Khomeini and his Iranian reformers instituted a strict regime of Shar’ia Law. Among the harshest penalties involved so-called Lavat, or sodomy, punishable by heavy flogging or even death (Human Rights Watch, 2005). While it is unknown how many Iranian homosexuals have actually been executed, the number is believed to be relatively low. This may be because of the difficulty in legally proving homosexual activity (four witnesses are required) or, more likely, a popular policy of ‘collective denial’ (Alizadeh and Poore, 2007). Originally, transsexuality and 14 homosexuality were grouped together; Iranian transsexuals were simply considered gay, and hence punishable to the same degree as any other practitioner of Lavat (Tait, 2007). The story of how transsexuality became legalized within Iran is surely romanticized, and its exact accuracy is ultimately unimportant. Regardless, it is confirmed that a (pre-op) MtF named Mayam Katoon Malkara continually lobbied for Ayatollah Khomeini’s recognition, and actually burst into his palace dressed as a male (Tait, 2005). Eventually brought to the Supreme Leader by Khomeini’s son, Malkara is said to have dramatically revealed her breasts and fervently described her condition as a ‘disease’. Convinced that his earlier writings applied not only to hermaphrodites but transsexuals, the Ayatollah consequently issued a fatwa (or religious decree) formally legalizing transsexual operations. While homosexuality and cross-dressing have remained highly illegal, Khomeini himself thus legitimated transsexual operations within Iran. Similarly to Japan, in Iran transsexuality is principally viewed as a disease (Islamic Thinkers Society, 2006). Unlike the Asian nation’s medico-rational discourse, however, Persia’s is ultimately steeped in religious overtones. Science may provide a useful supplement, but is always subordinate to the dominant Islamic ethos. Unlike America or Japan, there are no constitutional safeguards or procedural protections if an Ayatollah suddenly decides to reverse past precedent. While Iranian transsexuals likely feel relatively blessed by their situation, the threat of a new fatwa is therefore always possible. So far, the ruling elite has been reluctant to reverse Khomeini’s ‘enlightened’ decision. The current Ayatollah has publicly supported sexual reassignment surgery, and 15 the Presidentxi, despite his ideologically extreme record, has never overtly addressed this issue. A prominent Iranian scholar has even recently published a dissertation on Iranian transsexualism, attempting to ground it within Persia’s prevailing legal framework (Tait, 2005). Matters of particular importance are whether a wife can get surgery without her husband’s position, and when the marriage itself is to be considered voided by the state. Issues of civil law are considerably more progressive than in Japan or the United States; Iranian transsexuals are able to get a new driver’s license and birth certificate almost immediately, and are legally reassigned gender without much technical hassle. To legally get a sex change in Iran, an individual must be of consenting age and judged ‘mentally ill’ due to Sexual Identity Disorder (Islamic Thinkers Society, 2006). Combining religious and legal discourses, it is a clerical judge, and not a doctor, who grants the final permission to proceed. It is unknown how many transsexual operations have actually been performed in Iran, but the number is considered remarkably high. One doctor reported that he had done approximately 300 sexual reassignment surgeries in Iran within the last decade, compared with around 40 in all of Europe (Harrison, 2005). Despite the government’s surprising liberalism, Iranian transsexuals are said to suffer considerable criminal harassment and violence. While the state may bless sexual reassignment surgery, such patients are often still considered homosexuals or perverts by their local community (Eqbali, 2004). Indeed, most violence is likely inter-familial, inflicted on transsexual (and transgendered) individuals by their own parents or siblings. As one news source reported, ‘transsexuals in Iran continue to suffer not just ostracism, but physical attacks’ (Mangez, 2005). Of course, the number of assaults is impossible to gather, as is the amount of Iranian crime in general. Personal accounts report being burnt 16 by oil or viciously beaten by family members, but almost always come from desperate exiles. The army is said to be especially dangerous for pre-op transsexuals, who are often reportedly attacked and have even reported being sexually abused/assaulted. Despite its surgical blessing, the Iranian state is not entirely sympathetic to transsexual individuals. Transsexuals may be arrested and charged as homosexuals in the middle of their hormonal treatment, or even detained for cross-dressing (which remains very much illegal) (Safra Project, 2004). Further, there are reports that some homosexual (but not transsexual) individuals are pressured or coerced into undergoing gender reassignment surgery in order to legalize their sexual orientation. Perhaps most troublingly, many FtMs have undoubtedly switched sexes principally to gain male privileges. As one individual remarked, ‘As a man in Iran I have more freedom and choice than as a woman...I did not want to wear a chador. Now I can pray in boxer shorts if I feel like it’ (Mangez, 2005). It is both puzzling and ironic that one of the most religiously repressive nations on Earth has proven a virtual epicenter for transsexual openness. Even more ironic is that such opportunity only arose through absolute tyranny; indeed, there are few more comprehensive or effective policies than those enabled by religious decree. By equating Gender Identity Disorder with an affliction like cancer, Iran’s transsexual debate has been supported and legitimized by a larger medico-religious discourse. The sexually ‘confused’ were granted their freedom, as long as homosexuality itself remained the same old unnamable but ever-perilous specter. 17 Conclusion Despite their discrete cultural heritages, the issue of transsexuality has certain parallels within the United States, Japan, and Iran. Of course, due to each nation’s unique legal structure, one must always be careful when extrapolating supposed similarities. Regardless, I believe three core themes can be reliably recognized and explored. First, there has been a fundamental divide between state and street repression within each country. While the United States government has markedly deferred from penalizing sexual reassignment surgery, crimes against transsexuals have proven both disturbingly common and egregiously under-addressed. In stark contrast, the Japanese government has only recently allowed transsexual procedures, but such individuals need rarely fear attack. Finally, while the Ayatollahs have taken a surprisingly liberal stance towards transsexualism, this community still faces a combination of familial threats and communal ostracism in Iran. Second, each nation’s legal framework has been highly influenced by the medical discourse in place. Many early American doctors were reluctant to perform sexual reassignment surgery, but the nation’s long held reverence for entrepreneurship and individual autonomy likely helped such procedures to flourish. Japan’s post-World War II nationalism had predicated itself around a previous medical paradigm (the Eugenic Protection Act), which was eventually replaced through the legitimation of Gender Identity Disorder. And even Iran’s religious supremacy proved compatible with medical principles, as transsexuals became sick people in need of a cure. 18 Third, each nation has considerable holes in the relevant data. While the United States undoubtedly has the most comprehensive information, the FBI’s reluctance to record offenses against transsexuals and the transgendered obscures the extent of their victimhood (and virtually denies their very existence). Further, since transsexuality has only recently been legalized in Japan, there has been little time (or incentive) to gather meaningful statistics. And finding general criminal data in Iran is hard enough, never mind for specific offenses against sexual minorities. Of course, other organizations have recorded the prevalence of offenses against American transsexuals, and it has been reliably documented that Japanese transsexuals can walk the streets openly and safely. Iranian abuses have almost exclusively arisen from first-hand accounts, which provide a powerful but ultimately limited picture. The legal situation facing transsexuals in the United States, Japan and Iran is ultimately daunting but hopeful. Sexual reassignment surgery is legal in all three countries, but the danger of being a transsexual (with the possible exception of Japan) remains a day-to-day reality. As mentioned earlier, it is somewhat problematic to even compare such unique entities; U.S. federalism, for example, has little parallel with Iranian autocracy. The possibility of educative tolerance also varies significantly from country to country. Japan’s long held tradition of ambivalent gender roles bends to larger communal interests, and the law can likely do little to change this. As one commentator remarked, ‘Japan, unlike the United States, is not a very litigious society…Much more important than legal developments are developments in the social field’, including the advance of written sources, Internet forums and the increasing prevalence of queer youth culture(Lunsing, 2005: 148). Change in Iran would seemingly have to come from the 19 top down, but even this has proven problematic; despite Ayatollah Khomeini’s liberal attitude towards transsexuality, such individuals are still often considered freaks or (even worse) homosexuals. The United State’s federalist system offers perhaps the greatest hope; states may have the authority to differ, and are therefore left unrestrained by a single policy. This has complications all its own, however, since tolerance may diverge significantly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Whatever the country, transsexuality is becoming a growingly recognizable issue, and one that the criminal law ignores at this sexual minority’s peril. 20 EndNotes i Since the allowance of sexual reassignment surgery is such an obvious and important indicator of a country’s stance towards transsexuality, the legal status of this procedure will be prominently detailed within each nation reviewed. ii For the purposes of this paper, however, such larger complexities will have to be temporarily (and regrettably) ignored. iii Which accounts for the significantly lengthier section on the United States. iv In order to marry a female v Certain U.S. Representatives, such as Barney Frank, have expressed some support for the transgendered and transsexual community, but usually only in tangent with larger LGBT causes (Lochhead, 2007). vi Later detailed in the 1999 independent film Boys Don’t Cry vii Although there have been no comprehensive empirical studies performed on offenders’ purposes for attacking transsexuals, their motivations are usually considered an alternative form of homophobia known as ‘transphobia’ (www.transgenderlaw.org). viii It is unclear whether the Western emulating Meijis sought to superficially adopt Occidental sex codes or merely to crack down on all marginal, seemingly deviant behaviors. ix So-called because transsexual individuals were popularly known as ‘Blue Boys’ (the phrase itself was taken from a Parisian transvestite show popular in Japan). x I unfortunately could not locate any document (in English) explaining the logic of this pledge and therefore do not have enough knowledge to speculate on its deeper origins. 21 xi Who ultimately serves as a mouthpiece for the Ayatollah 22 References Alizadeh, Hossein, and Poor, Grace (2007) ‘Iran’s Sodomy Law: Reading Between the Lines’, International Gay and Lesbian Human Rights Commission, 20 June. 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URL (accessed 12 November 2007): http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/fl20070123zg.html. 24 Lochhead, Carolyn (2007) ‘Gay rights champ Rep. Barney Frank lashes out at critics’, San Francisco Chronicle, 22 January. URL (accessed 19 November 2007): http://www.sfgate.com/cgibin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2007/10/12/MNKESOESB.DTL &hw=barney+frank&sn=001&sc=1000 Lunsing, W. (2005) ‘LGBT Rights in Japan’, Peace Review: A Journal of Social Justice 17: 143-148. Mackie, Vera (2001) ‘The Trans-sexual Citizen: Queering Sameness and Difference’, Australian Feminist Studies 16. Mangez, Caroline. (2005) ‘Iran’s Transsexual Revolution’, The Independent UK, 13 November. www.truthout.org. URL (accessed 11 September 2007): http://www.truthout.org/cgibin/artman/exec/view.cgi/35/15513/printer McLelland, M. (2004) ‘From the stage to the clinic: changing transgender identities in post-war Japan’, Japan Forum 16: 1-20. Meyer, Lisa. (1999) ‘The Hidden Hate Epidemic’, The Advocate, 25 May. 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work_7f2huq75ancqhnfpkuk7jvq3um	----	Predicting electoral activism among gays and lesbians in the United States Predicting electoral activism among gays and lesbians in the United States Eric Swank1, Breanne Fahs2 1Department of Sociology, Social Work and Criminology, Morehead State University 2Women and Gender Studies Program, Arizona State University Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Eric Swank, 311 Rader Hall, Morehead, KY 40351, USA. E-mail: e.swank@morehead-st.edu doi: 10.1111/jasp.12095 Abstract Although battles over gay and lesbian rights have appeared prominently in political arenas, scholars have created few empirical studies on gay and lesbian activism. To address this absence, this quantitative study identified factors that inspired greater electoral engagement among gays and lesbians in the United States (n = 285). After integrating “resource,” “mobilizing,” and “framing” variables into regressions, this study found that electoral activism was inspired by many sorts of motivators. In sum, activist tendencies were swayed by educational levels, perceptions of political potency, a desire to conceal sexual orientations, surviving hate crimes, and joining certain political groups. Interestingly, this study supported “new social movement” theories that downplay economic factors as predictors of involvement in gay and lesbian rights campaigns. Introduction Discrimination against gays and lesbians takes many forms. In its crudest terms, homophobia manifests itself through instances of physical violence and a language that chastises and belittles both homosexuality and non-normative gender behavior. In slightly subtler terms, heteronormativity leads a long list of insidious practices that privileges heterosexuality. Whether via the lack of legal marital rights, or the assumption that everybody is and must be completely heterosexual, gays and lesbians often endure hostile environments that monitor and penalize homosexual behavior in the United States. To minimize negative social sanctions, some gays and lesbians may try to deny or hide their sexual identity to themselves and others. Some gays and lesbians may personally accept their sexual identity but resign themselves to quietly enduring social injustices. Others may try to minimize homophobia by presenting an image that pleases the expectations of hetero- sexual audiences. This assimilation approach argues that gays and lesbians can win acceptance from a skeptical majority if they downplay mannerisms that are considered “strange” and “peculiar” to heterosexual sensibilities. While social stigmas may be managed by hiding one’s sexual identity, being politi- cally acquiescent, or offering “sensible” or “assuaging” perso- nas, other gays and lesbians may contest the basis of their subordination. This may occur in several ways: Gays and les- bians may enact hidden resistances that covertly defy hetero- sexual privilege; they may individually dispute heterosexist comments or use legal means to correct inequities; or they may initiate social movements that contest institutional prac- tices (Scott, 1990). Collective efforts at ending heterosexism can take many forms (Bernstein, 1997; Smith & Haider-Markel, 2002; Taylor & Whittier, 1992). Segments of the gay and lesbian rights movement focus on transforming the social customs and worldviews of others. In doing so, some sections of the gay and lesbian rights movement attempt to reinterpret cul- tural practices by normalizing same-sex relationships and deconstructing the justifications of heterosexism and com- pulsory heterosexuality (among other things). Other wings of the gay and lesbian rights movement focus on improving governmental laws, policies, and regulations. This “state- centered” approach emphasizes the expansion of rights and statuary protections through the use of “insider” and “out- sider” political tactics. When choosing tactics in light of evolving political opportunities, “insider” and “electoral” tactics embody the more conventional and institutionalized modes of voting, lobbying, and campaign contributions. Alternatively, the “outsider” tactics of protests, strikes, and boycotts try to force concessions through more disruptive and less institutionalized ways (Jenkins & Klandermans, 1995). bs_bs_banner Journal of Applied Social Psychology 2013, 43, pp. 1382–1393 © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Journal of Applied Social Psychology 2013, 43, pp. 1382–1393 With an individual unit of analysis, this paper investigates the use of insider tactics for gays and lesbians in the United States. By exploring the topic of electoral participation, we asked, how often, and in what circumstances, have gays and lesbians voted and lobbied politicians on the behalf of gay and lesbian rights? The explanatory scope of this study centers on the factors that inspire or hinder greater levels of political activism. Because there is a shortage of studies on this topic, we mostly utilized universal models of political participation when selecting our independent variables. The much-cited “resource” model of political science guided this analysis (Brady, Verba, & Scholzman, 1995) as did the sociological theories of “mobilization structures” (McAdam & Paulsen, 1993; McCarthy, 1996; Passy, 2001) and “collective action frames” (Gamson, 1992; Klandermans, 1997; Snow & Benford, 1992). However, this work also used the initial empirical literature on voting activities among sexual minorities (Bailey, 1998; Egan, Edelman & Sherrill, 2008; Hertzog, 1996; Lewis, Rogers, & Sherrill, 2011; Swank & Fahs, 2011; Waldner, 2001), people who protest for gay or transgender rights (Friedman & Leaper, 2010; Lombardi, 1999; Simon et al., 1998; Taylor, Kimport, Van Dyke & Andersen, 2009) and individuals who joined AIDS advocacy groups (Elbaz, 1996; Jennings & Andersen, 2003; Rollins & Hirsch, 2003). Literature review To assemble our theoretical model, we began with the much- cited “resource-model” of political participation (Brady et al., 1995). Offering a succinct answer to why people refrain from politics, the resource model asserts “because they can’t, because they don’t want to, or because nobody asked” (Brady et al., 1995, p. 271). With regard to “they can’t,” many people refrain from politics because of a supposed dearth of necessary resources to be political. While crucial resources may come in many forms, these authors emphasize the importance of financial situations, free time, and civic skills. The predicament of “they don’t want to” deals with a lack of psychological interest in politics. An indifference to politics and policy is sometimes belied as stupidity or indolence, but the resource model assumes that blasé attitudes are a reaction to a lower sense of political efficacy or greater levels of indi- vidualism. For this study, politics may lack salience to gays and lesbians when they think that politicians ignore lesbian, gay, bisexual (LGB) communities or when gay and lesbian individuals do not think they share a common destiny with other sexual minorities. Finally, the “nobody asked” factor implies that people are isolated from the recruitment net- works that move citizens into action. That is, lower levels of activism may be a result of existing in social contexts that fail to transmit the necessary values and information that make activism probable. “They can’t”: the role of income, education, and status hierarchies Every society has an unequal distribution of wealth, prestige, and power. This unequal allocation of resources creates aggregates of people—social classes—who share similar amounts of income and life opportunities. The resource model assumes these class and status hierarchies are funda- mental to political inclinations and activism (Brady et al., 1995; Lake & Huckfeldt, 1998; Leighley & Vedlitz, 1999; Lim, 2008; McClurg, 2003; Timpone, 1998). Socioeconomic standing is a universal variable that drives political participa- tion tendencies for members of every social group in society (i.e., socioeconomic status works across race, gender, reli- gious, or sexual orientation boundaries). In the simplest of terms, a person’s class location grants or impedes access to opportunities and financial resources that make political activism easier. Consequently, people in higher socioeco- nomic levels amass and retain the structural elicitors of activ- ism, be it more money, wider educational opportunities, greater amounts of free time, or more chances to lead people in day-to-day scenarios. Conversely, Zipp, Landerman, and Luebke (1982) argues that economically disenfranchised individuals suffer the opposite plight: “Due to less education, more restricted occupation-related learning experiences, greater social isolation, and higher alienation, lower status persons are less interested in politics, are less aware of the need for or possible benefits of participation, feel less politi- cally efficacious, less often possess those social and political skills, and have less time, money, and energy to expend in political participation” (p. 1141). Studies of the general population often find greater afflu- ence linked to greater electoral activism (Brady et al., 1995; Harder & Krosnick, 2008; Leighley & Vedlitz, 1999; Timpone, 1998). However, these results are less consistent in studies of gay and lesbian activism. One study found that transsexuals who were employed in professional occupa- tions were more involved in political campaigns than their blue-collar counterparts (Lombardi, 1999) and other studies suggested that higher income gays and lesbians attended more demonstrations for the recognition of same- sex marriages (Taylor, Kimport, Van Dyke, & Andersen, 2009) and funding for AIDS issues (Jennings & Andersen, 2003). A more recent article added that richer lesbians and gays were more likely to vote for liberal presidential candi- dates than poorer sexual minorities (Lewis et al., 2011). Conversely, income did not predict voting tendencies (Bailey, 1998) nor the amount of involvement in gay and lesbian and AIDS rights groups (Elbaz, 1996; Sturmer & Simon, 2004). Finally, one study revealed an inverse rela- tionship as it contended that it was poorer, rather than richer, gays and lesbians who joined Queer Nation and ACT UP (Rollins & Hirsch, 2003). Swank and Fahs 1383 © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Journal of Applied Social Psychology 2013, 43, pp. 1382–1393 The role of education was also unclear. One study found that college educated sexual minorities gay more money to political candidates than lesbians and gays with high school degrees (Swank & Fahs, 2011) and two studies have suggested that ACT UP members were highly educated (Elbaz, 1996; Rollins & Hirsch, 2003). Conversely, four other studies claimed that educational attainment did not differentiate the amount of political activism among gays and lesbians (Lewis et al., 2011; Lombardi, 1999; Sturmer & Simon, 2004; Waldner, 2001). The role of gender hierarchies for political participation is far from certain in studies of the U.S. populace. Older studies suggested that heterosexual women, from the beginning of enfranchisement to the 1950s, have been slightly less inclined than heterosexual men to be politically active. Conversely, newer studies have suggested that this gender gap disap- peared or had even reversed in the years that followed the second wave of the women’s movement (Harder & Krosnick, 2008; Hritzuk & Park, 2000; Leighley & Nagler, 1992; Timpone, 1998). To add to the confusion, a recent study sug- gested that women were more likely to vote in elections and sign petitions but were less likely to write a politician or join a protest (Coffé & Bolzendahl, 2010). Inconsistent gender effects are mostly echoed in the studies of gay and lesbian political engagement. One study argued that lesbians voted more for lesbian political candidates (Hertzog, 1996) while another suggested that lesbians wore more political buttons (Herek, Norton, Allen, & Sims, 2010). Further, gay men wrote more letters to politicians (Herek et al., 2010) and made larger financial contributions to politi- cal candidates than lesbians (Herek et al., 2010; Swank & Fahs, 2011). Other studies contend that the frequency of political activism was roughly the same with gays and lesbians (Bailey, 1998; Jennings & Andersen, 2003; Lewis et al., 2011; Rollins & Hirsch, 2003; Taylor et al., 2009; Waldner, 2001). “They don’t want to”: framing grievances, efficacy, and collective identities Frames are generally conceived as cultural tools or schemas that provide “tacit theories about what exists, what happens, and what matters” (Gitlin, 1980, p. 6). While frames help with the classification and organization of incoming stimuli, they also serve a political role of sanctioning or challenging the status quo. Conventional frames acquire the consent of the less powerful by portraying the social order as proper, normal, and inevitable. By seeking widespread conformity, mainstream narratives get people to subscribe to values, ideals, and self- definitions that bind them to their location in the prevailing power structure. While conservative frames prioritize defer- ence to conventional standards, collective action frames do the exact opposite, as they motivate people into joining collective efforts that publicly seek social change. Doug McAdam (1999) wrote: “Mediating between opportunity, organization, and action are the shared meanings and cultural understandings— including a shared collective identity—that people bring to an instance of incipient contention” (p. 5). Movement theorists have identified four dimensions of collective action frames (Ashmore, Deaux, & McLaughlin-Volpe, 2004; Gamson, 1992; Klandermans, 1997; Lavine et al., 1999; Miller, Gurin, Gurin, & Malanchuk, 1981; van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008). First, collective action frames initially render some societal norms as wrong, unacceptable and unjust. By naming the injustice, Snow and Benford (1992) suggested these frames serve as “accenting devices that either underscore or embel- lish the seriousness and injustice of a social condition or redefines it as unjust immoral” (p. 137). These injustice frames can highlight many sorts of maltreatments but they often generate greater salience when they focus on viola- tions of fairness or equity norms. Injustices seem worse or viler when dominant groups seem to benefit at the expense of innocent victims. Second, frames identify the causes of the injustice. By providing a diagnostic function, frames are etiologies that explain why problems exist and assign levels of blame or capability to different entities. By making these attributions, frames draw attention to the sources of social ills and highlight the practices that should be modified, transformed, or eliminated. Third, frames also convince bystanders that they should use political tactics to stop these violations. These prognostic aspects of frames usually emphasize the urgency of political action and a sense that challenges from less powerful con- stituencies can force concessions from a reluctant target (this confidence in movement tactics is sometimes called “agency” or a “sense of collective efficacy”). In short, in order to be effective, collective action frames must assure gays and lesbi- ans that electoral or protest movements are a proper and viable response to their grievances. Finally, frames must provide a collective identity among the aggrieved. In doing so, collective identities establish social boundaries of “us” and “them” by specifying who belongs to the righteous in-group of the mistreated and who exemplifies the antagonistic wrongdoers who must be challenged. These collective identi- ties often contest and refute societal claims that members of their group are inferior, worthless, sick, or maladjusted. Instead, collective action frames offer narratives about the virtues of similar people and they suggest that their group is illegitimately threatened, deprived, or treated badly. These collective identities enhance a sense of solidarity and loyalty for the people who share the same problems, while simultane- ously fostering some distrust or contempt for the people or institutions that maintain these problems. It is the goal of this paper to ascertain the sort of injustice, attributional, prognos- tic, and collective identity frames that precede electoral efforts at social change. 1384 Gay and lesbian electoral activism © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Journal of Applied Social Psychology 2013, 43, pp. 1382–1393 Perceptions of injustices may or may not be related to per- sonal experiences of discrimination and prejudice. In many cases, gay and lesbians may become aware of heterosexism by observing or hearing about the mistreatment of other LGB people (Evans & Herriott, 2004; Hartman, 2005; Russell & McGuire, 2008). In other cases, enduring personal experi- ences of discrimination can delegitimize conventional norms and lead to an oppositional consciousness that challenges the status quo. The circumscribed, face-to-face nature of experi- enced discrimination makes it more proximal and salient than institutionalized forms of biases. This immediacy may create impulses to challenge this hardship, yet these impulses may be curbed or suppressed since heterosexism insists that gays and lesbians should be passive, accommodating, silent, or self-hating. This combination of suppression and discrimination can foster a number of detrimental coping mechanisms such as disengagement (Wilson & Yoshikawa, 2004), withdrawal or avoidance (Thompson, 2006), greater suicide and drug risk (Mays & Cochran, 2001), dangerous sexual practices (Wilson & Yoshikawa, 2004), and stigmatiz- ing others (Swim & Thomas, 2006). Although surviving discrimination can lead to negative consequences, cases of first-hand discrimination seem equally important to gay and lesbian activism (Duncan, 1999; Hyers, 2007; Jennings & Andersen, 2003; Taylor et al., 2009; Waldner, 2001). Two studies on AIDS activism found that gay men were more likely to protest governmental policies when they were demeaned by the medical professionals (Jennings & Andersen, 2003; Tester, 2004). Gays and lesbians who dealt with sexual and verbal harassment, or discrimination in housing and employment, were more likely to accept the sort of queer identity that leads to joining radical gay and lesbian rights groups (Friedman & Leaper, 2010; Rollins & Hirsch, 2003; Simon et al., 1998; Waldner, 2001). Moreover, the act of surviving deliberate and overt forms of homophobia remained statistically significant even when researchers con- trolled for contextual and framing influences (Simon et al., 1998; Waldner, 2001). Efficacy perceptions are sometimes related to the protest- ing inclinations of gays and lesbians (Hertzog, 1996; Jennings & Andersen, 2003; Jones, 2002; Swank & Fahs, 2011). For example, Jennings and Andersen (2003) suggested that gay men were more likely to join AIDS advocacy groups when they thought they had a good understanding of political issues. However, perceptions of political efficacy were irrel- evant to how often married gays and lesbians joined gay and lesbian right groups or attended a political demonstration (Taylor et al., 2009) and the only quantitative study of gay and lesbian electoral activism noted that “power expectancies” worked in the exact opposite ways as predicted (Waldner, 2001). That is, gays and lesbians were more likely to join a gay and lesbian political campaign when they thought the gov- ernment was unresponsive to gay or lesbian demands. As such, confidence in one’s political competencies might have different effects than confidence in a groups’ ability to change institutional practices. Issues of concealing one’s identity and “passing-as- straight” are inevitably linked to gay and lesbian rights activ- ism. Within a movement that tries to “gain the recognition for new social identities,” the very act of being “out” challenges the veracity of compulsorily heterosexuality (Bernstein, 1997). For individuals, public acknowledgments of sexual identities are often crafted through a complicated set of dis- closures practices. Some sexual minorities may feel comfort- able revealing their sexual identity in most settings while others may only hint at their sexual identity to a few confi- dants or nobody at all. Disclosures of sexuality are often stra- tegic, and the explicit assertion of a gay or lesbian identity implies that some aspects of the internalized heteronormativ- ity have been ignored. Finally, the person who willingly dis- closes a stigmatized identity in potentially risky situations often feels more entitled to demand more rights for gays and lesbians. Accordingly, identities can be tools of political empower- ment. Several studies have discovered greater political involvement among gays and lesbians who are more public about their sexual identity (Gortmaker & Brown, 2006; Lewis et al., 2011; Waldner, 2001). However, one study warned that the significant relationship between joining a gay and lesbian rights demonstration and disguising a gay or lesbian orienta- tion disappeared when they moved from a bivariate to multi- variate analysis (Simon et al., 1998). To address activist identities, a study of college students revealed that lesbians were more inclined to assertively challenge homophobic comments when they embraced the activists norms of “standing up for what’s right” and defending the rights of subordinated groups (Hyers, 2007). When addressing activist inclinations, gays and lesbians were more interested in politi- cal activism after they fully committed to their sexual identity (Konik & Stewart, 2004), paid attention to policies that effect lesbians and gays (Lewis et al., 2011), or felt solidarity with other sexual minorities (Friedman & Leaper, 2010). In terms of political behaviors, Herek et al. (2010) discovered that sexual minorities who were convinced of their sexuality were more likely to contact a government official or give money to a political candidate, while Rollins and Hirsch (2003) found that people who called themselves “queer” were more likely to join AIDS advocacy groups. “Nobody asked”: belonging to straight and gay civic groups Theories about “mobilizing structures” suggest that residing in certain social environments fostered greater political activ- ism (Lim, 2008; McAdam & Paulsen, 1993; McCarthy, 1996; Passy, 2001; Polletta & Jasper, 2001; Timpone, 1998). Social Swank and Fahs 1385 © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Journal of Applied Social Psychology 2013, 43, pp. 1382–1393 networks, which represent webs of recurring interactions between people and groups, always conveys some sort of beliefs, values, norms, and identities. While the content of networks is filtered through a complicated interpretive process, most people derive their worldviews and identities from their immersion in contexts that praise prevailing social orders and dismiss the worth of minority groups. However, some networks transmit collective action frames that contest conventional social scripts and suggest political challenges are necessary, important, and worthwhile. While the commu- nication between network partners can inspire activist incli- nations, such exchanges can also draw people into specific political mobilizations (Harder & Krosnick, 2008; Lake & Huckfeldt, 1998; McClurg, 2003). Political parties, commit- ted partisans, and movement activists often try to motivate activism through different persuasive techniques (e.g., face- to-face conversations, phone calls, email, direct mail, etc.). While each of these recruitment mediums transforms some sympathetic bystanders into activists, budding activists are more likely to act on their political predispositions when encouraged or asked to be active by someone who they per- sonally know (Hritzuk & Park, 2000; Lim, 2008; McClurg, 2003). As such, social networks seem to play the dual purpose of pushing and pulling people into political activism. In effect, social networks boost political engagement since they often convey the attitudes that make people prone or recep- tive to activism and they also disseminate the logistical infor- mation that makes activism possible. For studies of gay and lesbian activism the concept of social network immersion works has been measured via network size, network density, and types of group affiliations (Elbaz, 1996; Lombardi, 1999; Waldner, 2001). Some studies have found that gays and lesbians who routinely talked with other gays and lesbians were more politically active (Lombardi, 1999; Tester, 2004). Similarly being active in the lesbian and gay community lead to greater voting for liberal political can- didates (Lewis et al., 2011) and being contacted by the Demo- cratic political party increased the likelihood of voting for a lesbian candidate (Hertzog, 1996). Other studies suggest that membership in specific voluntary groups matters even more (Duncan, 1999). This is based on the premise that civic groups inspire more activism since they provide wider access to relevant information and have a higher concentration of friends who expect high levels of community engagement (Hritzuk & Park, 2000; Lim, 2008; Timpone, 1998). While joining a gay athletic club or a gay friendly church may sensi- tize participants about shared grievances and enhance group solidarity, theorists have often argued that the gay and lesbian community centers are the strongest engines of cognitive lib- eration (Bernstein, 1997). While LGB centers provide access to psychological and educational resources, they also intro- duce political rookies to explicitly political networks (e.g., consciousness-raising groups and national gay and lesbian rights groups that block recruit at their functions). In turn, this integration into LGB centers seems to translate into greater political activism (Elbaz, 1996; Lombardi, 1999; Waldner, 2001). In fact, the best predictor of gay and lesbian activism is membership in LGB groups (Lombardi, 1999; Swank & Fahs, 2011; Waldner, 2001). To turn this literature into a testable theoretical model, this study examined how resource, framing, and mobilizing vari- ables predicted an individual’s use of electoral tactics to further gay and lesbian rights. By applying the seven variables of family income, education, gender, hate crime victimiza- tion, gay or lesbian identities, perceptions of efficacy, and group membership to the data from an online survey, the fol- lowing analysis identified factors that distinguished gays and lesbians who were more or less active in electoral processes. Methods Participants This online study drew on a sample of 285 women and men from throughout the United States (December 2007), though centering primarily in the Mid-South and Midwestern states. Online surveys are often the best option when studying gay and lesbian populations (Koch & Emrey, 2002; Riggle, Rostosky & Reedy, 2005) for several reasons: First, national random samples often fail to ask questions about sexual orientation. Second, the Internet offers a national scope of potential respondents. This is important since the qualities of mobilizing structures vary dramatically throughout the United States. Third, online surveys offer research designs that have a quasi-experimental flavor.1 By using political and apolitical listervs to find respondents, we were able to create comparison groups of gays and lesbians who were involved in activist and non-activist social circles. This use of nonequiva- lent comparison groups has never been done before in studies on gay and lesbian political participation. Previous studies of gay activism collected their data through snowball samples of activists (Jones, 2002; Tester, 2004; Waldner, 2001), conven- ience samples of women in college (Friedman & Leaper, 2010; Hyers, 2007), mailing surveys to members of gay and lesbian organizations (Rollins & Hirsch, 2003; Simon et al., 1998; Sturmer & Simon, 2004; Taylor et al., 2009) or distributing surveys at political events (Elbaz, 1996; Lombardi, 1999; Waldner, 2001). Fourth, random phone or mail samples were impossible to complete, in part because researchers vary in the definition of who qualifies as “homosexual,” and complete lists of every gay and lesbian person in the United States do not exist. Fifth, snowball samples are often less representative 1Technically, Earl Babbie (2008) calls it a “case-control” design in which cross- sectional studies start with nonequivalent comparison on the dependent variable and collects retrospective data on the independent variables. 1386 Gay and lesbian electoral activism © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Journal of Applied Social Psychology 2013, 43, pp. 1382–1393 since they attract participants that are too homogeneous (Faugier & Sargeant, 1997). Snowball techniques dispropor- tionably select those who are already “out” and located solidly within the gay community (Farquhar, 1999; Rhoads, 1997), or they rely upon “tokenism” in order to achieve proper rep- resentation for groups outside of the sample’s social network (Brown, 2005). Finally, in-person recruitment at lesbian or gay establishments like bars or clubs would be too selective as well (Riggle et al., 2005), as it would likely oversample those who are younger or more active in the gay community, while excluding people with disability (Butler, 1999) and encourag- ing racial homogeneity (Bassi, 2002). Respondents were selected through a purposive stratified sample of several email listservs. The first stratum included two listservs of members in gay and lesbian rights organiza- tions. These political listservs were run by umbrella “Fairness Alliances.” These coalitions of political and human service organizations seek equality for LGB individuals by encourag- ing leadership development, public education, and participa- tion in the democratic process. Memberships in these email groups were free and most of its participants resided in Mid- western and Mid-Atlantic states, with the largest contingen- cies from Kentucky, Ohio, Indiana, Tennessee and West Virginia. It was assumed that these lists would guarantee access to people who were already embedded in a politically energized social network. The second stratum served as a comparison group of gays and lesbians who were involved in less politically engaged networks. The researchers selected Yahoo Groups that met three criteria. First, the group had to exist for explicitly social purposes (i.e., they did not mention anything political in the description of their listserv). Some of these groups con- centrated on hobbies (i.e., “Dykes on Bykes,” “Gay Square Dancers,” or “GLBT Horselovers”) while others displayed support group qualities (i.e., “Lavender Mothers” or “Ken- tucky Pride”). Second, we excluded groups that seemed to serve as romantic or sexual matchmaking sites. Finally, we looked for groups that mentioned the regions that were most common in the political listservs (i.e., Queer Kentucky, Rural Pride of Tennessee, or Gay in Ohio). The cover letters sent via the listservs asked potential respondents to click over to a SurveyMonkey web site. The letter solicited the involvement of adults who self-identified as gays or lesbians. In addition to the standard discussion of anonymity, voluntarism, and informed consent, we tried to build some trust and rapport by describing the educational and professional backgrounds of the primary investigators.2 The response rate to this letter was impossible to calculate since we cannot estimate the number of people who belonged to each listserv. The sample of 285 participants had a preponderance of males (58% male) and a mainly Euro-American racial com- position (79% European American, 7% Native American, 2% African American, 1% Asian American, 1% Latino/a, and 10% “refuse to answer”). Ages in the sample spanned a wide range, from age 18–75, with 24% under age 30, 54% ages 30–50, and 22% ages 51–75. The sample included a diverse array of incomes, including 10% below $20,000 per year, 27% $20,000–50,000 per year, 25% 50,000–80,000 per year, and 31% over $80,000 per year, with 8% being missing data. Similar to most samples of “out” lesbian and gay participants, our sample was highly educated, with 3% having earned a high school degree, 58% having some college or a bachelor’s degree, and 32% having a graduate degree. Participants tended to be distributed in many types of urban and rural spaces, with 26% residing in a large urban center, 18% resid- ing in a suburb of a large city, 18% residing in a mid-sized city, and 32% residing in smaller towns or rural areas. Because the majority of recruitment took place in the geographic South of the United States, 65.2% of participants lived in the South, 15.7% lived in the Midwest, 6.2% lived in the West, and 4% lived in the East, with Kentucky, Ohio, Indiana, Tennessee, and West Virginia representing the most respondents. Measures The anonymous online survey contained 88 close-ended items. The items on self-perceptions or perceptions of the gay and lesbian community were mostly measured via a 5-point scale (strongly agree to strongly disagree). Demographics and experiences of discrimination were handled through binary or 3-point scales. For example, respondents were offered the responses of never, once, or twice or more to the item of “Because of your sexual orientation, have you ever had verbal insults directed your way since you were 16-years-old?” Electoral activism In democratic societies, citizens can choose between a range of conventional political behaviors. Electoral activism refers to the institutionalized practices “by private citizens that are more or less directly aimed at influencing the selection of government personal and/or the actions they take” (Verba & Nie, 1972, p. 2). The options of voting, making campaign contributions, and contacting elected officials embody the electoral or insider mode of political participation. To match these electoral options to the gay and lesbian rights move- ment, we asked respondents if they had ever voted, signed a petition, or wrote a letter to a politician on the behalf of gay and lesbian rights. After each item was answered in a yes or no format, we then created a composite scale of that ranged from 0 (none of these behaviors) to 3 (all of these behaviors). In doing so, we hoped to capture the overall levels of electoral activism 2Sociologist Bernadette Barton of Morehead State University was another primary investigator during these stages of data collection. Swank and Fahs 1387 © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Journal of Applied Social Psychology 2013, 43, pp. 1382–1393 among gay and lesbian populations. See Table 1 for the distri- bution of responses to these items. Family income Participants’ economic resources were assessed through a current family income scale ranging from 1 (under $20,000) to 5 (above $151,001). Education level Academic achievement was measured by a five5-item scale that focused on the highest status achieved. Responses ranged from 1 (some high school) to 5 (graduate or professional degree). Gender Answers to “What is your gender” were coded in a binary fashion, from 0 (female) to 1 (male). Hate crime experiences Herek’s victimization scales (Herek, 2009) established the extent of hate crime violence in the respondents’ lifetimes (similar to Waldner, 2001). Respondents were asked three questions about the frequency in which they have been physi- cally or verbally attacked because of their perceived sexual identity. When focusing on being targeted because of their sexual identity, one item asked if they have been “punched, hit, kicked or beaten” while other items asked if were “chased or followed” or “had objects thrown at them.” Individual items had scores ranging from 0 (never) to 2 (two times or more), while the composite scale went from 0 to 6, with higher scores indicating a greater degree of victimization (Cronbach’s á = .785). Public disclosure of gay or lesbian identities To see how people managed the public disclosure of gay and lesbian identities, we chose an item from the public identifi- cation subscale of the Lesbian Internalized Homophobia Scale (Szymanski & Chung, 2001). Our item focused on issues of disclosure, or the willingness to publicly express a person’s gay or lesbian identity: “I try not to give any signs that I am gay or lesbian.” Note that the cover letter asked for volunteers who were self-identified gays and lesbians, so the question itself was not a form of disclosure to the researchers. Responses ranged from 0 (strongly agree) to 4 (strongly disagree). Sense of collective efficacy Collective efficacy judgments are future-oriented expectan- cies about the likelihood of a group achieving its intended goals. To focus on group potency, our measure addresses the perceived collective capacities of the gay and lesbian commu- nity: “When gays and lesbians work together, they can solve the problems facing them” (see Yeich & Levine, 1994). Responses ranged from 0 (strongly disagree) to 4 (strongly agree). Gay and lesbian group membership To trace the role of enabling social networks, we asked if respondents had ever joined a gay or lesbian athletic team, professional group, support group (similar to Lombardi, 1999). By creating a composite measure, we combined the yes or no items into a final score. Participants responses ranged from 0 (none of these activities) to 3 (all of these activities). Results Descriptive statistics Table 1 addresses the extent of political activism among our sample. While 83% of the sample indicated that they had cast a ballot for gay and lesbian rights, it was clear that voting was the most common act by far. Another half of the sample sug- gested that they had written a letter for gay and lesbian rights, and 24% indicated that they had signed a petition for gay and lesbian rights. Although we had a stratified sample, the amount of elec- toral activism was comparable to other national samples. A random sample of sexual minorities in 2007 found that 23% of respondents had communicated with a politician in the last year and 10% had written a letter to the news paper in that time (Egan et al., 2008). After averaging 20 years of Roper Political Participation questions, Henry Brady (1999) noted that roughly 86% of the nation had ever voted, while another 33% had signed petitions and 14% had written a senator or district representative. However, because our sample was far from random, we would caution that readers should not take any strong conclusions from this comparison. Explanatory statistics This study ran three ordinary least squares regressions. When deploying a hierarchal approach, the first regression limited itself to only the resource predictors. After estimating the Table 1 Descriptive Statistics for Electoral Participation Among Gays and Lesbians Item Frequency yes Percent yes Standard deviation Have you ever done any of these actions in support of gay rights? Voted 237 83% .37 Signed a petition 68 24% .42 Wrote a letter 142 50% .50 1388 Gay and lesbian electoral activism © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Journal of Applied Social Psychology 2013, 43, pp. 1382–1393 resource model, the ensuing regressions added batches of framing and mobilizing structure variables. As with any regression, this technique deciphered the direct association for each variable when controlling for the influence of the other independent variables (standardized coefficients), and it discerned the cumulative amount of variance explained by all of the variables included in the step (R2). Additionally, this technique illuminated the additional explanatory power of the new set of predictors (R2 change and F change identified the improvement in R2 when the latest variables were placed into the regression). Finally, our data met the requirements for this analysis since the dependent variable had an interval level of measurement and the sample lacked multicollinearity and heteroskedasticity. Table 2 presents the three models that explain electoral participation of gays and lesbians. Model 1 included only the resource variables while Model 2 adds the framing factors. The last model included all of the independent variables. When exploring the calculations, some clear patterns emerged. First, the entire model provided somewhat robust effect sizes. In the final regression, the cumulative effects of every variable accounted for 33.5% of the variance in elec- toral activism (p < .001). Second, each set variables made a unique contribution to the analysis, indicated through the R2 changed in the second and third regressions. In the first regression, all of the resource variables accounted for 8% of variance for electoral activism (p < .001). Next, the framing variables, net the effects of the resource variables, contrib- uted another 15% to R2 (p < .001). Lastly, the mobilizing structures contributed another 10% of predictive powers beyond the influence of the resource and framing variables (p < .001). Specific variables also made unique contributions. Educa- tional attainment was statistically significant across all models (although the beta coefficient slipped from .31 to .16 in the three different regressions the probability was always less than .001). The framing variables remained important as well. Before adding the networking variable in model 3, the factors of hate crime victimization, being out publicly, and the sense of collective efficacy had significant standardized coefficients between .23 and .17 (p < .001 or p < .01). After adding the LGB membership variable, the framing variables remained significant but saw their strength of association drop a bit (p < .05 or p < .01). Hate crime victimization fell to .16 while public identities and collective efficacy impressions dipped to .14 and .11. In the last regression, the membership variable netted the largest association (beta = .36, p < .001). Finally, the resource variables of family income and gender never rejected the null. Discussion By trying to discover the factors that inspired electoral activ- ism among gays and lesbians, this study offers a unique look into a retrospective sample of activists and non-activists. The study also offers a more theoretically comprehensive analysis than previous studies because this quantitative study synthe- sizes the insights of “resource,” “framing,” and “mobilization” theories of political participation. While researchers have tested similar models among heterosexual populations, this is not true among studies of gay and lesbian activists (LGB studies rarely go beyond a handful of variables at a single time). By taking an integrated approach, we hoped that the final regression model would be especially robust. Likewise, by embracing theoretical breadth and interdisciplinary eclec- ticism, we intended to eliminate or minimize the presence of spurious or confounding relationships. Finally, the coeffi- cients in a study that combines alternative theories allows for a better understanding of the relative importance of each type of variable. Table 2 Ordinary Least Squares Regressions of Electoral Activism and Resource, Framing, and Social Network Variables Independent variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Resource variables Family income .00 (.05) .02 (.05) .04 (.04) Educational attainment .31*** (.07) .22*** (.06) .16** (.06) Gender (male = 1) .03 (.12) .03 (.11) .07 (.10) Framing Experienced a hate crime .21*** (.03) .16** (.02) Public gay or lesbian identity .23*** (.05) .14* (.05) Gay and lesbian collective efficacy .17** (.06) .11* (.06) Mobilizing structure LGB group membership .36*** (.11) Adjusted R2 .08 .23 .33 F 8.80*** 12.97*** 18.31*** R2 change .149 .105 F change 15.53*** 37.98*** *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001. Standard error (r). Swank and Fahs 1389 © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Journal of Applied Social Psychology 2013, 43, pp. 1382–1393 Our results highlighted two primary findings: First, gays and lesbians showed clear electoral participation; and second, resource, framing, and mobilization theories were all relevant to gay and lesbian activism.3 The mobilizing factor of mem- bership in a LGB organization provided the strongest associa- tion.4 While involvement in gay and lesbian social groups seemed to beget greater electoral activism, future research may want to explore the mechanisms that drive this associa- tion. Movement scholars suggest that membership in any civic associations increases the chance of being asked to join political event (Lim, 2008). Moreover, integration into LGB groups probably fosters some aspects of collective action frames that we failed to study. Qualitative works by Taylor and Whittier (1992) and Masequesmay (2003) suggested that extended conversations in gay-only settings fostered more in-group camaraderie and sharper distinctions between het- erosexual and sexual minority communities. Future research may want to see if these claims are accurate and if additional qualities of LGB groups enabled political activism. Perhaps being ensconced in other types of political groups inspires greater electoral activism (e.g., belonging to college Demo- crats, feminist organizations, or unions). Similarly, informal socialization processes in primary groups may predispose people to activism. Gays and lesbians may show greater incli- nations to political activism if their families debate politics, they took a gender studies classes in college, or they routinely sat through religious sermons that chastised homosexuality. Of course, the list of possible socializing agents is quite vast and future researchers can explore the impact of communica- tive acts in many different types of settings. Our data also suggests that framing variables are important as well. There are political consequences of being “closeted” or “out.” Respondents who routinely concealed their sexual orientation were less politically engaged than those who did not. (Bernstein, 1997; Polletta & Jasper, 2001; Taylor & Whittier, 1992). This may be partially a development of self- interest—it seems wise to protect gay or lesbian rights when one fully embraces such identities. However, electoral activ- ism can be related to definitions of a liberated self. After years of being ignored or vilified, silenced peoples are often relieved or excited when they feel safe enough to advocate for greater rights. Similar satisfactions may also come from the breaking of demeaning social roles and for doing the “right thing” of protecting more vulnerable gays and lesbians who are too afraid to do so themselves. The importance of other frames was revealed as well. Pre- sumably to the chagrin of homophobic bullies, hate crimes did not seem to intimidate gays and lesbians into submission. Instead, surviving violent homophobic attacks seemed to generate resilient gays and lesbians who were more resolved in their political efforts. It could be that violence of this sort shatters illusions of a fair or acceptable status quo, or it could highlight a sense of urgency when seeking social change. Regardless, ensuing rounds of research should determine if other forms of experienced discrimination propel activism. Greater activism may be connected to blocked opportunities in schools, housing, workplaces, court proceedings, hospitals, etc. The topic of collective efficacy seems important as well. Gays and lesbians were more resigned to stay out of electoral politics when they thought the government was unresponsive to gay and lesbian demands. Conversely, involvement in poli- tics was much higher for the respondents who envisioned that a gay and lesbian rights movement could force concessions from a sometimes hostile and recalcitrant government. Finally, the resource model had mixed results. The factor of educational attainment moved people to activism, while issues of social class and gender did not. It appears as if edu- cation prompted greater electoral activism. It could be that the resource theorists are correct in claiming that colleges foster the sort of analytical skills that are necessary for activ- ism. It is also possible that content of college curriculums inspires greater liberalism among students and that college settings often grant access to a wider scope of gay and lesbian social circles. The lack of significance for salary can mean two different things. Class backgrounds may in fact fail to predict electoral gay and lesbian rights activism. This would nullify the famil- iar patterns of older left movements mostly drawing from the working and poorer social classes (e.g., labor and socialist movements). This interpretation would confirm “New Social Movement” theories that claim that gay and lesbian rights activism is more concerned with challenging cultural codes than with the unequal distribution of financial resources (Johnston, Larana, & Gusfield, 1994; Van Dyke, Soule, & Taylor, 2004). On the other hand, the proponents of the “resource” theories of participation could argue that our research methodologies probably underestimated the effects of family income. Using an online survey perhaps distorts the impact of salaries in that people who use the internet may have higher class standings than people who do not. However, some methodological papers have found that the demo- graphic characteristics of online and mail samples of gays and lesbians were “practically indistinguishable” and “equivalent” (Koch & Emrey, 2002; Riggle et al., 2005). Income could have also presented a stronger impact if we included different measures of electoral activism. Matters of wealth and salaries 3While our data finds that gays and lesbians are involved in electoral activism, our measures are not perfect. With our measures, it is impossible to know how many times a respondent engaged in each political action, as the act of voting for gay cause can mean several things (be it voting on a referendum or select- ing a candidate that promotes greater rights for sexual minorities). 4Because access to LGBT organizations and exposure to discrimination could vary by location (Tewksbury, Grossi, Suresh, & Helms, 1999), it is possible that these findings may not fully reflect the activism of gays and lesbians who reside outside of Midwestern and Southern states. 1390 Gay and lesbian electoral activism © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Journal of Applied Social Psychology 2013, 43, pp. 1382–1393 could have been more important if we asked questions about the financial methods of swaying electoral cam- paigns (e.g., making a donation to a political candidate, a political party, or a gay or lesbian Political Action Committee). Because our entire model accounted for roughly one third of the variance in electoral activism, future research should insert new variables into their studies. Scholars might see if the demographic variables of race, age, or residential mobility influences political participation (Bailey, 1998; Harder & Krosnick, 2008). Other studies might explore the role of other framing and social-psychological processes. Activism may be connected to general impressions of discrimination, attribu- tions of system blame, perceived salience of sexuality, cer- tainty about sexual orientation, favorable impressions or solidarity with other gays and lesbians, a sense of interde- pendence and mutual fate among gays and lesbians, a dislike for heterosexuals, or perceptions of civic duties (Ashmore et al., 2004; Hertzog, 1996; Swank & Fahs, 2011; Van Zomeren et al., 2008). To measure such topics, researchers might look at recent versions of modern heterosexist and internalized homophobia scales (Mayfield, 2001; Morrison & Morrison, 2002). Changes in governmental actions or political opportu- nity structures could alter the electoral activism of sexual minorities as well. A study by Swank and Fahs (2011) found increases in contributions to political candidates when gay right initiatives were on the ballot and Riggle, Rostosky, and Horne (2009) discovered an increase in gay and lesbian activ- ism for sexual minorities who lived in the 13 states that held referendum votes on banning “same-sex marriages” in 2004. However, preliminary bivariate calculations could not detect significant relationships between our measures of electoral activism and any sorts of state-wide policies (this included public votes on same-sex marriages as well as laws on whether sexual orientation was included in antidiscrimination and hate crime laws). Understanding the impact of different mobilizing structures could also be illuminating. Befriending straight activists, living in liberal neighborhoods, or going to “gay- friendly” colleges could foster greater activism. Conversely, living in isolated rural communities or being raised in socially conservative families or orthodox religious institutions could dampen any inclinations to gay and lesbian activism. Researchers may also see how contact with movement activ- ists and access to different recruiting apparatuses shape the actions of the politically committed. Further, measuring the ways that electronic networks such as listservs, Facebook and Twitter affect activism may prove especially important to online surveys like the one used in this study, as “weak tie” versus “strong tie” activism can be explored. Future researchers may also improve on our research methods. First, when designing studies, it would be better to have longitudinal studies because cross-sectional studies often have temporal ordering problems. It is possible that engaging in gay and lesbian rights activism can alter people’s attitudes and/or their awareness of gay and lesbian groups. Second, measurement errors regularly haunt survey data. Critics might argue that the threshold of what constitutes an activist is too low (e.g., greater specificity about the frequen- cies of voting would be better). Single-item measures for the framing variables might miss some key dimensions as well. Shortcomings with item wording can also undermine the reli- ability of measures. Perhaps the phrase “giving signs that they are gay or lesbian” is vague as the item of “gays and lesbians” working together deals more with cooperation between the genders than the collective power of this cooperation. Ques- tions of social desirability may be especially relevant to our activist identity measures, as participants may want to sound good to themselves by overstating the amount that they fight for social justice. Finally, our binary coding of gender would not be exhaustive if some transgendered or intersexed respondents decided to complete our survey. Overall, this study provides evidence for the centrality of framing with regard to gay and lesbian activism, and it sug- gests that, despite the intensity of heteronormativity experi- enced by the gay and lesbian communities in this country, gay and lesbian populations have found a variety of ways to make their voices heard and combat homophobia through electoral means. 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work_7fgeah556rgmpmbemkiei5auxm	----	Organised and Ambient Digital Racism: Multidirectional Flows in the Irish Digital Sphere Right-Wing Populism and Mediated Activism: Creative Responses and Counter-Narratives How to Cite: Siapera, E 2019 Organised and Ambient Digital Racism: Multidirectional Flows in the Irish Digital Sphere. Open Library of Humanities, 5(1): 13, pp. 1–34. DOI: https://doi.org/10.16995/olh.405 Published: 08 February 2019 Peer Review: This article has been peer reviewed through the double-blind process of Open Library of Humanities, which is a journal published by the Open Library of Humanities. Copyright: © 2019 The Author(s). This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (CC-BY 4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited. See http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/. Open Access: Open Library of Humanities is a peer-reviewed open access journal. Digital Preservation: The Open Library of Humanities and all its journals are digitally preserved in the CLOCKSS scholarly archive service. https://doi.org/10.16995/olh.405 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ Eugenia Siapera, ‘Organised and Ambient Digital Racism: Multidirectional Flows in the Irish Digital Sphere’ (2019) 5(1): 13 Open Library of Humanities. DOI: https://doi.org/10.16995/olh.405 RIGHT-WING POPULISM AND MEDIATED ACTIVISM: CREATIVE RESPONSES AND COUNTER-NARRATIVES Organised and Ambient Digital Racism: Multidirectional Flows in the Irish Digital Sphere Eugenia Siapera University College Dublin, IE eugenia.siapera@ucd.ie This article is concerned with the distinction between acceptable race talk in social media and organised, extreme or ‘frozen’ racism which is considered hate speech and removed. While in the literature this distinction is used to point to different variants, styles and mutations of racism, in social media platforms and in European regulatory frameworks it becomes policy. The empirical part of the article considers this distinction drawing upon a series of posts following a stabbing incident in a small Irish town, which organised Twitter accounts sought to connect to terrorism. The empirical analysis examines the tweets of those accounts and the comments left on the Facebook page and website of one of the main Irish online news outlets. The analysis shows few if any differences between the two, concluding that there is a blending of supremacist and everyday, ambient racist discourses. This blending indicates the operation of a transnational contagion, given the shared vocabularies and discourses. It further problematises the distinction between ‘illegal hate speech’ and ‘acceptable race talk’, and throws into question the principle underlying both the policies of social media as well as the European efforts to de-toxify the digital public sphere. https://doi.org/10.16995/olh.405 mailto:eugenia.siapera@ucd.ie Siapera: Organised and Ambient Digital Racism2 This article identifies and analyses social media racist discourse, using as a case study a stabbing incident in Dundalk, a small town in Ireland. This fatal incident was for a brief period of time considered a terrorist attack, based on speculation on the accused’s nationality. Analysing the online discourses on this event, the article aims to show that conceptual and operational distinctions between organised, extreme racism and ambient, banal everyday race talk, do not in fact hold, and may even contribute to the circulation of racism in digital environments. Recent studies and reports have observed surges in racism, hate crime and discriminatory practices. In Ireland, in the first six months of 2017, there was an increase of 33% in (reported) hate crime, compared to the previous six months, and overall a consistent rise since 2013 (Michael, 2018). Of the incidents reported, over one third were instances of online racist hate speech. In the UK, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) reports that 95,552 instances of online racist hate speech recorded by the police in 2017, a 15% rise since 2016 and almost a 50% rise since 2013 (OSCE, n.d.). Tell Mama, a UK-based civil society organisation measuring anti-Muslim attacks, recorded 1,223 incidents in 2016, of which 64% were street/offline attacks and 36% online, an overall 47% increase from the previous reporting year of 2015 (Tell Mama, 2017). The spread of (digital) hate has also been noted by the European Commission and the Council of Europe, leading the former to establish a Code of Conduct with social media platforms for taking down illegal hate speech in a systematic and timely fashion, and the latter to launch the No Hate Speech Movement, a youth-based campaign against hate speech. In response to this rise in racist hate speech and hate crime, offline and online, there is a growing body of work that looks to address the types of online racism (Awan, 2014), the discursive shifts in racist repertoires (Lawson, 2018; Titley, 2016a; Titley, 2016b), the ambiguous role of new technologies and media (Farkas, Schou and Neumeier, 2018; Lentin and Humphrey, 2017), the increasing visibility of organised racist social media pages and accounts (Daniels, 2009a and 2009b; Ekman, 2015; Ekman, 2018) and the spillover from the offline to the online and vice versa (Klein, 2017). Building upon this research, the current contribution seeks to understand the differences between offline and online hate speech, if any, and the connections Siapera: Organised and Ambient Digital Racism 3 between the everyday banal, ‘ambient’ digital racism (Essed, 1991; Sharma, 2017) and the organised and/or extreme kind that is typically associated with the far right in Europe and the US. Essed (1991) writing in the 1990s, in the post-civil rights world where racism was seen as something of a past era, pointed out the importance of everyday encounters as a crucial locus for the reproduction of racism. Similarly, Lentin (2016) makes a distinction between ‘frozen’ and ‘motile’ racism, whereby the first is clear to all, but the latter becomes a moving target, the subject of discussion, denial and questioning. In the everyday context, racism becomes ‘banal’, shifts in forms, is experienced in a fragmented manner as a set of micro-aggressions (Sue, 2010) and becomes elusive and consistently questioned and denied (Titley, 2016a). On the other hand, most forms of organised, frozen, overt and explicit racism are seen as unacceptable and an aberration, as found for example in definitions of ‘illegal hate speech’ adopted by the European Union and most of the nation-states that comprise it (EC, 2008). Similarly, social media corporations have developed their own terms of service (Twitter), or ‘community standards’ (Facebook), which draw upon these understandings of illegal hate speech, but which also allow certain contents to circulate under rules governing freedom of expression and public debate. In this manner, we obtain a dichotomy of what effectively constitutes ‘acceptable racism’ and what is deemed unacceptable or even illegal. Drawing on a dataset of posts following an event in a small town in Ireland, this article will seek to show that there are very few differences between these two forms, which are often combined and circulated in tandem. The article will begin with a review of the literature on digital and online racism. It will then move on to discuss how the dataset under analysis was generated and the methodology by which the analysis was conducted. The analysis will show the ways in which in practice very little separates the forms of racism that circulate in everyday online discussions and those found in the accounts and spaces occupied by those associated with the far right. Additionally, both kinds, if we accept this division, seem to circulate unhindered and for the most part unreported. The final section attempts to examine some of the implications of the findings, especially in terms of the recent Code of Conduct signed between the European Commission and social media platforms. Siapera: Organised and Ambient Digital Racism4 The focus on illegal hate speech and enforcement appears to allow certain contents to circulate while arbitrarily prohibiting others which form part of the same overall discourse; the result is that the focus is on governing and managing digital racism rather than seeking to eradicate it. Digital Racism One of the earliest articles that studied the internet from a socio-cultural perspective was Robert Eatwell’s ‘Surfing the Great White Wave: The Internet, Extremism, and the Problem of Control’. Published in 1996, two years before Google was founded and almost ten years before the rise of social media, the article discussed the white supremacist site Stormfront, the potential of the internet for such groups and the difficulty of controlling online communications. What is important to note here is that the expansion of supremacist groups online began almost as soon as the World Wide Web allowed individuals and groups to go online. While this may appear surprising, especially given the association of the early internet with libertarian virtual communities (Rheingold, 2000), it is noted here to show the intricate and intimate links between the web and racism. The first line of inquiry into digital racism then concerns the connections between technology and racism. Even conceding that racism is always present, the preponderance of racist hate online (Daniels, 2013) still requires explanation and explication especially given the many forms it takes. A second line of inquiry looks at this issue and the new impetus for racism afforded by the digital space. These areas of inquiry foreground the institutional role of the regulators of the internet, which in the first instance include the social media platforms themselves who have become the new ‘custodians of the internet’ (Gillespie, 2018). This constitutes the third line of inquiry as, ultimately, their policies shape the form of digital racism. It is here, at the operational level, that we find the clearest separation between ‘ambient’ racism which is seen as acceptable or at least as something than can be tolerated, and illegal, extreme and unacceptable racism that has to be taken down. This section will discuss these lines of inquiry, concluding that a question: how different are these two racisms? Siapera: Organised and Ambient Digital Racism 5 Technology and Racism Notwithstanding the links between the US military and the internet, it is the liberal Californian ideology (Barbrook and Cameron, 1996) that shapes current technology and technological policy as well as public understandings of it. This ideology revolves around discourses of freedom, individualism and egalitarianism but holds that these can only be enacted through economic liberalism and individual entrepreneurship which will give rise to a bright technological future. As Barbrook and Cameron put it, the Californian ideology is ‘a bizarre mishmash of hippie anarchism and economic liberalism beefed up with lots of technological determinism’ (1996: 52). But this ideological patina fails to mask the undercurrent of racism and inequality that underpins not only the relations of production of technology and its products but also the codes and algorithms that make up the internet. As Nakamura (2002) put it, the default internet user is a middle-class white male, with everyone else ‘cybertyped’ from futuristic Asians to ‘techno-primitive’ Blacks. The supposed colour-blindness of technology masks the racialised reality of its production, which shows a typical racial hierarchy of white men and a few white women at the top, buttressed by men and women of the global south that do the manual work of assembling the circuits either as immigrant labour in the global north or as outsourced workers in the south (Daniels, 2015; Dyer-Witheford, 2015; Gajjala, 2004). Well-meaning studies of the racial digital divide that understand race as a variable end up creating a deficit model in which minorities are lacking, forever trying to play catch up (Zuberi and Bonilla Silva, 2008). Perhaps because of these structural inequalities, the coding language itself is racially loaded. Moreover, in a context of constant surveillance and securitized technocapitalism, technologies often become instruments for further subjugation and control. A 2016 investigation by Angwin et al. showed that risk assessments in penal contexts conducted via algorithms systematically discriminate against minorities, for example denying them bail or contributing to higher sentences. Algorithms can only be trained on existing data, which are derived from societies that are already racially structured, hence Siapera: Organised and Ambient Digital Racism6 reproducing the current racial logics. Another example here is Microsoft’s attempt to use Twitter crowds to train a chat-bot: in less than a day, the bot was trained to use racist and misogynistic language (Vincent, 2016). Technological artefacts, apps and platforms are further used as a means of racial differentiation. Boyd argued a contributory factor to the demise of MySpace was its association with Black users (2013). A flipside to this is the rise of Black Twitter, a space created by Black publics within Twitter, which constitutes a Black cultural artefact (Brock, 2012; Sharma, 2013). While Black Twitter has been seen as empowering, it is also a means of foregrounding racialised practices. As Brock (2012) notes, Twitter’s affordances are mediated differently depending on the racial affiliation of those using it. On the one hand, Twitter acts as a facilitator of cultural deficit racial stereotypes, such as, for example, that Black people are not as technologically advanced as Whites; on the other hand, it can be seen as an important forum for civic action (Brock, 2012). Sharma (2013) understands race and Twitter as an assemblage whereby racialised subjects multiply, contest and transmit different ways of being raced online. In Sharma’s view, neither the technologies nor the users are pre-constituted but emerge out of their coming together, opening up new ways of being. This brief exposition outlines some of the ways in which new technologies reproduce dominant racial understandings, but also offer the potential for to subvert these, through the practices and appropriations of technologies by racialised subjects. However, looking at the kinds of contents and representations that circulate in the online platforms that have come to structure the internet it seems that racial hate prevails. Online Racist Hate There is a large body of research that has identified online racist hate speech, focusing on those who develop and share racist hate, on the specific targets and on the various internet and/or digital genres that host such hateful speech. Taken together, these aspects form a very bleak picture of a digital environment that is not only racialised, in the sense that it is becoming inimical to, and marginalises or ghettoises non-white, non-Western people, but which also actively robs these people from participating in the construction of a common digital future. Siapera: Organised and Ambient Digital Racism 7 In terms of the tropes of racist hate, important work has been conducted by think tanks such as the UK-based Demos. Using data mining through complex algorithms and qualitative content analysis of selected content, Demos has published studies on the prevalence and patterns of use of racial and ethnic slurs on Twitter (Bartlett et al., 2014; Bartlett and Krasodomski-Jones, 2016); on Islamophobia spikes on Twitter in the immediate aftermath of news events, especially terrorist attacks (Miller and Smith, 2017); on the volume of derogatory and/or hateful anti-Muslim tweets; as well as the impact of the EU Referendum on xenophobia and racism. Demos (Bartlett et al., 2014) estimated that about 1 in every 15,000 tweets contains an ethnic or racial slur but included terms such as ‘whitey’ which do not carry the same force as some of the derogatory terms used for black, Asian or Jewish people. Demos further found that Islamophobic tweets surge after specific incidents, such as terrorist attacks. Following the Nice attacks in July 2016, Miller and Smith (2017) reported an average of 286 Islamophobic tweets per hour. In a study of the aftermath of the EU referendum, Miller et al. (2016) found that about 40% of the tweets on Brexit, in the period 19 June–1 July 2016 used a term that showed a xenophobic or anti-immigrant attitude. Studies such as these show clearly the extent of problematic contents circulating, contents that may not qualify for removal as ‘illegal hate speech’ and which therefore remain online. Increasing volumes of racist hate were also observed by other monitoring organisations, such as the UK-based Tell Mama. In its 2017 report, the organisation reported a clear escalation, with a 31% rise in verified incidents compared to 2016. The organisation also noted spikes following specific incidents: for example, the Brexit referendum led to a 475% increase in reported anti-Muslim incidents compared to the week before the referendum and a 700% surge following the terrorist attack in Manchester, in May 2017, compared again to the week before the attack. Tell Mama monitors both physical and online hate incidents. In terms of the online incidents, Tell Mama highlighted the role of bots and foreign-run accounts. Two of those, @DavidJo52951945 and @SouthLoneStar, were subsequently found to be operated by the so-called Internet Research Agency based in Russia (Booth et al., 2017). Tell Mama noted that these accounts operate transnationally, using https://twitter.com/hashtag/davidjo52951945?lang=en https://twitter.com/hashtag/southlonestar?lang=en Siapera: Organised and Ambient Digital Racism8 Islamophobic hashtags such as #BanIslam and #CultofDeath. In terms of the content of online racist speech, Awan (2014) analysed 500 Islamophobic tweets, identifying some of the dominant hateful discourses, consisting of words or phrases such as ‘Muslim pigs’ (9%), ‘Muzrats’ (14%), ‘Muslim Paedos’ (30%), ‘Muslim terrorists’ (22%), ‘Muslim scum’ (15%) and ‘Pisslam’ (10%). Awan’s analysis took place after two incidents, the murder of Lee Rigby in Woolwich (2013) and the conviction of several Asian men for grooming young women for sex in Rotherham, the extent of which was publicised in the UK media in 2013. The analysis maps the surge in Islamophobia that typically follows such news events, but not necessarily the more banal, everyday expressions. In the US, it is primarily white supremacy contents that have been mapped and understood, by theorists such as Daniels (2009a; 2016). Daniels (2009a) compared print to digital white supremacism, highlighting the new opportunities for this ideology afforded by the new media. Overall, white supremacists online mobilise anti-Semitic conspiratorial discourses about Jewish control of the media and the complicity of mainstream politicians that does not allow the ‘natural’ superiority of white identity to emerge. Brown (2009) discusses online supremacist discourse as positing a strict racial and gendered hierarchy with Western European men at the top, using biological and similar essentialist arguments, which are described as ‘facts’. Daniels (2009b) further points out the role played by ‘cloaked websites’, which are sites that hide their authorship and links to political causes such as white supremacy, pretend they are neutral, informational websites and peddle racist propaganda, such as, for example, that slavery was an idyllic social system. More recently, cloaked pages were examined by Farkas, Schou and Neumayer (2018) who found that fake Islamist Facebook pages are used to stoke racist hate in Denmark. Taking stock of this body of work, alongside the rise of the alt right, Daniels (2018) shows that the expressed purpose of organised racist groups in digital environments is to push the boundaries of acceptable discourse; Daniels (2018: 64) quotes a white nationalist on Twitter claiming that ‘People have adopted our rhetoric, sometimes without even realizing it. We’re setting up for a massive cultural shift’. Siapera: Organised and Ambient Digital Racism 9 In Europe, the rise of identitarianism associated with political movements and parties such as the Golden Dawn in Greece (Siapera and Veikou, 2016), Pegida in Germany (Vorländer, Herold and Schäller, 2018), the True Finns and Sweden Democrats in Northern Europe (Teitelbaum, 2016) and Jobbik in Hungary, points to the association of white supremacy with nativist and ethno-nationalist ideologies. According to Ahmed and Pisoiu (2017) the three core ideas of identitarianism are: (i) Ethnopluralism, which refers to the idea that cultures should strive to retain their uniqueness, but separately from one another. Ethnopluralism is connected to anti-migrant and strong border discourses; (ii) Post-ideology, which refers to an ideological positioning beyond left and right and which sets up identitarianism primarily as a cultural movement. Post-ideology is associated with a populist critique of all non-identitarian political parties and the political establishment; and (iii) ‘Retorsion’, the idea that the majority is now somehow a threatened minority in its own territory, a situation which needs to be resisted. Retorsion is linked to discourses of ‘replacement’, and to anti-refugee and anti-migrant positions. While this body of work illustrates the ways in which social media have provided another platform for racist hate, especially by organised groups, another line of inquiry focuses on the ways in which racism is denied in digital environments. Titley (2016a, 2016b, forthcoming) has argued that the proliferation of racist and anti-racist voices in digital environments, the opportunities for discursive exchange and the race-blindness of digital platforms, within a post-racial ideological context, are factors contributing to the rise of the debatability of racism. For Titley, the very existence of these debates contributes to silencing and denying racism through making noise, constantly debating and arguing about what is race and racism. Moreover, their existence is a political issue as it raises important questions as to who gets to define racism. While this debatability is the result of what Lentin (2016) calls the motility of racism, its dynamic, generative and evolving character, along with online affordances, such as the spreadability of contents (Jenkins, Ford and Green, 2018), actively contribute to its current shape. Siapera: Organised and Ambient Digital Racism10 Taking the above into account, the picture that is emerging shows that digital and social media have enabled both the proliferation of racist discourses and a shift towards a different kind of racism that is spreading racist hate all the while denying its existence. It is within this context that the role of the ‘custodians of the internet’ (Gillespie, 2018) emerges as crucial. Platform regulation of contents The policies used by digital platforms are directly responsible for the contents we see. What is less clear however is where these policies are derived and how they are implemented. To begin with, in the US the legal context within which platforms operate is the so-called safe harbour policy, established by Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act of 1996 (Gillespie, 2018). This policy prevents platforms from being liable for contents published on them, on the basis that they are not publishers but provide access to the internet. In a second move, Section 230 allows platforms to remove some contents if they so choose without losing their safe harbour status. This dual provision, argues Gillespie (2018), shaped the platform approach to content moderation. A similar policy exists in the European Union: in the 2015 Delfi vs Estonia case (ECtHR 64669/09), on the extent to which an online news publisher (Delfi) should be liable for contents posted by users in the comments section, the European Court of Human Rights upheld the original decision of the local Estonian courts, making publishers liable. The Court further considered that its judgment was not applicable in the case of an internet forum, social media platforms or comments left on personal blogs. Social media platforms specifically are protected by the limited liability for internet service providers (ISP) in terms of the E-Commerce Directive of 2000 (Directive 2000/31/EC). Social media platforms are considered ‘mere conduits’ and hence not responsible; however, the directive states that an ‘information society service […] upon obtaining knowledge or awareness of illegal activities has to act expeditiously to remove or to disable access to the information concerned’ (Article 46: L 178/6) and that ‘Member States are prevented from imposing a monitoring obligation on service providers’ (Article 47: L. 178/6). These requirements create a context whereby social media platforms only voluntarily impose content controls according to their own criteria and rules, and Siapera: Organised and Ambient Digital Racism 11 typically act retro-actively, upon receiving reports of illegal contents, not proactively by pre-moderating contents before they publish them. While still voluntary, the European Commission (2018a) signed a code of conduct with four platforms (YouTube/Google, Facebook, Twitter and Microsoft) in 2016, while more platforms joined in 2018 (Snapchat, Google+ and Instagram). The basic premises of the code of conduct require that companies must make clear the reporting process, that they must review and if necessary remove illegal contents within 24 hours of notification, that they should form more relationships with civil society and in general be more transparent in terms of how they operate with respect to such contents. The Commission monitors how the code is applied. The most recent report, in January 2018 (European Commission, 2018b), noted considerable progress with 70% of reported illegal contents taken down compared to 28% in the first monitoring exercise in 2016. Notwithstanding the importance of the code of conduct, the whole exercise hinges firstly on what is considered illegal hate speech and secondly on users actually reporting contents. In the EU, the definition of illegal hate speech is determined by the EC 2008 Framework Decision on combating certain forms and expressions of racism and xenophobia by means of criminal law. The framework decision expects member states to introduce legislation against xenophobia and hate speech that includes incitement ‘to violence or hatred directed against a group of persons or a member of such a group defined by reference to race, colour, religion, descent or national or ethnic origin’; the ‘public dissemination or distribution of tracts, pictures or other material’ that incites to violence or hatred; and the trivialization of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and crimes covered by the Tribunal of Nuremberg (European Commission, 2008: 328/56). In contrast, the US First Amendment does now allow any content- based regulation, with two exceptions: libellous and defamatory contents and/or ‘fighting words’, i.e. incitement to violence (Cornell Law School, n.d.). Social media platforms navigate this regulatory environment and its tensions by creating their own ‘terms of service’, ‘community standards’ and policies (Twitter, Facebook and YouTube respectively). In general, these policies draw upon the UN Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 and the subsequent International Covenant Siapera: Organised and Ambient Digital Racism12 of Civil and Political Rights, and specifically Article 19 on Freedom of Expression, and Articles 20 and 26 that prohibit advocacy of racial, religious or national hatred that incites discrimination, hostility or violence and establish the right to non- discrimination on grounds such as such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin and equality before the law for all these groups (UN, 1966). For instance, Facebook (n.d.) defines hate speech as: A direct attack on people based on what we call protected characteristics – race, ethnicity, national origin, religious affiliation, sexual orientation, sex, gender, gender identity and serious disability or disease. We also provide some protections for immigration status. We define ‘attack’ as violent or dehumanising speech, statements of inferiority, or calls for exclusion or segregation. On the other hand, when the training materials used by Facebook were leaked to the media, it emerged that the procedures used created a two-tiered system, whereby certain contents were (rightly) seen as unacceptable while other equally problematic contents remained. In the leaked documents, it is made clear that while for example followers of a religion (e.g. Muslims) are protected, the religion itself is not. In enforcing its rules, Facebook has made a distinction between protected, not protected and quasi-protected categories. The protected categories are those referred to above. Non-protected categories include social class, appearance, countries, political ideologies, occupations and so on (Guardian, 2017: n.p.). The quasi-protected categories include refugees, migrants and transgender people. In an article in the New York Times, Carlsen and Haque (2017: n.p.) show how Facebook allows statements such as ‘Poor black people should still sit in the back of a bus’ but not statements such as ‘White men are assholes’. This is because ‘white men’ combines two protected categories, race and gender, while ‘poor black people’ combines a protected category, race, with a non-protected category, social status, which according to the leaked training materials means that the protected category loses its protected status. Additionally, the leaked documents revealed various rules that allow, for example, calls for dismissing or excluding whole groups of people, Siapera: Organised and Ambient Digital Racism 13 but which delete dehumanising generalizations. The emergence of these kinds of rules points to the need for digital platforms to balance conflicting demands: the demand to allow contents to circulate as this is their main business model with the demand to keep out hate speech (Siapera, Viejo-Otero and Moreo, 2017). In doing so, platforms have created a division between acceptable and unacceptable racist speech, whereby unacceptable racist hate is seen as dehumanising and harmful but acceptable racist hate is seen as ‘allowing for a broad public discussion’ (Guardian, 2017: n.p.). In this, platforms appear to understand racism as an expression of a set of bad attitudes or beliefs – what Lentin (2016) calls ‘frozen’ racism, often associated with extremists. This is the unacceptable racism that Facebook and other social media seek to control. For example, Facebook has implemented a long-standing ban on the Greek far right party Golden Dawn, and has recently banned the US-based group Proud Boys, a self-proclaimed ‘Western chauvinist’ organisation. In justifying this decision, Facebook noted that they continue: To study trends in organized hate and hate speech and works with partners to better understand hate organizations as they evolve […] We ban these organizations and individuals from our platforms and also remove all praise and support when we become aware of it (quoted in Price, 2018: n.p.). However, other forms of ‘ambient’ racism are not considered problematic because they are seen as open to debate, because they are seen as a matter of private discussion between users and because both the circulation of contents-data and issues of ‘freedom of expression’ require that such contents remain. In this context, the empirical question that emerges concerns the tropes of racist hate encountered in the digital domain and whether indeed there can be any actual differentiation in terms of unacceptable and ‘acceptable’ forms of racism, with the former often referring to organised racist accounts, and the latter to ‘milder’ forms of ambient, everyday or banal racism. The remainder of the article will examine this question empirically. Siapera: Organised and Ambient Digital Racism14 Methodology This article focusses on a particular case study of an incident that occurred in Dundalk, a small town to the north of Dublin, Ireland. On 3 January 2018, an 18-year-old man of unknown nationality attacked and stabbed three men, killing one of them, 24 year-old Yosuke Sasaki. While the nationality of the accused is still not determined, there was speculation that the attack had terrorist motives. Our corpus harvested and analysed the tweets using #Dundalk and #Dundalkattacks as Twitter indicated these two as trending during the incident. We harvested in total 6,302 tweets on the day of the incident (3 January 2018), of which we analysed 1,905 original tweets (the remaining 4,397 tweets were retweets that repeated the contents of the original 1,905). In these tweets we looked at the ‘bios’ and other tweets that the user had shared in order to understand the background of the accounts that were involved in tweeting racially- loaded toxic posts.1 Indicators of organised activity were seen as a large number of racially toxic tweets, as well multiple retweets of the same racially toxic tweets on the Dundalk incident, that indicate that the account had a political agenda. We operationalised user activity, specifically comments appearing in news sites and their Facebook pages as corresponding to non-organised public debate. Here, the analysis included all 215 user comments left on the relevant Facebook post of TheJournal.ie news site and all 409 user comments left on the original story on TheJournal.ie site. We focused on TheJournal.ie as it is the only site in Ireland to allow for user comments on its website, while it is also the most popular digital news site according to the Reuters Digital News Report of 2018. This has resulted in a vibrant comment section. There is no foolproof way of dividing the posts into those clearly coming from organised or strongly partisan right-wing political views and those coming from ordinary users: this operationalisation relies on the affordances of Twitter compared to Facebook pages of news web sites. Recent reports (Berger, 1 The term is used to denote ‘language and contents that entrench polarisation; reinforce stereotypes; spread myths and disinformation; justify the exclusion, stigmatisation, and inferiorisation of particular groups; and reinforce exclusivist notions of national belonging and identity’ (Siapera, Moreo and Zhou, 2018: 3). It was derived from interviews with anti-racists and community-based activists, and it strives to go beyond limited notions of illegal hate speech or keyword based approaches to digital hate speech. Siapera: Organised and Ambient Digital Racism 15 2018; Neudert et al., 2017) found that extreme right views are very prominent on Twitter, while the structure of Facebook, which still relies on personal accounts and insists on real identities, may be seen as more linked to private individuals rather than political activists. Facebook pages of news outlets tend to host debates but because of the real name policy these can be seen as taking place mainly between private individuals. On their websites, news outlets such as TheJournal.ie impose registration policies to users and moderate contents if they are reported to them, in an attempt to discourage the highjacking of the discussion by partisan interests. In this analysis, we present the general outlines of the forms that an organised version of the story takes compared to what appears to be a discussion of the same story among private individuals. To analyse all contents, we employed a combination of grounded theory (Glaser and Strauss, 2017 [1999]) and discourse analysis (Fairclough, 2013 [1995]). Discourse analysis looks for patterns and regularities in texts and then interprets these in terms of the relationships they engender and the sociocultural practices they are associated with (Fairclough, 2103: 132). Rather than formulating hypotheses and then examining the data to see whether they support the hypotheses, we sought to generate insights from the data in a bottom up manner. We read and re-read the contents to understand the patterns that emerged and sought to order the fragmented narrative of the event as it was emerging from the tweets. In assembling this narrative, we were interested in identifying the parts told by different accounts and the manner in which they were told. Primarily, we wanted to see how the ostensibly different ‘race talk’ of organised or quasi-organised user accounts linked to right-wing political positions compared to that of private users. The findings are presented in terms of the themes emerging from this systematic reading of the contents, the story they tell and the political function they accomplish. Ultimately, we want to outline the difficulties in the current models of thinking about and monitoring online racist speech, as fragments meld together and are re-signified in specific ways. The next section will discuss the findings of this analysis. In discussing the tweets, we have not identified any of the account handles, except for those of media or politicians, following the requirements for ethical treatment of social media data (AOIR, 2012). Siapera: Organised and Ambient Digital Racism16 #Dundalk: Re-tracing a narrative Right-wing accounts This part discusses the narrative as it emerged on Twitter, with an emphasis on accounts that seem to have a particular political agenda. The first reports came from local media Dundalk Democrat (9.28 am) and Louth Page, a local digital news blog. These spoke of an ‘incident’ (9.43 am), while the Irish Daily Star crime correspondent Michael O’Toole was the first to report on it involving a fatal stabbing (9.56 am). Then at 10.48 am, a pseudonymous twitter account tweeted a link to an RTE article referring to the suspect as of Syrian nationality, using the hashtag #migrantcrisis. When other mainstream media began to refer to the suspect’s nationality, accounts linked to nationalist-identitarian politics began to tweet links to mainstream media references to the Middle Eastern origins of the suspect, then purported to be Syrian, speculating on a potential terrorist attack and simultaneously accusing the mainstream media of a cover up. While mainstream media followed news values, such as immediacy, sensationalism and speculation (Lewis and Cushion, 2009; Harcup and O’Neil, 2017), some users sought to exploit these values for political purposes. Explicitly speculating on the suspect’s nationality before this or any motives for the attacks were known made the media complicit, albeit unwittingly, in furthering the extreme right-wing agenda. However, some tweets both made use and attacked the mainstream media in pursuing their political goals. These political goals were three fold: (i) to attack the Irish political establishment but also assumed ‘leftists’, especially targeting Katherine Zappone2 and all those considered ‘responsible’ for accepting refugees; (ii) to involve foreign personalities known for nationalist or extreme right-wing views, such as Alex Jones and Paul Joseph Watson (@prisonplanet, editor of InfoWars) from the US, and Katie Hopkins and Tommy Robinson (who is now banned from Twitter) from the UK, building up transnational links; and (iii) to push a xenophobic and Islamophobic agenda within 2 Katherine Zappone is an Independent TD and Minister for Children and Youth Affairs. Although she is part of a conservative government coalition, she is openly gay and has endorsed liberal political positions in favour of marriage equality, single parent family rights and abortion rights. https://twitter.com/PrisonPlanet Siapera: Organised and Ambient Digital Racism 17 the Irish public sphere, while at the same time trying to push the public sphere to the right. The first objective involved direct attacks on specific targets such as politicians like Zappone: ‘Zappone must be checking to see if all her Syrian children are at home reading up on transgender theory. #Dundalk’. Scoring political points involved more general attacks, for example: Given that the guy was apparently from Syria I can see all of the leftists leaping to his defence saying that he came from a horrible background and his mental state was messed up before they tell us to love everyone and we should let more in #Dundalk. These tweets come from accounts that appear to pursue a particular political agenda, one that is clearly xenophobic and against immigration and multiculturalism. The second objective was achieved through tagging foreign actors and media that have a similar political agenda. Examples here include: ‘@TRobinsonNewEra Syrian refugee stabs Japanese men to death and attacks two other Irish people in Dundalk and no one mentions the word terrorism’; ‘@RealAlexJones Terrorist attack in Dundalk, Ireland. Syrian man stabs Japanese man to death and attack two Irishmen with an Iron bar!’; ‘First terrorist attack in dundalk Ireland refugee stabs 3 people killing one @TRobinsonNewEra @TheRebelTV @PrisonPlanet @KTHopkins @DVATW @DefendEvropa @mc5506 @BreitbartLondon https://www.thesun.ie/ news/2000230/gardai-confirm-terror-attack-is-a-line-of-inquiry-after-man- is-killed-and-two-others-injured-in-dundalk-stabbings/’. This tactic was successful, as eventually the ‘information’ was picked up by Watson who tweeted to his 928,000 followers (Figure 1). It is noteworthy that he links to a mainstream news article. The point of forging a link between the alleged nationality of the suspect and terrorism is to push an anti-immigration and Islamophobic agenda into the https://twitter.com/hashtag/trobinsonnewera?lang=en https://twitter.com/hashtag/realalexjones?lang=en https://twitter.com/hashtag/trobinsonnewera?lang=en https://twitter.com/TheRebelTV https://twitter.com/PrisonPlanet https://twitter.com/KTHopkins https://twitter.com/DVATW https://twitter.com/defendevropa?lang=en https://twitter.com/Baddiel/status/941233053254537216 https://twitter.com/breitbartlondon?lang=en https://www.thesun.ie/news/2000230/gardai-confirm-terror-attack-is-a-line-of-inquiry-after-man-is-killed-and-two-others-injured-in-dundalk-stabbings/ https://www.thesun.ie/news/2000230/gardai-confirm-terror-attack-is-a-line-of-inquiry-after-man-is-killed-and-two-others-injured-in-dundalk-stabbings/ https://www.thesun.ie/news/2000230/gardai-confirm-terror-attack-is-a-line-of-inquiry-after-man-is-killed-and-two-others-injured-in-dundalk-stabbings/ Siapera: Organised and Ambient Digital Racism18 mainstream digital sphere. Pushing a xenophobic and anti-immigrant agenda in turn relied on direct attacks against Muslims and/or refugees and attacks against mainstream media. The first tweet by a pseudonymous account using a fake stereotypically Muslim name immediately sought to make a connection between the incident and immigration even when such connections were not made by the media: ‘#BreakingNews #MigrantCrisis #Dundalk https://www.rte. ie/news/2018/0103/930792-dundalk-death/’. Other examples include: ‘Dundalk stabbing assailant reportedly a Syrian migrant which means media blackout is imminent. Always remember #DiversityIsOurStrength’ ‘RTE News at One calling the #Dundalk Syrian man a teenager. They’ve said ‘teenager’ multiple times. This is why people despise the news media’ Gardai launch ‘terror probe’ after one man is fatally stabbed and two others injured in early morning knife attack in #Dundalk https://t.co/U5iFF81Nke [LINK TO IRISH SUN] Isn’t multiculturalism wonderful especially the enrichment the #ReligionOfPeace brings? ’ Figure 1: Paul Joseph Watson, InfoWars editor, tweets about Dundalk. https://www.rte.ie/news/2018/0103/930792-dundalk-death/ https://www.rte.ie/news/2018/0103/930792-dundalk-death/ https://t.co/U5iFF81Nke Siapera: Organised and Ambient Digital Racism 19 Similarly, Paul Joseph Watson’s tweet in Figure 1 does not make the link in a direct manner, but many of those replying and retweeting actually did. For example, this was one of the replies: But do you invite killers into your home? Not all of these refugees are, but a high percentage of that population skews towards terror/violence and a large number are males of military age. There is compassion but there is also common sense. Linking violence to migration is ‘just common sense’. In further responses, another of Watson’s interlocutors offers a ‘solution’: [Replying to @PrisonPlanet] ‘Deport them all back to home nation @potus @realDonaldTrump #MAGA #MASA #LockHerUp #EndDACA #FakeNews’. In a significant development, a journalist found a discussion in 4chan3 which instructed users on what kind of ‘common sense’ to mobilise (Figure 2). A user, possibly from the US, as indicated by the US flag, urges others to go on boards.ie, the most popular Irish discussion forum, and Reddit to use this event to ‘red pill normies’, i.e. to make them see ‘reality’. In the second picture, a user tweeted the exact same message. The political agenda of these posts is made clear in this tweet: ‘If you want to know what political party in Ireland wants to act to prevent future events such as what happened today in #Dundalk, join @NationalPartyIE and follow @JustinBarrettNP’. The National Party of Ireland has a clear identitarian agenda, explained in their website as follows: We believe in the Irish people, our right to exist as a nation and our right to defend and lay claim to our homeland. We seek an Ireland united, Irish and free. […] We stand against the corrupt and amoral establishment who push 3 4chan is an ‘everything goes’ bulletin board, underpinned by libertarian ideas on freedom of expression and freedom of information, where anonymous users can post without restrictions. 4chan has been at the centre of a number controversies, ranging from the anti-Scientology protests that helped create the Anonymous movement (Coleman, 2014) to the Pizzagate conspiracy theory (Tuters, Jokubauskaitė, and Bach, 2018) and is even credited with helping the election of Donald Trump (Wendling, 2018). https://twitter.com/PrisonPlanet https://twitter.com/potus?lang=en https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump https://twitter.com/nationalpartyie?lang=en https://twitter.com/justinbarrettnp?lang=en Siapera: Organised and Ambient Digital Racism20 replacement level immigration which will in time completely destroy Irish nationality. We stand against the project of a federated European Superstate which is explicitly anti-national and therefore anti-Irish. And most of all we stand against the decay of national spirit at the heart of our society. (National Party of Ireland, n.d.: n.p.) All this is amplified and spread through multiple retweets, often by the same accounts, which frequently retweet their own tweets. It is also clear in this analysis that none of these tweets qualify as ‘hate speech’ according to formal definitions even though they are stoking up division and even hate against Muslims, and more broadly against immigrants. In re-checking these tweets, we found that some users had been suspended, resulting in the removal of all their tweets, but the majority of the tweets we collected are still online. If this has been the reaction of some of those allied with right-wing politics, was the reaction of the broader publics different? This will be examined in the next section. Figure 2: 4chan user provides text to be used in other platforms. Siapera: Organised and Ambient Digital Racism 21 The broader publics While this analysis cannot capture the entirety of the reaction across social media timelines and newsfeeds, the focus on news sites and the reactions ‘below the line’ provides an overview of the range of reactions to and discussions triggered by this event. The story centred on issues of security and purported tensions arising due to migration, in a very similar way to the story emerging from the organised accounts discussed above. In short, the main themes of the discussion revolved around: (i) the deservedness of refugees/migrants and the relevant policies in Ireland; (ii) the character and the culture of foreigners, especially Muslims; (iii) calls to deport or otherwise exclude undeserving foreigners; (iv) and links to broader political issues, specifically Brexit and the hard border with Northern Ireland, Trump and EU politics. Finally, (v) a number of comments were concerned with defining what is racist and what isn’t. This section is elaborating on these themes, using some of the most typical user comments per theme to illustrate them. On the Facebook post of TheJournal.ie, the comment that received the highest number of reactions was this: ‘He’ll be chauffeur driven to the late late show next … sick of this country ’. This post, which received 64 likes, 2 smiley emojis and two angry emojis, alluded to the case of Ibrahim Halawa, an Irish citizen and son of the most senior Muslim cleric in Ireland, who was arrested in Egypt in 2013, when he was 17, for participating in political protests. After four years in prison, he was acquitted of all charges and upon his return to Ireland he was invited to The Late Late Show on the Irish public service broadcaster RTE. Halawa’s Irishness and alliance to Ireland were disputed among certain circles, who constructed him as ungrateful and circulated false rumours that he burned his Irish passport while in Egypt (O’Rourke, 2018). In the first instance, the focus on ungratefulness operates as a divider, separating those who ‘deserve’ the right to live in Ireland from those who don’t. Secondly, the Facebook post of TheJournal.ie operates in a manner that criticises Irish asylum policies as being ‘too generous’ and undiscerning: ostensibly there are too few controls, no differentiation among immigrants and ‘everyone’ can get in. Claims that Ireland is too welcoming to refugees and migrants, and lacks proper border controls, are found in several comments: Siapera: Organised and Ambient Digital Racism22 ‘So a guy comes over to Ireland from Syria and repays our hospitality by stabbing a man to death and injuring 2 others, oh yeah thanks lad’. ‘We are just letting everyone into this country. No vetting. Ireland as we know it is being changed utterly’. ‘Only in Ireland would he be welcomed with open arms…. Our law system is a joke…. Our border patrol & checks are lax unless you are from here of course…. We let in paedo’s & criminals to beat the band…. A serious overhaul of the system is needed’. These views in turn were followed and amplified by calls to enforce not only stricter controls but more targeted ones, and in general to be much more discerning in terms of who is ‘allowed in’. This has clear echoes of the identitarian argument that immigration is ‘out of control’ and will lead to the ‘replacement’ of local ethnically Irish people with ‘undeserving’ non-European foreigners: ‘Here we go with the start of this crap from these people and none of them being checked before coming into the Country. It’s one of the best infiltrations of Europe ever’. ‘This young man was stabbed on his way to work, he was here making a contribution to Irish society causing no trouble. That’s the immigration we want & need. The immigration we don’t want is letting people who have no intention of contributing to society, have a values system incompatible with ours & despise us into our country. Tragic stuff’. Several comments demand that ‘they’ be excluded or deported in order to protect the nation from both potential violence and potential loss of its ethnic purity and cultural character, repeating the same rhetoric of exclusion found in the right-wing accounts: ‘Get them all out’ ‘The current Polish government, elected about 18 months ago, scrapped their imposed quota of 4,000 Syrian refugees and instead replaced it with 400 – insisting Christians only, NO Muslims. That government was elected on 38% of the vote and have since been ever more nativist nationalistic. The latest Siapera: Organised and Ambient Digital Racism 23 poll puts them on more than 50% – unheard of in Irish politics. Poland has a future, Ireland does not’. Divisions between ‘them’ and ‘us’ is the topic of several comments, which mobilise essentialist, stereotypical and openly Islamophobic tropes. Most of this rhetoric is using apparently reasonable language, i.e. language that does not use racial slurs or is outright offensive but relies on what appears to be rational argumentation based on alleged ‘facts’: ‘[…] I suggest you look at examples of the influence of Islam in places like Molenbeek, Blackburn, Malmo and countless other European towns where large populations of Muslim’s are present, you will see for yourself that the idea of freedom and individuality are being strangled by the power of a 1400 year old ideology’. ‘Shipping in large numbers of unvetted individuals such as the “bearded children” from zones where Islamic Jihadists operate and want to attack any western targets will not end well. While some on here don’t articulate this well their basic fear and worry is legitimate uncontrolled immigration from dubious parts of the globe threaten our values and society’. ‘There is simply no peaceful version of a religion founded on the principles of a mass-murderer (Mohammad). So it’s important we know the motivation, and if it’s confirmed to be islamic terror, we can be certain there will be more, probably involving driving vehicles into ‘infidels’. This isn’t ‘racist’, ‘bigoted’ etc – this is being objective. Europe has an enormous enormous problem – now it’s come to our doorstep’. Some comments draw a line connecting the event in Dundalk with other political issues, specifically President Trump’s rhetoric for border control and critiques of the alleged ‘open border’ policy of Germany and the EU.4 The anti-EU and anti-elite 4 It should be made clear here that none of the ‘facts’ alleged by these comments are true. The EU and Ireland have very strict border controls and the asylum process is very long and difficult, with people caught up in limbo for years. For more information on the Irish case see Fanning (2018). Siapera: Organised and Ambient Digital Racism24 agenda in some of these tweets is almost identical to that pursued by the identitarian- nationalist accounts we saw on Twitter. ‘Gee, Trump does not appear so wrong about defending borders now, does he? ’ ‘Trump is right!’ ‘Leaving the EU may now be a very real option. Staying in requires us to take a certain quota of these mentalists. Please god the Irish public sees sense or we will start hearing and seeing a lot more of this, IF we aren’t the victim the next time that is. Rip poor soul. taken for no reason. A senseless, satanic act whatever way you look at it. And now people may sit up and take heed to the fact we ARE very much a target to terrorists. This is only the beginning our government should be hung for allowing these nut jobs in our country in the first place. They have blood on their hands.’ ‘Merkel and the globalist agenda divide and conquer, drive down wages and working conditions, the results of this nonsense will not effect [sic] them behind their security gates. Wake up people and let the political classes know we have had enough of this mass migration of non EU citizens into Europe.’ These allusions to global politics, and specifically to justifications and support for the shift towards right-wing xenophobic policies, contribute to further polarization on the issue of migration and borders, making it appear as a black and white issue: you either have total control of borders or none at all, and if it is the latter, ‘anyone’ (which in fact is a reference to non-white or racialised people) will enter un-checked. This issue of controlling who gets in makes clear allusions to race politics. When called out, some posts revert to what Titley (2016a) described as the debatability of racism: open refutation of racism, references to freedom of expression and even ‘reverse-racism’: ‘Then what’s with you dropping the racist card? Personally, I think there should be extreme vetting from ME countries, not only because of the security risk but medical reasons too, TB etc. Simply picking random refugees, economic migrants from camps in the ME and dropping them off in a fancy hotel near a small village community away from Dublin is reckless, wouldn’t you agree? ’ Siapera: Organised and Ambient Digital Racism 25 ‘Freedom of speech only when it suits the liberal agenda. It will lead to a right wing backlash. People can’t express any fear of immigration or they are labeled racist. It’s why Trump/Brexit happened’ ‘As far as I can see the most hate-filled and venomous comments on here are the ones accusing other commenters of being racists, bigots, xenophobic etc. etc..’ ‘Yeah everyone that says anything about Islam & Islamic terrorism is logically a racist.’ This post received 369 upvotes on the Journal.ie. This debatability of racism acts, as Titley (2016a) has argued, as a means of silencing. At the same time however, in insisting that it is a valid debate to be had, this trope is significant because it speaks to the values at the heart of social media: that everything can be debated, that everyone is entitled to their opinion, which is considered to represent diversity in the marketplace of ideas, and that platforms are there to encourage and host such debate and the exchange of all ideas. For example, in the introduction to their Community Standards (n.d.), Facebook states that ‘Our mission is all about embracing diverse views. We err on the side of allowing content, even when some find it objectionable, unless removing that content can prevent a specific harm’. In their ‘Hard Questions’ blog, Richard Allan, VP EMEA Public Policy, elaborates further: We are an open platform for all ideas, a place where we want to encourage self-expression, connection and sharing. […] [W]e have left in place the ability for people to express their views on immigration itself. And we are deeply committed to making sure Facebook remains a place for legitimate debate (2017: n.p.). This analysis of user comments shows the similarity between the tropes used by those pursuing a specific political agenda and some commenters who appeared to merely mobilise ‘common sense’ discourses. While there is no way of knowing whether some of the comments were written by members of organised or quasi-organised racist/identitarian groups, the discourses used represent an emerging ‘common sense’ around security, a purported incompatibility between European/Christian and other cultural and religious values and a justification of the kinds of politics associated Siapera: Organised and Ambient Digital Racism26 with Brexit, Trump and European populist identitarianism. That such discourses and their specific vocabulary were triggered and readily used by the mere suspicion of a terrorist attack, and in the absence of any concrete events of Islamic terrorism in the context of Ireland, shows at the very least a transnational contagion of racist and supremacist discourses. Such discourses, which share important similarities with the supremacist ideologies in the US discussed by among others Daniels (2009a, 2016), and their circulation as ‘common sense’ in Ireland, point to the fact that if ever there was a moment to effectively distinguish between organised and ambient forms of racism, it has now passed. In fact, as the example of the 4chan-dictated ‘common sense’ used to ‘red pill’ the Irish ‘normies’ in Figure 2, the blending of supremacist and ‘common sense’ banal racism is purposeful. While the direction or flow of such views is not entirely clear, Mudde (2010) suggests that instead of seeing right-wing views as pathological or perverse, it may be more appropriate to view them as gradations of the same mainstream attitudes that are widely shared; this is a case of ‘pathological normalcy’ in which the populist right expresses mainstream views against foreigners, elites, Islam and so on, taken to their logical extreme. The implications of this blending and emergence of a supremacist common sense throw into question the moderating practices of social media platforms and specifically their tendency to allow the circulation of some discourses as debate but the removal of what they consider as direct attacks and hate speech. Further, the analysis points to the futility of attempts to control and contain certain forms of the extreme ‘frozen’ racism associated with organised racist groups, as their discourses have adapted to, or can also act as the source of the social media ‘common sense’ on race. The analysis shows that both ambient and organised/extreme forms co-exist and mutually reinforce one another. Conclusions This article began with a consideration of the relationship between digital media and racism, which was found to be ambiguous. Previous research has shown the ways in which digital media and technologies are not only linked structurally to racialised social relations but are also connected to white supremacist racist hate discourses. In order to address the latter, social media platforms developed a series Siapera: Organised and Ambient Digital Racism 27 of policies on content moderation and signed a voluntary code of conduct with the European Commission. The enforcement of these policies and the code relies on making a separation between what is acceptable race discourse and what is considered hate speech and will be removed. In this article we have sought to problematise such distinctions, focusing on the one between organised and ambient race discourses. We have found that very little separates the two. If anything, the ambient racist discourses appear to mobilise a wider variety of arguments against mainly non-white migrants. Both rely on essentialist understandings of culture, race and ethnicity; both posit a racial hierarchy with white Christian natives on top; both link migration to violence and terrorism. Both ultimately justify, support and sustain exclusionary and discriminatory policies and practices towards racialised others. The analysis points to the ways in which supremacist discourses have blended with racial and ethno-nationalistic common sense. Daniels (2009a) argued that far from marginal, in fact white supremacist views are at the heart of US culture. Mudde (2010), who studied attitude surveys in Europe, echoes the same view: xenophobia and anti-immigration attitudes are at the heart of European culture, not in the extreme margins. The blending we encountered here suggests a similar dynamic in the case of Ireland, which points to a transnational contagion further evidenced not only in shared vocabularies but also in providing verbatim quotes to be used in social media, as the example in Figure 2 shows. This blending makes it very difficult to sustain arguments about acceptable race debates and unacceptable hate speech and makes clear the moral vacuity of rhetoric on diversity of opinion and ideas used by social media platforms to justify their policies. Competing Interests The author has no competing interests to declare. References Ahmed, R and Pisoiu, D 2017 The mobilization of the extreme right online: A frame analysis approach. Paper presented at the 11th ECPR Conference. 6–9 September 2017, University of Oslo. Siapera: Organised and Ambient Digital Racism28 Allan, R 2017 Hard Questions. Available at: https://newsroom.fb.com/ news/2017/06/hard-questions-hate-speech/ [Last accessed 03 January 2019]. 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Ethnic and Racial Studies, 39(13): 2269–2277. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2016.1202434 Titley, G forthcoming Racism and the Media. London: Sage. Tuters, M, Jokubauskaitė, E and Bach, D 2018. Post-Truth Protest: How 4chan Cooked Up the Pizzagate Bullshit. M/C Journal, 21(3). Available at: http:// journal.media-culture.org.au/index.php/mcjournal/article/view/1422 [Last accessed 15 January 2019]. United Nations 1966 International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights. Available at: https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume%20999/volume-999- i-14668-english.pdf [Last accessed 15 January 2019]. Vincent, J 2016 Twitter taught Microsoft’s AI chatbot to be a racist asshole in less than a day, March 24. Available at: https://www.theverge. com/2016/3/24/11297050/tay-microsoft-chatbot-racist [Last accessed 04 January 2019]. Vorländer, H, Herold, M and Schäller, S 2018 PEGIDA and New Right-Wing Populism in Germany. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. DOI: https://doi. org/10.1007/978-3-319-67495-7 Wendling, M 2018 Alt-Right: From 4chan to the White House. London: Pluto. Zuberi, T and Bonilla-Silva, E (Eds.) 2008 White logic, white methods: Racism and methodology. London: Rowman & Littlefield. How to cite this article: Siapera, E 2019 Organised and Ambient Digital Racism: Multidirectional Flows in the Irish Digital Sphere. Open Library of Humanities, 5(1): 13, pp. 1–34. DOI: https://doi.org/10.16995/olh.405 Published: 08 February 2019 Copyright: © 2019 The Author(s). This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (CC-BY 4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited. See http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/. OPEN ACCESS Open Library of Humanities is a peer-reviewed open access journal published by Open Library of Humanities. https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2016.1202434 http://journal.media-culture.org.au/index.php/mcjournal/article/view/1422 http://journal.media-culture.org.au/index.php/mcjournal/article/view/1422 https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume%20999/volume-999-i-14668-english.pdf https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume%20999/volume-999-i-14668-english.pdf https://www.theverge.com/2016/3/24/11297050/tay-microsoft-chatbot-racist https://www.theverge.com/2016/3/24/11297050/tay-microsoft-chatbot-racist https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-67495-7 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-67495-7 https://doi.org/10.16995/olh.405 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ Digital Racism Technology and Racism Online Racist Hate Platform regulation of contents Methodology #Dundalk: Re-tracing a narrative Right-wing accounts The broader publics Conclusions Competing Interests References Figure 1 Figure 2 
work_7gkq6tc4xfhgxn2jxprohixqzu	----	University of Winchester Skip to main navigation Skip to search Skip to main content Welcome to University of Winchester Explore profiles, expertise and research at University of Winchester Advanced search 62 Research Units 2558 Research output 183 Projects 94 Prizes 16326 Activities 146 Student theses University of Winchester Research Portal Welcome to the University of Winchester's Institutional Repository which showcases the excellent research undertaken across the University. The Repository enables open access to outputs where permitted, and full citation details where restrictions apply, making our research accessible worldwide through a searchable, browse-able database. New items are being added all the time. For further information about the Repository, please contact repository@winchester.ac.uk Collaborations within the past 5 years. Click dots and donuts to bring up details or Select a country from the list Collaborations within the past 5 years. Select a country to view shared publications and projects Close Powered by Pure, Scopus & Elsevier Fingerprint Engine™ © 2021 Elsevier B.V. We use cookies to help provide and enhance our service and tailor content. By continuing you agree to the use of cookies Log in to Pure About web accessibility University of Winchester contact form 
work_7hjwersvovephiq3ejn2oe3yei	----	The Role of Language in Anti-Immigrant Prejudice: What Can We Learn from Immigrants’ Historical Experiences? $ € £ ¥ social sciences Article The Role of Language in Anti-Immigrant Prejudice: What Can We Learn from Immigrants’ Historical Experiences? Kai Wei 1, Daniel Jacobson López 1 and Shiyou Wu 2,* 1 School of Social Work, University of Pittsburgh, 4200 Fifth Ave, Pittsburgh, PA 15260, USA; kaw153@pitt.edu (K.W.); DAJ57@pitt.edu (D.J.L.) 2 School of Social Work, Arizona State University, 411 N. Central Avenue, Suite 800, Phoenix, AZ 85004-0689, USA * Correspondence: shiyou.wu@asu.edu Received: 14 January 2019; Accepted: 20 February 2019; Published: 11 March 2019 ���������� ������� Abstract: Prejudice remains an unpleasant experience in immigrants’ everyday lives, especially for those of stigmatized groups. In the recurring struggle of various immigrant groups, historical and contemporary events reveal the important role of language in the creation, transmission, and perpetuation of anti-immigrant prejudice. Living in an anti-immigrant climate, immigrants are frequently exposed to stigmatizing language in both political and social discourse. This may be a more significant and frequent experience for immigrants since the beginning of the 2016 United States presidential election. Although it has long been understood that language is inextricably linked with prejudice, the investigation of the role of language in creating, transmitting, and perpetuating anti-immigrant prejudice remains undeveloped in social work research. This paper provides a theoretical explanation of anti-immigrant sentiment by discussing how stigmatization has allowed for immigrants to be subjected to various forms of prejudice throughout history. Building upon prior theoretical concepts of stigma, this paper argues that being an immigrant is a stigma. This paper reviews historical and contemporary cases of prejudice against immigrants to provide evidence for how stigmatizing language transmits and perpetuates anti-immigrant prejudice in the United States and building upon prior stigma theories, defines one’s status of an immigrant to be form of stigma itself. The paper concludes with a call for appreciable attention to the role of language in anti-immigrant prejudice and the need for social workers to advocate for immigrants within higher education and in our communities to reduce such stigma though social work practice, education and research. Keywords: anti-immigration prejudice; language; history; contemporary 1. Introduction From private charity organizations to settlement houses, social workers have been at the frontier of work with immigrants (Padilla et al. 2008). As early pioneers, Jane Addams and Ellen Gates Starr founded the Hull house in Chicago, and their efforts in the settlement house movement were a landmark in social work practice. In her later practice, Jane Addams recognized the need for social workers to address social injustices experienced by immigrants in their everyday lives (Addams 1990; LaGumina 1999). As a practice-oriented profession, social work has always valued social justice as a core component of its profession (Webb 2006). The goal of social justice is to build a society without arbitrary or unnecessary suffering, exploitation, prejudice, and discrimination (Jost and Kay 2010). Similarly, The National Association of Social Workers’ Code of Ethics similarly places value on core Soc. Sci. 2019, 8, 93; doi:10.3390/socsci8030093 www.mdpi.com/journal/socsci http://www.mdpi.com/journal/socsci http://www.mdpi.com https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6531-5351 http://www.mdpi.com/2076-0760/8/3/93?type=check_update&version=1 http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/socsci8030093 http://www.mdpi.com/journal/socsci Soc. Sci. 2019, 8, 93 2 of 18 ethical principles of the profession, namely, social justice (NASW National Association of Social Workers). The NASW Code of Ethics states that social workers should strive to work on behalf of oppressed groups of people. Given the anti-immigrant climate today, advocating for social change therefore becomes an important and urgent task for social workers in the United States. To date, 42.4 million immigrants are residing in this country (Pew Research Center 2017). Limited language skills and culture knowledge may play a role in inhibiting immigrants from integrating into a host society (Cervantes et al. 2013; Lara et al. 2005; Lopez-Class et al. 2011). However, their marginalized experience also derives from an environment in which they often experience prejudice, stigmatization, and ethnic profiling (Derose et al. 2007; Matthews 2003; Pérez 2010). As a foreign-born population, immigrants in the United States, are frequently exposed to stigmatizing language in political and social discourse in today’s anti-immigrant climate. Immigrants exposed to such discourse in their daily lives were more likely to experience emotional distress (Sabo et al. 2014). As the largest immigrant group in the United States, Mexican immigrants (about a third of all immigrant populations) have been the primary targets of anti-immigrant prejudice for the past several decades (Chavez 2013). Although Mexican immigrants are currently the primary targets for anti-immigrant prejudice, they are not the only group that suffers from stigmatizing language and its related consequences. Although it has long been understood that language is inextricably linked with prejudice, few studies have investigated the role of language in creating, transmitting, and perpetuating anti-immigrant prejudice. To address this research gap and yield a better understanding of recurring anti-immigrant dynamics, this paper reviews historical and contemporary cases of prejudice against immigrants to provide evidence for how stigmatizing language transmits and perpetuates anti-immigrant prejudice throughout United States history. This paper calls for appreciable attention to the role of language in anti-immigrant prejudice in social work practice and research. This is followed by an in-depth discussion about the role of language in prejudice with a focus on linguistic bias and the transmission of such bias through communication. Furthermore, this paper argues that one’s immigrant status is a form of stigma, a further evolution of the conceptualization of stigma, most notably building about Howarth (2006) definition of race as stigma. We define immigrant status as stigma due to the complex nature of factors that result in anti-immigrant prejudice regardless of the specific immigrant group. This paper concludes with a call for appreciable attention to anti-immigrant prejudice and a need for advocacy within the social work field to reduce the stigmatization of immigrants both in social work practice and research. 2. Theoretical Framework—Stigma Theory To best understand and conceptualize how various groups are separated and placed in a hierarchical order among one another, the conceptualization of stigma must be discussed. This discussion lends towards our understanding of how immigrant groups have been stigmatized and labeled by other groups in society. Goffman’s original conceptualization of stigma (Goffman 1963) has been used by social psychologists as a way of understanding how people construct social categories and link these categories to stereotypes (Link and Phelan 2001). Goffman (1963) set forth three criteria that constituted stigma: Blemishes of individual character, abominations of the body and tribal stigma (Major and O’Brien 2005, p. 395). Stigma is also considered a process; that individuals move through transitions of being labeled based on society’s perception of them (Young et al. 2007). This is particularly relevant for immigrants who transition through different levels of stigmatization based upon their arrival and their perceived assimilation in the United States. Stigma additionally takes race and culture into account, as society determines which groups are to be stigmatized and which are not (Kusow 2004; Link and Phelan 2001), which often results from racialized language and policies. This allows us to better understand the application of stigma onto certain racial and/or ethnic immigrant populations. This paper proposes that one’s immigrant status is also a stigma. Soc. Sci. 2019, 8, 93 3 of 18 Literature tends to view stigma as social construction, which can vary across time and culture (Kusow 2004; Major and O’Brien 2005). Since groups are labeled as deviating from a norm, or having a devalued characteristic, this stigmatization is dependent and based on the values and perceptions of a given society (Major and O’Brien 2005; Yang et al. 2007). There are varying definitions of what constitutes stigma, as evidenced by the terminology by various researchers and this paper builds upon former conceptualizations of theory. Goffman (1963) defines stigma as a discrediting characteristic (Albrecht et al. 1982; Link and Phelan 2001; Major and O’Brien 2005). Stafford and Scott (1986) define stigma as a characteristic that is contrary to a norm (Link and Phelan 2001). Other definitions include those by Crocker et al. (1998), who define stigma as a social identity that is devalued by society (Major and O’Brien 2005), such as is the case with the identity and status of being an immigrant. Most theorists agree that stigma is socially constructed (Yang et al. 2007). While stigma is a social construct, it does have long lasting effects on those who are stigmatized (Link and Phelan 2001; Major and O’Brien 2005). Stigma can result in discrimination, labeling, and negative stereotyping (Kusow 2004; Link and Phelan 2001; Yang et al. 2007). We have seen such acts of discrimination based on immigrant status reflected in recent immigrant policies in the United States, such as with the Muslim ban and the separation of Latinx families (Minoff 2018; Sidiqqui 2018). Researchers also proposed that stigmatization occurs when a person receives a mark- a deviation from the norm has been linked to them (Kurzban and Leary 2001; Yang et al. 2007). This mark is what separates the individual from the rest of society and affects the way society reacts to them based on the stigma assigned to them (Kurzban and Leary 2001). The second variation defining stigma was proposed by Elliott and colleagues (Elliott et al. 1982), which proposes that stigma is a form of deviance which causes others to judge them and excludes them from participation in society (Kurzban and Leary 2001). The third variation was proposed by Crocker et al. (1998), stating that there is often not one single characteristic that determines an individual’s stigmatization but rather their belonging to a particular group that is stigmatized (Kurzban and Leary 2001). This definition of stigma applies to immigrants who by belonging to a given group (e.g., Chinese, Mexican, Muslim) are stigmatized and individually discriminated against based on their belonging to the larger stigmatized group. While this definition includes immigrants, we further expand upon this definition and propose that being an immigrant is a stigma. The closest definition of stigma to which we build from is that of Howarth (2006). Howarth (2006) defines race as a possible stigma. Howarth (2006) addresses the social construction of race, acknowledging that one’s race cannot be seen or physically observed by others, but can be inferred by physical characteristics such as skin tone. For example, Howarth (2006) definition of stigma is fitting when addressing how Chinese immigrants were referred to as the yellow peril and the current fear of The Browning of America, both referencing skin tones of certain racial/ethnic groups. Howarth (2006) definition of stigma includes race and skin tone, which can include immigrants who have a darker skin tone or are from different areas of the world, which makes them subject to being stigmatized due to their race and/or ethnicity. We expound upon Goffman (1963), Crocker et al. (1998), and Howarth (2006) definition of stigma, which categories stigma as a mark or even race. Immigrants can be separated based on their belonging to their social category as immigrants, as well as being grouped by their nationality, ethnicity or religious-affiliation. As immigrants can be categorized and stigmatized based on nationality, race/ethnicity, and religion, they are therefore labeled and stigmatized simply for being an immigrant. The prior definitions set forth by Crocker et al. (1998), Goffman (1963) and Howarth (2006), all lend credibility towards how immigrant status is a form of stigma, as they incorporate the aspects towards being labeled, being stigmatized due to one’s belonging to a particular group and one’s race. Immigrants are incorporated into each of these categories. For example, the recent anti-Mexican language and erroneous descriptions of Mexicans in the United States, constitute a form of stigma towards Mexican immigrants based on their nationality (Mexican) and their ethnicity Soc. Sci. 2019, 8, 93 4 of 18 (Latinx). Therefore, we argue that one’s immigrant status (Mexican immigrant) is a stigma itself, which incorporates their belonging to a larger group, as well as their race and/or ethnicity. The recent Muslim ban, upheld in 2018 by the United States Supreme Court (Sidiqqui 2018), is a discriminatory policy based on an immigrant’s religion (Islam) and has resulted in discriminatory policies based on that individual’s belonging to a group, consistent with Crocker et al. (1998). As such, we propose that immigrant status is a stigma within itself, as their status as immigrants results in being labeled, marked as different from the norm, incorporates their belonging to a larger group, often is due to their race and/or ethnicity, and can result in discrimination. It is therefore evident that immigrant status is a stigma. 2.1. Recurring Dynamics of Anti-Immigrant Prejudice Anti-immigrant prejudice has recurred for every major immigration wave since the early 1800s (see Table 1 for details). Immigrants who once suffered from anti-immigrant prejudice transferred the prejudice to which they were subjected onto the newly arrived immigrants (Barrett 1992). Each recurrence of anti-immigrant sentiment follows a distinct pattern: a newly arriving immigrant group is perceived as a threat to established group interests, the threatened groups brand immigrants with stigmatizing labels and rhetoric and this stigmatization gives rise to, reinforces, and perpetuates anti-immigrant prejudice. As this pattern is predictable and consistent, it allow for social workers to be able to actively work towards developing interventions to reduce anti-immigrant language through programming and interventions in order to reduce the stigma placed onto immigrants. Large numbers of incoming immigrants are perceived as disrupting established order and threatening established interests, and as such, justify social responses to mitigate the harmful effects of these disruptions on settled Americans and immigrants. However, stigmatizing language and anti-immigrant prejudice lead to sanctioned social responses (grassroots driven and top-down policy driven) that are often harmful to immigrants or discriminate in ways that diminish social justice for all Americans. Extreme stigmatizing rhetoric also leads to extreme forms of violence, such as hate crimes (including lynching, Allport 1954). Unfortunately, these forms of violence against immigrants have historically been socially sanctioned. Although the pattern of viewing immigrants as a perceived threat, and then being labeled and stigmatized and consequently being subjected to various forms of prejudice is recurring, the specific manifestations of each recurrence differs in ways that reveal the complex social, economic, and cultural forces that drive anti-immigrant prejudice in the United States. This pattern of anti-immigrant sentiment for several distinct immigrant populations is first reviewed (e.g., Irish, German, Chinese, Mexican, and Muslim). This historical review of anti-immigrant prejudice highlights the various social responses towards immigrants in the United States and allows us to understand the contemporary treatment of immigrants as well as to tailor interventions to reduce the stigmatization of immigrants. Soc. Sci. 2019, 8, 93 5 of 18 Table 1. Manifestations of anti-immigrant prejudice across different groups in the United States. Manifestations of Anti-Immigrant Prejudice Descriptions Examples of across Different Immigrant Groups in the United States Irish Immigrant (1830s–1850s) German Immigrant (1850s-WWI) Italian Immigrant (1880s-WWI) Chinese Immigrant (1850s–1870s) Japanese Immigrant (WWII) Mexican Immigrant (Post-1965) Muslim Immigrant (Post-9/11) Prejudicial language Negative connotative language describing immigrants such as hate speech They were called white negroes (Houstoun 1850), alcoholics, and Pagans (Berger 1946). They called anarchist, extremist, hyphenated-American, incendiary, extremists, radical, and traitor (Allport et al. 1954; Kennedy 2004). Italian immigrants were called dago, alien hordes, criminals, mafia, Italian loafer, and slippery (Higham 2002; LaGumina 1999) They were called as yellow peril, barbarians, and enraged coolie (Young 2014) They were called the yellow bastards, a Jap, a yellow-belly Jap, and a Jap-a-Nazi-Rat (MacDougall 1999) They were called “criminals” and “rapists” (Kohn 2015). They were called radical, jihad, and terrorists (Ali 2012; Kundnani 2014). Discrimination Intention of disadvantaging immigrants such as employment exclusion Irish immigrants were disproportionally represented in the number of arrests, imprisonment, and confinement in poorhouse and mental hospitals (Casey and Lee 2007). German language was not forbidden to use in any public place in Iowa (Kennedy 2004). Italian immigrants were disproportionally represented in criminal justice system with charges such as blackmail and assaults in New york City during early 1920s (LaGumina 1999). In 1854, People v. Hall ruled that Chinese could not testify against white people due to the fact that Chinese were an inferior race with insufficient intelligence to testify (People v. Hall 1854). More than 100,000 Japanese immigrants and Japanese Americans were incarcerated in concentration camps whose only crimes were having an un-American identity—Japanese (Robinson 2009) In early 1900s, Mexican repatriation removed more than 400,000 Mexican American citizens (California Senate Bill No. 670, 2005). Following the 9/11, there was an exponential increase of hate crimes and bias incidents (e.g., airline profiling) targeting at Arabs and Muslims Americans (Alsultany 2012, 2013). Physical attack Acts of violence against immigrants Rioters in Boston burned Irish immigrants’ houses and forced them to leave their homes (Calavita 1984). German immigrants were physically attacked. For example, a man in Wyoming were hanged and made to kneel and kiss the American flag (Kennedy 2004). In August 1920, local mobs firebombed the Italian quarters, killing one Italian immigrant, injuring 30, and destroying $20,000 in property (Mormino 2002). Chinese’s homes and businesses were burned (Takaki 1990). Japanese immigrants were physically attacked after the release of The Cheat, an anti-Japanese film (Miyao 2007). Mexican immigrants and Mexican Americans were physically attacked because they were also perceived as economic threat, and because they spoke Spanish too loudly and acted too Mexican (Carrigan and Webb 2003). From 2000 to 2001, for example, hate crimes against Arabs and Muslims increased from 117 to 1915 (FBI 2001). Extermination Removal of immigrants by any means such as lynching A German immigrant was lynched near St. Louis in April 1918 (Kennedy 2004). In 1891, 11 Italian immigrants were lynched in New Orleans, Louisiana (Gambino 1977). In Los Angeles, 18 Chinese immigrants were systematically killed, one of the largest incidents of mass lynching in United States history (Dorland 1894). Outside the Tally Theater, a Japanese noodle shop owner was lynched (Miyao 2007). Between 1848 and 1928, mobs lynched at least 597 Mexicans in the United States (Carrigan and Webb 2003). Soc. Sci. 2019, 8, 93 6 of 18 In the 1840s, a large number of Irish immigrants began arriving in the United States to escape potato famine and other deprivations arising from political conflicts between Ireland and Britain. By 1850, the Irish accounted for 44% of the total immigrant population in the United States (Kennedy and Kennedy 1964), and settled primarily in large cities in the northeastern United States, such as Boston, New York, and Philadelphia. The political and economic elite welcomed the newly arriving immigrants because they provided a superabundance of cheap labor to fuel the U.S. growth. As President Tyler explained to Congress on June 1841, “We hold out to the people of other countries an invitation to come and settle among us as members of our rapidly growing family” (Richardson 1908, p. 41). However, many working class Americans viewed Irish immigrants as posing an economic threat: their pauperism as Americans workers (Mitchell 1862). In large numbers, Irish immigrants replaced U.S. adult male labor in factories, and replaced American women and child workers in textile mills (Handlin 1941). American workers attributed the blame to Irish immigrants for their loss of jobs, rather than to the owners of factories and textile mills, or to external economic causes. The middle-class took a characteristically different view: they perceived Irish immigrants as posing a threat to the stability of social and economic order as a consequence of rising pauperism (Crenson 1998) and as Catholic immigrants differentiating themselves from the dominant middle-class Protestant population. Consistent with Jones and colleagues’ (1984) definition of stigma, which states that stigma occurs when an individual receives a mark that deviates them from the norm. As is the case with Irish immigrants, their Catholicism was viewed as a deviation from Protestantism, which consequently led to them as receiving a mark, separating them apart from the dominant society. Irish immigrants were labeled as the worse plague of all (Martineau 1837), white negroes (Houstoun 1850), alcoholics, and Pagans (Berger 1946). These prejudicial labels induced and reinforced American workers’ anxious and angry feelings, and provoked violent nativist and anti-Catholic riots, including burning immigrants’ homes and churches (Arnold 2011). Armed conflict between American workers and Irish immigrant workers occurred repeatedly on the railroads and in the textile mills in 1844 (Feldberg 1975), and by the 1850s, armed conflicts were occurring in nearly every state (Calavita 1984). Political movements also arose that were explicitly opposed to immigration (e.g., the Know Nothing Party from 1854 to 1856). The intergroup conflicts between Irish immigrants and Americans were primarily caused by different economic interest and religious differences. The stigmatizing labels encoded American workers’ antipathy and loathing about immigrants reflect nothing more than their blaming of Irish immigrants for their own economic insecurity and concerns about potential threats from a different religion. This stigmatization of Irish immigrants is also consistent with Crocker et al. (1998), who set forth that one’s belonging to a certain group constitutes stigma as well as the findings that stigma often results in discrimination, labeling, negative stereotyping and violence (Allport 1954; Kusow 2004; Link and Phelan 2001; Yang et al. 2007). 2.1.1. Anti-German Prejudice Prior to World War I, German immigrants were regarded as the most esteemed immigrant group, in part because they settled in rural rather than urban areas, and therefore did not compete with low-skilled labor workers. German immigrants also fit the dominant White Anglo-Saxon Protestant culture (Kennedy 2004). All of this changed, however, with the advent of World War I, when they were perceived as direct threats to American security, and in the disruptive aftermaths of the war such as the Red Scare1, when German immigrants and settled Germans alike were perceived as threats to American culture and social order. In the public eye, German immigrants became the group who had no intention of becoming Americans (Park 1914). The term German became stigmatizing in and of itself, essentially becoming equated with being un-American and disloyal (Gordon 1964). German immigrants and settled Germans 1 The Red Scare refers to the fear of socialist revolution, communism, and political radicalism since World War I. Soc. Sci. 2019, 8, 93 7 of 18 were labeled as extremists, hyphenated-Americans, incendiaries, radicals, and traitors (Kennedy 2004). German words, such as hamburger and sauerkraut, were replaced by terms such as liberty sandwich and liberty cabbage. In Iowa, the governor forbade speaking German language in public (Kennedy 2004). Near St. Louis, Missouri, a German immigrant was stripped and bounded with American flag, and eventually “lynched to the lusty cheer of five hundred patriots” (Kennedy 2004, p. 68). The lynch mob was charged but found not guilty, a result described in the Washington Post as “a healthful and wholesome awakening in the interior of the country” (Peterson and Fite 1986, pp. 202–7). Despite the fact that German immigrants fit into White Anglo-Saxon Protestant culture, their status changed after World War I. Different from the anti-Irish immigrant experience, anti-German prejudice showcases the dynamic process of anti-immigrant prejudice where hostility against immigrants can rise from conflicting interests residing from international relationships. In addition, the words that depict German immigrants after the war reflect Americans’ heightened perceived threat of outsiders and served as a justification for enacting violence against German immigrants. The experience of German immigrants is notable in that their status and acceptance in the United States deteriorated over time as a result of political and social occurrences in history. German immigrants’ experience of stigma is consistent with literature that acknowledges that stigma is based on the values of perceptions of a society, varying across time (Major and O’Brien 2005; Yang et al. 2007). 2.1.2. Anti-Chinese Prejudice During the 1850s, a significant number of Chinese immigrants seeking economic opportunity and escape from war and political upheaval began to arrive on the U.S. west coast. As was the case with Irish immigrants, Chinese immigrants were a cheap source of labor for U.S. businesses eager to maximize profits. In fact, the credit-ticket emigration system legalized the contractual relationship between Chinese laborers and brokerage companies, and constituted a barely-disguised form of slave trade (Barth 1964). American workers as well as other immigrants (Irish immigrants, in particular) accordingly perceived Chinese immigrants as economic threats to unskilled labor jobs (Goloboy 2009). They accused Chinese immigrants of reducing the U.S. labor standards to “the Chinese standard of rice and rats” (Takaki 1990, p. 234). Chinese immigrants were also perceived as being racially inferior, and as a threat to American racial identity. Racism was, at that time, sustained by scientific racism as well as race-based laws (Dred Scott v. Sandford 1857) that served as a legal basis for slavery in the United States. Chinese immigrants were labeled as Asiatic blood, yellow peril, barbarians, and enraged coolie (Young 2014), and portrayed in a publisher, the Hearst-dominated print media, as purveyors of opium and seducers of white women (Provine 2007). Chinese immigrants were stigmatized and violently persecuted as a result of this stigmatization, consistent with Allport (1954), Kusow (2004), and Yang and colleagues (Yang et al. 2007). An incident in Los Angeles involved the lynching of 18 Chinese immigrants remains the worst mass lynching in U.S. history (Dorland 1894). However, the lynch mob was never punished because a California Supreme Court judge ruled that Chinese witnesses could not testify against white people on the legal basis that Chinese were an inferior race with insufficient intelligence (People v. Hall 1854). In the late 1870s, “Chinese Must Go” became the slogan for the Workingmen’s Party of California (Gyory 1998, p. 111). Perhaps most notably, the Chinese became the first illegal aliens in the United States with the passage of the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 and its amendment in 1891, which included penalties of imprisonment and deportation (Young 2014). The experience of Chinese immigrants revealed a more complicated mechanism that intersects anti-immigrant prejudice with Americans’ racial bias. Compared to earlier wave immigrants (Irish and German), Chinese immigrants were the first to be legally excluded for the reason that their inferior race posed threat to American identity. These racial biases are transmitted through words such as yellow peril, which use the biological traits of Chinese to justify the legality of social exclusion. While we agree that these various forms of violence, and legalized discrimination are forms of stigmatization we due to their race (Howarth 2006), we contend that the status of being an immigrant is a stigma Soc. Sci. 2019, 8, 93 8 of 18 itself. While the complex mechanism by which Chinese immigrants were subjected to anti-immigrant sentiment showcases the various forms of discrimination, we argue that their status of being immigrant alone stands as a stigma. 2.1.3. Anti-Mexican Prejudice Since the earliest days of the United States, Mexicans lived, worked, and were woven into the social fabric of the U.S. southwest. Mexico and Canada were unique in not being subjected to immigration quotas. This changed with the advent of the 1965 Immigration Reform Act, which imposed quotas on Mexican immigration. However, long-established immigration patterns and customs were regarded as violations of U.S. law. The extent to which the status quo was disrupted is apparent in raw numbers: circa 2015 there were 5.6 million undocumented Mexican immigrants, from a total of 9 million undocumented Latino immigrants (Gonzalez-Barrera and Krogstad 2015; Passel and Cohn 2014). One effect of this disrupted status quo is the emergence of Latino Threat Narrative (Chavez 2013). Chavez (2013) observed that from 1965 to 2000, two-thirds of the national magazine coverage on immigration described Latinos, particularly Mexican immigrants, as being unwilling or incapable of integrating into U.S. society and as being invaders who may destroy the U.S. status quo. This threat narrative continued to appear widely in media, political discourse, and everyday conversations (Fujioka 2011; Massey and Pren 2012; Santa Ana 2002). Mexicans are dehumanized and stigmatized as an out-group in through linguistic mechanisms in phrases such as, they are taking our jobs, they are diseased, and they are criminals (Streitmatter 1999). As an out-group, Mexican immigrants are perceived as threats to American cultural identity who would Hispanicize Americans (Monotgomery 2013), and as dividing the nation into “two peoples, two cultures, and two languages” (Huntington 2004, p. 30). This similar separation of groups is consistent with the notion that stigma pertains to a social group which is devalued by society (Crocker et al. 1998) and one that is socially constructed (Yang et al. 2007). In the heated 2016 U.S. presidential campaign discourse, the stigma of being labeled as violators of immigration law translated to Mexican immigrants being labeled as vile criminals and being referred as rapists and murders (Kohn 2015). This racist, anti-immigrant and anti-Mexican sentiment has also resulted in the separation of Latinx families in the United States (Minoff 2018), which has garnered considerable national attention. Similar to Chinese immigrants, Mexican immigrants not only are perceived as posing an economic threat, but also as a threat to the American identity, due to their race/ethnicity and culture, which echoes Howarth (2006) definition of stigma. Adding onto these theorists, it is evident that their status of an immigrant is a stigma, as evident by how the use of anti-immigrant language, racist rhetoric and defamatory references. However, the language used towards Mexicans that revealed racial prejudice against Mexicans has become subtler due to the change of Americans’ racial bias following civil rights movements, exemplifying that race is a stigma as set forth by Howarth (2006). This subtle language use that exemplifies Americans’ intentions to exclude Mexicans by the use of the words “we” (ingroup) and “they” (outgroup), where Mexicans have been ascribed as an out-group. The language description of Mexican immigrants as an outgroup in public discourse has been consistent with restrictive immigration policies that deport a disproportionate number of Mexican immigrants from the United States compared with other immigrant groups. 2.1.4. Anti-Muslim Prejudice The experience of established Muslims and Muslim immigrants is similar in one respect to the experience of Germans: intense prejudice arising from conflicts with foreign entities, which constitutes forms of stigma (Young et al. 2007). The shock of the 9/11 terror attacks and the ensuing conflicts with nebulous non-state terrorist actors (Cole 2009) has led to widespread perception that terrorism imposes a threat on U.S. soil. The rise of Islamic Terrorism, in which terrorists act in the name of Islam and have no single national origin (Sheridan 2006), has induced prejudice against Arab and Muslim immigrants in general, and in particular to those who also practice Islam. A growing number of scholars have Soc. Sci. 2019, 8, 93 9 of 18 labeled the post-9/11 response to the threat of terror directed towards Arab and Muslim Americans and immigrants as Islamophobia, i.e., a sense of fear or hatred towards anyone of Islamic belief (Sheehi 2011). The anti-immigrant sentiment and stigma of Muslim immigrants is a result of their belonging to the Islamic faith and is associated with a devalued characteristic (their religion), exemplifying forms of stigma (Crocker et al. 1998; Major and O’Brien 2005). Muslims as a whole are labeled as radical, extremist, and as potential terrorists (Kundnani 2014). Following 9/11, there has been a sharp increase of hate crimes and bias incidents (e.g., airline profiling) targeting Arab and Muslim Americans (Alsultany 2013). Between 2000 and 2001, hate crimes against Arabs and Muslims increased tenfold, from 117 to 1915 (FBI 2001). Anti-Muslim prejudice has become more prevalent following the Paris attack on 13 November 2015, the San Bernardino attack on 2 December 2015 and the Orlando attack on 2 June 2016, with reported hate crimes towards Muslims tripling after the 2015 attacks, including physical assaults on hijab-wearing students, arsons and vandalism at mosques, and shooting and death threats at Islamic-owned businesses (Lichtablau 2015). Victims of hate crimes were found to be more likely to suffer from emotional stress, such as depression and anxiety (Awan and Zempi 2015). Anti-Muslim immigrant prejudice is complicated with external threat, which is a similar case as with German immigrants, and well as being tied with their religion. The words that describe these two groups can provide some insights. While German immigrants were referred to as traitors during World War I, while Muslim immigrants are referred to as terrorists. These assigned labels suggest a splitting in how Americans perceive these two groups in terms of their belonging to the United States, consistent with the definition of stigma by Crocker et al. (1998). A traitor (although a negative label) belongs to a given country, whereas terrorist does not. The differences in language use reflect and constrain how we conceptualize different immigrant groups. 2.2. The Deep Commonality of Anti-Immigrant Dynamics This review of anti-immigrant prejudice across multiple groups (Irish, German, Chinese, Mexican, and Muslim) provides insight for the dynamics of prejudice within a group (surface level) and across multiple groups (deep level). At the surface level, each group has its unique sufferings from prejudice. For example, the prejudice experienced by German immigrants is different from that experienced by Chinese immigrants. However, with some careful investigation we can identify deeper commonality among their experiences, as each recurrence of stigmatization follows a pattern: 1. Established groups perceive a newly arriving immigrant group as a threat. 2. The threatened groups encode perceived threat in biased language that brands immigrants with stigmatizing labels in social discourse and rhetoric. 3. When biased language becomes systematic, it perpetuates anti-immigrant prejudice, gives rise to discriminatory laws (e.g., exclusion acts), and in the minds of some, sanctions criminal behaviors (e.g., hate crimes and lynching). As previously mentioned, each immigrant group has experienced various forms of anti-immigrant prejudice, and are stigmatized for their race/ethnicity, religion, nationality, belonging to their specific group as well as being vulnerable to social and political historical contexts. As we have outlined the various forms of stigmatization which each unique immigrant group has endured, as according to the theorists, they are some similarities among all groups. Each group has been subject to the social and political climate, which often has determined their experiences of anti-immigrant sentiment. Stigma theorist have readily recognized this occurrence (Kusow 2004; Major and O’Brien 2005; Yang et al. 2007). Chinese, Mexican and Muslim immigrants’ stigmatization is due to their ethnicity, culture, and race, the latter of which Howarth (2006) considers to be a stigma. As we recognize and acknowledge the commonalities and differences of anti-immigrant prejudice among the varying immigrant groups, we claim that one’s identity of an immigrant is a stigma. Similar to Howarth (2006), definition of race as a stigma, we likewise define one’s status as an immigrant to be a stigma. While each immigrant group was attacked due to their status of being an immigrant, whether it was due to Soc. Sci. 2019, 8, 93 10 of 18 their race/ethnicity, nationality, or religion; all groups were targeted because they were immigrants. While we certainly acknowledge the unique differences in their subjugation and readily take race, skin color, and religion into account of our proposal, we clearly consider one’s status of an immigrant to be a stigma. 3. The Role of Language in Anti-Immigrant Prejudice Biased language plays a central role in influencing anti-immigrant prejudice at micro and macro level processes. A full understanding of this central role of language provides insights for social work interventions. A tenant of cognitive linguistics is that language and cognition are intimately related, and in particular language constrains what we think, what we communicate, and how we interpret communication (Lakoff and Johnson 2008). Nouns and adjectives (abstract language) serve to perpetuate negative evaluation of different groups (Porter et al. 2015). The levels of language abstraction can indicate our attitudes, expectation, and beliefs about others, which in turn, can be passed on to those with whom we communicate (Fiedler 2011). Generally, individuals holding negative attitudes towards group members are more like to use abstract language to describe negative behaviors of these groups and use concrete language to describe their positive behavior, and vice versa (Maass 1999). 3.1. Linguistic Bias and Prejudice Systematic bias in language use can, in subtle ways, serve to transmit and perpetuate negative evaluations and prejudice against different groups (Maass 1999). Immigrant groups, regardless of their country of origin, were perceived as a threat at the time of their arrival in the United States. To perpetuate prejudice towards these groups, the established groups fix their negative evaluation in words by using abstract language to dehumanize immigrant groups. In the description of immigrants, emotion-toned labels have been used in historical and contemporary context with an intention not only to characterize immigrants’ membership, but also to disparage and reject them (Allport 1954). For example, the labels Asiatic blood and yellow peril not only characterize Chinese immigrants as racially different, but they also imply deviation from a desirable race and, therefore, Chinese are seen as a threat to the (desirable) Whiteness of the nation (Young 2014). The anti-immigrant sentiment and stigma is racial, as set forth by Howarth (2006). Similar examples can be seen in recent discussions of the Browning of America (Monotgomery 2013). The word illegal not only serves a legal distinction of immigration status, but also dehumanizes immigrants and conveys a message of rejection and exclusion (López 2012). These emotion-toned labels serve to vilify immigrants as being deviant and to transmit and perpetuate the prejudice and stigma of immigrant groups and are transacted through people’s day-to-day communication. 3.2. Communication Process and the Transmission of Prejudice Hall (1980) formulated an encoding/decoding model of communication in which communicants function in one of two roles: as message senders (organize one’s feelings and thoughts into language conveyed to others), and message receivers (understand and interpret the language conveyed from others). Hall (1980) model has important implications for understanding the relation of language and prejudice in communication processes. The words chosen by a sender will reflect the feelings and thoughts of the sender about certain issues and groups. For example, when describing a gay individual, a biased sender will more likely to use the word fag, while less biased senders might use gay (Carnaghi and Maass 2007). The way receivers interpret messages from a sender will analogously be shaped by and possibly amplify the receiver’s prior feelings and thoughts about those issues and groups. For example, Pearson (2010) found that using the term illegal aliens generates more prejudice towards Mexican immigrants than using the term undocumented workers. Soc. Sci. 2019, 8, 93 11 of 18 In some cases, communication is one way. Where the communication is one way, the receiver is not simply passively interpreting messages but rather experiencing a sequence of cognitive responses and emotional feelings (Scheufele and Tewksbury 2007). In the process of news exposure, for instance, media outlets (sender) can shape their consumers’ opinions (receivers) (Bakshy et al. 2015). Research has showed that individuals’ prejudice towards immigrants can be amplified if they rely on media as their primary source of information where that source frequently reports negatively about immigration issues, such as associating immigrants with increasing crime rates or reducing job opportunities (White et al. 2012). Collins and Clément (2012) also proposed the important role of social norms that can moderate the relationship of language and prejudice. This role can be understood in a cross-national context as well as within a nation. The expression of prejudiced beliefs using offensive language is more socially tolerated in the United States than that in the United Kingdom. In the United Kingdom, a series of hate speech laws were passed to regulate language use in public. For example, The Racial and Religious Hatred Act of 2006, forbade the use of threatening words in any written materials that expresses religious hate. Within the United States, the expression of biased opinions about immigrant groups, such as their race and ethnicity, may be more socially acceptable in online social network platforms than in day-to-day interactions with members of different groups. Language can also differentially influence the feelings and thoughts of receivers according to their group membership. These differential effects can be illustrated in the following three conditions. First, for individuals who perceive immigrants as threats, the exposure of biased language use about immigrants may reinforce their prejudicial attitudes (Igartua et al. 2012). Second, for individuals who do not perceive immigrants as threats, the exposure of biased language may induce their prejudicial attitudes. Third, based on social identity theory (Stets and Burke 2000), for immigrants who are perceived as threats, the exposure of biased language about themselves may lead to these immigrants to internalize bias (accept the bias), externalize bias (express hate toward society), or both. In addition to internalized and externalized bias, some immigrants may also choose to finger-point at their own group members (whom they think represent certain labels) or choose to collectively respond to bias. Language can encode individuals’ prejudices, which in turn, can pass down through day-to-day interactions with members of different groups. The language encoded prejudice not only has a negative effect on perceiver attitudes about a group, but also influence the self-perception of targeted groups. 4. Conclusions and Implications This paper examines the dynamics of anti-immigrant prejudice in the United States and proposes that immigrant status constitutes stigma. History and contemporary events reveal the recurring struggle of vulnerable and socially marginalized immigrants: they are perceived as economic, cultural and security threats, assigned stigmatizing labels and narratives, and face prejudice and discrimination. While each group encountered unique challenges and experiences of anti-immigrant sentiment specific to their race/ethnicity, nationality, skin-tone and religion, each group experienced prejudice and discrimination because of their immigrant status. Therefore, it is evident one’s immigrant status is a stigma. With each recurrence, structural barriers are erected that limit the economic, political and social rights and opportunities of immigrants. Social work research and practice needs to actively resist anti-immigrant prejudice and discrimination if it is to fulfill its mission in promoting social justice, where all individuals are treated with dignity and respect. Although immigrant welfare has long been a concern to social work, the contemporary immigrant experience demonstrates the extreme need for social work to imminently and actively work to achieve its mission of social justice. It is incumbent upon all social workers to advocate for immigrants who are subject to prejudice, discrimination, and violent acts, both in practice and policy. While reviewing the literature of language on anti-immigrant bias, it is apparent that social workers must actively work to educate and intervene to combat such language. Social workers can actively work to educate others about the effects that such Soc. Sci. 2019, 8, 93 12 of 18 biased language has on immigrants and society as well as propose appropriate and non-stigmatizing language to be used in classrooms, daily conversations and the work place. 4.1. Implications for Social Work Research In recent years, there has been a growing consensus among social work educators to promote social justice, address social stigma, and reduce structural barriers. Despite being at the forefront of working with immigrants, this consensus has not led to appreciable attention in social work practice to marginalized immigrant populations who have been stigmatized and are confronted by punitive immigration laws that reflect and reinforce contemporary forms of anti-immigrant stigma. Although we should avoid the irony of assigning negative stereotypes to social work as a whole, there are some who believe that the silence of social work on immigration issues reflects its reactionary and uncritical view of immigration policy (Humphries 2004). The increased awareness of prejudice towards immigrants may be one of the first steps toward making this issue more visible in social work. One aim of this work is to suggest the inclusion of language in the study of anti-immigrant prejudice. In today’s context, words matter more than ever. By means of inexpensive Internet, any social media user could spread anti-immigrant remarks at almost no cost, and these messages can reach to millions of users in a short period of time. This reality presents great challenges for social work to intervene. This emerging area is suitable for the interdisciplinary nature of social work research and may create an opportunity for a new research frontier. Social work may function as an interdisciplinary hub in which social work researchers can tap the resources of other disciplines to develop effective interventions that would increase individual empathy and sympathy in physical and virtual world. Social work researchers can work collaboratively with psychologists and cognitive scientists to design, implement, and evaluate these effectiveness and cultural competency of these interventions. Meanwhile, it is important to collaborate with researchers in data science who have the expertise in analyzing big data and provides data visualization tools for identifying target groups for intervention efforts. It would be also important for social work researchers to collaborate with scholars from law, political science, and international public policy in that immigration, by nature, is a political issue that requires changes in laws and policies. Social workers should also aim to conduct qualitative research to further understand the lived experiences of immigrants and the role that anti-immigrant language has on their lives. Qualitative methods are best utilized to understand a phenomenon that is not yet fully known and where seeking the meaning of one’s experience is central to the research (Denzin and Lincoln 2011). This is particularly relevant for understanding the experiences of immigrants, as the topic is under researched as a whole and that the understandings of their experiences is imperative towards developing quality and effective interventions to reduce anti-immigrant prejudice. One such proposal would be to interview individuals of various immigrant groups and ask about the effect that anti-immigrant language has on their identity, self-esteem and feelings of safety. In addition, such research should also seek to ask immigrants what terms they prefer to be used and are respectful of their culture, race, ethnicity and religion. As social workers, we must seek to empower others and allow them agency over their lives. This would provide an excellent opportunity for immigrants themselves to educate others on how they self-identify and on how best to reduce prejudice against them. This research would allow for in-depth conversations with immigrants to better understand their experiences as well as to begin to gather data on the ways in which would best reduce anti-immigrant prejudice and stigma from those most affected. Such research would allow us to best develop interventions that are effective and culturally competent. 4.2. Implications for Social Work Practice School social workers can utilize existing prejudice-reduction interventions and implement them in educational settings, such as enrichment after school programs or multicultural programs (Perkins and Mebert 2005). Prejudice towards ethnic minorities was found to begin among children of three to six years old (Raabe and Beelmann 2011). In this case, early childhood interventions will help Soc. Sci. 2019, 8, 93 13 of 18 prevent children from developing negative attitudes towards out-group members. To develop positive attitudes and increase mutual respect and understanding, social workers may present materials without ethnic and racial bias (Bigler and Liben 2007), utilize role-playing, or provide moral explanations about not using prejudicial language (Aboud and Miller 2007). Such programs that conduct and assist with anti-bias training programs in the United States are the Anti-Defamation League, National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, UnidosUS, and Muslim Advocates, which are possible organizations for social workers to collaborate with to educate about diversity and to combat anti-immigrant prejudice. Social workers can actively work to implement aspects of teaching about diversity, racism, anti-bias and the history of immigrants into their classrooms at their respective universities, for bachelor, master and doctoral students of social work. Such initiatives are consistent with learning how the stigmatization of immigrants can often be a result of racism, socio-political historical factors and society’s understanding of different groups at specific times in history, consistent with Howarth (2006), Crocker et al. (1998) and Link and Phelan (2001). School social workers can also implement such lessons into their curriculum with students in grades K-12. Furthermore, social workers in administrative positions at universities can advocate and implement for diversity trainings and mandatory curriculum development to address issues of race, culture, and religion into the campus environment. Social workers in higher education are not solely limited to education in their classrooms. Social workers may also work to advocate for improving the campus environment to be more inclusive to immigrants both in the formation of student lead groups and the need for offices to address the needs of international students at their university. For example, students may work to ensure that immigrant students have resources available to them at the university and advocate for student led groups that work to address immigrant rights and provide a safe space towards students. Social workers may also collaborate with student unions, who are working to advocate for immigrants in the local community. In addition, social workers can work both on the campus level and the community level to declare their university and/or city a sanctuary university or city for immigrants. Each of these initiatives allows for a safer and more respectful environment for immigrants on their campus. This will allow for the rights of immigrants to be addressed on a macro-level. While the empowerment of immigrants is still crucial at the individual level, how to covey macro-level efforts to immigrants may be one of the priorities in reducing structural barriers. Immigrants who are not aware of their legal rights in the United States are less likely to report being subjected to discrimination, harassment or hate crimes, including physical attacks. To empower immigrants, social work practitioners can help advise them of their legal rights, encourage them to report hate crimes, and organize immigrant residents to question anti-immigrant legislations (Shively et al. 2014). One of the recent efforts at federal level is the passage of Matthew Shepard and James Byrd Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2009, which provides funding and assistance to state and local jurisdictions to investigate hate crimes (United States Congress 2010). It is important for social workers to be aware of this law as well as other laws that provide protection for immigrants and to inform them about their legal rights. Promoting language changes in immigration policies and media may be comprised of important macro-level social work practices. In immigration policies, the word alien is used frequently. When immigrants become permanent residents, they will receive a green card, which has a neutral connotation on its own. However, the green card is also called the United States Alien Registration Receipt Card, and a green card holder is also called resident alien. The word alien is often accompanied with negative terms such as abduction, and this, in turn, may lead people to automatically and unintentionally associate immigrants with extraterrestrial others and extraterrestrial abduction (Nunez 2013). The other identified derogatory word is illegal, a word criminalizing immigrant groups (Furman et al. 2012). Social workers can promote the change of words with negative connotations to alternatives with neutral or benign words in policies and in mass media. This change is possible because many linguists, Latino/a/x and immigration activists, and students from Dartmouth College Soc. Sci. 2019, 8, 93 14 of 18 are actively promoting the change of derogatory words (Padilla and Rivera 2016). One of the most recent promising outcomes was the response from the Library of Congress (2016), who has agreed that the term illegal aliens is an offensive term and announced it would no longer use it as a bibliographical term. While there are many challenges in research, there is an even larger amount of opportunities for social workers to promote equality and acceptance of immigrants. In conclusion, historical and contemporary events reveal the important role of language in the creation, transmission, and perpetuation of anti-immigrant prejudice. As a review of the historical literature has shown, the status of being an immigrant is a stigma, regardless of the specific immigrant group. Building upon prior theoretical conceptualizations of stigma, we define being an immigrant as a stigma, which allows us to tailor interventions and research in order to reduce the anti-immigrant prejudice. The investigation of language in the study of prejudice would be one of the first steps towards understanding stigmatization of immigrants and addressing structural barriers to equality. Promoting changes in the language used in immigration policies and in media discussion of immigration issues may constitute an important area of social work practice. The need to advocate for immigrants in policy, research and education is urgent in order to best enhance the well-being of all immigrants in the United States. Author Contributions: Conceptualization, K.W. and S.W.; literature, K.W. and D.L.; writing—original draft preparation, K.W.; writing—review and editing, D.L. and S.W.; supervision, S.W. Funding: This research received no external funding. Conflicts of Interest: The authors declare no conflict of interest. References Aboud, Frances, and Lior Miller. 2007. Promoting peer intervention in name-calling. South African Journal of Psychology 37: 803–19. [CrossRef] Addams, Jane. 1990. 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Introduction Theoretical Framework—Stigma Theory Recurring Dynamics of Anti-Immigrant Prejudice Anti-German Prejudice Anti-Chinese Prejudice Anti-Mexican Prejudice Anti-Muslim Prejudice The Deep Commonality of Anti-Immigrant Dynamics The Role of Language in Anti-Immigrant Prejudice Linguistic Bias and Prejudice Communication Process and the Transmission of Prejudice Conclusions and Implications Implications for Social Work Research Implications for Social Work Practice References 
work_7hnp77uk2zahbfopw26f2jc2eq	----	3 Journal of Muslim Mental Health ISSN1556–4908 Volume 8, Issue 2, 2014 http://dx.doi.org/10.3998/jmmh.10381607.0008.202 Acculturation, Acculturative Stress, Religiosity and Psychological Adjustment among Muslim Arab American Adolescents Anisa N. Goforth University of Montana Evelyn R. Oka Michigan State University Frederick T. L. Leong Michigan State University Daniel J. Denis University of Montana This research was supported in part by U.S. Department of Education, Office of Special Education Programs (grant H325D070093). Additional support was provided through the Michigan State University Department of Counseling, Special Education, and Educational Psychology Supplemental Research Funding Award. Special thanks to Mona Farroukh, Hawraa Hakim, Mariam Mouhanna, and Ceasar Dakroub and Carolyn Hayter for assisting in collecting data for this study. Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Anisa N. Goforth, Department of Psychology, The University of Montana, Skaggs Building 367, Missoula, MT, 59812. Email: anisa. goforth@umontana.edu. Abstract Whether born in the United States or being immigrants, Arab American youth may experience challenges related to maintaining their heritage culture’s traditions and values and the degree to which they participate in mainstream American tra- 4 Anisa Goforth, Evelyn Oka, Frederick Leong, and Daniel Denis ditions. The goals of this research study were to see how acculturation, accultura- tive stress, and religiosity were associated with psychological adjustment among Muslim Arab American adolescents. One hundred twenty- eight Arab American adolescents (ages 11–21) completed measures of demographic characteristics, acculturation, acculturative stress, religiosity, and social desirability. Age, gen- der, religiosity, and length of time in the U.S. were found to significantly predict heritage cultural orientation but not mainstream cultural orientation. Moreover, acculturation and acculturative stress significantly predicted psychological prob- lems but not overall competence. The implications of the study address how prac- titioners may consider religion, acculturation, and related stressors when working with Muslim Arab American adolescents. Keywords: acculturation, acculturative stress, psychological adjustment, Arab American There are over three million Arab Americans in the United States (Arab Amer- ican Institute, 2002), yet this ethnic minority group is seldom examined in psy- chological research. Americans of Arab decent are an ethnically and religiously diverse group and trace their roots to countries in the Middle East and North Africa. Most Arab Americans are highly educated and reside predominantly in metropolitan areas. There is also diversity of religious beliefs among Arab Americans, with a majority being Christian (63%) followed by Muslim (25%; Arab American Institute, 2002) Like other immigrants, Muslim Arab Americans have experienced chal- lenges related to acculturation, adjustment, and prejudice. The sociopolitical events in the past twenty years as well as the events of September 11th have led to increased negative perceptions and acts of discrimination toward the Arab American community (Cainkar, 2004; Haddad, 2004). In a report by the Coun- cil of American- Islamic Relations (2006), 135 cases of hate crimes occurred in 2007. Additionally, approximately one in four Americans believe that Islam is associated with hatred and violence (Council on American- Islamic Relations, 2006). These underlying attitudes and hate crimes toward Muslims likely have an impact on Muslim youth and communities. For Arab American youth, the issues of acculturation and prejudice be- come more complicated as they develop into adolescents. Not only are they developing independence, a clearer sense of their personal identity, and closer friendships (Erikson, 1968), but they are also negotiating multiple cultures and forging identities reflecting their Arab and mainstream culture (Abu- Laban & Abu- Laban, 1999). During this critical stage of identity development, they are beginning to understand themselves as a member of an ethnic group (Phin- ney, 1989). This negotiation of culture and identity becomes increasingly com- plex when understood in the context of the current social- political climate in the United States. Not only are they beginning to recognize themselves as Acculturation and Adjustment 5 Arab American and/or Muslim, but also they are recognizing what being Arab American represents in mainstream society. Indeed, Muslim youth experience a number of stressors that may affect their overall wellbeing. In one study, Muslim American adolescents from var- ied ethnic backgrounds were interviewed and surveyed about the challenges of being Muslim American, their gendered identities, and difficulties in the home and their communities (Ajrouch, 2004). Many of the young Muslim Ameri- cans experienced daily discrimination both in school and in their communi- ties. Moreover, there were differences in experiences of Arab American girls and boys, with girls experiencing more discrimination due to wearing the hijab (head covering). Difficulties at home and the community may be associated with how Mus- lim Arab American adolescents socialized. Arab cultures have typically been characterized as being collectivist or interdependent cultures, in which the self is defined in relation to others (Gregg, 2005). If a Muslim Arab American is a recent immigrant to the United States, he or she is likely to have been socialized within a different cultural context than his or her parents, leading to differences in cultural attitudes and values, and subsequent conflict within the home. Despite the substantial number of Arab Americans, the continuing emi- gration of Arabs to the U.S., and their increased visibility due to the current social- political climate, there is limited research on the process of accultura- tion and psychological adjustment of Arab American youth. Further, there is a notable lack of research on Arab American populations overall and even less on Muslim Arab American adolescents. Previous studies have suggested that Canadian Arab youth who endorsed Arab cultural orientation, but not a Euro- pean Canadian cultural orientation, reported great life satisfaction (Paterson & Hakim- Larson, 2012). Furthermore, a strong association has been shown be- tween socio- cultural adversities (e.g., religious coping and support), discrimi- nation, acculturative stress, and psychological distress among Arab American (Ahmed, Kia- Keating, & Tsai, 2011). Understanding their acculturative experi- ences and the relationship of these experiences to their psychological adjust- ment would help in the provision of culturally responsive assessment, inter- vention, and consultative services. Acculturation & Acculturative Stress Acculturation has been widely studied as a way to understand the dynamic interactions between a person’s culture of origin and culture of settlement. It is characterized as process of cultural and psychological change between groups or individuals (Berry, 2005). Research on acculturation has primarily used one of two models, either a unidimensional or a bidimensional approach. In 6 Anisa Goforth, Evelyn Oka, Frederick Leong, and Daniel Denis the unidimensional model, individuals from one culture assume the cultural norms, values, and beliefs of the culture in which they come into contact (Gor- don, 1964). The bidimensional model, however, defines acculturation as the degree to which one maintains one’s heritage culture and the degree to which one participates in the mainstream culture. Acculturation is viewed as a pro- cess by which an individual must negotiate the new culture while simultane- ously determining whether to maintain the practices and beliefs of his or her heritage culture (Berry, 1997). During the process of acculturation, some people may experience a variety of stressors associated with their personal characteristics, perceptions of the dominant culture about their group, or factors related to their immigration. Acculturative stress refers to “a response by individuals to life events (that are rooted in intercultural contact) when they exceed the capacity of individuals to deal with them” (Berry, Poortinga, Segall, & Dasen, 2002, p. 362). Accultura- tive stress is the behavioral response to intercultural contact and is a way to understand how the interaction between cultures affects an individual psycho- logically. Immigrants’ experiences of entering a new culture can differ based on how they are able to cope with the stressors related to acculturation, and can result in a variety of physical, psychological, and social changes. Specifically, three dimensions of acculturative stress have been shown to be particularly relevant for ethnic minority or immigrant groups: environmental, attitudinal, and family factors (Fuertes & Westbrook, 1996). The environmental factors include subtle or overt acts of racism, attitudinal factors include diffi- culties stemming from being distant from families, friends, or heritage culture, and family factors relate to conflicts with the families’ values or expectations. These multidimensional factors of acculturative stress can result in a variety of physical, psychological, and social changes. When individuals have the capac- ity to deal with the demands of acculturation and are able to make behavioral changes that are adaptive to the host culture, acculturative stress may not oc- cur. However, for some individuals, the demands may exceed their ability to cope and consequently, they could experience acculturative stress. Acculturative stress plays a critical role in the overall wellbeing of adoles- cents across a variety of immigrant groups. In a longitudinal study of immi- grant adolescents in 10th and 12th grades, Sirin and colleagues (2013) found that acculturative stress appeared to contribute significantly to psychological prob- lems. Similarly, Ahmed, Kia- Keating, and Tsai (2011) examined socio- cultural adversities (including acculturative stress), cultural resources, and psychologi- cal distress and found a strong association between perceived discrimination, acculturative stress, and mental health. They argued that the pervasiveness of “anti- Arabism” in the current sociopolitical environment is an important con- sideration in understanding acculturative stress in this population. Acculturation and Adjustment 7 Acculturation, Acculturative Stress, & Psychological Adjustment There have been a number of research studies showing the association between acculturation, acculturative stress, and psychological adjustment. Psychologi- cal adjustment is characterized in this study as both psychological problems (e.g., internalizing and externalizing problems) and overall competence (e.g., social skills, friendship). First, several studies have suggested that those im- migrant and/or ethnic minority youth who identify with both the mainstream culture and their heritage culture have better overall mental health (e.g., Berry, Phinney, Sam, & Vedder, 2006). Specifically, youth who identify with both cul- tures appear to experience fewer psychological problems compared to youth who identify with either one or the other. For Muslim Arab American youth, it suggests that the degree to which they identify with a particular culture may affect their psychological adjustment. There are a number of factors that affect the process of acculturation for Muslim and/or Arab American youth, including age, gender, and length of time living in the host culture. As a member of an ethnic group, the adoles- cent’s development of the self and the relationship of the self to others may play a critical role in whether the adolescent maintains his or her heritage culture and/or has contact with and participation with the mainstream culture. Re- search studies have found that younger children differ in level of acculturation compared to older children, with younger children being more acculturated than older children (Berry, 1997). In addition to age, there are acculturative differences between male and female youth. Previous studies with participants from Arab cultures have sug- gested that there may be gender differences in levels of acculturation (e.g., Ghaffarian, 1998). Women and girls may have more difficulty adapting to a new culture because of differences in gender roles and expectations. Girls, as compared to boys, may have to alter more of their behaviors (e.g., dress) to participate in the mainstream culture. Finally, length of residence in the host culture has been found to be one of the strongest predictors of adjustment among immigrants (Zlobina, Basabe, Paez, & Furnham, 2006). Immigrants who have lived longer in a mainstream culture are more likely to desire contact with and participate in the new culture. Similarly, among adolescent immigrants, the length of residence in the main- stream culture is related to acculturation (Berry et al., 2006). These factors have an impact on the process of acculturation and overall mental health. 8 Anisa Goforth, Evelyn Oka, Frederick Leong, and Daniel Denis Religiosity Religiosity and religious affiliation have also been shown to play an important role in the acculturative experience of immigrant groups, particularly for Arab Americans. Religion, ethnicity, and culture are often inseparable. Religious practices, values, and beliefs are part of every aspect of an Arab American’s life, including child- rearing, education, and relationships with others (Ajrouch, 2000). Religious practices therefore may pervade both ethnic and cultural practices and may be important variables to consider when examining Arab American acculturative experiences and psychological adjustment. Religion is multifaceted and multidimensional and includes an individual’s emotions, cognitions, and behavior (Hackney & Sanders, 2003). Religion has been examined in many different ways and religiosity is one component of reli- gion that has been broadly defined as “phenomena that include some relevance to traditional institutionalized searches to acknowledge and maintain some re- lationship with the transcendent” (Hill & Hood, 1999). One way that religiosity has been conceptualized is in terms of three components: cognitive, affective, and behavioral (Cornwall, Albrecht, Cunningham, & Pitcher, 1986). The cog- nitive component of religiosity relates to the degree of orthodoxy or religious- ness. The affective component relates to how an individual feels about beliefs, objects, and practices of religion. Finally, the behavioral component relates to religious practices and behaviors. Religiosity, therefore, is a multicomponent construct that includes thoughts and feelings, as well as behaviors. Research has suggested that religiosity plays an important role in accultur- ation among Arab Americans. Studies have shown that Arab Americans who identified as Christians reported greater life satisfaction and acculturation to U.S. society than those who identified as Muslims (Amer & Hovey, 2005; Fara- gallah, Schumm, & Webb, 1997). Furthermore, Muslim Arab Americans who affirmed their Arab ethnic identity reported experiencing more discrimination compared to those who were Christian (Awad, 2010). Although these studies have shown differential experiences among Arab Americans, these studies in- cluded only adults. Other studies, however, have also shown that religiosity is related to acculturation among Arab American adolescents. Adolescents who reported using religious coping, who had higher ethnic identity, and who re- ported having religious support also reported fewer internalizing and external- izing psychological symptoms (Ahmed et al., 2011). Religiosity, therefore, may also play an important role in psychological adjustment among Muslim Arab American adolescents. Acculturation and Adjustment 9 Research Questions This association between acculturation, religiosity, and psychological adjust- ment, as well as the negative perception of the Arab community within the United States, suggests a need for better understanding the acculturative ex- periences of Muslim Arab Americans. Therefore, the purpose of this study is to extend previous research by examining acculturation (mainstream and heritage cultural orientation), acculturative stress, religiosity and psychological adjustment among Muslim Arab American adolescents. Specifically, there are three primary research questions in this study: 1) Does age, gender, religiosity, and length of time in the United States predict acculturation among Muslim Arab American adolescents?, 2) Does age, gender, and length of time in the U.S. predict acculturative stress?, 3) How is acculturation, acculturative stress, and religiosity associated with psychological adjustment? Method Participants and Setting Participants were recruited through a health clinic in a large Midwestern city. The clinic serves a large Arab American population as well as other ethnic groups. This area includes a population of about 70,000 native- born and 62,000 foreign- born Arab Americans (U.S. Census Bureau, 2008). Participants were recruited by issuing invitations when parents made appointments in the health clinic and by using informational flyers posted in the clinic and community. A total of 128 Muslim Arab American adolescents, between the ages of 11 and 21 (mean age 15.50, SD = 2.80), participated in the study. Twenty- one par- ticipants did not indicate their age or gender on the questionnaire; as a result, some data are missing. Table 1 includes the demographic characteristics of the participants. Data Collection and Measures The study was approved by a university human subjects board and supported by the community clinic. Three research assistants (two female, one male) who were current staff members at the clinic and fluent in both English and Arabic administered the measures. They completed the primary investigator’s insti- tutional Human Subject Research Protection Program training that involved web modules and quizzes. They also received intensive training from the first author in the research procedures. The first author did not have contact with participants. Parental consent and adolescent assent was obtained prior to ad- 10 Anisa Goforth, Evelyn Oka, Frederick Leong, and Daniel Denis ministering the measures. The adolescent completed a packet of surveys in either English (n = 127) or Arabic (n = 1), depending on the adolescent’s lan- guage preference. Participants completed the measures independently with the research assistants present to answer questions. Demographic Questionnaire. A 10- item questionnaire was developed by the researcher and adapted from Amer (2005) to obtain socio- demographic in- formation on the adolescents. Items asked for information on age, sex, ethnic- ity, religious affiliation, preferred language at home, parent conflict, and peer ethnic group. Specific items include, “At home, do you speak  .  .  . and “What religion do you follow?” Acculturation. The Vancouver Index of Acculturation (VIA) is a 20- item self- report using a bidimensional model of acculturation (Ryder, Alden, & Paulhus, 2000). The VIA measures the degree to which an individual displays characteristics or behaviors associated with each culture using a 9- point Likert scale (“Strongly Disagree” to “Strongly Agree”). Items on the VIA are catego- rized as values, social relationships, and adherence to traditions. Ten items are based on North American culture and 10 items are based on the heritage cul- ture. An overall mean is calculated for each scale, with higher scores indicating higher association with the culture. Reliability ranged from 0.82 to 0.91 for TAbLE 1. Demographic Characteristics of Participants Variable n % Gender * 107 Male 50 39.1 Female 57 44.5 Age * 107 Middle School (11 - 13) 28 21.9 High School (14 - 17) 54 42.2 Post High School (18 - 21) 25 19.5 Religion Muslim 128 Sunni 63 49.2 Shia 23 18.0 both Sunni & Shia 1 0.8 Did not specify 41 32.0 Preferred Language at Home 128 Mostly English 46 35.9 English & Arabic equally 67 52.3 Mostly Arabic 11 8.6 Only English 1 0.8 Another Language 3 2.3 Place of birth 125 U.S. 29 23.2 Other 96 76.8 *Note: Gender and age were obtained from the Youth Self- Report (YSR) and 21 participants did not indicate age or gender. Acculturation and Adjustment 11 Heritage Culture and 0.85 to 0.89 for the Mainstream Culture subscale. In- ternal consistency reliability for the current study was α = .86 for Mainstream Culture and (α = .94) for Heritage Culture. Acculturative stress. The Societal, Academic, Familial, and Environmen- tal Acculturative Stress Scale: Children’s Version (SAFE- C), a modified version of the Short SAFE created for children (Chavez, Moran, Reid, & Lopez, 1997), was used in this study because it is relevant and developmentally appropriate for an adolescent population (e.g., items regarding parents and peers in school). The SAFE- C consists of 36 items with three subscales using a 6- point Likert- type format. The General Social Stress (GSS) scale includes 16 items related to general stressors that all children may experience, regardless of ethnicity. The Process- Oriented Stress (PO) subscale measures the process of accultura- tion and includes items such as “People think I am shy, when I really just have trouble speaking English.” The Perceived Discrimination Stress (PD) subscale includes items such as “Because of the group I am in, I don’t get the grades I deserve.” Scores obtained on the SAFE- C range from 0 and 180, with higher scores indicating higher levels of acculturative stress. The SAFE- C has good reliability with a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.86 and validity (Chavez et al., 1997). In the current study, a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.75 was found. Religiosity. Four domains of the Brief Multidimensional Measure of Reli- giousness/Spirituality (BMMRS; Fetzer Institute & National Institute on Aging Working Group, 1999) were administered. The original BMMRS is a 54- item scale designed to measure 11 key domains of religiousness and spirituality. In this study, Organizational Religiousness (ORG), Private Religious Practices (PRP), and Overall Spirituality and Religiousness (OSR) domains were includ- ed. Reliability estimates was found for ORG (α = 0.82), PRP (α = 0.72), and OSR (α = 0.91; Fetzer Institute & National Institute on Aging Working Group, 1999). Four domains were chosen to capture important components of religios- ity, such as the frequency of attendance in religious organizations, involvement in informal religious activities, as well as subjective reports of religiousness and spirituality. Previous studies that included the BMMRS with adolescents (e.g., Pearce, Little, & Perez, 2003) have shown that the four domains are appropriate for measuring religiosity with this population. Due to the four domains being highly intercorrelated (range .474 to .517), a Religiosity Composite was then computed by summing the scale scores. Reliability of the scale was α = 0.80. Social desirability. To minimize response bias, the Reynolds Short Form A of the Marlowe- Crowne Social Desirability Scale (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960) was administered. The Reynolds Short Form A is an 11- item True/False mea- sure with scores (2 – 22) calculated by determining whether the respondent’s answer matches the keyed response (6 false, 5 true). High scores suggest high social desirability responding. Studies show good reliability (α = 0.74) (Barger, 2002). Reliability for the current study was good (α = 0.92). 12 Anisa Goforth, Evelyn Oka, Frederick Leong, and Daniel Denis Psychological adjustment. An English or Arabic version of the Youth Self- Report (YSR; Achenbach & Rescorla, 2001) measures social and emotional functioning of children between the ages of 11 and 18. Two components of YSR include Social Competence and Total Problems. Social Competence (20 items) measures the child’s preferences in activities, friendship, and performance on academic subjects. Total Problems scale (112 items) measures internalizing and externalizing problems. The YSR has high internal consistency (α = .79). In the current study, reliability was good (α = .89). Results Data were screened for distributional characteristics (normality, skewness, kurtosis, and outliers). The Marlowe- Crowne Scale was examined to determine the degree to which participants responded in socially desirable ways. Mean responses were 6.89 (SD =2.49) and a median of 7, suggesting that participants tended to show an average degree of concern related to their responses. Given that there was not a high degree of social desirability and to ensure parsimony in the regression analyses, the variable was excluded from the analyses. Zero- order correlations were obtained on all variables as an exploratory look at potential linear relationships (Table 2). Results showed significant nega- tive correlations between length of time living in the U.S. and process- oriented stress, perceived discrimination stress, and global stress. Furthermore, there were significant positive correlations between VIA- A and perceived discrimi- nation stress (SAFE- C POS) and global stress (SAFE- C GSS), suggesting self- reported orientation with American culture was associated with higher acculturative stress. Heritage cultural orientation (VIA- H) was significantly negatively correlated with YSR Total Problems but not correlated with overall competence, suggesting self- reported orientation to Arab culture was associ- ated with lower self- reported psychological problems but not higher or lower competence. Finally, SAFE- C GSS was associated with YSR- Total Problems and negatively associated with YSR- Total Competence. Adolescents who reported higher global stress associated with acculturation reported more psychological problems and less overall competence. A series of simultaneous regressions were performed to assess the predic- tive strength of a variety of models. The first set of regression models examined the predictive ability of age, gender, religiosity, and length of time in the U.S. on acculturation, both VIA- A and VIA- H. The model for VIA- A was found to be not statistically significant [F(4, 93) = 1.75, p = .15]. The model for VIA- H however was found to be statistically significant [F (4, 92) = 4.10, p = .004, R2 = .15]. Religiosity proved to be the strongest predictor of VIA- H [β = .35, p < .01]. Acculturation and Adjustment 13 The second set of regression models examined the predictive ability of age, gender, religiosity, and length in the US on acculturative stress (GSS, PD, and POS). All three models were statistically significant (p < .001). The GSS model came out statistically significant [F (4, 93) = 4.92, p = .001, R2 = .18]. More spe- cifically, age, gender, religiosity, and length of time in the U.S. predicted 18% of the variance in general social stress. The PD model came out statistically significant [F(4, 93) = 6.67, p = .001, R2 = .22] and had statistically significant effects for gender (β = – .18, p = .04), religiosity (β = – .24, p = .01), and length of time in the US (β = – .31, p = .02). Overall, the model explained 22% of the variance in PD. The POS model was also statistically significant [F(4, 93) = 7.03, p = .001, R2 = .23]. In this model, religiosity predicted POST (β = – .21, p = .02). Overall, the model explained 23% of the variance in POS. The third and final set of regression models examined the predictive strength of VIA- A, VIA- H, and SAFE- C on Psychological Adjustment, as mea- sured by YSR- Total Problems and YSR- Competence. Both models came out statistically significant. Specifically, the YSR- Total Problems model explained 18.5% of variance [F(3, 102) = 7.70, p = .001, R 2 = .185] with VIA- H (β = – .20, p = .04) and SAFE– C (β = .36, p = .001) both being statistically significant pre- dictors. The YSR- Competence model explained 19% of the variance [F(3, 95) = 7.26, p = .001, R2 = .19] with both VIA- A (β = – .20, p = .04) and SAFE- C (β = – .33, p = .001) coming out statistically significant. TAbLE 2. Correlations of Variables Zero- order r Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 1. Length in U.S. .70** – .02 .02 – .33** – .26** – .29** .01 .21* .12 – .11 2. Age .04 – .06 – .34** – .23* – .39** – .01 .13 .12 – .04 3. VIA- A .21* .11 .19* .29** .01 – .23* .11 – .07 4. VIA- H – .13 – .10 – .02 – .24* .10 .28** .01 5. SAFE-C POS .70** .51** .31** – .13 – .22* – .18* 6. SAFE-C DIS .61** .25** – .27* – .27* – .08 7. SAFE- C GSS .35** – .46** – .19* – .18* 8. YSR Total Problems – .26* – .14 – .29** 9. YSR Total Competence .17 .05 10. REL- Composite .01 11. Marlowe Crowne Note: VIA = Vancouver Index of Acculturation; VIA- A = VIA American Scale, VIA- H = VIA Heritage Scale; SAFE- C = So- cietal, Academic, Familial, and Environmental Acculturative Stress Scale— Children’s Version; YSR = Youth Self- Report; REL- Composite = religiosity ***p < 0.01, *p < 0.05 14 Anisa Goforth, Evelyn Oka, Frederick Leong, and Daniel Denis Discussion The purpose of this study was to examine acculturation, acculturative stress, religiosity and psychological adjustment among Muslim Arab American ado- lescents. The first goal was to determine whether Muslim Arab American ado- lescents’ age, gender, religiosity, and length of time in the United States predicts acculturation. Overall, results of the study showed that these variables signifi- cantly predicted heritage cultural orientation but not mainstream cultural ori- entation. In particular, age, gender, and time in the U.S., religiosity predicted heritage cultural orientation. That is, Muslim Arab American adolescents who endorsed higher religiosity reported a stronger orientation to their heritage culture. Previous studies with Muslim young adults have found a positive as- sociation between intensity of faith and orientation toward their heritage cul- ture (Saroglou & Mathijsen, 2007). Similarly, intrinsic religiosity with Islam has been found to be associated with reduced acculturation to the host culture (Friedman & Saroglou, 2010). The current study extends these findings for Muslim Arab American adolescents. Religion plays an important role in their orientation toward their Arab heritage culture, and following the principles of Islam may be closely tied with Muslim Arab American adolescents sense of ethnic community and identity. The second goal of the study was to examine whether age, gender, religios- ity, and length of time living in the U.S predicted acculturative stress. Results showed that, as a group, these variables significantly predicted general social stress, perceived discrimination stress, and process- oriented stress. Furthermore, results showed that length of time in the United States significantly negatively correlated to perceived discrimination stress. Specifically, the longer a Muslim Arab American adolescent has lived in the United States, the less the adolescent reports experiencing stress related to discrimination. These results suggest that as the adolescent is exposed to the values, traditions, and culture of mainstream America across time, they are less likely to report experiencing stress associated with discrimination. These results extend previous findings by Ahmed and col- leagues (2011) that demonstrate the importance of perceived discrimination as a factor in the development and acculturation of Arab American adolescents. Overall, religiosity was found to be a significant predictor across per- ceived discrimination stress and process- oriented acculturative stress. Results showed that the more Muslim Arab American adolescents endorsed religiosity, the less they experienced stress associated with acculturation. Being a member of a religious community, perceiving support from God, and practicing their religion may be protective factors from the stress of acculturation for these adolescents. Previous research with Arab American adolescents suggested that religious coping and support play an important role in the process of accultura- tion (Ahmed et al., 2011). Acculturation and Adjustment 15 The final goal of the study was to examine whether acculturation and ac- culturative stress predicted psychological adjustment among Arab American adolescents. First, the results of the study found that acculturation and accul- turative stress significantly predicted psychological problems. These results align with the previous research showing an association between accultura- tion, acculturative stress, and psychological problems across a variety of ethnic minority and/or immigrant groups (Lopez, Ehly, & Garcia- Vazquez, 2002) as well as with Arab American adolescents (Ahmed et al., 2011). Immigrant or ethnic minority groups who maintain their cultural traditions and values may experience fewer psychological problems because they are able to identify with, and feel a part of, their ethnic community (Greene, Way, & Pahl, 2006). This connection and support may, in turn, provide a buffer to stressors and reduce the likelihood for the manifestation of a psychological disorder. Results of the study also suggested that acculturation and acculturative stress predicted overall competence, such as an adolescent’s ability to make and maintain friendships, involvement in organizations and teams, and per- formance in school. This relationship between acculturative stress and over- all competence may be related to aspects of resilience and post- traumatic growth. Adolescents who have experienced stress may also have an increased self- awareness, discover more meaning in their lives, and develop closer rela- tionships (Tedeschi & Calhoun, 2004). There was also a negative association between mainstream American cultural orientation and competence. Muslim Arab American adolescents who endorsed their American culture reported lower scores on overall social competence; however, there was no statistically significant association between heritage cultural orientation and overall social competence. Developmental models of ethnic identity suggest that strong, se- cure ethnic identity is associated with better psychological wellbeing across a number of immigrant groups (Phinney, Horenczyk, Liebkind, & Vedder, 2001). Similarly, within this sample of Muslim Arab American youth, stronger orientation to their Arab culture is associated with fewer psychological prob- lems, but not necessarily associated with higher social competence. There may be other factors beyond acculturation associated with adolescent friendship skills, involvement in organizations, and academic performance. For example, peer relationships or family conflict may also play a role in an adolescent’s de- velopment of competence. Implications The results of this study have a number of implications for practitioners work- ing with Muslim Arab American youth. First, practitioners should consider the importance of religion and culture when working with Muslim Arab American adolescents. Being a member of the Muslim faith includes both faith- based 16 Anisa Goforth, Evelyn Oka, Frederick Leong, and Daniel Denis (e.g., prayers) and social- based practices (e.g., working with charitable orga- nizations). Therefore, when working with a child, practitioners should con- sider whether the religious community has an important role in that child’s life. Indeed, including cultural and religious consultants (e.g., the imam) may be important in the provision of services (Abu- Ras, Gheith, & Cournos, 2008). Practitioners should also consider how to assess the acculturation and related stressors when working with Muslim Arab American youth, and the ways that these experiences may affect mental health. Goforth (2011) recom- mends that practitioners use a multisystem approach gather various kinds of information from the child as well as the immediate and extended family, in- cluding levels of acculturation, educational and child- care practices in their home country, and immigration history. By understanding these factors, prac- titioners can better understand how the acculturative experiences may have affected the child. Limitations Additional studies are needed that include a larger sample of Arab American youth from diverse areas of the United States (and not just from a commu- nity with a large number of Arab Americans). Similarly, given the heteroge- neity among Arab Americans, future research studies should examine diverse cultural practices and beliefs within this group. Future research should also examine how religion is related to acculturative stress, particularly whether a Muslim Arab American youth’s religiosity and spirituality may provide a buffer for acculturative stress. Finally, this study did not specifically examine how an adolescent identifies with their ethnicity and the degree to which their sense of self is associated with their ethnic group (Phinney, 1990). Future research could examine Arab American ethnic identity and its association with overall mental health. 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work_7ihigjw62fbpbeeprwp224cgna	----	Us and them: identifying cyber hate on Twitter across multiple protected characteristics Burnap and Williams EPJ Data Science (2016) 5:11 DOI 10.1140/epjds/s13688-016-0072-6 R E G U L A R A R T I C L E Open Access Us and them: identifying cyber hate on Twitter across multiple protected characteristics Pete Burnap1* and Matthew L Williams2 *Correspondence: burnapp@cardiff.ac.uk 1Cardiff School of Computer Science & Informatics, Cardiff University, Cardiff, UK Full list of author information is available at the end of the article Abstract Hateful and antagonistic content published and propagated via the World Wide Web has the potential to cause harm and suffering on an individual basis, and lead to social tension and disorder beyond cyber space. Despite new legislation aimed at prosecuting those who misuse new forms of communication to post threatening, harassing, or grossly offensive language - or cyber hate - and the fact large social media companies have committed to protecting their users from harm, it goes largely unpunished due to difficulties in policing online public spaces. To support the automatic detection of cyber hate online, specifically on Twitter, we build multiple individual models to classify cyber hate for a range of protected characteristics including race, disability and sexual orientation. We use text parsing to extract typed dependencies, which represent syntactic and grammatical relationships between words, and are shown to capture ‘othering’ language - consistently improving machine classification for different types of cyber hate beyond the use of a Bag of Words and known hateful terms. Furthermore, we build a data-driven blended model of cyber hate to improve classification where more than one protected characteristic may be attacked (e.g. race and sexual orientation), contributing to the nascent study of intersectionality in hate crime. Keywords: cyber hate; hate speech; Twitter; NLP; machine learning 1 Introduction The evolution of the World Wide Web from a static linked content publishing platform to a highly interactive real-time broadcast medium through which billions of people are able to publish their current thoughts, feelings and beliefs has revolutionised public commu- nication. While the benefits of this are massive in terms of bringing people together and enabling distributed communities to be connected, one unanticipated drawback of this is the ability for hateful and antagonistic content - or cyber hate - to be published and prop- agated [, ]. Several studies have shown how individuals with prejudicial views towards a range of minority groups are taking to the Web to spread such hateful messages [–]. Oksanen et al. [] reported  per cent of  to  year olds in a study of social media users had been exposed to cyber hate on Facebook and YouTube, with  per cent becoming vic- tims of such material. Instances of cyber hate and racist tension on social media have also been shown to be triggered by antecedent events, such as terrorist acts [, , ]. This is a © 2016 Burnap and Williams. This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made. http://dx.doi.org/10.1140/epjds/s13688-016-0072-6 http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1140/epjds/s13688-016-0072-6&domain=pdf mailto:burnapp@cardiff.ac.uk Burnap and Williams EPJ Data Science (2016) 5:11 Page 2 of 15 not only morally and ethically problematic. Recently, cyber hate has become a legal issue in many countries, and custodial sentences have been given to people who use the Web to spread and incite hatred based on individual characteristics such as race, religion and sexual orientation. Arguably the UK (England and Wales) is the most progressive in this area. Legislation pertaining to England and Wales that protects people from threatening, harassing, or grossly offensive speech online includes the Offences Against the Person Act , the Public Order Act , the Malicious Communications Act , the Protection from Harassment Act , and the Criminal Justice Act . Similar laws also apply in France, Denmark and the Netherlands. In the US there are protections against posting harassing messages on the Web, without exposing personal identity. In , for first time, representatives from some of the leading social media compa- nies came together with politicians and academics at a meeting of the Inter-parliamentary Coalition for Combating Anti-Semitism (ICCA) Task Force on Internet Hate at Stanford University. It was established that it is extremely difficult to respond to cyber hate due to scale, definition and classification []. The outcome of the meeting was to establish ‘Best Practices for Responding to Cyber Hate’ [] that recommend timely and proportionate re- sponses from social media providers, and for the Internet community to explore avenues for counter-speech as a viable alternative to criminal sanctions. However, despite increasing evidence that cyber hate is on the rise, the availability of legislation to bring about prosecution, and the desire from leading social media compa- nies to reduce harm, it goes largely unpunished given the multiple difficulties in policing online public spaces. Of these difficulties, classifying cyber hate in a timely manner, and at scale, are the most challenging given increasing restrictions on policing resources [] and the difficulty with identifying appropriate opportunities to engage in counter speech. Therefore, automated techniques are needed that programmatically classify cyber hate to lighten the burden on those that have a responsibility to protect the public. This task is non-trivial given the number of ‘protected characteristics’, including race, religion, dis- ability, sexual orientation and transgender status. Each characteristic is associated with specific hate related terms complicating the task of automated classification. The task is further complicated by the intersection of multiple identities in single victims. The debate on intersectionality in hate crime scholarship, while nascent, has begun to unpack how various identities interact and are read by victims and perpetrators. For example, a lim- ited literature reporting on the intersectional nature of homophobic and transphobic (e.g. []), Islamophobic and genderphobic (e.g. []) and homophobic and racist (e.g. []) vic- timisation has begun to emerge. Intersectionality therefore presents a particular challenge for the automated identification of cyber hate. Furthermore, gauging public ‘levels’ of cyber hate following major incidents is a key re- quirement for policing. More than half of all hate-related terrestrial attacks following / occurred within two weeks of the event []. It is during this period that policy and de- cision makers may require additional intelligence due to the lack of real-time insight into wide scale social reaction following an event based on reported crimes. Open source com- munications, such as social media data, lend themselves to this purpose given their inher- ent fine-grained temporal characteristics. Social media posts are produced by the second, while curated and administrative data have a much higher degree of latency in terms of both availability to decision makers and measurement of reaction. Thus, an automated cyber hate classification system could support more proactive public order management Burnap and Williams EPJ Data Science (2016) 5:11 Page 3 of 15 in the first two weeks following an event, and reduce harm to targeted social groups in an appropriate manner. In this paper we built on previous work that developed a machine classification system to automatically detect religious cyber hate in Twitter posts []. We aimed to build a more generalisable model that could address the aforementioned challenge of intersectional- ity by providing evidence to support the hypothesis that classification can be improved by developing a blended model that incorporates knowledge of how different protected char- acteristics (e.g. race and sexuality) intersect in cyber hate speech. The contribution of the research is twofold. The primary contribution is a set of supervised machine classification models for multiple protected characteristics - race, disability and sexual orientation - to complement the existing classifier for religion. The systematic generation of features that support classification was applied across multiple cyber hate types, with consistent im- provement in classification performance. A secondary contribution is an exploratory sin- gle blended model of cyber hate that incorporates knowledge of features across multiple types. In this instance, the blended model is shown to improve classification performance for instances of cyber hate in an intertextual context. 2 Datasets In this study, the aim was to build cyber hate speech classifiers for text that is targeted to- wards individuals or social groups based on their race, sexual orientation or disability. This builds on previous work that developed a machine classification system for religious cyber hate []. Transgender cyber hate was not considered as part of the study. As hate crimes have been shown to spike following antecedent or ‘trigger’ events [], study data sets were collected from Twitter for a period immediately following selected ‘trigger’ events. Twitter was selected as the data source because it differs from other online social networks, such as Facebook and Google+, in that posts are largely public, programmatically accessible, and free to academic researchers. The open nature of Twitter also allows larger groups of people to interact publicly, something that is less common between individuals or small groups in other social networks. Twitter effectively supports a digital agora that promotes real-time interactive exchange of thoughts, opinions and beliefs, making it a defensible and well-suited source for data for this research. The selected ‘trigger’ events were: for race, the presidential re-election of Barack Obama starting November th ; for sex- ual orientation, the public announcement by Jason Collins on th April  - the first active athlete in an American professional sports team to come out as gay. This dataset was specifically chosen because of its intersectional nature. Jason Collins is homosexual and black and thus likely to be targeted based on sexual orientation and race; and for dis- ability, the opening ceremony of the Paralympic games in London, UK on th August . Data collection used search terms based on named entities that were the focus of the event i.e. ‘obama’, ‘jason collins’, ‘paralympic’. These terms would include many refer- ences to the events and the main hashtags surrounding the event e.g. ‘# paralympics’. The hashtag convention is widely used on Twitter to link an individual’s thoughts and com- ments to an event. Data were collected for a two-week window following the start of an event. This specific duration was selected for two reasons. First, existing research indi- cates that public interest in events typically spikes a short time after the event, and then rapidly declines []. Second, as more than half of all hate-related attacks following / occurred within two weeks of the event [], it is assumed that this time window would provide us with the widest variety, and the largest number, of hateful responses. Burnap and Williams EPJ Data Science (2016) 5:11 Page 4 of 15 Building models to classify data according to a predefined coding scheme is an essen- tial task in data science, especially in research involving machine classification of subjec- tive matter. Building a model to predict house prices can use historical and factual data. Building a model to predict emotions, beliefs or sentiments (such as hateful remarks) in electronic text requires an additional step to establish a ‘gold standard’ that is suitable for training and testing supervised machine classifiers, and is based on human agreement on which class a piece of text belongs to. Commonly, this is obtained by sampling from a larger data set and employing human annotators to label each data point (tweet) according to a coding frame ([, ]). The coding frame serves as a set of categories or classes into which each data point can be classified. Computationally crowdsourcing human annotations is now becoming popular, and Web services such as CrowdFlower or the Amazon Mechani- cal Turk provide programmatic application programming interfaces (APIs) through which researchers can automatically upload a data set, coding frame, and set of instructions for annotation. The results of the annotation tasks can then be split into training and testing data sets for machine learning. Each event produced datasets between , and . million, from which we ran- domly sampled , to be human coded. Coders were provided with each tweet and the question: ‘is this text offensive or antagonistic in terms of race ethnicity/sexual orienta- tion/disability?’ They were presented with a ternary set of classes - yes, no, undecided. We utilized the CrowdFlower online service that allows for Human Intelligence Tasks, such as coding text into classes, to be distributed over multiple workers. Workers can sign up to the service to participate in tasks in return for micropayments (small payments set by the task creator based on the number of tasks completed to an acceptable standard). Task cre- ators can also specify a range of worker requirements such as location and experience, and can verify the level of expertise via test questions. Results from workers can then either be accepted or rejected, based on level of agreement with other workers. CrowdFlower recruits from its pool of workers until each unit of analysis (in this case, each tweet) is annotated by a minimum number of workers, as specified by the task creator. We required at least four human annotations per tweet as per the convention in related research []. CrowdFlower provides an agreement score for each annotated unit, which is based on the majority vote of the trusted workers []. Because CrowdFlower contin- ues to recruit workers until the task is complete, there is no guarantee that all workers will annotate the same set of units. Therefore we cannot calculate traditional inter-rater reliability scores, such as Krippendorf ’s Alpha or Cohen’s Kappa to determine agreement between all annotators. However, CrowdFlower has been shown to produce an agreement score that compares well to these classic measures []. Based on the output from our an- notator task we can determine agreement on each unit. The purpose of the experiments performed in this article are to establish the accuracy of a machine classifier when anno- tating tweets as hateful and/or antagonistic or not, and thus it is the agreement score for the unit of analysis (each tweet), and not the overall human agreement for all units that is important for validation. We removed all tweets with less than  percent agreement and also those upon which the coders could reach an absolute decision (i.e., the ‘undecided’ class) - again, following established methods from related research []. The results of the annotation exercise produced three ‘gold standard’ data sets as follows: Sexual Ori- entation - , tweets, with  instances of offensive or antagonistic content (.% of the annotated sample); Race - , tweets, with  instances of offensive or antagonis- Burnap and Williams EPJ Data Science (2016) 5:11 Page 5 of 15 tic content (.% of the annotated sample); Disability - , tweets, with  instances of offensive or antagonistic content (.% of the annotated sample). The proportion of instances of offensive or antagonistic content, which we refer to after this point as cyber hate, is small relative to the size of the sample. However, these are random samples of the full datasets for each event and are therefore representative of the overall levels of cyber hate within the corpus of tweets. 3 Automatically identifying cyber hate speech Greevy & Smeaton [] classified racist content in Web pages using a supervised machine learning approach with a bag-of-words (BOW) as features. A BOW approach uses words within a corpus as predictive features and ignores word sequence as well as any syntactic or semantic content. This approach can lead to misclassification due to word use in dif- ferent contexts and, if words are used as a primary features for classification, it has been shown that combining sequential words into n-grams (list of words occurring in sequence from  – n) improves classifier performance by incorporating some degree of context into the features []. However, an n-gram approach can suffer from the problem of high levels of distance between related words - for example, if related words appear near the start and near the end of a sentence []. Dadvar, Trieschnigg, and de Jong [] used profane words in a social media account username, references to profanities and bullying-sensitive topics, and first and second person pronouns to classify antagonistic behaviour on YouTube. Di- nakar et al. [] also focused on the identification of cyberbullying using a BOW approach, but also incorporated lists of profane words, parts-of-speech and words with negative con- notations as machine learning features. Furthermore, they included a common-sense rea- soning approach to classification by using a database that encoded particular knowledge about bullying situations (e.g., associating wearing dresses with males). Burnap et al. [] developed a rule-based approach to classifying antagonistic content on Twitter and, similarly to [], they used associational terms as features. They also included accusational and attributional terms targeted at a person or persons following a socially disruptive event as features, in an effort to capture the context of the term use. Their results demonstrated an improvement on standard learning techniques (see also []). Chen et al. [] identified offensive content by using profanities, obscenities, and pejorative terms as features, weighted accordingly based on the associated strength of the term, as well as references to people. They also produced a set of rules to model offensive content, showing an improvement on standard machine learning approaches in terms of a much-reduced false negative rate. Burnap et al. [] identified that ‘othering’ language was a useful feature for classifying cyber hate based on religious beliefs - specifically for identifying anti-muslim sentiment. Othering is an established construct in rhetorical narrative surrounding hate speech [], and the ‘we-they’ dichotomy has long been identified in racist discourse []. Examples of language that distanced particular social groups geographically (e.g. ‘send them home’), attempted to justify an expectation of malicious behaviour from the group (e.g. ‘told you so’), and was openly derogatory (e.g. ‘muslim savages’) were reported on Twitter follow- ing the murder of Lee Rigby by Islamist extremists in London,  []. Following the effectiveness of identifying othering terms and their success as features in a machine clas- sifier for cyber hate targeted at specific religious groups, the present research aimed to test the effectiveness of the ‘us and them’ model on other types of hate speech to develop Burnap and Williams EPJ Data Science (2016) 5:11 Page 6 of 15 Plain text: ‘Totally fed up with the way this country has turned into a haven for terrorists. Send them all back home.’ The typed dependency parser returns the following output: [root(ROOT-, Send-), nsubj(home-, them-), det(home-, all-), amod(home-, back-), xcomp(Send-, home-)] Figure 1 Example of text transformation to typed dependency feature set. evidence for the generalizability of this method. To extract potential othering terms the Stanford Lexical Parser was implemented, along with a context-free lexical parsing model, to extract typed dependencies within the tweet text []. Typed dependencies provide a representation of syntactic grammatical relationships in a sentence (or tweet in this case) that can be used as features for classification, and have the potential to capture othering language. The following example explains the meaning of such relationships and how they can be used as features to inform the machine classifier. Consider the sentence in Figure . Within the output we can see five instances of typed dependencies. The second instance (nsubj(home-, them-)) identifies a relationship between ‘home’ and ‘them’, with ‘home’ being the fifth word in the sentence and ‘them’ appearing before ‘home’ as the second word. Word order within a sentence is preserved in the type dependency and provides a feature for classification as well as the syntactic relationship between words. The rela- tionship identified by the parser in this case is nsubj, which is an abbreviation of nom- inal subject. This will include a noun phrase (‘them’), which is the syntactic subject in the sentence, and an associated relational term (‘home’). Linguistically therefore, the term ‘them’ is associated with ‘home’ in a relational sense. Sociologically, this is an othering phrase, which essentially distances ‘them’ from ‘us’ through the relational action of re- moving ‘them’ to their ‘home’, as perceived by the author of the tweet. Similarly, the third typed dependency (det(home-, all-)) identifies a det relationship, which is short for de- terminer, where a link is established between a noun phrase and its determiner. The noun phrase here being ‘home’ (as in a place) and the determiner being ‘all’. Again, this falls into an othering behaviour, suggesting that the entire social group should have a relationship with ‘home’, which we can assume means the perceived ‘home’ of the social group by the author of the tweet (i.e., ‘not my country’). For further explanation of the other features there is a complete documentation in []. This combination of linguistics and sociology potentially provides a very interesting set of features for the more nuanced classification of cyber hate, beyond the BOW approach that utilizes expletives and derogatory terms. It allows a more common-sense reasoning approach to classifying cyber hate by consider- ing the integration of othering terms and calls for retribution action into the classification features. 4 Feature preparation and modelling The first set of features used was a Bag of Words (BOW). For each tweet the words were stemmed using the Snowball method and transformed to lowercase before being split into n grams of size -, retaining , features, with word frequency normalised for each vector. The second feature was extracted by identifying known hateful terms and phrases for hate speech based on race, disability and sexual orientation. These were extracted from Burnap and Williams EPJ Data Science (2016) 5:11 Page 7 of 15 a crowd-sourced list of terms on Wikipedia.a b c The final set of features were the typed dependencies. Each tweet was transformed into typed dependency representation using the Stanford Lexical Parser, transformed to lowercase, and split into n grams of size -, retaining , features, with frequency normalisation applied. Machine classification experimentation was performed using (i) a Support Vector Ma- chine (SVM) algorithm with a linear kernel, and (ii) a Random Forest Decision Tree algo- rithm with  trees. The rationale for the selection of these methods is based on previous research that analysed the performance of a range of alternative methods using similar data to those used in this study, and reported that these methods produced optimum re- sults []. It was evident for the experiments performed in the present research that SVM continually outperformed the Random Forest approach, as such only the SVM results are reported for brevity. Experiments were also conducted using RBF and Polynomial kernels using SVM to establish whether a non-linear model fitted the data better, but both of these produced models with very poor detection of cyber hate. The SVM parameters were set to normalize data and use a gamma of . and C of ., refined through experimentation. 5 Results 5.1 Individual models of cyber hate speech The first set of results document the findings of applying machine classification to cyber hate directed towards each protected characteristic individually, based on disability, race, and sexual orientation. Religion is also included in the results for comparison, based on previous research using typed dependencies to detect a single type of cyber hate []. The results shown are for cyber hate detection rates only. The classification performance for non-hate text was consistently above .-. and are omitted to reduce complexity in presenting the results. Our main interest is with the improvement of cyber hate classifi- cation. For this set of results a -fold cross-validation approach was used to train and test the supervised machine learning method. This approach has previously been used for building machine classifiers for short text []. It functions by iteratively training the classifier with features from  percent of the manually coded data set, and classifying the remaining  percent as ‘unseen’ data, based on the features evident in the cases it has encountered in the training data. It then determines the accuracy of the classification process and moves on to the next iteration, finally calculating the overall accuracy. The results of the classification experiments are provided using standard text classifica- tion measures of: precision (i.e., for class x, how often are tweets classified as x when they should not be (false positives) - a measure of true positives normalised by the sum of true and false positives); recall (i.e., for class x, how often are tweets not classified as x when they should be (false negatives) - a measure of true positives normalised by the sum of true positives and false negatives); and F -Measure, a harmonized mean of precision and recall. The results for each measure range between  (worst) and  (best). The formulae for calculating these results are shown in Figure  (where TP = true positives, FP = false positives, TN = true negative, and FN = false negative). The aim of the research was to produce a system to identify instances of cyber hate posted to online social networks such as Twitter. Thus, one objective was to identify the features that reduce false negatives - so as to minimise instances of cyber hate missed. A second objective was to reduce false positives - so the system minimises instances of Burnap and Williams EPJ Data Science (2016) 5:11 Page 8 of 15 precision = TP TP + FP recall = TP TP + FN F measure =  ∗ P ∗ R P + R Figure 2 Formula for generating performance metrics. ‘false alarms’. The experiments conducted produce metrics that can be compared to deter- mine the optimum individual features or combinations. As such, number of false positives and false negatives for each feature/type (of hate speech) couple are provided in the re- sults. These are not intended to be compared between types of hate speech (horizontally), but between feature sets (vertically). Table  provides machine classification performance results for four different protected characteristics. Religion is provided as a baseline from previous research, and disability, race and sexual orientation are new results. The key find- ing from previous research was that the inclusion of typed dependencies in the classifica- tion of religious cyber hate reduced the false negative rate by % when compared to using hateful terms alone [, ]. From the new results we can infer the following insights: For dis- ability, there is no significant improvement in using typed dependencies over a standard BOW approach. However, the hateful terms provided no contribution to the classification of this type of hate speech. Using hateful terms alone results in everything being classified as non-hate. For race, there is a % reduction in false negatives when including typed dependen- cies as an additional feature together with hateful terms, while retaining performance in the false positive rate. Typed dependencies also provide a % reduction in false negatives over a BOW model, while reducing the false positive rate by almost x. This is a significant improvement for the classification of racial cyber hate and suggests the typed dependency inclusion is necessary for improving classifier performance. The lowest false negative rate is achieved with by combining the BOW and hateful terms - but the lack of typed depen- dencies in this model leads to a higher false positive rate. Overall, the best performance for racial cyber hate is achieved by blending the BOW, hateful terms and typed dependency features sets. This combination returns a very low false positive rate, and a false negative rate reduction of % over the use of hateful terms alone. Classification results for sexual orientation exhibit similar characteristics to the race results in that: (i) hateful terms alone yield very poor performance; (ii) the combination of BOW and hateful terms produces the lowest false positive rate, and (iii) introducing typed dependency features has a significant improvement on the false positive rate - re- ducing it by up to x - but to the detriment of false negative performance, which will lead to missed instances of hate speech. Overall, the highest f -measure for sexual orien- tation was achieved by combining BOW and hateful terms. This model produced a % improvement over the combination of all three features sets. However, the importance of typed dependencies remains evident by producing nearly .x fewer false positives in the combined model, leading to an f measure of only . below that of BOW and hateful terms. To summarise this experiment, we have produced evidence to suggest the inclusion of typed dependencies as features in the classification of cyber hate reduced false positive rate in the classification of  out of  types of hate speech - race and sexual orientation - when Burnap and Williams EPJ Data Science (2016) 5:11 Page 9 of 15 Ta b le 1 M ac h in e cl as si fi ca ti o n p er fo rm an ce fo r cy b er h at e b as ed o n d is ab ili ty ,r ac e an d se xu al o ri en ta ti o n (r es u lt s ro u n d ed to 2d p ) R el ig io n (b as el in e) D is ab ili ty R ac e Se xu al o ri en ta ti o n P R F P R F P R F P R F n -G ra m w o rd s 1 to 5 w it h 2, 00 0 fe at u re s 0. 80 FP = 38 0. 69 FN = 69 0. 74 0. 96 9 FP = 1 0. 60 8 FN = 20 0. 73 0. 72 FP = 15 0. 54 FN = 32 0. 62 0. 53 FP = 67 0. 42 FN = 10 7 0. 47 n -G ra m h at ef u lt er m s 0. 89 FP = 19 0. 66 FN = 75 0. 76 0. 00 0. 00 0. 00 0. 93 FP = 3 0. 53 FN = 33 0. 67 1. 00 FP = 0 0. 09 8 FN = 16 5 0. 18 n -G ra m w o rd s (1 -5 )w it h 2, 00 0 fe at u re s + h at ef u lt er m s 0. 74 FP = 58 0. 65 FN = 78 0. 69 0. 89 FP = 4 0. 61 FN = 20 0. 72 0. 79 FP = 13 0. 71 FP = 20 0. 75 0. 57 FP = 60 0. 44 FN = 10 5 0. 49 n -G ra m ty p ed d ep en d en ci es 0. 53 FP = 48 0. 24 FP = 16 8 0. 33 0. 97 FP = 1 0. 61 FP = 20 0. 75 0. 87 FP = 3 0. 29 FN = 50 0. 43 0. 95 FP = 2 0. 22 FN = 14 2 0. 36 n -G ra m ty p ed d ep en d en ci es + h at ef u lt er m s 0. 89 FP = 19 0. 69 FN = 70 0. 77 0. 97 FP = 1 0. 61 FP = 20 0. 75 0. 91 FP = 4 0. 59 FN = 29 0. 71 0. 96 FP = 2 0. 27 FN = 13 4 0. 42 n -G ra m w o rd s (1 -5 )w it h 2, 00 0 fe at u re s + n -G ra m ty p ed d ep en d en ci es + h at ef u lt er m s 0. 89 FP = 19 0. 69 FN = 70 0. 77 0. 97 FP = 1 0. 61 FN = 20 0. 75 0. 87 FP = 7 0. 66 FN = 24 0. 75 0. 72 FP = 25 0. 35 FN = 11 9 0. 47 Burnap and Williams EPJ Data Science (2016) 5:11 Page 10 of 15 Table 2 Cross validation of different types of cyber hate Training data Disability Race Sexual orientation P R F P R F P R F Testing Data Disability 0.96 FP = 1 0.61 FN = 20 0.75 0.00 FP = 0 0.00 FN = 51 0.00 0.00 FP = 1 0.00 FN = 51 0.00 Race 0.00 FP = 1 0.00 FN = 70 0.00 0.87 FP = 7 0.64 FN = 25 0.74 0.95 FP = 1 0.29 FN = 50 0.44 Sexual orientation 0.00 FP = 2 0.00 FN = 183 0.00 1.00 FP = 0 0.09 FN = 165 0.18 0.74 FP = 23 0.37 FN = 116 0.49 Table 3 Binary cyber hate classification using a combined dataset of 3 different protected characteristics P R F Non-hate 0.97 0.99 0.98 Hate 0.79 (FP = 62) 0.59 (FN = 162) 0.68 Overall 0.96 0.97 0.96 compared to using a BOW model and/or hateful terms as features. Typed dependencies combined with BOW and hateful terms also produced overall classification performance results that were equal to, or better than BOW and hateful terms alone in  out of  types of hate speech - race and sexual orientation. 5.2 Blended models of cyber hate speech The first experimental phase produced evidence to suggest that including probabilistic syntactic and grammatical language features in a predictive model of cyber hate speech in short informal text, such as Twitter posts, will improve performance. The second phase of this research was to determine the possibility of developing a more generalizable model of cyber hate. The motivation for this was to explore the potential for building a model that is capable of handling intersectional cyber hate where more than one protected character- istic is targeted. To do this we followed a number of data-driven experiments to establish the effectiveness of ‘cross-pollination’ between samples of individual types of cyber hate, by mixing samples at the training stage. First, to determine the effectiveness of each individual model in classifying cyber hate for other protected characteristics, we cross-validated across all classes on an individual basis - training on one and testing on another (results shown in Table ). Second, to deter- mine the effectiveness of mixing instances of cyber hate across protected characteristics in improving classification of individual types of hate speech, we drew a random sample from each individual dataset (race, sexuality and disability) and combined the samples into a single dataset for training. We retained the same proportions of hate/non-hate as in the individual datasets so as not to artificially improve performance by altering the balance of classes in training. Two experiments were conducted using this data. One aimed to de- termine the effectiveness of the blended model in improving cyber hate classification on a binary basis (hate/non-hate) (results shown in Table ). For the other, we relabeled the training data to retain not only the cyber hate label but also the protected characteristic to which the hate speech was directed (race-hate, race-non-hate, sexual-orientation-hate etc.). This experiment aimed to establish improvements in detecting individual types of cyber hate when combining features. Theoretically, this was motivated by the observa- Burnap and Williams EPJ Data Science (2016) 5:11 Page 11 of 15 tion that there may be some use of multiple types of hateful language when the context of the remark includes individuals or groups that have intersectional protected character- istics - for example, Jason Collins is homosexual and black. The results of a data-driven experiment are necessary to measure any improvement in classifying the sexual orien- tation dataset - which would then suggest the combination of models based on context, rather than a single model of cyber hate. Table  illustrates very clearly that individual models of cyber hate do not generalise well across different protected characteristics. In all but two cases, the trained models did not detect any cyber hate in test instances from a different protected characteristic. However, one case where there was an improvement was when the model was trained using homophobic cyber hate instances and tested using the race dataset. This suggests that there were features present within the sexual orientation data that were relevant to racism. In this case, it is possible that the sexual orientation training data also contained racist narrative due to the context of the case. The homophobic hate speech was directed at a black male. There is a smaller reciprocal improvement in classification performance when using sexual orientation as the test dataset after having trained the model on racist cyber hate. In this case, the racist element of the sexual orientation dataset is likely being predictive of racist cyber hate, but to a lesser degree. These results suggest people posting this content were targeting more racist content towards a black homosexual man than they were targeting homophobic remarks to a black heterosexual man. This presents an interesting future research direction - determining whether it is possible to measure the likelihood of attacking more than one protected characteristic with varying degrees of frequency in certain cases, to dynamically improve classification of hate speech following a new event. If this were measurable, it may be possible to mix training datasets on-the-fly and rebuild supervised classification models to reflect the context of the antecedent event and measure public reaction in real-time. For example, if a terrorist attack was carried out by a member of a minority group in a predominantly caucasian community in the UK/US, it would be expected that there may follow a hateful response. If the individual or group responsible for the attack exhibited particular race characteristics different to caucasian, the response would be expected to reflect on that. If it transpired later that they also exhibited or supported religious or sexuality beliefs, the response may also reflect on that. As the context changed, it would be likely that the cyber hate classifier would also require updating to maintain levels of accuracy. The dynamic production of context-specific training data is beyond the scope of this study, but to provide some evidence for the utility in producing blended models of cyber hate, and measuring their relative improvement on individual models, Table  shows the results of an experiment where all individual datasets - race, disability and sexual orien- tation - are combined into a single dataset, and used to train and test a model using the same SVM configuration as the earlier experiments and the combination of BOW, hateful terms and typed dependency features. The model is tested using -fold cross validation. The mixed dataset contained , tweets, with , containing no cyber hate and  containing cyber hate. The mean precision of the individual classifiers for cyber hate was ., the mean recall ., and the mean f -measure .. The combination of individ- ual training data into a single model reduced mean precision to . but improved recall to . and f -measure to ., suggesting that ‘cross-pollination’ of training data actually Burnap and Williams EPJ Data Science (2016) 5:11 Page 12 of 15 Table 4 Multi-class cyber hate classification using a combined dataset of 3 different protected characteristics P R F Non-hate-disability 0.95 0.97 0.96 Hate-disability 0.91 0.61 0.73 Non-hate-race 0.95 0.96 0.95 Hate-race 0.86 0.60 0.71 Non-hate-sexual orientation 0.94 0.97 0.95 Hate-sexual orientation 0.66 0.41 0.51 Table 5 Confusion matrix for multi-class cyber hate classification using a combined dataset of 3 different protected characteristics a b c d e f ← classified as 1,798 3 61 0 1 0 a = non-hate-disability 18 31 2 0 0 0 b = hate-disability 74 0 1,724 7 0 1 c = non-hate-race 0 0 28 42 0 0 d = hate-race 3 0 3 0 1,577 37 e = non-hate-sexual orientation 0 0 0 0 108 75 f = hate-sexual orientation improves the performance of cyber hate classification across all classes - most likely by capturing intersectional hate speech. To better understand how this is improving the classification of cyber hate for individual protected characteristics, Table  shows the performance for the individual classes using the same combined single dataset but retaining the separate class labels. From this we see a slight drop in precision for each type when compared to the individual models - . to . for disability, . to . for race, and . to . for sexual orientation. For re- call - disability remains unchanged, race drops from . to ., but sexual orientation improves from . to .. As per the cross validation results in Table , this supports the possibility that blending datasets where the context of the cyber hate could contain mul- tiple types of hate speech due to intersectionality (in this case, homophobic and racist) will improve classification results. It is encouraging here to note that while Table  reports results for sexual orientation hate speech with P = ., R = . and F = . when using a single classifier, Table  reports sexual orientation hate speech results of P = ., R = . and F = .. There is a small drop in recall, which the confusion matrix (see Table ) showed was due to classification as non-hate, rather than confusing sexual orientation hate speech with other classes. Despite the small drop in recall, there is a significant increase in precision due to a % decrease in false positives when being exposed to features from other types of hate speech. The blended results offer supporting evidence that exposing a supervised machine learned model to different types of hate speech can improve results if the training data can suitably blended to capture an intersectional context. However, this must be carefully constructed because it appears the inclusion of training data from alternative protected characteristics can cause confusion within the supervised classifica- tion model and lead to a drop in precision performance. Table  shows classifier output with expected class on the vertical axis and machine classification result on the horizontal. Ideally, numbers greater than zero would be in the diagonal cells that cut through these, and every other cell would be . Reflecting on Table , some confusion appears between the non-hate classification based on race and disability, but generally misclassification is contained to the individual classes, with confusion between hate and non-hate. This sug- Burnap and Williams EPJ Data Science (2016) 5:11 Page 13 of 15 Table 6 Confusion matrix for multi-class cyber hate classification using a combined dataset of 3 different protected characteristics Typed dependency Explanation Homophobic samples det(backdoor-7, the-6) Determiner (a specific reference to a noun phrase) discussing ‘the backdoor’ in a context of homosexual activity dobj(kill-2, yourself-3) Direct object (an accusatory object of the verb) suggesting homosexual ‘others’ should ‘kill yourself’ det(closet-8, the-7) Determiner (a specific reference to a noun phrase) discussing ‘the closet’ - most likely referring to where the person should have remained amod(disgrace-6, absolute-5) Adjectival modifier (a descriptive phrase related to a noun phrase) dis- cussing ‘disgrace’ - and amplifying this accusation with ‘absolute’ det(disgrace-6, an-4) aux(commending-12, him-13) Determiner (a specific reference to a noun phrase) discussing ‘disgrace’ - plus Auxiliary ‘commending’, branding people commending the person a disgrace Race samples advcl(won-7, black-11) advcl(won-7, obama-13) Two adverbial clause modifiers relating ‘won’ and ‘obama’ & ‘won’ and ‘black’ - highlighting the colour of skin as a key related term to the victory aux(destroying-10, is-9) Auxiliary verb potentially suggesting Obama is having a ‘destroying’ impact amod(people-7, white-6), advmod(won-11, how-9) Modifiers linking ‘white people’ to the outcome of the election outcomes ‘how.. .won’ dobj(see-13, you-14) Direct object (an accusatory object of the verb) referring to ‘you’ and the impact the outcome may have Disability samples amod(athletes-11, olympic-10) advmod(drunk-14, really-13) Modifiers referring to ‘olympic athletes’ and ‘really drunk’ in mocking manner referring to ‘you’ and the impact the outcome may have det(jokes-10,the-9) Referring to noun ‘joke’ in relation to paralympic athletes amod(women-12,disabled-11) dobj(falling-13,wish-15) Modifier of ‘women’ to refer to ‘disabled’ female athletes and ‘wish’ they would be ‘falling’ using direct object amod(bench-11, midget-9) The key term here being the derogatory term ‘midget’ gests there remains some latent features within the text that require further exploration to continue this line of research. 5.3 Example typed dependencies from blended model In Table  we present some of the most highly weighted features from the blended model. That is, features that contribute highly to the classification of each type of cyber hate. The interpretation of these is somewhat subjective but given the narrow context of the events, and the fact they are highly predictive of text labelled as cyber hate by human annotators, we can make some assumptions about the meaning of these terms. For sexual orienta- tion and race types we can see that ‘othering’ terms continue to be present. References to ‘the closet’, ‘absolute disgrace’ and ‘kill yourself ’ are all used in a derogatory and sepa- ratist manner, intended to denigrate and offend based on sexual orientation. Similarly, ‘is destroying’, ‘white people’ and ‘won. . . black’ are used in racist cyber hate to differentiate white from black people in the context of the event, perhaps even suggesting skin colour had some outcome on the election. For disability cyber hate we can see less explicit ‘oth- ering’ terms and more of a focus on mocking disabled athletes using terms such as ‘jokes’, ‘really drunk’ and ‘wish. . . falling’. In all three cases we can see why using typed dependen- cies has improved the classification outcome by identifying features that a BOW or hateful terms model would not identify, and incorporating co-occurring but often distant terms ( or  words apart with different terms inbetween). Burnap and Williams EPJ Data Science (2016) 5:11 Page 14 of 15 6 Conclusions In this paper we developed novel machine classification models to identify different types of cyber hate individually and intersectionally. We used text parsing to extract typed de- pendencies, which represent syntactic and grammatical relationships between words, and are shown to capture ‘othering’ language - consistently improving machine classification for different types of cyber hate beyond the use of a Bag of Words and known hateful terms, which have been the main method for identifying cyber hate previously. Furthermore, we built a data-driven blended model of cyber hate to improve classifica- tion where more than one protected characteristic may be attacked (e.g. race and sexual orientation), contributing to the nascent study of intersectionality in hate crime. The re- sults for this model suggest that if a context can be established for the likely factors that may trigger hateful responses, a bespoke supervised model could be built using a blend of historical training data relating to these factors. The extraction of typed dependencies that were most predictive of each class label within the blended model identified co-occurring terms and exact type of cyber hate lan- guage - highlighting ‘othering’ terms for sexual orientation and race, and mockery in the language of hate speech targeting disability. Some limitations remain to be addressed in future research. First, while typed depen- dency examples improved classification in the majority of the supervised models, they also illustrated how specific predictive terms are related to event-related contexts. Thus we need more cases to expand the model to be more generalisable. This is particularly rel- evant for cases with an intersectional dimension. Future research should seek cases where religion intersects with sexual orientation, or race intersects with disability and sexual ori- entation etc. Second, the cases in this research focused on western examples in UK/US. Cases should also be selected from different world regions and cultures. Future studies should consider cases in non-western cultures where tolerance toward minority charac- teristics may be different. Finally, the results of the models indicate room for improvement in the identification of features - identifying novel ways to measure latent hateful and an- tagonistic meaning within the language of cyber hate. One direction could be to investigate interaction between users as well as classifying tweets in isolation. The resulting cyber hate classification models have been shown to be applicable to a range of protected characteristics including race, disability and sexual orientation, and provide new ability to automatically identify content perceived by a group of human an- notators as hateful or antagonistic. Instead of requiring a human moderator to observe and monitor online social networks for such content in the aftermath of potential ‘trigger’ events, our approach will help inform those responsible for managing such content, and allow them to verify and react, rather than have to search for offensive content in large streams of data. Competing interests The authors declare that they have no competing interests. Authors’ contributions PB proposed the use of typed dependencies as a classification feature and to blend datasets to produce the mixed model. PB designed and implemented the machine classification experiments, and identified the notion of othering within the predictive features. MW developed the narrative around intersectionality and its growing significance in hate crime. PB prepared the technical theory and results for the manuscript. MW developed the theoretical aspects of criminology and hate crime. Both authors read and approved the final manuscript. Burnap and Williams EPJ Data Science (2016) 5:11 Page 15 of 15 Author details 1Cardiff School of Computer Science & Informatics, Cardiff University, Cardiff, UK. 2Cardiff School of Social Sciences, Cardiff University, Cardiff, UK. Acknowledgements This work was supported by the Economic and Social Research Council and Google Data Analytics Research Grant: ‘Hate Speech and Social Media: Understanding Users, Networks and Information Flows’ [ES/K008013/1]. We are grateful to Dr. Walter Colombo and Prof. William Housley for their input into the CrowdFlower data annotation tasks. Endnotes a https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_ethnic_slurs. b https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_LGBT_slang_terms. c https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_disability-related_terms_with_negative_connotations. Received: 22 November 2015 Accepted: 15 March 2016 References 1. 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Paper presented at the international conference on language resources and evaluation (LREC, May 24-26, Genoa, Italy) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_ethnic_slurs https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_LGBT_slang_terms https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_disability-related_terms_with_negative_connotations Us and them: identifying cyber hate on Twitter across multiple protected characteristics Abstract Keywords Introduction Datasets Automatically identifying cyber hate speech Feature preparation and modelling Results Individual models of cyber hate speech Blended models of cyber hate speech Example typed dependencies from blended model Conclusions Competing interests Authors' contributions Author details Acknowledgements Endnotes References 
work_7iqzkpivi5flnpz3xvlkk477vy	----	Home | Political Science | University of Waterloo Skip to main Skip to footer Visit our COVID-19 information website to learn how Warriors protect Warriors. University of Waterloo Admissions About Waterloo Faculties & academics Offices & services Support Waterloo Search Menu This site Political Science home About Political Science Our people Faculty Staff Sessionals Visiting scholars & Post-Docs Adjunct and Emeriti Professors Undergraduate Academic Plans Plan Requirements Cooperative Education in Political Science International Studies International Trade Courses Experiential learning courses Special Studies Courses Scholarships and awards Political Science Student Association (PSSA) Careers in Political Science Research Funded faculty research Recent faculty publications Faculty in the media Centres and groups Graduate Master's program MRP requirements Thesis requirements MA student handbook Student stories and profiles Student research Career outcomes How to apply Funding and awards Co-op Co-op requirements Graduate courses Get involved Opportunities Calls for papers Job postings Research & study opportunities Policies and forms Convocation and applying to graduate Alumni Profiles and achievements Share your story Make a gift Master of Public Service UWaterloo Admissions About Waterloo Faculties & academics Offices & services Support Waterloo Political Science Info Call for applications CRC Tier II in Indigenous Studies, Tenure-Track Assistant Professor, Faculty of Arts Display banner #1 Display banner #2 Political Science home About Political Science Undergraduate Research Graduate Alumni Master of Public Service Welcome to Political Science With four central strengths—Canadian Politics, Global Politics, Politics & Business, and Public Policy & Administration—Political Science at Waterloo offers innovative specializations and career relevant minors that explore Ideas for Changing the World. Don't forget to check out our Political Science Newsletter and recent faculty publications to stay up-to-date with what the Political Science department is doing. Information for UNDERGRADUATE STUDENTS Information for GRADUATE STUDENTS information about FACULTY RESEARCH VISIT US STUDENT STORIES TOP Share Department of Political Science Hagey Hall, room 315 Tel 519 888-4567 x 32100 Undergraduate inquiries: x 33396 Graduate inquiries: x 32415 Contact Visit Support Arts Faculty positions in Arts​ ​Arts social media directory Website feedback Information for faculty and staff University of Waterloo University of Waterloo 43.471468 -80.544205 200 University Avenue West Waterloo, ON, Canada  N2L 3G1 +1 519 888 4567 Contact Waterloo Maps & Directions WatSAFE Accessibility Privacy Copyright News Careers Feedback @uwaterloo social directory The University of Waterloo acknowledges that much of our work takes place on the traditional territory of the Neutral, Anishinaabeg and Haudenosaunee peoples. Our main campus is situated on the Haldimand Tract, the land granted to the Six Nations that includes six miles on each side of the Grand River. Our active work toward reconciliation takes place across our campuses through research, learning, teaching, and community building, and is centralized within our Indigenous Initiatives Office. Log in 
work_7nn3um6esbhepbh27un4r5j37q	----	Action Plan-edit_1.1 1 Bielefeld, 10 July 2019 We are an interdisciplinary and multicultural group of students from Germany, Turkey, Greece, Italy, and Mexico. In the seminar “Hate Speech and Disinformation on Social Media,” taught by Monika Hübscher (Haifa University), we increased our awareness of the global threat of hate speech and fake news on social media. While dealing with the topic, we understood that, particularly in Germany, existing counter strategies are insufficient when viewed in contrast with the extreme outcome that fake news and hate speech on social media can have. In its gravest consequences, disinformation can disrupt democratic exercise, as seen in the US election campaigns in 2016, and hate speech has been found to enable ethnic cleansing as in the ongoing violence against the Muslim Rohingya minority in Myanmar. Universities have a responsibility to address contemporary, global and social issues, however only few faculties have a focus group working on this topic. We find this alarming because hate speech and fake news on social media need interdisciplinary research and cooperation to be fully understood and confronted. We see an urgent need for action, and thus please find below our recommendations based on the research and work we have done in our seminar. Our hope is to raise your awareness and to begin a discourse that leads to appropriate reactions from the accountable actors and most importantly, prevention of harm from disinformation and hate on social media. We hope that our definitions and recommendations can serve as an impulse and starting point for research on hate speech and disinformation, specifically focusing on social media. Please get in touch with us for more in-depth discussion. With kind regards, Amela Becirevic – Master student of Pedagogy – amelabecirevic95@gmail.com Bahar Merve Ay – Bachelor student of Psychology – baharmerve_ay@hotmail.com Jose Rene Guerrero Rocha – Bachelor student of International Relations – guerrero.udg@gmail.com Mona Corsmeier – Bachelor student of Sociology – Mona.corsmeier@uni-bielefeld.de Jaana Duensing – Bachelor student of Pedagogy – jaana.duensing@uni-bielefeld.de Dominik Goertz – Bachelor student of Sociology – goertzdom@gmail.com Michael Löwe – Bachelor student of History and English – loewe.micha@web.de Eleni Metanoia – Bachelor student of Law – elenmetanoia@gmail.com 2 Vanessa Walter – Bachelor student of History – v.walter@uni-bielefeld.de Ismail Erbil Keskin – Bachelor student of Political Science and International Relations – ismailkskn0808@gmail.com Monika Hübscher – PhD fellow at Haifa University and Fondation pour la Mémoire de la Shoah, lecturer of “Hate speech and disinformation on social media” – mo.huebscher@gmail.com Update, September 2019: Working group on Hate Speech and Disinformation on Social Media Concerned about the state of research and events surrounding the topic hate speech and disinformation on social media, a small group from the seminar has decided to continue to work on the issue. Mona Corsmeier, Dominik Goertz, Vanessa Walter, and Monika Hübscher will continue to debate and research on the topic. Additionally, Marc Grimm, a researcher at the Centre for Prevention and Intervention in Childhood and Adolescence and the Faculty of Educational Science, has joined the group and will serve as the contact at Bielefeld University. We are looking for students and researchers from all disciplines to join our group. Currently we are organizing an interdisciplinary get together on the topic. If you are interested in our work and if you consider joining, please send an email to: @ Bielefeld University: marcgrimm@uni-bielefeld.de @ Haifa University: mo.huebscher@gmail.com 3 Action Plan to establish social media studies at Universities From the students of the seminar “Hate speech and disinformation on social media” Under the guidance of Monika Hübscher Quote as: Hübscher, M.; et.al: Action Plan to Establish Social Media Studies at Universities, 2019. 1. Working Definition of Fake News and Hate Speech on Social Media Social media providers, such as Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, YouTube, are globally operating companies that allow users to create profiles and use the platforms in exchange for the users’ data. In our research we found many definitions of hate speech and fake news, but none specifically defined the phenomenon on social media. Fake news on social media entails intentionally created deceptive content in the form of, for example, counterfeit videos, articles, audio files but also posts, images, memes, gifs, and files attached to online posts (documents, audio, visuals). They are put to work with the intent to influence, mislead, polarize, impersonate, discredit and to purposely deceive the public. Specific to social media are tools to engage with the content such as like buttons and share, comment, and streaming options. Additionally, social media providers and specialized companies offer the opportunity to increase dissemination through bots and trolls as well as micro-targeting ads. It is due to these tools that social media can be weaponized to deceive the public and to influence public opinion and the social climate on a large scale. It can potentially lead to distrust and delegitimization of political systems, the media and academic and state institutions. The dissemination of fake news can create an environment of fear and as such, has the potential to inform hate speech. Hate speech on social media is any form of expression that can hurt and harm people, physically and mentally, intentionally and unintentionally. Hate speech is used to target a group or the individual as a representative of a group. Due to social media specific tools, as mentioned above, hate speech can be circulated widely and thus has not only the potential to create individual harm, but can have severe offline consequences such as the incitement of violence. Hate speech can turn into endangering speech and thus can incite people to engage in further hate speech or to commit offline hate crimes. This can even take the form of organized campaigns. 4 In the past it has been used by governments, religious leaders, media, military, public figures, trolls, interest groups and individual users. The aim is to target groups by creating, releasing sharing and commenting on content with the intent to dehumanize and incite discrimination, hate and ultimately even crimes against humanity. 2. Targeted Groups and Victims of Hate Speech and Fake News On the individual level, the dangers of hate speech are often overlooked. Most commonly targeted groups of hate speech on social media are groups with a history of discrimination. During our research we have observed harm on the following groups. The list is unfortunately not exhaustive: Hate speech is used to target groups according to their ideologies, religious beliefs, sex and gender expressions, sexual orientation, appearance, ethnicity, socio-economic status, lifestyle, and disabilities. 3. Possible Online and Offline Effects of Hate Speech and Disinformation During our research we have observed various reported harmful effects of hate speech on social media. The list includes but is not limited to: physical violence, group polarization, fear, psychological issues, discrimination, increase of prejudices, exclusion, and/or crimes against humanity. 4. Recommendations: Universities should establish an interdisciplinary social media focus group. This focus group organizes regular conferences with the aim to establish a network of political actors, NGOs, scholars, representatives of social media companies, experts from the tech industry, educators, teachers and police. They need to create an environment of trust and open discussion, develop a network and divide tasks accordingly. 1. Universities: coordinating and organizing the conferences that raise awareness of the global issue of disinformation and endangering speech on social media and its on- and offline consequences; a focus group has to monitor results of the studies by scholars and the results of the education programs for educators, teachers and subsequently pupils in 5 schools; it needs to educate teachers on the topic of social media and make it a mandatory component of study programs. Ultimately, social media should itself become a discipline at the university. 2. Political actors: coin definitions of fake news and hate speech on social media to spread awareness; hold the social media providers responsible to enforce laws; advance social media literacy as a regular school subject. 3. Social media providers: create easily accessible, transparent local headquarters around the world that can work according to local customs and laws; develop technical tools to identify and eliminate fake news and disinformation. In the meantime, the number of content moderators should be increased, and their training improved. Content moderators should also review content exclusively in their own language in order to guarantee they understand the issue from their cultural background. Content moderators should have access to regular supervision, training and psychological support. 4. Educators and teachers: participate in continuing education programs on social media literacy and transmit the knowledge to pupils. Easy access to teaching material online needs to be guaranteed. 5. It is a long-term goal to institutionalize the research on online hate speech as to guarantee that young scholars can built careers on focusing that topic. A short-term recommendation is to draw attention to the following topics and research question. - What characterizes the interdependence between hate speech on social media and offline hate crime? - How does it influence our trust in the German political system? - Is there a relation between online and offline behavior? - Is there a specific characteristic or trait that makes people more susceptible to commit hate speech on social media? - Is there a relationship between education level and hate speech literacy on social media? - Does hate speech have structure? - Why is the existing legal framework to combat hate speech and fake news insufficient? - What is the relation between fake news and the increase of anti-democratic tendencies? - How do “likes” on social media influence the belief system of the users? 6 - How is the dissemination of fake news and hate speech on social media organized on a formal and informal level? - Is hate speech on social media influencing peace processes in places of conflict? - How can artificial intelligence be used to combat hate speech? - What is the role of algorithms and social bots in the dissemination of fake news and hate speech on social media? 
work_7nqye7hevfho3kq5scbaoyjhc4	----	Diversity in Higher Education The Three Rs SHEKHAR MISRA GARY McMAHON CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY, CHICO CHICO, CALIFORNIA A B S T R A C T . Research indicates that a diverse student body is beneficial for edu- cation. The Association to Advance Colle- giate Schools of Business (AACSB) accred- itation standards also include a commitment to diversity. In California, as well as in some other states, preferential treatment in admissions to bring about a diverse student body is against the law, which may be problematic for some universities (Golden, 2003). Many schools have struggled with this dilemma of developing diversity in the campus population. In this article, the authors examine diversity in the student body, and the role of recruitment, retention, and relationship building. The authors pro- pose a conceptual model for successfully enhancing student diversity. They also pre- sent the implementation of the model devel- oped at a California university and discuss the benefits of the study to the students as well as the employers. Key words: AACSB, accreditation, diversity, higher education Copyright © 2006 Heldref Publications n ti the past couple of decades the U debate about learning and knowledge has undergone a quantum shift. Accord- ing to Bruffee (1993), . . . many people now tend to agree that the world is undergoing profound change and that college and university education based on traditional, cognitive assumptions, sometimes in this context called "struc- turalist," no longer prepares students ade- quately to live in it. Because the most threatening issues in the world today are multicultural, our ability to communicate instantaneously and threaten massively one another's lives has made effective interde- pendence a necessity everywhere, (p. 172) Educators everywhere have been attempting to come to grips with the new reality of the need for diversity, with mixed results. Lately, for business schools, the pres- sure to adapt and change has also been coming from another direction—the premier accreditation agency, the AACSB (see Miles, Hazeldine, & Munilla, 2004 for a general discussion of the new AACSB standards). AACSB (2004) reaffirms its "commitment to the concept that divetsity in people and ideas enhances the educational experi- ence in every management education program" (p. 9). The leading accrediting body for business schools recognizes that diver- sity is a complex concept, and that there are many facets to it. It does expect accredited schools to demonstrate "commitment and actions in support of diversity in the educational experience" (AACSB, p. 9). Although diversity is defined broadly in terms of providing exposure to multi- ple frames of reference and opinions, for most schools it boils down to socioe- conomic and ethnic diversity in the background of the students (Judkins & LaHurd, 1999). In 1996, California voters passed Proposition 209 that effectively banned affirmative action in that state (Schmidt, 1997). The 2003 Supreme Court ruling on a University of IVIichigan admissions case and other court decisions has not clarified the affirmative action protocol (Golden, 2003). Reconciling the mandate of the AACSB with state law has been a challenge for Califomia campuses. At the California State University (CSU), Chico, the college of business has devel- oped a model that is seen as an example of best practices for the entire campus. Background The makeup of the workforce in the United States has changed and employ- ers are looking for college graduates who reflect that diversity (Gilroy, 2003). Unfortunately, business education has become less popular among minorities even as colleges and universities are devoting greater attention to the issue (Gilroy). Thus, while 23% of bachelor's 40 Journal of Education for Busitiess degrees awarded to Hispanics in 1989 were in business, that proportion had dropped to 19% by 1998 (Gilroy). Simi- larly, the numbers for African Americans dropped from 26% to 21%, while those for Native Americans dropped from 21% to 16% during the same period. Because employers emphasized the diversification of business personnel they were unable to hire enough minorities despite aggressive recruitment efforts (Gilroy, 2003; American Association of Advertising Agencies [AAAA], 2004). This difficulty in hiring has caused major corporations like GMAC, Citigroup, and KPMG to form the Diversity Pipeline Alliance in an attempt to increase interest in management education and careers among students of color (Gilroy). The AAAA, frustrated at the lack of college recruits of color coming to member agen- cies, recently launched Operation Suc- cess. This program is designed to signifi- cantly increase ethnic diversity and inclusiveness in key operational areas of the advertising business. Retention A Pew study found that in the period from 1997 to 2000, Latinos had high college enrollment rates but low gradu- ation rates (Rooney, 2002). The study found that Latino Americans were sec- ond only to Asian Americans when it came to enrolling in college, but were fourth behind Asian Americans, non- Hispanic White people, and African Americans when it came to completing college education. Even the Wisconsin Alliance for Minority Participation, supported by a $2.5 million grant from the National Science Foundation, reported a retention rate of 20% among minorities at the University of Wiscon- sin (Chappell, 2004). Clearly, retention of students of color is a serious concern. To deal with the challenges presented by these facts, employers are also attempting to increase the popularity of business education among students of color. They believe that "unless efforts being made to increase enrollments suc- ceed, the future impact on corporate diversity could be devastating" (Gilroy, 2003, pp. 46-51). Thus, success in busi- ness education for students from disad- vantaged backgrounds is becoming an increasingly important policy goal. It is in this context that business schools have been attempting to develop student pro- files that reflect the population they serve. The problem for business schools is how to not only attract but also retain students of color. The fact that many of the stu- dents of color are also first-generation college students makes it even harder to retain them (Gilroy). A recent study by the U.S. Education Department found that such students are more likely to take remedial courses, to have trouble decid- ing on a major, and have lower grades, on average, than are students whose parents went to college (Schuman, 2005). The Challenges The challenges in the path toward creating and maintaining a diverse stu- dent body can be of many kinds. 1. The social infrastructure at a campus may not be able to support campus diversity goals. For example, in terms of housing on campus, students from diverse backgrounds create more challenges for housing advisors and administrators. The area community may have elements that do not share the campus diversity goals. This can be devastating to some, and may even lead to hate crimes. CSU, Chico has faced such issues. 2. With a relatively small group of minority students everyone knows everyone's personal business. The mistakes that students make as they mature tend to become known by everyone and are rarely forgotten. 3. Students who prefer to date within their own race have a difficult time in a school that lacks diversity. 4. Students may face financial obstacles of different kinds, with some of them sending their financial aid money to their relatives. 5. Old survival skills that may have worked well in the neighborhoods where some students grew up are not appropriate in the higher education setting. 6. There is a general lack of role models for these students. 7. Many of the students encounter a lot of internal noise and they are always wondering if their skin color is a fac- tor in what people say and do. A Conceptual Model A large proportion of disadvantaged students as well as students of color entering college come with characteris- tics that are unique. Many of them are first generation college-goers and other students from lower socioeconomic stra- ta and, therefore, have greater financial problems or have not been adequately prepared for the rigors and responsibili- ties of an AACSB-accredited business program (Schuman, 2005). Even after those obstacles have been successfully overcome, many students are still faced with a nagging question: Do I really belong here? It is up to business schools to help inculcate a sense of belonging in these students that comes from their being integrated academically as well as socially. Without a sense of belonging, students are likely to feel alienated from their new surroundings and are likely to drop out at a higher rate. A sense of belonging can be devel- oped by a series of activities that pro- vide academic as well as social integra- tion for the students (see Figure 1). It is only when they feel part of the educa- tional institution that they can be expected to want to stay there and par- ticipate in the educational process. In other words, the social and academic integration can lead to a greater sense of belonging and community that in turn may lead to a greater retention rate. A significant aspect of the integra- tion is collaborative learning. Profes- sor Uri Triesman's experiment at the Berkeley campus of the University of California revealed that, through col- laborative learning even students in remedial math and science were able to eventually reach A and B grade lev- els (Bruffee, 1993). Collaborative learning gives students a chance to work together when the stakes are rel- atively low, so that they can work more effectively when the stakes are higher. These collaborations in small groups can also lead to a greater feeling of community. The Business Resource Center In 1998, CSU, Chico college of busi- ness recognized a lack of diversity among its students. Determined to September/October 2006 41 Student Characteristics at Entry * - FIGURE 1. The role ol sense of belonging ir BRC Academic Integration Social Integration Sense of Belonging >• Retention BRC business resource center (BRC) in developing a 1 students. attract and serve a diverse student body, the college's administration established the Business Resource Center (BRC), a learning community with the mission of recruiting and retaining a diverse popu- lation of business students. The BRC Program has been success- ful. According to data that we collect- ed, the number of minority students enrolled in the college of business since 1997 has almost doubled. Enroll- ments of African American students have increased from 22 in Fall 1997 to 58 in Fall 2005, an increase of 164%, and Hispanic student enrollments in 2005 were 67% higher than they were 8 years earlier, going from 138 to 230. The number of students who were clas- sified as Pacific Islanders increased from 12 to 31, an increase of 158% during the same 8-year period. The retention rate for African American and Hispanic students, the primary focus of the BRC, was 22 out of 25 (88%) at the end of the first academic year (Fall 2003 to the end of Spring 2004), and was 20 out of the original 25 (80%) at the end of fifth semester. Fall 2005. This compares favorably with the 20% retention rate reported elsewhere by Chappell (2004). A uniqueness of the BRC is that it takes a multicultural approach to diver- sity, not an ethnocentric approach. That is, BRC activities involve as many majority students as they do minority students. Working collaboratively, the students begin to understand the dynam- ics of working in a true multicultural environment and are better integrated into the larger academic community. The board of the BRC has representa- tion from students of all ethnicities, including White students. The BRC also has a distinct adminis- trative advantage in that the center's founding director also served the col- lege as an assistant dean for the col- lege's student services and for the AACSB accreditation reports. The director was also a member of the col- lege's administrative group, a group that oversees the operations of the college. This relationship allowed the rest of the college's administrators to remain updated on the BRC's progress and challenges. Although the assistant dean is no longer the director of the BRC he continues to represent that perspective in the administrative group. The BRC works closely with other campus resources including financial aid, the educational opportunity pro- gram, and college preparatory pro- grams to solve the traditional and well- identified obstacles. Where the BRC is effective is in helping students answer the question. Do I belong here? If students do not have a strong belief that they belong in a university, programmatic solutions such as finan- cial aid and the educational opportuni- ty program can only provide temporary solutions. When students begin dealing with homesickness or a disappointing midterm score they often look for escape routes (Rooney, 2002). If there is a lack of other students in similar sit- uations usually leads to even more dif- ficult academic and social experiences as the students lose their commitment to academic and professional goals. The Pillars of the BRC: Recruitment, Retention, Relationships The BRC staff at CSU, Chico has cul- tivated relationships with select high schools—some as far as 500 miles away. These relationships have helped in recruiting new students of color, through the favorable word-of-mouth communications from past students. The BRC attempts to build communi- ty through leadership. Activities include representing the college at key universi- ty events, on-campus housing programs, informal faculty-student interactions, personal integrity forums, and commu- nity service. Opportunities afforded to students in the BRC are: 1. Leadership. The BRC student board of directors meets on a weekly basis. In addition to providing insights into recruitment and retention issues, the students also engage in professional development activities. 2. Housing. BRC Theme House is the on-campus residence for 13 first- time freshmen studying business. The residence hall is a true multicul- tural living and learning environment where the students develop lasting relationships while also forming an informal network of information and support. 3. Faculty-Student Interactions. Bowl- ing tournaments provide an opportu- nity for students to interact with fac- ulty members outside the classroom. Hiking trips offer the students the opportunity to understand the geo- graphic, uniqueness of the service region while providing a relaxed atmosphere for one-on-one conversa- tions. Retreats focus on the formation of personal values and academic integrity and provide a forum for for- mer students to share their experi- ences in the business world. Meals together provide the opportunity for additional relaxed conversation and a shared sense of community. 4. Integrity. Open and honest discus- sions are conducted within the group and center around ethics, both per- sonal and professional. 5. Community Service activities. BRC is guided by the principle, "When I begin to give back, I know that I 42 Journal of Education for Business belong." Community service also allows for teambuilding opportunities. 6. Family. Getting to know the families of other students not only helps the students but also has sometimes led to siblings and cousins of past stu- dents enrolling at CSU, Chico. 7. Mentoring. A mentoring program that links the BRC students with incoming freshmen provides the latter with a support system as well as role models. For a residential campus like CSU, Chico the BRC also provides students with a feeling of having a home away from home. This helps foster a sense of belonging in the students. Having a physical infrastructure—a big room with sofas and six desktop computers— allows for a place where the students of color can mingle with White students who are also members of the BRC. Outcome The major metrics for the success of this model have been in the recruitment and retention rates. According to CSU, Chico records, the college of business enrollment of African Americans increased from 22 to 58, a 164% increase from Fall 1997 to Fall 2005. Hispanic students increased from 138 to 230 (67% increase), and Pacific Islander enrollment grew from 12 to 31 (158% increase). Overall, the number of stu- dents of color has almost doubled in the last 8 years, going from 265 to 481 (82% increase). During the same period the non-Hispanic White student popula- tion increased from 1216 to 1667, a 37% change. The retention rate for African American and Hispanic first time freshman students has also been well above the university averages. Over the five semester period (Fall 2003 to the end of Fall 2005), of the 25 African American and Hispanics first- time freshman that had enrolled in the college of business, 20 were still enrolled at the university, giving a reten- tion rate of 80%. The comparable num- ber for the 1,970 total freshmen at the university entering Fall 2003 was 70%. Similarly, for those starting Fall 2004 the university's retention rate at the end of one year was 85% while it was 90% (52 of 58) for the African American and Hispanic freshmen. At the end of the third semester 81% were still enrolled, but comparable data for the university is not available. The high retention rate for African American and Hispanic stu- dents is particularly significant because many of these students are considered at risk and traditionally have had higher dropout rates than have other students. Successful graduates have found placement with numerous prominent companies (e.g.. Chevron Texaco, Hewlett-Packard, Pepsi Bottling Group, and Walgreens). One of the first gradu- ates of the BRC at CSU, Chico became a staff advisor in the college of business undergraduate advising office and a member of the BRC board and is now the director of the BRC. The campus has now adopted the BRC as a bench- mark program for the rest of the cam- pus. Thus, whether examined quantita- tively or qualitatively, the program has been successful in achieving its goals. Conclusion In order to prepare business students for the workplace of tomorrow, it is essential for the entire student body to be exposed to a diversity of ideas and people. The AACSB recognizes that importance and requires evidence of diversity for accreditation reviews. Some schools have difficulty in attract- ing and retaining a diverse student body. The successful experiment described in this study relates to recruiting and retaining students from underrepresented groups and provides a model for others. The primary focus of our effort is in providing a framework (recruitment, retention, and relationships) that can facilitate the integration of the select students into the larger learning com- munity. In the process students develop a work ethic and a sense of community. This sense of community helps engen- der a sense of belonging that prevents the at-risk students from dropping out, a problem that used to be a substantial concern in the past. The program also helps generate a reputation that helps attract future students. NOTE Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Shekhar Misra, Professor of Mar- keting, College of Business, California State Uni- versity, Chico, CA 95929. E-mail: sniisra@csuchico.edu REFERENCES American Association of Advertising Agencies (AAAA). (2004, September 22). AAAA launches initiative to increase diversity repre- sentation in advertising industry. Retrieved August 23, 2006, from http://www.hispanic business.com/news/newsbyid.asp?id=18198 Association to Advance Collegiate Schools of Busi- ness (AACSB). (2004). Eligibility Procedures and Accreditation Standards for Business Accreditation (Rev. ed.). St. Louis, MO: Author. Bruffee, K. A. (1993). Collaborative learning: Higher education, interdependence, and the authority ofhmwledge. Baltimore: Johns Hop- kins University Press. Chappell, L. (2004, September 9). New U. Wis- consin program 'amping' up minority gradua- tion rates. The Daily Cardinal, p. I. Gilroy, M. (2003). Where are minorities in busi- ness? Education Digest, 68{5), 46-51. Golden, D. (2003, December 30). Not black and white: Colleges cut back minority programs after court rulings. The Wall Street Journal, p. A-1. Judkins B. M., & LaHurd, R. (1999). Building community from diversity. American Behav- ioral Scientist, 42(5), 786-799. Miles, M. P, Hazeldine, M. R, & Munilla, L. S. (2004). The 2003 AACSB accreditation stan- dards and implications for business faculty: A short note. Journal of Education for Business, 78, 29-34. Rooney, M. (2002, September 20). Report on Latino students notes high enrollment rates, lower graduation rates. The Chronicle of High- er Education, p. 36. Schmidt, P (1997, September 12). Supreme Court refuses to stay Proposition 209. The Chronicle of Higher Education, p. A42. Schuman, J. (2005, September 2). First-genera- tion college students face a steep climb in acad- eme. The Chronicle of Higher Education, p. 7. September/October 2006 43 
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work_7ouiazroynfdxd6pqliitqpk5i	----	preprint.PDF Pr e- Pu bli ca tio n D ra ft 1 The Psychology of Sexual Prejudice Gregory M. Herek University of California, Davis Current Directions in Psychological Science, in press (1999) Abstract1 Sexual prejudice refers to negative attitudes toward an individual because of her or his sexual orientation. In this article, it is used to characterize heterosexuals’ negative attitudes toward (a) homosexual behavior; (b) people with a homosexual or bisexual orientation; and (c) communities of gay, lesbian, and bisexual people. Sexual prejudice is a preferable term to homophobia because it conveys no assumptions about the motivations underlying negative attitudes, locates the study of attitudes concerning sexual orientation within the broader context of social psychological research on prejudice, and avoids value judgments about such attitudes. Sexual prejudice remains widespread in the United States, although moral condemnation has decreased in the 1990s and opposition to antigay discrimination has increased. The article reviews current knowledge about the prevalence of sexual prejudice, its psychological correlates, its underlying motivations, and its relationship to hate crimes and other antigay behaviors. In a six-month period beginning late in 1998, Americans were shocked by the brutal murders of Matthew Shepard and Billy Jack Gaither. Shepard, a 21-year old Wyoming college student, and Gaither, a 39-year old factory worker in 1 Address correspondence to Gregory Herek, Department of Psychology, University of California, Davis, CA 95616-8775. Preparation of this paper was supported in part by an Independent Scientist Award from the National Institute of Mental Health (K02 MH01455). Alabama, had little in common except that each was targeted for attack because he was gay. Unfortunately, their slayings were not isolated events. Lesbians, gay men, and bisexual people — as well as heterosexuals perceived to be gay — routinely experience violence, discrimination, and personal rejection. A total of 1,102 hate crimes based on sexual orientation were tallied by law enforcement authorities in 1997. Because a substantial proportion of such crimes are never reported to police, that figure represents only the tip of an iceberg (Herek, Gillis, & Cogan, 1999). People with homosexual or bisexual orientations have long been stigmatized. With the rise of the gay political movement in the late 1960s, however, homosexuality’s condemnation as immoral, criminal, and sick came under increasing scrutiny. When the American Psychiatric Association dropped homosexuality as a psychiatric diagnosis in 1973, the question of why some heterosexuals harbor strongly negative attitudes toward homosexuals began to receive serious scientific consideration. Society’s rethinking of sexual orientation was crystallized in the term homophobia , which heterosexual psychologist George Weinberg coined in the late 1960s. The word first appeared in print in 1969 and was subsequently discussed at length in a popular book (Weinberg, 1972).2 Around the same time, heterosexism began to be used as a term analogous to sexism and racism, describing an ideological system that casts homosexuality as inferior to 2Although Weinberg coined the term homophobia, it was first used in print in 1969 by Jack Nichols and Lige Clarke in their May 23rd column in Screw magazine. Personal communications with George Weinberg (October 30, 1998) and Jack Nichols (November 5, 1998). Pr e- Pu bli ca tio n D ra ft 2 heterosexuality.3 Although usage of the two words has not been uniform, homophobia has typically been employed to describe individual antigay attitudes and behaviors whereas heterosexism has referred to societal-level ideologies and patterns of institutionalized oppression of non-heterosexual people. By drawing popular and scientific attention to antigay hostility, the creation of these terms marked a watershed. Of the two, homophobia is probably more widely used and more often criticized. Its critics note that homophobia implicitly suggests that antigay attitudes are best understood as an irrational fear and that they represent a form of individual psychopathology rather than a socially reinforced prejudice. As antigay attitudes have become increasingly central to conservative political and religious ideologies since the 1980s, these limitations have become more problematic. Yet, heterosexism, with its historic macro-level focus on cultural ideologies rather than individual attitudes, is not a satisfactory replacement for homophobia. Thus, scientific analysis of the psychology of antigay attitudes will be facilitated by a new term. I offer sexual prejudice for this purpose. Broadly conceived, sexual prejudice refers to all negative attitudes based on sexual orientation, whether the target is homosexual, bisexual, or heterosexual. Given the current social organization of sexuality, however, such prejudice is almost always directed at people who engage in homosexual behavior or label themselves gay, lesbian, or bisexual. Thus, as used here, sexual prejudice encompasses heterosexuals’ negative attitudes toward (a) homosexual behavior; (b) people with a homosexual or bisexual orientation; and (c) communities of gay, lesbian, and bisexual people. Like other types of prejudice, sexual prejudice 3Heterosexism was used as early as July 10, 1972, in two separate letters printed in the Great Speckled Bird, an alternative newspaper published in Atlanta, Georgia. I thank Joanne Despres of the Merriam Webster Company for her kind assistance with researching the origins of this word. has three principal features: It is an attitude (i.e., an evaluation or judgment); it is directed at a social group and its members; and it is negative, involving hostility or dislike. Conceptualizing heterosexuals’ negative attitudes toward homosexuality and bisexuality as sexual prejudice — rather than homophobia — has several advantages. First, sexual prejudice is a descriptive term. Unlike homophobia, it conveys no a priori assumptions about the origins, dynamics, and underlying motivations of antigay attitudes. Second, the term explicitly links the study of antigay hostility with the rich tradition of social psychological research on prejudice. Third, using the construct of sexual prejudice does not require value judgments that antigay attitudes are inherently irrational or evil. PREVALENCE Most adults in the United States hold negative attitudes toward homosexual behavior, regarding it as wrong and unnatural (Herek & Capitanio, 1996; Yang, 1997). Nevertheless, poll data show that attitudes have become more favorable over the past three decades. For example, whereas at least two-thirds of respondents to the General Social Survey (GSS) considered homosexual behavior “always wrong” in the 1970s and 1980s, that figure declined noticeably in the 1990s. By 1996, only 56% of GSS respondents regarded it as always wrong (Yang, 1997). Much of the public also holds negative attitudes toward individuals who are homosexual. In a 1992 national survey, more than half of the heterosexual respondents expressed disgust for lesbians and gay men (Herek, 1994). Respondents to the ongoing American National Election Studies have typically rated lesbians and gay men among the lowest of all groups on a 101-point feeling thermometer, although mean scores increased by approximately 10 points between 1984 and 1996 (Yang, 1997). Despite these examples of negative attitudes, most Americans believe that a gay person should not be denied employment or basic civil liberties. The public is reluctant to treat homosexuality on a par with heterosexuality, however. Although most Americans favor giving same-sex domestic Pr e- Pu bli ca tio n D ra ft 3 partners limited recognition (e.g., employee health benefits, hospital visitation rights), they generally oppose legalizing same-sex marriages. Whereas the public generally supports the employment rights of gay teachers, they do not believe that lesbians and gay men should be able to adopt children (Yang, 1997). Unfortunately, most studies have not separately assessed attitudes toward lesbians and gay men. To the extent that data are available, attitudes toward gay men appear to be more negative than attitudes toward lesbians, especially among heterosexual men (Herek & Capitanio, 1996; Kite & Whitley, 1998). This pattern may reflect differences in the underlying cognitive organization of attitudes toward gay men and lesbians (Herek & Capitanio, 1999). CORRELATES Laboratory and questionnaire studies have utilized a variety of scales and outcome measures to assess heterosexuals’ attitudes toward gay men and lesbians (e.g., Davis, Yarber, Bauserman, Schreer, & Davis, 1998). Consistent with findings from public opinion surveys, they have revealed higher levels of sexual prejudice among individuals who are older, less educated, living in the U.S. South or Midwest, and rural residents (Herek, 1994). The previously noted sex difference in sexual prejudice occurs not only in the area of personal acceptance (Herek & Capitanio, 1999; Kite & Whitley, 1998) but also in attitudes concerning civil rights and social policy (Yang, 1998). Sexual prejudice is also reliably correlated with several psychological and social variables. Heterosexuals with high levels of sexual prejudice tend to score higher than others on authoritarianism (Altemeyer, 1996; Haddock & Zanna, 1998). In addition, heterosexuals who identify with a fundamentalist religious denomination and frequently attend religious services typically manifest higher levels of sexual prejudice than do the nonreligious and members of liberal denominations (Herek & Capitanio, 1996). Since the 1980s, political ideology and party affiliation have also come to be strongly associated with sexual prejudice, with conservatives and Republicans expressing the highest levels (Yang, 1998). Sexual prejudice is strongly related to whether or not a heterosexual knows gay people personally. The lowest levels of prejudice are manifested by heterosexuals with gay friends or family members who describe their relationships with those individuals as close and report having directly discussed the gay or lesbian person’s sexual orientation with him or her. Interpersonal contact and prejudice are reciprocally related. Not only are heterosexuals with gay friends or relatives less prejudiced, but heterosexuals from demographic groups with low levels of sexual prejudice (e.g., women, highly educated people) are more likely to experience personal contact with an openly gay person (Herek & Capitanio, 1996). Relatively little empirical research has examined racial and ethnic differences. Sexual prejudice may be somewhat greater among heterosexual African Americans than among Whites, mainly because of White women’s relatively favorable attitudes toward lesbians and gay men. The correlates of sexual prejudice may vary by race and ethnicity. Interpersonal contact experiences may be more important in shaping the attitudes of Whites than of Blacks, for example, whereas the belief that homosexuality is a choice may be a more influential predictor of heterosexual Blacks’ sexual prejudice (Herek & Capitanio, 1995). UNDERLYING MOTIVATIONS As with other forms of prejudice, sexual prejudice has multiple motivations. For some heterosexuals, it results from unpleasant interactions with gay individuals, which are then generalized to attitudes toward the entire group. This explanation probably applies mainly to cases in which interpersonal contact has been superficial and minimal. For others, sexual prejudice is rooted in fears associated with homosexuality, perhaps reflecting discomfort with one’s own sexual impulses or gender conformity. For still others, sexual prejudice reflects influences of in-group norms that are hostile to homosexual and bisexual people. Yet Pr e- Pu bli ca tio n D ra ft 4 another source of prejudice is the perception that gay people and the gay community represent values that are directly in conflict with one’s personal value system. These different motivations can be understood as deriving from the psychological functions that sexual prejudice serves, which vary from one individual to another. One heterosexual’s sexual prejudice, for example, may reduce anxiety associated with his fears about sexuality and gender, whereas another’s prejudice might reinforce a positive sense of herself as a member of the social group “good Christians.” Such attitudes are functional only when they are consistent with cultural and situational cues, for example, when homosexuality is defined as inconsistent with a masculine identity or when a religious congregation defines hostility to homosexuality as a criterion for being a good Christian (Herek, 1987). PREJUDICE AND BEHAVIOR Hate crimes and discrimination are inevitably influenced by complex situational factors (Franklin, 1998). Nevertheless, sexual prejudice contributes to antigay behaviors. In experimental studies, sexual prejudice is correlated with antigay behaviors, although other factors often moderate this relationship (Haddock & Zanna, 1998; Kite & Whitley, 1998). Voting patterns on gay-related ballot measures have been generally consistent with the demographic correlates of sexual prejudice described above (Strand, 1998). Recognizing the complex relationship between sexual prejudice and antigay behavior further underscores the value of anchoring this phenomenon in the scientific literature on prejudice, which offers multiple models for understanding the links between attitudes and behavior. CONCLUSION AND DIRECTIONS FOR RESEARCH Although more than a quarter century has passed since George Weinberg first presented a scholarly discussion of the psychology of homophobia, empirical research on sexual prejudice is still in its early stages. To date, the prevalence and correlates of sexual prejudice have received the most attention. Relatively little research has been devoted as yet to understanding the dynamic cognitive processes associated with antigay attitudes and stereotypes, that is, how heterosexuals think about lesbians and gay men. Nor has extensive systematic inquiry been devoted to the underlying motivations for sexual prejudice or the effectiveness of different interventions for reducing sexual prejudice. These represent promising areas for future research. In addition, descriptive studies of sexual prejudice are needed within different subsets of the population, including ethnic and age groups. Given the tendency for antigay behaviors to be perpetrated by adolescents and young adults, studies are especially needed of the development of sexual prejudice early in the life span. Finally, study is needed of commonalities and convergences in the psychology of sexual prejudice according to whether the target is men or women, homosexuals or bisexuals. Much of the empirical research in this area to date has been limited because it focused (implicitly or explicitly) on heterosexuals’ attitudes toward gay men. Stigma based on sexual orientation has been commonplace throughout the twentieth century. Conceptualizing such hostility as sexual prejudice represents a step toward achieving a scientific understanding of its origins, dynamics, and functions. Perhaps most important, such an understanding may help to prevent the behavioral expression of sexual prejudice through violence, discrimination, and harassment. References Altemeyer, B. (1996). The authoritarian specter. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Davis, C.M., Yarber, W.L., Bauserman, R., Schreer, G., & Davis, S.L. (Eds.). (1998). Handbook of sexuality-related measures. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Franklin, K. (1998). Unassuming motivations: Contextualizing the narratives of antigay assailants. In G. M. Herek (Ed.), Stigma and sexual orientation (pp. Pr e- Pu bli ca tio n D ra ft 5 1-23). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Haddock, G., & Zanna, M. (1998). Authoritarianism values, and the favorability and structure of antigay attitudes. In G. M. Herek (Ed.), Stigma and sexual orientation (pp. 82-107). Newbury Park, CA: Sage. Herek, G. M. (1987). Can functions be measured? A new perspective on the functional approach to attitudes. Social Psychology Quarterly, 50, 285-303. Herek, G. M. (1994). Assessing attitudes toward lesbians and gay men: A review of empirical research with the ATLG scale. In B. Greene, & G. M. Herek (Eds.), Lesbian and gay psychology (pp. 206-228). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Herek, G. M., & Capitanio, J. (1995). Black heterosexuals’ attitudes toward lesbians and gay men in the United States. Journal of Sex Research, 32, 95- 105. Herek, G. M., & Capitanio, J. (1996). “Some of my best friends”: Intergroup contact, concealable stigma, and heterosexuals’ attitudes toward gay men and lesbians. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 22, 412-424. Herek, G. M., & Capitanio, J. P. (1999). Sex differences in how heterosexuals think about lesbians and gay men: Evidence from survey context effects. Journal of Sex Research, in press. Herek, G. M., Gillis, J., & Cogan, J. (1999). Psychological sequelae of hate crime victimization among lesbian, gay, and bisexual adults. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, in press. Kite, M. E., & Whitley, B. E., Jr. (1998). Do heterosexual women and men differ in their attitudes toward homosexuality? A conceptual and methodological analysis. In G. M. Herek (Ed.), Stigma and sexual orientation (pp. 39-61). Newbury Park, CA: Sage. Strand, D. (1998). Civil liberties, civil rights, and stigma: Voter attitudes and behavior in the politics of homosexuality. In G. M. Herek (Ed.), Stigma and sexual orientation (pp. 108-137). Newbury Park, CA: Sage. Weinberg, G. (1972). Society and the healthy homosexual. New York: St. Martin’s. Yang, A. (1997). Trends: Attitudes toward homosexuality. Public Opinion Quarterly, 61, 477- 507. Yang, A. (1998). From wrongs to rights: Public opinion on gay and lesbian Americans moves toward equality. Washington, DC: National Gay and Lesbian Task Force Policy Institute. Recommended Readings Herek, G.M. (Ed.).(1998). Stigma and sexual orientation: Understanding prejudice against lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals. Newbury Park, CA: Sage. Herek, G. M., & Berrill, K. (Eds.) (1992). Hate crimes: Confronting violence against lesbians and gay men. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Herek, G. M., Kimmel, D. C., Amaro, H., & Melton, G. B. (1991). Avoiding heterosexist bias in psychological research. American Psychologist, 46, 957-963. Herman, D. (1997). The antigay agenda: Orthodox vision and the Christian Right. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Rothblum, E., & Bond, L. (Eds.).(1996). Preventing heterosexism and homophobia. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Pr e- Pu bli ca tio n D ra ft 6 
work_7po3534zgjfq5fc6b74jop6w7q	----	Untitled Kent Academic Repository Full text document (pdf) Copyright & reuse Content in the Kent Academic Repository is made available for research purposes. Unless otherwise stated all content is protected by copyright and in the absence of an open licence (eg Creative Commons), permissions for further reuse of content should be sought from the publisher, author or other copyright holder. Versions of research The version in the Kent Academic Repository may differ from the final published version. Users are advised to check http://kar.kent.ac.uk for the status of the paper. Users should always cite the published version of record. Enquiries For any further enquiries regarding the licence status of this document, please contact: researchsupport@kent.ac.uk If you believe this document infringes copyright then please contact the KAR admin team with the take-down information provided at http://kar.kent.ac.uk/contact.html Citation for published version McCarthy, Michelle (2017) What kind of abuse is him spitting in my food?: Reflections on the similarities between disability hate crime, so-called ‘mate’ crime and domestic violence against women with intellectual disabilities. Disability and Society, 32 (4). pp. 595-600. ISSN 0968-7599. DOI https://doi.org/10.1080/09687599.2017.1301854 Link to record in KAR https://kar.kent.ac.uk/61088/ Document Version Author's Accepted Manuscript Wｴ;デ ﾆｷﾐS ﾗa ;H┌ゲW ｷゲ ｴｷﾏ ゲヮｷデデｷﾐｪ ｷﾐ ﾏ┞ aﾗﾗSいげぎ ‘WaﾉWIデｷﾗﾐゲ ﾗﾐ デｴW similarities between disability hate crime, so-I;ﾉﾉWS けﾏ;デWげ IヴｷﾏW ;ﾐS domestic violence against women with intellectual disabilities Dr. Michelle McCarthy, The Tizard Centre, University of Kent. Paper received 21/12/2016; Final version accepted 24/02/17 Abstract Domestic violence against women with learning disabilities is a wholly under-researched topic. A recent study indicated that there are strong parallels between domestic violence, disability hate IヴｷﾏW ;ﾐS けﾏ;デWげ IヴｷﾏWく Tｴｷゲ ヮ;ヮWヴ W┝ヮﾉﾗヴWゲ デｴWゲW ゲｷﾏｷﾉ;ヴｷデｷWゲ ;ﾐS ;ヴｪ┌Wゲ デｴ;デ ヴ;デｴWヴ デｴ;ﾐ デヴW;デｷﾐｪ them as discrete phenomena, we need to make the connections and re-affirm the commitment that feminist scholars and activists made long ago, namely to take violence committed in private as seriously as that committed in public. Keywords: intellectual disability; domestic violence, mate crime, hate crime Women with intellectual disabilities have historically been almost entirely overlooked in the vast amount of research which has been conducted on domestic violence since the 1970s . Where Sｷゲ;HﾉWS ┘ﾗﾏWﾐげゲ W┝ヮWヴｷWﾐIWゲ ｴ;┗W HWWﾐ ヴWIﾗｪﾐｷゲWS ;ﾐS SﾗI┌ﾏWﾐデWSが デｴｷゲ ｴ;ゲ デWﾐSWS デﾗ ｷﾐIﾉ┌SW only those with physical and sensory impairments (Thiara et al 2012). It was this exclusion of the experiences of women with intellectual disabilities which motivated my recent research. My colleagues and I conducted in depth interviews with 15 women in London and the South East of England. We used a broad definition of intellectual disability to encompass women who self- identified as having one, who had been given that label by professionals, had ever been in receipt of a specialist service and/or who had attended a special school. Ours was a purposive sample of women with mild and moderate intellectual disabilities who had had recent experience of domestic violence. All the women had left the violent relationships, as we were not granted ethical approval to include those still with violent partners. Female research workers were recruited who had experience both of supporting people with intellectual disabilities and of domestic violence. The interviews with the women were lengthy, enabling them to talk in detail about the domestic violence they had experienced. Details of the findings can be found elsewhere (McCarthy, Hunt and Milne-Skillman 2017). A small number of other studies have also documented the domestic violence experiences of women with intellectual disabilities, both in the UK and internationally. Walter Brice et al (2012) found that the five women in their study had experienced multiple forms of abuse from their partners, much of it severe, including the use of weapons; that the abuse, harassment and threats continued after the end of the relationship and that responses from Police and Social Services were minimal and the women were left unprotected (although children were removed from their mothers). Pestka and Wendt (2014) also conducted a small qualitative study interviewing 5 women with intellectual disabilities. They found that the women had all experienced rejection in their childhoods and sought a sense of belonging in adult intimate relationships, even if they were abusive. Most recently, Douglas and Hurpur (2016) interviewing 6 women with intellectual disabilities, found that financial abuse and physical violence were Iﾗﾏﾏﾗﾐ さﾗaデWﾐ デﾗ ; ﾉW┗Wﾉ ヴWケ┌ｷヴｷﾐｪ ｴﾗゲヮｷデ;ﾉｷゲ;デｷﾗﾐざ (p.310). During our research, I was struck by many similarities in the experiences of women with intellectual disabilities who were on the receiving end of violence and abuse from intimate partners and the experiences of the many people with intellectual disabilities who have experienced either hate crime, or けﾏ;デWげ crime (Gravell 2012, Landman 2014.) Whilst there is no statutory definition of mate crime in UK law, the term is commonly understood to refer to the befriending of people, who are perceived by perpetrators to be vulnerable, for the purposes of taking advantage of, exploiting and/or abusing them. Despite the similarities between mate crime and domestic violence involving women with intellectual disabilities, the responses to the women by the professionals who support them and by society at large, can be quite different and this article is an attempt to explore how and why this happens. Take the following example: A woman with intellectual disabilities is living in her own home and a man moves in next door and starts to harass and abuse her, verbally, physically, sexually. An acceptable professional and societal response to that woman is not to say けｷデげs your choice to stay in this situation or move out if you Sﾗﾐげデ ﾉｷﾆW ｷデくげ Tｴ;デ ┘ﾗ┌ﾉS ﾐﾗデ HW reasonable. We would expect the State, in the form of the Police, perhaps social care providers and social housing providers to take action on behalf of the woman and do all they can デﾗ ゲデﾗヮ デｴW ﾏ;ﾐげゲ behaviour, including if necessary, permanently removing him from his home, using the Anti-Social Behaviour Crime and Policing Act 2014 . But consider if that man did not move in next door to the woman, but rather moved in with her in her home, and carried out exactly the same kinds of abuse - it is now seen and treated differently. The woman is expected to sort it out. She can attempt to use the criminal justice system certainly, with all the inherent difficulties associated with that (HMIC 2014), but in many cases she is left with the stark choice of staying and putting up with it, or escaping by leaving her own home. What is the difference between these two scenarios? They involve the same people, the same abuse, just in different buildings. Arguably, the difference is about autonomy. It is a human right to be free to make your own choices, as enshrined in the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. In England and Wales, the Mental Capacity Act 2005 states clearly that it should always be assumed an individual has the capacity to make a decision themselves, unless it is proved otherwise through a capacity assessment. Therefore notions of autonomy are crucial: as an adult, you are considered able to enter into a relationship of your own free will, you are able to make the choice to invite your partner to come and live with you. You do not, on the other hand, exert any autonomy over who moves in next door to you. So, it is clear there is a difference here. But, in reality, there are some problems with this kind of analysis. We found that other people and/or circumstances can and do conspire to make it very difficult or impossible for some women with intellectual disabilities to exert their autonomy. The pattern we discovered in our research was that the (usually non-disabled) man would initiate a relationship with the woman with intellectual disabilities, be pleasant at first, move into her flat at a very early stage in the relationship, then immediately start deploying a range of controlling HWｴ;┗ｷﾗ┌ヴゲが ｷﾐIﾉ┌Sｷﾐｪ ┗ｷﾗﾉWﾐIWが SWゲｷｪﾐWS デﾗ ﾏWWデ ｴｷゲ ﾗ┘ﾐ ﾐWWSゲ ;デ デｴW W┝ヮWﾐゲW ﾗa デｴW ┘ﾗﾏ;ﾐげゲ. The women, reflecting back on their situations, were able to explain how all this could happen so quickly. Firstly, they were railroaded into cementing the relationship very quickly, for instance because of an unplanned pregnancy: さ I was going to leave him, then I aﾗ┌ﾐS ﾗ┌デ I ┘;ゲ ヮヴWｪﾐ;ﾐデく I デｴﾗ┌ｪｴデ けI I;ﾐげデ ﾐﾗ┘げく I デｴﾗ┌ｪｴデ I ┘;ゲ デﾗﾗ ┞ﾗ┌ﾐｪ ぷ;ｪWS ヱヵへくざ It could also happen through manipulation, with the man declaring himself homeless. The second reason why the women found themselves co-habiting very quickly was that they felt they were not well equipped to make good decisions about relationships. This was because, as they themselves described, they ┘WヴW けW;ゲｷﾉ┞ ﾉWSげ ;ﾐS had had troubled background/personal histories: さIa ┞ﾗ┌ Sﾗﾐげデ ゲWW ﾉﾗ┗ｷﾐｪ ヴWﾉ;デｷﾗﾐゲｴｷヮゲ ┘ｴWﾐ ┞ﾗ┌げヴW ｪヴﾗ┘ｷﾐｪ ┌ヮが ┞ﾗ┌げﾉﾉ ｪWデ ﾏWゲゲWS ┌ヮが ﾉｷﾆW I SｷSくざ There was a kind of naivety or lack of awareness of social norms about what is appropriate or acceptableぎ さ I Iﾗ┌ﾉSﾐげデ ゲ;┞ ﾐﾗ ;ゲ ｴW ｴ;S HﾗﾗﾆWS デｴW ヴWｪｷゲデヴ┞ ﾗaaｷIWくざ This difficulty with, or lack of experience and capacity for, making sound judgements about character and situations has been noted in the mate crime literature (Landman 2014) and the literature on sexual grooming and trafficking of girls with intellectual disabilities (Reid 2016). Once the ﾏWﾐ ｴ;S ﾏﾗ┗WS ｷﾐデﾗ デｴW ┘ﾗﾏWﾐげゲ ｴﾗﾏWs (and in our research it was usually this way round), they started very quickly to use domination and controlく Tｴｷゲ ﾏW;ﾐデ デｴW ┘ﾗﾏWﾐげゲ ｴﾗﾏWゲ were no longer their own: さ I ;ﾉ┘;┞ゲ ﾆWヮデ ﾏ┞ ヮﾉ;IW ヴW;ﾉﾉ┞ IﾉW;ﾐ ;ﾐS デｷS┞が H┌デ once he come in, he brought all his stuff to ﾏ┞ ヮﾉ;IW ;ﾐS I ｴ;S デﾗ ﾉｷ┗W ｷﾐ デｴW aヴﾗﾐデ ヴﾗﾗﾏが ゲﾉWWヮｷﾐｪ ﾗﾐ デｴW ゲWデデWWが Iﾗゲ ｴWげS ﾃ┌ﾐﾆWS ┌ヮ ﾏ┞ HWSヴﾗﾗﾏ ┘ｷデｴ H;ｪゲ ﾗa ｴｷゲ ヴ┌HHｷゲｴ ;ﾐS ｷデ ゲﾏWﾉﾉWSざく The parallels with mate crime here are very strong. TｴW ヮｴWﾐﾗﾏWﾐﾗﾐ ﾗa けI┌Iﾆﾗﾗｷﾐｪげ is well understood in mate crime literature as being when a perpetrator takes over the home of a vulnerable person and treats it as their own (Gravell 2012:17). The victims of mate crime often do not perceive what is happening to them as abuse, because of their strong desire for friendship and acceptance. The control that was exerted over the women also fits the classic profile of coercive control as a form of domestic violence (Stark 2009), with the men systematically isolating the women and controlling every aspect of their lives from the mundane (whether they could watch a TV programme) to the very serious (whether they could keep contact with children who had been taken into care). Targetting people because of certain characteristics which render them vulnerable (through age, gender, disability status, etc) is a key definitional feature of hate crime. Gerstenfeld (2013:11) states さ TｴW ゲｷﾏヮﾉWゲデ SWaｷﾐｷデｷﾗﾐ ﾗa ; ｴ;デW IヴｷﾏW ｷゲ デｴｷゲ ぎ; Iヴｷﾏｷﾐ;ﾉ ;Iデ ┘ｴｷIｴ ｷゲ ﾏﾗデｷ┗;デWS ;デ ﾉW;ゲデ ｷﾐ part by デｴW ｪヴﾗ┌ヮ SWaｷﾐｷデｷﾗﾐ ﾗa デｴW ┗ｷIデｷﾏざく YWデ IWヴデ;ｷﾐ IヴｷﾏWゲが ﾐﾗデ;Hﾉ┞ ┗ｷﾗﾉWﾐIW ;ｪ;ｷﾐゲデ ┘ﾗﾏWﾐ ;ﾐS デｴW sexual grooming of young girls by older men, seem not to attract the hate crime label, despite fitting this definition. This may be because of an on-going relationship between victim and perpetrator which does not fit pre-conceived notions of hate crimes being committed by strangers. For example, research in the US found that many police officers did not define a crime as hate crime if there was any kind of pre-existing relationship between the parties (Bell 2002, cited in Sherry 2014) Other parallels with disability hate crime include the levels of what I refer to as sadistic abuse, meaning that it involved levels of humiliation, cruelty, and violence way beyond what might have been deemed necessary to control the women. Acts which seemed to serve no purpose other than humiliation were also confusing for the women who were on the receiving end of them. One woman ｷﾐ ﾗ┌ヴ ゲデ┌S┞ ;ゲﾆWS ┌ゲ さWhat kind of abuse iゲ ｴｷﾏ ゲヮｷデデｷﾐｪ ｷﾐ ﾏ┞ aﾗﾗSいざく Hate crime was also evident in the sheer persistence and determination of the perpetrators to simply never give up on the abuse, even after the women had left the relationship, left her home, left the area. One perpetrator in our study asked for a last visit from his ex- partner as he was dying in a hospice. He was literally on his death bed when he tried to assault her one last time. Just as the victims of disability hate crime will be abused simply for being disabled, so the women with intellectual disabilities in violent relationships found their disability emphasised and ridiculed by their partners: HWげS ゲ;┞ け┞ﾗ┌げヴW ┌ゲWﾉWゲゲが ┞ﾗ┌ I;ﾐげデ Sﾗ ﾐﾗデｴｷﾐｪげくざ The perpetrators in these violent relationships shared another feature with those who commit acts of disability hate crime, namely a bravado, an openness about what they do, seeming to feel they are untouchable and immune from repercussions for their actions (Gravell 2012). In our study, many people knew the women with intellectual disabilities were experiencing domestic violence に police, doctors, nurses, health visitors, social workers, support workers, aゲ ┘Wﾉﾉ ;ゲ デｴW ┘ﾗﾏWﾐげゲ a;ﾏｷﾉ┞ ;ﾐS friends. Yet arrests were uncommon, charges, prosecutions and convictions even more so. It is no wonder that the perpetrators felt immune from repercussions に effectively they were. A frequently quoted statistic suggests that, on average, two women per week are murdered in the UK by their I┌ヴヴWﾐデ ﾗヴ aﾗヴﾏWヴ ｴ┌ゲH;ﾐSゲっヮ;ヴデﾐWヴゲ ふWﾗﾏWﾐげゲ AｷS ヲヰヱ6). We do not know how many, if any, of these women have intellectual disabilities, but it is not fanciful to speculate that there will be some amongst them. Conclusion Feminists have campaigned for decades to have violence against women committed in the private sphere taken as seriously as that committed in the public realm. Many times during my research when the women have talked about what has been done to them, I have found myself thinking けデｴWゲW ﾏWﾐ ゲWWﾏ デﾗ ヴW;ﾉﾉ┞ ｴ;デW デｴW ┘ﾗﾏWﾐげ. Therefore, to conclude, I am arguing that rather than attaching labels (and legislation) ﾗa けｴ;デW IヴｷﾏWげ to certain kinds of acts if they happen in the street, but けSﾗﾏWゲデｷI ┗ｷﾗﾉWﾐIWげ ｷa they happen at home, we need to heighten our awareness of all and any kinds of abuse. In the UK context, this means all those who provide a service to women with intellectual disabilities need to be trained to recognise the indicators of domestic violence, its many forms and dynamics. Professionals, families, friends and supporters need to recognise that when women with mild and moderate intellectual disabilities lack supportive social networks, jobs, interests and activities, then this increases their vulnerability to abuse in both broad and specific ways. Advocacy, self-;S┗ﾗI;I┞が デｴW ゲ┌ヮヮﾗヴデ ﾗa ﾗデｴWヴ ┘ﾗﾏWﾐ デｴヴﾗ┌ｪｴ ┘ﾗﾏWﾐげゲ ｪヴﾗ┌ヮゲ ;ﾐS ;IIWゲゲｷHﾉW ｷﾐaﾗヴﾏ;デｷﾗﾐ ;Hﾗ┌デ デｴW ヮﾗゲｷデｷ┗W ;ﾐS ﾐWｪ;デｷ┗W ;ゲヮWIデゲ ﾗa ヴWﾉ;デｷﾗﾐゲｴｷヮゲ I;ﾐ ;ﾉﾉ ｴWﾉヮ デﾗ ヴWS┌IW ┘ﾗﾏWﾐげゲ vulnerability to exploitation and harm from those who they hoped would love them. REFERENCES Douglas, H. and Hurpur, P. (2016) さIntellectual disabilities, domestic violence and legal engagementざ, Disability and Society, early online at http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09687599.2016.1167673 Gerstenfeld, P. (2013) Hate Crimes: Causes, Controls and Controversies. Los Angeles: Sage. Gravell, C. (2012) Loneliness and Cruelty: People with intellectual disabilities and their experience of harassment, abuse and related crime in the community. London: Lemos and Crane. HMIC ヲヰヱヴ E┗Wヴ┞ﾗﾐWげゲ H┌ゲｷﾐWゲゲぎ Iﾏヮヴﾗ┗ｷﾐｪ デｴW ヮﾗﾉｷIW ヴWゲヮﾗﾐゲW デﾗ SﾗﾏWゲデｷI ;H┌ゲWく A┗;ｷﾉ;HﾉW aヴﾗﾏ https://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmic/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/improving-the-police- response-to-domestic-abuse.pdf (Accessed 2.9.16) L;ﾐSﾏ;ﾐが ‘く ふヲヰヱヴぶがゎさA Iﾗ┌ﾐデWヴaWｷデ aヴｷWﾐSゲｴｷヮざぎ ﾏ;デW IヴｷﾏW ;ﾐS ヮWﾗヮﾉW ┘ｷデｴ intellectual disabilities", The Journal of Adult Protection, 16 (6) pp. 355 に 366. McCarthy, M., Hunt, S. and Milne-Skillman, K. (2017ぶ ゎけI ﾆﾐﾗ┘ ｷデ ┘;ゲ W┗Wヴ┞ ┘WWﾆが H┌デ I I;ﾐげデ HW ゲ┌ヴW ｷa it was every day': domestic violence and women with intellectual disabilities." Journal of Applied Research in Intellectual Disabilities, 30 (2), pp 269-82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09687599.2016.1167673 https://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmic/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/improving-the-police-response-to-domestic-abuse.pdf https://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmic/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/improving-the-police-response-to-domestic-abuse.pdf Pestka, K. and Wendt, S. (2014) さBWﾉﾗﾐｪｷﾐｪぎ ┘ﾗﾏWﾐげゲ ﾉｷ┗ｷﾐｪ ┘ｷデｴ ｷﾐデWﾉﾉWIデ┌;ﾉ Sｷゲ;HｷﾉｷデｷWゲ ;ﾐS experiences of domestic violenceざ, Disability and Society, 29 (7), pp 1031-45. Reid, J. A. (2016). Sex Trafficking of Girls With Intellectual Disabilities An Exploratory Mixed Methods Study. Sexual abuse: a journal of research and treatment, 1-25. Sherry, M. (2014). Exploring disability hate crimes, Review of Disability Studies: An International Journal, 1(1). Stark, E. (2009) Coercive control: The entrapment of women in personal life. Oxford University Press. Thiara,R., Hague, G., Bashall, R., Ellis, B. and Mullender,A. (2012) Disabled Women and Domestic Violence: Responding to the Experiences of Survivors. London: Jessica Kingsley Publishers. Walter-Brice, A. et al (2012) さWhat do women with intellectual disabilities say about their experiences of domestic abuse within the context of their intimate partner relationships?ざ Disability and Society, 27,4, 503-517 WﾗﾏWﾐげゲ AｷS ふヲヰヱンぶ “デ;デｷゲデｷIゲく https://www.womensaid.org.uk/information-support/what-is- domestic-abuse/how-common-is-domestic-abuse/#_edn1 (Accessed 27.8.16) https://www.womensaid.org.uk/information-support/what-is-domestic-abuse/how-common-is-domestic-abuse/#_edn1 https://www.womensaid.org.uk/information-support/what-is-domestic-abuse/how-common-is-domestic-abuse/#_edn1 
work_7pz6yueulfb6jnxvit3mnfz37i	----	NPS_2000035 1..13 SPECIAL ISSUE ARTICLE Global Nationalism in Times of the COVID-19 Pandemic Florian Bieber* Centre for Southeast European Studies, University of Graz *Corresponding author. Email: florian.bieber@uni-graz.at Abstract The article outlines the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on nationalism around the world. Starting from the premise that nationalism is a global and ubiquitous idea in the contemporary world, it explores whether exclusionary tendencies have been reinforced by the pandemic. The pandemic and government responses will not necessarily trigger the increase in exclusionary nationalism that both far-right politicians and observers have noted. However, there are 4 aspects, examined in the article, that might be shaped by the pandemic. These include the recent trajectory of nationalism and its social relevance prior to the pandemic, the rise of authoritarianism as governments suspend or reduce democratic freedoms and civil liberties, the rise of biases against some groups associated with the pandemic, the rise of borders and deglobalization, and the politics of fear. Thus, while the rise of exclusionary nationalism might not be the inevitable consequence of the pandemic, it risks reinforcing preexisting nationalist dynamics. Keywords: Nationalism; pandemic; authoritarianism; disease We are all nationalists now. —Nigel Farage (2020) The global pandemic and the response by governments in most countries has created an emergency felt on a scale like few other events in human history. Even the two World Wars were far from being global, with large parts of the world, from Latin America to most of Sub-Saharan Africa, only marginally affected. The near-simultaneous lockdown of a substantial share of the world’s popu- lation is a unique shared experience. Foremost, it is public health concern for millions, but both the disease itself and the response of governments and societies has deeply shaped and will continue to shape the world. While the pandemic lasts and the human loss, the economic collapse, the closure of borders, and other effects are felt, it is easy to imagine that the post-pandemic world will be fundamentally different than the one that came before. However, change and continuity are always closely intertwined in the transformation of human society. So, while the after will be different, it will be built on the before. As the world seemed to come to a standstill, a number of observers have noted that a global rise of nationalism might be a consequence of the pandemic and states’ responses (Rachman 2020; Tisdall 2020; Harari 2020). From the closure of borders and the difficulty of mobilizing support and solidarity across them, to the fear many people experience, the response appears to make nation- alism more salient as people look to support their own communities. However, the opposite argument could also be made. The shared global experience, and the fact that the “enemy” is not another nation or group but an indiscriminate virus, might promote greater cross-national solidarity and cooperation. The inability to confront the pandemic within the © The Author(s), 2020. Published by Cambridge University Press. This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. Nationalities Papers (2020), 1–13 doi:10.1017/nps.2020.35 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:22, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use. mailto:florian.bieber@uni-graz.at http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://doi.org/10.1017/nps.2020.35 https://www.cambridge.org/core confines of the nation-state underlines the need for cooperation, even if the immediate response has often been otherwise. It is far from clear whether the world will be confronted with what some have called “corona- tionalism” or global solidarity (Ozkirimli 2020). Forcasting the post-pandemic world is both tempting and difficult. Initial responses, as well as the environment of crisis, might prove to be misleading or temporary indicators rather than reliable predictors. However, nationalism has become visible in numerous forms during the pandemic response. Considering the increased importance of exclusionary nationalism in numerous societies and political debates around the world prior to the pandemic, this is no surprise. It thus merits reflection on how both the pandemic itself and the various government responses are likely to shape the role of nationalism in the world. Nationalism has become a central ideology and practice around the world over the past two centuries. It is a central feature of contemporary society, from the structure of the state system into units that commonly define themselves as nation–states, to the potency of national movements to affirm states or challenge them (Malešević 2019). Nationalism is best understood to be a malleable and narrow ideology that values membership in a nation more than belonging to other groups, and it gives preference to political representation by the nation for the nation (Bieber 2020a, 10). In brief, nationalism assumes the dominant political and social importance of the nation and understands the world to be structured in nations, often with the understanding that these are the natural units of social and political organization. It is thus perhaps obvious to assume that the global pandemic will impact this structural feature of the contemporary world. As nationalism is ubiquitous and takes form in a variety of ways, from individual biases and political parties to foreign affairs and government policy, there is no single effect or trajectory that can be mapped with any certainty. In particular, in the middle of the pandemic, it is impossible to give a clear assessment of how the pandemic and government responses will shape nationalism. This contribution is thus cautious and inherently preliminary, a first draft at best. Disasters, Disease, and Nationalism The interplay of pandemics, or even natural disasters more broadly, and nationalism has received little attention in the academic literature. This is no surprise, as there have been few global pandemics since the rise of the modern nation, and research on public health and disease and social and political ideas such as nationalism are rarely interlinked. Ironically, the language of discussing nationalism and pandemics is similar. The notions of spread and contagion, terms borrowed from the realm of diseases, are often applied to the study of nationalism. The link was made explicit by Albert Einstein, who claimed that “nationalism is an infantile disease. It is the measles of mankind,” (1929). Of course, this linguistic link is not necessarily helpful for under- standing the dynamics between the two. The experience of the 1918–20 Spanish flu1 is of limited help. The pandemic began in the last year of World War I and killed between 17 and 100 million people around the world within two years. Its peak during such events as the end of World War I, the Russian revolution, and the breakup of major empires results in it being overshadowed by these events, even if the experience of many ordinary citizens at the time may have been more profoundly shaped by the pandemic. In many ways, the pandemic contributed to the larger trauma of the war and compounded the collapse of the pre-war era, which in Europe was associated with the stability of the Great Power balance and elsewhere with the experience of colonialism. Thus, it is impossible to disentangle the impact of the influenza pandemic on nationalism. As Laura Spinney outlines in her masterful study of the Spanish flu and its consequences, rather than one outcome, it contributed more broadly in shaping the emergence of public healthcare and international institutions, and it impacted local politics across the world: different mortality rates and the impact on important individuals, as well as 2 Florian Bieber Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:22, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use. https://www.cambridge.org/core soldiers and civilians in the last months of the war, shaped both the end of the war and the peace that followed (2017). Disease, like other natural disasters, is first and foremost an exogenous shock to society that can trigger greater cooperation (Kelman 2011), such as the 1999 Greek-Turkish earthquake diplo- macy (Ker-Lindsay 2000). Other cases, such as droughts, can exacerbate tensions and conflict.2 Natural disasters can be understood as critical junctures or moments of uncertainty, often induced by exogenous and indigenous crises. They are critical because the institutional and policy paths that are chosen at such moments are difficult to change in normal circumstances (Capoccia and Kelemen 2007, 341–342). This historical institutionalist argument does not imply historical determinism but distinguishes between moments of greater opportunity for large-scale change and periods where such choices are rare and unusual. Critical junctures do not imply that a radical change is the inevitable outcome but rather that it becomes a greater possibility. Furthermore, such crises do not imply any particular outcome. A pandemic, a natural disaster, a major economic crisis, a war, or a state collapse—each constitutes such a critical juncture (i.e., they are both rare and constitute a major disruption). The concept of critical junctures is commonly employed to understand institutional change but could also be evoked to study larger social transformation. To understand the outcomes that could emerge as a result of the pandemic and societal and state responses to it, and their impact on nationalism, one can consider the following aspects that provide the context and the first effects of the pandemic: (1) the recent trajectory of nationalism and the social relevance of nationalism prior to the pandemic; (2) the interrelationship between authori- tarianism and nationalism and the impact of the pandemic on this linkage; (3) how the pandemic is shaping biases; (4) the (temporary) deglobalization and the closure of borders; and (5) the role of fear. These five dimensions allow for some preliminary considerations of how nationalism is being shaped by the pandemic and responses to it. Recent Trajectory of Nationalism Nationalism is universal to the extent that it is nearly impossible to determine its strength or fluctuation on a global level. It is furthermore empirically difficult to capture, as the concept of nationalism cannot be easily grasped through one idea or definition. Recent years have seen an increase of important political leaders and parties promoting an exclusionary nationalist policy. These are expressed in a variety of forms, such as the “America First” platform of US president Donald Trump, the Vote Leave campaign for Brexit, the success of the Hindu nationalism of Narendra Modi, the nationalism promoted by Benjamin Netanyahu in Israel, and the conservative nationalism of Japanese Prime Minister Shinzō Abe. In addition, populist and far-right parties have been successful in numerous European elections and at times joined ruling coalitions and shaped government policies (Bieber 2018). There is considerable overlap between what I have termed exclusionary nationalism (Bieber 2020a, 15) with the political far right, namely, political parties that seek to establish ethnocracies (i.e., monoethnic states dominated by a specific nation that is usually defined in narrow ethnic terms [Mudde 2019, 64]). Cas Mudde (2019, 50–56) has convincingly argued that the far right has entered the political mainstream after 2001, which in addition to their increase in electoral support contributes essentially to their significance. Exclusionary nationalism can express itself in political organizations, from parties (or parts of parties) to media and civil society. It can also be reflected in widely held attitudes and their public expression. The success of exclusionary nationalist parties and candidates is at times only margin- ally the result of nationalism itself. Instead, such political actors draw on other themes, such as populist strategies, namely, claiming to represent the majority against an alien elite or using corruption and other themes to gain success. However, whether on the way to power or after they assume it, exclusionary nationalists shift the agenda and change the acceptable public discourse. Nationalities Papers 3 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:22, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use. https://www.cambridge.org/core Particularly common themes have been the supposed threat posed by migration and Islam, a discourse that increased in potency, especially in Europe, in the aftermath of the so-called migration crisis. However, anti-migrant and anti-Muslim themes can be found in exclusionary nationalist discourse elsewhere, including Myanmar, India, and the USA. The rise and electoral success of far-right parties and candidates has led to a shift of the public debate, often pursued by these actors (Sharpe 2017; Robertson 2018). Importantly, the rise of the far right and their political mainstreaming has meant that exclusionary nationalist ideas have become more widespread and socially accepted in numerous countries. These discursive and social shifts are more enduring than the policies or rhetoric of any given party or official. Policies and public debates on migration and Islam in most European countries best illustrate how exclusionary nationalist parties and movements have changed the political agenda. This does not mean that this shift is universally shared or permanent. In fact, exclusionary nationalism is highly polarizing and divisive as it is often combined with populism, which denies the legitimacy of alternative political positions. For example, in the USA, the most important policy issues for self-declared Republicans and Republican-leaning independents in January 2020 were terrorism, the economy, and immigration, none of which figured in the top spots for self-declared Democrats or Democratic-leaning independents (Pew Research Centre 2020). Closely linked to the shift in public debate are both state policies and social behavior. Migration policies have become more repressive (Wallace and Young 2018; Chin 2017). Recent years have also seen significant increases in hate crimes and discrimination. The OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe) has been recording such data among its member states, and while the data is not comparable across countries due to different methodologies and context, there is a marked increase in key countries. For example, in Germany and the UK hate crimes reported by the police more than doubled between 2014 and 2018; in other countries like the USA, it increased substantially (OSCE ODIHR 2019).3 The increase appears to be linked to the shift in public discourse and crucial events such the election of Donald Trump in the USA, the Brexit referendum in the UK, and so-called migration crisis in Europe, which all occurred between 2015 and 2016 (Edwards and Rushin 2018; Cuerden and Rogers 2017; Rees et al. 2019). Thus, the COVID pandemic began against a backdrop of strong mainstreamed exclusionary nationalism in key countries around the world, in particular in Europe and North America. The pandemic has overshadowed these earlier issues, but it remains uncertain whether anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim policies and discourse have been permanently eclipsed (i.e., whether they will reemerge after the end of the pandemic emergency). Furthermore, the pandemic may also reinforce some of these anti-immigrant and isolationist policies and positions. Nationalism, Authoritarianism, and the State of Emergency Exclusionary nationalism and authoritarianism often enjoy a symbiotic relationship. Of course, there are political parties and other actors that are nationalist and not authoritarian, and there are autocrats who derive their legitimacy from sources other than nationalism. However, the combi- nation is common, as exclusionary nationalism has strong authoritarian themes, such as the importance of the collective nation over individuals and its exclusionary and Manichean under- standing of politics. For autocrats, nationalism is often a ready-made ideology that does not challenge their rule and can be used to mobilize against challengers. Finally, there has been an increase of authoritarian and populist regimes concurrent with increased nationalism globally. It is thus appropriate to argue that authoritarianism, populism, and exclusionary nationalism have been closely interlinked and often mutually reinforcing (Bonikowski 2017; Jenne 2018). In an early reflection on the impact of the pandemic on global politics, Ivan Krastev noted the return of experts to the forefront of discourse. In brief, populism and authoritarianism have in recent years discredited the importance of experts and relativized the notion of truth. The notorious 4 Florian Bieber Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:22, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use. https://www.cambridge.org/core claim by President Trump’s advisor Kellyanne Conway about “alternative facts” suggested that facts are not established or objective but subject to political claims and counter claims. Krastev noted that “professionalism is back in fashion,” (2020). As nonexpert instructions to ignore the pandemic or rely on herd immunity failed to contain its spread and increased the risk to human life, expertise by professionals has gained ground. When facts are not about the number of attendees at a presidential inauguration but rather the life or death of individuals, including friends and relatives, expertise becomes more important. This shift would also imply that populist and far-right parties would stand to lose from such a dynamic, as it is these parties that have openly questioned the importance of expertise and supported conspiracy theories. In some countries, polling data seems to bear out such trends. For example, in Germany the ruling coalition, and in particular Chancellor Angela Merkel, has gained popularity since the onset of the crisis, while the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) has lost political ground, dropping to around 10 percent of electoral support in late March 2020, its lowest rating in over two years. There is, however, no wider European or global trend. In Italy, where the far-right Lega and Fratelli d’Italia are in opposition, both have been holding steady at more than 40 percent support since 2019. Patterns of decline in electoral support often preceded the coronavirus crisis, as in Austria and Germany (Politico 2020). It is true that during the crisis not only has the importance of expertise increased but also that the classic topics of the far right, such as migration and Islam, have been sidelined. However, it would be simplistic to assume that the pandemic would threaten populism or the far right. While some populists have responded late and erratically to the crisis, such as US President Trump, British Prime Minister Boris Johnson, and Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro, others, including Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netan- yahu and India Prime Minister Narendra Modi, have responded with strong measures. In both cases the responses have been self-serving and framed in the rhetorical style of the incumbent (Mudde 2020). Thus, it would be overly optimistic to assume that the pandemic will shift the focus away from the classical themes of exclusionary nationalists and that a new era of expertise driven politics is likely to emerge. The pandemic has allowed for an unprecedented restriction of civil liberties and freedoms across the world, in both established democracies as well as in authoritarian regimes. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has used the crisis to increase the extent of his political control by sidelining parliament and ruling by decree (Hopkins and Hall 2020). Emergency politics are a central theme of authoritarian rule. Emergencies have given autocratic leaders the opportunity to destroy or suspend democratic institutions and their checks and balances. The most prominent historical example is the Reichstag fire in February 1933. Occurring during the early weeks of Nazi rule, it allowed the government led by Adolf Hitler to pass the sweeping Enabling Act (Ermächtigungsgesetz) that provided the basis for his unchecked rule. Emergencies are often moments when the executive gains power, and due process is suspended (Snyder 2017). This leads to what Johnathan White has called “emergency politics, in which actions departing from conventional practice are rationalised as necessary responses to exceptional and urgent threats” (2015, 300; italics in the original). There is little doubt that the threat of the pandemic justified measures such as postponing elections (i.e., the Democratic primaries in the USA, parliamentary elections in Serbia and North Macedonia), the assembly of large groups of people, and the closure of some institutions. However, the risk from such derogations is twofold. First, the measures have to be proportional to the desired goal, and the judgment of proportionality can be difficult in vibrant democracies, not to mention weaker democracies and competitive authoritarian regimes. Second, autocrats can seize this opportunity to increase their control and dismantle checks and balances (Bieber 2020b). While authoritarianism could thrive due to the global pandemic, nationalism need not follow the same trajectory. In fact, populists and autocrats might shift from the threat of migrants, terrorism, or Islam toward using the pandemic as the primary device to justify illiberal and undemocratic policies. However, such a disassociation might be temporary. Parties and governments that built Nationalities Papers 5 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:22, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use. https://www.cambridge.org/core their electoral success on such items are likely to maintain exclusionary nationalism as part of their platform and addend it with new themes. Furthermore, the pandemic will not provide an unlimited legitimation for a state of emergency. To continue with emergency powers, whether de facto or de jure, other sources of legitimacy might be needed. As discussed in the next section, some populists and autocrats have blamed minorities or migrants and other so-called outsiders, creating a link between the disease and specific population groups. For example, in Hungary, Viktor Orbán blamed the opposition for the spread of the virus after it opposed a sweeping emergency bill, showing how the pandemic can easily be politically weaponized. Disease, Nationalism, and Bias: The “Kung Flu” An iconic image of the global pandemic was a close-up of the daily press briefing of US president Donald Trump, captured by Washington Post photographer Jabin Botsford, that showed the statement to be read by the president with only the word Corona crossed out and replaced with Chinese (CNN 2020). The Trump administration has adopted the term Chinese virus to link the pandemic to China and also externalize responsibility for the spread. The president and high- ranking officials have defended the use of the term (Rogers, Jakes, and Swanson 2020). Since the spread of COVID-19, there have been reports of increased racism and discrimination directed against individuals of Chinese origin or those who are assumed to be Chinese in the United States and beyond. Just within two weeks (March 19–April 1, 2020), an online reporting tool in the USA recorded 1,135 cases of COVID-19-related discrimination. Most cases involved verbal assault; others report being denied services, including transport, and being spat on and physically assaulted, usually with direct or indirect reference to COVID-19 (Jeung 2020). While anti-Chinese and anti- Asian bias has been particularly pronounced in the USA, facilitated by the discursive link made by President Trump, it has been noted elsewhere, including Europe and Australia (Escobar 2020; FRA 2020). This feeds into existing anti-Chinese and anti-Asian bias that has a long historical record. It has been fueled recently by the rise of China as a global actor and the increasing rivalry between China, the EU, and the USA. The implicit and explicit link between COVID-19 and the Other has not just been directed against Chinese or Asians; other groups have been blamed for spreading the disease (OHCHR 2020). Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orbán claimed that the spread of the virus was linked to immigration, a central theme of his rhetoric since 2014. Without providing any evidence of the link, which appeared implausible, his government closed down the already highly restrictive asylum system (Inotai 2020). In the USA, the emergency rules to combat the pandemic have empowered the Department of Homeland Security to return illegal and undocumented migrants to their countries of origin without due process (Castellanos-Jankiewicz 2020). In India, officials of the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party likened Muslims to suicide bombers for protesting against the new citizenship law, as the government ordered a lock down and the ruling party and media have singled out Muslims as “supercarriers” (Daragahi 2020; Kazmin, White, and Palma 2020). Far-right parties in Europe, such as the Alternative for Germany (AfD) and the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ), have also linked the pandemic to the supposed threat of migration or have demanded repressive measures specifically aimed at migrants (Jansen 2020). In Central Europe, Roma became targets of discrimination, being blamed for spreading the disease (FRA 2020). There is a long-established pattern of linking minorities, racial groups, and specific communities to disease. Exclusionary nationalism and racism often equate specific groups with diseases them- selves. A prominent example is the anti-semitic discourse in Nazi Germany, which likened Jews to a disease effecting the body of the German nation. These notions of disease not only dehumanized people belonging to particular groups but also allowed for the promotion of an organic under- standing of the nation that equated nations with living bodies. Considering people as parasites or diseases played a crucial role in normalizing their nonhuman status and justifying their murder. 6 Florian Bieber Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:22, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use. https://www.cambridge.org/core Furthermore, minorities and other marginalized groups have often been described as carriers of disease, with their marginalization justified through the lens of public hygiene and controlling the spread of disease. In the Nazi Propaganda film Der Ewige Jude (The Eternal Jew, 1940), for example, Jews are compared to rats as carriers of the plague (Friedman and Koch 1989). From the 1892 cholera outbreak to HIV/AIDS and Ebola, minorities and vulnerable communities are easily made scapegoats for pandemics and epidemics (Bartholomew 2020). Blaming migrants or minorities for disease is well-established and risks remaining a strong line of discourse even if the pandemic itself recedes. These links are also activated as implicit biases. A 2009 study during the swine flu epidemic suggested that those who had been vaccinated expressed fewer negative views about migration, as “their sense of vulnerability to disease was tied to unacknowledged fears about infected immigrants” (Eberhardt 2019). Such findings would suggest that the traumatic experience of the pandemic might have a long-term impact on implicit biases towards migrants. At times, the response to the pandemic has resulted in disadvantaging marginalized groups and asserting the dominance of the majority. There are banal examples, from not providing warnings and guidelines in minority languages, to the case of Denmark, where naturalization was temporarily stopped with the outbreak of the pandemic, as the naturalization law requires a handshake with the official granting citizenship. The 2019 law sought to force migrants who for religious reasons reject handshakes to do so. Thus, the assimilationist law resulted in a de facto full suspension of naturalization, as social distancing rules did not permit handshakes (Strittmatter 2020). Even without an explicit link between the pandemic and vulnerable groups, government responses can deliberately or inadvertently lead to discrimination and reinforce exclusion.4 Deglobalization and Old Borders One immediate impact has been the rise of what has been called “medical nationalism” (Youde 2020), the strong support for national medical priorities, irrespective of the potential external costs or effects. Due to shortages and domestic worries, the first response of numerous governments is to reduce international cooperation. While some of the early reports of the scramble for medical supplies have overstated the antagonistic and adversarial dimension, they nevertheless shape public perceptions. Member state restrictions on the export of medical supplies constituted an early problem within the EU, undermining the common market and jeopardizing the notion of solidarity in the bloc. One of the first measures of the EU in light of the global crisis was to establish Union-wide rules requiring permits for the export of medical supplies in short supply. This effectively Europeanized the restrictions and reestablished intra-EU cooperation (Bayer et al. 2020). However, elsewhere, where such structures do not exist, the rigidity of national borders became more apparent. Beyond medical supplies and the reemergence of borders, the EU has been shaken by the national responses to the pandemic. Lacking competences in the field of public health, the EU had been institutionally ill equipped to respond. In particular, in countries strongly affected by the pandemic, such as Italy, the slow and halting response from other EU member states undermined their confidence in European solidarity. Such trends have been exploited by Eurosceptic parties, such as the far-right Lega in Italy, and reinforced the north-south divide in the EU dating back to the Eurozone crisis between 2010–2012 (Johnson, Fleming, and Chazan 2020). Far-right and populist politicians from around the world have made temporary border closures in response to the pandemic, claiming vindication for their longstanding emphasis on closing borders. Most prominently, US president Donald Trump tweeted on March 23, “THIS IS WHY WE NEED BORDERS!” (Trump 2020). Laura Huhtasaari, a Member of the European Parliament of the far-right Finns Party, noted that that “the need for borders is being vindicated by the pandemic” (Kirschbaum, King, and and Bernhard 2020). Nationalities Papers 7 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:22, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use. https://www.cambridge.org/core While far-right parties and political figures may be tempted to see their worldview vindicated by the global lock down, the link is not as straightforward. First, the closures are temporary. Even if they last longer than originally anticipated, they are neither intended nor could they realistically become permanent. Second, for the first time, many citizens in prosperous democracies in Europe and North America, used to easy mobility across borders, travel, and work abroad, are locked in, not just in their countries but at home. Whereas many citizens might support such measures as necessary steps during a crisis, it is implausible that this experience would generate support for such measures in the long term. The crisis has also highlighted the difficulties that closed borders entail. Furthermore, the spread of COVID-19 across borders has demonstrated that even highly repressive measures, including border closures and the collapse of international air traffic, could not stop the spread the disease. As a result, the limited utility of border controls during the pandemic might help to promote their reduction, rather than their maintenance, in the long term. In Europe, the aftermath of the so-called migration crisis resulted in the temporary introduction of border checks in multiple European countries and the gradual erosion of the Schengen Area system. However, as these checks mostly have affected migrants, with citizens from privileged countries largely exempted, many tolerated these restrictions. The pandemic induced restrictions, on the other hand, did not distinguish between citizens on the basis of wealth or prestige of the country of origin. On a related note, the closing of borders around the world and evacuation of citizens by foreign ministries has reemphasized the importance of citizenship. Some of these expressions are primarily discursive. Austrian Chancellor Sebastian Kurz, in his statements to the public on the crisis, consistently addressed all Austrians, while ignoring the substantial number of permanent residents who are not Austrian citizens. The value of citizenship has shifted and increased, though it has not always followed traditional criteria, as its value has shifted based on which countries have been most affected. Initially, Chinese and Iranian citizens faced restric- tions, but as the pandemic spread to Europe, it became Italians who encountered limits on travel. As borders reemerged across the continent and the world, citizenship enabled a return home but often placed foreigners in precarious positions.5 The restrictions introduced in February and March 2020 often did not distinguish between the place of residence or origin for travel and citizenship purposes. Thus, Chinese and other citizens became subjects of discrimination, even if they had not been traveling from so called hot spots (Dzankic and Piccoli 2020). As the pandemic has spread globally, the risk is that citizens from the Global South will be particularly affected by continuous border restrictions. The result could be a reinforcement of global inequalities of citizenship, especially as citizenship and migratory policies are likely to remain more rigid. Certainly, the pandemic at first reinforced the primacy of the state (Rachman 2020; Krastev 2020). It is states that are providing security, ensuring the functioning of the health-care system, and intervening in the economy. The degree of state intervention that occurred within a few weeks of the outbreak of the pandemic across the world stood in stark contrast to role of the state in the neoliberal global system. In addition, reinforcing the role of the state has been pursued by governments across the ideological spectrum. The (temporary) rise of the state weakens the neoliberal paradigm that the market alone can regulate economic needs. In fact, states have intervened against free markets to secure supplies for their citizens. The primacy of the state also weakens global governance and cooperation. The EU, due to its relatively robust regime and rules, has been able to reassert itself after the initial crisis, but intra-EU solidarity has been brittle. As Gideon Rachman (2020) has argued, the pandemic has highlighted the vulnerability of individual countries to global supply changes, which in times of crisis and disruption leave many countries at risk of not receiving key medical supplies and other goods of critical importance. The retreat from globalization has been advocated and articulated by supporters of US president Donald Trump: “What is the point of pursuing internationalism even as an ideal, when interconnectedness itself exposes us to such serious risks? After all, the pandemic would have been far easier to 8 Florian Bieber Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:22, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use. https://www.cambridge.org/core manage if cross-border trade and travel were not so pervasive—if people, all along, had stuck closer to home,” (Waddy 2020). Whereas smaller countries are unlikely to overcome this global dependency, larger countries, such as the USA, could opt for greater protectionism. This would reinforce preexisting rivalries and strengthen nationalism and power competition. The temporary deglobalization has been unprecedented, and the reopening of borders and the resumption of global traffic could take months, if not years. In the process of opening borders and resuming flows, considerations other than disease control will inform the de-restriction. In particular, populist and nationalist elites will, as they have in the first period the pandemic, combine disease control with nationalist and isolationist motives. While the closure of borders and national isolation is presumably temporary, some measures will be extended for a variety of motivations, often closely intertwined with exclusionary nationalism, and anti-globalization arguments will be reinforced. Politics of Conspiracy and Fear An essential feature of the global pandemic has been the proliferation of fear. As New York Times correspondent Steven Erlanger aptly noted, “The coronavirus has created its own form of terror. It has upended daily life, paralyzed the economy and divided people one from another. It has engendered fear of the stranger, of the unknown and unseen,” (2020). Fear of illness or the hardship associated with government responses and the economic crisis are real and tangible for a substantial share of the global population. Fear is also a potent and dangerous motivator in political choices. Extremist groups have used the pandemic as an opportunity to spread fear and conspiracy theories. The crisis has been weaponized in various forms to diverse ends: denying its importance and favoring various conspiracy theories; blaming particular racial or ethnic groups for the pandemic; and pushing for chaos and anarchy to promote a new political order (Colborne 2020). However, such groups, usually on the neo-Nazi spectrum of the far right, are politically marginal and often relish in apocalyptic visions. The pandemic has also given fuel to crude conspiracy theories, spread by social media. From the idea that 5G technology spread the virus, to classical conspiracy theories that the disease is merely a smokescreen for a government plot, there have been a wide range of bizarre ideas circulating since the beginning of the outbreak. These alleged conspiracies are spread by networks that have been linked to far-right and radical groups and activists. These include similar networks as the “Pizzagate” conspiracy in the USA (Robb 2017) and the so-called Reichsbürger in Germany (i.e., self-identified citizens of the German Reich, who believe that the current German Federal Republic is illegal; see Speit [2017]). Social media networks like 4chan and 8chan have provided space for unfiltered conspiracy theories, memes, and transgressions that have been seized upon by far-right groups and individuals over the past decade (Nagle 2017). Although small and relatively fringe groups, the ideas have circulated widely and been given prominence by far-right and populist politicians and parties. Conspiracy theories can undermine trust in democratic institutions and in extreme cases generate violence (Sunstein and Vermeule 2009), as religious rioting in India attests (Horowitz 2001, 74–77). In an environment of fear and uncertainty, conspiracy theories become particularly widespread and more likely to find a following. This feeds into some of the aforementioned risks of the pandemic and governments responses, namely, the scapegoating of minorities and the use of this context by far- right groups. In addition to the fertile environment the pandemic provides for conspiracy theories, the psychological and economic effects of the pandemic will fuel the politics of fear. The extent of the economic crisis that individual countries and the global economy will face after the pandemic remains difficult to predict, but it will constitute one of the most serious economic crises of the past century (Giles 2020). Considering that the political consequences of the 2008–2009 economic crisis still reverberate, and the link between economic crisis and nationalism is well documented Nationalities Papers 9 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:22, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use. https://www.cambridge.org/core (Rantanen 2012), the global economic consequences of the pandemic are likely to fuel exclusionary nationalism. Nationalism in the Post-COVID-19 World In “A World Less Open, Prosperous, and Free,” Stephen M. Walt, a key representative of the realist school of international relations, has argued, “the pandemic will strengthen the state and reinforce nationalism” (Allen et al. 2020). This view concurs with nationalist politicians themselves, who claim vindication for their position. However, such predications betray the biases of on observer like Walt or nationalist politicians themselves. A crisis is likely to be interpreted through the framework and ideological bias of each respective witness. Nationalism is deeply engrained into the global system and most societies around the world. As such, the global coronavirus pandemic and state responses are not going to fundamentally alter this reality. Neither will the pandemic usher in a new era of global solidarity, nor is it likely to destroy the networks that globalization has created. As many citizens are locked in, including those from countries usually privileged in terms of their ability to cross borders, the appreciation of open borders may increase. Thus, a post-pandemic world with stronger borders seems unlikely. How- ever, the opening of closed borders for all citizens will be a drawn-out process. The fear created by the pandemic and the biases that have already been linked to COVID-19 are likely to be enduring, and they will shape the post-pandemic world. In the search for scapegoats, minorities and other vulnerable groups are likely to suffer and become targets of exclusion. In particular, migrants are vulnerable and have already been instrumentalized by far-right parties, characterized as carriers of disease. The past decade has been an era of anxiety, as crises, especially in Europe, have become common and normalized. The economic uncertainty after 2008, the narrative of migration as a threat, and now the pandemic all have contributed to a social environment of uncertainty and fear. In addition to the psychological consequences of collective anxiety, the political and social outcome is more likely to strengthen exclusionary nationalism. Finally, government responses to the pandemic risk turning fragile democracies into competitive authoritarian regimes. Such competitive authoritarian regimes might initially rely on the pandemic to justify repressive policies, but they are likely to turn to exclusionary nationalism as a key legitimizing ideology in order to sustain power. There is nothing inevitable about the dominance of exclusionary nationalism in the post- pandemic world, as some doomsayers, nationalists, and far-right figures proclaim. At a critical juncture, different paths are available, and the outcome will depend on the language used and the policy choices made during the crisis. Financial Support. The author acknowledges the financial support by the University of Graz. Disclosure. Author has nothing to disclose. Notes 1 It is named “Spanish” as Spain, being neutral in World War I, had less restrictive censorship than countries at war. As a result, the first reporting on the influenza pandemic began in Spain. 2 Although most scholarship is careful about the direct link between disaster and war, the causal link appears to be rather indirect Slettebak (2012). 3 In the USA, between 2014 and 2018 the increase of hate crimes recorded by police from rose from 6,385 to 8,496, in the UK from 52,853 to 111,076, in Germany from 3,059 to 8,113, and in France from 1,662 to 1,838. 4 In response to government measures, the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities has issued set of guidelines to ensure social cohesion and prevent discrimination (HCNM 2020). 10 Florian Bieber Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:22, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use. https://www.cambridge.org/core 5 A rare exception has been Portugal, which granted migrants and asylum seekers permanent residence (Euronews 2020). 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work_7siabpq42bbopdazhe2pgij4ge	----	‘Inappropriate but not crime?’ Policing racial hatred in Sweden Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=scri21 Nordic Journal of Criminology ISSN: 2578-983X (Print) 2578-9821 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/scri21 ‘Inappropriate but not crime?’ Policing racial hatred in Sweden Kivanç Atak To cite this article: Kivanç Atak (2019): ‘Inappropriate but not crime?’ Policing racial hatred in Sweden, Nordic Journal of Criminology, DOI: 10.1080/2578983X.2019.1680169 To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/2578983X.2019.1680169 © 2019 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group. Published online: 18 Oct 2019. Submit your article to this journal Article views: 132 View related articles View Crossmark data https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=scri21 https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/scri21 https://www.tandfonline.com/action/showCitFormats?doi=10.1080/2578983X.2019.1680169 https://doi.org/10.1080/2578983X.2019.1680169 https://www.tandfonline.com/action/authorSubmission?journalCode=scri21&show=instructions https://www.tandfonline.com/action/authorSubmission?journalCode=scri21&show=instructions https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/mlt/10.1080/2578983X.2019.1680169 https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/mlt/10.1080/2578983X.2019.1680169 http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1080/2578983X.2019.1680169&domain=pdf&date_stamp=2019-10-18 http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1080/2578983X.2019.1680169&domain=pdf&date_stamp=2019-10-18 ‘Inappropriate but not crime?’ Policing racial hatred in Sweden Kivanç Atak Department of Criminology, Stockholm University, Stockholm, Sweden ABSTRACT Racial bias afflicts police practices across the globe. Police discrimina- tion against and mistreatment of racial and ethnic minorities is indeed difficult to underestimate. While much attention has been thus paid to racially biased policing, fewer studies examine the question from the reverse angle, namely how the police themselves combat racist offences. This article offers empirical insights into the policing of racial hatred in Sweden, a relevant yet relatively understudied case. Drawing on interviews with police officers and crime investigators, I discuss law enforcement perspectives, e.g. perceptions and reasoning in relation to the investigation of racist offences. Findings evince a rather narrow approach as regards the constructions of racist motive that involves a relatively restricted use of bias labelling in identifying hate incidents, especially when the boundaries of racial hostility are perceived as blurred. I argue that while such an approach may reflect a legitimate effort to demonstrate the existence of a motive behind an offence, it may also lead to an underestimation of more mundane forms of racism and their harms inflicted upon racialized individuals and communities. The results have implications for ‘recognition’ and ‘belonging’ as benchmarks of democratic policing, and ‘the promise of inclusion’ associated with combatting hate crimes. ARTICLE HISTORY Received 3 June 2019 Accepted 11 October 2019 KEYWORDS Police; hate crime; racism; Sweden Introduction Much research on police relations with racial and ethnic minorities has noted the perva- sive nature of racial bias and exclusion (e.g. Rice & White, 2010). Policing is informed by negative bias against non-white communities in most western democracies, which may be due to both institutional predispositions or implicit, ‘cognitive machinations’ (Trinkner & Goff, 2016). Scholars have suggested a number of different ways to combat racially biased policing (see Harcourt, 2010, on randomization; White, 2010, on improved accountability mechanisms; and Trinkner & Goff, 2016 on deconstructing racial stereo- types). The evidence on how these proposals might be implemented is not exhaustive. If racial bias is ingrained in police practices, it is also necessary to understand how the police themselves deal with racially biased forms of offending. Addressing this question is an important task, and one which is inextricably tied to what Loader (2006) has referred to as two central aspects of a democratic policing ideal, namely recognition and belonging. CONTACT Kivanç Atak kivanc.atak@gmail.com Department of Criminology, Stockholm University, Stockholm SE-10691 NORDIC JOURNAL OF CRIMINOLOGY https://doi.org/10.1080/2578983X.2019.1680169 © 2019 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/ by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. http://www.tandfonline.com https://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1080/2578983X.2019.1680169&domain=pdf&date_stamp=2019-10-17 This article does not intend to reaffirm the existence of racial bias in policing, but rather to revisit police relations with racial and ethnic minorities from a different angle, via a scrutiny of hate crime policing in Sweden. Few subjects are as intriguing with respect to the relationship between police and racial minorities as the policing of hate crime. The significance of this issue lies in the way that racial bias, which otherwise permeates police conduct, is here transformed into one of the central questions at which the police are expected to direct their efforts. Addressing racial bias in crime may thus be seen as a step towards the ‘promise of social inclusion’ (Mason, 2014). This does not mean that hate crime policing itself is devoid of biases. It has been suggested, for example, that police departments are not entirely colour-blind with respect to either the demographic context of hate crime victimization (King, 2007), or the racial composition of victim-offender relationships (Nelson, Wooditch, Martin, Hummer, & Gabbidon, 2016). Further complica- tions arise as a result of conceptual ambiguities surrounding hate crime, the unwillingness or incompetence of police officers when it comes to registering hate incidents and the lack of resources for investigating hate crime (Chakraborti, 2010; Hall, 2012). While much has been written on the racial aspects of policing and the control of hate crime in the Anglo-American countries, research is relatively scarce in the broader geographical context. This article presents a qualitative study of the policing of racial hatred in Sweden. Drawing on interviews with police officers and civilian crime investi- gators, as well as published reports from the Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention (hereafter Brå), the study examines the ways in which the Swedish police perceive, and how they reason in relation to, their duty to combat racially motivated offences. It primarily shows that police constructions of racist motives reflect a narrow approach which involves a relatively restricted use of bias labelling for identifying hate incidents. Police constructions include references to banal aggressions and prior disputes as likely triggers of racial slurs in the context of an offence, particularly when the boundaries of racial hostility are perceived as contestable. While such an approach may be conceived as constituting a legitimate effort to demonstrate a necessary link between motive and offence, it may also lead to an underestimation of more mundane, everyday forms of racism at the expense of the harms inflicted on those targeted groups and individuals. Implications of these findings are discussed in relation to the promise of inclusion, and in terms of policy and practice. Policing, race and the spectre of exclusion Historically, the policing of racial and ethnic minorities has been plagued by biased practices. The literature is vast and there are hardly any studies that do not critically or perhaps somewhat apologetically confront racially biased policing (Engel, 2010). Admittedly, it is not bias per se but its underlying causes that discussions revolve around. Many view bias as a euphemism for discrimination, profiling, intimidation or institutional racism that cannot be reduced to individual factors (e.g. Bourne, 2001). Others contend that bias is a necessary evil which has its roots in police officers’ ‘working personality’ (Skolnick, 2010) or in the social-psychology of stereotyping (Smith & Alpert, 2007). Recent debates on the rise of predictive policing technologies have added yet another layer to this debate. Facilitated by the ubiquitous surveillance of human actions and 2 K. ATAK transactions, policing by prediction builds on actuarial methods and the analysis of ‘big data’ (Ferguson, 2017). The profiling of potential offenders is vindicated by means of a premise of objectivity, since it is argued that the metrics of multifaceted data would counteract, or else provide empirical justification for, the disproportionate targeting of particular – non-white – populations. One of the more vocal critics of predictive policing, Harcourt (2008), calls this a false premise. Selective targeting, he maintains, will not reduce crime and may even increase it since it is impossible to know for certain the ‘relative responsiveness of profiled individuals’ to these new policing techniques. In defence of prediction, Margalioth (2008) has argued that ‘profiling is (nearly) always efficient in theory’ but maybe distorted by ‘misguided use’ in practice. In this light, it is tempting to extend Neocleous’ (2000) conception of policing as an instrument of class domination to policing as an instrument of racial domination. However, while scholars have long directed a spotlight at racial bias in police practices (see Davenport, Soule, & Armstrong, 2011, on protest policing see; Muniz, 2015, on community policing; White & Fradella, 2016, on stop-and-frisk), little attention has been directed at the question from the reverse angle, namely, how the police themselves deal with racial bias in criminal behaviour. The policing of racist offences has become increas- ingly salient at a time when right-wing populism, with its emphasis on the exploitation of anti-immigration sentiments, is a getting a firmer hold both in Europe and beyond. Loader’s (2006) assertion that the police are ‘both minders and reminders of community’ thus deserves to be reconsidered in the context of racially motivated crimes. Loader builds his argument on a critique of what he calls ‘ambient policing’ strategies – neighbourhood-, quality of life-, community-policing and so on – which practitioners and scholars alike tend to embrace as pathways to police-citizen partnerships. One of the problems with these strategies, he claims, is the ready acceptance of majority demands for security as benign concerns, often at the expense of the interests of more proactively policed, racialized communities. Policing cannot be understood, Loader reminds us, without referring to its cultural aspects and the production of social meanings. As a mediator of collective identity, the police may, and often do, ‘expressly or implicitly denigrate or misrecognize minority – immigrant or indigenous – populations’, and send ‘powerful exclusion signals, [via] practices that indicate that particular groups – teenage boys, or black males or Muslims – are not to be considered full members of society’ (ibid., pp. 211–212). If anything, a democratic ideal for policing should be anchored in recogni- tion and belonging, that is, in the establishment of ‘conditions in which individuals possess an effortless, confident attachment to a political community in ways that enable them to feel routinely at ease with the threats posed by the settings of their everyday lives’ (ibid., p. 215). These conditions require that the police ‘recognize the security claims of all citizens and respond to them in ways that sustain rather than undermine their sense of belonging’ (ibid., p. 217). Given the cultural work that Loader identifies in police behaviour, there is good reason to examine how police officers reason about and grapple with racist incidents in the context of their investigative work. Are there perhaps ‘permanent barriers’, as Harkin (2015) has recently labelled the constraints on the potential of democratic policing, to envisioning a law enforcement framework that is informed by recognition and belonging? In the following, I first set out a discussion of hate crime policing as an emblematic case of ‘social control designed to protect minority populations’ (King, 2007, italics in original). NORDIC JOURNAL OF CRIMINOLOGY 3 This is a rather unconventional task for police forces since it deals with victimization that is specifically due to the victim’s actual or perceived identity. Thus, it provides a good opportunity to examine policing in a context in which racism becomes the object of police work. Hate crimes and the promise of inclusion A couple of decades have passed since hate crime entered the dictionary of law enforce- ment. Most jurisdictions do not define hate crime as a distinct category of offences but instead generally refer to penalty enhancement statutes, to hate crime motives as an aggravating factor in relation to sentencing or to administrative measures such as collecting statistics (King, 2009). While legal definitions vary, hate crime is commonly understood as a criminal act that is partially or wholly motivated by bias or prejudice towards the victim’s actual or perceived identity (e.g. Walters, 2014). For some, such a definition necessarily involves a ‘norm of sameness’ (Jenness, 2003), since it applies regardless of the majority or minority status of the victim. For others, this would involve turning a blind eye to the structural inequalities that make hate crime victimization an asymmetrical phenomenon (Bourne, 2002). Evidence suggests that the bulk of hate crime victims are members of minority populations, and the most frequent targets tend to be members of racial and ethnic minorities. The emergence of the hate crime concept and its gradual adoption into law also owes a great deal to social movements and civil rights activism focused on counteracting the violent intimidation of historically subjugated groups based on their skin colour, religious faith, sexual orientation, disability and so forth (Jenness & Grattet, 2001). The peculiarity of hate crime law lies in that it ‘attempts to reverse the exclusive logic of punishment by exploiting punitiveness towards the promise of social inclusion rather than exclusion’ (Mason, 2014, p. 296, quoted in Russell, 2017; italics in original). Putting hate crime into the context of punishment theory, Russell (2017) claims that hate crime law can be considered as a deviation from the symbolism of traditional criminal law, which seeks to ‘affirm existing hierarchies of legitimacy and social order’. What the penal construction of hate crime does, she argues, is to ‘“turn the law against itself”, in the sense that the violence of law is called upon to protect those groups that have historically been subjugated or invisibilised by it’ (ibid., p. 319). However, the existing literature on hate crime policing shows that the symbolic content of hate crime law does not neatly produce instrumental effects in the context of its implementation. One of the major issues here pertains to the (in-)capacity and the (lack of) commitment of the police as regards hate crime investigations (Hall, 2012). One common tendency among police departments is to under-prioritize crimes motivated by prejudice. Boyd, Berk, and Hamner (1996, p. 827) have observed that while a completely dismissive attitude was not widely shared, ‘many interviewed officers, detectives, and commanding officers expressed resentment over the demands placed on them by the new [hate crime] policy, seeing it as another bureaucratic imposition that takes officers away from their “real” crime-solving duties’. It is also not uncommon for police officers to consider racist violence and intimidation as insignificant or simply ‘yobbish’, or to associ- ate victim claims with ‘ulterior motives’ such as seeking additional benefits (Bowling, 1999). Recent analyses have also shown that hate crimes overall are less likely to attract 4 K. ATAK police attention and to result in arrest or clearance compared to non-bias crimes (Lantz, Gladfelter, & Ruback, 2019). Studies on specialized hate- or bias-crime units present a more nuanced picture. For one thing, the law enforcement response to hate crimes seems to be patterned by organizational and demographic factors. Jenness and Grattet (2005) argue that police departments that prove to be ‘pervious’, that is, relatively flexible in terms of policy innovation, are more likely to adopt a specific hate crime policy into their repertoires. Moreover, the policing of bias crimes can itself be racially biased. King (2007) has shown that U.S. police agencies are less likely to comply with the Hate Crime Statistics Act in regions with a larger black population, even though this association is confined only to the southern states. King concludes that hate crime policing is ‘not a colour-blind process’, since the law is ‘possibly enforced the least where they are at highest risk of occurrence’ (ibid., p. 218). Police responses might also be more attentive to certain forms of interracial conflict and victimization (Nelson et al., 2016). A further point is that even when detectives purportedly follow rigorous guidelines and checklists in order to identify, say, a racist motive, controversies arise in the construc- tion of hate crimes, prosecutions are rare and investigatory outcomes are usually less than satisfactory (Boyd et al., 1996; Mason, McCulloch, & Maher, 2016). In one ethnographic study, Bell (2002) observed that bias-unit detectives in the so-called Centre City experi- enced both pressure to enforce hate crime laws (by advocacy groups) and pressure not to enforce them (by white working-class residents). Jacobs and Potter (1998), in their work on the NYPD, have argued that police officers’ ‘unique responsibility for deciding whether particular crimes ought to be labelled “bias related”’, ‘complicates and contributes to the politicization of police operations’. This may partly explain why police departments tend to assign more resources to hate incidents characterized by extremist attacks or brutality, while less effort is invested in cases of everyday racism, assault and intimidation. Lewis’ (2014) critical discussion of the cultural politics of hate crimes, for example captures how devoting excessive attention to ‘hyper-violent murders committed by clearly guilty perpetrators who belonged to white power groups’ (p. 5) might foster indifference to mundane forms of racial violence, under the guise of tolerance and colour blindness. The above discussion raises important questions about the policing of racist offences. It seems that such offences are likely to be placed towards the lower end of the hierarchy of police work. Even if this could be refuted, the promise of inclusion is obfuscated by practices of selective enforcement and by the politicized nature of bias labelling. It would however be wrong to understate the notable advancements that have been made in hate crime policing in various countries in the past two decades (Chakraborti, 2014). At the same time, even though progress has been made, further issues may surface, with Mason et al. (2016), for example describing the possible risks of police forces using over- and under-inclusive checklists to identify hate crimes. At any rate, the bulk of the literature builds on observations from the U.S.A., the U.K. and Australia with little input from other contexts. To what extent these findings are generalizable to a broader geographical context thus remains unclear. In this regard, the Swedish case provides an intriguing example. Although Sweden has an institutionalized police response to hate crime, research on the policing of racism is sparse (for notable exceptions see Holgersson, 2018; Shoultz, 2015). The Swedish popula- tion with a non-European background has increased markedly in recent decades, while NORDIC JOURNAL OF CRIMINOLOGY 5 a number of Sweden’s urban districts have become segregated along racial and ethnic lines. Recent reports even point to the notoriety of racial profiling in police stops of non- white individuals (Mulinari, 2017). The populist far-right has been expanding its electoral base, and neo-Nazi demonstrations have raised public concerns. Thus the policing of racially motivated hate crimes has become an ever more salient issue in Sweden, not least for police-minority relations. Against this background, the overarching purpose of this study is to explore some of the prevalent perceptions and patterns of reasoning within the Swedish Police with regard to the investigation of racially motivated hate crimes. I am particularly interested in how racist hate motives are constructed, or dismissed, from a police decision-making perspective. As a secondary aim, I also want to address the question of what kinds of justificatory claims are used in relation to contested issues such as under-enforcement and low prosecution rates – questions that have commonly been emphasized in previous research (Mason et al., 2017; Perry, 2008). Policing racial hatred in Sweden A brief overview The concept of hate crime entered the public discourse in Sweden in the 1990s (Tiby, 1999). Legislation on hate crime has a longer history however. Sweden has three reference points regarding hate crime in its criminal code. Crimes that are committed with a motive to aggrieve an individual or group based on race, skin-colour, national or ethnic back- ground, faith, sexual orientation or transgender identity are covered by a penalty enhancement rule (Chapter 29, Section 7) which first came into force in 1994. The second reference point, the offence of agitation against a national or ethnic group (hets mot folkgrupp), dates back to the late 1940s. It was introduced in the wake of the Second World War as a measure against racist and anti-religious propaganda and has subsequently been integrated into the criminal code (Chapter 16, Section 8). Finally, the notion of unlawful discrimination offence (olaga diskriminering) entered the criminal code in 1970. It basically refers to cases in which people who would like to obtain a service at a business facility such as a shop, restaurant or bar are discriminated on the grounds of their identity (Chapter 16, Section 9) (Granström, Mellgren, & Tiby, 2016). Statistics on hate crimes can be traced back to the early 1990s when they were produced by the Swedish Security Service (Säpo). In 2006 the task was handed over to Brå, which has since published hate crime statistics based on incidents reported to the police and also on data from victimization surveys. Since 2012 the presentation of police- reported hate crimes is based on a random sample that includes around 50 percent of a subset of offences1 reported to the police. The relevant offence reports are then filtered by Brå, and those meeting the definitional criteria for hate crime are selected (BRÅ, 2017, p. 27). Among these, the most common hate crime motive identified is racial prejudice, as is the case in many other jurisdictions. What is striking is the large discrepancy between self-reported exposure to hate crime and the number of hate crimes that are reported to the police. As regards crimes with a racist motive, recent estimates indicate that less than 20 percent of incidents are reported to the police (ibid.). Whilst not being a specifically Swedish phenomenon, this discrepancy can be attributed to factors such as the troubled 6 K. ATAK relationship between minorities and the police, a shared belief that reporting to the police would not make much difference, or shortcomings in police knowledge, education and training, which could possibly increase the likelihood of secondary victimization (Holgersson, 2018; Shoultz, 2015; Wigerfelt, Wigerfelt, & Kiiskinen, 2013). This study Since the present work focuses on the police perspective, it draws primarily on interviews with police officers of varying rank and position, and civilian investigators employed within the Swedish Police Authority. The number of participants interviewed for this study is 32. Since individuals are not required to be police officers with a formal police education to work as investigators (utredare) within the Swedish Police, it is useful to make a distinction between civilian investigators and police officers. The latter term denotes personnel who are officially employed as polis, and who undertake various tasks in yttre tjänst (patrolling, emergency response, neighbourhood policing and so forth) or who work on investigations. In planning the sample of interview subjects, I assumed that interviewing only hate crime investigators would risk missing a substantial amount of information about situa- tions in which an incident might initially has been suspected to constitute a potential hate crime, without then being passed on to specialized hate crime investigators. I therefore decided to interview not only hate crime investigators but also police officers whose work is focused on other tasks, such as patrolling, neighbourhood- liaison and administration. The intention was to provide a basis for developing a holistic perspective in relation to the questions I wanted to explore. One limitation associated with this approach, however, is that it involves interviewing officers who are not well versed in, and have relatively few experiences of, hate crime. Indeed, this turned out to be the case with some interviewees, largely because of my sampling strategy. However, even these interviews were able to provide information about how the Swedish police at large perceive and reason about their work to combat racial hatred. Thus, what may at first seem like a limitation may also be viewed as providing an opportunity in relation to the aims of the current study. The interviews were conducted at multiple locations in Sweden between June 2017 and October 2018. Initial contacts were established during a personal visit to an exhibition on hate crime at the Police Museum in Stockholm. Further contacts were then established by means of a snowballing strategy. In practical terms, this strategy is associated with both strengths and weaknesses. It nonetheless allowed me to reach investigators who specialize in hate crime in several different parts of Sweden. In sum, I interviewed 12 full- time or part-time investigators with specialized knowledge on hate crime. As regards police officers who work with other tasks, however, experiences of hate crime varied considerably. This group included some who had first-hand experience, and others whose experience was rather limited or second hand. I established contact with these officers based on my communications with previous interviewees. At the outset, I intended to conduct interviews on an individual basis. However, the time and workplace constraints experienced by some participants made the use of joint interviews, with two or more colleagues, a more feasible option. Thus, on six occasions group interviews were held with at least two participants. Among those interviewed, 18 NORDIC JOURNAL OF CRIMINOLOGY 7 were male and 14 were female. The age of the interviewees ranged between 25 and 64. While some interviewees had started their career in the police force quite recently – which was mostly the case among patrolling officers – others had been in the organization for many years. With the exception of two, all interviews took place at police stations. In one of the two remaining cases, the interviewee preferred to meet at a cafe, and in the other, the participant was interviewed by phone. Participants were informed, verbally and in writing, about the purposes of the research. The interviews were semi-structured and questions were directed at investigating work- ing principles, processes and professional reflections with respect to hate crimes specifi- cally motivated by racism. Key issues covered included the different stages of hate crime investigations, education and training, relations with the victims and the reporting tendencies of complainants. The length of the interviews varied between approximately 15 min and 1 h-and-10 min. With the exception of the phone interview, all interviews were recorded and transcribed by the author. All markers, e.g. names and locations, which might possibly identify the participant, were removed from the material. In the quotations from the interviews presented in the results section, names have been replaced by pseudonyms. The results presented below are based on a repeated, close reading of the inter- view material. For the purpose of this article, particular attention has been paid to the constructions of racist motives and to the justificatory claims made in relation to these constructions. Quotes from the interviews have been translated from the Swedish. On a few occasions, I use parentheses to denote an unfinished or unin- telligible sentence ([. . .]), and to add my own clarification of expressions ([author’s note]) in a given sentence. Results Until recently, the police capacity for investigating hate crimes was limited to one specialized unit and a handful of crime investigators in Sweden. In 2014, the Swedish Police was instructed by the government to prioritize and invest more resources in combating hate crime (Polisen, 2017). Two additional units were subsequently estab- lished in the West and South police regions, and more investigators were recruited across the country to focus specifically on hate crimes. Specialized units are not only in charge of criminal investigations but also work to develop capacity and conduct liaison tasks. Capacity development involves both educational activities, such as attending university-level courses on topics such as racism and Islamophobia, and the instruction of front-line police officers about hate crime. Liaison tasks involve establishing contacts with civil society groups and organizations and representatives of minority communities, and holding meetings with them mostly on a yearly basis. The Swedish Police have also introduced an interactive, but non-compulsory, educa- tional package on hate crime that is available to all police staff. Before a reported incident is passed on to hate crime investigators, it has to be marked as a suspected hate crime at some point after the complaint has been registered. This means that Police Contact Centres (PKC) and front-line officers are key actors in relation to the initial identification of hate crime incidents. 8 K. ATAK As a police officer I can tell you the following. First we take notes about the incident. At the same time, we ask some extra questions [at the crime scene] to find out whether the incident may involve a hate crime. We write everything down. Once we arrive at the police station, we type our notes into the computer. All the information we collected, and our interrogation notes, are included in this document. While drafting the report, a check-box pops up in the digital platform we use. It asks you, ‘Is it possibly a hate crime?’ You answer by putting a cross in the YES box or the NO box. (Patrol officer Roger) It should be noted that front-line officers’ decisions are no guarantee that all such marked cases will automatically be sent to hate crime investigators. The incident may be con- firmed, or dismissed, as a probable hate crime case at a local police station or by officers who are specialized in the underlying offence category. It is also possible that a complaint which has not been marked initially, might subsequently be identified as a likely case of hate crime. In other words, there are multiple checkpoints before hate crime investigators begin their inquiries. While this multi-stage process may work as a filtering mechanism, false dismissals at the onset may also result in the jettisoning of a number of cases that would have otherwise been dealt with as hate crimes. Making hate a crime motive: when is racism (dis-)counted? Both qualitative and quantitative studies on hate crime policing commonly make the observation that an under-prioritization of hate incidents has been a shared tendency among various police departments in different contexts. Even though remarkable progress has been noted, this tendency does not seem to have entirely disappeared. The level of attention that is (not) focused on hate crimes, as was mentioned earlier, is influenced by factors such as police competency and organizational features, as well as by different types of (interracial) conflict. In Sweden, the vast majority of hate crime reports are written-off either directly or after a preliminary investigation (BRÅ, 2017). While this does not seem to be specific only to hate crimes, it would not be entirely unexpected to find that the perception that ‘nothing happens anyway’ would produce a negative incentive for victims to file a complaint. Nonetheless, it would be overly hasty to conclude that most cases are dismissed simply because hate incidents are trivialized by the police. There appears to be a particular way of reasoning, however, among the officers and investigators interviewed for this study. Rather than making an explicit effort to downplay hatred, most interviewees tend to adopt a relatively narrow approach – somewhat reminiscent of what Mason et al. (2016) have labelled an under-inclusive definition of hate crime – in their constructions of racist motives. The following excerpt from an interview indicates that even in cases where racial prejudice seems self-evident, a link between motive and action needs to be established. ‘Why do you think you have been assaulted this way?’ we typically ask. Let’s say molestation. We want to know what exactly has happened. So you’d get a picture [from the victim’s description]: ‘Well, I was just standing there. He saw that I was wearing Romani clothes and said: “Aah, you fucking Romani!”’ Then we ask: ‘Was it a coincidence that you were molested, or was it like . . . of all the other people around, he picked you because you had . . . clothes. Because you are like dark-skinned? [Inaudible] We let them explain. We don’t ask many leading questions but try to keep things open. Ehm . . . ‘What is it like . . ., do you know this person? How did it happen?’ That kind of open-ended questions, to find out why this person was victimized. ‘Was it coincidence, by chance, or did he choose you because of who you are?’ (Investigator Anna) NORDIC JOURNAL OF CRIMINOLOGY 9 We might thus infer that the purpose of asking questions about ‘coincidence’ and ‘by chance’ is to demonstrate that a racist motive exists, given that there is a criminal offence. Two things would follow from this reasoning. The first, and arguably less controversial, of these is that in the absence of a criminal offence, a racist incident would not be investigated further. The second is that not every offence that is perceived by the victim as a hate crime would be considered so, unless the motive-action link can be established – a difference from the U.K. model. Further evidence from the interviews indicates the narrow approach that the Swedish police tend to employ in their work against hate crimes involving racism. Below are two quotes which illustrate how the interviewees base their explanations of the complex nature of hate crime investigations on the ‘heat of the moment’ argument (Walters, 2014, p. 15). Today you often hear stories like, someone shouts svartskalle2 at someone. It’s not a crime to do so. But admittedly inappropriate. It’s not okay to say things like that, and yet it would never lead to a prosecution. But say, someone shouts ‘fucking svartskalle’ and hits the person. Then yes . . . It can be . . . It is a crime [. . .] Then you ask questions and the victim tells you what happened. ‘I was passing this person and he just hit me’. We also ask the suspect about what happened. ‘Well, this person was passing and spilled beer on me. I became damn angry. So I hit him, and I happened to use that expression’. (Investigator Mattias) You know the whole issue revolves around aggression. An effect of aggression itself. So that’s the difference in this example. You shout ‘svartskalle’. That’s an effect of aggression [. . .] ‘I didn’t hit him because he was a svartskalle. Actually, we were just arguing with each other. He spilled beer on me. He happened to spill his beer. So I was like . . . I hit him. At the moment I hit him, I also said this word. But that’s not why I . . . [hit him]’ Like I said, we have to be able to distinguish between two things here. ‘Was it an effect of aggression that you shouted “fucking svartskalle” in that moment? Or was the reason that you hit this person, because he is a svartskalle?’ (Investigator Linda) It goes without saying that due to a lack of evidence, witnesses or an identifiable suspect, police might not be able to carry the criminal investigation of a hate incident further. Most interviewees claimed that many cases thus end up being described as ‘one individual’s testimony being pitted against that of another (ord mot ord). However, even if the underlying offence can be established, the police may subsequently realize that the expressed racial slur cannot be directly linked to the action itself because it has to do with ‘something else’. Another interviewee confirmed this: It may be something that at the outset makes you think like: ‘This is a hate crime’. Take molestation or insulting behaviour for example. You recognize some racist expressions and say to yourself: ‘Well, this one I would describe as a hate crime, or potentially a hate crime’. But then, when you look into the case more closely, it may become . . . Perhaps during the interrogation [. . .] It may turn out that what has been said [. . .] has something to do with a prior issue. Maybe a dispute which is about something completely unrelated. So we can talk about an expression in affect. In such a situation, the [hate] motive would not count even though at the beginning there was so . . . say, such a powerful indication of . . . I mean this expression, this powerful expression which is so unmistakably racist or something similar. In fact, few things are self-evident and clear. What you think at the beginning may change later on. (Investigator Gunilla) To put it another way, if an investigator arrives at the conclusion that there is no necessary link between a racial slur and the offence itself, the hate motive will most likely be dismissed. It is certainly plausible to argue that the boundaries for when racism becomes 10 K. ATAK the driving force behind an offence may often be blurred. However, as far as the interview material is concerned, the police appear likely to exercise discretion in a way that gives more credence to explanations based on banal aggressions, relative to everyday forms of racism which may actually underlie that aggression. Clearly, there may be plenty of cases in which the motive of the offender is relatively unambiguous and leaves little room for doubt. To take one example, the quote below shows that the link between motive and action can also be communicated by means of other markers such as symbols, clothing or simply by ‘doing’: I read about a case which involved someone who poured milk over a dark-skinned person. A glass of milk. Pondering about such an act you may wonder: ‘Okay, what’s the point of [using] milk?’ For it could simply have been water, but that person chose milk. Just milk, but not water or anything else. So it was very obvious. I mean, the intention of the person who did this thing. The motive behind it, I mean. (Investigator Sara) However, the boundaries of racial prejudice, as well as the lines between when an offence is racially motivated and when it is not, might also be intangible, not least from a police perspective. In fact, what needs to be explored is not only how the police perceive and act in these less straightforward cases. It is equally important to understand what is viewed as difficult or unclear with regard to racist motives and their investigation from a policing point of view. In the following excerpt, an interviewee describes a scenario which can be read as an example of ‘white flight’ (Kruse, 2005). It is notable that the story is explained in terms of economic rationality rather than racial prejudice or bigotry: Sometimes things are straightforward, but they can also be much more complicated. Suppose you bully a person and say things like . . . Let’s say some people start moving into a residential area – people with an Arab background. Residents of that neighbourhood may actually have nothing against the Arab identity. But if more and more people from a different ethnic background move in, the residents believe, house prices will plummet. It [the neigh- bourhood] would no longer be attractive. In fact, they [the residents] do not have anything against them [ethnic Arabs] but they just want the [house] prices to remain high. That’s why they do such things. Then you may ask yourself: is there really something to dig up here because the issue is not really about being against [an ethnic group]? They just want to keep the house prices high [. . .] The motivation is not to intimidate others because they have another [ethnic identity] [. . .] It may depend on many things which are often difficult to prove. (Investigator Kalle) What is considered an expression of material concern may arguably be viewed as a display of racial hostility, rendering the distinction between a complicated as opposed to a straightforward case contestable. This reasoning squares with the abovementioned accounts that indicate that a racial slur may not be counted as a hate motive if the perpetrator used that ‘unmistakably racist’ expression ‘not because he or she has anything against . . . ’ but as a result of aggression or a prior dispute about some other issue. I would argue that this adds yet another layer to what Loader (2006) has articulated as the cultural work of policing. More importantly, in using their discretionary power to draw the lines of racial bias in relation to an offensive behaviour – lines which are conceivably permeable, indefinite or obscure – the Swedish police seem to prefer a restrictive use of bias labelling. The narrowness of this approach may prevent the development of an ‘inflated image of the problem’ (Mason et al., 2016) or the over-stigmatization of offenders as ‘haters’ (Walters, 2014). However, it might also signal that the concerns of racialized communities NORDIC JOURNAL OF CRIMINOLOGY 11 about, and their frequent subjection to, everyday racism are not being addressed ade- quately. How serious it may get if hate-victim claims are not well-recognized was perhaps most notoriously experienced in the ‘Pilkington case’ in Leicestershire 2007 (for a summary see Walker, 2011). The fact that the bulk of hate incidents reported to the police are dismissed or, where investigated, not labelled as hate crime, may at least partially be a result of this approach. Justificatory claims: dismissal of cases and low prosecution rates At this point, it would be beneficial to further explore police perceptions about claims of under-enforcement, the dismissal of cases and low prosecution rates – questions that are commonly raised in the existing research on hate crime policing. It has been noted that ‘the need to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the offender was motivated by prejudice’ often has a negative effect on the willingness of police officers to label incidents as cases of hate crime, and feeds into reluctance to do so (Hall, 2010). Thus, it is no huge mystery why ‘very few offenders accused of a hate offence are ever convicted or sentenced as “hate offenders”’ (Walters, 2014, p. 27). A common theme in the inter- views corroborates this observation. In the quote below, liaison officer Nils points to the perceived dilemmas of bias-labelling. You have cases like [where] someone jumps and beats up on an African because he is an African. But how would you know exactly if no one says anything outright? Obviously there are many hate crimes of this kind out there, but we don’t know always if this person has beaten up on you only because you are an African [. . .] That’s why disagreement arises [. . .] Can we say that it [the conflict] has simply resulted from you guys being different from each other? Is it necessarily about racism? [. . .] What we may see is two people who are quarrelling. We don’t see it in terms of a Swedish versus an African [. . .] If no one puts it like: ‘Just because you are Swedish, I am going to do this’, or: ‘Just because you are African, I am going to do that’ [. . .] we cannot prove that there is a hate motive [. . .]. (Liaison officer Nils) Another theme that runs through the interviews involves an emphasis on the police’s function as law enforcers. While a certain amount of criticism has been directed at the under-policing of hate incidents, a number of interviewees stressed the legal boundaries of police work. Recent debates about the police’s stance on neo-Nazi rallies might help to illustrate this point. In particular, street demonstrations by the Nordic Resistance Movement (Nordiska motståndsrörelsen NMR) have raised concerns about the under- enforcement of hate crime provisions, specifically those pertaining to the hets mot folkgrupp offence. NMR members usually wear identical clothes, and carry shields and flags with Nazi symbols such as the Tyr rune3 on their marches. Many people complain like: ‘They [neo-Nazis] march carrying flags and the Tyr rune symbol [. . .] Why don’t the police intervene and arrest them for hets mot folkgrupp? Isn’t it so clear?’ But again, there are laws we abide by. It’s not up to us to decide [on freedom of assembly]. When it comes to the Tyr rune, the Chancellor of Justice has already stated that this symbol alone is not enough to be labelled hets mot folkgrupp. Then it becomes totally meaningless for us to act on . . . because we would never have sufficient grounds for doing so. (Investigator Gunilla) The emphasis on the law-enforcement role of the police may be interpreted as an effort to deflect much of the attention directed at the discretionary powers of the police. ‘I don’t 12 K. ATAK think people are well-informed about a lot of things like how we and other authorities work, who’s responsible for what, who drafts laws and so on’, said one investigator. With respect to the neo-Nazi marches, the legal boundaries of police work were often men- tioned in relation to law making and policy making, as processes external to the police. ‘This is a political decision’, one interviewee noted with regard to NMR demonstrations, and added: ‘It is up to politicians who have the power to decide on the right to demonstrate, how wide its scope should be and which groups have the right to use it and so on’. Another interviewee stated that it was ‘too bad that we should be made to answer for something which is not our decision’. A third theme focuses on the symbolic virtues of hate crime policing viewed against the backdrop of a very low prosecution rate. For that matter, the number of hate incidents reported to the police in Sweden increased considerably from 2226 in 2000 to 6415 in 2016. At the same time, the clearance rate dropped from 9 percent in 2007 to 4 percent in 2016, and it is hard to confirm any substantial change in the distribution of offences with a hate motive during this period (BRÅ, 2008, 2017). Many interviewees were aware of the unwillingness shared by racialized victims to file a complaint because doing so would most likely ‘not lead anywhere’. As Kalle, an investigating officer, put it: ‘But what happens in the end? A lot of people come to realize that nothing has happened. You would say: “I was assaulted, the police came, it led to a trial, and he got acquitted”’. In this regard, Sweden is by no means an outlier. That is probably why police officers and investigators also frame their work to combat hate crime in terms of its symbolic effects. In a follow-up phone interview, Fredrik, a relatively experienced officer, stated that the outcome of an investigation, i.e. whether a case would be dismissed or prosecuted, is not the most important issue to be concerned about. Reporting to the police is meaningful in itself, he insisted, as it can reveal that a particular type of criminality is becoming more common and that something needs to be done about it. His reasoning was echoed by another interviewee: There is yet another thing to think about when it comes to reporting [crimes] to the police. It concerns why people should file a complaint beyond reasons about justice, I mean, reasons related to obtaining redress within the criminal justice process. Reporting has a statistical effect because every complaint that is registered becomes part of the statistics on reported crimes. So even if your complaint eventually gets dismissed, it would still show that we have a problem in our society. (Investigator Gunilla) Ever since the birth of the hate crime concept, much debate has centred on the symbolic effects of legislating against criminal acts motivated by bias or prejudice. Grattet and Jenness (2008) suggest that the reporting of hate incidents to the police could in itself be viewed as one form of instrumental effect. This follows from the assumption that ‘hate crime reporting likely reflects commitment by the police to enforce hate crime initiatives’ (King, 2008, p. 1370). As far as the Swedish case is concerned, the increase in hate crime reporting in the last two decades might indeed be an indication of growing public sensitivity to hatred. Nonetheless, it would be preferable to maintain a healthy scepticism, until we understand how the presumed symbolic and instrumental effects of policing are experienced by those at the receiving end of law enforcement. Given the perceived dilemmas of bias labelling and the use of discretion, police decisions on reported incidents would be likely to become politicized, as has been NORDIC JOURNAL OF CRIMINOLOGY 13 noted by Jacobs and Potter (1998). This would pave the way for additional problems for hate crime policing, both when hate crime provisions are enforced and when they are not enforced. However, a recourse to the symbolic virtues of hate crime policing may not always help to alleviate the likely alienation of racialized communities from police decisions, since the perception that complaints ‘don’t lead anywhere’ appears to be so well established that is endorsed even by the police themselves. The question of being ‘tough on hate?’ which was recently raised by Lewis (2014) thus remains a valid one to address. Conclusion One of the major challenges to contemporary policing is that of ensuring the equitable treatment of racial and ethnic minorities. Police continue to have a troubled relationship with non-white communities in western democracies and beyond, and the presence of racially biased over- and under-policing is perhaps the most pervasive, as well as the most contested, phenomenon infecting this relationship in one way or another. The current study has addressed this question by revisiting the presence of racial bias on the other side of the equation. Much research has focused on the causes and consequences of racial bias in police behaviour, while little attention has been paid to situations in which racial bias itself becomes the object of police work. This article provides insights into the possibility of, and the inherent limitations associated with, the ‘promise of inclusion’ as a distinct feature of hate crime policing. In Sweden, the police seem to adopt a rather narrow approach which involves a relatively restrictive use of bias labelling for offences that may involve racial hatred. While police officers do not trivialize hate crimes as being insignificant, there is a discernible tendency to refer to actions taken in the ‘heat of the moment’, or the significance of a prior but unrelated dispute, as explanations for commonly experienced situations that might just as well be considered as manifestations of racial hostility. Arguably, the use of this approach might reflect a legitimate concern regarding the police’s duty to demonstrate that the offence, if an offence has been committed, was indeed the result of a hate motive. This might militate against over-policing of hatred, and prevent over-stigmatization of offenders as bigots. But it is also quite likely that more mundane, everyday forms of racism and the harms that these inflict primarily on racialized people will be ignored. By endangering recognition and belonging, and consequently the promise of inclusion, police relations with racial and ethnic minorities will thus be undermined. As it can also be inferred from the study, justificatory claims around the dismissal of cases and low prosecution rates lay bare the conundrums for hate crime policing. On the basis of the above discussion, it would be possible to formulate a couple of policy implications. First, it would make sense to suggest that a less restrictive, and perhaps more inclusive, approach to what is counted as a racially motivated offence might help (i) to combat incidents of hatred that lie beyond the tip of the iceberg and (ii) to meet some of the pressing concerns experienced by racialized communities about hate crime victimization. Second, improved communication channels with victim complainants would also be beneficial in terms of addressing their questions, demands and frustrations related to criminal investigations and bias labelling. 14 K. ATAK Since the current study is based primarily on the perceptions of police officers, no inferences can be made about how police decisions and behaviours focused on addres- sing racial hatred are experienced at the receiving end of this issue in the Swedish context. This has implications for future research in at least two respects. First, the symbolic, let alone the instrumental, effects of police work cannot be taken for granted without developing an understanding of their consequences for those affected by racist victimization. Second, what matters is not only the content of the police decisions made in relation to reported incidents, but also the treatment of victim complainants in their contacts with the police. This dimension has far-reaching implications for both procedural justice and the ideal of democratic policing. Notes 1. This subset of offences includes violent crimes, unlawful threats, defamation, molestation, agitation against a national or ethnic group, injury, graffiti and additional offences (BRÅ, 2017). 2. Svartskalle is a derogatory term (svart = black, skalle = skull) used to cause offence to dark- skinned, dark-haired people. 3. The Tyr rune (Tyrrunnan) is an upward arrow symbol which was used in Nazi Germany and was later adopted by neo-Nazi organizations. See https://expo.se/fakta/symbollexikon/tyrru nan (Retrieved 25 February 2019). Acknowledgments I am grateful to Henrik Tham and Leandro S. Mulinari for their valuable comments on earlier versions of this article. I also thank David Shannon for editing the language of the article. Disclosure statement No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author. Funding This research is funded by the Swedish Research Council (project grant number 2016-04660). References Bell, J. (2002). 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Malmö: Malmö Institute for Studies of Migration, Diversity and Welfare. NORDIC JOURNAL OF CRIMINOLOGY 17 https://polisen.se/siteassets/dokument/regeringsuppdrag/aterredovisningtill-regering-om-hatbrott-2017.pdf https://polisen.se/siteassets/dokument/regeringsuppdrag/aterredovisningtill-regering-om-hatbrott-2017.pdf https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2011/may/24/fiona-pilkington-police-misconduct-proceedings https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2011/may/24/fiona-pilkington-police-misconduct-proceedings Abstract Introduction Policing, race and the spectre of exclusion Hate crimes and the promise of inclusion Policing racial hatred in Sweden Abrief overview This study Results Making hate acrime motive: when is racism (dis-)counted? Justificatory claims: dismissal of cases and low prosecution rates Conclusion Notes Acknowledgments Disclosure statement Funding References 
work_7uo7dfmv3nhc7p5z5d4noyzwze	----	RSAF_A_511792_P 421..436 Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=rsaf20 Download by: [University of Cape Town Libraries] Date: 11 January 2016, At: 02:21 Safundi ISSN: 1753-3171 (Print) 1543-1304 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rsaf20 Zanele Muholi's Intimate Archive: Photography and Post-apartheid Lesbian Lives Kylie Thomas To cite this article: Kylie Thomas (2010) Zanele Muholi's Intimate Archive: Photography and Post-apartheid Lesbian Lives, Safundi, 11:4, 421-436, DOI: 10.1080/17533171.2010.511792 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17533171.2010.511792 Published online: 23 Sep 2010. Submit your article to this journal Article views: 1372 View related articles Citing articles: 10 View citing articles http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=rsaf20 http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rsaf20 http://www.tandfonline.com/action/showCitFormats?doi=10.1080/17533171.2010.511792 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17533171.2010.511792 http://www.tandfonline.com/action/authorSubmission?journalCode=rsaf20&page=instructions http://www.tandfonline.com/action/authorSubmission?journalCode=rsaf20&page=instructions http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/mlt/10.1080/17533171.2010.511792 http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/mlt/10.1080/17533171.2010.511792 http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/citedby/10.1080/17533171.2010.511792#tabModule http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/citedby/10.1080/17533171.2010.511792#tabModule Safundi: The Journal of South African and American Studies Vol. 11, No 4, October 2010, 421–436 Zanele Muholi’s Intimate Archive: Photography and Post-apartheid Lesbian Lives Kylie Thomas The ones who fear me think they know who I am. Minnie Bruce Pratt1 This paper focuses on the work of South African black lesbian photographer Zanele Muholi and raises the question of how experience that is deemed unspeakable can enter representation. If we always read images through ‘‘codes of connotation,’’ through what Roland Barthes terms the ‘‘studium’’ of our knowing, how is it possible to overturn ways of seeing that render lesbian subjectivity invisible?2 And if lesbian subjectivity is made visible through suspending the structures of recognition, what are the political implications of occupying such an ‘‘outlaw’’ position? How does being beyond recognition open or close the field of political possibility? The paper makes two theoretical claims: one, that Barthes’ influential concept of the ‘‘punctum’’ can be understood as a mode of queer reading, and two, that Muholi’s work constructs an archive that insists on the specificity of lesbian lives and loss through a complex strategy of ‘‘passing.’’ My reading of Muholi’s portraits that constitute her ‘‘Faces and Phases’’ series explores how her photographs work with the ambiguities of ‘‘passing’’—passing away, passing between states of gendered being, and passing through the prohibitions against making lesbian experience visible and mourning lesbian loss. In this way, the paper argues that Muholi’s most recent body of work ‘‘queers’’ both the conventions of memorial photography and her own earlier representations of lesbian subjectivity. Correspondence to: Kylie Thomas, Post-doctoral Research Fellow, Archive and Public Culture Research Initiative, Department of Social Anthropology, University of Cape Town, Private Bag, Rondebosch 7701, South Africa. Email: kylie.thomas@uct.ac.za 1Pratt, Crime Against Nature, 114. 2 Barthes, Camera Lucida, 26. ISSN 1753-3171 (print)/ISSN 1543-1304 (online) � 2010 Taylor & Francis DOI: 10.1080/17533171.2010.511792 D ow nl oa de d by [ U ni ve rs it y of C ap e T ow n L ib ra ri es ] at 0 2: 21 1 1 Ja nu ar y 20 16 Zanele Muholi is one of a handful of black women artists who figure prominently in the visual art field and her work has been shown both in South Africa and abroad. She is certainly the most visible black lesbian artist in South Africa and has received numerous awards for her work. Her photographs have also generated a great deal of controversy. In August 2009, South Africa’s Minister of Arts and Culture, Lulu Xingwana, walked out of an exhibition that contained several of Muholi’s photographs on the grounds that they were ‘‘immoral, offensive’’ and worked ‘‘against nation-building.’’3 This has placed Muholi’s photographs at the center of a national debate about homophobia, freedom of expression, and queer experience.4 I will return to the significance of Xingwana’s comments later in this paper in my discussion of the tactics Muholi employs in her photographs of black lesbians who have been subject to ‘‘corrective rape’’ and who have died of AIDS-related causes, or who were murdered as a result of hate crimes. I read these images as works of mourning that invoke conventional tropes of memorialization to circumvent precisely the socially normative prohibitions so dramatically performed by Xingwana in her role as an authorized voice of the state. The paper offers an analysis of the transformation in Muholi’s mode of working that occurs when she addresses the question of how to represent loss. In particular I trace how her current work draws on the conventions of memorial photography in order to secure a place for queer subjects within representation. At the same time, I show how this complex working with and against the ‘‘structures of recognition’’ signals a departure from her earlier and more narrow conceptualizations of lesbian subjectivity.5 In order to do this, I begin by describing some of the ways in which her photographs can be understood as engaged in the task of ‘‘differencing the canon,’’ before turning to a reading of her most recent series of portraits, ‘‘Faces and Phases.’’ The work of South African feminist theorists Desiree Lewis and Pumla Dineo Gqola and curator and artist Gabi Ngcobo has drawn attention to how Muholi’s photographs render visible the complexity of lesbian lives.6 However, this brave and politically necessary task is not the sum of her work. The import of her current photographs lies in how they both lay bare and contest the ways in which the lives of queer subjects are made invisible and their deaths ungrievable. ‘‘Faces and Phases,’’ I argue here, works at the limit of the speakable, and Muholi’s photographs mark that limit even as they pass beyond it. 3 Van Wyk, ‘‘Xingwana.’’ For the media statement issued by Xingwana, see her ‘‘Statement’’ online. It is also instructive to read the Minister’s statements on art that does promote nation-building. See, for instance, her address at the launch of the ‘‘Moral Regeneration Month’’ in July 2009: Xingwana, ‘‘Address by the Minister of Arts and Culture.’’ 4I employ the term ‘‘queer’’ to open a way of thinking about sexuality and subjectivity that crosses and seeks to undo the bounds between categories of identification such as ‘‘gay,’’ ‘‘lesbian,’’ ‘‘straight,’’ ‘‘bisexual,’’ and ‘‘intersex.’’ 5 I draw the phrase ‘‘structures of recognition’’ from psychoanalytic theorist Parveen Adams. The term implies socially constructed ways of seeing and modes by which one becomes recognizable as a subject, as well as the psychic dimension of the operations of the gaze. See Adams, Emptiness of the Image. 6 See Lewis, ‘‘Against the Grain’’; Gqola, ‘‘Through Zanele Muholi’s Eyes’’; and Ngcobo, ‘‘Introduction.’’ 422 K. Thomas D ow nl oa de d by [ U ni ve rs it y of C ap e T ow n L ib ra ri es ] at 0 2: 21 1 1 Ja nu ar y 20 16 DISRUPTING VISUAL CODES In Encounters in the Virtual Feminist Museum, Griselda Pollock presents an approach to the history of art that embarks on the work of what she terms ‘‘differencing the canon.’’7 She swiftly lays to rest the notion that the canon is quite ‘‘differenced’’ enough already by noting that ‘‘[n]ot only have we had to struggle and still struggle on to ensure equity in the representation of all women as well as all men in our cultural archives, but now our very struggle is being written out of history, brushed off as a passing irritant.’’8 Pollock begins her reflections on the place of women in the history of art, in the museum and in the archive, by relating her encounter with a series of postcards that depict The Three Graces, a neo-classical sculpture by Antonio Canova. She notes how the prevalence of the female nude in the art museum is so naturalized that we no longer see its strangeness, and as longstanding signifier of Western art the naked female form becomes a placeholder for women in art—the place of ‘‘woman’’ in the museum, a stony limit point for feminist art practice and theory. Her book goes on to produce ‘‘a virtual feminist museum’’ through a constellation of images exhibited in what she terms ‘‘rooms’’ at the beginning of each of her chapters, all of which unsettle and recalibrate the archive of art history. Pollock’s work reminds us that ‘‘Archives matter. What is included shapes forever what we think we were and hence what we might become. The absence of women’s histories in world archives has defined a vision of the human on the pattern of a privileged masculinity.’’9 Pollock’s approach to reconfiguring how we think about visual culture is suggestive, and her archival feminist aim resonates with the work of Zanele Muholi in several ways. Muholi’s project is also an archival one and is concerned with many of the same issues of visibility and invisibility that have consumed feminist scholarship since the 1970s. In her artist’s statement that appears in the catalogue for the ‘‘Innovative Women’’ exhibition, she writes: ‘‘As an insider within the black lesbian community and a visual activist, I want to ensure that my community, especially those lesbian women who come from the marginalised townships, are included in the women’s ‘canon.’’’10 A cursory survey of Muholi’s work thus far reveals the intensity of her commitment to producing a visual archive of black lesbian experience. Her photographs have appeared in group exhibitions since 2002; her solo exhibition Visual Sexuality was held at the Johannesburg Art Gallery in 2004; and since 2006, she has been represented by Michael Stevenson, a commercial art gallery in South Africa. She has held four additional solo exhibitions there: Only Half the Picture (2006); Being (2007); Faces and Phases, first exhibited as a series in 2009; and Indawo Yami (2010). Her exhibitions in Europe and North America include solo shows in Vienna and Amsterdam. In 2007, together with white South African lesbian photographer Jean Brundrit, Muholi facilitated a series of photographic workshops ‘‘to gather 7 Pollock, Encounters, 13. See also Pollock, Differencing the Canon. 8Pollock, Encounters, 13. 9Ibid., 12. 10 Van Wyk, ‘‘Xingwana.’’ Safundi: The Journal of South African and American Studies 423 D ow nl oa de d by [ U ni ve rs it y of C ap e T ow n L ib ra ri es ] at 0 2: 21 1 1 Ja nu ar y 20 16 diverse opinions and diverse lesbian experiences in South Africa’’ with eight aspiring photographers.11 While the artist is now firmly positioned within the commercial art world, she continues her work with the Forum for the Empowerment of Women, an organization that she co-founded, and to teach others to take photographs.12 As this paper shows, the bounds of her photographic archive have expanded to include representations of multiple forms of queer subjectivity. Muholi’s photographs open new spaces of representation in South African visual culture, but follow in the tradition of feminist/lesbian art-making practices established over time by artists such as the US-based Judy Chicago, Cindy Sherman, Laura Aguilar and others. In her oeuvre there are numerous works that proclaim their transgressive, disruptive stance, and these are perhaps the images that are easiest to categorize, easiest to dismiss—as some critics have—as ‘‘not very good art’’ that nonetheless makes an important political point.13 Some of the images in Muholi’s book Only Half the Picture and some that appear in her more recent ‘‘Being’’ series are among those that invoke conventional tropes of lesbian/feminist representation to contest the bounds of what is considered proper for women and for art. ‘‘Dada, 2003,’’ a black-and-white photograph of a bare-breasted black woman strapping on a dildo, her face beyond the frame of the image, the 2005–6 ‘‘Period’’ series, and the 2009 ‘‘LiZa’’ series can all be read as testing the limits of propriety in art and as a straightforward claiming of a visual space for embodied black lesbian experience. And through these works Muholi’s project can be said to be aligned with the mainstream feminist position that Pollock articulates in Encounters in the Virtual Feminist Museum. For in this conceptualization of the production of a new form of feminist archive that makes the experiences of women visible, it is of course necessary that the women who are represented are recognizable as women. Muholi’s project, one that she articulates on her website as ‘‘mapping and archiving a visual history of black lesbians in post-Apartheid South Africa,’’ also engages and affirms a particular form of identity politics in order to lay claim to a place within an existing order of representation. At the same time, Muholi’s concern with securing a place for lesbian experience within ‘‘the women’s ‘canon’’’ signals that what constitutes lesbian subjectivity is by no means decided. Her words testify to the ontological insecurity of the category of being that is ‘‘lesbian’’ in a context where ‘‘corrective rape’’ is practiced as way to ‘‘restore’’ lesbians to womanhood. Bringing the work of Zanele Muholi into conversation with the feminist position that Pollock articulates also opens a way to consider what the limits of ‘‘differencing the canon’’ might be. What happens when radical and disruptive forms of subjectivity seek to enter representation? Does the canon hold? Does the archive seize up, prohibit entry? What kinds of silences remain? 11A selection of photographs by the participants at the workshop, a description of the project and some of Jean Brundrit’s own very interesting photographic work—which, like Muholi’s, engages with lesbian experience, (in)visibility and the archive—is collected in Brundrit, ‘‘A Lesbian Story.’’ 12For more information about Muholi’s visual activism, see her projects on her website www.zanelemuholi.com. 13See the critiques leveled at Muholi’s early work by reviewers such as Smith, and reprinted in Muholi’s Only Half the Picture, 2006, 90–1; and Hogg, cited in Lewis, ‘‘Against the Grain,’’ 17. 424 K. Thomas D ow nl oa de d by [ U ni ve rs it y of C ap e T ow n L ib ra ri es ] at 0 2: 21 1 1 Ja nu ar y 20 16 AFTER LIFE: READING PHOTOGRAPHIC IMAGES (OR WHAT THE MINISTER THOUGHT SHE SAW AT THE SHOW) [P]hotographic connotation, like every well structured signification, is an institutional activity; in relation to society overall, its function is to integrate man, to reassure him. Roland Barthes14 In August last year, I was invited to speak at the Innovative Women Art Exhibition at Constitution Hill. Upon arrival at the Exhibition, I immediately saw images which I deemed offensive. The images in large frames were of naked bodies presumably involved in sexual acts. I was particularly revolted by an image called ‘‘Self-rape,’’ depicting a sexual act with a nature scene as backdrop. The notion of self-rape trivialises the scourge of rape in this country. To my mind, these were not works of arts [sic] but crude misrepresentations of women (both black and white) masquerading as artworks rather than engaged in questioning or interrogating— which I believe is what art is about. Those particular works of art stereotyped black women. Lulu Xingwana15 In response to criticism that her departure from the show was homophobic, the Minister of Arts and Culture stated: ‘‘Contrary to media reports, I was not even aware as to whether the ‘bodies’ in the images were of men or women or both for that matter.’’16 There is a strange way in which Xingwana’s comments can be read as particularly insightful: Muholi’s photographs do trouble the distinctions between men, women, ‘‘or both for that matter,’’ and there is a powerful sense in which lesbians can only enter recognizable representation as ‘‘crude misrepresentations of women masquerading as artworks.’’ Xingwana’s act of turning away from the exhibition, her inability to look, also speaks to how certain images might serve to challenge and even overturn the conventions that govern our gaze. Her statements also reveal more than they intend about the challenges we find when we attempt to describe what it is we see, and in particular when we try to read a photograph. For what emerges is that while Xingwana found herself powerfully affected by her brief immersion in the field of black lesbian visual art, she did not see what she describes, nor is she quite sure of what it was she saw. In her now classic work, On Photography, Susan Sontag explores the ubiquity and importance of photographic images in the industrialized countries of the West, where, she argues, life can no longer be imagined without cameras to provide evidence of life itself and people ‘‘feel that they are images, and are made real by photographs.’’ 17 Sontag’s reflections on the symbolic power that photographic images have come to hold in contemporary society can also be read as an attempt to make sense of photography, to provide an answer to the question: ‘‘What is a photograph?’’ ‘‘The photographer both loots and preserves, denounces 14 Barthes, Image, Music, Text, 31. 15Xingwana, ‘‘Statement.’’ 16Ibid. 17 Sontag, On Photography, 161. Safundi: The Journal of South African and American Studies 425 D ow nl oa de d by [ U ni ve rs it y of C ap e T ow n L ib ra ri es ] at 0 2: 21 1 1 Ja nu ar y 20 16 and consecrates,’’18 she writes, and although ‘‘there is a sense in which the camera does indeed capture reality, not just interpret it, photographs are as much an interpretation of the world as paintings and drawings are.’’19 While for Sontag, the ‘‘force of a photograph is that it keeps open to scrutiny instants which the normal flow of time immediately replaces,’’ for Roland Barthes the photographic image is no more outside of time than those who view it.20 For Barthes, photographs do not ‘‘capture’’ a moment of the real to be seen again and again, but in responding to the image, it is the viewer, and the society of which they are part, that is laid open to scrutiny. The instant in time the photograph is intended to capture is perceived afterwards; and it is in this after-time that the significance of the image comes to be constituted. In this sense, photographs do not preserve life but instead create it, a perpetual after-life. And it is in this making that the critical project of constructing a photographic archive of queer experience lies; an archive that testifies to the presence of black lesbians in the past, but also one that asserts and ensures their presence in the future. In his essay ‘‘The Photographic Message,’’ Barthes extends and complicates Sontag’s definition of photographs and her analysis of how they can be read. He begins his essay with what he terms ‘‘the photographic paradox’’: ‘‘analogical perfection,’’ the absence of a code that translates the object into its image, defines the photograph, which, at the same time, is a sign of something other than itself. The photograph appears to be ‘‘a mechanical analogue of reality,’’ a ‘‘denoted message,’’ and to describe it is to attach to the image a ‘‘connoted message, which is the manner in which the society to a certain extent communicates what it thinks of it.’’21 In front of a photograph, the feeling of ‘‘denotation,’’ or, if one prefers, of analogical plenitude, is so great that the description of a photograph is literally impossible; to describe consists precisely in joining to the denoted message a relay or second-order message derived from a code which is that of language and constituting in relation to the photographic analogue, however much care one takes to be exact, a connotation: to describe is thus not simply to be imprecise or incomplete, it is to change structures, to signify something different to what is shown.22 For Barthes, then, a photograph is, and can only be, our reading of it. When we describe what we see, we ‘‘signify something different to what is shown.’’ And crucially, how one reads is through other images, visible or remembered, alongside and in conjunction with the single image that can never be singular. In Camera Lucida, Barthes extends his thinking about how photographs are read through the concepts of the ‘‘studium’’ and the ‘‘punctum.’’ Most photographs belong to the studium, that which I have learned to see by acculturation and that which cannot really reach me. And then there are those photographs that arrest my gaze, 18 Ibid., 64–5. 19 Ibid., 6–7. 20Ibid., 112. 21Barthes, Image, Music, Text, 16–18. 22 Ibid., 18–19. 426 K. Thomas D ow nl oa de d by [ U ni ve rs it y of C ap e T ow n L ib ra ri es ] at 0 2: 21 1 1 Ja nu ar y 20 16 photographs that disturb the studium of my knowing, photographs that wound me, photographs that I love. This element within the photograph is animated through the particularity of my gaze. It is this that Barthes terms the ‘‘punctum’’: ‘‘The second element will break or (punctuate) the studium. This time it is not I who seek it out (as I invest the field of the studium with my sovereign consciousness), it is this element which rises from the scene, shoots out of it like an arrow, and pierces me.’’23 Again, we are reminded of Barthes’ key insight that there is nothing really internal to the image: I read everything I see, and can only see what I read. This is not to disavow the relationship between myself and the image—the image wields a certain power by virtue of what it draws out in me. But as I look, the image becomes what I turn it into: my reading structures the image; I make it mean. Barthes’ concepts of the studium and the punctum set up a method of reading photographs that illuminates how all readings are cultural—but at the same time legitimate a deeply subjective mode of response. The concept of the punctum allows Barthes (not to mention all those who have followed in his wake) to cast his emotional, poetic responses to photographs as a theory. I draw on these concepts here to grant a kind of legitimacy to my readings of Muholi’s photographs. At the same time, I am struck by how thinking of her work in relation to Barthes’ influential terms casts light on the implications of ‘‘queering the gaze’’ beyond gay and lesbian studies. In other words, it is not simply that Barthes’ method offers a productive mode of reading Muholi’s photographs, but Muholi’s work shows that reading with and for the punctum can be understood as a mode of queer reading, an openness to ways of seeing that disrupt the heteronormative patriarchal hegemony that limits and structures our gaze. In Camera Lucida, Barthes writes of how ‘‘to give examples of punctum is, in a certain fashion, to give myself up.’’24 To reveal the ways in which I am affected by a photograph is to be exposed, describing what I see is an act that ‘‘outs’’ me, one that positions my intimate self in a public sphere. ‘‘Giving myself up’’ before a photograph is also to occupy a subject position beyond or outside of my own. Faced with Muholi’s portrait of Nomonde Mbusi, for example, I know that I have been set up to see in a certain way—this is the photographer’s art. As with so many of her photographs, I face a beautiful image of a beautiful woman.25 The lines of this young woman’s body are carved in light and are accentuated by the dark cloth behind her. Her head is wrapped in a scarf so that only the faintest trace of her hair is visible on her forehead. She appears to be moving towards the viewer; it seems she is about to speak. She is not wearing a shirt, but the photograph is cropped above her breasts. The smooth open expanse of her skin and her wide eyes are a form of invitation—an erotic photograph. The photographic encounter frames my desire—I want to see this woman, to hold her with my gaze. And yet she holds me; a kind of Mona Lisa effect comes into play; she seems to move as I do. To be interpellated by Nomonde Mbusi’s 23Barthes, Camera Lucida, 26. 24Ibid., 43. 25 The image can be viewed online. See Muholi, ‘‘Faces and Phases.’’ Safundi: The Journal of South African and American Studies 427 D ow nl oa de d by [ U ni ve rs it y of C ap e T ow n L ib ra ri es ] at 0 2: 21 1 1 Ja nu ar y 20 16 eyes in this way is both liberating and disturbing. ‘‘Seeing’’ Muholi’s photographs is premised on the notion that exchanging queer looks and recognizing the desire they conjure is to acknowledge the queerness inside ourselves. What might the Minister have seen had she stayed to look at Muholi’s photographs? The incendiary quality of the works Xingwana did and did not see lies in how they make possible a space for us to acknowledge our own (queer) desire, I want to argue, in how they provide an entry point into an intimate archive—one that is embodied, one that is formed through love. Xingwana’s inability to look returns us to the question of how Muholi’s representations of lesbian subjectivity alert us to the limit of the speakable even as they pass beyond it. LIGHT WRITING IN DARK TIMES Muholi’s first monograph, Only Half the Picture, carefully works with the aesthetics of the body, a complex holding of traumatic histories encoded in skin together with a celebration of lesbian desire and the promise of pleasure. Through Muholi’s lens, black female bodies are re-signified: framed as the subjects of and for lesbian desire, they make visible an erotics of longing, of sexual intimacy and of community. At the same time, many of the photographs carry resonances of images of black female bodies drawn from a long history of racist iconography and which map the continuities of black female oppression over time. In the cracked toenails of the women in ‘‘Triple III,’’ for instance, there are signs of hardship; in the dark markings along the outer edges of the thighs of the reclining figures there is a shadow of darkness, of violence, bruises or stains.26 Read in conjunction with the other photographs in the ‘‘Triple’’ series that portray the interlocking legs and buttocks of three women and that bring to mind the erotic nudes of Edward Weston or Imogen Cunningham, the ambiguities of ‘‘Triple III’’ are largely erased. Its erotic dimension comes to the fore. The pose of the three women speaks of the stillness of sleep and shows the protective tenderness of bodies curved around one another. And yet there is something disturbing about the arrangement of these bodies on the floor. They are shown to be resting on a strip of carpet, its detail in the foreground so close-up it becomes a strange terrain and then fades to merge with what appears to be a stone floor that extends behind them. The marks on the limbs of these women evoke the history of slavery, summon photographs of the bodies of those killed in the Rwandan genocide, provide a visual echo of the legs of school-girls who have been tear-gassed and who run from the police in Soweto in South Africa in 1976. The larger context of Muholi’s book, one that includes photographs of women after being raped, raises the question of how it is possible to read black lesbian desire outside of the violence of both the past and present. I want to say that inside the frame of ‘‘Triple III’’ there is no fear, only kinship, intimacy, love. But if this is so, then fear is just beyond the borders of what is made visible here and haunts this 26The image can be seen on the Michael Stevenson Gallery website; see Muholi, ‘‘Only Half the Picture: 29 March—29 April 2006.’’ 428 K. Thomas D ow nl oa de d by [ U ni ve rs it y of C ap e T ow n L ib ra ri es ] at 0 2: 21 1 1 Ja nu ar y 20 16 beautiful assemblage of bare forms. Here, as in the works that form part of her series portraying lesbians who have been subject to hate crimes that I discuss below, Muholi is masterful in her portrayal of the vulnerability of the human body and the complexity of embodied experience. In ‘‘Ordeal, 2003,’’ there is a line of fury that runs through the arm of the woman who crouches at the edge of an enamel basin scrubbing her hands into a blurred frenzy, moving so fast and so slick with water they appear unskinned.27 At the center of the photograph in which everything else remains still, these hands are rendered unrecognizable, a pulpy mass, an internal organ exposed to the air, an aborted fetus or placenta. Something that cannot be washed clean. This is the first of a series of photographs in Only Half the Picture that depicts the survivors of hate crimes. It is followed by a double-page spread of a case number, a crumpled piece of lined paper depicted against a black ground, issued by the South African Police Service in Meadowlands, Soweto. Handwritten on the page are the details of a case—the date of the incident, the name of the inspector assigned to the case, a phone number and an official stamp. There is also a line that reads ‘‘ATT. Rape þ Assault GBH’’ [grievous bodily harm]. The photograph that appears overleaf casts light on why this hastily written case number should be accorded so much space. ‘‘Hate Crime Survivor I, 2004’’ is a closely cropped portrait of a woman visible from her waist to just above her knees. The vertical lines of her hospital-issue pajama pants angle slightly in towards the center of the photograph and draw the viewer’s eyes to her slender wrists and hands which are positioned on her lap, her curved finger and thumb forming a dark hollow, a point of entry into her body, a metonym for the violated parts of her we cannot see. Around her wrists are three identificatory tags that signify her inpatient status but here also read as manacles, handcuffs. And suddenly her striped clothing resembles a prison uniform, and the posture of her body holds the echo of countless images of incarcerated men who stand with their heads bent, their hands and feet bound—a stance of guilt. The implication is that in spite of the indisputable archival evidence represented by the photograph of the case number that immediately precedes this image, lesbians who are raped are often not believed and are treated as criminals both inside and outside of the justice system. The juxtaposition of these two photographs makes visible the ways in which those who are subject to rape are also often accused of having brought violence on themselves. The concept of ‘‘corrective’’ or ‘‘curative’’ rape is often read as premised on the idea that lesbians have done something wrong to begin with and that rape is that which will set things right, restoring ‘‘the natural order.’’ Muholi articulates how rape is used to punish and ‘‘correct’’ lesbians in South Africa: ‘‘Curative rapes, as they are called, are perpetrated against us in order to make us into ‘real’ and ‘true’ African women—appropriately feminine, mothers, men’s property.’’28 Yet as Muholi’s photographs show, understanding the psychic mechanism that underlies curative rape as an act that restores the order of patriarchy 27See this and other images at Muholi, ‘‘Only Half the Picture: 29 March—29 April 2006.’’ 28 Muholi, ‘‘Mapping Our Histories,’’ 19. Safundi: The Journal of South African and American Studies 429 D ow nl oa de d by [ U ni ve rs it y of C ap e T ow n L ib ra ri es ] at 0 2: 21 1 1 Ja nu ar y 20 16 through affirming relations of power between men and women is to grant a kind of sense to senseless acts of hate. Her series depicting survivors of hate crimes shows how the act of ‘‘curative rape’’ is fundamentally tied to a desire to murder. One of the most painful photographs in Muholi’s oeuvre is ‘‘Hate Crime Survivor II.’’ It appears alongside the photograph of the ‘‘criminal/survivor’’ and powerfully undoes the flawed and fatal logic that seeks to blame lesbians who are raped. In a hospital ward on a high bed covered with a white sheet is a figure under a heap of dark bedclothes. In fact it is only the caption that accompanies the photograph which renders the figure legible—without the single line that tells us that what we are looking at is a person, a ‘‘survivor,’’ there is no way to know for certain that the shape on the bed is a human form. The camera angle renders the bed enormous and foreshortens the figure so that the person appears shrunken, barely there. The photograph portrays how the human form is overcome by the trauma of psychic collapse. Here the effect of rape is shown to be ontological erasure, the annihilation of subjectivity. The person who we know to be there but that we cannot see has not been made ‘‘woman,’’ but has been altogether unmade as a subject. ‘‘Aftermath, 2004’’ portrays a woman standing, and in this sense contrasts the collapsed figure on the hospital bed on the preceding page.29 However, the large scar that extends down the length of this woman’s thigh signifies that there can be no easy moving beyond the trauma of rape. The scar is a sign of a much older wound, but serves here as an outer manifestation of her more recent physical and psychic wounding through ‘‘corrective rape.’’ The scar itself, an elongated teardrop, an opening into her body now closed, like the curled hand of the woman depicted in ‘‘Hate Crime Survivor I,’’ serves as a metonym for her violated vagina. There is something unbearable about the positioning of this woman’s hands. They seek to shield her, to protect her, in this instance from our gaze as much as from the traumatic memory of attack; but at the same time they are passive, they are hands that speak a history of defeat. If there is a punctum here, it is not the scar—which we cannot fail to see—but the light as it catches the thumb of this woman, her curled fingers, the vulnerability of her being that is encoded in her hands. Muholi’s hate-crimes series asks us to think differently about how we understand sexuality and subjectivity, and this is not restricted to thinking what lesbians are or might be. They show us that to be lesbian is not to perform desire in a way that transforms/queers an underlying essential being that is ‘‘woman.’’ Instead they show, through laying bare the painful way in which the corrective rape of lesbians restores absolutely nothing at all, the emptiness at the center of the fiction that animates all forms of gendered being. 30 29For other readings of this photograph see Lewis, ‘‘Against the Grain,’’ and Gunkel, Cultural Politics. 30The key text for thinking gender as performative remains Judith Butler’s Gender Trouble, which asks, among other things, how ‘‘language itself produce[s] the fictive construction of ‘sex’’’ (xi). 430 K. Thomas D ow nl oa de d by [ U ni ve rs it y of C ap e T ow n L ib ra ri es ] at 0 2: 21 1 1 Ja nu ar y 20 16 QUEERING THE ARCHIVE The ways in which Antonio Canova’s sculpture of the Three Graces might be read as pregnant with lesbian/transsexual desire is surfaced in a photographic work by British artist Della Grace/Del LaGrace Volcano.31 The black-and-white photograph shows three women, naked but for their jackboots, standing in the pose of The Three Graces with their arms around one another and their heads shaved, their bodies scarified, pierced and tattooed. I first saw LaGrace Volcano’s reworking of the sculpture in Parveen Adams’ book The Emptiness of the Image, and Adams’ reading of the photograph is a provocative one. For Adams, the image disturbs the conventional modes of representation of woman to such an extent that she argues: ‘‘These women are beyond recognition.’’32 She goes on to explain: Recognition is a process that may be looked at from two sides. Women who are recognized as such are recognized by a rigorous template of definition. If we do not recognize, in this photograph, these women, it is not because they are recognized as something else. It is rather because the structure of recognition has been suspended.33 What Adams draws attention to here is the way in which LaGrace Volcano’s photograph inaugurates a way of looking that undoes our gendered gaze. The transgressive power of the image lies in the fact that we cannot simply substitute ‘‘woman’’ for another recognizable category of being—whether that is ‘‘lesbian’’ or anything else. Adams’ reading provides a way to account for the absence of LaGrace Volcano’s The Three Graces from Pollock’s virtual feminist museum. Her analysis of how the photograph works to suspend the structures of recognition raises the question of what it means to be positioned outside the realms of the legible. And this returns us to the significance of the archive, which, as Pollock notes, is pre-selected in ways that reflect what each culture considered worth storing and remembering, skewing historical record and indeed historical writing towards the privileged, the powerful, the political, military and religious. Vast areas of social life and huge numbers of people hardly exist, according to the archive. The archive is overdetermined by facts of class, race, gender, sexuality and above all power. 34 Indeed, the archive produces these ‘‘facts’’ as much as it holds them and seeks to secure them. The archive is also (and I think this is the sense in which Zanele Muholi employs the term) a site of struggle for legitimacy. A certain kind of entry into the archive will mark queer lives as deviant, perverse, and criminal. Another mode of entry, one that Muholi’s work seeks to find, is that which will guarantee visibility within the social that is not at the same time a form of erasure. Central here is the question of what the archive itself demands: what are the conditions of entry into the archive of legibility? If ‘‘the archive is the law of what can be said,’’ then what is 31 Della Grace is now Del LaGrace Volcano, a gender-variant visual artist. See www.dellagracevolcano.com. 32Adams, Emptiness of the Image, 123. 33Ibid., 138. 34 Pollock, Encounters, 12 (my italics). Safundi: The Journal of South African and American Studies 431 D ow nl oa de d by [ U ni ve rs it y of C ap e T ow n L ib ra ri es ] at 0 2: 21 1 1 Ja nu ar y 20 16 the place of outlaw subjects who are not merely beyond or outside the law, but who signify the law’s very undoing?35 It is in a space of suspension, a kind of limit zone between recognition and invisibility, that Muholi’s most powerful photographs are situated. The ways in which Muholi carefully forces the boundaries of the archive’s frontier is the subject of the remainder of this paper. I explore how, through a process that literary theorist Ross Chambers terms ‘‘genre-hijacking’’36 and that I draw on and recode here as ‘‘passing,’’ Muholi’s work performs a complex negotiation of the limits and possibilities of and for queer subjectivity within representation.37 MOURNING AND/AS MASQUERADE Ultimately, Photography is subversive not when it frightens, when it repels, or even stigmatizes, but when it is pensive, when it thinks. Roland Barthes38 There is a second punctum that Barthes identifies as he studies the photographs that move him and attempts to identify the secrets of photographic affect. That punctum is time. Photographs make visible the passage of time and they mark our inability to halt its passage. This relation between photography and time is central to understanding how photography, and portrait photography in particular, is linked to mourning. In Camera Lucida, Barthes reads Alexander Gardner’s 1865 portrait of Lewis Payne, a young man who was photographed in his cell while awaiting execution for attempting to assassinate Secretary of State W.H. Seward: ‘‘The photograph is handsome, as is the boy: that is the studium. But the punctum is: he is going to die.’’39 Barthes quickly comes to see that all photographs make visible our being-towards-death. ‘‘I read at the same time: This will be and this has been; I observe with horror an anterior future of which death is the stake. By giving me the absolute past of the pose (aorist), the photograph tells me death in the future.’’40 The photographs that make up the ‘‘Faces and Phases’’ series exploit the relation between photography and mourning to great effect. All the photographs in the series are shot in black-and-white; almost all the subjects face the camera, ‘‘returning’’ the viewer’s gaze; most are half-length portraits, and several depict only the head and shoulders of the subject. Each photograph is captioned with the name of the person portrayed, the place in which they were photographed, and the date the image 35Michel Foucault, Archaeology of Knowledge, 145. 36See Chambers, Untimely Interventions, 29. See also Chambers, Facing It (1998), for an excellent study of how writing the experience of living with and dying of AIDS tests the boundaries of autobiographical writing. 37Natasha Distiller’s essay ‘‘Another Story’’ offers a critical reflection on the limits of and for lesbian experience within representation. Interestingly, Muholi refers to Distiller’s argument in her discussion of her motivation for producing ‘‘Faces and Phases’’ and states: ‘‘I wanted to resist the heterosexual representation of lesbians through portraits’’ (Muholi, ‘‘Mapping Our Histories,’’ 26). 38Barthes, Camera Lucida, 38. 39Ibid., 96. 40 Ibid. 432 K. Thomas D ow nl oa de d by [ U ni ve rs it y of C ap e T ow n L ib ra ri es ] at 0 2: 21 1 1 Ja nu ar y 20 16 was taken. The uniformity of the images indicates that they form part of a single body of work. The seeming regularity of the series also serves another end—it operates as a visual sign of a shared experience, of a community of being, and is a common practice in photography that aims to memorialize. Muholi’s artist’s statement for ‘‘Faces and Phases’’ overtly articulates her desire to assert black queer presence in contemporary South Africa and frames that desire in relation to the ever-present threat of violence, both discursive and material. ‘‘It is important to mark, map and preserve our mo(ve)ments through visual histories for reference and posterity so that future generations will note that we were here.’’41 In her description of the work she intends the series to perform, Muholi writes: ‘‘Historically, portraits serve as memorable records for families and friends as evidence when someone passes. Faces express the persons, and Phases signifies the transition from one stage of sexuality or gender expression and experience to another.’’42 Here, Muholi uses the term ‘‘passes’’ in the sense of ‘‘passed away’’ or ‘‘to die.’’ An analysis of the work that ‘‘Faces and Phases’’ performs also reveals how ‘‘passing’’ operates in another way, through these photographs that make visible the ‘‘passing away’’ of lesbians as a result of hate crimes and AIDS-related diseases and a form of ‘‘passing’’ between fixed-gendered positions. These portraits simultaneously permit these lesbian lives to ‘‘pass’’ into an archive of mainstream visual representation through their ‘‘hijacking’’ of the generic conventions of memorializa- tion. Ross Chambers has developed this idea in relation to the work of gay writers who have testified to their experiences of living with and dying of AIDS. ‘‘Genre- hijacking’’ makes use of established generic conventions to speak what culture has deemed unspeakable. In the case of Muholi’s work in South Africa, what is unspeakable is both lesbian desire and loss.43 ‘‘Faces and Phases’’ mobilizes the conventions of memorial portrait photography to open a space for mourning and at the same time queers that space by juxtaposing images of the dead with multiple portraits of living queer subjects. The question of what is at stake in this act of passing marks the fine line between passing as a strategy of survival, a mechanism that allows one to appear, and ‘‘passing away,’’ becoming invisible as a queer subject through one’s entry into the realm of the legible. This invisibility can be psychic, a metaphoric loss of subjectivity, and can take material form through the threat of murder that affects lesbian being everywhere in South Africa today. Muholi’s artist’s statement draws attention to the portraits of those who have died, but at the same time positions them among the portraits of the living. Here, the presence of the dead signals the precarious position of the living, and the living remind us of the subjectivity of the dead: Phases articulates the collective pain we as a community experience due to the loss of friends and acquaintances through disease and hate crimes. Some of those who 41 Muholi, ‘‘Faces and Phases.’’ 42Muholi, ‘‘Mapping Our Histories,’’ 27. 43Carolyn Hamilton discusses how art opens a space for what has been deemed unspeakable; see Hamilton, ‘‘Uncertain Citizenship,’’ 368. Safundi: The Journal of South African and American Studies 433 D ow nl oa de d by [ U ni ve rs it y of C ap e T ow n L ib ra ri es ] at 0 2: 21 1 1 Ja nu ar y 20 16 participated in this visual project have already passed away. We fondly remember Buhle Msibi (2006), Busi Sigasa (2007), Nosizwe Cekiso (2009) and Penny Fish (2009): may they rest in peace. The portraits also celebrate friends and acquaintances who hold different positions and play many different roles within black queer communities—an actress, soccer players, a scholar, cultural activists, dancers, filmmakers, writers, photographers, human rights and gender activists, mothers, lovers, friends, sisters, brothers, daughters and sons.44 Positioning the portraits of the dead among those still living implies solidarity with the dead, a community that traverses the boundary between life and death. The rhetorical force of this pairing of the living and the dead powerfully refuses the dehumanization of black lesbians that led to the deaths of the women memorialized here. This positioning which insists on the relation between the living and the dead also means that we necessarily read each portrait in the series as haunted by the possibility of violence, rape and murder. The photographs in the series of women who have died—Busi Sigasa, Penny Fish and Nosizwe Cekiso—make use of the recognizable codes of the obituary form; but read in relation to the other portraits in the series, these codes are undeniably queered. Witness the juxtaposition of ‘‘Nosizwe Cekiso, Gugulethu, Cape Town, 2008’’ with ‘‘Gazi T Zuma, Umlazi, Durban, 2010.’’ What results is a form of queer memorializing that makes lesbian lives and deaths visible without sacrificing their queerness. It is the particularity of these deaths as lesbian deaths that Muholi will not allow to pass, even as they ‘‘pass’’ into the memorial structures of recognition. The photographs that make up ‘‘Faces and Phases’’ negotiate the line between passing and death, visibility and invisibility. For in these images, what we see is not ‘‘woman,’’ and yet we cannot recognize these subjects as lesbians either; for a moment, in looking, the fixity of our gendered look cannot hold.45 ‘‘The structure of recognition has been suspended.’’46 All that is thought to separate black lesbians from ‘‘human’’ subjectivity is simultaneously present and absent here. The photographs insist on the particularity of the black lesbians they portray at the same time as they insist on their sameness— to other women, to other embodied subjects, to the human. Through these ‘‘straight’’ portraits, we bear witness to queer lives. Muholi’s photographs move us through and beyond our perceptions of what lesbian subjectivity might be and at the same time challenge us to reconceptualize the bounds of what is thought to constitute the human. Must the passage between invisibility and visibility entail giving up queerness? In their complex defamiliarizing of the conventions through which we recognize the human, the portraits that constitute ‘‘Faces and Phases’’ suggest this does not have to be so. Muholi’s photographs claim a place for queer subjects in the field of visual art. Through this act of ‘‘claiming,’’ her work testifies to the complexity of queer 44 Muholi, ‘‘Faces and Phases.’’ 45For a representative selection of images, see Muholi, ‘‘Faces and Phases: 9 July to 8 August 2009’’ (Brodie/ Stevenson Gallery), and Muholi, ‘‘Faces and Phases’’ (Michael Stevenson Gallery). 46 Adams, Emptiness of the Image, 138. 434 K. Thomas D ow nl oa de d by [ U ni ve rs it y of C ap e T ow n L ib ra ri es ] at 0 2: 21 1 1 Ja nu ar y 20 16 experience in post-apartheid South Africa and at the same time constitutes a demand for political recognition. Muholi’s photographs, which bear witness to the experiences of lesbians who have been subject to hate crimes, as well as some of the responses her work has generated—like that of Xingwana—illuminate that this demand has yet to be met.47 The inclusivity of the South African Constitution is often the starting-point for debates about gay and lesbian rights in the country; however, as many of Muholi’s photographs show, to be queer is still to be subject to multiple, and often violent, forms of erasure. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would like to acknowledge the financial support of the National Research Foundation and of the Ford Foundation. I would like to thank Natasha Distiller, Carolyn Hamilton, Joan Hambidge, John Higgins and Coı̀lı́n Parsons, all of whom read this paper at very short notice and offered me suggestions and encouragement; the participants in the Archive and Public Culture Research Initiative quarterly workshops and reading group; and Mona Hakimi, who provided research assistance at a critical time. The insights of the anonymous reviewers were both critical and generous. Andrew van der Vlies invited the paper into being. As always, Louise Green helped me to conceptualize and write this. Alastair Douglas makes it all possible. This is for Sophie Douglas, my brave wolf-child. REFERENCES Adams, Parveen. The emptiness of the image: Psychoanalysis and sexual differences. London: Routledge, 1996. Barthes, Roland. Image, music, text. Trans. Stephen Heath. Glasgow: Fontana, 1977. ———. Camera lucida: Reflections on photography. Trans. Richard Howard. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1981. Brundrit, Jean. A lesbian story. An exhibition project by Jean Brundrit, Self-published, 2008. Butler, Judith. Gender trouble: Feminism and the subversion of identity. New York: Routledge, 1990. Chambers, Ross. Untimely interventions: AIDS writing, testimonial and the rhetoric of haunting. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2004. ———. Facing it: AIDS diaries and the death of the author. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998. Distiller, Natasha. ‘‘Another story: The (im)possibility of lesbian desire.’’ Agenda 63 (2005): 44–57. Fabricius, Peter. SA fails to back efforts at UN to protect gays. Cape Times, June 23, p. 3, 2010. Foucault, Michel. The archaeology of knowledge. Trans. A.M. Sheridan Smith. London: Routledge, 2002. Gqola, Pumla Dineo. ‘‘Through Zanele Muholi’s eyes: Re/imagining ways of seeing black lesbians.’’ In Zanele Muholi: Only half the picture, edited by Sophie Perryer. Johannesburg: STE, 2006. 82–9. 47 See for example the recent incident at the United Nations Human Rights Council in Geneva, where South Africa’s representative Jerry Matjila objected to the inclusion of sexual orientation in a report on racism as to do so would be to ‘‘demean[s] the legitimate plight of the victims of racism’’ (Fabricius, ‘‘SA Fails to Back Efforts at UN to Protect Gays,’’ 3). Safundi: The Journal of South African and American Studies 435 D ow nl oa de d by [ U ni ve rs it y of C ap e T ow n L ib ra ri es ] at 0 2: 21 1 1 Ja nu ar y 20 16 Gunkel, Henriette. The cultural politics of female sexuality in South Africa. New York: Routledge, 2010. Hamilton, Carolyn. ‘‘Uncertain citizenship and public deliberation in post-apartheid South Africa.’’ Social Dynamics 35, no. 2 (2009): 355–74. Lewis, Desiree. ‘‘Against the grain: Black women and sexuality.’’ Agenda 63 (2005): 11–24. Muholi, Zanele. Only half the picture: 29 March—29 April. Archived exhibition announcement and images. Cape Town: Michael Stevenson, 2005. http://www.michaelstevenson.com/ contemporary/exhibitions/muholi/muholi.htm, 2006a. ———. Zanele Muholi: Only half the picture. Johannesburg: STE, 2006b. ———. Mapping our histories: A visual history of black lesbians in post-apartheid South Africa. Self-published essay. http://www.zanelemuholi.com/writings.htm4, 2009. ———. Faces and phases: 9 July to 8 August. Archived exhibition announcement and images. Johannesburg: Brodie/Stevenson. http://www.brodiestevenson.com/exhibitions/muholi/ index.htm, 2009. ———. Faces and phases. Artist’s statement and images. Cape Town: Michael Stevenson. http:// www.michaelstevenson.com/contemporary/exhibitions/muholi/facesphases.htm, 2010. Ngcobo, Gabi. Introduction. In Zanele Muholi: Only half the picture, edited by Sophie Perryer. Johannesburg: STE, 2006. 4–5. Pollock, Griselda. Encounters in the virtual feminist museum: Time, space and the archive. New York: Routledge, 2007. ———. Differencing the canon: Feminist desire and the writing of art’s histories. London: Routledge, 1999. Pratt, Minnie Bruce. Crime against nature. New York: Firebrand Books, 1990. Sontag, Susan. On photography. New York: Penguin, 1979 [1973]. Van Wyk, Lisa. Xingwana: Homophobic claims ‘‘baseless, insulting.’’ Mail and Guardian Online, March 5. http://www.mg.co.za/article/2010-03-05-xingwana-homophobic-claims-baseless- insulting, 2010. Xingwana, Lulu. Address by the Minister of Arts and Culture, Ms Lulama Xingwana, MP, at the launch of Moral Regeneration Month, Polokwana, July 11. Department of Arts and Culture website. http://www.dac.gov.za/speeches/minister/2009/11Jull09Speech.html, 2009. Xingwana, Lulu. Statement by Minister of Arts and Culture Ms Lulu Xingwana on media reports around the Innovative Women exhibition. Department of Arts and Culture website. http:// www.dac.gov.za/media_releases/2010/04-03-10.html, 2010. 436 K. Thomas D ow nl oa de d by [ U ni ve rs it y of C ap e T ow n L ib ra ri es ] at 0 2: 21 1 1 Ja nu ar y 20 16 
work_7xauzkqiw5c6fa2aokjtw2xbhi	----	Vol. 10, 2015 LSD JOURNAL 3 Cusack, Waranius VISUAL DETECTION OF SEX OFFENDERS AND CONSEQUENTIAL BIASES AMONG CHRISTIANS Carmen M. Cusack; Matthew E. Waranius This pilot study investigated whether biases influenced respondents’ perceptions of a subject’s history of sex offense convictions. Biased perceptions of subjects’ religion, culture, ethnicity, or race may influence whether respondents believe that a subject has perpetrated a sex offense. Potential negative impacts for offenders include: hampered social dynamics, community coalescence, and rehabilitative aims. Biases may also affect criminal justice through witness bias or false conviction. Community members and potential victims may be negatively impacted by misperceptions of criminal history. Potential victims may be unable to identify sex offenders, causing them to misplace their trust in people who, to them, appear to be unthreatening. In addition, these potential victims may be biased against individuals who are less likely to perpetrate sex crimes. Communities and potential mating Vol. 10, 2015 LSD JOURNAL 4 Cusack, Waranius populations could suffer from a lack of diversity due to unconscious bias. This knowledge is critical for communities, offenders, and potential victims. This Article explains the foundation for this investigation and pilot study, which considered whether physical appearance evidences sex crime perpetration. Section II discusses facial features associated with non-traditional sexual preferences, sexual aggression, and sexual dominance. Section III, Methods, explains sampling and data collection strategies used to investigate relationships among race, bias, and perception of sex-offending. Section IV presents the data collected from surveying and Section V analyzes this data. Finally, Section VI, the Discussion Section, concludes that perception of sex offense perpetration may correlate with perception that a person is unlikely to be Christians. Methodological limitations of this pilot study, which may be improved for future studies, are described in Section VII. 
work_7ykhqv6jm5hknnrgz2wetbzl3m	----	sensors Article Detecting and Monitoring Hate Speech in Twitter Juan Carlos Pereira-Kohatsu 1, Lara Quijano-Sánchez 1,2,* , Federico Liberatore 2,3 and Miguel Camacho-Collados 4,5 1 Engineering School, Autonomous University of Madrid, 28049 Madrid, Spain; jc.pereira.kohatsu@gmail.com 2 UC3M-BS Institute of Financial Big Data, Charles III University of Madrid, 28903 Madrid, Spain 3 School of Computer Science & Informatics, Cardiff University, Cardiff CF24 3AA, UK; LiberatoreF@cardiff.ac.uk 4 Artificial Intelligence Area Coordinator, Cabinet of the Secretary of State for Digital Advancement, 28020 Madrid, Spain; mcamachoc@mineco.es 5 State Secretariat for Security, Interior Ministry, 28010 Madrid, Spain * Correspondence: lara.quijano@uam.es Received: 13 September 2019; Accepted: 21 October 2019; Published: 26 October 2019 ���������� ������� Abstract: Social Media are sensors in the real world that can be used to measure the pulse of societies. However, the massive and unfiltered feed of messages posted in social media is a phenomenon that nowadays raises social alarms, especially when these messages contain hate speech targeted to a specific individual or group. In this context, governments and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are concerned about the possible negative impact that these messages can have on individuals or on the society. In this paper, we present HaterNet, an intelligent system currently being used by the Spanish National Office Against Hate Crimes of the Spanish State Secretariat for Security that identifies and monitors the evolution of hate speech in Twitter. The contributions of this research are many-fold: (1) It introduces the first intelligent system that monitors and visualizes, using social network analysis techniques, hate speech in Social Media. (2) It introduces a novel public dataset on hate speech in Spanish consisting of 6000 expert-labeled tweets. (3) It compares several classification approaches based on different document representation strategies and text classification models. (4) The best approach consists of a combination of a LTSM+MLP neural network that takes as input the tweet’s word, emoji, and expression tokens’ embeddings enriched by the tf-idf, and obtains an area under the curve (AUC) of 0.828 on our dataset, outperforming previous methods presented in the literature. Keywords: hate crime; sentiment analysis; text classification; predictive policing; social network analysis; Twitter 1. Introduction Worldwide accessibility to the Internet has incredibly reshaped our perception of the world. One of the children of the World Wide Web is Social Media (SM), which is present in many forms: online game platforms, dating apps, forums, online news services, and social networks. Different social networks aim at different objectives: opinion transmission (Twitter or Facebook), business contacts (LinkedIn), image sharing (Instagram), video transmission (YouTube), dating (Meetic), and so on. However, they all have one thing in common: they aim to connect people. The power of social networking is so great that the number of worldwide users is expected to reach 3.02 billion active social media users per month by 2021. This will account for approximately one-third of the Earth’s population. Among the many existing social networks, Twitter currently ranks as one of the leading platforms and is one of the most important data sources for researchers. Twitter is a well-known real-time Sensors 2019, 19, 4654; doi:10.3390/s19214654 www.mdpi.com/journal/sensors http://www.mdpi.com/journal/sensors http://www.mdpi.com https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9389-2380 http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/s19214654 http://www.mdpi.com/journal/sensors https://www.mdpi.com/1424-8220/19/21/4654?type=check_update&version=2 Sensors 2019, 19, 4654 2 of 37 public microblogging network where, frequently, news appear before than on official news media. Characterized by its short message limit (now 280 characters) and unfiltered feed, its usage has quickly escalated, especially amid events, with an average of 500 million tweets posted per day. In recent years, social networks (and especially Twitter) have been used to spread hate messages. Hate speech refers to a kind of speech that denigrates a person or multiple persons based on their membership to a group, usually defined by race, ethnicity, sexual orientation, gender identity, disability, religion, political affiliation, or views. The Rabat Plan of Action of the United Nations [1], which defines the guidelines to distinguish between free speech and hate speech, recommends differentiating between three types of expressions: “expression that constitutes a criminal offence; expression that is not criminally punishable, but may justify a civil suit or administrative sanctions; expression that does not give rise to criminal, civil or administrative sanctions, but still raises concern in terms of tolerance, civility and respect for the rights of others.” Related to this, hate crimes are a type of violation of the law whose primary motivation is the existence of prejudices regarding the victims. This occurs when the offender chooses victims on grounds that they belong to a certain group defined basically by the attributes mentioned earlier. There is evidence that hate crimes are influenced by singular widely publicized events [2] (terrorist attacks, uncontrolled migration, demonstrations, riots, etc.). These events usually act as triggers, and their effect is dramatically increased inside SM. This makes SM a sensor in the real world [3] and a source of valuable information for crime forecasting [4]. In fact, social networks are filled with messages from individuals inciting punishment against different targeted groups. When these messages are collected after a trigger event over a period of time, they can be used for the analysis of hate crimes in all the phases [2]: climbing , stabilization, duration, and decline of the threat. Therefore, monitoring SM becomes a priority for the forecasting, detection and analysis of hate crimes. Following this necessity, the main goal of this paper is the design of a system, HaterNet, capable of identifying and classifying hate speech in Twitter, as well as monitoring and analyzing hate trends and other negative sentiments. This system allows to detect triggers of hate waves, especially against minority groups and individuals belonging to these groups. This provides valuable information for security agencies and police corps, especially to predict future crimes or to take measures afterwards. In fact, HaterNet has been developed in collaboration with the Spanish State Secretariat for Security of the Ministry of Interior (SES) and, more concretely, the Spanish National Office Against Hate Crimes (SNOAHC-SES). However, the methodology described in this paper is not country- or language-specific and could be localized. Due to the application context, the system presented in this research studies exclusively the first two types of expressions identified by the Rabat Plan of Action (as they can give rise to suits or sanctions). The study of the third one, which is more subjective in nature, is left as future work. HaterNet is comprised of two modules: 1. Hate Speech Detection: tweet collection and classification 2. Social Network Analyzer The first module deals with sampling and classifying tweets, whereas the second one provides tools to analyze the hate speech content inside the social network. As further detailed next, the contributions related to hate speech classification research are mainly twofold. (1) A new public dataset that can be used to test, train, and benchmark new developed methods. This contribution is very relevant as authors have so far only found three public hate-speech datasets [5–7]. The first two datasets have the inconvenience of consisting of ids of tweets to download. As Twitter periodically erases some tweets, especially if offensive, it is currently not possible to download the original datasets presented in [5,6]. Besides, most of the related literature on hate speech is benchmarked against them [8–11]. Therefore, it is crucial for future advances in this domain to provide new self-contained public datasets. (2) A new classification approach, referred as a double deep learning neural approach, consisting of a combination of a Long Short-Term Memory (LTSM) Sensors 2019, 19, 4654 3 of 37 and a Multilayer Perceptron (MLP) neural network that takes as input words, emojis, and expression tokens’ embeddings of a tweet, enriched by the tf-idf. The embeddings are, in turn, obtained using a neural network-based word2vec methodology. Our experiments have shown that this approach outperforms reference models in the literature. It is in the second module, the “Social Network Analyzer”, where the main novelty of this paper lies. In fact, the literature on hate speech so far has been concerned only on studying and proposing methods that classify texts as containers of hate speech or not. We go one step further: the classification provided by HaterNet can be used to build networks of concepts and actors, according to their relationship to the hate messages, which can then be visually represented. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first system with these characteristics that has been presented in the literature [12]. There are many services and application contexts that can benefit from it. For instance, it provides an interpretable graphical representation of the classification algorithm functioning. Whereas other systems are usually black-boxes, HaterNet illustrates the relevant terms, receivers, and emitters identified inside hate speech texts. This feature could be used for either further studying correlations or different aspects inside hate containing text, or for detecting biases. Transparency and explainability are currently hot topics in the area of artificial intelligence tools [13], as well as bias in classification algorithms [14]. Another usage of this function is related to policing and journalism. In fact, observers can use HaterNet to analyze the evolution of different hate trends, key words, or actors; study their triggers; and design protocols to mitigate concrete peaks of hate; among others. Furthermore, this research spans two scopes and provides methodological and applied contributions: (1) in text classification, and (2) in the design, development, testing, and implementation of an artificial intelligence system capable of recognizing, interpreting, processing, and visualizing the state of a specific sentiment (i.e., hate). With regards to the latter the contributions are as below. • The design and implementation of a novel intelligent system for monitoring hate speech in SM. In particular, HaterNet acts as a visual thermometer of emotions that allows to map the hate state of a region and its evolution by targeting, aspects, emitters, and receivers of hate. • A novel addition to the literature on predictive policing, as HaterNet has been developed to carry out policing tasks. Note that it could be used in other investigation fields, such as journalism or social analysis. • The definition of a methodology that combines text classification and social network analysis to monitor the evolution of classes of documents (in this case, hate speech) in SM and identify the main actors and groups involved. With respect to the text classification area, the contributions are as below. • The introduction of a new approach based on double deep learning neural networks. • A novel public dataset in Spanish on hate speech, comprised of two million untagged tweets and 6000 tagged tweets. • A thorough comparison of text classification methodologies on datasets from the literature and on a new real-world corpus, where the results show that the model proposed in this paper provides better performance than previous models in all the datasets considered. • A study on the significance of including suffixes in text classification models. To the best of the authors knowledge, this is the first model to explicitly consider suffixes in the Spanish language. The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we introduce some of the state-of-the-art research regarding predictive policing, SM predictive systems, sentiment analysis, and hate speech detection. Section 3 illustrates the theoretical concepts and design of the text classification module. Implementation details are given in Section 4. The computational experiments undertaken on the classification models are the subject of Section 5. Following, Section 6 analyzes the obtained results and compares them against the state-of-the-art literature allowing for a discussion and providing some insights. Next, Section 7 presents the user interface tools of the Social Network Analyzer module and Sensors 2019, 19, 4654 4 of 37 the applications of HaterNet for the Spanish government. Section 8 summarizes the architecture and functioning of HaterNet. Finally, Section 9 concludes the paper and proposes future lines of research. 2. Related Work As the volume of papers published in the area of SM proves, analyzing, understanding, and studying social networks are a major research challenge [15]. Currently, one of the main concerns about SM usage is the impact (either positive or negative) that specific messages can have on individuals or on the society. This is the reason why new research topics like Social Network Analysis and Sentiment Analysis have become important fields of study and interest not only for academics, but also for companies and governments. Sentiment analysis is a family of techniques that is widely used in areas such as marketing, social networking development, reviews, survey responses, and especially in customer service [16]. It uses data science methods like Natural Language Processing (NLP), Machine Learning (ML), and Statistics to determine how an individual or group of people feels and reacts to a specific situation or comment [17]. It can be also used to perform geolocation analysis to determine political feelings (e.g., which political leader has better acceptance), marketing preferences (e.g., competitor’s products opinion over population), or, in general, any statistical analysis on text data [18]. Through sentiment analysis, and more concretely ML classification algorithms, messages in a social network such as Twitter can be analyzed and tagged to determine the writer’s attitude on a topic. In our case, we design and implement a sentiment analysis model to identify tweets that contain hate speech. In the following subsections, a brief summary of previous work in the context of predictive policing, SM used as a predictive tool, sentiment analysis, and hate speech detection is given. 2.1. State-of-the-Art on Predictive Policing Predictive policing consists of the use of quantitative analysis methods to detect and forecast potential criminal activity. To date, there are four different types of predictive policing strategies [19]: • Methods for predicting felonies: used to forecast places and times with crime escalation. • Methods for predicting transgressors: used to identify individuals at risk of committing a felony in the future. • Methods for predicting transgressors’ identities: used to shape profiles that precisely match likely transgressors with specific past felonies. • Methods for predicting victims of felonies: used to identify groups, prototypes, or, in some cases, individuals who are likely to become victims of a felony. The system here proposed, HaterNet, belongs to the last group. Also, it could be part of a system that predicts future felonies (hate crimes in particular), transgressors’ profiles, and identities. In fact, by detecting hate speech, analyzing the targets, and the spatiotemporal characteristics, actions can be taken to identify possible victims and transgressors. Examples of other works that support police actions through modeling are given in the following. Cohen et al. [20] predicted violence in crimes with an accuracy of R2 = [0.69 − 0.79] by using a linear regression based model aided by neural networks. Yu et al. [21] forecasted crime hotspots through the usage of ML classification techniques on crime records. On the other hand, Kang and Kang [22] predicted crime occurrence using a deep neural network (DNN), on a dataset collected from various online databases, obtaining an area under the curve (AUC) of 0.833. Recently, Quijano-Sánchez et al. [23] developed VeriPol, a system currently in use by the Spanish National Police, to infer the probability of falsehood of police reports. VeriPol combines NLP and ML to achieve a success rate of more than 91%. Related to monitoring crime and improving patrolling, hot-spot maps are a traditional method for analyzing and visualizing the distribution of crimes across space and time [24,25]. Future crimes often occur in the vicinity of past crimes, making hot-spot maps a valuable prediction tool. More advanced Sensors 2019, 19, 4654 5 of 37 techniques use time series [26] and self-exciting point process models to capture the spatiotemporal clustering of criminal events [27]. These techniques, as pointed out in Bendler et al. [28], are useful but carry specific limitations, as they do not consider the rich SM landscape when analyzing crime patterns. 2.2. State-of-the-Art on Twitter Data for Predictive Analytics With the increasing expansion of social media networks, our capacity to interact, collaborate, and network has highly and rapidly increased [29]. In this context, research in a number of academic fields that involve both the transformation of noisy raw data and the design of analysis methods has shown the incredible predictive power of SM, and more concretely Twitter, to forecast political reactions [30] or disease outbreaks [31]. In their survey paper Kalampokis et al. [32], the authors identify seven application areas: disease outbreaks [33], election results [17], macroeconomic processes [34], box office performance of movies [35], natural phenomena such as earthquakes [36], product sales [37], and financial markets [38]. Among the 52 articles reviewed, only Wang et al. [34] applied SM analysis to crime prediction. More recently, Gerber [39] presented a linear regression strategy to predict local criminal activity in Chicago that combines standard Kernel Density Estimation (KDE) with a topic modeling algorithm trained on Twitter content. Using a similar modeling strategy, Chen et al. [40] improved on the above-mentioned work by adding weather features and the polarity of the revised Twitter data, estimated through a sentiment lexicon dictionary. 2.3. State-of-the-Art on Text Classification Sentiment analysis is a text classification technique used to discern opinions and sentiments in text [41]. To date, there are three different approaches to complete this task: • Lexicon-based [40,42], which uses a predefined lexicon to check the occurrence of words in the revised text. • ML-based [39,43], which uses language model classifiers, being linear regression the most common [39]. • Deep learning techniques [43], which learn complex features using deep neural networks. The first two approaches are known as surface forms, as they use lexical and syntactical information to search for text patterns, whereas the third approach relies on semantic aspects. Surface forms consider that each document is represented as a set of terms and their frequency in the document. These models make use of approaches, such as Bag Of Words (BOW), n-grams, or Part-of-Speech tagging (POS), and have worked remarkably well for many NLP problems [23,44]. However, they are not capable of explaining the word semantics. Methods based on word embeddings make possible to come close to this objective. Their goal is to represent terms in a high dimensional space, while preserving their semantic relationships. There are different models that create word embeddings, word2vec [45] being the most popular. This model generates embeddings by training a neural network with a single hidden layer. It is necessary to set the size of the neighborhood of a word, i.e., the other words that surround it and that define its context. The training process consists of trying to predict the neighbors of each input word. Word2vec uses self-supervised learning, and its rationale is that the semantics of a term depend on the neighbors of such term. The length of the generated word embedding depends on the number of neurons in the hidden layer. With respect to sentiment analysis, Kalampokis et al. [32] drew the following conclusions. • So far, prediction results in sentiment analysis have been poor due to the informal and noisy nature of SM, which creates problems for NLP tools [42]. However, as illustrated in Section 5.3, HaterNet obtains an AUC of 0.828, which denotes a reliable classification. • Studies in this area are mainly focused on stock market and leisure reviews [38,43,46–49]. • The use of non-SM predictor variables is mainly limited to past values of objective phenomenons (weather and budgets) and demographics [35,40]. In contrast, HaterNet uses prediction features (e.g., the appearance of suffixes) extracted from the text by applying NLP techniques. Sensors 2019, 19, 4654 6 of 37 More recently, Quijano-Sánchez et al. [23] presented a text classification approach that discerned between truthful and deceptive texts. The proposed algorithm was tested against the following state-of-the-art sentiment analysis approaches and proved more accurate across a wide number of evaluation metrics (refer to Section 3.6): • Ott et al. [46,47], Hernández Fusilier et al. [48], and Cagnina and Rosso [49] addressed text classification between positive and negative sentiment in hotel opinions. • Mihalcea and Strapparava [50] tackled text classification between truthful and false abortion, death penalty, and friends opinions. • Li et al. [51] focused on text classification between positive and negative sentiment in hotels, restaurants, and doctors opinions. Thus, in this paper, the approach followed by Quijano-Sánchez et al. [23] is taken as gold standard. Our research improves on it by considering more document representations and more complex models. Work Araque et al. [43] comes closest to the present research by using ensemble techniques that combine both deep learning approaches and traditional surface methods. However, although their base classifier consists of a word embedding model and a linear ML algorithm, our double deep learning approach consists of a word embedding model and a neural network ML algorithm combined with frequency features. Araque et al. [43] also present several ensemble classifiers, combining their baseline with state-of-the-art surface classifiers, that outperform each of these methodologies individually. However, as explained in Section 6, our double deep learning approach surpasses the methodologies proposed by Araque et al. [43] and, therefore, all the other approaches they tested themselves against. 2.4. State-of-the-Art on Hate Speech Detection Recently, there has been a growing interest in the application of text classification models for the detection of hate speech, especially in the context of online outlets, such as social media and web blogs. This trend has resulted in a number of papers published on the subject in the last years. Most researches focused on applying text classification models to datasets obtained from online sources, with different degrees of success [12]. Table 1 presents a summary of the main characteristics of each contribution in the literature. In particular, the features adopted, the training models studied, the datasets employed in the experiments, their availability, and the reported performances are summarized. Djuric et al. [52] extracted approximately 950k Yahoo Finance user comments and applied paragraph2vec for joint modeling of whole comments and words, using the continuous BOW (CBOW) neural language model. The embeddings are then used in a LR model to classify the comments into hate or clean. Zia et al. [53] focused on the problem of identifying hatred in the context of spiritual belief (i.e., Christianity, Islam, and Judaism) based on Twitter dataset. Unfortunately, the size of the dataset is not specified in the paper. The authors compared different classical machine learning models and found that Support Vector Machine (SVM) performs the best. Silva et al. [54] used sentence structure rules and a hate thesaurus to identify hate in whispers and tweets. Despite the humongous size of their dataset (more than 27M whispers and 512M tweets), only 100 messages identified as hateful by their model have been used to validate it. Waseem and Hovy [5] provided the first of two widely used datasets. In particular, the dataset is comprised of 16,914 annotated tweets, of which 3383 are categorized as “sexist” and 1972 as “racist”. The corpus was annotated by the two authors and a student in gender studies to mitigate the bias, showing an inter-annotator agreement of κ = 0.84. In terms of model, the authors consider gender, length, location, character, and word n-grams features, which are used to estimate a LR classification model. The second dataset, comprised of 6909 annotated tweets, was introduced in Waseem [6]. It includes 3000 tweets from the previous dataset, albeit with new annotations, and 4000 new tweets. The annotation is carried out by two groups of users: experts (mostly feminist and anti-racism activist) and amateurs (600 crowd-sourced labelers). It is Sensors 2019, 19, 4654 7 of 37 found that the inter-annotator agreement among the amateur annotators is κ = 0.57(σ = 0.08). The authors stated that the low value is an evidence in favor of the claim by Ross et al. [55] that stated that the annotation of hate speech is a hard task. With respect to the classification model, the authors expanded on their previous contribution by adding skip-gram, cluster, POS, and Author Historical Salient Terms features, significantly improving their LR classification model. Badjatiya et al. [11] (Code available at https://github.com/pinkeshbadjatiya/twitter-hatespeech) used the 16,000 tweet dataset by [5]. The authors tested different configurations of features and models (see Table 1). The best results, which outperform those of [5,10], are obtained by using random word embeddings, LSTM, and Gradient Boosted Decision Trees (GBDT). Davidson et al. [7] (Code available at https://github.com/t-davidson/hate-speech-and-offensive-language) introduced a novel dataset comprised of almost 25,000 tweets labeled using crowdsourcing. The authors characterized the messages through features based on words and other aspects of the tweet, such as readability, sentiment, hastags, mentions, retweets, and URLs. These features were used to train classical machine learning models (i.e., Logistic Regression (LR), Naïve Bayes (NB), Decision Trees (DT), Random Forests (RF), and linear SVMs). The authors, that found that LR and Linear SVM performed significantly better than other models, and chose a LR model with L2 penalization due to explainability reasons. Gambäck and Sikdar [8] applied CNNs to a subset of 6655 tweets from dataset [6], as some of the annotated tweets were unavailable or had been deleted from Twitter because of its offensive content. The authors tested the classification capabilities of word embeddings and character n-grams. The results obtained, though inferior to those of Waseem [6], are not fully comparable due to the differences in the dataset. Park and Fung [9] merged the dataset in [5], with the tweets annotated by experts in [6], in a single dataset. The authors explored the impact of using character and word embeddings in three different CNN architectures. Del Vigna et al. [56] combined morpho-syntactical features, sentiment polarity, and word embedding lexicons to classify a novel dataset of 6502 annotated Facebook comments in Italian, using SVM and LSTM. The reported inter-annotator agreement on this dataset is of κ = 0.26, stressing again the difficulty of annotating hate speech. Also, Salminen et al. [57] introduced a new dataset. The authors annotated 5143 comments from Twitter and Facebook videos, and tested word embeddings, and semantic and syntactic features on classical Machine Learning algorithms. The best performance was obtained using linear SVM. Unfortunately, the two datasets are not publicly available. Finally, Zhang et al. [10] (Code available at https://github.com/ziqizhang/chase) tackled the problem of classifying hateful comments in five datasets: [5,6], the combination of [5,6] used in [9]; the 25k labeled tweets from Davidson et al. [7]; and a novel dataset of 2435 annotated tweets. In terms of features, the authors expanded on those adopted in the previous papers by adding mentions, misspellings, emojis, punctuation, and capitalization features. The tested models were SVM and CNNs combined with GRU (Gated Recurrent Unit Networks), providing better results the latter. In terms of performance, reported results show an improvement on the approaches described in [5–7]. However, they are inferior to the models proposed by Badjatiya et al. [11] and Park and Fung [9]. https://github.com/pinkeshbadjatiya/twitter-hatespeech https://github.com/t-davidson/hate-speech-and-offensive-language https://github.com/ziqizhang/chase Sensors 2019, 19, 4654 8 of 37 Table 1. Summary of the main characteristics of hate detection models in the literature. The first two columns show the paper and the year of publishing. Next, the features considered (in bold the features used in the best model), the classification models tested (best one in bold), the datasets used in the experiments, and the availability of the used dataset (an asterisk (*) indicate that only a fraction of the original dataset is available) are reported. Finally, the performance of the best model found is illustrated: accuracy, precision, recall, F1 score, and AUC. A dash (-) indicates that the value is not available. Paper Year Features Model Dataset Available Accuracy Precision Recall F1 Score AUC Djuric et al. [52] 2015 BOW, TF, TF-IDF, paragraph2vec embeddings LR 951,736 Yahoo Finance user comments No - - - - 0.8007 Zia et al. [53] 2016 unigrams, TF-IDF, retweets, favourites, page autenticity SVM, NB, kNN tweets No - 0.971 0.97 0.971 - Silva et al. [54] 2016 sentence structure rule based 27.55M whispers and 512M tweets, unlabeled. 100 labeled messages. No - 1 - - - Waseem and Hovy [5] 2016 Author gender, length of tweets, length of user description, location, char n-grams, word n-grams LR 16,914 annotated tweets Yes * - 0.7293 0.7774 0.7393 - Waseem [6] 2016 char n-grams, word n-grams, skip-grams, tweet length, author gender, clusters, POS, Author Historical Salient Terms (AHST) LR 6909 annotated tweets Yes * - 0.9250 0.9249 0.9119 - Badjatiya et al. [11] 2017 char n-grams, TF-IDF, BoWV, random embeddings, GloVe embeddings LR, RF, SVM, GBDT, DNN, CNN, LTSM [5] Yes * - 0.930 0.930 0.930 - Davidson et al. [7] 2017 n-grams, TF-IDF, POS, readability, sentiment, hashtags, mentions, retweets, URLs, length LR, NB, DT, RF, SVM 24,802 labeled tweets Yes - 0.91 0.90 0.90 - Sensors 2019, 19, 4654 9 of 37 Table 1. Cont. Paper Year Features Model Dataset Available Accuracy Precision Recall F1 Score AUC Gambäck and Sikdar [8] 2017 word2vec embeddings, random embeddings, char n-grams CNN 6655 tweets from [6] Yes - 0.8566 0.7214 0.7829 - Park and Fung [9] 2017 char embeddings, word embeddings CharCNN, WordCNN, and HybridCNN [5,6] Yes * - 0.827 0.827 0.827 - Del Vigna et al. [56] 2017 POS, sentiment analysis, word2vec embeddings, CBOW, n-grams, text features, word polarity SVM, LSTM 6502 annotated Facebook comments No 0.7523 0.732 0.7371 0.731 - Salminen et al. [57] 2018 n-grams, semantic and syntactic, TF-IDF, word2vec embeddings, doc2vec embeddings LR, DT, RF, Adabost, SVM 5143 labeled comments YouTube and Facebook videos No - - - 0.96 - Zhang et al. [10] 2018 n-grams, POS, TF-IDF, mentions, hastags, length, readability, sentiment, mispellings, emojis, punctuation, capitalisation, word embeddings SVM, CNN + GRU [5–7] and 2435 annotated tweets Yes * [5]; Yes * [6]; Yes [7]; No [10] - - - 0.82 in [5]; 0.92 in [6]; 0.82 in [5,6]; 0.94 in [7]; 0.92 in [10] - Sensors 2019, 19, 4654 10 of 37 3. Hate Speech Detection: Design and Theoretical Concepts HaterNet’s first module, Hate Speech Detection, periodically collects tweets and classifies them as containers of hate speech or not. This module is comprised of the following steps, conceptualized in Figure 1. We refer the reader to the survey by Mirończuk and Protasiewicz [58] for a comprehensive overview of the essential phases of text classification. Figure 1. Standard text classification process (source: Mirończuk and Protasiewicz [58]). 3.1. Corpus Collection and Cleaning HaterNet’s classification process uses a supervised learning approach where an ML function is inferred from labeled training data. An initial corpus of two million tweets is downloaded using Twitter’s API Rest. This “raw” corpus is the base of the model’s training dataset. Next, a cleaning step prepares the texts for processing, i.e., dealing with capitalization, uncommon characters, symbols, etc. 3.2. Document Selection The number of tweets containing hate speech in a given period of time is very low, usually less than 1%. This fact poses two difficulties that must be addressed: (1) imbalanced classes and (2) manually tagging a relevant dataset. Thus, to obtain a representative and balanced training dataset that can be tagged by experts, it is necessary to previously filter the initial two million downloaded tweets. This necessity is even more acute in our specific application as the training dataset needs to be systematically renewed, and therefore it has to be continuously tagged, due to the ongoing evolution of trends and hate targets in social media. Note that, at the end of this stage, the training set becomes more balanced than the raw corpus. 3.3. Document Labeling The filtered tweets are manually classified to produce both training and test sets. In HaterNet, this task is executed by four different raters. Authors are aware of the possible bias of having a limited and nonrandomized set of experts tagging the sample and leave for future work the development of a nonbiased corpus. Sensors 2019, 19, 4654 11 of 37 3.4. Document Representation and Feature Extraction Prior to classifying, tweets are processed to generate representative features that can be then provided as inputs to the classification models. Initially, an NLP preprocessing pipeline [58] is followed: lowercasing, tokenization, POS tagging, lemmatization, and stopword removal for the obtention of unigrams. The software TreeTagger [59] is used for tokenization, lemmatization, and POS tagging. Although tokenization and stopword removal are standard prior steps for normalizing texts, lower-casing and lemmatization are aimed at reducing sparsity and vocabulary size, steps which have been proved beneficial in text classification tasks. As far as the stopword removal step is concerned, in our system, a word is considered as stopword if it is not a verb, a noun, an adjective, or an adverb. For a list of the POS tags considered and their description, please refer to [60]. A new feature representing word suffixes is included. Suffixes in Spanish tend to be useful in tweet representation because they add different inflections and meanings to a word. As an example, the suffix “-ucho” is used for obtaining new nouns and adjectives that are usually derogatory: the word “hotel” has the same meaning as in English, whereas “hotelucho” means “fleabag hotel”. Obviously, given HaterNet’s classification goal, the detection of pejorative aspects could be relevant. Finally, new tokens are created to unify different nonverbal expressions (e.g., URLs, hashtags, and marks). After this processing, two types of features are extracted: • Frequency-based: Computed for unigrams, POS tags, emojis, suffixes, and expression tokens. All the following types of frequencies are considered for each feature. - Absolute frequency, ft,d: the number of times that term t occurs in document d. - Binary transformation, f bt,d: equals 1 if ft,d > 0, and 0 otherwise. - Logarithm transformation, log(1 + ft,d). - Ratio transformation, ft,d ∑t′∈d ft′,d . Adjusts the absolute frequency to the document length. • Embeddings-based: Words, emojis, suffixes, and tokens embeddings are obtained using word2vec. These embeddings can be extended by attaching them POS tags (transformed using one-hot encoding) and Text Frequency-Inverse Document Frequency (tf-idf) Kusner et al. [61] information. Tf-idf represents the importance of a term in a document relative to the whole corpus. It is based on the idea that a term that appears many times inside a document must be relevant for that document, but if it appears many times in other documents, its relevance decreases. Also, both representations can be complemented by adding the number of words, lemmata (total and unique), and sentences in the tweet. This features provide a measure of the length of the tweet (number of words, sentences, and total lemmata) as well as its lexical complexity (number of unique lemmata). 3.5. Feature Selection Feature selection and dimensionality reduction are key parts in text classification problems, as having too many features might hamper generalization and could result in overfitting [62]. There are many methods for selecting relevant features, usually divided into three main categories: (i) Wrapper methods, such as the Las Vegas Wrapper [63]; (ii) filter methods, such as Chi-square [64]; and (iii) embedded methods , such as LASSO (Least Absolute Shrinkage and Selection Operator) [65], which is a regression analysis method that performs variable selection and, to a lesser extent, regularization to enhance the prediction accuracy and interpretability of the statistical model it produces. In this paper, feature selection is applied only when using frequency-based features and is carried out using a filter method based on feature sparsity and variance, combined with a LASSO model. 3.6. Document Classification Supervised classification consists of predicting the value of a qualitative response variable. This response variable is commonly known as category or class. There are many different Sensors 2019, 19, 4654 12 of 37 classifiers, and their performance depends on the problem. We refer the reader to the paper by Jordan and Mitchell [66] for an overview on the state-of-the-art of classifiers in machine and statistical learning. As there is not a classifier that is the best for all kinds of problems (no free lunch theorem, Wolpert and Macready [67]), for HaterNet’s design, a set of models have been evaluated: • Logistic regression (LR) uses features(predictors) for building a linear model that estimates the probability that an observation belongs to a class. It is possible to apply feature selection or shrinkage by introducing L1 (lasso) or L2 (ridge) penalizations, respectively. • Random Forests (RF): Ensemble classifiers whose construction is based on the use of several decision trees [68]. Each decision tree is trained with a sample bootstrapped from the training dataset and using a random subset of the features. Decision trees partition the factor space according to value tests, therefore resulting in a nonlinear classification. The nodes of the trees are determined so as to maximize the information gain. There are different criteria for determining this information gain being Gini and entropy two of the most common. • Support Vector Machines (SVM) are classifiers whose result is based on a decision boundary generated by support vectors, i.e., the points closest to the decision boundary. The shape of the boundary is determined by a kernel function. In this way, it is possible to solve problems that cannot be solved by a linear boundary. Intuitively, a good separation is achieved by the hyperplane that has the largest distance to the support vectors, as, in general, the larger the margin the lower the generalization error of the classifier. • Linear Discriminant Analysis (LDA) is a classifier based on Bayes’ theorem, which requires modeling the distribution function of continuous features. Classification is made by using Bayes’ rule to compute the posterior probability of each class, given the vector of the observed attribute values. Bayes rule assumes that the features are conditionally independent given the category. • Quadratic Discriminant Analysis (QDA), as LDA, is a classifier based on Bayes’ theorem. However, QDA assumes that each class has its own covariance matrix. • Neural Networks are one of the most popular classifiers currently used in ML and crime prediction [69]. There are two important types of neural networks: (i) Feedforward Networks (FFN), that have no loops and (ii) Recurrent Neural Networks (RNN), which both process sequences of data and take into account the instant of time that each piece of data is processed. Therefore, they are more useful for solving NLP problems. In these types of network, the output of the neurons is not only based on the input values, but also on the previous outputs. For this reason, RNN are generally trained using back-propagation through time (BPTT) [70]. Classification Metrics The above classifiers have been evaluated in our system according to the following metrics [71] (see Figure 2 for references to the symbols in the formulas). Figure 2. Confusion matrix and classification metrics terminology. Sensors 2019, 19, 4654 13 of 37 1. Accuracy measures the overall performance of the classifier. acc = TP + T N TP + FP + T N + FN Unfortunately, accuracy is not a significant performance measure when the dataset is imbalanced. Thus, other metrics, such as the following, should be considered. 2. Precision (also called positive predictive value) is the fraction of relevant instances among the retrieved instances: p = TP TP + FP 3. Recall (also called sensitivity or true positive rate) is the fraction of relevant instances that have been retrieved over the total amount of relevant instances: r = TP TP + FN 4. F1 score is the harmonic mean of precision and recall: F1 = 2 · p · r p + r 5. False positive rate is the fraction of nonrelevant instances that are consider relevant over the total amount of relevant instances: FPR = FP T N + FP 6. ROC curve and Area under the ROC curve (also called AUC or AUCROC). The ROC curve is obtained by plotting the true positive rate (TPR) against the false positive rate (FPR). The AUC is the area under the resulting ROC curve. 4. Hate Speech Detection: Implementation Having reviewed the main stages and theoretical concepts used in our system, HaterNet’s specific implementation details and configuration are next illustrated. Note that the steps described in Sections 4.2 and 4.3 are only necessary for labeling the initial corpus on which HaterNet’s supervised learning methods are trained. 4.1. Tweet Collection and Cleaning The first task is gathering a corpus that will be the basis for the development and implementation processes. For this first version of HaterNet, a corpus composed of tweets collected at different random dates between February 2017 and December 2017—having a final size of 2M tweets—has been created. This strategy of collecting tweets at different dates is an approach for reducing the problem of the triggering events mentioned by Downs [2], as more topics and events are captured than in shorter observation periods. The tweets are collected using the Twitter Rest API [72]. In each request, a json file is received with the tweets’ content and metadata, including the UTC offset, which is used to identify the tweets originating from Spain. Once HaterNet was trained and running only the latest tweets written in Spanish are retrieved for their evaluation and monitoring. The rationale is to obtain the most recent tweets from Spain written in Spanish. Data Cleaning As mentioned in Section 3, HaterNet’s cleaning task consist of preparing the downloaded raw text for processing. A tweet’s content is coded in Unicode format, so it may contain: emojis, tildes, Chinese, and other non-ASCII characters. To avoid codification problems, all non-alphanumeric characters are Sensors 2019, 19, 4654 14 of 37 removed and the text is converted to lower case and tokenized. Also, during this stage, symbols that do not add semantic content are deleted while new expression tokens are created to unify “colloquial” expressions that refer to the same concepts (e.g., laugh and surprise). Examples of generated tokens are shown in Table 2. Table 2. Example of tokens created to unify expressions. Semantic Token Type URL TOKENURL Mention USER Hashtag HASHTAG Question mark TOKENQUES Exclamation mark TOKEXC Laughing face: XD TOKENXD Quotation marks TOKENCOMI Laughs: jaja, ajaj, jajaj TOKENLAUGH Surprise: WTF, wtf TOKENWTF This process is done through the design of rules and regular expressions that identify both the tokenized content and the normal text. For example, to detect if there is a hashtag in a tweet, the following regular expression is used; “\#[0-9a-zA-z]”, which means that it detects as a hashtag everything that begins with # and is followed by alphanumeric characters. Here, the hashtag is tokenized as HASHTAG, whereas the text that follows is kept following a designed rule. As previously mentioned, this process is also used to create general tokens meant for unifying words/concepts that can be expressed/represented in different ways as well as to detect possible misspellings. For example, “jaaja”, “jaja”, and “jajaj” in spanish mean the same, and therefore are classified in the same token, i.e., TOKENLAUGH. Note that in this cleaning process emojis have been preserved and tokenized as they add semantics to the analyzed tweets. Examples of emojis and their codes can be found in Table 3. Table 3. Sample emojis. Emoji Code :smiling_face_with_open_mouth: :kissing_face_with_closed_eyes: :pile_of_poo: :oncoming_fist::light_skin_tone: :oncoming_fist::dark_skin_tone: The tweet represented in Figure 3 shows the importance of emojis to obtain semantic information. Figure 3. The importance of emojis. Literal meaning of the text: “What a defense and what a goalkeeper!!!” In this case, the red face emoji shows that the user that sent the tweet is angry (without this information the textual content is not enough to ascertain the polarity of the message), and the flag Sensors 2019, 19, 4654 15 of 37 shows that the defense and goalkeeper the tweet is refereeing to belongs to the Spanish national soccer team. Note that different variants of the same emoji are detected, as exemplified by the two bottom emojis in the Table 3. In our case, the Emoji’s skin color can be very valuable for determining if the hate speech in a tweet is about race or ethnicity. 4.2. Tweet Selection As motivated in Section 3.2, it is necessary to apply a filter to the corpus of two million tweets prior the manual labeling process. The filter (sketched in Figure 4) is designed as a two-step process that makes use of seven files. Six of them are dictionaries of words that represent different types of hate speech (i.e., ethnicity, race, gender, disability, politics, and religion), whereas the last one contains generic insults. Figure 4. Filtering process. Words inside each of the first six files are tagged with two possible degrees of hate: absolute or relative. A word is said to contain absolute hate if the word unequivocally expresses hate, regardless of its context. Otherwise, if hate depends on the context, the word is said to contain relative hate. For example: “feminazi” contains absolute hate, whereas “negro”, which also denotes the color black in Spanish, may contain hate or not depending on the context. At this point, each tweet is represented as a vector of elements. Therefore, for this process, each element in the vector is scanned using the first six files of the filter. If the tweet contains at least one element tagged as absolute hate, then it is selected as possible container of hate speech and passes the filter. If, on the other hand, it contains an element tagged as relative hate, then the context of that term is assessed using the seventh file of the filter: if at least one of the elements of the tweet appears in this file, then the tweet is selected as possible container of hate speech and, therefore, passes the filter. For example, if the word “negro” (tagged as relative hate) appears in a tweet, the rest of the terms are scanned in the second step of the filter. If the tweet contains a generic insult, then the tweet is likely to contain hate and is included in the new reduced corpus to be labeled. The example in Figure 5 shows two real tweets where the generic insult vocabulary is important to ascertain their meaning. The filter described has been designed to focus explicitly on the type of hate speech considered in this study (see Section 1). Therefore, the bias introduced by the generic insult vocabulary ensures that the content of the tweet might be civilly or criminally punishable. Note that, after applying the filter, only 8710 tweets out of the original 2 m in the raw corpus were selected for labeling. Sensors 2019, 19, 4654 16 of 37 Figure 5. Hate and non-hate tweets. Literal translation and meaning: (i) “I won’t even go to the corner with that f***ing negro” (meaning: I will not have anything to do with that black person); (ii) 11I’m a black belt in fighting for everything” (meaning: I never give up). 4.3. Tweet Labeling At this stage, all tweets that passed the filter were labeled by hand. To label the corpus, the SNOAHC-SES selected four experts with different backgrounds: - Labeler A: 44-year-old, public servant. - Labeler B: 23-year-old, Psychology graduate. - Labeler C: 24-year-old, Law graduate. - Labeler D: 23-year-old, Criminology graduate. Each expert read the whole filtered corpus and indicated for each tweet if they considered it contained hate speech or not according to the definition given (see Section 1). The final label of each tweet has been decided by majority vote. As there is an even number of labelers, it is possible to incur in a tie. In this event, a fifth person (Labeler E, a 49-year-old professor of Computer Science) casts the deciding vote. For an inter-agreement analysis of the labelers, please refer to Section 5. At the end of this stage, due to time restrictions, 6000 tweets out of the 8710 filtered were labeled. Using the majority vote method, 1567 tweets (26% of the corpus) have been labeled as hate containers, whereas 4433 (74% of the corpus) have been labeled as non-hate containers. Both the initial 2M tweets dataset and the labeled dataset are available at DOI:10.5281/zenodo.2592149. 4.4. Tweet Representation At this point an NLP preprocessing pipeline is followed: lemmatization, stopword removal, and POS tagging. Therefore, at the end of this stage, each tweet is represented as a vector of unigrams, i.e., words, emojis, POs tags, or tokens. With respect to suffixes detection, we have developed an ad hoc algorithm, as there is no library for detecting suffixes in Spanish. In particular, a word contains a suffix if it ends with one of the suffixes contained in the last appendix of the Dictionary of the Royal Spanish Academy [73]. Identified suffixes are also added to the vector tweet representation. Next, as explained in Section 3.4, each tweet is converted into one of these two representations, depending on the model: frequency-based and embedding-based. 4.4.1. Frequency-Based Representation When using the frequency-based representation, each tweet i is represented by a vector vi that includes four frequencies (i.e., absolute, binary, logarithm, and ratio) for each unigram considered (i.e., words, POS tags, emojis, suffixes, and expression tokens), plus four more elements for the number of words, lemmata (total and unique), and sentences in the tweet. Using the labeled corpus, 9586 different unigrams (containing words, tokens, or emojis), 56 different POS tags, and 149 different suffixes were found. That is, each text is annotated by (9586 + 56 + 149)× 4 + 4 = 39,168 different features. DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.2592149 Sensors 2019, 19, 4654 17 of 37 4.4.2. Embeddings-Based Representation This second representation is based on natural language semantics, where the semantic of each term in the tweets is obtained using a word2vec model. Unigram embeddings are obtained using the Gensim Python library for NLP. The neural network for the embeddings is trained using the unfiltered and unlabeled 2M tweets corpus. This allows taking advantage of all the semantic information of the whole corpus, which poses an improvement, as the method recognizes more vocabulary. This comes especially in handy when HaterNet analyzes new tweets which include tokens that are not present in the labeled corpus. In this case, a classification model estimated on the embedding-based representation would be able to take advantage of this information, while a frequency-based model would not. The neural network used for building the embeddings for words, emojis and expression tokens has 200 neurons in the hidden layer, this means that the generated embeddings have 200 dimensions. Therefore, when using this configuration each tweet is represented by a matrix having as many rows as unigrams and 200 columns (see Figure 6). Figure 6. Matrix representation of a tweet. t is the number of unigrams in the tweet. These embeddings can be extended by attaching them the corresponding suffixes, POS tags, and tf-idf information. When such information is not available, a vector of zeros of the appropriate size is attached instead. In particular, suffixes embeddings are trained separately using word2vec with 10 neurons, POS tags are represented using one-hot encoding, and tf-idf is a single real value. 4.5. Feature Selection The step of feature selection is applied only when using the frequency-based representation. Initially, a filter is applied on the absolute frequencies to remove vector elements with high sparsity (i.e., less that 1% non-zeroes) or very low sparsity and variability (i.e., more than 99% non-zeroes and very low coefficient of variation). This allows disregarding vector elements that could only be used to discriminate a tiny fraction of the documents and that, therefore, could lead to overfitting. After this filter, only 1.65% of the initial vector elements are preserved. After applying this method, the original vocabulary (having a size of 9791) is reduced to 245 elements. For these elements, the four studied frequency measures (i.e., absolute frequency, binary, logarithm, and ratio transformations) are computed. After this first filter, the feature space dimension is 245 × 4 + 4 = 984. Next, a LASSO algorithm using a logistic regression model with L1 penalization is applied. Leave-one-out cross-validation is used to choose the best penalization parameter and, consequently, the final set of features. After this step, the number of selected features is 148. This reduced space dimension is reasonable, as tweets are short messages, and is more suitable for the classification stage. When using the embedding-based representation it is not necessary to apply feature selection as (i) it is not logical to delete embeddings (columns in the matrix), as they contain different semantics of a tweet’s unigrams (rows in the matrix), and (ii) 200 features are not considered excessive for the classification stage. Sensors 2019, 19, 4654 18 of 37 4.6. Classification Due to their differences, the frequency-based and the embedding-based representations require the use of different classification models, which are presented in the following. 4.6.1. Frequency-Based Representation The features obtained after the selection stage are used to train the following supervised classification models; LDA, QDA, Random Forest, Ridge Logistic Regression, and SVM. 4.6.2. Embeddings-Based Representation As tweets in this iteration are represented in a matrix form, it is not possible to directly apply classifiers, as the number of rows in the matrix is variable and depends on the number of unigrams in the tweets. However, there are approaches that allow to transform this matrix representation into a single vector [74]. For example, a tweet could be represented as the tf-idf weighted sum of all the word embeddings that it contains. Unfortunately, this simple methodology does not take into consideration the order of the words, which is extremely relevant as it affects the meaning of a sentence, e.g., “poor unfortunate men” and “unfortunate poor men”. Thus, it is necessary to look for a way to take into account the words’ order. The solution implemented is a recurrent neural network, concretely a LSTM neural network, described by Graves [75]. Before training the recurrent neural network, there needs to be a fixed number of terms. In our case, this is the maximum number of terms found after preprocessing the tweets of the labeled corpus, which is 33. All tweets that contain less than 33 terms have the remaining rows filled with 0 s (padding technique). The designed neural network architecture is shown in Figure 7. Figure 7. LSTM+MLP architecture. The LSTM is combined with a multilayer perceptron (MLP) with two hidden layers. Word embeddings are processed by the LSTM neural network in each time step, one at a time, preserving word order. The output of the LSTM neural network is processed by an hyperbolic tangent activation Sensors 2019, 19, 4654 19 of 37 function. This output is a vector of dimensions 600. The MLP network consists of the input layer (600 neurons), two hidden layers (1600 and 100 neurons with ReLu activation function), and the output layer (a single neuron with sigmoid activation function). Dropout units have been placed between each pair of layers, having associated probabilities of 0.8, 0.8, and 0.4, respectively. The dropout units assign to each input neuron a probability of elimination during training and they are used to avoid overfitting. If the value provided by the output neuron is above a threshold, then the classifier considers that the tweet contains hate speech; otherwise, the neural network considers that there is no hate content in the tweet. 4.6.3. Parameter Estimation The classification models considered have a number of parameters that need to be estimated in order to achieve optimal classifications. For this purpose, different values of these parameters are considered and the performance of the resulting models is evaluated. In this work, the Area Under the Curve (AUC) (Section 3.6) is used for determining the goodness of the classifiers, as we are facing an imbalanced classification problem and are interested in the general performance of the classifier for different probability thresholds. The performance of the classifiers is estimated using 10-fold cross-validation. Hyperparameter tuning is based on a grid search using a 3-fold cross-validation. A grid search allows to find instances of classifiers with all the combinations of specified by the user. This stage has a high computational cost. Figure 8 shows a diagram of the validation procedure. Labelled dataset 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Training 10 fold crossvalidation 3 fold crossvalidation 1 2 3 TrainingValidation 21 3 21 3 ValidationValidation TrainingTraining Training Repeat for each parameter combination Mean score Best parameter combination Score classifier Test Mean score Figure 8. Classifiers’ performance estimation and hyperparameter tuning diagram. Sensors 2019, 19, 4654 20 of 37 5. Results This section presents the results of the experiments and a discussion of their significance. First, the inter-rater agreement among the labelers is calculated. Then, the representativeness of the embeddings is evaluated. Finally, the classification models considered are evaluated and compared to identify the best, which is chosen to be included in HaterNet. In the following section, the performance of HaterNet is compared to that of the models from the literature. 5.1. Labelers’ Inter-Rater Agreement When using human evaluators, it is important to measure their degree of agreement. The two main statistical measures of the agreement percentage, popular in labeling processes and areas such as psychology and education [76], are Cohens’ kappa [77], which measures the degree of agreement between two raters, and Fliess’ kappa [78], which makes it possible to measure the concordance among two or more raters. Both measures are considered to be more robust than the simple agreement percentage. For both measures, the agreement κ is defined as κ = po − pe 1 − pe = 1 − 1 − po 1 − pe (1) where po represents the relative observed agreement and pe measures the hypothetical chance agreement probability. κ = 1 means that the degree of agreement is maximum among users, κ = 0 indicates that the degree of agreement is obtained just by pure chance, and κ ≤ 0 means that the concordance is worse than rating randomly. The average inter-agreement among the labelers is κ = 0.588(σ = 0.081), denoting moderate agreement according to the qualitative interpretation proposed by Landis and Koch [79]. 5.2. Word Embeddings Representativeness The goodness of the generated word embeddings has been checked using a quantitative and a qualitative approach: (i) Accuracy, where 91% of the times the word2vec trained neural network (detailed in Section 4.4.2) predicts correctly the neighbors of a word in the corpus. (ii) Random Sampling, where some words were taken from the vocabulary and five of their nearest neighbors were analyzed. Cosine similarity is used for calculating how close two word embeddings are Cos(W 1, W 2) = W 1·W 2 ||W 1||||W 2|| where W 1 and W 2 represent the two word embeddings. Table 4 (first column) shows some words (translated from Spanish) taken from the corpus and five of their nearest neighbors. It can be seen that columns are related to the term’s meaning, i.e, colors, body parts, months, mobile phones, food, and soccer players. Table 4. Word embeddings’ nearest neighbors (translated from Spanish). Term\Nearest n. 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th red yellow green blue orange white head back leg neck belly stomach january march september february june august samsung galaxy xiaomi lg snapdragon huawei food dinner supper snack eat breakfast messi neymar ney cristiano umtiti mathieu As far as emojis are concerned, they have been decoded and included in the tweet corpus and their embeddings seem to correctly capture their semantics (see Table 5). Sensors 2019, 19, 4654 21 of 37 Table 5. Emojis embeddings semantics (translated from Spanish). Reference Embedding Nearest Neighbor smacker sandwich shit As shown in the table, some emojis are included among the nearest neighbors of some terms from the corpus and vice versa. The last row in the table illustrates that, also among the emojis, semantics has been captured: for example, an angry face emoji’s meaning is close to that of a red angry face. After analyzing the results presented in this section, we can conclude that there are grounds to state that the obtained word embeddings satisfactorily capture the semantics. 5.3. Classifiers’ Performance Results This section analyzes the performance of the classification models considered. Table 6 shows the results of our experiments. As illustrated in the table, different combinations of features, classification models, and thresholds have been considered. Overall, 17 different models have been tested. For each of them, the precision, recall, F1, and AUC have been computed using cross-validation on the best parameters found, as explained in Section 4.6. It is important to underline that models 1–5 have the same structure as the one proposed by Quijano-Sánchez et al. [23], and they have been included for comparison purposes. We consider that the most significant performance measure is the AUC, as it is not affected by the threshold chosen. Therefore, the best models are 7, 13, and 9 that achieve an AUC of 0.828. However, model 7 uses less features, therefore, following the principle of parsimony, it is chosen as the best model and selected for production in HaterNet. Model 7 enriches token embeddings with td-idf and classifies tweets using LSTM+MLP. Determining the best threshold is still relevant to the problem at hand, as HaterNet has to provide a definitive classification to the final user. The SNOAHC-SES has specified that their greater need is to analyze a small number of tweets containing hate speech. Thus, the probability threshold has been set to 0.7, as it obtains a precision of 0.784. This comes at a cost, as the recall is rather low (0.333). However, due to the high number of tweets available, this is not a major problem. The results obtained allow to draw some interesting insights. Concerning the features considered, the following conclusions can be drawn. According to Table 6, including suffixes and POS tags does not improve the classification for the embedding-based models, as the AUC does not change (AUC = 0.828). However, the results for the frequency-based models are mixed. Most models perform slightly worse when including emojis and suffixes. The only classification model that benefits from their inclusion is the QDA. However, its AUC is still lower than those of all the other models. We can conclude that suffixes and POS tags do not have a significant impact on the classification. On the other hand, td-idf improves the performance of the embedding-based models. Finally, in the context considered, embedding-based models perform better than the frequency-based. Sensors 2019, 19, 4654 22 of 37 Table 6. Performance statistics for the models considered: precision, recall, F1, and AUC. Model ID Features Type Features Considered Classification Model Classification Threshold Precision Recall F1 AUC #1 Frequency based Unigrams, POS tags Ridge R. 0.5 0.655 0.382 0.483 0.798 #2 SVM 0.685 0.329 0.445 0.79 #3 RF 0.809 0.167 0.277 0.769 #4 QDA 0.341 0.789 0.476 0.651 #5 LDA 0.641 0.42 0.507 0.796 #6 Embeddings based Words, emojis, and expression tokens LSTM+MLP 0.62 0.572 0.595 0.823 #7 Words, emojis, expression tokens, and tf-idf 0.625 0.598 0.611 0.828 #8 Frequency based Unigrams, POS tags, suffixes, emojis, expression tokens Ridge R. 0.639 0.417 0.505 0.794 #9 SVM 0.629 0.392 0.483 0.777 #10 RF 0.746 0.165 0.27 0.766 #11 QDA 0.386 0.71 0.5 0.71 #12 LDA 0.622 0.422 0.503 0.79 #13 Embeddings based Words, emojis, expression tokens, suffixes, POS tags, tf-idf LSTM+MLP 0.625 0.598 0.611 0.828 #14 Frequency based Unigrams, POS tags, suffixes, emojis, expression tokens Ridge R. 0.7 0.794 0.219 0.343 0.794 #15 SVM 0.786 0.19 0.306 0.777 #16 RF 1 0.005 0.001 0.766 #17 QDA 0.382 0.72 0.495 0.71 #18 LDA 0.741 0.272 0.398 0.079 #19 Embeddings based Words, emojis, expression tokens, suffixes, POS tags, tf-idf LSTM+MLP 0.784 0.333 0.467 0.828 Sensors 2019, 19, 4654 23 of 37 6. Comparison of HaterNet against State-Of-The-Art Approaches and Discussion As illustrated in Table 6, the best model obtained is 7, which achieves a better AUC than models 1–5. This means that, for the data considered, the double neural deep learning approach proposed in this paper improves on the methodology presented by Quijano-Sánchez et al. [23]. This, in turn, means that our model outperforms all the models that Quijano-Sánchez et al. [23] compared against the authors of [46–51]. To further assess the relevance of the methodology proposed, we have applied model 7 to a number of datasets from the literature and compared the performance of HaterNet against those reported. Concretely, Araque et al. [43] used several Twitter datasets and proved the improvement in the performance of their ensemble approaches against well-know state-of-the-art approaches, specifically the approaches followed by Go et al. [80], Manning et al. [81], Narayanan et al. [82], Smedt and Daelemans [83], Loria [84], and Kathuria [85]. Out of all the datasets used by Araque et al. [43], only Vader [86] and STS-Gold [87] are fully reproducible. The best F1 score obtained by the authors were 0.895 and 0.892 for the Vader and STS-Gold datasets, respectively, (note that we provide the F1 measure as it is the one given in the revised paper). Table 7 shows HaterNet’s performance on the aforementioned datasets where, again, our model wins the comparison. Table 7. Performance statistics of Model 7 on datasets from the literature: precision, recall, F1, AUC. Dataset Precision Recall F1 AUC Vader 0.923 0.890 0.906 0.925 STS-Gold 0.898 0.888 0.893 0.914 Analyzing both our reported results and those in the state-of-the-art of hate speech (see Table 1), a number of interesting multidimensional aspects can be concluded: • Regarding the employed datasets, most approaches use the same datasets to compare themselves against [5,6,8–11]. These datasets were originally proposed in [5], where authors manually annotated 16k tweets labeled as “sexist”, “racist”, or “clean”, and in [6], where authors designed a new dataset of 6k tweets (3k being part of the previous dataset), using both expert and amateur annotators. These datasets, along with the one presented in [7], are, to the best of our knowledge, the only publicly available hate speech datasets. Unfortunately, it is no longer possible to use the first two datasets as benchmarks as the authors provided only the ids of the tweets to be downloaded; as also reported in [8], Twitter has deleted several of them, mainly due to their offensive content. For instance, out of Waseem and Hovy [5] original 16k tweets, only 11k are available. Therefore, it is not possible to compare to the results reported using these datasets. This reality stresses the importance of one of this paper’s contributions, that is, the necessity of providing open datasets for reproducibility and benchmarking. • Regarding the inter-annotator agreement, only the datasets described in [5,56] reported their κ coefficient being 0.57 and 0.26, respectively. Again the lack of details in the related literature hinders more profound and transversal analysis. However, it allows us to (i) conclude that our reported parameter of κ = 0.588 falls within normal boundaries and (ii) agree with the conclusion reached in Waseem [6], Del Vigna et al. [56], and Ross et al. [55], that the annotation of hate speech is a hard task. • Regarding the studied features, the models achieving the best results on the datasets in the literature are [9,11]. All of them make use of embeddings: [9] combines character and word embeddings, whereas [11] uses random word embeddings. Also, HaterNet relies on embeddings; specifically, on word, emoji, and expression embeddings. Differently from the previous models, in HaterNet, the embeddings are enriched by adding the tf-idf which, as explained in Section 5.3, helps the classification and improves the performance of the embedding-based models. This Sensors 2019, 19, 4654 24 of 37 analysis suggests that, in the context of hate speech detection in Twitter, embedding-based methods outperform frequency-based models. • Regarding the implemented classification approaches, different classical machine learning models have been studied throughout the years, with LR, NB, DT, RF, and SVM being the most common Most studies have so far reported that SVM outperforms the others; this is the case in [7,53,57]. However, as pointed out by [7], LR has the advantage of allowing a more transparent and comprehensible interpretation of the results, being the observed performance sometimes even better or not significantly different. Our results reported in Table 6 and [23] support this affirmation. Also, a significant group of researchers have applied neural network-based approaches to implement classifiers that detect hate speech in social media content [8–11,56]. When comparing this approaches to other machine learning methods, the performance of NN clearly outperforms the latter; this conclusion is supported by this paper’s results and those of the related literature [10]. • Regarding this paper ’s novelty and contribution with respect to other hate classifiers, as previously mentioned, not having public datasets makes it difficult to benchmark. Besides, the lack of details given in the papers in the literature also makes it difficult to reproduce their results; this is, for example, in the case of [9]. As previously reported in Section 2.4, only three of the reviewed papers provide the source code or enough implementation details). However, the approaches presented in [5–7,52–54,57] make use of either LR, SVM, NB, or RF methods. These have been shown, both in [10,11,56] and in this research, to be inferior when compared to NN methodologies. Therefore, we can conclude that this paper’s model would essentially outperform all of them. With regards to the papers that implement a NN approach, all of them, except for [56], test their approaches on common previously published datasets. However, it is currently not possible to obtain all the tweets comprising the datasets as some of them have been removed from Twitter, as previously explained. Due to the impossibility of testing our best model on these datasets, a fair comparison could be obtained by testing the best models in the literature [9,11] on our dataset. However, as mentioned earlier, [9] does not provide neither the source code nor sufficient details for the reimplementation of their methodology. Therefore, we could test on our dataset only the combination of LSTM with Random Embedding and GBDT by Badjatiya et al. [11]. The results are illustrated in Table 8. The model by Badjatiya et al. [11] obtains an AUC of 0.788, which is inferior to the AUC obtained by our best model, 0.828. Therefore, in the context of our data, model 7 is preferable to the model by Badjatiya et al. [11]. The main difference between these models is that, in the case of Badjatiya et al. [11], the word embeddings are generated using only the labeled tweets; whereas, in the present case, we use the full dataset of 2M tweets. A second significant discrepancy is that Badjatiya et al. [11] generate document embeddings by averaging the word embedding, which could result in a significant loss of information. Finally, we include emojis and tokens embeddings and enrich all the embeddings with additional tf-idf information. These differences in the implementation could cause the gap in terms of performance and should be further investigated in future research. All in all, to the best of our knowledge, it can be concluded that our double deep learning approach, which uses token embeddings enriched with the tf-idf, outperforms the best models from the literature on text classification. Sensors 2019, 19, 4654 25 of 37 Table 8. Performance statistics of the best model proposed by Badjatiya et al. [11] (LSTM+Random Embedding + GBDT) on our dataset: precision, recall, F1, AUC. Threshold Precision Recall F1 AUC 0.7 0.787 0.123 0.212 0.782 0.5 0.647 0.394 0.490 0.782 7. Social Network Analyzer So far, we have presented the details relative to the tasks of collecting and classifying tweets. However, as mentioned in Section 1, HaterNet has another key application: the analysis and monitoring of hate in Twitter. In this section, we introduce the second module of our system: the Social Network Analyzer. Social Network Analysis uses graph theory techniques to investigate social structures [88] and offers innovative insights by targeting information more effectively [89]. The literature presents many researches that combine social media, sentiment analysis, and graph analysis metrics (using likes, hashtags, etc.) to perform trend analysis [90,91]. However, to best of the authors knowledge, there is no single approach that enables finding the distribution of communities by using concurrency of words in tweets, or the targeted source of the topic. As stated in the introduction, our goal is to provide a visual thermometer of emotions that allows to map the hate state of a territory and, therefore, to monitor its evolution and to take measures by targeting concepts, emitters, and receivers of hate. The high number of tweets containing hate speech identified by HaterNet makes it impossible to analyze their content manually to extract information patterns and trends. Therefore, it is desirable for the final user to have an expert system that automatizes and supports this task. To this end, the Social Network Analyzer has three main functionalities that will be next detailed: (i) word cloud tab, (ii) users’ mentions tab, and (iii) terms tab. These visualization tools use as input the following information: • The Hate Speech Detection module output, i.e., the set of tweets classified as hate speech containers and the associated probability. • The most common terms in the selected tweets, their frequency, and a list of the document indexes where they appear. This ranking only includes adjectives, nouns, and emojis. • Word embeddings reduced to two dimensions using a t-distributed stochastic neighbor embedding (t-SNE) technique, which is a dimensional reduction technique for maintaining relative distances between words in the new space [92]. • A directed graph built on user’s mentions. In the graph, nodes represent users and an arc (A,B) is created when user A mentions B in a tweet. • A non-directed words concurrency graph based on document appearance. In the graph, the nodes represent words and two nodes are connected by an edge if the corresponding words appear in the same tweet. 7.1. Word Cloud Tab The main interface of the application is dedicated to analyzing terms, as shown in Figure 9. The main tab shows a semantic word cloud of the most frequent adjectives and nouns found in the tweets that contain hate. Usually, word clouds are plots of terms whose size varies proportionally to the terms’ frequency, i.e., terms’ size increase as frequency does. Besides, as in this project we have used word embeddings, we can take advantage of this fact to plot terms which are semantically related closer to each other. However, before plotting these terms, it is necessary to use dimensional reduction techniques. In this case, t-SNE is used. The user can interact with the graph by zooming in and out to better visualize the different hate terms and by passing the mouse over the terms and observe their frequency. Sensors 2019, 19, 4654 26 of 37 Figure 9. Example of main tab. Users’ names have been censored for privacy reasons. Sensors 2019, 19, 4654 27 of 37 The upper part of Figure 9 shows an example of a semantic word cloud in HaterNet where the tweets with hate content were captured the day of the Spain vs. Portugal soccer match of the 2018 World Cup. This is reflected in the graph with soccer players located very close to each other and with the word “Cristiano Ronaldo” standing out as a very common term. The second tab, located below the semantic word cloud, contains a table with all the hate tweets that were captured. This table allows the user to sort the rows by column values. In this case, the user can sort the table by author’s name or by the probability of containing hate. This helps police officers to focus on the tweets with high probability of containing hate. The designed interface allows the user to interact with data tables. Therefore, it is possible for the user to click on a term to show the tweets that contain that term in the data table. Figure 9 shows an example of a user that clicked on “Pique” in the graph and sorted the data table by the probability of containing hate. Being able to identify relevant nouns and adjectives inside the identified hate messages provides useful applications: (i) It allows for the comparison of hate trends and to study its evolution by looking at the cloud of words at different periods of time; this, in turn, can result in actions taken to prevent/mitigate specific hate waves or in the study of possible triggers or origins (e.g., another highlighted noun reflected in Figure 9 is the government itself). (ii) It serves as an explicative tool, allowing to visualize and analyze the terms that the classifier identifies inside hate messages, especially those highlighted by being bigger than the rest. This feature can be used to detect possible biases. (iii) It allows the user (in this case, the police) to cluster messages by topic/terms and analyze common patterns or triggers. (iv) It allows to further cluster topics/terms (and their corresponding messages) related to each other. As a consequence, analysts can associate and study similar hate aspects together, which permits the detection of common patterns that can be used for surveillance or for designing preventive measures. These last two actions are further supported by the functionality of the terms’ tab, described in Section 7.3. 7.2. Users’ Mentions Tab The main purpose of this second tab is to analyze the way hate messages propagate in Twitter. Usually, when a user mentions another user in a tweet that contains hate speech, it is because the first one is insulting the second one or because the second one is related to topics that the first one does not like. These relations can be represented in a graph where a user (node) is connected to another if the first one is the author of the tweet in which the second one is mentioned. This tab summarizes information in two ways: (i) As a table (see Figure 10 top), where we can see the number of nodes in the component, the highest in-degree in the graph, the highest out-degree, and the PageRank [93]. The node with the highest in-degree could be interpreted as the most hated, whereas the node with the highest out-degree is the node that emits hate the most. PageRank is used to measure the importance of each node in the network in terms of hate received. (ii) As a graph (see Figure 10 bottom), where a red node represents a user that has sent hate content through Twitter, whereas a blue one is related to a user that received messages with hate content. The current tab also includes a check box in order to adapt the nodes’ size proportionally to their in or out degree. By doing so, if the graph is too large, the user can check which nodes to filter. It also allows the user to drag a node, zoom in/out, and highlight the neighborhood of a node. Extra functionalities have been added to ease the task of hate analysts, e.g., when passing the mouse over an edge the tweet that originated the drawn relation appears. Sensors 2019, 19, 4654 28 of 37 Figure 10. Example of the users’ mentions tab. This functionality is novel to hate speech detectors. In fact, previous works [12] have focused on the message and not on the actors involved. As shown in Figure 10, drawing the actors as a connected network of related people that emit or receive hate allows to easily visualize and highlight, which users are especially being the focus of hate messages (see the big blue node in the right part of the graph) or which ones are acting as generators of hate (see the red nodes surrounding it). It also allows to detect peculiar relationships (e.g., two nodes mutually hating each other in the bottom left part of the graph), or particularly “agressive” nodes (e.g., the red, centered star in the top left part of the graph, which represents a user hating seven others). This, in turn, can trigger different policing measures related to both protection and surveillance. 7.3. Terms’ Tab The last tab is dedicated to visualizing the word concurrency graph. Edges are weighted by the frequency two terms appear together in the same tweet. Next, the Louvain community detection algorithm is applied [94]. The objective is to allow analysts to be able to discover relationships between events by identifying clusters (painted with different colors) and isolating them for further study. Extra functionalities have been added to allow analysts to isolate communities, remove nodes, or highlight a node’s neighbors (see Figure 11). Sensors 2019, 19, 4654 29 of 37 Figure 11. Terms neighborhood highlighting. 7.4. Applications HaterNet is already in use as an observatory of phenomena for significant events and days, such as the International Women’s Day, the gay pride parade, or soccer matches (see Figure 12 for an example). The SNOAHC-SES has been studying for months the results of both modules: (i) the lists of tweets identified as hate containers of the Hate Speech Detection module, and (ii) the evolution of the hate cloud and the different tabs of the Social Network Analyzer module. Concrete examples of hate trends discovered are out of the scope of this paper. However, we here highlight some of the activities that the use of this system has led to: • Analysis of tweets tagged by HaterNet as hate speech containers including their symbology (e.g., emojis). • Analysis and classification of “tweeter” communities that share messages with toxic content, as well as the permanence and evolution of hate speech in networks produced by a relevant social events. • Statistics on relevant events, words and terms, used as a support tool for the police units with Twitter “Trusted Flagger” licenses, for the elimination of hate content. Sensors 2019, 19, 4654 30 of 37 Figure 12. Twitter’s hate map in Spain on the 8 March 2019 (International Women’s Day) was focused on an extreme right political party and its leader. 8. Implemented Architecture This section summarizes the functioning of HaterNet as a whole. To better illustrate the process, Figure 13 graphically illustrates all the different steps. When a new tweet is obtained for analysis, first it has to be processed by the Hate Speech Detection module (Section 3) that classifies it as hate or clean. Inside of the module, the tweet undertakes a number of steps, detailed in the following. The first step is data cleaning (Section 4.1), which standardizes the content of the tweet. Next, the cleaned tweet is passed through a rule-based filter (Section 4.2) that ascertains whether the tweet might contain hate speech or not. If the tweet fails the test, then it is classified as clean and it is not further processed. Otherwise, it has to be analyzed by the classification model. Therefore, the tweet needs to be prepared for the task, by undertaking an NLP processing step (Section 4.4), and then its features are extracted (Section 4.4). The classifier model assigns a score that represents the probability that the tweet contains hate speech (Section 4.6). If this score is lower than the threshold, 0.7, then the tweet is classified as clean; otherwise, it is classified as hate by the module. Once the Hate Speech Detection module terminates its analysis, if the tweet contains hate, then it is passed to the Social Network Analyzer module (Section 7) that stores the tweet in a database. The tweets in the database are then processed by the module which represents the information obtained in the word cloud, users’ mentions, and in the terms tabs (Sections 7.1, 7.2, and 7.3, respectively). Sensors 2019, 19, 4654 31 of 37 Raw tweet Data cleaning Filtering Clean Tweet fail passNLP processing Features generation Classification score < 0.7 score ≥ 0.7 Hate Tweet pass Hate Speech Detection module Social Network Analyzer module - non-alphanumeric chars removal - lowercasing - tokenization - expression tokens generation - emoji encoding - stopword removal - lemmatization - POS tagging - suffixes extraction - word embeddings - tf-idf Database Figure 13. Implemented architecture. 9. Conclusions This paper presents HaterNet, an intelligent system for the detection and analysis of hate speech in Twitter. HaterNet has been developed in collaboration with the Spanish National Office Against Hate Crimes, and it is currently in use to monitor the evolution of hate in Social Media. It is comprised of a novel text classification model to detect hate speech and a social network analysis module to monitor and visualize its state and evolution. The design of the text classification module has been experiment-driven. We have compared 19 different strategies, each consisting of a combination of features and classification models. Finally, the best model, which achieves the highest AUC of 0.828, uses embeddings of words, emojis, and token expressions, and then enriches them by including tf-idf. Other features, such as POS tags and suffixes, have been tested and it has been found that they have no positive impact. The classifier implemented in HaterNet is a double deep learning model, which combines an LSTM and an MLP neural network and frequency features. Our approach has been compared with previous models from the literature and it has been found that HaterNet outperforms all of them. Moreover, the designed visualization tool is the first of its kind to provide a user-friendly representation of those terms that appear in tweets containing hate speech and, also, of the interaction between users in tweets. This module organizes information in a simpler and more visual way through interactive tables and graphs that allow the study of users’ relationships, communities, and, overall, makes it easier to monitor the state of hate in Twitter. Sensors 2019, 19, 4654 32 of 37 Looking at the practical implications of this research to the Spanish National Office Against Hate Crimes, HaterNet represents an advancement in terms of analysis capabilities—manually evaluating the amount of daily generated tweets is unaffordable—and application possibilities. As mentioned in the previous section, monitoring and studying the identified tweets can help establish an early warning that allows to take predictive actions against potential hate crimes. Besides, HaterNet has recently been used to analyze hate in Twitter during Spanish elections [95] and to study its impact on LGTBI communities [96]. Future possibilities for the extension of HaterNet and research opportunities are highlighted in the following. • Classification of tweets according to the type of hate expressed, e.g., racist, homophobic, and xenophobic. This classification could be used as an open source of information by organizations, observatories, or specialized NGOs. • Adapting the system to other domains aimed at police investigation, e.g., terrorism, gender violence, or cyberbullying. • Strengthening knowledge and capacities of institutions and civil society by having an online hate speech thermometer. • Establishing an early warning alert that allows to take action against the potential impact of hate speech. • Understanding the correlation between hate speech and crimes with hate motivation finally reported to the police. This would allow testing of the hypothesis that hate speech is the prelude to hate crime. • Automatically removing toxic content from SM, or penalizing its appearance in the rankings. Also, HaterNet could be used to identify possible criminal content, as a previous step to safeguarding this information, and then pursuit of possible legal prosecution. We hope that this work will be a useful source of ideas for future research on text classification and will contribute further in the development of more sophisticated and accurate models for the detection of hate speech. Author Contributions: Conceptualization, J.C.P.-K., L.Q.-S., F.L., and M.C.-C.; Data curation, J.C.P.-K.; Formal analysis, J.C.P.-K., L.Q.-S., and F.L.; Funding acquisition, F.L. and M.C.-C.; Investigation, J.C.P.-K. and L.Q.-S.; Methodology, L.Q.-S. and F.L.; Project administration, M.C.-C.; Software, J.C.P.-K.; Supervision, L.Q.-S.; Validation, L.Q.-S. and F.L.; Visualization, J.C.P.-K.; Writing—original draft, L.Q.-S. and F.L.; Writing—review & editing, L.Q.-S. and F.L. Funding: The work by Quijano-Sanchez was supported by the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation grant FJCI-2016-28855. The research of Liberatore was supported by the Government of Spain, grant MTM2015-65803-R, and by the European Union’s Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation Programme, under the Marie Sklodowska-Curie grant agreement No. 691161 (GEOSAFE). All the financial support is gratefully acknowledged. Acknowledgments: We would like to thank Álvaro Ortigosa Juárez for inspiring discussions on this problem and the related literature. The authors are also grateful for the support received from the State Secretariat for Security of the Spanish Interior Ministry. In particular, special thanks go to the anonymous labelers that contributed in the making of the corpus. Also, we would like to express our gratitude to the jury of the Spanish Police Foundation for awarding HaterNet the 2018 Research Award accesit. Finally, the authors would like to thank Twitter for supporting research and advancement in science by providing an open API. Conflicts of Interest: The authors declare no conflicts of interest. The information and views set out in this paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official opinion of the financial supporters and of the affiliation institutions. The funders had no role in the design of the study; in the collection, analyses, or interpretation of data; in the writing of the manuscript; or in the decision to publish the results. Sensors 2019, 19, 4654 33 of 37 Abbreviations The following abbreviations are used in this manuscript: SM Social Media SES Security of the Ministry of Interior SNOAHC-SES Spanish National Office Against Hate Crimes NLP Natural Language Processing ML Machine Learning DNN deep neural network KDE Kernel Density Estimation BOW Bag Of Words POS Part-of-Speech tagging AUC Area Under the Curve SVM Support Vector Machines CNN Convolutional Neural Network RF Random Forests DT Decision Trees LDA Linear Discriminant Analysis QDA Quadratic Discriminant Analysis FNN Feedforward Networks RNN Recurrent Neural Networks BPTT back-propagation through time GDBT Gradient Boosted Decision Trees MLP Multilayer Perceptron LSTM Long Short-Term Memory GRU GRU Gated Recurrent Unit Networks LR Logistic Regression References 1. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. 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This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/). http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2529310 https://buildmedia.readthedocs.org/media/pdf/textblob/dev/textblob.pdf https://buildmedia.readthedocs.org/media/pdf/textblob/dev/textblob.pdf https://github.com/kevincobain2000/sentiment$_$classifier https://github.com/kevincobain2000/sentiment$_$classifier http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/016555150202800601 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.comnet.2012.08.009 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.future.2016.04.009 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tele.2015.04.008 https://elpais.com/tecnologia/2019/05/28/actualidad/1559039892_332196.html https://elpais.com/tecnologia/2019/05/28/actualidad/1559039892_332196.html http://www.mineco.gob.es/portal/site/mineco/menuitem.ac30f9268750bd56a0b0240e026041a0/?vgnextoid=b1ad544a1929b610VgnVCM1000001d04140aRCRD&vgnextchannel=864e154527515310VgnVCM1000001d04140aRCRD http://www.mineco.gob.es/portal/site/mineco/menuitem.ac30f9268750bd56a0b0240e026041a0/?vgnextoid=b1ad544a1929b610VgnVCM1000001d04140aRCRD&vgnextchannel=864e154527515310VgnVCM1000001d04140aRCRD http://www.mineco.gob.es/portal/site/mineco/menuitem.ac30f9268750bd56a0b0240e026041a0/?vgnextoid=b1ad544a1929b610VgnVCM1000001d04140aRCRD&vgnextchannel=864e154527515310VgnVCM1000001d04140aRCRD http://creativecommons.org/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/. Introduction Related Work State-of-the-Art on Predictive Policing State-of-the-Art on Twitter Data for Predictive Analytics State-of-the-Art on Text Classification State-of-the-Art on Hate Speech Detection Hate Speech Detection: Design and Theoretical Concepts Corpus Collection and Cleaning Document Selection Document Labeling Document Representation and Feature Extraction Feature Selection Document Classification Hate Speech Detection: Implementation Tweet Collection and Cleaning Tweet Selection Tweet Labeling Tweet Representation Frequency-Based Representation Embeddings-Based Representation Feature Selection Classification Frequency-Based Representation Embeddings-Based Representation Parameter Estimation Results Labelers' Inter-Rater Agreement Word Embeddings Representativeness Classifiers' Performance Results Comparison of HaterNet against State-Of-The-Art Approaches and Discussion Social Network Analyzer Word Cloud Tab Users' Mentions Tab Terms' Tab Applications Implemented Architecture Conclusions References 
work_7lh3ytjc4vgrph52vwinmciuv4	----	Ravndal,manus.pdf Right-Wing Terrorism and Violence in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis Jacob Aasland Ravndal Department of Political Science Faculty of Social Sciences University of Oslo © Jacob Aasland Ravndal, 2017 Series of dissertations submitted to the Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Oslo No. 667 ISSN 1564-3991 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without permission. Cover: Hanne Baadsgaard Utigard. Print production: Reprosentralen, University of Oslo. Contents Preface and acknowledgements ................................................................................................. v Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 1 Research questions and outline .................................................................................................. 3 Synthesis of articles .................................................................................................................... 5 Concepts and definitions ............................................................................................................ 6 Left versus right ideas ......................................................................................................... 6 Criminal versus terrorist violence ....................................................................................... 7 Radical versus extreme actors ............................................................................................. 8 Existing theory and literature ................................................................................................... 10 Related fields ..................................................................................................................... 11 Existing explanations ........................................................................................................ 13 Shortcomings ..................................................................................................................... 17 Research design ........................................................................................................................ 19 Philosophy of science ........................................................................................................ 19 Methods ............................................................................................................................. 20 Data ................................................................................................................................... 24 Article summaries .................................................................................................................... 26 Article I ............................................................................................................................. 26 Article II ............................................................................................................................ 28 Article III ........................................................................................................................... 30 Article IV .......................................................................................................................... 32 Summary of main findings ....................................................................................................... 33 Research question 1 ........................................................................................................... 33 Research question 2 ........................................................................................................... 35 Research question 3 ........................................................................................................... 36 Implications for research and policy ........................................................................................ 39 Contributions to existing research ..................................................................................... 39 Future research .................................................................................................................. 42 Policy implications ............................................................................................................ 44 Concluding remarks ................................................................................................................. 46 Literature .................................................................................................................................. 48 Article I: Thugs or Terrorists? A Typology of Right-Wing Terrorism and Violence in Western Europe ...................................................................................................................................... 61 Article II: Right-Wing Terrorism and Violence in Western Europe: Introducing the RTV Dataset ...................................................................................................................................... 99 Article III: Explaining Right-Wing Terrorism and Violence in Western Europe: Grievances, Opportunities, and Polarization .............................................................................................. 113 Article IV: Right-Wing Terrorism and Militancy in the Nordic Countries: A Comparative Case Study .............................................................................................................................. 139 Appendices to Article III ........................................................................................................ 165 Preface and acknowledgements This PhD project follows in the wake of a national disaster: the 22 July terrorist attacks in Norway in 2011. These attacks – prepared and carried out by a single perpetrator – left 77 mostly young people dead, 46 severely wounded, and hundreds of victims and relatives injured or traumatized. The attacks also exposed important gaps in our present knowledge about the characteristics, extent, and dynamics of right-wing terrorism and violence in Western Europe. Without such knowledge, it is difficult to place events such as the 22 July attacks in a larger picture and to determine whether they should be seen as an outlier event, or as signalling an emergent threat. A key motivation for this PhD project has therefore been to generate new knowledge that may help answer such questions. I first learned about the 22 July attacks upon arrival at my parents’ house in Italy, where I was going to spend some time together with my wife and a couple of Norwegian friends. As we arrived at the house in the early afternoon, my father came running towards us, telling us that something terrible was happening at home. We spent the next hours and days dumbfounded in front of the TV, watching the events unfold. Norway is a small country. It soon turned out that one of my friends who was there with us knew one of the people killed by the bomb in the Government Quarter. I remember a feeling of helplessness and a strong desire to return to Oslo. I immediately downloaded the compendium distributed by the terrorist shortly before the attacks (later to become known as his Manifesto in the media), which I read intensely for days, trying to figure out what was going on. I was puzzled by the facts that he grew up in the same part of Oslo as I did, that we were almost the same age, and that we had frequented some of the same places (perhaps at the same time?). Little did I know then that this event would also change my life when, a few months later, Thomas Hegghammer (then Director of Terrorism Research at the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, FFI) called to ask me if I would consider applying for a PhD scholarship on right-wing terrorism. Despite having no prior experience of researching terrorism, or the extreme right for that matter, I realized that this was a unique opportunity that I could not miss out on. Because this project started as a blank slate entitled “Something about right-wing terrorism”, it would have never materialized without the help of many others. First, I would like to thank my two outstanding supervisors Tore Bjørgo and Jon Hovi for carefully shepherding this project to its final destination. I had to persuade Jon into doing it, because he was initially v uncomfortable supervising a topic he was unfamiliar with. In hindsight, making Jon change his mind about this project was the best investment I could have made, as his stringent and experienced advice on structure, methods, and language has proven invaluable to me. Tore was not unfamiliar with the topic, to put it mildly, and having him by my side throughout this process has been a privilege. His steadfast encouragement and support, not to mention his excellent homebrewed beer, has given me the necessary confidence to bring this project into new territories left largely unexplored by existing research. I also owe special thanks to Thomas Hegghammer, who in many ways has served as my third supervisor. This entire project was Thomas’s idea, as he quickly realized that this type of knowledge would be in demand after the 22 July attacks. Having an experienced and distinguished terrorism scholar such as Thomas by my side during the project’s initial phase was of critical importance, as my own immature thoughts and ideas were floating all over the place, and I needed someone who could pull them together and send them off in the right direction. Thomas also masterminded FFI’s hiring of Johannes Due Enstad, who came to be (and still is) my closest working partner in this field. Having just completed his PhD on history of Soviet Russia under Nazi occupation, Johannes was tasked to study the extreme right in post-Soviet Russia, a severely understudied yet critically important topic. Thus, as two newcomers to this field, we were able to ask each other silly questions and delve into the unknown together, which has been a major advantage. Johannes also happens to be one of the most talented scholars I know, and his sharp observations and clear thinking have surely benefited my own analytical faculties. Johannes and I represented “the extreme right” of FFI’s Terrorism Research Group (Terra), whose accomplished “Jihadi” members besides Thomas – Anne Stenersen, Petter Nesser, Truls Tønnesen, Henrik Gråtrud, Erik Skare, and Brynjar Lia – deserves my gratitude for providing an inspiring and challenging working environment, and for giving me helpful comments and feedback on this manuscript and on several of my articles. I would also like to thank FFI for giving me the opportunity to pursue an academic career ever since I started working there as student intern back in 2008, followed by two-and-a-half years working as a research fellow, before receiving this PhD scholarship in 2012. In particular, I wish to thank all the friendly people in the Analysis Division for providing me with a stimulating working environment. Special thanks go to Bård Eggereide for helping me build vi and analyse my own events dataset, to Andreas Forø Tollefsen for helping me with statistical analysis (although I ended up not using it), and to Alida Skiple for dragging me along to observe right-wing militants in action, and for commenting on one of my manuscripts. Finally, I thank my close friend and colleague Stian Kjeksrud, who was the one who hired me in the first place, who also became my first research partner and field work companion as we travelled together to distant conflict zones, and whose kind support, encouragement, and personal friendship mean a lot to me. In April 2016, the Center for Research on Extremism (C-REX) was officially opened at the University of Oslo. With FFI being one of five Norwegian partner institutions, I was given the opportunity to spend the last months of my PhD project at C-REX together with other PhD students and scholars working in this field, an experience that has been truly enlightening and inspiring. In particular, I wish to thank C-REX affiliates Birgitte Prangerød Haanshuus, Ingvild Magnæs Gjelsvik, Lars Erik Berntzen, Nina Høy-Petersen, Eviane Leidig, and Astrid Hauge Rambøl for creating an inspiring and feel-good atmosphere in the otherwise stressful life of a PhD student about to complete his thesis. I also thank Dagfinn Hagen for giving me all the administrative support I needed, and Emilie Silkoset for being my part-time research assistant over the past few months – a privilege most PhD students can only dream of. Finally, I owe special thanks to Anders Ravik Jupskås, Deputy Director at C-REX, for constantly luring me into long and hard discussions about the essential elements of our field and the meaning of the work we do – discussions that have been tremendously rewarding and cleared my thinking about several issues. Anders has also provided excellent and truly demanding comments on every part of this thesis, for which I am very grateful. Besides the people at FFI and C-REX, a few others deserve special mention. From the Department of Political Science at the University of Oslo, I thank Olav Schram Stokke and Scott Gates for giving me valuable feedback during my trial public defence. I also thank Vegar and Trine from the Norwegian Police for bringing me along to activist demonstrations and gatherings in Norway and abroad, and for granting me insights into their excellent police work. To Ellen H. and her team (you know who you are), thank you for being so including and for your good spirits (you know what I mean). A few colleagues from abroad also merit my gratitude. First and foremost, I wish to thank my friend and colleague Daniel Köhler from the German Institute on Radicalization and De- radicalization Studies (GIRDS) for facilitating my research stay in Berlin in 2015, for sharing vii relevant events data from GIRDS’ Database on Terrorism in Germany, and for sharing with me his extensive knowledge about the German extreme right scene. I would also like to thank Damian Ghamlouche for inviting me as visiting scholar to the Berlin Institute for Integration and Migration Research at Humboldt University. Next, I would like to thank Leena Malkki and Mats Fridlund for inviting me to contribute to their conference on terrorism in the Nordic countries at the University of Helsinki, and to the special journal issue that will follow. I would also like to thank Catarina Froio and Pietro Castelli Gattinara for including me in their European Consortium for Political Research panel on “the radical right beyond the electoral arena” from which several fruitful discussions emerged, and for providing useful comments on one of my manuscripts. Finally, I wish to thank Professor Charles Ragin for introducing me to his intriguing world of fuzzy sets and Boolean algebra during his PhD course on qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) at the University of Oslo in 2015. Following this course, I have learned that QCA is a method that, once mastered, opens an entire new world of possibilities. Two weeks before my wife and I arrived in Italy on 22 July 2011, I received another life- changing piece of news, but this time of a more joyful character: we were expecting our first child. Nine months later (and three months into this PhD project) our first daughter was born, followed by her little sister two-and-a-half years later. Having two kids during the course of a PhD project is certainly a challenge, but, more importantly, a rewarding experience. I would therefore like to extend my final thanks to my two daughters, Tiril and Ebba, and to my dearest wife Mari, for being the most wonderful distractions in this world, for supporting me throughout this project, and for keeping me grounded. viii Introduction Strange as it may sound, studies of the human mind have found that some people are bound to experience liberal democracy as utterly unfair and morally misguided (Haidt, 2012; Stenner, 2005). Today, most of these people express their discomfort relatively peacefully, for example by voting for radical right parties (Art, 2011; Kitschelt & McGann, 1995; Mudde, 2007), by voicing their concerns online (Bartlett & Littler, 2011; Caiani & Kröll, 2015), or by joining a protest movement (Berntzen & Weisskircher, 2016; Busher, 2016). However, some of them – a very small subset indeed – end up using violence and terrorism to express their antipathies, or to generate political change. This thesis is about those people – or more precisely about the terror and violence they produce, and the political and societal conditions that promote or discourage it. Specifically, the thesis examines the evolution of right-wing terrorism and violence (RTV) in post-WWII Western Europe, documents its most recent developments, and provides explanations of why some West European countries have experienced more RTV than others.1 This last question remains largely unanswered in the existing literature on the extreme right (Mudde, 2004, pp. 205–208). Indeed, Koopmans (1996) gave it an honest try, but his theory about elites’ negative framing of immigrants and weak radical right parties must be read with caution because of limited and unreliable data (Bjørgo, 2003). Other scholars have also looked into RTV’s underlying causes (Bjørgo, 1997; Heitmeyer, 1993; Hoffman, 1982; Kaplan, 1995; Sprinzak, 1995; Weinberg, 1995; Weinberg & Eubank, 1987; Wilkinson, 1995; Willems, 1995; Witte, 1995), but their diverse propositions (including but not limited to authoritarianism, fascism, fear, immigration, isolation, leftism, policing, politics, poverty, public opinion, religion, repression, and unemployment) have yet to be investigated systematically across more than a handful of cases. In other words, we have been presented with a number of plausible hypotheses, but little systematic evidence has been offered to disprove or support them. Poor evidence notwithstanding, RTV remains a challenge to Western liberal democracies. Perpetrators of RTV repeatedly target minorities, political opponents, and government representatives (Köhler, 2017). Furthermore, such violent attacks may provoke repressive countermeasures from the state that are essentially illiberal in nature, thereby undermining the 1 By Western Europe, I mean all European countries that did not form part of the Eastern Bloc during the Cold War. 1 very virtues they are meant to protect (Minkenberg, 2006; Pedahzur, 2001). Countering RTV without compromising core liberal democratic principles such as freedom of expression or political freedom for all people, including those on the far right, is a challenging balancing act (Eatwell & Mudde, 2004; Kirshner, 2014). To help policymakers and practitioners perform this balancing act with more precision, this thesis offers new and updated knowledge about contemporary RTV perpetrators, their methods, and their victims. It also demonstrates how certain combinations of political and societal conditions may create inflammable environments from which extensive RTV is more likely to emerge. Before moving on to present the structure and contents of this thesis in more detail, let me first say a few words about case selection. I have limited this study to Western Europe for three reasons. The first is that other Western liberal democracies, most notably the United States, are already well covered by existing research (Adamczyk et al., 2014; Chermak et al., 2013; Hamm, 1993; Hewitt, 2003; Kaplan, 1995; Kerodal et al., 2015; Lipset & Raab, 1970; Michael, 2012; Perliger, 2012; Simi, 2010; Simi et al., 2016). By contrast, research on RTV in Western Europe has been scarce since it peaked during the 1990s (key contributions include Bjørgo, 1995a, 1997; Bjørgo & Witte, 1993a; Koopmans, 1996; Wilkinson, 1995). Yet much has happened in this region since that turbulent decade, and there is an increasing demand for new and updated RTV studies (recent contributions answering to this demand include Caiani et al., 2012; Köhler, 2017; Taylor et al., 2013). The second reason is that Western Europe constitutes a particularly useful empirical universe for conducting comparative studies at the cross-national level. Such comparative studies have been endemically lacking in this field, which is heavily dominated by case studies of specific individuals, groups, and movements (notable exceptions include Bjørgo, 1997; Caiani et al., 2012; Koopmans, 1996). As a result, we know a lot about the micro-dynamics of RTV, but much less about RTV’s macro-structural causes, or how to connect these causes with relevant conditions at the meso- and micro-levels. Finally, a third reason why this region needs studying is that several experts have warned that an outbreak of RTV is brewing in Western Europe (see e.g. Bartlett & Birdwell, 2011; Fekete, 2016; Ramalingam, 2014). Such concerns have in turn been intensified by the ongoing migration crisis, by Islamist terrorism, and by growing support for radical right parties. However, because our knowledge about RTV’s underlying causes remains limited, and because updated events data are lacking, it is difficult to assess the credibility of these warnings, and to 2 identify the most relevant countermeasures for dealing with the emergent threat they are warning us against. Research questions and outline Against this backdrop, three knowledge gaps in particular inform the structure and content of this study. The first is the lack of a systematic categorization of key RTV actors in post-WWII Western Europe. Following the 22 July terrorist attacks in Norway, some experts argued that they were indicative of West European right-wing terrorism more generally, portrayed as a relatively rare phenomenon characterized by large-scale attacks with many casualties, such as the Bologna train station bombing in 1980, or the Oktoberfest bombing in Munich, also in 1980 (see e.g. Engene, 2011). However, except for large casualty numbers, these two events and their assumed perpetrators have little in common with the 22 July attacks. Most notably, the 22 July attacks were carried out by a mentally disturbed lone actor unaffiliated to any right-wing militant group (Melle, 2013; Ravndal, 2012). By contrast, the bombings in Bologna and Munich are believed to have been orchestrated by some of the largest and most influential right-wing terrorist organizations in Western Europe’s post-WWII history (Ferraresi, 1996; Fromm, 1998; Paterson, 2015). Thus, to develop precise explanations of such different terrorist attacks, it is useful first to identify some key characteristics of the different perpetrator types involved. A typology of right-wing terrorism and violence in post-WWII Western Europe is therefore needed. The second knowledge gap concerns the lack of updated events data suitable for analysing variation of RTV across time and place. The most relevant existing datasets, such as the Terrorism in Western Europe: Events Data (TWEED) dataset (Engene, 2007) and the Domestic Terrorism Victims (DTV) dataset (De la Calle & Sanchez-Cuenca, 2011), do not include events from the past decade. Furthermore, a majority of events registered by TWEED and DTV are from the Cold War period when the communist threat was still a primary concern for most right- wing militants (Hoffman, 1982). Today, this communist threat has in the eyes of many activists been replaced by the threat from immigration, Islamism, and the ruling political elites (Mammone et al., 2012, 2013). Furthermore, while some of the most influential right-wing terrorist groups from the Cold War period received financial and operational support from members of the political elites to fight the communist threat (Cento Bull, 2007; Ferraresi, 1996; Harrison, 1989), today’s extreme right activists operate under considerably more hostile and repressive conditions (Bleich, 2007; Minkenberg, 2006). This change of operating environment 3 influences the motives, target selection, and mobilization opportunities of today’s activists. Yet because systematic events data have been lacking, we know little about the extent and characteristics of contemporary RTV, including whether it is a rising or declining phenomenon, whether some countries are experiencing more RTV per capita than others, or who the main perpetrators and victims are. New and updated RTV events data are therefore needed. Finally, we have limited knowledge about why RTV has been more extensive in some countries than in others. This limitation follows directly from the lack of systematic events data described above. Without such basic information, it is difficult to carry out comparative studies to develop and test RTV theories. Indeed, a number of explanations have been proposed by the existing literature (see the literature review below). However, these explanations have yet to be tested systematically across more than a few cases. More comparative RTV research is therefore needed to identify the conditions under which RTV is most – and least – likely to occur. To help fill these three gaps, this PhD project sets out to answer the following three research questions: 1. What characterizes the most important RTV perpetrator types in post-WWII Western Europe? 2. What is the record of RTV events in Western Europe between 1990 and 2015? 3. Why have some West European countries experienced considerably more RTV than others between 1990 and 2015? This thesis addresses these three questions in four articles. Question one is considered by the first article, question two by the second article, while question three is considered by the third and fourth articles. I will now give a brief synthesis of these four articles to illustrate how they relate to each other. I then move on to define some key concepts used in this thesis, before reviewing existing theory and literature in this field, highlighting relevant shortcomings therein. Next, I present my underlying philosophical assumptions and the mixed methods research design employed in this thesis. I then summarize the contents of each article, before drawing on my main findings to answer each of the three research questions introduced above. Finally, this introductory chapter closes by discussing the thesis’s main contributions to existing research, by proposing some ideas for future research, and by discussing how some of my findings might inform future policies aimed at combating violent extremism on the far right. 4 Synthesis of articles To avoid repetition, I will not say too much about each article’s substantive contents now, because that information is provided in the article summaries below. Here, I simply present the main idea behind each article and show how these ideas connect to each other. The main idea underlying Article I is to set the scene by offering a comprehensive historical overview of the most important RTV perpetrator types in post-WWII Western Europe. In doing so, the article illustrates how RTV perpetrators have changed fundamentally since the end of WWII in response to changing environmental conditions. Most notably, large and well organized elite-sponsored groups involved in large-scale terrorist campaigns have been replaced by more loosely organized subcultural networks, groups, and individuals, whose violence and target selection is of a less terroristic nature. To identify the most important perpetrator types, the article mainly draws on events data from the TWEED dataset. Although this dataset proves helpful for painting the larger picture, TWEED only covers the period 1950– 2004 and is less helpful for capturing more recent developments. Article I therefore closes by calling for new and updated RTV events data. Article II answers this call by introducing a new dataset covering RTV events in Western Europe between 1990 and 2015. In particular, this dataset may be used to analyse variation in RTV over time and between countries. I show that, contrary to common perceptions of a growing threat, deadly RTV events have decreased considerably in Western Europe since the 1990s, culminating in no deadly events in 2014, and only one in 2015. However, notwithstanding this general decline, the dataset also shows that RTV remains more widespread in some West European countries than others. The article therefore closes by calling for more comparative RTV research aiming to explain such cross-national variation. Article III responds to this call by offering a comparative study of RTV in 18 West European countries between 1990 and 2015. This analysis results in two explanatory models, each containing three causal conditions, the combination of which appears to fuel hostility, polarization, and violence. The first (North European) model involves the combination of high immigration, low electoral support for anti-immigration (radical right) parties, and extensive public repression of radical right actors and opinions. The second (South European) model involves the combination of socio-economic hardship, authoritarian legacies, and extensive left-wing terrorism and militancy. Together, these two models consistently distinguish countries with extensive RTV experience from countries with moderate or low RTV 5 experience. Notably, both models contain elements of “grievances” and “opportunities”, suggesting that these two theories, which are conventionally seen as contrasting, may be more fruitfully seen as complementary. However, considering the causal distance between the conditions included in this analysis and their outcome variable (RTV), these findings would benefit from being complemented by more in-depth case studies. Article III therefore closes by calling for more case-oriented research to investigate further the causal mechanisms implied by each model. Finally, Article IV answers this call by further investigating the North European model, seeking to explain why right-wing terrorism and militancy have been more widespread in Sweden than in Denmark, Finland, and Norway. In doing so, the article draws on a theoretical framework proposed by social movement scholars as particularly helpful for explaining extreme right mobilization, using concepts such as political opportunities, organizational resources, and framing (Caiani et al., 2012). By applying this framework to the Nordic countries, the article finds that Sweden’s outlier position may originate in different WWII experiences, leaving Sweden with a stronger and more resilient extreme right movement, but also from receiving more immigrants while lacking influential anti-immigration (radical right) parties, and from conducting a more restrictive public debate on immigration, leaving little room for anti-immigration concerns in the public sphere. Concepts and definitions Before proceeding to review existing theory and literature, let me first clarify my own understanding and use of three sets of concepts at the heart of this thesis. The first two sets are used to define the thesis’s subject matter. The third set prepares the ground for my explanation of it. All three sets share the characteristic that they represent different types of political spectrum: (1) a spectrum of political ideas, ranging from left to right; (2) a spectrum of political violence, ranging from criminal (hate crimes) to terrorist; and (3) a spectrum of political actors, ranging from radical to extreme. Left versus right ideas The left–right distinction originated during the French Revolution in 1789. The French king’s supporters (those wanting to keep their privileges) sat to the right of the National Assembly’s president, while the revolution’s supporters (those wanting liberty, equality, and fraternity) sat 6 to his left. Since those dramatic days and weeks, many new meanings have been attached to these two terms, and a shared understanding of their essence has been lost along the way (Arian & Shamir, 1983; Jahn, 2011). For the purpose of this thesis, I lean on Bobbio’s (1996) classic distinction between those on the left who support egalitarian policies designed to reduce social inequality, and those on the right who regard social inequality – or hierarchical order – as inevitable, natural, or even desirable. Furthermore, to distinguish between democratic moderates and antidemocratic extremists, Bobbio introduces a second spectrum ranging from libertarianism (individual freedom) to authoritarianism (imposed law and order). Bobbio’s categorization thus yields four types: the extreme left (authoritarian egalitarians), the moderate left (liberal egalitarians), the moderate right (liberal inegalitarians), and the extreme right (authoritarian inegalitarians). Bobbio’s distinction between authoritarian and libertarian politics is echoed by Stenner’s (2005, pp. 14–15) conceptualization of authoritarian and libertarian personality types. According to Stenner, authoritarians are characterized by an inherent need for sameness, oneness, and submission to group authority, while libertarians celebrate diversity and individual autonomy. By implication, authoritarians may be distinguished from libertarians in that they are intolerant towards diversity, that is, anyone perceived as a threat to the uniformity, order, and authority of the group or community they adhere to. In the case of right-wing authoritarians, this group or community is often extended to the nation-state, resulting in some form of nativism or ethnic nationalism, as is also suggested by Mudde’s (1995) review of extreme right definitions, summarized as an ideology made up of five features: nationalism, racism, xenophobia, anti-democracy, and a strong state (authoritarianism). Criminal versus terrorist violence The distinction between criminal and terrorist violence is not always clear-cut. “Violent criminal” and “terrorist” are both pejorative terms whose definitions rely on existing jurisdictions and norms rather than on the nature or intention of an act itself. For example, if a Muslim immigrant kills a random native European in the name of Allah, it is probably more likely to be labelled terrorism than if a native European kills a random Muslim immigrant to defend his country from Islamism. The latter type of attack is usually referred to as “hate crime” rather than terrorism. While some scholars see hate crimes and terrorism as close cousins (see e.g. Mills et al., 2015), others deem them as rather distant relatives (Deloughery et al., 2012). However, the concept “hate” offers a rather superficial and potentially misleading 7 understanding of the nature of these types of events. “Fear” might be a more appropriate term, although “love” (of nation, people, or culture) could in some cases be equally relevant. In any case, how activists feel is probably not the best indicator for distinguishing between criminal violence (hate crimes) and terrorism (and would be impossible to measure anyway). To distinguish between criminal and terrorist violence, I therefore emphasize targeting strategy and stated motive rather than feelings and inner motivation. One practical reason is that the types of open sources used in this study, such as newspaper articles, typically contain enough information to establish whether a victim was attacked because (s)he belongs to some pre-defined target group, or because of some non-political or personal motive. All violent attacks causing physical harm and whose target selection – minority groups, political adversaries, or government representatives – are determined by authoritarian right-wing ideas (intolerance towards difference from a nationalist or ethnic majority point of view) are here considered to be right-wing violence, irrespective of what the perpetrator’s inner motivation or feelings (hate/fear/love/confusion) might have been. Furthermore, if available information can establish that such violent attacks were also ineluctably political in aims and motives; designed to have far-reaching psychological repercussions beyond the immediate victim or target; and conducted either by an organization with an identifiable chain of command or conspirational cell structure or by individuals or a small collection of individuals directly influenced by the ideological aims or example of some existent terrorist movement and/or its leaders (Hoffman, 2006, p. 40) they qualify as terrorism. In most cases, such information is not available, and the question of criminal violence versus terrorism remains open. However, to remedy this inherent limitation, I distinguish between spontaneous and premeditated attacks in the dataset that I developed for this thesis. Spontaneous attacks rarely qualify as terrorism. Premeditated attacks are closer to fulfilling the criteria of most standard terrorism definitions (Schmid, 2011a), although one can never know for sure unless the perpetrators openly reveal their targeting strategy and motive. Radical versus extreme actors To investigate RTV’s underlying causes in the context of Western liberal democracies, I have found it necessary to distinguish between far right actors operating within the democratic rules, such as political parties, and antidemocratic extra-parliamentary actors. I therefore propose a slightly altered version of Bobbio’s distinction between democratic moderates and 8 antidemocratic (authoritarian) extremists, dividing his extremists into two subtypes: (1) radicals, whose political ideas may be authoritarian, but who use conventional democratic means such as elections or peaceful demonstrations to influence politics; and (2) militants or extremists, who openly reject democracy and favour violent or other non-conventional means to generate revolutionary change. This radical–extreme distinction has proved important for two reasons. The first is that some existing literature tends to conflate radical and extreme right actors, resulting in the potentially bewildering notion that non-violent and violent behaviour can be explained using the same theories (Copsey, 2013; Fekete, 2012; Wilkinson, 1981, 1995). In other words, it is assumed that radical right parties pave the way for more extreme forms of activism, including violence and terrorism. This assumption seems to be motivated by a strong desire, particularly among anti-fascist groups, to portray radical and extreme right actors as similar components of a larger phenomenon seen as a fundamental threat to Western liberal democracy: fascism. However, besides being an exceptionally evasive concept, the diffusion of fascist ideas in West European societies remains a rather trivial explanation of RTV. To be sure, many such violent events may be related to fascist ideas or sentiments. However, rather than exposing these actors’ proclivity towards fascism (whatever that is), one should rather try to identify the conditions under which such ideas translate into actual violence and terrorism. The second reason why the radical–extreme distinction has proven important relates to the symbiotic relationship between radical and extreme actors. Contrary to existing assumptions about radical right actors paving the way for extreme right activism and violence (see e.g. Bonikowski & Gidron, 2016, p. 12), my research suggests that these two actor types may be involved in a negative symbiotic relationship. That is, where the radical right is strong, the extreme right appears to be weak, and vice versa. This is certainly not a new idea, but is one that has been observed by several scholars before (Caiani et al., 2012, pp. 77–78; Koopmans, 1996). However, more research is still needed on this relationship before drawing any final conclusions. In any event, the radical–extreme distinction remains essential to anyone interested in understanding why some right-wing activists turn to terrorism and violence, while the large majority remain non-violent (while being mindful that this distinction involves several grey zones in practice). I therefore distinguish consistently between radical (democratic/non-violent) 9 and extreme- (antidemocratic/violent) right actors in this thesis, while referring to the far right as a collective term comprising both actor types when appropriate. Existing theory and literature The existing RTV literature may be characterized as diverse, disorganized, and discontinuous, which is also reflected in existing reviews and discussions of it (Bjørgo, 1995b; Bjørgo & Witte, 1993b; Heitmeyer, 2003, 2005). Dominant theories or ongoing theoretical debates are hard to come across, exempting Sprinzak’s (1995) theory of split delegitimization, which has been considered as incomplete by a number of scholars.2 Furthermore, the existing literature is made up of contributions from many different disciplines that rarely speak to each other, including but not limited to history (Ferraresi, 1996; Harrison, 1989; Lööw, 2000; Macklin, 2017), criminology (Chermak et al., 2013; Hamm, 1993; Kerodal et al., 2015), sociology (Fangen, 2001a; Simi et al., 2016; Willems, 1995), political science (Lipset & Raab, 1970; Sprinzak, 1995; Weinberg, 1995), and political psychology (Adorno, 1950; Stenner, 2005). Providing a concise review of the RTV literature is therefore a challenging task. I begin my review by briefly discussing the relevance of three more general yet closely related fields: (1) the study of radical and extreme right politics; (2) terrorism studies; and (3) social movement studies. I do so because, at face value, all three fields come across as highly relevant, while a closer look shows that the first two (politics and terrorism) generally concern phenomena that are slightly different from RTV, while the third (social movements) may offer a more fruitful foundation for developing new RTV theory. Next, I present different explanations proposed in existing RTV research. I have categorized these explanations according to their corresponding levels of analysis (macro-meso-micro). Alternative ordering principles would certainly be possible, such as by way of discipline, method, time, or geography. However, I believe this categorization is most relevant for preparing future theory development, which should combine elements from different levels of analysis. Finally, I briefly discuss three shortcomings that constrain current RTV research from moving ahead: (1) 2 Sprinzak merits recognition for having developed the first universal RTV theory. However, his theory and corresponding typology have been criticised for being “too simplistic” (Bjørgo, 1995b, p. 7), for ignoring the dynamics of mass politics (Wilkinson, 1995), for underestimating the state as primary enemy (Kaplan, 1995, pp. 74–87), for being inconsistent with empirical evidence (Köhler, 2017, pp. 252–253), and for not satisfying basic typological criteria (Ravndal, 2015). Furthermore, it is rarely applied in current research (an exception being Kerodal et al., 2015). 10 a lack of comparative designs; (2) a lack of complex explanations, and (3) a lack of multilevel analysis. Related fields Radical and extreme right politics A logical starting point for students of right-wing terrorism and violence would be the study of radical and extreme right politics. (For a recent review of this literature, see Mudde, 2016.) However, anyone browsing this field will soon realize that it is heavily dominated by research on political parties and their voters, while studies of the extra-parliamentary far right (e.g. those using violence) are rare, particularly within the top journals. We must therefore consider whether theories meant to explain electoral support to political parties may also be used to explain terrorism and violence. While some general preconditions could be relevant for understanding both right-wing voting and right-wing violence, such as grievances related to immigration, they do not help distinguish cases with extensive RTV from cases with moderate or low RTV. For example, Sweden, Denmark, and France have all experienced problems related to high immigration, but only Sweden experienced extensive RTV relative to population size between 1990 and 2015, as this thesis shows. One should keep in mind that, unlike voting, political violence is a rare event in today’s Western Europe, a phenomenon that most people never experience and that occurs only under special circumstances. Right-wing voting and right-wing violence therefore require different explanations because voting theories cannot explain when and why some activists turn to violence and terrorism, while the large majority remain non-violent. Terrorism studies To answer this last question, a second logical starting point for students of right-wing terrorism and violence would be the field of terrorism studies. However, most terrorism research is concerned with organizations, groups, and networks whose levels of strategy and organization far exceed those of most contemporary violent perpetrators on the far right in Western Europe. This apparent mismatch between organized terrorist groups and networks on one hand, and less organized violent right-wing perpetrators on the other is also reflected in the relatively low number of articles on RTV in leading terrorism journals such as Terrorism and Political Violence (TPV) and Studies in Conflict and Terrorism (SCT), particularly during the 2000s (see Figure I). 11 Figure 1. Share of articles covering right-wing extremism, left-wing extremism and militant Islamism in TPV and SCT. Note that in 1995, TPV published a special issue on terror from the extreme right. Most violent acts committed by right-wing perpetrators in Western Europe over the past years simply do not qualify as terrorism (as defined above), thereby making terrorism studies less relevant for explaining this type of more loosely organized and often spontaneous violence (apart from those few events that actually qualify as terrorism). Furthermore, although terrorism research has expanded exponentially over the past 15 years, the field has become heavily dominated by studies of Islamist terrorism (see Figure 1). Unlike RTV, Islamist terrorism is rooted in ongoing armed conflicts and orchestrated by well-organized transnational terrorist networks, including in those attacks that occur in Europe (Nesser, 2015). Islamist terrorism therefore seems to grow out of different conditions than RTV. Finally, on a more general level, terrorism studies have been criticized for being too politicized and theoretically underdeveloped by several prominent scholars within this field (Ranstorp, 2007, pp. 1–29; Schmid, 2011b, pp. 11–17; Silke, 2004). Social movement theory Similar criticisms have been raised by social movement scholars, noting that terrorism research has been “oriented more toward developing antiterrorist policies than toward gaining a social science understanding of the phenomenon” (della Porta, 2013, p. 11). Social movement theory has therefore been proposed as a more promising field for explaining terrorism and political violence by small clandestine groups (Beck, 2008; della Porta, 2013, pp. 12–18). Social movements are generally understood as informal networks of groups and individuals using 0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40% 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Right-Wing Extremism Left-Wing Extremism Militant Islamism 12 unconventional means to promote or oppose social change (della Porta & Diani, 2006, pp. 20– 22). As such, social movement theory does indeed come across as a promising field, considering that RTV appears to emerge from loose networks of different actors promoting similar goals. Although social movement research has traditionally covered non-violent forms of protest, an increasingly large number of studies apply social movement theory to analyse terrorism and political violence (key contributions include della Porta, 1995, 2013; Tilly, 2003; Wieviorka, 1993), including studies of extreme right violence (Berntzen & Sandberg, 2014; Caiani et al., 2012; Caiani & Kröll, 2015; Gattinara & Froio, 2014; Koopmans, 1996). In other words, there seems to be untapped potential in using social movement theory as a foundation for developing new RTV theory. Existing explanations Because dominant theories and theoretical debates about the underlying causes of RTV are hard to come across, it is useful to categorize some existing explanations proposed in the literature. In the following, I organize these explanations according to their corresponding levels of analysis (macro-meso-micro). By macro-explanations, I mean explanations emphasizing societal characteristics at the country level, such as the economy, the political system, or national history. By meso-explanations, I mean explanations emphasizing internal and external dynamics at the group level, such as internal group radicalization mechanisms, as well as extreme right groups’ interactions with external actors, such as left-wing activists or the police. By micro-explanations, I mean explanations emphasizing personal characteristics at the individual level, such as socio-economic background, psychological profile, and personality type. Macro explanations At least five macro-explanations may be derived from the existing literature: ideology, authoritarian experiences, grievances, opportunities, and repression. First, some scholars are mainly concerned with ideology in general and fascism in particular. They tend to highlight the violent but also appealing nature of revolutionary fascism in an increasingly modernized and fluid world as a key to understanding why RTV occurs (Copsey, 2013; Griffin, 1999, 2012; Wilkinson, 1981). Ideology is undoubtedly important for understanding any RTV event because, without the ideological component, the event would not be classified as right wing to begin with. However, the aim here is not to explain single events but rather to explain cross- national variation. Provided that the essence of fascism does not vary substantially over time or 13 between countries, it does not really help us explain why RTV has been more extensive in some countries than in others, all other things being equal. Fascism may still matter, however, but more as an experience than as an idea. West European countries with former fascist regimes may be more predisposed to RTV because of certain aftereffects from these authoritarian experiences, such as a more pronounced left–right conflict, a higher acceptance of fascism among certain segments of the population, or historical legacies creating favourable (discursive) opportunities for mobilizing on the extreme right (Gattinara & Froio, 2014). In that case, we would expect RTV to be more extensive in countries with former authoritarian (fascist) regimes than in countries lacking such authoritarian experiences. Another explanation much inspired by Ted Gurr’s book Why Men Rebel (1970) relates to social grievances caused by such factors as increased immigration, unemployment, and socio- economic deprivation. According to this approach, people turn to violence because they are angry, and they are angry because they believe they are being denied something they are entitled to, such as a job, or the right to promote the interests of their ethnic group. Immigrants may then easily become scapegoats, and thereby also targets of right-wing violence. This is the dominant explanation provided in Lipset and Raab’s (1970) landmark study of the American extreme right. It has also been fronted by the German sociologist Wilhelm Heitmeyer (1993). In addition, more recent research has found a positive association between levels of unemployment and extreme right crimes in Germany (Falk et al., 2011), although previous research shows that unemployed youth only represented a small subset of German RTV offenders (Willems, 1995). In any event, according to grievance-oriented theory, RTV would be more likely in countries with high immigration, high youth unemployment, or extensive socio-economic hardship. Grievance theory has been criticized, most notably by social movement scholars, for not being able to explain cross-national variation of right-wing violence (Koopmans, 1996), and for failing to connect macro-causes with micro-behaviours (Caiani et al., 2012, p. 9). As an alternative to grievances, these scholars argue that analysing political and discursive opportunities may provide better explanations. More specifically, extreme right mobilization and violence is seen as more likely in countries where support to radical right parties is limited or blocked, thereby channelling people with radical right sympathies into more extreme forms of activism (Koopmans, 1996). Furthermore, racist violence is seen as more likely when the 14 political elites and the media create favourable discursive opportunities for the extreme right, most notably by framing immigrants as a societal threat (Koopmans, 1996; Koopmans & Olzak, 2004). Thus, according to opportunity-oriented social movement research, RTV should be more extensive in countries where radical right parties have limited support, in particular if immigrants are also being framed negatively by the political elites and the media. Finally, some scholars have noted that repressive measures meant to curb radical right actors and opinions have a tendency to fuel more extreme forms of activism (Art, 2011, pp. 44– 49; Minkenberg, 2006). These observations tie into a larger debate on how to approach radical right parties, and whether repression and exclusion of such parties and their sympathisers have the desired effects, or if such measures only contribute to further polarization (Eatwell & Mudde, 2004; Kirshner, 2014; Pedahzur, 2001; Van Spanje & Van Der Brug, 2007). On this note, existing research finds that high stigmatization increases the inner spirit of extreme right groups (Simi & Futrell, 2009). Furthermore, different forms and degrees of stigmatization appear to have opposite effects on different types of extreme right activists (Linden & Klandermans, 2006). While extensive repression and stigmatization might fuel violence and militancy, a complete absence of repression and stigmatization might also lead to the same outcome (given that a sizeable militant movement exists), as seems to have been the case in Russia (Enstad, 2015). High or low repression and stigmatization should, in other words, not be seen as mutually exclusive causal conditions, but rather as two alternative paths that may lead to a similar outcome (equifinality). Meso explanations At the meso-level, at least two sets of explanations may be derived from the existing literature. While the first set relates to the internal dynamics of extreme right groups, the second relates to the external dynamics caused by confrontations between these groups and their enemies, such as left-wing activists or the police. Both types of dynamics are present in Sprinzak’s (1995) theory of right-wing terrorism, where a process of “spilt delegitimization” between extreme right groups and their enemies may become accelerated by the internal “psychodynamics” of terrorist groups. Notably, Sprinzak (1995, p. 21) argues that “violence, and gradually terrorism, will only emerge when the group involved feels increasingly insecure or threatened [by their enemies]”. A number of other studies have also documented these types of internal and external radicalization mechanisms, which appear to be of a universal nature (Bjørgo, 1997; Fangen, 2001a; Hamm, 1993; Lööw, 1993; Simi et al., 2016). The most systematic exposition to date is provided by della Porta in her recent book Clandestine Political Violence (2013), tracing causal 15 mechanisms such as “escalating policing” and “competitive escalation” (within and between extremist groups) across different contexts and ideological spaces, including the extreme right. Considering the universal nature of these dynamics, it is primarily the external confrontational dynamics that can be expected to vary substantially across countries. We would thus expect RTV to be more extensive in countries where the militant left is strong and active, or in countries with the most repressive forms of policing. Micro explanations At the micro-level, three sets of explanations are routinely used to explain the violent behaviour of RTV perpetrators: (1) their socio-economic background, (2) their psychological profile, and (3) their personality type. First, there seems to be little doubt that a considerable proportion of RTV perpetrators come from troubled backgrounds, and that joining an extremist group often represents compensation for some personal problem rather than a desire to promote a political agenda. Previous research shows that many of those who join extreme right groups do it for some non-political reason such as a search for meaning and belonging, protection, a sense of brotherhood, or simply adventure seeking (Bjørgo, 1997; Blazak, 2001; Simi et al., 2016; Willems, 1995). Second, a considerable proportion of RTV perpetrators, most notably those operating alone, suffer from some sort of personality disorder or mental illness (Corner & Gill, 2015; Gill et al., 2014). Psychological problems have also been prevalent among organized members of extreme right terrorist groups (Hoffman, 1982, pp. 18–19), and in many cases such problems can be related to childhood trauma (Simi et al., 2016). Finally, political psychologists have for decades been trying to disentangle the relationship between the so-called “authoritarian personality” and various forms of intolerant behaviour, including violence. The authoritarian personality was originally introduced by Adorno et al. (1950) as an attempt to understand the atrocities committed by Nazi Germany during WWII. This book has generated an extensive but also highly contested body of research, aiming to identify certain personality traits making some people more susceptible to authoritarian or fascist ideas and behaviour than others (Altemeyer, 1981, 1988, 1996; R. Christie & Jahoda, 1954). As late as 2001, this research strand was described as “the most deeply flawed work of prominence in political psychology” (Martin, 2001, p. 1), mainly because it continually failed to match empirical evidence with theoretical expectations. However, that was before Stenner’s 16 (2005) theory of the authoritarian dynamic was introduced, resolving many of the empirical inconsistencies and tautologies that this field had been marred with for more than half a century. Stenner’s empirically dense analysis – combining surveys, psychological experiments, and interviews – includes the following relevant findings and implications: (1) intolerance towards difference is not necessarily rare or extreme, but rather a stable and inherently human trait or innate predisposition present among segments of most populations; (2) such intolerant (authoritarian) predispositions only translate into actual intolerant attitudes and behaviour when the people holding them experience threats against their inherent need for sameness, oneness, and group authority; (3) being an innate human disposition, intolerance cannot be easily unlearned; and (4) “exposure to difference, talking about difference, and applauding difference – the hallmarks of liberal democracy – are the surest ways to aggravate those who are innately intolerant, and to guarantee the increased expression of their predispositions in manifestly intolerant attitudes and behaviours” (Stenner, 2005, p. 330). Summing up, in line with grievance theory, research on RTV perpetrators’ socio-economic backgrounds suggests that we would expect more RTV in countries where the proportion of people living in poor socio-economic conditions is high. Regarding the psychology of RTV perpetrators, it is difficult to ascertain whether the proportion of people suffering from psychological problems varies enough between West European countries also to have an influence on the extent of RTV. Finally, although the proportion of people with authoritarian dispositions seems to be stable across populations, Stenner shows that it is the extent to which these people experience threats against their preferred way of life that matters. Therefore, we would expect RTV to be more extensive in countries experiencing threats to “the authoritarian lifestyle”, such as high exposure to diversity, poor leadership, or societal fragmentation and polarization. Shortcomings As the above review illustrates, the RTV literature is rather diverse, involving many different explanations at different levels of analysis. Notwithstanding this theoretical diversity, much of the literature suffers from the same three shortcomings: (1) a bias towards case studies and a lack of comparative designs suitable for theory testing; (2) a failure to develop complex explanatory models investigating combinations of causal conditions rather than trying to isolate the effects of only one or two independent variables; and (3) a failure to connect explanations from different levels of analysis. This thesis primarily answers the first two shortcomings, 17 although I do propose a new theoretical framework that might cater to the third in my discussion of future research at the end of this introductory chapter. Lack of comparative designs Unlike many other conflict research fields, most notably the civil war literature, the RTV literature includes few comparative studies, particularly at the cross-national level (notable exceptions include Bjørgo, 1997; Caiani et al., 2012; Koopmans, 1996). This shortcoming follows directly from the lack of systematic events data described earlier. Consequently, the literature is heavily dominated by historical, ethnographic, and micro-sociological case studies of specific individuals (Berntzen & Sandberg, 2014; S. Christie, 1984; Gardell, 2015; Hemmingby & Bjørgo, 2016), groups (Fromm, 1998; Gattinara & Froio, 2014; Harrison, 1989; Jackson, 2014; Köhler, 2014; Lowles, 2001), networks (Griffin, 2003; Jackson et al., 2011; Schlembach, 2013), and national movements (Fangen, 2001a; Ferraresi, 1996; Ibarra, 2011; Karpantschof & Mikkelsen, 2016; Köhler, 2017; Lööw, 1995; Pekonen et al., 1999; Skenderovic, 2009). Such case studies are highly valuable for investigating local dynamics and mechanisms at the meso- and micro-levels. However, to develop a consistent RTV theory, we need to compare these mechanisms across cases and contexts and connect them with relevant conditions at the macro-level. Lack of complex explanations Considering the multitude of different explanations introduced above, placing your bets on only one or two of them seems risky. Most likely, RTV typically results from different combinations of different conditions in different contexts. However, in those few cases where scholars have been able to generate events data suitable for analysing variation across time or place, they tend to investigate the isolated effect of only one or two independent variables, such as unemployment (Falk et al., 2011), immigration (Garcia, 2015), or at best the interaction between economy and immigration (McLaren, 1999), rather than trying to understand how several different variables might interact. This shortcoming may result from methodological rather than theoretical constraints, because causal complexity involving three or more interacting variables is difficult to model using conventional statistics. However, as I explain in the methods section below, alternative methods designed precisely to capture such causal complexities do exist. 18 Lack of multilevel analysis A final shortcoming illustrated by the above review is that much RTV research investigates dynamics on only one level of analysis, thereby failing to develop explanations that connect with the other levels. However, two notable exceptions to this rule might guide us out of this quagmire. The first is a conceptual framework for analysing mobilization on the extreme right, developed by social movement scholars precisely to capture causal mechanisms that intervene between macro-causes and micro-behaviours (Caiani et al., 2012). By integrating concepts such as political opportunities, organizational resources, framing, and action repertoires into one framework, this contribution may serve as a blueprint for multilevel analysis in future research. The second notable exception is Stenner’s (2005) theory of the authoritarian dynamic. By combining individual dispositions at the micro-level with societal conditions at the macro-level, most notably the extent of societal polarization, Stenner convincingly explains why intolerant attitudes and behaviours have been more prevalent in some countries than in others. Although Stenner does not analyse violence specifically but rather all forms of intolerant behaviours and attitudes, I believe that her theory is relevant for explaining how intolerant opinions may become salient within a large segment of a population, preparing the ground for extreme right mobilization and violence. Research design I will now present the research design of the thesis, that is, my overarching strategy for answering the three research questions introduced earlier. I begin by outlining my underlying philosophical assumptions. I then describe the different methods used to answer my three research questions. Finally, I describe the different types of data used in this thesis. Philosophy of science This thesis is founded on a philosophy of science that is fairly optimistic about the possibility of making reasonably accurate inferences about (mostly non-observable) causal relationships and mechanisms based on theoretically informed empirical investigations and observations. More specifically, I adhere to the scientific realist philosophy of science, characterized by (1) a belief in the existence of a world independent of our minds (while recognizing that our world observations are influenced by prevailing concepts, ideas, and theories); (2) by believing that this world consists of both observable and unobservable (social) phenomena that may be fairly 19 accurately described and explained by matching theories with empirical evidence; and (3) by seeking ever deeper layers of explanation by mechanisms (Bhaskar, 1978; Churchland, 1979; Elster, 1989; Lane, 1996; Suppe, 1989). Although explanation by mechanisms may be seen as an ideal, or perhaps rather as a final stage of the research process, the extent to which such causal mechanisms can be fully spelled out and subsequently tested empirically via process tracing (Bennett & Checkel, 2015) depends on the level of progress any given research field has reached. Causal mechanisms typically serve to explain how some independent variable or causal condition influences the dependent variable or outcome of interest (Checkel, 2006; Elster, 1989; George & Bennett, 2005; Hedström & Swedberg, 1998; Mayntz, 2004; Tilly, 2001). In other words, before investigating the causal mechanisms linking some variable or condition X with the outcome Y, this hypothetical causal relationship between X and Y must first be established, at least theoretically, if not also empirically. As the above theory and literature review shows, a number of causal relationships have been proposed by the existing RTV literature. However, few of them have been tested empirically using comparative designs. Thus, instead of cherry-picking only one or two proposed causal relationships for deeper analysis by mechanisms or statistical analysis, and thereby risking making the wrong selection or missing out on some other important causal condition, I begin with a wider selection of conditions proposed by the existing literature as conducive to RTV. I then compare cases systematically to identify the most relevant (combinations of) of these conditions. Such comparative analysis may thus be seen as a first and necessary step towards more case-oriented analysis aimed at tracing the causal mechanisms implied by the causal conditions that turn out to be the most relevant. Methods To answer my three research questions, this thesis employs a mixed-methods research design (Johnson et al., 2007; Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004; Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998), combining typological analysis (RQ 1), descriptive analysis of old and new events datasets (RQs 1 and 2), qualitative comparative analysis (RQ 3), and comparative case analysis (RQs 1 and 3). In the following, I briefly describe how these methods are used to answer my three research questions. 20 RQ 1: What characterizes the most important RTV perpetrator types in post-WWII Western Europe? To answer this question, I first developed a practical method for reviewing and developing typologies. Becoming an increasingly popular analytical tool in the study of terrorism and political violence, typologies are useful for categorizing data, characterizing and comparing cases, and developing theory (Ganor, 2008; Marsden, 2014; Marsden & Schmid, 2011). However, to maximize a typology’s scientific utility, certain criteria must be fulfilled. I therefore identified frequently cited publications on typologies in quality social science journals (D. Collier et al., 2012; Doty & Glick, 1994; Elman, 2005) as well as authoritative books (Bailey, 1994; George & Bennett, 2005; McKinney, 1950). I then developed a list of five criteria that good typologies should satisfy according to this literature (see the summary of Article I below). Next, I used these criteria to review critically one existing RTV typology (Sprinzak, 1995) and to propose a new typology, specifically tailored to the case of Western Europe. In creating my own typology, I also used descriptive statistics on attack and casualty frequencies derived from the TWEED dataset, in combination with comparative case studies, to identify and characterize the most important RTV perpetrator types in post-WWII Western Europe. These case studies were in turn primarily based on secondary sources, most notably historical and journalistic accounts of some of the most important right-wing terrorist actors in post-WWII Western Europe (Bocca, 1968; S. Christie, 1984; Ferraresi, 1996; Fromm, 1998; Harrison, 1989; Henissart, 1971; Heléne Lööw, 2000; Ryan, 2003; Salas, 2003; Schmidt, 1993). RQ 2: What is the record of RTV events in post-1990 Western Europe? To answer this question, I had to create a new dataset using available open source information documenting right-wing violence across Western Europe (Ravndal, 2016). Developing a fairly consistent account of such an obscure and poorly documented phenomenon as RTV has indeed been a challenge. As the number of violent events is far too large to be dealt with rigorously and systematically, the RTV dataset therefore includes only the most severe types of events. Such events are fewer in number and less likely to go unnoticed. More specifically, the dataset includes (1) attacks with a deadly or near deadly outcome, (2) attacks involving active use of deadly weapons such as knives, firearms, and bombs, (3) major attack plots involving use of deadly weapons, (4) discoveries of bomb-making materials or major arms depositaries belonging to right-wing activists, and (5) other violent events that undoubtedly qualify as acts 21 of terrorism. Vandalism and other attacks causing material damage only, such as fire bombs targeting empty buildings at night, are not included. A majority of events included in the RTV dataset are based on online newspaper articles. Other key sources include activist autobiographies, official and unofficial RTV chronologies and datasets, anti-fascist blogs and bulletins, personal communication with RTV experts, court documents, online videos, and in some cases secondary literature. Multiple sources have been gathered for nearly all events, most of which are available online from links embedded in the publicly available dataset.3 The dataset comprises 578 events, including 190 deadly events causing 303 deaths. I have manually researched each event and coded them on a range of variables, including time and location, perpetrator and victim characteristics, organizational affiliations, weapon types, and number of casualties. I have also made an effort to include all deadly events, for example by contacting RTV experts from different West European countries. Considering the severity of political and racist murders, such events rarely go unnoticed. We may therefore assume that the dataset covers (nearly) all deadly RTV events between 1990 and 2015. Furthermore, deadly RTV events arguably also constitute a reasonably good indicator of right-wing violence more generally. Political and racist murders rarely occur in complete isolation from less severe forms of violence. The dataset can therefore be used to compare frequencies of deadly events across time and space, and to make causal inferences about RTV more generally from these patterns with reasonable confidence. RQ 3: Why have some West European countries experienced considerably more RTV than others between 1990 and 2015? To answer this question, I first applied qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) to investigate how six causal conditions proposed by existing research as being conducive to RTV (immigration, socio-economic hardship, authoritarian legacies, radical right support, radical right repression, and left-wing terrorism and militancy) relate to the extent of RTV in 18 West European countries. QCA is a set-theoretic method (Mahoney, 2001, 2007, 2008; Ragin & Rihoux, 2009; Schneider & Wagemann, 2013) invented and still being developed by the American sociologist Charles Ragin (Ragin, 1987, 2008, 2014). Ragin developed QCA because he was getting increasingly frustrated with the difficulties of modelling complex causal relationships using conventional statistics (Ragin, 2014, pp. vii–xxx). To investigate causal 3 The dataset is available at http://www.sv.uio.no/c-rex/rtv 22 complexity such as equifinality (multiple causal paths to the same outcome) and conjunctural causation (conditions that become necessary or sufficient for an outcome only in combination), correlation-based methods such as statistical analysis require extensive interaction modelling whose results may be difficult to interpret meaningfully once the number of interacting variables exceeds two or three. Unlike correlation-based models designed to isolate the effects of only one or two independent variables on an outcome variable, set-theoretic methods – and QCA in particular – are specifically designed to capture causal complexities such as equifinality and conjunctural causation (Schneider & Wagemann, 2013, pp. 78–79). Regarding cross-national variation of RTV, both forms of causal complexity appear to be present. For example, immigration may be relevant for explaining why countries such as Sweden and Germany have experienced extensive RTV. At the same time, immigration has been limited (until the recent migration crisis) in countries such as Italy and Spain where RTV has nevertheless been extensive, indicating equifinality. Furthermore, high immigration alone does not necessarily lead to extensive RTV, as illustrated by cases such as Switzerland and France, unless it is combined with other conditions, indicating conjunctural causation. Thus, by using the QCA method, I was able to match every logically possible combination of my six causal conditions with the available empirical evidence. This analysis resulted in two so-called causal recipes (configurations of causal conditions) that consistently distinguish countries with extensive RTV experience from those with moderate or low RTV experience.4 In Article IV, I go on to investigate one of these recipes using a more conventional comparative case study design, also known as the method of structured focused comparison (George & Bennett, 2005, pp. 67–72). Originally developed by Alexander George (1979), this method: is “structured” in that the researcher writes general questions that reflect the research objective and that these questions are asked of each case under study to guide data collection, thereby making systematic comparison and cumulation of the findings of cases possible. The method is “focused” in that it deals only with certain aspects of the historical cases examined. (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 68). 4 I also experimented with different statistical models using the number of deadly RTV events per country-year (N=450) as my dependent variable. Although several statistically significant relationships were identified, the different models (the most relevant being a negative binominal count model) yielded inconsistent findings, most likely reflecting limited variation on my independent variables, and the fact that some variables seem to be relevant in some cases but not in others. 23 In my study, I focus on the extent of right-wing terrorism and militancy in four Nordic countries between 1990 and 2015, aiming to explain why right-wing terrorism and militancy have been more widespread in Sweden than in Denmark, Finland and Norway. In doing so, I first describe and compare the extent of violent events and militant activism in each country. I then pursue questions related to the Nordic militant movements’ organizational resources, political opportunities, and collective action framing – concepts proposed by existing social movement research (Caiani et al., 2012) as particularly relevant for explaining extreme right mobilization. Lastly, it is worth mentioning that the arguments presented in Article IV are also set- theoretic in nature (i.e. they could have been presented in terms of set relations), although the article does not make this point explicit because no particular set-theoretic method was used in this more conventional comparative case study. QCA can thus be fruitfully complemented by case studies in the same way as large-N statistical analyses can be (Schneider & Rohlfing, 2013). However, as opposed to large-N statistical analysis, QCA may also be used for medium- and even low-N studies. Yet adopting a QCA design should not be justified in terms of case numbers. Its justification should rather rely on an expectation that the phenomenon of interest is best understood in terms of set relations (Schneider & Wagemann, 2013, p. 12). Such relations are particularly relevant if you expect there to be more than one causal path to your outcome of interest (equifinality), and if you expect these paths to contain causal condition that become necessary or sufficient for the outcome only in combination (conjunctural causation). Data This thesis builds on extensive and varied data. Of the many different types of data sources I have used, the internet constitutes the most important. Besides online sources, the thesis also draws on existing datasets as well as on a large collection of written primary and secondary sources. In the following, I briefly describe how each type of data has been used in my research. Online sources This thesis would not have existed without the internet. I have used online sources for two main purposes. The first was to create my own events dataset, which was also made publicly available online in 2016. Most events registered in the RTV dataset are based on online sources, usually including two or more independent sources per event. The second purpose was to trace the evolution of right-wing terrorism and militancy in the Nordic countries between 1990 and 2015. The 2000–2015 period is poorly covered by existing 24 research, and the internet has therefore proven to be an invaluable source, considering the large amount of information posted by these actors themselves, by their leftist adversaries, and by journalists. Combined, this information gives a reasonably accurate picture of these movements’ activities. However, such information must be handled with caution and checked against other sources when possible. I have gathered and organized most of these online sources in a digital library, using the web-based research tool Zotero. My RTV Zotero library currently counts more than 2500 different items (webpages, newspaper articles, online documents, videos, blogs, literature etc.) organized in different folders, including one for each West European country. Datasets My second most important data source has been various datasets. Most notably, I analyse events data from the TWEED dataset (available online in SPSS format) in my first article to identify the most important RTV perpetrators in post-WWII Western Europe. In Article III, I also use events data from the DTV dataset (available online in SPSS format) to corroborate my own RTV data, and to inform my assessment of the extent of left-wing terrorism in Western Europe between 1990 and 2015. I have also used Nesser’s (2015) jihadi terrorism dataset to compare the extent of Islamist terrorism across West European countries since 1990. Besides these terrorist events datasets, I use Eurostat data to assess annual asylum seeker frequencies in West European countries between 1990 and 2015, the extent of ethnic diversity in each country, and people’s risk of poverty or social exclusion in each country. Finally, I have used data from the World Bank to determine the average level of youth unemployment in all West European countries between 1990 and 2015. Written primary and secondary sources Written primary and secondary sources have been used in this thesis for two main purposes. The first was to code events for the RTV dataset. Although a majority of RTV events are based on online sources, a considerable proportion is also derived from different offline written primary and secondary sources such as activists’ autobiographies, historical and journalistic accounts, academic studies, and various reports on racist violence published by international, governmental, and non-governmental organizations (Human Rights First, 2008; Sunderland et al., 2012; Sunderland & Ward, 2011). 25 The second purpose was to carry out case studies of the most influential groups and movements. For example, the typology proposed in Article I draws on case studies of l’Organisation de l’Armeé Secrete in France (Bocca, 1968; Harrison, 1989; Henissart, 1971), Ordine Nero and Nuclei Armati Rivoluzionari in Italy (Cento Bull, 2007; Ferraresi, 1996; Laurent & Sutton, 1978), Wehrsportgruppe Hoffmann in Germany (Fromm, 1998), and Combat 18 in the UK (Lowles, 2001; Ryan, 2003). Furthermore, Article IV provides a comparative case study of right-wing terrorism and militancy in Denmark (Karpantschof & Mikkelsen, 2016), Finland (Pekonen et al., 1999), Norway (Bjørgo, 1997; Fangen, 2001a) and Sweden (Lööw, 2000, 2015), as well as a case study of the most important contemporary group in the Nordic countries, the Swedish Resistance Movement, and its sister divisions in Finland, Norway and Denmark. To carry out this last case study, a collection of written primary sources published by the Swedish Resistance Movement, including activist magazines, handbooks, and even fiction, was particularly useful. Article summaries Article I Thugs or Terrorists? A Typology of Right-Wing Terrorism and Violence in Western Europe Published in Journal for Deradicalization, Vol. 1, No. 3, 2015. Article I begins by introducing a new method for reviewing and developing typologies. This method is introduced for two reasons. The first is that a systematic categorization of key RTV perpetrator types in post-WWII Western Europe has been lacking. Considering RTV’s multifaceted and complex nature, such categorizations may facilitate sharper distinctions between terrorists and violent thugs, and thereby inform future RTV theories that try to reconcile such different perpetrator types within the same theoretical framework. The second reason is that the most frequently cited and most widely known publication on right-wing terrorism (Sprinzak, 1995) proposes a typology of right-wing terrorism. This typology is in turn derived from Sprinzak’s theory of split delegitimization, also introduced in this same publication. A logical starting point for this PhD project was therefore to assess critically the scientific merits of Sprinzak’s theory and corresponding typology, using 26 established typological criteria. From a broad reading of social science literature on typologies, I therefore derived five criteria that good typologies should satisfy. They should: 1. clearly define the overarching concept of the typology; 2. specify whether the typology is descriptive or explanatory; 3. describe in detail how the types are (inductively and/or deductively) constructed; 4. propose an intuitive model or matrix of the typology; and 5. consider a simpler solution with mutually exclusive types. Next, by applying these criteria to review Sprinzak’s typology step by step, I find that his typology does not fully satisfy any of them. I therefore conclude that an alternative typology of right-wing terrorism and violence is needed. The article then uses the same five criteria to develop a new typology of right-wing terrorism and violence, specifically tailored to the case of Western Europe. In developing this new typology, I combine events data from the TWEED dataset with a number of case studies to describe and categorize the most salient right-wing terrorist actors and violent perpetrators in post-WWII Western Europe. Having compared different actor types on a range of different variables, including organizational structure, leadership, size, political strategy, affiliations to former regimes, access to military resources, and international connections, I finally reduce the number of variables included in my typology to two: strategy and organization. Table 1. Typology of right-wing terrorism and violence in Western Europe Political strategy Organization Yes No Strong Elite-sponsored groups Crime syndicates Loose Autonomous groups/cells Mobs/gangs/ hooligans Absent Lone actors Violent loners Type of violence Terrorism Criminal violence By emphasizing differences in the strategy and organization of perpetrators, this proposed typology offers sharper distinctions – both between different types of perpetrators and between 27 different forms of violence – than conventional terrorist typologies based primarily on ideological differences. Article II Right-Wing Terrorism and Violence in Western Europe: Introducing the RTV Dataset Published in Perspectives on Terrorism, Vol. 10, No. 3, 2016. This article introduces the RTV dataset, explains how it has been constructed, discusses its strengths and weaknesses, and presents some of its key findings. In addition, the last section of the article proposes six hypotheses aimed at explaining what is perhaps the most puzzling finding emerging from the RTV dataset: that the number of deadly events has declined considerably under conditions commonly assumed to stimulate RTV. These conditions include increased immigration, growing support for radical right parties, Islamist terrorism, and booming youth unemployment rates. Part one of the article reviews existing terrorism databases and other relevant event chronologies, demonstrating that they do not satisfy the increasingly pressing demand for more systematic RTV events data. This review finds that existing databases and event chronologies are either outdated, miss right-wing events, lack contextual information, rely on poor or no longer available information, omit terrorist plots or non-lethal events, apply overly lax inclusion criteria, or contain data that cannot be compared. Part two explains how the RTV dataset has been constructed and specifies its inclusion criteria. Most notably, the dataset includes only those events where the target selection – minority groups, political adversaries, or the government – is based on authoritarian right-wing ideas (as defined previously). Furthermore, the dataset includes only violent events of a certain severity, and those with a terroristic quality, as explained in more detail in the methods section above. The article then moves on to discuss the strengths and weaknesses of the RTV dataset, such as the types of open sources used to code each event. This discussion concludes by recognizing that the dataset may be skewed towards countries and time periods that are better documented by available sources, and that deadly RTV events therefore represent the most definitive and reliable measure for analysing variation across time and place. 28 Next, the article presents some key findings emerging from the dataset, most notably that the number of deadly RTV events has declined considerably in Western Europe since the 1990s (see Figure 2). Figure 2. RTV deadly events in Western Europe, 1990–2015 (N=190) The third and final part of the article briefly introduces six hypotheses that might help explain this decline: less conventional political activism, a shift towards more internet activism, less crime in general, different subcultural practices and action repertoires, more favourable political opportunities, and acceptance of multicultural societies. Finally, the article closes by calling for more comparative RTV research at the cross-national level to investigate how these and other relevant hypotheses might be explored further to identify the conditions under which RTV is most – and least – likely to occur. 29 Article III Explaining Right-Wing Terrorism and Violence in Western Europe: Grievances, Opportunities, and Polarization Unpublished manuscript. Article III is aimed at explaining why some West European countries have experienced considerably more RTV than others. This question remains largely unanswered in existing RTV research because (1) events data suitable for cross-national comparisons have been lacking, and (2) existing analyses fail to capture RTV’s causal complexity, involving multiple causal paths (equifinality) comprising causal conditions that become sufficient for the outcome only in combination (conjunctural causation). To help fill these gaps, the article uses events data from the RTV dataset in a qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) research design. The article begins by documenting that some West European countries – Sweden, Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy, Spain, and Greece – have experienced considerably more RTV per capita than others between 1990 and 2015. To explain this cross-national variation, the article then reviews existing theory and literature to identify the most relevant causal conditions proposed as being conducive to RTV. The selection of causal conditions is informed by three theoretical premises derived from existing research. Building on Hewitt (2003), the first premise states that a sufficient number of dedicated militants is a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for extensive RTV to occur. Identifying conditions that might fuel militant mobilization on the far right is therefore an important first step, and both grievances and opportunities come across as relevant in this regard. Next, building on the civil war literature (Ballentine & Sherman, 2003; Bara, 2014; P. Collier & Sambanis, 2005, p. 329; Korf, 2005), the second premise states that grievances and opportunities are more fruitfully approached as complementary rather than as contrasting. Finally, building on civil war research on polarization (Esteban & Schneider, 2008; Montalvo & Reynal-Querol, 2005; Østby, 2008), the third premise states that a highly polarized conflict between far right activists and their enemies represents a third necessary condition for extensive RTV to occur. Using these three premises to guide my selection, six causal conditions listed in Table II are finally included in the QCA analysis that follows. 30 Table 2. Causal conditions included in the analysis Conditions Theoretical basis Immigration and ethnic diversity Grievances Socio-economic hardship Grievances Radical right support Opportunities Authoritarian legacies Opportunities Radical right repression Polarization Left-wing terrorism and militancy Polarization Next, the article measures and scores these six conditions according to standard QCA procedures (Ragin, 2008; Schneider & Wagemann, 2013). When feeding my scores into the fsQCA software, two causal recipes are derived that have a reasonably good solution consistency score (0.88 for the intermediate solution) and coverage score (0.76 for the intermediate solution). The first recipe involves the combination of high immigration, low electoral support to radical right (anti-immigration) parties, and extensive public repression of radical right actors and opinions. The second recipe involves the combination of socio- economic hardship, authoritarian legacies, and extensive left-wing terrorism and militancy. The first recipe covers North European countries with extensive RTV experiences (Sweden, Germany, and the United Kingdom); the second recipe covers South European countries with extensive RTV experiences (Italy, Greece, and Spain). Notably, both recipes contain elements of “grievances” and “opportunities”, suggesting that these two theories conventionally seen as contrasting (Koopmans, 1996) may be more fruitfully seen as complementary. In combination, these two causal recipes thus offer a fairly consistent account of why some West European countries have experienced considerably more RTV than others. Robustness tests recommended by the QCA literature (Schneider & Wagemann, 2013, pp. 284–294) also indicate that my findings are reasonably robust. However, considering the inherently explorative nature of QCA analysis and the causal distance between many of the conditions included in this analysis and my outcome variable (RTV), these findings should be seen as provisional rather than definite. Therefore, this article closes by calling for more case-oriented research, aiming to further investigate the causal mechanisms implied by each recipe. 31 Article IV Right-Wing Terrorism and Militancy in the Nordic Countries: A Comparative Case Study Accepted for publication in Terrorism and Political Violence. This article begins by documenting and comparing the evolution of right-wing terrorism and militancy in the Nordic countries between 1990 and 2015. This comparative analysis show that, in Denmark, Finland and Norway, the right-wing militant movements collapsed during the early 2000s and were replaced by more moderate and democratically oriented organizations and political parties. By contrast, the Swedish militant movement has remained strong and active during the 2000s, and has generated considerably more terrorism and violence between 1990 and 2015 than its Nordic counterparts have. In fact, RTV data suggests that Sweden (with a population of 10 million) has experienced more right-wing terrorism and violence than Denmark, Norway, and Finland combined (with an aggregate population of 16 million). Sweden also hosts by far the most influential contemporary militant groups: Svenska motståndsrörelsen (the Swedish Resistance Movement, SRM). To further illustrate cross- national differences, the article therefore includes a separate case study of SRM, showing that this organization has been trying to establish sister divisions in Norway, Finland and Denmark, but with far less success than in Sweden. Having established that Sweden has experienced considerably more right-wing terrorism and militancy between 1990 and 2015 than the other Nordic countries, the article then seeks to account for Sweden’s outlier position. In doing so, the article draws on three concepts proposed by social movement research (Caiani et al., 2012) to explain extreme right mobilization: political opportunities, organizational resources, and frame analysis. Applying these concepts to the Nordic countries, the article finds that Sweden’s outlier position may originate from different WWII experiences, leaving Sweden with a stronger and more resilient extreme right movement, but also from receiving more immigrants while lacking influential anti-immigration (radical right) parties, and from conducting a more restrictive public debate on immigration, leaving little room for anti-immigration concerns in the public sphere. While the first and second explanations are consistent with existing social movement research, the third explanation challenges the dominant view on how the public debate on immigration might influence mobilization and violence. Former studies suggest that elites’ 32 negative framing of immigrants legitimates and thereby triggers right-wing violence (Koopmans, 1996). By contrast, this study suggests that an excessively negative framing of anti-immigration actors and opinions might lead to a similar outcome. One reason is that such moralizing frames might cause frustration and anger among people with far-right sympathies, in particular when problems related to high immigration are substantial but anti-immigration (radical right) parties are weak. Furthermore, such moralizing frames resonate well with the frames produced by the extreme right movement, portraying “politically correct” elites as unwilling to confront the challenges posed by high immigration, and accusing them of marginalizing people with anti-immigration concerns. Such polarizing mechanisms may in turn stimulate terrorism and violence, as some activists end up regarding violent revolution as the only viable way of generating true political change. Summary of main findings The aim of this thesis has been to generate new knowledge about the characteristics, extent, and dynamics of RTV in Western Europe after WWII. In doing so, three more specific research questions have been pursued. In this section, I draw on my findings to answer each of these three questions. Research question 1 What characterizes the most important RTV perpetrator types in post-WWII Western Europe? One general emerging from my research is that RTV should be seen as a highly diverse and complex phenomenon emerging from different contexts and situations, rather than as a uniform phenomenon always produced by the same set of causal conditions. This inherent diversity notwithstanding, a few generic RTV actor types may still be derived from the available evidence. Analysing TWEED events data, a key finding from my first article is that only a handful of terrorist groups were behind almost half of all registered right-wing terrorist attacks and more than half of all killings in Western Europe between 1954 and 2004. Case studies of some of these groups, such as l’Organisation de l’Armeé Secrete in France (Harrison, 1989), Ordine Nero and Nuclei Armati Rivoluzionari in Italy (Ferraresi, 1996), and Wehrsportgruppe Hoffmann in Germany (Fromm, 1998), show that they were large and well organized “elite- sponsored groups”, operating predominantly between the 1960s and the 1980s in countries with 33 former authoritarian regimes. Such elite-sponsored groups had up to several hundred militants each and were organized hierarchically with a centralized leadership. Their terrorist campaigns were motivated by international conflicts rather than by immigration, which had yet to become a contested issue in Western Europe. More specifically, their campaigns were products of elite- driven strategies meant to reinstall former authoritarian regimes, or to obstruct their communist enemies from obtaining political power. These types of elite-sponsored groups gradually disappeared from Western Europe as the Cold War came to an end and the legacies of former authoritarian regimes evaporated. By implication, given Western Europe’s current political situation, the threat from strongly organized right-wing terrorist groups appears to be significantly lower today than some 30 to 40 years ago. Assuming that the legacies of former authoritarian regimes continue to evaporate, and democracies consolidate, Western Europe provides less fertile ground and an unlikely operating base for such large and well-organized terrorist groups. Article I also shows how these elite-sponsored groups were replaced by more loosely organized “subcultural networks” during the late 1980s and early 1990s (Merkl & Weinberg, 1997). In contrast to elite-sponsored groups, subcultural networks have little support beyond their own underground movement and therefore operate under considerably more hostile and repressive conditions. Furthermore, the type of violence committed by these subcultural actors – mobs, skinhead gangs, and hooligans – has been generally less terroristic in nature and more spontaneous, typically targeting immigrants, particularly during the early 1990s (Bjørgo & Witte, 1993a). However, from the mid-1990s onwards, some of these loosely organized networks developed into more tightly organized “autonomous groups and cells” inspired by the strategy of leaderless resistance (Fangen, 2001b, pp. 90–104; Kaplan, 1997; Köhler, 2017; Heléne Lööw, 2000, pp. 77–122; Ryan, 2003). Unlike mobs, skinhead gangs and hooligans, such autonomous groups do engage in terrorism and have a much higher kill rate per attack – almost 1:1 – as I show in Article II. However, they have also been relatively rare compared to most other generic actor types described in this thesis, such as “lone actors”, which brings us to the last terrorist type included in the typology proposed in Article I. Lone-actor terrorism is in this thesis understood as terrorist attacks or plots that nobody except the individual perpetrator or plotter is aware of until an attack occurs or a plot is discovered (for alternative conceptualizations, see Nesser, 2012). While lone actors carry out their operational planning in isolation, they are generally seen as strongly influenced by existing 34 political movements, typically through online activities (Berntzen & Sandberg, 2014; Kaplan et al., 2014). Recent research also suggests that, while most terrorists are normal, psychologically speaking, a significant share of lone actors suffer from some form of mental illness or disorder (Corner & Gill, 2015). One study, which analysed 198 lone actor attacks, found that right-wing actors constituted the second largest category (17%), next to attacks in which the perpetrator’s ideological conviction remains unknown (Ramón Spaaij, 2012). A similar study of 119 lone actors found that 34% were right-wingers (Gill et al., 2014). In short, lone actor terrorism is not exclusively a right-wing phenomenon, but right-wing motivations have been overrepresented compared to other political ideologies. Research question 2 What is the record of RTV events in post-1990 Western Europe? Perhaps the most remarkable finding from my analyses of the RTV dataset is that the annual number of deadly RTV events has declined considerably in Western Europe since the 1990s, culminating in no deadly events in 2014, and only one in 2015. Furthermore, this decline has occurred under conditions normally assumed to foster RTV, such as increased immigration (Garcia, 2015), rising unemployment (Falk et al., 2011), Islamist terrorism (Eatwell, 2006), and growing support to radical right parties (Wilkinson, 1995). Stable or declining attack frequencies are also documented by several national hate crimes statistics covering right-wing violence in different West European countries during the same period, as is shown in Appendix I to Article II. These findings challenge widespread assumptions about RTV being on the rise in Western Europe – a popular misconception partly created by media reports based on anecdotal evidence rather than on systematic events data. Another relevant finding from the RTV dataset is that premeditated attacks have been carried out predominantly by gangs and lone actors, and less frequently by organized groups or their affiliated members. Furthermore, the majority of killings have been committed by gangs, unorganized groups, and lone actors – and not by organized militants. These findings, too, challenge existing assumptions about who the most important RTV perpetrators are, and support the claim made in Article I that organized RTV is becoming increasingly rare in Western Europe. They also suggest that, while lone actors may pose the most significant terrorist threat today, less spectacular forms of violence committed by unorganized groups and individuals represent the most likely threat. Finally, contrary to recent research which has found that lone actor terrorism is on rise in Europe (Ellis et al., 2016), an increase in the number of 35 lone actor attacks between 1990 and 2015 cannot be observed in the RTV data. This last finding is in line with RTV research from the United States, finding that lone actor terrorism has generally not increased during the past decade (Gruenewald et al., 2013). Turning to victims, two groups stand out as by far the most frequently targeted: immigrants (249 events) and leftists (138 events). Other significant target groups include government representatives (25 events), homeless people (25 events), and homosexuals (23 events). Jews have been targeted less frequently (7 events) than Muslims (28 events). This observation resonates with a general ideological reorientation by many extreme right groups that no longer consider their main enemies to be Communists or Zionists, but rather Islamists and Muslims more generally (Mammone et al., 2012, 2013). In terms of weapons use, RTV perpetrators most often resort to knives (119 events), unarmed beating and kicking (108 events), explosives (86 events), firearms (85 events), and blunt instruments such as iron bars, bats, or wooden sticks (68 events). In addition, firebombs (38 attacks) and arson (20 attacks) have also been frequently used. Truly complex attacks that combine explosives with firearms have so far occurred only once (the 22 July attacks in Norway). Finally, analysing deadly RTV events across time and space reveals several interesting patterns for further explanatory analysis. One is that, notwithstanding the general decline described above, some West European countries have experienced considerably more RTV than others between 1990 and 2015. Research question 3 Why have some West European countries experienced considerably more RTV than others between 1990 and 2015? Before answering this question, let me begin by presenting some negative findings, that is, causal conditions that were initially included in my analyses but turned out not to form part of any consistent explanation. Most notably, anti-immigration sentiments in the general population do not seem to have a strong influence on RTV. A number of countries that (according to Card et al., 2005) score high on anti-immigration sentiments, such as Finland and Portugal, score low on RTV, while other countries with high RTV scores, such as Sweden and Germany, score low on anti-immigration sentiments. This does not, of course, mean that anti- immigration views do not exist in countries such as Sweden and Germany. However, in these 36 countries, such opinions could be clustering within certain segments of the population perceived by the majority as racists, while in countries like Finland and Portugal, such opinions could be more widespread and therefore generally perceived as less racist. A second causal condition that does not form part of any consistent explanation is youth unemployment. A number of countries that score fairly high on youth unemployment, such as Portugal, Finland, Belgium, and France, score low on RTV, while other countries with high RTV scores, such as Germany and the UK, do not have particularly high youth unemployment rates compared to many other West European countries. This may come as a surprise, because we tend to assume that unemployed youths are overrepresented among violent RTV offenders. Yet previous research has shown that unemployed youth only represented a small subset of violent RTV offenders in Germany (Willems, 1995). That being said, we should also be mindful that different patterns might emerge if we disaggregate from the country level to capture sub- national variations (Falk et al., 2011). In any event, youth unemployment does not seem to offer any consistent explanation of RTV, even when being combined with other relevant conditions, as I have done in my QCA analyses. I now turn to those (combinations of) conditions that, according to my analyses, may be more relevant for explaining why RTV has been more extensive in some countries than in others. In particular, two causal recipes were derived from my QCA analysis. In the first recipe, grievances caused by problems related to high immigration or diversity appear to have become particularly pronounced in a handful of North European countries that also lacked influential anti-immigration (radical right) parties during the period under investigation (1990–2015), thereby creating mobilization opportunities for the extreme right. Such militant mobilization has in turn been fuelled by extensive public repression and stigmatization of radical right actors and opinions in countries such as Sweden, Germany and the UK. The explanation may be that in these countries, people with far-right sympathies have experienced frustration and anger at not having access to political decision making or to public debates, and because of being publicly ridiculed, repressed, and continually labelled as racists, thereby making militant activism a more attractive option than elsewhere. While such repression and stigmatization may discourage some people from joining radical and extreme right groups, it may also push some of the most ardent activists onto more clandestine and revolutionary paths, ultimately leading to violence and terrorism (Klandermans & Mayer, 2006, pp. 272–273; Minkenberg, 2006; Pedahzur, 2001). 37 In the second recipe, grievances caused by socio-economic hardship combined with the legacies of former authoritarian regimes create opportunities for mobilizing militant extremists on both sides of the political spectrum, intensifying an already polarized left–right divide. Once a sufficient number of militants have been mobilized on both sides, a reciprocal spiral of violence and terrorism is then likely to follow (Weinberg, 1995; Weinberg & Eubank, 1987). These dynamics are also echoed by the RTV dataset, most notably by the Italian and Spanish cases, where a majority of registered attacks have targeted left-wing militants as opposed to most other countries where immigrants constitute the largest target group. While attacks against left-wing militants in Greece are less covered by the RTV dataset (most likely because of limited data), several reports describe an ongoing street war between the militant left and the militant right in Greece (Faiola, 2014; Spillius, 2012) – a conflict that according to local experts is best understood in light of Greece’s former authoritarian regime (Sotiris, 2012). The continuity of these “old” left–right political cleavages is also indicated by the fact that Italy, Spain and Greece still have active communist parties (sometimes with parliamentary representation), a rare phenomenon in the rest of Western Europe (March & Mudde, 2005). To investigate the North European recipe further, Article IV offers a comparative case study of the Nordic countries, aiming to explain why right-wing terrorism and militancy has been more widespread in Sweden than in Denmark, Finland, and Norway. Notably, this study finds that a number of experts and observers believe that the Swedish immigration debate has been conducted within a narrow “opinion corridor” policed by left-leaning journalists, intellectuals, and politicians who consistently brand and thus marginalize criticism and scepticism towards immigration as racist or conducive to the spread of racism. Whether the Swedish public debate on immigration has in fact been more restrictive than in the other Nordic countries remains an open question, because we lack comparative studies of this phenomenon, although some existing research supports this claim (Jørgensen & Meret, 2012). However, more important here is the widespread belief that this is indeed the case, not only within the extreme right movement, but also among a number of journalists, academics, foreign observers, and people in general. This belief resonates with frames produced by the extreme right movement, portraying traitorous political elites, unwilling to protect the cultural heritage of its own people, hence the alleged need for violent revolution as the only viable alternative for generating true change. Perceptions of a more restrictive public debate on immigration may in other words have contributed to more militant recruitment and violence in Sweden than in the other Nordic countries, where the public debates on immigration are 38 generally seen as more open and inclusive, and where radical right parties have gained more access to political power than in Sweden. Implications for research and policy In this final section, I explain why and how some of my findings may be relevant to future research and policy. I begin by discussing the main contributions of the thesis to the study of right-wing terrorism and violence. Next, I propose some new ideas for future RTV research, most notably a three-step integrative model that may serve as a stepping stone towards a new RTV theory, as well as a new way of contrasting left and right. Finally, I discuss how some of my findings might inform future policies aimed at combating violent extremism on the far right. Contributions to existing research The most important contribution from this thesis to existing research on right-wing terrorism and violence is the RTV dataset, which was made publicly available in 2016. This dataset offers a systematic and updated account of RTV events in Western Europe between 1990 and 2015 – information that may be used to analyse variation across time and place. This means that anyone studying RTV is now free to use this dataset to carry out comparative studies – which have been endemically lacking in this field – and thereby also to begin to test existing and future theories on why RTV has been more extensive in some places than in others. The RTV dataset also offers new and detailed information on RTV perpetrators and their victims, such as the time and place of each attack, whether it was spontaneous or premeditated, the perpetrator’s organizational characteristics and affiliations, casualty numbers, and the types of weapons used by different perpetrator types, in different situations, against different targets. All this information may be cross-analysed in a number of ways that may reveal new and interesting patterns. The dataset may also be used as a point of departure for more detailed investigations of specific regions, countries, militant groups, and perpetrator types. For example, it includes 140 events involving 76 different lone actors whose background and motives could be further explored in future research. My own analyses of the RTV dataset have resulted in several key findings that both support and challenge existing RTV research. First, the RTV dataset shows that these types of violent attacks have mainly been committed by racist gangs, unorganized groups, and individuals, and not by organized militants with a more pronounced political agenda. This finding supports 39 previous RTV research that downplay the importance of ideological and political motives in explaining violence, and highlight predominantly social and situational factors such as troubled backgrounds, adventure seeking, confrontational dynamics, a need for protection, a sense of brotherhood, or a search for purpose and meaning in life (see e.g. Bjørgo, 1997; Fangen, 2001a; Simi et al., 2016). Second, while micro-motives may be more social than political, my analyses also suggest that RTV’s macro-structural causes may be more political than social, although the two explanations may be more fruitfully seen as complementary. Specifically, I argue that grievances and opportunities – two dominant theories conventionally seen as contrasting in this field (Koopmans, 1996) – are more fruitfully seen as complementary because their implied causal mechanisms do not logically exclude one another. By combining rather than contrasting different elements from these two models such as immigration (grievances), socio-economic hardship (grievances), limited radical right support (opportunities) and authoritarian legacies (opportunities), I was able to distinguish consistently all the West European countries with extensive RTV experience from those with moderate or low RTV experience. On this note, similar claims about the complementarity of these two models, which dominate most conflict- oriented research, have also been made by scholars from other fields, most notably in the civil war literature (Ballentine & Sherman, 2003; P. Collier & Sambanis, 2005, p. 329; Korf, 2005), and convincingly demonstrated empirically using the same type of complexity-oriented methods (QCA) as I have used here (Bara, 2014). My QCA analysis also shows that no single causal condition (or variable) explains consistently why RTV has been more extensive in some places than in others. The fact that RTV has decreased in Western Europe while conditions normally assumed to foster RTV, such as immigration (Garcia, 2015) and support to radical right parties (Wilkinson, 1995), have increased could suggest that these conditions are less relevant for explaining RTV than previously assumed. However, a more likely interpretation is that they must be combined with other relevant conditions to become part of a consistent explanation. In doing so, I was able to show that the relationship between radical right support and RTV may (under certain conditions) in fact be negative. This finding supports previous claims, most notably from social movement scholars such as Koopmans (1996). However, unlike Koopmans’s theory, in which such limited support must combine with elites’ negative framing of immigrants to trigger racist violence, my findings suggest that it is rather elites’ negative 40 framing of radical right actors and opinions that distinguish countries with extensive RTV (e.g. Sweden and Germany) from those with moderate or low RTV experience (e.g. Denmark and Switzerland). As such, this finding challenges the dominant view on how the public discourse on immigration might influence extreme right mobilization and violence. It suggests that a predominantly pro-immigration elite perceived as hostile towards people with anti-immigration concerns might be exploited by the extreme right to mobilize new followers and motivate violent protest. This argument ties into a more general finding emerging from my research, suggesting that a highly polarized conflict between far-right activists and their enemies, including leftists, political elites, and the public at large, represents a necessary condition for extensive RTV to occur. This finding supports previous research that highlight polarization and threat perceptions as important for explaining RTV (Sprinzak, 1995), political violence more generally (della Porta, 2013), and intolerant attitudes and behaviours across a wide range of countries and contexts (Stenner, 2005). Methodologically, perhaps the most noteworthy contribution from this thesis is that it provides an example of how QCA may be used fruitfully to compare more than a handful of cases when the outcome of interest entails causal complexities and available data are limited or do not offer sufficient variation for making meaningful inferences using statistical analysis. QCA remains a contested method, and methodologists continue to argue about its added value vis-à-vis conventional statistics (Munck, 2016; Paine, 2016; Schneider, 2016; Thiem & Baumgartner, 2016). As such, this thesis should by no means be read as a case against statistical analysis, but rather as a case in favour of QCA when problems related to causal complexities, too few cases, or limited data make conventional statistical analysis less appropriate. A final contribution from this thesis is the practical method for reviewing and developing typologies introduced in Article I. In this thesis, I use this method to review one existing RTV typology and to develop a new one. However, this method applies not only to studying RTV; indeed, it can be used to review and develop typologies in any social science field. It may therefore prove helpful to anyone interested in critically assessing some existing typology, or in developing a new one. 41 Future research This thesis has mainly focused on RTV’s macro-structural causes, because that is where the most important knowledge gaps are today. However, in working towards a more complete RTV theory, future research should combine insights from all three levels of analysis (macro-meso- micro). As a way of preparing the ground for such multilevel research, I therefore propose a new integrative three-step model that I believe could be a fruitful way forward, combining elements from political psychology (the authoritarian dynamic), social movement theory (opportunities-resources-framing), and sociology (micro-level theory of violence). First, building on Stenner’s (2005) theory of the authoritarian dynamic, step one explains how intolerant opinions may become salient within a sufficiently large segment of a population under certain threatening conditions (societal fragmentation and polarization), preparing the ground for collective mobilization on the far right. Second, building on social movement theory, in particular Caiani, della Porta, and Wagemann’s (2012) framework for analysing extreme right mobilization, step two explains when and how this mobilization will result in extreme and militant groups rather than in more democratically oriented organizations and parties. Furthermore, della Porta’s (2013) recent book on clandestine political violence brings this analysis one important step forward by introducing group-level mechanisms to explain how mobilized activists might end up as members of small, increasingly isolated, and ultimately violent militant groups and cells. Finally, building on Collins’s (2009) micro-sociological theory of violence, step three explains how some but far from all mobilized militants, as well as some unorganized individuals, manage to overcome inherent barriers against violent confrontation in certain situations, and eventually carry out violent attacks. Thus far, I have not mentioned Collins’s micro-sociological theory of violence, mainly because it covers not only political violence, but also physical violence in all its shapes and forms, ranging from domestic family violence via sports violence to outright war. However, I still believe that this universal micro-level theory of violence captures important mechanisms necessary for explaining why violence occurs in some situations rather than in others, namely how violent situations are shaped by what Collins’s describes as “an emotional field of tension and fear” (Collins, 2009, pp. 10–19). This theory may be particularly relevant for explaining RTV, precisely because of the “tension and fear” that appear to drive many such attacks. Furthermore, many RTV events are of a rather spontaneous nature, and seemingly resulting from unexpected encounters between the perpetrator(s) and some person(s) belonging to a 42 predefined target group. These types of random violent encounters resonate with Collins’s theory which, unlike much other research on political violence, is primarily concerned with the dynamics of violent situations rather than with the individual predispositions or backgrounds of violent individuals. To be sure, in isolation Collins’s theory may come across as somewhat one-sided, ignoring all forms of background conditions that may have been conducive to a violent event. However, I still believe it may be fruitfully added to a broader theoretical framework that also includes relevant background conditions at different levels of analysis, as does the three-step model outlined here. Besides further developing, testing, and refining this three-step model, I believe future RTV research would benefit from looking more into the dynamics of left–right reciprocal violence and polarization, which in turn ties in to an ongoing debate on so-called cumulative extremism (Busher & Macklin, 2015; Eatwell, 2006). According to Bobbio (1996, pp. 1–17), several observers and activists seem to believe that the left–right divide no longer matters or is not useful for understanding these actors’ ideas and behaviour. However, while working with this thesis I have – just like Bobbio – reached the opposite conclusion: that the left–right divide remains a defining feature and a key identity marker for militant activists on both sides (see also Klandermans & Mayer, 2006, pp. 248–268). At the same time, there are also apparent similarities between left- and right-wing militants concerning revolutionary ideas, tactics, aesthetics, an appetite for conspiracies, and activist profiles, perhaps also including some shared personality traits. Future research might benefit from further investigating such similarities and differences between the militant left and militant right, and also consider whether these characteristics might help explain their tendency to end up in violent confrontations. On this note, while working with this thesis, I have come up with an alternative way of contrasting left and right that might be useful for future research, namely to distinguish between universal solidarity on the one hand, and relational or contingent solidarity on the other. While many on the left promote the universal solidarity of all mankind as a guiding principle for their policies, irrespective of factors such as race, ethnicity, nationality, or culture, many on the right regard solidarity primarily as contingent on the proximity and strength of established relational bonds, ranging from the family, via the local community, to entire nations, ethnic groups, and cultures. This conceptualization may also be related to Haidt’s (2012) acclaimed analysis of the different moral foundations that conservatives (usually rightists) and liberals (usually leftists) adhere to. 43 In this thesis, I have used Bobbio’s conceptualization, primarily because it is already well established by the existing literature. However, because Bobbio begins his conceptualization by defining the left (policies aimed at reducing social inequality), and then simply contrasts this rather positively loaded definition, he ends up with a definition of the right that is somewhat negatively loaded: policies promoting social inequality. My impression is that most political activists are motivated by a desire to do something good, but disagree about how this “good” is produced and for whom. My alternative definition of universal versus relational solidarity captures this desire to do good by proposing two definitions that are both positively loaded. I therefore believe that this conceptualization may offer a more precise description of the types of ideas contemporary right-wing activists associate with – and thus be a better conceptual tool for understanding their behaviour. Policy implications Some of the findings presented here may also be used to inform policies aimed at combating violent extremism on the far right. The fact that a majority of violent events registered in the RTV dataset have been committed by unorganized groups and individuals suggests that measures targeting organized militants may have limited effect in most countries. In countries with extensive militant movements (Germany, Sweden, Italy), such measures must, of course, still be considered, but should mainly target those who appear willing to actually employ violence and terrorism. As has been previously noted by several scholars (Kirshner, 2014; Minkenberg, 2006; Pedahzur, 2001), repressive or disruptive measures against actors mainly operating within democratic boundaries may have adverse effects by pushing some of the most ardent activists on to more extreme and clandestine paths. Furthermore, although the internet and social media are not in themselves sufficient to explain why some activists turn to terrorism and violence (Caiani & Borri, 2012; Conway, 2016), they certainly facilitate access to extreme right ideas and to information about operational tactics, in particular for those who lack such information via existing militant groups and organizations (Caiani & Kröll, 2015). However, developing effective countermeasures against unorganized online activists is extremely difficult, if not impossible. For example, although Breivik was an avid internet and social media user in the years leading up to the 22 July attacks, a review of his online posts between 2002 and 2011 revealed that he never discussed his terrorist plans with anyone online (Ravndal, 2013). In fact, his online posts can hardly be described as extreme compared to some of the posts that appear regularly in the 44 comments sections in mainstream news media. Thus, even if Norwegian security authorities had monitored Breivik’s online activity, they would most likely not have responded to it. If countermeasures targeting organized militants have limited effect in most countries, and if identifying those who might actually radicalize online is difficult if not impossible, it may also be useful to look towards more general societal conditions that might be conducive to violent extremism on the far right. Some of the conditions identified as such in this thesis, such as authoritarian legacies, limited radical right support, or socio-economic hardship, are hard for policymakers to do anything about, at least within a short-term perspective. Other conditions, most notably immigration, invoke a number of humanitarian and societal implications that are arguably more important than the relatively small threat posed by RTV in today’s Western Europe. In other words, countering RTV is probably not a sufficient reason for changing immigration policies, although doing so could be an effective measure in some countries. This leaves us with two conditions. The first concerns the extent of public repression of radical right actors and opinions. If it is the case that public repression and stigmatization of radical right actors and opinions under certain conditions (high immigration and low radical right support) fuel anger and resentment on the far right, and thereby also militant mobilization and violence, as findings from this thesis suggest, then one should perhaps be more careful about how these types of actors and opinions are treated publicly. For example, by dismissing concerns about high immigration as hateful conspiracies, racism, or some form of irrational phobia, Western elites and policymakers (unintentionally) make these threats more real in the eyes of far-right activists, because they regard the elites as an active part of the underlying conflict. Telling someone who is afraid that his or her fears are groundless generally does not help much, especially if you personify the very thing that they fear. This does not mean that one should not contest or challenge intolerant radical right actors and opinions publicly. However, in line with political psychologists who have studied authoritarian and conservative mindsets (Haidt, 2012, pp. 319–366; Stenner, 2005, pp. 328–335), I believe that one should try to do so without coming across as overly aggressive, derogatory, or moralizing, however difficult that may be. The second condition of potential relevance for policymakers concerns the extent of left- wing terrorism and militancy. If it is the case that left-wing terrorism and militancy fuel right- wing terrorism and militancy, as findings from this thesis suggest, then one should perhaps be more attentive to such polarization mechanisms and to potential ways of disrupting them. For 45 example, violent extremism on the far right is usually approached by policymakers as an isolated problem, typically as hate crimes, rather than as a response to violent extremism on the far left. Seeing the two forms as interdependent could potentially result in a better understanding of both, and thereby also in more effective countermeasures. Concluding remarks Although this thesis follows in the wake of the 22 July terrorist attacks in Norway, these attacks and the person who committed them do not figure prominently in it. The reason is that these attacks in many ways represent an outlier case. First, the number of victims far exceeds that of any other attack since 1990. Second, the perpetrator not only prepared and carried out the attacks alone; unlike most lone actors, he had no ties to any right-wing militant group (Gable & Jackson, 2011). Third, it is the only attack where the perpetrator combined explosives and firearms. Finally, it is one of few attacks where the perpetrator deliberately used terrorism as a tactic to achieve one or several explicitly stated aims. Despite these outlier characteristics, the 22 July case is also indicative of some general trends. First, those few right-wing attacks from the post-1990 period that truly qualify as terrorism have mainly been committed by lone actors and not by organized militants. Second, there is an increasing body of evidence showing that, unlike most terrorists, a majority of lone actor terrorists suffer from some personality disorder or mental illness (Corner & Gill, 2015; Gill et al., 2014). Third, the rapid development of the internet and social media may facilitate lone actor terrorism, making it extremely unpredictable and difficult to respond to in time (Smith et al., 2016; Ramon Spaaij, 2015). To conclude, the evidence presented in this thesis suggests that the 22 July attacks should not be seen as a sign of an emergent threat. The overall trend is that RTV has decreased in Western Europe over the past decades, although RTV levels remain considerably higher in some West European countries than in others. That said, one should be mindful that we could be facing a new wave of RTV in the wake of the ongoing migrant crisis, although it is still too early to come to conclusion about this development. So far, it appears that much of the fear and uncertainty created by this situation have been channelled into more democratically oriented radical right or populist parties and organizations, rather than into violent militant groups. Finally, findings from this thesis suggest that RTV should be seen as a highly diverse phenomenon, consisting of different types of actors, emerging from different contexts, and 46 driven by different motives. However, these differences notwithstanding, the actors involved appear to share two experiences: The first concerns perceptions of alienation, threat, and repression. By themselves, such perceptions may not constitute a sufficient condition for engaging in RTV. 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A Typology of Right-Wing Terrorism and Violence in Western Europe 1 Summer/15 Nr. 3 ISSN: 2363-9849 Thugs or Terrorists? A Typology of Right-Wing Terrorism and Violence in Western Europe By: Jacob Aasland Ravndal 1 Abstract Despite Western Europe’s extensive history of right-wing terrorism, a systematic categorization of key actors and events is lacking. This article aims to narrow this gap by proposing the first empirically derived typology of right-wing terrorism and violence in Western Europe. The article begins by introducing a method for reviewing and developing typologies, informed by relevant social science literature. This method is first used to review Ehud Sprinzak’s seminal typology of right-wing terrorism. While Sprinzak merits recognition for having developed the only universal typology in the field, the review shows that his typology does not satisfy established criteria for typology building. Combining quantitative and qualitative post-WWII data, a new typology is therefore proposed, based on attack frequencies and differences in perpetrators’ strategy and organization. This new typology facilitates sharper distinctions, both between different types of perpetrators and between different forms of violence. 1 Jacob Aasland Ravndal is Research Fellow at the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI), Jacob- Aasland.Ravndal@ffi.no. I thank Jon Hovi, Tore Bjørgo, Thomas Hegghammer, Jan Oskar Engene, Johannes Due Enstad, Helge Renå, Daniel Köhler, and two anonymous reviewers for providing useful comments to earlier versions of this article. 61 Jacob Aasland Ravndal: Thugs or Terrorists? A Typology of Right-Wing Terrorism and Violence in Western Europe 2 Summer/15 Nr. 3 ISSN: 2363-9849 Introduction Having attracted relatively little attention for some time, right-wing terrorism returned to Western Europe's public eye in 2011 with the terrorist attacks in Norway and the disclosure of the German terrorist cell Nationalsozialistischer Untergrund (NSU). To determine whether these were isolated events or signal a revival of right-wing terrorism in Western Europe it is helpful to (1) identify and explore past waves of right-wing terrorism and violence in this region and (2) categorize and compare the most important events and actors involved. Such comparative studies of right-wing terrorism and violence in Western Europe have so far been rare. In particular, no systematic categorization of key events and actors exists. Aiming to narrow this gap, this article proposes a typology of right-wing terrorism and violence, specifically tailored to the case of Western Europe. Becoming increasingly popular in the study of terrorism and political violence, typologies constitute a particularly useful analytical tool for categorizing data, comparing cases, and developing theory (Ganor, 2008; Marsden, 2014; Marsden & Schmid, 2011). However, to boost a typology’s theoretical utility, certain criteria must be met (Bailey, 1994; Collier, LaPorte, & Seawright, 2012; Doty & Glick, 1994; Elman, 2005; George & Bennett, 2005; McKinney, 1966). Ehud Sprinzak’s (1995) seminal typology of right-wing terrorism remains to date the only universal typology in the field, and is the most frequently cited publication on right-wing terrorism more generally. 2 Its strength lies in being based on an explicit theory of how right-wing activists become terrorists – the theory of split delegitimization. However, as this article argues, this theory builds on vague concepts, shaky assumptions about right-wing activists, and empirical inaccuracies concerning past terrorist attacks. Moreover, it remains unclear exactly how Sprinzak derived his types from his theory, and his typology includes types that are not mutually exclusive. In short, Sprinzak’s 2 According to search queries on “right-wing terrorism” on Google Scholar and Web of Science. 62 Jacob Aasland Ravndal: Thugs or Terrorists? A Typology of Right-Wing Terrorism and Violence in Western Europe 3 Summer/15 Nr. 3 ISSN: 2363-9849 typology does not satisfy established criteria for typology building. An alternative typology of right-wing terrorism is therefore needed. Combining quantitative and qualitative post-WWII data, this article proposes the first empirically derived typology of right-wing terrorism and violence in Western Europe. 3 Western Europe was chosen because this region arguably has the world’s most extensive history of right-wing terrorism – yet a categorization of such events does not exist. Furthermore, while most right-wing terrorists share some common characteristics, there are important regional dynamics that must be taken into consideration to fully understand why terrorism occurs at a given time and place. 4 Accordingly, relevant typologies have been developed for regions such as North America (Kaplan, 1995; Perliger, 2012) and Russia (Laryš & Mareš, 2011), but not for Western Europe. Finally, existing databases on West European terrorism (Engene, 2004, 2007) enables the construction of an empirically derived typology for this region. Unfortunately, similar data is unavailable for Europe as a whole. The article contributes in four ways: First, it provides a comparative analysis of key right-wing terrorists in Western Europe and their different paths towards terrorism. Notably, this analysis suggests that despite recent terrorist incidents, the threat from organized right-wing terrorism to West European citizens is likely significantly lower today than some 20 to 30 years ago. 5 At the same time, reliable and updated data on more loosely 3 Sarah V. Marsden (2014) makes a convincing case for the utility of empirically derived typologies in the study of terrorism and political violence. 4 For example, Wilhelm Heitmeyer (2003, pp. 399–436) argues in his extensive review of the literature on right-wing violence that there are substantial differences between the American, East European, and West European contexts. 5 This claim is supported by findings from a forthcoming study by this author documenting and analysing about 500 incidents of right-wing terrorism and violence across Western Europe between 1990 and 2015. 63 Jacob Aasland Ravndal: Thugs or Terrorists? A Typology of Right-Wing Terrorism and Violence in Western Europe 4 Summer/15 Nr. 3 ISSN: 2363-9849 organized forms of right-wing terrorism and violence is lacking, and more research is needed to document recent developments. 6 Second, the article introduces a practical method for reviewing and developing typologies, informed by relevant social science literature. The method applies not only to studying terrorism and political violence; indeed it can be used to develop and review typologies in any social science field. Third, by emphasizing differences in perpetrators’ strategy and organization, the proposed typology offers sharper distinctions – both between different types of perpetrators and between different forms of violence – than typologies based primarily on ideological differences. 7 Finally, the typology offers a new contribution to the relatively small literature on right-wing terrorism and violence in Western Europe. While the comparative literature on European radical right parties and movements has grown steadily, the comparative literature on right-wing terrorism and violence in Europe peaked during the 1990s, but then largely stagnated (key examples include Bjørgo, 1995, 1997; Bjørgo & Witte, 1993; Hoffman, 1982; Koopmans, 1996; Pedahzur, 2001). This article seeks to contribute to an ongoing and much needed revitalization of this field of study (see e.g. Backes & Moreau, 2012; Caiani, Porta, & Wagemann, 2012; Taylor, Holbrook, & Currie, 2013). The article starts by introducing five criteria that good typologies should satisfy. Next, these criteria are used to conduct a detailed review of Sprinzak’s typology. Finally, the criteria are applied to develop a new typology of right-wing terrorism and violence, specifically tailored to the case of Western Europe. 6 A commendable contribution is in this regard Daniel Köhler’s (2014a) recent study of German right-wing terrorism. 7 Strategy and organization are among seven variables proposed by Richard Schultz’ (1978) in his pioneering article on terrorism typologies. 64 Jacob Aasland Ravndal: Thugs or Terrorists? A Typology of Right-Wing Terrorism and Violence in Western Europe 5 Summer/15 Nr. 3 ISSN: 2363-9849 A Practical Method for Developing and Reviewing Typologies A typology’s scientific merit rests on the methods used to construct it and on its creator’s ability to communicate these methods to the reader. From a broad reading of relevant social science literature, five criteria that good typologies should satisfy emerge: 8 1. Clearly define the overarching concept of the typology 2. Specify whether the typology is descriptive or explanatory 3. Describe in detail how the types are (inductively and/or deductively) constructed 4. Propose an intuitive model or matrix of the typology 5. Consider a simpler solution with mutually exclusive types These five criteria can also be seen as sequential tasks. While task one, three and four are intuitive and straightforward, task two and five may require some further elaboration. Although typologies serve various functions, scholars seem to agree that two main categories of typologies exit: First, descriptive typologies characterize variants of a phenomenon. Routinely being used to organize data and compare cases, they offer a simplified yet systematic and analytically useful depiction of a phenomenon’s subtypes and the characteristics distinguishing them. Second, explanatory typologies, also known as typological theories help scholars test or develop theory. They “seek to identify the various causal mechanisms and pathways that link the independent variables of each ‘type’, or cell in a typology, with its outcome”(George & Bennett, 2005, p. 234). 8 My method of enquiry was the following: I identified frequently cited publications on typologies in quality social science journals over the past 20 years, in addition to authoritative books (Bailey, 1994; Collier, LaPorte, & Seawright, 2012; Doty & Glick, 1994; Elman, 2005; George & Bennett, 2005; McKinney, 1966). Next, I developed a list of criteria that good typologies should satisfy according to this literature. Finally, I eliminated criteria considered as too ambitious, such as the criterion of exhaustiveness, which requires knowledge about the entire empirical universe, and the criterion of having at least two dimensions or variables, which excludes one-dimensional typologies. 65 Jacob Aasland Ravndal: Thugs or Terrorists? A Typology of Right-Wing Terrorism and Violence in Western Europe 6 Summer/15 Nr. 3 ISSN: 2363-9849 A couple of examples may be helpful here: In Politics (ND), Aristotle introduced one of the first typologies of political systems (Table 1): TABLE 1 ARISTOTLE’S TYPOLOGY OF POLITICAL SYSTEMS Form Number of ruler(s) Normal Perverted One Monarchy Tyranny Few Aristocracy Oligarchy Many Polity Democracy Aristotle’s typology is descriptive because its constitutive variables do not follow from any explicit theory about how political systems emerge; they simply characterize different variants. Aristotle’s typology marked the beginning of a millennium-long research tradition on political systems, offering more sophisticated and theoretically informed typologies. A famous example is Arend Lijphart’s (1968) typology of democratic systems, developing the “polity” and “democracy” cells from Aristotle into an explanatory typology (Table 2): TABLE 2 LIJPHART’S TYPOLOGY OF DEMOCRATIC SYSTEMS Political culture Elite behaviour Homogenous Fragmented Coalescent Depoliticized democracy Consociational democracy Competitive Centripetal democracy Centrifugal democracy 66 Jacob Aasland Ravndal: Thugs or Terrorists? A Typology of Right-Wing Terrorism and Violence in Western Europe 7 Summer/15 Nr. 3 ISSN: 2363-9849 In practice, an explanatory typology is a theory presented in a matrix in which the logically possible value combinations of the independent variables determine the possible outcomes on the dependent variable. The idea is that schematically presenting a theory will spur theory development in two ways: first, by encouraging thinking about all possible combinations of independent variables, the outcomes they produce, and the mechanisms linking independent variables with outcomes; and second, by identifying theoretically interesting causal relationships that can be tested empirically through cross-case comparisons and within-case analysis (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 254). The fifth criterion – consider a simpler solution with mutually exclusive types – is inspired by the principle known as Ockham’s razor. This principle is to select the hypothesis with the fewest assumptions, and proceed to simpler theories as long as explanatory power is not compromised. The principle is clearly relevant for explanatory typologies aiming to develop theory. On this note, a key debate in the typology literature concerns how to reduce the number of cells, also known as “the property space” (Elman, 2005; George & Bennett, 2005, pp. 249–251). The property space is created by cross-tabulating all variables in a typology – a useful mapping exercise for exploring causal relationships, or, in the case of descriptive typologies, for identifying essential distinguishing characteristics. Cross-tabulated typologies also ensure mutually exclusive types as long as all cases can be meaningfully scored on the selected variables, that is, no case can assume more than one score or value on any of the relevant variables. The combined number of values on the descriptive/explanatory variables determines the size of the property space which grows exponentially and easily becomes unmanageable. Cells can thus be reduced by eliminating nonessential variables, by limiting the number of values on a variable, by merging similar variables, by merging or eliminating 67 Jacob Aasland Ravndal: Thugs or Terrorists? A Typology of Right-Wing Terrorism and Violence in Western Europe 8 Summer/15 Nr. 3 ISSN: 2363-9849 variables with identical scores, or by eliminating cells that are logically impossible. 9 The theoretical relevance of a variable should ultimately decide whether to keep it or eliminate it. Finally, some literature stresses that explanatory typologies are more relevant for theory development (Doty & Glick, 1994; George & Bennett, 2005). A general advice is therefore to choose, whenever possible, explanatory typologies over descriptive ones. However, scholars are rarely free to make this choice because explanatory typologies require pre-existing theory (Elman, 2005, p. 296). Proponents of explanatory typologies may thus have overstated these typologies’ theoretical relevance at the expense of descriptive typologies. Descriptive typologies can also be relevant for theory development, although they are not premised on pre-existing causal theory (Collier et al., 2012, pp. 227–228). They encourage empirical precision and deep thinking about how and why types differ, and thus ultimately about types’ underlying causes – the question explanatory typologies seek to answer (Elman, 2005, pp. 296–298). Descriptive typologies can therefore be seen as a logical and sometimes necessary prelude to explanatory typologies when relevant theory is lacking. Having completed this general but necessary section on typology building, I now turn to Sprinzak’s typology of right-wing terrorism to see how it complies with the criteria outlined above. First, however, it is necessary to summarize his theory. The Theory of Split Delegitimization Sprinzak’s theory of right-wing terrorism arises from his work on what he called “the process of delegitimization” (Sprinzak, 1991). The essence of this process is a slowly evolving crisis of legitimacy between an insurgent group and the government. Terrorism is 9 For a more detailed discussion on cell reduction, see Elman (2005, pp. 300–308). 68 Jacob Aasland Ravndal: Thugs or Terrorists? A Typology of Right-Wing Terrorism and Violence in Western Europe 9 Summer/15 Nr. 3 ISSN: 2363-9849 the peak of this process, which has three stages: (1) a crisis of confidence, (2) a conflict of legitimacy, and (3) a crisis of legitimacy. Sprinzak seeks to explain how members of political protest groups can transform into brutal and indiscriminate killers. He describes how an initial crisis of confidence between protesters and the government, through confrontations with the police, can escalate into a conflict wherein protesters question the regime’s very legitimacy. At this point, the “psychodynamics” of small and isolated protest groups, including a “dehumanization of anyone associated with the regime,” leads to a state of crisis wherein protesters can “disengage morally and commit atrocities without remorse”(Sprinzak, 1995, pp. 18–20). Sprinzak uses this delegitimization process as a baseline for developing a theory of right-wing terrorism. To differentiate right-wing terrorists from other terrorists, Sprinzak distinguishes between “universalistic” terrorist organizations in direct conflict with the ruling government, and “particularistic” (right-wing) terrorist organizations fighting “private wars” against non-ruling groups (Sprinzak, 1995, p. 17). A “split” occurs when at some point violence is also directed towards the government. This split ensues when a rightist group feels that the government is not protecting them from a perceived threat. In this case, Sprinzak envisages “an intense delegitimization vis-à-vis the unaccepted non-ruling target group and a diluted delegitimization towards the regime” (Sprinzak, 1995, p. 20). Hence, “the issue at stake is one of split delegitimization, namely, a case where an uneven radicalization of a group of extremists develops against two separate units” (Sprinzak, 1995, p. 20, italics in original). Reviewing Sprinzak’s Typology Having introduced this theory, Sprinzak presents six right-wing terrorist types (revolutionary, reactive, vigilante, racist, millenarian, and youth counterculture) “based on 69 Jacob Aasland Ravndal: Thugs or Terrorists? A Typology of Right-Wing Terrorism and Violence in Western Europe 10 Summer/15 Nr. 3 ISSN: 2363-9849 the identification of the dominant principle around which a rightist group is organized and on its relation to the dynamics of split delegitimization” (Sprinzak, 1995, p. 23, italics in original). In the following section, I discuss how this typology corresponds to the five criteria introduced above. 1. Define the Overarching Concept Sprinzak offers characteristics of right-wing terrorist groups, but no explicit definition. He claims the split delegitimization theory identifies “the distinctive features of right-wing terrorism” (Sprinzak, 1995, p. 17). The split delegitimization theory emphasizes target selection as the distinctive feature of right-wing terrorists claiming that they target non-ruling groups before the government. However, this claim is incorrect for a number of important cases. Some of Western Europe’s best known right-wing terrorist groups, such as l’Organisation de l’Armée Sécrete and Nuclei Armati Rivolutzionario directed their terrorist campaigns against the government either directly or indirectly (by attacking civilians). In particular, they did not consider immigrants or other minorities as their primary targets. A more recent example is Anders Behring Breivik, who bombed the Norwegian government quarters (eight persons killed) before murdering 69 members of the then-governing Norwegian Labour Party’s youth wing. The type of target may indicate who is behind a terrorist attack, but it can be a deceptive indicator. For example, Italian neo-Fascists conducted several attacks disguised as left-wing terrorism (Ferraresi, 1996). Similarly, the 1980 bomb attack on the Jewish synagogue on Rue Copernic in Paris, in the midst of a series of right-wing terrorist attacks in France, was the work of Middle Eastern terrorists (Hoffman, 1982; Shapiro & Suzan, 2003). Yet several analysts, including Sprinzak, continued portraying it as right-wing terrorism (Sprinzak, 1995, p. 25). 70 Jacob Aasland Ravndal: Thugs or Terrorists? A Typology of Right-Wing Terrorism and Violence in Western Europe 11 Summer/15 Nr. 3 ISSN: 2363-9849 A second distinctive feature identified by Sprinzak is how right-wing terrorists come to choose violence as a means for political struggle. According to Sprinzak, violence and terrorism emerge only gradually when the group involved feels increasingly insecure or threatened (Sprinzak, 1995, p. 21). This radicalization pattern may well apply, but is not limited to right-wing terrorist groups. Many other terrorist attacks result from growing anxiety towards perceived threats, normally from a superior enemy. 10 Violent responses to perceived threats are hardly unique to right-wing terrorists, and therefore not a useful distinguishing feature. Finally, a third feature identified by Sprinzak concerns how right-wing terrorists feel about using violence. According to Sprinzak, right-wing terrorists “do not feel remorse about their violence and the atrocities they cause,” and there is “no need to undergo a profound psycho-political transformation to become brutal killers” (Sprinzak, 1995, p. 22). However, no evidence is offered to support this claim; hence, the characteristic appears rather speculative. 2. Specify Whether the Typology is Descriptive or Explanatory Is Sprinzak’s typology descriptive or explanatory? According to Sprinzak, the purpose is to organize data and compare cases, indicating a descriptive typology (Sprinzak, 1995, pp. 18, 22). At the same time, the typology is indeed based on an explicit theory of why and under what conditions right-wing groups resort to terrorism, indicating an explanatory typology. The problem is that the theory does not specify its explanatory variables. One possible interpretation, however, is that it has two explanatory variables: (1) perceived threats from non-ruling groups, and (2) government protection from perceived 10 The asymmetric relationship between terrorists and their enemies is highlighted by several terrorism scholars as one of several key traits of terrorism. For more details, see Schmid (2011). 71 Jacob Aasland Ravndal: Thugs or Terrorists? A Typology of Right-Wing Terrorism and Violence in Western Europe 12 Summer/15 Nr. 3 ISSN: 2363-9849 threats. If this interpretation is correct, the theory predicts that right-wing groups who feel sufficiently threatened will resort to terrorism, first against non-ruling groups, then against the government if protection is lacking. If we dichotomize these explanatory variables, the theory can be presented in a 2x2 matrix as an explanatory typology (Table 3). TABLE 3 EXPLANATORY TYPOLOGY BASED ON THE SPLIT DELEGITIMIZATION THEORY Perceived threats from non-ruling groups Government protection Yes No Yes Single-targeting terrorism No terrorism No Double-targeting terrorism (split) No terrorism This typology contains only two logical types, single- and double-targeting terrorism. How, then, did Sprinzak end up with six types? It appears that the dynamics of split delegitimization played only a secondary role in constructing the typology, while the main constitutive variable was “the dominant principle around which the rightist group is organized” (Sprinzak, 1995, p. 23 italics in original). Thus, the typology is not explanatory because this variable is not based on a theory. Rather, it is a descriptive variable identifying principles of group organization. 72 Jacob Aasland Ravndal: Thugs or Terrorists? A Typology of Right-Wing Terrorism and Violence in Western Europe 13 Summer/15 Nr. 3 ISSN: 2363-9849 3. Describe How the Types Are Constructed Sprinzak does not elaborate on how this dominant organizing principle has been identified and operationalized. Instead, he systematically discusses the presence or absence of the dynamics of split delegitimization for each type. This discussion reveals that these dynamics are only partially present in most types and completely absent in others (Sprinzak, 1995, pp. 35–37). While Sprinzak could present these findings as an example of theory falsification, he does not acknowledge the apparent lack of consistency between his theory and his typology. Thus, the theory is not rejected, despite the conflicting anecdotal evidence introduced by the author himself. 4. Propose a Model or Matrix Sprinzak offers no model or matrix of his typology. Note, however, that Table 3 illustrates one way of presenting the split delegitimization theory in a 2x2 matrix. 5. Consider a Simpler Solution with Mutually Exclusive Types Sprinzak has offered the only universal typology of right-wing terrorism to date. This is praiseworthy; however, the typology’s broad scope can also be seen as a weakness. By covering the entire world, Sprinzak is forced to include very different actors under the same label. He also lacks systematic data for such a large empirical universe. The typology therefore appears to have been built using anecdotal evidence rather than by systematically employing theoretical or empirical variables. Furthermore, Sprinzak’s types are not mutually exclusive. Although Sprinzak recognizes the problem, he does not try to solve it (Sprinzak, 1995, p. 22). A major weakness of his typology is therefore that several cases can be attributed to more than one type. 73 Jacob Aasland Ravndal: Thugs or Terrorists? A Typology of Right-Wing Terrorism and Violence in Western Europe 14 Summer/15 Nr. 3 ISSN: 2363-9849 Finally, it remains unclear exactly how the typology was created. Rather than extending and patching Sprinzak’s typology, I therefore propose to develop a new typology of right-wing terrorism. A Typology of Right-Wing Terrorism and Violence in Western Europe I now apply the five criteria introduced earlier to develop a new typology of right- wing terrorism in Western Europe. Note that the emphasis on Western Europe is not intended to challenge the notion of a strong transatlantic relationship between the radical right in Europe and that in North America – a relationship that is well documented by the existing literature (Jackson & Shekhovtsov, 2014; Kaplan & Bjørgo, 1998; Kaplan & Weinberg, 1998). Western Europe was chosen because the region lacks an adequate categorization of key actors and key events. 1. Define the Overarching Concept The literature on right-wing extremism is a logical starting point for conceptualizing right-wing terrorism. However, the literature offers no unified definition of right-wing extremism. The problem arises from the existence of two distinct approaches to studying political extremism. The first approach relates extremism to political opinion: If your political opinions diverge dramatically from the majority opinion, you are an extremist. 11 The second approach relates extremism to the means activists use in pursuing their political goals: If you support illegal violence, you are an extremist, regardless of your specific political opinions. 12 While these descriptions admittedly exaggerate each approach, they 11 For an overview of 26 opinion-based definitions of right-wing extremism, see Mudde (1995). 12 For a more detailed discussion, see Heitmeyer (2003, p. 203). 74 Jacob Aasland Ravndal: Thugs or Terrorists? A Typology of Right-Wing Terrorism and Violence in Western Europe 15 Summer/15 Nr. 3 ISSN: 2363-9849 serve to illustrate why existing scholarship on right-wing extremism remains ambiguous concerning precisely what and who the objects of study are. For the purpose of this article, right-wing extremism is understood as the support of using illegal violence to promote right-wing policies. What are right-wing policies? The left/right dichotomy originated during the French Revolution. 13 Since then, it has been given many new meanings. At its core, however, remains a fundamental divide between those on the left who support policies designed to reduce social inequality, and those on the right who regard social inequality as inevitable, natural, or desirable (Bobbio & Cameron, 1996). Right-wing extremists thus accept use of illegal violence to promote social inequality. The exact nature of such policies and the criteria used to make corresponding social hierarchies, or rules of segregation, are subject to change across time and space. The majority of right-wing extremists are not physically involved in violence. Posting extremist messages online (i.e. encouraging violence) involves less risk than participating in violent street activism or even terrorism. Two additional distinctions are therefore helpful: between extremists and militants, and between militants and terrorists. A militant physically demonstrates a willingness to use violence to pursue political goals. 14 A terrorist uses or threatens violence strategically to affect and audience beyond the immediate target (Hoffman, 2006, p. 40). I shall not delve further into the terrorism definition debate. Although terrorism remains a contested concept, terrorism scholars broadly agree about its main features (Schmid, 2011). Right-wing terrorists are therefore defined as non-state actors who strategically use or threaten violence to affect an audience beyond the immediate target to promote social inequality. 13 The French king’s supporters sat to the right of the National Assembly’s president and the revolution’s supporters sat to his left. 14 The Oxford English Dictionary defines militancy as “favouring confrontational or violent methods in support of a political or social cause.” 75 Jacob Aasland Ravndal: Thugs or Terrorists? A Typology of Right-Wing Terrorism and Violence in Western Europe 16 Summer/15 Nr. 3 ISSN: 2363-9849 2. Specify Whether the Typology is Descriptive or Explanatory Because specific theories of right-wing terrorism are in short supply, notwithstanding Sprinzak’s split delegitimization theory, a descriptive typology is proposed. 15 The typology aims to describe and categorize the most salient right-wing terrorist actors and violent perpetrators in Western Europe after WWII. Furthermore, by identifying and highlighting essential differences between key actors, the typology is also intended to generate thinking about the different socio-political conditions from which these actors emerged. As such, the typology may contribute to future theory development and perhaps also to future explanatory typologies. 3. Describe How the Types Are Constructed I begin by examining available records of right-wing terrorist attacks in Western Europe post–WWII. The latest edition of Routledge’s Handbook of Terrorism Research reviews the world’s top 20 terrorism databases (Bowie & Schmid, 2011). Only four databases allow isolating right-wing attacks in Western Europe from other attacks. Two recently became unavailable (WITS and MIPT), thereby leaving us with The Terrorism in Western Europe: Events Data (TWEED) and Europol’s annual EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-SAT). 16 15 This lack of theories is emphasized by Wilhelm Heitmeyer (2003, 2005) in his two reviews of the literature on right- wing terrorism and violence respectively. Note, however, that the social movement literature has recently produced several fruitful studies of right-wing militancy and terrorism in Western Europe (key examples include Albanese & Froio, 2014; Caiani, Porta, & Wagemann, 2012; Della Porta, 2013). 16 The TWEED dataset is available at http://folk.uib.no/sspje/tweed.htm. TE-SAT is available at https://www.europol.europa.eu/latest_publications/37. A third relevant source not included in this review is the Domestic Terrorist Victims (DTV) dataset available at www.march.es/dtv. Matching DTV data against TWEED data shows that the main patterns of right-wing terrorism largely overlap. 76 Jacob Aasland Ravndal: Thugs or Terrorists? A Typology of Right-Wing Terrorism and Violence in Western Europe 17 Summer/15 Nr. 3 ISSN: 2363-9849 Coincidentally, the periods covered by these two databases link up. TWEED covers 1950–2004, while TE-SAT covers 2004–2013, although systematically only from 2006 onwards. Combined data from these two databases thus indicate general trends of right- wing terrorism 1950–2013, despite different registration methods. 17 TWEED registered 648 right-wing terrorist attacks 1950–2004 (approximately 6% of a total of 10,239 attacks). TE-SAT registered nine right-wing terrorist attacks 2006–2013, but only two in Western Europe. The remaining quantitative analysis is therefore based on TWEED data only. 18 TWEED displays three waves of attacks: France in the early 1960s, Italy in the 1970s, and Germany in the early 1990s. France, Italy, and Germany also dominate the aggregate country share of casualties. Figure 1 and Table 4 illustrate attack frequencies and casualties. What do these patterns tell us? 17 TE-SAT is based on annual reporting from EU member states. TWEED is entirely based on Keesing’s Record of World Events, available at http://library.princeton.edu/resource/3894. 18 For a more detailed discussion about the validity and reliability of TWEED data, see Engene (2004, pp. 50–58). 77 Jacob Aasland Ravndal: Thugs or Terrorists? A Typology of Right-Wing Terrorism and Violence in Western Europe 18 Summer/15 Nr. 3 ISSN: 2363-9849 FIGURE 1 NUMBER OF RIGHT-WING TERRORIST ATTACKS IN WESTERN EUROPE 1950–2004 Source: TWEED: http://folk.uib.no/sspje/tweed.htm. 78 Jacob Aasland Ravndal: Thugs or Terrorists? A Typology of Right-Wing Terrorism and Violence in Western Europe 19 Summer/15 Nr. 3 ISSN: 2363-9849 TABLE 4 CASUALTIES OF RIGHT-WING TERRORISM IN WESTERN EUROPE 1950–2004 Country Killed (Wounded) Attacks Intensity Italy 162 (772) 89 10,5 France 89 (303) 262 1,5 (West) Germany 51 (267) 133 2,4 Spain 15 (56) 36 2,0 Belgium 7 (3) 12 0,8 Portugal 5 (4) 11 0,8 Austria 4 (4) 14 0,6 Switzerland 3 (5) 9 0,9 United Kingdom 2 (115) 10 11,7 Greece 1 (81) 65 1,3 Norway 1 (0) 2 0,5 Sweden 0 (4) 3 1,3 Denmark 0 (0) 1 0,0 Netherlands 0 (0) 1 0,0 Finland - - - Iceland - - - Luxemburg - - - Ireland - - - Sum 340 (1614) 648 Note: Intensity is the sum of killed and wounded divided by number of attacks. Source: TWEED: http://folk.uib.no/sspje/tweed.htm 79 Jacob Aasland Ravndal: Thugs or Terrorists? A Typology of Right-Wing Terrorism and Violence in Western Europe 20 Summer/15 Nr. 3 ISSN: 2363-9849 Individual data for France, Italy, and Germany reveal a striking picture: only four terrorist groups were behind as much as 39% of the 648 right-wing attacks registered in TWEED, and 56% of all killings: l’Organisation de l’Armeé Secrete (OAS) in France, Ordine Nero (ON) and Nuclei Armati Rivoluzionari (NAR) in Italy, and Wehrsportgruppe Hoffmann (WSH) in Germany. While only four groups conducted a significant share of the attacks, a much larger number of mostly unknown groups conducted the rest. Excluding one outlier, 65% of these attacks have unknown perpetrators. 19 Nearly half of these 65% happened in Germany 1991–1992, while the remaining half is distributed evenly across time and space, except for two smaller peaks in Italy in the 1970s. As many as 42 known groups were behind the remaining 35% of the attacks – also distributed evenly across time and space. Of those 42 groups, only four conducted more than five attacks, and no one group conducted more than ten attacks. The majority of the known groups conducted only one or two attacks. These numbers suggest that right-wing terrorists in Western Europe can be divided into two categories or types: one consisting of a handful of known groups responsible for a substantial number of attacks and killings, and one consisting of 42 known and even more unknown groups involved in only a few attacks, typically one or two. These initial patterns form the basis of the typology proposed below. Next, by investigating specific cases from each category, additional type characteristics emerge. Such case studies may help identify new variables that can be used to compare and contrast the corresponding types. In addition, new types may appear that do not fit the original categories. For example, lone actors represent a potential third category or 19 On 17 December 1978, the Greek group Organismus Etnikis Anorthosoos claimed responsibility for 40 attacks (zero killed or wounded). The group never reappeared. 80 Jacob Aasland Ravndal: Thugs or Terrorists? A Typology of Right-Wing Terrorism and Violence in Western Europe 21 Summer/15 Nr. 3 ISSN: 2363-9849 type. Thus, based on a broad investigation of relevant cases, the following three tentative types are proposed and described below: elite-sponsored groups, subcultural networks, and lone actors. Elite-sponsored groups. Elite-sponsored terrorists operated predominantly in France, Italy, Spain, and Germany between the 1960s and the 1980s. These groups had up to several hundred militants and were organized hierarchically with a centralized leadership. Their terrorist campaigns were motivated by international conflicts rather than by immigration, which had yet to become a contested issue in Western Europe. More specifically, their campaigns were products of elite-sponsored strategies meant to protect or reinstall former authoritarian regimes, and to obstruct their leftist enemies from gaining political power. The OAS, ON, NAR, and WSH are among the most important cases. OAS is behind the largest number of right-wing terrorist attacks in history. TWEED covers attacks in France, but not in Algeria, where OAS was most active. From 1961–1962, OAS conducted 221 attacks in France, killing 63 persons and wounding 191. Former high- ranking French officers and a handful of civilians created OAS in February 1960. They wanted to protect the large, white, and privileged pied noir community then living in Algeria. Their strategic aims were therefore to prevent France from granting Algeria independence, and to defeat the socialist revolutionaries from the Algerian Front de Libération Nationale. OAS soon developed into an advanced terrorist organization, benefiting from its founding officers’ military experience. At its peak, OAS counted about 1,000 militants, divided into sectors, branches, and Delta commando units of 7–12 members 81 Jacob Aasland Ravndal: Thugs or Terrorists? A Typology of Right-Wing Terrorism and Violence in Western Europe 22 Summer/15 Nr. 3 ISSN: 2363-9849 (Harrison, 1989). These units conducted terrorist campaigns on two continents simultaneously including several assassination attempts on President Charles de Gaulle. 20 The Black Orchestra refers to a shadowy Italian network assumed to be behind one of history’s most extensive right-wing terrorist campaigns (Laurent & Sutton, 1978). Waves of left- and right-wing violence hit Italy between the late 1960s and the early 1980s. Among a multitude of militant factions, four right-wing groups stand out as key protagonists of this violent drama: Ordine Nuevo, Avanguardia Nazionale, Ordine Nero, and Nuclei Armati Rivoluzionari. These groups are assumed to be behind some of Italy’s most devastating terrorist attacks, including the following bombings: Piazza Fontana in Rome (1969), Peteano (1972), the Italicus train (1974), Piazza della Loggia in Brescia (1974), and the Bologna train station (1980). These attacks were part of an elite-driven strategy known as “the strategy of tension” (Cento Bull, 2007). The strategic aim, understandable only in a Cold War context, was preventing Communism’s influence in Italy and beyond. Those implementing it, mainly members of Italy’s secret service and police, used right-wing militants to conduct terrorist attacks masked as left-wing terrorism to weaken popular support for Italy’s Communist Party (Ferraresi, 1996). Two of the deadliest attacks in the history of right-wing terrorism happened in 1980: the Bologna train station attack (85 killed and over 200 wounded), and the Munich Oktoberfest bombing (thirteen killed and 213 wounded). The latter has by several accounts (including TWEED) been attributed to the German militia Wehsportgruppe Hoffmann (WSH), although this group was never convicted. Recent evidence, however, strengthens the alleged connection between WSH and the Oktoberfest attack (Paterson, 2015). WSH’s strategic aim was overthrowing West Germany’s socialist government and installing a new 20 Alexander Harrison (1989) has written the most authoritative account of the OAS. Other relevant accounts include Bocca (1968), Buchard (1963), and Henissart (1971). 82 Jacob Aasland Ravndal: Thugs or Terrorists? A Typology of Right-Wing Terrorism and Violence in Western Europe 23 Summer/15 Nr. 3 ISSN: 2363-9849 authoritarian regime (Fromm, 1998). They drew inspiration from the paramilitary assault division of the German Nazi Party –Sturmabteilung (SA) – that was influential in Hitler’s rise to power. WSH had at least six divisions across Germany, totalling about 400 members (Fromm, 1998). These divisions had access to substantial military resources and the group emulated a professional military organization with uniforms, ranks, and insignia. WSH members were also involved in international terrorism, reportedly collaborating with the Lebanese Phalange and with the PLO (Hoffman, 1982; Schmidt, 1993). Subcultural networks. While elite-sponsored groups diminished in the 1980s, right- wing subcultural networks flourished in the 1980s and 1990s (Bjørgo, 1997; Bjørgo & Witte, 1993; Merkl & Weinberg, 1997). One contributing factor to this new wave of right- wing activism was the large influx of non-western immigrants that Western Europe experienced during the late 1980s and 1990s, in combination with an emerging and increasingly violent skinhead subculture. 21 In contrast to elite-sponsored groups, subcultural networks have little support beyond their own underground movement. They may express general antipathy towards immigrants, political enemies, and the government through symbols and propaganda, but rarely present concrete political demands. Sometimes, an attack’s primary aim may simply be to gain respect and influence within a group or social network. Subcultural networks are largely nationally oriented and only rarely involved in international terrorism. While concerned about immigration, they are also motivated by their endless street war with leftist militants. 22 21 Perhaps the best account of the emergence of the European skinhead subculture is found in the introduction of John Hamm’s (1993) pioneering study of American skinheads. 22 For insider accounts, see for example Collins (2012), Salas (2003), and Schmidt (1993). 83 Jacob Aasland Ravndal: Thugs or Terrorists? A Typology of Right-Wing Terrorism and Violence in Western Europe 24 Summer/15 Nr. 3 ISSN: 2363-9849 Existing literature suggest that violence by subcultural networks has been distributed over at least two generations: The first generation was behind a wave of attacks (primarily targeting immigrants) in the late 1980s and early 1990s (Koopmans, 1996). Most attacks were conducted by unorganized racist youth mobs, skinhead gangs, and hooligans with limited ideological motivation, and no overarching strategy (Bjørgo & Witte, 1993). The second generation emerged in the mid-1990s and consisted of smaller autonomous groups that were better organized and more ideologically motivated. These groups typically had no leadership beyond their own cell structure, but were connected through a loosely organized network of similar groups, sometimes referred to as a groupuscular network (Griffin, 2003; Jackson, 2014; Virchow, 2004). Compared to the first generation, they conducted fewer but more targeted attacks, not only against immigrants, but also against left-wing and government targets. 23 Many such groups were inspired by the strategic principle of leaderless resistance, introduced by the American white supremacist Louis Beam (1992). Their strategic aim was to incite a revolutionary war between races. Lone actors. Finally, lone-actor terrorism consists of attacks or plots that nobody except the individual perpetrator is aware of. While lone actors carry out their operational planning in isolation, they are generally seen as strongly influenced by existing political movements, typically through online activities (Kaplan, Lööw, & Malkki, 2014). Recent research also suggests that while most terrorists are normal, psychologically speaking, a significant share of lone actors suffer from mental disorders (Corner & Gill, 2014). One study, which analysed 198 lone actor attacks, found that right-wing actors constituted the second largest category (17%), next to attacks in which the perpetrator’s ideological conviction remains unknown (Spaaij, 2012). A similar study of 119 lone actors 23 One example would be the UK-based group Combat 18. See Lowles (2001) and Ryan (2011). 84 Jacob Aasland Ravndal: Thugs or Terrorists? A Typology of Right-Wing Terrorism and Violence in Western Europe 25 Summer/15 Nr. 3 ISSN: 2363-9849 found that 34% were right-wingers (Gill, Horgan, & Deckert, 2014). In short, lone actor terrorism is not exclusively a right-wing phenomenon, but right-wing motivations are overrepresented compared to other political ideologies. 4. Propose a Model or Matrix Having described some key characteristics of and differences between these three tentative types, we may now illustrate them using a model or a matrix. Table 5 offers an initial overview of eight descriptive variables (all of which were used in the above discussion to compare and contrast the three tentative types). TABLE 5 TENTATIVE TYPOLOGY OF RIGHT-WING TERRORISM IN WESTERN EUROPE Types Variables Elite-sponsored groups Subcultural networks Lone actors Organizational structure Hierarchy Network N/A Leadership Centralized Decentralized N/A Group membership Large (>100) Small (<50) N/A Known political strategy Always Sometimes Sometimes Affiliation to former right-wing regime Yes No No Sponsorship Elites Subculture None Significant access to military resources Yes No No International terrorism Yes No No 85 Jacob Aasland Ravndal: Thugs or Terrorists? A Typology of Right-Wing Terrorism and Violence in Western Europe 26 Summer/15 Nr. 3 ISSN: 2363-9849 Not yet cross-tabulated, these variables are meant to help illustrate key differences between three ideal types as an intermediary step towards a more rigorous categorization. This means that deviations may and will occur. For example, most terrorist attacks from subcultural groups and lone actors occur within a national context. However, there are exceptions to this rule, such as when a Danish affiliate of the UK-based group Combat 18 in 1997 attempted to send letter-bombs from Sweden to UK addresses, or, when the Austrian- based lone actor Franz Fuchs targeted people in Germany, also with letter bombs. 5. Consider a Simpler Solution with Mutually Exclusive Types As already explained, cross-tabulating variables ensures mutually exclusive types and encourages simple solutions because the number of variables and/or values must be limited to achieve a manageable property space. If all eight variables in Table 5 were to be cross-tabulated, we would end up with 2 8 =256 cells (assuming only dichotomous cells) and 253 potentially new types in addition to the initial three. Clearly, cell reduction is needed to create a simpler typology. One technique for reducing cells is merging similar variables. The variables “organizational structure,” “leadership,” and “group membership” can for example be merged into the variable “organization” with three values: “strong,” “loose,” and “absent.” Another cell reduction technique is to merge or eliminate variables with identical scores on several types. Most of the dichotomous variables in Table 5 can be eliminated because they score identically on subcultural networks and lone actors and are therefore not helpful for distinguishing between them. The theoretically most relevant variables should be kept. Terrorism is always part of a political strategy, which, in turn, helps explain why an actor engages in violence. If a 86 Jacob Aasland Ravndal: Thugs or Terrorists? A Typology of Right-Wing Terrorism and Violence in Western Europe 27 Summer/15 Nr. 3 ISSN: 2363-9849 strategic aim is lacking, or is not political, we are likely not dealing with terrorists. As shown by the preceding discussion, violent attacks from subcultural networks and lone actors are not always motivated by specific political strategies. It may therefore be useful to apply a dichotomous “strategy” variable to distinguish thugs from terrorists, although the former may also have a terrorizing effect on their victims. Cross-tabulating these two variables (organization and strategy) results in a 3x2 matrix (Table 6). We may then consider whether all types are logically possible, whether they can be populated with relevant cases, and try to find an appropriate label for each type. TABLE 6 TYPOLOGY FRAMEWORK Political strategy Organization Yes No Strong A D Loose B E Absent C F Elite-sponsored groups (cell A), such as the OAS and NAR, are strongly organised groups, aiming to conserve or reinstall authoritarian regimes and to undermine their leftist enemies. These groups gradually disappeared from Western Europe as the Cold War came to an end and the legacies of former authoritarian regimes evaporated. Note, however, that large hierarchic militant groups have been active in Western Europe also after the end of the Cold War. Examples include the German Skinheads Sächsische Schweiz – a group consisting of up to 140 members that was banned in 2001, or, the still active Swedish group Svenska Motståndsrörelsen with well beyond 100 active members in several divisions in Sweden, Finland and Norway. However, these and similar groups have never been accused 87 Jacob Aasland Ravndal: Thugs or Terrorists? A Typology of Right-Wing Terrorism and Violence in Western Europe 28 Summer/15 Nr. 3 ISSN: 2363-9849 of being involved in large-scale terrorist campaigns. One reason may be that they lack significant elite support – a decisive factor for facilitating and justifying the terrorist campaigns of their predecessors. Indeed, these groups have more in common with more loosely organized subcultural networks. As described earlier, violence by subcultural networks has been distributed over at least two waves of attacks. The first was attributed to racist mobs, gangs, and hooligans (cell E) with limited ideological motivation and no overarching strategy. Although terrorizing their victims, such attacks do not necessarily qualify as terrorism because their strategic aim is unclear. The second wave consisted of more targeted attacks intended to incite revolutionary war. The perpetrators organized in small autonomous groups or cells (cell B) inspired by the strategic principle of leaderless resistance. The German NSU-cell provides an example (Köhler, 2014b). Some lone actors, such as Anders Behring Breivik and David Copeland, expressed their strategic aims clearly through political manifestos or in court. Both were lone actors (cell C), Copeland aiming to incite a war between races, Breivik aiming to incite a war between cultures. Other violent loners (cell F) fail to express their aims clearly, either because they act spontaneously or because they have no clear strategy. Labelling such perpetrators as terrorists would be misleading. Finally, some groups appear equally or more interested in making money than in politics. For example, in 2005, 18 members of a Spanish neo-Nazi network were arrested for storing and selling weapons, including dozens of shotguns and a grenade launcher, and for advocating violence through their website (El Temps, 2008). Yet their activities apparently did not involve the planning of terrorist attacks. In 2009, UK police rounded up a global arms ring supplying white supremacists worldwide with firearms and explosives (Bounds & Boxell, 2009). These were right-wing crime syndicates (cell D), but not terrorists. 88 Jacob Aasland Ravndal: Thugs or Terrorists? A Typology of Right-Wing Terrorism and Violence in Western Europe 29 Summer/15 Nr. 3 ISSN: 2363-9849 Such criminal groups may however act as supporters of more politically oriented clandestine groups. For example, the Austrian group “Object 21” which controlled large parts of the red light scene at the German-Austrian border, used money and explosives acquired though criminal activity to support other and more politically oriented groups in Germany and Austria (The Vienna Review, 2013). Summing up the discussion in the last few paragraphs, Table 7 presents a simplified (fewer variables) yet more nuanced (more types) version of the typology introduced in Table 5. The typology includes an additional dimension categorizing perpetrators into two overarching types of violence: terrorism and criminal violence. This dimension is included to illustrate the inherent ambiguity of right-wing terrorism as a concept, and its close relation to other forms of violence, such as hate crimes (see Deloughery, King, & Asal, 2012). TABLE 7 TYPOLOGY OF RIGHT-WING TERRORISM AND VIOLENCE IN WESTERN EUROPE Political strategy Organization Yes No Strong Elite-sponsored groups Crime syndicates Loose Autonomous groups/cells Mobs/gangs/ hooligans Absent Lone actors Violent loners Type of violence Terrorism Criminal violence 89 Jacob Aasland Ravndal: Thugs or Terrorists? A Typology of Right-Wing Terrorism and Violence in Western Europe 30 Summer/15 Nr. 3 ISSN: 2363-9849 Conclusion The aim of this article has been to systematically categorize Western Europe’s most important right-wing terrorists and violent perpetrators after WWII. As such, the proposed typology should only be seen as an initial step towards more explanatory oriented studies of past and present actors. Its strengths lie in its simplicity and in the fact that its types are derived from a combination of empirical patterns (TWEED attack frequencies), case studies, and the typological criteria introduced earlier. While the proposed typology offers only limited insight into the causal mechanisms underlying its proposed types, certain aspects could be interesting to pursue further in future studies. For example, the interplay between international conflicts, regime types, and elite behaviour could be key for understanding the rise and fall of large-scale right-wing terrorist campaigns. Consequently, given Western Europe’s current political situation, the threat from strongly organized right-wing groups appears to be significantly lower today than some 20 to 30 years ago. The reason is that the majority of attacks and killings were conducted by a type of elite-sponsored groups that are less likely to operate in contemporary Western Europe. As long as the legacies of former authoritarian regimes continue to evaporate, and democracies consolidate, Western Europe provides less fertile ground for such large and well-organised terrorist groups. At the same time, we lack reliable and updated data on more loosely organized forms of right-wing terrorism and violence. This type of violence tends to fall beneath the government radar, and is often reported as hate crime rather than terrorism. The low number of right-wing incidents reported by Europol’s annual terrorism report is an indicator of this problem. There is therefore a critical need for more empirical research to document recent developments. A commendable contribution in this regard is Daniel Köhler’s (2014a) recent study of German right-wing terrorism. 90 Jacob Aasland Ravndal: Thugs or Terrorists? A Typology of Right-Wing Terrorism and Violence in Western Europe 31 Summer/15 Nr. 3 ISSN: 2363-9849 In terms of future theory development, the proposed typology also suggests that right-wing terrorism should not be treated as a monolithic phenomenon, and that different actor types must be studied independently. A logical next step would therefore be to develop more actor-specific theories, possibly by use of explanatory typologies. Such actor- specific theories may in fact prove more universally valid than any universal theory or typology of right-wing terrorism. For example, rightist lone actors may not be so different from leftist or jihadist lone actors. Some of the proposed types may thus apply also outside the right-wing extremist domain. The proposed typology could therefore potentially prove useful for analysing other forms of terrorism and political violence, considering the universal nature of its constitutive variables, strategy and organization. Although the proposed typology is descriptive rather than explanatory, it can be used as a springboard for further explanatory analysis. Rather than contrasting descriptive and explanatory typologies, we should ask how they relate, and how we can move from description towards explanation when relevant theory is lacking. This question has so far not been adequately addressed by the social science scholarship on typologies. A more nuanced understanding would certainly boost the theoretical utility of many typologies, including the one proposed in this article. 91 Jacob Aasland Ravndal: Thugs or Terrorists? A Typology of Right-Wing Terrorism and Violence in Western Europe 32 Summer/15 Nr. 3 ISSN: 2363-9849 References Albanese, M., & Froio, C. (2014). Discourse and Practice of Violence in the Italian Extreme Right: Frames, Symbols, and Identity-Building in CasaPound Italia. International Journal of Conflict and Violence, 8, 1. Aristotle. (ND). Book 4, chapter 4-5. In Politics. 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Hate: my life in the British far right. London: Biteback. Corner, E., & Gill, P. (2014). A False Dichotomy? Mental Illness and Lone-Actor Terrorism. Law and Human Behavior, Advance online publication. Della Porta, D. (2013). Clandestine Political Violence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Deloughery, K., King, R. D., & Asal, V. (2012). Close Cousins or Distant Relatives? The Relationship Between Terrorism and Hate Crime. Crime & Delinquency, 58(5) Doty, H. D., & Glick, W. H. (1994). Typologies as a unique form of theory building: Toward improved understanding and modeling. Academy of Management Review, 19(2), 230–251. Elman, C. (2005). Explanatory Typologies in Qualitative Studies of International Politics. International Organization, 59(02), 293–326. El Temps. (2008, May 20). “Operació Panzer”: armas del exèrcit espanyol a mans de l’extrema dreta. El Temps, 19–29. Engene, J. O. (2004). Terrorism in Western Europe: explaining the trends since 1950. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 93 Jacob Aasland Ravndal: Thugs or Terrorists? A Typology of Right-Wing Terrorism and Violence in Western Europe 34 Summer/15 Nr. 3 ISSN: 2363-9849 Engene, J. O. (2007). Five Decades of Terrorism in Europe: The TWEED Dataset. Journal of Peace Research, 44(1), 109–121. Ferraresi, F. (1996). Threats to Democracy. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Fromm, R. (1998). Die “Wehrsportgruppe Hoffmann”: Darstellung, Analyse und Einordnung : ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des deutschen und europäischen Rechtsextremismus. Berlin: Peter Lang. Ganor, B. (2008). Terrorist Organization Typologies and the Probability of a Boomerang Effect. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 31(4), 269–283. George, A. L., & Bennett, A. (2005). Integrating Comparative and Within-Case Analysis: Typological Theory. In Case studies and theory development in the social sciences (pp. 233–262). Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. Gill, P., Horgan, J., & Deckert, P. (2014). Bombing Alone: Tracing the Motivations and Antecedent Behaviors of Lone-Actor Terrorists. Journal of Forensic Sciences, 59(2), 425–435. Griffin, R. (2003). From slime mould to rhizome: an introduction to the groupuscular right. Patterns of Prejudice, 37(1), 27–50. Hamm, M. S. (1993). American skinheads: the criminology and control of hate crime. Westport, Conn.: Praeger. Harrison, A. (1989). Challenging De Gaulle: the O.A.S. and the counterrevolution in Algeria, 1954-1962. New York: Praeger. Heitmeyer, W. (2003). Right-Wing Extremist Violence. In J. Hagan & W. Heitmeyer (Eds.), The International handbook on violence research (pp. 399–436). Dordrecht: Kluwer. Heitmeyer, W. (2005). Right-wing terrorism. In Tore Bjørgo (Ed.), Root Causes of Terrorism (pp. 141–153). London and New York: Routledge. 94 Jacob Aasland Ravndal: Thugs or Terrorists? A Typology of Right-Wing Terrorism and Violence in Western Europe 35 Summer/15 Nr. 3 ISSN: 2363-9849 Henissart, P. (1971). 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The emergence of a Euro-American radical right. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press. Köhler, D. (2014a). German Right-Wing Terrorism in Historical Perspective. A First Quantitative Overview of the “Database on Terrorism in Germany (Right-Wing Extremism)” – DTGrwx’ Project. Perspectives on Terrorism, 8(5). Köhler, D. (2014b). The German ’National Socialist Underground (NSU) and Anglo- American Networks: The Internationalisation of Far-Right Terror. In P. Jackson & A. Shekhovtsov (Eds.), The Post-War Anglo-American Far Right. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Koopmans, R. (1996). Explaining the rise of racist and extreme right violence in Western Europe: Grievances or opportunities? European Journal of Political Research, 30(2), 185–216. 95 Jacob Aasland Ravndal: Thugs or Terrorists? A Typology of Right-Wing Terrorism and Violence in Western Europe 36 Summer/15 Nr. 3 ISSN: 2363-9849 Laryš, M., & Mareš, M. (2011). Right-Wing Extremist Violence in the Russian Federation. Europe-Asia Studies, 63(1), 129–154. Laurent, F., & Sutton, N. (1978). L’Orchetre noir: Enquête sur les réseaux néo-fascistes. Paris: Stock. Lijphart, A. (1968). Typologies of Democratic Systems. Comparative Political Studies, 1(1), 3–44. Lowles, N. (2001). White riot: the violent rise and fall of Combat 18. London: Milo. Marsden, S. V. (2014). A Social Movement Theory Typology of Militant Organisations: Contextualising Terrorism. Terrorism and Political Violence, [Online first] doi: 10.1080/09546553.2014.954039. Marsden, S. V., & Schmid, A. P. (2011). Typologies of Terrorism and Political Violence. In A. P. Schmid (Ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research (pp. 158–200). New York: Routledge. McKinney, J. C. (1966). Constructive Typology and Social Theory. New York: Appelton- Century-Crofts. Merkl, P. H., & Weinberg, L. (1997). The Revival of right-wing extremism in the nineties. London: Frank Cass. Mudde, C. (1995). Right-wing extremism analyzed. A comparative analysis of the ideologies of three alleged right-wing extremist parties (NPD, NDP, CP’86). European Journal of Political Research, 27(2), 203–224. Paterson, T. (2015, February 4). Oktoberfest bomb inquiry: Severed hand may prove 1980 attack was carried out by neo-Nazis and not a lone wolf. The Independent. Retrieved from http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/oktoberfest-bomb- inquiry-severed-hand-may-prove-1980-attack-was-carried-out-by-neonazis-and-not- a-lone-wolf-10024250.html 96 Jacob Aasland Ravndal: Thugs or Terrorists? A Typology of Right-Wing Terrorism and Violence in Western Europe 37 Summer/15 Nr. 3 ISSN: 2363-9849 Pedahzur, A. (2001). Struggling with the Challenges of Right-Wing Extremism and Terrorism within Democratic Boundaries: A Comparative Analysis. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 24(5), 339–359. Perliger, A. (2012). Challengers from the Sidelines. West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center. Retrieved from https://www.ctc.usma.edu/wp- content/uploads/2013/01/ChallengersFromtheSidelines.pdf Ryan, N. (2011). Homeland: Into a World of Hate. Edinburgh: Mainstream Salas, A. (2003). Diario de Un Skin: Un Topo En El Movimiento Neonazi Espanol. Madrid: Temas de Hoy. Schmid, A. P. (2011). The Definition of Terrorism. In The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research. New York: Routledge. Schmidt, M. (1993). The new Reich: violent extremism in unified Germany and beyond. New York: Pantheon Books. Schultz, R. (1978). Conceptualizing Political Terrorism: A Typology. Journal of International Affairs, 32(1), 7. Shapiro, J., & Suzan, B. (2003). The French Experience of Counter-terrorism. Survival, 45(1), 67–98. Spaaij, R. (2012). Understanding lone wolf terrorism: global patterns, motivations and prevention. Dordrecht: Springer. Sprinzak, E. (1991). The process of delegitimation: Towards a linkage theory of political terrorism. Terrorism and Political Violence, 3(1), 50–68. Sprinzak, E. (1995). Right-Wing Terrorism in a Comparative Perspective: The Case of Split Delegitimization. Terrorism and Political Violence, 7(1), 17–43. Taylor, M., Holbrook, D., & Currie, P. M. (2013). Extreme right-wing political violence and terrorism. London: Bloomsbury. 97 Jacob Aasland Ravndal: Thugs or Terrorists? A Typology of Right-Wing Terrorism and Violence in Western Europe 38 Summer/15 Nr. 3 ISSN: 2363-9849 The Vienna Review. (2013, December 13). Neo-Nazis convicted. The Vienna Review. Retrieved from http://www.viennareview.net/news/news-briefs/austria-news- briefs/neo-nazis-convicted Virchow, F. (2004). The groupuscularization of neo-Nazism in Germany: the case of the Aktionsbüro Norddeutschland. Patterns of Prejudice, 38(1), 56–70. 98 2ISSN 2334-3745 June 2016 PERSPECTIVES ON TERRORISM Volume 10, Issue 3 I. Articles Right-Wing Terrorism and Violence in Western Europe: Introducing the RTV Dataset by Jacob Aasland Ravndal Abstract What is the record of right-wing terrorism and violence (RTV) in Western Europe post-1990? To date, RTV incident data suitable for temporal and cross-national comparisons have been lacking. Consequently, few comparative studies of RTV exist, and we generally have limited knowledge about the most recent evolution of RTV in Western Europe. To help fill these gaps, this article introduces a new dataset covering RTV incidents in Western Europe between 1990 and 2015. Including the most severe types of incidents only, the dataset comprises 578 incidents, including 190 deadly incidents causing 303 deaths. Each incident has been manually researched by the same person and coded on a range of variables, including time and location, perpetrator and victim characteristics, organizational affiliations, weapon types, and number of casualties. The article also proposes six hypotheses aiming to explain the perhaps most puzzling finding emerging from the RTV dataset: that the number of deadly incidents has declined considerably under conditions commonly assumed to stimulate RTV. These conditions include increased immigration, enhanced support to radical right parties, Islamist terrorism, and booming youth unemployment rates. Keywords: right-wing extremism; terrorism; violence; Western Europe; database Introduction In Western Europe, right-wing terrorism and violence (RTV) is commonly portrayed either as a marginal problem or as an imminent threat. Political motives aside, the coexistence of these two opposing views originate in a lack of systematic incident data showing variation in attack frequencies over time or between countries. This lack of good incident data limits our knowledge about the extent of RTV in contemporary Western Europe, including whether it is a rising or declining phenomenon, whether some countries are experiencing more RTV per capita than others are, and who the main perpetrators and victims are. Especially important, it constrains the potential for making causal inferences based on temporal and cross-national variation. To help fill these gaps, this article introduces a new dataset covering RTV incidents in Western Europe between 1990 and 2015. Focusing on the most severe types of incidents, that is, attacks with a lethal or near- lethal outcome, attacks involving the active use of deadly weapons, and extensive plots and preparations for armed struggle, the new dataset offers a modest yet relatively consistent account of RTV in post-1990 Western Europe. In particular, an effort has been made to include all relevant deadly incidents (the dataset comprises 578 incidents, including 190 deadly incidents causing 303 deaths). The dataset can therefore be used to compare frequencies of such incidents across time and space, and also serve to make causal inferences from these patterns with reasonable confidence. The entire dataset is exclusively based on open sources; all data and corresponding sources will become freely accessible online upon the publication of this article via the C-REX website.[1] To illustrate the need for fresh RTV incident data, the article first reviews existing terrorism databases and relevant incident chronologies. Part II introduces the RTV dataset, explains how it has been built, discusses its strengths and weaknesses, and presents some key findings. Finally, part III proposes six hypotheses aiming 99 3ISSN 2334-3745 June 2016 PERSPECTIVES ON TERRORISM Volume 10, Issue 3 to explain the perhaps most puzzling finding emerging from the RTV dataset: that the number of deadly incidents has declined considerably under conditions commonly assumed to stimulate RTV. These conditions include increased immigration,[2] enhanced support to radical right parties,[3] Islamist terrorism,[4] and booming youth unemployment rates.[5] Reviewing Existing Incident Data Why do we need fresh RTV incident data? One reason is that public opinion about the extent of RTV in Western Europe tends to polarize towards two opposing ends: at one end, various domestic intelligence agencies and other governmental bodies tend to downplay the RTV threat. These actors’ position is epitomized by Europol’s Terrorism Trend and Situation Report (TE-SAT), based on annual reports of terrorist incidents from EU member states.[6] Since Europol started reporting terrorist incidents systematically in 2006, only nine right-wing incidents (four attacks, five plots) have been reported, two of them happened in Western Europe. By contrast, Europol registered 2,111 “ethno-nationalist and separatist” terrorist incidents during the same period. The discrepancy between right-wing and ethno-separatist incidents may reflect a true yet probably smaller difference in attack frequencies. However, it likely also reflects EU member states’ interest in reporting certain types of terrorism and not others. Furthermore, many right-wing attacks remain below these governments’ radars, either because they are registered as hate crimes rather than terrorism, or because they are never registered at all. At the other end of the spectrum we find various anti-racist organizations, policy-oriented think tanks, journalists, and other interest groups. These actors tend to exaggerate the RTV threat, typically by use of anecdotal evidence rather than through a systematic incident analysis.[7] They portray Europe as facing rising levels of right-wing militancy and violence – a situation that if one could believe some accounts, even resembles the interwar period in and around Germany. These two opposing accounts can only be tested with more systematic incident data. However, existing terrorism databases do not satisfy this demand. Larger and well-known terrorism databases, such as the Global Terrorism Database (GDT) and the RAND Worldwide Database of Terrorism Incidents (RDWTI), both US-based, do not code for the political profile of an attack’s perpetrator. Using these American databases, it is virtually impossible to effectively distinguish right-wing attacks from others. A handful of relevant incidents can be found using relevant search queries. However, these incidents appear to have been registered haphazardly, they often lack source references, and substantial information about perpetrators and context is often missing – or even misleading.[8] Among the top 20 terrorism databases reviewed by Alex Schmid’s Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research, only four databases allow isolating right-wing attacks in Western Europe from other attacks.[9] Two of these – the Worldwide Incidents Tracking System (WITS) and the MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base (TKB) – recently became unavailable, thereby leaving us with Terrorism in Western Europe: Events Data (TWEED), and Europol’s annual EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-SAT). As already explained, TE-SAT offers scarce information about right-wing terrorism, which, if we are to interpret the reported attack frequencies literally, is close to being non-existent in Western Europe. By contrast, the 648 right-wing terrorist attacks registered by TWEED [10] have proven helpful for identifying and categorizing key right-wing terrorist actors and events in post-WWII Western Europe.[11] However, TWEED only covers the period 1950-2004, and is not helpful for capturing more recent developments. TWEED also relies entirely on a single news source: Keesing’s Record of World Events. A single source ensures data consistency, but many incidents most likely never made it to the news headlines Keesing’s daily news digest relies upon. TWEED is therefore helpful for painting the larger picture but less helpful for detailing 100 4ISSN 2334-3745 June 2016 PERSPECTIVES ON TERRORISM Volume 10, Issue 3 lower-scale incidents – a type of violence that may be more characteristic of contemporary right-wing militants. Another relevant database (not included in Schmid’s Handbook of Terrorism Research) is the Domestic Terrorism Victims Dataset (DTV) covering terrorist killings in Western Europe 1965-2005.[12] DTV includes two (of five) relevant perpetrator categories: “Extreme-right” and “Neonazi” [sic]. The DTV codebook fails to explain why these two categories were kept apart. It does, however, state that “it was much more difficult to find reliable information about the perpetrators of these killings” (extreme-right and neo- Nazi) and that “the information we have obtained about these killings is, in general, of worse quality than the one on nationalist and leftwing [sic] terrorism.”[13] In other words, the main problem with the 250 extreme- right and neo-Nazi murders registered by DTV post-1990 is that they rely on poor sources. Many sources are no longer available online, and those that are available generally include few details about each incident. While compiling the RTV dataset, the author of this article thoroughly researched every single extreme-right and neo-Nazi murder listed by DTV. This investigation revealed that many incidents should not have been included, either because the target selection was not primarily based on right-wing beliefs or by anti-minority biases, or because their circumstances remain extremely vague. In the creation of a new dataset, the author also came across murders that should have been included in the DTV dataset but were not. Furthermore, by excluding non-lethal incidents and terrorist plots, DTV misses out on important elements of the larger RTV universe. Thus, while DTV can be useful for comparing the modus operandi linked to different perpetrator’s ideologies, it is less relevant for analysing contemporary right-wing terrorism in more depth. In addition to existing terrorism databases, a handful of relevant incident chronologies have been compiled for some countries. Most notably, right-wing murder chronologies have been compiled for Germany,[14] the UK,[15] Spain,[16] and Sweden [17] – some of which were used as key sources for the DTV dataset. Relevant incident chronologies have also been compiled for countries such as Spain,[18] Italy,[19] and Greece [20] by anti-racist activists. However, some of these chronologies have rather broad and vague inclusion criteria. Having checked all registered incidents thoroughly, this author noticed a tendency to include incidents that either cannot be corroborated by credible sources, or whose target selection turned out not to have been primarily based on right-wing beliefs or anti-minority biases. Potentially more credible sources are the various hate crime statistics published annually in a number of West European countries. Some of these statistics are of great value, such as the annual reports from the German [21] and Austrian [22] domestic intelligence services. These reports distinguish between different types of violence – murders, bomb attacks, arson attacks, and physical assaults – committed by right-wing activists. They do not, however, provide contextual information about each incident. The majority of official hate crime reports are, however, less helpful for analysing right-wing violence. Some of them, such as the UK statistics, do not distinguish violent from non-violent hate crimes.[23] Instances of racist graffiti or verbal racial abuse are included in the same category as violent attacks. Another problem is that some official hate crime statistics, for example those from Finland, do not distinguish racist crimes (some of which are committed between minority groups) from crimes committed by right-wing activists. [24] In the Danish statistics, left- and right-wing attacks have recently been compiled together.[25] The latest German report no longer distinguishes between different types of right-wing violence, and mixes politically motivated attacks with apolitical crimes such as robberies. Another limitation of many national hate crime statistics is that they only include incidents reported to the police. A considerable number of attacks therefore remain unreported. Yet the most important reason why most of these statistics are of limited value is that they are ultimately incomparable. Each country uses different definitions, different registration methods, and different inclusion criteria. Some countries also tend to change their methods and criteria from time to time, making time-series 101 5ISSN 2334-3745 June 2016 PERSPECTIVES ON TERRORISM Volume 10, Issue 3 analysis difficult. Some countries do not provide official hate crime statistics at all, including Spain, Greece, Italy, and Portugal. Finally, a handful of academics have compiled relevant datasets, all of which have been used as background sources for building the RTV dataset. Daniel Köhler has created a database of German right-wing terrorist groups and incidents for the period 1965-2015.[26] Jan Oskar Engene has compiled an extensive dataset of political violence in Norway from 1945 to 2012 (unpublished). René Karpantschof has registered violent and non-violent protest events from the Danish right-wing scene for the years 1990-1997.[27] Aron Kundnani has compiled right-wing murder incidents for post-1990 Europe, largely based on the murder chronologies discussed above.[28] In addition, Kundnani has collected some incident data. However, the number of incidents included in Kundnani’s study is limited, and the data have not been systematically organized and categorized, thereby making temporal and cross-national comparisons difficult. Summing up, existing databases and incident chronologies are outdated (TWEED, DTV), understate right- wing incidents (TE-SAT, GDT, RDWTI), lack contextual information (TWEED, DTV), rely on poor or no longer available information (DTV, GTD), omit terrorist plots or non-lethal incidents (DTV), apply overly lax inclusion criteria (anti-racist incident chronologies), or contain incomparable data (national hate crime statistics). As a result of all this, a new dataset was created by the present author. Introducing the RTV Dataset Counting 578 incidents only, the RTV dataset is smaller than most other terrorist databases. However, compared to most other terrorist databases, RTV includes more information about each incident, including all corresponding sources. This information has been used to code a range of variables such as date, location, incident type, perpetrator’s organizational structure, perpetrator’s organizational affiliation, target group, type(s) of weapon used, and number of casualties. Inclusion Criteria Each RTV incident has been carefully selected, using the following criteria: The dataset includes only incidents whose target selection – minority groups, political adversaries, or the government – is based on right-wing beliefs.[29] Incidents resulting from physical confrontations initiated by the victim, or violence caused by disputes within or between right-wing groups, are not included. Furthermore, the dataset includes only violent incidents of a certain severity or those with a terroristic quality. More specifically, the dataset includes (1) attacks with a lethal or near fatal outcome, (2) attacks involving active use of deadly weapons such as knives, firearms, and bombs, (3) major attack plots involving use of deadly weapons, (4) discoveries of bomb-making materials or major arms depositaries belonging to right-wing activists, and (5) other violent incidents that unmistakably qualify as acts of terrorism.[30] Vandalism and other attacks causing material damage only, such as fire bombs targeting empty buildings at night, are not included. Sources, Strengths and Weaknesses The RTV dataset is based on many different sources. A majority of incidents are based on online newspaper articles. Other key sources include activist autobiographies, official and unofficial RTV chronologies and datasets, anti-fascist blogs and bulletins, personal communication with RTV experts, court documents, online videos, and in some cases secondary literature. Multiple sources have been gathered for nearly all incidents, most of which are available online from links embedded in the publicly available dataset. As a general rule, poorly documented incidents whose motivation remains unclear are not included. The number 102 6ISSN 2334-3745 June 2016 PERSPECTIVES ON TERRORISM Volume 10, Issue 3 of incidents that has been considered but not included in the dataset is much larger than the number of incidents that has been included. The use of multiple sources entails both advantages as well as disadvantages. One advantage is that the number of incidents included is higher than it would have been using only one or a handful of sources, thereby strengthening the potential for making precise descriptive inferences. A disadvantage is that the potential for making causal inferences based on comparisons across time and space is somewhat weak, because the data are skewed towards countries and time periods that are better documented by available sources. For example, regular reports on right-wing violence in Italy have been found only from 2003 onwards, leaving the period 1990-2002 underreported in this particular case. Because of this inherent limitation, it might be more fruitful to use deadly RTV incidents rather than all RTV incidents as a basis for explanatory analysis (all incidents should, however, be included when descriptive inference about RTV more generally is the main goal, such as exploring hypotheses about operational patterns, targeting, and organizational dynamics). Considering the severity of political and racist murders, such incidents rarely go unnoticed. We may therefore assume that the dataset covers (nearly) all relevant deadly RTV incidents between 1990 and 2015. While compiling the RTV dataset, this author also made an effort to include all incidents with a fatal outcome by asking RTV experts across Western Europe to provide information about relevant cases.[31] Furthermore, RTV killings arguably constitute a reasonably good indicator of right-wing violence more generally. Political and racist murders rarely occur in complete isolation from less severe forms of violence. In many cases, violent perpetrators have been groomed through other violent episodes before committing a murder. We may therefore expect to find higher levels of right-wing violence in places and during periods with higher murder frequencies. In addition to attacks and killings, the RTV dataset also includes major plots and preparations for armed struggle, unlike many other terrorist incident databases. Such incidents arguably constitute important elements of the RTV universe because they might have caused considerable harm had they not been discovered in time by the police. A final strength of the RTV dataset is that all incidents have been researched and coded by the same person, using explicit and standardized inclusion criteria. This method ensures a degree of data familiarity and consistency that is hard to achieve in larger databases counting thousands of incidents. Incident and Perpetrator Types The RTV dataset distinguishes between four incident types: (1) premeditated attacks, (2) spontaneous attacks, (3) attack plots, and (4) preparation for armed struggle. Attacks in which perpetrators have actively pursued a pre-defined person or target group have been coded as premeditated. Attacks triggered by random confrontations between perpetrator(s) and victim(s) associated to some pre-defined target group have been coded as spontaneous. Planned but not completed attacks by an identifiable group or individual involving the use of deadly weapons have been coded as plots. Finally, discovery of bomb-making materials or major arms depositories belonging to right-wing activists have been coded as preparation for armed struggle. In many cases, the level of strategy and organization behind an attack or plot is hard to determine based on the available sources. Distinguishing terrorist incidents from other types of incidents has therefore been intentionally avoided because of the inherently blurred nature of such incidents. Yet a considerable number of the incidents included in the dataset would indeed satisfy most standard definitions of terrorism. 103 7ISSN 2334-3745 June 2016 PERSPECTIVES ON TERRORISM Volume 10, Issue 3 Building on Ravndal’s typology of right-wing terrorism and violence,[32] RTV perpetrators are categorized into seven types: (1) perpetrators acting on behalf of organized groups (known entities with five or more members whose association primarily relies on a strong commitment to right-wing politics), (2) affiliated members of organised groups acting on their own, (3) autonomous cells (clandestine entity of two to four members whose association primarily relies on a strong commitment to right-wing politics), (4) gangs (informal constellations of three or more acquaintances with a general right-wing commitment, but whose loose association primarily relies on social bonds, e.g. skinhead gangs and racist youth gangs), (5) unorganized perpetrators (two or more perpetrators with no known association to any specific right-wing group, cell, or gang), (6) lone actors (single perpetrators who prepare and sometimes also carry out attacks without anyone else knowing about it beforehand), and (7) shadow groups (unresolved attacks claimed by formerly unknown groups). Having introduced some key features of the RTV dataset, we can now turn to some key findings. Key Findings Table 1 shows the distribution of incident types across the seven RTV perpetrator types: Type of Violence Perpetrator type Premeditated attacks Spontaneous attacks Plots Preparing for armed struggle Sum Organized groups 30 4 8 9 51 Affiliated members 37 6 1 5 49 Autonomous cells 19 1 8 4 32 Gangs 117 40 - - 157 Unorganised 47 34 - - 81 Lone actors 96 25 11 8 140 Shadow groups 6 - - - 6 Unknown 61 - - 1 62 Total 413 110 28 27 578 Table 1. RTV Violence and Perpetrator Types The perhaps most striking pattern from Table 1 is that premeditated attacks have been predominantly carried out by gangs (117 incidents) or lone actors (96 incidents), and less frequently by organized groups (30 incidents) or their affiliated members (37 incidents). Spontaneous attacks are mainly carried out by gangs (40 incidents), unorganized groups (34 incidents), and lone actors (25 incidents). Next, consider the number of fatalities. Table 2 shows that the majority of killings have been committed by gangs, unorganized groups, and lone actors – and not by organized militants. However, autonomous cells have a much higher kill rate per attack than all other types – almost 1:1. Note that in Table 2 two cells in the lone actor row contain two numbers. The second number represents an outlier incident: the 22/7/2011 attacks committed by a lone actor in Norway in 2011, leaving 77 persons dead and 151 persons severely wounded. 104 8ISSN 2334-3745 June 2016 PERSPECTIVES ON TERRORISM Volume 10, Issue 3 Attacks Casualties Perpetrator Types Killed Wounded Organized groups 34 5 86 Affiliated members 43 10 76 Autonomous cells 20 18 34 Gangs 157 76 247 Unorganised 81 55 77 Lone actors 121 56 (+77) 218 (+151) Shadow groups 6 2 9 Unknown 61 4 29 Sum 523 226 (303) 776 (927) Table 2. RTV Perpetrator Types, Attack Frequencies and Casualties Turning to victims, two groups stand out as these are by far most frequently targeted: immigrants (249 incidents) and leftists (138 incidents). Other significant target groups include Muslims (28 incidents), government representatives (25 incidents), homeless people (25 incidents), and homosexuals (23 incidents). Jews have been less frequently targeted (7 incidents), while Muslims appear to be increasingly targeted. This observation resonates well with a general ideological reorientation by many extreme-right groups, who no longer consider their main enemies to be Communists or Zionists, but rather Islam and Muslims.[33] Finally, RTV perpetrators most often resort to knives (119 incidents), unarmed beating and kicking (108 incidents), explosives (86 incidents), firearms (85 incidents), and blunt instruments such as iron bars, bats, or wooden sticks (68 incidents). In addition, firebombs (38 attacks) and arson (20 attacks) have also been frequently used. Truly complex terrorist attacks that combine explosives and firearms have so far happened only once (the 22/7/2011 attacks in Norway). From Description to Explanation Existing RTV research typically covers one of three regions: the USA, Russia (sometimes including Eastern Europe), and Europe (sometimes excluding Eastern Europe). Although RTV perpetrators may share some universal ideological traits, scholars generally tend to agree that context matters. These three regions represent different political, institutional, and cultural contexts from which RTV perpetrators emerge.[34] Scholars studying the American context have produced some of the most advanced studies to date, partly because they have had access to systematic incident data.[35] While some findings from this body of research come across as highly context-specific, other findings may be more universally valid, such as the strong relationship identified between the number of active militants and groups on one hand, and levels of terrorism and violence on the other.[36] In Russia, systematic incident data have also been available from the SOVA Center from 2004 onwards.[37] These data suggest that Russian RTV levels exceed those of any other country or region in the world, even when controlling for the population. Despite such high RTV levels, however, the Russian case remains largely understudied, with a few notable exceptions.[38] More research is thus needed to explain this outlier case. Unlike the United States and Russia, systematic incident data has to date not been available for Europe as a whole, as discussed above. Consequently, much European RTV research consists of case studies covering specific groups, countries, or regions.[39] One notable exception is Koopmans’ study of right-wing violence in Western Europe.[40] However, to establish cross-national and temporal variation of his dependent 105 9ISSN 2334-3745 June 2016 PERSPECTIVES ON TERRORISM Volume 10, Issue 3 variable (right-wing violence), Koopmans compares incident data from different datasets that are ultimately incomparable.[41] The causal inferences presented in Koopmans’ study must therefore be read with caution. For some West European countries – Germany in particular – systematic incident data have been available, thus enabling a number of more rigorous studies. [42] However, one could argue that Germany represents in several ways (e.g. history, size, federal system) an outlier case, and that one should be careful about generalizing findings from Germany to the rest of Europe. Either way, it is beyond the scope of this introductory article to truly engage with the existing RTV literature and the myriad of different hypotheses and theories proposed therein.[43] For the purpose of this article, it suffices to say that although the number of RTV publications covering (Western) Europe is considerable and growing, the inferences that can be drawn from this body of research remains somewhat limited, due to the heavy inclination towards case studies and a general lack of comparative perspectives. By introducing the RTV dataset, the present author hopes to prepare the ground for more such comparative studies in future research. As already explained, killing incidents represent the most definitive and reliable measure of RTV. Analysing RTV killing incidents across time and space reveals several interesting patterns for further explanatory analysis. One of them will be briefly elaborated upon here, namely a considerable decline in deadly RTV incidents across Western Europe since the 1990s (Figure 1). In the following, a suggestion is made how this pattern might be further explored in future studies. The idea is just to illustrate how RTV data can be used in explanatory studies. Actually carrying out such an analysis would require considerably more space and rigorous analysis and is beyond the scope of this article. Figure 1. RTV killing incidents, 1990-2015 (N=190) A decline of deadly right-wing incidents may come as a surprise at a moment in time when experts are warning about rising levels of right-wing militancy and violence across Europe.[44] Yet several annual reports on right-wing violence over the past 10-15 years show low, stable, or decreasing levels of violence. Such reports can be found from around 2000 onwards for Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands, Germany, France, Austria, and Switzerland (see Appendix 1).[45] 106 10ISSN 2334-3745 June 2016 PERSPECTIVES ON TERRORISM Volume 10, Issue 3 It should be noted, however, that these patterns may change in some countries following the ongoing irregular migrant flow crisis in Europe. It is still too early to say anything certain about the effects of this crisis on RTV, partly because many suspicious attacks remain unsolved. Many reported attacks have targeted empty buildings and other symbolic targets and would therefore not be included in the RTV dataset. Furthermore, few if any deadly incidents directly related to the migrant crisis have been reported thus far, although such incidents may of course have happened without attracting any media attention. With this minor limitation in mind, the reader should be aware that the RTV dataset and the following brief discussion is limited to the period 1990–2015, and that only a handful of incidents related to the ongoing irregular immigration crisis have been included in the dataset, most of which occurred in Germany in 2015. The stable or declining patterns of right-wing violence that may be inferred from the RTV dataset and other relevant sources (see Appendix 1) challenge widespread assumptions regarding the conditions under which RTV is expected to occur–such as increased immigration,[46] enhanced support to radical right parties,[47] Islamist terrorism,[48] and substantial youth unemployment rates.[49] The fact that these macro variables have generally increased while right-wing killings and violence have decreased or remained stable gives us reason to believe that they may be less important than is often assumed. Clearly, more sophisticated causal analysis is needed before drawing any conclusions with confidence. However, we might benefit from looking at other explanatory variables, in addition to these four “usual suspects.” What other variables might help explain a general decline in West European RTV since the 1990s? Based on a broad reading of existing research, I propose the following six hypotheses as points of departure for future research: H 1: Less Activism The first hypothesis states that contemporary West European youths may be less politically active than their predecessors were. As mentioned previously, existing research suggests a strong relationship between the number of political activists on the one hand, and political violence and terrorism on the other.[50] Thus, when the total number of political activists drops, we should also expect a drop in the number of political activists who radicalize and eventually turn to violence and terrorism. This trend can be observed through indicators such as youth electoral participation or youth memberships in political parties. While scholars seem to disagree about whether contemporary youths are actually less interested in politics, or whether they only express their political interest differently, there appears to be a broad consensus that they participate less in traditional political activities.[51] H 2: More Internet Activism The second hypothesis is that contemporary youths who do participate politically use different arenas and channels of influence from which direct violence is less likely to emerge. Most notably, street activism has been largely replaced by internet activism. Existing research suggests that “keyboard warriors” operating at the transnational level are less likely to carry out violent attacks than radicalized street gangs operating on the national or local levels.[52] At the same time, the Internet clearly represents a platform for radicalization. However, it remains unclear whether the Internet mainly pacifies and keeps most radicalized youths off the streets, or rather pushes them into the streets (and to conflict zones) to commit violent acts.[53] More systematic research is therefore needed to better understand the effects of internet activism on violent radicalization. 107 11ISSN 2334-3745 June 2016 PERSPECTIVES ON TERRORISM Volume 10, Issue 3 H 3: Less Crime A third hypothesis is that RTV may be caused by similar factors as apolitical violent crimes. Such factors as the quality of policing, social cohesion, the existence of illicit markets, and the existence of a legitimate state authority, have been found to significantly influence homicide rates in Europe.[54] Paramedic capabilities have also improved, which may influence death rates. When general homicide rates drop, one would expect a similar drop in RTV killings. Matching homicide rates (Figure 2) with RTV killing rates, one finds that the patterns largely overlap, suggesting that RTV may in part be explained by societal factors beyond mere politics and ideology. Figure 2. Intentional homicides in Western Europe, 1994-2012 Source: Eurostat: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/crime/database H 4: New Subcultural Trends and Action Repertoires The fourth hypothesis is that the subcultural trends and preferred action repertoires of contemporary right-wing militants have changed. During the 1980s and 1990s, an inherently violent skinhead subculture emerged throughout Western Europe and beyond. Violence was at the core of the skinhead movement and sometimes became an end in and of itself.[55] Today, the skinhead subculture has been largely replaced by less violent and confrontational subcultural styles in many West European countries. Some scholars refer to the “new right” (la nouvelle droite) as a more intellectualized movement that prefers long-term, deliberative, democratic and (social) media-oriented activism over violent street activism and terrorism.[56] We may thus be witnessing the emergence of a new form of right-wing activism that is less focused on violence per se, and more focused on a broader repertoire of mostly non-violent forms of action. [57] H 5: Political Opportunity Structures The fifth hypothesis, derived from social movement research, suggests that the use of violence becomes less likely when radical right-wing actors gain access to political decision-making.[58] The underlying mechanism, sometimes referred to as the “pressure cooker theory,” is that when radical right parties obtain substantial electoral support, followed by political influence, this may function as a “safety valve”, releasing pressure from dissatisfied activists who may otherwise have turned to violence. By contrast, when access to 108 12ISSN 2334-3745 June 2016 PERSPECTIVES ON TERRORISM Volume 10, Issue 3 political decision-making is blocked, engaging in violent protest and revolutionary struggle becomes more attractive. Thus, the fact that radical right parties have gained access to political power in a number of West European countries over the past 25 years might have contributed to less violence. H 6: Multicultural Acceptance The final hypothesis is that contemporary Western youths are more accepting to non-Western immigrants than previous generations were. While the youth generations of the 1980s and 1990s experienced large-scale non-Western immigration for the first time and witnessed how this immigration changed the outlook of many cities, towns and neighbourhoods, a larger share of today’s youths grow up in multicultural societies. They do not experience the same “cultural shock” that apparently produced so many violent and xenophobic reactions during the 1980s and 1990s.[59] Perhaps it is the case that initial experiences with immigrants in formerly ethnically homogenous societies produce violent responses? This could help explain, for example, why Eastern Germany, which has received far less immigrants than Western Germany, currently experiences much higher levels of anti-foreigner violence.[60] Conclusion The dataset introduced in this article offers new and detailed information on RTV perpetrators, their victims, and, more in general, about the evolution of RTV in Western Europe after the end of the Cold War. Drawing on these new data, the article adds two important nuances to existing warnings about rising levels of right- wing militancy and violence in Western Europe: First, the majority of attacks and killings have not been committed by organized militant groups but rather by unorganized gangs and lone actors. While organized right-wing terrorism in Western Europe has been rare, lone-actor terrorism is more widespread and may be on the rise. This trend is still not very strong, but the number of lone actor incidents per year has increased slightly since the 1990s. More research is therefore needed to better understand why and how some individuals enter such a violent path. Second, the number of deadly incidents motivated by right-wing beliefs or by anti-minority biases has declined considerably since the 1990s, with zero incidents in 2014 and one incident in 2015. The article proposed six hypotheses aiming to explain this decline: less activism, a shift toward more Internet activism, less crime in general, different subcultural practices and action repertoires, more favourable political opportunities, and acceptance to multicultural societies. To further explore the fruitfulness of these six hypotheses, they might be tested in future comparative research, for example to investigate why some countries have experienced considerably more RTV than others have. In this article, only bits and pieces from the RTV dataset have been presented. Several aspects have yet to be addressed, most notably cross-national variations in the frequency of (deadly) attacks. Other aspects that may be explored, using the RTV dataset, include the relationships between different perpetrator types and target groups, or between different organizational structures, weapon types, and casualty numbers. The dataset may also be used as a point of departure for more detailed investigations of specific regions, countries, militant groups, and perpetrators types. For example, the dataset includes 140 incidents involving 76 different lone actors whose background and motives could be explored in future research. This author hopes that the RTV dataset will prove useful and stimulate more comparative research, aiming to uncover the conditions under which RTV is most – and least – likely to occur. 109 13ISSN 2334-3745 June 2016 PERSPECTIVES ON TERRORISM Volume 10, Issue 3 About the Author: Jacob Aasland Ravndal is a PhD candidate with the Terrorism Research Group at the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI) and the Center for Extremism Research (C-REX) at the University of Oslo (2016–). Please note the RTV Codebook and RTV Dataset are available as supplementary files from the C-Rex website. Notes [1] The RTV dataset and codebook can be downloaded from http://www.sv.uio.no/c-rex/rtv. [2] Blake Evan Garcia, “International Migration and Extreme-Right Terrorism” (PhD Thesis, Texas A&M University, 2015); URL: http://oaktrust.library.tamu.edu/ handle/1969.1/155240. [3] Paul Wilkinson, “Violence and Terror and the Extreme Right,” Terrorism and Political Violence 7, no. 4 (1995): 82–93. [4] Roger Eatwell, “Community Cohesion and Cumulative Extremism in Contemporary Britain,” The Political Quarterly 77, no. 2 (2006): 204–216. [5] Armin Falk, Andreas Kuhn, and Josef Zweimüller, “Unemployment and Right-Wing Extremist Crime,” Scandinavian Journal of Economics 113, no. 2 (2011): 260–85. [6] See URL: https://www.europol.europa.eu/latest_publications/37. [7] Jamie Bartlett and Jonathan Birdwell, “Rise of the Radical Right,” Foreign Policy, 25 July 2011; URL: http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/07/25/rise-of-the-radical- right/; Liz Fekete, “The Shifting Shape of the European Far Right,” Sicherheitspolitik-Blog, 2016; URL: http://www.sicherheitspolitik-blog.de/2016/03/17/the-shifting- shape-of-the-european-far-right/; Vidhya Ramalingam, “The European Far Right Is on the Rise, Again. Here’s How to Tackle It,” The Guardian, 13 February 2014; URL: http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/feb/13/european-far-right-on-the-rise-how-to-tackle. [8] For example, in GDT the three terrorist attacks committed by lone actor David Copeland are registered as attacks committed by Combat 18/White Wolves. Copeland was, however, never a member of Combat 18, whereas White Wolves appears to have been his own one-man project. [9] Neil G. Bowie and Alex P. Schmid, “Databases on Terrorism,” in Alex P. Schmid (Ed.) The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research (New York: Routledge, 2011), 294–340. [10] Jan Oskar Engene, “Five Decades of Terrorism in Europe: The TWEED Dataset,” Journal of Peace Research 44, no. 1 (2007): 109–21. [11] Jacob Aasland Ravndal, “Thugs or Terrorists? A Typology of Right-Wing Terrorism and Violence in Western Europe,” Journal for Deradicalization 1, no. 3 (2015): 1–38. [12] L. d. l. Calle and I. Sanchez-Cuenca, “The Quantity and Quality of Terrorism: The DTV Dataset,” Journal of Peace Research 48, no. 1 (2011): 49–58. [13] DTV Codebook (Centre for Advanced Study in the Social Sciences (Juan March Institute), 2009), 17; URL: http://recursos.march.es/web/ceacs/proyectos/dtv/ datasets/DTV%20Codebook.pdf. [14] See URL: http://www.zeit.de/gesellschaft/zeitgeschehen/2010-09/todesopfer-rechte-gewalt. [15] See URL: http://www.irr.org.uk/research/deaths/. [16] See URL: http://www.movimientocontralaintolerancia.com/html/admin/verNoticia.asp?cod=1260&esBusq=True. [17] See URL: http://expo.se/www/download/faktablad-mordade.pdf. [18] See URL: http://www.movimientocontralaintolerancia.com/html/raxen/raxen.asp. [19] See URL: http://www.ecn.org/antifa/article/357/AZIONI%20FASCISTE. [20] See: URL http://map.crisis-scape.net/reports. [21] See: URL: http://www.verfassungsschutz.de/de/oeffentlichkeitsarbeit/publikationen/verfassungsschutzberichte. [22] See URL: http://www.bmi.gv.at/cms/bmi_verfassungsschutz/. [23] See URL: https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/an-overview-of-hate-crime-in-england-and-wales. [24] The Finnish reports can be found online by googling “poliisin tietoon tullut viharikollisuus suomessa.” [25] See URL: https://www.pet.dk/Publikationer/RACI-indberetning.aspx. [26] Daniel Köhler, “German Right-Wing Terrorism in Historical Perspective. A First Quantitative Overview of the ‘Database on Terrorism in Germany (Right- Wing Extremism)’ – DTGrwx’ Project,” Perspectives on Terrorism 8, no. 5 (2014). [27] Flemming Mikkelsen and Rene Karpantschof, “Rise and Fall of the Racist Right-Wing Movement in Denmark, 1982-2000,” in 13th Nordic Migration Conference, 2004; URL: http://www.amid.dk/ocs/viewabstract.php?id=141&cf=1. [28] Arun Kundnani, Blind Spot? Security Narratives and Far-Right Violence in Europe, ICCT Research Paper (The Hague: The International Centre for Counter- Terrorism, 2012). [29] Right-wing beliefs are here understood as ideas promoting social inequality. For a more detailed discussion, see Norberto Bobbio and Allan Cameron, Left and Right: The Significance of a Political Distinction (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996). [30] Terrorism is here understood as premeditated threats or use of violence intended to intimidate and thereby influence an audience beyond the immediate target. For a more detailed discussion, see Alex P. Schmid, “The Definition of Terrorism,” in The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research (New York: Routledge, 2011, pp.86-87); Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 40. [31] I thank Rob Witte from Lokaal Centraal, Willem Wagenaar from the Anne Frank Stichting, Ingrid Aedenoom from the Centre interfédéral pour l’égalité des chances, Daniel Köhler from the German Institute on Radicalization and De-radicalization Studies, and the Italian Editors of InfoAntifa for sharing useful information. [32] Jacob Aasland Ravndal, “Thugs or Terrorists? A Typology of Right-Wing Terrorism and Violence in Western Europe.” 110 14ISSN 2334-3745 June 2016 PERSPECTIVES ON TERRORISM Volume 10, Issue 3 [33] Max Taylor, Donald Holbrook, and P. M. Currie, Extreme Right-Wing Political Violence and Terrorism (London: Bloomsbury, 2013). [34] This point is recognized by Heitmeyer’s in his comprehensive review chapter on right-wing violence. See Wilhelm Heitmeyer, “Right-Wing Extremist Violence,” in The International Handbook on Violence Research, edited by John Hagan and Wilhelm Heitmeyer (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2003), 399–436. [35] Christopher Hewitt, Understanding Terrorism in America: From the Klan to Al Qaeda (London: Routledge, 2003); Arie Perliger, Challengers from the Sidelines, CTC Report (West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center, 2012); Steven M. Chermak et al., “American Terrorism and Extremist Crime Data Sources and Selectivity Bias: An Investigation Focusing on Homicide Events Committed by Far-Right Extremists,” Journal of Quantitative Criminology 28, no. 1 (March 2012): 191–218; Steven Chermak, Joshua Freilich, and Michael Suttmoeller, “The Organizational Dynamics of Far-Right Hate Groups in the United States: Comparing Violent to Nonviolent Organizations,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 36, no. 3 (2013): 193–218; Joshua D. Freilich et al., ‘Introducing the United States Extremist Crime Database (ECDB)’, Terrorism and Political Violence 26, no. 2 (April 2014): 372–84; Amy Adamczyk et al., “The Relationship between Hate Groups and Far-Right Ideological Violence,” Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice 30, no.3 (2014): 310–332; James A. Piazza, “The Determinants of Domestic Right-Wing Terrorism in the USA: Economic Grievance, Societal Change and Political Resentment,” Conflict Management and Peace Science, advance online publication, 13 March 2015; URL: http://cmp.sagepub.com/content/early/2015/03/06/0738894215570429.abstract. [36] Christopher Hewitt, Understanding Terrorism in America, 46; Adamczyk et al., “The Relationship between Hate Groups and Far-Right Ideological Violence.” [37] See URL: http://www.sova-center.ru/en/. [38] Mihai Varga, “How Political Opportunities Strengthen the Far Right: Understanding the Rise in Far-Right Militancy in Russia,” Europe-Asia Studies 60, no. 4 (2008): 561–79; Richard Arnold, “Visions of Hate: Explaining Neo-Nazi Violence in the Russian Federation,” Problems of Post-Communism 57, no. 2 (2010): 37–49; Martin Laryš and Miroslav Mareš, Right-Wing Extremist Violence in the Russian Federation,” Europe-Asia Studies 63, no. 1 (2011): 129–54; Johannes Due Enstad, ‘“Glory to Breivik!”: The Russian Far Right and the 2011 Norway Attacks,” Terrorism and Political Violence, advance online publication, 19 March 2015; URL: http:// www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09546553.2015.1008629. [39] Key publications include Tore Bjørgo and Rob Witte (Eds.), Racist Violence in Europe (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1993); Tore Bjørgo (ed.), Terror from the Extreme Right (London: Frank Cass, 1995); Tore Bjørgo, Racist and Right-Wing Violence in Scandinavia: Patterns, Perpetrators, and Responses (Oslo: Tano Aschehoug, 1997); Manuela Caiani, Donatella della Porta, and Claudius Wagemann, Mobilizing on the Extreme Right: Germany, Italy, and the United States (Oxford University Press, 2012); Max Taylor, Donald Holbrook, and P. M. Currie, Extreme Right-Wing Political Violence and Terrorism (London: Bloomsbury, 2013). [40] Ruud Koopmans, “Explaining the Rise of Racist and Extreme Right Violence in Western Europe: Grievances or Opportunities?”, European Journal of Political Research 30, no. 2 (1996): 185–216. [41] Tore Bjørgo, “Violence against Ethnic and Religious Minorities,” in International Handbook of Violence Research, edited by Wilhelm Heitmeyer and John Hagan (Dordrecht; Boston: Kluwer, 2003), 793–94. [42] See, for example, Lauren M. McLaren, “Explaining Right-Wing Violence in Germany: A Time Series Analysis,” Social Science Quarterly 80, no. 1 (1999): 166–80; Ruud Koopmans and Susan Olzak, “Discursive Opportunities and the Evolution of Right-Wing Violence in Germany,” American Journal of Sociology 110, no. 1 (2004): 198–230; Marc Coester, “Commentary: Right-Wing Extremism and Bias Crime in Germany,” Journal of Ethnicity in Criminal Justice 8, no. 1 (2010): 49–69; Daniel Köhler, “German Right-Wing Terrorism in Historical Perspective.” [43] For general reviews of the RTV literature, see Wilhelm Heitmeyer, “Right-Wing Violence”; Wilhelm Heitmeyer, “Right-Wing Terrorism,” in Root Causes of Terrorism, edited by Tore Bjørgo (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 141–53. [44] Bartlett and Birdwell, “Rise of the Radical Right”; Fekete, “The Shifting Shape of the European Far Right”; Ramalingam, “The European Far Right Is on the Rise, Again. Here’s How to Tackle It.” [45] Please note that the numbers displayed in Appendix 1 should not be compared between countries as each country operates with different units of analysis and registration methods. [46] Garcia, “International Migration and Extreme-Right Terrorism.” [47] Wilkinson, “Violence and Terror and the Extreme Right.” [48] Eatwell, “Community Cohesion and Cumulative Extremism in Contemporary Britain.” [49] Falk and Zweimüller, “Unemployment and Right-Wing Extremist Crime.” [50] Christopher Hewitt, Understanding Terrorism in America, 46. [51] Joerg Forbrig, Revisiting Youth Political Participation: Challenges for Research and Democratic Practice in Europe (Strasbourg: Council of Europe Pub., 2005). [52] Manuela Caiani and Patricia Kröll, “The Transnationalization of the Extreme Right and the Use of the Internet,” International Journal of Comparative and Applied Criminal Justice 39, no. 4 (2015): 331–51. [53] Maura Conway, “Determining the Role of the Internet in Violent Extremism and Terrorism: Six Suggestions for Progressing Research,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 25 February 2016, advance online publication, URL: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1057610X.2016.1157408. [54] Manuel Eisner, “What Causes Large-Scale Variation in Homicide Rates?”, in Aggression in Humans and Other Primates Biology, Psychology, Sociology, edited by Hans-Henning Kortüm and Jürgen Heinze (Berlin; Boston: De Gruyter, 2013), 137–63. [55] Mark S Hamm, American Skinheads: The Criminology and Control of Hate Crime (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1993). [56] Michael Minkenberg, “The Renewal of the Radical Right: Between Modernity and Anti-modernity,” Government and Opposition 35, no. 2 (2000): 170–188; Tamir Bar-On, “Fascism to the Nouvelle Droite: The Dream of Pan-European Empire,” Journal of Contemporary European Studies 16, no. 3 (2008): 327–45. [57] Manuela Caiani, Donatella della Porta, and Claudius Wagemann, Mobilizing on the Extreme Right, 76–101. [58] Ruud Koopmans, “Explaining the Rise of Racist and Extreme Right Violence in Western Europe,” 185–216; Caiani, della Porta, and Wagemann, Mobilizing on the Extreme Right, 10. [59] Rob Witte, ‘Racist Violence in Western Europe’, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 21, no. 4 (1995): 489–500; Ruud Koopmans, “Extreme Right Violence in Western Europe.” [60] David Benček and Julia Strasheim, Refugees Welcome? Introducing a New Dataset on Anti-Refugee Violence in Germany, 2014-2015, Kiel Working Paper 2032 (Kiel Institute for the World Economy, 2016); URL: http://www.econstor.eu/handle/10419/129617. 111 Ye ar Sw ed en 1 1 Sw ed en 2 2 D en m ar k 13 D en m ar k 24 N et he rl an ds 1 5 N et he rl an ds 2 6 G er m an y7 Fr an ce 8 A us tr ia 1 9 Sw itz er la nd 10 20 00 29 83 99 8 10 20 01 15 46 70 9 9 20 02 13 75 77 2 25 20 03 28 7 60 75 9 13 20 04 8 41 5 77 6 39 53 20 05 27 6 70 95 8 23 52 20 06 27 9 60 10 47 26 64 20 07 26 5 57 98 0 26 37 58 20 08 50 13 64 10 42 18 8 24 20 09 31 9 9 25 89 1 25 14 32 20 10 25 7 6 9 76 2 5 32 13 20 11 14 5 4 3 75 5 4 41 18 20 12 19 14 2 2 80 2 7 39 25 20 13 22 17 2 80 1 7 11 13 20 14 * 99 0 * 14 10 1 U ni t o f a na ly si s: S ev er e ab us e m ot iv at ed b y w hi te p ow er id eo lo gy . S ou rc e: A nn ua l r ep or ts b y th e Sw ed is h Se cu ri ty S er vi ce (S Ä PO );U R L: h ttp :// w w w .sa ke rh et sp ol is en .se /p ub lik at io ne r.h tm l. 2 U ni t o f a na ly si s: V io le nt c ri m es m ot iv at ed b y w hi te p ow er id eo lo gy . S ou rc e: A nn ua l r ep or ts b y Th e Sw ed is h N at io na l C ou nc il fo r C ri m e Pr ev en tio n (B rå ); U R L: h ttp :// w w w .b ra .se /b ra /b ra -i n- en gl is h/ ho m e/ cr im e- an d- st at is tic s/ ha te -c ri m e. ht m l. * Fr om 2 01 4 on w ar ds , B rå n o lo ng er p ro vi de s i nf or m at io n ab ou t v io le nt c ri m es c om m itt ed b y th e ex tr em e ri gh t s pe ci fic al ly . 3 U ni t o f a na ly si s: R ac ia lly m ot iv at ed v io le nt in ci de nt s – m ay a ls o in cl ud e ra ci al v io le nc e be tw ee n m in or ity g ro up s ( 20 03 -2 00 6 m an ua lly c ou nt ed b y th is a ut ho r) . S ou rc e: A nn ua l r ep or ts b y th e D an is h Se cr et S er vi ce (P ET ); U R L: ht tp s:/ /w w w .p et .d k/ Pu bl ik at io ne r/ R A C I- in db er et ni ng .a sp x. 4 U ni t o f a na ly si s: P ol iti ca lly (r ig ht a nd le ft) m ot iv at ed v io le nt in ci de nt s. So ur ce : A nn ua l r ep or ts b y th e D an is h Se cr et S er vi ce (P ET ); U R L: h ttp s:/ /w w w .p et .d k/ Pu bl ik at io ne r/ R A C I- in db er et ni ng .a sp x. 5 U ni t o f a na ly si s: V io le nt a ss au lts m ot iv at ed ra ci sm a nd /o r t he e xt re m e ri gh t. So ur ce : A nn ua l r ep or t ( R ac is m a nd E xt re m is m M on ito r) b y th e A nn e Fr an k H ou se ; U R L: h ttp :// w w w .a nn ef ra nk .o rg /e n/ Ed uc at io n/ M on ito r- H om ep ag e/ R ac is m -m on ito r/ . 6 U ni t o f a na ly si s: V io le nt a ss au lts m ot iv at ed ra ci sm a nd /o r t he e xt re m e ri gh t. So ur ce : R ep or t b y th e A nn e Fr an k H ou se , “ Se co nd re po rt o n ra ci sm , a nt i- Se m iti sm , a nd ri gh t- w in g ex tr em is t v io le nc e in th e N et he rl an ds ”; U R L: h ttp :// w w w .v er w ey -j on ke r.n l/d oc /v ita lit ei t/ 73 52 % 20 A nn e% 20 Fr an k% 20 En gl is h% 20 M on ito r% 20 W eb .p df . 7 U ni t o f a na ly si s: V io le nt a ss au lts (G ew al tta te n) c om m itt ed b y ri gh t- w in g ac tiv is ts . S ou rc e: A nn ua l r ep or ts b y G er m an S ec ur ity S er vi ce , h ttp :// w w w .v er fa ss un gs sc hu tz .d e/ de /o eff en tli ch ke its ar be it/ pu bl ik at io ne n/ ve rf as su ng ss ch ut zb er ic ht e. 8 U ni t o f a na ly si s: V io le nt a tta ck s ( ac tio ne s v io le nt es ) c om m itt ed b y ri gh t- w in g ac tiv is ts . S ou rc e: A nn al re po rt s b y La C om m is si on n at io na le c on su lta tiv e de s d ro its d e l’h om m e (C N C D H ) ; U R L : h ttp :// w w w .c nc dh .fr /f r/ p u bl ic at io ns /? f[ 0] =i m _fi el d_ th em e% 3A 13 9& f[ 1] =i m _fi el d_ ty pe _d e_ do cu m en t% 3A 14 7. * F ro m 2 01 4 on w ar ds , C N D C H n o lo ng er sp ec ifi es v io le nt a ct s. 9 U ni t o f a na ly si s: B od ily in ju ry (K ör pe rv er le tz un g) p er pe tr at ed b y ri gh t- w in g ac tiv is ts . S ou rc e: A us tr ia n Se cu ri ty S er vi ce ; U R L: h ttp :// w w w .b m i.g v. at /c m s/ bm i_ ve rf as su ng ss ch ut z/ . 10 U ni t o f a na ly si s: V io le nc e- re la te d in ci de nt s m ot iv at ed b y ri gh t- w in g ex tr em is m . S ou rc e: S w is s F ed er al In te lli ge nc e Se rv ic e; U R L: h ttp :// w w w .v bs .a dm in .c h/ in te rn et /v bs /e n/ ho m e/ do cu m en ta tio n/ pu bl ic at io n/ sn d_ pu bl .h tm l. A p p en d ix 1 . R ig h t- W in g a n d R a ci st V io le n ce in S ev en W es t E u ro p ea n C o u n tr ie s ISSN 2334-3745 Vo lu m e 10 , Is su e 3 P E R SP E C T IV E S O N T E R R O R IS M Ju ne 2 01 6 15 IS SN 2 33 4- 37 45 (O nl in e) 112 Explaining right-wing terrorism and violence in Western Europe: Grievances, opportunities, and polarization Jacob Aasland Ravndal Unpublished manuscript Abstract Why have some Western democracies experienced more right-wing terrorism and violence (RTV) than others? This question remains largely unanswered in existing research on the extreme right because (1) events data suitable for cross-national comparisons have been lacking, and (2) existing analyses fail to capture RTV’s causal complexity, which involve multiple causal paths (equifinality) comprising causal conditions that become sufficient for the outcome only in combination (conjunctural causation). To help fill these gaps, this paper uses new events data from the RTV dataset in a qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) research design, aiming to explain variation in the extent of RTV in 18 West European countries between 1990 and 2015. In doing so, the paper identifies two “causal recipes” that consistently distinguish countries with extensive RTV experience from those with low or moderate RTV experience. The first (North European) recipe involves the combination of high immigration, low electoral support for anti-immigration (radical right) parties, and extensive public repression of radical right actors and opinions. The second (South European) recipe involves the combination of socio-economic hardship, authoritarian legacies, and extensive left-wing terrorism and militancy. Notably, both recipes contain elements of “grievances” and “opportunities”, suggesting that these two theories, which are conventionally seen as contrasting, may be more fruitfully seen as complementary. Furthermore, a highly polarized conflict between far right activists and their enemies represents a third necessary condition for extensive RTV to occur. A key to combating violent extremism on the far right therefore lies in disrupting rather than accelerating such polarization mechanisms, suggesting that openness and dialogue might work better than public repression, stigmatization, or aggressive confrontation. Introduction Since the end of WWII, the threat posed by right-wing terrorism and violence (RTV) has varied considerably over time and across countries in Western Europe. Existing research shows that RTV comes in waves, and scholars seem to agree that the most recent wave began around the late 1980s and ended during the early 2000s in most countries (Bjørgo, 1997, pp. 74–75; 113 Koopmans, 1996; Merkl, 1995). Thus, following a relatively peaceful period, several experts are now warning that a new outbreak of RTV might be brewing in Western Europe (Bartlett & Birdwell, 2011; Fekete, 2016; Ramalingam, 2014). These concerns have in turn been intensified by the ongoing migration crisis, by a prolonged financial crisis, by rising Islamist terrorism, and by growing support for radical right parties. However, because our knowledge about RTV’s underlying causes remains limited, and because we lack updated events data, it is difficult to assess the credibility of such warnings, and to identify the most relevant countermeasures for dealing with this allegedly emergent threat. To help fill these gaps, this paper uses new events data from the RTV dataset (Ravndal, 2016) to investigate why some West European countries have experienced more RTV than others between 1990 and 2015.1 This question remains largely unanswered in existing research on the extreme right (Mudde, 2004, pp. 205–208). Although several scholars have looked into RTV’s underlying causes (e.g. Bjørgo, 1997; Hoffman, 1982; Koopmans, 1996; Sprinzak, 1995), their diverse propositions have yet to be investigated systematically across more than a handful of cases. In other words, we have been presented with a number of plausible hypotheses, but little systematic evidence has been offered to disprove or support them. Furthermore, in those few instances where scholars have been able to generate systematic events data, they tend to investigate the isolated effects of only one or two independent variables, such as unemployment (Falk et al., 2011), immigration (Garcia, 2015), or at best the interaction between the economy and immigration (McLaren, 1999). Yet there are reasons to believe that more complex explanatory models are required to explain consistently why RTV has been more extensive in some countries than in others. For example, grievances caused by high immigration may be relevant for explaining why countries such as Sweden and Germany have experienced extensive RTV. At the same time, immigration has (until the recent migration crisis) been limited in countries such as Italy and Spain where RTV has nevertheless been extensive, indicating equifinality (multiple causal paths to the same outcome). Furthermore, high immigration alone does not necessarily lead to extensive RTV, as illustrated by cases such as Switzerland and France, unless it is combined with other conditions, indicating conjunctural causation (conditions that only in combination become necessary or sufficient for an outcome). 1 By Western Europe, I mean all European countries that did not form part of the Eastern Bloc during the Cold War. 114 To resolve some of these problems, this paper applies qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) – a method designed precisely to capture causal complexity such as equifinality and conjunctural causation (Ragin, 2014, pp. 19–33; Schneider & Wagemann, 2013, pp. 78–79). More specifically, I use QCA to investigate how six causal conditions proposed as being conducive to RTV in existing research (immigration, socio-economic hardship, authoritarian legacies, radical right support, radical right repression, and left-wing terrorism and militancy) relate to the extent of RTV in 18 West European countries between 1990 and 2015. This analysis results in two “causal recipes”, each containing three causal conditions, the combination of which appears to fuel hostility, polarization, and violence.2 The first (North European) recipe involves the combination of high immigration, low electoral support for anti-immigration (radical right) parties, and extensive public repression of radical right actors and opinions. The second (South European) recipe involves the combination of socio-economic hardship, authoritarian legacies, and extensive left-wing terrorism and militancy. Notably, both recipes contain elements of grievances and opportunities, suggesting that these two theoretical approaches, which are conventionally seen as contrasting (Koopmans, 1996), may be more fruitfully seen as complementary (Bara, 2014). In addition, a highly polarized conflict between far right activists and their enemies represents a third necessary condition for extensive RTV to occur. Conceptually, I follow Bobbio’s (1996) classic distinction between those on the left who support egalitarian policies designed to reduce social inequality, and those on the right who regard social inequality – or hierarchical order – as inevitable, natural, or even desirable. Furthermore, unlike their moderate counterparts, members of the far right share an authoritarian inclination (Bobbio, 1996, pp. 72–80), that is, an inherent need for sameness, oneness, and submission to group authority, resulting in intolerance towards diversity and individual autonomy (Stenner, 2005), and some form of nativism or ethnic nationalism (Mudde, 2007, pp. 15–23). I also distinguish between on the one hand radical right actors who use conventional democratic means to gain political power, and on the other hand militants or extremists, who openly reject democracy and favour violent or other non-conventional means to generate 2 I have also experimented with statistical analysis using the number of deadly RTV events per country-year (N=450) as my dependent variable. Although several statistically significant relationships were discovered, different statistical models (the most relevant being a negative binominal count model) yielded different findings, most likely reflecting the causal complexity underlying the phenomenon under investigation (RTV), but also limited variation in the variables included in the analysis, making conventional statistical analysis less appropriate. 115 revolutionary change. Finally, I use the far right as a collective term comprising both radical and extreme actors when appropriate. The paper proceeds as follows. Part one combines RTV events data with other sources to illustrate cross-national differences in the extent of RTV in 18 West European countries between 1990 and 2015. Part two draws on existing theory and literature to identify the most relevant causal conditions for explaining this cross-national variation. Part three outlines how each condition included in my analysis has been measured and scored. Part four presents the results from my QCA analysis. In conclusion, the paper draws on these results to reflect on the paradox that countermeasures intended to constrain radical right politics appear to fuel extreme right violence, while countermeasures that may constrain extreme right violence would imply an advancement of radical right politics. RTV in post-1990 Western Europe A critical weakness in existing research on RTV in Western Europe has been a lack of systematic events data suitable for analysing cross-national variation. By comparison, research on RTV in the United States has progressed because systematic events data have been developed (Adamczyk et al., 2014; Chermak et al., 2013; Freilich et al., 2014; Kerodal et al., 2015). To overcome this challenge, this study uses new events data from the RTV dataset.3 Including only the most severe types of events, this dataset offers a modest but fairly consistent account of RTV in Western Europe between 1990 and 2015. More specifically, the dataset includes: (1) attacks with a deadly or near deadly outcome; (2) attacks involving active use of deadly weapons such as knives, firearms, and bombs; (3) major attack plots involving use of deadly weapons; (4) discoveries of bomb-making materials or major arms depositaries belonging to right-wing activists; and (5) other violent events that undoubtedly qualify as acts of terrorism. In particular, the dataset includes (nearly) all deadly RTV events. Considering that political and racist murders rarely occur in complete isolation from less severe forms of violence, such deadly events arguably also constitute a reasonably good indicator of right-wing violence more generally. The RTV dataset can therefore be used to compare frequencies of deadly events across time and space, and to make causal inferences about RTV more generally from these patterns with reasonable confidence. 3 The RTV dataset can be downloaded at: http://www.sv.uio.no/c-rex/rtv 116 Table 1 shows that deadly RTV events cluster around four countries in particular: Sweden, Germany, the United Kingdom, and Spain. Table 1. RTV attack frequencies and casualties Country RTV events Deadly RTV events (number killed) Deadly events per average million inhabitants 1990– 2015 Austria *23 1 (4) 0.1 Belgium 6 3 (5) 0.3 Denmark 19 1 (1) 0.2 Finland 8 - - France 16 9 (11) 0.1 Germany 122 82 (104) 1,0 Greece 55 6 (7) 0.6 Iceland - - - Ireland 4 3 (4) 0.8 Italy 99 5 (6) 0.1 Luxemburg - - - Netherlands 10 3 (3) 0.2 Norway 25 3 (79) 0.7 Portugal 3 3 (3) 0.3 Spain 39 22 (22) 0.5 Sweden 89 17 (20) 1.9 Switzerland 1 1 (1) 0.1 UK 59 31 (33) 0.5 Sum 578 190 (303) * All 23 events were carried out by one person: Franz Fuchs. Besides these four countries, Table 1 also shows that Italy and Greece appear to have experienced extensive amounts of mostly non-lethal RTV. Furthermore, a closer look at Italy and Greece’s records in the RTV dataset shows that regular events reports have only been available for limited periods, and that nearly all registered events cluster within these periods. A high number of events registered during limited periods indicates that Italy and Greece have likely experienced considerably more RTV between 1990 and 2015 than those events included in the RTV dataset, and thus considerably more RTV than most other West European countries. The RTV dataset clearly has its limitations, and inferences about cross-national variation must be drawn with caution, particularly when including non-lethal events. With that caveat in mind, it seems reasonable to argue that Sweden, Germany, the UK, and Spain have experienced considerably more RTV per capita than other West European countries (being mindful that 117 small countries with only a few deadly events, such as Norway and Ireland, score disproportionally high on the number of deadly events per capita). Furthermore, the high amounts of (mostly non-lethal) RTV events attributed to Italy and Greece during limited periods suggest that these two cases may also be considered as countries with extensive RTV experience. Evidence from alternative sources corroborates these claims. For example, the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance and the European Network Against Racism produce regular reports on racist violence in Europe.4 Although these reports lack systematic and comparable events data, they offer a qualitative assessment of racist violence in most West European countries. A systematic review of these reports shows that Sweden, Germany, the UK, Spain, Greece, and Italy are all portrayed as countries with extensive racist violence, and more so than any other West European country. Another relevant source is the Domestic Terrorism Victims (DTV) dataset (De la Calle & Sanchez-Cuenca, 2011). DTV documents victims of deadly terrorism in Western Europe 1966– 2005, including events motivated by the extreme right. Isolating post-1990 events and taking population size into account, Germany, the UK, Spain, and Sweden stand out, with far more RTV victims per capita than any other West European country. In addition, Greece has a higher number of victims per capita than any of the other remaining countries, while Italy does not stand out in this particular statistic. Finally, the internationally recognized non-governmental organization Human Rights Watch (HRW) has documented racist violence in Italy and Greece (Sunderland et al., 2012; Sunderland & Ward, 2011). Although lacking comparative perspectives, these reports suggest that both Italy and Greece have been marred by unregistered racist violence over the past decades. Ideally, similar reports would be available for all West European countries. However, it is reasonable to assume that the HRW’s case selection relies on the fact that Italy and Greece have experienced extensive amounts of mostly unreported violence, while most other West European countries either have better reporting mechanisms or have experienced less violence. In sum, the evidence presented here suggests that RTV in Western Europe clusters around six countries in particular: Sweden, Germany, the UK, Spain, Italy, and Greece. In the 4 See http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/ecri/ and http://enar-eu.org. 118 following, I discuss how this clustering might be explained using the existing RTV literature as a point of departure. Theoretical framework The existing RTV literature may be characterised as diverse, disorganized, and discontinuous, which is also reflected in existing reviews of it (Heitmeyer, 2003, 2005). A number of different and at times conflicting explanations of RTV have been proposed, including but not limited to immigration (Garcia, 2015), social isolation and disintegration (Heitmeyer, 1993), a search for meaning and purpose in life (Griffin, 2003), threat perceptions (Sprinzak, 1995), elite behaviour and public discourse (Koopmans, 1996), and apolitical factors such as low socio-economic status, identity formation, or criminal dispositions (Bjørgo, 1997). However, few of these explanations have been tested systematically using comparative designs. The first (and as far as I know only) attempt so far to explain cross-national variation in right-wing violence in Western Europe was published by Ruud Koopmans in 1996. In this study, Koopmans aims to test what he portrays as two contrasting theoretical models: the grievance model, which sees protest and mobilization as a result of grievances caused by increased immigration and feelings of anomie among the socially marginalized; and the opportunity model, which emphasizes the role of political institutions, elites, and parties in shaping mobilization opportunities for social movements (Koopmans, 1996). Koopmans merits recognition for having offered the first comparative cross-national study of this kind. However, his analysis leans on a rather cursory depiction of right-wing violence in only 8 of Western Europe’s 18 countries. In particular, he excludes highly relevant countries such as Italy, Spain, and Greece. He also compares events data from different datasets that cannot be compared because they rely on different definitions of right-wing violence, different data collection methods, and different types of sources (Bjørgo, 2003, pp. 793–794). Furthermore, by approaching these two competing models as mutually exclusive, Koopmans creates a potentially false dichotomy between grievances and opportunities – two aspects of reality that may well co-exist and influence the level of right-wing violence, not only as different causal paths to the same outcome (equifinality), but also as causal conditions that become sufficient for the outcome only in combination (conjunctural causation). Koopmans is forthright about the inherent ambiguity of his findings (Koopmans, 1996, pp. 199, 208). It is 119 therefore surprising that no one has attempted to conduct a similar study, only with more reliable data, or with a more appropriate research design. Aiming to do just that, this paper investigates how six causal conditions proposed as being conducive to RTV (immigration, socio-economic hardship, authoritarian legacies, radical right support, radical right repression, and left-wing terrorism and militancy) relate to the extent of RTV in 18 West European countries. My selection of causal conditions rests on three theoretical premises derived from existing research: (1) sufficient militant mobilization; (2) combining rather than contrasting grievances and opportunities; and (3) polarization. First premise: sufficient militant mobilization Based on a chronology of more than 3000 terrorist attacks in the United States between 1954 and 2004, the majority of which were right-wing, Hewitt found a strong relationship between the numbers of active militants, or what he labels “mobilized activists”, on the one hand, and levels of terrorism and violence on the other hand. At the same time, the number of unorganized sympathisers did not seem to influence terrorism and violence in the same way (Hewitt, 2003, p. 46). Assuming that these causal relationships apply also to the European context, a key condition to explain varying levels of terrorism and violence would be the number of active militants at any given time. Both grievances and opportunities come across as relevant in this regard. From the grievance side, factors such as immigration, modernization, and socio-economic hardship have been proposed as being conducive to extreme right mobilization and violence (Garcia, 2015; Heitmeyer, 1993; Lipset & Raab, 1970). However, this approach has been criticized by social movement scholars for failing to “explain the causal mechanisms that intervene between macro- causes and micro-behaviours” and for emphasizing conditions that in isolation are “neither necessary nor sufficient” for the outcome of interest (Caiani et al., 2012, p. 9). For example, one can easily find countries in Western Europe, such as Switzerland and France, where immigration has been extensive but where RTV has been low or moderate. From the opportunity side, social movement scholars have proposed looking at how political and discursive opportunities might shape militant mobilization. More specifically, extreme right mobilization has been proposed as more likely in countries where support for radical right parties is limited or blocked, thereby channelling people with far right sympathies into more extreme forms of activism (Koopmans, 1996), and in countries where former 120 authoritarian (fascist) experiences create favourable opportunities for militant mobilization (Gattinara & Froio, 2014). Some social movement scholars also argue that racist violence is more likely to occur when the political elites and the media create favourable discursive opportunities for the extreme right, most notably by framing immigrants as a societal threat (Koopmans, 1996; Koopmans & Olzak, 2004). The idea is that such discursive opportunities legitimize, and thus facilitate, extreme right mobilization and violence. However, while elites’ negative framing of immigrants may have contributed to racist violence in some countries, particularly during the early and mid-1990s, it does not explain why countries with a more restrictive public debate on immigration, such as Sweden, have nevertheless experienced extensive RTV (Jørgensen & Meret, 2012). Furthermore, although immigrants constitute the largest target group in the RTV dataset, they represent less than half of the registered victims. The second largest target group are left-wing activists. Other significant target groups include homosexuals and homeless people. Western political elites and the media have hardly framed these target groups as societal threats, and elite framing therefore offers a less helpful explanation of these types of violent attacks. Second premise: combining rather than contrasting grievances and opportunities Grievances and opportunities were originally introduced as useful ordering concepts for the study of war (Starr, 1978), and have since become recurrent themes in the civil war literature (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004). While conventionally approached as two competing theories, civil war scholars have more recently found that they may be more fruitfully approached as complementary because their implied causal mechanisms do not logically exclude one another (Ballentine & Sherman, 2003; Korf, 2005). By contrast, one may argue that opportunity- oriented explanations follow logically from grievances, and that grievances are necessary for explaining why some actors choose to exploit existing opportunities, while others remain inactive. The potential complementarity between grievances and opportunities (or incentives) has also been convincingly demonstrated empirically to explain civil war onset using QCA analysis (Bara, 2014). This method may therefore also provide a useful tool for investigating how elements from grievances and opportunities might combine to explain cross-national variation in RTV in Western Europe. However, unlike countries experiencing civil wars, a belligerent conflict is not necessarily present in all West European countries. To explain why some West 121 European countries have experienced considerably more RTV than others, a third component might therefore be fruitfully added to the grievance and opportunity models: polarization. Third premise: polarization My third and last premise concerns the nature and dynamics of ongoing conflicts between the far right and its enemies. This premise, too, builds on research derived from the civil war literature, but this time on the violent consequences of highly polarized conflicts (Montalvo & Reynal-Querol, 2005; Østby, 2008). Applying this concept to the West European context, I assume that extensive RTV is more likely to occur in countries with a highly polarized left– right conflict than in countries where the left–right divide is less pronounced. Polarization may in turn be accentuated via different mechanisms, such as violent confrontations between left- and right-wing militants, or through public repression and stigmatization of radical right actors and opinion, pushing some of the most ardent activists onto more extreme and clandestine paths. Such mechanisms are well documented in existing RTV research, although rarely analysed comparatively or systematically across cases. Notably, Sprinzak (1995, p. 21) argues that extreme right “violence, and gradually terrorism, will only emerge when the group involved feels increasingly insecure or threatened [by their enemies]”. A number of other studies have also documented these types of confrontational mechanisms, which appear to be of a universal nature (Bjørgo, 1997, pp. 211–235; Fangen, 2001, p. 54; Lööw, 1993; Merkl, 1995, p. 111; Weinberg, 1995). The most systematic exposition to date is provided by della Porta in her recent book Clandestine Political Violence (2013), tracing causal mechanisms such as “escalating policing” and “competitive escalation” (within and between extremist groups) across different contexts and ideological spaces, including the extreme right. Finally, several scholars have noted that repressive measures meant to curb radical right actors and opinions have a tendency to fuel more extreme forms of activism (Art, 2011, pp. 44– 49; Klandermans & Mayer, 2006, pp. 272–273; Minkenberg, 2006). These observations tie into a larger debate on the relationship between violence and repression (della Porta, 2014). They also tie into an ongoing debate on how to approach radical right parties, and whether repression and stigmatization of such parties and their sympathisers have the desired effects, or if such measures only contribute to further polarization (Van Spanje & Van Der Brug, 2007). On this note, existing research finds that, while high stigmatization might constrain recruitment, it also increases the inner spirit of extreme right groups (Simi & Futrell, 2009). Furthermore, different forms and degrees of stigmatization appear to have opposite effects on different types of 122 extreme right activists (Linden & Klandermans, 2006). While extensive repression and stigmatization might fuel violence and militancy, a complete absence of repression and stigmatization might also lead to the same outcome (given that a sizeable militant movement exists), as seems to have been the case in Russia (Enstad, 2015). High or low repression and stigmatization should in other words not be seen as mutually exclusive conditions, but rather as two alternative paths that may lead to a similar outcome (equifinality). Not all conditions proposed as being conducive to RTV come across as equally relevant for explaining cross-national variation. Furthermore, the number of causal conditions to be included in a QCA analysis should be kept at a moderate level (Schneider & Wagemann, 2013, pp. 276–277). Consequently, using the three premises discussed above to inform my selection, I have opted for the six conditions listed in Table 2. Table 2. Causal conditions included in the analysis Conditions Theoretical foundation Ethnic diversity or immigration Grievances Socio-economic hardship Grievances Radical right support Opportunities Authoritarian legacies Opportunities Left-wing terrorism and militancy Polarization Radical right repression Polarization Method - a short introduction to fuzzy set QCA QCA is a comparative method for the social sciences invented and developed by the American sociologist Charles Ragin (1987, 2000, 2008). To investigate causal complexity such as equifinality and conjunctural causation, correlation-based methods require extensive interaction modelling whose results may be difficult to interpret meaningfully once the number of interacting variables exceeds two or three. By contrast, QCA is specifically designed to capture such causal complexity (Ragin, 2014, pp. 19–33; Schneider & Wagemann, 2013, pp. 78–79). In QCA, both the outcome variable and the independent variables – or causal conditions in QCA terminology – are treated as partially overlapping “sets” in which cases may be members or not. For example, one may look at how the set of Western liberal democracies with extensive RTV experience (outcome variable) overlaps with the set of countries with high immigration 123 and the set of countries with authoritarian legacies, as illustrated by the Venn diagrams in Figure 1. By quantifying and then cross-analysing such set memberships in a truth table, QCA helps identify (combinations of) causal conditions that may be regarded as necessary or sufficient for the outcome. In the (imagined) example from Figure 1, we see that all countries with extensive RTV experience have experienced either an authoritarian regime, or high immigration, or both. However, we also see that none of these conditions are necessary for the outcome because they only cover a portion of the outcome set. Furthermore, because they also include cases outside the outcome set, they are not sufficient, and must be combined with additional conditions to become part of a consistent explanation. Figure 1. Venn diagrams illustrating set-theoretic reasoning Fuzzy-set QCA also allows cases to have partial set memberships, reflecting the often fuzzy boundaries of many social science concepts (Goertz, 2006), such as “democracy”. In doing so, the researcher assigns scores of between 0 and 1, where 1 means full membership, and 0 means no membership, while 0.5 represents the critical cut-off point separating those cases that are considered to be more in than out of the set, based on the researcher’s substantive and theoretical knowledge (Ragin, 2008, pp. 82–83). Because of the asymmetric nature of set relations, crossing the cut-off point has much greater inferential implications than moving up or down on either side of this point. To critically assess any given fuzzy scores, one should therefore primarily consider which cases are above or below the cut-off point, before examining the relative position of cases to each other on either side of the fuzzy scale. 124 Finally, in terms of causal explanation, it should be noted that uncovering necessary or sufficient relationships between sets does not automatically imply that they are causally related. In fact, from a pure mathematical perspective, such set relationships say nothing about causality (Thiem & Baumgartner, 2016). However, given that the selection of causal conditions is theoretically informed, QCA represents a systematic method for identifying empirically consistent (combinations of) conditions whose implied causal mechanisms may then be further investigated using process-tracing or similar case study methods (Schneider & Rohlfing, 2013). As such, QCA may be complemented by case studies in the same way as large-N statistical analyses may be (Sambanis, 2004). However, as opposed to large-N statistical analysis, QCA may also be used for medium- and even low-N studies. Measurements The following paragraphs outline how my outcome variable and causal conditions have been measured and scored according to standard QCA procedures. Each condition has been calibrated as a four-level fuzzy variable with the following thresholds: 1.0 / 0.75 / 0.25 / 0.0. A more detailed description, including tables with raw scores and case distributions for all measurements, the negated set analysis, and robustness test scores, are found in Appendix I. Outcome variable My outcome variable is the extent of RTV in each West European country between 1990 and 2015. To obtain a reliable measurement of this variable, I combine a quantitative measure with a qualitative assessment. My quantitative measure is the number of deadly RTV events per million inhabitants in each country between 1990 and 2015. Deadly RTV events arguably represent the most definitive and reliable measure of RTV. However, as explained previously, some countries have experienced extensive non-lethal violence, but relatively few deaths, and it would be misleading to place such cases below the cut-off point. In addition, small countries with only a handful of deadly events would get disproportionally high scores if only the number of deadly events per capita counted. I therefore use a second qualitative assessment to inform and adjust the ranking resulting from my quantitative measure. This qualitative assessment is based on a variety of sources documenting RTV across Western Europe, most notably events data from the RTV dataset, but also national hate crime statistics on right-wing violence (see Appendix II), as well as existing reports and literature on racist violence in different West European countries (see Appendix III). The cut-off point is set at 0.5 deadly events per million inhabitants, at which point a gap appears in the distribution of cases, effectively separating 125 Spain and the UK (both 0.5) from Belgium and Portugal (both 0.3). Appendix I gives a more detailed explanation of how each case has been scored. Causal conditions Ethnic diversity or immigration (diversity) has been operationalized as a macro condition (one that combines two measures) using the logical OR operator to combine measures of ethnic diversity with asylum seeker frequencies. I use the OR operator because low scores on one of these measures become less meaningful if the score on the other measure is high (violent far right activists do not seem to care about foreigners’ citizenship status). My measure of ethnic diversity relies on Eurostat’s (2014) figures for the relative share of a country’s population born outside the EU – a type of measure used in previous research on ethnic diversity (Lolle & Torpe, 2011). Asylum seeker frequencies are based on Eurostat data documenting the number of asylum seekers registered annually between 1990 and 2014 in each country. Note that I have intentionally left out figures for 2015, when the migration crisis hit Europe with full force. The reason is that one may expect a temporal lag between increased immigration and militant mobilization and violence. Therefore, including these latest figures might give a misleading impression about the effects of immigration on RTV. Cut-off points and interval levels are in both measures based on case distributions, as well as a few cases whose raw scores indicate a middle position, but which are generally considered as having experienced either high ethnic diversity (the UK) or high immigration (Germany and Denmark). Socio-economic hardship (hardship) was measured using Eurostat’s so-called “at risk of poverty or social exclusion” variable, reflecting a population’s share of people either at risk of poverty, or severely materially deprived, or living in a household with a very low work intensity.5 Hardship’s fuzzy scores are based on each country’s average AROPE scores in the period 2004-2014 (data on previous years are not available), and high and low thresholds are set according to the case distribution and the positions of cases known for their good (e.g. Norway) or bad (e.g. Greece) socio-economic performance. The cut-off point was set at 25 per cent, at which point a gap appears in the distribution of cases, effectively separating Spain (26) from the UK (24). Radical right support (support) was measured using data compiled by Minkenberg (2015, p. 8). Data have been added for seven cases not included in Minkenberg’s study: Iceland, 5 See http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/People_at_risk_of_poverty_or_social_exclusion 126 Ireland, Luxemburg, Portugal, Spain, Finland and Greece – countries where radical right parties have been electorally irrelevant, except for more recently in Finland (Finns Party) and Greece (Golden Dawn). I use 5-percent intervals based on the average percentage of votes given to radical right parties in parliamentary elections between 1990 and 2014. The cut-off point is set at 10 percent, at which point a gap appears in the distribution of cases, effectively separating Belgium (10.2) from the Netherlands (6.7). This cut-off point is also based on the theoretical expectation that support for radical right parties should exceed 10 percent to discourage alternative and more extreme forms of mobilization. Authoritarian legacies (legacies) was measured using a mini-survey sent to a group of experts on former authoritarian regimes, asking them to rank West European countries according to their authoritarian experiences and legacies.6 More specifically, I asked them to rank countries on a 4-value scale where the full membership score (1.0) is given to countries still heavily influenced by extensive authoritarian experiences. The more in than out score (0.75) is given to countries with significant authoritarian experience still influencing parts of the population. The more out than in score (0.25) is given to countries that have some authoritarian experience, but are being influenced to a lesser extent by that experience today. Finally, the fully out score (0) is given to countries with insignificant or no authoritarian experience. Interim Nazi governments during WWII have not been considered as a relevant experience here because they arguably fuelled more resistance than support. Radical right repression (repression) was measured using relevant academic accounts, most notably Art’s (2011, pp. 44–49) discussion of repressive versus permissive environments for radical right parties in Europe, van Spanje and van der Brug’s (2007) research on ostracism of anti-immigration parties; and Bleich’s (2007; Bleich & Lambert, 2013) research on government responses to hate crimes and racist associations in West European countries. Some countries included in my analysis are not referred to in these studies, primarily because they never had any prominent radical right parties. Such cases (e.g. Spain and Iceland) have been assigned the 0 score, while being mindful that extensive repression might have existed if radical right parties were more prominent, and that the non-existence of such parties could be interpreted as a result of extensive repression. The full membership score (1.0) is given to countries where existing academic accounts leave little doubt about a repressive environment. The more in than out score (0.75) is given to countries where existing academic accounts 6 This ranking exercise was given to relevant researchers at the Norwegian Center for Studies of Holocaust and Religious Minorities: http://www.hlsenteret.no/english/ 127 portray somewhat milder forms of repression, or to countries that have evolved from a repressive towards a more permissive environment, or the other way around. The more out than in score (0.25) is given to countries for which existing academic accounts testify to some but no consistent repression. Finally, the fully out score (0) is given to countries described as mostly permissive or not mentioned in existing academic accounts. Left-wing terrorism and militancy (aggression) has been operationalized using three different measures: (1) left-wing terrorism 1990–2004 as indicated by the TWEED and DTV datasets; (2) left-wing terrorism and militancy 2006–2015 as portrayed by Europol’s annual Terrorism Trend and Situation (TE-SAT) reports; and (3) a mini-survey conducted among contemporary left-wing militants ranking their own movement’s size and visibility in different West European countries.7 The full membership score (1) is given to countries that score high on all three measures. The more in than out score (0,75) is given to countries that score high on two of three measures. The more out than in score (0,25) is given to countries that score high on one of three measures. Finally, the fully out score (0) is given to countries with low scores on all three measures. All fuzzy scores are presented in Table 3: Table 3. Fuzzy score matrix Country RTV Diversity Hardship Support Legacies Repression Aggression AUT 0.25 1 0 1 1 0 0 BEL 0.25 1 0.25 0.75 0.25 0.75 0 DEN 0.25 0.75 0 0.75 0 0 0.25 FIN 0.25 0 0 0.25 0 0 0 FRA 0.25 0.75 0 0.75 0.25 0.75 0.25 GER 1 0.75 0.25 0 1 1 0.75 GRE 0.75 0.75 1 0 1 0 1 ICE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 IRE 0.25 0.75 0.75 0 0 0 0 ITA 0.75 0.25 0.75 0.75 1 0 0.75 LUX 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 NED 0.25 0.75 0 0.25 0 0.75 0 NOR 0.25 1 0 0.75 0 0 0 POR 0 0.25 0.75 0 1 0 0 SPA 0.75 0.75 0.75 0 1 0 0.75 SWE 1 1 0 0 0 1 0.25 SWI 0.25 1 0 1 0 0.25 0 UK 0.75 0.75 0.25 0 0 0.75 0 7 This survey was given over e-mail via an intermediary person. All respondents were informed about who and what the survey was for. 128 Analysis and results Any QCA analysis should begin by searching for necessary (non-trivial) conditions. The fsQCA software has a specific function for the necessity analysis which should be conducted independently from the truth table analysis (Schneider & Wagemann, 2013, pp. 69–75). Table 4 shows the scores produced by this necessity analysis. Table 4. Analysis of necessary conditions Condition Consistency Coverage diversity 0.86 0.50 hardship 0.45 0.68 ~support* 0.86 0.53 legacies 0.55 0.62 repression 0.52 0.71 aggression 0.52 0.94 * ~ symbolizes set negation, in this case the set of countries with no or low radical right support These results suggest that none of the conditions included in my analysis are necessary for RTV (which would require consistency and coverage scores at least above 0.9). In fact, these results illustrate RTV’s causal complexity. Conditions with fairly high consistency scores (diversity and ~support) have low coverage scores, meaning that the outcome set constitutes a relatively small subset of these two conditions. In other words, while diversity (grievances) and ~support (opportunities) may constitute important preconditions for right-wing violence in some cases, they must be combined with other conditions to become part of a consistent explanation, indicating conjunctural causation. Conversely, the only condition with a high coverage score (aggression), scores low on consistency, suggesting that left-wing terrorism and militancy may be relevant for some but not all cases in the outcome set, indicating equifinality. This brings us to the test for sufficiency, designed precisely to capture these types of causal complexity. The most critical measure of the sufficiency analysis – solution consistency – expresses the combined consistency of the proposed causal recipes derived from a truth table analysis. In other words, do the proposed combinations of conditions consistently explain the outcomes across the cases involved in the analysis? The second measure – solution coverage – expresses how much of the outcome set is being covered by these proposed causal recipes. The consistency cut-off level decided by the researcher also influences solution consistency and coverage scores. In my case, the truth table generated by the fsQCA software leaves two possible cut-off options: 1.0, including four of the six cases that are more in than out of my outcome set; or 0.82, including all six cases plus one case (the Netherlands) that is more out 129 than in (0.25) of my outcome set. Setting the cut-off level at 1.0 logically yields higher solution consistency (0.93 for the intermediate solution) but lower solution coverage (0.45 for the intermediate solution).8 Conversely, setting the cut-off level at 0.82 yields a somewhat lower but still acceptable solution consistency score (0.88 for the intermediate solution) and a higher solution coverage score (0.76 for the intermediate solution), as illustrated by Table 5. Table 5. Solution terms from the intermediate solution Causal recipes Raw coverage Unique coverage Consistency Frequency cut-off: 1.00 Consistency cut-off: 0.82 Assumptions: diversity*hardship*~support*legacies*repression*aggression → rtv repression*~support*diversity 0.45 0.41 0.87 aggression*hardship*legacies 0.34 0.31 0.91 Solution coverage: 0.76 Solution consistency: 0.88 Opting for the 0.82 cut-off level, two causal recipes (intermediate solution) are derived from the logical minimization performed by the fsQCA software (* symbolizes the AND operator, → symbolizes sufficiency):9 diversity*~support*repression → RTV hardship*legacies*aggression → RTV If we look at the different cases covered by these two recipes, an interesting geographical pattern emerges: the first recipe covers North European countries with extensive RTV (Sweden, the United Kingdom, and Germany) while the second recipe covers South European countries with extensive RTV (Italy, Spain and Greece). In the first recipe, grievances caused by problems related to high immigration or diversity appear to have become particularly pronounced in a handful of North European countries that also lacked influential anti- immigration (radical right) parties during the period under investigation (1990–2015), thereby creating mobilization opportunities for the extreme right. Such militant mobilization has in turn been fuelled by extensive public repression and stigmatization of radical right actors and 8 The fsQCA software offers three solutions: complex, parsimonious, and intermediate, reflecting different degrees of simplifying and theoretical assumptions. I prefer the intermediate solution, where the researcher’s theoretical assumptions are used to calculate logical remainders, that is, logically possible rows that are consistent with the empirical data fed into the analysis, but lacking empirical cases. 9 I have changed the order of the conditions according to the logical direction of the assumed causal path. 130 opinions in countries such as Sweden, Germany and the UK (Art, 2011, p. 48; E. Bleich, 2007; Van Spanje & Van Der Brug, 2007). While such repression and stigmatization may discourage some people from joining radical and extreme right groups, it may also push some of the most ardent activists onto more clandestine and revolutionary paths, ultimately leading to violence and terrorism. In the second recipe, grievances caused by socio-economic hardship combined with the legacies of former authoritarian regimes create opportunities for militant mobilization on both sides of the political spectrum, intensifying an already polarized left–right divide. Once a sufficient number of militants have been mobilized on both sides, a reciprocal spiral of violence and terrorism is then likely to follow (Weinberg, 1995; Weinberg & Eubank, 1987). These dynamics are also echoed by the RTV dataset, most notably by the Italian and Spanish cases, where a majority of registered attacks have targeted left-wing militants as opposed to most other countries where immigrants constitute the largest target group. While attacks against left-wing militants in Greece are less covered by the RTV dataset (most likely because of limited data), several reports describe an ongoing street war between the militant left and the militant right in Greece (Faiola, 2014; Spillius, 2012) – a conflict that according to local experts is best understood in light of Greece’s former authoritarian regime (Sotiris, 2012). The continuity of these “old” left–right political cleavages is also indicated by the fact that Italy, Spain and Greece still have active communist parties (sometimes with parliamentary representation), a rare phenomenon in the rest of Western Europe (March & Mudde, 2005). Uncertainty and robustness What might we infer from these findings and are they robust? Importantly, the explorative character of QCA analysis implies provisional results that should always be followed by additional case studies and/or statistical analysis (Schneider & Wagemann, 2010, p. 400). Considering the causal distance between many of the conditions included in my analysis and actual terrorism and violence, more in-depth case studies tracing the causal mechanisms implied by each recipe are therefore needed before drawing any conclusions with confidence. It is beyond the scope of this macro-comparative analysis to provide such detailed case studies, which would require different types of data and methods, including inside information generated by ethnographic studies and in-depth interviews. With regards to robustness, Schneider and Wagemann (2013, pp. 284–295) propose three types of robustness tests for QCA analysis: (1) changing calibration thresholds; (2) changing 131 consistency levels for truth table rows; and (3) adding or dropping cases. The general rule is that the analysis can be regarded as reasonably robust if slightly adjusting any of these three elements does not result in substantive changes in the solution formulas’ parameters of fit (consistency and coverage scores) or in the composition of the solution formulas. Thus, to experiment with different calibration thresholds, I ran a robustness test where the cut-off points for diversity, hardship and support (my frequency-based conditions) were determined by the median score rather than by the case distribution and the position of a few key cases, and where the intervals were set to be equally large. This test gave fairly similar results as in my original analysis, except that hardship was added to the North European recipe, because the UK was included in the set of countries with socio-economic hardship with these alternative calibration thresholds. In addition, a third causal recipe mainly reflecting the German case was derived from this alternative analysis, combining all the elements from the other two recipes except for hardship, but with a unique coverage of only 0.07. The solution consistency score of these three recipes was 0.95, while the solution coverage score was 0.59. This robustness test thus suggests that socio-economic hardship may be more important than suggested by my original analysis, but only if we accept that the UK experienced considerable socio-economic hardship between 1990 and 2015, which is debatable. I therefore consider my original findings as reasonably robust after having performed this test. Regarding consistency cut-off levels, I have already described how different consistency cut-off levels (1.0 versus 0.82) yielded different parameters of fit, especially on solution coverage, because the 1.0 cut-off level included only four of six cases from the outcome set. By setting the consistency cut-off point at 1.0, and thereby defining the 0.82 row (containing Sweden, the UK, and the Netherlands) as insufficient for the outcome, the “North European” causal recipe is replaced by a new recipe that is substantially reconcilable with the original recipe (because diversity * ~support * repression are still included) but more restrictive because two conditions are added to the recipe (legacies and aggression). Conversely, by including the 0.82 row, all six cases from my outcome set are included plus the Netherlands, which is the only fully inconsistent case, being a full member of the North European recipe, but with an RTV score of only 0.25. As such, the Netherlands represents an interesting case for further investigation (perhaps the Dutch liberal mindset is a barrier against RTV?). The QCA convention is not to include rows with a consistency of lower than 0.75. Excluding a 0.82 row therefore makes little sense, and, considering that in doing so, one of the proposed recipes 132 remains identical and the second substantially reconcilable, I consider my original findings to be reasonably robust after having performed this test. The final robustness test (dropping or adding cases) entails certain practical barriers in terms of finding relevant cases. To be sure, by dropping some of the most contradictory cases, such as Portugal (legacies + hardship but aggression = 0) or the Netherlands, my consistency and coverage scores would indeed improve. Adding East European cases is not an option for the time being, because comparable RTV data are lacking, perhaps with the exception of Russia where RTV has definitely been extensive since 1990 (Arnold, 2010; Laryš & Mareš, 2011). However, considering Russia’s current semi-autocratic regime and recent political history, this case may not fit well into the theoretical framework used here to explain RTV in the context of Western liberal democracy. Finally, the United States represents a relevant case with available RTV data (Freilich et al., 2014). However, in the Unites States, RTV appears to occur under somewhat different conditions (more emphasis on religion, survivalism, and anti-federalism) than in Western Europe. Summing up, despite being fairly robust, the findings presented here should be seen as provisional rather than definite, and the analysis would benefit from being completed by case studies or statistical analysis documenting variation over time (inherently difficult with QCA). As such, the analysis may serve as a useful point of departure for future more fine-grained RTV research. Conclusion Existing research on the extreme right offers few consistent explanations of why RTV has been more extensive in some countries than in others. To help fill this gap, this paper used new RTV events data in a QCA research design. This analysis arrived at two causal recipes, each containing three causal conditions, the combination of which appears to fuel hostility, polarization, and violence. First, there is a North European recipe that involves the combination of high immigration, low electoral support for anti-immigration (radical right) parties, and extensive public repression of radical right actors and opinions. Second, there is a South European recipe that involves the combination of socio-economic hardship, authoritarian legacies, and extensive left-wing terrorism and militancy. Notably, both recipes contain elements of “grievances” and “opportunities”, suggesting that these two theories portrayed as 133 contrasting by Koopmans (1996) in his pioneering study of extreme right violence, may be more fruitfully seen as complementary. The North European recipe does provide some support to Koopmans’s study, in particular that the relationship between radical right support and RTV may (under certain conditions) be negative. However, unlike Koopmans theory, in which such limited support must combine with elites’ negative framing of immigrants to trigger racist violence, my findings suggest that it is rather elites’ negative framing of radical right actors and opinions that distinguishes countries with extensive RTV (e.g. Sweden and Germany) from those with moderate or low RTV experience (e.g. Denmark and Switzerland). As such, this finding challenges the dominant view on how the public discourse on immigration might influence extreme right mobilization and violence. It suggests that a predominantly pro-immigration elite perceived as hostile towards people with anti-immigration concerns might be exploited by the extreme right to mobilize new followers and to motivate terrorism and violence. This argument ties into a more general finding emerging from this analysis, suggesting that a highly polarized conflict between far-right activists and their enemies, including leftists, political elites, and the public at large, represents a necessary condition for extensive RTV to occur. This finding supports previous research that highlight polarization and threat perceptions as important for explaining RTV (Sprinzak, 1995), political violence more generally (della Porta, 2013), and intolerant attitudes and behaviours across a wide range of countries and contexts (Stenner, 2005). By implication, a potentially effective cure for RTV could be to limit immigration and be more accepting towards radical right actors and opinions. However, considering the inherently intolerant policies that these actors seek to implement, this cure comes with a bitter aftertaste from a liberal democratic perspective. This liberal’s dilemma has no easy solution, as is also demonstrated in previous studies (Kirshner, 2014; Pedahzur, 2001). It warrants a demanding balancing act between upholding core liberal democratic principles such as the freedom of expression and political freedoms for all people, including those on the far right, on the one hand, and trying to prevent any form of antidemocratic or violent behaviour on the other. The ongoing migration crisis is currently fuelling fear, uncertainty, and polarization in a number of West European countries. A main ambition must be to stop such fears from translating into intolerant and violent behaviour, and thereby risking a new outbreak of RTV in this region. 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Boulder: Westview Press. 138 Explaining right-wing terrorism and violence in Western Europe: Grievances, opportunities, and polarization Appendices I–III Contents Appendix I.............................................................................................................................. 166 Outcome variable – measurements and fuzzy scores ......................................................... 166 Causal conditions – measurements and fuzzy scores ......................................................... 169 Analysis of the negated set ................................................................................................. 173 Robustness test scores ........................................................................................................ 175 Appendix II – national hate crime statistics ........................................................................... 178 Appendix III – A selection of country-specific sources on RTV in Western Europe............ 179 165 Appendix I Outcome variable – measurements and fuzzy scores Table 1. RTV scores Country Quantitative measure Qualitative assessment Fuzzy score Deadly events/ deaths Deadly events per capita Sweden 17/20 1.9 Besides having Western Europe’s highest score on the number of deadly RTV events per capita, Sweden also scores high on non-lethal RTV events. In addition, extensive RTV is documented by hate crimes statistics from SÄPO and BRÅ (see Appendix II) as well as in a number of reports and academic studies (see Appendix III). 1.0 Germany 82/104 1.0 Besides having Western Europe’s second highest score on the number of deadly events per capita, extensive RTV in Germany is well documented in official hate crime statistics (see Appendix II) and in existing reports and literature (see Appendix III). 1.0 Greece 6/7 0.6 Besides scoring relatively high on the number of deadly RTV events per capita, extensive RTV in Greece is indicated by its high number of non-lethal RTV events, and documented in several reports and studies, in particular from Human Rights Watch and the online crowd- surfing site “The City At Times of Crisis” (see Appendix III). 0.75 UK 31/33 0.5 Besides scoring relatively high on the number of deadly RTV events per capita, extensive RTV in the UK is indicated by many non- lethal RTV events, and documented in several reports and studies, in particular from the Institute of Race Relations and Human Rights Watch (see Appendix III). 0.75 Spain 22/22 0.5 Besides scoring relatively high on the number of deadly RTV events per capita, extensive RTV in Spain is documented in a number of reports and studies, in particular from 0.75 166 Moviemiento Contra la Intolerancia (see Appendix III). Italy 5/6 0.1 Although Italy has experienced relatively few deadly RTV events per capita, extensive RTV is indicated by its high number of non-lethal RTV events, and documented in several reports and studies, in particular from Human Rights Watch (see Appendix III). In addition, Italian anti-fascists provide detailed reports on RTV on their national website (see Appendix III). 0.75 Ireland 3/4 0.8 Ireland’s high score on the number of deadly RTV events per capita must be balanced against its low (absolute) number of deadly events (three). Literature on RTV in Ireland is limited, but existing reports indicate moderate to low amounts (see Appendix III). 0.25 Norway 3/79 0.7 Norway’s high score on the number of deadly RTV events per capita must be balanced against its low (absolute) number of deadly events (three). Furthermore, existing reports and datasets suggest that RTV has been modest or even low in Norway since the more violent 1990s (see Appendix III). 0.25 Belgium 3/5 0.3 Apart from Belgium’s moderate score on number of deadly events per capita, few non- lethal RTV events have been registered. Reports on RTV in Belgium are limited, but testify to moderate to low amounts (see Appendix III). This is confirmed in private correspondence between the author and representatives from the “Interfederal Centre for Equal Opportunities”. 0.25 Netherlands 3/3 0.2 The Netherlands scores low on the number of deadly events per capita, and few non-lethal RTV events have been registered. However, several existing reports and studies, in particular from the Anne Frank House, indicate moderate amounts of RTV (see Appendices II and III). 0.25 Denmark 1/1 0.2 Notwithstanding Denmark’s low score on the number of deadly events per capita, several non-lethal RTV events have been registered. In addition, official hate crime reports and 0.25 167 existing literature testify to moderate amounts of RTV (see Appendices II and III). Austria 1/4 0.1 Notwithstanding Austria’s low number of deadly events per capita, several RTV events have been registered. However, all events were committed by the same lone actor. Apart from RTV events data, annual hate crime statistics and existing reports indicate moderate amounts of RTV (see Appendices II and III). 0.25 France 9/11 0.1 France scores low on the number of deadly events per capita, and few non-lethal RTV events have been registered. However, annual hate crime statistics and existing reports indicate moderate to low amounts of RTV (see Appendices II and III). 0.25 Switzerland 1/1 0.1 Switzerland scores low on the number of deadly events per capita, and few non-lethal RTV events have been registered. However, annual hate crime statistics and existing literature indicate moderate to low amounts of RTV (see Appendices II and III). 0.25 Finland - - Although no deadly RTV events have been registered in Finland between 1990 and 2015, existing hate crime statistics and literature indicate moderate amounts of RTV, particularly during the 1990s (see Appendix III). 0.25 Portugal 3/3 0.3 Apart from the three deadly RTV events registered in Portugal, no other RTV events have been registered. Furthermore, the few existing reports on RTV in Portugal testify to low amounts (see Appendix III). 0,0 Iceland - - No deadly or non-lethal RTV events have been registered in Iceland. Existing literature on RTV in Iceland is limited, but indicates low amounts of RTV (see Appendix III). 0,0 Luxemburg - - No deadly or non-lethal RTV events have been registered in Iceland. Existing literature on RTV in Luxemburg is limited, but indicates low amounts of RTV (see Appendix III). 0,0 168 Causal conditions – measurements and fuzzy scores Table 2. Ethnic diversity Fuzzy score Share of population born outside the EU Case distribution 1.0 > 10 % Luxemburg (11), Sweden (10.6), Switzerland (10.6) 0.75 7–9.9 % Austria (9.1), Netherlands (8.6), Spain (8.5), Belgium (8.4), Greece (8.4), France (8.3), UK (8.1), Norway (7.6), Germany (7.4) 0.25 5–6.9 % Denmark (6.7), Italy (6.5), Portugal (6.1), Ireland (5.9) 0.0 < 5 % Iceland (3.9), Finland (3.5) Source: Eurostat, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/images/7/79/Foreign- born_population_by_country_of_birth%2C_1_January_2014_%28%C2%B9%29_YB15.png Table 3. Immigration Fuzzy score Average number of annual asylum seekers per million inhabitants 1991–2014 Case distribution 1.0 > 1500 Sweden (3044), Switzerland (2913), Luxemburg (2247), Austria (2084), Norway (1977), Belgium (1890) 0.75 900–1500 Netherlands (1487), Germany (1294), Denmark (1119), Ireland (947) 0.25 500–900 UK (741), France (676), Greece (665) 0.0 < 500 Finland (490), Italy (234), Iceland (188), Spain (151), Portugal (34) Source : Eurostat, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics- explained/index.php/Asylum_statistics Table 4. Ethnic diversity and immigration combined score (logical or) Fuzzy score Case distribution 1.0 Sweden, Switzerland, Luxemburg, Austria, Norway, Belgium 0.75 Netherlands, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Greece, France, UK, Ireland, 0.25 Italy, Portugal 0.0 Iceland, Finland 169 Table 5. Socio-economic hardship Fuzzy score Risk of poverty or social exclusion average scores 2004–2012 Case distribution 1.0 < 30 Greece (31) 0.75 25–29 Italy (27), Portugal (26), Ireland (26), Spain (26) 0.25 20–24 UK (24), Belgium (21) Germany (20) 0.0 > 20 France (19), Austria (18), Denmark (17), Switzerland (17), Luxemburg (17), Finland (17), Sweden (15), Netherlands (15), Norway (15), Iceland (13) Source: Eurostat, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics- explained/index.php/People_at_risk_of_poverty_or_social_exclusion Table 6. Radical right support Fuzzy score Average percentage of parliamentary votes for radical right parties 1990–2014 Case distribution 1.0 > 20 % Switzerland (22.8), Austria (21.3) 0.75 10–19.9 % Norway (15.0), Italy (12.1), France (11.7), Denmark (11.0) Belgium (10.2) 0.25 5–9.9 % Netherlands (6.7), Finland (5.1) 0.0 < 5 % Greece (3.6), Sweden (3.5), UK (2.1), Germany (2.0), Portugal (0.1), Iceland (0), Ireland (0), Luxemburg (0), Spain (0) Sources: Minkenberg, M. (2015). “Pattern, Process, Policies: Conceptualizing Radical Right Impact”. Paper presented at the 2015 ECPR General Conference, Montreal. Retrieved from http://ecpr.eu/Filestore/PaperProposal/37f31939-2ecb-4a71-9026-928ef890c1ed.pdf; The European Election and Referendum Database, available at http://www.nsd.uib.no/european_election_database/about/about_data.html. 170 Table 7. Authoritarian legacies Fuzzy score Threshold Case distribution 1.0 Countries still heavily influenced by extensive authoritarian experiences Austria, Germany, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain 0.75 Countries with significant authoritarian experience still influencing parts of the population No cases 0.25 Countries that have some authoritarian experience, but are being influenced by that experience to a lesser extent today Belgium, France 0 Countries with insignificant or no authoritarian experience Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Ireland, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, UK Source: Survey sent to scholars working at the Norwegian Center for Studies of Holocaust and Religious Minorities, asking them to rank West European countries according to their Authoritarian experiences and legacies. Table 8. Radical right repression Fuzzy score Threshold Case distribution 1.0 Existing academic accounts leave little doubt about a repressive environment Germany, Sweden 0.75 Existing academic accounts portray somewhat milder forms of repression, or a country that has evolved from a repressive towards a more permissive environment, or the other way around Belgium, France, the Netherlands, UK 0.25 Existing academic accounts testify to some but no consistent repression Switzerland 0.0 Described as mostly permissive or not mentioned in existing academic accounts Austria, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Ireland, Luxemburg, Norway, Portugal, Spain Sources: Art, D. (2011). Inside the Radical Right: the Development of Anti-Immigrant Parties in Western Europe, pp. 44–49. New York: Cambridge University Press; Van Spanje, J., & Van Der Brug, W. (2007). “The Party as Pariah: The Exclusion of Anti-Immigration Parties and its Effect on their Ideological Positions”, West European Politics, 30(5), 1022–1040; Bleich, E. (2007). “Hate Crime Policy in Western Europe: Responding to Racist Violence in Britain, Germany, and France”, American Behavioral Scientist, 51(2), 149–165; Bleich, E., & Lambert, F. (2013). “Why Are Racist Associations Free in Some States and Banned in Others? Evidence from 10 Liberal Democracies”, West European Politics, 36(1), 122–149. 171 Table 9. Left-wing terrorism and militancy Fuzzy score Threshold Case distribution (TWEED and DTV events combined score / number of years mentioned in Europol reports 2006–2015 / number of times ranked as high by leftist militants) 1.0 High score on all three measures Greece (49/9/4) 0.75 High score on two of three measures Italy (15/10/1), Spain (14/10/0) Germany (7/5/4) 0.25 High score on one of three measures Denmark (1/1/3), Sweden (0/0/4), France (0/0/2) 0 Only low scores Netherlands (2/0/1), UK (1/0/1), Austria (0/0/0), Belgium (0/0/0), Norway (0/0/0), Switzerland (0/0/0), Finland (0/0/0), Iceland (0/0/0), Ireland (0/0/0), Luxemburg (0/0/0), Portugal (0/0/0) Sources: TWEED dataset, available at http://folk.uib.no/sspje/tweed.htm; DTV dataset, available at https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=hdl:1902.1/14717; Europol’s annual Terrorism Trend and Situation (TE-SAT) reports, available at https://www.europol.europa.eu/activities-services/main-reports/eu-terrorism-situation-and- trend-report; survey sent to five left-wing militants, asking them to rank their own movement’s size and visibility in different West European countries (one activist refused to answer). 172 Analysis of the negated set A common and potentially interesting exercise in QCA analysis is to use the conditions from the analysis of the outcome set to analyse its negated version, in this case the set of West European countries that did not experience extensive RTV between 1990 and 2015. Due to the asymmetrical nature of set relations, the negated set should ideally be analysed using its own set of casual conditions deemed as most relevant for explaining the non-occurrence of the outcome of interest. However, conditions deemed as relevant for explaining its occurrence may also be relevant for explaining its non-occurrence. The necessity analysis of my negated set resulted in the following scores: Table 10. Analysis of the negated set Condition Consistency Coverage ~aggression 0.98 0.75 ~repression 0.86 0.73 ~hardship 0.86 0.70 ~legacies 0.77 0.72 support 0.49 0.84 ~diversity 0.42 0.82 Notably, both ~diversity and support receive low consistency scores, suggesting that these two conditions derived from the grievance and opportunity models offer inconsistent explanations of the non-occurrence of RTV. At the same time, ~hardship (grievances), ~legacies (opportunities), ~aggression (polarization) and ~repression (polarization) receive far better consistency scores. However, their relatively poor coverage scores show that they only explain subsets of the negated outcome set. These findings thus call for a more complexity-oriented analysis investigating different combinations of conditions to arrive at an explanation that covers more cases. This brings us to the sufficiency analysis. The intermediate solution of a sufficiency analysis of my negated set includes four causal recipes, as illustrated by Table 11. 173 Table 11. Solution terms from negated set analysis Causal recipes Raw coverage Unique coverage Consistency Frequency cut-off: 1.00 Consistency cut-off: 0.86 Assumptions: ~diversity*~hardship*support*~legacies*~repression*~aggression → ~rtv ~aggression*~repression*~diversity 0.40 0.93 0.94 ~aggression*~repression*~legacies 0.63 0.14 0.90 ~aggression*~legacies*support*~hardship 0.40 0.93 0.94 ~aggression*~repression*support*~hardship 0.40 0.07 0.94 Solution coverage: 0.91 Solution consistency: 0.89 As indicated by the necessity analysis, all four recipes include ~aggression, while three of the four include ~repression. Furthermore, combined with the other conditions derived from the grievances and opportunity models (diversity, hardship, support, and legacies) these four recipes offer a fairly consistent explanation of why most West European countries did not experience extensive RTV between 1990 and 2015, covering as many as 11 of 12 cases (once again, the Netherlands is the most inconsistent case). Interestingly, they do not represent a negated mirror image of the causal recipes derived from my analysis of the outcome set, but rather new and unique combinations of conditions, thereby illustrating the asymmetric nature of set relations – that is, the fact that the occurrence and non-occurrence of a phenomenon require qualitatively different explanations. However, considering that the conditions included in this negated set analysis were originally intended to explain the occurrence of RTV rather than its non-occurrence, one should be careful in drawing final conclusions from these results. 174 Robustness test scores To experiment with different calibration thresholds, a robustness test was carried out in which the cut-off points for diversity, hardship and support (conditions based on frequency distributions) were determined by the median score rather than by the case distribution and the position of a few key cases, and the intervals were set to be equally large, again irrespective of how the cases clustered. These robustness test scores are presented in Tables 12–16, and the solution terms derived from these new scores in Table 17. My interpretation of this test is found in the last section of the original manuscript. Table 12. Ethnic diversity (median) Fuzzy score Share of population born outside the EU Case distribution 1.0 9.2–11 % Luxemburg (11), Sweden (10.6), Switzerland (10.6) 0.75 7.3–9.1 % Austria (9.1), Netherlands (8.6), Spain (8.5), Belgium (8.4), Greece (8.4), France (8.3), UK (8.1), Norway (7.6), Germany (7.4) 0.25 5.4–7.2 % Denmark (6.7), Italy (6.5), Portugal (6.1), Ireland (5.9) 0.0 3.5–5.3 % Iceland (3.9), Finland (3.5) Source: Eurostat, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/images/7/79/Foreign- born_population_by_country_of_birth%2C_1_January_2014_%28%C2%B9%29_YB15.png Table 13. Immigration (median) Fuzzy score Average number of annual asylum seekers per million inhabitants 1991–2014 Case distribution 1.0 2293–3044 Sweden (3044), Switzerland (2913), 0.75 1540–2292 Luxemburg (2247), Austria (2084), Norway (1977), Belgium (1890), 0.25 787–1539 Netherlands (1487), Germany (1294), Denmark (1119), Ireland (947) 0.0 34–786 UK (741), France (676), Greece (665), Finland (490), Italy (234), Iceland (188), Spain (151), Portugal (34) Source: Eurostat, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Asylum_statistics 175 Table 14. Ethnic diversity and immigration combined score (median) Fuzzy score Case distribution 1.0 Sweden, Switzerland, Luxemburg, 0.75 Austria, Norway, Belgium Netherlands, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Greece, France, UK 0.25 Italy, Portugal, Ireland 0.0 Iceland, Finland Table 15. Socio-economic hardship (median) Fuzzy score Risk of poverty or social exclusion (AROPE) Eurostat average score 2004– 2012 Case distribution 1.0 28–31 Greece (31) 0.75 23–27 Italy (27), Portugal (26), Ireland (26), Spain (26), UK (24) 0.25 18–22 Belgium (21), Germany (20), France (19), Austria (18) 0.0 13–17 Denmark (17), Switzerland (17), Luxemburg (17), Finland (17), Sweden (15), Netherlands (15), Norway (15), Iceland (13) Source: Eurostat, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics- explained/index.php/People_at_risk_of_poverty_or_social_exclusion Table 16. Radical right support (median) Fuzzy score Average percentage of parliamentary votes for radical right parties 1990–2014 Case distribution 1.0 17.2–22.8 % Switzerland (22.8), Austria (21.3) 0.75 11.4–17.19 % Norway (15.0), Italy (12.1), France (11.7) 0.25 5.7–11.39 % Denmark (11.0) Belgium (10.2), Netherlands (6.7) 0.0 0–5.69 % Finland (5.1), Greece (3.6), Sweden (3.5), UK (2.1), Germany (2.0), Portugal (0.1), Iceland (0), Ireland (0), Luxemburg (0), Spain (0) Sources: Minkenberg, M. (2015). “Pattern, Process, Policies: Conceptualizing Radical Right Impact”. Paper presented at the 2015 ECPR General Conference, Montreal. Retrieved from http://ecpr.eu/Filestore/PaperProposal/37f31939-2ecb-4a71-9026-928ef890c1ed.pdf; The European Election and Referendum Database, available at http://www.nsd.uib.no/european_election_database/about/about_data.html. 176 Table 17. Solution terms from robustness test Causal recipes Raw coverage Unique coverage Consistency Frequency cut-off: 1.00 Consistency cut-off: 1.00 Assumptions: diversity*hardship*~support*legacies*repression*aggression → rtv aggression*hardship*legacies 0.38 0.31 0.92 repression*~support*hardship*diversity 0.21 0.14 1.00 aggression*repression* legacies*diversity 0.14 0.07 1.00 Solution coverage: 0.59 Solution consistency: 0.94 177 A p p en d ix I I – n at io n al h at e cr im e st at is ti cs T ab le 1 . R ig ht -w in g an d ra ci st v io le nc e in s ev en W es t E ur op ea n co un tr ie s Y ea r S w ed en 1 1 S w ed en 2 2 D en m ar k 1 3 D en m ar k 2 4 N et he rl an ds 1 5 N et he rl an ds 2 6 G er m an y7 F ra nc e8 A us tr ia 1 9 S w it ze rl an d1 0 20 00 29 83 99 8 10 20 01 15 46 70 9 9 20 02 13 75 77 2 25 20 03 28 7 60 75 9 13 20 04 8 41 5 77 6 39 53 20 05 27 6 70 95 8 23 52 20 06 27 9 60 10 47 26 64 20 07 26 5 57 98 0 26 37 58 20 08 50 13 64 10 42 18 8 24 20 09 31 9 9 25 89 1 25 14 32 20 10 25 7 6 9 76 2 5 32 13 20 11 14 5 4 3 75 5 4 41 18 20 12 19 14 2 2 80 2 7 39 25 20 13 22 17 2 80 1 7 11 13 20 14 * * 99 0 * 14 10 1 U n it o f an al ys is : S ev er e ab us e m ot iv at ed b y w hi te p ow er i d eo lo gy . S ou rc e: A nn ua l re po rt s by t he S w ed is h S ec ur it y S er vi ce ( S Ä P O ), h tt p: // w w w .s ak er he ts po lis en .s e/ pu bl ik at io ne r. ht m l. 2 U n it o f an al ys is : V io le nt c ri m es m ot iv at ed b y w hi te p ow er i d eo lo gy . S ou rc e: A nn ua l re po rt s by T h e S w ed is h N at io na l C ou nc il f or C ri m e P re ve nt io n (B rå ), h tt p: // w w w .b ra .s e/ br a/ br a- in - en gl is h/ ho m e/ cr im e- an d- st at is tic s/ ha te -c rim e. ht m l. * F ro m 2 01 4 on w ar ds , B rå n o lo ng er p ro vi d es i nf or m at io n ab ou t vi o le nt c ri m es c om m it te d by t h e ex tr em e ri gh t sp ec if ic al ly . 3 U n it o f an al ys is : R ac ia ll y m ot iv at ed v io le nt i nc id en ts – m ay a ls o in cl ud e ra ci al v io le nc e be tw ee n m in or it y gr ou ps ( 20 03 –2 00 6 m an ua ll y co un te d by t h is a ut ho r) . S ou rc e: A nn ua l re po rt s by t he D an is h S ec re t S er vi ce ( P E T ), ht tp s: // w w w .p et .d k/ Pu bl ik at io ne r/ RA CI -in db er et ni ng .a sp x. * In 2 01 4, P ET d id n ot p ub lis h th ei r an nu al h at e cr im e re po rt . 4 U n it o f an al ys is : P ol it ic al ly ( ri g ht a nd l ef t) m ot iv at ed v io le nt i n ci de nt s. S ou rc e: A nn ua l re po rt s by t he D an is h S ec re t S er vi ce ( P E T ) ht tp s: // w w w .p et .d k/ Pu bl ik at io ne r/ RA CI -in db er et ni ng .a sp x. 5 U n it o f an al ys is : V io le nt a ss au lt s m ot iv at ed r ac is m a nd /o r th e ex tr em e ri gh t. S ou rc e: A nn ua l re po rt ( R ac is m a nd E xt re m is m M on it or ) by t he A nn e F ra nk H ou se , ht tp :/ /w w w .a nn ef ra nk .o rg /e n/ Ed uc at io n/ M on ito r- H om ep ag e/ Ra ci sm -m on ito r/ . 6 U n it o f an al ys is : V io le nt a ss au lt s m ot iv at ed r ac is m a nd /o r th e ex tr em e ri gh t. S ou rc e: R ep or t b y th e A nn e Fr an k H ou se , “ Se co nd re po rt o n ra ci sm , a nt i- S em it is m , a nd r ig ht -w in g ex tr em is t vi o le nc e in th e N et he rl an ds ”, h tt p: // w w w .v er w ey -jo nk er .n l/ do c/ vi ta lit ei t/ 73 52 % 20 A nn e% 20 Fr an k% 20 En gl is h% 20 M on ito r% 20 W eb .p df . 7 U n it o f an al ys is : V io le nt a ss au lt s (g ew al tt a te n ) co m m it te d by r ig h t- w in g ac ti vi st s. S ou rc e: A nn ua l re po rt s by G er m an S ec ur it y S er vi ce , ht tp :/ /w w w .v er fa ss un gs sc hu tz .d e/ de /o ef fe nt lic hk ei ts ar be it/ pu bl ik at io ne n/ ve rf as su ng ss ch ut zb er ic ht e. 8 U n it o f an al ys is : V io le nt a tt ac ks ( a ct io n es v io le nt es ) co m m it te d by r ig ht -w in g ac ti vi st s. S ou rc e: A nn al r ep or ts b y La C om m is si on n at io na le c on su lta tiv e de s dr oi ts d e l’ ho m m e (C N C D H ), ht tp :/ /w w w .c nc dh .fr /f r/ pu bl ic at io ns /? f[ 0] =i m _f ie ld _t he m e% 3A 13 9& f[ 1] =i m _f ie ld _t yp e_ de _d oc um en t% 3A 14 7. * F ro m 2 01 4 on w ar ds , C N D CH n o lo ng er s pe ci fie s vi ol en t a ct s. 9 U n it o f an al ys is : B od il y in ju ry ( K ör pe rv er le tz un g ) pe rp et ra te d by r ig ht -w in g ac ti vi st s. S ou rc e: A us tr ia n S ec ur it y S er vi ce , ht tp :/ /w w w .b m i.g v. at /c m s/ bm i_ ve rf as su ng ss ch ut z/ . 10 U n it o f an al ys is : V io le nc e- re la te d in ci de nt s m ot iv at ed b y ri gh t- w in g ex tr em is m . S ou rc e: S w is s F ed er al I nt el li ge nc e S er vi ce ,h tt p: // w w w .v bs .a dm in .c h/ en /d oc um en ts /s ea rc h. ht m l. 17 8 Appendix III – A selection of country-specific sources on RTV in Western Europe Austria Austrian Security Service, annual hate crime reports, available at: http://www.bmi.gv.at/cms/bmi_verfassungsschutz/. European Network Against Racism (ENAR), “Racist Violence in Austria”, available at: http://cms.horus.be/files/99935/MediaArchive/publications/Racist%20Violence%20Rep ort%20Austria%20-%20online.pdf. European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (2005). “National Analytical Study on Racist Violence and Crime”, available at: http://fra.europa.eu/en/country- data/2012/racist-violence-15-eu-member-states. European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI), country monitoring reports, available at: http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/ecri/library/publications.asp. European Network Against Racism (ENAR), shadow reports on racism in Europe, available at: http://www.enar-eu.org/Shadow-Reports-on-racism-in-Europe-203. Belgium Interfederal Center for Equal Opportunities, “Discrimination, Diversité, Rapport Annuel 2011”, available at: http://unia.be/fr/publications-et-statistiques/publications/rapport- annuel-2011-discrimination-diversite . Anti-Fascistisch Front (AFF): http://aff.skynetblogs.be/. European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (2005). “National Analytical Study on Racist Violence and Crime”, available at: http://fra.europa.eu/en/country- data/2012/racist-violence-15-eu-member-states. European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI), country monitoring reports, available at: http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/ecri/library/publications.asp. European Network Against Racism (ENAR), shadow reports on racism in Europe, available at: http://www.enar-eu.org/Shadow-Reports-on-racism-in-Europe-203. Denmark Danish Secret Service (PET), annual hate crime reports, available at: https://www.pet.dk/Publikationer/RACI-indberetning.aspx. 179 European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (2005). “National Analytical Study on Racist Violence and Crime”, available at: http://fra.europa.eu/en/country- data/2012/racist-violence-15-eu-member-states. European Network Against Racism (ENAR), “Racist Violence in Denmark”, available at: http://cms.horus.be/files/99935/MediaArchive/Racist%20Violence%20Denmark%20- %20online.pdf. European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI), country monitoring reports, available at: http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/ecri/library/publications.asp. European Network Against Racism (ENAR), shadow reports on racism in Europe, available at: http://www.enar-eu.org/Shadow-Reports-on-racism-in-Europe-203. Larsen, Chris Holmsted (2012). “Politisk ekstremisme i Danmark”, University of Roskilde, avialable at: http://libsoc.dk/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Politisk-ekstremisme-i- Danmark-april-2012.pdf. Karpantschof, R. & Mikkelsen, F. (2016). “The Rise and Transformation of the Radical Right Movement in Denmark, 1980–2015”. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, advance online publication, available at: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/1057610X.2016.1234313. Demos (2012), “Højreesktremisme: Blodig Alvor,” Demos Nyhedsbrev No. 106, available at: http://demos.dk/nyhedsbrev/1190-demos-nyhedsbrev-nr-106-hojreekstremisme-blodig- alvor-sp-431. Bjørgo, T. (1997). Racist and Right-Wing Violence in Scandinavia: Patterns, Perpetrators, and Responses. Oslo: Tano Aschehoug. Finland European Network Against Racism (ENAR), “Racist Violence in Finland”, available at: http://cms.horus.be/files/99935/MediaArchive/Racist%20Violence%20Report%20Finla nd%20-%20online.pdf. Peutere, Lara (2009). “Hate Crimes Reported To The Police In Finland, 2008”, available at https://www.theseus.fi/bitstream/handle/10024/86712/raportti_85_en.pdf?sequence=1. European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (2005). “National Analytical Study on Racist Violence and Crime”, available at: http://fra.europa.eu/en/country- data/2012/racist-violence-15-eu-member-states. EXPO (2012). “Organiserad intolerans i Finland och Sverige”, available at: http://expo.se/www/download/Organiserad%20intolerans%20i%20Finland%20och%20 Sverige_SLUTLIG.pdf. Pekonen (ed.) (1999). The New Radical Right in Finland, The Finnish Political Science Association. Virtanen, T. (1999). “Racist Violence from the Part of Skinheads: The Expression of Hate in Finland”, in Youth, Racist Violence and Anti-racist Responses in the Nordic Countries. 180 Helsinki: The Finnish Youth Research Society, available at http://www.nuorisotutkimusseura.fi/images/julkaisuja/virtanen/1/1.html. European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI), country monitoring reports, available at: http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/ecri/library/publications.asp. European Network Against Racism (ENAR), shadow reports on racism in Europe, available at: http://www.enar-eu.org/Shadow-Reports-on-racism-in-Europe-203. France La Commission nationale consultative des droits de l’homme (CNCDH), annual hate crime reports, available at: http://www.cncdh.fr/fr/publications/?f[0]=im_field_theme%3A139&f[1]=im_field_type _de_document%3A147. European Network Against Racism (ENAR), “Racist Violence in France”, available at: http://cms.horus.be/files/99935/MediaArchive/Racist%20Violence%20Report%20Franc e%20-%20online.pdf. European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (2005). “National Analytical Study on Racist Violence and Crime”, available at: http://fra.europa.eu/en/country- data/2012/racist-violence-15-eu-member-states. European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI), country monitoring reports, available at: http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/ecri/library/publications.asp. European Network Against Racism (ENAR), shadow reports on racism in Europe, available at: http://www.enar-eu.org/Shadow-Reports-on-racism-in-Europe-203. Germany German Security Service, annual hate crime reports, available at: http://www.verfassungsschutz.de/de/oeffentlichkeitsarbeit/publikationen/verfassungssch utzberichte. European Network Against Racism (ENAR), “Racist Violence in Germany”, available at http://cms.horus.be/files/99935/MediaArchive/Racist%20Violence%20Report%20Germ any%20-%20online.pdf. European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (2005). “National Analytical Study on Racist Violence and Crime”, available at: http://fra.europa.eu/en/country- data/2012/racist-violence-15-eu-member-states. Wikipedia, “Victims of Deadly Right-Wing Extremist Crimes in Germany”, available at http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Todesopfer_rechtsextremer_Gewalt_in_Deutschland. Köhler, D. (2017). Right-Wing Terrorism in the 21st century. The ‘National Socialist Underground’ and the History of Terror from the Far-Right in Germany. Abingdon, Oxon; New York: Routledge, available at: https://books.google.no/books?id=1w8xDQAAQBAJ&redir_esc=y 181 Benček, D. & Strasheim, J. (2016). “Refugees Welcome? A Dataset on Anti-Refugee Violence in Germany”. Research & Politics 3(4), available at: http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/2053168016679590. Köhler, D. (2014). “German Right-Wing Terrorism in Historical Perspective. A First Quantitative Overview of the ‘Database on Terrorism in Germany (Right-Wing Extremism)’ – DTGrwx’ Project”. Perspectives on Terrorism, 8(5), http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/377. Koopmans, R. & Olzak, S. (2004). “Discursive Opportunities and the Evolution of Right- Wing Violence in Germany”. American Journal of Sociology 110(1): 198–230, available at: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/386271?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents. McLaren, L. M. (1999). “Explaining Right-Wing Violence in Germany: A Time Series Analysis”. Social Science Quarterly, 80(1), 166–180, available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/42863880. Willems, H. (1995). “Development, Patterns, Causes of Violence against Foreigners in Germany: Social and Biographical Characteristics of Perpetrators and the Process of Escalation”. Terrorism and Political Violence, 7(1), 162–181, available at: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09546559508427288. Heitmeyer, W. (1993). “Hostility and Violence towards Foreigners in Germany”. In T. Bjørgo & R. Witte (Eds.), Racist Violence in Europe (pp. 17–28). Basingstoke: Macmillan Press. European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI), country monitoring reports, available at: http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/ecri/library/publications.asp. European Network Against Racism (ENAR), shadow reports on racism in Europe, available at: http://www.enar-eu.org/Shadow-Reports-on-racism-in-Europe-203. Greece European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (2005). “National Analytical Study on Racist Violence and Crime”, available at: http://fra.europa.eu/en/country- data/2012/racist-violence-15-eu-member-states. Sunderland, J., Cossé, E., Ward, B., & Human Rights Watch (Organization). (2012). “Hate on the Streets: Xenophobic Violence in Greece”, Human Rights Watch, available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/greece0712ForUpload.pdf. The City At Times of Crisis: Map of Attacks on Migrants in Athens, available at: http://map.crisis-scape.net/page/index/2. European Network Against Racism (ENAR), “Racist Violence in Greece”, available at: http://cms.horus.be/files/99935/MediaArchive/Racist%20Violence%20Report%20Gree ce%20-%20online.pdf. European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI), country monitoring reports, available at: http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/ecri/library/publications.asp. 182 European Network Against Racism (ENAR), shadow reports on racism in Europe, available at: http://www.enar-eu.org/Shadow-Reports-on-racism-in-Europe-203. Iceland European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI), country monitoring reports, available at: http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/ecri/library/publications.asp. Italy European Network Against Racism (ENAR), “Racist Violence in Italy”, available at: http://cms.horus.be/files/99935/MediaArchive/Racist%20Violence%20Report%20Italy %20-%20online.pdf European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (2005). “National Analytical Study on Racist Violence and Crime”, available at: http://fra.europa.eu/en/country- data/2012/racist-violence-15-eu-member-states. Gattinara, P. C. & Froio, C. (2014). “Discourse and Practice of Violence in the Italian Extreme Right: Frames, Symbols, and Identity-Building in CasaPound Italia”. International Journal of Conflict and Violence 8(1), available at: http://www.ijcv.org/earlyview/339.pdf. Sunderland, J., Ward, B., & Human Rights Watch (Organization). (2011). “Everyday Intolerance: Racist and Xenophobic Violence in Italy”. Human Rights Watch, available at https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/italy0311WebRevised.pdf. Andrisani, P. & Naletto, G. (2009). “Rapporto sul razzismo in Italia”. Manifestolibri, available at: http://www.cronachediordinariorazzismo.org/wp- content/uploads/rapportosulrazzismo.pdf. InfoAntifa, extensive oveview of “fascist actions”, available at http://www.ecn.org/antifa/article/357/AZIONI%20FASCISTE European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI), country monitoring reports, available at: http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/ecri/library/publications.asp. European Network Against Racism (ENAR), shadow reports on racism in Europe, available at: http://www.enar-eu.org/Shadow-Reports-on-racism-in-Europe-203. Ireland European Network Against Racism (ENAR), “Racist Violence in Ireland”, available at: http://cms.horus.be/files/99935/MediaArchive/Racist%20Violence%20Report%20Irelan d%20-%20online.pdf European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (2005). “National Analytical Study on Racist Violence and Crime”, available at: http://fra.europa.eu/en/country- data/2012/racist-violence-15-eu-member-states. 183 Institute of Race Relations, “Racial Violence in Ireland”, available at: http://www.irr.org.uk/news/racial-violence-in-ireland/ European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI), country monitoring reports, available at: http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/ecri/library/publications.asp. European Network Against Racism (ENAR), shadow reports on racism in Europe, available at: http://www.enar-eu.org/Shadow-Reports-on-racism-in-Europe-203. Luxemburg European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (2005). “National Analytical Study on Racist Violence and Crime”, available at: http://fra.europa.eu/en/country- data/2012/racist-violence-15-eu-member-states. European Network Against Racism (ENAR), “Responding to Racism in Luxemburg”, available at: http://cms.horus.be/files/99935/MediaArchive/pdf/luxembourg_en.pdf. European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI), country monitoring reports, available at: http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/ecri/library/publications.asp. European Network Against Racism (ENAR), shadow reports on racism in Europe, available at: http://www.enar-eu.org/Shadow-Reports-on-racism-in-Europe-203. Netherlands European Network Against Racism (ENAR), “Racist Violence in the Netherlands”, available at: http://cms.horus.be/files/99935/MediaArchive/Racist%20Violence%20The%20Netherla nds%20-%20online.pdf. Dutch Secret Service (2014). “Right-Wing Extremism and the Extreme Right in the Netherlands – Intelligence report”, available at https://www.aivd.nl/publish/pages/2327/brochure_extreemrechts_engels.pdf European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (2005). “National Analytical Study on Racist Violence and Crime”, available at: http://fra.europa.eu/en/country- data/2012/racist-violence-15-eu-member-states. Police Academy of the Netherlands, annual hate crime reports (POLDIS), available at: http://www.burojansen.nl/observant/discrimineert-de-politie-2/ Anne Frank House, Racism and Extremism Monitor, available at: http://www.annefrank.org/en/Education/Monitor-Homepage/Racism-monitor/. Anne Frank House (2012). “Second Report on Racism, Anti-Semitism, and Right-Wing Extremist Violence in the Netherlands”, available at: http://www.annefrank.org/ImageVaultFiles/id_17077/cf_21/AFS_VJI_Report_2012_En glish.PDF 184 Braun, R. (2011). “The Diffusion of Racist Violence in the Netherlands: Discourse and Distance”. Journal of Peace Research, 48(6), 753–766, available at: http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0022343311419238. Dutch Ministry of Justice (1997). “Racist Violence in the Netherlands: Nature and Extent, Judicial Reaction, Offender Types”, available at https://english.wodc.nl/onderzoeksdatabase/w00160-racistisch-geweld-in-nederland- aard-en-omvang-strafrechtelijke-afdoening-dadertypen.aspx. van Donselar, J. (1993). “The Extreme Right and Racist Violence in the Netherlands”. In T. Bjørgo & R. Witte (Eds.), Racist Violence in Europe (pp. 46–62). Basingstoke: Macmillan Press. European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI), country monitoring reports, available at: http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/ecri/library/publications.asp. European Network Against Racism (ENAR), shadow reports on racism in Europe, available at: http://www.enar-eu.org/Shadow-Reports-on-racism-in-Europe-203. Norway Jan Oskar Engene, “Politisk Vold i Norge 1945-2012”, unpublished dataset on political violence in Norway. Norwegian Police, national hate crimes statistics 2007–2016, available at: https://www.politi.no/oslo/strategier_og_analyser/statistikker_og_analyser/Tema_1793. xml Lunde, H. (1999). “Racist Violence and Harassment in Norway”, in T. Virtanen (ed.), Youth, Racist Violence and Anti-racist Responses in the Nordic Countries. Finnish Youth Research Society, available at: http://www.nuorisotutkimusseura.fi/images/julkaisuja/virtanen/3/6.html. Bjørgo, T. (1997). “Racist and Right-Wing Violence in Scandinavia: Patterns, Perpetrators, and Responses” (Doctoral Thesis). Oslo: Tano Aschehoug. Fangen, K. (2001). “Pride and Power: a Sociological Study of the Norwegian Radical Nationalist Underground Movement”, doctoral thesis, University of Oslo. European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI), country monitoring reports, available at: http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/ecri/library/publications.asp. Portugal European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (2005). “National Analytical Study on Racist Violence and Crime”, available at: http://fra.europa.eu/en/country- data/2012/racist-violence-15-eu-member-states. European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI), country monitoring reports, available at: http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/ecri/library/publications.asp. 185 European Network Against Racism (ENAR), shadow reports on racism in Europe, available at: http://www.enar-eu.org/Shadow-Reports-on-racism-in-Europe-203. Spain European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (2005). “National Analytical Study on Racist Violence and Crime”, available at: http://fra.europa.eu/en/country- data/2012/racist-violence-15-eu-member-states. European Network Against Racism (ENAR), “Racist Violence in Spain”, available at: http://cms.horus.be/files/99935/MediaArchive/Racist%20Violence%20Spain%20- online.pdf Moviemiento Contra la Intolerancia, provides extensive reporting on right-wing extremist hate crimes: www.movimientocontralaintolerancia.com Confederación General del Trabajo, “Ojos que no ven” (documentary about victims of deadly right-wing extremist crimes in Spain, available at: http://www.rojoynegro.info/articulo/cultura-libre/ojos-no-ven-documental-creative- commons-sobre-las-victima-del-fascismo-espana Ibarra, E. (2011). “La España racista: la lucha en defensa de las víctimas del odio”. Ediciones Temas de Hoy European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI), country monitoring reports, available at: http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/ecri/library/publications.asp. European Network Against Racism (ENAR), shadow reports on racism in Europe, available at: http://www.enar-eu.org/Shadow-Reports-on-racism-in-Europe-203. Sweden Swedish Security Service (SÄPO), annual hate crime reports 2000–2004, available at: http://www.sakerhetspolisen.se/publikationer.html The Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention (Brå), annual hate crime reports 2004– 2014, available at: http://www.bra.se/bra/bra-in-english/home/crime-and-statistics/hate- crime.html Swedish Ministry of Justice (2014). “Våldsbejakande extremism i Sverige: nuläge och tendenser”, report on violent extremism in Sweden, available at: http://www.regeringen.se/contentassets/a76118e6b4fc49bfba45804f6bb3c956/valdsbeja kande-extremism-i-sverige--nulage-och-tendenser-ds-20144 Swedish Security Service (SÄPO) (2009). 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work_7yl2cvu37bf77jxmivxjr3wmti	----	247 ARTICLES Journal of Intercollegiate Sport, 2016, 9, 247 -267 © 2016 Human Kinetics, Inc. Toomey is with the Norton School of Family and Consumer Sciences, Family Studies and Human Development Program, The University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ. McGeorge and Carlson are with Human Development and Family Science, North Dakota State University, Fargo, ND. Address author correspondence to Russell B. Toomey at toomey@email.arizona.edu. http://dx.doi.org/10.1123/jis.2015-0049 A Mixed-Methods Pilot Study of Student Athlete Engagement in LGBTQ Ally Actions Russell B. Toomey University of Arizona Christi R. McGeorge and Thomas S. Carlson North Dakota State University Reports of sexual prejudice and heterosexism in sports are still pervasive, despite growing acceptance of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer (LGBTQ) persons in the U.S. Yet, few studies have investigated how and why college student- athletes engage in LGBTQ-focused ally actions (e.g., standing up and speaking out against sexual prejudice; showing support at LGBTQ events). This mixed-methods pilot study describes the development and psychometric testing of the Engagement in LGBTQ Ally Actions in Sports Scale, in addition to analyses of two open-ended questions that provided supplementary insight into what it means to collegiate athletes to be an ally to the LGBTQ community. The convenience sample included 159 college student-athletes from two public universities (M age = 20.67 years, SD = 1.56). Findings indicated that the Engagement in LGBTQ Ally Actions in Sports Scale demonstrated strong internal consistency, validity, and equivalence across gender. Qualitative analyses suggested that college student-athletes define being an ally to the LGBTQ community as involvement in advocacy behaviors and supporting LGBTQ teammates; yet, important gender differences emerged in these findings. Keywords: ally engagement; heterosexism; measurement; mixed methods; sexual prejudice; sports. Attitudes toward lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer (LGBTQ) people in the United States have become more tolerant and accepting in recent years (McCormack, 2012; Pew Research Center, 2015). Yet, data still suggest that the collegiate sports context may be an unwelcoming environment for LGBTQ student-athletes (Denison & Kitchen, 2015; Gay, Lesbian and Straight Education http://dx.doi.org/10.1123/jis.2015-0049 248 Toomey, McGeorge, and Carlson JIS Vol. 9, No. 2, 2016 Network [GLSEN], 2013; Gill, Morrow, Collins, Lucey, & Schultz, 2010; Rankin, Merson, Sorgen, McHale, Loya, & Oseguera, 2011). For example, over half of U.S. athletes surveyed had heard disparaging jokes about LGBTQ people while participating in sports (Denison & Kitchen, 2015). Notably, while unwelcoming environments may be the status quo for LGBTQ athletes, several recent developments may represent a tipping point toward more acceptance of sexual minorities and gender diversity in the sporting context. First, in 2010, the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) adopted an enumerated nondiscrimination policy that included sexual orientation and gender expression, and released the first comprehensive resource focused on LGBTQ athletes for use by college athletic departments (Champions of Respect, Griffin & Taylor, 2013). Second, a handful of professional and collegiate athletes (for example, Kye Allums [U.S. college basketball], Megan Rapinoe [U.S. Olympic soccer], Michael Sam [National Football League], and Wade Davis [National Football League]) have pub- licly disclosed their sexual orientation while participating in their respective sports or after retirement. Finally, in the past ten years, several not-for-profit organizations have come to fruition with missions focused exclusively on fostering affirmative climates for LGBTQ athletes (e.g., Athlete Ally; Go! Athletes; You Can Play). A focus for some of these not-for-profit organizations is the training and identification of LGBTQ allies in sports (e.g., Athlete Ally, Taylor, 2015). Tradi- tionally, the term ally has been defined as a member of the “dominant or majority group who works to end oppression in his or her personal and professional life through support of, and as an advocate for, the oppressed population” (Washington & Evans, 1991, p. 195). By definition, the focus of allyship should be on actions (i.e., defining allyship as a verb) rather than identity (i.e., defining allyship as a noun). Thus, college student-athlete LGBTQ “allies” should theoretically be acting in ways that reduce oppression related to sexual orientation and gender diversity in the sports context (Taylor, 2015). This mixed-methods pilot study examined the psychometric properties of the Engagement in LGBQ Ally Actions in Sports Scale, which assesses college student-athletes’ level of engagement in LGBTQ ally-typed behaviors. Further, via qualitative data, this study examined what it means to be an ally to LGBTQ persons from the perspectives of college student-athletes as well as the antecedents for engaging in LGBTQ ally-focused behavior. For the purposes of this study, ally behaviors include a range of actions such as providing support to LGBTQ team- mates, friends, or family members to engagement in behaviors aimed at reducing oppression and promoting social justice for LGBTQ populations. The Unique Context of Collegiate Sports While research on LGBTQ ally identities and behaviors does exist (e.g., Asta & Vacha-Haase, 2013; Russell, 2011), it has not focused specifically on the experiences of college student-athletes. A focus on college, rather than high school or professional sports, is warranted given that college is a central context where civic development occurs (Flanagan & Levine, 2010). Yet, research has documented that student athletes, particularly those in prestigious Division I schools, have little time for campus activi- ties and academic responsibilities (Gayles & Hu, 2009). Further, Hoffman, Kihl, and Student Athlete Engagement in LGBTQ Ally Actions 249 JIS Vol. 9, No. 2, 2016 Browning (2015) found that while college student-athletes were more likely to engage in volunteerism than their nonathlete peers, they were reluctant to engage in political activism. However, none of these studies have focused on LGBTQ-specific ally behav- iors, but rather focused on engagement behaviors broadly (e.g., from volunteerism to overall political engagement to participation in college clubs or organizations). Notably, the level of stigma attached to LGBTQ communities, as well as LGBTQ ally identities and behaviors, likely varies across settings. An exclusive focus on LGBTQ ally engagement among college student-athletes is warranted given the unique dominance of hegemonic masculinity in the sports context, which has been framed as an underlying culprit for sexual prejudice (e.g., Anderson, 2008; Griffin, 2014). The sport industry, in particular, has a very narrow definition of what constitutes masculinity and femininity, which creates a culture that reinforces heteronormative behaviors in all participants, ranging from athletes to coaches to fans (Cunningham & Sagas, 2008; Knight & Guiliano, 2003; Sartore-Baldwin & Warner, 2012). Thus, given the unique culture of collegiate athletics and the general lack of inclusiveness within college athletic departments (see Cunningham, 2015b; Melton, 2015), it is likely that LGBTQ ally engagement by student-athletes differs from the extant literature on LGBTQ ally engagement among the general population. LGBTQ Ally Engagement The study of LGBTQ allies has largely focused on understanding the antecedents of one’s ally identity, rather than ally behaviors. That is, several rich, qualitative studies point to three main catalysts for why a person “adopted” an LGBTQ ally identity, including: (a) contact and relationships with LGBTQ persons (Fingerhut, 2011; Grzanka, Adler, & Brazer, 2015; Russell, 2011; Strotzer, 2009), (b) upbring- ing or family socialization (Duhigg, Rostosky, Gray, & Wilmsatt, 2010; Grzanka et al., 2015; Russell, 2011; Strotzer, 2009), and (c) a social justice-oriented ideology or belief system (Asta & Vacha-Haase, 2013; Broido, 2000; Duhigg et al., 2010; Rostosky, Black, Riggle, & Rosenkrantz, 2015; Russell, 2011). Empathy with the struggles of LGBTQ people has also been discussed as a reason why a person adopted an ally identity (Russell, 2011; Strozer, 2009). Yet, we are not aware of any study that has examined the meaning of LGBTQ ally identities among student- athletes or the corresponding LGBTQ ally behaviors engaged in by these students. Research on LGBTQ ally behaviors has posited that some allies, perhaps in earlier developmental stages of their identity, engage in more passive actions (e.g., displaying a rainbow on their social media profile to support marriage equality), while others, perhaps in later stages of development, engage in more active actions (e.g., advocating for institutional changes to disrupt heterosexism, sexual prejudice; Ji, Du Bois, & Finnessy, 2009). Indeed, Grzanka and colleagues (2015) found evidence for the distinction between passive and active LGBTQ-related activism. Importantly, the extant literature on ally action engagement has not been conducted within in the sports context, where, given the continued prevalence of sexual preju- dice, it may be important to perceive any LGBTQ ally-related actions as active rather than passive (Melton & Cunningham, 2012). Therefore, the current study intended to assess actions related to Standing Up to heterosexist behaviors and Showing Up to visibly support LGBTQ communities, rather than the passive-active dichotomy that has been conceptualized and used in the prior literature. Further, we theorize 250 Toomey, McGeorge, and Carlson JIS Vol. 9, No. 2, 2016 that, given the prestigious social status that athletes assume on college campuses, particularly in Division I schools, even attendance at an LGBTQ community event should be interpreted as a meaningful and an active action on the behalf of that athlete (Melton, 2015). That is, if the overall campus environment is hostile to LGBTQ populations, it is a daring act of leadership for an athlete to be seen with LGBTQ communities, as the stigma associated with being LGBTQ may be placed on that athlete (e.g., Goffman, 1963). Indeed, research does suggest that a hostile community or campus climate for LGBTQ communities can result in a lack of or hesitation to participate in ally behaviors (e.g., Melton & Cunningham, 2014a), particularly for collegiate athletes in conservative college towns (e.g., Melton & Cunningham, 2014b). Alternatively, when LGBTQ populations are affirmed on college campuses, the attendance of an athlete at LGBTQ events may be considered an act of leadership related to social change (Melton, 2015). Gender, LGBTQ Ally Engagement, and Sports Given the unique organizational climate and structure of collegiate sports (Cun- ningham, 2015b; Melton, 2015), as well as the documented rates of sexual prejudice in sports (Denison & Kitchen, 2015; GLSEN, 2013; Gill et al., 2010), engaging in LGBTQ ally-related behaviors may be distinct in the sporting context compared with other commonly studied contexts (e.g., workplace). Several scholars argue that the distinctiveness of LGBTQ issues in sports exists because of the salience and dominance of masculinity (e.g., Anderson, 2008; Griffin, 2014). Importantly, when integrating findings across studies, antigay-related hostility appears to manifest differently in women’s sports as compared with men’s sports (Anderson & Bullingham, 2013; Cunningham, Pickett, Melton, Lee, & Miner, 2013; Fink, Burton, Farrell, & Parker, 2012; Griffin 2012; Krane, 1996; Melton & Cunningham, 2012), suggesting that gender plays an important role in understanding how col- lege student-athletes address and deal with LGBTQ issues on and off the field. For example, Griffin and Taylor (2013) argue that one of the reasons for this differential manifestation is due to the influence of hegemonic masculinity which creates the erroneous assumption that all women athletes are lesbian or bisexual and no male athletes are gay or bisexual. Furthermore, given that women’s collegiate athletics is already marginalized in terms of funding and prestige due to gender bias (Krane, Choi, Baird, Aimar, & Kauer, 2004), the association of women athletes as sexual minorities may create a fear among coaches, administrators and athletes that such an association will further delegitimize women’s sports (Griffin & Taylor, 2013; Sartore-Baldwin & Cunningham, 2010). Thus, given that existing research has documented that attitudes toward the LGBTQ community differ between men and women athletes (e.g., Cunningham et al., 2013), we also examined how LGBTQ ally-related behaviors differed by gender among college student-athletes. Study Aims The overarching goal of this pilot study was to understand LGBTQ ally engagement in the context of collegiate athletics using both quantitative and qualitative methodolo- gies. A simultaneous mixed-methodology design (Creswell, Plano Clark, Gutmann, Student Athlete Engagement in LGBTQ Ally Actions 251 JIS Vol. 9, No. 2, 2016 & Hanson, 2003) was chosen to employ both a rigorous quantitative assessment of a new measure assessing LGBTQ ally engagement (i.e., the Engagement in LGBTQ Ally Actions in Sports Scale with two subscales—standing up and showing up), and to explore the meaning of these constructs with rich contextual understandings via qualitative methods. Based on existing research and recommendations (e.g., Griffin & Taylor, 2013; Russell, 2011), the first aim of the study was to establish the factor structure of and validate the newly created scale that assesses engagement in LGBTQ ally-related behaviors among college student-athletes. After adequate measurement structure was established, we examined the associations between the scale and five measures to assess the convergent (similarity between theoretically similar measures) and divergent validity (the absence of an association between theoretically unrelated constructs) of these measures (DeVellis, 2012). Given the important role that gender plays in understanding sexual prejudice, heterosexism and cissexism in the sports context (e.g., Griffin, 2014; Worthen, 2014), we also examined whether the measure was equivalent across gender. The second aim was to gain a deeper understanding of the meaning that college student-athletes associate with the term “athlete ally” and any antecedents of ally identity that are specific to the sports context. Method Procedure Two universities were selected using a convenience sampling approach for this pilot study. The Athletic Director at the first university was approached about having his athletes participate in this study as he was known to be an ally to the LGBT commu- nity. Upon the request of the researchers, this particular Athletic Director contacted an Athletic Director at another university who he thought would be willing to assist in the recruitment of student athletes for this study. Neither athletic department had implemented an LGBT ally training program; however, approximately 12% of the resultant sample had attended a university-sponsored LGBT ally training session. Importantly, a third university was initially recruited for inclusion in the study; however, the Athletic Director at that university withdrew participation in the study after one of their athletes engaged in an overt homophobic behavior via social media that received national media attention. College student-athletes at the two participating universities received recruit- ment emails that described the study in the spring semester of 2014. The emails were distributed to all student-athletes by athletic directors and academic advisors for athletics. After the initial e-mail was sent, student-athletes received three reminder emails, sent at two-week intervals. Participants completed a 15–20-minute web- based survey, which was hosted by Qualtrics. College student-athletes who agreed to participate in the study were provided the option to enter a drawing for one of ten $25.00 gift cards. The study’s protocol was approved by the institutional review boards at North Dakota State University and Kent State University. Sample The resultant convenience sample included 159 college student-athletes from two public universities. Both universities have NCAA Division I athletics programs, 252 Toomey, McGeorge, and Carlson JIS Vol. 9, No. 2, 2016 and each enroll approximately 15,000 students. One of the universities is located in the Mountain West region of the U.S., while the other is located in the Upper Midwest region. Nearly half (49.7%) identified as women, and the majority (95%) identified as heterosexual/straight (5% identified as lesbian or bisexual). A large percentage (86.2%) identified as White, non-Latino, and most were from upper middle class families of origin (reported median income range for family of origin was $75,000 to $100,000). Participants were, on average, 20.67 years old (SD = 1.56, Range = 18–28 years); 30.8% were freshman, 20.1% were sophomores, 23.9% were juniors, and 19.5% were fourth-year or fifth-year seniors; 1.9% were attending graduate school, and 3.8% did not answer the question about their current year of school enrollment. Finally, the sports played by participants ranged widely (e.g., basketball, cross country, football, soccer, wrestling), and most (76.7%) were funded by a full or partial athletic scholarship. Measures Ally Engagement. The Engagement in LGBTQ Ally Actions in Sports Scale was created to assess how frequently college student-athletes engaged in actions that are considered to be supportive of the LGBTQ community. Items were reviewed for inclusion in the scale by a panel of ally-identified college students and two ally-identified athletic directors to ensure that the items had face validity. Eight items (see Table 1) were created based on the recommendations and results of the Champions of Respect: Inclusion of LGBTQ Student-Athletes and Staff in NCAA Programs report (Griffin & Taylor, 2013). Items were assessed using a 4-point Likert-scale, ranging from Never to Often. The response option, Not Applicable, was also provided for participants if, for instance, their school did not hold campus events intended to support the LGBTQ community. The first hypothesized subscale, named Standing Up Engagement, assessed the degree to which athletes engage in ally actions that include speaking out against heterosexist behaviors in the sports context and was comprised of three items (Items 1, 2, and 6; see Table 1). The second hypothesized subscale, named Showing Up Engagement, assessed the degree to which athletes engage in ally actions that include attending events to show support of the LGBTQ community and was comprised of four items (Items 3, 4, 5, and 8; see Table 1). Higher scores indicate more frequent LGBTQ ally engagement. Open-Ended Questions. Two open-ended questions were used to further explore college student-athletes’ understandings of what it means to be an ally to the LGBTQ community. In particular, participants were asked to respond to the fol- lowing questions: 1) What does it personally mean to you to be an “athlete ally” to the LGBTQ community? and 2) Looking back on your life experiences, what do you think prompted you to identify as an ally to the LGBTQ community? Convergent Validity Measures. Four measures were used to assess the convergent validity of the Engagement in LGBTQ Ally Actions in Sports Scale including (a) attitudes toward social justice, (b) common fate with LGBTQ people ideology, (c) affirming beliefs about LGBTQ persons, and (d) intervention in LGBTQ- related bias in sports. First, attitudes toward social justice were measured using an adapted version of Kizer’s (2011) Attitudes Toward Social Justice Scale. The original scale was used to assess counselors’ attitudes toward social justice and Student Athlete Engagement in LGBTQ Ally Actions 253 JIS Vol. 9, No. 2, 2016 was adapted for the current study to assess the attitudes of student-athletes. The adapted scale consists of nine out of the ten original items; one item could not be adapted for use with a noncounselor population as it was specific to beliefs about the ethics of the counseling profession. Participants rated the items on a 6-point Likert-type scale, ranging from Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree, with higher scores indicating greater social justice attitudes and beliefs. Exploratory and Table 1 Original Items of the Engagement in LGBTQ Ally Actions in Sports Scale 1. I let teammates know that I don’t like to hear them use anti-LGBTQ slurs and explain why they are problematic. (Standing Up) 2. I stand up for teammates who are LGBTQ if I hear other teammates talking badly about them behind their backs because of their sexual orientation or gender identity and expression. (Standing Up) 3. I participate in my university’s LGBTQ-straight alliance group to make my school safer for all students. (Showing Up) 4. When offered, I regularly attend campus events that are intended to support the LGBTQ community (for example activities associated with Coming Out Week, Trans- gender Awareness Week, Pride Week). (Showing Up) 5. When offered, I regularly attend community events that are intended to support the LGBTQ community (for example activities associated with Coming Out Week, Trans- gender Awareness Week, Pride Week). (Showing Up) 6. I communicate my identity as an ally to the LGBTQ community through the use of symbols (for example, I have worn a rainbow sticker, button, or t-shirt that is supportive of the LGBTQ community or have used an LGBTQ equality symbol as my Facebook profile picture). (Standing Up) 7. I have attended rallies or political demonstrations in support of LGBTQ rights (for example, same-sex marriage, employment nondiscrimination acts, or hate crime legis- lation). (Showing Up) 8. I have written emails or sent letters to my political (for example, local council mem- bers, state governors, or national Congressional representatives) or campus representa- tives (for example, university president or provost) to urge them to pass LGBTQ rights legislation (for example, same-sex marriage, employment nondiscrimination acts, hate crimes legislation) or policies (for example, domestic partner benefits for faculty and staff). (Standing Up) Note. Item 8 was dropped from the scale because it lacked substantial variance (item is italicized). 254 Toomey, McGeorge, and Carlson JIS Vol. 9, No. 2, 2016 confirmatory factor analyses revealed that the factor structure was unidimensional and that items 5 (“It is okay for my family members or friends to make jokes about marginalized groups in the privacy of their own homes”) and 7 (“Involvement in social justice activities is a matter of personal preference”) did not significantly load onto the latent factor, and thus were removed from the scale. The final scale had seven items, which had excellent reliability (α = .90). Second, common fate with LGBTQ people ideology was assessed by three items (e.g., “How much do you feel you have in common with most LGBTQ people?”). These three items were adapted from Curtin’s (2011) measure that assessed common fate related to gender identity. Items were rated on a 5-point Likert-scale, ranging from Hardly at All to Very Much; higher scores reflect a higher sense of common fate with LGBTQ people. The measure had acceptable reliability (α = .73). Third, affirmative beliefs about LGBTQ people were assessed by a single item: “On a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 is extremely not accepting and 7 is extremely accepting/affirming, how would you describe your own beliefs about LGBTQ people?” Finally, participants responded to a single item that assessed how often they actively intervened in LGBTQ-related bias in sports: “How often do you stop others from making negative comments or slurs based on sexual orientation or gender identity and expression?” This item was rated on a 4-point Likert-scale, ranging from Never to Often; higher scores reflected more frequent intervention. Divergent Validity Measure. Given that a participant’s birth month conceptually should not be associated with engaging in LGBTQ ally behaviors, it was chosen to assess divergent validity for the newly developed measure. Birth month was assessed by one item: “What is your date of birth?” participants selected their month of birth from a dropdown box, coded from 1 (January) to 12 (December). At least one participant was born in each month of the year (Range per month: n = 6–22). Analytic Method for Quantitative Data Three steps were used to examine the psychometric properties of the Engagement in LGBTQ Ally Actions in Sports Scale. Step one examined the factor structures of the scale using confirmatory factor analyses (CFA). Three fit indices were used to examine overall model fit: the chi-square statistic, the comparative fit index (CFI), and the standardized root-mean-square residual (SRMR). A nonsignificant chi-square statistic suggests that the model fits the data well; however, this statistic is prone to bias related to sample size (Kenny & McCoach, 2003). Model fit was considered to be good (acceptable) if the SRMR was less than or equal to .05 (.08), and if the CFI was greater than or equal to .95 (.90) (Kline, 2016). In step two, we evaluated whether the factor structures of the newly developed measures were equivalent across gender identity groups. Factor invariance would suggest that the items functioned similarly for women and men, and was tested with a series of nested multiple group CFAs that included gender identity as the group variable. The tenability of invariance was tested at three sequential levels: configural, loading, and intercept invariance (e.g., Little, Card, Slegers, & Ledford, 2007). The tenability of the constraints was evaluated by using a chi-square difference test, in which a significant change in chi-square indicated that the constraints were not tenable (i.e., the items did not function similarly across gender identity groups). Student Athlete Engagement in LGBTQ Ally Actions 255 JIS Vol. 9, No. 2, 2016 Finally, in step three, we examined the reliability and validity of the Engage- ment in LGBTQ Ally Actions in Sports Scale. Reliability was examined using Cronbach’s alpha, and convergent and divergent validity were tested using structural equation modeling, controlling for age and gender. To test for convergent validity, the examination of whether measures are correlated in conceptually meaningful ways, it was hypothesized that both ally engagement subscales would be positively associated with attitudes toward social justice, common fate with LGBTQ people ideology, affirming beliefs about LGBTQ persons, and intervention in LGBTQ- related bias in sports (e.g., Russell, 2011; Taylor, 2015). To test for divergent validity, when measures are unrelated to constructs and no conceptual reason for an association exists, we examined the associations between ally engagement and birth month. All analyses were conducted in Mplus version 7.3 (Muthén & Muthén, 2014), and full information maximum likelihood was used to handle missing data (Schlomer, Bauman, & Card, 2010). Analytic Method for Qualitative Data Thematic analysis was used to code the qualitative data to identify categories, themes, and subthemes that might exist within and across the participants’ responses (Braun & Clarke, 2006). Specifically, Braun and Clarke (2006) defined thematic analysis as “a method for identifying, analyzing, and reporting patterns (themes) within the data set in (rich) detail” (p. 79). Categories represent broad or overarch- ing descriptions of the data, while themes are unique representations of the data within the larger category (Braun & Clarke, 2006). Subthemes are “themes-within- a-theme” that highlight varying descriptions or understanding within a theme (Braun & Clarke, 2006, p. 92). Before we (the second and third authors) began the coding process, we read the qualitative data several times to familiarize ourselves with the participants’ responses. After this review, we identified meaningful patterns in the data and worked to identify codes or common ideas that existed across participants’ responses. We then grouped the data in terms of these initial codes in an effort to explore the extent to which these codes were represented in participants’ responses and looked for the emergence of categories. Once categories were defined, we coded the data within each category to identify any possible themes and subthemes. After initially identifying the categories, themes, and subthemes, we met for peer debrief- ing with the first author to add more credibility to the coding process (Daly, 2007; Lincoln & Guba, 1985). Finally, after consensus was reached on the categories, themes, and subthemes, we selected verbatim quotations as illustrations of the data. Results Engagement in LGBTQ Ally Actions in Sports Scale Before CFA analyses, we examined the descriptive statistics of each of the eight items to ensure that each item was normally distributed and contained sufficient variance. All of the items, with the exception of item 8, met these criteria, sug- gesting that participants varied on their levels of ally engagement. Item 8 (“I have written emails or sent letters to my political [for example, local council members, 256 Toomey, McGeorge, and Carlson JIS Vol. 9, No. 2, 2016 state governors, or national Congressional representatives] or campus representa- tives [for example, university president or provost] to urge them to pass LGBTQ rights legislation [for example, same-sex marriage, employment nondiscrimination acts, hate crimes legislation] or policies [for example, domestic partner benefits for faculty and staff]”) was dropped because it lacked substantial variance (only two participants answered that they had ever engaged in this type of action). A CFA of the resultant 2-factor, 7-item scale revealed that it had good fit: χ2 (df =13) = 19.09, p = .12; CFI = 0.98; SRMR = .04. Factor loadings, residuals, and latent intercepts are shown in Table 2. Tests of measurement invariance revealed that the items functioned similarly for women and men. That is, criteria for configural, loading (Δχ2(df = 5) = 7.593, p = .18), and intercept invariance (Δχ2(df = 5) = 5.87, p = .32) were not significant. Importantly, Standing Up and Showing Up subscales were significantly associated with one another (r = .73, p < .001); however, a test of redundancy (Kline, 2016), indicated that the two subscales were unique (Δχ2 (df = 1) = 27.47, p < .001). Finally, we examined the reliability and validity of the Standing Up and Show- ing Up subscales. Acceptable reliability was demonstrated for the Standing Up subscale for all participants (α = .80), men (α = .81), and women (α = .73). Tests of convergent validity were consistent with hypotheses (see Table 3 for summary of latent correlations), and model fit of this structural model was acceptable: χ2 (df =165) = 231.18, p < .05; CFI = 0.939; SRMR = .06. As expected, Standing Up was positively associated with attitudes toward social justice (Latent r = .56, p < .001), affirmative beliefs about LGBTQ people (Latent r = .71, p < .001), having a common fate with LGBTQ people ideology (Latent r = .59, p < .001), and inter- vention in LGBTQ-related bias in sports (Latent r = .60, p < .001). Evidence for divergent validity was found, in that the Standing Up subscale was not associated with birth month (Latent r = -.06, p = .46). Of note, men were less likely to engage in Standing Up actions compared with women (Latent r = -.43, p < .001). Acceptable reliability was also demonstrated for the Showing Up subscale for all participants (α = .83), men (α = .83), and women (α = .82). Tests of convergent validity were consistent with hypotheses, such that Showing Up was positively associated with attitudes toward social justice (Latent r = .36, p < .001), affirmative beliefs about LGBTQ people (Latent r = .38, p < .001), having a common fate with LGBTQ people ideology (Latent r = .28, p < .05), and intervention in LGBTQ- related bias in sports (Latent r = .38, p < .001). Finally, evidence for divergent validity was found, in that the Showing Up subscale was not associated with birth month (Latent r = -.11, p = .23). Of note, men were also less likely to engage in Showing Up actions compared with women (Latent r = -.23, p < .05). What it Means to Simultaneously be an Ally and an Athlete As mentioned previously, the first open-ended question asked participants to describe what it means to them personally to be an “athlete ally” to the LGBTQ community. The thematic analysis lead to the identification of three categories: 1) Actions, 2) Attitudes, and 3) I am Not an Ally. The Action category encompassed participants’ responses that defined being an ally in terms of certain behaviors they felt were central to being an ally for the LGBTQ community. Within this category, three themes were identified. The first 257JIS Vol. 9, No. 2, 2016 Ta b le 2 F a c to r L o a d in g s a n d R e s id u a ls o f th e E n g a g e m e n t in L G B T Q A ll y A c ti o n s i n S p o rt s S c a le S ta n d ar d iz ed F ac to r L o ad in g U n st an d ar d iz ed Fa ct o r L o ad in g s (S ta n d ar d E rr o r) U n st an d ar d iz ed R es id u al L at en t In te rc ep t S ta nd in g U p I le t te am m at es k no w t ha t I do n’ t li ke t o he ar t he m u se a nt i- L G B T Q s lu rs a nd e xp la in w hy t he y ar e pr ob le m at ic . .7 47 .7 09 ( .0 9) ** * .3 98 ( .0 8) ** * 1. 93 I st an d up f or t ea m m at es w ho a re L G B T Q i f I he ar o th er t ea m - m at es t al ki ng b ad ly a bo ut t he m b eh in d th ei r ba ck s be ca us e of th ei r se xu al o ri en ta ti on o r ge nd er i de nt it y an d ex pr es si on . .7 47 .8 15 ( .1 3) ** * .5 28 ( .1 4) ** * 2. 44 I co m m un ic at e m y id en ti ty a s an a ll y to t he L G B T Q c om m un it y th ro ug h th e us e of s ym bo ls ( fo r ex am pl e, I h av e w or n a ra in bo w st ic ke r, b ut to n, o r t- sh ir t th at i s su pp or ti ve o f th e L G B T Q c om - m un it y or h av e us ed a n L G B T Q e qu al it y sy m bo l as m y F ac eb oo k pr ofi le p ic tu re ). .8 06 .6 94 ( .0 8) ** * .2 59 ( .0 6) ** * 1. 53 S ho w in g U p I pa rt ic ip at e in m y un iv er si ty ’s L G B T Q -s tr ai gh t al li an ce g ro up t o m ak e m y sc ho ol s af er f or a ll s tu de nt s. .7 09 .4 87 ( .0 7) ** * .2 35 ( .0 4) ** * 1. 38 W he n of fe re d, I r eg ul ar ly a tt en d ca m pu s ev en ts t ha t ar e in te nd ed to s up po rt t he L G B T Q c om m un it y (f or e xa m pl e ac ti vi ti es a ss oc i- at ed w it h C om in g O ut W ee k, T ra ns ge nd er A w ar en es s W ee k, P ri de W ee k) . .8 69 .5 78 ( .0 5) ** * .1 08 ( .0 2) ** * 1. 34 W he n of fe re d, I r eg ul ar ly a tt en d co m m un it y ev en ts t ha t ar e in te nd ed t o su pp or t th e L G B T Q c om m un it y (f or e xa m pl e ac ti vi - ti es a ss oc ia te d w it h C om in g O ut W ee k, T ra ns ge nd er A w ar en es s W ee k, P ri de W ee k) . .9 17 .5 61 ( .0 5) ** * .0 6 (. 02 )* ** 1. 31 I ha ve a tt en de d ra ll ie s or p ol it ic al d em on st ra ti on s in s up po rt o f L G B T Q r ig ht s (f or e xa m pl e, s am e- se x m ar ri ag e, e m pl oy m en t no nd is cr im in at io n ac ts , o r ha te c ri m e le gi sl at io n) . .6 74 .5 16 ( .0 7) ** * .3 21 ( .0 5) ** * 1. 23 N ot e. * ** p < .0 01 . 258 JIS Vol. 9, No. 2, 2016 Ta b le 3 L a te n t C o rr e la ti o n s A m o n g t h e E n g a g e m e n t in L G B T Q A ll y A c ti o n s i n S p o rt s S c a le a n d V a li d it y C o n s tr u c ts 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 1. S ta nd in g U p — 2. S ho w in g U p .7 4* ** — 3. S oc ia l Ju st ic e A tt it ud es .5 6* ** .3 6* ** — 4. A ffi rm at iv e B el ie fs .7 1* ** .3 8* ** .4 7* ** — 5. C om m on F at e Id eo lo gy .5 9* ** .2 8* .4 5* ** .7 5* ** — 6. I nt er ve nt io n in L G B T Q B ia s .6 0* ** .4 0* ** .4 9* ** .5 0* ** .3 4* ** — 7. G en de r -. 43 ** * -. 23 * -. 19 * -. 28 ** * -. 26 ** -. 39 ** * — 8. A ge .1 2 -. 04 .0 6 .1 1 .2 0* -. 14 .2 1* * — 9. B ir th M on th -. 06 -. 11 -. 02 -. 04 .0 3 -. 02 .0 7 .1 2 — N ot e. G en de r w as c od ed 0 = W om en a nd 1 = M en . * ** p < .0 01 . * * p < .0 1. * p < .0 5. Student Athlete Engagement in LGBTQ Ally Actions 259 JIS Vol. 9, No. 2, 2016 theme was labeled Standing and Speaking Up and represented participants’ views that being an ally involves defending the rights of LGBTQ teammates. This theme is illustrated by the following quotation by a woman athlete: Personally, it means that I stand up for those who may have a hard time speak- ing for themselves in a potentially harsh environment. Athletics is not known for being the most supportive of LGBTQ community, but I do what I can to make sure that others don’t attack them just because of their sexual orienta- tion. If a person attacks my teammate for being gay I immediately stand by their side and defend them. This theme of Standing and Speaking Up had one subtheme called Political Action. This subtheme represented participants’ beliefs that being an LGBTQ ally also involves broader involvement at the political level, beyond the microsystem of sport, and is represented by the below quotation from a man athlete: Being an ally to this community certainly means that one would stick up for sexual equality in orientation and prevent clear bullying of individuals that are a part of the LGBTQ community. To me, it would also mean that there is a strict obligation to vote on the matter when it finally comes to that political stage. The second theme within the Action category was labeled as Supporting, which included responses that reflected the importance of providing active support to members of the LGBTQ community and other athletes. The following quote by a woman athlete is an illustration of this theme: “To me an athlete ally means providing physical, emotional and psychological support.” The third and final theme in this category was named Role Modeling, which reflects participants’ beliefs that college student-athletes have a special responsi- bility to be an LGBTQ ally given their privileged and often influential status on college campuses. The following quotation from a man athlete is representative of this theme: “As an athlete I am held to a higher standard and people think more of our stances on issues. For me to voice my opinions on this matter means more than someone else in the community in my opinion.” The second category, Attitude, was comprised of three themes and represented participants’ views that being an athlete ally was associated with certain types of beliefs or understandings about the LGBTQ community. The first theme in this category was labeled Accepting and highlights participants’ beliefs that acceptance plays a vital role in being an athlete ally. It seems important to note that all of the responses coded in this theme were from women student-athletes. A sample quotation from this theme is: “It means that all my teammates can ‘Like’ whoever they want without being judged. I want everyone to feel comfortable and be with who they want to be.” The second theme in the Attitude category was named Equality and Human Rights and reflected the notion that athletes who are allies to the LGBTQ com- munity should believe LGBTQ individuals deserve the same rights and treatment as heterosexual persons. The following quotations by two women student-athletes are representative of this theme: “I believe that wanting everyone to have the same rights as everyone else should be a common goal for everyone. It is a basic human right” and “Everyone should be treated equally, no matter who they love.” One 260 Toomey, McGeorge, and Carlson JIS Vol. 9, No. 2, 2016 subtheme was identified within this theme, which was labeled Sexual Orientation Should Not Matter. This subtheme highlights the belief that a person’s sexual orientation is not relevant in athletics and should not influence how teammates are treated. The following two quotations from women student-athletes provide good illustrations of this theme: “Accepting and respecting every athlete that I see whether it’s a competitor or a teammate. Not classifying fellow athletes as ‘gay’ or ‘straight’ but rather as one unified classification of ‘athlete’” and “It means that I support any person in their athletics regardless of their sexual orientation or gender identification.” The third, and last theme, in the Attitude category was called Non-Judgmental, which describes participants’ views about the importance of not judging LGBTQ teammates. A women athlete shared: “I feel like I am doing the right thing, and I have no right to judge who others love,” while a man athlete wrote “I feel like it is everyone’s job to make everyone feel comfortable around each other and not feel judged.” While the survey question asked participants to describe what it meant to them to be an athlete ally, 11 of the men student-athletes (but no women athletes) responded that they were not an ally to the LGBTQ community. These responses representative our final category, I am Not an Ally. Antecedents of Ally Identity The second open-ended question asked participants to share what prompted student athletes to identify as an ally to the LGBTQ community. The thematic analysis led to the identification of five categories: 1) Personal Beliefs, 2) Relationships with LGBTQ People, 3) Family Socialization, 4) Discrimination, and 5) I am Not an Ally. The first category, Personal Beliefs, reflects participants’ responses about how their own values and morals influenced their decision to be an ally. The following quotations from men student-athletes illustrate this category: “That I believe in equality for all people” and “I believe in equality and think LGBTQ [equality] is in many ways similar to race equality.” There were no themes identified within this category. The second category, Relationships with LGBTQ People, was comprised of three themes and represented participants’ views about the importance of having personal relationships or significant contact with members of the LGBTQ community. The first theme in this category was labeled Family and included participants’ descriptions of the important role that having a family member who identified as LGBTQ played in their development of an identity as an ally. This following quotation by a man athlete is a good illustration of this theme: “Mostly having two cousins that have come out and a couple people I know in high school coming out made me become more of an ally! Knowing someone personally I think changes your whole mindset on that LGBTQ community.” The second theme in this category, Friends and Teammates, describes the significance of having an LGBTQ friend or teammate. Two women student-athletes provided responses that are indicative of this theme: “Hearing stories from LGBTQ friends and teammates and seeing the struggle they face on being judged” and “Personally, there are a lot of LGBT players on my team. Those teammates are not only my friends, but my family and I would love to support them in Student Athlete Engagement in LGBTQ Ally Actions 261 JIS Vol. 9, No. 2, 2016 gaining equality.” The third and final theme in the category of Relationships with LGBTQ People was labeled as Community and School, which highlights the role that interacting with members of the LGBTQ community had in shap- ing these participants’ ally identities. The following quotations by two women student-athletes are representative of this theme: “Meeting people in college that are gay has opened my eyes to how they feel” and “Knowing people in the LGBTQ community.” The third category, Family Socialization, describes the role that college student- athletes’ families of origin played in their development of an identity as an ally to the LGBTQ community. As an example of this category, a woman athlete shared: “My parents raised me to be tolerant of others. They exposed me to the LGBTQ community at a relatively young age, and after that I felt that I was responsible for making sure they got treated equally,” while a man athlete explained “I was taught to love everyone and keep an open-mind with everyone who I encounter.” No themes were identified within this category. Discrimination is the fourth category related to what prompted participants to develop an identity as an LGBTQ ally. This category highlights how experiencing, witnessing, or a sensitivity to discrimination shaped student-athletes’ develop- ment of ally identity. Example quotations from this category include: “I was also treated unfairly at a point in my life” (man athlete), “Being friends with people who identify as LGBTQ, and seeing them be mistreated. It sparks the same anger and injustice as the mistreatment and sexual objectification of women” (woman athlete), and “Seeing kids get bullied and not treated the same upset me” (woman athlete). There were no themes identified within this category. As in the previous section, there were 12 participants (an equal number of women and men) who responded to this question by stating they were not allies to the LGBTQ community and these responses represent the fifth and final category, which was labeled I am Not an Ally. Discussion The results of this pilot study provide initial support for the validity and factor structure of the Engagement in LGBTQ Ally Actions in Sports Scale as a measure of the frequency with which college student-athletes engaged in actions that are con- sidered to be supportive of the LGBTQ community. In addition, the results provide initial support for the validity of the two subscales of the Engagement in LGBTQ Ally Actions in Sports Scale: Standing Up and Showing Up. The establishment of this measure is significant given that this is the first study focused on LGBTQ ally engagement in a sample of college student-athletes. Moreover, the results of this study suggest that the Engagement in LGBTQ Ally Actions in Sports Scale is an equally valid measure for both women and men. In addition to establishing the psychometric properties of the Engagement in LGBTQ Ally Actions in Sports Scale, the findings from the qualitative data lend further support to the items com- prising this scale as well as providing supplemental insight into the LGBTQ ally development process for college student-athletes. One finding about the development of an identity as an ally to the LGBTQ community that seems uniquely relevant for college student-athletes is the belief 262 Toomey, McGeorge, and Carlson JIS Vol. 9, No. 2, 2016 that they have a responsibility to be role models on their campuses for the equal treatment of LGBTQ people. Notably, other studies have found that an important aspect of being an ally to the LGBTQ community involved role modeling behav- iors (e.g., Cunningham, 2015a; Melton & Cunningham, 2014b; Rostosky et al., 2015); however, those actions were not framed by the same heightened status that college student-athletes mentioned in the current study. Of importance, however, the work by Cunningham (2015a) and Melton and Cunningham (2014b) did find the importance of role modeling leader expectations of allyship in the context of employees working in college athletics. The higher status associated with being a college student-athletes may allow them to be more “effective advocates for social change” (Melton, 2015, p. 2). This finding is particularly important given that research posits that interventions may be most successful if they are led by key individuals who hold power within their social networks (e.g., Dearing, 2009). Thus, future work to enhance campus climate could consider the role of college student-athletes in promoting more affirming, safer environments for LGBTQ students, faculty, and staff. It seems important to acknowledge the gender differences that emerged in both our qualitative and quantitative findings. First, when asked about what it means to be an ally, twice as many men athletes reported that they were not allies, while only women athletes discussed the importance of accepting all teammates regardless of sexual orientation. Second, and similarly, in the quantitative data, women athletes were more likely to engage in Standing Up and Showing Up LGBTQ ally-related behaviors. These findings are consistent with research on heterosexuals in the general population suggesting that men have more negative attitudes about sexual minorities than women (Herek, 2002). Further, they are consistent with studies of sport organization employees that found that women were more likely to be sup- portive of LGBT issues (Melton & Cunningham, 2014b). Thus, it will be important for future research to unpack gender differences in athletes’ ally identification and engagement in ally-related actions. Based on the findings of this study, there are important implications for the future use of the Engagement in LGBTQ Ally Actions in Sports Scale. For example, athletic departments could use this scale to assess the types and frequencies with which their student-athletes are engaging in LGBTQ ally behaviors. Further, the scale could be used as a team-level assessment to inform discussions between coaches and players and to help encourage LGBTQ ally behavior among teammates. Limitations and Implications for Future Research As with any research there are limitations to this study that may impact the gener- alizability of the findings. First, while the sample size was more than adequate for our statistical analyses, the sample size was relatively small and lacked diversity in terms of race, economic class, and sexual orientation. It would be important that future researchers seek to recruit college student-athletes from minority groups to ensure broader representation, particularly given research noting the importance of attending to the intersectionality of race, gender, and sexual orientation (Walker & Melton, 2015). Relatedly, our convenience sample was limited to two universities that participate in NCAA Division I-level sports. Given that the sports contexts and campus climates vary widely based on region, importance of sports to the Student Athlete Engagement in LGBTQ Ally Actions 263 JIS Vol. 9, No. 2, 2016 university and surrounding community, these results are limited in terms of their generalizability to athletes in other sport and university contexts. As noted in the Methods section, we had originally hoped to gather data from a third school that would have added substantial diversity to the sample; however, when an athlete in that school engaged in public forms of sexual prejudice via social media the Athletic Director withdrew his support for the study. This example documents the considerable difficulty that still remains in gathering empirical evidence on LGBTQ issues in athletics, and clearly was a contributor to the limitations inherent to this pilot study. Third, it is possible that the student-athletes who chose to participate in this study may have had strong opinions, either negative or positive, about the research topic which may have influenced the findings. Moreover, this study relied on self- report measures and it is possible that the participants either over or under-reported their actions related to being an ally for the LGBTQ community. Finally, with regard to the qualitative data, while the on-line survey methodology allowed for the gathering of a wide range of responses and provided participants with increased anonymity, the asking of follow-up or clarifying questions was not possible. Given the exploratory nature of this study, the research was focused on gathering a breadth rather than depth of responses. The findings of this study suggest a number of directions for future research. For example, to expand on this study, researchers could conduct in-depth interviews with college student-athletes who identify as allies for the LGBTQ community to gain greater insight into the processes by which they developed their identities as allies and how those processes were (or were not) informed by their participation in athletics. Future studies could also more systematically examine whether attend- ing a formal ally training was associated with ally engagement and development among college student athletes. In addition, it may be important to interview or survey LGBTQ college student-athletes about the ally actions that they observe from their teammates as well as the actions and behaviors they would find par- ticularly helpful to improve the climate for LGBTQ student-athletes. Likewise, future research could also examine how LGBTQ ally behaviors are related to other types of civic engagement behaviors engaged in by student-athletes (Weerts, Cabrera, & Perez Mejias, 2014). For example, do student athletes who engage in LGBTQ ally behaviors also engage in other social justice related activities, like issues related to race-ethnicity (e.g., the 2015 protest by University of Missouri football players in response to racial injustices on campus; Tracy & Southall, 2015)? This latter point is particularly intriguing, given the time demands placed on student athletes, particularly those in a Division I sports context (Gayles & Hu, 2009). Beyond studying ally behaviors in college student-athletes, future research could also focus on high school athletics given the increasingly early age at which LGBTQ youth are coming out (Grov, Bimbi, Nanín, & Parsons, 2006; Poteat & Russell, 2013). With slight modifications (e.g., replacing “campus” or “university” with “school”), our items can be made relevant to other school-aged populations (e.g., middle or high schools); these modifications, however, will need to be empiri- cally assessed. A final recommendation is to focus on the attitudes and behaviors of professional athletes, coaches, and sports fans as it relates to creating a safe and welcoming environment for LGBTQ athletes. 264 Toomey, McGeorge, and Carlson JIS Vol. 9, No. 2, 2016 Conclusions Given that the existing research suggests that the sports context may be an unwel- coming environment for LGBTQ student-athletes (GLSEN, 2013; Gill et al., 2010), the development of measures to assess LGBTQ ally actions among college student- athletes is particularly important. To address this need, the current study established the reliability and validity of the Engagement in LGBTQ Ally Actions in Sports Scale. 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Little, T.D., Card, N.A., Slegers, D.W., & Ledford, E. (2007). Representing contextual effects in multiple-group MACS models. In T.D. Little, J.A. Bovaird, & N.A. Card (Eds.), Modeling contextual effects in longitudinal studies (pp. 121–148). New York: Routledge. McCormack, M. (2012). The declining significance of homophobia: How teenage boys are redefining masculinity and heterosexuality. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199778249.001.0001 Melton, E.N. (2015). Creating social change in and through intercollegiate sport. Journal of Intercollegiate Sport, 8, 1–13. doi:10.1123/jis.2015-0017 Melton, E., & Cunningham, G. (2012). When identities collide. Journal for the Study of Sports and Athletes in Education, 6(1), 45–66. doi:10.1179/ssa.2012.6.1.45 Melton, E.N., & Cunningham, G. (2014a). The experiences of LGBT sport employees: A social categorization perspective. 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Indianapolis, IN: National Collegiate Athletic Association. Rostosky, S.S., Black, W.W., Riggle, E.D.B., & Rosenkrantz, D. (2015). Positive aspects of being a heterosexual ally to lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) people. The American Journal of Orthopsychiatry, 85, 331–338. PubMed doi:10.1037/ort0000056 Russell, G.M. (2011). Motives of heterosexual allies in collective action for equality. The Journal of Social Issues, 67(2), 376–393. doi:10.1111/j.1540-4560.2011.01703.x Sartore-Baldwin, M.L., & Cunningham, G.B. (2010). The lesbian label as a component of women’s stigmatization in sport organizations: An exploration of two health and kinesiology departments. Journal of Sport Management, 24(5), 581–581. Sartore-Baldwin, M.L., & Warner, S. (2012). Perceptions of justice within intercollegiate athletics among current and former athletes. 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(2010). Best practices for missing data man- agement in counseling psychology. Journal of Counseling Psychology, 57(1), 1–10. PubMed doi:10.1037/a0018082 Strotzer, R.L. (2009). Straight allies: Supportive attitudes toward lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals in a college sample. Sex Roles, 60, 67–80. doi:10.1007/s11199-008-9508-1 Taylor, H. (2015). Activating change through allyship. Journal of Intercollegiate Sport, 8, 37–42. doi:10.1123/jis.2015-0025 Tracy, M., & Southall, A. (2015, November 8). Black football players lend heft to protests at Missouri. The New York Times. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com Walker, N.A., & Melton, E.N. (2015). The tipping point: The intersection of race, gender, and sexual orientation in intercollegiate sports. Journal of Sport Management, 29, 257–271. doi:10.1123/jsm.2013-0079 Washington, J., & Evans, N.J. (1991). Becoming an ally. In N.J. Evans & V.A. Wall (Eds.), Beyond tolerance: Gays, lesbians and bisexuals on campus (pp. 215–224). 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work_7z4krwfnknh7tjgqht4qc2eacy	----	feminists@law Vol 8, No 2 (2018) _________________________________________________________________________ ___________________________________________________________________ 1 Marian Duggan (ed.), Revisiting the 'Ideal Victim': Developments in Critical Victimology, Policy Press: Bristol 2018 ISBN 978-1447338765. HB £75.00 Jamie Grace* I should confess from the outset that I was very much a latecomer to the seminal article by the late Nils Christie on 'ideal victims', which is the article that forms the inspiration for the book under consideration in this review. The work concerned1 was first drawn to my attention by a colleague at Sheffield Hallam University2 in one of those very productive conversations you can have waiting for the photocopier to do its work (or not). In fact, full disclosure is required: not only are two colleagues of mine at Hallam contributors to this excellent edited volume of insightful chapters,3 but its editor, Marian Duggan, is also a former colleague and is another person who has developed my fledgling knowledge of critical victimology.4 The book contains insightful chapters on the concept of the 'ideal victim' in relation to, for example: hate crime victims generally; Muslim women who wear the veil; LGB/T women; female sex worker victims; migrants; survivors of childhood sexual abuse; victims of domestic violence; elderly rape victims; online fraud victims; and male prisoners as victims. If I had to summarise the collective thrust of this book, it would be as follows: Too many victims of crime, and particularly too many female victims of sexual offending and crimes such as domestic abuse in its many forms, are treated as 'non-ideal' victims, and suffer a loss of dignity, respect, and any proper avenue to justice as a result.5 In sum, the non-ideal victim is in practice at great risk of being non-powerful. This is partly because, as Christie wrote, a "condition… for being an ideal victim, is thus that you are powerful enough to make your case known and successfully claim the status of an ideal victim".6 The alternative, Christie * Senior Lecturer in Law, Sheffield Hallam University, UK. Email: j.grace@shu.ac.uk. 1 Nils Christie, 'The Ideal Victim (1986)', re-printed in Marian Duggan (ed.), Revisiting the ‘ideal victim’: Developments in critical victimology, Policy Press: Bristol, 2018. 2 Dr. Jenny Rainbow. 3 As well as Dr. Jenny Rainbow, my Hallam colleague Dr. Vicky Heap has also contributed a chapter to the book. 4 See Marian Duggan & Jamie Grace, 'Assessing vulnerabilities in the Domestic Violence Disclosure Scheme', (2018) 30(2) Child and Family Law Quarterly 145. 5 For an insightful and contemporary overview of these issues in the UK criminal justice system today, see Helena Kennedy QC, Eve was shamed: How British justice is failing women, Penguin: London, 2018. 6 Christie, op cit., p.14. Jamie Grace Book Review _________________________________________________________________________ _________________________________________________________________________ 2 concluded, is that a non-ideal victim may be "opposed by so strong counter-powers that you can not be heard".7 Doctrinal opposition from the courts as to the righteous nature of victims and victimhood where there have been failures to secure their safety, at least, is diminishing, in some ways. In the spring of 2018, a case brought by a pair of the victims of John Worboys (the 'Black Cab Rapist'), in a claim known as DSD, saw the Supreme Court determine that the victims of serious sexual offending were entitled to damages under the Human Rights Act 1998 where “egregious and significant” errors in police investigations entailed a failure to apprehend an offender in a specific case.8 Lord Kerr, writing in DSD, rejected the idea that failings in the investigation of offences committed by Worboys were “largely attributable to a flawed structural approach”; arguing instead that there were sufficiently serious failings at a local police level that the claimants should be afforded a remedy against the Metropolitan Police, in the form of damages, in this particular case. The Supreme Court observed that in the cases concerned there were failures to record information in reports of crimes; failures to promptly interview witnesses; failures to collect CCTV evidence (from a police station no less!); and failures to link complaints from multiples victims to one man.9 The value of Duggan's work in bringing together 16 chapters from a range of contributors and perspectives is that this demonstrates to a largely black-letter legal audience (of which I am a member) that a single shift in the courts on a particular point of law, while important, will not be enough to recognise the challenges that victims of crime face, in the UK or elsewhere. The 16 chapters in this text make a significant contribution between them to the discourse of critical victimology, and take the problematic criminological concept of 'ideal' victimhood as their collective touchstone. Many of the 16 chapters in the volume in turn address issues faced in the criminal justice system(s) concerned by ideal/non-ideal victims in particular groups or with particular identities. Sometimes the chapter authors address victimisation thematically. It might be that the authors had no choice in taking this approach, as statute law might shape and frame our analyses of the ideal/non-ideal status of victims. For example, Hannah Mason-Bish notes 7 Ibid. 8 Lord Kerr in Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis v DSD and another [2018] UKSC 11 at 29. 9 Ibid. at 51. feminists@law Vol 8, No 2 (2018) _________________________________________________________________________ ___________________________________________________________________ 3 that: "'Hate crime' is the ultimate 'ideal victim' crime in that legislative approaches have specified very particular groups of victims as worthy of the enhanced protection that such laws afford."10 But it is also often the case, in terms of group-labelling by the state, that possible victims may instead be potentially criminalised. As Catherine Donovan and Rebecca Barnes have concluded: …black and minority ethnic women and men, and lesbians and gay men have historically been constructed not only as unreliable witnesses [to their own victimisation],but also, especially those who are black or belong to other minority ethnic groups, as well as gay men, as potential criminals to be the subject of surveillance rather than as potential victims of crime.11 On finishing my reading of this collection of chapters, with their combined, and impressive swathe and scope, I was left wondering if society would only pursue and harm more victims through (re)creating their identities; labelling them effectively, and in practice, as non-ideal. This process might occur even as we increasingly, in a scholarly sense, identify barriers to the 'ideal' status for victims under our academic gaze. Perhaps the non-ideal victim is shamefully intrinsic to us, because of our tendency to stigmatise.12 Buried in the text, in the chapter by Alice Bosma, Eva Mulder and Antony Pemberton, is a point that any of the chapters in this excellent collection could have concluded on: "[I]s it the extent to which the victim is ideal that influences reactions to them, or do reactions to the victim establish to what extent they are ideal?"13 I am conscious that I began this book review with an eye to the development of increased human rights protections for victims of serious sexual offences, as a particular shift in case law, but also something that is a progressive development for victims' rights: and I would still 10 Hannah Mason-Bish, 'Creating ideal victims in hate crime policy', in Marian Duggan (ed.), Revisiting the ‘ideal victim’: Developments in critical victimology, p.43. 11 Catherine Donovan and Rebecca Barnes, 'Being “ideal” or falling short? The legitimacy of lesbian, gay, bisexual and/r transgender victims of domestic violence and hate crime', in Marian Duggan (ed.), Revisiting the ‘ideal victim’: Developments in critical victimology, p.83. 12 Classically, see Erving Goffman, Stigma: Notes on the management of spoiled identity, Penguin, Harmondsworth. 13 Alice Bosma, Eva Mulder and Antony Pemberton, 'The ideal victim through other(s') eyes', in Marian Duggan (ed.), Revisiting the ‘ideal victim’: Developments in critical victimology, p.27. Jamie Grace Book Review _________________________________________________________________________ _________________________________________________________________________ 4 explain it as such. However, there is then the issue of less-serious sexual and/or violent offences and their report and investigation through to prosecution. The UK courts have maintained (in a way that the DSD judgment does not preclude) that criminal offences are on a ‘sliding scale’ of seriousness in human rights terms – with some offending not warranting proper protection (in the sense of a strictest duty of investigation) under the absolute human rights across the panoply of those available under the European Convention on Human Rights. These include the comparatively inflexible Article 3 ECHR: the right not to be subject to inhuman or degrading treatment. Article 8 ECHR which entails the right to respect for private and family life, is inherently not so protective or so strict. Lavender J has mused whether "a case which fell within the scope of Article 8 could also be seen as part of [a] sliding scale, and that a case which fell within the scope of Article 8 but not Article 3 would fall further down the scale than a case which fell within the scope of Article 3".14 However, Lavender J also noted the "English courts have yet to consider the circumstances in which such a duty might arise under Article 8 on a case which does not also fall within the scope of Article 3".15 Gross LJ has concluded that "it would be necessary to think long and hard before acceding to any claim raising the prospect of some generalised positive obligation on the State to intervene under Art. 8, without the closest scrutiny of the limits of any such postulated obligation".16 Gross LJ surmised that the "ramifications otherwise could be most unfortunate – not least, the unhappy prospect of widening the scope of Art. 8 still further".17 I confess, in conclusion, that this book has made me consider a different “unhappy prospect”. Currently, any legal discussion of victims' rights shows that there is still work for the black- letter law to do in terms of encompassing the breadth of challenges facing victims whose experiences warrant dignified treatment, and whose reported crimes morally deserve investigation. The book under review, in its 16 chapters, highlights how this development of the law and practice might be best informed by scholarship in the field of critical victimology; and in particular, recommendations of the status of 'ideal/non-ideal' victims. 14 R (MLIA and another) v Chief Constable of Hampshire Constabulary [2017] EWHC 292 (QB) at 189. 15 Ibid. at 185. 16 Allen v. Chief Constable of the Hampshire Constabulary [2013] EWCA Civ 967 at. 57. 17 Ibid.. 
work_7zpp77os5japrfo3isr4evvx3e	----	The Association between State Policy Environments and Self-Rated Health Disparities for Sexual Minorities in the United States International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health Article The Association between State Policy Environments and Self-Rated Health Disparities for Sexual Minorities in the United States Gilbert Gonzales 1,* and Jesse M. Ehrenfeld 2 ID 1 Department of Health Policy, Vanderbilt University School of Medicine, Nashville, TN 37203, USA 2 Departments of Anesthesiology, Biomedical Informatics, Surgery & Health Policy, Vanderbilt University School of Medicine, Nashville, TN 37232, USA; jesse.ehrenfeld@vanderbilt.edu * Correspondence: gilbert.gonzales@vanderbilt.edu; Tel.: +1-615-875-9469 Received: 2 May 2018; Accepted: 26 May 2018; Published: 1 June 2018 ���������� ������� Abstract: A large body of research has documented disparities in health and access to care for lesbian, gay, and bisexual (LGB) people in the United States. Less research has examined how the level of legal protection afforded to LGB people (the state policy environment) affects health disparities for sexual minorities. This study used data on 14,687 sexual minority adults and 490,071 heterosexual adults from the 2014–2016 Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System to document differences in health. Unadjusted state-specific prevalence estimates and multivariable logistic regression models were used to compare poor/fair self-rated health by gender, sexual minority status, and state policy environments (comprehensive versus limited protections for LGB people). We found disparities in self-rated health between sexual minority adults and heterosexual adults in most states. On average, sexual minority men in states with limited protections and sexual minority women in states with either comprehensive or limited protections were more likely to report poor/fair self-rated health compared to their heterosexual counterparts. This study adds new findings on the association between state policy environments and self-rated health for sexual minorities and suggests differences in this relationship by gender. The associations and impacts of state-specific policies affecting LGB populations may vary by gender, as well as other intersectional identities. Keywords: LGBT health; health policy; state policy; health disparities 1. Introduction Numerous studies have documented wide disparities in health status for sexual minorities, or gay, lesbian, bisexual (LGB), and other nonheterosexual populations [1–7]. First, sexual minorities experience barriers to routine medical care. Numerous studies have noted higher levels of uninsurance and reports of financial barriers to care for LGB people compared with their heterosexual peers [8,9]. Many employers historically did not cover same-sex spouses of sexual minority workers—leaving some LGB individuals without health care benefits. Additionally, sexual minorities are more likely to report worse health status compared to their heterosexual counterparts due to, in part, “minority stress”, which is the additional stress sexual minorities experience associated with being a member of a marginalized community [10–13]. Discriminatory environments can stigmatize sexual minorities and reduce their self-esteem and confidence, which may lead to adverse health and risk-taking behaviors. Previous research has noted that sexual minorities living in states without legal protections (e.g., same-sex marriage) were more likely to report symptoms of depression, anxiety, and alcohol use disorder [14,15]. A growing body of research has also shown that the state policy environment for sexual minorities, defined as the legal protections afforded, is related to health. Rooted in social ecological theories Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2018, 15, 1136; doi:10.3390/ijerph15061136 www.mdpi.com/journal/ijerph http://www.mdpi.com/journal/ijerph http://www.mdpi.com https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3427-0140 http://www.mdpi.com/1660-4601/15/6/1136?type=check_update&version=1 http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/ijerph15061136 http://www.mdpi.com/journal/ijerph Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2018, 15, 1136 2 of 11 of health [16], public policies can have a downstream effect on population health, health behaviors, and resources needed for better health. For instance, living in a state with legal same-sex marriage was associated with better self-rated health for individuals in same-sex relationships in the 2010–2013 Current Population Survey [17]. Meanwhile, living in a state with legal protections against hate crimes and employment-based discrimination for sexual minorities was associated with reduced prevalence of depression and anxiety disorder for sexual minorities participating in the 2004–2005 National Epidemiological Survey on Alcohol and Related Conditions [18]. More recently, a study using data from the 2011–2015 Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System found that living in a state with public attitudes and laws supporting legal protections for sexual minorities was associated with better self-rated health among lesbian and gay participants; however, this study did not stratify the analysis by gender or make comparisons to heterosexual individuals [19]. Other studies using samples from single states have found same-sex marriage laws to be associated with improvements in health insurance coverage [20,21] and reductions in mental health service utilization [22]. This study therefore builds on previous research and extends the analysis of self-rated health disparities by gender and sexual minority status. We hypothesize that living in a state with comprehensive legal protections for sexual minorities is associated with narrower disparities in self-rated health for lesbian, gay, and bisexual individuals. To test this hypothesis, we used recently collected data from a large, population-based, and multistate survey to compare self-rated health by state policy environment (comprehensive versus limited protections for LGB people). While previous studies have found that self-rated health for sexual minorities was generally better in states with legal protections, early studies often lacked a comparison group of heterosexual individuals to examine disparities in self-rated health. This study examines (1) how disparities in self-rated health vary across the United States and (2) whether disparities in self-rated health are modified by comprehensive legal protections for sexual minorities. 2. Materials and Methods This study analyzed recently collected data from the 2014–2016 Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS). The BRFSS is a nationally representative and telephone-based survey of civilian, noninstitutionalized adults aged 18 years and older in the United States. Conducted since 1984 by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) in coordination with state health departments, the BRFSS now collects health information for approximately 450,000 randomly selected adults each year. The core questionnaire ascertains key demographic and socioeconomic characteristics, medical diagnoses, health behaviors, and access to medical care. States can participate in optional CDC-designed modules or add their own specific questions to their statewide BRFSS surveys. The median response rate across all states was 47.1% in 2016 (which ranged from 30.7% in Louisiana to 65.0% in Wyoming) [23]. The core demographic questionnaire in the BRFSS currently does not ask respondents about their sexual orientation, but some states have previously added sexual orientation questions to their individual BRFSS surveys [2,24,25]. Because responses to state-added questions are not submitted to the CDC, analyzing health and access to care for sexual minorities in previous years required approval from each individual state [4]. Beginning in 2014, however, the CDC allowed states to add and submit their responses to an optional and unified module that asked about sexual orientation and gender identity. The following 31 states added the sexual orientation and gender identity module to their BRFSS survey in 2014, 2015, and/or 2016: California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. In the sexual orientation and gender identity module, respondents were asked which of the following categories best represents how they identify themselves: straight; lesbian or gay; or bisexual. While the BRFSS does include information on transgender status, we chose to focus this study on the Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2018, 15, 1136 3 of 11 association between state policy environments and self-rated health for sexual minorities. Our final sample included 14,687 sexual minority adults aged 18 years and older and 490,071 heterosexual adults aged 18 years and older. Our analysis excluded respondents indicating their sexual orientation as something else (n = 1945), respondents who did not know the answer (n = 5117), respondents who refused to answer (n = 8961), and respondents missing information on self-rated health (n = 1521). Previous research on nonresponse to a related sexual orientation question in state-level BRFSS surveys reported higher prevalence of nonresponse among racial and ethnic minorities [26], but nonresponse to a sexual orientation question was similar to nonresponse in other sensitive questions, such as race, ethnicity, and body weight [27]. We used descriptive statistics and chi-square tests to characterize the study sample. We then estimated the prevalence of poor/fair self-rated health (versus excellent, very good, or good health) by sexual minority status for all 31 states ascertaining sexual orientation. We restricted state-specific estimates to states with 50 or more sexual minority respondents to ensure a large enough sample size (28 states for men; 30 states for women). Then, we compared poor/fair self-rated health by sexual minority status and state policy environments. Individuals from all 31 states were classified into two categories based on the level of legal protections granted to sexual minorities in 2014 (the first year when the Human Rights Campaign collected data on the following five policies affecting sexual minorities) [28]. More specifically, we considered states to have comprehensive legal protections if they enacted all five of the following policies that are inclusive of sexual orientation: hate crime protections, legal same-sex marriage, employment nondiscrimination, nondiscrimination in housing, and nondiscrimination in public accommodations. Of the 31 states participating in the optional sexual orientation module, 16 states had comprehensive protections for sexual minorities by 2014 (CA, CO, CT, DE, HI, IL, IA, MD, MA, MN, NV, NY, RI, VT, WA, and WI) [28]. The remaining 15 states were classified as states with limited or no legal protections (GA, ID, IN, KS, KY, LA, MS, MO, MT, OH, PA, TX, VA, WV, and WY). While some policies have changed during the study period, especially with the recognition of federal same-sex marriage, all 15 of the study states with limited protections still lacked at least one of these protections routinely monitored by the Human Rights Campaign throughout the study period [29,30]. Unadjusted and adjusted logistic regression models were conducted to compare poor/fair health by sexual minority status, first for all adults and then stratified by state policy environments (comprehensive versus limited legal protection). All analyses were conducted separately by gender. Our fully adjusted models controlled for age, race/ethnicity, relationship status, the presence of a child in the household, educational attainment, employment status, household income, chronic disease diagnoses, health insurance status, having a usual source of care, state of residence, and survey year. Results from the logistic regression models are presented as odds ratios (ORs) with 95% confidence intervals (CIs). All analyses were conducted in Stata version 14 using survey weights and the svy command to reflect the complex survey design of the BRFSS. This study was deemed exempt by the Institutional Review Board because data were obtained from publicly available and secondary sources. 3. Results Table 1 presents demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of the sample by gender and sexual minority status. Approximately 3.6–3.8% of respondents self-identify as lesbian, gay, or bisexual. Consistent with prior studies [31], sexual minority men were more likely to be younger (over 40% of sexual minority men were under 35 years of age compared to 29% of heterosexual men), racially and ethnically diverse, and college graduates. Sexual minority men were less likely to be married or living with a partner, less likely to have a child in the household, less likely to be employed, and less likely to have household incomes of $50,000 or more compared to their heterosexual peers. Although sexual minority men were slightly less likely to report a chronic disease diagnosis, there were no statistical differences in health insurance status and having a usual source of care. Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2018, 15, 1136 4 of 11 Table 1. Demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of adult respondents by gender and sexual minority status. Sociodemographic Characteristics Men Women Heterosexual Sexual Minority p Value Heterosexual Sexual Minority p Value (n = 207,562) (n = 6894) (n = 282,509) (n = 7793) Total 96.4 3.6 <0.001 96.2 3.8 <0.001 Age, years <0.001 <0.001 18–24 12.6 21.8 10.7 31.3 25–34 16.2 21.7 14.7 26.3 35–44 16.3 12.9 15.6 14.6 45–54 17.9 18.2 17.7 12.3 55–64 17.5 14.3 17.7 8.0 ≥65 18.8 10.8 22.8 7.1 Missing data 0.7 0.2 0.9 0.4 Race/Ethnicity 0.01 <0.001 White 67.1 64.5 67.5 62.6 Black 10.5 10.8 12.0 13.6 Hispanic 13.2 14.0 12.5 12.9 Other/Multiple Races 7.5 9.4 6.7 9.6 Missing data 1.8 1.3 1.3 1.3 Relationship status <0.001 <0.001 Married or living with a partner 58.7 32.8 55.2 36.4 Divorced, separated, or widowed 15.7 10.6 24.6 15.3 Never married 25.1 55.8 19.8 47.7 Missing data 0.5 0.8 0.4 0.6 Children in the household <0.001 0.017 None 64.7 80.8 61.3 58.4 At least one child 34.8 18.8 38.2 41.3 Missing data 0.6 0.3 0.4 0.3 Educational attainment <0.001 0.001 Less than high school 13.3 9.9 11.9 13.6 High school graduate 30.8 26.3 27.9 26.4 Some college 29.2 32.3 32.7 35.7 College graduate 26.4 31.2 27.3 24.1 Missing data 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 Employment status <0.001 <0.001 Employed 64.5 60.6 50.5 54.9 Unemployed 5.8 7.7 5.0 9.6 Not in labor force 29.0 31.1 43.9 34.8 Missing data 0.7 0.5 0.6 0.8 Household income, $ <0.001 <0.001 0–9999 3.6 5.8 4.9 8.6 10,000–19,999 9.1 11.8 11.5 14.0 20,000–34,999 15.6 16.8 17.1 18.8 35,000–49,999 12.7 13.0 11.6 11.5 50,000–74,999 14.4 12.4 12.9 10.0 ≥75,000 32.7 28.1 26.7 21.3 Missing data 12.0 12.0 15.3 15.9 Chronic disease diagnoses 0.06 0.008 None 58.2 60.8 50.6 53.1 One chronic disease 23.1 21.4 26.7 26.4 Multiple chronic diseases 15.9 14.7 20.3 17.6 Missing data 2.8 3.1 2.5 2.9 Health insurance status 0.86 <0.001 Insured 87.4 87.4 90.7 86.8 Uninsured 12.0 11.7 8.9 12.6 Missing data 0.6 0.9 0.4 0.6 Has usual source of care 0.85 <0.001 Yes 68.7 69.3 78.9 69.1 No 30.7 30.2 20.8 30.5 Missing data 0.6 0.6 0.4 0.4 Source: 2014–2016 Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System. Table 1 also presents the sociodemographic characteristics for sexual minority women and heterosexual women. Again, consistent with prior studies [31], sexual minority women were more likely to be younger (over half of sexual minority women were under 35 years of age compared to 25% of heterosexual women) and racially and ethnically diverse. Sexual minority women were also less likely to be married or living with a partner, but they were more likely to have a child in the household compared to heterosexual women. Educational attainment was relatively similar between sexual Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2018, 15, 1136 5 of 11 minority and heterosexual women, but sexual minority women were more likely to be unemployed and in households with incomes less than $50,000. Compared with heterosexual women, sexual minority women were less likely to report a chronic disease diagnosis, less likely to have health insurance, and less likely to have a usual source of care. 3.1. State-Specific Disparities in Self-Rated Health Figure 1 presents the unadjusted state-specific estimates of poor/fair self-rated health by sexual minority status for men. Sexual minority men were more likely to report poor/fair health compared to heterosexual men in most states. The widest disparities in poor/fair health for sexual minority men were found in Montana and Rhode Island—where sexual minority men were, on average, 10 percentage points more likely to report poor/fair health compared with heterosexual men. Reporting of poor/fair health among sexual minority men was also high in Pennsylvania, Ohio, Louisiana, Idaho, Nevada, and Maryland; more than 20% of sexual minority men in these states reported poor/fair health. Sexual minority men were less likely to report poor/fair health in seven states: California, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Massachusetts, New York, and Washington. Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2018, 15, x 5 of 11 likely to be younger (over half of sexual minority women were under 35 years of age compared to 25% of heterosexual women) and racially and ethnically diverse. Sexual minority women were also less likely to be married or living with a partner, but they were more likely to have a child in the household compared to heterosexual women. Educational attainment was relatively similar between sexual minority and heterosexual women, but sexual minority women were more likely to be unemployed and in households with incomes less than $50,000. Compared with heterosexual women, sexual minority women were less likely to report a chronic disease diagnosis, less likely to have health insurance, and less likely to have a usual source of care. 3.1. State-Specific Disparities in Self-Rated Health Figure 1 presents the unadjusted state-specific estimates of poor/fair self-rated health by sexual minority status for men. Sexual minority men were more likely to report poor/fair health compared to heterosexual men in most states. The widest disparities in poor/fair health for sexual minority men were found in Montana and Rhode Island—where sexual minority men were, on average, 10 percentage points more likely to report poor/fair health compared with heterosexual men. Reporting of poor/fair health among sexual minority men was also high in Pennsylvania, Ohio, Louisiana, Idaho, Nevada, and Maryland; more than 20% of sexual minority men in these states reported poor/fair health. Sexual minority men were less likely to report poor/fair health in seven states: California, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Massachusetts, New York, and Washington. Figure 1. State-specific estimates of poor or fair health by sexual minority status for men. Weighted estimates represent the percentage of adults aged 18 years and older who report poor or fair health (instead of excellent, very good, or good health). ● = heterosexual adults; ♦ = sexual minority adults. Source: 2014–2016 Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance Survey. Note that not all states in the figure ascertained sexual orientation every year, but comparisons between heterosexual and sexual minority adults are state–year specific. Figure 1. State-specific estimates of poor or fair health by sexual minority status for men. Weighted estimates represent the percentage of adults aged 18 years and older who report poor or fair health (instead of excellent, very good, or good health). = heterosexual adults; � = sexual minority adults. Source: 2014–2016 Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance Survey. Note that not all states in the figure ascertained sexual orientation every year, but comparisons between heterosexual and sexual minority adults are state–year specific. Figure 2 presents the unadjusted state-specific estimates of poor/fair self-rated health by sexual minority status for women. Sexual minority women were also more likely to report poor/fair health Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2018, 15, 1136 6 of 11 compared with heterosexual women in most states. Disparities in poor/fair health by sexual minority status were widest in Iowa, Nevada, and Wyoming—all states where sexual minority women were more likely to report poor/fair health compared with heterosexual women by 10 percentage points or more. Sexual minority women in West Virginia, Nevada, and Louisiana also reported high levels of poor/fair health; more than 30% of sexual minority women living in these states reported poor/fair health. Sexual minority women in California, Kentucky Missouri, Montana, and Ohio were less likely to report poor/fair health compared with heterosexual women. Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2018, 15, x 6 of 11 Figure 2 presents the unadjusted state-specific estimates of poor/fair self-rated health by sexual minority status for women. Sexual minority women were also more likely to report poor/fair health compared with heterosexual women in most states. Disparities in poor/fair health by sexual minority status were widest in Iowa, Nevada, and Wyoming—all states where sexual minority women were more likely to report poor/fair health compared with heterosexual women by 10 percentage points or more. Sexual minority women in West Virginia, Nevada, and Louisiana also reported high levels of poor/fair health; more than 30% of sexual minority women living in these states reported poor/fair health. Sexual minority women in California, Kentucky Missouri, Montana, and Ohio were less likely to report poor/fair health compared with heterosexual women. Figure 2. State-specific estimates of poor or fair health by sexual minority status for women. Weighted estimates represent the percentage of adults aged 18 years and older who report poor or fair health (instead of excellent, very good, or good health). ● = heterosexual adults; ♦ = sexual minority adults. Source: 2014–2016 Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance Survey. Note that not all states in the figure ascertained sexual orientation every year, but comparisons between heterosexual and sexual minority adults are state–year specific. 3.2. Association between State Policy Environments and Self-Rated Health Disparities Table 2 presents the prevalence and odds ratios of poor/fair health among men by sexual minority status and state policy environments. There were no statistical differences in self-rated poor/fair health between sexual minority (17.4%) and heterosexual (16.4%) men in all study states— even after controlling for sociodemographic characteristics (odds ratio [OR] = 1.10; 95% confidence interval [CI] = 0.94–1.28). After stratifying by state policy environments, there were still no differences in self-rated poor/fair health for sexual minority (14.9%) and heterosexual (15.4%) men in the study states with comprehensive legal protections for sexual minorities (OR = 0.96; 95% CI = 0.79–1.16). Figure 2. State-specific estimates of poor or fair health by sexual minority status for women. Weighted estimates represent the percentage of adults aged 18 years and older who report poor or fair health (instead of excellent, very good, or good health). = heterosexual adults; � = sexual minority adults. Source: 2014–2016 Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance Survey. Note that not all states in the figure ascertained sexual orientation every year, but comparisons between heterosexual and sexual minority adults are state–year specific. 3.2. Association between State Policy Environments and Self-Rated Health Disparities Table 2 presents the prevalence and odds ratios of poor/fair health among men by sexual minority status and state policy environments. There were no statistical differences in self-rated poor/fair health between sexual minority (17.4%) and heterosexual (16.4%) men in all study states—even after controlling for sociodemographic characteristics (odds ratio [OR] = 1.10; 95% confidence interval [CI] = 0.94–1.28). After stratifying by state policy environments, there were still no differences in self-rated poor/fair health for sexual minority (14.9%) and heterosexual (15.4%) men in the study states with comprehensive legal protections for sexual minorities (OR = 0.96; 95% CI = 0.79–1.16). However, Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2018, 15, 1136 7 of 11 sexual minority men in states with limited protections were more likely to report poor/fair health compared with heterosexual men (20.6% vs. 17.4%). This relationship persisted after controlling for sociodemographic variables (OR = 1.30; 95% CI = 1.03–1.64). Table 2. Prevalence and odds ratios comparing poor/fair health among men by sexual minority status and state policy environment. Study Sample Weighted Prevalence (%) Unadjusted OR (95% CI) Adjusted OR (95% CI) † Men in all 31 study states Heterosexual 16.4 1.00 [Reference] 1.00 [Reference] Sexual Minority 17.4 1.07 (0.95–1.21) 1.10 (0.94–1.28) Men in 16 study states with comprehensive protections Heterosexual 15.4 1.00 [Reference] 1.00 [Reference] Sexual Minority 14.9 0.96 (0.82–1.13) 0.96 (0.79–1.16) Men in 15 study states with limited protections Heterosexual 17.4 1.00 [Reference] 1.00 [Reference] Sexual Minority 20.6 1.23 (1.03–1.47) ** 1.30 (1.03–1.64) ** Source: 2014–2016 Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS). Notes: OR = odds ratio; CI = confidence interval. † Adjusted OR estimates are from logistic regression models adjusting for age, race/ethnicity, relationship status, children in the household, educational attainment, household income, employment status, chronic disease status, health insurance status, usual source of care, state of residence, and survey year. *** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.05. Table 3 presents prevalence estimates and odds ratios comparing poor/fair health among women by sexual minority status and state policy environment. On average, sexual minority women (20.7%) were more likely to report poor/fair health (OR = 1.21; 95% CI = 1.09–1.35) compared with heterosexual women (17.7%) after controlling for sociodemographic characteristics. Additionally, sexual minority women were more likely to report poor/fair health in states with comprehensive protections (OR = 1.26; 95% CI = 1.08–1.46) and in states with limited protections (OR = 1.19; 95% CI = 1.01–1.40). State policy environments did not modify the association between sexual minority status and self-rated health for women in this analysis. Table 3. Prevalence and odds ratios comparing poor/fair health among women by sexual minority status and state policy environment. Study Sample Weighted Prevalence (%) Unadjusted OR (95% CI) Adjusted OR (95% CI) † Women in all 31 study states Heterosexual 17.7 1.00 [Reference] 1.00 [Reference] Sexual Minority 20.7 1.21 (1.09–1.35) ** 1.35 (1.17–1.55) *** Women in 16 study states with comprehensive protections Heterosexual 16.1 1.00 [Reference] 1.00 [Reference] Sexual Minority 19.5 1.26 (1.08–1.46) ** 1.44 (1.19–1.75) *** Women in 15 study states with limited protections Heterosexual 19.2 1.00 [Reference] 1.00 [Reference] Sexual Minority 22.0 1.19 (1.01–1.40) ** 1.28 (1.04–1.57) ** Source: 2014–2016 Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS). Notes: OR = odds ratio; CI = confidence interval. † Adjusted OR estimates are from logistic regression models adjusting for age, race/ethnicity, relationship status, children in the household, educational attainment, household income, employment status, chronic disease status, health insurance status, usual source of care, state of residence, and survey year. *** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.05. Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2018, 15, 1136 8 of 11 4. Discussion This study used a well-validated, population-based, and multistate sample of sexual minority and heterosexual adults in the United States to document disparities in self-rated health by state policy environment. We tested whether living in a state with comprehensive legal protections for sexual minorities (i.e., hate crime protections, legal same-sex marriage, employment nondiscrimination, nondiscrimination in housing, and nondiscrimination in public accommodations) was associated with narrower differences in self-rated health by sexual minority status. As hypothesized, we found narrower and nonsignificant differences in self-rated health for sexual minority men in states with comprehensive protections, but sexual minority men in states with limited protections were more likely to report poor/fair self-rated health compared with heterosexual men. Unexpectedly, we did not find a similar relationship for sexual minority women, who were more likely to report poor/fair self-rated health regardless of the state policy environment. This study is consistent with previous research that has documented the association between better self-rated health among same-sex couples [17], sexual minority men [22], and sexual minority men and women [19] in states adopting same-sex marriage laws or other legal protections for sexual minorities. Because health disparities and poor health may be costly to society [32], policymakers should consider the health benefits of legal protections for sexual minorities when debating new proposals and legislation. Since these data were collected, same-sex marriage has been extended across the United States. While legal same-sex marriage may be associated with improved health for sexual minorities, our study suggests that comprehensive legal protections may be associated with better self-rated health for some LGB people—and the health benefits may not be shared equally. Some sexual minorities may not fully enjoy the health advantages of LGB-affirming policies depending on other sociodemographic factors (e.g., heterosexism, sexism, and racism) or the policy environments found in the places they live (e.g., comprehensive versus limited protections). Our study provides early evidence that sexual minority women still report disparities in self-rated health regardless of their state policy environment—which, for us, was unexpected. Our analysis did not explore the causal mechanisms explaining why disparities in self-rated health persisted for sexual minority women, but the relationship between legal protections and health should be examined from a gendered perspective. Sociologists have found that heterosexual marriage disproportionately improves the health of men compared with that of women (which may be emerging through our findings) [33]. Other sociologists have argued that public policy can reinforce or reshape marital, social, and economic situations for women [34,35]—all of which may affect women’s health differently than men’s health. Future studies should compare the health impacts of LGB-based policies by gender and other sociodemographic dimensions, including race/ethnicity, socioeconomic status, and disability status. Our research also demonstrates the importance of state-level data for monitoring health disparities among sexual minorities. Having more comprehensive sexual orientation data at the state and municipal levels can inform targeted interventions for improving health outcomes and health behaviors in sexual minorities. Additional data can also help identify groups within the sexual minority population at greatest risk of worse health. For instance, while not examined directly in this study, sexual minority women experienced different trends and disparities in self-rated health compared with sexual minority men. On average, sexual minority women were more likely to report poor/fair self-rated health (20.7%) compared with sexual minority men (17.4%). Relatedly, sometimes disparities in self-rated health between heterosexual individuals and sexual minorities were wider for women than men in the same state (e.g., Iowa, Massachusetts, and Nevada). Future research should use qualitative or mixed-methods study designs to better understand how health is understood or interpreted for sexual minorities and whether definitions of ‘excellent’ health vary by sexual orientation and within the sexual minority population. Other research should continue to use alternative data (e.g., the National Health Interview Survey) and different settings (e.g., European countries) to confirm or negate these findings. Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2018, 15, 1136 9 of 11 Limitations Our findings should be interpreted with caution, as several limitations were present throughout this study, such as reporting bias, missing data, small sample sizes, and noncausal research designs. First, all responses in the BRFSS—including sociodemographic characteristics and health status—were self-reported, which may suffer from recall and response bias. Relatedly, responses to the sexual orientation question may be threatened by selection bias. The sample of sexual minorities examined in this study only included adults in noninstitutionalized settings (with landline or cell phones) who were comfortable disclosing their sexual orientation to BRFSS surveyors. Homeless adults and adults in nursing homes, incarceration facilities, and institutionalized medical facilities were missing from this study. Also missing were adults not comfortable disclosing their sexual minority status, which may bias our estimates to the extent that vulnerable subpopulations were included among nonrespondents. Meanwhile, adults in states not using the sexual orientation module in their BRFSS survey were also missing from this analysis. Because our sample only included data from 31 states, our results may not be generalizable to the rest of the country or to the entire sexual minority population. States in the southeastern U.S. were especially underrepresented, which includes numerous states with limited legal protections for LGBT people. Differences in self-rated health may be wider than what we detected here. We are hopeful that additional states will participate in the sexual orientation and gender identity module or that questions on sexual orientation and gender identity will be added to the core BRFSS questionnaire in the near future. Small sample sizes also restricted our analysis to sexual minority status. We were unable to separate our analysis by specific sexual orientation (i.e., stratified analyses for lesbians, gay men, bisexual men, and bisexual women were less reliable because of small samples). Relatedly, the BRFSS module only asks a single question about sexual orientation identity and does not measure other dimensions of sexual orientation, such as sexual behavior or sexual attraction. Our analysis precludes individuals who are sexually active with or attracted to people of the same sex but do not identify as lesbian, gay, or bisexual. Additionally, our study only focused on health disparities by sexual minority status and did not include comparisons by transgender status or gender identity—both because of the limited sample size of transgender respondents and because gender identity is a separate and distinct concept from sexual orientation [36]. We hope that future research will investigate whether and how self-rated health varies for transgender individuals by state policy environment. Finally, this analysis is limited by its observational research design. The BRFSS is a cross-sectional health survey and the correlations identified in this analysis cannot definitively establish the causal pathways between sexual minority status, self-rated health, and state policy environments. Omitted and unmeasured variables—such as experiences of sexual-orientation-based discrimination and micro-level exposures to inclusivity or hostility in various settings (e.g., employment, health care, and the household)—may explain the relationship between state policy environments and self-rated health for sexual minorities reported here. Future research should examine the impact of micro-level exposures to discrimination on self-rated health. Other research should use quasi-experimental designs or longitudinal data to test and establish causality in the relationship between legal protections and health outcomes for sexual minorities. Still, more research should build on this study and examine the relationship between legal protections and alternative dimensions of health, including mental health, activity limitations, and health behaviors. 5. Conclusions This study adds new evidence of the association between state policy environments and self-rated health disparities for sexual minorities using a population-based and multistate sample in the United States. While much focus has been placed on the impact of state health policy on health outcomes, this study emphasizes the importance of further understanding the relationships between non-health-related legal protections and the health of populations vulnerable to discrimination. Ultimately, the ability to elucidate the impact of public policies at the federal, state, and local levels Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2018, 15, 1136 10 of 11 will enable the development of better strategies to reduce disparities and improve the overall health of vulnerable populations, including sexual minorities. Author Contributions: G.G. conceived and designed the analysis; G.G. performed the analysis; G.G. and J.M.E. analyzed the data; G.G. and J.M.E. wrote the paper. Acknowledgments: Gilbert Gonzales received support from the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation (grant #74174) during this project. Jesse Ehrenfeld received support from the Morehouse School of Medicine Transdisciplinary Collaborative Center and the National Institute on Minority Health and Health Disparities (NIMHD) Grant Number U54MD008173. Conflicts of Interest: The authors declare no conflict of interest. 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Introduction Materials and Methods Results State-Specific Disparities in Self-Rated Health Association between State Policy Environments and Self-Rated Health Disparities Discussion Conclusions References 
work_a32bxp2qqjgjjo52po3jvxbxqm	----	The Local Role in Homeland Security The Local Role in Homeland Security David Thacher There has been considerable discussion since September 11 of the enormous resource that local police potentially represent in the fight against terrorism. This article identifies limits to the local role in homeland security by analyzing a case study of Dearborn, Michigan. Partly because Dearborn is home to one of the largest concentrations of Arabs in the United States, its experience with homeland security highlights two kinds of burdens that cities incur when they engage in proactive surveillance to identify potential terrorists: damage to their reputation (since police surveillance implies that its objects are not trustworthy) and damage to police legitimacy (since new surveillance may undermine trust between police and the community). Because the benefits of efforts to identify terrorists typically accrue to jurisdictions other than the one that engages in itFunlike street crime, terrorism is a national or even inter- national problemFlocal governments have little reason to pursue it. Instead, cities such as Dearborn have reason to emphasize what I call the ‘‘community protection’’ aspects of homeland security, such as target hardening and emer- gency response. This finding has more general implications for our under- standing of the police role and the politics of policing, showing how both are shaped by the structural location police occupy in federalist systems of government. In the face of a national problem such as homeland security, the most striking feature of American policing is its decentralization: the overwhelming majority of U.S. police are distributed across nearly 13,000 autonomous local police departments. As many par- ticipants in the debate about homeland security have observed, there are more than 600,000 local police but only 12,000 FBI agents, and from this fact they conclude that the nation will max- imize its ability to prevent new attacks by enlisting local police in the search for terrorists (Berger 2002; Biden 2003; Flanagan 2002; Northeast Regional Homeland Security Agreement 2003). Schol- Law & Society Review, Volume 39, Number 3 (2005) r 2005 by The Law and Society Association. All rights reserved. 635 I would like to thank Ann Lin, Michael Musheno, and the editor and reviewers at Law & Society Review for helpful comments on this article, as well as Liz Gerber and Barry Rabe for helpful discussion. This research was supported by a grant from the Center for Local, State, and Urban Policy (CLOSUP) at the University of Michigan. Please direct corre- spondence to David Thacher, Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy, 712 Oakland Street, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI 48104; e-mail: dthacher@umich.edu. ars, too, have come to expect that local police will play a large role in many aspects of homeland security. One recent analysis indicat- ed that local police would soon be ‘‘developing new areas of in- vestigative expertise, cooperating much more with federal law enforcement and intelligence agencies, working more closely with the military, increasing their levels of surveillance over their com- munities, [and] paying more attention to the safety of critical in- frastructure’’ (Maguire & King 2004:21). This view about the local role in homeland security is oppor- tunistic in the sense that it treats the massive institutional capacity of local policing as a resource that can be mobilized for any end that policy makers desire. It reflects an understanding of federal sys- tems in which ‘‘any activity performed by nations can be performed by cities’’ (Peterson 1981:15), so local governments can easily be enlisted in the service of national goals. In political science, this conception of federalism had its heyday in the 1970s after Grodzins (1966) described the federal system as a ‘‘marble cake,’’ meaning that policy functions were distributed somewhat arbitrarily among local, state, and national governments. But as Peterson (1981) has argued, this perspective fails to account for the distinctive limits within which local government operates. This article analyzes how the fragmented and decentralized nature of American government shapes the local role in homeland security by investigating the experiences of the Dearborn, Mich- igan, police department. To guide this investigation, I draw from and extend Peterson’s (1981) theory of local governmentFone of the leading theories of local government in political science, but one that has not been incorporated into sociolegal studies. Peter- son’s theory sheds light on the local role in homeland security by showing how local government’s limited powers influence the in- terests cities have, the political dynamics that express those inter- ests, and the policy choices that emerge. That analysis extends our understanding of the police function and the politics of local po- licing by showing how both are shaped by the decentralization of American government. Moreover, by bringing Peterson’s theory to bear on policing, this analysis extends that theory (via a return to its Weberian roots) to incorporate the distinctive interests impli- cated by legal institutions. Dearborn is a fruitful place to examine these issues. Because it has one of the nation’s largest concentrations of Arab Americans and has been a major focus of national attention since 9/11, its experi- ence illustrates with special clarity how a city’s interests in honor and the legitimate use of police authority are relevant to its homeland security efforts. In Dearborn, those interests drove police to em- phasize what I call the community protection functions of homeland security (especially emergency response and protective security for 636 The Local Role in Homeland Security potential targets) and avoid what I call the offender search functions (investigative efforts to locate those who have committed or intend to commit terrorist acts). If the forces that shaped Dearborn’s de- cisions are general, then local governments are well-situated to ad- minister community protection functions but poorly situated to administer offender searchFa conclusion that challenges the op- portunistic view of the local role in homeland security. Local Government and the Police Role Recent research already suggests limits to the local role in homeland security. To support its lobbying efforts asking the fed- eral government for increased homeland security funds, the U.S. Conference of Mayors surveyed 192 cities to document their new homeland security activities and costs since 9/11. Of the 159 cities that described those activities, only five listed even minimal inves- tigative efforts focused on potential terrorists, and the report’s own summary of the most common activities identified 10 categories of community protection tasks (e.g., hazmat response, building secu- rity, and investigation of suspicious packages delivered locally) and no offender search tasks (U.S. Conference of Mayors 2002:11). The survey was hardly systematic, and it may well misreport the level of local offender search activities. Nevertheless, it is striking that even in a political document commissioned to demonstrate how extensive local homeland security efforts are, very few cities reported any offender search work at all. On reflection, this pattern is not surprising. Local governments are responsible for the well-being of particular territories, and that responsibility limits the policy functions they can and should pur- sue. For example, if a policy mainly benefits jurisdictions other than the one that bears its burdens, it is unlikely that any local government will pursue it; indeed it would generally be inappro- priate for a local government to do so because local governments should mainly serve local interests (Peterson 1981). That obvious fact has important implications for the local role in homeland se- curity because there is often a geographic mismatch between the costs and benefits of anti-terrorism activities. The distinction be- tween community protection and offender search helps make this point more precisely. Community protection encompasses all the tasks involved in protecting a specific place against terrorism, in- cluding target hardening, preventive patrol focused on likely tar- gets of terrorist attack, response to threats against a specific target, and the development of emergency response plans. Offender search encompasses all the tasks involved in identifying and inves- tigating particular people suspected of involvement in terrorist Thacher 637 activities, either to bring them to justice after they have committed an attack or to prevent them from doing so in the first place. This distinction is important because the two tasks typically distribute their benefits and costs differently. When a city pursues community protection, both the benefits and the costs redound to the city itself because community protection safeguards just those people and places the city chooses. But since terrorism is a national or even international problem, the benefits of offender search do not nec- essarily accrue to the city where potential terrorists reside, while the costs do. A city that increases its offender search efforts must spend its own resources and place its own residents under in- creased surveillance to prevent acts of terrorism that in all prob- ability will take place elsewhere. It is instructive to compare homeland security to conventional crime control in this regard. As Thacher (2001a) and Wilson (1972) observed, community concerns about police harassment generate pressure for police to minimize police surveillance when they tar- get street crime, but concerns about safety create countervailing pressures to increase it. These conflicting concerns make policing street crime a contentious issue, but since pressures arise in both directions, the final equilibrium usually does involve some atten- tion to offender search when the topic is crime control. When the topic is homeland security, however, the people who suffer the burdens of police surveillance often differ from the people who enjoy its benefits, so no local police department has much reason to pursue it. Localism in the Police Role Scholarship about the police sometimes makes little of their territorial commitments, suggesting that police focus not on spe- cific places but on specific functions such as order maintenance (Banton 1964; Wilson 1968), information-brokering (Ericson & Haggerty 1997), the situationally rational use of force (Bittner 1990), or crime control (Skolnick 1975; Bayley 1994). For example, William Westley concluded that police felt they got more credit for getting ‘‘a good pinch’’ than for keeping a ‘‘clean beat’’ (1953:35– 6). From that perspective, what matters is whether offender search activities offer police the opportunity to make good pinches or perform any of their other defining tasks, not whether they im- prove the well-being of a particular place. As I will show later in this article, such occupational norms often did influence Dearborn’s initial approach to homeland security. Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to ignore the territorial commitments of police entirely. At the level of individual officers, many studies demonstrate that police take responsibility for law and order mainly within their 638 The Local Role in Homeland Security assigned beats, ignoring or even contributing to illegality and dis- order elsewhere. Rubinstein captured this focus clearly, writing that a patrol officer ‘‘has no need to know about places beyond the district’s limits. The first thing he learns about his district, after the location of the station house, is its boundaries. His knowledge of what lies beyond them is limited and his curiosity restricted’’ (1973:129). More recently, Herbert analyzed police territoriality at length (1997a, b). The bulk of his analysis examined how police use control of space to maintain order, but in places his work also sug- gested how geography defines the limits of police responsibility. In one anecdote, two officers near the eastern boundary of their beat frisked four suspicious youth: None of these searches bear fruit, so they release the young men and tell them to leave the area. They begin to walk west, but the officer in charge yells at them to walk in the other direction. He wants them to walk east because they will cross the boundary be- tween two patrol divisions. Once on the other side of the boundary, the men become some other officer’s concern. (1997b:90) Since police sometimes actively displace crime into other jurisdic- tions, it should surprise no one if they are reluctant to take costly and controversial steps to try to prevent it from arising there. Policing scholars have said less about this territorial commit- ment at the organizational level, where the relevant questions are how and in what sense a police department becomes committed to the well-being of its city and how that commitment shapes its or- ganizational and policy choices. When the literature has raised these questions, it has done so by investigating how local politics shapes police decisions. Such studies typically echo the broader literature in urban politics, and like that broader literature they can be classified according to whose influence they emphasize. For ex- ample, the view that a ‘‘power elite’’ controls local policymaking (Hunter 1953) appears in Skolnick’s earliest work, which refers to the demands of ‘‘the so-called power structure of the community’’ to explain why police emphasize crime control over legality (1975:242), and the view that the push and pull of interest groups shapes local policy (Dahl 1961) dominates the community policing literature, which often treats the community organizations that partner with police as devices for bringing neighborhood interests to police attention (Henig 1978; Skogan 1988; Bass 2000; Thacher 2001a). Other scholars imply that police decisions come from the preferences of the electorate as a whole (Ostrom & Whitaker 1973), from police themselves (Wilson 1968:227–32; Lyons 1999), or from a mix of pressures from all these actors (Heinz et al. 1983). Finally, Wilson’s seminal study of the politics of policing suggests that in those rare cases when the local polity influences police decisions at Thacher 639 all, it typically does so through party politics and interest group pressure (1968:236–71), which enforce a ‘‘zone of indifference’’ within which police exercise discretion (1968:233). These studies have made valuable contributions to knowledge about the politics of policing, but they share an important limita- tion with the broader urban politics literature that they echo. In an influential critique of that literature, Peterson described it as an ‘‘internal’’ perspective on local policymaking that looks for the factors that influence policy choices by examining political forces within the cityF‘‘the rivalry among groups, the patterns of coali- tion formation, the presence or absence of competitive political parties, the power of local elites, or the vagaries of political cam- paigns’’ (1981:3). Peterson argued that this overt drama offers only a surface view of local policymaking because the roles its actors play are partly shaped offstage. In making this argument, Peterson emphasized that local gov- ernments have only a fraction of the federal government’s powers F‘‘they cannot make war or peace; they cannot issue passports or forbid outsiders from entering their territory; they cannot issue currency; and they cannot control imports or erect tariff walls’’ (1981:4)Fand he suggested that the implications of these limits pervade local policymaking. For example, local governments’ in- ability to set monetary policy, forbid businesses and wealthy house- holds from leaving, or prevent influxes of unskilled workers puts them in a precarious fiscal position that limits their policy choices; in particular, it makes redistributive policies nearly hopeless at the local level. Peterson suggested that politicians, bureaucrats, and even in- terest groups all tend to become aware of these limits, at least implicitly, so they influence the positions that rational political ac- tors take in the overt drama the internal perspective examines. For example, he criticized community power studies as follows: ‘‘When ‘power-elite’ theorists identified a small group of power holders, they regarded the decisions this group made as the primary factors determining local policy. In fact these leaders were largely re- sponding to factors external to the community that were quite be- yond the control of the ‘power elite’ ’’ (1981:5). City politicians and bureaucrats have even more reason to adapt their preferences to those limits: if they do not, they risk driving dissatisfied residents away and ultimately going bankrupt (1981:29). Aware of these risks, city officials deflect political pressure to make bad policy choices (1981:182–3), and they embrace outside groups whose in- terests align with the city’s (1981:141). In this way, ‘‘reputation, respectability, popularity, and power flow to those who take the city’s interests as their own, or who are fortunate enough to have special interests that converge with those of the city’’ (1981:145). 640 The Local Role in Homeland Security In offering this critique, Peterson did not claim that analysts should ignore the push and pull of local politics entirely. He simply argued that to interpret the meaning of that visible drama, scholars should consider how structural features of local government shape it (1981:131–83). For example, where much of the policing liter- ature has treated the expressed demands of political actors as brute, un-analyzable facts about the world (e.g., Skolnick 1975:242; Wilson 1968:228; Thacher 2001a:776), Peterson directed attention to the features of local governance that shape these preferences in the first place, recognizing that the limits of local government con- strain the kinds of policy preferences that political actors can sen- sibly pursue and city officials can reasonably accommodate. This analytic strategy may give some coherence to an otherwise ad hoc review of arbitrary political demands. To conceptualize the constraints on local government con- cisely, Peterson proposed to treat cities as a particular kind of social structure that, like all social structures, have interests deter- mined by ‘‘their place in the larger socioeconomic and polit- ical context’’ (1981:4). ‘‘Just as we can speak of union interests, judicial interests, and the interests of politicians, so we can speak of the interests of that structured system of social interactions that we call a city’’ (1981:17). While recognizing that there exist diverse roles within a city, Peterson defined city interests as the component of individuals’ overall interests that they have by virtue of their residence or movement in a particular legal jurisdictionF one whose powers are limited in the ways noted above (1981:21). Peterson went on to argue that local governments have reason to pursue just those policies that advance city interests defined in this way. This argument does not imply that city interests determine policy choices. In many cases it is debatable whether a policy will serve a city’s interests, so the ideal of serving city interests shapes the kind arguments that political actors make without determining the con- clusions they reach (Peterson 1981:22, 132–3). In other cases, pol- icy decisions have little effect on the interests of the city as a whole but simply allocate a fixed pie of benefits to various groups, so the preferences political actors express will more obviously reflect group interests (1981:150–66). Finally, in later work Peterson ar- gued that local governments occasionally act against the city’s in- terests, particularly when highly professionalized occupational groups implement federal programs (though even here, profes- sionals may be reined in if an issue attracts publicity or political leaders exercise especially rigid control) (Peterson et al. 1986). This last idea is very relevant to the local role in homeland security, since I have already noted how occupational norms in policing may support offender search activities. Thacher 641 Peterson’s theory remains one of the most influential analyses of local government in political science, but like any influential theory it has been subject to incisive criticisms (e.g., Stone 2004). This is not the place to review those criticisms in detail, since the most significant focus on details of Peterson’s framework that are not relevant for my purposes (such as his claim that what he calls ‘‘developmental’’ policies inspire little political controversy) or de- tails I will challenge myself (such as his claim that the city has a unitary interest in enhancing its economic position). Instead, I propose to ask what follows for our understanding of local policing Fand particularly the local role in homeland securityFif we pur- sue Peterson’s basic idea that it can be useful to treat cities as social structures with interests of their own. City Limits Revisited Peterson developed his theory of city interests by applying a more general argument from Weber, who argued that all social actors have interests in their economic position, social honor, and political power (1978:926–40), but he quickly set aside honor and power as matters of little importance for cities to focus on their economic interestsFin particular, their ‘‘attractiveness as a locale for economic activity’’ (Peterson 1981:22). This perspective works reasonably well for policy issues such as infrastructure, land use, and economic development, where costs and benefits are primarily economic, but a conception of city interests that focuses mainly on economic interests does not adequately capture the interests im- plicated by legal institutions. Police efforts to maintain order and control crime do help local economies to function, but police also play a role in a system of punishment that maintains the moral order as much as the economic order. More important, the costs of policing are only partly economic costs. Legal institutions distribute not only financial benefits and burdens; they also, and more dis- tinctively, distribute the benefits and burdens associated with the use of governmental coercive authorityFnotably the surveillance and information-gathering used to identify deviance (Marx 1988) and the coercive force used to stop it (Bittner 1990). The challenge is to conceptualize the city’s interests in a way that connects with these features of legal institutions. It is more difficult to meet that challenge than it may first ap- pear (Imbroscio 2003). Since the goal is to treat the city as a social actor in its own right, it will not suffice to incorporate individual interests as they relate to police surveillance and coercion; instead, one must adequately define the interests of the city itself. I propose to meet this challenge by returning to the two Weberian interests Peterson set aside. 642 The Local Role in Homeland Security The first is the interest status honor. Since police surveillance implies that the object of surveillance cannot be trusted, and the use of coercion stigmatizes its object as outright blameworthy, po- licing implicates the interest in status honor. A few scholars have recognized how officers’ street-level decisions can confer honor and stigma on individuals (Oberweis & Musheno 1999; Ericson & Haggerty 1997:443; Applebaum 1996), but the Dearborn case il- lustrates how police policy decisions can confer honor and stigma on groupsFparticularly the city’s large Arab American community (as Weber noted, status honor attaches especially to racial and ethnic groups [1978:390–3]), and also on the city as a whole. To be sure, surveillance does not always have this consequence. If surveillance targets a generic and abstract class of suspected criminals, no iden- tifiable social group need be singled out for suspicion. But when surveillance focuses heavily on an identifiable group, the group’s honor may be damaged, particularly if it is already precarious. This distinction is important in the context of homeland security be- cause of the ethnic overtones of current discussions about terror- ism. Since most Americans assume that offender search focuses on Arabs, new efforts may threaten that group’s honor by implying that its members are untrustworthy. In a city such as Dearborn, whose public image is tied closely to its ethnic composition, effects on Arab honor carry over to the city’s own reputation, and to preserve its honor it must either preserve the reputation of the relevant ethnic group or disentangle its public image from that of the group. The Dearborn case illustrates how these conflicts over ethnic honor and city reputation are partly fought out in, and therefore shape, homeland security decisions. Second, policing also implicates a city’s interest in the legitimate use of authority, since its political power depends on perceptions of local government legitimacy (Weber 1978:213).1 If police use their authority recklessly, they may undermine public cooperation (Tyler 2004) and suffer instability and interference from their overseers (Crank & Langworthy 1992). In extreme cases, local agencies have been placed under the oversight of state commissions or court re- ceivers because they misspent their authority rather than their money (Moore 1995:209)Fincidents that vividly illustrate how the limited sovereignty of local government shapes cities’ policymaking freedom. A desire to avoid this fate gives city officials reason to worry about the legitimate use of authority, just as a desire to avoid 1 Here the city is a somewhat awkward social actor for the Weberian typology of interests. Its power is a not a matter of its ability to seize the reins of local government (Weber 1978:939)Fsomething it enjoys almost by definition in a decentralized systemF but of the strength, and hence legitimacy, of the government it controls. Thacher 643 fiscal bankruptcy (Peterson 1981: Ch. 10) gives them reason to worry about economic interests. The challenge facing both scholars and political actors is to de- fine what makes the use of authority legitimate. That challenge is particularly difficult today because, as recent scholarship demon- strates, modern policing relies less on outright coercion than on surveillance and information-gathering (Ericson & Haggerty 1997; Marx 1988). Since those techniques do not obviously involve coer- cive authority (Ericson & Haggerty 1997:133; Foucault 1977:177), some observers worry that it may be difficult to define legitimate boundaries for their use. Thus Foucault, whose ideas partly inspired this scholarship about policing, argued that there is a mismatch be- tween the concepts of modern political theory and the practices of modern powerFthat the juridical language the Enlightenment de- veloped to regulate the exercise of power cannot do the job ade- quately because disciplinary power evades its categories (1977:223, 303; 1980:107–8). There are reasons to question Foucault’s bleak conclusion, since his analysis of resistance to disciplinary power suf- fered from serious empirical (Brenner 1994) and normative (Fraser 1981) gaps; indeed, even his specific argument that modern political theory cannot regulate modern power seems overdrawn, since it is not clear that traditional juridical ideas about the legitimate use of state authority (such as those that emphasize individual rights and the procedural regularity required by the rule of law) have outlived their usefulness (Walzer 1983b:489). Still, Foucault’s analysis con- tains the kernel of a valid concern, so there remains a need to study the reasons for resistance to disciplinary power. The Dearborn case contributes to such study by illustrating how surveillance and information-gathering can have chilling ef- fects on a city’s social life that may undermine trust and cooper- ation with police. As Nagel argued, the degree to which our private and community lives are exposed to the watching eyes of a broader public affects our ability to maintain trusting social relationships. As ‘‘interpersonal spheres of privacy protected from the public gaze’’ erode (Nagel 1998:20), many of our relationships may become untenable. If they persist at all, we enter them burdened by a need to conform to the expectations of the wider society that watches us, unable to speak and act in ways that give expression to our own sense of who we are and how we fit into the local social milieu. Thus police surveillance and information-gathering may under- mine trusting relationships between police and the community, so cities have a reason to want to minimize it (though of course other interests may give them countervailing reasons to increase it). Even procedurally well-regulated police surveillance threatens this city interest, so this analysis supplements recent literature that mainly associates police legitimacy with procedural fairness. 644 The Local Role in Homeland Security These extensions to Peterson’s theory offer useful conceptual tools for the analysis of legal institutions, which Peterson himself mostly neglected. As I demonstrate, interests in honor and the legitimate use of authority particularly influence the local role in homeland security, driving local police to embrace community protection while contributing to controversy about offender search. The Study To investigate the city interests that shape the local role in homeland security, I analyzed how that role evolved in Dearborn in order to develop what Dworkin would call a ‘‘constructive’’ inter- pretation of the city’s decisionmaking (Dworkin 1986). Such an interpretation must both fit empirical evidence about what the city did and provide a normative argument that explains why those actions were valuable (e.g., because they serve particular interests or exemplify particular moral principles). Dworkin developed the concept of a constructive interpretation to clarify how judges and legal scholars should analyze a body of law, but as several scholars have suggested (Dworkin 1986:46–73; Nonet & Selznick 1978; Thacher 2001b, forthcoming), constructive interpretations can be developed for many social practices other than adjudication. Here I propose to do that for the governance of cities. Conceiving of a city’s decisionmaking in some policy area as a particular kind of social practice, I aim to develop a constructive interpretation of that practice that both fits the main details of what political actors do and identifies the purpose of their actions in terms of the city in- terests they can plausibly be taken to serve. The normative di- mension of this analysis is indispensable because (notwithstanding Greenstone & Peterson 1975:60–3) any claim about what a city’s interests really are cannot help but be a normative claim, and as such it requires normative justification. This agenda requires a detailed historical account of Dear- born’s homeland security activities and the public and internal de- bates that informed them. To develop that account, I gathered information through interviews, observations, and document re- view. On the community side, I conducted open-ended interviews with leaders and members of the city’s most prominent Arab American institutions (including the Arab Community Center for Economic and Social Services [ACCESS], the Lebanese-American Heritage Club, and a neighborhood organization serving the neighborhoods with the city’s largest Arab population) as well as two informal leaders in the Arab community; I also held shorter conversations with members of the American-Arab Anti-Discrim- ination Committee (ADC) and the American-Arab Chamber of Thacher 645 Commerce. On the government side, I conducted interviews with the mayor, the police chief, and several Dearborn Police Depart- ment (DPD) command staff members, focusing on those who were closely involved in homeland security. (Because Dearborn is a strong-mayor city characterized by relatively centralized control, it was particularly important to discuss major decisions with the mayor.) I also observed and interviewed the city’s community po- licing officers, and I observed several neighborhood association meetings. Finally, I reviewed information from written documents, including government reports, articles in Detroit and Dearborn newspapers since 1988, and more than 100 informational e-mails from community groups. As I reviewed the case study material, I sought to identify a manageable number of homeland security decisions the city made that together would cover its most important policy initiatives in this area. In the end, I focused on four: the city’s response to the threat of hate crimes after 9/11, its response to media attention after the attacks, its decision about the role it would play in federal interviews with recent immigrants about terrorism, and its creation of a local homeland security office. I do not think it will be con- troversial when I claim that these are the most significant parts of Dearborn’s homeland security practice. My account of how these episodes unfolded, however, may be more controversialFthat is inevitable in this kind of researchFbut since I have foregone the usual custom of disguising place names, in principle readers can verify, contest, or elaborate on my account by returning to (most of) my sources, something that is a common practice among historians but perhaps rarer than it should be among social scientists. In any case, I have shared a draft of the case study with several people I spoke with in Dearborn (including the mayor, three members of the DPD’s command staff, the DPD patrol officer involved most directly in homeland security, and two community leaders), and none objected to my account. In analyzing these four episodes, I aimed to develop a con- structive interpretation of Dearborn’s homeland security practice that both fit the details of the decisions the city actually made and identified the city interests those decisions served. Readers who wish to challenge my interpretation need to show that I failed in this effortFi.e., that my interpretation does not account for the choices Dearborn officials made or that it does not recognize im- portant city interests or obligations that are relevant to those choices. My analysis was mostly inductive, though it inevitably drew on my knowledge of related literature. As I reviewed all the ev- idence that described how the city made a particular decision, I tried to identify recurrent interests that either seemed to drive those responses or were relevant to it even where the participants 646 The Local Role in Homeland Security did not recognize (or admit to) that fact. Doing that meant focusing not only on the reasons that interviewees themselves gave for their actions, but also asking how their actions might serve interests they did not mention. Often that meant supplementing information from city officials with information from other interviewees, from observations, or from review of written documents; although of- ficial decision makers usually knew more than anyone else about the city’s policy decisions, in some cases they also had more reason to shade the truth. With its large and vibrant Arab community, Dearborn is clearly an extreme case, but because it is extreme it highlights important dynamics that are otherwise hard to discern (Burawoy 1998). Con- cerns about honor and the legitimate use of authority may be less salient in most other American cities, so those cities may have more scope for offender search. At the same time, the Dearborn case does have implications for national discussions about homeland securityFnot only because it calls attention to forces that operate less visibly in other cities but also because it does probably reflect the dynamics of exactly those cities where policy makers would most like to gain local cooperation for offender search. For exam- ple, when the U.S. Department of Justice sought to interview 5,000 recent immigrants about terrorism, Dearborn apparently had the largest number of interviewees per capita in the nation (see U.S. General Accounting Office [GAO] 2003:29–31, and the discussion of the number of interviewees in Dearborn below). The Evolution of Homeland Security in Dearborn More than 200,000 Arab Americans live in metropolitan De- troit, making the region home to one of the largest concentrations of Arabs in the world outside the Middle East. Dearborn, a near-in suburb that borders Detroit to the west, is in many ways the center of this regional ethnic community. Dearborn is the location of many important regional institutions and events, including ACCESS, the Midwest headquarters of the ADC, the American-Arab Chamber of Commerce, and the Dearborn Arab International festival (which organizers describe as the largest annual Arab festival in the na- tion). Dearborn’s Arab population has grown steadily since the 1960s, when waves of displaced immigrants began arriving from troubled areas in the Middle East, joining a smaller number of earlier immigrants who had come to Dearborn seeking economic opportunity in the auto industry. All told, Dearborn is home to 98,000 residents, 29,300 of whom told U.S. Census interviewers they were of Arabic ancestry. The largest group by far is Lebanese, but other sizable groups include Iraqis, Palestinians, and Yemenis Thacher 647 (U.S. Census Bureau 2000). City officials say the city’s daytime population is three times its residential population; among other businesses, Dearborn hosts the world headquarters of the Ford Motor Company. Dearborn’s Arab community has had a rocky history with local police. The city’s Arab population began to grow at a time when a reputation for racial intolerance still tarred Dearborn, which was run from 1942 to 1978 by openly segregationist Mayor Orville Hubbard. Hubbard’s extreme racial views focused mainly on blacks (in one notorious incident, he stood on Dearborn’s border with Detroit holding a shotgun and dared blacks to cross city lines), but longtime members of Dearborn’s Arab community also recall police harassment toward Arabs during the final years of Hub- bard’s reign. ‘‘As this became an Arab community, you had things like anti-war demonstrations down here,’’ one Arab resident ex- plained, referring to the 1960s and 1970s. ‘‘And a lot of public activity down here which the police also played a directing role in. Like somebody who was with a megaphone, they would take it away from them. And also a sense that the police were spying on pro-Arab activity in the community.’’ In the late 1980s, the police department faced two scandals that further damaged its relation- ship with the Arab community: one of the department’s few Arab officers sued the city for a hostile work environment, and residents and business owners accused two community substation officers of harassment. Well into the mid-1990s, Dearborn police still had a poor reputation in the Arab community. After an incident at a local high school in 1990, community leaders prevailed upon the FBI and the local U.S. Attorney to investigate the department for abus- ing several Arab students. Eventually the FBI concluded that there was no evidence officers had behaved improperly, but the city later settled a civil suit filed by the alleged victims without admitting any wrongdoing. The result of these and other incidents, one Arab resident of the city explained, was that ‘‘there were about five years of just outright hostility to city government and the police’’ during the early 1990s. Police themselves emphasized the federal inves- tigation into the high school incident as a low point in their re- lationship with the community. City officials took several steps to try to repair this relationship, including hiring more Arab police officers and working more closely with organizers of community events. The city’s most ex- tensive effort, however, came in 1996, when it opened a new com- munity policing substation in predominantly Arab East Dearborn. City officials hoped the program would improve community rela- tions by providing less-contentious opportunities for officers to interact with residents and build trust. Today, officers who work for the station describe their main job as interacting with the 648 The Local Role in Homeland Security community to provide services and address quality of life concerns that patrol officers do not have time for. One explained that as a result, community residents ‘‘feel comfortable telling me [about a problem] instead of some guy they never saw before that just showed up on a radio call.’’ Arab community leaders, who uni- formly applaud community policing in Dearborn, echoed the sen- timent. By all accounts, these initiatives did help mend the DPD’s relationship with the Arab community, even if they did not relieve every source of tension. One Arab community leader who has been critical of police explained: I wouldn’t say that everything is hunky-dory but people are will- ing to give some benefit of doubt to the police now. There’s an old saying: if your friend does something he made a mistake; if your enemy does it he did it on purpose. I think that that’s what’s going on here. They’re less in the enemy camp from people’s point of view. They’re not exactly considered our best friends in the community by most Arab Americans. But they’re not con- sidered the enemy either anymore. Other leaders in the Arab community echoed this basic conclusion, and many offered a more optimistic account of police-community relations. This history is important background because after the Sep- tember 11, 2001, terrorist attacks by 19 Middle Eastern men, po- lice-community relations in Dearborn’s Arab community became a major concern, as Arab Americans’ relationship with law enforce- ment became strained throughout the country. In the event, al- though some strain between local law enforcement and Arab Americans did arise in Dearborn, it never spiraled out of control to create a serious crisis of police-community relations in the city. In one police commander’s estimation, the city’s ability to avoid this potential crisis was a direct result of the trust that had developed between police and Dearborn’s Arab community: I guess the best way I can explain all this is that it was like a stepladder. You know, we were at the bottom of the stepladder there for a while. And then we took the first step, and then each rung leading right up to 9/11Fwhich [is] when it really proved to be invaluable. . . . I’ll swear by the day I die that if [9/11] were five years sooner, or six or eight years before we started really de- veloping that stepladder . . . . It was not only that the new relationship between police and the Arab community helped the city cope with the challenges of 9/11. It was also that the earlier history of mistrust between police and the Arab community served as a vivid warning about the challenges that could return if police did not take community concerns Thacher 649 seriously, including federal investigations, harsh media coverage, and political pressure from community groups. The remainder of this case study examines more recent history in Dearborn in two parts. First, the next three sections describe three major interests relevant to the city’s homeland security plans by recounting three episodes in which each interest played a cen- tral role. Second, the final section illustrates how all three interests came together to shape the mandate of the city’s Office of Home- land Security. Protecting the Community Against Retaliation The DPD displayed its orientation toward community protec- tion in its immediate reactions to 9/11. In its first significant re- sponse, the city convened a series of community meetings with local Arab leaders to learn about community concerns during this unprecedented time. As Mayor Guido explained, ‘‘It was a very unsettling timeFif there’s anything we learned it’s just that eve- rybody in town just felt uncomfortable, so we were unsure about what might be on the minds of Arab community leaders.’’ Conse- quently, staff from the mayor’s office and the police department used their newly forged community networks to contact several community leaders immediately after the attacks, inviting them and anyone they wanted to bring to a series of informal meetings in the DPD’s training room. The initial meetings, held weekly, were standing-room only, with several dozen city officials and commu- nity leaders attending. ‘‘We just wanted information about what they were thinking and how they were feeling so that we could react to the issues that we felt we needed to,’’ Guido explained. That is not to say that city officials internalized all the views they were exposed to. Community leaders who attended the meetings said they focused mainly on two themes: protection from hate crimes and concerns about their civil liberties. Some believed police were responsive to both sets of concerns, but others suggested that police listened more closely to the first set. One explained: I think the police wanted to project a view that everything’s OK in Dearborn and everybody’s getting along and everybody’s pro- tected. I think from our point of view we did not feel that way, and we wanted assurance in a larger sense than they were able to convey [about] defense of our rights and that kind of stuff. I think they were more trying to project an image. But to be fair they did several things that were usefulFput police out at mosques dur- ing certain periods and so forth. Indeed, some DPD members remembered only part of the con- cerns community leaders said they raised. ‘‘It was usually about safety issues,’’ one police official remembered of the meetings. 650 The Local Role in Homeland Security ‘‘About extra patrol and how we can secure and make their com- munity feel a little more safe, because they were certainly con- cerned about retaliatory action.’’ Notably absent in this account is any mention of the concerns that community members said they raised about respect for civil liberties, and the accounts of other police (though not all of them)2 are similar in this respect. It is not that police actively resisted the community’s civil liberties concerns. Frank discussion of civil liberties did take place later around spe- cific issues such as the Justice Department interview project. It is just that police seized more quickly on concerns about public safety because they resonated more easily with their own sense of their professional responsibilities. In keeping with this view about its primary mission, city gov- ernment responded quickly to concerns about retaliation. Mayor Guido appeared on local television the afternoon of September 11 to warn viewers against committing hate crimes, and the DPD de- ployed patrol cars near potential Arab targets by early afternoon. On September 12, the DPD put officers on 12-hour shifts for the first time in many department veterans’ memory to offer extra patrol around mosques, the Arab business district, and local schools with large Arab populations. One police commander explained these efforts as follows: I heard from several people that the Arabic people in the com- munity were actually fearful for their selves because the media was spinning this so much that a lot of people were fearful to come out. There was a drop in business for a while [in] our res- taurants and grocery stores . . . And we met with them over and over and over and the chief explained, ‘‘We are doing this. We did go to 12-hour [shifts]. We are obviously more concerned. We know what we have to do, we’re doing it.’’ That is what we do for a living. This account, echoed by other police, suggests how easily the com- munity calls for protection resonated with the core concerns of policeFthe sense that ‘‘that is what we do for a living.’’ In par- ticular, this commander expressed a hope to provide a level of protection that would enable the city’s business life to return to normal. So although the department’s community networks en- sured that it was exposed to the concerns of Arab leaders, that dialogue was filtered through the lens of the police’s sense of their primary role as the guarantors of public order; police internalized and acted most readily on community concerns that spoke to that self-image. 2 One DPD member who attended the meetings recalled, ‘‘They were up front. They wanted to know are we going to pull them over, call INS, and stuff like that. We told them no. It’s going to be regular stuff, legit stuff.’’ Thacher 651 As the DPD stepped up patrol to protect Arab institutions and neighborhoods against hate crimes, it also tried to prevent them by discouraging large demonstrations that could become targets. City officials did ultimately approve all demonstrations that community members proposed, but they also appealed to community leaders to exercise restraint. For example, during an early meeting between city officials and community leaders, a Yemeni leader indicated that his community wanted to organize a demonstration to express sup- port for America and condemn the terrorist attacks. City officials, however, asked him not to. ‘‘Because other people are going to interpret that as a protest so soon after,’’ a DPD manager explained. ‘‘It could cause some serious mob rioting type problems. So they listened to us and there was never a march. . . . I think we prevented a lot of people from getting hurt.’’ Instead, he suggested, commu- nity members might show support for the United States by writing newspaper articles and letters. Other city officials raised similar concerns about marches. Mayor Guido explained: We did sit down and ask [community leaders] to review the rules of marches and demonstrations. . . . From a public safety per- spective, I can’t have public streets blocked and I can’t bring in 100 police officers while people protest Israel, Palestine, or the U.S. policy on Iraq. . . . It’s a safety hazard and given current tensions, it could cause future problems for our community. Pro- tests can lead to all kinds of unforeseen conflicts with passersby, both on foot and in cars. Some angry guy out in a cabin in the middle of Montana will watch this on the news, see where in Michigan it’s taking place and say to himself, ‘‘I think I’ll go over there.’’ We don’t need that. Here the city’s concern about hate crimes was not just a response to community sentiment. To the contrary, in this example it arose out of officials’ own sense that maintaining public order was their pri- mary goal. Eventually, however, many Arab community members came to share city officials’ viewpoint, as discussed below. In any case, the DPD’s focus on public safety concerns was evident in these two ways: by the rapid steps it took to provide security for potential targets, and its discomfort with public dem- onstrations that might call attention to the city and make it a target for retaliation. Dearborn’s quick response to the threat of hate crimes after 9/11 earned it praise in a report from Human Rights Watch (2002), which singled out Dearborn as the only city among six studied nationally that responded adequately to the threat. That quick response was made possible by two converging factors: the city’s pre-existing relationship with the Arab community, which gave police information about where concerns about retaliation were most debilitating, and police views of their role as guarantors 652 The Local Role in Homeland Security of public order in the city. In this case, police concerns and com- munity knowledge reinforced one another to single out an impor- tant interest for local government to pursue. Shrinking From the Spotlight Discomfort with political demonstrations also had another di- mension, one that illustrates concerns about the city’s national im- age. In the months after 9/11, city residents and officials became concerned about the level and type of media attention Dearborn was receiving. In a widely circulated e-mail, one Arab resident vented frustration about the recent surge in demonstrations: Yes, I support freedom of speech, freedom of expression, freedom of assembly, peaceful expression of different opinions, etc. But frankly I am sick and tired of all of the demonstrations and/or marches that are so often organized to take place in Dearborn. . . . Possible examples of the downside to the numerous demonstra- tions/marches in Dearborn: The continual negative publicity and spotlight on Dearborn; the drain on local taxpayers for additional police personnel, including overtime; the disruption to traffic, residents, and businesses; the potential for lowering of property values; businesses not wanting to locate in a possibly volatile, unstable location; the potential for violence; and the local ill will created which often lingers long after the demonstrations/marches. Mixed in among a number of pragmatic concerns, such as the drain on city finances for crowd control, was a concern about ‘‘the continual negative publicity and spotlight on Dearborn.’’ The ADC’s Imad Hamad responded sympathetically, writing, ‘‘I hear you very well and I do not think that you are out of track here. I personally not a fan of demonstration period except in very rare occasions.’’ Elsewhere, Hamad himself had raised concerns about what he ruefully called ‘‘the Dearborn Syndrome’’Fthe prominent place Dearborn had unwillingly come to occupy in national dis- cussions about terrorism and 9/11 (Niemiec 2002). Thus even the region’s most politically active Arab organization, which might be expected to resist any attempt to temper public demonstrations, ultimately echoed city officials’ concerns. Both residents and city officials saw two subtexts to what they viewed as the excessive coverage of Dearborn in local and national media. First, they felt that many media stories implied that Dear- born might be home to Arab terrorists or sympathizers. (At times the implication was explicit, as when radio talk show host Howard Stern repeated false rumors that Dearborn Arabs had rioted in the streets to celebrate the attacksFrumors that also plagued other Arab centers such as Paterson, New Jersey [Moritz 2001].) The implication was worse than troubling, for it questioned the Thacher 653 patriotism and loyalty of city residents at a time when that aspect of Arab American identity was under siege. As one Arab American from Dearborn told a reporter a year after September 11, ‘‘To say things changed is an understatement. All of a sudden, we had to prove how American we are’’ (Cohen 2002:S-8). Lebanese immi- grant Abed Hammoud, who challenged Mayor Guido in the city’s 2001 mayoral election, felt the need to print up a flier denouncing the terrorist attacks and indicating his loyalty to the United States. In this context, the explosion of media coverage about Dearborn seemed to reinforce the idea that the city’s Arab population might be less than patriotic. The second concern about media coverage, more important for the city’s image in Southeast Michigan than at the national level, was what city officials saw as overdrawn media interest in stories about hate crimes in Dearborn. In reporting these stories, city of- ficials felt, the media portrayed Dearborn’s white residents as in- tolerant holdovers from the segregationist days of Mayor Hubbard. Where stories about local support for terrorists defamed Dear- born’s Arab community, stories about hate crimes defamed its non- Arab community. City officials believed the media attention to both issues was unfairly damaging the city’s reputation. ‘‘All this stuffFthat they’re rioting, that they [Arab residents of Dearborn] hate the police de- partment or the city, and that the police department hates themF that’s what the media wants to think,’’ one DPD member insisted. ‘‘We were very concerned over retaliation and hate crimes and things like that. We were trying to prevent all that, [but the media was] trying to embellish it into a big problem that really we didn’t even have. . . . Other towns were having more trouble than we were’’ (emphasis in original). Another police official echoed the point, insisting that ‘‘there weren’t any threatsFwe got more me- dia calls about it than any actual threats.’’ As they responded to media inquiries, police officials tried to counteract the negative light being cast on Dearborn. One member of the DPD command staff recalled: I would make statements in the media . . . that I’m very proud of the metropolitan Detroit area and how they’re reacting and han- dling this sensitive situation of 9/11. . . . I mean there were very few incidents of any type of hate crime. . . . And one of [the] things that I always brag about is that through knowing all these [Arab] community leaders, that if there was actually some type of ter- rorist activity being planned and they knew about it, they would come to me and tell me. They don’t want this activity either. Arab leaders echoed these sentiments. ‘‘It is a tireless and contin- uous effort to connect negative events to Dearborn,’’ Hamad said 654 The Local Role in Homeland Security of the media attention. ‘‘The reality is that Dearborn, as of Sept. 11, prevailed to be a role model city with a good working relationship with law enforcement. It is beyond images that may have portrayed it as a place of residence of many people linked to acts of terrorism’’ (Lewis 2002:S-10). The DPD’s wary relationship with the media reflected these concerns about Dearborn’s reputation. Just as Arab American identity was under siege after 9/11, so was the reputation of a city with one of the nation’s largest concentration of Arabs. To defend against the stigma that threatened to taint Dearborn’s image, police officials repeatedly stressed the patriotism of city residents and their condemnation of the terrorist attacks, and they became more attentive to the symbolic implication of their words and actions in ways I describe shortly. These responses to media attention illus- trate the important interest that the city developed in defending its honor after 9/11Fan interest that a wide range of community groups and city officials shared. Even when the urge to shrink from the spotlight led police to take the potentially controversial step of discouraging public demonstrations, community leaders who might be expected to object never did. Justice Department Interviews of Recent Immigrants Concerns about police surveillance and information-gathering Fwhich were always prominent in the Arab community but were initially less central for city officialsFtook shape in a more complex and uncertain way as city government began to define its role in homeland security. That process is best illustrated by the DPD’s response to a federal request to help interview recent immigrants about international terrorism. Because this episode clearly illus- trates the limits of local offender search efforts, I examine it at greater length than the previous two episodes. On November 9, 2001, the U.S. Department of Justice an- nounced a plan to interview about 5,000 temporary visa-holders who had recently entered the United States from countries reputed to have a substantial Al Qaeda presence to gather information that might be useful in the war on terror. The Justice Department de- scribed the interviews as voluntary, but a November 9, 2001, memo from the Deputy Attorney General indicated that the law enforce- ment officials who conducted the interviews ‘‘should feel free to use all appropriate means of encouraging an individual to cooperate’’ (Office of the Deputy Attorney General 2001). Of the 5,000 men initially targeted for interviews, more than 500 lived in Southeast Michigan, and more than 200 were in Dearborn. By the end of the project, the Eastern District of Michigan would conduct 330 Thacher 655 interviewsFby far the most of any district in the nation (U.S. GAO 2003:29–31). Because of the scope of the initiative, the Attorney General looked beyond the Department of Justice for help. ‘‘Thousands of individuals have been interviewed,’’ he wrote in a separate No- vember 9 letter that announced the new plans, referring to earlier post-9/11 investigations. ‘‘Federal resources have their limits, how- ever, and we are finding that there are many more people to be interviewed than there are federal agents to conduct the inter- views’’ (Office of the Attorney General 2001). Consequently, the Justice Department planned to enlist help from the regional Anti- Terrorism Task Forces (which were led by the 94 U.S. Attorneys and included federal and local law enforcement officials as partic- ipants). FBI representatives initially suggested that state and local law enforcement would primarily conduct the interviews, while federal agents would play a supporting role (Hakim 2001). In this respect, the interview project is an especially clear example of the opportunistic view of the local role in homeland security. Local reactions to the interview project in Dearborn ranged from wary to outright hostile. Many Arab community members denounced the interviews as unjustified ethnic profiling, and they worried that interviewees would face heightened scrutiny from immigration authorities. One explained that he felt the initiative ‘‘challenged [Arab Americans’] civil rights,’’ stepping over the ‘‘di- viding line’’ that separated legitimate law enforcement from ille- gitimate harassment. At the same time, since Arab Americans’ patriotism and support for the war on terror were under suspicion, Dearborn Arabs had reasons to avoid unqualified opposition to homeland security efforts. One response to this dilemma was to try to distinguish the innocent ‘‘us’’ from the guilty ‘‘them.’’ For ex- ample, one Arab American interviewee implied that too much fuss had been made about the interviews, explaining, ‘‘If you didn’t do anything, you don’t have to worry.’’ Even this man, however, com- plained that federal investigators sometimes continued to press interviewees after they had established that they knew nothing about terrorism, and he worried that the list of interviewees was riddled with mistakesFa concern echoed by other Dearborn res- idents, police, and even a GAO report (2002). ‘‘A lot of the names are pretty similar in Dearborn,’’ he explained. ‘‘You know, there are a lot of people with names like ‘Hussein’.’’ Since 9/11, he felt, the FBI had become more suspicious of Arabs in the United States and, as a result, such cases of mistaken identity would be harder to resolve. So although he did not oppose the interviews in principle, in practice he worried that Arabs who had done nothing wrong might fall victim to overzealous policing. Many of the men con- tacted by the Justice Department for interviews apparently had 656 The Local Role in Homeland Security similar concerns. ‘‘When they got these letters they freaked out,’’ one social service provider who spoke with several of the men recalled. ‘‘They didn’t know what was going on and they [thought police] were taking them to jail. And [they said], ‘I didn’t do an- ything!’’’ Other Arabs worried that police might misinterpret innocuous statements the interviewees made. These fears focused on the risks posed by the interviews them- selves, but the idea that Dearborn police would help the Justice Department conduct them raised additional concerns. In particu- lar, close collaboration between local police and federal agents might instill everyday police-community interactions with sinister undertones, as local Arabs wondered whether Dearborn officers were passing information to federal agents. In the immediate af- termath of the attacks, many members of Dearborn’s Arab com- munity say they became suspicious of local police in this way. For example, when asked how her views about local police changed after 9/11, one Dearborn Arab explained, ‘‘I think there will always be in the back of your head, like, ‘Oh, he could be working with the FBI, this guy’.’’ Such suspicion infected the most mundane inter- actions. For example, as part of the city’s increasing attention to neighborhood government, the mayor’s office decided to begin sending police officers to meetings for all the city’s neighborhood associations in 2002. But when the city contacted the associations to make arrangements, it aroused suspicion among some neighbor- hood groups. One member of a group in a predominantly Arab neighborhood explained: You’re sending the police to homeowners meetings . . . And I mentioned to [the mayor’s community liaison], ‘‘You’ve got to do a little bit of communicating to people what the purpose of this is because at a time like this, you get a call like that from City Hall’’ Fand I said, ‘‘What’s the purpose? I know people are going to be asking me.’’ ‘‘Well, the mayor and the police chief want it.’’ Well, why? Are they spying? Such concerns were particularly salient after 9/11, as widespread concerns that Arabs were under heightened suspicion had already made many of them more reticent. For example, two Arab inter- viewees reported that many local Arabs had begun to feel self- conscious about expressing controversial political views (such as their opinions about Palestine) in public places. In this context, Dearborn police had good reason to distance themselves from federal surveillance efforts, which threatened to stifle their rela- tionship with local community members who already felt they were being watched. In contrast to the predominantly critical view of the interviews in the community, police initially seemed inclined to support the Thacher 657 effort. Some police did question whether the interviews would be effective, and one viewed them as a resource drain for the DPD, but none of those I spoke with suggested that Dearborn should not have participated. In part, their support arose out of a sense of patriotic duty. ‘‘You’ve got to help your country,’’ one DPD mem- ber explained when asked why the DPD assisted the Justice De- partment with the interviews, echoing the language of other police officials. In part, the support arose out of a sense of shared law enforcement mission with federal investigators. ‘‘The chief had no problem with it at all,’’ another manager explained. ‘‘He’s an FBI academy grad. He knows the process, he’s a street cop.’’ Most po- lice and city officials did say that they understood and sympathized with community concerns about the interviews, but many thought those concerns were overdrawn, insisting that the interviews were voluntary and nonthreatening and, therefore, a reasonable law enforcement tactic. ‘‘They were concerned about profiling and losing their rights,’’ one member of the DPD member recalled. ‘‘Which of course none of us would ever condone. But I mean there’s still such a thing asFeverybody calls it things like racial profiling . . . I call it criminal profiling. It’s so simple.’’ One Arab American police officer explained: They [local Arabs] didn’t like it. They thought, ‘‘Why them, why them?’’ And I would tell them, ‘‘19 guys or whatever it was on the planes. Well they weren’t 19 Mexicans. They weren’t 19 black guys. They were of Middle Eastern descent. That’s the reason. That’s the bottom line. You can do all the window dressing you want. That’s the bottom line.’’ (interviewee’s emphasis) A few months after the interviews ended, Mayor Guido publicly questioned whether there was too much concern about profiling. ‘‘There is a fine line between safety and political correctness,’’ he told a reporter. ‘‘Sometimes there’s an oversensitivity in terms of profiling. We’re all learning what is the right way to do things’’ (Pierre 2002:A-3). Despite their own views, police and other city officials were aware that the interview project was controversial in the Arab community. The controversy made their role in the interviews problematic, since police officers continued to worry about their precarious reputation in the Arab community. One police com- mander described the conflict he felt when reporters asked him about the interviews. ‘‘What can I say? I mean, I’m not going to say that I’m not going to support our federal government. I’m not going to say I’m going to take away the rights of the Arabic com- munity.’’ In the end, Dearborn officials (unlike their counterparts in cities such as Portland, Oregon) did decide to assist the Justice 658 The Local Role in Homeland Security Department with the interviews, but community concerns visibly affected the way the city participated. In particular, while Dearborn police agreed to help federal agents locate interviewees and accompany them as they conducted interviews, they declined the U.S. Attorney’s request to conduct the interviews themselves. Mayor Guido, who was directly involved in the decision, explained it as follows: Guido: We told them that we didn’t want to do the interviews. Initially the local police were going to be the information-gath- ering organization. And we said, ‘‘We will assist you, but we’re not going to gather the information. We’re not going to ask the questions. We’ll accompany you, we know how to get you where you want to go, but once [you’re] there, you can do what you need to do’’ [compare with Guido’s similar statements to the press in Niemiec 2002]. Interviewer: Why was that? Guido: Well, we spent years trying to establish trust and under- standing with the Arab community. If we would have directly participated in these interviews, having our officers going around with big clipboards asking, ‘‘Where were you the night of Sep- tember 11?’’ especially during times when it seemed as if all Arab people and Muslims were under a cloud of suspicion, it would have caused many years of work building these relationships to go down the drain. This role wasn’t appropriate for us. Several police officials echoed Guido’s views. So although local police did participate in the interviews, they did so as supporting partners, and they emphasized that fact by noting that the federal government had spearheaded the effort. One DPD member ex- plained, ‘‘[People asked me], are you for these interviews? I didn’t start or initiate these interviews. The federal government initiated them and we will assist them.’’ Community concerns about the interviews also led police to think of themselves as something other than just assistants to the federal agents. Local police did help federal agents locate inter- viewees, and in some cases they served as translators because fed- eral agencies had a shortage of Arabic speakers. But they also tried to help reassure the interviewees and make their experiences as nonthreatening as possible. City officials said they pursued these goals in two ways. First, during the interviews, Dearborn police viewed their role partly in terms of monitoring federal agents to ensure they acted professionally. ‘‘We were present if [the interviewees] had an issue or problem,’’ Mayor Guido explained. Reflecting this idea, the of- ficer who assisted federal agents with most of the interviews in Dearborn explained that at the end of each one, he asked the Thacher 659 interviewee whether he had found the questioning ‘‘offensive.’’ A police manager elaborated on the DPD’s role: I think [accompanying the federal agents] is a good thing to do because at least we know what’s going on. You know, we know how the federal government is treating these people. Because we’ve got to deal with them on a day-to-day basis, the feds don’t. So if we’re involved, at least we can have some input into what’s going on. And if they [federal agents] do something stupid, you know, we can say [laughing] ‘‘Hey, they did that’’ and try to focus the attentionFthe negative attentionFon where it should be focused. (interviewee’s emphasis)3 He went on to say that no such complaints arose, and the officers who participated in the interviews concurred with that assessment. ‘‘You know they were very professional, the federal investigators, and hopefully our officers were too,’’ the manager continued. ‘‘I have not received any complaints about [the] officers, which is good. Especially in this sensitive area like interviewing immigrants. So I think it worked out well. It was a good idea to have the locals involved.’’ Second, at a broader policy level, local police reported that they worked with and reinforced the message of Arab leaders who had formed a working group designed to urge Jeff Collins, the U.S. Attorney for Eastern Michigan, to modify the Justice Department’s plans in his district. The DPD had an important mechanism for relaying those concerns because one of its officers served on the local Anti-Terrorism Task Force, which had the authority to decide how the interview plans would be implemented. A Justice Depart- ment spokeswoman told reporters that the U.S. Attorney’s Office welcomed such input from local police (Wilgoren 2001). After several discussions, Collins agreed to a number of chang- es, including sending letters before visiting the interviewees’ homes, arriving in plainclothes, and emphasizing the voluntary nature of the interviews. The most significant change was the method of contacting interviewees. At first federal agents planned to contact the interviewees by knocking on their doors unan- nounced, but Collins agreed to first mail letters asking each inter- viewee to contact his office to schedule a meeting. The letters stressed that ‘‘we have no reason to believe that you are, in any way, associated with terrorist activities. Nevertheless . . . it is quite possible that you have information that may seem irrelevant to you but which may help us piece together this puzzle’’ (Letter from Jeffrey Collins to prospective interviewees, November 26, 2001; emphasis in original). Arab leaders hoped that by sending letters about the 3 The police chief in Fremont, California (which has one of the nation’s largest Afghan populations), explained his department’s participation similarly (Herel & Hendricks 2001). 660 The Local Role in Homeland Security interviews before federal agents knocked on anyone’s door, the would-be interviewees would be less intimidated by the agents’ visits and have an opportunity to contact a lawyer before deciding whether to cooperate. (ACCESS and the ADC reported referring dozens of clients to lawyers for this purpose.) Collins seemed to endorse these aims, explaining that the changes his office made to its interview plans ‘‘represent a conscious decision by law enforce- ment to initiate contact in a manner that is the least intrusive’’ (Schaefer 2001:A-1). In the end, Collins’s district made more con- cessions to community concerns about the interviews than any other district in the country, and its changes to the interview pro- tocol eventually served as a model that other U.S. Attorneys cop- ied.4 With these assurances, a number of local Arab institutionsF including ACCESS and the bilingual Arab-American NewsFasked those contacted to cooperate with the government during the in- itial round of interviews. (Most withdrew their support, however, when the Justice Department announced plans for a second round of interviews with a larger group of immigrants in March 2002.) Despite these steps by local police, many community leaders remained critical of the DPD’s decision to participate in the inter- views. Rumors reportedly began circulating that the DPD commu- nity policing officer who assisted federal agents with the largest number of interviews was deporting immigrants. At the same time, these rumors eventually died down, and the officer reported no change in his rapport with the community. In any case, the city’s decision to assist federal agents with the interviews never became a major source of tension between Dearborn police and local Arab leaders. While some Arab residents continued to object to the in- terviews, they directed disapproval mainly at the federal govern- ment, not local police. In the end, it is hard to gauge how well the city’s efforts to attend to community concerns mitigated the damage the interviews might cause to police-community relations, though it is clear that community leaders appreciated the fact that police discussed the initiative with them at length. The important point here is that concerns about community trust did seem to influence the way the city participated in the interviews, despite the police’s own incli- nation to view the effort as a legitimate law enforcement tool. Local police declined to conduct the interviews themselves, they went to great lengths to explain their participation in a qualified way, and 4 These concessions did not apparently undermine the project’s investigative goals. At the end of both rounds of interviews, the Eastern District of Michigan had completed 59% of its interviews, placing it in the top quarter of all districts nationally despite its enormous caseload. Among districts that interviewed more than 100 immigrants, the Eastern District had the highest rate of completion in the nation (author’s calculations from U.S. GAO 2003: Appendix III). Close to half of the district’s interviews were reportedly in Dearborn. Thacher 661 they ultimately adopted the role (at least in part) of monitors for the federal agents and representatives of community concerns. In that way, the role the DPD played in the Justice Department in- terviews was shaped by the interest local police had in establishing legitimate boundaries around the use of new surveillance and in- formation-gathering efforts, which could otherwise undermine the trust and support they had worked so hard to develop in the Arab community. Dearborn’s Office of Community Preparedness Early in 2002, Dearborn announced that it would establish a local Office of Homeland Security to spearhead its anti-terrorism efforts. Organizationally, the office would be located in the police department, and a police lieutenant would direct it. Its evolution demonstrates how the three interests described separately so far came together to shape the city’s main anti-terrorism initiative. Community reaction to the announcement was mixed, as many community leaders and media commentators questioned the city’s reasons for establishing the office. ‘‘People . . . responded very negatively to it,’’ one Arab leader in Dearborn explained. Another concurred: ‘‘When the office of security homeland [sic] came out, there were a lot of mixed feelings about it in the city . . . People thought that you had to be careful.’’ In particular, this community leader felt that the office’s name had overtones of a police state. ‘‘I hate that word,’’ he explained. ‘‘‘Homeland’ to me sounds like Nazi Germany.’’ Others worried the office would do more damage to Dearborn’s reputation by sending the wrong message to the re- gional and national audience that seemed to watch the city’s every move. The ADC’s Imad Hamad expressed this concern succinctly to a reporter at the time: ‘‘I don’t see that it’s needed,’’ he said of the new office. ‘‘It might send the wrong signal . . . that a high number of Arab-American people makes Dearborn a dangerous community’’ (Niemiec 2002:B-1). He went on to suggest that the announcement might reinforce the negative attention Dearborn had been subjected to in the national media, and he indicated that he did not want the city to apply for homeland security funds on the grounds that it had a large Arab population (Niemiec 2002). The city quickly responded to these concerns by renaming the office. Instead of an office for homeland security, Dearborn would establish an office for community preparedness. Community mem- bers expressed approval for the change. ‘‘That’s a good sign,’’ one commented, and another described the new name as ‘‘more pal- atable.’’ One city official remembered the episode: We got hung for that one. The federal government can call it homeland security, the state can call it homeland security. Dear- 662 The Local Role in Homeland Security born says, ‘‘OK, we’ve got a homeland security [office].’’ ‘‘Why? Have you got terrorists in your town?’’ No, that’s not what we said! . . . It was [just] a nice name because it was consistent with the federal government and the state. And of course we quickly changed that name to community preparedness coordinator just so there wouldn’t be any more [criticism]. To quiet the . . . per- ception that we had a terrorist problem in Dearborn. Because that’s what everyone said, ‘‘You’re doing this because you must have this problem.’’ Thus although police themselves had not initially recognized how a new office of ‘‘homeland security’’ might exacerbate concerns about the city’s reputation, they did not hesitate to rename it once community members brought that concern to their attention. Naming the office was only a symbolic act, but the city’s sym- bolic statement that police would pursue ‘‘community prepared- ness’’ rather than ‘‘homeland security’’ can serve as a metaphor for the priorities the office has adopted. On that point, DPD command staff, the mayor, and the coordinator of the new office all offered similar accounts, insisting that the office was not designed to sup- port new surveillance efforts focused on Dearborn residents but to coordinate and extend existing community preparedness tasks. So far, the makeup and operation of the office support that claim. For example, in selecting the first community preparedness coordina- tor, the police chief did not choose an investigator but a former head of the training division who had extensive budgetary expe- rience. That choice apparently reflected the view that one of the role’s core responsibilities would be to apply for federal grants to fund emergency response activities. Discussing the kind of grants he plans to pursue, the coordinator focuses on resources that can help the department cope with the aftermath of terrorist attacks. For example, to illustrate the kind of activity he will try to secure grant money for, the coordinator mentioned a regional consortium of law enforcement agencies mobilized after a 1997 plane crash to gather evidence and manage the crash scene. In this respect, the coordinator views the city’s anti-terrorism needs in the same terms as its needs for other kinds of disastersFan analogy that holds for the community protection side of homeland security but not offender search. Other city officials echo this perspective. When asked which homeland security activities he asked the new office to pursue, Mayor Guido focused on first response: ‘‘For us emergency pre- parednessFwhether it’s a tornado, a flood, or some sort of bomb- ingFrequires that proper procedures be put in place. It’s all about determining the best way to react in order to protect and save lives. Whether it’s a tornado or a bombing, we need to be ready.’’ Guido went on to emphasize functions such as the acquisition of technol- Thacher 663 ogy to handle hazardous materials and the development of proto- cols for handling bodies in large disasters (compare with his similar account in Associated Press 2002). Once again, by comparing the city’s role with regard to terrorism to its role with regard to natural disasters, city officials place offender search activities outside the scope of their homeland security efforts. Other aspects of community protection round out the main functions of the office. One of the coordinator’s duties is to inves- tigate reports of hate crimes in the city, and he oversees efforts to prevent hate crimes. He also has responsibility for organizing the city’s response to terrorist threats. In particular, when the federal government announces that it thinks the risk of an attack has risen, those warnings are routed to the coordinator, who in turn commu- nicates with the rest of the force to indicate how officers should tighten up security. For example, when federal officials raised the nation’s color-coded terrorist alert level during one holiday week- end, the coordinator received the alert and distributed an an- nouncement throughout the DPD indicating that officers should be especially vigilant for unusual activity, such as suspicious cars parked in city lots over the weekend. Finally, the coordinator follows up on more specific threats when officers become aware of them. For ex- ample, on the day I interviewed the coordinator, he had just finished questioning a young Arab man who had allegedly made threats against the police department during an argument with a business- man. In this case, after talking with the young man and the business owner, the coordinator concluded that if the man had made threat- ening statements at all, they were probably idle. Asked to speculate what he would have done if they had not been, the coordinator said he would hand the case off to federal investigators. Thus local police involvement in offender search is limited even when the investiga- tion is reactive and even when Dearborn itself might be a target. As important as what the community preparedness coordinator does is what his office does not do. Throughout the evolution of the community preparedness office, the city has emphasized that it will not be engaged in proactive surveillance. City officials took this po- sition early on, in the first of its regular meetings with Arab leaders after a new homeland security office was announced. ‘‘‘Why are we doing it?’’’ Mayor Guido remembered community leaders asking. ‘‘‘Because there’s a lot [of] Arabs in this city and they think there are people in the Arab community that are [involved in terrorism]? Are they here to spy on us?’’’ In response, Guido and other city officials say they denied that the office would be involved in ‘‘spying,’’ and that the new office only existed to coordinate the community pre- paredness functions described so far. ‘‘I said, ‘We’re not here to spy Fwe’re not in that business,’’’ Guido remembers. ‘‘The feds have their own setups, the CIA and the FBI and all those people. Ours is 664 The Local Role in Homeland Security to respond and to react and that’s what we’ve been doing.’’ When asked specific questions about whether the DPD might proactively investigate potential terrorist cells in the city, either on its own in- itiative or in response to requests from the federal government, city officials uniformly expressed doubts. ‘‘We’re not, you know, the FBI,’’ one police manager explained. And if they asked us to do that, we probably wouldn’t. . . . We want to keep you safe, and we want to keep that level of protection up. And we’re not going to stop doing what we’re doing to go do this. If they want to do it they can do it. . . . That’s the next level, and I’m not sure if we want to go to the next level. They’d have to come in with some very, very tough evidence that they needed this, that this was absolutely necessary, for us to stand up and do it. We don’t want to violate that community-police relationship. Several other city officials offered similar answers to this question, indicating a widespread reluctance to have Dearborn officers en- gage in offender search activities. A concern that such activities would undermine community trust seems to animate this reluc- tance, as the previous quotation indicates. There is one major exception to this barrier against local in- volvement in offender search efforts. Dearborn police have as- signed one officer to the FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Force ( JTTF), which draws membership from federal agencies (notably the FBI and the INS) and local law enforcement. The main function of the task force is to coordinate investigations of potential terrorist ac- tivity in the region. For example, an investigation coordinated by the task force led to the arrest of three former Dearborn residents in Detroit in late September 2001. After 9/11, in its most significant commitment of resources to offender search efforts to date, Dear- born assigned one officer to the task force, and its community preparedness coordinator attends many task force meetings. As might be expected, the city approached this relationship with trepidation. Mayor Guido, for example, emphasized the city’s hands-off relationship with the officer who serves as their primary liaison to the task force: We do have people assigned to the task force, but they are not even in our building and they don’t interact with our officers. They’re there basically working with the federal government. And any of that intelligence stuffFso and so might be here and this person is thereFI don’t want to know about it. I want to be able to go up on the avenue and have my lunch and smile at everybody. I don’t want to be looking at anybody with suspicious eyes. Indeed, for some time the community preparedness coordinator did not have security clearance, so he was not privy to much of the information received by the officer his department had assigned to Thacher 665 the task forceFan officer who ostensibly reported to him. So the city does contribute to proactive investigations of terrorism by as- signing an officer to the federal JTTF, but the officer operates under federal direction, and the city maintains considerable dis- tance between him and the rest of city government, as if to insulate itself from the contaminating effects of offender search activities. That still leaves the question of why the city maintains any relationship with the task force at all. No doubt one reason is the sense of occupational purpose and national duty that played a role in other offender search activities, such as the Justice Department interviews. But involvement with the JTTF also has direct benefits to the city, by both enhancing its capacity for community protection andFparadoxicallyFminimizing its offender search responsibili- ties. First, the relationship with the task force gives police access to federal intelligence about possible terrorist attacks. As one police manager explained, ‘‘They [the task force] can share information with us knowing that if there’s something that’s going to happen, at least we can prepare the department and the city.’’ Second, the relationship relieves local police from the need to investigate ter- rorist activity by establishing a simple channel they can use to pass information to federal agents. If officers become aware of potential terrorist threats, they can alert the JTTF and return to their reg- ular duties. For example, when the young man mentioned above allegedly made terrorist threats against police, Dearborn’s com- munity preparedness coordinator explained that if the threats had not turned out to be idle, he would have turned the matter over to the JTTF rather than investigate the incident himself. In that re- spect, the DPD’s relationship with the JTTF reduces rather than expands its own responsibilities for investigating terrorist activity. Dearborn’s Office of Community Preparedness is the city’s central institutional vehicle for homeland security, and it bears the imprint of the three concerns introduced earlier. After some initial turmoil, city officials shied away from statements about the office that might exacerbate negative perceptions of Dearborn. Moreo- ver, because of concerns about ‘‘violating that police-community relationship’’ and about the consequences of ‘‘looking at anybody with suspicious eyes,’’ the office has shunned new offender search activities, trying to pass them on to federal investigators. Finally, city officials have placed special emphasis on the role the office will play in emergency preparedness and protective security. Discussion The evolution of homeland security in Dearborn illustrates the considerations that can steer local government away from offender 666 The Local Role in Homeland Security search and toward community protection. Since local government is mainly concerned with the well-being of a specific place, it has little reason to bear the costs of new police activities unless the benefits to the city itself are clear. For example, when Dearborn’s own safety and vitality were at risk from the threat of hate crimes after 9/11, local police quickly stepped up patrol around potential targets, and they did so with strong community support. But absent specific threats such as these, debates about offender search have focused entirely on the damage it could do to the cityFin particular, damage to its reputation and damage to the legitimacy of its police. In these decisions where the interests of the city itself were at stake (as opposed to the merely ‘‘allocational’’ decisions discussed by Peterson), a wide range of local political actors quickly came to rough agreement about the right course of action, and they ex- erted influence when and because they helped advance the inter- ests of the city as a whole (Peterson 1981:131–49, 167–83). In the early response to the threat of hate crimes, there was no disagree- ment among community leaders and city officials who attended the city’s post-9/11 meetings. Even when police tried to discourage public demonstrations that might draw negative attention to Dear- born, Arab community leaders who might be expected to object never did so. Police themselves did generate controversy when they named their new anti-terrorism unit an ‘‘office of homeland security’’ and offered initial support to offender search efforts. But they backpedaled quickly and without any real resistance once community leaders called attention to the damage these choices could do to police legitimacy and Dearborn’s reputationFdespite the fact that they had to act against their occupational ideals and assumptions to do so (compare with Peterson et al. 1986:191–215). Although the relevant policy issues, city interests, and political actors differ, this deference by Dearborn officials to community leaders resembles Peterson’s description of the politics that typify ‘‘developmental’’ policymaking. In that domain, Peterson conclud- ed that city officials often work closely and consensually with busi- ness leaders because they ‘‘are the people who are aware of the factors that could help promote the community’s economic capac- ity, and they possess sufficient financial and other resources to in- fluence it’’ (1981:141). Similarly, the community leaders who worked with the DPD are the sort of people who are aware of the factors that enhance police legitimacy, and they possess sufficient clout with the community and media to influence it. Those assets position them well to help design and broadcast an ‘‘umbrella of legitimacy’’ for police actions (Winship & Berrien 1999:54), as Dearborn officials recognized. The city’s early decision to convene regular meetings with Arab leaders and its repeated decisions to respond quickly to concerns raised in them reflect an awareness Thacher 667 that Arab leaders were in a better position than police themselves to know how policy choices might affect police legitimacy and the city’s reputation. That cooperation had special importance when the DPD faced new questions about the unfamiliar issue of home- land security. In such situations, community leaders’ expertise about police legitimacy and city honor is particularly valuable be- cause police must evaluate new uses for their authority, whose ef- fects on community trust may not be clear. Other departments in similar situations have also turned to community leaders for help (Winship & Berrien 1999). In these respects, Dearborn’s homeland security decisions il- lustrate Peterson’s idea that the surface drama of local politics is shaped by the interests of the city as a whole. Although local of- fender search efforts may serve important national goals, any par- ticular city has little reason to pursue them except in rare cases when local political actors believe that suspected terrorists have targeted their city; otherwise, offender search threatens to bring nothing but damage to police legitimacy and the city’s reputation. Stung by the crisis of police legitimacy in the 1990s, Dearborn city officials recognized these risks, and they turned to Arab community leaders for help. Although the Dearborn case reflects Peterson’s basic ideas about the role city interests play in local governance, it also chal- lenges and extends his analysis by complicating the kinds of inter- ests that cities have. Economic interests alone cannot explain (much less justify) Dearborn’s homeland security decisions. To be sure, the city’s emphasis on public safety may reflect its interest in economic vitality. Some city officials explained their efforts to reassure Dear- born’s Arab community that police would protect them from hate crimes by citing concerns about falloff in local business activity; and in fact, academic research supports the idea that public safety con- tributes to economic vitality (DiIulio 1989; Cullen & Levitt 1999). But if Dearborn’s interest in public safety can be accommodated easily within Peterson’s economics-driven framework, the other two interests that shaped Dearborn’s decisions cannot. First, city officials’ response to insistent media coverage after 9/11 and their attention to the implicit messages conveyed by Dearborn’s homeland security activities were driven not by con- cerns about economic vitality but by a sense that the city’s honor was at risk. City officials and residents alike expressed this concern explicitly, and it clearly underlies both the message they tried to convey to the media and the decision the city made to rename its homeland security office. City officials had good reasons to worry about honor and reputation in these ways, since immigrant groups and the communities where they live often find their social stand- ing thrown into question during times of international conflict 668 The Local Role in Homeland Security (Higham 1988). Dearborn’s reputation was particularly vulnerable because, as a historical matter, its public image had become tied to its ethnic composition and its segregationist past. Second, the city’s complicated response to the Justice Depart- ment’s interview project and the mission it assigned to its Office of Community Preparedness were shaped by a legitimate interest in maintaining community trust, and thus in the fair and restrained use of the surveillance and information-gathering it requires. Local police sought to work with federal investigators to make sure the interviews followed fair procedures (e.g., by contacting interview- ees in advance so that they had a chance to seek legal counsel) and that federal agents treated interviewees with respect, recognizing that Dearborn’s Arab community might lose trust in local police otherwise (compare with Tyler 2004). The DPD also tried to limit new offender search activities of its own, fearing that stepped-up surveillance could stifle unguarded expression and damage the relationship police had developed with the Arab communityF particularly at a time when Dearborn Arabs felt they were under a ‘‘cloud of suspicion,’’ in Guido’s words (compare with Nagel 1998). Where street crime is concerned, these concerns about the costs of surveillance and information-gathering must often give way to an interest in community protection (Thacher 2001a). But in the case of homeland security, where the benefits of offender search typ- ically accrue to other jurisdictions, no city interest counterbalances the burdens of police surveillance. It might be objected that even if Dearborn’s interests in honor and the legitimate use of authority were the proximate reasons it emphasized community protection rather than offender search, economic interests still drove that emphasis in some ultimate sense. For example, concerns about the city’s honor may reflect deeper concerns that a reputation for unpatriotic sentiments or intoler- ance could damage the city’s business climate (Sharp 1999: 235). Similarly, the city’s interest in police legitimacy may also ultimately rest on its economic interests because legitimacy arguably promotes crime control effectiveness and thus economic vitality. This objection makes an important point, since Weber himself acknowledged that interests in status and power are often inter- twined with economic interests in modern societies (1978:932, 938). Nevertheless, Weber insisted that it remains useful to distin- guish these interests conceptually, and good reasons support his position. Most simply, although interests in class, status, and power often reinforce one another, sometimes they conflict, and in those cases social action will be incomprehensible if we only consider economic interests (1978:212, 926, 932). More subtly, even when institutions and practices serve instrumental purposes such as eco- nomic growth in some ultimate sense, they may still bring into play Thacher 669 new commitments to ideals that transcend their instrumental or- igins (Selznick 1957). The best-known example is punishment. Even if we create the institution of punishment for the utilitarian purpose of crime control, nonutilitarian principles may regulate the practice of punishment (Hart 1968). Similarly, even if police legitimacy ultimately matters only because police cannot fight crime effectively without it, police must still abide by independent principles that define what makes the use of authority legitimate in order to safeguard their legitimacy (Weber 1978:212–6; Tyler 2004). That may be why there is no evidence that concerns about crime control effectiveness directly influenced the way city officials thought about protecting community trust in the DPD. Instead, police concerns about community trust were tied to their desire to avoid a repeat of the crisis of legitimacy they experienced during the 1990s, which brought extensive media criticism and a traumatic federal investigation. In that respect, even if police legitimacy pro- motes public safety and thus serves a city’s economic interests in some ultimate sense, the ideal of fair and restrained use of au- thority still plays an ineliminable role in local governance. The same could be said about the interest in honor: even if a city only wants to shore up its honor for economic reasons, it has to play by the rules of the honor game to do so (Weber 1978:932–8; Walzer 1983a:249–80). So although the objection I am considering makes the impor- tant point that the city’s multiple interests are intertwined, each one still defines a partly independent set of constraints on local policy. Everyday politics cannot always live in the world of ultimate considerations because the institutions and practices we create to serve those ultimate considerations set in motion their own dis- tinctive logics of action. Conclusion The Dearborn case illustrates how the evolution of American legal institutions is shaped by the position they occupy in our fed- eral system of government. It is easy to miss this fact by focusing mainly on street-level efforts to control crime and disorder, as much of the policing literature has done, since both the costs and benefits of street crime tend to accrue to roughly the same places.5 By contrast, a national problem such as homeland security draws attention to the way the limited powers and geographic respon- sibilities of local government shape the local police role. The struc- 5 For an interesting normative analysis that is relevant to my argument here (in that it supports police surveillance only when its benefits redound to the same people who bear its costs) see Meares and Kahan (1999), particularly the discussion of ‘‘burden-sharing.’’ 670 The Local Role in Homeland Security tural position of local governments in a federalist system influences their interests, their politics, and the decisions they have reason to make about policing. To date, sociolegal literature has said little about these issues. As noted at the outset of this article, literature about the police role has largely emphasized the commitment of police to particular functions rather than their commitment to the well-being of particular places, and literature about the politics of policing has not recognized how the positions political actors take are shaped by the structural constraints of local government. By bringing Peterson’s theory of local government to bear on policing, it is possible to extend our understanding of police organizations to recognize how these territorial commitments and structural con- straints are relevant to their practice. Although this extension has general importance for sociolegal theory about the policeFand potentially for theory about other legal institutions located at the local level as wellFit has special importance for understanding the local role in homeland security. This application of Peterson’s theory to policing also helps ex- tend the theory itself because it reveals the influence of city inter- ests that go beyond economic vitality. Because legal institutions involve the projection of government’s coercive powers, not just its expenditure of money, they implicate a city’s interests in its honor and the legitimate use of authority. Those interests, which are likely to be important in policy domains other than homeland security,6 have at least two implications for theories about local government. First, a more complex account of city interests suggests the need for a more complex account of political rationality: although local governments may be rational actors (Peterson 1981), they often need to rely on more complicated forms of rationality than the means-end rationality of economic efficiencyFboth because they must manage the conflicts among their multiple interests (Thacher & Rein 2004) and because their noneconomic interests often re- quire judgments about appropriateness rather than judgments about consequences (March & Olsen 1989:160). Second, the im- portance of honor and the legitimate use of authority in city pol- icymaking has important implications for our understanding of federalism because of the special characteristics those interests have. If the city’s interests are primarily economic, there are limits to the kinds of policies that local governments will finance, but there are no limits in principle to the policies they will administer, since higher levels of government can simply subsidize them. But if cities have interests in honor and the legitimate use of authority, and if 6 Notably the ‘‘morality policies’’ Sharp (1999) analyzed, which often involve police and other regulatory powers (pp. 1–3) and which may have implications for a city’s rep- utation even when they do not (p. 235). Thacher 671 honor and legitimacy cannot be bought, then there may be policies that are more inexorably closed to local government. For example, there may be no practical and ethical way to pay local governments to pursue offender search efforts because honor and legitimacyF the two goods in whose coin the major burdens of offender search efforts are paidFlie on the far side of a blocked exchange (Walzer 1983a:97–103). In such blocked exchanges lie the limits of the intergovernmental transfers approach to federalism. In addition to its theoretical implications for the literatures about policing and local government, this study has implications for homeland security policy, since it sheds light on the obstacles and opportunities federal policy makers should consider as they turn to local police for help. Federal efforts to stimulate community protection at the local level are likely to move forward with the same enthusiasm that greeted many of the intergovernmental pro- grams in the 1994 crime bill (Public Safety Partnership and Com- munity Policing Act 1994), and they share that characteristic with other intergovernmental programs that serve city interests (Peter- son et al. 1986:81–112). If federal officials hope to enlist cooper- ation from local governments for offender search, however, they should recognize the strong reasons cities have to resist. To suc- ceed, federal policy makers would need to create the kinds of de- tailed regulations, monitoring efforts, incentives, and widespread professionalization among key occupational groups that have proved necessary for controversial intergovernmental programs such as compensatory education, whose redistributive objectives conflicted with city interests (Peterson et al. 1986:131–59, 170–8). In short, such efforts would require fairly deep structural changes in American government, and even then federal expectations would probably need to be modest (Peterson et al. 1986: 191–215). Consequently, the decentralized nature of American government places sharp limits on the ability of national policy makers to mo- bilize the great majority of the country’s police officers to serve national goals. Those limits involve not just the different opera- tional capabilities of federal versus local law enforcement (Geller & Morris 1992:321) but also the different corporate interests that motivate them. If policy makers and the public conclude that these national goals have grown in importance relative to street crime, they may find it easier to shift resources toward federal police rather than try to reshape local policing. As I noted at the outset, not only is Dearborn ‘‘just one case’’: it is an especially extreme case in many ways, and its experiences are unlikely to be replicated exactly in many other cities (though the U.S. Conference of Mayors survey discussed earlier (2002) does suggest that most other cities have emphasized the same aspects of homeland security as Dearborn, and the refusal of cities such as 672 The Local Role in Homeland Security Portland, Oregon to assist with the federal interview project sug- gests that Dearborn’s wariness about offender search efforts is not unique or even extreme). It seems particularly important to ex- amine whether homeland security efforts evolve differently in cities with smaller Arab American populations, where concerns about honor and the legitimate use of surveillance and information-gath- ering are likely to be less salient, and in cities perceived to be at great risk of terrorist attack, where a larger share of the benefits of offender search activities redound to the city itself. (It could be especially instructive to investigate how local police define their homeland security role in non-U.S. cities such as Jerusalem, where terrorism is a constant threat in everyday life.) Moreover, from an international perspective, it remains an open question whether the limits on local policing described here only apply if the formal structure of a federalist system is in place, since formally centralized systems of policing often behave like decentralized systems (Bayley 1985:54). Nevertheless, despite the continuing need for future re- search into questions such as these, the Dearborn case already demonstrates that there are significant barriers to local govern- ment involvement in offender search activities in precisely those cities where U.S. homeland security policy makers would most like to target their efforts. References Applebaum, Arthur (1996) ‘‘Racial Generalization, Police Discretion, and Bayesian Contractualism,’’ in J. Kleinig, ed., Handled with Discretion. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. Associated Press (2002) ‘‘Dearborn Plans for Homeland Security,’’ Associated Press State and Local Wire, Jan. 14. Banton, Michael (1964) The Policeman in the Community. London: Tavistock. Bass, Sandra (2000) ‘‘Negotiating Change: Community Organizations and the Politics of Policing,’’ 36 Urban Affairs Rev. 148–77. Bayley, David (1985) Patterns of Policing. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers Univ. Press. FFF (1994) Police for the Future. New York: Oxford Univ. Press. 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Thacher 673 Cullen, Julie, & Steven Levitt (1999) ‘‘Crime, Urban Flight, and The Consequences for Cities,’’ 81 Rev. of Economics and Statistics 159–69. Dahl, Robert (1961) Who Governs? New Haven: Yale Univ. Press. DiIulio, John Jr. (1989) ‘‘The Impact of Inner-City Crime,’’ 96 The Public Interest 28–46. Dworkin, Ronald (1986) Law’s Empire. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press. Ericson, Richard, & Kevin Haggerty (1997) Policing the Risk Society. Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press. Flanagan, Newman (2002) ‘‘Message from the Executive Director,’’ National District Attorney’s Association, Sept.-Oct., http://www.ndaa.org (accessed May 13, 2005). Foucault, Michel (1977) Discipline and Punish. New York: Vintage. FFF (1980) Power/Knowledge. New York: Pantheon. Fraser, Nancy (1981) ‘‘Foucault on Modern Power,’’ 1 Praxis International 272–87. Geller, William, & Norval Morris (1992) ‘‘Relations Between Federal and Local Police,’’ in M. Tonry & N. Morris, eds., Modern Policing. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press. Greenstone, J. David, & Paul Peterson (1975) Race and Authority in Urban Politics. New York: Russell Sage. Grodzins, Morton (1966) The American System. Chicago: Rand McNally. Hakim, Danny (2001) ‘‘Inquiries Put Mideast Men In Spotlight,’’ New York Times, 16 Nov., p. B-10. Hart, H. L. A. (1968) Punishment and Responsibility. New York: Oxford Univ. Press. Heinz, Anne, et al. (1983) Crime in City Politics. New York: Longman. Henig, Jeffrey (1978) ‘‘Copping a Cop: Neighborhood Organizations and Police Patrol Allocation,’’ 7 J. of Voluntary Action Research 75–84. Herbert, Steve (1997a) Policing Space. Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press. FFF (1997b) ‘‘Territoriality and the Police,’’ 49 Professional Geographer 86–94. Herel, Suzanne, & Tyche Hendricks (2001) ‘‘Fremont police turn down ACLU, will help FBI with questioning,’’ San Francisco Chronicle, 5 Dec., p. A-9. Higham, John (1988) Strangers in the Land, 2d. ed. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers Univ. Press. 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Meares, Tracey, & Dan Kahan (1999) ‘‘When Rights Are Wrong,’’ 24 Boston Rev. 4–8. Moore, Mark H. (1995) Creating Public Value. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press. Moritz, Owen (2001) ‘‘Local Victims of Backlash Deny Accusations,’’ New York Daily News, 14 Sept., p. 76. Nagel, Thomas (1998) ‘‘Concealment and Exposure,’’ 27 Philosophy & Public Affairs 3– 30. Niemiec, Dennis (2002) ‘‘Dearborn to Adopt Antiterror Program,’’ Detroit Free Press, 14 Jan., p. B-1. Nonet, Philippe, & Philip Selznick (1978) Law and Society in Transition. New York: Octagon. 674 The Local Role in Homeland Security Northeast Regional Homeland Security Agreement (2003) ‘‘Letter to Department of Homeland Security Director Tom Ridge,’’ July 24. Oberweis, Trish, & Michael Musheno (1999) ‘‘Policing Identities: Cop Decision Making and the Constitution of Citizens,’’ 24 Law and Social Inquiry 897–923. Office of the Attorney General (2001) ‘‘Interviews Regarding International Terrorism,’’ Memorandum for all United States Attorneys and all members of the anti-terrorism task forces, November 9. Office of the Deputy Attorney General (2001) ‘‘Guidelines for the Interviews Regarding International Terrorism,’’ Memorandum for all United States Attorneys and all members of the anti-terrorism task forces, November 9. Ostrom, Elinor, & Gordon Whitaker (1973) ‘‘Does Local Community Control of Police Make a Difference? Some Preliminary Findings,’’ 17 American J. of Political Science 48–76. Peterson, Paul (1981) City Limits. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press. FFF, et al. (1986) When Federalism Works. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution. Pierre, Robert (2002) ‘‘Fear and Anxiety Permeate Arab Enclave Near Detroit,’’ Wash- ington Post, 4 Aug., p. A-3. Rubinstein, Jonathan (1973) City Police. New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux. Schaefer, Jim (2001) ‘‘U.S. softens tactics in terror questioning,’’ Detroit Free Press, 27 Nov., p. A-1. Selznick, Philip (1957) Leadership in Administration. Evanston, IL: Row, Peterson, and Co. Sharp, Elaine (1999) Culture Wars and Local Politics. Lawrence: Univ. of Kansas Press. Skogan, Wesley (1988) ‘‘Community Organizations and Crime,’’ in M. Tonry & N. Morris, eds., Crime and Justice, Vol. 10. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press. Skolnick, Jerome (1975) Justice Without Trial, 2d ed. New York: John Wiley & Sons. Stone, Clarence (2004) ‘‘It’s More than the Economy After All,’’ 26 J. of Urban Affairs 1–19. Thacher, David (2001a) ‘‘Conflicting Values in Community Policing,’’ 35 Law & Society Rev. 765–98. FFF (2001b) ‘‘Policing Is Not a Treatment: Alternatives to the Medical Model of Police Research,’’ 38 J. of Research in Crime and Delinquency 387–415. FFF (forthcoming) ‘‘The Normative Case Study,’’ American J. of Sociology. Thacher, David, & Martin Rein (2004) ‘‘Managing Value Conflict in Public Policy,’’ 17 Governance 457–86. Tyler, Tom (2004) ‘‘Enhancing Police Legitimacy,’’ 593 Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences 84–99. U.S. Census Bureau (2000) Census 2000. Summary File 3: Table QT-P13. American Factfinder, http://factfinder.census.gov (accessed May 2005). U.S. Conference of Mayors (2002) The Cost of Heightened Security in America’s Cities: A 192-City Survey, January. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Conference of Mayors. U.S. General Accounting Office (2002) INS Cannot Locate Many Aliens Because It Lacks Reliable Address Information. Report to Congressional Requesters #GAO-03- 188. FFF (2003) Justice Department’s Project to Interview Aliens After September 11, 2001. GAO Report to Congressional Committees # GAO-03-459. Walzer, Michael (1983a) Spheres of Justice. New York: Basic. FFF (1983b) ‘‘The Politics of Michel Foucault,’’ 30 Dissent 481–91. Weber, Max (1978) Economy and Society, 2 vols. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press. Westley, William (1953) ‘‘Violence and the Police,’’ 59 American J. of Sociology 34–41. Wilgoren, Jodi (2001) ‘‘Michigan ‘Invites’ Men From Mideast to Be Interviewed,’’ New York Times, 27 Nov., p. A-1. Wilson, James Q. (1968) Varieties of Police Behavior. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press. FFF (1972) ‘‘The Police in the Ghetto,’’ in R. Steadman, ed., The Police and the Com- munity. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press. Thacher 675 Winship, Chris, & Jenny Berrien (1999) ‘‘Boston Cops and Black Churches,’’ 136 Public Interest 52–68. Statute Cited Public Safety Partnership and Community Policing Act of 1994 [Title I of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994]. Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796, 1807 (1994). David Thacher is Associate Professor of Public Policy and Urban Planning at the University of Michigan. His research seeks to develop and apply new ways of using case studies and other social science methods to study values in public policy, with a particular focus on criminal justice policy and public management. His work has appeared in journals such as Governance, Law & Society Review, The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, and The Journal of Quantitative Criminology. He is currently working on a study of housing for ex-convicts. 676 The Local Role in Homeland Security 
work_a3jsnncasfe75a3k2i4o2oinji	----	J155v05n01_09.pdf This article was downloaded by: [University of Auckland Library] On: 19 August 2015, At: 02:40 Publisher: Routledge Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: 5 Howick Place, London, SW1P 1WG Journal of Lesbian Studies Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/wjls20 The Great, Late Lesbian and Bisexual Women's Discrimination Survey Jenny Rankine Published online: 12 Oct 2008. To cite this article: Jenny Rankine (2001) The Great, Late Lesbian and Bisexual Women's Discrimination Survey, Journal of Lesbian Studies, 5:1-2, 133-142, DOI: 10.1300/J155v05n01_09 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1300/J155v05n01_09 PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the “Content”) contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising out of the use of the Content. This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/wjls20 http://www.tandfonline.com/action/showCitFormats?doi=10.1300/J155v05n01_09 http://dx.doi.org/10.1300/J155v05n01_09 expressly forbidden. Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions D ow nl oa de d by [ U ni ve rs it y of A uc kl an d L ib ra ry ] at 0 2: 40 1 9 A ug us t 20 15 http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions The Great, Late Lesbian and Bisexual Women’s Discrimination Survey Jenny Rankine SUMMARY. This 1992 New Zealand survey of discrimination against 261 lesbian and bisexual women found comparable rates of public abuse and workplace discrimination to those reported by surveys in oth- er developed countries. The women reported higher rates of assault in public places than a random sample of New Zealand women. Indige- nous Maori women reported higher rates of assault, threats, verbal abuse, and workplace discrimination than the non-Maori women sur- veyed. Aggression against the women was often in response to public expression of affection for another woman or to rejection of men’s pub- lic sexual advances. The respondents reported hostile educational envi- ronments that coincided with peer harassment of students attracted to their own gender. Around two-thirds of the women had hidden their sexuality on some occasions at work to avoid discrimination. No signifi- cant differences between the discrimination experiences of lesbian and bi- sexual women emerged, although the bisexual sample was too small for statistical analysis. [Article copies available for a fee from The Haworth Document Delivery Service: 1-800-342-9678. E-mail address: <getinfo@haworthpressinc. com> Website: <http://www.HaworthPress.com> E 2001 by The Haworth Press, Inc. All rights reserved.] KEYWORDS. Bisexual women, coming out, discrimination, discrimi- nation in education, harassment, hate crimes, lesbian, sexual identity, sexual orientation, New Zealand [Haworth co-indexing entry note]: ‘‘The Great, Late Lesbian and Bisexual Women’s Discrimination Survey.’’ Rankine, Jenny. Co-published simultaneously in Journal of Lesbian Studies (Harrington Park Press, an imprint of The Haworth Press, Inc.) Vol. 5, No. 1/2, 2001, pp. 133-142; and: Lesbian Studies in Aotearoa/New Zealand (ed: Alison J. Laurie) Harrington Park Press, an imprint of The Haworth Press, Inc., 2001, pp. 133-142. Single or multiple copies of this article are available for a fee from The Haworth Document Delivery Service [1-800-342-9678, 9:00 a.m. - 5:00 p.m. (EST). E-mail address: getinfo@haworthpressinc. com]. E 2001 by The Haworth Press, Inc. All rights reserved. 133 D ow nl oa de d by [ U ni ve rs it y of A uc kl an d L ib ra ry ] at 0 2: 40 1 9 A ug us t 20 15 LESBIAN STUDIES IN AOTEAROA/NEW ZEALAND134 A New Zealand survey of discrimination against lesbian and bi- sexual women has reported rates of public abuse and workplace dis- crimination comparable to those reported in surveys in other devel- oped countries.1 This is despite high reported tolerance of homosexual identity in New Zealand surveys (AGB-McNair, 1990). The survey was carried out in 1992, before sexual orientation was included in New Zealand human rights legislation as one of several new grounds for protection against discrimination. It aimed to provide a baseline against which changes in lesbian experiences of discrimina- tion could be measured. It also aimed to identify any differences between discrimination experienced by lesbian and by bisexual women. It was carried out by a voluntary community-based group of lesbians, and difficulties in obtaining funding meant that it was not published until 1997. The survey was distributed as a printed booklet through lesbian mailing lists, snowball sampling, and lesbian venues, mostly in Auck- land, but also in other cities and provincial centres. It asked 49 ques- tions about coming out, experiences of harassment and violence, and discrimination in employment, housing, health, education, services, religion, and parenting. Two hundred sixty-one completed questionnaires were returned, from 229 lesbians, 27 bisexual women, and five women who did not want to label their sexuality. The small number of bisexual women who responded means that the survey’s second aim could not be met, and their answers are reported separately only when they differ signifi- cantly from the lesbian responses. The participants represented a range of ethnicities and ages, al- though women from the indigenous Maori population of New Zealand were underrepresented (6% compared with 9.7% in the 1991 Census), and immigrant women from European backgrounds were over-repre- sented (11% compared with 9.2% born in the UK, USA, Canada, or Australia in the 1991 Census). Summaries of some of the results follow. COMING OUT Just under half the women (49%) had been in a previous heterosex- ual relationship. The survey asked at what age women first thought and knew they were lesbian or bisexual. Women first thought they D ow nl oa de d by [ U ni ve rs it y of A uc kl an d L ib ra ry ] at 0 2: 40 1 9 A ug us t 20 15 Jenny Rankine 135 might love women at a median age of 17. The lesbian women knew at a median of 23, while the bisexual women, who were overall a younger group, knew at 21. This realisation came slightly later than it did for UK women surveyed in 1990/1992 (Snape et al., 1995). The median age at which the New Zealand lesbian respondents first had sex with another woman was 23. This was also later than the female respondents to another UK survey (Stonewall, 1993). Just over two-fifths of the New Zealand women felt positive when they first knew they loved women, just over one in five had very mixed feelings, and one in five felt ashamed or in other ways strongly negative. One Pakeha lesbian said: ‘‘Good--it was like light dawning on why I hadn’t felt and behaved like other women towards men.’’ Another said: ‘‘I felt that I was abnormal, sick (insane), guilty and dirty. Ashamed and alarmed.’’ Almost two-thirds reported positive responses from the people they told. One-quarter of the lesbians reported negative reactions. More than half the lesbians did not know of any support services when they first came out, whereas most of the bisexual women did. This differ- ence may be related to the high proportion of bisexual women’s sur- veys returned by members of two bisexual support groups. Typically, all the women were most out to friends. EDUCATION More than nine out of ten women had been told nothing about lesbianism or bisexuality during their secondary education. This is a similar proportion to the UK survey (Stonewall, 1993). Only 21 had been told anything in class, and for 13 this information was treated negatively. Forty-one percent of lesbians and 60% of bisexual women reported experiencing discrimination in education on the grounds of sexual identity. Incidents were evenly spread over the previous four decades. Forty-two women added comments about their school mates’ regular and often virulent ridicule and harassment of lesbians and gays. As one lesbian said: ‘‘The things that I did hear through informal channels while at school were so terrible that I never related the word ‘lesbian’ to my feelings for women.’’ The New Zealand schools which this group of women experienced had created a hostile environment for and coincided with peer harass- ment of students attracted to their own gender. A qualitative study D ow nl oa de d by [ U ni ve rs it y of A uc kl an d L ib ra ry ] at 0 2: 40 1 9 A ug us t 20 15 LESBIAN STUDIES IN AOTEAROA/NEW ZEALAND136 since the passing of the Human Rights Act (Quinlivan, 1997) suggests that this has not significantly improved for girls who love other girls at secondary school. Effective programmes to counter peer harassment of lesbian, bisexual, and gay students remain urgently needed. The current creation of education markets in New Zealand school- ing is tending to ghettoise disadvantaged racial and socio-economic populations into certain areas and schools. This may result in a small number of schools where lesbian, gay, and bisexual students and teachers can more easily be out, but is likely to leave a large majority of students dealing with restrictive constructions of female sexuality in which same-sex love is invisible. PUBLIC VIOLENCE More than three-quarters of all the surveyed women had been ver- bally abused about their sexuality at least once, and 9% had been verbally abused often. Reported rates of verbal abuse of lesbians in other surveys vary markedly, from 34% in a small sample of Sydney lesbians (Gay and Lesbian Rights Lobby, 1991) to 92% in a small Wellington survey (Lesbian and Gay Rights Resource Centre, 1985). In additional comments, 51 women commented on what they thought had provoked this abuse. Almost all were related to holding hands or otherwise expressing public affection for another woman (whether a friend or partner) or to disinterest in men’s public sexual advances. Another seven said they had been abused near a gay or a women’s venue. These comments provide strong support for Carol Ruthchild’s conclusion that public abuse and violence is one way in which lesbians are punished for their sexual autonomy from men (Gay and Lesbian Rights Lobby, 1991). Thirty-one percent of the lesbians and 42% of the bisexual women had been threatened with violence. This is similar to the findings of overseas surveys which have asked this question: around one-third of participants commonly report receiving threats of violence (Herek, 1989; Herek et al., 1992; Gay and Lesbian Rights Lobby, 1991; Fitz- gerald, 1996; Mason et al., 1996). Around 13% of the New Zealand women had been physically assaulted at least once as a result of their sexual identity. Rates of assault reported in contemporary overseas surveys vary markedly, from 11% in a 1993 Victorian survey (Fitzger- D ow nl oa de d by [ U ni ve rs it y of A uc kl an d L ib ra ry ] at 0 2: 40 1 9 A ug us t 20 15 Jenny Rankine 137 ald, 1996) to 52% in the small Sydney sample (Gay and Lesbian Rights Lobby, 1991). In comparison, 22% of a cohort of 1,000 21-year-old Dunedin women reported being assaulted in the previous 12 months, with 15% reporting multiple assaults (Martin et al., 1998). However, the bulk of these assaults were by partners. This sample experienced much lower rates of assault in public places than the lesbian and bisexual sample did. Maori women reported higher rates of assault, threats of violence, and verbal abuse than Pakeha or immigrant European women. Women who were more out about their sexuality were more likely to report abuse. The bisexual women’s experience of abuse was largely related to their affectionate behaviour towards other women in public. Seven comments from four women mention abuse based on their bisexual identity. More than one-third reported being sometimes or often afraid of public harassment. Twelve women commented about the ways in which public abuse caused them to alter their behaviour towards their partners in public, although this question was not included. ‘‘My beha- viour in public is always monitored, always aware, sometimes brave,’’ said one lesbian. DISCRIMINATION AT WORK Being treated differently by and from heterosexual workmates were the most common forms of workplace discrimination, reported by more than one in three women. Twenty-three percent of lesbians had been harassed about their sexuality at work, similar to the 21% in a UK survey (Snape et al., 1995). Ten percent of the lesbians had lost a job because of their sexuality, and a further six women were unsure whether their sexual identity was the reason that they had to leave their jobs. Rates in other surveys ranged from 4% (Snape et al., 1995) to 12% (NZAF, 1992). Some women reported the imposition of inappropriate and unnecessary re- strictions on their work roles, although this question was not specifi- cally asked. Nine percent of the lesbians thought they had been denied promo- tion because of their sexuality, and another 7% suspected that might be the reason. This compares with 5% in the Less Equal than Others D ow nl oa de d by [ U ni ve rs it y of A uc kl an d L ib ra ry ] at 0 2: 40 1 9 A ug us t 20 15 LESBIAN STUDIES IN AOTEAROA/NEW ZEALAND138 survey by Stonewall in the UK (Palmer, 1993). Five percent of the lesbians believed they had been denied a job because of responses to their sexuality. Maori women reported higher rates of unfair dismissal and denial of jobs and promotions than Pakeha and immigrant women. Women who were out to all their workmates and employers reported higher rates of denial of jobs and promotions. None of the women who were com- pletely closeted at work reported being denied jobs or promotion. However, women out to all their workmates reported similar rates of harassment as women who had told nobody. Most of the lesbians (63%) had hidden their sexuality in at least some situations at work to avoid discrimination. Many of the women described wearing carefully ‘‘feminine’’ clothes for key situations, going alone to work social functions, and avoiding discussions of homosexuality at work. These results indicate substantial institutional discrimination in New Zealand workplaces at this time. Some of the women’s experiences of sexual harassment appeared to differ from those which heterosexual women may experience. Les- bians are stereotyped as sexual aggressors, yet some of the lesbians and bisexual women who had been sexually harassed did not complain precisely because of this stereotype. One Maori woman said: ‘‘I was sexually assaulted by heterosexual women in the workforce. I felt powerless because I was a lesbian and never reported it.’’ Although the Human Rights Act 1993 now prohibits discrimination in employment on the grounds of sexual orientation, the impact of the Employment Contracts Act (ECA) 1991 may have cancelled out any gains which human rights protection brought for lesbians and bisexual women. By 1993, union representation of women had fallen by about a third (Sarr, 1993), and their bargaining power at work had decreased. By 1999, overall union membership was less than half what it was before the ECA, and it is likely that this is true for women too. The gap between men’s and women’s wages, which was slowly closing, has also started to widen again (Ministry of Women’s Affairs, 1997). These losses may be somewhat reversed by new employment relations legislation planned by the current Labour-led Government. The ‘‘more market’’ emphasis may also be undermining the imple- mentation of workplace EEO policies, many of which now include sexual orientation. These policies are required only in the public sec- tor, although some private firms have adopted EEO policies. D ow nl oa de d by [ U ni ve rs it y of A uc kl an d L ib ra ry ] at 0 2: 40 1 9 A ug us t 20 15 Jenny Rankine 139 LEGAL DISCRIMINATION When asked how they thought same-sex relationships should be treated by the law, almost three-quarters of the lesbians said ‘‘the same’’ [as heterosexual relationships]. Another 18% of the lesbians and one-third of the bisexual women said other legal changes were still needed to implement full human rights for same-sex couples. Many women had obviously thought hard about this issue, and listed several rights ‘‘which straights take for granted and which are denied lesbians,’’ as one Pakeha lesbian put it. One Maori lesbian said: I think the law should offer the option for same sex couples to have access to the same procedures available to heterosexuals. Also an alternative to those procedures, which would be after full consulta- tion with the gay/lesbian community, and would recognise the in- trinsic differences and specialness of same sex relationships. Since this survey, six lesbians have unsuccessfully challenged the discriminatory administration of the New Zealand Marriage Act, and their appeal has been submitted to the United Nations. The issue of same-sex marriage, however, remains controversial in lesbian commu- nities as well as in the wider society. The state is currently inviting submissions about the legal status of same-sex relationships and New Zealand lesbians are engaging with these issues in more detail than ever before. It is likely that at least some of the legal changes which women said were needed in this survey will be passed by the current Labour-led government. PARENTING Eighty-five women, almost one-third, were responsible for parent- ing children at the time of the survey. Of those, 74% were biological mothers, and the others were co-parents. More than four out of five of the biological parents had had their children as part of a heterosexual relationship. Another four women had used donor insemination to conceive, all through informal arrangements. In 1992 in New Zealand, lesbians were denied access to alternative insemination at public and private fertility services. D ow nl oa de d by [ U ni ve rs it y of A uc kl an d L ib ra ry ] at 0 2: 40 1 9 A ug us t 20 15 LESBIAN STUDIES IN AOTEAROA/NEW ZEALAND140 Thirty-six of the women said that neither they nor their children were discriminated against in childcare or at school. However, 28 said they were. Another nine were not sure whether difficult issues were a result of responses to their sexuality, and six were not out to those services. One Pakeha lesbian said: ‘‘Both my children were treated abominably by their peers because of my lesbianism. The teachers knew about it but didn’t appreciate the degree of harm this caused. As a consequence, my children have had a very difficult time with their self-esteem, and accepting me and my relationships.’’ Thirteen women had experienced custody or access difficulties re- lated to their sexuality. For several women, complaints about their lesbianism were used as a threat by their former partners. BOUNDARIES BETWEEN LESBIANS AND BISEXUAL WOMEN New Zealand lesbian and bisexual communities have collaborated on issues of common interest, such as the Homosexual Law Reform Bill Campaign in the mid-1980s, but their boundaries remain con- tested. Ten lesbians and eight bisexual women commented about the inclusion of bisexual women in the survey. The lesbians stressed the differences they perceived between lesbian experiences, choices, and perspectives, and those of bisexual women. However, few significant differences in discrimination experiences emerged from this survey. The public abuse and threats the bisexual women reported were asso- ciated in their comments largely with reactions to same-sex behaviour, rather than to their sexual identity. The only marked difference was the bisexual women’s comments about discrimination experienced from lesbians. Although five les- bians reported that their abuser was also a lesbian, none of them wrote any comments about this. New Zealand lesbians have consistently expressed a desire for les- bian-only social spaces and political groups, which enable them to resist and temporarily escape the intense heterosexism they experience. However, in comparison to the pervasiveness of heterosexism, lesbians as a group have little social power, even over their own social events. For example, despite the ‘‘lesbian-only’’ tag on the long-running Auck- land Lesbian Ball, bisexual women have attended, and organisers do not query women’s identity at the venue door. With the greater visibility D ow nl oa de d by [ U ni ve rs it y of A uc kl an d L ib ra ry ] at 0 2: 40 1 9 A ug us t 20 15 Jenny Rankine 141 of lesbians in the media, entertainment, and liberal workplaces,2 it is likely that the embattled communities which several older lesbians referred to in their comments will gradually let down their drawbridges. It is clear from this survey that discrimination against women’s sexual relationships is a significant issue in New Zealand schools and workplaces. It is also likely that male harassment and violence against women who are affectionate towards other women in public happens at similar levels to that reported in other countries. Since the introduc- tion of sexual orientation into the Human Rights Commission Act, there have been few government interventions to address these issues. The survey recommended that: S The Consistency 2000 Project, which catalogued the number of laws and regulations breaching the HRC Act, be completed; S Laws on hate-motivated crime be introduced; S The Ministry of Education develop an anti-heterosexism policy covering curriculum and the school environment; S Schools have anti-harassment policies which include sexual ori- entation as a condition of school accreditation; S Research be undertaken into the social and personal costs of hate-motivated crime; S Pilot funding be made available for community-based projects supporting victims of hate crime; S Women’s refuges be funded to provide services for survivors of anti-lesbian harassment and lesbian and bisexual victims of part- ner violence; S Researchers evaluate the impact of youth suicide interventions on young lesbians, gay men, and bisexual people; S All EEO policies and procedures include sexual orientation. Consistency 2000, which was dropped by the former National coali- tion government, has been restarted by the Labour-led government. Laws are likely to be changed in areas of current discrimination, such as adop- tion, fostering, custody, access, inheritance, next-of-kin, and relationship property. Women’s refuges have started providing space for lesbians, but largely as victims of partner violence rather than anti-lesbian violence. Researchers are including sexual orientation as a factor in suicide. But the bulk of these recommendations have yet to be enacted. D ow nl oa de d by [ U ni ve rs it y of A uc kl an d L ib ra ry ] at 0 2: 40 1 9 A ug us t 20 15 LESBIAN STUDIES IN AOTEAROA/NEW ZEALAND142 NOTES 1. Rankine, Jenny (1997). The Great Late Lesbian and Bisexual Women’s Dis- crimination Survey, available from Discrimination Survey, PO Box 44056, Auckland 2, Aotearoa New Zealand. 2. Shortland Street, the long-running New Zealand soap opera, started a plot line in 1999 involving a core cast character in a lesbian relationship. This was a very daring move in the entertainment environment of 1992. REFERENCES AGB-McNair (1990). Attitudes to discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation, prepared for the New Zealand AIDS Foundation, Auckland: AGB-McNair. Fitzgerald, Andrew (1996). Australia’s criminal justice system fails lesbians and gay men, E Law--Murdoch University Electronic Journal of Law 3(2) July. <http://www.murdoch.edu.au/pub/elaw/issues/v3n2>. Gay and Lesbian Rights Lobby Inc. (1991). The Off Our Backs Report, Sydney: Anti- Violence Project. Herek, Gregory M. (1989). Hate crimes against lesbians and gay men: Issues for research and policy. American Psychologist 44(6), June, pp. 948-954. Herek, Gregory M. and Berrill, Kevin T. (eds.) (1992). Hate Crimes: Confronting violence against lesbians and gay men, London: Sage Publications. Lesbian and Gay Rights Resource Centre (1995). Survey on anti-gay/lesbian vio- lence, Wellington: Gay Task Force. Martin, Judy, Nada-Raja, Shyamala, Langley, John, Feehan, Michael, McGee, Rob, Clarke, Judith, Begg, Dorothy, Hutchinson-Cervantes, Maria, Moffitt, Terrie, and Rivara, Frederick (1998). Physical assault in New Zealand: The experience of 21-year-old men and women in a community sample, NZMJ 111, pp. 158-160. Mason, Angela and Palmer, Anya (1996). Queer Bashing--A national survey of hate crimes against lesbians and gay men, London: Stonewall. Ministry of Women’s Affairs (1997). Panui, August. NZAF (1992). Discrimination against gay and bisexual men in New Zealand, Auck- land: New Zealand AIDS Foundation. Palmer, Anya (1993). Less Equal than Others--A survey of lesbians and gay men at work, London: Stonewall. Quinlivan, Kathleen (1997). Claiming an identity they taught me to despise--Lesbian students respond to the regulation of same sex desire within New Zealand schools, Women’s Studies Journal 12(2), Spring, Special Issue: Educating Sexuality, pp. 99-113. Sarr, Patricia (1993). Shifting Sands: Women in New Zealand unions, Wellington: New Zealand Council of Trade Unions. Snape, Dawn, Thomson, Katrina, and Chetwynd, Mark (1995). Discrimination against gay men and lesbians--A study on the nature and extent of discrimination against homosexual men and women in Britain today, London: Social and Com- munity Planning Research. Stonewall, (1993). Arrested Development? Stonewall survey on the age of consent and sex education, London: Stonewall. D ow nl oa de d by [ U ni ve rs it y of A uc kl an d L ib ra ry ] at 0 2: 40 1 9 A ug us t 20 15 
work_a4deoo2sr5fatohnjp2z2igzoy	----	doi:10.1016/j.ijhcs.2006.08.009 ARTICLE IN PRESS 1071-5819/$ - se doi:10.1016/j.ijh � Correspond E-mail addr jxu@bentley.ed Int. J. Human-Computer Studies 65 (2007) 57–70 www.elsevier.com/locate/ijhcs Mining communities and their relationships in blogs: A study of online hate groups Michael Chau a,� , Jennifer Xu b a School of Business, The University of Hong Kong, Pokfulam, Hong Kong b Department of Computer Information Systems, Bentley College, Waltham, MA 02452, USA Available online 10 October 2006 Abstract Blogs, often treated as the equivalence of online personal diaries, have become one of the fastest growing types of Web-based media. Everyone is free to express their opinions and emotions very easily through blogs. In the blogosphere, many communities have emerged, which include hate groups and racists that are trying to share their ideology, express their views, or recruit new group members. It is important to analyze these virtual communities, defined based on membership and subscription linkages, in order to monitor for activities that are potentially harmful to society. While many Web mining and network analysis techniques have been used to analyze the content and structure of the Web sites of hate groups on the Internet, these techniques have not been applied to the study of hate groups in blogs. To address this issue, we have proposed a semi-automated approach in this research. The proposed approach consists of four modules, namely blog spider, information extraction, network analysis, and visualization. We applied this approach to identify and analyze a selected set of 28 anti-Blacks hate groups (820 bloggers) on Xanga, one of the most popular blog hosting sites. Our analysis results revealed some interesting demographical and topological characteristics in these groups, and identified at least two large communities on top of the smaller ones. The study also demonstrated the feasibility in applying the proposed approach in the study of hate groups and other related communities in blogs. r 2006 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. Keywords: Blogs; Social network analysis; Hate groups; Web mining 1. Introduction Blogs, or Weblogs, have become increasingly popular in recent years. Blog is a Web-based publication that allows users to add content periodically, normally in reverse chronological order, in a relatively easy way. Blogs also combine personal Web pages with tools to make linking to other pages easier, as well as to post comments and afterthoughts (Blood, 2004). Instead of having a few people being in control of the threads on traditional Internet forums, blogs basically allow anyone to express their ideas and thoughts. Many free blog hosting sites are available. Sites like www.blogger.com, www.xanga.com, and www. livejournal.com, are a few examples. e front matter r 2006 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. cs.2006.08.009 ing author. Tel.: +852 2859 1014; fax: +852 2858 5614. esses: mchau@business.hku.hk (M. Chau), u (J. Xu). Many communities have emerged in the blogosphere. These could be support communities such as those for technical support or educational support (Nardi et al., 2004), or groups of bloggers who already knew each other in other context, such as a group for a high school or a company. In addition, there are also communities formed by people who share common interests or opinions. Many free blog hosting sites have the function to allow bloggers to link to each other to form explicit groups. Similar to other Web-based media such as Web sites, discussion forums, or chat rooms where hate groups are present (Anti- Defamation League, 2001; CNN, 1999; Glaser et al., 2002), there are also hate groups in blogs that are formed by bloggers who are racists or extremists. The consequences of the formation of such groups on the Internet cannot be underestimated. Hate groups or White supremacist groups like the Ku Klux Klan have started to use the Internet to spread their beliefs, recruit new members, or even advocate hate crimes with considerable success (Anti-Defamation http://www.blogger.com http://www.xanga.com http://www.livejournal.com http://www.livejournal.com www.elsevier.com/locater/ijhcs dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijhcs.2006.08.009 mailto:jxu@bentley.edu mailto:jxu@bentley.edu ARTICLE IN PRESS M. Chau, J. Xu / Int. J. Human-Computer Studies 65 (2007) 57–7058 League, 2001). The Web has allowed these groups to reach much further into society than ever before. Young people, the major group of bloggers, are more likely to be affected and even ‘‘brainwashed’’ by ideas propagated through the Web as a global medium. Hatred and extremism ideas could easily be embedded into their minds to make them become members of these hate groups or even conduct hate crimes. Facing the new trend in the cyberspace, our study has two objectives. First, we propose a semi-automated approach that combines blog spidering and social network analysis techniques to facilitate the monitoring, study, and research on the networks of bloggers, especially those in hate groups. To study the cyber activities of hate groups in blogs, it is important to devise an efficient and effective way to identify these groups, extract the information of their members, and explore their relationships. In recent years, advanced techniques such as text mining, Web mining, and social network analysis have been widely used in studies on cyber crimes, online extremist groups, and terrorist organizations (e.g., Burris et al., 2000, Chen et al., 2004, Zhou et al., 2005). However, the application of these techniques to blog analysis on the Web is a new area and no prior research has been published. Our approach consists of a set of techniques for identifying and analyzing hate groups in the blogosphere on the Web. Moreover, we include in our approach topological analysis, a new network analysis methodology that has not been employed in prior hate group and blog-related research, to study the relationships between bloggers. Second, our study seeks insights into the organization and movement of online hate groups. We reveal the structural properties of social networks of bloggers through a case study and compare our findings with those from previous studies. Like many other extremist organi- zations, hate groups and their activities are a type of social movement, which has significant social and political implications (Burris et al., 2000; Douglas et al., 2005). Because of their tendency toward violence, association with crimes, and especially, potential influence on youths, hatred and hate groups have attracted much attention from academics recently. Moreover, since such a move- ment is dynamic and keeps changing over time, it is desirable to constantly monitor the changes, compare findings across studies, and continuously update our understanding of hate groups. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we review the research background of hate group analysis and related research in text mining, Web mining, and social network analysis. We pose our research questions in Section 3, and a semi-automated approach to hate group analysis in blogs is presented in Section 4. In Section 5 we present a case study that we have performed on a popular blog hosting site based on the proposed approach and discuss our analysis findings. Lastly, we conclude our research in Section 6 and suggest some directions for future work. 2. Related work In this section we will review the background of the increasingly popular blogging phenomena. We also review relevant techniques in Web mining and social network analysis that have been applied in analyzing Web contents. 2.1. Blogging Blogs have become increasingly popular in the past few years. In the early days, blogs, a short form of weblogs, were used mainly for pages where links to other useful resources were periodically ‘‘logged’’ and posted. At that time blogs were mostly maintained by hand (Blood, 2004). After easy-to-use blogging software became widely avail- able in the early 2000s, the nature of blogs has changed and many blogs are more like personal Web sites that contain various types of content (not limited to links) posted in reverse-chronological order. Bloggers often make a record of their lives and express their opinions, feelings, and emotions through writing blogs (Nardi et al., 2004). Many bloggers consider blogging as an outlet for their thoughts and emotions. Besides personal blogs, there are also blogs created by companies. For example, ice.com, an online jewelry seller, has launched three blogs and reported that thousands of people linked to their Web site from these blogs (Hof, 2005). One of the most important features in blogs is the ability for any reader to write a comment on a blog entry. On most blog hosting sites, it is very easy to write a comment, in a way quite similar to replying to a previous message in traditional discussion forums. The ability to comment on blogs has facilitated the interaction between bloggers and their readers. On some controversial issues, like those related to racism, it is not uncommon to find a blog entry with thousands of comments where people dispute back and forth on the matter. Cyber communities have also emerged in blogs. Com- munities in blogs can be categorized as explicit commu- nities or implicit communities, like some other cyber communities on the Web (Kumar et al., 1999). Explicit communities in blogs are the groups, or blogrings, that bloggers have explicitly formed and joined. Most blog hosting sites allow bloggers to form a new group or join any existing groups. On the other hand, implicit commu- nities can only be defined by the interactions among bloggers, such as subscription, linking, or commenting. For example, a blogger may subscribe to another blog, meaning that the subscriber can get updates when the subscribed blog has been updated. A blogger can also post a link or add a comment to another blog, which are perhaps the most traditional activities among bloggers. These interac- tions signify some kind of connection between two bloggers. Because of such interactions among bloggers, these communities are less similar to the cyber communities as discussed in Kumar et al. (1999) but more resembling to the virtual communities which involve the social interaction ARTICLE IN PRESS M. Chau, J. Xu / Int. J. Human-Computer Studies 65 (2007) 57–70 59 between members characterized by memberships, sense of belonging, relationships, shared values and practices, and self-regulation (Erickson, 1997; Roberts, 1998; Rheingold, 2000). Similar to the analysis of hyperlinks among Web pages to identify communities (Chau et al., 2005a,b), analysis of the connections between bloggers could also identify these virtual communities, their characteristics, and their relationships. 2.2. Web mining and social network analysis Techniques based on both Web mining and social network techniques have been used in intelligence- and security-related applications and achieved considerable success. Web mining techniques are important because the Web has provided a vast amount of publicly accessible information that could be useful in security applications. It has been reported that many terrorists and extremist groups have been using the Web for various purposes (Zhou et al., 2005; Qin et al., 2006). Analysis and mining of such content can provide useful insights that are important to national and international security. Similarly, social network analysis (SNA) techniques also have been increasingly used in security applications in recent years. As SNA analyzes the interactions between individuals, it can often identify communities within a group of individuals and reveal some other interesting findings. This is especially useful for analyzing criminal organizations and terrorist groups and promising results have been reported (Xu and Chen, 2005). In the rest of this subsection, we give a brief review of Web mining and SNA techniques that are relevant to this research. Web mining techniques have been widely applied to various Web applications in recent years. In these applications, Web spiders usually are an indispensable component. Spiders, also known as crawlers, wanderers, or Webbots, are defined as ‘‘software programs that traverse the World Wide Web information space by following hypertext links and retrieving Web documents by standard HTTP protocol’’ (Cheong, 1996). Since the early days of the Web, spiders have been widely used to build the underlying databases of search engines (e.g., Pinkerton, 1994), to perform personal search (e.g., Chau et al., (2001)), to archive particular Web sites or even the whole Web (e.g., Kahle, 1997), or to collect Web statistics (e.g., Broder et al., 2000). Web mining techniques can be categorized into three types: content mining, structure mining, and usage mining (Kosala and Blockeel, 2000). Web content mining refers to the discovery of useful information from Web contents, including text, images, audio, video, etc. Web content mining research includes resource discovery from the Web (e.g., Cho et al., 1998; Chakrabarti et al., 1999), document categorization and clustering (e.g., Zamir and Etzioni, 1999; Chen et al., 2003), and information extraction from Web pages. Web structure mining studies the model underlying the hyperlink structures of the Web. It usually involves the analysis of in-links and out-links information of a Web page, and has been used for search engine result ranking and other Web applications. Google’s PageRank (Brin and Page, 1998) and HITS (Kleinberg, 1998) are the two most widely used algorithms. Web usage mining employs data mining techniques to analyze search logs or other activity logs to find interesting patterns. One of the main applications of Web usage mining is its use to learn user profiles (e.g., Armstrong et al., 1995). Specifically, the identification of Web communities has to a large extent relied on Web structure mining (Gibson et al., 1998; Kumar et al., 1999). Many of existing community identification methods are rooted in the HITS algorithm (Kleinberg, 1998). Kumar et al. (1999) propose a trawling approach to find a set of core pages containing both authoritative and hub pages for a specific topic. The core is a directed bipartite subgraph whose node set is divided into two sets with all hub pages in one set and authoritative pages in the other. The core and the other related pages constitute a Web community (Gibson et al., 1998). Treating the Web as a large graph, the problem of community identification can also be formulated as a minimum-cut problem, which finds clusters of roughly equal sizes while minimizing the number of links between clusters (Flake et al., 2000, 2002). Realizing that the minimum-cut problem is equivalent to the maximum-flow problem (Ford and Fulkerson, 1956), Flake et al. (2000) formulate the Web community identification problem as an s�t maximum flow problem, which can be solved using efficient polynomial time methods. Recently, a number of hierarchical clustering methods have also been proposed for identifying community structure in networks. These methods are especially suitable for unweighted networks such as the Web, in which hyperlinks do not have associated weights. The G–N algorithm (Girvan and Newman, 2002), for example, is a divisive clustering algorithm that gradually removes links to break a connected graph into clusters. However, the algorithm is rather slow. A few alternative methods such as the modularity-based algorithm (Newman, 2004b) and the edge clustering coefficient based algorithm (Radicchi et al., 2004) have improved the efficiency of the G–N algorithm. Web structure mining, on the other hand, also has a big overlap with social network analysis. SNA is a sociological methodology for analyzing patterns of relationships and interactions between social actors in order to discover the underlying social structure (Wasserman and Faust, 1994). Not only the attributes of social actors, such as their age, gender, socioeconomic status, and education, but also the properties of relationships between social actors, such as the nature, intensity, and frequency of the relationships, are believed to have important implications to the social structure. SNA methods have been employed to study organizational behavior (Borgatti and Foster, 2003), inter- organizational relations (Stuart, 1998), citation patterns (Baldi, 1998), virutal communities (Garton et al., 1999), and many other domains. Recently, SNA has also been ARTICLE IN PRESS M. Chau, J. Xu / Int. J. Human-Computer Studies 65 (2007) 57–7060 used in the intelligence and security domain to analyze criminal and terrorist networks (Dombroski and Carley, 2002; Krebs, 2001; Xu and Chen, 2004, 2005). When used to mine a network, SNA can help reveal the structural patterns such as the central nodes which act as hubs, leaders, or gatekeepers, the densely-knit communities or groups, and the patterns of interactions between the communities and groups. These patterns often have important implications to the functioning of the network. For example, the central nodes often play a key role by issuing commands or bridging different communities. The removal of central nodes can effectively disrupt a network than peripheral nodes (Albert et al., 2000). Moreover, a recent movement in statistical analysis of network topology (Albert and Barabási, 2002) has brought new insights and research methodology to the study of network structure. Networks, regardless of their contents, are classified into three categories: random network (Bollobás, 1985), small-world network (Watts and Strogatz, 1998), and scale-free network (Barabási et al., 1999). In a random network the probability that two randomly selected nodes are connected is a constant p. As a result, each node has roughly the same number of links and nodes are rather homogenous. In addition, communities are not likely to exist in random networks. Small-world networks, in contrast, have a significantly high tendency to form groups and communities. Most empirical networks ranging from social networks (Newman, 2004a), biological net- works (Jeong et al., 2001), to the Web (Albert et al., 1999) have been found to be nonrandom networks. In addition, many of these networks are also scale-free networks (Barabási et al., 1999), in which a large percentage of nodes have just a few links, while a small percentage of the nodes have a large number of links. Thus, nodes in scale- free networks are not homogenous in terms of their links. Some nodes become hubs or leaders that play important roles in the operation of the network. The Web has been found to have both small-world and scale-free properties (Albert and Barabási, 2002). 2.3. Hate on the Internet Hate crimes have been one of the long-standing problems in the United States because of various historical, cultural, and political reasons. Race, gender, religion, and disability often become the reason of hate. Over time, hate groups have been formed to unite individuals with similar beliefs as well as to spread such ideology. For example, White supremacist groups such as Ku Klux Klan (KKK), Neo-Nazis, and Racist Skinheads have been active in the United States for a long time (Burris et al., 2000). Hate groups have been increasingly using the Internet to express their ideas, spread their beliefs, and recruit new members (Lee and Leets, 2002). It has been reported that 60% of hate criminals are youths (Levin and McDevitt, 1993), who are, perhaps unfortunately, also one of the largest groups of Internet users. Glaser et al. (2002) suggest that racists often express their views more freely on the Internet. The Hate Directory (Franklin, 2005) compiles a list of hundreds of Web sites, files archives, newsgroups, and other Internet resources related to hate and racism. Several studies have investigated Web sites that are related to racism or White supremacy. Douglas et al. (2005) studied 43 Web sites that were related to White supremacy. It was found that while these groups showed lower level of advocated violence due to legal constraints, they exhibited high levels of social conflict and social creativity. Lee and Leets (2002) found that storytelling-style, implicit messages often used by hate groups on the Internet were more persuasive to adolescents, who have become the target of new member recruitment of many hate groups. These adolescences might be easily influenced to conduct hate crimes. Gerstenfeld et al. (2003) conducted a manual analysis of 157 extremist Web sites. They found that some hate Web sites were associated with hate groups while others were maintained by individuals. Many of these sites had links to other extremist sites or hate group sites, showing that some of these groups are linked to each other. Burris et al. (2000) systematically analyzed the networks of Web sites maintained by white supremacist groups and found that this network had a decentralized structure with several centers of influence. In addition, communities were present in this network in which groups sharing similar interests and ideologies tended to be closely connected. Zhou et al. (2005) used software to automate the analysis of the content of hate group Web sites and the linkage among them. They found that one of the major objectives of these Web sites was to share ideology. Cyber commu- nities such as White Supremacists and Neo-Nazis were identified among these sites. Recent years have seen the emergence of hate groups in blogs, where high-narrative messages are the norm. This has made blogs an ideal medium for spreading hatred. Blogs have also made it possible for individuals to find others with similar belief and ideology much more easily. As a result, hate groups have emerged in blogs. To study these online hate groups in blogs, it is important to analyze the content of these blogs as well as the relationships among the bloggers. However, because of the large volume of data involved, it is often a mentally exhausting, if not infeasible, process to perform such kind of analysis manually. There is great potential value to apply Web mining and social network analysis techniques, which have been used successfully in other security-related applications, to analyze hate-related blogs automatically in order to identify patterns and facilitate further analysis. However, we have not been able to identify any prior research in this aspect in the literature. 3. Research questions As discussed earlier, it is an important and timely issue to identify the hate groups in blogs and analyze their relationships. Web mining techniques have been used to ARTICLE IN PRESS M. Chau, J. Xu / Int. J. Human-Computer Studies 65 (2007) 57–70 61 analyze Web content such as Web pages and hyperlinks; however, few of these techniques have been applied to blog analysis. Based on our review, we pose the following two sets of research questions: (1) Can we use semi-automatic techniques, such as automated text collection, text analysis, and network analysis, to identify hate groups in blogs? (2) What are the structural properties of the social networks of bloggers in the hate groups? Are there bloggers who stand out as leaders of influence in these groups? What is the community structure in these groups? What do the structural properties suggest about the organization of the hate groups? What are the social and political implications of these properties? 4. Proposed approach In this section, we propose a semi-automated approach for identifying groups and analyzing their relationships in blogs. The approach is diagrammed in Fig. 1. Our approach consists of four main modules, namely Blog Spider, Information Extraction, Network Analysis, and Visualization. The Blog Spider module downloads blog pages from the Web. These pages are then processed by the Information Extraction module. Data about these blogs and their relationships are extracted and passed to the Network Analysis module for further analysis. Finally the Visualization module presents the analysis results to users in a graphical display. In the following, we describe each module in more detail. 4.1. Blog spider A blog spider program is first needed to download the relevant pages from the blogs of interest. Similar to general Web fetching, the spider can connect to blog hosting sites Fig. 1. The proposed semi-automated using standard HTTP protocol. After a blogring descrip- tion page or a blog page is fetched, URLs are extracted and stored into a queue. However, instead of following all extracted links, the blog spider should only follow links that are of interest, e.g., links to a group’s members, other bloggers, comment links, and so on. Links to other external resources are often less useful in blog analysis. Multi- threading also can be used, as in standard spiders, such that multiple Web pages can be downloaded in parallel (Chau et al., 2005a,b). This can avoid bottleneck in the process if any particular Web server is sending malicious response or not responding at all. Alternatively, asynchro- nous I/O can be used for parallel fetching (Brin and Page, 1998). In either case, after a page is downloaded it can be stored into a relational database or as a flat file. In addition, the spider can use RSS (Really Simple Syndica- tion) and get notification when the blog is updated. However, this is only necessary when monitoring or incremental analysis is desired. 4.2. Information extraction After a blog page has been downloaded, it is necessary to extract useful information from the page. This includes information related to the blog or the blogger, such as user profiles and date of creation. This can also include linkage information between two bloggers, such as linkage, commenting, or subscription. Because different blogs may have different formats, it is not a trivial task to extract this information from blogs. Even blogs hosted on the same hosting site could have considerably different formats as they can be easily customized by each blogger. Pattern matching or entity extraction techniques can be applied. For example, rule-based algorithms that rely on hand- crafted rules can be used to extract useful information such approach for blog link analysis. ARTICLE IN PRESS M. Chau, J. Xu / Int. J. Human-Computer Studies 65 (2007) 57–7062 as named entities. The rules may be structural, contextual, or lexical (Krupka and Hausman, 1998). Although such human created rules are usually of high quality, this approach is not scalable to large number of entities and not robust to less structured documents such as blogs. Fortunately, some standard information such as name and location are oftentimes put into specific format (e.g., as a sidebar) in large blog hosting sites, and simple rules should suffice. Nonetheless, different rules may be needed for different blog hosts. Other techniques, such as statistical approach or machine learning techniques, also can be applied if more detailed information needs to be extracted. The information extracted can be stored into database for further analysis. Links extracted can be passed back to the blog spider for further fetching. 4.3. Network analysis Network analysis is a major component in our approach. In this module we propose three types of analysis: topological analysis centrality analysis and community analysis. The goal of topological analysis is to ensure that the network extracted based on links between bloggers is not random and it is meaningful to perform the centrality and community analysis. We use three statistics that are widely used in topological studies to categorize the extracted network (Albert and Barabási, 2002): average shortest path length, clustering coefficient and degree distribution. Aver- age path length is the mean of the all-pair shortest paths in a network. It measures the efficiency of communication between nodes in a network. Clustering coefficient in- dicates how likely nodes in a network form groups or communities. The degree distribution, P(k), is the prob- ability that a node has exactly k links. Another measure related to average path length is the network’s global efficiency, which is defined as the average of the inverses of shortest path lengths over all pairs of nodes in a network (Crucitti et al., 2003). It is shown that a random network usually has a small average path length and is more efficient because an arbitrary node can reach any other node in a few steps. Small-world networks usually have significantly high clustering coefficients than their random network counterparts. Scale-free networks are categorized by a power-law degree distribution, which is different from the Poisson degree distribution presented in random networks. Centrality analysis follows the topological analysis if the extracted network is shown to be a nonrandom network in which node degrees may vary greatly. The goal of centrality analysis is to identify the key nodes in a network. Three traditional centrality measures can be used: degree, betweenness, and closeness (Freeman, 1979). Degree measures how active a particular node is. It is defined as the number of direct links a node has. ‘‘Popular’’ nodes with high degree scores are the leaders, experts, or hubs in a network. It has been shown that these popular nodes can be a network’s ‘‘Archilles’ Heel,’’ whose failure or removal will cause the network to quickly fall apart (Albert et al., 2000; Holme et al., 2002). In the intelligence and security context, the removal of key offenders in a criminal or terrorist network is often an effective disruptive strategy (McAndrew, 1999; Sparrow, 1991). Betweenness measures the extent to which a particular node lies between other nodes in a network. The betweenness of a node is defined as the number of geodesics (shortest paths between two nodes) passing through it. Nodes with high betweenness scores often serve as gatekeepers and brokers between different communities. They are important communication channels through which information, goods, and other resources are transmitted or exchanged (Wasserman and Faust, 1994). The removal of nodes with high betweenness scores can be even more devastating than the removal of nodes with high degrees (Holme et al., 2002). Closeness is the sum of the length of geodesics between a particular node and all the other nodes in a network. A node with low closeness may find it very difficult to communicate with other nodes in the network. Such nodes are thus more ‘‘peripheral’’ and can become outliers in the network (Sparrow, 1991; Xu and Chen, 2005). Community analysis is to identify social groups in a network. In SNA a subset of nodes is considered a community or a social group if nodes in this group have stronger or denser links with nodes within the group than with nodes outside of the group (Wasserman and Faust, 1994). A weighted network in which each link has an associated weight can be partitioned into groups by maximizing the within-group link weights while minimizing between-group link weights. Because the link weight represents node similarity or link strength and intensity, nodes in the same group are more similar to each other or more strongly connected. An unweighted network can be partitioned into groups by maximizing within-group link density while minimizing between-group link density. In this case, groups are densely-knit subsets of the network. Note that community and groups here do not refer to the explicit groups (blogrings). They refer to a subset of nodes which form implicit clusters through various relationships. In these communities, members subscribe to or post comments to each other’s blogs frequently even though they may not belong to the same blogrings. After a network is partitioned into groups, the between- group relationships become composites of links between individual nodes. In SNA, a method called blockmodeling is often used to reveal the patterns of interactions between groups (White et al., 1976). Given groups in a network, blockmodel analysis determines the presence or absence of a relationship between two groups based on the link density (Wasserman and Faust, 1994). When the density of the links between the two groups is greater than a predefined threshold value, a between-group relationship is present, indicating that the two groups interact with each other constantly and thus have a strong relationship. By this means, blockmodeling summarizes individual relational ARTICLE IN PRESS M. Chau, J. Xu / Int. J. Human-Computer Studies 65 (2007) 57–70 63 details into relationships between groups so that the overall structure of the network becomes more prominent. 4.4. Visualization The extracted network and analysis results can be visualized using various types of network layout methods. Two examples are multidimensional scaling (MDS) and graph layout approaches. MDS is the most commonly used method for social network visualization (Freeman, 2000). It is a statistical method that projects higher-dimensional data onto a lower-dimensional display. It seeks to provide a visual representation of proximities (dissimilarities) among nodes so that nodes that are more similar to each other are closer on the display, while nodes that are less similar to each other are further apart (Kruskal and Wish, 1978). Graph layout algorithms have been developed particularly for drawing aesthetically pleasing network presentations (Fruchterman and Reingold, 1991). A type of graph layout algorithm called spring embedder, also known as force-directed method (Davidson and Harel, 1996; Eades, 1984; Fruchterman and Reingold, 1991; Kamada and Kawai, 1989) has been widely used to visualize networks. This algorithm treats a network as an energy system in which steel rings (nodes) are connected by springs (links). Nodes attract and repulse each other and finally settle down when the total energy carried by the springs is minimized. 5. Case study 5.1. Focus and Methods We applied our approach to conduct a case study of hate groups in blogs. As pointed out in our review, hate crimes have been a long-standing problem in the United States and it is important to study the phenomenon of online hate groups on the Internet, particularly in new media such as blogs. We chose to study the hate groups against Blacks. There are two reasons for the focus. First, the nature of hate groups and hate crimes is often dependent on the target ‘‘hated’’ group. By focusing on a type of hate groups it is possible to identify relationships that are more prominent. Second, among different hate crimes, anti- Black hate crimes have been one of the most widely studied (e.g., Burris et al., 2000; Glaser et al., 2002). This allows us to compare our results with previous research in the literature. To keep the study at a manageable size, we limit our study to the blogs on Xanga (www.xanga.com). According to statistics provided by Alexa (2005), Xanga is the second most popular Web site that is primarily devoted to blogs, only after Blogger (www.blogger.com). It is also ranked 17th in traffic (visit popularity) among all Web sites in English. We chose Xanga over Blogger because Xanga has more prominent features to support subscriptions and groups (as blogrings). These features are useful for the identification of hate groups in the blogs and the relation- ships between bloggers. After choosing our focus, we had to identify a set of hate groups on Xanga. We used the search feature in Xanga to semi-automate the task. First, a set of terms related to Black-hatred, such as ‘‘KKK’’, ‘‘niggers’’, ‘‘white pride’’, were identified. We used these terms to search for groups (blogrings) on Xanga that have any of these words in their group name or description. We then checked these groups and filtered out those not related to anti-Black. Groups with only one single member, which were likely to have been formed by one blogger with no one else joining afterwards, were also removed from our list. This resulted in a set of 40 groups. While most of these groups showed some beliefs of racism or White supremacies, we tried to further narrow these down to groups that demonstrated explicit hatred, so as to make sure that our analysis focused on ‘‘hate groups’’. Therefore, we manually checked these groups and only included those that explicitly mentioned hatred (e.g., ‘‘I hate black people’’, ‘‘hate the black race’’) or used offensive languages (e.g., ‘‘nigger beaters’’, four- letter words) towards the Blacks in their group name or description. Finally we had a list of 28 groups. These groups are listed in Table 1. In order to further justify the validity of the list of the 28 groups identified, we tried to compare this list with the ‘‘racist blogs’’ list in the Hate Directory (Franklin, 2005). However, only 14 bloggers (10 hosted on Xanga) were listed in the Hate Directory, and no blogrings were listed. To make the comparison possible, we compared our list with the blogrings that these bloggers belong to. As two out of the 10 bloggers on Xanga were no longer available, we had 8 bloggers for our comparison. We found that all these 8 bloggers are members of at least one of the groups identified in our list. Five of these bloggers are members of ‘‘! White Power !’’, the biggest blogring identified in our list. While the comparison was not direct, it showed that our list of groups had covered all of the racist bloggers listed in the Hate Directory, who were some of the more prominent bloggers. Spiders were used to automatically download the description page and member list of each of these groups. A total of 820 bloggers were identified from these 28 groups. The spiders further downloaded the blogs of each of these bloggers. The extraction program was then executed to extract the information of each blogger, including user id, real name, date of creation, date of birth, city, state, and country. One should note that these data were self-reported; they could be fraud or even missing. The extraction program also analyzed the relationship between these bloggers. In this study, two types of relationships were extracted: 1. Group co-membership: two bloggers belong to the same group (blogring). This is an undirected relationship with an integer weight (based on the number of groups shared by the two bloggers). http://www.xanga.com http://www.blogger.com ARTICLE IN PRESS Table 1 The 28 groups (blogrings) identified in our analysis Blogring name URL No. of members ! White Power ! http://www.xanga.com/groups/group.aspx?id=76863 371 KKK white is right http://www.xanga.com/groups/group.aspx?id=84971 135 The KKK (Ku Klux Klan) http://www.xanga.com/groups/group.aspx?id=164821 67 Are u racist? hate queers and niggers? Me too. http://www.xanga.com/groups/group.aspx?id=191887 67 Angry and White http://www.xanga.com/groups/group.aspx?id=258062 48 ! ! ! !Hatred 4 SoCiEtY! ! ! ! http://www.xanga.com/groups/group.aspx?id=709048 43 ALL NiGgErS sTiNk http://www.xanga.com/groups/group.aspx?id=107296 40 I HATE BLACK PEOPLE http://www.xanga.com/groups/group.aspx?id=525845 37 ::White::Power:: http://www.xanga.com/groups/group.aspx?id=261285 37 Nigger beaters http://www.xanga.com/groups/group.aspx?id=58711 29 WHITE f**kin PRIDE http://www.xanga.com/groups/group.aspx?id=240012 24 KKK WE GONNA KILL THE NIGGERS!!! http://www.xanga.com/groups/group.aspx?id=250810 21 I HATE THE FREAKIN PORCH MONKEYS http://www.xanga.com/groups/group.aspx?id=1066584 14 White-power http://www.xanga.com/groups/group.aspx?id=1244436 9 ** WHITE POWER NATION ** http://www.xanga.com/groups/group.aspx?id=1298240 8 N I G G E R S L A Y E R http://www.xanga.com/groups/group.aspx?id=1184100 7 K.K.K. MEMBERS http://www.xanga.com/groups/group.aspx?id=1447382 5 The ‘‘i like to beat negros and mexicans’’ blog rin http://www.xanga.com/groups/group.aspx?id=387326 5 Honor+The+Ku+Klux+Klan http://www.xanga.com/groups/group.aspx?id=323614 4 THE REAL KU KLUX KLAN http://www.xanga.com/groups/group.aspx?id=1315712 4 Dj aNDIE http://www.xanga.com/groups/group.aspx?id=794267 4 I hate G-Unit http://www.xanga.com/groups/group.aspx?id=916827 4 **�I Hate negros�** http://www.xanga.com/groups/group.aspx?id=1470409 4 Niggerzsmellfunny http://www.xanga.com/groups/group.aspx?id=317512 4 Ku Klux Klan_White Knights Of America http://www.xanga.com/groups/group.aspx?id=1014877 3 ‘*�NEGRO HATERS�*’ http://www.xanga.com/groups/group.aspx?id=325247 2 Black Haters and Negro Hangers http://www.xanga.com/groups/group.aspx?id=1401428 2 | | | | | I HATE N1GGERS | | | | | http://www.xanga.com/groups/group.aspx?id=1733297 2 M. Chau, J. Xu / Int. J. Human-Computer Studies 65 (2007) 57–7064 2. Subscription: blogger A subscribes to blogger B. This is a directed, binary relationship. The first type of relationship (group co-membership) assumes that two bloggers are related as long as they join the same blogring. Co-membership relationship is impor- tant as it often reflects that the two bloggers involved have similar belief or ideology. The resulting network based on such relationships consisted of several fully-connected cliques. Each clique corresponded to a blogring, in which each node was connected with every other node. This made the nodes indistinguishable from each other in terms of degrees. Thus, we included in our network only co- membership links whose weight was greater than one. That is, we considered a co-membership link between two bloggers a valid link only if they shared memberships of at least two common groups. For the second type of relationship, we included all subscription links. Subscrip- tion link is important because it means that the subscriber is interested in reading the subscribed blogs. It suggests that there is an information flow between the two individuals. 5.2. Analysis and results After collecting the blogs and extracting information from them, we performed demographical and network analysis on the data set in order to reveal the characteristics of these groups and ascertain whether any patterns exist. Visualization was then applied to present the results. We discuss the details of our analysis in the following sections. 5.2.1. Demographical analysis We provide a brief summary of the demographical information of the bloggers of interest and the growth patterns of the blog space of hate groups. As in many other Internet-based media such as forums and chat rooms, the real identities of bloggers are unknown. Thus, the self- reported demographical information of bloggers is subject to the problems of anonymity. However, since blogs are often personal online diaries many bloggers still choose to release partial information about their demographics such as gender and country. Many bloggers even post their personal photos on their blogs making the true gender information accessible, assuming the photos are really those of the bloggers themselves. Among the 820 bloggers in our data set, 659 explicitly indicate their gender. Sixty three percent of them are male and 37% are female. These bloggers are from various countries. Among the 529 bloggers who explicitly report the country information, 81.9% are from the United States. The two next countries are Germany and Afghani- stan, taking on 2.6% and 2.1%, respectively. The remain- ing 13.4% of bloggers are from 43 other countries. It can be seen that hate groups are dominated by male bloggers from the United States. However, we are aware that this http://www.xanga.com/groups/group.aspx?id=76863 http://www.xanga.com/groups/group.aspx?id=84971 http://www.xanga.com/groups/group.aspx?id=164821 http://www.xanga.com/groups/group.aspx?id=191887 http://www.xanga.com/groups/group.aspx?id=258062 http://www.xanga.com/groups/group.aspx?id=709048 http://www.xanga.com/groups/group.aspx?id=107296 http://www.xanga.com/groups/group.aspx?id=525845 http://www.xanga.com/groups/group.aspx?id=261285 http://www.xanga.com/groups/group.aspx?id=58711 http://www.xanga.com/groups/group.aspx?id=240012 http://www.xanga.com/groups/group.aspx?id=250810 http://www.xanga.com/groups/group.aspx?id=1066584 http://www.xanga.com/groups/group.aspx?id=1244436 http://www.xanga.com/groups/group.aspx?id=1298240 http://www.xanga.com/groups/group.aspx?id=1184100 http://www.xanga.com/groups/group.aspx?id=1447382 http://www.xanga.com/groups/group.aspx?id=387326 http://www.xanga.com/groups/group.aspx?id=323614 http://www.xanga.com/groups/group.aspx?id=1315712 http://www.xanga.com/groups/group.aspx?id=794267 http://www.xanga.com/groups/group.aspx?id=916827 http://www.xanga.com/groups/group.aspx?id=1470409 http://www.xanga.com/groups/group.aspx?id=317512 http://www.xanga.com/groups/group.aspx?id=1014877 http://www.xanga.com/groups/group.aspx?id=325247 http://www.xanga.com/groups/group.aspx?id=1401428 http://www.xanga.com/groups/group.aspx?id=1733297 ARTICLE IN PRESS M. Chau, J. Xu / Int. J. Human-Computer Studies 65 (2007) 57–70 65 finding is based on the problematic source of demographic information. The actual distribution of gender and country may be different. Nevertheless, this finding provides the evidence that the Internet and blogs have become convenient media for hate groups to penetrate into different countries and regions. The anti-Black ideology and Black-hatred groups are no longer unique to specific Western countries but have the potential to reach international audience. This finding is consistent with previous studies on online hate groups (Burris et al., 2000; Gerstenfeld et al., 2003). For example, Burris et al. (2000) found that the Internet had made it possible and rather easy for white supremacist groups to form a transnational cyber-community via hyperlinks between their Web sites. We also analyzed the growth of the hate group blogs over the years. Unlike demographical information, the exact time when a blogger registered on the blog hosting site (Xanga) is recorded by the server and thus is generally not subject to fraud. Fig. 2 presents the growth of the number of bloggers who registered on and joined the anti- Black blogrings since the first quarter of 2002. The number increased steadily between 2003 and the third quarter of 2004 and started to fluctuate since the forth quarter of 2004. This may be because some bloggers who have recently registered have not joined those popular blogrings or have not formed into large communities. As a result, some of them were not included in the data set after we filtered the raw data. Fig. 2 implies that hate groups have been gaining popularity in blog space over years as more and more individual bloggers joined these groups. Such a trend should not be underestimated because the ideas, beliefs, and opinions advocated by racists and extremists may pose potential threats to the society. More impor- tantly, if more youths join these anti-Black blogrings, they can be influenced by the ideology easily and become future 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 1/ 20 02 3/ 20 02 4/ 20 02 1/ 20 03 2/ 20 03 3/ 20 03 4/ 20 03 1/ 20 04 2/ 20 04 3/ 20 04 4/ 20 04 1/ 20 05 2/ 20 05 3/ 20 05 Time (Quarter) N u m b e r o f B lo g g e rs R e g is tr e d Fig. 2. The number of hate-group bloggers registered over the years. Table 2 The topological properties of the giant component (number in the parenthese Average shortest path length Giant component 3.62 Random counterpart 2.89 (0.03) members of extremist organizations. As extremist organi- zations gain more members, popularity, and powers, their advocated illegal activities and crimes would substantially hamper the stability of the society. 5.2.2. Topological analysis When analyzing the topology of the network, we ignored the weight of co-membership relationship and the direction of subscription. We connected two nodes (bloggers) if they belonged to at least two common groups or one subscribed to the other. As a result, there could only be at most one link between a pair of nodes. The resulting network was an unweighted, undirected network consisting of 1193 links. This network was not a connected graph in that it consisted of several disjoint components, between which no link existed. The largest connected component, often called a giant component in graph theory (Bollobás, 1985), contained 273 nodes connected by 1115 links. This giant component was a rather dense graph with an average node degree of 8.2. We performed topological analysis for the giant compo- nent. Table 2 provides the statistics of the average shortest path length, global efficiency, and clustering coefficient. To compare the giant component with its random graph counterpart, we generated 30 random networks consisting of the same number of nodes (273) and links (1115) with the giant component. The resulting statistics are also reported in Table 2. It shows that the giant component is slightly less efficient than its random graph counterpart. On average, a node in the giant component must take 0.75 more steps than in the random graph to reach another arbitrary node. Although it is less efficient than a random network, the giant component is indeed an efficient network. It takes a blogger no more than four steps (three intermediate bloggers) to reach another arbitrary one among the 273 bloggers. This short path length has an important implication to the diffusion and communication of information in the network. In other words, new ideas, opinions, beliefs, and propaganda can be quickly distrib- uted among the bloggers in the network, making it easier for bloggers to influence each other. Moreover, the giant component has a significantly higher clustering coefficient, which is 31 times more than its random graph counterpart. This implies that the giant component is a small world, in which densely-knit communities are very likely to exist. Communities have also been observed in other online media of hate groups. For example, Burris et al. (2000) found that there was a community of Holocaust Revisionist Web sites, consisting s are standard deviations) Global efficiency Clustering coefficient 0.33 0.37 0.37 (0.00) 0.03 (0.00) ARTICLE IN PRESS 0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 k p ( k ) Fig. 3. The degree distribution of the giant component. M. Chau, J. Xu / Int. J. Human-Computer Studies 65 (2007) 57–7066 of 11 sites connected by dense hyperlinks. A community plays an important role in reinforcing the interests and beliefs of its members, and helps create a ‘‘collective identity’’ (Gerstenfeld et al., 2003). By comparing with other members in the community, one may feel that his/her extremism ideas and beliefs are shared by many other people and thus are not extreme at all. The degree distribution of the giant component seems to follow a power-law distribution (see Fig. 3). The most distinctive feature of a power-law distribution curve is its long tail for large degree (k), which is significantly different from a bell-shaped Poisson distribution. The long tail indicates that a small number of nodes in the network have a large number of links and they are the ‘‘centers’’ of the network. Actually, the power-law degree distribution manifests the ‘‘rich-get-richer’’ phenomenon (Albert and Barabási, 2002), where nodes with many links are more capable of attracting links. If a blogger has many subscribers, he/she may attract more bloggers to visit, make comments on, and subscribe to his/her blog. Such a blogger become an ‘‘authoritative’’ (Kleinberg, 1998) and influential leader in the network. His/her beliefs and even advocated crimes could influence more people faster. On the other hand, a blogger subscribing to many other bloggers can appear as a ‘‘hub’’ that serves as a pointer and channel to many other bloggers including those central, influential leaders. 5.2.3. SNA and visualization We used a prototype system we developed (Xu and Chen, 2005) to find the central nodes and to identify the communities. The system has a graphical user interface to facilitate interaction between users and the system (see Fig. 4). The user interface visualizes the network and presents the results of social network analysis. In the visualization, each node represents a blogger. A straight line connecting two nodes indicates that the two corre- sponding bloggers either co-register in more than one blogring, or one blogger subscribes to the other. Note that the directions of subscription links are not shown. The layout of the network is determined using the MDS method. In order to position nodes which are likely to belong to the same community close to each other on the display, we assigned each link an ‘‘edge clustering coefficient’’, which measures the likelihood of two incident nodes of the link to form a cluster (Radicchi et al., 2004). The community analysis can be performed by adjusting the ‘‘level of abstraction’’ slider at the bottom of the panel. At the lowest level of abstraction, each individual node and link are presented. As the abstraction level increases, the system employs hierarchical clustering method to gradually merge nodes, which are connected by links of high edge clustering coefficients. When the highest abstraction level is reached, the whole giant component becomes a big community. At any level of abstraction, a circle represents a community. The size of the circle is proportional to the number of bloggers in the community. Straight lines connecting circles represent between-group relationships, which are extracted using blockmodel analysis. The thickness of a line is proportional to the density of the links between the two corresponding communities. Fig. 4(a) presents the giant component at its lowest abstraction level. The bloggers who have the highest degree and betweenness scores are highlighted and labeled with their usernames. These bloggers are those who may participate in multiple blogrings or have many subscription relationships with other bloggers. It is interesting to see that in addition to joining explicit groups (blogrings), bloggers have also formed implicit communities through co-membership and subscription. Three circles of nodes are apparently communities in which bloggers share many common memberships. The communities found by the system (see Fig. 4(c)) also confirm this pattern. The two circles indicate that at least two big communities exist among the bloggers. Moreover, the two communities also interact with each other very actively, as represented by the thick line between the two circles. Because the communities can be analyzed at different levels, the two big communities may consist of smaller communities. For example, the inner structure of the bigger community shows that two smaller circles of nodes, which may also be communities, exist in the community (see Fig. 4(d)). The Fig. 4(d) also displays at the right-hand side of the screen the rankings of the community members in terms of their centrality scores within the specific commu- nity. These three centrality measures are interpreted as the leader role, gatekeeper role, and outlier role. Therefore, a blogger which ranks the highest in degree in the community would likely be the centers of the community. Actually, these central bloggers may be either authoritative leaders or hubs. The leaders with many in-links from subscribers can spread their beliefs and opinions to many of their subscribers; and the hubs with many out-links may facilitate such a spread of influence by directing their visitors to the leaders via subscription links. To separate the co-membership links and subscription links we also present the network with only subscription links in Fig. 4(b). Comparing Fig. 4(a) and (b) one can see that among the five highlighted nodes, two bloggers (the upper right one and the lower left one) stand out due to ARTICLE IN PRESS Fig. 4. The prototype system for SNA and visualization. (a) The giant component with both co-membership and subscription links. The highlighted nodes are those who have large degree or betweenness scores. (b) The giant component with only subscription links. Note that the directions of subscription are omitted. (c) The two major communities found in the network. (d) The inner structure of a community which is represented by the large circle in (c). M. Chau, J. Xu / Int. J. Human-Computer Studies 65 (2007) 57–70 67 their large number of subscription links. Because the system interface does not show the directions of the subscription links it is difficult to visually determine whether they are leaders or hubs. By calculating the in- degree and the out-degree of these nodes, we found that they were actually hubs who subscribed to many other blogs. In general, it is worth a closer look at the bloggers with many subscribers and a high in-degree. A content analysis on their blogs may reveal whether they are actually popular leaders who often express extremism ideas, beliefs, and opinions. Because such ideologies may easily be spread among and influence their subscribers, these bloggers need to be closely monitored. On the other hand, the hubs with a high out-degree should also be paid attention since they may be intermediate channels leading to the extremism ideologies. In addition, although the network in Fig. 4(b) is not as dense as the one in Fig. 4(a), some part of the network is still rather dense indicating a tendency for forming communities. Interestingly, the upper right highlighted node seems to be a joining point that holds a community around it. This further implies that hubs, although they may not be leaders, can be important communication channels. 5.3. Discussion In this section we compare our findings with previous studies while providing answers to our research questions regarding online hate groups. Specifically, we choose to compare with the findings in Burris et al. (2000), primarily because among the limited number of studies on online hate groups, this article studies this social movement from a social network perspective. The authors focused on the structural properties of the Web site networks among white supremacist groups, making it appropriate for us to align and compare our findings with theirs. a. What are the structural properties of the social networks of bloggers in the hate groups? Similar to the network of white supremacist Web sites (Burris et al., 2000), the network of bloggers in hate groups is decentralized. The data set contains a number of isolated clusters and a giant component consisting of roughly one third of the bloggers. Centralized structures such as star and hierarchical ones are not observed in the network. This is not out of our expectation because the hate groups under study were mostly formed spontaneously. They have not evolved into organizations or associations with formal organizational structure. ARTICLE IN PRESS M. Chau, J. Xu / Int. J. Human-Computer Studies 65 (2007) 57–7068 b. Are there bloggers who stand out as leaders of influence in these groups? Burris et al. (2000) found that the decentralized white supremacist groups had different centers of influence. Our analysis shows that there are some bloggers who are connected with many others through common membership and subscription. These bloggers may be either leaders of opinions and ideologies or hubs of communication. Both types of center require closer analysis and examination. c. What is the community structure in these groups? Communities, represented by densely-knit clusters of Web sites in Burris et al. (2000), are also present in the blogger network. However, these communities are not composed of Web sites but individual bloggers. Com- munities provide an environment for its members to exchange their ideas and opinions and reinforce the shared ideology. A community becomes the collective social identity of its members and is potential of facilitating the communication and collaboration among its members to carry out illegal activities and crimes. In addition, we observed that the two commu- nities identified are closely connected. It suggests that members of these communities may share common ideologies and interests, and it is not unlikely that they will merge as a larger community in the future. d. What do the structural properties suggest about the organization of the hate groups? As mentioned in point (a), the structure of the network suggests that the hate groups in blogosphere have not formed into centralized organizations. However, it does not eliminate the possibility that these groups may help prepare future members for extremist organizations such as the Ku Klux Klan. Especially, their influence on youths should not be underestimated. e. What are the social and political implications of these properties? Burris et al. (2000) commented that extremist groups are a type of social movement which has profound social and political implications. At this stage of our study we cannot find any evidence that the bloggers in hate groups are affiliated with any political entities or associations. Indeed, there has not been any group that takes a form of organization. However, we do find that the hate groups are gaining popularity among bloggers as more and more individuals join the groups. In addition, these hate groups also show transnational characteristics, meaning that hatred and hate-related illegal activities are not a problem to a particular country or region but an international phenomenon. Such a movement should not be over- looked and ignored by authorities, researchers, and other watchdog organizations such as the Hate Direc- tory (Franklin, 2005). 6. Conclusion and future directions In this paper, we have discussed the problems of the emergence of hate groups and racism in blogs. Our contributions are twofold. First, we have proposed a semi-automated approach for blog analysis. Our approach consists of a set of Web mining and network analysis techniques that can be applied to the study of blogosphere. Such techniques as network topology analysis, which has not been employed in blog or hate group related research, are proposed and have been demonstrated useful and relevant in this context. While the approach has been proposed and studied in the context of hate group analysis, we have tried to keep the approach general such that it is not specific to such analysis. We believe that the approach can also be applied to other domains that involve virtual community analysis and mining, which we believe would be an increasingly important field for various applications. These applications include not only other security infor- matics research such as bioterrorism (Raghu and Vinze, In Press) but also other applications such as marketing analysis and business intelligence analysis (Chau et al., 2005a,b). Second, we applied this approach to investigate the characteristic and structural relationships among the hate groups in blogs in our case study. Hatred and hate groups are a type of social movement which should not be ignored in today’s information age. Extremist groups are using the Internet to disseminate their propaganda, spread their ideologies, and recruit new members. These groups have also been present in Blogs, a new online communication and publication tool, thereby posing threat to our society. However, there has not been much research on this movement. We believe that our research is timely and important to the security of society. By disseminating both explicit and implicit hatred messages through blogs, racists can easily target youths with ubiquitous coverage— basically anyone who has access to the Internet—that was never possible in the past. Youths are often easily influenced by these messages and could eventually become terrorists and pose a threat to our society (Blazak, 2001). Our study not only has provided an approach that could facilitate the analysis of law enforcement and social workers in studying and monitoring such activities, but also has brought insights into the structural properties of online hate groups and helped broaden and deepen our understanding of such a social movement. In the future, we will extend our study in three major directions to address some limitations of the current study. First, the current study only investigated the hate group activities on one single blog site, Xanga. Although Xanga has been reported to have the most number of blogs associated with hate groups (Franklin, 2005), a further study that includes other popular sites such as Blogger would be more comprehensive. Second, only two types of relationships, namely co-membership and subscription, were considered in the present study. It would be interesting to expand our study to include other types of relationships, such as commenting and hyperlinking, in the network analysis. Inclusion of these relationships could reveal other implicit linkages among the bloggers. Third, ARTICLE IN PRESS M. Chau, J. Xu / Int. J. Human-Computer Studies 65 (2007) 57–70 69 in-depth content analysis can be performed on blogs. Important nodes identified by the current approach can be further analyzed using text mining techniques such as co- occurrence analysis or entity extraction (Chau et al., 2002). Such analysis will help further unveil online hate groups. 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work_a7vn3vmodncihpsdcpw7yd2ppi	----	Including and involving young people (under 18’s) in hate research without the consent of parents PICKLES, James Available from Sheffield Hallam University Research Archive (SHURA) at: http://shura.shu.ac.uk/23591/ This document is the author deposited version. You are advised to consult the publisher's version if you wish to cite from it. Published version PICKLES, James (2019). Including and involving young people (under 18’s) in hate research without the consent of parents. Qualitative Research. Copyright and re-use policy See http://shura.shu.ac.uk/information.html Sheffield Hallam University Research Archive http://shura.shu.ac.uk http://shura.shu.ac.uk/ http://shura.shu.ac.uk/information.html 1 Abstract This article provides a reflection on the ethical challenges faced when seeking ethical approval to include young people in a research project examining LGBT+ ‘hate’ experiences. I outline the ethical parameters constructed when attempting to recruit under 18’s into the project and justify the rationale for doing so. I detail how ethical approval was gained and reflect on the safeguards put in place to protect young participants. The methodological position adopted took a youth affirmative outlook, premised on enabling and championing the autonomy and agency of young people. Traditional ethical guidelines maintain that parental consent is required to include young people within sensitive research. Seeking parental consent placed young participants in a position of greater risk than what would occur during participation. Parental consent was not sought for young people to participate, nor were they informed about the involvement of their children in the project. This article provides justifications on rejecting the notion that parental consent is the only means for youth inclusion, and details how young people were empowered during participation. I argue that young people should not be instinctively excluded from sensitive research but should be actively enabled by minimising but not eradicating possible and potential risk. Introduction Although there is a greater level of attention being drawn on conducting socially conscious research with diverse, minority, and vulnerable populations, there is relatively little literature on how academic scholarship and practitioner based research intersect to actively enable these populations to participate in research (Martin and Meezan, 2009). This articles draws on a study, exploring anti-LGBT+ hate crime among voluntary sector community and social groups across the North East of England, by examining the ethical hurdles that faced when conducting this research. More specifically the ethical ramifications and obstacles of 2 including young LGBT+ people, 13-18 years old, in qualitative research – a frequently neglected demographic within social scientific disciplines (Allen, 2008; Chabot, et al., 2012) – is scrutinised. Whilst carrying out this study, I sought to understand the sociality of hate experiences, by identifying how LGBT+ people, of all ages, negotiated, navigated, and reconciled the identities for which they were victimised. Within this remit I decided, partly due to my paid job as an LGBT+ youth worker, to include LGBT+ young people, aged 13-18, in order to explore how youth identities influenced hate experiences. Criminological literature within the field of hate crime demonstrates that coming into contact with hate and homo-bi-trans- queerphobic experiences is a significant social issue for LGBT+ people (see Moran, 2004; 2008; Browne, et al., 2011; Gay British Crime Survey, 2013). Similar to other forms of interpersonal violence, sexuality and victimised experiences often intersect within intimate environments such as the home, neighbourhoods, workplaces, and educational settings where perpetrators are neighbours, friends, colleagues, and family members (Moran, 2018). Far too frequently however, ‘hate’ within social research is framed as an adult-centric process in juxtaposition with school based victimisation – bullying (Espelage and Swearer, 2008; Warwick and Aggleton, 2014) – of LGBT+ youth. This article addresses this gap in adult-centric social research whilst acknowledging that the nature of sensitive research presents many ethical obstacles that discourage or prevent social researchers from including young people. Throughout I argue that the ethical challenges of including young people should not be discouraging for social researchers. This article provides suggestions of how social researchers can actively enable rather than disable or prevent young people from participating in sensitive research, in the ‘safest’ ways possible, relative to their situation. 3 This article is used to reflect on the ethical ramifications that arose during the process of conducting research for the LGBT+ hate crime project. Below, an outline of the project, its aims, scope, and theoretical considerations, is presented. Following this, previous sexuality research is reviewed in order to discuss the ethics of conducting sensitive research with non- heterosexual people. The decision to involve young people without the consent of their parents is then discussed. Finally I reflect on the multitude of ethical ramifications that arose when conducting the LGBT+ project, pertinent to the young people involved, and outline the specific steps taken to ensure the safety and protection of young participants. The Project Whilst there is now extensive research on LGBT+ youth experiences of homophobia, biphobia, and transphobia (Birkett, et al., 2009; DePalma and Atkinson, 2010; DePalma and Jennett, 2010; Dragowski, et al., 2011; Little, 2001) this research is often quantitative in nature and circumscribed to the schooling or educational setting. This is not without merit however as the latest Stonewall School Report (2017) found that 45% of LGB students, 11- 19 years old, are bullied for their sexuality within the British schooling system; this includes 64% of trans pupils (Bradlow, et al., 2017). However, there is little empirical, qualitative research that includes young LGBT+ people around these issues and even less research that bridges experiences of hate crime with experiences of school based bullying. Stonewall's own research even separates the two types of experiences (see Bachmann and Gooch, 2017). The impact of victimisation for LGBT+ people, of all ages, can be significant. This can include posttraumatic stress symptoms (Dragowski, et al., 2011) such as not being able to cope with stressful life events; internalised homophobia, where the hostility directed towards LGBT+ individuals is internalised and turned into self-hate, directed at one’s own sexuality or gender expression (Flowers and Buston, 2001); and increased risk of suicide ideation and self-injury (Herba, et al., 2008), amongst others. 4 The aim of my project was to qualitatively explore how LGBT+ people, of all ages, experienced hate crime – how they negotiated, navigated, and reconciled their hate experiences – towards their identities. LGBT+ people were recruited from community organisations and youth groups across the North East of England. Youth and community groups that were LGBT+ exclusive, with services dedicated to LGBT+ individuals, were therefore targeted. These groups were exclusionary to straight identifying people as users have to be LGBT+ and above the age of 13. My overall sample group (n=23) contained four young people who were under the age of 18; the youngest being 14 years old. Specific steps and safeguards were put in place for these four individuals which will be detailed later in this article. These individuals were bifurcated into two groups: Under 16s (n=2) and 16-18s (n=2). Parental consent was not sought for these participants so as to avoid ‘outing’ and revealing their identities to their parents. It should be emphasised now, for the benefit of points raised later in this article, that these individuals identified as LGBT+, were aware of their sexuality and gender, and attended LGBT+ specific youth groups. Although the bulk of the interview data for the project was conducted with adults, I will focus specifically on the rationale to include LGBT+ young people aged 16-18 and ethically justify how and why they were included into the research. I will then provide additional ethical discussion for how and why young people, under the age of 16, were enabled to participate in this research. Sexuality Research and Ethics Ethical obligations and standards that are applied to sexuality research, specifically research involving people as participants, have advanced significantly from the mid-1900’s. Indeed, previous research on sexuality – historically, research that medicalised (homo)sexuality – violates many contemporary ethical principles (Martin and Meezan, 2009). The medicalised approach to sexuality caused many harms and injustices towards LGBT+ participants and the communities they belonged. Previous studies attempted to eliminate homosexuality by 5 evaluating the effectiveness of chemical castration (Bremer, 1959), electric shock therapy of homosexual ‘deviants’ (Owensby, 1941), and aversion and apomorphine therapy (Callahan and Cameron, 1973) causing vomiting when aroused. Thus, there is vast historical evidence that research on sexuality pathologised non-heterosexuality causing physical, psychological, and emotional harm towards, often unwilling and non-consenting, participants. The social disciplines have also employed questionable research methodologies towards LGBT+ populations. The most prolific of which is Humphreys’ (1970) Tearoom Trade. Laud Humphreys (1970) covertly observed men engage in same-sex behaviour in outdoor toilets (tearooms), without the consent of participants. This was not the most deceptive technique employed however. Following these observations, Humphreys obtained the license plates of the men that he had observed in order to gain access to their home addresses. He then went to their home address and under false pretences asked them to participate in interviews about their personal lives. Although this invaded the participants’ privacy, he did not breach their confidentiality by releasing this information, protecting parts of their anonymity. The study is iconic for shedding light on a stigmatised issue without bringing direct physical and emotional harm to participants. Further, it exposed the levels of blackmail and corruption amongst police officers, who threatened to expose and ‘out’ men engaging in tearoom behaviour. Thus, it can be argued that the overall benefits here outweighed the potential harms. This overall methodological approach however is, by contemporary standards, profoundly unethical due to its covert approach, invasion of privacy, and risk of harm to participants. In an attempt to move away from the harms caused by studies such as these, there is increasing acknowledgement within the social disciplines of the importance of ethical parameters to safeguard both participants and researchers from harm. I will therefore briefly outline the British Sociological Association's (BSA) most recent ethical guidance on safeguarding participants. When conducting research, the BSA (2017: 5) argues that 6 12. Sociologists have a responsibility to ensure that the physical, social and psychological well-being of research participants is not adversely affected by the research. They should strive to protect the rights of those they study, their interests, sensitivities and privacy, while recognising the difficulty of balancing potentially conflicting interests. However, Martin and Meezan (2009) outline that contemporary ethical guidelines offer very little guidance over the unique dilemmas that may come about when researching sexuality. Indeed, LGBT+ people are at a heightened risk of experiencing violence and discrimination (Birkett, et al., 2009; Bradlow, et al., 2017; Browne, et al., 2011; Chakraborti and Garland, 2015; Dragowski, et al., 2011; Dunbar, 2006; Gay British Crime Survey, 2013; Meyer, 2010; Moran, 2004; Moran, 2008; Pierce, 2001; Stanko and Curry, 1997; Willis, 2004). As such, research around non-heterosexuality, with queer participants, always takes place within this context of structural and societal oppression. Martin and Meezan (2009) posit that the risks of harm to LGBT+ participants are therefore likely to be magnified. Specific risks such as ‘outing’, reproducing heterosexist and binary biases of gender and sexuality, exposing participants to heterosexual dominated environments, and homogenising all LGBT+ people as an identical collective are particularly pertinent and specific to sexuality research. During the conduct of this project, it was the intention to remain reflexive throughout, with the purpose of being mindful of the unique risks that may occur to LGBT+ people. A central component to this reflexivity was to reflect consistently on my own gendered and sexual biases, as an LGBT+ person raised in a heteronormative society. LGBT+ communities are so diverse even personal knowledge of being LGBT+ does not make one an expert into all areas of queer identity. A black, trans 1 , lesbian may have a different experience and by default a different layering of ethical hurdles than a white, cisgender 2 , gay man. 1 Transgender: an umbrella term to describe individuals with a gender identity different to the one they were given at birth 2 People with the gender identity they were assigned at birth; not transgender. 7 Due to the heightened risk of harm, LGBT+ people – and by default research on sexuality – are considered vulnerable. The BSA (2017: 6) advises that ‘special care should be taken where research participants are particularly vulnerable by virtue of factors such as age, disability, their physical or mental health.’ The type of ‘special care’ that is required is contextual and nuanced, particularly when age is a significant variable. It is the secondary aim of this article to provide a coherent guideline, based on the project outlined, on how to include young LGBT+ people. Roffee and Waling (2017) have provided researchers with clear suggestions on how to resolve ethical challenges when researching LGBTIQ (sic) populations. These include allowing participants to self-select and label their sexualities and gender identities, so as not to assign, misgender, or promote a heterosexist paradigm. Indeed, they found that a broad range of sexualities and gender identities were used by participants, such as agender, pansexual, androgynous, masc/femme, and curious as opposed to traditional lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender categories. In cases of sensitive information being disclosed, such as homophobic harassment, Roffee and Waling (2017: 15) found that anonymously disclosing some of their data to participants was ‘an overriding benefit to the participant in knowing that there were others like them on campus.’ For example, letting participants know that other participants felt the same way as they did, indicating that they were not the only ones with these experiences, created a sense of shared identity. Although these are useful insights into sexuality research on LGBT+ people, there is a significant gap in the discourse on ethics around young LGBT+ people who face additional challenges. The BSA (2017: 6) for example highlights: 30. Research involving children requires particular care. The consent of the child should be sought in addition to that of the parent. Researchers should use their skills to provide information that could be understood by the child, and their judgement to decide on the child´s capacity to understand what is being proposed. Specialist advice and expertise should be sought where relevant. 8 However, Elze (2009) argues that requiring parental consent for LGBT+ youth who were not ‘out’ to their parents and come from abusive and homophobic households, would compromise the welfare and safety of younger participants. Thus, the informed consent of minors should take precedence. However, youth researchers are becoming increasingly critical towards the concept of informed consent for young people, preferring to use the terms informed assent/informed dissent. Assent indicates that a minor's approval of the project is sufficient. With this approach young people do not have to fulfil adult-centric frameworks of 'maturity', 'competence', and 'completeness' (Fargas-Malet, et al., 2010). For example, children with learning difficulties or very young children may not fully comprehend the concept of a research project or data collection, but may express an interest in the topic being researched. Informed dissent refers to participants being able to consciously reject or engage with questions and activities (Bourke and Loveridge, 2014). However, 'in English Law, "competent minors" under 16 can give valid consent, with "competence" being defined as having sufficient understanding and intelligence to understand what is being proposed' (Flewitt, 2005: 555). Thus, there are no simple, prescriptive techniques that can be employed to gain informed 'consent' from minors (Bourke and Loveridge, 2014). Methodologically, all minors are arguably able to affirm whether they agree or disagree (assent and dissent), providing that researchers remain reflexive towards how they inform young people sufficiently. In line with Elze (2009) I did not ask for parental consent for young people, under the age of 18, to participate in the hate crime project. I will justify the reasons for this and outline how this ethical challenge was resolved, later. Scenarios such as these are very difficult to negotiate with such broad guidelines such as those provided by the BSA. Ultimately, research that is carried out within the capacity of a university researcher, such as myself, must go through a university ethics review panel. 9 University ethics review panels are designed to protect the researcher, the institution to which the researcher is affiliated, and the participants that will be recruited in the research, from direct and indirect harm. Ethics committees now have a duty to scrutinise the manner in which findings will be used and ensure that they are not used to promote negative and malevolent stereotypes of minority groups, such as LGBT+ people. Historically this has included Bieber and colleagues (1962) pro-conversion study and Cameron and colleagues (Cameron and Cameron, 1996; Cameron, et al., 1985) research on alleged harm caused to pupils by homosexual teachers. Indeed, Herek (1998) emphasises that these studies have been used to promote the stigma of LGBT+ people as diseased, perverted, and predatory towards other members of society. They have also been used to prevent anti-discrimination laws and to block gay men and lesbians from fostering or adopting. Against the backdrop of these historical ethical violations carried out by sexuality research, Tufford, et al. (2012: 222-3) argue that past ‘ethical failures to protect research participants may propagate overly protective stances by some ethics boards that unwittingly manifest stigma against LGB populations and present undue obstacles to potentially important scientific research.’ Indeed, it is acknowledged by Dingwall (2008) that ethics boards have blocked many research projects due to this risk adverse standpoint. The legitimacy of having an ethics review process is generally accepted however (see Calvey, 2017) as a negotiation process one undertakes prior to research commencing. Certainly, when applying for ethical approval for the hate crime project I was met with resistance from colleagues who asked me warily how young people ‘know’ that they are gay or trans. Senior researchers advised me that they thought I would cause young people harm by talking to them about their sexuality and gender. These biased attitudes towards youth (queer) sexuality silenced any logical justification I gave of recruiting self-declared LGBT+ young people from youth groups that were specifically LGBT+ exclusive. This strong advice 10 from colleagues, to exclude under 18’s from my sample, was an act that marginalise youth narratives further and promotes unfounded, yet unintentional, prejudices towards youth sexuality. Similarly, Tufford et al. (2012) posit that biases such as these can be held by members of ethics committees which can shape the overall ethics process that sexuality research is concerned with. It is therefore important to scrutinise whether these biases of assumed risk to participants are grounded in tangible or real world harms or whether they are rooted in latent prejudices towards non-heterosexuals, specifically queer young people. After several two-way responses between myself and ethics panel members – who were very helpful throughout this process – I was cleared to conduct my research for the project. Catch 22: Outing Ethics panels usually require researchers to obtain parental consent to include participants who are under the legal age; in the United Kingdom this is 18. Contrary to this standard practice, under 18’s were included in the project, without parental consent or knowledge. Disclosing the identities of LGBT+ young people to their parents could have placed them at an increased risk of harm. Indeed, young LGBT+ people are at an increased risk of experiencing hostility and violence from homophobic/transphobic parents (Morrow, 2004), including being made homeless by unaccepting parents (The Albert Kennedy Trust, 2015). There is also evidence to suggest that young people experience internal/emotional distress caused by the uncertainty of acceptance or rejection from parents, stemming from the coming out process (Meyer, 2003; Saltzberg, 2004). Taylor (2008) affirms that holding parental consent as a holy grail to youth participation niavely assumes that all parents are to be trusted to make the best or even good decisions for their children. Ethics panels therefore risk violating their own ethical principles when requiring parental consent, in all cases, by forcing young people to put themselves in greater dangerous or high risk scenarios in order to participate. 11 The ethics committee who approved this research understood that the standard of parental consent for participants would potentially put them in greater harm. The committee recognised that 'it is not always possible to conduct research with youngsters where they may not wish their parents to know they are taking part (for example, projects involving underage smokers)' (Northumbria University, 2016/17: 35). However, they suggested that an adult, associated with the young person, could act as a guardian in loco parentis for the purpose of signing consent agreements. The adult could be present to support the young person should they become distressed. Critics may argue that having a second adult present does not automatically make the research ethically sound, as it may reinforce that young people are not independent from adults. There are times however when a second adult is required to protect young people. For example, it is suggested that male general practitioners have a second female adult present - a chaperone - when they are intimately examining young female patients (General Medical Council, 2013). Although one can consider that young people may talk more openely with an outsider, there are also safeguards that need to be maintained, particularly when unknown outsiders seek to research young people. Further, Balen and colleages' (2006) found that research ethics committees only permit research with minors when informed consent and parental consent is obtained. It therefore seemed a sensible compromise - and methodologically advantageous, which I shed light on later - to comply with the committee's suggestions that a second adult, who worked closely with the young person, be used in loco parentis as a safeguard. Providing exclusion of participation as the only alternative marginalises the marginalised and unjustifiably disables the autonomy of young people. Additionally, a stipulation of ethical research is being granted the option to withdraw from the study. If ‘outed’ it would be impossible for the young participants involved in the project to withdraw from the potential negative consequences of parental hostility and ‘take back’ the consequences of being 12 involved. By choosing not to seek parental consent for the project, additional safeguarding assessments were carried out, in order to enable youth participation. I will now move to outline those safeguards and relay the justifications provided to my ethics panel, to include under 18’s in the project. Young People and Autonomy Lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender people do not emerge fully formed at age 18 like the Roman goddess Venus from the sea and it is not scientifically sound to begin all studies of LGBT+ populations at age 18 (Mustanski, 2011: 675). Contrary to the instinctive attitudes of colleagues that it would be unethical to include young people in hate crime research, due to the perceived risk of causing them psychosocial harm, I felt, to which the ethics committee concurred, that it would be unethical to exclude the voices of young people from an adult centric discipline. Utilising a risk framework to be averse to the inclusion of participants – of any participants – is unsound for several reasons. Such an approach disables rather than enables potentially marginalised voices; marginalising them further. Instinctively situating young people, under the age of 18, as unable to participate in sexuality research infantilises them and limits rather than empowers their autonomy. Disallowing young people from discussing their sexuality asexualises them. Researchers risk viewing them as not having a sexuality, as unable to realise their sexuality, and as passive innocents who should be prevented from discussing ‘corruptible’ subjects like their sexuality. There is no evidence to base this framing of young people other than the biases that adults have towards young people. Undeniably, western societies have an age-segregated structure that legitimises adult power over young people through discursive, structural, and legislative practices (Allen, 2008). Fisher and Mustanski (2014) argue that it is through these value- laden judgements on young people that well intentioned ethical evaluations often prevent research being conducted with LGBT+ young people rather than empowering researchers and indeed LGBT+ young people to participate. 13 Informed consent/assent is a key component to this empowerment process. Lambert and Glacken (2011) argue that minors should be afforded the decision on whether they would like to participate in research rather than instinctively dismissed. The visibility of how one informs minors to engage with the assent process is often lacking however. They recommend that researchers ask young people to 'repeat back' to them what they think the project is about, what their involvement entails, and what they need to say and do to withdraw from the research in order to be certain that consent/assent is informed. Informed assent should be gained even when parental or in loco parentis consent is obtained, as parents may consent to their child partaking in research without the agreement of the child (Balen, et al., 2006). Thus, informed assent is critical in taking seriously the need for minors to be involved in the decision making and risk management process. According to the Health and Safety Executive (2018: np) sensible risk management is not reducing protection of people from risks that cause real harm; scaring people by exaggerating or publicising trivial risks; stopping important recreational and learning activities for individuals where the risks are managed; creating a totally risk-free society; generating useless paperwork mountains. Thus, identifying the specific risks of including young LGBT+ people within sensitive research should not be used to exclude them. It should be used to enable them to participate in the safest way possible. This article acknowledges that people-oriented research can never be risk free but advocates that researchers can be empowered to include young LGBT+ people, within social research, by a) minimising risk b) providing appropriate safeguards and c) gaining informed assent. The project emphasised a youth centred methodology whereby young people were not perceived as being passive objects. Rather, in line with Allen (2008), the young LGBT+ people were situated throughout as active social agents, who are able to convey meaning, construct narratives, and exercise power within the parameters of the research project. Sampling LGBT+ young people who had already made the decision to 14 attend LGBT+ youth and community groups demonstrates how young people articulate their agency through membership to these groups. This reinforced my philosophy that young LGBT+ people are active, autonomous decision makers. Nevertheless, safeguarding precautions had to be taken in order to ensure the safety and protection of these participants. 16-18-year-old participants In order to first work with vulnerable people, including people under 18 years of age, the law in England and Wales requires clearance from the Disclosure and Barring Service (DBS). A DBS check is a public body sponsored by the Home Office which conduct criminal background checks on all prospective employees. Researchers are required to undergo this process to safeguard young people from adults who may have a history of harming them. DBS clearance was obtained as the initial step to research young LGBT+ people. The voluntary sectors targeted in the project offered services to young LGBT+ people who were 13 years old and above. Thus, in practice, practitioner services offer support to LGBT+ people under the age of 18. These services identify that LGBT+ young people require support for identity-based victimisation and run youth groups, counselling services, and sexual health screenings for all service users. Participants from the ages of 16-18 were therefore included. Yep (2002) argues that LGBT+ youth grow up in a heterosexist society and feel shame over their sexuality, believing that they are flawed. Including young people who attend these groups and services in sensitive research is and was desirable for several reasons. Firstly, it allows researchers to adopt a time-space sampling method (Muhib, et al., 2001), where researchers can specifically target venues that are attended, at specific times, by LGBT+ people. From this one is able to build a rapport with service and youth workers who act as gatekeepers. Recruiting from this setting allows for an additional layer of protections maintained by professional youth, community, and social workers. Secondly, young LGBT+ 15 people are able to access youth services such as LGBT+ youth groups, external to parental consent or control. Further, these young people affirm their identities as LGBT+ and recognise the issues they face by seeking support for identity based victimisation. These decisions demonstrate the individual autonomy of young LGBT+ people. Article 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights (1950: 11-12) allows youth and community services to offer a space to meet and support LGBT+ people outside of parental control/consent, circumnavigating any potential disapproval, homophobia, or transphobia from parents with hostile attitudes towards LGBT+ people. This maintains the protection of LGBT+ young people by not outing them to parents. In line with these services and to avoid any confidentiality policies they had in place, I also chose not to out potential participants to parents. Respecting and prioritising the private identities of young LGBT+ people is the first step in maintaining their safety from potentially hostile outcomes. This does not mean that guardianship was not sought however. Youth workers, who acted as gatekeepers by providing the space for youth groups and the support for LGBT+ young people, were requested to act as guardians in lieu of parents. This mechanism allowed for youth professionals to safeguard young LGBT+ participants whilst avoiding exposing youth identities to parents. Information sheets were provided to young people, which youth workers also had to view, followed up by a consent form which both parties were required to sign. Working alongside youth workers was a merit to the project due to the familiarity youth workers had with their young people. Placing them as guardians in lieu of parents allowed me to work in partnership with workers to assess the ability of each young person to assent and for workers to disclose any concerns pertinent to the individual young person such as mental health assistance. It also gave time to consider the appropriateness of each individual young person who wished to participate. Moreover, developing an interview schedule with youth workers enables all questions on hate experiences to be scrutinised and reviewed. 16 This at first seemed daunting in the early stages of the research design and may seem daunting to other researchers. However, it is advantageous for several reasons to undergo this scrutiny. It enables the building of relationships between youth services and the researcher, a vital methodological step in a) gaining access to young participants and b) maintaining contact with these services for future research, collaboration, and impact. It also allows a space for youth workers to recommend questions or lines of inquiry that the researcher, as an outsider to the young people, may not have initially thought of. This dynamic therefore aids in the richness of data gathering whilst providing an ethical framework in which questions can be edited or modified if they are deemed unhelpful, not applicable, or potentially harmful to young LGBT+ participants. I also advised, which other researchers may wish to consider, that youth workers discuss participation with young LGBT+ people separately, so that the young people did not feel they were being coerced into participating. This step also proves to ethics boards that guardianship is present throughout the process of recruitment of young people. Following these steps enable young LGBT+ people to express their autonomy by participating in highly sensitive research, with people they are already familiar with in venues and environments that they claim as spaces of safety. These enhanced steps were put in place to actively empower and include young people in the research, and to involve professionals who support young people to engage with this process. This is central to gain the voices of frequently marginalised members of society within an ethically rigorous, yet empowering, strategy. Further enhanced safeguards were developed for participants under 16 years of age. Under 16’s Voluntary sector services offer support to young LGBT+ people 13-16, in England and Wales, for issues relating to sexuality and gender. As was revealed by the project, parental 17 consent was not required for young people to attend groups and seek out support due to Article 11, as outlined previously. They are therefore considered competent to make specific decisions about their lives, using their individual agency and autonomy, external to parental knowledge and wishes. The Gillick Competency (GC) model is used within medical sectors and youth worker practice to situate young people, under the age of 16, as active decision makers with individual agency. Underpinning the GC model are the Fraiser Guidelines which determine whether a child (under 16) is mature enough to make independent decisions. GC refers to the legal case Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority, initiated by Victoria Gillick in 1982. Gillick objected to children receiving contraception under the age of 16 without parental consent. The case went through several appeal processes, directly to the House of Lords in 1985. The final ruling of the case determined that girls under 16 were legally emancipated from parental consent should they wish to seek contraceptive, providing they fulfilled the guidelines set out by Lord Fraiser in the final ruling. Fraiser acknowledged there will be some cases, where the girl refuses either to tell the parents herself or to permit the doctor to do so and in such cases, the doctor will, in my opinion, be justified in proceeding without the parents' consent or even knowledge provided he is satisfied on the following matters: (1) that the girl (although under 16 years of age) will understand his advice; (2) that he cannot persuade her to inform her parents or to allow him to inform the parents that she is seeking contraceptive advice; (3) that she is very likely to begin or to continue having sexual intercourse with or without contraceptive treatment; (4) that unless she receives contraceptive advice or treatment her physical or mental health or both are likely to suffer; (5) that her best interests require him to give her contraceptive advice, treatment or both without the parental consent (Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority, 1985: np). Although this case is medically contextualised, it has been used much more widely by professionals working with young people to determine whether young people under 16 are competent enough to make their own decisions and understand the implications of those decisions (NSPCC, 2018). Guidelines 2 and 3 were especially pertinent to the project as I was targeting venues where young people were likely to continue disclosing their experiences of 18 hate victimisation, amongst other sensitive topics relating to their sexuality and gender, regardless of my presence. Under these guidelines, young people seeking out these services can not be forced or persuaded to inform parents if they are deemed competent and mature enough to demonstrate autonomous decisions. Persuading youth to inform their parents, in this project, would have placed significant pressure on the young person to out themselves before they were ready. Ultimately, this puts them at significant risk if they have not disclosed their identity to parents and breaks the confidentiality of voluntary services. In cases such as these it is ethically justified to recruit participants under 16 without parental consent due to the potential harms that this could cause. Indeed, Morris, Hegarty, and Humphreys (2012) advocate for the inclusion of under 16’s in sensitive research such as studies of victimisation and violence as it helps to raise these often unacknowledged voices to the forefront of research. Research can then inform adult-centric policies and initiatives; to positively impact young people, you must listen and research young people. Excluding under 16’s from sensitive research when practitioner services identify that there is a specific social need for this widens the fissures between academic research and practitioner based operations. This creates an inconsistent ethical framework that excludes young people from partaking in research, due to the adult-centric perceptions that curtail agency rather than provide the safest means to empower. Methodologically young LGBT+ people were empowered to make sense of their experiences of victimisation, within a familiarised and supporting environment (Solberg, 2012), that they received care in. In order to fulfil traditional safeguarding mechanisms of informing young people of the aims and implications of the project, an easy read information sheet, utilising youth work posters as a template, was designed. Again, both participant and a youth or community worker, in the place of parents, were to sign a consent form. Two extra layers of protection and support was provided for the young LGBT+ person during the interview. Firstly, interviews with under 19 16’s were much shorter than interviews with adults, lasting up to half an hour in total. The aim of this was to prevent the experience from being an exhaustive one and to maximise the security of the young person. Secondly, a person over the age of 18 whom the young person trusted, such as a youth worker sat in on the interview acting similarly to an appropriate adult. It was made clear to this adult that they were there to support the participants, safeguard them, and pay close attention to the interview relationship. It was not their role to partake in the interview but to observe and intervene if they perceived the young person feeling distressed by the interview process. In criminal and legal contexts, such as police interviews, appropriate adults are independent people who are there to assist, protect, and safeguard vulnerable people whilst in police custody. They are championed as a vital safeguard to protect the welfare of young people and to strengthening the overall validity and reliability of police interviews (Medford, Gudjonsson and Pearse, 2003). They are there to observe and advise whether the interview being conducted is fair to the needs of the vulnerable individual. This dynamic was replicated in order to strengthen the safeguards to protect the young participants and facilitate a supportive space where they could participate fully and describe their experiences of hate. Just before starting the interview, as an additional protection method, an interview schedule was provided to the young LGBT+ person so that they were aware of the types of questions and themes that we would discuss. They were then asked if there were any questions that they did not wish to be asked or any content that they did not wish to discuss. This gave them an additional opportunity to withdraw their consent or declare any topics that I should avoid. This step actively engages young LGBT+ people to steer the direction of the interview away from sensitive topics that they may not wish to describe. Interviews were then ended with a brief discussion between the young people and appropriate adult/gatekeeper without my presence. This provides an opportunity for the adult to highlight 20 any issues that they identified or that the young person wished to raise without the researchers presence. Additionally, it enabled a space where the worker could signpost and support the young person, immediately, should an issue arise. To refer back to my comments on risk, the intention here is not to eliminate any and all risks, including the emotional harms to participants. Rather, it is to assess any forseen and potential risks and implement the means to reduce and manage those risks, whilst enabling participation. Enabling, including, and involving young people rather than disabling and excluding them is the ultimate aim of ethically grounded research with young people. Conclusion Utilising a Gillick competency model within the project’s methodological approach, service workers within LGBT+ youth and community groups helped to consider the competency of young LGBT+ people, in attendance, to make independent decisions external to their parental wishes and knowledge. Sampling participants with these methods enabled rather than excluded LGBT+ youth, a significant alternative to traditional methods that maintain exclusion of youth. Service workers acted as guardians in lieu of parents in order to protect the anonymity and safety of the young person from potential homophobic/transphobic parents. This overriding concern prioritised the safety of young participants whilst providing the methodological means to participate in sensitive research. Participants assented to the project by being afforded the right to decide whether they would like to partake. Consent was formalised using a guardian in loco parentis in order to safeguard the young person and satisfy the guidance suggested by the ethics committee. Although the suggestions and reflections provided throughout this article may seem daunting to future scholars and researchers, they are methodologically advantageous. The steps taken provide an ethical framework aimed at empowering young people to participate in sensitive 21 research. These steps enable researchers to provide a platform where young people can express individual autonomy, whilst proving to ethics boards that guardianship and protection of young people is present throughout; a requirement that I predict will continue. The protocols suggested throughout address the need to hear more directly from young LGBT+ people about their experiences of hate. Involving young people in hate research captures perspectives that may differ from adult-centric positions. These perspectives can be used to reorient adult-centric social policies and initiatives by raising their voices to the forefront of research. However, there are limitations to the protocols suggested. Appropriate guardians may not always be present, such as in the case of homeless young people. Although the guardians in this research were methodologically advantageous, it would be erroneous to assume that all guardians will contribute positively to research. For example, guardians may have reacted negatively if the young person revealed deleterious aspects of the youth services targeted. Researchers will need to evaluate the advantages and disadvantages on a case by case basis. The reflections offered in this article present future researchers with ethical justifications geared towards including young LGBT+ people, and possibly non-LGBT+ young people also, in research. References Allen, L (2008) Young people's 'agency' in sexuality research using visual methods. 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work_acbzmvdmzvbypfw65p6jwblv6i	----	INTERPERSONAL RELATIONS AND GROUP PROCESSES From Lynching to Gay Bashing: The Elusive Connection Between Economic Conditions and Hate Crime Donald P. Green, Jack Glaser, and Andrew Rich Yale University Trends in bigoted violence are often explained by reference to frustrations arising from macroeco- nomic downturns. Historical and recent time-series studies have turned up significant links between economic conditions and lynchings of Blacks in the pre-Depression South (e.g., Hepworth & West, 1988; Hovland & Sears, 1940). However, replicating the time-series analyses of lynching, extending them through the Great Depression, and applying similar techniques to contemporary data fail to provide robust evidence of a link between economic performance and intolerant behavior directed against minorities. The authors speculate that the predictive force of macroeconomic fluctuation is undermined by the rapid rate of decay in the frustration-bred aggressive impulse and the absence of prominent political actors affixing economic blame on target groups. Many social science theories trace intergroup antagonism and violence to adverse economic conditions. In sociology, in- tergroup hostility is frequently attributed to competition for scarce material resources, the effects of which are exacerbated during periods of economic retrenchment (Bobo, 1988; Olzak, 1990; Olzak & Shanahan, 1996). A variant of this hypothesis common in studies of comparative politics focuses on the manip- ulative role played by political leaders, who encourage out-group hostilities by playing upon economic resentments (Horowitz, 1985). The mediating role of elites also figures prominently in the Marxist thesis that racial antagonism between Black and White workers in the South was fomented by capitalists eager Donald P. Green and Andrew Rich, Department of Political Science, Yale University; Jack Glaser, Department of Psychology, Yale University. This research was supported by grants from the H. F. Guggenheim Foundation, the Russell Sage Foundation, the National Science Founda- tion (SBR-9357937), and the Institution for Social and Policy Studies at Yale University. We thank E. M. Beck for sharing the Tolnay and Beck (1995) lynching data. We are grateful also to Deputy Inspector Peter J. Buccino, com- mander of the Bias Incident Investigating Unit of the New 'fork City Police Department, along with the unit's detectives and staff for making the data related to New \brk City bias crimes available to us. Chris Maxwell and the staff of the New "York City Gay and Lesbian Anti- violence Project also generously shared information from their databases. We also wish to thank Robert P. Abelson and Tali Mendelberg for com- ments on an earlier version of this article. Replication data sets and programs may be found on the World Wide Web at pantheon.yale.edu/~gogreen. Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Donald P. Green, Department of Political Science, Yale University, 124 Prospect Street, New Haven, Connecticut 06520-8301. Electronic mail may be sent to donald.green@yale.edu. to deflect attention away from class politics, particularly during periods of economic strain (Cox, 1948). In the field of psychology, one of the most commonly articu- lated hypotheses linking intergroup antagonism to economic contraction is the frustration-aggression thesis formulated by Dollard, Doob, Miller, Mowrer, and Sears (1939) and elaborated by Miller (1941). This thesis was given its most memorable empirical grounding in a classic paper by Hovland and Sears (1940), in which the authors argued that the frustrations atten- dant to economic downturns produce aggressive impulses that are directed at vulnerable targets, such as minority groups, even when these groups bear no actual or perceived responsibility for economic decline. Reasoning that "aggressive acts should be more numerous during years of depression than during years of prosperity, since economic conditions, in general, reflect the ease or difficulty with which the customary economic activities of the members of a group can be carried out," Hovland and Sears (1940, p. 301) expected a statistical association between economic conditions and the frequency of anti-Black lynchings in the South. The nature and strength of this relationship has been the subject of continual revision. Building on its discovery by Raper (1933), Hovland and Sears (1940) reported a strong statistical relationship between lynchings of Blacks in the American South and economic downturns, as gauged by cotton prices and eco- nomic growth from 1882 to 1930. A few years later, Mintz (1946) questioned the validity of Hovland and Sears's statistical analysis, arguing that the putative relationship between eco- nomic conditions and lynching declines markedly when one removes the nonlinear deterministic trend in the lynching series. After this exchange, studies of lynching moved away from time-series analysis, focusing instead on interregional variability in the incidence of lynching (cf. Tolnay, Beck, & Massey, 1989). Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1998, Vol. 75, No. 1, 8 2 - 9 2 Copyright 1998 by the American Psychological Association, Inc. 0O22-3514/98/J3.00 82 ECONOMIC CONDITIONS AND HATE CRIME 83 Notwithstanding Mintz's (1946) critique, Hovland and Sears's (1940) findings continued to be widely cited and accepted among social scientists, prompting Reed, Doss, and Hulbert (1987) to dub their argument " a thesis too good to be false." But no sooner had Reed et al. taken social scientists to task for placing stock in a dubious empirical claim than new research appeared. Hepworth and West (1988) presented a detailed repli- cation of the Hovland and Sears analysis using modern time- series techniques.1 Although there is much to commend in Hep- worth and West's analysis, we regard the link between economic performance and lynching as much more tenuous than indicated in this and other similar studies (E. M. Beck & Tolnay, 1990; Olzak, 1990; Tolnay & Beck, 1995). Replicating these time-series analyses, we focused in particu- lar on sampling and measurement issues. For example, the time- series data to which successive generations of scholars have turned halt abruptly at the cusp of the Great Depression. What happens to the relationship between lynching and economic conditions when the series is extended a few years beyond 1930? For that matter, how do the results change when one uses eco- nomic indexes or lynching data other than those available to Hovland and Sears in 1940? Recognizing the limitations of continual reanalysis of the lynching time series, we also conducted a new test of the macro- economic-strain hypothesis. Unlike other ecological studies that have looked at the links between economic fluctuations and acts of aggression (e.g., Catalano, Novaco, & McConnell, 1997), the present study takes as its dependent variable "hate crime," here defined as acts of violence, vandalism, harassment, and intimidation directed against victims on account of their putative race, religion, ethnicity, or sexual orientation (Wang, 1994). Using monthly data for New \fork City over a span of 9 years, we tested the relationship between unemployment rates and the frequency of hate crimes directed against gay men, lesbians, Blacks, Whites, Jews, or Asians. Our purpose was to reassess the long purported relation between economic variables and intergroup violence and suggest more refined hypotheses about the conditions under which economic frustration and competi- tion lead to hate crime. Reanalyzing Hovland and Sears ( 1 9 4 0 ) In the first effort to replicate the Raper (1933) and Hovland and Sears (1940) analyses using modern time-series techniques, Hepworth and West (1988) rightly pointed out that the statistical techniques used both by Hovland and Sears and their critic Mintz (1946) are crude by contemporary standards. In particu- lar, these early analyses failed to take into account the possibility that both the independent and dependent variables might be serially correlated in ways that could have led to spurious corre- lations (McLeary & Hay, 1980). Hepworth and West's (1988) time-series analysis of the lynching series proceeded in two stages. First, each of the inde- pendent and dependent variables were "prewhitened" using autoregressive moving average (ARMA) models and polynomi- als in time so as to remove serial dependencies and trends (for an explanation of this approach, see Catalano et al., 1997; McCleary & Hay, 1980). This prewhitening step also has the theoretical advantage of creating a series of unanticipated changes in the economy. Dollard et al. (1939) argued that frus- tration results when expected outcomes are blocked, so that, as Berkowitz (1989) pointed out, "deprivation is not necessarily the same as frustration" (p. 6 1 ) . Hepworth and West (1988) evaluated the causal link between lynchings and economic performance by examining the contem- poraneous correlations among the whitened series. They found no apparent relationship between lynching and cotton prices but did find a sizable and statistically significant correlation between lynchings of Blacks and the "Ayres index" (Ayres, 1939, p. 204), an early effort to chart national economic performance used by Hovland and Sears (1940). One important feature of Hepworth and West's (1988) analy- sis is that they took base-10 logarithms of each series in order to "stabilize the variance" of the whitened residuals (p. 243).2 This decision has important consequences. Logarithms have the effect of transforming levels into ratios, such that the change from 50 to 100 lynchings is the same as from 5 to 10. Loga- rithms thus greatly amplify the relative magnitude of lynchings after 1920. For example, Hovland and Sears (1940) reported 102 anti-Black lynchings during 1898, 51 during 1922, and 17 during 1925. The corresponding log10 lynchings are 2.01, 1.71, and 1.23. Although the drop in absolute numbers is greater between 1898 and 1922, logarithms record a smaller propor- tional decrease. One empirical question, then, regards the extent to which the results hinge on the log transformation of the lynching series or the inclusion of data from 1920 to 1930. In Table 1, we present our replication of the Hepworth and West (1988) analysis. Consistent with their findings, we ob- tained a modest relationship (— .20) between the whitened (per acre) value of cotton and the whitened log of Black lynchings. We also found a strong contemporaneous correlation (—.42) between the whitened Ayres index and the whitened log of Black lynchings.3 But as Table 1 makes apparent, the Ayres index correlated appreciably with only the whitened log of Black lynchings for the period 1882-1930. Discard the last 10 obser- vations or use the untransformed number of lynchings as the 1 E. M. Beck and Tolnay (1990), working without reference to Hep- worth and West (1988), advanced a more comprehensive model of lynchings, in which the economic circumstances of Southern Whites played a central role. This essay later appeared in somewhat modified form in their award-winning book A Festival of Violence (Tolnay & Beck, 1995). Another analysis of the link between economic factors and lynching appears in Olzak (1990). Although each of these time-series investigations seems to lend strong support to the long-standing claim that lynchings of Southern Blacks fluctuated in response to changing economic conditions, none is robust against slight alterations in the specification of their models. 2 The log transformation does not in fact eliminate the problem of heteroskedasticity. Examining the residuals from Hepworth and West's (1988) model of log lynchings, we found the White F statistic for heteroskedasticity to be 6.02, p = .002. 3 We were surprised to discover that the cross-correlations between the whitened Ayres index and the whitened lynching series are significantly positive at Lags 2 ( r = .30) and 3 (r = .30). The unexpected pattern holds for the cross-correlation between whitened cotton, lagged three periods, and whitened lynching ( r = .37). Aside from the contemporane- ous cross-correlation, no other cross-correlations are significantly negative. 84 GREEN, GLASER, AND RICH Table 1 Economic Correlates of Lynching: Replication of Hepworth and West (1988) Dependent variable Number of anti-Black lynchings Whitened log of anti-Black lynchings Whitened number of anti-Black lynchings Number of anti-Black lynchings Whitened log of anti-Black lynchings Whitened number of anti-Black lynchings Ayres index - . 1 7 - . 4 5 - . 2 2 - . 3 0 - . 2 6 - . 1 5 Whitened Ayres index 1882-1930 - . 1 7 - . 4 2 - . 2 0 1882-1920 - . 2 8 - . 2 2 - . 1 0 Whitened per acre value of cotton - . 0 2 - . 2 0 .03 .01 .09 .15 Percent change in real per capita GNP .03 - . 1 7 - . 0 6 .04 - . 0 4 .02 Note. Entries are contemporaneous Pearson correlations. Ayres index and number of anti-Black lynchings are drawn from Hovland and Sears (1940, p. 304). Whitened log of anti-Black lynchings, whitened Ayres index, and whitened per acre value of cotton are derived from the procedures described in Hepworth and West (1988, pp. 243-244). Annual change in real per capita gross national product (GNP) is drawn from Series F 1 - 5 of Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1970 and Table R-40 in Kuznets (1961). For creation of the whitened number of lynchings, see Appendix A. dependent variable, and the correlation drops markedly. For ex- ample, the correlation between the whitened Ayres index and the whitened number of lynchings is - . 2 0 for the period 1882- 1930, and the correlation between the whitened Ayres index and the whitened log of lynchings is - . 2 2 for the period 1882- 1920.4 Cotton prices bear a slightly positive relationship to every variant of the lynching series through 1920. Moreover, the results obtained using the Ayres index evaporate altogether when one substitutes an alternative measure of per capita national economic performance.5 A commonly used mea- sure for purposes of charting fluctuations in national prosperity (cf. Kuznets, 1961; U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1975) dating back to the 19th century is the percentage change in real dispos- able gross national product (GNP) per capita. Among its virtues is the fact that change in GNP requires no prewhitening. This series bears only a weak correlation (—.17) with the whitened log-lynching series for the period 1882-1930 and none at all for any other time period or variant of the dependent variable. Nor do alternative estimation approaches yield support for the hypothesis that lynchings change in response to economic fluctuations. Because the annual number of Black lynching vic- tims is an event count, linear regression models of the sort used by Hepworth and West (1988) may produce misleading results, as they make no allowance for the fact that the dependent vari- able is limited to the range of nonnegative integers (King, 1989). Taking logs of the dependent variable has been shown to be an inadequate, and possibly counterproductive, remedy (King, 1988). Event count models, however, offer no support for the macroeconomic hypothesis.6 In summary, one sees a connection between lynching and economic conditions only if one uses one particular measure of economic conditions for one particular time period for one particular transformation of the dependent variable. Indeed, if we extend the Hovland and Sears (1940) data beyond 1930 (cf. Guzman, 1952, p. 278), we do not find lynchings on the rise as the country spiraled into a massive economic recession (Table 2 ) . Between 1930 and 1931, real per capita GNP declined by 8.5%, and yet lynchings dropped from 20 to 12. The following year, real per capita GNP dropped again, this time by an aston- ishing 15.4%, and lynchings fell to 6. During the remainder of the decade, lynchings jumped up and down in a manner that bears no consistent relationship to absolute levels of prosperity or year-to-year changes. The Ayres index is available through 1938, so using it and the updated lynching series, we approximated the Hepworth and West (1988) analysis for a longer time span. Again, no relationship whatsoever turned up between changes in GNP and 4 Resampling experiments (n = 500), in which correlations are calcu- lated on the basis of 39 observations, are drawn at random (with replace- ment) from the whitened Ayres and whitened log-lynching series, and produced an average correlation of - . 4 1 . 5 Although immortalized in the work of Hovland and Sears (1940), Ayres's (1939) measure of economic performance, which encompasses a wide array of different indicators and standardizes the variance of economic swings across business cycles, has left no trace in the annals of economic history. Even encyclopedic works such as Kuznets's (1961) Capital in the American Economy make no mention of it. For the period 1882-1930, the Ayres index and percentage change in real disposable gross national product correlated at .58. 6 We treated lynchings as a negative binomial process in which the underlying lynching rate in a given year (#,) is a function of an economic predictor and lynching in the previous year: 9, = exp(/?0 + PiX, + 02^i-1)' The negative binomial was selected because it allows for over- dispersion, or more variance than would be anticipated by a Poisson model (King, 1989, p. 52). This analysis, however, again attests to the weak relationship between cotton prices and lynchings. Regardless of which economic condition we used, we found little evidence of a nega- tive relationship between the economy and lynching (replication data sets, programs, and output may be found on the World Wide Web at pantheon.yale.edu/~gogreen). ECONOMIC CONDITIONS AND HATE CRIME 85 Table 2 Economic Correlates of Lynching: Replication of Hepworth and West (1988) Through the Great Depression (1882-1938) Dependent variable Ayres index Whitened Ayres index Whitened per acre value of cotton Percent change in real per capita GNP Number of anti-Black lynchings .36 - . 0 8 - . 0 6 Whitened log of anti-Black lynchings - . 2 1 - . 1 3 .04 Whitened number of anti-Black lynchings - . 0 5 - . 1 7 - . 1 3 .09 .06 - . 0 3 Note. Entries are contemporaneous Pearson correlations. The Ayres index is derived from Ayres (1939), and the number of anti-Black lynchings is drawn from Guzman (1952). Whitened log of anti-Black lynchings, whitened Ayres index, and whitened per acre value of cotton are derived from the procedures described in Appendix A. Annual change in real per capita gross national product (GNP) is drawn from Series F 1-5 of Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1970 and Table R-40 in Kuznets (1961). either lynchings or log-lynchings (Table 2 ) . The correlation between the whitened Ayres index and the log of lynchings falls from —.42 to —.13, with all of the dropoff occurring by the time the series is extended to 1933. As before, we found trivial correlations between the log of cotton value and lynchings, in contrast to recent work, which purported to show that cotton prices—but not national economic conditions—affected the frequency of lynchings (E. M. Beck & Tolnay, 1990; Tolnay & Beck, 1995). Contrary to the predictions of the economic model, the economic catastrophe of the Great Depression, which set back real per capita GNP by decades, did not return the South to pre-World War I rates of racial violence. Given the post hoc fashion in which the frustration-aggression interpretation was superimposed by Hovland and Sears (1940) onto the empirical regularity previously discovered by Raper (1933), faulty out- of-sample prediction of this magnitude is quite telling. At the risk of belaboring the point, we would add that the same results obtained when we analyzed the number of lynching incidents rather than the number of victims. Bowling (1993) has argued forcefully that the former is the appropriate dependent variable in analyses of hate crime, and the two lynching series differ somewhat. Drawing upon a thorough inventory of lynching incidents created by Tolnay and Beck (1995), we con- structed an alternative series based on the number of lynching episodes in the Deep South. Thus, if on a given day a lynch mob kills n victims in a given county; we treat that as one lynching event, rather than n events. White lynching parties in Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Mississippi, and South Carolina claimed 1,452 victims between 1882 and 1930; the number of lynching events was 1,193. Replicating the Hepworth and West (1988) analysis with the alternative lynching series (Figure 1), however, has little effect on the results. For the period 1882- 1930, the correlation between this whitened series and the GNP series is —.17; with whitened cotton prices, the correlation is - . 0 6 . It seems clear that the bivariate relationship between lynchings and economic conditions reported by Hepworth and West (1988) is quite fragile. Slight alterations in the measures used or the time period studied produced substantially weaker correlations. Moreover, the small number of implicit degrees of freedom that remain after Hepworth and West prewhitened a variety of different variables undermines further the significance of the few large correlations that they report. Because multivari- ate analyses of Southern lynchings (Beck & Tblnay, 1990; 01- zak, 1990; Tolnay & Beck, 1995) are, if anything, even more vulnerable to this and other methodological critiques (see Green, Glaser, & Rich, 1996), we find the case for macroeconomic explanations of this form of racial violence unpersuasive. Contemporary Hate Crime The logic of frustration-aggression, as articulated by Hov- land and Sears (1940), implies that hate crimes directed against target groups such as gay men and lesbians will tend to become more numerous in periods of recession, as the frustrations en- gendered by economic contraction find expression in attacks against a vulnerable scapegoat. The thesis that deteriorating economic conditions increase rates of aggression against vulner- able out-groups is often invoked by public interest groups and scholars to explain hate crime. For example, in its report on hate crime in 1993, the Los Angeles County Commission on Human Relations cited recession and economic displacement 180 160- - Original Lynching Series Series Updated in 1952 - Lynching Events in 5 States Lynching Victims Update •, / • - " , 85 90 95 00 05 10 15 20 25 30 35 Year Figure 1. Anti-Black lynching: Victims and events. 86 GREEN, GLASER, AND RICH among the causes of hate crime (1994, p. 30). In its 1991 Audit of Anti-Semitic Incidents, the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith linked the "deteriorating American economy" to "rec- ord-setting levels of anti-Jewish acts" (1992, p. 19), a sentiment echoed in a report issued by North Carolinians Against Racial and Religious Violence (1992, p. 20). In their widely cited monograph, Levin and McDevitt (1993, pp. 4 5 - 5 4 ) highlighted "zero-sum economic thinking" in their analysis of the factors that motivate hate crime, and Pinderhughes (1993) underscored economic resentments and frustration in his ethnographic ac- count of White youth and hate crime in New Y>rk City. Despite the frequency with which hate crime is attributed to poor economic performance, evidence linking the two phenom- ena is rather sparse. Analyses of contemporary hate-crime pat- terns have appeared only recently. A panel analysis of 100 North Carolina counties traced over the period 1987-1993 undertaken by Green and Rich (in press) revealed weak links between county unemployment rates and anti-gay and -lesbian or anti- Black hate crime. Similarly, Krueger and Pischke (1997) and Green, Strolovitch, and Wong (in press) found no link between economic conditions and racially motivated hate crime in their cross-sectional studies of German localities and New 'fork City communities, respectively. However, Stenner (1995) traced White-on-Black racial violence in the United States between 1960 and 1989 and found unemployment and inflation to be significant predictors, though the statistical analysis is crude by the standards of the Hepworth and West (1988) study. The question, then, is whether macroeconomic downturns in fact precipitate greater incidence of hate crime. In an effort to assess the temporal link between economic conditions and hate crime, we assembled monthly hate-crime statistics during the period 1987 -1995 for the New \fork City boroughs of Brooklyn, Queens, Manhattan, and the Bronx. Our bias crime data came from records of the New %rk City Police Department's Bias Incident Investigative Unit (BIIU). The BIIU is a detective unit responsible for documenting, investigating, and analyzing un- lawful acts committed against a person, group, or place because of the race, religion, ethnicity, or sexual orientation of the vic- tim. Our data included all incidents that were reported to the BIIU between January 1987 and December 1995. Data from years prior to 1987 are not available to the public. Incidents are reported to the BIIU either by patrol officers who respond to police calls or by precinct commanding officers. Although New %rk State's bias-crime statute covers only "aggravated harass- ment,' ' the BIIU documents and investigates all types of crimes that are suspected to have occurred because of bias. The fact that these data are gathered by a single source using consistent reporting practices over time makes it more reliable than the less systematic national hate-crime data used by Stenner (1995). The monthly pattern of hate crimes directed against gay men and lesbians, Jews, Blacks, Whites, and Asians is presented in Figure 2. Although it is often supposed that hate crimes are on the rise, these data suggest a stable, or perhaps slightly decreas- ing, rate of hate crime since the late 1980s. Another noteworthy feature of these data is the widely varying rate of hate-crime reports across victim groups (note the disparate ranges on the y axes of Figure 2 ) . One cannot tell from these data whether the cross-group differences reflect actual rates of victimization or willingness to report incidents to the police, but our doubts about the cross-group comparability of hate-crime rates led us to analyze each victimization series separately. The independent variable was the unemployment rate, the only economic indicator available on a monthly basis. Because we wished to gauge the level of economic discomfort, we used actual, rather than seasonally adjusted, unemployment rates sup- plied by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. The fact that the unemployment rate for the four large boroughs move in lockstep (with contemporaneous correlations above .98) encouraged us to model the time series of hate crime occurring for this region as a whole, rather than constructing time series borough by borough. As noted in Appendix B, the unemployment rate for New %rk City seems to follow an ARMA(1,1) pattern, which is what we would expect if the citywide unemployment rate were a first-order autoregression process but were measured with random sampling error (Beck, 1985). On the other hand, the results would be identical if one were to model unemploy- ment as an integrated moving average process (ARIMA [ 0,1,1 ]) or to allow for nonlinear deterministic trends. The statistical analysis used here was modeled after Hepworth and West's (1988) assessment of the link between lynching and economic conditions. The period under study covers a complete economic cycle: Unemployment starts at 7.5% in 1987, drops to 4.3% the following year, gradually climbs to 13.0% in 1992, and thereafter falls to 7.0%. We prewhitened the unemployment series and each monthly hate-crime series. The specific models used to prewhiten each series are reported in Appendix B. Next, we examined the cross-correlations between whitened unem- ployment and each whitened hate-crime series. Support for the notion that hate crime follows macroeconomic downturns would be suggested by statistically significant cross-correlations at low lags or by smoothly declining cross-correlations after lags of a certain order. Either pattern would warrant a more elaborate transfer function model in which unemployment is assumed to influence hate crime. Table 3 reports cross-correlations to Lag 12 between whit- ened unemployment and hate-crime series. If there were an immediate causal relationship between economic conditions and hate crime, we would expect to see significant positive correla- tions between hate crimes and Lag 0 or Lag 1 unemployment rates. No such cross-correlations turned up. Instead, we found long strings of weak cross-correlations at lower lags. Of the four significant correlations, two were in the appropriate direc- tion, and these turned up as theoretically unintelligible spikes at Lags 5 and 7. Evidently, the innovations (i.e., the components not anticipated by past unemployment levels) in the unemploy- ment series do not anticipate shifts in the various hate-crime series. As noted in Appendix B, we repeated this exercise using a wide array of different specifications. Linear and nonlinear trends were introduced for both hate crime and unemployment series, with similar results. We also experimented with scales constructed from two or more hate-crime series, but again found no intelligible patterns suggesting a link between unemployment rates and acts of bigotry. The sole way to build a case for the macroeconomic-condi- tions hypothesis using these data was to perform a naive regres- sion (in levels) of hate crime on unemployment, ignoring shared (and potentially incidental) trends in these variables. This ECONOMIC CONDITIONS AND HATE CRIME 87 90 91 92 93 94 9587 88 90 91 92 93 94 9587 88 90 91 92 93 94 9587 88 Anti-Gay/Lesbian Incidents | 90 91 92 93 94 9587 88 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 Figure 2. Unemployment rates and monthly incidence of hate crime in New 'Ybrk City, by victim group. method yielded significant "effects" for two hate-crime series, anti-gay and -lesbian and anti-Semitic incidents, but these two coefficients turned out to be fragile. If one divides the 108- month time series into two 54-month series, the coefficients associated with unemployment drop sharply, the implication be- ing that unemployment rates over the 1987-1995 period are correlated fortuitously with omitted variables that have led to a gradual rise in the reported incidence of anti-Semitic and anti- gay and -lesbian hate crime. In summary, our analysis of hate crime in New \brk City turned up little evidence linking racial, religious, ethnic, or homophobic incidents to fluctuating eco- nomic conditions. Is the failure to obtain significant cross-correlations the result of faulty data? Given the uncertainties that surround any attempt GREEN, GLASER, AND RICH Table 3 Cross-Correlations Between Whitened Monthly Unemployment and Whitened Hate-Crime Rates, by Type of Victim, February 1987 to December 1995 Lag of unemployment rate 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Anti-Black .06 - . 1 8 - . 0 3 .05 .03 - . 1 8 * - . 0 6 .03 .05 - . 0 8 .14 - . 0 4 - . 0 2 Anti-gay and -lesbian .12 .07 - . 0 4 .06 - . 0 2 - . 0 0 .12 .22* - . 0 1 .02 .12 - . 0 5 - . 1 7 Anti-Semitic - . 1 0 - . 0 3 .12 .11 .14 .20* - . 0 9 - . 1 0 .00 .04 .04 .17 - . 0 6 Anti-White .04 - . 1 1 .08 .08 .05 .12 .05 - . 0 2 .01 .01 .03 .06 .04 Anti-Asian .04 .10 - . 1 4 - . 2 4 * .08 .07 - . 0 5 .06 .06 - . 1 5 - . 0 1 .08 - . 0 3 Note. Unemployment rate for New \fork City (excluding Staten Island) is prewhitened using a first-order autoregressive moving average model. The anti-Asian hate-crime series required no prewhitening. Other series were prewhitened using a Lag 1 autoregressive specification, with the exception of the anti-gay/ lesbian series, which was prewhitened assuming autoregressive errors at Lags 1 and 12. See Appendix B for details on prewhitening models and alternative specifications. * Indicates correlations significant at p < .05 with proper sign. # Indicates correlations significant at p < .05 with improper sign. to measure the frequency of hate crime, no statistical analysis of this kind is above suspicion. Nonetheless, certain properties of our hate-crime data inspire confidence. First, when broken down by precincts, the data revealed quite robust relationships (corroborated by survey data) between rates of minority in- migration and rates of hate crime in predominantly White areas (Green et al., in press). Second, consistent with the thesis that integration of predominantly White neighborhoods precipitates hate crime, anti-Black hate crime has gradually diminished over time, as both the number of New "fork's White neighborhoods and the rate of Black in-migration into such areas have dimin- ished. Third, the time-series dynamics of hate crime can in no way be construed as unsystematic. During an era that will be remembered for its Black-White tensions, the correlation be- tween anti-Black and anti-White hate crime was .53 (.40 be- tween the two whitened series), suggesting cycles of attack and reprisal. However, as one would expect, no correlation exists, for example, between anti-gay and -lesbian and anti-Black hate crime. Although one might cast doubt on the reporting of anti- gay and -lesbian hate crime, the fact is that anti-gay and -lesbian incidents closely track monthly rates of aggravated assault in Manhattan (contemporaneous r = .53). The New "fork City hate crime data are not formless; they are simply not structured by macroeconomic indicators. Conclusion Given the practical limitations that confront any study of bigoted violence, no single empirical finding can be regarded as decisive. But as these results accumulate, defenders of the notion that hate crime rises with a declining economy are hemmed in by untoward findings. We have seen that the statisti- cal link between hate crime and economic circumstances turned up in the case of lynching for just one time span (1882-1930), one measure of economic conditions (Ayres's index of national economic conditions), one measure of lynching (the log of lynching victims), and one test statistic (contemporaneous, as opposed to lagged, correlations). Alter, extend, or replicate this analysis, and the relationship evaporates. The absence of a robust relationship between changing eco- nomic conditions and hate crime warrants a reexamination of the theoretical and experimental premises on which frustration- based models of hate crime are constructed. For decades, schol- ars have alluded to the putative connection between economic downturns and attacks against vulnerable minorities when illus- trating the practical applicability of the frustration-aggression displacement hypothesis (cf. Reed et al., 1987). The widespread belief that Whites are especially prone to lash out against minor- ities during times of economic recession is bolstered by refer- ence to a large stock of laboratory evidence showing that hu- mans or rodents tend to aggress against available targets after being shocked, denied expected rewards, insulted, and the like. However, a closer look at the theoretical postulates and lab evi- dence suggests some important limiting conditions to the frustra- tion-aggression hypothesis. One frequently neglected property of the frustration-aggres- sion relationship is the rate at which the effects of frustration dissipate over time. Consider first experiments using animal subjects. Miller (1948), in one of the first laboratory demonstra- tions of displaced aggression, observed heightened aggression in rats subjected to electric shock when targets were presented 2 s afterward, but this effect was nonexistent after just 6 s. Azrin, Hutchinson, and Sallery (1964) as well as Roediger and Stevens (1970) obtained similarly rapid rates of decay in ag- gressive impulses with monkeys and rats, respectively. ECONOMIC CONDITIONS AND HATE CRIME 89 Among the scores of frustration-aggression displacement studies involving human participants (e.g., Fitz, 1976; Holmes, 1972; Konecni & Doob, 1972; Miller & Bugelski, 1948), none directly examined decay over time. Konecni (1975), studying aggression that was not induced by frustration, found that ag- gressive impulses attenuated over time, even without opportunity to aggress. Similarly, Doob and Climie (1972) found that an initial difference in aggressiveness between those exposed to aggressive versus neutral materials disappeared 15 min later. Buvinic and Berkowitz (1976) also found that aggressive re- sponses (i.e., retaliation for an insult) decayed dramatically after a 1-hr delay. Accordingly, Zillmann, Hoyt, and Day (1974) lamented the prevailing assumption that aggressive impulses last long, or at least until they are quenched, stating in recognition of the characteristically quite moderate excitatory elevation and typical decay gradients associated with exposure to aggressive materials, and under the assumption that the effect on post-exposure behavior is mainly modified by activated arousal, it may be expected that the duration of effects is a fraction of what has been generally anticipated and extremely short-lived indeed, (pp. 291-292) One countervailing reason to expect aggressive impulses to persist over time is that cognitive mediation (i.e., interpretation, rehearsal, and rumination of the instigation) justifies and main- tains the impulse (Berkowitz, 1984). Individual differences in tendency to ruminate have been shown to moderate aggressive- ness (Bushman & Geen, 1990; Caprara, 1986; Collins & Bell, 1997). On the other hand, Zillmann (1988) provided evidence that cognition can diminish aggression through reassessment of the situation. Nevertheless, even if researchers assume that rumination can extend the life span of aggressive impulses, it is unclear whether this process applies to displaced aggression, wherein the target of aggression may not be the subject of rumination. It is telling, also, that none of our aggregate data showed a lagged temporal relationship between economic downturn and hate crime. Absent a proximal target, the aggressive impulses bred by frustration may dissipate before an attack occurs. Lynching and contemporary hate crime tend to be group activities (Brundage, 1993; Garofalo, 1991) that require more coordination and persis- tence than more simple forms of aggression, such as domestic violence. The decay of aggressive impulses may account for the fact that macroeconomic downturns coincide with surges in child abuse (Steinberg, Catalano, & Dooley, 1981) and civil commitments for danger to others (Catalano et al., 1997) but not with hate crime. What, then, are we to make of those instances in which eco- nomic downturns do translate into racial strife? History suggests that political elites and organizations play a mediating role by attributing blame and fomenting public resentment toward mi- nority groups in times of economic contraction. For example, Wade (1987) documents the Ku Klux Klan's strategy of recruit- ing and demonstrating in economically depressed regions during the 1970s. Olzak (1990) establishes a link between turn-of- the-century wage competition and anti-Black urban violence orchestrated in part by labor unions. Similarly, Foner (1974) reported that some antebellum politicians and labor and industry leaders argued in speeches and editorials that emancipated Blacks would pose overwhelming labor competition to White workers (see also Calavita, 1996;Saxton, 1971, for a description of economic scapegoating and dehumanization of immigrants). Similar episodes of stigmatization of Blacks as "strike break- e r s " and " s c a b s " by labor leaders were documented in the early 1900s (Kennedy, 1969) and 1960s (Marable, 1983). Propaganda about Black laborers is credited with fostering the racial vio- lence of the 1917 St. Louis riots (Foner, 1974). These historical examples support the hypothesis that political actors can trans- form economic strife into intergroup conflict and violence. It is important to distinguish uncoordinated activities carried out sporadically by small groups (a description that encom- passes most lynchings and contemporary hate crimes) from systematic campaigns set in motion by political organizations. The latter are bolstered by propaganda efforts that call attention to economic frustrations while at the same time attributing blame to particular target groups. This mobilization strategy may, in effect, revitalize flagging aggressive impulses and focus otherwise diffuse attributions. The mediating role of political organizations may help explain the divergent paths of two central propositions offered by Hov- land and Sears (1940). Although that essay is best remembered for its analysis of lynching, it was also an early effort to assem- ble evidence linking economic performance to voter support for an incumbent administration. 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Zillmann, D. (1988). Cognition-excitation interdependencies in aggres- sive behavior. Aggressive Behavior, 14, 5 1 - 6 4 . Zillmann, D., Hoyt, J. L., Day, K. D. (1974). Strength and duration of the effect of aggressive, violent, and erotic communications on subsequent aggressive behavior. Communication Research, 1, 2 8 6 - 306. Appendix A Models Used to Prewhiten Series: Lynching Analysis Series 1. Number of Blacks lynched, 1882-1930, as a function of a second-order polynomial in time and AR( 1) errors. Data from Hovland and Sears (1940). Used in Table 1. Y = 83.016 - 1.913(y«) - 0.051(i7?2) + e[\ - .67B]~l ( A l ) Adjusted R2 = .80. 2 ( 1 2 ) = 8.8, p = .64. Standard error = 15.84. N of residuals = 48. White's F test for heteroskedasticity: 1.78, p = .16. Series 2. Number of Blacks lynched, 1882-1938, as a function of a linear time trend and ARMA(1,3) errors. Data from Guzman (1952). Used in Table 2. Y = 70.722 - 2.019(YR) + e[l - .39B3] [1 - . 6 4 5 ] " ' (A2) Adjusted R2 = .84. g ( 1 2 ) = 6.7, p = .76. Standard error = 15.00. N of residuals = 56. White's F test for heteroskedasticity: 2.70, p = .08. Series 3. Base-10 log of 1 plus the number of Blacks lynched, 1882- 1938, as a function of a second-order polynomial in time and ARMA(1,6) errors. Data from Guzman (1952). Used in Table 2. Y = 1.910 - 0.014(17?) - .0006(y«2) + e[l - .34B6] [1 - . 3 2 5 ] - ' (A3) Adjusted R2 = .88. g ( 1 2 ) = 12.7, p = .24. Standard error = .127. N of residuals = 56. White's F test for heteroskedasticity: 3.73, p = .02. Series 4. Ayres index, 1882-1938, as a function of a second-order polynomial in time and ARM A (1,5) errors. Data from Ayres (1939). Used in Table 2. Y = 4.617 - 0.019(17?) - .0322(KR2) + e[l - A2B5] [1 - . 5 2 S ] - 1 (A4) Adjusted R2 = .62. g ( 1 2 ) = 10.7, p = .39. Standard error = 8.21. N of residuals = 56. White's F test for heteroskedasticity: 2.84, p = .05. Series 5. Percentage change in real gross national product per capita, 1882-1938. Data are from Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1970 (Series F-15) and Kuznets (1961); Table R-40). No whitening required: 2 ( 1 2 ) = 8.2, p = .77. White's F test for heteroskedasticity (with a linear trend term): 3.3, p = .05. Series 6. Base-10 log of 1 plus the farm value of cotton, 1882-1938, as a function of a second order polynomial in time and AR( 1) errors. Data from Ayres (1939) and updated using Table 24 of U.S. Department of Agriculture (1951-1952) Statistical Bulletin 99: Statistics on Cotton and Related Data. Y = 1.360 + .0098(17?) - 0.0003(17?2) + e[l - JOB]'' (A5) Adjusted R2 = .69. g ( 1 2 ) = 10.7, p = .47. Standard error = .093. N of residuals = 56. White's F test for heteroskedasticity: 5.58, p = .002. Series 7. Number of anti-Black lynching events as a quadratic function of time and AR( 1) errors. Data from Tblnay and Beck (1995). Y = 31.27 - .40(17?) - 0.0337(17?2) + e[l - . 2 1 3 ] " ' (A6) Adjusted R2 = .61. g ( 1 2 ) = 6.0, p = .88. Standard error = 6.90. N of residuals = 48. White's F test for heteroskedasticity: .59, p = .62. Note. The model specifications used to remove serial dependencies from each time series are described using notational system (see Box, Jenkins, & Reinsel, 1994; Hepworth & West, 1988): B = the backshift operator, such that Be, = e,-i\ Y = the series to be prewhitened; e = disturbances associated with the series Y; AR(p) = p t h order autore- gressive disturbances; ABMA(p,q) = an autoregressive moving average model with p and q order lags; ARIMA(p,\,q) = an autoregressive moving average in which the dependent variable is the difference be- tween Y and Lag Y; YR = year minus 1906; ARCH LM = A Lagrange multiplier test for autoregressive-conditional heteroskedasticity among the disturbances; Q(k) = Ljung-Box statistic for assessing serial correla- tion among the disturbances at the jfcth lag. Other series used in Tables 1 and 2 follow the whitening procedures in Hepworth and West. All estimates were obtained using Econometric Views 2.0 software (Lilien et al., 1994). (Appendixes continue) 92 GREEN, GLASER, AND RICH Appendix B Models Used to Prewhiten Series: Contemporary Hate-Crime Analysis Series la. Number of anti-Semitic hate crimes, as a function of AR( 1) errors. Used in Table 3. Y= 13.23 + e[l - .355]" ( B l ) Adjusted R2 = .12. Q(12) = 8.94, p = .63. Standard error = 5.99. N of residuals = 107. ARCH LM F test: .04, p = .84. Series lb. Number of anti-Semitic hate crimes, as a function of AR (1) errors and linear trend. Y = 10.28 + .05(month) + e[l - .31 BY (B2) Adjusted R2 = .14. Q(12) = 10.55, p = .48. Standard error = 5.92. N of residuals = 107. White's F test for heteroskedasticity: 1.13, p = .33. Series 2a. Number of anti-Black hate crimes, as a function of AR( 1) errors. Used in Table 3. Y= 9.23 + e[\ - .41 flr (B3) Adjusted R2 = .17. Q(12) = 12.37, p = .74. Standard error = 4.06. N of residuals = 107. ARCH LM F test: 2.88, p = .09. Series 2b. Number of anti-Black hate crimes, as a function of AR( 1) errors and linear trend. Y = 12.82 - .06(month) + e[l - .25B]~ (B4) Adjusted R2 = .25. g ( 1 2 ) = 9.50, p = .58. Standard error = 3.86. N of residuals = 107. White's F test for heteroskedasticity: 1.94, p = .15. Series 3. Number of anti-Asian hate crimes. Used in Table 3. No whitening required. No linear or nonlinear trends. Q( 12) = 12.06, p = .44. N of residuals = 108. White's F test for heteroskedasticity (with insignificant linear trend): .32, p = .72. Series 4. Number of anti-White hate crimes, as a function of AR( 1) errors. Y = 6.30 + e[l - .37B]" (B5) Adjusted R2 = .16. G(12) = 6.72, p = .82. Standard error = 4.90. N of residuals = 107. ARCH LM F test: .15, p = .69. No significant linear or nonlinear trends. Series 5a. Number of anti-gay and -lesbian hate crimes, as a function of AR(1,12) errors. Used in Table 3. Y = 6.39 + e[l - . 3 3 5 ] " ' [1 - .27B12]" (B6) Adjusted R2 = .22. g ( 1 2 ) = 9.73, p = .46. Standard error = 3.35. N of residuals = 96. ARCH LM F test: .12, p = .73. Series 5b. Number of anti-gay and -lesbian hate crimes, as a function of ARMA(1,5) errors and quadratic trend. Y = .21 + .22(month) - .0016(month2) + e[l - .21B5] [1 - .29B]"1 (B7) Adjusted R2 = .29. G(12) = 13.48, p = .20. Standard error = 3.22. N of residuals = 107. White's F test for heteroskedasticity: 1.10, p = .35. Series 6a. Unemployment rate in four largest boroughs of New \brk City, as a function of ARMA(l.l) errors. Used in Table 3. Y = 8.28 + e[l - AQB] [1 - .91 BY (B8) Adjusted R2 = .87. Q(12) = 11.84, p = .30. Standard error = .78. N of residuals = 107. ARCH LM F test: .04, p = .84. Series 6b. Unemployment rate in four largest boroughs of New \brk City, as a function of ARMA(1,1) errors and quadratic trend. Y = -1.20 + .29(month) - .0019(month2) + e[\ - A\B] [1 - .90B]-' (B9) Adjusted R2 = .88. G(12) = 12.62, p = .25. Standard error = .75. N of residuals = 107. White's F test for heteroskedasticity: 2.07, P = .n. Series 6c. Unemployment rate in four largest boroughs of New Ybrk City, as a function of ARIMA(0,l,l) errors. [1 - B]Y = .01 + e[\ - .425] (B10) Adjusted R2 = .10. fi(12) = 11.63, p = .39. Standard error = .78. N of residuals = 107. ARCH LM F test: .01, p = .91. Note. The model specifications used to remove serial dependencies from each time series are described using notational system (see Box, Jenkins, & Reinsel, 1994; Hepworth & West, 1988). B = the backshift operator, such that Be, = e— 1; Y = the series to be prewhitened; e = disturbances associated with the series K; AR(p) = pth order autore- gressive disturbances; ARMA(p,<?) = an autoregressive moving average model with p and q order lags; ARIMA(p,l,<?) = an autoregressive moving average in which the dependent variable is the difference be- tween Y and Lag Y; month = months elapsed since January 1987; ARCH LM = A Lagrange multiplier test for autoregressive-conditinoal heteroskedasticity among the disturbances; Q(k) = Ljung-Box statistic for assessing serial correlation among the disturbances at the kth lag. All estimates were obtained using Econometric Views 2.0 software (Li- lien et al., 1994). Data are from New \brk Police Department and the U.S. Bureau of Labor. Received August 12, 1997 Revision received December 14, 1997 Accepted December 14, 1997 • 
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work_ahmep32mf5hcjl6zx3pkpqfgdy	----	SIGNIFICANCE OF IMPACT: Patient uptake of LEAPED was high, which suggests that patient-report is a feasible method of evaluating diagnostic decision making and delivery to patients and yields insightful information beyond administrative data. The next steps are to validate the accuracy of patient-reported diagnostic error by comparing with administrative data. 4077 Listening with the HEAR-QL: Quality of Life in Children with Hearing Loss Brandon Malik Wahba1, and Judith Lieu2 1Washington University in St. Louis, Institute Of Clinical and Translational Sciences; 2Washington University School of Medicine OBJECTIVES/GOALS: This study evaluates the utility of self-reported quality of life measure in children with hearing loss. We will compare self-reported HEAR-QL scores with parent-reported HEAR-QL scores. We will then test the relationship between HEAR-QL scores and scores on a standardized assessment of cognition, the NIH Cognition Battery. METHODS/STUDY POPULATION: We will administer the HEAR-QL questionnaire to children with hearing loss and their parents. We will then administer the NIH Cognition Battery tothechild.Wewillincludeinourpopulationchildrenages7to14with hearing loss of any severity or side. We will exclude those with intellec- tual disability, disorders of speech or language, or those who would be unable to complete the questionnaires for any reason. Children will be recruited from Otolaryngology clinics at St. Louis Children’s Hospital based on ICD diagnosis of sensorineural hearing loss between 01/2015 – 03/2020. RESULTS/ANTICIPATED RESULTS: We will aim to recruit 44 patients in total, which is the sample size needed to detect a moderate correlation (r = 0.4) with a 1-sided α = 0.05 and 1- β = 0.8. HEAR-QL scores and NIH Cognition Battery scores will be reported using descriptive statistics. Linear regression as well as corre- lation analysis between HEAR-QL scores and cognitive testing scores will be performed using a 1-sided α = 0.05, with 1-β = 0.8. If recruit- mentissufficient, wewilladjustfor demographicsthat are significantly correlated with the outcome on multivariate analysis. Finally, we will testforagreementbetweenparentreportandchildreportbycalculating aKappastatistic.DISCUSSION/SIGNIFICANCEOFIMPACT:There islittleclarity on the necessity of amplificationin children with hearing loss, yet the child’s perspective is not routinely assessed inclinical prac- tice.Thisstudyemploysself-reportin apediatricpopulationwithhear- ing loss to find out if children provide new and reliable information. 4221 Lower Serum TWEAK Concentration is a Biomarker for Mortality in Community Acquired Pneumonia Daniela Parra1, Manuela Sáenz-Valcárcel2, Laura Claverias3, Sandra Trefler4, María Bodí4, Judith Marín-Corral5, Antonio García-España6, Alejandro Rodriguez4, and Luis Felipe Reyes2 1Universidad de la Sabana, Chía, Colombia; 2Universidad de la Sabana, Chia, Colombia; 3Hospital Verge de la Cinta, Tortosa, Spain; 4Hospital Joan XXIII /URV/IISPV/CIBERES, Tarragona, Spain; 5Hospital del Mar /IMIM, Barcelona, Spain; 6Unidad de bilogía celular Instituto de Investigación Sanitar OBJECTIVES/GOALS: To determine the relationship among serum concentration of tumor necrosis factor (TNF)-like weak inducer of apoptosis (TWEAK) and mortality in community-acquired pneu- monia (CAP) patients. METHODS/STUDY POPULATION: This is a multicenter 2-year cohort study in Spain, designed to better understand the role of sTWEAK concentrations in CAP patients. CAP patients were prospectively enrolled in two University hospitals and sTWEAK was measured within the first 24 hours of ICU admission. Samples were collected and stored for laboratory analy- ses. To detect sTWEAK in human samples, we used a commercially available ELISA kit following manufacturer’s instructions. Demographic patients’ characteristics and ICU mortality were pro- spectively collected. Descriptive statistics and logistical regressions were used to assess the proposed aims. RESULTS/ANTICIPATED RESULTS: A total of forty-three patients were included in the study (10 healthy users, 10 uninfected controls and 23 CAP patients). In comparison to healthy volunteers, patients admitted to the hospital (both, infected and non-infected) had lower level of sTWEAK. During hospital admission, 7 (17%) patients died. Patients whom died during ICU stay due to CAP, had significantly lower levels of sTWEAK when comparing with patients whom survived (Median [IQR]; 509.35 [357.49, 953.92] Vs 1103.03 [716.93, 1663.16]; p = 0.015). In contrast, patients that developed shock did not have dif- ferent concentrations of sTWEAK (Median [IQR]; 1008.04 [531.87, 1390.80] Vs 1062.29 [575.24, 1598.83], p = 0.84). DISCUSSION/ SIGNIFICANCE OF IMPACT: Community-acquired pneumonia (CAP) is the first cause of death in underdeveloped countries. CAP is a pulmonary infection that creates a proinflammatory envi- ronment not just locally but also systemically, secondary to upregu- lation of molecular cascades with a wide variety of proteins being released perpetuating this inflammation and tissue damage. Several of these molecules have been described and linked to a greater risk of inhospital complications, longer length of hospital stay and mortality. TNF-like weak inducer of apoptosis (TWEAK) is a member of the TNF-alpha superfamily, involved in immune response, cell growth, angiogenesis, NF-kB activation and apoptosis induction in tumor cells. It is known that serum-TWEAK plays a role in inflammatory processes, however, its behavior is unknown in patients with CAP. Therefore, this study aims to identify whether there is a relationship between serum concentration of TWEAK and prognosis in CAP patients. To our knowledge, this is the first study to shown that concentration of sTWEAK within the first 24 hours of ICU admission is lower in patients with CAP. Moreover, patients whom died during ICU admission due to CAP, have lower sTWEAK levels. This biomarker may identify patients at higher risk of dying due to CAP and may represent severe CAP. However, fur- ther studies are needed to confirm these findings. 4379 MARCKS protein is altered in naturally occurring model of asthma in horses Kaori Davis1, and Mary Sheats1 1North Carolina State University OBJECTIVES/GOALS: Asthma is a significant health concern that affects people of all ages worldwide. EAS demonstrates many of the pathophysiological characteristics of nonatopic human asthma, which has led EAS to be used as naturally occurring model. Previous work from our lab determined that MARCKS (Myristoylated Alanine Rich C Kinase Substrate) protein is an essential regulator of cellular inflammatory functions. In the current study, we hypothesized that JCTS 2020 Abstract Supplement 139 https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/cts.2020.412 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:35, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/cts.2020.412 https://www.cambridge.org/core MARCKSlevelswouldbeincreasedinBALcelllysatesfromhorseswith EAS,andthatinhibitionofMARCKSinzymosan-stimulatedBALcells (ex vivo) would diminish respiratory burst. METHODS/STUDY POPULATION: Lysates were prepared from BAL cells isolated from horseswithno,mild/moderateandsevereEAS.RelativeMARCKSpro- tein levels were determined using equine specific MARCKS ELISA (MyBioSource). Cultured BAL cells were pretreated with a MARCKS inhibitor peptide (MANS), control peptide (RNS) or vehicle control and stimulated with zymosan for 5 hours. Reactive oxygenspe- cies levels were determined by luminescence to evaluate respiratory burst. Data were analyzed by One-way ANOVA (p<0.05). RESULTS/ANTICIPATED RESULTS: We determined that normal- ized MARCKS protein expression is significantly increased in BAL cell lysates from horses with mild/moderate or severe EAS, compared to horses with normal BAL cytology. Preliminary findings also suggest that MANS treatment of zymosan-stimulated equine BAL cells ex vivo attenuateslevelsrespiratoryburst.DISCUSSION/SIGNIFICANCEOF IMPACT: These findings point to a possible role for MARCKS protein in the pathophysiology of EAS and support MARCKS inhibition as a potential therapeutic strategy. 4377 Missed Opportunities to Prevent Homicide: An Analysis of the National Violent Death Reporting System Justin Cirone1, Jennifer Cone1, Brian Williams1, David Hampton1, Priya Prakash1, and Tanya Zakrison1 1University of Chicago OBJECTIVES/GOALS: The goal of this study is to better understand the homicide victim population who were institutionalized within 30 days prior to their death. Improved knowledge of this population can potentially prevent these future homicides. METHODS/STUDY POPULATION: A retrospective analysis of the 36 states included in the 2003-2017 National Violent Death Reporting System was per- formed. Demographics of recently institutionalized homicide vic- tims (RIHV) in the last 30 days were compared to homicide victims who were not recently institutionalized. Circumstances of the homicide, such as suspected gang involvement, were also com- pared. Parametric and non-parametric statistical analyses were per- formed. Significance was set at p<0.05. RESULTS/ANTICIPATED RESULTS: There were 81,229 homicides with 992 (1.2%) RIHV. The majority of RIHV were Black (49.6%) and older than victims who were not recently institutionalized (37.2 vs. 34.8, p<0.001). RIHV had a high school degree or higher in 54.8% of cases and the primary homicide weapon was a firearm in 67% of the deaths. They were more likely to be homeless (3.1% vs. 1.5%), have a mental health diagnosis (9.2% vs. 2.3%), abuse alcohol (6.1% vs. 2.2%), or abuse other substances (15.2% vs. 5.8%) [all p <0.001]. These victims were most commonly institutionalized in a correctional facility or a hospital compared to other facilities such as nursing homes. Homicide circumstances for RIHV were more likely to involve abuse/neglect (4.3% vs. 2.2%, p<0.001), gang violence (7.6% vs. 5.6%, p = 0.002), or a hate crime (1.0% vs. 0.1%. p<0.001). DISCUSSION/SIGNIFICANCE OF IMPACT: Contact with an institution such as a hospital or prison provides high-risk patients the opportunity to potentially participate in violence intervention programs. These institutions should seek to identify and intervene on this population to reduce the risk of violent homicides. 4141 Molecular Signatures of Cocaine Toxicity in Postmortem Human Brain and Neurons Emily Frances Mendez1, Laura Stertz1, Gabriel Fries1, Ruifeng Hu1, Thomas Meyer1, Zhongming Zhao1, and Consuelo Walss-Bass1 1The University of Texas Health Science Center at Houston OBJECTIVES/GOALS: The goal of this project is to identify new therapeutic targets and biomarkers to treat or prevent cocaine tox- icity by investigating proteomic, transcriptomic and epigenetic sig- natures of cocaine exposure in human subjects. METHODS/ STUDY POPULATION: Cocaine is a highly addictive neurotoxic substance, and it is estimated that 1.9 million Americans are current users of cocaine. To study the molecular effects of cocaine, we gen- erated preliminary proteomics and next-generation RNA sequencing (RNAseq) data from human postmortem dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (Broadmann area 9 or BA9) of 12 cocaine-exposed subjects and 17 controls. Future directions for this project include RNAseq and DNA methylation analysis of neuronal nuclei sorted from human postmortem BA9 and a human induced pluripotent stem cell-derived neuron (hiPSN) model of cocaine exposure from the same postmortem subjects from whom we have brain samples. RESULTS/ANTICIPATED RESULTS: We found alterations in neu- ronal synaptic protein levels and gene expression, including the sero- tonin transporter SLC6A4, and synaptic proteins SNAP25, SYN2, SYNGR3. Pathway analysis of our results revealed alterations in spe- cific pathways involved with neuronal function including voltage- gated calcium channels, and GABA receptor signaling. In the future, we expect to see an enhancement in neuron-specific gene expression signatures in our sorted neuronal nuclei and our hiPSN model of cocaine exposure. The hiPSN model will help elucidate which effects are due to acute versus chronic exposure of cocaine. DISCUSSION/ SIGNIFICANCE OF IMPACT: Neuronal signatures found with this analysis can help us understand mechanisms of cognitive decline in long-term cocaine users as well as the acute effects on the brain of cocaine taken in overdose. With this work and future proposed stud- ies, we can discover novel clinical biomarkers for cocaine neurotox- icity in patients with cocaine use disorder and determine readouts for future therapeutic development on cocaine addiction and overdose. 4488 Neural Network of the Cognitive Model of Reading† Joseph Posner1, Vivian Dickens, Andrew DeMarco, Sarah Snider, Peter Turkeltaub, and Rhonda Friedman 1Georgetown - Howard Universities OBJECTIVES/GOALS: A particularly debilitating consequence of stroke is alexia, an acquired impairment in reading. Cognitive mod- els aim to characterize how information is processed based on behav- ioral data. If we can concurrently characterize how neural networks process that information, we can enhance the models to reflect the neuronal interactions that drive them. METHODS/STUDY POPULATION: There will be 10 unimpaired adult readers. Two functional localizer tasks, deigned to consistently activate robust lan- guage areas, identify the regions of interest that process the cognitive reading functions (orthography, phonology, semantics). Another task, designed for this experiment, analyses the reading-related 140 JCTS 2020 Abstract Supplement https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/cts.2020.412 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:35, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/cts.2020.412 https://www.cambridge.org/core 
work_aibpu5tikbc7lcnvic3f5xoqda	----	WLHR_A_309522.dvi Gender Nonconformity as a Target of Prejudice, Discrimination, and Violence Against LGB Individuals Allegra R. Gordon Ilan H. Meyer ABSTRACT. Research into antigay violence has been limited by a lack of attention to issues of gender presentation. Understanding gender nonconformity is important for addressing antigay prejudice and hate crimes. We assessed experiences of gender-nonconformity-related prejudice among 396 Black, Latino, and White lesbian, gay, and bisexual individuals recruited from diverse community venues in New York City. We assessed the prevalence and contexts of prejudice-related life events and ev- eryday discrimination using both quantitative and qualitative approaches. Gender nonconformity had precipitated major prejudice events for 9% of the respondents and discrimination instances for 19%. Women were more likely than men to report gender-nonconformity-related discrimination but there were no differences by other demographic characteristics. In analysis of events narratives, we show that gender nonconformity prejudice is often intertwined with antigay prejudice. Our results demonstrate that both constructs should be included when addressing prejudice and hate crimes targeting lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender individuals and communities. KEYWORDS. Gender nonconformity, sexual orientation, discrimination, prejudice, LGB, minority stress Researchers, community organizers, and law enforcement officials who are concerned with antilesbian, -gay, and -bisexual (LGB) preju- dice and discrimination tend to conflate aspects of anti-LGB prejudice and discrimination that target sexual orientation with other aspects that target gender nonconformity. Because sexual orientation is the explicit target of anti-LGB prejudice, there can be a lack of attention to issues of gender nonconformity, gender norms, and gender presentations in anti-LGB preju- dice and discrimination. Gender nonconformity Allegra R. Gordon, MPH, is affiliated with the Department of Sociomedical Sciences, Mailman School of Public Health, Columbia University; Ilan H. Meyer, PhD, is affiliated with the Department of Sociomedical Sciences, Mailman School of Public Health, Columbia University. Allegra R. Gordon is now at Philadelphia Health Management Corporation, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Address correspondence to: Allegra Gordon, MPH, PHMC, 260 South Broad Street, 18th Floor, Philadel- phia, PA 19102 (E-mail: allegra@alum.swarthmore.edu). The authors thank Theo Sandfort and Sharon Schwartz for their assistance and insight. This research was supported by the National Institute of Mental Health, grant number MH066058 (Ilan H. Meyer, Principal Investigator). is typically defined as some variation on the following: Gender expression (or outward appear- ance) [that] does not follow traditional gender roles: “feminine boys,” “masculine girls,” and students who are androgynous, for example. It can also include students who look the way boys and girls are ex- pected to look but participate in activities that are gender nonconforming, like a boy who does ballet. (Gay–Straight Alliance Network, 2004, p. 1) Journal of LGBT Health Research, Vol. 3(3) 2007 Available online at http://jlhr.haworthpress.com C© 2007 by The Haworth Press. All rights reserved. doi: 10.1080.15574090802093562 55 56 JOURNAL OF LGBT HEALTH RESEARCH The history and experiences of sexual minori- ties are tightly bound up with gender nonconfor- mity and gender deviant behavior, and sexual minority subcultures in the 20th and 21st cen- turies have been both subverting and reifying normative genders (Chauncey, 1994;Foucault, 1978/1990; Garber, 1992; Meyerowitz, 2002; Nestle, 1992). From the huge drag balls in the Bowery, Village, and Harlem neighbor- hoods of New York City in the 1920s that attracted thousands of participants and spec- tators (Chauncey, 1994) to the butch drag artists of New York’s Greenwich Village in the 1940’s (Davis, 1992) to more contemporary gender-blurring performers such as modern day drag kings and queens (Halberstam & Volcano, 1999), gender nonconformity has long been a marker of homosexuality that has been both cel- ebrated and stigmatized within sexual minority communities. Simultaneously, gender nonconformity has been at the root of some forms of antigay dis- crimination and violence across multiple eras. Throughout the 20th century, gender deviance was, at times, the proximal motivation for dis- criminatory treatment, violent assault, or po- lice brutality (Bulkin, 1992; Chauncey, 1994; Feinberg, 1993; Rivera, 2002). For example, in the early decades of the 20th century, “fairies and other homosexuals were widely recognized as social types in the streets of working-class neighborhoods” of New York, and, as such, “they were also regarded as easy marks by the gangs of youth who controlled much of the traffic on those streets” (Chauncey, 1994, p. 59). Same- sex desire and partnering is a characteristic that may be concealed in a process known as passing (Goffman, 1963), a process with particular men- tal health and other ramifications (Pachankis, 2007). Gender nonconformity differs in that it is typically a visible stigma, and thus a readily identifiable target for discrimination (Seidman, 2002). In addition, although homosexual behav- ior is gradually becoming more socially accept- able in certain forms (for example, in 2003 the U.S. Supreme Court ended the criminalization of sodomy), gender transgressive appearance or behavior remains widely stigmatized and tar- geted for violence (Bornstein, 1998; Lombardi, Wilchins, & Priesing, 2001; Wilchins, 2004). In this article, we describe antigay preju- dice related to perceived gender nonconfor- mity. Using a mixed methodology combining a quantitative analysis of subgroup differences re- garding gender-nonconformity-related discrim- ination and a qualitative analysis of respondent narratives, we show that gender nonconformity can play an important role in antigay prejudice and discrimination, violence, and hate crimes. We highlight two key issues: (a) the range of con- texts, or social circumstances, in which gender- nonconformity-related prejudice occurs, and (b) the relationship between sexual orientation and gender presentation in regards to prejudice. Gender Nonconformity in Research Gender has long been an interest of those in LGB research, and gender nonconformity has often been embedded in work on prejudice tar- geting LGB populations (Balsam, Rothblum, & Beauchaine, 2005; Comstock, 1991; Franklin, 1998; Herek & Berrill, 1992). Yet assessment of the role of gender nonconformity in instances of prejudice has been more elusive. For exam- ple, Comstock (1991) discussedthe importance of sex-role stereotyping in motivating perpetra- tors of antigay violence and in determining the social position of gay and lesbian individuals, but in his survey of antigay/lesbian violence, he did not identify the ways in which sex-role vio- lation or gender nonconformity played a part in antigay events. Herek, Gillis, and Cogan (1999) found that “hate crime victimization was higher for individuals reporting more openness about their sexual orientation” (p. 950)—a finding that could indicate that the participant is more visibly gender nonconforming, which is often equated with degree of openness or outness. Without dis- entangling gender nonconformity from sexuality here, we miss crucial information about the pro- cesses involved in prejudice and hate crimes. A few approaches to gender nonconformity have focused on heterosexuals’ attitudes to- wards gay men and lesbians, based on whether or not they are gender nonconforming. Simon (1998) found, for example, that gay men and lesbians are “less liked” if they are perceived as unmasculine or unfeminine, respectively. Gen- der nonconformity as a separate construct is Allegra R. Gordon and Ilan H. Meyer 57 most frequently discussed in relation to chil- dren and lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) adolescents. Traditionally, social scien- tists studying childhood gender nonconformity were most interested in gender nonconformity as a predictor of homosexuality or psychoso- cial problems in adulthood (Bailey & Zucker, 1995; Dawood, Pillard, Horvath, Revelle, & Bailey, 2000; Landolt, Bartholomew, Saffrey, Oram, & Perlman, 2004; Weinrich, Atkinson, McCutchan, & Grant, 1995). However, in recent years a number of studies have begun to con- sider gender nonconformity in relation to preju- dice, bullying and school climate (Bochenek & Brown, 2001; Cianciotto & Cahill, 2003; Gay– Straight Alliance Network, 2004; Harris Inter- active & Gay, Lesbian, and Straight Education Network [GLSEN], 2005). Although this article considers non-trans gender-identified LGB populations, prejudice against transgender populations must be men- tioned as an important piece of the gender nonconformity picture. The growing body of research on transgender identities, health, and well-being both implicitly and explicitly deals with the role of gender nonconformity in ex- periences of discrimination and barriers to care (Lombardi et al., 2001; Park, 2002). The fre- quency and severity of violence targeting trans- gender individuals are often seen as evidence of the widespread prejudice against those visibly crossing gender norms (Sandfort, Melendez, & Diaz, 2007). Prejudice and Discrimination as Social Stressors Research on stigma, prejudice, and discrim- ination as social stressors has attempted to identify impacts of prejudice on both men- tal and physical health (Guyll, Matthews, & Bromberger, 2001; Kessler, Mickelson, & Williams, 1999; Krieger & Sidney, 1996; Meyer, 2003a; Schulz et al., 2000; Williams, Spencer, & Jackson, 1999). A growing body of research has suggested that “the psychological and physio- logical correlates and consequences of discrimi- nation are similar to those of other psychosocial stressors” (Williams et al., 1999, p. 72). Meyer (2003a) posited that LGB individuals are ex- posed to such social stress and suggested a set of relationships between various levels of social stressors, minority identities, coping and social support, and mental health outcomes. Demon- strating the potency of antigay prejudice as a social stressor, Herek et al. (1999) have shown that antigay hate crimes can have greater neg- ative psychological impact than other criminal victimization that does not target the LGB per- son’s sexual orientation. However, similar to re- search on antigay violence, gender nonconfor- mity has been a missing or invisible component of stress research. Given the historical intercon- nectedness of sexual orientation and gender non- conformity, the visibility and targeting of gen- der nonconformity, and the potential impact of such prejudice on the life and health of LGB individuals and communities, the inclusion of gender nonconformity in research into sexual- orientation-based prejudice is essential. METHOD Sampling and Recruitment The study results reported are from Project Stride, a study of stress, identity, and mental health in diverse LGB populations (Meyer, Frost, Narvaez, & Dietrich, 2006). We used a venue-based sampling of LGB respondents. Venues were selected following ethnographic immersion into the communities of interest by the field director and outreach work- ers. Sampling venues were selected to ensure a wide diversity of cultural, political, ethnic, and sexual representation within the demographics of interest. Respondents were sampled in diverse New York City venues that catered primarily to LGB individuals (e.g., business establishments such as bookstores and cafes, social groups, and outdoor areas such as parks). Recruitment was conducted by outreach workers who approached potential study participants and invited them to participate in the study, described as concern- ing the health of “LGB communities.” To en- rich the diversity of the sample by reaching respondents who were less likely to be found in public venues, we also used snowball sam- pling, in which respondents were given letters of 58 JOURNAL OF LGBT HEALTH RESEARCH invitation to pass along to potential respondents such as friends and colleagues. To reduce bias, venues were excluded from our venue-sampling frame if they were likely to over- or underrepre- sent people receiving support for mental health problems (e.g., 12-step programs, HIV/AIDS treatment facilities), or significant life events (e.g., organizations that provide services to peo- ple who have experienced domestic violence). Between February 2004 and January 2005, 25 outreach workers visited a total of 274 venues in 32 different New York City zip codes. Re- cruiters first completed a brief screening form for each potential respondent that would deter- mine eligibility for participation in the study. Respondents were eligible if they were 18– 59 years old, New York City residents for 2 years or more, and self-identified as: (a) heterosexual or LGB; (b) nontransgender man or woman; and (c) White, Black/African-American, or Latino (respondents may have used other identity terms in referring to these social groups). We used quota sampling to ensure approximately equiv- alent numbers of respondents of similar age, across gender and race/ethnicity. Eligible re- spondents were contacted by trained research in- terviewers and invited to participate in a face-to- face interview. The cooperation rate for the study was 79% and the response rate was 60% (Amer- ican Association for Public Opinion Research, 2005). Response and cooperation rates did not differ significantly by gender, race, and sexual orientation. Recruitment efforts were successful at reaching individuals who resided in diverse New York City neighborhoods and avoiding concentration in particular “gay neighborhoods” that is often characteristic of sampling LGB pop- ulations. Interviewed individuals resided in 128 different New York City zip codes and no more than 3.8% of the sample resided in any one zip code area. Participants Three hundred and ninety-six LGB re- spondents were interviewed in-person, using computer-assisted and paper-and-pencil instru- ments. The sample was designed to include equal numbers of White (34%, n = 134), Black/African-American (33%, n = 131), and Latino (33%, n = 131) respondents, as well as equal numbers of men and women (50%, n = 198 each). The mean age of the respondents was 32 (SD = 9). Nineteen percent had educa- tion equal to or less than a high school diploma (n = 97); 52% (n = 267) had a negative net worth (they owed more than their total assets (Conger et al., 2002); and 16% (n = 83) were unemployed. Some notable demographic differ- ences existed among the subgroups in the sam- ple defined by race/ethnicity, gender, and sexual orientation. The Latina lesbians/bisexual women were the least educated (30%, n = 20 having a high school diploma or less); and the Black les- bian/bisexual women had the highest instance of negative net worth (73%, n = 45). Interviews lasted a mean of 3.8 hr (SD = 55 min). Respon- dents were paid $80 for their participation in the study. The research protocol was reviewed by the Western Institutional Review Board. Respon- dents signed a written informed consent after the study procedure had been fully explained to them. As this study was part of a larger epidemio- logical study, the reader is invited to visit the full project Web site for further information about methodology (www.columbia.edu/∼im15). Measures Self-Appraisal of Discrimination The everyday discrimination measure (Cron- bach’s α = 0.85) was modified from the 8-item instrument originally developed by Williams, Yu, Jackson, and Anderson (1997) and based on qualitative research with African-Americans. This instrument measured chronic, routine, and less overt experiences of unfair treatment. The eight items assessed experiences of: being treated with less courtesy, less respect, as if others are better, as if not smart, as if dishon- est, receiving poorer service than others, be- ing feared, and being called names or insulted. The scale was adapted so that it applied to all the minority groups in the study (i.e., gen- der, racial/ethnic, and sexual minority identi- ties). The questions inquired as to how often these experiences occurred over respondents’ lifetimes on a four-point scale (1 = often through 4 = never). For each item, respondents were asked whether the experience was related to their Allegra R. Gordon and Ilan H. Meyer 59 sexual orientation, gender, race/ethnicity, physi- cal appearance, or some other form of discrim- ination. Responses were coded so that higher scores reflected more everyday discrimination. Summed scores were divided by the number of items for the scale to obtain a mean total score for each participant. In addition, the modified every- day discrimination measure included a probe to record gender nonconformity as a target of dis- crimination among those who endorsed physical appearance (“What was it about your physical appearance that lead to. . . [type of discrimina- tory treatment]?”). This item was used to de- lineate the subset of respondents who reported discrimination related to gender nonconformity. Life Events Assessment of Prejudic Adapted from the Structured Event Probe and Narrative Rating (SEPARATE) scale (Dohrenwend, 2004; Dohrenwend, Raphael, Schwartz, Stueve, & Skodol, 1993), this instru- ment was used to evaluate general life events by assessing both subjective and objective stress- inducing properties of life events, including fate- fulness (the extent to which an event occurred outside of the respondents’ control), threat to life, physical integrity, goals, and magnitude of change in usual activities that is likely to be brought about for an average person. The in- terview included an events checklist and probes about the number, dates, and types of events the participant experienced. A total of 43 possible life events were assessed; events assessed in- cluded, for example, job loss, separation from a partner, assault, major health problems, and childhood abuse events. All events receiving an affirmative response were probed using stan- dardized guidelines; interviewers recorded short narrative summaries for each event. Each probe examined explicit evidence regarding the cause and context of the event (for example, the cir- cumstances of a job loss) regardless of the par- ticipant’s attribution of the cause of the event. After comprehensive data were collected, two independent raters rated the event on the dimen- sions previously outlined (such as fatefulness and threat to basic needs). The raters also clas- sified the event as to whether or not prejudice was involved, and if so, the extent to which the event was motivated by prejudice (rated on a scale of 0 to 4, for which 0 indicated an event that was not at all motivated by prejudice and 4 indicated completely motivated by prejudice) and the type of prejudice that was involved was specified (i.e., gender, ethnic/racial, age, SES, religion, gender nonconformity, other physical appearance, disability, or sexual orientation sta- tus). In all instances, the average score of the two raters was analyzed. Cases in which the two raters were discrepant by more than 1 point were resolved by the research team in weekly rating meetings. Each event had the potential to be rated on 15 dimensions. Overall, 5,139 events were rated (i.e., 77,085 potential ratings). Of these po- tential ratings, 2.2% (1,705 ratings) were found to be discrepant and required consensus rating by the group. The most frequently discrepant ratings were source and magnitude. To code an event as involving prejudice based on gender nonconformity, the raters looked for gender nonconformity in multiple domains: the respondent’s self-presentation (e.g., gen- der nonconventional clothing or mannerisms); the perpetrator’s communication (e.g., epithets targeting gender transgression); and other sur- rounding factors (e.g., the respondent socializing with others who were gender nonconforming). The presence of these gender nonconformity markers were based on self-report, rather than targeted interviewer probing. One respondent might have multiple events involving prejudice; in this case, each event would be counted sepa- rately. Data Analysis Two groups of individuals affected by preju- dice due to gender nonconformity were identi- fied using the 2 measures previously described: (a) 76 individuals who reported on one or more items of the everyday discrimination measure that they had been exposed to discrimination re- lated to gender nonconformity, and (b) 35 in- dividuals who reported one or more life events that were subsequently rated as involving gender nonconformity. We first conducted quantitative analyses to briefly describe these two sub- groups. We compared demographic character- istics of the exposed groups (n = 76, n = 35, 60 JOURNAL OF LGBT HEALTH RESEARCH respectively) to the remainder of the LGB sam- ple (n = 320, n = 361, respectively). We used odds ratios to look for differences based on gen- der, race/ethnicity, age group, educational attain- ment, and net worth between the exposed and unexposed groups (based on perception of dis- crimination and rater-assessed discrimination, respectively). The heart of this study is our thematic analysis of the events narratives, which we conducted to explore the range of gender nonconformity prej- udice and the contexts in which such prejudice occurs. Thematic analysis is defined broadly as a flexible, qualitative “method for identifying, an- alyzing, and reporting patterns (themes) within data” (Braun & Clarke, 2006, p. 79). Braun and Clarke argued that thematic analysis, although not often named explicitly, is frequently used in qualitative research because it offers a set of tools that can be used by a variety of episte- mological frameworks. For this study, thematic analysis provided a way to work within a large and rich data set, but highlight a small selection of key themes. We used a deductive, or theoretical, approach to the analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006; Gilbert, 1993): that is, we used the minority stress model as applied to LGB populations as a theoretical base from which to define the themes of interest. Meyer’s (2003a) minority stress model hypoth- esizes that those from stigmatized social cate- gories are exposed to excess stress as a result of their minority social position, and suggests a set of relationships between various levels of social stressors, minority identities, coping and social support, and mental health outcomes. The di- mension of interest for this analysis was context: The situation in which gender-nonconformity- related prejudice events occurred; these situa- tions can range, as we show, from anonymous incidents on the street to intimate violence within families. This dimension was selected because it provides essential groundwork for understand- ing the functioning of such prejudice in individ- uals’ and communities’ daily lives. We followed a modified version of Braun and Clarke’s (2006) six phases of thematic anal- ysis, using an iterative process of reviewing and coding (May, 2001). Using the codes of the independent raters, we isolated the event narratives that involved gender-nonconformity- related prejudice. We transcribed the handwrit- ten interviewers’ summaries of each event, and read through the narratives multiple times to fa- miliarize ourselves with the details of each re- sponse. On our second and third passes through the narratives, we began systematically coding features of the data related to gender noncon- formity. We then grouped all relevant codes into our focal themes, including setting, perpetrator, and reason for targeting. RESULTS Prejudice Life Events and Everyday Discrimination Group A: Self-Appraised Routine Discrimination Of the 396 LGB respondents, 76 (19%) re- ported at least one occurrence of routine dis- crimination attributed to gender nonconformity on the everyday discrimination measure. Of them, 62 (82%) also reported at least one occur- rence of discrimination due to sexual orientation. Among all 396 respondents, 295 (75%) reported at least one occurrence of discrimination due to their sexual orientation, and 115 (29%) reported neither. The 76 respondents who reported gender non- conformity discrimination on the everyday dis- crimination measure did not differ significantly from the larger study sample in terms of their race/ethnicity, age group, educational attain- ment, and net worth (Table 1, column A; sta- tistical analyses not shown). However, women were more likely than men to report discrim- ination instances due to gender nonconformity (OR = 4.14, 95%CI = [2.34–7.35], p < .001). In contrast, women were no more likely than men to report discrimination related to sexual orientation. Group B: Rater-Assessed Acute Life Eevents In the assessment of prejudice-related life events, gender nonconformity was a cause of prejudice for 35 respondents (9% of the 396) Allegra R. Gordon and Ilan H. Meyer 61 TABLE 1. Demographic Differences in Exposure to Gender Nonconformity Prejudice A. Everyday Discrimination B. Life Events All Related to Prejudice Related to Respondents Gender Nonconformity Gender Nonconformity Column N N % N % Total 396 76 19 35 9 Gender Men 198 18 9 16 8 Women 198 58 29 19 10 Race/ethnicity White 134 30 22 7 5 Black/African-American 131 25 19 13 10 Latino 131 21 16 15 11 Age Group 18–30 196 33 17 17 9 31–59 196 43 22 18 9 Education < College degree 206 45 22 21 10 ≥College degree 190 31 16 14 7 Net worth Negative 171 31 11 18 11 Positive 212 45 21 17 8 Note. Negative net worth includes respondents reporting no assets or debt; positive net worth includes respondents reporting assets greater than zero. who had, in sum, 43 separate events related to gender nonconformity. All gender noncon- formity events were also assessed as involv- ing sexual orientation-based prejudice. In the total sample, there were 133 respondents who experienced a prejudice event assessed by the raters to be related to sexual orientation. The group of 35 respondents who experienced a gender-nonconformity-related event represents about 27% of those experiencing prejudice re- lated to sexual orientation. These 35 respon- dents exposed to life events related to gender nonconformity were not significantly different than the rest of the LGB sample in terms of gen- der, race/ethnicity, age group, education level, or net worth (Table 1, column B; statistical anal- yses not shown). All 35 individuals assessed with gender-nonconformity-related life events were among the 76 respondents who reported gender nonconformity as a target of discrimi- nation at least once on everyday discrimination measure. We next compared the type of life events and instances of discrimination that were due to gen- der nonconformity with those that were due to all other types of prejudice (sexual orientation, race/ethnicity, religion, etc.) to examine whether gender nonconformity is related to particular ways in which prejudice is enacted (Table 2). Some areas proved to be similar, for example, 42% of the gender-nonconformity-related life events involved violence, compared with 38% of all other prejudice-related life events. Addi- tionally, 21% of the gender nonconformity life events were nonassault victimizations (harass- ment or vandalism), as compared with 20% of all prejudice events. However, in some areas gender nonconformity was distinct from other forms of prejudice events. For example, child- hood peer assault (e.g., bullying and attacks at or near school) was associated with 12% of the gender nonconformity events but 7% of the total prejudice. Notably, the only two prejudice events of rape or childhood sexual assault both involved gender nonconformity-related prejudice. Thematic Analysis of Prejudice Events We now examine the range of contexts in which gender-nonconformity-related prejudice events can occur, and, following the minority stress hypothesis, suggest that it is important to 62 JOURNAL OF LGBT HEALTH RESEARCH TABLE 2. Types of Life Events Related to Gender Nonconformity and All Prejudice Life Events Event % of All Prejudice % of Gender Nonconformity Type Events(N = 260) Related Events(N = 43) Assault or threat of violence 38.1% 41.9% Nonassault victimization (harassment, vandalism) 20.4% 20.9% Childhood peer assault 6.9% 11.6% Theft or burglary 2.3% 4.7% Homelessness 5.4% 4.7% Crime against significant other 1.9% 4.7% Childhood physical abuse 3.5% 2.3% Dropping out of high school 2.7% 2.3% Rape 0.4% 2.3% Childhood sexual assault or abuse 0.4% 2.3% Significant other raped 0.4% 2.3% Unemployment 4 weeks or longer 5.0% — Other childhood events 1.9% — Convicted of a crime 1.5% — Charged with a crime, not convicted 0.8% — Arrested, not charged 1.1% — All other events 7.3% — Total 100.0% 100.0% analyze the context and nature of such prejudice because these may have different psychosocial impacts. We make distinctions between some of the events where gender-nonconformity-related prejudice is central to the event’s occurrence (e.g., an attack on the street that was explicitly motivated by gender nonconformity prejudice) and others where gender nonconformity is one of many factors involved. We also consider the connections between sexual orientation and gen- der nonconformity. Overall, these narratives pro- vide a small window into the nature of prejudice against gender nonconformity across a range of situations. Gender-nonconformity-related prejudice eve nts took place in three broad types of settings: (a) a familial setting, or other home environment that is often assumed to be safe, such as the home or the car of a family-member; (b) a school or a work-place setting (including one event in a church); and (c) a public space such as a commercial or retail setting. For each setting described in this section, we also describe the perpetrators, as they are intricately linked, yet distinct from the setting. For the most part, perpetrators correspond to the settings: (a) home environment perpetrators were often family members or family friends, although a few events were perpetrated by neighbors; (b) school or work-place perpetrators were often peers and colleagues and less often school authority figures or employers; and (c) retail and public space per- petrators were often strangers who typically ini- tiated the incident without prior contact with the respondent. Home and Familial Spaces Public forms of hate violence or harassment are the most visible to outside observers; events taking place in the home are rarely thought of in terms of prejudice or hate crime. We found that 8 of the 43 gender-nonconformity-related prejudice events (about 18%) took place in a re- spondent’s home and/or were perpetrated by a family acquaintance or member. In these events narratives, the familial or acquaintance settings were generally those in which some of the most serious events occurred. In a particularly brutal example, the respondent, a Latino man (age 43), reported that at age 13 he was raped, beaten un- conscious, and left for dead by a family friend who picked him up after school. In this event, the respondent explained that the family friend “raped me because I was gay and to teach me what a faggot goes through.” Although the re- spondent was only 13, he was identified as “a Allegra R. Gordon and Ilan H. Meyer 63 faggot” by the family friend due to his gender nonconformity: “I was very feminine (hand ges- tures, walk, dress[ed in] tight pants).” In another home-based event, a Latino man (age 31) re- ported that up to age 12 he was excessively dis- ciplined (compared with his siblings) and was humiliated by his mother and his four siblings. He was the only sibling who was gender noncon- forming: He was “effeminate” and “liked to play with dolls,” and because of this his mother beat him with various objects. In another instance, he reported that his brother called him “faggot” and spit on him—an act that was condoned by their mother. Other familial settings did not involve the same degree of violence and life threat, but were in other ways severe and life-changing, such as the two cases of respondents who became home- less at age 17 because they were kicked out by parents. In one instance, the respondent (a Latina woman, age 22) was “asked to leave” her house by her parents, who said, “‘We have a daugh- ter, not a son, and we don’t want you in our home.’“ The respondent commented, “I wasn’t trying to hide my queerness from them—had a buzzed head, all friends female, they just sort of knew and assumed . . . ” She also noted that it was her father who most wanted her to leave; the mother stayed in contact with the respon- dent and eventually “coerced” the father into “letting me stay at home again.” In a similar event, a Latina woman (age 35) explained, “My dad kicked me out of my house [at age 17] because my stepmother didn’t like that I was gay. . . . Stepmother thought I would be a bad influence on her daughter—didn’t like the way I dressed—like a drag king.” In both of these events, the respondent’s self-presentation was considered a threat to the household. In the latter case, the stepmother also considered the respon- dent to be a “bad influence on her daughter”—a threat to the daughter’s sexuality and/or femi- ninity. Also, both cases involved some degree of tension or a differential between two parents who had discordant responses to their child’s gender nonconformity; yet, at least initially, they chose to stand unified as parents, rather than one opting to support the child. In the latter event, the respondent did not reconcile suffi- ciently to return home, and instead reported see- ing her father only on holidays. In the former event, the respondent eventually returned home although she and her father, who had been “re- ally close growing up,” didn’t talk for 2 years after that, and she reported feeling pressured to “play by their rules,” even to the extent that she “got a boyfriend . . . and it was just a big mess.” Neighbors as Perpetrators The other form of home-environment-related events involved threats and abuse conducted not by family members, but by neighbors who van- dalized or otherwise threatened the respondent’s place of residence. These events are linked to the family/home events in that both forms of events deeply threaten an individual’s sense of safety and stability in their own homes. However, neighbor-perpetrated prejudice is more akin to traditional notions of hate crimes and other forms of discrimination, and its psychological and behavioral impacts may be quite distinct from the effects of prejudiced violence or ne- glect by family members. Three of the eight home-based events were related to neighbors (about 7% of the 43 total gender nonconformity events). A typical example of prejudiced intimidation by neighbors is the case of a Latino man (age 22) who reported that in the 4 months preceding the interview he had repeatedly found threatening notes and graffiti on his front door (“FAGIT” and “Be careful where you walk around here at night”). This respondent described himself as “very ‘out’ in my neighborhood and very fashion-oriented,” suggesting that physical cues of gender nonconformity were the dominant rea- son that he was targeted. In another situation of prolonged harassment and threat, a Latina woman (age 30) described the series of events that occurred when she and her partner, a mixed- race couple, moved to North Carolina to raise their 6-year-old daughter. The White neigh- bors, who “didn’t know my girlfriend was a woman til the summer,” engaged in vandalism and harassment of increasing severity that cross- cut racism and homophobia, and implicated prejudice based on gender deviance. This in- cluded threatening their daughter and calling her 64 JOURNAL OF LGBT HEALTH RESEARCH “nigger,” breaking windows, calling out “spic” and “dyke,” running over their dog and killing it, and finally digging up their septic tank, resulting in the property being condemned and the respon- dent’s family being forced to move. According to the respondent, when these incidents were re- ported to law enforcement, the police claimed there “wasn’t proof” and called the situation a “neighborly dispute.” These events, both those perpetrated by fam- ily and those perpetrated by known or unknown neighbors, indicate that for LGB people who are perceived as gender nonconforming, the home is, at times, not a place of security but the source and location of a host of social stressors. School and Work Environments The events narratives demonstrate that gen- der nonconformity also plays a role in many antigay incidents within schools and places of employment. Eight of the 43 events took place in school settings, and two in workplace set- tings. School settings are worth particular atten- tion: Young people may not be “out” or even have formed a distinct nonheterosexual identity, but gender nonconformity can still be used by peers to tease, ostracize, or bully their gender- different classmates. One respondent, a Black woman (age 20), describes a junior high bully who “called me ‘butch,’ ‘lesbian,’ cuz I was ag- gressive and played sports. He’d push me some- times but didn’t hurt me. I told the teachers but it created more conflict, so I stopped telling. Kept to myself in general.” Most of the other events in this category involved harassment at the high school level, leading at least one respondent to drop out of school at age 14. This respondent (a Black man, age 48) indicated that he “didn’t even approach school officials,” because he knew it would be futile and could potentially exacer- bate the situation, similar to the response of the woman just quoted. For some respondents, harassment and vio- lence from their peers and other kids extended off-campus when the school day was over. In a particularly poignant narrative, a Latino man (age 27) described an attack after school at age 16 when he was walking home with a friend. AT first they called us faggots and said, “We’re going to beat you up so you be- have like men.” They then threatened us with a bat, came at us and held us down to the ground. They did not hit us or beat us . . . just held us down calling us faggots. They robbed us before leaving, took our jewelry. . . . We never told anyone about this—in a way I felt I deserved it for being gay. After this happened, I stopped wearing jewelry and didn’t walk to the train station; I took buses. This narrative could also be categorized within the “public space” prejudice context, described in the following section. However, such events are most appropriately considered in school terms, given that the trip to and from school deeply impacts educational experience, and be- cause “incidents occurring on public transit [or en route to public transit] can be a better indica- tion than school-based incidents” of the experi- ence of students who are victims of antigay vio- lence (Anti-Violence Project, 2003, p. 2). Note, in particular, the language of gender regulation employed by the assailants: “We’re going to beat you up so you behave like men.” One respondent, a Latina (Brazilian) woman (age 27), specifically reported sexual orienta- tion and gender nonconformity prejudice at her workplace, where she was “extremely out on the job.” In the incident she described, she was new to the job and driving with male colleagues who were checking out women passing in the street and “asking if I like ‘that type’ and what I would do in bed with them—who’s the man and who’s the woman.” Like many of the prejudice events, this incident contains the intersection of multiple forms of prejudice, as these colleagues were also making comments “about Brazilian women, and how they’ll fuck you for five dol- lars,” all for the benefit of the respondent. She also noted that this was only one of multiple inci- dents, and that she subsequently became increas- ingly hateful toward colleagues and dreaded go- ing to work. The respondent tried discussing the incidents with her boss, but the boss refused to honor her request not to work with those particu- lar men anymore on the grounds that “they were good workers.” Allegra R. Gordon and Ilan H. Meyer 65 Commercial Settings and Other Public Spaces Over half of the events (23 of the 43) occurred in public spaces, such as a place of business or the street. These are the events that are most commonly thought of as hate crimes in both the popular imagination and the hate crimes liter- ature. Sometimes such events take place in a known “gay” location—such as by a gay club, or in New York City’s Greenwich Village, where perpetrators purposefully go to seek LGB in- dividuals with the intention to hurt them—and other times they take place in nongay spaces— such as a store, a train, or on the street where perpetrators happen to encounter an LGB per- son. In our respondents’ narratives, perpetrators of these events were almost always strangers, although in one case the perpetrator was a busi- ness owner with whom the respondent had mul- tiple contacts. Public space was also, in one instance, the site of more institutional manifes- tations of prejudice, in the form of overt police harassment. A number of events in this category involved physical assault on the street, such as the case of a Black man (age 41) who described walk- ing down the street in New York City (not in a known gay neighborhood) when he was pro- voked and assaulted: “Two men made a remark like, ‘Catch the girlie comin’ down the street’ and called me faggot and homo. [They] called me these names and they started hitting me—I had scissors and stabbed one of the men in the arm and shoulder.” In another example, a White woman (age 24) was in a residential neighbor- hood (not in New York City) when two young men passed her and asked her how old she was, then asked if she “was a boy or a girl,” to which she said “girl” (she noted to the interviewer that she “looked more masculine at the time”). She then started to run away from the boys, who ran after her and punched her in the face, dislocating her jaw. The respondent had to go to the hospi- tal and was physically unable to eat for a week. This event is atypical of the sample, in that there is no explicit overlap between homophobia and prejudice against gender nonconformity—only the respondent’s nonconforming gender presen- tation was implicated in the assault. Another respondent, a White woman (age 20) reported an event in which she was wear- ing a shirt and tie on the subway. “Four big guys got on the train—started being rude—‘look at that dyke’—said they would rape me, [say- ing] ‘We’ll show you what real men can do.” The respondent reported that no one else on the train said anything, and although she was not harmed in the incident, she became more “re- served with my clothing—didn’t want to out- wardly appear gay—will cover up with a jacket or have someone with me.” This was not the only event in which threat of rape (explicit or implicit) was levied against someone who was gender transgressive. Another example came from the previously-discussed 22-year old Latina woman (whose parents kicked out of the home at age 17) who described a recent attack against her on a train platform near her apartment. In this event, five young men came up to the respondent and asked to borrow her cell phone: And they figured I was a young guy and I didn’t speak because I didn’t want them to hear my voice. One pinned me up against a wall—I said something like “Back off,” and they heard my voice and were like, “You’re a fucking dyke”—and they started hitting me, trying to take my shirt off. . . . I was really scared. But then a train came and people got off and I ran away, onto the train. Even though this respondent escaped further physical harm by running onto the train, she con- tinued to be subjected to prejudice-based threat: Once on the train, the respondent “called a friend and then started getting harassed by another man who heard my story and he was like, ‘They should’ve fucked you up. . . . ” thus identifying himself as a new source of threat. This conclu- sion demonstrates that even making it to the rel- ative safety of a more public space does not free the visibly gender nonconforming person from peril. The omnipresence of a prejudiced public eye meant that the respondent was not even al- lowed to recount her trauma to a friend without being further harassed for her gender presen- tation. The respondent explained this chain of 66 JOURNAL OF LGBT HEALTH RESEARCH events by noting, “I had just gotten a haircut, so I guess looked especially boyish.” A final important event in this category demonstrates the potential for prejudice events in public space initiated by the police them- selves. It also illustrates the historical continuity within this analysis of prejudice. This narrative describes events that took place over 3 decades ago, when a particular kind of police harassment in New York City was far more common. The respondent was 50 during the time of the inter- view, but age 16 during these events: I would be hanging out with my friends and we were wearing chest bands to make our chests flat—wearing men’s clothing— very butch—holding hands. We looked like boys. This would happen routinely: After hanging out outside a club, cops would ha- rass us—“You think you’re a man, dyke”— they would throw us against the wall, search us—my friends would get arrested for wearing men’s clothing. That was a law then—“male impersonation.” I was not ar- rested. Made me more courageous. If I was brave, I would have to deal with penalties. [I] did nothing differently. Although these kinds of events are today less frequent, or at least less overt (and the anticross- dressing regulations are no longer in place in New York City), police harassment based on sexual orientation and gender presentation, as well as gender identity, still exists (Amnesty In- ternational USA, 2005). DISCUSSION Our findings illuminate multiple facets of the role that gender-nonconformity-related preju- dice can play in the lives of LGB individuals. The prevalence of gender-nonconformity-related prejudice events was 9% using the rater-assessed measure and 19% from the self-appraised measure—a discrepancy that is probably related to the greater severity of incidents captured in the events category, as compared with the everyday discrimination category. The qualitative analy- sis of the event narratives demonstrated the sig- nificance, complexity, and severity of gender- nonconformity-related prejudice, and its range of manifestations across the lives of LGB indi- viduals and communities. We focused on one element of the minority stress process that was observable in the narratives: the situational con- texts from which social stressors emerged. In particular, the issue of prejudice and hate vio- lence within the home warrants further discus- sion. Violence at Home Our analysis of the environmental contexts of prejudice events demonstrated that 8 of the 43 gender-nonconformity-related prejudice events took place in a respondent’s home and/or were perpetrated by a family member or acquaintance; this is an important element of prejudice ex- perienced by LGBT persons, and particularly those who are gender nonconforming within a prejudiced family. In his survey examining vio- lence against lesbians and gay men, Comstock (1991) also described the home as one of the primary settings in which antigay violence oc- curs. Comstock found that 26% of 157 victims of antiay/lesbian violence reported events that occurred in home settings (including the respon- dent’s own home, a parent’s home, or another’s home). Garofalo (1991) studied police reports in New York City to compare racial bias and nonbias crimes (matched by type and day of occurrence). This study found that hate crimes were more likely to involve multiple offenders and vic- tims, to occur between strangers and in public places, and to involve young male individuals (both victims and perpetrators). Although Garo- falo’s findings do, to some extent, map onto the distribution of prejudice events collected here (e.g., 19, or almost 50%, of these events were perpetrated by male strangers in public places, but slightly more women than men in this study had experienced such events), this approach to focusing on dominant hate crimes patterns tends to overlook the difficulty of conceptualizing and measuring hate crimes that occur in the home, in schools, and in other places where greater safety than in the street or other public places is assumed. Allegra R. Gordon and Ilan H. Meyer 67 Events in the home that are perpetrated by relatives or family members may resemble hate crimes in prejudice-motivation and in their severity or excessive brutality, but are unlikely to be reported as hate crimes. For example, con- sider the case of the respondent who was beaten because of playing with dolls and perceived as not being sufficiently masculine in childhood. Such a beating would likely not be reported as a hate crime (by the respondent himself, still a child at the time, or by a witness), although it might fit the criteria. The Anti-Violence Project of New York City collects and reports data re- lated to domestic violence among LGBT pop- ulations. In their most recent report they found that, of the 423 new domestic violence cases they opened in 2003, 9% were perpetrated by relatives or family members (excluding partners); of the 486 in 2004, 12% were perpetrated by family members. Overall, only 36–38% of domestic vi- olence incidents were reported to the police over those 2 years (Anti-Violence Project, 2005); no comparable estimates could be found of the pro- portion of all hate violence incidents that are reported to the police. Unlike many other oppressed minority groups, young LGB individuals typically are not raised by other sexual minorities and are often raised in environments that promote antigay at- titudes (Meyer & Dean, 1998). In that sense, the race/ethnicity model of prejudice, discrim- ination, and hate crimes is not ideal for appli- cation to some LGB contexts. This has impli- cations for all forms of prejudice experienced by LGB individuals. In a study of LGB youths, D’Augelli (2006) found that 12% of his sample of 542 young people reported that their moth- ers had verbally abused them because they were LGB, and 7% reported that their fathers ver- bally abused them because they were LGB; there were also reports by young men and women of physical abuse by mothers and fathers be- cause of their LGB identity. Balsam et al. (2005) found that, within the same family, LGB sib- lings may be at greater risk for victimization than their heterosexual siblings. This kind of intrafamilial, prejudice-based violence can re- sult in adverse mental health consequences: in D’Augelli’s study, parental negative reactions to their child’s LGB identity were associated with lowered self-esteem and more negative men- tal health outcomes in the young person. Ad- ditionally, for LGB individuals growing up in an intensely prejudiced family structure, physi- cal health and the security of basic needs such as shelter are also at risk (Hyde, 2005; Savin- Williams, 1994). Indeed, we highlighted cases from this study in which teens were forced out of their homes by parents who could not ac- cept their child’s sexual orientation and/or gen- der presentation. Gender nonconformity plays an important role in this kind of familial or home-based vi- olence against youth. As in the narrative of the woman whose stepmother did not like the way she dressed “like a drag king,” gender nonconfor- mity can be taken as a marker of homosexuality by family members, even if the child does not yet identify as LGBT. Some young people (e.g., the boy who only wants to sew and decorate, or the girl who won’t grow out of her “tomboy phase”) may be persecuted by family members for gen- der nonconformity because they are assumed to be homosexual, even though they ultimately develop as heterosexual (Harris Interactive & GLSEN, 2005). Because of the potentially dam- aging health and developmental consequences outlined above, the issues faced by youth who are gender nonconforming have rightfully merited particular attention in LGBT research and advo- cacy work. This work is essential, and should continue to build on the message that gender- nonconformity-based harassment and violence are detrimental to all students who don’t fit into the dominant gender ideals, and that such prej- udice creates a school climate that is not con- ducive to learning or health (Russell, 2006). Inclusion of Gender Nonconformity in the Minority Stress Model Based on our findings, we recommend that researchers working with the minority stress model explicitly incorporate gender- nonconformity-related prejudice as a stressor for sexual minorities. The importance of pay- ing attention to gender nonconformity in close relation to, or overlapping with, sexual minority status cannot be overstated. As our research has shown, there is an implicit link between gender 68 JOURNAL OF LGBT HEALTH RESEARCH nonconformity and sexual orientation. This link means that those exposed to prejudice events due to their nonconforming gender presentations are likely also being targeted as sexual minorities, regardless of the individual’s actual sexual or gender identity. Study Limitations and Conclusions In this study, we faced a number of concep- tual and measurement limitations. The modi- fied everyday discrimination scale, in particu- lar, may have been limited by its reliance on subjective appraisal of discrimination and self- report. Some research has shown that minority group members may minimize discrimination (both in terms of perception and articulation) to protect self-esteem, maintain a sense of control, and protect against both recrimination and rein- forcement of derogatory stereotypes (Crocker & Major, 1989; Krieger & Sidney, 1996; Ruggiero & Taylor, 1997). We found an unexpected gender discrepancy: In the self-appraised measure, women report- ed significantly more gender-nonconformity- related discrimination than men, but this was not the case in the rater-assessed measure. We be- lieve that this discrepancy reflects measurement limitations associated with the self-appraised measure of chronic discrimination, as well as conceptual challenges posed by the question of gender nonconformity. Research into anti-LGB violence has suggested that men report higher levels of victimization than women (Bon- tempo & D’Augelli, 2002; D’Augelli, 2006; Herek et al., 1999). The gender gap that we found for gender nonconformity suggests that gender-nonconformity-related discrimination is perceived and reported differently than antigay discrimination. Two measurement explanations are plausible, both forms of reporting bias, and both with implications for the identification and reduction of gender nonconformity-related discrimination. First, women may be more likely to perceive and report gender-related discrimination due to the raised gender consciousness that the fem- inist movement of the 1960s and 1970s pro- vided (Rosen, 2000). Men may not use the same framework for thinking about gender and power relations as women (Seidman, 2002), and gay men might, instead, conceptualize discrimina- tion solely in terms of sexual orientation or other targets. Second, gay men may also be less likely to self-report such discrimination be- cause gender nonconformity is still highly stig- matized even within many communities of gay men (Garber, 1992; Nestle, 1992; Taywaditep, 2001). Femininity in all men is socially un- acceptable, but for sexual minority men, fem- ininity places them in an even more socially subjugated position (Sandfort, 2005). The social pressure to be masculine makes it likely that gay men would actively or unconsciously avoid self- reporting gender nonconformity as a measure of psychosocial protection (Ruggiero & Taylor, 1997). This limitation of the self-appraised measure reinforces the importance of externally-assessed measures of prejudice where gender is con- cerned. The SEPARATE measure used to gather life events narratives represents an attempt to move away from the biases of perceived discrim- ination measures; however, this measure is also limited, to some extent, by its reliance on self- report. Reporting bias could be present if certain groups (or certain types of events) are less likely than others to incorporate details into their narra- tives that signify gender nonconformity, causing an underclassification of that subgroup (or that type of event) in the event narratives (Meyer, 2003b). Another limitation is the use of a nonrandom sample, which does not allow us to generalize the reported prevalences to the larger community. Nevertheless, the patterns we recorded and the comparisons among subgroups do not depend on external validity and are instructive. Future re- search using a random population survey should ascertain more accurate prevalence estimates of events related to gender nonconformity. This study is also limited because it lacked an objective assessment of an individual’s gender nonconformity. We used implied gender non- conformity as identified via respondents’ report- ing of prejudice-related life events and everyday discrimination. We cannot, however, assess the extent to which respondents were gender non- conforming. It can be claimed that in prejudice, discrimination, and violence, the perpetrator’s Allegra R. Gordon and Ilan H. Meyer 69 perception of gender nonconformity, rather than an objective assessment, is what matters. Still, it would be important to understand aspects of gender nonconformity that are associated with prejudice and violence. In the past, instruments for measuring gender nonconformity have fo- cused on narrowly-defined behavioral traits or biological explanations of gender deviance in re- lation to sexual orientation (Lippa, 2000). Work to develop more nuanced measures of gender nonconformity-based prejudice is needed. Three key questions must be considered in this future measurement: (a) To what extent should gender nonconformity be based on self-report alone? (b) What are the appropriate ways to measure nonconformity with relative objectivity, or with- out relying on self-identification? and (c) How should one measure the extent to which gender nonconformity was an immediate motivator for a discriminatory or hate event, as well as the ways it was used within a prejudice event (e.g., through epithets)? We studied nontransgendered LGB individu- als. Future research into minority stress as ex- perienced by transgender and transsexual popu- lations is essential to fully understand the role of gender nonconformity within the minority stress model. In addition, a qualitative explo- ration of gender nonconforming heterosexuals’ experiences of prejudice and discrimination is also needed to flesh out gender nonconformity as a minority stressor. As we have argued, a full consideration of gender nonconformity should span the entire spectrum of gender possibilities. We have demonstrated the importance of gender-nonconformity-related prejudice in the lives of LGB individuals and communities. Re- searchers have begun to recognize gender non- conformity as a field of inquiry in contemporary LGB research, but research on LGB health and anti-LGB discrimination has not sufficiently in- vestigated gender nonconformity’s role. We ar- gued that this form of prejudice must be disag- gregated from sexual orientation if researchers are to expand their understanding of the social stressors impacting sexual minorities and their communities. Gender nonconformity is tied to histories of both abuse and resilience, as well as to the relatively new blossoming of transgen- der politics, and as such it has sometimes been a controversial or painful subject to discuss among LGBT and feminist communities. 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work_aigur42wdza3vjnexysdjte7ay	----	Citation for published version: Mondon, A & Winter, A 2017, 'Articulations of Islamophobia: From the Extreme to the Mainstream?', Ethnic and Racial Studies, vol. 40, no. 13, pp. 2151-2179 . https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2017.1312008 DOI: 10.1080/01419870.2017.1312008 Publication date: 2017 Document Version Peer reviewed version Link to publication This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in Ethnic and Racial Studies on 26 May 2017, available online: http://www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/01419870.2017.1312008 University of Bath Alternative formats If you require this document in an alternative format, please contact: openaccess@bath.ac.uk General rights Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights. Take down policy If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim. Download date: 06. Apr. 2021 https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2017.1312008 https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2017.1312008 https://researchportal.bath.ac.uk/en/publications/articulations-of-islamophobia-from-the-extreme-to-the-mainstream(2887bdd6-fcf1-4414-a0c0-04819067c93f).html Mondon, A. and Winter, A. 2017 (forthcoming). “Articulations of Islamophobia: From the Extreme to the Mainstream?” Ethnic and Racial Studies Review. Articulations of Islamophobia: From the Extreme to the Mainstream? Aurelien Mondon1 Department of Politics, Languages & International Studies, University of Bath, Bath, UK Aaron Winter Criminology, University of East London, London, UK ABSTRACT This article examines the construction, functions and relationship between the diverse and changing articulations of Islamophobia. The aim is to contribute to debates about the definition of Islamophobia, which have tended to be contextually specific, fixed and/or polarized between racism and religious prejudice, between extreme and mainstream, state and non-state versions, or undifferentiated, and offer a more nuanced framework to: (a) delineate articulations of Islamophobia as opposed to precise types and categories; (b) highlight the porosity in the discourse between extreme articulations widely condemned in the mainstream, and normalized and insidious ones, which the former tend to render more acceptable in comparison; (c) map where these intersect in response to events, historical and political conditions and new ideological forces and imperatives; and (d) compare these articulations of Islamophobia in two contexts, France and the United States. KEY WORDS: Islamophobia; Anti-Muslim Racism; Liberalism; France; United States; Terrorism 1 Aurelien Mondon. email: a.mondon@bath.ac.uk, twitter: @aurelmondon, university profile: http://www.bath.ac.uk/polis/staff/aurelien-mondon/, personal website: http://extremism.hypotheses.org/. Aaron Winter, email: a.winter@uel.ac.uk, twitter: @aaronzwinter, university profile: https://www.uel.ac.uk/Staff/w/aaron-winter, personal website: https://aaronzwinter.wordpress.com/, academia.edu: https://uel.academia.edu/AaronWinter. Introduction In the aftermath of the attack on the office of Charlie Hebdo in January 2015, one could see and hear the statement ‘Je suis Charlie’ appearing throughout Paris, France and the world. The public narrative was unequivocal: this was an attack on freedom of speech – designated as the cornerstone of democracy and freedom itself. Charlie Hebdo’s journalists were proclaimed as martyrs in the struggle for free speech, their courage symbolized in the 2006 publication of provocative cartoons of the Prophet Muhammed. They did what ‘We’ were afraid to do and mourning their loss seemed insufficient: ‘We’ must identify if not become them in solidarity and resistance. On the 7th of January and for weeks to come, the streets of Paris and the west, Facebook pages and Tweeter feeds were filled with those calling themselves ‘Charlie’. Criticising this essentialist and absolutist vision of understanding fell outside of freedom of speech and was considered something akin to cowardice if not treason, as witnessed in the many headlines about children refusing to obey the minute of silence in French suburbs (Berretta 10 January 2015, Leconte 14 January 2015, Beyer and Verduzier 20 January 2015). This communion around the slogan ‘Je suis Charlie’, and the self-righteous defence of freedom of speech under the protection of the state, its police and army, hid a multitude of inconsistencies and contradictions. The most notable was the photo opportunity with the leaders of the ‘free’ and not so free world (and the war on terror) leading (or pretending to lead) the march of solidarity, whose record with regard to freedom of speech and the press was heavily criticized as hypocritical (Sherriff 13 January 2015). Yet, despite such discrepancies at the core of the hegemonic discourse, the overall pattern is familiar: widespread and normalized criticism of an essentialized Muslim threat for its hatred of ‘our’ liberal freedom and tolerant societies, even as ‘our’ countries pass - and the population at large chooses to ignore - counter-terrorism and extremism legislation that curtails those very freedoms. This has become common place since US President George W. Bush (20 September 2001) stated in his 9/11 address, prior to the establishment of Homeland Security and the Patriot Act, ‘They hate our freedoms: our freedom of religion, our freedom of speech, our freedom to vote and assemble and disagree with each other’, which became a mantra of the American-led war on terror. Islam has become central to the contradictions inherent to the construction (and presentation) of our identity and self-image as citizens of free and egalitarian liberal democracies: from evocations of free speech in defence of Islamophobes, while monitoring and censoring political speech under the auspices of countering Muslim ‘hate’ preachers and extremism, to evocations of gender rights in the west, particularly around banning the hijab and burka in the name of emancipation. As such paternalistic narratives developed and disproportionately targeted Muslim communities, they have distracted from failures to achieve gender equality on a structural level, as well as failing to acknowledge the growing anti-feminist backlash within western liberal culture. This article will examine the construction, functions and relationship between the diverse and changing articulations of Islamophobia. The aim of this article is to contribute to debates about the definition of Islamophobia, which have tended to be contextually specific (and sometimes universalized), fixed and/or polarized between racism and religious prejudice, between extreme and mainstream, state and non-state versions, or undifferentiated, and equip those interested in the issue with a more nuanced framework to: (a) clearly delineate articulations of Islamophobia as opposed to precise types and categories; (b) highlight the porosity in the discourse between the more extreme articulations widely condemned in the mainstream, and the more normalized and insidious ones, which the former tend to render more acceptable in comparison; (c) map where these intersect in response to events, historical and political conditions and new ideological forces and imperatives; and (d) compare articulations of Islamophobia in two contexts, France and the United States (US), in order to demonstrate both contextual differences and overlap and the application of our analysis and framework. The framework developed in this article is built around two main articulations of Islamophobia: an illiberal and a liberal kind. These broad articulations do not work in opposition, as their borders are fuzzy, and that one cannot survive without the other giving it legitimacy. To provide some essential background, the first part of the article provides an overview of definitions of Islamophobia and debates in the field, and explains and justifies our use of the term Islamophobia over alternatives such as anti-Muslim racism. The second and third sections develop the two articulations of Islamophobias we believe are essential to provide a comprehensive picture of the current state of racism towards anyone deemed Muslim. Throughout the article, examples from France and the United States are provided to illuminate the way in which different articulations of Islamophobia emerge and how it has become increasingly common and in some cases normalized and hegemonic, through the interplay between its liberal and illiberal articulations. These cases provide an excellent opportunity for comparative analysis of elite discourse (media, politicians and academics). Both are secular republics, right-based with a liberal legal and political order and history and significantly both experienced social revolutions in the 1960s and a ‘culture war’ backlash today, which is key to our analysis as stated earlier. Yet, they are also very different and allow for contrast. France has dominant linguistic-ethnic national identity, historical state religion, a significant and conflicted history through orientalism, colonialism in North Africa and post-colonial immigration, whereas the US is a white settler former colony, with a history of slavery and an immigration society, where Muslims have been overshadowed by a history of more developed anti-Black and anti-Mexican, as well as wider anti-Hispanic, racisms. Yet, both have seen a rise in both anti-Muslim rhetoric, attacks and movements on the extremes and more worryingly, in the mainstream, including in democratic electoral politics. Islamophobias: Definitions and debates In 1997, the Runnymede Trust dedicated a report to the rise of Islamophobia in Britain which it defined as ‘unfounded hostility towards Islam’ (Runnymede Trust 1997, 1).1 However, it is since 9/11, that Islam and Muslims, and closely linked, the issue of Islamophobia, have become central to public, policy and research debates and agendas (Morey and Yaqin 2011). In Secularism, Religion and Multicultural Citizenship , Geoffrey Brahm Levey and Tariq Modood (2008) pointedly note: The Islamist attacks of 9/11, the Danish cartoon affair and rioting by Muslim youths in France [and we would presume Charlie Hebdo would be added now] are just some of the events that have caused the ‘Muslim question’ to become a key issue of public debate in many western democracies. Various surveys have shown in recent years that ‘anti-Muslim biases’ (Taras 2013, 426-431) have been prevalent across much of Europe (for a more thorough overview in France, see (Hajjat and Mohammed 2013, 37-68) and in Britain, see (Field 2007)). While it is too early to have a precise picture, Islamophobic sentiment and attacks appear to have increased throughout the western world following the attacks in Paris in 2015 (Mark 18 November 2015, Al-Othman 1 December 2015, Friedersdorf 16 November 2015, LeMonde.fr 17 July 2015). According to data compiled by TellMama in the UK, in the week following the November 2015 Paris attacks, hate crimes against Muslims increased more than 300% to 115 and most victims were Muslim girls and women ‘in traditional Islamic dress’ (Mogul 23 November 2015). Hate crimes against Muslim and attacks on mosques in the United States also rose in 2015. According to multi-state research by the Center for the Study of Hate and Extremism at California State University, San Bernardino, hate crimes against Muslims rose 78% from 110 in 2014 to 296 in 2015, and anti-Arab attacks rose 219% from 21 to 67 (Levin and Grisham 2015, Norton 18 December 2015, Lichtblau 17 September 2016). The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) reported that anti-Muslim hate crimes rose 67% nationally in 2015 from 154 in 2014 to 257, the highest since 9/11 (Potok 14 November 2016, SPLC 15 February 2017). The Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC) reported that anti-Muslim hate groups almost tripled in number the following year, from 34 in 2015 to 101 in 2016 (SPLC 15 February 2017). This occurred in the context of the 2015 Paris and San Bernardino attacks, as well as Donald Trump’s campaign, during which exploited the attacks, http://www.amazon.co.uk/s/ref=dp_byline_sr_book_2?ie=UTF8&field-author=Geoffrey+Brahm+Levey&search-alias=books-uk&text=Geoffrey+Brahm+Levey&sort=relevancerank http://www.amazon.co.uk/s/ref=dp_byline_sr_book_3?ie=UTF8&field-author=Tariq+Modood&search-alias=books-uk&text=Tariq+Modood&sort=relevancerank deployed anti-Muslim rhetoric and called for Muslims to be banned from entering the country and for the establishment of a national Muslim registry (Pilkington 7 December 2015). The SPLC has argued that this played a role in the rise in anti-Muslim hatred and hate crimes during this period (Potok 14 November 2016, SPLC 15 February 2017). While there is relative consensus about the growing concern regarding ‘Islamophobia’ or anti- Muslim hate, there is no consensus on the label or definition. The focus of research and debate has included a wide range of issues and originates from various perspectives and agendas. Research has focused on issues such as Islam and Muslim history, Muslim identities, media representations, multiculturalism and social cohesion, migration, citizenship, religion and culture, racialization, secularism, gender, sexuality, nationalism, terrorism, extremism and securitization. It is therefore not surprising that, as Chris Allen (2010) has argued, there is no clear and agreed upon definition. This section is thus devoted to explaining our own definitional standpoint as clearly as possible to provide the basis for the framework developed in the following part. Halliday (1999) and others have argued that the preferred term should be ‘anti-Muslim hate’ or ‘anti-Muslim racism, as hate and/or racism is more accurate than fear (or phobia) and it is directed against a people, rather than a religion. Nasar Meer and Tariq Modood (2009, 338) do not reject the term, but argue that Islamophobia needs to be seen in relation to/as a form of racism. Being Muslim is argued to be a belief system and thus a choice, a status one decides to take on willingly, as opposed to a set of characteristics imposed by birth like ‘race’. For Raymond Taras (2013, 422), ‘Islamophobia can be characterized as a cryptic articulation of the concept of race and racism even if overtly it appears as a form of religious-based prejudice’. For Pnina Werbner (2013, 455), Whatever the case, the effects of securitisation and the attacks on Islamic symbols are racist, in the sense that they license the actions and discourses of individuals and groups who promote more offensive racist imaginaries. Sixteen years after its first report on the issue, it is thus unsurprising that, in the Runnymede Trust’s 2013 report ‘The New Muslims’ (Alexander et al. 2013), Claire Alexander (2013, 5) observes that ‘as the “colour line” was for the early 20th century, “The Muslim Question” has become the defining issue of our times.’ The forward to the report, Rob Berkeley (2013, 2) points out that since 1997 we have seen a shift in domestic and international policy from a focus on equality and justice to issues of security and cohesion, and from race and ethnicity to religion, largely, focused on Muslims. Although the focus is on religion, the distinction between race and ethnicity and religion is not always clear, particularly when it comes to issues of inequalities, state policies and practise (e.g. securitization) and hate in the media and civil society. Alexander (2013, 6) notes that: Since this period the race equality and religious equality agendas have become increasingly separate, and academic research in these areas has also become distinct… it is now seemingly possible to talk about religion without race and race without reference to religion. In the first instance, we risk separating out Muslims from a broader struggle for equality, and in the second we run the risk of subsuming or erasing the differences between experiences, priorities, groups and subjectivities for a one-size-fits-all definition of racism. In addition to this article highlighting diverse articulations of Islamophobia and constructing a more complex, nuanced and inclusive definition of Islamophobia, this argument by Alexander highlights the need for a more complex, nuanced and inclusive definition of racism, where Islamophobia fits in. Alexander (2013, 6) further points out that: … the term ‘Muslim’ [which underpins both Islamophobia and many conceptualisations of it] is too often a codeword for a series of pathologies. If we think of dominant representations, they appear in three main categories: gender (the hijab/forced marriage/ honour killings triad), gangs and grooming, and terrorists/extremists. None of these are good … and all provide grist to the mill of the born-again racism without-race popular with both the EDL and the so-called liberal left because, apparently, it’s not racist to be anti-Muslim. Overall, the debate between Islamophobia being about religion or race is not solely about what Islam is, but what one wants to say about it and how they do it. Religion does provide a convenient cover for those wishing to argue that they are attacking a belief and not people, and in a context where racism is allegedly unacceptable, wriggle out of or deflect such charges. Defining and seeing Islamophobia only through the prism of religion not only ignores these issues, processes and effects, but is particularly problematic (or functional) in so-called secular societies such as France, Britain and to a lesser extent in the United States, where criticism of religion is considered a healthy and necessary practice to allow for freedom of thought and expression. This is even the case when the identification and discourse about Islam as a ‘religion’ slips into ‘culture’, although the latter brings us closer to a form of racism, which will be returned to. In this context, the Islamophobe is often praised for breaking taboos in the name of freedom of speech and secularism. This is particularly the case regarding Islam as it is often considered to take ‘a conservative line’ on issues such as gender, sexuality and equality in general, which have come to symbolize liberal causes and liberalism in the post-60s west. As highlighted by David Theo Goldberg (2006, 345), ‘Islam is taken in the dominant European imaginary to represent a collection of lacks: of freedom; of a disposition of scientific inquiry; of civility and manners; of love of life; of human worth; of equal respect for women and gay people’. For Sayyid (2010, 1), its detractors perceive Islamophobia as simply a fig leaf behind which ‘backward’ (sic) social practices and totalitarian political ambitions are covered up and afforded bogus exemption from legitimate criticism and challenge’. Therefore, in this article, we do not take the term ‘Islamophobia’ literally to mean fear (beyond a psychoanalytic reading in which underlying fear is an element), but use it both as the most widely used term and to accommodate different forms of hate that includes those focused on different aspects, including those claiming to be referring to the religion as opposed to people or ‘race’. Key to our framework is the understanding of Islamophobias as articulations rather than self- contained categories. Our focus is thus on discourse, and is influenced by the post-structuralist theory and the so-called Essex school in particular (Laclau 2005, Laclau and Mouffe 1985). Through the different modes of articulation outlined in the following section, the signifier ‘Muslim’ and ‘Islam’ are constructed in different manners, but ultimately, they represent an Other, often described along racist lines in the current hegemonic discourse in much of the west. Yet, we argue, it is only through the dual offer of what we define as illiberal and liberal and Islamophobias in this article that this racist discourse can become naturalized and common sense, since it allows for those espousing the liberal position to justify their racist discourse by opposing it to the illiberal articulation, even though both are part of the same exclusionary paradigm. While it remains conceptual, contingent and may be contested, the distinction we make between the illiberal and liberal articulations is present to accommodate different articulations and acknowledge the construction of an opposition by those espousing the liberal version for functional and strategic reasons: to displace racism and appear more mainstream. We acknowledge that this obscures their shared racist basis and eventual convergence, but argue that the discursive and functional distinction should be examined. We thus see Islamophobia as a construct, and the Muslim signifier as one which does not come from the individual Muslim in a subjective manner, but is defined by the onlooker in a position of power and imposed onto people through various types of generalization, misperception and stigmatization, such as the so-called secular and anti-terrorist laws, but also through the media coverage of Islam (Liogier 2016, Deltombe 2005, Kundnani 2014). Such constructions can be articulated through different types of discourses, from the more traditional forms of biological racism in unreconstructed far-right and white supremacist circles, to more ‘evolved’ forms of racism based on culture and even progressive tropes. Political actors across the spectrum rarely limit themselves to one of these articulations, and yet their distinctiveness is key to legitimize, normalize and internalize certain forms of racism as they appear to stand in opposition to more reviled forms. It is precisely these articulations of hate which are central to this article, and how Islamophobia springs from different sources and discourses and serves different purposes, contexts and constituencies, from the illiberal, unacceptable and extreme racist hate to the more liberal, acceptable and mainstream, but ultimately intersects. As noted by Mattias Ekman (2015, 1998), ‘Islamophobia is framed in relation to various national and transnational political actors and processes, and depending on the topic, events or circumstances, it intersects with various political rationales and processes’. In the following sections, we construct a framework to account for what we consider the two most prominent articulations of current Islamophobic discourse to provide a more flexible and comprehensive way to delineate Islamophobias and thus address them and where they intersect more precisely. These are, as stated, illiberal Islamophobia and liberal Islamophobia. illiberal Islamophobia: Highlighting and marginalising the extreme and unacceptable face of hate This section provides an analysis of what we call illiberal Islamophobia. It is ‘illiberal’ inasmuch as it is not only not accepted by the liberal norm, but denounced as unacceptable and alien to our post-racial societies (Lentin and Titley 2011), thus allowing the legitimization of other, less obvious and less racialized forms. Our distinction between the liberal and illiberal articulation here is not so much based on political and ideology theory, but rather on the perceived quality of each concept in the mainstream discourse. Liberal thus refers to the prevalent obedience to the constitution and the rule of law particularly regarding equal treatment of citizens, and a loyalty to the deliberation processes central to liberal democracy particularly in the form of elections. Illiberal in our case refers to the treatment of certain groups, particularly based on ethnic and/or cultural generalized traits, and the possibility (discursive or otherwise) to circumvent the rule of law, the constitution and even electoral results should a threat be considered serious enough. While ‘extreme’ and ‘mainstream’ Islamophobias could be considered more appropriate, we argue that what we term ‘liberal Islamophobia’ occurs both on the extreme and in the mainstream. In addition to this, as our examples illustrate, liberalism is a concept around which actors articulate their opposition to Islam and Muslims, whereas ‘extreme’ and ‘mainstream’ are not. Not only has Islamophobia experienced a mainstreaming (through the liberal articulation), but so too have what were once deemed ‘extreme’ or far-right ideologies, groups and movements, often by appealing to liberal Islamophobia as will be examined. The most notable examples being the Front National in France, the white nationalist ‘Alt-Right’ that has emerged in the United States (SPLC 2016), and United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP). Illiberal Islamophobia commonly emerges from exclusivist ideologies, discourses and identities associated with easily recognisable forms of racisms, typically originating on the far-right and within ultra-conservative circles. This type of Islamophobia is closest to traditional racism and often presents Islam as monolithic and innately threatening and inferior (in terms of ‘race’ if not also culture). It is essentialist and total as it includes all Muslims without making distinctions in terms of the specific belief, background ideology, behaviour or activity of individuals or sub-groups. Muslimness becomes an immutable characteristic (akin to biology): Muslims are innately Muslims and there is no loyalty test possible. It often targets those belonging to visible racial or ethnic groups associated with Islam, most notably Asians and North Africans, regardless of their faith or religious identification. This is most obvious in attacks on Sikhs. Illiberal Islamophobia can be witnessed in attacks, whether discursive or physical, against Muslims and mosques, but also in calls for repatriation or even genocide. However, illiberal Islamophobia is not synonymous to traditional, biological forms of racism, and is not restricted to white supremacist circles. While it is indeed most clearly related to traditional right-wing race hate, its most pervasive and insidious occurrences are represented by what Etienne Balibar, amongst others (Taguieff 1994, Barker 1982), has termed the ‘new racism’: a racism which has as its dominant theme not the biological heredity, but the irreducibility of cultural differences; a racism which, at first sight, does not imply the superiority of certain groups or peoples over others, but ‘only’ the noxiousness of the removal of borders, the incompatibility of ways of life and traditions (Balibar 1997, 33). This type of discourse remains very much on the margin of politics because of its illiberal quality, insofar as it advocates for different rights to different people and cultures, but it occupies a space between the most reviled forms of racism based on biology and its more insidious occurrences based on culture. This is enabled by several factors specific to Islam and Muslims, most notably the status of Islam as a religion, returning to the previous discussion, as well as the legacy of colonial discourses in France and Britain, migration, and essentialized constructions of cultural difference. In terms of the latter, this can take the form of colonial cultural essentialism and hierarchies or a pseudo progressive anthropological one. This opens the door to liberal Islamophobia by concealing its racism behind ‘culture’. Obviously, as with other ideological elements, the borders between what is acceptable or not, what is mainstream or extreme, are fuzzy and in constant evolution, which has been both useful and damaging for those parties and movements trying to walk the tightrope. In France for example, illiberal Islamophobia is mostly associated with the far-right, and the Front National (FN) in particular. The party, founded by neo-fascists in the early 1970s, took a conscious turn in the 1980s as its radical and uncompromising strategy based on racist and proto-fascist politics was clearly failing (Mondon 2013). With the arrival of a new generation of thinkers and expert politicians, the FN turned gradually to a strategy of normalization, which meant moving away from crude racist politics towards a ‘new’ racism based on culture. Under the impulse of the Nouvelle droite and Alain de Benoist’s theories in particular (Taguieff 1994, Bar-On 2013), the FN implemented a form of right-wing Gramscism: cultural power must come before political power. Far-right measures and ideological tenets became hidden under a veneer of softer rhetoric; the concepts of invasion, conspiracy and violence remained omnipresent throughout the programme, but were camouflaged by apparently positive or at least non-threatening labels. This discursive shift has accelerated under the leadership of Marine Le Pen, by moving away from its traditional racist past and discourse to a more hegemonic strategy aimed at securing the common understanding of key concepts such as the Republic and laïcité (secularism) (Alduy and Wahnich 2015, Crépon, Dézé, and Mayer 2015). However, the FN’s strategy has required an ideological stretch from the party as its quest to reach a broader electorate cannot take place at the expense of the more traditional and active section of supporters (Mondon 2014). Therefore, despite its attempts at reshaping its discourse in a more liberal progressive form, the FN remains the symbol of illiberal Islamophobia, although not its crudest proponent. As such, it falls outside the remits of what is considered acceptable in the hegemonic discourse and apart from the most ideologically- focussed groups on the right, most have tried to distance themselves from such labels. In the United States, illiberal racisms have not been limited to the far-right. The US provides an interesting supplement to the story in France as a fellow republic with a tension and contradiction between its liberal and egalitarian premise and reactionary, illiberal practices and state formations from settler colonialism and slavery to Jim Crow segregation, supported by movements such as the Ku Klux Klan (KKK). Yet, as Muslims experienced increased suspicion, securitization and attacks following 9/11, the American far-right did not target them. Instead, what we saw was not the Islamophobia and anti-Muslim hate, one would expect, but statements of support for al Qaeda (SPLC 2001, Winter 2010).2 One of the arguments as to why the far-right were supportive of the attacks and al-Qaeda was their shared anti-Semitism and illiberalism and opposition to democracy and the American government (Michael 2006, Winter 2014). August Kreis of Aryan Nations posted the piece ‘Why Islam Is Our Ally’ following 9/11 and later established the position of ‘Minister of Islamic Liaison’ (Winter 2014). Although not technically on the far-right, the religious right, another bastion of illiberalism that was on the ascent during the Bush era (Martin 2005) and was associated in this area with the inflammatory Koran burning tactics of Pastor Terry Jones, was not initially focused on Islam. Immediately following 9/11, Jerry Falwell, the founder of the Moral Majority, issued a statement that blamed liberals, feminists, ‘gays’ and ‘lesbians’, but not Muslims.3 A more coherent ideological Islamophobic project was gestating in the early 2000s from within the neo-conservative movement, who shifted their focus from the traditional ‘Arabs’ to ‘Muslims’, but it was primarily focused on the Middle East and foreign policy, specifically the ‘war on terror’, the invasion of Iraq and US support for Israel. Notable names included commentators Thomas Friedman and Daniel Pipes, who ran Middle East Watch and Campus Watch. There was also the Clarion Project, Jihad Watch, Act! for America, Center for Security Policy (CSP) (Kazem 20 June 2016). While neo-conservatives parted ways with the religious and far-right on social issues such as gender rights and abortion, they were illiberal on academic freedom of speech when it came to American foreign policy and Israel. Examples include Pipes’ Campus Watch, the David Horowitz Freedom Center and Students for Academic Freedom, opposing ‘leftist indoctrination’ in academia. Horowitz saw liberals, the left and political correctness as totalitarian, and thus sharing something with Islam, in writing such as Unholy Alliance: Radical Islam and the American Left (Horowitz 2004). Islamophobia did not emerge as a salient domestic political issue until 2009-10 with three mainstream developments. The first was the so-called ‘Birther’ movement which sought to prove that President Obama was a Muslim born in Kenya and was supported by Pamela Geller and Robert Spencer’s Stop Islamization of America (SIA), inspired by its European counterpart, and Donald Trump. The second was the Republican Congressman and Chairman of the House Homeland Security Committee Peter King’s hearings on ‘The Radicalization of American Muslims and response of the community’, and SIA’s ‘Ground Zero Mosque’ campaign, but these came and went without wider national mobilization. There are several possible reasons for this late start, lack of focus for the right and lack of popular national traction: (1) attention has historically been focused on African-Americans and Hispanic immigrants; (2) Muslims have historically been identified as ‘good immigrants’, with the largest Muslim population in the United States living in Dearborn Michigan and working in the car industry or coming from anti-American regimes and taking refuge in the US; (3) If Muslims are seen as religious and culturally and socially conservative on gender and sexuality, they would not present a challenge to the right, even if seen to reject freedom of speech; and (4) Anti-Muslim movements were fragmented, appealing to often contradictory interests and ideologies. Movements such as PEGIDA in Germany, the English Defence League (EDL) in Britain or Riposte laïque in France have tried to use the lack of clarity between the different articulations of Islamophobia to distance themselves from traditional racist politics. As Kundnani (2014, 238-239) noted, the EDL’s first video plundered ‘antifascist imagery in an attempt to construct a popular front against Islamic extremism … By claiming to attack Muslim extremism rather than Muslims per se, the EDL hoped to dispel the suspicion that it was just another fringe, racist, far-right group’. It did so by http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/David_Horowitz_Freedom_Center http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Students_for_Academic_Freedom http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/American_Muslims highlighting gender and setting up an LGBT division. While such attempts were thwarted by the obvious racist leanings of most of its propaganda, they demonstrated the increasingly blurry borders between the crudest form of Islamophobia and more accepted and even mainstream forms. Therefore, the illiberal articulation of Islamophobia has two elements central to our argument. The first is that it can be defined as a discourse falling outside of the liberal norm because of its calls for discriminatory practices based on culture, ethnicity and or/religion, but at the same time stirring clear from the most common definition of racism. The second element relates to the positioning of the contingent line drawn between the mainstream and the extreme, what is acceptable and what is unacceptable. It is the construction and containment of a clearly delineated type of Islamophobia at the margins of the political spectrum, one which falls outside of the liberal, mainstream ideal based on a liberal democratic fantasy because of its essentialism, unmediated call for violence, total rejection and open discrimination, which make it possible for subtler forms of Islamophobia to enter the mainstream discourse due their apparent allegiance to liberal democratic rules. From the illiberal to the liberal, slippage and distinction within Islamophobic discourse While the most caricatural forms of illiberal Islamophobia are usually easily recognized and widely denounced in mainstream discourse, we argue that a more mainstream trend has taken hold of public discourse and become increasingly normalized. The liberal articulation of Islamophobia can be contrasted with the illiberal one by its proclaimed allegiance to fantasized liberal and democratic principles, but both share a basic structure. In both cases, hate and prejudice against Muslims focuses on culture, as in the case of colonial Orientalism, which current forms have inherited and can draw on (Said 2003, Meer 2014). The difference is that the illiberal form, finding its roots in traditionally racist movements, draws on the anti-Arab racism of earlier colonial and cold war discourses, and the liberal form takes its cultural understanding of racism a step further by explicitly distancing itself from, and even repudiating openly traditional racism and hate, by appearing to focus only on ‘religion’, ‘culture’ and/or values, and/in relation to rights and tolerance as values inherent to Western societies Therefore, contrary to illiberal and more extreme forms of Islamophobia, liberal Islamophobia is anchored in a pseudo-progressive narrative in the defence of the rule of law based on liberal equality, freedom and rights (e.g. liberal versions of freedom of speech, gender and sexual equality). Critiques of Islam and Muslims based on illiberalism, particularly in terms of free speech, found their contemporary roots in the wake of the fatwa issued against Salman Rushdie for The Satanic Verses (Rushdie 2008, Appignanesi and Maitland 1989). This period also saw the emergence of Women Against Fundamentalism, founded in 1989 to challenge what was seen as the growth of religious fundamentalism and was both feminist and anti-racist. The issue of gender became increasingly prominent following 9/11 with the invasion of Afghanistan justified party by coalition partners in terms of emancipating women from the Taliban (Khiabany and Williamson 2011, 175). In more recent years, there has been increased attention on the gendered aspect of Islamophobia in response to calls to ban, and actual bans on, different Muslim head coverings. Corresponding to these developments and other gender-related ones, there has been a growth in literature on gender and Islamophobia, notable examples include Irene Zempi and Neil Chakraborti’s Islamophobia, Victimisation and the Veil (2014), Christine Delphy’s Separate and Dominate: Feminism and Racism after the War on Terror (2015), Narzanin Massoumi’s Muslim Women, Social Movements and the 'War on Terror' (2015) and Naaz Rashid’s Veiled threats: Representing the Muslim woman in public policy discourses (2016). In terms of sexuality, an early case was witnessed in the Netherlands with Pim Fortuyn and his use of country’s liberal sex laws and gay rights as a platform to campaign against Islam. More recently, the reaction to the 2015 Charlie Hebdo attacks rekindled this type of discourse and blurred the boundaries further. Before going any further, it is important to note that, by stating that mainstream articulations of Islamophobia are couched in the defence of gender or sexual rights, means that any criticism directed at discriminatory practices is necessarily Islamophobic. While oppression can certainly be expressed through particular versions and implementations of Islam, what this article describes as mainstream Islamophobia is the creation of a loosely defined Muslim culture and community inherently and homogenously opposed to some of the core values espoused in a mythical essentialized culturally homogenous, superior and enlightened West. In this vision, the progress achieved by the West is taken uncritically and portrayed as a natural state of things ignoring that democracy, human rights, free speech, gender and sexual equality and rights remain precarious, unequally distributed and unfulfilled. A similar concept to that which is studied here, has been discussed by Deepa Kumar in Islamophobia and the Politics of Empire. In it, Kumar differentiates the liberal form not from an illiberal one, but ‘conservative Islamophobia’. She argues that the key characteristics of the liberal version are: 1. The rejection of the ‘Clash of Civilizations’ thesis; 2. The recognition of ‘good’ Muslims; and 3. A willingness to work with ‘moderate Islamists’ (Kumar 2012, 133). She also adds that the liberal version is ‘rhetorically gentler’, but that it remains racist and imperialist as it ‘takes for granted the “white man’s burden” (Kumar 2012, 133). This last aspect is crucial, as Kumar links the emergence of liberal Islamophobia to that of liberal imperialism, and both to the Obama era. While Kumar’s contribution is extremely valuable, we argue here that even though mainstream/liberal Islamophobes may reject the absolute essentialist reading of the ‘Clash of Civilizations’, they do articulate nonetheless a civilizational/cultural clash when describing the differences between Islam and the ‘West’ in terms of free speech, gender and sexuality. Furthermore, the neo-conservatives central to the definition of ‘conservative Islamophobia’ did make an effort to distinguish between ‘good’ or ‘moderate’ Islam or Muslims and extremists, as well as emphasising liberal issues, or liberal approaches to issues such free speech, human rights, gender rights, in imperialist terms when advocating wars. First lady Laura Bush’s intervention on the situation for women and girls in Afghanistan in the lead up to the invasion is a perfect example of this (Gerstenzang and Getter 18 November 2001). In our framework, and to take the argument beyond the US context, two aspects make the liberal articulation of Islamophobia distinct, not from conservative, but extreme and illiberal forms: • It allows for limited distinctions between ‘good’ (redeemable) and ‘bad’ Muslims subject to a loyalty test, that is through (demands for) explicit expressions of opposition and apologies from ‘moderate’ Muslims, even though the line to satisfy such demands is arbitrary, and always moving out of reach. • It emphasises the apparent inclusion of other ethnic and religious groups typically hated by the far-right and traditional racists. Such groups provide a veneer of tolerance and progressivism as their victimization is acknowledged, albeit diverted onto a particular scapegoat: the racialized and stigmatized group can join if ‘They’ decide to integrate through hate. We argue that while this may be a characteristic of mainstream and thus liberal Islamophobia and serves to provide cover against accusations of racism, it is used by conservatives and even those usually associated with the more illiberal articulation as well, as demonstrated further. As a result, a simplistic and unitary picture emerges in opposition to Islam whereby the West stands unified behind a fantasized version of equality and freedom based on a clear negative homogenizing generalization or stereotype about Islam and Muslims, and positive one about the ‘West’. Strengthening the opposition between ‘Us’ and ‘Them’, this picture wilfully ignores the tensions within liberalism in terms of the legacy(ies) of the Enlightenment, universalism, racism, colonialism, imperialism and patriarchy, as well as the inequalities and curtailment of freedoms within the ‘West’. Contrary to illiberal forms of Islamophobia taking their ideological impulse from anti- egalitarian and authoritarian movements, liberal islamophobia acts as a decoy to provide ‘Us’ with a righteous sense of ourselves as the defenders of a more progressive vision of the world, and displaces these tensions, failures and inadequacies onto Islam as a sole responsible for our problems. To gain legitimacy, it is thus crucial that liberal Islamophobia goes beyond its attacks on Muslims, and appears to challenge traditional far-right and ultra-conservative discourses and ideologies. In its self-proclaimed yet limited opposition to the reviled ‘racists’, ‘sexists’ and ‘fundamentalists’ of all kinds, it enables far greater mainstream and even progressive acceptance. As has already been mentioned, freedom of speech, gender rights and secularism have been key elements to justify the mainstreaming of Islamophobia. To illustrate this trend, key themes were selected from our case studies. Liberal Islamophobia and free speech The reaction to the tragic events in Paris in January 2015 demonstrated further the prevalence of the liberal articulation of Islamophobia in France. While most commentators, be they journalists, politicians or academics, warned against laying indiscriminate blame against Islam, their initial disclaimers were often lost in simplistic and stigmatising analysis opposing free speech and anyone loosely linked to Islam. In the prevalent discourse, the ‘Muslim community’ was commonly described as foreign to ‘our’ land, values and beliefs. To cite but one example, Alain Juppé (7 January 2015), former French Prime Minister, Mayor of Bordeaux and progressive runner-up in Républicains’ primaries, while warning against divisions, told French Muslims on the radio after the attacks that it is their responsibility ‘to speak up’, as he believed that ‘there can be a responsible, enlightened Islam [islam des lumières]’. This had been an ongoing trend which originated in what Hajjat and Mohammed (Hajjat and Mohammed 2013, 12-16) have called an ‘islamophobie de plume’ (public intellectual islamophobia). This new hegemonic status was made clear in late 2014 and early 2015 when the two best sellers in France and across Europe, Michel Houellebecq’s Submission (2015) and Eric Zemmour’s The French Suicide (2014), played on the apocalyptic fear of a conquering Islam. Both were advertised widely as breaking further taboos, even though their authors were very much part of the ‘establishment’ with a broad access to much of the mainstream media in the country, and with their books published by mainstream publishers. Mixing liberal and illiberal Islamophobic articulations, both implied with more or less subtlety that Islam did not hold sole responsibility for France’s demise, and that a culture of emancipation was in fact to blame. For Zemmour in particular, the demise of France in the hands of Islam has taken place as a result of the feminization and homosexualization of the country’s population and politics, thus allowing a testosterone-fuelled and macho Muslim youth to take over. While Zemmour’s Islamophobia has been widely denounced in the mainstream media, but also used as publicity by his publisher, his ubiquitous presence on TV, the radio and the press has allowed for a more nuanced Islamophobia, anchored in liberal values such as secularism to become naturalized. It was therefore not surprising that the day before the first anniversary of the Charlie Hebdo events, Elisabeth Badinter (6 January 2016), a prominent mainstream public intellectual declared on France Inter radio: ‘one should not be scared to be called an Islamophobe’. In the US, freedom of speech being constitutionally protected in the first amendment and part of the political identity and mythology of American nationalism and exceptionalism, it is thus unsurprising that this would be central to Islamophobia, particularly in light of attacks on journalists and cartoonists. Yet, this was not something that the right could easily champion as it was aligned with the religious right who were authoritarian and opposed to anti-religious speech (e.g. blasphemy). With the right so fragmented and contradictory on Islam and Muslims, Islamophobia did take root in liberal quarters. Most notably, though Bill Maher, host of Real Time, and fellow new atheist Sam Harris, Chief Executive of Project Reason and author of Islam and the Future of Tolerance: A Dialogue (Harris and Nawaz 2015), who have been described as proponents of the ‘new liberal Islamophobia’ in the media (Kolhatkar 10 October 2014). In the polarized political landscape of the United States, the association of anti-Muslim sentiment with the right would make it untouchable by liberals and thus difficult to spread, but Maher’s focus on issues of free speech, women’s and LGBT rights allowed for such mainstreaming. Even before the attack on the offices of Charlie Hebdo, Maher stated on his show ‘Islam is the only religion that acts like the mafia that will fucking kill you if you say the wrong thing’. He continued: ... If vast numbers of Muslims across the world believe – and they do - that humans deserve to die for merely holding a different idea or drawing a cartoon or writing a book or eloping with the wrong person, not only does the Muslim world have something in common with Isis. It has too much in common with Isis (Jalabi 7 October 2014). Maher defended himself against accusations of Islamophobia by arguing, based on the assumption that liberals are by definition, against racism and prejudice ‘[w]e are not bigoted people. On the contrary! We’re trying to stand up for the principles of liberalism!’ (Jalabi 7 October 2014). He even chastised liberals for not doing the same: To count yourself as a liberal, you have to stand up for liberal principles: Free speech. Separation of church and state. Freedom to practice any religion or no religion without the threat of violence. Respect for minorities, including homosexuals. Equality for women (Maher 27 September 2014). This critique of liberals served to shame liberals and soften conservatives to the point where the space was created to allow for a broader based and more widespread acceptance of Islamophobia. The https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islam_and_the_Future_of_Tolerance Charlie Hebdo attack was used to justify that Maher had been correct. While the US State Department attempted to defend free speech, while not exacerbating tensions and fuelling Islamophobia4 , the Charlie Hebdo attack gave Islamophobes on the right, such as SIA, an opportunity to recapture momentum lost since the ‘Ground Zero Mosque’ Protests. It was a ‘Prophet Muhammad Art Exhibit and Cartoon Contest’ in Texas, co-organized with Jihad Watch, that would be framed as a tribute to Charlie Hebdo and a challenge to Muslims. According to Geller: ‘We decided to have a cartoon contest to show we would not kowtow to violent intimidation and allow the freedom of speech to be overwhelmed by thugs and bullies’. During the event, two gunmen committed a drive-by shooting, hitting a security guard, which Geller called a ‘war on free speech’ (Bever 4 May 2015).5 Liberal Islamophobia and gender rights The use of gender rights has been particularly prevalent in the stigmatization of Islam. Some features and manifestations of what we identify as elements of mainstream Islamophobia relate to what has been defined as ‘homonationalism’ (Puar 2007) and ‘femonationalism’ (Farris 2012). Building on the work of Jasbir Puar, Sara Farris uses the term ‘femonationalism’ ‘to address the political economy of the discursive formation that brings together the heterogeneous anti-Muslim and anti- immigrant concerns of nationalist parties, some feminists, and some governments under the idea of gender equality’. Just has homosexuality and gay rights became entwined with American (and western) nationalism for Puar, and Israeli in the form of ‘pinkwashing’, feminism and women’s rights have become considered parts of ‘our’ national tradition. Yet this nationalistic appropriation of apparently progressive, albeit fantasized struggles for minority rights has allowed many to attack Islam on the basis of its supposed inherent illiberalism and inherent incompatibility with ‘our’ way of life. Defences of women’s rights that emerge from within the mainstream Islamophobic discourse are typically imperialist, paternalistic, racist and even sexist reassertions of the patriarchal order: calls to ban the hijab, burka or burkini (Mondon 1 September 2016, Mondon and Winter 28 July 2016), as has been the case in France, present themselves as attempts to emancipate women from an oppressive patriarchal culture, but really only target and punish women with charges and penalties by demonising a particular garment, without ever considering the agency of the bearer. Muslim women are thus given a choice: remove the items or remove yourself from the public sphere and associated rights and resources (e.g. employment, social services and education) and return to the private sphere. Whether this flawed argument is based on secularism, free speech or gender rights, mainstream islamophobia demands from anyone wishing to belong to its fantasized version of the enlightened west to make a choice between the defence of these values and that of a particular minority. As Christine Delphy pointedly demonstrated in the French debate on the hijab, many French feminists felt forced into making a false choice between racism and sexism (Delphy 2006, see also Scott 2007). The basis for the exclusion of the other in the name of progress is to be found in new articulations of racism. This has allowed movements traditionally thought of as extreme to move closer to the centre ground. Recently, Pegida and other groups have attempted to exploit the New Year’s Eve 2016 sexual assaults in Cologne which were blamed on Muslim refugees. In response, feminists have been criticized for not rejecting the use of feminism and women’s issues in anti-Muslim politics specifically, and called on to do so (Ingulfsen 18 February 2016). It is worth noting that while some individuals and groups spoke out about the sexual assaults, including in ways that did not challenge anti-Muslim politics, the use of feminism in such politics has not been widely endorsed by feminists, and is far from feminism. The use of such discourses by Pegida and others are examples of the traditional racist- nationalist patriarchal attempt by men to appoint themselves protectors of white women from men from different cultures and races seen to pose a sexual threat. In the US context, Maher has claimed to champion women’s rights when it comes to Islam, and played host to reformist and ex-Muslim women. To quote: 91% of Egyptian women have had their clitorises forcibly removed. 98% of Somalian women have. Ayaan Hirsi Ali […] is one of them. She was scheduled to speak at Yale last week, but the school’s atheist organization — my people — complained that she ‘did not represent the totality of the ex- Muslim experience.’ Meaning what? The women who like mutilation? You’re atheists! You should be attacking religion, not siding with the people who hold women down and violate them, which, apparently, you will defend in the name of ‘multiculturalism’ and then lose your shit when someone refers to Chaz Bono by the wrong pronoun (Maher 27 September 2014). Yet, Maher has not been exactly liberal on gender issues, and associates such tolerance with femininity: ‘For a lack of a better term I would say the feminine values are now the values of America, sensitivity is more important than truth, feelings are more important that facts’ (Maher 2016). As the feminization thesis indicates, he employs gender stereotypes as a matter of course and provocation. In one case, he combined an attack on Muslims and sexism: ‘Dealing with Hamas is like dealing with a crazy woman who's trying to kill you - you can only hold her wrists so long before you have to slap her’ (Maher 2016). While most conservatives have opposed women’s rights broadly speaking, most notably the religious rights, gender was taken up by the neo-conservative SIA who, unlike Horowitz and others, were not committed to opposing campus liberalism. SIA co-founder Robert Spencer wrote ‘The Violent Oppression of Women in Islam’ and ‘Islam: Religion of Bigots’, and ran Jihad Watch, which ‘seeks to bring public attention to: The plight of women under Sharia provisions …’ (Jihad Watch 2016). Horowitz’s opposition to Islam and campus liberalism is something shared with former Breitbart editor, icon of the ‘Alt-Right’ and Trump supporter Milos Yiannopoulos who combines appeals to both liberalism, particularly free speech, and illiberalism in selective ideological ways and has made both Islam and Feminism targets of his attacks. According to Heidi Beirich of the SPLC, ‘Milo is the person who propelled the alt-right movement into the mainstream’ (Stein 15 January 2015). In his talk on ‘Feminism and Islam, the Unholy Alliance’ at Western Carolina University on 12 October 2016, Yiannopoulos argued that ‘Feminism and Islam are the twin problems facing America today’ (Yiannopoulos 12 October 2016), and that the two are in an alliance due to a shared opposition to free speech and penchant for censorship, opposition to the exposure of women’s bodies and a desire to control women, as well as hatred of the West. Referring to London Mayor Sadiq Khan’s ban on Protein World posters with an image of a woman in a bikini and the words ‘are you beach body ready’ from the transport system (as an example and like references to so-called ‘no-go areas’ in France, a warning to America), Yiannopoulos highlighted the fact that Khan is Muslim and asked ‘Was this move really to combat body shaming, like feminists wanted? Or was it to make the underground more shariah- compliant?’ (Yiannopoulos 12 October 2016). He also argued that feminism’s acceptance of political correctness and focus on campus rape culture, western culture and white men, ignores and enables Muslim sexism and violence against women. In that sense, Yiannopoulos is arguing that not only is Islam a threat to women’s rights and safety, but so too is feminism (Yiannopoulos 12 October 2016). It is also worth mentioning that Yiannopoulos has also attacked Islam and Muslims for homophobia, highlighting the fact that as a gay man he would be a target, but he criticized the gay community and liberals in general for failing to call out Muslims in the wake of the attack on The Pulse nightclub in Orlando by Omar Mateen on 12 June 12 2016, and focusing instead on gun control (Yiannopoulos 15 June 2016), Gay people need an end to gun free zones. Gay people need and end to the pointless pacifism of the left because we have a threat on our shores, in our communities, in our societies, in streets not far from here, that requires a response from the minorities the left has given up on. It refuses to protect us, instead it pits us against each other. It creates a victimhood hierarchy with Muslims at the top, well the problem with putting Muslims at the top is they want to kill everyone else on the list. Returning to the issue of gender, Despite the focus on women’s rights, however defined and constructed, it emerged that a US Airforce Research Laboratory report ‘Countering Violent Extremism: Scientific Methods and Strategies’ claimed that the hijab, far from being oppressive, was a form of ‘passive terrorism’ (Buncombe 24 February 2016); Muslim women were no longer victims to be saved, but weapons. Liberal Islamophobia and secularism The religious argument and its place in secular western societies has been key to the mainstreaming of the liberal articulation of Islamophobia. In France, Laïcité (often loosely translated as secularism), a traditionally progressive concept in French historiography and politics, has been brought back into the public debate under purposefully fuzzy and multiple meanings, and thus allowed various criticisms of Islam formulated in pseudo-progressive jargon to enter the mainstream (Mondon 2015). While its original aims, as stated in the 1st article of the 1905 Law on the separation of Church and State, demand that the Republic ensure ‘freedom of conscience [and] guarantee freedom of worship limited only by the following rules in the interest of public order’, a new understanding aimed directly at the singularising and stigmatising of Islam began to take precedence in the 2000s. The 2004 and 2011 laws banning the hijab and burqa under more general pretence were clear examples of the use of secularism to target Muslim communities (Scott 2007, Tevanian 2005). While the laws were couched in innocuous terms, part of the liberal jargon and apparently respectful of the constitution and rule of law, it was clear that it was the hijab and the burqa, and Islam generally, which were targeted (Delphy 2006). With the focus on laïcité and the law of 2004 imposing a very clear stigma on certain practices said to emanate from an essentialized community, Arabness was replaced by Muslimness, and thus the traditional racist characteristic became much less visible. Despite being recognized as a religious nation amongst Western democracies with examples ranging from the its founding myths of manifest destiny and religious persecution, its ‘one nation under God’ motto, freedom of religion in the constitution, high levels of religious belief and religiosity expected of political candidates, the United States is a secular republic like France. Although it does not have an equivalent to Laïcité, the US has a constitutional separation of church and state and no state religion. While this has prevented the institutionalization of religion in politics, it has allowed for the proliferation not just of religions, but activist and politicized ones. The dominant model being the religious right which, instead of promoting religious freedom, has taken a self-interested authoritarian approach to curtailing the influence of secularism and liberalism in education, sexuality and reproductive rights. As such, Islam is not opposed on liberal grounds by the religious right, which has veered from blaming liberals for 9/11 to burning the Koran as a threat to the Christian nation. Where secularism is central to Islamophobia is amongst liberal new atheists such as Maher, as well as Richard Dawkins, Christopher Hitchens and Sam Harris who all appeared on Maher’s show. In addition to being involved in the enlightenment referencing Project Reason, Harris is also author of End of Faith: Religion, Terror and the Future of Reason (Harris 2004) and bestselling Letter to a Christian Nation (Harris 2008). Harris and Maher targeted the religious right for their beliefs, intolerance and authoritarianism as well. But they did so mostly during the Bush era when they were on the ascent and without acknowledging the difference in power between the religious right and Muslims in domestic and international politics and American society. Therefore, what we witness with the liberal articulation of Islamophobia is a double standard which betrays its racist basis. In the examples we provided from our case studies, the ‘Muslim’ becomes the ultimate threat to universalism. However, Muslims are not posited as the only threat as others’ demands for equality and emancipation are also constructed as putting the current hegemony at risk. More than simply the racist construction of the Muslim, it is anything different from a very particular, limited and reactionary understanding of the liberal west which is placed under a state of suspicion and potential exclusion. As David Tyrer (2010, 102) points out, ‘Islamophobia codes the Muslim other in terms of degrees of difference from the universal white male, rather than through the hard logic of pure alterity’. Conclusion: Fuzzy borders and the mainstreaming of Islamophobia The first part of the article discussed briefly some of the many debates currently taking place in academia with regard to Islamophobia and anti-Muslim hate, demonstrating the very flexibility which has made it such a powerful tool. While there are many ways to demonstrate the potency of Islamophobia in our society, this article argues that the division between liberal and illiberal types can help us shed more light as to the ways in which it travels and has been mainstreamed in different political and cultural contexts However, this division does not mean that the concepts are exclusive. In fact, they are linked by the target and at the borders. As was argued in the article, the acceptance of liberal Islamophobia within the mainstream rests on that of illiberal Islamophobia being both easily identified, contrasted and denounced. Yet the mask slips easily and often, not only because there is a blurred or slippery relationship between the two concepts based on a shared antagonism, target and structure, but also because both are responses or backlashes to the impact of the liberal social movements of the 1960s-80s: feminism, anti-colonialism, LGBT rights and anti-racism despite liberals claiming to champion some of these. Illiberal Islamophobia stands strongly against these and wants the clock turned back. While there was once a clear support in the mainstream elite discourse for these social movements, a counter- hegemonic discourse has gained ground since the 1990s positing that the emancipation and equality of some beneficiaries of liberal rights and equality may pose a risk to western culture based around https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Letter_to_a_Christian_Nation universal liberal secular rights, by demanding ‘real’ equality, and protection from hate speech and against discrimination. Liberal Islamophobia, with its discourse based in fantasized liberal rights and thus appearing progressive, borrows much from what has been called ‘new’ racism, basing its criticism of Islam on no less a cultural essentialism, it emerges from within a backlash and views particularist movements for rights and equality as part of the cause, and legitimizes and mainstreams all, even illiberal, forms of Islamophobia. To illustrate this development, this article focused on two cases. The French case demonstrated the increasingly blurry relationship between illiberal and liberal Islamophobias as much of the discourse of the far-right, and the FN in particular, has been mainstreamed by politicians, the media and some prominent public intellectuals and commentators. Beyond the simple yet powerful mainstreaming of far-right exclusivist discourse, Islamophobia has also been legalized and thus further normalized through the laws against the hijab (2004) and the burqa (2011) and the recent debates around the state of emergency in the wake of the 2015 attacks. While Islamophobic extra-judicial violence remains virulently denounced as unrepublican, and thus illiberal, state-sponsored and systemic violence have become the norm in France. In the United States, Islamophobia did not enter the mainstream from the illiberal margins, but was introduced by the security-based neo-conservative version and popularized by liberal commentators such as Bill Maher and Sam Harris, both of which far overshadowed illiberal forms of Islamophobia. The liberal version found its argument legitimized in the wake of the Charlie Hebdo attacks. It was following the November 2015 Paris attacks that the conversation turned from liberalism, freedom and rights back to security and explicit fear and hate, calls for bans on Muslims and Syrian refugees and a spike in hate crimes against Muslims. When sexual assaults in Cologne on New Year’s Eve were blamed on refugees and the target were non-Muslim women as opposed to Muslims, the racist illiberal hate overshadows the liberal. This also could be seen in the United States with Trump’s campaign threat to ban Muslims from entering the country, a rise in anti-Muslim hate crimes and hate groups in 2015 and 2016 (Levin and Grisham 2015; Norton 18 December 2015, Lichtblau 17 September 2016, Potok 14 November 2016, SPLC 15 February 2017), his candidacy being supported or endorsed by figures in the ‘Alt-Right’ (SPLC 2016) and wider far-right, former Klansman David Duke and Marine and Jean-Marie Le Pen, bringing the two case studies and illiberal Islamophobias together (Neiwert and Posner 21 September 2016, Hafner 25 February 2016). In response to the rise in illiberalism during the campaign, Salon’s Jeffrey Tayler (13 December 2015) called for people to: ‘Follow Bill Maher’s lead, not Donald Trump’s: There’s a way to critique ideology behind religion without resorting to hate’. Tayler failed to recognize that Maher set the stage for acceptance of Trump’s Islamophobia in mainstream, and that these two articulations were converging. The situation seemed to get worse when Trump was elected, with the SPLC reporting a spike in hate crimes against Muslims and other groups in the month following the election (SPLC 15 November 2016), and then when he took office. A week after being inaugurated on 20 January, Trump issued his executive order Protection of the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States. The order banned Muslims from seven countries, including refugees from Syria, from entering the United States for 90 days and suspending the Refugee Admissions Program for 120 days (Merica 30 January 2017). In response, Harris appeared on Real Time on 3 February and both he and Maher opposed it, in the latter’s words ‘because we are liberals’. Harris argued that a blanket ban was counter-productive because ‘we’ are ‘desperate for moderate Muslims in society’ as ‘only secular, liberal and former Muslims, frankly, can police this for us’ (Harris 2017). Harris, like Tayler, was trying to differentiate between two articulations of Islamophobia and failed to see the Islamophobic construction of the good vs bad Muslim underpinning his argument or the fact that, along with Maher, he had a role in mainstreaming the Islamophobia that Trump mobilized. Although Harris may have a sense that the two articulations are converging, which may lie behind his attempt to police the boundary between them so explicitly at this point in time. This convergence became clear the when Maher hosted Yiannopoulos on Real Time on 17 February and the two bonded, despite different opinions on Trump, over their shared Islamophobia. 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Yiannopoulos, Milo. 15 June 2016. “Milo in Orlando: Gays, like Jews, should say ‘never again!’.” Breitbart. http://www.breitbart.com/milo/2016/06/15/milo-orlando-gays-say-never/ Yiannopoulos, Milo. 12 October 2016. “Full Text: Milo at WCU on Feminism and Islam, the Unholy Alliance.” Breitbart. http://www.breitbart.com/milo/2016/10/12/full-text-milo-wcu- feminism-islam-unholy-alliance/ 1 The report elaborated eight ‘distinctions’ which could lead to the unfair treatment of the Muslim community, including that Islam is seen as: a monolithic bloc, static and unresponsive to change; lacking values in common with other cultures; as inferior to the West; as barbaric, irrational, primitive, and sexist; as violent, aggressive, threatening, supportive of terrorism. 2 See for example this statement from the National Alliance’s Billy Roper: ‘The enemy of our enemy is, for now at least, our friends. We may not want them marrying our daughters, just as they would not want us marrying theirs. We may not want them in our societies, just as they would not want us in theirs …. But anyone who is willing to drive a plane into a building to kill jews is alright by me. I wish our members had half as much testicular fortitude’ (SPLC 2001). 3 Falwell declared: ‘I really believe that the pagans, and the abortionists, and the feminists, and the gays and the lesbians who are actively trying to make that an alternative lifestyle …I point the finger in their face and say, 'You helped this happen’ (SPLC 2001). 4 The US State Department issued the following statement following the January 2015 attack: ‘Regardless of what anyone's personal opinion is, and I know there are very heated personal opinions about this, we absolutely support the right of Charlie Hebdo to publish things like this …That's what happens in a democracy. Period.’ (Klapper 13 January 2015) 5 A similar trend has also been witnessed in the UK. Spiked!’s campaigns in which anti-racists, feminists and LGBT activists, ‘safe spaces’, ‘no platforming’, the Rhodes Must Fall campaign, the attack on Charlie Hebdo and ISIS’s destruction of Palmyra, are placed on the same continuum, if not equated, based on a shared inclination towards particularism, being ‘offended’ and censorship (O’Neill 28 November 2015) Not only are anti-racists, feminists and LBGT activists seen as abusing the liberal rights and equalities bestowed upon them by progressive liberalism, through their particularism, identity politics, political correctness, anti-racism, anti-imperialism and multiculturalism, they invited Muslims and their illiberalism and intolerance into ‘Our’ society, and continue to defend them. 
work_aiw7xhgv7nfipllfckju6ehy6y	----	1 A version of this paper is published in: James, Z. and Smith, D. (2017) Safer Communities. 16, 4: DOI 10.1108/ SC-06-2017-0022 Acceptance date: 10/08/2017, Embargo release 12 months Roma Inclusion Post Brexit: A Challenge to Existing Rhetoric? Abstract Purpose of this paper: This paper proposes that the UK’s exit from the EU is unlikely to impact heavily on the lived reality of Roma, given its negligible impact prior to Brexit. The paper sets out a critique of existing EU approaches to anti-Gypsyism that are based in discourses of racism and anti-nomadism and are typified in the EU hate crime agenda. The paper argues for recognition of the systemic social harms caused by discrimination against Roma in the EU and the commonality of their experience with other socially excluded groups that do not conform to the requirements of contemporary neoliberal capitalism. Design/methodology/approach: The paper comprises an opinion piece that sets out a critical examination of existing literature on policy and research in Romani studies and utilises theoretical work within criminology and social policy. Findings: The paper explains the inability of existing EU approaches to tackle social harms experienced by Roma throughout the EU. In doing so it suggests that the UKs exit from the EU may not have a significant impact on Roma in the UK. What is original/value of paper: The paper challenges extant discourses and proposes new ways of thinking about anti-Gypsyism. Introduction This paper is an opinion piece which argues that the EU has had a negligible impact on the lived realities of Roma 1 in Europe and therefore that Brexit is unlikely to have a significant impact on them either. We suggest that existing narratives and analyses of Roma exclusion fail to appreciate or acknowledge the wider organising social structures of capitalist neoliberalism that places the majority of Roma, along with multiple other marginalised groups, at the bottom of a hierarchy that fortunes the wealthy and privileged few. In doing so, we intend to challenge those popular scholarly narratives for anti-Gypsyism that are located fundamentally in discourses on anti-nomadism and racism. The paper will firstly set out how this existing rhetoric has explained the stigma experienced by Europe’s Roma populations. It will then consider how the EU has responded to anti-Gypsyism within that context, particularly 1 We have deliberately chosen to use the over-arching term ‘Roma’ for the purposes of this paper in order to conform to the agreement at the first World Romani Congress in 1971 to use this moniker. However, we recognise that in the UK many prefer the titles Gypsy or Traveller, rather than Roma, and likewise in mainland Europe the communities are diverse. Liegeois refers to Roma as ‘a rich mosaic of ethnic fragments’(1994:12, Kostadinova, 2011). 2 considering its engagement with the hate crime agenda. Finally, the paper will suggest that the EU response to anti-Gypsyism has largely only served to identify Roma experiences of subjective violence that manifest as hate crime, rather than acknowledging the systemic violence they experience as discrimination. In doing so the EU approach has insufficiently challenged anti-Gypsyism due to its neglect of the structural and systemic origins of this phenomenon. In order to effectively discuss the failure of the EU to address anti-Gypsyism as a systemic issue, this paper considers the problem from a Europe-wide perspective. In doing so it is then able to set out the potentially negligible impact on Roma communities of the UK’s exit from the EU. The paper does not intend to provide a policy analysis, but rather it aims to promote discussion of inequality, the role of the EU and Brexit as it unfolds. Existing Rhetoric on Anti-Gypsyism Since the mid 19 th century what was to become known as Romani studies has comprehensively examined the lives and experiences of the Roma (for example: Kenrick and Puxon, 1972; Okely, 1983, Fraser, 1992, Acton, 2010). As part of this work the prejudice and discrimination often shown towards Roma by majority societies has largely been explained in two interrelated ways: as products of anti- nomadism and racism. We will now briefly set out those perspectives and a critique of them in turn. In the first, the Roma’s nomadic lifestyles have been seen as diametrically opposed to sedentarist principles of modernity that rely on wage labour and fixed residence (Sibley, 1994, Halfacree, 1996). McVeigh (1997:9) defines sedentarism as ‘the system of ideas and practices which serve to normalise and reproduce sedentary modes of existence’. This divergence around attitudes to, and practices in relation to, work and land use has resulted in community tensions, social distancing and the stigmatising of nomadic communities. As such, Roma have been described as ‘insular’ minorities (Ryder, 2011), living ‘outside’ the modern environment (Karner, 2004). While this difference in attitudes and practices may explain some animosity and conflict between communities we would argue that it is an insufficient explanation for anti-Gypsyism on its own. To begin with, such explanations tend to be overly focused on the small proportion of Roma that are still mobile communities. Mobility does not equate to nomadism, nor does it denote Roma identity. Roma culture instead values ’the tradition or even potential of nomadism, economic independence and flexibility, different family structure, language and caravan dwelling’ (Kabachnik, 2009: 469), rather than specifically mobility. Additionally, even when settled in housing or on permanent sites Roma often continue to be stigmatised by the surrounding population (Smith and Greenfields, 2013). Anti-nomadism as an explanatory framework also conflates mobility with migration (Acton, 2010) and while 3 Roma migration may help us to understand aspects of their stigmatisation it does not fully explain it (Acton, 2010; Mawby and Gisby, 2009). This is most obviously because most Roma communities, including those in the UK, have been settled in their home country for centuries. Moreover in the early modern period the Roma were one small element of a much larger peripatetic population with social mixing between different sections of the population. Consequently many modern-day Gypsies and Travellers in the UK for example are of indigenous, not ethnic-Roma, origins (Beier, 1985; Mayall, 1988). Finally the notion of Roma living ‘outside’ of the economic and social structures of modernity and existing as anachronistic premodern minorities is problematic; Roma have long relied on the provision of certain goods and services to the majority population for their economic survival (Okely, 1983). Typically this relationship is dependent upon a distinct ‘peripatetic’s niche’ and its ability to exploit its ‘social resource’ base thus implying not isolation, but a long history of interaction and exchange with majority societies (Gmelch 1986). To turn to the second focus of existing studies of anti-Gypsyism, Racism has undoubtedly been a major factor in the stigmatisation of Roma. Racist notions are based on colonial ideologies of racial hierarchy which located the Roma in the category of ‘backward/primitive’ for their apparent indifference to the ‘benefits’ of modernity. As with other minority ethnic communities, Roma have been classified as ‘dirty’ (Sibley, 1994), as pollutants that are strangers in modern society (Simmel, 1971). Notwithstanding some debates on the nature of racism against Roma research on the racialised nature of anti-Gypsyism has been extensive (Acton, 2016). We would argue however, that on its own racism only provides a partial view on the current situation of Roma. Their historically vulnerable position has worsened in recent decades as a result of the wide reaching economic, social and political changes brought about by contemporary neoliberalism and globalisation. Within this environment, the endless pursuit of profit and associated consumerism has resulted in social harms that have also impacted on other minority communities and large sections of the working class (Reiner, 2007; Winlow et at, 2017). From a UK perspective, in terms of employment these changes have rendered many traditional forms of work carried out by Gypsies and Travellers redundant. Also, labour driven migration and increased mobility of the wider workforce throughout Europe has intensified competition for the seasonal agricultural work those communities had long performed. Additionally, many of the goods and services that mobile Gypsies and Travellers in the UK had once provided have become virtually obsolete, and travelling lifestyles are increasingly difficult to maintain due to anti-nomadic legislation and policies (Belton, 2005; James, 2006, 2014). Similar forms of exclusionary work patterns have impacted on the seasonal employment of Roma in the West of Europe, while in the East the employment, housing and healthcare provided to Roma within communist regimes has subsequently been lost (Cahn and Vermeersch, 2007, Raihman, 2007). These Roma have suffered chronic levels of economic exclusion and labour market discrimination that has served to push them 4 to migrate to the West, where they compete with other migrants for seasonal work that ironically may have previously been performed by their indigenous counterparts. Vilified by western Europe as economic migrants or ‘benefit tourists’ and by the east as harbingers of negative western perceptions about the ‘primitive’ eastern and central regions of Europe, Roma are placed in an untenable position (Acton, 2010). In addition to and associated with shifting patterns of employment, Roma have been spatially excluded within rural and urban environments. As land and property have become more valuable in western Europe and as wealth has been gained from its sale and use, Roma have been removed from it (Morris and Clements, 2002). Cities have gentrified and rural areas been appropriated by the middle classes as their idyllic playground. Despite the fact that research has evidenced the illusive nature of Roma ethnicity (Acton, 2016), a romantic myth of what constitutes legitimate ethnic ‘Gypsy’ identity has burgeoned while the reality of impoverishment and marginalisation for Roma is their lived reality (Sibley, 1994; Somersan and Kirca- Schroeder, 2007). Holloway (2005:360) found in her research in the UK that positive public perceptions of Roma were particularly associated with dark skin colour, rather than the cultural markers of their contemporary identity. Indeed, she found that those Roma who did not conform to romantic stereotypes of their ‘traditional’ characteristics, including having darker skin colour and living in horse-drawn waggons, were regarded as criminals and ‘hangers on’. The reduction of identity to ethnicity evidenced here has served to essentialise Roma and produced an inverted racism wherein their whiteness denotes inferiority. A double bind therefore occurs: dark skinned Roma migrants to the UK experience prejudice such as the negative press coverage that focused on their ‘foreign’ and alien customs, such as childhood engagement, bride auctions and child marriage, whereas indigenous Gypsies and Travellers are often portrayed as a sub-element of the white British underclass (Smith, 2016). Interestingly then, the prejudice is meted out against Roma on the basis of their cultural markers of poverty and exclusion as well as their ethnicity. Above we have identified some of the economic, social and political forces that have eroded the mobility, autonomy and self-reliance that have characterised Roma communities throughout history, pushing many into the disenfranchised end of the working class. In contemporary society we would suggest that it is necessary to acknowledge that once there they have been subject to the same neoliberal policies of deregulation and privatisation that have channelled large swathes of the working class, including other minority ethnic communities, into the precariat: those groups whose lives are defined by precariousness and insecurity, especially in relation to work (Standing, 2014). As the precariat experience this ‘massive structural violence from above’ (Wacquant, 2008: 24), so they have been consigned to ‘neighbourhoods of exile’. Such neighbourhoods are marked by ‘territorial stigma’ and are far removed spatially and socially from the professional middle classes who write about these trends from a distance. They therefore do not necessarily identify and thus obscure to many observers the underlying structural forces at play here. It is necessary to 5 address the spatial outcome of these trends that is an increasing geographic concentration of those, including the Roma that lack or reject the forms of ‘capital’ necessary for social mobility in globalised, neoliberal and post-industrial societies. Further, additional to the exclusion of those within the precariat, as a consequence of shared residential space and competition for the same pool of work Standing (2014:42) notes, ‘Tensions within the precariat are setting people against each other, preventing them from recognising that the social and economic structure is producing their common set of vulnerabilities’. Social tensions therefore arise within and beyond the precariat that can be seen in the rise in hate crimes throughout Europe (OSCE, 2015). These hate crimes have commonly been attributed to an increase of far-right groups and ideology rather than neoliberal capitalism that has actually created the conditions within which hate festers (Winlow et al, 2017) or is ‘enabled’, as noted by Chakraborti and Hardy earlier in this special edition. Roma experiences of marginalisation therefore are augmented by their economic and social vulnerability and exacerbated by racist and anti-nomadic policies such as ethnic profiling, segregation and forced expulsions (McGarry, 2011). The capacity of EU institutional and policy mechanisms to address the deep rooted social exclusion of many Roma across the EU through focusing on ‘anti-Gypsyism’ will be considered next. EU Policy and the Hate Crime Agenda Roma inclusion has been a central plank of EU equalities policy, particularly since post-communist transition. Specific recognition of Roma victimisation in central and eastern Europe led to the 2011 EU Framework for National Roma Integration Strategies. This involved scrutiny of existing and prospective EU member states monitoring of ‘anti-Gypsyism’ and securing civil and human rights as a condition of joining the EU. Victimisation on the basis of identity has been classified as ‘hate crime’ and ‘hate speech’ in academic and policy environments in recent years, following policy examples from the USA (Perry, 2001). The EU monitors hate crimes specifically (European Union Minorities and Discrimination Survey, 2012, OSCE, 2015, 2012, 2011) while EU funded projects have examined the impact of hate speech against Roma communities (PRISM, 2015). How far these measures have improved the lot of Roma communities though is open to question. In the run up to EU accession some countries simply minimised recorded hate against Roma to that end (Sobotka and Vermeersch, 2012) and it is evident that across Europe Roma communities continue to be used as scapegoats by the political right that has identified them as the fearful ‘other’ (Stewart, 2012; James, 2015). In the face of an upswing in anti-Gypsy sentiment across much of central and eastern Europe post 1989 combined with EU expansion, as noted above there has been a westward migration of Roma to the UK and Western Europe (Mawby, 2009). 6 Once there Roma have been used by anti-EU parties to symbolise all that is wrong with the EU principle of freedom of movement. Media and politically driven moral panics surrounding a potential influx of criminally inclined Roma ‘welfare tourists’ from Romania and Bulgaria were a key element in stoking up fears over large scale migration in the run up to the UK EU referendum vote (Smith, 2016). Indeed, we recognise that such fear mongering was partly responsible for the rise in hate crimes during that period (Sharman and Jones, 2017). Commentators such as Morris (2016) have argued that Brexit may represent a dire environment for Roma who will be beyond the reach of the security provided by EU inclusion policies that frame, fund and support national strategies for Roma integration (EU 2011). However, the cursory response of the UK government and other member states to the EU Framework indicates the low priority governments attach to complying with these requirements. The failure of states to act has been described by Perry (2001) as a form of collusion with those who commit hate crime, and the lack of international statute to address states failure to conform to EU policy has resulted in local intransigence, such as the failure of the state of Ireland to legislate against hate crime (Haynes and Schweppe, 2016). Burns (2016) research shows that there has also been a lack of successful cases sent to the European Court of Human Rights wherein state-tolerated and state-sponsored violence against Roma has been claimed. This may suggest that there were no cases to answer, though this seems unlikely given the wealth of evidence of such activity gathered by civil society and the academy (for example see: James, 2007; Clough Marinaro, 2009; Kesetovic, 2009; Szikinger, 2010; Bumbu, 2012; Buckova, 2012). It perhaps purports instead to the incapacity of the European Court to serve the justice needs of the precariat more widely and Roma more specifically. EU policy on Roma focuses on the necessity to tackle racism. However, this has served to remove the Roma experience from a wider discourse on poverty and exclusion such as that suggested above. The advance of identity politics and the assertion of ‘difference’ between the majority and various ethnic minorities since the 1970s has on one hand, been politically beneficial and brought a measure of social and political inclusion for minority group members. On the other hand, as Alleyne (2002:609) notes, this approach can “totalize people into ‘communities’ and serve to reinforce historically and theoretically untenable notions of difference between things unreflexively and ahistorically imagined as ‘cultures’, ‘communities’, ‘ethnic groups’ and ‘races’”. This makes it an effective strategy for governing as it drives conflict both between and within different social and ethnic groups. From this perspective social and economic inequalities are articulated as ethnically and culturally based through its preoccupation with what divides people and downplaying the underlying economic and political processes that are driving those inequalities and which impact on all social groups. Multiculturalism, as Winlow et al (2017) note, therefore offers a positive cultural programme alongside a brutally negative economic programme 7 characterised by ferocious economic competition and does not serve the needs of all, let alone the needs of the few. EU policy and associated practice has disconnected Roma from the rest of society by essentialising their identity (Surdu and Kovats, 2015). This has served the purpose of identifying Roma as a vulnerable group, alongside other minorities that are ‘hated’ and victimised on that basis. Thus, hate crime policy and practice has set out with the laudable aim of protecting the vulnerable in society (Chakraborti and Garland, 2012). However, the hate crime agenda has not sufficiently embraced the question of why such crimes occur in late modernity. Although, as one reviewer of this paper noted, EU policy may not intend to tackle the causes of hate, it has certainly asserted that membership should enable equalities and challenge prejudice (EU, 1997). Perry (2003) has noted the power of hate crime to serve as a message to the vulnerable not to challenge the hegemonic order but it is the lack of recognition of neo-liberalism’s impact on the vulnerable in society, of which Roma are a part, which has resulted in policies that serve the interests of the status quo. The beneficiaries of identity politics then, from which the hate crime agenda is derived, have subsequently largely been self-appointed community leaders working in unison with their well-educated, middle class advocates and ‘experts’ whose existence and social privilege is contingent on the continuing exclusion and stigmatisation of those groups they represent. Civil society organisations can be insular, failing to represent Roma voices (Okely, 2014; Acton and Ryder, 2015) while Valeriu (2013:np) lambasts the EU Roma agenda for its failure to truly engage with Roma and its, “Useless and very expensive conferences, bombastic empty speeches, copy and paste type newspeak reports, training for the sake of spending money and poorly thought projects focused on absorption of money rather than addressing the problems did nothing but delegitimised the European Commission and Member States efforts and weakened even further the already weak Roma civil society.” A hierarchy of need, vulnerability and victimisation has been created, reasserting existing racisms by setting up who are legitimate victims and who are not (Chakraborti and Garland, 2012). This in turn has encouraged right-wing extremists to utilise that hierarchy and identify ‘others’ as scapegoats for society’s ills thus diverting attention from exclusionary processes experienced in common with many working class and minority ethnic people. Identity politics and the EU policies borne from them have divided the disenfranchised, rather than united them. Despite its aims to challenge powerful elites, the hate crime agenda has fed this process by embracing multiculturalism without an accompanying critique of the political economy of neoliberalism (as was originally denoted by civil rights movements in the 1960s). The capacity of contemporary research, policy and practice to be blindsided 8 by the ‘logic’ of neoliberalism evidences its dispersed power and ability to shape even the most inclusive of agendas (Fisher, 2009). We will now go on to consider the social harm caused by the hate crime agenda’s narrow and partial focus and argue for the need to recognise discrimination against Roma as part of the spectrum of hate in late modernity. Discrimination as Systemic Violence The research and policy focus on Roma experiences of ‘hate crime’ in itself is problematic. Hate crime legislation and policy distinguishes between hate crimes and hate incidents but does not incorporate discrimination motivated by hate. Research evidence shows that discrimination is as harmful to Roma communities as hate crimes, if not more (James, 2011). It is therefore the bias-motivation, rather than the action, that counts from the Roma perspective. This has been misinterpreted by hate crime scholars and policy makers as necessitating legislation and policy against bias-motivated crimes, rather than a consideration of where that motivation comes from and how to address it. The populist punitive response to hate crime is driven by the horrific nature of hate victimisation, including murder, arson, physical assaults and criminal damage against Roma throughout Europe (see James, 2015 for a review of the literature). The insecurity created by these events for the individuals affected and their wider communities can be catastrophic (Bowling, 1999) and push them further in to the disenfranchised spaces of the precariat. However, as Reiner (2007) notes, the culture of neoliberalism creates an anomic society that erodes moral values and social solidarity. Consequently punitive law and order strategies do not impact on the perpetrators of hate, whose prejudice is borne of fear and insecurity that is exacerbated by those very measures and is reflected in media discourse and state discrimination as discussed below. Despite the extensive impact of hate crimes on communities, it is the discrimination they experience that really troubles Roma and impacts directly on their daily lives (James, 2015). As such it should be acknowledged as the central aspect of their experience of exclusion (Phillips and Bowling, 2008). Discrimination against Roma exists on multiple levels: exclusion from health and education services, from physical spaces and from civil participation. Across the EU around 90% of Roma live in households below national poverty lines and less than one in three are in paid work (FRA, 2011). Further, they have some of the worst outcomes in terms of health, education and welfare throughout Europe (EPHA, 2014). Hate crime policies that record EU wide levels of bias-motivated offending constitute recording of what Zizek (2008:1) refers to as ‘subjective violence’ experienced by Roma in society, where a perpetrator and victim can easily be distinguished. By contrast the discrimination they suffer as a consequence of the neoliberal political order is ‘systemic violence’ that is not measured or acknowledged. The precarious position of Roma as victims of discrimination has been evidenced by reports and 9 research as noted above and significantly by the UN Special Rapporteur on minority issues who acknowledged “the deeply embedded social and structural discrimination Roma face worldwide” (2015: 5). However, the minority rights approach to resolving that discrimination simply reasserts cultural political discourse that uses racism and anti-nomadism as the tools to deconstruct the problem. The minority rights perspective produces policy interventions to promote social inclusion that start from a ‘deficit model’. Roma’s social and economic exclusion are treated as a matter of individual competency and a lack of skills due to a cultural orientation that places a low value on social mobility or self-improvement. At the same time racism and anti-nomadism are seen as products of individual attitudes that can be rectified through education and ‘cultural awareness’ training. Silva (2014) argues that in this regard the current politics of ‘integration’ in the EU constitutes a strategy of denial that depoliticises and therefore shuts down discussion of the political and legal structures which protect privilege and govern minorities. The discrimination experienced by Roma is exacerbated by racism and anti- nomadism that structures their lived experience. However, it is determined by the systemic violence that manifests in their societal position as one part of the precariat - their insecurity in a global capitalist system based on individualism and consumption within which ‘non-productive’ elements like Roma are redundant and fair game for repressive and discriminatory policies and treatment. This social structural location in turn reproduces the systemic violence imposed upon it, replicating the hierarchies of wider society and pitching battles within different elements of the working classes along fissures of race, gender, competition for work, affordable accommodation and use of limited spaces. The hate that manifests as subjective violence within the precariat is described by Winlow et al (2017:8) as ‘inarticulate anger’ which is directed at the fearful other, who are likely victims of the same socioeconomic and political processes themselves. We would argue therefore that EU policy and practice, including the hate crime agenda, should challenge the divisive capacity of single issue politics and propose a collective approach to challenging systemic violence such as discrimination. Conclusion In this paper we have set out an initial critique of existing scholarly explanations for anti-Gypsyism that utilise anti-nomadism and racism to explain the marginalised position of Roma throughout Europe. Such explanations have been embedded into EU policy and practice and specifically inform the hate crime agenda. We have proposed that the EU response to anti-Gypsyism is based on a divisive approach that separates the experiences of different marginalised communities despite their commonalities as part of the precariat. The paper has therefore argued that the EU has failed to acknowledge or provide mechanisms to address either bias-motivated crimes committed against Roma or discrimination against Roma. Our analysis has utilised Zizec’s (2008) concept of violence in order to distinguish between the 10 subjective violence experienced by Roma as hate crime, and the systemic violence experienced by Roma as discrimination. The EU hate crime agenda has provided some measures of hate victimisation (though as noted above these measures are themselves problematic), but it has not acknowledged the potential cause of hate crime. We suggest here that hate crime is a social harm caused by the neoliberal political economy of late modernity that is itself systemically violent. Callinicos (2015: 4) argues that rather than representing the transcendence of nationalism, the EU “has provided a framework in which the larger European capitalisms could pursue their interests” and that “for the past 30 years… has functioned as an engine promoting neoliberalism both within and beyond its borders”. Roma do not fit within this system because their cultures are based on sustainable and communal lifestyles rather than on the fleeting individualised cultures of consumer capitalism. At best then, EU policies have resulted in recognition of the subjective violence committed against Roma. The capacity of this to result in changed systems and attitudes is questionable while the systemic nature of that hate remains neglected and not addressed. Laclau and Mouffe (1985) propose a broad based democratic coalition between migrant, black, women’s, working class groups and new social movements and we would commend a more critical approach from hate crime scholars to evidence the need for changed process and practice. It is clear that post-Brexit a more inclusive approach must recognise that our most fundamental problems as a society are economic inequality and exclusion rather than a lack of tolerance and cultural acceptance (Winlow et al, 2017). Indeed it is economic injustice and exclusion that is fuelling intolerance and divisions along ethnic/cultural lines. 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work_ajell3fuxvdl7fkjjjt4i6irca	----	Provoking Discomfort: A Theoretical Analysis of Racism at Columbia University School of Social Work 5 Triggered by differing responses of Columbia University School of So- cial Work students to a recent hate crime at neighboring Teachers College, this paper explores evidence that parts of the student body may, through lacking awareness of its own prejudiced tendencies, be acting out subtle racism and perpetuating the very ethnic divides that fuel racist aggression. The paper ar- gues that fear and an underrepresentation of minority students impede the real dialogue necessary to overcome such aversive racism - but contends that the in- trospective and emotionally honest debate which has followed in the wake of the hate crime offers a window of opportunity for change. Steps need to be taken to build the self-reflection witnessed in ensuing forums into the school curriculum and ensure that all graduating students are similarly provoked to the necessary understanding of our individual role in sustaining or combating prejudice and segregation. Only in this manner can we hope to overcome racism as a whole and become the social work practitioners we aspire to be – capable of resolving the conflicts and tensions within us, as well as around us. he recent hate crime at Columbia University Teachers College, in which a noose was found outside the door of a black professor (O’Connor, 2007), sparked an outpouring of responses from the university community to what most considered a deplorable act of racism. At the Columbia University School of Social Work (CUSSW), a series of forums was arranged in the ensu- ing days to allow for students and teachers to come together and discuss the event and how it impacted them. As a participant in one of these meetings, I was simultaneously delighted and surprised at the content and form of the dialogue. Roughly half of the participants in the forum were “non-white,” a large overrep- resentation compared to the number in the school as a whole. I took this to mean that the people present at the forum were those most affected by or interested in the issues of prejudice and racism. While it was quickly evident that everybody present deplored the incident, two diverging responses manifested among participants in the dialogue. On the one hand, a group of people felt strongly that a public response was needed to Andreas Ring T PROVOKING DISCOMFORT: A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS OF RACISM AT COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF SOCIAL WORK PROVOKING DISCOMFORT 6 JOURNAL OF STUDENT SOCIAL WORK, VOL. VI A N D R E A S R IN G outwardly express to the community our school’s condemnation of the racist act. This group’s response apparently echoed similar sentiments evident in other parts of the university, as students in the following days received a number of emails in which administrative university leaders expressed their denunciation of the hate crime. Although students at the forum planned to go further than writ- ing an additional email – they planned for a rally – their response was similarly focused on publicly distancing themselves from the racist act. The second, and in my view more interesting, response from forum partici- pants argued against focusing on this particular incident and seemed to consider the rally somewhat of an overreaction. This group, consisting largely of people of color, argued that the noose incident was neither surprising nor new, and that such incidents happen all the time. They argued that instead of focusing on one overt act of racism, which everybody agrees to condemn anyway, we should ad- dress the many slighter acts of racism that go undetected every single day, even here at our own school. Some participants of this group suggested a more intro- spective approach to addressing racism, which focused on training students in racism awareness. Different models of awareness training were suggested, rang- ing from voluntary workshops for those most interested to mandatory training for all first-year students. Interestingly, it was the “public condemnation” model of the first group that seemed to win the most popular support. Having argued in favor of the introspec- tive approach of the second group, I considered whether the lack of support for this approach reflects eagerness to point out the faults of others, and hesitance to look at our own. From previous exposure to anti-racist teaching, and from readings in my professional identity class, I realize that the diverging views of the two groups are not new. Laymen and scholars alike have suggested for some time that racism is much more than the overt and hateful acts of skinheads, Ku Klux Klan members, or angered youth. It is tempting to focus on the violent and aggressive acts such as noose-hangings, since the majority of us can agree that they are wrong and the blame is so conveniently located outside ourselves. Many anti-racist authors ask us to look in our own hearts, however, to see how our in- ner biases and understandings of the world help to perpetuate a racist thinking and agenda. I believe we must turn to such authors in order to critically evaluate the first group’s view of racism as something located outside CUSSW, something that we must distance ourselves from through public displays of condemnation. These authors remind us that framing racism in this manner – as blatant and overt acts 7 A N D R E A S R IN G of aggression – and defining ourselves in opposition hereto as “anti-racists,” represents an overly simplistic understanding of the nature of racist influence on society. Distancing ourselves in this manner not only disregards the importance of addressing the many minor acts of racism that go unchecked every day, but also undermines the possibility of overcoming racism as a whole by failing to address our own inner biases and prejudicial actions, thus ignoring our role as system-actors in maintaining the status quo. They posit that racism must be un- derstood more generally – as any individual act, intentional or not, and as any institutional policy or practice which has the effect of excluding or disadvantag- ing a particular ethnic group. It is when we accept this broader understanding of racism that it becomes clear how we ourselves, through our actions or words, may be inadvertently perpetuating perceptions and stereotypes that sustain rac- ist, societal practices. The argument is aptly illustrated by the work of Constantine (2007), the African American, female professor at Teachers College targeted by the noose incident, who in her responses to the event has addressed what she calls the mi- croaggressions that perpetuate a racial divide. Based on her studies of cross-cul- tural counseling, she defines microaggressions as the “subtle and commonplace exchanges that somehow convey insulting or demeaning messages to people of color” (Constantine, 2007, p. 2). As everyday examples of microaggressions against African Americans, she mentions being ignored by salesclerks in favor of white customers, and being mistaken for service personnel in stores. Professor Constantine prompts us to remember that when we fall into the role of micro ag- gressors, we are often blissfully unaware of the oppressive impact of our actions. Such aggressions are often the unintended, clumsy, but hurtful actions of people who do not consider themselves to be racist; actions characterized by “Whites’ harboring of unconscious or preconscious negative racial feelings and beliefs towards people of color, despite the fact that they may perceive themselves as egalitarian, fair, and nonracist”(Constantine, 2007, p. 2). Constantine defines this less obvious but no less harmful form of racism as aversive racism. Exploring the diverging views of the two forum groups through the lens of Constantine’s research, I have to wonder whether it is a lack of awareness of our propensity to engage in microaggressions that lends the greatest support to the outward-oriented and condemning response of the first group. Everybody can agree that hanging a noose on someone’s door is deplorable, but not everyone agrees with the second group’s contention that we must also examine ourselves for microaggressions, in order to combat racism as a whole – probably because the very nature of microaggressions implies that we are unaware of their pres- PROVOKING DISCOMFORT 8 JOURNAL OF STUDENT SOCIAL WORK, VOL. VI A N D R E A S R IN G ence in our actions. Constantine’s framework reminds us that, because we tend to be blind to our own prejudices, we often end up addressing the overt racism of others and leaving our own more subtle racism unexplored. Microaggressions may hardly register in the mind of a perpetrator – examples from daily life at CUSSW could include the unconscious tendency to overlook a particular ethnic group when choosing a partner for a class assignment, or the instinctive assump- tion that a student of color must be attending school on a scholarship. Small as such insults may seem in comparison to noose-hangings, Constantine cautions us not to ignore the accumulated impact of repeated and sustained prejudiced aggressions over a lifetime on the self-worth of a targeted individual. Without a devoted effort to scrutinizing ourselves, our tendencies to engage in microag- gressions can be hard to self-correct. Ironically, our inability to address our own prejudice may be perpetuating the very racial divide that fuels the larger aggres- sions we leap to condemn, by implicitly sustaining the “them” and “us” mental- ity at the root of ethnically-based violence. Building on such a framework of racist understanding, Favaro (2004) has written a provocative reflection paper on the presence of aversive racism at the School of Social Work. She suggests, based on her own experiences as a student there that CUSSW is infused with its own share of subtle, racist thinking. Build- ing her argument on examples of prejudiced thinking at multiple levels in the school, Favaro argues that both students and faculty alike display tendencies of aversive racism. Among the student body, she points out the exaggerated fears of her fellow, white classmates when walking through minority neighborhoods as an example of a skewed perception of people of color. In the classroom, she puts forth an instructor’s avoidance of meaningful discussion about racism when class content is challenged by students as “racist propaganda” to exemplify how in- structors are unaware of and susceptible to subtle racism themselves. At a collec- tive or administrative level, Favaro points to the lack of anti-racism workshops, classes, and field placements as evidence for the tacit acceptance of the status quo by the school, and challenges administrators to look to other schools of social work that have been more progressive in including anti-racism education in the curriculum. While I am left with little doubt that Favaro has a firm anti- racist mindset which may influence her perception and interpretation of events, the data that she presents us with is at least worth exploring. Moreover, Favaro’s observations are similar to those that I have made during my time at CUSSW. Most visibly, consider why there is a Black Caucus, a Latino Caucus, and an Asian Caucus at the school – but no White Caucus. Most students would probably respond that we do not need a White Caucus, but wherein then lies 9 A N D R E A S R IN G the need for a Black, Latino, and an Asian Caucus? It can be argued that their purposes are to serve the ethnic communities, in principal leaving them open to students of all colors, and yet they tend to be predominantly made up of students of one particular ethnicity. In a society continually struggling with racism, such self-segregation must inevitably prompt us to question the extent to which we are successful in bridging our ethnic divides. Do some Black, Latino, and Asian students at our school feel the need to consolidate in ethnic groups above and beyond their desire to serve a particular ethnic community and, if so, why? Does their consolidation result from a desire to immerse themselves in their culture and learn from and be inspired by other like-minded individuals – or is con- solidation a result of external pressure, such as microaggression from the sur- rounding community? Tatum’s insightful analysis, aptly entitled “Why are all the Black kids sitting together in the cafeteria?”, reminds us that the self-segregation of minority students commonly observed in school settings is a product of stu- dents defining themselves first and foremost in terms of their race or ethnic back- ground. Further, Tatum suggests from years of clinical experience with bridging racial divides that ethnic consolidation may be the outcome of an oppositional response born from consistent exposure to perceptions of stereotyping and rac- ist behavior, an oppositional stance which “both protects one’s identity from the psychological assault of racism and keeps the dominant group at a distance” (Tatum, 1997, p. 60). Tatum’s analysis urges us to bear in mind that the self- segregation observable at the school may also be a response to perceived racism or lack of understanding and congruence with the residual community. It is my impression, from the conversations I have had to date, that Tatum’s analysis may well be applicable to CUSSW. If so, what does this tell us about our supposed social work ability to be all-inclusive? Are we successfully role modeling the non-judgmental and non-aggressive behavior we purpose to inspire in our clients – or does our own interaction reflect the very same patterns of fear, prejudice, and microaggression that characterizes society around us? More than the evident racial and ethnic segregation among students in the school, I remain dumbfounded that nobody seems to talk about it. Debates on racism at the school seem to be impeded by a combination of high-sensitivity and raw emotion on the minority side, and a combination of insensitivity and a fear of stepping on toes on the white side – as a recent example from class illustrates. In a class discussion of racial identity, an African American friend of mine was asked by a white classmate why African American people were al- lowed to use the “N word” when white people were not. My friend’s response, presumably fueled by a perception of provocative intent and insensitivity on the PROVOKING DISCOMFORT 10 JOURNAL OF STUDENT SOCIAL WORK, VOL. VI A N D R E A S R IN G part of the classmate, was a clever and not too friendly retort, which effectively closed the conversation. Sadly, such non-conducive exchanges are not unusual at the school, and often fail to provide the more profound dialogue on racism which may mutually enrich both parties. Even moderated class discussions tend to run awry, as Favaro’s example and my own experiences testament to. All too often, discussions that touch upon race and racism are avoided in the classroom setting by instructors and students alike, rather than openly explored. Sue’s (2006) model of racial and cultural identity development provides a theoretical underpinning that may explain self-segregation and students’ prob- lems discussing it. Based on his work with cross-cultural counseling, Sue de- veloped his model of racial and cultural identity development to describe how people of color and whites come to terms with their own inner racism or expo- sure to discrimination. Briefly, people tend to go through five stages in dealing with their inner racism before they transgress on to a state of introspection and comprehensive awareness. The first stage is one of denial; white people refuse to acknowledge their active role in racism and explain it away for example with reference to “natural” tendencies for some races to be more hard-working, while minority groups deny that they are subjects of racism and subordinate them- selves to the believed superiority of the dominant culture by taking on its values and perceptions, thus giving rise to derogatory terms such as “oreo” – black on the outside, white on the inside. This is the stage in which microaggressions are most prevalent as both whites and minority groups deny or denigrate the stereo- typing and hurtful impact of prejudiced words and behavior. Stage two begins when an event or a person challenges the individual’s belief system and prompts them to begin questioning their racial understanding and perceptions of racial groups. Both whites and minorities are confronted with identity confusion at this stage, as they begin to see their active role in, or subjec- tion to, racism. People who laugh along at the stereotyping jokes made by others, for example, start to see how their passive acceptance of racist behavior can be as harmful as active participation. In the third stage, the turning point, those who do not digress from confusion back into denial are now presented with feelings of anger and guilt as they come to an increasingly fuller understanding of their past participation in culturally sanctioned racism. For both minorities and whites, this anger tends to manifest itself as a fierce and sometimes generalizing rejec- tion of white, “racist” society, coupled with a desire to be immersed in or learn more of minority culture. Minorities tend to experience this as an almost global anti-white distrust or dislike, which often leads to a strong consolidation in ethni- cally based groups. Whites on the other hand experience this as self-anger and 11 A N D R E A S R IN G guilt and tend to seek out minority cultures with which to identify – efforts which are often rejected as paternalistic or over identifying by minority cultures. The subsequent stage four involves a more introspective role, in which minority and white individuals develop a more balanced appreciation for the strengths of all cultures alongside a maturing awareness of racism and oppressive social struc- tures. Finally, stage five comes to a state of integrative awareness, which involves acceptance of one-self as a cultural being and a deep commitment to eradicating oppression of all forms. Using Sue’s model as a framework for analyzing racism at CUSSW, several of the above discussed observations seem to indicate that we have quite a way to go yet as we seek to increase our racial and cultural self-awareness as a school. The split of the student caucuses along ethnic lines indicates the consolidation of minorities, which is characteristic of stage three in Sue’s model. The lack of open discussion on racism due to a combination of high-sensitivity and insen- sitivity points to a student body generally caught somewhere between the anger and dismissal of stage three and the denial and microaggression of stage one, respectively. Finally, the minor support for an inward-looking response to the noose-incident hints that only a small body of students are actively focused on an introspective approach representative of those in stage four or five of Sue’s model. Using this cursory analysis of student interaction at the school, the ma- jority of students seem to be located in the early phases of racial identity devel- opment, somewhere between stages one and three, struggling with the accom- panying sentiments of denial, confusion, and anger. While these struggles are a natural part of any student’s racial identity development, is it not surprising that Favaro (2004) experienced that racism is neither acknowledged nor dealt with appropriately at the school. A cocktail of such strong emotions hardly produces the most conducive environment for debate. Admittedly, this analysis is based on cursory and potentially biased evi- dence obtained by Favaro (2004) and myself. Supposing that the analysis accu- rately captures the current state of affairs at CUSSW, what can we do to change this? Favaro challenges us to be proactively searching for the growth and self- awareness necessary to move beyond our aversive racism, and calls for debates and workshops on anti-racism to sensitize people to the impact of prejudice at the school. Referring to the instructor who neglected to explore a student-initiated discussion on racism, Favaro brings to our attention a critical barrier, however: “I sense that many students yearn to discuss context and impact, but without a catalyst or encouraging environment, conversations dealing honestly and frank- ly with race are not permitted to exist” (Favaro, 2004, p. 57). Her sentiments PROVOKING DISCOMFORT 12 JOURNAL OF STUDENT SOCIAL WORK, VOL. VI A N D R E A S R IN G closely mirror my own as well as those I have heard expressed from several other students. On some topics, open and honest discussion seems to be more the exception than the rule, as exemplified by my last professional identity class, in which our discussion of the then-recent noose-hanging incident sparked a debate somewhat beyond the usual level of intensity. Here, I recall students expressing pleasure at what they felt was an unusually honest and emotional expression of opinions, moving beyond what was often experienced as a superficial and politi- cally correct dialogue. “Politically correct” is a term I often hear used to describe the in-class conversations that take place at CUSSW – and most instructors do not seem eager to push us further. Why are discussions on race and prejudice so hard to have? Based on decades of work with overcoming racism, Tatum (1997) offers consolation that we are not unique in our struggle with bringing these sensitive topics to the table. Tatum identifies what she calls the “paralysis of fear” when it comes to speaking out on racial issues; a fear which affects all parties involved. Minority students still in the early stages of exploring their racial identity may be genuinely afraid of rejection if they release the anger that has been held back. Some white students may be unable to empathize with the pent-up anger that can emerge from minority students, and may react defensively or evasively to the sometimes sweeping criticism of racist, white society, leading to either explosive discussion or no discussion at all. Other white students may empathize, but be hesitant to engage in debate with minority students for fear of stepping on toes by inadvertently asking inappropriate questions. Feeling naïve in their questioning and ill-prepared to debate such a sensitive topic compared to minority students, who have often been exposed to these topics from an earlier age, white students may seek to steer around such debates altogether, despite a possibly genuine interest in bridging racial divides. Instructors and administrators, no less human, may feel obligated to protect students from discussions they fear can spiral out of control and damage relationships beyond repair, or they may feel ill-equipped to moderate such challenging dialogues and tend to avoid them altogether. Tatum’s response is unmistakable, however. To combat racism, we need to overcome our fear of openly addressing the issue: “In order for there to be meaningful dia- logue, fear, whether of anger or isolation, must eventually give way to risk and trust” (Tatum, 1997, p. 200). She adds from her work with one woman: ‘Yes, there is fear,’ one white woman writes, ‘the fear of speaking is overwhelming. I do not feel, for me, that it is fear of rejection from people of my race, but anger and disdain from people of 13 A N D R E A S R IN G color. The ones who I am fighting for.” In my response to this woman’s comment, I explain that she needs to fight for herself, not for people of color. After all, she has been damaged by the cycle of racism, too, though perhaps this is less obvious. If she speaks because she needs to speak, perhaps then it would be less important whether the people of color are appreciative of her comments. She seems to understand my comment, but the fear remains (Tatum, 1997, p. 194). Tatum’s experience in bridging racial divides is central to understanding the importance of the crossroad we stand at now. I believe that it is the open dialogue she asks for that we must increasingly strive to sustain at our school in order to come to a deeper understanding of race, racism, and oppression. All of the authors discussed above implore us to recall that aversive racism by its very nature is elusive, and that the danger lies in our tendency to overlook or deny our own prejudiced thinking. Favaro (2004) and Tatum (1997) univocally call for the instigation of real and open-hearted discussions at the school as the single, direct measure to overcoming racism and prejudice, while simultaneously pointing to the danger that fear will restrain the emergence of any real dialogue. The noose- hanging incident, however – unpleasant as it was – may have provided us with the very catalyst necessary for students to move past their apprehension and fear to engage in an honest debate on these difficult issues. Although the subsequent forums showed us that we differ in our perceptions of the nature and cures of rac- ism, they also allowed the participants the opportunity to wholeheartedly share these views and to grow in self-understanding from observing and reflecting upon their differences. It is critical that we continue our progression along this path. If the forums inspired by the noose incident become a temporary high in our ability to talk openly about sensitive issues which then dies out, we will have failed to take advantage of an opportunity granted us to inspire our collective, personal growth and to address one of the fundamental and difficult challenges our school faces. We have to ensure that this event becomes the catalyst Favaro asked for, which inspires students to take self-awareness training, especially pertaining to their own stereotypical treatment of those who are different from themselves, to a new and sustainable level. Columbia already has a reputation for being a predomi- nantly white university and we cannot, as a school of social work sending our students to work with mostly minority clients, afford to be seen as racially un- aware or insensitive. It is the impression of Favaro, myself, and other students I PROVOKING DISCOMFORT 14 JOURNAL OF STUDENT SOCIAL WORK, VOL. VI A N D R E A S R IN G have spoken with that racism is not dead at CUSSW – it is alive, although subtle, and students sense this. The problem is unlikely to go away by itself. We have to create forums in which white students are allowed to say the wrong thing, minority students are allowed to vent the anger that may emerge, and both sides may learn to forgive each other and move on, strengthened in a renewed and deepened understanding of each others needs and basic humanity. CUSSW faculty should understand the key role they can play here in submitting students to open and honest classroom discussions on racism, helping us to chal- lenge our own prejudiced ways of thinking and bridging the divides. Because it is unawareness that fuels microaggression and aversive racism, faculty must recog- nize that students may need to be pushed to the level of confusion and discomfort necessary to induce growth. Importantly, this demands of instructors that they are not afraid to deal with the denial, confusion, and anger that may emerge, and that they place faith in students’ ability to reflect, reconcile, and grow through the process. By staging in-class discussions on the issues of race and racism which students have trouble exploring, and playing devil’s advocate if need be, faculty can uniquely contribute to identify unrecognized prejudices and provoke the discomfort necessary to bring about a change of perception. The Challenging Dialogues initiative to increase instructors’ comfort in managing student dis- cussions is an important step towards furthering in-class dialogues, which may be bearing fruit. I have witnessed some faculty members successfully conduct staged classroom debates on racism that were widely commended by attending students, and I sense other faculty members attempting the same. Despite the positive responses from students, however, such methods are inconsistently ap- plied across classrooms, and many faculty members still seem uncomfortable moderating debates on racism. Administration could take a stand on tackling these difficult issues by orga- nizing an Anti-Racism Conference at the School of Social Work. A full-day event on anti-racism would unmistakably alert students and faculty to the significance of the topic and build a powerful foundation of interest, discussion, and inspira- tion from which to proceed. In light of the recent hate crimes at Columbia, a conference would also send a valuable and resolute signal to the outside commu- nity that CUSSW is committed to taking a lead role on anti-racism and cultural competence. Anti-racist pioneers, including any of the authors quoted in this article, could be invited to speak to students and faculty from CUSSW and affili- ated schools such as Teacher’s College on their perception of aversive racism and its cures. Ethnically-based student caucuses and coalitions should be encouraged to involve themselves by arranging events and raising awareness. In the days 15 A N D R E A S R IN G PROVOKING DISCOMFORT following the conference, anti-racism educators such as The People’s Institute for Survival and Beyond could arrange workshops for those students and faculty members passionate about anti-racism, specifically designed to challenge them to grow to a more complex understanding of their own prejudicial biases. Sincere considerations should also be given to expanding the self-aware- ness training day from one day to three or four whole days, spread out on mul- tiple workshops throughout the program. The current training day is a start to- wards instilling reflections on power, privilege, and racial identity in students but it cannot stand alone, particularly in light of the emphasis that the school places on self-awareness and cultural competence. While other initiatives such as community days and forums arranged throughout the year provide additional opportunities for reflection, these do not allow for the rigorous and incremental self-development that a repeated program of mandatory workshops would. Com- munity days and forums are largely voluntary and will tend to attract the students who are already attuned to the topic, leaving those “unattuned” without consis- tent training. To live up to our ambitions on self-awareness, we need a mandatory program of repeated workshops which may build upon the seeds that were sown in the beginning of the year. The problem we face is designing a curriculum to encompass a body of students in widely different stages of racial identity de- velopment, but work is currently in progress on how to solve this problem and improve the training for next year. Importantly, administration should take charge of conducting a compre- hensive survey of the student body’s experience with racism and prejudice. The arguments put forth in this paper are based on cursory and circumstantial evi- dence, yet coupled with Favaro’s (2004) paper, a pattern emerges. Surprisingly, very little hard data exists and no consistent surveys have been undertaken to document the extent to which students echo the sentiments presented here. A truly informed debate on the issue – and any real acknowledgement or disproval that subtle racism exists at CUSSW – would require a more complete under- standing of the experiences of the student body, in particular students of color. We have the practitioners and know-how at the school to undertake such a study, so it should not be for lack of expertise that the data is not provided. The risk that embarrassing figures may emerge can only be reason to hasten the process, so any existing issues may be addressed sooner rather than later. Care should be taken not to relegate responsibility for reform initiatives to student groups like the Black and Latino caucuses. As argued by the authors cited in this paper, racism is not a minority problem to be solved by minority champions but a communal problem, sustained by and affecting all parties and 16 JOURNAL OF STUDENT SOCIAL WORK, VOL. VI A N D R E A S R IN G resolved by all parties working together. Student groups such as Community Organizing Against Racism (COAR) and cross-caucus initiatives like Coalition for Action and Awareness on Race and Ethnicity (CAARE) that have emerged (and reemerged) in response to the noose-hanging incident are an important step towards a self-reflective and multi-ethnic student response to addressing school racism which deserve our attention and support – and yet without substantial like-minded effort from other parts of the school, these groups are hard pressed to create any lasting change. Student-led initiatives are inexorably prone to de- cline when the initial excitement wears off and interest shifts in favor of another topic, leaving often only a small core group to lift the burden. The responsibility for addressing racism at CUSSW is too great to leave to the fleeting support that a student initiative can muster. In the end, what we need is a joint student, faculty, and administration-led reform initiative – charged with inventing and implementing the tools necessary to address racism at the school, and instituting anti-racism training as a core part of the social work curriculum. Faculty and administration need to bring further support to the burgeoning anti-racist movement, recognizing that they too may need training in order to deal with their own biases and microaggressions. We, as students, need to take individual responsibility for our role in acting out or perpetuating aversive racism and be willing to leave our comfort-zone and talk about race and racism. We need to deal with our discomfort on this issue, because if we leave the school and have not learned to address our own, inner prejudices, and then who are we to pretend that we can help other people live their lives? If we graduate without learning to honestly and fearlessly address the unspoken, ethnic tensions among our own student body, how can we hope to resolve the conflicts and heal the wounds of the communities around us? Only by engaging in the painstaking self-scrutiny and difficult dialogues can we hope to overcome these challenges and become the social work practitioners we aspire to be – ca- pable of resolving the conflicts and tensions within us, as well as around us. References Constantine, M. G. (2007). Racial microaggressions against African American clients in cross-racial counseling relationships, Journal of Counseling Psychology 54(1), 1-16. Favaro, J. (2004). Reflections of racial consciousness in social work, Journal of Student Social Work 2, 53-61. O’Connor, A. (2007, October 10). Hate-crime investigation at Columbia. New 17 A N D R E A S R IN G York Times [online]. Retrieved February 9, 2008, from: http://www. nytimes.com. Sue, D. W. (2006). Multicultural social work practice. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons. Tatum, B. D. (1997). “Why are all the black kids sitting together in the cafeteria?” and other conversations about race. New York: Basic Books. ANDREAS RING is a first year master’s student at CUSSW within the Policy Practice method, in the International Social Welfare and Services to Immigrants and Refugees field of practice. He is currently interning in a middle school in the South Bronx doing individual and group counseling. He holds a master’s degree in economics from New York University and another from University of Copen- hagen, Denmark. His e-mail address is ar2549@columbia.edu. PROVOKING DISCOMFORT 
work_akfnbmta2bhpvcdbfw5ghjdioq	----	TSQ61_05Nay_1pp 64..79 The Atmosphere of Trans* Politics in the Global North and West YV E. NAY Abstract This essay scrutinizes the conundrum of recent trans* politics in the global north and west. Although this trans* politics has achieved important social changes for some gender-variant people, it at the same time participates in neoliberal notions of equality. In addition, while constructing a seemingly legitimate subject called transgender, this politics perpetuates colonial violence. This article suggests a turn to atmospheres as a crucial term to reassess this quandary. With a focus on discomfort, this article explores ways to decolonize and deprivilege transnational trans* politics in the global north and west. It argues that such an approach might open up ways to consider trans* politics as an imaginary that would enable fragmented realities, bodies, and selves to become legible and articulable and thereby also make it possible to name the constitutive violence that is at work in politics under the purview of trans*. Keywords global transgender politics, politics of affect, mood, empathy, discomfort F or several decades now, a wealth of local, regional, and transnational trans* communities, networks, and organizations have been emerging in different parts of the globe to counter the worldwide discrimination of trans* people in diverse facets of life. Since the 2000s in particular, political activism initiated by trans* people and their allies has raised the awareness of politicians, legislators, and the general public regarding the challenges facing trans* persons. As a result, innovative legislation on gender recognition has recently been adopted or is cur- rently being drafted in various jurisdictions.1 This article takes as its point of departure this specific moment in recent trans* politics in the global north and west, a version of politics that rapidly grew strong, expanding from its predominantly local dimension to an increasingly global movement with transnational impacts. This version of trans* politics is pervaded by ideals of success and goal orientation and considered as progress for an assumed trans* community. However, as trans* activists and scholars aptly caution, these politics need not only be celebrated as progressive achievement for gender-variant 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 TSQ: Transgender Studies Quarterly * Volume 6, Number 1 * February 2019 64 DOI 10.1215/23289252-7253496 ª 2019 Duke University Press TSQ61_05Nay_1pp.3d 10/27/18 12:32am Page 64 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 people. On the contrary, this version of trans* politics should also be seen as assimilatory professionalization that normalizes and flattens out the differences among the divergent needs of various trans* people. Building on this critique, the purpose of this article is to explore the question, how can trans* politics— particularly transnational trans* politics from the global north and west—address current injustices without falling prey to the ultimately counterproductive accom- modation associated with neoliberal notions of equality? And, furthermore, how can these injustices be contested without perpetuating colonizing violence in the process of constructing a seemingly legitimate subject called transgender/trans* that is bound up with questions of nation, geographical position, and citizenship and is thus intertwined with racism, xenophobia, and class privilege? In response to this dilemma, I argue that thinking affect and politics together as imbricated may help reassess the conundrum of trans* politics acting from a privileged position predominantly located in the global north and west. I suggest that taking into account the affective entanglements of politics under the purview of trans* opens a way to consider politics as an imaginary that enables fragmented realities, bodies, and selves to become legible and articulable. It also makes it possible to name the constitutive violence that is at work thereby in such trans* politics. This leads me to explore discomfort as an atmosphere in privileged trans* politics located in and acting from the global north and west. Such an atmosphere may enable kinds of change that work against a politics that is unilateral, policy oriented, assimilationist, additive, and that elides plurality. The Euro- and U.S.-centric Regimes of Knowledge in Trans* Politics Awareness among the general public of the challenges facing trans* persons, as well as the legislative achievements in confronting these challenges, are pre- dominantly associated with the global trans* politics of institutions such as the European Union. However, this politics is a result of trans* activists’ increasing challenge of the state’s power regarding the regulations of legal and medical gender assignment. Trans* activists more and more use the courts to hold their govern- ments accountable for discriminatory practices with regard to trans* people’s needs. As a result, the Council of Europe, for example, recently stated that “severe vio- lations of human rights occur in relation to legal gender recognition” (Council of Europe 2015: 1) and called for a diminishing of those specific forms of discrimi- nation that trans* people face. The regulation of transgender within legal, medical, psychological, and public realms has been addressed in reports and surveys recently commissioned by political entities in the global north and west. For example, the European Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) published a report in 2014 on the multiple forms of discrimination against trans* people in all European Union member states (European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights FRA 2014), which TSQ61_05Nay_1pp.3d 10/27/18 12:32am Page 65 NAY * Trans* Politics in The Global North and West 65 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 underscores the results of previous surveys (Whittle, Turner, and Combs 2008; European Commission 2012; Balzer and Hutta 2012). Particularly striking forms of discrimination cited in that report include violence; harassment; the widespread lack of gender recognition under the law; and the often lengthy, complicated, and pathologizing procedures necessary to obtain legal gender recognition, as well as difficulties in accessing appropriate general health care and gender-confirming treatment (see also Hammarberg 2009; International Commission of Jurists 2007; United Nations OHCHR 2012). As the Council of Europe points out, these reports aim “to provide law-makers with information on the challenges that transgender people currently face” (Council of Europe 2015: 1). Indispensable as this recent, publicly highlighted role of transnational institutions is in the fight to enable and improve lives for many trans* persons, it has several limitations. To begin, the role recently taken on by these transnational institutions often eclipses the decades-long grassroots activism of trans* people that served as precondition for such institutional politics (see exemplarily Stryker 2008; Baumgartinger 2017; Wilchins 2017). Furthermore, informed by Euro- and U.S.-centric regimes of knowledge, these policies are steeped in colonial violence. This is evident if we scrutinize the politically commissioned reports themselves on which the European Union’s transnational politics regarding trans* are built. The imperative to examine these documents is prompted by the cautionary remarks of Susan Stryker and Paisley Currah (2014), who point out the importance of questioning the steady growth of politically commissioned research on trans* and to analyze the politics aligned with this research. Accordingly, it is crucial that the European Union’s official statements be examined to ascertain what they refer to when reporting on trans* and gender-variant lives. What political notions of transgender are these reports producing? And what are the effects this term has when it circulates in the global trans* politics of supranational entities such as institutions of the European Union? The term transgender as employed in this commissioned research com- monly denotes a broad range of gender-nonconforming people. Such subsump- tion of the multiplicity of gender variance calls for critical inspection. In doing so, I align my considerations with existing research in transgender studies, which insists that the historicity and cultural contingency of this term be borne in mind (Stryker and Whittle 2006; Stryker and Aizura 2013; Stryker and Currah 2014; Stryker 1998). As transgender studies scholars assert, the generalizing use of the category transgender in the global north and west has increasingly subsumed cross-cultural variations in nonconforming gender embodiments under an onto- logical Euro- and U.S.-centric category, a category that is bound up with narra- tives of modernization (Beollstorff et al. 2014; Aizura et al. 2014). In this regard, David Valentine (2007) points out that, as a category, transgender is often imagined TSQ61_05Nay_1pp.3d 10/27/18 12:32am Page 66 66 TSQ * Transgender Studies Quarterly 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 as a form of progressive modernity that restores outmoded conceptions of gender, sexuality, embodiment, and identity (see also Davidson 2007). Accordingly, it cannot be understood as a “modern” innovation but must be regarded as deeply embedded in political and economic dominance. The use of this category elicits the question of how the notion transgender circulates within a colonizing project that grasps gender variance within predomi- nantly white, Euro- and U.S.-centric frames of reference and regimes of knowledge. This is evident in the following excerpt from the mentioned Council of Europe report: “The emergence in Europe of the right to gender identity is a positive development and may represent a model for future national legislations” (Council of Europe 2015: 1). While the Council of Europe should be lauded for advocating the legislative implementation of self-determined gender assignment for trans* people, a measure also recommended by the European human rights commis- sioner (Hammarberg 2009), the mode of how it does this must be questioned. For, at the same time as it seeks to address the problem, this statement also consolidates the idea of Europe as the “vanguard” of human rights as well as a “model” for the “future” of trans* rights. What is problematic about the latter is that trans* rights thereby become a crucial element of what appears to be con- stitutive of so-called liberal democratic nation-states. Such calls for trans* rights as generalized “human rights” (Council of Europe 2015: 1) has an impact not only on European nation states; it also operates on a global scale. By acting on, defending, and enforcing trans* activist claims to self-determine one’s gender as a “universal” right issued by allegedly “avant-garde” European institutions, such trans* politics reconstitutes and consolidates the colonial idea of Europe as the locus of “modernity,” “progress,” and as the “cradle of democracy.” As postcolonial and decolonial theory have shown (see for example Spivak 1988, 1990; Mohanty 1988; Bacchetta and Haritaworn 2001; Massad 2007; Puar 2007; Kulpa and Mizielińska 2011), such approaches both anchor and proliferate violent colonial regimes. Statements such as these by the European Council propel the power to assert European global politics. Supranational institu- tions such as the Council of Europe thus produce and consolidate a notion of transgender that allows them to advocate for “justice” and thereby take on a role of “vanguard” for human rights while reproducing violent colonial regimes of knowledge. This has manifold consequences for the ways of living and of speci- fying gender variance in nonprivileged contexts within and beyond the global north and west. As such, transnational politics using the universalizing term transgender refers to a legal, medical and political regulation of gender-variant expressions that secures rights for some trans* people at the expense of others, while reifying the inequity of participation in resources, and of recognition, representa- tion, and survival (Aizura et al. 2014; Beollstorff et al. 2014). TSQ61_05Nay_1pp.3d 10/27/18 12:32am Page 67 NAY * Trans* Politics in The Global North and West 67 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 However necessary it might be to continue engaging with such politics of “universal” human rights for trans* people, it is important—particularly from a perspective of politics from the global north and west—to address their violent impacts as well as the conundrum of this currently strong transnational presence of trans* politics. To do so, I focus on the affective entanglements of trans* politics; that is, I shift the perspective from the politics of recognition and rights to the affective dimensions of trans* politics. The Affective Entanglements of Trans* Politics in the Global North and West Research from affect studies shed some light on how emotions and affects inform politics. Also referred to as the “affective turn” (Clough and Halley 2007): this strand of research takes affect, emotion, feeling, and sensation as significant matters of concern. In line with feminist, queer, and postcolonial critique, affect studies illustrates how emotionality and rationality, or subjectivity and objec- tivity, have been attributed to certain individuals in order to establish gendered, sexualized, racialized, and classed hierarchies (Lorde 1984; Ahmed 2000; Skeggs 2005; Puar 2007; Butler 2009; Berlant 2008; for an overview, see Gregg and Seigh- worth 2010; Baier et al. 2014). Conceptually, my approach to the affective entan- glements of trans* politics is based on what Raymond Williams (1977) has called “structures of feeling.” Williams’s influential work understands culture as feelings that are entangled with regimes of power—not as “feeling against thought, but thought as felt and feeling as thought” (Williams 1977: 132). I furthermore conceive of affect as the crossover between body and mind, “inside” and “outside,” the self and the “other.” Like Sara Ahmed (2004), instead of asking what emotions are, I rather focus on what they do—that is, on how they contribute to the constitution of “inside” and “outside,” of the self and the “other.” In this regard, Ahmed writes, “In my model of sociality of emotions, I suggest that emotions create the very effect of the surfaces and boundaries that allow us to distinguish an inside and an outside in the first place. So, emotions are not simply something ‘I’ or ‘we’ have. Rather, it is through emotions, or how we respond to objects and others, that surfaces or boundaries are made” (Ahmed 2004: 10). Thus, individuals do not possess emo- tions, but emotions direct the ways in which the self is placed in relation to the “other.” Put differently, the “inside” of the self is established only through the exchange of emotions with its “outside.” This conceptualization allows us to view affect and emotion as both intimate and impersonal. In terms of trans* politics, this conceptualization blurs the clear-cut divide between the individual inside and the social outside of trans* lives. Discrimination and violence against trans* people, the obstacles to recog- nition of trans* people, and the lack of public awareness of trans* persons’ lives, persistently evoke various feelings. Whatever those feelings might be, they are, TSQ61_05Nay_1pp.3d 10/27/18 12:32am Page 68 68 TSQ * Transgender Studies Quarterly 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 however, neither purely individual nor solely socially induced, but are rather reciprocal. Thus, when we consider a so-called feeling of “being” trans* and feelings involved with a gender-variant expression as neither intrinsic nor as socially induced and assigned, it becomes possible to interweave the “inside” and “outside” of the self. In this way, affect can be understood as saturated by regimes of power and, conversely, regimes of power can be understood as pervaded by affect. Drawing on these insights from affect theory brings into focus the formative force of affect for politics, which makes it possible to consider emotion as a political resource for trans* politics. Accordingly, trans* activism is to be conceived as an affectively saturated atmosphere rather than the accumulation of feeling individuals. In order to reassess the conundrum of trans* politics, I underscore the importance of moods in trans* politics as an important addition to the felt experiences of trans* individuals. To begin, I scru- tinize the structure of feelings of trans* politics and its repercussions on a global level. In doing so, I consider a further site of trans* politics that promises to address the problem of marginalizing particular trans* lives that the supranational insti- tutions mentioned above fail to address and recognize adequately. This political critique can be illustrated by recourse to the work of C. Riley Snorton and Jin Haritaworn (2013). While other postcolonial and antiracist scholarship primarily focuses on feminist as well as gay and lesbian politics, Snorton and Haritaworn examine the global entanglements of trans* activism, which makes their research particularly salient for the present argument.2 A central feature of their work is to point out trans* politics’ attachment to hate crimes against trans* people. While Snorton and Haritaworn condemn the violence (often resulting in death), they question the politics that addresses these hate crimes. This violence is made visible by transnational-scale political projects, such as the community-building rituals of the Transgender Day of Remembrance (TDOR), or statistical surveys like the Trans Murder Monitoring (TMM) Project that systematically collects data on the killings of trans* people worldwide. In their critical analyses of these projects, Snorton and Haritaworn reference a form of power that Achille Mbembe (2003) calls “necro- politics,” a term he uses to describe a regime of power that puts one part of a population to death while it strengthens the vitality of another part of the popu- lation. As Snorton and Haritaworn demonstrate, the politics targeting hate crimes paradoxically fosters the bio- and necropolitical implications of trans* mortality and trans* vitality. Accordingly, the mentioned projects on deadly violence, par- ticularly against Black trans* women and trans* women of color, lay the foundation for and are utilized by privileged white trans* activists who live in metropoles in the global north and west (see Haritaworn 2015). When certain white trans* activists assume politically leftist and queer-feminist positions—by engaging in struggles in the name of queer diversity, by fighting for the recognition of trans* persons, in TSQ61_05Nay_1pp.3d 10/27/18 12:32am Page 69 NAY * Trans* Politics in The Global North and West 69 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 confronting the violence against trans* people of color—they use hate crimes against Black trans* women and trans* people of color as a resource to achieve political aims that primarily serve to increase their own visibility, safety, and vitality. Haritaworn furthermore shows how this activism is enmeshed with racialization and ethnicization, as white trans* activists in the global north and west locate the subject who afflicts trans*phobic violence in the figure that is both of Islamic faith and economically precarious. Thus, through their affective attachment to the trans* deaths of predominately Black trans* women and trans* people of color, trans* activist campaigns against violence also draw strength from the widespread racist panic around Muslims’ alleged homo- and trans*phobia. As Snorton and Haritaworn argue, these actions do nothing to fundamentally alter the conditions under which the vitality of the lives of trans* people of color are compromised; instead they instrumentalize the deaths of trans* people of color for their own purposes.3 Rather than serve the well-being particularly of Black trans* women and trans* people of color, their deaths function as a vital resource for the development and global expansion of homo- and trans*normative political projects.4 Such an affective political attachment to hate crimes by white queer- feminist and trans* politics in the global north and west consolidates the idea of Europe as “progressive.” It does so by turning trans*ness into a symbol of “free- dom,” thereby legitimating imperial wars against the so-called terror, and by accompanying such wars with restrictive and racist migration regimes in “Wes- tern,” “secular,” and “liberal” nation-states. Against the backdrop of this research, I suggest that the structure of feelings of privileged, predominantly white trans* activism and transnational-scale trans* politics in the global north and west that argue for a commitment to address the needs of the most vulnerable and disenfranchised trans* individuals and groups is based on affective attachments that enable collective political action and at the same time coconstitutively performs racist, xenophobic, anti-Islamic, and classist violence. This affective structure lays the foundation for the lived atmospheres within trans* politics in the global north and west. Focusing on this growing form of political action—and on how this version of politics is informed by the force of affect, initially as it manifests itself in attachments and finally in atmospheres— makes it possible to see the circulation of emotions within trans* politics as both stabilizing and unsettling for political action and social change. The Atmosphere of Discomfort and the Imaginary of Trans* Politics In light of these findings that show the limits of political action and social change in present trans* politics in the global north and west, the question is, how— from a position of trans* activism in the global north and west—can we think of an atmosphere in trans* politics that undoes the colonial violence and imperial TSQ61_05Nay_1pp.3d 10/27/18 12:32am Page 70 70 TSQ * Transgender Studies Quarterly 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 gesture outlined above? And, given the present remarkably violent constitution of trans* politics, how can we conceptualize such an atmosphere while both taking seriously the conundrum of transnational trans* politics in the global north and west and rejecting political apathy? What affects might be generated in order to rework trans* politics and communities in the global north and west so that we question the conventional understanding of politics as progress rather than pro- duce a seemingly neat solution to this conundrum? My questions allude to the political potential of affects, which I want to frame by referring to a critical approach to the so-called affective turn (Hemmings 2005; Leys 2011). In line with this critical perspective, I argue against positions that consider an unequivocal understanding of affect as a promise for liberating politics as well as for a paradigm change that renews theory. Therein I follow Clare Hemmings, who argues that affect is a politically crucial force for connecting individuals, yet still questions “its proponent’s over-investment in its positive capacities” (Hemmings 2015: 149).5 Taking a multivalent approach to affect allows us to see it as bound up with gendered, racialized, and classed regimes of power. As queer, feminist, and postcolonial work within affect theory has shown (Ahmed 2004; Berlant 2011; Cvetkovich 2003), affect is a moving force in the creation of attachments to and in the production of the normative, while also maintaining the potential to transform norms. Expanding this approach into the evaluation of trans* politics touched upon above, I home in on the ambivalence of affect: while, on the one hand, affect may offer alternative moods in current politics, on the other hand it may also reinforce existing regimes of power. This is evident if we consider empathy, an effect that constitutes the moving force for political action within the structure of affect of the trans* politics of European institutions as well as of white queer- feminist activists in metropoles of the global north and west. The Council of Europe’s report, with its plea for novel legislation that enables the self-declaration of one’s gender, for example, empathizes with trans* people’s distress concerning the gender they were assigned at birth, and with their legal struggles to adopt their self-determined gender. Likewise, the politics attached to trans* deaths that Snorton and Haritaworn analyze feels for the marginalization and fatal violence against trans* people of color. Both of these empathic attachments implicate pro- cesses of violent colonizing and imperial hierarchization, exclusion and othering, even as they simultaneously propel vital communities of trans* activists. The ambivalence inherent in such empathic ways of conducting politics and building communities warrants further scrutiny. Feminist and postcolonial theory has shown how empathy and compas- sion are built upon a historical hierarchy of categories of the privileged “here” and the marginalized “there” (Berlant 2008; Dhawan 2013; Hemmings 2011; Spivak TSQ61_05Nay_1pp.3d 10/27/18 12:32am Page 71 NAY * Trans* Politics in The Global North and West 71 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 1988, 2012). Supposedly suffering “others” are fixed in a site located beyond the “innate here” of the privileged. The latter may, for instance, reify those in the global south as racialized “other,” of an “other” faith, as socioeconomically pre- carious, and/or as “illiterate.” Under these conditions, empathy transports a powerful hierarchy that involves referring to the “other” through sentiment, which leads to a hierarchical classification of the self and the “other.” This critique of politics that takes empathy as the fulcrum for transformation, is apt. First, the notion of empathy assumes a reciprocity of those expressing and those receiving empathy. Empathy reifies rather than erodes the hierarchy between the self and the “other.” Second, it is problematic to deal with disregard and rejection by solely focusing on intersubjective encounters and on the reflective capacity of the empa- thetic subject. Doing so largely conceals the functions and effects inherent within relations of power and dominance. Thus, failure to recognize the historical and political grounds for a lack of response to this reciprocity, and relying on the self- reflexivity of the empathetic subject to resolve the problem of hierarchy-creating knowledge regimes, apprehends, according to this critique, transformation as individual and the individual as rational. This simultaneously assumes the existence of and reifies the illusion of a coherent, autonomous and rational subject, instead of acknowledging the subject as dependent, vulnerable, emo- tional, and ambivalent. The question that therefore arises is—in political mobilization and prac- tices that aim to address the actual injustices that face trans* people—How can we avoid colonizing moves that coopt and unify? How may we conceptualize rela- tionality in a way that neither presumes reciprocity nor views political activism through the lens of individuality, but instead views relationality as solidarity that takes the form of decolonial and deprivileging practices—that is, that purposefully disrupts structures of colonization and privilege?6 In order to think about this question in the present moment of trans* politics, I suggest referring to the potential of affects notwithstanding its ambiv- alence. We are currently in the global north and west in a political time of empathy fatigue and increased racism, sexism, and homo- and trans*phobia that a newly established nationalist, fascist, and right-wing politics explicitly endorse. The fatigue of empathy with the marginalized and disenfranchised goes hand in hand with a seemingly paradoxical growth in the range and intensity of emotional expressions legitimated in the public sphere. Emotions are perceived, as Elaine Swan suggests, “to provide a privileged source of truth about the self and its relations to others” (Swan 2008: 89). There is a conviction that emotional knowl- edge is direct and therefore more legitimate and real than other ways of knowing. In other words, feelings are truth and truth is felt. In the face of this present moment, I suggest thinking about collective political practices to fight discrimination, violence, TSQ61_05Nay_1pp.3d 10/27/18 12:32am Page 72 72 TSQ * Transgender Studies Quarterly 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 and death—if we are trans* activists in a privileged position—on the basis of an undoing of the belief that emotions provide truth. I want to argue that neither empathy nor critical self-reflection can provide a “true” way to endorse a political commitment to the various needs of gender-variant people. However, even as we must critique our inherent connection to the continued justification of imperialism, as Nikita Dhawan (2013) argues, referring to Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, there is no escape from the colonial legacies of “justice” and “human rights,” which we at the same time cannot not want. We have to learn to see ourselves as part of the problem, which, however, not only entails an acknowledgement of complicity wherein we need to dismantle the processes that convert us into advocators for justice and rights; following Dhawan I suggest that solidarity is based on giving up the illusion of sovereignty (Dhawan 2013: 149). Relating this to privileged trans* politics would mean a decentering of our desire for “justice” by renouncing the performance of the empathic, self-reflective, and “vanguard” trans* activist. This, however, doesn’t mean that trans* activists from a privileged position should not engage in trans* politics despite the dangers of reification. But my point is that, while engaging in the fight for the various needs of gender-variant people, privileged trans* politics in the global north and west must forfeit their “vanguard” position. I argue that focusing on the potential of affect might help to question the illusion of sovereignty, which needs to disrupt the intactness and coherence of the privileged, Western, white, autonomous subject and body and thereby enables us to forge new views on the complicities of trans* politics. Emotions and affect are, however, not to be interpreted as a lens for getting closer to reality but rather as a crucial element through which power is felt, imagined, and contested (Ahmed 2004; Berlant 2000). Referring to the violent power dynamics in the examples of trans* politics delineated above, I suggest that privileged trans* politics in the global north and west might instead resort to a sense of discomfort, rather than focus on empathy with the figure of the generalized trans* person or with the figure of the trans* person afflicted with deathly violence. Instead of thinking trans* politics from a presupposed coherent trans* identity or shared feelings, I propose picturing trans* politics in the global north and west as based on a desire for social change that entails a feeling of discomfort. Yet, I do not grasp discomfort as a feeling in a strict individual sense, that is, as a so-called “authentic” emotion that functions as a preexisting foundation for politics (Berlant 2000). Instead, I propose seeing discomfort as a mood that constitutes an atmosphere. Taking as point of departure the critical approach to affect outlined above (combining a focus on the force of affect with the critique of the so-called affective turn), I propose that discomfort be conceived as a mood. Discomfort, like other moods, is neither raw sensation nor pure reason but an ambience through which one moves, something akin to the flavor of the present. In their comparison of TSQ61_05Nay_1pp.3d 10/27/18 12:32am Page 73 NAY * Trans* Politics in The Global North and West 73 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 mood and affect, René Rosfort and Giovanni Stanghellini note that moods “often manifest themselves as prolonged feeling-states” (Rosfort and Stanghellini 2009: 258) and are less volitional or transitory than affect. Mood is often used to grasp an orientation to the world that causes the world to come into view in a certain way. In this sense, a mood becomes an affective lens that impacts how one is affected. Being in a certain mood makes the world appear in a specific way. Martin Heidegger’s analysis of mood and attunement (Stimmung) suggests that mood is ontologically prior to the exercise of will and cognition. He writes: “Attunements are not side-effects, but are something which in advance determine our being with one another. It seems as though attunement is in each case already there, so to speak, like an atmosphere in which we first immerse ourselves in each case and which then attunes us through and through” (Heidegger 1995: 66–67). A mood, I suggest, constitutes an overall atmosphere that paves the way for ideas, helping to determine what will matter or not. Taking mood as the crucial term to scrutinize the conundrum of trans- national trans* politics in the global north and west shows how in particular an atmosphere of discomfort can animate activists to pursue a certain path of inquiry and political action. At the same time, the process is reciprocal and dynamic— i.e., styles of thinking and acting, in their turn, also promote and sustain moods. From this perspective, trans* politics in the global north and west is paved by an atmosphere of discomfort—an unease with and suffering from current legal reg- ulations for gender-nonconforming people as well as the deadly violence against trans* people—that in turn reinforces colonial and imperial hierarchies. Thereby prevailing trans* politics consolidates precisely the feeling of discomfort it aims to fight. Understanding discomfort in trans* politics in the global north and west as an atmosphere circumvents the problematic implications associated with the feeling of empathy touched upon above. In its dynamic reciprocity, mood is neither solely an individual feeling nor only a firm ontological foundation that presses upon indi- viduals, but both simultaneously. Or, as Rita Felski and Susan Fraiman write, the concept of mood avoids such binaries. Mood emphasizes, instead, “its role in modulating thought, acknowledging a dynamic and interactive relationship between reason and emotion. Mood is tied up with self-understanding and shapes thinking rather than being stifled by thinking” (Felski and Fraiman 2012: vi). Hence, if a thing can appear differently depending on the mood we are in and that surrounds us, then—putting it in Sara Ahmed’s terms—“moods matter as the how of what appears” (Ahmed 2014: 14). In this sense, an atmosphere of discomfort can restrict the sovereignty of the above-mentioned politically legit- imate subject position transgender/trans*. Discomfort as an atmosphere can foster the acceptance of the ambiguity of knowledge, feeling, and judgment within trans* politics in the global north and west, without necessarily giving up the TSQ61_05Nay_1pp.3d 10/27/18 12:32am Page 74 74 TSQ * Transgender Studies Quarterly 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 possibility of seizing agency under the purview of transgender/trans*. Discomfort does render trans* activism plural, ambivalent, insecure, and unstable, but it does not make such activism dispensable. If actual injustices toward trans* people are to be addressed from a perspective of trans* politics in the global north and west in a less-violent manner, discomfort as an atmosphere might help to think soli- darity as a feeling—with or not—with others, a feeling that does not become clear cut or distinct in a romanticizing harmonic way. Along with one’s sense of what things mean and how they matter, moods inform one’s felt connection or lack of connection with others. Referring to Heidegger’s German term Stimmung, which is translated not only as “mood” but also as “attunement”—a term that underscores the relational aspect of adjusting oneself to a certain mood—Ahmed (2014) astutely carves out the ways of resonating or failing to resonate with others. To be attuned to one another is to share in mood. A lack of attunement, or misattunement, estranges some from others. By pointing to discomfort as an atmosphere in conceptualizing hegemonic politics, I want to underline the feeling of seemingly paradoxical unease with attunement per se. An atmosphere of discomfort, notably in privileged trans* politics in the context of the global north and west, would thus mean sensing ways of being out of sync with the present world without assuming therein a harmony but nevertheless aiming at a world where misattunement would not be considered troublesome. Against this background, I suggest that we reassess affective soli- darity in transnational trans* politics in the global north and west as a sense of forging and being in a mood of discomfort with the present world, including one’s own strategies of political engagement, without expecting self-affirming reciprocity in political attempts to bring about social change. As a consequence, and according to Ahmed (2014), moods are not necessarily social or bring people together. The mood of discomfort is thus both an obstacle to, and potential catalyst for social change. I conclude that the possibility to decolonize and deprivilege trans* politics in the global north and west does not lie in an identity-based logic of inclusion. Instead, a decolonize and deprivilege trans* politics rather focuses on discomfort in political solidarity, while striving for collective social change. This discomfort within the context of trans* politics of the global north and west might make it possible to challenge and politicize the violent conditions in which this politics is embedded. This, however, entails reconceptualizing trans* politics as an imag- inative power rather than as an ideal form of political organization for social change. Taking the atmosphere of discomfort as a starting point in order to engage in decolonizing and deprivileging politics would hence not promote any kind of universal political aims. Instead, the atmosphere of discomfort as a starting point might sharpen our awareness of the limits of liberal politics of progress that TSQ61_05Nay_1pp.3d 10/27/18 12:32am Page 75 NAY * Trans* Politics in The Global North and West 75 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 ascribes to an imperial logic. Only then might it become possible—in the words of Aren Z. Aizura, Trystan Cotton, Carsten Balzer/Carla LaGata, Marcia Ochoa, and Salvador Vidal-Ortiz (2014)—to “decolonize the transgender imaginary” in knowledge production and political action. As an expression of violent power formations, the atmosphere of discomfort readily points to the decolonizing potential of individual and collective politics and to potentially new forms of taking action. This affective politics, however, is a ceaselessly ongoing process of formation and realization. Thereby such affective politics resists defining a universal solution for a definitive progression toward reaching an end goal; instead, it opens up a way to consider trans* politics as an imaginary that enables fragmented real- ities, bodies, and selves to become legible and articulable and thereby also to name the constitutive violence that is at work in trans* politics in the global north and west. This might forge a collectivity that is necessary but impossible. A perspective from atmospheres of discomfort complicates easy notions of alliances along the lines of class, race, and gender and challenges the idea of collectivity while it warns against romantic notions of solidarity. I thus conclude borrowing Dhawan’s words: “Our solidarity efforts are indispensable and yet inadequate” (2013: 163). Yv E. Nay is postdoctoral fellow at the Department of Gender Studies at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE). Nay’s publications include Feeling Family (2017) and “‘Happy as in Queer’—The Affective Paradoxes of Queer Families” (Sociologus, winter 2015). Nay is coeditor of the anthology Affekt und Geschlecht (2014). Acknowledgments I want to thank my colleagues and members of the faculty reading group at the LSE Department of Gender Studies, the TSQ editors, and the anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments. This article is based on my research funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation. Notes 1. Such novel legislation is based on the self-declaration of one’s gender and does not require applicants to undergo complicated pathologizing and costly procedures for gender reassignment. For an overview see, for example, Amnesty International (2014). 2. Extraordinary research in the field of postcolonial, antiracist theory focusing on gender and sexuality includes the illustrative work of Massad (2007); Puar (2007); Kulpa and Mizielińska (2011); El-Tayeb (2003); Yılmaz-Günay (2011); Kuntsman (2008); and Gunkel (2013), to name just a few. 3. See also Yılmaz-Günay 2011 and Haritaworn, Kuntsman, and Posocco 2014. 4. See also Dean Spade (2011) for the regulation of trans* people in the form of databases as a form of violent administration that distributes vitality while contributing to necro- politics. TSQ61_05Nay_1pp.3d 10/27/18 12:32am Page 76 76 TSQ * Transgender Studies Quarterly 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 5. My argument also relates to the work of Lauren Berlant, who problematizes the politics of “true feeling” (Berlant 2000), a politics that, in a nonambivalent manner, grants emotions an explanatory value and status for politics. 6. Here, I refer to Gayatri Spivak’s (1990) call for the need to “unlearn one’s privileges.” References Ahmed, Sara. 2000. Strange Encounters: Embodied Others in Post-coloniality. New York: Routledge. Ahmed, Sara. 2004. The Cultural Politics of Emotion. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Ahmed, Sara. 2014. “Not in the Mood.” New Formations: A Journal of Culture/Theory/Politics 82: 13–28. Aizura, Aren Z., et al. 2014. “Introduction.” TSQ 1, no. 3: 308–19. Amnesty International. 2014. The State Decides Who I Am: Lack of Recognition for Transgender People. London: Amnesty International. Bacchetta, Paola, and Jin Haritaworn. 2001. “There Are Many Transatlantics: Homonationalism, Homotransnationalism and Feminist-Queer-Trans of Colour Theories and Practices.” In Transatlantic Conversations. Feminism as a Travelling Theory, edited by Kathy Davis and Mary Evans, 127–43. London: Ashgate. Baier, Angelika, et al., eds. 2014. Affekt und Geschlecht—Eine einführende Anthologie (Affect and Gender: An Introduction). Vienna: Zaglossus. Balzer, Carsten, and Jan S. Hutta. 2012. Transrespect versus Transphobia Worldwide: A Comparative Review of the Human-Rights Situation of Gendervariant/Trans People. Würzburg: Flyer- alarm. Baumgartinger, Persson Perry. 2017. Trans Studies: Historische, begriffliche und aktivistische Aspekte (Trans Studies: History, Terms and Activism). Vienna: Zaglossus. Beollstorff, Tom, et al. 2014. “Decolonizing Transgender: A Roundtable Discussion.” TSQ 1, no. 3: 419–39. Berlant, Lauren. 2000. “The Subject of True Feeling: Pain, Privacy, and Politics.” In Transforma- tions: Thinking through Feminism, edited by Sara Ahmed, et al., 33–47. London: Routledge. Berlant, Lauren 2008. The Female Complaint: The Unfinished Business of Sentimentality in American Culture. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Berlant, Lauren. 2011. Cruel Optimism. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Butler, Judith. 2009. Frames of War: When Is Life Grievable? New York: Verso. Clough, Patricia T., and Jacob O. Halley, eds. 2007. The Affective Turn: Political Economy, Bio- media, and Bodies. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Council of Europe. 2015. Discrimination against Transgender People in Europe. Report of the Committee on Equality and Nondiscrimination. Doc. 13742. assembly.coe.int/nw/xml /XRef/Xref-XML2HTML-EN.asp?fileid=21736&lang=en. Cvetkovich, Ann. 2003. An Archive of Feelings: Trauma, Sexuality, and Lesbian Public Cultures. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Davidson, Megan. 2007. “Seeking Refuge under the Umbrella: Inclusion, Exclusion, and Organizing within the Category Transgender.” Sexuality Research and Social Policy 4, no. 4: 60–80. Dhawan, Nikita. 2013. “Coercive Cosmopolitanism and Impossible Solidarities.” Qui Parle 22, no. 1: 139–66. European Commission. 2012. Trans and Intersex People: Discrimination on the Grounds of Sex, Gender Identity, and Gender Expression. 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Felski, Rita, and Susan Fraiman. 2012. “Introduction.” New Literary History 43, no. 3: v–xxii. Gregg, Melissa, and Gregg J. Seigworth, eds. 2010. The Affect Theory Reader. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Gunkel, Henriette. 2013. “Some Reflections on Postcolonial Homophobia, Local Interventions, and LGBTI Solidarity Online: The Politics of Global Petitions.” African Studies Review 56, no. 2: 67–81. Hammarberg, Thomas. 2009. Human Rights and Gender Identity. Strasbourg: Council of Europe Office of the Commissioner for Human Rights. Haritaworn, Jin. 2015. Queer Lovers and Hateful Others: Regenerating Violent Times and Places. London: Pluto. Haritaworn, Jin, Adi Kuntsman, and Silvia Posocco. 2014. Queer Necropolitics. London: Routledge. Heidegger, Martin. 1995. The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude. Translated by William McNeill and Nicholas Walker. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Hemmings, Clare. 2005. “Invoking Affect.” Cultural Studies 19, no. 5: 548–67. Hemmings, Clare. 2012. “Affective Solidarity: Feminist Reflexivity and Political Transformation.” Feminist Theory 13, no. 2: 147–61. Hemmings, Clare. 2015. “Affect and Feminist Methodology, or What Does It Mean to be Moved?” In Structures of Feeling: Affectivity and the Study of Culture, edited by Devika Sharma and Frederik Tygstrup, 147–58. Berlin: De Gruyter. International Commission of Jurists. 2007. “Yogyakarta Principles: Principles on the Application of International Human Rights Law in Relation to Sexual Orientation and Gender Iden- tity.” www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/48244e602.html. Kulpa, Robert, and Joanna Mizielińska. 2011. De-Centring Western Sexualities: Central and Eastern European Perspectives. Routledge: London. Kuntsman, Adi. 2008. “The Soldier and the Terrorist: Sexy Nationalism, Queer Violence.” Sex- ualities 11, no. 1: 159–87. 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TSQ61_05Nay_1pp.3d 10/27/18 12:32am Page 78 78 TSQ * Transgender Studies Quarterly http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/48244e602.html 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 Snorton, C. Riley, and Jin Haritaworn. 2013. “Trans Necropolitics: A Transnational Reflection on Violence, Death, and the Trans of Color Afterlife.” In The Transgender Studies Reader 2, edited by Susan Stryker and Aren Z. Aizura, 66–75. New York: Routledge. Spade, Dean. 2011. Normal Life—Administrative Violence, Critical Trans Politics, the Limits of Law. Brooklyn: South End. Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty. 1988. “Can the Subaltern Speak?” In Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture, edited by Cary Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg, 271–313. Urbana: University of Illinois Press. Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty. 1990. The Post-colonial Critic: Interviews, Strategies, Dialogues. New York: Routledge. Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty. 2012. 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work_aqawouhkwncn3pkkygpvjlw2qe	----	The violence of disablism This is a repository copy of The violence of disablism. White Rose Research Online URL for this paper: http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/94278/ Version: Accepted Version Article: Goodley, D. and Runswick Cole, K. (2011) The violence of disablism. Sociology of Health & Illness, 33 (4). pp. 602-617. ISSN 0141-9889 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9566.2010.01302.x This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Goodley, D. and Runswick-Cole, K. (2011), The violence of disablism. Sociology of Health & Illness, 33: 602–617. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9566.2010.01302.x which has been published in final form at https://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9566.2010.01302.x. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Self-Archiving (http://olabout.wiley.com/WileyCDA/Section/id-820227.html). eprints@whiterose.ac.uk https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/ Reuse Unless indicated otherwise, fulltext items are protected by copyright with all rights reserved. The copyright exception in section 29 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 allows the making of a single copy solely for the purpose of non-commercial research or private study within the limits of fair dealing. The publisher or other rights-holder may allow further reproduction and re-use of this version - refer to the White Rose Research Online record for this item. Where records identify the publisher as the copyright holder, users can verify any specific terms of use on the publisher’s website. Takedown If you consider content in White Rose Research Online to be in breach of UK law, please notify us by emailing eprints@whiterose.ac.uk including the URL of the record and the reason for the withdrawal request. mailto:eprints@whiterose.ac.uk https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/   1  The violence of disablism! Dan Goodley and Katherine Runswick Cole Manchester Metropolitan University, Department of Psychology, Research Institute of Health and Social Change, Gaskell Campus, Manchester M13 0JA. Correspondence d.goodley@mmu.ac.uk; k.runswick-cole@mmu.ac.uk Paper accepted, Sociology of Health and Illness, due out late 2010 Abstract This paper addresses the multi-faceted nature of violence in the lives of disabled people, with a specific focus on the accounts of disabled children and their families. Traditionally, when violence and disability have been considered together, this has emphasised the disabled subject whom inevitably exhibits violent challenging behaviour. Recently, however, more attention has been paid to violence experienced by disabled people, most notably in relation to hate crime. This paper embraces theories that do not put the problems of disablism or violence back onto disabled people but magnify and expose processes of disablism that are produced in the relationships between people, which sometimes involve violence. This, we argue, means taking seriously the role of social relationships, institutions and culture in the constitution of violence. Disabled children, we argue, are enculturated by the violence of disablism. We follow Žižek’s (2008: 1) advice to step back from the obvious signals of violence to ‘perceive the contours of the background which generates such outbursts’, and identify four elements of the violence of disablism which we define as real, psychoemotional, systemic and cultural. We come to the conclusion that violence experienced by disabled children and their families says more about the dominant culture of disablism than it does the acts of a few seemingly irrational,   2  unreasonable, mean, violent individuals. We conclude that there is a need for extensive cultural deconstruction and reformation. Introduction This paper explores the multi-faceted nature of violence in the lives of disabled people, with a specific focus on the accounts of disabled children and their families. We start this paper with three stories from a project: It’s finding the people [to look after him] that could actually physically cope with my son. Because if he doesn’t co-operate you have to manhandle him, to get him out of the door and, you know, he’ll be punching you, kicking you (Roberta) My daughter has a good line in hand-biting and hitting people which really upsets the escort on the mini bus. I think at some point, if she actually manages to get the escort, I think he’ll say, ‘I’m not having that child on my bus ever again’. (Shelley) I had to restrain my son and he wasn’t very happy about that and so he started hitting me. I was seeing stars and …. and my daughter was bright enough to phone the cops again. (Jane) These accounts appear to support the idea that, for some disabled children at least, violence and impairment are knotted together as a pathological whole. This version of the mad/bad disabled body is not simply a well worn cultural trope to be found in popular cultural images (see Mitchell and Snyder, 2006) but testimony to the   3  dominance of a particular philosophy or epistemology of disability discourse. What is immediately apparent when one starts to research violence and disability is the dominance of functionalism. As Goodley (2010) notes early social and cultural theories of disability were heavily influence by the structural-functionalist sociologist Parsons (e.g. 1951), who saw the coherence of the social system as ‘analogous to a biological system – a system of social structures interacting and co-existing as a consensual web of relationships’ (Thomas, 2007: 16-17). Functionalism views disability as a product of a damaged body or mind that ‘struggles to escape the pitfalls of essentialism and biological determinism’ (Donaldson, 2002: 112). Functionalism is a position that emphasizes the consensual nature of society; it starts and ends with deficient individuals and the maintenance of these individuals and the social order. In this sense, then, we could argue that functionalism underpins ableism: the social, cultural and political conditions of contemporary life that emphasise ability and denigrate disability. Campbell (2008a) argues that disabled people are pathologised through the ‘production, operation and maintenance of ableist-normativity’ (2008a: 1). Functionalism serves to maintain the ableist consensus through the othering of disabled people. Following Donaldson (2002: 112), disabled people are discharged from the functionalist clinical episteme as pathological, problem-infused victims who must place themselves in the hands of authorities – such as medicine – in order to follow ‘illness management regimes’. Consequently, good patients/disabled people are deferent, dependent, compliant and non-violent (Greenop, 2009). This dual assessment of problem and compliance to treatment ensures that huge disability industries have grown in the service of functionalism. Medicalisation, psychological therapies and specialist educational interventions have spiraled in terms of their application in the lives of disabled people. Journal of Applied Behaviour Analysis,   4  Journal of Intellectual and Developmental Disability, Journal of Learning Disabilities and Offending Behaviour all have published papers that seek to understand, rehabilitate and cure the flawed and impaired individual. A recurring theme within all these publications is a common functionalist trope: the disabled subject that inevitably exhibits challenging behaviour often manifesting itself through violence. Indeed, one could view our accounts presented above as evidence for the hostile and handicapped disabled subject. Some more critical appraisals of challenging behaviour have depicted this phenomenon as a tragic and secondary handicap of living with an impairment (Sinason, 1992). These accounts attempt to spin a sociological explanation about the violence of disabled people. They understand hitting out and biting, exhibited by Shelley’s daughter, as less the functionalist consequence of having an impairment and more a maladaptive response to living with impairment and the associated experiences of professional control, segregation and parental protection. Violence occurs at the intersections of impairment and environment and might be understood as frustration, learnt helplessness or attempts to communicate. Moreover, the accounts presented above, might be understood as examples of justified anger that boil over in social environments which, more often than not, exclude disabled children. While we welcome these more critical reviews, our paper seeks to do something different. We understand impairment as a biological, cognitive, sensory or psychological difference that is framed often within a medical context and disability as the negative social reaction to those differences (Sherry, 2007: 10). We understand disablism, following Thomas (2007: 73), as ‘a form of social oppression involving the social imposition of restrictions of activity on people with impairments and the socially engendered   5  undermining of their psycho-emotional well being’. It is our contention that violence and disability can only be understood in the contemporary culture of disablism. Our aim, then, is not to individualise explanations for violence and place these within the disabled individual – nor to consider violence as secondary handicaps – but ‘to choose action with respect to the real source of conflict – that is, towards social structures’ (Fanon, 1993: 100). We aim to embrace theories that do not put the problems of disablism or violence back onto disabled people but magnify and expose processes of disablism that are produced in the relationships between people. This means taking seriously the role of institutions, culture and social relationships in the constitution of violence. Disabled children, we argue, are enculturated into the violence of disablism. This paper is timely in light of growing media reports of violence against disabled adults and children (Sherry, 2000, 2010). At its most extreme, violence against disabled people results in hate crime, a socio-political act that is finally being acknowledged. A number of high profile cases of disabled adults and young people i led the disability studies scholar Tom Shakespeare (2010, np) to write: David Askew's tragedy follows the deaths of Raymond Atherton, Rikki Judkins … Fiona Pilkington, Christine Lakinski … over the last few years. Each of these individuals was targeted because they were vulnerable and disabled, exploited, humiliated, and finally killed. Looking again at the evidence, and thinking more deeply about the problem, I realise how mistaken I was to trivialise hate crime. It's not just a matter of bullying. It's not something that people can just ignore or laugh off. It is a scourge on our society. We are members of a community where the most vulnerable people   6  live in fear of their lives and where they are being terrified on a daily basis by the bored or the loutish or the dispossessed. I think my mental block arose because I did not want to believe that human beings could be so vile. I was wrong. Shakespeare’s reflexive account captures the multi-faceted nature of the violence of disablism. He asks, when does hate crime begin and bullying stop? How can we separate ignorance and hatred? Is violence against disabled people deeply ingrained in the psyches, social relationships and cultural practices of members of contemporary society? In our paper we consider the ways in which violence against disabled people – specifically children and their families – reflects a trenchant dimension of culture; in this case disablist culture. Drawing, in part, on Žižek’s (2008) book Violence, we come to the conclusion that violence experienced by disabled children and their families says more about the dominant culture of disablism, and its effects upon the being of people, than it does the acts of a few seemingly irrational, mad, bad or mean violent individuals. Those that enact violence against disabled children should be understood in ways that recognize that the being of people is a socio-symbolic or culturally formed being (Žižek, 2008: 62). Disabled people experience violence because of contemporary society’s deeply held contradictory discourses about dis/ability. While Shakespeare (2010) did not want to think that the protagonists of hate crime could be so vile, we did not want to think that acts against disabled children reflect common circulating practices of a contemporary culture of disablism. Sadly, accounts from our research suggest that we were wrong. Methodology   7  To address the violence of disablism we explore the accounts of parents of disabled children. Their accounts have been collected as part of a two-year project funded by the Economic and Social Research Council (RES – 062-23-1138) (http//www.rihsc.mmu.ac.uk/postblairproject/): ‘Does every child matter, Post- Blair: Interconnections of disabled childhoods’ ii . We aim to understand what it means to be a disabled child growing up in England. The study is based in the north of England and runs from September 2008 – April 2011. The participants include disabled children aged 4-16, their parents/carers and professionals who work with disabled children, including teachers, third sector workers, health workers and social workers. The data for this paper, however, was gathered primarily from interviews with twenty parents/carers of disabled children and ethnographic research on the community lives of disabled children. The interviews were open-ended and covered a range of issues including families’ experiences of health, social care, education and leisure. Children had a range of impairment labels including autism, cerebral palsy, developmental disability, Down Syndrome, achondroplasia, profound and multiple learning disability and epilepsy. Our ethnography involved one of us (Katherine) attending children’s birthday parties, bowling, shopping with families. She was also invited to impairment-specific leisure activities, including an autism specific social club, parent groups, and user consultation meetings set up by local authorities, services and professionals to access the views of families. A few of the families involved in the interviews were also involved in the ethnography but the latter was extended to include different children and their families. Finally, our research also included focus group interviews with professionals ranging from teachers, social workers, speech pathologists, advocates, and leisure providers. In the course of the analysis we visited and re-visited the data to search for themes (Snow et al, 2004)   8  with two emphases in mind: (i) to search for accounts of violence and (ii) to seek rich data: that speaks of the lives of disabled children and their families. We feel it important to ‘out ourselves’ as this point in the paper. One of us (Katherine) is a mother of a disabled child. The other (Dan) is also a parent and has worked alongside disabled people with the label of learning difficulties who are engaged in their own politicization through their membership of a self-advocacy group. These experiences have, we feel, alerted us to some of the daily experiences of discrimination faced by disabled people. Before the project, we both shared the view that disablism is rife in our socio-cultural contexts. Our view has been clearly and tragically supported by our research. We want to acknowledge that we feel tensions in telling stories about violence. We worry that these accounts might feed into a voyeuristic interest in the tragic stories of disability. We are, also, anxious that in writing a research paper we are in danger of domesticating or objectifying very real stories of oppression. However, our attempts to take seriously the violence of disablism reveals deeply held cultural discourses around disability that require, not only our attention, but also our response. Analysis In the paper we explore four types of violence; real, psychoemotional, systemic and cultural. Each of these overlap with one another in ways that are correlated with three broad elements of disablism: the psyche, society and culture (Goodley, 2010, fc: 2). The psychological experience of violence acknowledges the complex ways in which the social and cultural world is produced through individuals. The psyche recognises the tight knot of the person and the social word, the self and other people, the individual and society. Societal and cultural forms of violence are reproduced through processes of domination, ideology and oppression that shape the inner world of our   9  psyches. Cultural, social and psychical forms of violence against disabled people reflect often subtle, mundane and everyday encounters with disablism. Real violence She’s had her moments, she got bullied by a girl on the school bus, they pinned her down and were putting tampons in her mouth but you know you don’t always get the, but then I think well you can’t fight against that can you. We stuck out on the bus a bit longer and then I thought no, so that’s why we give her the lift. (Lesley) Because the thing that we’ve had with his school now, they don’t tell any staff – he’s actually been physically assaulted by a lunchtime supervisor and- she thought he’d been bullying her granddaughter, she hit him in the dining hall and said she’d ‘bloody kill him’ next time. (Gayle) The youth worker called me into her office. She looked dreadful, shocked. Eventually she told me that there had been an incident in the toilet. A group of girls had been teasing Isobel and they tried to get her to lick the toilet seat. There was a rumour that the whole thing had been videoed on a camera phone and posted on You Tube. (Alex) [The teacher] made Andrew participate with this lady in this event and he was absolutely screaming and tugging and I felt as a parent I wanted to be in there saying ‘don’t do this to my child’, but part of me was thinking that’s going to be seen as very reactive, and what’s everybody else going to think and it is   10  only a two minute situation. But that to me gave me a greater take on possibly what had been going on in the months prior to that (Lucy). Lucy suspected that what she had seen in the assembly was the tip of the iceberg. She wondered what had gone on when she wasn’t there and was worried because she knew her son, who has a communication impairment, would not have been able to tell her (Katherine’s ethnographic comments on Lucy’s interview). These accounts sadly confirm that the disabled body is, often, an easy target for what we might term real physical violence of non-disabled others. Alongside the numerous examples of hate crime documented by scholars such as Sherry (2010) we know too that between 1/3 and 1/10 of the disabled population have been sexually abused at some point in their lives (Brown and Craft, 1989). Real violence is experienced physically and psychologically. We appropriate the term ‘real’ here from psychoanalysis; specifically Lacanian theory (1977). The real of violence is an embodied encounter: of pain inflicted by one body on another. What we read here are real physical encounters with violence; pain, humiliation and, we could suggest, torture. Perhaps we also have evidence for violence enacted by ‘evil’ people; who are prepared to denigrate disabled children. However, for Lacan, while the real of flesh and bones might feel like the pre-discursive – the embodied, tangible, somatic individual outside of culture – we come to touch or feel the real through culture. The body is a cultural body and the physical act of violence is felt and interpreted through our relationships with others. Behind these real violent encounters described above are the socio-cultural conditions of disablism and their psychoemotional   11  concomitants. Our sense is that it is too easy to relegate violence to the real acts of a few bad people. There are wider discourses and cultural conditions at play behind these real acts of violence. These conditions are of equal interest to us in our analysis of disablism. While, of course, we do not want to denigrate the feelings of the physical pain of violence – which feels very real – our commitment to an analysis of disablism means that we are interested in the wider socio-cultural and political factors that promote such real violence against disabled people. We recognize that there are practical, intellectual and ethical dangers in this analytical turn to the possible socio- cultural foundations of violence. Such a turn might be seen as negating the varying impact of violence upon victims whilst ignoring issues of intent and agency on the part of those enacting violence. However, if we accept that disablism exists, and that violence might be one of its manifestations, then we believe it is necessary to engage with social and cultural formations that permit forms of real violence against disabled people. We follow Žižek’s (2008: 1) advice to step back from the obvious signals of violence to ‘perceive the contours of the background which generates such outbursts’. To look only at real physical violence ‘obliterates from view the more subtle forms of violence’ (Ibid: 9) that characterize society’s encounters with disabled children and their families. Violent acts against disabled people can only be understood by reflecting on the wider circulating practices of a disablist culture. Psycho-emotional violence Critical disability studies have engaged with the psychological and affective aspects of disablism. In Britain, the work of Thomas (1999, 2007) and Reeve (2002, 2008) has crucially intervened in materialist sociological accounts of disablism by drawing   12  attention to the ‘barriers in here’ experienced by disabled people (Reeve, 2008: 1). Against a wide understanding of structural inequalities, psycho-emotional disablism interrogates the experiences between disabled people and disabling society. This interrogation has identified direct and indirect forms of discrimination: Direct forms can be found in discriminatory interactions, acts of invalidation, patronising responses of others and hate crimes such as the destruction of group symbols and hate literature (Sherry, 2000, 2010). Recent crime statistics from Britain suggest that 25% of disabled people report being victimised (Roulstone and Balderston, 2009). Indirect forms may be due to the side effects of structural disablism or unintended actions, words or deeds. The psycho-emotional refers to the impact of these ingredients of disablism on the ontological security or confidence of disabled people (Thomas, 1999). A key psychic reaction to such hostility is internalised oppression: the re-injuring of self through internalising discriminatory values (Marks, 1999), lowering self- worth and lessening a sense of intrinsic value (Thomas, 2007) (Goodley, 2010fc: 90). Žižek (2008: 60) describes this as an ontic violence: a violence against being or existence: ‘there is a direct link between ontological violence and the texture of social violence (of sustaining relations and enforced domination)’ (Ibid: 61). Interpersonal forms of violence threaten to determine the ‘very being and social existence of the interpreted subject’ (Ibid: 62). The following narratives represent, for us, potent examples of psycho-emotional or ontic violence:   13  The administrators of the FaceBook page for supporters of the Every Disabled Child Matters 1 campaign have twice had to remove comments from the page full of hatred towards disabled children and their families. Although the comments have been removed swiftly and the people who made them reported and banned from FaceBook, it is hard to understand why someone would feel the need to take the time to join as a fan of the campaign and write an offensive message on the wall of the site. (Katherine’s ethnographic notes) So they [autism outreach teachers] went in with, you know the suggestions of how to do this – and one of the things was, “Well it becomes apparent that we don’t understand when Sam’s distressed or upset or anxious, maybe if we introduced a one to five scale, that’s a simple way that he can communicate to us that he’s feeling stressed.” How did it go? Sam told the learning mentor he was at four and was approaching five, her response was, “Well how do you think I feel? I’m at a ten.” Can you believe that? I … honestly … I nearly died when he told me. I was just speechless and he was like, “Are you alright mum?” and I said, “I’ll be fine, just give me a minute.” (Gayle). The learning mentor’s response foregrounds her own ontological needs and positions Sam as burden or stress trigger point. As enemies of the normate homelands of schools (Michalko, 2002), disabled children are often made to exist as outliers and aliens that threaten that homeland. We can only speculate about the impacts of such a reaction on Sam and his mother. One possibility is that such a disablist response threatens to inflict, following Marks (1999), ontological invalidation of Sam. His                                                          1 See www.edcm.org.uk for details of the campaign    14  emotions are not only ignored but his very being is invalidated by the learning mentor who puts her own self first (‘Well how do you think I feel?’). They [social workers] said I was doing my masters and I shouldn’t do my masters and I should look after him [Sally’s son]. And they said he was going to school and I’d access some respite provision when he went to school. They said he was too young – that he should be staying in a parent’s care. (Sally) The underlying expectations held by social care professionals about this mother reflect discourses of ‘good enough mothering’ (whatever that might be), assumptions that a disabled child requires 24 hour full time care (preferably enacted by the mother only) and the valuing of feminised care over more ‘selfish’ ambitions of educational status on the part of the mother. Following Žižek’s earlier observation, the mother is both interpreted and determined through professional discourse. This captures the ‘asymmetrical character to intersubjectivity – there is never a balanced reciprocity in my encountering the subject’ (Žižek, 2008: 53). [As part of a social services assessment] I had to describe Henry as autistic … I told them he has an IQ of 49. I had to explain that he couldn’t do things that other children his age can do, that we can’t leave him on his own, that he can’t organise himself to get a meal, that he still needs help with his personal care, including washing his hair and wiping his bum, that we have to take him everywhere with us and that sometimes he doesn’t want to go. She started to type ‘he can’t do things that normal fourteen year olds can do’. I said, ‘I didn’t say that he isn’t ‘not normal’. She apologised and said she didn’t mean that she meant ‘average’. (Imogen).   15  In the formalized routine of professional assessment this mother is incited to articulate an abnormal version of her child. Parents have reported to us many times that often it is less effort and more convenient to explain their children’s health, demeanor, comportment or behaviour in terms of culturally acceptable disability discourses than to offer more enabling alternatives. While parents do resist – as we can see in this account above – it is often easy to explain away the ontological make-up of their children in terms of sticky labels such as ‘oh, he’s being autistic’ or ‘forgive him, he’s ADHD’ or ‘it’s his impairment’, because these are culturally acceptable and expected ways of describing the ontologies of disabled children. Indeed, as Reeve and Thomas have noted, these cultural discourses (‘out there’ in the social world) inform internalised conversations about disability (‘in there’ of the psychological worlds of disabled children and their families). These cultural expectations threaten to promote ontological attacks on disabled people: viciously othering and marking the beings of disabled children and their families. The responses of non-disabled others to disabled children and their families described in the accounts above are not responses of demonic, violent, bad nor evil others. They are responses perfectly compatible with a culture of disablism that pathologises difference, individualises impairment and maintains ableism. This culture appears to equate proper care for disabled child with that of full time mothering. This culture places educational, health and social care professionals who work with disabled children in often low paid, high pressured and exacting conditions of employment. This culture has clear sight of what makes for normal childhood and what constitutes abnormality. Our view, then, is that these accounts of psychoemotional violence take place in cultures and systems. We follow Žižek’s (2008: 53) point that attending only to subjective violence – enacted by social   16  agents or evil individuals – ignores the more systemic roots of violence. We move our analysis up a notch to systemic violence. Systemic violence Systemic violence is the often catastrophic consequences of the smooth functioning of our economic and political systems …We’re talking here of the violence inherent in a system: not only of direct physical violence, but also the more subtle forms of coercion that sustain relations of domination: including the threat of violence (Žižek, 2008: 1-8). Unsurprisingly, many of the accounts of parents and encounters with children involved schools. Within these institutional systems disabled children are subjected to what many teachers like to refer to as the coal-face of education: the (grim) practical realities of mass schooling. Schools are highly stressful systems: subjected to league tables, children to endless tests, teachers to inspection. McLaren (2009) observes that the nationalization of curricula across schools not only allows comparison between schools, teachers and pupils on their efforts in science, maths and literacy but seeks to promote key skills in learners to be fit for advanced capitalist societies. Educational systems have therefore become increasingly folded into a market ideology that Barton (2004: 64) observes seeks to promote cost effectiveness, efficiency, and value for money leading to more competition, selection and social divisions. School systems have become infected by ‘New Right’ or neoliberal thinking which is tuned into individualistic understanding of human behaviour and achievement (Munford, 1994: 273); cherishing self-interest, self-contentment, selfishness and distrust (Ballard, 2004): this dance of capital, which pursues its goal of profitability in blessed indifference to how its movement will affect social reality (Žižek: 2008: 11). When   17  children are deemed deficient, difficult or objectionable then they threaten these cherished ideals of childhood and the performativity of the school. We have collected accounts of children’s experiences of mainstream and special schools. Clearly, those children ‘included’ in mainstream settings were subjected to the rigours of marketisation. To some extents, the same could be said about special schools, which also increasingly face surveillance and performance management (Wedell, 2002). Across the different kinds of provision were responses to disabled children which might be understood as examples of systemic violence. Žižek’s (2008) conceptualization of this phenomenon directs us to the fall-out that is created by institutional systems that seek order in the name of those systems. And, when the aims and meaning of education are couched in terms of accountability, achievement, reasonableness and containment – all key artifacts of the marketisation of education – then disabled children face the violence of educational enforcement; ‘inherent in the system’ (Žižek, 2008: 5; out italics). My experience of school going to the Christmas concert I saw similarly what I’d seen in nursery in that Andrew was dragged by the hand into the hall sat down and it was just like the naughty child really. I felt as a parent I wanted to be in there saying ‘don’t do that to my child’. You expect that people in educational establishments and with that sort of training wouldn’t be doing these kinds of things and again from a parent’s perspective you don’t always feel comfortable with going in all the time, because you know you are classified as the parent who is always (Lucy).   18  Lining up, ‘sitting nicely’ and always putting your hand up before you speak, represent the regimented nature of schools. Andrew is an ‘unruly’ child who threatens to disrupt the smoothing practices of schools which promote the idealised image of a conforming child. While we accept the need for schools to be safe and calm places, it is perhaps ironic that the actions of the ‘unruly’ professional, who drags Andrew into the hall, escapes scrutiny while children’s ‘unruly’ acts are all too often presented as evidence of their violent pathology. In this account we hear the constraining nature of the ordering of educational system on the child, parent and the professionals alongside the expectation that good professionals should behave better. This contradiction is at the heart of Žižek’s notion of systemic violence which views violence as part of the maintenance of the system. The manhandling of the child into the hall is a direct product of a school system that requires regulation, governance and control. One should expect to see educational professionals ‘doing these kinds of things’ because educational professionals must act in such ways to fit the rigidity of systemic rituals. Kamil grabs another child with a hand covered in paint. The TA grabs him by the forearm and drags him to the corner of the room saying ‘No! No!”and tells him it is not funny and not to smile. Kamil wanders around the room not involved in the painting activity, eventually he decides to join in the activity and sits down to take a paint brush. The teaching assistant takes it out of his hand (there is a minor struggle) and says ‘paint finished’ and gives him a coloured pencil instead. He loses interest and leaves the table again and begins to wander about the classroom (Katherine’s ethnographic notes)   19  Following Žižek (2008: 11) violence against disabled children is real because it is felt, it hurts and it is wrong. But systems, such as schools, are more interested in the reality of the production of the system which may indeed lead to the threat of exclusion, movement and physical touch. Families experienced a plethora of educational systems ranging from family and children’s centres, through to parenting classes and child development centres, each with their own systemic requirements: We were going to the [child development centre] for sessions every Thursday, they were just horrendous. Oh, I hated them. They did things like put you in a room on your own with your child and they have a two way mirror and I knew, I knew that they were doing that, but they thought they wouldn’t tell me, but I knew someone who worked there, so they didn’t tell me they were there. (Lesley). At times these systems got under the skins of parents and their children: to their very emotions: The school made another parent’s life hell, I mean she cried all the time, she was constantly, and I wouldn’t I was determined I was not going to cry. I was scared to cry. I think if I’d started I wouldn’t have been able to stop. So I just totally pushed all emotions, you know it was just fight, fight, fight all the time. (Lesley). The systemic and the affective combine with one another for expression. ‘Fighting the system’ is a phrase that we have heard time and time again in our research. The very   20  workings of systems ensure that possible antecedents of real violence are never addressed: And the scary thing is that on occasion Sam’s been in trouble for kicking somebody or pummelling somebody: “Well why did you do that Sam?” “Oh, because they [other pupils] told me to do it.” And this is, you know, this is a whole area that absolutely terrifies the life out of me, because no matter how many times I go to school and say, “Sam does not come from a violent family, he doesn’t see violence, he’s not exposed to violence, so if he actually does physically hurt somebody, when you say to him, “Sam, did you do that?” – he’s got Asperger’s, he doesn’t really lie, his brain doesn’t work like that, he can’t string together a whole story to throw us off the scent. He will say, “Yes, I hit whoever it was.” And please could you take another two seconds to say, “Why did you do it?”” Because they never do. (Gayle) We can read this story of Sam alongside Žižek’s controversial though illuminating analysis of paedophilia in the church. He argues that, rather than regarding child sexual abuse as the actions of a few evil clergymen, we should view child sexual abuse as institutionalised within the church: ‘such an institutional unconscious designates the obscene underside that sustains the public institution’ (Žižek: 2008: 142). Hence, ‘the church as an institution should itself be investigated with regards to the ways it systematically creates conditions for such crimes’ (Ibid: 143). When we see these crimes against children – we see children being initiated into the culture of the church – showing the obscene ‘pleasures’ that sustain that culture (Ibid). Žižek’s point is simple: the consistent, historical and widespread evidence of child sexual abuse in the church reveals obscene pleasures that have become institutionalised and systemic. Following this, then, it is possible to view systemic violence against   21  disabled children as revealing more about the underlying barbarism of civilisation (Ibid: 150) of schools. Violence against disabled children reflects a wider systemic intolerance for disabled, disrupted, unruly and different children. Their continued exclusion, discrimination and marginalisation is akin to being initiated into the exclusionary systems of schooling. Similar things could be said about the exclusionary nature of the institutionalised unconscious of schools. Indeed, we could argued that the exclusion of disabled children – their initiation in the culture of schools - takes on a particular flavour in light of the fact that many schools uphold themselves as inclusive. This could be read as the ultimate (and perhaps most barbaric) version of ‘inclusion’: an example of ‘a superego of blackmail of gigantic proportions that claims to help the undeveloped with aids, credits, etc while ignoring its complicity in the development of exclusionary practices’ (Ibid: 19). Clearly these examples reflect underlying cultural values and practices which legitimise systemic acts of violence, and it is the concept of cultural violence that underpins our final node of analysis. Cultural violence We have now come to the roots of the violence of disablism already described in this paper. Underpinning the real, psychoemotional and systemic acts of violence against disabled children is the cultural violence of disablism. It is possible to draw on Burman’s (2008: 157) critical analysis of child/hood to suggest that disabled children violate the model of the happy, playing, discovering child. In some cases this may mean that the disabled child ceases to exist as a child – in terms of dominant cultural notions of childhood – and instead functions ‘in order to restore our sense of   22  ourselves and the world we want’ (Ibid. 159). Disabled children are brought together as a specific cultural site: the dumping ground for the projection of non-disabled society’s fears of illness, frailty, incapacity and mortality (Shakespeare, 1997). Goodley (2010, fc,: 100) points to the cultural fetishisation of disabled bodies. Broadly speaking a fetish is that which we (mis) believe will sate our desires. In capitalist societies, the process of fetishisation describes the values that we inhere in objects or commodities that they do not intrinsically have. Fetishistic culture imbues objects with value (from sculpted pecs, to expensive wine, the latest iPhone, to pathological children and uncivilised nations). The disabled body is also a fetishized object, onto which are conferred a whole host of (unconscious) values, that sate a variety of values. Disabled bodies are fetishised in a host of contradictory ways; as vulnerable, dependent, broken, tragic, exotic, uber-different, pathological, violent: The ‘unfortunate person’ is assumed to have wonderful and exceptional courage (although underneath this overt canonisation there is usually a degree of irritation and hostility which comes to light at moments of stress) (Hunt, 1966: 148). Hunt’s reflections capture the cultural disavowal (Goodley, fc, 2011) of disablism: a fascination with and fear of disabled people; staring at and staring through; loving and hating; an appealing and appalling sight. Disabling culture’s ambivalent relationship with disability ensures that disabled people are split between contradictory positions: desired/rejected in equal measure. Žižek (2008: 71) proclaims that it is ‘only psychoanalysis that can disclose the full contours of the shattering impact of modernity – that is, capitalism combined with the hegemony of scientific discourse –   23  on the way our identity is grounded in symbolic identifications’. While we are not totally seduced by the power of psychoanalysis (and are more than aware of its pathological, conservative and reactionary tendencies, see Goodley, 2010; Goodley, fc, 2011), we do share Žižek’s belief that psychoanalytic concepts can be used to make sense of the cultural violence experienced by disabled people which are based in large part on a disavowal of the disabled person. Žižek argues that resentment and envy underpin even some of the most extreme forms of violence, such as fundamentalist religious acts of terror, revealing themselves to be resentment towards, but also envy of, their foes. Following Žižek, our attention should be less on these obvious forms of violence and more on the contradictions ingrained within the cultural psyche that continues to envy and resent disabled people in ways that leave them split as subjects and outcasts as cultural members. The following accounts reflect examples of cultural disavowal, which are often rendered invisible or mundane through the frequency of such events and their subsequent familiarity. You find an aisle [in the supermarket] big enough [for a wheelchair] and then they’ve stuck a bargain bin in the middle of it. And on top of that you’ve got people looking, well I don’t mind the looking it is the staring and you’ve got people staring and then there’s children saying ‘what’s that big boy doing in a buggy, mummy?” ‘I don’t know, darling’ Instead of saying there might be something wrong with him and then walking off it is well let’s not confront it, it is too awful. And I feel like saying, well that’s my life, you know. But going to town with L makes me this person I’m actually not. (Shelley). Becoming the ‘person I’m actually not’ powerfully relays the personal impact of a mother’s anguish in being hit with the disavowal of a disabling community.   24  We also went on a train ride, at a kiddies animal park thing and I took my nephew, my sister-in-law and Hattie and myself and I handed over the 50ps and he [fairground attendant] gave me 50 p back and I said ‘no, no it’s alright that’s the right money’ and he said ‘it is alright sweetheart’, he said ‘I never charge for retards (Lesley). Here is the disavowal of disablism: the pathological ‘hate’ object that is also ‘loved’ to access free leisure activities. We might suggest that here we have a case of the disabled child so disavowed by the fairground attendant that, as Žižek (2008: p48) puts it quoting Gilles Deleuze , ‘if you’re trapped in the dream of the other: you’re fucked’. One mother who has a child with the label of Down Syndrome told us that people had stopped her in the street when she was with her daughter pushing her in the push chair and asked, ‘didn’t you have the test?’. Natalie was also asked ‘did you know they were going to be disabled before you had them?’. She thought that people were trying to gauge how sorry they felt for her – if she knew, before her daughter was born that she would be disabled the implication was that she was less deserving of their pity. Because disavowal is a contradictory act then a culture of disablism acts in equally ambivalent ways. In some cases this means distancing one’s self from the Other ‘The Other is just fine but only insofar as his presence is not intrusive, insofar as the Other is not really there’ (Žižek, 2008: 35): Some people look at them [her children] going down the street and I’ve walked into bushes before especially when I’ve got the three of them. They look at me and go [open mouthed]. Their face, their mouths fall open which isn’t hard sometimes and their head follows them and sometimes, my older children get very upset when I do this, I say do you want a photo of my beautiful children? Is that why you are looking? Is there something I can   25  help you with? Is there a question you’d like to ask me that you haven’t had answered? Or would you like a photo next time pet? And the children go, ‘please mum don’t do that’, and I don’t now so much but once or twice it has when they have been with me and they have said ‘why are you staring at my brothers and sisters? What is the matter with them?’ What we can pick up on in this account – in response to the cultural reactions to a disabled child - is what Žižek (2008: 45) describes as fetishist disavowal: I know that disability is bad, but I don’t want to know that I know, so I don’t know. Hence, the disabled child is culturally disavowed: potentially ignored or ‘condensed into a caricature’ (Ibid: 50): a monstrous/fascinating object to be gazed at and/or ignored. In making sense of these acts of cultural violence we are encouraged by Žižek to turn our attention to the pathological conditions of society. For example, he argues that Nazi anti-semitism was pathological because it relied upon: the disavowed libidinal investment into the figure the Jew … the cause of all social antagonisms was projected onto the ‘Jew’; the object of a perverted love-hatred: the spectral figure of mixed fascination and disgust (Žižek, 2008: 85). Similarly, we could argue that the violence of disablism becomes a cultural norm because disabled people come to occupy a figure invested as a disavowed libidinal object of both love and hate; fascination and disgust. But, because the disabled object is so near then disavowal takes on different qualities: ‘the proximity’ of the tortured subject which causes sympathy and makes torture unacceptable’ (Ibid: 51) is responded to in less direct though equally as torturous ways; at least in terms of social conventions:   26  Shortly after that, the speech therapist at school who’d recently qualified on a feeding course, decided that one day at school she would feed Laurie. Well, she’d never fed him before and he choked, he coughed and she panicked and she made a decision that he would never be fed in school… they didn’t ring me or anything, they sent him home with a letter having not fed him that day, he hadn’t had a drink or anything and just to say they wouldn’t feed him in school. And the speech therapist had said it so social services had to act on what the speech therapist was saying, so that meant I had not choice I had to if I wanted him to go to school, if I wanted to access respite care, we were in a position where we were being forced to have a gastro tube fitted. (Shelley) Conclusions Our analysis has tragically revealed a propensity for violence against disabled children ingrained in the relationships, institutions and cultural acts of our time. We worry that as contemporary economic conditions increase feelings of stress, disempowerment and poverty then these socio-economic conditions may well increase the violence of disablism. To tackle this violence means not simply targeting those few ‘evil souls’ responsible for hate crimes against disabled people but deconstructing and reforming the very cultural norms that legitimize violence against disabled people in the first place. Žižek (2008) offers us some hope for subverting this culture of violence. A key contribution lies in exposing the emptiness of a culture in which disabled children and their families continue to be disavowed. Žižek calls for a new ethics, following Levinas, of ‘abandoning the claim to sameness that underlies universality, and replacing it with a respect for otherness’ (Ibid: 47). Instead, we need:   27  to celebrate collective solidarity, connection, responsibility for dependent others, duty to respect the customs of one’s community – instead of Western Capitalist culture’s valuing of autonomy and liberal freedom (Žižek, 2008: 123) This ethics can feed directly into disability activism, forms of education, health and social welfare and professional practice, which collectively work together to reduce violence against disabled people. This vision resonates with an ideal proposed by Finkelstein (1999a, 1999b) in his notion of the profession allied to the community (PAC). In contrast to professions allied to medicine, PACs refer to services and professionals that respond to and are led by the aspirations of disabled people and their representative organisations. Developing a PAC could bring into a production a ‘virgin field of theory and practice through which professionals are re-engaged with the aspirations of disabled people’ (Finkelstein, 1999b: 3). This virgin field incorporates ideas from critical disability studies and demands professionals to invest less time in pathological views of impairment (such as naturally associating challenging behaviour with intellectual disabilities) and more time in challenging the conditions of disablism (including violence). This field would requires professionals, for example, to address their own acts of psychoemotional disablism and disavowal which underpin the understandings they hold of the people they are paid to enable. 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In Darder, A., Baltodano, M.P., Torres, R.D. (ed). The critical pedagogy reader (2 nd edition). (pp69- 96). New York: Routledge.   30  Mitchell, D. and Snyder, S. (2006). Narrative prosthesis and the materiality of metaphor. In L. Davis. (Ed). The Disability Studies Reader. Second Edition. New York: Routledge. Munford, R. (1994). The politics of care-giving. In M. Rioux and M. Bach. (Eds). Disability is not measles: New directions in disability. (pp265-287). Ontario: L’Institut Roeher. Parsons, T. (1951) The Social System London: Routledge and Kagan Paul. Reeve, D. (2002). Negotiating Psycho-Emotional Dimensions of Disability and Their Influence on Identity Constructions. Disability & Society, 17(5), 493-508. Reeve, D. (2008). Negotiating disability in everyday life: The experience of psycho- emotional disablism. Lancaster: Unpublished PhD thesis. Roulstone, A. and Balderston, S. (2009). Is violence, murder and harassment against disabled people really hate crime? Paper presented at the Office for Disability Issues Evidence Day, London, 19 th November 2009. Shakespeare, T. (1997). Cultural Representation of Disabled People: Dustbins for Disavowal? In, Barton, L. and Oliver, M. (Eds). Disability Studies: Past Present and Future. Leeds: The Disability Press. Shakespeare, Y. (2010). The cruel toll of disability hate crime, The Guardian, 12 th March, 2010, Accessed 16 th March 2010: http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/mar/12/disability-hate-crime-david- askew. Sherry, M. (2000). Hate crimes against disabled people. Social alternatives, 19 (4),   31  23-30. Sherry, M. (2007). (Post) Colonising disability. Special issue of Wagadu, Journal of Transnational Women's and Gender Studies, Volume 4, Summer 2007, 10-22. Sherry, M. (2010). Disability Hate Crimes: Does Anyone Really Hate Disabled People? London: Ashgate. Sinason, V. (1992) Mental Handicap and the Human Condition. London: Free Association Books. Snow, D.A., Morrill, C., and Anderson, L. (2004) Elaborating Analytic Ethnography: Linking Fieldwork and Theory, in Ethnography 4 (2) 153-5 Thomas, C. (1999). Female Forms: Experiencing and Understanding Disability. Buckingham: The Open University Press. Thomas, C. (2007). Sociologies of disability, ‘impairment’, and chronic illness: Ideas in disability studies and medical sociology. London: Palgrave. Wedell, K. (2008). Confusion about inclusion: patching up or system change? British Journal of Special Education, 35 (3), 127-135. Žižek, S. (2008). Violence. London: Profile books.                                                          i David Askew's was a 64 year old disabled man who suffered a heart attack when verbally abused by neighbours (http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/david-askew-a-human-tragedy-and- national-scandal-1920089.html)   32                                                                                                                                                                  Raymond Atherton was beaten to death by a group of teenagers after years of abuse (http://www.guardian.co.uk/society/2007/aug/15/guardiansocietysupplement.socialcar e) Rikki Judkins died from a rock being dropped on his head by two young men (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/lancashire/6369319.stm) Fiona Pilkington was killed by her own mother after the family had suffered years of abuse from local residents (http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2009/sep/28/fiona-pilkington-suicide-mother-police) Christine Lakinski died after an incident occurred in which a man urinated on her as she lay in a street of her local town (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/tees/7002627.stm) ii We would like to gratefully acknowledge the support of the Economic and Social Research Council for the funding of this research. 
work_armitls5lvge7emrvbe5wgutdi	----	Bordering isolation: Attitudes to minorities in Turkey Before the Syrian civil war, 60-year-old Shaima was used to slipping over Turkey’s porous eastern border twice a year. “They hated us here, but in the summer there was always work. The men helped with the harvest, and there were weddings for the girls to dance. And at the wedding parties, they’d pay our men for music, then you- know-what with our women. Every winter, we would go back to Aleppo, to the big fam- ily.” Did she ever have a passport to ease her transit? “Of course not! Haven’t the Turks told you, we are gypsies?” Shaima is a Syrian Dom, a member of a marginal group whose nomadic existence has left her people barely documented and all but invisible in their place of refuge. Today Shaima lives in a refugee camp near Gaziantep, Turkey’s sixth-largest city. She is among the 2.5 million people who have fled Syria as civil war ravages the country. As of March 2014, the United Nations High Com- missioner for Refugees had documented the arrival of nearly 650,000 Syrian refugees in Turkey. Activist Kemal Vural Tarlan, a pho- tographer who has documented the Dom for the last decade, argues that the true number is nearly double that, and should include hundreds of thousands of unregistered refu- gees who have illicitly crept or bribed their way across the border and now work in the black economy. The Syrian Dom are among the least likely Syrians to have ID papers, and all people arriving at the border with- out papers spend months in spontaneously established border camps, shanty towns in the no-man’s land between the spot where Syria ends and Turkey begins, denied entry. Tens of thousands of Syrians are reported to have died of starvation here, just out of reach of refuge. Since the emergence of jihadist guerilla opposition to the Syrian regime, most impor- tantly ISIS, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, access to much of the border is con- trolled by Islamist fighters. So the unofficial shanty camps stretching for miles just inside the Turkish border are places of starvation and suspicion. “To bring aid to the starving,” claims Vural Tarlan, “you have to be per- mitted by the jihadis.” Shiraz Maher, senior research fellow at King’s College London’s International Centre for the Study of Radi- calisation, has similar tales from the region: “No one can get aid inside the border with- out the agreement of the IHH.” Wildly popu- lar in Turkey, the IHH is an Islamist-leaning organisation that collects funds seemingly for humanitarian aid: it is frequently accused of siphoning its funds to Islamist fighters. In the West, the IHH is mainly known for its role in the 2010 “flotilla raid” to break the Israeli blockade of the Gaza strip. To its defenders, the IHH is merely an Islamic ver- sion of Christian Aid; to its detractors, it is a front for terrorism. What is clear is that the Bordering isolation Kate Maltby reports on the Doms, nomads who have been forced by the Syrian war into Turkey and “pass” as Kurds to get better treatment 43(2): 62/66 | DOI: 10.1177/0306422014536301 4 3 . 0 2 62 indexoncensorship.org http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1177%2F0306422014536301&domain=pdf&date_stamp=2014-06-11 ➔ Above: Nomadic Dom musicians in the Amuq plain, close to the Turkish city of Antakya C re d it: K e m a l V u ra l Ta rla n w w w .k e m a lvu ra lta rla n .co m Syrian Dom are undesirable to Islamists. In regions where access to aid is dependent on perceived piety, the Dom, with their reputa- tion for Alevi theism and promiscuity, rarely make the cut. Those who do get to eastern Turkey find that ethnic rivalries have preceded them. Broadly speaking, the Turkish population has been welcoming to their Syrian guests: the Turkish government has spent $2 billion on refugee support, and for all the country’s political divisions, the cost to the Turkish taxpayer has been accepted with barely a murmur from the opposition. But this gen- erosity rarely extends to those refugees who swell the numbers of ethnic minorities that Turkey already finds inconvenient. And as the total number of refugees in the country approaches one million, the reluctance in some quarters to integrate Syrians culturally in Turkey is creating a demographic time- bomb. At present, Turkish officials and Syr- ian refugee leaders alike choose to murmur about a swift end to the Syrian war and a return home for refugees, ducking questions about how far Syrians should put down roots in Turkey. The ruling AK Party 63 indexoncensorship.org proudly boasts that it will pay for any Syrian who meets the entry requirements to attend a Turkish university – but in reality a mere thousand state scholarships have been awarded, because few of the hundreds of thousands young Syrians in the country meet the required proficiency in Turkish. This is not a hurdle the Turkish govern- ment is keen to remove. The question of whether Syrian children should learn Turk- ish has become a political battle. In a nation which for years denied Kurdish children education in their own tongue, the ministry of education now insists that children in Syr- ian refugee camps should learn in their own language – and only their own language. In the Gaziantep region’s generously funded network of showpiece refugee camps, the ministry provides schoolbooks based on the Turkish curriculum, but only in Syrian Arabic. Aid agencies talk, off the record, of serious difficulties in encouraging camp gov- ernors to provide lessons in Turkish, or even English. Fatima, a Circassian refugee in the flagship Nizip II camp in Gaziantep, told me she had abandoned her post as a volunteer in the camp school in protest against the authorities’ refusal to provide even a basic introduction to Turkish for her children. “They told me, why do I need to learn Turk- ish, when I won’t be staying in Turkey? So I said, what is the point of teaching our chil- dren at all, if they will never have a life in this country?” This is not to say Turkish citizenship is off the table for all Syrians: ahead of the April 2014 elections, reports emerged in Gaziantep of incumbent officials handing out ID cards on condition that the recipients performed their first civic duty by obediently voting AKP. Meanwhile, as Prime Minister Recep Tayypi Erdogan continues to rally his sup- porters against those considered insufficiently Islamic, his main targets have been Turkey’s Alevi population, a group closely associated with Domari speakers. The Alevi religion combines music and dance: as Hussein, a young Alevi from Istanbul, tells me: “Almost every ritual is a dance – we worship the divine through music and with our bodies.” Alevi religious practices have long fasci- nated the West, with their Sufi-influenced mysticism lionised as a liberal Islam. None- theless, most Alevi traditions quite clearly predate Islam, a fact that is not lost on their Islamist detractors. One of the most significant demonstrations against Erdogan last year, during the Gezi park protests, took place on 2 July, the 20th anniversary of an arson attack on an Alevi conference in which 33 leading intellectuals were killed at Sivas, Istanbul. Two months earlier, Erdogan had announced the name of the latest structure to bridge the Bosphorus: the Yavuz Sultan Selim Bridge, named for Selim the Grim, notorious for massacring Alevis. As Anglo- Turkish author Alev Scott notes in her recent book, Turkish Awakening, Selim famously declared: “The killing of one Alevi has as much heavenly reward as the killing of 70 Christians.” On the anniversary of the Sivas massacre, for which no one has been con- victed, it felt like a slap in the face. By no means all of the 10-15 million Alevis in Turkey are Domari speakers, but a majority of Domari speakers are Alevis or, crucially, perceived to be so. In a transitory population, such distinctions between Alevi and Domari, Domari and Kurd, frequently blur. The European Roma Rights Centre (ERRC) claims that Turkey was already home to 500,000 Domari speakers before the Syrian influx, in a combined total of five At this fault line between two hard-pressed minorities much of the worst violence experienced by the Dom has erupted 64 indexoncensorship.org ➔ C re d it: K e m a l V u ra l Ta rla n w w w .k e m a lvu ra lta rla n .co m million Roma, Dom and Lom “gypsies”. But most assimilated Domari speakers go through phases of hiding their ethnic herit- age, passing as Kurds when settling in new towns. And it is at this fault line between two hard-pressed minorities that much of the worst violence experienced by the Dom has erupted. In a notorious instance in 2006, two Dom teenagers working as shepherds were lynched in the city of Silvan, shortly before their employers, an impoverished Kurdish farming family, were due to pay them for seven months’ work. The local police repeat- edly failed to investigate the deaths. Syria’s Dom population is a marginal group whose nomadic existence has left them barely documented and all but invis- ible in their place of refuge. The question of whether the label “gypsy” should be used for the Dom is one on which ethnologists fiercely disagree – Shaima herself insists that her people have no ethnic relation- ship to the “criminal” Roma. But here in eastern Turkey, the locals are in no doubt. “Çingene”, a regional leader of the ruling AK Party, spits out when asked about provision for the Dom population. And then, reverting to English: “Gypsies. Why do you want to go near them? Anyway, there are none here. They go to dirty places, like Istanbul.” The 2.2 million Dom have always lived on the margins of society. Most Middle East states disclaim the need to provide Domari language support in schools, or seasonal health clinics at Dom campsites. One of the few places to offer them some shelter was Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, at some cost to their reputation: a few years ago I met young Iraqis in Istanbul who spoke with nostalgia of Baghdad’s red-light Kamalia district, in which Dom women worked as dancers for Saddam’s top commanders – and allegedly as courtesans. Since the US invasion in 2003, religious sects have taken turns to purge Baghdad of the Doms’ seemingly unIslamic influence: Kamalia has been renamed Hay al-Zahra after the distinctly more virtuous daughter of the Prophet, and in 2005 Reuters and the Dom Research Center reported that the army of Muqtada al-Sadr had unleashed mortar rounds on a makeshift village of 250 Dom families near Diwaniya, killing one and forcing the encampment to disband. “Iraqi leaders of all sects repeat the same line about the Dom people: ‘They are alcohol-sellers and whores, so there is no place for them in an Islamic nation,’” says photographer Vural Tarlan. “They can no longer punish Saddam, so they have decided the Dom symbolise his decadence. This is their revenge.” Now it is the turn of Syria’s Dom popu- lation to be cast adrift. Before the civil war, tens of thousands of Dom made their winter homes in Syria, mainly in Damascus and Aleppo. SIL International, the UNESCO- recognised body which researches endan- gered languages, claims 37,000 Domari speakers were left in the country in 2005, but linguist Dr Bruno Hérin, one of the world’s few experts on the Domari tongue, cautions against exact figures. Vural Tarlan suggests that the number under the radar may be far higher: “There is no official rec- ognition whatsoever, in Syria, just as in Tur- key, Lebanon, Jordan or Palestine.” So most Syrian Dom have lived in hiding, passing as Kurds for official purposes. Hérin’s research suggests that up to 10,000 Domari speak- ers based themselves in Damascus before the war – alongside scratching a living as musicians, blacksmiths and tinkers, the Dom appear to have cornered the Syrian market in cut-price dentistry. ➔ Above: Two Dom children play as adults collect waste paper, card and scrap iron, in Antep, Turkey 65 indexoncensorship.org And that’s not all. The ERRC’s 2008 report on violence against Roma and Dom populations identified a disturbing pat- tern of Dom women marrying into Kurdish families, only for their in-laws to respond with violence when they discovered that the new wife was merely “passing”. Frequently Dom women are on the receiving end of violence from both their own and neigh- bouring communities. In a typical instance in 1997, a woman from the town of Van was discovered by her husband’s Kurdish family to be of Dom origin – her in-laws expelled her, but her brother escorted her back to her husband’s home to avert dishonour. Shortly after, she was found shot to death, almost certainly at the hands of her husband. In the same town, locals tell the story of a young Dom woman convicted of the murder of her Kurdish husband. At her trial, neigh- bours testified that a functional marriage had suddenly turned sour when, after seven years, the husband had discovered his wife’s Dom origin. He had responded with extreme physical abuse, marking her breasts with scissors and publicly harnessing her to carts. But for all this doom and gloom, there are growing signs of Dom-Kurd integration throughout eastern Turkey. A century after the genocide, the old Armenian quarter in Gazi- antep once again bustles with life. The Arme- nian quarter is long gone, but its narrow houses are home to an assortment of Kurds, Dom and Syrian refugees, living alongside each other. Together, they form the city’s second economy: Gaziantep, one of the world’s fastest growing cities, is hungry for cheap labour to support its booming agricultural industry. So when Turks come home to sleep, the refugees go out to cover the nightshift in farms and factories. In a quiet alley in this quarter is Kemal Vural Tarlan’s Kirkayak Arts Centre. It is the only place in Gaziantep you can watch an independent film – and the locus of a project to forge a new relationship between Kurds and the Dom travellers they have so long resented. Vural Tarlan is a Kurd. He tries to give Dom refugees a voice through phototherapy: every weekend he holds workshops for the Dom community, teach- ing them to use a camera, and encouraging them to take photographs of their experi- ences throughout the week. “These people are travellers,” he says. “They come to my workshops for two months, three months, then they move out of town. But when I print their photographs, I find they have left something permanent behind.” He regularly holds exhibitions dedicated to Dom pho- tography in universities throughout Tur- key, visual campaigns to remind Turks of the forgotten communities living alongside them. But Vural Tarlan doesn’t just give the Dom people artistic representation. His arts centre is a hub for the Kurdish community in Gaziantep – and it is through him that Gaziantep’s Kurds find themselves meeting the despised Dom people as equals, neigh- bours, even artistic partners. Vural Tarlan believes things are improving between the two groups, citing regional government efforts in neighbouring Diyarbakır to ensure hate crimes reported by the Dom are fol- lowed up by police. In a region under intense demographic pressure, racial tensions are not going away any time soon. But leaving Vural Tarlan’s workshop, surrounded by self-por- traits of smiling, confident Dom children, it is hard not to feel hopeful. x Some names in this article have been changed ©Kate Maltby www.indexoncensorship.org Kate Maltby has travelled widely in Turkey as a classical scholar. She writes on politics for the Daily Telegraph in the UK, and is completing a PhD at University College Lon- don. She tweets @katemaltby ➔ 4 3 . 0 2 66 indexoncensorship.org 
work_asnscgmio5finboetvqdn4z6ru	----	Historical Events and Spaces of Hate: Hate Crimes against Arabs and Muslims in Post-9/11 America Historical Events and Spaces of Hate: Hate Crimes against Arabs and Muslims in Post-9/11 America Author(s): Ilir Disha, James C. Cavendish, Ryan D. King Source: Social Problems, Vol. 58, No. 1 (February 2011), pp. 21-46 Published by: University of California Press on behalf of the Society for the Study of Social Problems Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/sp.2011.58.1.21 . Accessed: 16/02/2011 12:18 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. 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University of California Press and Society for the Study of Social Problems are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Social Problems. http://www.jstor.org http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=ucal http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=sssp http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/sp.2011.58.1.21?origin=JSTOR-pdf http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=ucal Social Problems, Vol. 58, Issue 1, pp. 21–46, ISSN 0037-7791, electronic ISSN 1533-8533. © 2011 by Society for the Study of Social Problems, Inc. All rights reserved. Please direct all requests for permission to photocopy or reproduce article content through the University of California Press’s Rights and Permissions website at www.ucpressjournals.com/reprintinfo/asp. DOI: 10.1525/sp.2011.58.1.21. Historical Events and Spaces of Hate: Hate Crimes against Arabs and Muslims in Post-9/11 America Ilir Disha, University at Albany, SUNY James C. Cavendish, University of South Florida Ryan D. King, University at Albany, SUNY This research investigates variation in hate crime offending against Arabs and Muslims across U.S. coun- ties in the months before and after September 11, 2001. Four questions are of particular interest. First, what were the determinants of anti-Arab and Muslim hate crimes prior to 9/11? Second, in what social contexts were Arabs and Muslims at greatest risk of victimization? Third, to what extent did hate crimes against these groups increase after the terrorist attacks? And last, did the predictors of hate crimes against Arabs and Muslims change appreciably after 9/11? Findings show that hate crimes targeting Arabs and Muslims increased dramatically in the months following 9/11, although the structural determinants and geographic concentration of these crimes remained largely consistent after the attacks. Negative binomial regression results further suggest that counties with larger concentrations of Arabs and Muslims have higher incidents of such hate crimes, which likely reflects the availability of targets for this type of offending. At the same time, the likelihood of victimization for a given Arab or Muslim person is lowest in counties where the percent Arab or percent Muslim is highest, in line with a power-differential perspective on discrimination and intergroup violence. The findings imply that terrorist attacks may indeed incite retaliation and set off a wave of hate crime offending, but the location of these crimes is likely to remain consistent after a galvanizing event. Keywords: Arab, hate crime, Muslim, September 11, threat. Over the last three decades, an increasing number of politicians, interest groups, and social movement organizations in the United States have defined “hate crimes” as a social problem of national concern. Amid this growing concern, and in response to mounting pres- sure from civil rights activists, numerous states have adopted hate crimes legislation. The federal government also responded to these voices by passing laws requesting that law en- forcement agencies collect data on hate crimes (Grattet, Jenness, and Curry 1998; Grattet and Jenness 2001; Jenness and Broad 1997; Jenness and Grattet 2001). Together, these events have made the United States a world leader in the implementation of laws intended to track and combat bias-motivated crimes, which the Hate Crime Statistics Act of 1990 defines as “of- fenses against a person or property motivated by bias toward race, religion, ethnicity/national origin, disability, or sexual orientation” (FBI 2005a). Despite these state and national efforts to combat hate crimes in the 1990s, available data indicate that the incidence of hate crime offending has not significantly diminished over the last 20 years, and hate crimes against Arab and Muslim Americans increased dramatically in the months and years following September 11, 2001. To illustrate the magnitude of the in- crease in anti-Muslim hate crime offending, the FBI (2002) reported a 1,600 percent increase The authors thank Glenn Deane, Margarethe Kusenbach, Donileen Loseke, Rory McVeigh, Steven Messner, and the editors and anonymous reviewers of Social Problems for providing helpful comments at various stages of this research. Direct correspondence to: Ilir Disha, Department of Sociology, University at Albany, SUNY, A&S 351, 1400 Washington Ave., Albany, NY 12222. E-mail: id454135@albany.edu. SP5801_02.indd 21 12/29/10 12:51:41 PM 22 Disha/CavenDish/King in such hate crimes between 2000 and 2001—from 28 hate incidents in 2000 to 481 in 2001. According to New York City police, there were 117 reports of hate crimes against Muslims in that city alone between September 11, 2001 and March 2002 (Evans 2005). Furthermore, although the FBI lacks comparable data on trends in anti-Arab crimes because of the lack of an “Arab” category, the states of California, Colorado, and Illinois (Gerstenfeld 2004), along with a variety of Arab advocacy groups, report a dramatic rise in anti-Arab hate crimes over the same period. Although the numbers of such anti-Muslim and anti-Arab hate crimes have declined since 2001, several years later the numbers of anti-Muslim hate crimes remained five times what they were in 2000 (FBI 2005b). Moreover, the recent controversies over the building of an Islamic mosque near “ground zero” and the threats of burning copies of the Koran on the anniversary of 9/11 suggest that stereotypes portraying Arabs and Muslims as perpetrators of terrorism have not dissipated nearly a decade after 9/11. In some circumstances, such stereo- types continue to inspire hate-motivated violence, as evidenced by the recent violent assault on a Bangladeshi taxi driver who stated to a passenger that he was Muslim (Hays 2010). This reported increase in hate crime incidents against Arab and Muslim Americans (what we refer to as “Arab/Muslim” throughout the text)1 in the aftermath of 9/11 calls for a thorough, systematic investigation. Did hate crimes against other major social groups (e.g., black, Hispanic, Asian) change in the months and years surrounding 9/11, and if so, how? If anti-Arab/Muslim hate crimes increased, were the increases proportionately similar across various sociodemo- graphic contexts? Or did “hot spots” for anti-Arab/Muslim hate crimes change after 9/11? And in what places were individual Arabs and Muslims at highest risk of victimization? We shed light on these questions by investigating hate crimes perpetrated against Arabs/Muslims before and after September 11th. We first use incident-level data to investigate whether the increase in crimes against Arabs/Muslims after September 11th paralleled trends in hate crimes against other groups. Then, aggregating these data to the county level, we examine the county-level demographic, economic, and sociopolitical determinants of anti-Arab/Muslim hate crimes in the months preceding and just after the 9/11 attacks. Importantly, we differentiate between two types of questions. On the one hand, we are interested in the conditions that produce higher counts of anti-Arab or anti-Muslim hate crimes. That is, where are these types of crimes most prevalent? On the other hand, we are equally interested in the rate of this type of hate crime. Fo- cusing on the rate as opposed to the count answers a related but distinct question: where were individual Arabs and Muslim most vulnerable to attack? As we explain below, answering these questions requires different model specifications and yields different results. We see the above research questions as important and timely for several reasons. For one, existing studies of racially and ethnically motivated hate crime offending focus almost exclusively on crimes against blacks, Latinos, or Asians (e.g., Green, Strolovitch, and Wong 1998; Lyons 2007; Torres 1999). To the best of our knowledge, no studies of hate-motivated behavior have investigated the conditions under which crimes against small minority groups such as Arab and Muslim Americans occur. Second, our focus on anti-Arab/Muslim hate crimes speaks directly to theories of in- tergroup crime and violence. Prior research often explains temporal and spatial variation in intergroup crime with reference to theories emphasizing minority group threat (Jacobs and Wood 1999; Liska 1992). From this perspective, a large or growing minority group is per- ceived as a threat to many majority group members, and a backlash ensues that often results in prejudicial acts committed against minorities (Blalock 1967). Although this perspective has received ample support in the study of prejudicial attitudes (Quillian 1995, 1996; Taylor 1. Referring to “anti-Arab/Muslim hate crimes” is admittedly somewhat imprecise. After all, anti-Muslim hate crimes are distinct from anti-Arab hate crimes given that not all Arabs are Muslims, and vice versa. We nonetheless use this term for consistency and convenience throughout the text. We also elaborate on the use of the term when providing the rationale for the measure of our dependent variable (see below). SP5801_02.indd 22 12/29/10 12:51:41 PM hate Crimes in Post-9/11 america 23 1998) and homicide (Jacobs and Wood 1999), it has received far less support in prior work on hate crime offending (Lyons 2007). An alternative hypothesis explored in the present work emphasizes power differences between groups (Levine and Campbell 1972). The key notion here is that majority group members are emboldened when the minority group is proportion- ately small. To state it rather colloquially, potential offenders see safety in numbers and have no reason to fear reprisal when and where the minority group constitutes only a percentage or two of the population. This perspective on hate crime offending offers different predictions from the more traditional group (or racial) threat theories, and we see our empirical case as useful for adjudicating between these theoretical camps. Finally, to our knowledge, no studies have investigated whether, or to what extent, the effects of demographic composition and economic conditions are exacerbated following a landmark event, such as the politically charged attacks of September 11th. Research has ex- plored how historical events affect attitudinal change (Firebaugh and Davis 1988; Hyman and Sheatsley 1964; Verkuyten and Zaremba 2005), yet studies investigating how social conditions affect hate motivated behavior against small minority groups in the wake of historical events are largely absent from the literature. The present work, in part, speaks to this issue as well. Perspectives on Hate Crime Offending The study of intergroup conflict, and offending motivated by prejudice in particular, is of- ten understood as being driven by three types of factors: demographics, economic conditions, and the distribution of political power (King 2009). Much of this research, to variable degrees, draws on the foundational theoretical work of Hubert Blalock (1967) on intergroup relations, which indeed emphasized the importance of these three factors. However, extant theory and empirical studies since Blalock’s seminal work have yielded competing predictions and results. As Donald P. Green, Dara Z. Strolovitch, and Janelle S. Wong (1998) note in their widely cited work on racially motivated hate crime, “These literatures . . . offer conflicting hypotheses about the conditions under which racially motivated violence [is] likely to arise” (p. 373). We see reasons to expect that demographics, economic conditions, and politically charged events will explain some of the variation in hate crimes perpetrated against Arabs and Mus- lims. Yet, the precise nature of these relationships is not straightforward and extant theory pushes us in multiple directions. As such, we briefly review some relevant theoretical work to put our research questions in context before moving to the analyses. Racial and Ethnic Demographics The literature on prejudice and discrimination identifies minority group size as an important determinant of intergroup conflict and prejudice, yet precisely how and why group size mat- ters remains debatable. Moreover, group size may affect behavior (e.g., criminal offenses) and attitudes (e.g., racial prejudice) differently, since the former places greater emphasis on factors such as opportunity, risk of retaliation, and risk of law enforcement sanction. We see three notable ways in which minority group size is likely to influence hate crimes against Arabs and Muslims. First, group size may simply indicate opportunity. At a general level, places with higher proportions of minorities may have more intergroup crime simply because there are more targets available. As David Jacobs and Katherine Wood (1999) find in their work on in- terracial homicide, white killings of blacks increase with the proportion of the population that is black, likely because of the probability of interracial interaction. In our case, we would expect the number of anti-Arab/Muslim hate crimes to increase with the proportion of Arabs or Mus- lims in a county, although an opportunity-based perspective would predict no association with the rate of offending. That is, the minority group percentage matters insofar as it is correlated with the number of available targets. Once the number of Arabs/Muslims (targets) is used as a SP5801_02.indd 23 12/29/10 12:51:42 PM 24 Disha/CavenDish/King denominator in the variable measuring hate crime offenses (effectively making the dependent variable into a rate of hate crime offenses per number of available targets), the percent Arab/ Muslim would presumably be of little meaning from a pure opportunity perspective. A second argument emphasizes the real or perceived threats posed by a minority group. Blalock (1967), for instance, asserted that dominant groups in society would seek to main- tain their powerful positions and would resort to discrimination and perhaps even violence to obviate threats from minority groups. Blalock (1967) emphasized the importance of pro- portionate minority group size as a source of both political and economic threat. Large or growing minority groups, according to Blalock (1967), may become politically viable and compete for political power, which elicits a reaction from the majority or “dominant” group. Likewise, minority groups represent a source of cheap and expendable labor that can compete with majority group members, at least under certain labor market conditions. Although not all contemporary work supports this premise, the general tenets of the group threat perspec- tive have received considerable support in the study of prejudice (Dixon 2006; Quillian 1995; Semyonov et al. 2004; Taylor 1998), punishment (Jacobs and Kleban 2003), and most rel- evant to our case, racially motivated violence (Corzine, Creech, and Corzine, 1983; Reed, 1972; Tolnay, Deane, and Beck 1996). It follows from this perspective that the percent Arab/ Muslim would be positively associated with anti-Arab/Muslim hate crimes, measured either as a count of such hate crimes or as a rate per Arab/Muslim population. The key notion is that the larger proportion of Arabs/Muslims would be perceived as threatening by segments of the majority group, and a backlash would ensue. We stress one additional and important detail relevant to group threat theory and its ap- plicability to our substantive case. Blalock emphasized the importance of minority group size for both political and economic forms of threat, although we see neither as likely to accrue either before or after 9/11. The largest concentration of Arabs is about 3 percent of a county’s population (the percent Muslim is only slightly higher), hardly on par with the concentrations of other minority groups, such as blacks and Hispanics, and thus concerns about competition and power are unlikely to materialize. Rather, we suggest that in the eyes of many non-Arabs a relatively large concentration of Arabs or Muslims may trigger fears of terrorism or mass violence. Although the actual association between Arab ethnicity and terrorism may be dubi- ous, the perceived association rests on a strong empirical foundation. For instance, Gallup polls not only indicate that almost a quarter of Americans thought it was likely that their community would experience an act of terrorism in November of 2001 (Gallup 2009), they also singled out Arabs as particularly suspicious. Forty-nine percent of Americans supported a require- ment that Arabs (including Arab U.S. citizens) carry a special form of identification with them, and 58 percent favored a requirement that Arabs have a special and more intensive screening process at airports (Gallup 2009). We see the terrorism threat associated with Arabs as akin to the exaggerated threat of street crime associated with African Americans (Eitle, D’Alessio, and Stolzenberg 2002; Quillian and Pager 2001). Finally, a power-differential perspective would predict precisely the opposite of that pos- ited by traditional group threat theory. This line of theorizing suggests that majority group members are emboldened to act on their prejudices when they anticipate little or no reprisal from local law enforcement and a low likelihood of retribution from the minority group. In their work on ethnocentrism, Robert Levine and Donald Campbell (1972) express this senti- ment when stating that “the fear of retaliation for hostility against powerful groups may make the level of inhibition against aggression greater than the level of evocation so that outgroups with the power to retaliate will be least likely to be aggressed against . . . ” (pp. 216–17). In other words, Levine and Campbell’s idea aligns with the adage that “there is safety in numbers.” Minority group members are at a lower risk of victimization in areas where they constitute a higher proportion of the population because dominant group members may fear the consequences of their acts. Violence can beget retaliatory violence, or perhaps bring about the force of the law. Returning to our case of anti-Arab/Muslim hate crimes, the power-differential thesis suggests SP5801_02.indd 24 12/29/10 12:51:42 PM hate Crimes in Post-9/11 america 25 that hate crimes may indeed occur with some frequency in places with a large raw number of Arabs and Muslims. Yet, the rate of hate crime offending against this minority group is expected to be smaller where the proportion of Arabs and Muslims in a county is higher. Economic Conditions Prior research, often growing out of the group threat tradition, also emphasizes the poten- tial importance of economic conditions in the study of prejudice and hate crime. In Blalock’s (1967:147–50) classic formulation, economic threat was primarily understood as a consequence of minority group size. More recent theorizing (Olzak 1992; Quillian 1995, 1996), however, suggests that economic conditions affect levels of competition between groups and contribute to elevated levels of perceived threat independently of minority group size. As Lincoln Quillian (1996) states, “The idea is that the dominant group perceives their own group to be more threatened by minority presence when economic circumstances are worse” (p. 821). These more recent explanations of economic threat usually follow one of two pathways. The first, frequently referred to as the “frustration-aggression hypothesis,” argues that inter- group hostility is higher at times and places that experience difficult economic conditions. This path emphasizes resource competition (Olzak 1992; Quillian 1995; Tolnay and Beck 1993) among groups. Competition for scarce resources in certain occupational niches can bring ma- jority and minority groups in contact with each other in the economic domain, and this inter- action becomes more hostile during times when economic conditions are poor because some factions of the majority group vent their frustration by acting aggressively against minority group members. The classic expression of this hypothesis is found in Carl Hovland and Robert Sears’s (1940) analysis of the economy and black lynchings in the American South over nearly 50 years. They show that lynchings increased during periods of economic turmoil, which they viewed as consistent with frustration-aggression (see also Hepworth and West 1988). Marshall Medoff (1999) recently found similar support for the frustration-aggression hypothesis as an explanation for contemporary hate crimes by showing that hate crime rates and market wages are inversely correlated. Still, not all empirical work has supported the frustration-aggression hypothesis (Green, Glaser, and Rich 1998; Green, Strolovitch, and Wong 1998; Lyons 2007). To this end, an al- ternative perspective takes issue with the notion that hate crimes are more frequent in loca- tions characterized by disadvantageous economic conditions. For instance, Christopher Lyons’s (2007) research on racially motivated crimes in Chicago communities found that anti-black hate crimes are more common in affluent white communities which “appear . . . organized in favor of anti-black crimes” (p. 847). These wealthy and ostensibly socially organized com- munities are likely to have higher levels of trust, cohesion, and informal means of social control among community members. In such communities, “outsiders” may be at higher risk of attack. In short, there are reasons to suspect that hate crimes against Arabs/Muslims may be higher in affluent areas, although the causal mechanisms may have more to do with con- founding factors such as social cohesion and informal control than absolute wealth (Lyons 2007). We are mindful of both lines of argument and test whether measures of economic conditions have a negative or a positive effect on anti-Arab/Muslim hate crimes. The Political Context and Triggering Events Other recent work on intergroup crime gives greater weight to the political environment (Green et al. 1998; King and Brustein 2006; McVeigh, Welch, and Bjarnason 2003). For ex- ample, Donald P. Green, Jack Glaser, and Andrew Rich (1998) reanalyzed Hovland and Sears’s (1940) data on lynchings in the South and found not only that the correlation between eco- nomic turmoil and lynching was less robust than earlier studies had indicated, but also that the correlation was strongest at times and places in which political, business, or labor leaders SP5801_02.indd 25 12/29/10 12:51:43 PM 26 Disha/CavenDish/King had tried to persuade their communities that blacks were the cause of their economic prob- lems. Ryan D. King and William Brustein (2006) similarly point towards the specific political situation of Jews during a particular historic period, such as pre-World War II Germany. Their study found that the “association of [Jews] with the leadership of the political left,” rather than Jewish population size or economic conditions, was a principal determinant of anti-Se- mitic violence (King and Brustein 2006:867). Hence, research during the past decade indicates that political change and political discourse can directly and indirectly influence intergroup violence (see Koopmans and Olzak 2004). In a similar vein, a related line of work points to the role of specific events that can trig- ger intergroup violence or otherwise influence prejudice. In contrast to more traditional racial threat models that posit a “gradual, unbroken trend” (Quillian 1996:825; see also Firebaugh and Davis 1988; Hyman and Sheatsley 1964) of attitude change unaffected by the particular historical events of the period, another model suggests that historical events have the ability to influence attitude change. This is demonstrated in recent research by Maykel Verkuyten and Katarzyna Zaremba (2005) on the evaluations of various groups in the Netherlands toward ethnic majority-(Dutch) and minority-groups (including two Islamic outgroups, Turks and Moroccans) before, during, and after the rise of a new populist rightist movement in 2002. The authors report that during the height of the movement, Dutch respondents evaluated the Islamic outgroups more negatively than any other ethnic minority groups. They conclude that “it is important to study ethnic relations across time, in relation to political circumstances” (Verkuyten and Zaremba 2005:375). In line with this body of work, we consider the events of September 11th to be an histori- cal event that transformed Arabs and Muslims into convenient targets for acts of “vicarious retribution,” defined as an act that “occurs when a member of a group commits an act of ag- gression toward members of an outgroup for an assault or provocation that had no personal consequences for him or her, but did harm a fellow ingroup member” (Lickel et al. 2006:372). This implies that retaliatory actions by dominant group members are amplified in response to a (construed) threatening event. Brian Lickel and associates (2006) argue that if the event is construed in a way that elicits high ingroup identification and negative outgroup dispositions, then aggressive behavior in the form of vicarious retribution is an expected outcome directed against the “provoking group.” September 11th was clearly a politically charged, transforma- tive event for U.S. society in general, including American Arabs and Muslims. Given that the fateful event was orchestrated by individuals of Arab descent, it brought to the forefront of public scrutiny members of Arab and Muslim origins. Before 9/11, and despite experiences of discrimination (Akram and Johnson 2002), their plight was overshadowed by the concerns of other minority groups. After 9/11, Arabs and Muslims were largely depicted as a uni- fied, coherent, and threatening group consisting of “foreigners,” “extremists,” and “terrorists” (Gerstenfeld 2004; Merskin 2004; Volpp 2002). We argue that such a negative depiction of Arabs and Muslims, coupled with high “ingroup identification—group pride, group member empathy, and normative pressure” (Lickel et al. 2006:375), makes the post-9/11 environment highly conducive to acts of aggressive retaliation against individuals who appeared to display characteristics of an Arab ancestry or Islamic faith. We thus expect a sizeable increase in hate crimes against Arabs and Muslims in the months after 9/11 relative to the preceding months. Finally, existing research has rarely investigated whether or how galvanizing landmark events such as 9/11 affect the socioeconomic determinants of prejudice or intergroup conflict. We see three scenarios as plausible for the present case of anti-Arab/Muslim hate crimes. First, landmark historical events like the 9/11 attacks may weaken the association between minority group size and hate crimes. The event could fuel broad hostility towards Arabs and Muslims, and thus the motivation to offend would extend more broadly after the event than before. To wit, the event would alter the spatial distribution of hate crime offending so that hate crimes against Arabs/Muslims are more evenly distributed across county contexts. Alternatively, we might expect no change after 9/11; that is, the event may simply be obsolete SP5801_02.indd 26 12/29/10 12:51:43 PM hate Crimes in Post-9/11 america 27 with respect to hate crime offending. From this perspective, demographic conditions simply trump the importance of potentially galvanizing events. Levels of hate crime offending and their spatial distribution would remain consistent before and after the attack. A third possi- bility is that hate crimes increase by proportionately equal amounts in all counties, and thus the 9/11 attacks would alter the frequency or rate of hate crime offending but not necessarily the spatial patterning of such crimes. We adjudicate between these three alternatives in the present research. Acknowledging the Social Constructionist Approach We have discussed how minority group size, economic conditions, and historical events contribute to hate crime offending, particularly as they pertain to anti-Arab/Muslim hate crimes. However, we are aware that reports of anti-Arab/Muslim hate crimes, like other forms of hate crime, can be a combination of actual incidents and institutional reporting practices. One of the most comprehensive studies to examine the role of such political and institutional practices on hate crimes is Rory McVeigh, Michael R. Welch, and Thoroddur Bjarnason’s (2003) study of county-level variation in hate crimes reported to the FBI in the year 2000 (see also McVeigh, Neblett, and Shafiq 2006). McVeigh and associates (2003) acknowledge that “hate crimes are rooted in an objective reality” (p. 848). However, they also suggest that hate crime reporting is a reflection of “different incentives to call acts of bias to the attention of local au- thorities, as well as different incentives that influence law enforcement agencies to report hate crimes” (McVeigh et al. 2003:846). In their work, hate crimes are more likely to be reported in counties with a legislative mandate for data collection, in counties with resourceful civil rights organizations, and in counties with more political party competition. They also show that the effect of civil rights organizations is highly dependent on the “availability of resources, a favor- able political context, and objective features of local communities that lend credibility to civil rights framing” (McVeigh et al. 2003:862). It is thus prudent to account for the constructionist approach when assessing the determinants of hate crime offending, and hence to the extent possible, with available data. We control for sociopolitical factors (e.g., legislative mandates for hate crime data collection; the presence of Arab Advocacy organizations; political party voting preferences) that are likely to affect the reporting of bias-motivated crimes. Research Methods Data and Variables of Interest The data for our analyses come from a variety of sources: the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports for 2001–2002 (U.S. Department of Justice 2002b, 2003) supply data on hate crime incidents; the U.S. Census (U.S. Census Bureau 2002) provides us with population demographics of U.S. counties; the Glenmary Research Center (Jones et al. 2002), an independent private organiza- tion that collects and disseminates data on religious bodies and adherents, provides county-level estimates of Muslim population size; the Web sites of a variety of Arab advocacy organizations supply information on the locations of their chapters in 2001 (ADC 2002; CAIR 2002: MPAC 2002); and data obtained from Polidata (2001) provide county-level measures of election outcomes in 1996 and 2000. Incident-Level Hate Crime Data. The FBI provides incident-level data on hate crimes in which each case represents a single incident report. Practically no single reported incident of hate crime is classified as having more than one bias motivation (only 12 incidents between 2001 and 2002), enabling us to construct variables measuring the frequency of each type of bias motivation. Of the 17,180 single-bias incidents reported over the 2001–2002 period, SP5801_02.indd 27 12/29/10 12:51:44 PM 28 Disha/CavenDish/King 46.6 percent were motivated by racial bias, 18.9 percent by religious bias, 18.6 percent by ethnic bias, 15.4 percent by sexual orientation bias, and .5 percent were motivated by bias against the disabled. In comparison to the distribution of hate crime incidents reported in the year 2000 (as reported by McVeigh et al. 2003), the data show an increase in the proportion of incidents motivated by religious and ethnic bias (from 18.3 percent in 2000 to 18.9 percent in 2001–2002 and from 11.3 percent in 2000 to 18.6 percent in 2001–2002, respectively) but a decrease in the percentage of incidents motivated by racial bias (from 53.8 percent in 2000 to 46.6 percent in 2001–2002). We examine whether this change is partly attributable to September 11, 2001. The County-Level Data. Because of our interest in exploring how the characteristics of local contexts also contribute to anti-Arab/Muslim hate crime incidents after September 11, we drew the incident-level data from the period between January 1, 2001 and May 31, 2002 (a period of equal duration before and after September 11, 2001) and aggregated these data to the county level. Since our dependent variable combines anti-Arab and anti-Muslim hate crimes (see below), we develop two separate county-level data sets. The first data set consists of 2,343 counties that have a nonzero Arab population. We are interested in examining the ef- fect of Arab population size on anti-Arab/Muslim hate crimes, and thus we limited the sample to those counties with a nonzero Arab population. The population of Arab descent is defined as people who report “Arab” as their first or second ancestry (definition is based on the U.S. Census 2000 SF3 files).2 A second sample consists of 422 cases. The latter included only coun- ties with a nonzero Muslim population based on county-level estimates from the Glenmary Research Center (Jones et al. 2002). The Dependent Variable. In most of our analyses, the dependent variable is the combined number of anti-Arab and anti-Muslim hate crimes. It must be noted that the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports do not have a separate “Arab” category, but we argue, partly via the process of elimination, that the FBI’s measure of crimes against people of “other ethnicity” is largely, if not entirely, capturing anti-Arab hate crimes. In other words, because virtually all other types of hate crime have their own specific categories, and because each crime incident is assigned a single bias motivation, hate crimes committed against Arabs have the highest probability of being assigned to the “other ethnicity” category. In fact, Arabs are the only major ethnic group with no representation under existing hate crime classifications. Assuming that anti-Arab hate crimes constitute a significant proportion of hate crimes against “other” ethnicities, an argument we further validate shortly, our justification for com- bining the anti-other and anti-Muslim categories rests on a few arguments. First, in the eyes of many Americans, Arabs and Muslims have become equated, especially during the period under consideration. The following paragraph illustrates this point. Arab Americans and Muslims have been “raced” as “terrorists:” foreign, disloyal, and imminently threatening. Although Arabs trace their roots to the Middle East and claim many different reli- gious backgrounds, and Muslims come from all over the world, these distinctions are blurred and negative images about either Arabs or Muslims are attributed to both. As Ibrahim Hooper of the Council on American-Islamic relations notes, “the common stereotypes are that we’re all Arabs, we’re all violent, and we’re all conducting a holy war” (Saito 2001, as quoted in Akram and John- son 2002:296). Second, there is some face validity to our assumption about the “other ethnicity” cat- egory as consisting largely of anti-Arab hate crimes. Figures 1, 2, and 3 show that trends for 2. Our reliance on the combined Arab ancestry reports (versus those reporting only first Arab ancestry) stems from the fact that hate crime reports in the aftermath of 9/11 were directed not only to those with a “certain” Arab background but also to those with a “mistaken” Arab identity. This suggests that we would want to include in our models all individu- als who would report complete and partial Arab ancestry. SP5801_02.indd 28 12/29/10 12:51:44 PM hate Crimes in Post-9/11 america 29 what we call “anti-Arab” hate crimes (labeled “other ethnicity” in the Uniform Crime Reports) closely parallel the trend lines for bona fide anti-Muslim hate crimes. Figure 1 presents the distribution of the number of hate crimes by subcategory over a ten-year period, from 1995 through 2005. As expected, hate crimes against Muslims peaked in 2001, when there were 481 reported incidents, as did crimes against people of “other ethnicity,” when there were 1,502 reported incidents in this category. No other type of motivation displayed a comparable temporal pattern. Figures 2 and 3 report patterns in hate crime incidents motivated by differ- ent categories of religious bias and ethnic bias, respectively. As these figures illustrate, there are very dramatic spikes in religious bias crimes against Muslims and ethnic bias crimes against the “other ethnicity” (interpreted Arab) immediately following 9/11. That the two lines so closely resemble each other increases our confidence that anti-Arab hate crimes constitute a significant portion (albeit perhaps not all) of hate crimes against those of the “other ethnicity.” To make these figures intelligible, alongside the anti-Muslim and anti-”other ethnicity” trend lines, we have reported only the trend lines for the most frequently occurring hate crimes motivated by religion and race—anti-Jewish and anti-black hate crimes, respectively. Third, because some readers may continue to question this rationale for collapsing the “other ethnicity” category and the “Muslim” category, all of our analyses have been repli- cated using only the “anti-Muslim” category, and then using only the “anti-other ethnicity” category, as separate dependent variables. Results of these analyses, although not reported here, are virtually identical to those presented below and are available from the authors upon request. Appendix A provides an overview of the dependent variable. It reports the total number of anti-Muslim and anti-Arab hate crimes before and after September 11th for counties with the greatest increase in the overall number of anti-other (hereafter referred to as anti-Arab) and anti-Muslim hate crimes following September 11th, 2001. 4000 3500 3000 2500 2000 1500 1000 N u m b e r o f In c id e n ts 500 0 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Anti-Black Anti-MuslimAnti-Other Ethnicity Anti-Jewish Figure 1 • Distribution of Hate Crimes by Select Subcategories, 1995–2005 SP5801_02.indd 29 12/29/10 12:51:46 PM 30 Disha/CavenDish/King N u m b e r o f In c id e n ts Incident Date 50 40 30 20 Bias Motivation Anti-Muslim Anti-Jewish 10 Ja n 1, 2 00 1 Fe b 1, 2 00 1 M ar 1 , 2 00 1 Ap r 1 , 2 00 1 M ay 1 , 2 00 1 Ju n 1, 2 00 1 Ju l 1 , 2 00 1 Au g 1, 2 00 1 Se p 1, 2 00 1 O ct 1 , 2 00 1 No v 1, 2 00 1 De c 1, 2 00 1 Ja n 1, 2 00 2 Fe b 1, 2 00 2 M ar 1 , 2 00 2 Ap r 1 , 2 00 2 M ay 1 , 2 00 2 M ay 3 1, 2 00 2 0 Figure 2 • Reported Hate Crimes Due to Religious Bias, Jan 1, 2001–May 31, 2002 N u m b e r o f In c id e n ts Incident Date Bias Motivation Anti-Other Ethnicity Anti-Black Ja n 1, 2 00 1 Fe b 1, 2 00 1 M ar 1 , 2 00 1 Ap r 1 , 2 00 1 M ay 1 , 2 00 1 Ju n 1, 2 00 1 Ju l 1 , 2 00 1 Au g 1, 2 00 1 Se p 1, 2 00 1 O ct 1 , 2 00 1 No v 1, 2 00 1 De c 1, 2 00 1 Ja n 1, 2 00 2 Fe b 1, 2 00 2 M ar 1 , 2 00 2 Ap r 1 , 2 00 2 M ay 1 , 2 00 2 M ay 3 1, 2 00 2 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 Figure 3 • Reported Hate Crimes Due to Racial/Ethnic Bias, Jan 1, 2001–May 31, 2002 SP5801_02.indd 30 12/29/10 12:51:47 PM hate Crimes in Post-9/11 america 31 Focal Predictor Variables. The 2000 U.S. Census contains data on a variety of demographic characteristics, which allow us to test theories of intergroup violence. (See Appendix B for descriptive statistics on all the variables of interest). We include variables that measure the percentage of the population that is non-Hispanic white, the percentage of a county’s popu- lation that is of Arab ancestry, and per capita income as an indicator of economic condi- tions. The indicator of non-Hispanic white population size is important because research by Green and associates (1998) showed that hate crimes against minorities were highest in the predominantly white neighborhoods of New York City, a finding consistent with the power- differential approach. The percent of a county’s population having an Arab ancestry—the focal independent variable—was computed by using the total number of individuals reporting an Arab ances- try, dividing it by the total county population, and multiplying by 100. We also included a measure of Muslim population—obtained from Jones and colleagues (2002)—similar to the above computations of Arab ancestry. Moreover, we include a quadratic term for percent Arab (percent Arab squared) and percent Muslim (percent Muslim squared) because classic minor- ity group threat theory (Blalock 1967) raises the possibility of curvilinear effects in the study of prejudice. In addition to racial-ethnic composition variables, we also include an indicator of eco- nomic conditions. Following Quillian’s (1995, 1996) research on prejudice and group threat, we use a county’s per capita income as a measure of affluence. Control Variables. We control for a variety of sociodemographic factors known or sus- pected to influence the incidence of hate crimes. Among these variables are total population size (in logarithmic form), which is likely to display a positive relationship with the number of hate crimes; percentage of the population aged 15 to 24, because younger age groups com- mit a disproportionate share of serious crimes (Moffitt 2006; Rosenfeld 2002) and hate crimes (Levin and McDevitt 1993); and percentage of the population that is urban, because urban counties are likely to have more crimes of all types. In addition to demographic composition, we control for the county rate of serious crimi- nal offenses (expressed as an index of crimes per 100 residents in a county) and police force size using Uniform Crime Report (U.S. Department of Justice 2002a, 2002c) data. The crime rate includes the total number of reports of murder, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft in each county. It is used in our analyses because the number of hate crimes is, in part, a reflection of general patterns of crime within a county. McVeigh and colleagues (2003) argue that the effect of the crime rate on hate crime report- ing is likely “to be curvilinear (inverted-U), as an extremely high volume of general offenses within a community could force local authorities to give less priority to the enforcement of hate crime legislation” (p. 855). For this reason, we add a quadratic term (crime rate squared) to the model. A measure of police force size per 100,000 is also included. It is tenable that counties with a smaller police force would have fewer personnel to monitor and report hate crimes. Hence, we see this as an important control variable. Furthermore, we include a variety of political context measures that are thought to affect hate crime reporting practices. The number of Arab advocacy organizations in each county is included because these organizations are known to encourage their constituents and pressure public officials to report hate crimes. In our search for Arab advocacy organizations, we relied on two selection criteria. First, advocacy organizations had to have a national, rather than a local reach. Second, they must have been established before 2000. Usually, the organizations that have a national scope and have had time to establish themselves draw more adherents and are more influential in political and public media settings. To verify this, we visited the Web sites of a number of Arab advocacy organizations and selected three of them; the Amer- ican-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee (the largest, established in 1980), the Council on American-Islamic Relations (established in 1994), and the Muslim Public Affairs Council SP5801_02.indd 31 12/29/10 12:51:47 PM 32 Disha/CavenDish/King (established in 1988; see Bakalian and Bozorgmehr 2009). We found evidence that these organizations do, in fact, actively encourage victims of hate crimes to report these incidents to law enforcement agents. The American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee (ADC 2002), for instance, encourages all victims to “call your local Police Department and file an official police report.” The Muslim Public Affairs Council (MPAC 2002), to take another example, lists on its Web site a number of reasons why victims should report incidents of hatred. To construct a measure of the presence of Arab advocacy organizations we gathered in- formation from the Web sites of these three national organizations that report having local chapters across the United States: ADC, CAIR, and MPAC. Because it is believed that advocacy organizations could exert influence in their own county or in other counties in their state, and because their efforts are likely strengthened by working in unison with other Arab advocacy chapters within their state, we calculated an Arab advocacy variable that represents the total number of advocacy organizations in the state plus the number of advocacy organizations in the county. This variable, ranging from 0 to 6, has a mean of 1.90; 834 (or 35.6 percent) of all counties do not have a chapter in their state or county, and 226 (9.3 percent) have as many as six chapters within their state or county. We also include a measure of whether the county is located in a state with a statutory mandate for law enforcement agencies to report hate crime incidents to the state attorney general. We obtained this information from the Anti-Defamation League (ADL 2001). Our rationale for including this measure rests on our belief that counties located in states with legislative mandates to collect data are more likely to have normalized the process of reporting (King 2007). Other factors influencing hate crime reporting, following McVeigh and colleagues (2003), are the county’s political party preference and the degree of political competitiveness. McVeigh and colleagues (2003) suggest that “political incentives” propel local authorities to respond to civil rights issues, such as hate crime (p. 853). We suspect that Democratic, rather than Repub- lican, counties would be more favorable to hate crime reporting given their particular concern with civil rights issues. Following this rationale, we measure Democratic voting as the percent of votes cast for Democratic candidate Al Gore in the 2000 election, thinking that Democratic strongholds are more favorable to hate crime reporting. Similarly, hate crime reporting would be taken more seriously in a politically competitive environment. To that end, we calculate political competitiveness by taking the mean of the absolute difference between the percentage of votes cast for the Republican and Democratic presidential candidates in the 1996 and 2000 elections, and multiplying this value by -1 so the higher scores represent greater competition.3 Analytic Strategy Using the incident-level data, we first explore whether the trend in hate crime offend- ing against Arabs/Muslims was altered by the events of September 11, 2001. We also assess whether there are any noticeable fluctuations on other categories of hate crimes that surfaced during the 2001–2002 period. Then, using the county-level data, we utilize negative binomial regression to assess whether county-level characteristics are associated with the number of anti-Arab/Muslim hate crimes reported before and after 9/11. With respect to the county- level analyses, ordinary least squares (OLS) regression is problematic because the distribution 3. Because political mediation theory, as described by McVeigh and colleagues (2003), suggests that the influence of Arab advocacy organizations on hate crime reporting is contingent on the presence of these “political incentives” for public officials to respond to their demands, we also created variables to measure the interactions between Arab advocacy organizations and three key variables: whether the county is located in a state with a legislative mandate, the percent of the county’s population that voted Democratic in the 2000 presidential election, and the degree of political competition. Since interactions were not significant and did not alter the results, they are not included in our models but are available upon request. SP5801_02.indd 32 12/29/10 12:51:47 PM hate Crimes in Post-9/11 america 33 of our outcome, the count of anti-Arab/Muslim hate crimes, is heavily skewed with many counties reporting no such hate crimes. As such, we do not work with a normal distribution and the heteroskedasticity present in the data clearly violates OLS assumptions. A Poisson- based estimator can provide nonbiased estimates for positively skewed event counts (Osgood 2000), although the presence of overdispersion renders the Poisson model problematic. We thus employ a negative binomial model, which is based on the Poisson distribution but pro- vides more efficient estimates in the presence of over dispersion. As mentioned above, we are equally interested in characteristics of counties that influ- ence the overall count of anti-Arab/Muslim hate crimes and factors that affect the rate (per Arab population). Again, the former tells us if these crimes are saturated in particular types of counties, while the latter tells us about the relative risk for the average Arab or Muslim in a county. These are distinct but equally important issues. Accordingly, some of our negative binomial models include the respective Arab and Muslim populations (logged) as offsets to account for the population at risk, which essentially restores the rate distribution of the data in a Poisson-based model.4 Results Incident-Level Findings One of our objectives is to explore whether the events of 9/11 had any observable impact on patterns of hate crime incidents against various categories of people, particularly Arabs and Muslims. Although our primary interest is the 2001–2002 period, we begin by examin- ing some general trends in hate crime offending. Figures 1 through 3, which were discussed earlier, clearly indicate that crimes motivated by hatred against most groups remained flat or slightly declined in the years (Figure 1) or months (Figures 2 and 3) before and after 9/11. The only notable exceptions are crimes manifesting hatred against Arabs and Muslims, which increased dramatically in the wake of 9/11. Comparing different categories of hate crime for the first 8½ months of 2001 (i.e., from January 1–September 10) to the 8½ months following September 11th (i.e., from September 11, 2001–May 31, 2002) further illustrates this point. The total number of hate crimes attributed to both anti-Muslim and anti-Arab bias (we have not collapsed the categories of our dependent variable in these descriptive statistics) increased from 26 and 260, respectively, in the pre-September 11th period to 517 and 1,502 hate crimes in the post-September 11th period. Corresponding with these increases are decreases in the number of hate crimes motivated by bias against blacks, whites, Asians, and Latinos. Anti- Jewish hate crime was the only other category showing a slight increase after September 11th (from 720 to 740). In fact, the historically most common form of bias motivation (i.e., motiva- tion against blacks) dropped by a total of 361; from 2,159 offenses in the first 8½ months of 2001 to 1,798 offenses in the 8½ months after September 11th. The 9/11 attacks thus clearly mattered for hate crime offending against Arabs and Muslims, although an unresolved ques- tion is whether the location and determinants of anti-Arab/Muslim hate crimes significantly changed after 9/11. County-Level Findings Hate crimes against Arabs and Muslims clearly increased following the 9/11 attacks, but was the increase more pronounced in some places than others? To answer this question, we employ negative binomial regression models to assess which county-level characteristics are 4. The respective (logged) Arab and Muslim populations are included as offsets in all models in Tables 3, 4, and 5. With this specification, the logged population coefficient is a constant with a fixed value of one, and hence these coef- ficients are not depicted in the tables. SP5801_02.indd 33 12/29/10 12:51:48 PM 34 Disha/CavenDish/King associated with the number of anti-Arab/Muslim hate crime offenses before and after 9/11. We present the findings in Tables 1 through 4, with each table having an identical organization. Models 1 and 2 in each table present findings for the 8½ months prior to 9/11, while Models 3 and 4 present findings for the 8½ months after 9/11. We also point out that all models in Tables 1 and 2 do not include the logged Arab or Muslim population size as an offset, whereas all models in Tables 3 and 4 use the respective logged population sizes as offsets, thereby con- verting our outcome variable into a rate. Table 1 shows the results without minority population offsets for counties with a nonzero Arab population. In all models, we are primarily interested in examining whether percent Arab is associated with anti-Arab/Muslim hate crimes, net of our control variables. Look- ing at Model 1, we first note that several control variables are associated with the outcome Table 1 • Negative Binomial Estimates of Anti-Arab/Muslim Hate Crime Incidents in U.S. Counties with Nonzero Arab Population before and after September 11, 2001 Anti-Arab/Muslim Hate Crimes before September 11 Anti-Arab/Muslim Hate Crimes after September 11 Categories Independent Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Population, urbanicity, crime, and law enforcement control variables Population in 2000 (in 1,000s, logged) 1.34*** (.17) 1.30*** (.17) 1.27*** (.09) 1.25*** (.09) Percent urban .01 (.01) .00 (.11) .01 (.01) .01 (.00) Percent ages 15–24 .10** (.03) .09** (.03) .07*** (.01) .06*** (.02) Crime rate in 2000 .34 (.22) .33 (.22) .32** (.10) .31** (.10) (Crime rate)2 in 2000 -.02 (.02) -.02 (.02) -.02* (.01) -.02* (.01) Police size (per 100,000) -.00 (.00) -.00 (.00) -.00 (.00) -.00 (.00) Political context and political processes control variables Legislative mandate for HC data collection .50* (.24) .50* (.24) .69*** (.12) .69*** (.12) Arab advocacy organizations -.02 (.06) -.02 (.06) .04 (.03) .03 (.03) Percent voting Democrat .02 (.01) .01 (.01) .01 (.01) .01 (.01) Party competitiveness -.01 (.01) -.01 (.01) -.00 (.00) -.00 (.00) Focal independent variables Percent white in 2000 .01 (.01) .01 (.01) .01** (.01) .01* (.00) Percent Arab in 2000 .49 (.32) 1.53 (.86) .54** (.20) 1.14* (.49) Per capita income (in $1,000s) .10*** (.03) .09** (.03) .06*** (.02) .05** (.02) Percent Arab squared in 2000 __ -.49 (.36) __ -.31 (.22) Log-likelihood -345.48 -344.661 -1083.11 -1082.24 Pseudo R2 .3746 .3760 .3413 .3418 N = 2,343 Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. Coefficients for the intercepts are not reported. Data for these analy- ses are restricted to the 8½ months before and 8½ months after September 11, 2001. *p < .05 **p < .01 ***p < .001 (two-tailed tests) SP5801_02.indd 34 12/29/10 12:51:49 PM hate Crimes in Post-9/11 america 35 variable prior to 9/11. The number of hate crimes is significantly associated with population size (b = 1.34), proportion of the population 15 to 24 years old (b = .10), and the presence of a state data collection statute (b = .50). Of the focal variables, per capita income (b = .10) is posi- tively correlated with anti-Arab/Muslim hate crimes before 9/11, suggesting that they occur more frequently in relatively affluent counties. This finding runs against the predictions of the frustration-aggression hypothesis but is generally consistent with Lyons’s (2007) work on hate crimes against blacks. However, we find no association between percent Arab and anti-Arab/ Muslim hate crimes prior to 9/11, which lends little support for any of the theories discussed above that emphasize demographic influences. This pattern of findings remains unchanged in Model 2, which adds the quadratic term (percent Arab squared). The quadratic term is not statistically significant. Turning to Models 3 and 4 (post 9/11), we observe three changes. First, the crime rate and its squared term reach statistical significance and the functional form is consistent with McVeigh and associates’ (2003) findings. Second, the percent non-Hispanic white population (referred to as percent white hereafter; b = .01) is positive and significant, indicating that post- 9/11 anti-Arab/Muslim hate crimes are more prevalent where the white population is propor- tionately larger. Third, we find that percent Arab (b = .54) is significantly associated with hate crimes, indicating that anti-Arab/Muslim hate crimes after 9/11 are more frequent in counties with larger proportions of individuals with Arab ancestry. The squared term in Model 4 is again nonsignificant while Z-tests of differences in coefficients for the respective models in the pre- and post-9/11 period reveal no statistically significant differences.5 Table 2 presents essentially the same models as those reported in Table 1, but here we focus on the Muslim population instead of the Arab population. These results can be dealt with rather concisely. First, although the N is substantially smaller in this analysis (N = 422), the pattern of findings for the control variables remains remarkably similar to Table 1. Second, the coefficients for percent Muslim are quite consistent with those for percent Arab, and on this note it is worth emphasizing that the two variables are not simply proxies for one an- other (Pearson correlation = .44). The coefficient is positive but nonsignificant prior to 9/11, but significant and positive after 9/11 (b = .23; see Model 3 of Table 2). Third, although there is some shift in the magnitude of the latter coefficient after 9/11, the before-after difference is not statistically significant (again based on a Z-test for differences in coefficients). Fourth, there is some evidence of nonlinearity in Model 4 of Table 2. The significant quadratic term indicates that the strength of the slope dissipates at higher values of percent Muslim, perhaps indicating a saturation level at which point further increases in the proportion of Muslims have less of an effect on anti-Arab or anti-Muslim hate crimes. More specifically, the apex of the curvilinear function is approximately 6 percent. Only three counties in our sample have Muslim populations in excess of 5 percent, and hence we are probably not picking up a change in direction with the quadratic term. Rather, we think it indicates a decreasing slope in which the change from 1 to 2 percent Muslim yields a larger increase in hate crimes than a change from 4 to 5 percent. Before proceeding to Tables 3 and 4, we briefly take stock of a few findings. Earlier we posed the question: “Where do anti-Arab/Muslim hate crimes occur most frequently?” Be- fore 9/11, the chief determinants were overall population size, age structure, and wealth. Yet, it appears that 9/11 served as a catalyst for hate crimes against Arabs and Muslims (Figures 2 and 3), and in the wake of 9/11 it seems that religious, ethnic, and racial demographics help us explain with considerably less error where such hate crimes occurred. After 9/11, places with higher proportionate numbers of Arabs and Muslims experienced more hate crimes of this nature. We also note that hate crimes with these motivations occurred with greater frequency 5. The test of difference that we utilized is explained by Kleinbaum (1988). It is a Z-test of difference: Z = (b 1 – b 2 ) / √(s 1 2 + s 2 2) where b 1 and b 2 refer to the unstandardized regression coefficients for pre- and post-9/11, respectively, whereas s 1 2(b 1 ) and s 2 2(b 2 ) refer to the variance of coefficients in pre- and post-9/11 models, respectively. SP5801_02.indd 35 12/29/10 12:51:50 PM 36 Disha/CavenDish/King where the white population was proportionately larger. Importantly, the differences in coeffi- cients before and after 9/11 are not statistically significant. In fact, the magnitudes of the co- efficients for percent Arab and percent Muslim change very little, but the standard errors are noticeably smaller after 9/11. We thus see no evidence of significant changes in the location of anti-Arab/Muslim hate crimes, but more likely an escalation of hate crimes in counties that have above average Arab and Muslim populations and had some hate crime activity of this nature prior to 9/11. In addition, we point out that the findings from Tables 1 and 2 could support group threat theory or a simple target opportunity model. To further assess whether minority group threat is applicable in this context, we next turn to a set of models that takes into account the raw number of Arabs (Table 3) and Muslims (Table 4), respectively. In these models, the respective number of Arabs or Muslims (in logged form) is used as an offset in Table 2 • Negative Binomial Estimates of Anti-Arab/Muslim Hate Crime Incidents in U.S. Counties with Nonzero Muslim Population before and after September 11, 2001 Anti-Arab/Muslim Hate Crimes before September 11 Anti-Arab/Muslim Hate Crimes after September 11 Categories Independent Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Population, urbanicity, crime, and law enforcement control variables Population in 2000 (in 1,000s, logged) 1.38*** (.21) 1.30*** (.21) 1.16*** (.11) 1.14*** (.11) Percent urban .03 (.02) .03 (.02) .03* (.01) .02* (.01) Percent ages 15–24 .12** (.04) .11** (.04) .06** (.02) .06** (.02) Crime rate in 2000 .48 (.28) .53 (.29) .48** (.14) .47** (.14) (Crime rate)2 in 2000 -.04 (.03) -.05 (.03) -.04** (.01) -.04** (.01) Police size (per 100,000) -.00 (.00) -.00 (.00) -.00 (.00) -.01 (.00) Political context and political processes control variables Legislative mandate for HC data collection .32 (.26) .34 (.26) .78*** (.15) .80*** (.15) Arab advocacy organizations -.05 (.07) -.04 (.07) .05 (.04) .05 (.04) Percent voting Democrat .01 (.01) .01 (.02) .01 (.01) .01 (.01) Party competitiveness -.01 (.01) -.01 (.01) -.00 (.01) -.01 (.01) Focal independent variables Percent white in 2000 .01 (.01) .01 (.01) .02** (.01) .02** (.01) Percent Muslim in 2000 .12 (.17) .84 (.52) .23* (.10) .57* (.26) Per capita income (in $1,000s) .10** (.03) .09** (.03) .04* (.02) .03 (.02) Percent Muslim squared in 2000 __ -.19 (.16) __ -.05** (.02) Log-likelihood -246.118 -244.406 -690.289 -686.907 Pseudo R2 .2534 .2586 .2137 .2176 N = 422 Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. Coefficients for the intercepts are not reported. Data for these analy- ses are restricted to the 8½ months before and 8½ months after September 11, 2001. *p < .05 **p < .01 ***p < .001 (two-tailed tests) SP5801_02.indd 36 12/29/10 12:51:51 PM hate Crimes in Post-9/11 america 37 the equation, thereby allowing us to treat the dependent variable as a rate per Arab or Mus- lim population in a county. This set of models enables us to answer a slightly different ques- tion: In what counties are individual Arabs and Muslims most vulnerable? We first note that the effects of our control variables remain largely consistent in Table 3 (likewise for the models in Table 4). Of greatest interest in Table 3 is the dramatic change in the percent Arab coefficient, which is negative and significant in all models in which the Arab population is used as an offset. These results indicate that the rate of anti-Arab/Muslim hate crime offending is inversely correlated with percent Arab (Models 1 and 3). This implies that individuals of Arab descent are at a lower risk of victimization in counties where they constitute a larger proportion of the population. We interpret this set of coefficients as largely in line with a power-differential hypothesis, where proportionately large numbers of Arabs Table 3 • Negative Binomial Estimates of Anti-Arab/Muslim Hate Crime Incidents in U.S. Counties with Nonzero Arab Population before and after September 11, 2001 (Arab Population Size as an Offset) Anti-Arab/Muslim Hate Crimes before September 11 Anti-Arab/Muslim Hate Crimes after September 11 Categories Independent Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Population, urbanicity, crime, and law enforcement control variables Population in 2000 (in 1,000s, logged) .23 (.17) .24 (.17) .14 (.09) .16* (.09) Percent urban -.00 (.01) -.00 (.01) .00 (.01) .00 (.01) Percent ages 15–24 .08* (.03) .08** (.03) .04** (.02) .05** (.02) Crime rate in 2000 .32 (.22) .32 (.22) .30** (.10) .31** (.10) (Crime rate)2 in 2000 -.02 (.02) -.02 (.02) -.02 (.01) -.02* (.01) Police size (per 100,000) -.00 (.00) -.00 (.00) -.00 (.00) -.00 (.00) Political context and political processes control variables Legislative mandate for HC data collection .47 (.24) .46 (.24) .67*** (.13) .65*** (.12) Arab advocacy organizations -.03 (.06) -.03 (.06) .02 (.03) .03 (.03) Percent voting Democrat .01 (.01) .01 (.01) .01 (.01) .01* (.01) Party competitiveness -.01 (.01) -.01 (.01) .00 (.00) .00 (.00) Focal independent variables Percent white in 2000 .01 (.01) .01 (.01) .01 (.00) .01* (.00) Percent Arab in 2000 -.81** (.29) -1.49 (.87) -.97*** (.17) -2.47*** (.52) Per capita income (in $1,000s) .07** (.03) .08** (.03) .03* (.01) .05** (.02) Percent Arab squared in 2000 __ .31 (.38) __ .75** (.26) Log-likelihood -344.267 -343.934 -1086.23 -1081.26 Pseudo R2 .0424 .0433 .0415 .0458 N = 2,343 Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. Coefficients for the intercepts are not reported. Data for these analy- ses are restricted to the 8½ months before and 8½ months after September 11, 2001. *p < .05 **p < .01 ***p < .001 (two-tailed tests) SP5801_02.indd 37 12/29/10 12:51:52 PM 38 Disha/CavenDish/King probably instill a sense of potential retaliation if attacked. In addition, in Model 4 we observe that percent Arab squared (b = .75) is statistically significant. We are again cautious when in- terpreting this finding. The positive squared term indicates a weakening slope, but it does not signify a reversal of direction (i.e., we see no true tipping point). The base of the curve would be just under the 2 percent Arab mark, and only four counties exist in which Arabs consti- tute more than 2 percent of the population. To wit, we again interpret the significant squared term as indicating a weakening effect in counties with higher concentrations of Arabs. In Table 4, we replace percent Arab with percent Muslim and use the logged number of Muslims as an offset in the negative binomial models. These results are very consistent with the results of Table 3; when employing the offset, we see an inverse association between percent Muslim and anti-Arab/Muslim hate crimes. In general, it appears that the rate of Table 4 • Negative Binomial Estimates of Anti-Arab/Muslim Hate Crime Incidents in U.S. Counties with Nonzero Arab Population before and after September 11, 2001 (Muslim Population Size as an Offset) Anti-Arab/Muslim Hate Crimes before September 11 Anti-Arab/Muslim Hate Crimes after September 11 Categories Independent Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Population, urbanicity, crime, and law enforcement control variables Population in 2000 (in 1,000s, logged) .19 (.21) .20 (.21) .00 (.12) .00 (.12) Percent urban .31 (.02) .03 (.02) .03** (.01) .03** (.01) Percent ages 15–24 .10* (.04) .10* (.04) .05* (.02) .05* (.02) Crime rate in 2000 .61* (.29) .59* (.29) .58*** (.15) .60*** (.15) (Crime rate)2 in 2000 -.05 (.03) -.05 (.03) -.05** (.02) -.05** (.02) Police size (per 100,000) -.00 (.00) -.00 (.00) -.01* (.00) -.01* (.00) Political context and political processes control variables Legislative mandate for HC data collection .36 (.27) .34 (.27) .94*** (.16) .90*** (.16) Arab advocacy organizations -.02 (.07) -.03 (.07) .10* (.04) .09* (.04) Percent voting Democrat .01 (.02) .01 (.02) .01 (.01) .01 (.01) Party competitiveness -.01 (.01) -.01 (.01) -.01 (.01) -.00 (.01) Focal independent variables Percent white in 2000 .01 (.01) .01 (.01) .02*** (.01) .02** (.01) Percent Muslim in 2000 -.84*** (.22) -1.03*** (.30) -.59*** (.10) -1.09*** (.17) Per capita income (in $1,000s) .09** (.03) .09** (.03) .02 (.02) .03 (.02) Percent Muslim squared in 2000 __ .05 (.05) __ .08** (.03) Log-likelihood -247.020 -246.676 -715.872 -708.893 Pseudo R2 .0969 .0982 .0853 .0942 N = 422 Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. Coefficients for the intercepts are not reported. Data for these analyses are restricted to the 8½ months before and 8½ months after September 11, 2001. *p < .05 **p < .01 ***p < .001 (two-tailed tests) SP5801_02.indd 38 12/29/10 12:51:53 PM hate Crimes in Post-9/11 america 39 anti-Arab/Muslim hate crimes is lower in counties with larger proportions of Muslims, sug- gesting that the average Muslim is at a higher risk of victimization when and where few other Muslims reside. Before moving to a more general discussion of our findings in relation to prior work, we close this section by highlighting two findings that we see as important. First, and similar to the findings from models without the population offset (Tables 1 and 2), the changes in pre- dictor variables before and after 9/11 are not statistically significant in Tables 3 and 4. Overall, the rate of hate crime activity may change after 9/11, but the determinants remain largely consistent across the two periods. Second, we can claim even stronger support for the power- differential hypothesis if we were to find that small Arab or Muslim populations in counties with very large majority group populations (i.e., whites in the United States) were especially likely to experience anti-Arab/Muslim hate crimes. The latter assertion implies an interac- tion between minority group size and percent white in the models with population offsets, and we show these results in Table 5. The control variables were practically unchanged from earlier models, and thus Table 5 includes only the interactions and their component variables (although all other variables are statistically controlled; see note below Table 5). Three of the four models, including both post-9/11 models, show significant interaction coefficients in the predicted direction, which lends additional support for the power-differential hypothesis. One way of interpreting the interaction coefficients is to assess the difference in slopes for percent white at low (e.g., .01) and high (e.g., 1 percent) values of percent Arab and Muslim. Looking at the post-9/11 models (Models 3 and 4), we see that the effect of percent white is .02 when the percent Arab is .01 percent (.02 - .03*.01) but changes to -.01 when the percent Arab increases to 1 percent (.02 - .03*1; see Model 3). A similar pattern emerges for the Muslim population. Increases in the percent white yield more anti-Arab/Muslim hate crimes when the percent Muslim is .01 percent (.03 - .02*.01 = .03), yet the percent white coefficient weakens as the percent Muslim increases to 1 percent (.03 - .02*1 = .01). In short, a small Table 5 • Negative Binomial Estimates of Anti-Arab/Muslim Hate Crime Incidents in U.S. Counties with Nonzero Arab or Nonzero Muslim Population before and after September 11, 2001 (with Respec- tive Population Sizes as Offsets) Anti-Arab/Muslim Hate Crimes before September 11 Anti-Arab/Muslim Hate Crimes after September 11 Independent Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Percent white in 2000 .02 (.01) .02* (.01) .02*** (.01) .03*** (.01) Percent Arab in 2000 .32 (.93) __ .81 (.57) __ Percent Muslim in 2000 __ .48 (.40) __ .21 (.24) Percent Arab*percent white -.02 (.01) __ -.03*** (.01) __ Percent Muslim*percent white -.03** (.01) __ -.02*** (.004) N = 2,343 in Models 1 and 3 N = 422 in Models 2 and 4 Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. Only the interaction terms and their component variables are shown in the table, although all models control for all variables included in previous tables (except for the quadratic terms for percent Muslim and percent Arab). Data for these analyses are restricted to the 8½ months before and 8½ months after September 11th, 2001. All models include population offsets (logged number of Arabs in Models 1 and 3; logged number of Muslims in Models 2 and 4). *p < .05 **p < .01 ***p < .001 (two-tailed tests) SP5801_02.indd 39 12/29/10 12:51:54 PM 40 Disha/CavenDish/King minority appears most at risk when the majority group is sizeable, and this is a particularly robust finding after 9/11.6 Discussion and Conclusion At a very general level, this article had a twofold purpose: first, to understand the “spaces of hate”—where anti-Arab/Muslim hate crimes occur more frequently—and second, to understand the “times of hate”—when and how anti-Arab/Muslim hate crimes change given the historical events of September 11th. Taken together, the results support three primary conclusions. First, while the majority of racially and ethnically motivated hate crimes (i.e., anti-black, anti-Asian, anti-Hispanic) declined after 9/11, the number of anti-Arab/Muslim hate crimes in- creased sharply. This finding is consistent with reports from the FBI and from Arab advocacy organizations suggesting that 9/11 created a climate in which many Americans felt united against a “new enemy” and in which acts of hatred against Arabs and Muslims became “normalized” behaviors (Perry 2001, 2002; Wang 2002). This finding is also in line with the conclusions of numerous researchers who argue that historical events can serve as triggers that shape and en- able the social construction of binary oppositions, such as “American citizen” versus “foreign alien” (Alexander 1992; Petonito 2000; Volpp 2002), increase levels of interethnic hostility and prejudice (Verkuyten and Zaremba 2005), and fuel intergroup violence through acts of vicarious retribution (Gerstenfeld 2002, 2004; Green et al. 1998; Lickel et al. 2006). Yet, this landmark event has no effect on the predictors of anti-Arab/Muslim hate crimes; the determinants of hate crime remain largely unchanged as indicated by the relatively similar coefficients across the two periods. In other words, the timing of hate crime offending may change, but its place remains rather constant. This implies that the conditions for anti-Arab/Muslim hate crimes did not simply culminate immediately after September 11th. Rather, the conditions have been in place, probably as early as Arabs and Muslims began migrating to the United States (Akram and Johnson 2001), and hence some counties were ripe for vengeance in the aftermath of the 9/11 events. Second, Tables 1 and 2 revealed that hate crime offending, at least against Arabs and Mus- lims after 9/11, is partly a function of target opportunity. Places with proportionately larger Arab and Muslim populations had higher numbers of anti-Arab/Muslim hate crimes. This finding, although intuitive, is important in that it tells us where to expect more of such hate crimes should another terrorist attack attributed to Arabs or Muslims transpire. However, as a third concluding point, we find little support for the traditional group threat account of prejudice and intergroup violence. Once the Arab or Muslim populations were taken into account as offsets, the results indicated that Arabs and Muslims were at higher risk of victimization after 9/11 in counties where their proportions were extremely small, and Table 5 indicated that this was particularly the case when the majority group (whites) repre- sented a very large proportion of the population. In such contexts, the small minority group is visible, has little protection, and is thus highly vulnerable. We see this finding as aligning with a power-differential hypothesis. As Levine and Campbell (1972) might have argued, large proportions of minorities may not be an indication of threat but of power to mobilize and retaliate against discrimination and hostility. We would add that this is especially the case for very small minority groups. As indicated by the squared terms in Model 4 of Tables 3 and 4, there is evidence of a decreasingly powerful slope as the minority population increases. It is worth noting at this point that somewhat of a paradox is at play when predicting hate crimes against Arabs and Muslims, particularly in the immediate post-9/11 period. Places with 6. In the models shown in Table 5, the respective main effects of percent white indicate the coefficient magnitudes and significance levels when percent Arab and Muslim are set to 0. We tested to see if the slopes for percent white were statistically significant at the .01 percent and 1 percent level of percent Arab and Muslim using a technique recom- mended by Jaccard, Turrisi, and Wan (1990). The slopes were statistically significant (p < .05) in three of the four cases. SP5801_02.indd 40 12/29/10 12:51:54 PM hate Crimes in Post-9/11 america 41 more Arabs may indeed have more anti-Arab hate crime, but each individual Arab is at lower risk. A brief example might usefully illustrate how this plays out. Consider, for instance, a county with a high Arab population (Wayne County, Michigan) and another with a slightly above aver- age Arab population (Hennepin County, Minnesota). The former county is home to more than 56,000 Arabs (about 2.7 percent of the population) and experienced 27 anti-Arab hate crimes after 9/11. This equates to a rate of about 48 offenses per 100,000 Arabs. Hennepin County, by contrast, had fewer overall post-9/11 anti-Arab hate crimes (21), but also a comparatively small Arab population (4,832). The rate per 100,000 Arabs in the latter county is approximately 434, or about 9 times higher than Wayne County. This simple comparison is in many respects a mi- crocosm of our overall findings, and it stresses the importance of matching the question (how many versus relative risk) with the method (e.g., with or without a population offset). In addition to the population findings, we also call attention to the results for economic conditions. Measured either as a count or as a rate, most of our models indicate that anti- Arab/Muslim hate crimes happen with more regularity in affluent counties. We suspect that hate crimes (in our case, anti-Arab/Muslim hate crimes) occur more frequently in affluent counties because they entail more informal social control and respond more forcefully to threatening outsiders (Lyons 2007). While a disadvantageous economic condition has been reported as a useful mechanism for explaining crime in general (Morenoff, Sampson, and Raudenbush 2001) or anti-white hate crimes in particular (Lyons 2007), this is not the case for anti-Arab/Muslim hate-motivated behavior. We close with a few comments about the limitations of our study and some suggestions for future research. First, we are acutely aware of the limitations of our dependent variable. Collapsing the categories of anti-other (ostensibly anti-Arab) and anti-Muslim hate crimes, while logical and we think empirically defensible (e.g., Figures 2 and 3), our assumptions may still leave readers with questions. In some sense, our investigation has attempted to un- cover something that does not exist in the Uniform Crime Reports—hate crimes against Arabs. By saying this, we do not imply that hate crimes against Arabs have not occurred. Rather, we wish to simply suggest that a critical dimension of the process that makes these crimes real—namely, classifying these crimes as a distinct hate crime category—has been absent. This makes the job of both researchers and policy makers all the more difficult. Neither can fully capture hate crimes against Arabs if such offenses are not categorized as a social problem that warrants accurate recording. Rather than abandoning our attempt to investigate this phenomenon, we decided to proceed while acknowledging the limitations we faced in using these data. Perhaps future research will be aided by the adoption of an “anti-Arab” hate crime category, which would be a useful alternative to the current practice of simply clustering them as crimes against “others.” Second, we also acknowledge that some theoretical ideas on hate crime offending could not be tested here, namely the defended neighborhoods theory that has received ample support in prior work. We were only able to aggregate our data to the county level, and hence such theories that emphasize community-level demographic changes could not be adequately assessed in the present research. Still, we think the conclusions from this work can be useful in guiding future research. Future studies should investigate the effect of historical events both on the outcome vari- able as well as on the predictors of that variable. An historical event and similar processes of vicarious retribution may influence the study of intergroup violence in other contexts. For example, the highpoint of violence against Jews prior to WWII occurred in the aftermath of the assassination of a German diplomat at the hands of a young Jewish man (the infamous Kristallnacht pogrom). Susan Olzak (1990) similarly observed a spike in lynching after elec- tions when Populist movements challenged the status quo in the Jim Crow South. To that end, such events must not necessarily constitute acts of violence on par with the 9/11 attacks or a political assassination. For instance, we would suspect an increase in hate crimes against immigrants, and particularly Mexican immigrants, during acrimonious political debates about amnesty and violence at the border. More closely related to this research, we would expect SP5801_02.indd 41 12/29/10 12:51:55 PM 42 Disha/CavenDish/King more hate crimes against members of the Arab and Muslim community in the short period following the media coverage of beheadings that took place in Middle Eastern countries like Iraq and Afghanistan or the construction of an Islamic mosque near “ground zero.” Overall, we think the study of triggering events and the distribution of hate-motivated behavior is a rich and theoretically informative area for future research. Appendix A • Counties with Greatest Increases in Overall Number of Anti-Arab/Muslim Hate Crimes: Comparing the 8½ Months prior to September 11th to the 8½ Months after September 11th # of Crimes Committed 1/1/01–9/10/01 # of Crimes Committed 9/11/01–5/31/02 Increase Rank County State Anti- Muslim Anti- “Other” Total Before Anti- Muslim Anti- “Other” Total After (Total After – Total Before) 1 Los Angeles CA 3 35 38 26 133 159 121 2 Maricopa AZ 0 1 1 15 64 79 78 3 San Francisco CA 1 6 7 13 49 62 55 4 San Diego CA 1 2 3 8 48 56 53 5 Cuyahoga OH 0 1 1 4 46 50 49 6 Cook IL 0 2 2 7 42 49 47 7 Suffolk MA 0 6 6 11 41 52 46 8 Harris TX 0 1 1 5 34 39 38 9 Suffolk NY 0 9 9 0 44 44 35 10 Santa Clara CA 0 5 5 4 30 34 29 10 Camden NJ 0 2 2 11 20 31 29 11 Alameda CA 0 1 1 1 25 26 25 11 Orange CA 0 2 2 3 24 27 25 11 Wayne MI 0 2 2 7 20 27 25 12 Franklin OH 2 2 4 26 2 28 24 13 Bexar TX 0 0 0 5 17 22 22 14 King WA 0 5 5 10 16 26 21 15 Pima AZ 0 1 1 6 15 21 20 15 Hennepin MN 1 0 1 13 8 21 20 16 Sacramento CA 0 3 3 4 18 22 19 16 Middlesex MA 0 1 1 5 15 20 19 16 Hudson NJ 1 0 1 6 14 20 19 17 Pinellas FL 0 1 1 0 17 17 16 17 Dallas TX 0 1 1 5 12 17 16 18 Bergen NJ 2 2 4 6 13 19 15 19 Contra Costa CA 0 1 1 1 14 15 14 19 Hillsborough FL 0 1 1 1 14 15 14 19 Multnomah OR 0 1 1 0 15 15 14 20 Riverside CA 0 1 1 4 10 14 13 20 Essex NJ 1 0 1 4 10 14 13 21 New Haven CT 0 1 1 4 9 13 12 21 Clark NV 1 1 2 2 12 14 12 21 Passaic NJ 0 0 0 6 6 12 12 22 Fresno CA 0 1 1 2 10 12 11 22 Middlesex NJ 0 4 4 6 9 15 11 22 Monmouth NJ 0 2 2 4 9 13 11 23 Miami-Dade FL 0 0 0 0 10 10 10 National Mean (3,113 Counties) .01 .08 .07 .17 .48 .56 .56 National Minimum 0 0 0 0 0 0 -3 National Maximum 3 35 38 26 133 159 121 SP5801_02.indd 42 12/29/10 12:51:58 PM hate Crimes in Post-9/11 america 43 References Akram, Susan M. and Kevin R. 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Appendix B • Descriptive Statistics for Variables of Interest 2,343 Counties with Nonzero Arab Population 422 Counties with Nonzero Muslim Population Mean Standard Deviation Mean Standard Deviation Pre-9/11 anti-Arab/Muslim hate crimes .10 .89 .47 2.04 Post-9/11 anti-Arab/Muslim hate crimes .74 4.76 3.74 10.69 Natural logarithm of county population (in 1,000s) 3.73 1.30 5.41 1.19 Percent urban 46.83 30.09 80.60 18.92 Percent population 15–24 years old 13.78 3.60 15.93 5.13 Crime rate (per 100) 2.78 1.81 4.24 2.08 Crime rate (per 100) squared 11.00 13.58 22.27 20.52 Police size (per 100,000) 269.13 238.71 326.74 303.34 State legislative mandate to collect data (0 = no; 1 = yes) .52 .50 .57 .50 Arab advocacy organizations 1.90 2.00 2.57 2.16 Percent voting Democrat 41.01 11.00 47.97 11.64 Party competitiveness 21.55 15.69 18.34 14.91 Percent non-Hispanic white population 81.52 17.88 71.25 18.82 Percent Arab population .19 .22 — — Percent Muslim population — — .64 .90 Per capita income (in 1,000s) 18.14 4.08 20.96 4.98 SP5801_02.indd 43 12/29/10 12:51:59 PM 44 Disha/CavenDish/King ———. 2005a. 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work_av6f2at775gnll4sbaxoea2shq	----	Mcbride, M. (2017) The Offensive Behaviour at Football and Threatening Communications (Scotland) Act 2012 – assessing the case for repeal. Edinburgh Law Review, 21(2), pp. 234-239. (doi:10.3366/elr.2017.0414) This is the author’s final accepted version. There may be differences between this version and the published version. You are advised to consult the publisher’s version if you wish to cite from it. http://eprints.gla.ac.uk/160704/ Deposited on: 11 June 2018 Enlighten – Research publications by members of the University of Glasgow http://eprints.gla.ac.uk http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/elr.2017.0414 http://eprints.gla.ac.uk/160704/ http://eprints.gla.ac.uk/160704/ http://eprints.gla.ac.uk/ http://eprints.gla.ac.uk/ THE OFFENSIVE BEHAVIOUR AT FOOTBALL AND THREATENING COMMUNICATIONS (SCOTLAND) ACT 2012 – ASSESSING THE CASE FOR REPEAL A. INTRODUCTION In November 2016, four and a half years after the introduction of the controversial Offensive Behaviour at Football and Threatening Communications (Scotland) Act 2012 (hereafter OBTC Act), Labour MSP James Kelly lodged a Member’s Bill seeking to repeal the legislation. The Bill, in which Kelly criticises the OBTC Act as “an illiberal law”, received support from all four opposition parties, and represented the culmination of several years of campaigning by activists and some opposition MSPs. Despite this, the Scottish Government remain committed to retaining the Act, with various SNP sources citing a “lack of alternative approaches” offered by critics. Minister for Community Safety Annabelle Ewing claimed that the vote in the Scottish Parliament to repeal the Act “threatens to set us back as a country in our efforts to effectively combat prejudice, hate crime and sectarianism”.1 This short article attempts to outline and contextualise the current situation, and offers a further contribution to the debate based on findings from my ongoing doctoral research.2 B. CONTEXT AND SUMMARY Legislation aimed at tackling the allegedly sectarian or otherwise offensive behaviour of football supporters was proposed at a summit in the immediate aftermath of a high-tension match between Celtic and Rangers in March 2011,3 though it is important to note that actual disorder amongst fans at the match was minimal. Around the same time, a series of incidents with apparent racist or sectarian motives received intense media focus. Neil Lennon, the then Celtic manager, received death threats and, along with two Celtic players (who, like Lennon, were Northern Irish Catholics), received bullets in the post. Former Cardinal Keith O’Brien revealed that the previous year he had received a live bullet in the post prior to the Pope’s 1 Scottish Government News Release, ‘Offensive Behaviour Act’, 2 November 2016, available at http://news.gov.scot/news/offensive-behaviour-act. 2 My research takes a sociological approach, exploring the OBTC Act and sectarianism more broadly from the perspective of football supporters. 3 See The Guardian, 8 March 2011, available at https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2011/mar/08/celtic-rangers-old-firm-violence visit to Scotland, by senders claiming to be the Protestant Action Group.4 Viable parcel bombs were intercepted which had been sent to Lennon, his QC, the late Paul McBride, and former Labour MSP Trish Godman (the latter, both high profile Celtic-supporting Catholics), as well as to Cairde na hÉireann, an Irish Republican group based in Glasgow.5 Furthermore, Lennon was publicly attacked by an opposition supporter in May 2011 and called a “fenian bastard”, though the ‘religiously-aggravated’ aspect of that charge was dropped when the case went to trial.6 The OBTC Act has been described as a “panic reaction” to this apparent spike in sectarian-motivated attacks.7 Indeed, the situation in early 2011 was highly unusual, as sectarianism in Scotland has tended to manifest itself in a far subtler manner. Yet the decision to introduce legislation solely targeting football supporters was contentious given that the aforementioned incidents took place outwith the context of football and appeared to be characterised by anti-Irish and anti-Catholic sentiment as much as by antipathy towards a particular football club. The Bill was eventually passed by the Scottish Parliament on 14 December 2011 and came into force on 1 March 2012. Amidst claims that this was a knee- jerk and politically-motivated piece of legislation the Act was marked by opposition from the outset, and was the first piece of legislation to be passed in the Scottish Parliament without cross-party support. Notably, the word sectarianism is absent from the text of the legislation despite the fact that it was – and continues to be – framed this way in the political and media rhetoric.8 Rather, the Act created an offence of engaging in behaviour “in relation to a regulated football match” which “is likely to incite public disorder” and which is hateful, threatening or 4 See The Scotsman, 21 April 2011, available at http://www.scotsman.com/news/cardinal- says-he-s-going-on-as-normal-after-threat-1-1596529. 5 See The Scotsman, 20 April 2011, available at http://www.scotsman.com/news/celtic- manager-neil-lennon-qc-paul-mcbride-and-former-msp-trish-godman-targeted-with-letter- bombs-1-1595731. 6 See The Guardian, 31 August 2011, available at https://www.theguardian.com/football/2011/aug/31/neil-lennon-attacker-sectarian-verdict. 7 Michael Lavalette and Gerry Mooney, ‘The Scottish state and the criminalisation of football fans’ (2013) 93 Criminal Justice Matters available at https://www.crimeandjustice.org.uk/sites/crimeandjustice.org.uk/files/09627251.2013.83379 0.pdf. 8 E.g. in the OTBC Bill’s Policy Memorandum, Alex Salmond stated (at [1]): “We will not tolerate sectarianism as a parasite in our national game of football or anywhere else in this society”. is “other behaviour that a reasonable person would be likely to consider offensive”.9 Crucially, an offended party or a person likely to be incited to public disorder does not have to be present for the law to be enforced, a point defended by Former Justice Secretary Kenny MacAskill as he stated: “The absence of good people to be offended doesn’t make something inoffensive if it patently is offensive”.10 For some, this veers into dangerous legal territory given the subjective nature of offensiveness, and the ‘reasonable person’ test in this legislation has attracted a great deal of criticism. C. THE REVIEW In section 11 of the Act, the Scottish Government committed to reviewing it after two full football seasons in operation. In June 2015, it published a report entitled An evaluation of Section 1 of the Offensive Behaviour at Football and Threatening Communications (Scotland) Act 2012, based on research conducted by an independent research team.11 Alongside this, a review of Section 6 was conducted internally. The Minister for Community Safety and Legal Affairs, Paul Wheelhouse, stated in Parliament that “we have fulfilled the requirement in section 11 of the Act for us to report on the operation of the offences in sections 1 and 6 by 1 August this year”.12 The authors of the evaluation of Section 1 commented that “the evaluation is intended to be one contribution, sitting alongside other possible evidence, perspectives or material in the Scottish Government’s consideration of the Act”. The lead researcher, Dr Niall Hamilton-Smith, added: Our evaluation neither endorses nor rejects the Act, but presents robust evidence on patterns of implementation, perceptions of impact and emerging issues and questions relating to section one of the legislation.13 9 Offensive Behaviour at Football and Threatening Communications (Scotland) Act 2012, s 1(1), (2). 10 See The Herald, 16 March 2016, available at http://www.heraldscotland.com/opinion/14345916.Kenny_MacAskill__It_is_right_to_bring_ to_book_those_who_perpetrate_offensive_behaviour_at_football_grounds_and_elsewhere/. 11 Hamilton-Smith et al, An evaluation of Section 1 of the Offensive Behaviour at Football and Threatening Communications (Scotland) Act 2012 (2015), available at http://www.gov.scot/Resource/0047/00479049.pdf. 12 SP OR 16 June 2015 col 9. 13 University of Stirling News Release, ‘Stirling Study Considers Football Behaviour Legislation’, 12 June 2015, available at https://www.stir.ac.uk/news/2015/06/stirlingstudyconsidersfootballbehaviourlegislation/. Critics have claimed that the Scottish Government did not fulfill its duty to carry out a full review of the Act by simply publishing an evaluation14, and have also pointed out that the evaluation itself has been cited selectively. The Scottish Government’s press release stated that “[t]he evaluation found evidence from a range of sources that offensive behaviour at football matches has decreased since the legislation was introduced”.15 Yet the report emphasises that this cannot be directly attributed to the Act itself: broader crime trends make it extremely difficult to make judgements about the impact of the Act. Both police recorded, and crime survey figures show sustained falls in most of the relevant crime categories, both before and after the introduction of the Act.16 In short, the Scottish Government has been accused by opposition politicians and activists of ducking the responsibility to fully review the Act and failing to take seriously the negative impacts of the legislation, which this paper now moves on to discuss. D. CRITICISMS OF THE ACT The Act has been challenged from many angles, including from leading Human Rights organisations. The Scottish Human Rights Commission, during a consultation on the OBTC Bill in 2011, recommended that the Government delete the section which refers to “behaviour that a reasonable person would be likely to consider offensive”.17 Liberty described the Act as having a “chilling effect” on free speech and freedom of expression.18 The Law Society of Scotland pointed that out the law could cause “confusion” rather than the clarity it was 14 See comments by Labour MSP James Kelly, quoted in STV News, 12 January 2016, available at https://stv.tv/news/scotland/1338718-campaigners-urge-msps-to-back-review-of- controversial-football-act/ 15 Scottish Government News Release, ‘Offensive Behaviour Act evaluation published’, 12 June 2015, available at http://news.gov.scot/news/offensive-behaviour-act-evaluation- published. 16 Hamilton-Smith et al, above n12, sec 4 para 20. 17 SP OR J 20 September 2011 col 278-279. 18 Liberty, Briefing on the Proposed Football Act (Repeal) (Scotland) Bill, October 2016, available at https://www.liberty-human- rights.org.uk/sites/default/files/Liberty's%20briefing%20on%20the%20Proposed%20Footbal l%20Act%20(Repeal)%20(Scotland)%20Bill.pdf. apparently seeking to bring, and noted that there was sufficient existing legislation to deal with threatening behaviour or behaviour that would incite hate: a substantial proportion of the offensive behaviour related to football which leads to public disorder was likely to be caught by the substantive criminal law which existed prior to the 2012 Act coming into force, and continues to exist.19 The fact that the Act tackles only behaviours which take place in the context of football has led to claims that football fans are being treated in a discriminatory manner, as the same behaviours would either be tolerated, or tackled differently, if they occurred at any other sporting event, for example. The Law Society of Scotland also expressed concerns about the “definition and meaning of behaviour in relation to a regulated football match”20 and confusion around what constitutes unacceptable or offensive forms of behaviour. Specific concerns have been raised regarding how the Act has operated in practice. Policing practices in particular have been criticised by supporters’ groups and activists.21 In my own research, participants emphasised a breakdown in trust between supporters and the police. Many spoke of a general increase in ‘surveillance’, with one supporter commenting: I think it is eerily similar to a police state when you’re at a football game. You know, you can’t walk round the corner without cameras or eyes on you. It’s just a worrying time to be a football fan. Although participants of all ages offered similar responses, the implementation of the Act appears to have disproportionately affected younger supporters. In response to the recently published consultation exercise on the proposal to repeal the Act, Glasgow City Council stated that “[w]e are concerned at the number of young men in particular that are being 19 See Law Society of Scotland, Committee update December 2016, available at http://www.lawscot.org.uk/members/legal-reform-and-policy/law-reform/committee-updates- 2016/december-2016/proposed-football-act-(repeal)-(scotland)-bill/. 20 Law Society of Scotland, Committee update December 2016. 21 See Fans against Criminalisation statement 16 February 2017, available at http://fansagainstcriminalisation.com/author/fac/ and CommonSpace article, 18 November 2015, available at https://www.commonspace.scot/articles/2945/exclusive-i-will-fucking- ruin-your-life-football-fans-recording-alleged-police-abuse http://fansagainstcriminalisation.com/author/fac/ criminalised by the legislation”.22 The 2015 evaluation of the Act discussed earlier raised similar concerns. The report highlighted that representatives of Police Scotland described fans as ‘risk groups’ and commented: This categorisation of young supporters and ‘singing sections’ as risk groups, whilst potentially appropriate on occasions, also seemed commonplace and potentially problematic, in particular when sections of supporters, who whilst maybe having the potential to be offensive, were clearly not associated with more violent disorder, came to draw on the scarce police assets and resources normally reserved for violent risk groups.23 Of course, policing of young people is a concern not limited to football supporters. Law and Mooney argue that the Scottish criminal justice system has seen a shift towards a more punitive approach since the early 2000s.24 Recent research by Kath Murray on Police Scotland’s stop and search practices highlighted that in some areas: officers make extensive use of stop and search without reasonable suspicion and searches tend to impact on younger age groups, arguably over and above the probability of offending.25 Other related issues raised in my research included claims that in the event of being charged under the Act, young people (predominately young men) are frequently encouraged to plead guilty even if they contest having acted illegally and have no previous convictions or contact with the criminal justice system. Furthermore, evidence suggests that it is not, despite the rhetoric, being used to solely tackle sectarianism, hate crime or prejudice, and in fact is being 22 Proposed Football Act (Repeal) (Scotland) Bill, available at http://www.parliament.scot/S5MembersBills/20161128_Football_Repeal_Bill_FINAL_SUM MARY.pdf. 23 An evaluation of Section 1 of the Offensive Behaviour at Football and Threatening Communications (Scotland) Act 2012’, available at http://www.gov.scot/Resource/0047/00479049.pdf 24 Alex Law and Gerry Mooney, “The De-Civilizing Process and Urban Working Class Youth in Scotland” (2012) 38 Social Justice 126. 25 Kath Murray, “Stop and search in Scotland: An evaluation of police practice” (2014), SCCJR report available at http://www.sccjr.ac.uk/publications/stop-and-search-in-scotland- an-evaluation-of-police-practice/ utilised to deal with far more low-level behaviours.26 For example, a participant in my research was convicted under the Act for swearing at a police officer during a football match. Aside from the appropriateness of responding to such incidents with arrests, this participant’s experience highlights the symbolic labelling power of the legislation as he explained: “even though there was no sectarian element to my charge, the fact that I was done under the Offensive Behaviour Act – all anyone sees about that is sectarian, sectarian”. Being charged under this particular legislation, rather than with breach of the peace, for example, has had a significant impact on his life given the connotations of the Act with sectarianism and hate crime. A final problem with the legislation is that it also sustains a common-sense understanding of sectarianism which hinders genuine attempts to tackle the problem. Although the Act is used in a broader manner, the Court of Criminal Appeal in Donnelly and Walsh v Procurator Fiscal, Edinburgh stated that: “the main, but not exclusive, focus is on the behaviour of certain Celtic and Rangers fans with their long standing attachment to opposing factions involved in the politics of Ireland, and Ulster in particular”.27 This common-sense understanding, also reflected in much of the academic analysis on the topic, suggests that sectarianism is a problem of hostilities between two equal groups. There is insufficient space to explore this in detail here, however this ‘culture of equivalence’ occludes the fact that most religiously aggravated offences in Scotland have been against Roman Catholics,28 and overlooks the historic racialisation of Irish Catholics and the structural inequalities that they faced.29 As Kay Goodall commented at the time of the Act’s introduction: 26 According to evidence compiled by activist group Fans Against Criminalisation, examples of behaviours leading to arrest and prosecution under the Act includes:  wearing a t-shirt referring to oneself as an ‘unrepentant Fenian bastard’  gesticulating in an unspecified way to opposition supporters  arguing with stewards  arguing with police officers Submission to the Consultation on repeal of the Offensive Behaviour Act, available at http://fansagainstcriminalisation.com/fac-submission-to-the-consultation-on-repeal-of-the- offensive-behaviour-act/ 27 Donnelly and Walsh v Procurator Fiscal, Edinburgh [2015] HCJAC 35 at [1]. 28 Scottish Government, Religiously Aggravated Offending in Scotland 2015-16, (2016) available at http://www.gov.scot/Resource/0050/00501327.pdf 29 See Satnam Virdee ‘Racism, Class and the Racialized Outsider’ (2014). It is wrong to imply by omission that the hostility is the same on both sides. Chants of “Prod” or “Hun” and a few breach of the peace convictions do not amount to equivalence. Scots law, however, could not successfully distinguish the two phenomena without incurring huge criticism: recognising the differences would thus inevitably be left to the fiscals and the courts.30 To date, in the implementation of the OBTC Act, these differences remain largely unrecognised. E. CONCLUSION The Offensive Behaviour at Football and Threatening Communications (Scotland) Act 2012 has had a range of (mostly negative) effects on football supporters since its introduction, which this paper has attempted to outline. In addition, I suggest that the way the Act is increasingly conceptualized within a Hate Crime ‘framework’ risks undermining separate legislation which exists to protect minority groups from victimisation. The definition of hate crime is broadened to include behaviours such as singing a song at a football match which is identified as offensive, or other more low-level offences such as swearing at a police officer. Without significant reform of the legislation, calls for its repeal are likely to intensify. Maureen McBride PhD Candidate, University of Glasgow 30 Kay Goodall, ‘Tackling Sectarianism Through the Criminal Law’ (2011) 15 EdinLR 425. 
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work_b2histpzrngfvn7ja2jk5mbiiq	----	1 ‘I will Blow your face off’ – Virtual and Physical World Anti-Muslim Hate Crime Abstract Anti-Muslim hate crime is usually viewed in the prism of physical attacks; however, it also occurs in a cyber context, and this reality has considerable consequences for victims. In seeking to help improve our understanding of anti-Muslim hate crime, this article draws on the findings from a project that involved qualitative interviews with Muslim men and women who experienced both virtual and physical world anti- Muslim hate, and reported their experiences to the British government-funded service Tell MAMA (Measuring Anti-Muslim Attacks). In doing so, this article sets out the first ever study to examine the nature, determinants and impacts of both virtual and physical world anti-Muslim hate crime upon Muslim men and Muslim women in the United Kingdom (UK). Correspondingly, we found that victims of both virtual and physical world anti-Muslim hate crime are likely to suffer from emotional stress, anxiety and fear of cyber threats materialising in the ‘real world’. Key Words: Anti-Muslim Hate crime; Victims; Virtual; Physical Attacks; Qualitative Interviews Introduction Following the terrorist attacks in Paris and Tunisia in 2015, and in Woolwich, south east London where British Army soldier Drummer Lee Rigby was murdered in 2013, we have seen a sharp rise in anti-Muslim attacks (Littler and Feldman 2015). These incidents have occurred in the physical world where mosques have been targeted, Muslim women have had their hijab (headscarf) or niqab (face veil) pulled off, Muslim men have been attacked, and racist graffiti has been scrawled against Muslim graves and properties. In addition, there has been a spike in anti-Muslim attacks occurring in a cyber context, including Muslims being targeted by campaigns of cyber bullying, cyber harassment, cyber incitement and threats of physical violence. According to Tell MAMA, 548 verified incidents (of 729) were reported to them concerning anti-Muslim hate crime. The majority of incidents took place in a cyber context (402 out of 548) (Littler and Feldman 2015). Almost a fifth of service users reported repeat incidents of anti-Muslim hate, with Muslim women suffering more incidents in the physical world than Muslim men. Typically, the victim was wearing 2 traditional Islamic clothing at the time of the incident and the perpetrators were overwhelmingly white male (Littler and Feldman 2015). Indeed, evidence shows that individuals with a ‘visible’ Muslim identity are more vulnerable to anti-Muslim hostility, intimidation, abuse and threats of violence (see, for example, Allen et al. 2013; Zempi and Chakraborti 2014). Against this background, the aim of our article is twofold. Firstly, to examine the nature and extent of virtual and physical world anti-Muslim hate crime directed towards Muslims in the UK. Secondly, to consider the impact of this hostility upon victims, their families and wider Muslim communities. Drawing on qualitative interviews with Muslim men and women who have been victims of both virtual and physical world anti-Muslim hate crime in the UK, this is the first ever study to shed light on the anti-Muslim hate crime experiences of Muslims both in the virtual and physical world, rather than examining these experiences in isolation. It will be concluded that especially for repeat victims, it is difficult to isolate the virtual threats from the intimidation, violence and abuse that they suffer in the physical world. Rather, there is a continuity of anti-Muslim hostility in both the virtual and the physical world, especially in the globalised world. Understanding anti-Muslim hate crime Anti-Muslim hate crime falls under the category of religious hate crime. It is not limited to physical attacks but includes a wide range of potential criminal behaviour from offensive graffiti, damage to property, abusive and threatening messages, harassment, intimidation and verbal abuse. Perry (2001: 10) argues that hate crime is about offenders pursuing a level of control and power, and states that a hate crime must involve “…acts of violence and intimidation, usually directed towards already stigmatized and marginalized groups...” According to the Association of Chief Police Officers (2014), hate crime in a cyber context includes illegal hate content that aims to incite hatred based on the grounds of race, religion and sexual orientation. This could include; words; posts; forums; videos; chatrooms; pictures and websites. One of the problems with understanding hate speech and virtual hate crime is the relationship between virtual hate speech and actual acts of violence. For example, the Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers (1997) argue that hate speech 3 involves all forms of hateful material and content including inciting, promoting and justifying racial hatred. They argue that such intolerance is based upon notions of nationalism, ethnocentrism, discrimination and stereotyping minority communities. Moreover, the Council of Europe’s Additional Protocol to the Convention on Cybercrime (2003) defines virtual hate speech as including written material or images which promote and incite hatred and discrimination based on a person or groups of person’s race, ethnicity, descent and national origin. The role therefore of actual ‘threats’, ‘action’ and ‘speech’ problematise the notion of what constitutes virtual hate speech and actual hate crime. We argue that virtual hate speech includes material of a malicious nature that are posted with the intent to promote, or justify intolerance, hostility and prejudice towards an individual or group of people. However, the problematic associations with hate speech and hate crime on the Internet are exacerbated by the notions of freedom of speech and expression within the current climate. Indeed, the European Court of Human Rights (1976) has found that people have a right to cause ‘offence’ to others, without clarifying what could constitute offence. We believe that this could cause problems where people express ideas or dissent, and instead should include material that causes fear alongside harassment and intimidation. Interestingly, those at the sharp end of tackling much of the virtual hate speech and hate crime are social media network sites. For example, Facebook uses its community standards to define what it considers to be hate speech, which it defines as content that ‘attacks people based on their actual or perceived race, ethnicity, national origin, religion, sex, gender, sexual orientation, disability or disease is not allowed. We do, however, allow clear attempts at humour or satire that might otherwise be considered a possible threat or attack. This includes content that many people may find to be in bad taste (ex: jokes, stand-up comedy, popular song lyrics, etc)’ (Facebook Community Standards 2015). Other sites such as Twitter (2015) whilst not providing a definition of hate speech, do make the case that all ‘hateful content, sensitive topics, and violence globally’ are prohibited. Another popular, social media site known as Reddit uses its virtual community to monitor and report incidents of hate speech. Through the use of subreddits (a discussion forum) it allows it’s over 136,000 users to pose questions to 4 other users and challenge any hateful content. Reddit also provides a list of what it views as hate speech which include bigotry; overtly sexual comments about appearance; body shaming; lewd comments and name calling as hate speech. Similarly, YouTube (2015) define hate speech as ‘content that promotes violence or hatred against individuals or groups based on certain attributes, such as: race or ethnic origin; religion; disability; gender; age; veteran status and sexual orientation/gender identity’. As noted above, the difficulty therefore in distinguishing virtual hate speech and hate crime is further reinforced by the Crown Prosecution guidelines (2013) which state that there must be either a credible threat of violence or communications which specifically target an individual or group of people. Such communications must be a breach of a court order or is considered grossly offensive, indecent, obscene or false. In practice, the element of posing a threat remains the most important reason to pursue a prosecution. As a result, we argue that virtual hate speech must be viewed in a broader context and we make the case that virtual hate speech intends to dehumanise and demonise individuals and does not necessarily need to include inciting threats of violence but relies on creating tensions. For example, in our study this is personified through the ‘them versus us’ culture (Cole and Cole 2009). Furthermore, a key finding that emerges from our project is the fact that anti-Muslim hate incidents and crimes increased both in the virtual and physical world following ‘trigger’ attacks including terrorist attacks carried out by individuals who choose to identify themselves as being Muslim or acting in the name of Islam. Such ‘trigger’ attacks include the terror attack that hit London in July 2005 and the terror attack that hit the United States in September 2001 (Hanes and Machin, 2014; Poynting and Mason, 2006). According to Byers and Jones (2007), terrorist attacks have a significant impact on the rise of anti-Muslim hate crime. We therefore argue that ‘trigger’ events such as the terrorist attacks in Paris and Tunisia can also lead to anti- Muslim hostility and indeed wider impacts on Muslim communities. For example, the organisation Tell MAMA, has found that there had been a significant rise in anti- Muslim attacks, ranging from incitement, harassment, cyber threats to actual physical violence, following the Tunisia, Paris and Woolwich events (Littler and Feldman 2015). 5 Moreover, local and regional events such as the Rotherham child sexual exploitation scandal in the UK have perpetuated anti-Muslim sentiments and ‘legitimised’ anti- Muslim attacks both in the virtual and physical world (Feldman et al. 2013). Previous studies have found that anti-Muslim hate crime has also increased in a cyber context, in particular against Muslim women, for example, via social networking sites such as Facebook and Twitter (Awan 2014). Within this context, Muslims are deemed to be part of the ‘problem’ and a ‘risk’ to society (Walklate and Mythen 2014). This is reinforced when discussing issues pertaining to the hijab and niqab and the comments used to describe Muslim women as a ‘national security threat’ (Mythen et al. 2009). This spike in anti-Muslim prejudice has led to further strengthening the narrative of official suspicion and has led to the current debate that Muslims are the ‘new suspect community’ (Pantazis and Pemberton 2009; Awan and Blakemore 2012; Perry and Alvi 2012; Perry and Olsson 2009; Keats 2014). Threatening and abusive comments, whether it be by visual images, fake virtual profiles, Facebook messages, YouTube videos and tweets, can have a detrimental effect on the victims who are targeted, their families and wider communities (Poynting and Noble 2004). What our study demonstrates is that anti-Muslim hate crime in a cyber context can be ‘normalised’ by offenders on the basis that they consistently use anonymity, manipulation and social control to target their victims (Douglas et al. 2005). Virtual perpetrators can often hide their identity and conceal personal information in order to escape detection. This level of anonymity means that many perpetrators of virtual anti-Muslim hostility tend to use the cyber space to disguise who they really are, knowing that they are highly likely to evade the authorities and thus feeling safe to express hate messages in the cyber world. However, whilst this form of cyber hate often remains “invisible”, sometimes due to offenders deleting tweets, comments or posts and also because the perpetrator can hide their identity, the threat remains very real for the victims it targets (Hall 2013). As we shall discuss later, the hate images and posts in particular contain a number of loaded generalisations with respect to Islam and Muslims. As a result, Muslims are considered a “threat”, and the perpetrators of cyber hate stereotype and demonise all Muslims in the same manner, and therefore consider them as a group 6 that should be ostracised, deported or killed by using hostile imagery and depicting them in an innately negative fashion (Allport 1979; McKenna and Bargh 1998). The social cognitive theory, as purported by Bandura (2001), provides us with some important points to consider with regards to how cyber hate communication can be influenced by the social environment. According to Bandura (2001), this approach helps to inform groups and creates ‘motivating’ factors. Bandura (2001: 265) states that: “ social cognitive theory provides an agentic conceptual framework within which to examine the determinants and mechanisms of such effects...” Within the construct of cyber hate, motivation and behaviour, groups such as the English Defence League (EDL) have been proactive in exploiting the virtual environment and are using worldwide events to incite hatred towards Islam and Muslims. Within the framework of social cognitive theory, we see how members of groups can act as producers within a virtual social environment. The use of emotional factors are symbols of how hate groups in a cyber context can also transform and galvanise groups, and transfer power of the environment to create cognitive models of judgement. Meyrowitz (1985) observes that electronic media has changed the way in which we interact with each other over time; therefore, the Internet has had significant impacts on social behaviour. Moreover, Meyrowitz (1985) argues that these virtual behaviours are determined by different stages of socialisation in a cyber context. Furthermore, Goodboy and Martin (2015) observe that hate groups in a cyber context can build profiles upon certain traits. Their study examined the relationships between the Dark Triad personality traits and self-reported cyberbullying behaviours. They found three trait behaviours as being prominent in such cases, namely; Machiavellianism, Psychopathy and Narcissism (Goodboy and Martin 2015: 1). Goodboy and Martin (2015: 1) also point out that cyberbullies attempt to “harass, denigrate, impersonate, or ostracize others” and “spend a considerable amount of time online and engage in risky online behaviours”. As our study has found, there are overlaps between those aggressive behaviours and how anti-Muslim hostility was used through videos and posts in a cyber context in order to coordinate aggressive responses and enter into hate-filled dialogue. 7 Similarly, Christopherson (2007) argues that anonymity affords protection for individuals and groups in the virtual world. This level of anonymity can influence the way individuals behave within cyber groups. This forms part of social psychological concepts within cyber groups and includes the notions of ‘bystander apathy’ and ‘social loafing.’ This level of anonymity in the virtual world was also described by Zimbardo (1969) as the ‘deindividuation theory’. This means that anonymity and personal social environmental factors can influence cyber behaviour. Dubrovsky et al. (1991) argue that face-to-face communication and electronic communication can vary in different groups depending on the social structure. Taking a similar view, Hayne et al. (1997) suggest that anonymity in group support systems is used by groups to create a cyber presence. McKenna and Bargh (1998) emphasise that these identities are built upon a sense of self-esteem and self-belonging. Social cognitive theory also demonstrates how ‘visible’ Muslims are targeted in the cyber world in the wake of national and international ‘trigger’ events. As discussed in more detail below, our research questions were semi-structured and explorative in nature as we aimed to examine anti-Muslim hostility in both the physical and virtual world. Using the basis of emotional impacts within social constructs we hoped to see whether people online had been impacted by social behaviour and/or trigger events. We also hoped to see how the environment can lead to behaviour patterns and trends when reporting anti-Muslim hostility and as a result our research questions were based upon notions of the environment, social behaviour and how these directly impact upon victims perceptions of the criminal justice system. Furthermore, the Social Learning Theory specifically, examines how people are viewed in a mediatised world. According to Bandura, this type of behaviour can be influenced by the environment, behaviour and experiences of cognitive behaviour. This is particularly important in our study since we argue that victims’ personal experiences in the virtual world determine their expectations of the criminal justice system as a whole. The Research Project The methodology of the study was comprised of 20 individual interviews with Muslim men and women who have been victims of both virtual and physical world anti- 8 Muslim hate crime in the UK. Participants had reported their experiences to Tell MAMA, which is a public service that supports victims of anti-Muslim hate and also measures and monitors anti-Muslim incidents. Victims of anti-Muslim abuse can use a freephone number to speak to staff or report cyber incidents via social media networks such as Twitter, Facebook and via email. In addition, Tell MAMA has a website which provides a range of sources and information for victims of anti-Muslim hostility and uses the information it receives to pass onto the police service. Within this space Tell MAMA staff work closely with victims to help provide them with support mechanisms and raise awareness of the experiences of victims of anti- Muslim abuse. Tell MAMA contacted Muslims who had reported both virtual and physical world incidents of anti-Muslim hate crime to them within 2015. Once prospective participants confirmed their interest in taking part in this study, their details were passed on to the researchers of this study, who engaged directly with participants for conducting the interviews. Certainly, our sample does not cover the full spectrum of views and experiences that might be held by Muslims who have experienced cyber and/or physical world anti-Muslim hate crime, and it is not representative of the hundreds of victims who have used MAMA’s services. However, we are confident that they provide a starting point for academics, researchers and policy makers who are working within this area. The interviews were conducted between May and August 2015. Participation to this study was voluntary. Also, participants’ names have been changed in order to ensure their anonymity. Out of the twenty participants, we interviewed eleven female and nine male individuals. A common characteristic amongst all participants was that they were ‘visibly identifiable’ as Muslim. For example, some of the female participants wore the jilbab, hijab and/or niqab whilst the male participants had a beard and often wore the traditional Islamic clothing and a cap that identified them as being Muslim. In terms of age, the majority of participants were aged between 20 - 30 years (seven participants aged 20 and over and eight participants aged 30 and over) with four participants aged 40 and over and one participant aged 50. The youngest participant we interviewed was aged 20 and the oldest was 50. In terms of ethnicity, we had a broad and diverse group, which was made up of different backgrounds and ethnicity. The interviewees included those from Asian heritage 9 (eleven) participants, White British convert (five), Somalian (three) and Libyan (one). The locations where victims were targeted in the physical world varied and included public transport, schools and near their homes, business or mosques. Ethical considerations involved all participants being able to withdraw their consent at any time and all participants were ensured confidentiality and anonymity throughout the research study. All data collection instruments used (such as interview questions and topic guides for participants) were framed and worded selectively. Recordings of the interviews were transcribed and thematically analysed. Participants of the interviews consented to being involved in a participant process that involved reading and clarifying a summary of the role of the interview before the process. Audio-recordings were transcribed verbatim and each participant name has been changed to ensure confidentiality and anonymity. Transcripts were read and annotated to develop themes, which are defined below. Although it is not possible to generalise the current findings due to the qualitative nature of the study, we hope that by sharing participants’ stories we shed light on the links between virtual and physical world anti-Muslim hate crime, and the multiple impacts it can have upon victims, their families and wider Muslim communities. It is important to acknowledge that this was a qualitative study based on a very small sample; therefore participants’ accounts cannot be generalised to a wider population. However, using grounded theory the study provided a detailed exploration of participants experiences of both cyber and ‘real’ world anti-Muslim hate crime. Also, the research did not speak to perpetrators. Although this aspect was deliberately excluded from the parameters of this study, it is evident that we do not actually know the motivations that drove the perpetrators to commit the acts that they did. Rather, we have to rely on victims’ testimony in order to draw conclusions about offenders’ motivations. These limitations do not undermine the significance of the study but it is clear that future research should explore them in more depth. Determinants of anti-Muslim hate crime incidence The prevalence and severity of anti-Muslim hate crimes are influenced by ‘trigger’ events of local, national and international significance. As Williams and Burnap (2015) point out, hate crimes are communicative acts, which are often provoked by antecedent events that incite a desire for retribution in the targeted group, towards 10 the group that share similar characteristics to the perpetrators. From this perspective, hate crimes increase following ‘trigger’ events as they operate to galvanise tensions and sentiments against the suspected perpetrators and groups associated with them. Indeed, evidence shows that anti-Muslim hate crimes have increased significantly following ‘trigger’ attacks including terrorist attacks carried out by individuals who choose to identify themselves as being Muslim or acting in the name of Islam (Hanes and Machin 2014). Spikes in anti-Muslim hate crimes and incidents following ‘trigger’ events are not confided to the physical world; rather, the physical world pattern is replicated in the virtual world (Awan 2014). Indeed, the Woolwich attack1 was cited by our participants as a terrorist antecedent ‘trigger’ event, which induced a significant increase in their virtual and physical world anti-Muslim hate crime experiences, as the following extracts illustrate: I know sisters who have been punched, being shouted at on the street, being pulled and pushed around by people, had their houses being burned down. These are the results of trigger events like when Lee Rigby was murdered. (Sarah) I have figured out over the years that this happens when there is a terrorist attack in the news committed by Muslims so Islamophobia happens even more. A clear example is the Lee Rigby murder. (Ahmed) Littler and Feldman (2015) found that there was a substantial spike in reports of anti- Muslim hate crime following the Woolwich attack, which ranged from general abuse towards ‘visible’ Muslims on the street, to graffiti at mosques, through to firebombs at mosques and threats in a cyber context. Britain’s biggest force, the Metropolitan police, recorded 500 anti-Muslim hate crimes following the Woolwich attack (The Guardian 2013). Furthermore, participants reported that the prevalence of both virtual and physical world anti-Muslim hate crimes increased following high-profile terrorist attacks around the world such as Sydney2, the Charlie Hebdo attack in Paris3, and attacks in Copenhagen4 and Tunisia5. Reflecting a spike in both virtual and physical world anti-Muslim hate crime, participants stated that: I have received Islamophobic abuse in social media and on the street on various occasions. After the Sydney incident, I received Islamophobic remarks on four separate occasions in the space of two weeks. (Hamza) After the Paris attacks, I got a lot of nasty comments especially on social media. (Asma) 11 In addition, it is important to recognise that in a globally connected world, the actions by one terrorist group such as ISIS can lead to counter-reactions and impacts on Muslims in the UK. Participants pointed out that they were “bombarded with virtual and physical world threats” with the prominence of ISIS, especially following the release of videos showing beheadings carried out by ISIS or when there was a terror threat made against the UK from ISIS members, as the following extracts indicate: I keep my Facebook account private but I get a lot of abuse on twitter especially if something has happened like when ISIS killed Alan Henning … I recently posted a comment on Channel 4 News webpage saying that the ISIS actions are bad and then I got loads and loads of abusive comments like “you are part of a terrorist religion”. (Sophie) I was on my way to the shops and people shouted at me “why don’t we chop your head off?” In another case, people on the street shouted ‘your head will be much better on the floor’. (Sarah) Furthermore, national scandals such as the grooming of young girls in Rotherham by groups of Pakistani men, twisted by the far-right into a ‘Muslim’ issue or the alleged ‘Trojan Horse’ scandal in Birmingham framed as a ‘jihadist plot’ to take over schools, were also highlighted by our participants as ‘trigger’ events. In the context of the Rotherham scandal, ‘Muslim’ was deployed in order to cast all Muslims as synonymous with child abusers and indeed participants reported incidents where they were called ‘rapists’ and ‘paedos’ – (paedophiles). The child sexual abuse scandal in Rotherham and the Trojan Horse investigation at Birmingham schools saw an increase in anti-Muslim attacks at record levels. (Hamza) I live in Rotherham and the grooming case has portrayed all Pakistani men in Rotherham as paedophiles but what about the Jimmy Saville case? Why did they not mention his colour and religion? This really frustrates me and makes me angry. (Ibrahim) As the following extract demonstrates, a couple of participants pointed out that certain Muslim individuals have failed to condemn these ‘trigger’ attacks and therefore they were to some extent ‘responsible’ for the rise in anti-Muslim hostility. There are Muslims like Anjem Choudary who are proverbial thorns in the side of Islam who refuse to condemn the Woolwich attack and the killings committed by ISIS…I am comfortable to speak out against the abhorrent actions of ISIS. These people are doing so much damage to the image of Islam that not to speak out is a bad thing. (Adam) At the same time, some participants highlighted the role of media in reporting of these ‘trigger’ events as ‘adding fuel to the fire’. Williams and Burnap (2015) argue 12 that the traditional media play a role in ‘setting the agenda’, ‘transmitting the images’ and ‘claims making’ following deviant events of national or international interest. According to Hanes and Machin (2014), if attitudes towards Muslims are influenced by ‘trigger’ attacks and by media coverage of these attacks, then this finding fits with the proposition of ‘attitudinal shocks,’ where a driver of hate crimes is the level of hatred or bigotry for a particular group in society, which may be influenced by media framing and coverage of attacks. The perceived role of both traditional and social media in promoting anti-Muslim sentiments is evident in the following quotes: I experience anti-Muslim hostility from people based on what they read on the Daily Mail or what they read on Facebook pages by Britain First. (Nabeela) My mother is hostile to my hijab. She watches the news and because of the disproportionate coverage of Islam and terrorism she thinks that this is what Islam is. (Kelly) Relatedly, participants highlighted that people are largely ignorant about the teachings of Islam and that the media do not take sufficient action to educate the public about what ‘true’ Islam means, as the following extracts illustrate: Anti-Muslim hate exists because of ignorance about Muslims that is fuelled by the media. People don't understand Muslims because they are not exposed to them. If the only information they get is from the media, then they are naturally going to assume that all Muslims are as bad as ISIS. But if you live next to Mr and Mrs Khan [common Muslim family name] you will realise that Muslims are just normal people. (Sophie) In addition to ‘trigger’ events, the visibility of Islam is key to revealing the individual’s Muslim identity and thus triggering virtual and physical world anti-Muslim attacks. Indeed, it is well established in the literature that there is a significant relationship between being visible as a Muslim and experiencing anti-Muslim hate crime (see, for example, Allen et al. 2013; Zempi and Chakraborti 2014). In this context, if the markers of Islam (for example, a Muslim dress or a Muslim name) are absent, ‘passing’ as a non-Muslim is possible for those without conspicuous Muslim names or dress, and those who do not ‘look like’ a Muslim. Correspondingly, participants were convinced that it was their distinctive Muslim appearance that made them a target of anti-Muslim hate, as the following extracts illustrate: I have a public twitter account to promote my work and I get regular abuse on that. I have my picture on my twitter account so they know I am Muslim … I started wearing the hijab two years ago. I was not a Muslim before. I did not get any online or offline abuse at all before wearing the hijab. (Sophie) 13 I am identifiable as a Muslim because I have the full beard, I wear a turban and I also wear the Islamic clothes. I am a very practising Muslim and I feel that is why I am targeted. (Ibrahim) Our study highlights the significance of ‘visible’ Muslim identities in both the virtual and physical world. Specifically, young Muslims are particularly vulnerable to abuse on social media. According to the Global Digital Data statistics on Internet users, the number of people actively using social media networks is 2.078 billion (Kemp 2015). In the case of young Muslims we also see a growing population increase and one that inevitably have been using social media and the Internet. In the case of the virtual world where Muslims have a visible identity they have been targeted because they have been identified by their name, their faith, age, dress, appearance and also the views they have expressed online. At the same time, Muslim women highlighted feeling vulnerable in a cyber context and also in the ‘real’ world because they were visibly identifiable as Muslims. Specifically, we found that Muslim women were seen as the personification of the ‘Islamic problem’ in a cyber context. This was true, when discussing the hijab and niqab and the comments used to describe Muslim women on social media sites, such as a ‘national security threat’ and comments suggesting that they were forced to wear the veil. The hate images and posts in some cases contained a number of loaded generalisations with respect to Muslim women as a ‘threat’ because of the visible identity. As a result, Muslim women were more likely to receive cyber hate messages that stereotyped and demonised them through hostile imagery and depicting them in an innately negative manner. For example, Hira who mainly uses Facebook, had to make her Facebook profile private because of the consistent online anti-Muslim abuse she has suffered. She noted that: I have had to re-adjust all my security settings, so that only friends can contact me or see my profile because of the abuse I have suffered. (Hira) This sense of fear and pervading insecurity in a cyber context is also personified by Kelly, who stated that: These trolls are not the stereotyped EDL, they come from all walks of life and all backgrounds which is alarming. They will set up a hoax ID and from there they can abuse anyone with complete anonymity and hiding behind a false ID. (Kelly) 14 The relentless abuse Sophie suffered was because of her ‘visible’ presence in the virtual world as a White Muslim convert. Halima has also been the victim of the EDL cyber mob and had to report the abuse that she had suffered because of the direct threats that were made to her life. In Halima’s case, an EDL sympathiser had threatened her with physical violence. Below is the conversation that took place in the virtual world: Hahahhahaa I told you my agenda hunny. Don’t worry I will knock you out.' 'Babe let's do a meet and greet. We're not far from each other.' 'Save your smart mouth for Saturday. I can't wait. (Sophie) The virtual world prejudice and discrimination paradigm is used by perpetrators who will involve swearing coupled with anti-Muslim, racist language as a means to target Muslims. This cyber element is also used by perpetrators where prejudicial statements and messages are used to target a particular group or person. Indeed, this type of negativity can also lead to an escalation of cyber abuse and the normalisation of such behaviour through likes and retweets via social media sites such as Twitter and Facebook. However, as we shall see below, both cyber and physical world incidents can have a similar pattern and a trend, which is based primarily on the perpetrator using abusive and provocative language to pose real offline threats against victims, their families and wider Muslim communities. Similarly to the virtual world, where actual and potential victims are identified through the visibility of their Muslim identity, Muslims are equally vulnerable to intimidation, violence and abuse on the street, particularly when their Muslim identity is visible offline. Evidence suggests that ‘visible’ Muslims – such as Muslim men with a beard and Muslim women who wear hijab or niqab – are at heightened risk of anti-Muslim hostility in public by virtue of their visible ‘Muslimness’. Specifically, popular perceptions that veiled Muslim women are passive, oppressed and powerless increase their chance of assault, thereby marking them as an ‘easy’ target to attack. We also found that whilst stereotypes were used to depict Muslims in a negative manner in the virtual world, such effects were used in the physical world to characterise Muslims with strong verbal abuse. For example, Sarah noted that: 15 When I became identifiably Muslim I got nasty looks, threats and abuse, and that’s an everyday experience, especially because I am a white British Muslim. (Sarah) These views were reinforced by comments that were made against Sarah who on a daily basis had to hear the following comments ‘Oh you are a Paki lover.’ These comments were not isolated to Sarah, but a number of other participants had also experienced racist abuse, which they suffered because of their visible identification as Muslim. Ahmed stated that: They call me ‘terrorist’, they call me ‘paki’, I’ve been told ‘fuck off go away’, I get sworn at, and that’s mainly because I’m Muslim. The thing is, I am born in this country. I want to live here. (Ahmed) Mohammad talked about how his children have also been targeted by anti-Muslim abuse in schools. He noted that ‘Other pupils call them names like ‘Paki get lost’, swearing, ‘go back home’, ‘you don't belong here’, ‘Muslim monkeys’, other pupils have pulled their headscarves.’ Sophie stated that: On my previous school placement, my hijab was sharply pulled by a child, this was witnessed by a teacher but was not challenged by them. (Sophie) Along similar lines, Hamza stated that ‘I was called a ‘Muslim groomer’ while Mohammad also argued that ‘I have been called ‘Muslim terrorist’ and ‘Here come’s Osama Bin Laden’. Ultimately, it is important to recognise that the visibility of Islam is key to revealing the individual’s Muslim identity and thus triggering cyber attacks towards Muslims. For example, in social networking sites individuals might be perceived as ‘Muslim’ because of their name, appearance in their profile picture (dress for women and beard for men) and comments indicating their affiliation with Islam. Visibility is a critical element to prejudice given that “perceptible differences are of basic importance in distinguishing between out-group and in-group members” (Allport 1979: 132). The power of social perception along with negative attributions ascribed to those viewed as visibly different is a key element to understanding hate crime in general and anti-Muslim hate crime committed against individuals more specifically (Byers and Jones 2008). Without what Allport (1979) refers to as “visible differences” in the form of social dress, perceived in-group and out-group membership would not be ascribed. He refers to the merging of the “symbol” (e.g., 16 physical and cultural attributes) and what the symbol is perceived to stand for (e.g., terrorism, enemy) as “condensation” whereby the visible difference and the ascribed meaning given to the symbol come together, thus, creating a key element of the necessary perceptual formula for prejudice (Jacobs and Potter 1998: 13). In light of the fact that the visibility of their Muslim identity was key to triggering attacks, participants took steps to become less ‘visible’ through downplaying or concealing their ‘Muslimness’ in order to protect themselves from abuse both in the virtual and physical world, as discussed below. Impacts of virtual and physical world anti-Muslim hate crime Crime can incur a number of different ‘costs’ following a victimisation experience that involve emotional, psychological, physical and financial liabilities. However, evidence shows that ‘hate crimes hurt more’. Indeed, empirical studies of targeted victimisation emphasise the more severe impact for victims of hate crime when compared to non-hate victims (see, for example, Chakraborti et al. 2014; Smith et al. 2012; Williams and Tregidga 2014). In the context of anti-Muslim hate crime, both virtual and physical world attacks upon Muslims ‘hurt’ more than ‘normal’ crimes as they are seen as an attack upon the victims’ Muslim identity. From this perspective, the impact of anti-Muslim hate crime may exceed that of ‘normal’ crime because of victims’ perceived and actual vulnerability due to their affiliation to Islam. Our participants reported suffering a range of psychological and emotional responses to anti-Muslim hate, from lowered self-confidence and insecurity to depression, isolation and anxiety. Given that they were targeted because of the ‘visibility’ of their Muslim identity – which is easily identifiable because of their Muslim name and/or Muslim appearance either in the virtual world or in the physical sphere – participants were unable to take comfort in the belief that what happened to them was simply random and ‘could have happened to anyone’. Rather, they were forced to view this abuse as an attack on their Muslim identity and this had severe implications for their levels of confidence and self-esteem as well as for their feelings of belonging and safety in the UK. 17 As might be expected, experiences of virtual and physical world anti-Muslim hate crime increased feelings of vulnerability, fear and insecurity amongst participants. Ahmed stated ‘It is scary because we are constantly under attack.’ As mentioned previously, the Internet allows people to take on a new and anonymous identity, and to bypass traditional editorial controls, to share their views with millions. Cyber anti- Muslim hate messages can be sent anonymously or by using a false identity, making it difficult to identify the offender. As the following quote shows, the anonymity aspect in cases of anti-Muslim hate messages in a cyber context is extremely frightening as the perpetrator could be anyone and the virtual threats can escalate into the physical space. I am scared because in face-to-face situations I can see who the perpetrator is but when someone does it online I always think who is it? Who is hiding behind the keyboard sending me messages of hate? (Aisha) Repeat incidents of virtual and physical world anti-Muslim hate increased feelings of insecurity, vulnerability and anxiety amongst our participants. Bowling (2009) states that repeated or persistent victimisation can undermine the security of actual and potential victims, and induce fear and anxiety. The distressing nature of anti-Muslim hate crime coupled with the frequency with which these acts were committed, had created high levels of fear amongst participants. As a result, they felt extremely vulnerable for themselves and they were also concerned about the safely of their family. One of our participants, Ibrahim, expressed his fear for the safety of his wife who wears the niqab: ‘My wife is very vulnerable when she is on her own. I fear for her safety’. A couple of participants warned about the risks of radicalisation, especially for young people as a result of suffering virtual and physical world anti- Muslim hate crime, as the following quote illustrates: Anti-Muslim hate crime has affected Muslims. This is why Muslims are going to Syria. This is why they support ISIS. When people experience Islamophobic abuse, they will be easily radicalised. They feel weak, lonely, isolated, and rejected from British society. (Hamza) Affective responses that were common amongst our participants were isolation, depression, loneliness, and a sense of rejection from wider society. In this regard, experiences of anti-Muslim hate crime have long-lasting effects for victims including making them afraid to engage with other communities and feeling like social 18 outcasts. For example, Hafsa, Bilal and Asma reported feelings of social isolation in the following quotes: I feel very isolated and I have become quite cynical about non-Muslims. (Hafsa) Suffering Islamophobia has made me become insular, lack confidence, I feel I am not accepted. (Bilal) As a result of their recurring experiences of virtual and physical world anti-Muslim hate, participants emphasised that they always had to keep their guard up and be vigilant. In this regard, they felt anxious and were constantly on the alert. Anxiety was usually expressed as excessive fear and worry, which was often coupled with feelings of tension, restlessness and vigilance. You might find it bizarre but when I walk on the street I am always watching out in case anything happens. I am a big guy, six-feet tall, I stand out as a sore thumb. Sometimes people look at me with disgust. (Ibrahim) It is important to recognise that the continual threat of virtual and physical world abuse can be emotionally draining for victims who feel the need to be constantly on the alert, even to the extent that they might become paranoid, as the following extracts illustrate: To be honest, I have slowed down with my openness on twitter because I feel very unsafe, I feel very vulnerable. There was a time I felt so vulnerable just being in the UK because of my twitter account. I became paranoid, that everybody might be watching me, the government, people, everyone really. (Bilal) As already indicated, a key finding throughout interviews was that participants were multiple and repeat victims of both virtual and physical forms of anti-Muslim hate crime. Rarely did participants describe anti-Muslim hate crime as ‘one-off’; rather there was always the sense, the fear, the expectation for another attack. From this perspective, anti-Muslim hate crime and its attendant forms of virtual and physical abuse, intimidation, violence and harassment were seen by the majority of participants as ‘normal’ (Awan 2014, Zempi and Chakraborti 2014). The fact that anti-Muslim hostility was understood as a normative part of their lived experiences also meant that some participants had become ‘used to it’ and therefore ‘immune’ to this victimisation, as the following quotes indicate: When I suffer abuse in public, people walk off or stare. Anti-Muslim hate is normal. (Sarah) 19 I have been called a “Muslim terrorist” so many times but I have grown a thicker skin as a result. (Bilal) I am not afraid anymore because I am so used to it. I have to live here so I need to adjust myself to the abuse. If I beat the crap out of them I will be in trouble. I take the abuse and keep my head down. I just want to carry on with my life. (Muhammad) We argue that the victims and perpetrators of anti-Muslim abuse are both located and targeted in the cyber and real-world with reference to threats and specific acts of violence. We found that for victims and their families, it is often difficult to isolate cyber threats from the intimidation, violence and abuse that they suffer in the ‘real’ world. Rather, there is a continuity of anti-Muslim hostility in both the virtual and the physical world, especially in the globalised world. Specifically, participants highlighted the relationship between cyber and physical world anti-Muslim hate crime, and described living in fear because of the possibility of threats in a cyber context materialising in the physical world, as the following quotes demonstrate: I am scared, I fear for my life because at the end of the day they [cyber perpetrators] might come and find me because my twitter profile is public. (Aisha) I know many Muslims who have been physically attacked and verbally attacked. Personally, I have been called “Muslim scum”, “jihadist” and “paedophile”. (Adam) In some cases, cyber attacks had effects in the ‘real’ world. For example, in the case of Amin, an image was used of him on Twitter with the caption “suspended child grooming taxi drivers” despite the post being false and malicious. Amin stated that: They used a picture of me and said ‘Taxi driver groomer suspended’. The impact has been immense because Rotherham is a small town and people get to know things quickly … I can’t even get a job in Rotherham now because of this picture. (Amin) The case of Amin directly shows the link between the virtual and physical world as Amin noted how he could not find a job because of the manner in which his picture had been used in a cyber context to damage his reputation. He reported feeling uncomfortable walking down the streets in Rotherham because people might recognise his picture from Twitter, and think that he was one of the perpetrators of the grooming scandal. Clearly, cyber hate messages and comments contribute towards the stigmatisation and the ‘othering’ of Muslim communities in the ‘real’ 20 world. This shows that in reality, virtual and physical world boundaries may be more blurred than the terms imply. Furthermore, another cost that victims of anti-Muslim hate crime often experience is a change in their routines and lifestyles. In this case, the threat of both virtual and physical anti-Muslim hate crime is so ‘real’ that it can cause individuals to change the way that they live their lives and even take steps to become less ‘visibly’ Muslim. For example, some participants who had converted to Islam (such as Sarah, Kelly, Sophie and Adam) explained that they kept their English name to avoid suffering anti-Muslim hostility whilst other participants who were born into Islam had adopted western names in order to hide their Muslim identity, especially in a cyber context. Moreover, some participants were reluctant to leave the house, especially on their own because of fear of being attacked, as the following quotes indicate: We stay in, we don’t go out because we are scared of what will happen. If I leave the house I am usually accompanied by my husband or my son. (Nabeela) My wife wears the niqab and she had many incidents where people have made nasty remarks, so just to avoid conflict we don't go out. (Ibrahim) The constant threat of anti-Muslim hate crime had forced participants to adopt a siege mentality and keep a low profile in order to reduce the potential for future attacks. Zempi and Chakraborti (2014) found that veiled Muslim women often try to become less ‘visible’ and as such less vulnerable by taking the veil off. Similarly, our participants revealed downplaying their ‘Muslimness’ by taking the Muslim dress off, or by dressing in western clothes, as the following extracts illustrate: I do not feel safe to wear the hijab up in my hometown because of the dangers there. I take my hijab and abaya off when I go to my hometown because of the abuse I will get as a result. (Sarah) In this context, participants appear to manage impressions of their Muslim identity in the virtual and physical world mainly through concealment with the aim to reduce the risk of future abuse. Perry and Alvi (2012) point out that this is not a voluntary choice, but the ‘safe’ choice. Whether in cyber or ‘real’ world, anti-Muslim hate crime creates ‘invisible’ boundaries, across which members of the Muslim community are not ‘welcome’ to step. The enactment of both virtual and physical boundaries impacts upon ‘emotional geographies’ in relation to the way in which Muslims 21 perceive the spaces and places around and outside their communities of abode. Rather than risk the threat of being attacked, either in a cyber or physical context, many actual and potential victims opt to change their lifestyles and retreat to ‘their own’ communities. Furthermore, several participants felt angry, upset and frustrated because they were targeted for being Muslim. Indeed, hate crime studies have established both specific and generalised frustration and anger on the part of victims – towards the perpetrator and towards a culture of bias and exclusion (Williams and Tregidga 2014). I suffer Islamophobia all the time. People have labelled me as a “paki bomber” just by looking at me, which makes me very angry. I feel I have to pay for something that it is not even my fault. (Bilal) Clearly some participants felt frustrated; however, others felt weak, powerless and defenceless on the basis that they were not ‘allowed’ to challenge anti-Muslim hate crime, as the following extract indicates: When incidents like the Charlie Hebdo happen, I am asked to condemn it and I do condemn it, not only as a Muslim but also as a human being, but when attacks against Muslims happen, no one asks me to condemn it. That is Islamophobia for me and it is very upsetting…We feel helpless. (Hamza) Finally, a couple of participants pointed out that anti-Muslim hate experiences made their faith in Islam stronger. In this regard, Islam became a more salient and important marker of identity in response to experiences of virtual and physical world anti-Muslim hate crime. Such experiences increased in-group solidarity and identification with their religious identity. Brown (2001) observes that as Muslim identities have been constructed as ‘other’ to western identities, an attempt to distort Muslim identities, or to suppress the symbols of these identities, often has the opposite effect; it strengthens these identities. As the following quotes show, suffering anti-Muslim hate crime made some participants more determined to continue to practise Islam. Islamophobia has pushed me closer to practising Islam. I am more passionate now about my Muslim identity. I feel I don't belong anywhere else. (Bilal) I love my hijab more when they attack me for it’ (Asma) Conclusion 22 The preceding discussion has examined the virtual and physical world, anti-Muslim hate crime experiences of Muslim men and women in the UK. Specifically, the aim of this article was to examine: (a) the nature and extent of cyber and ‘real’ world anti- Muslim attacks directed towards Muslims in the UK and (b) the impact of this hostility upon victims, their families and wider Muslim communities. The study included 20 in- depth interviews with Muslims who have been victims of virtual and physical world anti-Muslim hate crime, and had reported these experiences to Tell MAMA. Key themes that emerged from the research findings included the nature and determinants of anti-Muslim hate crime incidence, and the consequences for victims. Correspondingly, we found that the prevalence and severity of virtual and physical world anti-Muslim hate crimes are influenced by ‘trigger’ events of local, national and international significance. Terrorist attacks carried out by individuals who identify themselves as being Muslim or acting in the name of Islam – such as the Woolwich attack, the atrocities committed by ISIS and attacks around the world such as Sydney, the Charlie Hebdo attack in Paris, and attacks in Copenhagen and Tunisia – induced a significant increase in participants’ virtual and physical world anti-Muslim hate crime experiences. Additionally, national scandals such as the grooming of young girls in Rotherham by groups of Pakistani men, and the alleged ‘Trojan Horse’ scandal in Birmingham framed as a ‘jihadist plot’ to take over schools, were also highlighted by participants as ‘trigger’ events, which increased their vulnerability to anti-Muslim hostility. Participants highlighted that the visibility of their Muslim identity was key to being identified as Muslims, and thus triggering virtual and/or physical world anti-Muslim attacks. Unarguably, this victimisation increased feelings of vulnerability, fear and insecurity amongst participants. They also suffered a range of psychological and emotional responses such as low confidence, depression and anxiety. Throughout interviews, participants highlighted the relationship between virtual and physical world anti-Muslim hate crime, and described living in fear because of the possibility of cyber threats materialising in the physical world. The constant threat of anti- Muslim hate crime had forced participants to adopt a siege mentality and keep a low profile in order to reduce the potential for future attacks. Many participants reported 23 taking steps to become less ‘visible’ for example by taking the headscarf off for women and shaving their beards for men. Our research study has found that when it comes to behaviour in the virtual world, individuals learn to adapt and behave in certain ways by viewing what other people have done. These socially constructed behaviours as purported by Bandura (2004), demonstrate how witnessing behaviour in the virtual world can influence perpetrators and their decision to target someone. For example, in our study many participants spoke about how they have been targeted by a string of cyber comments where perpetrators personified similar behaviours and tactics. This means that in many cases victims of cyber anti-Muslim hate speech would witness a cyber mob who would replicate the same observed behaviours from those who began the thread of conversations. The cyber mobs in this instance are likely to mimic those instructions (Bandura 2002). This shows how cyber hate speech becomes a normality and adopted by the perpetrators. Furthermore, these processes have had a huge impact when it comes to how victims view the world, their self and others because of the manner in which they perceive social identities. In our study, this is relevant to the type of prejudice and discrimination they have to encounter, and the social reality that attitudes are shaped by the way in which people categorise them as a ‘threat’. The reality is that victims’ social reality is placed within a narrative that they are different and therefore they have rationalised this fact that they are helpless. Moreover, for victims the motivations of being deemed as victims of hate crime becomes normalised to the extent that this is their social and human reality. Indeed, Bandura’s model of moral disengagement explores how offending behaviour can be justified both in the virtual and physical world (Bandura 1990; Bandura et al., 1996). Ultimately, increased awareness of the nature and impacts of both virtual and physical world anti-Muslim hate crime is crucial. Only by raising awareness about this problem, and learning about Muslims’ experiences of anti-Muslim hate crime, can we begin to address the harmful consequences of this form of hate crime. 24 Notes: 1 Muslim converts Michael Adebolajo and Michael Adebowale murdered Fusilier Lee Rigby at the Royal Artillery Barracks in Woolwich, south-east London on 22 May 2013. 2 On 15-16 December 2014, Man Haron Monis, an Iranian-born Australian citizen, took hostages in a siege at the Lindt Chocolate Café at Martin Place, Sydney. The siege resulted in the death of Monis and two hostages. 3 For three days (from 7 to 9 January 2015), a series of terrorist attacks occurred in Paris. On 7 January 2015, brothers Saïd and Chérif Kouachi forced their way into the offices of the French satirical weekly newspaper Charlie Hebdo in Paris and killed 11 people and injured 11 others in the building. 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work_b564ztcj4jamtarstc5wnsxv6a	----	Media Images and Experiences of Being a Jew in the Swedish City of Malmö SAGE Open January-March 2016: 1–14 © The Author(s) 2016 DOI: 10.1177/2158244016633739 sgo.sagepub.com Creative Commons CC-BY: This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 License (http://www.creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/) which permits any use, reproduction and distribution of the work without further permission provided the original work is attributed as specified on the SAGE and Open Access pages (https://us.sagepub.com/en-us/nam/open-access-at-sage). Article Introduction “I’m hated in Malmö!” This is the headline of an article in southern Sweden’s biggest daily newspaper, Sydsvenska Dagbladet (SDS), in which a young woman with Jewish identity expresses why she has moved from Malmö in southern Sweden to Israel. In the article, she describes how she has been regularly called a “bloody Jewish whore” at school and is increasingly afraid of being exposed to anti-Semitic hate crime (SDS, July 19, 2015). Other people and their families have also moved from Malmö to other parts of Sweden or to Israel in recent years and have talked to the media about Jews’ vulnerability and their decision to move, which has attracted international attention. Although anti-Semitic incidents have occurred through- out Sweden, most of the focus has been on one city in particular, Malmö. Located in the south of the country, Malmö is Sweden’s third largest city (300,000 inhabit- ants) and is well known from the television series The Bridge, which is seen across large parts of the world. Since 1994, the Social Democrats have been the dominat- ing party in the city. More than 170 nationalities are represented in Malmö. The largest groups come from Iraq, Denmark, ex-Yugoslavia, Poland, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. According to statistics pub- lished in 2013, 30% (about 92,000) of the population of Malmö were born outside Sweden and about 11% were born in Sweden to parents originating from another country (www. malmo.se, February 19, 2014). As religion and ethnicity are not listed in the Swedish statistics, it is difficult to say exactly how many Jews there are in Sweden and in Malmö. The Official Council of Swedish Jewish Communities estimates the number of Jews in Sweden to be around 20,000 (www. judiskacentralradet.se). According to the information provided by the Jewish community in Malmö, there were 2,000 mem- bers in the 1970s. Ten years ago, the number was 1,000, while today there are only 600. However, not all Jews living in Malmö are members of the community (www.jfm.se, May 15, 2014). White power groups (neo-Nazi) are active in Sweden today, and some anti-Semitic hate crimes are committed by their members. In Malmö, however, White power groups are very small. But the right-wing populist party, the Sweden Democrats (Sverigedemokraterna), which was a very small party around 15 years ago with strong connections to the White Power Movement, is now an important actor in the Swedish Parliament. The Sweden Democrats received 12.9% of the votes in the parliamentary elections in 2014, including 13.5% of the votes in Malmö, and have a political manifesto that prioritizes reduced immigration, resistance to multicul- turalism and to Islam, which resembles the agendas of 633739 SGOXXX10.1177/2158244016633739SAGE OpenWigerfelt and Wigerfelt research-article2016 1Malmö University, Sweden Corresponding Author: Anders Wigerfelt, Malmö University, Malmö 205 06, Sweden. Email: anders.wigerfelt@mah.se Media Images and Experiences of Being a Jew in the Swedish City of Malmö Anders Wigerfelt1 and Berit Wigerfelt1 Abstract A series of high-profile incidents in and after 2008 placed Malmö in southern Sweden on the national and international map as a place that was unsafe for people identified as Jews. The primary aim of this article is to explore and exemplify what it is like to live with Jewish identity in Malmö within a framework of how the media reports anti-Semitism and how this group copes with being the potential target of anti-Semitic harassment and hate crime. Based on interviews with people with Jewish identity in Malmö, we analyze and discuss their experiences using different themes, such as violent and everyday anti-Semitism, the local impact of the Israel–Palestine conflict, how media images affect their lives, and how exposure and vulnerability are dealt with. The findings are important in terms of both possible long-term measures against anti-Semitism and as immediate support for those targeted. Keywords anti-Semitism, hate crime, harassment, media images, Malmö by guest on March 30, 2016Downloaded from www.malmo.se www.malmo.se www.judiskacentralradet.se). According to the information provided by the Jewish community in Malm www.judiskacentralradet.se). According to the information provided by the Jewish community in Malm www.judiskacentralradet.se). According to the information provided by the Jewish community in Malm www.jfm.se, May 15, 2014) www.jfm.se, May 15, 2014) mailto:anders.wigerfelt@mah.se 2 SAGE Open similar popular parties in Europe (Borevi, 2013). The party is divided in attitudes toward Jews—that are primarily Muslims who are considered a danger for Sweden—but there are party members who openly declare anti-Jewish positions (Ravid, 2013). A series of high-profile incidents in and after 2008 placed Malmö on the national and international map as a place that was unsafe for people identified as Jews (see, for example, Sunday Telegraph, January 29, 2010). In the Swedish and international press, Malmö has been described as a city in which anti-Semitism flourishes; an anti-Semitism that is fueled by the Israel–Palestine conflict and which targets Swedish Jews as responsible for the actions taken by the state of Israel (see, for example, Aftonbladet [AB], August 14, 2014; Göteborgs Posten [GP], February 27, 2010; Skånska Dagbladet [SkD], January 25, 2010). In 2012, the situation in Malmö was considered so serious that Barack Obama sent his special envoy, Hannah Rosenthal, to gather more information about the situation there. Since 2010, the international Simon Wiesenthal Centre has been advising Jews not to travel to Malmö because their safety cannot be guaranteed due to the high risk of exposure to hate crime (SDS, October 1, 2012; SDS, March 8, 2013). The focus on Malmö can also be discerned in newspaper headlines, such as “USA’s envoy reaches hateful Malmö” (Kvällsposten [KvP], April 24, 2012) and “The eyes of the world are focused on Malmö” (SDS, February 27, 2012). Media exposure like this could have affected both the image of Jews’ exposure to hate crime and the Jewish experi- ence of such exposure. The media’s contributions are impor- tant when it comes to structuring the images and discourses that help people to interpret the world (Golding & Murdock, 2000; S. Hall, 1997). Based on a combined interview and media study, this article examines Jews’ experiences of vul- nerability and anti-Semitic hate crime in Malmö in a frame- work of how the media reports anti-Semitism of the city of Malmö as a special place for hate crime. The connection between the media’s news reporting and the experience of anti-Semitic harassment and hate crimes is, to our knowl- edge, not previously researched. We are aware that ethnic identity and positions are not always the most important aspects, but that dimensions such as gender, race, class, religion, and age can interact intersec- tionally in complex ways. We all have multiple identities. Identity is a positioning that is dependent on a specific con- text and can be chosen or forced (Börjesson & Palmblad, 2008; Chancer & Watkins, 2009; Hammarén & Johansson, 2009). As there are major differences among and between Jews, generalizing Jews as a group can be dangerous. Despite the difficulties associated with generalizations, we have cho- sen to use the identity position Jews in the text. This catego- rization could help to identify the vulnerability of specific groups, even though there is risk of stereotyped notions being reproduced (see Strömblad & Myrberg, 2015, for a discussion about the dilemmas of categorization). The primary aim of this article is to explore and exemplify what it is like to live with Jewish identity in Malmö within a framework of how the media reports anti-Semitism and how this group copes with being the potential target of anti- Semitic harassment and hate crime. In the study, this aim is broken down into three specific questions: •• How do people with Jewish identity experience their lives in Malmö? •• How is vulnerability dealt with in cases of obvious and potential hate crime? •• How is the media image of Malmö as a city that is especially prone to anti-Semitic hate crime? Listening to victims’ stories is vital and enables us to gain access to and understand openly manifested anti-Semitism as well as the more subtle expressions of prejudice and stereo- typing. Based on interviews with people with Jewish identity in Malmö, we analyze and discuss their experiences using different themes, such as violent and everyday anti-Semi- tism, the local impact of the Israel–Palestine conflict, how media images affect their lives, and how exposure and vul- nerability are dealt with. The findings are important in terms of both possible long-term measures against anti-Semitism and as immediate support for those targeted. Previous Research and the Theoretical Point of Departure In recent years, reports of anti-Semitic hate crimes against Jews and Jewish institutions have increased in Europe as a whole and range from the vandalism of Jewish burial grounds to murder (Iganski, 2013, Rich, 2014; Smith, 2012). In December 2013, the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) published the report titled Discrimination and Hate Crime Against Jews in EU Member States: Experiences and Perceptions of Anti-Semitism. Around 5,500 Jews in eight member states, of which Sweden was one, responded to an online survey about anti-Semitism and hate crime. The survey showed that many Jews had been exposed to anti-Semitism and hate crime in the examined countries. On average, 66% of the respondents regarded anti- Semitism as major problem. In Sweden, the figure was 60%. Eighty percent of the respondents in Sweden said that anti- Semitism had increased in recent years. Of those responding in Sweden, 22% said that they had personally been subjected to verbal or physical attacks in 2012, although 75% said that they had not reported this to the police because they did not think that it would lead anywhere (FRA, 2013). Some of the anti-Semitic incidents/hate crimes in Sweden are reported to the police, although the number of unrecorded cases is probably great. The Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention publishes annual statistics on the number of reported hate crimes,1 including those with an anti-Semitic by guest on March 30, 2016Downloaded from Wigerfelt and Wigerfelt 3 motive. The statistics show that more hate crimes were reported to the police in 2014 (270 cases) than in 2013 (190 cases; Brå, National Council for Crime Prevention, 2015). It is difficult to say anything definite about the intensity of anti- Semitism based on reports to the police and online surveys. The only thing that we can be sure about is that being Jewish in Sweden in 2015 is problematic, even though many regard Jews as part of the “white” establishment in Sweden (Nylund Skog, 2006). The influence of anti-Semitism on Swedish thinking and acting in a historical perspective is well documented in research (see, for example, Andersson, 2000; Bachner, 2009; Berggren, 1999; Carlsson, 2004; Tydén, 1986). Kvist Geverts (2008) uses the phrase “background noise” to explain that while most people condemned anti-Semitism in Germany, anti-Semitic notions were “normal” in society and were always present, like a constant murmur. However, Kvist Geverts’s metaphor has been criticized. Tydén (2010) claims that Kvist Geverts takes anti-Semitism for granted, and thus does not examine whether the different treatments of Jews can be due to various causes. Åmark (2011) explains that there was a change in the beginning of the 1930s toward polarization of views on anti-Semitism. For example, Swedish Nazis use vulgar anti-Semitic propaganda, while others previously involved in everyday anti-Semitism reacted by distancing themselves from the anti-Semitic speech. After the Second World War, anti-Semitism was regarded as something that belonged to the past. However, in many parts of the world, including Sweden, anti-Semitic hate speech and violence are again on the rise (Bergmann, 2008; MacShane, 2008; Salzborn, 2010). Studies report that Jewish communities continue to experience violence against people and their property—synagogues, cemeteries, businesses, and homes (Bunzl, 2005; Salzborn, 2010; Smith, 2012). The growth of new communication and transport technologies facilitates the dissemination of anti-Semitic ideas between different countries and leads to the creation of local and international anti-Semitic ideological networks (Judaken, 2008; Watts, 2001). Such tendencies are visible not only in the Middle East, where anti-Jewish sentiments are often linked to hostility toward Israel, but also in the West, where in the last decade incidents of anti-Semitic expression and violence have become more visible (Balogh, 2011; Bergmann, 2008; Cohen et al., 2009; Iganski, 2013; Iganski & Kosmin, 2003; Partington, 2012; Peace, 2009; Smith, 2012). The academic literature on anti-Semitic hate crime in Europe is extensive. Much of the literature argues that today’s anti-Semitic hate crimes are triggered by the con- flicts in the Middle East—often referred to as “new anti- Semitism” (e.g., Bacquet, 2009; Bunzl, 2005; Chesler, 2003; Forster & Epstein, 1974; FRA, 2013; Glazer, 2010; Iganski, 2013; Iganski & Kosmin, 2003; Levy, 1991; MacShane, 2008; Marrus et al., 2005; Rensmann & Schoeps, 2010; Silverstein, 2008; Smith, 2012; Taguieff, 2004). Many of these authors argue that a new wave or outbreak of hostility toward Jews in Europe began with the start of the second Palestinian intifada in September 2000 and is still making its presence felt. This “new anti-Semitism” manifests itself as hostility toward the state of Israel, which implies that there is a parity between individual Jews and the state of Israel (Cohen et al., 2009; Fine, 2009; Glazer, 2010; Judaken, 2008; Klug, 2003).2 Several researchers claim that if the “old” anti-Semitism mainly had been advocated by the extreme right, the new wave of anti-Semitism was spread partly by the left (see, for example, Ulrich, 2013; Wistrich, 2010). This also applies to Sweden according to Bachner (2000), who contends that it was certainly only extreme right groups who stood for open anti-Semitism, but from the 1960s variations of anti-Semitism have also been expressed by some left groups. Some scholars emphasize that anti-Semitism stems from prejudices, ideologies, and conspiracy theories portraying Jews as powerful, cunning, and dangerous (e.g., Bergmann, 2008; Bilewicz & Krzeminski, 2010; Byford, 2003; Kersten & Hankel, 2013; Rensmann & Schoeps, 2010; Rudling, 2006). Much of this literature argues that understanding the causes of anti-Semitic hate crime also means recognizing the conspiratorial and mythical nature of the anti-Semitic ideol- ogy. As Bergmann (2008) notes, the core feature of anti- Semitic conspiracy theory and prejudice is that Jews are regarded as the embodiment of supranational modern phe- nomena, such as international financial markets, commu- nism, and liberal values. Accordingly, their rapid social advancement in most European societies is interpreted as confirmation that Jews secretly dominate the economic and political world (Byford, 2003). According to these studies, the causes and persistence of anti-Semitic hate crimes in Europe cannot be understood if the mythical and conspirato- rial nature of anti-Semitic ideologies is not accounted for. In line with scholars like Bachner and Ring (2005), we argue that traditional anti-Jewish thinking has contributed to the intensification of anti-Semitism in Europe, which is explained by its deep historical and cultural roots. However, latent anti-Semitism is fanned into life by external events and developments and the reactions they trigger (Bachner & Ring, 2005; see also Klug, 2003). Similarly, Iganski (2008) argues that the Israel–Palestine conflict sometimes serves as a catalyst for the venting of prejudices that for many people are simmering below the surface. The literature on anti-Semitism in Sweden today tends to view anti-Semitism as something that is mainly manifested among Muslims (Bevelander & Hjerm, 2015; Tossavainen, 2005). However, Bachner (2014) warns against reducing anti-Semitism to a “Muslim problem” and thinks that anti- Semitism should be understood as a wider social problem. This is also one of our points of departure. What a victim perceives as anti-Semitic harassment is not always regarded as a crime from a legal point of view, by guest on March 30, 2016Downloaded from 4 SAGE Open although this does not negate the victim’s lived experience of the event. Even though the media often highlights and focuses on violent hate crime, many victims say that it is not the violence that is “psychologically worst” but rather the everyday “low-level” nature of the crimes (McClintock, 2005). Studies, such as that conducted by Iganski (2008) on the different categories of people exposed to hate crime, show that such crimes are often committed as part of the nor- mal everyday routine. If harassment is part of everyday “nor- mality,” it is less likely to be reported to the police and becomes part of the victim’s everyday life (see also Wang, 2002). This so-called “everyday anti-Semitism” has been underexplored so far. The modes of oppression are in some ways similar to what is called “everyday sexism” (Bates, 2014). From a legal point of view, anti-Semitic hate crime and hate crime in general are often regarded as well-defined and separate events, although according to Bowling (1999) they should be seen as part of a continuous chain. Hate crime is generally based on prejudice, and it is difficult to say where a hate crime starts and stops. It is rather an ongoing process with a cumulative effect; a dynamic process that develops over time in a specific social, political, and historic context (Bowling, 1999). Iganski, Kielinger, and Paterson (2005) maintain that like hate crime in general, anti-Semitic inci- dents do not occur in a vacuum but take place in a cultural context in which prejudice and violence are used as social resources. Many scholars claim that hate crime is worse than many other crimes because it signals that the group to which the victim belongs should “know its place” and that compared with other categories many hate crime victims suffer from long-term psychological problems such as fear, depression, anxiety, panic attacks, a loss of self-confidence, and sleep- lessness (Ehrlich, Larcom, & Purvis, 1994; N. Hall, 2005; Herek, Cogan, & Gillis, 2002; Iganski, 2008). McDevitt, Balboni, Garcia, and Gu (2003) mean that the consequences of hate crime are different from those of other crimes, in that the victims are replaceable, that is, anyone in the targeted group could be a victim. In addition, it is not only the victim who experiences problems later on but also the group to which the victim belongs or is seen to belong. Some victims of hate crime are afraid of being targeted again because they belong to a certain group (Boeckmann & Turpin-Petrosino, 2002). According to Craig (2002), hate crime is a unique form of aggression that prevents targeted individuals and groups living a “free” life. Potential victims experience that they need to be careful and perhaps even conceal their iden- tity, which restricts their movements and lives. As one study on anti-Semitism in Sweden (Nylund Skog, 2006) shows, hiding one’s Jewish identity by concealing symbols like the Star of David and the kippah is common. The fear of being exposed to hate crime due to group affinity can also be strengthened by the media’s descriptions. The extent to which different target groups are portrayed in the media depends on a number of factors. Some groups have stronger voices than others, and can therefore be regarded as more exposed. It is therefore difficult to determine which groups are most vulnerable to hate crime as a result of media reporting. The media in turn can influence opinion by setting the agenda for which type of hate crime is featured (Strömbäck, 2009). According to Munro (2014), the media plays an important role in this process, in that it can choose which hate crime victims to report on and which to ignore. Our knowledge about hate crime is often limited to what we read in the newspapers or watch on TV, which can give us the impression that hate crime victims are exposed to extreme violence. Drama sells and the media often focuses on the most extreme cases. Behind the reported incidents of extreme violence are thousands of other, more everyday, incidents that do not make the news (see, for example, Tiby, 2010). Serious crimes are often overrepresented in the media, and the reporting of crime can reinforce the fear of being exposed (Chermak, 1998; Gunter, 1987; Reiner, Livingstone, & Allen, 2000). According to Haavisto and Petersson (2013), although our attitudes may not change as a result of a newspaper arti- cle or blog spot, if a way of thinking or perspective is repeated and hammered year after year from many different directions it can affect our self-image and understanding of the world. Research (see, for example, Demker, 2014; Sandberg & Demker, 2014) indicates that there may be a connection between how people experience a concern, for example, anti- Semitism, and how often the media highlights the different events linked to it. There could thus be a connection between the extent of the media coverage of hate crime incidents in Malmö and Jewish people’s concern about being targeted. This connection is one of the issues that we examine in this study. We use aspects of agenda-setting theory to analyze the media’s representations of anti-Semitic hate crime in Malmö. Agenda-setting theory is about which social issues are given most attention in the media. The first level concerns which objects—factual matters, organizations, and people—are high on the media’s agenda. The second level concerns how the media reports certain issues and how the general public understands them. This shifts the focus to how prominent the different attributes are on different agendas. By attributes, we mean the qualities and characteristics that are associated with various objects (Strömbäck, 2009). Hate crime as an object has attracted considerable interest and been high on the media’s agenda in recent years, with Malmö being espe- cially highlighted as a city in which anti-Semitic hate crime has escalated. A number of incidents, which we call here key incidents, have put Malmö on the map both nationally and internationally. What is known as priming is found at the sec- ond level of agenda-setting theory and concerns the interplay between the media content and a person’s cognitive state (Strömbäck, 2009). The mind can be seen as an associative network consisting of different nodes and links that connect by guest on March 30, 2016Downloaded from Wigerfelt and Wigerfelt 5 the nodes to each other, as per the associative network model (Fiske & Taylor, 1991). The links between the different nodes are both cognitive and affective, and relate to which objects are associated with each other and how a person feels about the links (Strömbäck, 2009). The object Malmö acts as a node, which for many people is connected with the nodes of anti-Semitism and hate crime. The more often we hear about Malmö and anti-Semitic hate crime, the more likely we are to connect Malmö with this. Materials and Method This article is mostly based on in-depth interviews conducted within the project titled “Hate Crime—A Challenge to Democracy.” This is a multidisciplinary study on hate crime in Skåne that focuses on the causes, consequences, and sup- port initiatives, and is financed by the Swedish Research Council and the Swedish Crime Victim Compensation Support Authority. The project studies groups that are often exposed to crime, such as Jews, Muslims, Afroswedes, Roma/Travelers, and the LGBT community, and this article is based on one of the project’s substudies. As our primary aim in this article is to examine how peo- ple who identify themselves as Jews in Malmö experience and deal with anti-Semitic hate crime in a framework of media reporting of anti-Semitism, we have interviewed peo- ple with some connection to the Jewish community in Malmö. All the interviews were semistructured, concentrated on a number of fairly wide themes, were tape-recorded, and later transcribed. An important intention with the interviews has been to try to capture the informants’ own meaning mak- ing, that is, how they describe their own and others’ experi- ences of violation and hate crime. To formulate the relevant research questions, we first presented our project at a meet- ing (March 15, 2012) of the Jewish community in Malmö in connection with a discussion about the subject of hate crime. On that occasion, we were able to listen to different people’s experiences of anti-Semitic hate crime. We also met with a Jewish cultural association (June 19, 2014). After a few introductory interviews, the authors made contact with other informants via the snowball method (Bryman, 2008). As this method builds on other people’s social contacts, the infor- mants are not representative of the group in a statistical sense (Bryman, 2008). The people we choose to interview all had experiences of anti-Semitism. In one case, we contacted a woman we had identified through the media. It should be pointed out that very few people are convicted of hate crimes, which makes it very difficult to contact informants who have been officially recognized as hate crime victims. However, despite the lack of convictions, we know that the number of people affected by hate crime and similar incidents is great. For this reason, we have been both broad and explorative in our projections. In this substudy, a total number of 11 people between the ages of 16 and 67—seven women and four men—were interviewed separately and are presented here with fictitious names. All the informants identify themselves as Jewish and are proud of it. All except one of the informants are well established in Swedish society and were also born in Sweden. They can thus be said to have a high social, economic, and cultural capital. As the study does not include all Jewish indi- viduals and groups in Malmö, the findings cannot be gener- alized, although they can contribute to a deeper understanding of the vulnerability that many experience. We stopped col- lecting data when we considered that a “saturation” point had been reached and when the results of the themes raised in the interviews began to show similarities with each other (Bryman, 2008). In the article, we have chosen to allow many of the informants to speak for themselves by making use of short, yet representative quotations from the con- ducted interviews. We have also used longer narratives to illustrate our conclusions and thereby create a better under- standing of the problems. Miller (2000) maintains that in studies based on life stories or biographical research, narra- tive interviews are more oriented toward eliciting the infor- mants’ perspectives than objective facts. To a great extent, the interviewer is part of the process, in that he or she is included in the construction of the informant’s story. All the interviews were conducted in Swedish, and the individual interviews lasted between 1 and 2 hr. The infor- mants were told about the purpose of the study and that par- ticipation was voluntary. Anonymity was also guaranteed. We have made minor revisions to the language used when translating from Swedish to English but have tried to stay as close as possible to the original wording. Data were col- lected, and analyses were conducted throughout the research process. The interview guide was frequently revised to suit the varying circumstances, in that questions were added and some were omitted. The analysis began by listening to the taped interviews and reading the transcriptions and docu- mentation. The interviews were then coded according to the central themes that had been identified. Comparisons were made between the researchers’ interpretations and the coding revised accordingly. Theoretical concepts were then applied to analyze the interpretations. This led to new questions, which were addressed by returning to the empirical mate- rial—an abductive process (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 1994) that was enhanced by alternating between the theory and the empirical material. Attacks on Jewish buildings and individuals, for example, the rabbi, are things that affect Jews as a group (see, for example, Boeckmann & Turpin-Petrosino, 2002, on how hate crime spreads fear). The image of Malmö as an anti- Semitic bastion emerged at the end of 2008/beginning of 2009 and can be linked to the conflict between Israel and Palestine. In the interviews, the informants often referred to incidents that had been reported in the media, and that these events and the media coverage of these events have affected their experience of vulnerability, which led us to conduct a media survey and content analysis of a qualitative and by guest on March 30, 2016Downloaded from 6 SAGE Open interpretive nature. We searched a variety of databases for Swedish newspaper articles on anti-Semitism and hate crime published between January 2009 and September 2015. This search yielded 126 articles from a total of 31 different Swedish daily newspapers at both the local and national lev- els. The reporting mainly focused on news events but also included in-depth interviews with Jews who in various ways have been exposed to hate crime and contributed to debates. In our analysis of the material, the main focus has been on how the connection between the city of Malmö and anti- Semitism is construed in the media. We began the investiga- tion by sorting the material chronologically, which enabled us to follow the media’s portrayal of anti-Semitic hate crime over time. We then tried to identify important key incidents, that is, events that took place in Malmö and attracted wide media coverage. It became apparent that these incidents had also been reproduced intertextually in different newspapers and in some cases also internationally. It also became clear that different key incidents were reproduced over time. When a new incident that could be linked to anti-Semitism occurred in Malmö, the media connected it with earlier incidents, which added to the image of a town in which anti-Semitism was strong. Finally, we analyzed and interpreted the media material in relation to the interviews. Results and Analysis An Increased Vulnerability and Vigilance Independently of each other, most of the informants describe and share the experience that the situation for Jews has wors- ened in recent years. John, now in his late 60s, was born and bred in Malmö, and remembers how people were very quick to respond to anti-Semitic demonstrations when he was growing up: “It simply wasn’t tolerated by society” (John, December 5, 2012). Susan, a woman in her mid-50s who has lived in Malmö all her adult life, agrees with this and says that the situation for Jews in Malmö has become much worse over the last couple of years and that nowadays anti-Semitism is much more tangible and visible (Susan, April 18, 2012). Today, the limits have been stretched, and the general level of acceptance of abusive language is much greater. The view of hate crime is related to the use of language—the dis- course—that is accepted at any given point in time (Cowan, Resendez, Marshall, & Quist, 2002). According to several of our informants, the acceptance of verbal anti-Semitic harass- ment now seems to be greater than ever before. In addition, several of the informants say that anti-Semitic feelings have grown not only in neo-Nazi circles but also in minority groups from the Middle East (John, December 5, 2012). The younger informants are not sure whether the targeting of Jews has increased in recent years, but say that awareness of the problem and watchfulness has increased. For example, Sara says, “My awareness has increased and I am now much, much more vigilant in town” (May 30, 2012). The Internet is an important source of information for those wanting to remain informed and updated about hate crime. On the more negative side, social forums on the Internet are a haven for the spread of hatred (Wigerfelt, Wigerfelt, & Dahlstrand, 2015). All the younger informants are extra vigilant when surfing the net because they never know when they might come across an anti-Semitic website or be unexpectedly exposed to anti-Semitic propaganda. They all share the expe- rience of being at the receiving end of offensive comments in social forums or being threatened, including death threats, on social media sites such as Facebook, via email or text mes- sages (Adam, May 30, 2012; Anna, May 30, 2012; Christopher, June 12, 2012). Several of the informants describe incidents that have occurred in connection with two children’s camps at a Jewish conference center located outside Malmö. On the first occa- sion, in 2008, a small group of young people suddenly appeared shouting abusive insults but disappeared when the police arrived on the scene (Susan, April 18, 2012). Two years later, in 2010, a group of about 15 young people appeared on the first evening of the camp shouting “Jewish pigs,” “Kill all Jews,” and “Heil Hitler” outside the center. On the following evening, the youth, aged around 14 to 15, reappeared, and this time kicked down the fence, behaved in a threatening manner, and threw eggs and glass bottles at the building. The incident came as a shock to those present and, according to one of the informants, the younger children cried and were afraid (Filip, May 30, 2012). The perpetrators on these occasions were local youth with “Swedish” back- grounds, and the motives for the attacks seem to have been anti-Semitism in connection primarily to prejudices as well as conspiracy theories. The local school arranged a meeting with the assailants’ parents and measures were taken (John, December 5, 2012). The quick reaction to the incident is something that several of the informants regard as very posi- tive and worthy of imitation (Susan, April 18, 2012; John, December 5, 2012). The area in which the conference center is located is one of the most prosperous in southern Sweden. Although very few inhabitants are born outside Sweden, the area has had problems for several years with explicit racism. In other words, anti-Semitism is not just a phenomenon that can be linked to segregation, outsiderhood, and the conflict between Israel and Palestine. Its manifestations and extent differ at different times and in diverse places. Everyday Anti-Semitism According to Bachner (2000), the term anti-Semitism has become “overcharged” and often implies an intensive, open, and action-oriented hate, as described above. However, the connection between Nazism has resulted in a partial blind- ness to other kinds of anti-Semitism, such as culturally deter- mined prejudices and inherited negative attitudes. In a similar way, Iganski (2008) argues that many hate crime incidents by guest on March 30, 2016Downloaded from Wigerfelt and Wigerfelt 7 have nothing to do with people’s violent hate, but rather indi- cate a kind of latent anti-Semitism that in many people sim- mers below the surface. Anti-Semitism surfaces at random and can be triggered by a conflict or everyday irritation in the encounter with a Jewish person. At a more everyday and subtle level, general anti-Semitic prejudices seem to have been passed down through the gen- erations and have spread to other circles. This anti-Semitic prejudice can erupt in different situations, sometimes from friends, neighbors, school- and workmates, which many of the younger informants have experience of. Jokes and ironic remarks about Jews are common phenomena for those we talked to, are part of the respondent’s everyday life, and something that is almost seen as “unavoidable.” As they are impossible to predict, people are forced to be constantly on guard. Our informants found it increasingly difficult to accept jokes about Jews, partly because they felt more vul- nerable now and partly because the jokes reproduced old, classic, anti-Semitic stereotypes about Jews. The younger informants told us that it can start with someone telling a joke about Jews, which then escalates to people openly expressing a menacing anti-Semitism, which can be seen as an interrelated process. As the Jewish group in Malmö is small, Jewish youth are more vulnerable in certain situations. There is a power aspect to this, where the number of Jews in relation to other groups is significant. According to Ben, being a single Jew in a pub- lic place can feel particularly vulnerable, even though many regard Jews as part of “white Sweden”: “There are so few Jews in Malmö that people can shout whatever they want” (Ben, May 30, 2012). Sara gave an example of meetings in which she had been verbally attacked because she was Jewish and where the aggression had spread to other people: “If they are supported by 3-4 people I cannot defend myself at all. I am outnumbered when I am alone. If I am not with my Jewish friends then I am alone” (Sara, May 30, 2012). The fact that the Jewish presence in Malmö is small and appears to continue to diminish contributes to a vicious circle, where young people who want to live a richer Jewish life move to Stockholm or Gothenburg because the Jewish communities are much larger there and it is possible to “keep the traditions alive.” The Jewish community thus continues to diminish, and those who remain can experience themselves as part of a diminishing minority and therefore more vulnerable. Jewish Identity and Spatial Limitations Our informants said that as Jews in Malmö they were forced to reflect on where and in which situation their Jewish iden- tity could or could not be exposed. Some of the informants thought that they could choose their Jewish identity, whereas others, like John, said that they looked like Jews on the out- side: “Nobody could have failed to notice that I am a Jew” (John, December 5, 2012; see also Börjesson & Palmblad, 2008). An obvious Jewish symbol that is very uncommon in Malmö is the headwear known as the kippah, which can be seen as a mark of identification. The interviewees experi- enced this as a “stigma symbol” (Goffman, 1963/2007). Other important “stigma symbols” include Jewish jewelry/ necklaces that many are careful about wearing openly in dif- ferent situations: I usually wear a necklace bearing my Hebrew name. I always wear it, but if I’m in Lund [an academic city close to Malmö] it doesn’t matter where I have it. It’s always there. But if I go out on an evening in Malmö I usually take it off. I put it in my pocket. And if we are in Malmö on a weekday afternoon or evening I always check where it is. If it is in front I turn it round. (Sara, May 30, 2012) According to Craig (2002), targeted individuals/groups are prevented from living a “free” life. Potential victims feel that they have to be careful and, if possible, conceal their identity, which restricts their lives. Although Andrea (June 21, 2012) has not personally been exposed to harassment as a result of her Jewish identity, she has heard a lot about it from friends and relatives. These narratives have made her much more cautious: “I don’t tell everyone that I’m a Jew because I don’t want to be a target myself.” Christopher is also cautious about revealing his Jewish identity: “I don’t hide my identity but I don’t tell everyone that I’m a Jew. You have to be careful who you talk to” (Christopher, June 21, 2012). The spatial consequences of hate crime can be that vul- nerable groups create mental maps of a town and where it is safe, which affects the everyday situation (Iganski & Lagou, 2009). It is clear that the informants are very conscious of spatial limitations. The majority of hate crime takes place around the synagogue and assembly hall in Malmö—places where attacks have occurred and where safety measures are in place. These are places of symbolic significance and where hate crime is clearly against Jews as a group. The like- lihood of being exposed to hate crime here is greater than anywhere else. The Jewish community’s rabbi, Shneur Kesselman, is the most vulnerable and is regularly subjected to abuse, insults, and gestures from passers-by and people driving past in cars. Most of the reported anti-Semitic hate crimes are directed against him. But other members of the community also know that they need to be vigilant on their way to or from the synagogue, because the likelihood of being attacked is greatest there. The Israeli–Palestinian Conflict, Its Local Imprints, and Media Images There was a significant increase in the reporting of hate crime against Jews in the Swedish media, with a special focus on Malmö, at the end of 2008/beginning of 2009, which was largely associated with the conflict between Israel by guest on March 30, 2016Downloaded from 8 SAGE Open and Palestine. An attribute that was ascribed to Malmö was that hate crime was increasing. This was reflected in newspa- per headlines such as “Jewish hatred is rampant in Malmö” (SDS, February 7, 2009) or “Jewish hatred drives them away from Malmö” (SkD, December 12, 2012). In 2008/2009, the conflict in Gaza escalated due to the Israeli military operation known as Cast Lead. In Sweden, Jews began to feel threatened. The Council of Swedish Jewish Communities wrote to the Swedish Government to ask for help in stopping an increasing threat toward Jews in Sweden. The background to the letter was that threats, violent actions, and arson attacks had been directed at Jews and Jewish insti- tutions (Dagen, February 4, 2009). The worsening situation on the Gaza Strip had local imprints. In Malmö, a Jewish net- work/association organized a demonstration demanding Israel’s right to exist, which ended in chaos with demonstra- tors being pelted with stones and eggs. Some of the demon- strators were reported to have shouted “fucking Jews” and “Heil Hitler.” The police were unable to guarantee safety and security, and many people, including Jews, sought shelter in the streets and alleys adjoining the square (Dagen, February 4, 2009). This incident—an important key incident in the media images of Malmö as a city especially characterized by anti-Semitic hate crime—was reported in both the national and international media. In the weeks and months following this turbulent demonstration, Jews experienced an escalation in the number of harassments. In an interview, a spokesperson from the Jewish community described the incident as a kind of collective trauma for its members, and perhaps also for the inhabitants of Malmö (SkD, January 27, 2010). In March 2009, shortly after Cast Lead and the demon- stration described above, the city of Malmö hosted a Davis Cup tennis match between Sweden and Israel. Due to the turbulent nature of the demonstration, the increase in reported anti-Semitic hate crimes and lobbying by anti-Israel groups, the police decided that the match should be played privately and not be open to the public. This decision resulted in a polarized and heated debate, both nationally and internation- ally. For example, the Israeli media accused Sweden, and specifically Malmö, of anti-Semitism (Nordvästra Skånes Tidningar [NST], December 7, 2012). This can also be seen as yet another so-called key incident that recurs in both the informants’ narratives and media reports. Without exception, the informants living in Malmö stress that they all are affected by the Israel–Palestine conflict but that over the years they have developed strategies to cope with it. They emphasize the importance of being informed about what is happening in Israel and do this by reading daily updates on the Internet, accessing information via Facebook, from friends living in Israel, and so on. All our informants in Malmö experi- ence a clear connection between increased anti-Semitic harass- ment and open conflicts between Israelis and Palestinians. They feel themselves to be held collectively accountable for the events in the Middle East. Sara said that she and other Jews were held responsible for what happened in Israel: When anything happens people don’t distinguish between Israel and us. The conclusion is that Israel plus Jews equals one. But it isn’t. I can’t be held responsible for a whole country’s actions. I have to stand up for my own actions. (May 30, 2012) Over the years, Susan has learned that certain subjects are charged and no longer gets involved in discussions about, for example, circumcision, or the Israel–Palestine conflict, at her place of work. The discomfort increases when the situation in Israel heats up: What I have come up against and is very unpleasant is at work when something happens in Israel. It’s discussed at work and it feels as though I have to shoulder the blame for everything that happens there. I make a hasty retreat. I’ve learned not to get involved in such discussions. (Susan, April 18, 2012) Petra said something similar in another interview: You are singled out as guilty. “Why are YOU firing missiles?” And then you hear on the radio that of course they don’t like Jews here in Sweden because they murder their families in the Middle East. I get so very angry. What have we, I am 16 years old, done? Have I shot someone there? They see us as a group and mix it up with the state of Israel. They don’t see us as individuals. (June 21, 2012) Ben thought that it was people from different backgrounds who hurled insults, although in the main it was people from the Middle East: At school there are also Swedes (who insult us), but in the main it’s people from the Middle East. It’s not just Palestinians, but others too. Some may have friends who are Palestinians. (May 30, 2012) Students with a Middle Eastern background attend many of Malmö’s schools. Some informants told us that their children have been exposed to hate crime incidents initiated by some of these students. As a result, many Jewish families have chosen to send their children to schools where there seems to be less risk of them being targeted. Jewish teachers also talked about their vulnerability in school, which in some cases has led to teachers leaving the profession due to harassment and threats. Anti-Semitism and Segregation According to Bachner and Ring (2005), the anti-Semitism that is evident in certain Muslim groups in Europe is sus- tained by the Israel–Palestine conflict but is probably also fueled by the social and economic marginalization and outsi- derhood that characterizes many of the migrant groups in Europe (see also Bergmann & Wetzel, 2003; Taguieff, 2004). Several of the informants point to the city’s increased segre- gation as an explanation for why Jews feel more exposed in Malmö than in other parts of the country (John, December 5, 2012; Petur, July 19, 2014). Susan reasons in a similar way by guest on March 30, 2016Downloaded from Wigerfelt and Wigerfelt 9 and thinks that the most important factor for Malmö in com- bating anti-Semitism is to invest in a good integration policy. In this, she points to the major schisms in the city, where many people are unemployed and live in socially vulnerable areas (April 18, 2012). Sophia is a Jewish woman in her late 30s. She lives in Malmö but was born and brought up in a small village out- side the city. For several years, and especially in connection with the intensification of the conflict between Israel and Palestine, she has been repeatedly harassed; an experience that began when she moved to Malmö. For more than a decade, she has lived in a segregated area that is populated by a large number of people from different parts of the Middle East, where it is well known that she and her friend have a Jewish background. She has experienced harassment in her everyday life. For her, taking the dog out for a walk and going to the supermarket are everyday situations in which she is constantly exposed to physical and verbal harassment. Both the woman with whom I share a flat and I have had stones thrown at our heads. My friend even had a mug of urine thrown over her from an upstairs balcony. . . . I have been called a “fucking Jew,” a “Jewish whore” and a “Jewish cunt.” (Sophia, May 28, 2013) One experience that was particularly painful and upset- ting for Sophia was a late-night burglary in her home. When she realized that the things that were missing were sacred Jewish artifacts of great sentimental value, she connected the theft with anti-Semitism. Attacks like these have affected both women’s health—especially psychologically—and restricted their movements, to the extent that they are now afraid to leave their home and mix with other people. The effects of hate crime go beyond the immediate vic- tim. Others in the same group who hear or read about the hate crime can react angrily and/or with fear (see, for example, Boeckmann & Turpin-Petrosino, 2002; Craig, 2002; Craig- Henderson, 2009; Wachtel, 1999). Several of our informants said that they felt vulnerable as Jews even when something happened in other places: When something happens that is directed at Jews in other places the tension increases, because the threat is always there. We are always vigilant and this affects us a lot, especially when the threat is real. We can’t “keep looking over our shoulder” but have to try to live a normal everyday life. (Judith, March 22, 2012) The Media Images of an “Anti-Semitic City” The Jewish community’s rabbi became something of an “offi- cial face” and “object” for the anti-Semitism manifested in Malmö. Rabbi Shneur Kesselman, clearly identifiable as a Jew with his black clothes and long beard, has talked about his vulnerability in Malmö in several newspaper interviews. Kesselman’s appearance singles him out as especially exposed. He describes being spat at on the street, having soft drink cans thrown at him while walking through the streets and almost being run over by a passing car. The rabbi usually reports most of the hate crime incidents he is involved in to the police. As yet, none of the reported incidents have led to any legal action being taken (Dagen, February 4, 2009; Dagens Nyheter [DN], November 7, 2011; KvP, March 5, 2010; KvP, October 28, 2011; KvP, April 24, 2012; SDS, February 7, 2009; SDS, July 17, 2011). What about our rabbi? He looks like a Jew. He walks around town and is harassed, spat at or whatever. But imagine if we’d all looked like him! Would we be able to live here at all? I don’t understand it. He hasn’t even done anything. He’s not even from Israel. He’s from the USA. (Petra, June 21, 2012) Ilmar Reepalu, the former mayor of Malmö, who has received a lot of negative attention in the debate on anti-Semi- tism and has been accused of anti-Semitic rhetoric in his public utterances about Jews living in the city, can also be seen as an “object” with negative attributes in the media descriptions of Malmö as an anti-Semitic city. For example, Reepalu has said that Jews in Malmö ought to distance themselves from Israel’s actions. This has been criticized and discussed in the media by politicians and other actors. Reepalu has thus become an offi- cial representative of Malmö, and his utterances have contrib- uted to headlines such as “Hate of Jews is greatest in Malmö” (Tidningarnas Telegrambyrå [TT], January 29, 2010). Reepalu’s statements have also been strongly criticized in the local press (SDS, September 29, 2012), as exemplified by the headline: “Reepalu is the Problem” (SDS, September 30, 2012). Reepalu’s statements have been reproduced and dis- cussed in several newspaper debate articles and have been taken up in contexts in which Malmö is described as a city characterized by anti-Semitism. Reepalu has come to personify the critique that government agencies and politicians do not do enough to combat and stand up to anti-Semitism. A consequence of the key incidents described above and one’s own and others’ experiences of harassment is that many Jewish families have moved away from Malmö. According to both the media and our interviews, it is clear that some Jewish families have decided to leave Malmö in the hope of finding a better life elsewhere. Some families have even talked openly to the press about why they want to move. In one newspaper article, a family was interviewed about why they wanted to move from Malmö to Israel. The main reason that was given was an increasing anti-Semitism. “My children are not safe here. It will only get worse,” said the man in the family. Some of his relatives have lived in Malmö since the beginning of the 1800s, while others who had survived the extermination camps came in 1945. The man said that people had shouted “fucking Jew” at him, and he had witnessed how his friend had been seriously violated and threatened. He said that if someone shouts “Kill the by guest on March 30, 2016Downloaded from 10 SAGE Open Jews,” it also affects him and pierces his heart. The man did not know of anyone who dared to wear visible signs of Judaism, such as the Star of David or the kippah. He was critical of those in power in Malmö, and thought that they did not openly distance themselves from anti-Semitism (SkD, January 25, 2010). In an interview, one of the informants said that it was not only anti-Semitic hate crime that made fami- lies leave Malmö but also dissatisfaction with politicians who did not take the problem seriously. If they had, the fami- lies might have stayed (Eva, September 25, 2012). In 2014, the conflict between Israel and Palestine flared up yet again in Gaza, which in Malmö meant that anti-Semi- tism was refueled and used by certain individuals to activate hostility toward Jews and Jewish symbols/buildings. Windows were smashed in the synagogue, and at one point five people shouting anti-Semitic slogans tried to force their way into the Jewish assembly hall next to the synagogue (SDS, August 3, 2014). The rabbi was attacked twice in the same day. On the first occasion, a bottle was thrown at him and on the second a cigarette lighter. A man shouted “Jewish pig” and other derogatory words at the rabbi (SDS, August 5, 2014). Final Discussion The reporting of anti-Semitic hate crime has increased in Europe as a whole in recent years. This anti-Semitic current has also affected Sweden, where the city of Malmö has been highlighted by the media and by the Simon Wiesenthal Centre as a dangerous city for people with a Jewish identity. Our examination of the Swedish media’s reporting of anti- Semitic hate crime incidents shows that in recent years the focus on Malmö and some of the key incidents that have taken place there has increased. An attribute that is ascribed to anti-Semitic hate crime in Malmö is the city’s unique posi- tion in Sweden. Objects like anti-Semitism, hate crime, and Malmö’s politicians serve as nodes that are interconnected with other nodes and key incidents. The links between the different nodes are both cognitive and affective, in that they deal with which objects are associated with and how one feels about the links. In short, the more the media reports on Malmö and anti-Semitic hate crime, the more likely we are to connect the city with this. Also, the more often certain objects or attributes are highlighted in the media, the more often these objects are activated and attributed in our minds (prim- ing) and the more likely we are to think about these particular objects or attributes. The events described above have been intertextually repeated in other parts of Sweden’s media and have contrib- uted to a view of Malmö as the bastion of anti-Semitism; a stigmatization that the city finds difficult to shake off. This has also had international repercussions. The effect of this could be that anti-Semitic incidents in other places are ignored. The fear that is spread by the media is reinforced and accumulated by the so-called key incidents that many of the informants themselves, or their friends and relatives, have been exposed to. The key incidents that are particularly highlighted are harassment and threats in connection with demonstrations; for example, Jews being chased on the street, hate crimes committed against the rabbi, attacks on youth camps, and teachers and children with a Jewish iden- tity being harassed at school—events that are distressing and confirm increased vulnerability. There is great disappoint- ment among the informants that politicians and government agencies do not intervene forcefully enough. The majority of the informants think that they have been collectively blamed for the situation in the Middle East, to the extent that has become more difficult to be a “visible” Jew in Malmö. This is most obvious in the case of the rabbi in Malmö, but in Sophia’s story it is also clear that she and her friend are singled out as Jews in their neighborhood. The stories also show that Jews in other cities are forced to adjust to a kind of latent threat that tends to increase when the conflict between Israel and Palestine escalates. Some of the informants connect the perpetrators of hate crime with young men from the Middle East who mainly act when the conflict between Israel and Palestine is at its most acute. The presence of large population groups from the Middle East in relation to the small Jewish minority can lead to feelings of insecurity. Many point out that Malmö is a socially vulnerable and segregated city, and that it is also relatively compact, where encounters between people take place in a more direct way than in larger cities, for exam- ple, Stockholm, with its large geographic spread and suburbs some distance from the center. However, the informants’ stories also reveal a more com- plex picture of who the perpetrators are. One example of this is the prosperous area outside Malmö where Jewish children and young people are confronted by extreme right-wing Nazi slogans from local young people. The stories about anti- Semitic prejudices and stereotypes of friends, neighbors, and colleagues who are Jews indicate another, more widespread, abuse. For several of the informants, everyday anti-Semitism is very distressing. Iganski (2008) argues that most anti-Jew- ish incidents are what are sometimes called commonplace incidents—a kind of latent anti-Semitism that becomes man- ifest when the opportunity to ventilate prejudices presents itself and is triggered by simple schisms. It is often difficult to judge when an anti-Semitic hate crime starts and ends, because it is an ongoing process with a cumulative effect (Bowling, 1999). The situation of Jews in Malmö has changed, and many experience that openly revealing their Jewish affinity is prob- lematic due to the latent threats. Jewish symbols are often spontaneously hidden and, even if one has not been person- ally affected, there is concern and deliberation about where and when one’s Jewish identity can be revealed. The syna- gogue, the Jewish community’s premises, and the Jewish cemetery are obvious material symbols for the Jewish group and are targets for hate crime attacks. As a Jew, one is forced to be extra careful around these areas and be constantly on by guest on March 30, 2016Downloaded from Wigerfelt and Wigerfelt 11 guard. The consequences for the individual can be very seri- ous. Restrictions in how one lives one’s life also affect the entire group (Iganski, 2008; McDevitt, Balboni, Garcia, & Gu, 2003). When someone is affected by hate crime incidents, the entire Jewish group is affected. Anti-Semitic acts can also be described as “message crimes,” in that they announce to the victim’s group that they can also become targets (Lawrence, 2003). Doubts as to whether society can protect and support these members and the feeling of abandonment are some of the reasons as to why hate crime is seen as worse than crimes that are not motivated by hate crime (see also Tiby, 2009). It is therefore very important that hate crime is explicitly condemned by leading politicians and government agencies, and that special measures are introduced. Declaration of Conflicting Interests The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article. Funding The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: The Swedish Research Council and the Swedish Crime Victim Compensaton Support Authority. Notes 1. Swedish legislation relating to hate crime and stiffer penalties is based on the motives of the perpetrator in a criminal action. 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Internet www.malmo.se, February 19, 2014 www.jfm.se, May 15, 2014 www.judiskacentralradet.se Newspaper AB, Aftonbladet: August 14, 2014 Dagen: February 4, 2009 DN, Dagens Nyheter: November 7, 2011; August 3, 2014 GP, Göteborgs Posten: February 27, 2010 KvP, Kvällsposten: March 5, 2010; October 28, 2011; April 24, 2012 NST, Nordvästra Skånes Tidningar: December 7, 2012 by guest on March 30, 2016Downloaded from www.malmo.se www.jfm.se www.judiskacentralradet.se 14 SAGE Open SDS, Sydsvenska Dagbladet: February 7, 2009; July 17, 2011; September 29, 2012; October 1, 2012; October 20, 2012; February 11, 2013; February 13, 2013; March 8, 2013; August 3, 2014; August 5, 2014 SkD, Skånska Dagbladet: January 27, 2010; October 25, 2010 Sunday Telegraph: January 29, 2010 TT, Tidningarnas Telegrambyrå: November 29, 2010 TV SVT 1, Uppdrag granskning: January 21, 2015 Author Biographies Anders Wigerfelt has a PhD in history and is associate profes- sor in international migration and ethnic relations (IMER) at Malmö University. He has written articles and books about migration, racism, hate crime, multiculturalism, diversity, and refugee policy. Berit Wigerfelt has a PhD in ethnology and is associate professor in IMER at Malmö University, Malmö Institute for Studies of Migration, Diversity and Welfare, Sweden (MIM). She has written articles and books about youth culture, multiculturalism in school, ethnicity, racism, and hate crime. by guest on March 30, 2016Downloaded from 
work_b5daun566fcqjag76sttxdasc4	----	Journal of Identity and Migration Studies Journal of Identity and Migration Studies Volume 9, number 1, 2015 49 RESEARCH ARTICLES Concerns about Violent Crime in France: Does Immigrant Status Make a Difference in Public Perceptions of Safety? Viviana ANDREESCU Abstract: The present analysis compares and contrasts groups of natives and immigrants in France in terms of their prior exposure to victimization and their perceived risk of violent victimization based on survey data collected in 2010 from a representative sample of French residents (N=1728). Results show no significant inter-group differences regarding victimization experience and fear of violent victimization. In both subsamples, direct or vicarious victimization, as well as distrust in people in general, are significantly and positively associated with higher levels of perceived unsafety. The inter-group differential effect of several fear-of-crime predictors is also observed and the implications of the findings are briefly discussed. Keywords: fear of violent crime, victimization, immigrants, France. Introduction France is the second largest country in the European Union and its population of 65.8 million people represents approximately 13% of EU population (National Institute for Statistics and Economic Studies/INSEE 2013). Different from other Western European countries that became destination countries for immigrants mainly after WWII, during the nineteenth century, France was already regarded as a sanctuary for political refugees and other people in search of freedom and civil liberties. The trend continued during the following decades and by 1931, the foreign-born persons represented about 6.5% of the French population. As a result of post-war industrial expansion a substantial number of immigrants, ready to satisfy the country’s labor needs for low-skilled workers Viviana ANDREESCU JIMS - Volume 9, number 1, 2015 50 migrated to France from Italy, Portugal, Spain, and North Africa. Although this trend stopped in the early 1970s after the first oil crisis, family and humanitarian migration continued (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development/OECD 2008; Seljuq 1997; Tucci 2010). In 1990, for instance, there were 4.2 million immigrants in France and after a decade of relative stability in terms of migration inflows, starting with 1999, the number of immigrants continued to increase. Based on recent data, in 2010, 5.5 million people were first generation immigrants, representing 8.4% of the total population and 6.7 million persons were second-generation immigrants (i.e., persons born in France to immigrant parents) (INSEE 2011). If in 1990, one out of two immigrants was born in Europe, currently only 38% of the immigrants are born in a European country. About 43% of non-natives are born in Africa and most of these immigrants (70%) are born in one of the North African/Maghrebian countries – Algeria, Tunis, and Morocco (INSEE 2013). Recent data also show that 61% of the children born in France between 2006 and 2008 had two native parents who were both descendents of natives, while 10% had two immigrant parents and 29% had a least one parent who was born abroad or is a descendant of a foreign-born person(Breuil-Genier, Borrel & Lhommeau 2011, 36). Even if France had a long experience with migration, an immigrant integration policy was formerly defined only recently (OECD 2008). And the recent tragic events in Paris, where seventeen people were killed, as well as the series of hate crimes that followed, suggest that France is currently facing a serious challenge. On one hand, similar to situations registered in other countries (see Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe /OSCE/ODIHR 2012), certain immigrant populations in France are facing suspicion, prejudice, xenophobia, or even hate crimes, while on the other hand, a large majority of the population publicly manifest its discontent with immigration policies as well, increasing the social distance (see Tucci 2010) between the group of natives of French origin and the others, making the immigrants’ socioeconomic integration difficult and negatively affecting the cohesiveness of the French society. For instance, a public opinion poll conducted in 2011 at the request of the National Consultative Commission for Human Rights (CNCDH) on a representative stratified sample of adult residents in France (N = 979) showed that the majority of the residents in France (56%) declared that “there are too many immigrants in France” and 67% of those interviewed contended that many immigrants relocate to France only to receive welfare benefits. Approximately 50% of the respondents said they do not feel at home in France anymore, 44% of the interviewees noted that Concerns about Violent Crime in France JIMS - Volume 9, number 1, 2015 51 immigration is the main cause of insecurity in the country, and 26% of the respondents declared that those who are born in France to foreign-born parents, are not really French. Overall, compared to 2008, public opinion poll data indicated an increase in anti-immigration attitudes. Additionally, approximately 87% of the residents in France considered that racism is a widespread phenomenon in the country, an increase by 11 points compared to 2008. Almost half of those interviewed (46%) declared that Muslim immigrants from North Africa are the most common victims of racism in the country, followed by black immigrants from Africa. Roma people, Muslims, and Maghrebis are perceived by a large segment of the population in France, respectively 72%, 48%, and 35%, as being a ‘different group of people’ in the French society. Results of the face-to-face interviews also indicated that during the past five years prior to data collection, 28% of those interviewed had experienced racist attitudes and discrimination. According to those who were victimized, one’s nationality and one’s skin color were the most common reasons for racist attitudes (Institut d'Etudes et de Conseil /CSA 2011, 6). Authorities responsible for hate-crime data collection in France are the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights Defender. Bias motivations recorded in hate crime statistics are: race/color; ethnicity/national origin/national minority; citizenship; religion; sexual orientation; disability; gender; political conviction, and state of health and hate crimes are classified in the country as homicide, physical assault, damage to property, desecration of graves, attacks on places of worship, vandalism, and threats/threatening behavior. In 2012, France amended all hate crime provisions contained in its criminal code to include gender identity as a protected characteristic. Although anti-Semitic crimes represent a specific category and are recorded separately, anti-Muslim, anti-Christian and anti-Roma/Sinti hate crimes are not registered as a specific type of bias-motivated crime (OSCE/ODIHR 2013, 109). Although no official data on anti-Semitic, anti-Muslim, anti-Christian, anti- Roma, or crimes motivated by bias against LGTB people were reported to ODIHR in 2012, different non-governmental organizations and human rights agencies recorded a relatively large number of incidents motivated by bias against different social minorities in France. For instance, LICRA, the International League against Racism and Anti-Semitism (Ligue Internationale Contre le Racisme et l'Antisémitisme), reported the case of a series of murders on 19 March, 2012 that included three children and the father of one of the children being shot dead outside a Jewish school in Toulouse. The perpetrator was killed by the police in the process of being apprehended. LICRA also reported a further case of damage to Viviana ANDREESCU JIMS - Volume 9, number 1, 2015 52 property against a kosher supermarket. The Jewish Community Protection Service reported 96 incidents of physical violence, including a knife attack against a girl, three attacks involving spraying tear gas in the victims’ faces, an attack by a group causing serious injury to a man, one attack by a group at school against one child resulting in serious injury; one case of robbery and physical assault resulting in serious injury against a Jewish man with significant disabilities; one case of blanks being shot out of a car at a rabbi and his congregation outside their synagogue; 172 cases of graffiti; 71 cases of vandalism and two cases of arson. The OIC Observatory reported eight cases of desecration of and vandalism to mosques, including two where a pig’s head was left outside a mosque and one case where a mosque was smeared with excrement; one arson attack against a mosque; and three cases of desecration of graves, including one incident where 30 tombstones were vandalized. The Association against Islamophobia in France (CCIF) reported two physical assaults, including one against two men, and a serious assault against a girl resulting in her hospitalization; one case of graffiti on the home of a Muslim family; two case of threats with a gun; a case where a Muslim family found a pig’s head in the stroller of their baby; and a case involving a woman’s burka being pulled and ripped. The Holy See (the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of the Catholic Church in Rome) reported four cases of grave desecration involving over 130 graves and a case of church desecration. The Observatory on Intolerance Against Christians reported one incident in which Christian icons in public places were vandalized; three arson attacks against church property, including one against a nativity scene and two against a church; 12 incidents of damage and/or vandalism to church property, including one incident against a bookstore owned by a church; three incidents of theft of church property; and four incidents of cemetery desecration.Amnesty International and the European Roma Rights Centrereported in 2012 an arson attack against the temporary home of a Roma family in Marseille and the NGO SOS Homophobie reported 138 physical assaults, 12 sexual assaults and 255 incidents involving threat and/or blackmail directed at persons belonging to sexual minority groups (OSCE/ODIHR 2013, 57-81) Nevertheless, although the total number of hate crimes reported to the police in France from 2010 to 2012 remains unknown, according to official hate- crime data, in 2010, out of 2,007 bias-motivated incidents (including defamation and discrimination crimes) prosecuted in France, 562 (28%) crimes received a sentence, indicating that the large majority of the cases (72%) have been dismissed prior to trial (OSCE/ODIHR 2013).Due to differences in methods of recording crimes and also because many bias-motivated crimes remain underreported, especially if Concerns about Violent Crime in France JIMS - Volume 9, number 1, 2015 53 the victim was an illegal immigrant, inter-country comparisons remain almost impossible and it is difficult to determine how France compares to other European countries or other developed nations in the world in terms of the extent of hate- crime offenses. However, it should be noted that during the two-week period that followed the January 7-9, 2015 shooting spree by three French jihadists that killed 17 persons, including four French Jews at a kosher supermarket, the National Observatory against Islamophobia reported 116 anti-Muslim incidents (e.g., in several towns shots have been fired at mosques and racist slogans have been painted on their walls), a significant increase compared to the full month of January 2014, when there were reported 28 attacks on places of worship and 88 threats. In order to increase security and protect the mosques, a significant number of troops have been mobilized as part of the governmental anti-hate crime strategies (Agence France Press 2015). It should be noted that despite the fact that in France collecting official statistics about the race or religion of the citizens is prohibited by law, based on the average of several recent studies that attempted to calculate the number of people in France whose origins are from Muslim majority countries (see also Pew Research Forum 2011), it is estimated that about 6.5 million Muslims currently live in France, representing about 10% of the population. Oberwittler & Roché (2013), the authors of a recent study that examined the relationships between the police and adolescents of foreign origin in France and Germany, noted that systematic empirical research on social issues regarding different minority groups in France is lacking, French social research relying mostly on political analyses or a mix of theoretical formulations and qualitative data. Additionally, it is quite difficult for researchers to determine how public attitudes and behaviors vary by ethnic groups because official statistics cannot legally include data on ethnicity. One objective of this analysis is to contribute to the literature on fear of crime by examining perceptions of safety experienced by groups differentiated by their place of birth. The amount of victimization each group has been exposed to will be also evaluated. Moreover, in addition to commonly used predictors of fear of crime, the analysis will observe the effect of ethnicity on attitudes by using African origin as a proxy. Even if the category used here includes persons belonging to different ethnic sub-groups it was restricted by the information available in the dataset structure. Another objective of the paper is to determine if data collected years prior to the lethal attacks recently registered in Paris, France would offer some indication that immigrants’ victimization levels and/or a higher perceived risk of violent victimization might further motivate some Viviana ANDREESCU JIMS - Volume 9, number 1, 2015 54 persons of foreign origin to retaliate and socially interact aggressively. Knowing the immigrants’ perceptions of safety and the factors that influence their levels of fear is important not only because the perceived risk of victimization experienced by this particular group did not receive extensive attention from scholars (see Andreescu 2013), but also because by finding ways to diminish the citizens’ worries about crime, immigrants’ integration levels, as well as the social cohesiveness and the community capacity to prevent and fight crime might increase substantially. Criminal victimization, perceived vulnerability, social context, and fear of crime In general, most studies that tried to determine why certain people worry about becoming victims of crime more often than others considered the influence on perceptions of safety of factors such as: one’s exposure to direct and indirect (vicarious) victimization, personal socio-demographic characteristics that make individuals see themselves as being more vulnerable to victimization (e.g., women, the elderly, the youth, economically disadvantaged individuals, persons physically impaired, racial/ethnic minorities, etc), and the social environment a person lives in (e.g., quality and extent of social interactions; level of urbanization; neighborhood characteristics, etc) (see Halle 1996).Although research on fear of crime is characterized by a lack of uniformity regarding the way the dependent variable (fear of crime) as well as important predictors have been defined and operationalized, a review of the literature (see Andreescu 2013), yet not exhaustive, shows that at least partial support for the three theoretical models of fear of crime (Halle 1996) has been documented by research.Although a significant and positive relationship between experience with victimization and fear of crime was not always supported by evidence, several studies that examined people’s fear of crime found that persons who have been victimized or were aware of other relatives/close friends being victims of crime tended to also express higher levels of insecurity (Ferraro 1995; Kanan & Pruitt 2002; Lee & Ulmer 2000; Reese 2009; Skogan & Maxfield 1981;Taylor, Eitle & Russell 2009).Onthe other hand,persons less likely to be victimized, such as women and the elderly, were among those who worried significantly more often about crime than men and younger individuals, respectively (Chiricos, Hogan & Gertz 1997; De Donder, Verte & Messelis 2005; Lane & Meeker 2000; Reese 2009; Scott 2003; Taylor, Eitle & Russel 2009; Ziegler & Mitchell 2003). However, it should be noted that not all studies examining the relationship age –fear of crime found a significant and positive relationship between these variables. Similarly, while several researchers (Hough 1995; Jordan Concerns about Violent Crime in France JIMS - Volume 9, number 1, 2015 55 & Gabbidon 2010; Salisbury & Upson 2004; Skogan & Maxfield 1981) concluded that persons belonging to racial/ethnic minority groups tend to have higher levels of fear of crime than the majority of the population, other scholars did not find that one’s race or one’s ethnicity had a significant influence on a person’s perceptions of safety. Results have been inconsistent as well when the relationship socioeconomic status and fear of crime has been examined. Yet, more frequently researchers found that economically and socially marginalized persons tend to worry more about the possibility of becoming victims of crime than individuals who are better educated and more secure financially (Jordan & Gabbidon 2010; Lane & Meeker 2000; Lee & Ulmer 2000; Scott 2003). Although research examining the relationship between fear of crime and subjective or objective health is not extensive, studies that tried to determine if an individual’s mental health and physical functioning are influencing his/her perceptions of safety generally concluded that persons with health problems tend to worry more about crime, a fact that, as Jackson and Stafford (2009) noted, might negatively affect one’s well- being even further by decreasing the fearful persons’ health and by making them more vulnerable to victimization. Regardless of the fact that research examining fear of crime experienced by the foreign-born is quite limited, prior studies that tried to determine how often non-natives worry about crime found that immigrants tend to express higher levels of fear of victimization than natives do (Andreescu 2013; Brown and Benedict 2004; Kernshaw et al. 2000; Lee & Ulmer 2000; Martens 2001; Perreault 2008), even if, according to statistical evidence, foreign nationals have been victimized, directly or indirectly, at a lesser extent or not significantly more than natives did, as several studies showed (Andreescu 2013; Bell & Machin 2011; Johnson 2005; Perreault 2008).While variations in immigrants’ perceptions of safety in the host country are sometimes shaped by prior experiences with victimization or an already high level of perceived unsafety in the country of origin (Menjivar & Bejarano 2004; Wu & Wen 2014), it seems reasonable to consider immigrants as being part of a socially vulnerable group, particularly in Europe, where an increase in anti-immigration attitudes and bias-motivated crimes has been documented by recent research (OSCE/ODIHR 2013). Research that examined the influence of the social context on one’s perceptions of safety found that persons living in cohesive and socially organized communities, individuals who tend to trust people in general, also tend to worry less about being victimized (Andreescu 2013; Ferraro 1995; Gibson et al. 2002; Jackson 2009). In contrast, several studies found that residency in larger urban Viviana ANDREESCU JIMS - Volume 9, number 1, 2015 56 areas, where social interaction is more superficial and exposure to crime is higher, was positively associated with higher levels of fear of crime (Andreescu 2013; Bankston et al. 1987; Keane 1992; Scott 2003). Methodology The analysis presented in this paper uses as a data source the European Social Survey conducted in 2010 on a representative sample of residents in France (ESS Round 5 2010, 2012). This is the most recent available ESS survey that includes information regarding citizens’ worries about violent victimization. The analysis intends to compare immigrants to natives in terms of direct and vicarious victimization and fear of violent victimization. Additionally, several individual-level predictors will be used in multivariate analyses to determine if they affect differently one’s perceived risk of violent victimization when attitudes are examined separately based on the respondent’s nationality status. The dependent variable, fear of violent victimization is a dummy variable coded 1 if the responded declared that he/she worries some time or most/all of the time of becoming a victim of a violent crime and zero otherwise. The large majority of the fear-of-crime predictors used in this analysis followed the same coding scheme used in a prior comparative study that examined fear of violent crime in United Kingdom (see Andreescu 2013). The independent variables used in this analysis are described below. Experience with victimization was coded 1 if the respondent declared that in the last five years he/she or a household member has been a victim of a burglary or physical assault and zero otherwise. Interpersonal distrust - a factor of interpersonal distrust has been created through principal component analysis (PCA) of answers at three questions (i.e., Most people can be trusted or you can’t be too careful; Most people try to be fair or try take advantage of you; Most of the time people are helpful or mostly looking for themselves). The original variables have been recoded so higher values would indicate higher levels of interpersonal distrust. As a result of PCA only one factor has been extracted (Eigenvalue = 1.662; variance explained = 55.3%). The factor loadings varied from .713 to .783. The Cronbach’s reliability coefficient Alpha for this index was .597. Police distrust - the original variable has been recoded and takes values from zero (complete trust in the police) to 10 (complete distrust). Healthproblems is an ordinal-level variable that measures the respondent’s subjective assessment of his/her health; the measure varies from 1 (very good health) to 5 (very poor health). Perceived discrimination - persons who consider themselves as being part of a discriminated Concerns about Violent Crime in France JIMS - Volume 9, number 1, 2015 57 group as a result of their age, gender, ethnicity, sexual orientation, language, or religion were coded 1 and the others were coded zero. Economic marginalization – respondents who stated that it is difficult and very difficult to live on present income were coded 1, while the better-off individuals were coded zero. Immigrant status – is a dummy variable, coded 1 if a person was not born in France, and zero if the respondent was a native of France. Household size – this interval-level variable records as a code the number of persons living in the same house. Residency – persons living in large urban areas (big cities) were coded one, while those living in suburban areas, in smaller cities, or in rural areas were coded zero. Gender, a dummy variable, was coded 1 if the respondent was a female and zero otherwise. Age is a continuous variable representing the respondent’s calculated age. Born in Africa – coded 1 if the foreign-born respondent was born in Africa and zero otherwise. Additionally, because several research studies found that an immigrant’s level of acculturation and fear of crime are significantly related (Andreescu, 2013; Brown & Benedict 2004; Lee & Ulmer 2000; Yun et al. 2010) the present analysis used two measures of acculturation. A foreign-born individual’s level of acculturation refers mainly to an immigrant’s level of integration in the host country, his/her usage of the official language, and the immigrant’s capacity to share the cultural beliefs and the values of the natives in the receiving country (Hazuda, Stern & Haffner 1988). Based on the information provided by ESS5, the analysis used as measures of acculturation the language most often spoken at home (a dummy variable coded 1 if the respondent speaks frequently at home a language other than French and zero if the respondent mostly speaks French at home) and the length of time in years the foreign-born respondent spent in France since arrival. Consistent with a similar study conducted on sample data from United Kingdom (see Andreescu, 2013), it is anticipated that persons who directly or indirectly experienced victimization, residents of large urban areas, persons who perceive themselves as being unable to successfully control potential crime events, those who have lower levels of interpersonal trust and distrust the institution meant to protect them from being victimized, and those who see themselves as being socially and economically marginalized will express higher levels of fear of violent victimization. Additionally, it is hypothesized that immigrants who appear to be better integrated in the host country will worry less about violent victimization than their counterparts characterized by lower levels of acculturation. Viviana ANDREESCU JIMS - Volume 9, number 1, 2015 58 Results Univariate analyses presented in table 1 show that about four out of ten immigrants (37%) and three out of ten natives (31%) in France worry often or very often they might become a victim of a violent crime. As indicated by the independent-samples t tests, there are no significant inter-group differences in the levels of experienced victimization (t = -.023; p=.981) or the fear of violent crime when immigrants and natives are compared (t= 1.504; p=.133). Although immigrants appear to distrust people more and police less than natives do, the attitudes expressed by the two subsamples in terms of interpersonal and institutional trust are not significantly different. However, if only 8% of the natives see themselves as being part of a discriminated group, a significantly higher percentage of the immigrants (23%) acknowledge discrimination (t = 5.714; p = .000). The proportion of immigrants experiencing financial difficulties (32%) is almost twice higher (t = 4.651; p = .000) than the proportion of natives (17%) who cannot make ends meet. Table 1: Descriptive statistics and independent-samples t-tests Immigrant (155) Native (1573) Variable Mean SD Mean SD t p Fear of violent crime .37 .48 .31 .46 1.504 .133 Experience with victimization .21 .41 .21 .41 -.023 .981 Interpersonal distrust .06 1.01 -.01 .99 .866 .387 Police distrust 4.11 2.33 4.39 2.31 -1.428 .154 Part of discriminated group .23 .42 .08 .28 5.714 .000 Health problems .23 .42 .24 .43 -.118 .906 Financial difficulties .32 .47 .17 .37 4.651 .000 Gender (female) .57 .49 .53 .49 1.002 .316 Age 51.09 17.8 49.24 18.6 1.188 .235 Residential area (big city) .42 .49 .17 .38 7.561 .000 Household size 2.52 1.46 2.35 1.28 1.546 .122 Born in Africa .59 .49 Years lived in France 33.94 20.2 Language spoken at home (other than French) .35 .48 It should be also noted that almost 60% of the immigrants are born in an African country and that even if on average, the foreign-born people spent about 34 years in their host country, more than a third of the immigrants (34%) in France speak at home a language other than French. Concerns about Violent Crime in France JIMS - Volume 9, number 1, 2015 59 Table 2 presents the results of the logistic regression, the statistical analysis used to examine the effects of the selected predictors on variations in fear of violent victimization for the overall sample and separately for the subsample of immigrants and the subsample of natives. Although the effect of one’s immigration status on perceptions of safety could have been assessed using a series of interaction terms, due to the fact that the interpretation of interactions is not always intuitive, separate models have been created for the main groups of interest differentiated by the respondent’s place of birth. Consistent with the results of the bivariate analysis, the respondent’s nationality does not produce significant differences in perceived fear of violent victimization when controlling for additional i ndividual-level variables. In the overall sample, results show that gender and experience with victimization are the predictors that impact the most variations in perceived safety. As hypothesized, individuals with health problems and those with low levels of confidence in their fellow citizens tend to worry more about crime than, respectively, people who do not suffer from physical or mental impairments or those who live in trustworthy communities. Different from what has been anticipated, age, perceptions of social discrimination, economic marginalization, family structure, or residency did not impact significantly variations in perceived safety. In order to determine if there are inter -group differences regarding the magnitude and direction of the effects the selected predictors might have on the dependent variable two additional models are also presented in table 2. Both natives and foreign-born people who experienced victimization directly or indirectly are more likely to be afraid of becoming a victim of a violent crime. The odds of being afraid of violent victimization are however increased by a factor of 3 (OR = 3.131) in the immigrant group and by a factor of 2 (OR = 1.979) in the group of natives, suggesting that vicarious and/or direct victimization has a stronger effect on the immigrants’ feelings of safety . In both subsamples, interpersonal distrust is positively and significantly associated with fear of violent crime and the effects are approximately equal (OR = 1.695 for immigrants; OR = 1.505 for natives). In other words, persons with low confidence in people in general, also worry more about crime. Viviana ANDREESCU JIMS - Volume 9, number 1, 2015 60 Table 2: Logit estimates for fear of violent crimes in France Total (N=1728) Immigrants (N=155) Natives (N=1573) B (SE) Exp (B) p B (SE) Exp (B) p B (SE) Exp (B) p Foreign-born .120 (.191) 1.128 .528 Experienced victimization .693 (.129) 1.999 .000 1.141 (.474) 3.131 .016 .683 (.136) 1.979 .000 Interpersonal distrust .422 (.058) 1.524 .000 .528 (.209) 1.695 .012 .409 (.061) 1.505 .000 Police distrust -.025 (.025) .975 .308 .013 (.085) 1.013 .877 -.028 (.026) .973 .286 Part of discriminated group .177 (.184) 1.193 .338 .228 (.490) 1.256 .641 .194 (.204) 1.214 .342 Health problems .280 (.135) 1.323 .038 .247 (.457) 1.280 .589 .277 (.142) 1.320 .050 Financial difficulties .053 (.145) 1.055 .714 .332 (.440) 1.393 .451 -.010 (.157) .990 .951 Gender (female) .852 (.113) 2.343 .000 .315 (.411) .1.371 .443 .921 (.120) 2.513 .000 Age .000 (.003) 1.000 .969 .032 (.019) 1.033 .099 -.002 (.004) .998 .509 Residential area (big city) .256 (.138) 1.292 .063 .362 (.391) 1.436 .355 .194 (.151) 1.214 .199 Household size .033 (.046) 1.033 .481 .443 (.152) 1.557 .004 -.025 (.050) .975 .620 Born in Africa -.592 (.427) .553 .166 Years lived in France -.015 (.016) .985 .350 Language spoken at home (non French) -.402 (.437) .669 .357 Constant - 1.571 (.291) .208 .000 -3.280 (1.303) .038 .012 - 1.330 (.305) .264 .000 Pseudo R 2 (Nagelkerke) .124 .252 .124 Although the effect is positive in both groups, having health problems (i.e., being hampered in daily activities by illness, disability, or mental problems) increases significantly one’s level of fear of violent victimization only in the subsample of natives. Only in the subsample of natives, gender has a significant Concerns about Violent Crime in France JIMS - Volume 9, number 1, 2015 61 effect on perceived safety. While French women worry significantly more (OR = 2.513) about violent victimization than their male counterparts, the difference in perceptions of fear between female and male immigrants is not large enough to be significant. Even if the average household size is comparable in both groups (2.5 persons in immigrant families and 2.4 persons in French-born families), only in the foreign-born subsample there is a significant increase in fear of violent crime with an increase in the number of persons currently living in the same household. While additional analyses (not shown) that examined levels of fear among residents belonging to different age groups did not suggest that age and fear of violent crime are significantly related, it should be noted that with age, immigrants tend to worry more about being victimized (OR = 1.033; p < .10), while natives tend to feel safer, as indicated by a negative, though non-significant relationship age – fear of violent crime. Additional variables included in the model pertaining to foreign-born residents examined the effects of acculturation on immigrants’ fear of violent victimization. Different from prior research (see Andreescu 2013), this analysis found that individuals (35% of the subsample of immigrants) who speak more often at home a language other than French (which could be considered an indicator of a lower integration in the host society), appear to worry less often about being victimized. As hypothesized, with a longer period of stay in France, the immigrants’ level of fear of violent victimization tends to decrease. Both acculturation effects were, however, not significant. Despite the fact that that the variable did not have a significant effect on immigrants’ perceived risk of violent victimization, it can be observed that immigrants born in an African country tended to worry less about becoming a victim of a violent crime than immigrants born in other parts of the world. Conclusions For the most part, this study replicated a prior analysis (see Andreescu, 2013) based on data from a national sample of residents in United Kingdom that also examined variations in fear of violent victimization when natives were compared to the foreign-born people. Similar to what was found in UK, immigrants and native French had almost identical levels of victimization. In both countries approximately one in five persons, natives or immigrants, experienced directly or indirectly some form of criminal victimization. Nonetheless, in both countries Viviana ANDREESCU JIMS - Volume 9, number 1, 2015 62 immigrants tended to have a higher level of perceived unsafety than natives did, but in France the inter-group difference was not significant. Consistent with prior research (Andreescu 2013; Ferraro 1995; Kanan & Pruitt 2002; Lee & Ulmer 2000; Reese 2009; Skogan & Maxfield 1981; Taylor et al. 2009; Yun et al. 2010), French residents (natives or foreign-born) who have been exposed to some form of criminal victimization are significantly more afraid of becoming victims of a violent crime. It should be noted that similar to what was found in the analysis of sample data from United Kingdom the effect of victimization on perceptions of insecurity was much higher in the subsample of immigrants than it was in the subsample of natives. Although the present analysis found strong support for the crime experience theoretical perspective, support for the vulnerability hypothesis was more limited in France than it has been found in the prior analysis of survey data collected in United Kingdom (Andreescu 2013). While in both countries and consistent with prior research (e.g., Chiricos et al. 1997; De Donder et al. 2005; Garofalo 1979; Scott 2003; Taylor et al. 2009), women in the overall sample and in subsample of natives were significantly more afraid of becoming victims of a violent crime than their male counterparts, French women born abroad did not worry about violent crime much more often than immigrant men did.Taking into account the fact that the majority of the immigrants in the population are born in Africa, it is possible that a significant part of the foreign-born arrived in France as refugees trying to escape civil wars or other human rights violations that exposed men and women equally to violence and somewhat may have leveled intra-group gender differences in fear of violent victimization. Different from results obtained from the UK sample and findings from other studies (see Andreescu, 2013), in France, fear of violent victimization does not increase significantly with age in any subsample differentiated by the respondent’s nationality status. Additional analyses (not presented) that examined variations in fear among different age groups confirmed that age and fear of violent crime are not significantly related in France. In addition, in both subsamples other variables meant to identify groups that according to the literature may feel vulnerable in potentially harmful situations, such as being part of a discriminated group, being an ethnic minority (i.e., born in Africa) or being economically disadvantaged did not impact significantly one’s levels of fear. However, in France as in United Kingdom (Andreescu 2013) or in United States (Taylor et al. 2009) natives with a poor health feel unsafe and are more afraid of being victimized. Interestingly, like gender, having health problems does not appear to influence Concerns about Violent Crime in France JIMS - Volume 9, number 1, 2015 63 significantly variations in fear of violent crimes within the sample of immigrants. It appears that just by having an immigrant status places a person in a position of vulnerability, diminishing the influence on fear of violent crime of other individual- level characteristics. Nevertheless, further research using a larger sample of immigrants might be able to determine if there are internal variations in fear of victimization among foreign-born groups differentiated by additional important characteristics. As in United Kingdom and consistent with prior research (Andreescu 2013; Gibson et al. 2002; Jackson 2009), support for the integrative model of fear of crime was quite strong in France as well. Even if the effect of the interpersonal trust on perceptions of safety is slightly higher in the group of immigrants, in both subsamples, those who think that people are in general helpful, fair, and trustworthy are also significantly less likely to express worries about violent victimization. Different from other research findings (Jackson et al. 2009) but similar to what has been found inprevious analyses of survey data from United Kingdom (Andreescu 2013; Bennett 1994), in multivariate analyses people’s attitudes toward the police did not appear to influence significantly their perceptions of safety in France. In terms of contextual factors, big-city residency does not impact significantly the natives’ or the immigrants’ levels of fear in France. This result differed from was found in United Kingdom, where residency in large urban areas, particularly for natives, was significantly and positively associated with fear of violent victimization (Andreescu 2013). However, taking into account the highly publicized 2015 lethal terrorist attacks in Paris, it is possible that fear of violent victimization expressed by urban residents will increase in France as well. Regarding the effect of two measures of acculturation (language spoken at home and length of stay in France) on immigrants’ perceived fear of violent victimization, different from what has been hypothesized, results showed that one’s level of integration in the French society does not appear to play an important part in the foreign-born person’s perceptions of safety. It should be noted that on average, an immigrant spent about 34 years in France, a period of time long enough to ensure one’s integration in the host society. Additionally, even if one third of the immigrants interviewed declared they spoke at home other language than French, it should not be inferred that an equally large segment of the immigrant population lacks language proficiency, especially when a large proportion of the foreign-born persons immigrated to France from French-speaking Northern-African countries. Taking into account the fact that many native French people continue to consider the first- and even second-generation immigrants from Viviana ANDREESCU JIMS - Volume 9, number 1, 2015 64 Africa, as not being “really French” (see CSA 2011) and that three times more immigrants than natives see themselves as being discriminated (see Table 1 and also Breuil-Genier et al. 2011, 39),it appears that the foreign-born people’s fears of violent victimization are less a function of one’s degree of adaptation to the host society and more a result of perceived anti-immigrant attitudes, documented by several public opinion polls conducted in recent years.Despite the fact that in 2007 it was created in France a ministry meant to ensure immigrants’ integration in the French society and several programmes and policies have been specially designed to increase social cohesion, statistical information indicates that children of immigrants, particularly those of Maghreb and other African origin have much higher unemployment rates and are frequently facing discriminatory hiring practices when seeking employment (OECD 2008; Tucci 2010).In sum, despite its inability to clearly determine why certain people feel at a higher risk of victimization than others, the present secondary-data analysis suggests that direct or indirect experience with victimization and a lack of interpersonal trust can be considered the most important predictors of fear of violent crimes expressed not only by foreign-born people in France, but also by natives. One objective of this analysis was to determine if data collected five years before the dramatic, but isolated events that took place in France in January 2015, would offer some indication that immigrants’ victimization levels attracted some desire to retaliate and respond to aggressive behavior with increased violence. Despite the fact that bias-motivated crimes and negative public attitudes toward foreign-born people belonging to certain ethnic and religious groups have been documented by research conducted in France in the past few years (see CSA 2011, 2013; France 24, 2012; OSCE/ODIHR 2013), the results of the present analysis showed no difference in actual victimization rates and perceptions of safety when natives and immigrants were compared. However, it should be noted that the group of natives also included persons born in France to immigrant parents and the attitudes expressed by them could have affected the results. More detailed further analyses could try to verify the consistency of the findings presented here by comparing the first-generation immigrants’ attitudes and victimization experiences with those expressed by persons born in France to native parents and persons born in France to immigrant parents. Referring probably to the 2005 riots in France organized mainly by Arab, North African and black second-generation immigrants that compelled the French Parliament to declare a three-month state of emergency and were considered by many analysts the largest rebellions in recent European history Concerns about Violent Crime in France JIMS - Volume 9, number 1, 2015 65 (see Oberwittler & Roché 2013), an OECD report stated not long ago that the “French society is already paying a price in terms of disinvestment and disaffection by children of immigrants, in reaction to both past and current unfavorable outcomes (OECD 2008, 11).”And, as the recent heartrending events in Paris showed, second-generation immigrants’ involvement in criminal activities can be one of the negative outcomes of ineffective government policies regarding immigrant integration. Three weeks after the series of attacks that left seventeen people dead in France’s capital city, the French television channel France 24 (2015) announced that the French government launched a new social media campaign meant to discourage potential jihadists from joining Islamist fighters in Syria and Iraq. The French government estimates that about 1,200 French residents are currently involved in jihadist activities and the new initiative is an addition to a 2014 pilot program intended to stop young people from leaving the country for Syria. Although it is premature to assess the effectiveness of the government- sponsored message that in response to jihadist propaganda tells radicals in France and elsewhere that they “will discover hell on earth and will die alone” (see France 24 2015), it is reasonable to assume that as long as the French government will not address more efficiently the root causes of the current issues that risk to divide the French society even further it is unlikely that major changes in public attitudes and behavior will happen.Socio-economic, educational, and mentoring programs targeting disadvantaged young people who are part of religious and ethnic minority groups coupled with novel media strategies meant to temper anti-immigrant feelings and reduce hate crimes in France might have much more lasting positive effects and might be able to help restore institutional and interpersonal trust within the French society making it safer and less vulnerable to external negative pressure. 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Xénophobie, Antisémitismes, Racisme, Anti-Racisme et Discriminations en France. Sondage de l’Institut CSA, no. 1201646, Décembre 2012. http://www.csa.eu/multimedia/data/sondages/data2013/opi20130321-Barometre-CNCDH- pour-publication.pdf, accessed June 11, 2014. Jackson, J. (2009) “A Psychological Perspective on Vulnerability in the Fear of Crime.” Psychology, Crime and Law 15(4): 365-390. Jackson, J. & Stafford, M. (2009) “Public Health and Fear of Crime: A Prospective cohort Study.”British Journal of Criminology 49(6): 832-847. Johnson, H. (2005). Crime Victimisation in Australia: Key Results of the 2004 International Crime Victimisation Survey.Australian Institute of Criminology Research and Public Policy Series No. 64, Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology, http://rechten.uvt.nl/icvs/pdffiles/rpp64.pdf, accessed May 15, 2012. Jordan, K. L. & Gabbidon, S. L. 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Menjivar, C. & Bejarano, C. (2004) “Latino Immigrants’ Perceptions of Crime and Police Authorities in the United States: A Case Study from the Phoenix Metropolitan Area” Ethnic and Racial Studies 27(1): 120-148. National Institute for Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE) (2011).France, portrait social édition 2011. http://www.insee.fr/fr/publications-et-services/sommaire.asp?codesage=FPORSOC11, accessed June 11, 2014. National Institute for Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE) (2013).France, portrait social édition 2013. http://www.insee.fr/fr/ffc/docs_ffc/FPORSOC13.pdf,accessed June 11, 2014. Oberwittler, D.& Roché, S. 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Annual Report for 2012. http://tandis.odihr.pl/hcr2012/pdf/Hate_Crime_Report_full_version.pdf, accessed June 9, 2014. http://www.csa.eu/multimedia/data/sondages/data2013/opi20130321-Barometre-CNCDH-pour-publication.pdf http://www.csa.eu/multimedia/data/sondages/data2013/opi20130321-Barometre-CNCDH-pour-publication.pdf http://www.insee.fr/fr/publications-et-services/sommaire.asp?codesage=FPORSOC11 http://www.insee.fr/fr/ffc/docs_ffc/FPORSOC13.pdf http://www.oecd.org/france/41708151.pdf http://tandis.odihr.pl/hcr2012/pdf/Hate_Crime_Report_full_version.pdf Viviana ANDREESCU JIMS - Volume 9, number 1, 2015 68 Perreault, S. (2008) “Immigrants and Victimization, 2004.”Canadian Centre for Justice StatisticsProfile Series. No. 18. Statistics Canada Catalogue no. 85F0033 (Ottawa: Minister of Industry). Pew Research Forum (2011).The Future of the Global Muslim Population.Region: Europe. http://www.pewforum.org/2011/01/27/future-of-the-global-muslim-population-regional- europe/#, accessed August 3, 2014. Reese, B. (2009) “Determinants of the Fear of Crime.”International Journal of Sociology 39(1): 62-75. Salisbury, H. and Upson, A. (2004) Ethnicity, Victimisation and Worry about Crime: Findings from the 2001/02 and 2002/03 British Crime Surveys.Findings 237.London: Home Office Research Development and Statistics Directorate. Skogan, W. G. and Maxfield, M. G. (1981) Coping with Crime and Neighborhood Reaction. (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage). Scott, H. (2003)“Stranger Danger: Explaining Women's Fear of Crime.” Western Criminology Review 4(3): 203–214. Seljuq, A. (1997) “Cultural Conflicts: North African Immigrants in France.” The International Journal of Peace Studies 2 (2). http://www.gmu.edu/programs/icar/ijps/vol2_2/seljuq.htm, accessed May 11, 2014 Taylor, J., Eitle, D. and Russell, D. 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work_b5k23flcmvdc7myopsl3sr23qq	----	warwick.ac.uk/lib-publications Manuscript version: Author’s Accepted Manuscript The version presented in WRAP is the author’s accepted manuscript and may differ from the published version or Version of Record. Persistent WRAP URL: http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/107755 How to cite: Please refer to published version for the most recent bibliographic citation information. If a published version is known of, the repository item page linked to above, will contain details on accessing it. Copyright and reuse: The Warwick Research Archive Portal (WRAP) makes this work by researchers of the University of Warwick available open access under the following conditions. Copyright © and all moral rights to the version of the paper presented here belong to the individual author(s) and/or other copyright owners. To the extent reasonable and practicable the material made available in WRAP has been checked for eligibility before being made available. 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Refugees, state capacity, and non-state actor violence Tobias Böhmelt Department of Government, University of Essex Vincenzo Bove Department of Politics and International Studies, University of Warwick Kristian Skrede Gleditsch Department of Government, University of Essex & Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO)∗ Abstract Existing research argues that refugee inflows may increase the risk of domestic conflict, particularly civil war that, by definition, involves the state as an actor. However, many of the postulated mechanisms linking refugees to a higher risk of such conflict pertain to tensions with locals, which do not necessarily involve any grievances against government authorities. We contend that it is more likely to identify an association between refugees and non-state actor violence, i.e., armed violence between organized non-state groups, neither of which pertains to the state. We also claim that the extent to which refugees are associated with a higher likelihood of non-state conflict depends on the capacity of governments to manage and mitigate risks. We report evidence that refugee populations can be linked to an increased risk of non-state conflict, as well as for a mitigating effect of state capacity on the risk of non-state conflicts in the presence of refugees. We do not find a clear effect of refugee populations on civil war, suggesting that the link depends on existing conflict cleavages relevant to mobilizing refugees or locals. Our research helps to shed light on the relevant security consequences of managing refugee populations. Despite the common arguments portraying refugees as security risks in developed countries, the risk of non-state conflict applies primarily to weak states that have been forced to shoulder a disproportionate burden in hosting refugees. Keywords: Non-state conflict; refugees; state capacity; quantitative analysis TOBIAS BÖHMELT, b. 1982, PhD in International Relations (University of Essex, 2010); Professor at the University of Essex (2013-); current research interests: environmental politics, international mediation, and civil-military relations. VINCENZO BOVE, b. 1980, PhD in Economics (Birkbeck College, University of London, 2011); Reader at the University of Warwick (2014-); current research interests: peacekeeping operations, migration, conflict and development, civil-military relations, and military spending. KRISTIAN SKREDE GLEDITSCH, b. 1971, PhD in Political Science (University of Colorado, Boulder, 1999); Professor at the University of Essex (2005-); Research Associate, Peace Research Institute Oslo (2003-); current research interests: violent and non-violent conflict, democratization, and political violence. We thank the special issue editors, Alex Braithwaite, Idean Salehyan, and Burcu Savun as well as three anonymous reviewers for useful comments and suggestions. We are also grateful to Faten Ghosn, Arzu Kibris, Adam Lichtenheld, John McManus, and participants at the workshop ‘Political, Economic, Social, and Legal Aspects of Hosting Migrants and Refugees’, Istanbul, July 4-8, 2017, supported by the British Council Newton Fund (grant number: RLWK6-261786650), as well as audiences at seminar presentations at the Universities of Mannheim and Warwick for their valuable feedback. ∗Email address of corresponding author: tbohmelt@essex.ac.uk Non-state actor violence: Refugees and state capacity 2 Introduction A large literature has emerged suggesting that refugees can be associated with a higher risk of violent civil conflict within hosting countries. Most of this research focuses on conventional civil war or on how refugees are likely to exacerbate tensions within countries that in turn are more likely to lead to violent disputes involving the state. For example, the ‘refugee-warrior thesis’ highlights how refugees in camps could be mobilized to participate in violent uprisings against a government, with the 1970 Black September uprising of Palestinian refugees in Jordan as the canonical example (see Zolberg et al., 1989). However, there are also many examples where refugee flows have not been associated with violent conflict at all, or where refugees may have been linked to other forms of violence, distinct from conventional civil war. In particular, numerous events involving violence are not initiated by refugees, are not directed at the state, and do not involve the government as an actor in any meaningful way (see also Gleditsch & Bartusevičius, 2018). In one of the largest contemporary refugee crises in South-East Asia, for example, an estimated 40,000 Rohingya have fled violent persecution in Myanmar and sought refuge in India by mid-2017. Many Rohingya in India have become victims of violent persecution from hostile local populations. In early 2017, the Jammu and Kashmir National Panthers Party in Northwest India launched a series of demonstrations calling for the Rohingya to be expelled from the province. And beyond simply exerting voice or raising political demands, there have been many threats to use violence as well as reports of violent attacks against Rohingya refugees. However, these violent events do not fit the traditional definition of civil war or the template of the ‘refugee- warrior thesis’ (see Zolberg et al., 1989), which focus on security risks arising from refugees taking up arms against the government in response to marginalization and immiseration. Although some have voiced concerns over the potential for radicalization and recruitment among the Rohingya refugees, there is no evidence that these have joined insurgent groups in Kashmir and there appears to be little mobilization over the common Muslim religious identities shared between the Indian Muslims and the Rohingya. Moreover, the violence that has been perpetrated against Rohingya refugees is neither carried out nor implicitly endorsed by the government. The case of the Rohingya in India illustrates the need to look beyond the effects of refugees on conventional conflict and consider the possible implications for non-state violence, i.e., violence between organized armed groups, neither of which pertains to the state (Melander et al., 2016; Sundberg et al., 2012). Although different forms of (organized) violence may share some common underlying causes and can occur simultaneously (see, e.g., Cunningham & Lemke, 2013), there are also important differences. Non-state conflict involves fighting among groups outside of and not affiliated with the state that are identified by shared communal identities, and are often fought over land distribution, access to natural resources, or result of socioeconomic inequalities (Fjelde & Østby, 2014). Partially because of data availability, however, existing quantitative literature has largely tested theories about refugees and violence exclusively using data on conflict involving the state.1 Qualitative research has 1In a recent exception, Fisk (2018) explores violence against civilians in refugee-populated communities. She finds that refugee populations positively correlate with civilian victimization, particularly in areas with larger self-settled populations, i.e., those living among the local population who do not have official legal status as refugees (see also Fisk, 2019). Non-state actor violence: Refugees and state capacity 3 acknowledged other forms of violence more systematically. Onoma (2013), for example, contributes in significant ways to our understanding of the refugee-conflict nexus by focusing on refugees as victims of violence. In light of this, there has been a reported increase in threats against refugees in European countries that have hosted larger numbers of refugees from the Syrian civil war. However, in countries such as Germany, concerted efforts by the police have been undertaken against people suspected of planning violent responses, and there has been considerable investment in efforts to monitor social media and prevent the diffusion of such acts. In this article, we build on previous studies by, e.g., Onoma (2013) on refugee populations and the risk of non-state violence and consider the potential mitigating influence of state capacity. We first take stock of the literature on the security implications of refugees and the dire predictions that some have derived from the current refugee crisis based on their interpretation of existing research. We then outline the key arguments why refugees may be associated with a higher risk of non-state violence as well as the mechanism through which governments can intervene and mitigate risks. We contend that the prospects for such state interventions, if supported by a sufficiently large amount of state capacity, can potentially moderate how refugee populations are associated with non-state conflict. We empirically test these claims, combining the Uppsala Conflict Data Program’s (UCDP) Non-State Conflict Dataset (Melander et al., 2016; Sundberg et al., 2012) with data on refugee populations from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Population Statistics Reference Database.2 Our analyses show that a larger number of refugees can be associated with a higher non-state conflict risk, but not a higher risk of civil war, i.e., state-based conflict. We also report evidence for the moderating effect of state capacity. Our research has important implications for scholarship and policy. On one hand, we improve our under- standing of how postulated drivers of intrastate conflict are related to specific types of violence (or not), as we show that refugees are less likely to be related to ‘traditional’ civil wars in their destination country, but could be associated with intrastate violence among non-state actors. On the other hand, we also help clarify the relevant security consequences of hosting refugees as well as why certain fears of widespread civil war are less likely to be borne out. Our findings provide insights that can inform policymakers and public responses to address the security implications stemming from refugee populations. In particular, they can help to develop a more adequate understanding of the relevant concerns and challenges to states in dealing with the serious refugee crisis playing out at the present time. Our analysis lends little support to the alarmist calls for restricting refugee access in developed countries on security grounds, and the risk of non-state conflict primarily applies to the developing countries that face a disproportionate impact of the current refugee crisis and also have the least capacity to cope with large refugee populations. The contemporary refugee crisis and conflict potential The scale of the contemporary refugee crisis is undeniable (Hatton, 2016): the global number of refugees has risen rapidly with the Syrian civil war, and there were more than 21 million refugees globally by the end of 2015 2Available online at http://popstats.unhcr.org/en/time_series. http://popstats.unhcr.org/en/time_series Non-state actor violence: Refugees and state capacity 4 according to the UNHCR. Existing work has identified several different ways in which an increase in a state’s refugee population might give rise to civil conflict. Based on the postulated positive links between refugees and civil war in this literature, one should expect the current rise in refugees to go together with an increase in new outbreaks of civil war, at least for refugee populations in neighboring countries. An increase in both refugees and civil wars appeared to take place in the early 1990s, and there was at least clear anecdotal evidence that refugees often became involved in civil wars in other neighboring states, in line with the refugee-warrior proposition (see Salehyan & Gleditsch, 2006; Zolberg et al., 1989). However, this coincided with a period where we saw many refugees crossing borders in large regional clusters of interrelated and contagious conflicts as in, e.g., the Great Lakes Region of Africa (Gleditsch, 2007). It is difficult to detect a similar corresponding increase in the number of contemporary civil wars in light of the current rise in refugees, and the incidence of civil war is generally known to have declined since the mid-1990s, aside from the Syrian civil war (Gleditsch & Clauset, 2018). This can be confirmed by looking at internal state-based conflicts in the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (Gleditsch et al., 2002; Melander et al., 2016) in the left panel of Figure I. As shown in the right panel of Figure I, however, the number of UCDP internal non-state conflicts appears to have increased notably over the same period. Considering Figure I, it is pertinent to ask if some of the recorded increase in non-state conflict may be associated with population movements. Figure I. Conflict trends, 1989-2015 Note: State-based internal armed conflicts (totals by distinct incompatibilities) in the left panel and non-state internal conflict incidence (total) in the right panel. Time period is limited to 1989-2015 as data for non-state conflict are only available as of 1989. States can experience a number of difficulties when trying to manage the arrival of large numbers of refugees. These difficulties could undermine local livelihoods and generate popular grievances, and induce further negative externalities affecting host states in a number of direct and indirect ways (Adamson, 2006; Dowty & Loescher, 1996; Buhaug & Gleditsch, 2008; Salehyan & Gleditsch, 2006; Bove & Böhmelt, 2016; Milton et al., 2013). However, differences in state capacity can have important effects on the risk of domestic violence at the outset, and the relevance of the specific mechanisms differs between institutionally and economically developed and less Non-state actor violence: Refugees and state capacity 5 developed states (Fearon & Laitin, 2003). State capacity shapes the success of challenges by violent opposition groups, as stronger government capacity can reduce the ability of rebels to take advantage of national grievances as well as the likely support for rebels (de Rouen & Sobek, 2004). State capacity also influences a government’s ability to prevent conflict and to withstand the spread of violence from neighboring territories (Braithwaite, 2010). Although existing research provides many contributions and helpful insights, it does not engage directly with whether and how refugees can provide opportunities for unconventional forms of political violence among non- state actors. In fact, past works by e.g., Salehyan & Gleditsch (2006) suggest that refugees can increase the risk of civil war by, e.g., altering the ethnic balance of host societies, worsening already poor economic conditions, and by facilitating the traveling of weapons and mobilized belligerents across borders. Yet, grievances against the state are not always present when there is social tension, and the state as an actor is not necessarily involved in episodes of violence. Salehyan & Gleditsch (2006) highlight the role of refugees from neighboring countries in conflict, which are more likely to have ties to local populations’ cleavages, and argue that refugees hosted in countries far from the origin were unlikely to give rise to a higher risk of civil war. Gleditsch & Bartusevičius (2018) further demonstrate the role of potential incompatibilities and contend that refugee flows from neighboring countries are primarily associated with a higher risk of conflict when countries have observed cleavages that can give rise to conflict. We complement existing works on civil wars by showing that refugee populations may also be associated with non-state conflict. Moreover, we investigate in detail under which circumstances more refugees can increase the risk of violence. There are a number of scope conditions and intervening factors that can mitigate or exacerbate the impact of population movements on different types of violence in the host state in diverse and complex ways, such as the presence of pre-existing incompatibilities, the type of grievances against the state, the cultural differences between native populations and refugees, and other surrounding contextual parameters. We contribute to furthering this line of research by exploring how state capacity, or the lack thereof, moderates the negative externalities of large population movements on the risk of violent conflict in receiving states. Our research builds on and extends earlier studies on refugees and conflict by investigating some of the contextual factors that may enhance or hamper violence diffusion through refugee flows (Salehyan & Gleditsch, 2006), paying particular attention to non-state violence, which is commonly defined as communal conflict (see Sundberg et al., 2012). We argue that refugee populations can be linked to non-state violence, but that this threat affects weaker states to a much greater degree than countries with stronger state capacity. Non-state violence, refugees, and state capacity Refugees and non-state violence As discussed above, most of the existing literature concentrates on violent conflict that directly targets the state either over control of the government or for territorial secession. We focus on how tensions between refugees Non-state actor violence: Refugees and state capacity 6 and the local population could also lead to non-state violence in cases where conventional civil war may be less likely. Non-state conflict and refugees are plausibly linked through various mechanisms that relate to the costs on a host society (see also Savun & Gineste, 2017). These mechanisms may also suggest that refugees can become ‘targets’ of non-state violence. And in other cases, we might observe an increase in the risk of local groups fighting each other, where refugees themselves are not directly involved in violent conflict. In what follows, we provide an argument for the macro-level effect of refugees on non-state violence. The perceived economic burden placed by immigrants on the local population’s welfare seems to be one of the main drivers of hostility toward refugees (Preston, 2014). In fact, a larger refugee population can intensify existing problems associated with economic scarcity (Dancygier, 2010). This is consistent with the work of Homer-Dixon (2010), who contends that the likelihood of violence increases with scarce resources. Alternatively, as people migrate to other areas to escape resource scarcity, we may see clashes with native populations over resource access or the distribution of goods. Refugees also compete with locals over limited public services such as food assistance, housing support, or medical services. Indeed, the very presence of refugees may generate grievances and tensions between natives and the refugees – especially if the former see refugees as a threat or feel that refugees are depriving the local population of what is rightfully theirs (Chambers, 1986; Weiner, 1992; Savun & Gineste, 2017; Fjelde & von Uexkull, 2012).3 Overall, this discussion leads to the formulation of our first, unconditional hypothesis: Hypothesis 1: The risk of non-state violence increases with the number of refugees in a country. The mediating effect of state capacity Without ignoring the humanitarian and moral aspects of the plight of refugees, host states could experience difficulties in trying to manage or accommodate refugees, which may generate popular grievances and violence against refugees. It seems plausible that the negative externality accompanying hosting refugee populations will be more severe and the ability to control violence lower in weak states, i.e., countries that are characterized by a low level of state capacity. In the following, we argue that state capacity mitigates the conflict-generating aspects of refugee populations. To this end, we focus on the administrative capacity of a high-capacity state to develop and disseminate information and (re-) distribute goods and services in an effective manner (see Hendrix, 2010). We see the strength of the bureaucratic apparatus as the most important aspect of state capacity; in particular, we look at the quality of public and civil service, including its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, as well as the credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies. Hence, we focus on the ‘economic capacity’ to provide public goods and, as a result, to reduce the grievances of the population rather than the ‘security capacity’ to deter violence directly. Particularly important for our purposes, Adamson (2006, 176) shows that refugees can ‘overwhelm a state’s capacity to provide public services and can lead to conflicts over resources’. Most of the world’s refugees are 3The appendix elaborates on the underlying, micro-level implications of this macro-level framework. Non-state actor violence: Refugees and state capacity 7 hosted in poor countries where already rather weak state institutions are put under additional pressure.4 In the words of Dowty & Loescher (1996, 47), ‘the cost falls disproportionately on nations least able to afford it, where the presence of large impoverished refugee populations further strains resources and perpetuates the poverty of the host nation. Refugees need water, food, fuel, and land; the environmental impact in already-marginal areas may be devastating. [...] They require social services beyond those provided by international agencies, putting further strain on domestic structures that may already have been inadequate’. At the same time, Sundberg et al. (2012) show that developing countries, in particular in Africa, see the largest number of non-state conflicts, suggesting that existing pressures on weak states are likely to increase as a large number of refugees can worsen the competition over already scarce resources. Although low-capacity states have limited ability to provide services or ensure sustainable livelihoods, they are particularly poorly suited to manage pressures arising from refugees. Not surprisingly, states ‘with high levels of institutional capacity are in a much better position to adapt to this new environment than are weak or failing states’ (Adamson, 2006, 176). We claim accordingly that the quality of state institutions is likely to play a major role in shaping and addressing possible tensions between refugees and locals, and preventing instances of non-state violence in the presence of large refugee populations. According to the IMF (2016), the impact of refugees on medium and long-term economic prospects hinges on how countries manage to integrate refugees in the labor market (see also Maystadt & Verwimp, 2014). Successfully addressing the challenges associated with refugees and responding to their needs effectively will be more difficult in societies with inadequate social welfare provision and no income support or unemployment benefits. All this depends on the quality and professionalism of the state apparatus – a key feature of our understanding of state capacity. Countries with more professional institutions are likely to be in a better position to minimize the negative social and economic aspects linked to refugee populations. In turn, this should reduce the risk of tensions between refugees and locals and the likelihood that this will foster non-state violence. As an illustrative example, consider how states differ in their ability to factor in the challenges associated with the arrival of refugees. According to the OECD (2015, 13), for example, European countries have long established introduction programs for refugees, generally related to language training, but also with a focus on labor-market integration, which is vital for ‘migrants’ economic independence, and a precondition for a positive economic impact of migration’. Nations with strong state capacity could even reap many benefits from access to a greater pool of skilled workers, which might promote technological innovation, stimulate economic growth, and redistribute gains to compensate potential losers. Immigrants are carriers of a variety of ideas and abilities, and the economic benefits of increased openness to immigration will tend to outweigh the economic costs, at least in the aggregate. Thielemann (2018) suggests here that when larger and more capable states accept to host large numbers of asylum seekers, they make a significant contribution to the provision of regional stability by reducing the scale of unregulated movement and stabilizing volatile situations. Ultimately, the degree to which organized non-state actors are involved in episodes of violence depends on 4This is stressed in a report from the Brookings Institution, available online at https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/ uploads/2017/01/global_20170109_foresight_africa.pdf. https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/global_20170109_foresight_africa.pdf https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/global_20170109_foresight_africa.pdf Non-state actor violence: Refugees and state capacity 8 the level of state capacity. In light of this discussion, although refugee flows can generate economic strains and pressures for violence, states with a high level of economic capacity can offer a sufficient level of public good provision and an effective economic and social integration so as to ensure peaceful cohabitation. Where the state is weak, however, there is little to prevent tensions between refugees and the local populations from emerging.5 We thus expect that any effect of refugee populations on a higher risk of non-state violence should be conditional on state capacity. Support for integration, access to social services, and better infrastructure can reduce the tensions between refugees and locals – and, thus, the risk of non-state violence. Hypothesis 2: State capacity conditions the effect of refugees on the risk of non-state violence. Research design Data, dependent variables, and methodology We constructed a time-series cross-section data set containing all countries between 1989 and 2015, using the country-year as the unit of analysis. The time period is determined by the data availability for our variables. A central aspect of our theoretical argument is that many of the mechanisms through which refugees are meant to increase the risk of conflict include tensions with locals. But this does not entail clear grievances against the state authorities as such, especially if local populations see refugees as responsible. An implication of this claim is that refugee populations are likely to be associated with non-state conflict, but not necessarily with a higher likelihood of a full-scale civil war involving the host country’s government as a belligerent. Against this background, in a first step, we conduct an empirical analysis where we jointly model peace, non-state conflict, and civil war as separate outcomes in a multinomial logistic regression framework. The goal of this analysis is to show that there may not be a significant or substantive influence of refugees on civil conflict as the outcome, at least in the absence of a cleavage for mobilization exacerbated by refugee inflows. After having established this finding, we then concentrate on non-state conflict as the outcome with logistic regression models. The first dependent variable for the multinomial regression analysis codes for each country-year whether there was no conflict at all (0; we use this outcome value as the baseline category), non-state conflict (1), or civil conflict (2). Our data source for value 1 of that item (and the binary dependent variable described below) is the UCDP Non-State Conflict Dataset (Sundberg et al., 2012; Melander et al., 2016), which defines non-state conflicts as ‘the use of armed force between two organized armed groups, neither of which is the government of a state, which results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in a year’. Organized groups are defined either formally or informally. The former refers to ‘any non-governmental group of people having announced a name for their group and using armed force against another similarly formally organized group’. The latter comprises ‘any group without an announced name, but who uses armed force against another similarly organized group, where there is a clear pattern of violent incidents that are connected and in which both groups use armed force 5Note that in countries with high levels of state capacity, social services provided through government funding are also targeted at native communities, which significantly reduces concerns over locals having a limited access to public services. Non-state actor violence: Refugees and state capacity 9 against the other’. The Non-State Conflict Dataset excludes incidents of one-sided violence, where organized groups use violence against unorganized civilians.6 Moreover, violence by unorganized individuals such as hate crimes against refugees and riots by refugees or local populations are not included as they do not meet the group criterion and are spontaneous rather than organized.7 However, note that the data are not limited to formal organizations but also include ‘informally organized groups [...] without an announced name, [...] who use armed force against another similarly organized group’, and cover ‘communal violence [...] between very broad categories of identification’, with the codebook citing the case of Hindus vs. Muslims in India as an example. We see non-state conflict onset in about 2.7% of the 5,118 observations in our sample. The data on civil conflict (value 2 of the nominal dependent variable) are taken from Gleditsch et al. (2002) and Themnér & Wallensteen (2012), and we employ the 25 battle-deaths threshold to define onsets. We convert the recorded instances of non-state or civil conflicts since 1989 to binary variables indicating the onset of (at least) one non-state or state-based conflict in a given country-year. Since we focus on onset, we drop all ongoing conflict years from the analyses, and a country with past conflict only enters the analysis in the first non-conflict year (following the definitions above). In turn, we use this information to construct the nominal variable for the multinomial regression analysis. Note that non-state violence onset and civil conflict onset occurred in 13 observations at the same time, while there are 68 cases in which ongoing non-state conflict and ongoing civil-conflict years overlap. We drop these country-years to ensure that the categories of the dependent variable for the multinomial regression are mutually exclusive. The outcome variable for our second set of analyses is binary and we use logistic regression models as a result. This dichotomous dependent variable comprises all onsets of non-state violence, regardless of whether these overlap with state-based civil conflict onsets or incidence. The standard errors in either the multinomial regression or the logit models are clustered by country to control for potential differences in the variance between states. Explanatory variables Our argument focuses on refugee populations, state capacity, and the interaction of these two variables as we expect the latter to moderate the effect of the former on the risk of, particularly, non-state actor conflict. First, for refugee populations, we rely on the UNHCR Population Statistics Reference Database. These data provide information on the number of different ‘population types’ per country year. We concentrate on refugees, persons in refugee-like situations, and asylum seekers as the relevant population types, and calculate the total number of these groups in a country-year. Internally displaced persons or returnees are excluded from our measure, since these sub-populations are likely to differ in important ways from those populations we focus on. Based 6Although the UCDP also collects data on one-sided violence by non-state actors, we show in the appendix that these are largely confined to actors involved in a state-based civil conflict. Hence, although we could see one-sided violence by organized non-state actors against refugees, such events will not be systematically captured by existing data, largely limited to situations with ongoing or recent civil conflict. Evaluating one-sided violence against refugees would also benefit from information on victims to assess whether refugees are specifically targeted. Although we see more one-sided violence by governments against civilians outside civil war (Savun & Gineste, 2019), governments are unlikely to have incentives to target refugees unless they perceive a high risk of organized violence, which would suggest a higher risk of civil conflict. 7See Savun & Gineste (2017) on refugee riots and Koopmans & Olzak (2004) on hate crimes. Non-state actor violence: Refugees and state capacity 10 on the raw data from the UNHCR, we replaced missing observations by 0s and we added the value of 1 before taking the natural logarithm of the total number of refugees to arrive at the final item, Refugees (ln) (mean value of 6.565; standard deviation of 4.495). The pairwise correlation between Non-state conflict and Refugees (ln) is 0.084 (p<0.001). Second, although state capacity is a potentially multidimensional concept that is challenging to measure (see also Hendrix, 2010), we focus on state capacity pertaining to the strength and quality of the bureaucratic apparatus. Countries with an effective bureaucracy are most likely to be able to maintain, control, and sustain state services. Similarly, Fukuyama (2013) argues that measures of state capacity based on what the state produces are problematic and, instead, suggests that state capacity is best to be measured by looking at how governments function, specifically bureaucratic procedures, capacity, and autonomy. We capture this empirically by the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), which report aggregate governance indicators for more than 200 countries in 1996-2015. These data are based on enterprise, citizen, and expert survey respondents in industrial and developing states, and further incorporate information from over 30 individual data sources (e.g., survey institutes, think tanks, non-governmental organizations, international organizations, or private sector firms). The specific variable we focus on, namely government effectiveness, is intended to capture perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies. The WGI measure is widely used in the literature, but the temporal scope is limited in that data before 1996 are not available. To overcome this, we rely on an alternative indicator from the Political Risk Services Group’s (PRSG) International Country Risk Guide, which is based on expert assessments on a state’s bureaucratic quality and ranges in [0; 4]. According to the PRSG, ‘high points are given to countries where the bureaucracy has the strength and expertise to govern without drastic changes in policy or interruptions in government services. In these low-risk countries, the bureaucracy tends to be somewhat autonomous from political pressure and to have an established mechanism for recruitment and training. Countries that lack the cushioning effect of a strong bureaucracy receive low points because a change in government tends to be traumatic in terms of policy formulation and day-to-day administrative functions’. We combine the two variables by interpolating missing values of the WGI variable using information from the PRSG. The final variable, State capacity, is thus an interpolated version of the WGI item covering the period from 1989 to 2015, and its pairwise correlation with Non-state conflict is -0.091 (p<0.001). It has a mean value of -0.028 with a standard deviation of 0.966. Note that refugees are present in countries of all levels of state capacity, with or without non-state conflict. Finally, we include a multiplicative interactive term between Refugees (ln) and State capacity to examine whether state capacity moderates the effect of refugees. With regard to the control variables, we consider a series of other covariates reflecting alternative influences leading to the outbreak of non-state conflict that are also plausibly associated with refugees and state capacity. First, taken from the World Bank Development Indicators, we control for a country’s midyear total population, Non-state actor violence: Refugees and state capacity 11 which counts all residents regardless of legal status or citizenship – however, refugees not permanently settled are included only in Refugees (ln). Second, we use an indicator for democracy based on the 21 point combined polity score from the Polity IV database, ranging from −10 to 10, with higher values reflecting states with more democratic institutions (Marshall & Jaggers, 2016). As this particular democracy measure might be endogenous to factional non-state conflict, we use the modified XPolity variable by Vreeland (2008). Since some work on regime type and civil war suggests that partly democratic countries are more prone to conflict than both full democracies and full autocracies (Hegre et al., 2001), we also include the square term of XPolity as well. Third, we consider the share of population in excluded ethnic groups, based on the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) data (see Cederman et al., 2010; Wimmer et al., 2009). According to the EPR data, included/excluded ethnic groups are defined by ethnicity and their access to power. Excluded groups (largely) lack access to executive power, i.e., representation in the presidency, the cabinet, and senior posts in the administration, including the army. Ethnic groups are also excluded if they are discriminated, powerless, or have regional or separatist autonomy. For our specific question, ethnic exclusion and tensions might not only affect the risk of non-state conflict, but also the degree of state capacity and refugees’ self-selection into host societies: it is plausible that refugees may avoid fleeing to countries that have significant ethnic tensions manifested in political exclusion of ethnic groups. We use the normalized share of the population in excluded groups. Finally, to address temporal dependencies in the analysis using our nominal outcome variable, we calculate cubic polynomials based on the time elapsed (in years) since the last conflict onset (if any and however defined it may be, i.e., non-state conflict or civil conflict) following Carter & Signorino (2010). As the outcome variable for our second set of analyses differs from the multinomial regressions, we adjust the variables for temporal correction accordingly (i.e., the time elapsed since the last onset of non-state violence, its squared term, and this variable raised to the power of 3). Empirical findings Table I and Figure II summarize our findings based on the multinomial logistic regression analysis. First, our coefficient estimates for the non-state conflict outcome suggest that state capacity can mitigate the negative externalities in the relationship between refugee populations and non-state violence. Second, when coming to the results for the civil-conflict outcome, however, our main variables of interest – with the exception of State capacity – are no longer statistically significant. Figure II supports these conclusions. We plot average marginal effects of Refugees (ln) on Non-state conflict (left panel) and Civil conflict (right panel). The pattern in the left panel of Figure II shows, in line with our expectations, that the marginal effect of Refugees (ln) is positive and significant for low levels of State capacity, but becomes insignificant with higher values of the latter. However, this differs from the civil-conflict context (right panel), where the influence of refugees is statistically insignificant at any value of State capacity.8 8Our results for civil war are not directly comparable to Salehyan & Gleditsch (2006), though. We do not impose their suggested scope restriction to refugees from neighboring countries, while Salehyan & Gleditsch (2006) do not consider an interaction between refugees and state capacity. Our main purpose here is not to examine the more specific conditions under which refugees can increase Non-state actor violence: Refugees and state capacity 12 Table I. Non-state actor violence and civil conflict: Refugees and state capacity Model 1: Non-state violence Model 1: Civil conflict Refugees (ln) 0.029 0.104 (0.053) (0.068) State capacity 0.560 −1.718** (0.397) (0.583) Refugees (ln) × State capacity −0.091* 0.097 (0.041) (0.060) Population (ln) 0.432** 0.232** (0.118) (0.084) XPolity 0.164** −0.027 (0.059) (0.033) XPolity2 −0.042** −0.006 (0.013) (0.011) Excluded population 0.482 0.156 (0.828) (0.509) Peace years −0.262 −0.556** (0.143) (0.116) Peace years2 0.011 0.034** (0.016) (0.013) Peace years3 0.000 −0.001 (0.000) (0.000) Constant −9.636 −6.840** (2.030) (1.457) Obs. 3,204 Pseudo log likelihood -449.688 Prob > χ2 0.000 * p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; two-tailed. Standard errors clustered on country in parentheses. In the following, we focus on non-state conflict as the outcome variable. We present four additional models in Table II. Model 2 only includes the variables correcting for temporal dependence and State capacity in order to show that there is an independent effect stemming from the moderating variable. Model 3 provides an estimation with only the temporal controls and all our main explanatory variables, excluding the substantive control items. Model 4 includes the temporal controls and other control covariates, but we omit Refugees (ln) and the interaction term. Model 5 is our full estimation where all explanatory items are considered. Figure III depicts the average marginal effects of Refugees (ln) for given values of State capacity. The left panel of Figure III shows the substantive effects of our variables of interest for Model 3, whereas the right panel summarizes the average marginal effects associated with Refugees (ln) for Model 5. As expected, a larger number of refugees in a country is associated with a higher risk of non-state actor conflict, but only when countries have little state capacity. For example, increasing Refugees (ln) from its minimum to its maximum while holding State capacity at -2 (with all other variables in Model 5 held constant at their means) increases conflict risk from 0.8% to 6.8% – an increase of 6%-points. This is mirrored by the average marginal effect of Refugees (ln), which is positive and statistically significant at conventional levels for low values of State capacity. In both the left and the right panel of Figure III, these effects become statistically insignificant for higher levels of State capacity. To this end, the point estimate for the predicted probability of conflict risk decreases when changing Refugees the risk of civil war, but rather the more direct relationship to non-state conflict. Non-state actor violence: Refugees and state capacity 13 Figure II. Non-state actor violence and civil conflict: Refugees and state capacity in a multinomial logistic framework Note: Graph shows average marginal effects of Refugees (ln) conditional on State capacity, while holding all other covariates constant at their means; vertical bars signify 95% confidence intervals; rug plots at horizontal axes illustrate distribution of State capacity ; left panel pertains to Non-state conflict ; right panel pertains to Civil conflict. (ln) from its minimum to its maximum while holding State capacity at +2 (all other variables hold constant at their means) from 0.021 to 0.002; both estimates are statistically insignificant, however, based on Model 5. The risk of non-state conflict in low-capacity states increases with an influx of refugees, but remains rather low. As discussed above, this refers to a rise of about 6%-points when moving from the minimum to the maximum of the item on refugee populations. These results strongly and robustly support our theoretical argument. As an illustrative case, consider Lebanon, which had one of the largest refugee populations in the world in 2015 (about 1.08 million refugees), and a rather low state capacity (-0.471). According to a recent report by Human Right Watch,9 the Syrian refugee crisis coupled with limited international support and the government’s failure to provide basic services has led to a resurgence of violence in the country. Recent years have witnessed an increase in the number of ‘vigilante-style attacks’ directed at the large Syrian refugee population (Reuters, July 25, 2016) and, even in absence of visible attacks, aid agencies are increasingly concerned by a hostile shift in public opinion (NPR, September 2, 2017). Already inaccessible and in poor condition, the Lebanese public-health care system was particularly unprepared to deal with large numbers of refugees. Several assessments show that worsening living standards are closely connected to rising inter-communal tensions, particularly over access to social and municipal services (Ghanem, 2014; Mercy Corps, 2017). According to Maria Assi, the CEO of Beyond Association, an organization helping refugees in Lebanon, the upsurge in hostilities is caused by a ‘failure of the government and international aid agencies to put in place a long-term strategy to help the country adapt to the increase in population’ (NPR, 9Available online at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2017/country-chapters/lebanon. https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2017/country-chapters/lebanon Non-state actor violence: Refugees and state capacity 14 Table II. Non-state actor violence: Refugees and state capacity Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Refugees (ln) 0.089* −0.002 (0.041) (0.034) State capacity −0.466** −0.081 −0.368* 0.261 (0.151) (0.484) (0.153) (0.306) Refugees (ln) × State capacity −0.044 −0.075* (0.049) (0.032) Population (ln) 0.468** 0.473** (0.082) (0.092) XPolity 0.091* 0.078* (0.036) (0.035) XPolity2 −0.031** −0.027** (0.008) (0.007) Excluded population 1.047 0.843 (0.561) (0.521) Peace years −0.126 −0.102 −0.050 −0.038 (0.087) (0.082) (0.101) (0.101) Peace years2 −0.008 −0.009 −0.010 −0.011 (0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) Peace years3 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) Constant −2.333** −3.122** −10.190** −10.289** (0.246) (0.439) (1.574) (1.654) Obs. 4.293 4.293 3.686 3.686 Pseudo log likelihood -496.158 -483.936 -398.345 -395.243 Prob > χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 * p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; two-tailed. Standard errors clustered on country in parentheses. September 2, 2017). Although Lebanon has not seen renewed conventional civil conflict following the influx of refugees, the fact that Lebanon has seen the onset of non-state violence according to our definition in 2015 is consistent with the expectations from the model estimates. Table III. Substantive effects of control variables First difference Lower bound Upper bound (95%) (95%) Population (ln) 0.115 0.052 0.209 XPolity 0.011 0.001 0.022 XPolity2 −0.020 −0.038 −0.007 Excluded Population 0.016 −0.003 0.047 Table entries are based on Model 5 and simulated first differences, while holding all other variables at their means. Finally, for the control variables we evaluate their substantive implications in Table III, which summarizes first differences for each variable, i.e., changes in the predicted probability of non-state actor conflict risk for a variable at its maximum value compared to its minimum value, holding all other variables constant at their means. First, as expected, population is positively associated with conflict risk. For example, conflict risk increases by about 11.5%-points when moving from the minimum to the maximum of Population (ln). The excluded ethnic-population variable is statistically insignificant. We also plot the curvilinear effect of XPolity in the appendix, which shows that the likelihood of conflict is highest at ‘mixed regimes’, i.e., anocracies, which is in line with earlier studies on regime type and conflict. Non-state actor violence: Refugees and state capacity 15 Figure III. Non-state actor violence: Refugees and state capacity Note: The figure shows average marginal effects of Refugees (ln) conditional on State Capacity, while holding all other covariates constant at their means; vertical bars signify 95% confidence intervals; rug plots at horizontal axes illustrate distribution of State Capacity. To assess the robustness of our results, we examined various alternative specifications for the main logistic regression model (Model 5), which are discussed in the appendix. Here, we briefly describe the three most important additional analyses. First, our operationalization of Refugees (ln) is based on the number of refugees, not shifts or changes. It seems plausible, however, that our argument may work for the latter as well. The appendix summarizes the corresponding results: the average marginal effects of Refugee change (ln) decrease with higher values of State capacity, ultimately rendering the impact statistically insignificant. Hence, employing levels or changes for the refugee-population variable does not affect our core conclusions. Second, we replicate our main model when using the non-interpolated version of the WGI and the bureaucratic-quality item from the PRSG, respectively. Third, we include an additional control on the number of refugee camps in a country. Interestingly, the item for refugee camps is associated with an insignificant coefficient estimate. This suggests that there are competing mechanisms at work, which cancel each other out and, eventually, lead to the overall insignificance of the item. While Savun & Gineste (2017) contend that more concentrated refugee populations are more easily controllable, Onoma (2013) outlines that refugees are frequently targeted in times of civil war – and this might be facilitated as refugee populations are more concentrated in camps (see also Lischer, 2005; Fisk, 2014, 2019; Shaver & Zhou, 2017). Conclusion A central claim of our research is that high-intensity forms of organized political violence are unlikely to be linked to refugees. Lower-intensity forms of violence seem, ex-ante and if anything, more plausibly linked to Non-state actor violence: Refugees and state capacity 16 refugee populations, and we should also focus on types of conflict that do not see the state as the central actor. Our article extends existing work on refugees and conflict by analyzing the implications for non-state conflict. The main argument is that refugees can – directly or indirectly – be associated with non-state forms of violence, but primarily when state institutions are weak. The presence of refugees results in social and economic challenges that weak states are less prepared to take measures necessary to prevent (see also Chambers, 1986). The moderating influence of state capacity is important, as developing and emerging countries host the most refugees and suffer disproportionately. Indeed, our results run completely counter to the security rationale cited for efforts to restrict refugee inflows in the USA and many European countries. A key implication of our analysis is that the risk of non-state conflict remains low despite high inflows when hosting states have high capacity. The relevant security implications arise in low-capacity, developing countries. In part as a result of the problems of achieving a proportionate global burden sharing and the reluctance of many developed countries to accept refugees (Bauböck, 2018), UNHCR estimates indicate that as many as 84% of the world’s refugees are hosted in developing countries least prepared to deal with the challenges. If fleeing and fighting are potential substitutes (Okamoto & Wilkes, 2008), efforts to crack down on opportunities for refugees or asylum institutions risk exac- erbating conflicts and their devastating impact in the countries of origin, with potentially worse consequences for neighboring states. Hence, our results should also not be interpreted as evidence in favor of exclusionary policies in low-capacity states against refugees from neighboring countries, as limits to opportunities for asy- lum can exacerbate neighboring conflict and generate even more severe transnational security challenges from conflicts. The link between state capacity and non-state conflict from hosting refugees may seem to have largely negative policy implications, in that many states hosting refugees lack the capacity to implement measures that could be effective in mitigating the risks of violence. However, state capacity is not just determined by domestic forces, and resources from outside a country can also be important to compensate for limited domestic capacity. Many European nations have developed better settlement services for refugees over the course of the recent crisis, and some of this capacity could, at least in principle, be transferred to vulnerable countries hosting refugees closer to ongoing conflicts. Third-party assistance that can raise host countries’ capacities may help these to address the difficulties in trying to manage the arrival of refugees in a way that does not undermine local service provision and generate popular grievances, before tensions arise and the risk of non-state violence increases. For this to happen, states must be less concerned with burden shirking, and steer more foreign assistance and development aid to state-capacity building measures in receiving nations (also Chambers, 1986). Several avenues for future research might emerge out of our work. Since previous research has paid limited attention to the multi-dimensional character of state capacity (Fukuyama, 2013; Migdal, 2001), disaggregating our measure of state capacity based on bureaucratic quality may be helpful. Studying how a more differentiated measure of state capacity plays out with respect to authority and legitimacy might also be an effort worth making (see also Tikuisis & Carment, 2017), and we believe that shedding more light on the willingness and opportunity aspects of state capacity can significantly improve our understanding of how state capacity mediates Non-state actor violence: Refugees and state capacity 17 the security implications of refugee flows. Our current state-capacity measure combines states’ willingness to use their resources with the possibilities they have at their disposal. However, in some cases, a government may actually have the necessary resources, but simply lack the willingness to invest them. Second, it would be interesting to expand the analysis of non-state conflict to other forms of political violence in varying degrees of organization and the relationship between them, as well as variation in intensity and severity. One-sided violence, hate crimes, violence by paramilitary and militia groups could all be interesting alternatives we should study. In addition, non-state actor violence may well be associated with state-based civil conflict in that the former may increase the risk of the latter or that the latter positively influences the onset of non-state conflict. Our multinomial regression analysis assumes that these two alternatives are unrelated to each other at the point of onset, but there may be more complex relationships between one type of conflict and the risk of others over time that are worthy of further investigation. A full analysis of the relationship between different forms of violence goes beyond the scope of this article, but we provide a preliminary analysis based on a simultaneous-equations model in the appendix. This suggests some evidence that non-state conflict may deter refugees and that states with lower state capacity may receive more refugees, but there is little evidence for a clear relationship from non-state conflict to civil war. Finally, our outcome variable in its present form cannot determine whether refugees are the source or the target of violence – or not directly involved in violence at all. This is in line with our theory, and the specific propositions we consider do not require that refugees must be the target or source of non-state violence. However, Onoma (2013) or Cuellar (2006) provide case studies indicating that refugees are often targeted in civil wars. Moreover, parts of our theoretical discussion and the Rohingya illustration also show that refugees frequently become targets of non-state violence in weak states because of the actual or perceived negative externalities they pose. Stigmatizing refugees seems therefore even more misleading, and victims should indeed not be blamed, but the lack of coding of targets in conflict in current data prevent a more thorough analysis. Hence, additional coding efforts to distinguish between refugees as the source or target of violence are necessary. Savun & Gineste (2019), Gineste & Savun (2019), or Polo & Wucherpfennig (2017) have begun to pursue this promising avenue of research; in addition, Fisk (2014) provides spatially disaggregated conflict and refugee data in 26 African countries for 2000-2010, while Shaver & Zhou (2017) have compiled geo-coded data on UNHCR refugee sites in 1989-2008. We conclude that no state is inherently unable to deal with refugees, and there is no automatic link between hosting more refugees and a higher likelihood of political violence. Our evidence helps to clarify the consequences that can be anticipated and what policies could be enacted. If governments are concerned about tensions in countries affected by the humanitarian impact of refugee crises and migration, efforts should be made to strengthen state capacity and the ability to integrate refugees into the local economy (see also Savun & Gineste, 2017). Blaming refugees for heightened security risks or simply closing borders to people in need of asylum entails large humanitarian consequences and can be counterproductive. It is unlikely that people will stop fleeing conflict and persecution, and efforts to close borders are likely to increase the burden on weaker states and force Non-state actor violence: Refugees and state capacity 18 refugees to seek more risky routes with a high loss of life. 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Savun, Burcu & Christian Gineste (2019) From protection to persecution: Threat environment & refugee scapegoating. Journal of Peace Research 56: Forthcoming. Shaver, Andrew & Yang-Yang Zhou (2017) Do refugees spread or reduce conflict? Harvard University: Type- script. Sundberg, Ralph; Kristine Eck & Joakim Kreutz (2012) Introducing the UCDP Non-State Conflict Dataset. Journal of Peace Research 49(2): 351–362. Themnér, Lotta & Peter Wallensteen (2012) Armed conflicts, 1946-2011. Journal of Peace Research 49(4): 565–575. Thielemann, Eiko (2018) Why refugee burden-sharing initiatives fail: Public goods, free-riding, and symbolic solidarity in the EU. Journal of Common Market Studies 56(1): 63–82. Tikuisis, Peter & David Carment (2017) Categorization of states beyond strong and weak. Stability: Interna- tional Journal of Security and Development 6(1): 12: 1–23. Vreeland, James (2008) The effect of political regime on civil war: Unpacking anocracy. 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work_bdmc76ze4bgfrjpoutwy4ynoi4	----	NET Institute* NET Institute* www.NETinst.org Working Paper #13-02 September 2013 The Internet and Hate Crime: Offline Spillovers from Online Access Jason Chan, Anindya Ghose and Robert Seamans Stern School of Business, NYU * The Networks, Electronic Commerce, and Telecommunications (“NET”) Institute, http://www.NETinst.org, is a non-profit institution devoted to research on network industries, electronic commerce, telecommunications, the Internet, “virtual networks” comprised of computers that share the same technical standard or operating system, and on network issues in general. http://www.netinst.org/ http://www.netinst.org/ 1 The Internet and Hate Crime: Offline Spillovers from Online Access Jason Chan, Anindya Ghose, Robert Seamans  Abstract: The Internet has had profound effects on society, both positive and negative. In this paper we examine the effect of the Internet on a negative spillover: hate crime. In order to better understand the link, we study the extent to which broadband availability affects racial hate crimes in the US from 1999 – 2008. To address measurement error, we instrument for broadband availability using slope of terrain. We find strong evidence that broadband availability increases racial hate crimes. The results are stronger in areas with greater racial segregation and with more online searches for racist words, suggesting that the direct effect of the Internet on hate crime is primarily due to a heightening of pre-existing propensities to engage in hate activity. We find no evidence that the Internet has affected crime reporting. The results are robust to alternative specifications and falsification tests. These results shed light on one of the many offline spillovers from increased online access, and suggest that governmental and private regulation of online content may help reduce hate crime. Keywords: Internet, broadband, online-offline interaction, hate crime, race  Authors are listed alphabetically by last names. Chan: Dept of Information, Operations, and Management Sciences, Stern School of Business, New York University, 44 West 4 th Street, New York NY 10012 (email: jchan@stern.nyu.edu); Ghose : Dept of Information, Operations, and Management Sciences, Stern School of Business, New York University, 44 West 4 th Street, New York NY 10012 (email: aghose@stern.nyu.edu); Seamans: Dept of Management, Stern School of Business, New York University, 44 West 4 th Street, New York NY 10012 (email: jchan@stern.nyu.edu). We thank Avi Goldfarb, Jed Kolko, and Seth Stephens-Davidowitz for sharing data. We are grateful for financial support from NET Institute (www.NETinst.org). We benefited from helpful discussions and comments from Chris Forman, Avi Goldfarb, Mitch Hoffman, Sonny Tambe, and Feng Zhu. All remaining errors are our own. mailto:jchan@stern.nyu.edu mailto:aghose@stern.nyu.edu mailto:jchan@stern.nyu.edu http://www.netinst.org/ 2 1. Introduction The Internet has had profound effects on society. Among the many positive spillovers include higher organizational productivity (Brynjolfsson and Hitt 2000), greater consumer surplus (Brynjolfsson et al. 2003, Ghose et al. 2006) and greater collaboration between scientists (Ding et al 2010, Forman and van Zeebroeck 2013). However, Internet technology can also be deployed in less benign ways, leading to negative spillovers from its usage. For example, Bhuller et al. (2013) document an increase in sex crimes due to Internet availability. Moreover, the Internet provides an accessible, affordable, and anonymous channel for posting and sharing hate ideologies. 1 Anecdotally, this appears to have led to an increase in hate related websites. According to a recent estimate, there are over 11,500 hate-related sites including websites, social network pages, chat forums and micro-bloggers (Lohr 2010). Indeed, extremists were among the Internet’s earliest adopters. The Anti-Defamation League notes that hate groups utilized Internet Relay Chat channels (e.g., #Nazi and #Klan), online newsgroups (e.g. alt.politics.white-power and alt.revisionism) and listservs to spread hate agendas even before the first hate site, Stormfront, was launched in 1995. While the Internet may have enabled the spread of hate ideology, the relationship between the Internet and hate crime is theoretically ambiguous (Glaeser 2005). On one hand, greater Internet availability may increase the efficiency with which extremists can spread hate ideology, and may therefore lead to an increase in the number of hate crimes committed. On the other hand, the Internet may improve interconnectivity between individuals and groups, leading to more united communities (Van Alstyne and Brynjolfsson 2005). In addition, the availability of the Internet as a rhetorical outlet may serve to reduce the number of hate crimes by allowing proponents of bigotry to express their frustrations in less physical ways (Glaser et al. 2002, 1 Under the protection of the First Amendment, the use of the Internet to communicate hateful expression is allowed, unless the content incites imminent lawless actions or true threats . See Planned Parenthood v. American Coalition (2002). Available at http://fl1.findlaw.com/news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/abortion/ppacla51602opn.pdf. 3 Gentzkow and Shapiro 2011). Thus, the effect of the Internet on hate crime remains largely an empirical question. In an effort to empirically examine this question, we use geographic and temporal variation in broadband availability to study the effect of the Internet on hate crime in the U.S. We use county-level data on the number of broadband providers and racial hate crimes between 1999 and 2008. We focus on racial hate crime because this category comprises two-thirds of all hate crimes committed in the U.S. In addition, the focus on a specific type of hate crime allows us to explore specific mechanisms driving the results. We use an instrumental variable approach to address measurement error in our measure of broadband availability. Following Kolko (2012), we instrument for the number of broadband providers using slope of the local terrain. Our results suggest that an increase in broadband access leads to an increase in racial hate crime. We also provide an in-depth discussion of the possible mechanisms that are driving the results. One hypothesized mechanism is that the Internet allows better matching between perpetrators and victims. Another hypothesized mechanism is that the Internet acts to heighten pre-existing propensities to engage in hate activity. We find no evidence that Internet availability leads to increased incidence of other crimes including burglary, murder, and robbery. However, we do find evidence that the link between Internet access and racial hate crimes is stronger in areas with higher levels of segregation and which perform more online searches for racist words. Thus, the evidence suggests that the direct effect of the Internet on hate crime is primarily due to a heightening of pre-existing propensities to engage in hate activity. Finally, we conduct a number of robustness checks, including alternative specifications and falsification tests. We also find no evidence that the Internet has affected crime reporting. Our work contributes to several streams of literature. First, our work adds to an existing literature that examines the consequences of IT access and expansion. Extant research in this area has documented various positive outcomes of Internet growth such as facilitating the process of 4 job search (Autor 2001, Stevenson 2008), raising wages and employment levels (Forman et al. 2012, Kolko 2012), increasing organizational productivity (Brynjolfsson and Hitt 2000), enhancing consumer surplus (Brown and Goolsbee 2002, Brynjolfsson et al. 2003, Ghose et al. 2006), and assisting research collaboration (Ding et al 2010, Forman and van Zeebroeck 2013). In contrast, other studies have detailed potentially negative outcomes from the Internet. For example, Bhuller et al. (2013) studies the link between sex crimes and Internet availability and Chan and Ghose (2013) studies the link between online classifieds and HIV. More broadly, in many cases online availability of goods leads to a displacement of offline sales (e.g.: Rob and Waldfogel 2006, Zentner 2006). 2 We add to this literature by describing another negative impact of Internet availability: the increase in racial hate crime. More generally, we examine socioeconomic changes due to increased Internet availability. Other research in this stream includes Chinn and Fairlie (2006) and Goldfarb and Prince (2008) who investigate the role of digital divide. The link between the Internet and interactions between different groups has been examined by Van Alstyne and Brynjolfsson (2005) and Gentzkow and Shapiro (2011). More specifically within this stream, we add to a literature on hate crime. Extant research in this area has studied the prevailing trends of hate activity with respect to changing socioeconomic conditions (Beck and Tolnay 1990) and political economy (Glaeser 2005, Fryer and Levitt 2012), its relation to geographical considerations (Krueger and Pischke 1996) and law enforcement policies (Gan et al. 2011). By empirically demonstrating the role of improved connectivity via Internet availability on racial hate crime, our work sheds light on the theoretically ambiguous relationship between communication technology and hatred (Glaeser 2005). The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the data. Section 3 describes the empirical approach and results. In Section 4, we explore mechanisms that might 2 For dissenting views, see Oberholzer-Gee and Strumpf (2007). 5 account for the effect of the Internet on racial hate crime. In Section 5 we discuss the robustness of our results to alternative explanations. Section 6 concludes with policy implications. 2. Data To examine how the incidence of racial hate crime varies with Internet growth, we consolidated detailed data from various official sources including the FBI, FCC, and U.S. Census Bureau. Hate crime data come from FBI’s annual report, Hate Crime Statistics. The FBI defines hate crimes as criminal offenses motivated, in whole or in part, by the offender’s bias against a race, religion, disability, sexual orientation, ethnicity, gender or gender identity. 3 Since its inception in 1992, the Hate Crime Statistics has drastically improved its coverage of the U.S. population from 51 percent to 85.7 percent. The increase in population coverage over the short period mirrors the emphasis placed by law enforcement to educate its officers in identifying such crime (Gale et al. 2002). 4 We restrict our empirical focus to the years 1999 – 2008 because the population coverage in the data is relatively stable, with a high of 88.6 percent in 2008 and a low of 82.8 percent in 2003. Our main dependent variable is racial hate crimeit, which is the number of racial hate crimes in county i in year t. We construct this variable by summing up the number of racial hate crimes across all the reporting cities in a county for a given year. We focus on racial hate crime for two reasons. First, close to two-thirds of reported hate crimes arise from racial-bias motivations, making racial hate crime the most typical form of bias-motivated crime in the U.S. There are strong motivations to understand the antecedents to the prevailing type of hate crime for effective policy implementation and intervention. Second, the nature of hate crime varies as a function of the target group, and the prevalence of each type of hate crime is affected by a different set of predictor variables (Glaser et al. 2002). To make meaningful inferences, rigorous quantitative 3 The Hate Crime Data Collection Guidelines and Training Manual provides further definitions and classifications for various hate crimes tracked by the FBI, available at http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/data-collection-manual. 4 The high coverage of the Hate Crime Statistics is also an effort in part of the local agencies consistently furnishing hate crime reports to the FBI, voluntarily. In states that do not impose data collection statutes (e.g., Alabama, Georgia and Mississippi), some agencies have nevertheless chosen to submit its reports. http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/data-collection-manual 6 analysis needs to be focused on one specific type of hate crime with careful and detailed empirical modeling. Standard deviations of the number of racial hate crimes during this period do not vary widely, suggesting that racial hate crimes are being classified consistently. 5 This observation is in line with the conclusions drawn in Boyd et al. (1996) and Martin (1995, 1996), that police departments engage in routine practices and well-defined reporting mechanisms to determine the hate-related status and hate type of an incident. Though the hate crime data do not suffer from documentation issues and ambiguous classification, it may still face the problem of under- reporting (DiIulio 1996). We address the potential effects of under-reporting through a separate test described in detail in the next section. Within our sample, though the absolute number of racial hate crimes decreased from 1999 to 2008, the incidence of these crimes became more evenly dispersed. The number of counties reporting at least one hate crime has risen by 23.5 percent from 1999 to 2008. The highest rate of racial hate crime over this period, 34.7 out of 10,000, was reported for Scott County, Arkansas in 2003. Our main independent variable is the number of broadband providers in county i in year t, BBProvidersit, which we use to measure broadband availability. We choose to focus on broadband access to the Internet over earlier forms of access as extant research shows that broadband adoption significantly increases the overall usage of the Internet, heightens the consumption of online content in quantity and diversity, and affects a range of online and offline activities (Hitt and Tambe 2007, Kolko 2010a). More specifically, the reduction in waiting times for loading images, sounds, and videos via broadband availability facilitates the likelihood and willingness to consume hate content online. We construct the variable for broadband availability by averaging the number of broadband providers across all ZIP codes in county i in year t. The data comes from 5 Gale et al. (2002) makes a similar observation. They reasoned that as hate crimes becomes more clearly defined, the distribution of the data would “tighten” over time. By comparing the hate crime rate from 1992 to 1995, they found a clear downward trend in the standard deviations of the data in Hate Crime Statistics. 7 FCC Form 477 which reports the number of broadband providers at each ZIP code offering broadband services at 200 kilobits per second or faster. Broadband providers include telephone- line DSL, cable modems, wireless, satellite, and power-line technologies. The FCC data is the only comprehensive indicator of U.S. broadband availability that is recorded annually since 1999 (Flamm 2006, Kolko 2010b), and is extensively used by policy makers and academics to assess broadband availability (California Public Utilities Commission 2006, Grubesic 2006, Xiao and Orazem 2011, Kolko 2012). Using data on the number of broadband providers from the FCC and proprietary data on broadband use from Forrester Research, Kolko (2010b) shows that the extent of broadband availability increases monotonically with the number of broadband providers. Given that broadband policies often work by adding providers to an area via public provision, subsidization and regulation, it is meaningful in a policy context to employ the number of broadband providers as a proxy for Internet availability. Several limitations of the FCC data have been documented in previous work (Greenstein and Mazzeo 2006, GAO 2006, 2009, Kolko 2010b, Xiao and Orazem 2011): the FCC data does not report whether providers serve consumers or businesses, how much they charge for service, the speed of their service, and whether they provide service to the whole or only part of a ZIP code. As a result, using the FCC data to measure broadband availability introduces measurement error. For example, there may be business but not residential subscribers in a ZIP code, so the FCC’s count will overstate residential broadband availability. In addition, the FCC does not report the actual number of providers for locations with 1-3 providers, instead grouping them into a single category. Following Kolko (2012), we assign a value of two to ZIP codes reported as having 1-3 providers. The provider count variable limits our ability to express the effects of additional providers on racial hate crime incidence quantitatively. Moreover, it introduces additional measurement error: ZIP codes with one or three providers will be incorrectly coded as having two providers. The presence of measurement error in our independent variable leads us to 8 adopt an instrumental variables approach described in Section 3.1 below. For use in robustness tests, we also construct categorical measures of broadband providers. In this alternative measure, various categories (or bins) are created to denote a specific range of providers. In other robustness tests, we use state-level counts of high speed Internet lines as a measure of Internet availability. This data, also reported on FCC Form 477, is only available at the state level, and suffers measurement errors of its own. For example, providers with fewer than 250 subscribers do not need to report on subscriptions. We combine racial hate crime and broadband availability measures with demographic, economic, and crime-related information from a variety of sources which allow us to control for the underlying propensity of racial hate crimes across locations. The U.S. Census provides county and state level information on migration rates, racial proportions, age proportions, and the number of persons below the poverty line. Estimates of these measures are available yearly from 1999 to 2008. The FBI database Law Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted provides our data on the annual number of police employees at each county. To control for general crime level, we rely on FBI’s Uniform Crime Report for counts of crimes by county. Table 1 provides descriptive statistics of our data. 3. Empirical Approach and Baseline Results 3.1. Empirical Approach Our identification strategy involves two approaches. First, we use fixed effects to account for location and time based factors that affect racial hate crime. These fixed effects help control for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity that varies across counties, such as long-standing culture of prejudices or tolerance, or level of urbanization. We also include a set of time-varying demographic, economic, and crime-related covariates (described below) to account for time- varying local factors that might affect racial hate crime such as changing attitudes towards various racial groups, changing economic conditions or policies, and episodes of conflict and terrorism. 9 Second, we follow Kolko (2012) and instrument for the number of broadband providers using the slope of the local terrain. The instrumental variables (IV) approach helps us address attenuation bias arising from measurement error in our independent variable BBProvidersit. To be a valid instrument, slope should be correlated with broadband availability and not directly correlated with racial hate crime. Our instrument identifies cross-sectional variance in the costs to broadband providers in extending Internet service to an area. As noted by GAO (2006) and Prieger (2003), terrain features such as slope affect the cost to extend broadband service in an area. Kolko (2012) finds a strong negative correlation between slope and the number of broadband providers. The exclusion restriction holds if slope does not have a direct effect on the incidence of racial hate crime, independent of its relationship with Internet availability. Terrain characteristics such as slope are unlikely to bear direct effects on racial hate crime, as these criminal acts are largely induced by human ideologies, prejudices, and influences, and not geographic factors. Though there may not be direct effects on racial hate crime, slope of a location may be linked to crime incidence indirectly. Locations with flat terrains are likely to be urbanized areas that may possess demographic and economic features associated with higher incidence of crime levels (Glaeser and Sacerdote 1999). To account for this possibility, a set of key demographic and economic drivers of crime rate are included in our model specifications as covariates. More specifically, we include age proportion and race proportion to account for potential demographic- based effects on crime incidence. The amount of migration is used as a covariate to account for the level of population heterogeneity and racial tolerance. The number of people below the poverty line, the number of police employees and general crime levels are included to control for the propensity of crime outbreaks in locations. Finally, the county fixed effects framework controls for any unobservable location-based effects, while the yearly dummies accounts for temporal effects that may potentially bias the validity of our instruments. We note that there are substantial differences in the number of broadband providers across the years. To allow for heterogeneous 10 impacts on the effects of our instrument over time we interact slope with year dummies, an approach that has been widely used in past research (e.g., Forman and van Zeebroeck 2013, Stevenson 2008). Our baseline specification to identify the effects of broadband availability on racial hate crime is as follows: (1) , where racial hate crimeit denotes the number of racial-based hate crimes in county i in year t, BBProviderit-1 represents the number of broadband providers, Xit-1 is a vector of control variables, Ci denotes location fixed effects, and Yt represents year fixed effects. We have included a lagged specification for broadband availability and controls to avoid simultaneity issues. Robust standard errors clustered over counties are used in our analyses. For the IV-approach to be valid, we require the expansion of broadband Internet to be unrelated to different underlying time trends in racial hate crimes across counties. To check for this possibility, we perform a test following Duflo (2001) that interacts the baseline year covariates with either a linear time trend (2) ∑ , or with time dummies (3) ∑ . This setup allows the broadband availability to be related to different underlying time trends in racial hate crime across locations. 3.2. Baseline Results Table 2 reports our baseline results linking broadband availability to racial hate crime. Column 1 provides pooled OLS results, Column 2 provides Fixed Effects OLS results, and Columns 3-8 provide IV results. The pooled OLS results in Column 1 include demographic controls, poverty, size of the police force and general crime levels. The coefficient on the number of broadband providers is positive and significant at the 1% level, indicating a significant correlation between 11 our measure of broadband availability and racial hate crime. However, the pooled OLS regressions do not account for unobserved heterogeneity across counties that may affect the incidence of racial hate crimes. Column 2 replicates Column 1, but includes county fixed effects and year dummies. The coefficient on broadband providers remains positive, but not significant. However, the fixed effects may exacerbate the attenuation bias arising from measurement error in our measure of broadband availability, so we turn to an IV approach. As described in Section 3.1, we instrument for broadband availability using slope of terrain. We report the results for both the first- and second-stage regressions. As expected, increases in slope of the local terrain are associated with a lower likelihood of broadband availability. The negative relationship holds across various years under various specifications in Table 2. Values of the F-statistics on the excluded instruments in the first-stage regression range from 14.141 to 28.422, and in all cases are significant above the 1% level. We also report the Stock and Yogo (2005) critical thresholds for weak instruments. Following Stock et al. (2002), we report critical thresholds for the test that the bias of two-stage least squares regression is no more than 10% of the inconsistency of ordinary least squares regression, and that the size of the maximal Wald test for the first-stage instruments is large enough that a 5% hypothesis test rejects no more than 15% of the time. Across all models, the F-statistic surpasses these critical values, indicating that the models do not suffer from weak instrument biases. Column 3 shows the estimates from the IV specification with only county fixed effects and year dummies. The results show a positive and significant coefficient on broadband providers, suggesting that racial hate crimes increase as broadband availability increases. The next three columns in Table 2 include control variables to investigate the extent to which the IV estimates of broadband availability are sensitive to the inclusion of time-varying observable factors. We add demographic controls in Column 4, poverty in Column 5 and the size of the police force and 12 general crime level in Column 6. The coefficient on broadband availability is significant and similar in magnitude across all specifications. In Columns 7 and 8, we include additional covariates constructed from the interaction terms of our observables with time trend and time dummies as per Equations (2) and (3). The coefficients on broadband availability remain significant and similar in magnitude across these additional specifications. These results provide us with some confidence that the IV-estimates are not subject to biases arising from underlying time trends in racial hate crimes. In addition, all of our IV models are overidentified and the p-values of the overidentification statistics indicate that the exclusion restriction of our instruments cannot be rejected at conventional levels. We note that the OLS fixed effects results in Column 2 differ in magnitude and significance from the IV results reported in Columns 3-8. The likely explanation for this difference is measurement error of the independent variable, which will exacerbate the attenuation bias arising from measurement error. We therefore perform a Durbin-Hausman-Wu test to better understand the role of measurement error. A comparison of the OLS estimates in Column 2 with the IV estimates in Column 6 under the test reveals a statistically significant difference between the two. This test result indicates that systematic measurement error is present and the model is biased under OLS estimation. 6 4. Mechanisms In this section, we investigate two possible mechanisms linking the Internet to racial hate crime. To this end, we adapt the approach in Bhuller et al. (2013) and decompose the overall effect of the Internet on racial hate crime into the separate effects of (1) the Internet on racial hate crime propensity and (2) the Internet on matching. This approach helps motivate a set of related questions that we address empirically. 6 This issue is well documented in labor and political economy research. For examples, see Krueger and Lindahl (2001), Miguel, Satyanath and Sergenti (2004) and Cotet and Tsui (2013). 13 4.1. The Internet and Racial Hate Crime Propensity One channel through which the Internet may affect racial hate crime is by changing the propensity to engage in racial hate crime. Individuals with a high racial hate crime propensity are more likely to commit such crime than others with a low propensity. However, in principle, the Internet may be equally likely to raise or lower the propensity to engage in racial hate crimes. Other researchers have carefully described these two perspectives. One perspective is that the internet raises the propensity to engage in extremist behavior. Mckenna and Bargh (1998) argued that norms in online groups exert a stronger than usual influence over members’ behaviors, as group membership provides acceptance of their ideologies and enhances their self-esteem and worth. McKenna and Bargh (1998) find that people who initially communicate a taboo identity on the Internet are subsequently likely to both incorporate that identity into their sense of self and to display it in “real life”. Even without actual participation in an online hate site, individuals who affiliate themselves to similar hate ideologies can still be motivated to carry out hate agendas proposed on the Internet on their own. For example, the post- September 11 terrorist acts carried out by the independent local groups did not take direct orders from Al Qaeda. These groups see the Al Qaeda as a source of inspiration to carry out their own independent terrorist acts (Sageman 2011). Other research on extremist groups suggests that far- right music is an effective recruiting tool (CNN 2012). While hate music cannot be bought in regular music stores, the availability of such music online (e.g., hate band websites, MySpace, last.fm, and other music-listening platforms) is suggestive of a positive relationship between hate crime propensity and prevalence of online hate activity. 7 Don Black, a white supremacist and member of various hate groups reported in a TV program that he was able to recruit people via the Internet whom he would have otherwise not reached. He further commented that his website, 7 For instance, the music of End Apathy – a neo-Nazi band can be easily found online. Wade Michael Page, a longtime member of the band went on a mass shooting at a Sikh temple in 2012, killing six people and wounding four others. 14 Stormfront, provides people who support similar ideologies with a forum to communicate to one another and form a virtual community (Anti Defamation League 2001). These perspectives suggest a positive relationship between hate crime propensity and the prevalence of online hate activity. An alternative perspective emphasizes the potential cathartic effects of participating in online hate sites, arguing that the Internet provides an open rhetorical forum for racists to express their opinions and vent their frustrations in a non-physical manner (Glaser et al. 2002). Also, Adams and Roscigno (2005) suggest that certain hate groups such as the Ku Klux Klan (KKK) use online platforms to advocate for non-violent administrative and political legislation, instead of physical expressions of their racial biases. Finally, with the presence of hate sites on the Internet, hate activity becomes more transparent to the public, allowing for active monitoring by watchdog groups and the government (Glaser et al. 2002). Anti-hate groups such as the Anti Defamation League among others have worked to debunk untrue statements made on hate sites, 8 thereby stifling potential opportunities for physical crimes to arise due to extreme ideologies posted online. We undertake several tests to investigate whether the Internet is likely to raise or lower the propensity to engage in racial hate crimes. In these tests, we attempt to understand the differential effect of Internet availability across areas that vary in terms of hate risk propensity. We use both offline and online measures of hate risk propensity. All else equal, we expect locations with high risk propensity to exhibit a stronger effect from Internet availability than locations with low risk propensity, should Internet availability increases the propensity to commit racial hate crimes. Historical prejudices have led to the segregation of blacks from whites in residential areas. As such, scholars have argued that residential segregation serves as an indicator for the level of racism and risk propensity in a location (Cell 1982). A commonly-used indicator of segregation is 8 See, for instance, http://www.adl.org/combating-hate/cyber-safety/. 15 dissimilarity. Dissimilarity measures the evenness of the distribution of the two social groups across an area (Cutler et al. 1999). The dissimilarity index, ranging from zero to one, is used to indicate the share of the black (or white) population that would need to change areas for the races to be evenly distributed in a city (Duncan and Duncan 1955). Another common measure for segregation is entropy (Massey and Denton 1988). The entropy index ranges from zero to one, where zero represents the situation where all subareas have the same population composition as the entire area (maximum integration), and where one represents the situation where all subareas contain one group only (maximum segregation). 9 We perform a median split of the counties based on their scores of dissimilarity and entropy index, and rerun our regressions on the sub-samples. In addition, we examine the differential effect of Internet availability across locations based on an online measurement of racial animus. Using the volume of Google search queries that include racially charged language, Stephens-Davidowitz (2012) develops a non-survey proxy for racial animosity of 200 media markets in the U.S. 10 By using search data, this online based measurement of racial animus is unlikely to suffer from social censoring biases as it is easier to express socially taboo thoughts when one is alone and online (Kreuter et al. 2008). We map the 200 media markets to counties in our dataset. We then split our sample based on the median index value and run separate regressions on the sub-samples. Columns 1 and 2 of Table 3 examine the impact of broadband availability split by dissimilarity scores, Columns 3 and 4 examine its effect by entropy index and Columns 5 and 6 examine the impact by racially charged online searches. The coefficient on number of broadband providers is positive but not significant in Column 1 (i.e., low dissimilarity), and is positive and significant in Column 2 (i.e., high dissimilarity). A similar result can be seen in Columns 3 and 4, 9 Gentzkow and Shapiro (2011) use similar indices of segregation to construct measures of ideological segregation. 10 Stephens-Davidowitz (2012) creates the index by averaging the counts of searches for racial epithets in each market from 2004-2007. He notes that the racial epithet is typically preceded or followed by search terms including “hate” or “joke(s)”. 16 where the low measure of entropy index holds a non-significant coefficient, and the high measure of entropy index has a positive and significant effect. That is, we use two common measures of residential segregation, and find that our main results are largely driven by areas with a high degree of segregation. Next, comparing Columns 5 and 6, we see that locations with more racially charged online searches experience a positive and significant effect from broadband availability, while areas with less racially charged online searches do not. In sum, it appears that the relationship between Internet availability and racial hate crimes is due, at least in part, to a heightening of racial hate crime propensity. 4.2. The Effect of Internet on Matching The Internet can also affect the prevalence of racial hate crimes via an indirect mechanism that involves increasing the number of matches between perpetrators and victims. Literature on online platforms shows that the Internet reduces search frictions, enabling more matches to form in the labor market (Autor 2001), the marriage market (Hitsch et al. 2010), the e-commerce market (Bakos 1997), and even the casual sex market (Chan and Ghose 2012). There may be several ways in which the Internet can increase the number of matches between potential hate perpetrators and victims. First, the Internet expands the choice set of victims by facilitating the matches that were previously unavailable through a lack of connection in traditional social networks. The process of locating a target can now be easily achieved through social media pages and networking sites. Second, the Internet is able to reduce information constraints between the hate perpetrators. For instance, an anti-abortion group created a website which included the names, photographs, addresses, and names of spouses and children of doctors who allegedly performed abortion. The site called for its supporters to bring justice, and marked the names of doctors who were wounded by protesters or killed by anti-abortionists (Kaplan and 17 Moss 2003). 11 Third, the Internet provides an additional channel for racial hate crime to be committed via online targeting. For example, in one well-known case a college student sent derogatory email messages and threats to hundreds of Hispanic faculty members, students, and persons employed at various institutions. 12 Finally, the anonymous nature of the Internet allows a perpetrator to befriend and solicit information from potential victims under a fake identity, thereby gaining access to a larger pool of individuals. While the Internet may allow perpetrators to more effectively reach potential victims online, it is not clear this will translate to more offline matches. Given widely publicized cases of cyber-stalking and the well-known risks of meeting online strangers, Internet users exercise care in divulging personal information online and are cautious in meeting online strangers alone for the first time. Furthermore, there may be a substitution effect between time spent online and time available for other activities. If more time is spent online in hate sites and social networks, there will be less time available for direct interaction with victims in real life, resulting in fewer matches. Thus, the relationship between the Internet and matching is ambiguous. To examine whether the matching effect plays an important role in driving the observed relationship between broadband availability and racial hate crimes, we consider the effect of broadband availability on crimes other than hate crimes. This check will reveal the indirect matching effect of the Internet, under the assumption that latent risk factor for these alternative crimes are not affected by the Internet. We focus on robbery, murder, and burglary as alternative crimes to investigate for three reasons. First, according to the FBI, these crimes do not represent the usual manifestations of racial hate crimes. Crimes that are associated with racial hate crimes will make it difficult to separate out any matching effects from the increased latent risk effect facilitated by Internet 11 See www.cbsnews.com/2100-201_162-20910.html. 12 See United States v. Kingman Quon (1999) Available at www.adl.org/civil_rights/newcyber.pdf. 18 availability. To formally check if these crimes are linked to racial hate crime, we separately run a regression of the number of robbery, murder and burglary on the number of racial hate crimes, controlling for county and year fixed effects and the same set of covariates as before. Results in Columns 1 to 3 of Table 4 show that racial hate crimes are not associated with burglary, murder and robbery. This result agrees with the FBI’s annual reports on hate crime, which show that the proportions of hate crime executed via these crimes are extremely low. 13 Second, the latent risk factors for robbery, murder and burglary are not known to bear any relationships with Internet availability, unlike other crimes like rape and other sexual offenses (e.g., Bhuller et al 2013). Finally, perpetrators of robbery, murder, and burglary would likely need to perform some form of planning before committing the criminal act. The planning of these crimes may involve effects of matching facilitated from Internet availability. To test for any matching effects, we perform a regression of these crimes on the number of broadband providers, separately, under the IV framework. Columns 4 to 6 in Table 4 report the results from the second stage of the IV regression. The coefficients on number of broadband providers are not significant in any model, suggesting that broadband availability has no effect on robberies, murders and burglaries. These results suggest that the link between the Internet and racial hate crime is not due to the matching effect from the Internet. Instead, it appears that the link between the Internet and racial hate crime is primarily due to heightened propensities to engage in hate crime. 5. Alternative Explanations In this section we address alternative explanations that may account for our results. We accomplish this in several steps. First, in order to rule out misspecification, we run multiple alternative specifications, including a set of results using a different measure of broadband 13 According to FBI statistics, most of the hate crimes manifest through simple assault, intimidation, and vandalism/property damage, with very few (if not none) committed via robberies and vagrancy. Less than 2% of hate crimes fall under robberies, murder, or burglary. 19 availability and a different instrument. Our results are robust to these alternative specifications. Second, we discuss the possible effect of the Internet on the reporting of crimes, and conduct two tests to rule out reporting effects as an alternative explanation. Finally, we conduct a falsification test, which further corroborates the causal direction of our main results. 5.1. Alternative Specifications We first examine the robustness of the baseline results to a categorical specification of broadband availability. Four different specifications of broadband provider count are tested: (1) the first bin denotes counties with 0-2 providers, the second represents that with 2-4 providers, the third indicates that with 4-6 providers, and the fourth represents that with more than six providers; (2) the first three bins are similar to the previous specification, with the fourth bin representing 6-8 providers and the last bin denoting more than 8 providers; (3) and (4) are largely similar to specifications (1) and (2) respectively, except the first bin denotes 0-3 providers and the second bin represents 3-4 providers. In all cases, we make the first bin the base group, so that we can interpret the resultant effect on racial hate crime with respect to increasing numbers of broadband providers. Across various specifications in Table 5, we observe positive coefficients for all bins, and significance in many cases, especially for the higher bin values. These results offer further evidence of the positive impact broadband availability on racial hate crime. Furthermore, we note that the coefficient sizes tend to increase with the number of providers, but experience a diminishing effect as the number of providers extends beyond eight. This finding corresponds well with the results in Kolko (2010b) which shows a monotonic and non-linear relationship between the number of broadband providers and the extent of broadband availability. In a second robustness check, we analyze the relationship between racial hate crime and broadband availability using a cross-sectional model that specifies our variables in a first- 20 difference format. This cross-sectional specification explicitly models for how the change in racial hate crimes is related to the growth in broadband availability as follows: (4) , where racial hate crimei represents the change in racial hate crimes in county i between 1999 and 2008, BBProvideri denotes the change in broadband providers in county i during the same period and Xi is a vector of controls at the baseline year. In Columns 1 and 2 of Table 6, we report the results of the first differenced OLS analyses. As in Column 2 of Table 2, these results show no significant relationship between broadband availability and racial hate crime, potentially due to attenuation bias arising from measurement error. In Column 3 and 4 we turn to IV regressions. In the first stage, the slope coefficient holds a negative and significant relationship with the change in broadband provider count between 1999 and 2008. The values of the F-statistics of both specifications are beyond the threshold levels, supporting earlier evidence that our instrument does not suffer from weak instrument biases. Looking at the second stage IV regression results in the Table 6, we see that the change in broadband providers has a positive and significant relationship with the change in racial hate crime. Third, we check the robustness of the main results to the removal of outlier observations. The prevalence of hate crimes may reach abnormally high or low levels in periods experiencing external shocks. For instance, the rate of racial hate crimes across the study period experiences a sharp peak and valley in the years 2001 and 2002, respectively. We suspect that shifts in hate crime rates are induced by the terror-related attacks on September 11, 2001. Anger, frustration and fear after the terror event can result in indiscriminate attacks on innocent individuals who appear to be of Muslim, Middle Eastern, or South Asian descent (Kaplan and Moss 2003). Following a sharp increase in such crimes, local enforcement task force may step up efforts to curb hate crimes, bringing about the decline in the adjacent year. Thus, in Table 7, we rerun the baseline 21 regression models after removing observations from 2001 and 2002. The results are consistent with those reported in Table 2. In a fourth robustness check, we work with state level data on the number of high speed Internet lines as a regressor in place of broadband providers. 14 In estimating the models involving this regressor, we adjusted all other variables to the state level. We note that slope values that are averaged across larger geographic areas become less representative of the local terrain features, thereby losing the desirable characteristics of capturing the cost of extending broadband service in the area. To alleviate this issue, we use the number of local connections to the ARPANET as an instrument in place of slope. The ARPANET is a wide area data communication network that was a predecessor of the Internet. The increase in number of connections to the ARPANET captures the variance in data communication infrastructure and human expertise with networking technologies. Availability of technical infrastructure and human expertise allow Internet providers to enjoy higher benefits and lower costs in extending Internet connections in those locations. Positive correlations between access to Internet and ARPANET connections are observed in the first stage IV regressions in previous studies involving Internet use (Forman et al. 2012, Forman and van Zeebroeck 2013). Furthermore, ARPANET connections represent historical decisions in the 1970s about connectivity to U.S. Department of Defense and university networks, thus the number of connections is unlikely to be correlated with the current prevalence of racial hate crimes, fulfilling the exclusion restriction needed for instrument validity. In Columns 1-2 of Table 8, we report the OLS results, which show a positive but not significant relationship between broadband providers and racial hate crime. In Columns 3-6, we report results from IV analyses. In Columns 3 and 5, we note that the number of ARPANET connections has positive and significant correlations with the number of Internet high speeds lines for various years but the value of its F-statistics is below the threshold values. The values of the F- 14 As noted above, this data also comes from the FCC’s Form 477. 22 statistics reach an acceptable level under the limited information maximum likelihood (LIML) specification, suggesting that the estimates derived under the LIML model will be more appropriate. Similar to the baseline analysis, the instrumental variable regressions are overidentified and the p-values of overidentification range from 0.118 to 0.516, implying that the number of ARPANET connections satisfies the exclusion restriction. Across all four models, the number of high speed lines holds positive and significant coefficients. In sum, the set of regressions reported in Tables 5-8 provide evidence that the main results are robust to alternative specifications. 5.2. Reporting Effects We next rule out that heterogeneity in reporting of crimes is influencing our results. If reporting does not differ systematically with broadband availability, the interpretation of our IV results would not be affected. However, it may be possible that broadband availability may increase reporting of crimes (or reduce underreporting of certain crimes), as the Internet presents an alternative way for victims and witnesses to report crimes. If broadband availability systematically affects the level of reporting, our IV estimation will overestimate the true impact of Internet on increasing the incidence of racial hate crimes. To test for this possibility, we run a set of checks using the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS). The NCVS is the largest ongoing survey of a nationally representative sample of residents conducted bi-annually to understand the characteristics of criminal victimization and incidence of crimes not reported to law enforcement. For our first check, we use NCVS data from 1979 to 2004 and tabulate the proportion of crimes that are reported. We then check whether the reporting trends differ between the pre- and post-Internet periods. Given that the first commercial ISP emerged in 1990, 15 we define the years prior to 1990 to be pre-Internet and the years after 1990 to be post-Internet. A set of demographic and crime related covariates are included in the regression along with location fixed effects. We 15 The first ISP, The World, started in 1990. See http://www.zakon.org/robert/internet/timeline/. 23 then compare the trend coefficients across the two periods. For robustness, we also conduct the test using alternate dates for the start of commercial Internet. As reported in Table 9, there is an increase in crime reported over time for both the pre- and post-Internet periods. Chi-square tests indicate that the difference in coefficients from the two periods are not statistically significant, suggesting that the increase in crime reporting in the post-Internet period does not differ from that in the pre-Internet period. Though this check provides some assurance that Internet availability does not affect crime reporting patterns, this test does not directly rule out a potential relationship between broadband availability and crime reporting trends, which we next address. We next regress the percent of crimes reported on broadband availability to understand whether a systematic relationship is present between the two factors. We include a full set of demographic and crime related factors, and use location fixed effects. We control for time effects in two ways: 1) a linear time trend and 2) year dummies (i.e., year fixed effects). Table 10 shows the estimates of regression analysis. Throughout all specifications, the coefficients on broadband providers are not statistically significant, suggesting that broadband availability does not change crime reporting trends. These two tests provide evidence suggesting that the positive relationship between Internet availability and racial hate crime is not driven by an increase in crime reporting due to greater broadband availability. 5.3. Falsification Tests Finally, we conduct two falsification tests to check whether the observed relationship is spurious. In the first test, we replace the current racial hate crime incidence with that from 1992 to 1998, while maintaining the broadband availability from the period 1999-2006. Internet access in the pre-broadband period in 1992-1998 is largely facilitated by dial-up technology. Hitt and Tambe (2007) find that quantity and diversity of information consumed in the pre-broadband adoption is lesser than that consumed after broadband adoption. With lower accessibility to online hate content in the pre-broadband period, we expect the coefficient on broadband availability to be 24 non-significant. Significant estimates in this falsification test would suggest that the instrument variable is correlated with underlying location-specific trends in racial hate crimes. Table 11 reports the result of this falsification test and compares it to the coefficients from the baseline IV specification (see Columns 1 and 2). It is reassuring to find no evidence of a significant correlation between the broadband availability in 1999-2006 and the pre-broadband racial hate crime trends in 1992-1998. The second falsification test checks whether next year’s broadband availability affects current racial hate crimes. A significant coefficient in this check would suggest that there is some omitted variable that drives the trends in racial hate crimes and broadband expansion simultaneously. We report the result of this test in Column 3 of Table 11. It is reassuring to find that the next year’s broadband availability does not affect the current levels of racial hate crimes. 6. Conclusion In this paper, we study the link between the Internet and racial hate crime in the U.S. We use slope of terrain as an instrument for the number of broadband providers to address measurement error. We provide evidence consistent with the idea that broadband availability leads to an increase in racial hate crime. In addition, we find that the effect of Internet is stronger in locations with greater segregation and more racially charged online searches. Thus, our analyses suggest that the increase in racial hate crime is induced by a positive effect of broadband availability on the risk propensity to commit racial hate crimes. Finally, we rule out a number of alternative explanations. Our study has implications for the policy debate over content regulation on the Internet. Recently, Facebook came under criticism for not doing enough to restrict hate speech on its site. 16 Our results suggest that efforts by popular websites such as Facebook to regulate user-generated content on their sites will help reduce hate crimes. More broadly, while the First Amendment protection for online hate activity remains as a high bar to hurdle, steps have been taken over the 16 Doug Gross, “Under Pressure, Facebook Targets Sexist Hate Speech,” CNN. Available http://www.cnn.com/2013/05/29/tech/social-media/facebook-hate-speech-women/index.html. Accessed June 30, 2013. 25 years to abate potential abuse of the Internet as a tool for propagating hate agendas. In an effort to address the preponderance of online hate sites, the U.S. Congress passed the Communication Decency Act in 1996 and the Children Internet Protection Act in 2001. Progress is also made in rulings against the First Amendment protection of online hate content. For instance in late 2001, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the anti-abortion website which shows the names and information of abortion doctors constitute a true threat of force and will therefore be not protected by the First Amendment. The jury had since ordered the site owners and operators to pay the listed doctors and abortion clinics more than $100 million in damages. While the results of this study may argue in favor of stricter censorship and regulation of hate activity on the Internet, care needs to be exercised in order for effective policy outcomes to result. Though online hate sites may perpetrate more hate crimes, the same resource can be reconfigured as a forum for open discussion and exchange, which may help address the root problem of racial biases and misconceptions. 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Dev Min Max Source Log (Racial Hate Crimes) 0.443 0.783 0 4.779 FBI Log (BB Providers) 1.629 0.449 0.693 3.069 FCC Log (Slope) 0.875 0.994 0 3.539 ArcGIS Log (Migration) 3.457 2.086 0 9.681 US Census African American to White Ratio 0.161 0.363 0.001 5.632 US Census Proportion Above Age 60 0.197 0.044 0.076 0.526 US Census Log (No. in Poverty) 8.706 1.174 5.318 12.917 US Census Log (No. Police Employees) 4.629 1.367 0 10.948 FBI Log (No. Crimes) 5.154 2.059 0 9.956 FBI 30 TABLE 2: BASELINE SPECIFICATION Baseline Specification Covariate Interactions OLS OLS IV Est. IV Est. IV Est. IV Est. Time Trend Time FE (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 1 st stage DV: Log(BB Providers) Log (Slope)*Year=2000 -0.003 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 0.002 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Log (Slope)*Year=2001 -0.030*** -0.028*** -0.028*** -0.028*** -0.025*** -0.010** (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Log (Slope)*Year=2002 -0.047*** -0.044*** -0.041*** -0.041*** -0.038*** -0.030*** (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) Log (Slope)*Year=2003 -0.048*** -0.045*** -0.041*** -0.041*** -0.036*** -0.028*** (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) Log (Slope)*Year=2004 -0.043*** -0.039*** -0.031*** -0.032*** -0.026*** -0.021*** (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) Log (Slope)*Year=2005 -0.082*** -0.078*** -0.074*** -0.075*** -0.066*** -0.056*** (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) Log (Slope)*Year=2006 -0.072*** -0.068*** -0.062*** -0.062*** -0.052*** -0.042*** (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) Log (Slope)*Year=2007 -0.073*** -0.068*** -0.061*** -0.061*** -0.051*** -0.047*** (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 2 nd stage DV: Log(Racial Hate Crime) Log (No. BB Providers) 0.094*** 0.002 0.308** 0.405*** 0.436*** 0.432*** 0.485** 0.479** (0.02) (0.03) (0.14) (0.15) (0.16) (0.16) (0.21) (0.24) Demographic controls        Economic controls       Crime-related controls      County & Year F.E.        Observations 9523 9523 9523 9523 9523 9523 9523 9523 F-statistics (1 st stage) 28.422 25.574 21.481 21.530 16.031 14.141 Stock and Yogo (2005) CV 11.39/18.54 11.39/18.54 11.39/18.54 11.39/18.54 11.39/18.54 11.39/18.55 J-statistics 7.800 7.982 7.847 7.880 7.746 10.885 Over-ID test (p-value) 0.351 0.334 0.346 0.343 0.356 0.144 Notes. Model 1 is a pooled OLS regression without fixed effects. Regressions in Models 2-8 include county and year dummies. Stock and Yogo (2005) critical values are reported for relative bias > 10% and maximal instrumental variable size > 15%, respectively. Robust standard errors, clustered on county, are in parentheses. The first year in the first stage regression is 1999, and is omitted in the interactions with slope as the reference group. All regressors are lagged by one period to avoid simultaneity biases. By using lagged regressors, the last year interacted with our instrument is 2007. * Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1%. 31 TABLE 3: EFFECT IN LOCATIONS WITH VARYING SEGREGATION Dissimilarity Entropy Index Online Search Below Median Above Median Below Median Above Median Below Median Above Median (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 2 nd stage DV: Log(Racial Hate Crimes) Log (BB Providers) 0.188 0.734** 0.214 0.809** -1.067 0.351*** (0.36) (0.30) (0.34) (0.34) (1.55) (0.11) Controls added       Notes. All regressions include constant term, county and year dummies. Robust standard errors, clustered on county, are in parentheses. All regressors are lagged by one period to avoid simultaneity biases. * Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1%. TABLE 4: EFFECT ON ALTERNATIVE CRIMES OLS Estimation IV Estimation Robbery Murder Burglary Robbery Murder Burglary (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Log (Racial Hate Crimes) 0.006 0.002 -0.002 - - - (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) Log (BB Providers) - - - -0.042 0.057 -0.002 (0.20) (0.19) (0.21) Controls Added       Notes. The dependent variable for each column is the log count of the crime stated at the top of the column. All regressions include county and year dummies. Second stage results are shown for Columns 4, 5, and 6. Robust standard errors, clustered on county, are in parentheses. All regressors are lagged by one period to avoid simultaneity biases. * Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1%. TABLE 5: CATEGORICAL SPECIFICATION OF REGRESSOR (1) (2) (3) (4) 2 nd stage DV: Log (Racial Hate Crimes) Bin II 0.739* 0.760* 0.527 0.534 (0.39) (0.39) (0.37) (0.38) Bin III 0.713** 0.783* 0.236 0.222 (0.36) (0.40) (0.19) (0.23) Bin IV 1.274** 1.208** 0.686** 0.715* (0.51) (0.54) (0.29) (0.39) Bin V 1.358** 0.673** (0.56) (0.32) Controls added     Observations 9523 9523 9523 9523 J-statistics 2.548 2.384 5.62 5.539 Overidentification test (p-value) 0.769 0.666 0.345 0.236 Notes. Model 1: Bin I (0-2 Providers), Bin II (2-4 Providers), Bin III (4-6 Providers), Bin IV (> 6 Providers). Model 2: Bin I (0-2 Providers), Bin II (2-4 Providers), Bin III (4-6 Providers), Bin IV (6-8 Providers), Bin V (> 8 Providers). Model 3: Bin I (0-3 Providers), Bin II (3-4 Providers), Bin III (4-6 Providers), Bin IV (> 6 Providers). Model 4: Bin I (0-3 Providers), Bin II (3-4 Providers), Bin III (4-6 Providers), Bin IV (6-8 Providers), Bin V (> 8 Providers). All regressions include county and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors, clustered on county, are in parentheses. * Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1%. 32 TABLE 6: CROSS-SECTIONAL ANALYSIS OLS IV Estimation (1) (2) (3) (4) 1st stage DV: Log ( BB Providers 1999-2008) Log (Slope) -0.117*** -0.081*** (0.01) (0.01) 2nd stage DV: Racial Hate Crimes 1999-2008 Log ( No. ISPs between '08 - '99) 0.053 -0.016 1.694* 3.249* (0.53) (0.34) (0.90) (1.68) Controls Added   Observations 1033 1033 1033 1033 F-statistics (1 st stage) - - 118.902 66.863 Stock and Yogo (2005) CV - - ./8.96 ./8.96 Notes. See Table 2 for descriptions of the Stock and Yogo (2005) critical values. Missing Stock and Yogo (2005) critical values mean they have not been computed or do not apply. Robust standard errors, clustered on county, are in parentheses. * Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1%. TABLE 7: OUTLIER TEST (1) (2) 1st stage DV: Log(BB providers) Log (Slope)*Year=2000 -0.003 -0.000 (0.00) (0.00) Log (Slope)*Year=2003 -0.048*** -0.040*** (0.01) (0.01) Log (Slope)*Year=2004 -0.043*** -0.030*** (0.01) (0.01) Log (Slope)*Year=2005 -0.082*** -0.074*** (0.01) (0.01) Log (Slope)*Year=2006 -0.073*** -0.060*** (0.01) (0.01) Log (Slope)*Year=2007 -0.074*** -0.060*** (0.01) (0.01) Second stage DV: Log(Racial Hate Crimes) Log (No. BB Providers) 0.406*** 0.533*** (0.15) (0.17) Controls Added  Observations 8729 8729 F-statistics (First stage) 30.426 26.287 Stock and Yogo (2005) CV 11.12/16.23 11.12/16.23 J-statistics 1.443 0.485 Overidentification test (p-value) 0.950 0.992 Notes. See Table 2 for descriptions of the Stock and Yogo (2005) critical values. Missing Stock and Yogo (2005) critical values mean they have not been computed or do not apply. Robust standard errors, clustered on county, are in parentheses. * Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1%. 33 TABLE 8: STATE LEVEL INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLE ANALYSIS OLS OLS TSLS LIML TSLS LIML estimates estimates estimates estimates estimates estimates (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 1 st stage DV: Log(High Speed Lines) Log (ARPANET)*Year = 2000 0.150* 0.150* 0.145 0.145 (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) Log (ARPANET)*Year = 2001 0.281*** 0.281*** 0.275*** 0.275*** (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) Log (ARPANET)*Year = 2002 0.137** 0.137** 0.131** 0.131** (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) Log (ARPANET)*Year = 2003 0.088* 0.088* 0.098* 0.098* (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) Log (ARPANET)*Year = 2004 0.068 0.068 0.100** 0.100** (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) Log (ARPANET)*Year = 2005 0.027 0.027 0.022 0.022 (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) Log (ARPANET)*Year = 2006 0.019 0.019 0.009 0.009 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) Log (ARPANET)*Year = 2007 0.006 0.006 -0.007 -0.007 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 2 nd stage DV: Log(Racial Hate Crime) Log (High Speed Lines) 0.020 0.075 1.294*** 1.697** 1.498*** 2.020*** (0.04) (0.20) (0.44) (0.69) (0.44) (0.73) Controls Added     State & Year F.E.      Observations 422 422 422 422 422 422 F-statistics (1 st stage) 3.061 3.061 3.515 3.515 Stock and Yogo (2005) CV 11.39/18.54 ./3.04 11.39/18.54 ./3.04 J-statistics 11.518 9.697 9.330 6.208 Over-ID test (p-value) 0.118 0.206 0.230 0.516 Notes. Model 1 is a pooled OLS regression without state and year fixed effects. Regressions in Model 2-6 include state and year dummies. See Table 2 for description on the Stock and Yogo (2005) critical values. The first year in the analysis is 1999 and is omitted in the interactions with ARPANet nodes as the reference group. Robust standard errors, clustered on state, are in parentheses. All regressors are lagged by one period to avoid simultaneity biases. By using lagged regressors, the last year interacted with our instrument is 2007. * Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1%. TABLE 9: REPORTING LEVELS BEFORE AND AFTER INTERNET EXPANSION Pre-1990 Post-1990 Pre-1991 Post-1991 Pre-1992 Post-1992 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Time trend 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.003** 0.003*** 0.002** 0.004*** (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Controls added        2 test p-value 0.224 0.807 0.424 Notes. The dependent variable is the proportion of crimes reported. All regressions include a constant and MSA fixed effects. Robust standard errors, clustered by MSA, are reported in parentheses. The difference in coefficients between the pre and post periods for all specifications is not statistically significant. 34 TABLE 10: EFFECT OF BROADBAND ON REPORTING LEVELS Time Trend Time FE Time Trend Time FE (1) (2) (3) (4) Log(BB Providers) 0.070 0.050 0.034 -0.055 (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.09) Controls added   Notes. The dependent variable is proportion of crimes reported. All regressions include a constant and MSA fixed effects. Robust standard errors, clustered by MSA, are reported in parentheses. TABLE 11: FALSIFICATION TESTS Baseline Pre-broadband outcomes Next Year Broadband Avail. 2 nd Stage Regression (1) (2) (3) Log (BB Providers) 0.432*** 0.226 0.101 (0.16) (0.15) (0.13) Controls Added    Notes. The dependent variable for Column 2 is the log count of the racial hate crime from 1992 to 1998. The broadband regressor for Column 3 is the next year’s broadband availability. All regressions include county and year dummies. Second stage results are shown for Columns 4, 5, and 6. Robust standard errors, clustered on county, are in parentheses. * Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1%. 
work_bdmop3pj6jb57ipnizlcfekvuq	----	Comparison of Government and Non-Government Alcohol and Other Drug (AOD) Treatment Service Delivery for the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender (LGBT) Community ISUM_A_1271430 TFJATS_StdSerif-800.cls February 6, 2017 15:44 Trim Info: 8.5in × 11in ISUM #1271430, VOL 0, ISS 0 Comparison of Government and Non-Government Alcohol and Other Drug (AOD) Treatment Service Delivery for the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender (LGBT) Community Amy B. Mullens, Jane Fischer, Mary Stewart, Kathryn Kenny, Shane Garvey, and Joseph Debattista QUERY SHEET This page lists questions we have about your paper. The numbers displayed at left can be found in the text of the paper for reference. In addition, please review your paper as a whole for correctness. Q1. Au: Please provide the department for affiliation d. Q2. Au: Do you mean Mullins, Staunton, et al. 2009 or Mullins, Young, et al., 2009 here? Q3. Au: A declaration of interest statement reporting no conflict of interest has been inserted. Please confirm whether the statement is correct. Q4. Au: Please provide all author names, including first initials, for Hayes et al. 2004. Q5. Au: Please provide the volume number and the page range in ref. Strodl et al., 2015. Q6. Au: Please provide a complete reference in APA 6th edition style for Thorpy et al. 2008. TABLE OF CONTENTS LISTING The table of contents for the journal will list your paper exactly as it appears below: Comparison of Government and Non-Government Alcohol and Other Drug (AOD) Treatment Service Delivery for the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender (LGBT) Community Amy B. Mullens, Jane Fischer, Mary Stewart, Kathryn Kenny, Shane Garvey, and Joseph Debattista ISUM_A_1271430 TFJATS_StdSerif-800.cls February 6, 2017 15:44 Trim Info: 8.5in × 11in SUBSTANCE USE & MISUSE , VOL. , NO. , – http://dx.doi.org/./.. ORIGINAL ARTICLE Comparison of Government and Non-Government Alcohol and Other Drug (AOD) Treatment Service Delivery for the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender (LGBT) Community Amy B. Mullensa , b, Jane Fischerc , d, Mary Stewartc, Kathryn Kennye, Shane Garveyf, and Joseph Debattistag a Sexual Health & HIV Service, Metro North Hospital and Health Service, Brisbane, Australia; b School of Psychology and Counselling, University of Southern Queensland, Ipswich, Australia; c Alcohol and Other Drug Service, Metro North Hospital & Health Service, Brisbane, Australia; d Flinders University, Adelaide, Australia; e DRUG ARM Australasia, Brisbane, Australia; f QLD AIDS Council (formerly QLD Association for HealthyQ1 Communities); g Metro North Public Health Unit, Metro North Hospital and Health Service, Brisbane, Australia. KEYWORDS Alcohol and other drug services; attitudes; knowledge; policy; health workers; non-government organizations; LGBT; faith-based organizations ABSTRACT Background: Lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) populations are more likely to misuse alcohol and other drugs (AOD), compared to the general population. However, LGBT engagement with AOD treatment is often precluded by insensitivity and misunderstanding of LGBT issues. These treatment barriers may be a consequence of either worker attitudes, organizational factors or a com- bination of both. Few studies have compared service context as an impediment to AOD treatment. Objectives: This pilot study sought to examine and compare staff attitudes, knowledge and awareness of LGBT issues in two state-wide AOD services within Australia. One organization was a government service, whilst the other was faith based. Methods: A cross-sectional study of a convenience sample (N = 130) of workers employed in a state-wide government AOD service (n = 65), and a state-wide non-government service (n = 65) was conducted. Participants self-completed a questionnaire com- prising tools previously used to assess staff attitudes, knowledge and awareness of LGBT issues. Results: Few significant differences in attitudes and awareness of LGBT issues between government and non-government respondents were found. Nearly all respondents were supportive of LGBT persons irrespective of organizational context, with a small number of negative views. Although most respon- dents demonstrated awareness of organizational policies and practices relating to LGBT clients, many were “unsure” or “neutral” of what these might be. Conclusion: It is confirming that the majority of staff report appropriate attitudes towards LGBT clients. Findings suggest that organizations need to con- tinue to take leadership to strengthen organizational training and capacity to deliver LGBT friendly AOD treatment practices. Studies involving lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgen- der (LGBT) populations in developed countries report higher rates of substance misuse compared to their heterosexual counterparts (Green & Feinstein, 2012; Leonard et al., 2012; Pollock et al., 2012; Roxburgh,5 Lea, de Wit, & Degenhardt, 2016). A number of factors contribute to these higher rates of misuse (Herdt, 1997; Mullens, Young, Dunne, & Norton, 2011a; 2011b). Alco- hol, stimulants, and cannabis use have been historically embedded within gay subcultures (Mullens et al., 2011b;10 Prestage et al., 2007; Prestage et al., 2015), particularly in association with sexual contact (Bourne, Reid, Hickson, Torres-Rueda, & Weatherburn, 2015; Halkitis & Parsons, 2002; Rajasingham et al., 2012), sexually “adventurous” practices (Semple et al., 2009) and enhanced sexual15 experiences (Green & Halkitis, 2006; Mullens, Young, Hamernick, & Dunne, 2009). Reinforcing the role of alcohol within LGBT communities, licensed or sexual CONTACT Joseph Debattista Joseph.Debattista@health.qld.gov.au Metro North Public Health Unit, Bryden Street, Brisbane, QLD , Australia. venues continue to be places where lesbians and gay men have felt comfortable socializing together without fear of 20 stigma from the wider society (Jones-Webb et al., 2013; Mullens, Staunton, Debattista, Hamernick, & Gill, 2009). LGBT people also experience unique challenges related to discrimination and stigma (Pachankis et al., 2014), vic- timization (Collier, van Beusekom, Bos, & Sandfort, 2013) 25 and physical abuse (Goldbach et al., 2014; Ignatavicius, 2013) that can negatively affect psychological well-being (see Flentje, Livingston, Roly, & Sorensen, 2015), and for which some persons use substances to help cope (Mullens et al., 2009; Williamson, 2000). It is well established that Q2 30 some of the most powerful institutions in society have his- torically rejected homosexuality, including various reli- gions, health systems and the media (Meyer, 2013). LGBT persons commonly face a number of specific dif- ficulties (see Leonard et al., 2012). Some of these include 35 social stigmatization, rejection from families, minority ©  Taylor & Francis Group, LLC http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10826084.2016.1271430 mailto:Joseph.Debattista@health.qld.gov.au ISUM_A_1271430 TFJATS_StdSerif-800.cls February 6, 2017 15:44 Trim Info: 8.5in × 11in 2 A. B. MULLENS ET AL. stress and homophobic abuse (Barrett et al.,1995; Bon- tempto & D’Augelli, 2002; Kelly et al., 2015; Strodl et al., 2015; Thorpy et al., 2008), which has also been associ- ated with an increased risk of psychological and substance40 use disorders (Chakraborty et al., 2011; Lyons & Hosk- ing, 2014; Wright et al., 2000). This is exacerbated by barriers to accessing mental health and substance treat- ment services (Cochran & Cauce, 2006; Kaufman et al., 1997; Staunton, 2007). Experiencing anti-LGBT discrim-45 ination has also been associated with increased frequency of unprotected sex (Jarama et al., 2005). To be effective, treatment must focus on and address cultural variables that influence onset, maintenance and relapse risk (Branstrom & van der Star, 2013; Flentje et al.,50 2015; Lombardi & van Servellan, 2000), including spe- cific LGBT issues. However, there has been an histori- cal reluctance by alcohol and other drug (AOD) services to include sexuality within standard assessment tools, thereby underestimating the number of LGBT clients uti-55 lizing those services (Centre for Substance Abuse Treat- ment, 2001). This lack of recognition of LGBT clients within services can create indifference and inhibit cul- tural and organizational change to servicing the needs of this community. Negative or ambivalent attitudes towards60 sexual diversity among some AOD counselors, and lack of sufficient inclusion of LGBT-specific issues, may also impact upon an LGBT individual’s treatment (Eliason, 2000; Talley, 2013). Compounding challenges to LGBT access and engage-65 ment with AOD treatment services there is a large vari- ation amongst LGBT individuals, and unique issues and processes regarding coming out, gender identity and stigma may also impact upon treatment (Lemoire & Chen, 2005). As a result of these specific issues, LGBT70 people may have unique treatment needs and these can be overlooked in more traditional AOD treatment programs (see Eliason & Hughes, 2004; Lombardi & van Servel- lan, 2000). Consequently, failure to take sexual orientation and identity sufficiently into consideration may also have75 a significant negative impact on the success of treatment (Hershberger & D’Augelli, 2000; Talley, 2013). Previous studies have suggested a range of strategies to enhance an LGBT individual’s access to health services. Initiatives should involve education of staff on LGBT80 issues (Cochran, Peavy, & Cauce, 2007), establishment of specialist services for LGBT in place of generalist ser- vices (Senreich, 2010), inclusion of sexual orientation and more flexible gender options on intake forms (Eliason & Hughes, 2004), and the development by services of LGBT-85 sensitive policies and programs (Leonard et al., 2008). Spector and Pinto (2011) recommend counselors and clinicians working in the alcohol and drug sector improve awareness and understanding of how dominant cultural beliefs and counter transference can impact the therapeu- 90 tic relationship and treatment, for example substance use and HIV prevention. There is limited information, to date, available regarding the effectiveness of LGBT awareness training (e.g., Flavin, 1997; Hayes et al, 2004) or LGBT- tailored treatment approaches (e.g., Green & Feinstein, 95 2012; Matthews et al., 2014). Initial studies within health contexts have demonstrated positive impacts regarding LGBT staff training (Hardacker et al., 2014; Kalinoski et al., 2013); however, data regarding secondary impacts upon client engagement and clinical outcomes are limited. 100 It is well established in the general clinical and coun- seling literature, that clients who feel accepted and under- stood, and are receiving “more culturally sensitive health care” (Lombardi & van Servellen, 2000, p. 295) are more likely to engage with therapy and experience enhanced 105 treatment outcomes (Kelly et al., 2015; Talley, 2013). Thus, the purpose of this study was to better understand over- all staff attitudes and knowledge, and awareness of LGBT issues, across two state-wide alcohol and drug services within Australia - a government agency and a faith based 110 nongovernment agency. Specifically we sought to advance the following research questions: What are AOD treat- ment staff attitudes toward LGBT clients, familiarity with LGBT issues, and awareness of organizational LGBT poli- cies?; and Do staff at governmental and nongovernmental 115 AOD treatment services differ on LGBT attitudes, famil- iarity and awareness of organizational policies? Further, we sought to examine whether staff members of a reli- gious affiliated organization may be more or less informed regarding LGBT issues than staff members of a govern- 120 ment funded service; and the possible impact of religious affiliation on service delivery and staff attitudes (Hatzen- buehler, 2014; Meyer, 2013; White & Whiters, 2005). Method Survey instrument 125 A survey was developed adapting and adopting a number of existing survey instruments that have previously been utilized to assess staff and organizational attitudes towards LGBT persons (Eliason, 2000; Gay and Lesbian Health Victoria, 2013; Herek, 1984). The survey was divided into 130 four domains designed to measure staff: attitudes, expe- rience/knowledge/familiarity, demographics and aware- ness of organization policies and procedures. In total, the survey included 62 questions. Items for the Staff Attitudes section were adapted from 135 Herek’s Attitudes Towards Lesbians and Gays (ATLG; Herek, 1984), with an additional 10 items modified and added to include specific attitudes regarding bisexual and transgender persons in the measurement tool; and ISUM_A_1271430 TFJATS_StdSerif-800.cls February 6, 2017 15:44 Trim Info: 8.5in × 11in SUBSTANCE USE & MISUSE 3 reviewed for acceptability among a focus group of AOD140 professionals with experience in LGBT issues. Ques- tion responses used a 9-point Likert scale ranging from Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree. Examples of ques- tions used include: “Lesbians just can’t fit into our soci- ety,” “Male homosexuality is a natural expression of sexu-145 ality in man,” and “God made man and woman: anything else is abnormal.” Questions in the “Attitudes” section were grouped regarding attitudes specifically regarding: gay, lesbians, bisexual and transgender people, to summa- rize views AOD staff may hold regarding one or more of150 these subgroups. An additional question asked about the respondent’s religious denomination or personal spiritual beliefs related to LGBT people. Along with reporting the mean response to individual items, a summary score was also calculated, with a possible score range from 20–180.155 Cronbach α was 0.488 for the twenty items. The Experience/Knowledge/Familiarity section included questions about the respondent’s levels of comfort and familiarity with each of the four populations and knowledge of common issues for LGBT people.160 Questions were drawn from a literature review of issues identified to influence substance use treatment for LGBT people (e.g., Center for Substance Abuse Treatment [CSAT], 2001; Eliason & Hughers, 2004; Staunton, 2007). Responses used a 4 point Likert scale ranging from Not165 at all Familiar to Very Familiar. Along with reporting the mean response to individual items, a familiarity-term summary score was calculated, with a possible score range from 4 to 16. Cronbach α was 0.698 for the four items.170 Respondents were also asked about training or educa- tion focusing on issues relevant to LBGT persons. Exam- ples of questions include: “How familiar are you with the term: transgender persons?,” “How familiar are you with the issue of: coming-out process?,” and “How familiar are175 you with the issue of: heterosexism?.” Along with report- ing the mean response to individual items, a familiarity- issues summary score was calculated, with a possible score range from 13 to 52. Cronbach α was 0.921 for the 13 items.180 The Organization Policies and Procedures section utilized the Sexuality & Gender Identity Organiza- tional Audit produced by the Queensland Association of Healthy Communities (now the Queensland AIDS Council), which was originally derived from the Gay185 and Lesbian Health Victoria Sexual Diversity Health Ser- vices Audit (Gay and Lesbian Health Victoria, 2013). This section included 14 statements concerning organi- zational policies, procedures and staff competencies using a 5 point Likert scale ranging from Strongly Disagree to190 Strongly Agree. Examples of statements were: “Your ser- vice displays pamphlets and posters with positive images,” “Your intake forms include gender-neutral options along- side standard terms,” and “Staff have had equity, diversity or awareness training which includes working with LGBT 195 people.” Along with reporting the mean response to indi- vidual items, a summary score was also calculated, with a possible score range from 0 to 96. Cronbach α was 0.929 for 24 items. Staff demographics included age, gender, sexual ori- 200 entation, childhood and current residence (to determine if respondents were from metropolitan, regional or rural areas), level of education, and number of years’ experience in AOD. A pilot study with 20 respondents was conducted at 205 a government AOD service in a metropolitan site (Bris- bane, Australia) to determine the readability and accept- ability of the survey, and minor adjustments were made accordingly. Participants and recruitment 210 For this pilot study, two state-wide AOD organizations— the state-wide government Alcohol and Drug Service operated by Queensland Health with district based pro- grams dispersed across the State, and a non-government AOD service, DrugARM Australasia, with community 215 programs across Queensland and in adjacent states, par- ticipated in the recruitment of staff. DrugARM Australasia is a not-for-profit organization founded upon Christian values and principles, with a stated aim to reducing harms associated with alcohol and 220 other drug use. DrugARM (Drug Awareness, Rehabili- tation and Management) provides education, awareness, prevention, rehabilitation, street outreach and support programs targeting individuals, families and communi- ties throughout New South Wales and Queensland and 225 South Australia. Following ethical approval, each Health Service Dis- trict in Queensland was approached and permission sought for paper based surveys to be distributed to all government AOD units (both hospital and community 230 based) within each of 15 health service districts. Sur- veys were forwarded to each AOD unit by mail, and then distributed to individual staff for anonymous self- completion. A total of approximately 300 government clinical and administrative staff were approached. 235 The same survey was converted to an electronic for- mat on Survey Monkey and the link distributed to all staff and volunteers of the non-government AOD agency, Dru- gARM. Approximately 150 non-government staff across 16 sites were approached. 240 A total of 65 AOD government staff from 15 Health Service Districts across Queensland (response rate 21.7%) completed the questionnaire over a one month period. ISUM_A_1271430 TFJATS_StdSerif-800.cls February 6, 2017 15:44 Trim Info: 8.5in × 11in 4 A. B. MULLENS ET AL. From the city of Brisbane, 35 surveys were completed with the remaining 30 completed by workers employed245 in regional and rural areas. Through DrugARM a total of 65 staff from 16 sites completed the questionnaire (response rate 43.3%). These included staff working in the National Office (Brisbane), the New South Wales State Office (Sydney), and vari-250 ous counseling, support and treatment programs. Two respondents were student volunteers. Data analysis Data were analyzed using SPSS19. Data (overall findings and aggregated by service type) were analyzed, with per-255 centages of respondents who Strongly Agree/Agree and Strongly Disagree/Disagree or Very Familiar/Familiar and Slightly Familiar/Not Familiar calculated. Using the numerical Likert scale, mean values were calculated for each response for both government and non-government260 respondents, which allowed a direct statistical compari- son between government and non-government staff. Ethics clearance This project received ethics clearance from The Prince Charles Hospital HREC, Metro North Hospital and265 Health Service; HREC/12/QPCH/55 Results Demographics Table 1 provides a summary of self-reported partici- pant characteristics based on site, regarding age, sex-270 ual orientation, region of residence (e.g., urban, regional, rural), and percentage of respondents reporting having had received “some training” or formal education focus- ing on issues relevant to LGBT clients. Table . Demographic characteristics by organization. Demographic characteristics Govt. n =  Non-govt. n =  Age (average, range) ; range – ; range – Gender Female .% .% Male .% .% Sexual orientation Heterosexual .% .% Homosexual .% .% “Other” .% .% Residence Large urban area .% .% Small regional city .% .% Small town .% .% Rural area .% .% Among government service respondents, the majority 275 of respondents had worked in a health service profession for over 10 years (62.9%). The main occupation of gov- ernment respondents was nursing (41.5%), psychology (15.4%) and social work (13.8%). The remaining positions evenly spread over a variety of roles including clinician, 280 manager, aboriginal health worker, counselor, adminis- tration officer, needle and syringe program worker, and mental health worker. This staff composition is generally reflective of the composition of roles within this govern- ment service. 285 Among NGO respondents, approximately a third had worked in drug and alcohol services for 1 to 5 years (33.9%) and 18.8% for 5 to 10 years. A third (33.1%) of NGO participants identified as “volunteers” with the remaining positions divided between non-clinical roles 290 (38.1%), education and training roles (13.1%) and clinical roles (15%), which is generally reflective of the composi- tion of roles within this service. Comparison of government and non-government services 295 There was a significant difference in the median age of government and non-government respondents (43 years vs. 32 years). Non-government respondents were more likely to be female, and most respondents in both organi- zations identified as heterosexual (9.2% and 6.5% of the 300 government and non-government sample, respectively, identified as homosexual; with inclusion of 7.7% and 6.5% identifying as “other” from each service, respectively). These estimates are higher than population estimates (Gates, 2011). Education levels were similar, but with a 305 higher level of postgraduate qualifications within the gov- ernment cohort. This may reflect the younger age and higher number of volunteers within the non-government sector. A greater proportion of non-government respondents 310 (75.4%) resided in large urban areas than government (47.7%) with far fewer residing and working in rural areas (<10% of non-government respondents compared to 29.2% of government respondents). There was a greater dispersion of government respondents across regional 315 and rural areas. Almost a third of the nongovernment respondents were volunteers, a sub-set were non-clinical (38.1%) or engaged in education and training. Fewer non-government respondents compared to government respondents were clinical staff (15% vs. 70.7%). Gov- 320 ernment clinical respondents comprised nurses (41.5%), social workers (13.8%) and psychologists (15.4%). Twice as many government workers than non-government workers reported some training on issues relevant to LGBT clients. 325 ISUM_A_1271430 TFJATS_StdSerif-800.cls February 6, 2017 15:44 Trim Info: 8.5in × 11in SUBSTANCE USE & MISUSE 5 Table . Comparison of government and non-government respondents’ attitudes to LGBT clients. Meana  = strongly agree and  = strongly disagree Attitudes toward LGBT clients Govt. n =  Non-govt. n =  Mean difference Total n =  Sig. difference (.) Attitudes summary score . . . . t() = . p = . %CI:-.–. Lesbians just can’t fit into our society . (.) . (.) . . (.) n/s State laws regulating private, consenting lesbian behavior should be loosened . (.) . (.) . . (.) n/s Female sexuality is a sin . (.) . (.) . . (.) n/s Female homosexuality …what society makes of it can be a problem . (.) . (.) . . (.) n/s Lesbians are sick . (.) . (.) . . (.) n/s Male homosexuals are disgusting . (.) . (.) . . (.) n/s Male homosexuality is a perversion . (.) . (.) . . (.) n/s Male homosexuality is a natural expression of sexuality in man . (.) . (.) . . (.) n/s Homosexual behavior between two men is just plain wrong . (.) . (.) . . (.) n/s Male homosexuality is merely a different kind of lifestyle that should not be condemned . (.) . (.) . . (.) n/s Bisexuals are sick . (.) . (.) . . (.) n/s All people are probably born bisexual . (.) . (.) . . (.) n/s There is no place in the moral fabric of society of bisexuality . (.) . (.) . . (.) n/s Bisexuality is merely one of many normal variants of human sexuality . (.) . (.) . . (.) n/s There should be stricter laws regulating bisexual behavior . (.) . (.) . . (.) n/s Transgender people are sick . (.) . (.) . . (.) n/s Laws that regulate people’s expression of gender should be removed . (.) . (.) . . (.) n/s God made man and woman: anything else is abnormal . (.) . (.) . . (.) n/s Having only two sexes is limiting …an expression of the continuum of gender . (.) . (.) . . (.) . It is necessary to have clear distinctions between women and men . (.) . (.) . . (.) n/s aBased on a scale  = Strongly agree,  = Agree,  = Undecided,  = Disagree, and  = Strongly disagree. Attitudes The majority of both government and non-government AOD workers identified as supportive of LGBT persons, with a small number of respondents expressing negative views (see Table 2). The majority of respondents disagreed330 with adverse statements towards LGBT persons. The results were more mixed when respondents were asked to consider statements concerning transgender per- sons, with more persons, both government and non- government undecided about the following statements:335 “it is necessary to have clear distinctions between women and men,” “having only two sexes is limiting - transgen- der people are an expression of the continuum of gender.” Respondents from both groups were most unsure about the statement “All people are probably born bisexual.”340 While there was a slightly higher rating of positive atti- tudes recorded amongst government respondents com- pared with non-government respondents, there were no statistical differences in mean scores, utilizing indepen- dent samples t-tests for comparisons (see Table 2). There345 was only one attitude item where a significant difference was found. On this item, the need for firm distinctions between male and female, appeared to be more flexible amongst government respondents. Although not statistically significant, the largest differ- 350 ences in attitudes were on the following attitude items: “It is necessary to have clear distinctions between women and men” (0.68 mean difference) followed by “laws that regulate people’s expression of gender should be removed” (0.54 mean difference), “lesbians just can’t fit 355 into society” (0.46 mean difference) and “having two sexes is limiting …” (0.45 mean difference). Govern- ment participants were more likely to agree with all of these statements than non-government organization participants. 360 When asked to consider whether they were “com- fortable” working with LGBT clients, all respondents stated that they were comfortable with Lesbian, Gay and Bisexual clients. However, 3.1% of government and 10.8% of non-government staff stated that they 365 were “not comfortable” working with transgender clients. An overall majority of participants stated that LGBT clients should be “accepted completely,” according to their ISUM_A_1271430 TFJATS_StdSerif-800.cls February 6, 2017 15:44 Trim Info: 8.5in × 11in 6 A. B. MULLENS ET AL. Table . Comparison of government and non-government respondents’ experience, knowledge and familiarity with LGBT issues. Meana  = not at all and  = very Experience/knowledge/familiarity Govt. n =  Non-govt. n =  Mean difference Total n =  Sig. difference (.) Familiarity—Terms summary score . . . . t() = . p = . %CI:.–.) How familiar are you with the term: lesbian persons . (.) . (.) . . (.) n/s How familiar are you with the term: gay men . (.) . (.) . . (.) n/s How familiar are you with the term: bisexual persons . (.) . (.) . . (.) n/s How familiar are you with the term: transgender persons . (.) . (.) . . (.) . Familiarity—Issues summary score . . . . t() = . p = . %CI:.–.) How familiar are you with the issue of: substance misuse prevalence . (.) . (.) . . (.) . How familiar are you with the issue of: relationships . (.) . (.) . . (.) n/s How familiar are you with the issue of: coming-out process . (.) . (.) . . (.) n/s How familiar are you with the issue of: gay-bashing/hate crimes . (.) . (.) . . (.) n/s How familiar are you with the issue of: domestic partnership laws . (.) . (.) . . (.) . How familiar are you with the issue of: legal issues e.g. power of attorney . (.) . (.) . . (.) . How familiar are you with the issue of: coping strategies . (.) . (.) . . (.) . How familiar are you with the issue of: appropriate terminology . (.) . (.) . . (.) n/s How familiar are you with the issue of: homophobia . (.) . (.) . . (.) . How familiar are you with the issue of: heterosexism . (.) . (.) . . (.) n/s How familiar are you with the issue of: internalized homophobia . (.) . (.) . . (.) n/s How familiar are you with the issue of: family issues . (.) . (.) . . (.) . How familiar are you with the issue of: legal protection . (.) . (.) . . (.) . aBased on a scale of  = Not at all,  = Slightly,  = Quite and  = Very. own personal religious beliefs (84.6% of both govern-370 ment and non-government respondents). However, 7.7% and 9.2% of government and non-government workers, respectively, responded that while LGBT people should be accepted, their behavior should be “condemned.” Fur- ther 6.2% and 0.0% of government and non-government375 workers, respectively, felt that they were “sinful and immoral.” Experience/skills/knowledge When asked to consider their familiarity with a range of terms relevant to LGBT people, most AOD respondents380 indicated that they were familiar (statistical compar- isons were made utilizing independent samples t-tests, See Table 3). Government respondents were signifi- cantly more likely to be familiar with the term trans- gender persons, issues of substance misuse, domestic385 partnership laws, power of attorney, coping strategies, homophobia, heterosexism, internalized homophobia and family issues. Familiarity with legal protection was significantly lower (p = 0.001) among government than non-government participants. 390 The largest differences in familiarity were on the fol- lowing issues: the term “transgender persons” (0.39 mean difference), “gay-bashing/hate crimes” (0.20 mean differ- ence), “substance misuse prevalence” (0.18 mean differ- ence) and “internalized homophobia” (0.18 mean differ- 395 ence). Government participants were more likely to be more familiar with these issues than non-government participants. However, overall the mean scores for both groups indicated an uncertainty about most issues, particularly 400 those of a legal nature. Alpha reliability calculations were conducted regarding the 17 items comprising Table 3 regarding self-reported familiarity with LGBT issues (alpha = .927.) ISUM_A_1271430 TFJATS_StdSerif-800.cls February 6, 2017 15:44 Trim Info: 8.5in × 11in SUBSTANCE USE & MISUSE 7 Organization policies and procedures405 Overall, knowledge of organizational policies was simi- lar across government and non-government respondents, with the mean score indicating uncertainty for most items (though government respondents tended to score slightly higher in awareness; statistical comparisons made via410 independent samples t-tests, See Table 4). However, with respect to bullying, use of gender-neutral terms (0.27 mean difference), personal definitions of “family,” confi- dentiality protection, inclusion of both same sex parents, and access to diversity training, government respondents415 identified a significantly higher level of awareness of poli- cies compared with non-government respondents. Other items with the largest differences in awareness of policies between organizational and non-government organizations were: “inclusive language” (0.22 mean dif-420 ference) and “training to identify and address basic health issues that may particularly affect LGBT clients” (0.18 mean difference). Government participants were more likely to be familiar with these policies than non- government participants.425 Discussion This pilot study has provided a snapshot summary regard- ing self-reported LGBT attitudes, knowledge and aware- ness across two Australian AOD service types. This study found that the majority of respondents held accepting430 attitudes towards LGBT clients, irrespective of service context, although respondents reported they were more unfamiliar with policies and procedures related to LGBT clients, and concepts such as ‘gender identity’. Overall, there was strong concordance of knowledge, attitudes and435 awareness between the government and non-government sector, which indicated that government and NGO staff did not markedly differ in their perspectives (i.e., illus- trated by significant difference found in the mean sum- mary attitudes, familiarity and awareness scores).440 The majority of respondents, whether government or non-government, were supportive of LGBT persons. Responses were more mixed with respect to transgender people (though still highly supportive), with a greater per- centage of government and non-government respondents445 expressing uncertainty (24.6% and 30.8%, respectively) as to whether transgender persons are an “expression of the continuum of gender.” There was also a greater unfa- miliarity by staff with issues of gender identity. This may translate to a level of discomfort or uncertainty for some450 staff working with transgender clients. This finding is con- sistent previous research (Eliason, 2000), which demon- strated limited knowledge and awareness regarding LGBT issues and needs. The majority of staff (both government and non- 455 government) identified personal religious and spiritual beliefs that were accepting of LGBT persons. However, approximately 8–9% held personal religious or spiritual beliefs that all LGBT behavior should be “condemned,” which warrant further attention. It is difficult to deter- 460 mine from these self-reports whether this is an expres- sion of personal belief or a statement of their particular religious affiliation’s views towards sexual diversity. Over- all, this study would suggest that the religious tradition of the non-government service did not contribute to sig- 465 nificantly adverse responses towards LGBT clients, com- pared to government service affiliation. Nonetheless, a small minority of staff employed by both government and non-government services did declare negative religious views and this could have serious implications for client 470 access. Given the likelihood that one such staff mem- ber could be encountered during the client journey, the potential for negative personal or religious beliefs towards sexual and gender diversity to potentially harm a client’s entire treatment experience cannot be underestimated. 475 Further research and staff training should seek to better assess such impact and organizational policies to mitigate these. Familiarity with LGBT terms indicate that most staff do have a certain degree of awareness of these issues, 480 however, the results also show that there is a signif- icant percentage of staff whom are not familiar. This was more pronounced for non-government respondents, which may reflect the higher proportion of respondents who were volunteers or operating in non-clinical posi- 485 tions. In particular, legal issues relating to “power of attorney,” “domestic partnerships,” and “legal protection” were familiar to only a minority of participants. Simi- larly, transgender issues were familiar only to a minor- ity of staff (over 40% were slightly and almost 30% not 490 at all familiar for both government and non-government respondents). Most respondents demonstrated awareness of organi- zational policies and practices relating to LGBT clients. However, a significant percentage of both government 495 and non-government respondents were unsure or neu- tral. For almost every item, a higher proportion of non- government staff indicated they were unaware or unsure of organizational policies that may particularly affect LGBT clients (e.g., written access, anti-discrimination 500 or inclusive service policies). This greater uncertainty amongst the non-government respondents was especially apparent for policies relating to transgender persons and those of a legal dimension. Again, these differences may be reflective of the greater number of volunteer and non- 505 clinical staff who responded from the non-government sector. However, the level of uncertainty by staff of both ISUM_A_1271430 TFJATS_StdSerif-800.cls February 6, 2017 15:44 Trim Info: 8.5in × 11in 8 A. B. MULLENS ET AL. Table . Comparison of government and non-government respondents’ awareness of organizational policies regarding LGBT clients. Meana  = strongly agree and  = strongly agree Organizational policies regarding LGBT clients Govt. n =  Non-govt. n =  Difference between means Total n =  Sig. difference (.) Awareness summary score . . . . t() = . p = . %CI:-.–.) Your service displays an anti-discrimination policy with a positive statement . (.) . (.) . . (.) n/s Your service displays pamphlets and posters with positive images . (.) . (.) . . (.) n/s Your staff use inclusive language which recognizes diverse relationships, sexuality and gender identities . (.) . (.) . . (.) n/s Your service has agreed policy and procedures to respond to bullying, abuse or inappropriate behavior . (.) . (.) . . (.) . Your intake forms include gender-neutral options alongside standard terms . (.) . (.) . . (.) . Your service adopts each client’s definition of ‘family’ which may include relatives by blood, same-sex partners, or spouses . (.) . (.) . . (.) . It is obvious to the client that confidentiality is protected and privacy respected . (.) . (.) . . (.) . When a transgender person attends your service staff addresses them as their presenting gender . (.) . (.) . . (.) n/s Their partner is acknowledged or included in the same way a heterosexual partner is. . (.) . (.) . . (.) n/s Staff use gender-neutral partner questions to ask about relationships and sexual behavior at all times . (.) . (.) . . (.) n/s When a child has same-sex parents staff include both in discussions about the child’s health care . (.) . (.) . . (.) . When a young person tells staff they may be LGBT, staff assure them of confidentiality and provide supportive responses . (.) . (.) . . (.) n/s Direct-care staff have had training to identify and address basic health issues that may particularly affect LGBT clients . (.) . (.) . . (.) n/s Staff have had equity, diversity or awareness training which includes working with LGBT people . (.) . (.) . . (.) . Staff know that Queensland legislation recognizes same-sex partnerships as ‘defacto relationships’ . (.) . (.) . . (.) n/s Your service has written access, anti-discrimination or inclusive service policies with specific reference to sexual orientation and gender identity . (.) . (.) . . (.) n/s Staff treat information about sexual orientation and gender identity as highly sensitive information . (.) . (.) . . (.) n/s Your service has links to other agencies that can provide services and support to LGBT clients . (.) . (.) . . (.) n/s The content of your health promotion activities and print resources is inclusive of diverse sexuality and gender identities . (.) . (.) . . (.) n/s Your service consults LGBT clients in the development of health promotion activities . (.) . (.) . . (. n/s Your service is able to refer LGBT clients to appropriate, ‘LGBT-friendly’ specialist services and resources . (.) . (.) . . (.) n/s LGBT staff members at your organization are able to be open about the gender of their partner . (.) . (.) . . (.) n/s Your organizational staff conditions or certified agreement recognize same-sex partners and their families under family leave . (.) . (.) . . (.) n/s When recruiting staff your organization includes sexuality and gender identity in non-discrimination statements such as ….. . (.) . (.) . . (.) n/s aBased on a scale of  –  with  = Strongly Disagree,  = Disagree,  = Neutral/Not Sure,  = Agree and  = Strongly Agree. ISUM_A_1271430 TFJATS_StdSerif-800.cls February 6, 2017 15:44 Trim Info: 8.5in × 11in SUBSTANCE USE & MISUSE 9 service types towards their own organizations’ LGBT pol- icy and practice does underlie the importance of staff training and clear managerial instruction.510 Study limitations As with all voluntary, self-reporting surveys, this study has limitations. The self-selected sample may have attracted a greater proportion of respondents more sup- portive of LGBT issues. While participation was anony-515 mous, social desirability may be a factor (but for differ- ent reasons) in both government and non-government respondent responses, and comparisons regarding demo- graphic features were unable to be made among those who did not participate in the survey from each service. Gov-520 ernment respondents may have modified their answers to satisfy perceived social and professional expectations, whereas non-government respondents, from a faith based organization, may have felt more secure in expressing divergent views that accorded with their own religious525 affiliation. There were demographic and occupational differences between the government and non-government respon- dent samples that may account for some of the variation in attitudes and knowledge (e.g., higher proportion of vol-530 unteers and non-clinical roles and younger age amongst the non-government sample). However, these character- istics are likely to be indicative of many non-government services as a typical reflection of the staff composition rather than sampling bias per se. This would also suggest535 that the differences identified between the two services are indicative of this workforce composition rather than any underlying religious culture. Although based on ser- vice preference, methodological differences between staff completing with survey online (religious affiliated) ver-540 sus via paper-pencil format (government affiliated), may also have impacted response rates and trends; as well as discrepancies in geographical areas represented by each group. Implications for research and practice545 Further research should focus on a comparison of self- reported attitudes and knowledge among staff compared to client perceptions as well as the impact of LGBT staff awareness training on rates of client access and engage- ment with services, and treatment outcomes (Kalinoski550 et al., 2013). Greater consideration should be given of staff beliefs based on workplace role and other demo- graphic features (e.g., rural versus metropolitan; older versus young) and differences in attitudes towards varied LGBT subgroups. Although this study focused primarily555 on attitudes regarding sexual identity, including transgen- der clients, it will be important in future research to study attitudes regarding gender identity as distinct from sexual identify and orientation, to assist with identifying specific knowledge and training gaps (Lombardi & van Servellan, 560 2000). Utilizing a similar survey process with staff from other community and health services may assist to identify staff barriers to service access and utilization among LGBT, and identify areas to target to heighten awareness and 565 identify further training needs (Eliason, 2000). Findings from this study could be used to encour- age AOD services to adopt and strengthen strategies that improve and promote LGBT access, engagement and sat- isfaction with such services; and further enhance health 570 staff knowledge, attitude and skills in screening, assessing and providing care to identified LGBT clients; and sub- sequently work towards improved AOD treatment out- comes for LGBT clients. Given that a small, but mean- ingful percentage of respondents noted personal, reli- 575 gious and/or spiritual views stating that LGBT persons should be ‘condemned’ or are ‘sinful’, this highlights the need for further diversity awareness training (Kalinoski et al., 2013), and/or supervision to explore and address counter transference or other process issues, which may 580 be impacting upon the therapeutic relationship and treat- ment outcomes (Spector & Pinto, 2011). This study highlights the need for a systems approach to address access and engagement of LGBT communi- ties with AOD services. A systems approach comprises 585 focusing on the interrelationship between the organiza- tion, teams/individuals and clients. Such a multifaceted approach builds the capacity and sustainability of orga- nizations, whether government or non-government to address LGBT disparities in AOD use, and more broadly 590 associated discrimination and stigma. Further, it moves the focus of removing barriers from the individual to the organization (Skinner et al.,2005). A systems approach also recognizes the role or insti- tutional policies and procedures in acting as a barrier 595 to LGBT AOD treatment seeking. Organizational/service level initiatives include organizational responsibility for developing teams sensitive to LGBT issues, employing staff experienced with LGBT issues, leading organiza- tional change e.g., introduction of new or modified guide- 600 lines, raising LGBT awareness, and alteration of office space to ensure that they are LGBT friendly (Skinner et al., 2005). These factors all play a role in devel- oping the capacity of organizations and their staff in addressing barriers to treatment and also in providing 605 effective AOD treatment for LGBT clients, and being mindful of unique socio-cultural features among LGBT (see Kelly et al., 2015; Lemoire & Chen, 2005; Mul- lens, Young, et al., 2009), which can impact upon pre- disposing and maintaining factors regarding substance 610 misuse. ISUM_A_1271430 TFJATS_StdSerif-800.cls February 6, 2017 15:44 Trim Info: 8.5in × 11in 10 A. B. MULLENS ET AL. Issues at an team/individual level include increasing awareness among AOD workers and clinicians of LGBT cultural and contextual issues associated with substance use and building the capacity of these teams to assess615 associated harms (e.g., HIV) in a sensitive, respectful and non-judgmental manner (Stall & Purcell, 2000; Stevens, 2012). One means of achieving this is by encouraging teams to ask more questions regarding patterns and con- texts of substance use and to consider the thoughts, feel-620 ings and behaviors associated with the temporal sequence leading up to substance misuse and underlying psychoso- cial mechanisms (Bimbi et al., 2006; Mullens, Young, et al., 2009). Conclusion625 Based on findings from the current study, the majority of AOD staff hold accepting self-reported attitudes towards LGBT clients. This study found few significant differences in attitudes and awareness of LGBT issues between gov- ernment and non-government respondents, and a high630 level of expressed support for LGBT clients. In addition, the religious tradition of the non-government service did not appear to contribute to these differences. However, within both the government and non-government ser- vice, the negative religious beliefs of a small minority of635 staff could potentially affect the client’s overall experi- ence of treatment despite an organizationally supportive environment. This study confirms the need for organiza- tions to take leadership in strengthening training for staff and improving service capacity to deliver LGBT friendly640 AOD treatment practices and to ensure that LGBT sup- portive policy and practice is understood by all staff. 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work_bfazxzpecjbfvnjadzscxndddq	----	Munich Personal RePEc Archive Hate Source: White Supremacist Hate Groups and Hate Crime Mulholland, Sean E. Stonehill College 11 February 2011 Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/28861/ MPRA Paper No. 28861, posted 21 Feb 2011 00:39 UTC Hate Source: White Supremacist Hate Groups and Hate Crime Sean E. Mulholland Stonehill College Abstract The relationship between hate group activity and hate crime is the- oretically ambiguous. Hate groups may incite criminal behavior in sup- port of their beliefs. On the other hand, hate groups may reduce hate crime by serving as a forum for members to verbally vent their frus- trations or as protection from future biased violence. I �nd that the presence of an active white supremacist hate group chapter is associ- ated with an 18.7 percent higher hate crime rate. White supremacist groups are not associated with the level of anti-white hate crimes com- mitted by non-whites, nor do they form in expectation of future hate crimes by non-whites. JEL Codes: K14, J15, D71 1 Introduction The relationship between hate group activity and hate crime is theoretically ambiguous.1Hate group activities may serve to incite criminal or violent be- havior in support of their beliefs. On the other hand, if hate groups serve as support groups for like-minded individuals, members may use meetings and protests as a way to verbally vent their frustrations. Thus hate group members may be less likely to carry out these frustrations through criminal or violent acts. Hate grous may also serve as a means of protection for individuals who believe they will be victims of biased violence in the future. From1997 to 2007, the Southern Poverty LawCenter (SPLC), an authority on hate group activity, declared that the number of active white supremacist hate group chapters in the United States increased by 63 percent, from 474 in 1997 to 888 in 2007.2 Yet, over the same period, the number of hate crimes 1For a discussion of the historical literature and a fresh look at old analyses of hate crimes, see Green, Glaser, and Rich [1998]. 2The number of groups and the number of a¢liations have changed over time. The analysis below includes only white supremacist hate groups: the Ku Klux Klan, neo-Nazis, Racist Skinheads, and Christian Identity Churches from 1997 to 2007. Therefore the terms hate groups and white supremacist groups will be used interchangeably throughout the manuscript. 1 recorded in the United States fell by 6.1 percent, from 8443 to 7945.3 Figure 1 depicts the slow and steady increase in the total number of active white supremacist chapters and the number of hate crimes reported across in the United States. <<Figure 1 here>> Previous studies have focused on economic conditions, demographics, and historical links between government provided services and the choice to formor join a hate group [Je¤erson and Pryor, 1999 and Mulholland, 2010]. However, few have looked at the determinants of hate crimes and all but one fail to in- clude a measure of hate group activity. McDevitt and Levin [1993] use Boston data and observe that many hate crimes involved violence directed at dissim- ilar others moving into a previously segregated area. Medo¤ [1999] performs a cross-sectional state estimation and �nds that market wages, mean age, and law enforcement activity predict hateful activity, but urbanization, occupa- tional status, and social mobility do not. Gale, Heath, and Ressler [2002] use a panel of 37 states from 1992 through 1995 and �nd that hate crime rates are positively correlated with unemployment rates, abuse rates, and the parity of income between blacks and whites. They also �nd hate crime is negatively correlated with law enforcement expenditures. Ryan and Leeson [2010] use state level panel data from 2002 through 2008 to �nd that unemployment and poverty are strongly associated with more hate crime, where as demographics and, most notably, the number of hate groups are not. Using U.S. county-level panel data from 1997 through 2007 and control- ling for unobserved county-level time-invariant heterogeneity, I �nd that hate crimes are 18.7 percent more likely to occur in counties with active white supremacist hate group chapters. Excluding hate crimes listed as anti-white, the presence of a white supremacist chapter is associated with a 19.7 to 24 percent higher rate of hate crimes and between a 22 to 25 percent higher rate of hate crimes committed by white perpetrators. Anti-white hate crimes committed by non-white perpetrators are not associated with the presence of a white supremacist chapter. Rejecting the protection hypothesis, I fail to �nd white supremacist chapter formation in expectation of future hate crimes by non-whites. Nor do I �nd chapter formation in response to increases in anti-white hate crimes perpetrated by non-whites. Section 2 presents a brief historical look at the evolution of hate crime legislation in the United States. Section 3 discusses hate groups and their origins. Section 4 lays out the estimation methodology. Sections 5 and 6 discuss the data and the estimated relationship between white supremacist chapters and hate crimes. Section 7 investigates further hypotheses on the relationship between hate groups and hate crimes. Section 8 o¤ers concluding remarks. 3Multiple hate crimes are sometimes reported for a single hate crime incident. Hate crime incidents fell by 5.4 percent from 8,049 to 7,624 over the same period. 2 2 Hate Crime Biased violence directed toward select social characteristics or status, moti- vated by racism, xenophobia, anti-Semitism, and other biases has been docu- mented throughout history: from the Old Testament description of the geno- cides of Amalekites and Midianites to more recent ethnic and religious-based violence in Bosnia and Sudan. The history of the United States includes bias- motivated violence against Native Americans, African Americans, and others. The movement for categorizing certain violent activity directed at individuals based on their ethnic or social characteristics as �hate crimes" in the United States, however, is a recent phenomena. According to Jenness and Ryken, in their book Making Hate a Crime: From Social Movement to Law Enforce- ment, an"anti-hatecrimemovement"was"energizedbyseveralprevious social movements" and "emerged in the late 1970s to bring public attention to vio- lence directed at certain minorities" [Jenness and Ryken, 2001. p.17]. Jenness and Ryken suggest that the movement to make biased violence a unique type of crime was born out of the combination of the modern civil rights movement and the crime victim movement. The civil rights movement initially concentrated on contesting legal prohi- bitions based on race. First focusing on voting and then expanding to separate but equal standards, the civil rights movement sought to obtain similar rights for those of all races. As groups such as the National Association for the Ad- vancement of Colored People (NAACP) slowly reduced legal racism, they then turned to reducing violence directed at those due to ethnic, racial, or religious status. With these successes, women�s and gay rights groups became more active in highlighting violence directed at women and gays [Katz, 1976]. In the late seventies, a separate and distinct victim rights movement de- veloped as a response to the Warren court�s expansion of defendant�s rights [Weed, 1995 and Maroney, 1998]. The victim rights movement, along with the women�s rights groups brought attention to the long run trauma of survivors of violence. These organizations focused their e¤orts on both the direct trauma resulting from the violence and the abuse that often times took place through the court system. Lead by Wisconsin in 1981, states began passing victims� rights legislation. By 1989, forty-two states had passed victims� rights bills [Weed, 1995]. Growth of the civil rights movement, women�s movement, gay and lesbian movement, and the victim rights movements set the foundation for discussing bias-motivated violence toward minorities. Groups that had been a part of the civil rights movement began focusing their e¤orts on gathering information about victims of bias-motivated violence. Notable examples include: the Anti- Defamation League of B�nai B�rith (ADL) which began tracking anti-Semitic violence in 1979, the Center for Democratic Renewal which began a bimonthly newsletter in 1979 tracking biased violence, and, the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC) which began tracking Ku Klux Klan activity in 1980 and now tracks other biased motivated groups. 3 As these organizations continued to track bias-motivated violence, they slowly began creating "a societal perception that hate crime was a speci�c evil requiring a speci�c response" Maroney [1998, 579]. The speci�c response often requested was legal redress. Beginning with Washington and Oregon in 1981, states began enacting hate crime legislation that criminalized violence direct at groups due to their racial, ethnic, religious, and various other characteristics. The activity of organizations interested in victims and civil rights culmi- nated in the 1990 passage of the Federal Hate Crime Statistics Act (P.L.101- 275). The act de�nes hate crimes as criminal incidents that are at least par- tially directed against the victims� race, religion, sexual orientation, or eth- nicity/nationality.4 The act also instructed the FBI to aggregate hate crime data from agencies actively documenting and willing to voluntarily report hate crime statistics. In 1992, the FBI began publishing Hate Crime Statistics, a compilation of hate crime reported by various law enforcement agencies across the US.5 Di¤erences in how agencies de�ne and report hate crimes are problematic in any empirical study on crimes in general and hate crimes in particular. As pointed out by Gale, Heath, and Ressler [2002], while hate crime statis- tics documentation have improved, there are still serious problems associated with crime statistics. DiIulio [1996] identi�es two potentially severe measure- ment errors of crime data: under-reporting by victims and by law enforcement agencies. Besci [1999] shows that wide variation exists between crime data sources by comparing the Uniform Crime Report to other sources of crime data. Furthermore, Grove, Hughes, and Geerken [1985] �nd that the reported crime rates are closer to the real crime rates for crimes that are less ambigu- ous between victims and law enforcement, such as homicide, than for more ambiguous crimes, such as aggravated assault. Grove et al. suggest that this ambiguity will likely overstate the reported crime rate. The core concept of a hate crime is ambiguous and therefore can make classi�cation di¢cult in almost every case [Jacobs and Potter 1998]. However, Martin [1995, 1996] in two quantitative studies on the Baltimore County and New York City police departments and Boyd, Berk, and Hamner [1996] in a study looking at two policing divisions within a large urban police department, �nd that the process is less problematic than suggested by Jacob and Potter. "[F]ar from �nding it problematic to interpret and classify speci�c incidents, police detectives engage in certain routine practices in order to determine the hate-related status of an incident" [Boyd, Berk, and Hammer 1996, 821]. Thus 4For more information on the Hate Crime Statistics Act, see CRS Report RL33403, Hate Crime Legislation, by William J. Krouse. 5Especially early on, the concept of a hate crime was nebulous and had yet to be tested constitutionally. Law enforcement o¢cers may have been reluctant to invest in how or whether to report a crime as a hate crime. Between 1984 and 1999, the US appellate court considered the constitutionality of hate crime statutes thirty-eight times, suggesting to Phillips and Grattet (2000) that the questions of constitutionality and rules had become settled by the late 1990s. 4 within a division the reporting mechanism for these police departments may be well de�ned and easier to follow than suggested by Jacobs and Potter [1998]. However, Boyd, Berk, and Hammer show that reporting methods di¤er across divisions causing comparisons across divisions to be suspect. Therefore, this manuscript will only look at changes in hate crimes within each county. Even looking within each county does not eliminate ambiguity and subjectivity that may occur across each division within each agency. Thus any empirical results must be interpreted through a critical lens. 3 Hate Groups The Southern Poverty Law Center de�nes a hate group as an organization having "beliefs or practices that attack or malign an entire class of people, typically for their immutable characteristics" [SPLC 2010]. Iannaccone [1992] and Berman [2000; 2003] demonstrate why rational, utility-maximizing in- dividuals voluntarily sacri�ce to join religious organizations, fraternities and sororities, communes, and hate groups. Hate group membership often requires certain prohibitions and costly signals, such as tattoos, piercings, and acts of violence. Participation in such prohibitions reveals to other members that the individual is committed to the organization, and as such, grants an active member certain privileges and bene�ts. Joining reveals that the bene�ts of membership are greater than the costs associated with signaling commitment to the group. White supremacist hate groups are by no means identical. Each organiza- tion, as shown in Table 1, has di¤erent levels of prohibitions and goals and thus solves the problem of collective action in a variety of ways. Racist Skinhead and neo-Nazi members, unlike Ku Klux Klan and Christian Identity mem- bers, often display tattoos or wear distinctive clothing to signal membership. Furthermore, each type and chapter express their biased views in a variety of manners. Some are physically violent while others are not. <<Table 1 here>> Often cited reasons for hate group formation include peer validation, frus- tration, scapegoating, and boredom. Groups form when a small number of like-minded individuals believe they have been wronged in a similar manner and are searching for ways to right perceived wrongs. One hypothesis put forth by McDevitt and J. Levin [1993] is that the impetus for organizing is often based on turf issues. Individuals commonly cite the thrill associated with the victimization [Levin 1993]. By forming a group, these individuals validate themselves by �committing an act that enhances one�s image internally, with a peer group, and with society at large� [Levin 1993]. If Levin is correct, then we should witness more hate crime in counties where hate groups are present. In a sense, then, many hate groups are much like gangs. In his work on gangs, Klein [1995] summarizes the psychological factors in his statement that �the gang is seen as an aggregate of individuals held together more by their 5 own shared incapacities than by mutual goals. Primarily, group identi�cation is important as it serves individual needs; it leads to delinquent group activity only secondarily and only in the absence of pro-social alternatives.� Thus, if Klein is correct, it may be the case that hate groups do not a¤ect the overall rate of hate crimes if they serve more of a pro-social role. Furthermore, recent emprical work by Osoba and Sobell [2009] on youth gangs suggests that gangs form in response to government�s failure to protect youth against violence.6 Without gangs, the level of violence may actually be higher. If hate groups form to protect its members from future violence, hate groups may actually be associated with less crime and even less hate crime. 4 Estimation Method The goal is to determine whether the hate crime rate in county i in year t is associated with white supremacist activity in county i for year t. While anec- dotal evidence suggests that the number of chapters is positively correlated with the number of members, the SPLC does not report the number of mem- bers per chapter.7 Therefore, changes in the number of chapters may be a poor measure of the level of activity. The formation of additional active hate group chapters from one year to the next may simply be a result of the splintering of one large group; the reduction in the number of chapters may be the result of a merger. Following Je¤erson and Pryor [1999] and Mulholland [2010], this analysis will focus on whether hate crime rates are associated with counties home to any active white supremacist chapters and not the total number of chapters.8 To address these issues, I �rst construct a dichotomous variable, activeit: activeit = � 1 if number of active white supremacist chapters is >0 0 if no active white supremacist chapters present � (1) where activeit equals one if there are active white supremacist hate group 6Theoretical models of government formation out of anarchy are developed by Nozick [1974] and Buchanan [1975]. 7For two discussions on the correlation between number of active chapters and member- ship see: Intelligence Report [2000] and The Stephen Roth Institute [2004]. 8A county may be home to a hate group even though it is not reported as present for that calendar year. It is possible that the hate group chapters simply did not draw attention to themselves for that calendar year. In order to determine the e¤ects of this possibility, I construct alternative measures that assumed a county was hate group free only if that county witnessed no hate group activity over multiple years. If an active hate group is present during any one of these years, I assume that the hate group was simply silent during the others and continued to be present over the entire time period. Using this methodology, I construct three alternative measures of white supremacist ac- tivity: one that assumes a hate group must be silent for two years before I consider it disbanded; one for three years; and one for four years. Repeating the estimation in Ta- ble 3 using these three alternative measures reveals qualitatively and quantitatively similar results. Results are available from the author upon request. 6 chapters in county i at time t and zero if no active white supremacist chapter is reported. I then estimate the e¤ects of the presence of one or more active white supremacist chapters on the overall rate of a hate crime: hate crimeit = �+��activeit +xit� +�i +�t +"it (2) where hate crimeit is the hate crime rate in county i in year t;activeit indicates presence of an active white supremacist chapter, xit is the vector of explana- tory variables for county i in time period t, and � is the vector of county parameters to be estimated. The control variables in xit include real median household income, the unemployment rate, the real unemployment bene�ts per unemployed citizen, the poverty rate, the percentages of the population that are black, Hispanic, and white, the population density, the percentage of males age �fteen through forty-four, and the overall crime rate.9 The Hausman test rejects the null hypothesis that the coe¢cients estimated by the e¢cient random e¤ects estimator are the same as the ones estimated by the consistent �xed e¤ects estimator.10 Therefore I include time-invariant, county-speci�c e¤ects represented by �i to control for omitted variables that di¤er between counties but are constant over time. This �xed e¤ects estimation methodology relies on within county variation. The year dummies, �t, control for omitted changes over time that a¤ect all counties similarly. The error term, "it; is clus- tered by county in order to account for non-random errors within each panel [Rogers, 1993; Williams, 2000; and Wooldridge, 2002].11 There are �aws associated with the collection of hate crime data that may bias the estimates. First, many states and local governments do not have formal guidelines for law enforcement o¢cials on how to complete a formal hate crime report.12 Thus only a fraction all possible hate crimes are reported. If counties with active hate groups are more likely to report crimes as hate crimes, then the estimates will be upward biased. If counties with active hate 9I do not include real expenditures on police protection because it is only available for 1997 and 2002 at the county level from the Census Bureau�s Census of Governments. When including real police expenditures, the presence of an active white supremacist chapter is associated with a greater increase in all types of hate crimes than the estimates presented in Table 3. 10The Hausman test value of 73.26 with 20 degrees of freedom result in a p-value of .00, thus rejecting the null that the more e¢cient random e¤ects estimator returns the same estimates as the �xed e¤ects estimator. 11Assuming that hate groups did not alter their voting behavior over this time period, using �xed e¤ects partially addresses any worry that that hate groups "may vote for policies that reduce the local government provision of services [Glaeser 2005]." 12Hate crime data reported by the FBI are "from all law enforcement agencies that submit- ted either of the following: 1) at least one National Incident-Based Reporting System Group A Incident Report, a Group B Arrest Report, or a Zero Report for at least 1 month of the calendar year; or 2) at least one Hate Crime Incident Report and/or a Quarterly Hate Crime Report" [http://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/hc2008/data/table_12_dd.html, Viewed 7/11/10]. 7 groups are less likely to report crimes as hate crimes, then the estimates will be downward biased. Second, in counties where hate crime reporting is conducted by a fraction of state and local agencies, only a portion of a county�s population may be covered. If localities within a county where active white supremacist chapters are present are less likely to be covered by hate crime reporting, this will downward bias the estimates. Finally, participation of agencies can vary from year to year. If this is random, it will not bias the estimates. However, if agencies are less likely to �le a report when chapters are present, the estimates will be downward biased. If agencies fail to submit hate crime information when white supremacist chapters are not present, the estimates will be upward biased. 5 Hate Crime and Hate Group Data Hate crime data comes from the FBI�s annual report, Hate Crime Statistics. First published in 1992, Hate Crime Statistics compiles hate crimes reported by various law enforcement agencies. In 1992, Hate Crime Statistics covered only 51 percent of the United States population from 42 states. By 1997, 83 percent of the population from 48 states and DC were covered. This is similar to the coverage in 2007: 85.7 percent from 49 states and DC. Due to the relative stable percentage of population covered from 1997 to 2007, ranging from a high of 86.6 percent in 2004 and a low of 80.0 percent in 1998, this manuscript uses data on hate crimes from 1997 through 2007. Figure 2 maps the highest hate crime rate for each county over the 1997 to 2007 time period.13 In 1997 approximately 21 percent of counties reported at least one hate crime incident with 52 percent of incidents resulting in one or two hate crimes committed. By 2007, 27 percent of counties reported at least one hate crime incident with just under 50 percent of incidents resulting in one or two criminal charges. While the overall number of hate crimes fell between 1997 to 2007, the number of counties reporting at least one hate crime rose by twenty-four percent. The portion of counties reporting at least one hate crime between 1997 and 2007 is 60.6 percent. The highest hate crime rate over this period, 37.4 out of 10,000, was reported for Scott County, Arkansas in 2003. Even though states such as Georgia, Alabama, and Mississippi have no state datacollectionstatutes, someagenciesvoluntarily submithatecrimereports to the FBI. The portion of former Confederate States of America (CSA) counties reporting at least one hate crime is 55.8 percent. <<Figure 2 here>> 13Hate crimes are reported at the agency level not the county level. Agencies whose jurisdictions cover multiple counties do not report which county the reported hate crime took place. Only 5.5 percent of hate crime incidents are reported by agencies covering multiple counties. For agencies that cover more than one county jurisdiction, I assign the crimes to the county Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) code listed for that agency in the Law Enforcement Agency Identi�ers Crosswalk [United States], 1996. 8 The Southern Poverty Law Center tracks hate groups by "using hate group publications and websites, citizen and law enforcement reports, �eld sources and news reports" [Southern Poverty Law Center]. Initiated in 1981, 1997 marks the �rst year the SPLC attempted to gather data for all known active hate group chapters by city.14 Although the SPLC now tracks many types of organizations only the Ku Klux Klan, neo-Nazi, Racist Skinhead, and Chris- tian Identity groups are available for every year from 1997 to 2007.15 Between 1997 and 2007, 793 US counties, or approximately 25 percent, were home to at least one active hate group.16 Figure 3 shows the maximum number of Ku Klux Klan, neo-Nazi, Racist Skinheads, and Christian Identity chapters by county reported during any calendar year from 1997 to 2007. Harris County, Texas, in 2006, and Cook County, Illinois, in 1997, 2005, and 2006, were home to the largest number of active hate group chapters during a single calendar year. Counties located in states that were part of the CSA are well represented and make up 43.4 percent of those reporting an active hate group through- out the period. However, over half of the counties reporting an active hate group were located outside the former CSA. In fact, of the twelve counties that report �ve or more active hate group chapters during a calendar year, only three: Harris, Texas in 2006 and 2007; Tarrant, Texas in 1998, and Spar- tanburg, South Carolina in 2005 and 2006 are located in states that were part of the CSA. <<Figure 3 here>> Figure 4 depicts the change in the overall presence of active Ku Klux Klan, neo-Nazi, Racist Skinheads, and Christian Identity chapters between 1997 through 2007. The thirty-two counties in red were always home to at least one active white supremacist chapter. Seven hundred and sixty one counties, shown in blue, representing 49 states witnessed at least one year with one or more active white supremacist chapters and one year without an active chapter. Of these 761 counties, 215 report an active chapter for only one year. 14Although the SPLC reports hate group location by city or town, the analysis is per- formed at the county level for theoretical and empirical reasons. First, many hate groups chapters hold rallies and recruitment meetings outside their home towns in locations nearby and thus have members from the surrounding towns and townships. Second, because many of these towns are not in Metropolitan Statistical Areas, county level data represents the least aggregated measures of crime, unemployment, poverty, and the like that are available. 15In 2000 the Southern Poverty Law Center began monitoring Neo-Confederate organi- zations. This study does not include those organizations because of their initial omission by the Southern Poverty Law Center, nor does it include Black Separatists or the "Other" category. 16Not all active hate groups can be assigned to a single county. For instance the SPLC reports an active chapter of the Knights of the White Kamellia (KKK) present in NC, but does not list a city. When no city is reported, the hate group is not included in the analysis. The portion of active groups not included ranges from 1.2 percent in 1998 to 12.8 percent in 2007. Undercounting active white supremacist chapters likely biases the estimates downward. 9 All remaining counties, shown in white were never home to an active white supremacist chapter. <<Figure 4 here>> Looking at the individual hate group types, 3.8 percent of the county-year observations report the presence of at least one active Ku Klux Klan chapter. Counties reporting an active KKK chapter for at least one year, were home to an active KKK chapter about 26 percent of the time. Neo-Nazi chapters look similar toKKKchapterswith4.1percentof county-yearobservations reporting the presence of a neo-Nazi chapter. Only about 2 percent of counties were home to a neo-Nazi organization over the ten year period. Racist Skinheads are much more transient than most other type of hate groups; counties that were home to a Racist Skinhead chapter reported an active Racist Skinhead chapter only 15 percent of the time. Christian Identity Churches were present in 3.5 percent of the counties. Christian Identity Churches were the least likely to disband. Counties that were home to a Christian Identity Church for at least one year, were home to an active church 34 percent of time. Table 2 displays the county-level summary statistics for hate crime rates, by various types of victims and perpetrators, and white supremacist activity. <<Table 2 here>> 6 The Relationship Between Hate Groups and Hate Crime The results of the �xed e¤ects estimation in equation 2 are reported in column one of Table 3. <<Table 3 here>> Using the overall sample, the presence of an active white supremacist chap- ter is associated with 286 more hate crimes per 10,000 residents. Given that the average number of hate crimes per 10,000 residents is 1494, the presence of an active white supremacist chapter is associated with an 18.7 percent higher hate crime rate.17 Column 3 displays the same estimation using only those counties that report one or more hate crimes over the 1997-2007 time frame. The restricted sample reveals that the presence of a chapter is associated with 335 more hate crime per 10,000 residents or an increase of 14.0 percent.18 17Agencies covering multiple counties do not report the county in which a hate crime took place. Therefore, I also estimate Equation 2 excluding the 5.5 percent of hate crimes reported by agencies covering multiple counties. The estimated coe¢cient on active white supremacist chapters is .029 and signi�cant at the �ve percent level. This corresponds to a 20.2 percent higher hate crime rate. 18The annual average number of hate crimes for counties that submit at least one report from 1997 through 2007 is 2393 per 10,000 residents. 10 These results suggest the validity of Levin�s (1993) hypothesis that commit- ting an act of violence may enhance members� image within the group. Given the annual nature of these data, I perform three tests for autocorre- lation: the Wooldridge Test, the modi�ed Bhargava et al. Durbin-Watson, and the Baltagi-Wu LBI test. The Woodlrigde Test barely fails to reject the null of no autocorrelation.19 The modi�ed Bhargava et al. Durbin-Watson statistic of 1.78 and the Baltagi-Wu LBI statistic of 1.93 both suggest the presence of �rst-order autocorrelation.20 Because the dependent variable exhibits �rst- order autocorrelation in two of the three tests, that is, it is dependent on its own past realizations, I use the Arellano-Bover (1995) and Blundell-Bond (1998) System General Method of Moments (GMM) dynamic panel estimator and include a lagged dependent variable as an explanatory variable. hate crimeit = �+� �hate crimei;t�1 +��activeit +xit� +�i +�t +"it (3) In this model speci�cation, the lagged hate crime rate is an endogenous variable and the overall crime rate is treated as a predetermined variable. All others variables are treated as exogenous. I address the endogeneity of the one year lag of hate crimes by using internal instruments, namely lagged levels and lagged di¤erence of the hate crime rate and the overall crime rate. This eliminates potential endogeneity and reverse causation. Given the number of instruments, I conduct a Hansen�s J-statistic overidenti�cation test based on the weighted matrix.21 With resulting Hansen J values of 13.628 and 14.698, and the resulting p-values of 0.626 and 0.547, for the full and restricted sample respectively, I fail to reject the null that these instruments are valid. Column2 and4 inTable3 reports theestimatedresultsusing the twostage System-GMMestimation method.22 For the overall sample, the System-GMM estimator returns a similar signi�cant relationship between white supremacist hate group presence and a higher hate crime rate: an increase of 18.6 percent. For the restricted sample, the relationship between hate crimes and white supremacist hate groups is imprecisely estimated 7 Further Investigation of Alternative Hypotheses The results above support the theory that white supremacist chapters increase the hate crime rate. However, the results are also consistent with two compet- 19The Wooldridge test for �rst-level autocorrelation returns an F( 1, 3101) = 4.017 with a Prob > F = 0.05, just barely failing to reject the null of no autocorrelation. 20For the both the modi�ed Bhargava et al. Durbin-Watson and the Baltagi-Wu LBI with a large number of cross sections, a test statistic of less than 2 indicates positive serial correlation. 21One di¢culty with Hansen�s J-statistic test is that its size is distorted as the number of instruments grows. Therefore, instead of generating an additional instrument for each panel, lag, and time, I only use the instruments for each panel and lag. Another overidenti�cation test, the Sargan test is more reliable, but not appropriate if errors are heteroskedastic. 22The Arellano and Bond two stage procedure generates estimates of the standard devia- tion which can be biased. For this reason the estimated standard errors are reported using the Windmeijer (2005) correction. 11 ing hypotheses: (1) that the presence of one or more white supremacist groups is a symptom of the overall level of distrust and violent antagonism amongst various citizens in a county and (2) that an increase in expected future hate crime leads to hate group formation for self-defensive purposes. Luckily, Hate Crime Statistics reports both the type of biased-motivated crime, for exam- ple anti-black or anti-homosexual, and the race of the perpetrator for each hate crime. To investigate the �rst competing hypothesis I look at whether activity by white supremacist chapters is associated with a higher rate of hate crimes listed as anti-white or hate crimes committed by non-whites. If the relationship is positive, white supremacist activity may proxy for the overall biased-motivated antagonism in a county and not be directly related to white supremacist group activity. Alternatively if white supremacist activity is as- sociated with more hate crimes excluding those listed as anti-white or more hate crimes committed by white perpetrators, the initial hypothesis that hate crimes are caused by white supremacist groups is more plausible. 7.1 Non-anti-white hate crimes and white perpetrators To disentangle these hypotheses, I �rst repeat the estimations in equations 2 and 3 but replace the dependent variable with the hate crimes, excluding those listed as anti-white.23 As reported in column 1 and 2 of Table 4, I �nd that the presence of a white supremacist chapter is associated with between 245 to 300 more non-anti-white hate crimes per 10,000 residents or an increase of between 19.7 to 24.1 percent. This is a slightly larger result than those found in Table 3 when looking at all types of hate crime. However, a portion of these hate crimes are committed by people who are unlikely to be members of white supremacists groups, namely non-whites. To account for this, I estimate the relationship between white supremacist groups and hate crimes committed by whites with non-white victims.24 The estimates are reported in columns 3 and 4 of Table 4. The presence of a white supremacist chapter is associated with between 136 and 155 more white on non-white hate crimes. Recognizing the smaller number of white-on-non- white hate crimes, this is an increase of between 22.0 and 25.1 percent. In both cases I �nd that the presence of an active white supremacist group is associated with a greater likelihood of non-anti-white hate crimes and hate crimes with non-white victims committed by whites. The percentage increase for these types of hate crimes is greater than the increase estimated for all types of hate crimes shown in Table 3. This suggests that white supremacist chapters play a direct role in hate crime rates. <<Table 4 here>> 23 hate crime(excluding anti-white) i;t is constructed using the entire county population in the denominator. 24The variable hate crime(white-on-other) i;t uses the total population as its denominator because biased motivation can include racial as well as non-racial characteristics such as gender, religion, and sexual identity. 12 7.2 Anti-white hate crimes and non-white perpetrators White supremacist group members or those sympathetic to white supremacist organizations are not likely to perpetrate hate crimes classi�ed as anti-white. They are also unlikely to be non-white. By looking at hate crimes by non- whites and those by non-white listed as anti-white, I am able to di¤erentiate whether or not white supremacist groups are symptomatic of the overall level of antagonism. A positive relationship between these types of hate crimes and white supremacists groups would reject the hypothesis that white suprema- cist groups cause hate crimes. A negative or non-relationship would further support the hypothesis that active white supremacist groups directly increase hate crime rates. I �rst estimate the relationship between white supremacist chapters and hate crimes committed by non-whites by replacing the dependent variable in equation 2 with the rate of hate crimes by non-whites. The results are reported in columns 1 and 2 in Table 5. The �xed e¤ect estimation shows no statistical relationship between white supremacist groups and hate crimes with non-white perpetrators. However, the System-GMM reports a positive relationship, suggesting that presence of a hate group may be symptomatic of overall antagonism. This results may come about if white supremacist groups in�ame anti-gay or anti-black, or other biases. Hate crimes listed as anti-white, however, are unlikely to be perpetrated by white supremacists Therefore, I replace the dependent variable with hate crimes listed as anti-white committed by non-whites. The estimated the re- lationship is reported in columns 3 and 4 in Table 5. Both the �xed e¤ects and the System-GMM reject the hypothesis that white supremacist groups are simply a proxy for violent antagonism. <<Table 5 here>> 7.3 Protection from future hate crimes The results in Tables 4 and 5, save for column 2 in Table 5, reject the hypoth- esis that white supremacist groups are symptomatic of overall antagonism in a county. Instead the results suggest that white supremacists are the source of greater hate crime rates. White supremacist chapters may, however, be a response to expected future increases in hate crime activity. Thus the above results may not reveal a causal e¤ect of white supremacist chapters on hate crimes. Rather the estimates may reveal the formation of chapters in antici- pation of future increases in hate crime by non-whites or hate crimes with an anti-white bias.25 To determine whether current changes in hate crimes perpetrated by non- whites is related to past changes in white supremacist activity or lagged changes in hate crimes by non-whites, I estimate Equation 4. Equation 4 25Heckman [2000] mentions that future yt often determines current xt in a dynamic eco- nomic model. 13 estimates whether a change hate crimes committed by non-whites is associ- ated with past changes in the presence of active white supremacist chapters. The regression controls for the lagged changes in hate crimes by non-whites as well. �hate crime(by non-white) it =�+ P 2 r=1 r ��hate crime(by non-white)i;t�r + P 2 r=1 �r ��activei;t�r +xit� +�t +"it (4) The results in column 1 of Table 6 show that the coe¢cient estimates of lagged chapter activity are not signi�cant. This reinforces the notion that non-whites do not commit more hate crime when a county witnesses a change in the activity of white supremacist chapters. To test whether chapters form in anticipation of future changes in hate crimes by non-whites, I �rst construct the trichotomous variable �activeit where: �activeit = 8 < : �1 if a county is no longer home to an active white supremacist chapter 0 if a county realizes no change in the presence or lack of presence of a chapter 1 if a county is no longer free of white supremacist activity 9 = ; (5) I then replace the dependent variable in Equation 4 with, �activeit, the change in the probability an active white supremacist chapter is present, and estimate the ordered logistic using Equation 6. �activeit =�+ P 2 r=1 r ��hate crime(by non-white)i;t�r + P 2 r=1 �r ��activei;t�r +xit� +�t +"it (6) Column 2 in Table 6 shows the results. The coe¢cient on hate crimes by non-whites is again not signi�cant, suggesting that current white supremacist activity is not related to past hate crimes committed by non-whites. White supremacist groups do not appear to form for protection from hate crimes committed by non-whites. Lookingmore deeply, however, potential white supremacymembers maybe less concerned with hate crimes committed by non-whites and more concerned with hate crimes by non-whites that are listed as anti-white. Table 7 repeats the exercise in Table 6 but replaces the dependent variable with anti-white hate crimes committed by non-whites and estimates each of the following two equations: �hate crime(other-on-white) i;t =�+ P 2 r=1 r ��hate crime(other-on-white)i;t�r + P 2 r=1 �r ��activei;t�r +xit� +�i +"it (7) �activei;t =�+ P 2 r=1 r ��hate crime(other-on-white)i;t�r + P 2 r=1 �r ��activei;t�r +xit� +�i +"it (8) 14 I again �nd no relationship. The change in anti-white hate crimes commit- tedbynon-whitesdoesnotappear related topast changes inwhite supremacist activity. Neither do white supremacist chapters appear to formto protect their members from anti-white hate crimes. 8 Conclusion Counties with active white supremacist chapters experience greater rates of hate crime. In particular, hate crimes not listed as anti-white and hate crimes committed by white perpetrators increase by a greater percentage than all types of hate crimes. White supremacists groups do not appear to increase the rate of anti-white hate crime perpetrated by non-whites. These results rejects the possibility that white supremacist groups are symptomatic of changes in the overall level of bias-motivated antagonism. I also reject the protection hypothesis. White supremacistgroupsdonotappear to formtoprotectagainst expected future increases in hate crimes by non-whites. Nor do they form to protect against future anti-white crimes perpetrated by non-whites. Previous research by Ryan and Leeson [2010] �nds no relationship between hate groups and hate crimes. There are several possible reasons why these results di¤er. First, Ryan and Leeson perform their estimation at the state level whereas this analysis is at the county level. If hate groups are a local phenomena, thenwhite supremacist groupsaremuchmore likely todirect their frustration at local residents. If a hate group member commits a hate crime, it is likely that theywill do soagainst thosewhomthey feelhavedirectlywronged them such as others in the community. Due to local di¤erences, aggregation may result in lost variation and reduce the estimated e¤ect. Moreover, because the SPLCdoes not report chapter size, the numberof chapters manybe a noisy measure of the number of white supremacists. Second, even if a hate group is not actively seeking to commit crimes, its presence may signal to local community members that a particular bias is acceptable. Non-members may act out against those viewed as inferior by the white supremacists because such views are present in the community. This may partially explain why I �nd a positive relationship between current white supremacist activity and hate crimes by non-white perpetrators, though I do not �nd a relationship when looking at the lagged changes. Spill over e¤ects, if they exist at all, are much more likely to be local in nature and thus lost when aggregating to the state level. Third, these results include only the KKK, neo-Nazi, Racist Skinhead Chapters, and Christian Identity Churches that are listed with a city or county location. Ryan and Leeson include all types of hate groups or all types sans Patriot Groups listed in a state. Their estimates include three addi- tional hate groups: neo-Confederates, Black Separatists, and Other. This "Other" category includes organizations that may be biased in their views of those covered or protected by hate crime legislation, but do not advo- cate violent acts against those whom they are biased. This category in- 15 cludes scienti�c research institutes, recording studios, religious organizations, rights organizations, and retail outlets . Included in the "Other" category is the Charles Darwin Research Institute (CDRI), "a scienti�c and educa- tional foundation established to honor and extend the scienti�c revolution inaugurated by one of the greatest �gures in the history of human thought" [http://www.charlesdarwinresearch.org, Viewed 11/10/10] and the Family Re- search Institute whose goal is "to generate empirical research on issues that threatenthe traditional family, particularlyhomosexuality, AIDS, sexual social policy, anddrugabuse" [http://www.familyresearchinst.org, Viewed11/10/10] Although both organizations may hold biased views that may "malign an en- tire class of people," they do not advocate violence. This "Other" category may produce a spill over e¤ect, and increase hate crime, but it is unlikely to occur through direct action of the organization�s members. White supremacist chapters do not appear to form in response to hate crimesperpetratedbynon-whitesorhatecrimes listedasanti-white. In this re- spect white supremacists groups are unlike gangs, where "violent crime causes an increase in gang membership" [Osoba and Sobel, 2010]. This di¤erence may be a function of how law enforcement agencies address hate crimes and gang crimes. When it comes to hate crimes, agencies may more closely follow Osoba and Sobel�s suggestion that "governments should try harder to protect the rights of individuals who are the victims of violence." This may in part be due to how hate crime legislation attempts to protect the rights of individuals who are victims of bias-based violence. Further research is needed to determine the source of these con�icting re- sults. In addition, further queries are required to determine if black separatist organizations, such as the new Black Panthers, and Patriot organizations are positively related to hate crimes in the United States. 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"Hate Crimes: The Rising Tide of Bigotry and Bloodshed". 9-19. [25] Medo¤, Marshall. 1999. "Allocation of Time and Hateful Behavior: A Theoretical Analysis of Hate and Hate Crimes." American Journal of Economics and Sociology 58: 959-973. [26] Nozick, Robert. 1974. Anarchy, State, and Utopia. Basic Books: New York, NY. [27] Phillips, Scott and Ryken Grattet. 2000. "Judicial Rhetoric, Meaning- Making, and the Institutionalization of Hate Crime Laws." Law & Society Review 34(3): 567-602. [28] Rogers, W. H. 1993. Regression standard errors in clustered samples. Stata Technical Bulletin 13: 19�23. Reprinted in Stata Technical Bulletin Reprints, vol. 3, 88�94. [29] Ryan, Matt E., and Peter T. Leeson. 2010. "Hate Groups and Hate Crimes". Working Paper. [30] Sobel, Russell S. and Brian J. Osoba. 2009. "Youth Gangs as Pseudo- Governments: Implications for Violent Crime," Southern Economic Jour- nal 75:4, pp. 996-1018. [31] Southern Poverty Law Center Website: http://www.splcenter.org/. (Ac- cessed 07/18/08). [32] The Southern Poverty Law Center. 1998. "474 Hate Groups Blanket America." Intelligence Report. Issue 89. [33] ____________. 1999. "Hate Groups Top 500." Intelligence Report. Issue 93. [34] ____________.2000."TheDecade inReview." Intelligence Report. Issue 97. [35] ____________. 2001. "Blood on the Border." Intelligence Report. Issue 101. [36] ____________. 2002. "The Year in Hate." Intelligence Report. Is- sue 105. [37] ____________.2003."HateTakesaHit." Intelligence Report. Issue 109. [38] ____________.2004."AgeofRage." Intelligence Report. Issue114. [39] ____________. 2005. "Holy War". Intelligence Report. Issue 117. [40] ____________. 2006. "The Year in Hate". Intelligence Report. Is- sue 121. [41] ____________. 2007. "The Year in Hate". Intelligence Report. Is- sue 125. [42] ____________. 2008. "The Year in Hate". Intelligence Report. Is- sue 129. [43] The Stephen Roth Institute. 2004. For The Study of Contemporary Anti- semitism and Racism Annual Report United States 2004. [44] U.S. Dept. of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics. LAW ENFORCE- 18 MENT AGENCY IDENTIFIERS CROSSWALK [UNITED STATES], 1996 [Computer �le]. ICPSR ed. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consor- tium for Political and Social Research [producer and distributor], 2000. doi:10.3886/ICPSR02876 [45] United States Census. 1992 Census of Government. Volume 4. Govern- ment Finances. Number 5, Compendium of Government Finances [46] ____________. 1997 Census of Government. Volume 4. Govern- ment Finances. Compendium of Government Finances. [47] Weed, Frank, 1995. Certainty of Justice: Refonn in the Crime victim Movement. New York,NY: Aldine De Gruyter. [48] Williams, R. L. 2000. A note on robust variance estimation for cluster- correlated data. Biometrics 56: 645�646. [49] Windmeijer, Frank, 2005. "A �nite sample correction for the variance of linear e¢cient two-step GMM estimators," Journal of Econometrics, 126(1), 25-51. [50] Wooldridge, J. M. 2002. Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. A Data Appendix crime data comes from the U.S. Dept. of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investiga- tion. Uniform Crime Reporting Program Data: County-Level Detailed Arrest And O¤ense Data, 1997 -2007. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (Retrieved 5/20/2006 & 10/20/10). 1997-2007. (Retrieved June 20, 2006), from the University of Virginia, GeospatialandStatisticalDataCenter: http://�sher.lib.virginia.edu/collections/stats/crime/. income is the median household income in thousands ($1000s) of 2006 dollars by county as reported by the U.S. Census Bureau, "State and County Income and Poverty Estimates (SAIPE) from 1997 through 2007. http:// www.census.gov/hhes/www/saipe/county.html. Viewed (10/20/10). unemployment rate is the annual average percent of county residents who are unemployed and looking for a job as reported by the United States De- partment of Labor: Bureau of Labor Statistics. Labor Force Data by County, Annual Averages (Viewed (07/10/10): ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests/la/laucnty97.txt ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests/la/laucnty98.txt ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests/la/laucnty99.txt ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests/la/laucnty00.txt ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests/la/laucnty01.txt ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests/la/laucnty02.txt ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests/la/laucnty03.txt ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests/la/laucnty04.txt ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests/la/laucnty05.txt ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests/la/laucnty06.txt ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests/la/laucnty07.txt 19 poverty is the portion of a county�s residents that are below a household income threshold as reported by the U.S. Census Bureau, "State and County Income and Poverty Estimates (SAIPE) from 1997 through 2007. http:// www.census.gov/hhes/www/saipe/county.html. Viewed (07/10/08). adult male is the percentage of the county population that is male and between the ages of 15 and 44. U.S. Census Bureau, Population Division: County estimates by demographic characteristics - age, sex, race, and Hispanic Origin. http://www.census.gov/popest/datasets.html (Viewed 7/15/08) U.S. Census Bureau, Population Division: adult female is the percentage of the county population that is female and between the ages of 15 and 44. U.S. Census Bureau, Population Division: County estimates by demographic characteristics - age, sex, race, and Hispanic Origin. http://www.census.gov/popest/datasets.html (Viewed 7/15/08) male youth is thepercentageof thecountypopulationthat ismaleandbe- tween the ages of 5 to 14 (1997 - 1999) or 5 to 13 (2000 - 2005) U.S. Census Bu- reau, Population Division: County estimates by demographic characteristics - age, sex, race, andHispanicOrigin. http://www.census.gov/popest/datasets.html (Viewed 7/15/08) female youth is thepercentageof thecountypopulationthat is femaleand between the ages of 5 to 14 (1997 - 1999) or 5 to 13 (2000 - 2005). U.S. Census Bureau, Population Division: County estimates by demographic characteris- tics -age, sex, race, andHispanicOrigin. http://www.census.gov/popest/datasets.html (Viewed 7/15/08) black is thepercentageof countypopulationthat isblack. U.S.CensusBu- reau, Population Division: County estimates by demographic characteristics - age, sex, race, andHispanicOrigin. http://www.census.gov/popest/datasets.html (Viewed 7/15/08) hispanic is the percentage of the county population that is Hispanic. U.S. Census Bureau, Population Division: County estimates by demographic char- acteristics -age, sex, race, andHispanicOrigin. http://www.census.gov/popest/datasets.html (Viewed 7/15/08) msa is the Metropolitan Statistical Area reported by the Population Divi- sion, U.S.CensusBureau in1999andupdated in2003: http://www.census.gov/population/estimate city/99m�ps.txt (Viewed 1/29/2007). population density is calculated from the county population in U.S. Cen- sus Bureau, Population Division: County estimates by demographic charac- teristics - age, sex, race, and Hispanic Origin, (Viewed 7/15/08) divided by the land area in square miles from the U.S. Census Bureau (Viewed 1/29/2007). hate group total is the total number of hate group chapters active in a county. This variable is the sum of all Ku Klux Klan, Neo-Nazi, Racist Skinheads, and Christian Identity Chapters active at the county level. These data are reported annually at the city level by the Southern Poverty Law Center in their quarterly publication the Intelligence Report. Each annual report reports activity for the previous year. - 1998. "474 Hate Groups Blanket America." The Southern Poverty Law 20 Center. Issue 89. - 1999. "Hate Groups Top 500." The Southern Poverty Law Center. Issue 93. - 2000. "The Decade in Review." The Southern Poverty Law Center. Issue 97. - 2001. "Blood on the Border." The Southern Poverty Law Center. Issue 101 - 2002. "The Year in Hate." The Southern Poverty Law Center. Issue 105. - 2003. "Hate Takes a Hit." The Southern Poverty Law Center. Issue 109. - 2004. "Age of Rage." The Southern Poverty Law Center. Issue 114. - 2005. "Holy War". The Southern Poverty Law Center. Issue 117 - 2006. "The Year in Hate". The Southern Poverty Law Center. Issue 121. - 2007. "The Year in Hate". The Southern Poverty Law Center. Issue 125. - 2008. "The Year in Hate". The Southern Poverty Law Center. Issue 129. kkk is the total number of Ku Klux Klan Chapters active in a county. These data are reported annually at the city level by the Southern Poverty Law Center in their quarterly publication the Intelligence Report, Issues 85, 89, 93, 97, 101, 105, 109, 114, 117, 121, 125, 129. nazi is the number of Neo-Nazi chapters active in county. These data are reported annually at the city level by the Southern Poverty Law Center in their quarterly publication the Intelligence Report, Issues 85, 89, 93, 97, 101, 105, 109, 114, 117, 121, 125, 129. skinheads is the number of racists skinhead chapters active in a county. These data are reported annually at the city level by the Southern Poverty Law Center in their quarterly publication the Intelligence Report, Issues 85, 89, 93, 97, 101, 105, 109, 114, 117, 121, 125, 129. identity is the number of Christian Identity Churches active in a county .These data are reported annually at the city level by the Southern Poverty Law Center in their quarterly publication the Intelligence Report, Issues 85, 89, 93, 97, 101, 105, 109, 114, 117, 121, 125, 129. consumer price index is from the United States Department of Labor: Bureau of Labor Statistics: Consumer Price Index. Washington, D.C. ftp:// ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests/cpi/cpiai.txt (viewed 7/10/08) hate crime data come from the United States Department of Justice. Federal Bureau of Investigation. Uniform Crime Reporting Program Data [UnitedStates]: HateCrimeData, 1997-2007. AnnArbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research. 21 Figure 1: Figure 1: Number of Hate Crimes and Number of Ku Klux Klan, Neo-Nazi, Skinhead, and Christian Identity Chapters in the US: 1997 - 2007 22 Figure 2: Maximum Hate Crime Rate in a Given Year: 1997 - 2007 2 3 Figure 3: Maximum Annual Number of Active Hate Group Chapters Present In Between 1997 and 2007 2 4 Figure 4: Change in Hate Group Presence From 1997 Through 2007 2 5 Table 1: Hate Group Characteristics Movement Ku Klux Klan neo-Nazi Racist Skinheads Christian Identity Year Established 1866 1913 1970s 1940s Estimated Membership 6,000 6,000 20,000-50,000 Prohibitions/Sacri�ce Clothing Scar Race Ethnic Religious Sexual No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Membership Bene�ts Mutual Insurance Mutual Insurance Educational Services Safety Mutual Insurance Safety Mutual Insurance Educational Services Safety Sources: Anti-Defamation Leage, Southern Poverty Law Center, Kleg (1993) 2 6 Table 2: Summary Statistics Mean Standard Deviation Maximum Minimum Number of Hate Crimes 2.877 18.261 925 0 Hate Crime Rate (10000) 0.16 0.58 37.443 0 Hate Crime Rate Excluding Anti-White (10000) 0.132 0.434 19.231 0 Hate Crime Rate Comitted by Whites Excluding Anti-White (10000) 0.066 0.241 8.251 0 Hate Crime Rate Comitted by Non-Whites (10000) 0.085 0.39 19.231 0 Anti-White Hate Crime Rate by Non-Whites 0.018 0.173 11.872 0 Hate Group Present (Yes=1) 0.091 0.288 1 0 Real Median Household Income ($2006) 41379.68 10442.02 106782.4 17808.63 Unemployment Rate 5.226 2.145 33.2 0.7 Bene�ts per Unemployed 4.36 2.174 32.402 0 Percent in Poverty 14.188 5.752 55.9 1.7 Percent Black 9.438 14.711 86.127 0 Percent Hispanic 6.869 12.611 104.657 0 Percent White 86.445 15.908 157.395 4.786 Population Density 268.643 1792.164 70786.2 0.043 Percentage Male Age 15-44 20.765 3.359 55.507 10.66 Crime Rate (10000) 272.326 171.97 3888.889 0.405 N 30621 2 7 Table 3: Hate Crime Rate 1997 - 2007: All Counties and Only Those Reporting At Least One Hate Crime All Counties Counties Reporting At Least One Hate Crime Fixed E¤ects Dynamic Panel System GMM Fixed E¤ects Dynamic Panel System GMM Hate Group Present(Y e � =1) 0.029 * * 0.028 * 0.034 * * 0.008 [0.013] [0.014] [0.016] [0.016] Hate Crime Ratet�1 0.435 * * * 0.418 * * * [0.124] [0.113] Income ($1000) 0.000 0.000 * * * 0.000 0.000 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] Unemployment Rate 0.001 -0.002 0.001 -0.008 * * [0.003] [0.002] [0.005] [0.004] Bene�ts per Unemployed -0.001 0.004 -0.002 0.005 [0.004] [0.003] [0.007] [0.004] Percent in Poverty -0.002 0.001 -0.004 0.003 [0.002] [0.002] [0.005] [0.003] Percent Black 0.001 -0.000 0.003 -0.002 * [0.004] [0.001] [0.007] [0.001] Percent Hispanic 0.005 * * -0.000 0.007 * -0.001 [0.002] [0.001] [0.003] [0.001] Population Density -0.000 0.000 * * * -0.000 0.000 * * * [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] Crime Rate 0.00 * * * -0.000 0.001 * * * 0.000 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.00] Adj. R-squared 0.003 0.006 R-squared Within 0.004 0.007 Correlation between u i and X b -0.776 -0.824 Rho 0.458 0.471 Hansen J statistic 13.552 14.302 Hansen p-value 0.632 0.576 AR(2) test statistic 1.628 1.617 AR(2) p-value 0.104 0.106 Di¤erence-in-Hansen GMM 0.741 0.826 No. of Instruments 38 38 No. of groups 3116 3115 1931 1931 No. of Observations 33948 30872 21200 19271 Standard errors in brackets. All Estimations Include Year Dummies. Columns 1 and 3 are �xed e¤ects regressions with standard errors clustered by county. Columns 2 and 4 are two-step system GMM with Windmeijer (2005) corrected standard errors. The collapsed instruments used in di¤erenced equations of the GMM estimation are: Hate Crime Ratet�r ; Crime Ratet� r for r=3,4, ...8 The collapsed instruments used in level equations of the GMM estimation are: � Hate Crime Ratet�2 ; � Crime Ratet�2 Signi�cant at * 10 % , * * 5 % , * * * 1% 1 Table 4: Hate Crime Rate Excluding Anti-White and Hate Crime Rate with White Perpetrator with Non-White Victim Hate Crime Excluding Anti-White White Perpetrator with Non-White Victim Fixed E¤ects Dynamic Panel System GMM Fixed E¤ects Dynamic Panel System GMM Hate Group Present (Yes=1) 0.025 � � 0.030� � � 0.016 � 0.014 � [0.011] [0.010] [0.009] [0.008] Excluding Anti-White Ratet�1 0.196 [0.140] White Perpetrator with -0.182 Non-White Victim Ratet�1 [0.234] Income ($2006) 0.000 � 0.000� � � 0.000 0.000 � � � [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] Unemployment Rate 0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 [0.0020] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] Bene�ts per Unemployed ($2006) -0.001 0.005� � -0.001 0.004 � � � [0.003] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] Percent in Poverty -0.002 0.003� -0.001 0.001 [0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] Percent Black 0.002 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 � � � [0.002] [0.000] [0.001] [0.00] Percent Hispanic 0.004 � � -0.001 � 0.001 -0.000 [0.002] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] Population Density -0.000 0.000� � � -0.000 � 0.000 � [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] Crime Rate (10000) 0.000 � � � 0.000 0.000 � � � 0.000 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] Adj. R-squared 0.005 0.003 R-squared Within 0.005 0.003 Correlation between ui and � b -0.839 -0.710 Rho 0.557 0.359 Hansen J statistic 16.499 20.251 Hansen p-value 0.419 0.209 AR(2) test statistic 0.964 -0.552 AR(2) p-value 0.335 0.581 Di¤erence-in-Hansen GMM 0.787 0.509 No. of Instruments 38 38 No. of groups 3116 3115 3116 3115 No. of Observations 33948 30872 33948 30872 Standard errors in brackets. All Estimations Include Year Dummies. Columns 1 and 3 are �xed e¤ects regressions with standard errors clustered by county. Columns 2 and 4 are two-step system GMM with Windmeijer (2005) corrected standard errors. The collapsed instruments used in di¤erenced equations of the GMM estimation are: Hate Crime Rate Typet�4, Hate Crime Rate Typet�5 , ...Hate Crime Rate Type1997;Crime Ratet�1,Crime Ratet�2,...Crime Rate1997. The collapsed instruments used in level equations of the GMM estimation are: � Hate Crime Rate Typet � � Crime Ratet�4 Signi�cant at � 10 � , � � 5 � , � � � 1� 2 Table 5: Hate Crimes Committed by Non-Whites and Hate Crimes Commotted by Non-Whites Listed as Anti-White Hate Crimes with Non-White Perpetrators Anti-White Hate Crimes with Non-White Perpetrators Fixed E¤ects Dynamic Panel System GMM Fixed E¤ects Dynamic Panel System GMM Hate Group Present (Yes=1) 0.011 0.017 � 0.002 0.000 [0.007] [0.009] [0.004] [0.004] Hate Crime Rate with 0.184 Non-White Perpetratort�1 [0.217] Anti-White Hate Crime Rate 0.237 with Non-White Perpetratort�1 [0.333] Income ($2006) 0.000 0.000� � � -0.000 0.000� [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] Unemployment Rate 0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] Bene�ts per Unemployed ($2006) 0.000 0.004 � -0.000 0.001 [0.003] [0.0020] [0.001] [0.000] Percent in Poverty -0.000 0.003 � � 0.001 0.000 [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] Percent Black 0.002 0.000 0.000 -0.000 [0.003] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] Percent Hispanic 0.003 � � -0.000 � 0.000 -0.000 � � � [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] Percent White -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 [0.002] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] Population Density -0.000 0.000 � � � 0.000 0.000 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] Percent Male Age 15-44 0.005 0.002 � � 0.002 0.000 [0.004] [0.001] [0.002] [0.000] Crime Rate (10000) 0.000 � � � 0.000 0.000� 0.000 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] Adj. R-squared 0.002 0.000 R-squared Within 0.003 0.001 Correlation between ui and � b -0.769 -0.207 Rho 0.444 0.195 Hansen J statistic 20.190 18.170 Hansen p-value 0.265 0.378 AR(2) test statistic 0.044 0.082 AR(2) p-value 0.965 0.935 Di¤erence-in-Hansen GMM 0.157 0.776 No. of Instruments 39 39 No. of groups 3116 3115 3116 3115 No. of Observations 33948 30872 33948 30872 Standard errors in brackets. All Estimations Include Year Dummies. Columns 1 and 3 are �xed e¤ects regressions with standard errors clustered by county. Columns 2 and 4 are two-step system GMM with Windmeijer (2005) corrected standard errors. The collapsed instruments used in di¤erenced equations of the GMM estimation are: Hate Crime Rate Typet�3, Hate Crime Rate Typet�4 , ...Hate Crime Rate Type1997;Crime Ratet�1,Crime Ratet�2,...Crime Rate1997. The collapsed instruments used in level equations of the GMM estimation are: Hate Crime Rate Typet Crime Ratet�4 Signi�cant at � 10 � , � � 5 � , � � � 1 � 3 Table 6: Expected Future Hate Crimes Committed by Non-Whites and Hate Group Activity � Hate Crime Rate by � Hate Group Presencet Non-White Perpetratort � Hate Crime Rate by -0.576 0.003 Non-White Perpetratort�1 [0.071] [0.052] � Hate Crime Rate by -0.317 0.037 Non-White Perpetratort�2 [0.067] [0.050] � Hate Group Presencet�1 0.018 -3.456 [0.014] [0.075] � Hate Group Presencet�2 -0.003 -2.455 [0.010] [0.109] Adj. R-squared 0.284 Psuedo-Rsquared 0.156 No. of Observations 24662 24662 All Estimations include, � incomet, � unemployment ratet, � unemployment rate bene�tst, � poverty ratet, � percentage blackt, � percentage Hispanict, � percentage whitet, � population densityt, � percentage male 15-44t, � crime ratet, and year dummies. Column 1 is ordinary least squares. Column 2 is an ordered logit. Robust standard errors in brackets. Signi�cant at 10 � , 5 � , 1 � . 4 Table 7: Expected Future Hate Crimes Committed by Non-Whites Listed as Anti-White and Hate Group Activity � Anti-White Hate Crime Rate � Hate Group Presencet by Non-White Perpetratort � Anti-White Hate Crime Rate -0.594 � � � 0.083 by Non-White Perpetratort�1 [0.118] [0.126] � Anti-White Hate Crime Rate -0.331 � � � -0.030 by Non-White Perpetratort�2 [0.101] [0.096] � Hate Group Presencet�1 0.010 -3.455 � � � [0.009] [0.075] � Hate Group Presencet�2 -0.001 -2.456 � � � [0.006] [0.109] Adj. R-squared 0.296 Psuedo-Rsquared 0.156 No. of Observations 24662 24662 All Estimations include, � incomet, � unemployment ratet, � unemployment rate bene�tst, � poverty ratet, � percentage blackt, � percentage Hispanict, � percentage whitet, � population densityt, � percentage male 15-44t, � crime ratet, and year dummies. Column 1 is ordinary least squares. Column 2 is an ordered logit. Robust standard errors in brackets. Signi�cant at � 10 � , � � 5 � , � � � 1 � . 5 
work_bfny3qiytfdmnatpikwqrn267y	----	               City, University of London Institutional Repository Citation: Eriksson, L. E. and Berglund, T. (2007). Health-related quality of life in homo- and bisexual men attending a sexually transmitted disease clinic in Sweden. International Journal of STD and AIDS, 18(3), pp. 207-211. doi: 10.1258/095646207780132442 This is the unspecified version of the paper. This version of the publication may differ from the final published version. Permanent repository link: http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/3744/ Link to published version: http://dx.doi.org/10.1258/095646207780132442 Copyright and reuse: City Research Online aims to make research outputs of City, University of London available to a wider audience. Copyright and Moral Rights remain with the author(s) and/or copyright holders. URLs from City Research Online may be freely distributed and linked to. City Research Online: http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/ publications@city.ac.uk City Research Online http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/ mailto:publications@city.ac.uk 1 Title: Health-related quality of life in homo- and bisexual men attending an STD clinic in Sweden Short title: HRQL in MSM Authors: L. E. Eriksson, M.Sc., Ph.D. 1,2 and T. Berglund, B.Sc. 2,3,4 1 Section of Nursing, Department of Neurobiology, Health Care Science and Society, Karolinska Institutet, Huddinge, Sweden 2 Department of Venhälsan, Karolinska University Hospital at South Stockholm General Hospital, Stockholm, Sweden 3 Department of Epidemiology, Swedish Institute of Infectious Disease Control, Solna, Sweden 4 Department of Medical Epidemiology and Biostatistics, Karolinska Institutet, Solna, Sweden Correspondence: Dr Lars E. Eriksson, Section of Nursing, Department of Neurobiology, Health Care Science and Society, Karolinska Institutet, 23300, SE-141 83 Huddinge, Sweden. Fax: +46 8 34 82 65; Phone: +46 8 524 800 00; E-mail: Lars.Eriksson@ki.se. Summary: Men who have sex with men (MSM) have an increased risk of contracting STD and HIV. Studies of their health-related quality of life (HRQL) are uncommon, though such studies may provide additional knowledge that is of interest in counseling and care. The HRQL in MSM attending a clinic for STD- and HIV-testing in Stockholm, Sweden, was investigated in 1996 and 2004, measured by means of the 2 Swedish Health-Related Quality of Life questionnaire. The results were compared with those for men from a general Swedish population sample and with HIV-infected men. The HIV-negative MSM had significantly worse emotional well-being, satisfaction with family life, relation to their partner and general health perception, and better physical HRQL compared with the general Swedish population. There were no differences in the emotional and family dimensions between HIV-infected and HIV-negative MSM, but the HIV-negative group scored their physical and general health higher than the HIV- infected group. No apparent differences over time were seen in the HIV-negative group. This study shows that psychosocial HRQL is lower for MSM than for a general male population sample, which calls for increased attention in the care of MSM patients. Key words: Homosexual men, health-related quality of life (HRQL), psychosocial, STD Clinic, HIV 3 Introduction In Sweden, laws covering registered partnership for couples of the same sex and anti- discrimination laws were implemented during the decades around the turn of the millennium and the attitudes towards homosexuality became more tolerant in the Swedish population during the 1990s. 1 One could thus hypothesize that this would have a positive impact on the health-related quality of life (HRQL) of men who have sex with men (MSM). In this study we focus on the HRQL of HIV-negative MSM, both from a longitudinal perspective and in relation to men from a general population sample and HIV-positive men. Several previous studies have focused on HRQL of HIV-positive MSM. However, it is not common to focus on HRQL of MSM without known HIV infection. Even though some European studies have indicated that this group’s quality-of-life is affected, 2,3 there is limited knowledge about the HRQL of MSM. In our own previous study of HRQL in HIV-positive men (69 MSM and 3 heterosexuals) we found a negative impact in scales measuring physical, emotional and social aspects of HRQL compared with a general population sample. 4 Since MSM in general are commonly seen in sexually transmissible disease (STD) clinics, our intention in the present study was to focus on the HRQL of a broader group of MSM without a known HIV diagnosis. The following research questions were addressed: (a) Does the HRQL of HIV-negative MSM differ from the HRQL of men from a general population sample, (b) Does the HRQL of HIV-negative MSM differ in comparison with the HRQL of a group of HIV-positive men and (c) Are there any differences in 4 HRQL when comparing a cohort of HIV-negative MSM from year 1996 with a cohort of HIV-negative MSM from year 2004. 5 Methods Setting Karolinska University Hospital Gay Men’s Health Clinic located at South Stockholm General Hospital is directed towards MSM and offers counseling, testing and treatment for STDs including HIV. Subjects Data stemming from three patient cohorts of the gay men’s health clinic are presented: (a) a group of presumed HIV-negative MSM investigated in year 1996 (1996 cohort), (b) a group of presumed HIV-negative MSM investigated in year 2004 (2004 cohort) and (c) data from a previously published study 4 of HRQL in a group of HIV-positive male patients, the great majority of whom were MSM, who were investigated in 1993- 95, i.e., before the era of highly active antiretroviral therapy (HIV-positive group). Furthermore, the results are compared with data from a published study of HRQL in a random sample of Swedish citizens 5 (Swedish population group). MSM 1996 cohort During a three-month period 1996 all persons visiting the clinic for STD screening/counseling received oral and written information about the study. The questionnaire was filled in anonymously by the respondents, either at the clinic in connection with the visit or at home. Out of a total of 211 persons visiting the clinic, 12 were not included due to language problems, and six had already answered the questionnaires on a previous visit. Of the remaining 193 patients, 164 (85%) responded to the questionnaires (29 declined to participate). 6 MSM 2004 cohort During a two-month period 2004 the study outline of 1996 was repeated. Out of a total of 380 persons visiting the clinic, three were not included due to language problems, and 135 had already participated/been asked to participate in the study on a previous visit. Of the remaining 242 patients, 201 (83%) responded to the questionnaire (21 declined to participate and 20 were by mistake not informed about the study). Swedish population group The SWED-QUAL questionnaire has been used in a sample of Swedish men and women (n=1443). 5 Details regarding the selection procedure have been presented by Brorsson et al. 5 From this publication, the results from men in the age range 18─74 years, corresponding to that of the study population, were extracted and used for comparison (Swedish population group). HIV-positive group Thorough data about this study can be found elsewhere. 4 In brief, HRQL data was collected from 72 HIV-positive men (mean age 37 (SD 9) years, mean CD4 count 431 (SD 193) × 10 6 cells/l and of whom 96% were MSM) before entering a clinical trial with a therapeutic HIV vaccine. Instruments The Swedish Health-Related Quality of Life questionnaire (SWED-QUAL) The SWED-QUAL was developed by Brorsson et al. 5 from the measures used in the USA Medical Outcomes Study (MOS). 6 The instrument is designed to measure HRQL and consists 63 items which form two single-item and 11 multi-item dimension scales 7 of Likert type. Each separate scale is transformed into a 0─100 index, with higher scores indicating better perceived HRQL. The scales are described in 5 and the adaptation for use in the present group are described in 4 . The questionnaire also contained questions about age, country of origin, education, and current activity (e.g., full or part time employment, sick leave, disability pension, etc.). Statistical methods Statistical calculations were performed with SPSS for Windows, version 12.0.1 (SPSS Inc., Chicago, Illinois). The criterion for statistical significance was p <0.05. The comparability in demographic variables of the MSM 1996 and 2004 cohorts was investigated by two group t-test as regards age and by χ 2 -test for frequency data. The differences in HRQL scores between the MSM 1996 cohort and the HIV-positive group and MSM 2004 cohort respectively were analyzed using the Mann-Whitney U-test. Since individual scores were not available for the published study 5 , one-sample t-test was used in the comparisons between the MSM 1996 cohort and the Swedish population group. 8 Results Demographics The age of the HIV-negative MSM 1996 cohort ranged between 17 and 74 years, and the mean age was 36 (SD 11) years; for the HIV-negative MSM 2004 cohort the age ranged between 16 and 67 years, and the mean age was 34 (SD 12; non-significant). Further patient characteristics are shown in Table 1. HRQL in HIV-negative MSM compared with a random population Compared with the Swedish population sample, the HIV-negative MSM 1996 cohort reported higher scores on the SWED-QUAL scales: physical functioning, satisfaction with physical ability and pain (Table 2). Further, they reported lower scores on the scales: emotional well-being positive and negative affect, satisfaction with family life, relation to partner and general health perception (Table 2). HRQL in HIV-negative MSM compared with HIV-positive men Compared with the group of HIV-positive men, the HIV-negative MSM 1996 cohort reported higher scores as regards the SWED-QUAL scales: mobility, role limitations due to physical health, pain, sexual functioning and general health perception (Table 2). No statistically significant differences were found as regards the scales measuring the emotional or family dimensions of health-related quality of life. HRQL in MSM 1996 compared with MSM 2004 When comparing the results of the MSM 1996 and 2004 cohorts there were no differences between the two groups in terms of demographics (Table 1). As regards the 9 SWED-QUAL scales there were no statistically significant differences except for a slight decrease in the sleep problems scale (Table 2). 10 Discussion We found a decreased emotional HRQL in HIV-negative MSM when compared with the general population. There was, however, no difference in emotional HRQL of the HIV-negative MSM as compared with the HIV-positive sample. Interestingly, Perkins et al. 7 found higher incidence of depression in MSM compared with general population figures, but no difference when comparing HIV-positive and HIV-negative MSM. This also indicates a negative influence of the emotional HRQL in the investigated MSM compared with the general population. Further, despite the positive changes in legal rights and general attitudes towards same-sex sexuality during the last decade, there were no indications of changes in the negatively affected HRQL when we compared the MSM 1996 and MSM 2004 samples. The HIV-negative MSM had higher scores on the physical and general health domains, both compared with HIV-positive MSM and the general population. The difference in relation to the HIV-positive group could possibly be explained by the fact that 72% of the patients in the HIV-positive group had symptoms from their HIV infection. 4 The difference in relation to the general population figures indicates that the investigated group of MSM is more concerned about their physical health than men from the general population. Our main findings that the HIV-negative MSM group reported lower scores on the emotional well-being and general health domains compared with the general population sample may have been influenced by the fact that the measurement in the MSM group was performed when the participants were visiting a health care facility for information and screening with regard to STDs. However, a decreased quality-of-life among same- 11 sex oriented individuals has also been found in other studies not performed at clinical settings. 2,3 Young age, concealment of sexual orientation and a segregating lifestyle were related to worse psychological health. 2 Decreased quality-of-life has also been shown related to lack of self-esteem and mastery. 3 Other factors behind the negative effect on the HRQL of the MSM could be the social stigma, 8 internalized homophobia, 9 minority stress 10 and increased experience of discrimination, violence, harassment and/or threats 2,11,12 that have been found in investigations of same-sex oriented men. The lack of positive changes in HRQL over time in HIV-negative MSM could possibly be related to several factors. Firstly, it might require a longer timeframe for the positive changes in legislation and attitudes to have positive influences of the individual experience of HRQL. Secondly, other factors could counteract the legal and attitudinal changes. One such factor could be experiences of increased vulnerability due to hate crimes related to homophobia, a phenomenon that have increased in Sweden during the last years. 13 Another reason could be increased vulnerability due to health aspects. For example, the STD incidence among MSM has increased markedly since the late 1990s, including outbreaks of syphilis in Sweden as well as in many other European countries. 14 As found in several studies, MSM have an increased risk of contracting an STD including HIV (e.g., 15-17 ). The STD and HIV-screening clinics have a great opportunity to reach this population and even if this is not the primary focus of these settings, there is a need to pay attention to psychosocial aspects of these patients in the counseling and testing situation. It could therefore be useful to include psychosocial aspects, as for example relations to family and partner and emotional well-being, in the structured 12 interview guides used in the STD counselling. If problems in these domains are indicated, referral to services specialized in psychosocial issues is recommended. Since a relationship between mood and unsafe sexual practice in MSM has been suggested, 18 such a referral practice could be of importance in STD prevention on an individual basis. We would like to stress some study limitations when interpreting the present results. Firstly, the fact that they visited a clinic with MSM as the special target group indicates that they had reached at least some level of acceptance of their same-sex sexuality and the risk of contracting STDs. It may not be possible to generalize the inferences drawn from this study to populations visiting clinics not directed towards MSM, and to non- clinical MSM-populations. The fact that concealment of sexual orientation has been shown to be related to worse psychological health, 2 indicates that an affected emotional HRQL probably holds true even for MSM with lower acceptance of their sexuality. Secondly, we wish to point out that the two measurements of HRQL in MSM 1996 and 2004 were cross-sectional; the study was not longitudinal on an individual level. Acknowledgements: We would like to acknowledge the assistance of the participants, who took the time to respond to the questionnaires. We would also like to thank the staff at the Department of Venhälsan, Karolinska University Hospital for their help in administering the instruments to the participants, Lena Nilsson Schönnesson for valuable comments on the manuscript and Eric Sandström and Göran A. Bratt for support and helpful discussions. 13 This study was supported by grants from the South Stockholm General Hospital, Stockholm County Council and the Center for Health Care Sciences at Karolinska Institutet. 14 References 1 Herlitz C. HIV/AIDS and society: knowledge, attitudes and behaviour 1989-2000. Stockholm: Swedish National Institute of Public Health, 2001 2 Hegna K, Kristiansen HW, Moseng BU. Levekår og livskvalitet blant lesbiske kvinner og homofile menn [The living conditions and life quality among lesbian women and gay men]. Oslo: Norsk institutt for forskning om oppvekst, velferd og aldring (NOVA), 1999 3 Sandfort TG, de Graaf R, Bijl RV. Same-sex sexuality and quality of life: findings from the Netherlands Mental Health Survey and Incidence Study. Arch Sex Behav 2003; 32:15-22. 4 Eriksson LE, Nordström G, Berglund T, Sandström E. The health-related quality of life in a Swedish sample of HIV-infected persons. J Adv Nurs 2000; 32:1213-1223 5 Brorsson B, Ifver J, Hays RD. The Swedish Health-Related Quality of Life Survey (SWED-QUAL). Qual Life Res 1993; 2:33-45 6 Tarlov AR, Ware JE, Greenfield S, Nelson EC, Perrin E, Zubkoff M. The Medical Outcomes Study. An application of methods for monitoring the results of medical care. JAMA 1989; 262:925-930 7 Perkins DO, Stern RA, Golden RN, Murphy C, Naftolowitz D, Evans DL. Mood disorders in HIV infection: prevalence and risk factors in a nonepicenter of the AIDS epidemic. Am J Psychiatry 1994; 151:233-236 8 Kimmel DC. Life-History Interviews of Aging Gay Men. Int J Aging Hum Dev 1979; 10:239-248 9 Wagner G, Brondolo E, Rabkin J. Internalized homophobia in a sample of HIV+ gay men, and its relationship to psychological distress, coping and illness progression. J Homosex 1996; 32:91-106 15 10 Meyer IH. Prejudice, social stress, and mental health in lesbian, gay, and bisexual populations: conceptual issues and research evidence. Psychol Bull 2003; 129:674-697 11 Mays VM, Cochran SD. Mental health correlates of perceived discrimination among lesbian, gay, and bisexual adults in the United States. Am J Public Health 2001; 91:1869-1876. 12 Tiby E. Victimization and fear among lesbians and gay men in Stockholm. Int Rev Victimology 2001; 8:217-243 13 Swedish Security Service. Brottslighet kopplad till rikets inre säkerhet 2004 [Offences related to national internal security 2004]. Stockholm: Swedish Security Service, 2005 14 Fenton KA, Lowndes CM, ESSTI Network. Recent trends in the epidemiology of sexually transmitted infections in the European Union. Sex Transm Infect 2005; 80:255- 263 15 Stall RD, Hays RB, Waldo CR, Ekstrand M, McFarland W. The gay '90s: a review of research in the 1990s on sexual behavior and HIV risk among men who have sex with men. AIDS 2000; 14:S101-S114 16 Macdonald N, Dougan S, McGarrigle CA, et al. Recent trends in diagnoses of HIV and other sexually transmitted infections in England and Wales among men who have sex with men. Sex Transm Infect 2004; 80:492-497 17 Fox KK, del Rio C, Holmes KK, et al. Gonorrhea in the HIV era: A reversal in trends among men who have sex with men. Am J Public Health 2001; 91:959-964 18 Rogers G, Curry M, Oddy J, Pratt N, Beilby J, Wilkinson D. Depressive disorders and unprotected causal anal sex among Australian homosexually active men in primary care. HIV Med 2003; 4:271-275 16 Table 1 Health-related quality of life in men who have sex with men (years 1996 and 2004), demographical data a MSM 1996 n=164 MSM 2004 n=201 Mean age SD 36 11 34 12 Country of origin: Sweden % 84 79 Other/not stated % 16 21 Working status: Full- or part-time work/studies % 84 84 Sick leave/disability pension % 6 7 Other/not stated % 10 9 Education: Compulsory school (6─9 years) % 7 7 Upper secondary/high school % 34 46 University studies % 57 45 Not stated % 2 2 Has a partner: Yes/No % 51/48 47/50 Not stated % 1 3 a there were no statistical differences between the groups as regards any of the variables; MSM men who have sex with men; SD standard deviation 17 Table 2 The Swedish Health-Related Quality of Life questionnaire. Comparisons between the MSM 1996 cohort (n=164) and the Swedish male population group, the HIV-positive men (n=72) and MSM 2004 cohort (n=201) respectively MSM 1996 Swedish population group MSM 1996 vs. Swedish pop. group MSM 1996 HIV-positive men MSM 2004 MSM 1996 vs. HIV-pos MSM 1996 vs. 2004 Mean (SD) Mean p-value a Median (IQR) Median (IQR) Median (IQR) p-value b p-value b Physical functioning 97.2 (6.0) 92.8 <0.001 100 (95.2─100) 100 (95.2─100) 100 (95.2─100) NS NS Mobility 99.0 (5.7) 98.1 NS 100 (100─100) 100 (100─100) 100 (100─100) 0.005 NS Satisfaction with physical ability 84.8 (19.0) 76.6 <0.001 100 (66.7─100) 66.7 (66.7─100) 100 (66.7─100) NS NS Role limitations due to physical health 88.5 (22.7) 88.3 NS 100 (88.9─100) 100 (55.6─100) 100 (88.9─100) 0.016 NS 18 Pain 90.7 (16.2) 85.7 <0.001 100 (84.7─100) 100 (62.5─100) 100 (73.6─100) 0.034 NS Positive affect 70.5 (23.2) 76.7 <0.01 75.0 (54.2─87.5) 68.7 (45.8─87.5) 77.1 (58.3─87.5) NS NS Negative affect 62.2 (27.0) 76.7 <0.001 62.5 (41.7─87.5) 62.5 (34.4─83.3) 58.3 (33.3─75.0) NS NS Role limitations due to emotional health 86.1 (22.7) 87.8 NS 100 (77-8─100) 100 (66.7─100) 100 (66.7─100) NS NS Sleep problems 72.6 (21.9) 76.0 NS 78.6 (57.1─89.3) 71.4 (39.3─89.3) 75.0 (53.6─85.7) NS 0.027 Satisfaction with family life 66.6 (26.5) 83.8 <0.001 72.9 (47.9─87.5) 68.8 (42.2─85.4) 72.9 (46.9─87.5) NS NS Relation to partner 79.1 (19.0) 85.3 <0.01 83.3 (66.7─95.8) 79.2 (62.5─95.8) 79.2 (66.7─95.8) NS NS 19 Sexual functioning 85.8 (20.2) 85.9 NS 91.7 (75.0─100) 87.5 (64.6─100) 91.7 (75.0─100) 0.039 NS General health perception 81.3 (16.9) 84.0 <0.05 86.1 (72.2─94.4) 72.2 (44.4─88.9) 83.3 (66.7─94.4) <0.001 NS a one-sample t-test; b Mann-Whitney U-test; MSM men who have sex with men; NS non-significant; IQR inter-quartile range 
work_bggiw7dwevalbnuy6oxlysy5rm	----	Climate of Hate: Similar Correlates of Far Right Electoral Support and Right-Wing Hate Crimes in Germany fpsyg-10-02328 October 17, 2019 Time: 18:20 # 1 ORIGINAL RESEARCH published: 18 October 2019 doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2019.02328 Edited by: Angel Gomez, National University of Distance Education (UNED), Spain Reviewed by: Ignacio Lago, Pompeu Fabra University, Spain Martin Elff, Zeppelin University, Germany *Correspondence: Jonas H. Rees jonas.rees@uni-bielefeld.de Specialty section: This article was submitted to Personality and Social Psychology, a section of the journal Frontiers in Psychology Received: 12 June 2019 Accepted: 30 September 2019 Published: 18 October 2019 Citation: Rees JH, Rees YPM, Hellmann JH and Zick A (2019) Climate of Hate: Similar Correlates of Far Right Electoral Support and Right-Wing Hate Crimes in Germany. Front. Psychol. 10:2328. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2019.02328 Climate of Hate: Similar Correlates of Far Right Electoral Support and Right-Wing Hate Crimes in Germany Jonas H. Rees1,2* , Yann P. M. Rees1, Jens H. Hellmann3 and Andreas Zick1 1 Institute for Interdisciplinary Research on Conflict and Violence, Bielefeld University, Bielefeld, Germany, 2 Department of Social Psychology, Bielefeld University, Bielefeld, Germany, 3 Department of Psychology, Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster, Münster, Germany Since 2015, far right parties drawing heavily on radical anti-refugee rhetoric gained electoral support in Germany while the number of political hate crimes targeting refugees rose. Both phenomena – far right electoral support and prevalence of right- wing hate crimes – have theoretically and empirically been linked with socio-structural and contextual variables. However, systematic empirical research on these links is scattered and scarce at best. We combine official statistics on political hate crimes targeting refugees in Germany and far right electoral support of the far right party “Alternative für Deutschland” (AfD) in the German national elections 2017 with socio- structural variables (proportion of foreigners and unemployment rate) and survey data collected in a representative survey (N = 1,506) in 2016. We aggregate and combine data for all German municipalities except Berlin which were the level of analysis for the current study. In path analyses, we find socio-structural variables to be unrelated with each other but significantly correlated with both criterion variables in a systematic fashion: proportion of foreigners was negatively while unemployment rate was positively linked with far right electoral support. Right-wing crime was linked positively with unemployment rate across Germany and positively with proportion of foreigners only in East Germany while proportion of foreigners was unrelated to right-wing crime in West Germany. When including survey measures into the model, they were linked with socio-structural variables in the predicted fashion – intergroup contact correlated positively with proportion of foreigners, collective deprivation correlated positively with unemployment rates, and both predicted extreme right-wing attitudes. However, their contribution to the explained variance in outcome variables above and beyond socio- structural variables was neglectable. We argue that both far right-wing electoral support and right-wing hate crime can be conceptualized as behavioral forms of political extremism shaped through socio-structural and contextual factors and discuss implications for preventing political extremism. Keywords: right-wing extremism, populist parties, intergroup contact, collective deprivation, socio-structural variables Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 1 October 2019 | Volume 10 | Article 2328 https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/psychology/ https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/psychology#editorial-board https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/psychology#editorial-board https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2019.02328 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2019.02328 http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.3389/fpsyg.2019.02328&domain=pdf&date_stamp=2019-10-18 https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpsyg.2019.02328/full http://loop.frontiersin.org/people/274130/overview http://loop.frontiersin.org/people/773791/overview http://loop.frontiersin.org/people/86900/overview https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/psychology/ https://www.frontiersin.org/ https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/psychology#articles fpsyg-10-02328 October 17, 2019 Time: 18:20 # 2 Rees et al. Climate of Hate “The one thing [. . .] that is truly ugly is the climate of hate and intimidation, created by a noisy few, which makes the decent majority reluctant to air in public their views on anything controversial.” – Edward Abbey INTRODUCTION Much has been written about the recent wave of success for far right, right-wing populist and extreme right-wing parties, figures and movements globally but especially in the Western world. There seems to be agreement that we are witnessing what some scholars have called a “revolt against liberal democracy” (Eatwell and Goodwin, 2018), a “cultural backlash” (Norris and Inglehart, 2019), or – in more technical and less alarming words – growing support for the far right (Golder, 2016). These developments seem to temporally coincide with an increase in hate-crime in countries across the world (see, e.g., Osce Hate Crime Reporting, 2019) and a number of right-wing terrorist attacks that have gained media attention around the world: Attacks in Oslo and Utøya, 2011, Charleston, 2015, and Christchurch, 2019 among others have been directly linked with extreme right-wing ideology. While there is by now a rich literature on far right electoral support, its potential links with right-wing crimes are not well understood. In public discourse and discussions amongst practitioners, there seems to be an implicit assumption that both phenomena – far right electoral support and prevalence of right-wing hate crimes – are related (e.g., Chu, 2018). However, systematic empirical research on such potential links is scattered and scarce at best. In the current paper, we argue that both are not independent phenomena but have similar correlates and are also correlated with each other. We combine official statistics on reported right-wing hate crimes targeting refugees in Germany and far right electoral support in the German national elections 2017 and investigate links with socio-structural variables (proportion of foreigners and unemployment rate) on the one hand and with psychological variables measured in a representative survey (perceived threat, intergroup contact, and extreme right-wing attitudes) on the other hand.1 We show that both phenomena co-occur geographically, and we do so in the German context where right-wing hate crime has recently peaked while the far right has seen increasing electoral support in the aftermath of the immense refugee in-migration since 2015. The German Context In recent years, wars and other conflicts including personal persecution, primarily in the Middle East and Africa have forced millions of individuals to leave their original places of residence. While most refugees temporarily settle in neighboring countries like Lebanon or Turkey, many have also migrated to Western Europe. Almost 1 million refugees have sought asylum in Germany in the year 2015 alone (German Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, 2019). Germany was not only the 1 We refer to the far right party family following Golder (2016) where a more elaborate discussion and distinction between radicalism, populism, extremism, and nationalism within the far right can be found. European country in which most refugees applied for asylum (Eurostat, 2017). It has also been at the center of attention for a number of events during this period, most prominently for its “welcome culture”. As one example, German chancellor Angela Merkel famously announced that several thousand refugees would be allowed to cross the border from Hungary to Austria and into Germany in September 2015 (e.g., Hall and Lichfield, 2015). Her public press announcement “Wir schaffen das!” (We can do this) became historical. While solidarity and the willingness to help have generally been high (e.g., Akrap, 2015), Germany also experienced a wave of hostile and violent resistance against refugees (e.g., Benček and Strasheim, 2016). The number of political hate crimes targeting refugees and their homes in Germany rose dramatically and peaked in 2016 with a total of more than 3,000 incidents according to official sources with an unclear number of incidents that remained in the dark field (Federal Government, 2017; ProAsyl, 2017).2 Such incidents range from propaganda crimes like libel, incitement of the masses and harassment to violent hate crimes like assault, arson and right-wing extremist terrorist attacks. During the same period, far right parties drawing on radical anti-refugee rhetoric gained electoral support in Germany – most notably the AfD (Alternative für Deutschland, Alternative for Germany). We begin by tracing the rise of this most prominent current far right party in Germany, the AfD, and summarize previous research and historical links between socio-structural variables such as unemployment and far right electoral support. We then briefly review two prominent social-psychological factors – perceived threat and intergroup contact – that can help understand both outcomes that are of interest for the current work. As we shall see, theoretically as well as empirically, far right electoral support and right-wing hate crimes have similar socio- structural as well as psychological correlates that can produce a dangerous climate of hate. Rise of the AfD The AfD was founded in 2013. During the first few years after its formation, the party strongly opposed European integration, the European currency “Euro” and especially European assistance programs during the European sovereign-debt crisis (Arzheimer, 2015), such as the European Stability Mechanism and the European Financial Stability Facility. The party’s “Euro-skeptic” positions broadened during the so called “European migration crisis” from 2015 and onward. Since then, a shift in AfD policy has been reliably documented: The party’s positions drastically changed from an economic critique of the European Union toward a far right ideological, nationalist and anti-immigration course (e.g., Franz et al., 2018). During this period of change, AfD personnel and party leadership also changed. This shift seems to have facilitated electoral success for the AfD. Since 2015, the 2 Officially, there is no hate crime legislation in the German Criminal Code. However, the legal equivalent is called, politisch motivierte Kriminalität rechts“ (PMK-r), which is officially defined as crime “against a person based on political attitude, nationality, ethnicity, race, skin color, religion, world view, origin, or physical appearance, disability, sexual orientation or societal status (so called “hate crimes”)“ (German Ministry of the Interior Building and Community, 2019). Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 2 October 2019 | Volume 10 | Article 2328 https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/psychology/ https://www.frontiersin.org/ https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/psychology#articles fpsyg-10-02328 October 17, 2019 Time: 18:20 # 3 Rees et al. Climate of Hate AfD gained more and more electoral support and was able to consolidate as a relevant political force with a breakthrough in 2016: In the Eastern German states of Saxony-Anhalt (24.2%) and Mecklenburg-Vorpommern (20.8%), the AfD had their biggest electoral successes. However, the AfD also had substantial impact in the in 2016 Western German state elections in Rhineland- Palatinate (12.6%), Berlin (14.2%) and Baden-Wurttemberg (15.1%). This trend culminated in a striking 12.6% in the German general elections in September of 2017 (21.8% in the five states of the former German Democratic Republic) establishing the AfD as the third most powerful party and opposition leader in the German Parliament, the Bundestag. With the AfD in the Bundestag, the party’s positions and views have entrenched large parts of German society seemingly independent of financial and societal status (Zick et al., 2016; Bergmann et al., 2017; Franz et al., 2018; Schröder, 2018) and support of AfD positions in the German society increased. Various polls currently have the AfD (13–14%) close to the Social Democrats (12%), making the AfD the third most successful party in Germany as of August 2019 (Wahlrecht.de, 2019). Before discussing psychological factors that should be relevant for the AfD’s electoral success as well as right-wing hate crime, we shall now review socio-structural variables that have historically and empirically been linked with far right electoral support. Unemployment and Far Right Electoral Support The link between unemployment and far right electoral support is well-established in the literature and has been empirically demonstrated numerous times. In one of the earliest studies, Pratt (1948) analyzed the 1932 German Reichstag Elections and found that unemployed citizens tended to vote for extreme political parties, such as the Nazi-Party (NSDAP), but also the Communist-Party (KPD). Falter and Zintl (1988) further corroborated these findings arguing that high unemployment rates facilitated the electoral and overall success of the Nazis in Germany in the 1930s. O’Loughlin et al. (1994), however, showed that these findings seem to hold only for the 1932 and 1933 German general elections but not for the 1930 election. The authors stress the importance of “regional and local contexts of the voting decisions” (O’Loughlin et al., 1994, p. 373). In more recent studies, the general assertion that unemployment and far right electoral support are correlated still holds true (e.g., Norris, 2005; Mudde, 2007; Rydgren, 2007). In his work on far right electoral support, Rydgren (2009) investigated the broader concept of social isolation. Among other factors such as lack of social relations, weak family structures and less personal involvement in civil society, he lists unemployment as a key variable for supporting far right parties (Rydgren, 2009). On the basis of a geographically weighted regression (GWR) analysis focusing on the electoral results of the German Neo- Nazi party NPD (Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschland), Teney (2012) found a connection between far right electoral outcomes and local unemployment rates while also emphasizing the importance of socio-spatial as well as regional variations among municipalities (Teney, 2012). However, there have been some studies showing that high levels of unemployment do not necessarily have a determining impact on far right voting. Based on election studies, far right voting outcome in seven European countries as well as supranational surveys, for example, Arzheimer and Carter (2006) found that higher unemployment rates are linked with less far right voting. Similarly, Oesch (2008) emphasizes that unemployment is no major factor influencing far right voting, but rather matters of identity claiming that “questions of identity are more important than economic questions” (Oesch, 2008, p. 370). It seems then that while unemployment has been linked with far right electoral support numerous times, it does not tell the full story. In social- psychological theorizing there are two prominent constructs that should be of interest for the current research, that is, intergroup contact and perceived threat. Intergroup Contact According to intergroup contact theory, which was first developed by Allport (1954), opportunities for random encounters or cross-group friendships (e.g., Pettigrew, 1998) reduce negative attitudes and prejudice toward outgroups. Allport originally assumed that certain “optimal conditions” (i.e., equal status, perception of common goals, institutional support, perception of common humanity) would facilitate the positive effects of intergroup contact (Allport, 1954). In a meta-analysis of more than 500 studies, Pettigrew and Tropp (2006) found empirical support for the theory and showed that optimal contact conditions may yield greater reduction in negative attitudes but might not always be necessary to reduce prejudice. Several adaptations and extensions for Allport’s original theory have been suggested (e.g., Wright et al., 1997; Pettigrew, 2009) but there seems to be general agreement that intergroup contact opportunities tend to decrease hostile and negative attitudes toward outgroups in general even in the absence of optimal conditions (but see Barlow et al., 2012). The proportion of foreigners in a given spatial unit (e.g., municipality) can be considered the most straightforward socio-structural indicator for contact opportunities and varies considerably across Germany (e.g., Wagner et al., 2003, 2006, 2008). For example, the rate of foreigners is still as much as four times lower in Eastern versus Western German federal states (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2018). Such preconditions provide only relatively few opportunities for intergroup contact for Germans in East as compared to West Germany. Contact theory has consequently been widely used as social-psychological theoretical framework explaining higher levels of prejudice (e.g., Decker et al., 2016; Zick et al., 2019) as well as higher rates of xenophobic attacks and hate crimes against foreigners (e.g., Benček and Strasheim, 2016) in East versus West Germany (see also Wagner et al., 2003; Andresen et al., 2018). Furthermore, intergroup contact with specifically refugees is more prevalent in West than in East Germany as revealed in recent large-scale surveys (Ahrens, 2017). Based on intergroup contact theory, one would therefore predict negative links between proportion of foreigners and prejudice as well as far right electoral support (Teney, 2012) and political hate-crime (Benček and Strasheim, 2016). It seems noteworthy that at least this second prediction is Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 3 October 2019 | Volume 10 | Article 2328 https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/psychology/ https://www.frontiersin.org/ https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/psychology#articles fpsyg-10-02328 October 17, 2019 Time: 18:20 # 4 Rees et al. Climate of Hate somewhat contradictory to the intuition that for hate-crimes to occur, the target outgroup needs to be present. However, according to intergroup contact theory, hate-crimes should be most frequent in areas with low rates of outgroup individuals, that is, for example, foreigners and refugees. In a nutshell, we thus assumed a negative relationship between number of refugees in a particular German municipality and numbers of hate-crimes against refugees. Other theoretical approach that is relevant for the present study concern perceived threat ostensibly posed by the outgroup and their members and collective deprivation. Perceived Threat and Collective Deprivation A major psychological driver of antagonistic intergroup attitudes is the perception that the outgroup threatens the ingroup’s status or culture (e.g., Semyonov et al., 2004; but see Wagner et al., 2006). Perceived threat has consequently also been used to explain differences in prejudice levels between East and West Germans (Wagner et al., 2003; Asbrock et al., 2014; also see Semyonov et al., 2004; Wagner et al., 2008). Interestingly, threat can be closely related to the socio- structural factor discussed above: Higher unemployment rates in Eastern versus Western German federal states may contribute to differences in perceived threat or status. In other words, competition over jobs and economic opportunities might translate into higher perceived threat by outgroups in general. This perception may, in turn, be linked with prejudice and other negative attitudes toward members of ethnic out-groups. Perceived threat does not necessarily coincide with realistic threat. In response to the recent so-called “refugee crisis”, concerns about immigration increased twice as much in East as compared to West Germany (Sola, 2018; also see Jacobsen et al., 2017). A concept that might therefore be psychologically more relevant in this context is collective or fraternal deprivation (Runciman, 1966; also see Major, 1994; Pettigrew and Meertens, 1995). In his original conceptualization, Runciman (1966) distinguished fraternal from egoistic deprivation and argued that it is linked with “lateral solidarity” or ingroup identification for social groups that are relatively deprived in some objective way – such as areas with higher unemployment. Even more importantly, collective deprivation also “uniquely generates agitation for or against structural change” (Taylor, 2002, p. 15). It should therefore be particularly relevant when it comes to voting for a party that insistently opposes structural and societal change – such as the AfD. The Current Study The aim of the current study was to investigate socio-structural and psychological correlates of far right electoral support and hate crimes in Germany. Due to its administrative organization into 401 municipalities (294 “Landkreise/Kreise” and 107 “kreisfreie Städte”), Germany lends itself to analyses combining data from different sources that are available on this level. We therefore combine socio-structural data that are made available on a regular basis (i.e., unemployment rates and proportion of foreigners per municipality) with other data from official sources (i.e., election results and reported hate crimes targeting refugees and their homes). We also included survey data on intergroup contact, fraternal deprivation, and extreme right-wing attitudes that were collected as part of a representative telephone survey and that could be located on the municipality level. As a first set of hypotheses, we predicted substantial links between socio-structural factors and both outcome variables. More specifically, based on previous research and theorizing, we expected (Hypothesis 1a) unemployment rate to be positively linked with far right electoral support (e.g., Pratt, 1948; Falter and Zintl, 1988; Jackman and Volpert, 1996; Rydgren, 2009) and (Hypothesis 1b) proportion of foreigners to be negatively linked with right-wing hate crime (e.g., Wagner et al., 2003; Bustikova, 2014; Benček and Strasheim, 2016; Andresen et al., 2018). As the evidence for a link between proportion of foreigners and far right electoral support is mixed (Arzheimer and Carter, 2006; Lubbers et al., 2006; Golder, 2016), we made no predictions regarding this link or the link between unemployment rate and right-wing crime. However, we hypothesized that they should be in the same direction, that is, unemployment rate may be positively linked with right-wing crime and proportion of foreigners negatively with AfD electoral success (Hypothesis 1c). In a second set of hypotheses, we predicted specific links of socio-structural factors with survey data. As such “cross- level” links are not commonly theorized or researched, we based our hypotheses on a general reading of the literature on intergroup contact (Allport, 1954; Pettigrew, 1998; Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006) and deprivation theory (Runciman, 1966; Major, 1994; Pettigrew and Meertens, 1995) and predicted psychological perceptions to be linked with the corresponding socio-structural parameters in the suitable fashion. More specifically, we expected proportion of foreigners to be linked with intergroup contact (Hypothesis 2a) and unemployment rate with perceptions of fraternal deprivation (Hypothesis 2b). Both should in turn be correlated with extreme right-wing attitudes (Hypothesis 2c) that should be predictive of both outcome variables (Hypothesis 2d). We made no predictions regarding intercorrelations of socio- structural predictors or outcomes. However, regarding far right electoral support and right-wing crime, we hypothesized that they might be correlated because they are facilitated by similar socio- structural as well as psychological factors. MATERIALS AND METHODS In a first step, we combined data from three independent and official sources: socio-structural data for the year 2016 provided by the German office for statistics, 2017 election results available through the Federal Election Commissioner, and 6,354 reports of crimes targeting refugees and their homes filed as “politically motivated crime, right-wing” by the police between 2015 and 2017 that were collected in an overview (Federal Government, 2016, 2017, 2018). In a second step, we added survey data from a representative sample drawn in 2016 into the data set.3 We shall now briefly describe each of our data sources in turn and how 3 Some data sources differentiated between East or West Berlin while others did not. We therefore decided, following previous research (e.g., Wagner et al., 2003) not Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 4 October 2019 | Volume 10 | Article 2328 https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/psychology/ https://www.frontiersin.org/ https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/psychology#articles fpsyg-10-02328 October 17, 2019 Time: 18:20 # 5 Rees et al. Climate of Hate they were combined before analyzing their interrelations more systematically. Socio-Structural Data Official numbers of residents per municipality were available through the German office for statistics along with other information on absolute numbers regarding legal status (unemployed persons and foreigners). We used these numbers to generate unemployment rates for June 2016 (ranging from 1.2 – 14.7%) and foreigners per municipality for 2016 (ranging from 1.96 – 33.91%). Election Results Results for the 2017 national elections are available from the Federal Election Commissioner along with total valid votes per municipality. We computed electoral success for the AfD as one dependent variable by dividing valid AfD votes by total valid votes per municipality (ranging from 4.94 – 35.46%). Right-Wing Hate Crimes Our second dependent variable was the number of right-wing attacks and crime targeting refugees and their homes reported to police within municipalities in 2017. We compiled an overview of 2.211 such incidents based on police statistics. The numbers of attacks targeting refugees and their homes are published by the federal Government in so called Antworten der Bundesregierung (official replies by the Federal Government to requests by parliamentarians and parties). These are special reports filed by the Government answering inquiries officially requested by parliamentary parties or MPs covering various political issues. The statistics on hate crimes targeting refugees and their homes were published quarterly and in a final version by the government in response to members of parliamentary party Die Linke (The Left). Crimes reported ranged in severity from right- wing graffiti and dissemination of propaganda to defamation and harassment all the way to assault, bomb attacks, and homicide. The crimes had been categorized by the Government as “politically motivated crime, right-wing” linking them directly to the “refugee subject matter” (Federal Government, 2018). Records included running number, date, location, federal state as well as the most severe reported offense. One sample line reads “268, 19.10.2017, Erftstadt, NW (Federal state of North Rhine- Westphalia), Schwere Brandstiftung §306a StGB (severe case of arson)” (Federal Government, 2018, p. 18). Two independent coders placed each reported crime within the respective municipality based on where it had been recorded. The index of right-wing crimes reported in 2017 ranged from 0 (e.g., in Bottrop) up to 58 in Chemnitz. As municipalities vary considerably in their numbers of residents and in order to yield similar ranges for this index as for the other indices, we used number of right-wing crimes targeting refugees and their homes reported per 10,000 inhabitants for the analyses to be reported below. to include Berlin in our analyses. We note, however, that the pattern of results did not change substantially when analyses were re-run including Berlin as a whole. Survey Data A representative sample of 2,008 German participants was surveyed in standardized telephone interviews that were conducted by a professional survey institute between June and August 2016. The survey covered measures for cross-group friendships, perceived economic threat, and attitudes toward various political issues including extreme right-wing attitudes that we will focus on in this paper and describe below in more detail (see Zick et al., 2016). To ascertain representativeness of the sample, telephone numbers were randomly generated, and the last-birthday method was used to randomly select participants within households. As 25% of the participants were contacted via mobile phone numbers and we needed to assign data to municipality- (Kreis-) level by city-prefix, we only used data from those N = 1,506 participants that were contacted by landline. Both sub-samples differed somewhat in terms of age and gender, with more younger (M = 46.10, SD = 16.93), t(1896) = 8.75, p < 0.001, and more male participants (55%), χ2 (N = 1917, df = 1) = 18.68, p < 0.001, in the mobile-only sub- sample than in the landline-only sub-sample. Crucially, however, both samples did not differ in terms of level of education and those measures that were of interest for our analyses. The resulting landline-only sample was M = 53.98 years old (SD = 16.93), with slightly more female than male participants (54.4%). Level of education was slightly skewed with 53.6% of the sample holding a university or technical degree, 28% reporting some secondary school-leaving certificate, and 12.8% reporting no degree at all. Monthly household net income was 20.2% “less than 2,000 EUR”, 19.9% “more than 2,000 but less than 3,000 EUR”, 13.6% “more than 3,000 but less than 4,000 EUR”, and 19.8% “4,000 EUR and more”. Perceived Collective Deprivation Perceived collective deprivation was measured with the item “How would you judge the economic situation of Germans compared with foreigners living here?” and answers ranging from 1 “very good” to 5 “very bad”. Intergroup Contact Intergroup contact was measured with the item “How many of your friends or close acquaintances have a migration background?” with answers ranging from 1 “none” to 4 “very many”. Extreme Right-Wing Attitudes Extreme right-wing attitudes were measured using seven items on a scale ranging from 1 “completely false” to 5 “completely true”. Items included statements such as “I can understand that some citizens resist forcefully against homes for asylum seekers” and “No one can expect for me to live next to a home for asylum seekers” (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.83; see section “Supplementary Material” for the full scale). As the analyses reported in the current study were based on secondary analyses of official sources and on data previously collected in a survey, ethics approval was not required as per applicable institutional and national guidelines and regulations. For the survey data used in our analyses, informed consent Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 5 October 2019 | Volume 10 | Article 2328 https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/psychology/ https://www.frontiersin.org/ https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/psychology#articles fpsyg-10-02328 October 17, 2019 Time: 18:20 # 6 Rees et al. Climate of Hate of the participants was implied through survey completion. Participation in the survey was completely voluntary and anonymous and participants were free to withdraw from the survey at any time without incurring any penalties. RESULTS Preliminary Analyses Means, standard deviations, and zero-order correlations are shown in Table 1 for all socio-structural variables on municipality level and in Table 2 for all psychological variables on both individual (lower triangle) and municipality level (upper triangle).4 As can be seen, for the latter, means, standard deviations, and correlational patterns did not differ significantly between individual and municipality level. We used psychological measures aggregated on municipality level for the current analyses to link them with socio-structural variables. On the one hand, it should be kept in mind that measures varied in range due to their different sources. On the other hand, it seems noteworthy that most of them were systematically linked despite their different sources even after correcting for skew or using non-parametric test procedures (see Footnote 4). Extreme right- wing attitudes, for example, were significantly and negatively correlated with proportion of foreigners, r(346) = −0.13, p = 0.02, but positively with far right electoral support, r(345) = 0.19, p < 0.001, and with right-wing crimes reported in the respective municipalities in the subsequent year, r(346) = 0.12, p = 0.03. While these correlations are small in magnitude, they were all significant and in the expected direction. Recall that attitudes were measured in an independent telephone survey. These were also correlated with our dependent variables as can be seen from Table 1. Local unemployment rates in June 2016, for example, while unrelated to local proportions of foreigners in the same year, were correlated with both local far right electoral support, r(397) = 0.25, p < 0.001, and right-wing crimes reported in the respective municipalities 1 year later, r(398) = 0.40, p < 0.001. As one final correlational result, both dependent variables, far right electoral support and right-wing crimes reported were linked substantially and positively, r(399) = 0.50, p < 0.001. Spatial distributions of socio-structural and outcome variables are illustrated in Figure 1. Figure 1 not only illustrates socio-structural variations across municipalities – unemployment rates tend to be highest in the East and the Ruhr area and lowest in the South of Germany, proportions of foreigners per municipality fall within the lowest category in almost all Eastern German municipalities. There is also a striking East-West difference regarding both outcome variables: far right electoral support was highest in the Eastern and Southern municipalities and the proportion of right-wing crime seems to be higher in these areas, too. These differences also show empirically with significantly higher unemployment 4 To correct for positive skew in the data, analyses were re-run using non- parametric tests or bootstrapping analyses where appropriate. As they yielded the same pattern of results that is described here and in the following sections, we report results based on the original data and parametric tests. TABLE 1 | Means, standard deviations, and zero-order correlations for socio-structural data on municipality level. M (SD) (2) (3) (4) (1) Unemployment rate 0.06 (0.03) 0.03 0.25∗∗∗ 0.33∗∗∗ (2) Proportion of foreigners 0.10 (0.05) −0.41∗∗∗ −0.29∗∗∗ (3) AfD electoral support 0.13 (0.05) 0.50∗∗∗ (4) Right-wing crimes 0.29 (0.37) (1) through (3) are per 100, and (4) per 10,000 inhabitants. ∗∗∗p < 0.001. TABLE 2 | Means, standard deviations, and zero-order correlations for data on individual and municipality level. M (SD) Individual Municipality (1) (2) (3) (1) Collective Deprivation 2.35 (0.90) 2.35 (0.66) −0.12∗ 0.42∗∗ (2) Contact 2.17 (0.84) 2.07 (0.59) −0.06∗∗ −0.25∗∗ (3) Extreme Right-wing Attitudes 2.34 (0.95) 2.39 (0.66) 0.30∗∗ −0.23∗∗ Individual level correlations in lower and municipality level correlations in upper triangle. ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01. rates (MEast = 0.08, SD = 0.02 vs. MWest = 0.05, SD = 0.02), lower proportions of foreigners (MEast = 0.04, SD = 0.02 vs. MWest = 0.11, SD = 0.05), higher far right electoral support (MEast = 0.22, SD = 0.05 vs. MWest = 0.11, SD = 0.03), and more right-wing crime reported per municipality on average (MEast = 0.75, SD = 0.55 vs. MWest = 0.18, SD = 0.20), t(399) = 9.26, t(322) = 20.56, t(87) = 18.94, and t(79) = 8.80, respectively, all ps < 0.001.5 As East-West differences regarding attitudes and behavior toward minority groups in Germany have been demonstrated before (Wagner et al., 2003; Benček and Strasheim, 2016; cf. Czymara and Schmidt-Catran, 2016), and may distort the results of the following analyses, we decided to account for East-West differences where appropriate and feasible. Testing the Proposed Model The correlational analyses reported above lend some initial support to our proposed model. However, they leave open the issue of shared variance in predicting the outcome variables as well as the question of how much predictive value – if any at all – is added above and beyond harder socio-structural variables through softer variables such as extreme right-wing attitudes measured in a telephone survey. In a first set of analyses, we consequently addressed the issue of shared variance. Crucially, in assuming random error, conventional statistical models do not account for shared variance due to geographical proximity or spatial auto-correlation. We addressed this issue in a second set of analyses using GWR analyses. In a third and final set of analyses, 5 The pattern of results remained the same when applying non-parametric Mann– Whitney tests (see section “Supplementary Material” for a summary of these results). Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 6 October 2019 | Volume 10 | Article 2328 https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/psychology/ https://www.frontiersin.org/ https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/psychology#articles fpsyg-10-02328 October 17, 2019 Time: 18:20 # 7 Rees et al. Climate of Hate FIGURE 1 | Natural breaks maps of Germany illustrating spatial distributions of socio-structural and outcome variables: (A) unemployment rate, (B) proportion of foreigners, (C) far right electoral support, (D) and right-wing crime. Berlin was excluded from the analyses. we accounted for and explored the differences between East and West Germany reported above. Controlling for Potential Overlap on Predictor and Criterion Sides First, we performed path analyses to account for potential overlap both on predictor and criterion sides and to test how much predictive value our psychological survey measures would add. Path analyses were performed using AMOS 24.0 and maximum likelihood estimation. The model was composed in such a way that the socio-structural variables, unemployment rate and proportion of foreigners correlated with far right electoral support and right-wing crime (Figure 2). All four paths remained significant and almost unchanged when compared to the zero- order correlations: Proportion of foreigners per municipality on the one hand were negatively linked with both right-wing crimes Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 7 October 2019 | Volume 10 | Article 2328 https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/psychology/ https://www.frontiersin.org/ https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/psychology#articles fpsyg-10-02328 October 17, 2019 Time: 18:20 # 8 Rees et al. Climate of Hate FIGURE 2 | Path model of socio-structural correlates of far right electoral support and political hate crimes in Germany. Standardized path coefficients for overall analyses; West and East Germany separately in brackets (West/East); error terms are not displayed for the sake of clarity. ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05, † p < 0.10. FIGURE 3 | Path model of socio-structural and psychological correlates of right-wing electoral support and political hate crimes in Germany. Standardized path coefficients for overall analyses; West and East Germany separately in brackets (West/East); error terms are not displayed for the sake of clarity. ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05, † p < 0.10. reported, β = −0.31, and even more strongly with far right electoral support 1 year later, β = −0.42. Unemployment rate on the other hand was linked with both AfD electoral success, β = 0.26, and even more strongly with right-wing crimes reported, β = 0.34 1 year later (all ps < 0.001). Taken together, both socio- structural predictors explained 20% and 24% of variance in right- wing crimes reported and AfD electoral support, respectively. To correct for skew in the data, we also performed bootstrapping analyses using 5000 bootstrap resamples and bias-corrected 95% confidence intervals (CIs). As none of the resulting CIs included zero, these analyses further supported the model. We then introduced the three psychological variables, collective deprivation, contact, and extreme right-wing attitudes, into the model (Figure 3). A first saturated model included paths between all constructs and, expectedly, fitted the data perfectly. We then computed a second model where a total of eight paths that we had not predicted were set to zero. Specifically, these were paths from socio-structural variables to psychologically incongruent constructs (i.e., paths from proportion of foreigners to collective deprivation and from unemployment rate to contact) and paths that we predicted to be zero because we assumed the psychological contribution to be mediated through extreme right-wing attitudes (i.e., paths from socio-structural variables to extreme right-wing attitudes and paths from contact and collective deprivation to both outcome variables, respectively). As this second model was nested within the previous one, we Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 8 October 2019 | Volume 10 | Article 2328 https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/psychology/ https://www.frontiersin.org/ https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/psychology#articles fpsyg-10-02328 October 17, 2019 Time: 18:20 # 9 Rees et al. Climate of Hate compared both and concluded that the second explained the data equally well, 1χ2 (df = 8) = 12.21, p = 0.14. It seems noteworthy that, as predicted, the deleted paths were generally statistically non-significant (ps > 0.10) except for the path from unemployment rate to contact (β = 0.12, p = 0.02). The resulting model is displayed in Figure 2. It had a good fit with the data, χ2 (N = 400, df = 8) = 15.57, p = 0.05, CFI = 0.98, RMSEA = 0.05, PCLOSE = 0.47 (MacCallum et al., 1996; Hu and Bentler, 1999). The original pattern remained almost unchanged when psychological variables were included into the full model. Extreme right-wing attitudes which had been significantly correlated with both outcome variables only retained a weak but reliable link with far right electoral support, β = 0.13, p = 0.01, but were not significantly linked with right-wing crime reported, β = 0.07, p = 0.16. Explained variance in both dependent variables remained unchanged.6 Accounting for Shared Variance Due to Geographical Proximity As briefly mentioned above, the analyses reported thus far neglect spatial auto-correlation or shared variance due to mere geographical proximity. Such shared variance may be due to common exposure of the observed variables to unobserved confounders and can create problems for conventional statistical models that assume random error (see Fotheringham et al., 2002; Teney, 2012). We performed a series of GWR analyses using spatial error models based on maximum likelihood estimation and queen contiguity weights in GeoDA (Version 1.12; Anselin et al., 2006; GeoDa, 2019) to address the issue of spatial auto- correlation. As can be seen from Table 3, results from these analyses replicated the results reported above in showing that unemployment was linked positively with both far right electoral support and right-wing crime while proportion of foreigners was linked negatively with both outcomes. Regarding the survey measures, the GWR analyses confirmed that they had weak but significant links with far right electoral success above and beyond socio-structural variables – the respective model was superior to that without survey measures according to the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC).7 Survey measures did not contribute significantly to the explained variance in right-wing crime as the outcome variable, however. In fact, that model became significantly worse according to the associated AIC. It seems noteworthy that the Lambda-coefficients were significant across all analyses: there was strong support for spatially correlated errors. Accordingly, the GWR models explained substantially more variance in both far right electoral support 6 An argument could be made that collective deprivation is not causally prior to extreme right-wing attitudes but that it is in fact part of or even an outcome of extreme right-wing attitudes. We therefore tested alternative models including (a) a reverse path from extreme right-wing attitudes to collective deprivation and (b) a bi-directional path between both constructs. Both models fitted the data descriptively better than the original model that we had hypothesized. It therefore seems worthwhile to note again that we are not testing any causal mechanisms based on the correlational data reported. 7 As a rule of thumb, an AIC difference of <2 indicates no meaningful discrepancy between models; a difference between 4 and 7 indicates considerable evidence that the model with the lower AIC is better, and a difference of >10 indicates substantial support for the model with the lower AIC (Burnham and Anderson, 2002). (R2 = 0.83) and right-wing crime (R2 = 0.38) than conventional regression models. Exploring East-West Differences As we had observed considerable differences for all variables of interest, we controlled for and explored the differences between East and West Germany in a third and final set of analyses. While accounting for spatial auto-correlation in GWR analyses and East-West differences through dummy-coding, we also included interaction terms with both socio-structural variables. When predicting far right electoral support, we found a significant interaction of proportion of foreigners and the East-West dummy variable, z = 7.56, p < 0.001. Similarly, when predicting right wing-crime, we found interactions with the East-West dummy variable for both unemployment rate, z = 4.37, p < 0.001, and proportion of foreigners, z = 4.20, p < 0.001. Following up on these results, we analyzed the data for municipalities in East and West Germany separately. For far right electoral support, both socio-structural factors retained significant links with the outcome: unemployment rate retained links of similar magnitude in the West, b = 0.36, z = 5.01, compared with the East, b = 0.44, z = 2.65, ps < 0.01. Proportion of foreigners, however, was linked much more strongly with the outcome in the East, b = −1.19, z = 7.92, p < 0.001 than in the West, b = −0.10, z = 2.76, p = 0.01. For right-wing crime, when analyzing East and West German municipalities separately, proportion of foreigners was no longer significantly linked with the outcome in West Germany, z < 1, and unemployment rate still retained a positive but much weaker link, b = 1.02, z = 1.70, p = 0.09. In East Germany, however, both socio-structural factors were still linked with the outcome: unemployment rate, b = 8.20, z = 2.64, as well as proportion of foreigners, b = 8.48, z = 2.77, ps < 0.01, were correlated with right-wing crime significantly and positively. Bootstrap analyses with 5000 resamples and bias-corrected 95% CIs generally replicated these results with some exceptions: CIs for the paths from socio-structural factors to far right electoral support did not include zero with the exception of the path from unemployment rate to far right electoral support. For right-wing crime, only those paths in East Germany were reliable according to these analyses and did not include zero while both paths in West Germany did. In a sense then this pattern of results was similar but more pronounced than that of the GWR analyses. DISCUSSION The present study systematically combined data on socio- structural variables (unemployment rates and proportion of foreigners by municipality) with self-reported attitudes and official data on actual behavior (police records on right-wing hate crime and far right electoral support in the German federal elections). In doing so, we tried to approximate what could be referred to as a “climate of hate” – a bundle of objective as well as more subjective or psychological variables all of which contribute to a social norm or a perception of such a norm that Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 9 October 2019 | Volume 10 | Article 2328 https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/psychology/ https://www.frontiersin.org/ https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/psychology#articles fpsyg-10-02328 October 17, 2019 Time: 18:20 # 10 Rees et al. Climate of Hate TABLE 3 | Geographically weighted regression (GWR) results for socio-structural correlates of far right electoral support (top panel) and political hate crimes in Germany (bottom panel). Coeff. S.E. z Coeff. S.E. z AfD electoral support Constant 0.12 0.01 12.50∗∗ 0.14 0.01 12.60∗∗ Lambda 0.86 0.03 33.05∗∗ 0.85 0.03 29.88∗∗ Unemployment rate 0.47 0.08 5.76∗∗ 0.40 0.09 4.56∗∗ Proportion of foreigners −0.23 0.04 5.50∗∗ −0.22 0.04 5.02∗∗ Collective deprivation −0.01 0.001 3.31∗∗ Contact <0.001 0.002 <1 Extreme right-wing attitudes 0.003 0.002 2.04∗ R2 0.83 0.83 AIC −1818.54 −1559.36 Right-wing Crime Constant 0.11 0.06 1.63 0.05 0.12 <1 Lambda 0.59 0.05 11.68∗∗ 0.58 0.05 10.96∗∗ Unemployment rate 5.72 0.86 6.62∗∗ 5.90 0.94 6.28∗∗ Proportion of foreigners −1.11 0.44 2.53∗ −1.39 0.48 2.93∗∗ Collective deprivation 0.02 0.03 <1 Contact 0.03 0.03 1.01 Extreme right-wing attitudes −0.01 0.03 <1 R2 0.38 0.39 AIC 189.09 172.94 ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01. facilitates hostile behaviors toward outgroups. One central notion of the current work is, consequently, that more conventional but potentially exclusionary behaviors such as far right voting on the one hand and more extreme behaviors such as right-wing hate crimes targeting refugees on the other hand should co-occur because they are facilitated by similar factors. Correlates of Behavioral Outcomes and Local Variation While unrelated with each other, both socio-structural factors were linked with both outcome variables in a systematic fashion: First, overall, the local proportion of foreigners was negatively correlated with relative number of hate crimes, and more strongly so with far right electoral support in municipalities. Second, unemployment rate was positively linked with far right electoral support, and more strongly so with relative number of hate crimes reported. When examining these links for East and West German municipalities separately, the pattern remained similar for correlates of far right electoral support. However, the pattern changed drastically for right-wing crime: While unemployment rate was still positively linked with right-wing crime across Germany (but substantially weaker so in Western municipalities), proportion of foreigners was no longer linked with the same outcome in West German municipalities. Contrary to what we had expected, in East German municipalities, this relation even reversed and proportion of foreigners was significantly and positively linked with right-wing crime reported. This pattern of results can be interpreted as an artificial overall negative correlation between proportion of foreigners and reported right- wing crime that can be attributed to the mean differences in measures between East and West Germany. With regard to the two behavioral outcomes, this local variation in their correlates may provide preliminary evidence for related but contrary underlying motives: While one seems to be driven by contact- logic (more contact opportunities, less far right electoral support; e.g., Allport, 1954), the other seems to be more in line with group threat-logic (more foreigners, more right-wing crime; e.g., Teney, 2012). Methodologically, however, this result emphasizes the importance of considering local variation of the phenomena that are being investigated. Attitudinal variables measured in a representative survey were also linked with socio-structural variables in the predicted direction, that is, intergroup contact correlated positively with local proportion of foreigners, thus replicating a host of previous research (Wagner et al., 2003, 2008; Semyonov et al., 2004). Furthermore, collective deprivation correlated positively with unemployment rates, and both, intergroup contact and collective deprivation predicted extreme right-wing attitudes. However, these predictors’ contribution to the explained variance in outcome variables above and beyond socio-structural variables was neglectable. We will address the limitations of the present research in more detail further below after discussing potential implications that can be drawn. Identifying Areas at Risk for Right-Wing Extremism Through Contextual Indicators In order to reduce or prevent political extremism, a first step can be to identify and monitor areas that are at particularly high risk of violent hate crimes. So far, monitoring instruments for such hate crimes have been scarce or non-existent Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 10 October 2019 | Volume 10 | Article 2328 https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/psychology/ https://www.frontiersin.org/ https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/psychology#articles fpsyg-10-02328 October 17, 2019 Time: 18:20 # 11 Rees et al. Climate of Hate (Benček and Strasheim, 2016; but see ProAsyl, 2017). We argue that high risk areas can still be identified based on contextual factors that are reliable correlates of actual violent extremism and that such correlates can be found in the neighboring research field on far right electoral support. For example, some previous research has predicted incidents of violent right-wing attacks from analyses of public discourse (Koopmans and Olzak, 2004) or from social media data (Müller and Schwarz, 2018). Scholars in the social sciences also seem to agree that there is merit in collecting data on political attitudes including attitudes toward outgroups in order to identify risks or at least shed light on psychological processes that may turn prejudice into violence (e.g., Wagner et al., 2003). All in all, the notion that contextual factors can be useful in identifying high risk areas is not new and two factors – unemployment rate and proportion of foreigners in a given local context – have been particularly well studied (Semyonov et al., 2004; Wagner et al., 2008). In his review of research on far right electoral success, Golder (2016) has systematized these contextual factors into “economic grievances” and “cultural grievances”. In discussing the global rise of the far right, some have argued that it is more about culture than economics (e.g., Norris and Inglehart, 2019), others that it is more about economics than culture (Judis, 2018). And even others have argued that such a binary distinction between economic and cultural grievances is “far too simplistic and glosses over the way in which concerns about culture and economics can, and often do, interact” (Eatwell and Goodwin, 2018, p. xxiv). We argue that much can be learned from investigating far right electoral support when studying right-wing hate crime and that both fields can benefit from each other. Based on the current study, we conclude that violent right-wing hate crime is particularly likely in areas with high unemployment rates (as is far right electoral support) and a high proportion of foreigners (contrary to far right electoral support) but that this latter correlate may vary locally. This finding is somewhat contradictory to intergroup contact theory (Pettigrew, 1998; Wagner et al., 2006) but well in line with the group threat hypothesis and the intuition that, in order for hate crimes to occur, the target outgroup needs to be present. Diversity, while increasing community resilience against far right agitation through contact opportunities (Allport, 1954; Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006) may ironically increase the risk of right-wing crime in the same area. Finally, far right electoral support was so strongly correlated with relative number of right-wing hate crimes that it might be considered an additional indicator for areas that are at high risk for right-wing extremism. In other words, our results seem to be supportive of the notion that far right electoral support is not only an indicator, but actually part of the social climate of hate that facilitates right-wing violence. Limitations and Future Research There are limitations of the current study, some of them due to its overall cross-sectional design or the nature of the data we use. First, we report correlational data that do not allow for causal inferences. While the basic premise of the current work does not necessarily hinge on causal relationships between the constructs but is merely to show that two behavioral outcomes are linked with the same socio-structural correlates and co-occur systematically in certain areas, the variables we used as predictors were all measured 1 year prior to the variables we used as criteria. We would therefore argue that the analyses reported are at least to some extent suggestive of the predictive value of socio-structural and survey data for future outcomes. The distinction between causality and correlation, however, is crucial especially for policy makers and practitioners and future research using longitudinal designs might tackle the issue of causality more convincingly. Second, from a methodological point of view, the compatibility of our measures especially at the interface of socio-structural and survey data may be open to criticism. More specifically, one could argue that perceived competition on the labor market would be more compatible with local unemployment than perceived collective deprivation. Also, the use of single item-measures is problematic. The weak explanatory performance of attitudinal variables, in other words, may then be due to issues of validity and reliability. However, empirically, we think the measures we used tap into the respective constructs – they do in fact correlate with socio-structural variables in the expected fashion (i.e., proportion of foreigners correlates with contact and unemployment correlates with perceptions of deprivation). While more elaborate data on the psychological level including longer scales would certainly be desirable, such data were not available for the analyses presented in this contribution. Our analysis may thus serve as a proof of principle and hopefully inspire future research to link socio- structural data with survey data and attitudinal as well as actual behavioral outcomes. Such research could also take context into account more systematically by studying specific other European countries experiencing an increase in far right electoral support, such as, Hungary (Palonen, 2009), Italy (Verbeek and Zaslove, 2016), or The Netherlands (Otjes and Louwerse, 2013) or by comparing far right electoral support and the prevalence of hate-crime in countries across Europe (e.g., Lubbers et al., 2002). Furthermore, future research might benefit from qualitative or mixed-methods approaches, ideally in a longitudinal design to examine regional specifics and developments in those municipalities and areas most affected by a climate of hate. It seems fruitful to investigate those contextual factors qualitatively, social constellations, and regional specifics that facilitate a climate of hate in identified risk areas to draw conclusions on how to strengthen community resilience against extreme right- wing behavior. Methodically, some studies already follow this approach, taking closer looks at intergroup relations on a small- scale level (Bynner, 2017) or at the “normalization” of anti- refugee sentiments in everyday life of a medium sized town (Kurtenbach, 2018). Conclusion The results of the current study can be placed within the wider research fields on far right electoral support (e.g., Golder, 2016; Eatwell and Goodwin, 2018) and the prevalence of hate-crime in countries across the world. Understanding both phenomena as partly connected may have important implications for future research, both basic and applied, as well as for politics and practice. Practitioners and policy-makers may find them useful Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 11 October 2019 | Volume 10 | Article 2328 https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/psychology/ https://www.frontiersin.org/ https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/psychology#articles fpsyg-10-02328 October 17, 2019 Time: 18:20 # 12 Rees et al. Climate of Hate in developing effective strategies to prevent or at least reduce right-wing extremism by identifying high risk areas. Diverse communities should be more resilient against far right agitation whereas areas with little heterogeneity and high unemployment rates are susceptible for a general climate of hate. A decentralized housing policy for newcomers like refugees may thus decrease far right support but also increase the risk for right-wing crime. Our final conclusion relates to the added value of survey data in identifying high risk areas. We believe that attitudinal data and surveys will continue to contribute invaluable insights into the processes of prejudice, discrimination, and radicalization. However, our analysis and its results might also serve as a cautionary note: Measures collected in a representative survey were generally linked with socio-structural indicators in the predicted pattern. Self-reported extreme right-wing attitudes were even correlated with actual voting behavior in municipalities 1 year later. While this is good news for attitude research in general and social scientists in particular, the bad news is that the incremental predictive value of these survey data above and beyond socio-structural indicators was neglectable. DATA AVAILABILITY STATEMENT The datasets generated for this study are available on request to the corresponding author. ETHICS STATEMENT Ethical review and approval was not required for the study on human participants in accordance with the local legislation and institutional requirements. Written informed consent for participation was not required for this study in accordance with the national legislation and the institutional requirements. AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS JR and YR planned the study, collected, compiled the data set, and drafted the manuscript together with JH. JR analyzed the data. AZ provided crucial comments and changes to all parts of the manuscript. All authors approved the submission of the final version of the manuscript. FUNDING This research was facilitated by research grants 01UG1858Y “Vorphase zum Aufbau eines Instituts für den gesellschaftlichen Zusammenhalt – Bielefeld” granted by the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research and B13.17-0050/17-BMI granted by the German Federal Ministry of the Interior, Building and Community. 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Population size, perceived threat, and exclusion: a multiple-indicators analysis of attitudes Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 13 October 2019 | Volume 10 | Article 2328 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11577-016-0361-x https://doi.org/10.1007/s11577-016-0361-x https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/asylum-and-managed-migration/publications https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/asylum-and-managed-migration/publications https://doi.org/10.2307/204223 http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/18/074/1807465.pdf http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/18/112/1811298.pdf http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/19/008/1900889.pdf https://doi.org/10.1016/S0198-9715(01)00009-6 https://doi.org/10.1016/S0198-9715(01)00009-6 http://geodacenter.github.io http://geodacenter.github.io http://www.bamf.de/SharedDocs/Anlagen/DE/Downloads/Infothek/Statistik/Asyl/aktuelle-zahlen-zu-asyl-april-2019.pdf?__blob=publicationFile http://www.bamf.de/SharedDocs/Anlagen/DE/Downloads/Infothek/Statistik/Asyl/aktuelle-zahlen-zu-asyl-april-2019.pdf?__blob=publicationFile http://www.bamf.de/SharedDocs/Anlagen/DE/Downloads/Infothek/Statistik/Asyl/aktuelle-zahlen-zu-asyl-april-2019.pdf?__blob=publicationFile https://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/faqs/DE/themen/sicherheit/pmk/pmk.html#f9828060 https://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/faqs/DE/themen/sicherheit/pmk/pmk.html#f9828060 https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-042814-012441 https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/germany-opens-its-gates-berlin-says-all-syrian-asylum-seekers-are-welcome-to-remain-as-britain-is-10470062.html https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/germany-opens-its-gates-berlin-says-all-syrian-asylum-seekers-are-welcome-to-remain-as-britain-is-10470062.html https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/germany-opens-its-gates-berlin-says-all-syrian-asylum-seekers-are-welcome-to-remain-as-britain-is-10470062.html https://doi.org/10.1080/10705519909540118 https://doi.org/10.1017/s0007123400007584 https://doi.org/10.1017/s0007123400007584 https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/magazine/wp/2018/11/29/feature/the-key-to-understanding-americas-red-blue-split-isnt-ideology-or-culture-its-economics/ https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/magazine/wp/2018/11/29/feature/the-key-to-understanding-americas-red-blue-split-isnt-ideology-or-culture-its-economics/ https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/magazine/wp/2018/11/29/feature/the-key-to-understanding-americas-red-blue-split-isnt-ideology-or-culture-its-economics/ https://doi.org/10.1086/386271 https://doi.org/10.1086/386271 https://doi.org/10.1093/esr/jci055 https://doi.org/10.1093/esr/jci055 https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.00015 https://doi.org/10.1037//1082-989x.1.2.130 https://doi.org/10.1016/s0065-2601(08)60156-2 https://ssrn.com/abstract=3082972 https://doi.org/10.1177/0192512107088390 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8306.1994.tb01865.x http://hatecrime.osce.org/what-do-we-know http://hatecrime.osce.org/what-do-we-know https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9248.12089 https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9248.12089 https://doi.org/10.1093/pa/gsn048 https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.psych.49.1.65 https://doi.org/10.1027/1864-9335.40.2.55 https://doi.org/10.1027/1864-9335.40.2.55 https://doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.2420250106 https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.90.5.751 https://www.proasyl.de/news/gewalt-gegen-fluechtlinge-2017-von-entwarnung-kann-keine-rede-sein/ https://www.proasyl.de/news/gewalt-gegen-fluechtlinge-2017-von-entwarnung-kann-keine-rede-sein/ https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.soc.33.040406.131752 https://doi.org/10.1080/17448680903154915 https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/psychology/ https://www.frontiersin.org/ https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/psychology#articles fpsyg-10-02328 October 17, 2019 Time: 18:20 # 14 Rees et al. 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The extended contact effect: knowledge of cross-group friendships and prejudice. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 73, 73–90. doi: 10.1037//0022-3514.73.1.73 Zick, A., Küpper, B., and Berghahn, W. (2019). Verlorene Mitte. Feindselige Zustände. Rechtsextreme Einstellungen in Deutschland 2019. Bonn: J.H.W. Dietz. Zick, A., Küpper, B., and Krause, D. (2016). Gespaltene Mitte. Feindselige Zustände. Rechtsextreme Einstellungen in Deutschland 2016. Bonn: J.H.W. Dietz. Conflict of Interest: The authors declare that the research was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest. Copyright © 2019 Rees, Rees, Hellmann and Zick. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) and the copyright owner(s) are credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms. Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 14 October 2019 | Volume 10 | Article 2328 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssresearch.2003.11.003 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssresearch.2003.11.003 https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511527753.002 https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511527753.002 https://doi.org/10.1515/zfsoz-2012-0304 https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2015.1076213 https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2015.1076213 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-4560.2008.00568.x https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-4560.2008.00568.x https://doi.org/10.1177/019027250606900406 https://doi.org/10.1177/1368430203006001010 https://www.wahlrecht.de/umfragen/ https://www.wahlrecht.de/umfragen/ https://doi.org/10.1037//0022-3514.73.1.73 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/psychology/ https://www.frontiersin.org/ https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/psychology#articles Climate of Hate: Similar Correlates of Far Right Electoral Support and Right-Wing Hate Crimes in Germany Introduction The German Context Rise of the AfD Unemployment and Far Right Electoral Support Intergroup Contact Perceived Threat and Collective Deprivation The Current Study Materials and Methods Socio-Structural Data Election Results Right-Wing Hate Crimes Survey Data Perceived Collective Deprivation Intergroup Contact Extreme Right-Wing Attitudes Results Preliminary Analyses Testing the Proposed Model Controlling for Potential Overlap on Predictor and Criterion Sides Accounting for Shared Variance Due to Geographical Proximity Exploring East-West Differences Discussion Correlates of Behavioral Outcomes and Local Variation Identifying Areas at Risk for Right-Wing Extremism Through Contextual Indicators Limitations and Future Research Conclusion Data Availability Statement Ethics Statement Author Contributions Funding Acknowledgments Supplementary Material References 
work_bhskrakedfbe5nyet52syeuisy	----	Introduction Crime Prev Community Saf (2018) 20:225–227 https://doi.org/10.1057/s41300-018-0054-7 INTRODUCTION Introduction R. I. Mawby1 Published online: 15 October 2018 © Springer Nature Limited 2018 It has been 20  years since Crime Prevention and Community Safety: an interna- tional journal was launched. To mark the occasion, the publishers and I agreed to produce a commemorative issue in which we asked five distinguished members of the board1 to provide their perspectives on how crime prevention and community safety discourses had changed in that time. As the five contributions make clear, the research agenda and policy implica- tions have changed markedly in those 20  years, albeit not necessarily in a positive direction. Back in the 1990s, debates over crime prevention and whether or not it should be broadened to encompass community safety more generally focused to a large extent on property crime, especially burglary. In the UK, a range of initiatives addressed burglary prevention through the identification of at-risk communities (hot spots) and households (hot dots) and the provision of a series of measures directed at enhanced protection, notably through target hardening, burglar alarms and neigh- bourhood watch. Indeed at one point, the UK promised to be the burglar alarm capi- tal of the world, with more households ‘alarmed’ than anywhere else. But of course, those who purchased alarms were not usually those at most risk, a point reflected in a plethora of national and local initiatives to improve home security for the most vulnerable. These included the Five Towns Programme, the Safer Cities Initiative * R. I. Mawby professorrobmawby@hotmail.com 1 Newport, UK 1 Drafts of the five papers were distributed among the ‘team’ and also independently peer-reviewed by other referees. Each paper was reviewed by at least three referees, including at least one of the other con- tributors and at least one independent referee. In the latter respect, I am grateful for the constructive and sometimes critical advice of: Rachel Armitage; Garner Clancey; Pam Davies; Bonnie Fisher; Dan Gill- ing; and Lesley Simmonds. http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1057/s41300-018-0054-7&domain=pdf 226 R. I. Mawby and Locks for Pensioners, a programme tailored to older residents of crime-prone areas. And this emphasis appeared successful, even if not all individual projects were effective. The first fifteen or more years of the new millennium saw a decrease in crime in the UK and elsewhere in the developed world, even surviving the period of austerity and reductions in, inter alia, police numbers. However, crime seems to be increasing again, and it is particularly appropriate to revisit crime prevention initia- tives, as the five papers in this issue do. The first paper, by Nick Tilley and Gloria Laycock, addresses the issue of effec- tiveness directly. However, while early twenty-first-century UK initiatives such as the Crime Reduction Programme (CRP), the What Works Centre for Crime Reduc- tion (WWCCR), the National Police Improvement Agency, and its successor, the College of Policing, were explicitly committed to addressing the ‘what works’ ques- tion and to developing evidence-based policies, the reality was that they were not fully exploited, and paid lip service to rigorous evaluation prior to policy imple- mentation. Additionally, as the earlier Locks for Pensioners initiative illustrated, the lessons from failure, often as valuable as those from success, tended to be ignored. The lack of government enthusiasm for crime prevention policies is addressed in the context of the USA by Steven Lab in the second paper. Within a federal system the role of central government in taking a lead in policy development is constrained, but Lab argues that even at the local level the enthusiasm for promoting crime pre- vention policies is noticeably lacking. In Lab’s words, there is an ‘absence of any driving force giving direction to a true prevention movement’. One exception that has benefited from central funding is the Project Safe Neighborhoods (PSN) that targets general violence, especially firearms and gang behaviour, and there is some evidence that it has been successful. Perhaps the best known US initiative, though, is the International Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) Association, an independent body that certifies individuals as CPTED practitioners, but—in contrast to the Secured By Design programme in the UK—does not certify buildings or communities as CPTED compliant. The reasons for this lack of govern- ment commitment to crime prevention are partly, Lab argues, because crime preven- tion is not a politically expedient activity. The fact that crime prevention initiatives rarely provide a ‘quick fix’ limits their appeal to politicians looking to the forthcom- ing elections, leading to a lack of commitment in the USA and, arguably, an exas- peration with the ‘what works’ agenda in the UK. One research-led policy development that has gained cross-national acceptance has been recognition of repeat victimisation as a common feature across a range of offence types, provoking policies aimed at reducing crime by targeting recent vic- tims. Ken Pease has been at the forefront of such initiatives, and in the third con- tribution to this volume he and his colleagues address the apparent demise of poli- cies concerning repeat victims. This is ironic at a time when the reduction in crime has been balanced by an increased proportion of those offences committed being repeats. Pease therefore argues that targeting repeat victims is a particularly cost- effective strategy but one that appears to have lost interest among policy makers. One particular feature of CPTED that has been developed by Danielle Reynald and others is the concept of guardianship. In the fourth contribution to this issue, 227Introduction Reynald and her colleagues step away from policy measures and look in more detail at the principles that underpin them, especially the ways in which increased guardi- anship can help reduce crime rates. Reynald considers the use of guardianship in the literature, distinguishing between guardianship by people (e.g. neighbours) and guardianship by objects (e.g. locks and bolts), which broadly correspond to the dif- ference between community crime prevention through neighbourhood watch and tar- get hardening. Reynald’s own preference is for a definition based around the first of these, guardianship by people, and she identifies three crucial dimensions if guardi- anship is to impact on crime: availability or presence of guardians, supervision or monitoring by guardians, and willingness of guardians to intervene when necessary. Taken together, these four contributions illustrate the extent to which crime pre- vention discourses have focused on property crimes, although Reynald and her col- leagues note its useful application to other offence types, including sexual offences and cybercrime. The final contribution, by Sandra Walklate, takes this on board by arguing that in addressing property crimes, crimes against women have been marginalised by crime prevention discourses. Noting the extent to which violence against women is commonly a process rather than an incident, or even a series of related incidents, she addresses the fear, risk and impact that coalesce to make vio- lence the lived reality for many, particularly marginalised, women. While it is true that the crime prevention and community safety agenda is broad- ening to encompass a wider range of crimes, inter alia stalking, hate crimes, human trafficking, forced marriage and cybercrimes, it is equally the case that the domi- nant discourse is one that addresses crimes by the other, the outsider, rather than the insider, spouse, partner, neighbour, employer or friend. To illustrate the limita- tions of this approach, it is pertinent to end this editorial with an example of crimes directed at tourist victims. In the Caribbean, one of the preferred crime prevention strategies is to encourage the promulgation of all-inclusive resorts, where holiday- makers can relax, insulated from the crime and disorder problems experienced in the ‘outside world’: the touristic equivalent of gated communities. As I write, it seems that such crime prevention strategies offered no protection to the two female tourists raped at gunpoint by a resort employee.2 It is only when crime prevention addresses the risks posed by insiders, as well as outsiders, that it will truly come of age. It is the intention of this journal to be at the forefront of this journey. 2 www.trave lmole .com/news_featu re.php?c=setre g&regio n=3&m_id=_rdmbm n&w_id=35249 &news_ id=20342 50, accessed 3 October 2018. http://www.travelmole.com/news_feature.php%3fc%3dsetreg%26region%3d3%26m_id%3d_rdmbmn%26w_id%3d35249%26news_id%3d2034250 http://www.travelmole.com/news_feature.php%3fc%3dsetreg%26region%3d3%26m_id%3d_rdmbmn%26w_id%3d35249%26news_id%3d2034250 Introduction 
work_bk56wtes7bfihegm7ju7goaj2a	----	“I Do, I Don’t”: The Benefits and Perils of Legalizing Same-Sex Marriage in the United States—One Year Later humanities Article “I Do, I Don’t”: The Benefits and Perils of Legalizing Same-Sex Marriage in the United States—One Year Later Kristina B. Wolff 1,2,3 1 Master of Health Care Delivery Science at Dartmouth, 37 Dewey Field Road, Hanover, NH 03755-7253, USA; kristina.b.wolff@dartmouth.edu 2 The Dartmouth Institute for Health Policy and Clinical Research, 1 Medical Center Drive, Lebanon, NH 03766, USA 3 Department of Public Health, School of Nursing and Health Professions, McKean 380, Colby-Sawyer College, New London, NH 03257, USA Academic Editors: Annabel Martín and Gail Finney Received: 14 February 2017; Accepted: 22 March 2017; Published: 30 March 2017 Abstract: In 1970, a gay male couple applied for and was given a marriage license in Minnesota. The license was eventually rescinded by court order. Forty-five years later, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act, limiting the federal definition of marriage to consist of one man and one woman, was unconstitutional. The result was the legalization of same-sex marriage in the United States. The purpose of this article is to discuss the importance of establishing the right for same-sex couples to legally marry. It outlines the benefits and costs to LGBT communities one year after the establishment of same-sex marriage in the U.S. This paper explores the limits of utilizing a rights-based approach when advocating social change. The recommendation is for LGBT individuals, communities and allies to shift tactics to adopt a capabilities approach to organizing and mobilizing people, groups, and organizations around issues of injustice. A capabilities framework addresses the complexities of individual and community needs while providing a foundation for coalition building and lasting positive social change. Keywords: same-sex marriage; LGBT marriage; social movement; social change; gay marriage 1. Introduction In 1970, Jack Baker and Michael McConnell applied for a marriage license in Minneapolis, MN. After being turned down by the county, they began their fight for their right to marry [1–3]. In 1971, the Minnesota Supreme Court ruled that it was constitutional to limit marriage to opposite sex couples. This decision was upheld via the U.S. Supreme Court’s dismissal of Baker and McConnell’s appeal in 1974 [4]. In 1996, the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) was established by Congress in response to the growing increase in the legal recognition of same-sex partnerships throughout the nation [5]. DOMA limited federal marriage recognition to married opposite-sex couples [5]. States could determine their own marriage laws but same-sex marriages were not federally recognized. In 2013, United States v Windsor was heard by the Supreme Court on the grounds that DOMA was discriminatory. The Court ruled that Section 3 of DOMA, which defined marriage as a relationship between opposite sex couples, was “unconstitutional as a deprivation of the equal liberty of persons that is protected by the Fifth Amendment” ([6], p. 1). In their decision, the Court described same-sex couples who were married by a state yet not federally recognized, as having a “second-tier marriage” when compared to opposite-sex marriages ([6], p. 23). The complexities of DOMA is an example of what Nancy Fraser calls “injustice of recognition” as same-sex married couples’ lack of federal recognition “prevents them from participating as a peer Humanities 2017, 6, 12; doi:10.3390/h6020012 www.mdpi.com/journal/humanities http://www.mdpi.com/journal/humanities http://www.mdpi.com http://www.mdpi.com/journal/humanities Humanities 2017, 6, 12 2 of 14 in social life” ([7], p. 176). “Misrecognition is a social relation, not a psychological one,” and is a “consequence of institutionalized patterns of interpretation and evaluation that constitute one as comparatively unworthy of respect or esteem” ([7], pp. 176–77). The decision in Windsor creates federal recognition of same-sex marriages and allows for states that sanction same sex-marriages to continue. It did not result in requiring all states to recognize and provide marriage licenses for same-sex marriages, which subtly reinforces prejudices and stigma, justifying discrimination toward LGBTQ1 people. Windsor paved the way for Obergefell et al. v Hodges, which challenged the constitutionality of limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples. The Court agreed and found that LGB rights were violated under the Fourteenth Amendment [8]. At a time when groups were fighting for equal rights for LGBTQ people in areas of employment, immigration status, and safety, it is curious that national LGBTQ organizations shifted focus onto legalizing same-sex marriage. At question is not the validity of the desire for couples to marry and gain the same rights and protections as opposite-sex couples. Yet there are unanswered questions: Why the shift in strategy? What is the potential impact on all LGBTQ people? Will this result in an increase in acceptance or an expectation of adopting the mainstream model of a nuclear family? What happens if a community is unwelcoming to same-sex couples? This essay explores some of the advantages and disadvantages of legalizing same-sex marriage and concludes with a recommendation to adopt a capabilities framework as part of an organizing strategy. This approach moves beyond recognizing basic rights to developing an ethos that also strives to achieve social justice and a dignified life for all. 2. Discussion 2.1. Benefits of Marriage Forty-five years post-Baker, after multiple legal challenges and changes throughout the country the U.S. Supreme Court overruled Baker in Obergefell et al. v. Hodges, thus legalizing same sex marriage across the United States, except for Native American Tribes as they are sovereign nations ([2,8–10]). When the Supreme Court decision was announced on 27 June 2015, President Obama called it a “victory” proclaiming “when all Americans are treated as equals we are all free” [11]. Images of rainbows and same-sex marriage ceremonies dominated mainstream media. President Obama and Vice-President Biden were photographed running thorough the White House carrying a rainbow flag, and that night, the White House was illuminated in rainbow colors. The decisions in both Windsor and Obergefell were a significant step forward in advancing civil rights for LGBTQ identified individuals in the United States. While same-sex couples have maintained long-term committed relationships for centuries, legal recognition of these relationships is a fairly new phenomenon [12–16]. At the time of the Obergefell decision, twenty countries (10% of all nations) and 36 (72%) U.S. states had legalized same-sex marriage. As it is difficult to determine how many people identify as LGBTQ, it is also challenging to ascertain how many wish to or are already married to a same-sex partner. The best data existing on marriage rates are the number of marriage licenses and divorce decrees in the country. In fact, while legally recognized same-sex marriages have been happening since 2004, it was not until 2013 that the U.S. Census said it would begin to count same-sex marriages in 2014 [17]. The national marriage rate for heterosexuals in the U.S. has decreased from 8.2 in 2000 to 6.9 (per 1000) in 2014 [18]. There is some evidence that these marriages are lasting longer than in the early 2000s as the divorce rate has also decreased from 4.0 in 2000 to 3.2 (per 1000) in 2014 [18]. In 2015, four months after Obergefell was decided, approximately 45% of same-sex couples were legally married, however much of this data is based on self-reporting [19]. The percentage of the U.S. population that identify as LGBTQ range from 1 LGBTQ represents individuals who identify as lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender or queer. Different variations of these abbreviations appear throughout the paper and vary by context. Often, LGB will be used when only discussing same-sex partnerships or marriages. Humanities 2017, 6, 12 3 of 14 4% to 10% of the population; it is known that the 96,000 same-sex couples who married in these same few months represent 11% of all new marriages in that time period [3,15,19,20]. Marriage is an important rite of passage in many societies and cultural traditions [8,12,21]. Combined with family, it provides the early foundation for shaping morals and socializing children. In the United States, before the 20th century, many opposite-sex couples married for social and economic class status. Some family members arranged marriages, indentured servants were sometimes forced into marriage, others married due to pregnancy, and some for love [12]. In the 1920s, cultural beliefs about marriage began to shift to focusing on love and companionship as the central reason for marriage [12]. As women’s independence evolved, art, media, and advertisements popularized images and stories of the ‘perfect’ wedding and the ‘ideal’ marriage, which was largely based on Judeo-Christian beliefs and Euro-American culture [12,21,22]. The merger and growth of industrialization and capitalism after World War II strengthened the foundation of today’s wedding industry and further solidified societal expectations of marriage and family structure in the country [12,22]. One place this is evident is in U.S. mainstream television shows ranging from Father Knows Best (1954) to current hits such as The Bachelor (20 seasons since 2002) and The Bachelorette (12 seasons since 2003). Thousands of television shows, movies, and social media sites depict marriages and engagements as desirable. These images dominate U.S. popular culture [12,22]. The marriage industry is estimated to generate between $40 and $70 billion annually [23]. In 2015, there were an estimated 2.5 million weddings in the U.S. at an average cost of $32,641 [24]. Early reports of same-sex marriages have mixed estimates regarding wedding cost. One study found that, on average, same-sex couples having a wedding out-of-state spent one-tenth of what residents paid for a wedding [25]. A 2014 report estimated same-sex marriage would generate $2.6 billion in revenue in the first three years of marriage with an additional $184.7 million in state and local tax revenues [26]. The foundation for legal marriage is an agreement that is primarily regulated by property law [27]. The original basis of a marriage contract solidified a husband’s control over his wife and children with the expectation that he provide adequately for the family. The wife operated the household, raised the children, and was subservient to her husband [12,21,22,27]. While the country has progressed since this time, many believe in traditional marriage roles and the original laws and customs that form the foundation of marriage and family law [8,27–32]. In addition to media and law reinforcing traditional marriage arrangements, policies and practices in areas of commerce, employment, housing, education, medicine, and healthcare continue to reinforce opposite-sex marriage as the ideal [21,22,29]. For LGB couples seeking to marry, some believe that recognition on a federal level may reduce stigma and increase acceptance. In Justice Kennedy’s decision in Obergefell, he affirmed the impact of stigma on LGB couples. Kennedy wrote that “without the recognition, stability and predictability marriage offers, children suffer the stigma of knowing their families are somehow lesser” ([8], p. 2). Whereas Chief Justice Roberts’ dissent sought to maintain the status quo and challenge the role of the Court in defining marriage despite previous Court rulings related to marriage and intimate relations [33–36]. Exhibiting a classic ‘if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it’ approach, Roberts writes, “[t]he majority expressly disclaims judicial ‘caution’ and omits even a pretense of humility, openly relying on its desire to remake society according to its own “new insight” into the “nature of injustice” ([8], p. 3). By arguing that marriage is always only for opposite-sex couples, Roberts is supporting a conservative argument that continues to be used as a means to discriminate against same-sex couples and by extension the LGBTQ communities across the country. Some advocate a wider definition of family and marriage. Paula Ettelbrook argues that “a better approach for our community would be to expand the definition of family, rather than confine ourselves to marriage . . . [it] would open up much broader possibilities for recognition of all” same-sex family relationships ([30,31]; [37], p. 31). In one feature by the New York Times, couples married after the Obergefell decision expressed how important it was to have marriage legalized on a federal level [38]. Similar to others’ experiences across the nation, some reflected on discrimination and hostility they had faced in their lives as well as family hesitation around having a public ceremony. One person said, Humanities 2017, 6, 12 4 of 14 “My husband’s parents were a bit hesitant and frightened by the idea of a big public wedding. They wanted us to keep the whole thing more private, discreet. It was very helpful to have the actual president of the United States on television saying this was a good thing. The tidal wave of news and social media posts about gay marriage gave us some legitimacy at the exact right moment.” ([38], p. 1) Kennedy’s decision touched on the importance of recognizing stigma, discrimination and violence LGBTQ people endure in U.S. society and how marriage can help mediate these things. In his decision, he quoted a passage from the Massachusetts case that led to the legalization of same-sex marriage in that state (Goodridge v Dept of Public Health 2003). Marriage holds an essential role in this nation as “it fulfills yearnings for security, safe haven, and connection that express our common humanity; civil marriage is an esteemed institution, and the decision whether and who to marry is among life’s momentous acts of self-definition” ([8], p. 13; [9,12–14]). Dean Spade notes that when same-sex couples live together in monogamous relationships or get married, they can “move from being highly stigmatized to being considered acceptable” ([39], p. 29). 2.2. Perils of Legalizing Marriage Many marriages are not as idyllic as portrayed in the promotion of legalizing same-sex marriage. Often, they can be quite stressful, due to societal expectations of married couples. In addition to possible challenges related to intimate relationships, the inclusion of children, employment and financial stress can contribute to an increase in personal struggles. [40–42]. Relationships can also be violent. For example, on average, over 20,000 phone calls are placed to domestic violence hotlines in the United States. More than 10 million people are abused by an intimate partner each year [43]. It is “estimated [that] 1 in 15 children are exposed to domestic violence each year and 90% witness” the violence ([43], p. 5). Same-sex partnerships have the same stressors as opposite-sex couples and often anxieties are intensified due to LGBTQ discrimination. Some studies have found that “minority stress” and prejudice that LGBTQ individuals face have a deleterious effect on their health and relationships [41,42,44–51]. The marketing campaign in favor of same-sex marriage rights depicted couples as happy, secure, loving, and carefree. In reality, many LGB married couples are adapting and doing their best to merge into mainstream married life designed for and by heterosexuals and reinforced by social institutions that are often the source of LGBTQ oppression [30,37,48]. Angela Davis reminds us that assimilation is not always possible nor does it solve many issues that LGBTQ people face. She notes, “the structures of heteronormativity, and the various violences these structures and discourses entail, do not necessarily disappear when the sexuality of the participants is changed” ([29], p. 161). This is further complicated if one is a member of other oppressed populations as U.S. institutions and culture are designed to push people into a specific way of being that is “enforced through internal and external policing and discipline” ([30], p. 104). Popular rhetoric may claim support of difference yet this masks the reality that there is little tolerance for those who do not conform to expected norms [15,30,31,39]. The decision to emphasize marriage as the main focus of efforts taken to improve the lives of LGBTQ individuals and communities is a bit murky. The organization ‘Freedom to Marry, Freedom to Love’ is a sales pitch as much as a goal to attain access to legal marriage. LGBTQ people as well as heterosexuals have successfully had romantic love relationships and partnerships for centuries, whether or not it was legal. The ‘Freedom to Marry, Freedom to Love’ organization founded by Evan Wolfson was one of the key groups working to advance the right for same-sex couples to marry [10,49]. By using a state-by-state approach to advance rights combined with lawsuits advancing their way through the courts; plus working in partnership with national organizations along with wealthy donors, they were successful at making same-sex marriage legal in the United States [11,21,49–51]. At question though, is why did marriage become the central focus of change for LGBTQ communities? Was there a definitive crisis involving marriage that Wolfson and the national organizations such as the Human Rights Campaign were responding to? Determining a specific focus Humanities 2017, 6, 12 5 of 14 for advancing LGBTQ equality is challenging as sexual orientation cuts across all races, ethnicities, genders, classes, ages, and other clearly defined populations. The common thread uniting LGBQ people is sexual orientation. The ways in which a person’s romantic, intimate, sexual experiences, and relationships impact her or his life is deeply personal and often difficult to mobilize around. Many LGBTQ individuals are focused on the necessities of daily living, therefore marriage is often not a top priority [13–15,30,31,37,39,50,51]. As previously noted, legal marriage brings with it recognition and rights from various private and state apparatuses including health care benefits, social security benefits, tax benefits along with positive social status. “It is an economic institution. It is about property. It is not about human relations, or intimate relations” ([21]; [29], p. 161; [52]). It is also recognition of a specific intimate type of relationship that two people have with one another [30,51,53]. For many in the LGBTQ community, marriage represents transcending Fraser’s “injustice of recognition” and for a select few this is possible. Numerous LGB individuals in leadership positions, working for the campaign as well as providing significant financial backing, had surpassed daily struggles and injustices that other LGBTQ individuals face due to racism, sexism, nationalism, ableism, classism, transphobia, and discrimination due to incarceration, religious affiliation and geographic location [7,30,37,39,53–56]. Therefore, access to legal marriage was the last barrier that needed to be dismantled. The push for marriage is viewed by some as a classist goal [21,37,48,53,55,57]. For example, in the U.S., college graduates have a higher rate of marriage and better options for high earnings. A 2010 study by the Pew Institute found that 64% of college graduates married compared to 48% of high school graduates [58]. One of the main reasons people do not marry is financial; this is particularly true for women [53]. Although the gender pay gap between women and men has narrowed, recent data show that women as a whole are paid 20% less than men who are in the same position [59]. Same-sex female couples compared to same-sex male couples are likely to earn significantly less income, especially if they do not have a college degree. Tthere are more single women raising children compared to single men. Women tend to earn less and have difficulties advancing in their careers due to the complex balance of job and children [53,57–59]. Similar to heterosexual couples, lower-income same-sex female couples with children who marry would likely benefit with an increase in income. However, for many lower-income couples, it may be just enough of an improvement to put government benefits for children into jeopardy [59]. This may not be the same situation for same-sex male couples with children. Same-sex couples may also face challenges within their communities and families due to lack of acceptance and understanding [14,29,30,37,50,53,60–64]. Several choose to remain silent and hidden within and outside of their communities due to prevailing adverse cultural and family beliefs, religious traditions, racism and homophobia [8,14,48,50,61–64]. LGBTQ people face “the sting of social disapproval and the persistence of discrimination in nearly every facet of everyday existence.” For “most of the 20th century and continuing even today, many gay people have lived their lives ‘in the closet’ so as not to risk losing a job, a home, or the love and support of family and friends.” ([61–64]; [65], p. 3) In places where non-discrimination policies for LGBT do not exist, married same-sex couples are at risk of being fired, denied housing, and other public accommodations without recourse if they revealed their sexual orientation. For many white LGB people, particularly those who are well-educated and have resources, the “Freedom to Marry” campaign provided an opportunity to work for social change that they would directly benefit from as this was likely the only place where they faced discrimination [7,30,31,36,48,50,66]. Unfortunately for those struggling financially or working in a state without LGBTQ protection, marriage usually offers little increased benefit. Coincidentally, the Employment Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA) was facing a crucial vote when the push for marriage intensified. All LGBT national organizations mobilized around marriage instead of ENDA. Therefore, when ENDA failed to pass a vote in the House, it was finished. This bill could have been of great benefit to the vast majority of LGBTQ individuals as well as heterosexual people. Humanities 2017, 6, 12 6 of 14 For non-whites, the complexities of living in the U.S. present many challenges beyond a single focus on race, gender, class, or sexual orientation. It is essential that an analysis of inequality utilize an intersectional framework of analysis when examining social issues and strategizing for change [28,51,66]. While one issue may be more salient at a particular moment, this does not mean that the impact of other systems of oppression cease to matter. “Our understanding of structural aspects is fundamentally connected to and mediated by conceptual constructs—the way we talk and think about any social group will influence the place we assign it within the social realm, and the way we treat people who fit in it.” ([67], p. 101). Images of same-sex couples and marriages during the campaign as well as after Obergefell are dominated by pictures of white couples [47,49,68]. This is what most people in the U.S. saw when viewing mainstream media and discussing same-sex marriage [51,53,54,59]. Wealthy whites were the primary spokespeople, leadership, and financiers of the push for same-sex marriage. This structure has been criticized since the LGBTQ movement began. Unless mainstream primarily white, national organizations, which are seen as the leadership of whatever LGBTQ ‘movement’ there is, truly take a more inclusive approach, change will continue to be driven by whites. Writing about the post-Stonewall era, Essex Hemphill states, “It has not fully dawned on white gay men that racist conditioning has rendered many of them no different from their heterosexual brothers in the eyes of black gays and lesbians. Coming out of the closet to confront sexual oppression has not necessarily given white males the motivation or insight to transcend their racist conditioning.” ([60], p. 95) Certainly, this “conditioning” or socialization that all people are subjected to in some way when living in the U.S., has an impact on decisions to marry. The issue regarding the structure and history of marriage in the U.S. has a different level of concern for people of color. Many are critical of the history and structure of the institution of marriage and power dynamics within marriage. Research show that there is a hesitancy to marry due to mainstream expectations of marriage as well as how marriage, inequality, and slavery are intertwined [48]. While often ‘invisible’ in mainstream America, communities of color are often subjected to inappropriate or ineffective programs, such as President Bush’s “Healthy Marriage Initiative”. This policy was aimed at poor communities of color in an effort to encourage marriage and perhaps save the government resources due to loss of benefits because of marriage status ([48], p. 76; [50]). For LGBTQ individuals and couples of color, many find they do not belong in their communities because of their sexual orientation. Yet, they are also invisible within the LGBTQ community because of their race/ethnicity [14,48,50,56,60,69]. From this vantage point, marriage may be a marker of assimilation, a means of survival, and/or a revolutionary act for LGBTQ couples of color. The decisions in Windsor and Obergefell were not greeted with great joy by many conservatives across the country. Religious leaders and politicians, particularly Republican candidates running for the 2016 Presidential nomination, quickly objected to the Obergefell ruling. Senator Lindsay Graham and Governor John Kasich noted that they would abide by the ruling even though they were disappointed and did not agree with it [70,71]. Other candidates such as Governors Scott Walker and Bobbie Jindahl turned the decision into an example of legalized religious prosecution of those opposed to the ruling due to religious beliefs [70,71]. They called for a constitutional amendment to keep marriage for opposite sex couples only [70,71]. While the amendment is unlikely, there is cause for concern as President Trump is against same-sex marriage. Of greater concern is Vice-President Mike Pence of Indiana who actively opposes anti-LGBTQ rights and favors discrimination of LGBTQ individuals [70].2 2 Protection for LGBTQ identity varies by state. Hate crime laws recognizing crime directed specifically at someone due to their perceived sexual orientation or identity as transgender were primarily established in the 1990s. Laws focusing on Humanities 2017, 6, 12 7 of 14 After the Obergefell decision, an Alabama Judge ruled that it was illegal to marry same-sex couples and would not allow licenses to be issued [72]. This has changed, yet there are a few counties in Alabama, Texas and Kentucky that will not issue licenses [72–75]. Before and after the Obergefell decision, numerous stories emerged around the U.S. of people refusing to provide goods or services for LGBT weddings. This spurred new types of legislation, such as ‘Pastor Protection’ Acts which allow religious leaders to refuse to marry same-sex couples if they disagree with the wedding on religious grounds.3 Other states have adopted laws that allow people to refuse services to LGBT individuals [73–80]. The extent of this conflict is significant and illustrates that “same-sex marriage has stirred so much resistance” that it has revealed “how widespread America’s attachment is to a narrow vision of marriage.” It also shows how “widespread the reluctance is to accept gay people within the social mainstream” ([2], p. 295). While much of the nation and the LGBTQ community celebrate the legalization of marriage, the level of the nature of negative responses also illustrates the precarious nature of a rights-focused approach to creating lasting social change. Coupled with the anti-LGBT marriage rhetoric are efforts to eliminate access to public spaces across the U.S. [81]. Many of these initiatives extend their focus to individuals who identify as transgender. Stories pepper social media about children being sent home from school for not dressing to match their biological gender or by openly identifying as transgender [82,83]. For example, in G.G. v. Gloucester County School Board, Gavin Grimm, who is a transgender female to male student, sued the school board for denial of access to use the boys’ bathroom at his school [82]. The school system created a policy that people must utilize the bathroom that matches their biological sex due to complaints of Grimm using the boys’ bathroom [82]. In August 2016, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a temporary order, blocking Grimm’s use of the bathroom and in October 2016, it agreed to hear the case [82,83]. In May, 2016, the US Justice Department and Department of Education issued a directive that all public schools must allow transgender students to use the bathroom of their choice [84]. Ten states filed a lawsuit against the government arguing that Title IX protections do not apply and that the government was overreaching [85].4 North Carolina made headlines in April 2016 for adopting a law that made it illegal for people to use public bathrooms and locker rooms that did not match their biological sex [73,76,77,86]. In the midst of protests and contentious debates, stories emerged of men monitoring women’s bathrooms looking for people violating the law [85–88]. While unnerving and despite the backlash against North Carolina via boycotts [81], the law still stands. At the heart of the law is the increased difficulty for individuals filing discrimination lawsuits in the state and the elimination of the minimum wage law, which was largely ignored in the press. In essence, transgender individuals are the scapegoats being used to advance laws that otherwise would not have been adopted [29,73,74,81,86]. Often incendiary language coupled with anti-LGBTQ backlash can lead to violence. The National Anti-Violence Project (AVP) 2015 report on violence impacting LGBTQ people highlights the complexities of LGBTQ individuals’ lives, which were largely erased during the marriage campaign [89]. It also calls attention to the brutality many face in immigrant detention centers and the positive impact of the Black Lives Matter Movement [88]. The annual report is based on 13 AVP sites around the country. For 2015, they documented 1253 survivors of violence; 62% of homicides were people of color and 67% of these homicides were transgender and gender non-conforming increasing access and eliminating discrimination for LGBTQ individuals became more widespread in the 2000s. Currently, four states have hate crime statutes for both sexual orientation and gender identity. An additional 14 states have hate crime laws for sexual orientation. Laws protecting individuals from discrimination also vary. Twelve states offer protection for gender identity and 22 recognize sexual orientation. Of these states, 18 states offer both and four recognize sexual orientation. Eighteen states also provide protection from discrimination for sexual orientation and gender identity in the areas of housing and employment. Seventeen of these states also offer protection for accessing public accommodations. 3 The states are Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Tennessee, and Texas. The law is immaterial as they already can refuse to conduct any marriage that they do not want to conduct. 4 The states are Texas, Wisconsin, Arizona, Alabama, West Virginia, Tennessee, Maine, Oklahoma, Louisiana and Georgia. Humanities 2017, 6, 12 8 of 14 people ([89], p. 9). The Federal Bureau of Investigation reports that LGBTQ identified people have experienced the highest reported rate of hate crimes in the U.S. since 2014 [90,91]. Stories of couples being beaten and harassed after the Windsor and Obergefell et al. decision have appeared throughout social media including one where two women were arrested in Honolulu for holding hands [92]. In the wake of the legal push for marriage, it is easy to forget that people experience discrimination and violence for doing simple things that opposite-sex couples can do openly, including holding hands or showing affection in public [92]. One extreme example of this is the violence that happened at the Pulse Nightclub in Orlando, FL. On 12 June 2016, 49 people were killed and an additional 53 were injured when one assailant entered the club and started shooting [93]. This massacre is certainly an incident that caused the nation to pause and reflect on anti-LGBTQ violence, yet little has changed in the wake of the event. 3. Conclusions Strategizing for Social Change: An Additional Approach Rights-based strategies are long proven mechanisms for creating social change in the U.S. However, they are limited as they often simply grant access to something rather than creating a cultural shift [29,30,39,55,56,93]. Many note that despite the Civil Rights Act of 1964, violence and discrimination continue in communities of color. Rates of incarceration for African and Latino/a Americans remain at proportionally higher rates than whites. The Black Lives Matter Movement's efforts have shown that, people of color are dying at the hands of the police at significantly higher rates than whites [29,30,89,94,95]. Additional legal actions need to occur to ensure that rights are being honored. Continued efforts on many levels must take effect in order to create a lasting cultural shift. This is evident in the rapid anti-LGBTQ backlash that has happened since the Obergefell et al. decision. It is important to celebrate the significance of the right for same-sex couples to marry. It also remains necessary to continue to organize across a multiplicity of factors affecting LGBTQ individuals’ lives including the impact of racism, classism, sexism, nationalism, ageism, issues related to varying abilities, religious intolerance and xenophobia. As this article is being written, there is a tremendous, often violent, backlash against LGBTQ individuals. Community gathering places are disappearing partially due to the impact of assimilation, and many politicians are using anti-LGBTQ rhetoric and proposed legislation as a foundation for their personal success. For LGBTQ individuals, the cost of marriage and increasing ‘acceptability’ encourage people to ‘pass’ or ‘cover,’ and to hide their LGBTQ selves, thus eroding away LGBTQ communities and culture. “There is no collective lesbian and gay past, there is only the straight-defined assimilationist future” ([96], p. 81). Any protection from discrimination or mistreatment due to social status is based on state-by-state laws and in some cases, city or town ordinances. Limited protection exists at the federal level. The new Republican administration and legislature are promoting an anti-LGBT agenda that includes supporting conversation therapy for LGBT youth, a repeal of same-sex marriage rights and various protections from discrimination or violence. Rights-based change is essential to achieve needed legal protections, yet they often fall short of addressing other needs. After Obergefell, in an interview with Evan Wolfson, he was asked what his next steps were going to be. Wolfson noted that “we’ve now achieved our goal. So we will, in a matter of months, shut down” [49]. He discussed the need to continue to “harness the power of the marriage win” and to keep working on LGBTQ issues, but failed to recognize the loss of the network that was created via the “Freedom to Marry” organization. Without a means to keep those involved together, the coalition died. Cornel West reminds us to take heed as “the fundamental forms of social misery in American society can be neither adequately addressed nor substantially transformed within the context of existing legal apparatuses” ([52], p. 269). Why did ‘Freedom to Marry’ not restructure and become a coalition that works on numerous issues facing LGBTQ individuals? Certainly, Wolfson is clear that marriage was the major barrier to cross. This reflects the limits of the marriage campaign, Humanities 2017, 6, 12 9 of 14 of a rights-based approach and a leadership focused on a goal that is most beneficial to them rather than what LGBTQ people need. Marriage only recognizes certain types of families and a specific kind of relationship. The campaign has “only been fighting for families that look exactly like the ideal of a straight family.” It ignores the “structural dimension of how these decisions give people access to certain cultural institutions,” which is limiting and often the source of discrimination ([9,39,48]; [50], p. 1; [64,67,69]). There is nothing that must change in these social systems except to grant access to a few more people. Urvashi Vaid notes that improved access does not transform into equality, “civil rights do not change the social order in dramatic ways; they change only the privileges of the group asserting those rights” ([67], p. 183). I suggest that the addition of a new framework for organizing, and a shift in the mindset and approach to creating change is essential. Economist Amartya Sen has argued that people’s capabilities must be taken into account when addressing human rights issues [97]. The basic premise is that the ‘one size fits all’ approach fails to adjust for differences in people’s lives. By paying attention to what “people are able to do and be”, it can bring us closer to “understanding the barriers societies have erected against full justice” ([97], p. 33). Martha Nussbaum states, “the language of capabilities gives important precision and supplementation to the language of rights” ([97], p. 37). Under the context of human rights, which places emphasis on “people’s choice and autonomy”, capabilities focus on choice, therefore people can decide what is important to them rather than having the decision made for them ([97], p. 40). For example, if a capabilities approach were applied to the push for same-sex marriage, perhaps a parallel campaign working on getting ENDA approved would have occurred at the same time due to LGBTQ people’s needs. Or if organizers learned that a community needed improved afternoon childcare, part of the campaign could include this issue as well. In doing so, a rights campaign is more inclusive. By working for community issues as well as their own, it is also more representative. Communities strengthen while rights are advanced and are ideally better able to respond to future needs. Nussbaum argues that social justice can be achieved if the capabilities approach is expanded to include “ten central human capabilities as central requirements of a life with dignity” ([97], p. 40). The addition of these specific capabilities reflects a necessary shift in mindset; they include “being able to live to the end of human life of normal length,” . . . “being able to move freely from place to place; to be secure against violent assault” . . . and “to love those who love and care for us” ([97], p. 41).5 If these tenets were embraced already, perhaps transgender people would have the right to use the public facilities of their choice in North Carolina. It would have been more difficult to access weapons used in the Pulse shooting, and same-sex couples would not feel social pressure to marry or conform to specific narrow definitions of family. Currently, most of these freedoms are not guaranteed and are often violated in numerous areas of people’s lives. For LGBTQ individuals, there is added stress and uncertainty tied to living life in the open or quietly. The complexities of living in a society designed for others is definitely experienced by people of color, the young and elderly, individuals with disabilities, non-Christians, immigrants, and many others who do not quite meet the cultural expectations of fitting into mainstream U.S. society. At issue are the types of strategies used for creating social change and who or what entity determines the place to focus efforts at addressing social injustice. Angela Davis states that “people have massively and collectively organized for change, and the world we live in today, however many problems remain, is the result of those movements” ([29], p. 154). Now that the celebration of achieving rights for same-sex marriage has happened, it is time to get back to work, to not just organize but to also mobilize; to support social justice efforts across the U.S. and beyond due to the new crises in the nation, including the election of Donald Trump and the goal of Republicans to eliminate much rights-based legislation [94,97]. Coalition building is the key to successful social 5 The “Central Human Capabilities” are: 1. Life, 2. Bodily Health, 3. Bodily Integrity, 4. Senses, Imagination and Thought, 5. Emotions, 6. Practical Reason, 7. Affiliation, 8. Other Species, 9. Play, 10. Control over One’s Environment ([97], pp. 41–42). Humanities 2017, 6, 12 10 of 14 change; one cannot work solely on issues that benefit a select few and expect deep meaningful change to occur. Denis Goldberg reminds us to work from a personal place of “respect for others’ dignity” and to not tire in our efforts at achieving social justice. As Nelson Mandela stated, “to be free, it is not enough to throw off one’s chains. One must live one’s life so that one respects and advances the freedom of others.” ([98], p. 165). At this moment, it is imperative that we eliminate the silo approach to organizing, that we unite as communities, build coalitions, and work to improve all lives. Conflicts of Interest: The author declares no conflict of interest. References 1. Erik Eckholm. “The Same-Sex Couple Who Got a Marriage License in 1971.” New York Times. 3 August 2016. Available online: http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/17/us/the-same-sex-couple-who-got-a-marriage- license-in-1971.html?_r=0 (accessed on 14 June 2016). 2. David L. Chambers. “Couples: Marriage, Civil Union, and Domestic Partnership.” In Creating Change: Sexuality, Public Policy, and Civil Rights. Edited by John D’Emilio, William B. Turner and Urvashi Vaid. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000, pp. 281–304. 3. Eric Marcus. Making History: The Struggle for Gay and Lesbian Equal Rights: 1945–1990. New York: Harper Collins, 1992. 4. “Marriage—Statute Prohibiting Same-Sex Marriage—Constitutionality.” Bloomberg Law, 15 October 1971. Available online: https://origin-www.bloomberglaw.com/public/desktop/document/Baker_v_Nelson_ 291_Minn_310_191_NW2d_185_1971_Court_Opinion?1490546153 (accessed on 2 November 2015). 5. “Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA).” 1 U.S.C.§7 and 28 U.S.C. § 1738C. Available online: https://www.gpo. gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-104hr3396enr/pdf/BILLS-104hr3396enr.pdf (accessed on 8 February 2017). 6. United States Supreme Court. “United States v. Windsor, Executor of the Estate of Spyer, et al.” 2015. Available online: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/12pdf/12-307_6j37.pdf (accessed on 13 June 2016). 7. Nancy Fraser. Fortunes of Feminism: From State-Managed Capitalism to Neoliberal Crisis. New York: Verso, 2013. 8. 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Matt Pearce. “What’s It Like to Live under North Carolina’s Bathroom Law if You’re Transgender.” Los Angeles Times, 12 June 2016. Available online: http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-north-carolina- bathrooms-20160601-snap-story.html (accessed on 14 August 2016). 88. Samantha Michaels. “We Asked Cops How They Plan to Enforce North Carolina’s Bathroom Law.” Mother Jones, 4 April 2016. Available online: http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2016/04/north-carolina-lgbt- bathrooms-hb2-enforcement (accessed on 28 September 2016). 89. National Anti-Violence Project. “Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Queer, and HIV-Affected Hate Violence in 2015: 2016 Release Edition.” Available online: http://www.avp.org/storage/documents/ncavp_ hvreport_2015_final.pdf (accessed on 13 September 2016). 90. Haeyoun Park, and Iaryna Mykhyalyshyn. “L.G.B.T. People Are More Likely to Be Targets of Hate Crimes Than Any Other Minority Group.” The New York Times, 16 June 2016. Available online: http://www.nytimes. com/interactive/2016/06/16/us/hate-crimes-against-lgbt.html (accessed on 16 June 2016). 91. Federal Bureau of Investigation. “2014 FBI Hate Crimes Statistics. ” Available online: https://ucr.fbi.gov/ hate-crime/2014 (accessed on 28 September 2016). 92. Elisha Fieldstadt. “Lesbian Couple Arrested in Honolulu for Holding Hands Reach $80K Settlement with City.” NBC News, 28 September 2016. Available online: http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us- news/lesbian-couple-arrested-honolulu-holding-hands-reach-80k-settlement-city-n578041 (accessed on 29 September 2016). 93. Southern Poverty Law Center. “Hatewatch: Update: Incidents of Hateful Harassment since Election Day.” Available online: https://www.splcenter.org/hatewatch/2016/11/18/update-incidents-hateful- harassment-election-day-now-number-701 (accessed on 25 November 2016). 94. Angela Y. Davis. Abolition Democracy: Beyond Prison, Torture and Empire. New York: Seven Stories Press, 2005. 95. The Guardian. “The Counted: People killed by police in the U.S.” The Guardian, 28 September 2016. Available online: https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/ng-interactive/2015/jun/01/the-counted-police-killings- us-database (accessed on 10 February 2017). 96. Victoria A. Brownworth. Too Queer: Essays from a Radical Life. New York: Firebrand Press, 1996. 97. Martha Nussbaum. “Capabilities as Fundamental Entitlements: Sen and Social Justice.” Feminist Economics 9 (2003): 33–59. [CrossRef] 98. Denis Goldberg. Long Walk to Freedom. Johannesburg: STE Publishers, 2010. © 2017 by the author. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. 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Introduction Discussion Benefits of Marriage Perils of Legalizing Marriage Conclusions 
work_bkp35htxkngn7l7a6ellgj7a3q	----	[PDF] The role of system-justification motivation, group status and system threat in directing support for hate crimes legislation | Semantic Scholar Skip to search formSkip to main content> Semantic Scholar's Logo Search Sign InCreate Free Account You are currently offline. Some features of the site may not work correctly. DOI:10.1016/J.JESP.2010.10.014 Corpus ID: 4659834The role of system-justification motivation, group status and system threat in directing support for hate crimes legislation @article{Mallett2011TheRO, title={The role of system-justification motivation, group status and system threat in directing support for hate crimes legislation}, author={Robyn K Mallett and Jeffrey R. Huntsinger and J. Swim}, journal={Journal of Experimental Social Psychology}, year={2011}, volume={47}, pages={384-390} } Robyn K Mallett, Jeffrey R. Huntsinger, J. Swim Published 2011 Psychology Journal of Experimental Social Psychology Abstract We examine factors that explain variability in attitudes toward hate crimes legislation. We find that one's posture toward the current social system directs the conditions under which characteristics of hate crimes exert the most influence. System-justification motivation is negatively related to support for hate crimes legislation (Studies 1–3). This relation is partially mediated by perceptions of harm from hate crimes. Specifically, when hate crimes target low-status groups, system… Expand View via Publisher jeffreyhuntsinger.weebly.com Save to Library Create Alert Cite Launch Research Feed Share This Paper 9 CitationsBackground Citations 1 View All Figures from this paper figure 1 figure 2 figure 3 9 Citations Citation Type Citation Type All Types Cites Results Cites Methods Cites Background Has PDF Publication Type Author More Filters More Filters Filters Sort by Relevance Sort by Most Influenced Papers Sort by Citation Count Sort by Recency Understanding Public Attitudes to Hate: Developing and Testing a U.K. Version of the Hate Crime Beliefs Scale. Alison M. Bacon, J. May, J. Charlesford Political Science, Medicine Journal of interpersonal violence 2020 PDF Save Alert Research Feed Measuring Attitudes About Hate: Development of the Hate Crime Beliefs Scale Mollimichelle K. Cabeldue, R. Cramer, A. Kehn, J. Crosby, J. Anastasi Psychology, Medicine Journal of interpersonal violence 2018 11 View 2 excerpts, cites background Save Alert Research Feed System justification: Experimental evidence, its contextual nature, and implications for social change Justin P Friesen, Kristin Laurin, Steven Shepherd, Danielle Gaucher, Aaron C Kay Psychology, Medicine The British journal of social psychology 2018 18 Save Alert Research Feed A quarter century of system justification theory: Questions, answers, criticisms, and societal applications J. Jost Psychology 2019 64 PDF Save Alert Research Feed Motivational orientations and psychiatric stigma: Social motives influence how causal explanations relate to stigmatizing attitudes Erlend P. Kvaale, N. Haslam Psychology 2016 12 PDF Save Alert Research Feed A few good (straight) men : uncoupling the effects of gender roles and sexual orientation on sexual prejudice toward army personnel Lauren Hawthorne Psychology 2011 2 Save Alert Research Feed White ≠ Poor J. Kunstman, E. Plant, Jason C. Deska Psychology, Medicine Personality & social psychology bulletin 2016 15 PDF Save Alert Research Feed "The world isn't fair": A system justification perspective on social stratification and inequality. J. Jost, D. Gaucher, C. Stern Economics 2015 53 PDF Save Alert Research Feed Hate Crime Legislation and Jurisprudence Frank S. Pezzella, Matthew D. Fetzer Political Science 2021 Save Alert Research Feed References SHOWING 1-10 OF 30 REFERENCES SORT BYRelevance Most Influenced Papers Recency Stigma or Sympathy? Attributions of Fault to Hate Crime Victims and Offenders C. J. Lyons Psychology 2006 64 View 1 excerpt, references background Save Alert Research Feed A Decade of System Justification Theory: Accumulated Evidence of Conscious and Unconscious Bolstering of the Status Quo J. Jost, Mahzarin R. Banaji, Brian A. Nosek Psychology 2004 1,891 PDF Save Alert Research Feed The psychology of system justification and the palliative function of ideology J. Jost, Orsolya Hunyady Psychology 2002 589 PDF Save Alert Research Feed Perceptions of Hate Crime Perpetrators and Victims as Influenced by Race, Political Orientation, and Peer Group A. Marcus‐Newhall, L. Blake, J. Baumann Psychology 2002 50 Save Alert Research Feed Moral Outrage Mediates the Dampening Effect of System Justification on Support for Redistributive Social Policies Cheryl Wakslak, J. Jost, T. Tyler, E. S. Chen Psychology, Medicine Psychological science 2007 239 View 3 excerpts, references background Save Alert Research Feed Victim Derogation and Victim Enhancement as Alternate Routes to System Justification Aaron C Kay, J. Jost, Sean Young Medicine, Psychology Psychological science 2005 236 PDF Save Alert Research Feed Antecedents and Consequences of System-Justifying Ideologies J. Jost, Orsolya Hunyady Psychology 2005 653 PDF View 1 excerpt, references background Save Alert Research Feed System-Justifying Functions of Complementary Regional and Ethnic Stereotypes: Cross-National Evidence J. Jost, Yifat Kivetz, M. Rubini, G. Guermandi, C. Mosso Sociology 2005 148 PDF Save Alert Research Feed „So, what's a hate crime anyway?” young adults' perceptions of hate crimes, victims, and perpetrators K. Craig, C. R. Waldo Psychology 1996 75 View 1 excerpt, references background Save Alert Research Feed Group-Based Dominance and Opposition to Equality Correspond to Different Psychological Motives M. Kugler, J. Cooper, Brian A. Nosek 2010 71 PDF View 1 excerpt, references background Save Alert Research Feed ... 1 2 3 ... 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work_bp4qacrdgjdx5kyn23ps5urb4q	----	162 162..164 Correspondence Protesting loudly about Prevent is popular but is it informed and sensible? BJPsych Bulletin has recently published several articles that were critical of the Prevent limb of the government’s current counter-terrorism strategy, including a polemical article by Summerfield 1 and a more thoughtful piece by Bhui. 2 Criticisms of the strategy are not confined to the professions; the Home Affairs Select Committee enjoyed media attention recently by staging a similar critique, with a special session held in Bradford. 3 However, objections to Prevent have included knee-jerk criticisms that have not stood up to closer scrutiny. When the BBC published an article suggesting that a child was referred for misspelling ‘terraced’ house, the Lancashire Constabulary’s Police and Crime Commissioner, Clive Grunshaw, revealed that ‘the police visit took place because of other worrying issues in the boy’s school work, not just the ‘‘terrorist house’’ line’. 4 The Independent Terrorism Legislation Reviewer, David Anderson QC, has recommended that the strategy ‘should be the subject of review by an independent panel’, but he also advised that such a review should be open to the possibility ‘that the problems have been exaggerated or misrepresented (as may have been the case in the ‘‘terrorist house’’ incident), either inadvertently or in pursuance of a political agenda’. 5 Bhui and Summerfield 1,2 made emotive suggestions that Prevent required mental health professionals to carry ‘a high index of suspicion’ of terrorism that some might interpret ‘with zeal’. 2 There was a call for ‘doing away with policies without evidence’, 2 the most extreme suggestions being that the ideas underlying Prevent are ‘of a piece with the era of McCarthyism in the USA of the 1950s’ and that they are so harmful that attending Prevent training would be unethical. 1 A more measured and balanced approach is needed. The most substantive of these authors’ ethical concerns relates to the contention that making disclosures to third parties (in this instance, Channel 6 ) would be to breach the confidentiality inherent in the fiduciary doctor-patient relationship. However, there is no absolute duty of medical confidentiality and there are already circumstances in which it can ethically be breached, including ‘when a disclosure would be likely to assist in the prevention, detection or prosecution of serious crime’. 7 The Prevent duty brings with it no legal change to our existing duties as doctors and it seems no different to the responsibility we might have in any other case where we believed a patient might be at risk of becoming involved in serious crime. We, too, would object to a requirement that we monitor and report all unacceptable thoughts, but of course this is not what we are being asked to do. We are being asked to be more informed and better educated about a particular sort of criminal activity and to consider breaching confidentiality when appropriate, just as we would do in any other case where we believed this was necessary to prevent serious crime. There is nothing within the Prevent strategy that would interfere with clinical judgement. Perhaps the greater risk is from those who boycott Prevent training and then find themselves making rash decisions, after failing to make use of opportunities to rehearse some of the dilemmas that this strategy could create. Indeed, we would suggest that such cases would be very similar to others where one becomes concerned about risks a patient may pose to others and which would normally be managed by thoughtful discussion within the clinical team and with one’s peers, before one made a clinical decision that might include making a disclosure to a third party. Running throughout the articles in the Bulletin were concerns that British Muslims risk alienation through the Prevent process and that psychiatrists are currently ill-equipped ‘to separate beliefs that are benignly religious from those that include political motivations and incite violence, but are disguised through religious rhetoric’. 2 There was also the erroneous contention that severe mental illness is of little importance overall in the area of terrorism. Islamophobic hate crime and misrepresentation of Muslims as terrorists deserve censure and, in some cases, criminal sanctions. But the problems in understanding what Prevent is about - evident here - may lie not with the Prevent strategy itself but the ‘radicalisation’ model. This is itself more hypothesis than empiricism and has been criticised within the literature on terrorism studies. 8 Our reading of the literature is that such models are probably unhelpful in the psychiatric context and that a case-by-case analysis is preferable. If a model is required, then a better one is that of grievance-fuelled targeted violence, a category that includes lone-actor terrorists, public figure assassins, school shooters and workplace attackers - groups which share important characteristics and risk factors. 9-11 It is with such lone actors that psychiatrists are most likely to have contact, reflecting the evidence that here severe mental illness is of central importance. Other psychiatrists, in common with us, will have encountered cases where counter-terrorism police have been monitoring people whose ‘radicalisation’ proved to signal the onset of a psychotic illness, with delusional beliefs involving religiose and paranoid themes drawn - as is typical - from the surrounding cultural milieu. Psychiatrists should be concerned with the well-being of people with mental illness, rather than the dictates of political correctness. Recent research has shown that 43% of so-called lone-actor terrorists have a history of mental illness - no doubt an underestimate given the limited access that the researchers had to any form of medical record. 12 Psychiatrists deal with the mentally ill; they do not concern themselves with the mentally well. Cases where vulnerable patients are drawn towards violence or cloak their paranoid and delusional grievances in the flag of a terrorist cause are ones where multiagency working, including through the Prevent strategy, is to the benefit of all. Whether we like it or not, the role of the psychiatrist involves the protection of society from violence resulting from mental illness, as well as preventing individuals with mental illness from ruining their lives by becoming involved in serious criminal acts. A reticence to do so where Islam is concerned is illogical and indefensible. It also seems to betray an ignorance COLUMNS 162 of the fact that studies of terrorism have consistently found that a greater number of lone-actor incidents in Europe and the USA are perpetrated by right-wing extremists or white supremacists 13,14 and that it is lone actors embracing far-right ideologies that pose a greater threat in Europe than Islamist ones, causing 48% of terrorism-related fatalities. 15 It is unclear to us whether opponents of the Prevent strategy in healthcare would have similar qualms about using Prevent mechanisms with, for instance, a future potential Breivik. We can all deplore, with Summerfield, 1 the way that poor - and possibly illegal - British and US foreign policy decisions in Afghanistan and Iraq have had unintended consequences; but we cannot put the clock back. We may not like the way societal changes impinge on our professional duties, but this does not mean we are entitled to turn our back on them. Jonathan Hurlow, consultant forensic psychiatrist, Birmingham and Solihull Mental Health NHS Foundation Trust, Birmingham, UK, email: jonathon.hurlow@nhs.net, Simon Wilson, consultant and honorary senior lecturer in forensic psychiatry, Barnet, Enfield and Haringey Mental Health NHS Trust and UCL Department of Security and Crime Science, London, UK and David V. James MA, MBBS, FRCPsych, consultant forensic psychiatrist, Theseus LLP, London, UK. 1 Summerfield D. Mandating doctors to attend counter-terrorism workshops is medically unethical. BJPsych Bull 2016; 40: 87-88. 2 Bhui K. Flash, the emperor and policies without evidence: counter- terrorism measures destined for failure and societally divisive. BJPsych Bull 2016; 40: 82-84. 3 BBC News UK. Extremism discussion event held in Bradford by committee. 2016; 28 Jan (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-leeds- 35430645) (accessed 8 March 2016). 4 Gani A, Slawson N. Lancashire police criticise BBC over ‘terrorist house’ story. Guardian 2016; 21 Jan (http://gu.com/p/4g2ag/sbl) (accessed 8 March 2016). 5 Anderson D. Supplementary written evidence submitted by David Anderson Q.C. (Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation) to Home Affairs Committee Countering Extremism Inquiry. 2016; 29 Jan (http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/ evidencedocument/home-affairs-committee/countering-extremism/ written/27920.pdf) (accessed 8 March 2016). 6 HM Government. Revised Prevent Duty Guidance for England and Wales. HM Government, 2016 (https://www.gov.uk/government/ uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/445977/ 3799_Revised_Prevent_Duty_Guidance__England_Wales_V2- Interactive.pdf) (accessed 8 March 2016). 7 General Medical Council. Confidentiality. GMC, 2009 (http://www. gmc-uk.org/guidance/ethical_guidance/confidentiality.asp). 8 Borum R. Informing lone-offender investigations. Criminol Public Policy 2013; 12: 103-112. 9 Capellan JA. Lone Wolf Terrorist or Deranged Shooter? A Study of Ideological Active Shooter Events in the United States, 1970-2014. Stud Conflict Terrorism 2015; 38: 395-413. 10 Gruenewald J, Chermak S, Freilich JD. Distinguishing ‘‘Loner’’ Attacks from Other Domestic Extremist Violence: A Comparison of Far-Right Homicide Incident and Offender Characteristics. Criminol Public Policy 2013; 12: 65-91. 11 McCauley C, Moskalenko S, Van Son B. Characteristics of Lone-Wolf Violent Offenders: a Comparison of Assassins and School Attackers. Perspectives on Terrorism 2013; 7: 4-24. 12 Corner E, Gill P. A False Dichotomy? Mental Illness and Lone-Actor Terrorism. Law Hum Behav 2015. 39: 23-34. 13 Spaaij R. Understanding Lone Wolf Terrorism: Global Patterns, Motivations and Prevention. Springer, 2012. 14 Gill P. Lone-Actor Terrorists: A Behavioural Analysis. Routledge, 2015. 15 Ellis C, Pantucci R, van Zuijdewijn J, Bakker E, Gomis B, Palombi S, et al. Lone Actor Terrorism: Analysis Paper. Countering Lone-Actor Terrorism Series No. 4. Royal United Services Institute, 2016. doi:10.1192/pb.40.3.162 Author’s reply: I cannot accept that the Prevent programme is of a piece with everyday psychiatric practice concerning safeguarding and confidentiality. Prevent is about spying and intelligence-gathering and this cannot be ducked. Hurlow et al are wrong: historically there has been very little relationship between diagnosable mental illness and terroristic acts, which are almost always committed on political grounds. Indeed, most of the terroristic violence in the world is committed by states, not by private individuals. And although it is true that violent radicalised individuals may be from, say, the neo-Nazi right, no one imagines that Prevent was intended to capture anyone other than Muslims. Prevent is part of a wider effort, deeply self-serving, to objectify Muslim culture and religion as carrying explanations for terrorism, so obscuring what damage Western powers have wrought in the Middle East. 1 1 Kundnani A. The Muslims are Coming!: Islamophobia, Extremism, and the Domestic War on Terror. Verso, 2014. Derek Summerfield consultant psychiatrist, South London and Maudsley NHS Foundation Trust, London, and honorary senior lecturer, Institute of Psychiatry, Psychology and Neuroscience, King’s College London, UK, email: derek.summerfield@slam.nhs.uk doi:10.1192/pb.40.3.163 Secure services for patients should be needs based and locally available Dye et al’s 1 timely editorial on ‘locked rehabilitation’ highlights the need for a closer working relationship between local and specialist commissioners in order to achieve appropriate, least-restrictive local care provision. It also raises the question whether the emergence of locked rehabilitation units is caused by a reduction in open hospital or community-based rehabilitation facilities, combined with a difficulty in accessing low secure units. In our experience, the pathway into locked rehabilitation is usually via acute in-patient facilities where treatment focus is on stabilisation of mental state and early discharge. In the absence of appropriate open or community-based rehabilitation facilities available locally within the National Health Service (NHS), patients requiring longer periods of rehabilitation are referred for locked rehabilitation in the private sector, usually out of area. A significant minority of these patients have a history of violence, including serious physical assault and fire-setting, but have neither been charged nor convicted. Regardless of current or future risks, ‘gatekeeping assessment’ to low secure care on behalf of NHS England relies on the non-clinical requirement that the person has either serious offence charges pending or has been convicted of an offence. This becomes a barrier to accessing appropriate local secure care because in some areas police are reluctant to charge patients with long-term psychotic problems, as it may be clear that eventually they will receive a psychiatric COLUMNS Correspondence 163 disposal. Clearly defined criteria for gatekeeping assessment are not readily available for referrers, although the Joint Commissioning Panel for Mental Health refers to a guidance to improve assessment consistency. 2 If the criteria set out by the Department of Health are taken as a reference, 3 a substantial majority of patients undergoing locked rehabilitation would satisfy them. There is a need for clarity and transparency to ensure accessible, equitable and local care to this vulnerable group of patients. Local and specialist commissioners need to redefine secure rehabilitation care pathways with input from both general adult and forensic mental health professionals to make low secure care more needs based than based on legal charge. To improve patient care, a review of allocation of financial resources across the low secure/locked rehabilitation healthcare system involving both general adult and forensic mental health professionals is urgently required. Ilyas Mirza, consultant psychiatrist and Mukesh Kripalani, locum consultant psychiatrist, Barnet Enfield and Haringey Mental Health NHS Trust, London, UK, email: ilyas.mirza@beh-mht.nhs.uk 1 Dye S, Smyth L, Pereira S. ‘Locked rehabilitation’: a need for clarification. BJPsych Bull, 2016, 40: 1-4. 2 Joint Commissioning Panel for Mental Health. Guidance for Commissioners of Forensic Mental Health Services. JCPMH, 2013. (http://jcpmh.info/wp-content/uploads/jcpmh-forensic-guide.pdf). 3 Department of Health Low Secure Services. Good Practice Commissioning Guide, Consultation Draft. Department of Health, 2012. (http:// apps.bps.org.uk/_publicationfiles/consultation-responses/ Low%20Se...). doi:10.1192/pb.40.3.163a COLUMNS Correspondence 164 10.1192/pb.40.3.162Access the most recent version at DOI: 2016, 40:162-163.BJPsych Bull Jonathan Hurlow, Simon Wilson and David V. James sensible? Protesting loudly about Prevent is popular but is it informed and References http://pb.rcpsych.org/content/40/3/162#BIBL This article cites 7 articles, 0 of which you can access for free at: permissions Reprints/ permissions@rcpsych.ac.ukwrite to To obtain reprints or permission to reproduce material from this paper, please to this article at You can respond /letters/submit/pbrcpsych;40/3/162 from Downloaded The Royal College of PsychiatristsPublished by on October 26, 2017http://pb.rcpsych.org/ http://pb.rcpsych.org/site/subscriptions/ go to: BJPsych Bulletin To subscribe to http://pb.rcpsych.org/ http://pb.rcpsych.org/content/40/3/162#BIBL http://pb.rcpsych.org/ http://www.rcpsych.ac.uk/ http://pb.rcpsych.org//site/subscriptions/ 
work_br4hjgkikffwxpow3k6qfrfgve	----	untitled Not all cultural traditions deserve respect Ruth Macklin The position Arora and Jacobs defend regarding female genital alteration (FGA) has much to recommend it. Sanctioning a form of FGA that seeks to minimise if not eliminate harm to infants, adolescents and adult women, and at the same time show respect for cultural traditions appears to make good sense. In arguing for a de minimis procedure, the authors contend that any harm would be equivalent to that of male circumcision, a practice that is per- mitted by countries that have made FGA illegal. They are correct in saying that in a de minimis form, FGA could not reasonably be considered a human rights violation. With these and other reasons that seem persuasive at first blush, why do I remain resistant to accepting this apparent solution to a public health problem that affects mil- lions of girls and women? Two different con- siderations lead me to reject the proposal. The first might be dismissed as ‘merely sym- bolic’, but is nevertheless real. The second is deep scepticism regarding several empirical premises that underlie the authors’ position. There is no doubt that in whatever form, FGA has its origin and purpose in controlling women. Whether it be control- ling their sexual behaviour in the most extreme form by sewing up the vaginal opening, or the lesser version of clitoro- dectomy to eliminate women’s sexual pleasure, or the social requirement of making it a condition of being marriage- able, as a cultural rite it signifies a means of making girls and women physically, aes- thetically or socially acceptable to men. Arora and Jacobs contend that a minimally invasive form of FGA has parity with male circumcision tolerated in liberal societies. That may be true regarding the degree of harm the procedure causes, but it is not true of the origins or the continued sym- bolic meaning of FGA as a necessity for being an ‘acceptable’ woman. Those who would dismiss this concern as ‘merely sym- bolic’ should reflect on the recent contro- versy in the southern state of South Carolina in the USA. After a 21-year-old racist committed a hate crime, shooting and killing nine African-Americans in a church, debate ensued about removing the Confederate flag from the statehouse. The debate continues in numerous southern US states about whether to remove the flag and other symbols of the confederacy, which fought the Civil War to retain the system of slavery. Although it may be a ‘mere symbol’, displaying the flag today signifies overt racism, whatever its defen- ders may claim about cultural tradition in the southern USA. Not all cultural symbols deserve respect. As for the questionable empirical prem- ises, Arora and Jacobs admit that they are ‘not suggesting that people whose beliefs or sense of propriety leads them to perform these procedures on their chil- dren would necessarily accept alterations in their practices to conform to the authors’ views of what is acceptable’. (p. 4) Based on some of the statistics they cite, evidence points in the opposite direc- tion. In Somalia, for example, a study revealed that 81% of subjects underwent infibulation and only 3% did not have FGA. ‘Eighty-five per cent had an inten- tion to subject their daughters to an extensive FGA procedure, and 90% sup- ported the continuation of the practice’. (p. 2) The example cited of the Seattle hospital in which a compromise was reached with the local Somali population to allow a ‘ritual nick’ is hardly convin- cing evidence of what is likely to take place in Somalia. Whether it is 90% or a lesser percentage of the population, defenders of the most invasive form of FGA could readily maintain that respect for their culture requires toleration of the procedure they favour. The question of precisely what ‘cultural sensitivity’ allows or requires has no satisfactory answer. Like other vague concepts, it is used to mean exactly what the speaker wants it to mean in a given context. The authors point out that ‘marriage is associated strongly with quality of life in these traditions. In some cultural milieus, a woman who has not undergone a pro- cedure to alter her external genitalia may find it difficult to marry’. (p. 14) This prompts the question how verification takes place in current practice, and how it can take place when the authors’ pro- posed procedure is used. In arguing against using the term ‘mutilation’ to refer to FGA, the authors say ‘a nick that heals completely is not mutilation in that there is no morphological alteration’. (p. 7) When the ritual is performed in infancy or even puberty and ‘heals completely’, it may be difficult to detect at the time of marriage. When FGA is conducted as part of a ceremony, whether at birth, as a rite of passage in puberty or in preparation for marriage, it is a community event. In addition to the individual who does the procedure, relatives of the girl or woman are present and there are witnesses, who may include members of the groom’s family. But if the procedure is done by a medical professional in a hygienic setting, who will be present? And what form of verification is envisaged if FGA remains a condition for marriage? As one article notes: ‘the intrusion of the groom and his family takes place even before he has married the bride, it occurs prior to the marriage proposal. The prospective groom may claim his right to ascertain that the woman is a virgin by inspecting her infibulation scar’ (ref. 1, note 59, p.416). It is demeaning, to say the least, to require women to undergo inspection of their genitalia if FGA in whatever form is a cultural requirement for marriage. The authors cite evidence that the prevalence of FGA is decreasing in some countries, especially among younger women. Cultural change proceeds slowly. But with strong support from non- governmental organisations, especially those comprising local and regional women, a cultural tradition designed to control women—even in its least harmful form—is best abandoned. Competing interests None declared. Provenance and peer review Not commissioned; internally peer reviewed. To cite Macklin R. J Med Ethics 2016;42:155. Received 30 July 2015 Accepted 23 August 2015 ▸ http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/medethics-2014-102375 ▸ http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/medethics-2015-103029 ▸ http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/medethics-2015-103030 ▸ http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/medethics-2016-103376 J Med Ethics 2016;42:155. doi:10.1136/medethics-2015-103027 REFERENCE 1 Sharif KF. Female genital mutilation: what does the new federal law really mean? Fordham Urban Law J 1996;24(2):408–26. Correspondence to Professor Ruth Macklin, Albert Einstein College of Medicine, 1300 Morris Park Avenue, Bronx, NY 10461, USA; ruth.macklin@einstein.yu.edu Macklin R. J Med Ethics March 2016 Vol 42 No 3 155 Commentary o n A p ril 5 , 2 0 2 1 b y g u e st. P ro te cte d b y co p yrig h t. h ttp ://jm e .b m j.co m / J M e d E th ics: first p u b lish e d a s 1 0 .1 1 3 6 /m e d e th ics-2 0 1 5 -1 0 3 0 2 7 o n 2 2 F e b ru a ry 2 0 1 6 . D o w n lo a d e d fro m http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1136/medethics-2015-103027&domain=pdf&date_stamp=2016-02-23 http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/medethics-2014-102375 http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/medethics-2015-103029 http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/medethics-2015-103030 http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/medethics-2016-103376 http://jme.bmj.com/ http://www.instituteofmedicalethics.org/website/ http://jme.bmj.com/ Not all cultural traditions deserve respect References 
work_brm4r4pqovfstietni6qheezre	----	With malice toward none and charity for some: UC Santa Cruz UC Santa Cruz Previously Published Works Title With malice toward none and charity for some: ingroup favoritism enables discrimination. Permalink https://escholarship.org/uc/item/14x6w6t4 Journal The American psychologist, 69(7) ISSN 0003-066X Authors Greenwald, Anthony G Pettigrew, Thomas F Publication Date 2014-10-01 DOI 10.1037/a0036056 Peer reviewed eScholarship.org Powered by the California Digital Library University of California https://escholarship.org/uc/item/14x6w6t4 https://escholarship.org http://www.cdlib.org/ “With malice toward none . . .” Draft of 9 November 2013 -1- With malice toward none and charity for some: Ingroup favoritism enables discrimination Anthony G. Greenwald & Thomas F. Pettigrew University of Washington University of California, Santa Cruz Contact information: Anthony G. Greenwald Department of Psychology University of Washington Box 351525 Seattle WA 98195-1525 Email: agg@u.washington.edu Phone: (206) 543–7227 Fax: (206) 329-0268 RUNNING HEAD: With malice toward none mailto:agg@u.washington.edu “With malice toward none . . .” Draft of 9 November 2013 -2- With malice toward none and charity for some: Ingroup favoritism enables discrimination Abstract Dramatic forms of discrimination, such as lynching, property destruction, and hate crimes, are widely understood to be consequences of prejudicial hostility. This article focuses on what has heretofore been only an infrequent counter-theme in scientific work on discrimination—that favoritism toward ingroups can be responsible for much discrimination. We extend this counter- thesis to the strong conclusion that ingroup favoritism is plausibly more significant as a basis for discrimination in contemporary American society than is outgroup-directed hostility. This conclusion has implications for theory, research methods, and practical remedies. “With malice toward none . . .” Draft of 9 November 2013 -3- Imagine: You are a well-positioned manager in a large business. You supervise several other managers who also have substantial responsibility. One of your subordinate managers, Sylvia, mentions that her daughter, Kate, who is a school classmate of your daughter, was just sent home from school with the flu. You encourage Sylvia to take time off until Kate can return to school. When it later becomes time for you to conduct Sylvia’s annual performance review you have a problem because her above-average performance falls just between levels that could justify your giving her an overall judgment of “meets expectations” or “exceeds expectations.” You opt for “exceeds expectations,” which ultimately helps Sylvia to qualify for a promotion and a salary raise. Another employee, Robert, is equally above average. Robert’s records show that he too missed several days of work, but you do not know him as well and do not know why he missed work. You give Robert a “meets expectations” evaluation, and he gets a smaller raise and no promotion. It is not difficult to understand why you, in your managerial role, would resolve doubt more favorably for a supervisee with whom your daughter provides a personal connection. Theories to explain effects of such personal connections on social judgment have existed at least since Heider’s (1958) analysis of interpersonal relations. Related explanations appear in more recent theoretical analyses of social identity (e.g., Brewer, 1999; Gaertner et al., 1997; Greenwald et al., 2002; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). If your favorable judgment of Sylvia’s work performance is understandable, then it is also understandable that many other types of connections between people—including ones due to shared race, ethnicity, age, religion, or perhaps even just a shared birthday (Finch & Cialdini, 1989)—can likewise result in tipping the balance toward a favorable judgment, giving “the benefit of the doubt.” This role of ingroup connections in shaping favorable feelings, judgments, and actions underlies this article’s thesis that ingroup-directed favoritism is, in the United States, a more potent engine for discriminatory impact than is outgroup-directed hostility. Quite often ingroup favoritism is hidden even from those who practice it. Consider the way much job recruitment occurs. Good workers are asked frequently to seek out others for job “With malice toward none . . .” Draft of 9 November 2013 -4- openings. Because of extensive (so-called “de facto”) racial segregation in residences, schools, and workplaces, this practice often leads to White workers, drawing on virtually all-White acquaintanceship networks, to seek out only other Whites for vacancies (Reskin, 1998; Rivera, 2012). By drawing heavily on ingroup ties, this unremarkable process can sustain or exacerbate racial or other imbalances, entirely without involvement of hostility toward minorities. In qualitative studies of White workers, DiTomaso (2012) shows how such ingroup-enabled networking affords increased access to job openings. Prejudice, Hostility, Discrimination, and Ingroup Favoritism The Oxford English Dictionary defines prejudice as “. . . dislike, hostility, or unjust behaviour deriving from preconceived and unfounded opinions.” 1 This definition, which links prejudice to both hostile intergroup attitude and discriminatory behavior, fits well with scholarly scientific analyses. To confirm that this understanding of “prejudice” was not merely our own caricature of scientific treatments, we searched for authoritative definitions in published research on prejudice and also in well-used past and current social psychology texts that we found on our bookshelves. We retrieved 24 definitions, 18 of which explicitly connected prejudice to negative attitude or negative evaluation; four others identified prejudice with either positive or negative attitudes; the remaining two identified prejudice with emotional reactions without specifying the emotions’ affective character. Only two of the 24 definitions we retrieved included ‘discrimination’ as part of the definition of prejudice. Following Gordon Allport’s (1954) lead, social psychologists have long held that the connection of prejudicial attitude to discriminatory behavior is not something to be assumed but, rather, something that requires empirical demonstration. Complementing this scientific understanding that the link between prejudicial attitude and discrimination is not obligatory, politicians and lawyers have likewise treated them as separable. With the exception of a few references to “hostile work environments,” America’s civil rights laws interpret discrimination in non-emotional terms, making it illegal to treat people unequally “because of” race, skin color, sex, religion, national origin, age, or disability status. Civil rights laws do not take either hostility or negative prejudicial attitude to be a necessary feature of discrimination. Likewise, in this article, we hold that discrimination does not require hostility. Unequal treatment can be 1Retrieved at http://www.oxfordreference.com, July 1, 2012. http://www.oxfordreference.com/ “With malice toward none . . .” Draft of 9 November 2013 -5- produced as readily (or, as we will conclude, more readily) by helping members of an advantaged group as by harming members of a disadvantaged group. The scientific study of prejudice has been pursued uninterruptedly since the introduction of the first measures of intergroup attitudes by Bogardus (1925) and Thurstone (1928). In this (now) massive body of scientific work, one is unlikely to encounter completely new ideas. True to that expectation, this article’s central thesis—that ingroup favoritism is a prime cause of discrimination—is not new. The importance of ingroup favoritism in discrimination was described especially clearly by both Gaertner et al. (1997) and Brewer (1999). Gaertner et al. wrote that “. . . racial bias, particularly in its contemporary manifestations, may reflect a prowhite, not simply [the] antiblack sentiment that many traditional theories and measures have implied” (p. 175). Brewer wrote: “Ultimately, many forms of discrimination and bias may develop not because outgroups are hated, but because positive emotions such as admiration, sympathy, and trust are reserved for the ingroup and withheld from outgroups” (p. 438). In a review article, Hewstone, Rubin, and Willis (2002) carefully considered the interplay of ingroup favoritism and outgroup hostility as components of intergroup bias, in the process presaging several topics central to this article. More recently, Dixon, Levine, Reicher, and Durrheim (2012) asked, “Has the time come to challenge the assumption that negative evaluations are inevitably the cognitive and affective hallmarks of discrimination?” (p. 411). We proceed further in this direction, concluding that, at least in North America, ingroup favoritism is the prime mechanism of discrimination.2 Perhaps because the most dramatic forms of discrimination contain no hint of ingroup favoritism, statements such as those by Gaertner et al. (1997) and Brewer (1999) have not displaced the view that outgroup hostility is discrimination’s primary antecedent. Studies collected for two meta-analyses confirm this observation. Among 1,351 individual tests of effects of intergroup contact on intergroup relations (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006; 2011) not even one of these employed a measure of ingroup favorability as a dependent variable. Likewise, among 370 tests analyzed by Smith, Pettigrew, Pippen & Bialosiewicz (2012) to determine the effects of group relative deprivation on prejudice, only two used ingroup favorability as a 2 At about the same time that it began to appear in the psychological literature, the proposition that workplace discrimination could occur importantly as ingroup favoritism was also beginning to appear in legal scholarship (see Krieger, 1998). “With malice toward none . . .” Draft of 9 November 2013 -6- dependent variable (Amiot, Terry, & Callan, 2007; Terry & O’Brien, 2001). The only ingroup- related measures—used in a small minority of tests in these two meta-analyses—were measures of collective self-esteem and ingroup identification. Consider, too, the Journal of Social Issues special issue in 2012 that focused on discrimination (Nier & Gaertner, 2012). Several authors in that issue acknowledged that hostility is not a necessary precondition for discrimination. For example, Nier and Gaertner (2012, p. 218) wrote: “In many cases, . . . discrimination is likely to be subtle and difficult to detect, and in some instances, may be unintentional.” Nevertheless, throughout the special issue the dominant assumption was that, in most instances, hostile prejudice is the wellspring of discrimination. And common throughout the research literature are studies that show how hostile prejudice is linked with discriminatory intentions without regard for ingroup favorability (e.g., Wagner, Christ & Pettigrew, 2008). In three steps, the remainder of this article builds a case for understanding ingroup favoritism as not just a cause but as the prime cause of American discrimination. First, we review findings supporting the two phenomena that are merged in this article’s main thesis: existence of strong positive dispositions toward ingroup members (i.e., ingroup favoritism), and evidence that discrimination occurs more often as differential favoring than as differential harming. Although both of these phenomena are thoroughly established empirically, the connection between them has had very little recognition. Second, we consider theories that explain the psychological antecedents of favoritism. Third, we review research methods that have been used in studies of discrimination to understand why there are so few available tests of the link between ingroup favoritism and discrimination. In the concluding discussion, we reflect on implications of this article’s ingroup favoritism thesis. Findings: Favoring Ingroup Members Similarity and Attraction Byrne (1961) introduced a method for investigating attraction as a function of attitude similarity. In an initial session, experimenters obtained subjects’ responses to 26 attitude questions. Two weeks later, the same subjects were asked to evaluate an otherwise unknown person for whom the only available information consisted of that person’s responses to the same “With malice toward none . . .” Draft of 9 November 2013 -7- 26 questions. Unknown to subjects, the attitude responses of these “strangers” had been filled out by researchers so as to vary systematically, in four levels, ranging from exactly agreeing with all of the subjects’ own responses to exactly disagreeing with all of them. Byrne’s finding, which proved to be robustly replicable, was that liking and attraction toward the strangers were strongly a function of attitude similarity. In Byrne’s (1961) report, across six dependent measures, effect sizes for the greater positivity of evaluations for most versus least similar strangers averaged a Cohen’s d of 3.40, constituting a very large effect. As a reference point, Cohen (1977) described d = 0.80 as a “large” effect. Subsequent studies showed that Byrne’s similarity–attraction principle was not limited to effects of attitude similarities; it occurred equally for similarities in personality traits and for similarities in behavior (e.g., Byrne, Ervin, & Lamberth, 1970). Furthering Byrne’s contentions, Rokeach proposed that the perception of conflicting beliefs and values triggered race prejudice more than does race itself (Rokeach, 1960; Rokeach & Mezei, 1966). This is plausible if, as Rokeach supposed, outgroup members were typically assumed to harbor beliefs and values conflicting with those of the ingroup. Rokeach’s position was initially controversial (see Stein, Hardyck, & Smith, 1965; Triandis, 1961; Triandis & Davis, 1965), but the controversy gradually disappeared. And, as already mentioned, by 1970 the similarity–attraction principle had been extended beyond attitudes to other characteristics (Byrne et al, 1970). Nevertheless, the effect of (especially) race similarity on interpersonal attitudes has continued to be interest. In work settings, evaluations have often been shown to be more favorable when the evaluator and evaluatee (e.g., a hiring manager and a job applicant) are similar, rather than different, in race or gender (e.g., Riordan, 2000). Interpretation of this demographic similarity effect as a form of discriminatory bias has been made plausible by reports that the effect can be minimized or eliminated when highly structured interview methods are used (e.g., McCarthy, Van Iddekinge, & Campion, 2010; Sacco, Scheu, Ryan, & Schmitt, 2003). Highly structured interviews are understood to minimize discriminatory effects because they leave little to the interviewer’s subjectivity or discretion (e.g., Heilman & Haynes, 2008). The interesting question as to whether effects of demographic similarity in the workplace are due to ingroup favoritism or outgroup hostility has not been directly addressed in most of the available research. However, the (earlier mentioned) studies by DiTomaso (2012), Reskin (2008), and Rivera (2012) are “With malice toward none . . .” Draft of 9 November 2013 -8- supportive of a favoritism interpretation. In sum, the similarity–attraction principle is consistent with an expectation that attitudes toward members of one’s own group (ingroup) will typically be more positive than attitudes toward members of other groups (outgroups). The Minimal Group Paradigm (MGP) “With malice toward none . . .” Draft of 9 November 2013 -9- More than 40 years after the discovery of minimal group paradigm (MGP) effects, the original report of that finding by Tajfel, Billig, Bundy and Flament (1971; see also Tajfel, 1970) continues to shape research and theory on intergroup relations. Tajfel et al. found that, even when subjects were assigned arbitrarily to groups in a laboratory study, they preferentially allocated resources to members of their own group rather than to those in another group. Later studies found that this occurred even when subjects knew that the basis for assignment was random. It also occurred when subjects did not know which, of the other subjects who were present, were members of their own group or members of the other group (Billig & Tajfel, 1973). Platow and Van Knippenberg (2001), using the MGP, showed that subjects expect and believe it is fair for an ingroup member to treat all ingroup members fairly. But they also tend to expect and believe it fair for an ingroup member to favor another ingroup member over an outgroup member. Not surprisingly, ingroup members cannot be expected to identify their ingroup favoritism as discrimination when they see their behavior as legitimate, normative and even procedurally fair. A further study by L. Gaertner and Insko (2001) showed that distributions of monetary payments in the MGP are partly constrained by equity norms—which prescribe giving equal rewards to all. Nevertheless, these investigators also observed ingroup favoritism when the monetary distributions were described as bonus payments (making equity irrelevant) and when subjects were asked to describe their feelings toward unspecified members of each group. Their article also introduced a new dependent measure format (“multiple alternative matrices”) that avoided a strict inverse relationship between outcomes to ingroup and outgroup members. This measure allowed the conclusion that, on average, subjects were more motivated by ingroup favoritism (higher payments to ingroup members) than by outgroup hostility (lower payments to outgroup members). In the context of similarity–attraction research, MGP research indicates that similarity that is solely due to membership in the same group suffices to provide a basis for both attraction and favoritism, even when no specific attributes are known to be shared with members of that (minimal) ingroup. Greater Differences between Ingroup and Outgroup in Positive than Negative Feelings If negative outgroup attitudes are expressed primarily in hostile form, we can expect that negative emotions should be more readily expressed toward outgroups than ingroups—a “With malice toward none . . .” Draft of 9 November 2013 -10- phenomenon that is indeed observed (cf. Smith, 1993; Smith & Mackie, 2005). A rarely addressed empirical question (but cf. Dovidio, Mann & Gaertner, 1989; Gaertner & McLaughlin, 1983) is how ingroup–outgroup differences in negative feelings compare to ingroup–outgroup differences in positive feelings. A study of racial attitudes in the 2012 American Presidential election (Ziegler, Kirby, Xu, & Greenwald, 2013) included data from more than 45,000 volunteers who responded to two measures of emotional responses to Black and White persons. One of these was a standard feeling thermometer, which asked “Please rate how warm or cold you feel toward White [or Black] people.” We limited analysis to Whites who expressed strong White preference and Blacks who expressed strong Black preference to be sure that we were appropriately focusing on Whites and Blacks for whom their racial group was justifiably considered an “ingroup”. For these participants, thermometer responses of strong warmth toward the ingroup exceeded expressions of strong cold feelings toward the outgroup by a ratio of approximately 4:1 for Whites and more than 50:1 for Blacks. That is, expressions of warmth toward the ingroup greatly exceeded expressions of coldness toward the outgroup. The second emotion measure used by Ziegler et al. (2013) was an adaptation of Pettigrew and Meertens’s (1995) measure of subtle racism. It consisted of two items asking “How often have you felt _____ for African Americans who grew up in slums and poverty?” The blank was replaced by “sympathy” or “admiration” in the two items. The same items were also asked about “Americans,” in place of “African Americans.” Subjects of both races whose Likert-item responses stated “very strong” racial ingroup preference were more disposed to feel positively toward impoverished members of their own racial group than toward comparable members of the outgroup.3 Similar findings with the same two items have emerged in European research. Pettigrew and Meertens (1995; Meertens and Pettigrew, 1997) found in seven independent samples from France, Germany, Great Britain and the Netherlands that these items correlated highly with other measures of prejudice. Although the sympathy and admiration items are typically not seen by native Europeans as reflecting prejudice, they nevertheless predicted pro-discrimination beliefs. 3 Note that the researchers assumed that “Americans” would be assumed to be White Americans. This is presumably a valid assumption, but we are not aware of direct empirical tests. “With malice toward none . . .” Draft of 9 November 2013 -11- For example, those who reported that they rarely or never felt sympathy or admiration for immigrants were significantly more likely to support expelling immigrants who have committed crimes or who have no immigration papers. These survey respondents are more appropriately described as withholding positive emotions (sympathy and admiration) from immigrants than as expressing negative feelings toward immigrants. Findings: Discrimination Often Occurs as Differential Favoring Studies of intergroup behavior in field settings have examined the extent to which significant discriminatory effects result from differential helping or favoring. Although there are limitations on conclusions from these studies that we will mention, nevertheless they are quite consistent in showing the potential for discrimination to result from differential favoring. Helping Behavior Experiments on unobtrusively observed helping of ingroup and outgroup members began with an ingenious study using a “wrong number” method devised by Gaertner and Bickman (1971). Researchers, speaking with accents that were racially identifiable as Black or White, placed telephone calls in which they claimed to be stranded drivers calling an automobile mechanic and urgently needing help for their disabled cars. Because of strong residential segregation in the Brooklyn, New York, neighborhoods to which those calls were directed, researchers could know whether the call recipients were racially White or Black. Claiming to have used his last coin in a pay phone, the caller asked the recipient to help by calling the mechanic to relay the emergency request for road service. The key finding: White call recipients discriminated by race—they were less likely to help Black callers (53 percent) than White callers (65 percent). Three later repetitions of the experiment replicated Gaertner and Bickman’s finding (see Crosby, Bromley, & Saxe, 1980; Saucier, Miller, & Doucet, 2005). A crucial element of Gaertner and Bickman’s (1971) wrong-number method was that potential helpers could not know that their helping or non-helping was being monitored. Dozens of later experiments in the 1970s similarly used unobtrusive measures to compare the amount of help that Black and White help seekers would receive from White potential helpers. In reviewing the accumulated collection of more than 30 such studies, Crosby et al. (1980) “With malice toward none . . .” Draft of 9 November 2013 -12- concluded, “Discriminatory behavior is more prevalent in the . . . unobtrusive studies than we might expect on the basis of survey data” (p. 557). Similar results have more recently been found in studies of tipping behavior. Obtaining the cooperation of taxi drivers in New Haven, Connecticut, Ayres, Vars, and Zakariya (2005) asked the drivers to keep records of fares and tips. White drivers received tips that were 51% larger than those received by Black drivers, a ratio that was even greater when computed as a percentage of fare. A study of restaurant tipping behavior by Lynn et al. (2006; 2008) likewise revealed a race difference—White waiters received tips that, on average, were 22 percent larger than those received by Black waiters. Hiring and Housing Audits Many field experiments using audit methods have assessed discrimination in employment and housing. The standard audit method uses paired testers who differ in race or ethnicity while being matched in relevant qualifications such as (for housing audits) income, assets, debt levels, family circumstances, employment history, credit record, and neatness of appearance. Randomizing which of the two members of each pair arrives first, the two testers apply for work or housing to each of a large sample of hiring managers or real estate agents. This method almost invariably reveals discrimination against Blacks and Hispanics in access to jobs (reviewed by Bendick, 2004) and housing (e.g., Turner, Ross, Galster & Yinger, 2002). Results obtained from field audit experiments strongly suggest that significant acts of discrimination in housing and employment can often occur without expression of hostility toward the people who are disadvantaged by those acts. Some of the individual hiring managers or real estate agents might have been hostile in their denials of consideration for job interviews or housing. However, the great majority of declinations of hiring and housing applications involve simply the non-occurrence of a helpful act—either the act of inviting the job seeker for an interview or the act of escorting the housing seeker to view an apartment or home. The greater non-occurrence of those helpful actions when applicants are Black or Hispanic than when they are White can effectively cause substantial discrimination in housing or hiring.4 Recently, 4 A necessary qualification in regard to ingroup favoritism follows from audit studies’ lack of systematic report of effects due to variations in race or ethnicity of real estate agents and hiring managers. Although it is a near certainty that the majority of agents and managers in all of the published audit studies were White, it remains unknown whether ingroup favoritism occurred “With malice toward none . . .” Draft of 9 November 2013 -13- Bendick (2007) and colleagues (Bendick, Rodriguez, & Jayaraman, 2010), using a method of situation testing in hiring studies, have shown that discrimination in hiring interactions is linked more to occurrences of favorable than of hostile actions. Policing Large bodies of data on discrimination in policing have been accumulated in studies of profiling by police in their interactions with pedestrians or with drivers who have been stopped for driving violations or vehicle maintenance infractions. Discrimination is evident when there is a greater probability of searching or issuing a citation when the driver is Black or Hispanic rather than White, or greater probability of subjecting Black or Hispanic pedestrians to search (Lamberth, 1994; Office of the Attorney General, 1999; Verniero & Zoubek, 1999; Weiss & Rosenbaum, 2009). In summarizing available profiling data, Chanin, Rintels et al. (2011) concluded that: (a) Blacks and Hispanics were stopped more frequently than Whites; (b) among those stopped, higher proportions of Blacks and Hispanics than Whites received citations; (c) among those stopped, higher proportions of Blacks and Hispanics than Whites were subjected to searches; and (d) among those searched, a smaller proportion of the searches of Blacks and Hispanics than Whites yield contraband (e.g., drugs or weapons). The lower yields of contraband from searches of Blacks and Hispanics establishes that the greater searching of Blacks and Hispanics is not justified by greater criminal activity of Blacks or Hispanics than of Whites among those who are stopped. The greater rate of discovering contraband from searches of vehicles driven by Whites suggests that White drivers are being stopped and searched at inappropriately low rates. This is consistent with the proposition that discrimination reflected in profiling data is in part—perhaps large part—due to favorable acts of either not stopping White drivers or (as the data show) not searching their vehicles after they are stopped. Public Opinion Surveys Surveys of White Americans’ racial attitudes over the past 50 years show that Whites have steadily increased their support for policies that provide educational or housing opportunities for African Americans (this and the other findings mentioned in this paragraph are documented in equally across variations in agent or manager race and ethnicity. This same qualification applies to the following section on policing. “With malice toward none . . .” Draft of 9 November 2013 -14- Schuman, Steeh, Bobo & Krysan, 1997). Surveys also have revealed White Americans’ increasing support for racial intermarriage, for equal opportunity in employment, and for the acceptability of an African-American candidate for U.S. President. At the same time, White Americans’ levels of support for policies that provide governmental help to minorities have been largely unchanged during the past half century. In particular, majorities of White Americans have steadily opposed financial assistance to minorities, social services to minorities, and affirmative action to benefit minorities in hiring or college admissions. Put differently, national American surveys across the past five decades have found that most White Americans accept basic principles of equal opportunity while, at the same time, resisting the implementation of policies that would increase equality directly by helping outgroups (see also DiTomaso, 2012; Pettigrew, 1979). In combination, these evidences of White Americans’ current high levels of opposition to both anti-minority segregation policies and pro-minority assistance policies suggest that the preferred policies of White Americans amount to a generalized anti-discrimination stance. That is, they favor neither segregation policies that could potentially harm Black Americans nor assistance policies that could potentially favor impoverished Black Americans over other impoverished Americans. At the same time, there are some government assistance programs that many White Americans do support. As was documented by political opinion polling during the American presidential campaign of 2012, White Americans (more than other demographic categories) supported tax laws that assist relatively wealthy Americans. Because America’s Black and Hispanic minorities are underrepresented at high income levels, benefits received via tax laws necessarily help Whites more than racial minorities. It appears that many White Americans’ are more likely to oppose laws that would disproportionately benefit relatively impoverished minorities than ones that disproportionately benefit relatively wealthy Whites. Although some of Whites’ support for benefits via tax laws can be attributed to economic self- interest, the supported laws often include benefits that affect only Americans much wealthier than those laws’ supporters. “With malice toward none . . .” Draft of 9 November 2013 -15- Theories: Roots of Favoritism A variety of theories explain conditions that promote and sustain favoritism—not limited to ingroup favoritism. This section describes theoretical accounts of favoritism stated at four levels of psycho-social analysis: intrapersonal, interpersonal, intergroup, and societal. Balance Theory and Balanced Identity Theory In explaining the powerful similarity–attraction phenomenon revealed in his research, Byrne (1961) proposed that “. . . any time that another person offers us validation by indicating that his percepts and concepts are congruent with ours, it constitutes a rewarding interaction and, hence, one element in forming a positive relationship” (p. 713). Byrne advanced this reward theory toward the end of an era in which learning–reinforcement theories were psychology’s dominant theories. By the 1960s, however, those reinforcement theories were in decline. At that same time, affective–cognitive consistency theories—especially Heider’s (1958) balance theory, Osgood and Tannenbaum’s (1955) congruity theory, and Festinger’s (1957) dissonance theory— were on the ascent in social psychology (see Abelson et al., 1968). Although consistency theories themselves declined in the 1970s, they have recently experienced a resurgence (cf. Gawronski & Strack, 2012). The recent “balanced identity” theory (BIT), which was developed as an extension of Heider’s balance theory (Greenwald et al., 2002) offers a cognitive consistency interpretation of similarity–attraction. BIT’s balance–congruity principle holds that two concepts that are both associated with the same third concept will become associated with each other. When a newly encountered person (P) is an ingroup member, both self and P are associated with the ingroup (a third concept) that they share. BIT’s balance–congruity principle therefore predicts that the association between self and P will strengthen. The same principle then extends to the combination of the new (self–P) association and the pervasive association of self with positive valence (i.e., self-esteem). When P and positive valence are thus both associated with self (third concept), the association between P and positive valence should itself strengthen, theoretically explaining attraction to the ingroup member (P). “With malice toward none . . .” Draft of 9 November 2013 -16- Social Identity Theory Social identity theory (SIT) was developed by Tajfel and Turner (1979) in part to account for Tajfel et al.’s (1971) findings of intergroup discrimination in the minimal group paradigm. In contrast to BIT’s association-formation interpretation of the relation between self-esteem and ingroup favoritism, SIT offers a motivational interpretation rooted in understanding self-esteem as a motive with the goals of achieving and sustaining positive self-regard. SIT links intergroup discrimination in the MGP to increased self-esteem in two ways (Abrams & Hogg, 1988): Either (a) a self-esteem increase is achieved as a consequence of perceiving one’s own group as superior to the other in the MGP, or (b) approximately the reverse—the motive to elevate self- esteem is the cause of perceiving one’s group as superior to the other (Abrams & Hogg, pp. 320– 321). Hewstone, Rubin, and Willis (2002) summarized SIT’s self-esteem hypothesis this way: “(1) successful intergroup bias enhances self-esteem and (2) depressed or threatened self-esteem motivates intergroup bias” (p. 41). However, Hewstone et al. also concluded that the evidence for this SIT theorization is at best mixed. System Justification Theory If ingroup favoritism is practiced equally by all, then greatest benefits will necessarily flow to members of a society’s more powerful groups; their greater power, along with their (typically) greater numbers translate to their being better positioned to benefit from ingroup helpers. System justification theory (SJT; Jost & Banaji, 1994) explains how a complementary form of favoritism, rooted in existing status, adds to the benefits accruing to high status groups. Jost and Banaji defined system justification as a “process by which existing social arrangements are legitimized, even at the expense of personal and group interest” (p. 2). There has been substantial empirical support for this theorized reversal of ingroup favoritism for low- status groups, including the prediction that “[a]s system justification tendencies increase . . . members of low-status groups will exhibit increased outgroup favoritism” (Jost, Banaji & Nosek, 2004, p. 901, emphasis added). In their review of 10 years of SJT research, Jost et al. (2004) cited substantial evidence for SJT’s outgroup favoritism hypothesis. This evidence took the form of finding outgroup-favoring attitudes among members of low-status minorities, sometimes assessed with unobtrusive “With malice toward none . . .” Draft of 9 November 2013 -17- behavioral indicators (Jost, Pelham, & Carvallo, 2002). Behavioral evidence of outgroup favoritism evidence was also obtained in some of the unobtrusive-measure studies of helping of the 1970s and in the more recent studies of tipping behavior. Although the first of the unobtrusive helping studies (Gaertner & Bickman, 1971) found (nonsignificantly) that Blacks helped Whites more than they helped fellow Blacks, subsequent replications did not show that pattern. On the other hand, the two tipping studies—by Ayres et al. (2005) with taxi passengers and by Lynn et al. (2006, 2008) with restaurant patrons—both found, consistent with SJT’s expectations, that Black customers gave larger tip percentages to White than to Black service providers. When, as theorized in SJT, favoritism thus extends to an advantaged outgroup, the consequence is to exacerbate the relative disadvantage of lower status groups. SJT thus explains an additional source of favoritism directed toward a society’s highest status groups. For a high status group that constitutes a societal minority, this second source explained by SJT might exceed ingroup favoritism as a basis for sustaining the group’s advantage. Unrecognized Discrimination and Illusory Individuation Learning about a person’s distinctive characteristics—“individuating” that person—is widely understood as a means of overcoming the disadvantaging effects of stereotypes (Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Kunda & Thagard, 1996; Locksley, Borgida, Brekke, & Hepburn, 1980). An unfamiliar person whose distinctive characteristics are unknown may be judged, unthinkingly, by applying stereotypes. However, knowing specific (individuating) characteristics of a person logically should pre-empt this use of stereotypes. This plausible theory notwithstanding, a series of studies conducted over the last thirty years has demonstrated that the expected reduction of stereotyping by individuation is rather easily thrown off track. Instead, stereotypes can insinuate themselves subtly into apparently individuated judgments that can prove disadvantageous to outgroup members. Darley and Gross (1983) found that their college-student subjects resisted applying stereotypes to judge the academic skills of a 9-year-old child (Hannah) for whom the only available information made clear that Hannah’s upbringing had been in either an impoverished or a well-to-do family environment. Perhaps the research setting put these subjects on alert not to “With malice toward none . . .” Draft of 9 November 2013 -18- let their knowledge of Hannah’s socioeconomic status influence their judgment of her academic skills. In two further conditions, subjects additionally observed a 12-minute videotape of Hannah’s responses to 25 ‘achievement-test’ questions. Her performance on these—showing Hannah giving a mixture of correct and incorrect responses—gave no clear impression of Hannah’s ability. Nevertheless, findings showed that, in these two individuated conditions, subjects interpreted the added information by applying social class stereotypes. They credited the well-to-do Hannah with having abilities at a higher grade level than the working-class Hannah. Exposure to the extra (presumably individuating) information apparently licensed subjects to apply stereotypes that they resisted applying when they had no opportunity to observe Hannah’s test performances. The process afforded by the videotape plausibly left subjects unaware that their knowledge of Hannah’s socioeconomic status had in any way affected their judgment. Yzerbyt, Schadron, Leyens, and Rocher (1994) conducted two experiments inspired by Darley and Gross’s (1983) finding. Remarkably, they found similarly that stereotype-confirming effects occurred even when subjects received no actual individuating information. Instead, they had merely been told that relevant information had been presented to one of their ears, outside of conscious awareness, in a selective listening (“shadowing”) task that required repeating an audible message presented to the other ear. Hodson, Dovidio, and Gaertner (2002) constructed a further variation on the use of illusory individuating information. They observed White subjects’ evaluations of two presumed college applicants, one White and one Black, whose qualifications differed. Although the two applicants were otherwise matched, one applicant was higher in high school grades and the other was higher on a standardized aptitude test. The two applicants therefore deserved, objectively, to be treated as approximately equally qualified. Hodson et al.’s noteworthy finding was that, in comparing the White and Black applicants, subjects who scored relatively high on a measure of prejudice attributed greater predictive weight to the measure on which the White applicant was superior. Again, this result reveals discrimination in the presence of actually uninformative, but presumably individuating, information. This discriminatory use of the information was apparent to experimenters who could compare the data from different conditions, but the subjects themselves had no basis for suspecting that stereotypes had influenced their judgments. “With malice toward none . . .” Draft of 9 November 2013 -19- Stronger biased-processing findings of the type obtained by Hodson et al. (2002) were obtained in subsequent studies by Norton, Vandello, and Darley (2004) and by Uhlmann and Cohen (2005). The biased processing observed in these studies was labeled variously hypothesis-confirming bias (Darley & Gross, 1983), social judgeability bias (Yzerbyt et al., 1994), differential weighting (Hodson et al., 2002), casuistry (Norton et al., 2004), and constructed criteria (Uhlmann & Cohen, 2005). These variations in labels notwithstanding, the several studies support each other in demonstrating the readiness with which people “engage in biased behavior while retaining a view of the self as objective” (Norton et al., 2004, p. 828). In each case the bias started with exposure to information that presumably afforded a basis for objective, individuated judgment, but was nevertheless used in biased fashion. These illusory individuation phenomena relate to this article’s main point in showing a subtle form of favoritism that can give the benefit of doubt to an ingroup member.5 Conformity to Social Norms Sociologists stress the importance of societal structures in producing intergroup discrimination (DiTomaso, 2012; Pettigrew, 1975; Pettigrew & Taylor, 2002). An important form of this theory is that historical realities such as past slavery and immigrant poverty are inevitably associated with differences in employment and wealth, and consequently with residential segregation. The resulting limitations of intergroup contact in turn provide a breeding ground for perceived differences that can take the form of stereotypes, intergroup threat, and wariness of the outgroup if not outright dislike (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2011). Just-world reasoning (Lerner, 1980) or “blaming the victim” (Ryan, 1976) can lead to perceiving the impoverished as deserving of their low status, in effect having brought their disadvantages on themselves. In this way, the residue of past discrimination can sustain and even exacerbate discrimination in a “vicious circle” (Myrdal, 1944). Sociologists appeal to norms, which are widely shared understandings of what constitutes acceptable social behavior. Both formal norms (e.g., a posted 65-mph automobile speed limit) 5 Norton et al.’s (2004) Studies 3–6 found that the majority of simulated college admissions choices by their (mostly White) subjects favored Black over White applicants. These decisions were clearly not ingroup-favoring. Nevertheless, Norton et al.’s findings agreed with the other studies in this collection by finding that subjects were highly flexible in their weighting of qualification criteria, with this flexibility serving to justify outgroup-favoring biased decisions based on knowledge of applicants’ racial categories. In non-laboratory settings in which those who make judgments do not expect that their judgments will be monitored by others, illusory individuated judgments may more consistently favor ingroup members. “With malice toward none . . .” Draft of 9 November 2013 -20- and informal norms (keeping to the right if driving below the speed limit) powerfully guide behavior (Pettigrew, 1991, 2011). Also important are rewards and punishments that may independently shape the norms (e.g., an enforced 75-mph limit on a highway with a posted 65- mph limit). Norms shape intergroup interaction and provide a common meaning to all participants in the interaction. Moreover, discriminatory norms are typically cumulative. That is, discriminatory norms build on themselves and tend to reinforce each other across societal realms. Thus, America’s extreme residential segregation by race shaped and continues to maintain racial discrimination in employment, schools, home mortgages, and civic services generally (Pettigrew, 1975; Pettigrew & Taylor, 2002). Norms are also self-perpetuating. They come in time to be unquestioned, to be accepted simply because “that’s just the way things are done” (Pettigrew, 1991, 1998). The persistence of norms means that their discriminatory effects can outlive the initiating past causes of discriminatory practices. Those who initiated the norms may have been motivated by hostile prejudice; but later generations can adhere to norms that benefit their ingroup without harboring the animosity felt by the norms’ creators. The result is that norms are likely to remain unchanged even while attitudes are shifting markedly. At present, in the midst of rapid formal change in intergroup relations in Northern Ireland, South Africa, and the southern United States, old norms are slowly receding while new equalitarian norms have yet to develop fully. In all three societies, reticence and awkwardness characterize intergroup interaction, often accompanied by intergroup avoidance and informal discrimination that occurs without hostile intent (see especially Dovidio & Gaertner’s analyses of aversive racism—e.g., Dovidio & Gaertner, 2004; also Pettigrew, 1991, 2011). Norms can be so unquestioned that people think and behave in conflicting ways in different social contexts, while remaining unaware of the inconsistency. At an Indiana steel mill in the 1950s, Blacks and Whites were members of the same racially desegregated union and worked well together (Reitzes, 1953; for a similar example, see Minard, 1952). Only 12% of the White workers reported low acceptance of African Americans on the job. Those most involved in the union were the strongest supporters of the union’s pro-desegregation norms. Yet these same White workers also lived in racially segregated, all-White neighborhoods and many belonged to activist pro-segregation neighborhood groups. Indeed, 84% of those who accepted African “With malice toward none . . .” Draft of 9 November 2013 -21- Americans at work were highly resistant to Blacks living in their neighborhoods. Those most involved with their neighborhoods were the most resistant to having Blacks as neighbors. The behavior in each setting favored the setting’s prominent ingroup—union solidarity at work, racial solidarity at home. Allport (1954) considered conformity an essential concept for understanding prejudice, devoting a full chapter of his classic volume to the subject. In a later article, Allport (1962) wrote that “Conformity is the missing link that explains why and how societal forces eventuate into patterns of acceptance or discrimination . . .” (p. 132). Thus, conformity research also supports our thesis. Relatively unprejudiced Americans typically follow their ingroup’s norms. If, as is typical, these norms demand preferential treatment of the ingroup, most people—like the Indiana steel workers—will conform without personal animus toward the outgroup. Method Limitations Discrimination has been investigated with a wide range of measures, including behavioral interactions (overt and nonverbal), behavioral intentions, interpersonal judgments, self-reported attitudes, and implicit attitudes—all of which we consider in this section. We will explain why most research procedures used in studies of prejudice are inadequate to distinguish ingroup favoritism from outgroup hostility as causes of discrimination. The consequence is that relatively few studies provide data optimal for evaluating the role of ingroup favoritism in discrimination. To distinguish ingroup favoritism from outgroup hostility as a cause of discrimination, a study must meet two requirements. First, the study’s measures must distinguish favorableness from hostility in thoughts, feelings, or behavior toward others. To do this a measure must have an unambiguous neutral point—a value that is neither favorable nor hostile. Second, the study must use a design that permits comparison between behavior toward ingroup members and behavior toward outgroup members. The first requirement is needed to distinguish favorable from hostile behavior. The second requirement is needed to assess whether discrimination has occurred. Only a small fraction of the many existing studies of intergroup behavior meet even one of these two criteria, and many lack both. Most of this section analyzes methods regarding “With malice toward none . . .” Draft of 9 November 2013 -22- the first requirement. Shortcomings regarding the second requirement are more easily and briefly described at the end of this section. Overt Behavior Measures Numerous experiments have investigated discrimination by using unobtrusive assessments of overt helping behavior (see the review by Crosby et al., 1980). These studies succeeded in unambiguously identifying favorable behavior, by scoring subjects simply as helping or as not helping (inaction). Inaction is neutral behavior and helping is positive. The studies have no hostile behavior option. Given the widespread understanding of prejudice as hostile behavior, one might expect that there must be many studies in which discrimination has been observed in the form of overtly hostile behavior toward members of an outgroup. In searching, we could find just seven laboratory studies in which discrimination was assessed using measures that appeared unambiguously to involve outgroup-directed hostile behavior. The behaviors were electric shock administration in six (Baron, 1979; Donnerstein & Donnerstein, 1972; Genthner & Taylor, 1973; Griffin & Rogers, 1970; Prentice–Dunn & Rogers, 1980; Rogers & Prentice–Dunn, 1981; Wilson & Rogers, 1975) and aversive noise administration in the seventh (Mummendey et al., 1992). The shock administration studies incorporated electric shock either as an outcome to be administered to another player in a competitive game or as an experimental stimulus to be presented for the ostensible purpose of increasing another subject’s heart rate. In most conditions of these studies, White subjects administered more shocks to Whites (i.e., to presumed ingroup members) than to Blacks.6 Experimenters interpreted this in terms of egalitarian norms and concerns about appearing prejudiced. In only one condition of one of these experiments did White subjects administer more shocks to another presumed subject who was Black than to one who was White. Contrary to researchers’ expectations, both in experiments with aversive shock and experiments with aversive noise stimuli, fairness (i.e., ingroup and outgroup receiving the same outcomes) prevailed in distributing the aversive outcomes. Accordingly, no evidence of outgroup hostility has been reported in experiments using unambiguously aversive stimuli. 6 Although the Black subjects of the Wilson and Rogers (1975) experiment chose higher intensity shocks to administer to (outgroup) White than to (ingroup) Black confederates, the product of intensity and shock duration measures revealed that they had chosen somewhat greater shocks for Black (ingroup) confederates. “With malice toward none . . .” Draft of 9 November 2013 -23- A famous early field experiment on prejudice also found no evidence for discrimination in a situation in which, had discrimination occurred, it would have had to take an overtly hostile form. LaPiere (1934) and two Chinese traveling companions toured the Southwestern United States, seeking housing and dining accommodations at 251 establishments. Face-to-face denial of service to potential customers is undeniably a hostile act. LaPiere and the Chinese couple were refused service only once. This result was in stark contrast with the finding that, in response to a subsequent mailed questionnaire, more than 90% of these same establishments reported that they would not accommodate “members of the Chinese race.” Nonverbal Behavior Measures One might expect that nonverbal measures, such as facial expressions, body orientation, and voice tone, can easily be classified into positive and negative categories. However, nonverbal measures rarely afford a clear neutral point. As one example, when the subject can position his or her chair at variable distances from a fellow participant, even though smaller distance translates unambiguously to greater positivity toward the other participant (cf. Amodio & Devine, 2006), it is not possible to identify a specific distance that can be scored as “neutral.” Measures of speaking time are similarly unambiguous in direction (more conversation is more favorable) but equally lack specifiable neutral values. Likewise, when measures of facial affect are being obtained (cf. McConnell & Leibold, 2001), it is difficult to score them so as to identify a neutral point. Problems come in combining multiple responses for a subject. Clearly, smiles cannot all be counted as equally positive nor frowns equally negative, and some of each might even be intended to communicate the opposite.7 Behavioral Intention Measures The procedure introduced by Tajfel et al., (1971) identifies an unambiguous neutral point when the measures involve distribution of payments to others. Neutral behavior takes the form of allocating a payment equal to the per-person average of available points or funds. Favoring (positive) and disfavoring (negative) behavior then takes the form of payment that falls, respectively, above or below that average level. LaPiere’s (1934) mailed questionnaire provides 7 The difficulty of characterizing nonverbal intergroup behavior unambiguously as positive or negative can be seen in some innovative studies in field settings that have demonstrated discrimination based on sexual orientation ( Hebl, Foster, Mannix, & Dovidio, 2002 ) and obesity ( King, Spiro, Hebl, Singletary, & Turner, 2006 ). “With malice toward none . . .” Draft of 9 November 2013 -24- another illustration of a behavioral intention measure—willingness or refusal to accept Chinese guests—that could be scored unambiguously as positive or negative.8 8 In the context of assessing favoritism, behavioral intention measures compare interestingly with overt behavior measures. Crosby et al. (1980) found that outgroup-directed helping was greater when White potential helpers were in face-to-face interaction with Black potential help recipients, compared to ‘remote’ situations in which the two were not face-to-face. Whites’ opposition to helping minorities expressed on surveys may be an analog of the low rate of helping found in the remote conditions of the unobtrusive-measure helping studies reviewed by Crosby et al. “With malice toward none . . .” Draft of 9 November 2013 -25- Interpersonal Judgment Measures Consider the judgment task of recommending a jail sentence for a convicted defendant for whom the available evidence indicates both guilt and mitigating circumstances. If the permissible sentence range is from a low of 6 months to a high of 5 years, it is clear that the shortest sentence is favorable and the longest sentence is unfavorable. But how can one identify an intermediate sentence term that is neutral—neither favorable nor hostile to the defendant? Furthermore, if the dependent measure is obtained as (say) a 7-point Likert-format judgment of endorsement of the maximum sentence, what level of agreement can be assumed to be neither favorable nor unfavorable to the defendant? This limitation can be overcome by providing the subject with information about an average sentence for the defendant’s circumstances, then requesting endorsement of either a shorter, equal or longer sentence. Self-report Attitude Measures Self-report attitude measures are easily constructed with neutral points, as with thermometer scales that have end anchors of warm (positive) and cold (negative) and a middle anchor of “neutral.” A useful alternative recommended by Gaertner et al. (1997) is to have separate rating scales for positive and negative traits, with the low anchor indicating absence of the trait. Using this method, Gaertner and McLaughlin (1983) and Dovidio et al. (1989) found that White subjects did not discriminate against Blacks on negative-trait scales; they rated Whites and Blacks equally on these. In contrast, they did discriminate on positive-trait scales (rating Whites higher than Blacks). This strong finding uncovers discriminatory judgment in the form of favoring the ingroup rather that disfavoring the outgroup. Implicit Attitude Measures For the most widely used implicit attitude measures, subjects make rapid classification responses to both valenced word stimuli and to images, words, or names that represent two contrasted categories, which can be an ingroup and outgroup, such as White and Black. These implicit measures generate relative-attitude scores that index greater favorability to one group than to the other (e.g., Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell & Kardes, 1986; Greenwald, McGhee & Schwartz, 1998). These measures often reveal evaluative separation between the two groups, but they do not unambiguously locate either group relative to a neutral point (i.e., a score that “With malice toward none . . .” Draft of 9 November 2013 -26- indicates neither positive nor negative evaluation). Some implicit measures may do a better job than others in distinguishing favorability from unfavorability in an absolute sense (e.g., Nosek & Banaji, 2001; Sriram & Greenwald, 2009), but even these measures are not established as having neutral zero points. Their zero points more confidently indicate indifference between the groups, which could mean that both groups are regarded equally positively or that they are regarded equally negatively. The “Second Requirement” Our treatment of method has to this point considered only the first requirement that we stated, which is to use measures of behavior or judgment that have an unambiguous neutral point. The second requirement is that the study must demonstrate discrimination by comparing behavior or judgments toward ingroup members versus outgroup members. To meet the second requirement at the individual-subject level requires a within-subjects design, in which each subject provides a measure for both ingroup and outgroup. Designs in which ingroup vs. outgroup is a between-subjects factor also permit assessment of discrimination, but not for individual subjects. For either type of design, determination of whether discrimination takes the form of ingroup favoritism or outgroup hostility can be had only if the first requirement (neutral point of dependent measure) is also met. The minimal group paradigm and studies that use unobtrusive measures of helping are the rare paradigms for which more than an occasional study meets both the neutral-point requirement and the ingroup–outgroup comparison requirement. Three Conclusions about Methods Methods Used in Most Studies of Discrimination Have Limited Capabilities Few studies in the voluminous research literature on prejudice and discrimination have used methods that can distinguish the relative roles of ingroup-favorable and outgroup-hostile behavior in producing discrimination. This could well be a consequence of the widespread (but, to us, incorrect) belief that discrimination most often occurs in the form of outgroup-directed hostility. When one makes this assumption, it might well appear unnecessary to investigate relative contributions of favoritism and hostility to discrimination. Most studies of discrimination address one of two other questions: (a) determining whether various experimental manipulations increase or reduce discrimination, or (b) determining whether various individual “With malice toward none . . .” Draft of 9 November 2013 -27- difference measures of prejudice successfully predict individual differences in discriminatory behavior. These aims do not require either of the two requirements for determining whether observed discrimination has resulted from ingroup favoritism or outgroup hostility. It is remarkable that relatively few studies have used dependent measures that assessed unequivocally hostile behavior. This paucity cannot be explained simply in terms of experimenters’ benevolence, because a paradigm involving aggression via (presumed) administration of electric shocks was widely used in the 1960s and 1970s (cf. Buss & Brock, 1963). The use of this well-known method in only six studies of race discrimination, during the same era in which more than 30 studies had investigated race discrimination in unobtrusive helping studies (Crosby et al. 1980), suggests that it may be much easier to observe discrimination in studies using unobtrusive measures of helping behavior than in studies that observe shock administration or other unequivocally hostile behavior. Balance of Findings with Existing Methods More studies have demonstrated discrimination resulting from ingroup favoritism than from outgroup hostility—an unexpected observation in light of the prevailing wisdom that discrimination typically occurs in the form of hostility directed toward outgroups. For whatever reason, it is apparently easier to demonstrate discrimination in the form of differential favoritism than in the form of differential hostility. The most plausible explanation is that, indeed, discrimination more often takes the form of ingroup favoritism than outgroup hostility. However, some portion of this imbalance in findings may also be due to the greater ease of meeting ethical research standards in laboratory studies using measures of benign behavior than in ones investigating hostile behavior. New Methods are Needed Prejudice researchers need to add methods to their toolboxes—methods that: (a) distinguish ingroup-favorable from outgroup-hostile subject behavior, (b) provide a comparison of outcomes to ingroup and outgroup members, and (c) are easy to administer in standardized form. Among existing laboratory methods, L. Gaertner and Insko’s (2001) multiple alternative matrices procedure for the minimal group paradigm comes closest to meeting this combination of requirements, but is not adapted to investigating face-to-face intergroup interactions. The most “With malice toward none . . .” Draft of 9 November 2013 -28- important method recommendation is to use measures—whether nonverbal, behavioral, self- report, or implicit—that have unambiguous neutral points to designate responses that are neither favoring nor hostile. Discussion We conclude that ingroup favoritism is currently more potent than outgroup hostility as a cause of intergroup discrimination in the United States. The support for this conclusion comes from multiple, well-established empirical paradigms, including laboratory studies of minimal group and similarity–attraction paradigms, field experiments using unobtrusive observations of helping behavior, and field audit studies of police profiling and of treatment accorded to potential job seekers, apartment renters, and home buyers. “With malice toward none . . .” Draft of 9 November 2013 -29- Two caveats to our conclusion are necessitated by the available research literature. First, many of the studies we cited involved race. It is conceivable that outgroup hostility may play a greater role in non-racial discrimination. Second, most of the studies we reviewed were conducted in the United States. Although conclusions based on these studies may also hold in other nations, it is premature to assume that the same will be found elsewhere—especially in locations such as Northern Ireland and South Africa, which have centuries-old histories of intergroup hostility and discrimination. Tests of the ingroup favoritism thesis in those countries should be highly informative. Pending broader investigations in other countries and with other forms of discrimination, our conclusion that ingroup favoritism enables discrimination should be regarded as most strongly established for Black–White racial discrimination in the United States. The Nature of the Evidence An obvious question prompted by our main conclusion is: Why is the ingroup-favoritism- enables-discrimination thesis not already generally accepted as a prime explanation of discrimination? If the evidence is so extensive and most of it has been available for at least a few decades, why have students of prejudice and discrimination not previously arrived at this conclusion? The answer has two parts. The more important part is that, through the history of prejudice’s scientific study, most researchers have defined and understood prejudice as an affectively negative outgroup-directed attitude that they expect to result in hostile acts of discrimination. That view was justified for a long time, but is now questionable given the societal transformations that have cumulatively produced dramatic reductions in both endorsements of negative attitudes toward minority groups and in hostile forms of discrimination. The second part is that—as explained in this article’s analysis of research methods—very few empirical studies of discrimination have used methods that can evaluate the relative contributions of ingroup favoritism and outgroup hostility to observed discrimination. “With malice toward none . . .” Draft of 9 November 2013 -30- Our conclusion about limitations of research methods makes a second question obvious: If methods to evaluate relative contributions of ingroup favoritism and outgroup hostility are so inadequate, how can we reach a strong conclusion about those relative contributions? The strategy of this article was to build its case by establishing three points. First, ingroup-directed positivity is pervasive and there is no comparable evidence for pervasiveness of outgroup- directed negativity. Second, discrimination frequently occurs in the form of differential favoring and there is no comparable evidence for discrimination occurring so frequently in the form of differential harming. Third, established theories offer multiple bases for understanding the development of positive regard for others—a point to which we next turn. Multiplicity of Explanations for Ingroup Favoritism “Societal factors... are distal causal factors in group relations. ...At the same time, the intervening factor of personality is ever the proximal cause of human conduct. . . . There are no good reasons for professional rivalry and backbiting among social scientists preferring one approach or the other. They can and should be blended in our outlook” (Allport, 1962, p. 132). This review has sought to establish that multiple theories, at both individual and societal levels, can explain the strength of ingroup favoritism. Allport’s observation about the synergy of theories applies not only to theories that fall on different sides of the disciplinary boundary between psychology and sociology, but equally to the sets of theories within each of those disciplines. Furthermore, the various theories most often do not conflict in their explanations. Rather, they offer multiple, complementary theoretical routes to the goal of understanding ingroup favoritism. Our focus on ingroup favoritism therefore affords a rapprochement among social psychology’s person-centered explanations and other social sciences’ social structure- centered explanations. We do not claim that hostile prejudice plays no role in discrimination. However, we do claim that much discrimination occurs without hostile intent; it occurs either as a consequence of social structures (such as the self-sustaining properties of segregation in schools, homes, workplaces, and institutional discrimination) or as a consequence of mental processes that lack animus (such as norms, similarity–attraction, and the judgment processes that we labeled illusory individuation). “With malice toward none . . .” Draft of 9 November 2013 -31- A common denominator in these discrimination-producing societal and mental processes is that, without engaging outgroup-directed hostility, they all tend to result in favoring already advantaged groups. In this way, discriminatory outcomes will often occur without the intergroup animus that, traditionally, has been a defining feature of prejudice. We do not suggest that prejudice should therefore be re-conceived without reference to hostility. That would be too radical a conclusion from our observations, especially because we are not inclined to claim that it has always been thus. The important, and perhaps no-less radical, conclusion is that in contemporary American society intergroup discrimination has a potent life that now can occur without intergroup hostility. Has there been a Decline of Malice? Although much societally significant discrimination continues to occur in hostile forms, it is even more apparent that hostile acts of race discrimination in the United States have steadily declined during the past century. Perhaps the most dramatic indication of decline is evident in data concerning lynchings. Lynchings—which were group killings of (mostly) Black Americans —declined from an average of 150 per year in the late 19th century to disappearance in the 1950s (“4,733 Mob Action Victims Since ’82, Tuskegee Reports”, 1959). A second compelling source of evidence is much more recent: In 1996, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) started compiling data on hate crimes.9 Hate crimes targeting Black victims declined steadily from an average of 4,071 per year in 1996–1998 to 2,762 per year in 2009–2011. As percentages of the United States Black population in 2000 and 2010, the percentages of Blacks who were victims of hate crimes had declined (between 1999–2001 and 2009–2011) by a third, from 0.030% to 0.020%. Implications Our strong conclusion is that, in present-day America, discrimination results more from helping ingroup members than from harming outgroup members. This conclusion has substantial implications for the conduct of research on discrimination, for the teaching of prejudice and discrimination, and for the design of programs to reduce discrimination. Because the implications for research and teaching both follow from the potential importance of the conclusion for practical application, this section focuses on the implications for practice. 9 Annual counts of multiple categories of hate crimes for 1996 through 2011 are available (at http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/hate-crime). “With malice toward none . . .” Draft of 9 November 2013 -32- Our conclusion adds force to the approach of Gaertner and Dovidio (2000), who emphasized the possible discrimination-reducing impact of forming “superordinate” identities, which extend ingroup boundaries and thereby increase the diversity of others who are encompassed within the ingroup fold. Our conclusion also suggests a quite different approach to discrimination reduction: Adopting policies of targeted outgroup-helping, in effect seeking to level the ingroup- favoritism playing field. This suggestion fits with affirmative action strategies that aim to increase benefits to disadvantaged minorities or to groups regarded as under-represented in workplaces and selective educational institutions. Relatedly, DiTomaso (2012) observed that resistance to affirmative action programs has at least a partial explanation in affirmative action’s disruption of routine forms of ingroup favoritism, which include seeking friends to fill job vacancies and admitting “legacy” applicants to elite educational institutions. In regard to employment discrimination, the courts provide opportunities for discrimination- reduction that depend not on intergroup attitudes and behavior, but on judges’ interpretations of law. It is therefore relevant to ask whether establishment of the potency of ingroup favoritism as a source of discrimination might affect efforts to reduce discrimination via litigation. Krieger (1998) pointed out that federal courts’ interpretations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 made it difficult for discrimination suits to succeed on the argument that plaintiff employees in protected classes were adversely impacted by ingroup favoritism that benefited others. By way of contrast with the situation when Krieger was writing in 1998, a 2012 federal court decision permitted a case based on an ingroup favoritism theory of discrimination to proceed. If the 2012 decision presages a future legal environment in which discrimination suits appealing to ingroup favoritism will generally be allowed to proceed, this article’s conclusions may prove useful to the courts deciding those cases.10 10 The contrast of two federal court opinions in 1993 and 2012 signals a change of direction regarding ingroup favoritism. The 1993 opinion, in the case of E.E.O.C. v. Consolidated Service Systems , declared that if a hiring policy “produce[s] a work force whose racial or religious or ethnic or nation-origin or gender composition pleases the employer, this is not intentional discrimination. The motive is not a discriminatory one”. The 2012 opinion, in the case of McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch , concluded that the defendant company might have discriminated by allowing a form of company-wide ingroup favoritism involving teams of brokers that could choose to exclude African American brokers: “The teams . . . are little fraternities [in which] the brokers choose as team members people who are like themselves. If they are white, they, or some of them anyway, are more comfortable teaming with other white brokers.” Especially noteworthy regarding these two opinions is that they were written by the same federal judge. “With malice toward none . . .” Draft of 9 November 2013 -33- A provocative recent article by Dixon et al. (2012) started, as we did, from observing that current conceptions may incorrectly link discrimination primarily to negative intergroup attitudes. Dixon et al. proceeded to conclude that collective political action by historically disadvantaged groups might be more efficacious in ending discrimination than efforts directed at increasing positivity toward outgroups.11 In closing, we must counter any impression that we regard favoritism as the only cause of discrimination worthy of scholarly attention. Although hostile forms of discrimination have declined steadily during the period in which prejudice has been studied scientifically, hostile discrimination nevertheless continues to exist in many forms, including racial and ethnic slurs, hostile work environments, hate crimes, and terrorism. At the same time, legal, ethical, and normative constraints against hostile discrimination now widely prevail in the United States, and there are few parallel constraints against forms of favoritism that can generate extensive discrimination. As ethnic and racial minorities become increasingly represented in American work settings, it is plausible that opportunities for favoritism to produce significant discrimination may even be increasing. 11 See Pettigrew and Tropp, 2011, for an alternate perspectivc on the conclusions reached by Dixon et al. 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Group Processes & Intergroup Relations, 4, 271-289. Thurstone, L. L. (1928). An experimental study of nationality preferences. Journal of General Psychology, 1, 405–425. Triandis, H. C. (1961). A note on Rokeach’s theory of prejudice. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 62, 184-186. Triandis, H. C., & Davis, E. E. (1965). Race and belief as determinants of behavioral intentions. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 2, 715-725. Turner, M. A., Ross, S. L., Galster, G. C., & Yinger, J. (2002). Discrimination in metropolitan housing markets: National results from Phase I HDS 2000. Washington, DC: Urban Institute. Turner, J. C., Hogg, M. A., Oakes, P. J., Reicher, S. D. & Wetherell, M. S. (1987). Rediscovering the social group: A self-categorization theory. Oxford: Blackwell. Uhlmann, E. L., & Cohen, G. L. (2005). Constructed Criteria: Redefining Merit to Justify Discrimination. Psychological Science, 16, 474–480. Verniero, P., & Zoubek, P. H. (1999). Interim report of the state police review team regarding allegations of racial profiling. Paper presented at the Race, Police and the Community Conference sponsored by the Criminal Justice Institute of Harvard Law School, December 7– 9, 2000, Cambridge, MA. Wagner, U., Christ, O., & Pettigrew, T. F. (2008). Prejudice and group-related behavior in Germany. Journal of Social Issues, 64 (2), 403–416. Weiss, A., & Rosenbaum, D. P. (2009). Illinois traffic stops statistics study: 2008 annual report. Center for Research in Law and Justice, University of Illinois at Chicago. Downloaded from www.dot.state.il.us/travelstats/ITSS 2008 Annual Report.pdf. Wilson, L., & Rogers, R. W. (1975). The fire this time: Effects of race of target, insult, and potential retaliation on black aggression. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1975, 32, 857–864. “With malice toward none . . .” Draft of 9 November 2013 -43- Yzerbyt, V. Y., Schadron, G., Leyens, J.-P., & Rocher, S. (1994). 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(1939, p. 152) Race prejudice, according to the present view, is a form of aggression Allport (1954, p. 9) an antipathy based upon a faulty and inflexible generalization Secord & Backman (1964, p. 413) an attitude that predisposes a person to think, perceive, feel, and act in favorable or unfavorable ways toward a group or its individual members Jones (1972, p. 61) an unjustified negative attitude towards an individual based solely on that individual’s membership in a group Baron & Byrne (1974, p. 218) Prejudice refers to a special type of attitude—generally a negative one— toward the members of some social group Tajfel (1982, p. 3) a favorable or unfavorable predisposition toward any member of the category in question Simpson & Yinger (1985, p. 21) an emotional, rigid attitude (a predisposition to respond to a certain stimulus in a certain way) toward a group of people Aronson (1988. p.231) a hostile or negative attitude toward a distinguishable group based on generalizations derived from faulty or incomplete information Baron & Graziano (1991, p 526) negative attitudes toward members of social groups Brigham (1991, p. 459) a negative attitude that is considered to be unjustified by an observer Smith (1993, p. 304) a social emotion experienced with respect to one’s social identity as a group member, with an outgroup as a target Stephan & Stephan (1993, p. 125) negative evaluations of social groups Brewer & Crano (1994, p. 464) negative affect directed toward all members of a specific social category Taylor, Peplau, & Sears (1994, p. 216) negative evaluations toward the outgroup Lippa (1994, p. 272) negative attitude that is based on another person’s membership in a social group Brown (1995, p.8) the holding of derogatory social attitudes or cognitive beliefs, the expression of negative affect or the display of hostile or discriminatory behaviour towards members of a group on account of their membership of that group Myers (1995, p. G– 10) an unjustifiable (and usually negative) attitude toward a group and its members [involving] stereotyped beliefs, negative feelings, and a predisposition to discriminatory action Smith & Mackie (1995, p. 170) a positive or negative evaluation of a social group and its members Feagin & Feagin (1996, p. 504) an antipathy, felt or expressed, based upon a faulty generalization and directed toward a group as a whole or toward individual members of a group “With malice toward none . . .” Draft of 9 November 2013 -45- Franzoi (1996, p. 386) a negative attitude directed toward people simply because they are members of a specific social group Stangor (2000, p. 1) a negative feeling or attitude toward the members of a group Nelson (2002, p. 11) an evaluation (positive or negative) [and] a biased perception of a group . . . based on the real or imagined characteristics of the group Eagly & Diekman (2005, p. 31) the relative devaluation in specific role contexts of members of a particular group compared to equivalent members of other groups Aronson, Wilson, & Akert (2012, p. 362) a hostile or negative attitude toward people in a distinguishable group, based solely on their membership in that group 
work_bsljqpgoxfd6hjmcuo3xceuzwi	----	Fighting impunity in hate crime — history, ethics, and the law: An interview with Harsh Mander Vol.:(0123456789) Jindal Global Law Review (2020) 11(1):157–179 https://doi.org/10.1007/s41020-020-00118-1 1 3 INTERVIEW Fighting impunity in hate crime — history, ethics, and the law: An interview with Harsh Mander M Mohsin Alam Bhat1 Published online: 20 August 2020 © O.P. Jindal Global University (JGU) 2020 Abstract This interview with writer and activist Harsh Mander was conducted on 21 and 23 April 2020 while numerous instances of hate crime, during the severe COVID-19 lockdown, were coming to light. This came on the heels of the popular protests against the Citizenship Amendment Act, 2019, and the February 2020 violence in Delhi. The interview situates the present moment, tying together history, socio-legal assessments of sectarian violence, evaluation of legal reform, and the ethics of anti- hate activism. First, Mander draws from his extensive experience — as a former bureaucrat, anti-hate advocate, and legal activist — to offer the larger historical trajectory of sectarian violence in India. His account highlights the role of the ris- ing majoritarian state ideology in facilitating and celebrating sectarian hostilities. He also develops an account of how we should understand the social and personal harms of mass violence and the phenomenon of lynching. Second, he discusses the contentious question of legal reform for ending impunity in hate crime cases. Spe- cifically, he notes the problem of state complicity in violence and the failed attempts to legislate an anti-communal violence law. Third, he elaborates on the protracted challenges of building viable strategies of litigation in the aftermath of sectar- ian violence. He evaluates Nyayagraha (literally meaning struggle for justice), his unique experiment after the 2002 Gujarat pogrom based on an ethical practice for legal justice. Keywords Communal riots · Hate crimes · Displacement · Impunity · Community justice * M Mohsin Alam Bhat mabhat@jgu.edu.in 1 Jindal Global Law School, O.P. Jindal Global University, Sonipat, India http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1007/s41020-020-00118-1&domain=pdf 158 Jindal Global Law Review (2020) 11(1):157–179 1 3 1 Introduction My first introduction to Harsh Mander was as the chronicler of India’s marginalised. Excerpts from his book Unheard Voices1 were part of the course on law and poverty offered by Professor Amita Dhanda.2 The book offered a window into the lives of the victims of caste and communal violence, hunger and poverty, sexual violence, and human-made calamities. Ironically, for many of the future lawyers in the class- room, these unusual readings in an unconventional law school course were the most memorable pedagogical experiences. The course was perhaps the first time many of us — mostly privileged, English-speaking, and urban law students — were exposed to the realities of our country. Personally for me, it was also the first time that I truly appreciated the Janus-faced nature of the law. It was a tool of oppression that often hid power and hierarchy. But it was also a formidable instrument of resistance. Mander quit the prestigious Indian Administrative Services (IAS) — the elite bureaucratic services in India — in response to the State’s complicity in the 2002 Gujarat riots. Years later, when I had the opportunity to work with him, Mander told me that many of his friends — all highly educated and liberal — distanced themselves from him. They thought Mander’s public repudiation was a misplaced provocation. In response, he spent the next many months in Gujarat building Nyaya- graha — a widely noted collaborative experiment for legal justice in communal riots cases.3 Nyayagraha succeeded in getting the Supreme Court to reopen more than 2000 cases that the Gujarat police had summarily closed without any prosecution.4 Mander has continued to chronicle the tragedy of sectarian violence in Gujarat, the seemingly insurmountable barriers to justice, and the social and political con- sequences for the country. In 2017, Mander — along with a number of senior aca- demics, journalists, and activists — inaugurated Karwan-e-Mohabbat (Caravan of Love).5 Karwan visited the victims and survivors of lynching, offered solidarity and legal support, and chronicled what looked like a rising tide of hate crime in the country. In December 2019, the Indian Parliament passed the Citizenship Amendment Act, 2019, which for the first time in the Republic’s history incorporated a  reli- gious test for citizenship. For many, this was a great betrayal of India’s secular and 1 Harsh Mander, Unheard Voices: Stories of Forgotten Lives (Penguin India 2001). 2 Professor Amita Dhanda teaches at the National Academy of Legal Studies and Research (NALSAR), Hyderabad. See NALSAR University of Law, ‘Amita Dhanda’. https ://www.nalsa r.ac.in/amita -dhand a. Accessed 20 July 2020. 3 Harsh Mander, Towards Healing? Seeking Paths for Justice and Reconciliation in Gujarat (WISCOMP 2008). 4 See National Human Rights Commission v State of Gujarat and Others Criminal Miscellaneous Peti- tion No.  3741 of 2004 in Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 109 of 2003. Also see  Harsh Mander, ‘From Godhra to Una: The Face of the Gujarat Riots Has Attached His Name to the Dalit Cause’ (Scroll.in, 28 August 2016). https ://scrol l.in/artic le/81391 9/from-godhr a-to-una-the-face-of-the-gujar at-riots -has-attac hed-his-name-to-the-dalit -cause . Accessed 15 July 2020. 5 See Karwan-e-Mohabbat, ‘About Us’. https ://karwa nemoh abbat .in/about /. Accessed 20 July 2020. https://www.nalsar.ac.in/amita-dhanda https://scroll.in/article/813919/from-godhra-to-una-the-face-of-the-gujarat-riots-has-attached-his-name-to-the-dalit-cause https://scroll.in/article/813919/from-godhra-to-una-the-face-of-the-gujarat-riots-has-attached-his-name-to-the-dalit-cause https://karwanemohabbat.in/about/ 159 1 3 Jindal Global Law Review (2020) 11(1):157–179 inclusive Constitution.6 Within weeks, an ocean of peaceful protests erupted across the country. Protestors — led by old and young Muslim women — held the national flag and sang the national anthem, asserting their national belonging as equal citi- zens. Mander became one of the definitive faces of the protests. The inspiring protests were soon broken — first by COVID-19 and then by the horrifying backlash in the form of the violence in Delhi in February 2020. In June 2020, the Delhi Police named Mander in the charge sheet of one of the riot cases. While at the time of writing the police had not named Mander as an accused, the charge sheet appeared to suggest that Mander’s speech during the protests incited violence.7 Ironically, this is how Mander had ended the speech to the protestors, … We have only one answer to their hatred, and that answer is love. They will cause violence, they will incite us to violence, but we will never commit violence. Please understand that it is their ploy to incite you to vio- lence. If we respond with violence, we will create 2% violence and they will respond with 100% violence. We have learnt from Gandhi what violence and injustice can do. Most importantly, we have to fight with non-violence. Anyone who incites you to violence and hatred is not a friend of yours. I will raise a slogan now: The Constitution [crowd responds] Long live8 2 Interview M Mohsin Alam Bhat (MAB): I looked back at your large body of work — your written academic prose, and popular pieces as an advocate and human rights activ- ist. One of the most iconic is ‘Cry, The Beloved Country’ that you wrote after the 2002 Gujarat pogrom.9 You began that essay with a striking sentence that suggested a sense of aching, tragedy, and responsibility. You wrote, ‘My heart is sickened, my 6 See Niraja Gopal Jayal, ‘Citizenship Amendment Act: ‘Principle of Discrimination Based on Faith will be Difficult to Limit’’ (The Indian Express, 24 December 2019). https ://india nexpr ess.com/artic le/expla ined/india n-const ituti on-citiz enshi p-amend ment-act-modi-govt-61817 61/. Accessed 20 July 2020. 7 Sruthisagar Yamunan, ‘Delhi Violence: In One Charge Sheet, Police Claim Muslim Protestors Pro- voked Riots’ (Scroll.in, 10 June 2020). https ://scrol l.in/artic le/96404 2/delhi -viole nce-in-one-charg e-sheet -polic e-claim -musli m-prote stors -provo ked-riots . Accessed 20 July 2020; Sarim Naved, ‘The Good, Bad and Ugly of the Delhi Police Riot Chargesheets’ (The Wire, 24 June 2020). https ://thewi re.in/commu nalis m/the-good-bad-and-ugly-of-the-delhi -polic e-riot-charg eshee ts. Accessed 20 July 2020. 8 Original in Hindi. For the original speech as well its English translation, see The Wire Staff, ‘‘Con- stitution, Love, Ahimsa’: Harsh Mander’s Speech Which Centre Now Claims ‘Incited Violence’’ (The Wire, 5 March 2020). https ://thewi re.in/right s/harsh -mande r-jamia -speec h-supre me-court -full-trans latio n. Accessed 20 July 2020. 9 Harsh Mander, ‘Cry, The Beloved Country: Reflections on the Gujarat Massacre by a Serving IAS Officer’ (Outlook, 19 March 2002). https ://www.outlo okind ia.com/websi te/story /cry-the-belov ed-count ry/21494 4. Accessed 12 July 2020. https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/indian-constitution-citizenship-amendment-act-modi-govt-6181761/ https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/indian-constitution-citizenship-amendment-act-modi-govt-6181761/ https://scroll.in/article/964042/delhi-violence-in-one-charge-sheet-police-claim-muslim-protestors-provoked-riots https://scroll.in/article/964042/delhi-violence-in-one-charge-sheet-police-claim-muslim-protestors-provoked-riots https://thewire.in/communalism/the-good-bad-and-ugly-of-the-delhi-police-riot-chargesheets https://thewire.in/communalism/the-good-bad-and-ugly-of-the-delhi-police-riot-chargesheets https://thewire.in/rights/harsh-mander-jamia-speech-supreme-court-full-translation https://thewire.in/rights/harsh-mander-jamia-speech-supreme-court-full-translation https://www.outlookindia.com/website/story/cry-the-beloved-country/214944 https://www.outlookindia.com/website/story/cry-the-beloved-country/214944 160 Jindal Global Law Review (2020) 11(1):157–179 1 3 soul wearied, my shoulders aching with the burdens of guilt and shame.’10 What is your assessment of how the conversation around sectarian violence, hate crime, and impunity has evolved since then? How would you place the current moment in the longer history of sectarian violence in India? Harsh Mander (HM): I think the movement for the demolition of the Babri Masjid and its actual demolition marks a very decisive shift.11 It was a shift not only in the conversations and sensitivity about the pattern of violence, but also in the operational idea of a secular democratic country that guarantees equal rights, respect, security, and participation for religious minorities in letter and spirit. Since the demolition of the Babri Masjid, there has been a continuous decline. 2002 was a very important milestone in that journey, which also led me in my personal life to move out of the government to join this battle as an independent citizen. There has been an increasing decline in multiple ways. There is growing normalisation of hate speech, violence, and everyday discrimination in society, and by the State and all its institutions, including the judiciary. Many moments — 1989 when the Babri Mas- jid issue was politicised, 1992 when the Masjid was demolished, the 2002 Gujarat massacre, the 2014 Muzaffarnagar violence in Uttar Pradesh, the 2012 Kokrajhar violence in Assam, the 2008 violence against Christians in Kandhamal in Odisha — were key milestones. But the 2014 and 2019 national elections represent a very decisive and precipitous decline in the lived reality of the religious minorities, par- ticularly the Muslims, and also to some degree the Indian Christians. The everyday normalisation and routinisation of hate violence and hate speech, I think, suggests that there has been a steady decline. In terms of the history of sectarian violence, we need to go further back. I would interpret this history as four stages of communal violence.12 The Partition in 1947 was a dystopian time in our history. Millions of people died in the Hindu-Muslim riots in its aftermath. It was Mahatma Gandhi’s resolve that India would belong equally to both Hindu and Muslim citizens. His last fast before his assassination was an extraordinarily important moment. A few months before he died, he told some- one that his work would not be complete until Muslims would be able to walk with- out fear in their heart in Delhi and the country.13 His last fast included the demand 13 This is a reference to a speech given by Gandhi on 13 January 1948 at the prayer meeting in Delhi while he was fasting for peace in the city. Gandhi said, ‘I shall terminate the fast only when peace has returned to Delhi. If peace is restored to Delhi it will have effect not only on the whole of India but also on Pakistan and when that happens, a Muslim can walk around in the city all by himself. I shall then terminate the fast…So my wish is that Hindus, Sikhs, Parsis, Christians and Muslims who are in India should continue to live in India and India should become a country where everyone’s life and property are safe. Only then will India progress.’ See Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi, vol 98, 227. https :// 10 ibid. 11 For the antecedents and implications of the Hindu nationalist Ayodhya movement for the demolition of the Babri mosque, see Thomas Blom Hansen, The Saffron Wave: Democracy and Hindu Nationalism in Modern India (Princeton University Press 1999) 154-199. 12 For some key literature on the subject, see Paul R  Brass, The Production of Hindu-Muslim Violence in Contemporary India (University of Washington Press 2003); Ashutosh Varshney, Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life: Hindus and Muslims in India (Yale University Press 2002); Steven I Wilkinson,  Votes and Violence: Electoral Competition and Ethnic Riots in India (Cambridge University Press 2004); Asghar Ali Engineer (ed) Communal Riots in Post-Independence India (Sangam Books 1984). https://www.gandhiashramsevagram.org/gandhi-literature/collected-works-of-mahatma-gandhi-volume-1-to-98.php 161 1 3 Jindal Global Law Review (2020) 11(1):157–179 for restoring the places of worship that had been taken away by the rioters from the Muslims and converted into Hindus temples. He also demanded the return of the homes and properties Muslims lost during the riots. His was a battle for equal rights in every respect in our country, based on equality and true fraternity. I think his assassination was the turning point. After that, the Constituent Assembly that drafted the Indian constitution included very strong protections for the minorities.14 It looked like the question had been resolved, and the Rashtriya Swayamsewak Sangh (RSS) and the Hindu Mahasabha went into the shadows of Indian public life. And of course, there was also the leadership of Jawahar Lal Nehru in the first decade and a half. The first major incident of communal violence in independent India happened in 1961 towards the last part of Nehru’s life.15 The first days of communal violence from 1961 to 1983 led to considerable loss of life and property for Muslims. To some extent, they were in the nature of riots. There was some degree of loss of life of the Hindu community as well, although the proportion was much higher for the minority Muslims. 1983 saw the Nellie massacre that was a completely one-sided killing — and a very brutal one — of Muslims in Assam.16 1984 saw the anti-Sikh massacre in Delhi and other parts of the country.17 There were many other epi- sodes of communal violence, including in Bhagalpur.18 After the demolition of the Babri Masjid, massive communal massacres were witnessed in places like Bombay (now Mumbai) and Bhopal.19 And then, we had communal violence in 2002.20 This 14 For a discussion of the Constituent Assembly and the drafting of the Constitution, see Granville Aus- tin, The Indian Constitution: Cornerstone of a Nation (Oxford University Press 1999). 15 The first major communal riot in post-colonial India occurred in the town of Jabalpur in the state of Madhya Pradesh in 1961. See Christophe Jaffrelot, The Hindu Nationalist Movement and Indian Politics: 1925 to the 1990s: Strategies of Identity-Building, Implantation and Mobilisation (With Special Refer- ence to Central India) (C Hurst & Co 1996) 166. 16 See Makiko Kimura,  The Nellie Massacre of 1983: Agency of Rioters (SAGE Publications India 2013). 17 See Virginia van Dyke, ‘The Anti-Sikh Riots of 1984 in Delhi: Politicians, Criminals, and the Dis- course of Communalism’ in Paul R Brass (ed),  Riots and Pogroms (Palgrave Macmillan 1996). Also see Justice GT Nanavati, Report of the Justice Nanavati Commission of Inquiry (1984 Anti-Sikh Riots): Volumes I and II (2005). 18 See Asghar Ali Engineer, ‘Bhagalpur Riot Inquiry Commission Report’ (1995) 30(28) Economic and Political Weekly 1729; Warisha Farasat, ‘The Forgotten Carnage of Bhagalpur’ (2013) 48(3) Economic and Political Weekly 34. 19 See Asghar Ali Engineer, ‘Bombay Shames India’ (1993) 28(3) Economic and Political Weekly 81; State Bureau Reports, ‘Babri Masjid Demolition Aftermath: Religious Hatred Engulfs India, Over 1,000 People Die’ (India Today, 31 December 1992). https ://www.india today .in/magaz ine/cover -story /story /19921 231-babri -masji d-demol ition -after math-relig ious-hatre d-engul fs-india -over-1000-peopl e-die- 76731 3-2012-12-21. Accessed 13 July 2020. 20 For studies on the 2002 Gujarat pogrom, see Achyut Yagnik and Suchitra Sheth, ‘Whither Gujarat? Violence and After’ (2002) 37(11) Economic and Political Weekly 1009. www.gandh iashr amsev agram .org/gandh i-liter ature /colle cted-works -of-mahat ma-gandh i-volum e-1-to-98. php. Accessed 12 July 2020. Footnote 13 (continued) https://www.indiatoday.in/magazine/cover-story/story/19921231-babri-masjid-demolition-aftermath-religious-hatred-engulfs-india-over-1000-people-die-767313-2012-12-21 https://www.indiatoday.in/magazine/cover-story/story/19921231-babri-masjid-demolition-aftermath-religious-hatred-engulfs-india-over-1000-people-die-767313-2012-12-21 https://www.indiatoday.in/magazine/cover-story/story/19921231-babri-masjid-demolition-aftermath-religious-hatred-engulfs-india-over-1000-people-die-767313-2012-12-21 https://www.gandhiashramsevagram.org/gandhi-literature/collected-works-of-mahatma-gandhi-volume-1-to-98.php https://www.gandhiashramsevagram.org/gandhi-literature/collected-works-of-mahatma-gandhi-volume-1-to-98.php 162 Jindal Global Law Review (2020) 11(1):157–179 1 3 spans a period of large one-sided communal massacres very much in the nature of pogroms.21 This marks the second phase. After the 2002 pogrom, a large number of human rights organisations felt that this was a turning point in our history. They knew that if they do not fight back, we would lose everything we had fought for in the secular imagination. There was a lot of concerted action. There was the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) and the Supreme Court.22 There was far more active media reporting about what had happened.23 In the end, it is true that Mr. Narendra Modi and indeed a range of police officers and the others guilty could not be substantially punished.24 Most of the cases have not been successful.25 But there was still enough action to make this kind of communal massacre very costly for those who led them. Mr. Modi was denied a visa from the United States (US) in this entire period and in fact by most European countries.26 He was a pariah. 21 For an accessible list of major incidents of communal violence till the mid-1980s, see Violette Graff and Juliette Galonnier, ‘Hindu-Muslim Communal Riots In India I (1947-1986)’ (SciencesPo, 15 July 2013). https ://www.scien cespo .fr/mass-viole nce-war-massa cre-resis tance /en/docum ent/hindu -musli m-commu nal-riots -india -i-1947-1986.html#:~:text=1961%3B%20Feb ruary %204%E2%80%939%3A%20 Jab alpur %20(Madhy a%20Pra desh)&text=The%20fir st%20maj or%2Dsca le%20rio t,the%20sta te%20 of%20Mad hya%20Pra desh. Accessed 13 July 2020. For major incidents of communal violence from 1986, see Violette Graff and Juliette Galonnier, ‘Hindu-Muslim Communal Riots In India II (1986- 2011)’ (SciencesPo, 20 August 2013). https ://www.scien cespo .fr/mass-viole nce-war-massa cre-resis tance /en/docum ent/hindu -musli m-commu nal-riots -india -ii-1986-2011.html. Accessed 13 July 2020. In 2007, the central government constituted National Integration Council published a report studying the inquiry commission reports for major communal riots; see Ministry of Home Affairs, Report of Working Group of National Integration Council to Study Reports of the Commissions of Inquiry on Communal Riots (2007). 22 The 2001-2002 Annual Report of the NHRC detailed the proceedings wherein the Commission had taken suo motu cognisance of the human rights situation in Gujarat and gave specific recommendation to prevent communal violence from being re-ignited. See NHRC, ‘Proceedings of the Commission on Gujarat’ in National Human Rights Commission Annual Report 2001-2002 (2002) 268-319. For an account of the steps taken by the Supreme Court in the interest of justice for the victims of Gujarat 2002, see Christophe Jaffrelot, ‘Gujarat 2002: What Justice for the Victims? The Supreme Court, the SIT, the Police and the State Judiciary’ (2012) 47(8) Economic and Political Weekly 77, 81-84. 23 For the ‘stupendous’ coverage of Gujarat 2002, see Saifuddin Ahmed, ‘The Role of the Media dur- ing Communal Riots in India: A Study of the 1984 Sikh Riots and the 2002 Gujarat Riots’ (2010) 37(2) Media Asia 103, 106-108. 24 For an account of the mixed judicial record in convicting those accused in Gujarat 2002, see Mahesh Langa, ‘Justice Nanvati-Mehta Commission Gives Clean Chit to Narendra Modi in 2002 Gujarat Riots’ The Hindu (Ahmedabad, 11 December 2019). https ://www.thehi ndu.com/news/natio nal/2002-gujar at- riots -state -govt-to-table -justi ce-nanav ati-mehta -commi ssion -repor t-in-assem bly-today /artic le302 74396 .ece. Accessed 13 July 2020; Scroll Staff, ‘2002 Gujarat Riots: 17 Convicts Get Bail in Sardarpura Mas- sacre, Asked to do Social, Spiritual Work’ (Scroll.in, 28 January 2020). https ://scrol l.in/lates t/95134 9/2002-gujar at-riots -sc-grant s-bail-to-14-convi cts-in-sarda rpura -massa cre-case. Accessed 13 July 2020. 25 To understand why the ‘results of judicial proceedings are very few’ in relation to Gujarat 2002, see Jaffrelot (n 22). 26 James Mann, ‘Why Narendra Modi Was Banned from the U.S.’ (The Wall Street Journal, 2 May 2014). https ://www.wsj.com/artic les/why-naren dra-modi-was-banne d-from-the-u-s-13990 62010 . Accessed 15 July 2020; Ross Colvin, ‘Quiet Lunch Shatters EU Boycott of Narendra Modi’ (Reuters, 8 February 2013). https ://in.reute rs.com/artic le/india -naren dra-modi-eu/quiet -lunch -shatt ers-eu-boyco tt-of- naren dra-modi-idIND EE917 07X20 13020 8. Accessed 15 July 2020. https://www.sciencespo.fr/mass-violence-war-massacre-resistance/en/document/hindu-muslim-communal-riots-india-i-1947-1986.html#:%7e:text%3d1961%253B%20February%204%25E2%2580%25939%253A%20Jabalpur%20(Madhya%20Pradesh)%26text%3dThe%20first%20major%252Dscale%20riot%2cthe%20state%20of%20Madhya%20Pradesh https://www.sciencespo.fr/mass-violence-war-massacre-resistance/en/document/hindu-muslim-communal-riots-india-i-1947-1986.html#:%7e:text%3d1961%253B%20February%204%25E2%2580%25939%253A%20Jabalpur%20(Madhya%20Pradesh)%26text%3dThe%20first%20major%252Dscale%20riot%2cthe%20state%20of%20Madhya%20Pradesh https://www.sciencespo.fr/mass-violence-war-massacre-resistance/en/document/hindu-muslim-communal-riots-india-i-1947-1986.html#:%7e:text%3d1961%253B%20February%204%25E2%2580%25939%253A%20Jabalpur%20(Madhya%20Pradesh)%26text%3dThe%20first%20major%252Dscale%20riot%2cthe%20state%20of%20Madhya%20Pradesh https://www.sciencespo.fr/mass-violence-war-massacre-resistance/en/document/hindu-muslim-communal-riots-india-i-1947-1986.html#:%7e:text%3d1961%253B%20February%204%25E2%2580%25939%253A%20Jabalpur%20(Madhya%20Pradesh)%26text%3dThe%20first%20major%252Dscale%20riot%2cthe%20state%20of%20Madhya%20Pradesh https://www.sciencespo.fr/mass-violence-war-massacre-resistance/en/document/hindu-muslim-communal-riots-india-ii-1986-2011.html https://www.sciencespo.fr/mass-violence-war-massacre-resistance/en/document/hindu-muslim-communal-riots-india-ii-1986-2011.html https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/2002-gujarat-riots-state-govt-to-table-justice-nanavati-mehta-commission-report-in-assembly-today/article30274396.ece https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/2002-gujarat-riots-state-govt-to-table-justice-nanavati-mehta-commission-report-in-assembly-today/article30274396.ece https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/2002-gujarat-riots-state-govt-to-table-justice-nanavati-mehta-commission-report-in-assembly-today/article30274396.ece https://scroll.in/latest/951349/2002-gujarat-riots-sc-grants-bail-to-14-convicts-in-sardarpura-massacre-case https://scroll.in/latest/951349/2002-gujarat-riots-sc-grants-bail-to-14-convicts-in-sardarpura-massacre-case https://www.wsj.com/articles/why-narendra-modi-was-banned-from-the-u-s-1399062010 https://in.reuters.com/article/india-narendra-modi-eu/quiet-lunch-shatters-eu-boycott-of-narendra-modi-idINDEE91707X20130208 https://in.reuters.com/article/india-narendra-modi-eu/quiet-lunch-shatters-eu-boycott-of-narendra-modi-idINDEE91707X20130208 163 1 3 Jindal Global Law Review (2020) 11(1):157–179 We see a very decisive shift since 2002. We stopped witnessing large massacres. All the episodes where communal violence has happened since 2002 until 2014 have been episodes where the loss of life has been actually much smaller. In each of these incidents, fewer than 100 people were killed, which is considerably lower than what we had seen before. But there has been an enormous displacement of people from their homes to a much larger degree. People have not been allowed to return to their homes after the attacks. The kind of normal processes that people had earlier — where people could settle down after the violence and restart their life — have considerably diminished. These violent episodes, despite much less loss of life, have led to permanent separation of populations. Displaced people have had to move to foreign places, forced to stay in Muslim majority areas as refugees. This happened with the survivors of Gujarat, and then Muzaffarnagar, Kandhamal, and Kokrajhar.27 I think that is the third phase. After 2014, we see the fourth phase. This is the phase of lynching. The casualty figure has gone down to one digit. If you actually add up the number of lives lost in each of the episodes of lynching, all of them taken together would still not amount to very large number.28 A single massacre of the past has seen more loss of life and property than all incidents of lynching together. But lynching has been powerful in deepening, consolidating, normalising, valorising, and legitimising hate. Episodes of communal violence — however brutal they were and however much rupture they caused — were always bound by geography and time. They occurred in a location, there was a beginning and an end, and eventually things settled down. Lynching has broken the boundaries of geography and time. These incidents communicate that if you belong to a particular religious identity, you are now no longer safe at any place and at any time. Anyone can walk into your kitchen and see what meat you are cook- ing, and lynch you to death. You may be on a train, and you may be lynched. You may be on the road and visibly Muslim, and may be lynched. Each of these episodes of lynching are performative acts. They are videotaped, celebrated, widely circu- lated on the Internet, and widely consumed. I found very close parallels with the lynching of African-Americans in the US. During the late-19th and mid-20th centuries, there were incidents of lynching in the 27 Damayantee Dhar, ‘Sixteen Years After 2002 Gujarat Riots, Victims in Rehabilitation Colonies Still Fear Displacement’ (The Wire, 28 February 2018). https ://thewi re.in/commu nalis m/sixte en-years -after -2002-gujar at-riots -victi ms-in-rehab ilita tion-colon ies-still -fear-displ aceme nt. Accessed 15 July 2020; Sanjeevini Badigar, ‘A ’Normal’ Anomaly: Displacement Due to Communal Violence in Gujarat’ (2012) 47(3) Economic and Political Weekly 42; Special Correspondent, ‘Riot Victims Live in Ghetto-Like Conditions: Report’ (The Hindu, 8 September 2016). https ://www.thehi ndu.com/news/natio nal/Riot-victi ms-live-in-ghett o-like-condi tions -Repor t/artic le146 26821 .ece. Accessed 15 July 2020; Kedar Nagarajan, ‘Justice Continues to Elude Victims of Kandhamal Violence’ (The Wire, 11 September 2015). https :// thewi re.in/commu nalis m/justi ce-conti nues-to-elude -victi ms-of-kandh amal-viole nce. Accessed 15 July 2020; Monirul Hussain, ‘State, Identity Movements and Internal Displacement in the North-East’ (2000) 35(51) Economic and Political Weekly 4519. 28 The Quint is maintaining detailed records of incidents of mob violence across India since 2015; the number of deaths by mob lynching, till the date of publication of this interview, is 113. See ‘Hunted: India’s Lynching Files’ (The Quint, 2018-till date). https ://www.thequ int.com/quint lab/lynch ing-in-india /. Accessed 15 July 2020. https://thewire.in/communalism/sixteen-years-after-2002-gujarat-riots-victims-in-rehabilitation-colonies-still-fear-displacement https://thewire.in/communalism/sixteen-years-after-2002-gujarat-riots-victims-in-rehabilitation-colonies-still-fear-displacement https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/Riot-victims-live-in-ghetto-like-conditions-Report/article14626821.ece https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/Riot-victims-live-in-ghetto-like-conditions-Report/article14626821.ece https://thewire.in/communalism/justice-continues-to-elude-victims-of-kandhamal-violence https://thewire.in/communalism/justice-continues-to-elude-victims-of-kandhamal-violence https://www.thequint.com/quintlab/lynching-in-india/ https://www.thequint.com/quintlab/lynching-in-india/ 164 Jindal Global Law Review (2020) 11(1):157–179 1 3 US but their numbers were not very high.29 Recorded episodes of lynching in the US work to about 50 incidents a year.30 But their impact was huge. They led to millions of people leaving the south of the US for the north.31 They led to the setting of fear in the African-American heart because of their symbolic character. This, I would say, is a very brief historical picture of communal violence. As with all such classifications, this is not very neat. But in terms of broad trends, I think this is what I have found. MAB: In your article ‘Conflict and Suffering’,32 you had given a perceptive account of the direct and indirect harms of mass sectarian violence. You had used phrases like ‘vicarious victimhood’33 and ‘graded suffering’34 to capture how vio- lence affects people who may not even be directly the victims. Recently, you have written about the symbolic impact of such incidents, referring to the work of Ameri- can scholars like Amy Woods.35 In light of your thesis, how would you theorise about the more localised, individualised hate crime incidents or incidents of lynch- ing? How would you compare the harm of these cases compared to mass violence? I think it was in ‘Conflict and Suffering’ that we note another striking observation is one of the impacts of violence in Gujarat and your experience was that people have a deep sense of hurt that their Hindu neighbours or people who were celebrat- ing festivals are not coming and asking for chanda (donations)36. So there seems to be a continuing rupture of social relationships after sectarian violence and many of the victims felt boycotted and left out that they gave money in charity or donations for Hindu religious festivals and now nobody cares for them anymore. That I think is a very perceptive observation. HM: In ‘Conflict and Suffering’, I wanted to make a few points. One, the suffer- ing people undergo because of hate violence is very different qualitatively from the suffering as a result of other kinds of violence. Suppose there is a massive earth- quake. I lost my home and loved ones. There will be enormous anguish in me. But if I lost my home and loved ones due to the violence of my neighbours, to the hate ideology of the State and the enabling of this violence by the police, it is a very dif- ferent kind of suffering. This is what I have observed in all the many years I worked with the survivors of violence. There is something in that grief that is much harder to find meaning for and closure to. I also talked about direct victims and vicarious 29 Jamiles Lartey and Sam Morris, ‘How White Americans Used Lynchings to Terrorize and Control Black People’ (The Guardian, 26 April 2018). https ://www.thegu ardia n.com/us-news/2018/apr/26/lynch ings-memor ial-us-south -montg omery -alaba ma. Accessed 15 July 2020. This article is based on a report by the Equal Justice Initiative on lynchings in America; see EJI, Lynching in America: Confronting the Legacy of Racial Terror (3rd edn, 2017). 30 ibid. 31 ibid. 32 Harsh Mander, ‘Conflict and Suffering: Survivors of Carnages in 1984 and 2002’ (2010) 45(32) Eco- nomic and Political Weekly 57. 33 ibid 58. 34 ibid 59. 35 See Harsh Mander, ‘A Shameful Marker of Five Years’ (The Hindu, 19 April 2019). https ://www.thehi ndu.com/opini on/lead/a-shame ful-marke r-of-five-years /artic le268 79575 .ece. Accessed 15 July 2020. 36 Mander (n 32) 62. https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/apr/26/lynchings-memorial-us-south-montgomery-alabama https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/apr/26/lynchings-memorial-us-south-montgomery-alabama https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/a-shameful-marker-of-five-years/article26879575.ece https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/a-shameful-marker-of-five-years/article26879575.ece 165 1 3 Jindal Global Law Review (2020) 11(1):157–179 victims. This struck me time after time after the Gujarat violence. While working with the survivors, I met people who had migrated to the US and had not come back to India for many years. They were people who had not lost anything from violence. But the violence had affected them personally. It had caused suffering as if there was something that had happened to them personally. The immediacy of that suffering, I found, led to clinical depression after the Gujarat violence because they felt it was a betrayal of the country they believed India was since their childhood. That sense of betrayal was a very personal one. That was what I had described as ‘vicarious’ suffering. Lynching is an instrument of hate violence that lends itself to a massive expan- sion of the scale, reach, and depth of this vicarious suffering. Every lynching in India is a performative act of public display. A single incident of lynching of an African-American reverberated across the rivers, mountains, deserts — in the heart of every African-American. The same is for India, where the effect of one lynching is carried across the land as if it were thousands of incidents. I found that Muslims have experienced each lynching in a deeply personal way. This nature of vicarious suffering has expanded precisely because lynching breaks the boundaries of geogra- phy and time. It potentially communicates that this can happen to any person of this identity and that nobody is safe at any time. I wish to underline, with some risk of generalisation, that this was the decisive shift after 2002. In the earlier episodes of communal violence, the attempt was to inflict as much harm and damage as possible at the time of the violence. After 2002, the attempt is to sustain the suffering and the loss not just in material terms. It is to divide your activity and social relations with your neighbours. The greatest worry among the victims I worked with used to be why people were not coming to their weddings any longer. I remember one instance when somebody actually went so far as to print two wedding cards — one card with Hindu religious symbols and no Muslim religious symbols — that she sent out to Hindu neighbours, hoping that at least that would encourage them to come to the wedding. But they still did not come in large numbers. Particularly in rural India, it means a lot if your neighbours come at your wedding, serve the bridegroom’s family, and participate in the festivities. These are symbols of being one people. With every episode of communal violence after 2002, there has been a systematic campaign to not allow these social relation- ships of shared life between the two communities to mend and restart. People have also not been encouraged or allowed to return after the violence. So, the displacement is larger. I remember my many conversations in Gujarat and Muzaffarnagar where more than 50 or 60 percent people were displaced and never able to return to their homes. I asked one person why he was not going back home. His reply was ‘Koi bulaye tab toh mai jaaon. Koi bulane hi nahi aaya (If some- one invites me back, I will go. No one is even calling me back).’ This idea that my neighbours — who were part of my life and whose children’s weddings I partici- pated in — now do not care anymore even when I have been living in a relief colony. That nobody has found it fit to ask how I am doing and when I will return. It is that kind of grief that I am talking about. This is the characteristic of the third phase. There is also a deep ongoing rupture in the nature of social and economic rela- tions, in the form of boycott. For years, people in Muzaffarnagar have stopped 166 Jindal Global Law Review (2020) 11(1):157–179 1 3 employing people of the other communities for a range of labour like specialised kinds of artisanship. Even if this may cause some kind of economic inconven- ience, the attempt is to not give them work, to not buy their services and labour. This is in addition to the social boycott of not participating in social activities. This is really striking in the new century of how hate violence has in a sense separated communities. We must understand the implications of this. We now have children growing up in segregated settlements. So, the word we hear all the time in Gujarat is “border” to describe lines of segregation. This is not just in Ahmedabad, but also in towns and villages. There is a sense of a border that Muslims are pushed to. They are no longer welcome in mixed colonies where there has been violence or fear of violence. So, children are growing up without having friends from another community. The lasting impact of this, in terms of the kind of India that Mahatma Gandhi dreamt for us, is destroyed when communities do not have the opportunity of meeting or build- ing social relations across the spectrum of the religious divide. And therefore, in a moment like the COVID-19 lockdown, it is possible to persuade a large majority of Hindus that somehow Muslims are responsible for consciously and concertedly spreading the virus.37 How could so many ordinary Hindus — who may not even see themselves as communal — be persuaded so easily about the role of Muslims in spreading the virus in this time of great fear and death? I see two kinds of scenarios that are being built which make Muslims the villains. The softer one is that there is so much religious bigotry among Muslims that they have large gatherings and are not mindful of the necessity of social distancing. But there is a further much more evil kind of portrayal. According to it, Muslims actually want to engage in a new form of jihad where they want to kill non-Muslims by introducing the virus into schools or on vegetables through their saliva.38 It’s so bizarre that people are actu- ally refusing to buy vegetables from Muslims.39 People are putting up flags to show the identity of the person selling vegetables. All in the course of the last few weeks! I am just amazed how millions of ordinary Hindus could be so persuaded. I think it is part of this long project where once you have started this social segregation, Muslims are not people you know, have grown with or count among your friends. It becomes easier and easier for such demonising imagery to actually find wide per- suasion or support. We cannot even say that the RSS went house to house persuad- ing people of this during the lockdown. Clearly, the soil was fertile to accept this completely bizarre set of prejudices about our Muslims neighbours. We will need a long time to understand how it is possible to conduct this kind of social project of hate so successfully in such a short time during the lockdown. But I think it can be explained by the last 20 years, especially since 2002 where the populations have 37 Ritika Jain, ‘Covid-19: How Fake News and Modi Government Messaging Fuelled India’s Latest Spi- ral of Islamophobia’ (Scroll.in, 21 April 2020). https ://scrol l.in/artic le/95980 6/covid -19-how-fake-news- and-modi-gover nment -messa ging-fuell ed-india s-lates t-spira l-of-islam ophob ia. Accessed 15 July 2020. 38 ibid. 39 The Wire Staff, ‘Coronavirus Hate Speech: BJP MLA in UP Says ‘Don’t Buy Vegetables from Mus- lim Sellers’’ (The Wire, 28 April 2020). https ://thewi re.in/commu nalis m/sures h-tiwar i-bjo-musli m-veget ables . Accessed 15 July 2020. https://scroll.in/article/959806/covid-19-how-fake-news-and-modi-government-messaging-fuelled-indias-latest-spiral-of-islamophobia https://scroll.in/article/959806/covid-19-how-fake-news-and-modi-government-messaging-fuelled-indias-latest-spiral-of-islamophobia https://thewire.in/communalism/suresh-tiwari-bjo-muslim-vegetables https://thewire.in/communalism/suresh-tiwari-bjo-muslim-vegetables 167 1 3 Jindal Global Law Review (2020) 11(1):157–179 been separated socially, economically, and most importantly at an emotional level, that it is possible to believe the worst about the other. MAB: In ‘Wages of Communal Violence’,40 among other things, you proposed that three conditions must exist for the occurrence of sectarian violence — delib- erately manufactured hate, organisation to execute violence, and State complicity. How would you calibrate this theoretical insight in the context of the localised and individualised incidents of lynching? How would you situate the role of the State? Does it follow the same logic? HM: Let me just reiterate very briefly what my thesis has been. My engagement with communal violence has been in many capacities. First, as a civil servant in charge of law and order right from 1984, when I was a young officer during the anti- Sikh riots in Indore. As an officer, I was also on duty when a series of communal instances happened around the Ram Janmabhoomi movement led by L.K. Advani.41 So, my understanding of communal violence comes from an intense experience of someone who not only has had a ringside view but has also been an intervener. I have seen and understood the role of the State, as well as the other factors that play an important role in communal violence. My second capacity, since the 2002 Guja- rat violence, has been as a human rights worker for justice with the survivors and community workers. The third has been in the capacity of a researcher — reflecting, thinking, meditating, agonising, and theorising about communal violence. I have tried to engage with various questions — what causes communal violence, what is the lived experience of the people, why does justice fail, and what are the necessary conditions of reconciliation? My thesis has emerged in these three capacities. Stated briefly, I have argued that there are two necessary conditions for commu- nal violence to occur. I call these the ‘manufacture of hatred’. I find a lot of echoes in the work of scholars like Paul R. Brass.42 I use the word ‘manufacture’ very cau- tiously, advisedly, and mindfully because it is truly amazing to me how hatred is actually manufactured. It is really like a chemical reaction of putting these things together and achieving something very different. You see over and over and over again right from the stories of the Partition violence. The classical ways of manufac- turing hatred like building a temple in the place of Muslim worship, to the rumours of large-scale killings, or slaughter and rape by people of the other community, are ubiquitous. The most dramatic example, which I think scholars will need time to study, is how within days of the lockdown, hatred was manufactured against Indian Muslims across the country in such a powerful and effective way. This is an example of the manufacture of hatred out of falsehood in a time of unprecedented crisis. In the 1984 anti-Sikh violence, while it is true that two Sikh bodyguards assassinated Mrs. Gandhi, the hatred behind the violence was built around the stories of large- scale celebration and distribution of sweets by Sikhs to celebrate the assassination of 40 Harsh Mander and others, ‘Wages of Communal Violence in Muzaffarnagar and Shamli’  (2016) 51(43) Economic & Political Weekly 39. 41 About which I have also written a short memoir in the sense of one of those riots in my book Unheard Voices. See Mander (n 1) 188-205. 42 See Brass (n 12). 168 Jindal Global Law Review (2020) 11(1):157–179 1 3 Mrs. Gandhi. There may have been stray incidents but most of it was manufactured and a complete falsehood. The Bhagalpur violence is another instance. In Bhagal- pur, this country has seen one of its worst slaughters after independence. Much of the slaughter of Muslims was driven by the rumour that Hindu students have been killed in large numbers in their hostels in Bhagalpur town. Not a single student was actually killed, but the way in which this rumour spread across the district — long before the age of the Internet — stirred the mobs to slaughter their neighbours with so much cruelty. There are organisations like the RSS that have the power and reach to successfully penetrate the hearts and minds with prejudice and hatred targeted against Muslims and Christians in a way that is incomparable to anywhere in the world. I am sure it would be equally true of the role of Jamaat-e-Islami in fostering hatred in Bangladesh. Thus, the manufacture of hatred is definitely the first neces- sary condition. The second condition is the actual logistics of organising the violence. Violence of any scale is never spontaneous. There again, Paul Brass has done very valuable work on ‘riot-producing’ machinery in the cases that he has studied.43 It isn’t by chance that a collection of houses is blown-up with large numbers of cooking gas cylinders or with a large quantity of petrol, or the kind of weapons and chemicals that are used in the violence. These are not something that people happen to have. Voters lists were used in many of the large massacres in 1984 and 2002. It is not that ordinary people suddenly get enraged. Preparation is required to conduct the slaugh- ter that we have witnessed. My observation has very strongly been that both of these are necessary but not sufficient conditions. The sufficient condition for violence to happen after these two conditions are met is the supportive or enabling role of the State. However much hatred has been manufactured, whatever the large and effective planning may be, it cannot happen beyond the initial stage, unless the State wants it to happen. This is because the law empowers the local magistrates and the police with more than suffi- cient powers to control even the largest communal massacres if they choose to do so. It is a lesson I learnt very dramatically in the first episode of communal violence that I dealt with as a young officer in Indore. That has what convinced me — and has been confirmed over and over again in every communal riot I have seen, worked with and studied the role of the State. I was posted as a young officer of just four years of service. I had never seen or dreamt that I would see anything like a large communal riot. My Collector at the time after Mrs. Gandhi was assassinated was the Additional District Magistrate. He and the Superintendent of Police called a meet- ing of all of us the morning after Mrs. Gandhi was assassinated at 6 am and said, ‘No one will use force under any circumstances, unless I personally order it.’ And then he just disappeared. This was long before we could have conversations on our mobile phones. By 12 noon, the violence started. It took that amount of time for all the preparations that I am speaking about — spreading of rumors and the prepara- tion of the logistics. And then, for a couple of hours, I saw the worst kind of vio- lence in my life that I never imagined I would see. Every time I asked the police 43 ibid. 169 1 3 Jindal Global Law Review (2020) 11(1):157–179 to intervene, they replied, ‘We are under orders not to act.’ At that point, I recalled what I had learnt in my training that the senior-most magistrate has the right to call in the army to control communal violence if it is not possible for the administration to do so. The Mahua cantonment is about an hour’s drive. I called the Major General there and said, ‘Sir, I want you to come immediately.’ He asked me if I was prepared to put it in writing. I told him that that I definitely would. He told me that his soldier columns were ready and drove in six lines of armed soldiers. I gave orders of impos- ing a curfew in this area at all costs. They took me on my word and took action to control the riot of the scale you saw in Delhi. It took them an hour and a half to impose complete curfew over the city. They shot 25 people. And then, everybody was indoors under a total curfew. All this happened in a space of six hours. This was a young greenhorn officer who had no experience whatsoever. It was possible for me to do this in this short period of time in a communal massacre of that scale. So, when you then hear that something like the Gujarat riots happened — where the entire state administration is under the control of the Chief Minister and the violence continues not for hours but days, weeks and in some cases for months — it is only possible because the State wanted it. You should not need any evi- dence of active complicity on behalf of the State in such circumstances. During the investigation, Mr. Narendra Modi actually held a meeting where Sanjiv Bhatt was present where he said, ‘Let people vent their anger against the Muslims.’44 It is not necessary in my opinion that you have to prove that. There is a term in law — res ipsa loquitor — facts speak for themselves. Justice Verma used that term during one of the NHRC proceedings that he was leading.45 I think you don’t need further evi- dence of the criminal complicity of the State, because the facts speak for themselves if the violence goes for any length of time beyond merely a few hours. As I said, in my thesis, the first two conditions are necessary but not sufficient. The third condi- tion is the decisive factor that is behind communal violence. You have asked me an interesting question about how this theory applies to incidents of lynching. In many ways it applies entirely. Let us talk about the manu- facture of hatred. In every case we have seen there is a systematic set of rumors that are spread about particular people having slaughtered a cow. In some cases, you can even pin down precisely where this rumour started. For example, Akhlaq was killed after there was the announcement in the temple that he had slaughtered a cow.46 In Hapur, again it was an announcement from the temple that a cow had been 44 This was a part of Sanjiv Bhatt’s affidavit to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court made a note of Bhatt’s  said allegations, that were filed  before it through an affidavit on 14 April 2011 in Jakia Nasim Ahesan and Another v State of Gujarat and Others Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No 1088/2008,  in  Sanjiv Rajendra Bhatt v Union of India and Others  (2016)  1  SCC 1 [4, 6].  See Sanjoy Majumder, ‘Narendra Modi ’Allowed’ Gujarat 2002 Anti-Muslim Riots’ (BBC, 22 April 2011). https :// www.bbc.com/news/world -south -asia-13170 914. Accessed 15 July 2020. 45 NHRC, ‘NHRC Makes Preliminary Comments and Recommendations to the Government of Guja- rat and Government of India’. https ://nhrc.nic.in/press -relea se/nhrc-makes -preli minar y-comme nts-and- recom menda tions -gover nment -gujar at-and-gover nment . Accessed 15 July 2020. 46 Abhimanyu Kumar, ‘The Lynching That Changed India’ (Al Jazeera, 5 October 2017). https ://www. aljaz eera.com/indep th/featu res/2017/09/lynch ing-chang ed-india -17092 70840 18325 .html. Accessed 15 July 2020. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-south-asia-13170914 https://www.bbc.com/news/world-south-asia-13170914 https://nhrc.nic.in/press-release/nhrc-makes-preliminary-comments-and-recommendations-government-gujarat-and-government https://nhrc.nic.in/press-release/nhrc-makes-preliminary-comments-and-recommendations-government-gujarat-and-government https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/09/lynching-changed-india-170927084018325.html https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/09/lynching-changed-india-170927084018325.html 170 Jindal Global Law Review (2020) 11(1):157–179 1 3 slaughtered.47 Similarly, WhatsApp messages were used to spread rumours in many other places. The manufacture of hatred is very clear and necessary to begin any communal violence. In one case where I found it very dramatic was an incident of the targeting of some Christian tribals in Jharkhand. There’s a tradition in the tribal communities that if an animal that you own dies, it becomes a part of the commons. Before the animal decays, there is a window of a few hours for people to carve out the meat. There is a tradition that people will just give a call saying that my animal has died, and people rush from all over the village to carve out their evening meal from the animal. This has been going on for generations. The same thing happened in this village. In this case, some caste Hindus spread the rumor that the cow was deliberately killed. A group of four men were caught and lynched very badly, with one of them dying.48 So the manufacture of hatred clearly applies to the incident of lynching. The same applies to the organisation of violence. Crowds do not naturally occur. They are always organised in every single case if you track them down. Whether the crowds gather spontaneously in each of these incidents, or whether they are also garnered and collected, is something I think needs a more careful study. I would be very surprised if in any case there is no logistical preparation and support for each of such episodes of lynching. And the role of the State in the act of lynching again is entirely decisive. In a large majority of these cases, I could see the police in uniform present and not inter- vening. Even when they are not physically present, every story that we have fol- lowed has accounts of people desperately trying to contact the police, and the police deliberately not coming or coming too late. In some cases, such as in the incident of Hapur,49 we have visuals of a man being very badly lynched and desperately asking for water. When the police finally arrived, instead of taking him to the hospital and arresting the culprits, they tied him with ropes and dragged him like an animal on the ground. This led to his death. What is also common in any incident of communal violence is the role of the police. In every episode of communal violence, without exception, they seem to take the favour of the attackers while criminalising the vic- tim. That is precisely what had happened in lynching. 47 Ananya Bhardwaj, ‘Pierced with Screw Drivers, Scraped with Sickles: How a Muslim Trader Was Lynched in UP’ (The Print, 26 June 2018). https ://thepr int.in/polit ics/how-a-musli m-trade r-was-lynch ed- in-up-pierc ed-with-screw -drive rs-sickl es/75169 /. Accessed 15 July 2020. 48 Harsh Mander, ‘Four Months After Oraon Man is Lynched in Jharkhand, Bafflement at How Neigh- bours Could be so Brutal’ (Scroll.in, 6 September 2019). https ://scrol l.in/artic le/93639 7/four-month s-after -oraon -man-is-lynch ed-in-jhark hand-baffl ement -at-how-neigh bours -could -be-so-bruta l. Accessed 15 July 2020. 49 Bhardwaj (n 47). https://theprint.in/politics/how-a-muslim-trader-was-lynched-in-up-pierced-with-screw-drivers-sickles/75169/ https://theprint.in/politics/how-a-muslim-trader-was-lynched-in-up-pierced-with-screw-drivers-sickles/75169/ https://scroll.in/article/936397/four-months-after-oraon-man-is-lynched-in-jharkhand-bafflement-at-how-neighbours-could-be-so-brutal https://scroll.in/article/936397/four-months-after-oraon-man-is-lynched-in-jharkhand-bafflement-at-how-neighbours-could-be-so-brutal 171 1 3 Jindal Global Law Review (2020) 11(1):157–179 From the evidence, we have seen that a vast majority of the hate crime incidents have happened after Mr. Modi came to power.50 Somebody might say, is it really my charge that Mr. Modi and Mr. Shah sit down every morning and organise episodes of lynching? This is not what I am claiming. What I am claiming is that they have cre- ated an environment that normalises, legitimises, and valorises hatred. It also com- municates that if you lynch people in the name of the protection of the cow or love jihad, you are actually the hero of a “Hindu nation”, and that the State will do all it can to protect you. This encouragement of hatred is the larger all-encompassing role of the State. And then you have the more specific enabling role of the State through the actions of the local officials. MAB: In fact, in your recent work, you have described these incidents not just hate crimes, but ‘command hate crimes’ because they emerge from structural, envi- ronmental, and institutional contexts.51 HM: Yes. And where institutions encourage and valorise attackers by protecting them, and by criminalising and victimising the victims. MAB: In the many accounts of sectarian violence in your writings, one of most striking things is the quality of violence. This is not just killing, but extreme forms of indignities and torture. There appears to be something deeply pathological about this kind of violence. HM: There is extreme cruelty in episodes of communal violence. In my latest book Between Memory and Forgetting52 on the Gujarat massacre, I graphically rec- reate some of the stories. It is so hard when you see the story of Bilkis Bano. People of her village — with whom she has grown up — gathered, stripped them naked, raped people, smashed the heads of children. In Naroda Patia, we had a boy who was made to drink petrol and explode with a matchbox. And this sexualised taunt- ing that we have heard even right now, with the rioters in North East Delhi coming and stripping themselves, exposing their genitals, and taunting people.53 There is an intense pathology in the nature of a communal violence over many decades. It is the same pathology but perhaps it is in even more sharp relief in lynching. In Karwan-e-Mohabbat we have made a resolve that we will visit every family who has been a victim of lynching, share their grief, seek forgiveness, and provide solidarity in their battle for justice. I recall one family telling us, ‘Bas aise hi maar dete. Goli mar dete. Churra maar dete hai. Itna torture karke kyun mara? (They should have 50 For data on the increasing number of hate crimes since the BJP came to power in 2014, see Anne Gowen and Manas Sharma, ‘Rising Hate in India’ (The Washington Post, 31 October 2018). https :// www.washi ngton post.com/graph ics/2018/world /repor ts-of-hate-crime -cases -have-spike d-in-india /. Accessed 15 July 2020. According to a study conducted by India Spend, ‘as many as 90% of religious hate crimes since 2009 have occurred after the BJP took power at the Centre in 2014’, cited in Harsh Mander, ‘New Hate Crime Tracker in India Finds Victims are Predominantly Muslims, Perpetrators Hin- dus’ (Scroll.in, 13 November 2018. https ://scrol l.in/artic le/90120 6/new-hate-crime -track er-in-india -finds -victi ms-are-predo minan tly-musli ms-perpe trato rs-hindu s. Accessed 15 July 2020. 51 Mander (n 35). 52 Harsh Mander, Between Memory and Forgetting (Yoda Press 2019). 53 Naomi Barton and Srishti Srivastava, ’They Took Down Their Pants, Pointed Their Genitals at Us, and Said, ’Yeh Lo Azaadi’’ (The Wire, 3 March 2020). https ://thewi re.in/women /delhi -riots -women -sexua l-haras sment . Accessed 15 July 2020. https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2018/world/reports-of-hate-crime-cases-have-spiked-in-india/ https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2018/world/reports-of-hate-crime-cases-have-spiked-in-india/ https://scroll.in/article/901206/new-hate-crime-tracker-in-india-finds-victims-are-predominantly-muslims-perpetrators-hindus https://scroll.in/article/901206/new-hate-crime-tracker-in-india-finds-victims-are-predominantly-muslims-perpetrators-hindus https://thewire.in/women/delhi-riots-women-sexual-harassment https://thewire.in/women/delhi-riots-women-sexual-harassment 172 Jindal Global Law Review (2020) 11(1):157–179 1 3 just killed them. Shot them. Stabbed them. Why did they torture him so much?)’ Why did they gouge out his eyes, smash his genitals? In one of the cases, when the family received the dead body of the victim, they found that the perpetrators had actually cut his penis as a taunt. It is those cruelties. And the kind of sadistic pleas- ure in actually video-taping it. In many video-tapings of lynching that we have seen, there is a certain pattern of how people hit the victim. In some videos, I have seen the victim ask for water, and the perpetrators take joy in not giving water. The victim finally becomes unconscious and dies. It is this collective cruelty. Many of these mobs have young people, even children well below the age of 18 years. The question that you are asking is where is this hatred or cruelty coming in from? I feel the era of lynching marks a decisive change, where the manufacturing of hatred has become almost a national project with a high degree of support from the highest political authority. NDTV recently conducted a VIP hate speech survey — hate speech by influential persons — where they found a leap of something like 500 percent in the amount of VIP hate speech that has happened in the Modi era.54 Hate speech of the worst kind is taking place in the presence of or from the highest offices themselves, including chief ministers, union ministers, and occasionally even the Prime Minister. We have seen that the manufacture of hatred — its normalisa- tion, legitimisation, and most of all its valorisation — is the real social project since 2014. So, there is a local manufacture of hatred but it is located within this much larger nationwide normalisation, legitimisation, and valorisation of hate that we are living in within these times. MAB: I wanted to ask you about how the law figures into this. You and many others have argued that the way to deal with the problem of State complicity and impunity cannot be to further strengthen the arms of the State. You had critiqued the United Progressive Alliance’s (UPA) ill-fated Communal Violence Bill.55 Your argu- ment was that the law against sectarian violence must not give more power to the State, but rather provide more legal accountability. But isn’t the law — even in the form of legal accountability — only further strengthening some institution of the law against other institutions of the law? Take the example of hate speech. Criminalisa- tion of hate speech has shown us that the law is invariably used not against those who essentially spur hatred but for everybody else.56 We do not want to empower State institutions but it seems that law is the only way to do it; it perhaps invariably does exactly that even if we frame it as accountability. Democracy would have been a very good mechanism of addressing this but it seems that it has failed altogether. So, there are three questions here. First, how do we bring in State accountability and can the law do it? Second, what are the limits of the law in this intervention? Third, 54 Nimisha Jaiswal, Sreenivasan Jain and Manas Pratap Singh, ‘Under Modi Government, VIP Hate Speech Skyrockets - By 500%’ (NDTV, 19 April 2018). https ://www.ndtv.com/india -news/under -naren dra-modi-gover nment -vip-hate-speec h-skyro ckets -by-500-18389 25. Accessed 15 July 2020. 55 The Prevention of Communal and Targeted Violence (Access to Justice and Reparations) Bill, 2011. 56 See Prabhir Vishnu Poruthiyil, ‘What ’Hate Speech’ Really Means, and How the Term is Being Mis- used’ (The Wire, 8 March 2020). https ://thewi re.in/right s/hate-speec h-sangh -pariv ar-prote sts. Accessed 15 July 2020. https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/under-narendra-modi-government-vip-hate-speech-skyrockets-by-500-1838925 https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/under-narendra-modi-government-vip-hate-speech-skyrockets-by-500-1838925 https://thewire.in/rights/hate-speech-sangh-parivar-protests 173 1 3 Jindal Global Law Review (2020) 11(1):157–179 why has democracy failed and can we think of democracy in a different way that would bring in some system of accountability? HM: These are the most difficult questions you have asked in this conversation. They present the most painful dilemmas. From the first episode of communal vio- lence that I handled and during the subsequent series of events I have witnessed, I was very struck by one irony. The greatest complaints of people — survivors of communal violence, who were mostly people from the minorities — were against the police. And yet their strongest demand everywhere was for police pickets and police thanas (stations)  for their protection. It struck me that they had the greatest anger against this institution’s criminal betrayal of its duty. And yet this was what they felt they needed in order to be safe in the future. At the larger level, I do think that at the end, in a democracy, we have to fight communal hatred as a social project deeply embedded in philosophy and ethics, and examine the nature of the social contract itself. In a political project, we understand that democracy is not about the will of the majority but very substantially also about the protection of the rights of the minorities. We have to build a set of political rules that will protect the rights of the minorities against the majoritarian onslaught of the kind that we have seen in India. But I think that whatever our difficulties and problems with the institutions of law may be, there is no turning away from embed- ding in law the normative standards for public servants, including the punitive con- sequences for those who fail to uphold their duties. Let me try to explain the arguments of why we felt a communal violence law was required, but one very different from the kind that was presented by the UPA government. I would also like to mention the rocky journey we had in the National Advisory Council where we presented a very different draft, and why it never saw the light. The fact that right through the history of independent India, very few people have actually faced punishment for communal violence is not simply an accident or a failure. It is a success because impunity is as much planned as the massacre. L.K. Advani, as the Home Minister in Vajpayee’s government, made a statement after the Gujarat pogrom. He said that it isn’t that the criminal justice system deliberately failed to punish the guilty. He said that the criminal justice system is generally so badly broken that it fails to secure justice. 57 I found it odd for the Home Minister to just make this claim that the justice system is unable to deliver justice normally as well, and to say that unproblematically. But I argued, responding to him saying that this was not true.58 It is not State failure but State success because impunity is what the State set out to ensure, and it has been spectacularly successful in doing that. We find a very clear pattern of systematic ways in which impunity is ensured at every stage. The first is delayed First Information Reports (FIRs). After incidents of mass 57 LK Advani to journalist Karan Thapar, ‘Hard Talk India: LK Advani 10 October 2003’ (22 February 2012). https ://www.youtu be.com/watch ?v=VVz2W NI_DbU. Accessed 15 July 2020. 58 Harsh Mander, ‘State Subversion: Gujarat’s Victims Completely Isolated’ (The Times of India, 22 November 2003). https ://times ofind ia.india times .com/edit-page/LEADE R-ARTIC LEBRS tate-Subve rsion -Gujar ats-Victi ms-Compl etely -Isola ted/artic lesho w/29552 8.cms. Accessed 15 July 2020. https://www.youtube.com/watch%3fv%3dVVz2WNI_DbU https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/edit-page/LEADER-ARTICLEBRState-Subversion-Gujarats-Victims-Completely-Isolated/articleshow/295528.cms https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/edit-page/LEADER-ARTICLEBRState-Subversion-Gujarats-Victims-Completely-Isolated/articleshow/295528.cms 174 Jindal Global Law Review (2020) 11(1):157–179 1 3 violence, people are in relief camps in devastated situations. If the police wanted, they could reach every individual in the camps and actively encourage them to file FIRs. Instead, what tends to happen is that in almost every incident, the police them- selves register reports. The character of these reports tends to be of two kinds. First, it tends to be an omnibus. So, 50-100 episodes of violence are crammed into one, which makes later investigation, charge sheeting, and prosecution extremely com- plicated. And they are literally ambiguous. These state that an ‘unarmed mob’ or ‘angry mob’ engaged in violence. The FIRs are framed as if these mobs had almost justifiable anger. For example, the police would write — angered by the burning of the train in Godhra, or in 1984 angered by Mrs. Gandhi’s assassination. The police are very careful so as to not include any details of who constituted the mob, and who the witnesses were. It is so striking because this delayed omnibus and ambiguous FIRs is something that you find across so many episodes of communal violence. When I saw this happen in Delhi again, I told my colleagues that there must be a secret manual somewhere that instructs the police to ensure impunity in precisely the same ways. After filing such FIRs and engaging in inaction masquerading as investigation, the police can either close the case or file a charge sheet. What we found in Gujarat and other instances is a pattern.59 A large majority of cases would be closed without filing a charge sheet, essentially stating, ‘Yes, the crime had happened but we do not know the culprits.’ There would be no names recorded, no evidence collected, no witnesses known. I had personally, with Indira Jaising as my advocate, found that more than 2000 FIRs — around half of the total registered FIRs — had been closed.60 I challenged this massive omnibus closure of cases in the Supreme Court.61 The Court finally authorised the reopening and reinvestigation of all the closed FIRs. I could go on about the many ways in which impunity is ensured. Coming to the UPA draft of the Bill to prevent further communal violence. This was a promise that they made when they were elected. What they effectively did was to add further to the powers of the police, specifically for enforcement in dis- turbed areas, and other powers that one typically associates with anti-terrorism laws. So, the Bill empowered the State to act, to arrest, to take a number of steps that are extraordinary and in contravention with standard principles of due process and human rights. The government claimed that only if the police have this kind of additional power will they be able to control the violence. My argument, and that of the others who opposed the Bill, was simply this: did they really think that Mr. Modi and his state government in Gujarat did not control the riots because they did not have the powers to do so? Or was it because they did not have the will to do it? Did the violence in 2002, or 1984, or any during any other incident of violence 59 See for eg Human Rights Watch, Discouraging Dissent: Intimidation and Harassment of Witnesses, Human Rights Activists, and Lawyers Pursuing Accountability for the 2002 Communal Violence in Guja- rat (2004) 7. 60 See n 4. 61 ibid. 175 1 3 Jindal Global Law Review (2020) 11(1):157–179 continue because the State was powerless or because it had a project — a pogrom — to execute? This has been my personal experience in all the major communal violence inci- dents that I have witnessed since the 1984 riots. Not me alone. There was somebody like Rahul Sharma who curtailed the violence in Gujarat.62 When I talked to him, I found that he did exactly what I had done in my district during the 1984 riots. In fact, there were so many echoes when we re-counted. He was able to control the violence in the shortest possible time. This goes back to the point that it is not that people do not have enough powers to control the violence. Even a young greenhorn officer in a very small district, with very little force at his disposal, is able to effec- tively control large episodes of communal violence. Adding more powers is only going to be used against the very minorities that the law actually means to protect. We argued that the law does not need to empower the State any further than it already does. Rather it must empower the victims and survivors to demand account- ability from the State. So, the most important single thing that we tried to put into the law was a different idea of creating a new crime — the crime of culpable inac- tion of public officials linked to the idea of command responsibility. We argued that most incidents of communal violence happen because of the culpable inaction of public officials under command from above, and only the recognition of these as a crime can prevent violence. Whether the same institutions in the police or the judiciary would allow the appli- cation of these provisions remains one of those difficult questions that I flounder to answer. But having worked in the civil services, I am quite certain that a large majority of civil servants are hugely risk averse. The moral responsibility to be fair and to protect lives in communal violence does not seem to work. But the fear that one day a regime could come that might punish them under these provisions of cul- pable inaction would, I hope, push a large number of civil servants to do their duty. MAB: Let us move on to the third theme of our conversation related to the legal strategy to address hate crime. I would like to ask you about your experience with Nyayagraha, which as we know is an acclaimed and powerful experiment in justice and solidarity. In Nyayagraha, you conceptualised the role of Amanpathiks (peace workers) as people who help survivors come to terms with their suffering and loss and to bring the estranged communities together as one project. You also conceptu- alised the role of Nyayapathiks (justice workers), who link this work with legal jus- tice, as people who ‘would walk the path of justice.’63 So Nyayagraha, as a project and ideal, is a way to bring legal and social justice together. How would you reflect on Nyayagraha as a form of legal strategy for justice in hate crime cases? Why is it crucial to integrate the legal and the social in this strategy? HM: Let me start with the birth of Nyayagraha. I found that after the Gujarat pogrom, even after getting all the closed FIRs reopened through the Supreme Court, in most cases the police reinvestigated and then closed the cases all over again for 62 Rana Ayyub, Gujarat Files: Anatomy of a Cover Up (2016) 84. 63 Harsh Mander, ‘Survivors of Mass Violence and the Idea of Justice’ in Patrick Hoenig and Navsharan Singh (eds), Landscapes of Fear: Understanding Impunity in India (Zubaan 2014). 176 Jindal Global Law Review (2020) 11(1):157–179 1 3 nearly the same reasons as before. But even in the cases that did go to trial, it was such an adverse setting for victims and survivors. There was an extremely hostile social political environment. And the courtroom itself was a site where the second- class citizenship was played out so openly. It seemed almost a hopeless task. A couple of years after the massacre, I took a big decision to relocate to Gujarat for some months. I spent almost a year there. I spent my time with the survivors, the volunteers, the Amanpathiks, the Nyayapathiks, and many people from the commu- nity. We tried to craft the strategy together. Nyayagraha is an idea that I drew from Satyagraha. Satyagraha is a political instrument of resistance against unjust laws. But in this context, it was not the law that was unjust but the implementation of the law by the state instruments that was the problem. So, I thought of calling it Nyayagraha — a demand for justice. It was founded on, firstly, that means are very important. If the battle is for truth and jus- tice, the means at every stage, and in every respect, must follow the same ethical principles. In a very real and tangible sense, it meant the following. I went from vil- lage to village, and camp to camp with my colleagues, to have meetings with com- munities. We started off with the question of informed consent. We used to say that it is very hard for the victims and survivors to fight for justice. We should not look down upon those who have to re-negotiate their lives and decide that they do not want to pursue justice. Everyone who wanted to fight for justice must really want to do it. We told that that we will stand with you if you so choose to fight. Once the informed consent was coming, we would say that we also had certain conditions. We would say that since it is a fight for truth and justice, we have to pledge that we will have to fight this entire battle through the principles of truth and justice. This translated into two practical rules. One is that at no stage in the legal battle will we be willing to offer a bribe to anybody to get any favours. Second is that we will never lie in any testimony, even if it leads us to lose the case. I had many senior lawyer colleagues who said, ‘We simply cannot understand these two rules!’ They said that we were already fighting such an unequal battle with the State. And then we wanted to further tie up our hands and our legs. But it remains a very fond memory that in working class communities where we used to have these discus- sions, people used to understand what we were saying. They actually felt strength- ened in a very ethical kind of way. Their morale was increased. They felt that they were truly fighting a battle for truth and justice. And they would always give their pledge. Our witness preparation then became a very simple job. During our witness preparation, we would tell them one clear principle of 4 words — ‘Sach bolo, saaf bolo (Speak the truth and speak it clearly).’ That is all that we have to say. There is so much mayhem in episodes of communal violence. People do not know what is going on and everyone is trying to save their lives. In all that mayhem, it is not always possible that the victims and survivors manage to see someone doing something. So, what sometimes happened in these cases is that the lawyer would sit you down and say, ‘Okay, this is the accused and you have not actually seen him. We know that. But you have to say, “I did not run away; that actually I was hiding behind a wall or behind a tree and I saw this person doing something.”’ But what we told the witnesses was, if you ran away during the violence, you ran away. If you did not see the accused, you did not see the accused. Under no circumstances will 177 1 3 Jindal Global Law Review (2020) 11(1):157–179 you say that you saw the accused. Once it became clear that I have to only speak the truth and speak it with clarity, it became a different kind of battle. We also realised that the outcome of a large majority of the cases is not deter- mined exclusively or even overwhelmingly by what is transacted in the courts. A great part of the outcome is actually determined by what happens in the community, because it is here that the victims and survivors and witnesses are often living in the shadow of the community and individuals who have caused harm. They continue to wield power, and can intimidate, threaten or bribe. The word compromise or ‘com- pro’ has become part of the local Gujarati parlance. I wrote a long essay on compro- mise in Gujarat,64 where I tried to describe how these compromises are transacted. I wrote it partly in defence of Zahira Sheikh, the 19-year-old woman in the Best Bak- ery case 65 caught in difficult circumstances. One cannot understand what it means to be placed in the midst of all of these winds blowing and tossing you here and there. We might make a morally unwise choice in these circumstances. Another important part of Nyayagraha’s approach is the community justice worker or the Nyayapathik. I consciously avoid using the term paralegal, because it seems to suggest that somehow you are subordinate to the lawyer and perform less important tasks. What we used to say was that the lawyer and Nyayapathik are both specialists. The Nyayapathik is the specialist on what happens in the community, and the lawyer is a specialist on what happens in the court. Because a large part of what is going to happen in the court depends on the kinds of pressures and negotia- tions that are happening in the community prior to the case, it is the Nyayapathik who builds the relationship of trust and support for the victims and survivors. She is the one who takes informed consent and support from the victims and survivors, provides support in order to enable them to stand strong, and ultimately accom- plishes ‘sach bolo, saaf bolo’ in the court. Those are the major parts of our legal strategy as conceptualised under the Nyayagraha idea. MAB: How would you reflect on Nyayagraha from the perspective of your interventions and campaigns under the banner of Karwan-e-Mohabbat? One of the important themes in Nyayagraha was the expression of ethical courage, which among other things had the power to bring about moral change in institutional actors and even sometimes in the perpetrators. You have written about how initially the police officers disrespected and disregarded the Nyayapathiks. The Nyayapa- thiks were asked to stand in a corner and not allowed to collect documents for the cases. But eventually, even the police officers acknowledged their moral power. They started to treat the Nyayapathiks from ‘undisguised hostility to grudging respect.’66 This was very similar to how Gandhi imagined Satyagraha, in terms of bringing a change in the hearts and minds of the colonial oppressor. Has this succeeded from your experience with Karwan-e-Mohabbat? In your recent writings on the chal- lenges in dealing with the lynching cases, you note that there is complete absence of 64 Harsh Mander, ‘Broken Lives and Compromise: Shadow Play in Gujarat’ (2012) 47(8) Economic and Political Weekly 90. 65 See Zahira Habibullah Sheikh and Others v State of Gujarat and Others (2006) 3 SCC 374. 66 Harsh Mander, Fear and Forgiveness (Penguin India 2009) 166. 178 Jindal Global Law Review (2020) 11(1):157–179 1 3 any remorse or guilt on the part of perpetrators. Do you think the current moment reflects the limits of the Nyagraha approach? HM: A lot of my friends and comrades in the legal fraternity used to reflect a lot on this whole idea of the Nyayagraha approach. A significant proportion of them were never convinced about the strategy at all. In fact, Dr. Upendra Baxi67 and Dr. Ram Kumar were the few people who took it seriously, and engaged with some of these ideas at a reflective and contemplative level. The others thought that this busi- ness of engaging the ethical in the midst of this fraught and unequal legal battle makes it even harder to win the case. But I often had discussions with my largely working-class colleagues who became Nyayapathiks and Amanpathiks. I used to delight in the moral clarity of the discussions that we often had together. We actu- ally lost a very large number of cases that we fought. But my colleagues would say that we did not actually lose those cases, we won them in many ways. We won them because the victims and survivors and we stood together on a moral plane. They said that this was a battle against a sense of despair, against a communal pogrom that took away from them even the idea of their humanity and equal citizenship. And in the process of engaging in this battle, they reclaimed their sense of humanity and citizenship. The legal system does not work for the majority of poor people. It also did not work for us. But in the way we were able to engage it affirmed for us a sense of both humanity and citizenship. The victims and survivors were not simply witnesses who had been trained just before their statement, but people who were the drivers of a righteous, non-violent, democratic, morally bound battle for justice. In the end, it helps the victims and survivors — who are treated with the worst of indignity and inhumanity — to engage and assert themselves as moral agents. It was becoming a moral agent, about influencing your adversary to engage on moral terms. And therefore, however adverse the circumstances, I do believe that a true battle for justice and human rights has to be founded on the principles of truth, jus- tice, solidarity, and compassion. MAB: You have been a great chronicler through your stories. Recently in your writings on Karwan-e-Mohabbat, you invoke the powerful story of Maulana Rashidi,68 who lost his son in sectarian violence in Asansol but exhibited great cour- age by stopping people from his community from engaging in violence. There are numerous other powerful and inspiring stories you have written and spoken about. In your experience, what impact do these stories have on the readers and listen- ers, especially those who have suffered such gruesome violence? What role does this chronicling and storytelling have in building solidarities and in changing hearts? HM: It’s a great question. I am deeply committed to storytelling for many rea- sons. When she was given a lifetime achievement award at the Golden Globes, Meryl Streep talked about the importance of cinema as a form of storytelling and as a vehicle of empathy. Solidarity is founded on our capacity for empathy. I think 67 Upendra Baxi, ‘Review: Revisiting Gujarat 2002 with Harsh Mander’ (2010) 45(14) Economic and Political Weekly 32. 68 Harsh Mander, ‘Miracles in Asansol: As Coal City Burnt in Hatred, a Muslim Cleric and Hindu Tem- ple Healed With Love’ (Scroll.in, 12 April 2018). https://scroll.in/article/875325/miracles-in-asansol- as-coal-city-burnt-in-hatred-a-muslim-cleric-and-hindu-temple-healed-with-love. Accessed 14 August 2020. 179 1 3 Jindal Global Law Review (2020) 11(1):157–179 we have created a world between ourselves, with walls so high that it is harder and harder for us to even imagine what life would be for a person who lived in differ- ent circumstances from ourselves. This is why right now during the COVID-19 pandemic lockdown, middle class people — who are so comfortable — do not feel outrage that the poor people do not have houses that they can be locked in, cannot maintain social distancing, and cannot live without work. The fact that we have no empathy for people who live in very difficult circumstances is why we have so lit- tle solidarity. I consciously began storytelling when I joined as a faculty member at the Lal Bahadur Shastri Academy to train the young recruits to the civil services for three years from 1993 to 1996. I had taken upon myself to talk to them a lot about communal violence, and about Dalits, hunger, and deprivation. I found that people were not able to imagine what life is like for people in very different circumstances. That is when I started writing my first stories, which actually came together later in my first major publication called Unheard Voices.69 The book had the stories I wrote for my students in order to help them empathise with what it means to be Dalit, or a survivor of sectarian violence, or a woman who was gang raped. I have also seen the value in the process of sitting with a person who has suffered a great deal of injustice and whose very humanity has been assaulted. I often talk to my students about a triangle with which one needs to approach people who have suf- fered great injustice — respect, curiosity, and empathy. You have to be really inter- ested in that other person, you need to have unconditional respect for that person, and through this process of storytelling there is a construction of empathy. Then you begin to recognise that a human being is not a category to be studied. She is not a problem to be solved. She is not a cause to be upheld. As a social scientist, she is not a statistic to be gathered and analysed. She has her full humanity and individual dig- nity. And this is how we must approach her. So, while you are working with people affected by communal violence, each individual is coping with it in her own kind of way and own kind of understanding. To understand that experience, and to give it weight and respect, is very re-affirming or the person who has lived through that extreme suffering and injustice. They feel a sense of acknowledgement and affirma- tion. Many people have told me that the process by which we constructed a story together became a very important moment in their own lives. Those were moments of recognition, of reaffirmation to them about their own worth. Storytelling for me is also important because of this kind feeling, affirmation, and demonstration of respect and equality that it can at its best nurture. Publisher’s Note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. 69 Mander (n 1). Fighting impunity in hate crime — history, ethics, and the law: An interview with Harsh Mander Abstract 1 Introduction 2 Interview 
work_bwsxiltwznhrhjwfqzpm6v4du4	----	Index action plan orders, 26 roY'usarial process. 13,70,93 alcohol problems, 25. 133, 134, 147 Alliance ofNon-govemmenw Organizations, 130 ancientwodd.l11 anti·social behaviour, 45 anti-social bebaviourorders, 164, 167 apologies,42, 86, 88, 135, 140, 143, 147 Argentina,S7 Australia: Aboriginal courts, 163 c~utioningcase.61 fIl.cilitators,70 &milygroup confc.rcncing, 113, 127, 137 incrcas.ing use of prison, 185 indigenous culturcs CIlStomaty law, 131 definition of crime.. 157-60 dispua: Iesolution, 115, 145 murder of wome~, 153 QlIetlt II Gj. 157-60 restorative justice, 29,81 introduction, 117 police and, 167,184 regulation, 184- victim traumas, 139 ),oungoffe:nders.147,148 b.u, 164,169,171,173 begging,45 Bdgiwn, 129 Bentham,Jeremy,35 Biden,] 0, 92 Bhgg,H,116,145,184 Blair, Tooy,34,36 bootca.mps, 170 Bottoms,A,112,119-20,166,174 BougainviUe.82 Braithwaite,]ohn, SO, 79, 111, 166, 110-1, 174,175 Buddhism, 111 bureaucr4C)',142 Canada: circles of support and accountability, 38-9, 163 sentencing circles. 113,117, 163 cautions, coodicionai cautions, 27-8 Chile, 87 Christie, NiLs, 9, 105 circle sentenciog,113, 117, 163 circles of support and accountability, 38--9, 90 civill2w systeIIUl, victims' role, 9 civil society, 19,36, 37,105,120,166,174, 175 dans, 112, 145 <:1"',54,112, 149, 164, 165,167,172, 175 co-existeocC!; JUcomplemc:nt:ary-approaeb~ coercion: coercion·oooseotstratcgies,l64 communities and, 177 neo-liberalismand, 169 offcnders,146-7 quali£icddefence, 57-60 state, 106 victims, 135 Coker,D,154,l64 colonialism, 153-4, 176 commonsense, 105--6,108-9, 122,131,161, 185 communication skills, 147--8 coatmUflitat:iaoism: civil liberties and, 35, 37-8, 40 eul.y tte2tises, 4 meming, 35-6 motalism, 121 New Labour, 34-5, 36, 37 reintegration, focus on, 121, 185 ri!;$tontive justice and, 34--40, 69 state and, 37-9 communities: absence of, 54-5 2ppropriate:panicipaots,I6-17,50-1 barriers, S5-6 chaos, 21-2 concept, 16 critique, 174-77 cultural attitudes, 157-60 dialogue, 40 emptiness, 22 engaging, ~7 190 Index communities (amI.): exclusionary communities, 61-2, 175 frngmaltedcommunitics, 91-5 G!tIJ!itlIdJtIji,19,119-22 heart of restorative! justice, 16-25 informaisanctions, 36-7 pi_SED, 17 pseudo-<ommunities, 20-1 social capital, 53, 54 soci2l construction, 175 stages of commuaity-building. 20-3 throtened by crimes, ~ true conununicies, ~3 community conkrCllces, 45-6 community payback,. 32 co=munity service, 14, 32 complementary approllchc..~: boundaries of proportiOt12lity. 60-9 ClISe for, 44-50 domestic violence, 80 facilitators, 69-71 faunewo<k.5~72. 95. 169 pyramid approaches, 48, 79 quali..fied defroce of cocrcion, 57--60 retributive/ restorative dichotomy, 40-4, 94,104-5 scope, 4 unexplored theories, 106 conditional cautions, 27--8 Confucianism, 111 consensus, 20, 40, 64, 69, 78. 155, 160, 177 Cook.K.149 corponte crimes, 11 courts lei crirninlll justice or;:rirne reporting. 134- aime victim surveys. 113,134 crimes: corpOnltt'- crimes, 11 cultural definition, 157-60 harms and, t 1-13, 137-8 l2.w, state and. 103, 162-7 POliCe.l1Ild criminalisation, 167-9 crimr=s ggainsthum1Ilicy,81-9. 118-80 criminal justice: class, race and gender. 41,133,164 complementary approaches sr6 comple- mentary approaches crimes against human1ty, 83-4 domestic violence and, 75-6,153 early :u:gume.nts against, 4 failllIe.122--3 formalism, 37 historical development, 8-9 meming,2-3 neo-liberal politics and, 125 Persephone mode~ 41 Portiamode~41 recent legislation authoriml3J1 approach to resoontive justice,146 hot criminological climate) 71-2 hypaactivity, 11, 26, 28-9 punitive trend, 128, 161, 166-7, 169-74, 182-3 US-UKc.onvergence,126 retributiVe/restorative dichotomy, 40-4, 94,104-5 treauncntofvictims, 141-5 truth and, 186-7 criminology ofhopc, 30-4 Crowley.Jim, 92-3 out",,, JU a/SOindjgenous cultures communities~d, 175 definition of crime and. 157-60 domestic violence and,153-4, 175-6 curfews, 164,170 customary law, 114, 131, 180 llily, Kathy, 103-4,111, 113,139, 169, 186 de2thpenaity,81, 115, 187 dcliberariveaccouotability. 63-5, 69, 90-1 Denmark, 129 dcteuence,Z, 116, 124,130, lG9, 173 devdopmcntof restorative justice: early arguments, 3-4, 186 globalisation, 102-3, 125-32 invented aaditiom.178-S0 myths of origin. 10>.--4, 109--17 over_intl <l.ted chi.rns, 94, 103 reasuns for rise. 118-25 search for legitimacy. 103-4 dialogue: oommunication skills lind, 148 community dialogue, 40 faciliuting, 52, 56, 59 murderers anu,74, 81 normative or moraliswg. 121 process, 7-8, 6(j restorative justice and, z., ]4, 74 domestic violenCe! rommunityand, 18,175-6 a:imin.at justice system and, 7~ 153 feminism and, 77. 118 minority women, 153 ofl'e:nder/victim ino!qruiliti@" 150-4 restorative justice :and, 75-81 laking seriously, 75--6 drug problems, 134, 147,166 dt.'e process, 10, 47, 70, 80, 83, 84, 94-5, 150, 183 Duff.And:.ony.42 ECOSOC,130 empowerment, 74, 77,132, 135, 136 Etzioni,Amitai, 35 evidence rules., 143 exciusionarypolicies, 31-.3. 61-2, 93, lOG exile, 115,116,145 facifuators: ~ptil;\td~. 69-71 identifying communities, 17-18 role, 7-8. 137-8 fiImilygroup conferences, 7,29,38,46, 110, 113,127,136-7 fumily justice centres, 76 fcardimatc, 31-2 feminism, 75-6, 77, 108, 118, 148--9, 151, 17H fines, 45, 122, 184- Fi!l.I!l.od,129 Fmnce,129 ga'{dtDCOutCS, IS, 82, 84-6, 1.31, 178-80 Gorland,D, 107, 123 g=lted communities, 55 Gares, Henry Louis, 92.-3 gender: criminal justice and, 41, 164 polic,,,,,d, 167 {estirution find, 112 I"e$toTlitive jllsricellnd. 148-9 viol.e.nce against women, 75-81,150-4 genocide, 82,83,84,89, 178-80 globalisation of.ttstorarlve justice, 102-3, 125-32 GoeJ,R. 153 g«i6ti,17,45,53,61 Guantlinanto Bay Detention Camp, 32 GuaternaI., 87 banns: crimes and, 11-13, 137-8 defining, 4 hate crime, 155-6 restorative justice processes and, 7 hare crimes, 68-9,155-6 Index 191 h~irrn8.41.73,74,83,89.102,109.110.114. 132,134,136 Hennan,j, 141-5, 152 Hinduism, 111 homelessrtess, 75, 133, 1.34, 163, 166, 173 homicide, 81, 153 homophobia. 18. 68-9. 155 human rightS Jee QUO due process commuaitarianism and, 35, 37-8, 40 complementary approaches, 95 gross abuses, 81-9 rights-ba~ed lI.pproach to restorative j1,lst- ice, 160 hybrid systeros, 15, 82, 85, 86 iOlmigrams, :,32, J3, 124, 176 incapacitation, 2, 31, 107, 124, 169, 170, 171, 173 incommensurability,157-60 indigenous cultures: colonialism and, 176 definition of crime, 157-60 disputeresolmion, 110-11, 113--17,145 invented traditions, 178--80 youths and restorative jllstice, 186 individualism, 40, 55 infonnal sanctions, 36-7 International Centre forTraositional Justice (let)), 178, 181 lntemational Criminal Court, 86 ictem:uional criminal bw, 84, 86 International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 84,86 Intenllltional Crimi.nal TributULl for the Former Yugoslavia, 86 international humanitarian law, 86 Tntemet, 16 Inuit. 115 invented traditions. 178-80 Jones, Trevor, 126 just deserts principle, 60-1. 62, 103, 170, 183 Katstedt, Susanne, 43-4, 127 Kcyncsianism, 166 law,1'olc,162-7 law and order strategies, 34-5, 124, 125, 166-7 libeny,3H Lundy, P, 181-2 lynching, 62 192 Index MeCold., Paul, 1-2 McConville, Michael, 30 McGovl::tn,M,181-2 MljO!,Jolm,3S managerialism.119.120, 12B. 166. 169 Maoriculm.re.l10,117 marginaliSCd<:ommunlties, 70,165,166,172, 174-5 Marshall, Tony, 1,102 Marxism, 94 Megan's law, 31 memorials, 85, S6 mental illness, 134,147, 163, 174-5 minor oFfences: [estorative justice and, 5,26, 48, 72,172 victims aod,134 yomh offenders, U zero-tolerance policing anu, 168--9 misogyny. 156 mitigation evidence, 13 moral certainty, 122, 131,170,185 mocalism,121, 125, 185 Mugabc., Robed., 89 Muncie,J, 127 myths of origin, 103-4, 109-17 naming and shaming IU sbaming Navajo Nation. 114-15, 154 neighbour disputes. 45. 118. 125 rn:ighbouthood watch schemes.53,I23, 125 neo·liber.iliS[Il, 101, 12.,....5.127, 165,169, 173 noo-marxism,108 neutralisation techniques, 67~. 78 New Zealand: family group conferencing. 110, 127, 136-7 ~nous culblre, t 13 introduction of restorative justice, 116-17 serious offences, 73 youngoffi:nders, 29, 36 Newbum, Tun. 126 NgacinamanLaw, 157--60 non-citizens, .32 NouhtlQ.lrdand,29,182 Norway,129 Obo..., B_1., 91-2, 93 O'Connell, '1'_, 81 offendera JU d/so young offenders accounmbili ty, 7, 10, 21, 39, 52, 66,75, 119,121,170,173 acknowi<:dgm<:nt of offences, 44, 59 as victims, 134, 162-3 coercion, 146-7 dialogue with victims sn dialogue gender issues, 148-9 bbelJing, 133 neuttalisa.tion techniques, 67-8,78 offender-victim relationships lute crimcs • .6~9, 155--6 incommensurability, 157~.GO inc:qU2lities, 150-7 social inequality, 156--7 violence ag.riastwomcn, 75-81, 150-4 :;:eparation J84 reparation ~~ation,24-5,33,37,52 restorative jw:tice and, 132 critique, 146-9 focus on., 136 viewofaffendetS,121 shaming, 164 social conteJet, 12--13 stereotypes, 133-4 vicLim-ofbdCLbarric:n, 10--11 O'Malley, P,170, 183 Orientalism,116 othedng, 11,31-3,37, 107, 116 parenting orders, 164 parenbi.56-7 Pashukaois, E"'geny, 104 paternalism., 76,129 patriarchy,77,175-6 peace-making, 113,1 14, 154 physical punishm,m, 115-16 pilot studies, 28, 73-4.128.168 police: access to restorative justice and, 147, 167 as facilitators, 70 criminalisarion aod,167-9 de~nninationof guilt, 146--7 dome3tic violence wd, 75-6 increasedpo~-et$, 164., 167 public oroer offences and. 141 restorative justicemd, lOG, 167-8, 184 unaccountability, 167 zero-toletllJlcc.policing, 126,128, 16~9, 171 pollution, 1 t posocolanial..i:;m, t OS, 153, 176 postmodetnism, 108 poverty,11 powermequ;11ities, 108, 150-7, 177 Putt.),170 pte.modem penality, 111, 170 pre-sote societie$. 104, 110-11 , 117 prison: ·academia and, 33-4 es:ciusioIWY effect. 93 mass imprisonment, 107, 161, 164,16~7, 173,185 'prison works,' 28, 174 priwtisations,l26 reh2bilit:!.tion, 51 US and UK populations, 31 YOWlgoff"enders, 172-3 pri~tisttions,124, 126, 156, 165, 166 p,o-5oci,] behaviour, 25, 51, 52, 53, 56 probation officer.;, 51 probation services, 2. 3, 43, 71 PIOportiOtWity of punishme.nc ab:a.ndoning, 170 complementary appco3che.s Mel. 60-9 Uldigenous societies. 116 justomm,60-1,62, 103,170,183 reston.tive justice and. 50, 94, 183 retributive justic!:, 41 Rw=I2,84 public opinion., 62 punishmenc: pbilosophies,63 proportioo.ali.ty Itt proportionality of pun· ishmeot puaitive trend. 121:1, 161,166-7, 16,...74, 182-3 riskand, 171--4 pyWllid approaches~ 48, 79 qU2.lity of life offences, 45-6 Deism. 45, 92, 133, 15~, I64, 167,172, 175 recidivism, 49, 73,107,168 refcttalorders,27,129,146 relubilitation: p=digm. 2, 130 prison.,St ttStor.l.tive justice. 42-3, 113,169,170 .lUft £rom, 124 reintegration: ceremonies, 145 communita..c:WUsm, 121,185 complc01wtaryltpprollches,80 COc.cept, 50-1 d~th penalty and, 81 hannNl communiti~, 53-4 hybrid systel!1$, 86 .indigenous culrw:es and, 116, 145, 159 Index 193 objective, 2, 19 parents and, 56-7 po_odan pemlity, 170 pre.condjtions, 24, 89 procedures,27 reincegnuive shaming, 120,133,149 'llwnes V1ilI.c:y scheme, 39 re.tigiO\lS communities, 54 reparation: comp<lli.bi1ity,65 crimes 2f?inst humanity, 85, 86 domestic vioJence and, 151 gOfot"D"courts, 85 indigenous cultwes and, 116 morality Mel, 122 posanodcro potUlity, 170 pre-.&t2te socil!:ties, 111_1 2 proporoonau: reparation agreements, 60. 61,6~S restorative justice. 42 SA'l'RC,88 t::r:ansitional justice, 178 victim--onertt.ed,112 repara.uoo orders, ~ 146 repentance, 42 resoc.ialisation, 24-5. 33, 37,52 respect, testorttive jllstice and, 74, 75 responsibilisation.123-5, 165, 169, 173. 17<>-7 restitution m reparation restorative justice: communiarianism fttcomrnuniwiaoi.s.m complementary appfOJ.chcS IU comple~ mc:ntary approaches Core vt\lue5,40, 74,102 defitrltion, 1-2,102 development Judevclopmttlt of restOra· tivejusticc divctSion.122 divetsityof pmc:tices., 101-2 inclusiorwy emphasjs, 40 inte.mational business, 102-3,125-32 objectives, 6-7, 136, 169-70 pen>! policy framewoclt. 169-74 pre-(;oodirions, 89, 90-1 processes, 7-8 retributive/restOrative dichotomy I 40-4, 94,104-5 schobuship, 30-4,101 social movement, 183 theory v practice, 6, 26-40, 186 retribution: intemational justice, 8:>.-4 194 Index retribution (Cl)l1t.): just: desertS principle, 60--1, 62, 103,170, 183 paradigm. 3, 130 proportionality m proportionality of pun- ishmem rc:;toIlltivc justice and, 169-70 [etDbutive/tt:stOratlve dichotOmy. 40-4, 94,104-5 shift to, 124 Richards, K, 112-13, 122-3, 135 risk society, 32-3, 40, 107, 169, 171-4 Robben Island, 140 Rock,P,113 Rose,N,176 Rw.tnda: gd .. lJrpeourts. 15, 82, 84-6, 131, 178-80 public excl;UtiOns. 83 Sarah's law, 31 schoo~, 17,45,46-7,102-3 Scott Peck, Morgan.. 19-23 "ripC>, 133,138, 143, 148, 149,181,185 self-detc:nninatioD,117,118 sentencing $et QlIo prison cir.cle. sentencing, 163 COotcxtu:ill information, 43 clisproportionality,50 indetem:rinate sentences, 172 public opinion and, 62-3 pymmid :1ppt02ches. 48,79 re!>tonlcive justice:mel, 163 young offenders, 17 2-3 sentencing cizcles.ll.3. 117, 163 serious offences: crimes ag:alnsthumanity, 81-9, 178-80 domestic violenc::e, 75--81 homicide, 81 limits of restorative justice, 89-91 meaning. 72 restorative justice and, 49-50, 72-91, 172 ~tionaljustic~ 177-83 victim traumas, 138-41 sex offenders, 31, 38-9, 126,162,172 sc:xual violence, 81, 90--1, 138, 150, 152, 157-9 slwning. 31,115,120, 128, 133,145,149, 164,170-1 Shennan.La~enc~ lZ7 shuttlemediatiOD, 7.14. 59,61 sink estates, S6 socW capital, 53, 54 socilllconnectedness, 122, 131, 185 sochU engineering, S l-? social ineqwlity, 156-7 social justice. 11-12 social movements,11S,I86 social solidarity, 125, 177 South Afric:;a: apologi~, 140 TRC,82, 87-$, 102,178, 180-1 Spoin, 129 spo=r, 54 stakeholders,2, 8 sure! coercion, tOG commuaitarianism and, 37- 9 criminal justice and, 9 exdl.lsive deUnition of cmne, 103 Keynesianism,166 neo-liberalgovemance,l23-5 nightwatchman state, 166 pte-state: societies, 104, 110-11, 117 quasi-represenuti ... es, 185 rcguiation of restorative juscice, 106-7, 137--1!,165,184 .regulatory state, 166 u:prC!ltllLaUves, 7, 8, 137,138,185 role, 5, 162-7 state/civil society dichotomy, 105 stigmatisaaon, 32, 150, 152 sti~diuy magistr.l.lCS, 71 Stop and si!:U'Ch powcn, 167 Stubbs,J,156 T aoism, 111 TbJimcs Valley, 38-9, 70,127,136 ThatCher, Margaret,35 Timor Lesa=, 82, 182 TOnnics, Perdirwld, 19 transitionaljustic.e,15,82, 102, 177-83 truth,64, 83, 86, 109,112,117,179, 183--7 truth commissions, 15, 82, 178,180--2 Tsvangirai, Morgan, 89 Tutu, De:smond, 180 Umbte:it, Mark, 81 une:mployment, 11,165,172 United Nations, 30, 109, 115, 129-30 United StateS: crimi.o..a.ljustice, 126, 128 deolh p=>Ity, 81 dom~tic vio1ene<:, t 53 indigenonsculture:s, 113, 114-15. 154 Megan's law, 31 prison population, 31 racism, 92 rep:w.tion agreements, 61 restorative justice, 29, 81 sex offend~[S, 31 victims' rolc, 9,10 universalism,tO?, 109,131, 182, 185 Van Ness, Dan. 1-29 vandalism, 45 victim compensll.tloa orders, 14-15 victim impact statemcnts, 14-15, 43 victimsuppon services, 14-15 vktlms: 18th-cenwry England, 8 2S witne:lscs, 9. 143 civil law s~t'e[[1$, 9 closure, 59, 132 . coero.ao, 135 caaditioa.a1 cautions md, 27 crime victim surveys, 113,134 crimes ag.UI'lSl humanity and, 85-6 dialogue with offenders #r.dialogue empowenncu, 132. 135, 136, 142 healing II. healing ruslorical development of criInincl. justic~ 8--9 ideal victims, 132, 133-4 in"lU3lity,112 intemational criminal law Atld, 86 labelling. 133 offender-victim relationships hate crimes, 68.--9,155-6 inoommensunbility,157--60 inequalities, 15~7 socia1int:quality,15~7 violence~stwomen, 75-81,150-4 offende..rs as, 134,162-3 participation Jevels, 134-7 publiconi~toffcnecsand,140-1 radical feminism and, 77 reparation to 1« reparation rc;p.rqenLOl.tivc-'1, 18, 43. 141, 144, I SS ftstocative justice and usessmentofbene6c, 141-5 er:itiql.l~,132, 134--45 satisfaction., 132,144 ,haming.152, 159 stereotypeS. 133-4 stigma, 152 telling their stories, 142-3 traumas, 138-41 1l1dex 195 vengeful victims, 61-2, 66-7 victim-offender barricr:!l,10-11 victims' right move:me.nt, 112-13 viole:nce against women, 150-4 voluntarine:ss.57-9 Youth Offende:~P3..ncls Md,27 vittualcOtnmunities,16 vQIW)~riness, 57-60, 146--7 Wachtel, Ted,l-2 W::&ldman, E, 139, 140 Waluorf,L,179,181 WalkIate., S, 127 war c.rirn es, 82 "'hat woxks agenda.' 34, 127-8 Williams, N, t 45 Wright, M,136 x~ophobia, 175 Yolgt'lu people, 115, 145 young offenders: action plan orders, 26 apologies, 147 communication skills, 147--8 'rera.l youths,' 28, 56 indigenouscultw:eti,l86 minorv serious offenders, 172 Ne:wLabourpolicies, 127 New Zealand, 29,38 Northem Ixe1and, 29 parmts' rolein restorative justice., 56-7 . prison, 172-3 publicorderoffcnccs, 140-1 refe:nal orden, 27, 129, 146 rep:mtion orot:r::i, 26 resaciali.s2tion,52 lestorative justice and,S, 12~1 minority youths, 168 victims' reacdons, l44~5 victim participation, 136 whatwotks agenda, 127 ),Ou.U1 offcndq- p~m:h, 27, 129 yauch offe:nding teams, 26 youth res:o:a.tive disposals (YRDs), 2B YOllth SeMce Level Cue ~semcnt InventolY.171-2 Zeh<, How=!, 40. 41 zero-tolewu:e policing, 126, 128,1~9, 171 Zimbabwe:, 89-90 
work_bxddiih6qvgg3ka3mamwuzaesy	----	PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE This article was downloaded by: [Bleich, Erik] On: 24 May 2011 Access details: Access Details: [subscription number 937670747] Publisher Routledge Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37- 41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~content=t713433350 The Rise of Hate Speech and Hate Crime Laws in Liberal Democracies Erik Bleicha a Political Science, Middlebury College, Online publication date: 16 May 2011 To cite this Article Bleich, Erik(2011) 'The Rise of Hate Speech and Hate Crime Laws in Liberal Democracies', Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 37: 6, 917 — 934 To link to this Article: DOI: 10.1080/1369183X.2011.576195 URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2011.576195 Full terms and conditions of use: http://www.informaworld.com/terms-and-conditions-of-access.pdf This article may be used for research, teaching and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, re-distribution, re-selling, loan or sub-licensing, systematic supply or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents will be complete or accurate or up to date. The accuracy of any instructions, formulae and drug doses should be independently verified with primary sources. The publisher shall not be liable for any loss, actions, claims, proceedings, demand or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material. http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~content=t713433350 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2011.576195 http://www.informaworld.com/terms-and-conditions-of-access.pdf The Rise of Hate Speech and Hate Crime Laws in Liberal Democracies Erik Bleich Since the 1960s, many liberal democracies have instituted laws that penalise hate speech and hate crimes in ways that limit the freedom for racists to express themselves. This article examines the legislation and enforcement of provisions against incitement to racial hatred, Holocaust denial, and crimes motivated by racial bias in Western Europe and the United States. Viewed over time, the pace of change has more closely resembled a slow creep than a slippery slope, and the extent of legislation and enforcement has differed across countries in different domains. This article documents the trend and highlights causes for concern, yet concludes that it is possible to enact and enforce laws that limit these forms of racism without being overly inimical to freedom of expression and opinion. Keywords: Freedom; Speech; Expression; Hate Crime; Racism; Holocaust Denial Freedom of expression and freedom of opinion have been cornerstones of the liberal project for centuries. From the 1689 English Bill of Rights to the 1948 United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, they have been enshrined and extended in constitutional and international law. 1 They have also been vigorously defended by thinkers such as John Stuart Mill, whose famous 1859 treatise On Liberty includes the bold assertion that ‘there ought to exist the fullest liberty of professing and discussing, as a matter of ethical conviction, any doctrine, however immoral it may be considered’ (Mill 1991: 20). This liberal standpoint has found absolutist supporters in the United States Supreme Court, and has drawn sympathy among scholars and citizens who subscribe to the view that ‘I may disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it’. Yet, as central as they are to the liberal project, freedom of speech and of opinion have never been sacrosanct values. Mill’s own ‘harm principle’ establishes guidelines for expression that can be justifiably limited by law, and his contributions have Erik Bleich is Associate Professor of Political Science at Middlebury College. Correspondence to: Prof. E. Bleich, Middlebury College, Middlebury, VT 05753, USA. E-mail: ebleich@middlebury.edu. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies Vol. 37, No. 6, July 2011, pp. 917�934 ISSN 1369-183X print/ISSN 1469-9451 online/11/060917-18 # 2011 Taylor & Francis DOI: 10.1080/1369183X.2011.576195 D o w n l o a d e d B y : [ B l e i c h , E r i k ] A t : 1 7 : 4 8 2 4 M a y 2 0 1 1 formed the basis for more than a century and a half of debate about just where to draw the line around permissible speech. This article contributes to this ongoing discussion through an empirical examination of how liberal democratic states have limited such freedoms when they take the form of racist expression or racist opinion- as-motive. 2 It examines the trajectory of laws against hate speech and hate crimes in Western Europe and in the US in order to judge the extent to which freedom of speech and of opinion have been constrained when they conflict with injunctions against racism. Overall it has become much riskier to express or to act upon provocatively racist thoughts in contemporary multi-racial, multi-ethnic and multi-faith democracies. Values such as community cohesion, public order, human dignity and psychological harm have been invoked as counterweights to freedom in order to justify restrictions on racism. 3 To illustrate this value shift, the first section of this article retraces the steps West European countries took between the 1920s and the 1990s to penalise racist sentiments. Between 1960 and 1990, in particular, many countries enacted specific laws against forms of racist speech such as incitement to racial hatred and Holocaust denial. These laws have limited the ability of individuals to express their racist beliefs. In the domain of incitement, the US has been the exception to this international rule by progressively elevating the value of free speech over protections against racist language. The second section highlights legislation and policy-making over the past two decades that have created additional limitations on the freedom to be racist. This is particularly visible in punishments for hate crimes*defined as crimes motivated by racial, ethnic or religious bias. In most cases, laws against hate crimes punish the underlying crime (such as vandalism or assault), but then supplement the sentence with an additional penalty for the perpetrator’s racist opinion when it serves as a motive for the crime. The effect is to penalise opinions that are seen as especially harmful because they are a central element in the commission of a crime. In this domain, the US has been at the forefront of developing legislation, with European countries more recently following suit. West European countries have also established or proposed additional provisions in the past few years that limit free expression in order to punish statements deemed racially, ethnically or religiously divisive. These include a British law prohibiting incitement to religious hatred and potential French legislation that may forbid denial of the Armenian genocide. The third section of this article examines prosecutions and legal penalties. It shows that the enforcement of provisions restricting the freedom to be racist has not been draconian. In most cases, judicious enforcement has meant that hate speech and hate crime provisions are not as inimical to freedom of expression and opinion as some might fear. However, in the conclusion I suggest that some of the recently proposed restrictions on free speech should raise red flags for those who seek a sustainable balance between free expression and limitations on racist speech. Although there has not been a slippery-slope effect, the slow creep away from freedom of expression and 918 E. Bleich D o w n l o a d e d B y : [ B l e i c h , E r i k ] A t : 1 7 : 4 8 2 4 M a y 2 0 1 1 of opinion is a significant limit of the liberal state that deserves close attention and extensive debate. Developments in Europe and the United States between the 1920s and the 1990s There were few meaningful legal restrictions on racist expressions in pre-World War Two Europe. Openly anti-Semitic newspapers such as Der Stürmer and L’Antijuif flourished in Weimar Germany and Third Republic France, as did anti-Semitic books and articles in mainstream newspapers (Brustein 2003; Schor 1992; Showalter 1982). 4 One of the few attempts to legislate against racist speech came in 1936, when backbench British law-makers proposed outlawing incitement to racial or religious prejudice in light of the rabble-rousing behaviour of Oswald Mosely’s British Union of Fascists. MPs opposed to such language argued that it would restrict criticism of churches and of Germany and France (Hansard, Commons, v. 318, cc. 639�40), the latter presumably on the grounds that such criticism might incite prejudice against the German or French ‘races’. Speaking for the government, the Attorney General rejected the proposed wording on the grounds that neutral, catch-all language banning incitement to disorder was more in keeping with legal precedent and, moreover, encompassed racial and religious incitement, making such narrow wording too limiting (Hansard, Commons, v. 318, cc. 643). These arguments won the day and the proposed amendment to ban incitement to racial or religious prejudice was rebuffed. Laws against racial incitement are now quite common and uncontroversial across Europe. Yet, as the British example suggests, they must not be viewed as preordained. Even in the early 1960s, Britain’s Conservative government refused to pass a law against racial incitement, ignoring the call to action of a 1962 petition with 430,000 signatures. Home Office bureaucrats maintained that such a law was unworkable and attempted to persuade the newly elected Labour government of 1964 to refrain from enacting one. Home Secretary Frank Soskice eventually overrode this argument by justifying the measure as a tool for immigrant integration, aiming thus to prevent Britain from establishing a ‘distinction between first- and second-class citizens and the disfigurement which can arise from inequality of treatment and incitement to feelings of hatred directed to the origins of particular citizens’ (Hansard, Commons, v. 711, c. 926). The House of Commons devoted substantial time to debating this law, with the Conservative spokesperson moving an amendment to halt debate on the bill which introduced ‘a new principle into the law affecting freedom of speech’ (Hansard, Commons, v. 711, c. 943). In spite of these objections, the 1965 Race Relations Act (Section 6) rendered it illegal to intentionally use threatening, abusive or insulting language likely to stir up hatred against sections of the British public on the grounds of colour, race, or ethnic/national origins. Over the years, this legislative principle has been extended several times. Many of these were codified in the 1986 Public Order Act, which grants protection to groups defined by nationality (including citizenship) and which eases the requirements for proving transgressions by eliminating the need for Journal of Ethnic and Racial Studies 919 D o w n l o a d e d B y : [ B l e i c h , E r i k ] A t : 1 7 : 4 8 2 4 M a y 2 0 1 1 both intent and likelihood to be present in the utterance*now either is sufficient (Bindman 1992: 259�60; Douglas-Scott 1994: 317; Sherr 1993).5 Germany acted more quickly in the postwar era to establish penalties for expressing or inciting racism. It did so in part through banning the use of Nazi rhetoric and symbols. Article 86 of the criminal code prohibits National Socialist propaganda that seeks to undermine the democratic order, while Article 86a forbids symbols such as Nazi flags, swastikas and the ‘Heil Hitler!’ salute (Wetzel 1993: 87). 6 Moreover, in 1960, Parliament unanimously voted*through a reform of Article 130 of the criminal code*to make it illegal to incite hatred, to provoke violence, or to insult, ridicule or defame ‘parts of the population’ in a manner apt to breach the public peace (Stein 1986: 283). While this provision did not specifically identify actions based on racism, its intent was clear to all parties*it was passed following a wave of synagogue and cemetery desecrations and in the wake of the courts’ failure to punish a Hamburg businessman who distributed tracts decrying the role of ‘international Jewry’ (Stein 1986: 282; Whitman 2000: 1337�8). Since that time, the criminal code has been supplemented with provisions that also prohibit racist publications. 7 The French government passed its landmark anti-racism law in 1972 after almost a decade and a half of mounting political pressure (Bleich 2003: 114�41; Errera 1992). Even as it prepared to enact legislation, prominent political leaders such as Minister of Justice René Pleven and Chairman of the National Assembly Law Committee Jean Foyer argued that no specific legislation against racial incitement was required. Yet, the 1972 law contained extensive provisions, banning not only defamation* technically outlawed by the 1939 Marchandeau decree, although its provisions were abrogated by the Vichy regime and went virtually unenforced in the postwar decades*but also provocation to hatred or violence based on ethnicity, nationality, race or religion. During the run-up to its passage, with the writing on the wall, even the skeptical Jean Foyer admitted that ‘It is nevertheless true that racist-inspired acts are particularly odious and that it may therefore be useful to foresee a specific punishment against them’. 8 All told, therefore, racial incitement provisions in the major European democracies originated primarily in the 1960s and 1970s, and not earlier, as might be supposed. Laws forbidding Holocaust denial are perhaps the most controversial limitation on freedom of expression to have flourished over the past few decades. These statutes make it illegal to deny the Holocaust took place, to downplay its extent, or to excuse the fact that it happened. Austria established such prohibitions by passing its Verbotsgesetz in 1947. The law was amended in 1992 and formed the basis for the highly publicised 2006 conviction of British historian David Irving, who asserted during a 1989 trip to Austria that there had been no gas chambers at Auschwitz, that Hitler had tried to protect Jews not murder them, and that Kristallnacht was carried out by agitators dressed as Nazis instead of by the Nazi party. Other countries have followed Austria’s path in enacting bans on Holocaust denial but, again, not in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War. Germany established its proto- provisions in 1985 and codified them in 1994, France acted in 1990 and Belgium in 920 E. Bleich D o w n l o a d e d B y : [ B l e i c h , E r i k ] A t : 1 7 : 4 8 2 4 M a y 2 0 1 1 1995. Among long-standing liberal democracies, Luxembourg and Israel also have such laws on their books. 9 In Germany and France, several influential political and societal leaders have acknowledged the controversial nature of these provisions. In the Bundestag debate surrounding the 1985 law, a liberal (FDP) member took particular pains to note that his party grudgingly supported this bill, but recognised that it placed limits on freedom of opinion (Stein 1986: 310). Prominent German legal scholars such as Winfried Brugger (2003) have also taken a stand against the provision. In France, several leaders of the conservative RPR party, as well as nationally known historians, publicly lamented that the measure smacked of establishing an ‘official history’ that would undermine principles of free academic research and might even give credibility to revisionist theses (Bleich 2003: 162�3). This line of criticism was vigorously pursued in recent years with the proposed passage of additional laws related to slavery, colonialism and the Armenian genocide (Weil 2007). A closer examination of the German case helps to reveal the rationale behind penalising Holocaust denial. 10 German constitutional logic differentiates between ‘high-value speech’, ‘low-value speech’ and ‘non-speech’ (Brugger 2003: 8). The expression of deep personal convictions in the political sphere is considered high- value speech, and as such it is to be strongly protected. However, when such expressions have significant negative consequences, they may be downgraded to the status of low-value speech, at which point free speech is no longer necessarily the preeminent value. In these cases, the courts weigh the importance of freedom of expression against its detrimental effect on other constitutional values such as dignity, honour, equality, the protection of young people, public peace and civility (Brugger 2003: 9). Brugger argues that the German government clearly sees ‘the right to speech [as] limited by the perceived higher value of eliminating all kinds of racism in the broadest sense’ (2003: 39). 11 Looking beyond individual European states, it is important to note that international institutions are also extremely supportive of laws against racism, even if they impinge upon free speech. United Nations documents portray freedom of expression as one core right among several, and one which can be limited in the face of other imperatives (Walker 1994: 87�90). The 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Art. 20, para. 2), for example, holds that ‘Any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law’. The 1966 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Articles 4a and 4b) goes even further, stating that signatory countries should ‘condemn [i.e. outlaw or ban] all propaganda and all organizations which are based on ideas or theories of superiority of one race or group of persons of one colour or ethnic origin, or which attempt to justify or promote racial hatred and discrimination in any form’, thereby targeting not only speech, but also associations. Only a handful of countries have expressed reservations about these articles when ratifying these documents (Walker 1994: 89� 90), suggesting the widespread international acceptance of these principles. Journal of Ethnic and Racial Studies 921 D o w n l o a d e d B y : [ B l e i c h , E r i k ] A t : 1 7 : 4 8 2 4 M a y 2 0 1 1 As a number of scholarly texts emphasise, the United States has been the most prominent exception to this trend toward limiting racist speech (Bird 2000; Delgado and Stefancic 1997; Gould 2005; Greenawalt 1995; Haiman 1981; Walker 1994). Most casual observers*particularly Americans*believe that the US has always been the citadel of free expression, having enshrined the principle in the First Amendment of the Constitution which proclaims in part that ‘Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech’. Yet, between the early 1940s and the early 1950s, the US enabled significant restrictions on freedom of expression that are little-remembered today. In the 1942 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire decision*315 US 568 (1942)*the Supreme Court developed its ‘fighting words’ doctrine, meant to define the limits of free speech when such expressions were likely to generate a breach of the peace. At the time, fighting words were defined as those that ‘by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace’. This formulation could easily have become the foundation for limiting speech that incited hatred or caused grievous offence across racial, ethnic or religious lines. A decade later, the 1952 Beauharnais v. Illinois ruling*343 US 250, 252 (1952)* upheld the constitutionality of group libel statutes, which punished injurious statements directed at racial or religious groups which would expose ‘the citizen of any race, colour, creed or religion to contempt, derision or obloquy or which is productive of breach of the peace or riots’ (quoted in Greenawalt 1995: 60). In the case in question, the leader of the White Circle League of America was convicted for circulating literature decrying the ‘rapes, robberies, knives, guns and marijuana of the negro’. Sympathy for such laws reached a peak in the context (and in the wake) of interwar American race riots and the atrocities of the Nazi era (Walker 1994). These laws were never extremely popular*only a few states enacted such statutes, and proposals for legislation in Congress did not make much headway (Haiman 1981: 90). But in delivering the 5�4 decision on the Beauharnais case, Justice Felix Frankfurter drew on a logic that would be familiar to contemporary European advocates of restricting racist speech when he wrote: [I]f an utterance directed at an individual may be the object of criminal sanctions, we cannot deny to a State power to punish the same utterance directed at a defined group unless we can say that this is a willful and purposeless restriction unrelated to the peace and well-being of the State. Illinois did not have to look beyond her own borders or await the tragic experience of the last three decades to conclude that willful purveyors of falsehood concerning racial and religious groups promote strife and tend powerfully to obstruct the manifold adjustments required for free, ordered life in a metropolitan, polyglot community. 12 If the sentiments underpinning the Chaplinsky and Beauharnais decisions had come to dominate American discourse, the position of the US on free speech may have become quite similar to those of its European liberal democratic counterparts. 922 E. Bleich D o w n l o a d e d B y : [ B l e i c h , E r i k ] A t : 1 7 : 4 8 2 4 M a y 2 0 1 1 But, between the late 1940s and the 1970s, the Supreme Court backtracked from this logic (Douglas-Scott 1994: 316�7; Gould 2005: 19�20; Walker 1994: 105�13). In the 1949 Terminiello v. Chicago decision*337 US 1, 4 (1949)*the Court overturned the conviction of a defrocked Catholic priest whose zealous anti-Semitism spurred a Chicago crowd to begin throwing rocks through windows. Instead of holding him accountable for an immediate breach of the peace, Justice William O. Douglas wrote for the 5�4 majority that provocative speech ‘may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger’. The 1969 Brandenburg v. Ohio decision*395 US 444 (1969)*established the principle that incitement to violence could only be proscribed if it was likely to produce imminent lawless action and not merely if it advocated violence in general terms or at a later time, thereby strictly limiting state prosecutions for incitement. 13 Finally, the death knell for group libel provisions was sounded in 1978, when the Supreme Court let stand the voiding of a Skokie, Illinois, city ordinance that prohibited ‘dissemination of any material . . . which promotes and incites hatred against persons by reason of their race, national origin, or religion, and is intended to do so’ (quoted in Walker 1994: 123�4). In the wake of this decision, a small group of American Nazis was granted permission to march through a town that was over 50 per cent Jewish and which contained almost 5,000 Holocaust survivors*though the group eventually decided not to carry out its march in Skokie (Walker 1994: 122). Decisions such as these signalled that even words that offend or inflict injury or that may lead to a breach of the peace have been interpreted as constitutionally protected forms of free speech in the US. 14 In most liberal democracies, however, the trend has been the opposite*to limit expression that is deemed harmful on racial, ethnic or religious grounds. There have been almost no parallels to the American model of moving to permit racist speech that was once forbidden. Recent Developments in the United States and Europe If the United States has taken steps to permit racist speech that was once forbidden, it has also taken the lead in developing hate crime statutes that enhance penalties for crimes ‘motivated by bias toward individuals or groups based on particular status characteristics such as race, religion, ancestry, sexual orientation, or gender’ (Jenness and Grattet 2001: 77). Most of these laws boost punishment for underlying crimes (such as assault, vandalism or intimidation) carried out because of biased motives which the state deems particularly opprobrious. The criminal act is technically the target of the penalties. But sentences can be supplemented if the perpetrator is motivated by racism, meaning that indications of racist opinions or ideologies are in effect independently punished if they are exhibited during (or sometimes even before or after) the act. Frequently, the most damning evidence that a crime is motivated by illegitimate bias consists of the perpetrator’s expressions, such Journal of Ethnic and Racial Studies 923 D o w n l o a d e d B y : [ B l e i c h , E r i k ] A t : 1 7 : 4 8 2 4 M a y 2 0 1 1 as the hurling of a racial epithet at a victim during an assault or the use of anti- Semitic graffiti when vandalising property. Fierce legal and scholarly debates have erupted over whether such laws punish opinion and expression or whether they simply penalise conduct (see Jacobs and Potter 1998; Lawrence 1999). In its landmark 1992 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul decision*505 US 377, 392�5 (1992)*the Supreme Court struck down a city ordinance that prohibited symbols that knowingly arouse anger, alarm or resentment on the basis of race, colour, creed, religion or gender. Writing the majority opinion, Justice Scalia held that the ordinance prohibited racist speech and biased beliefs and thus unfairly chose sides against the idea of racial prejudice (Lawrence 1999: 86�8). Following the R.A.V. decision, the supreme court of Wisconsin invalidated its state- level hate crime provisions on the grounds that they impermissibly punished racist thought, thereby violating First Amendment protections (169 Wis. 2d 153, 485 N.W. 2d 807; Lawrence 1999: 88�9). But the US Supreme Court overturned this ruling in its 1993 Wisconsin v. Mitchell decision*508 US 476 (1993). It reasoned that the Wisconsin statute against aggravated battery motivated by racism in fact penalised the conduct of the perpetrator, not his thought or expression. Yet, this seems a distinction without a difference, for the disputed element was not the battery but rather the racial bias that motivated the perpetrator. Following the Supreme Court’s decision*508 US 476 (1993)*a young man who was convicted of a crime that normally carries a two-year maximum penalty was sentenced to four years (out of a new maximum of seven years, under the provisions of the hate crime statute) because he selected his victim on the basis of race. In spite of their potential to infringe on freedom of opinion and expression, almost every US state now has a hate crime law on the books. Washington and Oregon were innovators in this domain, enacting laws in 1981. Four states passed legislation in 1982, and two more did so in 1983. By 1990, 28 states had hate crime laws, and by 1998 that number had risen to 41 (Jenness and Grattet 2001: 74; cf. Lawrence 1999: 178�89). The US federal government has also passed hate crime laws, including the Hate Crimes Sentencing Enhancement Act (HCSEA) of 1994, which identifies eight crimes for which judges are allowed to lay on additional penalties if the defendant acted ‘because of the actual or perceived race, color, religion, national origin, ethnicity, gender, disability, or sexual orientation of any person’ (quoted in Jenness and Grattet 2001: 44). Such enhanced penalties are typically justified on the grounds that hate crimes ‘cause greater societal harm and injury to the individual and community victims’ (Lawrence 1999: 103). In 1985 Congressional hearings on the proposed 1990 law, Representative Biaggi echoed this sentiment when he stated that ‘The effect of hate crimes . . . eats away at the very core of society. It is a form of poison spreading through our land. It affects people physically and psychologically’ (quoted in Jenness and Grattet 2001: 53). Widening the scope of such laws, Congress enacted the Hate Crimes Prevention Act in 2009 after over a decade of failed attempts to do so. 15 This law empowers federal authorities to aid state and local jurisdictions dealing with hate crimes, and it grants the 924 E. Bleich D o w n l o a d e d B y : [ B l e i c h , E r i k ] A t : 1 7 : 4 8 2 4 M a y 2 0 1 1 Department of Justice the right to pursue investigations and prosecutions where state laws are deemed insufficient. Moreover, the statute permits federal law enforcement to pursue a wider variety of infractions, instead of merely addressing crimes that violate a narrow list of federally protected civil rights, and widens the protected categories to include gender, sexual orientation, gender identity and disability and mandates the collection of statistics on hate crimes against transgendered people. Although the reach of this law has not yet been fully tested, by all accounts it involves a dramatic strengthening of federal power. The US therefore has an extremely well-developed arsenal of state and federal provisions against hate crimes that have garnered support from legislative majorities across the country. The most common European parallel to such laws lies in the use of racist motives as aggravating factors at the sentencing stage of successful prosecutions. Some countries have passed laws explicitly stating that racist motives merit additional penalties. Although these have typically not been termed hate crime laws, they are often exact or close analogues to American legislation. For example, Italian Law No. 205/1993, Section 3, established an aggravating circumstance for any crime committed ‘with a view to discrimination on racial, ethnic, national or religious ground[s]’ (OSCE/ODIHR 2005: 132). Sweden, Spain, Belgium, Austria and a number of other European liberal democracies have similar statutes (OSCE/ODIHR 2005: 105�58). France’s 2003 provisions (Law 2003-88 of 3 February), which were expanded in 2004 (Law 204 of 9 March), illustrate how closely these laws can mirror American practices. French law permits additional penalties for a list of infractions (ranging from threats and theft to torture and murder) if they were committed ‘because of the belonging or non-belonging, real or supposed, of victims in a determined religion, ethnic group, nation, or race’. Police, prosecutors and judges are directed to look for expressions such as ‘words, writings, images or acts’ that indicate a bias, evidence of which triggers the possibility of significantly more severe punishment, such as five years’ imprisonment and a t75,000 fine for theft instead of three years and a t45,000 fine, or life in prison instead of 30 years for murder (Ministère de la Justice 2004: 3�5). Of all the European countries that have enacted such laws over the past decade and a half, none looked more closely at American practices than Great Britain, whose civil servants studied model legislation in the United States. 16 After considering a variety of options, Britain pursued two paths through its 1998 Crime and Disorder Act. First, it established nine new crimes that explicitly depend on racial aggravation, including crimes of assault, criminal damage, public order offences and harassment, which carry higher maximum penalties than their non-racially aggravated counterparts (see Sections 29�32 of the 1998 Crime and Disorder Act). These crimes go beyond penalty enhancement provisions by linking the racial aspect to the very definition of the crime in a way that other European countries have not done. Second, sections 28 and 82 of the law provide that any offence can be considered racially aggravated if the prosecution proves that it was motivated by racial hostility. This is similar to many countries’ penalty enhancement statutes. But British law goes Journal of Ethnic and Racial Studies 925 D o w n l o a d e d B y : [ B l e i c h , E r i k ] A t : 1 7 : 4 8 2 4 M a y 2 0 1 1 further by declaring that racial aggravation can be triggered merely by showing that the perpetrator demonstrated racial hostility toward the victim during or immediately before or after the crime. Thus, if a white person says ‘I hate blacks’ and then walks over to a black man and commits a crime against him, he will be punished not only for the crime, but also for the racist motive if his statement of opinion is taken as evidence of racial hostility. 17 In these cases, the judge is required to declare in open court that the crime was racially aggravated, thereby shaming the perpetrator by branding him a racist. He or she is also required to impose a stiffer sentence within the maximum allowable range for the underlying crime. Looking beyond hate crime laws, European countries have also restricted racist speech in additional ways in recent years. A number of nations have statutes that exceed the traditional incitement provisions outlined above. For example, Belgian law penalises public announcements of intention to discriminate, hate or perpetrate violence against an individual or group because of race, colour, origin, descent or nationality. Danish law forbids public statements that threaten, insult or degrade on account of race, skin colour, national/ethnic origin, faith or sexual orientation. Italy has outlawed the dissemination of ideas based on superiority or racial and ethnic discrimination, while Sweden punishes racial agitation, which includes expressions that threaten or demonstrate contempt on the grounds of race, colour, national/ ethnic affiliation or religious belief (see OSCE/ODIHR 2005: Annex E for an overview of a wide variety of national laws). In each of these cases, the wording of these statutes provides wide latitude for curtailing public expressions of racism, should prosecutors and courts decide to do so. In addition to these examples, developments since 2005 illustrate that the boundaries of free expression continue to be challenged, even if there is contention surrounding these new proposals. The British government sought to limit potentially inflammatory speech in its 2006 Racial and Religious Hatred Act. This law overturned the 40-year old anomaly in Britain of forbidding incitement to racial hatred without prohibiting incitement to religious hatred. The initial government proposal involved extending to religious groups the precise protections granted over time to racial groups, namely that prosecutions could occur based on reckless as well as intentional statements and that ‘threatening, abusive, or insulting’ words or behaviour were out of bounds. 18 However, these elements were viewed with alarm by the majority of the House of Lords and by many Members of Parliament. They were also sharply criticised by civil society groups and especially by comedians (such as Blackadder star Rowan Atkinson), who feared that religious jokes would cross the legal line. The Labour government suffered an embarrassing public defeat when they lost a crucial House of Commons vote over these provisions. 19 In the end, the Act instituted protections only against intentionally threatening expressions of religious hatred, not against those that were merely abusive or insulting, nor those that are reckless and likely to stir up hatred (see Art. 29 of the 2006 Racial and Religious Hatred Act). The law was thus limited, but the law passed. 926 E. Bleich D o w n l o a d e d B y : [ B l e i c h , E r i k ] A t : 1 7 : 4 8 2 4 M a y 2 0 1 1 The most contentious French development aimed at restricting offensive speech is a Parliamentary bill that proposes penalising denial of the Armenian genocide. Its forerunner was Law 2001-70 of 29 January 2001, which stated simply that ‘France publicly recognizes the Armenian genocide of 1915’. Since then, the Council of Europe passed a 2003 protocol to its cybercrime convention (CETS No. 189, Art. 6) that encouraged signatories to outlaw a wide variety of racist actions on the internet. Extending the logic of national Holocaust denial legislation, it called for states to punish the denial, minimisation, approval or justification of all genocides or crimes against humanity recognised by international bodies. As of summer 2010, 32 of the 47 Council members had signed the protocol and 18 had ratified it (including France and Armenia). France’s National Assembly turned to these issues in 2006, but limited its legislative proposals to forbidding denial of the Armenian genocide. When the bill was first introduced, the President of the National Assembly took the highly unusual step of suspending discussion before the law came to a vote (Nouvel Observateur, 18 May 2006). In its second incarnation of October 2006, it was overwhelmingly approved by a cross-section of deputies from both the left and the right. 20 In part, supporters argued that it was highly offensive to Armenians to be subjected to signs proclaiming that the genocide was a lie, and that such statements aimed to ‘complete the genocide’ by erasing it from the collective memory. At least one proponent made the case that it was not possible to punish denial of the Jewish genocide while ignoring the Armenian genocide. On the other side of the debate, a number of nationally known historians organised themselves into a group called Freedom for History and declared that this proposal threatens ‘freedom of thought and expression’. The government itself did not look favourably on this bill, with then-Prime Minister de Villepin declaring at the time ‘It is not a good thing to legislate on questions of history and memory’. Responding to some of these concerns*all also voiced in Le Monde or Le Figaro, 13 October 2006*an amendment was introduced that would have exempted teachers and researchers from the law, but it was intensely opposed by a number of deputies and was ultimately rebuffed. This legislation was eventually approved by the National Assembly but it has since been held up by the Senate. Yet it elicited a striking amount of sympathy, suggesting that passage of such a law*or of the even-more-general ban as proposed by the Council of Europe*may be in France’s and in many European countries’ future. 21 Assessing the Provisions: Enforcement as the Key What has been the effect of these developments? Do laws penalising racist speech and racist opinion-as-motive serve as a bulwark against intolerance, or do they merely limit speech and opinion without preventing societal divisions? These questions are not easy to answer. Examining how hate speech statutes are applied in practice can provide a first step toward understanding whether the laws impinge upon a great number of speech acts, or whether they are less of a threat to free expression than Journal of Ethnic and Racial Studies 927 D o w n l o a d e d B y : [ B l e i c h , E r i k ] A t : 1 7 : 4 8 2 4 M a y 2 0 1 1 they may at first appear. Legislation against incitement to racial hatred, group libel, racial defamation and Holocaust denial appear to be used relatively infrequently in the major European liberal democracies. 22 Bindman (1992: 259�60) and Oyediran (1992: 248�9) point out, for example, that, between 1965 and the early 1990s, there were only a handful of prosecutions per year for racial incitement in Britain. According to information provided by the Attorney General in the run-up to the 2005 Religious Hatred Bill, between 1994 and November 2004 there were 37 prosecutions for incitement to racial hatred. 23 As of the 1980s, there were somewhere between 100 and 150 prosecutions for incitement and defamation per year in Germany, with Hofmann (1992: 166) reporting that, in 1982, 12 per cent of all prosecutions for right-wing extremists were on these grounds, and that, in 1987, there were 1,447 prosecutions related to right-wing extremism. More-recent statistics from France show that, for the three years from 2005 to 2007, there were on average 208 convictions per year for pure hate-speech offences, up from just over 100 per year in the five-year period from 1997 to 2001. 24 Examples of actions that have run afoul of the law include the distribution of a ‘blood libel’ leaflet by an 80-year-old British woman, a German teacher’s in-class assertion that there were no concentration camps or killings of Jews in the Nazi era, and the publication in France of well-known Holocaust denier Robert Faurisson’s views that ‘the myth of the gas chambers is a wicked act’ (see Bindman 1992: 260; Errera 1992: 155; Stein 1986: 294). The penalties for these infractions were relatively light. The aged widow was discharged on condition of six months’ good behaviour, the teacher received a six-month suspended sentence, and Faurisson’s 100,000 franc fine was suspended provided he did not re-offend within five years; the heaviest penalty in these cases was a 310,000 franc (or roughly $50,000) fine levied on the editor of the publication that printed Faurisson’s statement. Moreover, French data reveal that, in 2007, there were 258 guilty verdicts, of which 139 resulted in a fine (which averaged t726), 58 led to a suspended jail sentence, and three culminated in actual jail time with an average sentence of less than two months (Commission Nationale Consultative des Droits de l’Homme 2009: 68). By comparison, British data between 1986 and 1990 reveal 18 prosecutions and 16 convictions, of which only three cases resulted in actual time served in jail (Oyediran 1992: 249). This suggests that the laws are used, but are not used oppressively, and that liberal democracies are able to maintain their commitment to free expression while at the same time forbidding divisive or harmful racist speech. The limited number of prosecutions and penalties is also an indication that laws against racist speech serve both a symbolic and a practical function. Legislation has a strong declarative effect when it is enacted: in these cases, it asserts that certain expressions are deemed unacceptable by the country as a whole and reassures vulnerable groups that their interests and identities are considered worthy of national acknowledgement. Some sympathetic observers have argued that hate speech laws’ primary function is symbolic and educational, and that they can do more harm than good if ‘enacted or applied with excessive zeal’ (Parekh 1992: 359). However, if the 928 E. Bleich D o w n l o a d e d B y : [ B l e i c h , E r i k ] A t : 1 7 : 4 8 2 4 M a y 2 0 1 1 laws were merely symbolic and not backed by any prosecutions or convictions, they would soon lose their effectiveness, as they would be revealed as empty rhetoric. Banton (1992), for example, points to the potential setbacks involved in failed prosecutions under the law in addition to problems generated by a state’s reluctance to prosecute in the first place. Judicious enforcement is therefore critical to the success or failure of these laws, in terms both of achieving the desired social values and of not unduly limiting freedom of expression. If there are too few convictions, there will be little reason for potential perpetrators to alter their activities and no independent benefit from the false symbol of the law. If there are too many cases brought to court, there may be a perception among citizens that the laws are overly-burdensome restrictions on speech, which may generate a backlash against the minority groups viewed as their main beneficiaries. Striking a careful balance signals to vulnerable groups, to perpetrators and to the nation that the laws will be enforced and that highly divisive speech or actions will not be tolerated. And judicious enforcement with moderate penalties also reassures the nation that free speech is not on the chopping block, which helps to legitimise the modest restrictions that these laws often represent. 25 Conclusions Freedom of expression and freedom of opinion remain core values in Western Europe and in the United States, and there is still wide latitude in these countries to express racist views. Yet there has been a notable trend since the 1960s*and especially since the 1990s*toward penalising racist speech and racist opinion-as-motive. These developments have amounted to significant limits on a core liberal value in states where identity and belonging are complicated by racial, ethnic and religious diversity. Yet, forbidding these forms of racism is not gathering steam at an exponential rate. Rather, the pace of change has more closely resembled a slow creep than a slippery slope. Prohibitions against racism have been inching forward and making inroads into territory once firmly held by advocates of liberal freedoms. Over time, proscriptions against incitement to racial hatred and additional penalties for the racist element of crimes have become taken-for-granted where they had once been deemed unnecessary restrictions on expression or opinion. The trend is perhaps the most clearly encapsulated in the progress of laws against Holocaust denial. These began in late-1940s Austria, spread to Germany in embryonic form in 1985 and then to half a dozen other countries by the 1990s, and now may be poised to become institutionalised in many more Council of Europe countries in a significantly expanded form. Although the steps taken to limit freedom of opinion and expression so far have been measured rather than extreme, there are two reasons for concern. Because this shift has unfolded slowly over the decades, each individual step has seemed moderate at the time it was enacted. Typically, additional laws are merely extensions of old principles into new areas, such as the series of moves from libel laws to group libel Journal of Ethnic and Racial Studies 929 D o w n l o a d e d B y : [ B l e i c h , E r i k ] A t : 1 7 : 4 8 2 4 M a y 2 0 1 1 laws, to provisions against approving the Holocaust, to laws banning Holocaust denial, to recent proposals to forbid contesting the Armenian genocide or all legally recognised war crimes or crimes against humanity. Cumulatively, however, there has been a significant chipping away at freedom of opinion and of expression over the past 20 to 40 years in many countries. If we project the current trends another few decades into the future, will citizens be comfortable with the eventual outcome? Compounding this problem are recent systemic developments that risk increasing the pace of change in the near future. The British government has used the ‘war on terror’ to justify expanding its laws to cover incitement to religious hatred. It has also enacted provisions to punish the glorification of terrorism, which could prohibit statements made against racial, ethnic or religious groups that have been the targets of attacks. In the context of the permanent war on terror, future atrocities may be used to justify further curbs on speech deemed to threaten national cohesion or public order. In a different vein, French efforts to outlaw contestation of the Armenian genocide demonstrate that laws against Holocaust denial have opened the door to claimants who want to establish their victimhood as legally unassailable. If group after group demands protection for its history, it may prove politically difficult to rebuff successive claims because of the precedents set by earlier decisions. Drawing the line around the freedom for racists to express themselves or to be free from punishments for their opinions (even when they serve as motives to criminal acts) is a difficult task in ethnically diverse states. For liberal purists, there are few justifications for restricting racists’ rights to think, say and act according to their beliefs. For others, the marginal restrictions on racist expression or penalties for racist motives are acceptable because they help to preserve community cohesion and public order or because they prevent undue harm to victims and protect their dignity. There is no simple resolution to this long-standing debate. As I have argued elsewhere (Bleich 2011; Modood et al. 2006), I believe that democracies must judge the issues on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the domestic political context of the era. And each citizen has the responsibility to articulate his or her own position and to take part in broader discussions about how to balance the fundamental values of liberal democracies. In light of the evidence of this study and as a contribution to the on-going debate, my position is that restrictive laws are the most easily justified if they punish racist expression or racist opinion-as-motive when it inflicts significant harm to individuals or if it incites violence or stirs up extreme hatred, but not when it is merely offensive, even if hurtfully so (see Bleich 2011). This perspective focuses on assessing the level of harm of particular events in a way that has seldom been systematically done before. Moreover, once statutes are on the books, enforcement becomes a critical component of the equation. Successful prosecutions prove that the state is serious about curbing racism, while avoiding heavy prison sentences and excessive fines demonstrates that the laws are not overly intrusive. Striking a careful balance in legislation and enforcement is possible. It is also is the key to placing limits on racism that do not fatally compromise the cornerstone values that liberals have cherished for centuries. 930 E. Bleich D o w n l o a d e d B y : [ B l e i c h , E r i k ] A t : 1 7 : 4 8 2 4 M a y 2 0 1 1 Notes [1] The English Bill of Rights extends these freedoms to debates in Parliament:‘That the Freedome of Speech and Debates or Proceedings in Parlyament ought not to be impeached or questioned in any Court or Place out of Parlyament’. France’s Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen (1789) and the First Amendment of the American Bill of Rights (1789) broaden the coverage to all, in formulas similar to that adopted by the UN in 1948, Article 19 of which reads: ‘Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers’. [2] I use racist here in a broad sense to mean demonstrations of racial, ethnic or religious bias or hatred. By opinion-as-motive, I mean racist opinions that are translated into a motive to act, such as in a hate crime. [3] For cognate arguments about the trajectory of the human rights revolution at the global level and of the minority rights revolution at the American level, see Kymlicka (2007); Skrentny (2002). [4] Although some countries’ existing laws could have been deployed to curb public racism, they rarely were. For example, Weimar Germany had laws criminalising religious insult and incitement to violence against ‘classes of the population’. Yet, the editor of Der Stürmer was frequently able to minimise or to avoid penalties by arguing that his attacks against Jews were protected speech because they were levelled on racial instead of religious grounds and that they were protected as part of a political agenda (Levitt 1993; Showalter 1982). [5] In addition, the Football Act of 1991 prohibits indecent or racist chanting at matches. [6] For the Federal Ministry of Justice’s English-language text of the German Criminal Code, see http://www.iuscomp.org/gla/statutes/StGB.htm#86a. The text of Article 86a forbids ‘in particular, flags, insignia, uniforms, slogans and forms of greeting’, and declares that ‘symbols which are so similar as to be mistaken for those’ listed above are deemed equivalent. Other European countries have similar provisions banning Nazi symbols. [7] Article 130 prohibits writings that incite hatred or violence or which insult, maliciously malign or defame ‘segments of the population or a national, racial or religious group, or one characterised by its folk customs’. The forerunner to this aspect of Article 130 was Article 131 which, when established in 1973, prohibited racist writings (Hofmann 1992: 164). [8] Ministry of Justice Archives, Folder ‘Diffimation Raciale; Réponse à M. Jean Foyer’. [9] Switzerland, Liechtenstein, Portugal and Spain also have generic laws against denying genocides and, once they became fully fledged democracies in the 1990s, a number of East European countries*such as the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia*also crafted laws banning forms of Holocaust denial (Whine 2009: 544�6). [10] It is important not to overlook the political motives behind such laws, such as wrong- footing the opposing party or staking a claim to antiracist leadership for electoral purposes. Yet, these motives do not explain the specific form of the proposals*there are many ways to achieve those political goals in a liberal democracy which do not involve placing highly controversial limits on freedom of expression. [11] This logic applies in different ways to two types of Holocaust denial within Germany. Simple Holocaust denial, such as asserting ‘The Holocaust never happened’, is considered constitutional non-speech, as such statements merely assert facts without attaching an opinion. Because these facts are plainly wrong*so the argument runs*they have no value as ‘speech’ and can easily be banned within the constitutional framework if they are deemed harmful (Brugger 2003: 32�3). Qualified Holocaust denial includes statements that attach a political opinion to the historical argument*such as ‘We should do something about those Jews who spread lies about Auschwitz’. These expressions are deemed ‘low-value speech’ Journal of Ethnic and Racial Studies 931 D o w n l o a d e d B y : [ B l e i c h , E r i k ] A t : 1 7 : 4 8 2 4 M a y 2 0 1 1 http://www.iuscomp.org/gla/statutes/StGB.htm#86a. because, although they may represent deeply held political convictions, many Germans have concluded that such arguments lead to ‘‘‘pogrom’’, ‘‘massacre’’ and ‘‘genocide’’’ (quoted in Brugger 2003: 34). [12] Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 US 250, 258�59 (1952). Frankfurter went on to discuss multiple examples of racial strife in Illinois that could presumably justify passage of the state law. [13] In 1972, the Court further eviscerated the fighting words principle when it overturned the conviction of men found guilty for levelling at police officers terms that included ‘white son of a bitch’, ‘God damned m* f*’, and ‘black m* f* pig’ (Walker 1994: 111). [14] The exception is the ‘clear and present danger’ principle, wherein a speaker’s expression ‘immediately incites others to criminal or dangerous activity’, such as shouting ‘fire’ in a crowded theatre (Gould 2005: 19). Even this principle has been flexibly interpreted in US history, and at one point constituted a much greater threat to freedom of speech (Greenawalt 1995: 18�19). See Dennis v. United States, 341 US 494, 510 (1951). [15] Officially called the Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act, in earlier incarnations it was known as the Local Law Enforcement Hate Crimes Prevention Act. [16] Interview with Neil Stevenson, Home Office, Community Relations Unit, 19 November 2003. [17] According to the 1998 Crime and Disorder Act, protected groups are those defined by reference to race, colour, nationality (including citizenship) or ethnic/national origins. Article 39 of the 2001 Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act extended protections to religious groups, creating the category of ‘religiously aggravated offences’. [18] See House of Commons, Racial and Religious Hatred Bill, with the Home Office’s Explanatory Notes (Bill 11�EN), available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ cm200506/cmbills/011/2006011.htm. For the final text of the Act and the Explanatory Note, see http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2006/20060001.htm. [19] BBC News, 1 February 2006. The Home Office made clear that such jokes would not be caught by the law, writing in Bill 11�EN ‘The offences will not encompass material that just stirs up ridicule or prejudice or causes offence’. [20] These deputies may have been responding to the potential votes of the 500,000 descendents of Armenian origin in France (Le Figaro, 13 October 2006), some of whom are organised in the Committee for the Defense of the Armenian Cause (CDCA). They may also have been motivated by general anti-Turkish sentiment generated by fears of its joining the European Union (see Le Monde, 9 October 2006). [21] A leading advocate from the Armenian community believes that the law will eventually pass (interview with M. Alexis Govciyan, 20 May 2008); as noted in fn. 9, Switzerland, Liechtenstein, Portugal and Spain already have generic laws against denying genocides. [22] There are no systematic comparative data available on complaints, investigations, indictments, prosecutions and convictions for such crimes; such data would be necessary for a complete analysis of law enforcement. [23] Lords Hansard text for 13 December 2004, ‘Incitement to Racial Hatred: Prosecutions’, response to question by Lord Lester of Herne Hill, col. WA56. [24] Calculations for the 2005 to 2007 period come from the Annual Reports of the Commission Nationale Consultative des Droits de l’Homme, which produces statistics on convictions where the sole offense is a hate speech offense. There are also data on convictions where hate speech was one among two or more elements of the crime; if included, the number of convictions roughly doubles. Data from 1997 to 2001 are from the Commission Nationale Consultative des Droits de l’Homme (2003: 573). [25] Opponents of this view, such as Coliver (1992), argue that such laws are simply too risky to support. However, by Coliver’s own admission, these laws ‘do not appear to have been seriously abused’ by the established liberal democracies she reviews (1992: 365). 932 E. Bleich D o w n l o a d e d B y : [ B l e i c h , E r i k ] A t : 1 7 : 4 8 2 4 M a y 2 0 1 1 http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200506/cmbills/011/2006011.htm. http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200506/cmbills/011/2006011.htm. http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2006/20060001.htm. References Banton, M. (1992) ‘The declaratory value of laws against racial incitement’, in Coliver, S. (ed.) Striking a Balance: Hate Speech, Freedom of Expression and Non-Discrimination. London: ARTICLE 19 and Human Rights Centre, 349�57. Bindman, G. (1992) ‘Incitement to racial hatred in the United Kingdom: have we got the law we need?’, in Coliver, S. (ed.) Striking a Balance: Hate Speech, Freedom of Expression and Non- Discrimination. London: ARTICLE 19 and Human Rights Centre, 258�62. Bird, K. (2000) ‘Racist speech or free speech? A comparison of the law in France and the United States’, Comparative Politics, 32(4): 399�418. Bleich, E. 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(1992) ‘The United Kingdom’s compliance with Article 4 of the ICERD’, in Coliver, S. (ed.) Striking a Balance: Hate Speech, Freedom of Expression and Non-Discrimination. London: ARTICLE 19 and Human Rights Centre, 245�57. Parekh, B. (1992) ‘Group libel and freedom of expression: thoughts on the Rushdie affair’, in Coliver, S. (ed.) Striking a Balance: Hate Speech, Freedom of Expression and Non- Discrimination. London: ARTICLE 19 and Human Rights Centre, 358�62. Schor, R. (1992) L’Antisémitisme en France pendant les Années Trente. Paris: Editions Complexe. Sherr, A. (1993) ‘Incitement to racial hatred in England’, in Greenspan, L. and Levitt, C. (eds) Under the Shadow of Weimar: Democracy, Law, and Racial Incitement in Six Countries. Westport, CT: Praeger, 63�82. Showalter, D.E. (1982) Little Man, What Now? Der Stürmer in the Weimar Republic. Hamden, CT: Archon Books. Skrentny, J.D. (2002) The Minority Rights Revolution. Cambridge: Belknap Press. Stein, E. (1986) ‘History against free speech: the new German law against the ‘‘Auschwitz’’*and other*‘‘lies’’’, Michigan Law Review, 85(277): 277�324. Walker, S. (1994) Hate Speech: The History of an American Controversy. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. Weil, P. (2007) ‘Politique de la mémoire: l’interdit et la commémoration’, Esprit, Février: 124�42. Wetzel, J. (1993) ‘The judicial treatment of incitement against ethnic groups and of the denial of national socialist mass murder in the Federal Republic of Germany’, in Greenspan, L. and Levitt, C. (eds) Under the Shadow of Weimar: Democracy, Law, and Racial Incitement in Six Countries. Westport, CT: Praeger, 83�106. Whine, M. (2009) ‘Expanding Holocaust denial and legislation against it’, in Hare, I. and Weinstein, J. (eds) Extreme Speech and Democracy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 538�56. Whitman, J.Q. (2000) ‘Enforcing civility and respect: three societies’, Yale Law Journal, 109(6): 1279�398. 934 E. Bleich D o w n l o a d e d B y : [ B l e i c h , E r i k ] A t : 1 7 : 4 8 2 4 M a y 2 0 1 1 
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Some of My Best Friends Are Foreign Language Teachers Dennis Looney ADFL Bulletin Vol. 32, No. 2 (Winter 2001), p. 37 ISSN: 0148-7639 CrossRef DOI: 10.1632/adfl.32.2.37 IN “INCLUSIONARY Practices: The Politics of Syllabus Design,” Linda Dittmar points out the limitations of rele- gating previously excluded material to a special unit of a course, as if the material were “alien to the mainstream but morally important and politically unavoidable” (38). As well-intentioned as such course development may be, it inevitably leads to a kind of tokenism in which what one felt compelled to include is made to appear so mar- ginal that it cannot be taken as seriously as what it has been appended to. Dittmar is describing the design of course syllabi, daring us to imagine the potential a new course, if carried out properly, can have on curricular transformation. But much of what she says applies as well to the way university decision makers may conceptualize the organization of foreign language departments under their purview. And it also describes the way they interact with those departments. It is easy to perceive the foreign language department as “alien to the mainstream,” for several reasons. First and most obvious is its subject matter. The foreign language department is a site for preserving, maintaining, and pro- mulgating the essence of another culture through the study of the culture’s language and literature. Its primary reason for being is the study of a culture that is alien or foreign to the one of the institution that houses the de- partment. Second, the foreign language department is usually in a marginal position in relation to the center or mainstream of the curriculum, regardless of how an insti- tution determines that center. Even in a curriculum de- voted to international studies, the foreign language department dutifully takes a place in relation to depart- ments and programs that deal with such issues as foreign policy, international management, and current affairs. But “alien” in this context does not have to mean “alien- ated” from the mainstream: the foreign language depart- ment, like it or not, provides a service, and as such it is in its own interest to make a niche for itself. Whether we view a given foreign language as a subject in its own right or as an applied skill, its place in the curriculum is to some degree alien to the mainstream. Another way to talk about the status of the foreign lan- guage department is to highlight its diversity, which is ap- parent not only in the subject matter but probably also in the teaching corps (to a greater or lesser extent, depend- ing on the institution). In fact, the foreign language de- partment is often held up as an example of diversity on campus, a place where one may turn for information and guidance on how to negotiate issues of cultural difference and diversity; it is, to use the terms introduced at a recent ADFL Bulletin, Vol. 32, No. 2, Winter 2001 © 2001 by the association of departments of foreign languages AT THE 2000 Summer Seminars in Tempe, Arizona, and Wilmington and Newark, Delaware, partici- pants took part in frank discussions of foreign language departments as microcosms of cross-cultural difference. The discussions were far ranging, touching on differences among students and faculty mem- bers based on race, national and ethnic origin, faith, gender, education and training, learned and native (and prestigious and denigrated) linguistic varieties, physical abilities, and sexual preferences. The image of the department in the context of the institution was also considered as a basis for a politics of difference. Issues of culturally determined teaching, learning, and working styles were touched on, and solutions evoking balance, civility, and transparency of expectations were offered. We present here two essays from discussion participants, and we invite additional contributions of up to four thousand words from our readers. Seminar participants took the Report of the Task Force against Campus Bigotry (see www.mla.org) as a starting point for their comments: readers might want to look at the report as well. Two Views on Foreign Language Departments as Sites of Cross-Cultural Difference Some of My Best Friends Are Foreign Language Teachers Striking a Balance between Tolerance and Judgment 38 • Two Views on Foreign Language Departments as Sites of Cross-Cultural Difference ADFL seminar, a site of cross-cultural difference. But if the foreign language department embodies diversity as a site of cross-cultural difference and is also alien to the mainstream, it follows that diversity itself is alien to the mainstream or at least can be perceived as such. Needless to say, such a view diminishes the possibility for an au- thentic encounter with diversity, tucking the source of di- versity away into Dittmar’s separate and marginal course unit, thereby limiting its ability to transform the curricu- lum, the campus, and the academy at large. Such a view encourages a tokenism in which university decision mak- ers are happy with the foreign enclave down the hall or across campus as long as it stays on its side of town and doesn’t make too many demands. Foreign language educators must recognize this ten- dency to view diversity from a distance and must try to correct the shortsightedness responsible for it. We need to educate not only our students (that’s the easy part) but also our colleagues in our home institutions, especially our administrators, about what we do and how and why we do it. If the foreign language department becomes and re- mains a place to be kept at a comfortable distance (whose texts one might rather read in translation, as it were), we suffer the consequences and so does the diversity that we embody and embrace. One of the most glaring consequences is the discrep- ancy in salary between the typical foreign language educa- tor’s contract and those of other educators. Why are our salaries near the bottom of the scale? It may be that the increasingly pervasive view of language as a skill devoid of intellectual content promotes the notion that languages are easy to teach and that therefore the labor involved in teaching them is worth less on the market. One wonders if the predominance of women and minorities, not to mention foreigners or others perceived to be alien to the mainstream, who work and study in foreign languages also accounts for the low salary scale that characterizes the for- eign language instructor’s contract. Is the low pay really market-driven, or does a lack of genuine concern for di- versity on the part of those drawing up the contracts un- derlie it? Are low salaries brought about by a disdain for the challenges posed by diversity? If you believe you get what you pay for and you pay as little as possible, then your minimal interest in your investment is confirmed. Perhaps someone has done research on the correlation between salaries and diversity. If not, someone should. Dennis Looney French and Italian University of Pittsburgh Work Cited Dittmar, Linda. “Inclusionary Practices: The Politics of Syllabus De- sign.” Journal of Thought 20.3 (1985): 37– 47. THE final report of the MLA Task Force against Campus Bigotry admirably captures some of the complexity fac- ing campuses in an increasingly diverse society. If the bibliography and list of scenarios appended to the report are any indication, the task force was predominantly concerned with race, ethnicity, and gender stereotypes, though other targets of bigotry, such as religion, sexual orientation, and disabilities, were also considered. At the University of North Carolina, Charlotte (located in a booming Sunbelt city with a large international business presence and a quality-of-life climate for African Ameri- cans that is reputed to be one of the best in the country), race, country of origin, and gender per se are approached with a certain amount of civility, at least on the surface. Courtesy is the order of the day and hate crimes so infre- quent that our campus police, when I inquired, denied awareness of incidents. To the credit of our administra- tors over the years, the university’s attempts to attract minority applications have resulted in the highest per- centage of African American students at any of the Uni- versity of North Carolina system campuses except for the historically minority institutions. If indeed we have big- otry issues on our campus, then, they are not of the bla- tant variety. But at a university newly anointed with Doctoral Intensive status, with ambitions for growth and a desire to strengthen its ties with Charlotte’s formidable and conservative business community, voices that ruffle feathers or challenge the values of corporate America are seldom heard. When dealing with any issue that might impinge on individual students’ systems of belief, fear of offending (or, perhaps more often, fear of criticism) can lead to such caution that honest and probing intellectual inquiry in the classroom is stifled. Not surprisingly, a re- cent faculty study of our general degree requirements re- ported dissatisfaction with the courses that meet the values goal for undergraduates. I am grateful for the civility on my campus and would abhor discrimination toward individuals on the basis of their religious or ideological allegiances. With a wide range of backgrounds and cultures represented in our classrooms, however, it is not always easy to reconcile re- spect for each student’s ideological allegiances with the 
work_bxklvkmoefcoboucyuoc3hafwi	----	[PDF] The expulsion from Disneyland: the social psychological impact of 9/11. | Semantic Scholar Skip to search formSkip to main content> Semantic Scholar's Logo Search Sign InCreate Free Account You are currently offline. Some features of the site may not work correctly. DOI:10.1037/a0024772 Corpus ID: 33147829The expulsion from Disneyland: the social psychological impact of 9/11. @article{Morgan2011TheEF, title={The expulsion from Disneyland: the social psychological impact of 9/11.}, author={G. S. Morgan and Daniel C. Wisneski and L. Skitka}, journal={The American psychologist}, year={2011}, volume={66 6}, pages={ 447-54 } } G. S. Morgan, Daniel C. Wisneski, L. Skitka Published 2011 Psychology, Medicine The American psychologist People expressed many different reactions to the events of September 11th, 2001. Some of these reactions were clearly negative, such as political intolerance, discrimination, and hate crimes directed toward targets that some, if not many, people associated with the attackers. Other reactions were more positive. For example, people responded by donating blood, increasing contributions of time and money to charity, and flying the American flag. The goal of this article is to review some of… Expand View on PubMed lskitka.people.uic.edu Save to Library Create Alert Cite Launch Research Feed Share This Paper 61 CitationsHighly Influential Citations 3 Background Citations 8 Results Citations 2 View All 61 Citations Citation Type Citation Type All Types Cites Results Cites Methods Cites Background Has PDF Publication Type Author More Filters More Filters Filters Sort by Relevance Sort by Most Influenced Papers Sort by Citation Count Sort by Recency Growing up in the shadow of terrorism: youth in America after 9/11. N. Eisenberg, R. C. Silver Psychology, Medicine The American psychologist 2011 48 PDF Save Alert Research Feed Americans respond politically to 9/11: understanding the impact of the terrorist attacks and their aftermath. L. Huddy, S. Feldman Political Science, Medicine The American psychologist 2011 116 PDF Save Alert Research Feed Psychology Confronts 9/11: Explanations, Shortcomings, and Challenges Robert Demski Psychology 2019 Save Alert Research Feed Effects of viewing 9/11 footage on distress and Islamophobia: a temporally expanded approach Becky L. Choma, J. Charlesford, Leah Dalling, K. Smith Psychology 2015 7 Save Alert Research Feed Psychological distress and prejudice following terror attacks in France. R. Goodwin, K. Kaniasty, Shaojing Sun, M. Ben-Ezra Psychology, Medicine Journal of psychiatric research 2017 16 PDF Save Alert Research Feed Expression of Ethnic Prejudice in Focus Groups from Agencies Affected by the 9/11 Attacks on the World Trade Center C. North, Mollie R. Gordon, +7 authors D. Pollio Psychology 2014 8 Save Alert Research Feed An introduction to "9/11: ten years later". R. C. Silver Psychology, Medicine The American psychologist 2011 15 PDF View 1 excerpt, cites background Save Alert Research Feed Terrorism and Health Dana Rose Garfin, E. Holman Psychology 2016 Save Alert Research Feed The “Charlie-Hebdo” Effect: Repercussions of the January 2015 Terrorist Attacks in France on Prejudice toward Immigrants and North-Africans, Social Dominance Orientation, and Attachment to the Principle of Laïcité Medhi Cohu, Christelle Maisonneuve, B. Testé Political Science, Art 2016 13 PDF Save Alert Research Feed The Effect of a Major Catastrophe on Unrelated Charity Donations Tobias Linde Political Science 2017 PDF Save Alert Research Feed ... 1 2 3 4 5 ... References SHOWING 1-10 OF 65 REFERENCES SORT BYRelevance Most Influenced Papers Recency Emotions, Attributions, and Policy Endorsement in Response to the September 11th Terrorist Attacks Melody Sadler, Megan Lineberger, J. Correll, B. Park Psychology 2005 74 Save Alert Research Feed Threat, Anxiety, and Support of Antiterrorism Policies L. Huddy, S. Feldman, Charles Taber, Gallya Lahav Political Science 2005 657 PDF View 1 excerpt, references background Save Alert Research Feed Patriotism or Nationalism? Understanding Post-September 11, 2001, Flag-Display Behavior1 L. Skitka Sociology 2005 129 PDF View 1 excerpt, references background Save Alert Research Feed Terror management and aggression: evidence that mortality salience motivates aggression against worldview-threatening others. H. Mcgregor, J. Lieberman, +4 authors T. Pyszczynski Psychology, Medicine Journal of personality and social psychology 1998 537 View 2 excerpts, references background Save Alert Research Feed National Study of Behavioral and Life Changes Since September 11 M. Torabi, D. Seo Psychology, Medicine Health education & behavior : the official publication of the Society for Public Health Education 2004 83 Save Alert Research Feed The Politics of Threat: How Terrorism News Shapes Foreign Policy Attitudes S. Gadarian Political Science The Journal of Politics 2010 98 View 1 excerpt, references background Save Alert Research Feed Evidence for terror management theory II: The effects of mortality salience on reactions to those who threaten or bolster the cultural worldview. J. Greenberg, T. Pyszczynski, +4 authors D. Lyon Psychology 1990 1,246 PDF View 1 excerpt, references background Save Alert Research Feed Islamophobia in America?: September 11 and Islamophobic Hate Crime 1 Jeffrey Kaplan Sociology 2006 60 View 1 excerpt, references background Save Alert Research Feed Hate crimes against lesbians and gay men. Issues for research and policy. G. Herek Psychology, Medicine The American psychologist 1989 303 View 1 excerpt, references background Save Alert Research Feed Evidence for terror management theory: I. The effects of mortality salience on reactions to those who violate or uphold cultural values. A. Rosenblatt, J. Greenberg, S. Solomon, T. Pyszczynski, D. Lyon Psychology, Medicine Journal of personality and social psychology 1989 1,137 PDF Save Alert Research Feed ... 1 2 3 4 5 ... 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work_bxxena2ygfbl7jfkm6pfiipoqu	----	S1743923X18000752jra 619..648 Trump in Transnational Perspective: Insights from Global LGBT Politics Julie Moreau University of Toronto Despite campaign promises to be the most “gay-friendly” Republican president, since assuming office, Donald Trump has been proactive in what many lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) advocates call a “rollback” of gains made during the Barack Obama administration, shocking many observers and bringing sexual and gender politics to the fore. How can we make sense of the contradictions and consequences of Trump’s sexual and gender politics? I argue that examining the transnational processes of democratization, political homophobia, and homonationalism illuminates the significance of the administration’s actions. A democratization approach reveals how Trump’s reversal of Obama-era policies and appointment of conservative judges signifies a greater effort at de-democratization through the contraction of citizenship rights and weakening of the judiciary; political homophobia clarifies how the administration legitimizes its governance through opposition to LGBT people and issues with the appointment of openly homophobic and transphobic individuals to prominent positions; and homonationalism, or the entry of certain queer subjects into the nation at the expense of racialized “others,” aptly characterizes forms of queer inclusion still taking place under Trump. For these reasons, putting Trump’s sexual and gender politics in transnational perspective can help us better understand this moment in U.S. politics. Keywords: LGBT, queer, democratization, political homophobia, homonationalism, Trump, sexual politics, transnational, social movements D onald Trump’s inauguration ceremony as president of the UnitedStates had scarcely ended when reports surfaced that the new administration had removed reference to lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) issues from the White House website (McAffe Published by Cambridge University Press 1743-923X/18 $30.00 for The Women and Politics Research Section of the American Political Science Association. # The Women and Politics Research Section of the American Political Science Association, 2018 doi:10.1017/S1743923X18000752 619 Politics & Gender, 14 (2018), 619 – 648. terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1743923X18000752 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:29, subject to the Cambridge Core https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/S1743923X18000752 https://www.cambridge.org/core 2017). Indeed, a search for “LGBT” now returns a page with the message “Thank you for your interest in this subject,” asking the thwarted researcher to “stay tuned.”1 Despite Trump’s promise to be a “real friend” of the gay community just six months earlier (Diamond 2016), his administration has now asserted a remarkably different public position on LGBT issues.2 Given the number of new responsibilities facing a reportedly overwhelmed administration (Rosenfeld 2016), was eliminating reference to LGBT issues really so pressing? As it turns out, changes to the White House public profile foreshadowed the importance of sexuality and gender — including specifically LGBT issues — to the nascent administration. Thus far, scholars have attempted to understand sexuality and gender politics as part of Trump’s populist appeal. As do other populist leaders, Trump claims to work on behalf of a homogenous (American) “people” against the corrupting influence of elites and immigrants (De la Torre 2017; Oliver and Rahn 2016). His nationalist critique of globalization stokes white Americans’ fears about their declining economic and political superiority, whether because of international institutions such as the United Nations and the North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement or because of the fabricated threat of undocumented migrants (De la Torre 2017). Calling the media “fake news,” his political opponents “Crooked Hillary” and “Pocahontas,” and Mexicans “rapists” and “animals,” he eschews norms of political communication to constantly reiterate the racist and sexist rhetoric that resonates with this political base (Flegenheimer 2018; Korte and Gomez 2018). Indeed, Inglehart and Norris explain this rejection of “political correctness” as particularly appealing to “older, religious white traditionalists who find themselves left behind by growing support in America for such issues as same-sex marriage, rights for transsexuals, gender equality for women in politics, and immigration rights” (2016, 31). Hostility toward LGBT people, then, is one part of a larger “cultural backlash” that explains Trump’s popularity. While that explanation is no doubt correct, this analysis does not purport to account for Trump’s seeming about-face on gay-friendliness or the 1. From http://www.whitehouse.gov/LGBT (accessed October 10, 2017). 2. The initialism “LGBT” refers to lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender. I sometimes use the term “queer” as an umbrella term for non-normative genders and sexualities, and other times I use it to refer to queer studies and scholarship. I understand LGBT to be a political construct emerging from a specific set of contentious and changing identity politics in the United States (Murib 2014). The initialism is a transnationally circulated construct that can obscure local ways of knowing gender and sexuality, but it is nonetheless used by politicians and activists in many national contexts (Thoreson 2014). 620 TRUMP IN TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1743923X18000752 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:29, subject to the Cambridge Core http://www.whitehouse.gov/LGBT https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/S1743923X18000752 https://www.cambridge.org/core consequences of Trump’s gender and sexual politics during his first term. Following the same impulse as political scientists who search for answers to the hows and whys of the Trump administration by looking across usually siloed fields of study (Lieberman et al. 2017), this article aims to put the sexual and gender politics of the Trump administration in transnational perspective so as to grasp their complexities and broader ramifications. A transnational approach emphasizes interconnected and ongoing processes that cross borders and regions (Ayoub 2016). One of the major insights from scholarship on global sexualities is that seemingly fixed or static categories, such as sexual and gender identities, are processes of dynamic interaction (Povinelli and Chauncey 1999). Identities, strategies, and desires circulate globally — albeit through asymmetrical matrices of military and economic power (Alexander and Mohanty 1997; Grewal and Kaplan 2001). Scholars, attentive to the agency of local activists within these global power relations, have consistently located LGBT activism and politics in a transnational frame so as to appreciate local and national similarities and differences while capturing broader patterns (Ayoub 2016; Friedman 2012; Thoreson 2014). Putting contemporary U.S. LGBT politics in transnational perspective disrupts any presumptions of U.S. exceptionalism that prevent the observation of these patterns. An examination of three transnational processes that emerge in the global LGBT politics literature — democratization, political homophobia, and homonationalism — illuminates the significance of the administration’s actions. Through the lens of democratization theory, Trump’s efforts to undo many of Barack Obama’s policies and confirm conservative judges not only matter for a mainstream LGBT movement interested in institutional access but also signify a greater effort at de-democratization through the contraction of citizenship rights and weakening of the independent judiciary. In terms of political homophobia, the Trump administration acquires legitimacy through opposition to LGBT people and issues with the appointment of openly homophobic and transphobic individuals to prominent positions. Finally, homonationalism, a process through which certain queer subjects gain entry into the nation at the expense of racialized “others,” aptly characterizes forms of queer inclusion taking place under Trump, such as his rhetorical claims to protect LGBT citizens against “Islamic terrorists” and participation of LGBT people in right-wing politics. This article contributes to the growing literature on LGBT politics that explores “the relationship between American hegemony and the increasingly global project of LGBT-rights recognition” (Smith 2017, 474). The United States continues to benefit from international JULIE MOREAU 621 terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1743923X18000752 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:29, subject to the Cambridge Core https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/S1743923X18000752 https://www.cambridge.org/core dominance economically and politically, but it is nevertheless embedded in a set of transnational processes that shape LGBT politics the world over. My approach, which focuses on these processes, allows us to consider what is currently happening in the United States as one instance among others of democratization, political homophobia, and homonationalism while exploring the specifics of the Trump administration. By focusing on the significance of the administration’s actions, my approach also enables us to analyze the complexities and consequences of Trump’s politics as they emerge and enfold. On that point, this article does not purport to explain the motivations or origins of particular Trump policies or behaviors. Evidence, sometimes contradictory or dubious, emerges daily.3 Instead, I focus on a few key ways that scholarship on global LGBT politics can contribute to understanding the current political predicament of the United States. Because of the recent nature of Trump’s election, there exist few scholarly sources addressing Trump’s presidency, and fewer still that draw connections to LGBT issues. As a result, this article examines primary source documents produced by the administration and LGBT organizations, in addition to a variety of mainstream and LGBT media sources, to build a narrative of LGBT politics in the Trump era.4 While it is far too early to know what lessons scholars of LGBT politics will ultimately draw from the Trump administration, we can begin to apply these insights and suggest some future directions political scientists may take. POLITICAL FORECLOSURES: DE-DEMOCRATIZATION AND A ROLLBACK OF RIGHTS Numerous scholars of LGBT social movements have examined the influence of the democratization process on LGBT movements, arguing 3. For example, former press secretary Sean Spicer published a book in late July 2018, stating that the pro-LGBT statement in Trump’s speech at the Republican National Convention was motivated by a deal with Robert Sinners, a delegate from Washington, DC. Sinners agreed to support Trump in exchange for public acknowledgment of the LGBT community (Browning 2018). At present, it is difficult to know the degree to which Spicer’s recollection of events is trustworthy, as his book has been described as replete with “incorrect facts” (Gallucci 2018), “misstatements” (Quinn 2018), and “inaccuracies” (Miller 2018) and called “a bumbling effort at gaslighting Americans” (Wemple 2018). The analysis presented here attempts to understand the political effects of the speech, including its vilification of Muslims, rather than to speculate about specific motivations. 4. I rely on newspaper articles for facts regarding the discourse and action of the administration that do not make their way into official policy or press releases. While media data is subject to selection bias by both the researcher and journalists, Earl et al. (2004, 72) find that “description bias” of hard news, or inaccuracy of events described by journalists, is relatively low. Therefore, I trust these sources to provide an accurate account of the administration’s actions. 622 TRUMP IN TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1743923X18000752 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:29, subject to the Cambridge Core https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/S1743923X18000752 https://www.cambridge.org/core that democracy presents vital political opportunities for movements to grow and to achieve many of their goals (Brown 2002; Croucher 2002; Dı́ez 2011; Duyvendak 1995; Green 1994; Smith 1998, 2005, 2008). In addition to facilitating policy change, Omar Encarnación (2014) argues, democratization is essential for LGBT movements by expanding citizenship and increasing the strength and importance of the judiciary.5 Yet Donald Trump’s victory and subsequent actions in office have heightened fears that the United States, along with other stable democracies, is entering a phase of “de-democratization” (Frum 2017; Huq and Ginsburg 2017). In light of this, Trump’s “rollback” of policies by the Obama administration and his rapid nomination of social conservatives to the bench suggests that these actions go further than just presenting obstacles to LGBT activists, but signify a contraction of LGBT citizenship and a weakening of the judiciary.6 Obama compiled what Mathew Nosanchuck calls a “robust record of executive branch action to further LGBT equality” (2012, 445), including a presidential memorandum that extended same-sex partner benefits to foreign service and executive branch government employees, a presidential directive that required hospitals receiving federal funding to extend visitation rights to LGBT patients, and a Department of Education guidance that included antibullying efforts for LGBT students. The Obama administration’s receptivity to the demands of LGBT activists translated into “significant victories” for the mainstream LGBT movement (Wesley, Hendrix, and Williams 2011, 156). Since taking office, Donald Trump and his administration have reversed many of the Obama-era policies7 in a way that constitutes a contraction of 5. Omar Encarnación (2014) argues that democratization also strengthens civil society and develops levels of social tolerance. I find it too soon at present to know what the administration’s effects on civil society or social tolerance will be. 6. I am not arguing that conservative efforts to roll back legislative and judicial gains by the LGBT movement are new — these efforts have been made for decades (Goldberg-Hiller 2012). It is also not unusual for a newly elected president to use executive authority to undo policies of his predecessor that run contrary to his politics or to insist that executive branch agencies fall in line with the administration’s priorities (Coglianese 2010; Nosanchuk 2012). For example, former president Barack Obama reversed George W. Bush’s policies on issues ranging from marijuana criminalization to energy to the environment (Khan 2009). However, I am arguing that a transnational perspective on Trump’s actions can illuminate their contemporary import and ramifications, which extend beyond the policy changes themselves. 7. In a widely circulated essay, Ta-Nehisi Coates (2017) contends that “Trump’s presidency is the negation of Barack Obama’s legacy.” Coates argues that this is motivated by Trump’s ideological commitment to white supremacy. Coates’s essay demonstrates the importance of race to the contraction of all sorts of citizenship rights under Trump. Indeed, Latino citizens living along the U.S.-Mexico border have experienced difficulty obtaining passports because of suspicions of “citizenship fraud” by the State Department (Sieff 2018). JULIE MOREAU 623 terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1743923X18000752 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:29, subject to the Cambridge Core https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/S1743923X18000752 https://www.cambridge.org/core citizenship for LGBT people. A first example pertains to LGBT participation in the armed forces. The Obama administration ordered a military self-study that resulted in the recommendation to allow transgender troops to serve openly, and in 2016, the military took steps to implement the report’s recommendations (Engel Bromwich 2017). However, on July 26, 2017, Trump tweeted that transgender service members are a “burden” and will not be “accept[ed] or allow[ed]” in the U.S. military (Engel Bromwich 2017). While the tweet claimed consultation with “generals and military experts,” the administration could not provide any evidence that this was the case, and senior military officials broke convention to make public statements contradicting the president’s policy recommendation (Buncombe 2017; Starr, Cohen, and Sciutto 2017). Civil rights organizations, LGBT legal advocates, and service member organizations quickly filed for injunctive relief on the grounds that implementing the ban after the government had announced its intention to allow transgender troops to serve openly violated the equal protection clause of the U.S. Constitution and represented a stripping of service members’ civil rights (Segal 2017). The consequences of this policy reversal are likely to have a disproportionate impact on transgender people of color, as people of color are overrepresented in the U.S. military (Chalabi 2017).8 While there is significant disagreement within the LGBT movement regarding the merits of petitioning for military inclusion in the first place (Democracy Now 2017), a transgender ban on military service nevertheless constitutes a limit on the extent of citizenship rights for transgender individuals. The Department of Justice (DOJ) has played a significant role in undoing several policies of the Obama era, the effect of which has been to limit the exercise of LGBT rights. In March 2017, the DOJ blocked proposed questions on the U.S. Census about LGBT populations (Thompson 2017). This is true despite the fact that months earlier, under Obama, the Justice Department was one of four federal agencies, along with the Department of Housing and Urban Development, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, and the Environmental Protection Agency, that asked the Census Bureau to include questions regarding sexual orientation and gender identity on the American Community Survey (H. Wang 2017). Once Trump took office, the DOJ sent a letter to the Census Bureau disputing the “appropriateness” of 8. I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for making this point. 624 TRUMP IN TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1743923X18000752 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:29, subject to the Cambridge Core https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/S1743923X18000752 https://www.cambridge.org/core these questions, and then, a week later, they were removed (H. Wang 2017). The Census is used to determine the allocation of $400 billion in federal funding (H. Wang 2017). Refraining from enumerating LGBT people means less funding allocated to programs that support them (Green 2017b). In April 2017, the DOJ withdrew a lawsuit over North Carolina’s antitransgender House Bill 2 (HB 2), the so-called bathroom bill, which prohibited transgender people from using the bathroom that accords with their gender identity and reversed local ordinances expanding protections for LGBT people (Berman 2017). The DOJ said that it dropped the lawsuit because HB 2 was repealed; however, observers say the new bill does not repeal HB 2 and maintains the same provisions (Berman 2017). Another example deals with federal discrimination protection. Former attorney general Eric Holder released a memo in 2014 directing the DOJ to interpret Title VII’s prohibition on “sex” discrimination to include discrimination against individuals on the basis of their gender identity or expression (DOJ 2014). In October 2017, the DOJ rescinded that guidance, saying that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 does not cover transgender people (Holden 2017), and it filed a brief in a case before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit to advance the claim that Title VII does not protect lesbians and gays from workplace discrimination (Frankel 2018). The DOJ has also worked in concert with the Department of Education to diminish existing LGBT protections. Attorney General Jeff Sessions, in a joint letter with Education Secretary Betsy DeVos, rescinded Obama-era guidance for schools that allowed transgender students to use restrooms in public schools corresponding to their gender identities (Peters, Becker, and Davis 2017). Sessions and DeVos claimed that the guidance had been implemented “without due regard for the primary role of the states and local school districts in establishing educational policy” (Peters, Becker, and Davis 2017). Under DeVos, the Department of Education also refused to pursue discrimination complaints filed by transgender students (Holden 2018). Since January, 2017, the Trump administration has limited the scope of LGBT rights, challenging prior decisions made by the Obama administration to interpret the rights enumerated in the 1964 Civil Rights Act in a more expansive manner. Donald Trump has made the appointment of federal judges a top priority in his administration, and many of these appointees are skeptical of LGBT rights claims. In the United States, as elsewhere, the judiciary has provided an important avenue for the mainstream LGBT movement JULIE MOREAU 625 terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1743923X18000752 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:29, subject to the Cambridge Core https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/S1743923X18000752 https://www.cambridge.org/core to advance its agenda of political and social change (Andersen 2005; Taylor and Haider-Markel 2014). Trump’s appointments not only frustrate such efforts but also weaken and politicize the judiciary. While previous administrations have taken advantage of their influence to nominate politically favorable candidates to the federal bench (Owens 2017; Rosen 2004), Trump has openly criticized federal judges (Scott and Malloy 2017) and nominated individuals with short careers, appearing to privilege political orientation over legal expertise (Blake 2017a; V. Wang 2017). In his first year in office, Trump made 59 judicial nominations, 18 of which were confirmed (Lambda Legal 2017c). Of those 18 judges, 12 are circuit court judges. Trump confirmed more judges in his first year than Barack Obama, George W. Bush, or Bill Clinton (Lambda Legal 2017c). This is especially consequential as circuit court judges hold lifetime appointments. In a press conference with Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell, Trump said, “I want to say that we will set records in terms of the number of judges . . . There has never been anything like what we’ve been able to do together with judges” (Blake 2017b). The pace at which Trump has been able to make these confirmations has led advocacy groups to suggest that Trump is “stacking the courts” with social conservatives who would oppose the expansion, or even the exercise, of LGBT and other civil rights (Matthews 2017; Nash 2017; Savage 2017). A number of Trump’s judicial nominees have track records of discriminatory statements or writings, and even judicial histories wary of LGBT rights claims (Lambda Legal 2017c). The first judges confirmed under George W. Bush, also a staunchly conservative administration, did not have comparable public records of anti-LGBT animus.9 Of the 12 circuit court appointments made in Trump’s first 9. To add comparative context, I performed a Google search of George W. Bush’s and Trump’s appointments during their first year in office for evidence of their track records on LGBT issues. While 75% (9 out of 12) of Trump’s judicial appointments were associated with anti-LGBT public statements or rulings, none of Bush’s initial judicial appointments displayed similar evidence of anti- LGBT leanings. A caveat is that the past 10 years have witnessed a dramatic increase in LGBT visibility, and older digital public records may not reflect the same level of concern with these issues as they do today. 626 TRUMP IN TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1743923X18000752 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:29, subject to the Cambridge Core https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/S1743923X18000752 https://www.cambridge.org/core year, all but three had track records that concerned LGBT advocates (Lambda Legal 2017c).10 For example, 27 organizations sent a letter urging Senators Chuck Grassley and Dianne Feinstein to oppose the nomination of John K. Bush to the federal bench on the grounds that he had spoken out against the decriminalization of sodomy and used a homophobic epithet in a public speech (Lambda Legal 2017a). Another appointee, Amy Coney Barrett, who subsequently made Trump’s shortlist for the U.S. Supreme Court, gave a paid lecture to the conservative legal group Alliance Defending Freedom, the organization that represented business owners accused of LGBT discrimination in two recent Supreme Court cases (Lambda Legal 2017c). Ralph Erickson, confirmed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in October 2017, was one of two judges in 2016 to order the federal government not to enforce health care nondiscrimination protections for transgender individuals (Bendery 2017). Another example from the Eighth Circuit is Leonard Steven Grasz. As the chief deputy attorney general of Nebraska, he opposed same-sex marriage and argued in court that an unmarried lesbian couple should be prohibited from adoption because “[t]he state’s adoption law was not written with the intent to sanction gay adoption” (Lambda Legal 2017b). The American Bar Association (ABA) deemed him “not qualified” on the grounds that he has not demonstrated the ability to separate his personal political beliefs from his role as a judge. After his successful appointment, Republicans warned that the ABA, which has unofficially vetted candidates for more than half a century, may be stripped of this role as an independent assessor (Savage 2017). In perhaps the most consequential appointment of all, Trump secured the confirmation of Neil Gorsuch to the Supreme Court. LGBT advocates decried Gorsuch’s nomination, citing his opinion in Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, which arguably allows for discrimination in the name of religious conviction (Wong 2017). In June 2018, Trump nominated Brett Kavanaugh to replace the retiring Justice Anthony Kennedy on the Supreme Court. Kavanaugh’s record on LGBT issues is unclear; however, the right-wing Family Research Council has publicly praised his rulings (Sherman and Peltz 2018). 10. Trump’s nominations also lack racial, gender, and sexual diversity. Obama’s efforts to diversify the judiciary were extensive, and for his part, George W. Bush undertook some attempts to increase diversity among his nominees (Tobias 2018). As of late 2017, Trump had nominated only 10 people of color out of 113 circuit and district court nominees (Tobias 2018). His record on judicial diversity is “the worst one since President Ronald Reagan’s tenure when dramatically fewer persons of color, LGBT individuals, or women were practicing attorneys” (Tobias 2018, 402). JULIE MOREAU 627 terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1743923X18000752 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:29, subject to the Cambridge Core https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/S1743923X18000752 https://www.cambridge.org/core The Trump administration is taking actions that foreclose political opportunities for LGBT activists to undertake institutional and legal reform. However, an examination of sexual and gender politics from a transnational perspective reveals the ways in which the administration’s steps to roll back or reinterpret policy and appoint conservative federal judges means more than just missing opportunities. These actions pose a threat to democratization efforts such as the extension of citizenship rights to LGBT people and democratic institutions such as the independent judiciary. In a 2017 Vox article, German Lopez writes, “Trump is a reminder that rights gained can still be lost.” While the success of the LGBT movement may be intertwined with democratization and its more inclusive institutional landscape, maintenance of these gains is hardly a foregone achievement, even for established democracies. POLITICAL HOMOPHOBIA, BY APPOINTMENT Global LGBT scholarship is particularly attentive to the ways in which anti- LGBT animus becomes manifest in politics and under what conditions this sentiment gains traction among elites and the larger society. Scholars have conceptualized politicians’ deployment of antigay sentiment and policy in the process of state building using the term “political homophobia” (Boellstorff 2004; Bosia and Weiss 2013; Currier 2010, 2012; Murray 2007). For example, political homophobia is manifest in President Vladimir Putin’s “traditional values” discourse that underpins his rule and justifies Russia’s 2013 law prohibiting the distribution of information on homosexuality (Chaney 2018; Horvath 2016; Wilkinson 2014). Political homophobia, then, is about legitimizing political authority through the assertion of a properly heterosexual state. While that law has the effect of squelching dissent in civil society, political homophobia cannot be reduced to failing democratization or authoritarian governance (Currier 2010). Such reductionism “erases the gendered and sexualized contours of this strategy,” which disproportionately affects sexual and gender minorities (Currier 2010, 111 – 12). Since taking office, Trump has appointed openly homophobic and transphobic individuals to lead nearly every executive agency. Using political homophobia, it becomes clear that choosing anti-queer individuals to fill high-profile appointments reasserts the state’s heteronormativity and cisnormativity — both symbolically by making 628 TRUMP IN TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1743923X18000752 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:29, subject to the Cambridge Core https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/S1743923X18000752 https://www.cambridge.org/core these individuals the “face” of the government11 and in practice by enacting policies that marginalize LGBT people. Further, in the case of this administration, the deployment of political homophobia by government higher-ups sometimes means undermining the purpose of the agency they were appointed to lead. Trump sent early signals that political homophobia would characterize his administration with his choice of Mike Pence, former governor of Indiana, as his running mate. In March 2015, Pence signed into law an Indiana bill called the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. The bill allowed businesses to turn away LGBT individuals by citing a conflict with their religious convictions (Williams-Jent 2016). He opposed same- sex marriage, participation by gays and lesbians in the military, and funding for HIV treatment (Williams-Jent 2016). Of the 15 executive departments whose secretaries currently compose the cabinet, 13 employed political homophobia as a feature of their public service prior to taking office or have done so in their current positions.12 At the State Department, Trump’s initial pick of Rex Tillerson stood out as more socially liberal than Trump’s other cabinet members; in office, Tillerson recognized Pride Month (Caplan 2017) and retained Randy Berry as special envoy for the human rights of LGBTI persons — a position created by President Obama (Hudson 2017).13 Trump “soured” on Tillerson and replaced him with Mike Pompeo, his initial pick for Central Intelligence Agency director. As a congressman, Pompeo publicly opposed same-sex marriage (he called homosexuality a “perversion”) and the inclusion of lesbians and gays in the military (Parker et al. 2018). At the Department of Commerce, Wilbur Ross attracted criticism for sexist and homophobic jokes at a Wall Street fraternity party in 2014 (Roose 2014). Under his direction, the Commerce Department removed reference to “sexual orientation” and “gender identity” from its annual equal opportunity statement (Eilperin 2017). At the Department of 11. Claire Annesley and Susan Franceschet write that “[e]xecutives are the most visible political actors, representing the public ‘face’ of government” (2015, 613). 12. To determine this, I searched publicly available data on the statements and comportment of each appointee both before and since taking up their cabinet position. The only current cabinet appointees that do not have significant records of political homophobia are Kirstjen Nielsen at the Department of Homeland Security and Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin. Mnuchin lacks a track record of public service and therefore had no opportunity to engage in political homophobia. At other levels of government, Trump has appointed individuals who may prove more sympathetic to LGBT issues, including former Log Cabin Republican leader R. Clarke Cooper to the position of assistant of secretary of state for political-military affairs (Johnson 2018). 13. Berry has since left. The State Department told reporters that it was “looking to fill the position” (Lavers 2017). The position was vacant at the time of this writing. JULIE MOREAU 629 terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1743923X18000752 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:29, subject to the Cambridge Core https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/S1743923X18000752 https://www.cambridge.org/core Defense, James Mattis initially received praise from LGBT organizations for “defying” the president on the issue of the transgender military ban (Barbash and Hawkins 2017). However, Mattis later signed a memo that backed up Trump’s assessment of the risks of allowing openly transgender troops to serve (Johnson 2018). At the Department of Labor, Alexander Acosta has a thin public record on LGBT issues, but he served on the awards committee of the conservative organization Family Research Council and founded a group designed to monitor judicial decisions for “activism” on issues such as LGBT rights (Ogles 2018). In her capacity as labor secretary under George W. Bush, current head of the Department of Transportation Elaine Chao opposed LGBT antidiscrimination protections (Agerholm 2016). At Veterans Affairs, the LGBT military organization OutServe-SLDN opposed the nomination of Robert Wilkie to lead the department because of his support for the transgender ban on military service in his capacity as under secretary for personnel and readiness at the Department of Defense (OutServe-SLDN 2018). Attorney General Sessions is perhaps the best example of a state official asserting the state’s heteronormativity and cisnormativity both symbolically and in practice. As an Alabama senator, he came out against scrapping the military’s “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy, and in 2014, he sponsored a bill to allow states to continue to restrict the definition of marriage to heterosexual couples (Bendery 2016). He voted against the Matthew Shepard and James Byrd Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2009 on the grounds that he was “not sure women or people with different sexual orientations face that kind of discrimination” (Lang 2016). He also opposed the Employment Non-Discrimination Act, which would have extended federal antidiscrimination protections to LGBT people (Lang 2016). Sessions was one of the sponsors of the First Amendment Defense Act, which “would allow any taxpayer-funded organization to ignore laws that conflict with its religious beliefs about marriage” (Bendery 2016). In addition to narrowing the DOJ’s interpretation of Title VII as attorney general, Sessions issued a guidance instructing DOJ attorneys to protect religious liberty, potentially at the expense of nondiscrimination protections for women and LGBT people (Moreau 2017). Under his direction, the DOJ filed a brief for the Supreme Court case Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission on behalf of a Jack Phillips, a Christian baker who refused to serve a same-sex couple (Barnes 2017). In July 2018, Sessions announced the creation of a “religious liberty task force” that would “help the department fully 630 TRUMP IN TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1743923X18000752 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:29, subject to the Cambridge Core https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/S1743923X18000752 https://www.cambridge.org/core implement our religious guidance.” In his speech, Sessions declared, “A dangerous movement, undetected by many, is now challenging and eroding our great tradition of religious freedom. There can be no doubt. This is no little matter. It must be confronted and defeated” (DOJ 2018). Though he did not mention the LGBT movement by name, Sessions evoked LGBT issues through the repeated reference to the baker Jack Phillips, including once to say the DOJ was “proud to file a brief in support” of him. Here, Sessions engages in political homophobia by conjuring the specter of a “dangerous” movement intent on sabotaging the free exercise of religion and conferring upon himself the responsibility to confront and defeat it. As such, he symbolically consolidates the state as properly heterosexual and cisgender and announces his intention to, in practice, use state power to combat and destroy threats to the state’s investments in these forms of normativity. Trump’s appointment of public servants with histories of political homophobia is especially consequential, as Trump’s overall appointment rate to entities such as the State Department lags behind that of previous presidents and is thought to be part of a concerted political strategy to weaken government institutions (Kessler 2017). Indeed, in addition to making homophobic statements and advocating for homophobic policies in their official capacities, many of the appointments are “fox in the henhouse” appointments, meaning the appointees espouse political positions at odds with the duties of their new roles (Green 2017a). For example, Trump appointed Betsy DeVos to head the Department of Education. DeVos comes from a wealthy family whose foundation has donated more than $6 million to the conservative group Focus on the Family, an organization that opposed the very antibullying programs developed by the Department of Education to aid LGBT youth (Signorile 2017). This means that political homophobia under Trump consolidates a straight state even as it undermines state institutions. In another example, Trump tapped Ben Carson to head the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). During his confirmation hearings for the position, Carson eroded confidence in his ability to fulfill HUD’s mission to “build inclusive and sustainable communities free from discrimination”14 when he answered that he would not extend “extra rights” to LGBT people in response to a question about housing discrimination (Bollinger 2017). Indeed, recent reports suggest that 14. See https://www.hud.gov/about/mission (accessed July 31, 2018). JULIE MOREAU 631 terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1743923X18000752 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:29, subject to the Cambridge Core https://www.hud.gov/about/mission https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/S1743923X18000752 https://www.cambridge.org/core Carson intends to release a new mission statement for HUD with references to discrimination removed (Olmstead 2018). Under the direction of Alex Azar, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) erased references to “sex stereotyping” and “gender identity” from the department’s website describing antidiscrimination protections covered by Section 1557 of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) (Bergman and Campbell 2018). Also at HHS, Trump appointee Roger Severino took over as head of the Office of Civil Rights (OCR). Before his appointment, Severino worked at the Heritage Foundation, where he took strong stances against same-sex marriage and access to public facilities for transgender people (Green 2017a). He coauthored a report outlining his opposition to considering gender identity and sexual orientation as protected classes in civil rights, including as classes covered by Section 1557 of the ACA (Green 2017a). As director of the OCR, his very mandate is to interpret and enforce these nondiscrimination protections. Beginning in May 2017, the OCR began rolling back discrimination protections for transgender patients, and in April 2018, it announced an impending rule change to this effect (Thoreson 2018). In the meantime, the OCR created a division to defend health workers who refuse to care for certain patients (including LGBT patients) or perform certain services because of religious objections (Thoreson 2018). Much of the political homophobia of Trump’s cabinet appointees takes the form of a public opposition to same-sex marriage.15 While opposition to same-sex marriage is certainly a way to signal conservative credentials, it is also a position now at odds with a Supreme Court decision. At least two appointees have used their public platforms to question the authority of the judicial branch to weigh in on the issue. At the Department of the Interior, former congressman Ryan Zinke cosponsored legislation that put into writing his disagreement with the Supreme Court’s decision in Obergefell v. Hodges (Ogles 2018). The bill is intended to express that “the majority opinion in Obergefell unconstitutionally and indefensibly distorts the definition of marriage.”16 Similarly, Trump appointee Sonny 15. Other cabinet members who have similar histories are Tom Price and Rick Perry. Price, who has since resigned from his appointment as the head of the Department of Health and Human Services amid allegations of misuse of public funds (Baker, Thrush, and Haberman 2017), called the Supreme Court’s 2015 marriage equality decision “a sad day for marriage” and, like Sessions, opposed the 2009 Hate Crimes Prevention Act (Ring 2016b). At the Department of Energy, former Texas governor Perry publicly opposed same-sex marriage and supported a Texas ballot measure to define marriage as between a man and a woman (Ring 2016a). 16. See the text of the bill at https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-resolution/359 (accessed July 27, 2018). 632 TRUMP IN TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1743923X18000752 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:29, subject to the Cambridge Core https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-resolution/359 https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/S1743923X18000752 https://www.cambridge.org/core Perdue now heads the U.S. Department of Agriculture. As governor of Georgia, Purdue signed legislation to prohibit same-sex marriage in the state and vowed to fight any court ruling that declared such a ban unconstitutional (Ogles 2018). The effect of appointing executive branch officials whose political homophobia includes weakening the institutions to which they are appointed or attacking other branches of government is to build a homophobic state at the same time as undermining institutional checks and balances on Trump’s authority. Adopting a transnational perspective on Trump’s sexual and gender politics allows us to bring homophobia into focus as a “category of analysis” in the United States (Keating 2013, 246). Indeed, Michael Bosia and Meredith Weiss note that in the U.S. context, where public opinion on same-sex marriage has markedly improved, “pundits have seized on survey data to foretell not only the ultimate success of marriage equality in the United States, but the death of homophobia” (2013, 7), such that analysis of homophobia has receded into the background. However, in the past few months, the Trump administration has provided ample evidence for their warning: “Homophobia remains not just alive, but kicking” (Bosia and Weiss 2013, 7). Trump has appointed individuals with public records of hostility to LGBT people and rights to upper echelons of the government. The anti- queer sentiment expressed by the majority of his cabinet officials is not a coincidence or simply the result of successful lobbying by socially conservative organizations, though the latter certainly plays a role (Mahler 2018). Rather, as a manifestation of political homophobia, these appointments create the image of a straight state and signal to LGBT people that they have no place in it, a message that is reinforced when these government officials enact policies that further marginalize LGBT people. In the case of Trump’s cabinet, their deployment of political homophobia often contravenes the missions of their departments, undermining these institutions from within, or impugns the authority of the judiciary, undermining checks on the executive branch. HOMONATIONALISM AT PRESENT The retrenchment of rights and the clearness of political homophobia mobilized by elites in the United States could lead one to believe that Trump’s sexual and gender politics are only about the political exclusion of LGBT people. However, in the run-up to the election, Trump JULIE MOREAU 633 terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1743923X18000752 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:29, subject to the Cambridge Core https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/S1743923X18000752 https://www.cambridge.org/core appeared to make overtures to LGBT voters. One of the most striking optics of the campaign occurred at a rally in Colorado in October 2016 when Trump was handed a rainbow flag with the words “LGBTs for Trump” scrawled on the front with black sharpie, which he held while walking around on stage (Lambert 2016). This was not an isolated incident. His website sold the “Pride Men’s Tee”17 with the slogan “LGBT for Trump” against a rainbow background. He also made public statements opposing HB 2 in North Carolina (Levitz 2016) and calling same-sex marriage a settled issue (de Vogue 2016). Even after taking office, and despite rumors to the contrary, Trump did not rescind Obama’s executive order extending employment protections to federal LGBT workers (Scott and Wright 2017).18 Trump’s gestures toward LGBT inclusion merit theorization. Indeed, observers of global queer politics note the ease with which the LGBT community can be recast from “foe” to “friend” (Siegel 2017). Amy Lind and Christine Keating (2013) explore the contradictory actions by political elites to both include and exclude LGBT people. They posit that the other side of political homophobia is “homoprotectionism,” or instances in which the state takes a paternal stance toward LGBT citizens to legitimize state authority. While political homophobia relies on maligning sexual and gender minorities, homoprotectionism allows the state to curry favor with queers by offering them protection from other groups or forces in society (Lind and Keating 2013). In the United States and other parts of the world, politicians claim that LGBT people require state protection from “Islamic terrorism.” Jasbir Puar (2007) elaborates a connection between queer inclusion and Islamophobia with the concept of homonationalism. Puar argues that the war on terror that characterized the presidency of George W. Bush “rehabilitated some — clearly not all or most — lesbians, gays, and queers to US national citizenship” (2007, 38). A particular kind of white, middle-class, and normatively gendered homosexual was folded into the body politic through the extension of marriage rights, military participation, and other inclusive policies, thus enjoying the biopolitical investments historically reserved for heterosexuals. This inclusion is a fundamentally racialized process, which is only enabled through the racist and xenophobic invocation of the Muslim “terrorist” in opposition 17. At time of writing, this garment remains available for purchase at https://shop.donaldjtrump.com/ products/trump-pride-mens-tee-small. 18. President Trump did issue a separate order that relaxed the documentation standards for federal contractors, arguably allowing for anti-LGBT discrimination (O’Hara 2017). 634 TRUMP IN TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1743923X18000752 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:29, subject to the Cambridge Core https://shop.donaldjtrump.com/products/trump-pride-mens-tee-small https://shop.donaldjtrump.com/products/trump-pride-mens-tee-small https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/S1743923X18000752 https://www.cambridge.org/core to the queer citizen. Puar explains that bids for inclusion or acquisition of “gay rights” rely on “the shoring up of the respectability of homosexual subjects in relation to the performative reiteration of the pathologised perverse (homo- and hetero-) sexuality of racial others, specifically Muslim others, upon whom Orientalist and neo-Orientalist projections are cast” (2013, 25). Pairing the entry of queers into the nation with Islamophobia is important because doing so sanctions a global project of white supremacy, belief in U.S. exceptionalism and superiority, and militarism abroad. Though the concept began to circulate in the twilight of George W. Bush’s second term, homonationalism went viral during the Obama years, when mainstream acceptance for LGBT people was increasing and barriers to institutional access in the United States appeared to be falling away. However, homonationalism’s description of the racist, xenophobic exclusion that accompanies forms of queer inclusion continues to take place under Trump. In the postscript to the 10-year rerelease of Terrorist Assemblages, Puar directly addresses the question of the relevance of homonationalism to “Trump times.” “Trump-era style homonationalism,” she writes, is “masterfully elastic, sustaining the production of feared racial others and religious others on behalf of, but never directly benefiting (Christian secular), queers” (Puar 2017, 235). She argues, therefore, that homonationalism is not tied to the moment of “terror” post-9/11 but rather “names a historical shift” from states legitimizing authority through the enforcement of heteronormativity to leaning on both heteronormativity and homonormativity in the exercise of power (Puar 2017, 231). Understanding homonationalism as a process thus helps resolve the seeming contradiction between moves to include and exclude LGBT people. Candidate Trump deployed anti-Muslim rhetoric in almost the same breath as his declarations to be a “real friend” of the LGBT community. In a speech immediately following the shooting at the Pulse nightclub, Trump remarked, “This is a very dark moment in America’s history. A radical Islamic terrorist targeted the nightclub not only because he wanted to kill Americans, but in order to execute gay and lesbian citizens because of their sexual orientation.” Trump clearly juxtaposes gays and lesbians with an “Islamic terrorist,” and he proceeds to call the attack a “strike at the heart and soul of who we are as a nation” (Diamond 2016). Trump does not mention that the majority of the victims were Latinx. As a result, the specific subjectivity of “gay and lesbian citizen” is racialized as white (Vidal-Ortiz 2016) before being JULIE MOREAU 635 terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1743923X18000752 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:29, subject to the Cambridge Core https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/S1743923X18000752 https://www.cambridge.org/core incorporated into the nation as its heart and soul. Just as Puar argues that the homonational politics of the George W. Bush administration did not aim to recuperate all queer subjects for U.S. nationalism, under Trump, this racialized inclusion has been accompanied by equal moves to exclude certain queer subjectivities — namely, queers of color and all transgender people. Richard M. Juang (2006) argues that it is not possible to separate transphobia from issues of racism, ethnocentrism, and Eurocentrism. Since Trump became president, these ideologies have been clearly entangled in his attempts to shore up a white Christian nation through the implementation of a “Muslim ban,” a “zero- tolerance” policy on migrants entering the United States, and a “transban” on military service. A similar discourse featured at the Republican National Convention, where Trump stated that “49 wonderful Americans were savagely murdered by an Islamic terrorist. This time, the terrorist targeted our LGBT community. As your President, I will do everything in my power to protect our LGBT citizens from the violence and oppression of a hateful foreign ideology” (Politico 2016). Trump shifts the discussion from “gays and lesbians” to an “LGBT community,” which he claims as “ours.” In opting for the initialism and using the word “community,” Trump avoids any reference to specific queer subjectivities. The possessive language reinforces LGBT individuals’ subordinate status and vulnerability, as he casts himself as the only person capable of preventing future violence against them. As Puar’s work anticipates, Muslims are associated savagery and queers with citizenship. Omar Mateen, though born in the United States (BBC News 2016), is described as a foreign, external threat because the America Trump seeks to defend is defined as a Christian nation. In short, Islamophobia is justified as a campaign promise to LGBT Americans. In addition to Trump’s rhetoric, homonationalism can also elucidate processes of racialized inclusion of LGBT people and issues into political institutions. For example, scholars of LGBT mobilization demonstrate the increasing incorporation of LGBT issues into political parties (Adam, Duyvendak, and Krouwel 1999; Encarnación 2011; Lind and Keating 2013; Schulenberg 2013). With Trump at the helm, the mainstream LGBT movement in the United States can expect a loss of institutional access, but right-wing parties in the United States and elsewhere have been making overtures to gays and lesbians, who increasingly fill their ranks (Reynolds 2015, 2016). In these cases, LGBT 636 TRUMP IN TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1743923X18000752 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:29, subject to the Cambridge Core https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/S1743923X18000752 https://www.cambridge.org/core subjectivities and issues are not the dangerous “other” but a marker of modernity against Muslim otherness. The wave of success by populist parties in Europe suggests “a turning point in gay people’s willingness to publicly embrace the populist right” (Rogers 2017). Alice Weidel, openly lesbian, is the new face of Germany’s far-right party, Alternative for Germany (AfD). The party also has an LGBT group, “Alternative Homosexuals,” formerly known as “Homosexuals in the AfD.” Embracing queerness coincides with electoral success. In September, the AfD garnered 12.6% of the vote, an increase of 7.9%, to win a total of 13.3 seats (The Guardian 2017). Germany is not alone. Thomas Rogers (2017) writes that “in the Netherlands, Sweden, Norway, Switzerland, and Austria, right-wing populist parties have registered surprising success with openly gay voters, complicating the widely held assumption that LGBT people are innately more likely to support left-wing parties.” These parties consistently juxtapose gayness with Islam in order to “appear as ‘defenders of Western values’, particularly against a supposed ‘Islamisation’ of Europe” (Wielowiejski 2016). Scott Siegel (2017) argues that “speaking out against homophobia, anti-Semitism and sexism not only lends credibility to right-wing populists; it is a strategy that positions them inside ‘the enlightened West’ and, therefore, as ‘true Europeans.’” Siegel suggests that when family values are no longer as salient among the electorate, right-wing politicians may mobilize gay-friendliness. Siegel cites France’s National Front as another party “in ideological transition” putting issues like same-sex marriage in the background, while foregrounding Islamic fundamentalism. Polls show that the National Front performed better with gays and lesbians than it did with the general population (Siegel 2017). According to exit polls, Donald Trump garnered approximately 14% of the LGBT vote in November 2016 (Chibbaro 2016). The Log Cabin Republicans, the only nationwide Republican LGBT organization, waited until after his victory to throw their support behind Trump. The organization’s president, Gregory T. Angelo, said in an interview with Quartz that Trump’s presidency represented a “tremendous opportunity” for gay rights. Angelo listed “Obamacare, tax reform, death tax repeal, preservation of the second amendment, fighting radical Islamic terrorism” as the Log Cabin Republicans’ top priorities under Trump. Angelo’s foreign policy perspective included opposition to the Iranian nuclear deal because of “human rights abuses against gay men and men just perceived to be gay.” Angelo also mentioned the shooting at the JULIE MOREAU 637 terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1743923X18000752 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:29, subject to the Cambridge Core https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/S1743923X18000752 https://www.cambridge.org/core Pulse nightclub, saying, “On radical Islamic terrorism, Log Cabin Republicans called the Orlando massacre what it was, when the Obama administration was tip-toeing around that. This was an attack on the gay community” (de Haldevang and Timmons 2017). Chris Barron, former head of the now-defunct gay conservative organization GOProud, used very similar rhetoric to express his support for Trump. Describing Hillary Clinton’s foreign policy as “reckless,” he said in an interview with CNN, “She can find plenty of time to crucify Christians in the U.S. for perceived antigay bias, but when we’ve got ISIS throwing gay people off of buildings, when we have Muslim states that are prescribing the death penalty for people who are gay, I would think this would be something that a friend of the LGBT community would be able to speak out on” (Moody and Rosen 2016). Other groups sprang up around Trump’s candidacy, including Gays for Trump, led by Peter Boykin. The organization’s website (http://gaysfortrump.com) juxtaposes gay pride with Islamophobia. The hashtag #GaysForTrump is prominently displayed next to “Just say no to Radical Islam.” Homonationalism connects queer inclusion to the racialized othering of Muslims in a manner useful for explaining the dynamics of queer inclusion in the Trump era. As such, it resolves the seeming contradiction between the Trump administration’s political homophobia and candidate Trump’s homoprotectionist rhetoric. It can also help us understand the increasing role played by white cisgender gays and lesbians on the radical right. In this sense, the United States represents another case study for investigating right-wing parties as opportunities for certain queer people and policies. It is an empirical question if, in the U.S. case, the porosity of Trump’s populist politics will open up surprising opportunities for LGBT inclusion or if LGBT people continue to be political scapegoats. CONCLUSION This article has brought to bear some of the main insights in the literature on global LGBT social movements and politics on issues of sexuality and gender in the Trump era. I argue for the utility of a transnational perspective to understand the central role of LGBT issues in legitimizing Trump’s administration, the consequences of his policies, and seeming contradictions in his rhetoric and action. I have employed literature on democratization to understand the broader ramifications for LGBT 638 TRUMP IN TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1743923X18000752 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:29, subject to the Cambridge Core http://gaysfortrump.com https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/S1743923X18000752 https://www.cambridge.org/core citizenship of the rollback of the policies of the Obama era and rapid federal court appointments. Though it is important not to romanticize the Obama administration, it is equally important to recognize the impact such changes in the tenor of political leadership can have. Since 2016, a smattering of hate crimes and bullying have been justified with the words “Make America Great Again” (Blum 2017; Brammer 2017). The Trump administration has deployed anti-queer animus through the appointment of openly homophobic and transphobic individuals to prominent positions within the administration. Not only do these individuals have records of legitimizing their power through recourse to political homophobia, but also many have undertaken policies that marginalize LGBT people and threaten the integrity of the institutions to which they are appointed. Bosia and Weiss (2013) suggest that transphobia falls under the umbrella of political homophobia; however, the Trump administration’s focus on transgender issues raises the question of whether political transphobia merits its own consideration (Michaelson 2017). Future research could explore differences between populists’ use of homophobia and transphobia, especially as part of a broader politics of race and citizenship. Finally, Trump’s election and tenure raise questions about how to think of this period in U.S. history. The concept of homonationalism remains indispensable in thinking through LGBT politics in the United States because of the focus on racialization and Islamophobia as components of LGBT inclusion. LGBT politics in the era of Trump may at times feel shocking, but a transnational perspective reveals that this moment in U.S. history shares many important features with other contemporary contexts. 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Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:29, subject to the Cambridge Core https://www.apnews.com/47537133ca5042f88e5f55df9a94ec3f https://www.apnews.com/47537133ca5042f88e5f55df9a94ec3f https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/us-is-denying-passports-to-americans-along-the-border-throwing-their-citizenship-into-question/2018/08/29/1d630e84-a0da-11e8-a3dd-2a1991f075d5_story.html?utm_term=.235a7a777c0b https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/us-is-denying-passports-to-americans-along-the-border-throwing-their-citizenship-into-question/2018/08/29/1d630e84-a0da-11e8-a3dd-2a1991f075d5_story.html?utm_term=.235a7a777c0b https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/us-is-denying-passports-to-americans-along-the-border-throwing-their-citizenship-into-question/2018/08/29/1d630e84-a0da-11e8-a3dd-2a1991f075d5_story.html?utm_term=.235a7a777c0b https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/us-is-denying-passports-to-americans-along-the-border-throwing-their-citizenship-into-question/2018/08/29/1d630e84-a0da-11e8-a3dd-2a1991f075d5_story.html?utm_term=.235a7a777c0b http://www.europenowjournal.org/2017/07/05/friend-or-foe-the-lgbt-community-in-the-eyes-of-right-wing-populism/ http://www.europenowjournal.org/2017/07/05/friend-or-foe-the-lgbt-community-in-the-eyes-of-right-wing-populism/ https://www.huffingtonpost.ca/entry/why-education-secretary-nominee-betsy-devos-is-a-dangerous-threat-to-lgbtq-equality_us_587cdca2e4b0e58057ff862e https://www.huffingtonpost.ca/entry/why-education-secretary-nominee-betsy-devos-is-a-dangerous-threat-to-lgbtq-equality_us_587cdca2e4b0e58057ff862e https://www.huffingtonpost.ca/entry/why-education-secretary-nominee-betsy-devos-is-a-dangerous-threat-to-lgbtq-equality_us_587cdca2e4b0e58057ff862e https://www.cnn.com/2017/07/27/politics/trump-military-transgender-ban-joint-chiefs/index.html https://www.cnn.com/2017/07/27/politics/trump-military-transgender-ban-joint-chiefs/index.html https://www.census.gov/newsroom/blogs/director/2017/03/planned_subjects_2020.html https://www.census.gov/newsroom/blogs/director/2017/03/planned_subjects_2020.html https://www.hrw.org/report/2018/07/23/you-dont-want-second-best/anti-lgbt-discrimination-us-health-care https://www.hrw.org/report/2018/07/23/you-dont-want-second-best/anti-lgbt-discrimination-us-health-care https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-general-holder-directs-department-include-gender-identity-under-sex-discrimination https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-general-holder-directs-department-include-gender-identity-under-sex-discrimination https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-sessions-delivers-remarks-department-justice-s-religious-liberty-summit https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/S1743923X18000752 https://www.cambridge.org/core general-sessions-delivers-remarks-department-justice-s-religious-liberty-summit (accessed July 31, 2018). Vidal-Ortiz, Salvador. 2016. “Queer-Orlando-América.” The Society Pages, June 17. https://thesocietypages.org/feminist/2016/06/17/queer-orlando-america/ (accessed July 31, 2018). Wang, Hansi Lo. 2017. “Census Bureau Caught in Political Mess over LGBT Data.” National Public Radio, July 18. http://www.npr.org/2017/07/18/536484467/census- bureau-found-no-need-for-lgbt-data-despite-4-agencies-requesting-it (accessed October 16, 2017). Wang, Vivian. 2017. “Trump Nominee for Federal Judgeship Has Never Tried a Case.” New York Times, November 11. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/11/us/brett-talley- judge-senate.html (accessed July 20, 2018). Wemple, Erik, and the Washington Post. 2018. “Sean Spicer’s Book Is ‘a Bumbling Effort at Gaslighting Americans.’” Los Angeles Times, July 24. http://www.latimes.com/books/la- et-jc-sean-spicer-wapo-20180724-story.html (accessed July 25, 2018). Wesley, Joan Marshall, Ercilla Dometz Hendrix, and Jasmine N. Williams. 2011. “Moving Forward: Advancing Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender Rights under the Obama Administration through Progressive Politics.” Race, Gender & Class 18 (3 – 4): 150 – 68. Wielowiejski, Patrick. 2016. “Queerness and the Gay-Friendly Right Wing in Europe.” Young Voices of Europe (blog), March 1. http://young-voices.boellblog.org/2016/03/ 01/queerness-and-the-gay-friendly-right-wing-in-europe/ (accessed July 23, 2018). Wilkinson, Cai. 2014. “Putting ‘Traditional Values’ into Practice: The Rise and Contestation of Anti Homopropaganda Laws in Russia.” Journal of Human Rights 13 (3): 363 – 79. Williams-Jent, Ryan. 2016. “Ten Times Mike Pence Worked to Defeat the LGBT Community.” The New Civil Rights Movement, July 14. http://www.thenewcivilrights movement.com/ryanjent/mike_pence_10_stances_on_the_lgbt_community (accessed October 16, 2017). Wong, Curtis M. 2017. “LGBTQ Groups Blast Trump’s Supreme Court Pick Neil Gorsuch.” Huffington Post, February 1. https://www.huffingtonpost.ca/entry/gorsuch- lgbtq-reaction_us_58920a22e4b0c90eff015951 (accessed October 12, 2017). 648 TRUMP IN TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1743923X18000752 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:29, subject to the Cambridge Core https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-sessions-delivers-remarks-department-justice-s-religious-liberty-summit https://thesocietypages.org/feminist/2016/06/17/queer-orlando-america/ http://www.npr.org/2017/07/18/536484467/census-bureau-found-no-need-for-lgbt-data-despite-4-agencies-requesting-it http://www.npr.org/2017/07/18/536484467/census-bureau-found-no-need-for-lgbt-data-despite-4-agencies-requesting-it https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/11/us/brett-talley-judge-senate.html https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/11/us/brett-talley-judge-senate.html http://www.latimes.com/books/la-et-jc-sean-spicer-wapo-20180724-story.html http://www.latimes.com/books/la-et-jc-sean-spicer-wapo-20180724-story.html http://young-voices.boellblog.org/2016/03/01/queerness-and-the-gay-friendly-right-wing-in-europe/ http://young-voices.boellblog.org/2016/03/01/queerness-and-the-gay-friendly-right-wing-in-europe/ http://www.thenewcivilrightsmovement.com/ryanjent/mike_pence_10_stances_on_the_lgbt_community http://www.thenewcivilrightsmovement.com/ryanjent/mike_pence_10_stances_on_the_lgbt_community https://www.huffingtonpost.ca/entry/gorsuch-lgbtq-reaction_us_58920a22e4b0c90eff015951 https://www.huffingtonpost.ca/entry/gorsuch-lgbtq-reaction_us_58920a22e4b0c90eff015951 https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/S1743923X18000752 https://www.cambridge.org/core Trump in Transnational Perspective: Insights from Global LGBT Politics POLITICAL FORECLOSURES: DE-DEMOCRATIZATION AND A ROLLBACK OF RIGHTS POLITICAL HOMOPHOBIA, BY APPOINTMENT HOMONATIONALISM AT PRESENT CONCLUSION REFERENCES 
work_c2s7ojmwcjcllaeq3ztdsq2nti	----	Incorporating Lesbian and Bisexual Women into Women Veterans’ Health Priorities Keren Lehavot, PhD1,2 and Tracy L. Simpson, PhD1,2 1VA Puget Sound Health Care System, Seattle, WA, USA; 2Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral SciencesUniversity of Washington, Seattle, WA, USA. Relative to the general population, lesbian and bisexual (LB) women are overrepresented in the military and are significantly more likely to have a history of military service compared to all adult women. Due to institu- tional policies and stigma associated with a gay or lesbian identity, very little empirical research has been done on this group of women veterans. Available data suggest that compared to heterosexual women veter- ans, LB women veterans are likely to experience heightened levels of prejudice and discrimination, victimization, including greater incidence of rape, as well as adverse health and substance use disorders. They are also likely to encounter a host of unique issues when accessing health care, including fears of insensitive care and difficulty disclosing sexual orien- tation to Veterans Health Administration (VHA) pro- viders. Training of staff and providers, education efforts, outreach activities, and research on this subpopulation are critical to ensure equitable and high quality service delivery. KEY WORDS: women veterans; lesbian and bisexual women; sexual minority veterans. J Gen Intern Med 28(Suppl 2):S609–14 DOI: 10.1007/s11606-012-2291-2 © Society of General Internal Medicine 2012 INTRODUCTION Lesbian, gay, and bisexual (LGB) individuals have long served in the US military, despite a variety of policies that until very recently were designed to keep them out of service. According to the 2000 census, nearly one million gay and lesbian Americans are veterans.1 Lesbian and bisexual (LB) women, in particular, are more likely to serve than gay and bisexual men and have greater representation in the military (10.7 %) than in the general population (4.2 %).1–5 Very little is known about LB women veterans’ military experiences and health sequelae, though a 2004 report demonstrated that women were disproportionately impacted by Don’t Ask Don’t Tell (DADT), as they made up 30 % of all DADT discharges despite comprising only 14 % of the force.6 There are only a handful of empirical studies on LGB veterans (see Table 1),2,7–16 and of these, only three have focused specifically on women.8,9,14 Researchers, providers, and educators must address this subpopulation of women veterans and their specific needs if we are to fulfill the mission of serving America’s women veterans and providing equitable health care. WOMEN VETERANS AND LB WOMEN: STRIKING SIMILARITIES IN TRAUMA EXPERIENCE Among women veterans in general, a growing body of evidence has documented high rates of trauma across the lifespan and adverse health outcomes. A review of the literature indicated that almost all women veterans report a traumatic event at some point in their lives (81–93 %), and estimates of lifetime sexual assault, childhood sexual and physical abuse, adult sexual and physical assault, and intimate partner violence exceed estimates among nationally representative samples of women.17 Direct comparisons of women veterans to civilians parallel these findings.18,19 Once they enter the military, women veterans may experience additional forms of violence, including military sexual trauma (MST; reported by 20–40 %) and combat expo- sure.17,20 These high rates of trauma exposure appear to translate into heightened risk of poor mental health and health behaviors for women veterans. Two recent studies demonstrated that, compared to civilians, women veterans report worse health-related quality of life, worse general health, and greater likelihood of having a depressive disorder, smoking, and being overweight or obese.21,22 Rates of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) are also high, with some estimates as high as 21%23 and 27 %,24 which are substantially greater than the 10–12 % lifetime prevalence rate found in the general population of women.25,26 The elevated levels of trauma exposure and increased health challenges identified for women veterans are consis- tent with what has been found for LB women when they are compared to heterosexual women. In the general popula- tion, several studies have demonstrated that LB women are more likely to report sexual and physical abuse in both childhood and adolescence,27–30 as well as higher levels of sexual assault in adulthood.28,31,32 Data from population- based studies also indicate that sexual minority status among women is associated with hazardous drinking,33–37 S609 smoking,33,34,36,38 obesity,39,40 and mood and anxiety disorders, including PTSD.34,41–43 Similarities between women veterans and LB women raise the question of whether women who are both veterans and sexual minority are at a more elevated risk for victimization and poor health than those in only one of these populations. In a recent study comparing male and female LGB and heterosexual veterans, LGB veterans were Table 1. Empirical Studies Focusing on LGB Veteran Study Participants Authors Sample Key findings Balsam, Cochran, Molina, & Simpson (2012)7 379 US LGB veterans responding to non-probability Internet survey • 48 % of women indicated victimization due to sexual orientation while in the military 30 % female • 73 % of women report an unwanted sexual experience during military service, with 40 % attributing this to their sexual orientation Blonisch, Bossarte, & Silenzio (2012)2 1,700 US veterans from the 2005–2010 Massachusetts Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance Survey • More LGB veterans reported suicidal ideation compared to heterosexual veterans 4 % LGB veterans, and of those 19.7 % female • Decreased social and emotional support partly contributed to this association Booth, Davis, Cheney, Mengeling, Torner, & Sadler (2012)8 1,004 US Midwestern women veterans participated in retrospective telephone interviews • Women who had women as sex partners reported significantly lower physical health status. Chronic pain history mediated this effect11 % reported having had partnerships with women only or with both men and women Booth, Mengeling, Torner, & Sadler (2011)9 1,004 US Midwestern women veterans participated in retrospective telephone interviews • Women who had women as sex partners reported significantly higher rates of all measures of rape and lifetime substance use disorders11 % reported having had partnerships with women only or with both men and women Cochran, Balsam, Flentje, Malte, & Simpson (2012)10 409 US LGB veterans responding to non-probability Internet survey, compared to 15,000 veterans from a VA data warehouse • LGB veterans were more likely than veterans in the comparison group to screen positive for PTSD, depression, and alcohol problems 30 % female Herrell, Goldberg, True, Ramakrishan, Lyons, Eisen, & Ting (1999)11 103 middle-aged male–male Vietnam veteran twin pairs • Same-sex sexual orientation was significantly associated with thoughts of death, wanting to die, thoughts about committing suicide, and attempted suicide 50 % (one member of each pair) reported male sex partner after age 18 Moradi (2009)12 445 US LGB and transgender veterans responding to an Internet survey • Disclosing sexual orientation was related positively, while concealment and harassment were related negatively, to perceptions of social cohesion within the last units in which participants served 24 % female Nokes & Kendrew (1990)13 31 US male veterans with AIDS at the New York Veterans Administration Medical Center • Over a 6-month period, gay veterans (but not heterosexual veterans) had a significant increase in loneliness related to romantic sexual attachment 61 % reported male/male sexual activity Poulin, Gouliquer, & Moore (2009)14 13 Canadian lesbian veterans participated in semi-structured interviews • Participants reported being persecuted and undergoing ongoing risk evaluations • Discrimination and identity hiding contributed to adverse health outcomes Simpson, Balsam, Cochran, Lehavot, & Gold (2012)15 356 US LGB veterans responding to non- probability Internet survey • 46 % reported having accessed VHA services at some point in their lives and 29 % reported using VHA in the past year30 % female • Of those accessing VHA, only 33 % reported open communication about their sexual orientation with a VHA provider Trivette (2010)16 24 LGB veterans participated in interviews about impact of DADT • Participants highlighted paradoxes of the policy and creating their own form of military gay identity25 % female DADT Don’t Ask Don’t Tell; LGB Lesbian, gay, and bisexual individuals; VHA Veterans Health Administration The above studies do not include published research reports including estimates from the Census1,4 and annual reports provided by Servicemembers Legal Defense Network6 S610 Lehavot and Simpson: Lesbian and Bisexual Women Veterans JGIM more likely to report suicidal ideation, and this difference was partly explained by poorer mental health and lower social and emotional support.2 Similarly, another study that compared male and female LGB veterans to a comparison sample from a VA data warehouse found that LGB veterans were more likely to screen positive for PTSD, depression, and alcohol problems.10 In a unique sample comparing LB and heterosexual women veterans, LB women were more likely to report worse physical health,8 lifetime rape (73 % vs. 48 %),9 and meet criteria for both past-year and lifetime substance use disorders.9 PREJUDICE AND DISCRIMINATION In the LGB literature, both distal and proximal stressors have been described as group-specific processes that may contribute to observed health disparities.44 Distal stressors are defined as prejudice-inspired events, including violence and discrimination. Proximal stressors are internal processes that are presumed to occur following exposure to distal stressors.45 As an example of a distal stressor, in a national probability sample of LGB adults, about 20 % reported having experienced a crime based on their sexual orienta- tion.46 The limited data on LGB veterans demonstrate that discrimination experiences, especially within the military, are relatively common. In a study with 379 LGB veterans, 48 % of the women indicated at least one experience of victimization related to their sexual orientation.7 In semi- structured interviews with LB women veterans from Canada, participants reported significant stigma within the military that contributed to poorer mental health.14 Themes common to these women’s experiences included being persecuted, interrogated, humiliated, and coerced during their time of service. An important question is whether the experience of discrimination itself, in its frequency, severity, or quality, might be unique for LB women veterans compared to heterosexual women veterans or LB women civilians. This group violates cultural norms with respect to both gender (by virtue of being in the military) and heterosexuality. For LB women veterans, especially those who may be butch (e.g., present with a more masculine gender style), discrimination may be a result of gender nonconformity prejudice that is intertwined with antigay prejudice. For example, corrective rape is a term for a hate crime in which an individual is raped because of their perceived sexual or gender orientation, with the intended consequence of the rape to “correct” the individual’s orientation or make them “act” more like their gender.47 The term was coined in South Africa, and its occurrence among LB American women (or the interpretation of the assault as this type of crime) has not been extensively studied. Nonetheless, in 2010, a retired official from the a Tennessee District Attorney’s office advocated corrective rape for US lesbian soldiers,48 and this year a Ohio radio host also publicly xadvocated corrective rape for lesbians.49 Other discrimi- natory experiences may include bullying due to a woman’s perceived gender role nonconformity and sexuality, as well as antigay jokes and name-calling. Importantly, research has shown that hate crimes related to sexual orientation are more detrimental to mental health than nonbiased crimes.50 Examples of proximal stressors following exposure to distal stressors include fear of rejection, internalized homophobia, and concealment of one’s sexual orientation.44 Internalized homophobia involves incorporating negative societal views of homosexuality into the self-concept,51 and has been shown to have significant adverse effects on mental health.52 In a military culture that values both masculinity and heterosexuality, it is possible that LB women veterans exhibit heightened feelings of self-stigma. Concealing one’s orientation (until recently a requirement for active duty LB women) is another stressor that may lead to hypervigilance and social isolation,53 as well as to poor self-reported health and depressive symptoms.54 Poulin and colleagues found that in efforts to conceal their sexuality, LB women veterans they interviewed created “parallel” selves to maintain a heterosexual public persona, often modifying their behaviors, speech, dress, mannerisms, and social networks.14 ACCESS TO AND EXPERIENCE OF HEALTHCARE A particular concern is whether LB women veterans are accessing the VHA and whether the system is ready and able to provide them with high-quality, sensitive care. Data on LB women in general show that they are more likely than heterosexual women to use mental health care,55,56 although they are also more likely to report difficulty obtaining needed medical care.34,35 Moreover, compared to more feminine LB women, butch and more masculine LB women are significantly less likely to have routine gynecological exams and report worse treatment in health- care settings,57 putting them at potentially greater risk for undetected uterine or cervical cancer. One recent study examined VHA utilization by 356 LGB veterans (30 % female).15 Results indicated that the rate of past year VHA use (29 %) was similar to VA Central Office estimates among veterans overall, suggesting that LGB veterans are indeed accessing VHA. Nonetheless, of those who accessed VHA care, only 33 % reported open communication about their sexual orientation with VHA providers, and 25 % reported avoiding at least one VHA service because of concerns about stigma. The lack of ease in discussing sexual orientation has been found to influence healthcare utilization rates negatively among LGB civil- ians,58,59 and could further compromise the quality of care that these veterans receive. S611Lehavot and Simpson: Lesbian and Bisexual Women VeteransJGIM CONCLUSIONS LB women veterans are a large and distinct part of the greater women veteran community, and their presence, military experiences, and health needs must not be over- looked. Under DADT, 14,500 service-members were dis- charged,60 but in September 2011 this policy was repealed, allowing LB women to serve openly.61 In recent years, VHA has made enormous strides to address the health needs of vulnerable groups, including women and LGB and transgender veterans. For example, in 2011 Women’s Health became part of the Office of Patient Care Services62 and VHA established a National Call Center for Women Veterans.63 A VHA Directive established policy regarding the respectful delivery of health care to transgender and intersex veterans.64 The VHA Office of Diversity and Inclusion held its third annual LGB and Transgender Observance Program, and is further leading the effort to establish a formal LGB and transgender special emphasis program. VHA has also created an Office of Health Equity that will address LGB healthcare issues, among others.65 Despite these advances, other institutional policies remain in place that prevent LB women from claiming equal rights and equitable care. Because the Defense of Marriage Act defines marriage for the federal government as a union between a man and woman, many of the benefits the military extends to spouses are not available to same-sex spouses of service members during either their active duty service or when they transition to veteran status, potentially creating financial stresses following service.66 For example, heterosexual spouses of deceased veterans are entitled to many benefits (health care, death pensions, bereavement counseling, etc.) not available to same-sex spouses. Moreover, a recent assessment of the protections granted to LGB veterans concluded that there are significant gaps in VHA’s antidiscrimination policy, and thus made recommendations to VHA to provide explicit patient protections on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity.67 Additionally, as the number of women veterans is expected to increase, so will the number of LB women veterans who are in need of services. Cultural competency trainings are thus critical, and should provide education about LGB veterans, promote providers’ awareness of their own attitudes and potential anxiety about caring for LGB patients, and address best practices on asking about sexual orientation.68 Providers can facilitate open conversations about sexual orientation by their nonjudgmental stance and by sending a clear message that LGB veterans are welcome. For example, the Fenway Institute suggests beginning with open-ended questions, using inclusive or neutral language, and embedding further ques- tions in the sexual history should self-disclosure not come up.68 Such trainings may assist providers with becoming more inclusive and creating a safe atmosphere, so that patients are able to provide thorough disclosures that can improve their treatment plans and the resources available to them. At least one recommended resource is the creation of LGB veteran support groups that recognize the individual’s unique identity as both LGB and veteran. There are emerging models for this type of LGB-specific care, including VA Palo Alto’s Living Out Loud/Laughing Out Loud support group for LGB and transgender veterans.69 The group provides members with an opportunity to receive social support from peers, as well as explores a variety of topics, such as isolation, mental health, and family issues. The presence of such groups could help make VHA a provider of choice for LGB veterans, as well as increase sensitivity to and visibility of these veterans within VHA medical centers. As demonstrated in this article, research on LB women veterans is extremely limited. We encourage researchers to include questions about sexual orientation in their research programs. Research areas of particular importance to LB veterans include information about their exposures to trauma, mental health needs, access and barriers to care, and preferences for and experiences with treatment. As data become available, researchers, providers, and policy-makers alike can ensure that we address potential disparities, as well as assess setbacks or progress in meeting this group’s needs. Acknowledgements: This material is the result of work supported by resources from the Department of Veterans Affairs Office of Academic Affiliations, Advanced Fellowship Program in Mental Illness Research and Treatment, and the VA Puget Sound Health Care System, Seattle, Washington. The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not represent the views of the Department of Veterans Affairs or the United States government. Conflict of Interest: The authors declare that they do not have a conflict of interest. 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Intimate partner violence victimization among women veterans and associated heart health risks. Women’s Health Issues. 2011;21:S190–4. 19. Schultz J, Bell K, Naugle A, Polusny M. Child sexual abuse and adulthood sexual assault among military veteran and civilian women. Mil Med. 2006;171:723–8. 20. Kelly UA, Skelton K, Patel M, Bradley B. More than military sexual trauma: interpersonal violence, PTSD, and mental health in women veterans. Res Nurs Health. 2011;34:457–67. 21. Lehavot K, Hoerster KD, Nelson KM, Jakupcak M, Simpson TL. Health indicators for military, veteran, and civilian women. Am J Prev Med. 2012;42:473–80. 22. Shen C, Sambamoorthi U. Associations between health-related quality of life and financial barriers to care among women veterans and women non-veterans. Women Health. 2012;52:1–17. 23. Dobie D, Maynard C, Bush K, Davis T, Bradley K. PTSD in female veterans: association with self-reported health problems and functional impairment. Arch Intern Med. 2004;164:394–400. 24. Escalona R, Achilles G, Waitzkin H, Yager J. PTSD and somatization in women treated at a VA primary care clinic. Psychosomatics. 2004;45:291–6. 25. Kessler R, Sonnega A, Bromet E, Hughes M, Nelson CB. Posttraumatic stress disorder in the National Comorbidity Survey. Arch Gen Psychiatry. 1995;52:1048–60. 26. Resnick H, Kilpatrick D, Dansky B, Saunders B, Best CL. Prevalence of civilian trauma and PTSD in a representative national sample of women. J Consult Clin Psychol. 1993;61:984–91. 27. Austin SB, Jun HJ, Jackson B, et al. Disparities in child abuse victimization in lesbian, bisexual, and heterosexual women in the Nurses’ Health Study II. J Women’s Health. 2008;17:597–606. 28. Balsam KF, Rothblum ED, Beauchaine TP. Victimization over the life span: a comparison of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and heterosexual siblings. J Consult Clin Psychol. 2005;73:477–87. 29. Friedman MS, Marshal MP, Guadamuz TE, et al. A meta-analysis of disparities in childhood sexual abuse, parental physical abuse, and peer victimization among sexual minority and sexual nonminority individu- als. Am J Public Health. 2011;101:1481–94. 30. Wilsnack SC, Kristjanson AF, Hughes TL, Benson PW. Characteristics of childhood sexual abuse in lesbians and heterosexual women. Child Abuse Negl. 2012;36:260–5. 31. Hughes TL, Szalacha LA, Johnson TP, Kinnison KE, Wilsnack SC, Cho Y. Sexual victimization and hazardous drinking among heterosex- ual and sexual minority women. Addict Behav. 2010;35:1152–6. 32. Moracco KE, Runyan CW, Bowling MJ, Earp JAL. Women’s experi- ences with violence: a national study. Women’s Health Issues. 2007;17:3–12. 33. Boehmer U, Miao X, Linkletter C, Clark MA. Adult health behaviors over the life course by sexual orientation. Am J Public Health. 2012;102:292–300. 34. Burgess D, Tran A, Lee R, van Ryn M. Effects of perceived discrimination on mental health and mental health services utilization among gay, lesbian, bisexual and transgender persons. J LGBT Health Res. 2007;3:1–14. 35. Diamant AL, Wold C, Spritzer K, Gelberg L. Health behaviors, health status, and access to and use of health care: a population-based study of lesbian, bisexual, and heterosexual women. Arch Fam Med. 2000;9:1043–51. 36. Steele LS, Ross LE, Dobinson C, Veldhuizen S, Tinmouth JM. Women’s sexual orientation and health: results from a Canadian population-based survey. Women Health. 2009;49:353–67. 37. Wilsnack SC, Hughes TL, Johnson TP, Bostwick WB, Szalacha LA, Benson P, Kinnison KE. Drinking and drinking-related problems among heterosexual and sexual minority women. J Stud Alcohol Drugs. 2008;69:129–39. 38. Gruskin EP, Greenwood GL, Matevia M, Pollack LM, Bye LL. Disparities in smoking between the lesbian, gay, and bisexual population and the general population in California. Am J Public Health. 2007;97:1496–502. 39. Jun HJ, Corliss HL, Nichols LP, Pazaris MJ, Spiegelman D, Austin SB. Adult body mass index trajectories and sexual orientation: the Nurses’ Health Study II. Am J Prev Med. 2012;42:348–54. 40. Smith HA, Markovic N, Danielson ME, et al. Sexual abuse, sexual orientation, and obesity in women. J Women’s Health. 2010;19:1525–32. 41. Cochran SD. Emerging issues in research on lesbians’ and gay men’s mental health: does sexual orientation really matter? Am Psychol. 2001;56:931–47. 42. Gilman SE, Cochran SD, Mays VM, Hughes M, Ostrow D, Kessler RC. Risk of psychiatric disorders among individuals reporting same-sex sexual partners in the National Comorbidity Survey. Am J Public Health. 2001;91:933–9. 43. Roberts AL, Austin SB, Corliss HL, Vandermorris AK, Koenen KC. Pervasive trauma exposure among U.S. sexual orientation minority adults and risk of posttraumatic stress disorder. Am J Public Health. 2010;100:2433–41. 44. Meyer IH. Prejudice, social stress, and mental health in lesbian, gay, and bisexual populations: conceptual issues and research evidence. Psychol Bull. 2003;129:674–97. 45. Dohrenwend BP. The role of adversity and stress in psychopathology: some evidence and its implications for theory and research. J Health Soc Behav. 2000;41:1–19. 46. Herek GM. Hate crimes and stigma-related experiences among sexual minority adults in the United States: prevalence estimates from a national probability sample. J Interpers Violence. 2009;24:54–74. 47. Wikipedia. Corrective rape. Available at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Corrective_rape. Accessed September 21, 2012. 48. Views across the Pond. Joe Rehyansky advocates ‘corrective rape’ for US lesbian soldiers. December 1, 2010. Available at: http://viewsacrossthepond. wordpress.com/2010/12/01/joe-rehyansky-advocates-corrective-rape-for- us-lesbian-soldiers/. Accessed September 21, 2012. 49. Stone M. Ohio radio host advocates corrective rape for lesbian. Portland Progressive Examiner. April 28, 2012. Available at: http://www.examiner. com/article/ohio-radio-host-advocates-corrective-rape-for-lesbian. Accessed September 21, 2012. 50. Herek GM, Gillis JR, Cogan JC. Psychological sequelae of hate-crime victimization among lesbian, gay, and bisexual adults. J Consult Clin Psychol. 1999;67:945–51. 51. Thoits P. Self-labeling processes in mental illness: the role of emotional deviance. Am J Sociol. 1985;91:221–49. 52. Williamson I. Internalized homophobia and health issues affecting lesbians and gay men. Health Educ Res. 2000;15:97–107. 53. Pachankis JE. The psychological implications of concealing a stigma: a cognitive–affective–behavioral model. Psychol Bull. 2008;133:328–45. 54. Rothman EF, Sullivan M, Keyes S, Boehmer U. Parents’ supportive reactions to sexual orientation disclosure associated with better health: results from a population-based survey of LGB adults in Massachusetts. J Homosex. 2012;59:186–200. S613Lehavot and Simpson: Lesbian and Bisexual Women VeteransJGIM http://www.sldn.org/pages/sldn-reports http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Corrective_rape http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Corrective_rape http://viewsacrossthepond.wordpress.com/2010/12/01/joe-rehyansky-advocates-corrective-rape-for-us-lesbian-soldiers/ http://viewsacrossthepond.wordpress.com/2010/12/01/joe-rehyansky-advocates-corrective-rape-for-us-lesbian-soldiers/ http://viewsacrossthepond.wordpress.com/2010/12/01/joe-rehyansky-advocates-corrective-rape-for-us-lesbian-soldiers/ http://www.examiner.com/article/ohio-radio-host-advocates-corrective-rape-for-lesbian http://www.examiner.com/article/ohio-radio-host-advocates-corrective-rape-for-lesbian 55. Grella CE, Greenwell L, Mays VM, Cochran SD. Influence of gender, sexual orientation, and need on treatment utilization for substance use and mental disorders: findings from the California Quality of Life Survey. BMC Psychiatry. 2009;14:52. 56. McNair R, Szalacha LA, Hughes TL. Health status, health service use, and satisfaction according to sexual identity of young Australian women. Women’s Health Issues. 2011;21:40–7. 57. Hiestand KR, Horne SG, Levitt HM. Effects of gender identity on experiences of healthcare for sexual minority women. J LGBT Health Res. 2007;3:15–27. 58. Clark MA, Bonacore L, Wright SJ, Armstrong G, Rakowski W. The cancer screening project for women: experiences of women who partner with women and women who partner with men. Women Health. 2003;38:19–33. 59. Steele LS, Tinmouth JM, Lu A. Regular health care use by lesbians: a path analysis of predictive factors. Fam Pract. 2006;23:631–6. 60. Servicemembers Legal Defense Network. About “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell.” Available at: http://www.sldn.org/pages/about-dadt. Accessed Septem- ber 21, 2012. 61. Reuters. Obama certifies end of military’s gay ban. NBC News. July 22, 2011. Available at: http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/43859711/ns/ us_news-life/. Accessed September 21, 2012. 62. Department of Veterans Affairs, Women Veterans Health Care. About the program. Available at: http://www.womenshealth.va.gov/ WOMENSHEALTH/about.asp. Accessed September 21, 2012. 63. Department of Veterans Affairs, Women Veterans Task Force. Strategies for serving our women veterans. 2012 Report. 64. Department of Veterans Affairs. VHA Directive 2011-024. Providing health care for transgender and intersex veterans. 65. Office of Diversity and Inclusion (ODI). LGBT Program. Updated July 26, 2012. Available at: http://www.diversity.va.gov/programs/lgbt.aspx. Accessed September 21, 2012. 66. Servicemembers Legal Defense Network. Freedom to serve: the definitive guide to LGBT military service. Updated July 27, 2011. Available at: http://www.sldn.org/pages/guide-to-open-service. Accessed September 21, 2012. 67. Cray A. Reaching all who served: an analysis of Department of Veterans Affairs LGBT health policies. November 11, 2011. Available at: http://lgbthealth. webolutionary.com/sites/default/files/VA%20Final%20Report%20_0.pdf. Accessed September 21, 2012. 68. Bradford JB, Cahill S, Grasso C, Makadon HJ. Policy focus: how to gather data on sexual orientation and gender identity in clinical settings. The Fenway Institute. 2012. Available at: http://www.fenwayhealth.org/ site/DocServer/Policy_Brief_HowtoGather…_v3_01.09.12.pdf? docID=9142. Accessed September 21, 2012. 69. Ramirez MH, Rogers SJ, Johnson HL, Banks J, Seay WP, Tinsley BL, Grant AW. If we ask, what they might tell: clinical assessment lessons from LGBT military personnel post-DADT. J Homosex. In press. S614 Lehavot and Simpson: Lesbian and Bisexual Women Veterans JGIM http://www.sldn.org/pages/about-dadt http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/43859711/ns/us_news-life/ http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/43859711/ns/us_news-life/ http://www.womenshealth.va.gov/WOMENSHEALTH/about.asp http://www.womenshealth.va.gov/WOMENSHEALTH/about.asp http://www.diversity.va.gov/programs/lgbt.aspx http://www.sldn.org/pages/guide-to-open-service http://lgbthealth.webolutionary.com/sites/default/files/VA%20Final%20Report%20_0.pdf http://lgbthealth.webolutionary.com/sites/default/files/VA%20Final%20Report%20_0.pdf http://www.fenwayhealth.org/site/DocServer/Policy_Brief_HowtoGather&_v3_01.09.12.pdf?docID=9142 http://www.fenwayhealth.org/site/DocServer/Policy_Brief_HowtoGather&_v3_01.09.12.pdf?docID=9142 http://www.fenwayhealth.org/site/DocServer/Policy_Brief_HowtoGather&_v3_01.09.12.pdf?docID=9142 Incorporating Lesbian and Bisexual Women into Women Veterans’ Health Priorities Abstract Introduction WOMEN VETERANS AND LB WOMEN: STRIKING SIMILARITIES IN TRAUMA EXPERIENCE PREJUDICE AND DISCRIMINATION ACCESS TO AND EXPERIENCE OF HEALTHCARE CONCLUSIONS REFERENCES 
work_c4g6k2fgdbgjza7ptrb3s5lj7u	----	The criminal careers of those imprisoned for hate crime in the UK https://doi.org/10.1177/1477370819839598 European Journal of Criminology 2020, Vol. 17(6) 936 –955 © The Author(s) 2019 Article reuse guidelines: sagepub.com/journals-permissions DOI: 10.1177/1477370819839598 journals.sagepub.com/home/euc The criminal careers of those imprisoned for hate crime in the UK Darrick Jolliffe University of Greenwich, UK David P. Farrington Cambridge University, UK Abstract Hate crime research has increased, but there are very few studies examining hate crime offenders. It is, therefore, difficult to determine to what extent those who perpetrate this offence might be different from those who have not committed hate crime. This study is the first to provide an account of the demographics and criminal histories of those serving time in prison for committing a hate crime. It is based on a large complete population of offenders in the UK. Hate crime offenders released from prison were found to have prolific criminal careers, having committed a wide range and large number of different types of offences. When compared with those who committed a general (non-hate) violent offence, violent hate crime offenders were significantly older and were considerably more prolific in their previous offending. Violent hate crime appeared quantitatively, as opposed to qualitatively, different from violent non-hate crime, but this was less clearly true when those who had committed public order hate crime were compared with other public order offenders. Interventions to reduce the later offending of violent hate crime offenders should be based on the effective interventions that exist for violent offenders, but should take into account knowledge about the surprisingly prolific criminal careers of hate crime offenders. Keywords criminal careers, hate crime, prison, violence Introduction Although the perpetration of hate crime is potentially as old as history, research demon- strating the pervasiveness of this pernicious form of criminal offending appears to have Corresponding author: Darrick Jolliffe, School of Law and Criminology, University of Greenwich, London, SE10 9LS, UK. Email: d.jolliffe@gre.ac.uk 839598EUC0010.1177/1477370819839598European Journal of CriminologyJolliffe and Farrington research-article2019 Article https://uk.sagepub.com/en-gb/journals-permissions https://journals.sagepub.com/home/euc mailto:d.jolliffe@gre.ac.uk http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1177%2F1477370819839598&domain=pdf&date_stamp=2019-04-03 Jolliffe and Farrington 937 begun in the US in the late 1980s. Finn and McNeil (1987) conducted an exploratory review of the criminal justice responses to bias crimes,1 funded by the National Institute of Justice, and this was followed by the influential work of Herek (1989), who studied the prevalence of hate crime victimization against lesbian and gay men in the US. In both research contributions the prevalence of hate crime was much higher than anticipated. In the UK, academic research on hate crime commenced somewhat later, with rela- tively limited contributions before 2000. This was despite the fact that there were very high-profile hate crime offences perpetrated in the 1990s in England, including the racist murder of the Black teenager Stephen Lawrence, and the racist and homophobic nail bomb campaign in London by David Copland in 1999. It is noteworthy that the subse- quent police investigation into the murder of Stephen Lawrence was itself so discrimina- tory that a later review of the police response to this horrible offence resulted in the Metropolitan Police being labelled ‘institutionally racist’ (Macpherson, 1999). Although the most appropriate definition of hate crime is still the subject of much academic debate, in England and Wales the criminal justice system does have an agreed working definition. This is: ‘any criminal offence which is perceived, by the victim or any other person, to be motivated by hostility or prejudice’ (College of Policing, 2014). Of the nine official protected characteristics that were introduced by the Equality Act 2010,2 there are five that form the official ‘strands’ of hate crime and are recorded by the police. These are offences against people based on their ethnicity, religion, disability, sexual orientation or transgender status. Therefore, in England and Wales it is illegal to discriminate based on age, but an offence directed at someone because of their age would not be officially recorded as a hate crime. There is no single piece of ‘hate crime’ legislation in England and Wales, but the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 introduced racially and religiously aggravated offences, including those for assault, criminal damage, harassment, stalking and public order offences. In addition, as part of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, new sentencing provisions were introduced for those convicted of hate-related offences. These allowed for enhanced penalties, such as longer prison sentences, for those found guilty with evidence of hostil- ity towards the victim based on the victim’s (presumed) ethnicity, religion, disability or sexual orientation or if the victim was (presumed) transgender. There has been an exponential increase in the amount of research produced about hate crime, but this has tended to focus on fairly restricted areas. One aspect that has garnered considerable research is the amount of ‘hidden’ hate crime, or the hate crime that does not come to the attention of police (for example, Crime Survey of England and Wales, 2015; James, 2015). For example, in England and Wales in 2014/15 there were 52,528 hate crime offences reported to police, but the nationally representative Crime Survey of England and Wales estimates the number of hate crimes to be in the range of 222,000 (Crime Survey of England and Wales, 2015).3 Other areas of hate crime that have attracted considerable research include how best to define hate crime (for example, Hall, 2013), which groups should be considered as victims of hate crime (for example, Garland, 2010; James, 2015), the profound impact of hate crime on victims and communities (for example, Perry, 2001), and the criminal justice responses to hate crime and how these could, and should, be improved to avoid secondary victimization (Chakraborti et al., 2014). There has also been interest in how 938 European Journal of Criminology 17(6) wider political movements, such as the UK’s vote to leave the EU (Brexit) and the elec- tion of Donald Trump as US President may cause or in fact are causing changes in the prevalence of hate crime (for example, Levin, 2017; Metropolitan Police, 2017). Hall (2015) provides a useful overview of a number of sociological and criminologi- cal theoretical approaches that have been used to explain the perpetration of hate crime. These include suggesting that hate crime could be viewed through the lens of Mertonian strain theory, in which hate crime offences are a response to perceived threats (for example, competition for jobs, or other legitimate means to achieve societal goals) by minority groups. Cohen’s (1955) subcultural theory could also be used to explain group- oriented hate such as neo-Nazi groups. That is, hate groups form as a result of the ‘status frustration’ of failing to measure up to middle-class societal standards by forming delin- quent groups that reject middle-class goals and develop their own approaches to creat- ing status, such as targeting specific minorities. Others (for example, Iganski, 2008) have suggested that any theory that attempts to explain hate crime must account for the fact that hate crime seems to be typically committed by ‘ordinary people’ in the course of everyday interactions and is not commonly committed by hateful bigots who seek out victims. Hate crime research in both the US and the UK, however, has been considerably and noticeably deficient in the empirical study of those who perpetrate hate crime. There have been in-depth investigations of cohesive organizations that perpetrate hate (for example, Hamm, 1993), and those groups that may have an orientation towards hate, such as the English Defence League (Treadwell and Garland, 2011). However, the study of the ‘average’ hate crime perpetrator has been quite limited. With very few exceptions (reviewed below), research on hate crime offenders has been predominantly based on practitioners’ views (for example, Iganski, 2012) and the recollections and perceptions of victims (for example, Chakraborti et al., 2014; Mason, 2005; Sibbitt, 1997). Previous research on hate crime offenders McDevitt, Levin and Bennett (2002) conducted seminal research on hate crime perpetra- tors using 169 police case files of known suspects or those arrested for hate crime.4 Based on these records, and on interviews with the investigating officers, the authors attempted to infer offence motivation and identify ‘typologies’ of hate crime perpetra- tors. For example, 66 percent of the perpetrators were classified as ‘thrill’ offenders, who tended to be young and committed hate crime impulsively while in groups. The next most prevalent category (25 percent) was ‘defensive’ offenders, who committed their offence to ‘protect’ their turf (for example, neighbourhood) from perceived outsiders. Unfortunately, this study did not present the basic demographic or criminal history char- acteristics of hate crime offenders (HCOs), which would have been useful for providing a descriptive account of who typically perpetrates which ‘type’ of hate crime. Other research on HCOs has provided limited descriptive information. For example, the Crown Prosecution Service in England and Wales (2011) examined the basic char- acteristics of over 15,000 hate crime defendants. They found that most offenders were male and White British, with 50 percent being aged between 25 and 59 and another 27 percent between 18 and 24. Also, Mason (2005) examined victim reports to police in a Jolliffe and Farrington 939 random sample of 20 racially motivated incidents and 20 homophobic-related incidents. Unfortunately, key features of the perpetrator were often not available, with the gender of the perpetrator missing in half of the cases and age and ethnicity missing in three- quarters of the cases. Iganski and Smith (2011) used anonymized police data from Lancashire, London and Northern Ireland to examine the demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of those accused of hate crime. The results of this investigation suggested that HCOs were pre- dominantly male and of White racial background, with offenders generally being under 30. In addition, many of those accused of hate crime were unemployed (between 25 and 60 percent). The finding that most racially motivated offenders were male and White was also reported in a study of youth (age 10 and 17) serving sentences for racially motivated offending in England and Wales (Wilcox et al., 2010). The records of 58 HCOs convicted in Los Angeles were reviewed by Dunbar (2003). This was the entire population of those convicted for hate crimes between 1995 and 1997 in Los Angeles. Of these offenders, over 91 percent were men, and their average age was 24.5 (SD = 8.1, range 16–44). The ethnicity of the HCOs was generally representative of the Los Angeles area (over 43 percent Latino, 33 percent European White, 15.5 per- cent African American, 3.4 percent Asian Pacific). Almost half of the HCOs were con- victed for physical assault, with robbery/extortion being the next most prevalent offence (about 25 percent), followed by property offences (17 percent). Almost all of the victims (80 percent) were targeted because of their race. When rated on a measure of hate moti- vation based on four variables (a history of hate-motivated aggression, membership in a hate group or gang at the time of commission of the index crime, articulated hate speech during the commission of the crime, the presence of hate iconography such as literature, art, music, body tattoos or neo-Nazi garb at the time of the crime), 74 percent of those convicted for hate crime did not evidence hate motivation. Most hate offences were com- mitted in groups. Dunbar, Quinones and Crevecoeur (2005) investigated the criminal histories of a group of 204 HCOs in the US who had been identified and apprehended by the police. The results suggested that most HCOs were males (87 percent) with an average age of about 33. Slightly less than half of the arrestees were of Euro-White ethnicity, with those of Latino (26 per cent and African American race (15 percent) being the next most preva- lent ethnic groups. A total of 16 percent of this sample were adjudged to be members of hate-oriented criminal gangs or groups, but how this categorization was made was not clear. Slightly less than half of the offenders (45 percent) had previous misdemeanour convictions and 36 percent had prior felony convictions. Information about the number and types of previous offences was not available, but an ordinal assessment of the sever- ity of their previous offences suggested that many of these HCOs had committed both violent and non-violent offences previously. When separated into the target of the hate (race, sexual orientation or religion), the results suggested that HCOs who targeted indi- viduals because of their race had more extensive criminal histories than those who tar- geted individuals because of their religion. Although comparatively a valiant effort of descriptive research on HCOs, it is gener- ally not appropriate to combine male and female offenders into a single group, because the characteristics of male and female offenders tend to be so markedly different from 940 European Journal of Criminology 17(6) one another (for example, Hedderman and Jolliffe, 2015; Jolliffe, 2013). For example, a key result of Dunbar et al. (2005) was that those who targeted individuals because of race were more criminal than those who target individuals because of religion. However, this result could be confounded by the fact that males and females were included together in a single ‘offender’ category. That is, if males, who are generally more criminal, were more inclined to target victims based on race, and females, who are generally less crimi- nal, were more likely to target victims based on religion, this would be a gender differ- ence that created the perception of a difference in HCO motivation.5 Hate crime perpetration was also investigated in a large-scale nationally representa- tive self-report study of 4855 Finnish adolescents (51 percent male) aged 15–16. In this study, hate crime offending in the previous 12 months was based on two items: ‘Have you ever assaulted anyone?’ and ‘Have you bullied someone either in school or on the way to school?’ A positive response to either of these triggered follow-up questions about whether the act was motivated by the victim speaking a foreign language, the colour of their skin, their religion, ethnicity or political opinions. The prevalence of hate-motivated assault and bullying was 2.3 percent, with more males reporting such offences (4.0 per- cent) than females (0.7 percent). Using multinomial regression to compare three groups (those who did not report assault/bullying, those who reported assault/bullying, those who reported hate-related assault/bullying. Näsi et al. (2016) found that those who reported a hate-related offence were different from those who did not report assault/bul- lying, but similar to those who reported non-hate-related assault/bullying. The parents of those who reported both hate and non-hate assault/bullying were more likely than those who did not to drink more often, have poor parental supervision, have low self-control and be male. The only variable that appeared to differentiate hate from non-hate offend- ers was that the parents of HCOs were reported to fight more often. There have been other studies of HCOs (for example, Chakraborti et al., 2014; Godinet and Stotzer, 2017; Roberts et al., 2013), but these were based on victims’ accounts and so are somewhat limited in the extent to which they can provide informa- tion about non-observable (for example, criminal history) or even observable (for exam- ple, age, ethnicity) features of HCOs. It is essential to develop a better understanding of the characteristics of those who commit hate crime and to determine how far they are similar to or different from those who do not commit hate offences. It could be that HCOs possess unique demographic or criminal history profiles and are in some way ‘different’ from offenders who do not com- mit hate crime offences. Alternatively, those who commit hate crime may be very similar in relevant demographic and criminal history background characteristics to those who commit other types of offences. Although there is currently limited evidence on these two possibilities, the evidence from wider criminology might suggest the latter. It is over 30 years since the National Academy of Sciences published the seminal work Criminal Careers and Career Criminals (Blumstein et al., 1986). The voluminous knowledge generated by this paradigm is far beyond the scope of this article (see DeLisi and Piquero, 2011), but criminal career research has had much to say about offender ‘types’, including violent offenders (Farrington, 1991), intimate partner violent offend- ers (Hilton and Eke, 2016) and life-course persistent offenders (Jolliffe et al., 2017). Importantly, translating criminal career research for the purposes of studying HCOs, in Jolliffe and Farrington 941 their review of knowledge that has been generated by criminal career research about offender ‘types’ and offending specialization, DeLisi and Piquero (2011: 291) state: ‘A main conclusion is that the preponderance of offenders, and by preponderance we mean virtually all offenders, are generalists.’ This does not mean that there is not utility in examining the criminal careers of HCOs, even if they are found to be ‘generalist’ offenders. For example, using the Cambridge Study in Delinquent Development, a prospective longitudinal study of 411 boys fol- lowed up from age 8, Farrington (1991, 1998) found that young men who committed violence did so almost at random in the course of extensive criminal careers, and that the risk factors for violent offending were similar to those for frequent offending. In some way the commission of a violent offence and frequent non-violent offending could be seen as proxies for one another. It could be that the commission of a hate crime is indica- tive of a prolific criminal career. Developing a better understanding of HCOs is also of practical importance. As men- tioned, the limited available evidence suggests that HCOs might be quite ‘ordinary’ (for example, Iganski, 2008). If true, then the most efficacious approach to reducing reoff- ending amongst HCOs would be to utilize the extensive knowledge of successful offender rehabilitation that has developed using high-quality evaluations over the last 30 years (Lipsey, 2009). These approaches utilize a core set of principles and approaches that have demonstrable effectiveness for reducing reoffending (for example, Jolliffe and Farrington, 2007; Weisburd et al., 2016). If HCOs are qualitatively different from ‘typical’ offenders, then specialist interven- tions to address hate crime and hate crime motivation may be needed. Despite the lim- ited evidence to suggest that HCOs are specialists in hate crime (for example, Iganski, 2008), there is a veritable industry in developing and delivering interventions for HCOs (as reviewed by Iganski, 2012). These include interventions for HCOs being released from prison (for example, Lukas and Korn, 2012) and for HCOs serving sentences in the community (for example, Dixon and Court, 2015; Palmer and Smith, 2010), amongst others. Unfortunately, these hate crime interventions have not been robustly evaluated, nor do they appear to incorporate an understanding of the extensive knowledge around ‘what works’ to reduce reoffending (for example, Lipsey, 2009). This is particularly problem- atic because, in the absence of high-quality evaluations, the impact of the hate crime interventions is unknown. These interventions could be beneficial, have no impact, or, like many well-intentioned interventions, be toxic and increase later hate crime (McCord, 2003). Current study It is clear that much more research on those who perpetrate hate crime is needed, par- ticularly in the UK. This study makes use of administrative records to provide a descrip- tive picture of adult males who were found guilty and served time in prison for committing a hate crime. A significant limitation of much of the previous research on hate crime perpetrators is that it has used arrests, police records or defendants as perpe- trators, but with each of these measures there is a possibility that the perpetrator was 942 European Journal of Criminology 17(6) innocent and therefore not a true HCO. The study of those convicted and imprisoned for hate crime does not negate this possibility, but it does minimize this risk substantially. The research questions that guided this research were: 1. What are the demographic and criminal history features of those released from prison after serving time for a hate crime offence? 2. How far are those who were released after committing hate crimes similar to or different from others who had not committed a hate crime offence? Data and method The data for this study come from the Police National Computer database (PNC), which is the national database for offences and convictions held and updated by the police in the UK. These data are commonly made available for the purposes of evaluation or aca- demic study by the Ministry of Justice, which has oversight of prisons, courts, probation and attendance centres in England and Wales. An overview of what PNC data comprise, and how they are typically used in research, is provided by Sutherland (2013). Briefly, the extracts of the PNC provided to researchers contain basic demographic information about the offender (for example, age at index offence, race, nationality, region where offence occurred) and criminal history information such as the age at first offence and the number and the type of previous offences. In addition, information about the length of sentence was also available. The present study is based on a complete population of male offenders aged 18 and over who were released from short-term incarceration in England and Wales. Short-term prison sentences are those in which the individual was sentenced to prison for up to one year for their current offence.6 The main benefit of these data is that they are the first to systematically compare HCOs with other types of offenders. The main limitation of these data is that they cap- tures the behaviour of only a very specific type of HCO, those who committed an offence of a certain severity that resulted in a short prison sentence. Those who committed a hate crime offence that was not reported to the police or recorded by the police, who were not convicted or were convicted but received a lesser (for example, community) or more serious (for example, incarceration for greater than a year) sanction are not included. This is, therefore, a unique sample of HCOs and one that is highly unlikely to be repre- sentative of all those who commit hate crime, especially considering the disproportion- ately low level at which hate crimes are reported to the police and the low clearance rate of hate crime offences (for example, Home Office, 2018). Results During 1 year for which the data were available a total of 51,271 adult male offenders were released from short-term prison, and information about their index offence was available in 47,775 cases. Of these, 355 or 0.7 percent had an index offence indicative of hate crime.7 These are called hate crime offenders (HCOs). The Ministry of Justice in the UK separates offending into 21 categories for the purposes of analyses, and all of the hate crime offences could be classified into four of these. These included serious Jolliffe and Farrington 943 violence (n = 6/355, 1.7 percent, for example, racially or religiously motivated grievous bodily harm), violence (n = 287/355, 80.8 percent, for example, racially or religiously aggravated common assault), public order (n = 45/355, 12.7 percent, for example, racially or religiously aggravated harassment, alarm or distress), and criminal damage (n = 17/355, 4.8 percent, racially or religiously aggravated other criminal damage). Demographic characteristics of hate crime offenders Ethnicity and nationality. Over 86 percent of HCOs were of White ethnicity; 6.8 percent were Black, and 5.4 percent were Asian. A smaller proportion (1.7 percent) were of Mixed ethnicity or Other (0.3 percent). Over 93 percent of HCOs were UK nationals. Three HCOs were Irish nationals, and there were two of each from Jamaica, Poland and Iran. An additional 13 nationalities were represented. Age. Figure 1 shows the proportion of the HCOs who were in each age category at the time of their index offence. The age range of HCOs was from 18 to 77, with an average age of 33.6 (SD = 11.7). Region. England is separated into nine geographical regions; Wales is a separate region. A total of 28.5 percent of HCO offenders committed their offences in London; the North West (16.6 percent), West Midlands (12.4 percent) and South East (10.4 percent) were the only areas that had greater than 10 percent of the hate crime offences. Criminal history characteristics of hate crime offenders Number and type of previous offences. A total of 347 out of the 355 (97.7 percent) HCOs had previous offences. Table 1 shows the prevalence (that is, the proportion of offenders who committed a specified offence) and the frequency, or number of offences per offender, for the 21 standard offences in England and Wales. For example, 12.4 percent (44/355) of the HCOs had previously committed serious violence. Furthermore, these 44 offenders had committed 56 previous offences of serious violence, or 1.3 serious violent Figure 1. Distribution of the age of hate crime offenders. 944 European Journal of Criminology 17(6) offences per serious violent offender. Almost all (87 percent) HCOs had previously com- mitted serious or less serious violence, and those who had committed violence had com- mitted violence about six times. The next most prevalent offences were public order, criminal damage and other theft. Overall, HCOs had committed over 14,500 offences, for an average of 42 per previous offences per HCO. The bottom of Table 1 shows the prevalence and frequency of the previous experi- ences of court and incarcerations for HCOs. Almost all HCOs had been to court previ- ously (97.7 percent), with an average of more than 20 times per previous offender. Over 70 percent of HCOs had previously been incarcerated and they had served an average of seven previous custodial sentences. Age at first offence. A considerable amount of criminological evidence suggests that an early age of onset is associated with a long and prolific criminal career (for example, Moffitt, 1993). The average age of the first police recorded offence for HCOs was 18.2 (SD = 7.8) with a range from age 10 to 61. Table 1. Prevalence and frequency of offending by hate crime offenders. Offence type No. offenders No. offences Prev. Freq. Serious violence 44 56 12.4 1.3 Less serious violence 306 1750 86.2 5.7 total violence 308 1806 86.8 5.9 Robbery 57 83 16.1 1.5 Public order 271 2200 76.3 8.1 Sexual offence 18 42 5.1 2.3 Sexual offence against a child 4 5 1.1 1.3 Soliciting/prostitution 4 4 1.1 1.0 Domestic burglary 110 273 31.0 2.5 Other burglary 134 556 37.7 4.1 Other theft 251 2529 70.7 10.1 Handling 107 243 30.1 2.3 Fraud forgery 87 279 24.5 3.2 Absconding bail offences 238 1198 67.0 5.0 Taking and driving away 123 389 34.6 3.2 Theft of vehicles 74 159 20.8 2.1 Motoring offence 178 1320 50.1 7.4 Drink driving 103 189 29.0 1.8 Criminal damage 260 1253 73.2 4.8 Drug supply 20 39 5.6 2.0 Drug possession 170 523 47.9 3.1 Other/misc. offences 252 1475 71.0 5.9 Total previous offences 347 14,565 97.7 42.0 Previous court appearances 347 6976 97.7 20.2 Previous incarcerations 261 1854 73.5 7.1 Jolliffe and Farrington 945 Criminal career duration. The average criminal career duration, or the difference between the age of first and last offence, was 5625.5 days (SD = 4005.0), or 15.4 years, with a range from 51 days to over 23,000 days (about 62 years). Versatility. The number of different types of previous offences (out of 21) were added up for each HCO offender to develop a picture of the versatility of their previous offending. For the 347 HCOs who had previous offences, the average was 8 different types of previ- ous offences (SD = 3.6) with a range from 1 to 16 offences. Sentence length and time served. The average sentence length was 147.7 days (median = 140, SD = 77.9) and the average time served was 56.0 days (median = 49, SD = 43.2). Therefore, the average HCO served slightly more than 38 percent of their sentence. Offender Group Reconviction Score. The Offender Group Reconviction Score (OGRS) is a static risk assessment device that predicts the probability of reoffending (from 0 to 100) one year after release. This actuarial estimate is based on the offender’s gender, age at index offence and a measure of their speed of accruing convictions across their criminal career (Howard et al., 2009). The average HCO had an OGRS score of 50.2 (SD = 20.2), suggesting that these individuals had about a 50 percent chance of reoffending over the next 12 months. Description of hate crime offenders with no previous offences There were only eight HCOs (2.3 percent) who did not have previous criminal justice involvement. Of these eight, all but one was of White ethnicity (one was of Asian ethnic- ity), and all but one were of British nationality (one was of Pakistani nationality). The average age of these first-time offenders was 40 (median = 42; SD = 14.7), with a range from 23 to 60. Three of the offences took place in London, three in the West Midlands and two in Yorkshire and Humberside. Four of the index offences were for serious vio- lence and four were for less serious violence. Comparison with non-HCOs The overall picture suggested that HCOs released from prison had extensive criminal histories, which was similar to findings in other hate crime perpetrator research (for example, Dunbar et al., 2005). However, this prolific criminal history may be typical of all those subject to short-term incarceration, and not necessarily a unique attribute of HCOs. In order to explore to what extent HCOs might be similar to, or different from, non-HCOs, HCOs were matched with non-HCOs on the index offence that resulted in their incarceration. The numbers of HCOs were sufficient to match violent HCOs (VHCO; n = 287) and public order HCOs (POHCO; n = 45) separately. Violent hate crime offenders versus violent offenders Table 2 shows the results for the 287 VHCOs released after a index violent offence, com- pared with the 9170 offenders released after committing a non-hate-related index violent 946 European Journal of Criminology 17(6) offence. For example, 85.3 percent of the VHCOs were of White ethnicity, compared with 84.3 percent of those who were released after a non-hate violent index offence (VOs). This difference was not statistically significant (chi-squared = 0.2), and the small effect size (d = .04) also suggests limited difference between the two groups in White ethnicity. However, the results for those of Black and Asian ethnicity, although non-sig- nificant, had effect sizes (d = −.19 for Black and d = .20 for Asian) that are indicative of potential differences of note. A number of methods of interpreting the magnitude of effect sizes have been pro- posed. A widely used convention is that proposed by Cohen (1988). An effect size less than about .20 is considered small, while an effect size around .50 is considered medium and an effect size greater than about .80 is considered large. These criteria are probably too conservative. For example, the effect size d is approximately twice the absolute dif- ference in proportions in a 2 x 2 table. Thus, if 50 percent of HCOs had a specific char- acteristic (for example, early age of the first offence), compared with 20 percent of non-HCOs, d would be considered medium (.60). There was no evidence that VHCOs differed from VOs in nationality (over 90 percent UK) or age at first offence (about 18, see Table 2). However, VHCOs were much more likely to come from London and to be significantly older than VOs. Also, the criminal career duration (the time between the age at first offence and the index offence) was significantly longer for VHCOs compared with VOs, as a result of the significantly later age at the index offence. VHCOs were more likely to have committed several types of offences (for example, public order, other theft, absconding bail and criminal damage) compared with VOs, and they had also committed a significantly greater number of offences of certain types (for example, violence, public order, other burglary, other theft). There were no instances where the prevalence or frequency of offending were greater for VOs compared with VHCOs. VHCOs also appeared more extreme on the summary criminal justice involvement variables. For example, VHCOs had significantly more previous offences, court appear- ances, and incarcerations, and were also significantly more versatile in their previous offending. Interestingly, the results of the OGRS suggested that VHCOs were at a sig- nificantly higher risk of reoffending compared to VOs, although the effect size was not large (d = .13, or about a 7 percent absolute difference). There was also evidence that VHCOs received significantly longer sentences and served significantly longer in prison for their index offence, compared with VOs. This could indicate that the enhanced penalties introduced as part of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 for hate crime were being utilized. However, the sentencing guidelines in England and Wales suggest that a number of factors will be considered in setting a criminal pen- alty, including the age of the offender, the seriousness of the offence, the criminal record of the individual and whether the individual pleaded guilty or not (Sentencing Council, 2015). This makes it difficult to determine whether the longer sentences of the VHCOs were a result of their significantly older age, their more prolific criminal history or the fact that they had been found guilty of a hate crime.8 In order to investigate influences on sentencing, a multiple regression was used to pre- dict sentence length controlling for age, number of previous offences and whether the vio- lent offence was a hate offence or not. Using a stepwise regression, the results indicated Jolliffe and Farrington 947 Table 2. Violent hate crime offenders compared with violent non-hate crime offenders. Violent hate Violent non-hate N = 287 N = 9170 Ethnicity Percent Percent Chi-squared p d White 85.3 84.3 0.2 n.s. .04 Black 7.7 10.4 2.1 n.s. −.19 Asian 5.9 4.2 2.1 n.s. .20 Nationality Percent Percent Chi-squared p d UK 94.0 92.0 1.7 n.s. .01 Region Percent Percent Chi-squared p d London 27.9 17.6 20.1 0.0001 .43 Age M (SD) M (SD) t p d Age at index offence 33.6 (11.6) 30.6 (9.9) 4.9 0.0001 .30 Age at first offence 18.2(8.0) 17.8 (7.2) 1 n.s. −0.06 Criminal career duration (days) 5616 (4003) 4674 (3397) 4.6 0.0001 .28 Prevalence Percent Percent Chi-squared p d Public order 76.0 63.8 17.9 0.0001 .32 Other theft 70.4 63.7 5.4 0.02 .17 Absconding bail 66.2 55.9 11.9 0.0001 .24 Criminal damage 74.2 67.9 5.2 0.02 .17 Frequency M (SD) M (SD) t p d Violence 5.9 (5.6) 5.0 (4.6) 3.2 0.001 .19 Public order 8.4 (13.4) 4.1 (8.1) 7.5 0.0001 .51 Other burglary 4.4 (5.1) 3.3 (4.1) 2.6 0.009 .27 Other theft 11.1 (17.4) 7.1 (10.7) 5.1 0.0001 .36 Absconding bail 5.4 (6.0) 4.2 (4.0) 4.1 0.0001 .29 Criminal damage 5.0 (6.6) 3.7 (4.1) 4.4 0.0001 .31 Other 6.0 (7.7) 5.1 (6.3) 2 0.05 .14 Overall M (SD) M (SD) t p d Total previous offences 43.8 (48.1) 32.1 (33.9) 5.6 0.0001 .34 Number of previous court appearances 20.7 (21.8) 14.7 (13.6) 7.1 0.0001 .43 Previous imprisonments 7.5 (8.8) 5.4 (6.0) 5.0 0.0001 .34 Versatility 8.0 (3.7) 7.5 (3.7) 2.4 0.02 .14 Sentence length (days) 150.2 (77.9) 136.2 (70.0) 2.4 0.015 .20 Time served (days) 57.4 (43.5) 49.3 (61.1) 3.3 0.001 .13 OGRS 49.4 (20.5) 46.8 (20.2) 2.2 0.003 .13 that age (F change = 74.0, p < .0001), previous number of offences (F change = 14.3, p < .0001) and a violent hate offence (F change = 12.4, p < .0001) all predicted longer sentences, suggesting that enhanced penalties for violent hate crime were being used. 948 European Journal of Criminology 17(6) Public order hate crime offenders versus public order offenders Table 3 shows the results for the 45 HCOs released after a public order index versus index public order (POHCO), compared with the 1885 offenders released after commit- ting non-hate-related index public order offences (POs). Similar to the comparison between VHCOs and VOs, there was no difference between POHCOs and POs in nationality, and an equal proportion of both groups were of White Table 3. Public order hate crime offenders compared with public order non-hate crime offenders. Public order hate Public order non-hate N = 45 N = 1885 Ethnicity Percent Percent Chi-squared p d White 86.7 85.5 0.05 n.s. .06 Black 11.1 9.4 0.14 n.s. .10 Asian 2.2 4.3 0.462 n.s. −.37 Nationality Percent Percent Chi-squared p d UK 93.2 93.6 0.01 n.s. 0.0 Region Percent Percent Chi-squared p d London 37.8 14.7 18.1 0.0001 .53 Age M (SD) M (SD) t p d Age at index offence 35.4 (12.9) 28.9 (9.8) 4.4 0.0001 .66 Age at first offence 19.3 (8.1) 16.9 (5.6) 2.8 0.005 −.42 Criminal career duration (days) 5861 (4200) 4391 (3328) 2.9 0.004 .44 Prevalence Percent Percent Chi-squared p d Robbery 22.2 13.9 2.5 n.s. .32 Public order 82.2 72 2.3 n.s. .32 Sex offences 6.7 3.0 2.0 n.s. .46 Other theft 77.8 61.5 4.9 0.027 .44 Absconding bail 75.6 54.7 7.7 0.006 .53 Motor vehicle theft 31.1 18.9 4.2 0.041 .35 Frequency M (SD) M (SD) t p d Public order 8.0 (11.3) 5.2 (9.4) 1.8 n.s. .30 Other burglary 1.9 (1.7) 3.3 (4.6) 1.2 n.s. −.31 Fraud/forgery 4.2 (7.3) 2.7 (3.4) 1.4 n.s. .42 Absconding bail 3.3 (3.1) 4.4 (4.6) 1.3 n.s. −.24 Overall M (SD) M (SD) t p d Total previous offences 36.2 (31.6) 32.2 (37.1) 0.7 n.s. .11 Previous court appearances 19.2 (26.3) 15.2 (15.9) 1.6 n.s. .25 Previous imprisonments 5.8 (6.9) 5.6 (6.8) 0.2 n.s. .03 Versatility 8.0 (3.3) 7.2 (3.6) 1.4 n.s. .22 Sentence length (days) 134 (82) 143 (80) 0.7 n.s. −.11 Time served (days) 48 (40) 52 (79) 0.4 n.s. −0.05 OGRS 53.1 (18.7) 52.2 (20.9) 0.3 n.s. 0.04 Jolliffe and Farrington 949 ethnicity (about 86 percent) and Black ethnicity (about 10 percent). Based on the effect size (d = −.37, or about a 19 percent absolute difference) there was an indication that those of Asian ethnicity may be less likely to be POHCOs compared with POs, but this difference was not statistically significant, probably because of the small numbers in this analysis. POHCOs were significantly more likely to come from London, were signifi- cantly older and had longer durations of criminal careers. Interestingly, POs had signifi- cantly earlier ages of onset than POHCOs. Although not statistically significant, the effect sizes suggested that POHCOs might be more likely to have previously committed robbery, public order and sex offences compared with POs. These differences were statistically significant for other theft, absconding bail offences and motor vehicle theft. There were no statistically significant differences between the two groups in the frequency of previous offending, but, again, the effect sizes suggested potentially important differences, with POHCOs committing public order and fraud/forgery more often, and POs committing other burglary and absconding bail offences more often. POHCOs had committed a similar number of previous offences to PO offenders and had a similar number of previous imprisonments. There was no evidence that POHCO offenders had been sentenced to longer in prison, nor had they served longer in prison. The effect sizes of d = .25 and d = .22 (or absolute differences in the range of 11–13 percent) suggested that POHCOs may have been somewhat more likely to have had more previous court appearances and to have been somewhat more versatile in their offending. The OGRS score, or the summary measure of risk of future reoffending, was similar for the two groups. Discussion Wider research suggests that hate crime is increasing substantially, and yet relatively lit- tle is known about the people who perpetrate these offences or how best to reduce the likelihood of their future offending. This research offers a unique perspective on the population of HCOs released after serving a short-term prison sentence in England and Wales for a hate crime offence. It is based on a large complete population of offenders in England and Wales and is the first study to systematically compare HCOs with other types of offenders. The results suggested that HCOs made up a relatively small proportion of those sen- tenced to short-term incarceration (0.7 percent), and that these offenders had committed four different types of index hate crimes: serious violence, less serious violence, public order and criminal damage. These individuals were predominantly, but not exclusively, White and almost all were UK nationals. Before committing the hate crime offence that resulted in their short-term incarcera- tion, HCOs had extensive criminal careers, with 98 percent having committed previous offences and close to three-quarters having previously served time in prison. The typical hate crime offender had committed an average of 42 previous offences, been to court 20 times and been to prison 7 times. The range and versatility of the previous offending and criminal justice experience of HCOs suggests that the typical HCO is unlikely to be a specialist who commits only hate-motivated crime. This fits well with the extensive 950 European Journal of Criminology 17(6) knowledge generated by the criminal career approach about the versatility of offending (for example, DeLisi and Piquero, 2011), as well as practitioner-based hate crime research (Iganski, 2012). When matched on the index offence (violent or public order), HCOs were found to be older and, as a result, to have longer criminal career durations than non-HCOs. This could be an age-related finding, in that older people, many of whom may have experi- enced less cultural diversity in their upbringing, may be more likely to commit a hate crime. However, hate crime could also be an offence that arises later in a prolific criminal career. Just as previous longitudinal research has shown that shoplifting is typically com- mitted before burglary, which in turn is typically committed before robbery (Le Blanc and Fréchette, 1989), violent hate crime could arise at a later point in a criminal career, after, for example, violent offending. Alternatively, it could be that hate crime is an offence committed by chance in a relatively long and prolific criminal career. This research also showed that violent hate crime resulted in a longer sentence (con- trolling for age and number of previous offences), in line with the enhanced sentencing provisions of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. In addition, the number with hate criminal damage was very small (n = 17) but, when matched with those who had non-hate crimi- nal damage (n = 909), those with hate criminal damage also received significantly longer sentences (M = 164.0, SD = 71.6, compared with M = 82.2, SD = 61.7, p < .0001), and these two groups did not differ in age or number of previous offences. However, those with public order hate crime offences were not punished more harshly (Table 3). Future research should explore why public order hate crime offences, many of which can be quite serious (for example, aggravated harassment), were not worthy of increased penalties. Future research should also explore why most hate crime offences appeared to take place in London. This finding is congruent with seminal theories developed to explain inter-ethnic aggression such as the racial threat theory. This theory argues that majority group members perceive the relative size of minority populations as threatening and as a result take action, such as hate offences, to reassert their dominant status (for exam- ple, Blalock, 1967; Perry, 2001). London, being one of the most diverse cities in the world (with only 44.1 percent White British in the 2011 Census; Office of National Statistics, 2012), may therefore provide fertile ground for the perception of so-called racial threat. Alternative interpretations of the finding that there was increased incidence of hate crime in London include that the relatively high ethnic mix simply provides the greatest opportunity for hate crime, or that London, being a large metropolitan city, has high levels of crime, and therefore levels of hate crime are also high. In addition, and keeping in mind the select population under study, it could be that London has particularly effec- tive policing and prosecution of hate crime. This research has limitations that need to be considered. The use of those released from prison for a hate crime increases confidence that these individuals did commit a hate crime and that the offence was serious enough to warrant incarceration. Critically, however, these offenders are very unlikely to be representative of all those who commit hate crime, because these data miss those at the other levels of the crime funnel, from the commission of an offence to incarceration. For example, it is well known that many Jolliffe and Farrington 951 hate-related offences are not reported to the police (for example, Chakraborti et al., 2014), let alone result in an offender being apprehended or convicted. In addition, these data missed those who received community orders for hate offences and also those who committed more serious hate offences and were sentenced to longer terms of incarcera- tion. These limitations should be considered when reflecting on the generalizability of these results to all HCOs, most of whom may go undetected. Future research should explore whether there are differences in important demographic or criminal history fea- tures between those who commit hate offences, those who are arrested for hate crime, those who are convicted of hate crime, etc., all the way through the crime funnel (see Farrington et al., 2004). Unfortunately, the data did not allow for a proper exploration of specialization in hate crime offending. This is because the details of previous offences were recorded only into the 21 Home Office codes and previous hate crime offending could not be identified. This could mean that some specialization in hate crime offending does exist but, given the range of previous offences, this seems rather unlikely. The data also did not allow for an exploration of the specific details of the offence. Certain types of HCOs may be more likely to target victims because of certain protected characteristics, or may commit their offences in groups or with certain types of co-offenders. The quantitative approach used here also limits the ability to provide insight into the various findings. For example, the results showed that the largest proportion of HCOs came from London, but this could be because of more aggressive arrest and prosecutorial practices in London or because the multi-ethnic and multi-national make-up of London provided more opportunities for hate crime to take place. Future mixed-method approaches are clearly needed. Conclusion The commission of a hate crime has wide-reaching implications (for example, Perry, 2001), and much more high-quality research into the perpetrators of these offences and the details of these offences is needed. Ideally, prospective longitudinal community stud- ies, starting in childhood, should be conducted in which children and their families are interviewed at regular intervals about important individual (for example, impulsivity, empathy, school success), family (for example, parental supervision, parental antisocial behaviour) and social (for example, neighbourhood deprivation) factors associated with offending and antisocial behaviour. Information about the perpetration of hate crime, as well as other types of offending, could then be collected by self-reports and through searching official records. This would allow for an investigation of the factors associated with hate crime, including crimes not coming to police attention, and it would provide essential insight into the development of HCOs and the commission of hate crime offences. Furthermore, high-quality evaluation approaches such as randomized controlled trials and quasi-experiments are needed to evaluate the impact of programmes for HCOs on later offending. Currently, there is no robust evidence about ‘what works’ with HCOs. This is particularly problematic given the prolific criminal careers identified, particularly for violent HCOs, in this research. Until specific programmes for HCOs are properly 952 European Journal of Criminology 17(6) evaluated, HCO programmes should be based on programmes for general violent offend- ers (for example, Jolliffe and Farrington, 2007). Funding The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article. Notes 1. ‘Bias crime’ and ‘hate crime’ are used somewhat interchangeably in North America, whereas the term ‘hate crime’ is more common in the UK. 2. The Equality Act 2010 was introduced with the aim of providing a coherent legal framework to better tackle discrimination. The nine protected characteristics are: age, disability, gender reassignment, marriage or civil partnership, pregnancy and maternity, race, religion and belief, gender, and sexual orientation (Equality and Human Rights Commission, URL, accessed 6 March 2019: https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/en/equality-act/equality-act-2010). 3. 2014/15 is the most recent year that victimization measures were available in England and Wales. 4. This research was based on a re-analysis of data collected and presented earlier in Levin and McDevitt (1993). 5. Multivariate techniques may have been able to help disentangle these relationships. 6. Unfortunately, because of the way in which these data were made available, only data about those released from short-term prison sentences were available. 7. Unfortunately, it was not possible to separate offenders based on the target of their offence (for example, race or religion) because of the way in which the data were recorded. 8. Unfortunately, information about how the individual pleaded was not available. ORCID iD Darrick Jolliffe https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4590-6343 References Blalock HM (1967) Toward a Theory of Minority-group Relations. New York: Wiley. Blumstein A, Cohen J, Roth JA and Visher CA (eds) (1986) Criminal Careers and Career Criminals. Washington, DC: National Academy Press. Chakraborti N, Garland J and Hardy SJ (2014) The Leicester Hate Crime Project: Findings and Conclusions. University of Leicester. URL (accessed 6 March 2019): https://www2.le.ac.uk /departments/criminology/hate/documents/fc-full-report. Cohen AK (1955) Delinquent Boys: The Culture of the Gang. New York: Free Press. Cohen J (1988) Statistical Power Analysis for the Behavioral Sciences (2nd edn). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. College of Policing (2014) National Policing Hate Crime Strategy. URL (accessed 6 March 2019): http://library.college.police.uk/docs/college-of-policing/National-Policing-Hate-Crime -strategy.pdf. Crime Survey of England and Wales (2015). Hate crime, England and Wales, 2014–2015. URL (accessed 6 March 2019): https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/hate-crime-england-and -wales-2014-to-2015. DeLisi M and Piquero AR (2011) New frontiers in criminal careers research, 2000 – 2011: A state- of-the-art review. Journal of Criminal Justice 39: 289–301. https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/en/equality-act/equality-act-2010 https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4590-6343 https://www2.le.ac.uk/departments/criminology/hate/documents/fc-full-report https://www2.le.ac.uk/departments/criminology/hate/documents/fc-full-report http://library.college.police.uk/docs/college-of-policing/National-Policing-Hate-Crime-strategy.pdf http://library.college.police.uk/docs/college-of-policing/National-Policing-Hate-Crime-strategy.pdf https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/hate-crime-england-and-wales-2014-to-2015 https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/hate-crime-england-and-wales-2014-to-2015 Jolliffe and Farrington 953 Dixon L and Court D (2015) Working with perpetrators. In: Hall N, Corb A, Giannasi P and Grieve J (eds) The International Handbook of Hate Crime. London: Routledge. Dunbar E (2003) Symbolic, relational, and ideological signifiers of bias-motivated perpetrators: Toward a strategy of assessment. 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Final Report submitted to the National Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice. Garland J (2010) ‘It’s a mosher just been banged for no reason’: Assessing targeted violence against Goths and the parameters of hate crime. International Review of Victimology 17: 159–177. Godinet MT and Stotzer R (2017) Juvenile perpetrators of race/ethnicity-based bias crimes. Journal of Ethnicity in Criminal Justice 15(1): 21–35. Hall N (2013) Hate Crime. Abingdon, UK: Routledge. Hall N (2015) Understanding hate crimes: Sociological and criminological perspectives. In: Hall N, Corb A, Giannasi P and Grieve J (eds) The International Handbook of Hate Crime. London: Routledge. Hamm MS (1993) American Skinheads: The Criminology and Control of Hate Crime. Westport, CT: Praeger. Hedderman C and Jolliffe D (2015) The impact of prison on women: Paying the price for wrong decisions. Victims and Offenders 10: 152–178. Herek GM (1989) Hate crimes against lesbians and gay men: Issues for research and policy. American Psychologist 44: 948–955. Hilton NZ and Eke AW (2016) Non-specialization of criminal careers among intimate partner violence offenders. Criminal Justice and Behavior 43: 1347–1363. Home Office (2018) Hate crime, England and Wales, 2017/18. Statistical Bulletin 20/18. URL (accessed 6 March 2019): https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system /uploads/attachment_data/file/748598/hate-crime-1718-hosb2018.pdf. Howard P, Francis B, Soothill K and Humphreys L (2009) OGRS 3: The Revised Offender Group Reconviction Scale. Research Summary 7/09. London: Ministry of Justice. Iganski P (2008) Hate Crime in the City. Bristol: Policy Press. Iganski P (2012) Hate Crime: Taking Stock of Programmes for Offenders of Hate. Challenge Hate Crime Report 07. Belfast: Northern Ireland Association for the Care and Resettlement of Offenders. Iganski P and Smith D (2011) Rehabilitation of Hate Crime Perpetrators: Research Report. Equality and Human Rights Commission, Scotland. James Z (2015) Hate crimes against gypsies, travellers and Roma in Europe. In: Hall N, Corb A, Giannasi P and Grieve J (eds) The International Handbook of Hate Crime. London: Routledge. Jolliffe D (2013) Exploring the relationship between the five-factor model of personality and self- reported offending. Personality and Individual Differences 55: 47–52. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/748598/hate-crime-1718-hosb2018.pdf https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/748598/hate-crime-1718-hosb2018.pdf 954 European Journal of Criminology 17(6) Jolliffe D and Farrington DP (2007) A systematic review of the national and international evidence on the effectiveness of interventions with violent offenders. Ministry of Justice Research Series 16/07. Jolliffe D, Farrington DP, Piquero AR, Loeber R and Hill KG (2017) Systematic review of early risk factors for life-course-persistent, adolescence-limited, and late-onset offenders in pro- spective longitudinal studies. Aggression and Violent Behavior 33: 15–23. Le Blanc M and Fréchette M (1989) Male Criminal Activity from Childhood through Youth: Multilevel and Developmental Perspectives. New York: Springer-Verlag Publishing. Levin BH (2017) Hate crimes rise in major American localities in 2016. Center for the Study of Hate and Extremism, Department of Criminal Justice. URL (accessed 6 March 2019): https:// csbs.csusb.edu/sites/csusb_csbs/files/Levin%20DOJ%20Summit%202.pdf. Levin J and McDevitt J (1993) Hate Crimes: The Rising Tide of Bigotry and Bloodshed. New York: Plenum. Lipsey MW (2009) The primary factors that characterize effective interventions with juvenile offenders: A meta-analytic overview. Victims & Offenders 4(2): 124–147. Lukas H and Korn J (2012) Untersuchung zur Legalbewährung der Teilnehmer an VPN- Trainingskursen im Jugendstrafvollzug Kommentierte Kurzfassung. Berlin: VPN. McCord J (2003) Cures that harm: Unanticipated outcomes of crime prevention programs. The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 587: 16–30. McDevitt J, Levin J and Bennett S (2002) Hate crime perpetrators: An expanded typology. Journal of Social Issues 58: 303–317. Macpherson W (1999) The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry. Cm 4262-I. URL (accessed 6 March 2019): https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/277111 /4262.pdf. Mason G (2005) Hate crime and the image of the stranger. British Journal of Criminology 45: 837–859. Metropolitan Police (2017) Hate flagged offences before and after Brexit. URL (accessed 6 March 2019): https://www.met.police.uk/SysSiteAssets/foi-media/metropolitan-police/dis closure_2017/april_2017/information-rights-unit—spike-in-hate-crime-due-to-brexit-from -june-to-december-2016. Moffitt TE (1993) Adolescence-limited and life-course persistent antisocial behavior: A develop- mental taxonomy. Psychological Review 100: 674–701. Näsi M, Aaltonen M and Kivivuori J (2016) Youth hate crime offending: The role of strain, social control and self-control theories. Journal of Scandinavian Studies in Criminology and Crime Prevention 17: 177–184. Office of National Statistics (2012) 2011 Census. URL (accessed 7 March 2019): https://www.ons .gov.uk/census/2011census. Palmer J and Smith D (2010) Promoting human dignity: An evaluation of a programme for racially motivated offenders. Probation Journal 57: 368–382. Perry B (2001) In the Name of Hate: Understanding Hate Crimes. New York: Routledge. Roberts C, Innes M, Williams M, Tregidga J and Gadd D (2013) Understanding Who Commits Hate Crime and Why They Do It. Merthyr Tydfil: Welsh Government Social Research Report Number: 38/2013. Sentencing Council (2015) Hate Crime. URL (accessed 7 March 2019): https://www.sentencing council.org.uk/explanatory-material/magistrates-court/item/hate-crime/. Sibbitt R (1997) The Perpetrators of Racial Harassment and Racial Violence. London: Home Office Research Study No. 176. Sutherland AA (2013) A methodology for reconviction studies using Police National Computer (PNC) data. URL (accessed 6 March 2019): http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2378345. https://csbs.csusb.edu/sites/csusb_csbs/files/Levin%20DOJ%20Summit%202.pdf https://csbs.csusb.edu/sites/csusb_csbs/files/Levin%20DOJ%20Summit%202.pdf https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/277111/4262.pdf https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/277111/4262.pdf https://www.met.police.uk/SysSiteAssets/foi-media/metropolitan-police/disclosure_2017/april_2017/information-rights-unit https://www.met.police.uk/SysSiteAssets/foi-media/metropolitan-police/disclosure_2017/april_2017/information-rights-unit https://www.ons.gov.uk/census/2011census https://www.ons.gov.uk/census/2011census https://www.sentencingcouncil.org.uk/explanatory-material/magistrates-court/item/hate-crime/ https://www.sentencingcouncil.org.uk/explanatory-material/magistrates-court/item/hate-crime/ http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2378345 Jolliffe and Farrington 955 Treadwell J and Garland J (2011) Masculinity, marginalization and violence: A case study of the English Defence League. 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work_cci54rvvkbbfteu5wzethsnmfa	----	theatre research international · vol. 42 | no. 2 | pp209–211 C© International Federation for Theatre Research 2017 · doi:10.1017/S030788331700030X Dossier Introduction to Snapshot: Brazil c l á u d i a t a t i n g e n a s c i m e n t o This short dossier on contemporary Brazilian theatre offers the reader a snapshot of how artists have responded to the ongoing political crisis. The massive protests that erupted across the nation in June 2013 paved the way for the impeachment of President Dilma Rousseff in 2016, and left the economy in a shambles. Though flawed, the leftist political projects of former president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003–10) and of Rousseff, his successor in the presidency (2011–16), privileged social inclusion. A great part of the Brazilian middle and upper classes resented the resulting socio-economic ascension of historically underserved populations. Much like the reactions sparked by the spike in popularity of conservative leaders in Europe and the United States, the Brazilian opposition’s political manoeuvre to oust Rousseff in 2016 has divided the nation. A solid majority of the artistic class has sided with compatriots who call the impeachment a coup, albeit not a military one. Historian Sydney Chalhoub has observed that Brazil is no longer a democracy, and scholar James Green noted that ‘Dilma Rousseff’s ouster raises concerns that the many social gains the Brazilian left has achieved over the last two decades could be quickly reversed’.1 Nearly a year on from Rousseff’s impeachment, corruption scandals abound, and the government of Michel Temer has effectively crippled the country’s health, education and judicial systems. The Brazilian artistic métier has sustained its political activism during and beyond the impeachment process. For example, artists occupied the offices of the Ministry of Culture across the country – in Rio de Janeiro, the sit-in lasted 111 days – when, soon after being sworn in as the acting president in August 2016, Michel Temer moved to shut down this ministry. The two essays commissioned for this dossier introduce the reader to some of the ramifications of the crisis, as well as to how Brazilian artists have taken a political stance. I note that the professional profiles of their authors demonstrate that the boundaries between the roles of artist, scholar, critic and activist are quite porous in Brazil. Adriana Schneider Alcure is a professor of theatre at the Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro, an activist with the organization Reage, Artista!, and a director – the reader will find a review of her Cidade Correria in this dossier. Aimar Labaki is a playwright, director, translator and essayist living and working in São Paulo. He is the co-author, with Elena Vássina, of Stanislávski: vida, obra, sistema (Stanislavsky: Life, Work, System (2015)) and with Antonio Candengue of Nelson Rodrigues: A Esfinge Investigada (Nelson Rodrigues: A Sphinx Investigated (2006)). While Schneider Alcure’s essay focuses on the roots of present-day activism and the use of carnaval practices in protests, Labaki’s details the re-emergence of a Brazilian political theatre at this juncture. https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S030788331700030X Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:35, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://doi.org/10.1017/S030788331700030X https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/S030788331700030X https://www.cambridge.org/core 210 n a s c i m e n t o Introduction to Snapshot: Brazil Creatively, the political crisis has prompted Brazilian theatre to find new ways to denounce social injustices and stimulate important conversations. The reviews collected here – all of them previously published in major Brazilian periodicals – discuss performances principally from Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, the two main theatre hubs in Brazil, but also include examples from the country’s North East and South regions. These productions approach an array of politically relevant themes, from Brazil’s starved public schools to its shameful record as the leading nation in hate crimes against transpersons in the world. Conselho de Classe (Faculty Meeting) by Rio de Janeiro’s Cia. dos Atores and playwright Jô Bilac exposes the government’s profound neglect of the Brazilian public education system, while using the numerous protests of June 2013 as a backdrop. Created by Silvero Pereira, BR-Trans is a solo documentary theatre piece based on his interviews with transpersons living in the north-eastern state of Ceará, where Pereira is originally from, and the southern Rio Grande do Sul. The prefix ‘trans’ in the performance’s title shows us how in Brazil the term serves as an umbrella for a gamut of gender identities – not just transgender and transsexual people, but also travestis and transformistas.2 The country’s colonial past is at the heart of Aquela Cia.’s Caranguejo Overdrive, a production that links geographer Josué de Castro’s fictional story about a man-crab living in the mangrove at Rio de Janeiro’s Cidade Nova neighbourhood in the late 1800s, and the gentrification of the city during preparations for the 2014 FIFA World Cup and the 2016 Olympic Games. Cidade Correria (City Rat Race), by Rio de Janeiro’s Coletivo Bonobando, explores class relationships and discrimination in large urban centres. São Paulo theatre group Club Noir’s staging of the novel Spilt Milk (Leite Derramado) by Chico Buarque connects the military dictatorship to today’s political disarray. Adassa Martins’s solo performance Iracema reflects the recent rise of public concern with the rights of indigenous peoples in light of José de Alencar’s 1865 eponymous novel. PROJETO bRASIL, a devised piece by director Marcio Abreu and Cia. Brasileira de Teatro of Curitiba, responds to the many different national realities experienced by the creative team as it travelled across Brazil’s expansive territory. This collection of writings does not attempt to provide a comprehensive grasp of contemporary Brazilian theatre; rather, and alongside a selection of performance photographs, it hopes to awaken the reader’s interest in the aesthetic trends and plural political voices coming from that Latin American nation. n ote s 1 Sydney Chalhoub, ‘Brazilian Democracy and the Aftermath of the Impeachment’, talk at the Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs at Brown University, held on 28 September 2016. James Green, ‘Brazil: The Impeachment of a President and the Future of a Country’, North American Congress on Latin America (NACLA), at http://nacla.org/news/2016/09/07/brazil-impeachment- president-and-future-country, accessed 11 September 2016. 2 Though these definitions are quite fluid, in Brazil both travestis and transformistas are individuals assigned male identity at birth who construct a female identity, but the former group does so primarily in a performance context. cláudia tatinge nascimento (cnascimento@wesleyan.edu) is a scholar and artist with a special interest in experimental theatre. The author of Crossing Cultural Borders through the Actor’s Work: Foreign Bodies of https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S030788331700030X Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:35, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at http://nacla.org/news/2016/09/07/brazil-impeachment-president-and-future-country http://nacla.org/news/2016/09/07/brazil-impeachment-president-and-future-country mailto:cnascimento@wesleyan.edu https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/S030788331700030X https://www.cambridge.org/core n a s c i m e n t o Introduction to Snapshot: Brazil 211 Knowledge (2008), her current scholarly project examines the performances of the Brazilian post-dictatorship generation. Dossier translator elizabeth jackson is Adjunct Associate Professor of Portuguese at Wesleyan and at Yale, where she teaches summer study abroad in Brazil. She is a translator of Brazilian fiction and theatre and most recently translated four contemporary plays for the special issue on Brazil of Yale’s performance journal Theater, co-edited by Cláudia Tatinge Nascimento and Thomas Sellar. https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S030788331700030X Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:35, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/S030788331700030X https://www.cambridge.org/core 
work_cebdylkaprexfgkvlqn76odfhy	----	PRISM 1(2) Values in Education prism-journal.blackburn.ac.uk 94 REVIEW: Criminology A textbook for the next-generation of criminologists Copyright © 2017-2018 Prism: Casting New Light on Learning, Theory and Practice http://prism-journal.blackburn.ac.uk/ ISSN 2514-5347 Vol. 1 (2): pp. 94-98 DAVID HAYES Blackpool and the Fylde College University Centre david.hayes@blackpool.ac.uk Case, S., Johnson, P., Manlow, D., Smith, R., Williams, K. (2017) Criminology, OUP, Oxford. pp. 952 pages. This new introductory Criminology textbook is a very welcome core text for both undergraduate students and educational practitioners, in terms of the scope and breadth of coverage of relevant material and the inclusion of significant innovative features. The express aim of the book is to foster active criminologists and create students as producers actively engaged in research, reflective practice and applied agendas. The text offers useful advice and guidance that covers every facet of the student experience, from pre-graduate to induction, to providing the essential study skills and attributes for undergraduate study, research, and employability in the labour market. The exploration of key themes and perspectives in criminology is supported by contemporary illustrations and applications, with selected further readings, activities and weblinks to encourage extended reading, research and scholarly activity. As might be expected for a project of such scope and magnitude, there are some areas of Criminology that are relatively ‘underrepresented’ or underdeveloped, but the text goes a long way to being all-encompassing. On a critical note, the reviewer was struck by the seemingly uncritical incorporation of the employability agenda, an agenda and discourse which has ostensibly become ‘naturalised’ (Fairclough, 2014) and largely unquestioned and unchallenged in today’s neo-liberal UK HE Institutions. The uncritical use PRISM 1(2) Values in Education prism-journal.blackburn.ac.uk 95 of employability appears incongruous with a Criminology text that is otherwise explicitly concerned with developing criticality. Chapter One, of Part One (‘Journeying into Criminology’) of the new introductory undergraduate textbook ‘Criminology’ by Case et al (2017), is concerned with the process of ‘Becoming a Student’ and provides valuable insight into the variety of teaching and learning methods and different modes of assessment that the undergraduate student is likely to encounter. This chapter provides an excellent account of essential study skills, and the authors have effectively produced a HE toolkit that anticipates and captures the minutiae of the undergraduate experience. Not only does this chapter provide a technical manual and support guide for study, but it also acts as a useful and empowering navigational aid, charting and mapping the institutional terrain and the social and cultural processes of becoming a successful student and beyond. Crucially, and this is a key feature of the text throughout, there is a great emphasis on the development and application of critical analysis to relevant material. Students can sometimes lack an understanding of how to treat relevant material analytically, and the book is able to provide guidance on how to hone and practice these vital skills. Part Two of the text ably introduces the key principles and central dynamics of criminology as an undergraduate subject. This includes an excellent chapter (6) that provides a useful and accessible introduction to the potentially challenging area of research methods in criminology, including a detailed and critical discussion of the subjectivity-objectivity debate, epistemological, practical and ethical considerations, and the strengths and limitations of different research methodologies. This part of the text focuses on how criminological knowledge is constructed and contested, how we know what we know about the world and how we define what is ‘researchable’, with an acknowledgment that knowledge-making is, in part, reliant on questioning normative assumptions and critiquing the status quo. This is followed by a discussion of significant substantive topics, including crime and the media, hate crime and victimology, youth offending and youth justice, race-ethnicity and crime and criminal justice, gender and feminist criminology. Throughout, key concepts are clearly explained and complex ideas made accessible and understandable. Arguably, the inclusion of cybercrime under the topic of crime and the media could have been more PRISM 1(2) Values in Education prism-journal.blackburn.ac.uk 96 developed, perhaps deserving of a separate chapter. As the authors acknowledge, the criminological investigation of cybercrime is in itself now a vast area of criminological research and perhaps more space could have been dedicated to the understanding of cybercrime and the difficulties in policing the net. However, to its credit, the text does offer a useful introduction and gateway to the topic, which signposts some key debates and authors in the field. The section on gender and feminist criminology gives a very good account of the emergence of feminist criminology, its socio-political context, and its contributions to academic criminology and impact on criminal justice policy. The authors recognise how feminist criminology has subsequently evolved to include examinations of the relationships between crime and ideas of masculinity. This subsection could have benefited from a more developed discussion of sexualities and queer theory and gender identities that do not conform to narrow heterosexual norms. It would have been useful to bring together the diffuse, cross-disciplinary literature that examines a range of research questions around the law, crime and LGBTQ sexualities. These concerns could have been consolidated and located in a subsection that reflected a more fully theorised, self-consciously ‘queer’ criminology. However, the authors do explore elsewhere the criminological research that explicitly considers and includes the criminalisation and decriminalisation of sexualities constructed as ‘deviant’, the differential enforcement of the law when applied to members of sexual minorities, the policing of queer sexualities and queer spaces, and the classification of homophobic violence as a hate crime. Overall, the chapter offers an excellent account of the development of feminist scholarship in critical criminology and the large and varied body of theoretical and empirical research that it embodies. The book is also very impressive when examining contemporary strands of critical criminology, including green criminology, crimes of the powerful, convict and cultural criminology. Particularly impressive here is the material on cultural criminology, which neatly captures its interdisciplinary approach and demonstrates how it creates possibilities for thinking about crime from new perspectives by examining different forms of ‘crime media’, different ways of conceiving crime, and by examining the way crime is ‘represented’ in popular culture. The book, in keeping with its critical approach to material, could have usefully provided a critique of employability, with its normative expectation that the individual can no longer PRISM 1(2) Values in Education prism-journal.blackburn.ac.uk 97 expect secure and stable employment for life, and that individuals, as ‘entrepreneurs of the self’ (McGuigan, 2014), must be prepared and mobilised for an itinerant career developing ongoing portfolios with a variety of employers. A critical pedagogical approach might view this focus on employability as being an integral feature of ‘The New Spirit of Capitalism’ (Boltanksi and Chiapello, 2007), practicing a subtle and effective means of governance, social control and exploitation, as increasingly students/ employees are responsibilised and their identities disciplined. The employability agenda was debated and criticised at its inception, by both academics and politicians, being viewed by some as an “unworkable theory” (Boltanski and Chiapello, 2005), yet since that time it has become increasingly dominant, driven perhaps by the recent economic crisis, deteriorating conditions in the labour market and neo-liberal projections regarding the future of work. Employability has rapidly become an integral component of the new university agenda, to the point where courses that do not sufficiently embed employability at their core are deemed endangered. As employability gains in legitimacy and becomes increasingly ‘naturalised common sense’ (Fairclough, 2014), it is perhaps easy to lose sight that it is a neoliberal project that devolves responsibility for economic successes and failures in the labour market, making people believe that it is due to their individual deficiencies that they can't gain employment and ‘optimise themselves’ (Earle, 2011), rather than the structural failings of the capitalist labour market. Critical criminologists can seek to challenge these developments and develop counter-hegemonic pedagogical strategies and narratives. A ‘positive’ interpretation of employability would view the exact calculability and predictability in the social environment, that formal rationalization brings about, as potentially empowering students by helping them understand and navigate through the complex web of institutions in order to realize the ends of their own choice, thereby giving them structure, identity, meaning and recognition. Chapter 30, ‘Journeying into employability and careers’, can be seen as increasing student’s ability to calculate, predict and determine the outcomes of their actions, and therefore have more control and autonomy over their learning and their lives. However, freedom, autonomy and agency can be seen as being curtailed when the micro-processes of the student experience and institutional life are so closely administered and calculable. The increasing vocationalisation of the curriculum and PRISM 1(2) Values in Education prism-journal.blackburn.ac.uk 98 instrumentalisation of knowledge and learning threatens to stifle individual initiative, subjective values, substantive rationality, serendipity and critical autonomy, in a universe where things can only be done through standardised procedures. This core introductory text is a very welcome addition to the format, for both students and teachers. There are identifiable areas that could have been further developed, and the reviewer has argued that a more critical approach could have been taken towards employability. However, the book on the whole offers a lively, lucid, insightful, accessible, understandable, engaging, rigorous and relevant introduction to criminology. Links are consistently made throughout between criminological theory, research, criminal justice policy and practice, and wider historical, cultural, social, political and geographical contexts. Concepts, ideas, arguments, theories and perspectives are creatively synthesised throughout. The book itself serves as a model for thinking criminologically and represents a significant and very welcome contribution to the field which will serve to broaden and develop the criminological imagination. References Boltanski, L., Chiapello, È. (2005), The New Spirit of Capitalism, London-New York: Verso. Earle, R. (2011) ‘Prison and University: A Tale of Two Institutions?’, British Society of Criminology, Vol.11, pp. 20- 37. Fairclough, N. (2014) Language and Power (3rd edition), London: Longman. McGuigan, J. (2014) The Neoliberal Self, Culture Unbound, Vol.6, pp. 223-240. 
work_cfvq4fja4nfaljz5wmfpckgrpm	----	W O M E N I N M E D I C I N E In Conjunction with McGill Feminism in Medicine Women in Medicine: Dr. May Cohen, aka "The Gender Lady" Sara El Jaouhari1 1McGill University, Montreal, Quebec, Canada Dr. May Cohen Correspondence Sara El Jaouhari Email: sara.eljaouhari@mail.mcgill.ca Publication Date July 29, 2020 MJM 2020 (18) 6 www.mjmmed.com This work is licensed under a Creative Commons BY-NC-SA 4.0 International License. Image from: https://medicine.utoronto.ca/sites/default/files/cohen_may_ 2015.jpg K E Y W O R D S May Cohen, Gender Equity, Abortion Rights, Medicine Dr. May Cohen, aka "The Gender Lady" Some of the greatest strides seen in Canadian women’s health and in gender equity in medicine can be at- tributed to Dr. May Cohen: an unyielding activist who dedicated her life’s work to advocacy. From spearhead- ing the development of the first Women’s Health Office at McMaster University to serving as President of the Federation of Medical Women in Canada, her career is a testament to what can be achieved with a strong social conscience and unwavering determination. Even early on in her life, one could see that Dr. May Cohen had a strong sense of resolve. Born in Montreal and raised in Toronto, she wanted to become a doctor from an early age. In one interview, Dr. Cohen recalled the moment she shared her desire to become a physi- cian with her eighth grade teacher, who told her that “women do not become doctors.” (1) Fortunately, she didn’t let that dissuade her, and eventually she went on to attend the University of Toronto’s Medical School as one of only fourteen women in the class. (1) Dr. Cohen’s resolve persisted as a young woman pur- suing medical training before women in medicine were commonplace. In an interview on White Coat, Black Art, Dr. Cohen was asked what it was like as a medical stu- dent at a time when women formed merely 10% of the class. (2) She recalled the first day the dean came in to 1 2 El Jaouhari welcome the fresh-faced cohort: “He informed us that we would have to wear a tie and shave everyday. All we could do as the few women was look at our own legs.” (2) Similarly, she recalled that her anatomy profes- sor would always greet the class with “Good morning, Gentlemen.” On one occasion, she decided to sit in the front row along with the other women in the class to make a statement. His greeting, however, remained the same. At the time, she wasn’t yet sensitized to the dis- crimination and later stated she was simply happy to be amongst the chosen ten percent. (2) In 1955, Dr. Co- hen went on to graduate at the top of her class–a reflec- tion of the tenacity and perseverance that underlined the rest of her career and life. As Dr. Cohen moved into the early part of her ca- reer, she began to take an interest in social issues that intersected with women’s health. When Dr. Cohen first started practicing as a family physician in Toronto, abor- tion was illegal in Canada. (2) She remembered several instances where patients came to her seeking abortion services; fortunately, most of them at the time had the financial resources to travel to England, where abortion was legal. One of the most striking moments, however, was when one of her own patients was admitted to the emergency department and subsequently died from the complications of an illegal abortion. (2) For her, the young woman’s death became symbolic of a larger prob- lem, as she understood the fundamental connection be- tween women’s autonomy over their bodies and their health. Dr. Cohen took on a more active role in advocating for women’s medical rights as Canadian political land- scapes shifted. In 1969, a significant change in the abortion law was passed under Trudeau’s Liberal gov- ernment making abortion permissible under certain cir- cumstances. Under these laws, abortion would be legal to perform in a hospital if a committee of three physi- cians determined that continuing the pregnancy would endanger the mother’s life or health. (3) While this was certainly a huge step forward, Dr. Cohen quickly real- ized that loopholes existed within the new law. Firstly, not every hospital was obliged to have an abortion com- mittee and secondly, as ‘health’ and ‘life’ were not clearly defined in the law, it allowed greater room for interpre- tation resulting in some committees being more restric- tive than others. (2) At the time the change was highly contentious, and many pro-choice physicians and abor- tion providers were targeted in violent hate crimes. (2,3) Despite the risk to herself, Dr. Cohen joined the abor- tion decision committee at Branson Hospital in Toronto and tirelessly fought for access to legal and safe abor- tion for women across Canada. She strongly believed that “if someone is forced to carry a pregnancy they don’t want, that is a risk to their health.” (2) Since those early days, she has continued to figure prominently in the medicolegal debate on abortion laws and women’s right to choose. In addition to her advocacy work on abortion, Dr. Co- hen played an active role in promoting an understand- ing of women’s specific health needs across the country. ‘Year of the Woman’ was declared in 1975 and the gov- ernment funded several women’s health initiatives. (1) As part of one project, Dr. Cohen was invited to lead a workshop on women’s health in Shelburne, Nova Scotia. While she visited, she was disappointed to realize that women living in the area did not have access to routine breast exams or pap smears. “There was no concept of ‘women’s health’ and ‘men’s health’ at the time, and [Dr. Cohen] believed that if you were a good doctor then you were a good doctor to both.” (1) Her experience in Nova Scotia led her to question whether women’s health needs were being appropriately met elsewhere in Canada. (2) A few years later, while on sabbatical in Aus- tralia, Dr. Cohen learned of an ongoing study investigat- ing women’s specific health needs in each state, which motivated her to organize a similar effort in Canada. (1,2) This eventually led to her to co-found the Women’s Health Office at McMaster University in 1991, which would become the nucleus of the women’s health ini- tiative in Canada. (1) The first of its kind in any Canadian medical school, the Women’s Health Office sought to educate and raise awareness of diseases that affected women differently, whether in prevalence, prognosis or therapy. (4) “When I went to medical school, the medical paradigm was that of the 70 kg male, who was white,” she mentioned in El Jaouhari 3 one interview. “Everything in terms of dosage of drugs, in terms of prognosis, was based on that paradigm.” (2) The Office strived to change this by organizing lectures on women’s health to all members of the Faculty of Health Sciences, and by acting as a resource to univer- sity and community-based groups launching their own women’s health initiatives. Dr. Cohen’s persistence in pushing for the inclusion of women’s health in the med- ical school curriculum eventually led to the creation of the Women’s Health Inter School Curriculum Commit- tee, a partnership spanning across five Ontario medical schools. (4) In establishing institutional recognition of women’s health issues, Dr. Cohen challenged the male- centric paradigm in medicine and transformed the edu- cational landscape for all health students in Canada. Throughout her career, Dr. Cohen has focused on promoting an evidence-based understanding of women’s issues both in health and in healthcare. As a researcher, Dr. Cohen has promoted women’s health is- sues in areas such as breast cancer and domestic abuse. Within healthcare itself, Dr. Cohen has also played an important role in understanding the factors that have restricted equal access to the workplace. Issues of gen- der equality, discrimination, abuse, gender differences in practice, and the effect of having children on profes- sional life are all areas in which Dr. Cohen has taken an active interest. (5,6,7) In her article titled Cracking the glass ceiling, she states: “We know the difference that women leaders make in professional education, re- search and women’s health care. However, we must be more rigorous in defining and understanding the factors that influence the impact that women make, including their leadership style.” (8) By shedding light on such is- sues, Dr. Cohen has helped pave the way for the many female physicians who followed after her. Dr. May Cohen is now retired, but her legacy con- tinues to impact the medical community. In light of her longstanding advocacy for gender equality in medicine, she was inducted to the Canadian Medical Hall of Fame in 2016. In 2017, she was named an Officer to the Or- der of Canada for her “exemplary leadership in the es- tablishment and growth of the field of women’s health in Canada”. (4) In 2019, the world premiere of “The Gen- der Lady: The Fabulous May Cohen,” an award-winning documentary chronicling her inspirational life, aired at the Toronto Jewish Film Festival. When asked about the documentary, she said, “I want to send the message that physicians have a social responsibility, and that is what I tried to do during my career in promoting women and women’s health. These were all issues of social impor- tance that went beyond what was good for only myself.” (9) Through the many accomplishments in her life and career, Dr. May Cohen has certainly exemplified the pur- suit of social justice, and is a role model for current and future physicians alike. REFERENCES 1. Faculty of Medicine, University of Toronto. Women’s Health Trailblazer: Dr. May Cohen, MD’55. [Online]. Avail- able from: https://medicine.utoronto.ca/alumni/womens-health- trailblazer-dr-may-cohen-md55. 2. White Coat Black Art. [Online]. Available from: https://www.cbc.ca/player/play/1539433539961/. 3. Abortion rights: significant moments in Cana- dian history. [Online].; 2009. Available from: https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/abortion-rights-significant- moments-in-canadian-history-1.787212. 4. Federation of Medical Women of Canada. [Online]. Available from: https://fmwc.ca/dr-may-cohen-named-as-an-officer-to-the- order-of-canada/. 5. Cook DJ,GLE,CMea. Discrimination and abuse experienced by general internists in Canada. J Gen Intern Med. 1995;(10): 565- 572. 6. Woodward CA WAFBCM. Time spent on professional activities and unwaged domestic work. Is it different for male and female pri- mary care physicians who have children at home? Can Fam Physi- cian. 1996;(42): 1928-1935. 7. Cohen M FBWCGC. Gender differences in practice patterns of Ontario family physicians. Journal of the American Medical Women’s Association. 1991; 2(46): 49-54. 8. Cohen M. Women’s issues–Cracking the glass ceiling Cmaj 157.12 (1997): 1713-1714. CMAJ 157.12. 1997;: 1713-1714. 9. Depko T. Daily News. [Online]. Available from: https://dailynews.mcmaster.ca/articles/may-cohen-documentary- to-premiere-at-the-toronto-jewish-film-festival/. 
work_cfyglyj2uja57be6cqmzpif474	----	sps1000055a Social Policy & Society 10:2, 205–218 C© Cambridge University Press 2011 doi:10.1017/S1474746410000552 Developing Key Indicators of ‘Fairness’: Competing Frameworks, Multiple Strands and Ten Domains – an Array of Statistics S y l v i a W a l b y ∗ a n d J o A r m s t r o n g ∗∗ ∗Department of Sociology, University of Lancaster, UK E-mail: s.walby@lancaster.ac.uk ∗∗Department of Sociology, University of Lancaster, UK E-mail: J.E.Armstrong@lancaster.ac.uk This article argues that it is possible to develop key indicators to assess the broad agenda of ‘fairness’, even in the context of competing frameworks (e.g. equality, capabilities), multiple equality strands (gender, race/ethnicity, disability, age, religion/belief, sexual orientation, gender identity and social class) and several domains (e.g. health, education). Indicators are required to summarise complex statistical information to make it accessible to a wide audience. Methods for selecting indicators are discussed: identifying overlaps in frameworks, finding commonalities and applying quality criteria. Synthesising in this way enables identification of ‘key indicators’ of equality, including: intimate partner violence, risk of poverty and pay gaps. I n t r o d u c t i o n The measurement of inequalities and the development of indicators to summarise complex data are a necessary part of the evaluation of policies to reduce inequalities. The existence of competing frameworks, several legally protected equality strands, multiple policy domains and a wide range of potential statistics means that identifying indicators to assess ‘fairness’ is challenging. There are disparate and overlapping frameworks which conceptualise matters of fairness or justice differently, of which equality is one amongst many. These include: equality (equal treatment, opportunity or outcome); diversity and difference; good relations; human rights; and capabilities. Are there sufficient points of overlap to draw out a lead framework to serve as the basis for key indicators? There are several ‘equality strands’ to consider: the ‘conventional’ three of gender, ethnicity/race and disability, plus the more recently legally protected grounds of religion/belief, sexual orientation, age and gender identity (transgender). Social class occupies an ambiguous position; it has been to the forefront of recent debates (e.g. NEP, 2010), intersects or cuts across all other strands and is the subject of some unimplemented measures in the 2010 Equality Act (Act of Parliament, 2010). In addition, the range of equality/anti-discrimination issues has moved beyond a concern with employment to access to goods and services, largely reflecting developments in EU legislation. More recently, consideration of inequalities expanded to include different ‘dimensions’ with the Equalities Review (2007), a report commissioned by the government preparing for the new single equalities body in Britain, the Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC). This report specifies ten such dimensions or domains (i.e. ‘freedoms and activities that 205 Sylvia Walby and Jo Armstrong people have reason to value’ (Equalities Review, 2007: 6)): longevity; physical security; health; education; living standards; productive and valued activities; individual, family and social life; participation and influence; identity and expression; and legal security. Is it possible to put forward a single list of indicators that fulfils the demand for cross-strand coverage across these multiple domains? Statistics which relate to ‘fairness’ are unevenly available across the strands and domains; for some domains, such as education and employment, data can be accessed for most of the equality strands, while for other domains, such as legal security, it is more limited. Nevertheless, there are still many statistics to draw on. This raises the question of what criteria can be used to identify those most appropriate to serve as key indicators? One task of the EHRC is to map out existing inequalities in the Equality Measurement Framework (EMF),1 the foundation of which was laid in the Equalities Review (2007). The scope of the reports on the EMF is testament to the enormity of this task. The report by Alkire et al. (2009), which lays out the full framework, provides a rich and detailed proposal for the myriad of pieces of data proposed for the multi-faceted EMF. The aim of this article is slightly different to that of the EMF. The priority here is to identify key indicators that can be used in assessing ‘fairness’. Indicators summarise complex statistics in a form that is meaningful and accessible to a wide audience, including policy makers and the larger public (Walby, 2005). The article briefly introduces the competing frameworks of fairness, multiple equality strands and domains and the range of statistics that could serve as potential indicators. The methods for selecting indicators are then discussed: identifying points of overlap in competing frameworks, applying criteria of quality and finding indicators that are meaningful to as many strands as possible, without neglecting strand specificities. It is argued that combining these methods allows for synthesis and the development of a short list of key indicators. M u l t i p l i c i t y o f c o n c e r n s C o m p e t i n g f r a m e w o r k s o f f a i r n e s s The Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC) proposals for the Equality Measurement Framework (EMF) invoke multiple frameworks of fairness. Fairness is the lead or overarching concept used in the foundational review that preceded the establishment of the EHRC, the Equalities Review (2007). Five specific frameworks are identified in the Equalities Review, three of them grounded in legislation, one in practice in business and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and another in recent philosophical thought. These are: • equality, • diversity, • good relations, • human rights and • capabilities. First is ‘equality’. ‘Equal treatment’ is the core concept used in legislation aimed at removing certain forms of discrimination against protected equality groups. It is a legal requirement that individuals that belong to these protected equality groups be given ‘equal treatment’ with other people in specific areas of life, predominantly economically related. 206 Developing Key Indicators of ‘Fairness’ ‘Equal treatment’ is thus a specific application of the concept of equality in specific circum- stances. It is a process that is intended to deliver ‘equal opportunities’ in these fields. The legislative basis of ‘equal treatment’ has a long history. Key developments included those in the European Union (EU), which made it a requirement on all Member States, including the UK, to provide for this. These rights to equal treatment are embedded in treaties, starting with the Treaty of Rome in 1957, expanding to grounds in addition to gender, and domains in addition to employment in later treaties, especially the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1999. A long series of legally binding Directives derive from these treaties and are the basis for most of the UK legislation on equality and equal treatment (Europa, 2010). Equality is usually understood as an outcome rather than as a process. It is often, though not always, intended to be an outcome of equal treatment. There are significant differences in approach as to what are the most appropriate and important issues to which equality of outcome should apply (Phillips, 1999; Blond and Milbank, 2010). The concept of equality is given a distinctive twist in the UK policy documents setting up the EHRC. The Equalities Review (2007: 16) defines equality as follows: An equal society protects and promotes equal, real freedom and substantive opportunity to live in ways people value and would choose, so that everyone can flourish. Second is diversity, a recent addition to practices concerned with fairness. This framework is introduced into the definition of equality in the Equalities Review (2007: 16) in the following sentence: An equal society recognises people’s different needs, situations and goals and removes the barriers that limit what people can do and can be. There are two issues here. The first is that different treatment is sometimes needed in order to achieve equal outcomes, as is recognised in the disabilities legislation. The second is that the goals people might choose are recognised as being potentially different. Equality is thus not defined as achieving the same things. The third framework of fairness is ‘good relations’, which has long been used in UK legislation concerning ethnicity and race, as in the Race Relations Act (Act of Parliament, 1976). As Johnson and Tatam (2009) observe, while the concept has been used primarily in terms of race and religion/belief, it may have wider applicability to other strands. ‘Good relations’ is closely associated with a number of other concepts, including social capital, integration and community cohesion (Johnson and Tatam, 2009). Fourth is the ‘human rights’ framework, which has a long philosophical history and, for the UK, a more recent legislative one. Human rights was introduced into UK legislation in 1998 (Act of Parliament, 1998) following the adoption into law by the EU of the European Convention on Human Rights. In practice, this means the adoption of minimum or ‘threshold’ standards in relation to how individuals are treated by public bodies and the state, especially in regard to civil liberties and the use of violence (Kelly, 2005; Walby, 2009). The fifth framing of fairness is that of ‘capabilities’. The EMF (Alkire et al., 2009) and the Equalities Review (2007) are heavily influenced by the concept of capabilities, drawing on a body of philosophical work initiated by Amartya Sen (1999). These ‘capabilities’ are the ‘substantive freedoms’ that enable a person to do, or be, as they choose; they focus on a person’s freedom to have the capability to do and be the things they have reason to 207 Sylvia Walby and Jo Armstrong value (Sen, 2009: 231). This component of choice allows the possibility that the preferred outcomes may vary between people for valid reasons, and they may be diverse. In this way, this approach locates diversity, difference and choice at the centre of the framework. Capabilities are different from ‘functionings’, which are what people actually achieve (outcomes). This means that there are close parallels between the distinction between capabilities and functionings and the distinction between equality of opportunity and equality of outcome. The existence of a variety of frameworks of fairness represents the first and perhaps the most important challenge in identifying key indicators: which to use as the underpinning framework? M u l t i p l e s t r a n d s a n d d o m a i n s Recent policy developments have meant an increasing diversity of equality strands and relevant policy domains. The ‘conventional’ three equality strands or legally protected grounds – sex, race/ethnicity and disability – have been extended, largely to comply with EU Directives, to include age, gender identity, religion/belief and sexual orientation. The new Equality Act (Act of Parliament, 2010) introduces an eighth strand into the equalities legislation, with the proposed public sector duty regarding socio-economic inequalities. Under the Equality Act (2006), the EHRC also assumes responsibility for monitoring human rights, although discussion of a separate human rights body did take place prior to the creation of the Commission (and Scotland has a separate institution, the Scottish Human Rights Commission). Early equality law, following EU Directives, was focused on the equal treatment of equality groups with others in the field of employment, broadly defined (e.g. the transfer of pensions between partners is included since pensions are treated as deferred pay). This has been widened to include the sale and distribution of goods and services. Initially this was uneven between the legally protected grounds, but is being levelled up for all groups in the 2010 Equality Act. These domains have been widened still further by the requirement on public bodies to promote equality, initially for race, then disability and gender, and all grounds in the forthcoming public duty (Act of Parliament, 2010). A concern with inequalities is however no longer confined to those areas where there is legislation to provide for equal treatment, but is much wider, encompassing most areas of governmental policy making. The Equalities Review (2007) included a list of ten domains (capabilities or freedoms), drawing on background papers written from the perspectives of Sen’s capabilities and international human rights (Burchardt, 2006; Burchardt and Vizard, 2007). These domains are: longevity; physical security; health; education; living standards; work; individual, family and social life; participation and influence; identity and expression; and legal security (Alkire et al., 2009). Thus, a second challenge in identifying key indicators is to ensure adequate and appropriate coverage of all the strands across the ten domains. A n a r r a y o f s t a t i s t i c s Several reviews of data on equalities in Britain, including the Office for National Statistics (ONS) review (2007b, 2007c), the ONS (2003) Brief Guide to Gender Statistics, and Breitenbach’s (2006) review for the Equal Opportunities Commission, have revealed the availability of a wide range of statistics. A review of the data was also conducted by 208 Developing Key Indicators of ‘Fairness’ the authors of the current article (Walby et al., 2008), commissioned by the Equality and Human Rights Commission, upon which this article draws. The starting point for the review was the Equalities Review (2007), including the contributions of the background papers (e.g. Burchardt, 2006; Burchardt and Vizard, 2007; Vizard and Burchardt, 2007). The review included an examination of the work of the legacy commissions, especially, but not only, their research and policy work on key statistics and indicators (e.g. Commission for Racial Equality, 2006; the Disability Rights Commission, 2007; Equal Opportunities Commission, 2007a). The work of relevant government departments was considered, including the Department for Work and Pensions (e.g. the disability equality indicators, Office for Disability Issues, 2008a), and Department for Communities and Local Government (indicators for local authorities, DCLG, 2007a; the race equality in public service indicators, DCLG, 2007b). Government performance indicators were reviewed, including those of the UK ‘Public Service Agreements’ (e.g. HM Treasury, 2007) and the Scottish Government National Performance Framework Indicators. Key publications and reports by civil society organisations, other policy bodies and academics were reviewed especially, but not only, for those strands which did not previously have a Commission (i.e. age, sexual orientation and religion/belief), and for those dimensions (e.g. violence against women) that were not previously central to the work of those Commissions. In addition, a systematic review of the major surveys (e.g. the Labour Force Survey, the British Crime Survey) and sets of administrative data (e.g. housing statistics) was undertaken to assess the extent to which they provided relevant data. The review generated a list of around 200 key statistics on equalities (see Walby et al., 2008). More recently, the review has been further developed in the report by Alkire et al., (2009), which consists of a vast range of statistics to be used in populating the EMF. As these reviews evidence, the availability of data is somewhat uneven, both in terms of the equality strands for which information is available, and in terms of the varying coverage of the ten domains. In part, this reflects the history of the treatment of various groups (e.g. the different timing of legal protection for each social group) and the way in which some domains clearly map onto well-established policy areas (e.g. living standards), while others (e.g. identity and expression) do not. Nevertheless, the range of statistics is substantial, which raises a third challenge: how to select those to serve as key indicators? M e t h o d s f o r s e l e c t i o n : o v e r l a p s ; c o m m o n a l i t i e s a n d s p e c i fi c i t i e s ; a n d q u a l i t y c r i t e r i a The process of selecting key indicators involved three challenges: the attempt to reconcile disparate frameworks, the appropriate treatment of multiple strands and domains and choosing the best statistics to serve as indicators. Other difficulties associated with selection, in particular those concerned with data availability and the choice of technical measures, are discussed in greater depth elsewhere (Walby et al., 2008; Walby and Armstrong, 2010). I d e n t i f y i n g o v e r l a p s i n t h e f r a m e w o r k s o f f a i r n e s s The operationalisation of the notion of fairness is contested at least partly because there are rival conceptualisations, both internal to the notion of equality, such as equality of outcome or opportunity, and also due to the increased policy significance of adjacent 209 Sylvia Walby and Jo Armstrong frameworks, including human rights and capabilities. The range of frameworks raises a question of whether it is possible to suggest a single list of indicators or whether multiple lists are required. There is tension between the concept of ‘equality’ with those of diversity or choice. If there is diversity, then it is hard to know what standard to use in measuring equality. In its review of equality statistics, the Office for National Statistics (2007b: 74) comments that there is a need to clarify the relationship between equality and diversity. One aspect of the issue identified by the ONS is that by including diversity and choice so centrally, it makes the specification of the standard or outcome to be measured rather complex, since the implication might be that there can be multiple desired outcomes on any given issue, but the operationalisation of the concept of ‘outcome’ in statistics requires just one per issue. One illustration of the potential implications of accepting diversity is found in long-running feminist debates regarding sameness, difference and transformation in gendered divisions of labour (e.g. Fraser, 1997). These discussions have highlighted that an acceptance of difference and diversity can embed rather than challenge inequality. For example, research and campaigning by the legacy Equal Opportunities Commission (2007b) demonstrated the risks (e.g. homogenisation and stigmatisation) in using ‘difference’ arguments to explain the low participation of some minority ethnic women in employment; the EOC’s work instead pointed to the barriers and exclusions (e.g. discrimination in the labour market) experienced by these women, where ‘difference’ is actually indicative of inequalities in access to paid work. At the same time, however, in working towards equality it is important to avoid a position which ignores difference. For example, the Disability Discrimination Act (1995) places a duty upon employers to make reasonable adjustments in order that people with impairments are not disadvantaged or disabled by obstacles associated with the employment. In these circumstances, different treatment (i.e. making adjustments to remove the disabling barriers) may be required to achieve equal outcomes (House of Commons Work and Pensions Committee, 2009). The concept of ‘good relations’ is parallel to the concept of equality, but not the same. There are potential divergences where there are actions that might promote good relations that are additional to or other than equal treatment (e.g. inter-group and inter-community initiatives). But there are potentially significant overlaps between good relations and equal treatment in that equal treatment is likely to be perceived as constructive of good relations, while disproportionately worse treatment is likely to undermine good relations. As Johnson and Tatam (2009) observe, there are strong arguments in favour of extending the applicability of the concept of good relations beyond a conventional reference to race/ethnicity or religion/belief. Their review of the research aims to provide the basis for a measurement framework for good relations, to sit alongside the EMF. However, given the close links of the concept (and the causal processes implicated) with equality, the necessity of an additional measurement framework is questionable. Indeed, the Equalities Review (2007: 18) implied the need for consensus on a single framework for measurement, and the very existence of multiple frameworks may also be seen as potentially divisive. There is both tension and overlap between the concepts of equality and human rights. There is overlap in the sense that all human beings are regarded as equally entitled to human rights. There is tension in two respects. First, the measurement of equality is 210 Developing Key Indicators of ‘Fairness’ usually through the investigation of gaps; while the identification of whether there is a human rights abuse usually involves the application of a minimum threshold. Second, the policy domains where the concepts of equality and human rights have been traditionally applied and have achieved consensus status are different: equality (or more often equal treatment) is more often used in relation to economic and material matters, as in equal treatment in employment and the sale of goods and services; human rights are more often used in relation to excessive violence and to free speech and association. The use of a minimum threshold as opposed to the measurement of gaps, while effectively used in some indicators is limited in certain respects. For example, reaching a certain standard of living is regarded as a ‘human right’, in that no one should live in extreme poverty; however, beyond this standard such a framework becomes increasingly redundant. The relative disadvantage experienced by a group cannot be compared with the privileged conditions of the dominant groups. The gap between the two may be small, but it may also be large. The use of a threshold omits this information. It is possible that a majority of the population reach the threshold, but with large disparities between those who just reach it and those who far exceed it. Nevertheless, statistics on thresholds can be usefully transformed to measure such gaps. For example, the percentage of women living at or below the poverty line can be compared with the percentage of men, and so forth. This shifts the framework used though, from a framing of poverty as a human rights issue, to a framing in terms of inequality. Using the framework of human rights can extend the range of domains considered, for example, to include violence. But the addition of this framing may not always be necessary. Violence against women is commonly conceptualised as both a cause and consequence of gender inequality (HM Government, 2009). In the case of violence though, the goal is not to narrow the gap (since overall levels of violence can increase at the same time gaps between groups decrease), but to reduce violence against all groups. There is a tension between equality and capabilities. In part, this is a consequence of the varied ways in which Sen’s work has been interpreted. An important question is whether or not in practice capabilities and opportunities can be measured separately from functionings and outcomes. In their work on the EMF, Alkire et al. (2009: 2) distinguish outcomes from ‘processes’ (inequalities in treatment through discrimination or disadvantage) and ‘autonomy’, which is closest to notions of capability and choice (i.e. inequality in the degree of empowerment people have to make decisions affecting their lives). Despite their capabilities framework, Alkire et al. recommend using outcomes and processes, not autonomy, noting that measures of autonomy are not available and thus cannot be used. While they suggest further work on autonomy, it is questionable whether this will be fruitful. Social science has long critiqued notions such as choice; since choices and preferences are shaped by circumstances, which are likely to be affected by power and inequality, those in disadvantaged circumstances are likely to adapt their preferences to what is likely to be possible (Qizilibash, 1997). As a consequence, the preferences of the poor are likely to be more limited in ambition than the preferences of the rich. Such problems lead most to favour inequalities in outcomes as the best reflection of inequalities in capabilities (e.g. Robeyns, 2003). Most of the statistics Alkire et al. propose are measures of outcomes; some are measures of perceptions of processes. However, the use of perceptions as evidence is notoriously suspect in social science, being volatile, highly sensitive to wording of 211 Sylvia Walby and Jo Armstrong questions and with a varying rather than predictable relationship to the actual phenomena. For example, greater perceived discrimination is reported by the white population than by minority ethnic groups in access to housing (Walby et al., 2008), a finding at odds with the actual allocation of social housing (Rutter and Lattorre, 2009). Data on perceptions are thus rarely a reliable or robust measure to serve as the basis for key indicators. Utilising a capabilities framework therefore tends to produce many convolutions in practice, suggesting that it is perhaps better to retain this framework as a philosophical background and use equality in outcomes as the most robust measure. This reflects the conclusion reached by the Equalities Review, that measurement of inequality in outcomes actually attained in many cases will be a good indicator of whether people have the real freedom in question (Equalities Review, 2007: 130). The extent of overlap between an equalities framework with the other frameworks, together with its strength and robustness in terms of measuring fairness, suggest this framework as the lead contender for underpinning a single list of key indicators. This is not surprising given that there is a body of law, government and institutions that have sought for more than 30 years to operationalise the concept of equality and to embed it in legal, governmental and institutional practice. The many dilemmas and tensions in the equality agenda have been subject to democratic process, contestation between rival stakeholders, interpretation and reinterpretation in law, public debate and compromise. The institutional context for equalities has included the development of government units, several Commissions, a diverse and thriving NGO sector, new developments among trade unions and centres of research excellence in universities. In this rich and diverse context, there have been increasingly substantial attempts to specify, codify and operationalise the concept of equality. Debates on these statistics and indicators have led to increasing sophistication in their formulation. This has been a process involving simultaneous expertise and deliberative argumentation among the many stakeholders involved. S e a r c h i n g f o r c o m m o n a l i t i e s , a n d a t t e n d i n g t o s p e c i fi c i t y : s t r a n d s a n d d o m a i n s As noted above, the number of strands which are legally protected has expanded over recent years, largely following EU Directives. This expansion means that it becomes harder to find a limited number of indicators that are relevant to all strands. This is without considering the additional challenge of tackling the ways equality strands intersect. The equality legislation, which has traditionally concerned equal treatment in economic areas of life, has addressed the equality grounds that are protected under it in a similar way. This has largely concerned anti-discrimination measures. However, beyond the economy, the equality issues of most concern to each strand tend to diverge as a consequence of the ontological dissimilarity of these regimes of inequality (Verloo, 2006; Walby, 2009). Thus, while within the economy it is not too hard to find indicators that work across all strands, it becomes more of challenge beyond the economy. Extending legal protection and expanding the domains is clearly a welcome step in moving towards greater equality, but it poses challenges in terms of identifying indicators. One solution to this complexity is to search for commonalities. Some disadvantages and inequalities appear common across the strands: e.g. pay gaps, gaps in employment rates 212 Developing Key Indicators of ‘Fairness’ and gaps in risk of poverty. Their wide applicability makes them suitable contenders for key indicators. Thus, pay gaps, a well-established indicator of gender inequality, can be meaningfully applied to other equality strands, such as disability and ethnicity. Likewise, the measure of self-reported health can be used as a valuable indicator across different social groups. A search for commonality in the inequalities experienced by different groups for the purpose of selecting key indicators however should not be confused with implying that all regimes of inequality are the same, nor that all can be reduced to one. If one strand becomes dominant as an explanation of all inequality, and everything else is reduced to this, then it will become impossible to accurately identify causal paths, explain or tackle (and may even worsen) other separate, but interrelated, inequalities. In domains less related to economic matters, the task of identifying indicators appropriate to highlighting inequalities across the strands becomes a little more difficult. If the method of searching for commonality is applied without regard for strand specificity, then it risks becoming a somewhat meaningless exercise, resulting in fragmentation and a loss of the most urgent and pressing matters. This means that for some domains, different issues facing each strand group require emphasis by selecting different indicators. Where prioritisation by commonalities is not possible, such as in the domains of physical and legal security, then it becomes more appropriate to select different indicators for different strands (e.g. the specificity of violence against women: intimate partner violence; and hate crimes or targeted violence: racially or religiously aggravated violence, targeted violence against disabled people and homophobia). Hence, there is a need to select indicators that have the widest relevance for all groups wherever possible, but with recognition that some differences remain and are too important to neglect. Q u a l i t y c r i t e r i a : r e l e v a n c e a n d c l a r i t y By contrast with the requirement to cover a multiplicity of concerns in the EMF, the task of identifying key indicators requires a selection of a very few measurements on which to shine a spotlight in order to focus and direct high-level policy attention. Some criteria of quality apply to both the EMF and key indicators, for example the seven criteria of statistical quality developed by the Office for National Statistics (ONS, 2007a) – relevance, accuracy, timeliness, accessibility and clarity, comparability and coherence – but some are particular to each. While the criteria of quality for the EMF include the provision of many hundreds of detailed measurements in order to fill the cells of its multiplicity of concerns, the criteria of quality for the selection of key indicators include simplicity for the purpose of clarity and focus. The most powerful indicators are those that are the simplest. For example, the effectiveness of the UNDP’s Human Development Indicator, which challenged the established indicator of economic growth, was at least partly due to its being a single figure, according to the Director of the Human Development Reports (Fukuda-Parr, 2003). Building on and developing the work of others, Walby (2005) identifies a list of requirements necessary for an indicator to be fit for purpose. Indicators should: summarise complex data, be unambiguous and easy to interpret, enable assessment of whether improvement or deterioration has occurred, be meaningful and relevant, be capable of 213 Sylvia Walby and Jo Armstrong being supported by robust and reliable quantitative data, available at regular intervals with comparability between countries and population groups and be neither so many as to confuse, or so few as to mislead. The application of these criteria means the exclusion of many potential statistics, in particular measures that lack robustness and clarity. For example, crime reported to the police is not considered a reliable indicator of levels of violent crime since it is affected by people’s willingness to report incidents and varying practices of recording; likewise, data based on people’s perceptions is frequently considered inadequate since it is affected by the views of others and fluctuates independently of real changes in observed trends. In selecting indicators that are relevant and meaningful, priority is given to those measures previously and currently used by both governmental and civil society groups, with awareness of points of contention between the various stakeholders. This gives priority to well-established indicators, such as the pay gap and political participation, with assessment of their relevance for strands where their use has been less common. Thus, the pay gap has long been used to assess inequalities by gender, but it also serves as a valuable indicator for other equality strands, including ethnicity and disability. S y n t h e s i s i n g : t h e s u g g e s t e d k e y i n d i c a t o r s The selection of key indicators invoked a number of methods: quality criteria were applied to ensure that the statistics could be appropriately used as indicators; points of overlap between competing frameworks were identified to reconcile disparate concepts; and common measures relevant across the strands were sought, balanced against the need to attend to strand specific issues. It was also necessary to work within the limits of the data available. Indicators are to be deployed to work towards equality, but they are formulated in conditions that are unequal and thus a degree of pragmatism and compromise is required in their development. Using these methods simultaneously leads to a synthesis where it becomes possible to identify ‘key indicators’. Equality emerges as a lead framework, not least because when operationalised in terms of outcome it offers the most robust measure of fairness. This can be seen in work of practitioner communities, including the legacy commissions for equality, which tend to adopt and refine statistics, such as pay gaps, gaps in risk of poverty and levels of violence for use as key indicators. Applying the criteria of quality meant seeking measures that are both relevant and easily understood. Again, previous work on indicator sets by government, the legacy commissions and NGOs is useful in pointing to the most relevant issues confronting the various equality strands. Together with a demand for cross-strand relevance, this led to a search for common indicators, but not at the expense of those indicators that are necessary to highlight strand specific issues. Following these processes suggests a list of key indicators in the ten domains; these are presented below together with a short note regarding their selection (for further discussion, see Walby et al., 2008): 1 Longevity: gaps in infant mortality rates This statistic was selected over other measures, such as life expectancy, since it has wider strand relevance, in particular serving to highlight inequalities by ethnicity. 2 Physical security: incidents of intimate partner violence, and hate crime, as measured by crime surveys. 214 Developing Key Indicators of ‘Fairness’ The selection of two measures reflects strand specificity in issues of violence. 3 Health: gaps in self-reported general health. This measure covers a wide range of issues in the domain, has relevance across the equality strands and is unambiguous and easily interpreted. 4 Education: gaps in qualifications of adults, and in educational attainment at the end of compulsory schooling. These indicators were selected in particular for their relevance and cross-strand coverage. 5 Standard of living: gaps in the risk of living in a low-income household, and the Gini measure of inequality of income distribution. The former indicator is widely used to highlight inequalities by gender, disability, race/ethnicity, age; the second, again widely used, offers useful contextual information for the first, particularly in examining changes in inequality over time. 6 Productive and valued activities: pay gaps and employment gaps, and vertical occupational segregation. These indicators are selected to assess long-standing inequalities in the field of paid work; their widespread use attests to the significance of the issues they highlight for most if not all of the equality strands. 7 Individual, family and social life: gaps in the extent of independent living. Selecting a key indicator for this domain was problematic due to a lack of appropriate statistics. Nevertheless, data are becoming available as the concept of ‘independent living’ is being developed (Office for Disability Issues, 2008b). 8 Participation, influence and voice: gaps in the proportion of Members of Parliament and in councillors/council leaders; gaps in membership of the boards of top companies. The first indicator is widely used to assess inequalities in political participation and has cross-strand relevance; the second extends the concept of participation to highlight inequalities in economic governance. 9 Identity, expression and self-respect: perceived discrimination in employment, and perceived discrimination in accessing services. These indicators, based on perceptions of discrimination (measures which, as detailed above, are not robust), were selected in the absence of suitable alternatives and may be considered as temporary until more appropriate measures are developed. 10 Legal security: justice gaps, including disproportionality in the treatment of alleged offenders in the Criminal Justice System, in the number of people stopped and searched; and attrition rates for targeted violence against equality groups, including rape, intimate partner violence and hate crime. These indicators were selected to highlight the most relevant inequalities within the limits of the available data; given the strand specificity of the issues, more than one indicator is selected. C o n c l u s i o n s This article set out to identify a simple list of key indicators of fairness, taking into account the challenges of competing frameworks, multiple strands and domains and an array of statistics upon which to draw. It has been argued that a combination of methods (identifying overlaps, selecting robust measures, prioritising relevance and clarity, finding 215 Sylvia Walby and Jo Armstrong areas of commonality without neglecting specificity) allows the development of a single short list of key indicators. Synthesising in this way brings together and draws upon separate though adjacent fields of work: the philosophical underpinnings of different frameworks are juxtaposed against attempts to operationalise the concepts; the issues confronting different strand groupings in various domains are compared and contrasted; and detailed and complex statistical information is evaluated using criteria developed by expert practitioners in order to assess its relevance and clarity. The disparate knowledge bases and expertise of statisticians, social scientists and equality practitioners are therefore simultaneously drawn upon. Both the use of indicators and their development necessarily involves a loss of nuances and complexity; communicating detailed statistical information in a way that is accessible and meaningful would otherwise be impossible. Detail is sacrificed to realise the benefits of making inequalities visible, enabling assessments of progress, and to provide the tools for practitioners to intervene strategically and effectively in policy fields. N o t e 1 The change of government in May 2010 occurred after this paper was completed and before this Review using the EMF was due to be completed. R e f e r e n c e s Act of Parliament (1976), Race Relations Act, Chapter 74, http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts1976/pdf/ ukpga_19760074_en.pdf [accessed 08.04.2010]. Act of Parliament (1998), Human Rights Act, Chapter 42, Office of Public Sector Information, http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts1998/ukpga_19980042_en_1 [accessed 08.04.2010]. 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(2006), ‘Foundations for measuring equality: a discussion paper for the Equalities Review’, CASE, London School of Economics, http://archive.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/equalitiesreview/ upload/assets/www.theequalitiesreview.org.uk/foundations4measuring.pdf [accessed 02.04.2010]. Burchardt, T. and Vizard, P. (2007), ‘Definition of equality and framework for measurement: final recom- mendations of the Equalities Review Steering Group on Measurement’, Paper 1, The Equalities Review, CASE, London School of Economics, http://archive.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/equalitiesreview/upload/ assets/www.theequalitiesreview.org.uk/paper1equality.pdf [accessed 02.04.2010]. Commission for Racial Equality (2006), Factfile 1: Employment and Ethnicity, London: CRE. 216 Developing Key Indicators of ‘Fairness’ Department for Communities and Local Government (2007a), The New Performance Framework for Local Authorities and Local Authority Partnership: Single Set of National Indicators, London: DCLG. 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work_cnrf6oitmzdupnykuani7ut7b4	----	AJPH2009168971_Koenen 2433..2441 Pervasive Trauma Exposure Among US Sexual Orientation Minority Adults and Risk of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder Andrea L. Roberts, PhD, S. Bryn Austin, ScD, Heather L. Corliss, PhD, Ashley K. Vandermorris, MD, and Karestan C. Koenen, PhD Sexual orientation disparities in exposure to violence over the life course are well docu- mented.1–10 Individuals with minority sexual orientation (e.g., gay, lesbian, bisexual) report elevated frequency, severity, and persistence of physical and sexual abuse in childhood.1,3,4 Throughout their lives, sexual orientation mi- norities are more likely to experience violence in their communities, including hate crimes.5,10–12 Intimate partner violence and sexual assault in adulthood are also disproportionately prevalent among sexual orientation minorities.3,9 It is unknown whether sexual orientation disparities also exist in exposure to other types of potentially traumatic events. Despite the growing recognition of sexual orientation disparities in violence exposure, population-representative research examining possible sexual orientation differences in risk of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is very limited. PTSD is a mental disorder that de- velops in response to exposure to a potentially traumatic event, including violence (e.g., child- hood abuse, sexual assault) or other negative life experiences (e.g., disasters, accidents). The disorder is characterized by persistent reex- periencing of the event, persistent avoidance of stimuli associated with the event, emotional numbing, and hyperarousal. For PTSD diagnosis according to Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition (DSM-IV) criteria, symptoms must be present for at least 1 month and result in functional impairment.13 The public health consequences of PTSD are staggering and include secondary mental dis- orders, substance dependence,14,15 impaired role functioning, health problems,16–18 and re- duced life course opportunities (e.g., higher rates of unemployment).19 The lack of data on PTSD among sexual orientation minorities is a critical gap because, of all civilian traumas, interpersonal violence is associated with the highest condi- tional risk of developing PTSD.20,21 We examined sexual orientation disparities in expo- sure to violence and other potentially traumatic events and in risk of PTSD in a US representative sample. Previous studies have found elevated rates of PTSD among sexual orientation minorities in comparison with heterosexuals.6,10,22,23 How- ever, our understanding of the burden of PTSD in this vulnerable population is constrained by 3 limitations of extant research. First, as far as we know, only 1 study compared rates of PTSD across sexual orientation groups in a nationally representative sample.23 Several studies relied on convenience samples; selection factors in such samples could bias observed associations among sexual orientation, violence exposure, and PTSD. Second, the only study of sexual orienta- tion and PTSD in a nationally representative sample categorized members into a sexual orientation group solely by reports of the gender of their sexual partners. Other dimensions of sexual orientation, such as sexual orientation identity and feelings of sexual attraction, which have been shown to be important correlates of physical and mental health,24,25 were not mea- sured. Third, no previous study attempted to link possible sexual orientation disparities in PTSD directly to elevated risk of exposure to violence and other traumatic events in the minority sexual orientation population. Type of potentially trau- matic event exposure—particularly elevated rates of exposure to violence, exposure to multi- ple events, and younger age at exposure—are all important determinants of PTSD20,21,26–28 that may account for the disparities in PTSD by sexual orientation. We designed our study to document the public health burden of potentially traumatic Objectives. We assessed sexual orientation disparities in exposure to violence and other potentially traumatic events and onset of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) in a representative US sample. Methods. We used data from 34 653 noninstitutionalized adult US residents from the 2004 to 2005 wave of the National Epidemiologic Survey on Alcohol and Related Conditions. Results. Lesbians and gay men, bisexuals, and heterosexuals who reported any same-sex sexual partners over their lifetime had greater risk of childhood maltreatment, interpersonal violence, trauma to a close friend or relative, and unexpected death of someone close than did heterosexuals with no same-sex attractions or partners. Risk of onset of PTSD was higher among lesbians and gays (adjusted odds ratio [AOR] = 2.03; 95% confidence interval [CI] = 1.34, 3.06), bisexuals (AOR = 2.13; 95% CI = 1.38, 3.29), and heterosexuals with any same-sex partners (AOR = 2.06; 95% CI = 1.54, 2.74) than it was among the heterosexual reference group. This higher risk was largely accounted for by sexual orientation minorities’ greater exposure to violence, exposure to more potentially traumatic events, and earlier age of trauma exposure. Conclusions. Profound sexual orientation disparities exist in risk of PTSD and in violence exposure, beginning in childhood. Our findings suggest there is an urgent need for public health interventions aimed at preventing violence against individuals with minority sexual orientations and providing follow-up care to cope with the sequelae of violent victimization. (Am J Public Health. 2010;100: 2433–2441. doi:10.2105/AJPH.2009.168971) RESEARCH AND PRACTICE December 2010, Vol 100, No. 12 | American Journal of Public Health Roberts et al. | Peer Reviewed | Research and Practice | 2433 event exposure and PTSD in US residents with minority sexual orientations. We analyzed data from the National Epidemiologic Survey on Alcohol and Related Conditions (NESARC), a large, nationally representative survey of US adults.29 Respondents were asked to report on 3 dimensions of sexual orientation: identity (i.e., heterosexual, gay, lesbian, or bisexual), same-sex and opposite-sex attractions, and same-sex and opposite-sex sexual partners. We also investi- gated the causes of observed disparities in PTSD by analyzing NESARC’s detailed information on type of traumatic events and age at first exposure. These are therefore the most comprehensive data reported to date, derived from a nationally representative sample and aimed at quantifying disparities in potentially traumatic events and associated PTSD by sexual orientation. METHODS We analyzed data from Wave 2 (2004– 2005) of NESARC, a nationally representative survey of 34 653 adult US residents (86.7% response rate). NESARC used a 3-stage, nested sampling design to obtain a representative sam- ple of the civilian, noninstitutionalized popula- tion aged 18 years and older residing in the United States.29 At Wave 2, respondents were aged 20 years or older; respondents aged 90 years or older were top-coded as age 90 years. Measures Violence, potentially traumatic events, and posttraumatic stress disorder. The National In- stitute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism’s Alcohol Use Disorder and Associated Disabil- ities Interview Schedule from the DSM-IV30 was administered through computer-assisted, face-to-face interviews in respondents’ homes by trained US Census Bureau workers31,32 to assess lifetime experience of violence, other traumatic events, and PTSD. Participants were asked about 27 specific types of potentially traumatic events. We excluded 1 event, indirect exposure to a terrorist attack through watching TV or listening to the radio, from our analysis because its status as a PTSD–level event is controversial. We grouped the potentially trau- matic events into 6 major categories for sub- sequent analyses33,34: childhood maltreatment (3 items), interpersonal violence (6 items), war-related traumas (4 items), other injury or shocking event (7 items), learning of a trauma to a close friend or relative (5 items), and learning of an unexpected death (1 item). Age at first exposure to violence or mal- treatment in childhood was the earliest age the respondent reported for any of the 6 interper- sonal violence or 3 childhood maltreatment events, if younger than 18 years. Sexual orien- tation differences in these childhood experi- ences are important to assess because these events carry a high risk for PTSD14; thus our findings could better identify developmental periods in which public health interventions are needed and could inform clinicians treating children and adolescents. Each respondent who reported any trau- matic event was asked to identify his or her worst event. We diagnosed PTSD resulting from this event based on reported symptoms according to DSM-IV criteria.13 This required that respondents with a worst trauma confirm experiencing each of 6 conditions: (1) extreme feelings of fear, helplessness, or horror during the event; (2) at least 1 persistent reexperiencing symptom; (3) 3 avoidance or emotional numb- ness symptoms; (4) 2 hyperarousal symptoms; (5) symptoms lasting more than 1 month; and (6) functional impairment resulting from these symptoms. Sexual orientation. Sexual orientation was assessed after the questions about traumatic events and PTSD through items regarding 3 dimensions: identity, attraction, and sex of sexual partners. Respondents chose the sexual orientation identity category that best de- scribed them: heterosexual, gay or lesbian, bisexual, or not sure. Respondents were also asked about their feelings of sexual attraction: only attracted to females, mostly attracted to females, equally attracted to males and females, mostly attracted to males, and only attracted to males. Finally, respondents were asked about the sex of their lifetime sexual partners: whether they had had sex with only males, only females, both, or had never had sex. We classified individuals into 5 categories of sexual orientation, primarily by their sexual orientation identity (heterosexual, lesbian/gay, bisexual). We prioritized sexual orientation identity because studies suggest it is more strongly related to mental health and victimi- zation than is attraction or behavior.35–38 We further classified the heterosexual category into 3 subgroups based on sexual attraction and sexual partners: heterosexual with no same-sex attrac- tion or partners (reference group), heterosexual with same-sex attraction but no same-sex part- ners, and heterosexual with same-sex partners. Subdividing lesbian–gay and bisexual groups according to attraction and sexual partners was not possible because of small sample size. We excluded from our analysis 170 re- spondents (0.49%) who were unsure of their sexual orientation identity and 415 respon- dents (1.20%) who did not respond to 1 of the sexual orientation questions. Compared with the analytic sample, excluded respondents were somewhat older (mean age = 53.3 years; SE =1.06 versus mean age = 48.1 years; SE = 0.17), were more likely to be women (60.1% versus 52.0%; P = .007), and had lower educational attainment (P < .001), but did not differ in race/ethnicity. With regard to expo- sure to potentially traumatic events and con- ditional risk of PTSD, respondents who reported being unsure of their sexual orienta- tion were largely similar to heterosexuals with no same-sex attraction or partners. Many re- spondents with missing sexual orientation information were also missing data on trau- matic events and PTSD; therefore, it was not possible to determine whether these outcomes differed from those of the heterosexuals with no same-sex attraction or partners. Mediators. We considered 3 potential medi- ators of the association between sexual orien- tation and PTSD. Worst trauma type was determined according to the 6 categories we delineated from the interview questions. Age at worst trauma was divided into 4 categories: 11 years or younger, 12 to 17 years, 18 to 29 years, and 30 years or older. The third medi- ator was the number of potentially traumatic event types respondents reported experiencing prior to their worst trauma. Total number of previous potentially traumatic events could not be assessed from NESARC data. Demographic covariates. Following a US Census Bureau algorithm, NESARC classified respondents by self-report of their racial/ethnic origin to 1 race/ethnicity in the following preferential order: Hispanic, non-Hispanic Black, non-Hispanic American Indian/Native Alaskan, non-Hispanic Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander, non-Hispanic Asian, and non-Hispanic RESEARCH AND PRACTICE 2434 | Research and Practice | Peer Reviewed | Roberts et al. American Journal of Public Health | December 2010, Vol 100, No. 12 White.39 Educational attainment was catego- rized as less than high school diploma, high school diploma, some college, and college degree or higher. Categories for age at interview were 20 to 29 years, 30 to 39 years, 40 to 49 years, 50 to 59 years, and 60 years or older. Analyses To investigate whether individuals with mi- nority sexual orientation were at greater risk of exposure to violence and other potentially traumatic events than were heterosexuals with no same-sex attractions or sexual partners, we examined with the c2 test lifetime exposure to the 6 categories of events, lifetime exposure to specific events, and differences in violence exposure or maltreatment when younger than 18 years, by sexual orientation stratified by gender. Next, to test whether our proposed mediators differed by sexual orientation, we compared with the Wald test mean age at worst trauma and mean number of event types prior to worst trauma. Finally, to take into account the different ages of the respondents and to adjust for potential confounders, we conducted 7 discrete time survival analyses by sexual orientation, with age at first occurrence of any event and each of the 6 major types of events as the outcomes. Respondents who did not report events were censored at age at interview. Each model adjusted for gender, race/ethnicity, age at interview, and educational attainment. In models where gender–by–sexual orientation interaction terms were significant, we reported results stratified by gender. To examine whether individuals with mi- nority sexual orientation were more likely to develop PTSD following potentially traumatic event exposure, we compared lifetime preva- lence of PTSD among individuals exposed to an event, by sexual orientation stratified by gen- der. Next, to adjust for potential confounders and test for potential mediators, we constructed 3 logistic regression models estimating the odds of onset of PTSD among respondents exposed to a potentially traumatic event. In the base model, we looked at sexual orientation as the main predictor, adjusting for gender, race/ ethnicity, age at interview, and educational attainment. In model 2, we included the po- tential mediator of worst trauma type to see whether differences in type of event experi- enced accounted for differences in odds of PTSD among sexual orientation groups. In model 3, we added 2 more potential mediators, age at worst trauma, and number of event types prior to worst trauma. Because gender–by– sexual orientation interaction terms were not significant, we combined men and women in these models. All analyses were conducted with SUDAAN software40 to account for the nested sampling design of the NESARC study, which may have resulted in correlated responses, and to weight the data so that it reflected the US population.29 RESULTS The lifetime prevalence of potentially trau- matic event exposure (80.5% of women; 81.1% of men) and PTSD (10.4% of women; 4.3% of men) was consistent with that found in other epidemiologic studies that used DSM-IV crite- ria.28,41 The prevalence of sexual orientation groups was, for men, 93.9% heterosexual with no same-sex attractions or sexual partners, 1.8% heterosexual with same-sex attraction only, 2.4% heterosexual with same-sex partners, 1.1% gay, 0.4% bisexual; for women, 92.0% heterosexual with no same-sex attractions or partners, 4.6% heterosexual with same-sex attraction only, 1.5% heterosexual with same-sex partners, 0.7% les- bian, and 0.8% bisexual. Prevalence of Exposure to Potentially Traumatic Events by Gender Table 1 presents lifetime exposure to each of the 6 trauma event categories and individual events among women by sexual orientation. Lesbians, bisexual women, and heterosexual women with same-sex partners reported higher prevalence of childhood maltreatment, inter- personal violence, other injury or shocking event, and learning of trauma to a close friend or relative than did heterosexual women with no same-sex attraction or partners. The preva- lence of childhood maltreatment in lesbians (27.6%) and bisexual women (30.5%) was roughly twice that in the reference group (13.1%). Even more striking were the results for interpersonal violence. Heterosexual women with same-sex partners, lesbians, and bisexual women had significantly higher prevalence of nearly every kind of interpersonal violence than did the reference group, with the majority of lesbians (60.2%) and bisexual women (54.1%) reporting at least 1 experience of in- terpersonal violence; only 26.6% of the refer- ence group had such experiences. Lesbians (44.0%) and bisexual women (47.3%) also reported higher rates of unwanted sex than did the reference group (13.4%). Figure 1 shows that childhood exposure to maltreatment or interpersonal violence was significantly more prevalent among heterosex- ual women with same-sex partners (40.9%), lesbians (49.2%), and bisexuals (51.2%) than it was among the reference group (21.2%). Het- erosexual women with same-sex attraction had higher prevalence of war-related events but lower prevalence of any trauma, learning of trauma to a close friend or relative, and un- expected death of someone close than did the reference group. Table 2 presents lifetime exposure to each of the 6 trauma event categories and individual events among men by sexual orientation. Gay men and heterosexual men with same-sex partners reported significantly higher preva- lence of interpersonal violence and learning of a trauma to a close friend or relative than did the reference group. Experiencing unwanted sex was considerably more common among heterosexual men with any lifetime male sexual partners (12.7%), gay men (18.0%), and bi- sexual men (12.0%) than among the reference group (2.2%). Gay men, compared with the reference group, also had significantly elevated rates of almost every type of interpersonal violence, including domestic violence (11.5% versus 2.0%), being beaten up (20.7% versus 11.7%), being mugged (27.5% versus 16.2%), and being stalked (8.1% versus 2.6%). Het- erosexual men with same-sex attraction had prevalence similar to the reference group for each of the 6 major categories of potentially traumatic events. Figure 1 shows that child- hood exposure to violence or maltreatment was also higher among gay men (31.5%) and heterosexual men with same-sex partners (27.9%) than it was among the reference group (19.8%). Characteristics of Event Exposure as Mediators of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder Age at worst trauma was significantly youn- ger among heterosexuals with same-sex RESEARCH AND PRACTICE December 2010, Vol 100, No. 12 | American Journal of Public Health Roberts et al. | Peer Reviewed | Research and Practice | 2435 partners (mean = 29.0 years; SE = 0.8), gays and lesbians (mean = 26.5 years; SE = 0.9), and bisexuals (mean = 24.0 years; SE =1.1) than it was among the reference group (mean = 31.6 years; SE = 0.2), but significantly older in het- erosexuals with same-sex attractions only (mean = 35.9 years; SE = 0.8). We also observed sexual orientation dis- parities in number of event types prior to worst trauma. Heterosexuals with same-sex partners (mean =1.8; SE = 0.10) and gay men and les- bians (mean =1.9; SE = 0.10) reported significantly higher numbers of previous event types than did the reference group (mean =1.3; SE = 0.01). Heterosexuals with same-sex at- traction only (mean =1.4; SE = 0.07) did not differ significantly from the reference group. Multivariate Analyses for Potentially Traumatic Events In discrete time survival models for any potentially traumatic event and the 6 cate- gories of events that adjusted for gender, race/ ethnicity, age at interview, and educational attainment, heterosexuals with same-sex part- ners, gay men and lesbians, and bisexuals had significantly higher risk of exposure to any event, childhood maltreatment, and trauma to a close friend or relative than did the reference group. Sexual orientation disparities were substan- tial for both childhood maltreatment and in- terpersonal violence. Gay men, lesbians, and bisexuals had more than twice the risk of childhood maltreatment (gay men and lesbians, adjusted odds ratio [AOR] = 2.18; 95% TABLE 1—Prevalence of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and Potentially Traumatic Event Exposure Among Women (N = 19 717), by Sexual Orientation: United States, 2004–2005 Heterosexual Lesbian (n = 145), % (SE) Bisexual (n = 161), % (SE) No Same-Sex Attraction or Sexual Partners (n = 18144), % (SE) Same-Sex Attraction Only (n = 953), % (SE) Same-Sex Sexual Partners (n = 314), % (SE) PTSD prevalence among women exposed to a potentially traumatic event 12.50 (0.39) 11.62 (1.35) 22.78** (3.13) 18.04 (4.07) 25.68** (4.66) Any potentially traumatic event 80.48 (0.65) 76.79* (1.67) 87.42** (2.98) 88.92** (2.65) 86.25 (3.03) Childhood maltreatment 13.07 (0.35) 13.91 (1.38) 19.55* (2.73) 27.64** (4.83) 30.52*** (4.07) Physical abuse 3.81 (0.18) 3.53 (0.61) 6.44 (1.63) 11.27 (4.13) 11.11** (2.55) Neglect 3.26 (0.16) 3.26 (0.75) 6.51 (1.68) 12.36* (4.13) 8.72* (2.28) Witness to domestic violence 10.90 (0.33) 10.85 (1.26) 14.34 (2.05) 22.01* (4.80) 25.44** (4.07) Interpersonal violence 26.36 (0.51) 28.35 (1.82) 46.30*** (3.46) 60.21*** (4.98) 54.06*** (4.38) Unwanted sex 13.41 (0.42) 15.89 (1.53) 29.57*** (3.21) 43.98*** (4.92) 47.26*** (4.67) Victim of domestic violence 9.44 (0.29) 9.62 (1.20) 23.81*** (3.02) 16.10 (3.82) 20.17** (3.60) Attacked/beaten up 3.46 (0.17) 4.51 (0.80) 12.88*** (2.18) 10.37* (2.90) 20.73*** (3.96) Kidnapped 0.93 (0.08) 0.48* (0.21) 3.53* (1.12) 3.14 (1.56) 2.90 (1.47) Stalked 7.62 (0.29) 8.67 (1.08) 18.37*** (2.64) 14.21 (4.84) 16.64** (3.11) Mugged 7.27 (0.28) 8.21 (1.14) 16.91*** (2.32) 13.65* (3.09) 17.41* (3.81) Other injury or shocking event 43.89 (0.59) 46.83 (2.23) 61.12*** (2.98) 57.43** (4.55) 54.89* (4.47) Serious or life-threatening accident 11.55 (0.35) 14.79* (1.61) 23.35*** (2.81) 15.94 (4.00) 17.01 (3.80) Serious or life-threatening illness 16.41 (0.39) 17.76 (1.56) 25.05* (3.48) 22.44 (4.53) 12.90 (2.78) Natural disaster 13.44 (0.61) 15.29 (1.68) 21.87** (2.79) 10.41 (2.87) 16.83 (3.15) Terrorist attacka 0.60 (0.09) 0.50 (0.29) 1.11 (0.74) 0.24 (0.24) 1.36 (0.98) Saw someone injured/killed/discovered a dead body 16.13 (0.38) 14.10 (1.42) 29.20*** (3.12) 29.39** (4.57) 30.76** (4.30) War-related trauma 2.29 (0.19) 3.68* (0.67) 7.91** (1.91) 3.97 (1.77) 0.89 (0.89) Learned of trauma to close friend or relative 55.12 (0.76) 48.58** (2.41) 62.12* (3.42) 65.42* (4.52) 64.62* (4.16) Close friend or relative experienced serious or life-threatening accident or injury 49.50 (0.78) 43.62* (2.45) 55.26 (3.48) 61.10* (4.74) 61.09* (4.27) Close friend or relative experienced terrorist attacka 4.92 (0.42) 4.81 (0.91) 6.22 (1.70) 7.12 (2.20) 4.84 (1.94) Close friend or relative experienced other stressful or traumatic experience 14.77 (0.36) 12.45 (1.37) 23.15** (2.84) 16.95 (4.14) 27.90** (3.99) Learned of unexpected death 42.52 (0.74) 35.02 (2.07)b 45.79 (3.45) 52.98 (5.10) 49.97 (4.76) aDetermined by 3 questions in interview. *P < .05; **P < .01; ***P < .001; for statistically significant difference in prevalence of potentially traumatic event from reference group, heterosexuals with no same-sex attraction or sexual partners, by the c2 test. RESEARCH AND PRACTICE 2436 | Research and Practice | Peer Reviewed | Roberts et al. American Journal of Public Health | December 2010, Vol 100, No. 12 confidence interval [CI] =1.59, 2.99; bisexuals, AOR = 2.16; 95% CI =1.59, 2.93) than did the reference group. Risk of interpersonal violence was significantly higher than it was in the reference groups for all female sexual orienta- tion minority groups (heterosexual women with same-sex attraction, AOR =1.24; 95% CI =1.06, 1.46; heterosexual women with same-sex partners, AOR =1.93; 95% CI =1.57, 2.37; lesbians, AOR = 2.80; 95% CI = 2.12, 3.70; bisexual women, AOR = 2.56; 95% CI =1.96, 3.34), gay men (AOR = 2.29; 95% CI =1.79, 2.94), and heterosexual men with same-sex partners (AOR =1.51; 95% CI =1.22,1.88). Only heterosexuals with same-sex attractions did not have higher risk of childhood mal- treatment and had significantly lower risk of other injury or shocking event (AOR = 0.92; 95% CI = 0.85, 0.99) and unexpected death of someone close (AOR = 0.84; 95% CI = 0.75, 0.95). Multivariate Analyses for Posttraumatic Stress Disorder Among individuals exposed to a potentially traumatic event, heterosexual men and women with same-sex partners, bisexual women, and gay men had approximately twice the lifetime risk of PTSD as did the reference group (Tables 1 and 2). Table 3 presents the AORs for developing PTSD among people exposed to an event. In a model adjusting for gender, race/ ethnicity, education, and age at interview (model 1), heterosexuals with same-sex partners (AOR = 2.06; 95% CI =1.54, 2.74), lesbians and gay men (AOR = 2.03; 95% CI =1.34, 3.06), and bisexuals (AOR = 2.13; 95% CI = 1.38, 3.29) had greater odds of developing PTSD than did heterosexuals without same-sex attraction or partners. Adding worst event type to the model attenuated but did not fully explain this re- lationship (model 2). Adding age at worst event and number of trauma types prior to worst trauma further attenuated the relationship between sexual orientation and PTSD risk to nonsignificance for bisexuals and lesbians and gay men (model 3). However, in the full model the odds were still significantly higher for heterosexuals with same-sex partners (AOR = 1.59; 95% CI =1.16, 2.18) than for the refer- ence group. DISCUSSION Ours is the first analysis of national popula- tion-based data to document the link between sexual orientation disparities in exposure to multiple types of violence and other potentially traumatic events, and the increased risk of PTSD among sexual orientation minorities compared with heterosexuals without same-sex attraction or partners. Our key findings are that (1) lesbians, gay men, bisexuals, and hetero- sexuals with same-sex sexual partners—but not heterosexuals with same-sex attraction only—- had significantly elevated risk of exposure to nearly every event type except war-related traumas; (2) sexual orientation disparities in event exposure were greatest for childhood maltreatment and interpersonal violence; (3) lesbians and gay men, bisexuals, and hetero- sexuals with same-sex partners experienced their worst event at a younger age; (4) the 2 types of trauma for which sexual orientation minorities were most differentially at risk (interpersonal violence and childhood abuse or neglect) were also most strongly associated with PTSD onset of all the trauma types; and (5) sexual orientation disparities in PTSD were almost completely accounted for by differential traumatic event exposure, including type, age at worst event, and number of event types prior to the worst event. The sexual orientation disparities in violence exposure were striking. In these data, gay men, lesbians, and bisexual women were twice as likely as were the heterosexual reference group to be exposed to violence. Some proportion of the increased risk of violence exposure among sexual orientation minorities may in- volve bias or hate crimes, although the NESARC data did not allow us to examine the motivations of perpetrators of violence against sexual orientation minority participants. According to the Federal Bureau of Investiga- tion’s 2002 report on crime in the United States, 16.4% of all single-bias hate crimes were motivated by prejudice against the victim’s sexual orientation,42 and 32% of gay men, lesbians, and bisexuals reported having been personally targeted for violence against their person or property because of their sexual orientation in a recent US study.43 Sexual ori- entation disparities in violence exposure are likely 1 manifestation of the larger problem of discrimination and bias against sexual minorities in the United States. In addition to antigay hate (or bias) crimes, we posit 5 other mechanisms by which sexual orientation minorities could experience high rates of victimization and PTSD. First, sexual minorities may be more likely to exhibit be- haviors that do not conform to gender expec- tations, beginning in early childhood.44 Such behaviors have consistently been found to be associated with increased risk of victimization and rejection as well as poorer physical and mental health.22,45–53 Thus, such nonconformist behavior may partly account for the high prev- alence of maltreatment and interpersonal violence before age 12 years among sexual orientation minorities in our sample. Second, sexual minorities may experience social isolation Note. The sample size was N = 34 068. *P < .05; for statistically significant difference from heterosexual, by the c2 test. FIGURE 1—Childhood maltreatment or interpersonal violence, by sexual orientation, gender, and age at first occurrence: United States, 2004–2005. RESEARCH AND PRACTICE December 2010, Vol 100, No. 12 | American Journal of Public Health Roberts et al. | Peer Reviewed | Research and Practice | 2437 and distress if they perceive themselves to belong to a stigmatized group. Internalized stressors stemming from stigma, social isolation, discrimi- nation, and HIV/AIDS may put sexual orienta- tion minorities at higher risk for developing PTSD if exposed to a potentially traumatic event.54–58 Third, elevated rates of risk-taking behavior related to social isolation and psychological distress, especially substance use,35,59 may exacerbate risk for interpersonal violence, other traumatic events, and PTSD. Fourth, fewer resources to cope with traumatic events, such as lower levels of social support60–62 and less access to mental health care,63–65 may lead to higher rates of PTSD once exposed to an event. Finally, childhood traumas may influence how some individuals express their sexual orientation, although no studies to date support this pathway. We were unable to examine these factors in the NESARC data. However, sexual orientation disparities in PTSD were largely accounted for by characteristics of potentially traumatic event exposure, suggesting that event exposure plays a major role in observed disparities in PTSD. The finding that heterosexuals with same- sex attraction but not same-sex sexual partners did not have elevated risk of exposure to most events or higher risk of PTSD compared with the reference group is novel, because research on this group is in its infancy. We can speculate that heterosexuals without lifetime same-sex partners may be exposed to lower levels of internal and external stigma than are hetero- sexuals with same-sex partners, gay men, TABLE 2—Prevalence of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and Potentially Traumatic Event Exposure Among Men (N = 14 351), by Sexual Orientation: United States, 2004–2005 Heterosexual Gay (n = 190), % (SE) Bisexual (n = 81), % (SE) No Same-Sex Attraction or Sexual Partners (n = 13422), % (SE) Same-Sex Attraction Only (n = 293), % (SE) Same-Sex Sexual Partners (n = 365), % (SE) PTSD prevalence among men exposed to a potentially traumatic event 5.03 (0.23) 7.04 (1.77) 10.13* (2.07) 13.38** (2.82) 9.00 (4.26) Any potentially traumatic event 80.84 (0.61) 83.68 (2.53) 88.43*** (2.03) 85.20 (3.30) 75.61 (6.50) Childhood maltreatment 10.76 (0.36) 10.47 (2.01) 14.98 (2.20) 18.26 (3.75) 12.15 (4.05) Physical abuse 2.95 (0.17) 1.33* (0.63) 4.92 (1.24) 5.26 (1.88) 8.70 (3.67) Neglect 2.51 (0.17) 3.69 (1.30) 2.99 (0.92) 11.56* (3.24) 6.20 (3.21) Witness to domestic violence 8.76 (0.32) 7.53 (1.72) 12.61 (2.01) 11.42 (2.80) 9.16 (3.52) Interpersonal violence 24.95 (0.48) 20.97 (2.81) 33.98** (2.77) 50.69*** (4.00) 31.05 (3.69) Unwanted sex 2.23 (1.17) 2.91 (1.06) 12.71*** (2.00) 17.95*** (3.36) 12.04* (4.04) Victim of domestic violence 2.00 (0.15) 1.53 (0.79) 3.97 (1.06) 11.52** (3.00) 0 Attacked/beaten up 11.73 (0.35) 10.39 (2.38) 16.64 (2.48) 20.70* (3.61) 10.42 (3.40) Kidnapped 0.67 (0.08) 0 0.81 (0.43) 2.92 (2.11) 1.08 (1.08) Stalked 2.55 (0.16) 2.33 (0.99) 6.03* (1.50) 8.12* (2.30) 5.15 (3.44) Mugged 16.21 (0.48) 11.57* (1.77) 19.36 (2.27) 27.47** (3.77) 20.71 (4.94) Other injury or shocking event 56.27 (0.65) 61.42 (3.72) 60.30 (3.20) 63.33 (4.60) 54.16 (6.46) Serious or life-threatening accident 21.72 (0.46) 18.70 (2.58) 22.12 (2.71) 20.10 (3.25) 22.40 (4.81) Serious or life-threatening illness 17.05 (0.50) 22.73* (2.53) 22.69 (2.94) 25.66 (4.89) 33.15** (5.79) Natural disaster 18.04 (0.70) 16.25 (2.30) 18.21 (2.50) 20.40 (4.29) 8.77* (3.69) Terrorist attacka 1.25 (0.14) 1.41 (0.88) 2.02 (0.84) 4.51 (1.83) 0 Saw someone injured/killed/discovered a dead body 32.45 (0.63) 34.28 (3.19) 34.74 (3.05) 23.96* (3.66) 33.07 (6.03) War-related trauma 13.13 (0.40) 16.72 (3.02) 11.33 (1.77) 5.76** (1.84) 8.35 (3.10) Learned of trauma to close friend or relative 49.51 (0.70) 47.01 (3.20) 59.52** (3.27) 71.73*** (4.50) 50.64 (5.92) Close friend or relative experienced serious or life-threatening accident or injury 43.50 (0.74) 43.37 (3.32) 54.78** (3.33) 60.26** (4.93) 42.74 (5.71) Close friend or relative experienced terrorist attacka 5.57 (0.40) 3.39 (1.16) 6.05 (1.46) 14.17* (3.08) 3.36 (1.72) Close friend or relative experienced other stressful or traumatic experience 12.71 (0.36) 11.07 (1.97) 15.75 (2.32) 27.04** (4.76) 11.04 (4.07) Learned of unexpected death 41.21 (0.79) 40.19 (3.62) 48.57* (3.23) 45.69 (4.12) 43.37 (7.09) aDetermined by 3 questions in interview. *P < .05: **P < .01; ***P < .001 (statistically significant difference in prevalence of potentially traumatic event from reference group, heterosexuals with no same-sex attraction or sexual partners, by the c2 test). RESEARCH AND PRACTICE 2438 | Research and Practice | Peer Reviewed | Roberts et al. American Journal of Public Health | December 2010, Vol 100, No. 12 lesbians, and bisexuals,66 and therefore may be less likely to be targeted in bias crimes, may engage in fewer risk-taking behaviors, and may have better social support and access to mental health care. Our findings should be interpreted in the context of 3 limitations. First, we relied on retrospective reporting of event exposure, age of event exposure, and PTSD symptoms, which may have resulted in lower prevalence esti- mates of events and illness than would re- peated contemporaneous reporting67,68 and may have attenuated true associations.69 Second, reporting bias may have inflated our findings if willingness to report a stigmatized sexual orien- tation on a survey was associated with greater willingness to report other stigmatizing informa- tion (e.g., history of violence victimization).4 Third, conducting multiple tests of statistical significance may have led to results that were statistically significant by chance.70,71 Although the majority of individuals with a minority sexual orientation are mentally healthy, medical professionals need to be aware that a high percentage of patients with minority sexual orientation may have been victims of interpersonal violence and may benefit from follow-up care to cope with the sequelae of violent victimization. Adolescents’ health care providers should also note that adolescents who identify as lesbian, gay, bisexual, or who report same-sex sexual part- ners may have histories of abuse, neglect, or violent victimization and may require addi- tional services or intervention if their exposure to violence or child abuse is ongoing. j About the Authors Andrea L. Roberts, S. Bryn Austin, and Karestan C. Koenen are with the Department of Society, Human Development, and Health, School of Public Health, Harvard University, Boston, MA. Karestan C. Koenen is also with the De- partment of Epidemiology, School of Public Health, Harvard University, Boston, MA. S. Bryn Austin and Heather L. Corliss are with the Division of Adolescent/ Young Adult Medicine, Children’s Hospital, Boston, MA. Ashley K. Vandermorris is with the Faculty of Medicine, Department of Paediatrics, University of Toronto, Canada. Correspondence should be sent to Karestan C. Koenen, Harvard School of Public Health, 677 Huntington Ave, Kresge 613, Boston, MA 02115 (e-mail: kkoenen@hsph. harvard.edu). Reprints can be ordered at http://www.ajph. org by clicking the ‘‘Reprints/Eprints’’ link. This article was accepted October 12, 2009. Contributors A. L. Roberts, S. B. Austin, H. L. Corliss, and K. C. Koenen contributed to designing the analytic approach, data analysis and interpretation, and drafting and revising the article. A. K. Vandermorris contributed to review of relevant literature and to drafting and revising the article. K. C. Koenen originated the study. Acknowledgments A. L. Roberts is supported by the Harvard Training Program in Psychiatric Genetics and Translational Re- search (grant T32MH017119). S. B. Austin and H. L. Corliss are supported by the US Maternal and Child Health Bureau, Health Resources and Services Adminis- tration (grant T71-MC00009-17). H. L. Corliss is also supported by the National Institute on Drug Abuse (grant K01 DA023610). K. C. Koenen is supported by the National Institute of Mental Health (grants K08MH070627 and 5R01MH078928). Human Participant Protection Because this study used de-identified data, no protocol approval was needed. References 1. Austin SB, Jun HJ, Jackson B, et al. Disparities in child abuse victimization in lesbian, bisexual, and heterosexual women in the Nurses’ Health Study II. J Womens Health (Larchmt). 2008;17(4):597–606. 2. Austin SB, Roberts AL, Corliss HL, Molnar BE. Sexual violence victimization history and sexual risk indicators in a community-based urban cohort of ‘‘mostly hetero- sexual’’ and heterosexual young women. Am J Public Health. 2008;98(6):1015–1020. 3. Balsam KF, Rothblum ED, Beauchaine TP. Victimi- zation over the life span: a comparison of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and heterosexual siblings. J Consult Clin Psychol. 2005;73(3):477–487. 4. Corliss HL, Cochran SD, Mays VM. Reports of parental maltreatment during childhood in a United States population-based survey of homosexual, bisexual, and heterosexual adults. Child Abuse Negl. 2002;26(11): 1165–1178. 5. Herek GM. Hate crimes and stigma-related experi- ences among sexual minority adults in the United States: prevalence estimates from a national probability sample. J Interpers Violence. 2009;24(1):54–74. 6. Herek GM, Gillis JR, Cogan JC. Psychological sequelae of hate-crime victimization among lesbian, gay, and bisexual adults. J Consult Clin Psychol. 1999;67(6):945– 951. 7. Saewyc EM, Skay CL, Pettingell SL, et al. Hazards of stigma: the sexual and physical abuse of gay, lesbian, and TABLE 3—Logistic Regression Models of Onset of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder Conditional on Exposure to a Potentially Traumatic Event, With Sexual Orientation as the Main Predictor: United States, 2004–2005 Model 1, AOR (95% CI) Model 2, AOR (95% CI) Model 3, AOR (95% CI) Sexual orientation Heterosexual, no same-sex attraction or sexual partners (Ref) 1.00 1.00 1.00 Heterosexual, same-sex attraction only 1.06 (0.82, 1.38) 0.95 (0.72, 1.26) 0.91 (0.69, 1.20) Heterosexual, same-sex sexual partners 2.06* (1.54, 2.74) 1.81* (1.35, 2.44) 1.59* (1.16, 2.18) Lesbian/gay 2.03* (1.34, 3.06) 1.76* (1.13, 2.73) 1.48 (0.95, 2.30) Bisexual 2.13* (1.38, 3.29) 1.69* (1.08, 2.64) 1.39 (0.86, 2.25) Worst trauma type Learned of trauma to friend or relative (Ref) 1.00 1.00 Learned of unexpected death 1.93* (1.66, 2.23) 1.84* (1.59, 2.13) War-related 4.54* (3.29, 6.26) 3.45* (2.48, 4.78) Childhood maltreatment 5.52* (4.27, 7.14) 4.19* (3.20, 5.49) Interpersonal violence 6.37* (5.43, 7.47) 5.12* (4.33, 6.06) Injury or shocking event 1.67* (1.43, 1.94) 1.55* (1.33, 1.81) Age at worst trauma, y £ 11 2.50* (2.14, 2.91) 12–17 2.03* (1.69, 2.45) 18–29 1.51* (1.31, 1.75) ‡ 30 (Ref) 1.00 No. of trauma types prior to worst trauma 1.35* (1.32, 1.38) Note. AOR = adjusted odds ratio; CI = confidence interval. All models adjusted for gender, race/ethnicity, age at interview, and educational attainment. *P < .05 (statistically significant difference in prevalence of potentially traumatic event from reference group, heterosexuals with no same-sex attraction or sexual partners, by the t test). RESEARCH AND PRACTICE December 2010, Vol 100, No. 12 | American Journal of Public Health Roberts et al. | Peer Reviewed | Research and Practice | 2439 bisexual adolescents in the United States and Canada. Child Welfare. 2006;85(2):195–213. 8. Pilkington NW, D’Augelli AR. Victimization of les- bian, gay, and bisexual youth in community settings. J Community Psychol. 1995;23(1):34–56. 9. Tjaden P, Thoennes N, Allison CJ. Comparing vio- lence over the life span in samples of same-sex and opposite-sex cohabitants. Violence Vict. 1999; 14(4):413–425. 10. Whitbeck LB, Chen X, Hoyt DR, Tyler KA, Johnson KD. Mental disorder, subsistence strategies, and victimi- zation among gay, lesbian, and bisexual homeless and runaway adolescents. J Sex Res. 2004;41(4):329–342. 11. Garnets LD, Herek GM, Levy B, Garnets LD, Kimmel DC. Violence and victimization of lesbians and gay men: mental health consequences. In: Garnets LD, Kimmel DC, eds. Psychological Perspectives on Lesbian, Gay, and Bi- sexual Experiences. 2nd ed. New York, NY: Columbia University Press; 2003:188–206. 12. Russell ST, Franz BT, Driscoll AK. Same-sex ro- mantic attraction and experiences of violence in adoles- cence. Am J Public Health. 2001;91(6):903–906. 13. Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition. Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association; 1994. 14. Breslau N. Epidemiologic studies of trauma, post- traumatic stress disorder, and other psychiatric disorders. Can J Psychiatry. 2002;47(10):923–929. 15. Breslau N, Davis GC, Schultz LR. Posttraumatic stress disorder and the incidence of nicotine, alcohol, and other drug disorders in persons who have experienced trauma. Arch Gen Psychiatry. 2003;60:289–294. 16. Simpson TL. Women’s treatment utilization and its relationship to childhood sexual abuse history and lifetime PTSD. Subst Abus. 2002;23(1):17–30. 17. Zayfert C, Dums AR, Ferguson RJ, Hegel MT. Health functioning impairments associated with posttraumatic stress disorder, anxiety disorders, and depression. J Nerv Ment Dis. 2002;190(4):233–240. 18. Farley M, Patsalides BM. Physical symptoms, post- traumatic stress disorder and healthcare utilization of women with and without childhood physical and sexual abuse. Psychol Rep. 2001;89(3):595–606. 19. Kessler RC. Posttraumatic stress disorder: the burden to the individual and to society. J Clin Psychiatry. 2000;61(suppl 5):4–12. 20. Kessler RC, Sonnega A, Bromet E, Hughes M, Nelson CB. Posttraumatic stress disorder in the National Comorbidity Survey. Arch Gen Psychiatry. 1995;52(12): 1048–1060. 21. Breslau N, Chilcoat HD, Kessler RC, Davis GC. Previous exposure to trauma and PTSD effects of sub- sequent trauma: results from the Detroit Area Survey of Trauma. Am J Psychiatry. 1999;156(6):902–907. 22. D’Augelli AR, Grossman AH, Starks MT. Childhood gender atypicality, victimization, and PTSD among les- bian, gay, and bisexual youth. J Interpers Violence. 2006;21(11):1462–1482. 23. Gilman SE, Cochran SD, Mays VM, Hughes M, Ostrow D, Kessler RC. Risk of psychiatric disorders among individuals reporting same-sex sexual partners in the National Comorbidity Survey. Am J Public Health. 2001;91(6):933–939. 24. Sell RL, Petrulio C. Sampling homosexuals, bisexuals, gays, and lesbians for public health research: a review of the literature from 1990 to 1992. J Homosex. 1996; 30(4):31–47. 25. Institute of Medicine, Solarz AL, ed. Lesbian Health: Current Assessment and Directions for the Future. Wash- ington, DC: National Academies Press; 1999. 26. Breslau N, Peterson EL, Poisson LM, Schultz LR, Lucia VC. Estimating post-traumatic stress disorder in the community: lifetime perspective and the impact of typical traumatic events. Psychol Med. 2004;34(5):889–898. 27. Bromet E, Sonnega A, Kessler RC. Risk factors for DSM-III-R posttraumatic stress disorder: findings from the National Comorbidity Survey. Am J Epidemiol. 1998;147(4):353–361. 28. Breslau N, Kessler R, Chilcoat HD, Schultz LR, Davis GC, Andreski P. Trauma and posttraumatic stress disorder in the community: the 1996 Detroit area survey of trauma. Arch Gen Psychiatry. 1998;55(7): 626–632. 29. Grant B, Kaplan K. Source and Accuracy Statement for the Wave 2 National Epidemiologic Survey on Alcohol and Related Conditions (NESARC ). Rockville, MD: National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism; 2005. 30. Grant BF, Dawson DA, Hasin DS. The Alcohol Use Disorder and Associated Disabilities Interview Schedu- le—DSM-IV Version. Bethesda, MD: National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism; 2001. 31. Dawson DA, Grant BF, Stinson FS, Chou PS, Huang B, Ruan WJ. Recovery from DSM-IV alcohol depen- dence: United States, 2001–2002. Addiction. 2005; 100(3):281–292. 32. Blanco C, Grant J, Petry NM, et al. Prevalence and correlates of shoplifting in the United States: results from the National Epidemiologic Survey on Alcohol and Re- lated Conditions (NESARC). Am J Psychiatry. 2008; 165(7):905–913. 33. Breslau N, Lucia VC, Alvarado GF. Intelligence and other predisposing factors in exposure to trauma and posttraumatic stress disorder: a follow-up study at age 17 years. Arch Gen Psychiatry. 2006;63(11):1238–1245. 34. Breslau N, Wilcox HC, Storr CL, Lucia VC, Anthony JC. Trauma exposure and posttraumatic stress disorder: a study of youths in urban America. J Urban Health. 2004;81(4):530–544. 35. Marshal MP, Friedman MS, Stall R, et al. Sexual orientation and adolescent substance use: a meta-analysis and methodological review. Addiction. 2008;103(4): 546–556. 36. McCabe SE, Hughes TL, Bostwick WB, West BT, Boyd CJ. Sexual orientation, substance use behaviors and substance dependence in the United States. Addiction. 2009;104(8):1333–1345. 37. Faulkner AH, Cranston K. Correlates of same-sex sexual behavior in a random sample of Massachusetts high school students. Am J Public Health. 1998;88(2): 262–266. 38. Garofalo R, Wolf RC, Kessel S, Palfrey SJ, DuRant RH. The association between health risk behaviors and sexual orientation among a school-based sample of adolescents. Pediatrics. 1998;101(5):895–902. 39. National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism. Wave 1 NESARC data notes. Available at: http:// niaaa.census.gov. Accessed February 27, 2008. 40. SUDAAN (Windows Network SAS-Callable version) [computer program]. Version 9.0.3. Research Triangle Park, NC: Research Triangle Institute; 2008. 41. Kessler RC, Berglund P, Demler O, Jin R, Merikangas KR, Walters EE. Lifetime prevalence and age-of-onset distributions of DSM-IV disorders in the National Comorbidity Survey Replication. Arch Gen Psychiatry. 2005;62(6):593–602. 42. Federal Bureau of Investigation. Crime in the United States 2002. Available at: http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/ cius_02/html/web/offreported/02-nhatecrime12.html. Accessed February 24, 2010. 43. The Kaiser Family Foundation. Inside-OUT: A Re- port on the Experiences of Lesbians, Gays and Bisexuals in America and the Public’s Views on Issues and Policies Related to Sexual Orientation. Menlo Park, CA: Kaiser Family Foundation; 2001. 44. Rieger G, Linsenmeier JA, Gygax L, Bailey JM. Sexual orientation and childhood gender nonconformity: evi- dence from home videos. Dev Psychol. 2008;44(1): 46–58. 45. Carbone DJ. Treatment of gay men for post-trau- matic stress disorder resulting from social ostracism and ridicule: cognitive behavior therapy and eye movement desensitization and reprocessing approaches. Arch Sex Behav. 2008;37(2):305–316. 46. Landolt MA, Bartholomew K, Saffrey C, Oram D, Perlman D. Gender nonconformity, childhood rejection, and adult attachment: a study of gay men. Arch Sex Behav. 2004;33(2):117–128. 47. Rivers I. Recollections of bullying at school and their long-term implications for lesbians, gay men, and bi- sexuals. Crisis. 2004;25(4):169–175. 48. Skidmore WC, Linsenmeier JA, Bailey JM. Gender nonconformity and psychological distress in lesbians and gay men. Arch Sex Behav. 2006;35(6):685–697. 49. Fitzpatrick KK, Euton SJ, Jones JN, Schmidt NB. Gender role, sexual orientation and suicide risk. J Affect Disord. 2005;87(1):35–42. 50. Friedman MS, Koeske GF, Silvestre AJ, Korr WS, Sites EW. The impact of gender-role nonconforming behavior, bullying, and social support on suicidality among gay male youth. J Adolesc Health. 2006;38(5): 621–623. 51. Gordon AR, Meyer IH. Gender nonconformity as a target of prejudice, discrimination, and violence against LGB individuals. J LGBT Health Res. 2007;3(3):55–71. 52. Plöderl M, Fartacek R. Childhood gender noncon- formity and harassment as predictors of suicidality among gay, lesbian, bisexual, and heterosexual Austrians. Arch Sex Behav. 2009;38(3)400–410. 53. Rosario M, Schrimshaw EW, Hunter J. Butch/ Femme differences in substance use and abuse among young lesbian and bisexual women: examination and potential explanations. Subst Use Misuse. 2008; 43(8–9):1002–1015. 54. D’Augelli AR, Pilkington NW, Hershberger SL. In- cidence and mental health impact of sexual orientation victimization of lesbian, gay, and bisexual youths in high school. Sch Psychol Q. 2002;17(2):148–167. 55. Kelly B, Raphael B, Judd F, et al. Posttraumatic stress disorder in response to HIV infection. Gen Hosp Psychi- atry. 1998;20(6):345–352. 56. Radcliffe J, Fleisher CL, Hawkins LA, et al. Post- traumatic stress and trauma history in adolescents and RESEARCH AND PRACTICE 2440 | Research and Practice | Peer Reviewed | Roberts et al. American Journal of Public Health | December 2010, Vol 100, No. 12 young adults with HIV. AIDS Patient Care STDS. 2007;21(7):501–508. 57. Meyer IH. Minority stress and mental health in gay men. J Health Soc Behav. 1995;36(1):38–56. 58. Gold SD, Marx BP, Lexington JM. Gay male sexual assault survivors: the relations among internalized ho- mophobia, experiential avoidance, and psychological symptom severity. Behav Res Ther. 2007;45(3):549– 562. 59. Corliss HL, Rosario M, Wypij D, Fisher LB, Austin SB. Sexual orientation disparities in longitudinal alcohol use patterns among adolescents: findings from the Growing Up Today Study. Arch Pediatr Adolesc Med. 2008;162(11):1071–1078. 60. Jorm AF, Korten AE, Rodgers B, Jacomb PA, Chris- tensen H. Sexual orientation and mental health: results from a community survey of young and middle-aged adults. Br J Psychiatry. 2002;180(5):423–427. 61. Ueno K. Sexual orientation and psychological dis- tress in adolescence: examining interpersonal stressors and social support processes. Soc Psychol Q. 2005;68(3): 258–277. 62. Williams T, Connolly J, Pepler D, Craig W. Peer victimization, social support, and psychosocial adjustment of sexual minority adolescents. J Youth Adolesc. 2005; 34(5):471–482. 63. Cochran SD. Emerging issues in research on lesbians’ and gay men’s mental health: does sexual orientation really matter? Am Psychol. 2001;56(11):931–947. 64. Willging CE, Salvador M, Kano M. Unequal treat- ment: mental health care for sexual and gender minority groups in a rural state. Psychiatr Serv. 2006;57(6):867– 870. 65. Burgess D, Lee R, Tran A, van Ryn M. Effects of perceived discrimination on mental health and mental health services utilization among gay, lesbian, bisexual and transgender persons. J LGBT Health Res. 2007;3(4): 1–14. 66. Cochran SD, Mays VM. Physical health complaints among lesbians, gay men, and bisexual and homosexually experienced heterosexual individuals: results from the California Quality of Life Survey. Am J Public Health. 2007;97(11):2048–2055. 67. Kruijshaar ME, Barendregt J, Vos T, de Graaf R, Spijker J, Andrews G. Lifetime prevalence estimates of major depression: an indirect estimation method and a quantification of recall bias. Eur J Epidemiol. 2005; 20(1):103–111. 68. Brewin CR, Andrews B, Gotlib IH. Psychopathology and early experience: a reappraisal of retrospective reports. Psychol Bull. 1993;113(1):82–98. 69. Spiegelman D, Valanis B. Correcting for bias in relative risk estimates due to exposure measurement error: a case study of occupational exposure to antineo- plastics in pharmacists. 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work_cqsmvkpnjbfjnlk4kcs4w32dly	----	Un antisemitisme nouveau 1 Un antisémitisme nouveau? The debate about a ‘new antisemitism’ in France TIMOTHY PEACE ABSTRACT Nowhere has the debate about a ‘new antisemitism’ been as fierce and relevant as in France. In recent years this country has witnessed high recorded levels of antisemitism, prompting many commentators to claim that this constituted an antisémitisme nouveau. Something has indeed changed, at least in terms of the nature, frequency and perpetrators of antisemitic violence in France. Previously connected to the extreme right, it has now become associated with a group that is itself a victim of discrimination – Muslims living in the poor neighbourhoods (banlieues). Statistics produced by the French watchdog on racism and antisemitism are firstly discussed and explained as well as the effect of the Middle East conflict. The article then traces the debate on this ‘new antisemitism’ in the French context, contrasting the views of the label’s promoters and opponents. It is argued that while antisemitism has undoubtedly evolved, the ‘new’ label is effectively erroneous as it fuses supposedly leftist and ‘Muslim’ antisemitism into one entity when they are not necessarily linked. Vital clarifications on the distinction between anti-Zionism and antisemitism are also made along with suggestions for further research. KEYWORDS antisemitism, new antisemitism, anti-Zionism, France, Islam, French Muslims, French Jews, European Left, Israel I am indebted to the Luck-Hille Foundation who generously supported this research project conducted as part of a masters by research at the University of Leeds. I wish to thank Max Silverman who supervised the thesis, as well as Jim House and the two anonymous reviewers of this article for their useful advice and comments. I am also grateful to Mme Riou-Batista at the CNCDH for clarifications regarding statistics and monitoring of antisemitism in France. All translations from the French are my own, the usual disclaimer applies. 2 In the autumn of 2000, France witnessed an explosion of antisemitism, unprecedented since the Second World War. In that year alone, a total of 744 antisemitic incidents were recorded (520 in the month of October alone) compared to only 82 the previous year. This wave of anti-Jewish acts continued throughout the years that followed and peaked in 2002 and 2004, with 936 and 974 incidents respectively.1 In 2006, the death of Ilan Halimi, a young Jewish man, shocked and repulsed the nation. Lured to a flat in the suburbs of Paris, he was subsequently tortured to death by his captors who, believing that Jews are wealthy, sought a financial ransom for his release. Antisemitism became the major form of racism in France, at least in terms of recorded violence, and anti-Jewish hatred is now, according to one prominent scholar, ‘a permanent feature of Jewish life’.2 Often these incidents involve threats, insults and other forms of intimidation directed at members of the Jewish community - Europe’s largest. However, a large proportion also includes acts of violence such as personal assaults, vandalism and arson of synagogues, attacks on Jewish property such as vehicles, businesses, schools and cultural centres, as well as the desecration of Jewish cemeteries. Expressions of antisemitism in the public domain also became more frequent, notable examples being slogans and chants such as “Mort aux Juifs” (death to the Jews) emanating from certain groups of protestors at demonstrations against the actions of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and the U.S. led invasion of Iraq. The problem of antisemitism in schools was also highlighted with the publication of several articles and books3 as well as some documentaries screened on national television which appeared to show growing tensions amongst pupils from different religious communities. Investigations found that antisemitism was also being propagated at certain universities.4 The French Jewish community has become increasingly concerned and fearful about this situation. Many Jewish parents have taken their children out of state schools as a result and an increasing number of French Jews have even left their country in recent years, many emigrating to the United States, Canada and Israel. The Israeli government itself has positively encouraged Jews to make their aliyah. In January 2002, the Israeli Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Rabbi Michael Melchior described France as the worst Western country for antisemitism and in July 2004, then Prime Minister Ariel Sharon invited French Jews to move to Israel in order to escape this threat.5 One of the most severe condemnations of the situation in France came from the American Jewish Congress (AJC) which called on Hollywood stars and producers to consider boycotting the 2002 Cannes film festival in protest. In the wake of such criticism and the indisputably high levels of anti-Jewish attacks, the French government launched a sustained campaign against antisemitism. Measures included the creation of a ministerial committee charged with tackling the problem, a massive urban regeneration programme and a substantial contribution towards the costs of increased 3 security at private Jewish schools. A series of new laws were also passed in order to improve the monitoring of antisemitism, institute severer punishments for hate crimes and increase the number of people convicted of such misdemeanours in order to send out a clear message. During his time as minister of the Interior, current president Nicolas Sarkozy issued numerous statements in order to reassure the French Jewish community and zealously pursued zero-tolerance measures concerning antisemitism. It should also be noted that the controversial law banning ‘ostentatious’ religious insignia and symbols in French state schools in 2004 was also, at least in part, a result of the concerns about antisemitism in France.6 This rise in antisemitic incidents in France since the year 2000 produced a steady stream of books, articles and reports dealing with the topic, both in France and internationally and launched the debate about the existence of a ‘new antisemitism’. The subject became entangled in some of the wider issues in French politics and society such as Foreign affairs, domestic security and criminality and concerns about immigration and integration. The debate found resonance outside the usual remit of scholars and academics on antisemitism to include journalists, lawyers, religious leaders and other opinion makers. Much of the discussion focused on who was committing these acts of antisemitism. Previously connected exclusively to the extreme right, antisemitism became commonly associated with a group that is itself a victim of prejudice and discrimination –‘Arab- Muslims’.7 Indeed the implication of France’s Muslims population was one of the most controversial issues in the whole debate, not least because it came at a time when much scrutiny was already being placed on them due to other national and international events. Gathering the statistics The discussion about a ‘new antisemitism’ was in part propelled by the publication of statistics proving what many had already suspected, that there had been a huge increase in the number of recorded incidents since the year 2000. France has some of the most sophisticated methods for monitoring racist and antisemitic acts in the whole of the EU and the anti-racist law of 1990 (loi Gayssot) established the convention for the publication of an annual report on racism, antisemitism and xenophobia through the Commision Nationale Consultative des Droits de l’Homme (CNCDH).8 Unofficial statistics on antisemitism are also produced by the Service de protection de la communauté juive (SPCJ),9 although I will restrict my analysis here to the CNCDH reports which contain data gathered by the Interior, Justice and Education Ministries. The figures that most concern us here are those collected by the Interior Ministry which oversees the police and gendarmerie. Figures collected by these two organisations are passed on to the Direction centrale du renseignement intérieur (DCRI)10 which collates, analyses and presents these statistics to the 4 CNCDH. The collection of this data and the exchange of information between the police and gendarmerie has been significantly improved in recent years.11 Statistics on antisemitism gathered by the Interior Ministry are divided into two main categories; ‘threats’ (menaces) and ‘acts of violence’ (actions violentes). The former category includes graffiti, inflammatory literature (tracts provocateurs) including holocaust denial12 and other kinds of written or verbal threatening behaviour (such as bomb threats). Violence includes physical assaults (agressions), arson attacks (incendies) and damage to property (dégradtions) including the desecration of cemeteries. The figures only take into account incidents which have been officially reported to the police. The Justice Ministry provides information on court cases and convictions of hate crimes through information collected by the Direction des affaires criminelles et des grâces (DACG). Recent increases in the number of convictions do not translate into a rise in crimes of a racist or antisemitic nature but need to be understood in the context of new legal measures which started to have an effect in 2005.13 It has been argued that these new laws have led to an over-reporting of the actual number incidents perpetrated,14 although this is actually false because these laws have only had an effect on the Justice Ministy’s figures, not those provided by the Interior Ministry. Since 2004 the numbers of reported antisemitic incidents have generally decreased and the law passed on 9th March 2004 merely slightly increased the number of misdemeanours that could be potentially classed as antisemitic ‘threats’. These new legal guidelines have made no difference to the way antisemitic violence is recorded and it is naturally these figures which are of most concern. Indeed, despite the attempt of some authors to downplay the levels of antisemitism in France, or even portray it as a construction of the ‘Israeli lobby’15, the recorded levels of violent acts of antisemitism remain worryingly high when compared to the pre-2000 period. The statistics provided by the Ministry of Education are also presented in the CNCDH reports. In 2001, French schools implemented the use of software (SIGNA) which recorded acts of violence, in particular those of a racist character. This system, unique in the EU, was introduced as a way of combating rising violence in French schools. It was replaced in 2007 by a supposedly improved software system - (SIVIS) after a boycott of the SIGNA system by headmasters in 2006.16 Although the CNCDH reports on these figures, they must not be confused with those provided by the Interior Ministry which form the basis for the ‘official’ figures illustrated in fig. 1 (below). figure 1 here In fact, given the interruption in data collection in 2006-2007 and the introduction of the new system, information on antisemitism in schools was not even presented in the latest report published 5 by the CNCDH in 2008. It is misleading to insinuate that these statistics are contributing to the over-reporting of antisemitism17 as the only incidents that are included are those that result in the lodging of an official complaint with the police, and therefore only those of a relatively serious nature. A common assumption about antisemitism in France is that it is directly connected to events in the Middle East and must therefore be seen as ‘revenge for the Israeli oppression of their fellow Muslims’.18 Although between 2000 and 2002 there did appear to be a clear link between antisemitism and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (the initial wave of antisemitism occurred in September/October 2000 coinciding with the second intifada) there has subsequently been no overall correlation. In 2004 for example, the year which saw the highest figures of recorded antisemitism, there was no distinctive peak in antisemitic activity as could be observed in 2002 around the time of the IDF’s ‘Operation Defensive Shield’. The CNCDH itself acknowledges that there is now no observable link between events in the Middle East and acts of antisemitism. This further complicates any understanding of contemporary antisemitism in France. Indeed, events closer to home my also play their part, a partial rise in antisemitism in February and March 2006 for example was attributed to the effect of the media coverage of the murder of Ilan Halimi. Central to the debate about whether a ‘new antisemitism’ exists in France is the question of who is committing these acts, particularly those classed as violent. The CNCDH reports contain information about the perpetrators (or ‘vectors’) of antisemitic threats and violence and highlights in particular those which can be attributed to the extreme-right (milieux extrémistes de droite) and ‘Arab-Muslims’ (les milieux arabo-musulans). The fact that information about ethnic or religious affiliation is recorded in this manner is actually an anomaly within the French legal system.19 For the years 2000-2003 the reports did not include these figures and merely stated that many of the perpetrators were the children of North African immigrants from the ‘difficult neighbourhoods’ (quartiers dits « sensibles ») and that the involvement of the extreme right was on the wane. It was not until the report for 2004 that they released any actual figures about how many antisemitic acts were associated with either the extreme right or ‘Arab-Muslims’. These figures revealed that since the year 2000, ‘Arab-Muslims’ had overtaken the extreme right in terms of antisemitic threats and violence (see fig. 2). figure 2 here However, given that on average 50% of antisemitic acts are not attributed to any particular group, deciphering who is responsible is complicated even further. The only certainty is that ‘Arab- Muslims’ are now often implicated in acts of antisemitism which did not appear to be the case 6 before the year 2000. However, the motivation for such acts remains unclear and under researched. Studies have demonstrated that antisemitic prejudice amongst young people in the banlieues is certainly very prevalent20 and one recent survey also revealed that antisemitism was more frequent amongst those who professed Islam as their faith.21 However, there is no evidence linking Islamic religiosity, acts of antisemitism and the motivation behind them. Therefore, some have suggested that the problem of antisemitism amongst Muslims is likely to be ‘more cultural than religious’,22 in other words just as likely to be found amongst non-Muslim residents of the banlieues and more connected to non-practicing Muslims than those who are pious or involved in a particular Islamic organisation. Michel Wieviorka, one of the foremost experts on antisemitism in France concurs: On the whole, it does seem that the majority of violent antisemitic acts at the beginning of the decade were committed by young people of ‘Maghrebi immigrant origin’. Yet this was entirely disconnected to any organisation or collective structure and was in no way related to activists engaged in either pro-Palestinian or Islamist movements.23 The intellectual debate The situation that developed in France led to the publishing of numerous works on the subject, some advancing the case of a supposed ‘new antisemitism’ distinct from its traditional form24 and others proposing a ‘new face’ or return of antisemitism.25 On the other hand there were those who argued categorically against the existence of a ‘new antisemitism’ or even using the word ‘antisemitism’ when referring to hostility connected to the State of Israel.26 Some even implied that the use of such a term was a means of alimenting an existing climate of Islamophobia in France.27 The discussion of this phenomenon first intensified around the beginning of 2002 with the publication of Pierre-André Taguieff’s La Nouvelle Judéophobie28 and the term ‘new antisemitism’ eventually gained wide currency, even being referred to in official reports written for the French government.29 Some authors blamed the state and other institutions of being complicit in the rise of this antisemitism and claimed that the French media was also somehow responsible for the rise in anti-Jewish attacks, particularly the way in which it presented the Middle East conflict.30 Others asserted that after the outbreak of antisemitic violence in 2000, the press remained silent or did not sufficiently report these acts.31 The allegation of media silence is surprising as there has actually been extensive coverage in the French press of the attacks suffered by the French Jewish community in recent years.32 The drive to sell the ‘new antisemitism’ theory was perceived by a number of scholars, including many Jewish ones, as a kind of propaganda campaign, waged against journalists and 7 academics who are critical of Israel - what one critic labelled an ‘ideological counter-intifada by the unconditional supporters of Israel’.33 Consequently the ‘new antisemitism’ label was seen by many as merely a method for equating either criticism of Israel or anti-Zionism with antisemitism. Indeed a number of high profile court cases were brought against people who had been critical of Israel such as the journalist Daniel Mermet and the sociologist Edgar Morin (himself Jewish), who were accused of inciting racial hatred against Jews.34 According to Gilles William Goldnadel, the lawyer responsible for bringing many of these cases before the judges, ‘the case which is being brought against Daniel Mermet is that of new-look antisemitism’.35 Regrettably, the effect of such actions was to stifle any serious debate about antisemitism in France and the two camps remained entrenched in their respective positions. Indeed much of the literature dealing with this topic in France remained extremely partisan and polemical in its nature. Those supporting the ‘new antisemitism’ hypothesis could generally be classified as supporting a generally pro-Israeli position and those with pro-Palestinian sympathies argued against it. Defining the new antisemitism in France The use of the ‘new’ prefix is complicated by the fact that it is not always clear what this refers to. Amongst proponents of its usage, a consensus on its definition is currently lacking. Commentators have not only been unable to agree on this, but the descriptions that have been proposed often differ quite starkly from each other. Surveying the literature, it is indeed possible to identify three basic components of what may constitute antisémitisme nouveau. The first and most prominent, common to many definitions, is that the state of Israel and/or Zionism, has replaced ‘the Jew’ as the object of antipathy in the eyes of antisemites. Therefore Jews are targeted, not as individuals, but as a people and/or nation. In other words, Israel has become, in the words of Brian Klug, the ‘collective Jew’.36 The journalist Sylvain Attal summarised this as the ‘detestation and criminalisation of Israel. Not as a government, as a state like many others, but as a symbol of something whose very right to exist is even questioned.’37 This assessment therefore argues that the internal nature of antisemitism has changed because ‘the Jew’ has been redefined. This antipathy towards Israel would thus account for the excessive criticism and blame for the world’s troubles often levelled at the Jewish state and its relative pariah status. It is argued thus that antisemitism implicitly informs the disproportionate criticism that Israel receives and would therefore explain why antisemitic attacks often coincide with events in the Middle East with Jews supposedly pay the price for this (antisemitic) hatred of 8 Israel. Taguieff’s reading of the phenomenon adds that this hatred coalesces around a representation of Zionism as the incarnation of absolute evil and the belief that every Jew is a ‘Zionist’.38 The second aspect that designates antisemitism as new is its association with the Left which would distinguish it from supposedly ‘older’ forms. This ‘classic’ version of antisemitism refers to that which generally derived from the extreme right, motivated by ethnocentric/biological racism, nationalist chauvinism or religious bigotry. The political Left in France, broadly sympathetic to Israel in the early years of its existence, turned against her after the occupation of the territories captured during the Six-Day war. Henceforth Israel was largely depicted as a colonialist power with imperialist ambitions and anti-Zionism became ingrained within the discourse of the Left, particularly those who identified themselves as members of the so-called New Left.39 The mainstream left in France incarnated by the Socialist Party (PS) has always been split on the issue of Zionism and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; however its leadership has generally supported the Israeli labour party and the two-state solution. Therefore the ‘new antisemitism’ of the Left is uniquely associated with the extreme left (including the Green Party - Les Verts) and causes such as anti-racism, anti-imperialism, human rights, support for the Palestinian cause, and opposition to Islamophobia. This has been sarcastically referred to by some commentators as Islamo-gauchisme or la gauche obscurantiste.40 According to this theory, ‘new antisemitism’ acquires a paradoxical quality because it is supposedly perpetrated in the name of just causes. However, rather than those on the left being directly associated with acts of antisemitism, they are accused of promoting ‘antisemitism by proxy’ (antisémitisme par procuration) through their anti-Zionist discourse.41 This phenomenon associated with the left-wing intelligentsia is described by Taguieff as the ‘ideological metamorphosis of antisemitism from an explicit to an implicit anti-Jewish racism’.42 Thirdly and finally, no doubt the most controversial element attributed to definitions of the ‘new antisemitism’ is that it has a direct connection with cultural and religious origins, namely Islam. Some scholars do not hesitate to refer to ‘Muslim antisemitism’ and argue that the rhetoric of radical Islamists has influenced perceptions of Jews in France.43 Taguieff suggests that antisemitism is undergoing a process of Islamisation and that the leaders of radical Islam have reformulated the classic antisemitic allegation of a Jewish conspiracy as a Zionist and/or Western plot against Islam.44 This would explain why antisemitic sentiments are particularly prevalent amongst young French Muslims, sensitive to events in the Middle East. This view is synthesised by Eli Barnavi, former Israeli Ambassador to France: Previously exported from the West towards the East, antisemitism is now coming back the other way. It has since become an antisemitism of importation, which has mostly settled amongst those of a Muslim background, even though it is encouraged by irresponsible leftists….It is these Palestinians by proxy who are responsible for the antisemitic acts which have multiplied in France in recent 9 years, who find in these far away events, of which they fail to grasp the complexity, an easy outlet for their resentment and frustration.45 The involvement of the Left and Muslims is consistently evoked, as Klug has noted ‘when people speak of a new antisemitism, they point an accusing finger at these two groups in particular’.46 Yet it is rarely stated how the two strands are related (apart from opposition to Israel). This, as we shall see, creates a number of problems. Firstly, one difficulty of defining this phenomenon as ‘new’ is dating its starting point. In France, ‘new antisemitism’ is normally used to denote that which became apparent since the year 2000. Indeed, many commentators saw it as something which evolved after the outbreak of the second Palestinian intifada. However, if ‘new antisemitism’ also refers to that from the Left, dating this phenomenon from such a recent period must be seriously questioned. Ignoring the fact that antisemitism on the French left (including figures such as Alphonse Toussenel and Pierre-Joseph Proudhon) actually has a long history, it would be more accurate to date this to 1967, since this is the period when hostility to Israel emerged from within the Left in France (and much of Western Europe). Consequently, the rise in antisemitism from the year 2000 onwards could not be the result of an entirely new phenomenon, but rather a new (and more violent) wave of an existing one. Indeed, it has been argued by Taguieff that what France has been facing is in fact the second wave of the ‘new antisemitism’.47 The more pressing problem however regarding the ‘new antisemitism’ terminology is that it fuses supposedly leftist and ‘Muslim’ antisemitism into one entity when they are not necessarily linked. Taguieff for example states that today’s anti-Jewish current emanates principally from radical Islamists, Christian humanitarians, anti-imperialists, ‘Third Worldists’ (tiermondistes), ‘certain elites’, anarcho-Trotskyites, anti-globalists and various regimes in the Arab world. Despite all these groups having in common either a relationship with the Left or Islam, it appears to be an impossibly long list which does not include any distinctions whatsoever. The pluralistic nature that Taguieff ascribes to the ‘new antisemitism’ must indeed be questioned as it is unrealistic to compare and merge the ideas of radical Islamists with pacifist Christian humanitarians! The assertion that the ‘new antisemitism’ is composed of such an impossibly wide array of protagonists appears disingenuous, as the only common denominator between these groups is their critical position vis-à-vis Israel, whether it be extreme or moderate. This has the effect of associating certain opinions or political positions with acts of antisemitic violence which can only lead to confusion. Therefore, if such a term were to be used, one would have to see the ‘new antisemitism’ as constituting two strains, one which is supposedly propagated from within the Left and another that 10 is either inspired by interpretations of Islam, or is at least a cultural phenomenon that seems prevalent amongst Muslims. These strains would thus be connected by their rejection of Zionism but separate in the way they manifest themselves. Due to these evident complexities, some have avoided the ‘new’ terminology and have instead promulgated several other appellations in order to specify the type of antisemitism associated with ‘Arab-Muslims’ in France such as ‘banlieue’,48 ‘ghetto’49 or ‘pro-Palestinian’50 antisemitism. In the French debate, a common complaint about this phenomenon was its supposed respectability and immunity to criticism, especially as it relates to those on the Left and their response to it. Thus the widely respected historian Michel Winock lamented that: When the enemy is fascism, when antisemitism has the name of Le Pen, everything is clear. When the most abusive antisemitic insults and the most blatant acts of antisemitism can be traced to those in France whose origins are in the Third World, antisemitism becomes rather less important, respectable even.51 At the heart of the argument advanced by proponents of the ‘new antisemitism’ label is that the line distinguishing anti-Zionism and criticism of Israel from antisemitism has become increasingly blurred. Many present anti-Zionism as forming the ideological core of ‘new antisemitism’ and some have even claimed that anti-Zionism is inherently antisemitic and that the two concepts are essentially ‘Siamese twins’.52 Taguieff introduces a certain amount of confusion into his own argument by identifying two types of anti-Zionism, the first involving the ‘critique of Israeli policy’ and the second characterised by ‘bringing into question Israel’s right to exist’.53 Only the second type can of course actually be considered as anti-Zionism. Such critiques of anti- Zionism and are not only erroneous but also unhelpful when trying to analytically entangle these two concepts. They must be treated separately as it should be conceivable that someone could oppose the existence of Israel and not bear any prejudice against Jews, just as one could hate Jews but still (paradoxically) be a fervent supporter of the Zionist cause.54 Further proof of this argument is the existence of significant Jewish opposition to Zionism or what David Myers calls ‘principled anti-Zionism’.55 Unless we accept the idea that these individuals are merely all ‘self-hating Jews’, it becomes evident that their opposition must be based on something more than antisemitism (even though technically it would not be impossible to be both Jewish and antisemitic). Equally, the fact that anti-Zionism and antisemitism are not interchangeable does not mean that anti-Zionism or anti- Zionists cannot be antisemitic. As the late French philosopher and prominent scholar of racism Christian Delacampagne once noted, ‘even if anti-Zionism is not automatically intrinsic to hostility towards Jews, one cannot deny that it has often served, since 1967, as an alibi for antisemitism that has not only come from the Right but equally from the Left’.56 Such would be the case where the 11 term ‘Zionist’ becomes merely a euphemism for ‘Jew’ such as the idea of a ‘Zionist conspiracy’.57 In most cases though is of course impossible to know whether an anti-Zionist statement is actually motivated by antisemitism. The European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) has attempted to address the thorny issue of when antisemitism may manifest itself with regard to the state of Israel. According to its working definition of antisemitism, this includes claiming that Israel is a racist endeavour, using classic antisemitic symbols to characterise the country, making comparisons with Israeli and Nazi policy and holding Jews as collectively responsible for the actions of the state of Israel.58 This endeavour is also limited though as it often just identifies when criticism crosses the line from fair to foul rather than providing a set of criteria that would help to distinguish when something becomes antisemitic, or in other words, the construction of Israel as ‘the Jew’. Some have also argued that this definition merely serves to uphold a new orthodoxy that anti-Zionism can be equated with antisemitism.59 There are still a variety of nebulous areas that the definition does not address. If, for example, it is antisemitic to compare Israel’s actions to Nazi atrocities, is it antisemitic to compare Israel to Apartheid South Africa?60 It is inevitable that any discussion of these factors will remain subjective and the fact that Israel is a state essentially governed by Jews will perhaps inevitably interfere with the way people criticise its policies.61 For this reason alone, the suspicion that criticism of Israel represents a thinly veiled cover for antisemitism will probably continue to persist, even if this is probably rarely the case. Is it really new? The contemporary debate about a ‘new antisemitism’, both in France and internationally, repeats much of the discussion that developed in the 1980s focusing on whether critical attitudes towards Zionism or opposition to the State of Israel and its policies had given a new impetus to or constituted a new form of antisemitism.62 The use of such a term is essentially problematic as it would imply that the internal nature of antisemitism has changed so as to be quantifiably different from forms of antisemitism which preceded it (or continue to exist along side it). Approaches that distinguish ‘new’ from ‘old’ and ‘classic’ from ‘modern’ seem to ignore the essential continuity of antisemitism throughout history and the fact that many aspects of antisemitism we see today can be traced back to stereotypes that have existed for hundreds, if not thousands of years. As Yehuda Bauer once noted regarding the supposed differences between newer and older forms of antisemitism: 12 Antisemitism in the post-Holocaust world is, in principle, not that different from the pre-1939 variety, similarly combining continuity and new developments. The terminology used by some commentators, which tries to differentiate between ‘classical’ and ‘modern’ (or racist) antisemitism is much too rigid. We have already seen how the Nazis adapted old concepts to fit new realities. Hence, to differentiate ‘classical’ antisemitism from new versions is a dangerous and potentially misleading exercise.63 The assessment that Israel has replaced ‘the Jew’ is equally hard to establish despite the fact that that there are new groups of antisemites and the nature, frequency and perpetrators of antisemitic acts in France has changed. Perhaps the key problem with the ‘new antisemitism’ terminology is that it refers to two aspects which may not necessarily be related, or at least emanate from entirely distinct ideological perspectives. As Paul Thibaud notes, the use of an expression such as nouvel antisémitisme is questionable as it ‘affirms that there is a link and even a continuity between, on the one hand, antisemitic harassment in certain banlieues, and on the other hand, the hostility towards Israel shared by the vast majority of public opinion.’64 The only common reference point of this ‘new antisemitism’ is Israel; however hostility towards Israel or anti-Zionism cannot of course always be traced to a hatred of Jews. In fact, the greatest problem facing scholars of this subject is assessing the motives for antisemitic attacks. Just as we are unable to always know whether criticism of Israel is motivated by anti-Jewish prejudice, we cannot easily assess whether an attack on a synagogue is driven by the hatred of Jews as ‘Israeli fellow travellers’65, the construction of Israel as ‘the Jew’ in the antisemitic world-view or as something completely disconnected from the situation in the Middle East. Antisemites themselves have understood this quandary perfectly and hence it is increasingly rare that one finds an outright condemnation of ‘the Jews’, except in the most extreme and marginalised circles. Therefore, it is increasingly the term ‘Zionists’ that is used, making anti-Zionism the ‘lingua franca of many modern day antisemites’.66 The task of identifying when anti-Zionism is antisemitic is both a thankless and futile one. Neither antisemitism which emanates from the Left nor that of Muslims can be described as a particularly recent occurrence. Antisemitism on the Left in France has a long history and, in terms of opposition to Israel, can at least be traced back to the 1960s. Neither has Muslim hostility towards Jews developed within the last few years. Antisemitism associated with Muslims in Europe is naturally a controversial issue, but perhaps one that needs to be researched most urgently.67 The two vectors of ‘new antisemitism’ are not only old; they also need to be separated from each other in order to be rationally analysed. The accusation of a genuine leftist antisemitism, which could be compared to that of the extreme right, is, at any rate, extremely disingenuous. First, there is so far no evidence that shows that people identifying themselves with the Left in France are involved in acts of antisemitism and no major leader of the Left in France has made comments which could be described as antisemitic. The majority of those on the Left in France are, given that they support a 13 two-state solution, not even anti-Zionists let alone antisemitic. The only possible criticism that could be levelled against members of the left is that their stance against Israel might inadvertently encourage antisemitism by proxy, something which of course can be neither proven nor measured. Shulamit Volkov has asked ‘whether the position towards Israel today, which has become a central issue for the European Left, can still be considered a cultural code or whether it rather indicates a more direct anti-Jewish attack’.68 There appears to be little evidence for the latter in the case of France and the extreme right still poses more of a threat to Jews than the extreme left. This form of antisemitism can hardly be described as ‘old’, especially as the classic antisemitic texts such as ‘The Protocols of the Elders of Zion’ may inspire many of the ‘new’ antisemites. What we have witnessed in recent years in France appears to be simply a new face of an old hatred, a continuation of a phenomenon that has existed for centuries, always evolving, but essentially remaining the same. As Le Monde journalist Nicolas Weill correctly pointed out: ‘There can be no question that the perpetrators of antisemitism have changed or rather diversified. But the idioms through which this ‘new antisemitism’ expresses itself, sadly re-emerge from a rather ‘classical’ register’.69 Timothy Peace is a PhD candidate in the Department of Social and Political Sciences at the European University Institute. Timothy.Peace@eui.eu mailto:Timothy.Peace@eui.eu 14 Figure 1 should be a line graph entitled ‘Recorded levels of antisemitism in France’ which incorporates the following statistics: Year Antisemitic threats Antisemitic violence Combined antisemitic incidents 1997 90 3 93 1998 80 1 81 1999 70 12 82 2000 625 119 744 2001 187 32 219 2002 739 197 936 2003 474 127 601 2004 774 200 974 2005 409 99 508 2006 434 137 571 2007 280 106 386 2008 297 100 397 The two graphs below give an indication of how fig. 1 should be presented. If there is enough space in the article, these graphs themselves could perhaps also be included. 15 Figure 2 should be a column graph entitled ‘Perpetrators of antisemitic violence in France’ based on the image below As the numbers are difficult to read, here are the relevant statistics Year Extreme right ‘Arab-Muslims’ Other Overall 1997 1 0 2 3 1998 1 0 0 1 1999 8 3 1 12 2000 5 109 5 119 2001 1 10 21 32 2002 3 51 143 197 2003 6 44 77 127 2004 14 67 119 200 2005 10 41 48 99 2006 15 38 84 137 2007 12 36 58 106 Source: Commision Nationale Consultative des Droits de l’Homme (2008) The source for all these statistics is Commision Nationale Consultative des Droits de l’Homme, La lutte contre le racisme, l’antisémitisme et la xénophobie. Année 2007. (Paris: La documentation Française 2008). Permission may have to be sought from the CNCDH. 16 Endnotes 1 These figures refer to the combined total of antisemitic threats and acts of violence, see figure 1. 2 Jean-Yves Camus, ‘Jenseits des republikanischen Modells : Antisemitismus in Frankreich’ in Lars Rensmann and Julius Schoeps (eds.) Feindbild Judentum. Antisemitismus in Europa (Berlin: Verlag für Berlin-Brandenburg 2008), 44. 3 Emmanuel Brenner, Les Territoires perdus de la République (Paris: Mille et une nuits 2002) was the most notorious. It consists of a series of testimonies of teachers of the difficulties they faced trying to conduct their classes, specifically in the poorer suburbs. It was a publishing phenomenon and was said to have influenced Jacques Chirac’s decision to appoint the Stasi commission (which led to then ban on religious insignia in schools in 2004). It was however criticised by some for unjustly portraying young French people of North African origin as being inherently sexist, antisemitic and disrespectful towards authority figures. Brenner, a pseudonym of Georges Bensoussan, is a historian specialising in the Holocaust. 4 Michel Wieviorka (ed.), La Tentation antisémite : haine des juifs dans la France d'aujourd'hui (Paris: Robert Laffont 2005), 337-380. Similar problems in the UK prompted the government to implement measures to tackle antisemitism in British universities. Isabel Oakeshott and Chris Gourlay, ‘Anti-semitism rules come in at universities’, The Times, 25 March 2007. 5 For an account of this ‘exodus’ of the Jewish community to Israel and in particular operation Sarcelles d'abord mounted by the Jewish Agency for Israel, see Cécilia Gabizon and Johan Weisz, OPA sur les juifs de France : enquête sur un exode programmé (2000-2005) (Paris: Grasset 2006). 6 Many of those interviewed by the Stasi commission mentioned the problem of antisemitism in their testimonies. Ironically many Jewish figures rallied in favour of the ban even though it of course meant that the kippa would also be banned. For more details on the reasons for the implementation of this law see John Bowen, Why the French Don’t Like Headscarves: Islam, the State, and Public Space (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 2007). 7 It is to some extent problematic to simply label these actors as ‘Muslims’ and I utilise this particular terminology (arabo-musulmans) as it is that which appears in the reports by the CNCDH. On the racialisation of North African immigrants and their children as ‘Muslims’ see Paul A. Silverstein, ‘The context of antisemitism and Islamophobia in France’, Patterns of Prejudice, vol. 42, no. 1, February 2008. 8 These annual reports entitled La lutte contre le racisme, l’antisémitisme et la xénophobie are published on 21st March (The UN’s International Day for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination) and are available to download from http://www.cncdh.fr 9 Created by the Conseil Représentatif des Institutions juives de France (CRIF), the Consistoires and the Fonds Social Juif Unifié (FSJU) in 1980 in the wake of the bombing of the rue Copernic synagogue in Paris. It performs a similar funtion to the CST in the UK and works in close collaboration with the ministry of the interior. To view their figures see http://www.spcj.org 10 Formerly the Direction centrale des renseignements généraux (DCRG) which in July 2008 was merged with the Direction de la surveillance du territoire (DST) to form the new body. This is a three step process, local police or gendarmerie forces gather information which is then collected by the direction générale of each organisation which in turn sends these figures to the DCRI at the end of the year. 11 Since late 2005, the Direction générale de la police nationale (DGPN) has been using a system named STIC (système de traitement des infractions constatées) in order to produce its statistical data relating to crimes of racism and antisemitism. This is due to be connected to Judex, the equivalent system used by the Direction générale de la gendarmerie nationale (DGGN) to form a new catalogue (fichier) named Ariane. This will allow for a more systematic exchange of information between the DGPN and DGGN and is due to be implemented in 2009. 12 The 1990 law (n° 90-615) also made holocaust denial a punishable crime. 13 These new laws that were passed in response to the increase in antisemitism include n° 2003-88 (loi Lellouche), n° 2004-204 and n° 2004-1486 as well as the circular of 13th August 2004. 14 Paul A. Silverstein, ‘The context of antisemitism and Islamophobia in France’, 23. 15 John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt, ‘The Israeli Lobby’, London Review of Books, vol. 28, no. 6, March 2006. 16 This was in response to an article published in Le Point detailing a league table of the ‘most violent schools’ using the SIGNA data. 17 Paul A. Silverstein, op.cit 18 ‘In Zion’s hall of mirrors: a comment on Neur Antisemitismus, Patterns of Prejudice, vol. 41, no.2, May 2007, 223. 19 As is well known, the first article of the French constitution promises equality for all citizens ‘irrespective of origin, race or religion’. This understanding has meant the collection of such data remains officially illegal. Nevertheless, the Ministry of Justice passes these statistics over to the CNCDH for its annual reports despite refusing to specify what this category actually means and how these figures are obtained. 20 Referred to as ‘ghetto antisemitism’ in Michel Wieviorka, La Tentation anti-Semite. This is the best study of contemporary antisemitism in France, avoiding the partisan and polemical nature of much of the other work that has http://www.cncdh.fr/ http://www.spcj.org/ 17 been dedicated to this subject. It has been translated into English as The lure of anti-semitism: hatred of Jews in present- day France (Leiden: Brill 2007). 21 Sylvain Broard and Vincent Tiberj, Français comme les autres? Enquête sur les citoyens d’origine maghrébine, africaine et turque (Paris : Presses de Science Po 2005), 108. According to the statistics gathered in this study, 46% of practising Muslims in France were classed as being ‘intolerant’ towards Jews. 22 Jonathan Laurence and Justin Vaisse, Integratine Islam: Political and Religious Challenges in Contemporary France (Washington D.C: Brookings Institution Press 2006), 241. 23 Michel Wieviorka, L’antisémitisme est-il de retour? (Paris : Larousse 2008), 30. Wieviorka was one of the first to use the term ‘new antisemitism’ to refer to this phenomenon. Michel Wieviorka, ‘Crise au Proche Orient. Un nouvel antisémitisme’, La Croix, 20 October 2000. 24 Raphaël Draï, Sous le signe de Sion : l'antisémitisme nouveau est arrivé (Paris: Michalon 2002), Pierre-André Taguieff, La Nouvelle judéophobie (Paris: Mille et une nuits. 2002), Sylvain Attal, La Plaie : enquête sur le nouvel antisémitisme (Paris: Denoël 2004), Paul Giniewski, Antisionisme : le nouvel antisémitisme (Le Coudray-Macouard: Cheminements 2005). 25 Gilles William Goldnadel, Le Nouveau bréviaire de la haine : antisémitisme et antisionisme (Paris: Ramsay 2001), Jean-Pierre Allali, Les Habits neufs de l'antisémitisme : anatomie d'une angoisse (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer 2002), Alain Finkielkraut, Au Nom de l'autre : réflexions sur l'antisémitisme qui vient (Paris: Gallimard 2003),, Alexis Lacroix, Le Socialisme des imbéciles: quand l'antisémitisme redevient de gauche (Paris: Table Ronde 2005). 26 Etienne Balibar et al, Antisémitisme: l’intolérable chantage. Israël-Palestine, une affaire française? (Paris: La Découverte 2003), Pascal Boniface, Est-il permis de critiquer Israël ? (Paris: Robert Laffont 2003), Guillaume Weill- Raynal, Une Haine imaginaire?: contre-enquête sur le « nouvel antisémitisme » (Paris: Armand Colin 2005). 27 Vincent Geisser, La Nouvelle islamophobie (Paris : La Découverte 2003), Thomas Deltombe, Islam imaginaire : La construction médiatique de l’islamophobie en France, 1975-2005 (Paris : La Découverte 2005), Vincent Geisser and Aziz Zemouri, Marianne et Allah (Paris : La Découverte 2007). 28 Since it was published, this book has achieved a certain level of notoriety in intellectual circles but has become the text of reference for many in the French Jewish community on this subject. Its success can be seen by the publication of two other books which paraphrase its title, Geisser’s La Nouvelle islamophobie and René Rémond, Le nouvel antichristianisme (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer 2005). An abridged translation in English also exists Rising from the muck: the new anti-semitism in Europe (Chicago : Ivan R. Dee 2004). 29 Most notably the report of the Stasi commission Laïcité et République: commission de réflexion sur l'application du principe de laïcité dans la République (Paris : La documentation Française 2004) which led to the controversial law banning religious symbols in state schools, but also the Rufin report Chantier sur la lutte contre le racisme et l’antisémitisme (Paris : La documentation Française 2004) which was commissioned by then minister of the interior Dominique de Villepin. 30 Paul Foster, ‘Les Médias français seraient-ils devenus antisémites?’ in Alexandre Feigenbaum, Jacqueline Rebibo, and Monique Sander (eds) [Nouveaux visages] de l'antisémitisme: haine-passion ou haine-historique? (Paris: NM7 2001), 221-228. 31 Shmuel Trigano, La Démission de la République: juifs et musulmans en France (Paris : Presses Universitaires de France 2003). Ironically, others even accused the French media of reporting too many antisemitic incidents therefore increasing the risk of inspiring copycat acts, Jonathan Laurence and Justin Vaisse, Integrating Islam, 229. 32 Guillaume Weill-Raynal for example has systematically countered this assertion and accused proponents of the concept of a ‘new antisemitism’ such as Alain Finkielkraut, Gilles William Goldnadel, Pierre-André Taguieff, Jacques Tarnero and Shmuel Trigano of basing their theories on speculation rather than any actual evidence. 33 Dominique Vidal, Le Mal-être juif : entre repli, assimilation & manipulations (Marseille: Agone 2003), 71. 34 Daniel Mermet hosts a popular radio show Là bas si j’y suis on the France Inter station and was accused of airing defamatory remarks by listeners concerning a report from Gaza. Edgar Morin was indicted along with his co-authors former Euro MP Sami Naïr and writer Danièle Sallenave after they published an article critical of Israel in the 4 June 2002 edition of Le Monde entitled ‘Israel-Palestine: the cancer’. Mermet won his case but, after originally being cleared, Morin was found guilty by the court of appeal. This despite an organised campaign of support led by some of France’s leading intellectuals. 35 Marie-Amélie Lombard, ‘Les tribunaux français face au conflit israélo-palestinien’, Le Figaro, 19 June 2002. 36 Brian Klug ‘The collective Jew: Israel and the new antisemitism’, Patterns of Prejudice, vol. 37, no. 2, June 2003, 117-138. 37 Sylvain Attal, La Plaie, 19. 38 Taguieff, La Nouvelle judéophobie 39 Shulamit Volkov, ‘Readjusting cultural codes: reflections on anti-Semitism and anti-Zionism’, The Journal of Israeli History, vol. 25, no. 1, March 2006, 51-62. 40 Caroline Fourest, La tentation obscurantiste (Paris: Grasset 2005). 41 ‘Facilitators of antisemitism who by their opinions, or through their silence, legitimise such acts’, Jean-Christophe Rufin, Chantier sur la lutte contre le racisme et l’antisémitisme, 15. 18 42 Pierre-André Taguieff, Prêcheurs de haine : traversée de la judéophobie planétaire (Paris: Mille et une nuits 2004), 17. 43 This is not unique to France of course. The report by the British All-Party Parliamentary Group against Antisemitism, also refers to ‘islamist antisemitism’ All-Party Parliamentary Inquiry into Antisemitism (London: The Stationery Office 2006), 26. 44 Taguieff, La Nouvelle judéophobie, 128. 45 Eli Barnavi, ‘Où en est Israël?’ Le Débat, no. 128, January 2004, 19. 46 Brian Klug, ‘Is Europe a lost cause? The European debate on antisemitism and the Middle East conflict’, Patterns of Prejudice, vol. 39, no. 1, March 2005, 57. 47 He first developed the notion of la nouvelle judéophobie back in 1989, Pierre-André Taguieff, ‘La nouvelle judéophobie. Antisionisme, antiracisme, anti-impérialisme’, Les Temps Modernes, no. 520, November 1989, 1-80. 48 Benoît Rayski, Jours tranquilles à Créteil : voyage au bout d'une haine ordinaire (Paris: Ramsay 2004). 49 Michel Wieviorka, La Tentation anti-Semite. 50 Michel Winock, La France et les juifs : de 1789 à nos jours (Paris: Editions du Seuil 2004). 51 Ibid., 363. 52 Raphaël Draï, Sous le signe de Sion, 18. 53 Ibid., 21. 54 Certain elements of the French extreme right could be considered as antisemitic Zionists because they would rather see Jews in Israel than in France, Pascal Boniface, ‘L’antisémitisme et la France’ in Alain Houziaux (ed.) Israël, les juifs, l'antisémitisme (Paris: Editions de l'atelier 2005), 37. 55 David Myers, ‘Can there be a principled anti-Zionism? On the nexus between anti-historicism and anti-Zionism in modern Jewish thought’, The Journal of Israeli History, vol. 25, no. 1, March 2006, 33-50. 56 Christian Delacampagne, ‘L’Antisémitisme en France (1945-1993)’ in Léon Poliakov, (ed.) Histoire de l'antisémitisme, 1945-1993 (Paris: Editions du Seuil 1994), 140. Here one would immediately think of the Soviet Union whose state-sponsored antisemitism was often propagated under the pretence of ‘anti-Zionism’ as well as the organised ‘anti-Zionist’ campaign of 1968 in Poland. Many believed that the September 2001 World Conference against Racism (WCAR) in Durban was used to disseminate antisemitism under the banner of anti-Zionism. 57 Conspiracy theories about the involvement of Jews/Zionists in 9/11 are prevalent amongst youths in the French banlieues. Michel Wieviorka, La Tentation anti-Semite, 194. 58 FRA working definition of Antisemitism - http://fra.europa.eu/fra/material/pub/AS/AS-WorkingDefinition-draft.pdf (viewed 15 August 2007). For an account of how this definition was formulated see Dina Porat, ‘The Road that Led to an Internationally Accepted Definition of Antisemitism’, Jahrbuch für Antisemitismusforschung, vol. 16, 2007, 117- 137. This agency was formerly known as the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC) and has published several reports on antisemitism. 59 Antony Lerman, ‘Jews attacking Jews’, Haaretz, 12 September 2008. 60 Myers tries to clear up this ambiguity, by pointing to ‘group stigmatisation’ as the defining criteria of criticism of Israel as antisemitism. Therefore, when the target of this criticism is the supposed nature of the Jews themselves, whether in Israel or in the Diaspora, it crosses the red line and becomes antisemitic. David Myers, ‘Can there be a principled anti-Zionism?’ The most emblematic example of such stigmatisation in the French context would be Charles de Gaulle’s comments in November 1967 about Jews being ‘an elitist people, sure of themselves, and with a tendency for domination’. The ex-president of the CRIF paraphrased this remark for the title of his book in which he reveals how he brought pressure to bear on government leaders to act against antisemitism. Roger Cukierman, Ni fiers ni dominateurs (Paris: Editions du Moment 2008). 61 Alain Houziaux, Israël, les juifs, l'antisémitisme, 17. 62 See the contributions to Michael Curtis (ed.) Antisemitism in the Contemporary World (Boulder: Westview Press 1986). Israeli Historian Jacob Talmon published an article on ‘The New Antisemitism’ as early as 1976 as a response to the 1975 UN resolution equating Zionism with racism. 63 Yehuda Bauer, ‘Antisemitism and anti-Zionism – new and old’ in Robert Wistrich, (ed.) Anti-Zionism and Antisemitism in the Contemporary World (Basingstoke: Macmillan 1990), 198. 64 Paul Thibaud, ‘La Question juive et la crise française’, Le Débat, no. 131, September 2004, 48. 65 Brian Klug, ‘Is Europe a lost cause?’, 58. 66 All-Party Parliamentary Group against Antisemitism, All-Party Parliamentary Inquiry into Antisemitism, 17. 67 See for example Günter Jikeli, ‘Antisemitismus unter männlichen Jugendlichen mit palästinensischem und libanesischem Hintergrund – eine Fallstudie in Berlin-Kreuzberg’, Jahrbuch für Antisemitismusforschung, vol. 17, 2008. 68 Shulamit Volkov, ‘Readjusting cultural codes’, 51. 69 Nicolas Weill, La République et les antisémites (Paris: Grasset 2004), 24. http://fra.europa.eu/fra/material/pub/AS/AS-WorkingDefinition-draft.pdf 
work_ai35e5n2g5a25iortizigdbzki	----	Microsoft Word - Thesis Hate Crime Law and Social Contention.doc HATE CRIME LAW & SOCIAL CONTENTION: A COMPARISON OF NONGOVERNMENTAL KNOWLEDGE PRACTICES IN CANADA & THE UNITED STATES by Bernard P. Haggerty B.S., Iowa State University, 1988 J.D., cum laude, Howard University School of Law, 1992 LL.M., University of Utah, 2001 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY in The Faculty of Graduate Studies (Law) THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA (Vancouver) August 2008 © Bernard P. Haggerty, 2008 ii ABSTRACT Hate crime laws in both Canada and the United States purport to promote equality using the language of antidiscrimination law. National criminal codes in both countries authorize enhanced punishment for crimes motivated by “sexual orientation” but not “gender identity” or “gender expression.” Cities and states in the United States have also adopted hate crime laws, some of which denounce both homophobic and trans-phobic crimes. Hate crime penalty enhancement laws have been applied by courts in both Canada and the United States to establish a growing jurisprudence. In both countries, moreover, other hate crime laws contribute to official legal knowledge by regulating hate speech, hate crime statistics, and conduct equivalent to hate crimes in schools, workplaces, and elsewhere. Yet, despite the proliferation of hate crime laws and jurisprudence, governmental officials do not control all legal knowledge about hate crimes. Sociological “others” attend criminal sentencing proceedings and provide support to hate crime victims during prosecutions, but they also frame their own unofficial inquiries and announce their own classification decisions for hate-related events. In both Canada and the United States, nongovernmental groups contend both inside and outside official governmental channels to establish legal knowledge about homophobic and trans-phobic hate crimes. In two comparable Canadian and American cities, similar groups monitor and classify homophobic and trans-phobic attacks using a variety of information practices. Interviews with representatives of these groups reveal a relationship between the practices of each group and hate crime laws at each site. The results support one principal conclusion. The availability of local legislative power and a local mechanism for public review are key determinants of the sites and styles of iii nongovernmental contention about hate crimes. Where police gather and publish official hate crime statistics, the official classification system serves as both a site for mobilization, and a constraint on the styles of contention used by nongovernmental groups. Where police do not gather or publish hate crime statistics, nongovernmental groups are deprived of the resource represented by a local site for social contention, but their styles of contention are liberated from the subtle influences of an official hate crime classification system. Table of Contents iv TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT................................................................................................................................... ii TABLE OF CONTENTS ............................................................................................................ iv LIST OF TABLES ...................................................................................................................... vii LIST OF FIGURES ................................................................................................................... viii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ........................................................................................................ ix DEDICATION............................................................................................................................... x 1 Introduction........................................................................................................................... 1 1.1. Statement of the Problem ................................................................................................. 1 1.2 Analytical Frame................................................................................................................ 5 1.2.1 The Comparative Method .......................................................................................... 6 1.2.2 The Analytical Legal Comparison............................................................................. 7 1.2.2 The Concept of Social Contention ............................................................................. 9 1.3 Contribution to Existing Literature ............................................................................... 12 1.4 Research Goals & Questions Posed................................................................................ 15 1.5 Research Methods ............................................................................................................ 16 1.5.1. Site Selection............................................................................................................. 16 1.6 Conclusion—A Roadmap for the Thesis........................................................................ 19 2 Hate Crimes, Social Contention & Legal Knowledge...................................................... 30 2.1 Matthew Shepard—a Case of Hate Crime Law & Social Contention ........................ 30 2.2 Hate Crimes & Social Contention— Historical Challenges to Intolerance................ 32 2.2.1 Dante, the Sowers of Discord & De Scandalis Magnatum (ca. 1310) .................. 35 2.2.2 Augustine’s Sermon on Lynching (ca. 390) ............................................................ 38 2.2.3 Patrick’s Letter to the Soldiers of Coroticus (ca. 420) .......................................... 41 2.3 Legal Inquiry & the Sites & Styles of Social Contention ............................................. 44 2.4 Legal Knowledge & the Silencing of Social Contention ............................................... 46 3 Hate Crime Law & Equality in Canada & the U.S.: An Analytical Comparison ....... 51 3.1 Introduction...................................................................................................................... 51 3.2 Analytical Legal Comparison ......................................................................................... 53 3.2.1 Governmental Powers .............................................................................................. 58 3.2.1.1 Division of Legislative Powers .......................................................................... 58 3.2.1.1.1 Canada ......................................................................................................... 58 3.2.1.1.2 United States................................................................................................ 60 3.2.1.1.3 Analysis ........................................................................................................ 62 3.2.1.2 Judicial Review................................................................................................... 64 3.2.2 Equality Rights.......................................................................................................... 65 3.2.2.1 Equality Rights Texts ........................................................................................ 66 3.2.2.1.1 Canada ......................................................................................................... 67 3.2.2.1.2 United States................................................................................................ 72 3.2.2.1.3 Analysis ........................................................................................................ 76 3.2.2.2 Free Expression Constraints on Equality ........................................................ 83 3.2.2.2.1 Canada ......................................................................................................... 83 3.2.2.2.2 United States................................................................................................ 86 3.2.2.2.3 Analysis ........................................................................................................ 87 3.2.3 Enhanced Penalties for Homophobic & Trans-phobic Hate Crimes ................... 90 3.2.3.1 Hate Crime Penalty Enhancement Laws ......................................................... 93 Table of Contents v 3.2.3.1.1 Canada ......................................................................................................... 97 3.2.3.1.2 United States................................................................................................ 98 3.2.3.1.3 Analysis ...................................................................................................... 101 3.2.3.2 Antidiscrimination Terminology in Hate Crime Sentencing ....................... 101 3.2.3.2.1 Canada ....................................................................................................... 102 3.2.3.2.2 United States.............................................................................................. 103 3.2.3.2.3 Analysis ...................................................................................................... 104 3.2.3.3 Standard of Proof............................................................................................. 110 3.2.3.3.1 Canada ....................................................................................................... 110 3.2.3.3.2 United States.............................................................................................. 112 3.2.3.3.3 Analysis ...................................................................................................... 113 3.2.3.4 Mixed Motives & Causation ........................................................................... 115 3.2.3.4.1 Canada ....................................................................................................... 115 3.2.3.4.2 United States.............................................................................................. 118 3.2.3.4.3 Analysis ...................................................................................................... 120 3.2.3.5 Provocation & Self-Defense ............................................................................ 121 3.2.3.6 Hate Crimes in Youth or Juvenile Proceedings ............................................ 122 3.2.3.7 The Effect of Hate Crime Laws—A Trend Analysis .................................... 123 3.2.3.7.1 Early Cases ................................................................................................ 126 3.2.3.7.2 Pre-Hate Crime Cases .............................................................................. 129 3.2.3.7.3 Post-Hate Crime Cases ............................................................................. 141 3.2.3.7.4 Recent Cases .............................................................................................. 148 3.2.3.7.5 Analysis ...................................................................................................... 157 3.2.4 Other Hate Crime Laws ......................................................................................... 159 3.2.4.1 Hate Speech & Propaganda Laws .................................................................. 160 3.2.4.2 Hate Crime Statistics Laws .............................................................................. 162 3.2.4.2.1 Constitutional Authority for Statistics.................................................... 165 3.2.4.2.2 National Hate Crime Statistics Laws ...................................................... 165 3.2.4.2.3 Hate Crimes & Campus Crime Statistics ............................................... 167 3.2.4.3 Civil Rights & Human Rights Laws............................................................... 168 3.2.4.4 School Harassment & Bullying Laws............................................................. 169 3.2.4.5 Other Laws ....................................................................................................... 173 3.2.4.6 Analysis—The Role of Other Hate Crime Laws in Canada & the U.S. ..... 178 3.2.5 Summary.................................................................................................................. 179 4 Case Comparison .............................................................................................................. 187 4.1 Introduction.................................................................................................................... 187 4.2 A Canadian Case—Aaron Webster ............................................................................. 188 4.2.1 The Youths—‘J.S.’ & ‘A.C.’ .................................................................................. 188 4.2.2 The Adult—Cran .................................................................................................... 196 4.3 An American Case—Micah Painter............................................................................. 200 4.4 Analysis—Comparing Cases......................................................................................... 206 4.5 Conclusion ...................................................................................................................... 210 5 Hate Crimes & Social Contention in Canada & the United States .............................. 212 5.1 Introduction.................................................................................................................... 212 5.2 Community Anti-Violence Projects.............................................................................. 220 5.2.1 Anti-Violence Pilot Project—Vancouver .............................................................. 221 5.2.2 Hate Crime Awareness Project—Seattle .............................................................. 230 5.2.3 Comparison ............................................................................................................. 246 5.3 Ad Hoc Anti-Violence Groups....................................................................................... 249 Table of Contents vi 5.3.1 West Enders Against Violence Everywhere (WEAVE)—Vancouver................ 250 5.3.2 Action Northwest Bias Crime Forum—Seattle .................................................... 255 5.3.3 Comparison ............................................................................................................. 258 5.4 School Safety & Education Groups.............................................................................. 260 5.4.1 Safe Schools Coalition—Seattle ............................................................................. 260 5.4.2 Gay and Lesbian Educators BC (GALE-BC)—Vancouver................................ 266 5.4.3 Comparison ............................................................................................................. 274 5.5 Family Support Groups (PFLAG) ............................................................................... 275 5.5.1 PFLAG—Seattle ..................................................................................................... 275 5.5.2 PFLAG—Vancouver .............................................................................................. 277 5.5.3 Comparison ............................................................................................................. 279 5.6 Transgender Rights Groups.......................................................................................... 279 5.6.1 Ingersoll Gender Center—Seattle ......................................................................... 279 5.6.2 Trans Alliance Society—Vancouver ..................................................................... 283 5.6.3 Comparison ............................................................................................................. 286 5.7 Police Hate Crime Units ................................................................................................ 287 5.7.1 Vancouver Police Department & BC Hate Crime Team .................................... 290 5.7.2 Seattle Police Department Bias Crime Coordinator............................................ 300 5.7.3 Comparison ............................................................................................................. 302 6 Conclusions........................................................................................................................ 308 6.1 Legal Systems ................................................................................................................. 308 6.2 Social Groups ................................................................................................................. 314 6.3 Connecting Social Contention with Legal Systems..................................................... 320 6.4 Summary of Findings .................................................................................................... 323 6.4.1 The Dynamics of Social Contention in the Hate Crime Field ....................... 324 6.4.2 Intermediary Roles ........................................................................................... 327 6.4.3 Social Mobilization............................................................................................ 330 6.4.4 Summary............................................................................................................ 331 6.4.5 Further Research .............................................................................................. 332 6.4.6 Conclusion ............................................................................................................... 334 BIBLIOGRAPHY ..................................................................................................................... 336 APPENDICES Appendix A Interview Contents........................................................................................ 364 Appendix B Vancouver Police Press Conference Excerpts ............................................ 369 Appendix C Interview Scripts ........................................................................................... 374 Appendix D Certificate of Approval UBC Behavioural Research Ethics Board ......... 378 vii LIST OF TABLES Table 2.1—Legal Inquiry Type & Sites & Styles of Social Contention ................................. 45 Table 3.1—Equality Rights & Free Expression ....................................................................... 88 Table 3.2—Equality Rights Language in Hate crime Laws (United States & Canada)..... 180 Table 5.1—Information Practices of Groups that Monitoring Hate Crimes ...................... 214 Table 5.2—Data Table.............................................................................................................. 219 Table 6.1—Official Hate Crime Classification Systems—Seattle & Vancouver ................ 310 Table 6.2—School Harassment Laws—Seattle & Vancouver .............................................. 313 Table 6.3—Site & Style of Social Contention by Groups in Canada & the U.S. ................ 314 Table 6.4—Results Summary .................................................................................................. 321 viii LIST OF FIGURES Figure 2.1—Suppression of Nongovernmental Legal Knowledge.......................................... 47 Figure 5.1—Information Flow Model Groups that Monitor Hate Crimes ......................... 215 Figure 6.1— Effect of Successive Triggering Events ............................................................. 326 ix ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This project would have been impossible without the willing participation of the groups and individuals that provided interviews. I heartily thank the groups and their representatives for their indispensable contributions of time and information. Also indispensable were the members of my Ph.D. Thesis Committee: Professors William Black and Christine Boyle of the Faculty of Law, Julian Dierkes of the Institute for Asian Research, and Renisa Mawani of the Department of Sociology. Professor John Torpey, now of the City University of New York also provided invaluable input and support. I also had the benefit of support and guidance from my fellow students, in particular recent graduate Dr. Dawn Mills, and from longtime friend and collaborator Edward Ohnemus. Finally, I am grateful for the employment, companionship, and inspiration provided by the Lummi Nation Victims of Crime Program throughout the course of my graduate studies. Thanks to all of you for your contributions; I accept full responsibility for any mistakes. x DEDICATION To my family, Dr. Toi Geil and Heath Geil-Haggerty, for your years of sacrifice and support during this project. And, to the memory of Matthew Shepard. Chapter 1—Introduction 1 1 Introduction 1.1 Statement of the Problem In the fall of 1998 two youths beat Matthew Shepard to death outside Laramie, Wyoming. County police completed the (voluntary) government form labeling the killing a “hate crime” motivated by “sexual orientation.” The state Division of Criminal Investigation forwarded this information to the FBI, which included the killing in its annual hate crime statistics. The prosecutor challenged the label before the killers’ trial, contending the event was not a hate crime. The point seemed moot, since state law did not recognize hate crimes. Yet, the “hate crime” label for the Shepard killing was, and remains, subject to contention.1 Chapter 4 of this thesis sets out two similar cases. First, in the fall of 2001 a group of youths beat Aaron Webster to death in Vancouver, British Columbia. Vancouver Police Department investigators gave the crime an early “hate crime” label, but their statements to the media were equivocal. Unlike police investigators in Wyoming, Vancouver Police were never called upon to apply a definitive “hate crime” label, because they do not participate in a systematic hate crime statistics and reporting program. Unlike Wyoming, however, a national hate crime sentencing law was available to Crown prosecutors. The outcome of traditional criminal justice labeling was split. One judge labeled the killing a hate crime motivated by Webster’s sexual orientation and enhanced a juvenile killer’s disposition. Crown prosecutors declined to seek enhanced penalties for two of the adult killers. 1 At the time of the Shepard killing local residents labeled the killing a hate crime and a lynching. See Bernard P. Haggerty, Hate Crimes: A View from Laramie, Wyoming’s First Bias Crime Law, the Fight Against Discriminatory Crime, & a New Cooperative Federalism, 45 HOW. L. J. 1, at 9-10 n.25 (citing references) (2001). The County Sheriff investigators who completed the FBI hate crime incident report labeled the killing a hate crime for official statistical purposes, but the local prosecutor, lacking any applicable hate crime statute, denied the killing was a hate crime. See Haggerty, id., at 39. Years later, in an interview with television news reporters, Shepard’s killers denied they were motivated by anti-gay bias. See Casey Charles, Panic in the Project: Critical Queer Studies & the Matthew Shepard Murder, 18 LAW & LITERATURE 225 (2006) (reviewing literature arising from Shepard killing). Chapter 1—Introduction 2 Second, in the summer of 2005, three young men attacked Micah Painter in Seattle, Washington. Police labeled the attack “malicious harassment” under Washington law and a “hate crime” motivated by Painter’s sexual orientation under the federal statistics law. Prosecutors charged the attackers with malicious harassment and they were found guilty and sentenced for the crime. These three events illustrate the dynamics of a field of social contention that has emerged since the enactment of hate crime laws in both Canada and the United States.2 A comparison of the events themselves reveals some similarities. Webster, Painter, and Shepard, were all gay men, and each was attacked by a group of young men with at least some evidence of homophobic motivation. Thus, each attack was at least arguably an act of hate-related, specifically homophobic, violence. Each event triggered immediate contests to ascribe a social meaning according to a series of legal labels. Each event set off a sequence of criminal investigations, charging decisions, prosecutions, and sentencing proceedings. These traditional criminal justice contests were framed by similar, though not identical, legal texts, practices, and cultures. Nevertheless, participants at each site contended for and against a “hate crime” label. In Seattle and Vancouver, the attackers’ penalties varied at least in part according to a “hate crime” label.3 Police and Prosecutors in Seattle successfully fixed the “malicious harassment” label authorized by state statute. Canadian law authorizes a sentencing premium for homophobic hate crimes, but police, prosecutors, and judges in Vancouver divided different labels among Webster’s killers. One judge applied a “hate crime” label during Youth Court disposition; the 2 The concept of social contention used here is taken from the work of Alberto Melucci, Doug McAdam, and others. See Alberto Melucci, CHALLENGING CODES: COLLECTIVE ACTION IN THE INFORMATION AGE (1996); Alberto Melucci, NOMADS OF THE PRESENT: SOCIAL MOVEMENTS & INDIVIDUAL NEEDS IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY (1989); DYNAMICS OF CONTENTION (Doug McAdam, et al. eds., 2001). 3 Shepard’s killers both received life without parole; Painter’s three attackers were sentenced to prison; and, of Webster’s attackers one adult received six years for manslaughter, one adult was acquitted, and one youth received the maximum three years. Factors other than a “hate crime” label influenced the actual penalties differently in each case, but the focus here is on the knowledge associated with the labeling, rather than punishment. The Shepard case is introduced further in Chapter 2, and the Painter and Webster cases are compared in Chapter 4. Chapter 1—Introduction 3 Crown did not seek a “hate crime” label at sentencing in two later cases. Because Wyoming had no hate crime statute, judges and juries were never asked to fix a hate crime label, although the prosecutor sought to fix the label “not a hate crime.” The laws and practices that constitute the field of criminal justice influence ideas, especially ideas about violence—in both Canada and the United States. Yet, in all three cases here, both governmental agencies and nongovernmental social groups sought to establish knowledge outside the traditional criminal charges, verdicts, and sentences. Adding to the courtroom forum and surrounding criminal justice mechanisms, legislatures in both countries have authorized ongoing hate crime labeling for official statistics. In the United States a national Hate Crime Statistics Act encourages, but does not require, police to gather hate crime statistics. Some state and local governments require police to gather hate crime statistics, but not all police agencies participate. These police-generated statistics are supplemented by a National Crime Victims Survey, which gathers hate crime statistics from telephone interviews with victims. Canada has no national hate crime statistics law, although some police agencies gather and report hate crime statistics according to local policies. As in the United States, a General Social Survey has counted hate crimes using telephone interviews with crime victims throughout Canada. The terminology of “hate crime” labeling varies between countries, and even within each country similar hate-related incidents may be processed by different hate crime statistics systems, subject to local variations. Finally, however, even beyond the official criminal justice and statistics labeling systems, nongovernmental groups participate in “hate crime” labeling. All three of the attacks presented above triggered contention outside the official labeling systems. In Seattle, Vancouver, and Laramie, reporters, priests, politicians, families—all struggled to ascribe meaning to the killings. Legislatures have changed criminal penalties and the definitions of crimes before—hate crime laws did not establish the first sentence enhancement factors, for example. Likewise, hate Chapter 1—Introduction 4 crime statistics laws are not the first examples of systematic, ongoing governmental inquiry. What is new 4 in the cases introduced in the following Chapters is the emerging role of nongovernmental social groups contending to establish knowledge in both official and unofficial “hate crime” labeling inquiries. Like their governmental counterparts, nongovernmental groups engage in both occasional, ad hoc, labeling and systematic, ongoing hate crime inquiry. How do these groups participate in individual hate crime labeling decisions? What is their role in the broader hate crime labeling systems? Do differences in hate crime inquiry practices matter to governmental and nongovernmental groups? These questions serve as the background for the research questions investigated here. In an earlier article,5 I documented the mobilization to institute a formal hate crime law and labeling system in Laramie after the Shepard killing. The outcome seemed modest—a city ordinance requiring police to gather and report hate crime statistics. On the other hand, as Professor Beth Loffreda’s book6 narrates, the mobilization gave some participants an opportunity for empowerment and learning. Furthermore, a body of literature appeared, documenting, commemorating, and analyzing the “aftermath” or “wake” of the Shepard killing. One of Professor Loffreda’s reviewers emphasized the passage of the local hate crime reporting law: Losing Matt Shepard ends with the political push, ultimately successful, to pass a bias-crimes ordinance in Laramie. At the time of the murder, a hate-crimes bill was stalled in the state legislature, for all the familiar reasons, and the killing swayed few if any lawmakers’ votes. Soon after the murder, the Laramie City Council issued a proclamation expressing its sympathy to Matthew Shepard’s parents and urging that “the healing process” begin—pop psychology become politics—but a handful of citizens, straight and gay, wanted a more concrete 4 Jenness & Grettet document the new process by which “hate crime” has become “a specific policy domain” and “a meaningful category.” Valerie Jenness & Ryken Grattet, MAKING HATE A CRIME: FROM SOCIAL MOVEMENT TO LAW, at 7, 8 (2001). Specifically, they describe: “the process by which the meanings and practices that constitute hate crime stabilize, become cognitively taken for granted by actors, and attain a high level of normative consensus.” Jenness & Grattet, id. While scholars have studied how “Hate crime” has joined the official “lexicon” of police, few have examined the corresponding processes by which nongovernmental social groups develop their own “hate crime” lexicon and participate in the official hate crime classification processes of police. 5 See Haggerty, supra note 1. 6 Beth Loffreda, LOSING MATT SHEPARD: LIFE & POLITICS IN THE AFTERMATH OF ANTI-GAY MURDER (2000). Chapter 1—Introduction 5 response. Eventually the council passed a measure calling for police training and better record-keeping. The detective who developed the case against the killers, himself a model of compassion and forensic intelligence, dismissively characterized it a “feel-good” gesture. Yet in Laramie—a town so conservative that a gay assistant professor feared acknowledging her sexuality for fear of jeopardizing her chance for tenure; a place so fearful of gay-bashing that the phone number for the AIDS hotline is unlisted, to discourage threatening calls— this tiny political step makes a difference. It puts Laramie on record as committed to protecting the most basic liberties of gay men and lesbians. In these times, and in this place, that's cause for cheer.7 Criminologists will ask whether hate crime laws work—whether they deter or prevent crimes. Critical criminologists may ask how police, prosecutors, and judges accommodate hate crime laws in their routines. But, as both Professor Loffreda and her reviewer suggest, the social practice of hate crime knowledge production has serious consequences beyond the accumulation and reporting of official data, and beyond the identification and punishment of crimes. Even a minor, local hate crime reporting law, “makes a difference,” by putting a community “on record” against intolerance. The social mobilization to enact such a law may have transformative effects on communities and individuals. But, what “difference” do hate crime laws make to groups in society? What transformative effects do hate crime laws facilitate? Do hate crime laws have any broader social consequences? Once they are enacted, do hate crime laws matter to society? Do they matter to groups that monitor homophobic or trans-phobic hate crimes in particular? These broader social consequences of hate crime laws will be examined in the Chapters that follow. This Chapter will introduce the analytical framework, research questions and answers, and research methods employed in the remainder of the thesis. 1.2 Analytical Frame The primary analytical framework here will be the logic of cross-national comparison.8 The comparative analysis will include two parts: (1) an analytical legal comparison; and, (2) a 7 David L. Kirp, Chronicle of a Death Foretold, THE NATION, Nov. 20, 2000 (reviewing Loffreda, id.), available online at http://www.thenation.com/doc/20001120/kirp (accessed Mar. 24, 2008). 8 The comparative analysis used here was shaped in the class “Cross-National Comparisons in the Social Sciences” taught by Professor Julian Dierkes at the University of British Columbia Institute for Asian Research. Chapter 1—Introduction 6 qualitative social comparison. 9 The legal comparison will introduce the similarities and differences in the hate crime law and labeling systems in the United States and Canada, and the qualitative social comparison will analyze the corresponding similarities and differences in the information practices of nongovernmental social groups that monitor homophobic and trans- phobic hate crimes in each country. Preceding the two comparative components will be a brief historical and conceptual introduction. This discussion will not present a thorough historical analysis tracing the origins of hate crime law; instead, it will set out historical examples of social contention related to intolerance to demonstrate the concepts applied later. While a thorough historical analysis relying on archival data would be a worthwhile exercise,10 the limited historical introduction will serve primarily to set the stage for the legal and social comparisons that follow. The methods employed to analyze legal and social differences in the hate crime field are described briefly below. 1.2.1 The Comparative Method Very different thinkers such as Mill, 11 Durkheim, 12 and Weber 13 have all applied a similar logic of comparison to social problems. John Stuart Mill articulated an early and influential statement of the logic of comparative studies.14 In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, both Emile Durkheim 15 and Max Weber16 gave particular attention to the 9 See, e.g., Gary King, et al., DESIGNING SOCIAL INQUIRY: SCIENTIFIC INFERENCE IN QUALITATIVE RESEARCH (1994); Charles C. Ragin, THE COMPARATIVE METHOD (1987). 10 See, e.g., Theda Skocpol, STATES & SOCIAL REVOLUTION (1979) (comparative historical analysis of revolutions). 11 John Stuart Mill, A SYSTEM OF LOGIC: RATIOCINATIVE & INDUCTIVE, BEING A CONNECTED VIEW OF THE PRINCIPLES OF EVIDENCE & THE METHODS OF SCIENTIFIC INVESTIGATION, at 253-66 (Longmans Green & Co. 1941). 12 E. Durkheim, THE RULES OF SOCIOLOGICAL METHOD, at 125-46 (8th ed. 1938). 13 THE METHODOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES: MAX WEBER, at 164-88 (Edward A. Shils & Henry A. Finch eds., 1949). 14 Mill, supra note 11, at 253-66. 15 Durkheim, supra note 12, at 125-46. 16 Weber, supra note 13, at 164-88. Chapter 1—Introduction 7 development and application of comparative methods in the social sciences.17 In recent decades, scholars continue to build upon growing theoretical and practical traditions in comparative studies. Recent scholarship has brought greater specificity both to the logic and practice of causal inference and to the larger field of comparative social research as a system.18 The logic of comparison used here can be described in Mill’s terms as an application of the method of differences, or a combined method of similarities and differences. Specifically, the legal systems used to classify hate crimes will be analyzed for their differences and similarities in an effort to explain differences and similarities in social contention related to hate crime labeling decisions in two cities in Canada and the United States. Although the comparative analysis will be structured around a logic of causal inference, the conclusions reached will be limited to correlations at most. Introductory comments about both the analytical legal comparison and the concept of social contention follow. 1.2.2 The Analytical Legal Comparison Chapters 3 and 4 will present a cross-national comparison of hate crime law and labeling systems in Canada and the United States. While her focus is more historical than legal, Theda Skocpol’s study of social revolutions illustrates this kind of comparison.19 Skocpol analyzes two sets of national examples—three with and three without successful social revolutions—to explain what caused the similarities and differences in outcomes.20 The comparison here will be less ambitious; it will trace only the differences and similarities in hate crime labeling systems in 17 See generally Neil J. Smelser, Comparative Methods in the Social Sciences (1976) (reviewing applications of comparative method). 18 See, e.g., King, et al. & Ragin, supra note 9. 19 See Skocpol, supra note 10. 20 Id. at 36 (citing Mill). Chapter 1—Introduction 8 two countries. Although the comparison here will necessarily differ from Skocpol’s, her cautionary remarks remain relevant: [T]he comparative method cannot define the phenomenon to be studied. It cannot select appropriate units of analysis or say which historical cases should be studied. Nor can it provide the causal hypotheses to be explored. All of these must come from the macro-sociological imagination, informed by the theoretical debates of the day, and sensitive to the patterns of evidence for sets of historical cases.21 In other words, “[C]omparative [] analysis is no substitute for theory. Indeed, it can be applied only with the indispensable aid of theoretical concepts and hypotheses.”22 Other scholars have compared aspects of the Canadian and American legal systems.23 Each researcher obeys a different imperative. In addition to differences in the method of comparison, each researcher chooses a comparative method for a different reason, and the “why” of each comparison necessarily influences its “how.” This study likewise has its own reasons, which necessarily influence its methods. A qualitative social comparison was selected for two reasons. First, although there is disagreement about the consequences, current hate crime scholarship reveals a near consensus—both legal concepts like hate crime, and specific hate-related events, are socially constructed. Therefore, a quantitative comparison of the numerical outcomes of this subjective social process would be misleading. Second, since the sites chosen here apply different hate crime laws and statistics policy, a quantitative comparison is also impractical. 21 Id., at 39. 22 Id. 23 See, e.g., Drew S. Days, III, Canadian Constitution: Civil Rights in Canada: An American Perspective, 32 AM. J. COMP. L. 307 (1984) (comparing approaches to “rights”); W. R. Lederman, A Comparison of Principal Elements of the Legal Systems & Constitutions of Canada and the United States, 11 AM. J. COMP. L. 286 (1962) (comparing “legal systems”); Seymour Martin Lipset, CONTINENTAL DIVIDE: THE VALUES & INSTITUTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES & CANADA (1991) (comparing “values and institutions”); Norbert MacDonald, DISTANT NEIGHBORS: A COMPARATIVE HISTORY OF SEATTLE & VANCOUVER (1987) (comparing local history of cities); Herbert Arthur Smith, FEDERALISM IN NORTH AMERICA: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF INSTITUTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES & CANADA (1923) (comparing “Federalism”); see also Harold Stannard, THE TWO CONSTITUTIONS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF BRITISH & AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEMS (1950) (comparing U.S., British constitutional systems); Alexis de Tocqueville, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (Arthur Goldhammer Tr. 2004) (comparing nineteenth century political systems in US, England, France). Chapter 1—Introduction 9 Chapter 3 will present some historical perspective alongside an analytical comparison of current law relevant to the classification of hate crimes in each country. This general organizational model has been followed by several scholars. 24 Comparative scholars have identified the use of historical context as a common analytical tool. While the thesis will not trace the entire historical processes by which hate crime classification systems developed in Canada and the United States, some “process tracing” will be evident in the analytical legal comparison. 25 The minimal legal history provided will help explain the similarities and differences between the two countries’ current hate crime law and labeling systems. The choice to combine an analytical legal comparison with a social comparison in the hate crime field necessarily reflects a choice of theoretical orientation which will determine the evidence revealed. Nevertheless, the organization of the cross-national legal comparison will not deviate substantially from the norm among similar studies. What is novel here is the focus on hate crime classification systems and their relationship to nongovernmental social contention in the hate crime field. 1.2.3 The Concept of Social Contention After providing a legal context, the study will examine the social construction of knowledge in the everyday practices of social groups that contribute to knowledge of hate crimes by contending in the hate crime field. The theoretical framework will combine the concept of “social contention” presented in the works of Doug McAdam and Alberto Melucci.26 In McAdam’s model of social contention, traditional institutional practices shape the 24 See generally id. note 23 (collecting examples). 25 See COMPARATIVE HISTORICAL ANALYSIS IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES, ch. 10, at 363 (Mahoney & Rueschemeyer, eds. 2003) (defining “process tracing”); see id., at 365 (noting benefits of process tracing where, “explanatory and outcome variables are separated by long periods of time.”). 26 Combining the works of McAdam, et al. and Melucci is not my original idea. See Mario Diani, The Terrestrial Emporium of Contentious Knowledge, 8 MOBILIZATION: AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL, 109-12 (2001) (reviewing McAdam, et al., supra note 2). Chapter 1—Introduction 10 behavior of social groups, which in turn shape institutional behavior. McAdam calls this dynamic, “the mutually constitutive relationship between institutionalized and contentious politics.” 27 He defines contention as “interaction between makers of claims and others, [] recognized by those others as bearing on their interests, and bring[ing] in government as mediator, target, or claimant.”28 While contention involves the state, it can appear as either “Contained contention”—“established actors employing well established means of claims making”; or “Transgressive contention”: at least some parties to the conflict are newly self-identified political actors, and/or [] at least some parties employ innovative collective action. (Action qualifies as innovative if it incorporates claims, selects objects of claims, includes collective self-representations, and/or adopts means that are either unprecedented or forbidden within the regime in question). The “dynamic model” of contention 29 is summarized as “the interactive attribution of opportunity and threat, appropriation of existing institutions and organizations, the framing or reframing of allies and enemies, goods and bads, and a combination of innovative and contained forms of collective action.”30 Melucci applies a definition of contention broader than McAdam’s in two ways. First, Melucci incorporates social movement practices before any “political contestation” occurs: Sometimes the movements . . . reveal new possibilities, another face of reality. When they act, something has already been said by this very action; at once, the message has been incorporated into the social arena and the debates may commence. Whether or not the issues become topics for political contestation depends on the extent to which they can be taken up by politically relevant agents or otherwise translated into political agendas for the public.31 Second, Melucci includes practices during an “invisibility” phase: movements can and certainly do disappear. But . . . a great deal of important activity takes place during the invisibility phase. . . . New problems and questions 27 See Doug McAdam, Harmonizing the Voices: Thematic Continuity across the Chapters, in SILENCE & VOICE IN THE STUDY OF CONTENTIOUS POLITICS, at 223 (Ronald R. Aminzade, et al., eds. 2001). 28 Id. 29 McAdam, et al., supra note 2, at 38. 30 Id., at 51. 31 Melucci 1996, supra note 2, at 183. Chapter 1—Introduction 11 are posed. New answers are invented and tested, and reality is perceived and named in different ways. All these experiences are displayed publicly only within particular conjunctures and only by means of the organizing activities described by resource mobilization theory. But none of this public activity would be possible without the laboratory experiences of the submerged networks.32 Although their definitions of contention appear to disagree, both McAdam and Melucci agree that innovation in contention can be more important than formal outcomes. As McAdam notes, “however modest their immediate substantive impacts, popular struggles may still have an enduring effect through the contentious innovations they pioneer.”33 While this study will examine social contending by nongovernmental groups, it will also necessarily examine the governmental institutions that label hate crimes, in both law and statistics. Of primary interest will be the unintended impact of institutional hate crime labeling systems on how social groups contest labeling decisions. McAdam emphasizes such unintended consequences—“the inadvertent creation of ‘free space’ by state authorities,” and broadly, “the role that state authorities play in shaping the spatial locus of popular protest.”34 This study will examine innovations in how social groups gather, process, and present information about hate crimes. Melucci emphasizes this kind of knowledge practice: Knowledge is a crucial resource for new conflictual actors, both because it is a focus of major conflicts (those over the appropriation and control of knowledge and information, and over the instruments of production and circulation of these), and because only in knowledge can the texture of social relationships be disclosed. . . . In mass society, in which the rigid separation between cultures and ways of life is disappearing, ideology tends to become the principal channel of consensual manipulation. Escaping from ideology to the production of knowledge . . . becomes a key resource for collective action.35 Because, “The cognitive frames and the relations which enable us to make experience out of reality depend on the information available to us,” Melucci asks scholars to “join the debate 32 Melucci 1989, supra note 2, at 207-08 (emphasis added). 33 McAdam, in Aminzade, et al., supra note 27, at 238 (emphasis added). 34 Id., at 231. 35 Melucci 1989, supra note 2, at 223-24. Chapter 1—Introduction 12 about the ways in which reality is constructed[.]”36 Adopting Melucci’s imperative, this study uses a broad definition social contention to examine how social groups contribute to the production of knowledge about hate crimes. The need for such an examination of nongovernmental knowledge-production in the hate crime field is evident from a brief review of existing literature. 1.3 Contribution to Existing Literature This thesis aims to make both theoretical and practical contributions to existing scholarship. First, it fills a practical gap in existing scholarship by examining the social construction of knowledge about hate crimes using a cross-national comparative method. Although a comparative method has been used to study hate crime knowledge production, within37 and between38 police departments, cross-national comparative studies are absent from the literature. Even studies in the broader field of policing practice rarely assume a cross- national perspective, and the few existing cross-national policing studies limit themselves to theory-building and the identification of description typologies of policing systems.39 Second, recent studies about hate crime knowledge production show evidence of either a bias favoring the interpretations of police authorities, or at least a perspective over-emphasizing the importance of governmental institutions like the police departments. Typical American studies of hate crime knowledge production to date have focused on how police departments 36 Id., at 226 (emphasis in original). 37 See Benjamin Bowling, Violent Racism: Victimization, Policing & Social Context (1998); Elizabeth A. Boyd, et al., “Motivated by Hatred or Prejudice”: Categorization of Hate-Motivated Crimes in Two Police Divisions, 30 LAW & SOC.’Y REV. 819 (1996). 38 See Susan E Martin, “A cross-burning is not just and Arson”: Police Social Construction of Hate Crimes in Baltimore County, 33 CRIMINOLOGY 303, at 311 (1995). 39 See, e.g., Jennifer Brown & Frances Heidensohn, GENDER & POLICING: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES (2000); Andreas Glaeser, DIVIDED IN UNITY: IDENTITY, GERMANY & THE BERLIN POLICE (1999); R. I. Mawby, COMPARING POLICING ISSUES: THE BRITISH & AMERICAN EXPERIENCE IN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE (1990). Chapter 1—Introduction 13 apply hate crime laws to identify hate crimes.40 Such studies depend on negotiated access for the purpose of participant research from within a police agency, and, arguably, on funding from institutional sources aligned with police agencies. Although Canadian scholarship has exhibited more independence from police authority, it has likewise examined knowledge production from a perspective that emphasizes the importance of policing institutions.41 Less common are studies about the emergence and diffusion of hate crime law in society as a conceptual “domain,”42 studies about how nongovernmental social movements shape discourse about hate crimes,43 and analyses of hate crime data from unofficial sources. 44 By examining the production of “unofficial” knowledge about hate crimes by social groups outside the police, this thesis presents a perspective that is under-represented in the emerging field of hate crime studies. Third, the thesis addresses theoretical questions that have been neglected, or at best addressed by implication only, in studies of hate crime and policing. Hate crime law can be seen both in history and in theory as a blend of concepts: social mobilization, civil rights, victims’ rights, equality, crime, deviance, policing, governance. Situated at the intersection between sub- disciplines in both law and sociology, hate crime law thus offers researchers an opportunity to reconcile observable mechanisms of knowledge production with theories of knowledge. The dialog between theory and data, between “ideas and evidence,”45 in this thesis will generate 40 Jeanine Bell, POLICING HATRED (2002); Elizabeth A. Boyd, et al., “Motivated by Hatred or Prejudice”: Categorization of Hate-Motivated Crimes in Two Police Divisions, 30 LAW & SOC.’Y REV. 819 (1996); see also Susan E Martin, “A cross-burning is not just and Arson”: Police Social Construction of Hate Crimes in Baltimore County, 33 CRIMINOLOGY 303, at 311 (1995) (describing comparative methodology of separate study). 41 Richard V. Ericson, A STUDY OF DETECTIVE WORK (1981); Richard V. Ericson & Kevin D. Haggerty, POLICING THE RISK SOCIETY (1997); Kevin D. Haggerty, MAKING CRIME COUNT (2001). 42 Barbara Perry, IN THE NAME OF HATE: UNDERSTANDING HATE CRIMES (2001); Jenness & Grattet, supra note 4. 43 T. A. Maroney, The struggle against hate crime: a movement at a crossroads, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 564 (1998); Mary Ellen Faulkner, A CASE STUDY OF THE INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSE TO ANTI-GAY/LESBIAN VIOLENCE IN TORONTO (Ph.D. dissertation, Univ. of Toronto, 1999); see also Jennifer Anne Petersen, FEELING IN THE PUBLIC SPHERE: A STUDY OF EMOTION, PUBLIC DISCOURSE, & THE LAW IN THE MURDERS OF JAMES BYRD JR. & MATTHEW SHEPARD (Dissertation, Univ. of Texas Austin, Aug. 2006), available online at http://www.lib.utexas.edu/etd/d/2006/petersend46798/petersend46798.pdf (accessed Jan. 18, 2008); Miriam Smith, LESBIAN & GAY RIGHTS IN CANADA: SOCIAL MOVEMENTS & EQUALITY-SEEKING: 1971-1995 (1999). 44 Gary David Comstock, VIOLENCE AGAINST LESBIANS & GAY MEN (1991) (surveying smaller Canadian and American studies alongside Comstock’s own survey). 45 See Ragin, supra note 9. Chapter 1—Introduction 14 observations about how and why social groups come to know about equality by contending with official knowledge production in the hate crime field. Specifically, the study provides preliminary answers to the call for a theory of knowledge applicable to the present era of “preventative surveillance” by policing agencies. 46 For, in addition to serving as merely another frame in which to create legal knowledge, the hate crime labeling process can be seen as a process of discipline by surveillance. Jean-Paul Brodeur’s brief review of leading work on policing practice critiques the authors’ failure to articulate a theory of knowledge.47 Indeed, Brodeur suggests that a focus on the theoretical underpinnings for the production of legal knowledge is “on the cutting edge of research,” to the extent it can “embed coercion into the wider context of surveillance.”48 Consistent with Brodeur’s suggestion, this thesis articulates a theory of knowledge that envisions a contested meaning for hate crime labeling decisions. Looking beyond the institutional apparatuses that announce official legal classification decisions, what is revealed is a model of dynamic social contention in which nongovernmental social groups participate in the social construction of knowledge about hate crimes, and ultimately inequality. In my prior work, 49 I explored the inquiry power as a constitutional basis for laws requiring police to conduct an official hate crime statistical inquiry in the United States. But, social groups outside law-making channels conduct inquiries too—by monitoring both police agencies and hate crime perpetrators. And, the knowledge that arises from this dynamic contributes to our collective knowledge of hate crimes and equality. 46 Jean-Paul Brodeur, Richard V. Ericson & Kevin D. Haggerty, Policing the Risk Society, 1998 CAN. J. CRIM. 455, 456 (book review); see also Jean-Paul Brodeur, Disenchanted criminology, 1999 CAN. J. CRIM. 131 (placing criminological research in context with the production of knowledge). 47 Brodeur 1998, id. at 456. 48 Id., at 463. 49 See Haggerty, supra note 1. Chapter 1—Introduction 15 1.4 Research Goals & Questions Posed This thesis has both theoretical and practical goals. The theoretical goal is to describe the dynamic interaction between a hate crime law and labeling system and the nongovernmental social groups that contend in the hate crime field. The description will illustrate the dynamics by which social groups help to shape knowledge about legal concepts like hate crime and equality. The practical outcome of the thesis will be: (1) to provide information to governmental decisionmakers in Canada, the United States, and elsewhere, considering changes to a their hate crime laws and reporting systems; and, (2) to facilitate self-examination and innovation among nongovernmental groups that monitor and contest official hate crime labeling decisions. The general research question posed is introduced in the statement of the problem above: Do hate crime laws matter? This question will be analyzed from two perspectives: doctrinal and social. The specific social research questions and hypotheses tested are described in more detail in the introduction to Chapter 5. But, the basic question posed is the same as the question that arose in the aftermath of the Shepard killing: Do hate crime laws matter? Specifically, do hate crime laws matter to groups that monitor homophobic or trans-phobic crimes? A comparative analysis is used to frame this question more specifically: Do differences in the practices of nongovernmental groups that contend in the hate crime field correspond to differences in hate crime laws? Because this complex social question cannot be answered without first delineating its legal context, a comparison of hate crime doctrine will be required. The basic doctrinal question posed is: What are the similarities and differences in legal principles relevant to homophobic and trans-phobic hate crimes in Canada and the United States? The analytic legal comparison set out in Chapter 3 will answer this question. Chapter 1—Introduction 16 To be even more specific, and to address theoretical concerns about the social construction of legal knowledge, both the doctrinal and the social dimensions of the analysis will analyze the role of hate crime statistics and reporting laws. By isolating a difference in hate crime statistics and reporting laws, the study will attempt to answer the precise question raised in the course of contention surrounding the Laramie Bias Crime Ordinance: does a law that merely requires police to gather and report hate crime statistics make any difference in society? The questions posed and a brief summary of answers provided throughout the thesis are reviewed sequentially in the “roadmap” set out in the concluding section of this Chapter. Before proceeding to a conclusion, however, a brief description of the social research methods will be provided next. 1.5 Research Methods The research methods for the doctrinal legal comparison of Chapter 3 are easily summarized—basic legal research techniques were used to describe and compare hate crime law and related concepts in Canada and the United States. The research methods used for the sociological comparison were more complex. However, both the doctrinal legal comparison and the social comparison are founded on a handful of critical methodological choices designed with the research questions in mind. The first of these critical choices was the selection of sites for comparison. 1.5.1 Site Selection Vancouver, British Columbia and Seattle, Washington were chosen as the primary sites for comparison based on their basic social and legal similarity, with the exception of one key variable: unlike Seattle, Vancouver police do not gather and publicly report official hate crime Chapter 1—Introduction 17 statistics. This key variation in legal context was isolated to determine whether a law requiring the collection and reporting of hate crime statistics makes a difference in the behavior of nongovernmental groups that monitor hate crimes. Two steps were taken to verify the comparability of Seattle and Vancouver. First, other studies in the social sciences were consulted to verify the general comparability of Vancouver and Seattle as sites of research. Several such studies confirmed that, despite some unavoidable differences, Seattle and Vancouver represent similar social and legal settings.50 Second, information was gathered about hate crimes and groups that monitor hate crimes at each site. This information was used to construct an initial pairing evaluation. This evaluation was performed to verify the availability of a measurable history of homophobic or trans-phobic hate-related events, and a range of nongovernmental groups monitoring or contesting hate crime labeling decisions at each site. This pairing evaluation was performed based on resources available on the world-wide web, and it confirmed that sufficient, comparable data would be available in Vancouver and Seattle. The result of the preliminary pairing evaluation was a list that paired comparable groups in Seattle and Vancouver, based on their roles in social contention, or at least some form of information practice, related to homophobic or trans-phobic crimes. The pairs of groups that participated in the study are listed in Appendix A. 1.5.2 Data Collection The doctrinal legal comparison did not involve significant data collection. The social research component used an interview procedure as its primary data source. The interviews 50Dan Zuberi, DIFFERENCES THAT MATTER: SOCIAL POLICY & THE WORKING POOR IN THE UNITED STATES & CANADA (2006); Angin, Zeynep, DIASPORAS OF DIFFERENCE: TURKISH COMMUNITIES IN GERMANY, CANADA, & THE UNITED STATES, Appendix: Methodology, at 203-14, (Ph.D. Dissertation, 2003), cited at http://md1.csa.com/htbin/ids65/procskel.cgi (last accessed Oct. 15, 2004); Michael J. Broadway, A Comparison of Patterns of Urban Deprivation Between Canadian & U.S. Cities, 21 SOCIAL INDICATORS RESEARCH 531 (1989). Chapter 1—Introduction 18 were conducted according to a script meant to prompt for each group’s information practices both broadly conceived and in response to hate-related events. Interview questions elicited information about the groups’ interactions with each other, but they were not constructed to support a formal social networks analysis. Instead they were designed to elicit information describing the groups’ ways of gathering, processing, and presenting information about hate crime labeling decisions, including their interactions with the official hate crime statistics production process. Each interview was videotaped and reproduced on a DVD. A chapter outline of each interview is provided in Appendix A. The interview procedures, including the interview script, were approved according to guidelines for human subject research in place at the University of British Columbia. The interview script is set out in Appendix C. Interviews were videotaped primarily to facilitate feedback.51 Once the interviews were complete, they were edited into a short composite film that contrasted the practices of groups at each site. The same informants that provided interviews were then invited to view the composite video and provide their feedback in a final recorded session at each site. These feedback sessions provided the informants an opportunity to learn from each other and to reflect on differences and similarities in their practices. The informants were also encouraged to critique the material presented for accuracy and to provide their impressions about the important similarities and differences that they observed. The feedback sessions are also outlined in Appendix A. The information from these feedback sessions, along with the initial interview data forms the core of the social data analyzed here. Secondary data for each group included documents provided during the interviews and materials drawn from other sources such as newspaper accounts of hate-related events. In addition to the nongovernmental groups, interviews were conducted with representatives of 51 See, e.g., Joseph Tobin, et al., PRESCHOOL IN THREE CULTURES (1989) (videotaped observations presented across sites to observe subjects’ reactions and encourage reflection on practice). Chapter 1—Introduction 19 police hate crime units in Seattle and Vancouver. These interviews used a similar script, but at the request of the officers they were not recorded. Therefore data for the police hate crime units consists of email correspondence, written responses to questions, and interview notes, along with documents provided in response to public record requests. The modified interview script used for police representatives is also set out in Appendix C. The interviews began in the spring of 2005 and concluded with feedback sessions in early winter, 2006. Most of the documentary materials were gathered at the time of the interviews, although a few significant items that appeared afterward are included in the analysis. 1.6 Conclusion—A Roadmap for the Thesis The five Chapters that follow analyze the complex, dynamic process in which governmental officials and nongovernmental social groups produce legal knowledge about hate- related events. The bulk of the thesis proceeds according to a similar logic of comparison designed to explore the similarities and differences in hate crime law and corresponding social behavior in Vancouver and Seattle. The lone exception to this comparative framework appears in Chapter 2, which introduces some of the historical concepts that influence current Canadian and American understandings of legal and social inquiry in the hate crime field. Chapter 2 illustrates the concept of social contention by citing a few historical examples of challenges to intolerance that are posed in legal terminology. Chapter 2 lays the foundation for the subsequent analysis by explaining the importance of legal sites of contention and their relationship to styles of contention used by groups in society to respond to acts of intolerance. Chapter 2 concludes by discussing the need for research about intolerance toward sexual minorities, in light of the historical silencing of knowledge about their experiences. Chapter 1—Introduction 20 The doctrinal component of the thesis appears primarily in Chapter 3, which provides an analytical comparison of hate crime law and equality in Canada and the United States. A more complete summary of the doctrinal analysis is set out in the introduction to Chapter 3. The overall goal of the doctrinal analysis is to describe the official, legal classification system that applies to hate-related events, particularly those motivated by sexual orientation or gender identity or expression. The similarities and differences revealed in this doctrinal comparison provide the context for the subsequent analysis of social research data. In other words the doctrinal analysis set the stage for a determination of whether, and how, differences in hate crime classifications systems matter to nongovernmental groups in each country. Chapter 3 begins by noting two themes in social contention about hate-related events: (1) a focus on the discretion of law enforcement officials to establish or withhold knowledge about inequality in society, and (2) a tension in the adoption of a new vocabulary of antidiscrimination in criminal law. To set the stage for an analysis of hate crime laws themselves, Chapter 3 compares legislative powers, judicial review, equality rights, and freedom of expression in Canada and the United States. A summary of equality rights and freedom of expression in the two countries is set out in Table 3.1. Against this backdrop, Chapter 3 proceeds with an analysis of each country’s national hate crime penalty enhancement law. Both nations’ laws authorize enhanced penalties for crimes motivated by “sexual orientation”; neither regime expressly extends to crimes motivated by “gender identity” or “gender expression.” In addition to the national laws, some attention is given at this point to state hate crime laws in the United States. Canadian provinces have no similar laws. Four aspects of the national texts authorizing hate crime penalty enhancements are given particular attention: (1) the antidiscrimination terminology used to define prohibited motives; (2) the standard of proof applicable to the sentence enhancement factor for a hate crime; (3) the degree of biased motivation or causation required to trigger an enhanced penalty; and, (4) Chapter 1—Introduction 21 the relationship between hate crime penalty enhancement laws and defenses in the nature of self- defense or provocation—in other words claims of “gay panic” or “homosexual advance.” Also addressed is the applicability of hate crime penalty enhancement laws to youth or juvenile court proceedings. What is revealed in this analysis is a basic similarity in the texts of national hate crime penalty enhancement laws. Despite seemingly significant differences in approaches to equality and the constraints that freedom of expression imposes on equality rights, the two national hate crime laws utilize facially neutral antidiscrimination language to authorize enhanced penalties, regardless of the disadvantaged or minority position of the victim in society. Based on their formally neutral text, the United States Supreme Court has held that hate crime laws do not generally violate the constitutional equality rights of those receiving enhanced penalties, although constitutional limits have been imposed on the procedural aspects of hate crime laws. Interpretive rules set out in the United States Sentencing Guidelines resolve most questions about the meaning of the antidiscrimination terminology used in the hate crime penalty enhancement provision. Canadian courts have not definitively reviewed their national hate crime penalty enhancement law for compliance with constitutional equality. Because Canada does not have a body of administrative sentencing guidelines, the antidiscrimination terminology used in the Sentencing Principles for bias, prejudice or hate remains subject to interpretation by individual courts imposing sentences and reviewing sentences on appeal. In both countries, the application of hate crime penalty enhancements in juvenile proceedings is subject to scholarly, judicial, and legislative debate. Chapter 3 next surveys court decisions in both countries that have considered homo- or trans-phobic motives in the context of criminal penalties. This analysis proposes a trend in court decisions beginning with early cases that characteristically considered biased motives only as mitigating factors or as defenses to alleged crimes against gays, lesbians, or transgendered Chapter 1—Introduction 22 persons. The premise of this trend analysis is that both Canada and the United States adopted their national hate crime penalty enhancement laws at roughly the same time and that therefore court decisions ought to gradually embrace the idea of hate crime penalties to an increasing degree during the transition period from before to after the adoption of the national laws. Cases decided shortly before the enactment of national laws seem to confirm this premise—as the adoption of national hate crime laws approached, courts tended to pay increasing attention to biased motives in crime. And, cases arising after the adoption of national laws show a continuing trend toward expressly considering biased motives in sentencing decisions, although this trend is more evident in Canadian than American decisions. After introducing the background legal environment of hate crime laws in the two countries, and after surveying court decisions directly considering enhanced penalties for hate crimes, Chapter 3 concludes with an analysis of “other” hate crime laws. These “other” hate crime laws include hate speech and propaganda laws, hate crime statistics laws, civil and human rights laws that authorize remedies for some hate-related conduct, and school harassment and bullying laws. With the notable exception of hate speech and propaganda laws, these “other” hate crime laws do not authorize criminal penalties for hate-related conduct. Nonetheless, they do contribute significantly to the overall legal classification system that gives social meaning to, and establishes knowledge about, hate crimes. Chapter 3 concludes with a summary of similarities and differences between Canadian and American hate crime classification systems. This summary is encapsulated in Table 3.2. While Chapter 3 provides a comparative analysis of hate crime laws in the two countries, this analysis is abstract. Chapter 4 is more tangible. The groups represented in the interviews identified recent cases in both Seattle and Vancouver that they considered homophobic hate crimes. Chapter 4 compares these cases to illustrate the operation of hate crime laws in practice in the two countries. Both cases arose from physical assaults against gay men—in Vancouver Chapter 1—Introduction 23 the killing of Aaron Webster, and in Seattle the non-fatal attack on Micah Painter. Both cases resulted in criminal prosecutions in which hate crime penalty enhancements were at least considered or discussed by the sentencing judges. In sum, the prosecutions studied confirm the general premise of the Chapter 3 trend analysis that courts are willing to at least consider enhanced penalties for homophobic hate crimes in appropriate cases. More importantly, both of the cases compared in Chapter 4 triggered social contention by nongovernmental groups seeking to classify the attacks as hate crimes. Informants for the interviews participated in an array of social contention directly related to the criminal prosecutions. And, in both cases those interviewed also engaged in contention to label the events as hate crimes outside the official legal proceedings. Because both the Seattle and Vancouver prosecutions occurred during the course of the social research for this study, and because they were discussed at length in the interviews, a comparison of the two cases serves as an ideal bridge between the doctrinal legal comparison of Chapter 3 and the subsequent analysis of interview data. The social data gathered during and after the interviews is summarized and compared in Chapter 5. The presentation of data is organized by pairing groups with similar roles at each site. The information practices of six pairs of groups are compared: (1) anti-violence groups based in lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) community centers; (2) anti-violence groups organized on an ad hoc basis; (3) school safety and education groups; (4) family support groups; (5) transgender rights groups; and, (6) police hate crime units. In both Vancouver and Seattle, anti-violence groups housed in community centers and organized on an ad hoc basis engage most directly in social contention in the hate crime field. At the time of the interviews in 2005 and early 2006, (LGBT) community centers in both Vancouver and Seattle had established grant-funded anti-violence programs. Both programs were temporary and both ended shortly after the interviews. During its six-month lifetime, the Chapter 1—Introduction 24 Vancouver program provided support and advocacy for hate crime victims, and it concluded with a Final Report that analyzed recent cases of homo- and trans-phobic violence and detailed the results of a survey showing the prevalence of violence among LGBT people. The Final Report reveals that the project was created in part as a response to the Aaron Webster killing. The Seattle project had a nine-month duration and was designed both to provide resources and referrals for victims of hate crimes and to increase education and awareness about hate crimes. Like its Vancouver counterpart, the proposal for the Seattle project was triggered by the Micah Painter attack and another similar attack in Seattle’s Ballard neighborhood. Rather than a final report or an independent survey, however, the Seattle project culminated in a city council proceeding to publicly review the procedures used by Seattle police to classify hate crimes for statistical and investigative purposes. In both Seattle and Vancouver ad hoc anti-violence groups were formed in response to the Painter and Webster attacks. The Vancouver group, which still exists, organized and publicized a community survey that gauged both the details of hate crimes in the LGBT community and the trends in the characteristics of perpetrator groups over the past five years. The survey was motivated both by the Webster killing and by the refusal of Vancouver police to publicly report their own hate crime data. In Seattle, ad hoc organizing took the form of an online bias crime forum that prompted viewers to attend court proceedings and other activities related to the Micah Painter prosecutions and sentencing proceedings. A further ad hoc response appeared in Seattle, however, after police were seen to have inadequately responded to the Ballard attack. A resident frustrated by what he saw as an inadequate neighborhood response to the attack obtained copies of police hate crime reports over a five-year period, and in conjunction with the community-centered anti-violence project intern issued a Report analyzing and critiquing police hate crime classification practices. This Report resulted in public hearings in the City Council. Chapter 1—Introduction 25 A comparison of contention by anti-violence groups gives the most direct answers to the research questions posed. Differences in hate crime laws, particularly at a local level, do matter to groups in society. Specifically, differences in social contention by both community and ad hoc anti-violence initiatives in Seattle and Vancouver are closely correlated to two key variables: (1) local legislative standards governing police hate crime classification decisions; and, (2) a mechanism for the publication and public review of police hate crime statistics. In Seattle, where both local legislative standards and public review are available, nongovernmental groups tend to focus their contention on reviewing police classification decisions and presenting their complaints in a local legislative forum. In Vancouver, where public statistics and a local legislative forum are unavailable, nongovernmental groups are not motivated to focus their contention either in a governmental forum or according to official legal standards. Whereas Seattle groups practice contained contention, Vancouver groups practice uncontained contention in the hate crime field. Data from school safety, family support, and transgender rights groups tend to confirm the findings from the anti-violence groups. The school safety groups serve as an apt basis for triangulating the data from the anti-violence groups. Because laws and policies regulating school harassment and bullying are structured similarly in Vancouver and Seattle, very similar, parallel sites of contention about homo- and trans-phobic school violence exist at both locations. The data from school safety groups in Seattle and Vancouver disclose practices that are very similar in both style and content. Groups in both cities advocate for local school board policies, and state or provincial legislation, designed to prohibit harassment motivated by sexual orientation or gender identity in schools. While the resulting laws and policies are not identical, the similarity in social contention at these local sites tends to verify the findings from the anti-violence groups. The family support groups in Vancouver and Seattle were chapters of the same organization, Parents and Friends of Lesbians and Gays (PFLAG). As such, they were organized Chapter 1—Introduction 26 according to almost identical principles. Despite some variations in degree, they also engaged in similar advocacy activities. Transgender rights organizers in Seattle and Vancouver likewise shared many common traits, but their differences tend to confirm the findings from the anti- violence groups. The Seattle group’s organizers had successfully advocated local laws prohibiting “gender identity” discrimination and authorizing enhanced penalties for municipal offences motivated by “gender identity.” After the conclusions of the interviews, moreover, the Seattle group issued a report thoroughly surveying trans-phobic violence in the region. These activities had no visible counterpart in Vancouver, and the difference tends to verify the important role of local lawmaking authority in shaping the contentious practices of nongovernmental groups. Chapter 5 concludes by comparing the policies and practices of police hate crime units. Police agencies employ specialized hate crime units in both Vancouver and Seattle. Data from interviews and other sources confirm the basic difference in knowledge practices of these groups. The Seattle Police Department is subject to local legislation requiring it to compile and report hate crime statistics. Seattle Police are also subject to local legislative oversight—the Seattle City Council has the authority to create criminal offences and to authorize enhanced penalties for hate crimes under the municipal code. The Vancouver Police Department is not subject to any of these constraints, and they do not publish their hate crime statistics or otherwise subject their hate crime classification decisions to routine public review. The data set out in Chapter 5 and the results of the analytical legal comparison from Chapters 3 and 4 are joined in a concluding analysis of results in Chapter 6. This final Chapter synthesizes the similarities and differences in legal systems and nongovernmental social contention in the hate crime field. Tables 6.3 and 6.4 attempt isolate the important variables disclosed along two axes: (1) the legal classification system, including local legal standards and the availability of public review for hate crime classification decisions; and, (2) social Chapter 1—Introduction 27 contention, including contained or uncontained sites of contention and reactive or ongoing styles of contention. In these terms, a correlation is shown between the availability of local legislative standards and public review of hate crime classification decisions and reactive contention contained by the existing local legal system and its standards. Conversely, where local legislative standards and public review of hate crime statistics are non-existent, nongovernmental groups contend in an uncontained manner, although their style of contention may also tend to be reactive. Chapter 6 elaborates on these variables by emphasizing three aspects of the dynamic nature of social contention in the hate crime field. First, Figure 6.1 illustrates the potential for a multiplier effect with a series of successive triggering events. Where a new hate-related event appears during an existing contentious episode, nongovernmental social contention appears to undergo a multiplier effect resulting in mobilizing energy greater than the sum of two events more separated in time. Second, contention in the hate crime field establishes important intermediary roles among both governmental and nongovernmental organizations. Police hate crime units fulfill different intermediary roles that coincide with differences in local legal standards and the availability of public review for hate crime classification decisions. In Vancouver, where police maintain a close proprietary control over their hate crime data, police officials serve as gatekeepers to law reform in the hate crime field. Thus, Vancouver police were able to channel their internal hate crime data into successful advocacy for the addition of “sexual orientation” as a prohibited ground of discrimination in Canadian hate propaganda laws. In Seattle, by contrast, police are stripped of this gatekeeper role, because they do not exercise proprietary control over hate crime data. In their place local legislators in the City Council become official brokers of legal recognition in the hate crime field. Chapter 1—Introduction 28 These official, governmental brokers have their corresponding nongovernmental intermediaries. In Seattle, local legislative oversight and publicly available hate crime data serve as local sites of nongovernmental legal contention in the hate crime field. Because these sites are available to them, social groups in Seattle use them to contend for particular hate crime classification decisions or for systematic change. In the process of this contention, the representatives of these groups gain both skills and notoriety. This process facilitates the formation of a class of local, nongovernmental intermediaries or brokers in the hate crime field. Vancouver, on the other hand, is relatively lacking in similar skills-building and brokerage activities between local governmental and nongovernmental groups in the hate crime field. It is possible that nongovernmental groups in Vancouver experience offsetting opportunities to build skills and notoriety in their relationships with each other. The interview informants did not, however, view Vancouver’s relative lack of local sites of contention in the hate crime field as an advantage. Third, the same factors that influence the dynamics of social contention in the hate crime field also serve as mobilizing influences among nongovernmental groups that monitor hate crimes. Whether it is the actual formation of a new organization or the creation of a new initiative like a community survey, hate-related events tend to trigger mobilization among nongovernmental groups. The trajectory of mobilization in response to hate related-events is powerfully shaped by the availability or unavailability of local sites of legal contention. Official hate crime labeling inquiries, and the laws that shape them, matter to the nongovernmental social groups that monitor homo- and trans-phobic hate crimes in Canada and the United States. These groups participate in the production of legal knowledge in the hate crime field. Chapter 6 concludes with a summation findings and a listing of significant questions deserving of further research. Chapter 1—Introduction 29 Knowledge about hate crimes comes from a complex, dynamic process that combines both official governmental inquiry and nongovernmental social contention. The remainder of the thesis is not meant to test the truthfulness of knowledge about any particular hate-related event or even the desirability of hate crime laws necessarily. Instead, it aims to reveal how nongovernmental groups mobilize and contend in the hate crime field. Specifying and analyzing governmental and nongovernmental information practices in response to events suggesting homo- and trans-phobic bias should empower not only policy makers and legal theorists, but also the groups themselves. Equipped with an understanding of the dynamics of social contention in the hate crime field, it is hoped that all involved may better prevent future atrocities. Ch. 2—Hate Crimes, Social Contention & Legal Knowledge 30 2 Hate Crimes, Social Contention & Legal Knowledge This Chapter attempts to identify the key ideas that constitute our contemporary understanding of hate crime law as it applies to homophobic and trans-phobic violence. What follows is not a thorough tracing1 of the origins of hate crime law but rather a set of examples roughly combining legal histories and literary references about violence and inequality. I suggest that no single origin exists for the concepts embedded in our understanding of hate crimes and that the field of hate crime law is therefore best introduced with reference to concrete examples. The Chapter begins by considering the 1998 killing of gay college student Matthew Shepard in Laramie, Wyoming as a typical “event” triggering mobilization, contention, and legal inquiry in the hate crime field. The remaining discussion will draw upon a handful of illustrations from more distant history to generate a simple model for understanding the social contention of nongovernmental social groups that monitor hate-related events today. 2.1 Matthew Shepard—a Case of Hate Crime Law & Social Contention A recent retrospective in Laramie’s daily newspaper interprets the local legal outcome of the Matthew Shepard killing by presenting the statements of two local Police officials: Nearly seven years ago, a gay college freshman named Matthew Shepard was tied to a fence and beaten into a coma. He died five days later. His murderers were convicted and sentenced to life in prison. . . . . After the attack, the Laramie City Council implemented a new policy requiring all police to receive training on hate crime investigations. Additionally, 1 The idea of a “trace” appears in Derrida’s deconstructive imperative: “the idea of the sign [] must be deconstructed, . . . the signified is ordinarily and essentially [] trace, [] it is always already in the position of the signifier.” Jacques Derrida, OF GRAMMATOLOGY, at 73 (Spivak Tr., 1976) (emphasis in original); see also Jacques Derrida, WRITING & DIFFERENCE (Bass Tr. 1978). Jennifer Beard utilizes a similar approach, tracing the concept of development in western imperial identity formation from origins in the texts of churchmen, including Augustine. See Jennifer Beard, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DESIRE: LAW, DEVELOPMENT & THE NATION (2006). Ch. 2—Hate Crimes, Social Contention & Legal Knowledge 31 the police chief must monitor the number of hate crimes committed each year and submit the results to the City Council. In 2004, one hate crime was reported in Laramie. Police Commander Dale Stalder said a gay man was assaulted by his sister’s boyfriend. The man suffered minor injuries. “The boyfriend told him the reason he was doing it was because of his sexual orientation,” Stalder said. “The investigation really supported that, so we classified it as a (hate) crime.” Stalder said he was surprised by the results of a recent University of Wyoming survey, which indicates 30 percent of students believe there is a homophobic climate on campus. “I thought it would be lower,” Stalder said. “We’re getting a different impression here at the PD. We don’t feel like we have that issue. I don’t see it in the reports.” Hate crimes — which are perpetrated out of prejudice for a race, religion, national origin or sexual orientation — are fairly uncommon in Laramie, Stalder said. In 2002 and 2003, no hate crimes were reported. However, there was a surge in cases in the months following the 9/11 attacks. “We had about 10 cases where minority groups felt like someone was targeting them,” Stalder said. “People were on edge. In that case, I think people were over-reporting it.” [Laramie Police Chief] Deutsch, who will present the latest hate crime data to the City Council on Tuesday, also said the city is undeserving of the homophobic stereotype. “It could have happened anywhere at anytime, in a small city or big city,” Deutsch said. “I’ve found it almost offensive that people have stereotyped us as this redneck, backward type of city.” Someday, the rest of the world may see the city in a different light. But it will take time, Deutsch said. “You never want to forget, and you always want to memorialize something like this,” Deutsch said. “But at some point, I hope there’s a separation between what happened in our community and the nature of our community.”2 The content of this account is typical. Both local and national journalists continue to reinterpret the Shepard killing, frequently as a dialog among elite participants in the criminal justice system.3 Accounts like these provide a glimpse of the official legal knowledge of hate crimes. 2 Angela Brooks, Fighting the Laramie stereotype, LARAMIE BOOMERANG, May 3, 2005. More immediate “aftermath” or “wake” scholarship and journalism includes: Writing the Book of Matthew, OUT, March, 1999; Bernard P. Haggerty, Hate Crimes: A View from Laramie, Wyoming’s First Bias Crime Law, the Fight Against Discriminatory Crime, & a New Cooperative Federalism, 45 HOW. L. J. 1 (2001); Tony Kushner, Matthew’s Passion, THE NATION, Nov. 9, 1998, reprinted sub nom. NECESSARY INCIVILITIES, in HARPER’S MAGAZINE, Jan. 1999, at 24; Beth Loffreda, LOSING MATT SHEPARD: LIFE & POLITICS IN THE AFTERMATH OF ANTI-GAY MURDER (2000); FROM HATE CRIMES TO HUMAN RIGHTS: A TRIBUTE TO MATTHEW SHEPARD (Mary E. Swigonski, et al., eds., 2001); Melanie Thernstrom, The Murder: The Crucifixion of Matthew Shepard, VANITY FAIR, Mar. 1999, at 209; JoAnn Wypijewski, Report, A Boy’s Life: For Matthew Shepard’s Killers, what does it take to pass as a man? HARPER’S MAGAZINE, Sept. 1999, at 61. 3 Two local print news sources maintain web links to archived articles that reference Shepard. WESTWORD, a Boulder, Colorado weekly, provides a searchable archive of all of its stories dating to before the Shepard killing. See http://www.westword.com/ (accessed Feb. 24, 2006). The LARAMIE BOOMERANG also maintains a web archive, but its content was not available online at the time of Shepard’s killing, and its online archive omits articles before 2002. See http://www.laramieboomerang.com/index.asp (accessed Feb. 24, 2006). Ch. 2—Hate Crimes, Social Contention & Legal Knowledge 32 And, a handful of fascinating studies have examined the information practices used to arrive at official hate crime labeling decisions.4 But, just as the victims of hate crimes are mentioned only indirectly in official hate crime statistics, the voices of victims are filtered, or even effaced, in a scholarly analysis of hate crime statistics. What is generally missing from hate crime scholarship is an analysis of the hate crime labeling process among nongovernmental groups with a stake in the labeling decision. Few scholars have examined the consequences of hate crime labeling practices for nongovernmental groups that monitor hate crimes. Little is known about the role of nongovernmental groups that contest hate crime labeling decisions or about the effects of official labeling practices on social mobilization among nongovernmental groups. The illustrations that follow will attempt to lay a foundation for a study of such groups. 2.2 Hate Crimes & Social Contention—Historical Challenges to Intolerance Even a brief sampling of contention in the aftermath of the Shepard killing reveals important patterns in knowledge-producing practices. The criminal labeling affixed after a series of trials, convictions, and sentences represents the routine knowledge production of the criminal justice system. Criminal proceedings result in ad hoc labeling—an assessment of guilt on a case- by-case basis. Hate crime statistics, on the other hand, represent a more systematic, or ongoing 4 Ellen Faulkner’s recent work provides an excellent example of the long-range impact of current knowledge- producing practices among LGBT groups. See Ellen Faulkner, Homophobic Hate Propaganda in Canada, 5 J. HATE STUDIES 63 (2006/07) (Special Issue on Hate and Communication, Gonzaga University School of Law, Institute for Action Against Hate) (comparing Canadian and American hate speech laws). The most frequently cited resource in her recent article about homophobic hate propaganda in Canada is the news clipping archive maintained by an Ontario LGBT group. See, e.g., Faulkner, id., at 89 n.6 (referencing “large source of data [] obtained from news clippings archived at the Coalition for Lesbian and Gay Rights Ontario.”). It is notable that Faulkner’s data are drawn primarily from Ontario groups or national groups based on Ontario. Thus, the examination of Western Canadian groups here represents a needed addition to existing literature. Ch. 2—Hate Crimes, Social Contention & Legal Knowledge 33 inquiry. 5 A parallel terminology might be applied to the corresponding ad hoc or ongoing contention of nongovernmental groups that contest official governmental accounts. But, to begin to understand the dynamics of contention in the field of hate crimes today, it will be useful to identify some of the historical antecedents to the development of “hate crime” classification systems. What we consider “hate crimes” today would have been known by different terminology even a few decades ago. Our current hate crime laws cannot be traced in unbroken lines to ancient legal principles. Even our understanding of equality has changed significantly in recent decades. Therefore, by definition, social contention about the classification of hate-related events as “hate crimes” is only a recent phenomenon. Nevertheless, some of the core concepts related to hate crimes and social contention appear in the historical record. In terms of homophobic violence, historian John Boswell provided one of the best histories, “using gay people as a case study of intolerance.”6 Boswell’s seminal study resorted to indirect literary references, because of the relative lack of evidence from other historical sources. He expressly cautioned against relying on legal texts alone, because they “may be grossly misleading if one does not comment on the extent to which such laws are honored, supported, or generally approved.”7 Despite his caution, Boswell examined some legal texts in their capacity as literary evidence. On the other hand, even Boswell’s thorough study was able to uncover only a few examples of social contention on behalf of gay people or in the name of tolerance toward homosexuality. Thus, Boswell’s examples do not disclose the kinds of social contention or 5 Contention and inquiry may also be classed by the persistence of the knowledge produced, as unrecorded versus recorded or epigraphic knowledge, or by its mode, epistolary, i.e., presented in an open letter. A further division of inquiry types separates those seeking particular, material reparation from those seeking pure ideological redress. See John Torpey, MAKING WHOLE WHAT HAS BEEN SMASHED, ON REPARATIONS POLITICS (2006). 6 John Boswell, CHRISTIANITY, SOCIAL TOLERANCE, & HOMOSEXUALITY: GAY PEOPLE IN WESTERN EUROPE FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE CHRISTIAN ERA TO THE FOURTEENTH CENTURY, at 30 (1980) (hereinafter Boswell); Boswell’s study inaugurated its own line of research. See, e.g., THE BOSWELL THESIS: ESSAYS ON CHRISTIANITY, SOCIAL TOLERANCE, & HOMOSEXUALITY (Mathew Kuefler ed., 2006) (introducing components of “Boswell Thesis” and collecting essays elaborating on Boswell’s original concepts). 7 Boswell, id., at 22. Boswell’s caution spoke to “restrictive statutes,” but the same can be said of today’s more supportive statutes, including laws authorizing criminal penalties for homophobic hate crimes. Ch. 2—Hate Crimes, Social Contention & Legal Knowledge 34 mobilization for legal equality that we would recognize today. In sum, Boswell presents a long series of examples from laws, literature, and theology, expressing some social tolerance toward homosexuality, but rapidly changing to official, legal intolerance around the Twelfth Century. Taking my cue from Boswell, I likewise provide three examples from the literary record that indirectly reveal ideas about of social intolerance. Each example contains an appeal loosely related to social tolerance and equality, and each invokes legalistic principles in response to a violent triggering event. None of the examples relates directly to homosexuality, but all three illustrate the use of legal classification to challenge acts of intolerance. Because each challenge is situated in a different social and legal context, a comparison will serve to introduce the dynamics of social mobilization and social contention in response to acts of intolerance. This brief analysis will be used to introduce the key concepts that remain important in the study of social contention about hate crimes today. Briefly stated, these concepts include both the important intermediary roles assumed by governmental and nongovernmental groups and the sites and styles of social contention and mobilization employed to classify and challenge acts of intolerance. Today, as in the distant past, challenges to social intolerance produce both knowledge and knowledge practices, among both governmental and nongovernmental groups. Boswell, an expert linguist and historian, was unable to locate significant direct evidence of the practices of nongovernmental groups opposed to social intolerance. Nonetheless, like Boswell, I can set out a few examples to introduce the dynamics of today’s social contention in the hate crime field. Unlike Boswell’s subjects, however, today’s social groups are available for direct study, and their practices are examined in greater detail in the concluding Chapters. Of the three examples that follow, the first, from Dante, establishes the important role of written laws, even in Medieval Europe, in the condemnation of group intolerance. The two additional Ch. 2—Hate Crimes, Social Contention & Legal Knowledge 35 examples, from St. Augustine and St. Patrick illustrate the use of legalistic rhetoric to condemn intolerance in response to discrete events. 2.2.1 Dante, the Sowers of Discord & De Scandalis Magnatum (ca. 1310) The Cohen Committee’s influential 1966 report on hate propaganda in Canada traced the history of both social intolerance and its regulation to early English laws.8 The Cohen Report documented early examples of social inequality and intolerance in Medieval England, from the Eleventh Century onward: [T]he eloquent champions of freedom of religion and conscience, freedom of speech and writing, in 17th century England, like John Milton and John Locke, denied such freedoms to atheists, Roman Catholics and Mohammedans [sic] on the ground that they could not be trusted to be loyal to the English crown, the English way of life, and English society.9 The Committee’s account of intolerance cited the advent of the African slave trade when, in both 1596 and 1601, Elizabeth I repeatedly attempted to expel all “negars and Blackamoors” because, “of which kinde of people there are already here too manie.” 10 British scholar Benjamin Bowling provides similar examples: “The massacre of 30 Jews in a riot in London after the coronation of Richard I in 1189 was followed by similar attacks in York, Bury St. Edmunds, Norwich and Lincoln until the small Jewish community was expelled in 1290.”11 Against the backdrop of Medieval English social intolerance, the Cohen Report juxtaposed a 1275 law known as De Scandalis Magnatum, one of the earliest attempts to regulate 8 The Report to the Minister of Justice of the Special Committee on Hate Propaganda in Canada (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1966) (hereinafter Cohen Report). 9 Cohen Report, id. 10 Cohen Report, id. 11 Benjamin Bowling, VIOLENT RACISM: VICTIMIZATION, POLICING & SOCIAL CONTEXT, at 24 (1998) (citation omitted). Ch. 2—Hate Crimes, Social Contention & Legal Knowledge 36 group intolerance. 12 Canadian Bruce P. Elman situates De Scandalis Magnatum in the legislative history of today’s hate crime laws: One of the earliest attempts at dealing with group defamation through the criminal law occurred in England in 1275. The law, known as De Scandalis Magnatum, prohibited the spreading of false rumors that might sow discord between the King and the Noblemen of the Realm. This law is not only of historical interest. Its offspring, the crime of “Spreading False News,” can be found in section 181 of the Criminal Code [of Canada]. It was upon this legislative provision that the prosecution of holocaust denier Ernst Zundel was based. . . . . An early prosecution for promoting hatred against Jews occurred in 1732 in the case of R. v. Osborn. The defendant in this case had published a false accusation that the Jews of London killed a Jewish woman and her illegitimate child because of her alleged promiscuity with a Christian. Riots occurred as a result of this libel, and Jews were attacked and beaten. Ultimately, Osborn was convicted of publishing a libel that occasioned a breach of the peace.13 Knowledge about De Scandalis Magnatum experienced a surprisingly rapid diffusion through Medieval Europe. The villains whose behavior gave rise to the English statute appeared in Italian poetry only about thirty years after it took effect. In 1310, Dante used vivid imagery to identify the Brit who best illustrated his category “Sowers of Discord Between Kinsmen”: I saw it there; I seem to see it still– a body without a head, that moved along like all the others in that spew and spill. It held the severed head by its own hair; swinging it like a lantern in its hand; and the head looked at us and wept in its despair. It made itself a lamp of its own head, and they were two in one and one in two; how this can be, He knows who so commanded. And when it stood directly under us it raised the head at arm’s length toward our bridge the better to be heard, and swaying thus it cried: “O living soul in this abyss, see what a sentence has been passed upon me, and search Hell for one to equal this! When you return to the world, remember me: I am Bernard de Born, and it was I who set the young king on to mutiny, 12 Cohen Report, supra note 8, at 7 (identifying De Scandalis Magnatum as first English hate crime law). 13 Bruce P. Elman, ch. 7, at 151, in UNDER THE SHADOW OF WEIMAR: DEMOCRACY, LAW, & RACIAL INCITEMENT IN SIX COUNTRIES (Louis Greenspan & Cyril Levitt, eds., 1993) (citations omitted). Osborn was prosecuted for libeling as a group: “certain Jews lately arrived from Portugal and living near Broad Street.” See Cohen Report, supra note 8, at 43 (quoting Osborn). Ch. 2—Hate Crimes, Social Contention & Legal Knowledge 37 son against father, father against son as Achitophel set Absalom and David; and since I parted those who should be one in duty and in love, I bear my brain divided from its source within this trunk; and walk here where my evil turns to pain, an eye for an eye for all eternity: thus is the law of Hell observed in me.14 The villain classified as a “Sower of Discord” by Dante was Bertrand de Born, “a great knight and master of the troubadours of Provence.15 He is said to have instigated a quarrel between Henry II of England and his son Prince Henry, called ‘The Young King’ because he was crowned within his father’s lifetime. 16 In the second Canticle of the Divine Comedy, the Purgatorio, Dante expresses his admiration for the both Henry II and his successor Edward I: See Henry of England seated there alone, the monarch of the simple life: his branches came to good issue in a noble son.17 In 1300, the setting of the Comedy, “The Young King,” Henry III has died, and his son Edward I is King of England. Dante classifies Henry III among the “Negligent Rulers,” in Purgatory because, though “pious,” he “attended so many masses daily that he never got around to governing his kingdom.”18 “Edward I, however, [] crowned a glorious reign with an enduring reform of English law.”19 Before he died in 1278, Henry II proclaimed De Scandalis Magnatum, prohibiting: “false rumors that might sow discord between the King and the Noblemen of the Realm.”20 The law apparently sought to prevent the kind of discord that Bertrand de Born had sown within the royal family. Dante’s sympathy with Edward I is understandable. He praises England’s “noble son” 14 Dante Alighieri, THE DIVINE COMEDY, INFERNO, XXVIII, lines 118-43 (Norton, John Ciardi Tr., 1970) (emphasis added). 15 Provence was located in present-day France; therefore, Bertrand de Born was technically a “Brit” only from the point of view of the English Kings who then ruled much of Western Europe. 16 Dante, supra note 14, at 149 n.119. 17 Dante, id., PURGATORIO, VII, lines 130-32. 18 Dante, id., at 225 n.130. 19 Id. 20 De Scandalis Magnatum, (1275); see Cohen Report, supra note 8. Ch. 2—Hate Crimes, Social Contention & Legal Knowledge 38 because he has transcended the division sown into his own royal family, between his father and grandfather–perhaps due to the protections of the statute De Scandalis Magnatum–and begun a glorious reign of peace, stability, and government under law. Meanwhile, in Dante’s Florence, families have warred on each other for decades, alternately expelling each other, destroying each other’s palaces, issuing special decrees against whole blood lines, and declaring decrees of heresy.21 Dante himself languishes in a “long exile” in France, forced to flee his own country’s strife. Receiving reports from England, Dante clearly came to admire the stability and peace represented in England’s “noble son” Edward I, and his reign of law. Central to Dante’s vision of inter-group harmony in Florence are the organized English laws, including De Scandalis Magnatum, which restored governmental stability after a period of inter-group strife. Dante’s Canto about “Sowers of Discord” is not the one true source of hate crime law in either Canada or the United States.22 Moreover, De Scandalis Magnatum privileged harmony among only a handful of elites in English society. Nevertheless, Dante’s poem documents the rapid diffusion of legal concepts about violence and inequality over time, across the geography of Europe, and through society. And, Dante’s use of English law to support his classification of those who would promote social division in European society represents a powerful early example of the use of legalistic rhetoric in response to inter-group intolerance. The following two examples illustrate the use of legalistic rhetoric in response to discrete instances of inter- group violence. 2.2.2 Augustine’s Sermon on Lynching (ca. 390) Augustine of Hippo, later St. Augustine, was a citizen of Roman North Africa; he received a formal education, traveled and lived overseas in Italy, taught rhetoric, and eventually 21 Dante, supra note 14, at 53. 22 Dante traces his label “Sowers of Discord” to recent English law and history, but he adds an older reference from Judeo-Christian Dogma: “Achitophel [who] set Absalom [against] David.” Dante, id., at 149 n.137. Ch. 2—Hate Crimes, Social Contention & Legal Knowledge 39 returned to North Africa to become Bishop in Hippo Regius. Augustine adopted a “life-time of philosophical discipline, spent in modestly rejecting false opinions,” modeled after the Academics of the Roman lawyer Cicero.23 In addition to his weekly sermons, many of which were transcribed and survive, Augustine assumed the role of arbiter or “legal agent” in disputes and intermediary between the people and the Roman provincial government. He used the sanctions available to him to teach a respect for law, and the “quick and uncorrupted” settlements demanded from him, in turn, influenced his writing and sermons.24 Augustine rigorously quelled discord among his intimates, for example, he “had written verses on the table to prohibit malicious gossip.”25 Despite his support for the suppression of heretics, Augustine disliked the local military bullies: “His congregation plainly agreed; for they once lynched the commander of their garrison.”26 Augustine’s biographer places this lynching in context with the defective Roman administration in the province: Corn was the basis of wealth in Hippo. . . . Corn filled the countryside with its most depressed and violent elements—the serf-like tenant farmer and the seasonal laborer. Corn, above all, attracted the unwelcome attention of the Imperial administration. An official charged with the compulsory purchase of grain resided at Hippo; too much of the harvest drained away into his state warehouses for transport to Rome and to the army. Even Augustine, in the City of God, dared to wish that things had been better arranged; while his congregation, especially the local traders, showed their opinion by lynching the commander of the local garrison. . . . 27 In response to this lynching, Augustine preached a sermon combining legal and theological principles to both condemn intolerance and reinforce his quasi-governmental role as an intermediary between his parishioners and the Imperial government: 23 Peter Brown, AUGUSTINE OF HIPPO: A BIOGRAPHY, at 80 (1967) (footnote omitted). 24 Id., at 140, 195-97, 226. Augustine’s biographer notes that, “Catholics were in the minority . . . For Donatism, not Catholicism, was the established church of Numidia.” Brown, id., at 226. 25 Id., at 409 (footnote omitted). Augustine performed weekly sermons, but these were recorded by “the shorthand writer” and constitute a body of epigraphic knowledge. Augustine’s devotion to epigraphic knowledge production appears most powerfully in his library work. As the Empire was collapsing he spent the last three years of his life perfecting his library, including the 93 that he wrote. Id., at 427-30. 26 Id., at 421 (citing Sermon 302, 16); see also John M. Rist, AUGUSTINE: ANCIENT THOUGHT BAPTIZED, at 194 n.114 (1994) (citing condemnation of lynching in Sermon 302). Augustine did not use the term “lynching”; the classification was apparently adopted by his Twentieth Century biographers. 27 Brown, supra note 23, at 191-92 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). Ch. 2—Hate Crimes, Social Contention & Legal Knowledge 40 “But that bad man did so many things, oppressed so many people, reduced so many to beggary and penury.” There are judges to deal with him, there are the authorities to deal with him. The state is well ordered; for the authorities that exist have been ordained by God (Rom. 13:1). What business is it of yours to vent rage like that? What authority have you received . . . . Consider a man destined for the scaffold, and condemned, the sword already hanging over him; it is not permissible for him to be struck down by anyone among the various ranks of the authorities, but only by the one who is employed for this; the executioner is employed for this; . . . If the shorthand writer strikes the condemned man, already destined for the scaffold, isn’t he killing both a condemned man and also condemning himself as a murderer? . . . . . . . . Why do you want to render a very difficult account for someone else’s death, when you don’t bear the burden of authority? God has saved you from being a judge; why grab someone else’s responsibility? Give an account just of yourself. “But that soldier did such dreadful things to me.” I would like to know, if you were a soldier, whether you wouldn’t be doing the same sort of things yourself. . . . I mean it isn’t being a soldier that prevents you doing good, but being evil minded. . . . . . . . We want the soldiers to listen to what Christ commanded; let us also listen ourselves. I mean he isn’t Christ for them and not for us; or their God and not ours. Let us all listen, and live harmoniously in peace. Brothers and sisters, I’ll say it more bluntly, and as far as the Lord grants me, freely: It’s only bad people who vent their rage on bad people. The obligations of authority are another matter. Because the judge is frequently compelled to unsheathe the sword, and he would prefer not to strike. As far as he is concerned, you see, he was willing to pass a sentence short of bloodshed; but perhaps he didn’t want law and order to be undermined. It was the concern of his profession, of his authority, of his duty. . . . In a word, brothers and sisters, why are we carrying on so long? We are all Christians; I up here also bear a burden of a greater danger. . . . [Y]ou all know that it’s your needs which compel me to go where I would much rather not; to dance attendance, to stand outside the door, to wait while the worthy and the unworthy go in, to be announced, to be scarcely admitted sometimes, to put up with little humiliations, to beg, sometimes to obtain favor, sometimes to depart in sadness. Who would want to endure such things, unless I was forced to? Look, as a concession to me, give me a holiday from this business. I beg you, I beseech you, don’t let anybody force me to it; I don’t want to have to deal with the authorities. . . . . . . . My brothers and sisters, I urge you, I beseech you by the Lord and his gentleness, be gentle in your lives, be peaceful in your lives. Peacefully permit the authorities to do what pertains to them, of which they will have to render an account to God and to their superiors. As often as you have to petition them, make your petitions in an honorable and quiet manner. Don’t mix with those who do evil and rampage in a rough and disorderly manner; don’t desire to be present at such goings on even as spectators.28 28 Saint Augustine (Augustine of Hippo) Sermon 302: On the Birthday of Saint Lawrence (circa 400 A.D.), in 8 THE WORKS OF SAINT AUGUSTINE: A TRANSLATION FOR THE 21ST CENTURY, at 300 ¶¶ 10-22, 300-312 Notes (John E. Rotelle ed. 1994) (emphasis added) (reprinting Augustine’s Sermon on Lynching with references); see also generally, THE WORKS OF SAINT AUGUSTINE, Vol. I: the Confessions (John E. Rotelle, ed. 1990) (chronicling Augustine’s conversion, and indicating views about “hatred”). Ch. 2—Hate Crimes, Social Contention & Legal Knowledge 41 The legal and social regulation of intolerance and inequality in Augustine’s Rome are unfamiliar to us, and we would not recognize Augustine as a champion of social equality by today’s standards.29 Still, his admonitions against rampage and his appeals to lawful authority provide a leading example of contention against violent intolerance. On the other hand, Augustine did resist inequality in Roman society in North Africa, especially when, in the “last politically unstable years of Augustine’s life,” raids for “slave- trading in free citizens” had undergone a “revival.”30 Augustine “spent much money trying to mitigate” the sale of citizens into slavery. 31 Slave taking among Roman citizens was not confined to Augustine’s North Africa. A similar practice was encountered by St. Patrick in Ireland, at about the same time. Despite the separation of distance, Augustine and Patrick utilized similar responses to slave-taking. The final example of a legalistic response to intolerance comes from Patrick’s condemnation of slave taking in Ireland. 2.2.3 Patrick’s Letter to the Soldiers of Coroticus (ca. 420) Augustine and Patrick both worked in “Western” Roman provinces—Ireland was part of Britannia and Hippo Regius was on the Northern coast of Numidia.32 But, Ireland was much more remote than Numidia, and Roman influence arrived their later. Augustine’s Numidia was brought under Roman “Rule” by 133 B.C. and England by 117 A.D. And, though Patrick and others introduced Roman religion, Ireland was never under direct Roman “Rule.” 33 Like 29 For example, when Rome put down an uprising by a Moorish Count, Augustine labeled the Donatist clergy who allied with the rebels “monstrous” enemies of “Roman order.” He used his position to preach against the united “Heretics, Jews and Pagans.” Brown, supra note 23, at 230-31. Augustine revealed his understanding of social and marital equality when he dismissed his slave-concubine, who was the mother of his son Adeodatus, in exchange for a better engagement. Id., at 213 n.24 (1994). 30 Id., at 237 n.37 (citing authorities). 31 Id., at 237. 32 I take my basic geographic and historical understanding of Augustine and Patrick in the Roman Empire from a standard text. See THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE ROMAN WORLD (John Boardman, et al. eds. 1986); see generally id., at 143-45, Map 3, The Roman Empire (Western Provinces). 33 See id., at 152-53, Map 4, The Growth of Roman Rule. Ch. 2—Hate Crimes, Social Contention & Legal Knowledge 42 Augustine, Patrick was technically born in a province of Rome, but unlike Augustine Patrick lived through Rome’s disintegration. Beyond their different geo-political contexts, Patrick’s personal experiences as a young adult were far different than Augustine’s. Patrick was himself captured and taken to Ireland as a slave as a young adult. He later escaped, entered the priesthood, and eventually returned as the first true Bishop of Ireland. While Augustine was an administrator and a prodigious scholar in the established church in North Africa, Patrick was mostly occupied with establishing and administering the new church in Ireland.34 Of the relatively few texts available,35 the most important here is a letter Patrick sent to protest the taking of slaves from among his converts.36 Patrick’s Letter is not the same kind of contention as Augustine’s Sermon on Lynching. Patrick’s editors describe the slave-taker, Coroticus as, “one of those local rulers on imperial territory who, after the breakdown of Roman Rule, defended as best they could the remnants of Roman civilization against the ‘barbarians.’”37 By the time Patrick eventually made his way back to Ireland as its Bishop, Coroticus had come to power on the British coast, from which he launched reprisal raids along the adjacent coast of Ireland. In one such raid he killed and enslaved a number of Patrick’s newly baptized Christians. Patrick, a former slave himself, first sent a letter directly to Coroticus, who merely jeered. In response, Patrick sent this second letter, addressed to the Soldiers of Coroticus: I, Patrick, a sinner, unlearned, resident in Ireland, declare myself to be a bishop. Most assuredly I believe that what I am I have received from God. And so I live among barbarians, a stranger and exile from the love of God. . . . 2. With my own hand I have written and composed these words, to be given, delivered, and sent to the Soldiers of Coroticus; I do not say, to my fellow citizens, or to 34 Patrick’s work is described as follows: “In adapting the organisation of the Roman Church to the conditions of Ireland, where there were no cities, [Patrick] seems to have made the tuatha (states) his dioceses; the episcopal sees, called civitates, were probably organized on a quasi-monastic pattern. Being himself a lover of monasticism, he transmitted this love to the Irish.” Boardman, et al., id., at 6-7 (footnotes omitted). Though not a prolific scholar, Patrick wrote his own Confession, in the form of an open letter apparently influenced by Augustine’s Confessions. 35 See ANCIENT CHRISTIAN WRITERS: THE WORKS OF THE FATHERS IN TRANSLATION, No. 17 The Works of St. Patrick & St. Secundinus Hymn of St. Patrick, at 41-47 (Ludwig Bieler Tr., 1953) (reprinting Letter). 36 See Bieler Tr., id., at 11-13 (describing the context of the Letter). 37 Id. In Britain this situation had existed since the withdrawal of Roman troops in 407. Id., at 11. Ch. 2—Hate Crimes, Social Contention & Legal Knowledge 43 fellow citizens of the holy Romans, but to fellow citizens of the demons, because of their evil works. Like our enemies, they live in death, allies of the Scots and the apostate Picts. Dripping with blood, they welter in the blood of innocent Christians, whom I have begotten into the number of God and confirmed in Christ! 3. The day after the newly baptized, anointed with chrism, in white garments (had been slain)—the fragrance was still on their foreheads when they were butchered and slaughtered with the sword by the above-mentioned people—I sent a letter with a holy presbyter whom I had taught from his childhood, clerics accompanying him, asking them to let us have some of the booty, and of the baptized they had made captives. They only jeered them. . . . . 7. Wherefore, then, I plead with you earnestly, ye holy and humble of heart, it is not permissible to court the favour of such people, nor to take food or drink with them, nor even to accept their alms, until they make reparation to God in hardships, through penance, with shedding of tears, and set free the baptized servants of God and handmaidens of Christ, for whom He died and was crucified. . . . . 10. Did I come to Ireland without God, or according to the flesh? Who compelled me? I am bound by the Spirit not to see any of my kinsfolk. Is it of my own doing that I have holy mercy on the people who once took me captive and made away with the servants and maids of my father’s house? I was freeborn according to the flesh. I am the son of a decurion. . . . . . . . 12. I am hated. What shall I do Lord? I am most despised. Look Thy sheep around me are torn to pieces and driven away, and that by those robbers, by the orders of the hostile-minded Coroticus. Far from the love of God is the man who hands over Christians to the Picts and Scots. . . . . . . . 16. Therefore, I shall raise my voice in sadness and grief: O you fair and beloved brethren and sons whom I have begotten in Christ, countless in number, what can I do for you? I am not worthy to come to the help of God or men. The wickedness of the wicked hath prevailed over us. We have been made, as it were, strangers. Perhaps they do not believe that we have received one and the same baptism, or have one and the same God as father. For them it is a disgrace that we are Irish. Have ye not, as is written, one God? Have ye, every one of you, forsaken his neighbor. . . . . 19. Where, then, will Coroticus with his criminals, rebels against Christ, where will they see themselves, they who distribute baptized women as prizes—for a miserable temporal kingdom, which will pass away in a moment? As a cloud or smoke that is dispersed by the wind, so shall the deceitful wicked perish at the presence of the Lord; but the just shall feast with great constancy with Christ, they shall judge nations, and rule over wicked kings for ever and ever. Amen. 20. I testify before God and His angels that it will be so as He indicated to my ignorance. It is not my words that I have set forth in Latin, but those of God and the apostles and prophets, who have never lied. . . . 21. I ask earnestly that whoever is a willing servant of God be a carrier of this letter, so that on no account it be suppressed or hidden by anyone, but rather be read before all the people, and in the presence of Coroticus himself. May God inspire them sometime to recover their senses for God, repenting, however late, their heinous deeds— Ch. 2—Hate Crimes, Social Contention & Legal Knowledge 44 murderers of the bretheren of the Lord!—and to set free the baptized women whom they took captive, in order that they may deserve to live to God, and be made whole, here and in eternity! Be peace to the Father, and to the Son, and to the Holy Spirit. Amen.38 Like Augustine’s Sermon, Patrick’s letter is expressly performative; he asks his followers to read it in public. And, like Augustine’s Sermon, the Letter is also obviously meant to record the series of episodic performances. Patrick must have retained a copy as a remembrance of the knowledge established—namely to document the killings and slave-takings along with his labeling of the soldiers as “criminals,” their deeds as “heinous.” On the other hand, in contrast to the other two texts, the Letter does not appear to propose any ongoing, systematic inquiry into violent inequality. The Letter, moreover, has no governmental force. Patrick’s letter certainly states his understanding of Roman Law—citizens are not to be taken slaves, and Christians are baptized into citizenship. Augustine held to the same understanding. But, unlike Augustine, Patrick does not pretend to have any authority to intercede with governmental authorities. Indeed, Coroticus would likely claim the same variety of governmental authority as the garrison soldier lynched by Augustine’s parishioners. But, unlike Augustine, Patrick had no governmental offices to visit, and so having no earthly intermediary role he offers his contention up in the form of a prayer. 2.3 Legal Inquiry & the Sites & Styles of Social Contention Tracing the concepts used by Augustine, Patrick, and Dante to our current understanding of hate crime law is neither practical nor necessary here. The selections suffice to illustrate the concepts governing social contention and hate crime law today. Augustine’s Sermon exhorts his congregation to rely on the legally established mode of dispute resolution—a complaint lodged by their intermediary (Bishop Augustine) with the 38 See Bieler Tr., supra note 35, at 41-47 (emphasis altered, footnotes omitted). If space permitted, Augustine of Canterbury, who is said to have penned the first laws of England (ca. 600 A.D.), would present another model of social contention via a quasi-governmental intermediary. Ch. 2—Hate Crimes, Social Contention & Legal Knowledge 45 Imperial governing authorities. Patrick, lacking any available Imperial authority, appeals directly to the slave takers. But, his medium is an open Letter, meant to be read to his converts. Augustine therefore submits to the containment of the legally constituted Imperial government; whereas, Patrick’s Letter has no point of reference in Imperial authority and therefore takes the form of a spiritual appeal. Unlike Augustine, Patrick is unconstrained by any fixed role in the Imperial government. Both Augustine and Patrick are reacting to an individual case and affixing a label to an act of group violence with an element of inequality. Dante, on the other hand, condemns the Sowers of Discord within an integrated moral code. Dante’s condemnation of group incitement is part of a classification system, not a response to any single triggering event. From these historical examples, a simple matrix of variables may be constructed to describe the structure of social contention in relation to a legal system that classifies acts of group violence or inequality. Either nongovernmental social contention or governmental legal inquiry may be classified according to two general “types”: Systematic and Ongoing, or Episodic and Reactive.39 And, each example of social contention may be characterized as either Contained or Uncontained within a legal system. Table 2.1 sets out these preliminary variables. Table 2.1—Legal Inquiry Type & Sites & Styles of Social Contention Legal Inquiry Social Contention (Site) Social Contention (Style) Single Case/Database Contained/Uncontained Reactive/Ongoing To illustrate in more current terms, a nongovernmental social group might contend for a particular legal label in response to an individual hate-related event by holding a rally in support 39 Both governmental and nongovernmental groups may be said to “contend.” The analysis here is limited to nongovernmental groups. Ch. 2—Hate Crimes, Social Contention & Legal Knowledge 46 of the victim. If this is the only response, then the contention could be classed as reactive rather than systematic or ongoing. If the groups involved in the same rally further present victim impact statements in Court, then they will have contended within an episodic or reactive legal inquiry, the trial or sentencing proceeding. While the types of social contention are surely more diverse, these types will serve as a preliminary model for the comparisons performed in the subsequent Chapters. The historical examples drawn from Augustine, Patrick, and Dante are useful for one additional purpose. Like the statements of the Laramie police officials that began this Chapter, each of these historical examples hints at nongovernmental social groups whose voices are either filtered or obliterated in the surviving texts. The silencing of these voices deserves some attention for both ethical and analytical reasons. 2.4 Legal Knowledge & the Silencing of Social Contention An historian wishing to know how nongovernmental social groups coped with homo- and trans-phobic violence would face two significant challenges. First, legal knowledge, in its modern form, enjoys the privilege of a systematic, written record. The practices of, and knowledge produced by, official governmental actors leave a formidable body of texts. Nongovernmental social groups, by contrast, appear only obliquely in the annals of official legal knowledge. And, because of their marginal resources, many such groups leave little, if any, historical records of their own. Unless a nongovernmental group succeeds in transmitting its ideas or its organization into official governmental practice, its forms of knowledge are apt to Ch. 2—Hate Crimes, Social Contention & Legal Knowledge 47 become extinct. 40 Figure 2.1 illustrates three possible avenues for the suppression of nongovernmental legal knowledge. Figure 2.1—Suppression of Nongovernmental Legal Knowledge Second, accurate legal knowledge of intolerant activities is distorted when the law either authorizes or requires the intolerance. A persistent theme emerges from literature examining the history of social intolerance, and especially intolerance against sexual minorities: knowledge of both legal and extra-legal violence has been neglected and even suppressed. How many killings? How many victims and survivors? What were their names? How many attackers? What were their names? These questions are impossible to answer precisely because recorded legal knowledge is filtered by the official, legal intolerance of the past. In his groundbreaking study of the social history of anti-gay intolerance in Europe, John Boswell emphasized the “most fundamental” disadvantage to students of anti-gay intolerance: “the longevity of prejudice against gay people and their sexuality has resulted in the deliberate falsification of historical records concerning them well into the [twentieth] century, rendering accurate reconstruction of their history particularly difficult.” 41 In addition to outright censorship of history, moreover, Boswell cited a related, more subtle, problem: translators and “lexicographers” documenting the lives of gay people have reinterpreted, disguised, and 40 See generally Doug McAdam, Harmonizing the Voices: Thematic Continuity across the Chapters, in SILENCE & VOICE IN THE STUDY OF CONTENTIOUS POLITICS, at 222 (Ronald R.Aminzade, et al., eds. 2001) (addressing silence). 41 Boswell, supra note 6, at 17. Nongovernmental Knowledge Practice: Production, Presentation, & Preservation Hidden Production & Preservation of Knowledge Suppression by Failure, Intimidation, etc. Suppression by Success Adoption as Official Governmental Practice or Clasification System Ch. 2—Hate Crimes, Social Contention & Legal Knowledge 48 distorted the meaning of legal texts and other sources of knowledge.42 These and other problems caused Boswell to rely on data from a broad range of literary sources rather than legal texts alone.43 While attitudes toward sexual minorities in Canada and the United States have changed, bias remains.44 In his recent examination of homophobic violence in Canada, Douglas Victor Janoff confronted the same problems with biased, distorted, and even suppressed data. 45 Remarkably, Janoff’s data came not from ancient history but from the immediate historical period of 1990 to 2005. In spite of his ten years of extremely thorough research, Janoff was forced to rely heavily on accounts of homophobic violence from newspapers and other extra- legal sources. Comparing Janoff’s “necrology” of deaths due to homophobic violence with the sources available reveals that only about one-fifth of the killings appeared in any official legal account such as a court decision. The necrology reports 121 killings, and the book details many more non-fatal attacks. Nevertheless, Janoff is able to cite only about twenty court decisions, many exonerating the attackers or failing to condemn their prejudiced motives. Even with the citations provided by Janoff, some of the decisions he cites are not publicly available in either electronic or print databases because they were not officially reported. No comparable study of homophobic violence has been produced in the United States, 46 but such a study would undoubtedly encounter the same difficulties with biased, distorted, and suppressed data. 42 Boswell, id., at 20-22 (collecting examples). 43 See id., at 22. 44 Boswell decried the “serious scholarly problem” caused by current prejudices: “it is unlikely that at any time in Western history have gay people been the victims of more widespread and vehement intolerance than during the first half of the twentieth century, and drawing inferences about homosexuality from observations of gay people in modern Western nations cannot be expected to yield generalizations more accurate or objective than inferences made about Jews in Nazi Germany or blacks in the antebellum South.” Boswell, supra note 6, at 23. 45 Douglas Janoff, PINK BLOOD: HOMOPHOBIC VIOLENCE IN CANADA (2005). Janoff is not alone. Recent studies of forced sexual sterilization, medical experimentation, and eugenics practiced against lesbians and gays and other “sexual perverts” have encountered similar difficulties. Compare Nancy Ordover, AMERICAN EUGENICS: RACE, QUEER ANATOMY, & THE SCIENCE OF NATIONALISM (2003), with Angus McLaren, OUR OWN MASTER RACE: EUGENICS IN CANADA, 1885-1945 (1990). 46 But see Gary David Comstock, VIOLENCE AGAINST LESBIANS & GAY MEN (1991) (surveying smaller Canadian and American studies alongside Comstock’s own survey). Ch. 2—Hate Crimes, Social Contention & Legal Knowledge 49 Despite the analytical challenges, contemporary knowledge practices of nongovernmental social groups that monitor homo- and trans-phobic hate crimes have been studied to a limited degree.47 So far, however, three important details are missing from this scholarship. First, as Chapter 1 revealed, a preponderance of the research remains focused on governmental actors and institutions—very few studies examine the knowledge practices of nongovernmental social groups. Second, since homo- and trans-phobic violence have only recently received official legal condemnation, research to date tends to focus on the hate crimes themselves, rather than the consequences of hate crime laws for groups in society. Finally, partly because most of these studies examine a single case—or a single site—, they conclude without articulating a coherent model by which the knowledge practices of nongovernmental groups may be analyzed. The production of legal knowledge outside official governmental channels is worth studying for its own sake. However, this thesis goes one step beyond the mere preservation of historically important data. The following Chapters use a cross-national comparison to isolate a single difference in hate crime classification systems to analyze the resulting differences in social contention by nongovernmental groups. While the observations presented are of inherent interest, the most significant result of the analysis may not be the answer to the specific experimental question, but rather the model used to arrive at the answer. 47 See Maria M. Gomez, DISCRIMINATION & EXCLUSION: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH TO HATE CRIME POLITICS (Ph.D. dissertation, New School Univ., 2006); Jennifer Anne Petersen, FEELING IN THE PUBLIC SPHERE: A STUDY OF EMOTION, PUBLIC DISCOURSE, & THE LAW IN THE MURDERS OF JAMES BYRD JR. & MATTHEW SHEPARD (Dissertation, Univ. of Texas Austin, Aug. 2006), available online at http://www.lib.utexas.edu/etd/d/2006/petersend46798/petersend46798.pdf (accessed Jan. 18, 2008); María Mercedes Gómez, Crímenes de odio en los Estados Unidos. La distinción analítica entre excluir y discriminar, 29 DEBATE FEMINISTA 158 (México, 2004) (reviewing North American hate crime literature from Latin American feminist perspective); Haggerty, supra note 2; Mary Ellen Faulkner, A CASE STUDY OF THE INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSE TO ANTI-GAY/LESBIAN VIOLENCE IN TORONTO (Ph.D. dissertation, Univ. of Toronto, 1999); T. A. Maroney, The struggle against hate crime: a movement at a crossroads, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 564 (1998). Surprisingly, no significant academic study of homo- or trans-phobic hate crimes in either Vancouver or Seattle has been conducted. Ch. 2—Hate Crimes, Social Contention & Legal Knowledge 50 The goal is not to critically assess the effectiveness of responses to hate crimes by governmental or nongovernmental groups.48 Nor is the goal to examine the experiences of hate crime victims themselves.49 Instead this study examines the problem of homo- and trans-phobic hate crimes from a more theoretical perspective. In place of an attempt to assess the effectiveness of responses to hate crimes according to a necessarily artificial standard, this study simply compares the knowledge-producing practices of similar nongovernmental groups at different sites, operating under only slightly different legal classification systems. Before exploring the practices of nongovernmental social groups, Chapter 3 will compare the contemporary legal principles that apply to the hate crime field in Canada and the United States. This analytical comparison will be followed in Chapter 4 with a study of two nearly contemporaneous cases from the two countries. 48 But see Faulkner, id., Introduction, at 1 (Toronto case study with goal of “critically assessing the effectiveness of” governmental and nongovernmental “institutional responses.”). 49 See Faulkner, id. Ch. 3—Analytical Legal Comparison 51 3 Hate Crime Law & Equality in Canada & the U.S.: An Analytical Comparison 3.1 Introduction This Chapter presents a comparative analysis of hate crime law in Canada and the United States, with a particular focus on the antidiscrimination language used to classify hate crimes in the statutes that authorize enhanced criminal penalties. In each country hate crime offences and criminal sentencing proceedings are part of a larger hate crime classification system that produces and certifies legal knowledge about discriminatory crimes and hate-related events. Both official governmental bodies and nongovernmental groups in each country apply legal labels according to a complex and dynamic mixture of knowledge practices. This system of labeling and knowledge production has emerged as a recognized field of legal inquiry in both Canada and the United States. The historical and conceptual origins of the hate crime field are discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, and the participation of nongovernmental groups in official hate crime inquiry is addressed in Chapter 5. The official governmental labeling addressed here includes two components: (1) criminal proceedings such as charging decisions, jury verdicts, and sentencing decisions; and, (2) the processing and classification of knowledge about hate crimes separate from the purposes of criminal punishment. Hate crime laws include both substantive offences penalizing discriminatory conduct and codified sentencing principles authorizing increased penalties for crimes motivated by discrimination. Less familiar are hate crime laws that structure and facilitate the creation of official legal knowledge about hate crimes outside of criminal proceedings. These “other” hate crime laws establish governmental statistics programs and define hate-related conduct in school Ch. 3—Analytical Legal Comparison 52 settings and elsewhere. Hate crime statistics laws notably structure knowledge both within and beyond criminal law enforcement. The discussion here addresses hate crimes motivated by sexual orientation or gender identity or expression, or alternatively homophobic or trans-phobic hate crimes.1 Because a study of homophobic and trans-phobic hate crimes presents ample complexity, crimes motivated by sex, gender, and other biases are addressed here only to provide context for an analysis within the overall hate crime field.2 Chapter 2 introduced hate crime classification as a form of legal inquiry, citing the “aftermath” of the Matthew Shepard killing as an example.3 One outcome of the contention arising from the killing was a local law establishing a systematic, ongoing hate crime inquiry within the agencies of local government and policing. This kind of hate crime classification system provides a model for the comparative legal analysis used here.4 Specifically, this Chapter presents an analytical comparison of the equality rights, formal hate crime laws, and official hate crime statistics and other legal labeling mechanisms, that embody the official hate crime classification system in each country. Chapter 4 will compare recent prosecutions in the aftermath of hate-related incidents in Seattle and Vancouver. The cases were identified as significant by the groups interviewed for the study. Although the crimes were separated by a few years, the sentencing decisions were rendered at about the same time, and courts in both cities applied the general principles of hate 1 The terms are from Douglas Victor Janoff, PINK BLOOD: HOMOPHOBIC VIOLENCE IN CANADA, at 158 (2005). Alternative labels exist. Cynthia Petersen uses the terms “heterosexist violence” and “queer-bashing.” See Cynthia Petersen, A Queer Response to Bashing: Legislating Against Hate, 16 QUEENS L. J. 237, 252 n.1 (1991) (explaining choice of terms). Petersen critiques the under-inclusion of anti-lesbian (“lesbophobic”) violence in hate crime research, concluding: “Clearly, more research is warranted in this area.” Petersen, id., at 240. Here, the term “homophobic” is used for anti-gay and anti-lesbian, and “trans-phobic” encompasses gender identity or expression biases, including discriminatory attitudes against Male-to-Female and Female-to-Male trans-gendered persons. 2 But see, e.g., Helen Zia, It’s a Crime: Will Gender be Included in the Federal Hate Crime Legislation, in WHAT IS A HATE CRIME? (Romen Espejo ed., 2002). 3 See supra, Chapter 2, at 31 n.2 (collecting citations). 4 For a critical analysis of civil rights reform legislation more generally, and at the state level in the United States, see Peter Cicchino, et al., Sex, Lies & Civil Rights: A Critical History of the Massachusetts Gay Civil Rights Bill, 26 HARV. CIVIL RIGHTS-CIVIL LIBERTIES L.REV. 549 (1991). Ch. 3—Analytical Legal Comparison 53 crime law to specific allegations of homophobic violence. The case comparison will therefore provide both a practical illustration of the hate crime laws analyzed in this Chapter and a context for the interviews analyzed in Chapters 5 and 6. 3.2 Analytical Legal Comparison Hate crime laws have assumed a significance both as part of the routines of criminal law enforcement and as an ingredient in our broader, collective understanding of social and legal equality. Specifically, hate crime laws are significant because of how they import the language of antidiscrimination law into the field of criminal law. In the resulting dynamic, criminal law enforcement becomes a mechanism for the production of official legal knowledge about discrimination and inequality. Two initial observations will introduce this egalitarian role of hate crime laws. First, the codification of hate crime laws has added something new to legal discourse about crimes. In both Canada and the United States, criminal codes, arrests, and prosecutions have always been significant sources of the public’s knowledge of law. In recent times, though, hate crime laws have altered the knowledge producing practices of police, prosecutors, and judges. And, hate crime laws have shaped the knowledge produced by government officials other than police—government statisticians and school personnel, for example. Decades ago, before we acquired a hate crime vocabulary, American legal scholar Kenneth Culp Davis published a pair of studies examining basic concepts of administrative law in criminal law enforcement. In his Preliminary Inquiry, 5 Davis noticed the extraordinary discretion of police and prosecutors—in particular the “negative power to withhold 5 Kenneth Culp Davis, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY, Preface, at v-vi (1969). Ch. 3—Analytical Legal Comparison 54 prosecution.”6 Inevitably, hate crime laws ask police, prosecutors, and judges to define equality in practice. So, in the hate crime field, law enforcement discretion has become a tremendous “negative power” to withhold knowledge about inequality. Davis’s research about the discretionary inaction of governmental officials did not address homophobic or trans-phobic discrimination by police, or hate crimes as we know them today. 7 But his recommendations for “guiding rules,” and “gentle checking,” 8 in the administration of criminal laws are profoundly relevant in the field of hate crime law. Laws that require judges to consider homophobic or trans-phobic bias in sentencing decisions also gently require police and prosecutors to examine conduct they may have otherwise disregarded. Hate crime statistics laws, which play no direct role in investigations or prosecutions, nevertheless guide law enforcement decisions as police investigators analyze incidents for hate-related motives. Even hate crime laws administered outside police departments educate the public and establish expectations about how officials do, or should, define equality. By interjecting basic concepts of administrative law into official law enforcement decisions, hate crime laws perform the functions Professor Davis recommended. Whenever a police officer is required to ask about biased motives or compile hate crime statistics, whenever prosecutors, judges, and defence lawyers argue about aggravating factors in sentencing, whenever a journalist reports these events—each of us receives a gentle reminder. In addition to 6 Id., at 188. Davis observed: “The extreme decentralization of power has been planned by no one; it has simply grown out of the gigantic false assumption, deliberately fostered by some policemen . . . , that of course the police do not make policy.” Id., at 88. The “habit” of denying the reality of police policy is based on what Davis identified as a compartmental thinking about law. “Unfortunately, our traditional legal classifications—‘administrative law,’ ‘the administrative process,’ and ‘administrative agencies’—have customarily excluded police and prosecutors.” Id., at 222. In response, Davis sought a transfer of “know-how” from federal agencies to local police and prosecutors. Id. 7 Davis’s more focused study, “Police Discretion,” incorporated interviews with police officers. Kenneth Culp Davis, POLICE DISCRETION (1975). Davis observed: “The police often make their own law and enforce it. Police- made law, with no statutory foundation, is a rather important phenomenon.” Id., at 16. He recommended public rulemaking by police agencies, “to educate the public in the reality that the police make vital policy.” Id., at 90-91. 8 Davis, POLICE DISCRETION, id., at 147-48. Ch. 3—Analytical Legal Comparison 55 criminal penalties and other remedies, hate crime laws harness the tutelary power9 of criminal law to teach an official meaning of equality. The principles of official hate crime inquiry thereby delimit the discretion of governmental officials who establish knowledge about legal equality. Second, hate crime laws have interjected a particular vocabulary of equality rights into the criminal laws of both Canada and the United States. The codification of hate crime laws has compelled government officials, including police, prosecutors, and judges, to articulate a new and more explicit terminology denouncing the discriminatory motives of those who commit crimes. It will come as no surprise therefore, that social contention about hate-related events and hate crime laws reveals the same two themes: (1) a focus on the discretion of law enforcement officials to withhold knowledge about inequality; and, (2) a tension in the adoption of a new vocabulary of antidiscrimination in criminal law. The following discussion provides a framework for examining social contention about hate crimes by comparing the legal texts that collectively establish and define hate crime as an official legal inquiry or classification system in Canada and the United States. A comparison of entire national legal systems will not be attempted.10 Instead, the focus will be on those laws and court decisions that consider enhanced criminal penalties for hate- related events or that otherwise classify those events for official purposes. A comparison of governmental powers, equality rights, and freedom of expression will be set out to provide a context for the analysis of hate crime laws in the two countries. The focus on hate crime penalty enhancement laws is justified here in part because studies of social mobilization have not focused on the mobilizing dynamic triggered by hate 9 See Joseph Tussman, GOVERNMENT & THE MIND (1977) (“tutelary” power of law). 10 Others have attempted such an analysis. The seminal comparative work is Seymour Martin Lipset, CONTINENTAL DIVIDE: THE VALUES & INSTITUTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES & CANADA (1991). Critics have discredited some, but not all of Lipset’s theses. See, e.g., Edward Grabb, et al., The Origins of American Individualism: Reconsidering the Historical Evidence, 24 CAN. J. SOCIOLOGY 511 (1999) (critiquing Lipset’s premises); Douglas Baer, et al., The Values of Canadians & Americans: A Rejoinder, 69 SOCIAL FORCES 273 (1990). Ch. 3—Analytical Legal Comparison 56 crime classification decisions.11 One of the best Canadian studies of social mobilization among lesbian and gay liberation and equality-seeking groups is Miriam Smith’s Lesbian & Gay Rights in Canada: Social Movements & Equality-Seeking. Smith noted the important role that the Charter 12 played in the dynamics of social contention among gay and lesbian rights groups. Yet, even Smith’s thorough comparison of these social movements before and after the Charter fails to address in any significant detail the mobilizations triggered by hate crimes against lesbian and gay people.13 The apparent omission of mobilization related to hate crimes is understandable given the timing of her research. While Smith was able to obtain data for an analysis of mobilization before and after the Charter, her book addressed events up to 1995 only and could therefore hardly be expected to analyze mobilization before and after the 1996 effective date of the Canadian Sentencing Principles for bias, prejudice or hate. Nonetheless, Smith’s methodology provides a useful basis for delimiting the analytical comparison set out in this Chapter. Smith’s analysis examined, in part, the effects of the Charter’s entrenchment of equality rights on, “social movement framing and strategy . . . . in the context of each movement.”14 The analysis here focuses on the effects of the Sentencing Principles for bias, prejudice or hate, rather than the Charter. But, the utility of Smith’s analysis lies not in its focus on the Charter but on its use of an important codification event as the fulcrum for a before-and-after analysis of laws and their effects on social movements. Thus, following Smith’s lead, this Chapter attempts a before- and-after analysis of national hate crime penalty enhancement laws codified almost simultaneously in Canada and the United States. 11 See, e.g., Miriam Smith, LESBIAN & GAY RIGHTS IN CANADA: SOCIAL MOVEMENTS & EQUALITY-SEEKING: 1971- 1995 (1999) (generally omitting mobilizing influences of hate crimes). 12 Canadian Charter of Rights & Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c.11 (hereinafter Charter). 13 Smith addresses mobilization in response to hate-related events primarily in the Quebec context, and primarily as an exception to her general observations about social mobilization. Smith noticed a “different path” in Montreal, based on “discourse . . . of violence and harassment toward lesbians and gays, and in particular an unsolved string of murders of gay men that occurred between 1989 and 1992.” See Smith, id., at 128 (footnote omitted). 14 Smith, id., at 144. Ch. 3—Analytical Legal Comparison 57 Chapter 4 examines cases from each country that apply the hate crime laws roughly ten years after the codification of national legislation. These cases will therefore represent the endpoint for the before-and-after analysis. In this Chapter, an attempt is made to begin with the earliest cases mentioning homo- or trans-phobic motives for crimes in each country. Chapter 5 follows with an analysis of social groups and their knowledge practices in the hate crime field at the same ten-year benchmark. While a comprehensive longitudinal analysis will not be attempted, it is hoped that Chapters 4 and 5 will nevertheless provide a picture of the consequences of hate crime penalty laws—and other hate crime laws—on the social mobilization and contention of nongovernmental groups. The comparative legal analysis that follows will be divided into four sections. The first section describes the distribution of governmental powers relevant to hate crime law. This discussion addresses primarily national and sub-national lawmaking powers and the availability of judicial review. The second section will introduce equality rights, including constitutional equality rights, particularly as they relate to criminal penalties. This section will also explain how freedom of expression constrains equality rights in the hate crime field in each country. The third section will synthesize the laws and judicial decisions that define the field of hate crime law in each country, with particular attention to hate crime sentence enhancements for homophobic and trans-phobic crimes. Finally, the fourth section will describe the significant other hate crime laws, particularly laws regulating hate crime statistics and reporting, that contribute to legal knowledge about hate crimes. A comparative analysis of legal principles will be incorporated throughout the discussion, and a concluding summary will analyze the most significant similarities and differences in hate crime laws in the two countries. Ch. 3—Analytical Legal Comparison 58 3.2.1 Governmental Powers 3.2.1.1 Division of Legislative Powers Laws mark the divisions of power among governmental units in both Canada and the United States, and these divisions shape the hate crime field differently in each country. In both countries, governmental powers are divided both between and within governmental units. The divisions of power within governmental units, or separation of powers, are addressed here only incidentally. In both countries, however, legislative powers are divided between national and sub-national governments. Canadian provinces and American states share legislative powers with their respective national governments. Cities and other municipal bodies also share some lawmaking powers in both countries. While Canadian and American governments exercise a similar set of lawmaking powers in the hate crime field, the location of power is not the same in the two countries. As the analysis of interview data in Chapter 5 will demonstrate, the location of lawmaking power bears an important relationship to the dynamic contention of governmental agencies and nongovernmental groups that together create knowledge in the hate crime field. A brief comparison will reveal the basic differences in the division of powers that are important to an understanding of hate crime law in Canada and the United States. 3.2.1.1.1 Canada In Canada, the Constitution Act, 1867, established the divisions of national and provincial legislative power.15 The national legislative powers most relevant here are set out in § 91: [T]he exclusive Legislative Authority of the Parliament of Canada extends to all Matters coming within the Classes of Subjects next hereinafter enumerated; that is to say, . . . . 15 Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Victoria, c. 3. See id., § 3 (authorizing Queen to proclaim, “One Dominion under the Name of Canada.”). Ch. 3—Analytical Legal Comparison 59 27. The Criminal Law, except the Constitution of Courts of Criminal Jurisdiction, but including the Procedure in Criminal Matters. . . . . And any Matter coming within any of the Classes of Subjects enumerated in this Section shall not be deemed to come within the Class of Matters of a local or private Nature comprised in the Enumeration of the Classes of Subjects by this Act assigned exclusively to the Legislatures of the Provinces.16 The Constitution Act, 1867, § 92 enumerates the relevant provincial powers: In each Province the Legislature may exclusively make Laws in relation to Matters coming within the Classes of Subjects next hereinafter enumerated; that is to say, . . . . 13. Property and Civil Rights in the Province. 14. The Administration of Justice in the Province, including the Constitution, Maintenance, and Organization of Provincial Courts, both of Civil and of Criminal Jurisdiction, and including Procedure in Civil Matters in those Courts. 15. The Imposition of Punishment by Fine, Penalty, or Imprisonment for enforcing any Law of the Province made in relation to any Matter coming within any of the Classes of Subjects enumerated in this Section. 16. Generally all Matters of a merely local or private Nature in the Province.17 Whereas the Constitution Act, 1867, divided lawmaking powers between the provinces and the national Parliament, the Constitution Act, 1982, promulgated the Canadian Charter of Rights & Freedoms (Charter). The Charter expressly constrains the conduct of both Parliament and the provinces by entrenching rights, including equality rights, in a constitutional text.18 The Constitution Act, 1982, which incorporated the Charter, contained an express supremacy clause: “The Constitution of Canada is the supreme law of Canada, and any law that is inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution is, to the extent of the inconsistency, of no force or effect.”19 Thus, the Charter provided the mechanism by which courts may review hate crime laws for 16 Constitution Act, 1867, § 91(27) (emphasis added). 17 Constitution Act, 1867, § 92(13)-(16) (emphasis added). The term “civil rights” as used in § 92(13) is not the same as the term “civil rights” used colloquially in the United States, although technically the term may be used to refer to matters such as the enforcement of contracts or remedies for torts in both countries. 18 Charter, § 32(1)(a) & (b). Strictly speaking, the Charter recognizes “principles of fundamental justice” in § 7 as the pre-requisite for any deprivation of “life, liberty and security of the person.” See also, Charter, id., preamble (founding “principles” recognizing supremacy of God and “rule of law”). The “Equality Rights” articulated in § 15 might be among the “principles of fundamental justice” recognized by § 7, but they are characterized as “rights” rather than “principles.” Equality Rights are addressed in section 3.2.2 below. 19 Constitution Act, 1982, § 52(1). The Canadian Constitution includes principles beyond the text of the Charter. See id., § 52(2). Ch. 3—Analytical Legal Comparison 60 constitutionality. Perhaps more important, the Charter also established a powerful model for the language of equality rights to be used in subsequent statutes, including hate crime laws. The Charter did not, however, alter the basic distribution of lawmaking powers relevant here. 20 The distribution of powers set in the Constitution Act, 1867, remains essentially unchanged in the fields of criminal law, civil rights, and the administration of justice. 3.2.1.1.2 United States Adopted in 1789, the written Constitution of the United States distributed lawmaking powers between the state and national governments. The national powers most relevant here are set out among the legislative powers assigned to Congress in Article I: The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises, to pay the debts and provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States; but all duties, imposts and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States; . . . . To regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes; . . . . To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof.21 But the Constitution granted only limited powers to the national government; the states expressly reserved un-enumerated powers to themselves: “The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people.”22 Aside from those powers granted to the national government, and subject to limits 20 The Charter recognizes the power of both Parliament and the provinces to enact legislation “notwithstanding” the legal rights and equality rights principles of the Charter. Charter, § 33(1). These notwithstanding clauses are subject to formal, procedural limits, however. See Charter, § 33(2)-(5). And, the notwithstanding powers have rarely been used. 21 U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 8, cl. 1, 3, 18. 22 U.S. CONST. AMEND. X. The Tenth Amendment reservation of state powers was ratified by the states in 1791 as one of the first ten amendments. These ten amendments constitute the Bill of Rights, and unlike the Canadian Bill of Rights, which will be discussed shortly, they established constitutional principles binding on both state and national governments. Ch. 3—Analytical Legal Comparison 61 expressed in the Bill of Rights and elsewhere in the Constitution, each state maintains its own separate sovereignty.23 Because general criminal lawmaking powers are not expressly addressed in the United States Constitution,24 each state may enact its own criminal laws, and the Congress may make criminal laws only to the extent of its other assigned powers. Congress therefore has no general power to mandate penalties for hate crimes. Congress may however enact hate crime laws that are “necessary and proper” to the regulation of interstate commerce or related to some other national lawmaking power. Although the states granted the national government powers in only limited areas, the Supremacy Clause recognized the superiority of laws “made in pursuance” of national authority: This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.25 Therefore, any civil or criminal hate crime laws enacted by Congress within the scope of its constitutional powers become part of “the supreme law of the land.” At first, the Constitution also did not expressly authorize Congress to legislate for the purpose of social equality. The powers of Congress were, however, expanded by three Amendments ratified in the years following the Civil War. The Civil War Amendments altered the balance of powers between the national and state governments by banning slavery, granting equal citizenship rights to freed slaves, and prohibiting race discrimination in federal elections. These three Amendments explicitly granted Congress additional powers to enforce equality 23 To coordinate the recognition of laws between states, the Constitution provides a Full Faith and Credit Clause: Full faith and credit shall be given in each state to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every other state. And the Congress may by general laws prescribe the manner in which such acts, records, and proceedings shall be proved, and the effect thereof. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (emphasis added). 24 The Constitution expressly authorizes Congress to enact criminal laws for counterfeiting, art. I, § 8, cl. 6, for “piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and offenses against the law of nations,” art. I, § 8, cl. 10, for the District of Columbia and military bases, art. I, § 8, cl. 17, and for treason, art. III, § 3, cl. 2. 25 U.S. CONST, art. VI, cl. 2 (emphasis added). Ch. 3—Analytical Legal Comparison 62 rights by “appropriate legislation.”26 Judges and scholars continue to dispute the scope of the legislative powers conferred by the Civil War Amendments, but Congress undeniably acquired some authority to enact criminal and civil rights laws vindicating the equality rights articulated in the three Amendments. 3.2.1.1.3 Analysis The analysis of interview data in Chapter 5 will reveal the overwhelming importance of one difference in the distribution of lawmaking powers in Canada and the United States: The location of criminal lawmaking power varies radically between the two countries. 27 With relatively minor exceptions, Canadian criminal law is made nationally and administered provincially; whereas, American criminal law is made and administered at every level of government—municipal, state, and federal. The constitutions of both countries contemplate geographical variations in the administration of hate crime laws. Predictably, however, the content of state hate crime laws varies widely throughout the United States and even within states from city to city. And, although the United States Code establishes a uniform federal criminal law, this extends only to conduct falling within the limited powers of Congress. 26 See U.S. CONST. AMENDS. XIII, § 2; XIV, § 5; XV, § 2. 27 While it was written before the Charter, one commentator from the 1970s succinctly contrasted the criminal law in Canada and the United States in a way that remains salient today: [T]he Dominion Parliament, under the provisions of the British North America Act, has established a unitary system of criminal law, which is applied in all ten provinces through provisions of the Canadian Criminal Code. Although the administration of criminal justice is left to the provinces, their legislatures do not exercise the comprehensive and largely independent law- making powers of the fifty states. Each provincial court is thus interpreting the same code of criminal law and related parliamentary measures such as the Canadian Bill of Rights. Accordingly, judicial decisions at this level would be expected to attract greater national attention from the bench and the bar in other parts of the country. Otis H. Stephens, Jr., Equal Justice & Counsel Rights in the United States & Canada, in COMPARATIVE HUMAN RIGHTS, at 161, 167-68 (Richard Claude, ed., 1976). Ch. 3—Analytical Legal Comparison 63 Social mobilization among gay rights groups covers a substantial cross-section of legal reform efforts, including hate crime laws.28 In the United States, these numerous topics of legal reform are tapped as resources for mobilization at the most local levels of government: Although marches on Washington and efforts to eliminate the ban on gays in the military have captured much of the publicity, the attention of most lesbian and gay activists has been monopolized by the political attempts to gain basic rights for gays in cities and states. The repeal of sodomy laws, the legalization of same- sex marriages, domestic partner benefits, hate crime laws, school programs and policies, and antidiscrimination legislation are all major goals of the gay movement, and they are also the source of intense political battles that have been and continue to be fought almost exclusively at the state and local levels.29 Because of the many local legislatures available for such battles, the number of discrete pieces of hate crime legislation submitted for contention has been large.30 The number of local measures submitted in the year following the Shepard killing is telling: “By August 1999, apparent reaction to the Shepard murder led to the introduction of at least 77 progay hate crime bills.”31 The availability of multiple, local sites for making hate crime laws shapes the behavior of both governmental agencies and nongovernmental groups in the United States. Agencies and social groups both understand that local lawmaking may be used to constrain the discretion of police and to demand the collection and publication of hate crime statistics, for example. Conversely, because of the relative unavailability of local lawmaking sites, Canadian groups and government officials must behave differently, and therefore influence hate crime laws differently, than their American counterparts. The analysis of knowledge practices among nongovernmental groups examined in Chapter 5 identifies the location of hate crime lawmaking power as a key variable in the dynamics of contention about hate-related events. Therefore, differences between Canadian and 28 See James W. Button, et al., The Politics of Gay Rights at the Local & State Level, in THE POLITICS OF GAY RIGHTS, at 269-89 (Craig A. Rimmerman, et al., eds., 2000). 29 Id., at 269. 30 See Donald P. Haider-Markel, Lesbian & Gay Politics in the States: Interest Groups, Electoral Politics, & Policy, in Rimmerman, et al., id., at 290. 31 Id., at 301 (citing Appendix collecting references); see id., at 326-46 Appendix B. Ch. 3—Analytical Legal Comparison 64 American lawmaking powers are worth emphasizing. Canadian criminal law is made by the national Parliament and administered by provincial authorities; whereas, American criminal law is made and administered at every level of government. National criminal law in the United States is limited to crimes in interstate commerce or with some other connection to a national lawmaking power; whereas, the Canadian Parliament defines practically all crimes. Lawmaking by cities and other local governments likewise varies significantly between the two countries. Local lawmaking in the hate crime field will be explored in more detail in Chapter 5 and in the Results set out in Chapter 6. 3.2.1.2 Judicial Review In both Canada and the United States, courts review legislation and other governmental action for compliance with a constitution. 32 In general, the power of judicial review for constitutionality has grown in both Canada and the United States as the recognition of equality rights has expanded. Just as the Charter expanded the authority of Canadian courts to review legislation for compliance with equality rights, more than a century earlier, the Fourteenth Amendment expanded the powers of American courts to review legislation and other forms of state action for compliance with the new Equal Protection Clause. American courts have issued a far larger volume of constitutional equality decisions than their Canadian counterparts, but for reasons unrelated to differences in judicial review. First, American courts have been applying the same basic constitutional text, the Equal Protection Clause, for more than a century; whereas, the § 15 equality rights of the Charter have been in effect for only about two decades. Second, the Fourteenth Amendment states a very general and facially neutral equality standard; whereas, the Charter, § 15, embodies a much more specific set 32 The United States Supreme Court recognized the availability of judicial review more than two hundred years ago in Marbury v. Madison. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cr.) 137 (1803). Canadian courts have long recognized the availability of constitutional judicial review. See generally Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 (per curiam) (summarizing history of Canadian constitutionalism and judicial review). Ch. 3—Analytical Legal Comparison 65 of equality rights. As a result, American courts have been forced to develop a broad jurisprudence defining constitutional equality. Canadian courts, by contrast, can resolve many constitutional equality claims by reference to the more detailed language of the Charter. Nevertheless, hate crime laws in both countries are subject to judicial review for compliance with constitutional equality rights. Courts in both countries have issued a body of decisions defining the role of hate crime penalty laws within the constitutional division of governmental powers and interpreting the constitutional rights of those charged with hate crimes. Courts in both countries have similarly reviewed hate crime laws for compliance with constitutional principles of free expression. While Canadian and American courts have reached significantly different conclusions regarding penalties for hate-related expression, they have reached similar results for laws penalizing hate-related conduct. Although judicial review is available in both Canada and the United States, the theory and mechanisms of judicial review vary between the two countries. An exhaustive study of differences in judicial review is not necessary to the analysis here. 33 Nevertheless, judicial review remains a critical feature of legal contention about hate crime laws in both countries, and cases applying judicial review appear throughout the discussion that follows. 3.2.2 Equality Rights Hate crime laws interject an antidiscrimination discourse into criminal punishment. The particular language embodied in hate crime statutes is necessarily influenced by the vocabulary of equality rights available when and where they are enacted. To differing degrees, hate crime laws in both Canada and the United States have also been influenced by constitutional 33 Judicial review by Canadian and American courts has been analyzed elsewhere. See Claire L’Heureux-Dube, Realizing Equality in the Twentieth Century: the Role of the Supreme Court of Canada in Comparative Perspective, 1 INT’L J. CONST. L. 35 (2003); Joel Bakan, Strange Expectations: A Review of Two Theories of Judicial Review (1990) 35 MCGILL L.J. 439. The failure of judicial review as a mechanism for the recognition gay civil rights in Canada before the Charter is documented in Jeff Richstone & J.Stuart Russell, Shutting the Gate: Gay Civil Rights in the Supreme Court of Canada (1981) 27 MCGILL L.J. 92. Ch. 3—Analytical Legal Comparison 66 protections for free expression. Therefore, a brief comparison of equality rights and free expression in Canada and the United States is necessary to establish the context for a comparison of hate crime laws. 3.2.2.1 Equality Rights Texts In both Canada and the United States equality rights appear in written constitutional and statutory texts. A thorough analysis of antidiscrimination as a principle34 of constitutional law in Canada and the United States will not be attempted here.35 Instead, this section will compare the basic texts that articulate equality rights in each country. A comparison of these texts reveals important differences, and some important similarities, in the vocabulary of legal equality in the two countries. In both countries, equality rights, including antidiscrimination principles, are incorporated into written civil rights and human rights laws, sometimes with greater detail than the constitutional texts themselves. A vocabulary of equality rights also appears in the text of hate crime laws, and hate crime laws do not always use the same language as either constitutions 34 In his preface to the Court’s decision in Law v. Canada, Iacobucci J. applied the language of “anti-discrimination jurisprudence” and “principles” to mean the judicial “guidelines” used to “analyze a discrimination claim under the Charter.” See Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment & Immigration), [1999] 1 S.C.R. 497, ¶¶ 4-5; compare Canada (House of Commons) v. Vaid, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 667, ¶ 90 (concluding, Canadian Human Rights Act “anti- discrimination norms” apply to employees of Parliament). Thus, the use of the term “Anti-Discrimination Principle” in Canadian constitutional law might be misleading. 35 But see, e.g., Jed Rubenfeld, The Anti- Antidiscrimination Agenda, 111 YALE L. J. (2002) (citing thread in recent U.S. Supreme Court cases, including new constitutional ideology toward affirmative action and antidiscrimination); Paul Brest, The Supreme Court 1975 Term Forward: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. (1976) (tracing history of antidiscrimination principle, especially in context with race discrimination in U.S.); K.G. Jan Pillai, Neutrality of the Equal Protection Clause, 27 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 89 (1999) (addressing neutral laws; noting U.S. Supreme Court’s abandonment of “anti-caste” principle for color-blind principle; advocating verified “impartiality” test in place of neutrality); Andrew Koppelman, ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW & SOCIAL EQUALITY (1996) (reviewing theories of equality in antidiscrimination law, process-based versus result-based theories, case studies, political theories); Kai Neilsen, Radical Egalitarianism Revisited, 15 WINDSOR Y.B. ACCESS TO JUST. 121 (1996) (examining equality rights beyond the “difference principle” including tabulation of egalitarian concepts); Colleen Sheppard, Study Paper in Litigating the Relationship Between Equity & Equality (Ont. Law Reform Comm’n, 1993) (summarizing Canadian equal rights law under Charter, § 15, collecting authorities for alternative approaches to equality rights); Kenneth H. Fogarty, EQUAL RIGHTS & THEIR LIMITS IN THE CHARTER (1987) (reviewing theoretical bases for equality, including comparative law guidance from U.S. experience). Perhaps the best articulation of the parallel between antidiscrimination laws and hate crime laws, in Spanish language literature, is provided by Professor María Mercedes Gómez. See María Mercedes Gómez, Usos jerárquicos y excluyentes de la violencia, in MÁS ALLÁ DEL DERECHO. JUSTICIA Y GÉNERO EN AMÉRICA LATINA, at 19, 37-55 (Cristina Motta & Luisa Cabal eds., 2005) (“Beyond the Law: Justice & Gender in Latin America”) (English language description available online at http://www.red-alas.org/english/ (accessed Feb. 29, 2008)). Ch. 3—Analytical Legal Comparison 67 or civil and human rights laws. The equal rights language of hate crime penalty laws will be analyzed in section 3.2.3 below, and other hate crime laws, including human rights, civil rights, and hate crime statistics laws will be analyzed in section 3.2.4. But, because hate crime laws exist alongside constitutional and statutory texts defining equality rights, these equality rights texts are addressed here first. 3.2.2.1.1 Canada Before 1982 no Canadian constitutional text articulated general equality rights.36 In 1960 Parliament enacted the Canadian Bill of Rights, a statute that recognized rights and freedoms, including equality rights, already in existence under Canadian law: It is hereby recognized and declared that in Canada there have existed and shall continue to exist without discrimination by reason of race, national origin, colour, religion or sex, the following human rights and fundamental freedoms, namely, (a) the right of the individual to life, liberty, security of the person and enjoyment of property, and the right not to be deprived thereof except by due process of law; (b) the right of the individual to equality before the law and the protection of the law; . . . ; (d) freedom of speech37 The rights enumerated in the Canadian Bill of Rights resemble those contained in the American Bill of Rights.38 However, the Canadian Bill of Rights was not a constitutional document, and it did not fundamentally alter the powers of either Parliament or provincial legislatures. Specifically, a saving clause exempted matters within the exclusive legislative authority of provinces from the application of the Bill of Rights.39 Hence, with minor exceptions, Canadian courts recognized no change in equal rights doctrine after the enactment of the Bill of Rights.40 36 The Charter came into force in 1982. The equality principles of § 15 appeared in the text of the Charter, but they did not come into force until 1985. 37 Canadian Bill of Rights—1960, c. 44 1960, c. 44, s. 3; 1970-71-72, c. 38, s. 29; 1985, c. 26, s. 105; 1992, c. 1, s. 144(F); see App. III to R.S., 1985. See also, id., §§ 1(c) (religion), (e) (assembly & association), (f) (press). 38 Compare U.S. CONST. AMENDS. I-VIII. 39 See Canadian Bill of Rights, § 5(3). 40 The one notable exception is R. v. Drybones, where the Supreme Court applied the Bill of Rights to invalidate a provision of the Indian Act that criminalized intoxication for Aboriginal Canadians but not others. R. v. Drybones, Ch. 3—Analytical Legal Comparison 68 The Constitution Act, 1982, established the current written constitution for Canada. Its first part, the Canadian Charter of Rights & Freedoms (Charter), specifies equality rights more broadly and with greater precision than the Canadian Bill of Rights: (1) Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability. (2) Subsection (1) does not preclude any law, program or activity that has as its object the amelioration of conditions of disadvantaged individuals or groups including those that are disadvantaged because of race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.41 The Supreme Court of Canada has since declared “sexual orientation” a ground of discrimination “analogous” to those expressly prohibited under the Charter, § 15. 42 The Court does not currently recognize “gender identity” or “gender expression” as constitutionally prohibited grounds of discrimination. The Supreme Court’s equality rights decisions are based on a judicial analysis applicable to Charter claims. In Law v. Canada, a 1994 decision, the Supreme Court articulated the “guidelines for analysis” applicable to discrimination claims based on the equality provisions of the Charter, § 15.43 The framework for a Charter discrimination claim is drawn from the Court’s earliest cases interpreting § 15: [T]he Andrews decision established that there are three key elements to a discrimination claim under s. 15(1) of the Charter: differential treatment, an enumerated or analogous ground, and discrimination in a substantive sense involving factors such as prejudice, stereotyping, and disadvantage. . . . [T]he determination of whether each of these elements exists in a particular case is [1970] S.C.R. 282, 2 D.L.R.3d 473. The majority of Justices, per Ritchie, J., agreed that, “an individual is denied equality before the law if it is made an offence punishable by law, on account of his race, for him to do something which his fellow Canadians are free to do without having committed any offence or having been made subject to any penalty.” id., at 297. 41 Charter § 15. Rights and freedoms are later guaranteed, “equally to male and female persons.” Charter § 28. 42 Egan v. Canada, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513. 43 Law v. Canada, supra note 34, ¶ 88. The Law case was not a human rights tribunal appeal but a Charter challenge to a statute after it was applied by an administrative agency. See generally Melina Buckley, Transforming Women’s Future: A 2004 Guide to Equality Rights Theory & Law (Alison Brewin, ed., West Coast Legal Education & Action Fund, 2004) (distinguishing the analysis applicable to human rights tribunal decisions). Ch. 3—Analytical Legal Comparison 69 always to be undertaken in a purposive manner, taking into account the full social, political, and legal context of the claim.44 Courts applying the guidelines must: (1) use a “purposive and contextual” approach focusing on the “strong remedial purpose” of § 15 and avoiding a “formalistic or mechanical” analysis; (2) locate the relevant “comparison group” based on the pleadings and the impugned legislation; and, (3) consider both the subjective and objective reasonableness of harm to a claimant’s dignity. The “list of factors is not closed,” but the Court has identified four important “contextual” factors: (A) Pre-existing disadvantage, stereotyping, prejudice, or vulnerability experienced by the individual or group at issue. . . . (B) The correspondence, or lack thereof, between the ground or grounds on which the claim is based and the actual need, capacity, or circumstances of the claimant or others. . . . (C) The ameliorative purpose or effects of the impugned law upon a more disadvantaged person or group in society. . . . and (D) The nature and scope of the interest affected by the impugned law.45 When a discrimination claim is based on an “enumerated” ground, for example “sex,” a Court may simply analyze the contextual factors and render a decision based on “judicial notice and logical reasoning.” When the alleged ground of discrimination is not “enumerated” in § 15, a claimant may seek to prove the discrimination alleged is “analogous” to the grounds listed.46 Unlike the Canadian Bill of Rights, the Charter is a constitutional text; its terms expressly bind both Parliament and provincial legislatures. 47 Despite its binding authority, however, the Charter itself recognizes limits on equality rights. Courts review restrictions on equality rights according to the standard set out in the Charter, § 1: “The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such 44 Law, id., ¶ 30 (citing Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143). 45 Law, id., ¶ 88. 46 Law, id., ¶¶ 29, 44 (reviewing cases considering analogous grounds). 47 See Charter, § 32(1). Ch. 3—Analytical Legal Comparison 70 reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.”48 Both Parliament and the provincial legislatures have enacted human rights legislation, which also includes antidiscrimination language. Because of the “comprehensiveness” of this human rights legislation, Canadian Courts do not recognize a common law tort of discrimination. 49 Instead, though Charter challenges to state action remain available, the remedies for private discrimination available in human rights agencies are practically exclusive.50 The Canadian Human Rights Act (CHRA) prohibits discrimination in fields within the legislative authority of Parliament. The CHRA specifies grounds of prohibited discrimination slightly broader than those expressly named in the Charter, § 15: For all purposes of this Act, the prohibited grounds of discrimination are race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, age, sex, sexual orientation, marital status, family status, disability and conviction for which a pardon has been granted.51 The CHRA has been amended since its enactment. For example, a 1998 amendment expressly authorized claims of discrimination based on multiple grounds.52 A Private Member’s Bill in the Session of Parliament ending in 2007 would have added “gender identity or expression” to the grounds of discrimination prohibited by the CHRA, but this Bill failed.53 48 Charter, § 1. 49 See Seneca College of Applied Arts & Technology v. Bhadauria, [1981] 2 S.C.R. 181 (holding Ontario Human Rights Code forecloses tort action for discrimination). 50 The Charter authorizes direct lawsuits to enforce its provisions, including the equality rights provisions. “Anyone whose rights or freedoms, as guaranteed by this Charter, have been infringed or denied may apply to a court of competent jurisdiction to obtain such remedy as the court considers appropriate and just in the circumstances.” Charter, § 24(1). 51 Canadian Human Rights Act, § 3(1), R.S., 1985, c. H-6 (hereinafter CHRA). The CHRA was amended to include “sexual orientation” as a prohibited ground of discrimination in 1996 (Bill S-2). 52 “For greater certainty, a discriminatory practice includes a practice based on one or more prohibited grounds of discrimination or on the effect of a combination of prohibited grounds.” CHRA, id., § 3.1, 1998, c. 9, s. 11. 53 See Bill C-326, First Session, Thirty-ninth Parliament, 55 Elizabeth II, 2006, House of Commons of Canada, First Reading, June 19, 2006. Ch. 3—Analytical Legal Comparison 71 Each province enacts its own human rights laws, and since provinces legislate exclusively in matters related to local property and civil rights, provincial human rights laws are significant. Provincial human rights laws therefore provide important contributions to the language of equality rights in Canada. For example, the British Columbia code generally prohibits discrimination against persons or classes of persons based on specified prohibited grounds: because of the race, colour, ancestry, place of origin, religion, marital status, family status, physical or mental disability, sex or sexual orientation of that person or class of persons.54 Like the CHRA, the provincial human rights codes all create some form of human rights agency to hear complaints and grant remedies. At least one province has enacted a “Civil Rights” Act authorizing lawsuits in court for acts of discrimination, but this Act does not apply to discrimination based on “sexual orientation.”55 Thus, like the CHRA, provincial human rights laws are enforced primarily within human rights agencies. Canadian courts have addressed discrimination motivated by “sexual orientation” under the equality rights language of both provincial and national human rights codes. Specifically, Canadian courts have held that “sexual orientation” must be included within the grounds of 54 Human Rights Code, § 8(b), R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 210 (banning discrimination in public accommodations). Effective January 1, 2008, age has been added as a prohibited ground of discrimination. See Bill 31—2007: Human Rights Code (Mandatory Retirement Elimination) Amendment Act, 2007, S.B.C. 2006, c. 21. The Northwest Territories Human Rights Act includes both “sexual orientation” and “gender identity” among prohibited grounds of discrimination. See Human Rights Act, S.N.W.T. 2002, c. 18, § 5(1). 55 See, e.g., Civil Rights Protection Act (B.C.), S.B.C. 1981-12-1 to -4 (effective Apr. 21, 1997), R.S.B.C. 1996 c. 49 s. 1-5 (authorizing tort action and offence for “interference with the civil rights” by promoting “hatred or contempt” or “superiority or inferiority . . . on the basis of colour, race, religion, ethnic origin or place of origin”). The definition section of the Civil Rights Protection Act sets out grounds apparently taken verbatim from the Criminal Code Hate Propaganda sections. See Criminal Code, § 318(4). But, while the Criminal Code has been amended to add “sexual orientation” as a prohibited ground, the BC Act has not. Moreover, even with the narrower list of prohibited grounds, reported cases applying the Civil Rights Protection Act are scarce. But see, e.g., Maughan v. University of British Columbia, 2003 BCSC 1367, [2003] B.C.J. No. 2080 (B.C. Supreme Ct.) (Brown J.) (striking some but not all claims under Act for failing to allege sufficient facts); LaFleur v. Royal & SunAlliance Insurance Co. of Canada, 2001 BCSC 856, [2001] B.C.J. No. 1220 (Supreme Ct.) (Drost J.) (dismissing complaint, including action under Act for failure to allege sufficient facts); Brochu v. Nelson, [1986] B.C.J. No. 998 (Supreme Ct.) (McKenzie J.) (dismissing action “at the threshold” for failing to prove prohibited act by “balance of probabilities”). One case is noteworthy here because it referred to the Civil Rights Protection Act in its analysis of Sentencing Principles for bias, prejudice or hate. See R. v. Gabara, [1997] B.C.J. No. 3090, ¶ 35 (Prov. Ct.) (Sundhu Prov. Ct. J.) (citing Act’s tort remedies and damages for the infringement of “civil rights” in support of sentencing premium for racial bias under Criminal Code, § 718.2). Ch. 3—Analytical Legal Comparison 72 discrimination prohibited by both national and provincial human rights laws; whereas, Discrimination based on “gender identity” or “gender expression” is not yet expressly prohibited by most provincial or national human rights laws.56 Although Canadian cities pass bylaws, they do not normally legislate in the field of equality, and they do not pass local hate crime laws.57 3.2.2.1.2 United States The United States Constitution did not originally specify general equality rights. In addition to altering the balance of powers between states and the national government, however, the Civil War Amendments added a vocabulary of equality rights to the constitutional text. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is most significant here because it established constitutional equality rights binding on the states: No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.58 The Supreme Court has construed the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to impose an analogous equal protection obligation on the federal government.59 56 A 1992 Ontario Court of Appeal case held that the Canadian Human Rights Act violated the Charter by failing to prohibit “sexual orientation” discrimination. Haig & Birch v. The Queen, [1992] O.J. No. 1609, 9 O.R. (3d) 495. The Court therefore read “sexual orientation” into the Act’s prohibited grounds of discrimination. In 1998 the Supreme Court held that a provincial human rights law failing to prohibit “sexual orientation” discrimination violated § 15. Vriend v. Alberta, (1998) 156 DLR (4th) 385. 57 Canadian Municipal governments do engage in legal contention related to hate crimes. For example a major human rights case establishing precedent for the suppression of internet hate propaganda arose from a formal human rights complaint filed by an agency of the Toronto, Ontario municipal government. See Citrion v. Zundel, [2002] C.H.R.D. No. 1, No. T.D. 1/02 (CHRT); see Citrion, id., ¶¶ 4-7 (summarizing complaint by Toronto Mayor’s Committee on Community & Race Relations, along with private citizen); see also id., n.49 (noting testimony of former Toronto Mayor regarding municipal agency mandate). Canadian cities also issue Resolutions condemning hate-related conduct. But, unlike the codes of some American cities, municipal bylaws in Canada do not generally address hate-related conduct. 58 U.S. CONST. AMEND. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added). 59 Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (construing U.S. CONST. AMEND. V). Constitutional equality appears in the Thirteenth Amendment (abolishing slavery), and the Fifteenth, Nineteenth, and Twenty-Sixth Amendments Ch. 3—Analytical Legal Comparison 73 While the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified in response to racial discrimination against African Americans, the term “equal protection of the laws” is expressed in neutral terms without specifying race or any other particular grounds of prohibited discrimination. The Fourteenth Amendment, furthermore, articulates no detailed standard for applying the Equal Protection Clause to particular disputes or particular kinds of discrimination. Because the Fourteenth Amendment has remained unchanged for nearly one hundred and fifty years, American courts have generated a significant body of jurisprudence interpreting its text. Courts apply one of three categories of scrutiny to review governmental classifications for compliance with the Equal Protection Clause. 60 The level of scrutiny alone does not determine the validity of a law, however.61 The United States Supreme Court has applied its most lenient level of scrutiny, a rational basis test, to invalidate state laws that expressly discriminate based on sexual orientation.62 On the other hand, the Court has not required states to pass laws affirmatively banning sexual orientation discrimination. And, like its Canadian counterpart, the United States Supreme Court has not definitively invalidated laws that discriminate based on gender identity or expression. (banning racial, gender, and age discrimination in federal elections). See U.S. CONST. AMENDS. XIII, XV, XIX, XXVI. 60 See United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (suggesting “more searching judicial inquiry” for anti-minority classifications); see generally, Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAL L. REV. 341 (1949) (discussing tiered analysis of fundamental rights claims). The lowest tier is a rational basis test—the government must prove the classification is rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest. Intermediate scrutiny applies to gender classifications: “For a gender-based classification to withstand equal protection scrutiny, it must be established at least that the [challenged] classification serves important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed are substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.” Nguyen v. INS, U.S. Sup. Ct. No. 99-2071 (June 11, 2001) (citations and quotation marks omitted) (applying equal protection component of Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause to classification in federal legislation). Race classifications receive strict scrutiny. See Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, U.S. Sup. Ct. No. 05-908 (June 28, 2007). 61 See Adarand Constructors, Inc., v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, at 229-230 (1995) (emphasizing level of scrutiny does not always determine outcome of judicial review). 62 See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634 (1996). The Court has applied the same standard to invalidate state laws interfering with liberty in “private, consensual homosexual conduct.” Lawrence v. Texas, U.S. Sup. Ct. No. 02-102 (June 26, 2003) (holding “statute furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual”). The Court declined to invalidate the Texas sodomy statute based on equal protection principles. Ch. 3—Analytical Legal Comparison 74 American courts do not interpret and apply the Equal Protection Clause by themselves. Since the Civil War era, the Congress has implemented constitutional equality rights in a series of Civil Rights Acts and other laws that elaborate on the Equal Protection Clause by articulating specific prohibited grounds of discrimination. 63 In addition to establishing governmental agencies in the civil rights field, the Civil Rights Acts have typically authorized criminal prosecutions and civil rights lawsuits in federal courts for discriminatory conduct. The model type of civil rights act remains current, and two relevant civil rights proposals currently pending in Congress adhere to the general type of civil rights legislation. The first proposal would amend the federal criminal laws in the civil rights field to authorize prosecutions against anyone “willfully” injuring others, “because of the actual or perceived religion, national origin, gender, sexual orientation, gender identity or disability of any person.” This Bill, named for Matthew Shepard, has passed a vote in the House of Representatives and has been introduced in the Senate.64 The Act would not alter the power of states to define and prosecute hate crimes under their own laws, but it would increase the number of hate crimes eligible for prosecution in federal court. The second proposal would authorize a private action in federal court for homo- and trans-phobic employment discrimination. The House of Representatives recently held hearings on this Bill, the Employment Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA). 65 ENDA would ban employment discrimination against “any individual . . . because of such individual’s actual or 63 Beginning with the Civil Rights Act of 1866, April 9, 1866, ch 31, 14 Stat. 27, and ending with the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Nov. 21, 1991, P. L. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, 42 USCS § 1981 nt., Congress has enacted nine statutes with the name “Civil Rights Act.” Congress has passed several other acts that use the term “Civil Rights” in their titles. A large number of federal statutes address civil rights without referring to the term in their titles. 64 The Matthew Shepard Local Law Enforcement Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2007, S.1105, 110th Congress, 1st Sess. (introduced in Senate Apr. 12, 2007); H.R. 1592 (identical legislation passed in the House by a vote of 237 to 180, May 3, 2007). 65 See H.R.3685, Employment Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA) (passed in House by vote of 235 to 184; introduced in Senate Nov. 13, 2007) (House version amended to omit ban on “gender identity” discrimination). Ch. 3—Analytical Legal Comparison 75 perceived sexual orientation[.]”66 It would expressly prohibit the collection of “statistics on actual or perceived sexual orientation.”67 States likewise enact civil rights and human rights laws, and these laws vary widely across the country. For instance, the Washington Law Against Discrimination guarantees a right to be free from discrimination based on grounds broader than federal civil rights laws: The right to be free from discrimination because of race, creed, color, national origin, sex, sexual orientation, or the presence of any sensory, mental, or physical disability or the use of a trained dog guide or service animal by a disabled person is recognized as and declared to be a civil right.68 The state statute authorizes both complaints to a state Human Rights Commission and citizen suits to enforce its terms in state court.69 Besides state legislation, American cities enact civil rights and human rights laws. The equality rights language used in these laws is too diverse to catalog here, but even municipal laws may expand equality rights. The Seattle Municipal Code prohibits discrimination in employment and other city-regulated activities based on a definition even broader than the Washington state statute: “Discrimination” means any conduct, whether by single act or as part of a practice, the effect of which is to adversely affect or differentiate between or among individuals or groups of individuals, because of race, color, creed, religion, ancestry, national origin, age, sex, marital status, parental status, sexual orientation, gender identity, political ideology, participation in a Section 8 program, the presence of any disability or the use of a trained dog guide or service animal by a disabled person.70 The Seattle Municipal Code also authorizes several municipal civil rights agencies with varying inquiry and enforcement powers. 66 Id., § 4(a)(1) & (2). 67 Id., § 9. 68 RCW § 49.60.030(1), as amended by 2006 c 4 § 3 (effective 2007). 69 See id., § 49.60.030(2) (authorizing “civil action . . . together with the costs of suit including reasonable attorney’s fees”). 70 Seattle Municipal Code § 14.06.020(L) (Definitions); § 14.04.040 (prohibiting unfair practices by private employers); see also § 3.110.260(A), (B)(1) (prohibiting discrimination by city agencies). Ch. 3—Analytical Legal Comparison 76 3.2.2.1.3 Analysis The texts, and even the court interpretations, defining equality rights in Canada and the United States seem simple enough on their face. The similarities and differences in these texts seem finite and, at first, easily understood. Yet, the theoretical approaches that underlie and accompany the application of equality rights in the two countries constitute a substantial literature. Therefore, after delineating several of the more obvious textual differences in equality rights texts in Canada and the United States, the following analysis will survey the differences in theoretical approaches to equality in the two countries. Several significant differences appear in the texts and interpretations of equality rights in Canada and the United States. First, Canadian constitutional equality has been articulated in the Charter in much greater detail, and much more recently, than its American counterpart. The Charter, § 15, specifies particular grounds of prohibited discrimination, and it authorizes the recognition of additional analogous grounds of discrimination.71 The American Equal Protection Clause is much older, and it defines constitutional equality in general terms of “equal protection” without specifying any particular grounds of prohibited discrimination. The neutral vocabulary invites courts to apply the Equal Protection Clause to all governmental classifications; yet, the text provides no formal mechanism for the recognition of particular grounds of prohibited discrimination. As a result, American courts apply evolving standards and levels of scrutiny that vary according to the types of discriminatory classifications challenged. Canadian courts, by contrast, are bound by particular grounds of prohibited discrimination and authorized to recognize additional grounds deemed analogous to those listed. 71 See Law, supra note 34, at ¶¶ 29, 44 (reviewing cases considering analogous grounds). Ch. 3—Analytical Legal Comparison 77 Second, the constitutional and statutory texts defining equality rights vary between the two countries.72 Beginning with the Civil War, Congress has enacted laws creating federal civil rights agencies and authorizing civil rights lawsuits and prosecutions in federal court to remedy prohibited discrimination. States and even cities have adopted similar civil rights laws. Many American civil rights laws also authorize remedies in administrative agencies. In Canada, the national and provincial governments have enacted human rights codes that prohibit discrimination and authorize administrative remedies, but civil rights litigation in Canadian courts is not generally part of the Canadian legislative model. Thus, while American equality is implemented significantly through civil rights litigation against both private parties and governmental entities in courts, in Canada discrimination claims against private entities are administered by human rights agencies. Third, while new analogous grounds of discrimination have been engrafted onto equality rights texts in both countries, the content of equality differs. In Canada, both provincial courts and the Supreme Court have mandated the recognition of “sexual orientation” as a ground of discrimination prohibited by human rights codes. American courts have not likewise mandated an affirmative, nationwide ban on sexual orientation discrimination in either federal or state laws. To date, American courts have merely invalidated legislation that discriminates based on sexual orientation in an irrational manner or in a manner that violates the privacy rights of persons accused of crimes, for instance. 72 The focus here is on the texts that define equality rights in each country. An alternative analysis would compare constitutional “cultures” or “sub-cultures” in the field of equality. See, e.g., David Schneiderman, Social Rights and “Common Sense”: Gosselin through a media lens, in POVERTY: RIGHTS, SOCIAL CITIZENSHIP, & LEGAL ACTION, ch. 3, at 57-73 (Margot Young, et al., eds., 2007) (examining “constitutional culture” of Canada in the context of social rights and poverty). Schneiderman defines a constitutional culture as: “those norms and values, reflected in constitutional text or in other instruments or institutional apparatus, which give expression to the . . . organizing principles for Canadian law and society. These, admittedly, may not be shared equally among all Canadians.” Schneiderman, id., at 57. Schneiderman identifies several specific sources of cultural evidence, including, “legislative schemes, media reports, or opinions of cultural leaders such as the Supreme Court of Canada.” Id. (footnote omitted). Ch. 3—Analytical Legal Comparison 78 Fourth, the Canadian Charter, § 15(2), expressly authorizes laws to ameliorate past discrimination by favoring the historically disadvantaged. Because no equivalent text appears in the Fourteenth Amendment, American courts have struggled to articulate the constitutional standards applicable to “affirmative action” laws. These differences appear in each country’s theoretical approaches to equality, which will be addressed next. In addition to the textual differences in equality rights laws, theoretical approaches to equality rights vary significantly between the two countries. Theoretical approaches to equality are significant to this study because hate crime laws in both Canada and the United States incorporate legal language defining equality using antidiscrimination terminology. The antidiscrimination terminology used in hate crime penalty enhancement laws has been the focus of criticism because of its inclusion of some, but not all, forms of discrimination among prohibited motives. This criticism is analyzed later, along with a comparison of the hate crime texts themselves. But, before leaving the topic of equality rights, it will be useful to describe the role of theoretical approaches to equality in Canadian and American legal discourse. By way of introduction, my earlier work arising from the Matthew Shepard killing proposed a particular theory of equality appropriate to the hate crime field in the United States. This theory focused on the distinction between group-based remedies for past discrimination: [W]hatever their validity in other areas, group remedies are foreign to criminal law. A group is not punished because one of its members commits a crime, and punishment does not depend on the group membership of a victim. Unlike the equitable remedies available in desegregation cases, hate crime laws overlay an anti-discrimination policy on the personal protections of the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments. . . . Interesting questions, beyond the scope of this article, arise about whether group-specific regulation (affirmative action) is permissible in the areas of employment discrimination, civil rights remedies, and even hate speech. However, in the context of hate crime laws themselves, neutrality is required.73 73 Bernard P. Haggerty, Hate Crimes: A View from Laramie, Wyoming’s First Bias Crime Law, the Fight Against Discriminatory Crime, & a New Cooperative Federalism, 45 HOW. L. J. 1, at 45-46 (2001) (footnotes omitted). Ch. 3—Analytical Legal Comparison 79 To explain, theories of equality in the United States tend to focus on group-based remedies for past discrimination because of the unique American experience with racial discrimination. My earlier article cited the Supreme Court cases, beginning even before the leading case of Brown v. Board of Education, in which the Supreme Court has struggled to articulate a coherent theory of equality applicable to remedies for racial discrimination.74 I concluded that over the course of the Twentieth Century, the Supreme Court’s approach shifted from an “individual” right to equality, to group-based remedies, and back to an emphasis on the “personal” nature of equality rights.75 Group-specific, equitable remedies for past discrimination remain available under the Court’s approach, but only upon a strict showing of “particularized findings of past discrimination.”76 The rhetorical struggle to articulate a coherent theory of equality applicable to group-specific remedies continues along similar lines in the United States.77 This rhetorical struggle to define an appropriate theory of equality rights in the United States has been characterized as a riddle of neutrality, which asks: “if the goal is to avoid identifying people by a trait of difference, but the institutions and practices make that trait matter, there seems to be no way to remedy the effects of difference without making difference matter yet again.” 78 Martha Minow resolves this riddle by settling on the “social-relations approach”—“learning to take the perspective of another,” and maintaining a “relational focus.”79 Iris Marion Young’s approach to equality rights is best described as a focus on “oppression and domination.”80 Adopting the communicative ethics approach of Habermas,81 Young argues for a 74 See Haggerty, id., at 45-46 nn.200-07 (collecting cases). 75 See Haggerty, id., at 45, 45 nn.199-203. 76 See id., at 45 (quoting Regents Univ. Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 299 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 77 See Haggerty, id., at 46 nn.208-09 (citing U.S. literature). 78 Martha Minow, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, & AMERICAN LAW, at 75 (1990). 79 Id., at 379. 80 Iris M. Young, JUSTICE & THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE, at 8-9 (1990). 81 Id., at 33-34, 42. Ch. 3—Analytical Legal Comparison 80 “group differentiated participatory public,”82 and a “democratic cultural pluralism.”83 Despite their theoretical appeal, these approaches have not been adopted by the United States Supreme Court. Theoretical approaches to equality in Canadian academic discourse do not differ significantly from their American counterparts. Citing Minow’s work, Coleen Sheppard notes the “difference dilemma” and joins the call for a “contextual, results-oriented approach,” with the goal to, “retain the beneficial effect of differential treatment without contributing to [] potential social stigma.”84 In the gender context, this approach considers four questions: (1) what social inequity is being ameliorated, and whether statutes can be worded in formally neutral terms that primarily benefit women; (2) is it possible to extend beneficial treatment to both men and women; (3) is it possible to eradicate the source rather than the symptoms of the inequity; and, (4) is “creative structuring of remedies” possible.85 Sheppard analyzes these questions and finds that the new equality provisions of the Charter, §§ 15(1)&(2), 28, and the § 1 interpretation provision, can accommodate them all, in theory. In a separate work Sheppard notes that concerns with costly and protracted affirmative action litigation led drafters to add the Charter, §15(2) special program provisions.86 Donna Greschner focuses on the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Law v. Canada., noting that the Court denied the equality claim presented in the case. Greschner nevertheless finds two important principles established by the decision: the “essential human dignity” test for disadvantage necessary to make out a discrimination claim; and, the need for an “examination of context and of the effects of law and policy,” to determine discrimination. 87 Greschner 82 Id., at. 95. 83 Id., at 174. 84 Colleen Sheppard, Grounds of Discrimination: Towards an Inclusive & Contextual Approach, 80 CAN. BAR REV., at 217, 221 (2001). 85 Id., at 219-20. 86 Sheppard, supra note 35, at 45-46. 87 Donna Greschner, The Purpose of Canadian Equality Rights, 6 REV. CONST. STUDIES 291, at 316-19 (2002). Ch. 3—Analytical Legal Comparison 81 reconciles the Law decision with her concept of “full membership” and “full belonging” within identity groups situated in society.88 In a more practical vein, Gwen Brodsky and Shelagh Day argue for an approach that extends the availability of government benefits programs where they are found to violate the equality provisions.89 Their framing “recognizes [] a difference between equalizing up and equalizing down.”90 Finally, as Greschner points out, unlike the United States Constitution, the Canadian Charter contains several multiculturalism provisions and “protects belonging in the human family (by virtue of containing human rights), identity groups and political communities.”91 This short survey does not pretend to exhaust academic arguments related to theories of equality in either Canada or the United States. Still, the authorities surveyed here are sufficient to support a simple observation about the state of equality in the two countries. While Canadian courts have not fully embraced the theories of equality offered by legal academics,92 the Charter does reflect a conscious choice to transcend the formally neutral approach to equality that prevails in the Supreme Court of the United States. To summarize, academic approaches to equality do not vary substantially between the United States and Canada. Judicial approaches to equality rights on the other hand vary significantly, and these variations track differences between the two countries’ constitutional equality texts—the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Charter, §15. The Supreme Court of the United States currently employs a formally neutral approach to constitutional equality rights. While the Supreme Court of Canada does not embrace all of the available academic theories of equality, it does recognize a more substantive approach to equality rights than its American counterpart. 88 Id., at 320-21. 89 Gwen Brodsky & Shelagh Day, CANADIAN CHARTER EQUALITY RIGHTS FOR WOMEN: ONE STEP FORWARD OR TWO STEPS BACK? at 86-87 (1989). 90 Id., at 92. 91 Greschner, supra note 87, at 304, 306. 92 See, Sheppard, supra note 35, at 60, 65 (citing examples of rational basis or similarly situate test creeping into analysis of Canadian court decisions). Ch. 3—Analytical Legal Comparison 82 Yet, the overall, national content of equality rights may be less important than the dynamics of equality rights within each country’s cultural setting.93 In the context of sexual minority rights, Canada and the United States share a common “Western” culture, democracy and human rights, and similar societies and economies. Also, sexual orientation discrimination “displays a degree of universality” in both countries.94 Canadian and American legal protections for sexual minorities have both been characterized as embracing an “Intermediate Recognition Model.” However, because of variations due to federalism, some American states embrace a “Mixed Recognition Model.”95 The recognition of rights varies even within states, moreover, and several major cities with more protective laws for sexual minorities, “might even be fairly assigned to the expansive recognition model.”96 While variations do appear in Canadian human rights laws, Canada does not exhibit such a geographical “pluralism” in human rights protection.97 Furthermore, despite the apparent differences in equality rights, American and Canadian legal systems remain surprisingly similar. Even though both the models of enforcement and the distribution of enforcement powers vary between the two countries, the resulting vocabulary of legal equality remains similar. Although the text of the American Equal Protection Clause remains the same after a century and a half, American courts and legislators have extended its general principle of equality to include most of the kinds of discrimination prohibited under the Canadian Charter and human rights codes. And,, while American law has not embraced an affirmative, nationwide ban on “sexual orientation” discrimination, such a ban has been adopted in several states and has been proposed in Congress. Finally, while neither country’s courts or 93 See Robert WINTEMUTE, SEXUAL ORIENTATION & HUMAN RIGHTS: THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION, & THE CANADIAN CHARTER (1995). 94 Id., at 229-30. 95 See Eric Heinze, SEXUAL ORIENTATION: A HUMAN RIGHT, AN ESSAY ON INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW, at 106-11 (1995). Heinze describes this classification as including decriminalization of consensual same-sex practices and some general laws banning sexual orientation discrimination, but falling short of “Affirmative Assimilation.” See id., at 107-11. 96 See id., at 111 n.34, 113. 97 See id., at 113. Ch. 3—Analytical Legal Comparison 83 lawmakers have adopted a nationwide ban on “gender identity” discrimination, 98 a ban on “gender identity” discrimination has been proposed in both countries. In both Canada and the United States, constitutional protections for freedom of expression may conflict with equality rights. Conflicts between free expression and equality appear acutely in the regulation of hate speech. These conflicts are resolved with very different outcomes in the two countries. Hate speech is not the focus of this study. Nevertheless, an examination of hate speech illustrates the legal limits of laws that impose criminal penalties for hate-related conduct in each country. Therefore, a brief discussion of the application of free expression and equality rights to hate speech laws appears in the next section. 3.2.2.2 Free Expression Constraints on Equality Hate crime laws are subject to constitutional limits in both Canada and the United States. In both countries, free expression principles constrain the use of laws to enforce equality. Both the constitutional texts and judicial interpretations of free expression and equality vary between the two countries. The differences in Canadian and American free expression principles are paralleled in dramatically different hate speech and hate propaganda laws. On the other hand, free expression principles have not significantly limited the application of hate crime penalty laws in either country. 3.2.2.2.1 Canada The statutory free expression provisions of the Canadian Bill of Rights remain valid, but Canada’s constitutional protection for free expression now appears in the Charter: 2. Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms: a) freedom of conscience and religion; 98 The analysis here suggests Canadians will adopt “gender identity” as a prohibited ground, if at all, beginning with court decisions and extending uniformly to provincial and federal human rights codes. Americans on the other hand will adopt the new ground, if at all, via legislation, but only if courts do not invalidate the new legislation. Ch. 3—Analytical Legal Comparison 84 b) freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including freedom of the press and other media of communication; c) freedom of peaceful assembly; and d) freedom of association.99 As with equality rights, the Charter’s free expression protections are subject to a “reasonable limits” standard.100 The application of free expression as a constraint on equality in Canada is best illustrated by the leading Canadian hate speech case. In R. v. Keegstra,101 the Supreme Court recognized the harm of discriminatory speech, even when it is unaccompanied by violent conduct: The offence does not require proof that the communication caused actual hatred. . . . The intention of Parliament was to prevent the risk of serious harm and not merely to target actual harm caused. The risk of hatred caused by hate propaganda is very real. . . . [D]enigration of persons on the basis of their ethnic identity or other group membership in and of itself, as well as in its other consequences, can be an irreversible harm[.]102 Prosecutions for Hate Propaganda in Canada will be addressed along with other hate crime laws later. But, for present purposes it is important to note that the Supreme Court of Canada has affirmed convictions under the Hate Propaganda sections of the Criminal Code, despite the recognized constitutional value of free expression. In Keegstra the Court specifically held that the ban on the willful promotion of hatred infringed the § 2(b) free expression provisions of the Charter, but that the infringement was justified as a reasonable limit in a free and democratic society under § 1.103 99 Charter, § 2. 100 See Charter, § 1. 101 R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697. See also R. v. Andrews, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 870 (companion case to Keegstra). 102 See Mugesera v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), [2005] 2 S.C.R. 100, ¶ 102 (citing Keegstra). 103 Soon after Keegstra, in Zundel, the Court declared the “spreading false news” provision of the Criminal Code unconstitutional as a violation of the Charter § 2(b) and unjustified under § 1. R. v. Zundel, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 731 (opinion of McLachlin, J) (invalidating Criminal Code § 181 pursuant to § 2(b)). Specifically, the Court found that the section was overbroad for the “objective of social harmony,” that it caused more than a “minimal impairment” out of proportion to its free expression impacts, and that therefore, it could not be justified under § 1 of the Charter. Zundel, id., ¶¶ 56, 68, 70. The Court reasoned: “If a limitation on rights is established, the onus shifts to the Crown to show that the legislation is justified under s. 1, where the benefits and prejudice associated with the measure are weighed.” Id., ¶ 37. The Court expressly refused to apply “the U.S. doctrine of shifting purposes” to the false news section: “To convert s. 181 into a provision directed at encouraging racial harmony is to go beyond any permissible shift in emphasis and effectively rewrite the section.” Id., ¶ 45. “Justification under s. 1 requires more than the general goal of protection from harm common to all criminal legislation; it requires a specific purpose so pressing Ch. 3—Analytical Legal Comparison 85 Even before the Charter, equality rights interacted with free expression to limit the availability of criminal penalties in Canada. The Supreme Court reversed a “seditious libel” conviction in the 1951 case Boucher v. the King.104 The defendant had published a pamphlet complaining about the persecution of Jehovah’s Witnesses in Quebec. Many of the acts condemned in the pamphlet would constitute hate crimes by a contemporary understanding in either Canada or the United States.105 The Court unanimously agreed that the jury instructions defining seditious libel were inadequate because they did not incorporate the Criminal Code protections for “good faith” condemnation of “hatred.”106 Boucher pre-dated even the Canadian Bill of Rights, and as with equality rights analysis, the Charter has since altered the legal analysis applicable to freedom of expression. Today, unless it is communicated directly via physical violence, hate speech falls within the Charter’s § 2(b) protection for freedom of expression. 107 But, even though hate speech may constitute protected expression under § 2(b), Parliament and the courts may impose restrictions, and even criminal penalties, for hate speech so long as they are balanced by reasonable limits necessary in a free and democratic society, as set out in § 1. Under this § 1 balancing test, the Court generally and substantial as to be capable of overriding the Charter’s guarantees.” Id., ¶ 46. The Court held that, unlike the propaganda sections which were supported by extensive findings in the Cohen Report and elsewhere, no available evidence explained why Parliament retained § 181. See id., ¶¶ 48-49. While the section may have served “legitimate purposes” the Court concluded it served, “no objective of pressing and substantial concern.” Id., ¶ 51. 104 [1951] S.C.R. 265. 105 See id., at 285 (opinion of Rand, J., summarizing, inter alia, assaults, destruction of bibles, mob violence). 106 Id., at 277-85 (opinion of Rand, J.) (construing Criminal Code § 133A). Rand, J. held Criminal Code 133A protected the pamphlet as “primarily a burning protest,” intended as “an earnest petition” for the protection of a religious minority. He quoted the Code provision protecting the “good faith” condemnation of “hatred”: WHAT IS NOT SEDITION.—No one shall be deemed to have a seditious intention only because he intends in good faith,- . . . . (c) to point out, in order to their removal, matters which are producing or have a tendency to produce feelings of hatred and ill-will between different classes of His Majesty’s subjects. Id., at 289-90 (quoting § 133A). According to Rand, J., the trial judge “virtually ignored” the defense of good faith. The majority also applied the good faith exemption to hold that the pamphlet could not have proven a seditious intention against the administration of justice or the courts. Id., at 290-92. 107 See Ross v. New Brunswick School District No. 15, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 825. Ch. 3—Analytical Legal Comparison 86 approves of restrictions on violent or terroristic expression. 108 And, as will be seen in the discussion of other hate crime laws later, the Canadian Criminal Code does authorize criminal penalties for hate propaganda. 3.2.2.2.2 United States In the United States, the First Amendment contains constitutional free expression principles applicable to both the state and national governments: Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, . . . or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.109 The Supreme Court of the United States applied the First Amendment to hate speech laws at about the same time as the Canadian decision in Keegstra—but with a different outcome. Soon after hate crime and hate speech laws became common, the United States Supreme Court defined the free expression constraints applicable to such laws in Wisconsin v. Mitchell110 and R.A.V. v. St. Paul. 111 In Mitchell, the Court approved a state statute authorizing an enhanced penalty for hate crimes, and in R.A.V. the Court invalidated a city ordinance banning cross-burning, on free expression grounds. These two decisions establish the free expression limits on both hate crime and hate speech laws. Hate speech laws violate the First Amendment’s free speech provisions if they prohibit only one particular form of discriminatory expression— for example cross-burning.112 State laws may punish conduct combined with expression, for 108 See R. v. Keegstra, supra note 101 (Dickson, C.J., § 1 balancing “preferable course” for laws limiting free expression, liberally defined); Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3. 109 U.S. CONST. AMEND. I. The free expression principles of the First Amendment were adopted a century earlier than even the Equal Protection Clause and have therefore accumulated a very large body of jurisprudence. 110 508 U.S. 489 (1993). 111 505 U.S. 377 (1992). 112 The Supreme Court has since held that a state statute banning cross-burning does not violate the First Amendment so long as it criminalizing cross-burning “carried out with an intent to intimidate.” Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003). The case was brought to challenge to the constitutionality of a state cross-burning statute, which, as in R. v. Zundel, was incorporated into a jury instruction in a criminal trial. See Virginia v. Black, id., at 363 (plurality op. of O’Connor, J.). Ch. 3—Analytical Legal Comparison 87 example cross-burning, when it is committed for the purpose of intimidation.113 And, hate crime sentencing laws do not violate the First Amendment so long as they punish harms distinct from speech.114 Unlike Canada, the United States has few federal laws directly criminalizing hate speech and no law prohibiting “hate propaganda.” Thus, most Supreme Court cases defining the permissible reach of hate speech laws arise from challenges to state statutes or municipal ordinances.115 The United States Code does contain a provision criminalizing incitement to genocide.116 The genocide statute, however, does not authorize a private right of action; the only statutory remedy for incitement to genocide is a federal criminal prosecution.117 And, based on free speech doctrine, the federal courts have construed the genocide statute quite narrowly.118 3.2.2.2.3 Analysis The application of equality rights and freedom of expression to criminal penalties for hate crimes is addressed in more detail in the next section. For present purposes, however, Table 3.1 113 See Virginia v. Black, supra note 112. The reasoning of the Justices in Virginia v. Black illustrates the application of equality and free expression principles in the context of hate speech: The First Amendment permits Virginia to outlaw cross burnings done with the intent to intimidate because burning a cross is a particularly virulent form of intimidation. Instead of prohibiting all intimidating messages, Virginia may choose to regulate this subset of intimidating messages in light of cross burning’s long and pernicious history as a signal of impending violence. Thus, just as a State may regulate only that obscenity which is the most obscene due to its prurient content, so too may a State choose to prohibit only those forms of intimidation that are most likely to inspire fear of bodily harm. A ban on cross burning carried out with the intent to intimidate is fully consistent with our holding in R. A. V. and is proscribable under the First Amendment Id., (op. of O’Connor, J.). The Majority remanded, but Souter, J., concluded the statute could not be saved under strict scrutiny: “Since no R. A. V. exception can save the statute as content based, it can only survive if narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest, id., at 395-396, a stringent test the statute cannot pass; a content-neutral statute banning intimidation would achieve the same object without singling out particular content.” Virginia v. Black, id. (op. of Souter, J.). 114 See 16B C.J.S. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 964 (2005 & Supp. 2006) (collecting cases). 115 See, e.g., R.A.V., supra note 111 (St. Paul city ordinance); Virginia v. Black, supra note 112 (state cross-burning statute). 116 42 U.S.C.A. § 1091 (c) (2000 & Supp. 2007). 117 See id., § 1091(b); Manybeads v. United States, 730 F.Supp. 1515, 1521 (D. Arizona 1989) (citing § 1092 “Exclusive remedies”). 118 See, e.g., Manybeads, id., at 1521. Although the federal genocide law does not preempt state and local genocide laws, they are subject to the free speech constraints of the First Amendment. Ch. 3—Analytical Legal Comparison 88 summarizes the differences and similarities in equality rights and free expression in Canada and the United States. Table 3.1—Equality Rights & Free Expression Canada United States Constitutional Equality Rights • Charter, § 15 • “equal protection and equal benefit of the law . . . without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.” • Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause • “equal protection of the laws” Equality Rights Legislation • National CHRA • Provincial Human Rights Codes • No Municipal Human Rights Laws • Federal Civil Rights Acts • State Civil & Human Rights Laws • Municipal Civil & Human Rights Laws Sexual Orientation Discrimination • Prohibited by Charter (Analogous Ground) • Mandatory inclusion in federal & provincial codes • Discriminatory Legislation Generally Prohibited (Rational Basis Scrutiny) • No mandatory inclusion in state or federal Laws Gender Identity or Expression Discrimination • Not Prohibited by Charter (Not Analogous Ground) • Not Generally Prohibited (Rational Basis Scrutiny) Free Expression • Charter, § 2 • First Amendment Free Speech Clause Hate Speech Laws • Criminal Code, §§ 318, 319 (“Sexual Orientation” a Prohibited Ground) • No Local Hate Speech Laws • No National Hate Speech Laws • State & Municipal Intimidation Laws (“Sexual Orientation” & “Gender Identity” Sometimes Prohibited Grounds) Ch. 3—Analytical Legal Comparison 89 As Table 3.1 indicates, Canadian and American legal systems share significant similarities. There are, however, important differences in both the content and the location of activity in the two legal systems.119 The Charter specifies prohibited grounds of discrimination, and Canadian courts have recognized “sexual orientation” as a ground of constitutionally-prohibited discrimination. Therefore the Charter requires both national and provincial human rights laws to prohibit discrimination based on “sexual orientation.” The Fourteenth Amendment articulates a standard of equality with no specific prohibited grounds of discrimination. American courts have invalidated laws that expressly discriminate based on “sexual orientation.” But, the United States Constitution does not require national or state governments to prohibit discrimination based on “sexual orientation.” Discrimination based on “gender identity” or “gender expression” remains lawful throughout much of Canada and the United States. In both Canada and the United States, criminal conduct motivated by prohibited grounds of discrimination is punished relatively unrestrained by constitutional freedom of expression. Hate-related speech, however, is far more protected in the United States than in Canada. Canada therefore employs much more robust hate propaganda laws, and these laws include “sexual orientation” as a prohibited bias. In addition to the content of equality and free expression principles, the location of legal activity differs considerably in the two countries. Canadian cities have no power to define equality rights in either antidiscrimination legislation or hate speech laws. Subject to the limits of the constitutional standards, American cities legislate actively in the field of equality, and although they are subject to the strict constraints of the First Amendment, they pass laws 119 See generally, Abigail Jones Southerland, The Tug of War Between First Amendment Freedoms & Antidiscrimination: A Look at the Rising Conflict of Homosexual Legislation, 5 REGENT J. INT’L L. 183, at 190-95 (2007) (cautioning Americans against borrowing Canadian approach to free expression and “antidiscrimination”). Ch. 3—Analytical Legal Comparison 90 penalizing hate speech—some of which include “sexual orientation” and “gender identity” as prohibited biases. These variations in content and location of legal activity provide the necessary context for an examination of hate crime penalty enhancement laws in the next section. 3.2.3 Enhanced Penalties for Homophobic & Trans-phobic Hate Crimes A comparison of national cultures would likely reveal variations in general legal philosophy between the two countries. But, in the area of hate crime penalties, judges, legislators, and other policy makers in Canada and the United States have produced a surprisingly similar body of law, over roughly the same time span. In recent decades courts in both countries have begun to incorporate the denunciation of discriminatory conduct into their sentencing decisions. Even homophobic and trans-phobic motives have been considered in criminal cases in both countries for some time. Until recent decades, however, both Canadian and American judges lacked a standard vocabulary to incorporate homophobic and trans-phobic bias into their decisions imposing criminal punishment. Therefore, finding older court decisions that expressly address homophobic and trans-phobic motives can be difficult. In both Canada and the United States, discriminatory motives have been considered in reported cases addressing criminal defenses loosely phrased “gay panic,” “homosexual advance,” or “homosexual assault.” Because of changes in legal terminology, analyzing these older decisions presents serious problems. Nevertheless, courts in these cases addressed behavior that today might constitute homophobic or trans-phobic hate crimes. Ch. 3—Analytical Legal Comparison 91 The Hate Crime Statistics Act of 1990 (HCSA), the first national hate crime law in the United States, identified certain crimes motivated by “sexual orientation” as hate crimes.120 The HCSA did not authorize criminal penalties or other legal remedies. While the Canadian Parliament enacted “hate propaganda” laws in the 1970s, 121 these laws were only recently amended to address expressive conduct motivated by “sexual orientation.”122 In the mid-1990s, however, national criminal laws in both Canada and the United States were amended to authorize enhanced penalties for discriminatory crimes. Beginning in the mid-1990s, therefore, both nations’ laws authorized enhanced criminal penalties for crimes motivated by “sexual orientation.” Because of their near contemporaneous enactment, these hate crime penalty laws provide a logical benchmark for an analysis of sentencing trends in both countries. Hate speech laws, while similarly conspicuous when applied, are excluded from the analysis here for several reasons. First, hate speech laws in Canada and the United States have been compared elsewhere.123 The role of hate speech as a mobilizing agent in social movements has similarly been examined in some detail elsewhere. 124 Thus, the need for a further examination of hate speech laws in the Canada and the United States is minimal. Second, despite significant differences in free expression doctrine in the two countries, the outcome of hate speech prosecutions may be the same in practice. Even in Canada, where 120 See 28 U.S.C.A § 534 notes (2006) (codifying Pub. L. 101-275, Apr. 23, 1990, 104 Stat. 140, as amended Pub. L. 103-322. Title XXXII, § 32096, Sept. 13, 1994, 108 Stat. 2131; Pub. L. 104-155, § 7, July 3, 1996, 110 Stat. 1394 (Hate Crime Statistics Act)). 121 See Criminal Code §§ 318 & 319 (codifying Bill C-3, An Act to Amend the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970 (1st Supp.), c. 11, amending R.S.C. 1970 (Royal Assent June 11, 1970). 122 See Criminal Code § 319, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-46 (formerly Criminal Code, § 281.2, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34)), as amended by Bill C-250, An Act to Amend the Criminal Code (hate propaganda), passed by the House of Commons of Canada on Sept. 17, 2003. 123 See Ellen Faulkner, Homophobic Hate Propaganda in Canada, 5 J. HATE STUDIES 63 (2006/07) (Special Issue on Hate and Communication, Gonzaga University School of Law, Institute for Action Against Hate) (comparing Canadian and American hate speech laws); William G. Buss, A Comparative Study of the Constitutional Protection of Hate Speech in Canada & the United States: A Search for Explanations, in CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (Sally Kenney, et al., eds., 1999); see generally James Warren Grayson, The Role of Government & the Constitutional Protection of Equality & Freedom of Expression in the United States & Canada (LL.M. Thesis, Univ. of B.C., 1996); Evelyn Kallen, ETHNICITY & HUMAN RIGHTS IN CANADA, at 261-67 (2nd ed. 1995) (distinguishing libertarian versus egalitarian values). 124 See David A. J. Richards, FREE SPEECH & THE POLITICS OF IDENTITY (1999) (analyzing role of hate speech in mobilization of civil rights groups). Ch. 3—Analytical Legal Comparison 92 hate speech is regulated by long-standing Criminal Code Hate Propaganda provisions, the distinction between hate speech and hate crimes attracts a large volume of literature.125 Yet, even the most vehement critics of the Canadian approach to hate speech admit that Canadian law enforcement authorities have not taken significant steps to enforce the hate propaganda provisions against homophobic hate speech. As one such commentator has emphasized, “How rigorously the new federal law proscribing speech critical of homosexuality will be enforced— and what real effect it will have on speech—remains to be seen.”126 The reluctance of police agencies to lay charges in hate speech cases before the addition of “sexual orientation” to the hate propaganda provisions is well documented.127 And, even hate propaganda cases involving other prohibited grounds are extremely rare.128 In an important article, a group of Canadian law enforcement officials themselves contrast the “apparent obstacles, difficulties and uncertainties” of hate propaganda prosecutions with the recently adopted Criminal Code Sentencing Principles for bias, prejudice or hate.129 Indeed, even the most libertarian opponents of Canadian hate speech law concede that hate speech actually inciting “violent hate crimes” should give rise to criminal penalties.130 So, in Canada, pragmatic law enforcement considerations have limited hate speech prosecutions relative to cases invoking the Sentencing Principles for bias, prejudice or hate. 125 See, e.g., Note, The “Privilege of Speech” in a “Pleasantly Authoritarian Country”: How Canada’s Judiciary Allowed Laws Prohibiting Discourse Critical of Homosexuality to Trump Free Speech & Religious Liberty, 38 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 443 (comparing Canadian and American approaches to homophobic hate speech). 126 See id., 38 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. at 464. 127 See Faulkner, supra note 123, at 93 n.33 (noting December, 1996 case of homophobic pamphlets distributed in Victoria, B.C., where, “The RCMP was unwilling to lay charges since lesbians, gays, and bisexuals are not a protected group under the Criminal Code. In addition, they concluded that the distribution of religion-based hate literature in good faith is protected.”). 128 See Craig S. Macmillan, et al., Criminal Proceedings as a Response to Hate: The British Columbia Experience, 45 CRIM. L. Q. 419, 445 (2002) (noting canvass of Canadian jurisdictions showing “no, or very few, cases in which prosecutions for hate propaganda have been undertaken.”). 129 See Macmillan, et al., id., at 445 (analyzing police hate crime data, and data-collection practices, through the year 2000); see also id., at 451 n.67 (noting officers instructed in training “not to make arrests” under B.C. Civil Rights legislation, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 49, § 1(1) (authorizing summary conviction for promotion of hatred based on race and other factors but not “sexual orientation”)). 130 See supra note 125, 38 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. at 491-92, 492 n.324 (distinguishing speech inciting to hate crimes from speech merely damaging to human dignity). Ch. 3—Analytical Legal Comparison 93 Third, and perhaps most important, the overall research strategy here ties a key similarity in hate crime sentence enhancement laws to a key difference in hate crime statistics laws in the two countries, without reference to hate speech laws. Both the interview questions and answers analyzed in Chapter 5 and the case studies presented in Chapter 4 concentrate on notorious examples of hate crimes rather than hate speech alone. And, while groups in both locations were clearly opposed to homo- and trans-phobic hate speech, the key cases cited in the interviews were physical assaults that led to criminal prosecutions and hate crime sentencing decisions. For all of these reasons, hate speech laws will be examined only to a limited degree below, under the heading “Other Hate Crime Laws.” Laws that impose criminal penalties for hate-related conduct, rather than hate speech alone, are analyzed next. 3.2.3.1 Hate Crime Penalty Enhancement Laws Before surveying the two countries’ hate crime laws, four points of clarification are in order. First, serious objections to the use of criminal law to punish some, but not all, discriminatory conduct have been raised. These objections will be discussed below, along with the antidiscrimination language used in legal texts authorizing enhanced penalties for hate crimes in each country. Second, in reality, the term “hate crime” is a misnomer. No hate crime law in Canada or the United States requires proof of generalized “hate.” The key elements of proof in both Canadian and American hate crime penalty laws are: the existence of a prohibited bias; the requisite degree or quantum of motivation associated with the prohibited bias; and, the degree or quantum of proof required for punishment, i.e., beyond a reasonable doubt or by a preponderance of evidence. Each of these elements is addressed separately below. Ch. 3—Analytical Legal Comparison 94 Whether separate proof of a general hateful character is required is determined in the first instance by the express language of a given hate crime penalty law. As is revealed below, in both countries a hate crime penalty appears to require only proof of a prohibited bias as a characteristic of the offence, not the offender. So long as the offender was motivated by a prohibited bias at the time of the offence, the threshold requirement has been met. In other words, proof of an offender’s generally hateful attitudes is not expressly required for the imposition of punishment in either country. Third, the discussion here does not distinguish between discreet hate crime offenses and hate crime sentence enhancement laws. For instance, as described below, Washington state law does not include a sentence enhancement provision for discriminatory motives. Instead, a Malicious Harassment conviction is simply processed through a statutory “Sentencing Grid” that assigns a sentencing range depending on the defendant’s “offender score” and the “seriousness level” of the crime. 131 The seriousness of the discriminatory motives is embedded in the definition of Malicious Harassment and reflected in the “seriousness level” assigned to the offense. Similarly, the United States Code has for more than a century contained a discreet offense for the deprivation of federally-protected rights under the color of law, when motivated by racial discrimination.132 A more recent example of a discreet discriminatory crime defined without reference to a sentence enhancement statute is set out in the Church Arson Prevention Act of 1996, which penalizes damage to religious property because of race. 133 But, unlike Washington state law, the United States Code contains no separate offense incorporating “sexual orientation” as a prohibited bias—instead, only the United States Sentencing Guidelines are available for the punishment of homophobic bias in the commission of federal crimes. Because the societal significance of discreet hate crime offences and hate crime sentence enhancement 131 See RCW 9.94A.510, Table 1—Sentencing grid. 132 See 18 U.S.C. § 242 (Deprivation of rights under color of law). 133 See 18 U.S.C. § 247(c). Ch. 3—Analytical Legal Comparison 95 laws are substantially similar, I collapse these two types of hate crime law into one category for the purposes of analysis.134 Fourth, as already mentioned, hate speech laws are mostly excluded from the analysis of hate crime penalty enhancement laws here. American courts and legislators have adopted a convention distinguishing between “hate crimes” and “hate speech.”135 This distinction, largely necessitated by First Amendment limitations, defines a hate crime as, “a crime in which the offender’s conduct was motivated by hatred, bias, or prejudice, based on [a prohibited bias motivation].”136 On the other hand, “hate speech” laws punish discriminatory utterances apart from any accompanying criminal conduct: “Statutes which . . . simply punish the utterance of racist or bigoted speech, or the commission of bigoted acts substantially equivalent to speech, have been distinguished as ‘hate speech laws.’”137 National laws in both Canada and the United States impose criminal penalties for hate speech. The Canadian Criminal Code Hate Propaganda provisions apply nationwide and authorize punishment for discriminatory utterances, even where no other conduct is alleged. The United States Code likewise includes a provision authorizing criminal penalties for advocacy of genocide on discriminatory grounds. Both would be considered “hate speech laws” by American standards. The Canadian Hate Propaganda provisions were amended in 2004 to include “sexual orientation” as a prohibited bias motive. The American genocide statute does not include “sexual orientation.” More importantly, however, the American genocide statute has been construed as unenforceable on First Amendment free expression grounds. Because of the significant differences in principles of free expression, therefore, penalties for hate speech are difficult to compare across the Canada-United States border. 134 See, e.g., Ryan D. King, The Context of Minority Group Threat: Race, Institutions, & Complying with Hate Crime Law, 41 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 189, at 192 (2007) (collapsing “substantive” hate crime laws and hate crime “penalty enhancement” laws into a single category for analysis). 135 See generally Faulkner, supra note 123 (comparing Canadian and American hate crime laws). 136 See 15 AM. JUR. CIVIL RIGHTS, § 21 (collecting citations). 137 15 AM. JUR. CIVIL RIGHTS, § 21 Observation. Ch. 3—Analytical Legal Comparison 96 Canadian and American hate speech laws are addressed briefly as “other hate crime laws” later in a later section. Hate speech laws are otherwise excluded from the analysis for two primary reasons. First, the significant legal differences in Canadian and American hate speech law, largely due to differences in free expression principles, makes a comparison of hate speech laws unwieldy. Second, however, hate speech laws are excluded from the analysis here for methodological reasons. The significant cases cited by the interviewees and analyzed in Chapter 4 involve crimes rather than merely speech. To be sure, interview subjects at both sites cared deeply about the problem of homo- and trans-phobic hate speech. Nevertheless, the most notorious contentious events at both locations involved the commission of crimes that went beyond mere speech. By contrast, laws that authorize criminal penalties for discriminatory conduct, as opposed to discriminatory speech, are directly relevant to the analysis here. Almost simultaneously, national legislatures in both Canada and the United States expressly authorized enhanced penalties for crimes motivated by “sexual orientation.” To date neither has expressly authorized enhanced punishment for crimes motivated by “gender identity” or “gender expression.” 138 American states and municipal governments have also enacted statutes authorizing enhanced penalties for homophobic, and to a limited extent, trans-phobic139 crimes. Therefore, what follows will be an examination of the legal texts that authorize enhanced criminal penalties for crimes motivated by sexual orientation or gender identity or expression in Canada and the United States. 138 Canadian lawmakers have since reinforced principles of equality applicable to homophobic violence. In 2000, the Sentencing Principles were amended to add a “common law partner” to the aggravating factor for spousal abuse. Modernization of Benefits & Obligations Act, S.C. 2000, c. 12, s. 95 (amending Criminal Code § 718.2(a)(ii)). This change was motivated by Charter equality rights: “This enactment extends benefits and obligations to all couples who have been cohabiting in a conjugal relationship for at least one year, in order to reflect values of tolerance, respect and equality, consistent with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.” Id. 139 See Anne C. DeCleene, The Reality of Gender Ambiguity: A Road toward Transgender Health Care Inclusion, 16 LAW & SEXUALITY 123 (2007) (surveying trans-inclusive state laws, including state hate crime laws). Ch. 3—Analytical Legal Comparison 97 3.2.3.1.1 Canada The Canadian Criminal Code establishes uniform, national Sentencing Principles for crimes motivated by bias, prejudice or hate: 718.2 Other sentencing principles A court that imposes a sentence shall also take into consideration the following principles: (a) a sentence should be increased or reduced to account for any relevant aggravating or mitigating circumstances relating to the offence or the offender, and, without limiting the generality of the foregoing, (i) evidence that the offence was motivated by bias, prejudice or hate based on race, national or ethnic origin, language, colour, religion, sex, age, mental or physical disability, sexual orientation, or any other similar factor140 The Sentencing Principles included the prohibited bias “sexual orientation” when they became effective in 1996. A proposal in the current Session of Parliament would create a separate crime of mischief against property if, “motivated by bias, prejudice or hate based on religion, race, colour, national or ethnic origin or sexual orientation. . . . against any identifiable group[.]”141 The same Bill would ban institutional vandalism motivated by listed biases.142 This legislation would expand the types of conduct subject to hate crime penalties, but outside the Criminal Code Sentencing Principles. It would not expand the prohibited biases to include “gender identity.” Because the Constitution Act, 1867, gives Parliament an exclusive power to define crimes, Canadian provinces and cities do not enact hate crime penalty laws. Neither Parliament nor the provincial legislatures have created agencies to establish formal guidelines for the implementation of the Sentencing Principles. Instead, Canadian courts apply the Sentencing Principles on a case-by-case basis, subject to an evolving body of judicial precedent. 140 1995, c. 22, s. 6; 1997, c. 23, s. 17; 2000, c. 12, s. 95(c); 2001, c. 41, s. 20. 141 BILL C-384 1st Session, 39th Parliament, House of Commons of Canada, 55 Elizabeth II, 2006 (adding a proposed Criminal Code § 430(4.11)). The Bill uses the definition of “identifiable group” from the hate propaganda provisions of the Criminal Code: “(4) In this section, ‘identifiable group’ means any section of the public distinguished by colour, race, religion, ethnic origin or sexual orientation.” Criminal Code, § 318(4), R.S., 1985, c. C-46, s. 318; 2004, c. 14, s. 1. Parliament added “sexual orientation” as a prohibited bias effective in 2004. Note that the hate propaganda provisions do not expressly authorize courts to recognize analogous “identifiable groups.” 142 See id., Criminal Code § 430(4.11)(a)-(c) (proposed). Ch. 3—Analytical Legal Comparison 98 3.2.3.1.2 United States Federal sentencing practices in the United States are regulated by an administrative agency, the United States Sentencing Commission. A 1994 statute directed the Sentencing Commission to add a mandatory minimum penalty enhancement for hate crimes. 143 The Commission accordingly adopted a hate crime Sentencing Guideline establishing both a standard of proof and degree of bias required for imposing an increased penalty: §3A1.1. Hate Crime Motivation or Vulnerable Victim (a) If the finder of fact at trial or, in the case of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, the court at sentencing determines beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant intentionally selected any victim or any property as the object of the offense of conviction because of the actual or perceived race, color, religion, national origin, ethnicity, gender, disability, or sexual orientation of any person, increase by 3 levels.144 Several attempts have been made to expand the current federal hate crime laws. The newest proposal, named for Matthew Shepard, 145 would add a new criminal section to the existing civil rights laws to authorize hate crime prosecutions in federal court. The Act would apply to persons who “willfully” injure or attempt to injure others, “because of the actual or perceived religion, national origin, gender, sexual orientation, gender identity or disability of any person,”146 or “because of the actual or perceived race, color, religion, or national origin of any person.” 147 Federal prosecutions would be subject to limits. First, only a few, particularly violent crimes would be subject to prosecution in federal court. Second, some connection to the commercial or civil rights powers of Congress would be required for a federal prosecution. 143 Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. 103–322, title XXVIII, § 280003, Sept. 13, 1994, 108 Stat. 2096. 144 United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual, § 3A1.1 (November 1, 2006) (available online at http://www.ussc.gov/2006guid/gl2006.pdf (accessed Sept. 14, 2007)). While gender is a prohibited bias, the commentary to § 3A1.1, also pursuant to instructions from Congress, articulates a limit applicable to this bias only: “Do not apply subsection (a) on the basis of gender in the case of a sexual offense.” Id., Commentary, Application Note 1. In other words, sex crimes are hate crimes when they are motivated by an anti-African American bias, for example, but not when they are motivated by an anti-woman bias. 145 See The Matthew Shepard Local Law Enforcement Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2007, S.1105, 110th Congress, 1st Sess. (introduced in Senate Apr. 12, 2007). 146 Id., 18 U.S.C. § 249(a)(2)(A) (proposed) 147 Id., § 249(a)(1) (proposed). Ch. 3—Analytical Legal Comparison 99 Third, a federal prosecution would be available only upon a two-part certification by the Attorney General: (1) such certifying individual has reasonable cause to believe that the actual or perceived race, color, religion, national origin, gender, sexual orientation, gender identity, or disability of any person was a motivating factor underlying the alleged conduct of the defendant; and (2) such certifying individual has consulted with State or local law enforcement officials regarding the prosecution and determined that— (A) the State does not have jurisdiction or does not intend to exercise jurisdiction; (B) the State has requested that the Federal Government assume jurisdiction; (C) the State does not object to the Federal Government assuming jurisdiction; or (D) the verdict or sentence obtained pursuant to State charges left demonstratively unvindicated the Federal interest in eradicating bias-motivated violence.148 Yet, even if the proposed federal legislation were enacted, most American hate crimes would remain within the prerogative of state and local legislators and law enforcement officials. Most American states, and some local municipalities, have enacted hate crime penalty laws. State hate crime laws in the United States are too complex and diverse to describe in detail here.149 Generally, however, these laws fall into two categories. Most states use a sentencing enhancement model which, like the federal Sentencing Guidelines, authorizes or requires enhanced penalties for particular predicate offenses found to be motivated by a prohibited bias. A second group of states have created discreet offenses which, like the federal civil rights crimes, incorporate a biased motive as an element of the offense. 148 Matthew Shepard Act, id., § 7(a), quoting proposed 18 U.S.C. § 249(b)(1) & (2). On May 3, 2007, the House of Representatives passed the same Bill (H.R. 1592) by a vote of 237 to 180. The Senate passed the same version but as an amendment to the annual Department of Defense budget bill, and in late 2007 the hate crime legislation was removed from the bill by a Defense Authorization Conference Committee. 149 Perhaps the most comprehensive survey of hate crime authorities in the United States, including both state and federal statutes and judicial opinions, is Hate Crimes Law, by Professor Lu-in Wang. Lu-In Wang, HATE CRIMES LAW (1994). First published before the adoption of federal sentence enhancement provisions for hate crimes, her introduction and overview of federal laws relevant to hate crimes nevertheless illustrates the close relationship between federal criminal penalties in the field of “civil rights” and hate crimes. See id., ch. 2., at 2-1 to 2-26. Appendix B sets forth a Jurisdictional Review of State Statutory Provisions Relevant to “Hate Crimes.” Her survey is useful not only because it is comprehensive, but because it necessarily establishes a useable taxonomy for variations in hate crime laws throughout the United States. Her three categories of state hate crime laws are (1) laws criminalizing “ethnic intimidation” or “malicious harassment” (2) mandatory penalty enhancements for crimes motivated by bias, and (3) discretionary sentence enhancements for bias. See id., § 10.03. For simplicity I have collapsed ethnic intimidation and malicious harassment laws into one category. Ch. 3—Analytical Legal Comparison 100 Both the state of Washington and the city of Seattle have adopted hate crime penalty laws in the second category.150 The state statute creates the offense “Malicious Harassment”: Malicious harassment — Definition and criminal penalty. (1) A person is guilty of malicious harassment if he or she maliciously and intentionally commits one of the following acts because of his or her perception of the victim’s race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, gender, sexual orientation, or mental, physical, or sensory handicap: (a) Causes physical injury to the victim or another person; (b) Causes physical damage to or destruction of the property of the victim or another person; or (c) Threatens a specific person or group of persons and places that person, or members of the specific group of persons, in reasonable fear of harm to person or property. . . . 151 The Seattle Municipal Code creates a municipal offense, also called “Malicious Harassment,” but with a list of additional prohibited biases: SMC 12A.06.115 Malicious harassment. A. A person is guilty of malicious harassment if he or she maliciously and intentionally commits one (1) of the following acts because of his or her perception of another person’s gender identity, marital status, political ideology, age, or parental status: [threatens or causes personal injury or property damage].152 150 The Washington State Sentencing Guidelines do not expressly authorize aggravated sentences for bias or prejudice. See Adult Sentencing Guidelines Manual 2006 (Washington Sentencing Guidelines Commission, 2006); see Guidelines Manual, id., § I, at 21-23 (available online at http://www.sgc.wa.gov/PUBS/Adult_Manual/On_Line/Sentence_Options.htm (accessed Nov. 11, 2007). Enhanced penalties are authorized for offenses involving domestic violence or violent offenses against women known to be pregnant, for example, but not for bias motivations generally. Id. Thus, in Washington hate crime penalties are processed through separate criminal prosecutions for Malicious Harassment. Note however that Malicious Harassment is listed in the Guidelines Manual as a Class C Felony, with a “Seriousness Level” of IV. See Guidelines Manual, Appendix A, Felony Table. Thus, Malicious Harassment may be subject to an aggravated sentence in the appropriate circumstances—but not for hate-related bias. 151 RCW 9A.36.080 [1993 c 127 § 2; 1989 c 95 § 1; 1984 c 268 § 1; 1981 c 267 § 1.]. In addition to the elements of the offense set out in the quoted text, the Malicious Harassment statute sets out standards for the reasonableness of a victim’s fear, limitations on the use of evidence of an accused’s expressions and associations, and examples of racial and religious malicious harassment. 152 Seattle Municipal Code § 12A.06.115(A) (Ord. 120132 Section 1, 2000.) The Code defines “Gender Identity”: C. “Gender identity” means a person’s identity, expression, or physical characteristics, whether or not traditionally associated with one’s biological sex or one’s sex at birth, including transsexual, transvestite, and transgendered, and including a person’s attitudes, preferences, beliefs, and practices pertaining thereto. Id., § 12A.06.115(C). Ch. 3—Analytical Legal Comparison 101 Because the criminal law-making power is distributed throughout the several levels of government in the United States, as many as three layers of hate crime penalty laws may apply to the same criminal conduct. 3.2.3.1.3 Analysis Surprising similarities appear in the texts of Canadian and American hate crime penalty laws. The foremost similarity lies in the antidiscrimination terminology used to describe prohibited motives or biases. The national criminal laws of both Canada and the United States authorize an increased penalty for discriminatory crimes, and both specify “sexual orientation” as a prohibited ground of discrimination or prohibited motive. Neither expressly includes “gender identity” as a prohibited motive. The use of common terminology suggests that the two countries share common notions about equality in the context of criminal law. Yet, a systematic analysis belies the superficial similarities in vocabulary. As systems of legal inquiry and classification, the two countries’ hate crime laws embody different equality rights in practice. The following sections will address the subtleties of the differences between the two systems, beginning with the differences in the vocabulary of equality used in hate crime penalty laws. 3.2.3.2 Antidiscrimination Terminology in Hate Crime Sentencing Hate crime penalty enhancement laws articulated antidiscrimination terminology in national criminal codes in both Canada and the United States in the mid-1990s. As will be seen, antidiscrimination terminology appeared in a few court decisions before the enactment of formal hate crime penalty laws. Sentencing judges in both the United States and Canada occasionally used antidiscrimination terminology in their sentencing decisions before the enactment of hate Ch. 3—Analytical Legal Comparison 102 crime penalty statutes. Although some courts applied antidiscrimination principles in sentencing earlier, formal hate crime laws compelled judges to analyze evidence of discriminatory motives in their sentencing decisions more systematically, using a uniform terminology. Because hate crime penalty laws have established a new vocabulary of equality in sentencing decisions, an examination of their antidiscrimination terminology is important. Therefore, before examining the trend in court decisions before and after the enactment of hate crime laws, the next section will examine the antidiscrimination terminology embodied in these laws. This antidiscrimination terminology has been controversial, however, because it authorizes penalty enhancements for only some discriminatory motives. Criticism centered on which discriminatory motives to prohibit will be analyzed below along with a discussion of the terminology used in the legal texts themselves. 3.2.3.2.1 Canada The Canadian sentencing premium requires: “evidence that the offence was motivated by bias, prejudice or hate based on race, national or ethnic origin, language, colour, religion, sex, age, mental or physical disability, sexual orientation or any other similar factor.” 153 The Supreme Court has not been called upon to interpret the language of the sentencing premium, but 153 Criminal Code, § 718.2(a)(i). Enacted in 1995, the Canadian Sentencing Principles for “bias, prejudice or hate” came into force on Sept. 3, 1996, by Order in Council P.C. 1996-1271 (Aug. 7, 1996). See Bill C-41, An Act to Amend the Criminal Code (Sentencing) and Other Acts in Consequence thereof, S.C. 1995, c. 22. The legislative Summary provided the following explanation of the new provisions: “Part XXIII is amended to include an express statement of the purpose and principles of sentencing. Where a crime is motivated by ‘hate’, this is deemed to be an aggravating factor for the purpose of sentencing.” Id., c.22 Summary. The same Act required courts to consider sanctions other than prison, “with particular attention to aboriginal offenders” and set a general principle of sentencing equality. See id., S.C. 1995, c. 22, § 6. The principle states: “all available sanctions other than imprisonment that are reasonable in the circumstances should be considered for all offenders, with particular attention to the circumstances of aboriginal offenders.” Criminal Code, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-46, s. 718.2(e). In its leading sentencing equality case the Supreme Court reconciled the new equality principle for aboriginal offenders by weighing it along with both new and old Sentencing Principles related to uniformity. See R. v. Gladue, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688. The Court affirmed the sentencing judge’s decision not to reduce the sentence of an Aboriginal woman. Ch. 3—Analytical Legal Comparison 103 lower courts have applied the Sentencing Principles to enhance penalties for crimes motivated by sexual orientation. 3.2.3.2.2 United States Hate crime terminology began to appear in state laws in the United States in the early 1980s.154 The 1994 legislation requiring a federal hate crime penalty enhancement, and its implementing Guidelines, apply when, “the defendant intentionally selected any victim . . . because of the actual or perceived race, color, religion, national origin, ethnicity, gender, disability, or sexual orientation of any person.”155 Both the United States Supreme Court and the lower federal courts have rendered significant decisions regarding the application of the hate crime Guidelines, but the federal courts have not frequently applied the Guidelines to homo- or trans-phobic crimes. 154 See Michael Shively, Study of Literature & Legislation of Hate Crime in America, at i Key Findings (USDOJ, National Institutes of Justice, 2005); Nancy E. Gist, A Policymaker’s Guide to Hate Crimes, ix, Executive Summary (USDOJ, BJA, Nov. 1999 Reprint) (NCJ 162304). Significantly, American scholarship does not trace hate crime laws directly to World War II atrocities or any other single source. Shively provides the following synopsis: Accompanying the rapid spread of federal and state hate crime legislation over the past 20 years has been dramatic growth of the research literature on hate crime over the same time period. However, it would be misleading to suggest that hate crime research is a recent phenomenon. Studies of lynching and other forms of race-motivated violence preceded this period by decades. But the term “hate crime” did not appear with any substantial frequency in the social research literature until recently. Studies in which hate crime is so named and defined in ways generally consistent with contemporary hate crime statutes have grown from a trickle in the 1980s to a steady stream over the past ten years. Shively, id., at 49 (citations omitted); see generally, id., ch. 3 (“Research and Evaluation of Literature”). 155 Hate Crimes Sentencing Enhancement Act, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994) (codified in part at 28 U.S.C. § 994 note (1994)) (HCSEA); see also U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 3A1.1(a) (1998) (implementing HCSEA). The Guidelines Manual includes earlier civil rights laws alongside new enhancements for hate motivation. See Guidelines Manual, id., § 2H1.1 Application Note 4 (citing § 3A1.1). The Guidelines Manual lists two particular statues as “involving Individual Rights”—18 U.S.C. § 1091 (criminal penalties for genocide or incitement to genocide against “national, ethnic, racial, or religious group”); and 42 U.S.C. § 3631 (criminal penalties for intimidation or interference with housing rights, because of race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, national origin). 1 Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual, § 2H1.1 Commentary (2005). As required by Congress, the Guidelines prohibited the application of the sentence enhancement to sexual offenses involving gender bias. The United States Attorney’s Manual mentions principles applicable to sentence enhancement proceedings in several places, but it does not mention sentencing enhancement for hate crimes. United States Attorneys’ Manual, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/index.html (accessed July 30, 2007). Ch. 3—Analytical Legal Comparison 104 3.2.3.2.3 Analysis It is worth noting that the text of the Canadian Charter, particularly § 15(2), enshrines a more substantive approach to equality than the American Fourteenth Amendment. The texts of hate crime penalty laws in both countries, however, retain a formal equality approach in their grounds of prohibited discrimination. 156 Specifically, both the United States Sentencing Guidelines and the Canadian Sentencing Principles present a list of prohibited biases stated in neutral terms.157 Thus, on the face of the hate crime penalty provisions, enhanced penalties may be imposed on offenders from disadvantaged groups, if they target members of dominant groups because of a prohibited ground of discrimination. In other words, a gay man may be subjected to an enhanced penalty for a hetero-phobic assault against a person perceived to be straight. Hetero-phobic hate crimes are practically unheard of in either Canada or the United States. But, for example, a substantial fraction of police-reported hate crimes in the United States are racially motivated crimes committed by Black assailants against victims perceived to be White. The Canadian Sentencing Principles are theoretically subject to the same formally neutral application. Several aspects of the two countries’ hate crime terminology are analyzed below. The most important similarity here, however, is presence of “sexual orientation” as a prohibited bias. On the other hand, not all crimes motivated by “sexual orientation” are covered by the United 156 The distinction between formal and substantive equality penetrates the everyday discourse of the local Queer press in Vancouver. Professor Brenda Cossman, articulated the “trend” in Canadian court decisions beginning in the late 1990s to reverse, “the denial of pure formal equality: outright discrimination against gay folks because they were gay; outright animus, hatred, dislike, often justified in the language of religion and tradition.” Brenda Cossman, Naked Eye: Equality on Paper, XTRA! WEST, May 10, 2007, at 5. In her analysis, Professor Cossman concludes formal inequality had been successfully defeated by the Charter, but only after it was combined with, “the coming out of gay issues in the 1990s.” Id. Cossman does not mention hate crime legislation, but it is notable that the trend she identifies coincides with the codification of the Sentencing Principles for “bias, prejudice or hate.” Cossman rightfully cites the series of Supreme Court of Canada decisions in support of her conclusion that the Charter, “allowed the courts, rather than cowering politicians, to take the lead on formal equality rights.” Cossman, id. The list of key decisions, however, does not include those implementing equality in criminal sentencing. Unlike other fields, where courts provided leadership in eliminating formal inequality, criminal sentencing embraced formal equality principles only after Parliament’s codification of the Sentencing Principles. 157 The Aboriginal offender sentencing principle, by comparison, embodies a form of substantive equality. An Aboriginal offender subject to the sentencing premium for bias, prejudice or hate might argue for an offsetting mitigation under the separate Sentencing Principle for Aboriginal Offenders. Ch. 3—Analytical Legal Comparison 105 States Sentencing Guidelines. Hate crimes committed outside the sphere of federal legislative authority are not covered by the Sentencing Guidelines and are not subject to enhanced penalties for bias under the laws of some states. The Washington state Malicious Harassment statute authorizes punishment for crimes motivated by “sexual orientation,” but not all state statutes are as broad. Canadian and American hate crime laws are also deceptively similar in their omissions. Neither country’s laws expressly authorize increased penalties for crimes motivated by “gender identity.” But, while trans-phobic hate crimes are omitted from both countries’ laws, they are omitted differently. The Canadian Sentencing Principles—like the text of the Charter, § 15— invite courts to embrace analogous prohibited biases. The recognition of analogous grounds like “gender identity” is thus left to the discretion of the Courts. The American Sentencing Guidelines do not expressly authorize the recognition of additional biases. The text of the Guidelines does not refer to other similar forms of bias, and the historical practice has been for Congress, rather than the federal Courts or the Sentencing Commissioners, to expand existing penalties under the Guidelines. Notably, it was Congress rather than the courts or the Commissions, that mandated the establishment of Guidelines for hate motivated conduct.158 Thus, hate crimes motivated by “gender identity” may well go unpunished, particularly if they are not addressed explicitly in state law. The Washington Malicious Harassment law, for example, does not authorize punishment for crimes motivated by “gender identity.” The Seattle Municipal Code, on the other hand, does incorporate “gender identity” along with, “marital status, political ideology, age, or parental status,” as prohibited biased motives for crimes within the City’s legislative authority. 158 See, e.g., Pub. L. 103-322, Title XXVIII, § 280003, Sept. 13, 1994, 108 Stat. 2096 (Hate Crimes Sentence Enhancement Act mandating hate crime enhancement in Sentencing Guidelines). Ch. 3—Analytical Legal Comparison 106 Legislative proposals in the two countries suggest a fundamentally different approach to legal change in the field of hate crime penalties. Lawmakers in both Canada and the United States have proposed legislation to broaden the underlying conduct subject to hate crime penalties. Only in the United States do federal legislators retain for themselves the power to expand the antidiscrimination terminology applicable to hate crime penalties. But, judges in both countries interpret and apply existing hate crime texts in individual cases. The key aspects of hate crime penalty laws that remain subject to judicial interpretation in the two countries are examined next.159 Aside from the particulars of antidiscrimination language used in hate crime laws, serious objections have been raised to the use of criminal laws to punish some, but not all, forms of discriminatory motives. This criticism can only be understood in context with the hate crime penalty enhancement texts and the construction given to the texts in the course of judicial review by courts that have reviewed them. In the United States, the validity of hate crime laws has generally been accepted as settled doctrine.160 The United States Supreme Court has held that hate crime laws do not generally violate the constitutional equality rights of those penalized for their discriminatory crimes. Yet, the Court’s reasoning in its seminal case assumes that hate crime laws will be drafted using “content-neutral” antidiscrimination language that authorizes enhanced penalties, “across the board.” The Court expressly analogized hate crime laws to federal antidiscrimination statutes, 159 Other differences appear in the American and Canadian hate crime penalty laws. For example, the United States Sentencing Guidelines for hate motivation apply only a limited set of violence criminal offenses. Thus, among the limited classes of federal crimes, a still narrower list of “predicate offenses” are subject to the penalty enhancement provisions of the Sentencing Guidelines for hate motivation. The Canadian Sentencing Principles do not make such a distinction. In theory, all criminal offences defined under the Criminal Code are available as predicate offences for an enhancement based on bias, prejudice or hate. The absence of limits to the available predicate offences raises interesting questions about the potential for double aggravation. For example, may a court imposing a sentence for the willful promotion of hatred based on “sexual orientation,” consider the bias built in to the elements of the offence as an aggravating factor? This possibility is avoided by the listing of limited predicate offences in the United States Sentencing Guidelines and their enabling legislation. 160 See Bernard P. Haggerty, Hate Crimes: A View from Laramie, Wyoming’s First Bias Crime Law, the Fight Against Discriminatory Crime, & a New Cooperative Federalism, 45 HOW. L. J. 1, at 42-43 (2001) (citing authorities). Ch. 3—Analytical Legal Comparison 107 which constitute, “permissible content-neutral regulation of conduct.”161 In other words, hate crime laws in the United States do not violate a defendant’s constitutional equality rights, so long as they use neutral antidiscrimination classifications, like race or sexual orientation. The inference from the Supreme Court’s cases is that a hate crime law would violate a defendant’s constitutional rights if it authorized penalties using affirmative action terminology. In other words, a hate crime law authorizing enhanced penalties because the victim was “gay” or “black” would almost certainly be declared unconstitutional. Which classifications, or grounds of discrimination, to include within the list of prohibited biases remains subject to debate. Generally the grounds of prohibited discrimination incorporated into hate crime laws have coincided with historically problematic discrimination. Some grounding for the selection of prohibited biases in hate crime penalty laws may be found in the history of discriminatory violence, to the extent that it is documented. But, part of the problem encountered by advocates of hate crime laws has been a lack of official documentation with which to justify additional hate crime legislation. Regardless of which discriminatory motives are chosen to include in a hate crime statute, however, in the United States each ground of prohibited discrimination must adhere to the rule of group neutrality. The requirement of neutrality in hate crime penalty laws should render these laws immune from criticism based on their discriminatory effects. Nevertheless, such criticism persists. In Canada, a hate crime penalty enhancement law could be constructed without the neutrality required the Supreme Court of the United States. It is, for instance, entirely conceivable that something like the aboriginal offender provision of the Sentencing Principles could be incorporated into the Sentencing Principles for bias, prejudice or hate. In other words, Parliament could amend the Criminal Code to state explicitly that the terms “bias, prejudice or 161 See id. (citations omitted). Ch. 3—Analytical Legal Comparison 108 hate” are meant to apply only to victims targeted because of their disadvantaged status in Canadian society. Alternatively Canadian courts, if pressed to do so by the litigants in a criminal sentencing proceeding, could interpret the existing Sentencing Principles to incorporate a requirement of some victim disadvantage. To date, however, Canadian Courts and Parliament have not deviated substantially from the American approach of formal neutrality. Without venturing to predict the outcome of such an interpretive exercise, two basic approaches seem possible. First, a court could apply an interpretation of the terms, “bias, prejudice or hate,” similar to the interpretation of “discrimination” in the human rights context, which requires some showing of disadvantage. Second, alternatively, a court could simply note that the aboriginal offender provision of the Sentencing Principles expressly requires courts to consider the disadvantaged status of aboriginal offenders, while the principles for bias, prejudice or hate do not. If Parliament intended to require a consideration of disadvantage in the provisions for “bias, prejudice or hate,” it would have made the requirement explicit. Which interpretation would prevail in a Canadian court is impossible to predict. While the Supreme Court of Canada has yet to address the question, a neutral application of the Sentencing Principles for bias, prejudice or hate seems permissible under the equality rights provisions of the Charter. But, might the Sentencing Principles for bias, prejudice or hate be interpreted more liberally to permit a form of affirmative action in sentencing? Because of the Canadian commitment to substantive equality discussed previously, it is conceivable that either a court or Parliament could adopt a disadvantage-specific approach to hate crime sentence enhancement without violating the equality rights provisions of the Charter. Affirmative action in Canadian hate crime sentencing remains an unanswered question. The American interpretation, by contrast, is virtually certain—affirmative action in sentencing is impermissible, because the prohibited grounds of discrimination must apply in a neutral, “across the board” fashion. In sum, therefore, as they now stand, both Canadian and American hate Ch. 3—Analytical Legal Comparison 109 crime laws apply neutral, antidiscrimination terminology. Hate crime sentencing is subject to de jure neutrality in the United States and de facto neutrality in Canada. Yet, despite the requirement of neutrality in hate crime sentencing in both countries, law enforcement officials seem reluctant to invoke hate crime laws. I suggest this reluctance stems from two primary sources. First, the rhetoric of some hate crime sentencing decisions suggests a reliance on a logical fallacy—a continuing assumption that hate crime laws constitute a form of affirmative action. As has been shown, to date at least, there is no basis for characterizing hate crime laws as a form of affirmative action in either Canada or the United States. Second, however, critics of hate crime laws continue to object to what they see as an arbitrary selection of prohibited, discriminatory motives. I have summarized both this critique and the responses that have been made to it in a separate work: Some critics, notably Gellman, and Jacobs and Potter, suggest that hate crime laws are invalid because they identify proscribed biases arbitrarily. First, as with the choice of which offenses to include, the choice of classifications is no more arbitrary than any other policy decisions about criminal law. Second, one modern scholar has answered this critique by requiring a consideration of the “social context” of discrimination, omitting any class of discrimination that would place current victims at greater risk. A third approach, consistent with the American “social context” of equal protection jurisprudence, is to test the duration, extent, and effects of past discrimination. Any characteristic susceptible to “particularized findings of past discrimination” should be included in a hate crime penalty enhancement law. Hence, upon a showing of past religious discrimination, crimes motivated by religion should be regulated. Whether past religious discrimination generally or past religious crime specifically should be required; what quantum of evidence should be required; and how narrowly tailored any remedy must be to the area subject to past discrimination, are all additional legislative policy choices. However, one useful purpose of the HCSA is to provide empirical support for whatever classifications a legislature decides to include in a substantive hate crime statute.162 My conclusion was, in essence, that (a) hate crime laws are no more arbitrary than any other criminal laws, and (b) a well-drafted hate crime statistics law should answer any objection to the arbitrary selection of biased motives prohibited by a hate crime penalty enhancement law. This 162 Haggerty, id., at 50-51 (footnotes omitted) (citing Susan Gellman, Sticks & Stones Can Put You in Jail, But Can Words Increase Your Sentence? Constitutional & Policy Dilemmas of Ethnic Intimidation Laws, 39 UCLA L. REV. 333 (1991); James B. Jacobs & Kimberly Potter, HATE CRIMES: CRIMINAL LAW & IDENTITY POLITICS (1998)). Ch. 3—Analytical Legal Comparison 110 conclusion still seems valid in the United States, and it seems to apply with equal force in Canada. Even if Canadian courts or the Parliament chose to embrace an affirmative action approach or disadvantaged status analysis to hate crime penalty enhancements, hate crime laws would be no more arbitrary than, for example, the aboriginal offender sentencing principles. And, while Canada has no national hate crime statistics reporting law, such a law could provide a rational justification for the grounds of discrimination prohibited by Canadian hate crime laws. 3.2.3.3 Standard of Proof In both Canada and the United States prosecutors must prove the elements necessary to impose increased penalties for hate crimes. Constitutions and statutes in both countries articulate a standard of proof for criminal cases, and courts in both countries have interpreted the standard of proof applicable to hate crime penalties. 3.2.3.3.1 Canada The Canadian Bill of Rights articulates a “right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty according to law in a fair and public hearing.”163 The Charter elaborated on the language of the Bill of Rights by adding a specific reference to trial by jury: 11. Any person charged with an offence has the right . . . ; d) to be presumed innocent until proven guilty according to law in a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal; . . . ; f) except in the case of an offence under military law tried before a military tribunal, to the benefit of trial by jury where the maximum punishment for the offence is imprisonment for five years or a more severe punishment;164 Neither text expressly mandates proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and neither specifically applies to sentencing proceedings. 163 Canadian Bill of Rights, § 2(f). 164 Charter, § 11(d), (f). Ch. 3—Analytical Legal Comparison 111 Even before the Charter, however, the Supreme Court of Canada unanimously held that the crown must prove aggravating factors in sentencing beyond a reasonable doubt.165 And, Parliament has since specified the standard of proof for an enhanced sentence under the Canadian Criminal Code: 724. (1) In determining a sentence, a court may accept as proved any information disclosed at the trial or at the sentencing proceedings and any facts agreed on by the prosecutor and the offender. . . . . (3) Where there is a dispute with respect to any fact that is relevant to the determination of a sentence, (a) the court shall request that evidence be adduced as to the existence of the fact unless the court is satisfied that sufficient evidence was adduced at the trial; . . . ; (d) subject to paragraph (e), the court must be satisfied on a balance of probabilities of the existence of the disputed fact before relying on it in determining the sentence; and (e) the prosecutor must establish, by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the existence of any aggravating fact or any previous conviction by the offender.166 The sentencing court “shall accept as proven all facts, express or implied, that are essential to the jury’s verdict of guilty.”167 165 See R. v. Gardiner, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 368 (per Dickson, J.); see also R. v. Boucher, [1951] S.C.R. 265 (reversing and remanding for entry of judgment of acquittal in absence of proof beyond a reasonable doubt). Laskin C.J., dissenting, reasoned that the Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction to address questions of “quantum” for sentences within the authorized range: “If Parliament has thought fit to leave the quantum of a sentence to be finally determined at the Court of Appeal level, it should similarly be considered that this carries with it the final determination of the considerations which enter into the measure of a sentence.” Gardiner, id. (opinion of Laskin, C.J., dissenting in part). In its 1982 decision, R. v. Gardiner, a majority of the Supreme Court held that the power to determine the standard of proof in sentencing lay with the Courts. The Majority held that the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review principles applied in sentencing, and in particular the applicable burden of proof: Questions of burden of proof have traditionally been of concern to the judiciary and left to the judiciary and not Parliament to resolve. We are dealing here with a procedure which has evolved at common law and not by statute. It is not an issue which should take the time of Parliament. It seems to me that there is a positive collective interest in having federal law, in particular the criminal law, one and the same for all Canadians and in knowing that the country’s highest Court is in the background, in case of need, to illuminate difficult points of law arising in the sentencing process. Cases calling for the articulation of governing and intelligible principles bearing upon deprivation of personal liberty would seem rationally to be the paradigm of the type of case which should find its way to this Court. R. v. Gardiner, id. (Majority opinion of Dickson, J.). Despite the dissent regarding jurisdiction, the Court was unanimous in its conclusion regarding the burden of proof in sentencing. 166 Canadian Criminal Code, R.S., 1985, c. C-46, s. 724; 1995, c. 22, s. 6 (emphasis added). The standard of proof for facts in sentencing proceedings may not lie within the Parliament’s power to define crimes, but the Parliament also has the exclusive power to regulate, “the procedure in criminal matters.” Constitution Act, 1867, § 91(27). 167 Id., § 724(2)(a). Ch. 3—Analytical Legal Comparison 112 These general statements of the standard of proof, however, must be weighed against the specific language of the Sentencing Principles. When sentencing for bias, prejudice or hate, under § 718.2(a)(i), judges, “shall [] take into consideration” the principle that, “a sentence should be increased” upon a showing of “evidence” of a prohibited, biased motive. This combination of language assigns sentencing judges a uniquely broad discretion. 3.2.3.3.2 United States In the United States, the Sixth Amendment establishes a nationwide standard of proof for all criminal cases: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy public trial, by an impartial jury . . . and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation[.]”168 Like the Canadian texts, the Sixth Amendment contains no express requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The United States Supreme Court has long recognized proof beyond a reasonable doubt as the common law standard of proof for crimes.169 In its 1975 decision in Mullaney v. Wilbur, the Court held that the prosecution must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, any fact that increases “the degree of criminal culpability.”170 The holding in Wilbur applied to Maine state statutes that authorized the elevation of manslaughter to murder without requiring the prosecution to prove the absence of provocation beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court expressly extended the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt to state sentence enhancement statutes in Apprendi v. New Jersey.171 168 U.S. CONST. AMEND. VI; see also id., art. III, § 2, cl. 3 (establishing trial by jury for all crimes). 169 In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361-69 (1970) (reviewing history of common law requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 692-704 (1975) (same). 170 Mullaney v. Wilbur, id., at 697-98. The Court reversed Wilbur’s murder conviction because Maine’s state law assigned the defendant the burden to prove provocation to support a conviction of the lesser offense of manslaughter. Significantly, Wilbur’s defense was “heat of passion provoked by [] homosexual assault”; he claimed he killed the victim, “in a frenzy provoked by [his] homosexual advance.” Wilbur, id., at 685. 171 530 U. S. 466 (2000). The Court held: “Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id., at 490; see also Cunningham v. California, 127 S. Ct. 856, 166 L. Ed. 2d 856 (2007) (holding California determinate sentencing law violated Sixth Amendment by authorizing sentencing judges to deviate upward from mid-point of sentencing range upon proof by a preponderance of the evidence). Ch. 3—Analytical Legal Comparison 113 But not all sentence enhancement statutes are the same. The prosecution need not prove the facts necessary to increase a sentence beyond a reasonable doubt, if the applicable legislation leaves the sentencing judge the discretion to deviate from the guideline establishing the aggravating factor. In United States v. Booker, the Supreme Court recently construed the Sentencing Guidelines to be “advisory” and thus effectively exempt from the constitutional requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 172 The Guidelines remain effective as “advisory” sentencing principles, but federal courts now have the discretion to deny an enhanced sentence despite evidence of a biased motive. 3.2.3.3.3 Analysis Despite differences in the distribution of criminal lawmaking powers, the standard of proof for hate crime penalties is uniform throughout both Canada and the United States. In both countries, prosecutors must prove elements necessary to authorize hate crime penalties beyond a reasonable doubt. Yet, in both countries the application of the standard of proof may be open to question in particular cases. For example, a Canadian sentencing court must be “satisfied on a balance of probabilities,” about any disputed facts used in sentencing, but the crown must prove aggravating factors, like biased motives, “beyond a reasonable doubt.” The court “shall accept” facts essential to a jury verdict, but if an aggravating factor like bias is not part of the verdict, the court, “shall request that evidence be adduced.” Disputes about which facts are “essential” to a jury’s verdict are probably inevitable. But, if only some evidence of a biased motive appears at trial, and if bias is not an essential element of the offense, then the Code requires the sentencing judge to request additional evidence. 172 See United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005). Although the Guidelines are now advisory rather than mandatory, sentencing courts must consider the Guidelines. See 24 C.J.S. CRIMINAL LAW § 2023 (2006) (collecting cases). Ch. 3—Analytical Legal Comparison 114 Requiring a sentencing judge to demand additional evidence, however, seems inconsistent with the prosecutor’s burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, if a prosecutor chooses not to present evidence of bias, prejudice or hate either at trial or during sentencing, the Code seems to authorize—even require—a sentencing judge to usurp the prosecutor’s discretion. A federal judge in the United States is confronted with a slightly different set of questions. The Sentencing Guidelines, which once mandated a particular sentence enhancement for biased motives, now only recommend an increased sentence. Since the Sentencing Guidelines are no longer mandatory, a prosecutor may seek an enhanced penalty for biased motives during sentencing, even if the question of bias was never presented to the jury. So long as the biased motive is not treated as an automatic aggravating factor it need not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. But, what if a prosecutor proves the biased motive beyond a reasonable doubt to the jury, then may the judge nevertheless decline to follow the recommended penalty enhancement? Without the mandatory sentence enhancement, moreover, how would a prosecutor ever place the question of a biased motive before a jury? The answers to these questions, for now, lie in the structure of criminal sentencing procedures. In both Canada and the United States, judges and prosecutors enjoy considerable discretion. The laws governing penalties for hate crimes generally increase rather than constrain this discretion. At most, hate crimes remain a tool for use only to the extent that judges and prosecutors chose to use them. Their discretion to withhold hate crime punishment is virtually unlimited. Canadian prosecutors may disregard evidence of bias, prejudice or hate, while Canadian judges bear an independent duty to inquire about evidence of bias, prejudice or hate. But, practically, the judicial duty is meaningless where a prosecutor has chosen not to present any evidence of motives. Moreover, no practical remedy exists for a judge’s failure to inquire when presented with some evidence of bias. And, for all practical purposes, American judges and Ch. 3—Analytical Legal Comparison 115 prosecutors enjoy similar discretion. In federal court, sentence enhancements for biased motives are entirely discretionary—if either a prosecutor or a judge chooses to disregard evidence of bias, then no enhanced penalty will be imposed. If state or federal legislators chose to mandate enhanced sentences for hate, then judicial discretion will be constrained, but prosecutors will still be free to shape penalties according to their discretion in charging decisions. 3.2.3.4 Mixed Motives & Causation Reported decisions imposing hate crime penalties in Canada and the United States commonly confront questions about the degree of biased motivation required. Canadian and American authorities have so far reached slightly different conclusions. 3.2.3.4.1 Canada The Canadian Criminal Code authorizes a sentencing premium upon a showing of “evidence that the offence was motivated by bias, prejudice or hate based on . . . sexual orientation[.]”173 The terms “motivated by” and “based on” are subject to interpretation. Some degree of motivation with some causal connection to one or more of the listed biases must be proven, but the Criminal Code does not specify a quantum of motive or causation. In addition to the questions about the quantum of motive or causation, one group of law enforcement officials has recommend a “codified definition” of hatred to facilitate not only hate crime and hate propaganda investigations and prosecutions but also hate crime statistical analysis.174 For hate propaganda, MacMillan, et al. note that, “in practice, by virtue of the Keegstra case, the police in Canada had broad discretion and little real direction on how to 173 Criminal Code § 718.2(a)(i). 174 See MacMillan, et al., supra note 128, at 459-61. Ch. 3—Analytical Legal Comparison 116 categorize material as meeting the test for hate.” 175 For the sentencing premium for bias, prejudice or hate, the same commentators suggest an added ambiguity inhibits enforcement: Another important reason for recommending a national definition of hatred is that it would greatly assist the police, Crown counsel and the courts in resolving some of the uncertainty surrounding the applicability of the elements of bias, prejudice or hate in sentencing under s. 718 for a hate/bias offence. . . . [I]t is not clear whether these motivational elements must be present in whole or in part for the section to be brought into play. . . . As well, a uniform national definition would assist in clarifying the sentencing standard intended by the phrase “bias, prejudice or hate”. In other words, is this sentencing phrase governed by the Keegstra definition of hatred, or does it include the lower standards of motivation because of the presence of the additional terms “bias” and “prejudice[?]”176 MacMillan, et al. add that, for statistical purposes, “until recently, some provinces or agencies only categorized offences as hate crimes if the offences were determined to be wholly or singularly motivated by bias, prejudice or hatred.”177 Judicial guidance regarding the application of the Sentencing Principles for bias, prejudice or hate has since been provided by Canadian courts. In R. v. Nash,178 an Ontario Court concluded racial motivation was “significant contributing factor” to the offence. While the case did not involve homo- or trans-phobic motives, the Court’s application of the burden of proof to co-defendants with differing degrees of prohibited bias is nevertheless noteworthy: I am satisfied, based on all the evidence, that the offence is properly characterized as one motivated by racial hatred, referred to in Section 718.2, although it is impossible, in my view, to dissect what was in the mind of each of the individuals who participated in this event. The accused was a party to this group attack, and the evidence is quite clear, in my view, given the racist comments that were made before the violence was initiated, and given the fact that the victims were members of a visible minority, and that this group of people attacked them without any provocation, that a significant contributing factor was this racist motivation. If the accused, Mr. Nash, had something else in his mind in addition to that, or if he was less of a racist, if one can say that, than Mr. McBurney was, that may be. I do not think I can make any determination 175 MacMillan, et al., id., at 459. 176 Id., at 460. 177 Id., at 460-61 (emphasis in original). 178 See R. v. Nash, [2002] O.J. No. 3843 (Ont. Ct. of Justice) (Fairgrieve J.) (finding racial motivation “significant contributing factor”) Ch. 3—Analytical Legal Comparison 117 concerning that, but I am satisfied that the offence itself has been proved by the Crown beyond a reasonable doubt to have been motivated by racial hatred.179 In support of its finding, the Court cited uncontested expert testimony establishing the “indicia of white supremacist racism,” in addition to the defendant’s group membership and participation in the group’s activities at the time of the offence.180 Based on the evidence, the Court applied the Code’s mandate: “the section of the Code makes it clear that the sentence is to be increased when that aggravating factor has been established.”181 The Alberta Court of Appeal provided further guidance in a case involving a mixture of “political” motives with those prohibited by the Sentencing Principles for bias, prejudice or hate.182 In R. v. Sandouga the Court of Appeal provided the following summary of Sentencing Principles applicable to aggravating circumstances: A court is required, in imposing a sentence, to consider aggravating and mitigating circumstances (s. 718.2(a)). Aggravating circumstances must be established by proof beyond a reasonable doubt (s. 724(3)(e)). Section 718.2(a)(i) addresses hate crimes. It deems “evidence that the offence was motivated by bias, prejudice or hate based on race, national or ethnic origin, [...] religion, [...] or any other similar factor [...] to be [an] aggravating [circumstance]”. The word “motivated” implies a link between the bias, prejudice or hate and the decision to commit the crime. 183 The Court found the trial court’s one-year sentence for a synagogue arson demonstrably unfit because it failed to, “unequivocally indicate that such hate crimes and terrorist acts will not be countenanced.”184 The Court specifically rejected any requirement of broad hatred against the targeted group. Even accepting the defendant’s claim that, “he does not hate Jews,”185 the Court found a “clear link” between the crime and the defendant’s prejudice: Sandouga’s actions were directed against an identifiable religious group and were motivated by revenge against all members of that group. Sandouga targeted 179 Id., ¶ 4 (emphasis added). 180 Id., ¶ 5. 181 Id., ¶ 6 (citing Criminal Code, § 718.2). 182 See R. v. Sandouga, 2002 ABCA 196, [2002] A.J. No. 1042 (Ct. App.) (Fruman J.A., Perras & Hembroff JJ.). 183 Id., ¶ 16 (quoting Criminal Code) (emphasis added). 184 Id., ¶ 37. 185 Id., ¶ 17. Ch. 3—Analytical Legal Comparison 118 the synagogue because its congregants are adherents of the same religion as the people he considers responsible for problems in Palestine. There is a clear link between his enmity towards or prejudice against the Jewish people, and his commission of the crime. The offence is therefore a hate crime. The sentencing judge erred in principle by failing to consider this serious aggravating circumstance.186 While provincial Courts of Appeal have addressed some of the questions about the quantum of motivation required by the Sentencing Principles, the Supreme Court of Canada has yet to address the topic. And, despite the specificity of the antidiscrimination terminology used in the Criminal Code Sentencing Principles for bias, prejudice or hate, significant space remains for discretion in the classification decisions of police, prosecutors, and judges. 3.2.3.4.2 United States The United States Sentencing Guidelines use a slightly different formulation, requiring proof that the accused “intentionally selected any victim or any property as the object of the offense of conviction because of the actual or perceived . . . sexual orientation of any person[.]” This formulation clearly authorizes increased punishment for crimes based on mistaken identity and for crimes directed toward a victim’s associates even if they do not possess the same characteristics as the victim. In this respect the Sentencing Guidelines are broader than the Canadian Sentencing Principles. On the other hand, the Guidelines require proof of a specific intent to select a victim “because of” a prohibited bias. The Sentencing Commission issues a Guidelines Manual that interprets the language of the Guidelines.187 The Manual explains that the hate crime enhancement applies only if, “a primary motivation for the offense was the race, color, religion, national origin, ethnicity, 186 Id., ¶ 18 (emphasis added); compare id., ¶ 17. 187 See Guidelines Manual, § 3A1.1(a); id. Commentary, Application Note 3 & Background. Ch. 3—Analytical Legal Comparison 119 gender, disability, or sexual orientation of the victim.” 188 Although the victim need not technically possess the characteristics motivating the offender, the hate crime enhancement is set out among other victim characteristics, including victim “vulnerability.” Offender characteristics are generally deemed irrelevant, and the Guidelines Manual states unequivocally that an offender’s “Race, Sex, National Origin, Creed, Religion, and Socio-Economic Status, . . . are not relevant in the determination of a sentence.”189 In a mixed motive case predating the hate crime Guideline, the Eighth Circuit held that a civil rights prosecution for racially-motivated interference with public park facilities was not precluded, even if the defendant was also motivated by other factors, including, “hatred for homosexuals.”190 Other federal courts have held that both a “vulnerable victim” and a “hate crime” enhancement may be applied in appropriate cases. 191 Thus, while the Sentencing Guidelines do incorporate a general prohibition on the “double-counting,”192 of the same motive for sentencing calculations, mixed motives do not preclude the application of a hate crime enhancement under the Guidelines. The language of state and municipal hate crime penalty laws varies throughout the United States. The Washington Malicious Harassment statute requires proof that an offender “maliciously and intentionally” injured the victim “because of” their actual or perceived characteristics.193 The statute does not require proof that the offender acted “solely because of” the victim’s characteristics. The state courts have adopted a “substantial factor” analysis—a 188 Id., § 3A1.1 Commentary, Background (emphasis added). A different quantum of motivation or causation applies to the identification of hate crimes for the purpose of crime statistics. 189 See Guidelines Manual, § 5H1.10. The Manual authorizes enhanced sentences for violations of the criminal civil rights laws for “hate crime motivation.” See Guidelines Manual, id., § 2H1.1 Application Note 4 (citing § 3A1.1). 190 See United States v. Bledsoe, 728 F.2d 1094, 1098 (8th Cir. 1984) (quoting jury instruction interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 245). 191 See United States v. Boylan, 5 F.Supp.2d 274, 283 (D.N.J. 1998) (construing Guidelines § 3A1.1(a) & (b) and noting “The two adjustments are not listed in the disjunctive and thus, it appears that both can apply to a given set of facts.”). Boylan was a municipal court judge who exchanged reduced traffic penalties for sexual favors, choosing his victims based on their race, gender, and financial vulnerability. 192 But see generally Boylan, id., at 283-84 (no “double counting” violation where defendant both chose vulnerable victims and perverted justice). 193 RCW § 9A.36.080(1). Ch. 3—Analytical Legal Comparison 120 prosecutor need only prove that the victim’s perceived characteristics were a “substantial factor” in the offender’s actions, not the sole motivation.194 3.2.3.4.3 Analysis A subtle difference may lie between the terms “motivated by” and “intentionally selects.” The terms “based on” and “because of” may likewise differ. But, in both Canada and the United States, prosecutors must prove, and judges must find, some degree of motivation and some causal connection between a biased motive and the criminal act before imposing an enhanced penalty for a discriminatory crime. Because of uncertainty in the degrees of motivation or causation, however, police, prosecutors, and sentencing judges are enabled to apply flexible interpretations of the sentencing provisions in both countries. The Guidelines Manual is available to provide interpretive guidance to law enforcement officials in the United States. And, if legislators disagree with the stated interpretations of the Guideline for hate motivation, then they have an open opportunity to mandate a different standard. In Canada, by contrast, no published interpretive rules apply to the Sentencing Principles for bias, prejudice or hate. The result is that sentencing courts interpret the motivation and causation requirements on a case-by-case basis. Provincial Courts of Appeal, and ultimately the Supreme Court of Canada, are available to provide a uniform interpretation, but this process may be time consuming. Interestingly, since the state sentencing guidelines do not interpret the motivation or causation requirement of the Washington Malicious Harassment statute, it has been applied according to the interpretations of courts, like the Canadian Criminal Code Sentencing Principles. Thus, in both Canada, and some states like Washington, law enforcement officials and sentencing judges enjoy an added modicum of discretion. 194 State v. Pollard, 906 P.2d 976, 981-82 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995). Ch. 3—Analytical Legal Comparison 121 In conclusion, the assessment of the motivation requirement for hate crimes is subject to the same forces that influence police and prosecutorial discretion in all other crimes. Because police agencies and prosecutors may be concerned with their case “clearance” or “success” rates, they may tend to exercise their discretion not to classify a crime as a hate crime in cases involving complex mixed motives, or other variations from the “paradigm” case, even where they could construe the relevant statutes as applicable.195 3.2.3.5 Provocation & Self-Defense An analysis of the effects of hate crime penalty statutes on subsequent sentencing decisions will follow shortly. As will be seen, however, these new laws have had a practical effect on the assertion of certain defenses in cases involving hate-related conduct. The hate crime laws attach a strategic risk to the assertion of certain defenses, particularly provocation and self-defense. The case of Mullaney v. Wilbur provides an example of the use of provocation as a defense to a charge of murder. Significantly, Wilbur’s defense was “heat of passion provoked by [] homosexual assault”; he claimed he killed the victim, “in a frenzy provoked by [his] homosexual advance.”196 Wilbur, however, arose long before either the American or Canadian hate crime penalty laws. Nothing in the terminology of hate crime penalty laws expressly prohibits the use of provocation or self-defense claims. But, hate crime laws make such claims more difficult in both Canada and the United States. If a defendant claims an assault was provoked or justified by homosexual advance, but is found guilty nevertheless, then he risks admitting the homophobic motive necessary for a sentence enhancement in the same case. Claims of “homosexual 195 See generally T. A. Maroney, The struggle against hate crime: a movement at a crossroads, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 564 (1998) (describing pull toward “paradigm cases”); Elizabeth A. Boyd, et al., “Motivated by Hatred or Prejudice”: Categorization of Hate-Motivated Crimes in Two Police Divisions, 30 LAW & SOC.’Y REV. 819 (1996) (comparing police interpretation of hate crime law in two divisions of same department). 196 Wilbur, id., at 685. The Court reversed Wilbur’s murder conviction because Maine’s state law assigned the defendant the burden to prove provocation to support a conviction of the lesser offense of manslaughter. Ch. 3—Analytical Legal Comparison 122 advance,” and “gay panic” are therefore more difficult, although they may still be asserted in both countries.197 3.2.3.6 Hate Crimes in Youth or Juvenile Proceedings In both Canada and the United States, youthful offenders are common among the perpetrators of hate crimes, including homo- and trans-phobic hate crimes. Therefore questions have arisen regarding the application of hate crime penalty laws in Youth Court or juvenile delinquency proceedings. As with the Criminal Code, Parliament has established a uniform, national law for youthful offender adjudications. 198 The Act codifying the Sentencing Principles applied to conditional discharges, pardons, and remissions, but it explicitly exempted youthful offender proceedings from the sentencing provisions of the Criminal Code.199 The United States Constitution establishes minimum standards of fairness in juvenile delinquency proceedings. For example, juveniles may not be found delinquent for conduct that would constitute an adult crime, unless the prosecutor presents proof beyond a reasonable doubt.200 Aside from such procedural protections, however, states almost exclusively determine the laws applicable to youthful offenders.201 In both Canada and the United States the applicability of hate crime sentencing principles to youth proceedings remains uncertain. 197 Heterosexual advance and straight panic have never been recognized in either country. 198 See Young Offenders Act. 199 See S.C. 1995, c. 22, § 16 (amending Young Offenders Act § 20(8)). 200 See Winship, 397 U.S. at 361-69 (1970) (adopting standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt for juvenile adjudications based on conduct equivalent to adult crimes). 201 Congress seeks to influence state juvenile justice laws by attaching conditions to its funding programs. A 1992 amendment required states receiving federal “formula grants” for juvenile justice to include provisions in their state plans allocating funds for “hate crime” prevention: “Programs designed to prevent and reduce hate crimes committed by juveniles, including educational programs and sentencing programs designed specifically for juveniles who commit hate crimes and that provide alternatives to incarceration[.]” See 42 U.S.C.A. § 5633(a)(10)(N) (1995) (codifying Pub. L. 102-586, § 2(f)(3)(i)(VI)). Ch. 3—Analytical Legal Comparison 123 As with adult criminal laws, Canadian Youth Court proceedings are governed by a national statute. The availability of the Sentencing Principles for bias, prejudice or hate in Youth Court proceedings has been contested. Since many hate-related incidents, including crimes motivated by “sexual orientation” and “gender identity” are committed by groups with at least some youthful participants, the applicability of the Sentencing Principles for bias, prejudice or hate is significant. Because the Youth Criminal Justice Act (YCJA) does not expressly exclude bias, prejudice or hate from consideration ancillary to the Act’s other purposes, Courts, and perhaps Parliament, will be forced to determine the relevancy of the Sentencing Principles in future cases and legislation. In the United States, most juvenile offenses are adjudicated under state or local laws.202 A complete analysis of hate crime laws in state juvenile court proceedings would be too complex for the present study. However, legislation pending in Congress recognizes the problem of hate crimes committed by juveniles by requiring the FBI to include juvenile offenses in its HCSA data.203 Thus, regardless of the treatment of this question in future court cases, Congress may well act to expand the hate crime field to include juvenile offenders. 3.2.3.7 The Effect of Hate Crime Laws—A Trend Analysis The emergence of a substantial body of jurisprudence in a relatively new and narrow field suggests that hate crime penalty laws are important. Questions about whether hate crime laws have reduced the frequency or severity of hate crimes, including homophobic and trans-phobic crimes, are beyond the scope of this study. But, have hate crime laws resulted in important legal changes? Would judges have imposed the same kinds of penalties and developed the same 202 See, e.g., R.A.V., supra note 111 (juvenile prosecution under St. Paul, Minnesota Municipal Ordinance). 203 See Matthew Shepard Local Law Enforcement Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2007, S. 1105, 110th Congress, 1st Session (introduced in Senate April 12, 2007) (proposing addition of crimes committee committed by juveniles to the data collection mandate of the HCSA); Local Law Enforcement Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2007, H.R. 1592, 110th Congress, 1st Session (Referred to Senate May 7, 2007) (identical Bill in House). Ch. 3—Analytical Legal Comparison 124 sentencing principles without codified hate crime laws? And, do answers to these questions differ in Canada and the United States? In order to answer these questions, it will be helpful to examine sentencing decisions in each country before and after the enactment of national hate crime penalty laws. A quantitative analysis of hate crime sentencing decisions is probably impossible. Nevertheless, an analysis of the trend among typical sentencing decisions in each country may reveal relevant evidence. A longitudinal study of cases before and after codification provides a convenient cross- national comparison. Such a comparison should reveal whether, and to what extent, the codification of national hate crime laws changed judicial decisionmaking, by for example: increasing or decreasing overall sentences for homophobic crimes, encouraging or discouraging the use of “gay panic” or “homosexual advance” defenses, or increasing consistency among sentencing judges. A comparison of typical Canadian and American sentencing decisions before and after the codification of national sentencing principles for hate crimes is therefore set out below. The analysis here will focus on the effects of the codification of sentencing principles for hate crimes on judicial sentencing decisions.204 The selection of typical cases before and after hate crime laws is inherently subjective. Still, a brief trend analysis provides worthwhile observations about the effects of hate crime laws in Canada and the United States. This analysis will also serve as an introduction to the comparison of recent cases set out in Chapter 4, , as well as the practices of nongovernmental social groups working in the hate crime field, set out in Chapter 5. In addition to other similarities, Canada and the United States share a similar benchmark date for an analysis of trends in hate crime cases. Although several state and local laws 204 For a similar before-and-after analysis using the entrenchment of Charter equality rights as a benchmark see Miriam Smith, LESBIAN & GAY RIGHTS IN CANADA: SOCIAL MOVEMENTS & EQUALITY-SEEKING: 1971-1995 (1999). Smith’s work analyzes the implications of legal change for social movements, but her analysis provides a useful model for examining the decisions sentencing judges. Ch. 3—Analytical Legal Comparison 125 authorized penalties for homophobic (and trans-phobic) motives earlier, 1994 is the closest benchmark year for American hate crime laws. For the purposes of a cross-national comparison, the federal hate crime enhancement serves a convenient proxy for the general national acceptance of homophobic bias as a consideration in criminal penalties. Furthermore, the addition of hate crimes to the United States Sentencing Guidelines coincides conveniently with the coming into force of the 1995 Canadian Criminal Code Sentencing Principles. Thus, sentencing principles for homophobic hate crimes were codified at roughly the same time and have since remained stable in Canada and the United States. Canadian and American courts occasionally denounced crimes motivated by “sexual orientation” before the statutory hate crime penalties became available in the mid-1990s. A few typical cases before and after the codified sentencing principles are analyzed here. Because a vocabulary naming homophobic and trans-phobic violence did not exist, even if officials had been willing to act upon it, a reliable quantitative analysis of cases before and after the enactment of the sentencing principles would be meaningless. Still, the trend seems to show an increase in decisions expressly addressing homophobic and trans-phobic bias.205 In each country, four rough, overlapping phases of judicial reasoning appear in criminal cases that mention homo- or trans-phobic motives: (1) early cases denouncing the victim or absolving the accused in part because of the victim’s characteristics; (2) pre-hate crime cases condemning the biases of the accused before the codification of sentencing principles for bias; (3) post-hate crime cases decided shortly after the enactment of hate crime laws but providing 205 A good critical examination of equality rights, with a focus on social movements, lesbian and gay rights case law, amendments to the Ontario Human Rights Code to prohibit “sexual orientation” discrimination, and early Charter litigation appears in Didi Herman, Reforming Rights: Lesbian & Gay Struggles for Legal Equality in Canada (Ph.D. Thesis, Univ. of Warwick, Dec., 1992); see also Herman, id., at 317-21 Appendix A-C (listing cases, statutes, and interview subjects), 351-70 Bibliography. Among other authorities, Herman cites Davina Cooper, Sexing the City: Lesbian & Gay Municipal Politics 1979-1987 (Ph.D. Thesis, Univ. of Warwick, 1992), and Philip Girard, Sexual Orientation as a Human Rights Issue in Canada 1969-1985 (1989) 21 OTTAWA L.REV. 387. Ch. 3—Analytical Legal Comparison 126 little analysis of bias; and, (4) recent cases providing an increasingly sophisticated analysis and application of hate crime sentencing laws. An analysis of Canadian decisions under the Sentencing Principles for bias, prejudice or hate is complicated by the lack of uniform publication among sentencing courts.206 This lack of uniform reporting is complicated by the relative scarcity of homophobic hate crime cases in comparison to all crimes.207 As in Canada, American courts mentioned homo- and trans-phobic motives in criminal cases both before and after the codification of hate crime penalty laws. In the United States sentencing decisions generally do not appear at all in published reporters unless they are appealed. Thus, American hate crime penalty cases may be even more difficult to analyze than their Canadian counterparts. Still, a body of typical Canadian and American cases is available for a general trend analysis. 3.2.3.7.1 Early Cases In both Canada and the United States, homophobic and trans-phobic violence was legally invisible, or even sanctioned by law, until recent decades. Canadian governments once practiced homophobic violence as official policy, 208 and laws criminalizing homosexual behavior 206 Compare, Julian V. Roberts & Andrew J.A. Hastings, Sentencing in Cases of Hate-Motivated Crime: An Analysis of Subparagraph 718.2(a)(i) of the Criminal Code, 27 QUEENS L.J. 93 (2001) (hereinafter Roberts & Hastings) (noting varied sources of decisions), with Julian V. Roberts, Disproportionate Harm: hate crime in Canada: an analysis of recent statistics (1995) (analyzing police hate crime statistics). In the United States, even in the federal courts, where sentencing decisions are subject to uniform criminal law and procedure, administrators have difficulty tracking hate crime sentencing decisions. For example, for the Fiscal Year 2006 the Sentencing Commission received “complete guideline application information” for only 65,055 out of 72,585 sentencing cases reported, effectively excluding thousands of sentences from analysis. See U.S. Sentencing Commission, 2006 Datafile, USSCFY06, Table 18 n.1. 207 Roberts and Hastings cited only a few homophobic hate crimes based on their analysis of both reported and unreported judgments during the first four years after the Sentencing Principles. Roberts & Hastings, id., 98 n.17 (noting informal transmission of unreported judgments to authors). 208 See, e.g., Muir v. Alberta, [1996] A.J. No. 37 (Ct. of Q.B.). In its judgment awarding damages of $740,780 against the Province, the Court cited discrimination as an “aggravating factor” in its calculations: Ms. Muir is entitled to aggravated damages relating to the sterilization. These relate to actions that caused her injury. The main aggravating feature of the sterilization is that it was done in the context of branding Ms. Muir as a mental defective, a moron. Thus, two serious blows were struck during the same sterilization operation: Ms. Muir’s reproductive capacity was irretrievably destroyed and she was physically and mentally branded as a moron. Ch. 3—Analytical Legal Comparison 127 facilitated the masking of discriminatory violence.209 In the 1979 case of R. v. Fraser,210 an Alberta Court accepted the defence theory, based on a “homosexual advance” posing “a real threat and [] a danger to him, both physically and emotionally, in his perceived image of himself as a male person the defendant’s gender self-image.” Because the defendant acted in “self defence,” the trial judge found him guilty of manslaughter instead of murder.211 As in Canada, few American court decisions that pre-date hate crime sentencing laws expressly authorize enhanced penalties for homophobic bias. 212 Instead, as in Canada, homophobic bias generally appears in context with either a defense or sentencing mitigation claim based on “homosexual advance” by the victim. In a 1964 decision, the Supreme Court of Georgia reversed a death sentence, based on the defendant’s claim that he was provoked to shoot his common law wife when he found her in bed, “with a woman known to him to be a lesbian.”213 The court affirmed the murder conviction214 but reversed the death sentence because Id., ¶ 145. Although the particular provision was not applied to the plaintiff, provincial policies expressly authorized the forced sterilization of women who “masturbated or had lesbian tendencies.” Id., ¶ 152. 209 For instance, the 1957 case of R. v. Galluzzo, [1957] O.J. No. 38 (Supreme Ct. Ct. App.) involved an appeal by one of two defendants convicted of an apparently consensual “attempt to commit the crime of buggery, the one with the other, contrary to the Criminal Code.” Id., ¶ 2. The appellant was released on bail after being sentenced to six months’ jail. The appellate court did not render a decision on the conviction, however, because the appellant failed to appear, resulting in an arrest warrant. Adult consensual “sodomy” was later decriminalized: . . . the offences of buggery and gross indecency, effective August 26, 1969, became subject to an exception for acts committed in private between a husband and wife, or any two persons, each of whom is 21 years or more of age, both of whom consent to the commission of the act. With the repeal of the gross indecency provision in 1988, the exception was no longer relevant to that offence, although it was retained for the offence of anal intercourse (the offence substituted for buggery), with the age of 18 replacing the age of 21. The anal intercourse offence itself was declared unconstitutional by the Ontario Court of Appeal in 1988: see R. v. LeBeau (1988), 41 C.C.C. (3d) 163 (Ont. C.A.), somewhat ironically on the ground that the exception for consenting adults over the age of 18 created an age-based distinction that violates s. 15 of the Charter, and that cannot be justified under s. 1 of the Charter. R. v. Golightly, [2007] O.J. No. 2007 (Supr. Ct. Justice) (D.K. Gray J.). 210 R. v. Fraser, [1979] A.J. No. 17 (Supreme Ct. T.D.) (Miller J.). 211 Fraser, id., ¶ 69. 212 See, e.g., People v. White, 157 Cal.App.3d 282 (Cal. Ct. App., 1984) (affirming sentence for 1981 attack where defendant kicked and beat victims and forced gay couple to engage in sex acts with each other, “because he thought that they had told his girlfriend that he was a homosexual”). 213 Tremble v. State, 138 S.E.2d 274, 275 (Ga. 1964). 214 Because provocation and self-defense are rarely available as defenses to theft-related crimes, homophobia is rarely available as a mitigating factor, and more likely an aggravating factor against defendants charged assaulting gay victims during a robbery. See, e.g., Derrick v. State, 773 S.W.2d 271 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) (noting “homosexual encounter” with victim as “part of a continuing scheme by appellant to commit robbery of homosexual victims in Houston” in early 1980s); Smith v. State, 365 So.2d 704 (Fla. 1978) (citing testimony that defendant and Ch. 3—Analytical Legal Comparison 128 the defense had specifically requested a voluntary manslaughter instruction, and the jury had made a specific request to consider manslaughter. The court held that, “it was a jury question whether the chain of circumstances and conduct was sufficient to engender irresistible passion.”215 In United States v. Bledsoe, 216 the Court of Appeal affirmed a federal civil rights conviction, following a state court acquittal for murder. The defendant was convicted in federal court of racially-motivated interference with the victim’s right to use public park facilities in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 245. The defendant admitted he had killed a “black faggot.”217 In affirming the conviction the Court approved the use of a jury instruction that permitted a conviction despite “mixed motives,” so long as the, “clear implication from the[] instructions is that a substantial motivating factor must have been race.” 218 While Bledsoe pre-dated the Sentencing Guidelines for hate crimes, it remains valid. But, since Bledsoe, the Sentencing Guidelines have added an aggravating factor for “sexual orientation” bias. Thus, under the current Sentencing Guidelines, Bledsoe’s sentence could have been enhanced an additional amount because of his homophobic bias as well. Since these decisions pre-dated hate crime penalty laws, the court had no reason to consider whether an anti-lesbian or anti-gay animus might be an aggravating factor. Courts in both countries also rejected claims of gay panic or homosexual advance for factual reasons long accomplices, “met at a bar and decided to rob a homosexual in order to obtain money for beer”); United States, ex rel., Butler v. Schubin, 376 F.Supp. 1241 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (citing inmate’s admission to killing professor, a “homosexual whom he was trying to ‘roll’”). 215 Id., at 275-76; compare, People v. Radford, 382 N.E.2d 486 (Ill. Ct. App., 1973) (noting “violent and heated” argument in which defendant made accusation of lesbian relationship while holding gun in hand). See also State v. Strub, 355 N.E.2d 819 (Ohio Ct. App., 1975) (noting “homosexual approaches” preceding aggravated murder); People v. Ramey, 317 N.E.2d 143 (Ill. Ct. App., 1974) (noting assault after “further advances,” following “homosexual activities”); People v. Stoltz, 196 Cal.App.2d 258 (Cal. Ct. App., 1961) (citing conflicting evidence regarding “homosexual advances”). 216 United States v. Bledsoe, 728 F.2d 1094 (8th Cir. 1984) 217 See Bledsoe, id., at 1096. 218 Id., at 1098 (collecting “mixed motives” cases). Ch. 3—Analytical Legal Comparison 129 before the enactment of hate crime laws.219 But, these early cases are characterized by their focus on whether the characteristics or behavior of the victim justified or provoked the crime. 3.2.3.7.2 Pre-Hate Crime Cases A few cases in both Canada and the United States condemned homophobic bias before the enactment of formal hate crime laws. In a 1978 case, an Ontario Court increased the sentences on appeal for three youths who “set out to beat up ‘queers.’”220 The sentences of eight months’ imprisonment were, according to the Court, “completely disproportionate to the gravity the offences that were committed by these youths and must be increased.” 221 The Court expressly held that the homophobic bias must be considered an aggravating factor in sentencing, even for young offenders.222 Most such cases, however, did not appear until much later. For example, the defendant in R. v. Wilson pled guilty to a 1991 assault “in the heart of the gay community” in Toronto.223 The sentencing judge questioned the omission of a victim statement from the facts presented in support of the guilty plea.224 The judge therefore invited statements from the victim and his friend for the purpose of sentencing, and his written decision quotes from 219 In 1976 a British Columbia Court denied a crown transfer request against a juvenile who participated in a planned killing his “homosexual mentor.” The charges had earlier been reduced from murder to manslaughter. R. v. D.I.G, [1976] B.C.J. No. 453 (Supreme Ct.) (Craig J.); see also R. v. Catagas, [1975] B.C.J. No. 646, ¶ 3, (Supreme Ct.) (Meredith J.). A possible homophobic bias was not considered. In another 1976 decision, a British Columbia Court reduced a sentence of three years and eight months to the eight months already served, plus three years’ probation. R. v. Catagas, [1976] B.C.J. No. 1011, Vancouver Registry No. CA 760134. The jury had convicted the defendant, a “Canadian Indian,” of manslaughter for stabbing an elderly man who had invited him into his home. The Court noted the victim’s “homosexual invitation” and the assailant’s “intensive aversion to homosexual practices,” because of a prior “homosexual attack described as a rape.” Id., ¶ 3. Because both the jury and apparently the Crown recommended leniency, the Court reduced the sentence. Id., ¶ 6, 8. 220 R. v. T.A. (T.A., D.I. & O.R.), [1978] O.J. No. 1173 (Supreme Ct. Ct. App.). 221 Id., ¶ 11. 222 Id., ¶¶ 6, 9-10. The Court therefore increased the sentences to “the maximum term permissible for a reformatory sentence,” two years less one day, followed a period of probation. Id., ¶¶ 11, 14. Another Ontario Court imposed a twelve-to-fifteen year sentence for the attempted murder of a gay man. The defendant hit the elderly, retired victim in the back of the head and plunged two knives into his back after they, “engaged in a variety of homosexual activities, including mutual acts of fellatio.” The Court did not expressly increase the sentence because of bias, and the defence apparently did not claim provocation due to homosexual advance. Instead of homophobia, the Court condemned the “stark horror” and breach of trust involved, emphasizing denunciation: “It must [] be made plain to all that such gratuitous violence simply will not be tolerated.” The Court rejected the Crown request for a life sentence. R. v. Young, [1991] O.J. No. 2210 (Ct. Justice Gen. Div.). 223 R. v. Wilson, [1991] O.J. No. 1746 (Ct. Justice Prov. Div.) (Harris Prov. Div. J.). 224 See id. Ch. 3—Analytical Legal Comparison 130 the victim’s testimony. 225 Although the decision pre-dated the statutory Sentencing Principles for bias, prejudice or hate, the Court gave a detailed listing of case-specific aggravating factors related to anti-gay bias, including, “language employed by the accused throughout [that] was threatening, intimidating, vulgar, obscene, and stereotypically referable to the gay community.” The Court denounced the “repulsive conduct” occurring “in the heart of the gay community” as “gay bashing” and analogized to Nazi war crimes.226 The judge expressly concluded that an enhanced sentence for bias was required: “This type of conduct can only be perceived by society in general as being abhorrent and must by necessity be reflected in my sentence. As a result the offence calls for a more severe penalty than ordinary assaultive conduct.”227 In case arising from a series of 1977 assaults, the Ontario Court of Appeal established a precedent for sentencing related to racist and homophobic violence. In its decision in R. v. Atkinson, Ing & Roberts, the Court described the assaults by a group of youths,228 and increased the penalties, adopting the reasoning of an earlier case involving a racially-motivated attack: The learned trial judge appears to have been of the opinion that what was stated in the case of R. v. Ingram, supra, was not relevant since that case was concerned with a racially motivated attack. While in R. v. Ingram the attack was racially motivated, the principles set forth in the judgment are not limited to such an attack. The motive for the assaults in this case should have been considered by the trial judge as an aggravating factor in imposing sentence. We think the learned trial judge erred in failing to give effect to this principle in imposing the sentences under appeal. Here a vicious assault was carried out by a cowardly gang of youths who selected innocent victims, complete strangers, who had the misfortune of being in a public park on that occasion. It is the type of offence which the public should 225 Wilson, id. 226 “[P]ermitting repulsive conduct of this nature to fester . . . is reminiscent of what . . . took place in Europe . . . during the 1930’s and 1940’s, resulting in the virtual hatred and extinction of millions of persons by a dictatorial zealot, because of the way they looked and their religious beliefs amongst other human characteristics.” Id. 227 Id. (citing, inter alia, R. v. Ingram & Grimsdale (1977), 35 C.C.C. (2d) 376)). The Court concluded by imposing a two-month sentence. The Judge did not resolve the victim’s suggestion of community service in the gay community. A man who attempted to stab his step-daughter’s lesbian lover to death received an eight-year prison term in a 1993 Manitoba case. R. v. Longpre, [1993] M.J. No. 309 (Prov. Ct.) (Devine Prov. Ct. J.). The Court did not expressly determine whether the crime was motivated by lesbophobic bias, but it did find, “[t]he step-daughter’s family was apparently vehemently opposed to this lesbian relationship and some sort of altercation took place . . . which prompted the step-daughter and her lover to flee.” The Court concluded by denouncing the “vigilante justice” used by the defendants. Longpre, id., ¶¶ 3-10, 18-19. 228 R. v. Atkinson, Ing & Roberts (1979), 43 C.C.C. (2d) 342, ¶ 1 (Ont. C.A.). Ch. 3—Analytical Legal Comparison 131 not and will not countenance, and the sentence imposed must reflect that. 229 In spite of its analogy to the earlier racist attack, however, the Court of Appeal only denounced the cowardice of the attackers and the innocence of their victims. Still, earlier in its opinion the Court does note that the attackers, “set out to beat up ‘queers’” in a park with, “a reputation of being a place frequented by homosexuals.”230 Addressing a series of alleged offences from August, 1989, Linhares de Sousa, Prov. Ct. J., denied a Crown application for a transfer to adult court.231 The Court’s reasons set out a series of alleged attacks by the youth and his co-defendants, including at least one motivated in part by anti-gay bias: . . . . The Crown alleges . . . Mr. M. became involved in various criminal activities with some other individuals. One of these activities was to attack and rob homosexual men at Major’s Hill Park, an area of Ottawa apparently known for its homosexual activity. The alleged reasons for the attacks were; firstly that they were easy victims tending to be small in stature. They didn’t complain and therefore made for successful financial crimes; secondly, an intense dislike for homosexuals among certain members of the group; Mr. M. is alleged to have expressed some anti-homosexual sentiments. The Crown alleges that one such attack which forms the basis of one of the three counts of attempt to murder with which Mr. M. has been charged was against a Mr. Thomas Linden, an admitted homosexual. Mr. Linden was approached in Major’s Hill Park by four male persons. He fled through the park and was pursued by one male who knocked him to the ground and stabbed him three times, twice in the back and once in the arm with a knife. Mr. Linden survived but suffered a punctured spleen. It is alleged that Mr. M. stabbed Mr. Linden. In addition to the bias alleged in the commission of the offences before the Court, the Crown presented evidence of the youth’s past homophobic violence: “[D]uring [a] short but significant period based on his own testimony, Mr. M. was exposed and participated in a variety of street criminal activities such as robberies or what is known in the vernacular as rolling ‘queers[.]’” The Court denounced the alleged offences as “serious and heinous,” but denied the transfer 229 Id. ¶¶ 9-10 (citing R. v. Ingram & Grimsdale (1977), 35 C.C.C. (2d) 376)). 230 Id. ¶ 1. 231 R. v. D.J.M., [1990] O.J. No. 514 (Prov. Ct. Youth Off. Ct.) (Linhares de Sousa Prov. Ct. J.). Ch. 3—Analytical Legal Comparison 132 application based in part on the youth’s need for treatment that would be unavailable in an adult institution until near the end of a lengthy period of incarceration.232 Reviewing a different adult court transfer decision under § 24(1) of the Charter, the Ontario Court (General Division), Garton J., concluded that the provisions of the newly-enacted Young Offenders Act did not offend the Charter.233 The Ontario Court (General Division), Garton J., affirmed the decision to transfer a youth to adult court for the 1991 killing of a homosexual man followed by the theft of his belongings. Among other reasons for its decision, the Court found that the three-year maximum term available in Youth Court would be inadequate to allow the extensive treatment needed by the defendant, and a life imprisonment without parole for five-to-ten years would be a more fit penalty for the alleged offence.234 Despite the brutality of the killing, and the defendant’s awareness that the victim was a homosexual man, the Court did not refer to any homophobic bias in its recitation of the relevant facts. On the other hand, the Court did highlight both the defendant’s varying admissions before his arrest about alleged homosexual advances by the victim and expert opinions questioning his credibility. The Ontario Court of Appeal in R. v. Cooney235 affirmed a manslaughter conviction for a 1991 killing but reduced the sentence imposed on the defendant from twelve to eight years. The Court, per Finlayson, J.A., concluded, on the most lenient view of the verdict, that the jury must have ruled out the defendant’s presence at the scene of the killing by acquitting him of first degree murder. The dissent, per Galligan, J.A., concluded that the jury could have found the defendant present, consistent with a manslaughter verdict and would therefore have affirmed the twelve-year sentence. Since the defendant’s role in the killing was in dispute, the Court of 232 Id. At the conclusion of the Court’s decision, the attorneys indicated on the record that they did not expect the case to proceed to trial. 233 See R. v. H. (A.), [1992] O.J. No. 2114, ¶ 32, 10 O.R. (3d) 683 (Gen. Div.) (Garton J.). 234 Id., ¶¶ 131-32. The Ontario Court of Appeal affirmed the transfer decision, finding “compelling reasons” in support of proceeding in adult court, because of the seriousness of the offence and “the interests of society and of the young person.” See R. v. H. (A.), [1993] O.J. No. 468, 12 O.R. (3d) 634 (Ct. App.). 235 [1995] O.J. No. 945 (Ct. App.). Ch. 3—Analytical Legal Comparison 133 Appeal did not address the motive for the killing, but its opinion establishes that whoever performed the killing targeted the victim in part because of his sexual orientation. The defendant had apparently used classified ads to arrange meetings with homosexual men; the Crown presented a statement from the defendant admitting he, “had placed an ad in a ‘fag’ magazine to lure a homosexual victim.”236 Nevertheless, neither of the Court of Appeal opinions touches upon any homophobic motivation. In R. v. K. (M.)237 the Ontario Court of Appeal affirmed the maximum disposition of three years’ secure custody followed by two years’ probation, less one day, for a youth who had pled guilty to second degree murder. The defendant, who was fourteen at the time of the killing, claimed his adult male victim had grabbed his genitals and propositioned him. But, he also bragged to his friends afterward about using a heavy metal bar like a baseball bat to kill the victim, and he threatened to kill his friends if they reported the killing. The Court of Appeal did not expressly consider homophobic bias as a motivating factor, but both the Court of Appeal and the Youth Court judge did apparently reject the youth’s homosexual advance claim. The Court of Appeal agreed with the Youth Court’s assessment of the need to “protect society,” but the Court also noted the youth was entitled to automatic, periodic review of his disposition under the Young Offenders Act.238 Although they include hearsay statements, further details about the killing are set out in the provincial court’s earlier decision denying the Crown’s adult court transfer application in the same case. 239 In particular, the transfer decision provides greater detail about the youth’s homosexual advance claim, which he described while he was bragging to his friends: 3 The accused, age fourteen years, apparently informed the youths that he went to the deceased’s apartment for cigarettes and beer as he routinely had in the past. Somerton allegedly made a sexual advance toward the accused and was warned, 236 Id., ¶¶ 4-5. 237 R. v. K. (M.), [1996] O.J. No. 1587, 28 O.R. (3d) 593 (Ct. App.) (Mcmurtry C.J.O., Finlayson & Abella JJ.A.). 238 Id., ¶¶ 21-22 (citing § 28, Young Offenders Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. Y-1). 239 See R. v. M.K., [1993] O.J. No. 1400 (Ct. of Justice Prov. Div.) (Weisman Prov. Div. J.). Ch. 3—Analytical Legal Comparison 134 “I’ll kill you if you do that again”. The deceased repeated the overture and was struck in the head ten to twelve times with a heavy iron bar that was kept in the apartment. 4 At one point during the attack, Somerton said, “Don’t hit me no more”, and at another, “Don’t hit me, it hurts”. The deceased’s fingers were broken when he attempted to cover his head. 5 In relating this tale, the accused seemed calm and happy about what he had done.240 In spite of the seriousness of the alleged offence, the provincial court denied the transfer application, in part because society would be best protected “in the long-term” by treatment available in youth facilities. 241 Like the Court of Appeal, however, the provincial court apparently discounted the youth’s homosexual advance claim. The New Brunswick Court of Appeal affirmed the sentence and parole eligibility determination in a case arising out of a “bizarre, horrible and serious” attack on several victims in 1993.242 During the attack the co-defendants repeatedly called the victims “queers, fagots, gays,” held them down, forced them to suck “each other’s penis” declaring, “that’s what you cocksuckers deserve,” and inserted a curling iron and a rum bottle into their rectums.243 The Court of Appeal held that the sentences were not unfit and affirmed the sentencing court’s decision to delay parole eligibility until the completion of the earlier of one-half of the sentence or ten years. 244 Yet, while the Court of Appeal cited the sentencing court’s reference to “denunciation,” the opinion does not explicitly denounce the apparent homophobic motives of the defendants. In its 1995 statement of reasons for sentencing, an Ontario court in R. v. McDonald245 considered the defendant’s mixed motives for robberies against gay men. And, even though the 240 Id., ¶¶ 3-5. 241 Id., ¶ 46. 242 R. v. Chaisson, [1995] N.B.J. No. 490 (Ct. App.). The Court of Appeal decision was made on remand from the Supreme Court of Canada, which held that the Court of Appeal had jurisdiction to review the sentencing court’s parole eligibility determination. See R. v. Chaisson, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1118, ¶¶ 16-17. 243 Id., ¶ 5 (quoting agreed statement of facts). 244 Id., ¶¶ 11, 12-13. 245 R. v. McDonald, [1995] O.J. No. 2137 (Ct. of Justice Gen. Div.) (Hamilton J.) (October, 1993 killing). Ch. 3—Analytical Legal Comparison 135 case pre-dated the Sentencing Principles for bias, prejudice or hate, the Court expressly denounced the defendant’s discriminatory motives: . . . McDonald has a pretty substantial record and he is not just a con man, he’s a violent con man. He uses violence on weaker people. He threatens the weaker person, as he did in this particular case, and he takes pride in it and justifies his criminal activities by his reply to Detective Earl when he says the victim is just a fag. So anything that is done to him is justifiable. . . . . . . . . people in the city are not going to put up with violence. It is not justifiable to pick on minorities or it is not justifiable to pick on people of different sexual persuasion than yourself and to prey on these people as McDonald seems to do and take pride in it. That type of thinking has to stop.246 Considering his extensive criminal history, the court sentenced the defendant to five years for robbery, concurrent with an additional two years for using a knife. The B.C. Court of Appeal addressed a provocation defense in its 1996 decision affirming first degree murder verdict in R. v. Moore. 247 The Court characterized the victim as, “a practicing but not aggressive homosexual.”248 Affirming the guilty verdict, the Court of Appeal discounted the defendant’s provocation theory: 35 There is no evidence of any description of a dispute between the victim and the appellant in the case at bar. The evidence of an unwanted sexual advance by the victim is circumstantial and tenuous. The instruction to the jury on provocation was the most favourable direction the appellant could receive on any theory of the defence premised on the victim’s homosexuality and the appellant’s apparent heterosexuality. . . .249 On the other hand, there is no indication in the opinion that the defendant received a sentencing premium because the crime was motivated by bias, prejudice or hate. Robert Joseph Carolan pleaded guilty to a 1994 aggravated assault claiming the victim made a “homosexual advance” on him in a washroom.250 The Court described the defendant’s reaction as, “violent in the extreme” and noted the victim had suffered “severe head injuries 246 Id., ¶¶ 1, 4. 247 [1996] B.C.J. No. 1959 (Ct. App.). 248 Id., ¶ 8. 249 Id., ¶ 35. 250 R. v. Carolan, [1995] A.J. No. 82 (Prov. Ct. Crim. Div.) (McMeekin Prov. Ct. J.) (Reasons for Sentence). Ch. 3—Analytical Legal Comparison 136 leaving him in a coma on life support systems to this day.” 251 The Court rejected the defendant’s apparent claim of sensitivity based on a childhood homosexual advance: Further material before the Court establishes that at age 17 the accused had been the victim of a homosexual advance which did not progress to any great degree and accordingly I’m inclined to accept the Crown’s submissions that this previous occurrence played little part in the events before the Bar.252 Even assuming the alleged homosexual advance, the Court rejected the theory as a mitigating factor, concluding, “the accused followed the victim into the washroom and what then occurred represented a grossly excessive use of force for whatever was done by the victim. . . . his reactions were sufficient to be categorized as prolonged, brutal and cowardly calling for an emphasis on deterrence in any sentence imposed.”253 The Court imposed a sentence of eight years, but declined the Crown’s request to require him to serve one-half of the term before parole eligibility.254 While the Court referred to denunciation and to, “family and friends of the victim” and “pressure groups in society today continually calling for more harsh penalties,” no reference was made to denunciation for homophobic bias.255 The Manitoba Court of Appeal in 1994 reduced the sentence of one of three attackers who, “with nothing to do to amuse themselves in the early hours of the morning, decided to attack a man who they perceived to be a homosexual.”256 The Court of Appeal agreed with the trial judge that, “general deterrence” was important but reduced the two-year prison sentence to seven months, followed by six months’ probation. The Court reasoned that the defendant was a “youthful first offender,” who had expressed regret, and who claimed to have, “changed his attitude and to disassociate from those who shaped his previous views.” The Court also stressed 251 Id., ¶ 3. 252 Id., ¶ 8. 253 Id., ¶ 10-11. 254 See id., ¶ 20. 255 See id., ¶ 14. 256 R. v. Gallant, [1994] M.J. No. 354 (Ct. App.) (Scott C.J.M., Huband & Helper JJ.A.). Ch. 3—Analytical Legal Comparison 137 that the defendant did not know his co-defendant had a club and that, while the victim was “beaten up,” he was released after only out-patient treatment. The B.C. Court of Appeal affirmed a first degree murder verdict in the face of objections to the jury instructions on homosexual provocation in R. v. Stewart.257 Stewart first claimed he “lost it” and killed his victim because of his homosexual advances, but later asserted an alibi.258 The trial court gave provocation instructions, and according to the Court of Appeal the court was not required to instruct the jury further on the cumulative effect of intoxication and provocation. On the other hand, the Court of Appeal held the trial judge improperly failed to instruct the jury that provocation could negate the planning and deliberation required for a first degree murder conviction. 259 The Court however, found that insufficient evidence supported a finding of deliberation and premeditation. Therefore, instead of remanding for a new trial, the Court of Appeal substituted a second degree murder verdict.260 The Court of Appeal noted a life sentence was required for second degree murder, but it invited submissions regarding parole eligibility. In sum, therefore, the Court may have accepted a homosexual panic defense, and the Court may have subsequently imposed a sentence without regard to the defendant’s admitted disgust for, and “strong aversion to homosexuality.”261 On the other hand, since the case arose from a 1991 killing the Sentencing Principles for bias, prejudice or hate did not apply; so, the Court of Appeal was not required to consider evidence of the defendant’s homophobic prejudice. Later in 1995, the same Court of Appeal reached a different result in response to a self- defence claim founded on an alleged homosexual advance in Regina v. Butler.262 Butler stabbed the victim to death with a kitchen knife, claiming self-defence because the victim allegedly used 257 R. v. Stewart, [1995] B.C.J. No. 1384 (Ct. App.) (McEachern C.J.B.C, Wood & Ryan JJ.A.). 258 See id., ¶ 46 (noting conflicting defenses). 259 See id., ¶¶ 52-55. 260 See id., ¶¶ 56-62. 261 See id., ¶¶ 10-11. 262 R. v. Butler, 104 C.C.C. (3d) 198 (B.C. Ct. App.) (Southin, Prowse & Williams JJ.A.). Ch. 3—Analytical Legal Comparison 138 the knife in the course of a homosexual advance.263 The Court of Appeal rejected the defence claims, primarily because the defendant admitted repeatedly that he did not feel threatened by the victim.264 The Court of Appeal did not review sentencing, but since the case arose from a 1993 killing, the Court was not required to consider the Sentencing Principles for bias, prejudice or hate. In a case arising from a 1995 killing, the Ontario Court of Appeal in R. v. Gilling265 remanded for a new trial based in part on the trial judge’s inadequate instructions regarding provocation. The Court of Appeal characterized the evidence of provocation as “marginal,” but remanded based on statements of the defendant indicating he cut the victim’s throat in response to a homosexual advance.266 Because the case was being remanded for a new trial, the Court of Appeal declined to review the sentence, noting however that Crown counsel conceded the assessment of fifteen-years’ parole ineligibility was excessive.267 Because the case arose before the effective date of the new Sentencing Principles, and because the Court of Appeal did not review the sentence, no conflict between the premium for bias, prejudice or hate and the defendant’s provocation claim arose. After a lengthy bench trial, an Ontario judge found Marcello Palma guilty of first degree murder in the killings of three prostitutes on the same night in May, 1996.268 One of the victims was a “transsexual” and another was picked up at a location, “well-known for transvestite prostitutes.” 269 The Court sentenced Palma to three concurrent terms of life without the possibility of parole for twenty five years. 270 But, nothing in the decision indicates the defendant’s selection of the victims based on their sexual orientation or gender identity was 263 Id., ¶¶ 57-58 (summarizing prosecution and defense theories). 264 Id., ¶¶ 59-62. 265 [1997] O.J. No. 2774, 34 O.R. (3d) 392 (Ct. App.). 266 See id., ¶ 25 (quoting statements). 267 Id., ¶ 30. 268 R. v. Palma, [2001] O.J. No. 3283 (Supr. Ct. of Justice) (Watt J.). 269 See id., ¶¶ 16-19. 270 Id., ¶ 233. Ch. 3—Analytical Legal Comparison 139 treated as an aggravating factor. Palma’s case is notable for two reasons. First, the Court rejected his provocation claims, 271 in part because his deliberate choice of victims from among what he deemed, “lesser beings.”272 Second, in spite of finding the defendant considered the victims “scum” and a “lesser species,” the Court gave no express consideration to a sentencing premium for bias, prejudice or hate.273 The Court did not cite § 718, or even mention sentencing principles. American cases immediately preceding the Sentencing Guidelines for hate crime tended to discount provocation claims and to treat homophobic violence more seriously. In 1990 a Pennsylvania Court rejected the use of provocation to justify homicide where the defendant had merely witnessed two women engaged in lesbian lovemaking. 274 The Court held that homosexual activity between two persons is insufficient provocation to justify reducing a murder charge to manslaughter.275 The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the judgment and sentence against a teenager tried as an adult for participating in, “the brutal beating murder of an alleged homosexual.”276 The court characterized the beatings, bludgeoning, and burning of the victim’s body, as “a heinous crime,” and noted expert testimony proving the defendant’s violent, “sociopathic personality.” Under these circumstances, the court affirmed a prison sentence of sixty years to life.277 The federal Court in United States v. Winslow,278 a 1991 case from Idaho, refused to apply a vulnerable victim enhancement to a conspiracy case because of the absence of actual victims: 271 Id., ¶¶ 207, 213-14, 220-21. 272 Id., ¶ 219. 273 See id., ¶¶ 218-21, 233. 274 Commonwealth v. Carr, 580 A.2d 1362 (Pa. Super. Ct.1990). 275 Id. 276 State v. Toney, 555 P.2d 650, 652 (Ariz. 1976). 277 Id., at 651-51, 655. 278 United States v. Winslow, 755 F.Supp. 914 (D.Idaho 1991) (Findings of Fact and Statement of Reasons). Ch. 3—Analytical Legal Comparison 140 The court found that in the case at bar, there was no evidence of any actual victims, but instead the only evidence was the defendants’ talk and speculation concerning the intended victims. The court was not willing to hold that the potential or intended victims of this criminal conspiracy, which included a large class of minorities and homosexuals, should be considered “vulnerable victims” applicable under the guidelines.279 This case was decided before the enactment of the Guidelines for hate crimes, and since the defendants selected their “intended victims” based on prohibited biases, a hate crime enhancement might now be available in a similar case under the current Guidelines. Also shortly before the Sentencing Guidelines for hate crimes, the Ninth Circuit remanded a similar extortion case for re-sentencing.280 Since the hate crime enhancement was not in effect, and since the defendant had been acquitted on the count that alleged an “anti- Semitic outburst,” the Court did not have occasion to consider the defendant’s discriminatory motives.281 In a third case arising shortly before the enactment of the hate crime Guideline, the Fourth Circuit affirmed a ruling admitting evidence of a prior stabbing after a perceived homosexual advance.282 The trial court admitted the evidence to prove “criminal intent” under the Federal Rules of Evidence: Here, the evidence of Oechsle’s prior stabbing was sufficiently similar in nature to his stabbing of Miller that it tended to prove his criminal intent. In both stabbings there were allegations, inter alia, of perceived homosexual overtures from the victim, followed by a facade of compliance from Oechsle, who then stabbed his victim in the back once the victim’s guard was down. Under these circumstances the trial judge did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence of the prior stabbing.283 Thus, not only was the defendant’s claim of homosexual advance rejected, his prior attempt to raise the defense was used against him. 279 Id., at 917. 280 See United States v. Marsh, 26 F.3d 1496 (9th Cir. 1994). 281 But see Marsh, id., at 1504-08 (op. of Noonan, Cir. J., concurring and dissenting, arguing that threats to expose homosexual relations did not constitute economic threats). 282 See United States v. Oechsle, 100 F.3d 951, 1996 WL 654377 (4th Cir. 1996) (Table) (per curiam) (not selected for official publication) (affirming conviction, remanding for re-sentencing for 1994 assault). 283 See Oechsle, id., 1996 WL 654377, at *2 (citing FED. R. EVID. 404(b)). Ch. 3—Analytical Legal Comparison 141 3.2.3.7.3 Post-Hate Crime Cases The first serious Canadian hate crime prosecution after the codification of the Sentencing Principles for bias, prejudice or hate was brought in British Columbia.284 The Provincial Court in R. v. Miloszewski285 allowed five co-defendants to plead guilty to manslaughter instead of murder in the killing of Nirmal Singh Gill in January, 1998. After an eleven-day sentencing hearing, the Court issued a detailed written decision imposing sentences of from fifteen to eighteen years in prison.286 The sentencing judge applied the Sentencing Principles for bias, prejudice or hate, emphasizing racist motives—but adding references to homophobia and other biases. The Court also attempted to reconcile the principles of equality and uniformity in sentencing: . . . . I have heard evidence of truly hateful and sickening comments made by all of the accused as they disparaged ethnic minorities, homosexuals and members of the Jewish community. Clearly these views were fueled by hate, fear and ignorance. . . . 284 See Roberts & Hastings, supra note 206, at 97 (citing R. v. Miloszewski, [1999] B.C.J. No. 2710 (Prov. Ct.)). Roberts and Hastings cited the extensive media coverage of this first hate crime case. Id., at 97 n.15 (citing S. Bittle, Newspaper Coverage of Hate Crime: A Case Study (Ottawa: Department of Justice Canada, 2000)). Other courts have rendered decisions explicitly or implicitly applying the Sentencing Principles to allegations of homophobic bias. See R. v. Zephyr Willson, (18 Jan. 2000), Sechelt 1187-2-B (B.C. Prov. Ct.) (unpublished) (homophobic bias “serious” aggravating factor); R. v. Peers & Foss (30 Sept. 1999), Vancouver 100463 (B.C. Prov. Ct.) (unpublished) (homophobic epithets accompanying assault; victim impact statement cited in sentencing decision). See also, e.g., R. v. C. (A.) 2004 BCPC 99, [2004] B.C.J. No. 811 (QL) (B.C. Youth Ct.); R. v. S. (J.) 2003 BCPC 442, [2003] B.C.J. No. 2877 (QL), (B.C. Youth Ct.); R. v. Howald, [1998] O.J. No. 3121 (QL) (Gen. Div.) (same-sex homophobic assault in custody; several factors considered, including homophobic motive); R. v. Lefebvre, [1998] A.Q. No. 985 (QL) (C.Q. Chambre criminelle) (anti-woman bias sole aggravating factor). Canadian legal scholars also analyzed hate crime laws both before and after the Sentencing Principles. See, e.g., Petersen, supra note 1; M. Shaffer, Criminal Responses to Hate-Motivated Violence: Is Bill C-41 Tough Enough? (1995), 41 MCGILL L.J. 199; L.J. Moran, The Emotional Dimensions of Lesbian & Gay Demands for Hate Crime Reform (2004), 49 MCGILL L.J. 925. Roberts and Hastings cite only a few homophobic hate crime cases from the first four years after codification, although they suggest a comparison of sentencing decisions for hate-motivated crimes before and after codification in 1995. Roberts & Hastings, supra note 206, at 97. 285 R. v. Miloszewski, [1999] B.C.J. No. 2710 (Prov. Ct.) (Stewart Prov. Ct. J.). More than a year after the Sentencing Principles came into force, the Court of Appeal in R. v. Devereaux, [1996] N.J. No. 323, 1995 No. 125 (Supreme Ct. Ct. App.) affirmed the dismissal of a private prosecution against a jailer who forced an inmate back to his cell after he refused to sign a property release form. The inmate had demanded the name of the officer who had made derogatory remarks about his sexual orientation when he was arrested . 286 Miloszewski, id., ¶¶ 171-76. Ch. 3—Analytical Legal Comparison 142 . . . . I am not sentencing them today for those past events but the events do demonstrate graphically that these five men have exulted in their use of violence against innocent persons for no reason other than their identity. . . . . . . . . . . . For hundreds of years, a paramount principle of the Common Law has been equality before the law. This principle applies equally to the law abiding and to the law breaker. No one, not even the most repugnant criminal ought to be singled out for special or markedly different punishment. Every person in our society has the right to both a full and fair trial, and if convicted, to a full and fair sentencing process. . . . . That means I must put aside my revulsion and contempt for the racist views espoused by these five men and ensure that I am punishing them only for their actions.287 Despite the lengthy sentences, the judge misapplied the codified principles of equality for crimes motivated by bias, prejudice or hate. Applying ancient “Common Law” principles of equality to reject a “special” increased punishment for biased motives contradicts the language of equality codified in the Sentencing Principles.288 The B.C. Court of Appeal affirmed the sentences of two of Miloszewski’s co- defendants,289 endorsing what it called, “fit sentences for this despicable crime cruelly committed by a gang of racial bigots in pursuit of their racist aims.”290 In R. v. Damelo,291 issued at about the same time as Miloszewski, an Ontario Court vigorously denounced anti-lesbian bias in a sentence for sexual assault. 287 Id., ¶¶ 159-67 (emphasis added). In another 1999 decision, the British Columbia Court of Appeal affirmed a seven year manslaughter sentence for a man who stabbed his co-worker to death while threatening to cut off his penis. The victim had been teasing the defendant about being gay. In R. v. Tran, 1999 BCCA 367, [1999] B.C.J. No. 1494 (Ct. App.) (Braidwood, J.A.) the Court of Appeal did not mention any homophobic motivation, but it also did not suggest any mitigation of sentence due to provocation. 288 The judge might be required to disregard racist and homophobic expressions if they were being prosecuted separately as hate propaganda, to avoid double punishment for the same conduct, but no danger of double punishment appeared in the sentencing proceeding. In a more recent case, R. v. Lankin, 2005 BCPC 1, [2005] B.C.J. No. 10 (Buller Bennett Prov. Ct. J.), the sentencing judge imposed sixty days for criminal harassment motivated by racial prejudice. The case did not involve homophobia, but notably the Court applied both the Sentencing Principles for bias, prejudice or hate and Charter values of equality and multicultural heritage. See Lankin, id., ¶¶ 28-29 (citing Crown submission and quoting Charter §§ 15(1), 27). This approach is analogous to the treatment of a human rights code as “quasi-constitutional,” and it acknowledges the seriousness of the principles of equality codified in the Sentencing Principles for bias, prejudice or hate. 289 R. v. Miloszewski (appeals by L.E.N. & Synderek), 2001 BCCA 745, [2001] B.C.J. No. 2765 (Ct. App.) (Lambert, Hollinrake & Saunders JJ.A.). 290 Id., ¶ 30. 291 R. v. Demelo, [1999] O.J. No. 3952 (Ct. of Justice Prov. Div.) (Harris Prov. J.). Ch. 3—Analytical Legal Comparison 143 [Damelo] apparently knew from the moment he entered the residence on Richmond Street that the victim was a lesbian. He was well aware of her gender preference and that it was female. He violated her sexually but there is a significant amount of evidence to suggest that he violated her as well because of her sexual preference. Whatever her preference may be and whatever he thinks, she does not have to be, nor should she be, nor should anyone of that particular preference be bashed around in this way. . . . . I question what he would do or say if some dope dealer or punk like him called his mother or his sister a dike . . . . I question how he would treat that kind of a situation . . . .292 The judge quoted the Sentencing Principles for bias, prejudice or hate, and concluded they “may have” been present: I commented earlier that the facts hinted that the assault was imposed because of the sexual preference of the victim. Sexual assaults generally may be imposed for a certain type of gratification. This may have been not only for gratification but motivation because of who the victim was and her sexual preference. Had she not been as tough as what she was, she may have been raped, and I believe she also thought she might have been.293 The judge imposed a sixty day custodial sentence, followed by eighteen months’ probation.294 A third example applying the Sentencing Principles shortly after their effective date, in this case a prosecution for incitement to hatred, is provided in R. v. Froebrich,295 where the defendant pleaded guilty and submitted a letter of apology. At sentencing the judge accounted for the apology in sentencing by noting that the defendant was an aboriginal offender and that a letter of apology held special significance in his community. 296 The case did not involve allegations of homophobic bias, but it did bridge the transition period from before to after the effective date of the Sentencing Principles for bias, prejudice or hate.297 292 Damelo, id., ¶¶ 1-6 (emphasis added). 293 Damelo, id., ¶ 14; see id., ¶ 13 (quoting Criminal Code § 718.2(a)(i)). 294 Id., ¶ 20. The Court also expressly rejected a request to serve the sentence intermittently to permit continued employment, reasoning that an intermittent sentence would amount to a term of probation, which was “totally inappropriate.” Id., ¶ 29. The Court did not quantify a premium for lesbophobic bias, but the references to “a significant amount of evidence” which “may have” established a biased motive suggest a standard of proof less than either a preponderance of evidence or beyond a reasonable doubt. This standard equates to a “substantial evidence” standard of judicial review for an agency’s findings of fact. 295 R. v. Froebrich, 1999 CarswellOnt 1280 (Prov. Div.) (Cole Prov. J.). 296 See id. (D. Cole, P.C.J., Oral Reasons for Sentence) (noting that in sentencing aboriginal persons, “notions of reparation and apology may be more appropriate” than other forms of punishment). 297 See Froebrich, id., ¶¶ 3-6 (surveying transition in Sentencing Principles occasioned by proclamation of Bill C-41 Ch. 3—Analytical Legal Comparison 144 In R. v. Tomlinson,298 a case arising shortly after the effective date of the Sentencing Principles for bias, prejudice or hate, the Saskatchewan Court of Queen’s Bench considered a claim of homosexual provocation as a defense to a second degree murder charge. Rejecting the defendant’s version of the facts, the Court characterized the evidence of provocation as follows: I find this factual scenario to be increditable. A 67-year old small man weighing approximately 130 pounds who had just been bloodied by a 29-year old man weighing 170 pounds with no tolerance for inappropriate sexual gestures, would not pursue the assailant with the view of grabbing his testes. However, given Clarke’s disposition and his previous impulsive conduct, it is possible that he became uncontrollably aroused and then touched Tomlinson’s genitals. Therefore, I must address the question of whether an ordinary person of the same age and sex as Tomlinson, who experienced similar sexual advances, would have lost self-control.299 After setting out the applicable legal standards, the Court rejected the provocation claim, under an objective test of reasonableness: Dr. Menzies in his testimony would go no further than opining that the average person would react to a sexual touching of a nature allegedly experienced by Tomlinson but not to the degree of losing the power of self-control. I am also satisfied that in our society an ordinary person, of the same age and sex and sharing with Tomlinson factors that may give Clarke’s actions and insults special meaning, would not have lost the power of self-control. In my view the defence of provocation is not intended to create an “open season” on homosexuals who act unlawfully. Such would be the case here for Tomlinson knew that Clarke was a cross dresser and had what might be described as a strong desire for homosexual contact. He was not caught off guard. Clarke had previously approached Tomlinson for sexual favours. Nor was this Tomlinson’s first experience for he had faced a similar incident in Vancouver which he handled without losing self-control.300 Because the “objective threshold” test for provocation was not satisfied, the Court found the defendant guilty. The Court did not address sentencing in its judgment, but since the killing occurred in July, 1997, the Sentencing Principles were in effect, and the Court would be required on September 3, 1996). 298 R. v. Tomlinson, [1998] S.J. No. 848 (Sask. Ct. Q.B.) (Klebuc J.). 299 Id., ¶ 46. 300 Id., ¶¶ 49-50 (emphasis added). Ch. 3—Analytical Legal Comparison 145 in a subsequent proceeding to consider evidence of the defendant’s biases if they motivated the murder. In a 1999 case, R. v. Cvetan,301 the Ontario Court of Appeal reduced the co-defendants’ sentences of six months’ imprisonment plus two years’ probation to six month conditional sentences. The Court’s reasoning was based on a lapse in the sentencing judge’s logic: The trial judge did not accept the evidence of [the Crown] to the effect that the assault was motivated by the sexual orientation of the complainants. Without this evidence, we see no other evidence to support the trial judge’s conclusion that the sexual orientation of the complainants played any part in this assault and was an aggravating factor in imposing sentence.302 The case stands for the simple principle that a sentencing court must base a sentence premium for bias, prejudice or hate on evidence that it has not itself rejected. Despite the reduction in the sentence, the Court of Appeal opinion does not repudiate the Sentencing Principles for bias, prejudice or hate—so long as they are applied logically. In a 2001 British Columbia case, the trial court sentenced one youth and one adult for an expressly homophobic attack.303 The Judge’s sentencing decision disavowed any finding of “provocation” by the victim and set out findings establishing both attackers’ homophobic bias: “this event was motivated by a bias, prejudice or hated of homosexuals. There is no other conclusion that can be reached based on the evidence.”304 Finally, in one case soon after the enactment of the Sentencing Principles a court accepted a defendant’s trans-sexuality as a mitigating factor in sentencing, because of 301 [1999] O.J. No. 250 (Ct. of App.). 302 Id., ¶ 9. 303 R. v. M.D.J. (& Troy Calvin Wilton), 2001 BCPC 250, [2001] B.C.J. No. 2110 (Prov. Ct.) (Burdett Prov. Ct. J.). A group including the two defendants called the victim derogatory names and sent the youth to “aggressively pursue” him to the back of a convenience store, where he was “beat up.” 304 M.D.J., id., ¶ 103. The sentencing Judge adopted “unequivocally” the reasons R. v. Ingram & Grimsdale. See M.D.J., id., ¶ 5-6. Because he had no criminal record, the Court sentenced the adult to fourteen days in custody and one year of probation, with a conditional sentence order allowing community service. Id., ¶¶ 9-11. The youth “J.” however had an extensive juvenile record and was on probation at the time of the attack. The Court sentenced him to thirty days’ incarceration, also conditionally allowing community service, followed by one years’ probation. Id., ¶¶ 12-13. Both were prohibited to contact the victim, except for a required letter of apology submitted through their probation officers. Id. Ch. 3—Analytical Legal Comparison 146 discriminatory abuse likely in prison. The Court reasoned: “Any sexuality irregularity identified in prison will attract focus and derision and beyond. . . . extended imprisonment in the subculture of a Federal Penitentiary would constitute punishment well beyond imprisonment.”305 In total, despite their condemnation of homophobic motives, cases decided soon after the enactment of the Sentencing Principles generally lacked a detailed analysis. Like their Canadian counterparts, American federal judges sometimes embraced homophobia as a problem worthy of denunciation before the addition of the hate motivation provisions of the Sentencing Guidelines.306 For instance, in United States v. Gonzalez,307 a 1991 decision, a Court of Appeals affirmed a downward departure for a defendant because he appeared homosexual and would therefore suffer increased vulnerability to sexual assault in prison. In the 1993 case of United States v. Lallemand, 308 a Court of Appeals affirmed a sentence enhancement based on a finding that married homosexual victims were selected for their vulnerability to extortion. And, a 1995 Court of Appeals decision, United States v. 305 R. v. Tideswell, [1997] O.J. No. 3743 (Ct. of Justice Gen. Div.) (Donnelly J.). The Canadian Human Rights Tribunal, furthermore, later rendered similar findings and invalidated prison regulations that facilitated trans-phobic violence. In Kavanagh, the Court affirmed a Canadian Human Rights Tribunal decision invalidating prison regulations that restricted (1) sex-reassignment surgery, and (2) the placement options of pre-operative transsexuals. Canada (Attorney General) v. Canada (Human Rights Commission), 2003 FCT 89 (CanLII), (2003), 46 C.H.R.R. 196, (2003), 228 F.T.R. 231. Although the decision did not directly address sentencing for trans-phobic violence, it incorporated testimony from the complainant, Ms. Synthia Kavanagh, describing discriminatory violence against her in prison: [129] According to Ms. Kavanagh, during her incarceration in male institutions operated by CSC, she was regularly beaten, sexually assaulted and ridiculed. In the course of an earlier federal sentence, Ms. Kavanagh says, she was raped by nine men. Ms. Kavanagh testified that some inmates viewed her as ‘a trophy’, and pursued her for sexual purposes. Insults from other inmates, who did not like what she was, would lead to violent confrontations. According to Ms. Kavanagh, there was always a great deal of conflict and violence surrounding her. Ms. Kavanagh acknowledged that other inmates are vulnerable to the sort of abuse that she experienced in male prisons, including homosexuals and very young inmates. Kavanagh v. Canada (Attorney General), 2001 CanLII 8496 (C.H.R.T.), (2001) 41 C.H.R.R. 119. The Tribunal did not order placement in women’s prisons; instead it required the agency to reconsider its policy based on the “special vulnerability” of pre-operative male-to-female transsexuals. The Tribunal held that “Gender Identity Disorder” constituted a disability and that the policies discriminated on the bases of gender and disability. 306 See generally United States v. Oechsle, supra note 282 (authorizing the admission of evidence showing a prior stabbing attack on a homosexual victim). 307 945 F.2d 525 (2nd Cir. 1991). 308 989 F.2d 936 (7th Cir. 1993). Ch. 3—Analytical Legal Comparison 147 Palmer,309 affirmed a sentence enhancement based in part on a prior state conviction for anti-gay intimidation. A 1990 state case from Illinois is better suited to reveal the transition in decisions before and after the enactment of a hate crime law.310 In People v. Williams, the state court of appeals affirmed a sentence enhanced for homophobic bias, even though the attack occurred in 1987, before the addition of the aggravating factor to the statute.311 The court, however, held the earlier list of aggravating factors was not exclusive, and therefore, “[a] sentencing court may base the sentence on elements other than those listed in the statute so long as they are consistent with the statute.”312 The court noted that, “the defendant intended to target persons he perceived were homosexuals,” that he and his accomplice went to the park, “to rob homosexuals,” and that he, “used a term derogatory to homosexuals in describing the site of the crime.” The Court specifically held the sentencing court, “did not err when it considered that defendant’s attack [] was motivated in part by defendant’s belief that [the victim] was a homosexual.” 313 The defendant, who was black, raised objections to racial biases expressed during jury selection, but the court held that the comments were immaterial and caused no prejudice to the defendant.314 In an unreported decision from 2000, a Tennessee court affirmed the dismissal of an equal protection claim by a prison inmate challenging a policy against “transsexual dressing,” including the wearing of earrings by men. Like the contemporaneous Canadian case above, the Court’s reasoning addresses the discriminatory motives sometimes involved in prison sexual assaults: The Court recognizes that in general, a male wearing an earring does not immediately suggest that the wearer is transsexual or invite sexual assault. However, the atmosphere among the inmates in a prison undoubtedly contains 309 68 F.3d 52 (2nd Cir. 1995). 310 People v. Williams, 655 N.E.2d 1071 (Ill. Ct. App., 1995). 311 See id., at 1078 (citing Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, ¶ 1005-5-3.2). 312 Id. (citation omitted). 313 Id., at 1078. 314 Id., at 1077. Ch. 3—Analytical Legal Comparison 148 greater tension, both sexual and otherwise, than the atmosphere outside the prison walls. Therefore, we find that a policy restricting transsexual dressing, even in what seems a minor way, is reasonably related to the legitimate government interest in the welfare and safety of the inmates. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment on Ahkeen’s equal protection claims.315 In the same case, however, the Court remanded for a trial on the question of liability against an individual prison official for selective enforcement, including an alleged violation of the state’s malicious harassment statute.316 While these state cases were not decided under the federal Sentencing Guidelines, they are indicative of the increased attention paid to claims of homo- and trans-phobic bias in American decisions shortly after the enactment of the Sentencing Guidelines. 3.2.3.7.4 Recent Cases Although the outcomes of the cases have varied, more recent Canadian cases have gradually adopted a longer and more sophisticated analysis of homophobic bias. A Calgary court recently applied the Sentencing Principles to a homophobic assault with a beer bottle.317 The Reasons for Judgment quote the factual basis for the guilty plea in which the defendant admitted he, “hit him twice across the face with a beer bottle, causing several lacerations across his right eye. One of the lacerations punctured his right eyeball. He also received two minor lacerations to his left cheek.”318 He also admitted calling the victim derogatory homophobic names immediately before he assaulted him. The sentencing judge adopted the Crown’s listing of twenty-one aggravating factors, including one for biased motivation: “The only motivation 315 Ahkeen v. Parker, No. W1998-00640-COA-R3CV, 2000 WL 52771 (Tenn.Ct.App. Jan. 10, 2000) (Not Reported in S.W.3d). 316 Id. (reversing summary judgment on “state law claims of civil rights intimidation via malicious harassment and official oppression pursuant to Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-17-309; § 4-21-701; and § 39-16-403.”). More recent decisions have also considered hate crime sentencing laws in context with homophobic prison violence. See Veney v. Wyche, 293 F.3d 726 (4th Cir. 2002) (noting, “concerns of bias-motivated attacks on homosexuals have prompted almost half of the states to protect homosexuals with hate crime statutes”). 317 R. v. Amr, 2006 ABPC 8, [2006] A.J. No. 92 (Prov. Ct., Crim. Div.) (Semenuk, Prov. Ct. J.). 318 Id., ¶ 4. Ch. 3—Analytical Legal Comparison 149 for the assault appears to be the Accused’s perception that the Victim was a homosexual and the fact that he is of French nationality.”319 Yet, the Court did not include homophobia among the factors indicating “a high degree of moral blameworthiness.”320 After reviewing the parties’ authorities for the range of sentences, the judge explained the role of aggravating factors, without any express mention of aggravation for bias. The Court’s analysis of Sentencing Principles comprises only a single paragraph, and despite its finding that prohibited biases were the defendant’s sole motive321 the Court did not analyze the Sentencing Principles for bias, prejudice or hate: 33 As stated above, denunciation and deterrence are primary sentencing considerations in this case. Protection of the public is also a major concern. The Court does not ignore the accused’s relative youth and the principle of rehabilitation. That being said, any discounting for his youth and rehabilitation will only be taken into account in fixing the length of a penitentiary sentence, and not for bringing the accused into the prison range of sentence. I say that because in the circumstances of this case I am of the opinion that the fundamental principle of sentence must govern. The sentence to be imposed here must be commensurate with the gravity of the offence and the moral blameworthiness of the accused. In this case, the offence is very grave, and the moral blameworthiness of the accused is very high. The aggravating circumstances are many, and the mitigating circumstances are few. A substantial penitentiary sentence is warranted. In my view, the sentence must be, at least, 4 years imprisonment. But for the accused’s youth, and lack of any serious adult record of violence, it would be higher. Giving the accused double credit for approximately 6 months spent in pre-trial custody, he is sentenced to 3 years imprisonment.322 While the Court must have enhanced the sentence for bias, the decision does not apportion punishment between the two biases—nationality and sexual orientation—and the other aggravating factors mentioned. By blending all of the Sentencing Principles into one ambiguous factor analysis, the Court effectively effaced the principles of equality embodied in the principle for bias, prejudice or hate. Arguably, the mere mention of bias, prejudice or hate, without further 319 Id., ¶ 31 (adopting Crown’s listing, ¶ (5)(o)). 320 Amr, id., ¶ 13. 321 See id., ¶ 29 (quoting Criminal Code, § 718.2(a)(i), (b), (d) & (e)). 322 Id., ¶ 33. Ch. 3—Analytical Legal Comparison 150 analysis, violated the Code’s sole mandate to “consider” the sentencing principle. Still, the only statutory aggravating factor quoted in the decision is § 718.2(a)(i), for “bias, prejudice or hate.” Perhaps the most extensive recorded application of the Sentencing Principles in a case involving bias, prejudice or hate based on sexual orientation appears in the sentencing colloquy of R. v. Demers.323 Demers pled guilty to an assault on Ryan MacKenzie, a participant in the City of Edmonton 2005 Gay Pride Festival.324 His sentencing was heard one year later, during 2006 Pride. The Crown presented a thorough factual basis for aggravating factors: There are a number of aggravating factors, Your Honour. Firstly, the nature of the offence and its surrounding circumstances. . . . It took place in a situation were there were people around. The complainant attended that location with a group of friends and there were other members of the public who also witnessed the incident and, in fact, attempted to intervene to stop the incident. . . . . specifically, this offence took place in the context of an official event to mark Gay Pride Week, which was the raising of the Gay Pride flag. . . . It’s an official event of the City of Edmonton. This year, our mayor was the marshal of the parade and so it is an official city event, which members of the public are invited to attend and expected to attend in safety. Of course, there’s always an expectation of safety for any members of the public who are going to Churchill Square or to City Hall as they have the right to do so as members of the City of Edmonton - residents of this city, regardless of whether they are gay or straight or their beliefs or their looks. . . . . Now, leading up to the event, as I indicated, there was some indication that the accused was with a group [] having some interaction with the complainant’s group of people. There were some words exchanged and there was some yelling; and the complainant has advised me he was of the view that he was being challenged to fight and that he wanted to avoid confrontation. . . . . he warned his friends to ignore it, that being the - what I might describe as taunting, and to keep on walking. And to quote from Mr. MacKenzie’s witness statement: I guess we were almost there, to the door of City Hall. I could hear them running and all I thought was, I only got a few more steps and I’m safe. That was what was running through Mr. MacKenzie’s mind; but he was, in fact, incorrect, because he opened the first door to enter City Hall and he was attacked in that location. He indicated that one of the guys - referring to the accused - Grabbed me and give me a good hit on the left side of the face right in 323 R. v. Demers, [2006] A.J. No. 1204 (Prov. Ct.) (Dzenick Prov. Ct. J.). 324 See id., ¶ 59. Ch. 3—Analytical Legal Comparison 151 front of the ear. And it was at this time, that the attack did not continue because a member of the public intervened to stop the attack. If I haven’t said so already - or if it hasn’t been highlighted previously - this act of violence was completely unprovoked. The complainant had no involvement with the accused and was, in fact, attempting to avoid any confrontation. . . . . The major aggravating factor, in addition to all of this, is that the Crown alleges, Your Honour, that this assault was motivated by prejudice and hatred due to the victim’s sexual orientation. Your Honour has heard previously that Mr. MacKenzie came to this event at City Hall dressed in a manner that would suggest a different sexual orientation . . . - he was wearing high heels - high-heeled boots, tight white jeans, and tight white belly shirt which exposed his midriff and a belly-button ring. Across his shirt was the term, Drama Queen San Francisco. On top of his shirt, he was wearing a white corduroy jacket with a full fur lining and collar. He was also wearing earrings and sunglasses. And he indicated that he was walking in a particular manner which he described as a model walk. . . . this is all in keeping with the spirit of the event and [] he was just doing this for fun. Now, the Crown does allege that that was the reason why Mr. MacKenzie was attacked. [The accused admitted] “I hit him. He deserved it. There should be a law against dressing that way.” . . . . He was asked: So why did you hit the guy? Was it because he was gay? The response he received was: Yes, I didn’t like the way he was walking and dressing. And he was asked: Do you hate gay people? And he said: I’m not fond of them.325 In addition to discussing exemplary cases, the Crown attorney presented reasons for applying the aggravating factor for bias, prejudice or hate from two sources: (1) the 2004 StatsCan Pilot Study on hate crime statistics; and, (2) the Ontario Crown Policy Manual for sentencing.326 Crown counsel also cited both the Criminal Code Sentencing Principles and the Canadian Human Rights Act to note that “hate-motivated discrimination that’s based on sexual orientation has formally been against the law in Canada for a decade.”327 The sentencing judge allowed the victim to read his impact statement and furthermore allowed the victim to ask the defendant if he would intervene to prevent homophobic violence in the future, and whether he would be 325 Id., ¶¶ 61-76. 326 Id., ¶¶ 88-94. 327 Id., ¶ 77. Ch. 3—Analytical Legal Comparison 152 accepting if he learned that his newborn son was gay.328 After the recorded dialog between the victim and the perpetrator, the judge deemed a conditional sentence “very much in order,” and adjourned for the parties to prepare submissions.329 The parties’ joint submission, approved by the Judge, imposed a six month conditional sentence followed by twelve months’ probation.330 In Ahenakew, the provincial Court of Appeal affirmed the quashing of a conviction and remand for a new trial, where the trial judge had failed “to consider all of the evidence relevant to the question of whether Mr. Ahenakew had the intent necessary for a finding of guilt,”331 and specifically, “relevant evidence concerning intent.”332 Ahenakew had been convicted of wilfully promoting hatred against Jewish people for statements he made at a conference. Ahenakew may 328 The reported colloquy between the victim and the acused is notable: MR. MacKENZIE: Am I allowed to ask him questions at this present time? THE COURT: Yes, if you wish to. MR. MacKENZIE: Okay. Recently, I have - saw you at City Centre, about a month and a half ago, and you were wearing the same typical clothes and you were hanging out with the same typical people as you were that day that I was victimized. My question to you is if - would you actually stop one of your friends from committing that kind of crime? Would you actually - if they started saying bad things, would you stick up for the gay community? Like, would you make sure that they would stop their conversations and stop the gay bashing verbally before it would actually escalate to what happened that day? THE ACCUSED: I haven’t hung out with any of those people for a very long time, and I have - I have stood up because there was this person at - that lived - we spoke about this in - I guess there was this person that was dressing up that lived at the place where I’m living at the moment and my girlfriend and I hung out with them, and some people weren’t right with them. I still hung out them in front of them, in front of my friends, so - MR. MacKENZIE: Okay. That’s good to hear. Second question: Congratulations upon your child and let’s say that your child happens to be gay when it grows up. Are you going to be able to accept that and love your child just the same or is that going to be an issue for you? THE ACCUSED: I have spoken about this to friends because when they heard that - well, they know pretty much about a lot of what’s going on with me, and they told me - they asked me about that, because they know about the crime committed. And I told them that I’m not sure how I’d take it, but I would if it’s my child and - because - so I should accept my child however they want to think or - MR. MacKENZIE: So you really don’t know how you’d react? THE ACCUSED: Not at the moment, but I believe I would accept my child no matter what. Id., ¶¶ 220-27. 329 Id., ¶ 256. 330 Id., ¶ 270. Among the cases cited by the Crown were C.A.M (or M.(C.A.)), [1996] 1 S.C.R. 500 (for the role of denunciation in sentencing), R. v. Wilson, supra note 223 (imposing aggravated sentence for crime motivated by sexual orientation), and M.D.J., [2001] B.C.J. No. 2110 (same). 331 R. v. Ahenakew, 2008 SKCA 4, [2008] 2 W.W.R. 68, 53 C.R. (6th) 314, 227 C.C.C. (3d) 428, 289 D.L.R. (4th) 59; see id., ¶ 52. 332 Id., ¶ 34. Ch. 3—Analytical Legal Comparison 153 be contrasted with R. v. Noble,333 where the B.C. Supreme Court convicted the defendant of the willful promotion of hatred based on materials he distributed via the internet. The B.C. Court, finding it “unnecessary to quote extensively from the evidence,” nevertheless gave examples, including materials advocating violence against “the Jews and homosexuals” and describing “homosexuality as a crime against nature,” along with “images and posters . . . attacking gays, and others.”334 The most recent Canadian hate crime penalty case addressing homophobic bias claims arose during the 2005 Pride celebration in Vancouver. 335 The victim, Michael Young was intoxicated and had had little sleep at the time of the altercation and was therefore unsure of his ability to identify his attackers.336 The Court therefore expressed doubt about some, though not all of Young’s testimony, and specifically, noted, “Young’s evidence about . . . whether anti-gay comments were made to him . . . must be considered with the greatest caution.”337 One of the two defendants testified, and the Court declined to accept his testimony.338 Instead, the Court relied primarily on the testimony of a passerby.339 The Court found it was, “left with a reasonable doubt about the nature and extent of Cheema’s participation in the fight.”340 The Court found that co-defendant Toor had, “punched [Young], with a closed fist to the face, at least once and quite possibly twice. This was after 333 R. v. Noble, 2008 CarswellBC 329, 2008 BCSC 215 (B.C. S.C. Feb 04, 2008). In conclusion, the trial Judge noted that, “Hatred is a term which has a broader meaning than simply violence.” Noble, id., ¶ 48 (emphasis in original). 334 Noble, id., ¶¶ 42-44 (reviewing evidence of willful intent to promote hatred). 335 See R. v. Cheema & Toor, 2008 BCPC 35 (Prov. Ct.) (Judgment issued Feb. 12, 2008) (Reasons for Judgment dated Feb. 22, 2008), available online at http://www.provincialcourt.bc.ca/judgments/pc/2008/00/p08_0035.htm (accessed Mar. 11, 2008); see also Natasha Barsotti, Gaybashing: One guilty, one acquitted, Judge convicts Toor of assault causing bodily harm, Xtra West, Wed., Feb. 27, 2008, available online at http://www.xtra.ca/public/viewstory.aspx?AFF_TYPE=4&STORY_ID=4399&PUB_TEMPLATE_ID=2 (accessed Mar. 11, 2008); Glenn Bohn, Man convicted in pride week assault: Judge to decide whether attack on gay man was a hate crime, Vancouver Sun Sat., Mar. 01, 2008; Natasha Barsotti, Gaybashing trial inches forward, Xtra West, Thurs., Aug. 30, 2007 (noting re-instatement of assault charges in alleged homophobic assault case, after “courtroom mix-up”). 336 See R. v. Cheema & Toor, id., ¶¶ 17-18. 337 Id., ¶ 87. 338 See id., ¶¶ 88-91 (detailing inconsistencies in Cheema’s testimony). 339 See id., ¶¶ 92-95 (reciting reasons). 340 Id., ¶ 107; see also id., ¶ 114. Ch. 3—Analytical Legal Comparison 154 Young had been separated from one or possibly both of the Indo-Canadian men and was walking away[.]”341 And, according to the Court, Toor kicked Young at least twice in the legs.342 The Court also found that Young had suffered bodily injury sufficient to support Toor’s conviction of assault with bodily harm.343 However, on the question of bias, the Court found insufficient evidence of anti-gay comments before the altercation: There is insufficient reliable evidence to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that anti-gay comments were made before the fight. I find that at least one of the men yelled [] “fucking faggot” as they were walking away in the lane. This was after the fight. There is not sufficient reliable evidence to determine which of two men yelled these words after the fight.344 As of March, 2008, the Court had not yet sentenced the one defendant found guilty of attacking Young. 345 Therefore, it is impossible to know for certain whether the Court will consider the sentencing principle for bias, prejudice or hate. However, the use of the Sentencing Principles for bias, prejudice or hate is doubtful since the Court was unable to rely on evidence of bias in its verdict. Two additional recent attacks addressed by the Courts during the course of this study are compared separately in Chapter 4. Still, despite the codification of the Sentencing Principles, and despite the gradually increasing sophistication of sentencing decisions, cases considering bias, prejudice or hate remain rare.346 Furthermore, while courts must consider homophobic bias in their sentencing 341 Id., ¶ 110. 342 Id., ¶ 111. 343 Id., ¶¶ 115-17. 344 Id., ¶ 113. 345 Coinciding with the release of the Court’s Reasons for Judgment in Young’s case, Vancouver queer leaders hosted a play followed by a panel discussion about homophobia and gaybashing. See Nathaniel Christopher, What are we doing about gaybashing? Queer leaders discuss hate crimes, Xtra West, Thurs., Feb. 28, 2008 (documenting Vancouver performance of play “Steel Kiss” followed by panel discussion); see also id. (linking video report of play and panel discussion). 346 The 2002 volume of the Canadian Abridgement lists only six cases addressing aggravating factors under the Sentencing Principles, and none of these addresses enhancement for bias, prejudice or hate. See R11B Canadian Abridgment, IX4h, at 103-06, nn.61953 to 61958 (2nd ed. 2002). Roberts and Hastings cited only a few homophobic Ch. 3—Analytical Legal Comparison 155 decisions, the Criminal Code does not quantify the sentencing premium. Academics have criticized this lack of guidance. 347 The general ethos of Canadian law allows judges more discretion than in the United States.348 But Roberts and Hastings specifically contrast the United States Sentencing Guidelines with the Sentencing Principles of the Criminal Code, concluding that guidelines are unlikely, despite an identified need for principles of sentencing equality for those convicted of hate-motivated offences.349 The Canadian trend toward increased attention to homophobic motives in sentencing is not reflected in federal sentencing in the United States. Despite the inclusion of “sexual orientation” in the United States Sentencing Guidelines for hate motivated crimes, almost no published cases have applied the Guidelines to impose enhanced penalties for homophobic hate crimes.350 In a 2004 decision, Greene v. Bowles,351 the federal Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal of a civil rights claim against prison officials based on their deliberate indifference hate crime cases from the first four years of the Sentencing Principles. The Canadian Statutory Citations likewise list only a handful of cases applying the Sentencing Principles for bias, prejudice or hate. The 2006 Supplement digests forty-one cases, and none of these mention bias, prejudice or hate based on sexual orientation or gender identity. See id., at 91-98 nn.418 to 459 (Supp. 2006). Two address racial bias, one applying the aggravating factor, and the other reversing the finding of bias. Id., (citing R. v. Lankin, 2005 BCPC 1 (2005), 2005 CarswellBC 29 (Prov. Ct.) (Bennett Prov. J.) (sentence of thirty-two days in jail for criminal harassment accompanied by racist note); R. v. Wright, 2002 ABCA 170, (2002), A.J. No. 892, 273 W.A.C. 371, 303 A.R. 371 (Ct..App.) (Bensler J. (ad hoc), Johnstone J. (ad hoc), Russell J.A.) (Setting aside finding of aggravating factor based on racist slur made by accused several hours after offence; affirming overall sentence)). One case citied in the 2006 Supplement expressly held that proof beyond reasonable doubt is required to establish an aggravating factor under the Sentencing Principles. See R v. P. (J.G.), 2003 ABPC 25 (Prov. Ct.) (Semenuk Prov. J.). 347 For example, Roberts and Hastings criticize the judicial discretion allowed under the Sentencing Principles: Section 718.2 of the Criminal Code clearly identifies the statutory aggravating factors to be considered at sentencing. However, it is left to the trial judge, guided by any direction from the appellate courts, to determine the extent to which the presence of hate motivation should increase the severity of the sentence imposed. The current sentencing system provides judges with considerable discretion at sentencing, and with no presumptive or even advisory guidelines on how to exercise their discretion. With few cases of hate crime being sentenced, and few sentences being reviewed by the appellate courts, the case law is unlikely to provide detailed guidance for trial judges. Under these circumstances, it will be difficult to establish with any consistency the extent of aggravation in any particular case. No precise guidance is likely to emerge from the case law unless judges explicitly identify the effect of the aggravating factors in their reasons for sentence. Roberts & Hastings, supra note 206, at 107 (footnote and citation omitted). 348 See Roberts & Hastings, id., at 110-11 (reviewing sentencing reform inquiries, provincial consultations, and adoption of narrative, rather than numerical guidelines in Sentencing Principles). 349 Id., at 111-12 (citing testimony from Parliamentary hearings). 350 Compare United States v. Allen, 341 F.3d 870 (9th Cir. 2003) (criminal civil rights prosecution for racist attacks not applying Guidelines enhancement for racial motivation). 351 No. 02-3626 (6th Cir., Mar. 16, 2004). Ch. 3—Analytical Legal Comparison 156 resulting in assaults on a pre-operative male-to-female transsexual. Although the Court did not specify any discriminatory motive, the decision was based in part on the prison warden’s own expert testimony that “transgendered inmates are often placed in protective custody because of the greater likelihood of their being attacked by their fellow inmates.”352 When he announced the indictment in response to the killing of a lesbian couple, Julianne Marie Williams and Lollie Winans, United States Attorney General John Ashcroft condemned the attack invoking the hate crime Sentencing Guideline.353 Professor Susan Becker poignantly countered this official pronouncement by highlighting the rarity of such prosecutions: one prosecution in eight years hardly reflects a solid record of federal commitment to eliminating hate crimes against gay men and lesbians who are victims of brutal crimes. . . . the dearth of prosecutions is not due to the shortage of brutal hate crimes against gay men and lesbians, but rather the incredibly narrow applicability of the Hate Crimes Sentencing Enhancement Act.354 The indictment alleged the defendant “intentionally selected” the victims because of their “actual or perceived gender or sexual orientation,” and that he did so in violation of the hate crime Guideline.355 The indictment was later withdrawn, however, and no further charges have been made in relation to the killings.356 In a recent case from the District of Columbia, the Court of Appeals affirmed a conviction under the D.C. Bias-Related Crimes Statute based on the defendant’s assaults on two women. 357 The Court concluded that a sufficient “nexus” connected the assaults and the 352 Id. The plaintiff’s claims were based on the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment, not the Equal Protection Clause. 353 See Susan J. Becker, Tumbling Towers as Turning Points: Will 9/11 Usher in a New Civil Rights Era for Gay Men & Lesbians in The United States? 9 Wm. & Mary J. Women & L. 207, at 249 (2003); see id., at 249 nn.246-50 (collecting references to announcement of indictment). Ashcroft asserted: “By invoking the hate crimes enhancement part of sentencing enhancement today, today’s murder indictment makes clear our commitment to seek every prosecutorial advantage and to use every available statute to secure justice for victims like Julianne Marie Williams and Lollie Winans.” See id., at 249. 354 Id., at 249-50 (citing announcement of federal indictment). 355 See Indictment (citing Sentencing Guidelines, § 3A1.1(a)), available online at http://fl1.findlaw.com/news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/rice/usrice040902ind.pdf (accessed Mar. 10, 2008). 356 See Charges against lesbian hikers’ accused killer may be withdrawn, The Advocate, Feb. 10, 2004, available online at http://www.advocate.com/news_detail_ektid04072.asp (accessed Mar. 10, 2008). 357 Shepherd v. United States, 905 A.2d 260 (D.C. App. 2006). Ch. 3—Analytical Legal Comparison 157 defendant’s biased motive, based in part on the “verbal stream of homophobic insults” accompanying the assaults.358 Because of the relative scarcity of United States federal cases applying the Sentencing Guidelines for hate motivation, Chapter 4 will utilize a recent Washington state case as a basis for comparison with a Canadian case. 3.2.3.7.5 Analysis As indicated, the impact of hate crime laws on society as a whole is beyond the scope of this analysis. As with society as a whole, moreover, it is impossible to know all of the details surrounding the incorporation of hate crime penalty practices into the routines of judicial sentencing decisions. Among other impediments to a comprehensive understanding of this process, judicial sentencing decisions are constrained by the decisions of police and prosecutors who screen many cases before they even arrive in courts—and even by victims who often avoid reporting crimes to police. Nevertheless, some conclusions are supported by the available sentencing decisions. First, codified hate crime laws have established a uniform a vocabulary for judicial sentencing decisions that was not available before. Although the language of Canadian and American hate crime penalty laws differs, sentencing judges within each country now have a shared basis for analyzing claims of biased motives in sentencing. And, in both countries this vocabulary identifies crimes motivated by “sexual orientation” as deserving of criminal punishment. 358 Id., at 262-63 (citing D.C.Code §§ 22-3701, -3703 (2001)). Ch. 3—Analytical Legal Comparison 158 Second, decisions analyzing biased motivations for crimes began to appear more frequently and with more sophistication, though only gradually, shortly before the codification of hate crime sentencing laws. Third, in both Canada and the United States, hate crime laws have probably reduced claims of gay panic and homosexual advance. And, even if such claims have not decreased, defendants and their attorneys have surely encountered far greater risks because of the possibility of enhanced penalties for homophobic bias. Fourth, crimes motivated by “gender identity” or “gender expression” are not expressly included in hate crime penalty laws in either Canada or the United States. Generally, trans- phobic crimes do not appear in sentencing decisions in either country according to the same trends as homophobic hate crimes. Nevertheless, trans-phobic violence has been the subject of judicial consideration in a few cases in both countries. A few important differences appear in the hate crime law in the two countries. Most significant, while judicial decisions denouncing homophobic violence have appeared in both Canada courts and American state courts, American federal courts have rarely considered hate crime penalties in cases involving homophobic violence. This gap in federal decisions may partly explain the current efforts to expand federal court hate crime jurisdiction. The effect of hate crime penalty laws on the frequency or severity of hate crimes is probably impossible to know. In both Canada and the United States, however, sentencing courts have at least acknowledged homophobic bias as an aggravating factor in sentencing. This gradual trend is certainly due to a complex interaction of many factors. But, one contributing factor is almost certainly the enactment of laws that either require or authorize enhanced criminal penalties for homophobic or trans-phobic bias. Hate crime prosecutions remain rare in both Canada and the United States. Nevertheless, a recognized hate crime classification system has emerged in both countries. While these Ch. 3—Analytical Legal Comparison 159 prosecutions have not always been successful, the legal classification systems in both countries have acknowledged homophobic hate crimes. Trans-phobic hate crimes remain at the threshold of recognition in both countries. A complete understanding of the legal classification systems for hate crimes in Canada and the United States is, however, impossible without examining a number of other laws that identify hate crimes and thus contribute to official legal knowledge about inequality in the criminal law field. 3.2.4 Other Hate Crime Laws Despite the central importance of criminal prosecutions and sentencing proceedings in defining the hate crime field in both the United States and Canada, other governmental proceedings address hate crimes and hate-related conduct. Some of these non-penal hate crime laws authorize legal remedies other than criminal punishment, but as a group they are important primarily for their contribution to official legal knowledge. In both Canada and the United States, hate crime penalty laws co-exist with other hate crime laws and together constitute a new “classification system.”359 Hate crimes occurred before the advent of hate crime laws, but they were either omitted as crimes altogether or classified in a manner that allowed them to remain invisible as a category. The new classification system constituted by hate crime laws has restructured a segment of official legal knowledge in both Canada and the United States. But, both the dynamics of this change and the resulting taxonomies differ slightly in the two 359 Geoffrey C. Bowker & Susan Leigh Star, SORTING THINGS OUT: CLASSIFICATION & ITS CONSEQUENCES (1999). New classification systems, “draw on the authority of outdated knowledge while simultaneously supplanting it.” Id., at 260. Bowker and Star explain why a thorough analysis of hate crimes before and after hate crime laws presents an impossible task: “There [is] no way of coding past knowledge and linking it to current practice.” Id., at 258. Despite the impossibility of connecting the new hate crime classification systems with past legal standards, present- day lawyers and judges necessarily assume that current hate crime laws rely on perfect historical memory: “Three social institutions, more than any others, claim perfect memory: the institutions of science, law, and religion.” Id., at 275. Yet, paradoxically, new classification systems, “draw on the authority of outdated knowledge while simultaneously supplanting it.” Id., at 260. Bowker and Star use the term “clearance” to describe the process of forgetting or erasing old knowledge, which is necessary to cope with the paradoxes of a new classification system. Id., at 259-61. Those aspects of old knowledge retained by the new classification system are necessarily drawn from what Bowker and Star call “potential memory”—archived files, forms, and other information of organizations. Id., at 268. Also paradoxically, the absence of any potential memory makes a new classification system impossible; whereas, a large potential memory retained within an old system makes a new classification system inconvenient. Ch. 3—Analytical Legal Comparison 160 countries. Some of these differences may be inconsequential, but some aspects of the hate crime classification systems have important consequences for nongovernmental groups that monitor homophobic and trans-phobic hate crimes. Antidiscrimination laws in the fields of civil rights and human rights authorize judicial and administrative remedies for hate crimes in both Canada and the United States. In both countries lawmakers have extended the terminology of hate crime law into the field of education and elsewhere. Official statistical inquiries in both countries contribute to legal knowledge in the hate crime field. Hate speech and propaganda laws have already been mentioned, and they also contribute to the hate crime classification system. An exhaustive study of all laws related to hate crime classification is impossible here, but five categories of legal inquiry will be examined: (a) hate speech and hate propaganda laws; (b) hate crime statistics laws; (c) laws authorizing civil rights and human rights remedies for hate crimes; (d) school harassment and bullying laws; and, (e) other laws authorizing governmental inquiries into hate-related conduct.360 3.2.4.1 Hate Speech & Propaganda Laws Hate speech and hate propaganda laws were addressed briefly above to illustrate the free expression limits on equality in Canada and the United States. As indicated earlier, laws punish hate speech to varying degrees in Canada and the United States. But, regardless of these differences, the hate propaganda sections of the Canadian Criminal Code and the various state and local hate speech regulations in the United States all influence their respective hate crime classification systems by articulating prohibited grounds of discrimination. The antidiscrimination language of these laws is therefore reviewed briefly here. 360 As indicated earlier, laws punish hate speech to varying degrees in Canada and the United States. The hate propaganda sections of the Canadian Criminal Code and the various state and local hate speech regulations in the United States all influence their respective hate crime classification systems by articulating prohibited grounds of discrimination. Ch. 3—Analytical Legal Comparison 161 The Criminal Code of Canada contains two types of hate crime laws. The first is the sentencing premium for offences “motivated by bias, prejudice or hate,” which has already been discussed.361 The second type of hate crime law is contained in the Hate Propaganda sections of the Criminal Code, §§ 318 & 319. As suggested above, the Canadian Charter accommodates more robust laws regulating hate-related speech than its American counterpart. And Canada’s hate propaganda laws have recently been amended to expressly prohibit hate propaganda motivated by “sexual orientation.” While Canada does not have the same history of criminal civil rights laws as the United States, the Criminal Code expressly incorporated antidiscrimination principles in the “Hate Propaganda” sections in the 1970s. The Hate Propaganda provisions 362 create offences and authorize criminal penalties for anyone who advocates genocide, publicly incites hatred, or willfully promotes hatred against an “identifiable group.” The equality rights language applicable to hate propaganda appears in the definition of “identifiable group”: “any section of the public distinguished by colour, race, religion, ethnic origin or sexual orientation.”363 American hate speech laws are found mostly among state statutes and municipal codes, and these laws are restricted by constitutional protections for free expression.364 The equality rights language embodied in these laws varies widely throughout the country, and even among municipalities within the same state. As an example, the St. Paul, Minnesota, Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance, which the Supreme Court invalidated in R.A.V. v. St. Paul, prohibited the display of symbols arousing “anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, 361 The same section contains Sentencing Principles for spouse, partner, and child abuse, abuse of “a position of trust or authority,” and several other factors. 362 Criminal Code §§ 318, 319, R.S., 1985, c. C-46, s. 320; R.S., 1985, c. 27 (2nd Supp.), s. 10, c. 40 (4th Supp.), s. 2; 1990, c. 16, s. 4, c. 17, s. 11; 1992, c. 1, s. 58, c. 51, s. 36; 1998, c. 30, s. 14; 1999, c. 3, s. 29; 2002, c. 7, s. 142. A person publicly incites hatred by: “communicating statements in any public place, incit[ing] hatred against any identifiable group where such incitement is likely to lead to a breach of the peace.” Criminal Code, § 319(1). A person willfully promotes hatred by: “communicating statements, other than in private conversation, willfully promot[ing] hatred against any identifiable group.” Id., § 319(2). 363 Criminal Code, § 318(4), R.S., 1985, c. C-46, s. 318; 2004, c. 14, s. 1. 364 State constitutions may provide greater free speech protection than the federal Constitution. Ch. 3—Analytical Legal Comparison 162 creed, religion or gender.”365 Legislation in both the state of Washington and the City of Seattle authorizes punishment for hate-related speech, but such laws are subject to strict limits articulated by the United States Supreme Court in R.A.V. 366 As described earlier, the Washington state Malicious Harassment statute applies to expressive conduct that constitutes a threat of harm, if it is accompanied by a discriminatory bias of, “race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, gender, sexual orientation, or mental, physical, or sensory handicap.”367 To comply with freedom of expression restrictions, the state statute expressly cautions: “Words alone do not constitute malicious harassment unless the context or circumstances surrounding the words indicate the words are a threat.”368 Seattle’s Malicious Harassment ordinance similarly prohibits hate speech if it constitutes a malicious and intentional threat of harm, but only if committed because of: “gender identity, marital status, political ideology, age, or parental status.” 369 In Seattle hate speech and hate conduct are prohibited by the same state and municipal legislation and therefore subject to the same prohibited biases. 3.2.4.2 Hate Crime Statistics Laws Government officials in both Canada and the United States gather national crime statistics, but there are differences in the legal frameworks governing official hate crime statistics. Hate crime statistics laws are directly relevant to hate crime penalties, because of the “conceptual overlap” between hate crime reporting by police agencies and the enforcement of hate crime laws.370 In other words, the collection of hate crime statistics influences how police investigate hate crimes. Moreover, as will be seen in Chapter 5, the differences in hate crime 365 See R.A.V., supra note 111, at 377 (quoting city ordinance). 366 See R.A.V., supra note 111. 367 RCW § 9A.36.080(a)(1). 368 RCW § 9A.36.080(1)(c). 369 See Seattle Municipal Code, § 12A.06.115. 370 See King, supra note 134, at 191 n.1 (citing, inter alia, Valerie Jenness & Ryken Grattet, MAKING HATE A CRIME: FROM SOCIAL MOVEMENT TO LAW, at 140 (2001) (hereinafter Jenness & Grattet)). Ch. 3—Analytical Legal Comparison 163 statistics law in the two countries result in significant differences in the legal knowledge resources available to nongovernmental groups that contest hate crime labeling decisions. The first national hate crime law, per se, in the United States was the Hate Crime Statistics Act of 1990—a uniform, national police reporting law. The HCSA was in effect for four years before Congress mandated the Sentencing Guidelines for hate crime motivation.371 Whereas the Sentencing Guidelines require proof that a prohibited bias was “a primary motivation,” 372 the Hate Crime Statistics Act uses a less strict standard. As noted earlier, legislation pending in Congress recognizes the problem of hate crimes committed by juvenile offenders by requiring the FBI to include juvenile offenses with the HCSA data it collects.373 Because of its comparable position as a centralized agency, the United States Sentencing Commission is able to compile extensive data documenting the application of hate crime Sentencing Guidelines in federal courts. For example, for the Fiscal Year 2006 the Commission received “complete guideline application information” for 65,055 out of 72,585 sentencing cases reported. 374 Only twenty six (26) of the offenders in these cases received “Hate Crime” 371 See 28 U.S.C.A § 534 notes (2006) (codifying Pub. L. 101-275, Apr. 23, 1990, 104 Stat. 140, as amended Pub. L. 103-322. Title XXXII, § 32096, Sept. 13, 1994, 108 Stat. 2131; Pub. L. 104-155, § 7, July 3, 1996, 110 Stat. 1394 (Hate Crime Statistics Act)). The HCSA has never been “codified.” From the time they were first authorized to the present, federal hate crime statistics have been governed by a curiously un-codified statute. 372 See Guidelines Manual, § 3A1.1(a); id. Commentary, Application Note 3 & Background. 373 See Matthew Shepard Local Law Enforcement Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2007, S. 1105, 110th Congress, 1st Session (introduced in Senate April 12, 2007) (“To provide Federal assistance to States, local jurisdictions, and Indian tribes to prosecute hate crimes, and for other purposes”); Local Law Enforcement Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2007, H.R. 1592, 110th Congress, 1st Session (Referred to Senate May 7, 2007); see also H. Rep. 110-113, 110TH Congress, 1st Session APRIL 30, 2007 (report of hearings in House committee). The legislation would also add “gender identity” and crimes committee committed by juveniles to the data collection mandate of the HCSA. A 1992 amendment required states receiving federal “formula grants” for juvenile justice to include provisions in their state plans allocating funds for “hate crime” prevention: “Programs designed to prevent and reduce hate crimes committed by juveniles, including educational programs and sentencing programs designed specifically for juveniles who commit hate crimes and that provide alternatives to incarceration[.]” See 42 U.S.C.A. § 5633(a)(10)(N) (1995) (codifying Pub. L. 102-586, § 2(f)(3)(i)(VI)). 374 See U.S. Sentencing Commission, Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing Statistics, available online at http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2006/SBTOC06.htm (accessed May 17, 2007) (2006 Datafile, USSCFY06), Table 18—Offenders Receiving each Chapter Three Guideline Adjustment, Fiscal Year 2006. The Commission noted that it received “complete guideline application information” for only 64,055 out of 72,585 federal sentencing cases in that year. Id., Table 18 n.1. Thus, sentencing decisions for roughly 8,000 federal criminal cases were unaccounted for in 2006. Ch. 3—Analytical Legal Comparison 164 guideline adjustments under § 3A1.1.375 The Commission also tracks the document submission rate for the various jurisdictions required to report.376 All of these analyses are set out in an annual Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing Statistics.377 On the other hand, the Commission’s data do not break down the hate crime sentences according to the type of bias. To date, Canada has no national system for reporting hate crime statistics, but a similar law has been advanced by legal scholars, and in 2004, Statistics Canada (StatsCan) reported the results of a Pilot Study collecting hate crime statistics from numerous police jurisdictions.378 The Ministry of Justice has authority to study hate crime sentencing. But, like police-generated hate crime statistics, hate crime sentencing practices have been analyzed in only a preliminary fashion in Canada.379 Technically, provinces hold the power over the administration of justice, giving them authority to analyze hate crime sentencing data and to establish standards and practices in the prosecution of hate crimes. Practically, however, the national Ministry of Justice is in the best position to gather uniform data and to produce uniform reference and training materials for police and prosecutors. So, for example, the Ministry has developed an annotated practice manual for police and prosecutors responding to criminal harassment complaints, which includes extensive guidance about sentencing, dangerous offender status, and protection orders, particularly in cases of domestic violence. 380 The Ministry has not developed comparable guidance documents for sentencing or other relief in hate crime cases. 375 See id., Table 18 Victim-Related. More offenders received adjustments for both vulnerable victims (220) and official victims (89). Id. 376 See id., Table 1. 377 See U.S. Sent’g Comm’n Ann. Rep. (11th ed. 2006), available at http://www.ussc.gov (accessed May 17, 2007) (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 994(w)(requiring accounting and recommendations) & 997 (requiring annual report)). 378 See Statistics Canada, http://dsp-psd.communication.gc.ca/Collection-R/Statcan/85-002-XIE/0040485-002- XIE.pdf (StatsCan Pilot Study released June 1, 2004) (Canadian Hate Crime Statistics). 379 This is apparently because of the variation in reporting practices for nationwide arrest, charging, and conviction data. See Roberts & Hastings, supra note 206, at 108-09. 380 Criminal Harassment: A Handbook for Police & Crown Prosecutors (Minister of Public Works and Government Services Canada, rev. ed. 2004) available at http://www.justice.gc.ca/en/ps/fm/pub/harassment (accessed Dec. 10, 2005). The Handbook was issued in 1999 and revised in 2004. The Ministry’s general guidance for crime victims likewise omits any discussion of hate crime. See A Crime Victim’s Guide to the Criminal Justice System, June 5, 2002, available at http://www.justice.gc.ca/en/ps/voc/guide/index.html (accessed Dec. 10, 2005). Ch. 3—Analytical Legal Comparison 165 3.2.4.2.1 Constitutional Authority for Statistics The United States Constitution does not use the word “statistics.” It requires an “actual Enumeration [of persons] . . . within every [] term of ten years,” and it expressly grants Congress the power to “direct” the manner of the enumeration.381 For purposes other than the census, however, any statistics mandated by Congress must be authorized by some other constitutional power, such as its commerce or spending powers. The Canadian Parliament is expressly granted exclusive authority to legislate in all matters related to “The Census and Statistics.”382 On the other hand, provinces possess exclusive authority in matters related to “The Administration of Justice in the Province.”383 Both Canadian and American governments produce masses of knowledge in the form of statistical data.384 Canada’s central statistical system has arisen in from 1918 legislation creating the Dominion Statistics Bureau, followed by the 1971 Statistics Act.385 But, in both countries, the collection of hate crime statistics remains a matter subject to contention between national, state, provincial, and local governments. The outcome to date has been different in the two countries. 3.2.4.2.2 National Hate Crime Statistics Laws In the United States, the federal Hate Crime Statistics Act contains the earliest and possibly the most significant definition of “hate crime” in federal law. The HCSA applies to all 381 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2; compare Art. I, § 2 (enumeration to apportion representatives) with Art. I, § 9 (“census or enumeration” to apportion taxes); but see, U.S. CONST. AMEND. XVI (authorizing taxation apportioned by individual income rather than state population). 382 Constitution Act, 1867, § 91(6). 383 Constitution Act, 1867, § 92(14). 384 Report to Congressional Requesters: Statistical Agencies—A Comparison of the U.S. & Canadian Statistical Systems (U.S. GAO, Aug., 1996) (GAO/GGD-96-142). This inquiry, posed by Congress to its General Accounting Office, asked about differences in “organizational and budget structures,” “legal frameworks,” and chief statisticians in the two countries. Id., at 1. The purpose and context of the inquiry were, “proposals to consolidate some or all of the agencies comprising the federal statistics system,” in comparison to “the centralized Canadian statistical system and Statistics Canada.” Id. 385 Id., at 18-19. Ch. 3—Analytical Legal Comparison 166 crimes “including where appropriate” eight predicate offenses. The HCSA did not expressly define the term “hate crime,” but its most significant features assign data collection and reporting duties to the Attorney General: (b)(1) Under the authority of section 534 of title 28, United States Code, the Attorney General shall acquire data, for each calendar year, about crimes that manifest evidence of prejudice based on race, religion, disability, sexual orientation, or ethnicity, including where appropriate the crimes of murder, non- negligent manslaughter; forcible rape; aggravated assault, simple assault, intimidation; arson; and destruction, damage or vandalism of property.386 Quantitative analyses of hate crime statistics gathered under the HCSA have been attempted.387 The proposed Matthew Shepard Act would expand the data collection and reporting requirements of the HCSA in two ways.388 First, it would add “gender and gender identity” to the prohibited grounds of discrimination for hate crimes to be reported. Second, it would add “crimes committed by, and crimes directed against juveniles” to the offenses subject to the Act.389 Shortly after the HCSA became law in the United States, a Private Member’s Bill proposing a Bias Incidents Statistics Act (BISA) was introduced in the Canadian Parliament.390 This proposal failed, however, and it has not been re-introduced in the last ten years. 391 Nevertheless, the proposed text is worth comparing to the HCSA. The Bill would have mandated a new unit within the RCMP with two data collection and reporting obligations: 386 Pub. L. 101–275, Apr. 23, 1990, 104 Stat. 140, as amended by Pub. L. 103–322, title XXXII, § 320926, Sept. 13, 1994, 108 Stat. 2131; Pub. L. 104–155, § 7, July 3, 1996, 110 Stat. 1394 (emphasis added). The same legislation requires the Attorney General to “establish guidelines” for data collection and “publish an annual summary” of hate crime data. See id., § 7(b)(2), (5). 387 See William B. Rubenstein, The Real Story of U.S. Hate Crime Statistics: An Empirical Analysis, 78 TUL. L. REV. 1213 (2004) (quantitative analysis of published, police-generated hate crime statistics database). Based on his quantitative analysis, Professor Rubenstein draws the conclusion that Congress should “strengthen the enforcement of criminal laws meant to deter hate crimes,” in addition to educational initiatives and antidiscrimination laws. See 78 TUL. L. REV. at 1243-44. 388 See The Matthew Shepard Local Law Enforcement Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2007, S.1105, 110th Congress, 1st Sess. (introduced in Senate Apr. 12, 2007). 389 See Matthew Shepard Act, id., § 8. 390 Bill C-45, Bias Incidents Statistics Act, 3d Sess., 34th Parl., 1991-92-93 (1st reading 8 June, 1993), cited in Glenn A. Gilmour, Working Document, Hate-Motivated Violence, at 56 n.275 (May 1994) available online: http://www.justice.gc.ca/en/ps/rs/rep/1994/wd94-6/wd94-6.pdf (accessed Sept. 14, 2007) (Department of Justice Canada Report No. WD1994-6e). 391 Since it has not been re-introduced recently, the text of the bill itself is not available on the Parliament’s website. Ch. 3—Analytical Legal Comparison 167 (a) classify as a bias incident, any incident investigated in that year by the Force that the unit is satisfied, after applying the criteria referred to in subsection (2), was wholly or partly motivated by bias against an identifiable group; and (b) collect and compile statistics that indicate the number of incidents classified in that year as bias incidents and that identify which identifiable group was the target of bias in each such incident. The proposal required the Minister of Justice to “establish and publish criteria” for identifying bias incidents and to publish an annual report of bias incident statistics.392 The explanatory note accompanying the Bill cited a desire for “public exposure” to statistics about “incidents . . . wholly or partly motivated by bias against those sections or individual members of the public distinguished by colour, race, religion, sexual orientation or ethnic origin.”393 In addition to the RCMP, the Bill would have authorized the Minister of Justice to negotiate agreements with provinces and municipalities to share statistics, “that are classified as bias incidents by that force and that identify which identifiable group was the target of bias in each such incident.”394 Despite the failure of the BISA, Statistics Canada has begun to develop a nationwide hate crime statistics program under its general legislative authority. A pilot project was conducted in two policing jurisdictions in Ontario, and nationwide statistics are expected to be reported for the first time in 2008. 395 3.2.4.2.3 Hate Crimes & Campus Crime Statistics In both Canada and the United States hate crimes occur on college and university campuses. The differences in higher education laws regarding campus crime statistics make these laws relevant here. In the United States, colleges and universities receiving federal funding are required to publish and report campus crime statistics to the United States Department of 392 See id., §§ (2) & (3). 393 See Gilmour, id. 394 See id., § 4(1). 395 See The Daily, Tues., Feb. 6, 2007, Police-reported data on organized crime, hate-motivated crime and cyber crime, available at http://www.statcan.ca/Daily/English/070206/d070206b.htm (accessed Dec. 12, 2007). Ch. 3—Analytical Legal Comparison 168 Education.396 This reporting requirement began in 1991, simultaneous with the Hate Crime Statistics Act, and it incorporated the definition from the HCSA. 397 Canadian educational institutions are subject to no nationwide campus crime or crime statistics mandate.398 3.2.4.3 Civil Rights & Human Rights Laws Civil rights and human rights laws were discussed earlier to describe their antidiscrimination terminology. Besides their general contributions the vocabulary of equality rights, however, these laws also provide remedies for hate-related conduct in limited circumstances. Canadian human rights codes authorize remedies for some hate-related conduct, including conduct motivated by “sexual orientation.” Canadians increasingly challenge hate- related activities in human rights tribunals, including the national Canadian Human Rights Tribunal.399 To date, the Canadian codes have not generally addressed conducted motivated by “gender identity.” Similarly, in the United States the federal civil rights laws authorize both administrative remedies, and remedies in federal court, for some hate-related conduct, in the context of employment discrimination for example. But, currently no federal law authorizes remedies for discrimination based on “sexual orientation” or “gender identity.” On the other hand, some state and municipal civil rights and human rights laws ban “sexual orientation” or “gender identity” discrimination, or both. The 1996 case of Romer v. Evans illustrates the importance of municipal laws protecting human and civil rights in the United States. The Supreme Court decision addressed a challenge to a state voter initiative—Amendment 2, passed by Colorado voters in 1992. The initiative, 396 See 20 U.S.C. § 1092(f)(1)(F)(i) & (ii) (2004). 397 Id., § 1092(f)(7); see also 20 U.S.C. § 7161 (4) (incorporating definition of “hate crime” from HCSA). 398 Instead, Canadian higher education funding is subject to a much more ad hoc negotiation encompassing revenue sharing grants from the national government to the provinces. 399 See, e.g., Warman v. Winnicki, 2006 CHRT 20 (CanLII); Warman v. Kulbashian, 2006 CHRT 11 (CanLII). Ch. 3—Analytical Legal Comparison 169 however, was proposed in part to invalidate local human rights and antidiscrimination laws adopted by several cities throughout the state. These laws attempted to prohibit discrimination based on “sexual orientation” in areas within the cities’ authority. 400 The Supreme Court’s decision effectively validated such local civil and human rights laws. The leading Canadian case addressing hate in a human rights decision is Ross v. New Brunswick School District No. 15,401 in which the Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of a teacher for his off-duty anti-Semitic and racist comments. The Court reversed the agency’s permanent ban on the teacher’s future employment.402 In a second leading case, outside the employment context, Taylor v. Canada (Human Rights Commission), 403 the Supreme Court affirmed a series of cease and desist orders by the Canadian Human Rights Commission against a political party and its representative who operated a telephone service used to transmit messages slandering Jews. Neither Taylor nor Ross involved homo- or trans-phobic speech, but such messages have been addressed in human rights jurisprudence. The Canadian Human Rights Tribunal has applied the Canadian Human Rights Act to homophobic hate messages on the world-wide web.404 In one such case the Tribunal issued a cease and desist order against the web-site operator whose postings were “likely to expose gay and lesbian persons to hatred and contempt.”405 3.2.4.4 School Harassment & Bullying Laws Similar school harassment complaints in Seattle and Vancouver illustrate how hate- related conduct in a school setting can create the potential for liability in either a human rights 400 See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634 (1996). 401 [1996] 1 S.C.R. 825. 402 Id., ¶¶ 111-12. 403 Taylor v. Canada (Human Rights Commission), [1990] 3 S.C.R. 892. 404 See, e.g., Schnell v. Machiavelli & Associates Emprize Inc., 2002 CanLII 1887, ¶¶ 58, 101-02, 105 (C.H.R.T.), T.D. 11/02. 405 Schnell, id., ¶¶ 162-64 (applying CHRA, § 54). Ch. 3—Analytical Legal Comparison 170 agency or a court case against the school. In a lawsuit against a Seattle-area school district, former student Mark Iversen complained of “six years of escalating anti-gay verbal harassment (by peers and, in some cases, school district employees).”406 The lawsuit did not result in a reported court decision. But, in an out-of-court settlement the Kent, WA School District agreed “to pay Mark $40,000 and sign[] a series of written commitments regarding its policies, procedures and training.”407 A similar result was reached in suburban Vancouver in the case of Azmi Jubran, which was litigated to a written decision. In Jubran,408 the provincial Human Rights Tribunal held a school board liable for harassment against a student that included anti-gay epithets and physical assaults. In the course of the harassment, the student retaliated and at one point was prosecuted for an assault on one of his assailants. In the end, the Tribunal found that the board failed to comply with its duties under the Human Rights Code by failing to provide adequate discipline and education and other resources to school personnel to eliminate the harassment. 409 Of particular interest is the Court of Appeal holding that Jubran was not required to prove he was either gay, or perceived as gay, in order to bring a complaint under the Code.410 The Jubran and Iversen cases are of note because, in effect, they impose a duty of local lawmaking in the field of equality rights for conduct that could be characterized as a hate crime. By requiring school boards to adopt policies and practices to eradicate homophobic violence and harassment in schools, these cases will result in local knowledge about equality rights in schools. And, although the label “hate crime” may be avoided in schools policies, knowledge about 406 Report, They don’t even know me!: Understanding Anti-Gay Harassment & Violence in Schools, A Report On the Five-Year Anti-Violence Research Project Of the Safe Schools Coalition of Washington State, at 68 (Beth Reis, et al., Jan., 1999) (citing Mark Iversen vs. Kent School District, et al. (unreported 1999 out-of-court settlement)). 407 Id. at 68. The settlement is also reported on the website of the Seattle Chapter of the American Civil Liberties Union, which represented the plaintiff. See http://www.aclu-wa.org/detail.cfm?id=174 (accessed Mar. 10, 2008). 408 School District No. 44 (North Vancouver) v. Jubran, 2005 BCCA 201. The Supreme Court of Canada denied Jubran’s application for leave to appeal one aspect of the BC Court of Appeals decision. See Board of School Trustees of School District No. 44 (North Vancouver) v. Jubran, 2005 CanLII 39611 (S.C.C.) (dismissing application for leave to appeal). 409 Id. ¶ 96. 410 Id. ¶ 55. Ch. 3—Analytical Legal Comparison 171 homophobic violence in schools is apt to influence habits of thought about “hate crimes” outside the schools. The B.C. School Act regulates harassment in schools, and as the Jubran case illustrates, its provisions can address virtually the same conduct as a hate crime prosecution or a human rights complaint based on a hate crime. Indeed, the analogy between school bullying and hate crimes is not unprecedented. In Citrion v. Zundel, the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal relied on the analogy explicitly: [81] ….The mere fact that they are singled out for recurring, public vilification can erode an individual’s personal dignity and sense of self-worth. It is not unlike being victimised by the school bully. Even if the bully and his or her friends do not act on the schoolyard taunts, the victim nonetheless suffers the public humiliation, shame and fear that flow from the verbal attack.411 School bullying and harassment policies are more than conceptually relevant to Sentencing Principles for bias, prejudice or hate. Sanctions imposed for school bullying may be considered in subsequent sentencing decisions, at least in Youth Court.412 Even in the small selection of court cases arising from the Webster killing, school behaviour was relevant to sentencing. At least one of Webster’s killers was apprehended because he bragged about the killing to classmates at school. And, the Supreme Court has recently agreed to hear a defamation case brought against a radio host who criticized opponents of school bullying laws in Surrey, B.C.413 Because of these lawsuits and human rights complaints, it is no surprise that state and provincial legislatures in Canada and the United States have considered school anti-harassment laws. And, some school districts in both Canada and America have adopted local anti- harassment policies that address homo- or trans-phobic conduct. 411 Citrion, supra note 57, ¶ 81 (emphasis added). 412 See, e.g., R. v. R.C.W.M., 2004 BCCA 502 (CanLII) (history of school bullying and harassment considered in review of sentences for fitness). A substantial history of school bullying and harassment is documented in the Reasons for Judgment in the Youth Court in the same case, although no discriminatory motivations are mentioned. See R. v. R.C.W.M. & C.Y.P., 2004 BCPC 128 (CanLII). 413 See Simpson v. Mair & WIC Radio Ltd., 2006 BCCA 287 (CanLII), [2006] 10 W.W.R. 460, (2006), 55 B.C.L.R. (4th) 30, leave to appeal granted, sub nom WIC Radio Ltd. & Rafe Mair v. Kari Simpson, 2007 CanLII 2769 (S.C.C.), No. 31608 (Feb. 1, 2007). Ch. 3—Analytical Legal Comparison 172 Washington state law requires school boards to adopt policies prohibiting discriminatory “harassment, intimidation, or bullying of any student,”414 when motivated by, “color, religion, ancestry, national origin, gender, or sexual orientation, or [] a mental, physical, or sensory handicap.”415 The legislation requires the state education agency to adopt a Model Policy for local districts to consider. The Model Policy adopted by the agency prohibits bullying and harassment motivated by “sexual orientation,” while giving administrators discretion to punish bullying and harassment motivated by “gender identity.”416 The Seattle Public Schools have adopted a policy prohibiting acts of hostility by school employees motivated by sexual orientation or gender identity.417 The student anti-harassment policy does not prohibit harassment or bullying motivated by sexual orientation or gender identity.418 Provincial legislation to address school bullying and harassment has been proposed in British Columbia.419 The 2006 version of the proposed Safe Schools Act would require school districts to adopt policies “prohibiting bullying, harassment, intimidation and or discrimination on the basis of” sexual orientation or gender identity.420 To date, however, this legislation has not passed. Meanwhile, the provincial government has issued a Guide for safe schools.421 The Guide’s Standards define “bullying, harassment or intimidation” as unacceptable conduct.422 But, as the Guide notes, the Schools Act makes the adoption of anti-harassment polices discretionary. 423 The Guide references the provincial Human Rights Code ban on “sexual 414 RCW § 28A.300.285. 415 See RCW § 28A.300.285(2) (adopting definition of prohibited biases from malicious harassment statute, RCW § 9A.36.080(3)). 416 See Sample Policy 3207—Students, Prohibition of Harassment, Intimidation and Bullying (adopted Apr. 8, 2002), available at http://www.k12.wa.us/SafetyCenter/LawEnforcement/pubdocs/ModelPolicy.doc (accessed Dec. 11, 2007). 417 See Seattle Public Schools Policy No. D50.00 (Rev., Sept. 2004), available at http://www.seattleschools.org/area/policies/d/D50.00.pdf (accessed Dec. 11, 2007). 418 See id., Policy No. D49.01 (Rev. April 4, 2007). 419 Bill M 204—2006, Safe Schools Act, 2nd Session, 38th Parliament (amending B.C. School Act). 420 Bill M 204—2006, id. (adding proposed § 2.2(a) to School Act). 421 Safe, Caring & Orderly Schools: A Guide (B.C. Ministry of Education, Standards Department, March 2004). 422 Id., at 16-17. 423 See Guide, id., at 16 (quoting B.C. Schools Act § 85(2)(c)(i) (authorizing but not requiring student codes of conduct)). Ch. 3—Analytical Legal Comparison 173 orientation” discrimination, and it invites schools to adopt policies addressing “homophobia” in schools. Vancouver School Board Policy prohibits “harassment related to sexual orientation,” but not “gender identity.”424 In both Canada and the United States school policies are administered locally. Beginning in 1994, however, federal education laws in the United States also began to include hate crime prevention sections.425 The education sections incorporate the HCSA definition of hate crime,426 and they authorize programming more broadly for preventing “crimes and conflicts motivated by hate in localities most directly affected by hate crimes.”427 These provisions did not create federally-protected rights sufficient to trigger civil rights liability against school officials for bullying.428 But, they have interjected national hate crime standards into local schools policy. Canadian schools, like Canadian colleges and universities, are free from any such national hate crime policy. 3.2.4.5 Other Laws In both Canada and the United States, governmental agencies conduct legal inquiries too numerous to list. These inquiries may be divided into two categories: (1) ad hoc; and, (2) systematic. Both types appear in Canada and the United States. The leading example of ad hoc inquiry in the field of hate crime law in Canada is the inquiry by the Cohen Committee, which was discussed in Chapter 2. The 1966 Cohen Report introduced hate crime terminology to Canadian law, and Parliament adopted the recommendations of the Cohen Report by enacting the hate propaganda provisions of §§ 318, 424 See Vancouver School Board, School District No. 39 (Vancouver), Policy No. JFCK* Violence Prevention (rev. Jan., 2005), available at http://www.vsb.bc.ca/districtinfo/policies/j/jfckviolenceprevention.htm (accessed Dec. 11, 2007). 425 See 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 7131(a)(7) & 7133 (2003) (authorizing agency programs and grant funding for hate crime prevention). 426 20 U.S.C.A. § 7161(4) (2003). 427 20 U.S.C. § 7131(a)(7) (2003). 428 See Stevenson ex rel. Stevenson v. Martin Bd. Of Educ., 93 F.Supp.2d 644 (E.D. N.C. 1999) (applying 42 U.S.C. § 1983). Ch. 3—Analytical Legal Comparison 174 319.429 The Cohen Report did not investigate homo- or trans-phobic violence, however, and the Canadian Criminal Code was not amended to prohibit homophobic hate propaganda until 2004. American legal inquiry in the field of civil rights tends to be systematic. The United States Commission on Civil Rights constitutes a systematic, ongoing equality rights inquiry. Created in 1957, the Commission exercises almost no remedial enforcement powers typical of a Canadian rights agency. But, its power to create knowledge is not reflected in any similar agency in Canada. A review of Commission publications shows it produced knowledge about hate crimes, even before the passage of the HCSA.430 Other forms of legal inquiry relevant to hate crime law, but not fully addressed here include: reporting obligations under international law; 431 civil rights laws; juvenile justice laws establishing punishments for young offenders; 432 laws authorizing delayed parole eligibility; 429 See Maxwell Cohen, The Report to the Minister of Justice of the Special Committee on Hate Propaganda in Canada (Queen’s Printer, 1966) (Cohen Report). 430 See, e.g., Who Is Guarding the Guardians? A Report on Police Practices. Based on a national consultation held in Washington, DC; hearings in Philadelphia and Houston; several State Advisory Committee reports and open meetings; and research during and after the hearings. 173 pp. No. 005-901-00029-4. (1981); Recent Activities Against Citizens and Residents of Asian Descent. Discusses historical discrimination against Asian immigrants and Asian Americans, demography of persons of Asian descent, factors in anti-Asian activity, and specific incidents since 1982 of violence, harassment, intimidation, and vandalism against persons of Asian descent. CHP 88. 87 pp. No. 005-902-00043-6. (1988); Intimidation and Violence: Racial and Religious Bigotry in America. An update of a 1983 statement. CHP 96. 29 pp. No. 005-902-00057-6 (1990). 431 Canadian national and provincial governments participate in human rights reporting pursuant to treaty obligations. See, e.g., Human Rights Program, Department of Canadian Heritage, International Covenant on Economic, Social & Cultural Rights, Fourth Report of Canada (2004); Human Rights Directorate, Multiculturalism and Citizenship Canada, International Covenant on Civil & Political Rights, Second & Third Reports of Canada (1990). In the field of domestic violence, for instance, the ICESCR references Canada’s 1999 General Social Survey Victimization Report, as “evidence-based information on spousal violence and abuse of older adults to be used in the development of policies and programs addressing the prevention of family violence.” ICESCR Report, at 65 ¶269. The United States has reported about hate crimes motivated by “sexual orientation” prosecuted and monitored under both state and federal laws in its reports to the United Nations treaty bodies. See The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination: Initial Report of the United States Of America to the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, at 64-65 (September 2000); see id. (noting 47 states have hate crime penalty laws, but only 19 have hate crime reporting and statistics laws); archived report, available at http://www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/cerd_report/cerd_report.pdf (accessed Aug. 9, 2007). Its most recent periodic report, however, excises all references to “sexual orientation,” even in quotations drawn from the HCSA and state hate crime laws. See Periodic Report of the United States of America to the U. N. Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination Concerning the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (April 2007), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/83517.pdf (accessed Aug. 9, 2007). 432 A 1992 amendment required states receiving federal “formula grants” for juvenile justice to include provisions in their state plans allocating funds for “hate crime” prevention: “Programs designed to prevent and reduce hate crimes Ch. 3—Analytical Legal Comparison 175 internal law enforcement and judicial administrative policies; laws authorizing ad hoc inquiries and systematic research about hate crimes;433 hate crime prevention laws;434 the common law and statutes regarding defamation; military regulations; 435 extradition and immigration laws; prison conduct policies; volunteer protection laws;436 and, domestic violence laws. In either Canada or the United States, or both, laws authorizing punishment or other remedies, or documenting hate-related incidents, have appeared in each of these areas, and more, too numerous to analyze in detail here. In both Canada and the United States a tort action is available for a physical assault or battery. For example, in a 2000 judgment, the B.C. Supreme Court awarded damages to plaintiffs Brian Coutts and Randall Lampreau who had sued the three men who attacked them in a “violent homophobic assault.”437 While the Court was able to award damages in the civil action, the Court noted that, “[a]t the [] criminal trial, the three defendants were acquitted by reason of identification issues.”438 Though the Court in Coutts v. Truong characterized the assault as homophobic, the judgment gives no indication that discriminatory motives were necessary to the assessment of damages. In Washington state, by contrast, the Malicious Harassment statute expressly authorizes a statutory tort action whose elements include committed by juveniles, including educational programs and sentencing programs designed specifically for juveniles who commit hate crimes and that provide alternatives to incarceration[.]” See 42 U.S.C.A. § 5633(a)(10)(N) (1995) (codifying Pub. L. 102-586, § 2(f)(3)(i)(VI)). 433 In addition to civil rights agencies, many additional federal agencies conduct inquiries related in some way to equality rights or hate crimes. In both countries such laws authorize crime statistics generated outside police departments (NCVS, NIBRS, and GSS). 434 For example, laws authorizing grants for community-based justice programs incorporate the crime prevention as a priority. See 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 13861 (authorizing grants), 13868 (defining “young violent offenders” as 7-to-22- year-olds who commit, inter alia, “hate crimes and civil rights violations”). 435 New legislation in 1996 required the Secretary of Defense to survey and report about “hate group” activity within the armed forces. See 10 U.S.C.A. § 481 notes (citing Pub. L. 104-201, § 571(c)(1)(adding both gender discrimination and hate group activity to reporting requirements)). This section was amended extensively in 2002 to segregate the gender relations and equal opportunity surveys. See id., § 481 (codifying Pub. L. 107-314, § 561(a)(1), 116 Stat. 2554). The legislation makes no mention of homophobic discrimination or harassment, but it also does not limit the term “hate group” to groups motivated by race or gender. 436 The federal Volunteer Protection Act exempts volunteers from limits on liability when they have committed “misconduct” that “constitutes a hate crime,” as defined b the HCSA, or have “been found to have violated a Federal or State civil rights law. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 14503(f)(1)(B) & (D) (2005). 437 See Coutts v. Truong, 2000 BCSC 1561, [2000] B.C.J. No. 2239, at ¶ 1 (Supreme Court) (Wilkinson J.). 438 Id., ¶ 9. Ch. 3—Analytical Legal Comparison 176 discriminatory motives. Thus, a civil action for malicious harassment may be brought, in addition to an action for assault or battery, when the attack is motivated by sexual orientation. Civil actions based on the malicious harassment statute have been rare, however.439 Likewise, as indicated previously, civil actions under the B.C. Civil Rights Act have been rare, and the B.C. legislation does not cover conduct motivated by sexual orientation. Like the national inquiry that resulted in the Cohen Report, provinces conduct ad hoc inquiries related to hate crimes. The history of formal rights inquiries in British Columbia440 includes such an inquiry into hate group activities. The McAlpine Report was the result of an inquiry into whether to appoint a public board of inquiry under the provincial Human Rights Code.441 The author concluded as a matter of law that he lacked authority under the existing Code to institute such an inquiry: My conclusion is that there is no case in law against the Klan under the Human Rights Code of British Columbia as currently drafted. It follows that the appointment of a board of inquiry would be unwarranted.442 The Report therefore recommends adopting additional provisions in the Code to prohibit statements encouraging discrimination. Of note are the author’s observations about monitoring and reporting: “Incidents of racism can only be effectively dealt with if there is a system by which incidents are reported by the police, the schools, and government agencies.” 443 He specifically criticized the Vancouver Police Department for failing to incorporate violations of 439 But see Ziegler v. Ziegler, 28 F.Supp.2d 601 (E.D.Wash., 1998) (denying motion to dismiss state law claims, including malicious harassment). 440 Legal inquiries, including rights inquiries, have been ongoing in British Columbia for some time. The process by which Vancouver Island and British Columbia were conjoined into a single jurisdiction is discussed in early the reports of inquiries conducted for the British Parliament. See Papers Regarding the Proposed Union of British Columbia & Vancouver Island (May 31, 1866); Duncan McDonald, British Columbia and Vancouver Island (1862). Robert McDonald provides an analysis of the first fifty years of Vancouver in his book Making Vancouver. Robert McDonald, Making Vancouver (1863-1913) (1996). Other histories touching upon Vancouver include: Working Lives Vancouver (1886-1986) (1989); J. A. Lapence, People vs. Politics: Vancouver-Burrard (1963-1965) (Univ. of Toronto Press 1969). Long before the union of British Columbia and Vancouver Island, however, the British Parliament regulated activities, in particular the fur trade, in the region. See, e.g., Bill for the Regulation of the Fur Trade & Establishing a Criminal & Civil Jurisdiction within Certain Parts of North America (1821). 441 John D. McAlpine, Report Arising out of the Activities of the Ku Klux Klan in British Columbia (1981). 442 McAlpine Report, id. at 59. 443 Id. at 66. Ch. 3—Analytical Legal Comparison 177 the Human Rights Code into its regulations and procedures manual. And, the expert retained to advise the Reporter recommended: “in all prima facie cases of overt violence against minorities, The Human Rights branch should press local police for full investigations and stepped up police service.”444 One more recent inquiry relevant to hate crimes and information practices in British Columbia is described in the 1994 Black Report.445 The report summarizes an extensive public consultation and review process and sets out similarly extensive recommendations for human rights law and practice in B.C. Matters related to anti-gay hate violence and information practices appear in the report. One of the goals recommended is to “monitor equality trends and patterns. The human rights system must serve to identify emerging issues or it will fail over the long run.”446 The recommended mandate for the human rights agency included “educational and information programs.” The report emphasized the inadequacy of case-by-case adjudication to address systemic inequality: Some part of the system for protecting human rights should have the capacity and resources to identify such patterns and bring them to public attention. Even the broadest of systemic cases will not be able to accomplish this task. A different kind of process for research and monitoring is needed.447 The need for information and monitoring programs recurs throughout the report, and the desirability of “coordinating educational initiatives” with nongovernmental rights groups is noted.448 The use of the Human Rights Code itself as “an Educational Document” is explicitly set out as a priority.449 The Black Report notes the limits on provincial powers in the area of criminal law: “In addition to other difficulties described in this section, there would be constitutional limitations on 444 Id. Appendix 1, at 3. 445 Bill Black, B.C. Human Rights Review, Report on Human Rights in British Columbia (Dec., 1994) (Report to the Ministry Responsible for Multiculturalism and Human Rights). 446 Black, id. at 1 (some emphasis omitted). 447 Id. at 14 (emphasis added). 448 Id. at 73-74. 449 Id. at 78. Ch. 3—Analytical Legal Comparison 178 how far the Province could go in creating penal provisions, since criminal law is an area within federal jurisdiction.”450 In addressing the grounds of discrimination to be included, however, the report rejected an invitation to delete “sexual orientation,” in part because, “It would be pointless to discuss this possibility since the courts have said in the clearest terms that the ground of sexual orientation deserves constitutional protection and is analogous to the other grounds set out in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.”451 The Black Report contains several explicit references to discriminatory violence, including violence against persons with HIV.452 In structural terms, the Black Report identified the establishment of, in effect, a permanent tribunal in 1984 as providing “continuity” and an “opportunity to develop expertise.”453 Additional recommendations include a requirement for annual reports, special reports, research projects, and special inquiries by a Human Rights Commission.454 Although the Report declines to recommend criminal penalties in Commission cases, it does note that sexual assault and hate propaganda are both crimes and violations of the Code.455 The landscape of hate crime law in the United States does not include ad hoc judicial inquiries at either the state or federal levels. On the other hand, unlike their Canadian counterparts, American cities institute human rights inquiries that lead to local legislation. These local laws include not only hate crimes penalty laws but also a variety of other legal principles related to hate crimes. Local inquiries of this nature are addressed in greater detail in Chapter 5. 3.2.4.6 Analysis—The Role of Other Hate Crime Laws in Canada & the U.S. Laws imposing penalties because of discrimination are important because in both text and practice they constitute a body of official knowledge about inequality. Even if they had no other 450 Black, id. at 142 n.138. 451 Id. at 162-62 n.172. 452 Id. at 9-10. 453 Id. at 21. 454 Id. at 47-49. 455 Id. at 143. Ch. 3—Analytical Legal Comparison 179 effect, the reported decisions of judges and juries considering increased penalties for hate crimes recognize inequality as a problem. Although unaccompanied by the solemnity or spectacle of criminal proceedings, other laws produce a similar result without considering the imposition of enhanced criminal penalties for bias. Among laws that do not authorize criminal penalties, laws that establish official hate crime statistics are critically important. Hate crime statistics directly justify increased penalties in individual cases. In the Canadian case of R. v. Demers, for instance, the Crown used hate crime statistics to support its sentencing submission for an assault committed during a Pride celebration.456 Hate crime statistics have had similar influences in the United States. For instance, a federal court considering the killing of a transvestite prison inmate,457 distinguished the official knowledge created by hate crime statistics laws from the terminology used in domestic violence laws.458 Thus, both in official judicial reasoning and in general public discourse, hate crime statistics play an important role in establishing legal knowledge about hate crimes. Beyond their instrumental effects in individual cases, however, hate crime statistics laws, and other hate crime laws, are part of an interconnected legal classification system for hate crimes in both Canada and the United States. 3.2.5 Summary Table 3.2 below sets out the important variations in the language and dynamics of equality rights in Canadian and American hate crime laws. The first two rows represent the hate 456 The Crown delivered an extensive submission, including citations to recent hate crime statistics. Demers, supra note 323, ¶¶ 88-92. 457 See Thomasson v. United States, No. 99-3165-JTM, Mem. Ord. Aug. 23, 1999, 1999 WL 690098 (Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, D.Kan., 1999). The case was decided before the Supreme Court invalidated the civil rights remedies of the VAWA in Morrison, but the reasoning reveals the importance of hate crime statistics laws. 458 The Court dismissed because the complaint alleged a “gender orientation” rather than “gender” motive. The decision recognizes the importance of principles of equality established during official Congressional inquiry: “the consistent tenor has been Congress’s concern about violence against women. Had Congress wished to extend the protections accorded in the VAWA to persons who have suffered violence based on gender or sexual orientation, it could have, but did not do so.” Id. (citations omitted). In dismissing the complaint, the Court noted that Congress included “sexual orientation” bias in the Hate Crimes Statistics Act, but excluded it from the Violence Against Women Act. Id., n.2. The VAWA standard, “motivated by gender,” is excluded from the HCSA. Ch. 3—Analytical Legal Comparison 180 crime penalty enhancement laws in Canada and the United States. National laws in both countries provide a uniform standard specifying the forms of discrimination to be denounced in the punishment of crimes. In Canada, the Sentencing Principles have been either applied, or at least considered, in a number of cases to denounce crimes motivated by sexual orientation. In the United States, the federal Sentencing Guidelines have been applied to homophobic hate crimes only minimally. Far more significant in the United States are the state and local hate crime laws available in some, but not all jurisdictions. In Canada, by contrast, provinces and municipalities do not generate hate crime penalty laws. Table 3.2—Equality Rights Language in Hate Crime Laws (United States & Canada) Hate Crime Law Y/N Prohibited Grounds Notes United States Sentencing Guidelines Y “intentionally selected any victim . . . because of the actual or perceived race, color, religion, national origin, ethnicity, gender, disability, or sexual orientation of any person.” • Uniform standard, predicate offenses limited. • Advisory, must consider. • Quantified Enhancement • Gender motive unavailable for rape & sexual assault. • State & local hate crime laws vary Canadian Criminal Code Sentencing Principles Y “evidence that the offence was motivated by bias, prejudice or hate based on race, national or ethnic origin, language, colour, religion, sex, age, mental or physical disability, sexual orientation or any other similar factor.” • Uniform national standard. • Predicate offences unlimited. • Discretionary, must consider. • Un-quantified enhancement. • Analogous grounds. • No provincial or local hate crime laws United States Hate Crime Statistics Act Y “manifest evidence of prejudice based on race, religion, disability, sexual orientation, or ethnicity.” • Uniform national standard. • Predicate offenses limited. • Voluntary participation, state local reporting laws & policies. • Un-codified statute. • Condition of federal funding. Ch. 3—Analytical Legal Comparison 181 Hate Crime Law Y/N Prohibited Grounds Notes Canadian Hate Crime Statistics N Bias Incident Statistics Act (proposed): “any incident . . . wholly or partly motivated by bias against an identifiable group . . . section of the public distinguished by colour, race, religion, sexual orientation or ethnic origin and includes any person belonging to that group.” • No uniform standard. • Voluntary statistics, provincial authority, local police RCMP reporting policies. • No federal funding conditions. Canadian Criminal Code, Hate Propaganda Y Incitement/Promotion of Hatred/Genocide Advocacy vs. “any section of the public distinguished by colour, race, or ethnic origin.” “sexual orientation” added 2004. • Valid, but limited by Free Expression. • Attorney General consent required. • Parallel private, human rights enforcement. • Omitted from Sentencing Principles. United States Hate Speech N Incitement to Genocide against, “national, ethnic, racial, or religious group.” Primarily Local & State Laws. • Limited by free expression principles. • No private prosecution. • No uniform human rights enforcement. • Included in Sentencing Guidelines. United States School Harassment N None. • Federal grants for school anti-hate programs. • State laws, local school board & university policies. Canada School Harassment N None. • Provincial laws, local school board & university policies. United States School Hate Crime Statistics. Y (higher ed. only) Same as HCSA. • Higher Education Statistics Mandatory. • Condition of Federal Funding. • HCSA definition, administered separately. • State laws & local policies. Canada School Hate Crime Statistics. N None. • Provincial laws, local school board & university policies. Ch. 3—Analytical Legal Comparison 182 Despite the informal influence of federal hate crime penalty enhancement law on state and local legislation in the United States, the grounds of prohibited discrimination in state and local hate crime laws are not subject to any national minimum standard. A state or city might authorize enhanced penalties for race-motivated crimes only, or for no hate crimes at all. To date, attempts to use federal law to set a minimum “backdrop” standard for criminal penalties have failed in Congress, and their fate in the Supreme Court is uncertain.459 Finally even if Congress were to extend a national hate crime law to local crimes, as in Canada, in both countries hate crime penalty enhancements remain subject to significant police, prosecutorial, and judicial discretion. The Canadian Sentencing Principles appear to establish a uniform understanding of equality rights in hate crime law, by specifying particular grounds of prohibited discrimination. Throughout Canada, sentencing judges are required to consider any evidence of the particular, named biases. The mandate to “take into consideration” evidence of listed biases is an express limit on sentencing discretion. The Code requires judges to consider listed, and other similar, biases so long as some “evidence” of such a bias is present. Yet, the Sentencing Principles also represent an expansion of judicial discretion. As long as the judge considers evidence of bias, the Sentencing Principles do not require any particular outcome. Unlike the United States Code and Sentencing Guidelines, the Canadian Sentencing Principles do not require or even advise any particular sentencing premium for a hate crime. Moreover, judges are required to coordinate the Sentencing Principles for bias, prejudice or hate with other, frequently conflicting principles. By imposing mandatory considerations without adopting administrative guidelines or delegating rulemaking authority to an administrative agency or 459 See Matthew Shepard Local Law Enforcement Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2007, S. 1105, 110th Congress, 1st Session (introduced in Senate April 12, 2007) (“To provide Federal assistance to States, local jurisdictions, and Indian tribes to prosecute hate crimes, and for other purposes”); Local Law Enforcement Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2007, H.R. 1592, 110th Congress, 1st Session (Referred to Senate May 7, 2007); see also H. Rep. 110-113, 110TH Congress, 1st Session APRIL 30, 2007 (report of hearings in House committee). The legislation would also add “gender identity” and crimes committee committed by juveniles to the data collection mandate of the HCSA. Ch. 3—Analytical Legal Comparison 183 commission, the Parliament gave judges broad overall discretion in sentencing decisions. In the United States, while the Sentencing Commission regulates the application of hate crime penalty enhancements, its Guidelines have been construed as merely advisory. 460 Thus, in both countries, the official definition of inequality in practice, including inequality motivated by sexual orientation, is firmly embedded in the discretionary decisions of law enforcement personnel. The remaining rows in Table 3.2 depict the influences of “Other” hate crime laws. Some of these laws similarly assign the discretion to define inequality to law enforcement personnel. The Canadian Hate Propaganda provisions and hate speech laws in the United States, to the extent that they are available at all under the constraints of freedom of expression, assign to law enforcement personnel the discretion to define inequality in practice be deciding which discriminatory utterances to investigate, prosecute, and punish. The Hate Crime Statistics Act in the United States, likewise delegates discretionary decisionmaking to federal, and ultimately local, police investigators. This law, earlier than any other national law in the United States, established official equality rights terminology for hate crimes, according to the particular grounds of prohibited discrimination to be monitored by police. But it is police who define inequality in practice under the HCSA as they classify, or decline to classify, individual hate-related events. Moreover, while the HCSA aspires to a national scope, even this law does not exhaust the discretionary power of Congress. First, Congress has only gradually added grounds of prohibited discrimination to the official hate crime database. While crimes motivated by sexual orientation count, gender and gender identity crimes do not. The Sentencing Guidelines include gender discrimination, except in cases involving sexual assault, while gender discrimination is excluded from the HCSA. Thus, the national definition of hate crime excludes most anti-woman crimes. And, of course, the national 460 See Booker, supra note 172. Ch. 3—Analytical Legal Comparison 184 definition of inequality established by the official hate crime statistics is further limited by the discretionary decisions of local police investigators. Differences in civil and human rights laws and other laws authorizing inquiries into hate- related activity have been addressed minimally to provide context. In both countries, civil rights or human rights laws authorize relief for conduct equivalent to hate crime, when it occurs in an employment settling, for example. Laws regulating harassment in schools and requiring schools to monitor and report hate-related harassment have been analyzed because they illustrate a key cross-national similarity in the division of governmental powers. In both Canada and the United States public schools are regulated by local school boards, which exercise remarkably similar powers under state or provincial legislation. And, the resulting school harassment laws and policies are remarkably similar. School harassment laws and policies, and other hate crime laws are reveling because they delegate the power to define inequality in practice to government officials outside the criminal law system, and hence subject to different local legislative dynamics. The constitutional division of governmental powers in the United States and Canada locates the activities of both governmental agencies and nongovernmental groups that contend in the hate crime field. The site of lawmaking and law enforcement power in the hate crime field locates both governmental and nongovernmental power to label hate crimes and similar discriminatory conduct. A review of the interview data in Chapter 5 will identify the sites of governmental power important to nongovernmental groups. Of these, two are most relevant to the comparison between Canada and the United States: (1) the power to define and monitor crimes and criminal penalties for discriminatory conduct; and, (2) the power to define and monitor similar conduct in school settings. School harassment laws and laws requiring hate crime statistics in higher education overlap with hate crime laws, when the conduct rises to the level of a crime. These laws would Ch. 3—Analytical Legal Comparison 185 not normally be considered hate crime laws. Nonetheless, they represent an opportunity to triangulate data and to verify the observations from a comparison of formal hate crime laws. Hate crimes motivated by “sexual orientation” have been subject to enhanced criminal penalties in both countries. In Canada prosecutions considering enhanced penalties for homophobic hate crimes have all been brought under a single, national criminal code, although they have appeared across the country. In the United States, the federal hate crime penalty law has been invoked only minimally for homophobic crimes, but state hate crime prosecutions have been more common. Homophobic, but not trans-phobic, hate crimes have thus “become cognitively taken for granted”461 in both Canada and the United States. Just as police begin to exercise a “power . . . to define racism”462 in their hate crime labeling decisions during criminal investigations, prosecutors and judges in both countries begin to define racism and other types of inequality. Other hate crime laws assign the discretion to define inequality outside police departments and courtrooms, but government officials—school administrators, for instance— remain the primary sources of official legal knowledge about hate crimes. The institutionalization of hate crime prosecutions and sentencing decisions has been accompanied to some extent by a parallel institutionalization among nongovernmental groups that contend in the hate crime field. Generally speaking, nongovernmental social groups engage in contention at every stage of discretionary decisionmaking in the hate crime classification process—from the labeling of hate crimes for statistical purposes by police investigators to sentencing decisions by judges. These parallel contentious practices among nongovernmental groups are addressed in Chapter 5. Before examining the legal knowledge practices of 461 See Jenness & Grattet, supra note 370, at 7-8 (addressing “institutionalization”: “the process by which the meanings and practices that constitute hate crime stabilize, become cognitively taken for granted by actors, and attain a high level of normative consensus.”); see also T. A. Maroney, The struggle against hate crime: a movement at a crossroads, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 564, 579 (1998) (describing process by which “‘Hate crime’ [] became a resonant new diagnosis.”). 462 See Jeanine Bell, POLICING HATRED at 13, 27, 64 (2002) (noting formal and informal “routine practices” of police “labeling” hate crimes, and “the power of the police to define racism, [etc.]”). Ch. 3—Analytical Legal Comparison 186 nongovernmental groups in the hate crime field, however, Chapter 4 will cap the discussion of official hate crime practices by comparing two similar Canadian and American cases. A comparison of recent court decisions issued in the aftermath of allegedly homophobic attacks in Canada and the United States will illustrate the practical institutionalization of hate crime sentencing laws in criminal cases in the two countries. Ch. 4—Case Comparison 187 4 Case Comparison 4.1 Introduction The analysis to this point has synthesized general principles related to hate crime law in Canada and the United States. Chapter 5 will examine the role of hate crime laws in the practices of nongovernmental groups that monitor homophobic and trans-phobic hate crimes in Seattle, Washington and Vancouver, British Columbia. This Chapter presents a comparison of recent hate crime prosecutions in these two cities, to connect the abstract principles of hate crime law to their social context. During the course of interviews beginning in the summer of 2005, nongovernmental groups in both Seattle and Vancouver identified hate-related events that they believed constituted hate crimes. When asked to provide examples of recent acts of homophobic or trans-phobic violence, a consensus in each city identified a single, recent event. In Vancouver it was the killing of Aaron Webster, and in Seattle, it was the assault on Micah Painter. Subjects interviewed in Vancouver questioned whether any person had ever received an enhanced sentence for homophobic or trans-phobic bias in Canada. The assumption seemed to be that such enhanced penalties had been imposed in at least some jurisdictions in the United States. A quantitative analysis of the numbers of sentences enhanced because of a sexual orientation or gender identity bias in Canadian and American courts would be a worthwhile exercise, but no such analysis is attempted here. Among other problems, variations in the publication of reasons for sentencing decisions would render such a quantitative analysis suspect. Nevertheless, Canadian and American courts have considered homophobic motives in their sentencing decisions. Specifically, recent court rulings in Vancouver and Seattle at least considered enhanced sentences for homophobic bias. In each prosecution, the guilty parties Ch. 4—Case Comparison 188 accepted their sentences without appealing. Therefore, decisions from appellate courts of record are unavailable. Still, the Courts issued written decisions in each of the cases, and gave either written or oral reasons for their decisions to apply or not to apply enhanced penalties for bias. The events were atrocious—Aaron Webster died, while Micah Painter survived a violent attack. Each event triggered claims of homophobic bias both inside and outside court, and in each case the sentencing judges analyzed the legal standard governing criminal penalties for bias. 4.2 A Canadian Case—Aaron Webster 4.2.1 The Youths—‘J.S.’ & ‘A.C.’ On November 17, 2001, a group of five young men used baseball bats and golf clubs to attack and kill Aaron Webster in Stanley Park in Vancouver. The attackers were not immediately identified, but tips to the Vancouver Police revealed that one of the attackers had bragged about the killing to his high school classmates. Seventeen-year-old JS was arrested, interrogated, and later confessed to participating in the killing.1 The Crown charged JS with manslaughter.2 The sentencing judge noted the Crown’s choice not to seek adult proceedings: It seems that originally the Crown sought to have the accused raised to adult Court because of the seriousness of the offence under the then Young Offenders Act, but appeared to have withdrawn that application upon some agreement with counsel for the accused which seemed to include his entering a plea of guilty to the offence in Youth Court.3 The Court set out the Summary of the Facts, which “was entered by the Crown with no opposition[.]”4 After investigating the tips about JS, police eventually interviewed him and obtained “a warned and videotaped” statement at first denying any involvement; he later advised 1 See R. v. J.S., 2003 BCPC 442 (CanLII). 2 Criminal Code, § 236(b). 3 See R. v. J.S, supra note 1, ¶ 2. 4 Id. ¶ 3. Ch. 4—Case Comparison 189 a Detective that “he wanted to come clean.”5 JS denied the attack was motivated by Webster’s sexual orientation; he claimed the group attacked Webster because they were drunk and he was one of “those peeping tom guys”: [Detective] M It just didn’t matter who it was? [JS (Suspect)] S No, actually it did. Well, we were looking for those, those peeping tom guys. M Peeping tom guys who look in cars at guys making out. S: fucking voyeurs. Yeah. Exactly.... And they fight back as well, you know.... PC: Oh, they do? S: Yeah PC: ... how many times did you say you guys did that, would you go out and look for guys? S: Oh, I’ve done it like three times .... . . . . M Were you looking for gays down there? S No. M Did you know he was gay when you got him? S No. M Why would you think he’s walking around nude for? S I didn’t know. We were drunk and that was a good excuse to beat him up. M Cause he was naked. S Yeah. ... . . . . M And just again, just so it’s clear in my mind, why, why did you guys go out to do that? Like what was the, was it a fun thing or? S Yeah. It’s um entertainment. ...6 The judge reviewed the extensive psychological evidence submitted in support of the sentencing recommendations of the Crown and the defence. While his lawyer instructed him not to discuss the details of the crime with the examining psychologist, JS did reveal his sexual orientation, and in the words of the psychologist: He described himself as hetero sexual by orientation and has never had homosexual thoughts. He went on to say that people having alternative lifestyles do not bother him. . . . I found him quite remorseful and he had the ability to take responsibility and empathize with people. Having said that, in the absence of his disclosure of the incident in question, it is obviously hard to figure out his real feeling towards the offence in question. 7 5 Id. 6 Id. ¶ 5. JS later went with investigators to Stanley Park and walked them through the attack and provided a second taped interview. See id. ¶ 6. 7 JS, id. ¶ 14 (quoting report of psychologist) (emphasis added). Ch. 4—Case Comparison 190 The Crown agreed not to pursue its application to raise the case to adult court, but the Crown’s expert compiled a report, and its conclusions were considered in sentencing. The Crown’s expert provided a similar caveat to his assessment: Nevertheless, after reviewing police reports and the synopses of the alleged offence, it is clear that this offence involved clear and purposeful planning, pre-meditation and intent, as indicated by a repeated pattern of aggression towards males in the Stanley Park area and the purposeful bringing and use of objects such as golf clubs and a baseball bat in the commission of the beating. Further more, my own review of police reports indicate that the offence involved an extremely violent and unprovoked attack by reportedly five males against one individual who was attempting to flee and avoid engaging in violence. The beating involved multiple blows to the victim, causing contusions to the back, face, neck forearm, leg, and ribcage. In addition, there are no indications that J.S. made any serious efforts to stop or prevent the assault from occurring. Overall, this offence reflects a great deal of callousness and lack of empathy toward the victim.8 Besides the expert assessments and agreed facts from the interviews, the Court considered victim impact statements from several sources, including the “Gay Community”: Victim Impact statements were given viva voce by the deceased’s mother, his sister and his cousin. The Court extends its deepest sympathies to them on their tragic loss. A written statement was provided by a member of the Gay Community who states that the incident happened in an area in Stanley Park normally frequented by gays and shared the media’s view that the killing was a “gay-bashing” which spread terror and fear in that community. There was some objection to this particular statement being relevant because of the accused statement that he and his friends went to the park looking for “peeping- toms” and he had no idea that the deceased was homosexual. I however choose to accept this statement as having some relevance to the issues of this case. 9 After reviewing the information available, the judge began the sentencing analysis with a critique of the expert testimony of the psychologists: I wish to state from the onset that it causes me some alarm that all the professionals involved in the assessment of this young person seemed so “charmed” by J.S.’s personality that no “alarm bells” went off on reading the statement by the accused that he and his friends went to the park looking for “entertainment” which they found by beating up innocent victims. . . . Counsel for the accused took objection to Crown counsel referring to his client as being part of a “gang.” I however will describe them as a “thug brigade stalking human prey for entertainment” in a manner very reminiscent of Nazi Youth in pre-war Germany. The civilized world continues to regard with abhorrence such pursuits, and I have every reason to believe that Canada is a shining example in decrying such intolerance. 8 Id. ¶ 5. 9 Id. ¶ 19 (emphasis in original). Ch. 4—Case Comparison 191 I made the comment during submissions when counsel for the young person kept referring to all the glowing reports from family, friends and teachers that J.S. “would not harm anyone” and how tolerant he was, that they were obviously not aware of J.S.’s nightly pursuits. I am totally amazed that Dr. Riar, supported by Dr. Ley and Dr. Bartel could conclude given the confession of J.S. that “He does not have any psychopathic, criminal, or antisocial traits and overall has been quite “pro-social.” Dr. Bartel redeems himself in my opinion when he calls the crime for what it is . . .10 Because JS was not prosecuted as an adult, the judge applied § 38 of the Youth Offenders Act.11 However, since the Act required consideration of other relevant aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the Court incorporated an analysis of the Criminal Code Sentencing Principles: I find that the accused and his friends formed a “gang-like group” and savagely beat Aaron Webster, causing his death, and in view of the above the accused’s degree of participation in the beating is irrelevant. Further it strikes me that the accused by using baseball bats and golf clubs to beat the accused must have been aware that death could result from these hard objects coming against a fragile body with the obvious force that was applied, and were really reckless as to the consequences of their actions. With regards a consideration of the harm done to victims, the death of the victim is obviously the worst harm that an offender can inflict, and the accused was certainly very instrumental in causing the death of Aaron Webster. With regards whether it was intentional and foreseeable, it strikes me that for young men to have weapons “resident” in their vehicle for excursions into a park looking for innocent victims to beat up, is certainly intentional, and death or serious injury to the victim is certainly either foreseeable or implies a certain recklessness as to consequences. Further the fact that the accused had indulged in this activity on three previous occasions, although he says that he did not use weapons, suggests to me that their actions were certainly intentional. With regards reparation by the young person, Mr. Webster has unfortunately been killed and reparation to the victim is impossible. With regards time spent in detention, J.S. has spent no time in detention, although his counsel has described his bail conditions as akin to house arrest. I do not believe that this amounts to detention. With regards previous findings of guilt, J.S. has no previous Court history. With regards “other aggravating and mitigating circumstances”, I find that in regard to mitigating circumstances, the fact that J.S. took one and a half years to confess and at first denying it until the sight of crime scene photos made him break down and confess, in my opinion certainly diminishes this aspect of mitigation. I also find that the accused has already benefited from a consideration of mitigating circumstances when the Crown withdrew its application to raise the young person to adult Court after what appears to be an agreement with his counsel that he would plead guilty in Youth Court, thereby avoiding the rigours of an adult sentence. I should state that I also find that the accused’s claim that he was drunk when committing the offence, merely a tactic to 10 JS, id. ¶¶ 33-37. 11 See id. ¶ 41 (citing § 38(3)). Ch. 4—Case Comparison 192 deflect culpability, as demonstrated by his contradictory statements to those interviewing him of his alcohol intake. I find that the clarity with which he remembered the details of events of that fateful night when he went to the scene with police officers, suggests that he was certainly not as intoxicated as he would have the professionals who interviewed him believe. The aggravating factors in my opinion are numerous: 1. The attack and beating of Mr. Webster was in fact a “hate crime” as set out in section 718.2 (a)(1) of the Criminal Code. I am aware that the Crown has conceded that since J.S. has stated that they went to the park looking for “peeping-toms” or “voyeurs”, and that he did not know that this area was frequented by homosexuals, she has no way of establishing that this was a “hate crime.” I disagree. Section 718.2 of the Criminal Code states as follows: [quoting § 718.2(a)(i)] I am of the opinion that this crime was motivated by “bias, prejudice or hate based” on a factor similar to sexual orientation and is covered by this section of the Criminal Code. It strikes me that this section contemplates hatred against “peeping toms” and/or “voyeurs” as being within its purview, since in my opinion such activity represents a sexual lifestyle which some may consider deviant, but is a sexual lifestyle all the same. I have been advised that the media has been describing this incident as a “gay-bashing” with no foundation for saying so. On this point I find it incredible that the accused and his friends who were obviously in the habit of visiting the park to “beat up” “peeping toms” and “voyeurs” were so naïve that they did not notice that this area was frequented by gays. In any event a gay person was “bashed” by the accused and his friends in an area reputedly frequented by gays, and in that regard I fail to see why it cannot be regarded as a “gay bashing.” 2. The attack was cowardly and so brutal that it caused the death of Aaron Webster. 3. This was a random, unprovoked attack by a group of strangers on a hapless victim who did not even fight back. 4. The young person confessed one and a half years later and after there were rumours around his school of his involvement. He even denied it at first. 5. The accused and his friends were in the habit of taking weapons in their vehicle with the purpose of seeking out certain innocent male victims and assaulting them.12 In its analysis, the Court drew a direct analogy to two leading precedents involving sentencing for racist and homophobic violence, R. v. Atkinson, Ing, & Roberts and R. v. Ingram & 12 JS, id. ¶¶ 43-58 (emphasis added). Ch. 4—Case Comparison 193 Grimsdale.13 The Court quoted at length from the facts of the first case, which it described as “eerily similar to the facts of the case at bar”: On the night of September 10, 1977, five youths, all residents of the Clifton House for Boys, set out to beat up “queers” in Riverdale Park, a municipal park situated close by. The park had a reputation of being a place frequented by homosexuals. The youth[s] sought out and physically beat up three men who were complete strangers to them. The assaults were completely unprovoked. It was not a melee. After the first victim was assaulted, he was left bloodied, beaten and lying on the ground. The youths then sought out and beat up a second victim, and after finishing with him, found a third. They also were left lying on the ground. All the victims were found either unconscious or only semi-conscious. The assaults were carried out with indescribable brutality. Although no weapons were used, the respondents beat their victims with their fists and kicked them.14 The Court agreed that, “in assaults of this nature,” general deterrence, “should not be the paramount consideration,” and instead, the Court should adopt the reasoning of R. v. Ingram and Grimsdale, “which was a precursor and instrumental to the enactment of S.718.2 of the Criminal Code.”15 Specifically, the Court accepted, “Parliament’s concern for the incitement of racial hatred is reflected in s. 281 of the Criminal Code. . . . Such assaults, unfortunately, invite imitation and repetition by others and incite retaliation.”16 Like the Court of Appeal in R. v. Atkinson, Ing, and Roberts, the judge in R. v. JS extended the Ingram and Grimsdale principles and considered the motive for the attacks as an aggravating factor: “Here, a vicious assault was carried out by a cowardly gang of youths who selected innocent victims, complete strangers, who had the misfortune of being in a public park on that occasion. It is the type of offence which the public should not and will not countenance, and the sentence imposed must reflect that.”17 Moreover, unlike the Court in R. v. Atkinson, Ing, and Roberts, the sentencing judge expressly found that the attack on Webster was not mere “youthful bad judgment in the heat of a 13 Id. ¶¶ 59-64 (citing R. v. Atkinson, Ing & Roberts (1979), 43 C.C.C. (2d) 342 (Ont. C.A.) & R. v. Ingram & Grimsdale (1977), 35 C.C.C. (2d) 376). 14 JS, id. (quoting R. v. Atkinson, id. ¶ 1). 15 Id. ¶¶ 62-63. 16 Id. ¶ 63. 17 Id. ¶ 64. Ch. 4—Case Comparison 194 tragic moment,” and, “that the egregious and extreme aggravating circumstances of this offence warrants a sentence that must reflect the abhorrence felt by a civilized society for such a heinous crime. . . . I find therefore for all the reasons stated above that a non-custodial sentence would be inappropriate.”18 The Court denied the Crown’s recommended sentence of 28 to 32 months in favor of “the maximum permitted under the Youth Criminal Justice Act for this offence[,] a Custody and Supervision Order for a period of three years.”19 A second juvenile, A.C., was sentenced in Youth Court by a different Provincial Court Judge.20 Werier, Prov. Ct. J., gave written reasons in support of A.C.’s sentence: 24 During the sentencing hearing three victim impact statements were read out in Court. One was from a close cousin of Mr. Webster, one was from his mother, and one was from his sister. Each of these statements reflects the powerful and lasting impact that this crime has had on an innocent family and indirectly on the community at large. . . . . 28 Section 38(3) of the YCJA outlines other factors that I am required to take into account in determining the appropriate sentence for A.C. These factors are: 29 The degree of participation of A.C. in the commission of this offence. (s. 38(3)(a)) A.C. was clearly an active participant in this tragic beating. He chased Mr. Webster, and hit him with the bat at least three times, the last time while Mr. Webster was already on the ground. 30 The harm done to victims and whether it was intentional or reasonably foreseeable. (s. 38(3)(b)) A.C.’s actions clearly contributed to the death of Mr. Webster. There is no doubt that a death would be a reasonably foreseeable outcome of a beating perpetrated on one innocent victim by a group of five young men wielding bats and clubs. . . . . 35 He was next involved with the youth criminal justice system at the age of 16. He was convicted of possession of stolen property (a motor vehicle) and dangerous operation of a motor vehicle. He was placed on probation for 12 months for that offence on October 10, 2001. He committed the manslaughter of Mr. Webster while on probation. . . . . 38 I am to consider any other aggravating and mitigating circumstances related to A.C. or the offence that are relevant to the purpose or principles set out in the YCJA. (s. 38(3)(f)) 39 The only mitigating circumstances argued by defence counsel were A.C.’s willingness to testify against the two adult co-accused, and the fact that he 18 Id. ¶¶ 66-67. 19 Id. ¶ 70 (citing § 105 Youth Criminal Justice Act). 20 R. v. A.C., 2004 BCPC 99, [2004] B.C.J. No. 811 (Youth Ct.) (Werier Prov. Ct. J.). Ch. 4—Case Comparison 195 entered a guilty plea. However, I find these circumstances to be diminished by the fact that A.C. remained in the community after committing this offence for almost two years, and did not begin to cooperate with the police until after J.S. made his statement to the police implicating A.C. As well, A.C. has received the significant benefit of the Crown seeking a youth sentence for this crime, rather than an adult sentence. 40 Insofar as aggravating factors are concerned, I have considered the following: a) This was a cowardly, unprovoked and vicious attack perpetrated by a group of young men, (which included A.C. as an active participant) on a previously unknown victim. He was beaten to death with baseball bats, a golf club, and other unknown blunt instruments. He was then left by these young people to die in the Park. This is an extremely aggravated case of manslaughter; b) As concluded by Dr. McBride, “There is no evidence that A.C. suffers from a major mental illness in the form of a mood, anxiety, or psychotic disorder. Furthermore, although he exhibited some antisocial traits, such as a capacity for callousness, a lack of insight, and repeated offending, he does not display the kind of lifestyle instability and impulsivity that is typically seen in individuals with an Antisocial Personality Disorder or with a Psychopathic Personality Disorder.” c) A.C. committed this crime while on probation. 41 It is obvious that it would be inappropriate to sentence A.C. to a non- custodial sentence given the extremely aggravating circumstances of this offence. He is considered a low to moderate risk for future violent offences. The pre- sentence report and psychiatric report make it clear that there are programs that A.C. might avail himself of while in custody, including the Violent Offender Treatment Program. This would address his rehabilitation while in custody and his reintegration into the community. The custody and supervision order would be a meaningful consequence which would serve to promote a sense of responsibility to this particular youth, while at the same time acknowledging the harm done to the victim and to the community. 42 I therefore impose a custody and supervision order for a period of three years. I order that A.C. spend two years in closed custody and one year in the community under conditional supervision in accordance with section 105 of the YCJA.21 The sentencing Judge’s only reference to a bias or hate motivation is in the repeated denials of the youth that he and the others discussed targeting gay men. And, the judge does not mention 21 R. v. A.C., id., ¶¶ 24, 28-42 (applying Youth Criminal Justice Act, S.C. 2002, c.1, s. 38(2)(e)(i) to (iii)). Ch. 4—Case Comparison 196 any argument by the Crown in support of bias, prejudice or hate as an aggravating factor. Plainly, however, the judge did not receive the same materials as the judge in R. v. Cran.22 4.2.2 The Adult—Cran The Canadian Criminal Code requires judges to consider sentences in other similar cases. Strict equalization is not required, however. Very similar cases can result in very different sentences. And, when adults and minors are prosecuted for similar conduct, or even the same events, the results can vary widely. Not only can judges depart from each other in similar cases, but prosecutors have broad discretion to seek either Youth Court or adult proceedings. This combination of judicial and prosecutorial discretion is even broader than normal in prosecutions for homophobic and trans-phobic attacks, since these attacks are frequently committed by groups of young men who may be sentenced separately. The Webster killing is an excellent example of the breadth of prosecutorial and judicial discretion. The Youth Court judge in R. v. JS departed from the prosecutor’s recommendation and increased the sentence to account for homophobic bias. The adult court judge who sentenced JS’s adult companion in crime, on the other hand, adopted a different perspective.23 In her Reasons for Sentence, Madam Justice Humphries both distinguished and disputed the earlier Youth Court sentencing decision: This case has received a great deal of publicity. Many comments have been made about the court’s failure to decide the case in certain ways or to characterize this crime in a particular way. I am going to begin by addressing the issue which has been of such public concern: the motive for this crime. 22 R. v. Cran, 2004 BCSC 1635, [2004] B.C.J. No. 2574 (QL), 65 W.C.B. (2d) 59 (B.C.S.C.) (Cran Judgment); R. v. Cran, 2005 BCSC 171, [2005] B.C.J. No. 215 (QL), 63 W.C.B. (2d) 642 (B.C.S.C.) (Cran Sentencing). Cran’s sentencing has been the subject of at least one individualized case study. See Sean Robertson, Spaces for Exception in Canadian Hate Crimes Legislation: Accounting for the Effects of Sexuality-Based Aggravation in R. v. Cran, 50 CRIM. L. Q. 482 (2005). Cran appealed his verdict and sentence. See id., at 489 n.22 (citing Man convicted of fatal gay-bashing in Stanley Park to appeal verdict, VANCOUVER SUN, at B3 (Mar. 19, 2005)). Robertson did not have access to Janoff’s book at the time he wrote his article, but he did cite Janoff’s earlier work. Compare Robertson, id., at 504 n.58 (citing D.V. Janoff, Pink Blood: Queer Bashing in Canada (M.A. Thesis, Simon Fraser Univ., Department of Criminology, 2000)) with Douglas Janoff, PINK BLOOD: HOMOPHOBIC VIOLENCE IN CANADA (2005). 23 R. v. Cran, 2005 BCSC 171 (Reasons for Sentence Feb. 8, 2005). Ch. 4—Case Comparison 197 I said in my reasons for conviction that the motive remains obscure. The Crown does not have to establish a motive when proving the elements of a charge. However, section 718.2(a)(i) of the Criminal Code provides that evidence that the offence was motivated by bias, prejudice or hate based on race, national or ethnic origin, language, colour, religion, sex, age, mental or physical disability, sexual orientation or any other similar factor is an aggravating factor on sentence. The youth court judge who sentenced the youth, J.S., on his plea of guilty stepped outside the sentencing provisions of the Youth Criminal Justice Act and called this crime “a hate crime,” referring to s. 718.2(a)(i) of the Criminal Code. A second youth court judge who subsequently sentenced the youth A.C. on his guilty plea did not. The sentence imposed for each youth was three years, which is the maximum for this offence under the Youth Criminal Justice Act. The Crown has not referred to s. 718.2(a)(i) in this case and does not rely on it, nor did they refer to it before either of the youth court judges. They have not taken the position that I could or should call the crime of which Mr. Cran has been found guilty “a hate crime.” The right of a person charged with an offence to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal is enshrined in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. That means that each case that comes before the court is decided by an impartial judge on the evidence put before the court, and only on that evidence. A court cannot step outside the rule of law and base its decisions on matters reported in the media. . . . . In a criminal case, which includes proceedings on sentence, that means basing the decision only on facts that have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt based on evidence called in open court. . . . With the greatest of respect to the youth court judge who referred to this as a hate crime, I can only say that I am not aware of any authority in the Criminal Code or otherwise which would allow this court to declare a particular crime “a hate crime.” I am aware that the death of Aaron Webster has had a significant effect on the gay community. However, there was no evidence before the court of Mr. Webster’s sexual orientation, other than what might be inferred from his presence at the Second Beach parking lot. As well, there was no evidence before the court that Mr. Cran’s motive for attacking Mr. Webster was his sexual orientation. In order to consider such a motivation as an aggravating factor on sentence, I must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that such a motive has been proven. There is also no basis on the evidence before the court to equate “peeping toms and voyeurs” to gay people in the mind of Ryan Cran in the absence of evidence and in the face of evidence to the contrary. . . . Ryan Cran told two friends of his involvement with Mr. Webster’s beating; the evidence at trial was that one of those friends wore a recording device for several months while having conversations with Ryan Cran. Despite these investigative measures, there was no evidence before the court that Mr. Cran was concerned with anything other than peeping toms, and there is no evidence that he ever mentioned a concern with gay people. In any event, Aaron Webster was not peeking in cars when this group encountered him. There is no suggestion Aaron Webster ever peeked in cars. He was simply standing near a parking lot, smoking, naked. There was no evidence before the court to explain where his clothes were or why Aaron Webster was naked. What motivated this group to chase and beat Mr. Webster remains, as I said in my earlier reasons, obscure. On the evidence before me, it appears to be because they were looking for peeping toms or voyeurs based on the previous incident in which a man had Ch. 4—Case Comparison 198 peeked into Ryan Cran’s car while he was with his girlfriend, and, as Mr. Weber said in his submissions, came across a man who caught their attention because he was alone and naked.24 The Court initially scorned the defence claim that Cran was less culpable than the other attackers: this was not a spontaneous event that occurred because the group happened to be parked at Second Beach, . . . . . . . Regardless of where they parked or why they went to Stanley Park in the first place, . . . [T]he group was looking for someone to beat up by the time they left the car with weapons in their hands. . . . Mr. Cran [] told Mr. Morgado they beat the man but he, Cran, stopped before the others did. From this, the only reasonable inference is that Mr. Cran also struck blows before he stopped. Mr. Cran told Mr. Rudek: “We lynched a guy, we beat him up.” 25 The Court explicitly found that, “Cran was a member of a group,” that the group had been riding in his van, which contained weapons, that he admitted using a weapon himself, rather than his fists, that he “was the most sober,” and that he and the others ran away leaving Webster without medical attention.26 The Crown did not claim an aggravated sentence for bias, but it did request a six- to nine- year sentence because of the group behaviour.27 The Court, however, felt obliged to distinguish the Youth Court and adult sentences, and to discount Cran’s lesser role within the assailant group: Here the two youths, both of whom struck blows to Mr. Webster’s head either of which could have been the fatal blow, were sentenced under a regime that has a maximum sentence of three years. This sentence cannot be of assistance in sentencing an adult, even one whose direct actions were less extensive than the youths’.28 The judge also emphasized the differences in evidence presented for the Youth Court guilty pleas versus the adult trial: “now that I have heard all the evidence at trial, which the provincial court judges who accepted guilty pleas did not, I am of the view that there is some differentiation to be 24 Id., ¶¶ 1-13 (some emphasis added). In her earlier decision, the Judge had convicted Cran and acquitted another adult co-defendant Danny Rao. See R. v. Cran 2004 BCSC 1635, 2004 CarswellBC 2894. The B.C. Court of Appeal later affirmed Cran’s conviction. See R. v. Cran, 2006 BCCA 464, 213 C.C.C. (3d) 212, 231 B.C.A.C. 205, 381 W.A.C. 205, [2007] B.C.W.L.D. 924, [2007] B.C.W.L.D. 923, [2007] B.C.W.L.D. 918. 25 Cran, id. ¶¶ 18-21 (emphasis added). 26 Id. ¶ 26. 27 Id. ¶ 27. 28 Id. Ch. 4—Case Comparison 199 drawn between the participation of J.S. and A.C. and that of Ryan Cran.”29 Thus, Cran received the benefit of favorable comparison to the other defendants sentenced earlier, as his sentencing judge seems to admit: “Different considerations might apply to an analysis of the actions of J.S. and A.C., given all of the evidence I have now heard, but those issues are not before me.”30 The Cran decision demonstrates that the last in a group to be sentenced separately may receive the greatest differentiation in sentencing by way of comparison with other defendants. So, factors like the prosecutor’s choice of which case to charge first and which cases should be accepted for plea agreements can make a substantial difference—the early cases can set the tone for the later cases, and even constrain the penalties imposed in later cases. The judge expressly found that none of the aggravating factors listed in § 718.2(a) applied, but concluded nevertheless, “there are other aggravating factors.”31 Nevertheless, the facts relevant to Ryan Cran are still extremely serious. I accept the Crown’s submissions that it is a significant aggravating circumstance that Mr. Cran was part of a group armed with weapons who targeted this innocent victim in a public place for no apparent reason other than he caught their eye as being different. Although there is no evidence that this crime was motivated by bias, prejudice or hatred for the enumerated reasons in s. 718.2, the court can always consider hate as an aggravating factor in a general sense. It may be that such willingness to inflict terrifying pain on another human being is inevitably an expression of some kind of hatred. But what is so chilling about this case is that this group seems to have done this for some reprehensible and almost inconceivable concept of entertainment.32 Despite its finding against an enumerated ground of bias, prejudice or hate, the Court noted the importance of denunciation and imposed a sentence of six years, between the defence and Crown recommendations: Given the circumstances of this offence the public must be satisfied that the principles of deterrence, denunciation and retribution are adequately taken into account in any sentence imposed. To say attacks such as this one cannot be countenanced is to state the self-evident. This is especially so when an attack is so random, so cowardly, and so 29 Id. ¶¶ 37-38. 30 Id. ¶ 39 (emphasis added). 31 Cran, id. ¶ 32. 32 Id. ¶¶ 41-42 (emphasis added). Ch. 4—Case Comparison 200 terrifying. A strong message must be sent to deter repetition or imitation of such a crime, and to express society’s abhorrence of such conduct. 33 What Cran’s sentence would have been with a premium for homophobic bias is hard to say. Nothing in the Criminal Code would have required a particular increase, and considering the qualitative nature of judicial sentencing discretion displayed in the decision, the judge might have adopted the same sentence, even with the premium. But, as the judge properly noted, the Crown withheld its discretion to seek a bias premium. Cran and his audience of peers must have learned the meaning of the term “Lynching” somewhere during the course of their schooling or upbringing. Both hate crimes and lynching have meaning with legalistic overtones, although the definition of hate crime varies, and although neither Canada nor the United States has criminalized “lynching” per se. Whatever their strict legal meaning in courts and government agencies, these labels clearly carry everyday meaning. And, the colloquial meaning of labels for violent inequality is important even in the most formal of legal inquiries. The role of colloquial meanings is exemplified by the label “gay- bashing” used in the prosecution of the young men who assaulted Micah Painter in Seattle in July 2004. 4.3 An American Case—Micah Painter During the Seattle Pride celebration in the summer of 2005, three young men used a broken vodka bottle to attack Micah Painter along a city street in Seattle, Washington. Police labeled the attack a “hate crime” motivated by Painter’s sexual orientation under the federal statistics law. Prosecutors charged the attackers with malicious harassment. The Court files documenting the prosecution and sentencing of Micah Painter’s attackers may be accessed by the public. 34 But, unlike the Vancouver sentencing decisions, written 33 Id. ¶ 43 (emphasis added); see id. ¶ 48-49. As an interesting aside, the Judge’s order included a weapons’ prohibition, but no mention was made of a ban on contact with the other group attackers. Ch. 4—Case Comparison 201 reasons supporting sentencing in the Seattle cases are not available online. Photocopies of the written Judgments and Sentences are available, but they are set out on standardized court forms with boxes (“[ ]”) checked to indicate the Court’s decisions. All three of Painter’s attackers were found guilty by a jury in the same trial. The jury found the principal attacker, Samusenko, guilty of two counts of Assault in the Second Degree and one count of Malicious Harassment.35 Because he used a vodka bottle to attack Painter, his malicious harassment conviction and one of his assault convictions were subject to a special verdict of “armed with a deadly weapon other than a firearm.”36 The same judge sentenced the attackers in two separate hearings, and their sentences varied accordingly. Samusenko was sentenced last. He received concurrent sentences of: fourteen months, with twelve month’s “mandatory confinement,” for his assault with the bottle; thirteen months, with six month’s consecutive mandatory confinement, for using the bottle during malicious harassment; and, thirteen months for an assault without the bottle. The terms amount to thirty-two months, but because of concurrent sentencing, the net term was effectively the longest of the three—fourteen months, with twelve month’s mandatory confinement. The Court ordered Samusenko to have “no contact” with either Painter or the other two attackers for “the maximum term of 10 years,” and to pay “$500 + restitution” to be determined 34 Criminal records for all three of Painter’s male assailants are indexed and summarized on the Court’s Web site. See www.metrokc.gov\kcscc; see also http://dw.courts.wa.gov/index.cfm?fa=home.namelist (online court document search engine) (accessed Jan. 29, 2007). The Court documents themselves are not available in electronic format at this time, but paper copies may be obtained by following the online instructions. Apparently, the sentencing Judge’s reasons are not set out in writing. Thanks are due to the Court’s staff for photocopying and mailing the sentencing documents at no cost for this research. The young women who were present for the attack were not charged. The verdicts in the Painter attack were reported in the local Seattle Gay News. See Robert Raketty, The Verdict is in: All three assailants found guilty in attack on Micah Painter, SEATTLE GAY NEWS, Fri., Apr. 1, 2005, at 1, available at http://www.sgn.org/sgnnews13/page1.cfm (accessed Jan. 11, 2006). Other scholars have encountered similar impediments to access in research related to the sentencing decisions of judges. See, e.g., Karen M. Masson, Familial Ideology in the Courts: The Sentencing of Women (M.A. Thesis, Simon Fraser Univ., June, 1992) (reprinting correspondence with judges regarding interviews transcripts of sentencing decisions). 35 See State v. Vadim Samusenko, No. 04-1-02026-0 SEA, ¶ 2.1 Counts I-III (Judgment & Sentence Felony, filed May 24, 2005) (citing RCW §§ 9A.36.021(1)(C) (Assault in the Second Degree), .080(1)(A)(B) or (C) (Malicious Harassment)). 36 Samusenko, id. ¶ 2.1(b) Special Verdict (quoting RCW § 9.94A.510(4)). Ch. 4—Case Comparison 202 later.37 The judge also imposed standard conditions to apply upon release from prison, including “Not to own, use, or possess a firearm or ammunition.”38 The other two attackers, Kravchenko and Savchak, were sentenced together a month before Samusenko. They received identical felony sentences of five-and-one-half month’s confinement, plus six month’s consecutive mandatory confinement for using a weapon other than a firearm during malicious harassment. 39 Each also received concurrent, suspended sentences of 364 days for Assault in the Fourth Degree.40 Both were ordered to have no contact with Painter, Samusenko, or each other for five years, but their sentences did not include a weapons ban. Detailed accounts of the trial and conviction of Painter’s attackers, including both the judge’s reasons for sentencing and interviews with jurors, appeared in the local press. Seattle’s largest independent weekly gave this account of the trial: Micah Painter wasn’t in court last week when the three young immigrants who gay- bashed him were found guilty of a hate crime and led away in handcuffs. . . . Painter had heard about the crowds of . . . supporters of his three Evangelical attackers. The crowds scared Painter. He feared his presence at the moment of judgment might kindle in the attackers’ compatriots a desire for revenge. Jurors also noticed the Russians and Ukrainians jamming the benches in court. Looking at the crowd, “a lot of us felt intimidated,” one juror told me. . . . , and some jurors expressed fear of running into the attackers’ friends later. In the end, those worries, justified or not, didn’t prevent the jury from finding all three attackers guilty of a hate crime and varying degrees of assault. . . . . The evidence was there, and it was damning: Two of the bashers essentially admitted to the attack after their arrest; multiple eyewitnesses saw them do it; and after the assault, one attacker bragged about having “beat that faggot.” . . . . [defense counsel] repeatedly suggested to the jury that gays are unfairly overprotected these days. When the jury began deliberating . . . , 11 people said yes immediately. [Counsel’s] inflammatory tactics had backfired, several jurors told me, 37 Id. ¶¶ 4.1, 4.3, 4.5. 38 Id. Appendix H (citing RCW 9.94A.720(2)). 39 See State v. David Kravchenko, No. 04-1-02027-8 SEA (Judgment & Sentence Felony, filed May 9, 2005); State v. Yevgeniy Savchak, No. 04-1-02097-9 SEA (Judgment & Sentence Felony, filed May 9, 2005). 40 See State v. David Kravchenko, No. 04-1-02027-8 SEA (Judgment & Sentence Non-Felony, filed May 9, 2005); State v. Yevgeniy Savchak, No. 04-1-02097-9 SEA (Judgment & Sentence Non-Felony, filed May 9, 2005). Ch. 4—Case Comparison 203 offending them and causing them to dig in their heels on the need for a hate-crime conviction. But one juror initially voted “no,” . . . he didn’t like the “thought police” aspect of hate- crime laws. This could easily have created a hung jury, but his fellow jurors convinced him that it was his job to enforce Washington’s hate-crime law, not to quibble with why it exists in the first place. He changed his vote. . . . . When it came to the assault charges, however, . . . all three were convicted of lesser assault charges, and none is now facing more than a few years. . . . . . . . . . . as many as eight jurors were ready to convict Samusenko on first-degree assault. “If you go at someone with a broken vodka bottle, your behavior reveals your intention,” he said. But one juror, a man in his 80s, believed he knew what a gay-bashing was, and that the intent of a gay-bashing was “just to gay-bash,” not to inflict great bodily harm. It didn’t make a lot of sense, but there was no budging him. Ultimately, the jury could only unanimously agree on convicting Samusenko of second-degree assault, for which the threshold for guilt is lower: “recklessly” inflicting “substantial bodily harm.” That left many on the jury angry and frustrated. [But, w]ith Samusenko having already received second-degree assault, the jurors felt they couldn’t give his accomplices anything higher. That left them with no choice but to give Kravchenko and Savchak fourth-degree assault. “I was not happy,” said juror Jan Weber, a homemaker from Kent. “I felt like they needed more than a slap on the hands.”41 The March, 2005 article concluded by explaining Painter’s understanding of the Courtroom crowds: “Guilty is guilty,” Micah Painter told me, “and I feel validated.” He was more upset with a gay community that seemed to think his meth use the night of the attack made him a poor candidate for the role of gay-bashed-martyr; the number of gay supporters at the trial never made it out of the single digits. And while the courtroom was filled with his assailants’ family members, neither of Painter’s parents—both Evangelical Christians, like his assailants—was present at the trial. A few weeks later, when the last of the attackers was sentenced, the same news sources documented the outcomes: King County Superior Court Judge Jeffrey M. Ramsdell has sentenced the last of three men convicted with the brutal bashing of a 24-year-old Micah Painter June. On Friday, May 13, Vadim Samusenko received two years and eight months in prison. The other men, David Kravchenko and Yevgeniy Savchak, had been sentenced last month to 11 months for their roles in the attack. 41 See Eli Sanders, Mixed Message: Micah Painter’s Assailants Found Guilty of Hate Crime but Get Lesser Assault Convictions, THE STRANGER, Apr. 7 – Apr. 13, 2005, available at http://www.thestranger.com/2005%2D03%2D31/feature.html (accessed Jan. 31, 2007) (with accompanying photograph captioned, “GUILTY Vadim Samusenko and David Kravchenko as the verdict was read”). Ch. 4—Case Comparison 204 The prosecutor had sought first degree assault convictions against the Whatcom County men, but failed to convince all of the jurors that the charge was warranted. Instead Samusenko, the instigator of the attack, was found guilty of second-degree assault with a deadly weapon. Kravchenko and Savchak were also found guilty of lesser charges. Samusenko was also found guilty of assault in the second degree for a separate incident. Minutes after his attack on Painter, Samusenko had pointed a gun to the chest of Richard Evans who had overheard the men bragging about the bashing. Samusenko accused Evans of being a police officer. Samusenko appealed to the mercy of the court during the sentencing hearing, which drew a small crowd of the victim’s supporters and the perpetrator’s family alike. . . . . . . . During an interview with the Seattle Gay News late last month, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney Sean O’Donnell called the event “three minutes of hate, violence and stupidity that changed Micah Painter’s life—and hopefully the defendants’ as well—forever.” “The police, particularly Detective Al Cruise, did an outstanding job investigating this crime,” said O’Donnell. “The community, as represented by the jury, spoke strongly against hate. It appeared to us that the Seattle community as a whole was appalled about what happened—and this was reflected in the witnesses’ willingness to not only cooperate, but proactively help the police during the investigation.” Painter had written a letter addressed to the three men, which O’Donnell shared with the court. O’Donnell had told the SGN last month that the letter was “generous and well thought…and…showed an impressive degree of maturity and forgiveness.” The letter reads: “No good can come from hatred. I hope the next time one of you encounters someone different than yourself—be it race, gender or beliefs—you try to understand them rather than show hate; show compassion instead of violence.” 42 Another citywide weekly paper likewise ran a full account of the sentencing proceeding, emphasizing the religious undertones in the proceedings: There was barely a mention of God during the three-week trial of the men who gay bashed and stabbed Micah Painter last summer. . . . It was as if religion had been completely erased from the discussion of a hate crime that occurred, according to a young Evangelical woman who was with Samusenko that night, because being gay is “against our religion.” But on Friday, May 13, when Samusenko, a 21-year-old immigrant from the former Soviet Union, faced sentencing for his crimes against Painter, there was no restraint in dropping God’s name. Samusenko’s lawyer, . . . lectured King County Superior Court Judge Jeffrey M. Ramsdell about mercy and seemed to suggest that the judge might incur the “wrath of God” if he wasn’t lenient. . . . 42 Robert Raketty, with David Hildebrand, Last of Micah Painter’s attackers sentenced Judge says basher’s remorse ‘too little, too late,’ SEATTLE GAY NEWS, Fri., May 20, 2005, available at http://www.sgn.org/ (accessed Jan. 31, 2007). Ch. 4—Case Comparison 205 Samusenko himself told a story about having strayed from God’s path and then returning to Christ during the 10 months he had so far spent in jail. . . . . If Judge Ramsdell was moved by the repeated invocations of God’s name, it didn’t show. He batted away Olmstead’s argument that an exceptionally light sentence was warranted because Samusenko was remorseful (“The defendant’s insight is too little too late”). . . . was a victim of his own intoxication that night. . . (“The defendant had been forewarned that his involvement with alcohol tended to result in criminal difficulties”). And Judge Ramsdell seemed particularly dismissive of [the] argument that Painter had brought the assault on himself. When Samusenko approached the victim holding a broken vodka bottle and demanded to know whether he was gay, Painter replied “yes.” Samusenko then stabbed Painter in the face and back. “Did [Painter] initiate the contact?” Judge Ramsdell asked. . . . : “No.” [The defense] also suggested that the “extremely verbal” gay community might be attempting to harden the judge’s heart, to which Judge Ramsdell responded: “I have received absolutely no communications from the purportedly ‘extremely verbal’ gay community.” The only people he’d heard from, he said, were Samusenko’s supporters. Judge Ramsdell gave Samusenko nearly three years in jail, close to the maximum that prosecutors had asked for. He had already sentenced Samusenko’s two accomplices, David Kravchenko, 20, and Yevgeniy Savchak, 18, last month. Each received one day less than a year in jail for their role. . . . the judge designed the sentence length so as not to trigger their automatic deportation back to the former Soviet Union, which their attorneys had argued was a “life sentence.” Painter didn’t show up to the sentencing hearings, but he did send an e-mail to be read aloud to the attackers. “Every day for the rest of my life I will bear the scars you carved in me,” Painter wrote. “None of us can change what has happened. We only have control over where we go from here.” One place the three attackers will not be going is back to their extremely conservative church in Bellingham—at least, not together. Judge Ramsdell prohibited the attackers from having contact with each other for five years, something their lawyers protested as harming their ability to practice their religion. That didn’t seem to bother Judge Ramsdell. “They’ll have to find a different church to attend,” he said.43 Because both the Canadian and American prosecutions occurred at about the same time as the interviews, further details about both cases appear in the comments of informants in Chapter 5. The details above will, however, serve to inform a comparison of the application of hate crime laws in practice in the two countries. 43 Eli Sanders, Word of God: Religion Comes Out at Sentencing of Micah Painter’s Convicted Gay Bashers, THE STRANGER, May 19 - May 25, 2005, (captioned, “JUDGMENT DAY? Painter’s attacker, Vadim Samusenko, gets three years.”), available at http://www.thestranger.com/2005%2D03%2D31/feature.html (accessed Jan. 31, 2007). Ch. 4—Case Comparison 206 4.4 Analysis—Comparing Cases The ultimate legal labeling of cases in Vancouver and Seattle differed. It seems remarkable, particularly from an American perspective, that Cran bragged about a “Lynching” and yet avoided the “hate crime” label. Imagine, by contrast, the same case brought by Webster’s relatives in a human rights agency, or the same case brought before an inquiry commission. In a broader inquiry, outside the narrow confines properly described by Cran’s sentencing Judge, the meaning of Lynching to Cran and to society would seem a proper topic. Would the Crown have presented its case differently if Cran had bragged about a hate crime instead of a Lynching? No law prohibits Lynching per se in either Canada or the United States. Still, this kind of admission seems relevant and important to an understanding of the social meaning of hate crime. Some similarities appeared in the reasoning of the fact-finders in both Canadian and American cases. Both Cran’s sentencing judge and the hold-out juror in the Painter prosecutions expressed reluctance to infer a motive from circumstances surrounding the attacks. Cran’s sentencing judge was reluctant to infer homophobic motives from the location of Webster’s killing in gay cruising area. Painter’s hold-out juror was reluctant to infer an intent to inflict serious harm based on his understanding of a typical “gay-bashing.” The sentencing Judges for JS and for Painter’s attackers used similar reasoning too. Both relied on inferences from evidence presented to denounce the attackers’ discriminatory motives. The sequence of the cases produced another similar result—in general, older attackers, sentenced last, and after a trial, received the benefit of a favorable comparison with those sentenced earlier.44 44 A similar observation might be made for Matthew Shepard’s attackers. Ch. 4—Case Comparison 207 Unlike the Painter case, Cran’s prosecutors did not present evidence of a prohibited bias, and Cran’s sentencing judge confined the analysis to facts alleged and proved by the Crown.45 Yet the sentencing judge in Cran seemed to confuse the concept of “hate crime” unnecessarily by embracing the ambiguous idea of “hate in a general sense.” The callousness of using group violence for its entertainment value seems better addressed by other unambiguous Sentencing Principles, without relying on abstract, “general” hate. Moreover, why was the apparently proven violent “attention” to male nudity not sufficient evidence of an impermissible bias? The group had not attacked any naked women. Furthermore, the judge and the Crown prosecutor seem to have overlooked the concept of sexual privacy motivating Cran. Cran resented a “Peeping Tom” who had seen him and his girlfriend alone in his van. He did not express concern for his girlfriend’s privacy; instead, he seems to have been offended by the thought of a naked man watching him during sexual activity. Arguably, according to Cran’s own logic, he was motivated in part by a negative reaction to homosexual attention. Of course, all of these considerations would require proof beyond a reasonable doubt, as well as perhaps other procedural protections, before they could justify a premium for bias. Also, a finding of bias, prejudice or hate, does not require any particular increase in sentencing. Thus, a judge could consciously or unconsciously offset this against mitigation for some other factor. In other words, the Criminal Code makes any statement of sentencing reasons inherently discretionary. Skillful judges and prosecutors could have characterized either case here as motivated in whole or in part by homophobic bias, skillful defence counsel could have contended otherwise, and skillful judges could have justified findings in either direction. Sentencing for “hate crimes” is a similarly discretionary process under the United States Code and the United States Sentencing Guidelines, as they are currently interpreted by the 45 The Judge’s characterization of the quantum of evidence required may have been technically incorrect, but since the Crown did not allege a bias motive, the standard of proof did not matter. Ch. 4—Case Comparison 208 Supreme Court. Until recently, sentencing in federal court was subject to binding sentencing principles defining precise sentencing ranges, with only narrow departures allowed for mitigating and aggravating factors. These factors remain, but they have been declared merely advisory. So, a sentence enhancement for a “hate crime” in federal courts in the United States operates like a corresponding sentencing premium under the Canadian Criminal Code. If the factor is proven, then the sentencing judge may incorporate the sentence enhancement factor into a complex sentencing discretion matrix. Neither Canadian nor U.S. sentencing principles as currently interpreted mandate a particular increase in penalty, even if the sentence enhancement factor is proven. Hate or bias crime sentencing is important primarily to denounce both the underlying crime and the discriminatory motive. In either Canada or the United States, however, a judge has broad discretion to determine the degree and terms of denunciation for both the underlying crime and the discriminatory motive. The Washington state statute applied to Painter’s attackers seems radically different than the Canadian and U.S. sentencing principles. “Malicious Harassment” is its own offense under the state’s Criminal Code and as such requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury that the accused “maliciously and intentionally” injured the victim “because of” their characteristics.46 Yet, a Malicious Harassment prosecution in Washington has an effect similar to a hate crime sentencing case in either Canadian courts or federal court in the United States. American jurisprudence requires pretrial notice, a jury trial, and proof beyond a reasonable doubt for any mandatory hate crime penalty. The quantum of proof for a discretionary hate crime penalty enhancement—a preponderance of evidence or beyond a reasonable doubt—varies and is not fully settled.47 The only seeming difference is that, as a separate offense, malicious harassment 46 RCW § 9A.36.080(1). 47 The bias element of Malicious Harassment requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt because it is an element of a crime. But the same standard applies for sentence enhancement factors that mandate an enhanced sentence. Ch. 4—Case Comparison 209 requires its own sentence in addition to sentences imposed for any underlying offenses like assault. But, at least in cases like the Painter attack, where malicious harassment is tried along with other concurrent offenses, a sentencing judge will have broad discretion to run sentences concurrently or consecutively. Just as Washington has adopted its own hate crime law, the city of Seattle has adopted an even more local variant of the state Malicious Harassment law. In theory, prosecutors would have an opportunity to seek denunciation for the same hate-related event in at least three jurisdictions. In practice, however, as the Painter case illustrates, a prosecution is usually limited to only one jurisdiction. In sum, therefore, both Canadian and American judges possess significant sentencing discretion, and prosecutors wield significant discretion in the choice and timing of charges. In both the United States and Canada, judges and prosecutors exercise significant control over the degree of official denunciation attached to both crimes and the discriminatory motives associated with crimes. The discretion of prosecutors and judges makes hate crime prosecutions and sentencing proceedings predominantly ad hoc proceedings. And even a civil action for damages and other relief under the Washington state Malicious Harassment statute would be processed by judges and juries on an ad hoc basis, without reference to a body of data on hate-related violence. The public might not reach any firm understanding of equality rights from cases like these. Indeed, both the Painter and Webster cases seem to support only the general conclusion that prosecutors and judges in Canada and the United States may denounce discrimination based on “sexual orientation” in their sentencing decisions when the facts are proven to their satisfaction. This may seem unremarkable, but the mere official acknowledgement that is at least implicit in the recent Canadian and American cases set out above confirms the arrival of new legal classification systems for hate crimes in both countries. Ch. 4—Case Comparison 210 While court cases appear on an ad hoc basis only, hate-related events are subject to ongoing, systematic contention in both Canada and the United States. In both Canada and the United States legal classifications are used to establish official knowledge about hate crimes outside the courts. For example, as will be revealed in the next Chapter, Vancouver police classified the Webster killing as a hate crime in their investigative reports and their subsequent law reform advocacy. Governmental classifications like these contribute to the meaning of both individual hate-related events and general concepts like hate crime and equality. Furthermore, in addition to these official, governmental classification decisions, nongovernmental groups participate in the definition of legal knowledge. In both Canada and the United States, nongovernmental social groups use legal terminology to present knowledge about hate-related events. The practices of these groups and their relationship to official classification decisions are explored in Chapter 5. 4.5 Conclusion A comparison of recent, typical hate crime cases in Vancouver and Seattle demonstrates that hate crime laws have assumed an important role in social contention about homophobic violence in Canada and the United States. A comparison of individual cases is incomprehensible without an understanding of the texts of hate crime penalty laws and their more general legal context. While Canadian and American legal systems and hate crime laws share many basic similarities, an analytical legal comparison also reveals several critical differences. First, the governmental powers relevant to hate crime law are distributed differently in the two countries. The Canadian national Parliament maintains the exclusive power to define crimes and criminal penalties. Therefore, the Canadian Criminal Code defines the Sentencing Principles for hate crimes throughout Canada. The United States Congress and the United States Sentencing Commission have likewise established nationwide Guidelines for hate crime Ch. 4—Case Comparison 211 penalties. These Guidelines serve as an important model for hate crime penalty laws, but most hate crimes are defined and prosecuted according to state or municipal laws, which vary widely throughout the country. Second, although the general equality rights accepted in the two countries vary, the language of equality articulated in hate crime penalty laws remains remarkably similar. Both countries penalize hate crimes motivated by “sexual orientation,” and, with minor exceptions, neither penalizes crimes motivated by “gender identity.” Third, in addition to hate crime penalty laws, both Canadian and American legal systems have adopted hate crime statistics mechanisms. The American system is expressly authorized by a Hate Crime Statistics Act, which defines hate crime to include crimes motivated by “sexual orientation,” but not “gender identity.” The Canadian Parliament has not enacted a separate hate crime statistics law, although the national statistics agency has begun to implement a hate crime statistics program using police reports about hate-related incidents. Fourth, a comparison of recent cases shows that Canadian and American courts struggle with the same fundamental questions in the application of hate crime penalty laws: What standard of proof applies to alleged biased motivations? What degree of motivation is required to establish a hate crime? To what extent are defenses such as provocation and self-defense implicated by hate crime penalty laws? How do hate crime penalties apply to youth court proceedings? In both Canada and the United States, however, hate crime penalty enhancement laws and other hate crime laws have combined to create new classification systems that create a body of official legal knowledge about inequality. These classification systems vary, and the introduction of hate crime classification systems has had different effects in the two countries. The dynamic social effects of the hate crime laws in Canada and the United States are studied in more detail in Chapter 5. Ch. 5—Hate Crimes & Social Contention 212 5 Hate Crimes & Social Contention in Canada & the United States 5.1 Introduction Chapter 1 introduced the research methods used to gather information from nongovernmental groups concerned about homo- and trans-phobic crimes in Canada and the United States. This Chapter begins with a more specific introduction. As suggested in Chapter 1, hate crime scholars and critical criminologists have called for more research in areas relevant to this study. Jean-Paul Brodeur, for instance, has called for the articulation of a theory of knowledge production among criminologists studying policing. 1 Professor Barbara Perry, on the other hand, has suggested that community responses to hate- related activity deserve more attention than they have received to date.2 This Chapter is meant to respond to both calls for research, by presenting the results of a qualitative comparison of how nongovernmental social groups contend and inquire about homophobic and trans-phobic hate crimes in Canada and the United States. While police practices are examined to provide context, the primary data from each site reveal the practices of nongovernmental groups, as they gather, process, and present information in an overall hate crime labeling or classification system. And, a comparative analysis of the data from the two countries describes knowledge production using the concept of social contention introduced in Chapters 1 and 2.3 The focus here is on the nongovernmental knowledge practices that contribute to hate crime labeling. In traditional criminal law practice, police, prosecutors, judges, and juries label 1 Jean-Paul Brodeur, Richard V. Ericson & Kevin D. Haggerty, Policing the Risk Society, 1998 CAN. J. CRIM. 455 (book review); see also Jean-Paul Brodeur, Disenchanted criminology, 1999 CAN. J. CRIM. 131 (placing criminological research in context with the production of knowledge). 2 See Barbara Perry, Hate Crime, 47 BRIT. J. CRIM. 842 (reviewing Nathan Hall, HATE CRIME (2005)). 3 See generally Alberto Melucci, CHALLENGING CODES: COLLECTIVE ACTION IN THE INFORMATION AGE (1996); Alberto Melucci, NOMADS OF THE PRESENT: SOCIAL MOVEMENTS & INDIVIDUAL NEEDS IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY (1989); DYNAMICS OF CONTENTION (Doug McAdam, et al. eds., 2001). Ch. 5—Hate Crimes & Social Contention 213 behavior “criminal” in courtrooms. By contrast, the hate crime labeling process, including hate crime statistics practice, arises only as an adjunct to traditional criminal procedure. A crime may be prosecuted to a criminal conviction, even though it is not labeled a hate crime. Nevertheless, hate crimes are labeled or classified predominantly during official, governmental inquiry, including criminal investigations and prosecutions and the official labeling of hate crimes for statistical purposes. In practice, however, knowledge about hate crimes also emerges from beyond the official inquiries that examine crime, punishment, and even statistics. Informants for this study represent nongovernmental groups that engage in some form of social contention or inquiry contributing to legal knowledge about hate crimes. The study examines hate crimes motivated by sexual orientation or gender identity or expression— homophobic and trans-phobic hate crimes. After introducing the research methods and hypotheses, this Chapter presents a summary and an analysis of data collected from interviews and other sources at two primary research sites: Vancouver, British Columbia and Seattle, Washington.4 The sites of comparison here were chosen for their convenient location and for their relevance to the research questions.5 Vancouver and Seattle both have official governmental hate crime labeling systems, but they currently utilize different labeling procedures, in particular different hate crime statistics mechanisms. The sites of comparison thus differentiate between jurisdictions where police do and do not collect and publicly report police hate crime statistics. It was hypothesized that hate crime information practices of groups would vary between sites according to variations in hate crime labeling processes. Where official hate crime statistics are produced in the routine of police investigations, intuition suggests that knowledge about hate 4 Similar “control” data were gathered from two additional sites, Winnipeg, Manitoba and Minneapolis, Minnesota, but a discussion of the control groups is omitted here for the sake of brevity. 5 English is the predominant language in both Vancouver and Seattle, and all of the interviews for this study were conducted in English. An obvious test of the analysis here would be to examine sites within Canada and the United States in which hate crime inquiry practices can be traced to French or Spanish language and colonial origins. Ch. 5—Hate Crimes & Social Contention 214 crimes might be taken for granted. Thus, groups monitoring hate crimes in Seattle should rely more on the official knowledge and statistics produced by police agencies; whereas, groups in Vancouver should adopt information practices independent of official statistics. A quantitative analysis was not anticipated, but the results were expected to identify “‘key’ causal conjectures, which could then be examined in more detailed case-oriented studies.”6 Before the study commenced, preliminary variables were identified using a “Boolean” Truth Table to illustrate the logic of the anticipated qualitative comparison: Table 5.1—Information Practices of Groups that Monitor Hate Crimes C S D Vancouver 1 0 0 Seattle 1 1 1 Key: C=Traditional Criminal Law Labeling Process; S=Police-Generated Statistics; D=Hate Crime Database. The first two columns represent the presence (“1”) or absence (“0”) of a traditional criminal procedure (“C”) that labels hate crimes, and a system of police-generated hate crime statistics (“S”). Both jurisdictions label hate crimes in traditional criminal proceedings, but Vancouver does not utilize police-generated hate crime statistics. The third column represents the outcome variable. It was expected that groups in Seattle would gather, process, and present information in systematic hate crime databases (“D”) maintained for the purpose of contending with similarly systematic, official hate crime labeling decisions; whereas, those in Vancouver would not. These preliminary variables were conjectural; the actual variables identified in the final results have been determined by the content of the data, in a “dialog of ideas and evidence.”7 Each group’s information practices are specified in greater detail in the course of this Chapter, and the actual indicators are drawn from the interview data.8 6 See generally Charles C. Ragin, THE COMPARATIVE METHOD, at 168 (1987) (discussing ‘key’ causal conjectures). 7 Ragin, id., at 164. 8 See id. Ch. 5—Hate Crimes & Social Contention 215 By definition, all of the groups studied monitor hate crimes and maintain data in some form. The interview script was designed to reveal information practices maintained for the purpose of contesting official labeling decisions. Participants were asked to describe and to explain the function of their information practices. The interview script is reproduced in Appendix 3. It was assumed that groups learn about hate-related events, gather information, and consciously or unconsciously chose whether to respond by initiating or participating in a contentious dialog. If the group does respond, it was assumed that its reaction could be classified as either discrete, ad hoc contention or an element in the group’s internal system of ongoing contention. Regardless of its ad hoc responses, groups may process and retain information in a database to facilitate retrieval and presentation in a future contentious episode. A preliminary model, set out in Figure 5.1 below, was developed to describe the flow of information in groups that monitor hate crimes. This model is refined somewhat in the analysis that follows. Figure 5.1—Information Flow Model for Groups that Monitor Hate Crimes As Chapters 3 and 4 demonstrated, the official hate crime classification systems in Canada and the United States are similar, but not identical. The systems of criminal law, governmental statistics, and other governmental and nongovernmental knowledge practices that combine to produce official hate crime labeling decisions all differ by both locality and nation. At each site, though, official legal inquiry combines with an inventory of nongovernmental inquiry practices in a dynamic process of social contention. This process constitutes both local Triggering Event (Source) Systematic Contention ad hoc Contention No Contention Hate Crime Frame Statistics Legislation Prosecution Innovation Systematic Database ad hoc Data Ch. 5—Hate Crimes & Social Contention 216 and national fields 9 of hate crime inquiry. And, nongovernmental practices of inquiry and contention may be correlated with laws defining the official hate crime inquiry at each location. The research proposal set out the following preliminary research questions and working hypotheses: RESEARCH QUESTIONS: How do nongovernmental groups that monitor anti-gay hate crimes gather, process, and present information for the purpose of contesting official hate crime labeling decisions? What are the similarities and differences in the hate crime databases of such groups in Vancouver and Seattle? WORKING HYPOTHESES: Where police investigators generate official hate crime statistics, nongovernmental social groups use systematic databases to contest official hate crime labeling decisions. In Seattle, groups will gather, process, and present data about hate crimes to contend within the frame of the official hate crime labeling system. Because Vancouver police do not generate hate crime statistics, Vancouver groups will use more ad hoc contention, presenting political claims outside the official labeling framework. The answers to these research questions and the results of hypothesis testing set out in this Chapter and the analysis of results in Chapter 6 suggest both theoretical and practical conclusions about the impact of differences in hate crime laws on the mobilization, information practices, and social contention of nongovernmental groups that monitor hate crimes. Between June, 2005 and January, 2006, groups in both Seattle and Vancouver provided interviews, which constitute the primary research data. Most of these interviews were videotaped, and an edited summary of the interviews was shown to participants in both Vancouver and Seattle to validate an initial comparison and to obtain further information.10 Data from the interviews was supplemented by references to secondary data sources, including websites, brochures, and newspaper accounts documenting hate crime labeling practices at each 9 I borrow the concept of a “field” of social inquiry primarily from the work of French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu. See Pierre Bourdieu, The Specificity of the Scientific Field, in FRENCH SOCIOLOGY: RUPTURE & RENEWAL SINCE 1968, ch. 15, at 257-92 (Charles Lemert ed., 1981); see also BOURDIEU: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES (Craig Calhoun, et al. eds., 1993) (collecting critical scholarship). 10 See, e.g., Joseph Tobin, et al., PRESCHOOL IN THREE CULTURES (1989) (describing use of videotapes for feedback). Ch. 5—Hate Crimes & Social Contention 217 location. Representatives of police hate crime units in Seattle and Vancouver were also interviewed, to place the practices of nongovernmental groups into context alongside official hate crime information practices. The results, however, are primarily meant to examine the practices of the nongovernmental groups. The interviews intentionally elicited more information than necessary to conduct the analysis presented here. The interviews were therefore not transcribed in their entirety. Instead, each interview was processed into a DVD format with a navigable menu consisting of the primary topics arranged in chronological order. These topics assigned menu titles, and the menu titles are used here as reference points for citations to the most significant information. The portions of the interviews analyzed here address only the practices of the groups most relevant to the construction of legal knowledge about homo- and trans-phobic hate crimes. The complete interviews are, however, set out in their entirety in the DVDs on file with the author. A Table of Contents listing the groups and DVD menu titles for each interview is set out in Appendix A.11 This table represents an informal coding of the interview data for use in the analysis. Because the volume of information gathered is too great to present here in its entirety, the presentation will be limited. The necessary filtering of information will be guided by two goals: first, to present the voices of groups interviewed as authentically and completely as possible; and, second, to present enough information, and the right information, from each group to permit a comparative analysis of their knowledge practices in relation to the official hate crime classification systems in use at each site. The qualitative comparison that follows will reveal important differences between the two sites. Nongovernmental social groups may adopt information practices of their own to influence official labeling decisions within an existing system, to re-shape official inquiry practices, or for their own autonomous development. In other words, the groups studied here 11 See Appendix A—Interview Contents. Ch. 5—Hate Crimes & Social Contention 218 seek to establish legal knowledge through both ad hoc and ongoing or systematic contention, and both within and outside the official channels of legal inquiry. These nongovernmental practices also fall on a continuum from those contained by the influences of the official channels of legal inquiry to more uncontained forms relatively free from official influence. The data reveal both similarities and differences in the practices of groups in Canada and the United States. In general terms, the results confirm the working hypotheses: Groups in Seattle use official hate crime statistics to frame their contention about hate crimes. In Vancouver, by contrast, no official hate crime statistics system exists to serve as either a resource for contention or as a limiting influence on the types of data gathered. This result coincides with a difference in the official hate crime classification systems: Seattle police publicly compile official hate crime statistics, and Vancouver Police do not. Where police do not systematically gather and publish hate crime statistics, social contention is at its least contained, in relation to the influences of an official classification system. Where local lawmakers are empowered to oversee or review classification decisions related to hate crimes, social contention more easily transgresses the official classification system, but remains contained by whatever local legal oversight mechanism is available. But, an analysis of the data discloses a more complex and dynamic relationship between the official knowledge production practices and the social contention of the nongovernmental groups studied here. The following analysis compares the practices of five pairs of Canadian and U.S. groups that contend in the hate crime field: (1) Community Anti-Violence Projects; (2) Ad hoc Anti- Violence Groups; (3) School Safety and Education Groups; (4) Family Support Groups; and, (5) Transgender Rights Groups. A sixth category, police hate crime units, is added at the end to provide context for the analysis of nongovernmental groups and their practices. At each site, similar groups are paired for an initial description utilizing a combination of quotations drawn Ch. 5—Hate Crimes & Social Contention 219 from interviews and literature either provided during interviews or otherwise available in print or electronic form. Several groups whose activities are relevant to this study were referenced in the course of interviews. Interviews were not conducted with all of these additional groups, but where relevant their activities are described as accurately as possible using information from the interviews and other secondary sources. In each of the first five categories, the practices of nongovernmental groups in each country are briefly compared. Following the initial analysis of nongovernmental groups, the official practices of police hate crime units at each site are discussed. Information provided during and after unrecorded interviews with police representatives at each site is summarized and briefly compared. Chapter 6 will provide a summary analysis that synthesizes the results of both this Chapter and the earlier Chapters. The remainder of this Chapter will analyze the knowledge practices of the six pairs of groups interviewed in Vancouver and Seattle. In addition to the detailed break-down of interview contents set out in Appendix A, the following Data Table lists the groups and their representatives who agreed to provide interviews for the study. Table 5.2—Data Table Research Site (n=2) Participant Group (n=12) Informant Vancouver Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Community Centre Anti-Violence Coordinator, Cameron Murdock West Enders Against Violence Everywhere (WEAVE) WEAVE Member, Jack Herman Gay and Lesbian Educators BC (GALE—BC) Media Spokesperson, Steve LeBel GALE—BC Member, James Chamberlain* Vancouver, B.C. Vancouver Parents and Friends of Lesbians and Gays (PFLAG) Vancouver PFLAG President, Susan Harman* Ch. 5—Hate Crimes & Social Contention 220 Research Site (n=2) Participant Group (n=12) Informant Trans Alliance Society Treasurer, Gayle Roberts EGALE Canada & Transaction Canada Member, Tami Starlight* Vancouver Police Department & BC Hate Crime Team Vancouver Police Department, Sergeant Mark Graf Seattle Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Community Center Executive Director, Shannon Thomas Hate Crime Awareness Project Coordinator, Kristina Armenakis* ACTION NorthWest** Safe Schools Coalition Co-chair, Beth Reis* Seattle Parents and Friends of Lesbians and Gays (PFLAG) Bellevue PFLAG Chair, Wendy Wartes Ingersoll Gender Center Board Member, Walker Burch-Lewis Seattle, WA Seattle Police Department & Bias Crime Coordinator Seattle Police Department Detective Christie-Lynne Bonner (former Bias Crime Coordinator) * Participated in Feedback Interviews. **No interview conducted. Because their activities include the most obvious and direct social contention in the hate crime field, anti-violence projects situated in lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgendered (LGBT) community centers are analyzed first. 5.2 Community Anti-Violence Projects In both Canada and the United States LGBT people establish community centres. A comparison of the overall services, facilities, and practices of LGBT community centres would Ch. 5—Hate Crimes & Social Contention 221 constitute a valuable addition to scholarship, as well as a useful resource for the centres themselves, but such a broad project is beyond the scope of this study. 12 Here I compare only the anti-violence programs, which are situated in LGBT community centres, and their role in social contention and the production of knowledge about homo- and trans-phobic hate crimes. In 2005, at the time this research was conducted, both Seattle and Vancouver LGBT Community Centers hosted anti-violence projects designed to serve and advocate for hate crime victims. The Seattle Hate Crime Awareness Project was just beginning its nine-month term, with a possibility of continuation; whereas, the Vancouver Anti-Violence Pilot Project was just ending its six-month term with no further services anticipated. Despite differences in the length and content of their operations, both of these programs participated in contention to establish legal knowledge about individual hate crimes and about homophobic and trans-phobic hate crimes in general. In Seattle I interviewed the Executive Director of the Center and the Coordinator of the Hate Crime Awareness Project. In Vancouver I interviewed the Coordinator of the Antiviolence Pilot Project. 5.2.1 Anti-Violence Pilot Project—Vancouver In 2005, the Vancouver LGBT Community Centre had recently received funding for an Anti-Violence Coordinator position, but the position was for a six-month “Pilot Project” only. The Anti-Violence Coordinator, Cameron Murdock, was from Seattle and until recently had served as a trained victim services volunteer with substantial knowledge concerning Seattle Police Department hate crime practices. The funding for the position was received after staff at 12 The documentary and videotaped data collected for this study constitute a body of knowledge, including knowledge about LGBT community centres, that cannot be fully tapped here. Ch. 5—Hate Crimes & Social Contention 222 The Centre submitted a grant application to the provincial Ministry for Public Safety & Solicitor General of the Solicitor General.13 According to Murdock, an early task for the Anti-Violence Coordinator was the production of a brochure titled “Lesbian, Gay, Transgender, Bisexual Anti-Violence Project at The Centre.” The Pilot Project is described in the text of the brochure: The Centre has received temporary support to be able to offer antiviolence staff to help LGTB people who have experienced violence/trauma. The LGTB Anti-Violence Pilot Project is made possible through a partnership with Victim Services and Community Programs Division of the Minister of Public Safety and Solicitor General. The Centre also partners with the BC Society for Male Survivors of Sexual Abuse to provide resources for our communities. We are committed to raising awareness of the realities of violence against and within LGTB communities. We want to demonstrate the needs of LGTB people and develop culturally relevant resources. Please utilize Pilot Project resources, share your experiences and identify your needs for ongoing services. Your involvement can make a difference! The LGTB Antiviolence Project is supported by other Centre programs, services & associates.14 Significantly, the Project’s goals combined both direct services to victims and information and knowledge production practices: The Anti-Violence Project documents crimes and participates in community activism. We work with law enforcement and social services agencies to make sure they provide appropriate services for LGBT people. We educate social service providers, law enforcement officials, and members of the LGTB communities.15 13 Murdock and the Centre staff understandably declined to release a copy of the grant application, because it was not available to the public, but they agreed to provide a copy of the concluding project report after it was published in the Spring of 2006. 14 Anti-Violence Pilot Project Brochure (2005) (available at www.lgtbcentrevancouver.com). The Brochure lists “Additional Community Resources,” including “The Centre: Reception/Prideline, Information, Referrals & Peer Support.” Murdock also provided copies of a brochure titled STOP Lesbian, Gay, Transgender, Bisexual BASHING: Self Defense Resources and Information (“Adapted from pamphlet produced by the 519 Community Centre, Toronto, ON”). This brochure apparently predated the Anti-Violence Pilot Project. It emphasizes safety and self-defense practices, and among other things encourages victims of “Bashing” to “develop a plan of how you will respond if you are verbally harassed or attacked,” to “Report the incident to the police. Get the badge number of each police officer with whom you speak,” and to “call the Prideline or LGTB Victim Services at The Centre.” Accompanying the two brochures, Centre distributes a business card titled “Bashing is a Crime,” which encourages victims to report to the LGTB Anti-Violence Pilot Project, the police, and other resource agencies. 15 Anti-Violence Pilot Project Brochure, id. The Pilot Project Brochure lists five categories of services (Bias (Hate) Crimes, Abusive Relationships, Sexual Assault & Rape, Pick-up Crimes, and Professional Training & Consultation) and concludes “Everyone deserves to feel safe!” Ch. 5—Hate Crimes & Social Contention 223 In our interview, Murdock described both the resources provided by the Vancouver LGBT Centre generally and the “advocacy” performed by the Anti-Violence Pilot Project.16 At the time of the interview, Murdock was still the Coordinator of the Project, but because it was funded only as a six-month pilot, it was scheduled to terminate shortly after the interview.17 The Pilot Project provided both advocacy and support to hate crime victims, beginning with the complex and stressful decision about whether to report their attack to the police.18 Knowledge about homo- and trans-phobic hate crimes was critical to virtually all of these activities, as Murdock explained in the context of the most notorious recent hate-related event: One of the key things to know is that these are crimes that are under-reported, for a number of different reasons. . . . There’s not really a lot of reporting that’s going on unfortunately, and when reports are made, that information isn’t necessarily being documented by different police organizations, and even if it is, there are times when that information is not presented by prosecutors in trial. So, for instance, in the case of Aaron Webster, a very famous case up here, that information that Aaron was gay, that the attack took place in a known gay cruising area, was not presented, and the crime of his murder was not tried as a hate crime. . . . . No information about Aaron’s sexuality and about the intent of the attackers was included [by the prosecutor].19 Because of resource limitations and the limited duration of the Project, Murdock explained, the Project relied on some outside sources of data regarding hate crimes. One key source of Vancouver hate crime data, according to Murdock, came from another group called WEAVE: As a pilot project we are pretty limited in what we can and are able to do. Fortunately, there’s another project called WEAVE, which is West Enders Against Violence Everywhere, and they are collecting data on hate crimes that happen here in the West End of Vancouver.20 16 See The Anti-Violence Pilot Project, DVD, Menu Title—The Anti-Violence Pilot Project. 17 See The Anti-Violence Pilot Project, DVD, Menu Title—Termination of Services. 18 See The Anti-Violence Pilot Project, DVD, Menu Title—Advocacy & Reporting. 19 See The Anti-Violence Pilot Project, DVD, Menu Title—Under-Reporting. 20 See WEAVE Vancouver, DVD. Ch. 5—Hate Crimes & Social Contention 224 Murdock gave an account of the hate crime data compiled by the Vancouver Police Department and the RCMP, but he emphasized his group’s reliance on the data produced by WEAVE—even in training provided to police workers themselves: Q: Do the Vancouver Police or the police in this region record or document some of those; do they have a policy or practice related to hate incidents or statistics or documentation about hate crimes? A: They do. And, you know one of the things that gets in the way is of course here in Canada we place a high value on being polite. And, in North American culture it is considered to be polite to assume that people are heterosexual. So, police, just like anybody else that you talk to, are frequently afraid that if they ask somebody about what their sexual orientation is that they might insult them or make them angry. And, so, oftentimes, officers are not asking the right questions; they are not asking someone what their sexual orientation is or if somebody made a reference to sexual orientation in a confrontation. So those types of things are under-reported. But, the mechanism is there in the reports for officers to document if there is a bias element. Q: Do you know whether that’s a policy that varies from suburban community, to rural, to urban? A: Yeah, you know, really what we would be talking about is not just the Vancouver Police but also the RCMP, the police agency that’s national. So, really, it is something that a mechanism is in place to capture, it’s just not captured as frequently as it’s happening. . . . . Q: Is there a process for compiling that information from the various jurisdictions and maybe reporting about it or doing an annual, yearly reports about that, do you know? A: You know, my understanding about that is that, like many police agencies, their resources are stretched a bit thin. Over 2001-2002, data from that time period was collected, and they [the Vancouver Police Department] published a report on bias crime in the area. . . . Q: But, that’s something that’s not done, or mandated to be done, annually it was just a pilot project? A: Yes, very similar. You know, because of the scope of what we’re doing and the resources that we have, we really aren’t capturing statistics like that. But, we’re relying on WEAVE as a close—our close relationship with them—to get that information and to look at things like trends. But, really what we are trying to do is prevention and then outreach. So, providing services and education. Ch. 5—Hate Crimes & Social Contention 225 Q: Do you know how long they’ve been in existence? A: I know that they have published two reports now. And, they really are a tremendous asset for us in terms of collecting demographic information and statistical information about incidents. So, yes, they are really helpful that way. . . . . Yeah, I absolutely have used their information in my education and outreach efforts. . . . For instance, I recently talked to police-based advocates that work within police departments that are working with folks that are experiencing incidents, violent crimes. In the training that I do for them, I used WEAVE’s statistics and talked about the trends that they were identifying—as well as the National Coalition of Anti-Violence Projects [NCAVP] in the States.21 After the conclusion of both the initial interview and the feedback meetings, I obtained a copy of the Anti-Violence Pilot Project Final Report, which was issued publicly.22 By this time, Murdock was no longer working at the Centre, and the Pilot Project was concluded.23 The purpose of the Final Report itself is described as follows: The final and key task was to create this report, in which we hope to provide policy makers, community leaders and community members with a more in-depth understanding of violent crimes against LGTB people, leading to the commitment of resources that support much-needed services to the LGTB communities. All too often, preventable violent crimes occur and are under reported by a group that has been silenced by heterosexism, homophobia and transphobia.24 21 See The Anti-Violence Pilot Project, DVD, Menu Title—Under-Reporting. 22 Cameron Murdock, Final Report, Lesbian, Gay, Transgender, Bisexual (LGTB) Anti-Violence Pilot Project (The Centre, Vancouver, B.C., 2006) (hereinafter Final Report). The Final Report credits the Pacific Foundation for the Advancement of Minority Equality, The Centre, A Community Centre Serving and Supporting Lesbian, Gay, Transgender and Bisexual People and Their Allies, and Donna Wilson, The Centre’s Executive Director. 23 According to the Centre’s Education Coordinator, funding had still not been located for an ongoing project as of May, 2006. Information about the Pilot Project no longer appears on the Vancouver Centre website, although another anti-violence initiative for communities outside Vancouver is described among the educational initiatives on the website. See The LGBT Anti-Violence Project: Creating Strong & Safe Queer Communities, available at http://www.lgtbcentrevancouver.com/violence.htm (accessed Jan. 18, 2008). The new year-long Project is described as follows: “This one-year project focuses on increasing safety, preventing violence and improving the strength and well being of LGBT people in four communities in BC: Prince George, Nanaimo, Nelson and Kelowna.” Id. The Project’s partners include the “Government of Canada’s National Crime Prevention Strategy” and the BC Ministry of Public Safety and Solicitor General—the same agency that funded the Pilot Project. 24 Final Report, supra note 22, at 3. Among many other points, the discussion documents the threat of “backlash” violence from opponents of marriage equality, the inadequacy of services for victims of same-sex intimate violence, and the need for stability in anti-violence programs. The discussion cites both news accounts of hate-related events and the results of systematic studies from the NCAVP in the United States. Id., at 13-15. The results of the WEAVE Survey are addressed in the next section. See Results: The West End Gay Bash Survey, 2003-2004 (WEAVE, Vancouver, B.C., 2005) (hereinafter WEAVE Survey) (on file with the author). Electronic copies of the Survey Results are available by contacting J. Herman at weave2y3@yahoo.ca. Ch. 5—Hate Crimes & Social Contention 226 In other words, the Final Report was meant to provide the knowledge resources necessary to mobilize resources to prevent homo- and trans-phobic hate crimes. The Final Report opened with a photograph of Aaron Webster, 25 and its text confirms the direct link between the killing and the Project. The first paragraph of the Final Report attributes the formation of the Project directly to the Aaron Webster killing: After the 2001 murder of Aaron Webster, a gay man who lived and died in Vancouver’s West End, the Centre, a Community Centre Serving and Supporting Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender People and Their Allies sought to respond to violence affecting the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender (LGBT) communities. A Safety Committee was established and involved representatives of The Centre, the Vancouver Police Department, LGTB business owners, and community members. The Committee identified and confirmed community issues and the need for direct service and education for LGTB people and education and consultation resources for service providers, law enforcement, and the judicial system.26 The formation of the Pilot Project was itself presented as a successful mobilization of resources in response to the Webster killing—although only temporarily. The Victim Services Division of the Ministry for Public Safety & Solicitor General funded the Pilot Project, and the Report praises the agency’s role: “While funds were not available for a full service program the establishment of a partnership with the Victim Service Division resulted in the very positive and practical development of a training manual and training program for Victim Service Workers and other practitioners in the field.”27 The Final Report provided three case studies as examples of “direct services” that the Pilot Project had provided to victims.28 Other activities documented in the Final Report included “Community Education,” and “Community Collaboration,” with a goal “to provide information about the Anti-Violence Pilot Project, solicit input about services 25 See id., at 2. 26 Final Report, supra note 22, at 2. 27 Id., at 2. 28 See id., at 4-6. Ch. 5—Hate Crimes & Social Contention 227 and to draw together a network of collaborating agencies and individuals to respond to local needs.”29 After stating its general findings, the Final Report lists five “Required Actions” to, “increase safety and an organized response to anti-LGTB violence.” 30 Yet, despite the Coordinator’s references to WEAVE in our interview, the Final Report does not mention the WEAVE Survey—which is discussed in the next section.31 Instead, the concluding section of the Final Report details the results of the Antiviolence Survey conducted by the Pilot Project itself during the summer of 2005.32 The demographic summary that introduces the Antiviolence Survey results provides significant detail, carefully describing “Respondents’ Gender” according to ten different categories, for example. Moreover, “Respondents’ Sexual/Affectional Orientation” is separately distinguished in nine categories, including “Other.”33 To further reveal the complexity of the respondents’ experiences, the results list “Crimes Experienced by LGTB Respondents” in nine categories: verbal abuse, harassment in the workplace, LGTB bashing (physical violence), sexual assault, abuse by same-sex partner, abuse by other-sex partner, child abuse, elder abuse, and other.34 Notably, the term “hate crime” is not used in the results. Instead, the pervasive violence in the lives of LGBT people is presented in a more narrative form: 95% of LGTB people reported experiencing verbal harassment. 40% had experienced some form of harassment in the workplace. Over 38% had been sexually assaulted. One third had been abused as children. 18% had experienced abuse in an intimate relationship, and 5% were victims of elder abuse. Every LGTB respondent reported experiencing violence. By comparison, the 4 29 Id., at 7. Among the groups included in this collaboration were local groups like WEAVE, groups from across Canada, like the 519 Antiviolence Programme in Toronto, and groups in the US, like the NCAVP. Id., at 6-7. 30 The only Required Action directly related to the police was, “Increase the Efficacy of the Criminal Justice System.” Id., at 11-12. 31 The Final Report does list WEAVE among the Pilot Project’s “network of collaborating agencies.” Final Report, id., at 7. 32 Id., at 16-20. 33 Id., at 16. 34 Id., at 19. Ch. 5—Hate Crimes & Social Contention 228 heterosexual participants reported no history of violence at all. Participants reported that they had experienced more than one of the seven types of violence in the survey: on average, participants had experienced violence in three different categories.35 The survey also provided an assessment of the knowledge and responsiveness of police, prosecutors, courts, and political leaders to violence affecting LGTB communities.36 Among survey respondents, 67% “believed police did not understand the LGTB communities”; whereas, 80% “believed that the police did not respond well enough to LGTB people.” The report explains this apparent discrepancy: Given that more people [thought] the police have an adequate understanding of LGTB people than an adequate response to them, it is possible that the difference between this and the statistic above represents a lack of trust in police, and perceptions of police as homophobic or heterosexist in their dealings with the community.37 As is apparent from the results summarized here, the Antiviolence Survey liberates respondents to express their own identities and experiences of violence with few constraints. The Survey also provided respondents an opportunity to critique the official response to violence against LGTB people. Both the Pilot Project’s Antiviolence Survey and the research cited to support the Final Report’s findings draw on other nongovernmental sources of knowledge about hate crimes. In fact, the Final Report does not cite any official hate crime statistics. On the contrary, it presents the following contentions about the state of official hate crime inquiry in Vancouver: “Vancouver is one of the few cities in Canada that does not collect statistics on hate crimes committed against specific minorities, such as queers. Vancouver police say that job falls to the provincial Hate Crime Team whose funding was cut by Victoria several years ago.” 35 Id., at 19. The Final Report notes that “abuse in same gender and heterosexual relationships occur at the same rate,” yet, “No LGTB specific battered partner shelters or advocacy exist in the province of B.C.” Id., at 14. 36 Id., at 17-19. 37 Id., at 18. A similar gap between “understanding” LGTB people and responding to violence in LGTB communities appears in perceptions of Lawmakers, Judges, and prosecutors. 83% thought political leaders responded inadequately, while 66% believed they needed to understand more. Courts are “ineffective in protecting the legal rights of LGTB crime victims,” according to 87% of respondents; whereas, 61% “thought the Crown needed a better understanding of LGTB people in order to respond more effectively to crimes referred by police.” Id., at 18-19. Ch. 5—Hate Crimes & Social Contention 229 Aaron Webster, an out gay man, was murdered by a group of men in a gay “stroll” area of Stanley Park. Despite all of the markings of a bias crime, his sexuality was never mentioned in the trial of his murderers, and none of the compelling evidence of bias were introduced by the Crown. No bias crime enhancement was sought by the Crown, despite protest from the LGTB communities.38 Knowledge about trans-phobic violence is presented with particularity in a statement by transgender activist Gwendolyn Ann Smith, quoted in the Final Report. The statement references one nongovernmental inquiry used to document trans-phobic violence: In fact, one thing that has come to light in [creating the website www.rememberingourdead.org] is how much more is yet to be done. Over the last decade, one person per month has died due to transgender-based hate or prejudice, regardless of any other factors in their lives. This trend shows no sign of abating. Will we be willing to bear yet another century of violence and hatred aimed at those who do not easily wear [the label] man or woman?39 The Coordinator reported that he received training from the National Coalition of Antiviolence Programs (NCAVP) in the United States,40 and at several points the Final Report references the NCAVP as a model. Specifically, the Final Report incorporates one of the NCAVP’s recommendations to “Increase the Efficacy of the Criminal Justice System”: Consistent with the recommendation of the National Coalition of Antiviolence Programs, a re-investment in anti-bias investigation and data collection is needed. Funding for the hate crimes unit needs to be increased, and uniform data collection standards need to be instituted throughout the province and country. The investigation and prosecution of acts of harassment, intimidation and anti-LGTB violence can only be improved by providing the resources needed 38 Final Report, supra note 22, at 8 (quoting and citing article by Jeremy Hainsworth, XTRA WEST, at www.365gay.com/newscon04/05/052404salArm.htm) (emphasis in original). To illustrate the problem of under- reporting common among victims of homo- and trans-phobic violence, the report refers to the Antiviolence Survey, and one additional, unnamed source: In a survey of LGTB people and allies living in the Vancouver area conducted by the AVPP, LGTB people responded that they reported violence and harassment to a partner or friend twice as often as they reported such crimes to the police or a medical provider. In 1997, a national survey of 1200 gay and lesbian people found that 22% of the respondents had experienced a physical assault, but only 26% of those assaulted reported them to the police. Final Report, id., at 9 (no citation provided). All of the sources listed at the conclusion of the Final Report are online documents linked to the report by hypertext worldwide web addresses. See Final Report, id., at 20. In addition, the Final Report references the use of the online reporting features available through SAFEgay.ca. Id., at 7. A thorough study of internet communication technologies (ICTs) exceeds the scope of this study. Many of the groups studied here used ICTs, but they were not pervasive. WEAVE, for example, maintained no website, although I was able to obtain its survey results in electronic format. 39 Final Report, id., at 13 (alternations in original, emphasis omitted). 40 Id., at 3. Ch. 5—Hate Crimes & Social Contention 230 by the criminal justice system. Training and resources to increase cultural awareness should be expanded in law enforcement agencies, and should be implemented at all levels of the Crown and judiciary throughout B.C. It must be made clear that violence against LGTB people will not be tolerated in British Columbia.41 The appeal to adopt a systematic and ongoing hate crime statistics program is reiterated in the recommendation to “Fund Research”: Our ability to respond effectively to violence impacting LGTB people is limited by our lack of reliable, British Columbian and Canadian research. While Toronto’s RCMP and 519 Community Centre have worked for years to collect data in concert with the NCAP in the United States, Vancouver and British Columbia trails behind in responding to violence against its LGTB citizens. We need to understand trends in violence, how violence differs in Vancouver and smaller B.C. municipalities, and what responses are most effective against it.42 Ad Hoc Anti-Violence Groups, including WEAVE, are compared in greater detail in section 5.3 below. The Seattle LGBT Center’s Hate Crime Awareness Project is examined next. 5.2.2 Hate Crime Awareness Project—Seattle I obtained data about the Seattle Hate Crime Awareness Project from two separate interviews, first with the Executive Director of the Seattle LGBT Community Center, and later, after she was hired, with the new Hate Crime Awareness Project Intern.43 Shannon Thomas, the Seattle Center’s Executive Director, provided both an interview and a tour of services provided by the Center.44 Thomas introduced the Center’s anti-violence programming by providing a copy of a folding Hate Crimes “Wallet Card.” The Card’s title page lists the agencies cooperating in its production: 41 Final Report, supra note 22, at 11 (emphasis added). 42 Id., at 12. 43 In addition to a separate interview, the Intern was able to participate in the Seattle feedback meeting. 44 Thomas’s tour of the Center included its privately-funded, public-access internet terminal, and the offices of several groups housed at the Center. See Seattle LGBT Center, DVD. Groups included, for example, an LGBT youth camp, an Hispanic LGBT group, Gay Community Social Services, Verbena, a Lesbian health and services project, the Northwest Lesbian & Gay History Museum Project, and Equality Washington, a marriage equality group. As with the Vancouver Centre, a full account of the services, facilities, and practices of the Seattle Center is impossible here. Ch. 5—Hate Crimes & Social Contention 231 Hate Crimes: What to do if it happens to you, . . . produced by the Anti-Gay Bias Education Project with cooperation from the: City of Seattle Commission for Sexual Minorities, City of Seattle Police Department, City of Seattle Department of Neighborhoods.45 The card quotes from the state Malicious Harassment statute and summarizes the Seattle Police Department policy, “to investigate by all means possible all reports of anti-gay malicious harassment.” To encourage reporting, the card instructs victims how to address police investigators: Stress [to investigating officers] that the crime was motivated by hate based on perceived sexual orientation. You do not need to reveal your sexual orientation to report the crime and you should not be asked to. It is the perpetrator’s perception that matters. Whether or not the perception is correct is irrelevant under the law.46 Conspicuously absent from the Wallet Card is any mention of the Seattle Municipal Ordinances, which extend the coverage of the state malicious harassment statute to offences motivated by gender identity and expression.47 Like the Vancouver Centre, the Seattle Center provides resources and referrals for a broad range of services, including services related to hate crimes: We [] provide a lot of resource and referral information through our Resources and Referral Network, which is open seven days a week both online and in the building itself for people to come in. And, basically, they can get any information they need on LGBT life in Seattle.48 Along with its general referrals, the Seattle Center makes referrals for callers who have been the victims of hate crimes: For instance, if they’re the victim of a hate crime, definitely getting them in touch with the local police department, do we need with immediate health care information? Do we need counseling and support services? So, really just feeling 45 See Wallet Card (on file with the author). 46 Id. 47 On the other hand, the card references remedies other than prosecution: “If you know the perpetrators, contact your district court for information about obtaining a no-contact/anti-harassment order.” Although obtaining an anti- harassment order against an unknown assailant may be difficult, no authority is identified that requires a known perpetrator. 48 See Seattle LGBT Center, DVD, Menu Title—Resources & Referrals. Other knowledge-related practices hosted by the Center include a Website, an online and print Newsletter, a Library, Education resources, Fiscal Sponsorship for Center partners, a Museum Project, services for partner groups housed within the Center, a Cyber-Center offering on-site internet access, and an art gallery. Ch. 5—Hate Crimes & Social Contention 232 the calls out, and you know we’ve got a database full of resources, so we’re able to link people up with whatever they might need.49 During the course of our interview, Thomas also announced the creation of the new Hate Crime Awareness Project to be hosted at the Center: Another thing that we’re going to be providing …. is more information and data on the prevalence of hate crime and then also how aware our community is of hate crimes, and what are the gaps found in programs and services and then hopefully addressing those needs in the future. Q: Can you maybe describe how that project came to be and what it’s going to …? It’s actually really exciting and it’s come together through the course of a lot of serendipitous meetings of leaders…. But, last year, after the hate crimes occurred, I actually coordinated with Beth Reis who’s with the Safe Schools Coalition and King County. We talked about a possible joint venture where we could have an intern or employee . . . to really do a few things. Number one, look at the data and track what is really happening in the city of Seattle around hate crimes, as well as school-based violence with LGBT youth. Also then making more community awareness . . . and where can we fill the gaps? What kind of advocacy and direct service needs are there for the community? So, we applied for a JustServe Intern, [and] she begins on the fifteenth [of September] . . . and we’ll have her through July 30th [of 2006].50 Thomas’s use of the term “the hate crimes” referred to the attack on Micah Painter and another hate-related attack in Seattle’s Ballard neighborhood. Thomas explained that the Center and the Seattle-Based Safe Schools Coalition would co-supervise the intern, and that the duties would overlap between the activities of both groups: We’re basically co-supervising the intern. There’s really two pieces to the Project. We’re looking not only at school-based violence, which is where the Safe Schools Coalition piece comes in, but we’re looking at community-based violence—and the awareness of the LGBT and mainstream community around hate-based crimes, whether they be LGBT-focused or other minority -focused. We want to look at a lot of data, of course focusing on an LGBT population. 49 See Seattle LGBT Center, DVD, Menu Title—Hate Crime Referrals. 50 See Seattle LGBT Center, DVD, Menu Title—Internship. The Executive Director described the JustServe program as follows: “JustServe is a program through the federal government where the . . . government has interns and the place them at non-profit organizations where the intern makes a very small stipend . . . a lot of real world experience and do a lot of great work for the non-profits[.]” The internship funding was also linked to funding from the federal Americorps program. Ch. 5—Hate Crimes & Social Contention 233 So, it’s sort of a dual project.51 The Seattle Center had engaged in contention about hate crimes before the Hate Crime Awareness Project was established. But, according to Thomas, the new position was meant to extend Seattle’s status as a “model city” for domestic violence intervention services to the field of hate crimes. Kristina Armenakis had just begun her term as Intern and Coordinator of the Hate Crime Awareness Project when we met for an interview at the Seattle LGBT Community Center in December of 2005.52 Armenakis described the creation of the Project as follows: . . . a brand new project that is focused on raising community awareness about local hate crimes and hate violence—hate incidents or hate crimes and providing any support to targets of hate crimes. . . . This position was created to coordinate that project, and we began in September [2005], and at that time we didn’t have any idea of what we were going to find. No idea of what kind of community support was available . . . for targets, and which organizations are equipped to work specifically with anti-LGBT hate crimes, what kind of statistics there were available locally on hate crimes, and how motivated the community was around this topic—if people perceive violence as a problem in Seattle…. So, since then, I’ve met with a lot of community organizations and looked at some of the national statistics and local statistics—like the FBI report, and the National Coalition of Anti-Violence Programs, they don’t have a specific Seattle set of statistics, but I’ve looked at sort of the general trends on anti-LGBT violence, and I’ve looked at Seattle Police Department statistics. . . . I’ve sort of gotten the sense that there’s not a lot of motivation in the community around this topic, but there’s also not a lot of talk about it. So, one of the things I am going to be doing is creating a website so that people understand what the laws are, what the reporting process is—and not just to call 911, but what the expectations are from the police when you call, like what kinds of things you will actually have to do and what you can expect from the officers, what kind of training officers have had, and then what the prosecution process would be through the King County Prosecutor’s Office, . . . 51 See Seattle LGBT Center, DVD, Menu Title—Hate Crime Data. 52 See Hate Crime Awareness Project, DVD. The term of the coordinator’s internship was set at nine months, subject to annual renewal by the local fund administrator—the Freemont Public Association, a non-profit, anti- oppression and anti-poverty organization. Ch. 5—Hate Crimes & Social Contention 234 And then also, like, some ways you can protect yourself, some community organizations you can go to if you’ve been targeted. And, it would be for both like support and if you wanted to do some sort of community response or some advocacy-based counseling, as opposed to like mental health counseling. So, the website will just be . . . It’ll be small because I don’t want people to be overwhelmed with information . . . it’ll just be locally-based information. So, that’s probably the biggest thing that’s going to happen right now, because I am still uncovering like how much interest will I get from people once I delve into this.53 The idea for the Seattle Hate Crime Awareness Project, Armenakis explained, emerged from an earlier Bias Crime Reporting Project which had developed a survey, but which had experienced “not a lot of success” finding a student to do the work.54 The earlier project was being implemented in part by the Seattle Police LGBT Advisory Council (a liaison committee between the LGBT community and the Department).55 Although the project had received grant funding for the distribution of the survey and media publicity from the Pride Foundation—a regional, non-profit, LGBT funding agency—, the “bureaucracy” of the groups involved slowed the project and eventually the funding had to be returned unused. Armenakis agreed that a problem with under-reporting of anti-LGBT hate crimes “definitely” exists in Seattle. She emphasized however that her role was not to pressure targets of hate crimes to report to the police but rather to educate the public about their reporting options: I’ll make sure people really understand what their options are. Through this website or any community education I do—that people know that they can report to the police and that that is one option, and that there is definitely a place for the legal system. And, some people, no matter what, are not going to report to the police and wouldn’t feel comfortable for a multitude of reasons. So, I kind of feel like it’s 53 See Hate Crime Awareness Project, DVD, Menu Titles—Introduction & HCAP Website (emphasis added). 54 To avoid this prior lack of success, and to maximize the small resources available to her, Armenakis had received help from Vista volunteers in other programs in Seattle, including the Washington Reading Corps. 55 The Seattle Police Department/LGBTQ Advisory Council was listed with its Seattle Government email address among the community organizations in the Seattle Gay News Community Calendar for June, 2005. See SEATTLE GAY NEWS, Arts & Entertainment Section, June 3, 2005, at 37. Ch. 5—Hate Crimes & Social Contention 235 my job as a person who’s going to work with a diverse community just to make sure that people know that there are other options out there outside of the police department that are available, but that the police is one totally viable option and people know exactly what to expect.56 While the Coordinator did not contemplate pressuring victims to report, her role did include “resource referral” for a range of services from safety planning and personal counseling to community advocacy organizations that could mobilize a community response “if somebody’s been targeted.” Armenakis explained her two-part job description: One part of it is responding to hate crimes—responding to the incidents that have already happened. So, that’s one half of my position, which is why it gets half of—twenty hours a week—of staff resources. . . . The Hate Crime Awareness Project is basically half-time. The other half of my position is with the Safe Schools Coalition, and so I am working on anti-LGBT bullying. And, that’s such an important link because it is that environment of bullying in schools where it is okay to use homophobic language that leads to hate crimes ultimately when we are adults. We set the climate for youth by saying that it’s okay to use this kind of language and to target people on the basis of actual or perceived sexual orientation. And so, I am doing some preventative education and responding, helping people respond to the actual hate crime incidents.57 Armenakis described tentative plans to conduct a survey which would serve as a central knowledge-producing function of the Project: We are going to do a community survey, and it’s not going to be a really scientific research model, we’re not going through the University of Washington or anything. But just we’ve come up with this survey, which I am going to distribute as widely as possible and just get people to tell me about their experiences with hate incidents in Seattle if they have been victimized in any way and to tell me about their experiences with police and to tell me about why they did or did not report and what happened as a result. So that may provide some information about why people are not reporting, like what kinds of stereotypes people have about police and what their fears are so I can make sure those are addressed so that people who would like to report but are just afraid to. 56 See Hate Crime Awareness Project, DVD, Menu Title—Hate Crime Reporting Options. 57 See Hate Crime Awareness Project, DVD, Menu Title—Job Description. Ch. 5—Hate Crimes & Social Contention 236 There could also be some information possibly of the nature of the incidents in Seattle.58 In addition to learning the nature and extent of under-reporting, moreover, the Coordinator indicated that the Community Survey would ask those who had reported hate crimes to the police to describe their experiences, including whether their report was investigated or prosecuted. Armenakis described the genesis of the Community Survey in the earlier Bias Crimes Reporting Project: The goal of that project was to increase community awareness, but mostly to increase reporting to the police department and find out why people were not reporting. So, I changed the focus a little bit, and made it more of a community model. But, they are the one’s who originally designed this Project, and I am just tailoring it and expanding it to fit more of our interests. They attempted to go through one of the departments of the University of Washington, and they didn’t have a lot of success, with trying to find a student to work on this. Again, if I had more time, I might spend more time just looking for someone to assist me in this process. I’m at a cross-roads of having to trade-off what’s going to be most important in this project. So, I’m trying to determine if going through that again and trying to recruit a student is a worthwhile use of time.59 Her comments in both our interview, and at the Seattle Feedback meeting, revealed that Armenakis was keenly aware of the details of both the Micah Painter attack and the attack in Ballard. Since she had served in her position for only a few months, she was unaware of any more recent homo- or trans-phobic hate crimes in Seattle. However, she did articulate a clear plan for a coordinated response in the event of such an incident: If that happened, I would probably try to make contact with the Bias Crimes Coordinator [at the Seattle Police Department]. They know that this position has been created and that through the LGBT Advisory Council we would try to 58 See Hate Crime Awareness Project, DVD, Menu Title—Community Survey. 59 See Hate Crime Awareness Project, DVD, Menu Title—Bias Crime Reporting Project. Armenakis explained that the earlier Bias Crime Reporting Project was never implemented. Nevertheless, she had access to both the materials compiled for the earlier version of a survey and a small amount of funding pledged by a local group. Ch. 5—Hate Crimes & Social Contention 237 provide support for that person who was the target. The Bias Crimes Coordinator could let that target know that services are available.60 Armenakis later revealed disappointment with the lack of a coordinated response to the Ballard incident. Like the Vancouver Anti-Violence Pilot Project, Seattle’s Hate Crime Awareness Project was established with government grant funding. But, in other respects, the services, funding, and staffing for the Seattle Project differed from Vancouver’s. The Seattle Center joined with the Safe Schools Coalition to submit a grant application to the JustServe/AmeriCorps program—a program funded by the United States Department of Justice and administered by a local non- profit group.61 Two aspects of the Grant Application are relevant here. First, the application cited official hate crime statistics to show that hate crimes motivated by sexual orientation are more violent than other crimes and are frequently committed by young offenders. The logic of the grant application was thus founded on both the reduction of violence in the community and preventative education in schools—coinciding with the goals of the two applicant groups. The choice of the official statistics over nongovernmental reports, from the NCAVP for example, is easily understood considering that the ultimate funding agency—the United States Department of Justice—is also the source of the official statistics. The need for a Hate Crime Awareness Project likely would seem more apparent when supported by the grantor’s own, “official” statistics rather than unofficial sources. Second, consistent with its name as a hate crime “awareness” project, the grant application set out particular goals for the production and 60 See Hate Crime Awareness Project, DVD, Menu Title—Incident Response. 61 Like the Vancouver Centre, the Seattle LGBT Center and Safe Schools did not wish to release their grant application and proposed job description to the general public—for understandable privacy reasons. Nevertheless, I was provided a copy of the document on the condition that I was not to release it publicly. See Grant Application, Seattle LGBT Community Center Proposal – JustServe AmeriCorps Hate Crime Awareness Project, at 1 ¶2 “Need” (undated, Summer 2005) (on file with the author) (citing “Hate Crime Reported in NIBRS, 1997-99” (linking to online report at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/hcrn99.pdf)). It may be significant to note that the statistical database cited by the groups is one of two official hate crime database produced by police in the United States— NIBRS and UCR. The groups did not cite UCR statistics. This choice is consistent with the Intern’s subsequent explanation of under-reporting in official statistics. Instead, the grant application cited results from the NIBRS, a research method based on reported “incidents” rather than crimes and therefore theoretically less susceptible to the dynamics of under-reporting. Ch. 5—Hate Crimes & Social Contention 238 distribution of knowledge in the form of data about anti-LGBT hate crimes in both schools and the “community.” Armenakis explained that even though official national and local statistics are available for anti-LGBT hate crimes, reporting is “really low.” She cited “personal stories” victims had reported to her, one involving an attack with a beer bottle. To assess awareness a survey was created and prepared to be circulated throughout the local LGBT community.62 Summarizing her work at the Safe Schools Coalition, Armenakis described the development and presentation of a brief anti-violence training for schools. Armenakis reconciled her dual roles by explaining that there is a “link” between anti-LGBT school bullying and hate crimes outside schools. The work of the Safe Schools Coalition is addressed more fully in a later section. By late Spring, 2006, the Hate Crime Awareness Project had not released the results of its own community survey. But, in April of 2006, the Project and the Center jointly issued a report analyzing “Bias Crimes and Incidents” in Seattle by type of bias and neighborhood for the preceding five years.63 The report was written by Ken Molsberry, a computer systems and data analyst for the Seattle City Attorney’s Office, who volunteered his time outside work hours, and edited by Armenakis from the Hate Crime Awareness Project. 64 The Report’s introductory section cites the Ballard incident in November, 2004 as the event that triggered the research study: 62 Noting that the survey sounded similar, I provided copies of the Vancouver WEAVE survey results in electronic format for her reference—she had not been aware of the WEAVE survey. Armenakis explained that other sources are available to supplement the incomplete official hate crime statistics, which frequently omit the nature of a crime, especially its community-wide effects. As an instance of such a source she cited the NCAVP, which issues an annual report covering LGBT Domestic Violence and anti LGBT hate crimes in several U.S. cities. To Armenakis, the NCAVP reports served as a source of ideas, and they emphasized that police intervention in hate crimes is only one option among several remedies for victims. 63 Ken Molsberry, Bias Crimes & Incidents in Seattle, 2000 to 2005: An analysis by type of bias & neighborhood (Kristina Armenakis ed., 2006) (hereinafter Molsberry Report). 64 See Molsberry Report, id., at 29 (Acknowledgements), 31 (About the Author). Ch. 5—Hate Crimes & Social Contention 239 This study arose out of a bias crime committed on November 24, 2004. A description of the assault is informative in illustrating the cruel and horrific nature of a “typical” bias crime. The victim, a white male, was in the bar of a Ballard restaurant where he was accosted by three male patrons who repeatedly asked if her were gay. . . . Upon leaving the restaurant, the victim was approached and struck forcefully in the head by one of the men, . . . The blow knocked the victim to the pavement where he struck his head and was knocked unconscious. Witnesses from the restaurant observed the assailant repeatedly kick the victim while he was unconscious. As the assailant attacked his victim, he shouted, “This is still Ballard” – to communicate that gay people were not welcome in that neighborhood. . . . . . . . . . . . The fact that the victim in this crime is in fact not gay demonstrates that anyone can be a victim of a bias attack, since such attacks are often based merely on the perceptions of the assailants rather than reality. Although bias attacks happen repeatedly in Seattle, there is a reason that this particular crime gave rise to this study. That reason is the lack of community response to the crime—not only during the assault, but afterward as well.65 According to the Report, Seattle Police recorded 144 bias crimes and 259 separate bias incidents during the study’s five-year period.66 Like many of these events, however, the Seattle Police Department “mischaracterized the [Ballard] attack, leading to a lapse in its investigation.”67 The Molsberry Report directly examines the data collected by the Seattle Police Department as part of its official hate crime statistics procedures.68 Even though the Report uses police investigators as its ultimate data source, it does not merely re-analyze the numerical data submitted to the FBI’s UCR program. Instead, it analyzes the text of police “bias crimes” reports 65 Molsberry Report, id., at 4 (footnotes omitted). The introduction cites three sources: the police incident report, correspondence with the victim, and a Seattle Gay News Article of December 17, 2004. Another more recent homophobic incident triggered an article and a weeklong web-log on the website of one of Seattle’s weekly newspapers. See David Schmader, weblog, Gay-Friendly Bashing Last Night on Capitol Hill, Mon. Jan. 7, 2008, available at http://slog.thestranger.com/2008/01/gayfriendly_bashing_last_night_on_capito (accessed Feb. 3, 2008) (collecting forty-nine comments). 66 Molsberry Report, supra note 63, at 4 n.6. 67 Molsberry Report, id., at 5 n.8. 68 Like the Anti-Violence Pilot Project Final Report from Vancouver, the Seattle Bias Crimes and Incidents Report presents a number of references with worldwide web addresses. See Molsberry Report, id., at 30 (Bibliography and resources). Ch. 5—Hate Crimes & Social Contention 240 provided pursuant to a public disclosure request—with confidential identifying information redacted.69 The Report provides both technical and practical justifications for re-examining the official data. First, Molsberry and Armenakis critique the limited knowledge that is produced with the annual release of bare hate crime statistics by the Seattle Police Department. They quote from a 2002 Human Rights Watch report criticizing Seattle’s limited release of hate crime data: Law enforcement agencies should regularly publish and make public comprehensive statistics on bias-motivated crimes in their jurisdictions regardless of whether the crimes are prosecuted under special hate crime legislation. [In contrast to Los Angeles, Chicago, Phoenix, and Dearborn, Michigan, neither] New York nor Seattle publish yearly data on hate crimes. . . . The only published data on hate crimes in New York and Seattle is the data published yearly by the FBI in its annual hate crimes report. This data . . . is cursory in nature, providing only the number of hate crimes committed each year and the types of victims. . .70 Second, the Report seeks to bridge a gap between national statistics and the local reality of hate crimes. Because, “Knowing about a problem is the first step in solving it,” and because, “awareness of the problem is one of the most powerful tools in preventing bias attacks,” the Report seeks to make law enforcement information more “readily available to the community.”71 The “community” targeted for information is defined as the local neighborhood: The purpose of this study [] is to dispel the misconception that there is any neighborhood in Seattle in which bias attacks are not a problem. By empowering the citizenry and neighborhood organizations with information about the prevalence of bias attacks in their neighborhoods, they will hopefully take action to reduce attacks motivated by bias, hate, and prejudice.72 But, despite the reasoning provided, the Seattle Report was not motivated by technical errors in the official knowledge about hate crimes. As with the Vancouver Pilot Project, the 69 See Molsberry Report, id., at 9. 70 See Molsberry Report, id., at 3 (quoting “We Are Not The Enemy”—Hate Crimes Against Arabs, Muslims, and Those Perceived to be Arab or Muslim after September 11, at 5, 39 (Human Rights Watch, New York, 2002)). 71 See Molsberry Report, id., at 29 (quoting Hate & Bias Crimes—A Citizen’s Guide From the Office of Attorney General Mike Hatch (Minn. Atty. Gen. Ofc.)) 72 See Molsberry Report, id., at 5. Ch. 5—Hate Crimes & Social Contention 241 Seattle Bias Crimes and Incidents Report was issued in response to a particular hate-related event: the November 24, 2004 Ballard neighborhood assault. 73 Citing the police Incident Report, correspondence with victim, and a Seattle Gay News article, the Report details a “shocking” attack involving three men who asked the victim if he was gay and later beat him, knocked him unconscious, and kicked him while he lay on the sidewalk outside a northwest Seattle restaurant.74 As indicated already, Molsberry and Armenakis distinguish this particular attack because of “the lack of community response to the crime.”75 The victim was “disgusted” because witnesses failed to “take action,” while he was attacked.76 The Ballard attack was reported to police, who “later discovered that it had been mischaracterized . . . leading to a lapse in the investigation.”77 When he learned about this attack in his own neighborhood, the Report’s primary author, Ken Molsberry, launched his own inquiry. He addressed emails, letters, and telephone calls to numerous local officials including the “district council of the neighborhood where this attack took place.” Two local elected officials “took action” by contacting the police Department, and one neighborhood resident wrote a letter to the editor of the neighborhood newspaper. But, Molsberry received little response from his neighborhood leaders, and because of this frustration he initiated the study that led to the Report. Molsberry learned that the police Incident Report had properly flagged the “BIAS CRIME” box but that a subsequent labeling error had occurred during the investigation. 78 73 Id., at 4 (footnote omitted). 74 See id., at 4 n.4 (citing sources). 75 Id., at 4. 76 See id., at 5 (quoting victim statements from news account). 77 See id., at 5 n.8. 78 See id., at 13 n.18. Molsberry’s February, 2005 and January, 2006 public disclosure requests were more successful than mine. He obtained incident reports covering a five-year period, including the report for the Ballard assault, even though it was technically still being investigated. My request for records about the Micah Painter attack was denied on the grounds of an ongoing investigation, even though convictions had already been obtained. Because my focus here is primarily on the practices of nongovernmental groups rather than governmental agencies, I have chosen not to dispute the denial of my disclosure requests by either the Vancouver or the Seattle Police. Ch. 5—Hate Crimes & Social Contention 242 Beginning from this error, the Report analyzes several broader categories of under-reporting by investigating officers, which combine to compound the problem of victim under-reporting: Such instances raise two potential causes for concern. First, some crimes are apparently not treated as such [as crimes], leading to underinvestigated cases. Second, SPD’s data might unintentionally understate the rate of crimes versus incidents.79 In other words, a labeling error at the beginning of a hate crime investigation infects both the database of knowledge about hate crimes and the investigation of an individual case. The Report sets out the method it uses to clarify ambiguous report data. A sample page from the Department’s database is set out in the Report. The police database does not reproduce narrative accounts by investigating officers; instead, each incident is tabulated in pre-assigned boxes and codes. Suspects and victims are described by their race, gender, orientation, age, victim injuries, and whether the suspect “Knows Victim.” The stages of the investigation are tracked with prompts for crime, bias focus, assigned, disposition, charge referred, and charge final. Adjacent to these prompts are three boxes to flag the report for bias crime, arrest, and convicted. A final box allows limited space for notes.80 The Report states that it does not re-evaluate the police determinations contained in the data, except to assign a “Bias focus,” when the “Notes” field in the police database “indicated a clear bias.”81 But, “between October 2004 and December 2005, more than 35% of the records lacked a Bias focus (or had an apparently inaccurate one) when the Notes would otherwise indicate a clear bias.”82 Among the examples of bias clearly indicated in the Notes field but omitted from the Bias focus field, the Report provides the following quote from an individual 79 Molsberry Report, supra note 63, at 13. 80 Id., at 9, Figure 1. 81 Id., at 11-12. 82 Id., at 12. Ch. 5—Hate Crimes & Social Contention 243 report: “[V]ictim received a letter from an unknown person. The letter implied that dire consequences could occur if Jewish people did not accept Jesus as the ‘Messiah’.”83 A higher rate of “missing Bias focus,” appeared in records entered after October, 2004, and the Report expresses “concern” about this new aspect of under-reporting: . . . . [T]he missing Bias focus data could be a cause for concern. SPD is required by state law to report the data to other law enforcement agencies for use in their studies and reports on the prevalence of bias attacks. If as many as one third of these records are being reported with no indication of their bias, it would cause substantial underreporting, not only to other law enforcement agencies but also for any other purpose to which the data might be put, including internal to SPD and the City of Seattle. Because many types of bias attacks are substantially underreported by victims to law enforcement agencies, further underreporting by law enforcement agencies would compound the problem.84 In addition to victim under-reporting, and an increased under-reporting of bias by investigators, the Report documents under-reporting in three subsequent stages of police labeling reflected in the SPD database: Bias Crime, Charge Referred, and Charge Final. The under- reporting of bias focus infects both events that rise to the level of a crime and those that are tracked as incidents only. The Report, however, documents under-reporting of crimes at each of these three subsequent stages: In addition to missing Bias focus data, there is a concern that the SPD data underreports the frequency of attacks that rise to the level of bias crime and malicious harassment. In the SPD database, these designations are recorded in the fields labeled Bias Crime, Charge Referred, and Charge Final.85 Apart from the Report’s data analysis, moreover, Molsberry’s experiences exemplify contention in the field of civil rights in Seattle. In the Ballard case, the victim engaged the official police inquiry processes, and, in part because of Molsberry’s inquiries, the Department initiated an internal inquiry and re-opened the investigation—though unsuccessfully.86 83 Id., at 12 n.11; see also, e.g., id., at 23 (tabulating anti-Muslim death and arson threats of Sept. 11 & 12, 2001). 84 Id., at 12. 85 Id., at 12. 86 Id., at 12-13 (recounting victim’s correspondence with Department). Ch. 5—Hate Crimes & Social Contention 244 Contention about this event was not confined to the boundaries of criminal law, however. Because of his sense of responsibility for his own neighborhood, and after unsuccessful inquiries among neighborhood representatives, Molsberry re-configured the police database to specify the number and type of bias attack for each of Seattle’s 18 neighborhoods.87 Molsberry furthermore documents the role of local government civil rights agencies. Implicitly, the Report contends that the city’s Department of Neighborhoods, local Neighborhood Councils, and neighbors themselves should assume some responsibility for hate crimes in Seattle. Explicitly, when the Report was released to the public, Molsberry said it confirmed the high rates of crimes motivated by sexual orientation found in a 1995 report by the Seattle Commission for Sexual Minorities.88 The Report’s text cites the work of the Seattle Office of Civil Rights. The Office of Civil Rights 87 See id., at 1, Table 1; see also id., at 3-5 (recounting motivation for study). The Report received substantial news coverage when it was presented to the public in April, 2006. See Manny Frishberg, Bias crimes in Seattle detailed in new report: Nearly half of all bias crimes are committed against Gays, SEATTLE GAY NEWS, Fri., May 5, 2006, available online at http://www.sgn.org/sgnnews34_18/page1.cfm (accessed Jan. 16, 2008) (linking Report to home.earthlink.net\~kennem\biascrime (inactive link)). The Report is available online at a different address: http://home.comcast.net/~kmolsberry/biascrime/ (accessed Jan. 16, 2008); see also Athima Chansanchai, Bias crimes found in all areas of city: Top 2 motivators cited are race, sexual orientation, SEATTLE POST- INTELLIGENCER, Thurs., May 4, 2006, available online at http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/local/268997_bias04.html (accessed Jan. 16, 2008). Shortly after the release of the Report, a racially motivated hate crime in the Ballard neighborhood received substantial press coverage. Sam Skolnik, Ballard residents take stand against hate crime, SEATTLE POST- INTELLIGENCER, Fri., May 19, 2006 (available at http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/local/270865_ballardparty19.html) (reporting malicious harassment charges against white assailants after April, 2006 attack against African-American Eighth Grader); see also News Release, Felony Charges Filed in Ballard Hate Crime (King County Prosecutor’s Office, May 9, 2006) (available at http://www.metrokc.gov/proatty/news/2006/ballardhatecrime.htm). Without mentioning the previous year’s attack, the press reported a substantial neighborhood response “an eclectic group of community activists, musicians and prosecutors gathered Thursday to stand united against hate crimes in their community.” The group included representatives from the African-American Jewish Coalition for Justice and the King County Washington Women Lawyers, but no LGBT groups were mentioned. Id. A year before this, at about the time Molsberry learned about the earlier Ballard attack, the press were reporting the King County Superior Court sentencing of Micah Painter’s last attacker two years and eight months in prison. See Robert Raketty, Last of Micah Painter’s attackers sentenced: Judge says basher’s remorse ‘too little, too late,’ SEATTLE GAY NEWS (available at http://www.sgn.org/sgnnews20/page1.cfm) (noting jury verdict, not guilty of first degree assault and guilty of lesser charge second degree assault with a deadly weapon). A month before, Painter’s other two attackers had been sentenced to eleven months in prison each. Id. Molsberry learned about the Ballard attack from the Seattle Gay News. During the same month as the Painter attack, the press reported an attack on a Seattle Men’s Chorus singer attending a festival in Montreal, Quebec, “apparently [] the second gay Seattle man to suffer a hate-related assault in the last month.” Sam Skolnik, Gay Seattle man recovering from attack in Montreal, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Wed., July 21, 2004 (available at http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/local/182942_assault21.html (accessed June 8, 2006)). “The chorus responded by dedicating ‘Not in Our Town,’ a song about communities fighting prejudice, to him.” Id. Although beyond the scope of this research, a study correlating press accounts of hate crimes to community “responses” would be worthwhile. 88 See Frishberg, Bias crimes in Seattle detailed in new report, id. Ch. 5—Hate Crimes & Social Contention 245 is equipped to receive reports of hate crimes at the same time they are reported to police. According to the staff interviews cited in the Report, the Office of Civil Rights reviews monthly bias crime reports from police, and has “expressed frustration” when “attacks seemed to have clear components of malicious harassment and should have been treated as bias crimes,” but were ruled out as crimes by police.89 The Seattle Bias Crimes and Incidents Report takes a hate-related incident as an opportunity for contention about hate crimes. Specifically, the Report utilizes police data to reconstruct knowledge about hate crimes according to a local understanding of neighborhood responsibility that would not otherwise appear in official police data. Yet, the police data impose inherent limits on the potential innovations in local knowledge about hate crimes. First, the Report itself assumes that police-generated data omit substantial numbers of hate crimes. Presumably, therefore, this knowledge is inherently omitted from any knowledge based on police-generated inputs. Yet, since the Report is an analysis of police-generated data, it seems to suffer from the same deficiency that it criticizes. Second, even though Seattle Police data are capable of capturing some narrative notes, the complexity of knowledge about individual hate crimes is limited by the boxes available. So, as the Report states, some reports “exhibited biases that were clear yet consisted of more than one bias.”90 Since the police inputs do not provide a convenient accounting for these “multiple- bias attacks,” the Report counted them as “Other.”91 Perhaps no inquiry system is capable of establishing a pure description of a hate-related incident, but the array of boxes available on an official set of forms imposes another inherent limit on knowledge. After its publication, the Molsberry Report became the basis for an official inquiry by the Seattle City Council. The Council invited the Report’s authors and representatives of the Seattle 89 Molsberry Report, supra note 63, at 12-13 (citing interviews). 90 Id., at 11. 91 Id. Ch. 5—Hate Crimes & Social Contention 246 Police Department to appear before the Council for a public hearing. In advance of this hearing, the Molsberry and Armenakis presented a list of recommendations, based on the Report and titled, “Improving Our Response to Bias Attacks.”92 Notably, the Recommendations and The SPD submitted a Memorandum detailing its response.93 The Report and Recommendations also became the basis for a public hearing held jointly by the Seattle Commission on Sexual Minorities and the Seattle Human Rights Commission.94 In short, the Molsberry Report became the basis for a significant local event contending about the details of the Police administration of knowledge about anti-LGBT hate crimes in Seattle. As of this writing, the website for the Hate Crime Awareness Project is no longer available on the Seattle Center’s website.95 Nevertheless, another Community Safety Forum was hosted by the Center in the Fall of 2007, “in response to recent news reports about incidents of gay-bashing and malicious harassment on Capitol Hill.”96 5.2.3 Comparison Participants in the feedback meetings in both Seattle and Vancouver noted that groups in the two cities share more similarities than differences. A notable similarity is the instability of 92 Ken Molsberry, Kristina Armenakis & Robert S. Jacobs, Improving Our Response to Bias Attacks: Recommendations for Seattle City Council (June, 2006), available online at http://home.comcast.net/~kmolsberry/biascrime/ (accessed Jan. 2008) (linking print and video materials related to Report). Added to Molsberry and Armenakis as a co-author was Robert S. Jacobs, Regional Director of the Anti- Defamation League. 93 See Letter from Ken Molsberry & Kristina Armenakis to Seattle City Council President & Police Chief (Jan.30, 2007), available online at http://home.comcast.net/~kmolsberry/biascrime/files/RecommendationsResponseToSPD.doc (accessed Jan. 16, 2008). 94 See Molsberry website, available at http://home.comcast.net/~kmolsberry/biascrime/ (accessed Jan. 2008) (linking print and video materials related to Report). The contention triggered by the Ballard attack has since resulted in a formal inquiry by the City Auditor into the Police Department’s Bias Crime practices. See Seattle’s Enforcement of Bias Crimes (Office of City Auditor, Aug. 4, 2008), available at http://www.seattle.gov/audit/2008.htm (accessed Aug. 11, 2008); see also Councilmembers receive final bias crimes audit, SEATTLE GAY NEWS, Fri., Aug. 8, 2008), available at http://www.sgn.org/sgnnews36_32/page8.cfm (accessed Aug. 11, 2008). 95 See http://www.seattlelgbt.org/hatecrimeproject/ (accessed Jan. 16, 2008). 96 See Event Announcement, Seattle LGBTQ Center Co-Sponsors Community Safety Forum Nov. 27th at 6:00pm, available at http://www.seattlelgbt.org/node/1032 (accessed Jan. 16, 2008). Ch. 5—Hate Crimes & Social Contention 247 Anti-Violence Programs, at least those that rely on government-funded grants. Seattle’s Hate Crime Awareness Project lasted only nine months, and the Vancouver Pilot Project lasted only six. Both Programs have ceased to exist in any form on the websites of their host organizations. Other similarities could be cited,97 but more important here are the several important differences that appear in a comparison of Anti-Violence Programs in the two cities. The most significant difference between the Seattle and Vancouver Projects, for the purposes of this study, lies in the relationship between official hate crime statistics and the knowledge producing practices of each program. In Seattle, official police statistics were fully integrated into the contentious practices of the Hate Crime Awareness Project. Police statistics were used to justify the governmental funding request, police statistics and police incident reports were used to generate the Molsberry Report, which was edited by the Hate Crime Awareness Project Intern, and even after the conclusion of the Internship, the former Intern continued to partner with Molsberry to use the hate crime statistics and reporting process as a site of contention about the proper classification of hate-related events. In Vancouver, on the other hand, because police statistics, and the information gathering and reporting practices that accompany them, were missing from the resources available, the hate crime statistics and reporting process was unavailable as a site of contention for the Pilot Project. While the Vancouver Pilot Project produced a concluding Report, it did not perform the same role as the Seattle Report. Specifically, it was not used as a vehicle of contention in any form of public governmental inquiry. On the other hand, the absence of hate crime statistics and reporting by police in Vancouver enabled WEAVE to form and produce the survey referred to by the Vancouver Pilot Project Coordinator in his interview. The omission of references to the WEAVE survey from the Pilot Project Final Report, moreover, confirms the disengagement of 97 For instance, both anti-violence projects began soon after notorious hate-related events. A more thorough examination of the mobilizing effects of hate-related triggering events would be worthwhile. The discussion here, however, focuses on knowledge-producing mobilizations. Ch. 5—Hate Crimes & Social Contention 248 the Pilot Project from explicit contention about official hate-crime classification decisions. WEAVE, and its Seattle counterparts are examined in more detail in the next section. The analysis performed in the Seattle Report would be possible in Vancouver if police there regularly compiled reports identifying suspected hate crimes, if those reports were adequately preserved, and if the Department were convinced to release information from the reports to a researcher. According to its 2000 Policy Guide, the B.C. Hate Crime Team is officially tasked with maintaining, “a system for tracking and analysis of data on hate-related offences, including . . . offences which include hate as a motivating factor,” and “A data analyst provides support for the Team in maintaining current information on the database.”98 Still, such an analysis has never been produced in Vancouver—at least not publicly.99 The suggestion by Vancouver’s Pilot Project Coordinator of cooperation “in concert” between police, the LGTB community center, and a nongovernmental group in the United States follows closely after an appeal for a “community response,” that emphasizes “Partnering with community organizations.” But, the Final Report appeals to a particular kind of partnering and cooperation. While it mentions meetings with WEAVE, and despite the Coordinator’s praise for WEAVE during our interview, the Final Report omits any reference to the WEAVE survey results. This omission seems intentional, and it illustrates a difference in the contentious practices of the established LGBT Centre and the more ad hoc group WEAVE. In comparison to the Molsberry Report in Seattle, moreover, both the Vancouver Pilot Project Final Report and the WEAVE Survey Results share another common feature. Unlike the Seattle Report, the two Vancouver reports focus entirely on, “heterosexism, homophobia, and 98 B.C. Attorney General & Minister Responsible for Human Rights, Hate/Bias Crime Policy Guide (Rev. Sept., 2000). 99 The Vancouver Police Department commissioned a Simon Fraser University student to produce a similar, though smaller, analysis of hate crimes in Vancouver neighborhoods, drawn from its police reports for the year 2000. The Department presented this report to lobby for the addition of “sexual orientation” to the ban on hate propaganda in the Canadian Criminal Code. See Scott MacMillan, Hate Bias Crimes in Vancouver 2001 & 2002 (Vancouver Police Department, undated) (on file with the author). Ch. 5—Hate Crimes & Social Contention 249 transphobia.” The Seattle Report on the other hand adopts the formal neutrality represented by the boxes offered in the police incident reports. Instead of focusing solely on systematic change in official hate crime statistics, the Pilot Project Report appeals for greater funding for community-based advocacy and services. The interviews with Community Anti-Violence Programs revealed the critically important role of less established groups that had been organized for the purpose of establishing knowledge about hate crimes. These ad hoc Anti-Violence Groups are examined next. 5.3 Ad Hoc Anti-Violence Groups Established groups like the LGBT Community Centres engage in a range of ongoing, systematic contention and more occasional, ad hoc contention about hate crimes. Distinct from contention within established organizations, however, the interviews revealed less established groups that emerged in response to discrete hate-related events. In Vancouver, I interviewed a representative of one such ad hoc group, West Enders Against Violence Everywhere (WEAVE). This group was added to the original list of participant groups after I met with the Anti-Violence Pilot Project Coordinator, because of his explicit reliance on the data from the WEAVE Survey. WEAVE did not appear in my initial subject list, because it maintains no website, and because it was a relatively new group. Nevertheless, the group seemed indispensable to a description of hate-related contention in Vancouver. To balance WEAVE, I also attempted to interview a representative of Action Northwest in Seattle—a similar group referenced in the Seattle interviews. While I was unable to arrange such an interview, I was able to construct a description of the Seattle group’s activities from its website and from the descriptions of other informants. The practices on these ad hoc groups are compared next. Ch. 5—Hate Crimes & Social Contention 250 5.3.1 West Enders Against Violence Everywhere (WEAVE)—Vancouver I met with Jack Herman, a representative from WEAVE during the lunch hour at the offices of the provincial government agency where he worked. Herman was employed by the Ministry of Public Safety & Solicitor General, the same agency that funded the Anti-Violence Pilot Project at the Vancouver LGBT Centre. Herman explained the close connection between the Aaron Webster killing and the formation of WEAVE. He indicated that WEAVE issued its first Press Release, announcing the group’s formation, in late 2002 or early 2003 when the Webster killing was still receiving significant media attention.100 Herman indicated that most of the members of the group had saved things like news clippings about bashing, and that he had maintained an envelope of his own with clippings, but no organized database existed apart from the survey. Herman was well informed about the Webster killing, and he noted that the attack had been classified as a “Hate Crime” in the juvenile proceedings and that the youths had received maximum sentences. The WEAVE Survey has already been mentioned, and the WEAVE organizers did not maintain a website. In the interview, however, I was able to elicit both the “Mandate” of WEAVE and the reasons for the survey: “Our mandate is to make the West End safer for all of its residents, particularly the gay, lesbian, bisexual, trans-gendered, and two-spirited community. We will measure the violence in our community and share that information with civic authorities and other community groups. Through these partnerships we will establish a community response of zero tolerance to violence on our streets. WEAVE defines violence to include rape, assault, verbal and physical queer bashing and all other forms of hate-motivated attacks.” How we got together was interesting because I was a volunteer on the Bash Line, that is no more, it’s defunct now, but... And, I answered a call where a couple had been bashed and referred them and helped them with the police, etc. Months later when the Bash Line was closed due to lack of volunteers I was at a party, and I recognized the voice of this caller—a very distinctive voice. And, she recognized my voice as well, and we sort of got together and introduced ourselves. 100 WEAVE Interview Notes dated Aug. 18, 2005 (on file with the author). Ch. 5—Hate Crimes & Social Contention 251 We said, “now that the Bash Line is gone we should do something.” And, what came out of that was a community meeting to say, “We want to know about violence in our community. We think it’s growing.” And we realized that nobody, no organization had ever measured the violence in the West End of Vancouver. The Queer Bashing violence. So, we decided, “Well, let’s go measure.” So, we had a lot of meetings, and we came up with a questionnaire, and we hit the streets. We’d stand outside bookstores, went in bars, coffee shops. And, we asked people: “have you ever been physically or verbally assaulted in the West End?”101 Although the survey was only a year-long project, it can be seen from the interview response that the group consciously chose to compile quantitative, numerical data. The WEAVE Survey Results allowed respondents to self-identify as gay, lesbian, transgender, or straight. Only a small fraction (six percent in recent months) of straight respondents responded affirmatively to the question: “Have you ever been verbally or physically assaulted in the West End?” These results are juxtaposed to emphasize the overwhelming rate of victimization among Gay (79 percent) and Lesbian (thirteen percent) respondents asked the same question.102 The Survey results themselves further demonstrate that the group tailored its survey questions to suit the needs of the West End. For instance the Survey asked respondents to describe the locations and other circumstances surrounding their assaults. The details of the Bash Line and its data-collection activities are worth noting, despite their subsequent disappearance: 101 WEAVE Vancouver, DVD, Menu Titles—WEAVE Vancouver to A Community Meeting; see also Hate Crime Study, Rough Cut, Nov. 28, 2005, DVD, Menu Title—Research & Reporting. As recently as June, 1998, the Bash Line was described in materials distributed by legal aid groups in B.C. See Joy Tataryn, et al., Same Sex, Same Laws: Lesbians, Gay Men, & the Law in B.C., at vii-viii (Legal Services Society, Information Update, June, 1998). The description of the Bash Line as it existed in 1998 is consistent with the description provided by Jack Herman and others. The 1996 version of the same publication also described the information-gathering processes of police: Homophobic violence often comes from strangers. It usually occurs because the offender assumes the victim to be lesbian or gay. The police classify this as a “hate crime.” It is important that you tell the police if you were attacked or threatened because you are a lesbian or gay, or because the offender thought you were. Then they can keep track of how often, when, where, and in what situations this happens. In this way, lesbians and gay men can help protect each other and can help police provide better protection by isolating patterns of violence. Id., The Police & You: Your Right to Police Protection, at 60 (1996). The same section provides a contact telephone number for the “lesbian and gay police liaison” in Vancouver for assistance. See id., at 61. 102 WEAVE Survey, supra note 24, Table—“Victims Identify As” (on file with the author). Transgendered respondents reported the lowest rates of recent victimization (two percent). Id. Ch. 5—Hate Crimes & Social Contention 252 Q: Who operated the Bash Line when it was in existence? A: Well, I did for its last leg. There was a long history of volunteers in there. It was basically . . . operated off of one cop’s desk—financed by the BC Government through a grant to the police and staffed by volunteers from the Queer community. Basically, it wasn’t a perfect system, but it was the only system for reporting bashings—except to the police of course. You would phone; you would leave your name and number and what time it was best to call; and then we would call them back and try to assist them then. Q: Sometimes that would lead to a police report and sometimes not? A: Sometimes. Right. We always took a report—not a police report, but an information report—if the victim was willing to talk about it. And, we were up- front, “I’m going to take down some, ask you some questions. You know, if you don’t want to answer, don’t answer.” The primary reason for the Bash Line was to have somebody to talk to and get some referral service going on. Q: Did you also, it sounds like, kept some baseline of information. Did you keep those information reports and form some kind of database with those? A: The police were supposed to. We filled out the forms and—when the victim was willing—and we dropped those off at the cop shop. And they were taken from there. From what I understand, down the road, they weren’t putting, using it, or doing anything with them anyway, so…. Q: What Happened to them do you know? A: I have no idea. Q: ….Are they in a box somewhere? A: Probably. Probably. Q: The Bash Line went out of operation in … A: 2002. 103 In addition to WEAVE, the Aaron Webster killing triggered the formation of a community group called the Davie Street Safety Committee. Herman described its initial activities: “It was a direct result of Aaron Webster’s murder. This Committee was formed after 103 WEAVE Vancouver, DVD, Menu Titles—The Bash Line to Bash Line Ended Ch. 5—Hate Crimes & Social Contention 253 Aaron Webster was killed, and they wanted to do something about it. . . . They incorporated the bash line as a new component of the Pride Line of The Centre.”104 Herman discussed the results of the WEAVE Survey that were distributed to the media in May, 2005. The Survey questionnaire was designed to capture the circumstances surrounding reported bashing incidents, including location of incidents.105 But the Survey questions were also designed specifically to elicit profiles describing the typical perpetrators: We wanted to get a profile of who was doing the bashing. And, we had heard when we were creating the survey—there were a lot of stories going on in the West End, on the street, about a particular racial group [that] was doing most of the attacking, and that they were quite young. And, then we were hearing other stories that there were “swarmings” where male and females were involved. So, we wanted to get a profile. So we started asking “race,” “age” of attackers, “sex,” that kind of thing so we could get a profile.106 Herman traced the history of WEAVE from its beginnings at around the time of the Aaron Webster killing to the release of the Survey results in May, 2005: [Q]: . . . . Can you explain maybe what you did with the report once it was put together? [A]: Well, we had a press release, and there was quite a lot of press coverage when we first announced WEAVE and what we were going to try to do. . . . . . . . late in 2002, Aaron Webster was murdered in Stanley Park. And, so Gay Bashing was like a “hot” story to the media. So when WEAVE was formed and it announced it was going to measure the violence in the West End, they were all sort of “in our face.” So, that was good. We were getting the message out there that we were going to start taking information and measuring violence. And, then, in May of 2005 when we released the results of the Survey, the media was there in full force. They had a lot of questions for us, and we were happy to see that much press coverage, because we’ve always said over and over again that the message has to keep going out there in the community about this violence. And, the more it’s told, the more educated we all are about how safe our streets are—or are not—, you know, an intelligent person can take that information and act accordingly. 104 See WEAVE Vancouver, DVD, Menu Title—It was a Direct Result. 105 See WEAVE Vancouver, DVD, Menu Title—The Report. Unlike the jurisdictional locations elicited on the FBI’s hate crime incident report forms, which attempt to connect incidents to channels of interstate commerce falling within the legislative authority of Congress, the WEAVE Survey was limited to more functional locations to enable residents to avoid places presenting a particular danger. 106 See WEAVE Vancouver, DVD, Menu Title—The Report. Ch. 5—Hate Crimes & Social Contention 254 [Q]: You mean to plan for safety, specifically? [A]: Yeah, personally, to plan for your personal safety. But, also . . . the stats surprised a lot of people who thought that maybe gay bashing was getting better, like getting less. And, you know, it wasn’t. It isn’t. And, as a matter of fact, what the Survey shows is that bashings are involving more perpetrators than ever . . .107 According to Herman, the Survey responses revealed disturbing trends over the preceding five year period. He emphasized three examples from the Survey: (1) the number of perpetrators involved in each incident was increasing; (2) women were becoming more frequent participants; and, (3) the number of teenaged perpetrators was increasing.108 [Q]: . . .when you did the research for drafting those questions, did you look at any particular resources that would describe how to do a survey like that? [A]: I did, but to be honest with you, I couldn’t find anything that . . . I could lift and model after for gay bashing. . . when I was surfing the web I couldn’t find a lot of information about measuring gay bashing—like who had done it? Where had it been done? There had been a lot of studies that I read about gay bashing, but I didn’t see any survey models. So I looked at other surveys . . . . . . . So, we had yet another meeting, and we said, “what are the things that we want to know, that we don’t know?” Forget all these other surveys. And that’s what we came up with. The long and the short of it is that after the Survey was finished, and we got the data, and we got the information out in readable form, we realized that there were other questions that we should have asked. But, you know, live and learn. It was a first attempt. [Q]: Do you think there will be another one? [A]: We are debating whether there is going to be another one. If there’s going to be another one we’re going to try to make it a lot more sophisticated. . . .109 107 See WEAVE Vancouver, DVD, Menu Title—Live & Learn to Aaron Webster Murdered. 108 See WEAVE Vancouver, DVD, Menu Title—The Stats Surprised a lot of People. Herman compared the respondents’ reports for the preceding year against the same respondents’ reports for one-to-five years earlier. Reports for the preceding year showed increases: perpetrator groups of three or more increased from two percent to twenty-two percent; and, perpetrator groups that included women increased from two percent to twelve percent. 109 See WEAVE Vancouver, DVD, Menu Title—Yet another Meeting to Live & Learn. Ch. 5—Hate Crimes & Social Contention 255 WEAVE disseminated its survey results, beginning in May, 2005, by issuing a press release, granting press interviews, and presenting its results to interested groups.110 Herman noted criticisms raised in the media after the release of the Survey results, and he indicated that any future survey would attempt to meet any legitimate objections. Specifically in response to criticism challenging the scientific methodology of the Survey, Herman concluded: “I said, well we’re not professionals at this, you know. But, somebody has to get out there and measure it. And, so that’s what we did.”111 After the conclusion of our interview, Herman volunteered additional information about hate crimes. 112 Specifically he condemned both the use of religious rhetoric to promote homophobic hatred and the failure of police and prosecutors to respond to both hate propaganda and hate crimes. 5.3.2 Action Northwest Bias Crime Forum—Seattle I learned about a Seattle ad hoc group during the course of my interviews with the Seattle LGBT Center and the Hate Crime Awareness Project, and during the Seattle feedback meeting. The online “Seattle/Puget Sound Bias Crime Forum,” which was specifically referenced in the interviews, remained available on the World-Wide Web throughout the course of the study. The masthead for the website includes the following greeting: Seattle/Puget Sound Bias Crime Forum A division of ACTION NorthWest Have you been a victim of a bias crime? Have you witnessed an attack? Sympathetic to the cause? Then this is the Forum for you.113 This interactive website was developed shortly after a particular hate-related event in Seattle. The website included an interactive “Micah Painter Bias Crime Forum,” “Trial News for 110 WEAVE Interview Notes, dated Aug. 18, 2005 (on file with the author). 111 See WEAVE Vancouver, DVD, Menu Title—Live & Learn. 112 See WEAVE Vancouver, DVD, Menu Title—More About Hate Crimes. 113 See http://www.actionnw.net/micah/ (accessed Jan. 31, 2007). Ch. 5—Hate Crimes & Social Contention 256 Micah’s Attackers,” an “Image Gallery,” and “Words of Support for Micah,” in addition to links to “Report a Bias Crime,” to learn about the “Q Patrol” initiative, and to the text of the state malicious harassment statutes. As the trial and sentencing of Painter’s attackers progressed, the Bias Crime Forum invited readers to participate publicly: “Please join the rest of us from ACTION NorthWest as the verdicts are handed down this Friday, April 8th, and again Friday, May 13th!”114 The Forum also presented local news stories, including prominently a March 9, 2005, Seattle Gay News story which detailed the public contention of nongovernmental groups, including Action Northwest: ACTION Northwest, a grassroots network of progressive organizations, has a forum about the trial on its website and links to resources for victims of malicious harassment. It can be found at www.actionnw.net . “We have always been focused on the charge of malicious harassment with a deadly weapon and the jury returned a verdict of guilty on all of those counts,” said Ryan Biava, a spokesperson for Equal Rights Washington, a new statewide advocacy group for the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender community. “That has been our focus throughout, because the laws of the state of Washington protect against this type of attack.” The irony is that Mr. Painter may be protected under Washington law this way, but he can be fired from his job or evicted from his apartment today due to his sexual orientation. Immediately after the attack happened last June 27, Gay Pride weekend in Seattle, the region’s LGBT community and Seattle’s political leaders came together to publicly decry the vicious nature of the attack. Several benefits where held to help Painter with medical bills and living expenses while he recovered from his injuries, which included bruises, internal bleeding and deep cuts to his face and back. “I think the public outcry and attention to this – especially from the Gay community – was extremely important in terms of moving this along very, very quickly,” said Seattle City Councilmember Tom Rasmussen, who is openly Gay. “I am sure the police department and the prosecutors would have done their job, but I think that the attention that was given to this really heightened the importance of this in everyone’s mind.” Rasmussen has long called for lawmakers in Olympia to pass the Anderson-Murray Anti- Discrimination bill, which has languished in one form or another in the Washington State Legislature for 29 years. The bill passed out of the House of Representatives but faces an uncertain future in the Senate. “The system worked in this case, but it is a reminder to me that we really need to have anti-discrimination laws on the books. The malicious harassment law was extremely important in the prosecution of these men,” said Rasmussen. “If we wouldn’t have had that law on the books there could have been a very different outcome – a far less just 114 Id., Message posted by Dave Hildebrand, Online Media Coordinator, Micah Painter Benefit. Ch. 5—Hate Crimes & Social Contention 257 outcome… I hope it finally convinces anyone who doubts the need for a statewide anti- discrimination law that further protection is warranted.”115 I learned about the Seattle Bias Crimes Forum in my correspondence with the Hate Crime Awareness Project Coordinator,116 who noted that Action Northwest was one of three organizers of the community forum in response to the Painter attack.117 The online Bias Crimes Forum was created by Action Northwest shortly after the Painter attack was publicly reported.118 Before the Painter attack, Action Northwest hosted a website with announcements and action alerts, for example tracking the progress of state legislation banning discrimination based on sexual orientation.119 Thus, the Painter attack did not lead to the creation of Action Northwest. The Bias Crime Forum, on the other hand, arose directly out of the Painter attack, and specifically in anticipation of the trial and sentencing of Painter’s attackers. Posts to the website included a “Call to Action” for a fundraising benefit at the Seattle Center, followed by a “Show of Support and Protest March.” And, in addition to a general “Micah Painter Bias Crime Forum,” listing messages posted by interested users, the site hosted a section titled, “Trial News for Micah’s Attackers.” This Trial News section announced important events and milestones in the criminal proceedings, including the trial and sentencing decisions for Painter’s attackers, and encouraged Painter’s friends and supporters to attend the public proceedings. Action Northwest was, therefore, actively engaged in both public contention in the criminal proceedings against Painter’s attackers and in the coordination of a community 115 See id. (reprinting Robert Raketty, “Verdict – Guilty,” SEATTLE GAY NEWS, Mar. 9, 2005). Social contention using Internet Communication Technologies (ICTs) was not limited to either the Action Northwest Bias Crime Forum, or the more conventional letters and articles in the local alternative press, however. The local Indymedia website similarly served as a forum for information exchange and argumentation about the Painter attack. See http://seattle.indymedia.org/en/2004/07/241303.shtml (accessed Jan. 31, 2007). 116 Specifically, the Project Coordinator referred me to an Action Northwest contact, but I was unable to contact this person to arrange an interview. See Email from Kristina Armenakis to author, dated Dec. 14, 2005 (on file with author). 117 See A Forum on Public Safety, SEATTLE GAY NEWS, Fri., Apr. 29, 2005, at 7, available online at http://www.sgn.org/sgnews17/page 7.cfm (accessed Jan. 1, 2006). The forum was presented May 4, 2005, at the Seattle Center, and the agenda included, “funding opportunities to bring back the Q Safety Patrol.” The other two organizers were the Seattle LGBT Community Center and the LGBT Advisory Council to the Seattle Police. 118 See http://www.actionnw.net/micah/viewtopic.php?t=5 (accessed Jan. 1, 2006). 119 See http://www.actionnw.net/frame.htm (accessed Jan. 11, 2006). Ch. 5—Hate Crimes & Social Contention 258 response that included not only nongovernmental groups like the LGBT Center but also Seattle Police and Prosecutors. Thus, unlike WEAVE in Vancouver, Action Northwest was able to channel its contention into some existing channels of official legal contention. 5.3.3 Comparison The Molsberry Report and the Bias Crime Forum in Seattle and the WEAVE survey in Vancouver suggest how principles of equality are interpreted and applied in the hate crime field by nongovernmental groups. In Seattle, the Molsberry Report gives the following explanation for the application of a formally neutral, antidiscrimination principle in the classification of hate crimes: When interpreting the results, it is important to bear in mind that the attacks are not always in the direction of members of the dominant culture (black, Muslim, foreign, for example). That is certainly the norm, but there are many instances in which assailants of the minority culture attack members of the dominant culture. For instance in regard to racial bias, black, white, and Asian people appear in the reports both as victims and as attackers. Regardless, bias attacks are pernicious in their effect no matter which direction they happen, and the same community efforts to build respect and acceptance will address both. Therefore the data as a whole may be interpreted generally without regard for this distinction.120 The fundamental difference between the Seattle analysis and the WEAVE study, however, lies in the source of the knowledge. The WEAVE survey was constructed and implemented by an ad hoc, nongovernmental group, using its own survey as the primary data source. The Seattle study, by comparison, drew exclusively from police-generated bias crime reports and statistics. Although more detailed, it was not significantly different from the Vancouver Police Department -sponsored academic study commissioned to support the hate propaganda amendments to the Criminal Code. Because it draws from police-generated data, 120 Molsberry Report, supra note 63, at 16. Ch. 5—Hate Crimes & Social Contention 259 accepting both official terminology and the reliability of the official incident reports, the Seattle study may be seen as fundamentally contained contention. Perhaps the most illuminating aspect of Herman’s account is the significant social consequences caused, at least in part, by the absence of any official hate crime statistics for Vancouver. The founders of WEAVE were motivated by a combination of triggering events, including primarily the abandonment of the Bash Line and the Aaron Webster killing. But they were also motivated partially by one non-event—the void created by the absence of any official hate crime statistics. Stated alternatively, WEAVE took advantage of an opportunity created by the absence of any official inquiry to conduct its own local legal inquiry. The resulting Survey constituted local legal knowledge about queer bashing, and hence social inequality equality. Moreover, in the dynamic surrounding the WEAVE Survey, the founders of the group took advantage of an opportunity to develop their own expertise, and their own credentials, which in turn may be available as resources for either an ongoing, periodic survey, or a subsequent survey conducted in response to another triggering event. In other words, in the event of another notorious hate-related incident, WEAVE exists as a recognizable group, with both a knowledge base and an expertise in the production of legal knowledge that lie outside the official governmental sources. Herman’s modest acknowledgement, “you live and learn,” may represent the most important outcome of the WEAVE Survey. The Vancouver participants in the feedback process doubted whether the autonomy illustrated by the WEAVE Survey outweighed the absence of official hat crime statistics. Nevertheless, respondents in both Seattle and Vancouver unanimously agreed that maintaining both governmental and nongovernmental sources of hate crime statistics represented the best practice. Homo- and trans-phobic behavior appears in schools in both Canada and the United States, and in both countries, nongovernmental groups participate in the construction of knowledge about this behavior. Because the concepts hate crime and school bullying can Ch. 5—Hate Crimes & Social Contention 260 overlap significantly, School Safety and Education Groups were included in the study, and their practices are compared next. 5.4 School Safety & Education Groups As indicated in Chapter 3, some school boards in Canada and the United States have adopted official policies or practices to identify hate-related incidents in schools. Nongovernmental groups study hate-related incidents in schools too, and their methods for classifying and inquiring about these incidents provide a useful analytical parallel to community- based Anti-Violence Groups. I interviewed representatives of Safe Schools Coalition in Seattle and Gay and Lesbian Educators BC (GALE—BC) in Vancouver.121 5.4.1 Safe Schools Coalition—Seattle Safe Schools Coalition originated in Seattle, and its operations are based in Seattle, but it has grown to become a national, and to some extent an international, organization. Beyond its wealth of publications, which are summarized below, my interview with one of the Coalition’s three co-chairs, Beth Reis, revealed further details about the contours of hate crime inquiry within the schools context. Reis explained that there is no uniform policy in the state for reporting school incidents, and that school data and police data about hate-related incidents are entirely separate. On the other hand, Reis counted as one of the group’s successes the passage in 2002 of a statewide school anti-bullying law—requiring school districts to consider adopting 121 In both our initial interview and the follow-up feedback meeting, the Safe Schools representative urged me to include the local Gay, Lesbian, Straight Education Network, GLSEN Puget Sound. Because Safe Schools is a national—even international—organization, the local GLSEN might have been a better pair to the province-wide GALE-BC. On the other hand, GALE-BC includes mostly educators, whereas, GLSEN includes a broader membership—at least in its title. I was unable to include GLSEN, however, primarily because of my own time constraints. Still, it is important to notice the structural and functional differences between Safe Schools and GALE- BC. Ch. 5—Hate Crimes & Social Contention 261 policies defining bullying, and establishing a state-issued model policy. The Coalition had since compiled a report about compliance with the new bullying law.122 After our interview, Reis provided additional, detailed references to research either conducted for or available from the Coalition.123 Reis also participated in the Seattle feedback meeting and provided additional information about the Coalition and school safety policy. In response to the description of the Vancouver School Board Pride Committee, Reis gave further details about the Seattle School District LGBT program—the School District has assigned a paid programming staff position whose “primary function” is to help with LGBT initiatives in schools.124 She explained that the new anti-bullying law does not require “any kind of state-level reporting system” or even district-level reporting system for discriminatory harassment in schools.125 Reis further noted that schools “often don’t report” hate crimes to the police or inform kids of their right to go to police, even when criminal complaints would be appropriate and that distinguishing between hate crime and harassment is difficult within the schools.126 122 Interview Notes, Safe Schools Coalition (on file with the author); Safe Schools Coalition, DVD. 123 Among the citations provided were: Office of Superintendent of Public Instruction, Washington State Survey of Adolescent Health Behaviors: Analytic Report (E.L Einspruch, et al. eds. 2001); Carmen McDowell, The prevalence, characteristics & typology of Washington state school district policies on bullying, harassment, and discrimination (Oct. 7, 2002), available at http://www.safeschoolscoalition.org/PolicyAnalysisProject-Final10-6- 02.pdf (accessed Aug. 12, 2003); D. Olweus, BULLING AT SCHOOL: WHAT WE KNOW & WHAT WE CAN DO (1993); L Jenks, Washington State Department of Health (unpublished research for the Safe Schools Coalition from the 2002 Healthy Youth Survey); T. Harachi, et al., United States, in THE NATURE OF SCHOOL BULLYING: A CROSS-NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE (PK Smith, et al. eds.); Washington attorney General’s Office, Anti-Bullying Brochure (available at http://www.atg.wa.gov/bullying/BullyingBrochure8_05.pdf). Among these, Carmen McDowell’s 2002 study of Washington state school district policies on bullying, harassment, and discrimination bears a striking resemblance to a Duluth, MN research project cited as influential by the Minneapolis Schools representative in a later interview. 124 See Seattle Feedback, DVD, Menu Title—Seattle Schools LGBT Committee. 125 See Seattle Feedback, DVD, Menu Title—Bullying Law Weaknesses. 126 See Seattle Feedback, DVD, Menu Title—Rural Police Differences. Ch. 5—Hate Crimes & Social Contention 262 The Coalition publishes numerous resources targeted primarily for use by educators.127 The publications demonstrate that the Coalition maintained a research practice from its beginnings. Early in its existence, the Coalition began a study of incidents of anti-gay violence in Washington state schools. The study was meant to present more than a head count of incidents; instead it gathered “objective facts” to tell the stories of those who did and did not survive the incidents. The Report issued at the conclusion of the study summarizes the Coalition’s formation story in its acknowledgements section: We are indebted to Dr. Robert Bidwell who, as a member of the Seattle Commission on Children and Youth, chaired the landmark 1988 hearings on the needs of GLBT youth and founded the committee that would become the Safe Schools Coalition.128 This report, issued in 1999, begins with a description of the Coalition and its Safe Schools Project, established to conduct a five-year study of anti-gay school violence.129 Although limited to school-related events, the Coalition’s 1999 Report at the conclusion of the Anti-Violence Research Project constitutes a significant example of hate crime classification. After analyzing the “sometimes-brutal,” narratives for each of the 111 incidents reported, two Appendices provide significant insight into the attitude of the group to the existing classification system for hate-related activity in schools.130 In particular, the Legal Appendix lists school polices and union contracts in the state that “specifically prohibit harassment and 127 A partial list of publications focusing on hate-related incidents in schools, includes: Brochure, The Safe Schools Intervention Services: Helping schools end anti-gay bullying and harassment (Feb., 2003); Report, Eighty-Three Thousand youth: Select Findings of Eight Population-Based Studies, as they pertain to anti-gay harassment & the safety and well-being of sexual minority students (May, 1999); Safe Schools Resource Guide: Helping Educators Serve ALL Youth & Families Regardless of Sexual Orientation or Gender Identity (Beth Reis ed., 3rd ed., Nov., 2001); Safe Schools Resource Guide—Washington State Supplement: Helping Educators Serve ALL Youth & Families Regardless of Sexual Orientation or Gender Identity (Beth Reis ed., Nov., 2001); Report, They don’t even know me!: Understanding Anti-Gay Harassment & Violence in Schools, A Report On the Five-Year Anti-Violence Research Project Of the Safe Schools Coalition of Washington State (Beth Reis, et al., Jan., 1999). 128 See Report, They don’t even know me!, id., at ii. 129 Id., at 1, Executive Summary (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted). 130 See id., Appendix A, Legal Definitions, Laws, & Policies, by Karen Kane; Appendix B, Towards an Appropriate Response to the Problem of Anti-Gay Harassment in Schools, by Carolyn Halley. Ch. 5—Hate Crimes & Social Contention 263 discrimination based on sexual orientation,” 131 and “Recent Lawsuits and Settlements,” 132 including a settlement by a Seattle (Kent, WA) school district for “six years of escalating anti- gay verbal harassment (by peers and, in some cases, school district employees)” against former student Mark Iversen. The Appropriate Response Appendix begins by noting the “dearth” of studies and lack of “program elements” related to anti-gay school harassment, despite the recommendations of a federal “Youth Suicide” Task Force Report.133 Specifically included in the recommended responses are school policies for “monitoring” bullying behavior. 134 One revealing observation from the Appropriate Responses Appendix addresses the “local political climate” measured by local lawmaking: The proportion of school districts offering mental health services targeting sexual minority youth appears to vary widely as a function of the political climate of the community. One study of 250 school districts reported that nearly a quarter of districts in communities with anti-gay-bias ordinances offered support groups or counseling for gays, lesbian, and bisexual students, while nearly none of the non- ordinance districts had such programs.135 The conclusions recommend the open adoption and implementation of written school policies against anti-gay harassment, for each locality: “schools should create policy prohibiting anti-gay language and behavior on the district or building level. These policies would optimally be created with student input, and would be posted prominently.”136 The Coalition continues to monitor hate-related incidents in schools. Its “Intervention Services” brochure invites reports of “all [school] bullying and violence, especially anti-gay harassment and other bias-based discrimination. . . . You do NOT have to be gay, lesbian, bisexual or transgender to use our services.” Those seeking help are directed to either the 131 Id., at 67-68 nn.7-12 (citing policies). 132 Id., at 68. 133 Id., Appendix B, at 69. 134 Id., at 70 n. 21 (and accompanying text). 135 Id., at 70 n.23 (and accompanying text). 136 Id., at 73. After issuing its January, 1999 Report, the Coalition conducted a meta-analysis of eight recent quantitative studies of anti-gay harassment in schools in the United States. This report describes the eight governmental and academic studies. See Report, Eighty-Three Thousand youth, supra note 127, at 1. Ch. 5—Hate Crimes & Social Contention 264 “Intervention Hotline,” a toll-free telephone number or the “Intervention Team” email address. The hotline is answered by a caseworker at the office of Hate Free Zone, another participant in this study.137 While the Coalition does not maintain a formal database listing all hate incidents it has discovered, the group’s monthly minutes do reference past incidents, and Reis maintains these minutes on a computer hard drive along with the group’s other organizational records.138 In 2001, the Coalition issued its third edition of the Resource Guide and the first edition of a Washington State Supplement to the Resource Guide. The primary Resource Guide includes a Law and Policy section that states: A growing number of states and school districts are adopting laws and policies that explicitly prohibit discrimination and harassment on, among other factors, sexual orientation, and gender identity. Regardless of local law or district policy, of course, public schools have a constitutional obligation, under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, not to selectively protect children from harm. Failure to protect a child can and has resulted in administrative intervention by the U.S. Department of Education as well as civil suit.139 The Handouts accompanying the Resource Guide emphasize the need for record-keeping to establish the existence of anti-gay harassment in schools. In addition to recommendations to “involve the police if you believe a crime may have been committed (including malicious harassment),” the Handout, An Administrator’s Guide To Handling Anti-Gay Harassment, presents recording recommendations: KEEP A RECORD of the events in the permanent files of the targeted student, with his or her permission, and the offenders, if there has been any disciplinary action. Also keep an incident report on file in a malicious harassment log, so that patterns can be discerned and ongoing problems can be addressed. 137 The 2003 printing of the Intervention Services Brochure explained that the hotline as, “actually it is Planned Parenthood’s Sex Information Line; they help the Safe Schools Coalition with these calls.” By the time of our 2005 interview, however, Beth Reis identified Hate Free Zone as the Hotline operator. See Safe Schools Coalition, DVD. 138 Other information-related activities include a “Zine” for kids (www.safeschoolzine.org). Like the Coalition’s many research resources and reports, the Zine is available on its sophisticated website. The group also circulates a “news digest,” about three times each year, which along with summaries of its monthly meeting minutes is distributed to its members via a list serve. See Safe Schools Coalition, DVD. 139 See Safe Schools Resource Guide: Helping Educators Serve ALL Youth & Families Regardless of Sexual Orientation or Gender Identity (hereinafter Resource Guide), supra note 127, at 14 ¶ 6.7. Ch. 5—Hate Crimes & Social Contention 265 The same handout encourages school officials to be vigilant against retribution against those who report harassment, and to announce “firm” policies each year.140 The Handout for educators intervening in harassment encourages teachers to both stop the behavior and use the event to educate students. It also includes directions for contending with unsupportive administrators.141 A separate Handout guides educators to surviving anti-gay harassment.142 This handout also emphasizes record keeping: KEEP A WRITTEN RECORD: • Write down everything that led up to the harassing incident(s) as well as what was said and done during the incidents. Note the time, location and who was involved (including witnesses). • Write down the names of those in whom you have confided or from whom you have sought help since the incident. Note the time, location and what was said during those conversations.143 This handout also notes the possibility of local laws prohibiting harassment, including local versions of hate crime laws: • If anti-gay slurs were used in the course of the incident, tell the police officer that the crime (or one of the crimes) you are reporting is “malicious harassment as defined by RCW 9A.36.080.” Stress that the crime was motivated by hate based on perceived sexual orientation. You don’t have to say whether you are actually gay and you shouldn’t be asked. • Describe in detail the hate or prejudice that was expressed and what caused you to fear harm. For example, “They called me ‘faggot’ and said they would ‘kick my butt’.” Or, “They asked me why ‘dykes’ liked other girls and said they would ‘teach me to like boys’.” If the assault was physical and you have physical pain, make sure it is written down in the police report. Get the incident number from the officer and ask how to get a copy of the police report. Get the officer’s name and badge number.144 Thus, even though the contention of the Coalition is directed toward education and schools, it directly addresses homophobic hate crimes that occur at school. The Washington State Supplement contains much of the same information as the primary Resource Guide. It adds information about state-specific resources, for instance, the Washington 140 Resource Guide, id., at 63, 64. 141 Resource Guide, id., at 65-66. 142 Id., at 67-68. 143 Id., at 67 (emphasis in original). 144 Id., at 68 (some citations omitted). Ch. 5—Hate Crimes & Social Contention 266 State School Safety Center, sponsored by the State Superintendent of Public Instruction, which, “provides model bullying/harassment/ intimidation policy.” The largest part of the Washington State Supplement, however, is contained in the Local Community Resources section, which lists local governmental and nongovernmental groups organized in ten regions throughout the state.145 5.4.2 Gay and Lesbian Educators BC (GALE-BC)—Vancouver Steve LeBel, Media Spokesperson for GALE-BC initially expressed reluctance to participate because the group saw itself as more of a “clearinghouse” for educational information than a participant in contention about hate crimes.146 During the eventual interview, moreover, LeBel distinguished hate crimes, like the Webster killing, from school bullying. One of the group’s leaders does have a history of individual advocacy in the field, including a partially successful lawsuit challenging the exclusion of LGBT subject matter from his Kindergarten teaching curriculum.147 The group itself, however, focuses on providing resources to educators. The group does, however, serve as a research resource center for bullying studies and as a provider of education in the field of school bullying and harassment against LGBT students. 145 See Safe Schools Resource Guide—Washington State Supplement: Helping Educators Serve ALL Youth & Families Regardless of Sexual Orientation or Gender Identity, supra note 127, at 21-35. 146 See Interview Notes, GALE-BC (on file with the author). School safety groups in both Seattle and Vancouver recognize that hate crimes occur in school settings. Research published by Seattle’s Safe Schools Coalition and incorporated into the educational materials of Vancouver’s GALE-BC surveys the national school statistics gathered in the United States, including statistics on “School Hate Crime Victimization.” Furthermore, the same research expresses hope for improvements in national hate crime data collection efforts, particularly the use of randomized crime victim surveys to test for uniformity in police reporting practices. See Beth Reis, Why Must Public Schools Teach About Sexual Orientation? in Challenging Homophobia, at Rationale, pages 1-6, (arguing that, “the ongoing addition of NCVS data on hate crime may allow sound estimation of the extent of underreporting, and examination of whether current cross-state variations in hate crime rates seen in UCR data are functions of different levels of hate crime or of different [police] reporting practices.”). See also generally, The Nation’s two crime measures, U.S. Department of Justice May 2003, available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/abstract/ntmc.htm (revised 5/21/03) (comparing UCR and NCVS). Yet, critically, the Safe Schools Coalition juxtaposes the national hate crime statistics efforts with local efforts in Seattle to document and remedy homophobic hate crimes, including those that occur both inside and outside school settings. See id., at 2-3 (collecting local legal authorities). Local efforts to document and quantify homophobic hate crimes in Vancouver, by contrast, are more limited. 147 See Chamberlain v. Surrey School District No. 36, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 710. The Supreme Court (Per McLachlin C.J.C.) held that the Surrey, B.C. School Board acted outside the authority of the B.C. Schools Act, and its own policies, in its resolution refusing to authorize three books for classroom instruction because they related to “same- sex parented families.” See id., ¶¶ 1-2. Ch. 5—Hate Crimes & Social Contention 267 In the subsequent Vancouver feedback meeting James Chamberlain, another GALE-BC representative elaborated on the information provided in the initial interview. Chamberlain explained that BC Schools do not “track” incidents; there is no mechanism for doing so. The “McCreery Center did a survey of 99 incidents in schools in 1999,” and this constituted the “only statistics” on school violence he knew of in BC.148 Although Chamberlain pointed to Victoria and Vancouver public schools as having made “concrete” efforts to do something about LGBT school harassment, he also noted the absence of any mechanism for province-wide incident tracking. As with the Seattle Coalition, much of the information I obtained from GALE-BC can be derived from the extensive literature that it produces and provides to educators. The 2000 version of its informational brochure includes the following Statement of Purpose: There is a pressing need for lesbians, gays, bisexuals, and transgendered people and allies to be able to support one another in the face of homophobia and intolerance within the educational system and society in general. The primary focus of GALE-BC is to advocate for change in the educational system which will result in a positive environment for lesbians, gays, bisexuals, and transgendered people in education, whether they are students, parents, teachers, support staff, or administrators. GALE-BC also offers support to its members through regular meetings, social events and a monthly newsletter.149 Its goals and commitments include several items related to homo- and trans-phobic violence and harassment: 148 See Vancouver Feedback, DVD, Menu Title—Tracking School Incidents. 149 Brochure, Committed to acceptance and understanding through quality education (GALE-BC, June 2000 rev.). GALE-BC’s most significant publications include the titles: Challenging Homophobia in Schools: A K to 12 resource for educators, counselors & administrators to aid in the support of, & education about Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, & Transgender youth & families (GALE-BC, 2nd ed. 2004); CREATING & SUPPORTING A GAY/STRAIGHT ALLIANCE (GALE-BC, 2nd ed. 2004); Dealing with Name-Calling: a resource produced by GALE (2005). Most of its publications are made available on the group’s website www.galebc.org. These publications reveal some interaction between groups included in this study. For example Challenging Homophobia includes both a July 27, 2004 endorsement letter and a letter of introduction to educators and service providers from Vancouver PFLAG. See Challenging Homophobia, id., Introduction, at 6, 7-8. The acknowledgements also credit both the current Trans Alliance Society, and the former Zenith Foundation, also participants here. See id., Introduction, at 10. Also included is a six-page article by Beth Reis, co-coordinator of the Safe Schools Coalition in Seattle. See Beth Reis, Why Must Public Schools Teach About Sexual Orientation? in Challenging Homophobia, id., Rationale, at 1-6. Ch. 5—Hate Crimes & Social Contention 268 • Increasing awareness of discrimination and harassment on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity • Stopping homophobic slurs, violence and intolerance in educational settings • Effective non-harassment and antidiscrimination policies While GALE-BC emphasizes educational materials, these materials do address anti- LGBT violence and harassment. Its most recent publication, Dealing with Name-Calling, begins with a four-page summary of the April, 2005 decision of the BC Court of Appeal reinstating a human rights tribunal judgment for monetary damages and other relief against a North Vancouver school for failing to protect one of its students from anti-gay bullying and homophobic taunts. The student, Azmi Jubran, “wasn’t gay,” but the Court of Appeal reinstated the judgment in his favor because he had been the victim of physical and verbal assaults that “attributed” negative stereotypes about homosexuality to him. The group summarized the Court of Appeal conclusions criticizing the absence of school Codes of Conduct, Training, Curricula, and Safety practices, addressing anti-LGBT discrimination and violence.150 Perhaps based on the school district’s failure to monitor the continued harassment of Jubran, the 2005 Name- Calling booklet presents a five-point list of anti-gay bullying actions.151 The list concludes with a forceful appeal for monitoring and reporting to ensure enforcement: 5. Report, record and follow-up Follow-up with school behaviour forms, think sheets, referral forms and put the problem on staff committee or staff meeting agendas. Record what happened, where, why, when, who was involved, how many times it has happened, how long it has been going on and who were the bystanders. This can be used to assess and identify repeated behaviour or aggressors and victims and facilitate discussions with parents, police and any other community agencies. Report the problem to your administrator, who will need to follow up with: -School Code of Conduct policy changes -A School-wide Strategy to deal with homophobic slurs -Case-by-Case Intervention plans -Parent and Community education programs152 150 Challenging Homophobia, id., 2-5. 151 Id., at 12-13. 152 Id., at 13. Ch. 5—Hate Crimes & Social Contention 269 In addition to the Jubran case summary and the new reporting and monitoring recommendations, the 2005 Name-Calling Booklet summarizes two other recent events. First, the booklet includes passages from the province-wide inquiry conducted by a task force of the Ministry of Education, concluding in 2003.153 Second, the booklet recounts the debate and adoption of the April 1, 2005 British Columbia School Trustees Association resolution encouraging the adoption of local school district anti-gay harassment policies. This resolution was passed “as a result of a lack of action by the BC Ministry of Education to advocate for LGBT students’ safety in schools.”154 A noticeable difference appears in both the BCSTA resolution and the recommendations of the Name-Calling booklet. The earlier Challenging Homophobia handbook recommends the adoption of student codes of conduct that mirror the language of the BC Human Rights Act. The Name-Calling booklet and the BCSTA resolution, on the other hand, for the first time recommend language exceeding the protections of the Act. After quoting the prohibited grounds of discrimination in the Act, the booklet states: Ensure your school’s code of conduct policy uses specific and inclusive language such as: “Discrimination and harassment towards students or employees on the basis of their real or perceived sexual orientation or gender identification will not be tolerated.” 155 The BCSTA resolution calls for policies that, “prohibit discrimination against, lesbian, gay, bisexual, and trans-identified students, as well as students who are harassed due to perceptions of their gender identity or sexual orientation.”156 By seeking prohibitions against gender identity harassment, both the Name-Calling booklet and the BCSTA resolution are using a local policymaking forum to advocate the expansion of equality rights. The booklet notes that both Vancouver and Victoria school districts have adopted such policies.157 153 Id., at 6, 17. 154 Id., at 17. 155 Dealing with Name-Calling: a resource produced by GALE, supra note 149, at 16. 156 Id., at 17. 157 Id. Ch. 5—Hate Crimes & Social Contention 270 Like its name-calling publication, the 2004 second edition of GALE-BC’s resource manual addresses hate crimes both in schools and in society. 158 One telling aspect of the Challenging Homophobia manual is its utilization of past hate crime inquiry results. The resource manual relates the results of numerous surveys and studies about anti-LGBT school harassment in both the US and Canada. One item, titled “Just the Facts . . . On Gay and Lesbian Students and Schools,” documents “Anti-Gay Violence and Harassment” and summarizes findings from studies by the US Department of Justice, the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force, and one additional US study.159 A second item, titled “More ‘Just the Facts’ . . . On LGBT Students in British Columbia,” compares the results of LGBT youth hate crime studies in the US with a 1992 adolescent health survey and a 1999 LGBT adolescent health survey. While the results cited show similar degrees of “Anti-Gay Violence and Harassment” in schools in BC and the US, the US results include a reference to Department of Justice criminal justice studies.160 No BC criminal justice data are referenced.161 The GALE-BC Challenging Homophobia manual is not organized the same as the Safe Schools Coalition Resource Guides, but it contains the same kinds of information, and significantly similar contention for reform to local and provincial school bullying laws. The Strategies section suggests ways to take action against homophobia; to create a safe school environment, school staff are encouraged to develop and implement clear policies: A safe school environment can only be created when effective policies are in place and enforced. It is a school staff’s obligation to be proactive in ensuring a safe environment for all. Every child needs to feel acceptance, respect and approval to feel a sense of security and belonging. …. 158 Challenging Homophobia in Schools: A K to 12 resource for educators, counselors & administrators to aid in the support of, & education about Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, & Transgender youth & families (hereinafter Resource Manual), supra note 149, Rationale, at 2-3 nn.10, 12-13. 159 Resource Manual, id., Rationale, at 22, 24 nn.18-21. 160 See id., at 23 nn.3, 14, 19, 20, 22, 26, & 24 n.18. 161 Id., Rationale, at 25-26 (citing Being Out: Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender Youth in BC: An Adolescent Health Survey (McCreary Centre Society, 1992 & 1999)). Ch. 5—Hate Crimes & Social Contention 271 At the school level there must be clearly delineated and enforced policy which ensures that schools are safe places, free from discrimination and harassment, for all people. Such policies need specifically to address issues of sexual orientation. Policies need to be publicized to the entire school community, so that the consequences of unacceptable behavior, and the procedures for dealing with it, are clear to all.162 Similarly, the strategies section concludes with suggestions for training “to enable staff to recognize and respond to individuals and groups who have perpetrated homophobic harassment and violence,” and strategies to “Lobby and support local, district, provincial and national education organizations”: Encourage the Ministry of Education and school boards to enact and enforce anti- homophobia and sexual harassment policies that explicitly include sexual orientation. These non-discrimination policies must protect the rights of teachers to discuss sexuality in an inclusive, accurate, and specific manner. As well, encourage all levels of teachers’ associations to include sexual orientation in all non-discrimination statements, whether in policy or in the collective agreement and to establish and support initiatives that deal with gay, lesbian, bisexual and transgender(ed) issues.163 To protect students experiencing anti-LBGT violence in schools, staff are encouraged to use prevention, including discussions utilizing “teachable moments,” and an explicit student code of conduct and strong disciplinary actions.164 And, staff members are invited to “Consult with the police liaison officer regarding LGBT issues.”165 Among the support resources for students are “School Boards that specifically support youth through anti-homophobia education and policies to protect students from anti-gay harassment (i.e. Greater Victoria (SD #61)) and Vancouver (SD #39),” “Police and School Liaison Officers,” and “Media Coverage.”166 Strategies for teachers include a “Teacher’s Self-Evaluation of Bias & Behavior,” meant to reveal a “hidden curriculum” of bias.167 When dealing with LGBT families, teachers are asked to “Inform parents (LGB or otherwise) of any harassment/intimidation directed at their child, for whatever 162 Id., Strategies, at 1-2. 163 Resource Manual, supra note 149, Strategies, at 5. 164 Id., Strategies, at 7. 165 Id., Strategies, at 8. 166 Id., Strategies, at 16. 167 Id., Strategies, at 17. Ch. 5—Hate Crimes & Social Contention 272 reason.”168 But, while some monitoring and tracking of incidents is implicit in ensuring an enforced policy, the manual does not explicitly detail incident reporting and monitoring policies as a recommended strategy. Like its larger publications, GALE-BC’s newsletter, GALE Force, stresses the field of education but includes explicit references to hate crimes. The March/April issue leads with an article about demands for province-wide schools policies against homophobic conduct, “including both emotional and physical abuse.”169 The article recounts the report of the 2003 Safe Schools Task Force which led to Ministry of Education guidelines, but it criticizes both the Task Force recommendations and the guidelines: The former neglects to make any specific recommendations around homophobia, despite detailing numerous examples in the body of the report; the latter encourages school boards to include references to homophobia in Codes of Conduct, but doesn’t mandate such inclusion. The issue reprints articles from both the United States and Canada including articles about “hate crimes” in schools. A second lengthy article, reprinted from Vancouver’s Xtra! West newspaper, details criticism of a proposed provincial Safe Schools Act recently introduced by the former Task Force chair. The article noted that the bill “specifically aims to prohibit discrimination and harassment on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity.” Critics, including GALE-BC members, explained that while the bill addressed school codes of conduct, it would not “make these codes mandatory and, as such, they say school boards will still be left with the option to do nothing.”170 In addition to omitting a firm mandate, the critics pointed out the absence of any educational or training requirements to introduce the problem of homophobic harassment to school communities outside those already enforcing policies in Vancouver and Victoria. 168 Id., Strategies, at 27. 169 GALE Force, The Newsletter for Friends and Families of the Gay and Lesbian Educators of BC (Vol. 15 No. 2 Mar./Apr. 2005). 170 See id., Too Little. Too Late? (reprinting Jeremy Hainsworth, Safer Schools: Critics Challenge Mayencourt’s New Education Bill, XTRA! WEST, Feb. 3, 2005). Ch. 5—Hate Crimes & Social Contention 273 One article addressed a recent hate-related crime in Vancouver that had no apparent connection to schools.171 The article recounted the verdicts and sentences against the two young offenders and two adults who killed Aaron Webster in Stanley Park in November, 2001. The newsletter article appended the following note: Editor’s note: Cran was sentenced to six years on February 8th, 2005. The judge who heard the case did not characterize it as a hate crime based upon sexual orientation which would have resulted in a longer sentence for Cran. The queer community was outraged that Webster’s murder was not acknowledged as a gay bashing. Adjacent to the Webster story, the newsletter described a “hate crime” that was being investigated at a public school in the US. In sum, the information practices of GALE-BC clearly include both providing educational materials and advocating for anti-bullying policies in local and provincial laws. And, at least to the extent that acts of bullying and harassment in schools sometimes constitute hate crimes, these activities constitute contention in the hate crime field. News coverage and commentary from Vancouver’s XTRA! West newspaper illustrates the perceived connection between the problem of school bullying and harassment and the curriculum in schools.172 Robin Perelle’s commentary connects demands for curriculum inclusion with demands for safety from homophobic violence, with a reference to the pending provincial safe schools legislation: I want to exist. And I want our province’s youth—gay and straight—to know it. I want them to learn, from the earliest possible age, that I am part of their world and have every right to share it. I want regular queer references in classes to reach the clueless kids, the friendly kids, the angry kids, the ignorant kids, and especially the kids currently indoctrinated by parents, churches and other powerful adults to hate us and try to hurt us. . . . . We already know we can’t leave it up to our school districts to take the lead and explicitly prohibit homophobic harassment. We tried that. Only two 171 See id., Terri Theodore, Mixed Verdicts in Vancouver Gay Murder, CANADIAN PRESS, Dec. 10, 2004. 172 Compare Lori Kittleberg, Education, Oppal says classes exclude queers, Corren complaint yields new course & promise of review, id., at 7, 9 (B.C. Attorney General praising creation of elective grade 12 course), with Robin Perelle, Naked Eye, Some Victory, id., at 5 (“one little elective course ain’t gonna do it.”). Ch. 5—Hate Crimes & Social Contention 274 districts rose to the challenge. Vancouver and Victoria. That’s it. Two districts out of 60. Two more districts at least mention sexual orientation in their policies. The rest are silent. Hardly a pass in anyone’s book. I hope no one in government thinks I’ll forget about the Safe Schools bill now that I’ve been offered a shiny, new elective course. 173 Because of the perceived connection between school violence and school curriculum, and because of the placement of school violence in an educational framework, in other words, supporters of provincial and local anti-bullying policies are apt to consider their advocacy as related to education rather than hate crimes. Yet, the two fields clearly overlap. 5.4.3 Comparison The differences between the Seattle and Vancouver school and education groups were negligible. Both groups engage in contention about hate-related events, but both do so primarily through the vehicle of educational materials meant to prevent school bullying and harassment. The groups share a common interest in the passage of school anti-bullying legislation, and the legislation sought by each group is meant to implement standardized educational and anti- harassment policies at the local school board level. The Washington Legislature has adopted such legislation; whereas, the B.C. Legislature has not. Neither B.C. nor Washington has any legal mechanism for systematically collecting data about school bullying and harassment on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity or expression. The radical similarity of groups that monitor school violence in the two locations may seem irrelevant, but there is a reason for the inclusion of these groups in the study. As will be discussed in the concluding analysis of Chapter 6, nongovernmental groups that contend in the hate crime field are significantly influenced by their local legal environment. In British Columbia and Washington, school anti-harassment policies are regulated at almost the identical locations within government. This fact of legal logistics makes school safety groups an ideal 173 Perelle, Naked Eye, id. (adding quip, “one little elective course ain’t gonna do it.”). Ch. 5—Hate Crimes & Social Contention 275 basis for comparison with groups that contest the classification and exclusion of hate crimes by police investigators. 5.5 Family Support Groups (PFLAG) Chapters of Parents and Friends of Lesbians and Gays (PFLAG) exist throughout both Canada and the United States. These groups share more than a common organizational name— they are part of the same international organization. PFLAG representatives provided interviews in both Vancouver and Seattle. Like the school safety groups at both sites, the PFLAG groups utilize extremely similar information and contention practices in response to hate-related events. Therefore, they are only briefly described here. 5.5.1 PFLAG—Seattle The Seattle PFLAG group referred me to Wendy Wartes, the Chair of the PFLAG chapter in nearby Bellevue, Washington.174 I met Wartes when I attended one of the chapter’s monthly meetings. The meetings follow a standard three-part PFLAG format: (1) introductions and expressions of “support” and confidential sharing in small groups; (2) an educational event with questions and answers; and, (3) suggestions for advocacy, “These may include groups to attend, letters to write, testimony before city, county or state officials, and marches and rallies.”175 Though she indicated “faith” in the Seattle Police, relative to police outside the city, the group Chair gave me several examples of recent advocacy by the group related to hate crimes in Seattle, in particular the Micah Painter attack. In response to calls for support, the group had raised money for medical and legal costs, attended a courthouse rally in support of Painter, and 174 See Hate Crime Study, Rough Cut, Nov. 28, 2005, DVD, Menu Title—Families. 175 See Letter, Welcome to PFLAG Bellevue (undated) (on file with the author). Ch. 5—Hate Crimes & Social Contention 276 joined with other groups to attend the trial itself to show the jury and court that Painter had widespread community support. She also recalled that group members had participated in vigils for Matthew Shepard, the gay college student killed in Laramie Wyoming in 1998. In July, 2005, an evangelical Christian group scheduled a conference to coincide with the Seattle Pride weekend. In response, the Seattle-area PFLAG group organized a counter- conference timed to coincide with the evangelical conference. The flier produced for the event stated, “People and clergy of all faiths are invited, regardless of their position on homosexuality. An atmosphere of mutual respect will be maintained.”176 At the conference, PFLAG organizers distributed a booklet produced by Soulforce, a national “interfaith” group. The booklet, A False Focus on My Family, details the five “Violent Claims” and “Strange Science” utilized by the evangelical group. 177 Several of the “violent claims” critiques emphasized the connection between religious evangelism and hate crimes against LGBT people.178 The Bellevue chapter newsletter is called The Banner. 179 The spring 2005 issue presented an article about a recent lobby day in support of a statewide antidiscrimination bill: “Seven cities have already passed anti-discrimination laws—Bill HB1515 will make discrimination due to sexual orientation against the law in the whole state.”180 Another article described the emergence of a new advocacy group in the Seattle area: “ACTION Northwest, a new network of like-minded progressive organizations . . . . A new mission to make some grand changes[.]” The formation of the group occurred at a recent rally: “other people had the same 176 Flier, LoveWelcomesAll, Achieving Emotional & Spiritual Health in Families with Gay & Lesbian Youth (2005) (available at www.lovewelcomesall-wa.org) (on file with the author). 177 Booklet, A False Focus on My Family, Why every person of faith should be deeply troubled by Dr. James Dobson’s dangerous & misleading words about the lesbian, gay, bisexual, & transgender community (Soulforce, Inc. 2004) (on file with the author). 178 Dear Dr. Dobson: An Open Letter Video to Focus on the Family (Soulforce, Inc. 2005), cited in Booklet, id. 179 THE BANNER, THE VOICE OF SEATTLE & BELLEVUE PARENTS, FAMILIES & FRIENDS OF LESBIANS, GAYS, BISEXUALS & TRANSGENDERS (Vol. 2005, Issue 1). 180 See Linda Baker, Lobby Day, id., at 1-2. Ch. 5—Hate Crimes & Social Contention 277 great idea. Other people joined this movement that day including equal marriage proponents and peace purveyors. . . . acting out in a constructive way[.]”181 Like the national organization’s founder, the local Bellevue Chair became involved in PFLAG to support her gay son. She explained her fears for her son at the time Matthew Shepard was killed in Wyoming. She emphasized to him that he should not walk alone after dark near his college. The Bellevue PFLAG maintains a news clipping binder that includes articles about its activities and about hate crimes against LGBT people. Group members also maintain close contact with other members across the country in an email network; when a hate crime or other important event occurs, they share the news with each other by email. Like the Vancouver chapter, the Bellevue group maintains a library of books and videotapes.182 5.5.2 PFLAG—Vancouver The Vancouver chapter of PFLAG engages in some activities related to anti-LGBT hate crimes, both generally and in response to specific cases. Its primary informational brochure, printed in both English and French, is produced by PFLAG Canada, with the addition of internet and telephone contact information for the local chapter. 183 Although it does not expressly mention hate crimes, the group’s brochure does state three broad functions including both services and information practices: 1. To provide information to local Chapters and Contacts on Canadian and international issues relevant to sexual orientation and gender identity so that they can better assist individuals, families and friends in their local communities. 2. To allow all the PFLAG Chapters and Contacts to have one strong, supportive and cohesive voice to address social and systematic events and issues that affect sexual orientation and/or gender identity in Canada. 181 Id., at 2. 182 See Hate Crime Study, Rough Cut, Nov. 28, 2005, DVD, Menu Title—Families. 183 See www.pflagvancouver.com. Ch. 5—Hate Crimes & Social Contention 278 3. To provide local Chapters and Contacts access to extensive print and published resource material.184 The local Vancouver PFLAG distributes its own one-page “Recommended Reading” flier naming general references about, for example, gay and lesbian children and transsexualism in families and the workplace.185 The majority of Vancouver PFLAG activities occur in context of its meetings. Susan Harman, the local chapter President indicated that meeting attendance and involvement of members proceed in cycles, with parents of LGBT children becoming involved during the “coming out” process and tending to decrease their involvement afterward. She described a slogan used by PFLAG “when you no longer need PFLAG, PFLAG needs you,” which is used to encourage family members and friends to stay involved after the “coming out” process to assist others.186 Harman noted one couple involved in the local chapter whose child had committed suicide during “coming out.” After what they saw as a failure of the courts to impose hate crime penalties against Aaron Webster’s adult killers, this couple and the chapter President jointly submitted a letter to the editor to a Vancouver daily newspaper. The editorial exemplifies the kind of advocacy practiced by family support groups in relation to hate crimes: As parents of gay children, we deplore the mild sentences given to the killers of Aaron Webster. These young men went to Stanley Park intending to cause trouble, and an innocent man died. In a province that has made great strides in moving towards equality for gays, how can judgments like this be acceptable? The family of Aaron Webster has had to suffer twice. First, they experienced the death of a loved one. Then they had to watch while that death was devalued by light sentences given his attackers. As members of Pflag, an organization for the parents, families and friends of lesbians and gays, we sympathize with the Webster family. Like all parents, we love our children and want what is best for them. Instead, we must fear that they will be victimized as Webster was. 184 PFLAG Canada, Struggling with issues of sexual orientation and/or gender identity? We can help! (available at www.pflag.ca). 185 PFLAG Vancouver, Recommended Reading (May, 1999) (printed list); see also Suggested Reading Materials http://www.pflagvancouver.com/read.html (accessed Feb. 29, 2008). 186 See Hate Crime Study, Rough Cut, Nov. 28, 2005, DVD, Menu Title—Families. Ch. 5—Hate Crimes & Social Contention 279 We urge that stronger sentences be given to the perpetrators of such hate crimes. As a society, we are all diminished when we appear to condone these crimes by failing to take adequate measures against them.187 Thus, although its resources ebb and flow, the Vancouver PFLAG chapter nevertheless practices advocacy in response to hate-related events. 5.5.3 Comparison Not surprisingly, the PFLAG groups in Vancouver and Seattle are extremely similar, although their education and advocacy activities vary according to current events in each city. But, PFLAG members in both Seattle and Vancouver responded by participating in public acts of support for the victims of allegedly homophobic hate crimes during the course of this study. 5.6 Transgender Rights Groups Nongovernmental groups provide services and advocacy for transgender people in both Seattle and Vancouver. I conducted an informal telephone interview with a representative of Ingersoll Gender Center in Seattle, and a videotaped interview with a member of Trans Alliance Society in Vancouver. I also invited a member of Transaction Canada and EGALE Canada to participate in the feedback meeting in Vancouver. And, through the Trans Alliance Society member, I also obtained documents from a former Vancouver organization, the Zenith Society. Like the PFLAG groups, the Transgender Rights Groups in Vancouver and Seattle bear a marked resemblance, with a couple of notable exceptions, and they are described only briefly. 5.6.1 Ingersoll Gender Center—Seattle I spoke to Walker Burch-Lewis by telephone about the Ingersoll Gender Center in Seattle.188 The Center mostly provides support groups for transgendered persons and public 187 See Hate Crime Study, Rough Cut, Nov. 28, 2005, DVD, Menu Title—Families; see also, Letter to the Editor, Light sentences increased family’s suffering, VANCOUVER SUN (undated) (on file with the author). Ch. 5—Hate Crimes & Social Contention 280 education. The group was created in 1977, and its founder is Marsha Botser. In the early days, the group provided only educational programs. Now it coordinates with other organizations in a larger network to provide educational programs, especially to promote cultural competency among health care providers. Its work is predominantly peer-support, however, and the IGC provides frequent support groups with volunteer “peer” facilitators and a referral process that involves volunteer therapists. While much of IGC’s activities are unrelated to hate crimes and only loosely related to social contention, several activities are particularly relevant. First, according to Burch-Lewis, some of the language now contained in the Seattle municipal ordinances, including gender identity and expression, “came out of Ingersoll . . . as well as other folks.” The Olympia, Washington ordinances, which include transgender-specific language to prohibit employment and housing discrimination, were written by Marsha Botser and one other person from Ingersoll.189 Second, like its Vancouver counterparts, the IGC’s activities include an annual Trans Days of Remembrance (TDOR) event in Seattle, and the IGC has hosted this event. For a number of years the TDOR was held outside, but it was often plagued by rain and cold, so in December, 2005, it was held indoors at the Seattle LGBT Center, making it more central and public. The indoor program included two elements, followed by the traditional remembrance event. First, Verbena held its annual Transform Health Project Brunch at the Center on the morning of the TDOR. Second, at mid-day, the community-based self-defense advocacy group Home-Alive presented a transgender and gender variant self-defense workshop. Organizers 188 Interview Notes (on file with the author). Our interview was not recorded; however, most of the information provided is also available on the Ingersoll Gender Center’s website. See http://www.ingersollcenter.org/ (accessed Feb. 29, 2008). 189 Other examples of local laws more protective of the rights of transgender people are Thurston County code provisions. Burch-Lewis was not sure if any particular hate-related events led to these ordinances. Ch. 5—Hate Crimes & Social Contention 281 drew a “logical” connection between the commemoration and political activities, including support for state antidiscrimination legislation.190 Third, current anti-violence efforts include an ad hoc King County Working Group organized in response to anti-trans incidents in county jails in 2005. Two earlier jail assaults in 2005 had not yet been made public, but more recently, in December, 2005, an additional incident had occurred during an anti-war student walkout. During the walk-out, police apparently targeted two or three gender variant protesters for their only arrests, and they had been harassed at detention facilities. Since the arrests, activists had held a meeting to get organized, followed by presentations to the County Commission on Civil Rights and a press release.191 At the time of our interview organizers were researching model policies and local ordinances and planning to lobby for local legislation. But they meant to do their “homework” before presenting their demands. Particularly, they were preparing recommendations from other regions for adoption locally. 192 The follow-up response had been “fairly good,” and, the initial response on the day of the incident was “amazing and impressive.” Largely through the “awesome” work of Action Northwest, organizers identified folks who knew the individuals arrested and arranged for immediate and culturally competent “jail solidarity” support at the jail, even before those arrested arrived.193 190 Not everyone agreed with a switch from a solemn commemoration to a more political event, but Burch-Lewis felt the differences of opinion coincided with those who want to focus on their own transitioning process and those who want to ally with a more lesbian and gay movement for law reform. The conflict over politicization is more apparent in the trans community than among queer activists in the more political LGB community. According to Burch-Lewis, differences of opinion are caused by the particular fears of disclosure common among transgender people. Disagreements also arise about whether to pursue a health focus versus legislation. 191 So far, one county commissioner, Tom Rassmussen, had been particularly supportive. 192 The Ingersoll Gender Center website now features its efforts to establish trans-inclusive policies for the King County Jail. See King County Trans Jail Policy Project Report, available at http://www.ingersollcenter.org/?q=jail- policy (accessed Feb. 29, 2008). Action Northwest submitted a letter of support for the IGC Jail Project, and it is reprinted on the IGC website. See Action Northwest Letter of Support, dated Apr. 23, 2006, available at http://www.ingersollcenter.org/jail-policy-actionnw-letter (accessed Feb. 29, 2008). 193 The “flash” mobilization during the protest and coordination in activism overall created an opportunity for solidarity between transgender rights activists and activists in other fields. The mobilization by Action Northwest and others used technology like cell phones, and later included calls for support posted on both the Action Northwest and Seattle Independent Media websites, and at the time of our interview, an article was forthcoming in the Seattle Gay News and action updates were continuing on the Action Northwest website. Ch. 5—Hate Crimes & Social Contention 282 A fourth area of activity is more directly related to this study. At the time of our interview, IGC generally deferred hate crime training, monitoring and education to other groups. Burch-Lewis identified the National Center for Transgender Equality (NCTE) as the leading source for trans-related hate crime information. The NCTE has developed a draft policy workbook to influence national hate crime organizing, and it provides information and educational materials for activists throughout the U.S., which it makes available through its website.194 Burch-Lewis provided the “personal view” that, while national organizing has been successful, transgender activists “need to get our shit together here” for the city and state level “elements.” Aware that statistics for hate crimes motivated by gender identity are available in Seattle, Burch-Lewis expressed a reluctance to demand enhanced penalties in view of the need for alternatives to the “prison industrial complex.” Burch-Lewis described the history of anti-transgender violence in the Seattle area—“not too many” incidents had occurred, except for “one big public” incident before the 1990s, during the “very early days” for transgender organizing. After our interview, however, IGC began a new research project, which reveals more specific information about hate-related experiences of trans-gendered persons in Seattle. The project, called the Perspectives Northwest Survey, began in June, 2006 and culminated in the release of a Report in January, 2008.195 The online Survey addressed numerous questions about the demographics of gender identity and expression in the Northwestern United States, but responses to three questions about hate crimes are relevant here: • Have you ever been the victim of a hate crime? [“yes” 30%] • If you answered “yes” to the previous question, (victim of a hate crime) was this due to your gender expression? [“yes” 54.6%] 194 See www.NCTEquality.org. 195 See Perspectives Northwest Survey Report: Transgender and Gender Variant Community Needs Assessment Survey, Survey Period: June 2006 – June 2007 (Ingersoll Gender Center, Seattle, Jan. 9, 2008), available at http://www.ourlives.tv/library/downloadables.php (accessed Feb. 29, 2008). A Research Assistant from the University of Washington School of Social Work was a member of the Survey’s core leadership team. See id., at 5. Ch. 5—Hate Crimes & Social Contention 283 • If you answered “yes” to the previous question, did you seek help or support via services within the Trans community (support groups, mental health, legal resources, etc)? [“no” 83.8%]196 In addition to the numerical results, the report reprinted several narratives documenting informants’ personal experiences with hate crimes.197 Burch-Lewis was also aware of the organizing by Action Northwest in response to the homophobic attack on Micah Painter and the subsequent court proceedings and press coverage. It is worth noting that the Perspectives Northwest Survey Report emerged shortly after the Painter cases, the Ballard attack, and the contention surrounding the King County Jail policies. 5.6.2 Trans Alliance Society—Vancouver Trans Alliance Society (TAS) Treasurer Gayle Roberts met with me for an interview in Vancouver and provided a collection of documents from the now disbanded Zenith Foundation. Zenith, the predecessor to TAS, published a news digest, and Roberts was a member of the Board. She described Zenith as minimally viable, with only about 150 members.198 Roberts described the TAS as an umbrella group. Among the organizations that provide services and resources to transgender persons in the Vancouver area are the Vancouver LGBT Centre and the Transgender Health Program of the Vancouver Coastal Health Authority. For victims of violence Roberts pointed to the group Women Against Violence Against Women (WAVAW) as the “trans-friendly” provider. She distinguished a different Vancouver organization, noting they had recently barred Kimberly Nixon, a transgendered person, from their volunteer training program.199 196 See Perspectives Northwest Survey Report, id., at 45-46. Three-fourths of respondents lived in Washington State; 3.1% resided outside the United States. See id., at 34. 197 See id., at 50, 51, 71 (references to “hate” or “hate crime”). 198 Interview Notes, Trans Alliance Society (on file with author); see also Trans Alliance Society, Videotaped Interview (on file with author). 199 See id. Ch. 5—Hate Crimes & Social Contention 284 Roberts acknowledged that she did not have much information about hate crimes, but she was able to provide information about health-related services for transgender persons, in addition to extensive documentation from the former Zenith Foundation. Though not directly related to hate crimes, Roberts was drafting a lengthy article critical of a public television program titled “Becoming Aden” recently aired by the Canadian Broadcasting Association (CBC). The program portrayed the difficulties encountered by a transitioning transsexual but did so using negative stereotypes, including drug abuse.200 The development of the VCHA Transgender Health Program is described in an article appearing in the local weekly newspaper XTRA! West.201 The article quotes both Gayle Roberts and Tami Starlight, another participant in this study: Jamie Lee Hamilton used to sit on the advisory body, but she took issue with the way it operated. She claims that from the beginning, there was no meaningful dialog within the committee, a lack of transparency and a lack of effective consultation with the trans community. “This program has not been responsive to the community,” she says. “I don’t think those issues have been resolved.” Gayle Roberts, a member of the advisory committee who transitioned under the old Gender Clinic, has been involved with the THP from its inception. She explains that while the members of the committee act as a liaison between the THP and the local health authority, when it comes down to it they essentially play an advisory role and don’t have the power to enact immediate change. She says, however, that VCH has been receptive to complaints and is doing the best it can with limited resources. “I believe the professionals are doing their very best to meet needs,” she says. “I believe that the organization is growing in a healthy way and responding well to any complaints.” . . . . But, Tami Starlight, a trans activist who was part of the THP’s education working group, agrees with Hamilton that the program is not responsive. The program isn’t doing enough to help the marginalized such as transgendered sex workers, homeless youth and First Nations people, she says. Starlight left the education board after a year, partially due to personal issues with the previous director, Josua Goldberg, but mainly because she felt the advisory committee lacked community consultation—leading to a feeling of disenfranchisement in the community. 200 Id. 201 Sondi Bruner, Resignations & strapped resources: New Transgender Health Program gets mixed reviews., XTRA! WEST, Sept. 29, 2005, at 7, 9. Ch. 5—Hate Crimes & Social Contention 285 She says that a program that doesn’t fully connect with the community and its needs leaves empowerment just out of reach. “They’re holding the fruit over people’s heads and seeing how far they can jump, she says. Hamilton is also concerned about the new clinic’s lack of medical services. With no doctors on staff, she says it’s harder for trans people interested in surgery to find medical care, which could prevent them from taking active steps to transition, such as beginning hormone therapy.202 Nevertheless, the article concludes based on testimonials from several clients and others that the THP has been helpful: “despite its alleged problems, transgendered people who use services at the THP find it extremely helpful after years of dealing with the frustrations of mainstream health attitudes towards the trans community.” And, the article quotes one staff member who identified the THP as a model program: The THP is providing a template for trans communities all over North America because it’s the only transgendered health program embedded within a health system that has people from the trans community working for it.203 The TAS uses an application form to identify its members, and it maintains a website with downloadable resources and links. Roberts gave a brief explanation of what she would expect of any group seeking to oppose trans-phobic violence: “I think if this is an issue that groups want to get involved in, then they’ve got to set up some kind of mechanism where they record it and it no longer becomes purely anecdotal.”204 Except for the WEAVE Survey, though, my interviews were unable to uncover any such initiative tailored to trans-phobic violence in Vancouver. 202 Id., at 9. 203 Id. The same edition of XTRA! West provides coverage of a controversy about the Surrey (suburban Vancouver) School District decision to ban the play The Laramie Project, about the killing of Matthew Shepard in Laramie, Wyoming in 1998. As the article notes, the same school district battled to the Canadian Supreme Court, but finally failed in its efforts to ban “three gay-themed children’s books.” This suit was initiated by GALE-BC member James Chamberlain. A good, nearly simultaneous, parallel appears between the movement to present the play The Laramie Project in both the United States and Canada and The Colour of Justice, the fourth in a series called The Tribunal Plays in Great Britain. Richard Norton-Taylor, THE COLOUR OF JUSTICE: BASED ON THE TRANSCRIPTS OF THE STEPHEN LAWRENCE INQUIRY (Oberon Books, London, 1999). Both are innovative types of contention by nongovernmental social groups, each re-presenting the legal (and social) inquiries triggered by individual hate- related events. 204 See Hate Crime Study, Rough Cut, Nov. 28, 2005, DVD, Menu Title—Research & Reporting. Ch. 5—Hate Crimes & Social Contention 286 5.6.3 Comparison In addition to a representative of TAS in Vancouver, I also met with Tami Starlight, an activist working with both EGALE Canada & Transaction Canada. Although I was unable to arrange a separate interview, I did invite Ms. Starlight to attend the Vancouver feedback session to view the composite video and provide comments. Her comments are incorporated below as part of the comparison. The video used for feedback included footage from the Trans Days of Remembrance in Vancouver. The feedback from Seattle confirmed that parallel activities occur in Seattle each year. I attended the Trans Days of Remembrance in Vancouver in December, 2005 and recorded the march through downtown and several of the speeches by prominent LGBT and Ally Members of Parliament. I found the attendance, and the speeches, of the several national legislators remarkable. And, although my later informants gave me details of a very successful Trans Day of Remembrance in Seattle, I do not believe any prominent national legislators attended. At the Vancouver TDOR, I also recorded the presentation of event organizer Tami Starlight. Tami agreed to participate in the study as a representative of both the national groups EGALE Canada & Transaction Canada. The “Remembrance” event furnished an excellent example of social contention for the production of a particular kind of knowledge about trans- phobic violence. Tami joined in the “feedback” event at the Vancouver Centre and was able to provide some of the most perceptive comments. Overall, transgender rights groups in Seattle and Vancouver both focus significantly on health care. Unlike Vancouver, Seattle transgender rights activists have succeeded in promoting local laws prohibiting discrimination based on gender identity or gender expression. And, soon Ch. 5—Hate Crimes & Social Contention 287 after the conclusion of the interviews for this study, Seattle groups had successfully conducted an anti-violence survey tailored to trans-phobic violence. 5.7 Police Hate Crime Units Because this study focuses on nongovernmental groups that monitor hate crimes, a detailed analysis of the information practices of police hate crime units in the two jurisdictions has not been attempted. An introduction to the legal and policy principles applicable to these units is set out in Chapter 3. This section compares the practices of the police hate crime units, but only to the extent necessary to provide a context for analyzing the nongovernmental groups that are the primary focus of the study. It is worth noting that, while I did interview a representative from each police unit, neither would allow any form of recording. And, my public record requests to the two agencies met with similarly reluctant responses. The Vancouver Police Department did provide a 2002 research study analyzing its homophobic hate crime data for Vancouver’s West End. And, I did receive a copy of a small procedure manual for police and crown attorneys setting out guidelines for hate crime investigations and prosecutions. Each unit provided access to its departmental procedures manual—both were available online during the course of the study. And, Seattle’s hate crime statistics are available online at the FBI UCR website. The Vancouver Police Department did release transcripts from a series of news conferences held by investigators in the days after the Aaron Webster killing in 2001. I also received copies of training materials used by both hate crime units. But, both departments substantially denied my requests for documents directly related to the cases presented in Chapter 4. Ch. 5—Hate Crimes & Social Contention 288 The Seattle Police Department denied my request for information about the Micah Painter case, alleging it was an ongoing investigation—even though the two assailants had by the time of my request been convicted, sentenced, and waived their right to an appeal. It is theoretically possible that their companions could be charged as accessories, but this seems implausible. Although I followed up on my requests by providing additional information requested, I chose not to appeal the denial of access in either case. While it is a form of invasive second-guessing, a review of the police narrative reports often provides the only documentation available to determine whether the investigating and supervisory officers were adhering to their training and properly implementing the law. Therefore, I commend a thorough review of these materials to a future scholar. Unlike the incident reports, however, I was able to review the written policies of both departments as they relate to bias-related incidents. The Seattle Police Department Manual is available online,205 as is the Vancouver Police Department, Regulations & Procedures Manual.206 The duties of the Bias Crimes Coordinator are set out in the Seattle Manual: (5) Bias Crimes Coordinator: The Bias Crimes Coordinator will coordinate the Department’s efforts against “hate crimes” by handling directly or coordinating the follow-up investigation on all malicious harassment cases. This unit will compile and report on all hate crimes as required by state and federal statutes, and provide training and information on “hate crimes” to Department staff, other law enforcement agencies, and the general public.207 The Manual also delineates strict procedures to be followed by officers investigating suspected bias crimes.208 Reports are “handled on a priority basis,” and the Manual requires a “thorough investigation.” Investigating officers are required to notify their superiors and forward copies of arrest packets and incident reports to the Bias Crimes Coordinator. The Bias Crimes Coordinator 205 See http://www.seattle.gov/police/publications/Policy/SPD_Manual.pdf (accessed Feb. 3, 2008). 206 See http://vancouver.ca/police/Planning/RPM/index.htm (accessed Feb. 3, 2008). 207 Seattle Police Department Policies & Procedures Manual, § 1.049A(III)(A)(1)(a)(5) (effective Nov. 22, 2005). 208 See Seattle Police Department Policies & Procedures Manual, § 3.097 (Malicious Harassment) (effective Sept. 26, 2007). Ch. 5—Hate Crimes & Social Contention 289 is tasked with receiving copies of bias-related arrest packets and incident reports, conducting follow-up investigations, and maintaining an official database: The Bias Crime Coordinator is responsible for follow-up investigation of malicious harassment incidents and will receive all arrest packets. . . . . In the event the circumstances are questionable, the incident shall be treated as a bias crime initially, all appropriate procedures shall be followed, and all the appropriate boxes on the Incident Report shall be checked, including the “Bias Crime” box. The Bias Crimes Coordinator shall review all case reports identified as malicious harassment and maintain detailed data on all incidents and copies of all reports.209 The Vancouver Police Department Manual also addresses hate crime investigations, but with substantially less detail than its Seattle counterpart. First, the Vancouver Manual makes no mention of the officer assigned to the BC Hate Crime Team. The only reference to a specialized unit or official for hate crime investigations is to the Diversity Relations Unit, which according to the Manual is to receive a copy of reports with “bias overtones”: 7. Incidents Involving Bias Overtones A bias related incident is defined under Section 718.2 [quoting section]. Whenever an investigating member, complainant, victim or witness, believes that an incident has occurred as a result of a bias overtone, the investigating member shall note the occurrence in the GO report and route the report to the Sergeant i/c Diversity Relations Section. Reports shall include full details of any bias overtones, including any verbatim racist comments that are made. Comments regarding the validity of the allegations, and specific reasons to substantiate any doubts, shall be included in a report when the investigator believes that the complaint may be unfounded.210 The Diversity Relations Unit is part of a Community and Police Incident Response Team; the Unit responds to an incident, “if there is a diversity issue present.” Its role is not to investigate but to manage information in “response to potentially serious and controversial incidents.” 209 Seattle Police Department Policies & Procedures Manual, § 1.049A(III)(A)(1)(a)(5) (Nov. 22, 2005). 210 Vancouver Police Department, Regulations & Procedures Manual, § 28.01(7) (Report Writing) (effective Jan. 21, 2002). A “GO” report is a General Occurrence report entered into the PRIME records software. The requirement of a GO report is deceptive, because investigating officers have the option to render a GO report either “private”—available for review by only a limited number of officers—or “invisible”—unavailable for review by anyone, including crown counsel. See Vancouver Manual, id., § 45.12 (Making Records Private or Invisible). As the Manual notes, rendering reports private or invisible can hamper, “information sharing and the collection of statistics.” Id. (Policy). Ch. 5—Hate Crimes & Social Contention 290 Nothing in the Manual tells the fate of reports routed to the Diversity Relations Unit, and nothing requires the maintenance of a database or the reporting of statistics related to bias incidents. My interviews at each site revealed additional details about the application of the written policies in practice. 5.7.1 Vancouver Police Department & BC Hate Crime Team Sergeant Mark Graf of the Vancouver Police Department provided both typed responses to my list of interview questions and an in-person interview.211 Sergeant Graf was paired with an RCMP officer and together these two officers constituted the BC Hate Crime Team. Although Graf was employed by the Vancouver Police Department, he worked out of the Surrey offices of the RCMP, which housed the physical offices of the Hate Crime Team. 212 Like the Seattle Bias Crimes Coordinator, Sergeant Graf declined to permit a recorded interview, but I was allowed to take notes.213 Sergeant Graf also provided several documents at the time of our interview. First, I obtained a one-page flier published by the Vancouver Police Department describing the BC Hate Crime Team, and its Mandate: The mandate of the Hate Crime Team is to ensure the effective identification, investigation, and prosecution of crimes motivated by hate. The Team will liaise with communities to assist them in identifying hate activity that is criminal and hate activity that can be pursued with the assistance of Multiculturalism B.C. through human rights legislation.214 211 See BC Hate Crime Team Interview Notes & Typewritten Responses, dated Sept. 29, 2005 (on file with the author). 212 Cameron Murdock of the Anti-Violence Pilot Project mentioned the existence of a Victoria, BC hate crime unit or office. I chose to exclude this office from my analysis here because Victoria lies outside even the extended suburban boundaries of Vancouver, and because I was able to contact the BC Hate Crime Team in Surrey. 213 See Email from Sergeant Graf to author, dated Sept. 28, 2005 (on file with author). 214 Flier, BC Provincial Hate Crime Team (City of Vancouver, Vancouver Police Department, undated) (on file with author). A description of the BC Hate Crime Team and its contact information appear on the Vancouver Public Library website. See http://www2.vpl.vancouver.bc.ca/dbs/redbook/orgpages/4/4735.html (accessed Sept. 16, 2005). The listing gives the Surrey RCMP contact information for the Team, along with the following summary: Tracks and follows-up reports of hate crimes, coordinating with local police as appropriate. People may call this office to obtain general information or to speak to police about a hate Ch. 5—Hate Crimes & Social Contention 291 Second, Sergeant Graf provided copies of the set of slides used during training provided by the Hate Crime Team to officers throughout the province. The six presentation slides were captioned: Mandate & Definition, Hate Crime Team, Hate Crime Sentencing Provisions, Hate Crime Criminal Offences—Advocating Genocide, Hate Crime Criminal Offences—Public Incitement & Willful Promotion of Hatred, and Identifiable Group, Section 318 C.C.C.215 Sergeant Graf explained that the Team’s Mandate had changed since its creation in 1997 from primarily training to the current mandate: “To ensure the effective identification, investigation, and prosecution of crimes motivated by hate.”216 The presentation slides set out the text of the Criminal Code sentencing provision for bias, prejudice or hate, as well as the hate propaganda provisions, and they conclude by noting that “sexual orientation” was recently included as an “identifiable group” in the hate propaganda provisions.217 Finally, Graf also provided a copy of the Hate/Bias Crime Pocket Guide developed by the Team.218 In response to questioning about the working definition or guidelines used by officers to identify hate crimes, Graf referred directly to the presentation slides used in training and the Pocket Guide. 219 The Pocket Guide folds to the size of a business card, but it provides significant detail about the guidance provided to investigating officers. Most of the Pocket Guide text mirrors the Presentation Slides used in officer training; however, a few additional details are included. First, the Definition section describes a “Hate/Bias crime” using the language of the Sentencing Principles for bias, prejudice or hate. But the same section distinguishes hate-related “incidents” that do not constitute crimes: “Hate/Bias incidents are incident. Community liaison is provided by both this office and the Settlement and Multiculturalism Branch, MCAWS. 215 See BC Hate Crime Team, Presentation Slides (on file with author). 216 See Presentation Slide, Mandate & Definition; Interview Script, Typewritten Response 1, Notes, at 1. 217 See Presentation Slides, id. 218 Hate/Bias Crime Pocket Guide (BC Hate Crime Team, undated) (on file with author). 219 Interview Script, Typewritten Response 4. The specific question and answer are set out below: 4. Where do investigators look for a working definition or a list of elements of a hate crime? Are there guidelines? - See Criminal code and slides of offences and our Pocket guide. Ch. 5—Hate Crimes & Social Contention 292 those actions that are not criminal in nature and may be covered by the Human Rights Code of Canada.”220 Second, the Pocket Guide provides examples explaining why victims are reluctant to report hate crimes, along with “Hate Indicators For Investigators.”221 Finally, the Guide lists specific “Duties of Police Officers,” including two directly related to the compilation of data: The following procedural guidelines have been developed to ensure appropriate response to incidents motivated by hate/bias: . . . . • Document the incident and ensure it is categorized as a hate/bias offence • Forward a copy of the report to the BC Hate Crime Team including concerns of the community and anticipated problems.222 Although they are listed among the “Duties” of investigating officers, the Pocket Guide does not cite any source of authority for these guidelines. In both our interview and his typewritten responses, Sergeant Graf provided information about how hate-related incidents and crimes are documented in practice. While the Team receives inquiries about hate-related incidents, and while police agencies throughout the province forward copies of reports about hate crimes to the Team, Graf emphasized the Team’s limited data collection role: We are typically asked about statistics by media. As an investigative unit we are driven by cases, not statistics. In doing so we keep abreast of what is happening in the province.223 220 Pocket Guide, id., Definition. The Overview section paraphrases the hate propaganda provisions and adds the following description of the sentencing principle for bias, prejudice or hate: “Any other offence motivated by hate or bias where the sentencing judge must consider this an aggravating or mitigating factor.” Id., Overview (citing § 718.2) (emphasis in original). 221 The Hate Indicators are similar to those developed by the United States Department of Justice and used in their training materials. 222 Pocket Guide, id., Duties of Police Officers (formatting in original). 223 Interview Script, Typewritten Response 3 Hate Crime Data; see also Interview Notes, at 1, ¶3. Regarding community disagreements with police handling of hate crimes, Graf cited several examples, foremost the Webster case: “Absolutely, take the Aaron Webster case[.]” Interview Script, Typewritten Response 6, Protest. My interview responses from the BC Hate Crime Team representative were somewhat inconsistent with information documented elsewhere by RCMP and Vancouver Police Department representatives. See Craig S. Macmillan, et al., Criminal Proceedings as a Response to Hate: The British Columbia Experience, 45 CRIM. L. Q. 419 (2002) (analyzing police hate crime data, and data-collection practices, through the year 2000). In fairness, however, my interview covered a period roughly five years later than the period described by Macmillan and his colleagues. Ch. 5—Hate Crimes & Social Contention 293 Graf did state in our interview that the Team was looking for ways to track hate crime and incident data using the Vancouver Police Department’s PRIME (Police Record Information Management Environment) software. He believed that PRIME offered investigating officers the option of a box to “flag” an incident as bias-related. And, he noted the system used by the RCMP enabled officers to enter a “code” to indicate a bias-motivation. However, even though “policy” required all departments to forward reports of “incidents” to the Team, Graf was not sure if this always happened. Both the Pocket Guide and Graf’s description of the Team’s actual data collection practices conflict in some respects with the description of the “Police Role” set out in the Vancouver Police Department flier. The flier includes the following items related to data collection: The role of the police members of the Team is to: . . . . • collect and analyse all reports of hate crime • compile a database of hate crime suspects and link this with other intelligence sources. • ensure that local police agencies are informed of hate activities in their own and surrounding jurisdictions. . . . . • liaise with Multiculturalism BC and the BC Human Rights Commission to ensure that they are informed of hate/bias incidents that are not criminal in nature.224 In practice, it seems the BC Hate Crime Team does not analyze hate crime reports collectively. And nothing revealed in our interview suggests the existence of a database of either hate-related incidents or suspects. If no such database exists, then the Team’s ability to provide information to surrounding jurisdictions and other agencies is limited to case-by-case notifications. In fairness to the BC Hate Crime Team, two possible explanations exist for the apparent discrepancy between policy articulated in the flier and the practices described in our interview. First, although I obtained the Vancouver Police Department flier at the Team’s offices, it may 224 Flier, BC Provincial Hate Crime Team (on file with the author). Ch. 5—Hate Crimes & Social Contention 294 have been superseded in 2003, when according to Graf, the Team’s mandate was modified to a primarily investigative role. Second, the Team may well analyze incident reports systematically and maintain and share its databases with other agencies—but, without acknowledging these practices publicly. Regardless of the internal policies and practices, however, from the point of view of the nongovernmental groups interviewed in this study, neither Vancouver Police nor the BC Hate Crime Team gather official hate crime statistics. At least no official hate crime statistics are publicly reported. As with the Seattle Bias Crime Coordinator, I combined my interview with the BC Hate Crime Team representative with a written public disclosure request. As in Seattle, I initially asked the Vancouver Police Department to provide anonymous data about hate and bias incidents and copies of the blank forms used to record such incidents. In the same letter, I requested information about the classification of one particular hate-related event—in this case the Aaron Webster killing. After my interview with Sergeant Graf, I submitted a second letter re-iterating my prior request and also requesting documentation showing how the former Vancouver Police Department Hate Crime Unit was re-constituted as part of the BC Provincial Hate Crime Team. I never received a response to my second letter, and as in Seattle, I chose not to challenge the denial of my request. In response to the first letter, however, the Department provided two sets of documentation: (1) transcribed notes of three police press conferences in the days after the Aaron Webster killing; and, (2) an academic research study commissioned by the Department analyzing its internal hate crime data for the years 2001 and 2002.225 The press conference transcripts reveal how police representatives classify bias-related incidents in the early stages of a criminal investigation—at least in their public statements to the 225 I am grateful to the Vancouver Police Department for providing photocopies of these documents without assessing a fee. The complete exchange of correspondence is contained in four letters: Letter from the Author Re: Request for Records, dated Sept. 15, 2005; Letter, from Information & Privacy Unit, dated Sept. 28, 2005 (I&P Unit Ref. No. 05-1903A); Letter from Author to Chief Constable, dated Oct. 21, 2005; and, Letter from Information & Privacy Unit Re: Records Access Request, dated Nov. 8, 2005 (I&P Unit Ref. No. 05-1903A). Ch. 5—Hate Crimes & Social Contention 295 press. A selection of quotations from the press conferences demonstrates the complexity, and fluidity, of hate crime classification decisions, both in the early stages of an individual criminal investigation, and on an ongoing basis.226 The incident was initially reported to the media on November 19, 2001—two days after the attack. The very first question from the media asked whether the crime was a gay bashing, and several subsequent questions addressed the availability of hate crime data generally: [Q]: IS GAY BASHING THE ONLY THEORY THAT POLICE ARE LOOKING ON PERHAPS? [A]: WE HAVEN’T DETERMINED YET EXACTLY WHAT THE MOTIVE FOR THIS PARTICULAR ATTACK IS. IT [sic] CERTAINLY ONE OF THEM WE HAVE NOT DISCOUNTED. IT HAS ALL THE EARMARKS OF A TYPE OF A SEXUALLY ORIENTED ATTACK. . . . . . . . [Q]: DO YOU HAVE ANY STATISTICS SCOTT ON HOW MANY SEXUALLY ORIENTED ASSAULTS THERE HAVE BEEN THIS YEAR TO DATE? [A]: NO. YOU WOULD HAVE TO GO TO THE, I BELIEVE ITS [] THE PROVINCIAL HATE CRIME UNIT FOR THOSE TYPES OF STATS.227 . . . . [Q]: ARE THERE ANY SUGGESTIONS OR INDICATIONS THAT IT MIGHT NOT BE A HATE CRIME? [A]: WELL WE WOULD HAVE TO SAY AT THIS POINT OF COURSE WE HAVE TO KEEP ALL AVENUES OF THE INVESTIGATION OPEN, THERE IS NOTHING THAT IS 100% DEFINITIVE . . . SUFFICE TO SAY WERE [sic] NOT 100% SATISFIED, BUT NONETHELESS IT HAS ALL THE EARMARKS AND THE POSSIBILITY THAT IT WAS HATE MOTIVATED BY A SEXUAL ORIENTATION, . . . . . . . [Detective]: . . . I’VE GOT INSPECTOR JONES WHO IS THE COMMANDER IN CHARGE OF THAT PARTICULAR SEGMENT OF THE CITY AND 226 The relevant quotations are set out more fully in the Appendix. See Appendix 2—Vancouver Police Department Press Conference Excerpts—Aaron Webster Killing, November, 2001. 227 Letter from Information & Privacy Unit Re: Records Access Request, dated Nov. 8, 2005 (I&P Unit Ref. No. 05- 1903A), DEPS NOTES, Nov. 19, 2001 (on file with the author). Ch. 5—Hate Crimes & Social Contention 296 HE’LL BE HERE TO GO AND SPEAK TO YOU ABOUT SOME OF OUR INITIATIVES AND SOME OF OUR ONGOING PROGRAMS THAT WE HAVE WITH THAT COMMUNITY. AND TO ADDRESS ANY QUESTIONS YOU MIGHT HAVE. . . . . HATRED IS INTOLERABLE IN ANY COMMUNITY AND WHEN IT MANIFESTS ITSELF AS IT HAS OVER THE LAST WEEKEND I THINK IT CAUSES SHOCK AND ALARM TO ALL MEMBERS OF THE COMMUNITY. . . . WE HAVE SOME PEOPLE OUT THERE WHO HATE, WHO ARE PREPARED TO USE VIOLENCE TO MANIFEST THAT HATE FOR WHATEVER MOTIVATIONS. . . . WE WANT THE NAMES OF THOSE PEOPLE, WE COLLECT THOSE NAMES WHEN PEOPLE ABUSE SEX TRADE WORKERS AND WE WANT TO DO SOMETHING SIMILAR TO THAT. WE WANT A RECORD, THESE PEOPLE THAT COMMITTED THIS ACT ON THE WEEKEND. . . . . . . . [Q]: WHAT DO YOU MEAN ABOUT DOCUMENTING AND REPORTING, IS THERE GOING TO BE A SPECIAL FILE ON THESE PEOPLE? [A]: PRIME BC HAS OFFERED US AN OPPORTUNITY NOW TO COLLECT THIS INFORMATION IN A MUCH MORE EFFECTIVE WAY THAN WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO IN THE PAST. . . . WE HAVE PRIME BC WHICH CREATES THE ABILITY FOR US TO DOCUMENT THESE ACTIVITIES AND TO COLLATE THEM AND TO ANALYZE THEM. [Q]: IS THAT A PROVINCIAL DATABASE? [A]: PRIME BC IS NOT ENTIRELY PROVINCIAL YET, IT WILL BE IN TIME. AT THE MOMENT THERE ARE 4 OR 5 POLICE AGENCIES ON IT. IN TIME THERE WILL BE MORE. . . . . [Q]: HAVE YOU SEEN AN INCREASE OR DECREASE IN THE AMOUNT OF [] GAY BASHING CRIMES BEING COMMITTED IN THAT AREA? [A]: WE HAD IN THE FIRST 6 MONTHS OF THIS YEAR 402 REPORTS TO THE BASH LINE, 8 OF THOSE WERE ACTUALLY CRIMINAL OFFENCES . . . . WE SEEM TO BE GETTING MORE COMFORT WITH THAT COMMUNITY REPORTING ACTUAL CRIMINAL OFFENCES, ASSAULTS THROUGH THE MAIN STREAM POLICE LINES. [Q]: DO YOU HAVE ANY IDEA LIKE NUMBERS HOW MANY PEOPLE, OR A ROUGH ESTIMATE? Ch. 5—Hate Crimes & Social Contention 297 [A]: I HAVE ASKED FOR THE PROVINCIAL HATE CRIMES PEOPLE TO PROVIDE WITH THAT DATA AND THEY HAVEN’T HAD A CHANCE TO COLLATE IT YET.228 . . . . [DETECTIVE]: . . . . AT THIS POINT THERE IS NOTHING CONCLUSIVE TO GO AND SAY THAT YOU KNOW THAT THIS WAS SOLELY DIRECTED BY SEXUAL ORIENTATION. WERE [sic] CERTAINLY KEEPING THE OTHER OPTIONS OPEN, AS FAR AS WHAT OTHER MOTIVES THERE MIGHT HAVE BEEN IN THIS ATTACK. [Q]: INSPECTOR JONES SEEMS TO THINK IT IS DEFINITELY A GAY BASHING? [A]: YEH, THE INSPECTOR JONES OF COURSE IS WORKING IN THE WEST END AND I THINK WHAT HE IS SPEAKING ABOUT IS THE FACT THAT BASICALLY THE COMMUNITY LOOKS UPON AS THAT FROM THAT COMMUNITY, SO OF COURSE THAT’S WHERE THE FOCUS IS GOING TO BE. BUT I CAN SAY ON BEHALF OF THE HOMICIDE SECTION OF COURSE OTHER MOTIVES OF COURSE HAVE NOT BEEN DISCOUNTED AT THIS EARLY STAGE AT ALL.229 The second item provided in response to my public disclosure request is a report by a Simon Fraser University student analyzing Vancouver Police Department data in response to the Aaron Webster killing.230 The report, titled “Hate Bias Crimes in Vancouver 2001 and 2002,” was printed with the seal of the Vancouver Police Department, and its introduction indicates it is being submitted to the Parliamentary committee considering the addition “sexual orientation” to the prohibited grounds of discrimination in the hate propaganda provisions of the Criminal Code. According to the report, “The death of Aaron Webster and heightened awareness of violence in the LGBT community prompted a review of hate/bias events in Vancouver.” 231 Without 228 Id., DEPS NOTES, Nov. 20, 2001 (on file with the author). 229 Id., DEPS NOTES, Nov. 22, 2001 (on file with the author). 230 Letter from Information & Privacy Unit Re: Records Access Request, dated Nov. 8, 2005 (I&P Unit Ref. No. 05- 1903A), Scott MacMillan, Hate Bias Crimes in Vancouver 2001 & 2002, supra note 99. The report’s introduction explains the research goal: “A research project was established to provide data to assist the Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights in their review of the need to add sexual orientation to Section 318(4)CCC.” Hate & Bias in Vancouver, id., at 2, A Question of Inclusion. 231 Hate & Bias Crimes in Vancouver, id., at 2, A Question of Inclusion. See also Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on Legal & Constitutional Affairs, Issue 3 - Evidence for March 11, 2004 (receiving testimony from Mr. Dave Jones, representing Vancouver Police Department, and others, endorsing Bill C-250, to amend the Ch. 5—Hate Crimes & Social Contention 298 precisely specifying its source material, the report references “Approximately 200 hate/bias incidents coded in 2001 – 2002 for Vancouver.” The report does not indicate whether these incidents were “coded” from the narrative descriptions of police incident reports, from boxes “flagged” in the PRIME database, or from some other source. Although the source data were apparently made available to the university student who compiled the report, the database for the report is not identified. Moreover, this source material—whatever it is—remains closed to public review. In other words, while the Aaron Webster killing triggered a review of hate crime data compiled by the Vancouver Police Department, the review was tightly controlled, and the data reviewed remained proprietary. Despite the effective closure of the Vancouver Police hate crime database, a few critically important facts are established by the 2002 report. First, the Vancouver Police Department maintains a capacity to collect and analyze hate crime data in some form. Thus, if police hate crime data were retained, and if these data were made publicly available, then a proceeding to review them could serve as a site of legal contention about the existence of hate crimes. For now, however, even if hate crime data are being retained, they are not available for any form of public scrutiny. Second, whether on his own or at the direction of police officials, the university researcher who analyzed the hate crime data for the years 2001 and 2002 established particular criteria for classifying and excluding hate crimes. While the report sets out the Criminal Code Sentencing Principle for a bias, prejudice or hate, the criteria used in the 2002 report “Filtered” the recorded incidents: • Filtered through a hate/bias crime criteria to establish a set of incidents where clear evidence of hate/bias could be determined Criminal Code (hate propaganda)). See Bill C-250, An Act to Amend the Criminal Code (hate propaganda), passed by the House of Commons of Canada on Sept. 17, 2003. Ch. 5—Hate Crimes & Social Contention 299 • 128 confirmed cases of hate/bias were identified232 As the analytical comparison of Chapter 3 noted, the Sentencing Principles incorporate a peculiar sort of proof: mere “evidence” of a prohibited bias, proven beyond a reasonable doubt. This, however, is the standard applicable to an enhanced sentence—not necessarily the standard applicable to hate or bias “incidents” or the standard for a statistical sample of hate crimes. So, even though the process of compiling the 2001 and 2002 data was not a public one, the results do provide a glimpse sufficient to raise a question about the classification of the Webster killing. Perhaps more interesting than the Vancouver Police Department’s analysis of its overall hate crime database, is its analysis of the single datum representing the Aaron Webster killing. All of the data analyzed are presented anonymously. Yet, only one “Death” is revealed in the entire dataset, and this death is classified with “clear evidence” as an incident motivated by a “sexual orientation” bias.233 Since Aaron Webster was the only person killed in a suspected gay bashing in 2001 or 2002, the police officially classified his death as a hate crime in their own data base and in their presentation to the Parliamentary Committee considering amendments to the Criminal Code. The conclusion of the report appeals for “similar protection” in the hate propaganda provisions for “those attacked on the basis of their sexual orientation.”234 Hence, the Vancouver Police Department, with the assistance of an academic researcher, (successfully) utilized the Aaron Webster killing as a resource to contend for a national legislative change. Ironically, though, the same event was insufficient to trigger either a public review of the police hate crime classification practices or the imposition of local legal standards governing those practices. Even assuming Vancouver Police gather and record information about hate-related incidents routinely in their investigations, their use of this information is apparently very limited. 233 See Hate & Bias Crimes in Vancouver, id., at 15, Degree of Injury (listing death due to sexual orientation bias). 234 See Hate & Bias Crimes in Vancouver, id., at 24, Conclusion. Ch. 5—Hate Crimes & Social Contention 300 My research disclosed only three instances in which Vancouver Police revealed any of their own hate crime data publicly. The first instance was a research report complied by representatives of the Vancouver Police, the RCMP, and Crown prosecutors. This report, published in 2002 presented a meta-analysis of hate crime incidents reported to police from 1991 to 1999, and the authors cautioned that their article does not represent the official views of their respective agencies. The second instance, appearing shortly after the article, was the 2002 research report conducted by a Simon Fraser University student analyzing homophobic hate crimes in and around Vancouver’s West End. The third instance was testimony during Parliamentary hearings on the 2003 Hate Propaganda amendments, in which the Vancouver Police Department gave its official endorsement to the amendments. This sequence of examples appears to disclose a pattern. While Vancouver police do gather some information about hate-related incidents, and while this information may be retained in a form that allows an analysis, Vancouver police carefully control the public presentation of the information. In this way, attention was deflected away from the actual hate crime classification system in practice. 5.7.2 Seattle Police Department Bias Crime Coordinator I was able to obtain relatively little direct information about hate crimes from the Seattle Police Department. The newly-appointed Bias Crime Coordinator, Susanne Moore, responded to my telephone calls, but she indicated that she would not “be honoring” my request for an interview.235 Her impression was that anti-gay bias crimes were not “a problem” in Seattle, although she noted she had only been in her position for a few months. Moore referred me to the Department’s Media Relations Unit, and after several more telephone calls, I was given permission to interview Moore’s predecessor, Detective Christie-Lynne Bonner, but without any 235 Seattle Police Department Interview Notes, dated Sept. 9 & 15-16, 2005 (on file with the author). Ch. 5—Hate Crimes & Social Contention 301 video or audio recording. Bonner agreed to “talk briefly” to provide general information for the study, but she emphasized that she would only be able to assist briefly, because such research projects “tend to eat up hours.”236 After my interview with Detective Bonner, I made a written public disclosure request seeking both (a) anonymous demographic information about hate crimes, including the forms used by investigators to record information about suspected hate crimes, and (b) documents from the Micah Painter investigation, including the forms investigators used to identify the attack as a hate crime or malicious harassment.237 The Department initially sent a letter acknowledging my requests and indicating that they were “being researched.” 238 In a January, 2006 letter, the Department denied my request for documents related to the Micah Painter attack, because the case remained “an active investigation.”239 No reason was given for denying my request for anonymous demographic information and forms, and I received no further correspondence from the Department. I chose not to challenge the denial of my public disclosure requests. During our interview, however, Detective Bonner provided several documents that she used to train fellow officers in the investigation of hate-related incidents.240 Bonner noted that even though she was no longer serving as the Bias Crimes Coordinator, she continued to provide hate crime training to new officers. Her training materials included: (1) A detailed press release available on the King County Prosecuting Attorney’s website explaining the office’s “Hate Crimes Filing Practice,” in context with a decision “Declining to Use the Hate Crimes Law,” in a particular prosecution; 241 (2) A one-page presentation handout titled, “Malicious Harassment Protected Classes,” listing the prohibited grounds of discrimination in the state and city 236 Id. 237 Letter, Request for Records, dated Oct. 21, 2005 (with Seattle Police Department Information Request form). 238 Letter, Public Disclosure Request: Hate Crimes Information, dated December 23, 2005. 239 Letter, Public Disclosure Request—SPD Incident # 04-262539, dated Jan. 13, 2006. 240 Seattle Police Department Interview Notes, dated Sept. 28, 2005 (on file with author). 241 Statement to Media for Release, dated May 25, 2001 (on file with author). Ch. 5—Hate Crimes & Social Contention 302 malicious harassment laws, accompanied by the text of the laws;242 and, (3) A Washington Court of Appeals opinion affirming a conviction for racially-motivated malicious harassment. 243 Finally, Bonner referred me to the Seattle Police Department Policy and Procedure Manual section on Malicious Harassment. She noted that the Manual was not available online, but that it was available at the public library. Bonner was able to provide examples of Malicious Harassment cases based only on the Seattle Municipal Code provisions, including at least one successful prosecution brought in Seattle Municipal Court in recent years. 5.7.3 Comparison Information about the Seattle Police Department’s hate crime classification practices seems relatively scant compared to the evidence available for Vancouver police. Indeed, my inquiries produced little information about the Seattle Police. Fortuitously, however, the very nongovernmental groups that I was studying were more successful than me. The Hate Crime Awareness Project Coordinator and her co-author were able to examine the raw source data used by Seattle Police, and to use the official police database as a site of contention in ways that proved impossible in Vancouver. Whereas the Vancouver Police Department successfully focused the attention from the Aaron Webster killing onto a national legislative campaign, the Seattle Police Department itself became the subject of a local legislative inquiry. The result seems counter-intuitive because police and prosecutors succeeded in obtaining Malicious Harassment convictions in the Painter case, while only one of the Vancouver cases was classified as a hate crime. The absence of public review or local legislative authority in Vancouver explains the absence of local legal contention about the Vancouver Police hate crime classification system. 242 Presentation Handout, id. (citing Seattle Municipal Code § 12A.06.115 & RC W § 9A.36.080). 243 State v. Pollard, 906 P.2d 976 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995). Ch. 5—Hate Crimes & Social Contention 303 Simply put, no local opportunity exists for social contention to challenge classification decisions by the Vancouver Police. Police hate crime classification systems provide a convenient focus for a summary of nongovernmental social contention in the hate crime field. The mere availability of public review and local legislative power does not fully explain the counter-intuitive result of open contention in Seattle. Given the apparent success of the Painter prosecutions, social contention ought to have been dampened. The contrary result is, however, explained by the occurrence of a fresh event in the Ballard neighborhood, which Seattle Police mistakenly excluded from their hate crime database. Even though the Ballard attack never resulted in a conviction—or even an arrest—, Molsberry and Armenakis were able to use their Report to channel energy from both the Painter attack and the Ballard assault, into a public review of the police hate crime classification system. But, it was only because of the availability of a public review mechanism, accompanied by local legislative power, that this effort was able to focus social contention on the police hate crime classification system. Both Armenakis, the Hate Crime Awareness Project Coordinator, and Reis, the Safe Schools Coalition representative, attended the Seattle feedback meeting, and they both noted differences in the language of legal equality used in the two countries.244 Armenakis emphasized that Washington state did not—at that time—have a law banning “sexual orientation” discrimination in employment and other fields.245 Beth Reis explained that City and County codes both ban discrimination based on gender identity, however.246 Aside from textual differences in laws related to equality rights, the feedback session revealed the dynamics of police-community relations that accompanied the successful malicious 244 See Seattle Feedback, DVD. 245 See Seattle Feedback, DVD, Menu Title—Different Antidiscrimination Laws. The legislature passed a state law banning “sexual orientation” discrimination soon afterward, and a campaign to repeal the law by referendum failed. 246 See Seattle Feedback, DVD, Menu Title—Seattle & King County Non-Discrimination Ordinances. One of Reis’s co-directors at the Safe Schools Coalition, and the founder of Seattle’s Ingersoll Gender Center, had co- authored a local ordinance in nearby Olympia, Washington that banned “gender identity” discrimination. Ch. 5—Hate Crimes & Social Contention 304 harassment prosecutions against Micah Painter’s assailants. The Seattle Bias Crime Coordinator and the Intern both attended a Public Safety Forum at the Center at which the police and prosecutors discussed the case. Reis was “very pleased” when prosecutors specifically asked community members to appear in the audience during the sentencing to counteract the impression that Painter lacked “a community that cared.”247 The founder of Action Northwest, which was also housed in the Seattle Center, helped organize the forum. In addition to establishing a Bias Crimes Forum on its website, Action Northwest organized a large march that progressed through downtown Seattle, with significant news coverage.248 The Action Northwest founder and other former members discussed reviving the Q-Patrol neighborhood safety program. Reis described Action Northwest as being “about political and community action.”249 In the field of hate crime statistics, Reis said it was good to have both the queer identified NCAVP data and the police data, and it was good for the police to take responsibility for the statistics.250 Reis emphasized the need to address under-reporting of hate crimes, explaining that the NCAVP surveys get higher victimization rates and show different trends, because of better reporting by victims to queer-identified agencies.251 In terms of community data collection, groups don’t do that in Seattle; some perceive statistics as not necessary. Armenakis observed that there was not a lot of “energy” around hate crime prevention in Seattle; many don’t want to work with the police.252 Reis agreed, although her perception was that the Seattle Police are better than many places toward LGBT crime victims.253 While the police and prosecutors strove to connect with the community in response to the Painter case, the relationship was not entirely reactive—Seattle has an established LBGT 247 See Seattle Feedback, DVD, Menu Title—Seattle Police Response. 248 See id. 249 See id. 250 See Seattle Feedback, DVD, Menu Title—NCAVP NGO Reporting. 251 See Seattle Feedback, DVD, Menu Title—“Their Numbers are Always Higher.” 252 See Seattle Feedback, DVD, Menu Title—Not much “Energy.” 253 See Seattle Feedback, DVD, Menu Title—Police LGBT Advisory Council. Ch. 5—Hate Crimes & Social Contention 305 community police advisory council, which has been in existence “for years.”254 The group meets in the Center, and the former Police Chief regularly attended the meetings. On the other hand, at the time of the feedback, Reis and the intern had not yet met the new Bias Crime Coordinator, even though she had been on the job for several months. Things clearly changed in Seattle within a few months after the feedback meeting. Molsberry and Armenakis published their Report, which triggered a series of publicly contentious episodes in the local legislature and local civil rights agencies. Something about the Ballard incident and the Molsberry Report provided the “energy” that had been lacking in the aftermath of the Painter attack and subsequent prosecutions. Three participants attended the feedback interview in Vancouver: Tami Starlight, James Chamberlain, and the PGLAG Vancouver chapter President. Tami Starlight’s impression was that there were more GLBT hate crimes in Seattle, otherwise the responses to hate crimes were mostly the same in the two cities.255 The PFLAG Vancouver President agreed that there were “more similarities than differences,” between groups in Seattle and Vancouver,256 and that the “support groups” in the two cities were “on the same page.” 257 The Vancouver participants noted important differences in police practices. Tami Starlight noticed the differences in Police administration of hate crime statistics, distinguishing the B.C. Hate Crime Team and the Seattle Bias Crime Coordinator. She complained about the B.C. Liberal government cutting funding for Vancouver Police Department’s diversity training program through the Justice Institute, and a resulting lapse in diversity training for four years.258 Chamberlain, the GALE-BC representative also noted that there had been a former office in the 254 See id. 255 See Vancouver Feedback, DVD, Menu Title—“We’re on the Same Page.” 256 See Vancouver Feedback, DVD, Menu Title—More Similarities than Differences. 257 See id. 258 See Vancouver Feedback, DVD, Menu Title—Police Hate Crime Statistics. Ch. 5—Hate Crimes & Social Contention 306 Yaletown area for the B.C. Hate Crime Team, and that it seemed “odd” that they would be relocated outside Vancouver in Surrey; he described this change as, “quite ironic.”259 Starlight emphasized that the Vancouver Police Department had a “rough record on self- examination,” had been “pretty dodgy,” in the past, had “botched” internal investigations, and that it would “be more wise to create a body separate from Police,” to monitor hate crime statistics. 260 Thus, Starlight found it “perplexing to see Seattle doing so much more by enforcement of law by keeping the statistics,” in contrast to “practically nothing” being done by the Vancouver Police Department. 261 Follow-up questioning revealed more of Starlight’s reasoning in favor of police statistics gathering: [Q]: Do you think that makes a difference? Is it really enforcing the law keeping the statistics, because the critics would say that that’s just some meaningless bookkeeping task? Do you think there is some use to having the patrol officers gather hate crime statistics? [A]: Absolutely. [Q]: Why? [A]: I think we have a culture of misinformation and apathy. Where it’s just like, “oh well, that doesn’t happen here,” . . . we forget so easily about things that happen, and if we actually look at it on paper and say well there’s been like fourteen violent acts in the past four months and go, “holy crap, no way,” right . . . I’m sure the community if it looked at a lot of the statistics would be just appalled. 262 The Vancouver PFLAG representative stated that a more accurate definition of hate crime was needed, and that “for starters” police have to be the ones keeping statistics, because they are the people there, and because gathering statistics will raise the awareness of officers. 259 See Vancouver Feedback, DVD, Menu Title—Police Hate Crime Statistics. 260 See Vancouver Feedback, DVD, Menu Title—Police Mistrust. 261 See id. 262 See Vancouver Feedback, DVD, Menu Title—Misinformation & Apathy. Starlight’s reasoning reflects hate crime scholarship. Among others, Professor Ryan King notes the “conceptual overlap” between hate crime reporting by police and the enforcement of hate crime laws. See Ryan D. King, The Context of Minority Group Threat: Race, Institutions, & Complying with Hate Crime Law, 41 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 189, at 191 n.1 (2007) (citation omitted). Ch. 5—Hate Crimes & Social Contention 307 Yet, she emphasized the need to have “somebody watching over the statistics.”263 Chamberlain observed that it was good to have “both kinds” of hate crime monitoring organizations—the police and rights groups. 264 As an example he cited the Vancouver School Board Pride Committee, which successfully combines “traditional educational partner groups,” and LGBT “community groups”: It’s like the watchdogs and the gatekeepers all together in one committee. It creates friction at times and initially when it started I think there was fear on the part of the gatekeepers that the other group were going to be gate-crashers and wouldn’t work with them. . . . I think it’s important for groups outside of the system, whatever the bureaucracy body is, and groups within the system to work together as best they can because they can create more impetus for change than if you have the gatekeeper of whatever group [] saying “this is a school issue,” “this is not a police issue” . . . . The gatekeeper ends up having to have a vested interest in the outcomes if they are participating in the process.265 And, although it may seem inefficient, Tami Starlight emphasized the need to keep the “watchdogs” separate from the “gatekeepers”—in other words, the police should not be left to monitor their own behavior.266 In Vancouver WEAVE partially fulfills this separate role, but its effectiveness is limited by the unavailability of any mechanism for public review of police hate crime classification decisions. This Chapter has set out the practices of nongovernmental groups that monitor homo- and trans-phobic hate-related events in Vancouver and Seattle. In the end, differences in local hate crime classification systems and processes for public review of classification decisions constitute important sites of social contention for nongovernmental groups in both cities. The similarities and differences between the contention practices of these groups will be analyzed in Chapter 6, along with the overall conclusions of the thesis. 263 See Vancouver Feedback, DVD, Menu Title—The Police are “There.” The GALE-BC representative explained that hate crime reporting must rely on rapport, noting that street cops are generally more receptive than office cops. 264 See Vancouver Feedback, DVD, Menu Title—Gatekeepers, Watchers & Gatecrashers. 265 Id. 266 Id. Starlight observed the need to address equality in multiple fields—education, health, etc.—because they are all inter-related; for example, the Pride Committee includes education partner groups and community LGBT groups, with “watchdogs” and “gatekeepers” together in one committee. Ch. 6—Conclusions 308 6 Conclusions The hypothesis that differences in hate crime labeling or classification systems would correspond with differences in the contentious practices of nongovernmental social groups that monitor hate crimes is supported by the evidence. The style of contention practiced by the groups also corresponds with the local site at which the legal classification operates. Moreover, the tone, or affective voice, used by the groups to describe the legal classification system for hate crimes coincides with their contentious practices. However, the proposed distinction between ad hoc and systematic contention appears inadequate to encompass the range of contentious practices of the groups that participated in the study. The summary that follows will attempt to synthesize the key variables that describe the relationship between the legal classification system for hate crimes and the contentious practices of groups at each site. 6.1 Legal Systems First, the legal systems corresponding to the nongovernmental contention at each site cannot be neatly divided into the two categories ad hoc and systematic. In both Vancouver and Seattle, hate crime laws are implemented through a combination of police administrative practices and litigation in criminal court proceedings. The observations of Professor Davis about discretionary inaction1 remain generally true at both research sites in this study: police agencies in both Seattle and Vancouver exercise a powerful discretionary authority to define an event as a suspected crime, eligible for prosecution. More importantly, as Davis observed, police exercise a largely unregulated authority to classify an event as not a crime. Because of their position as 1 See Kenneth Culp Davis, Police Discretion (1975); Kenneth Culp Davis, Discretionary Justice: A Preliminary Inquiry (1969). Ch. 6—Conclusions 309 the initial gatekeepers to official knowledge of crime, moreover, a determination by police investigators that an incident is not a crime is definitive, for if police decline to investigate an event as a suspected crime it generally will not be prosecuted. These discretionary decisions not to enforce the law are systematic only to the extent that they are governed by enforceable internal police policies. While such policies exist in both Seattle and Vancouver, they are not enforceable in any meaningful sense. The same discretionary authority to define an event as not a crime extends to hate crimes. But, in the hate crime field, police investigators serve as critical gatekeepers to knowledge of an incident both as a crime and as act of discrimination. Like all other suspected crimes, hate- related incidents are classified, or excluded, as hate crimes on an ad hoc basis, as they occur. This ad hoc treatment is the same for all incidents that come to the attention of the police. What makes hate crimes different, however, is the parallel administrative system by which police classify, or exclude, incidents as hate- or bias-related. This administrative classification system exists with dramatic differences in Seattle and Vancouver. In Vancouver, there is some evidence that police may, and perhaps do, classify, or exclude, incidents as bias- or hate-related at the early stages of their investigations. But, virtually no information about Vancouver Police Department’s classification system is available to the public, and this classification system, if it even exists in practice, is not subject to any meaningful public review. Thus, the evidence suggests that incidents are either never classified as hate-related by the Vancouver Police Department, or classified as hate-related only on an ad hoc basis. So, the distinction between ad hoc and systematic legal classification is descriptive of police practices in Vancouver. Police practices in Seattle are more difficult to characterize. As in Vancouver, incidents are classified as crimes on an ad hoc basis in Seattle as they come to the attention of the police. Unlike Vancouver, however, local laws in Seattle establish a system of public reporting and Ch. 6—Conclusions 310 review that applies to the classification of incidents as bias- or hate-related. Yet, the public administration of hate crime classifications in Seattle cannot be easily described as only systematic or only ad hoc. Police investigators, perhaps in consultation with the Bias Crime Coordinator, use a system of standardized forms and procedures to classify or exclude incidents as bias-related. But this system is applied, perforce, on an ad hoc basis as incidents come to the attention of police. Two key characteristics distinguish Seattle’s hate crime classification system from Vancouver’s: (1) local legal principles set out in the Municipal Code constrain police classification decisions; and, (2) an official public forum exists, in the form of legislative oversight in the City Council, for reviewing police discretion to exclude incidents as hate- or bias-related. Thus, in place of the ad hoc versus systematic distinction, hate crime classification decisions in Vancouver and Seattle are better characterized as either subject to, or free from local legal principles and public review. Table 6.1 illustrates the differences in official classification systems in practice in Seattle and Vancouver. Table 6.1—Official Hate Crime Classification Systems—Seattle & Vancouver Local Legal Principles Public Review Vancouver N N Seattle Y Y One caveat should be emphasized here. While the local hate crime classification system in Vancouver is free from both local legal principles and any meaningful public review, this is not necessarily so. The provincial legislature has some authority both to establish a procedure and standards for the identification of hate- or bias-related incidents throughout the British Columbia, and to make police hate crime classification decisions subject to ongoing public review. Alternatively, the province might delegate these functions to municipal governments, including the Vancouver City Council. Ch. 6—Conclusions 311 Canadian human rights groups have noticed the opportunities presented by the entrenchment of human rights principles in municipal legislation. 2 Furthermore, my email correspondence with Richard Warman,3 a Canadian lawyer noted for his successful litigation against hate-related World Wide Web sites, confirmed the importance of local lawmaking power in the hate crime field: Municipalities, are of course, creatures of the provincial legislation that enable their existence and thus limit the powers available to them. There’s a famous case out of BC where Vancouver attempted to pass a by-law barring Shell from bidding on municipal contracts until such time as it withdrew from apartheid South Africa. The Supreme Court held this was outside the power of the municipality: [4] [citing Shell Canada Products Ltd. v. Vancouver (City)] I think this would be an important case to cite in your research about the limits of municipal authority to ‘do good’ if you haven’t already. As you undoubtedly know, Canada’s cities have been struggling for many years to have greater constitutional protection enshrined in the constitution for themselves. That said, municipalities like London, Ontario have been approached by groups like the London Association for the Elimination of Hate to adopt zero-tolerance for neo-Nazi group use of public spaces. Also, people in BC have battled for years to try to stop the libraries in Vancouver and Victoria from continuing to quite happily rent out space to neo-Nazi groups and the libraries were adamant in defending their right to do so. (this is paraphrasing the controversy - you can find more info on this by doing an Internet search)5 2 See Claire Young, Bringing Human Rights to the City: Municipal Human Rights Charters in Canada (Centre for Equality Rights in Accommodation (CERA), Dec., 2005), available online at http://www.equalityrights.org/cera/docs/Municipal%20Charter%20Summary%20Dec%2005.doc (accessed Jan. 30, 2008) (citing recently enacted Montreal human rights charter). 3 Email from Richard Warman to author, dated Apr. 17, 2006 (Warman email) (on file with author). 4 Warman email, id. (citing Shell Canada Products Ltd. v. Vancouver (City), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 231 (invalidating Vancouver City Council anti-Apartheid Resolution)). The Majority of the Court (Per Sopinka J.) held that the resolutions exceeded the municipal authority of the City of Vancouver, because they were intended to address matters outside the boundaries of the city. See id., ¶ 35. In dictum, the Majority also concluded that the resolutions amounted to “unauthorized discrimination” against the oil companies, because they were not authorized by the city Charter. See id., ¶ 36. While, technically, the Court’s ruling on “unauthorized discrimination,” was not necessary to its holding, it remains an accurate statement of Canadian municipal law. In 114957 Canada v. Hudson (Ville), [2001] 2 S.C.R. 241, for example, the Supreme Court cited Shell Canada Products and re-articulated the same principles of interpretation, though with a different result. See 114957 Canada, id., ¶¶ 28-30 (concluding local bylaws regulating pesticide application within town did not constitute impermissible discrimination). 5 Warman email, id. Ch. 6—Conclusions 312 Canadian provinces have sole authority over, “Municipal Institutions in the Province.”6 Provincial legislators could expand the powers of municipalities to authorize local laws banning discrimination. And, utilizing their power in the administration of justice, provinces could be more explicit about the legal standards and procedures for public review governing police hate crime statistics. The current state of law, and the current practices of police agencies in British Columbia, however, precludes any meaningful legal principles or public review of hate crime classification decisions. Unlike the administrative practices of school administrators, moreover, the discretionary inaction of the police in response to hate-related incidents seem to be exempt from any meaningful review in the courts or human rights agencies. This too could be modified by legislation. One final point is, however, worth noting. While ongoing regulatory review of hate crime classification decisions is currently unavailable in British Columbia, any level of government could exercise its power to initiate an ad hoc public inquiry to examine the standards and procedures used by police to classify or exclude incidents as hate- or bias-related. What is said here about police discretion is largely true of prosecutorial discretion, with only a few exceptions. When prosecutors in either Seattle or Vancouver classify an incident as hate- or bias-related in their charging or sentencing pleadings, their decisions are subject to review by a fact-finder, either a judge or a jury. And, at both sites, a successful prosecution or sentencing based on a bias motivation is subject to review in the appellate courts. But, critically, prosecutorial decisions not to pursue hate crime penalties are practically un-reviewable in both countries. The official classification systems for hate crimes in Vancouver and Seattle stand in stark contrast to the classification systems for school bullying and harassment. At both sites, the classification of school harassment is subject to the legislative authority of local school boards. And local school boards in and near both Seattle and Vancouver have adopted publicly 6 Constitution Act 1867, § 92(8). Ch. 6—Conclusions 313 reviewable policies prohibiting homophobic and trans-phobic harassment. Table 6.2 characterizes school harassment laws at the two sites. A comparison of Tables 6.1 and 6.2 illustrates the differences between hate crime statistics laws and school anti-harassment laws. Whereas hate crime statistics are gathered and reviewed publicly at only one site, school board policies publicly prohibit homo- and trans-phobic harassment at both sites. Table 6.2—School Harassment Laws—Seattle & Vancouver Local Legal Principles Public Review Vancouver Y Y Seattle Y Y Moreover, the presence of local legislative authority and public review of school harassment policies does seem to be reflected in the contentious practices of nongovernmental groups at both sites. Both Vancouver’s GALE-BC and Seattle’s Safe Schools Coalition participate in advocacy activities meant to promote local anti-harassment policies and provincial or state anti-harassment legislation. While the success of advocacy has varied slightly between B.C. and Washington state, the availability of parallel state, provincial, and local legislative sites for contention correlates with similarities in the styles of contention used by school safety groups. Groups in Seattle and Vancouver advocate for radically similar school safety laws using very similar techniques. The consistency between school safety groups at the two sites tends to verify the assumption that legal cultures of Seattle and Vancouver are radically similar. Similarities in local school governance should lead to similarities in nongovernmental contention for similar anti-harassment policies only in radically similar cultures. Stated conversely, dissimilar cultures would be expected to produce different styles of contention, for different anti-harassment policies. But, the across-the-board correspondence in school governance and social contention for anti-harassment policies confirms that differences in the background legal cultures in Vancouver and Seattle are insignificant. Ch. 6—Conclusions 314 And, if background cultures are indeed similar, as a comparison of school safety laws and social contention suggests, then differences in social contention in the hate crime field are more certainly tied to differences in hate crime classification systems, including statistics laws. 6.2 Social Groups After completing the individual group interviews, I organized a feedback meeting at each site to give the groups an opportunity to review the initial videotaped presentation of results and to provide their analysis of differences and similarities between the two sites. Information from these feedback meetings was presented in Chapter 5 alongside information from the individual interviews. The feedback information is used for a second purpose here; it provides several framework principles for a concluding comparison. Some of the important axes for a comparative analysis come directly from the participants at the feedback meetings. Preliminary results for all five types of groups studied here are summarized in Table 6.3 below. In the Table, the first two columns represent the availability of Local Legal Standards and Public Review of classification decisions at each research site. Based on an analysis of the data, these two variables best articulate the legal principles most influential in the contentious behavior of the groups studied. Table 6.3—Site & Style of Social Contention by Groups in Canada & the U.S. Legal Classification System Social Contention Local Legal Standards Public Review of Classification Site(s) of Contention Style(s) of Contention Canadian Groups Anti-Violence Programs N N • Contained Government Funding, Collaboration & Victim Services • Reactive Group Formation & Case- Based Services Ad Hoc Anti- Violence Groups N N • Uncontained, Autonomous Neighborhood Survey • Reactive Group Formation • Ongoing (?) Survey Ch. 6—Conclusions 315 Legal Classification System Social Contention Local Legal Standards Public Review of Classification Site(s) of Contention Style(s) of Contention School Safety Groups Y Y/N • Contained Provincial Legislation & Local Policies • Ongoing, Established Group • Ongoing Lobbying & Education Family Groups N N • Contained, Case- Based Response • Ongoing, Established Group • Reactive, Case- Based Advocacy Transgender Rights Groups N N • Uncontained Education & Commemoration • Ongoing “Remembrance” U.S. Groups Anti-Violence Programs Y Y • Contained Police Advisory Council & Governmental Funding • Contained Police Data Analysis • Uncontained Local Legislative Inquiry • Reactive Group Formation & Community Survey • Reactive (?) Statistics Review • Ongoing Legislative Advocacy Ad Hoc Anti- Violence Groups Y Y • Uncontained, Autonomous Bias Crime Forum • Reactive Group Formation & Case- Based Response School Safety Groups Y Y/N • Contained State Legislation & Local Policies • Ongoing, Established Group • Ongoing Lobbying & Education Family Groups Y Y • Uncontained Education & Commemoration • Ongoing “Remembrance” Transgender Rights Groups Y Y • Contained Local & State Legislative Lobbying • Uncontained Education and Commemoration • Uncontained Survey • Established Group, Ongoing Lobbying • Ongoing “Remembrance” • Ongoing (?) Survey The last two columns represent the practices of the groups studied in relation to bias- motivated events. The first of these, Site of Contention, represents the location, or governmental focal point, of each group’s information practices. These practices are characterized as either contained, if they correspond to the official classification system, or uncontained, if they adopt their own classification system or their own forum independent of any official, governmental Ch. 6—Conclusions 316 system.7 Where a group focuses its contention at more than one site, each site is described briefly. The final column lists the predominant Style or Styles of contention or other information practice utilized by each group. The styles are characterized, as close as possible, as either Reactive, if they appear in reaction to discrete incidents, or Ongoing, if they are sustained even in the absence of individual triggering events. After explaining the characterization of each group’s practices, the following discussion will attempt to correlate each group’s practices with the key differences in local legal principles at each site. As suggested at the conclusion of Chapter 5, this discussion reveals an important connection between the local legal classification system used to label hate crimes and the dynamics of contention by nongovernmental groups that monitor hate crimes at each site. Of the groups studied, three types are most directly engaged with the legal classification systems for hate-related incidents. The community-based anti-violence programs, the ad hoc anti-violence groups, and the school safety groups all engage in contention directly focused on bias-related incidents. Collaboration with, and funding by, the governmental entities that implement the official classification system generally inhibits uncontained contention at the same site. Stated more simply, effective collaboration and resource pooling with governmental actors tends to contain the practices of nongovernmental groups. Vancouver’s Anti-Violence Pilot Project illustrates this containment process. Since the Pilot Project was funded by the official provincial agency 7 The contained versus uncontained dichotomy is an adaptation of Melucci’s distinction between contained and transgressive social contention. See Alberto Melucci, NOMADS OF THE PRESENT: SOCIAL MOVEMENTS & INDIVIDUAL NEEDS IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY (1989); see also Alberto Melucci, CHALLENGING CODES: COLLECTIVE ACTION IN THE INFORMATION AGE (1996); DYNAMICS OF CONTENTION (Doug McAdam, et al. eds., 2001). None of the group practices reviewed here seem transgressive. Yet, they do seem to embrace the official governmental classification systems to greater or lesser degrees. By contrast, an example of transgressive contention appears in R. v. Geoghegan, [2005] A.J. No. 1966 (Prov. Ct.) (Fraser Prov. Ct. J.) (Oral Judgment, Oct. 4, 2005). While awaiting sentencing for throwing a pie into the face of the Alberta Premier, Geoghegan was identified among a group of protestors who disrupted a meeting of the Concerned Christian Citizens gathered to discuss Bill C-250, adding “sexual orientation” to the Criminal Code Hate Propaganda provisions. Geoghegan was sentenced to thirty days’ jail for the pie incident and ordered to make a $500 charitable contribution to the Concerned Christian Citizens. Ch. 6—Conclusions 317 charged with providing victim services, its activities focused on case-by-case victim services. And, though the Pilot Project did produce a Survey as part of its Final Report, the instrument elicited responses from individuals accessing services at the community-based LGBT Centre. Since data were collected and processed with the primary purpose of service delivery, the database produced was adapted to the improvement of service delivery, rather than as a challenge or alternative to any official database. The ad hoc group WEAVE, by contrast, practices uncontained contention. Since its activities were neither funded by, nor coordinated with any official governmental agency, its Survey does not subscribe to the format or themes of any governmental entity. In the absence of any publicly reviewable database for hate-related incidents, moreover, the authors of the WEAVE Survey were at liberty to present their findings in any forum available to them. Judging by the responses of the participants in the feedback meetings, this freedom to choose a format and a forum for presenting nongovernmental classifications represents dubious advantages. The consensus at both locations was that parallel governmental and nongovernmental classification systems were the ideal. Nevertheless, the formation of WEAVE can be directly related to the absence of any publicly available official statistics. The tone of comments by Jack Herman during our interview demonstrates the importance among the group’s members of taking responsibility, assuming agency, in the betterment of their own neighborhood. Judging by Herman’s description, the WEAVE survey was conducted in defiance of the failure of police to publish official statistics. Indeed, the tone of Herman’s interview responses suggested that WEAVE takes some pride in its autonomy from governmental influence—at least its autonomy from Vancouver Police Department influence. In Seattle, when the Hate Crime Awareness Project was formed, there was little “energy” in the community for contention about hate crime statistics. The emotional state of let-down may be tied to the successful community collaboration between the LGBT community and police Ch. 6—Conclusions 318 and prosecutors during the prosecution and sentencing of Micah Painter’s attackers. If Beth Reis’s feedback is indicative, the community was “very pleased.” But, this contentment changed rapidly, upon news of a similar attack which the Seattle Police Department admittedly mis- labeled. There followed a significant episode of contention directly challenging the legal classification system used by police to label hate crimes. The variation in mood coincided with differences in sites and styles of contention. The reactive focus on the prosecution, and a successful case, served to contain the contention following the Painter attack. The failure to investigate or properly code the Ballard attack led to indignant complaints, a thoroughgoing analysis of police data, and contentions public proceedings in the City Council. While the Ballard attack was apparently contained within the local legislative sphere, it was allowed to breach the containment defined by the Seattle Police Department’s administration of legal knowledge. Similar observations apply to the Action Northwest. Its Bias Crime Forum and the public safety forum that it organized could have taken on a belligerent tone, but they were successfully contained by a focus on the prosecutions for the Painter attack. The practices of school safety groups must be analyzed in reference to the official governmental classification systems that correspond to their practices. In their activities related to school violence and harassment the school safety groups do not typically engage with criminal justice hate crime classifications. Instead, their practices focus on school bullying and harassment motivated by homo- and trans-phobic bias. Both Vancouver’s GALE-BC and Seattle’s Safe Schools Coalition actively advocate local board policies and either provincial or state legislation that would classify and prohibit homo- and trans-phobic harassment and violence in schools. In both Vancouver and Seattle, school safety groups look to virtually identical legislative bodies, with virtually identical policymaking authority, to contend for the creation of virtually identical classification systems. Ch. 6—Conclusions 319 Policymaking at the two most local levels of government serves as both a mechanism for a public review of classification decisions and an opportunity to establish or modify a system of classification. As would be expected by the research hypotheses here, therefore, school safety groups contend in virtually identical ways at virtually identical legal locations. Because an ongoing, systematic mechanism of classifying school violence and harassment seems possible in both locations, the groups are not driven by a reactive case-based response. The groups contend within the available sites of official public review. Their contentious practices are of a contained nature, because contained sites are readily available in local school boards and provincial or state legislatures. One further similarity is apparent from the comments of the school safety participants— they all expressed a desire for collaboration and conciliation in their relationships with school officials and educators. And, their tone of voice coincides with their style of contention—the school safety groups uniformly practice steady, ongoing contention for improvements in school bullying and harassment policy, within an existing legislative framework, and accompanied primarily by educational initiatives. The results of contention by the school safety groups, moreover, verify the radical similarities in cultural background at each location. While the Vancouver group has not succeeded in its advocacy for a province-wide anti-harassment mandate, several local boards have adopted policies which it supports. In Seattle, a statewide “Model Policy” has been enacted by the legislature and the state education agency, although the legislation falls short of the wishes of the Seattle’s Safe Schools Coalition, because it does not institute a statewide ban on homo- or tans-phobic school harassment. The representatives of the school safety groups themselves agreed unanimously that their groups’ practices were more similar than different. If the cultural backgrounds of Vancouver and Seattle differed significantly, then different results could be expected for the school safety groups. The profound similarity of the school safety groups in Ch. 6—Conclusions 320 Seattle and Vancouver therefore confirms the premise of the study that these two locations are truly similar. The PFLAG and transgender rights groups are the most difficult to characterize in their activities related to biased incidents, and the data analyzed here are therefore the least conclusive in relation to these two types of groups. These groups engage in contention related to homo- and trans-phobic events, but their contentious practices span a broad and unpredictable spectrum. The generally similar spectrum of contentious practices among transgender rights groups in Seattle and Vancouver reinforces the premise that the two locations share a similar cultural background. Comments in the Vancouver feedback meeting suggested any differences might be attributed to a smaller national population among Canadian groups, resulting in a lesser ability to achieve a “critical mass” of support for group efforts. Yet, the same commentators concluded that groups on both sides of the border were mostly “on the same page.” Nevertheless, Family and Transgender rights groups are more difficult to characterize in their anti-violence activities. This difficulty, I speculate, is caused by the multiplicity of organizing principles governing these groups. The Family groups engage in education and support activities centered around periodic group meetings. Advocacy is only one among three organizing principles, and advocacy is understandably distributed among other causes in addition to contesting hate-related events. Transgender rights groups similarly span a spectrum of activities that include prominently health care policy, in addition to anti-violence work. In sum, family and transgender rights groups engage with the official governmental classification of hate-related events, but only as a small fraction of their much broader activities. 6.3 Connecting Social Contention with Legal Systems The data related to the first three types of groups are more conclusive, however. Both the community-based anti-violence programs and the ad hoc anti-violence groups are organized directly around either discreet hate-related cases or hate-related violence generally. School Ch. 6—Conclusions 321 safety groups are likewise organized around anti-violence programming in schools and legislative and policy advocacy. And, although these Schools groups present educational materials and support local student groups, for example, all of these activities can fit easily into an anti-violence framework if they are characterized as preventative of future violence. Setting aside the practices of the more complex family and transgender rights groups, the practices of the first three types of groups correlate to differences in local legal classification systems for hate-related conduct. The results for these groups are summarized more succinctly in Table 6.4 below. Table 6.4—Results Summary Legal Classification System Social Contention Local Legal Standards Public Review of Classification Site(s) of Contention Style(s) of Contention Canadian Groups Anti-Violence Programs N N Contained Site (Grant- Funded Pilot Project) Reactive Formation Reactive Contention (Grant Terminated) Ad Hoc Anti- Violence Groups N N Uncontained Site (WEAVE Survey) Reactive Formation Reactive Contention (Ongoing (?) Survey) School Safety Groups Y Y Contained Sites (School Board Policy) Ongoing Contention U.S. Groups Anti-Violence Programs Y Y Contained Site (Grant Funded Project) Uncontained Site (City Council Review) Reactive Formation Ongoing Contention (?) (City Council) Ad Hoc Anti- Violence Groups Y Y Contained Site Court Case Mobilization Uncontained (online Bias Crime Forum) Reactive Formation Reactive Contention School Safety Groups Y Y Contained Sites (School Board Policy) Ongoing Contention When the groups are characterized strictly by their information practices in relation to police hate crime classification systems, the resulting correlation becomes apparent. In Vancouver, where police do not publicly gather hate crime statistics, and where their classification system is therefore un-reviewable, both ad hoc anti-violence groups and Ch. 6—Conclusions 322 community-based anti-violence programs have no official point of reference for contention about police hate crime classifications. The contention of these nongovernmental groups is therefore uncontained by any police classification system. At the same time, however, the absence of a police hate crime classification system deprives nongovernmental groups of any basis for a common, ongoing system of data collection in relation to hate-related events. Community-based anti-violence programs and ad hoc anti-violence groups in Seattle, on the other hand, enjoy both locally-defined legal standards and a local mechanism of public review for police hate crime classifications. This mechanism is situated in the City Council, whose powers include not only oversight over the Police Department but also legislative authority to create new criminal offenses and hence new responsibilities for police. Thus, even though their contention might be triggered by a discreet hate-related event, like the Ballard attack, their focus tends to be located within a local legislative framework, and their style seeks modifications to the ongoing system of classification. Where a police classification system and a mechanism for publicly reviewing police classification decisions are both available, two primary modes of behavior may be used to reconcile official and nongovernmental hate crime classifications. Nongovernmental groups may address disagreements about classification decisions—or classification practices more generally—either through collaboration or by seeking adversarial public review. Of these two techniques, collaboration remains “contained” from the perspective of police officials. If collaboration does not accomplish the desired reconciliation, however, nongovernmental groups may challenge police officials in a forum that permits public review of police classifications. From the perspective of police officials, public review would seem uncontained—the nongovernmental groups will have transgressed the boundaries of police authority. Still, from the perspective of a legal classification system, transferring a classification dispute to a local legislative body for public review remains within the boundaries of the overall legal Ch. 6—Conclusions 323 classification system. Thus, in the summary table above, I have characterized the public review of Seattle hate crime statistics as contained rather than uncontained contention. But, in Vancouver, where no official hate crime classification is accessible, neither collaboration nor public review is an option. Thus, by definition, any hate crime classification advocated by anti-violence groups in Vancouver is uncontained. So, while the activities of Vancouver’s community-based Anti-Violence Pilot Project might be seen as contained from the perspective of a victim services model, they are not contained by a police classification system for hate crimes. Moreover, even if public data collection and reporting were practiced by Vancouver police, the absence of any local legal forum in which to challenge police classifications would tend to liberate the practices of anti-violence programs from any police classification framework. 6.4 Summary of Findings This study has been about social mobilization and social contention among groups that contend in the hate crime field. Implicitly, two aspects of mobilization and contention are revealed here in a comparative context: (1) the powerful intermediary roles created or facilitated by legal classification systems; and, (2) the role of homo- and trans-phobic hate crimes as triggering events for mobilization and social contention. Either of these effects might be explored in the practices of governmental agencies, for example police departments or local school boards. Here, however, the focus has been upon nongovernmental groups in society that monitor or otherwise participate in social contention related to hate crimes. Several difficulties might be expected in a study with such a nongovernmental focus. The most obvious difficulty failed to materialize here. One might expect researchers to experience difficulty accessing the inner dynamics of groups which, by their nature, have a Ch. 6—Conclusions 324 serious stake in the privacy of their members and their proprietary knowledge. As Chapter 5 reveals, however, concerns about access were mostly unwarranted in this study. Informants were generally eager to provide information. Indeed more information was accumulated than can be adequately represented in the space allotted here. The second, and ethically more serious, drawback relates to the disciplinary effects of an inquiry of any kind that examines the activities of marginalized social groups, particularly sexual minorities. The glare of attention, even the relatively trivial exposure of a preliminary academic study like this, can threaten the autonomy and integrity, not to mention the privacy, of a marginalized group in society. Lacking formal training in the ethical implications of social anthropology, I have relied upon the institutional protections of an ethical review board combined with the good faith implicit in my personal interactions with informants. I can only thank those who agreed to provide data for this research, and express my hope that the results live up to their expectations. Any lingering errors are my responsibility alone. Having overcome these preliminary difficulties, the data suggested important findings related to both the dynamics of social contention and social mobilization in the hate crime field. 6.4.1 The Dynamics of Social Contention in the Hate Crime Field Research examining the knowledge-producing practices of police investigators in the hate crime field tends to describe an array of practices as if they are the end point on a spectrum of development, as if the recognition of hate crime as a domain brings an end to the processes by which legal knowledge is determined.8 The results here suggest a more dynamic process in which policing agencies continue to change their practices, despite the maintenance of a static set of applicable legal principles. But, the point emphasized here is that nongovernmental groups 8 See, e.g., Jeanine Bell, POLICING HATRED (2002); Valerie Jenness & Ryken Grattet, MAKING HATE A CRIME: FROM SOCIAL MOVEMENT TO LAW, at 7, 8 (2001); Elizabeth A. Boyd, et al., “Motivated by Hatred or Prejudice”: Categorization of Hate-Motivated Crimes in Two Police Divisions, 30 LAW & SOC.’Y REV. 819 (1996). Ch. 6—Conclusions 325 adopt knowledge-producing practices that either correspond with the official classification processes of police and other governmental agencies or represent autonomous efforts to define inequality in response to hate-related events. And, like policing agencies, nongovernmental groups sometimes adapt their practices in response to new triggering events, which include both changes in legal classification systems and new bias-related incidents. But, this study does not examine mobilization or social contention in their general forms. Instead, the primary focus is on the kinds of mobilization and contention that contribute to or influence knowledge about equality in the context of hate crime classification decisions. At this time, a quantitative analysis of homo- and trans-phobic hate crimes, using official hate crime statistics would be inadvisable, even if it were possible. An analysis of hate crime classification systems is nevertheless both possible and useful. And, even more interesting is the examination of the role of nongovernmental social groups in the construction of legal knowledge about such hate crimes. Moreover, and critically important to understanding the differences in practices in Seattle and Vancouver, the dynamics of social contention in the hate crime field do not always play out in a linear fashion. For example, as the interviews and other data reveal, the timing of multiple triggering events can cause a multiplier or crescendo effect, resulting in more vigorous mobilization than would have occurred in response to the separate events alone. Figure 6.1 below is meant to illustrate the sequence of events leading to a multiplier effect in social contention. Ch. 6—Conclusions 326 Figure 6.1—Effect of Successive Triggering Events To illustrate, if one isolated hate crime occurs in a community, nongovernmental groups are likely to respond with some form of social contention—either in cooperation with or challenging police and prosecutorial classification decisions. If a substantial time lag occurs after this initial triggering event, then a new event may trigger a very similar mobilization and similar kinds of social contention by the same social groups. Of course a separate triggering event might also result in no action because of either a sense of resignation or hopelessness or a sense of success after a prosecution. If, on the other hand, a new hate-related event occurs soon after the initial triggering event, the mobilization and the kinds of social contention emerging from the second event are apt to be substantially different than if the two events had occurred in isolation. Note, moreover, that from the perspective of nongovernmental groups, either a hate-related incident, or a seemingly inadequate official response to such an event, can constitute a trigger for social mobilization and contention.9 Examples of the multiplier effect of successive triggering events are easily identified in the data compiled for this study. In Seattle, following the successful mobilization and contention in support of the Micah Painter prosecutions, a second hate-related event triggered occurred in 9 This model is far too simple to accurately describe the multi-variable world of actual social relationships. One might easily imagine, for example, a second event that triggers a response in a social group different than the first, but related by similar goals and interests—say, a homophobic assault followed close in time by a racist assault. In this scenario the streams of mobilization might well merge, resulting in a completely different dynamic. The social networking implications of such a dynamic are worth examining in some detail, but beyond the scope of this study. Event 1 Event 2 Mobilization 1 Mobilization 1 X 2 Ch. 6—Conclusions 327 Seattle’s Ballard neighborhood. While this event might not have otherwise triggered any mobilization, the apparent misclassification of the event by Seattle Police was sufficient to energize some of the same groups that mobilized in response to the Painter case. The resulting contention may have been more vigorous than it would have been if the two events had been separated by a significant time. Successive triggering events were available for contention in Vancouver in the aftermath of the Aaron Webster killing and the subsequent court cases. Significantly, the failure of prosecutors to seek a sentencing premium for bias, prejudice or hate in the Cran case was considered a significant new event by more than one Vancouver informant. I speculate that the Cran decision did not trigger a multiplier or crescendo effect because of differences in the local legal systems of Vancouver and Seattle. In Seattle the Hate Crime Awareness Project Coordinator and others were able to step outside the containment of the police hate crime statistics system and present their claims in a different forum—the Seattle City Council. Vancouver groups, however, had nowhere to go in response to the failure of enhanced penalties in the Cran case. While documents from the Vancouver Police Department, as well as excerpts from their public statements, suggest that police classified the Webster attack as a hate crime, Vancouver groups had no way of knowing about this classification decision, since Vancouver police do not report their classifications publicly. Moreover, even if Vancouver groups like WEAVE or the Anti-Violence Pilot Project had known about a potential mis-classification in the Webster case, no local legal forum exists in Vancouver to hear a challenge to a hate crime classification decision. 6.4.2 Intermediary Roles Recalling the introductory examples cited in Chapter 2 will illustrate the powerful intermediary roles shared by police officials and the nongovernmental groups examined here. Ch. 6—Conclusions 328 History leaves little direct evidence of the practices of nongovernmental groups that interacted with Patrick and Augustine as they contended about slavery and mob violence centuries ago. Nonetheless, what we know from their recorded contention reveals several distinct similarities between the roles of these two church officials and the policing agencies and nongovernmental groups of today. Because they practiced legalistic classification, with some degree of official governmental authority, both Augustine and Patrick represent useful models for the analysis of roles among present-day governmental officials and nongovernmental groups. Furthermore, unlike ancient history, in our times the correspondence between governmental agencies and the nongovernmental groups that might contest their official legal classification decisions is available for immediate study. The interview data and information gathered from police sources reveal important differences in the intermediary roles of governmental and nongovernmental representatives in the two countries. Governmental officials who assign legal classifications to hate-related events may be seen as intermediaries between governmental and nongovernmental groups. Thus, a police investigator, or a unit within a police department may bee seen as the intermediary between the government and nongovernmental groups that monitor hate-related events. Simultaneously, these same governmental agents may be seen as intermediaries between different groups that share governmental authority. For instance, a police hate crime unit might be seen as an intermediary between an individual police investigator with questions about the classification of a hate-related incident and the prosecutor’s office that will be required to litigate criminal responsibility and sentencing. In turn, the prosecutor would be an intermediary between police officials and the fact finder or sentencing judge. These intermediary relationships within governmental departments are very interesting. It is however, a premise of this study that exploring the roles and behaviors of official governmental intermediaries is akin to hagiography—while interesting, there is no particular shortage of such research. What is less Ch. 6—Conclusions 329 common and potentially more useful is an examination of the nongovernmental intermediaries that correspond to the official governmental groups that classify hate crimes.10 In Vancouver, police officials maintain close control over their hate crime classification decisions. Because their decisions are not subject to public review or local legal standards, Vancouver police hold a monopoly on the official legal definition of hate crime in practice. Vancouver police do present their knowledge about hate crimes, but they do so through closely guarded, proprietary channels. Two concrete examples appear in the data gathered here: (1) the academic study of police hate crime reports commissioned by Vancouver Police in preparation for its lobbying in favor of Bill C-250; and, (2) the 2002 academic paper published by three law enforcement officials, using proprietary police data about hate crimes in B.C., including Vancouver. This combination of a cultivated monopoly on official hate crime data, and the absence of any local legal standards or public review of data, places Vancouver Police and the B.C. Hate Crime Team in the position of an unassailable intermediary or broker of legal knowledge about hate crimes. Moreover, the police forces themselves clearly value the control of their own hate crime database. Allowing only limited, controlled access to the database gives the police forces the power to nominate their own preferred intermediaries in the production of academic knowledge in the criminal justice field. Thus, the police forces in B.C are able to control not only the how and why of knowledge production in the hate crime field but also the “who.” In this environment, nongovernmental groups are left with no meaningful role in the official hate crime classification system. On the other hand, groups like WEAVE are free to 10 Note, however, that an important and ambivalent role is played by quasi-governmental agencies or social groups—even in the classification of hate crimes. For example, MacMillan, et al. note that the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police has interpreted the definition of a hate crime to exclude victims targeted because of both their vulnerability and a prohibited bias. See Craig S. Macmillan, et al., Criminal Proceedings as a Response to Hate: The British Columbia Experience, 45 CRIM. L. Q. 419, 460-61 (2002) (“the CACP agreed on April 1, 1998, that the operating definition for hate crime will be “a crime motivated by hate, not vulnerability.”). The Washington Association of Sheriffs and Police Chiefs (WASPC) plays a similar quasi-governmental role as the entity responsible for aggregating local hate crime statistics to forward to the FBI. Ch. 6—Conclusions 330 develop their own data collection techniques, free from the influence of official data or official data collection methods. In their intermediary roles, police and nongovernmental groups in Seattle differ profoundly from their Vancouver counterparts. Both Seattle Police and nongovernmental groups seek to classify hate-related events, but they do so in the presence of a third class of powerful intermediary—the City Council and local civil rights agencies. Because the City Council in particular has local lawmaking power binding on Seattle Police, and because Seattle Police are required to publish their hate crime classification decisions periodically, nongovernmental groups have a site at which to contest classification decisions. In this dynamic, both the nongovernmental groups and the City Council share a powerful intermediary role with the Police—all three entities combine to influence the definition of hate crime in practice. There is nothing inherently insidious, or exceptional, in the careful control of official legal knowledge, even when it implicates our social understanding of concepts like hate crime or equality. But, the tight control of hate crime data by the Vancouver police constitutes a significant difference in the hate crime classification systems in Vancouver and Seattle. And, differences in the control of hate crime data, local legal standards, and the availability of public review, have very important consequences for the dynamics of social mobilization and contention about hate-related incidents. 6.4.3 Social Mobilization What is distinctly, and unavoidably, lacking in the illustrations provided in Chapter 2 is evidence of the dynamics of social mobilization and social contention linked to the events described in Patrick’s Letter and Augustine’s Sermon. Each of these church officials was surely reacting not only to a discreet event but also to the sentiments of the social groups that constituted their congregations. Evidence about the practices of such nongovernmental groups is Ch. 6—Conclusions 331 generally omitted from recorded history, and the omission can probably never be cured. The practices of today’s social groups, on the other hand, are available for study. Perhaps even more today than in late Roman times, law defines the roles of both governmental and nongovernmental intermediaries, and law facilitates particular types of social mobilization and contention. But, how do laws shape the practices of these groups? And, how do nongovernmental groups seek to influence the laws themselves? These questions can probably never be answered definitively for groups in the early Fifth Century Roman provinces. But, they can, and should, be answered for equality-seeking groups operating in today’s American and Canadian cities. This study’s important findings about social mobilization and contention are set out in Tables 6.3 and 6.4 above. To summarize, the presence or absence of local legal standards and public review for hate crime classification decisions influences the social mobilization and contention of nongovernmental groups. Where local legal standards and public review exist, nongovernmental groups tend to conform their contention and mobilization to the legal sites available to them. In this environment, nongovernmental contention also tends to be ongoing rather than reactive, although this dichotomy has only a limited power to describe the reality of life for groups that contend in the hate crime field. Where local legal standards and public review are unavailable, nongovernmental groups are under no pressure to conform to an official classification system and are free to develop their own autonomous classification mechanisms. In this environment, however, nongovernmental groups tend to resort to reactive contention in response to hate-related events. 6.4.4 Summary The results of the study, in sum, suggest that nongovernmental social groups conform their contentious practices to the contours and dynamics of the locally available legal Ch. 6—Conclusions 332 classification systems. Stated in concrete terms: Nongovernmental social groups that monitor homo- and trans-phobic hate crimes tend to use the available police classification systems as their template for contesting hate crime classification decisions, and they tend to stylize their contention to fit the available mechanisms for local legislative review. Where a local hate crime classification system is either non-existent or not reviewable in public, nongovernmental social groups adapt both the location and style of their contentious practices to their own purposes. Overall, the results support the general hypothesis that an official hate crime classification system seems to produce systematic hate crime classification by nongovernmental groups; whereas, the absence of any official hate crime classification system seems to produce reactive nongovernmental classification decisions. Employing a law and literature analysis, Casey Charles suggests a similar distinction between “contained” versus “transformative” responses to homophobic hate crimes. 11 Particularly relevant here, Charles uses the popular production of The Laramie Project to propose the development of a “model” for transformative social responses rather than “contained or sympathetic catharsis.”12 Charles’s concluding imperative is suggestive of the very analysis attempted here: “our dramas must come out of the closet of the theatre into the streets, the courthouses, and the legislatures.”13 6.4.5 Further Research The results of this study are necessarily preliminary. Alternative avenues of investigation might be identified at each stage of the analysis employed here. Unfortunately, significant questions remain unanswered; indeed, the results may raise more questions than answers. First, 11 See Casey Charles, Panic in the Project: Critical Queer Studies & the Matthew Shepard Murder, 18 LAW & LITERATURE 225 (2006). 12 See Charles, 18 LAW & LITERATURE, at 247-48. 13 18 LAW & LITERATURE, at 248; see also, id. (noting “The production of The Project in Missoula did not lead to any police training or legislation on a municipal or state level, though clearly most in the room after the production would have voted for it.”). Ch. 6—Conclusions 333 if methodological challenges can be overcome, then a variety of quantitative studies of hate crimes and hate crime law would be extremely useful. If differences in terminology could be reconciled, a quantitative comparison of homo- and trans-phobic hate crimes in Canada and the United States would be of significant interest. Similarly, if the classification of hate crimes can ever be rendered sufficiently consistent over time, a longitudinal analysis of hate crime rates before and after the codification of hate crime sentencing principles, or before and after some other significant benchmark, would be revealing. Among other things, such quantitative analyses might tell us whether hate crime laws actually work to reduce the number or severity of hate crimes. Unfortunately, we may never have the advantage of a standardized hate crime vocabulary. Second, while several scholars have examined police practices in the hate crime field, a study of the incorporation of hate crime penalties into the routines of judicial sentencing decisions would be worthwhile. At a minimum, such a study would require some standardization of reporting practices making the reasoning of sentencing judges in hate crime cases uniformly available for analysis. Third, this study examined only a narrow sample of knowledge practices employed by a handful of nongovernmental groups. Even among these few groups, an inventory of services, facilities, and practices at various sites would constitute a valuable addition to scholarship, as well as a useful resource for the groups themselves. While such an examination might be seen as an unwarranted intrusion into the privacy of LGBT communities, the willingness of participants in this study suggests otherwise. By itself, a thorough study of internet communication technologies (ICTs) used by the groups studied here would constitute an important contribution to the literature on social contention. Likewise, studies correlating press accounts of hate crimes to community “responses,” or examining the social networking involved in social contention about hate crimes would be of interest. Ch. 6—Conclusions 334 Finally, this study began by offering the local aftermath of the Matthew Shepard killing in Laramie, Wyoming as an example of nongovernmental social contention triggered by homo- or trans-phobic hate crimes generally. Whether the results suggested here may be generalized to other sites in Canada and the United States would be worth investigating further. If the same relationships between the sites and styles of contention in the hate crime field can be verified for other urban sites in Canada and the United States, then a final extension of this analysis should focus on the same variables in more rural communities in the two countries. 6.4.6 Conclusion John Boswell’s seminal study reached a preliminary conclusion that differences in urban and rural or agrarian societies contribute to differences in social intolerance toward homosexuality. 14 This study confirms Boswell’s preliminary finding, but with subtle modifications. Setting aside the urban-rural distinction, Boswell’s premise was that location is critically important to levels of social tolerance toward sexual minorities. What Boswell was unable to draw from his historical evidence, however, was that geographical and cultural differences matter, even among places with similar levels of urban development. This study did not examine social intolerance directly; instead, it examined the construction of knowledge by nongovernmental groups in Seattle and Vancouver. But, despite geographical and demographic similarities, despite surprising similarities in legal texts, and despite comparable levels of urban development, nongovernmental groups in Seattle and Vancouver exhibited marked differences as they participated in the definition of hate crimes in practice. These differences corresponded, not to an urban-rural distinction, but to differences in local legal systems. In other words, 14 See generally, THE BOSWELL THESIS: ESSAYS ON CHRISTIANITY, SOCIAL TOLERANCE, & HOMOSEXUALITY (Mathew Kuefler ed., 2006) (examining aspects of “Boswell Thesis”). Ch. 6—Conclusions 335 differences between the countryside and the city, even differences between nations, may be less important than differences in the more intimate context of local legal culture. This study was constructed to examine the legal knowledge practices that define hate crimes and equality from a local perspective. Therefore, some overemphasis on the importance of local legal dynamics is to be expected. Nevertheless, the results invite a focus on something more intimate than national legal cultures or laws as they exist on a more abstract national plane. How do these results bear upon the social contention that arose after the Mathew Shepard killing? Like Boswell’s study, this thesis has yielded only preliminary conclusions. But, it does seem possible to confirm one aspect embedded in the Boswell Thesis: legal knowledge about intolerance is intensely local in both is practical content and its social dynamics. The comparative analysis here seems to verify that our knowledge about legal ideas like hate crime, and ultimately equality, is shaped profoundly by our physical and sociological place. Tentative and general as it is, such a finding would be far less convincing if drawn from a single case like the Shepard killing. The work of this thesis was therefore justified on theoretical grounds. Finally, however, translating theory into practical consequences, this thesis might be seen as a call for a particular kind of both scholarly and personal attention. Trite as the admonition may seem, the findings here suggest applying a global, at least cross-national, perspective to think locally. What is local in our lives is intimate and therefore unavoidably important to us. 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CREATING & SUPPORTING A GAY/STRAIGHT ALLIANCE (GALE-BC, 2nd ed. 2004) Dealing with Name-Calling: a resource produced by GALE (2005) “We Are Not The Enemy”—Hate Crimes Against Arabs, Muslims, and Those Perceived to be Arab or Muslim after September 11, at 5, 39 (Human Rights Watch, New York, 2002)) King County Prosecuting Attorney, Statement to Media for Release, dated May 25, 2001 Letter, Welcome to PFLAG Bellevue (undated) Flier, LoveWelcomesAll, Achieving Emotional & Spiritual Health in Families with Gay & Lesbian Youth (2005) (available at www.lovewelcomesall-wa.org) Being Out: Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender Youth in BC: An Adolescent Health Survey (McCreary Centre Society, 1992 & 1999) Carmen McDowell, The prevalence, characteristics & typology of Washington state school district policies on bullying, harassment, and discrimination (Oct. 7, 2002), available at http://www.safeschoolscoalition.org/PolicyAnalysisProject-Final10-6-02.pdf (accessed Aug. 12, 2003) Ken Molsberry, Bias Crimes & Incidents in Seattle, 2000 to 2005: An analysis by type of bias & neighborhood (Kristina Armenakis ed., 2006) Cameron Murdock, Final Report, Lesbian, Gay, Transgender, Bisexual (LGTB) Anti-Violence Pilot Project (The Centre, Vancouver, B.C., 2006) D. Olweus, BULLING AT SCHOOL: WHAT WE KNOW & WHAT WE CAN DO (1993) Report, They don’t even know me!: Understanding Anti-Gay Harassment & Violence in Schools, A Report On the Five-Year Anti-Violence Research Project Of the Safe Schools Coalition of Washington State (Beth Reis, et al., Jan., 1999) Safe Schools Resource Guide: Helping Educators Serve ALL Youth & Families Regardless of Sexual Orientation or Gender Identity (Beth Reis ed., 3rd ed., Nov., 2001) Bibliography 363 Safe Schools Resource Guide—Washington State Supplement: Helping Educators Serve ALL Youth & Families Regardless of Sexual Orientation or Gender Identity (Beth Reis ed., Nov., 2001) Report, They don’t even know me!: Understanding Anti-Gay Harassment & Violence in Schools, A Report On the Five-Year Anti-Violence Research Project Of the Safe Schools Coalition of Washington State (Beth Reis, et al., Jan., 1999) Grant Application, Seattle LGBT Community Center Proposal – JustServe AmeriCorps Hate Crime Awareness Project (undated, Summer 2005) L Jenks, Washington State Department of Health (unpublished research for the Safe Schools Coalition from the 2002 Healthy Youth Survey) Brochure, The Safe Schools Intervention Services: Helping schools end anti-gay bullying and harassment (Feb., 2003) Report, Eighty-Three Thousand youth: Select Findings of Eight Population-Based Studies, as they pertain to anti-gay harassment & the safety and well-being of sexual minority students (May, 1999) Seattle Police Department, Presentation Handouts (undated) Booklet, A False Focus on My Family, Why every person of faith should be deeply troubled by Dr. James Dobson’s dangerous & misleading words about the lesbian, gay, bisexual, & transgender community (Soulforce, Inc. 2004) Joy Tataryn, et al., Same Sex, Same Laws: Lesbians, Gay Men, & the Law in B.C., (Legal Services Society, Information Update, June, 1998) Brochure, Anti-Violence Pilot Project (The Centre, Vancouver, B.C., 2005) (available at www.lgtbcentrevancouver.com) Brochure, STOP Lesbian, Gay, Transgender, Bisexual BASHING: Self Defense Resources and Information (The Centre, Vancouver, B.C., undated) The LGBT Anti-Violence Project: Creating Strong & Safe Queer Communities, available at http://www.lgtbcentrevancouver.com/violence.htm (accessed Jan. 18, 2008) Vancouver Police Department Press Conference Excerpts—Aaron Webster Killing, November, 2001, DEPS NOTES, Nov. 19, 20, 22, 2001 Results: The West End Gay Bash Survey, 2003-2004 (WEAVE, Vancouver, B.C., 2005) Appendix 364 APPENDICES Appendix A Interview Contents Interview Title Chapter No. DVD Chapter Title 1 [no title] 2 Start 3 The Anti-Violence Pilot Project 4 Literature 5 Website 6 Client Services 7 Under-Reporting 8 WEAVE 9 Police Reporting 10 Police Training 11 Liaison Officers 12 Coalitions & Networks 13 Coordinator Background 14 Resources 15 Pride Line 16 Funding 17 Termination of Service 18 Advocacy & Reporting 19 Client Consent 20 Community Response 21 Centre Facilities 22 Self-Defence 23 Centre Tour 24 Library 25 The End Anti-Violence Pilot Project—Vancouver 1 Start 2 WEAVE Vancouver 3 Introduction 4 WEAVE Defines Violence 5 How We Got Together 6 A Community Meeting 7 The Bash Line 8 We Always Took a Report 9 Did you Keep those Reports? 10 Bash Line Ended 11 Liaison Officer 12 We Were There WEAVE—Vancouver 13 The Report Appendix 365 Interview Title Chapter No. DVD Chapter Title 14 Yet another Meeting 15 Live & Learn 16 Aaron Webster Murdered 17 The More Education… 18 The Stats Surprised a lot of People 19 We’ve Done Interviews 20 Conversations with the Police 21 Aaron Webster Part 2 22 It Was a Direct Result 23 Davie Street Safety Committee 24 Pride Line 25 The Last Thing You Want… 26 The Problem with the Justice System 27 Recent Bashing 28 It was a Cell Phone 29 Police Data Sharing? 30 More about Hate Crimes WEAVE—Vancouver, continued 1 Start 2 Seattle Hate Crime Awareness Project 3 Introduction 4 HCAP Website 5 Hate Crime Reporting Options 6 Prior Research Interests 7 Job Description 8 Community Survey 9 Funding 10 Bias Crime Reporting Project 11 SPD LGBT Advisory Council 12 Pride Foundation 13 Bias crime Reporting Archive 14 Safe Schools Coalition 15 NCAVP 16 Hate crime Definition 17 Incident Response 18 The End Hate Crime Awareness Project—Seattle 1 Start 2 Introduction 3 Website 4 Research 5 Incident Criteria 6 Hate Crimes in School 7 Reporting in Schools 8 Additional Literature Safe Schools Coalition— Seattle 9 Intervention Services Appendix 366 Interview Title Chapter No. DVD Chapter Title 10 Ongoing Reporting 11 More Literature 12 Group Formation 13 Education Committee 14 Coalition Partners 15 Funding 16 Web Links 17 Educators 18 Police Relations 19 Attorney Referrals 20 Funding & Staff 21 News Digest Archive 22 State Bullying Law 23 Library Tour 24 The End Safe Schools Coalition— Seattle, continued 1 Start 2 Office Space 3 Resource & Referrals 4 Hate Crime Referrals 5 Web & Newsletter 6 Library 7 Education 8 Hate Crime Awareness Project 9 Internship 10 Hate Crime Data 11 Recent Incidents 12 Intervention Services 13 Police Advisory Board 14 Center Tour 15 Fiscal Sponsorship 16 Museum Project 17 Tenant Services 18 Cyber-Centre 19 Library Part 2 20 Art Gallery LGBT Community Center— Seattle 1 Rough Cut Nov. 28, 2005 2 Families PFLAG Bellevue PFLAG Vancouver 3 Schools Safe Schools Coalition—Seattle GALE-BC—Vancouver Rough-Cut Nov. 28, 2005 4 Community Centers Vancouver LGBT Centre Seattle LGBT Center Appendix 367 Interview Title Chapter No. DVD Chapter Title 5 Anti-Violence Projects Seattle Hate Crime Awareness Project Vancouver Anti-Violence Pilot Project 6 Research & Reporting Safe Schools Coalition—Seattle GALE-BC—Vancouver Vancouver Anti-Violence Pilot Project West Enders Against Violence Everywhere (WEAVE)—Vancouver Trans Alliance Society—Vancouver Parliamentary Sex Trade Inquiry Hate Free Zone Hearings—Seattle Seattle Hate Crime Awareness Project 7 Commemoration Trans Days of Remembrance Knowing 8 The End Rough-Cut Nov. 28, 2005, continued 1 [no title] 2 Start 3 Vancouver Feedback 4 Mostly Similar 5 Anti-Violence Projects 6 More Similarities than Differences 7 Seattle First-Response 8 Tracking School Incidents 9 Anti-Violence Program Funding 10 “Interesting Ideas” 11 Police & Hate Crime Statistics 12 Police Mistrust 13 Enforcement through Statistics 14 Misinformation & Apathy 15 The Police are “There” 16 Gatekeepers, Watchdogs & Gatecrashers 17 It’s a Human Problem 18 Population Differences 19 “We’re on the Same Page” 20 Regional Differences Predominate 21 Subtle Differences Only Vancouver Feedback 22 The End 1 [no title] 2 Start 3 Seattle Feedback 4 Different Antidiscrimination Laws 5 Anti-Bullying Law 6 Bullying law Weaknesses 7 Seattle & King County Non-Discrimination Ordinances Seattle Feedback 8 Missing Groups (GLSEN) Appendix 368 Interview Title Chapter No. DVD Chapter Title 9 Seattle schools LGBT Committee 10 Home Alive 11 Q-Patrol 12 Seattle Police Response 13 Action Northwest 14 Limited Ethnic Diversity & Intersectionality 15 Risks to Trans & Gender Non-Conforming Youth 16 Gender Differences among Subjects 17 Anti-Lesbian Hate Crimes 18 Police Interaction 19 NCVAP NGO Reporting 20 “Their Numbers are Always Higher” 21 Not Much “Energy” 22 Police LGBT Advisory Council 23 Rural Police Differences 24 Lower Standards for Youth Safety 25 The End Seattle Feedback, continued Appendix 369 Appendix B Vancouver Police Press Conference Excerpts [Nov. 19, 2001] [Q]: IS GAY BASHING THE ONLY THEORY THAT POLICE ARE LOOKING ON PERHAPS? [A]: WE HAVEN’T DETERMINED YET EXACTLY WHAT THE MOTIVE FOR THIS PARTICULAR ATTACK IS. IT [sic] CERTAINLY ONE OF THEM WE HAVE NOT DISCOUNTED. IT HAS ALL THE EARMARKS OF A TYPE OF A SEXUALLY ORIENTED ATTACK ON THIS INDIVIDUAL ON OUR VICTIM. . . . . . . . [Q]: DO YOU HAVE ANY STATISTICS SCOTT ON HOW MANY SEXUALLY ORIENTED ASSAULTS THERE HAVE BEEN THIS YEAR TO DATE? [A]: NO. YOU WOULD HAVE TO GO TO THE, I BELIEVE ITS [] THE PROVINCIAL HATE CRIME UNIT FOR THOSE TYPES OF STATS. . . . . [Q]: WHEN WAS THE LAST TIME VANCOUVER HAD A GAY BASHING THAT LED TO A FATALITY? [A]: I’M AFRAID I DON’T HAVE ANY HISTORY ON THAT FOR YOU. . . . . [Q]: . . . IS THERE ALSO A HATE CRIMES INVESTIGATION INTO THIS? [A]: AT THIS POINT WHAT THEY WOULD DO, IS THEY WOULD BE LIASING WITH THE PROVINCIAL HATE CRIME UNIT. NOW, AS I SAY NOW WHAT HAPPENS IS THAT THERE [sic] JUST KEPT APRISE [sic], KEEP IN MIND, UPON CONVICTION IF WE ACTUALLY FIND SOMEBODY RESPONSIBLE FOR THIS, AND TAKE THEM TO CONVICTION THEN SOME OF THE MECHANICS IF IT CAN BE PROVEN THAT IT WAS A HATE CRIME YOU KNOW, MOTIVATED AT THAT POINT THEY WOULD BE IN FOR SENTENCING PURPOSES. [Q]: THE PROTOCOL IS THE HATE CRIMES UNIT DOES NOT GET INVOLVED IN THINGS LIKE YOUR MURDER INVESTIGATIONS UNTIL THERE IS REASON TO BELIEVE THAT, THAT IS WHAT HAPPENED[?] [A]: YES, AND KEEP IN MIND THAT THE HATE CRIMES UNIT IS A TOTAL SEPARATE ENTITY TO OUR HOMICIDE UNIT. THE HOMICIDE UNIT IS THE DETECTIVES THAT WILL DO THE INVESTIGATION. VERY POSSIBLY THE HATE Appendix 370 CRIMES UNIT MIGHT BE THE RECIPIENT OF CALLS FROM THE PUBLIC OR TIPS AS WELL, AND OF COURSE WE WOULD LIAISE WITH THEM YOU KNOW TO GENERATE FOLLOW-UP ON THOSE TIPS. [Q]: IS THERE A WARNING GOING OUT TO THE GAY COMMUNITY ABOUT FREQUENTING THE PARK? [A]: WE DID THE VERY FIRST, THAT DAY SATURDAY, WE PUT OUT A WARNING TO THE GAY COMMUNITY.1 [Nov. 20, 2001] [Q]: ARE THERE ANY SUGGESTIONS OR INDICATIONS THAT IT MIGHT NOT BE A HATE CRIME? [A]: WELL WE WOULD HAVE TO SAY AT THIS POINT OF COURSE WE HAVE TO KEEP ALL AVENUES OF THE INVESTIGATION OPEN, THERE IS NOTHING THAT IS 100% DEFINITIVE . . . SUFFICE TO SAY WERE [sic] NOT 100% SATISFIED, BUT NONETHELESS IT HAS ALL THE EARMARKS AND THE POSSIBILITY THAT IT WAS HATE MOTIVATED BY A SEXUAL ORIENTATION, TO US IT MEANS THAT WE HAVE TO CAUTION THE GAY COMMUNITY, AND THEY HAVE TO EXERCISE A LITTLE BIT MORE VIGILENCE IF THERE [sic] GOING TO BE IN THE PARK AFTER DARK. [Q]: HAVE THERE BEEN ANY MORE ATTENTION PAID TO THE GAY AREAS OR WHATEVER AS FAR AS THE POLICE PATROLLING OR ANYTHING SINCE JUST IN CASE MAYBE, IS THERE ANY THREAT THAT THERE MIGHT EVEN BE SOME GAY VIGILANTE GROUPS THAT MIGHT WANT TO TAKE THEIR OWN STEPS TO PATROL OR WHATEVER? [A]: WELL THERE IS NO INFORMATION AS FAR AS ANY GAY VIGILANTE ACTION OR ANYTHING LIKE THAT ON BEHALF OF THE GAY COMMUNITY, AND I REALLY DON’T EXPECT THERE WOULD BE ANYTHING LIKE THAT, IT’S A RESPONSIBLE COMMUNITY AND OF COURSE I THINK ITS IN A SITUATION WHERE THERE IN A GRIEVING POSITION RIGHT NOW. OF COURSE THERE WILL BE SOME ANGER AS A RESULT, BUT WERE [sic] WORKING TOGETHER WITH THAT COMMUNITY AND I’VE GOT INSPECTOR JONES WHO IS THE COMMANDER IN CHARGE OF THAT PARTICULAR SEGMENT OF THE CITY AND HE’LL BE HERE TO GO AND SPEAK TO YOU ABOUT SOME OF OUR INITIATIVES AND SOME OF OUR ONGOING PROGRAMS THAT WE HAVE WITH THAT COMMUNITY. AND TO ADDRESS ANY QUESTIONS YOU MIGHT HAVE. . . . . HATRED IS INTOLERABLE IN ANY COMMUNITY AND WHEN IT MANIFESTS ITSELF AS IT HAS OVER THE LAST WEEKEND I THINK IT CAUSES SHOCK AND ALARM TO 1 Letter from Information & Privacy Unit Re: Records Access Request, dated Nov. 8, 2005 (I&P Unit Ref. No. 05- 1903A), DEPS NOTES, Nov. 19, 2001 (on file with the author). Appendix 371 ALL MEMBERS OF THE COMMUNITY. FOR THE LAST FIVE YEARS, THE DOWNTOWN AREA HAS FELT SAFE OR SAFER THAN PERHAPS IT DID IN THE PAST; AND IN A SINGLE INSTANT IT FEELS LESS SAFE, AND YET 1500 – 2000 PEOPLE SHOWED UP FOR AARON WEBSTER’S MARCH AND MEMORIAL AND THAT SAYS THAT THIS IS SUCH A RARE ACT THAT THIS IS SUCH AN EXTREME ACT THAT VANCOUVER IS PERHAPS STILL SAFE; AND YET WE HAVE SOME PEOPLE OUT THERE WHO HATE, WHO ARE PREPARED TO USE VIOLENCE TO MANIFEST THAT HATE FOR WHATEVER MOTIVATIONS. . . . AARON WEBSTER’S ONLY JUSTICE PERHAPS IS IF WE ARE ABLE TO MOBILIZE A COMMUNITY TO MAKE IT A SAFER COMMUNITY, AND TOWARDS THAT END WE HAVE A NUMBER OF INITIATIVES. WE HEARD FROM THE GAY COMMUNITY THAT THEY DON’T ALWAYS FEEL SAFE COMFORTABLE WHEN THEY REPORT EVENTS TO US, AND WE HAVE TAKEN STEPS WITH EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS TO ENSURE THAT ANY INDICATION WHERE THERE IS HATE BIAS INVOLVED IS REFERRED DIRECTLY TO ONE OF OUR STREET NCO’S SO IT CAN BE ASSIGNED AND INVESTIGATED. EVERY PERSON WHO ENGAGES IN THIS TYPE OF ACTIVITY WILL BE DOCUMENTED AND RECORDED, AND IF THEY HAVE COMMITTED A CRIMINAL ACT, A THREAT, AN ASSAULT THEY WILL BE PROSECUTED AS FULLY AS WE POSSIBLY CAN. DAVE YOUNG WHO IS THE NEIGHBORHOOD PATROL OFFICER AT THE YALETOWN COMMUNITY POLICE CENTRE HAS BEEN ASKED TO RE- MOTIVATE PEOPLE TOWARDS THE BASH LINE. THE BASH LINE HAS BEEN IN OPERATION FOR ABOUT 5 YEARS NOW, AND ITS NUMBER IS 899-6203. WE ARE ASKING PEOPLE THAT ARE INTERESTED IN VOLUNTEERING ON THAT BASH LINE TO PHONE THAT NUMBER AND TO OFFER THEIR ASSISTANCE AT THIS TIME. WE ARE ASKING MEMBERS OF THE GAY COMMUNITY TO STEP FORWARD . . . .I’VE ASKED STEVE EELY WHO IS THE OFFICER WHO IDENTIFIED HIMSELF AS HAVING INTEREST IN WORKING WITH THIS COMMUNITY AND TO BE A LIAISON FOR THE GAY COMMUNITY. I’VE ASKED HIM TO MAKE CONTACT WITH THE CENTER AND BOTH GAY NEWSPAPERS TO SOLICITATE PEOPLE TO COME TO A COMMUNITY SAFETY FORUM, TO ADDRESS HOW THE POLICE AND THIS COMMUNITY, AND OTHER COMMUNITIES CAN WORK TO MAKE THIS DOWNTOWN AREA A SAFER AREA. . . . WE WANT THE NAMES OF THOSE PEOPLE, WE COLLECT THOSE NAMES WHEN PEOPLE ABUSE SEX TRADE WORKERS AND WE WANT TO DO SOMETHING SIMILAR TO THAT. WE WANT A RECORD, THESE PEOPLE THAT COMMITTED THIS ACT ON THE WEEKEND. . . . . . . . [Q]: WHAT DO YOU MEAN ABOUT DOCUMENTING AND REPORTING, IS THERE GOING TO BE A SPECIAL FILE ON THESE PEOPLE? [A]: PRIME BC HAS OFFERED US AN OPPORTUNITY NOW TO COLLECT THIS INFORMATION IN A MUCH MORE EFFECTIVE WAY THAN WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO IN THE PAST. IN THE PAST WE USED A PROGRAM CALLED DISC WHICH HAS NOW GONE NATIONAL. WE WON’T BE USING THAT PARTICULAR PROGRAM, WE HAVE PRIME BC WHICH CREATES THE ABILITY FOR US TO DOCUMENT THESE ACTIVITIES AND TO COLLATE THEM AND TO ANALYZE THEM. [Q]: IS THAT A PROVINCIAL DATABASE? Appendix 372 [A]: PRIME BC IS NOT ENTIRELY PROVINCIAL YET, IT WILL BE IN TIME. AT THE MOMENT THERE ARE 4 OR 5 POLICE AGENCIES ON IT. IN TIME THERE WILL BE MORE. . . . . [Q]: HAVE YOU SEEN AN INCREASE OR DECREASE IN THE AMOUNT OF SORT OF GAY BASHING CRIMES BEING COMMITTED IN THAT AREA? [A]: WE HAD IN THE FIRST 6 MONTHS OF THIS YEAR 402 REPORTS TO THE BASH LINE, 8 OF THOSE WERE ACTUALLY CRIMINAL OFFENCES AND THOSE WERE FOLLOWED UP THROUGH OUR YALE TOWN OFFICE. MY SENSE FROM SPEAKING TO MEMBERS OF THE COMMUNITY IS THAT THERE IS STILL A FAIR DEGREE OF VERBAL ABUSE AND INTIMIDATION. WE SEEM TO BE GETTING MORE COMFORT WITH THAT COMMUNITY REPORTING ACTUAL CRIMINAL OFFENCES, ASSAULTS THROUGH THE MAIN STREAM POLICE LINES. [Q]: DO YOU HAVE ANY IDEA LIKE NUMBERS HOW MANY PEOPLE, OR A ROUGH ESTIMATE? [A]: I HAVE ASKED FOR THE PROVINCIAL HATE CRIMES PEOPLE TO PROVIDE WITH THAT DATA AND THEY HAVEN’T HAD A CHANCE TO COLLATE IT YET. . . . . [Q]: YOU SAID THERE WERE 402 CALLS TO THE BASH LINE THIS YEAR AND 8 WERE CRIMINAL OFFENCES, WHAT WERE THE OTHERS? [A]: SEAKING [sic] INFORMATION, PEOPLE WANTING TO KNOW ABOUT THE BASH LINE, PEOPLE WANTING INFORMATION ON ACCESS TO OTHER RESOURCES FOR THE GAY COMMUNITY. THERE CURRENTLY IS ONLY ONE VOLUNTEER ON THAT LINE, IT IS A 24 HRS A DAY, 7 DAYS A WEEK; BUT [an] OFFICER PHONES THE COMPLAINANT BACK. [Q]: SO YOU WOULD LIKE TO SEE MORE VOLUNTEERS STAFFING THAT LINE? [A]: I WOULD LOVE TO SEE MORE VOLUNTEERS. ROZ SHAKESPERE – I WAS APPROACHED SEVERAL TIMES AT THE MARCH ON SUNDAY AND A NUMBER OF PEOPLE HAVE NOW APPROACHED ME ON HOW TO BECOME A VOLUNTEER ON THE BASH LINE AGAIN.2 2 Id., DEPS NOTES, Nov. 20, 2001 (on file with the author). Several informants for this study identified Roz Shakespeare as an informal liaison between the Vancouver Police Department and the LGBT community. Appendix 373 [Nov. 22, 2001] [DETECTIVE]: . . . . AND I JUST WANT TO STRESS AGAIN THAT AT THIS POINT THERE IS NOTHING CONCLUSIVE TO GO AND SAY THAT YOU KNOW THAT THIS WAS SOLELY DIRECTED BY SEXUAL ORIENTATION. WERE [sic] CERTAINLY KEEPING THE OTHER OPTIONS OPEN, AS FAR AS WHAT OTHER MOTIVES THERE MIGHT HAVE BEEN IN THIS ATTACK. [Q]: INSPECTOR JONES SEEMS TO THINK IT IS DEFINITELY A GAY BASHING? [A]: YEH, THE INSPECTOR JONES OF COURSE IS WORKING IN THE WEST END AND I THINK WHAT HE IS SPEAKING ABOUT IS THE FACT THAT BASICALLY THE COMMUNITY LOOKS UPON AS THAT FROM THAT COMMUNITY, SO OF COURSE THAT’S WHERE THE FOCUS IS GOING TO BE. BUT I CAN SAY ON BEHALF OF THE HOMICIDE SECTION OF COURSE OTHER MOTIVES OF COURSE HAVE NOT BEEN DISCOUNTED AT THIS EARLY STAGE AT ALL.3 3 Id., DEPS NOTES, Nov. 22, 2001 (on file with the author). Appendix 374 Appendix C Interview Scripts [Social Group Interview Script] Subject Number Code: Interview Script Social Contention & Hate Crime Labeling: a Comparison of Non- Governmental Knowledge Practice in Canada & the United States 1. Introduction. This interview is meant to gather information about how non-governmental groups gather, compile, and present information about hate crimes against Gay Lesbian, Bisexual and Transgendered people. I will ask you a series of questions and record your responses. Because the interviews will be used for a comparison, it is important to ask the same questions in each interview. But, you should feel welcome to add any information you consider relevant. [NOTE: please do not provide names or identifying information not already publicly-available about yourself or others.] 2. Educational Materials. Describe any educational materials or services your group provides related to hate crimes? (Examples: reports or brochures about hate crimes; webpage mentions hate crimes; conference presentations, speaker’s bureau, telephone hotline, counseling services). 3. Hate Crime Information. Do you gather, compile, or present information about hate crimes; if so, how? (Examples: newspaper clippings; newsletter; library materials about hate crimes; computer spread-sheet, database, timeline, or list of hate crimes in your city). Where else would your group look for reliable information about hate crimes during the last ten years? 4. Guidelines & Definitions. Does your group have guidelines that define what a hate crime is or how to respond to hate crime? How were these guidelines developed? How would you describe what a hate crime is? 5. Police Liaison. How does your group interact with the police, prosecutors, and other governmental agencies? (Examples: provide educational materials to the police, speakers for police training; inviting police investigators to meetings; refer victims to police; provide liaison or contact person for police; keep a copy of police business card or contact information). 6. Disagreement & Protest. Has your group ever disagreed with the police or other governmental agencies about a hate crime? If so, what did you do? (Examples: protest; complaint; letter to the editor; media contact; election campaign). Describe the level of trust your group places in police hate crime investigations and government hate crime statistics. 7. Other Groups—Local. Does your group interact with other groups that follow hate crimes in this city, including groups that monitor other kinds of hate crimes, for example, religious or racial hate crimes? If so, how do you interact? (Examples: organize events together/separately, share/not share office space or other resources, make referrals to each other, or not). 8. Other Groups—Non-Local. Does your group interact with regional, national, or international groups that monitor hate crimes? If so, how do you interact? (Examples: affiliate with a national group, or not, use reports, data, brochures from national group, or not) Interview Script: June 20, 2005 page 1 Appendix 375 9. Other Groups—Border. Does your group interact with similar groups in nearby cities across the (US/Canadian) border? If so, how do you interact? 10. Resources. How does your group use its resources to maximize the impact of its hate crime work? (Examples: volunteers, paid staff, government or non-governmental funding, donations, office space, equipment). 11. Innovation. Please share examples of how your group has used or developed innovative practices in its activities related to hate crimes. NOTES: Interview Script: June 20, 2005 page 2 Appendix 376 Documents: Consent Form Definition of Hate Crime Reports Intake Form Other Forms Confidentiality Policy Newsletter Calendar Web Page News Clippings History of Group Other Interview Procedures Checklist: Bring Consent Forms Stripe, Label & Cue Tapes Remove Lens Cap Check Lighting & Record Room Tone Record Audio & Video Change Camera Position Lock Out Tapes When Finished Obtain Photocopies Interview Script: June 20, 2005 page 3 Appendix 377 [Modified Script—Seattle Police Department] 1. Introduction: Introduce yourself and describe the SPD Bias Crime Unit, its history and purpose. Explain how the Unit interacts with other investigators and other, County, State, Federal, police forces, and other governmental agencies, e.g., City and State human rights agencies. 2. Education: How do police investigators learn about hate crime investigation techniques, what a hate crime is, etc.? Does the Bias Crime Unit provide training to officers about how to investigate hate crimes? Maintain a reference library with materials about hate crimes? A website? 3. Hate Crime Data: Do Seattle Police collect hate crime information or statistics? Can you describe how, including any form(s) that are used to identify hate crimes during investigations? Have statistics gathering processes changed over time? How is information about individual hate crimes presented to the public or the news media—by officers from the Bias Crime Unit A single media relations officer? 4. Where do investigators look for a working definition or a list of elements of a hate crime? Are there guidelines? 5. Liaison: How does the Unit interact with groups representing hate crime victims— particularly victims of anti-gay hate crimes? Outreach? Meetings? Does the Unit maintain a list of contacts? 6. Protest: Are you aware of occasions when groups have disagreed about how police handled a hate crime? Examples in which the process has worked particularly well? What level of trust do victims’ groups place in hate crime investigations or statistics in Seattle, King County, Washington State? How would you assess the level of under-reporting among victims of hate crimes—particularly anti-gay hate crimes? 7. Do investigators attend training or use reference materials from outside Seattle? From the FBI, state agencies, other departments? Do you interact with police in BC or Vancouver? 8. Do you rely on volunteers, e.g., from victim groups to assist with hate crime investigations or training? Other examples in which volunteers are used? How is the Bias Crime Unit funded? Do King County and Seattle share the costs? Foundation funding? Federal Funding? 9. Documents: I am hoping to get copies of brochures, reference materials, and any other documents you might consider useful to describe how hate crimes are investigated and reported in Seattle and Washington State. Script Detail [group identifier omitted]—Sept. 23, 2005 Appendix 378 Appendix D Certificate of Approval UBC Behavioural Research Ethics Board 
work_ctsz7pgv5bbf7dfljbjvspchwq	----	1 The short and longer term impacts of hate crimes experienced directly, indirectly and through the media Jenny L. Paterson1, Rupert Brown2, & Mark A. Walters2 1Teesside University 2University of Sussex Word count: (not including Title page, Tables and Figures) 10652 Running head: Short and long term impacts of hate crime Author note: This research was supported by a Leverhulme Trust Grant (RPG-2013-027) awarded to Rupert Brown and Mark Walters. Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Jenny Paterson, School of Social Sciences, Humanities & Law, Teesside University, Middlesbrough, TS1 3BX. Email: j.paterson@tees.ac.uk. 2 Abstract A longitudinal study (N = 774) explored the short and longer-term impacts of anti-LGBT hate crime experienced directly, indirectly and through the media. In the short term, being a victim (direct) or personally knowing of a hate crime victim (indirect) was positively associated with vulnerability, emotional responses and behavioural intentions after reading about a hate crime. Direct victims were also less empathic towards other victims and engaged in more victim-blaming. A structural equation model showed direct experiences (via personal vulnerability and empathy) and media experiences (via group-threat and victim-blaming) to be cross-sectionally associated with behavioural intentions. Media experiences also had lasting demobilising impacts on actual behaviours, again serially mediated by group-threat and victim-blaming. The findings highlight the emotional and behavioural impacts of hate crimes on both direct victims and on the wider LGBT community. They also raise questions about media reporting of hate crimes and the role of victim blaming. Key words: Hate crime; LGBT victimisation; Intergroup emotions; Intergroup threat; Victim blaming. 3 Crimes which are motivated by hostility towards a person’s sexual orientation or gender identity can be devastating for victims (Herek, Cogan, & Gillis, 2002; Walters, Paterson, Brown, & McDonnell, 2017). Individuals may be left with substantial physical injuries (Herek et al., 2002) along with extensive psychological trauma (D’Augelli, Grossman, & Starks, 2006; Walters et al., 2017), all of which may contribute to avoidant behaviours and social isolation (e.g., Perry, 2009). These impacts are also likely to reverberate through communities and individuals who share the targeted characteristic. Research has shown that Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Trans (LGBT) individuals who simply know someone who has been a victim of a hate crime (e.g. Perry & Alvi, 2012), or have heard about a hate crime through the media (Noelle, 2002), report similar responses as the direct victims (e.g., vulnerability, anger, anxiety). Since reported hate crimes against LGBT people are on the rise (Bachmann & Gooch, 2017; Corcoran & Smith, 2016), individuals who identify as LGBT are increasingly likely to be a victim, know a victim, or see a media report of an anti-LGBT hate crime. Understanding the impacts of such experiences of hate crimes is, thus, both timely and important. In this study, we explore the impacts of anti-LGBT hate crimes by first comparing how different types of hate crime experiences (e.g., direct and vicarious) impact on individuals’ perceptions, feelings, and behaviours. Second, we explore how these experiences lead to such responses in the short-term. Finally, utilising a longitudinal design, we investigate the longer-term impacts of hate crimes. In doing so, we aim to make significant contributions to the hate crime, intergroup relations, and victim blaming literatures, as well as providing data that can help inform current criminal justice debates surrounding the impacts of targeted victimisation of LGBT people and the support of victims (e.g., Walters et al., 2017). 4 Hate Crimes Experienced Directly, Indirectly and via the Media Most research investigating the impacts of hate crime has examined the experiences of direct victims – individuals who are singled out and abused by perpetrators (e.g., Herek et al., 2002). Studies have shown that anti-LGBT offences are more likely to involve physical violence than parallel non-hate crimes (Cheng, Ickes, & Kenworthy, 2013; Herek et al., 2002), often resulting in direct victims exhibiting acute signs of psychological trauma, including PTSD (e.g., D’Augelli et al., 2006). Victims are likely to feel vulnerable to further attacks, anger at their victimisation and may consequently alter their behaviour, for example by avoiding certain locations or hiding their sexuality or gender identity (Herek, Gillis, & Cogan, 1999). It is not only direct victims who may experience such harms. Hate crimes are symbolic attacks against “difference” which are intended to send messages of hate to entire groups of people. A growing body of research has begun to quantify the vicarious experiences of hate crimes (Bell & Perry, 2015; Iganski & Lagou, 2015; Noelle, 2002; Perry & Alvi, 2012; Walters et al., 2017). Within this nascent literature, these vicarious experiences of hate crime have been conceptualised in different ways. Noelle (2002), for example, showed that the media coverage of the homophobic murder of Mathew Shepard (in 1998) impacted the world-views of other LGB people. Others have shown that personally knowing other hate crime victims in their social network has adverse consequences (Walters et al., 2017). Though both approaches are similar, we believe that they represent two different types of vicarious hate crime victimisation: the former is via the media and the latter, more personal, experience is what we refer to as indirect victimisation. Regardless of the type of vicarious experience, both are likely to affect other group members. First, for those who share the targeted identity (i.e., other LGBT people), simply hearing of others’ victimisation is likely to make them feel personally vulnerable – that they 5 could be next (Paterson, Brown, & Walters, 2018). Second, in line with social identity approaches (e.g., intergroup emotions theory (IET), Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000; social identity theory (SIT), Tajfel & Turner, 1979), people who share the characteristic are also likely to view the hate crime as an attack on the group as a whole. Accordingly, individuals are more likely to respond as a group member and not just as a vulnerable individual (e.g., Smith, 1993). This group-based response is then likely to motivate ingroup members to react more strongly in order to protect themselves, their group’s status and rights, and the security of their fellow group members (Paterson, Brown, & Walters, in press). Although these findings all support the assumption that hate crimes have negative effects on individuals and communities, there has yet to be a study that includes measures of all three experiences simultaneously. Such an investigation is important as it would highlight the possible risks associated with each type of victimisation. For example, on learning of a new hate crime, while those who have experienced direct victimisation – due to its more personal nature – might be expected to experience more pronounced effects, those who have previously suffered vicarious forms of victimisation (indirect and via the media) would be expected to show report greater impacts than those who have had no such prior experiences (Hypothesis 1). The Pathways of Hate Below, we draw upon the existing literature to outline likely mechanisms through which the different types of hate crimes may impact LGBT individuals’ feelings of vulnerability, perceptions of hate crime victims, emotional reactions to hate crimes, and behavioural responses to hate crimes (Figure 1). 6 Step 1. Experiences of Hate Crimes and Perceptions of Threat As hate crimes target characteristics that are generally stable (i.e., sexual orientation and/or gender identity: Savin-Williams & Ream, 2007), direct victims, due to their likely marginalised status, often continue to feel vulnerable to further hate-motivated attacks (Herek et al., 1999). Furthermore, they may view the attack on their LGBT identity as an attack on the “LGBT identity” as a whole, thus highlighting hate crimes to pose a realistic, physical threat to other LGBT people, as well as a symbolic threat against LGBT rights, culture and way of life (see Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005 on the distinction between realistic and symbolic threats). Direct experiences of hate crime, then, are likely to be associated with increased feelings of personal vulnerability and perceptions of group-based threat (Hypothesis 2a). Similarly, vicarious experiences of hate crime are likely to make other LGBT individuals’ feel that their identity group is under threat and that they, as a group member, are vulnerable too. However, research has suggested that some group members minimise their feelings of personal vulnerability after hearing of a hate crime by distancing themselves from the victim and believing that they would not have been victimised as they would have avoided certain locations or hidden their sexual orientation (Noelle, 2002). Thus, vicarious experiences are likely to increase perceptions of threat posed to the group in general, but the literature is unclear whether these experiences would also lead to feelings of personal vulnerability (Hypothesis 2b). Step 2. Perceptions of Threat and Perceptions of Other Victims The experience of hate crimes and the resulting feelings of vulnerability and threat are likely to impact on how individuals respond to hearing about others’ hate-based victimisation, including how much empathy they feel for the victim(s) and to what extent they blame the victim(s). Cortland and colleagues (2017) recently found that sharing similar 7 discriminatory experiences, akin to hate crimes, promoted more empathy for other victimised groups. In one of their studies, Black people were more likely to be empathic towards gay people when discrimination (equal marriage) was framed as a ‘civil rights issue’ compared to a ‘gay issue’. This suggests that the ‘civil rights’ terminology increased the saliency of the vulnerability of Black people and so resulted in them being more empathic towards the discrimination of gay people. Thus, when LGBT people feel vulnerable or that their group is at risk, they will be more empathic towards ingroup victims of hate crimes (Hypothesis 3a). In addition, LGBT individuals who feel more vulnerable and threatened may be less likely to blame hate crime victims because they understand and appreciate the hostility that LGBT people face is pervasive and usually unavoidable. Nevertheless, research has also shown that victim blaming may be higher for those most vulnerable to similar hate-motivated crimes (Bell & Perry, 2015). A gay man participating in Noelle’s (2002) qualitative study, for example, insinuated Mathew Shepard may have had a role to play in his tragic murder by remarking, “I wouldn’t personally even go into a bar, in Wyoming, where there was a mixed crowd, and then be shooting off my mouth that I’m gay” (p. 40). Such statements reveal an element of victim-blaming that indicates an attempt to exert control over one’s own perceived risk of future victimisation – if I don’t act openly gay, I won’t be attacked. In addition, this tendency to victim blame is likely to be a product of the heteronormative societies in which LGBT people are ostracised for threatening sexual and gender norms (Bibbings, 2004). For instance, individuals who have had to “come out”, do so because there remains a general environment that positions heterosexuality as the dominant norm. Sexual orientations that subvert this norm have resulted in hostilities towards LGB people, including parents who disapprove of homosexual relationships. This puts additional emotional burdens on LGB people to conform to a heterosexual lifestyle (including “acting straight”) if they are to “fit in” to society. Surrounded by such negative perceptions can lead to LGBT people 8 internalising societal homophobia and genderism and, consequently, believing that LGBT people who subvert sexual or gender norms are (partly) to blame for any abusive reactions to their sexual orientation (Herek, Cogan, Gillis, & Glunt, 1998). Together, this suggests that, while feelings of vulnerability and group-based threats are likely to be positively associated with empathy for the victim (H3a), such feelings may also increase negative reactions to the victims in which they are (partly) blamed for their victimisation (Hypothesis 3b) Step 3. Perceptions of Victims Influence Emotional Reactions to Hate Crimes Empathy is generally defined as the process in which individuals recognise and match the emotions of someone in distress and, in turn, are motivated to act altruistically (Batson & Ahmed, 2009). As feelings of anger and anxiety are common in direct victims (Herek et al., 1999), it is likely that those who feel empathy for the victim will match such emotions. Indeed, previous research has shown such a link: empathy for the victim is positively associated with feelings of anger and anxiety towards hate crime (Hypothesis 4a: Paterson et al., 2018, in press) Victim blaming, meanwhile, is also likely to impact on the emotions felt towards the hate crime. As noted, group members can blame the victim when they feel particularly vulnerable to hate crimes and because of internalised homophobia (H3b). As internalised homophobia already causes LGBT people to feel ashamed of themselves and their identity group (Herek et al., 1998), personally engaging in such victim blaming reinforces heteronormative ideals and is, thus, likely to compound these feelings of shame about themselves and their group. Consistent with this, Tangney and colleagues (1990; 1992) have consistently found positive associations between blame and shame (but not between blame and guilt). Such findings lend support to our hypothesis that victim blame will be positively associated with feelings of shame towards the hate crime (Hypothesis 4b). 9 Step 4. Emotional Reactions Predict Behaviours IET is well placed to explain the emotional and behavioural impacts of hate crimes (Mackie, Smith, & Ray, 2008; Smith, 1993). This theory suggests that, when group identities are salient, specific group-based emotions will motivate relevant behaviours to help the group. For example, previous research has shown that group-based anger leads to more approach related behaviours, including confrontation (Iyer & Leach, 2008; Mackie et al., 2000) and collective pro-action, perhaps in an effort to re-establish a semblance of power and control over the situation (Iyer, Schmader, & Lickel, 2007; Leonard, Moons, Mackie, & Smith, 2011). Intergroup anxiety, conversely, is thought to lead to more avoidant behaviours which helps put individuals and their group out of harm’s way (Stephan, 2014; Stephan & Stephan, 1985). Likewise, group-based shame has been implicated in avoidant strategies (Sheikh, 2014), but is also thought to lead to a “hostile, humiliated fury” which motivates the shamed individual to retaliate against the (real or imagined) protagonist (Tangney et al., 1992, p. 670). Drawing on this research, then, suggests that once hate crimes elicit emotions (through empathy and blame: H3a and H3b), these group-based emotions will trigger specific behavioural reactions. Anger will be positively related to approach behaviours (Hypothesis 5a); anxiety will be positively associated with avoidant behaviours (Hypothesis 5b), and shame will be positively associated with avoidant and retaliatory behaviours (Hypothesis 5c). Step 5. Behavioural Intentions Translate to Subsequent Behaviours The hate crime literature has shown that victims of direct and vicarious forms of hate crime may change their behaviour as a consequence of their victimisation. Some become socially withdrawn, while others become engaged in more proactive responses (Perry, 2009; Perry & Alvi, 2012). Though this previous research is valuable in understanding the potential behavioural effects of hate crimes, the cross-sectional nature of the research has relied on 10 participants’ predictions of their behaviours (Walters et al., 2017) or participants’ current assessments of their behaviours (Perry & Alvi, 2012). Such designs are limited since participants may not be able to accurately predict their subsequent behaviours (though cf. Ajzen, 1991 for a counter argument). Here we add a longitudinal component to address these limitations. By asking respondents what they intend to do and, at a later date, obtaining reports of what they actually did, we are not only able to understand the effects of hate crime experiences on individuals’ current intentions to act, we are able to show how experiences affect actual behaviours in the longer term. A longitudinal design also permits slightly stronger causal inferences. By testing reciprocal statistical associations, one can determine if a variable at time 1 (e.g., experiences) predicts a variable at time 2 (behaviours) or vice-versa (Kelloway, 2014). Thus, this analysis can help to answer whether experiences with hate crimes impact subsequent behaviours, or whether these behaviours also affect future experiences. Overview and Hypotheses This study used a two-wave longitudinal design over a three-month time period to understand the short and longer term impacts of direct and vicarious experiences of anti- LGBT hate crimes in the UK. At both time points, we assessed participants’ previous experiences with hate crimes (direct, indirect, media) and their current perceptions of general threat and personal vulnerability to hate crime. We then assessed their reactions to a specific hate crime reported in the media, including their reactions to the victim (empathy and blame), their emotional reactions to the crime (anger, anxiety and shame), and their intended behavioural responses (avoidance, pro-action, retaliation, increased security, and raising others’ awareness). We also assessed participants’ self-reported behaviours between Time 1 and Time 2. We tested the following hypotheses: 11 • H1: The impacts of direct experiences of hate crimes will be more pronounced than the impacts associated with indirect experiences of hate crimes which, in turn, will be associated with stronger impacts than having no experiences of hate crimes. • Direct experiences will be positively associated with feelings of personal vulnerability and perceptions of group threat (H2a) while vicarious experiences will be associated with perceptions of threat against the group (H2b). • Feelings of vulnerability and group-based threat will be associated with more empathy for the victim of a hate crime (H3a) and more blame attributions (H3b). • Empathy for the victim will be positively associated with feelings of anger and anxiety towards the crime (H4a), while blame attributions will be positively linked to feelings of shame (H4b). • Anger towards the crime will be positively associated with approach behaviours (i.e., raising awareness, pro-action, retaliation, less avoidance, H5a); anxiety will be positively related to avoidant behaviours (i.e., avoidance, security measures, H5b); and shame will be positively correlated with avoidant behaviours and retaliatory wishes, H5c. • H6: Behavioural intentions at Time 1 will predict actual behaviours reported at Time 2. Method Participants Initially, 835 participants who identified as LGBT and resided in the UK were recruited by Qualtrics to complete a study about ‘Hate Crime Experiences’. Participants were informed that they were to complete the study at two-time points three months apart (February – May 2016) in exchange for a reward offered by Qualtrics (e.g., money, 12 vouchers). Of these 835 participants, 774 completed the first phase and a total of 465 participants completed both phases (retention rate 60%). Here we present demographic information for the final sample: a range of genders were reported - 286 males, 162 females, 12 trans, 1 agender, 1 male and female, 1 trans male, 1 trans female, and 1 intersex; and a range of sexual orientations were reported - 212 gay, 159 bisexual, 51 lesbian, 15 asexual, 14 straight, 10 queer and 4 pansexual. The majority of participants were White British (403), 19 White Other, 11 Multiple/mixed ethnic groups, 10 Black British, 7 Indian, 4 Pakistani, 3 Black Other, 2 New Zealand/Australian, 1 European and 1 Chinese1. The average age at Time 2 was 42.08 years, SD = 14.86. Measures All measures used a 1 (Strongly disagree) to 7 (Strongly agree) point Likert scale and were measured identically at Time 1 and Time 2, unless otherwise stated. Past experiences of anti-LGBT hate crimes and hate incidents2 were defined using the College of Policing operational guidance definition (2014, p. 4) “Any criminal offence, or non-crime incident, which is perceived, by the victim or any other person, to be motivated by a hostility or prejudice based on a person’s sexual orientation or perceived sexual orientation or transgender identity or perceived transgender identity.” Participants then indicated how many times they had been “verbally abused (e.g., shouted at, called names)”, “abused online (e.g., on Twitter, Facebook, discussion boards)” and “physically assaulted (e.g., pushed, punched, kicked)” “by a person who you think was motivated by a prejudice against LGBT people?” The time frame for Time 1 was the past three years and the timeframe for Time 2 was since the last study (approximately 3 months). Response options for verbal and online abuse were: 0, 1-2, 3-4, 5-6, 7-8, 9-10, and 11 times or more, while the response options for physical assaults were 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 times or 13 more. However, as responses showed significant skew, these measures were dichotomised to categorise people as having been victimised or not in each of the three ways (verbal, physical, online). We then averaged these three dichotomous values to obtain a measure of direct experiences: Time 1 α = .81, Time 2 α = .84. Severity of their worst experience was assessed using the item “Thinking about the time(s) when you have been a victim of a hate crime or incident, how severe would you rate your worst experience?” (1 =Very minor to 7 = Very severe with a “N/A I've not been a victim” option). Indirect experiences with hate crimes and severity of their indirect experience were assessed using the same items but referred to how many people they knew who had been victims (they did not need to be close friends with the victim(s) but did need to know them, i.e., not just seen on TV). Again, these experiences showed significant skew and so were dichotomised (Time 1 α = .80, Time 2 α = .82). Media experiences of hate crimes were assessed using the item “How many instances of anti-LGBT hate crimes and incidents would you estimate that you have seen or read about in the media (e.g., TV, radio, Facebook, Twitter, etc.)?” Response options were 0, 1-10, 11- 20, 21-30, and 31 instances or more. The severity of media experiences was assessed in a similar fashion to the direct and indirect experiences. General perceptions of hate crime. Personal vulnerability to hate crimes was measured using three items: “I worry about being a victim of an anti-LGBT hate crime or incident”, “Being LGBT makes me feel vulnerable to anti-LGBT hate crimes and incidents”, and “Showing affection to my partner in public makes me feel vulnerable to anti-LGBT hate crimes” (Time 1 α = .86, Time 2 α = .88). Two reversed items “I do NOT feel that anti-LGBT hate crimes and incidents represent an immediate threat to me” and “I feel safe from anti- 14 LGBT hate crimes and incidents in the area I live in” were dropped as the factor analyses for both time points revealed that these items loaded on to a separate factor3. Realistic threat to LGBT people was measured using five items adapted from Cottrell and Neuberg (2005) with the stem “I believe anti-LGBT hate crimes and incidents…” “Pose a physical threat to LGBT people”, “Endanger the safety of LGBT people”, “Pose a threat to the possessions of LGBT people”, “Pose a threat to the emotional well-being of LGBT people”, and “Pose a threat to the personal rights of LGBT people”, Time 1 α = .95, Time 2, α = .95. Symbolic threat used the same stem and the following three items: “Pose a threat to LGBT culture”, “Pose a threat to LGBT people's way of life”, and “Pose a threat to the beliefs and values of LGBT people”, Time 1 α = .94, Time 2 α = 95. Reactions to a specific hate crime incident. Participants then read an article described as having recently been published on a British news website with the headline “Gay man beaten in homophobic attack”. Following the article and using a 1 = ‘Not at all’ to 7 = ‘Very much so’ scale, participants were instructed “Thinking about the victim, to what extent do you….” and then indicated their empathy for the victim using four items: “Empathise with the victim”, “Feel sadness for the victim?”, “Feel sympathy for the victim?”, and “Feel respect for the victim?” (Time 1 α = .91, Time 2 α = .92). Participants then indicated to what extent they blamed the victim for the attack using three items, “Think the victim was at fault?”, “Think the victim was irresponsible?” and “Think the victim was reckless?” (Time 1 α =.96, Time 2 α = .97). Emotions towards the article were again assessed on a 1 = ‘Not at all’ to 7 ‘Very much so’ scale with the stem question: “How does reading the article make you feel?” Anger was then measured using four items: “Angry”, “Outraged”, “Annoyed” and “Appalled” 15 (Time 1 α =.91, Time 2 α = .92). Anxiety was measured using two items: “Afraid” and “Anxious” (Time 1 r = .78, Time 2 r = .80) and had initially included “Alarmed” but modification indices suggested that this item also cross-loaded onto anger (χ2(1)∆ = 77.89, p < .001) and so was dropped. Shame was initially measured using three items: “Ashamed”, “Embarrassed”, and “Guilty”, but since these three items are likely to be conceptually distinct (see Tangney, 1990 for an overview), we decided to include only the face valid item of “ashamed” in the analysis. Behavioural intentions were then measured with the lead “Having read the article, to what extent would you consider…” Avoidance was then measured using three items “Going out less often”, “Seeing friends less often”, and “Avoiding certain places and people” (Time 1 α =.88, Time 2 α = .88). Security was measured using two items: “Enrolling in a self-defence class” and “Improving the security of my home and my personal belongings (e.g., change locks, change passwords, improve house alarms)”, Time 1 r = .74, Time 2 r = .75. Pro-action was measured using three items: “Joining and/or increasing my participation in anti-hate crime groups”, “Joining and/or increasing my participation in groups and charities that help LGBT people”, and “Becoming more actively involved with groups that advocate LGBT rights” (Time 1 α =.94, Time 2 α = .95). Raising others’ awareness was measured using two items: “Using social media (e.g., Twitter) to raise others’ awareness of the crime” and “Telling other people (e.g., family and friends) about the crime” Time 1 r = .66, Time 2 r = .65. Initially “Naming and shaming the attackers on social media, if I could” was also included in the scales but since the item was found to cross-load onto actual retaliation (see below), the item was removed from these scales for consistency. Retaliation was measured using two items: “Verbally abusing the offenders if I had the opportunity”, and “Physically attacking the offenders if I had the opportunity”. As these latter two items evidenced significant skew, we created a retaliation scale to indicate those who were against retaliation 16 of any sort (scoring < 4 on both scales) and those who were not entirely against it (scoring 4 or more on either scale). Participants also indicated the strength of their LGBT identity using four items: “I feel good about being an LGBT individual”, “I identify with other LGBT people”, “I am like other LGBT people” and “Being LGBT is an important reflection of who I am” (Time 1 α =.85, Time 2 α = .87). At Time 2, participants completed an additional five items that measured self-reported actual behaviours since Time 1. Using the stem “We would now like to know about whether your behaviour has changed in any way since completing the previous survey. Thinking about the past 3 months, please indicate how often you have done the following – compared to what is usual for you” (1 = less often than usual, 4 = same as usual, 7 = more often than usual) and then participants completed the same items as the behavioural intentions above: Avoidance, α =.65; Security r = .68; Pro-action, α =.95; Retaliation, r = .92. Modification indices suggested that the item “Named and shamed the attackers on social media” cross- loaded onto retaliation (χ2(1)∆ = 173.27, p < .001) and so was dropped from the Awareness scale (r = .64). Results Analytical Strategy We first analysed participant attrition across the two-time points, following which we tested our hypotheses by splitting the analysis into three sections. First, exploiting the larger sample size and therefore greater power of Time 1, we conducted a MANCOVA to compare the effects of having direct, indirect and no experiences of hate crimes (H1). We then tested a longitudinal structural equation model (SEM) to test how experiences with hate crimes impacted on participants’ behavioural intentions at Time 1 and actual behaviours at Time 2 17 through the hypothesised mechanisms (H2 – H5: Figure 1). We then supplemented these analyses with a cross-lagged SEM to investigate the temporal relationships between experiences of hate crimes and behavioural intentions (H6). Attrition As noted earlier, we experienced a 40% attrition rate. Using chi square tests and a MANOVA t-test, we found that those who completed the studies at both time points (‘Completes’ n = 465) differed significantly from those who only completed Time 1 on several variables (‘Drop-outs’ n = 309). Demographically, the Drop-outs were younger (34.50 years vs. 41.53 years, F(1,772) = 45.54, p < .001, ηp 2 = .05), were more likely to be female (42.4% vs. 35.3%: χ2(1) = 4.00, p = .046) and less likely to be male (50.5% vs. 61.1%: χ2(1) = 8.49, p = .004). There were no differences in the number of trans people in the groups or intersex people (both χ2s(1) < 3.45, ps > .063). The samples also differed in the participants’ sexual orientation (χ2(11) = 42.48, p < .001: with more bisexual and straight people and fewer gay people in the Drop-out group) and ethnicity (χ2(13) = 39.45, p < .001: with fewer White British people in the Drop-out group). The two groups also differed in their experiences and reactions to hate crimes. Drop- outs were more likely to have been a direct and indirect victim of all types of hate crimes (all χ2s (1) > 11.51, ps < .001) and these experiences were rated as more severe (Fs(1,772) > 9.37, ps < .002, ηp 2s > .01). MANOVAs also revealed that Drop-outs reported viewing more media reports of hate crimes and showed higher scores on vulnerability, victim blame, anxiety, shame, avoidance, security, pro-action, awareness, and retaliation, all Fs(1,772) > 5.03, all ps < .025, ηp 2s > .01. There were no differences between the groups on the severity of media experiences, realistic or symbolic threat, empathy, anger, or LGBT identity. 18 Despite these compositional differences indicating that some of the attrition may have been non-random, comparisons of the correlation matrices of the two groups indicated that the associations between the variables were very comparable: 98% of the 171 correlations were in the same direction, with 92% of them being the same significance status (i.e., either significant or non-significant in both matrices). Only three correlations changed sign, and all three were non-significantly different from zero. Such similar pattern of responses suggests that the results presented below are unlikely to have been affected by participant attrition. Indeed, in light of the fact that the participants who dropped out had more experiences of hate crimes and stronger reactions, it suggests that the absence of these participants from the ‘complete’ sample makes our longitudinal results a more conservative estimate of the impacts of hate crime. Impacts of Direct, Indirect and No Experiences of Hate Crimes We first compared the impacts of those who had only indirect experiences of hate motivated physical assaults (‘Indirect only’ group: N = 219; Mage = 36.34, SD = 14.99) to those who had no experience (“No experience’ group: N = 392; Mage = 42.93, SD = 15.28) and those who had both direct and indirect experiences5 (‘Both’ group: N = 163; Mage = 31.82, SD = 9.75). As the average age of participants in the three groups significantly differed from one another (F(2,770) = 39.42, p < .001, ηp 2 = .09), a MANCOVA, controlling for age, was conducted on all measures and the findings are presented in Figure 26. The MANCOVA revealed that the groups significantly differed on all variables (Pilai’s Trace = .40, F(28,1514) = 13.34, p < .001, ηp 2 = .20; all univariate Fs(2,769) > 4.17, ps < .016, ηp 2s > .01). As hypothesized (H1), having both direct and indirect experiences (‘Both’ group) was generally associated with more pronounced reactions to hate crimes, especially compared to participants who had no experiences. Victims of both experiences felt 19 more personally vulnerable to hate crimes, more anxious and more shame in relation to the hate crime article, and were more likely to indicate that they would engage in all the behaviours assessed (all ps < .001). They were also less empathic towards the victim in the article and engaged in more victim blaming than participants who had not been victimised (both ps < .001). In partial support for H1, participants who had both experiences indicated that they were significantly more likely than participants who had only indirect experiences to engage in four of the five behaviours (all ps < .015, except raising others’ awareness, p = .440) and reported more anxiety and shame (both ps < .001). Nevertheless, contrary to H1, compared with having only indirect experiences, those participants who had both experiences rated their indirect experiences as less severe (p = .017), showed less empathy and more victim blaming (both ps < .001). They also felt that their group was under less threat physically (realistic threat, p = .002) and felt less angry in response to the hate crime article (p = .009). The impacts of indirect experiences of hate crime were more consistent. Compared with people who had had no experience of hate crimes, and consistent with H1, those who knew of someone else who had been assaulted in the past three years felt significantly more vulnerable towards hate crimes (p < .001) and thought hate crimes pose a more realistic (p < .001) and symbolic threat to LGBT people (p = .008). They also reported significantly stronger reactions to the hate crime reported in the article: they were more empathic (p = .010), angry (p < .001), and anxious (p < .001), and they engaged in marginally less victim blaming (p = .055). They were also more likely to engage in four out of the five behavioural intentions (all ps < .016; but retaliation, p = 1.00) and were more strongly identified as LGBT (p = .028). Taken together, these findings highlight the powerful indirect impacts of hate crimes. They also suggest that, while direct victimisation may enhance some responses in the 20 predicted direction, its effects, particularly on the perception of other victims, may not be as predictable. Structural Equation Model Next, we tested our hypothesised model in which previous experiences affected current thoughts and feelings which led to future actions (Figure 1). Table 1 presents the means, standard deviations, and correlations of the variables used in the SEM (n = 465). In general, participants did not feel especially personally vulnerable to hate crimes but did believe that hate crimes posed a realistic and symbolic threat to LGBT people as a group. After reading the hate crime article, participants showed empathy to the victim and did not blame the victim for the crime. The article elicited more anger than anxiety, and shame was the least pronounced reaction. Participants were most likely to engage in spreading the awareness of hate crimes, followed by joining relevant LGBT groups, improving security and engaging in avoidance, while 36% indicated that they were not wholly against retaliation. Three months later, participants reported that their behaviours had remained relatively unchanged with all five behaviours hovering around the midpoint of the scale (Ms = 3.69 – 4.10). We used Mplus to test our model and, as some variables were non-normally distributed, the MLR estimator was used (Muthén & Muthén, 2011). Factors at the same level were allowed to covary, and all factors were predicted to impact on actual behaviours at Time 2. Age was used as a covariate. All items loaded significantly on to their relevant factors (p < .001). Two indicators of the realistic threat scale were allowed to covary as were two indicators of the empathy scale, and actual avoidance scale. The absolute fit indices of the model were good: RMSEA = .047 [95% CIs: .044/.049], SRMR = .087 and the comparative fit index was adequate (CFI = .921), especially considering the complexity and temporal 21 nature of some of the relationships (Hu & Bentler, 1999). The chi-square was significant, as expected in a large model: χ2(792) = 1719.366, p < .001 (MLR scaling factor = 1.114) (Kelloway, 2014). Figure 3 presents the significant correlational paths and shows general support for the majority of the hypotheses. Direct experiences were positively correlated with feelings of personal vulnerability (H2a) and experiences via the media were positively related to perceptions of group threat, although indirect experiences were not, once direct and media experiences were controlled for (H2b). In addition to the hypothesised relationships, media experiences were positively related to personal vulnerability, while, contrary to H2a, direct experiences were negatively associated with realistic group threat. All three threats were then positively related to empathy for the hate crime victim as predicted (H3a), and vulnerability and symbolic group threat were positively associated with blame, as expected (H3b). However, contrary to H3b, realistic group threat was negatively associated with victim blaming. In support of H4a and H4b, empathy was positively associated with anger and anxiety, while blame was positively associated with shame. In addition, victim blaming was found to be positively related to anxiety. In the next step of the model, anger and shame were related to behavioural intentions in the expected fashion. Anger was positively associated with awareness, pro-action, retaliation, and was negatively associated with avoidance (H5a), and shame was positively associated with avoidance, security and retaliation (H5c). Anxiety was found to be positively linked to avoidant behavioural intentions (e.g., avoidance and security) as expected (H5b), but was also positively associated with the other behavioural intentions: awareness, pro-action, and retaliation. In the last step of the model, H6 received partial support. Three out of the five behavioural intentions were positively related to their actual behaviours at Time 2 (awareness, pro-action, and retaliation). Interestingly, all actual 22 behaviours were positively and significantly predicted by victim blame, even when controlling for all the other factors. Mediational Analyses The ‘model indirect’ command using 1000 bootstrap resamples and 95% confidence intervals was used in Mplus (Muthén & Muthén, 2011) to explore the indirect effects of hate crime experiences on shorter term behaviours (intended behaviours at Time 1: Table 2) and longer term behaviours (actual behaviours at Time 2: Table 3). Table 2 shows that direct experiences of hate crimes indirectly influenced four of the five behavioural intentions at Time 1 (all but retaliation)7. The significant mediational pathways revealed that direct experiences were associated with stronger feelings of vulnerability (H2a) which were, in turn, associated with more empathy for the victim (H3a). This empathy was then related to increased anger and anxiety (H4a). Anger was then associated with the more approach behaviours (more pro-action, more awareness, and less avoidance but no mediation to retaliation: H5a), while anxiety was associated with avoidant and security related behaviours (H5b), as well as more pro-action. Table 2 shows that media experiences indirectly influenced all five behavioural intentions at Time 1 and did so through a variety of paths. First, media experiences were positively associated with perceiving hate crimes to pose a realistic threat to LGBT people (H2b). This perception of threat, in turn, was positively associated to empathy (H3a) and these feelings of empathy were, as stated above, associated with feelings of anger and anxiety (H4a, H4b). Anger on this path was, again, associated with less avoidance and more pro- action and awareness raising but not retaliation (H5a). Likewise, anxiety was positively associated with avoidance and security (H5b). Anxiety, on this path, also increased both pro- action and awareness. 23 In addition to the empathic pathways to behavioural intentions, the effect of media experiences on behavioural intentions was mediated through victim blame. As above, media experiences were positively associated with perceptions of realistic group threat (H2b). Contrary to H3b, this threat was negatively associated with victim blame. Blame was then positively associated with shame as expected (H4b) and also with anxiety. Shame was then positively correlated with avoidance, security and retaliation. The anxiety pathway, meanwhile, positively predicted all five intentions. Using the same mediational analyses as above, we next examined the longitudinal mediational pathways of how hate crime experiences may influence actual behaviours three months later. Table 3 displays the total, direct, and indirect effects along with the significant pathways. It is important to note here that, due to potential suppression effects in which direct and indirect effects are opposite in sign making the total effect non-significant (MacKinnon, Krull, & Lockwood, 2000), we explored the significance of all potential pathways even if the overall effect was non-significant. We found that only media experiences of hate crime were significantly related to actual behaviours at Time 2, and these effects were all indirect. Media experiences were related to more awareness raising behaviours, sequentially mediated through realistic threat, empathy, anger and the intention to raise awareness. The experiences were also related to less pro-action, sequentially mediated by realistic threat, less blame, anxiety, and intentions to engage in pro-action. Notably, in addition to these two mediational pathways, media experiences indirectly – and negatively – affected all behaviours at Time 2. Media experiences were positively associated with perceptions of realistic group threat which were, in turn, negatively associated with victim blame, which was then subsequently positively related to all measured behaviours at Time 2. These findings suggest that media experiences have an overall negative impact on actual behaviours because, while media 24 accounts may increase perceptions of group threat, this threat decreases blame attributions which, in turn, decreases the likelihood of engaging in any subsequent behaviours. Supplementary Analyses To understand the temporal relationship between experiences of hate crimes and behaviours, we conducted a cross-lagged SEM in which experiences (direct, indirect, media) at Time 1 were estimated to predict behavioural intentions (avoidance, security, pro-action, awareness, retaliation) at Time 2, controlling for behavioural intentions at Time 1. Simultaneously, behavioural intentions at Time 1 were estimated to predict experiences at Time 2, controlling for experiences at Time 1. Factors on the same level were covaried (e.g., direct with indirect and media), as were items that were used at both time points (e.g., ‘direct’ at Time 1 with ‘direct’ at Time 2 to account for method covariance, Kelloway, 2014). Age was again used as a covariate and the model fit the data well: χ2(506) = 982.532, p < .001 (MLR scaling factor = 1.113), CFI = .955, RMSEA = .045 [95% CIs: .041/.049]; SRMR = .043 (Hu & Bentler, 1999). Figure 4 shows that direct experiences at Time 1 predicted pro- action, awareness and avoidance at Time 2, while avoidant behavioural intentions at Time 1 predicted greater experiences via the media at Time 2. Discussion Overall, our research clearly shows that anti-LGBT hate crimes, whether experienced directly, indirectly or through the media, have substantial short and longer-term impacts on LGBT individuals and communities. Short-term impacts are well explained by our expansion of IET since they show that the emotions elicited by threat and vulnerability seem to be generated by empathy and victim blaming. In a unique contribution to the hate crime literature, we also provide important longitudinal evidence, suggesting that hate crimes seen 25 through the media have durable – and negative – effects on actual behavioural engagement in response to hate crimes. Substantiating previous research, our results show that anti-LGBT hate crimes have significant impacts on direct victims (Herek et al., 1999). Compared with people who had no experiences of hate crime, direct victims were found to feel more vulnerable to future attacks and were more likely to change their behaviours in response to a reported hate crime. Our study also showed that hate incidents are acutely felt throughout targeted communities (H1). Simply knowing someone who had been a victim of a hate crime impacted on other LGBT individuals’ perceptions of threat and their emotional and behavioural responses to hate crimes, in a manner similar to direct victims. Although having only indirect experiences seemed to promote more positive and sympathetic views of hate crime victims, having both direct and indirect experiences had the opposite effect. These victims were relatively less empathic and more blaming of other LGBT hate crime victims. Such victim blaming is yet another indicator of the heightened traumas associated with multiple experiences of different types of hate crime victimisation. Direct and indirect experiences of hate compound the message that being LGBT is socially unacceptable and as individuals they are not worthy of respect (e.g., Noelle, 2002). With these experiences, the risk that this message becomes internalised is increased and, in turn, individuals will seek ways of avoiding future experiences of harm. One way of doing this is to enhance feelings of security and safety by dissociating oneself from certain risk factors. By placing personal blame on other victims for their experiences of anti-LGBT victimisation, some individuals can distance themselves from the perceived risk of re-victimisation – thereby protecting their emotional wellbeing in the long term (Garnets, Herek, & Levy, 1990). 26 SEM analyses generally supported the hypothesised pathways in which hate crimes impact individuals in the short term. The mediational analyses supported the proposition that direct experiences of hate crimes make people feel more vulnerable to further attacks (H2a) which, in turn, leads to greater empathy for other hate crime victims (H3a). Such findings suggest that, while direct victimisation is obviously a very negative event for individuals, it does allow them to understand and connect with fellow ingroup members. Such empathetic ties, furthermore, enhance anger and anxiety (H4a, H4B) and, consistent with IET, these predict relevant approach and avoidant behavioural responses in the short-term (H5a, H5b: e.g., anger to pro-action and anxiety to avoidance, e.g., Mackie & Smith, 2015). Media accounts of hate crimes were also shown to impact on behavioural intentions but did so via different mechanisms. Namely, instead of increasing personal vulnerability as direct experiences did, media experiences seemed to highlight that LGBT people, as a whole, live with the knowledge that they may be physically attacked (H2b: i.e., realistic threat). Perceiving the LGBT group to be under threat, individuals tended to be more empathic to victims of hate crime which, similar to direct experiences, motivate behavioural intentions via increasing feelings of anger and anxiety. However, perhaps, as the threat is less proximate than direct and indirect experiences, individuals were also less likely to engage in victim blaming, contrary to hypotheses (H3b). Feeling less ashamed was also related to less avoidance, and fewer retaliatory and security-related behaviours, as hypothesised (H5c). Feeling less anxious was related to less action altogether (partially supporting H5b). Although the link between realistic threat and blame (and its knock-on effect on behavioural intentions) was not anticipated, it suggests that while media accounts may increase behavioural intentions by promoting more ingroup empathy, the abundance of media reports of hate crimes that individuals see may also acclimatise and desensitise people to hate crimes and so blunt their intentions to act. For example, media reports may remind 27 individuals of the threat posed to their group and as such they may believe hate crimes are somewhat inevitable and unavoidable – thus they do not blame the victim, do not worry or feel ashamed over something they cannot change, and so do not feel compelled to change their situation (e.g., avoidance) or the situation of their group (e.g., pro-action). Further supporting the idea that the media may blunt individuals’ behavioural reactions, media experiences were negatively related to all actual behaviours reported three months later, serially mediated by realistic threats and victim blame. Again, media accounts of hate crime seemed to increase the saliency of the physical threat posed to LGBT group members and so the victim was not blamed as much for their victimisation and this lack of blame was associated with less action. In addition to this consistent four step mediation, media experiences were found to be indirectly associated with less pro-action (via realistic threat, blame, anxiety, and pro-action intentions) and more awareness (via realistic threat, empathy, anger, and awareness intentions). Such a finding supports the assertion that intentions are a useful predictor of behaviours (H6: Ajzen, 1991) and somewhat validates the use of behavioural intentions as a proxy for actual behaviours in previous hate crime research (e.g., Paterson et al., 2018; Walters et al., 2017). Nevertheless, intentions to avoid, retaliate, and to increase security did not predict their respective actions three months later, once all other factors had been accounted for. As individuals may find it easier to use social media and join community groups, rather than avoid certain places, change their security systems, or engage in retaliatory behaviours, these findings may reflect the differences in the ability to engage in these behaviours types, something which future research should explore. The findings have implications for practice, especially the finding that experiences of hate crimes via the media have effects on individuals and communities both in the short-term and long-term. Further research on how the media report hate crimes, and how agencies (e.g., 28 police) inform the media via press releases, is important to help mitigate the demobilising effect of media experiences revealed in this study. The results of supplementary analyses are also of theoretical and practical importance. The SEM revealed that while (direct) experiences of hate crime predict subsequent pro- active, avoidant, and awareness behaviours, behavioural intentions do not always influence later experiences (though avoidance positively predicted media experiences three months later). A pessimistic interpretation of the results could be that any reaction to minimise experiences of hate crimes is futile – and, in fact, being avoidant may be especially pointless as it was linked to more media experiences. A more optimistic view, however, is that, despite the possibility that pro-active responses, such as joining community groups, could result in greater visibility and therefore more opportunities to be victimised, we did not find this link. Instead, we believe that becoming more involved with LGBT groups and charities helps to mobilise individuals and brings communities together. With strengthened group bonds, LGBT individuals are more able to assert their rights and feel more protected, supported, and less vulnerable. Despite finding general support for our hypotheses, our research revealed some unanticipated results. Direct experiences were not associated with increases in perceptions of group threat as expected (e.g., Table 1, Figure 2) and were significantly negatively associated in the SEM. This unexpected finding may reflect a form of personalisation of their victimisation. For example, as victims are commonly attacked by someone who is known to them (Roberts, Innes, Williams, Tregidga, & Gadd, 2013), they may view themselves to be especially vulnerable to attack because of their situational circumstances, and believe that other LGBT people, with different situations, will not be the targets of such attacks. Research has also shown that hate crime offenders can be motivated by multiple factors, with many incidents occurring in the “heat of the moment”, whereby individuals caught up in an 29 altercation that is not primarily motivated by hatred towards LGBT people, ends in one person lashing out in frustration (Walters, Brown, & Wiedlitzka, 2016). In such cases, the victim may be harmed by their demonstration of hostility, but be less likely to view the incident as an attack on all LGBT people. As such, while their direct experiences lead to feelings of personal vulnerability they may be less likely to perceive it as a group-based threat. This finding was unexpected and warrants further investigation into whether there are different types of direct hate crime experiences that do and do not lead to perceptions of group-based threats. Indirect experiences did not predict any of the threat measures in the SEM as hypothesised (H2b), nor did they directly or indirectly predict any of the dependent variables, when the effects of direct and experiences were accounted for. In addition, perception of symbolic threat was not identified as a significant mediator in any of the analyses (H3a and H3b). Nevertheless, correlational analyses (Table 1) suggests that these variables were associated with relevant variables in the predicted ways and so suggest that, while both are likely to play an important role in understanding the widespread effects of hate crime, other factors may overshadow their relevance when statistically mapping the effects of hate crimes. Meanwhile anxiety was unexpectedly positively associated with feelings of blame. Similar to the blame-shame link, this association could represent a consequence of internalised homophobia in which participants not only experience reflective shame but also anxiety about who they are and the threats they and their group face (Herek et al., 1998). Anxiety was also found to be a mediator to the ‘approach’ behavioural intentions of pro- action, retaliation, and awareness raising. While this does seem to be in contrast to the existing literature which specifies anxiety to motivate avoidant tendencies (e.g., Stephan & Stephan, 1985), such links have been found before (anxiety to pro-action: Paterson et al., 2018, in press). Feeling anxious about hate crime may motivate individuals to seek support 30 from others by joining community groups (e.g., pro-action) and reaching out to people on social media (e.g., raising awareness). Furthermore, in an attempt to minimise their feelings of anxiety and powerlessness, they may want to retaliate (e.g., Van Zomeren, Fischer, & Spears, 2007). Lastly, while predictions derived from IET were generally supported cross- sectionally, they fared less well longitudinally. This could be because such responses to hate crimes are short lived. For example, if the anger felt towards the hate crime dissipates over time, its effects on behaviours would likely dissipate also. Alternatively, the complexity of our longitudinal model may have jeopardised our ability to detect these proposed mediational pathways. Future research may usefully include fewer variables over a wider temporal range (e.g., one week after, one month after, etc.) as this would better show the duration of hate crime impacts. The study was not without its limitations. Self-evidently, as a correlational design, strong causal inferences are problematic. However, this limitation was partly mitigated by the inclusion of a longitudinal element to the study, probably for the first time in research on the psychological effects of hate crime. Moreover, the findings reported here are consistent with some experimental results reported elsewhere (Paterson et al., 2018, in press) and so undue concerns about the causal direction of our findings may be misplaced. The systematic attrition from our sample might have biased the results. However, since participants who failed to complete the second questionnaire had more experiences of hate crimes, reported stronger responses and showed the same pattern of associations between the variables than did participants who completed both phases, if anything, such attrition may have led to underestimation of the effects of hate crimes. Methodologically, we only used a gay male victim within the study primes and analysed participants as ‘LGBT’ rather than their intersectional identities (e.g., gay male, 31 queer female, straight trans, etc). Although the heterogeneity of the LGBT community may give rise to different reactions based on these multifaceted identities, previous research suggests that responses to hate crimes are more likely to be derived from the LGBT superordinate identity (Paterson et al., 2018) and shared discriminatory experiences (Cortland et al., 2017) than specific sub-group identities. In addition, some of the measures were sub- optimal. Shame was measured with just one, albeit face-valid, item, while empathy was measured with four items that may be conceptually different from other definitions of empathy and, in particular, omitted any reference to perspective taking that is often central to the definition (e.g., Batson & Ahmad, 2009) Future research might be well advised to use conceptually more adequate measures. Conclusion This study supports and advances our theoretical knowledge of hate crimes whilst also having real practical implications on an issue that continues to blight individuals, communities and society as a whole. We show that hate crimes experienced directly or vicariously through other people or via the media, impact a range of perceptions, reactions and responses. The research also brings up unexpected new questions that future research could address, including the role of victim blaming and the potentially demobilising effect of media reports. Finally, as the results highlight how experiences of hate crime impact individuals, they suggest ways in which practitioners could identify, and thus manage, the resulting perceptions, emotional reactions and behavioural responses to hate crimes, whilst also helping to mobilise actions against them. 32 Footnotes 1. Participants generally reported the same gender identity (94%) and sexual orientation (87%) at both Time points. The inconsistent responses may illustrate the fluid nature of gender and sexuality. Ethnicities were also generally the same across time points (94%) and those that did differ were not greatly different (e.g., Black-British at Time 1 and Black-Other at Time 2). 2. To ensure a wide range of hate-motivated experiences were captured, participants were asked about their experiences of both hate incidents and hate crimes (those that constitute a criminal offence). For the rest of the paper, ‘hate crimes’ refer to both hate crimes and hate incidents. Also note, under UK law, verbal abuse/harassment can constitute a criminal offence (Crime and Disorder Act, 1998 (c.37)). 3. As we had not anticipated vulnerability to split into two factors, we used only one factor in the analysis. We also re-ran the analyses with all 5 items in the scale and the results showed no significant changes in associations or magnitudes. 4. Strength of LGBT identity was measured to ensure that participants were sufficiently identified as LGBT. This identity was consistent across time points (Mtime1 = 4.99 vs. Mtime2 = 5.02: t(474) = -.60, p = .547) and Identity at time 2 was not predicted by previous hate crime experiences (bs < .058, ps > .346). 5. As only 17 participants had been physically assaulted but did not know of another victim of a physical assault, we were unable to conduct the full 2x2 design. Instead, these participants were combined with participants who had direct and indirect experiences. 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A., Brown, R., & Wiedlitzka, S. (2016). Causes and motivations of hate crime. Retrieved from https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/sites/default/files/research- report-102-causes-and-motivations-of-hate-crime.pdf Walters, M. A., Paterson, J. L., Brown, R., & McDonnell, L. (2017). Hate crimes against trans people: assessing emotions, behaviors and attitudes towards criminal justice agencies. Journal of Interpersonal Violence. doi:10.1177/0886260517715026 https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/sites/default/files/research-report-102-causes-and-motivations-of-hate-crime.pdf https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/sites/default/files/research-report-102-causes-and-motivations-of-hate-crime.pdf 39 Figure 1. Hypothesised model (H2 -H6) Retaliation Security Pro-action Avoidance Anxiety Anger Empathy Blame Indirect Direct Media Awareness Real Threat Vuln Actual ret’n Actual pro-act Actual avoidance Actual awaren’ T2 Measured at T1 Shame Actual Security Previous experiences Perceptions of threat Perceptions of victim Emotions to crime Behavioural intentions Actual behaviours - Symb Threat 40 Figure 2. MANCOVA comparing the effects of direct, indirect and no experiences of hate crimes at Time 1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 A gr ee m en t No experience (n = 391) Indirect only (n = 219) Direct and indirect (n = 163) 41 Table 1 Means, SDs, and correlations of variables used in SEM 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 1. Direct - .64** .20** .34** -.01 .07 -.14** .41** .04 .32** .23** .45** .52** .35** .33** .24** .28** .25** .24** .32** .19** 2. Indirect - .30** .33** .07 .13** .01 .20** .12* .31** .11* .34** .45** .40** .39** .16** .17** .16** .20** .28** .10* 3. Media - .22** .28** .21** .16** -.10* .17** .17** -.02 .06 .09 .23** .23** -.08 .01 .02 .04 .15** .01 4. Vuln - .39** .37** .26** .08 .26** .65** .07 .53** .42** .39** .39** .22** .11* .15** .13** .17** -.01 5. Real - .73** .46** -.28** .45** .23** -.13* .11* .08 .26** .31** -.10* -.12* -.06 .05 .06 -.12* 6. Symb - .43** -.16** .45** .36** -.04 .22** .19** .34** .34** -.01 -.01 .01 .10* .09 -.09 7. Empathy - -.37** .61** .23** -.08 .05 .01 .20** .31** -.12* -.05 -.10* .01 .02 -.15** 8. Blame - -.23** .16** .41** .37** .36** .16** .08 .36** .37** .30** .21** .19** .26** 9. Anger - .31** -.01 .12** .14** .32** .39** -.04 .03 -.02 .09* .15** -.05 10. Anxiety - .23** .58** .52** .43** .36** .20** .18** .17** .18** .21** .03 11. Shame - .29** .27** .16** .04 .19** .19** .16** .10* .11* .13* 12. Avoid B - .73** .45** .38** .33** .23** .19** .21** .21** .08 13. Sec BI - .57** .47** .33** .24** .26** .22** .23** .12** 14. Pro-act BI - .76** .28** .15** .17** .24** .28** .05 15.Aware BI - .26** .16** .10* .22** .32** .01 16. Retal BI - .19** .18** .20** .20** .21** 17.Actual Avoid - .454** .43** .33** .32** 42 18 Actual Security - .54** .42** .59** 19.Actual Pro-act - .67** .59** 20.Actual aware - .41** 21.Actual retal - Means (SDs) 1.30 (.36) 1.50 (.42) 2.55 (1.11) 3.72 (1.67) 5.32 (1.34) 5.04 (1.54) 5.94 (1.12) 1.84 (1.47) 5.56 (1.29) 3.70 (1.69) 2.89(1.98) 2.56 (1.63) 2.76 (1.73) 3.52 (1.73) 3.79 (1.80) 1.36 (.48) 4.08 (.73) 3.71 (1.17) 3.94 (.91) 4.10 (.98) 3.69 (1.27) *p < .01,**p < .001 Note. Variables 1-16 measured at Time 1, variables 17-21 measured at T2. 43 Figure 3. Structural equation model *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. Retaliation Security Pro-action Avoidance Anxiety Anger Empathy Blame Indirect Direct Media Awareness Real Vuln Symb Actual ret’n Actual pro-act Actual avoidance Actual awaren’ .40** -.30* .11* .28*** .17** .25*** .33*** -.57*** .20** .17* .16*** .35*** .46** .49*** .72*** .38*** .24*** .29*** .33*** .61*** .55*** .18*** .16*** .14** .09* .17*** .22*** T2 Measured at T1 -.14** Shame Actual Security .21*** -.12* .22* .44*** .18* .18* .15* Previous experiences Perceptions of threat Perceptions of victim Emotions to crime Behavioural intentions Actual behaviours 44 Not shown: Age was used as a covariate. All factors at Time 1 estimated actual behaviours at Time 2. All items loaded onto their respective factors (p < .001), factors at the same level were allowed to covary, two items of realistic threats, empathy, and actual avoidance scales were covaried. χ2(1338) = 2684.757, p < .001 (MLR scaling factor = 1.114), CFI = .921, RMSEA = .047 [95% CIs: .044/.049], SRMR = .087. 45 Table 2. Indirect effects of hate crime experiences on behavioural intentions at Time 1 Predictor Outcome Total indirect effect [95% CIs] Significant indirect effect pathways [95% CIs] Media experiences Avoidance BI .001 [-.016/.017] Media  realistic threat  empathy  anger  avoid BI: -.009 [-.017/-.001] Media  realistic threat  empathy  anxiety  avoid BI: .027 [.009/.044] Media  realistic threat  blame  shame  avoid BI: -.013 [-.022/-.004] Media  realistic threat  blame  anxiety  avoid BI: -.033 [-.049/-.016] Security BI .011 [-.007/.030] Media  realistic threat empathy  anxiety  security BI: .024 [.009/.039] Media  realistic threat  blame  shame  security BI: -.012 [-.020/-.003] Media  realistic threat  blame  anxiety  security BI: -.030 [-.044/-.015] Pro-action BI .033 [.013/.053] Media  realistic threat  empathy  anger  pro-action BI: .016 [.006/.026] Media  realistic threat  empathy  anxiety  pro-action BI: .014 [.004/.025] Media  realistic threat  blame  anxiety  pro-action BI: -.018 [-.028/-.007] Awareness BI .049 [.025/.072] Media  realistic threat  empathy  anger  awareness BI: .025 [.011/.038] Media  realistic threat  empathy  anxiety  awareness BI: .013 [.002/.023] 46 Media  realistic threat  blame  anxiety  awareness BI: -.015 [-.026/-.005] Retaliation BI -.010 [-.022/.003] Media  realistic threat  blame  shame  retaliate BI: -.010 [-.018/-.002] Media  realistic threat  blame  anxiety  retaliate BI: -.011 [-.020/-.003] Direct experiences Avoidance BI .060 [.013/.106] Direct  vulnerability  empathy  anger  avoid BI: -.006 [-.012/-.001] Direct  vulnerability  empathy  anxiety  avoid BI: .019 [.003/.035] Security BI .049 [.003/.095] Direct  vulnerability  empathy  anxiety  security BI: .017 [.003/.031] Pro-action BI .016 [-.032/.064] Direct  vulnerability  empathy  anger  pro-action BI: .011 [.001/.021] Direct  vulnerability  empathy  anxiety  pro-action BI: .010 [.001/.019] Awareness BI -.002 [-.065/.061] Direct  vulnerability  empathy  anger  awareness BI: .017 [.004/.031] Retaliation BI .032 [.003/.060] None Indirect experiences Avoidance BI .006 [-.028/.039] None Security BI .014 [-.022/.050] None Pro-action BI .029 [-.015/.074] None Awareness BI .041 [-.020/.101] None Retaliation BI -.005 [-.027/.017] None Note. BI = Behavioural intention. CIs that do not straddle zero are significant. 47 Table 3. Direct, indirect and total effects of the longitudinal SEM Predictor Outcome Total estimate [95% CIs] Direct effect [95% CIs] Total indirect effect [95% CIs] Significant indirect effect pathways [95% CIs] Media experiences Avoidance .054 [-.069/.177] .120 [.000/.240] -.066 [-.117/-.015] Media  realistic threat blame actual avoidance: -.069 [-.118/-.021] Security -.049 [-.390/.042] -.019 [-.114/.076] -.030 [-.067/.007] Media realistic threat  blame  actual security: -.033 [-.056/-.011] Pro-action -.032 [-.105/.040] -.041 [-.100/.018] .009 [-.022/.041] Media  realistic threat  blame  actual pro-action: -.028 [-.051/-.004] Media  realistic threat  blame anxiety  pro-action intention  actual pro-action: -.003 [-.005/.-.001] Awareness .061 [-.036/.158] .057 [-.038/.152] .004 [-.030/.038] Media  realistic threat  blame  actual awareness: -.023 [-.044/-.002] Media  realistic threat empathy  anger awareness intention  actual awareness: .005 [.001/.010] 48 Retaliation -.001 [-.074/.073] .033 [-.038/.105] -.034 [-.066/-.002] Media  realistic threat  blame  actual retaliation: -.024 [-.050/-.005] Direct experiences Avoidance .576 [.117/1.034] .420 [-.048/.887] .156 [-.007/.319] None Security .209 [-.046/.464] .084 [-.207/.376] .125 [.010/.240] None Pro-action .170 [-.066/.407] .184 [-.089/.458] -.014 [-.119/.091] None Awareness .245 [.008/.481] .243 [-.036/.521] .002 [-.108/.112] None Retaliation .193 [-.014/.401] .163 [-.075/.401] .030 [-.070/.131] None Indirect experiences Avoidance -.269 [-.686/.147] -.230 [-.633/.173] -.039 [-.133/.055] None Security -.092 [-.329/.146] -.074 [-.312/.165] -.018 [-.090/.054] None Pro-action .011 [-.199/.221] -.001 [-.226/.225] .012 [-.034/.057] None Awareness -.030 [-.305/.246] -.032 [-.322/.258] .002 [-.045/.049] None Retaliation -.122 [-.329/.086] -.096 [-.305/.114] -.026 [-.079/.027] None Note. CIs that do not straddle zero are significant. 49 Figure 4 Cross-lagged SEM of experiences and behavioural intentions, age as a covariate Note. Start of arrow indicates Factor measured at Time 1, point of arrow indicates Factor measured at Time 2. †p = .06, *p < .05. Model fit: χ2(506) = 982.532, p < .001 (MLR scaling factor = 1.13), CFI = .955, RMSEA = .045 [95% CIs: .041/.049], SRMR = .043. Retaliation Security Pro-action Avoidance Media Indirec Direct Awareness .24† .21† .58* .23* 
work_cwqtliuovbem7addd6kd4cnfm4	----	‘You are a parasite on the productive classes’: online disablist hate speech in austere times This is a repository copy of ‘You are a parasite on the productive classes’: online disablist hate speech in austere times. White Rose Research Online URL for this paper: http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/125034/ Version: Accepted Version Article: Burch, LF orcid.org/0000-0003-1559-3075 (2018) ‘You are a parasite on the productive classes’: online disablist hate speech in austere times. Disability and Society, 33 (3). pp. 392-415. ISSN 0968-7599 https://doi.org/10.1080/09687599.2017.1411250 © 2017 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group. This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in Disability and Society on 7th December 2017, available online: http://www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/09687599.2017.1411250. eprints@whiterose.ac.uk https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/ Reuse Items deposited in White Rose Research Online are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved unless indicated otherwise. They may be downloaded and/or printed for private study, or other acts as permitted by national copyright laws. The publisher or other rights holders may allow further reproduction and re-use of the full text version. This is indicated by the licence information on the White Rose Research Online record for the item. Takedown If you consider content in White Rose Research Online to be in breach of UK law, please notify us by emailing eprints@whiterose.ac.uk including the URL of the record and the reason for the withdrawal request. mailto:eprints@whiterose.ac.uk https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/ ‘You are a parasite on the productive classes’: online disablist hate speech in austere times. Leah Burch *This is the final version of a paper published on Disability & Society. For all citations, please refer to the publisher version* Introduction Following the financial crisis of 2008, the election of a Coalition government promised to create a welfare system that was ‘fairer, more affordable and better able to tackle poverty, worklessness and welfare dependency’ (Department for Work and Pensions 2010). In an attempt to banish a ‘sickness culture’ (Cameron 2010), a series of welfare cuts commenced. Such cuts were premised upon the expectation that we must overcome economic downturn by responding to the stringent conditions of austerity (Goodley, Lawthom, and Runswick-Cole 2014). That is, we are expected to embody the ideologies of neoliberalism, by sculpting our minds and bodies to be self-serving, self-responsible and productive (Goodley and Runswick- Cole 2015). These changing economic relationships have transformed citizenship to maximise the role of economic production and individual responsibility. Marking a poignant shift from unconditional citizenship, the current status of citizen is that of ‘taxpayer,’ an agent obligated ‘to work and function as a “self-sufficient” actor in the market’ (Schram et al. 2010, 743). Under this transactional approach to citizenship, the government has implemented a residual model of welfare, in which the individual bears the responsibility of their actions if they come from their own “poor choices” (Lantz and Marston 2012, 859). That is, welfare becomes a ‘safety net’ (Ellison 2016), meaning the ‘choice’ to receive welfare support can be penalised and marked out. To justify these changes to welfare, politicians and media outlets have adopted a strategic narrative. That is, they have expressed pity for ‘hardworking taxpayers’ who have been portrayed as the real victims of financial instability (Cameron, 2010; UK Gov 2015; Hughes 2015). At the same time, we have witnessed a surge in vitriolic welfare rhetoric that brands welfare recipients, and many disabled people, as ‘scroungers,’ ‘cheats,’ and ‘scum’ (Briant, Watson, and Philo 2013, 2011; Garthwaite 2011). In turn, a cultural narrative has been established, to which disabled people have become the ‘new folk devil’ (Briant, Watson, and Philo 2013), ‘tipped into an abyss of counterfeit citizenship and smeared as “false” mendicants’ (Hughes 2015, 992). These representations are detrimental, as the portrayal of disabled people as a financial drain on society and a personal burden to ‘taxpayers’ is likely to impact the relationship between disabled and non-disabled people (Goodley and Runswick-Cole 2015; Hoong Sin 2015; Novis 2013; Quarmby 2011, 2013; Yeo and Moore 2003). Indeed, backed by the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD 2016, 14), it is suggested that the portrayal of disabled people as ‘dependent or making a living out of benefits, committing fraud as benefit claimants, being lazy and putting a burden on taxpayers’ may have led to the rise in ‘disability hate crimes’ that have been recorded by the police in recent years. Austerity, therefore, provides a ready context for analysis, particularly in relation to the prevalence of online hate speech. The growth of the World Wide Web has revolutionised communication. The offer of immediate, global and anonymous interaction has transformed the way in which we gather and distribute information (Banks 2010; Bowker & Tuffin 2002; Buchstein 1997; Fenton 2012; Rheingold 2000; Yates 2001), and the internet has become a site of information exchange and creator of cultural pedagogy (Reid 2003 cited in Hodkinson 2014). Geographically boundless, the internet provides a platform for multicultural knowledge construction and the dissemination of values and ideas across the globe (Daniels 2008). For Banks (2010, p.234), the internet creates a ‘new frontier’ for spreading hate ‘as millions can be reached through an inexpensive and encumbered social network.’ According to this stream of works, the manipulation of the facilities offered by the internet provides a strengthened infrastructure for the proliferation and reproduction of hate speech (Cornwell and Orbe 1999; Elbahtimy 2014). Most notably documented by scholars in the field of race studies (Adams and Roscigno 2005; Chau and Xu 2007; Duffy 2003; Lee and Leets 2002), the internet creates a venue for bullying and online hate to take place (Brennan 2009) without the geographical and indeed, moral constraints of the everyday physical world (Duffy 2003). The internet presents a multitude of unique sites of boundless communication across the globe, and therefore, ‘a dataset that can be subject to criminological inspection’ (Williams and Burnap 2016, 215). An extensive dataset is, however, too large to efficiently explore in this small research project. Consequently, for the purpose of this piece of research, the online bulletin board, Reddit was the chosen site of analysis. Reddit can be described as ‘a pretty open platform and free speech place’ (Reddit 2015d). The value that this site places upon the right to anonymity and free speech has attracted an estimated total of 234 million users (DMR 2016) from over 215 different countries (Reddit 2015a), and over 853,824 Subreddits to date (DMR 2016). Based upon these statistics, it is assumed that this site attracts cultural, geographical and ideological diversity that can be subject to analysis. In order to theorise the context of austerity in relation to online disablist hate speech, this paper finds use in the work of David Hevey (1991), in particular his concept ‘dustbins for disavowal.’ This concept offers a theoretical framework to understand the objectification of disabled people to cultural scribed narratives. The purpose of such narratives is to dispose of the anxieties, frustrations, and fears that one has towards the objected Other. In this process, disabled people are reduced to ‘objects, on to which artists project particular emotions’ (Shakespeare 1997, 222). This objectification has been cultivated through and by a metanarrative of disability that serves a purpose of validation for non-disabled people. Aiming to reveal this metanarrative, this article follows the work of David Bolt (2014), who in his exploration of blindness in twentieth-century Anglophone writing, shows how a metanarrative of disability is constructed by, and for, non-disabled people. This metanarrative, it is suggested, is taken up by perpetrators of disablist hate speech as a means of comparing their sense of identity, worth, and value to disabled people. In terms of this research, I will reveal how such a metanarrative is created through the articulation of online disablist hate speech, and how disabled people have been storied to particularly negative characters in the process. The aim of this paper is to contribute to emerging conversations regarding the relationship between austerity and growing levels of online hostility. This relationship is considered with central focus upon disability. First, this article maps some of the current literature surrounding the concept of hate speech to identify the absence of disability. What this section notes, importantly, is that little work has been done to connect work on disablist hate crime and disablist hate speech to wider scholarly debates on these criminal offences. Next, a brief methodological discussion outlines the use of CDA as an approach to analysis. Finally, this article analyses the existence of online disablist hate speech on Reddit, within the broader context of austerity and welfare dependency. The analysis also discusses some of the barriers to tackling this speech on the internet, with a particular interest in the role of anonymity in constructing online and offline identities. ‘Dustbins for Disavowal’: the normalisation of disablism To research online disablist hate speech reveals a single, yet compelling finding; it lacks any sophisticated existence in current academic literature. For example, at the time of writing this piece, I am aware of only three research papers that engage with the topic of online disablist hate speech. In two papers, Burnap and Williams (2016; 2015) identify the use of ‘Othering’ language on Twitter, based upon race, disability and sexual orientation. Noting the lack of available legislation to prosecute online hate speech, as well as the difficulties in policing these instances in relation to their intersectionality, Burnap and Williams (2016) attempt to develop a machine classification system that can code Tweets and explore the intersections of oppression that underpin hate speech. In the third paper, Alhaboby et al. (2016) use an online survey to explore the personal impacts of experiencing disability related cyber-hate and cyber- harassment. Although all three of these papers acknowledge the issue of disablist language, they fail to connect this to wider discourses surrounding hate speech. This could, of course, demonstrate that the problem of disablist hate speech is not an issue deserving of extensive consideration, however the vast number of studies that have presented the abuse, discrimination and exclusion of disabled people suggest that this is not the case. The exclusion, discrimination, and abuse of disabled people throughout history has been well documented. It has been found that a significant number of people with learning difficulties have negative experiences in their communities, and may be ‘bullied’ on a weekly or daily basis (Beadle-brown et al. 2014). While respondents recognised that these experiences could be distressing, they accepted them as an inevitable aspect of daily life. Similarly, research conducted by Mind in 2007 found that people with mental health issues were at significant risk of victimization. In particular, they were likely to be called terms such as “schizo” and “freak” during their daily navigations of the social world (Mind 2007). Findings presented by Macdonald (2015) has also recognised the commonplace nature of ‘hate incidents’ such as ‘verbal abuse’ for many disabled people. Indeed, hate speech, or verbal abuse as it is so often termed, is suggested to occur regularly on the university campus (Munn 2015), on public transport (Olsen, Pepe, and Redfearn 2017), and on the street (Brookes and Cain 2015; Smith 2015). Among others (EHRC 2012; Quarmby 2011; Roulstone and Mason-Bish 2013), these findings demonstrate that hate expressions have become a mundane intrusion to the lives of many disabled people, a ‘constant drip, drip, nag, nag of the so-called “low-level harassment’ (EHRC 2011). Such findings are consistent with the earlier work of Quarmby (2008), who has critiqued the ‘casual disablism’ that permeates our society and the tolerance towards these encounters as a result. Indeed, to refer to Mark Deal's (2007) coining of ‘aversive disablism,’ following on from earlier work by Dovidio & Gaertner (2004), the normality of disablism has become an unacknowledged feature of society, and a seemingly accepted experience for disabled people. On a personal level, for example, the regularity of disablist incidents can have a blurring effect, which prevents individuals from distinguishing between what is and is not acceptable (Brookes and Cain 2015; Hollomotz 2013; Smith 2015). Indeed, while intrusive and more implicit practices and expressions of hate are not often viewed as harmful, they are intrinsically linked to more severe acts of violence (Hollomotz 2013). Hate crime and hate speech harms in a multiplicity of ways. As proposed by Iganski (2008), the ‘harms’ of hate are not solely experienced within the realm of an individual. Instead, harms transgress boundaries, moving between personal, social, and cultural spaces. It seems the case, however, that disablist hate speech has become normalised to the point that its harms are not recognised. For example, research conducted by the Anti-Bullying Alliance (n.d) report that almost 70% of respondents had heard children using the words ‘spaz’, ‘spastic’, ‘retard’, and ‘mong’ in the school environment. They also noted that 44% of adult admitted to using such terminology as they were in casual conversation with others. The harm here operates on a number of levels, not only contributing to the reproduction of negative cultural representations but simultaneously continuing to blur the boundaries between what is, and is not, acceptable. As Levin writes: ‘The nasty labels associated with people with disabilities are just as hurtful as their racial and religious counterparts, but are simply not recognised to the same extent… The same people who would never dream of using the N-word are hardly reluctant to refer to an intellectually challenged individual as a “retard” or to a person in a wheelchair as a “cripple” or “freak”’ (Levin 2013, 99) Levin’s evaluation of the ‘nasty labels’ associated with disability suggests that there may be different rules and regulations about ‘hateful’ rhetoric depending upon the identity characteristic that it targets. Significantly, disablist hate speech is often coated by the terminological veil of ‘banter’ in order to justify its use on a day-to-day basis (Levin 2013). Indeed, the justification of unjust behaviour as ‘banter’ was recently used by the current President of the United States, Donald Trump. In his ‘apology’ over his claims to ‘moving onto a woman like a bitch’ (quoted in Eroukhmanoff 2017), the President attempted to play off the severity of his suggestions under the label of ‘locker room banter.’ In reality, the comments made have elicited gender constructions which position female bodies as objects to male dominance (Eroukhmanoff 2017). Although this case has quite rightly received worldwide media attention, the coating of disablist hate speech under the guise of banter rarely provokes a recognition or response. This suggests that there are culturally scripted, yet equally blurred lines between ‘banter’ and ‘hate speech’ when disability is the subject of discussion. Regulating the boundaries of hate speech In the United Kingdom, the issue of hate crime and hate speech can most notably be tied to the murder of Stephen Lawrence, whose tragic death and unlawful legislative response provided a watershed moment for an awareness of racist hate crime (Tyson, Giannasi, and Hall 2015). In addition, this moment also provided an opportunity for other oppressed groups to gain recognition, whose voices had, to this point, been unheard (Hall 2015). Thus, on slightly wider terms, Simpson (2013) defines hate speech as verbal conduct that expresses intense antipathy towards an individual perceived to identify with a certain ethnicity, religion, or sexual orientation. For Schulzke (2016, 225), hate speech is that which ‘is meant to offend, exclude, intimidate, or discriminate against members of a group based on the members’ race, religion, sex, sexual orientation, nationality or ethnicity.’ More recently, research has called for the recognition of misogynist sexual advances, such as ‘cat-calling’ as a type of hate speech (Mackenzie 2016; Townsend 2016) as well as hostility expressed against ‘alterative subcultures’ (Garland and Hodkinson 2014). Despite these disciplinary developments, current policy provisions in England and Wales remain limited in breadth. The policy framework in England and Wales is suggested to be one of the most advanced at tackling hate crime in the world to date (Giannasi, 2017; Tyson et al. 2015). The Crime and Disorder Act (1998) details specific offences of racially and religiously (as amended in 2001) aggravated crimes, such as wounding, assault, damage, and harassment. In addition, the Criminal Justice Act (2003) provides provisions for increased sentencing on the grounds that hostility on the basis of race, religion, disability, sexual orientation or transgender identity can be proven as a motivation for the criminal offence. Finally, under sections 18-23 and 29B-29F of the Public Order Act (1986), it is an offence to use ‘threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour’ to incite/stir up hatred in relation to race, religion, and/or sexual orientation. What is apparent, however, is that there are discrepancies within these policies that exclude particular identity categories. The exclusion of disability from the Public Order Act is particularly concerning, as it carries with it the possibility to prosecute hate speech as a recognisable crime in the criminal justice system. Although hate crime policies have notable shortfalls (Meyer 2014), particularly in relation to the way in which they bolster a ‘recognition politics’ that pushes those groups with fewer resources and opportunities to the peripheries (Al- Hakim 2015; Mason-Bish 2014), they also have merits. Hate crime policies carry a significant symbolic message to society that particular acts are not acceptable (Jenness and Grattet 2004). It is problematic, then, that whilst policy provisions are in place for tackling both hate crime and hate speech, they present a lack of unity in response to different characteristics (Owsusu- Bempah 2015) and, as a result, preserve a hierarchy of identity (Chakraborti 2015). Discrepancies in this policy area have recently been revised by the Law Commission (2014). In their report, they conclude by recommending to the government that the extension of the offence ‘stirring up hatred,’ to include disability and gender identity is not necessary. This decision, they suggest, appeals to the lack of sufficient evidence that any extension of this policy would be valuable (Law Commission 2014). The report similarly notes that the existing offences of harassment, alarm, and distress may already provide legislative protection for some of these instances, thus reducing the need for the extension (Law Commission 2014). While these are important provisions to be in place, they do not adequately address the problem of hate speech that many disabled people face. Rather, the reluctance to move beyond these offences results in a masking effect that reduces the inherent violence of ‘disablist hate speech.’ Further justification was offered in terms of the increasing resentment that the prosecution of disablist hate speech might create due to the ‘perception of creeping censorship and thought control’ (Law Commission 2014, 189). The levying of free speech against hate speech causes increasing concern in relation to a rising levels of online hate and will be explored in more detail in the analysis of this paper. Thus, while the Law Commission report does acknowledge that a lack of disparity among the protected characteristics may send the message that certain characteristics are treated less seriously by the law (Law Commission 2014), their conclusion is disappointing. Methodology This qualitative research employs a critical discourse analysis (CDA) in order to unearth and confront the existence of disablist hate speech upon the online bulletin board, Reddit. Discourse is inseparable from its surrounding world (Souto-Manning 2014) as it shapes, and is shaped by, overarching cultural systems and structures (Fairclough 2013). By critically considering discourse as it is expressed in the online domain, it is possible to reveal the underlying regimes of power and inequality (Blommeart 2005; Fairclough 1992; Fairclough and Wodak 1997; Liasidou 2011) that are inextricably interwoven within our cultural make-up. We can consider hate speech to be an artefact ‘of discourse,’ a discursive expression that is ‘socially constitutive as well as socially disabling’ (Wodak and Meyer 2009, 6). A CDA is employed in order to draw out these expressions, as well as explore the context to within which they occur. Concerned with the discursive aspect of social problems (Van Dijk 1996), a CDA aims to expose the social wrong of disablement as it is expressed upon online platforms. Considering the power inequalities that are often bound to social problems, Grue (2015, 5) recommends the use of CDA in order to ‘uncover the ways in which disability- and disablement- is constructed, administered, and policed through the socially and bureaucratically embedded use of language’. That is, the way in which a dominant ‘us’ is both produced and reinforced by discursively marking out the specified shortfalls of the ‘Other.’ Thus, the problem-oriented nature of CDA will enable this study to tease out the linguistic entrapments of disablist hate speech as it is expressed, shared, and retrieved on the online domain. Moving beyond this, CDA is critically and politically engaged (Jaworski and Coupland 2006) working to expose and critique the relationship between discourse and social wrongs (Fairclough 2015). This approach, therefore, aims to unveil the influences, ideologues and values that are characteristically rejected by non-disabled people and thrown into a metanarrative of disability as presented on Reddit. In order to manage such a large database, specific search terms were used to identify Reddit threads that were of relevance to this research project. Based upon previous research that has already outlined some of the key terms associated with welfare dependency and disability (Briant, Watson, and Philo 2013, 2011; Garthwaite 2011; Quarmby 2008), the terms ‘disability,’ ‘disabled,’ ‘scrounger,’ ‘shirker,’ ‘welfare,’ ‘benefit/benefit claimant,’ ‘cheat,’ and ‘fraud’ were searched for. In addition, the term ‘retard’ was searched for, to reflect the high number of US subscribers. This term remains prominent in the US culture, only recently removed from state legislation under Rosa’s Law (Public Law 2010, 111-256). Although this was swiftly followed by ruling of the Social Security Administration in 2013, which replaced the term ‘mental retardation’ with ‘intellectual disability’ in the Federal Register (Federal Register 2013), US culture is yet to dispose of this derogatory label. A total of 24 Reddit threads and 16,908 comments were descriptively and analytically coded. The first stage, descriptive coding, began to pull out emerging themes. The re-reading of the discourse, analytic coding, aimed to critically decipher and interpret the data (Böhm 2004). This second stage refined and developed descriptive codes into a thematically consolidated set of analytic codes. Many themes arose during the coding process that were not associated with the topic of welfare, such as the use of disability as a pun for a joke, and the infantilization of disabled people. However, in order to maintain a concise focus, disablist hate speech was explored as it was contextualised by a climate of austerity. The first section of this analysis explores how representations of welfare dependency create a metanarrative of disability as an economic expense to the rest of society. Next, the operation of hate speech on the internet is considered, with a particular focus upon how anonymity and claims to free speech serves to justify hateful expressions and thus, present a major barrier to overcome. Finally, this paper brings the findings together, using the conclusions from this research to offer new directions for recognising and responding to online disablist hate speech that will bring together a multiplicity of different agencies, experiences, and expertise. Analysis Us against Them: ‘Why do you think you have the right to live off my hard earned earnings? Early readings of the selected Reddit threads revealed the widespread use of disablist language within the context of austerity and welfare dependency. Constructing clear parallels to the language of austerity that has been broadcast across many media outlets, comments labelled welfare recipients and disabled people ‘scum of the earth’ (Reddit 2011b), ‘thieves,’ ‘cheats,’ ‘leeches,’ and ‘fraudsters’ (Reddit 2011a). Such terms have familiarity in recent times due to their widespread use as political tools. That is, they have sought to capture the attention and the emotions of the public during a period of financial instability (Garthwaite 2011). This language, as previously suggested, has confirmed a story of inequality. A similarly emotionally incited script emerged on Reddit, predicated upon the understanding that ‘it certainly isn’t fair that everyone else is forced to pay to subsidize the lives of disabled people’ (Reddit 2015b). The claims, for example, that ‘they’re living off the money which we have earned’ (Reddit 2015b) and that ‘you being disabled doesn’t make you entitled to the efforts of those of us who are able-bodied’ (Reddit 2014) ratify a metanarrative of disability that is consumed by the feeling of frustration at the perceived inequality underpinning the welfare system. The establishment of boundaries is integral to the storyline that is played out on Reddit. As illustrated in the comments above, many rely upon dichotomous pronouns as a means of confirming who they perceive to be ‘I,’ ‘us,’ and ‘we,’ in comparison to ‘them,’ ‘they,’ and ‘you.’ Following Pennycook (1994), these comments illustrate how the use of pronouns can be inherently problematic, and inevitably political in the pursuit to distance oneself from the nominated Other figure. Such boundaries are conceptual distinctions made by social actors to categorise people and, in turn, present particular realities (INSERT LAMONT REF HERE). This binary logic serves to differentiate between the online user and disabled people to create a sensually and physically felt distance between different bodies, minds and capabilities. In this way, binaries are both hierarchical and value-laden (McKenna 1992; Royle 2003) and therefore explicate the mechanical and homogenous structure of text (Derrida 1998) as hierarchical and divisive. Indeed, pronouns express the exact divisions that one is making, which in this case, is the hardworking taxpayer against the disabled Other, that is, the so-called fraud, cheat, and scum. Developing this narrative, some Redditors refer to their Others as ‘parasites.’ The naming of ‘parasites’ has been called into disability studies in the early beginnings, employed by Paul Hunt as a means of condemning the ‘parasite people’ who had contributed to disability oppression through their research (Hunt 1981). This term has come to take on a different meaning and target, however, charged with the emotions of austerity. Calling upon the story of injustice as a means of contextualising the use of this explicitly denigrating terminology, one user states that ‘I am not free if my money gets stolen to feed all kinds of parasites’ (Reddit 2014). Here, the synonymising of disability with ‘parasites’ makes an explicit tug towards a narrative in which ‘the ordinary working person, the taxpayer, the decent citizen, is the victim of injustice’ (Hughes 2015, 994) The use of ‘parasites’ as a means of identifying and marking out disability is supported by the relationship between welfare and employment, to which the first is presented as inferior to the latter. Making this connection, one user argues ‘you are a parasite on the productive class’ (Reddit 2014), thus confirming that the disabled figure is not only unproductive, but burdensome to those who are productive. Indeed, one user explains the importance of productivity, suggesting that ‘if you want anything in life, you have to work for it’ (Reddit, 2015d). Another user claims, ‘all parasites should perish… You do NOT have ANY right to exist on the INVOLUNTARY backs of others’ (Reddit 2015b). The use of capital letters here signifies the anger felt by this user, regarding so-called ‘parasites’ who rely upon the hard work of other citizens. Overtly negative and explicitly derogatory, ‘these forms of disability representation naturalise the exclusion of disabled people from societies organised on labour power as a key commodity in economic production’ (Hevey 1991, 13). Drawing out the way in which identities are established and rejected, a metanarrative of disability is established that is ‘fully invested with the fantasy of self-sufficiency and in the disavowal of our (frightening) interconnectedness and our (even more frightening) dependency on a planet of rapidly depleting resources’ (Cooper 2016, 132). In the context of welfare then, disablist hate speech may emerge as a product of this ‘social crisis’ whereby ‘unconstrained market forces destroy social bonds’ (Dodd 2016, 159). Indeed, it would appear that to ‘succeed’ within a climate of financial instability, one has to take part in the competition. Such a competition encourages self-individualism and, in turn, discourages our natural moral and ethical interdependency, to which we all help and give to one another. In this way, these comments similarly illustrate a sense of the narrator’s self-identification. Specifically, the way in which disablist language is used as a means of showcasing and performing one’s own aspiration to, and evidence of, being normal (Bolt 2016). Much like gender, ‘ableness’ becomes performed by individuals, demonstrating ‘the repeated stylization of the body’ in order to aspire to ‘a natural sort of being’ (Bulter 1990, 33). The performance of ableism in this way demonstrates how the ‘normative shadows’ of ableism haunt one’s sense of ontological security (Overboe 2009). In turn, ableism is able to shape how we understand ourselves in relation to those around us (Wolbring 2008). From this perspective, ableism operates through the process of ‘osmosis,’ that is, ‘via the gradual absorption of ideas that results from continual exposure’ (Bolt 2015, 1106). This process gains social and personal desirability as notions of ‘ableness’ are produced within a myriad of normative assumptions about how the mind and body should operate productively, all of which are particularly charged in austere times. This suggests that disablism has been taken up by a culture infatuated with the fallacies of ableism in a time of austerity, as the neoliberal-ableist requirement to be work- ready ‘breeds paranoia, confusion, fear and inadequacy’ (Goodley 2014, xi). The inherent desire to distinguish boundaries in this way relates to wider understandings of hate speech as a mechanism of dehumanization (Iganski and Levin 2015; Taylor 2012; Tsesis 2002). Hate speech preserves unequal power relations by denigrating the Other while simultaneously bolstering the superiority of the speaker. Indeed, it is often the case that ‘hate crimes’ are committed to reinforce the process of marginalisation, not simply because the perpetrator ‘hates’ the target (Mason-Bish 2013). The question of life: ‘Put down the downies so we can use the resources for something else’ Appealing to the ideologies of neoliberalism, the ‘social crisis’ of austerity drives upon the notion of individualism, demarcating community spirit with the mantra of ‘every man for himself’. Within this individualist culture, the Other becomes a threat, and in turn, can cause the emotion of hate to emerge at a dangerous pace (Sternberg & Sternberg 2008). Explored in detail by Bauman (1989), the perception of threat provided one ground to which the abuse and murder of many Jewish people could be justified upon in the early 1900’s. He suggests, ‘whoever felt thrown out of balanced, threatened or displaced, could easily – and rationally- make sense of his anxiety through articulating the experienced turbulence as an imprint of Jewish subversive incongruity’ (Bauman 1989, 45). Threat, whether to personal self-esteem, or to society more broadly creates a dangerous pathway to the escalation of hate. Indeed, within a climate of austerity and financial instability, concern with potential threats have been extensively endorsed. This culture is evident in the claims that ‘supporting the permanently disabled is a bad investment when the cost exceeds the benefit’ (Reddit 2014), ‘we shouldn’t be spending more money to accommodate those who will not contribute to society in any meaningful way’ (Reddit 2012), ‘the impact of not having to care for the weak and powerless would have incredible economic benefits to society’ (Reddit 2013b). The message is clear: ‘these folks are a colossal waste of energy and resources’ (Reddit 2013b). Such comments push disabled people to the margins of social worth, justified by their perceived threat to the established social order (Hughes 2000). Positioning disability upon these peripheries moves disablist hate speech to a realm of eugenic orthodoxy and incites further violence. Disablist hate speech that is situated within a rhetoric of welfare dependency transforms into expressions of deep-rooted hatred towards disabled people, who are presented as objects to be disposed of. That is, the portrayal of disabled people as dependent, a burden, and therefore a waste, awakens the eugenic logic that these people are ‘muddying up’ (Reddit 2013b) the gene pool. Such a narrative indeed echoes the justification of mass murder and sterilisation of disabled people in the twentieth century, premised on the conclusion that disabled people are a ‘poison to the race’ (Ellis 1927, 43) and ‘an evil which brings all other evils in its train’ (Dendy 1901). One user notes that ‘if we killed children with severe mental handicaps, we may eliminate the small chance that they taint the overall human gene pool’ (Reddit 2013a) and another, put more explicitly, suggests that we should ‘put down the downies so we can use resources for something else’ (Redditor 2012). For Quarmby (2011), this consideration of disability as a threat to the establishment of a superior race, is what constituted the shocking behaviours of the T4 programme those many years ago. The continued understanding of disability as genetically threatening is, therefore, a disablist expression that can be linked back to a time of horror and destruction. The underlying operation of eugenic ideology within discussions surrounding welfare dependency, and economic cost is detrimental to attitudes towards disabled people in modern times. As Mitchell and Snyder (2003, 849) write, the remnants of eugenics in modern society ‘contaminate a shared cultural space and turns disabled persons into a pariah at the population level.’ This peripheral positioning is dangerous, as it allows extremely harmful attitudes and suggestions, such as murder, to be unquestionably accepted when articulated within the context of economic cost. Disability, in this context, is presented as ‘deformed, maimed, mutilated, broken, diseased’ (Davis 1995, 5), consequently rendering the lives of disabled people as ‘absolutely pointless’ (Burleigh 1994, 17). Predicated upon neo-Nazi assumptions that devalue and question the existence of disabled people (Gallagher 1995), any discursive parallel to eugenics is undoubtedly dangerous (Wolbring 2001). It is dangerous as it incites an inherently violent rhetoric around the existence of disabled people in our world. Disabled people, within this narrative, are made subject to a process of ‘(human) waste disposal,’ to which ‘unfit, invalid or unviable human relations [are] born with the mark of impending wastage’ (Bauman (2004, 7). Marked in this way, disabled people are presented as an infringement to the economic and genetic advancement of society. ‘Scrupulously described, interpreted, and displayed,’ the bodies, minds, and behaviours of disabled people function as ‘icons upon which people charge their anxieties, convictions, and fantasies’ (Garland-Thompson 1997, 56). This analysis has shown how the emotions of austerity are captured within online disablist hate speech, and seek to validate socially constructed binaries between disabled and non-disabled people. This distance, as it has been argued, is fundamental to the creation of a metanarrative of disability constructed to support culturally chosen stories. Stories of welfare dependency and financial instability, for example, provide a site for disablist hate speech to thrive, as the anxieties and fears that arise as a result of austerity, can be pushed aside and projected onto the Other figure of disability. This act of scapegoating underpins much of the hate speech presented in this paper, as disabled people ‘are used to represent values or evils’ (Shakespeare 1997, 223) that are bolstered during particular times and contexts. In this process, disabled people are rendered as litter ready for disposal, and expected to incontestably take on the rejected characteristics of ableism in neoliberal times. Such a process is inherently hateful, as it manipulates the narratives of disabled people to one that secures the hierarchy structurally bound to ableist relations as they are constructed and reconstructed by a rhetoric of welfare dependency. Online anonymity and free speech: ‘Get out the throwaways’ Anonymity presents both opportunity and danger in relation to widening global participation on the online domain. Reddit endorses this feature of the internet, allowing users to create multiple accounts known on the site as ‘throwaways.’ Throwaway accounts allow users to engage online under ‘temporary technical identities’ (Leavitt 2015, 317) which, in turn, presents a significant degree of dissociative anonymity (Gagnon 2013). That is, through the creation of multiple accounts that are easily disposed of, ‘provocative, personal, and often- revealing aspects of a person’s life [can be] offloaded into accounts and spaces that are more difficult to connect back to that person’ (Gullota et al. 2014 no p.n.). Indeed, comments posted on Reddit suggest that online anonymity is allowing the easier distribution of hate speech. For example, in a thread entitled, ‘Get out the throw-aways: dear parents of disabled children, do you regret having your child(ren) or are you happier with them in your life?’ (Reddit 2012), the use of a throwaway encourages honest communication, as offline identities are less easily traced. Indeed, many of the comments within this particular thread were explicitly negative, derogatory and dehumanizing regarding the subject of disability. Comments, for example, that disability ‘is not life worth living’ (Reddit 2012) and that ‘we should euthanize infants,’ present a lack of consciousness in the stories of disability being told. In addition, the use of language was explicitly disablist, such as ‘special needs adult,’ ‘fucking retards,’ ‘this downie kid,’ and ‘retard baby’ (Reddit 2012). The impact of online anonymity to the way in which people engage with hateful language on the internet was recognised by some users. For example, when asking someone about the experience of disability, one user admits ‘I’ve always wondered but I never really had the balls to ask someone in person’ (Reddit 2012). Others argue that ‘the anonymity of the internet usually brings out the worst in people’ (Reddit 2014) and that having back-up Reddit accounts allows them to move onto another once their primary one has been blocked (Reddit 2015b). More critical of anonymity, one user calls out ‘keyboard warriors’ (Reddit 2015b) and another explains that ‘it is easier to just bitch about it on the internet’ (Reddit 2015b). This suggests that while users may be aware of the harm inherent in their comments, anonymity provides a safe platform for them to express them (Herring et al. 2002). Such a process allows for what Zimbardo (1969) has termed ‘a deindividuated state,’ whereby the feelings of guilt, shame, and fear are weakened. In an attempt to reduce the presence of hate speech on Reddit, there are regulations that manage the content that is shared on this website. Although no longer in use, moderators of Subreddits were able to ‘shadow’ ban individuals, meaning that while they were still able to comment on threads, these would be hidden from other users. Recently, this has been replaced in favour of account suspensions which inform the user of their temporary ban. These attempts to manage content are examples of the Terms of Service (TOS) that all internet page providers will have. Yet, the management of these TOS’s are complicated on Reddit, as the responsibility to remove comments and ban users is awarded to the moderator of individual Subreddits. Thus, while regulations are in place, they lack consistency across the whole site. More recently, the site went beyond moderator control to remove five Subreddits which were seen to harass individuals. The overall response on Reddit was anger, with some users warning ‘be careful talking about fat people. Entire subreddits have been blocked’ (Reddit 2015b) and ‘EVERYTHING IS BANNED NOTHING IS SAFE’ (Reddit 2015b). Appealing to the free speech debate, one user notes ‘surely, Reddit, a pioneer of free speech will provide us an outlet for our angst’ (Reddit 2015b). Such a comment draws upon the non-consequentialist justification of free speech which pertains to the right of citizens to engage with political debates and government decisions (Sorial 2015). From this perspective, the expression of hate speech in the context of this research may be justified on the basis that it is of importance to political debates concerning the reduction of welfare expenditure. For some authors, constraints to free speech are detrimental to human rights. Notably taken up by Tammy Bruce (2001), such a perspective argues that hate speech laws demonstrate ‘the actual criminalization of the most private, personal, and subjective part of our lives- what we think’. Critical of the constraints upon speech that political correctness imposes, Bruce argues that ‘opinions in and of themselves are not harmful’ and should not, therefore be supressed (Bruce 2001, xiii). Any regression of this right, according to Kiska (2012, 112), ‘shut[s] down debate and create[s] a heckler’s veto. In the end, a chilling effect is created that leads to self- censorship and an overtly sensitive society’. In a bid to justify their decision to ban the five Subreddits, Reddit argued that they were ‘banning behaviour, not ideas’, recognising the difficulty in managing the tension between the right to free speech and protection against harm (Reddit 2015c). The removal of five Subreddits does demonstrate a growing commitment on Reddit to manage the interactions on their site, however, there remains a significant lack of unity in first uncovering and subsequently penalising hate speech due to the restrictions to uphend the right of free speech. Indeed, the difficulties that Reddit faces in tackling the conflict between hate speech and free speech is a discussion that has significance beyond this site alone, demonstrated quite recently in the Charlottesville demonstrations. The demonstrations brought together ‘a coalition of old and new white supremacist groups connected by social media’ (Fausset and Feuer 2017). That is, the online space that allows for hateful propaganda to be shared and distributed was brought outside of this platform, and to the offline world. As a result, there has been newfound scrutiny among platforms and service provides to confront the use of the online domain as a site for hate groups to communicate (Brandom 2017). Despite the violence that occurred as a result of these online communications, there remains a commitment to freedom of expression, with organisations such as Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) arguing that the internet, as an online infrastructure, must remain neutral (Brandom 2017). Blocking certain content, then, is suggested to represent an infringement upon this, and to the rights of free speech. It is of course, imperative that freedom of expression is respected. However, the justification of hate speech under this right is a detrimental barrier to establishing human rights for all. Indeed, as Cornwell and Orbe (1999, 79) suggest, ‘hate speech- situated within the cloak of free speech- has been used by those traditionally in power’. Thus, free speech may be understood as a ‘political prize’ (Fish 1994), a ‘right’ that is made available to the privileged majority in order to validate strict social divisions between ‘us’ and ‘them.’ To this end, free speech and anonymity may be seen as privileges that are afforded to those who adhere to ableist standards, and express the dominant narrative. In austere times, this privilege is shown to have been taken up by so-called ‘hardworking taxpayers’ in order to mark out the dependent ‘Other’ figure of disability, and dispose of it to the dustbin of ableism. Concluding Thoughts This analysis has revealed a wealth of disablist hate speech that exists on the online bulletin board, Reddit. Contextualised within the wider context of austerity, hate speech is suggested to be part of a process of self-validation, which transgresses to the explicit dehumanisation of others. Disablist hate speech, in this way, functions to preserve ableist relations in a climate of austerity, by driving up the ontological security of the ‘hardworking taxpayer,’ and simultaneously branding disabled people with scars of austerity. As discussed, these relations are particularly charged in austere times, as the requirement for so-called ‘hardworking taxpayers’ underpinned by vicious attacks on the welfare state ‘make us all vulnerable’ (Bates, Goodley, and Runswick-Cole 2017). It is this sense of vulnerability that manifests itself within Hevey’s ‘dustbins for disavowal’ and provides a justified space for disablist hate speech to emerge. The current socio-economic climate and political response to this are thus fundamental agents in the development and normalisation of disablist discourses, and to the creation of an inherently negative metanarrative that renders disability as an unnecessary and burdensome cost. As Williams and Bendelow (1998, 47) explains, ‘deviance is necessary for the symbolic (re)affirmation of collective sentiments and the ritual (re)enforcement of moral boundaries.’ That is, the disablist hate speech is justified and socialised by a climate of austerity, to which ableism has rendered disability as the antithesis of what is considered human (Goodley and Runswick-Cole 2016). By forcing disabled people to the peripheries of society as an inferior Other, disablist hate speech reduces disability ‘in our minds from a whole and usual person to a tainted, discounted one’ (Goffman 1963, 12) that is subject to take on the anxieties and fears that non-disabled people wish to dispose of. While it has been outlined that these hierarchical relations have existed throughout history, it is shown that the navigation of emotions bound to the context of austerity serves to justify disablist hate, not just on the basis of perceived difference but that of disgust and resentment (Hughes 2015). As Tsesis (2002, 88) explains, ‘a violation of ethical norms is easier to explain if the victims belong to an outgroup and are widely portrayed as demonic adversaries who are purportedly menacing to the population.’ The violation of these norms is given a space on the internet, whereby the facilities of anonymity and immediacy serve to protect the right to free speech whilst demonstrating explicit harms for the proliferation of hate speech. The facilities of the online domain provide an opportunity for people to interact across the globe with few barriers. These findings suggest that this opportunity has been manipulated to bolster a relatively protected platform for the proliferation of hate against certain groups. The internet presents an opportunity to communicate anonymously which, as suggested, may allow the online space to become a platform for the expression of hate speech. In addition, the debates concerning free speech and hate speech have been reignited in light of online technologies, as the practical difficulty in regulating online communications fosters the demand for decreasing censorship. What is needed, therefore, is more research focused not just on evidencing the existence of online hate speech, but research that works towards practical solutions. Equally important, however, is that future developments involve disabled people, and are thus grounded upon knowledge that is experientially rich. Indeed, many disabled people actively participate and engage with online communities. According to Bowker and Tuffin (2002; 2004; 2007), online communities are an important means of communication for disabled people due to its removal from the conventions and confinements of offline reality. As Huffaker, and Calvert (2005) suggest, the internet is a space whereby ‘the power of the gaze becomes displaced by a textually oriented medium’ (Bowker & Tuffin 2002, p.340), affording disabled people agency over important aspects of identity construction (Guo, Bricout, and Huang 2005; Stamou, Alevriadou, and Soufla 2016; Williamson et al. 2001). Research by Kang, Brown, and Kiesler (2013) also presents anonymity as a tool for individuals to manage their online social relationships, particularly if they found this difficult offline, while for others, anonymity is sought to preserve their offline relationships by keeping their online persona separate from their constructed offline image (Bargh, McKenna, and Fitzsimons 2002). 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work_czwhd5qrgvb6bgslua7sxvx7bq	----	The Evidence-Based Investigative Tool (EBIT): a Legitimacy-Conscious Statistical Triage Process for High-Volume Crimes RESEARCH ARTICLE Open Access The Evidence-Based Investigative Tool (EBIT): a Legitimacy-Conscious Statistical Triage Process for High-Volume Crimes Kent McFadzien1 & Alan Pughsley2 & Andrew M. Featherstone2 & John M. Phillips2 # The Author(s) 2020 Abstract Research Question Based on the evidence at the end of a preliminary investigation of minor, non-domestic assault and public order cases, how accurately can the likelihood of a sanctioned detectionbepredictedfortriagedecisionswhilemaintaininghighawarenessoflegitimacyissues? Data Investigative records on assault and public order offences recorded by Kent Police, with a case-control sample of 522 randomly selected detected cases and 482 randomly selected undetected cases, a test sample of 931 cases, and an additional 7947 cases for testing the model on all eligible cases in the force area for the initial six months of its use. Methods A case control comparison between solved and unsolved cases produced a logistic regression model that was used to predict investigative outcomes in both the test sample and the complete tracking of its use in investigative operations. Findings Eight elements of evidence available by the end of the preliminary investigation were found to predict whether a sanctioned detection would result from further investigation: (1) victim supports police prosecution, and evidence includes (2) a named suspect, (3) a cooperative witness, (4) CCTV evidence, (5) confirming police testimony, (6) forensic evidence, (7) a connection to other cases and (8) a report of the crime to police less than 28 days after the incident occurred. When the EBIT was calibrated to identify only the 31% of cases most likely to yield a detection from further investigation, the model correctly forecast 97% of cases that would not be solved, producing only 3% false negatives. It also reduced the false-positive rate from 73 to 22% in cases that did not lead to a sanctioned detection. Conclusions A case control analysis of solvability factors at the end of a preliminary investigation can identify almost all of the cases that are likely to be solved, even while the model predicts that the majority of all cases at that point will not be solved. https://doi.org/10.1007/s41887-020-00050-3 * Kent McFadzien km609@cam.ac.uk 1 Institute of Criminology, University of Cambridge and Cambridge Centre for Evidence-Based Policing Ltd, Cambridge, UK 2 Kent Police, Kent, UK Cambridge Journal of Evidence-Based Policing (2020) 4:218–232 Published online: 8 September 2020 Keywords Solvability . Investigative triage . Volume crime . Police decision-making . Resource allocation . Case clearance . False negatives . Non-domestic assault Introduction The Evidence-Based Investigative Tool (EBIT) is a multi-stage early case review system deployed by Kent Police (UK) to assist with the allocation of additional investigative resources on minor, non-domestic assault and public order offences. By predicting investigative success with EBIT, police can free up more time for preventing serious crime or for investigating more solvable cases by reducing wasted resources applied to cases at the point they have clearly been established to be unsolvable (Sherman 2018). The tool aids decision-making by recommending an allocation decision based on an evidence-based actuarial solvability assessment by the use of a logistic regression model, after which a two-step review of the case applies a structured professional judgement and public interest assessment to such issues as victim vulner- abilities and offender propensities to reoffend. This process was designed in Kent Police and is shown in Fig. 1. Each crime type has its own bespoke statistical model constructed to maximize accuracy. This article focuses on the model built to predict investigative outcomes for reported crimes of minor assault and public order (EBITAPO). Minor non-domestic assault and public order were chosen as the initial group of crimes for building an EBIT for a number of reasons, including their low solvability and their high impact on police resource allocation. The aim of EBIT is to improve police decision-making after providing an initial investigation for all volume crime. The greatest potential value of the tool is for crimes that occur in the highest volume. The need for decision support with an EBIT has therefore grown substantially as minor assault and public order offences have increased. Assault and public order offences have experienced a substantial increase levels recorded by police, having doubled over the past 5 years across England and Wales (Fig. 2). This substantial uptick in volume, due primarily as a result of changes to crime recording rules, has not altered absolute numbers of sanctioned Police Public Crime Report Creation and Initial Assessment Eligible for EBIT Actuarial EBIT Assessment Allocate1 Public Interest Assessment Professional Judgement Allocate2 File File Fig. 1 The Kent Police EBIT (evidence-based investigative tool) assessment flow diagram Cambridge Journal of Evidence-Based Policing (2020) 4:218–232 219 detections (McFadzien and Phillips 2019). And because those absolute numbers, i.e. the number of cases receiving a charge or a caution, have barely changed, the proportion of cases proving to be solvable cases has dropped markedly. Compli- cating matters further is the disproportionate investment of investigative resource required to untangle the circumstances of these cases. The direct contact between complainants and suspects in these cases means that a large proportion of them will require an arrest and interviews in order to lead to detections (Burrows and Tarling 1987; Smit et al. 2004; Thanassoulis 1995). A final reason this category was chosen is because these crimes, while numerous, comprise a very low proportion of total crime harm in any community (Sherman et al. 2016). Even if higher detection rates succeeded in reducing such low-harm events, this would cause very little harm reduction in communities experiencing high levels of knife crime and serious gang violence. Thus, the benefit to the community is dispro- portionately low in relation to the large investment required to take each case beyond its initial investigation period. All of these reasons taken together mean that when police use resources dispropor- tionately to harm while achieving few sanctioned detections, it is in the public interest to review the resource allocation policy. That is what Kent Police decided to do in 2017. The alternative policy Kent Police selected was to develop and test a solvability framework to target those cases most likely to get a positive outcome, as a supplement to other considerations for continuing cases beyond initial investigations. This decision was made, in part, because a positive judicial outcome is not the only issue police should consider when choosing the best course of action about an alleged offence. Other features of the incident alleged to have been criminal are also important. Safeguarding vulnerable victims and targeting prolific offenders, for example, are core 25,000 50,000 75,000 100,000 125,000 150,000 175,000 200,000 20 13 20 14 20 15 20 16 20 17 20 18 20 19 20 20 Year N um be ro fC rim es Violence and Public Order Offfences: Recorded Charged and Cautioned Fig. 2 Violence against the person and public order offences in England and Wales from April 2013 to September 2019 Cambridge Journal of Evidence-Based Policing (2020) 4:218–232220 policing functions that need to be considered. EBIT addresses these by applying a structured professional judgement assessment to those cases that are not automatically allocated for further investigation. EBIT users are required by policy to establish the circumstances of the case for features such as the presence of a position of trust between the parties, victims who have suffered prior victimisations and suspects who are known to police due to prior offending. If any such features are identified, the case is sent to a supervisor for a professional judgement assessment. This assessment then takes into account both the initial EBIT solvability score and the features of public interest that have subsequently been identified in low-score cases. Only after reviewing both the solvability score and the qualitative dimensions of each case do the investi- gative managers determine the best course of action beyond the initial investigation. The options for such actions range from a police investigation, a referral or signposting to appropriate alternative services or case closure. The core contribution of EBIT is to provide a reliable and objective means to focus initially on case solvability. Where there are identifiable characteristics of a case that are known early in the investigation that correlate with a likely sanctioned detection, the EBIT result supports a decision to continue the investigation. It is only when the characteristics predict further police time to be wasteful that EBIT is used to trigger a police professional’s review of that arithmetic assessment. The decision to produce an evidence-based statistical assessment of the likelihood of success is not a replacement of humans with a robot; it is rather a tool for advising experienced police professionals what has been found useful in prior cases and in prior studies. Well before the Kent EBIT was developed, there was a modest but promising amount of research into solvability factors for violent offending. Most of the attention in solvability research focused on more harmful violent offences and acquisitive crimes (Olphin and Coupe 2019). While early studies had some limited success (see, e.g. Greenberg et al. 1977), there have also been a number of more recent studies that successfully identified solvability factors that are relevant in the context of EBIT (Peterson et al. 2010; Peterson et al. 2013); (Roberts 2008). The EBIT strategy builds on these studies in the context of UK policing culture, in which substantial value is placed on fair procedures across all complainants and the legitimacy of making decisions that benefit communities while being fair to individuals. Research Questions The specific research question for developing EBIT in mid-2017 was this: Based on the evidence at the end of a preliminary investigation of minor, non- domestic assault and public order cases, how accurately can the likelihood of a sanctioned detection be predicted for triage decisions, while maintaining high aware- ness of legitimacy issues? Once this question was answered, and a decision to implement EBIT was made, the further research question for this article was this: Once the EBIT was applied generally in investigative operations for the categories of cases identified, what was the ongoing accuracy of the model? How much wastage of police resource did the EBIT model reduce? Cambridge Journal of Evidence-Based Policing (2020) 4:218–232 221 Data and Methods Phase 1: Building the EBIT Model A retrospective case control design was used to identify solvability factors for the actuarial assessment component of EBIT. This design has many benefits for crimino- logical research when the frequencies of binary outcomes are unequal (Loftin and McDowall 1988), as is the case for detections, which comprise a small percentage of all investigative outcomes. The data for developing the EBIT predictive model from a “training” sample consisted of 1004 cases drawn from eligible assault and public order offences that occurred in Kent Police, a large county force in the UK in 2016, of which there were over 20,000. To be eligible, the case was not to have been recorded as a hate crime, domestic abuse or an assault case likely to be charged above the common assault charging standard. The random sample was chosen from the following offences: S.47 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 S.39 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 S.4(1) AND (4) of the Public Order Act 1986 S.4A(1) AND (5) of the Public Order Act 1986 S.5(1) AND (6) of the Public Order Act 1986 The dependent variable was case detection. A random sample of cases were selected from 2804 detected cases that were reported in the 2016 calendar year, and the sample was stratified across the 12 months to account for any seasonal variability. All cases meet the United Kingdom’s evidential charging standard for these outcomes: “charge”, adult and youth cautions, community resolutions and penalty notices for disorder (PNDs). The undetected cases were a similarly stratified random sample from the 21,210 cases in Kent in 2016 with outcomes that did not meet the charging threshold after an investigation and were filed with no further police action. The final sample consisted of 482 detected cases and 522 undetected cases. The independent variables were informed by prior research (such as; Eck 1979; Greenwood 1970; Isaacs 1967; Olphin and Mueller-Johnson 2019) and the availability of those variables in police records. They fell across three categories. Case variables, including outcome, CCTV evidence, forensic evidence, multiple offences, cooperative witnesses, report delay, skeleton reports (cases that have virtually no information, often reported by third parties), police evidence, presence of a weapon, reporting party and location of offence Victim variables, including victim support for prosecution, alcohol or drug con- sumption, prior offending, age and gender Suspect variables, including a named suspect, suspect’s alcohol or drug consump- tion, prior offending, age and gender Each case was screened for eligibility. Cases with a charging level above common assault or where the victim was a police officer were excluded from the analysis. Ultimately, 97 cases were excluded with replacement: 81 of these cases were removed Cambridge Journal of Evidence-Based Policing (2020) 4:218–232222 due to being assault with injury cases deemed chargeable above common assault standard, and 16 cases were removed due to having police victims. The independent variables were then either extracted by manual review by experi- enced detectives or data mined from the police intelligence system. Police actions and information gleaned after the point of allocation to divisional officers were discarded or treated in the negative to mimic the real-world application of the tool. In other words, the procedure limited the search for correlates to those that fit the chronological sequence of what was known at the end of a preliminary investigation, to the exclusion of what was discovered in a subsequent investigation. Once the dataset was compiled, analysis of the cases involved the construction of a logistic regression model in R (R Core Team 2017) using the caret package (Kuhn 2008) to identify useful solvability factors. This involved constructing a model in which all variables were initially included, then refining it by removing non- statistically significant results and factors that would reduce the legitimacy of the tool. The public interest questions were developed by experienced Kent Police officers. The questions included the following dimensions: The presence of victim warning markers indicating involvement in prior crime or victimization The victim being a repeat victim to the same suspect (ever) The victim being a repeat victim of any crime in the past 12 months The victim being an ‘enhanced victim’ under the United Kingdom’s victim code A position of trust between victim and suspect The presence of a named suspect also triggered a number of public interest questions: Does the suspect have a criminal history? Is the suspect currently on bail or prison licence? The answers to all these questions were scored using professional judgement. Answer- ing some of these questions in the affirmative requires an immediate review, while others require two positive answers to trigger a review. Phase 2: Testing the Model Once the solvability factors were identified (see “Findings” section below), a new random sample of 931 cases (without replacement from the training sample) was extracted from the 2016 assault and public order dataset. The new random sample resulted in the proportion of detected cases being (broadly) proportional to the preva- lence rate of detection in the underlying population of cases at approximately 13%. From this new sample, the eight EBIT solvability factors identified from the case control analysis were applied and its accuracy tested. Phase 3: Tracking EBIT in Operational Application EBIT was built into daily police business across Kent policing in January 2018, following a 3-month local pilot. The launch was implemented with software supporting users in the force control room undertaking desktop reviews of all preliminary Cambridge Journal of Evidence-Based Policing (2020) 4:218–232 223 investigations. The software prompted the users to answer the EBIT solvability ques- tions. If the case was deemed unlikely to be solved, the software then prompted them to answer the public interest questions. Once each case was processed, the software advised the user to either: Allocate the case to further investigation Close the case pending further evidence Send the case for further review by a supervisor (Fig. 1) The software does not display the solvability scores to the user, but they are stored in a database along with the answers to the EBIT questions. Over the first 6 months of 2018, EBIT was applied 7947 times to eligible cases. In the “Findings” section below, the final outcomes of these cases are analysed and compared with the solvability score they received. Findings Phase 1: Building the EBIT Model The case control analysis of 1004 cases (of which 482 had led to detections) identified nine factors as showing statistically significant differences between detected and undetected cases (Table 1). These included case variables of having a named suspect, the victim supporting a judicial outcome, the presence of CCTV evidence, forensic evidence and police evidence; the case was linked to multiple cases, and the primary reporting is police and a delay of over 28 days in reporting the incident. There were also two factors that were close to p = 0.05: victim alcohol consumption and the presence of cooperative witnesses. This was then further refined with non-statistically significant variables sequentially added and removed utilizing comparative BIC and AIC values (Burnham and Anderson 2002). The final model, shown in Table 2, contains eight statistically and operationally relevant variables. Two variables were weakly statistically significant but omitted from the final model. These were the reporting party and alcohol consumption by the victim. While interesting from a solvability perspective, these were excluded from the final model because of threats to legitimacy. It is highly unpalatable to respond to intoxicated victims differently to sober ones and equally to privilege the information provided by some informants over others. Of the eight solvability factors identified, seven indicate increased detection; ex- tended delays in reporting to police produced lower odds of detection. The odds are summarized in Fig. 3, in which an odds ratio of one indicates that the presence of a factor does not affect the odds of the outcome (Szumilas 2010). All eight variables are statistically significant as the error bars do not cross the centre vertical line denoting “OR = 1”. In order for readers to be able to replicate the logistic regression formula for EBIT, we display it in algebraic form below. When calculated, the regression yields an EBIT solvability score between 0 and 1. This model was built into a Cambridge Journal of Evidence-Based Policing (2020) 4:218–232224 bespoke software solution (built by Kent Police) that allows EBIT users to simply answer the eight questions and be provided with guidance on case solvability. This solution was deemed a preferable alternative to managers performing manual calculations or looking up the results in large tables displaying the outcome based on all permutations: EBITAPO ¼ −6:758 þ 2:387 VS þ 0:3799 W þ 3:464 S þ 0:6293 MC þ 1:606 D þ 0:6758 C þ 1:413PE þ 1:904 FE Table 1 Full EBIT logistic regression model Logistic regression Detection Predictors Log-Odds std. Error CI p Sig (Intercept) −4.79 0.52 −5.80 – −3.77 < 0.001 *** Forensic evidence yes 2.00 0.88 0.27–3.73 0.024 * CCTV exists yes 0.62 0.25 0.13–1.11 0.013 * Victim support yes 2.47 0.20 2.08–2.86 < 0.001 *** Multiple cases yes 0.67 0.20 0.27–1.06 0.001 *** Hate crime yes −0.44 0.59 −1.59 – 0.71 0.450 Cooperative witness yes 0.32 0.19 −0.04 – 0.68 0.085 . Report delay over 28 days yes −1.85 0.67 −3.16 – −0.55 0.005 ** Skeleton report yes 0.13 0.25 −0.36 – 0.63 0.597 Police evidence yes 1.26 0.48 0.31–2.21 0.009 ** Alcohol victim yes −0.76 0.41 −1.56 – 0.03 0.060 . Victim prior offender yes −0.29 0.32 −0.90 – 0.33 0.366 Victim prior suspect yes −0.15 0.28 −0.70 – 0.40 0.597 Victim prior victim yes −0.16 0.20 −0.56 – 0.23 0.420 Victim age −0.00 0.01 −0.01 – 0.01 0.739 Victim gender male 0.18 0.18 −0.17 – 0.54 0.308 Drugs victim yes 0.22 2.07 −3.83 – 4.27 0.915 Named suspect yes 3.46 0.35 2.77–4.16 < 0.001 *** Alcohol suspect yes 0.77 0.28 0.23–1.32 0.005 ** Drugs suspect yes 0.49 0.89 −1.24 – 2.23 0.578 Suspect possess weapon yes −0.09 0.32 −0.72 – 0.53 0.766 Reporting party other police −1.40 0.60 −2.58 – −0.22 0.020 * Reporting party third party −0.30 0.34 −0.95 – 0.36 0.377 Reporting party victim −0.43 0.33 −1.08 – 0.21 0.187 Observations 1004 Cox & Snell’s R2/Nagelkerke’s R2 0.432/0.576 Cambridge Journal of Evidence-Based Policing (2020) 4:218–232 225 Where: VS victim support for prosecution S named suspect D report delay under 28 days PE police evidence is present W cooperative witnesses present Table 2 EBIT logistic regression factors Logistic regression Detection Predictors Log-Odds std. Error CI p Sig (Intercept) −5.15 0.38 −5.90 – −4.40 <0.001 *** Victim support yes 2.39 0.19 2.02–2.76 <0.001 *** Cooperative witness yes 0.38 0.18 0.03–0.73 0.033 * Named suspect yes 3.46 0.34 2.79–4.14 <0.001 *** Multiple cases yes 0.63 0.19 0.26–1.00 0.001 *** Report delay over 28 days yes −1.61 0.64 −2.86 – −0.35 0.012 * CCTV exists yes 0.68 0.24 0.21–1.14 0.005 ** Police evidence yes 1.41 0.46 0.51–2.32 0.002 ** Forensic evidence yes 1.90 0.90 0.15–3.66 0.034 * Observations 1004 Cox & Snell’s R2/Nagelkerke’s R2 0.419/0.558 10.88 *** 1.46 * 31.95 *** 1.88 *** 0.20 * 1.97 ** 4.11 ** 6.71 * Report Delay Over 28 Days Coopera�ve Witness Mul�ple Cases CCTV Exists Police Evidence Forensic Evidence Vic�m Support Named Suspect 0.01 1 100 • • • • • • • • Fig. 3 Odds ratios of finalized EBIT solvability factors Cambridge Journal of Evidence-Based Policing (2020) 4:218–232226 MC multiple cases C evidential CCTV is present FE forensic evidence is present In order to get an initial understanding of optimal accuracy, the model was tested on the training sample before an independent sample was obtained. This was done because data collection for EBIT is resource intensive. The results of this analysis are shown in Table 3. Of the 1004 cases, the model accurately predicted 827 of them at the default 0.5 threshold. The sample is case controlled and does not represent the actual propor- tion of detected cases. Nonetheless, the 13% false-negative rate was adequate, partic- ularly as any police force can adjust the model score at which cases are immediately allocated from the baseline of 0.5 to reduce the false negative rate further (at the cost of more false positives). Phase 2: Testing the Model A robust assessment of the accuracy of EBIT, however, requires an independent “test” sample, which does not use any of the cases for developing the predictions in the “training” sample. The results testing the model on the independent “test” sample of 931 randomly selected cases are displayed in Table 4. The overall distribution of this new test sample yielded a detection rate proportional to the force-wide detection rate of approximately 15%. In this scenario, the EBIT model correctly predicted that 66% of the cases would not lead to a sanctioned detection. Only 26 cases or 2.8% of the sample were false negative (“harmful”) errors by which the model failed to predict an actual detection. Interestingly, under this scenario, the model only allocated 289 cases (31%) and had a detection rate of allocated cases in this sample of 39%—almost three times as high as the business-as-usual detection rate. Table 3 Confusion matrix of final EBIT model when applied to the training sample at a threshold of P = 0.5 Crime was actually Detected Not detected Model predicts crime was Detected 419 (true positives) 114 (false positives) Not detected 63 (false negatives) 408 (true negatives) Table 4 Confusion matrix of final EBIT model when applied to test sample at a threshold of P = 0.5 Crime was actually Detected Not detected Model predicts crime was Detected 113 (true positives) 176 (false positives) Not detected 26 (false negatives) 616 (true negatives) Cambridge Journal of Evidence-Based Policing (2020) 4:218–232 227 In order to properly assess the relationship between the false-negative error rate (the important harmful errors of the model) and the volume of cases allocated by the model, these rates were plotted in Fig. 4. This was chosen as instead of the standard area under the curve or receiver operating characteristics (AUC or ROC) in this context as it clearly shows the relationship between case allocation and detection rate. What Fig. 4 shows is the range of results between setting the false-negative threshold at zero (where all cases would be allocated and none missed) and (at the other extreme) setting a false- negative threshold at one, which would mean no cases were allocated and all detections would be missed. Strategic decision-makers can use this type of plot to make an evidence-based decision on the level of resourcing they have available and the cost of missed detections. In Fig. 4, a threshold of 0.5 was chosen for live application of the tool with the option of later refinement. Phase 3: Tracking EBIT in Operational Application The model went live on the 3rd of January 2018 across Kent Police and was used 7947 times over the first six months of 2018. The distribution of solvability scores across live cases was varied and unequal. The most two frequent crime categories had almost 1200 cases and included cases that were recently reported with no solvability factors (0.01) or had both support for prosecution and a named suspect (0.67). Overall, the model allocated 43% for further investigation (an increase on the 31% allocated in the retrospectively tested test sample) (Fig. 5). Once secondary investigation was complete on allocated cases, we undertook an analysis of the outcomes in relation to the solvability score that EBIT calculated. Of the 7947 cases that went through EBIT, 3427 were allocated for further investigation, of these 175 were ultimately detected. The distribution of allocated case split by outcome 0% 25% 50% 75% 100% 0.0 0 0.2 5 0.5 0 0.7 5 1.0 0 Solvability Threshold P er ce nt ag e False Negatives Allocated Cases Fig. 4 Allocation rate and false-negative rate for EBIT model across solvability thresholds Cambridge Journal of Evidence-Based Policing (2020) 4:218–232228 is shown in Fig. 6. The “violin plots” show the overall distributions of the two groups with detected cases having a modal value of 0.85, while undetected cases most frequently had a score of 0.67. The means of the two samples were statistically significantly different, with detected cases averaging 0.84 versus 0.76 for allocated undetected cases (t = 6.32, df = 3425, p < 0.01). The median solvability score was 0.8 in the detected group versus 0.75 in the undetected cases. In fact, the undetected median score was equal to the lower quartile of the detected cases meaning 25% of detected cases had a solvability score less than 0.75 compared with half of undetected cases. An analysis of all outcomes shows that a small minority of cases that were not automatically allocated were still detected (Fig. 7). As the probability of solvability goes up, the percentage of cases that are detected also rises. It is a clear picture: the 0 300 600 900 1200 0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00 Solvability Score C ou nt Fig. 5 Solvability distribution of 7947 assault and public order cases from EBIT assessment 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 Detected [n = 175] Undetected [n = 3,252] Case Outcome S ol va bi lit y S co re • • Fig. 6 Distribution of the solvability score in detected and undetected allocated EBIT cases Cambridge Journal of Evidence-Based Policing (2020) 4:218–232 229 detection rate is 2.7 times higher for the most solvable quartile versus the least solvable (automatically allocated) quartile. The detection rate was comfortably over 10% for those cases that scored above 0.9 on EBIT solvability. There were also a small number of cases that were detected but were not automat- ically allocated by EBIT. The majority of these were due to subsequent reopening of the case due to new evidence coming to light, often CCTV or the identification of a named suspect. A small minority were identified via the public interest test component of EBIT and allocated for investigation as a result. Conclusion By using EBIT, Kent Police has been able to improve the efficiency of their investi- gations into minor non-domestic assault and public order cases. The model employed does a very good job of prioritizing cases based on solvability, with those deemed most solvable demonstrably being solved at higher rates than those predicted to be less solvable. This demonstrated capacity to predict a detection is an advantage for police agencies wanting to prioritize cases that are reasonable uses of police time and resources. EBIT offers a substantial improvement in predictive accuracy over previous methods of allocation based on professional judgement alone or of allocating all cases for any high-volume offence category. Prioritizing case investments has become increasingly important in recent years in the UK. As crime recording standards have been adjusted to capture more reports of crime, in particular interpersonal crime, EBIT provides a fair and consistent method to decide which cases could be closed at the end of a preliminary investigation. Automatically AllocatedNot Automatically Allocated 0.0% 2.5% 5.0% 7.5% 10.0% 12.5% 0− 0.0 9 0.1 −0 .19 0.2 −0 .29 0.3 −0 .39 0.4 −0 .49 0.5 −0 .59 0.6 −0 .69 0.7 −0 .79 0.8 −0 .89 0.9 −1 Solvability Score D et ec tio n R at e Fig. 7 Detection rates of all EBIT cases allocated across EBIT solvability scores Cambridge Journal of Evidence-Based Policing (2020) 4:218–232230 A further benefit is the consistency and personalisation that EBIT provides the victims of crime. EBIT excludes all cases involving domestic abuse, hate crime or assault above a common assault. All remaining eligible cases receive a uniform investigative process and review criteria. Cases that meet the solvability threshold are automatically allocated, thereby removing regional (intra-county) or personal (officer- to-officer) differences in allocation criteria that are usually inherent in investigative allocations. The public interest questions make sure that particular needs of the victim are identified and appropriately addressed and offenders get appropriate police atten- tion. The result is all similar cases, victims and offenders get similar treatments based on external auditable criteria. Open Access This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence, and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this article are included in the article's Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the article's Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder. To view a copy of this licence, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/. References Burnham, K. P., & Anderson, D. R. (2002). A practical information-theoretic approach. In Model selection and multimodel inference (Vol. 2, 2nd ed.). New York: Springer. Burrows, J., & Tarling, R. (1987). The investigation of crime in England and Wales. The British Journal of Criminology, 27(3), 229–251. Eck, J. E. (1979). Managing case assignments: the burglary investigation decision model replication. Greenberg, B., Elliot, V. C., Kraft, L. P., & Procter, S. H. (1977). 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In Crime Solvability Factors (pp. 149–174). Berlin: Springer. Peterson, J., Sommers, I., Baskin, D., & Johnson, D. (2010). The role and impact of forensic evidence in the criminal justice process. Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Justice 1–151. Peterson, J. L., Hickman, M. J., Strom, K. J., & Johnson, D. J. (2013). Effect of forensic evidence on criminal justice case processing. J Forensic Sci, 58, S78–S90. R Core Team. (2017). R: A language and environment for statistical computing. R Foundation for Statistical Computing. Retrieved from https://www.R-project.org/. Roberts, A. (2008). The influences of incident and contextual characteristics on crime clearance of nonlethal violence: a multilevel event history analysis. J Crim Just, 36(1), 61–71. Sherman, L. W., Neyroud, P. W., & Neyroud, E. (2016). The Cambridge crime harm index: measuring total harm from crime based on sentencing guidelines. Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice, 10(3), 171– 183. Cambridge Journal of Evidence-Based Policing (2020) 4:218–232 231 Sherman, L. W. (2018). Targeting, testing, and tracking: the Cambridge assignment management system of evidence based police assignment. In R. J. Mitchell & L. Huey (Eds.), Evidence based policing: An introduction (p. 15). Smit, P. R., Meijer, R. F., & Groen, P.-P. J. (2004). Detection rates, an international comparison. Eur J Crim Policy Res, 10(2–3), 225–253. Szumilas, M. (2010). Explaining odds ratios. J Can Acad Child Adolesc Psychiatry, 19(3), 227. Thanassoulis, E. (1995). Assessing police forces in England and Wales using data envelopment analysis. Eur J Oper Res, 87(3), 641–657. Publisher’s Note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Kent McFadzien B.Sc. (Hons) is a research manager at the Cambridge Centre for Evidence-Based Policing and a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Cambridge Institute of Criminology. He previously served as an officer in the New Zealand Police. Alan Pughsley QPM has served as Chief Constable of the Kent Police since 2014. After joining the Metropolitan Police Service in 1984, he has worked for much of his career in criminal investigations. Andrew Featherstone M.St. (Cantab) is a serving police officer with 19 years’ experience in Kent Police. He has a breadth of policing experience specializing in criminal investigations, intelligence and research in policing and is currently responsible for Criminal Justice and Custody. John Phillips M.A. Ph.D. (Cantab) graduated from the University of Cambridge with First Class Honours in 1998, later pursuing doctoral research at Magdalene College. He joined Kent Police in 2003, serving in a variety of detective and uniformed roles and is currently detective superintendent responsible for professional standards. Cambridge Journal of Evidence-Based Policing (2020) 4:218–232232 The Evidence-Based Investigative Tool (EBIT): a Legitimacy-Conscious Statistical Triage Process for High-Volume Crimes Abstract Abstract Abstract Abstract Abstract Abstract Introduction Research Questions Data and Methods Phase 1: Building the EBIT Model Phase 2: Testing the Model Phase 3: Tracking EBIT in Operational Application Findings Phase 1: Building the EBIT Model Phase 2: Testing the Model Phase 3: Tracking EBIT in Operational Application Conclusion References 2020-12-23T10:18:58+0800 Certified PDF 2 Signature 
work_d2bkj2e5tvciflxp7c3wptnipq	----	Psychological Studies (March 2010) 55(1):35–45 35 Humiliation and Human Rights in Diverse Societies: Forgiveness and Other Solutions from Cross-Cultural Research1 Dharm P. S. Bhawuk Received: 29 July 2009 / Accepted: 6 October 2009 Living in a multicultural society like the United States leads to sampling a range of experiences that vary from being extremely delightful to excessively stressful, with many types of experiences in between. I present cases of positive experiences of immigrants that provide positive feelings of freedom, equality, fairness and due process. I also discuss negative experiences of minorities that vary from having their names mispronounced and their accent criticized to outright racial discrimination and hate crimes. How should the individuals navigate through this minefi eld of humiliating experiences? I present four theoretically meaningful strategies – Learning to Make Isomorphic Attributions, Learning to Extract Help from the System, Developing a Shared Network, and Using the Acculturating Strategy of Integration – that are derived from cross-cultural research that may help a society’s minority members to maintain human dignity in a multicultural society without feeling excessively cynical. I conclude the paper with a suggestion that, perhaps, we need to use our spiritual strength in dealing with humiliating situations and that forgiveness is the ultimate ointment, which allows us to heal from the wounds of humiliation. Keywords: Humiliation, Autoethnography, Forgiveness, Intercultural training D. P. S. Bhawuk Professor of Management and Culture and Community Psychology, H. Smith Richardson Visiting Fellow, Center for Creative Leadership, USA Shidler College of Business, University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa, 2404 Maile Way, Honolulu, HI 96826 e-mail: Bhawuk@hawaii.edu ORIGINAL ARTICLE ©National Academy of Psychology (NAOP) India Psychological Studies (March 2010) 55(1):35–45 Researchers have consistently identifi ed the three domains of cognition, affect and behavior (Triandis, 1977; Brislin, 1989; Landis & Bhawuk, 2004; Bhawuk, Landis & Lo, 2006; Bhawuk, 2009) that need to be addressed in intercultural training programs to prepare people to be effective in intercultural interactions. However, not much exists in the literature that addresses the affective issues faced by sojourners. In the acculturation literature there is more research on acculturative stress that captures the affective issues faced by immigrants (Berry, 2004) and refugees (Fangen, 2006); however, they are often presented as the plight of people facing marginalization, and others are assumed to be following the cultural learning paradigm of acculturation (Berry, 2004). An attempt is made to fi ll this lacuna in the literature by presenting positive and negative experiences of a successful immigrant and sojourner. Another critical topic that is neglected in both intercultural training and acculturation literature pertains to the notion of humiliation (Hartling & Luchetta, 1999; 1Paper presented at the 3rd Annual Meeting on Human Dignity and Humiliation Studies, September 16–18, 2004, Maison des Sciences de l’Homme, Paris, France. I would like to thank Smriti Anand and Manoj Chatlani with their help with this research. I would like to thank Randolph Sykes, Vijayan P. Munusamy, Keith Sakuda, Harry Triandis, Dan Landis, Evelin Lindner, Linda Hartling, Susan Mrazek and Ken Cushner for their constructive comments and help. I would like to express my gratitude to my brother Om P. Sharma and Professor David Bess for standing by me in good and bad times, giving me the strength, and showing me the way to deal with many life issues that are presented in this paper. I would also like to thank Merritt Sakata, Roger Epstein, Elizabeth Reveley, the Hawai‘i Forgiveness Project, and Sei-Cho-No-Ie community in Hawai‘i for being my support group on the path of forgiveness. I owe special gratitude to my spiritual mentor, Mrs. Hanako Kume, for teaching me the art of forgiveness through her own example of living a life of gratefulness everyday. I dedicate this paper to her. DOI: 10.1007/s12646-010-0004-7 36 Psychological Studies (March 2010) 55(1):35–45 Lindner, 2006; Rutan, 2000; Statman, 2000). In race relations literature there are some indirect references to humiliation (Bergman, Palmieri, Drasgow & Ormerod, 2007; Clark, Anderson, Clark & Williams, 1999), but it is also not at the forefront of the fi eld. Despite the preponderance of evidence supporting the presence of humiliation as a common feeling experienced by immigrants and members of minority communities (hate crimes, see Jacobs & Potter, 1998; racial slurs, see Leader, Mullen & Rice, 2009; and so forth) and women (sexual behavior in the workplace, see Berdahl & Aquino, 2009, glass ceiling, and so forth) in multicultural societies, the fi eld of intercultural training has not addressed this common experience. This paper attempts to fi ll this gap in the literature by presenting a critical incident capturing the humiliating experience of a successful immigrant instead of the experience of marginalized people who are more often the target of such research. It also presents some qualitative data that captures the refl ections on the incident of two minority members of a multicultural society. In this paper, I take an experiential approach to the study of social psychology and share some of my positive experiences – the good – in a multicultural society, and how that leads to positive feelings, a sense of dignity, and extreme satisfaction with life in general. I also share an extremely devastating and humiliating experience – the bad – that ate at the core of my being for a long time. This is what ethnographers call evocative autoethnography (Ellis, 1997). I present the comments of two independent people on the negative experience to be able to refl ect on my own experience with some objectivity. In so doing I combine autoethnography (Ellis, 2004) with interview, and used written response from the participants instead of orally interviewing them and transcribing their response. Following the discussion of the good and the bad experiences, I present four strategies to navigate the multicultural minefi eld. These strategies are theoretically meaningful as they are derived from the cross-cultural literature, and have been found to be useful in many other domains like preparing people to live abroad, deal with issues of racism, and so forth. Thus, I synthesize autoethnography and refl ections from other observers with the existing literature to derive some theoretically meaningful practical solutions to the fi eld of intercultural interactions. It is hoped that these cross-cultural ideas and methodology will be examined in future research for their usefulness and validity in dealing with humiliation, and in creating a multicultural society where human right, dignity and self-respect are valued. Finally, using autoethnography again, I conclude the paper with my personal experience of forgiveness, and its usefulness in dealing with humiliation. The Good When I completed my Master of Business Administration (MBA) program at the East-West Center (EWC) and the University of Hawai‘i in 1990, my mentor at the EWC asked me, “What will you miss most about the United States?” I answered spontaneously, “Freedom.” Over the years I have refl ected deeply upon my response, as objectively as I can. I fi nd that my experience can be organized into three areas where I experienced an enhanced sense of freedom – experience in the academic world, social experience in the real world, and the experienced shift in the basic value of fatalism. These are the three areas in which I felt that I would miss freedom upon returning to Nepal. Experience in the Academic World Freedom came to me in many ways, and most of them were unexpected and liberating. I was born and socialized in a Brahmin family in Nepal and went to Indian Institute of Technology, Kharagpur, in India where I received my fi rst degree in mechanical engineering. I was an MBA student at the University of Hawai‘i but I was able to specialize in cross- cultural training, even though there was nobody at the College of Business Administration (CBA) who was an expert on the topic. The fl exibility allowed by the University of Hawai‘i to its graduate students, which is a strength of the American graduate studies, made it possible for me to take a summer workshop and do a directed reading in conjunction with it to learn the literature on cross-cultural training. I could take a course on cross-cultural research methods, which further allowed me to delve more deeply into the cross-cultural training literature. Finally, I was able to do my master’s thesis on intercultural sensitivity, and the committee worked with such an open mind and allowed me to work with my EWC mentor, though he was not a faculty in the CBA at that time. This experience gave me an uplifting feeling of freedom, a taste of the “can do” attitude, and a fl avor of what it means to have an internal locus of control and to do what one wants to do. I was rewarded positively with the publication of a chapter on cross-cultural orientation programs (Bhawuk, 1990) and a paper-based on my master’s thesis on inter- cultural sensitivity using the theory of individualism and collectivism (Bhawuk & Brislin, 1992). This early success provided the foundation of my research career. This is not to argue that there is no bureaucracy in the university. There is, and I had to fi ll out forms that had strict deadlines, follow procedures, and so forth. However, the academic freedom to do what I wanted to do, and to carry it out when I wanted to do it, was extremely satisfying. For Psychological Studies (March 2010) 55(1):35–45 37 example, I took my electives before my core MBA courses were done. I actually did my statistics and microeconomics courses in the last semester, which people usually do in their fi rst semester. The ability to choose courses and to do projects in those courses that enhanced my learning objectives led to this feeling of freedom beyond learning the prescribed material in the way the teacher imposes, which is the standard way of teaching in Nepal and India. Social Experience in the Real World Another area where I experienced a sense of freedom was in the social interactions in the EWC community in Hawai‘i. The EWC is a federally-funded international research and education organization in Hawai‘i, and it was the source of my grant to study in the United States. When I was a student there, there would be upwards of 300 students and scholars from the United States, Asia and Pacifi c Island Nations pursuing degree studies and research projects. I felt that I was accepted for my achievements, rather than what family or country I came from. My wife and I invited many professors, graduate students who studied with me, and other people we came to know in the community to our place for dinner, and they were all very warm, friendly and accepting. Even the professors treated us like equals, and many reciprocated by inviting us back. We became a family to our host family, and they even visited us in Nepal when we returned to Nepal. Thus, we felt that we could move around in the society freely, despite being foreigners and new to the society, and there were no hierarchical or other barriers in our way despite being a poor graduate student with no status in the community. The acceptance ameliorated the feeling of being a peon, dhobi (washerman), janitor and driver, since I did these chores in the United States, which I did not have to do in Nepal (Bhawuk, Munusamy & Sakuda, 2009). Moving Beyond a Fatalistic Attitude The biggest freedom came from the liberation from the deterministic grip of fate, which I realized only toward the end of the 2 year program. In Nepal and India, people always talk about their destiny and fate, and often think that effort only counts so much, and in the end it is fate that takes us where we are going. From day one in the USA, I took charge of my learning and started by requesting a change in my assigned advisor, which was immediately accepted with warmth. I took 2 years of French language, and was encouraged to do so, though it was not a part of my graduate studies. Of course, I had to take it over and above my 12 credit of graduate studies, but I was happy to make that extra effort, if the system allowed me to do what I wanted to do. I worked hard and earned an “A” in all courses, attended all cross-cultural seminars organized at the EWC, worked as president of the Nepalese student chapter at the EWC, joined the International Toastmaster’s club and became a competent toastmaster. I also won the district level speech contest, and came second in the state-level contest, served as a faculty member on the summer workshop on intercultural coursework development at the EWC, wrote a chapter for an edited volume on Applied Cross-Cultural Psychology (Bhawuk, 1990), wrote a chapter for a microeconomics text book at the invitation of the professor, danced with the Nepalese group during the International Fair at the EWC, and did many other activities. I was driven and kept myself busy. I did not realize that I had not heard or talked about fate or destiny for 2 years since nobody discussed it. I did well in my quizzes and tests despite black cats crossing the street in front of me, almost everyday while I walked to campus. The saying in Sanskrit, which my uncle had said many years ago to assuage my concerns originating from a fellow student’s negative astrological forecast, that a man or woman makes his or her own destiny, came to be true to the letter in my 2 year experience in the USA during 1987-1989. I was able to do what I wanted to do, with effort and hard work, and with the blissful support of my wife, who took complete care of the newborn baby and a 5-year-old son. During these 2 years I experienced the true meaning of what I now call the theory of karma – once we are born in a certain family, we are free to do what we like to do, and we become what we want to become. All relationships are our own creation. All achievements are our own doing. We are who we have made ourselves. We are free to act or (do karma) and we reap the harvest of the seeds we sow and nurture. This experiential move away from fatalistic attitude to believing in my own theory of karma2 was the crown jewel of the freedom that I experienced in my fi rst 2 years in the USA. The above case study clearly speaks of a multitude of positive experiences; experiences that capture extreme productivity, were enabling and empowering to the core of being human. This is an example of what a multicultural society can offer to people of different ethnic backgrounds who come to make such a society their new home. Such experiences refl ect the high standards of human rights practiced in these societies. However, without being cynical, 2My understanding of the theory of karma has transformed since the fi rst draft of the paper was written in 2004. I have no doubt whatsoever in my mind that I have no control over my life, and I am happy to accept life as a gift of God. Whatever happens and whatever I do is a gift of God. And I am grateful to God. 38 Psychological Studies (March 2010) 55(1):35–45 one could also argue that I was using self-deception, the tendency to use one’s hopes, needs and desires to construct the way we see the world (Triandis, 2009). After all, there is another side of these societies where minorities and women are treated poorly on a daily basis and I might have been spared such an experience simply by chance. Even one such experience of humiliation can overwhelm us and wash out all the positive experiences in almost no time. Indeed, such experiences often happen when we expect it the least. The Bad: Experiencing Humiliation and some Analyses The following incident happened in 1999 at the University of Hawai‘i where I returned as an Assistant Professor of Management, in 1995. Unfortunately I was a victim, and the incident remained unresolved for many years. I present below the incident as it happened, and also the response of two managers with whom I discussed it in some detail. The Incident I was proctoring the examination for a course as a substitute for an Indian colleague for his class. Three of the students received questions that were blank on page two. So, I needed to make three copies of the examination questions. I came out of the room and wanted to ask someone where the department offi ce was. I saw a room nearby open, and so I knocked on the door to ask for directions. The following dialogue took place between the two of us (B for Bhawuk; DF for Don Fox3). B: Excuse me. Where is the department offi ce? DF: Why? B: I need to make some copies. DF: Who are you? B: I am giving an exam. DF: You son of a bitch. B: Excuse me? DF: You are the son of a bitch who is giving an exam today. B: I am not the teacher. DF: Yes, you cannot be a teacher. You are a son of a bitch. You don’t know what our students are going through. B: I am proctoring the exam. You are barking up the wrong tree, sir. DF: I don’t know. At this point he turned his back to me and did not even tell me where the department offi ce was. I looked for another person in the corridor, who directed me to the third fl oor of the building where the department offi ce was. I asked the secretary to make three copies for me. She did. I asked her who was in Room 205. She told me that it was the offi ce of Professor Don Fox. As I returned, I approached Professor Fox again, and the following dialogue took place: B: Professor Fox, is that how you talk to a stranger? DF: You are the one who came to my room. B: Yes sir. I knocked on your door and said, “Excuse me.” DF: Who are you? B: I am a professor of management. (Pause) B: I am going to complain to the Dean. DF: You go complain to Chris Lee. He shrugged off as if he did not care. B: I will. After the examination, I walked back to my offi ce. I went to see Dean Lee, but learned from, his secretary, that he was not in offi ce. I consulted with two colleagues and a friend. I called Campus Security to fi nd out if I had been subjected to a verbal assault. Offi cer Smith consulted with someone and told me that it would be considered verbal harassment. He asked me if I would like to press charge. I said I would. Offi cers Smith and Jones came to my offi ce and talked to me. I told them what had happened. They went to get papers for me to fi le the complaint. They came back and gave me the paper to write my statement, and went to take Professor Fox’s statement. When Offi cer Jones returned, he informed me that he had talked to the Associate Dean, but could not take the statement from Professor Fox since he had already left for the day. Offi cer Jones took my written statement and said, “I will forward the report to the Dean tomorrow.” On a Saturday shortly thereafter, I saw Professor Fox at a major social event of that department to which we were both invited. He did not say anything to me. The Associate Dean took time to speak to me and reassured me that he did not expect any trouble at the social event, since Professor Fox was not aware that I had fi led a complaint with the Campus Security. 3I found out from the Dean’s Secretary, after the incident, that I was talking to Professor Don Fox (not his real name). Chris Lee is not the Dean’s real name. Psychological Studies (March 2010) 55(1):35–45 39 I talked to Dean Lee on March 24, 1999. He advised me to write to the Associate Dean about this incident, and I wrote to him giving all the details of the incident as repor- ted above. I also learned from the Campus Security that the Associate Dean would have to write to them to obtain the report that I had fi led with them, and that it would not be sent to him as a routine procedure. The report, I was told, was confi dential, and stayed with the Campus Security. I found the behavior of Mr. Don Fox offensive. I actually did not feel comfortable going to the department library, as I was not sure how Mr. Fox would behave toward me. In my letter to the Associate Dean, I demanded an apology from Mr. Fox. I said, “Please note that I am a very peaceful person, but civility should not be taken as weakness. Mr. Fox needs to understand that abusing someone’s mother is a very serious offense, and I expect a written apology from him. He should be given a written reprimand so that if he behaves like this in the future, more stringent action can be taken against him. He should also be required to take professional counseling to demonstrate that he is capable of handling his personal problems effectively without directing his anger to innocent people who may seek his help at the university, and should submit evidence of such help received.” The Associate Dean and the Dean took no action for 2 years, and never tried to resolve the problem. The Dean retired, and the Associate Dean stepped down from the position after completing his term. I saw Don Fox from time-to-time in the parking lot since our offi ces are in adjacent buildings, and it always made me feel humiliated. I simply did not feel comfortable in his presence or going to the building in which his offi ce was located. I wondered if Don Fox was racist, and why the Dean and the Associate Dean did not take any action. I wondered what I should have done to get justice. I wondered if in such situations it is even possible for someone like me to get justice. I wondered what organizations should do to prevent such incidents from occurring again. I decided to fi nd out what others thought of my experience and requested two South Asian managers to share their perspective on the incident by answering some questions after reading it. Analysis of the Case by a Male Manager “There is not enough information in the case to determine whether Don Fox is a racist. He was VERY RUDE, but I’m not sure if that qualifi es as being racist.” “Why did the Dean and the Associate Dean not take any action?” “Your guess is as good as mine. It could have been any number of reasons. May be they knew that it would come down to being your word against his, and since he had been there a lot longer (assumption), it wouldn’t actually solve any problem. However, it would get the school a whole lot of unwanted publicity. It could also be that they knew that Don Fox was an accomplished professor (assumption), and losing him would be a huge blow to the school. Like I said, your guess is as good as mine.” “What should I have done to get justice? What would you do?” “I would have written to the Dean and Associate Dean every week, and paid them a visit every week, and left them phone messages every week, basically be a pain in their butts, until they fi nally give up and are forced to deal with the issue. I might have even done a column in the Honolulu Advertiser to that effect. I’m sure the campus security must have given you a copy of their signed report (as proof that the incident was indeed reported). When you cannot get something done in a simple way, you have to try crooked ways.” “In such situations, is it even possible for someone like me to get justice?” “Of course it is! You just have to be willing to get down to your opponent’s level and fi ght the battle. A squeaky wheel gets oiled. Of course, you must make sure you are not making too much noise, because if that was the case, then a REALLY squeaky wheel WILL get REPLACED!” “What should organizations do to prevent such incidents from occurring again?” “To start-off, organizations must have a policy on harassment (all kinds, even yelling). Once the policy is in place, there must be procedures put in place, in the event this policy is violated. It is not enough to merely set the policy and procedure in place. The organization must drill it into their employees’ heads that any type of harassment will not be tolerated. Furthermore, the organization should also make it known that it HIGHLY encourages all of its employees to fi le a complaint, if he/she feels that he/she has been a victim of any such harassment. After all, the employee must feel confi dent in the policy and procedures that are put in place. He/she must believe that if they fi le a complaint, it will not be fi led away somewhere, but will be given the due diligence that it deserves, something that the school apparently lacked.” Analysis of the Case by a Female Manager “First of all, I am sorry that you ever went through such a nasty experience; academia is the last place you expect these things to happen.” “Is Don Fox a racist?” “Based on his comments it is easy to assume DF is a racist. At the very least he does not seem to like foreigners. However, the case does not mention DF’s 40 Psychological Studies (March 2010) 55(1):35–45 nationality and race. Is he an African-American? If yes, then it would be hard to say he is a racist guy; he might be just an extremely rude person. Assuming DF is Anglo-Saxon, why did he behave in this manner? A highly educated academic person usually does not conduct himself in this manner. Is he suffering from some kind of illness? Could he be phobic of foreigners?” “Why did the Dean and the Associate Dean not take any action?” “This is the part that confounds me. My elementary school going kids know that they deserve respect from everyone – family members, classmates, teachers and other school staff. They also know that their parents and/ or teachers will take appropriate action if someone is being offensive to them (there have been examples of this in the past). So, how come we as adults have no similar support system at work? The Dean and his associate took the easy way out. They chose to ignore the incident and avoided any confl ict. The case incident happened in 1999, not 1969, so I am sure the university offi cials (even in Hawai‘i) were aware of racism and its repercussions. There could be three rationales for their behavior: a. The dean and associate dean are also racists and are condoning that kind of behavior on campus. b. The dean and associate dean are aware of DF being foreigner-phobic or having another psychological disorder. Knowing that they do not want to take any action against DF. Even then they could have at least mentioned that fact to you. c. The dean and associate dean are passive personalities. They might have seen similar incidents in the past, and noticed that the issue somehow got resolved. They might be afraid of opening the Pandora’s Box, i.e. getting into a potentially expensive lawsuit (expensive in terms of university reputation as well as staff time and money). So far all the discrimination/racism cases that have been covered by media seem to involve a lot of bureaucracy – long lawsuits and bad publicity for all parties involved. They just want to serve their term peacefully and leave this battle for someone else. They are setting a very bad example, but unfortunately a lot of upper management folks do this.” “What should I have done to get justice?” “Initially you did everything right. You tried to talk to the offender and make him aware that he was being offensive (many people never realize how churlish they are). You consulted with campus security and fi led the complaint; went to the Dean, etc. If I were in your shoes, I would have waited for a few weeks; then I would have sent a letter to the Dean and gone to the next higher offi cial at the university. If no one at the university showed willingness to address this issue, I would again have given a written notice to everyone I had met with, and then I would consult a lawyer. I realize this is taking a great risk; these things are in general hard to prove and you might have lost your job; but getting justice is never easy anyway.” “In such situations is it even possible for someone like me to get justice?” “At the risk of sounding dramatic, do you think Rosa Parks4 ever doubted her right to justice? Thankfully we live in modern times and justice is possible for everyone. It is a question of what price you are willing to pay for it. Are you willing to go against your department and university? Can you handle a potential loss of job/income/career?” “What should organizations do to prevent such incidents from occurring again?” “Organizations should have a clear policy against explicit or implicit racism and discrimination. This policy should be clearly communicated to all staff members periodically. There should be a clear step-by-step process and a small team to handle any such incidents. For example, your complaint was stopped at the Dean’s level. Most likely a copy was never sent to his boss, and there was no team to deal with it. One person might be passive or timid, but a team of three or four people will not behave in the same manner, especially if they have clear guidelines as to how an offense should be defi ned and dealt with.” Analyses From the comments of the two managers who could empathize with me as a South Asian, it is unclear if the offender was a racist or not. This is not unusual since these issues are always confounded by multiple variables. It is also clear that humiliation (i.e. disgrace, shame, mortifi cation, embarrassment, dishonor or degradation, as the dictionary defi nes the term) can happen even in the most unexpected place, the academic institution, and even to professors, supposedly the highest in the food chain in the university system. Statman (2000) defi nes humiliation as an injury to self-respect of the victim by the offender who intentionally degrades the victim by sending the message of subordination, rejection, or exclusion. It is clear that in this case the offender sent a message of degradation and subordination by using foul language, ignoring the authority of university administrators, and refusing to apologize. Organizations often ignore such incidents and let the victims suffer 4Rosa Louise McCauley Parks (February 4, 1913 – October 24, 2005) was an African American civil rights activist whom the U. S. Congress later called the "Mother of the Modern-Day Civil Rights movement." http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rosa_Parks Psychological Studies (March 2010) 55(1):35–45 41 without any resolution though it is plausible that they may be able to develop enabling procedures, which could avoid such events to recur. And this incident is mild compared to physical assaults, sexual harassment, repeated racial insult, and other such behaviors, which are still not uncommon in the USA or other liberal democracies. Humiliation clearly is associated with disconfi rmed expectation (Bhawuk, 2009) and much emotional stress. Though it is impossible to turn it around into a positive experience, it nevertheless needs to be addressed for the sojourner or immigrant to be functional and without stress. Next, I attempt to develop strategies to deal with these minefi elds to be able to build on the positive experiences discussed earlier. Navigating the Minefi eld Living in a multicultural society like the USA leads to sampling of experiences that are as extreme as the two cases presented above. On the one hand, there are experiences that provide positive feelings of freedom, equality, fairness and due process. However, on the other hand, minorities and women also have to deal with a host of negative experiences from getting their names mispronounced, their accent criticized, to outright racial discrimination and hate crimes. How should the individuals navigate through this minefi eld of humiliating experiences and maintain dignity? I present here four theoretically meaningful strategies from the perspective of cross-cultural research that may help the minority members to maintain human dignity in a multicultural society without feeling excessively cynical. Learning to Make Isomorphic Attributions Isomorphic attribution refers to making a correct attribution of the behavior of a person from another culture in an intercultural context (Triandis, 1975). In a homogenous culture, and to a great extent even in a multicultural society, it is often not so diffi cult to make the correct attribution about why people act in a certain way, especially if people share the same cultural mores. If students stand up when the teacher enters the class, the teacher makes the correct attribution in India that the students are showing respect to him or her. In the USA, if the students do not stand up when a teacher enters a classroom, continue to eat their lunch, or sit however they feel comfortable (e.g. putting their feet on the table), the teacher would make a correct attribution that this is a normal situation, and the students are not being disrespectful. However, an Indian professor is likely to make an incorrect attribution in the USA by thinking that the students are rude, and an American professor is likely to make an incorrect attribution by thinking that the students are being inauthentic by standing up. When we make the correct attribution about a behavior, it is referred to as isomorphic attribution (Triandis, 1975). To navigate in a multicultural society, we all need to learn to make isomorphic attributions, especially while dealing with people who do not share our cultural values, beliefs and norms. Making isomorphic attribution is particularly challenging when there is a history of confl ict between two communities or ethnic groups. History of Confl ict usually refers to a long tradition of fi ghting between two or more ethnic groups (Triandis, Kurowski & Gelfand, 1994). In the context of the US, European Americans have had a long history of confl ict with both the African Americans and the Native Americans (Bhawuk, 2007). Similar confl icts exist within the boundary of many nations. For example, the Tamils and the Singhalese in Sri Lanka, the Hindus and the Muslims in India, and the British colonizers and the Aborigines in Australia, have all had a long history of confl ict. To be able to make isomorphic attribution in such situations one often has to rationalize the history of confl ict. It is not easy to rationalize a long-standing confl ict between two ethnic groups. It is frequently the case that people of different ethnic groups would talk about how they have suffered, especially because of the powerful group, when they are in the presence of their own people. To be able to bridge this gap, one needs to look at the individuals as individuals, as professionals, as tax payers, and so forth, so that they can focus on the similarities between them, and discount the history of confl ict as the only explanation of their behaviors. Thus, by rationalizing the history of confl ict between groups one is able to make isomorphic attribution about the behavior of people who are ethnically different from themselves. This also applies to gender differences in a similar way. Cultural distance is another source of diffi culty in making isomorphic attributions. This refers to similarity (small distance) or differences (large distance) found among cultures when comparing their objective (like social structures, religion, political systems and economics) and subjective (like attitudes, norms, beliefs, values and so forth) elements. For example, the cultural distance between the US and Western Europe is small and there is evidence that it is easier for American managers to adjust to Europe than to other parts of the world like Asia, Africa, the Middle East and so forth. Clearly, cultural distance has a direct relation to the perception of dissimilarity; the larger the distance, the more dissimilar people perceive others to be (Triandis, Kurowski & Gelfand, 1994), and the harder it is 42 Psychological Studies (March 2010) 55(1):35–45 to make isomorphic attribution across such large cultural distances. To be able to make isomorphic attribution one has to learn to deal with cultural distance. One approach is to suspend judgment about the other person’s behavior, analyze the situation from one’s own cultural perspective, analyze the behavior from the other person’s cultural perspective, and then to try to come up with a way to communicate the cultural difference without offending the other person (Bhawuk & Brislin, 2000). Another approach that is relevant here, especially with rationalizing history of confl ict, pertains to what is referred to as rationalizing insult in the interpersonal work context (Bhawuk, 1997). There always is an occasion when a peer is rewarded a trip, training, or promotion that one strongly feels he or she deserved. In a worse situation, one may receive a derogatory or insulting remark by the superior. In such situations the subordinate is better off accepting the situation and working at the relationship with the superior with a positive attitude rather than with frustration. One has to take any such situation as a bitter pill or a tacit suggestion for improvement. This is what rationalizing insult means, and it can also be used effectively to make isomorphic attribution in trying situations. It should be noted that it requires more than making an isomorphic attribution in situations such as the one described in the case above. The perpetrator may be racist, sexist and so forth, and the victim has to come up with a way to deal with the humiliation. Perhaps accepting the person and not accepting the behavior is the way out5 (Gandhi, 1953), which clearly leads to the notion of compassion (Thurman, 1997), self-compassion (Leary, Tate, Adams, Batts Allen & Hancock, 2007) and forgiveness (McCullough, Bono & Root, 2007; Zechmeister & Romero, 2002). I will return to this at the end of the paper. Learning to Extract Help from the System When a humiliating event occurs, it is important to know what formal course of action is available to the person. For example, if a woman suffers a sexual harassment episode, she should know what avenues are available in the organization for her to proceed with the complaint. Often large organizations have an ombudsperson who is specially designated to deal with cases of dispute. Some organizations have a specially designated person to deal with sexual harassment cases, others have a designated person in the human resource management department to deal with such cases (Bhawuk et al., 2002). It is important for all of us to know what our rights are, and also what avenues of adjudicating complaints are available to us. Knowing this prevents us from becoming cynical about humiliating events, using these avenues to pursue justice allows us to stand up for ourselves, and it also helps in having a dignifi ed experience in the workplace and the society. However, help from the system may not necessarily be forthcoming (especially if you do not have any clout in the organization) as managing humiliation cases often requires a huge investment of time and energy on part of the organizational leadership, and shortsighted leadership may not view this as a necessary investment for the organization. Hence, when institutions do not come to help us, as was evident in the above case, we have to go beyond them and delve into our spiritual strength calling on compassion and forgiveness to make ourselves pono, a Hawaiian construct that means becoming right again after the wrong is undone within oneself through ho‘oponopono (Vitale & Len, 2007). Developing a Shared Network When we meet people from different cultural or ethnic groups in different social settings, we learn to appreciate the humanness in all of us (Bhawuk et al., 2002). An Asian engineer may realize that a Caucasian engineer thinks much like him or her, and male and female engineers may realize that they are closer to each other than accountants or human resource specialists because of the similarity in their training. Such overlap of networks between different groups of people leads to the broadening of category width (Detweiler, 1980), and people develop tolerance toward differences of all types (Triandis, Kurowski & Gelfand, 1994). This in the end helps to deal with humiliation at the individual level, instead of the group level. For example, if I think that Don Fox is a unique person, then I do not feel the same humiliation, as I do when I think that Don Fox is a representative of white males and his behavior generally represents people of his ethnicity. Using the Acculturating Strategy of Integration Integration, which refers to people choosing elements from both their native cultural values as well as the values of the host or dominant culture, is the strategy recommended in acculturation literature as the most sensible approach 5“Man and his deed are two distinct things. Whereas a good deed should call forth approbation and a wicked deed disapprobation, the doer of the deed, whether good or wicked, always deserves respect or pity as the case may be. ‘Hate the sin and not the sinner’ is a precept which, though easy enough to understand, is rarely practiced, and that is why the poison of hatred spreads in the world.” Gandhi 1953, pp. 276. Psychological Studies (March 2010) 55(1):35–45 43 to adapt in a foreign culture (Berry, 1990). When people assimilate, rather than integrate, they sacrifi ce their own cultural values. When they separate from the mainstream culture, they are not taking advantage of the good values of the dominant culture, and they also miss out on many of the support systems available in the society. When people are not able to accept the dominant culture, and are also not able to stay with their own cultural values, they are not able to function in the new culture effectively, and become marginalized, often requiring therapeutic help (Bhawuk, Landis & Lo, 2006). Thus, compared to all these approaches, integration seems to be the most productive when adapting to a multicultural society. The concept of integration, which suggests that minority group members maintain aspects of their cultural heritage while participating in the larger social network, is similar to positive multiculturalism (Triandis, 1976), whereas assimilation, in which ethnic group members completely adopt aspects of the dominant culture, is similar to negative multiculturalism (Triandis, 1976). Positive multiculturalism is proposed as the psychologi- cal consequence of intergroup interaction if those interactions are rewarded. Triandis (1976) defi ned positive multiculturalism as the condition in which individuals acquire additional skills and perspectives that improve their chances of relating effectively to other ethnic groups. Unlike negative multiculturalism in which an ethnic group must lose some of its essential self-defi ning attributes in order to relate to other groups, positive multiculturalism is additive, in the sense that one maintains the essential self- defi ning attributes and adds skills that facilitate relationships with other groups. As evidenced in the case cited above, humiliation can shock even those of us who are using an integration strategy of acculturation, and the literature is quite silent about how one should proceed in such situations. As noted above, compassion and forgiveness seem to be the way out of such situations. Summary and a Coda This paper makes a number of contributions. First, it fi lls the lacuna in the intercultural literature by providing thick descriptions (Geertz, 1973) of situations that lead to positive and negative affects on immigrants and sojourners, which has been hitherto neglected in the literature. Second, the paper introduces the concept of humiliation in intercultural training literature, which can be useful in studying that negative affect. Third, it shifted focus to the experience of interculturally successful sojourners from whom there is much to learn, which again has been missing in the literature. And fi nally, the paper presents autoethnographic story of the author’s subjective experience (Ellis & Bochner, 2000; Ellis, 2004) to highlight both positive and negative affect, opening the door for inclusion of the personal journey as a research tool in intercultural training research. Refl ecting on positive and negative experiences helps us avoid self-deception since we learn to live with moderation and develop a moderate worldview without leaning toward either the positive or the negative extreme (Triandis, 2009). Thus, the paper presents a strong case for using analytic autoethnography (Anderson, 2006) in intercultural training research. Living in a multicultural society is both a joy for the diversity that it offers, and a pain for the humiliating encounters or dreadful expectation of such encounters that life offers on a daily basis. Diversity offers to humankind a new social environment where we can learn to live with differences, unlike the past 5000 years during which people got away with viewing the world from an “us versus them” perspective. Humiliating experiences will continue to plague us, much like the minefi elds we have created in many parts of the world, and we will have to be prepared to deal with them as they happen. It would not be worthwhile to go back to the disconnected world of yesteryears, since the benefi ts of diversity outweigh its costs. We hope that the cross-cultural research literature will provide us meaningful ways to deal with the diffi culties of diversity. I presented four such strategies in this paper. But now I would like to share how I dealt with the experience with Don Fox, which is more spiritual in its nature than cross-cultural and may offer another valuable mechanism to us. One day I saw Don in the parking lot and, with his stomach protruding excessively; he looked very sick. I had also learned from some others that he was having serious health problems. I wondered if I was sending negative energy to him because he had never apologized to me. I asked myself whether my bad feelings toward him might be a “supernatural” cause of his poor health. It was clear to me that I did not wish him any harm, despite how he had treated me, and would feel badly if something injurious happened to him. It was not a minor incident for me, and it had remained unresolved for many years, but still I knew in my heart that I did not wish him misfortune. In Nepal and India they say that a Brahmin should not harbor evil thoughts about anybody. And, I decided to forgive him. To my surprise, the event stopped bothering me once I consciously and categorically forgave him in my heart with an open mind. I talked about it with a good friend, and he thought that it was a decent thing to do. About 2 years after the event, I wondered if I should have walked to his offi ce and told him that I had forgiven him and whether he would 44 Psychological Studies (March 2010) 55(1):35–45 have appreciated it. It became clear to me then that it was not important for him to know, as much as it was for me to know that I had forgiven him. Almost a decade later, today I do not even think about it and I am at complete peace with Don and the institution. If anything, I have come out stronger from this experience,6 and I am grateful to Don for what he did. He gave me the opportunity to learn experientially the Native American wisdom: I have no friends; I have no enemies; I have only teachers. Or, in my own tradition, I had an opportunity to practice the wisdom presented in Manusmriti (2.162): A Brahmin should get agitated when receiving honor as if he has been given poison, and he should always seek insult like nectar (Buhler, 1969).7 When I refl ect on this today, I still feel good about forgiving Don, and moving on. Thus, perhaps we need to practice forgiveness to resolve such humiliating events, for it brings the spirituality within us out to play and, conceivably there is nothing material – good or evil – that can survive the bliss of spirituality. Perhaps the wisdom of compassion and forgiveness has always been known to the saints and the messiahs, and that is why they are ever forgiving, even when they are crucifi ed. Forgiveness is possibly the ultimate cure for a victim who has suffered humiliation. References Anderson L (2006). Analytic autoethnography. Journal of Contemporary Ethnography, 35(4):373–395. Berry JW (1990). Psychology of acculturation: Understanding individuals moving between cultures. In W Richard Brislin (Ed.), Applied cross-cultural psychology (pp 232–253). Newbury Park, CA: Sage. Berry JW (2004). Stress perspectives on acculturation. In L David Sam & W John Berry (Eds.), The Cambridge handbook of acculturation psychology (pp 43–57). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Berdahl J & Aquino K (2009). Sexual behavior at work: Fun or folly? Journal of Applied Psychology, 94(1):34–47. Bergman ME, Palmieri PA, Drasgow F & Ormerod AJ (2007). 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work_d3tegi5jezafpkqie6e6yasshe	----	This may be the author’s version of a work that was submitted/accepted for publication in the following source: Dwyer, Angela (2011) Policing lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender young people: A gap in the research literature. Current Issues in Criminal Justice, 22(3), pp. 415-433. This file was downloaded from: https://eprints.qut.edu.au/40992/ c© Copyright 2011 Institute of Criminology Press This work is covered by copyright. Unless the document is being made available under a Creative Commons Licence, you must assume that re-use is limited to personal use and that permission from the copyright owner must be obtained for all other uses. If the docu- ment is available under a Creative Commons License (or other specified license) then refer to the Licence for details of permitted re-use. It is a condition of access that users recog- nise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights. If you believe that this work infringes copyright please provide details by email to qut.copyright@qut.edu.au Notice: Please note that this document may not be the Version of Record (i.e. published version) of the work. Author manuscript versions (as Sub- mitted for peer review or as Accepted for publication after peer review) can be identified by an absence of publisher branding and/or typeset appear- ance. If there is any doubt, please refer to the published source. http:// sydney.edu.au/ law/ criminology/ journal/ https://eprints.qut.edu.au/view/person/Dwyer,_Angela.html https://eprints.qut.edu.au/40992/ http://sydney.edu.au/law/criminology/journal/ 1 Policing LGBT Young People: A Gap in the Research Literature? Angela Dwyer1 This article argues for exploring lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) young people’s experiences with police. While research examines how factors such as indigeneity influence young peoples’ experiences with police, how sexuality and/or gender identity mediates these relationships remains largely unexplored. Key bodies of research suggest a need to explore this area further, including: literature documenting links between homophobic violence against LGBT young people and outcomes such as homelessness that fall within the gambit of policing work; research showing reluctance of LGBT communities to report crime to police; international research documenting homophobic police attitudes and Australian research demonstrating arguably homophobic court outcomes; and research outlining increasing police support of LGBT communities. Drawing on these bodies of literature, this article argues that LGBT young people experience policing warrants further research. Introduction For some time now, research with young people2 has demonstrated that they have a problematic relationship with police (CMC 2009; Carrington and Pereira 2009).3 This 1 Dr Angela Dwyer, Lecturer, School of Justice, Faculty of Law, Queensland University of Technology, email: ae.dwyer@qut.edu.au 2 In this article, ‘young people’ refers to the criminal justice definition of a young person as aged 10–17 years (Queensland is the only Australian jurisdiction that continues to define a young person as aged 10–16 years: AIHW 2007). 2 article argues that much of the literature examining young people’s relationships with police is informed by an overarching assumption: that young people are necessarily heterosexual. While there has been recent recognition of diversity as a factor mediating youth–police interactions, the literature tends to overlook diverse sexuality (lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender: LGBT) and/or gender identity4 as a factor mediating policing relationships. Ironically, this research gap runs alongside a burgeoning body of international literature documenting how victimisation experienced by LGBT young people (Hillier, Turner and Mitchell 2005) leads to ‘secondary victimisation’ (Berrill and Herek 1992), such as prostitution, homelessness, and substance abuse (Cochran et al 2002; Whitbeck et al 2004). This is especially concerning since outcomes like these, typically produce disproportionate police contact for young people spending time in public space more generally (Alder et al 1992). Even so, a cursory consideration of research demonstrates an apparent lack of knowledge about the degree to which LGBT status mediates policing experiences in general. Overlooking LGBT young peoples’ experiences of policing is even more bewildering in light of research suggesting police relationships may not be as satisfactory as we would otherwise assume in a contemporary Australian context (Leonard et al 2008). While police now very rarely perpetrate heterosexist and homophobic violence against LGBT people, in comparison with historical contexts (Wotherspoon 1991), homophobia5 and heterosexism6 may still implicitly contribute to the reluctance of a majority of LGBT 3 Police refers to ‘the gatekeepers of the criminal justice system’ (White and Perrone 2005:10) 4 For the purpose of clarity, this article uses the acronym LGBT as an inclusive term to describe people identifying as gay, lesbian, bisexual, transgender, transsexual, intersex, queer, pansexual, and questioning. LGBT status is understood to disrupt heteronormative relations because of their marginal, non- heteronormative sexuality and/or gender identity. 5 Homophobia refers to ‘the unreasoning fear or hatred of homosexuals and to anti-homosexual beliefs and prejudices’ (Flood and Hamilton 2008:16). 6 Heterosexism is defined as ‘the structural forms of compulsory heterosexuality that impact on the lives of GLBTIQ [gay, lesbian, bisexual, transgender, intersex, LGBT] individuals’ (Robinson 2008:3). 3 communities to report victimisation to police (Berman and Robinson 2010). As yet, we know very little about the police experiences of young people in LGBT communities or the degree to which homophobia and heterosexism informs policing practice with these young people. Complicating these issues further is the complex regulatory, social, historical context in which police were imbued with powers to enforce legislation outlawing sodomy (Bernstein and Kostelac 2002; Dalton 2006). Even though Australian jurisdictions have moved beyond criminalising sodomy, ambivalence may still characterise relationships with police and LGBT communities, especially in policing beats where men of all sexual orientations meet for anonymous public sexual encounters (Swivel 1991). Uncertainty may also emerge in enforcement of laws criminalising sodomy for young people under 18 years in Queensland.7 Laws like this have the potential to define everyday sexual behaviours of young males in LGBT communities ‘as deviant, subject to intense surveillance and recorded and processed by criminal justice agencies’ (Tomsen 1996:para 4). The key point, though, is that we have yet to conduct research to understand how these issues are relevant in a contemporary Australian policing context. This is significant since leading research on police–LGBT relations is based in the United States (US) which, while similarly a Western country, is dissimilar in its broader social context where the ‘antigay Christian right’ is highly influential and closely linked with US politics (Herman 1997). Most importantly, new studies must now acknowledge the marked improvements in how Australian police services support both LGBT people and a contemporary policing context that outwardly rejects heterosexist and homophobic violence against LGBT communities. 7 Queensland is the only state to do this, with all other states in Australia allowing sodomy as of 16 years of age. 4 Doing research on how LGBT young people are policed may be fraught with difficulties. It is complicated by: how young people are already markedly over-policed in everyday life (Alder et al 1992); how LGBT young people may be participants in various youth subcultures which make them more subject to police attention; how young people’s leisure practices (such as hanging out with friends) are becoming increasingly criminalised in public spaces; how being visibly homeless generally makes young people more subject to police attention; and how young people are vastly overrepresented in policing and crime statistics in most Western countries. Despite the difficulties, researchers have collectively noted the importance of police striving to support LGBT communities (Berman and Robinson 2010; Cherney 1999). This article interrogates the assumption that policing is about policing heterosexual spaces and calls for research on these issues. To do this, it engages with five core bodies of literature. First, it briefly considers literature showing problematic police–young people interactions in public spaces more broadly, and the degree to which they are subject to increased police attention. Second, the article examines literature highlighting how victimisation of LGBT young people situates these young people as a diverse group that may be subject to increased policing interactions. Third, it explores international research documenting homophobic attitudes of police officers, and research demonstrating arguably officially sanctioned homophobia in Australian courts. Fourth, discussion moves to research examining relationships between LGBT communities and police, and shows the limited knowledge we have of LGBT young people’s interactions with police. Finally, the article elaborates positive moves of Australian police services to improve relations with LGBT communities. The article concludes by suggesting future areas of research 5 concerning how LGBT young people experience policing in the contemporary Australian context. Policing Youth: Problematic Relations Between Young People and Police Long-standing research about young people and police suggests their interactions are especially problematic, characterised by mutual disrespect and harassment at best (Borrero 2001; Carrington and Pereira 2009; CMC 2009; Cunneen and White 2007; McAra and McVie 2005; Quinton, Bland and Miller 2000; Scraton 2008; White and Alder 1994). As such, young people’s activities continue to attract inordinate police attention, and this is well evidenced in how young people:  are more likely than adults to be represented as offenders and victims in police statistics (QPS 2008) and recorded crime statistics (ABS 2008; AIC 2009);  are more likely than adults to be subject to police harassment and over-policing8 in public spaces (Alder et al 1992; Liederbach 2007);  are more likely than adults to be detected and charged for an offence (QPS 2008);  are more likely than adults to have negative attitudes towards police (Taylor et al 2001); and  engage in activities defined as ‘risk-taking behaviours’ (Smart et al 2004) detected by police on the basis of suspicion of involvement in criminal activity (CMC 2009). Balancing the rights of young people to publicly recreate with political pressures on police to regulate these activities is a delicate manoeuvre (Omaji 2003), but it often 8 Over-policing refers to how specific groups may be ‘targeted by police for surveillance and intervention, and this disproportionate attention is customarily viewed as undue harassment by the affected groups’ (White and Perrone 2005:42). 6 produces police name-checks and repetitive questioning (White 1994), move-ons (White 1998), frisks (Antrum 1998), property searches for prohibited implements (Crane 2000), curfews (Simpson and Simpson 1993), and zero-tolerance strategies (White and Sutton 1995). Young people from diverse and marginalised backgrounds are especially subject to policing measures seeking to regulate public spaces (Hagan, Shedd and Payne 2005; McAra and McVie 2005; Wilson, Rose and Colvin 2010). An Australian study of young people from non-English speaking background found they were more likely to be searched and arrested, and they were more likely to be injured during contact with police, and the likelihood of these outcomes were increased when in the company of others (Youth Justice Coalition of NSW 1994:7–8). The frustration of police harassment is summarised by a young Lebanese-Australian male who wants to return to Lebanon because he would prefer that to ‘stay[ing] in this country and keep on being harassed by police’ (Collins et al 2000:172). While research examines policing experiences of ethnically and other diverse young people (such as indigenous young people: Cunneen 2008), only limited international research explores how diverse sexuality and/or gender identity mediates police–youth interactions. This is despite an ever-burgeoning literature about LGBT youth victimisation suggesting secondary outcomes of victimisation involving activities that may attract police attention in public spaces. Policing Vulnerability: LGBT Young People and Homophobic Victimisation There exists overwhelming research documenting the many different forms of victimisation, harassment, and abuse experienced by LGBT young people in international (Human Rights Watch 2001; Stonewall 2007) and Australian (Ellis and High 2004; Hillier, Turner and Mitchell 2005) contexts. This victimisation is defined in the literature as 7 primary and secondary victimisation (Herek and Berrill 1992). Primary victimisation refers to the discrimination, abuse (verbal, physical, emotional, psychological, social, economic) and harassment perpetrated against LGBT young people by strangers, friends, school peers, and family. Australian research has found that 38% of the 1749 young LGBT respondents reported unfair treatment on the basis of sexuality (Hillier, Turner and Mitchell 2005). Safety is not even assured in the family unit, with disclosure of sexual orientation and/or gender diversity to parents sometimes leading to harassment and violence (Gorman-Murray 2008). Even so, school is the most dangerous place for LGBT young people in Australia. Of the primary victimisation reported (Hillier, Turner and Mitchell 2005), 74% was perpetrated (and silenced) in school spaces—with teachers often unable and unwilling to challenge this behaviour (Warwick, Aggleton and Douglas 2001). Abuse included: threats to kill, being pushed down the stairs, being punched, being thrown into walls, being spat on, and being raped. While evidence of victimisation in this research is damning, the key concern in this article is the secondary victimisation resulting from primary victimisation. Again, a large body of international and Australian research documents secondary victimisation in terms of specific risk factors, including: mental and psychological distress (Safren and Heimberg 1999); suicidal ideation and suicide (Noell and Ochs 2001; Morrison and L’Heureux 2001); self-harm (Thorpy et al 2008); homelessness (Cull, Platzer and Balloch 2006); and health and sexual risk behaviours (Bontempo and D’Augelli 2002). Of 164 participants aged 12– 20 years in an Australian study, ‘37% of LGB [lesbian, gay, bisexual] young people had attempted suicide, 82% had considered suicide, and 59% had self harmed’ (Thorpy et al 2008:7). These outcomes for LGBT young people are increasingly concerning and leave 8 little doubt further research needs to explore the effects of these outcomes in the long term, particularly regarding their relationship with the criminal justice system over time. Of most concern in this article is how recent research suggests these risk factors can lead LGBT young people to be involved in risk-taking behaviours and make them more likely than heterosexual young people to come into contact with police, a pattern noted about young people more broadly in Australian research (CMC 2009; Smart et al 2004). Research concentrated in the US notes how LGBT young people are more likely to be involved in these risk-taking behaviours, like health and sexual risk behaviours, than their heterosexual counterparts (Bontempo and D’Augelli 2002; Cochran et al 2002). They are more involved in substance abuse (Jordan 2000) and are more likely to participate in prostitution and ‘survival sex’ as ‘subsistence strategies’ than their heterosexual peers (Whitbeck et al 2004)—and these activities are all subject to policing in public spaces. Homelessness also features as secondary victimisation for LGBT young people in the US (Cull, Platzer and Balloch 2006), and homeless people in Australia have been found to ‘endure extraordinarily high levels of police harassment and interference in their lives’ (Walsh 2007:7). Whitbeck et al (2004:329) also found 63 LGBT young people (in a sample of 428 young people) in their study were more likely than heterosexual young people to be ‘physically and sexually abused by caretakers, to engage in risky survival strategies when on their own (including survival sex) ... [and] to be physically and sexually victimized when on the streets’. These are all factors that, although presenting a bleak view of LGBT young people as victims (Marshall 2008), highlight how LGBT young people may attract police attention, especially given the public nature of sex work transactions and acquiring illicit substances. However, to the best knowledge of the author, no study has empirically examined the links between secondary victimisation and policing. 9 Only one very early US study by Remafedi (1987:334) reported results indicating LGBT young people have increased contact with the police and criminal justice system. This research found ‘substance abuse, truancy, prostitution, and running away from home were the major sources of conflict with the law’ for the 29 gay and bisexual males aged 15– 19 years that participated. Most importantly, this study found that ‘approximately one half of all subjects had been arrested, in juvenile detention, or arraigned in juvenile court on at least one occasion’ (Remafedi 1987:334). Even though this study does not tell us how LGBT and heterosexual young people compare, it is interesting this has not been researched further, particularly considering that living circumstances experienced by LGBT young people often fall within the gambit of policing work. Even though research on secondary victimisation is concentrated in international contexts, it highlights the need to explore these relationships further in an Australian context—especially since historical relationships between police and LGBT communities have been characterised by disrespect, discrimination and victimisation. Denigrating LGBT Communities: Homophobia in Police and Criminal Justice International studies have explored the existence and prevalence of homophobic attitudes among police officers (Bernstein and Kostelac 2002), corrections staff (Eigenberg 2000), criminal justice students (Cannon 2005; Cannon and Dirks-Linhorst 2006; Ventura et al 2004), and textbook content for law enforcement students (Olivero and Murataya 2001). Australian research about homophobia in the police is non-existent, with all studies focused in the US, a social and cultural context unlike Australia known for conservative, religious values (Herman 1997). For example, research in Texas by Lyons et al (2005), conducted with 152 police chiefs and commanders, found they endorsed homophobic attitudes, with 10 rural location and religiosity of the officers being predictors for the highest levels of homophobic sentiment. Overall, 32% of officers agreed and strongly agreed with the statement ‘I think male homosexuals are disgusting’. The results of a study with 747 Texan police chiefs found similar results with 62% of these officers believing ‘homosexuality constitutes “moral turpitude”’ (Lyons et al 2008:110). Stereotypes clearly informed how the officers thought about homosexuality with 56% of respondents identifying ‘homosexuality as a “perversion”’ (Lyons et al 2008:110). While the methodologies of these studies may be something we could replicate in Australia, it would be erroneous to surmise these studies reflect the attitudes of Australian police. Although not focused specifically on police, we do have evidence of homophobic attitudes in Australia. Flood and Hamilton (2008) conducted a survey with 24,718 Australian respondents (aged 14 years and above) on homophobic attitudes, and found more than 35% of the sample (43% of men and 27% of women) believed homosexuality to be immoral. These statistics demonstrate homophobia is strong in Australia, and highlights further the importance of further research with police on this topic. As police reify and reinforce heterosexual masculinity (Tomsen 2009), diverse sexual orientation and/or gender diversity challenges this (Herbert 2001). Gay males challenge cultural ideals about ‘men’s bodies as unbroken and powerful, protected from penetration and any emasculating desire’ (Tomsen 2009:22). Therefore, less explicit forms of denigration may be at work considering homosexuality disrupts the ‘violent, even dangerously destructive, forms of masculinity’ (Tomsen 2009:70) associated with police work. This article argues that tensions between heterosexual masculinity and homosexuality are potentially reflected in police interactions with LGBT young people and that Australian studies are needed to explore this. 11 There is some research from a social and cultural context more similar to Australia—this being research conducted by Pratt and Tuffin (1996) in New Zealand with eight (six male and two female) police officers. Homophobic attitudes permeated how the officers described homosexual men in particular, with officers drawing heavily on two specific discourses: effeminism and deviance. Homosexuality was equated with enacting visibly effeminate deportment and behaviour, and was described in terms of ‘references to an effeminate way of speaking, an effeminate way of walking and standing (swinging the hips and bending the wrist), and, in the extreme, cross-dressing’ (Pratt and Tuffin 1996:61). The troubling element of these accounts was how police then associated being effeminate with sexual deviance—with homosexuality aligned with promiscuous sex, sadism and masochism, indecent exposure, and paedophilia. Reflected here is a long-standing misconception gay men are paedophiles engaged in paedophilic activities with young boys, even though research has disputed this for some time (Jenny, Roesler and Poyer 1994). Most importantly, officers in this study emphasised their reservations about employing homosexual officers on the basis they would be harassed by other officers. While this clearly does not reflect official police policy in New Zealand, these actions would constitute a violation of employment and safe workplace laws as well as contravening anti- discrimination legislation. As New Zealand reflects a socio-cultural context similar to Australia, the homophobic attitudes of officers in Pratt and Tuffins’ (1996) research suggests the need to conduct research on these issues in an Australian setting. More importantly, though, the officers’ accounts in the research by Pratt and Tuffins (1996) may more accurately reflect contemporary hate speech as identified by Mason (2007a) in her work on White supremacist organisations: a language of care. Mason argues hate speech produced by these organisations employ discourses of care (by suggesting 12 immigration be avoided because of the strain on environmental resources for instance) to more closely align with anti-discrimination legislation. These contemporary, tacit forms of hate speech diverge somewhat from previous definitions of hate crime/speech as criminal acts/events directed at a particular diverse group (Mason 2007b). There is no want of Australian research on hate crime (in the form of heterosexist and homophobic victimisation), with many studies noting these experiences as unnervingly common (Attorney General’s Department of NSW 2003; Baird, Mason and Purcell 1994; Berman and Robinson 2010; Couch et al 2007; Cox 1990, 1994; GLAD 1994; Hillier, Turner and Mitchell 2005; Leonard et al 2008; Pitts et al 2006; Sandroussi and Thompson 1995; Mason and Tomsen 1997). The most recent work by Berman and Robinson (2010) notes the alarming regularity of homophobic and heterosexist violence among LGBT communities in Queensland. Clearly, research shows LGBT people are being heavily victimised, but this violence is more nuanced than one-on-one physical violence. For example, Cox (1990) noted that 73% of victims sustained physical injury, whereas Berman and Robinson (2010) note that just 9% of victims experienced physical attack. This research signifies a different, contemporary landscape of violence against LGBT communities, with other recent Australian research demonstrating hate speech emerging in more nuanced, politically correct forms of caring (Mason 2007a; Dwyer 2010). The extent to which this shift has informed how police interact with LGBT people is yet to be explored empirically in any context. Australia has undoubtedly moved beyond police perpetrating overt forms of hate crime against LGBT people, like those reported by Enough is Enough (Victorian Gay and Lesbian Rights Lobby 2000). However, the key issue warranting further consideration is how it has moved beyond this in a shifting contemporary landscape of subtle forms of hate speech. 13 Although research is required in Australia to better understand the issues above, one area of the criminal justice system continues to evidence State-sanctioned violence against LGBT people: the courtroom. For some time now, notably violent killings of gay male victims by typically younger heterosexual male perpetrators have attracted controversy because perpetrators have been readily acquitted or leniently sentenced by Australian courts (Tomsen 2009). Controversy surrounds the legitimacy of defendants using homosexual panic defence in these cases where they argue they lost control and killed the victim on the basis that the victim made a homosexual pass at the perpetrator. Tomsen (2009:104) argues that the court acceptance of this defence demonstrates the official legitimacy and ‘potency of claims about the affront to heterosexual manhood that derives from a homosexual pass’. The courts’ approval of homosexual advance defence suggests homosexual panic is a legitimate reason to end a person’s life. Legitimising homosexual panic defence in the highest ranks of official state regulation in Australia may imply to police, prosecutors and the public that it is acceptable to kill an LGBT person on the basis of a sexual miscommunication. Traces of homophobia (Flood and Hamilton 2008) in the criminal justice system like this could further legitimise differential treatment of LGBT young people by police, and merits empirical interrogation in an Australian social context. Policing LGBT Communities: The Research Evidence So Far LGBT communities and police relationships have been researched, but this is again mainly international research, with very few Australian studies detailing these relationships. These studies highlight that while the LGBT communities’ experiences with police are varied, police responses take two forms: under-policing9 and over-policing.10 Furthermore, LGBT 9 Under-policing is defined as ‘those instances where police persistently fail to respond to instances of violence perpetrated against certain (vulnerable) groups in society, thereby denying them official victim status’ (White and Perrone 2005:52). 14 young people are subsumed into larger research LGBT samples (for example, the age range in Leonard et al 2008 was 14–65 years), showing how their relationships with police are yet to be the focus of concentrated research anywhere in the world. Under-policing LGBT Communities: Police Non-response and Victim Non-reporting Existing research demonstrates one of the fundamental concerns of the LGBT communities in relation to police is non-response, or under-policing. Police disinterest was cited as the major reason LGBT victims of intimate partner violence (Farrell and Cerise 2006) and sexual prejudice did not report to police in recent Australian (Leonard et al 2008) and US (Bernstein and Kostelac 2002) research, with respondents in international research fearing further discrimination from officers (Williams and Robinson 2004) and suspicious of police homophobia (Buhrke 1996; Peel 1999). While some research conducted in the United Kingdom (UK) (Jones and Newburn 2001) and the US (Wolff and Cokely 2007) suggests that reporting victimisation to police produces negative outcomes for LGBT people, research seems to more accurately reflect participant concern about anticipated negative outcomes—they are assuming police will be discriminatory and homophobic. We can extrapolate from some studies broader conclusions about police experiences of LGBT young people, even though researchers fail to make young people a focus. Recent Queensland research (Berman and Robinson 2010:147–8) included 241 respondents aged 18–24 years, and found the following reasons provided by police for not investigating reports of victimisation further: The right of persons to their own opinions, lack of evidence..., unwillingness of the attending officer to discuss the matter aside from providing a “report number”, being advised to change numbers and move, individuals should be aware “hanging out in places like this”, inability of officers to act in the absence 10 See note 8 for a definition of over-policing. 15 of actual physical violence (three cases) with one such situation involving a stalker, the officer going on leave a week after reporting the incident with an assurance of getting in contact upon return which never occurred, and inability to locate the perpetrator. These results align closely with research based in Northern Ireland (Radford, Betts and Ostermeyer 2006) revealed 38% of 233 respondents were aged 18–25 years, and 39% of all respondents noted problems with police including: unsatisfactory service; failure to update about complaint progress; failure to follow up a call for assistance; failure to be taken seriously; failure to do police duty; being rude or impolite; and being discriminatory on the basis of their sexuality. This research highlights the centrality of police non-response in LGBT victimisation, despite LGBT young people’s experiences being integrated with broader results. Australian research reflects international research trends demonstrating LGBT communities are less than satisfied with police responses when reporting victimisation, albeit with only limited information about LGBT young people (Baird, Mason and Purcell 1994). The Private Lives (Pitts et al 2006) report stated that nearly half of all 5476 Australian participants (approximately 38% aged up to 25 years) in all age groups disagreed that police treated them ‘with courtesy and respect’. More importantly, this appears to translate into how members of LGBT communities report victimisation to police: ‘Of the third of participants who reported having been physically injured, only 20.4% had reported this to the police’ (Pitts et al 2006:52). The Victorian Coming Forward report also reflected these trends (Leonard et al 2008), but stops short of specifying how many young respondents were included among the 390 LGBT participants. While 85% of respondents experienced heterosexist victimisation, only 30% of respondents reported this to police (Leonard et al 2008). The main reasons for not reporting included: believing police would not take the report seriously, fear of police, 16 and police heterosexism/homophobia (Leonard et al 2008). For the 25% of respondents who reported victimisation to police, half were critical of police responses. Even more paradoxical is 83% of respondents knew about Gay and Lesbian Liaison Officers (GLLOs) in the Victorian Police Service, but 82.5% had never contacted them, despite 85% of respondents being victimised. Queensland research (Berman and Robinson 2010) also reflects this trend, with 52% of 1094 LGBT respondents aware of gay and lesbian police liaison services, but only 4% accessing this support, even when 53% had been victimised. Research by Leonard et al (2008) shows young people aged 14–29 were least likely to know about GLLOs, suggesting we need to raise awareness of these support mechanisms. Whereas 25% victimisation reporting rates in 2008 Victorian research (Leonard et al 2008) compare favourably with 18% reporting rates in New South Wales research in 1995 (Sandroussi and Thompson 1995), heterosexist victimisation is still underreported at 12% in Queensland in 2010 (Berman and Robinson 2010). This suggests underlying issues hinting perhaps at police insensitivity to the needs of LGBT victims (Leonard et al 2008). Only one Australian study, although focused again broadly on LGBT communities, has specifically asked LGBT young people about their experiences of policing. You Shouldn’t Have to Hide to be Safe (Attorney General’s Department of NSW 2003) reports on one focus group with eight females and five males aged 18 to early 20s, but only notes negative and positive interactions occurred without elaborating details. This study also found that out of 600 respondents, people aged 16–19 were significantly less likely to be confident reporting violence or harassment to police. For young people aged 16–19 who had been victimised, 84% of them had not reported this to police. This is the only specific information we have about LGBT young peoples’ experiences with police in Australia. 17 Overall, Australian studies suggest LGBT communities appear less than satisfied with their policing experiences, with their dissatisfaction often tied to under-policing and the assumption of police homophobic hostility. Interestingly, the reluctance to report and experiences of non-response exists alongside studies noting that significant numbers of LGBT people know about police services supporting LGBT communities (detailed further below). Contradictions like these in research may be indicative of other tacit issues impacting upon how LGBT people experience policing in Australia. Over-policing and LGBT Communities: Victimisation and Harassment by Police The flip side of under-policing is over-policing. Early international (Comstock 1991) and Australian (Wotherspoon 1991) research notes police abuses of LGBT communities. Groves (1995) describes early problems with police practices in the raid of the Tasty nightclub in Melbourne in 1994 on suspicion of drug use on the premises. Practices of this raid included: inappropriate language; lengthy police searches because patrons outnumbered police available for conducting searches; inconsistent searching techniques; lack of respect for privacy; lack of glove changes by officers between searches; and lack of female officers to search female patrons. Research also suggests little has changed in the US, with ‘police acting disrespectful, rude, in an inappropriate manner, engaging in harassment, denying services to victims ... [and] acting as the actual perpetrators of anti- LGBT verbal harassment, intimidation, and physical assault’ (Wolff and Cokely 2007:12; see also Bernstein and Kostelac 2002). However, recent Australian research suggests minimal evidence of police as perpetrators of sexual prejudice, with fourteen respondents listing perpetrators as ‘“Other” (all single responses) including “Husband” and “Police Officer”’ (Leonard et al 2008:35), in comparison with 16% reported by an earlier study (Baird, Mason and Purcell 1994). 18 A survey by Williams and Robinson (2004) indicates LGBT young people in the UK are four times more likely than employed LGBT people to feel harassed by police. More concerning is those under 25 years of age who had experienced physical victimisation (52% of the sample of 354 lesbian, gay and bisexual people residing in Wales) were ‘seven times more likely to report experiencing discrimination or harassment by the police’ (Williams and Robinson 2004:225). Even though these results constitute probably the best understanding we have of LGBT young peoples’ experiences of policing, this study does not detail the forms of discrimination or harassment perpetrated by police—we can only speculate about what these may be. Fundamentally, we have no research examining these issues in an Australian context up to this point, even though this context has undergone significant shifts in police–LGBT relations in recent times. Contemporary Contexts of Police–LGBT Relationships: Initiatives Bridging the Divide A raft of contemporary changes to legislation began significant moves away from policing LGBT communities as sexually deviant, and towards police working to protect and support LGBT people in Australia (Thompson 1997). In conjunction with historical changes to legislation criminalising sodomy (Willett 2000), legislation has been changed to end discrimination in law recently highlighted in inquiries like Same-Sex: Same Entitlements (HREOC 2007). These changes have afforded to LGBT communities human rights and entitlements previously denied to them. Police services across Australia have been at the forefront of ensuring these new laws are implemented and that LGBT peoples’ rights and freedoms are protected. 19 Police have worked to improve and build relationships with LGBT communities more broadly. Indeed, the first major research conducted on heterosexist and homophobic hate crime in Australia was conducted by, or in cooperation with, police services across Australia (Baird, Mason and Purcell 1994; Cox 1990, 1994; GLAD 1994; Sandroussi and Thompson 1995). These research outcomes spurred police to establish training for new recruits and collaborative anti-violence projects between police and LGBT health organisations, such as the well known proactive partnership between the New South Wales (NSW) Police Service and ACON (New South Wales' and Australia’s largest community- based LGBT health and HIV/AIDS organisation). This partnership extends to Working Together, a strategic framework encouraging collaboration across a network of community organisations and government departments to prevent violence against LGBT people. These projects encourage LGBT people to report violence and provide education campaigns about violence against LGBT communities and in same-sex partnerships, and police reporting measures are being improved regularly to ensure the best possible statistical data on these forms of violence (Berman and Robinson 2010). Every police service in Australia (including the Australian Federal Police) now runs gay and lesbian police liaison programs to provide direct support to LGBT people of all ages. Contingents from police services in some states (particularly Victoria and New South Wales) participate (in uniform) in annual LGBT social events like the Sydney Gay and Lesbian Mardi Gras and state and territory based Pride parades. Additional police officers attend these events to provide protection from sexual prejudice from the public. Leadership has been evidenced even from the highest ranks of police to improve relationships of LGBT people with police, particularly former Victorian Police Commissioner Christine Nixon. This leadership has informed visible police support of LGBT people from the Victorian 20 Police Service, including regular online posts by the manager of the Gay and Lesbian Advisory Unit in the Southern Star (a leading queer news source in Sydney and Melbourne) about LGBT issues. Officers from the NSW Police Service have even contributed to This is Oz, a national campaign raising awareness and fighting discrimination against LGBT people. There is no doubt police services in Australia have moved well beyond the homophobic policing practices evidenced in Australian history (Wotherspoon 1991). The extent to which these changes have informed street-level policing is unknown and requires exploration, particularly since this is the context in which LGBT young people would attract police attention. Where To From Here: Policing LGBT Young People as a Research Gap Although research about police and LGBT young people is lacking, clearly there is positive change evidenced in Australia (Cherney 1999). Even so, while we may have seen contemporary improvements with police processes related to LGBT communities, this article suggests there is more work to be done, particularly in relation to LGBT young people. Research outlined above demonstrates the living circumstances of some LGBT young people may involve participation in criminalised and risk-taking activities as a basis of subsistence and coping with the victimisation they experience. This is not all LGBT young people though. We have strong evidence LGBT young people are increasingly supported by their families, for example (Gorman-Murray 2008), which would reduce their potential to become homeless for instance. The question is more about how some LGBT young people present as more vulnerable than others, particularly if their living circumstances lead them to spend increasing time in public spaces. This may be especially true with LGBT young people whose visibly queer bodies are marked as bodies at-risk in public spaces (Dwyer 2008), and victimisation perhaps exemplifies ‘punishing or 21 constraining the public visibility of that group’ (Tomsen 2009:39). They may be considered ‘soft targets ... disciplined for their gender non-conformity’ (Tomsen 2009:42) by the public, masculinist police, and criminal justice processes. Working through risk factor approaches like those indicated in LGBT youth victimisation literature, ‘criminal justice policies based on the formulation of “risk” have the potential to criminalise the everyday “youthful behaviours” of those most excluded’ (McAlister 2008:16). Complicating these issues further is the assumption that public spaces are relatively safe for LGBT young people—a situation most heterosexual young people take for granted. Yet research on the victimisation of LGBT young people demonstrates this safety is most certainly a privilege that is not accorded to them in public space (Hillier, Turner and Mitchell 2005). More importantly, Australia has made significant advances in policing and supporting LGBT communities, but research on public gay and lesbian events demonstrates a more complex situation at work (Tomsen and Markwell 2009). While these events overtly demonstrate public support for LGBT people, they signify only temporary suspension of sexual prejudice in public spaces. There is little doubt that these events are safe spaces due to intricate, lengthy negotiations between police and LGBT groups, but it is concerning police intervention in victimisation was noted by only four participants out of 151 reports of victimisation at the events (Tomsen and Markwell 2009). This raises doubts about the socially just status of policing LGBT young people, and raises questions about the importance of young peoples’ understandings of how policing happens and their rights in these processes. More importantly, research reviewed above provides strong grounding for exploring further how LGBT young people experience policing, as well as broader experiences in youth justice systems (Ventura et al 2004). 22 This article suggests that it is necessary to further research these issues. While comparative jurisdictions like the US have forged ahead with researching how LGBT communities experience policing, Australia is yet to empirically interrogate most areas of concern identified in the literature discussed. Australian research needs to begin with the basics, like exploring homophobic attitudes in police officers and examining relationships between reporting victimisation to police and under-policing. Furthermore, links between the victimisation of LGBT young people and their experiences of policing in public spaces demand elaboration. Existing research points to a range of factors potentially contributing to LGBT young people having increased interactions with police: being young and hanging out in public spaces; being visibly LGBT; being involved in risk-taking activities; being involved in illegal subsistence strategies; being homeless; and being vulnerable and at-risk. Even though it may be more comfortable to accept all is well in these terms, research outlined in this article casts doubt on this assumption. It highlights the need to move forward with this as a future area of research inquiry—research conducted in partnership with police services around Australia to ensure new knowledge informs policing practice, as well as the dispositions of LGBT communities towards police. 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work_d3wxvayy3ndkbn4cv3bwrwi24q	----	Crime, Justice & the COVID-19 Pandemic: Toward a National Research Agenda Crime, Justice & the COVID-19 Pandemic: Toward a National Research Agenda J. Mitchell Miller1 & Alfred Blumstein2 Received: 1 July 2020 /Accepted: 1 July 2020 / Published online: 9 July 2020 # Southern Criminal Justice Association 2020 Abstract The novel corona virus COVID-19 has become a worldwide public health pandemic that has induced anomic conditions impacting daily routines. COVID-19 response measures specifically alter regular schedules and both restrict and expand opportunities for various types of crime while presenting unprecedented challenges for the criminal justice system. For criminologists and criminal justice scientists, the virus also presents natural experiment conditions allowing for real-world theory tests and observation of the relative effectiveness of practice and policy options under weighty conditions. Toward synthesizing scientific discourse and forthcoming empirical work, we suggest the benefits of a COVID-19 crime and justice research program and offer some anchoring concepts. Contagion, containment measures (social distancing, facemasks, shelter-in-place, economic shutdown, virtual work and schooling, banned group gath- erings), and social ordinance compliance (voluntary or enforced) posture a conceptual framework from which to align research on crime, justice, and victimization during the virus. After observing crime trends and justice system challenges, we suggest how the pandemic presents opportunities for review of various criminal justice, especially incarceration, policies. System change is a recurring theme across this special issue of the American Journal of Criminal Justice that features twenty additional contribu- tions from a wide range of authoritative crime and justice scholars. These articles on traditional crime during the virus, virus specific hate crime and domestic violence, and the challenges posed by COVID-19 to law enforcement, the courts, and corrections will hopefully provide initial commentary toward deeper inquiry. Keywords Contagion . COVID-19 crime . De-carceration . Social ordinances . National research agenda American Journal of Criminal Justice (2020) 45:515–524 https://doi.org/10.1007/s12103-020-09555-z * J. Mitchell Miller mitch.miller@unf.edu 1 University of North Florida, Jacksonville, FL, USA 2 Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA 15213, USA http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1007/s12103-020-09555-z&domain=pdf mailto:mitch.miller@unf.edu Introduction A 2019 novel coronavirus disease (COVID-19) broke out initially in China and spread globally with such speed and dire effects that the World Health Organization declared it a public health emergency of international concern in January of this year (World Health Organization, 2020). COVID-19 attacks the respiratory system more aggres- sively than other circulating coronaviruses that cause common cold-like illness and presents pronounced health risks of many sorts because there is not yet any pre-existing immunity, available vaccine, or proven treatment. An airborne virus, it spreads easily through human contact and has triggered exponential growth in cases, hospitalizations, and deaths around the globe. The actual extent of the virus can only be estimated as the affected can be contagious during lengthy asymptomatic incubation periods with only mild flu symptoms. Raging spread has resulted in an ongoing global pandemic that, at the time of writing, has resulted in well over eight million cases and 454,000 deaths worldwide with over two million cases and nearly 130,000 deaths in the United States that certainly will be considerably higher by time this issue is in print. The capacity of countries’ health systems to respond to the pandemic, the extent of testing, and reporting transparency vary considerably across (and within) countries so data is more approximate than exact. The virus is truly worldwide and apt to linger over multiple waves with China, Italy, Iran, India, the United Kingdom, and, most recently, Brazil and Russia joining the list headed by the United States as the most plagued nations per Johns Hopkins COVID-19 Dashboard statistics. Not since the Influenza of 1918 has the world experienced such a widespread pandemic, so there is only a minimal experiential reference base to guide an informed response. As the coronavirus impacts almost every part of public and professional life, social scientists have quickly pivoted to collect real-time data on a vast range of pandemic issues. The effects of limited human contact, contraction anxiety, unemployment, and heightened domestic strife are but a few topics of interest to psychologists and public health researchers; economists have unprecedented disruptions to employment and to supply chains and related market implications to address; and political scientists have “pandemic politics” wherein virtually every government position involves a tradeoff between protecting public health and reinvigorating the economy – a reality only magnified by the media during this election year (Adolph et al., 2020). For criminology and criminal justice, the new normal of virus life presents a flood of similarly complex choices between protecting public safety and protecting the health of those under control of the criminal justice system as well as those working in it. Most pundits anticipate the virus will drive increases in some types of crime (e.g,, commer- cial burglary resulting from absenteeism effecting lack of guardianship) while retarding others (e.g., residential burglary per increased home presence and guardianship), that increased domestic violence will ostensibly reflect the limits of social isolation, and that the justice apparatus will be challenged, topics representing but a fraction of crime and justice research foci. National themed social problems tend to invite quick descriptions of phenomena and fast research conclusions toward crafting solutions. A handful of empirical works, for example, have already reported early data on COVID-19 crime and justice topics (Brantigham, 2020; Payne & Morgan, 2020; Mohler et al., 2020; and Gerell & 516 American Journal of Criminal Justice (2020) 45:515–524 Kindgren, 2020), but similar to the time realities of vaccine approval, high quality applied research takes time and ideally employs mixed methods which means qualita- tive as well as quantitative data collection and analysis usually facilitated through site visits that, per the virus, are largely suspended in general and altogether at detention facilities. This is not to say that early research is wrong, necessarily lacks rigor, or consequence but first look explorations of phenomena do not always represent realities accurately and are typically too limited from which to make strong policy generaliza- tions. In that research shapes policy positions and practices, it is prudent to move forward cautiously rather than invest too heavily on sole studies without replicated result. Perhaps the most direct impact of the pandemic on the criminal justice system results from the concern over contagion of COVID-19 among the individuals the system controls in prisons and jails. Which arrestees should be sent to jail awaiting trial and which should be released into the community? For people convicted, should they be incarcerated or released on probation? Of people serving time in prison, which ones can be safely released into the community, either because of their high risk if infected or because4 of their low risk of committing crime on the outside? These decisions of pretrial release, probation, and parole have traditionally been addressed daily, but they could well take a different form in the context of the virus. The concern about contagion puts additional weight favoring release in order to reduce the density in the inevitably crowded prison or jail environments. Envisioning a National COVID-19 Research Program A national COVID-19 research program is needed not only because of its importance in helping to shape effective policy responses to the current version of the coronavirus pandemic, but because it has become clear that it could well change its form in future versions and other pandemics can reasonably be expected to arrive in the future, and the research program can help provide the understanding and insights that are important and necessary for dealing with the pandemic complexities. Toward this end, this introductory discussion identifies some primary concepts central to the development of a potential future pandemic crime and justice research agenda to orient and synthe- size directly related forthcoming inquiry toward rigorous scientific discovery and optimal applied practice.. National research programs can be consequential to intelligent policy and practice decisions. In the present case, there is a strong pragmatic and even if not moral premium on objective science and an empirical knowledge base so that official actions that respond to the virus are not grounded in ideology, partisanship, or selfish economic interests. A research program’s conceptual framework sets scope conditions and an orienting strategy that signals, if not directs, the tone of inquiry, actual issues researched, and related attributed significance. Theoretical or national research pro- grams are infrequent in academic criminology and criminal justice with more com- mentary than actual examples (see Miller, Gibson, & Byrd, 2008). Rather than resembling more formal theoretical research programs composed of set core and supporting maxims which must be falsifiable (Berger & Zelditch, 1993) as in related disciplines, criminology and criminal justice research has more loosely employed American Journal of Criminal Justice (2020) 45:515–524 517 theoretical integration toward research to establish a knowledge base from which to identify, synthesize, and analyze applied issues and challenges. Justice themed research programs have emphasized the actionable implications of findings from interlocking outcome studies such as Simpson and Sell’s series of evaluation research (1982) on the Drug Abuse Reporting Program and the National Institute of Mental Health research agenda organized around conceptual cores of development, classification, and prevention – essentially domains for research concep- tualization and design (Reiss & Price, 1996). Additionally, Huizinga et al., (1995) crafted a research agenda to disentangle the characteristics and arrest histories of chronic delinquents through a typology approach (risk factors identification, violence prediction, developmental pathways interactive effects). More recently, a proposed national research agenda for treatment courts was grounded in inter-twined evidence- based practice, research-practitioner partnership, and mixed-method concepts (Miller et al., 2019). Regardless of subject matter, a commonality across these research programs is specification of core concepts that, collectively, define active and future research questions and agendas. The virus presents opportunities for real-world theory tests and examination of the justice apparatus under its distinctive conditions, partly to contrast it with otherwise normal conditions and potentially to anticipate what might happen in other pandemic conditions. Leading criminological theories (e.g., routine activities theory, deterrence and rational choice theories, self-control theory, social disorganization, cultural trans- mission, and social learning perspectives) are of clear relevance to a broad range of both crime and justice COVID related topics. While active justice program evaluations have been compromised by virus-induced disruption of offender treatment protocols indicating program differentiation, linking the virus and criminal justice responses creates natural experiment conditions with comparison groups that otherwise would be impossible to construct - such as offenders receiving early release from incarcera- tion. Although much is yet to be determined regarding the dynamic nature of the virus and findings from virus-related research, a conceptual framework should facilitate discourse and inquiry on the links between the virus and crime and the justice responses. Core Concepts The two foremost focal concepts of the COVID-19 pandemic are contagion and containment. These interrelated ideas posit arenas of case confirmation and reaction around the objective of minimizing contagion and propagation. Shelter-in-place epito- mizes the national response of social distancing - a universal mandate of separation, for everyone to stay at home, and prohibition of aggregation of more than a specified number of people (but these vary across and even within states) - thereby canceling sporting events and entertainment events, shutting down restaurants, all “non-essential” businesses, and meetings of all sorts. Stay-home policies and closing of significant portions of the economy has spiked unemployment, social isolation, and competition for basic needs while forcing home schooling and virtual workplaces. Drastically altered daily life due to virus rules and compliance enforcement, ranging from response to defiance of stay-at-home orders and restrictions on public gatherings, and punish- ment for assault of medical workers usually through coughing, spitting, or sneezing. All 518 American Journal of Criminal Justice (2020) 45:515–524 these have fostered anomalous responses presenting a wide array of situational and global consequences that raise important research questions regarding individual and programmatic effects.. Containment measures, then, are strategies implemented as social ordinances de- signed to limit transmission of the virus among individuals. There is, unsurprisingly, a great deal of variation in the ways in which different countries, states, and cities have approached the pandemic and the types of containment measures they have employed, and then the timing and type of relief from those measures as the viruses impacts are diminished. Lack of a unified national strategy contributes to the considerable cross- state variation in the initiation and growth patterns of virus severity and of deaths in the United States and in regional variations in virus severity, but without question has resulted in containment measures and their alleviation that vary wildly from state to state and even within states as they and their citizenry vary in their trade-offs between economic recovery and aversion. Despite containment measures differences, each jurisdiction’s response has involved some combination of travel restrictions and border controls, quarantine requirements, social isolation and distancing requirements, and the large-scale closure of various services, business, and educational facilities. While the primary concern of government has been to minimize the health impacts of COVID-19, attention has also turned to the other effects of the pandemic. Government and regulatory interventions include strin- gent domestic and international travel restrictions and now a raft of phased stay-at- home and changing social distancing regulations. The scale of these containment measures has left criminologists wondering what impact this will have on various kinds of crime throughout the remainder of the virus and beyond. Although the federal government has guided social distancing recommendations through semi-regular Centers for Disease Control briefings that have made public health officials Drs. Anthony Fauci and Deborah Birx household names, it has been left to states and cities to implement measures on when to close and when to open different places of business, schools, and public events and local law enforcement agencies to effect compliance. Policy choices can both stimulate or inhibit criminal activity and, in doing so, will thereby generate both intended and unintended conse- quences, and those effects compared to pre-virus crime should be one focus of future research. Since the virus is not only ongoing but currently spiking in almost half of the states, it is now certain that it will be with us for some time, thereby accentuating the need for empirically informed policy guidance as well as providing the opportunity to develop that guidance. Crime & Justice during the Virus As the virus has blown up online-virtual life, normal human contact has been largely replaced with intra-family interaction and computerized linkages which have enabled essential government, education, and some business affairs to continue functioning despite the social distancing, but not without consequences. Increased screen time not only elevates exposure to and victimization from already embedded online scams and fraudulent transactions, but also virus-specific cyber-bullying and hate crime through often anonymous social mediums. Social distancing to “flatten the curve” thus impacts American Journal of Criminal Justice (2020) 45:515–524 519 some routine activities known to condition criminal opportunities and guardianship (Cohen & Felson, 1979). Lifestyle alterations around contagion threats theoretically should have an impact on the volume and distribution of crime with domestic and family violence correlated with quarantine, economic stress, and increased exposure to harmful relationships during periods of limited support options, perhaps the most obvious crime threat of forced isolation (Usher et al., 2020; Bradbury-Jones & Isham, 2020). Social distancing should also have an effect in reducing interpersonal violence other than perhaps domestic violence, sex offenses, illicit street markets, and intergang conflicts. More generally, empty streets could well be an indicator of a reduction in the opportunities for conducting robberies, auto theft, and other street crimes and bolster police patrol and surveillance of crime in traditional “hot spot” neighborhoods. The Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) analyzed crime reports from thirty cities across the United States between mid-March and mid-April of 2020 and compared obser- vations to the same timeframe in 2019 (https://www.policeforum.org/coronavirus). While the police role in the virus is pronounced and invites obvious research attention to ordinance compliance, domestic violence, the shut-down of the economy has also reduced autono- mous revenue generation for law enforcement agencies that fund overtime opportunities (e.g., speeding citations, asset forfeitures, off-duty traffic services, and security services) as all but one place (Prince George County, Maryland) saw fewer calls for service than in 2019. Violent crime generally declined for the most part over the first 100 days of the virus in roughly 60% of the nation’s cities but is now either stable or on the uptake in most places. Robberies and aggravated assault thus far have declined markedly (83% and 57%, respec- tively), 83% of cities experienced an overall drop in property crime, and there were 43% less burglaries compared to same months in 2019. As staying home has bolstered online commerce, cybercrime and package theft has increased. Amidst all of this virus crime data to sort out, March and April of 2020 witnessed the highest numbers of gun-related deaths (2100) in the country since 2016 which could well be related to the reports of a significant rise in thefts of guns from gun shops and this could well be related to the reports of a significant rise in thefts of guns from gun shops. As we move deeper into the quarantine and virus life, the crime trend landscape is sure to shift as society attempts to balance re-opening with virus resurgence. The virus is compelling a range of reactions from law enforcement, the courts, and corrections that also signal research opportunities. In an effort to limit officer exposure to the virus, police departments in several states have begun scaling back arrests for lower level offenses. In order to reduce COVID-19 exposure within their detention facilities, the Nashville Police Department, for example, has already discontinued misdemeanor arrests with the exceptions of domestic violence and drunk driving. Law enforcement in some places face shortages in personal protective equipment and access to testing while increasingly and somewhat ironically tasked with more virus generated risky work. As more officers contract the virus and agency budgets become strained, some departments will be forced to scale back non-essential services. The Los Angeles Police Department has already closed its front desk to the public in order to ensure distancing and slow the spread. U.S. Customs and Border Protection officials are enforcing new restrictions on travel and commerce along the borders with Canada and Mexico and the Drug Enforcement Administration has had to reprioritize away from traditional investiga- tions to ensure regulated medicines needed to fight the virus are available to their staff and, in turn has loosened restrictions on telemedicine prescription of controlled drugs. 520 American Journal of Criminal Justice (2020) 45:515–524 https://www.policeforum.org/covidmay12 https://www.policeforum.org/coronavirus Federal courts around the United States have closed and delayed trials and most state courts have suspended jury trials, utilized mass plea hearings, and most have pivoted to video proceedings. The impact on jails and prisons in terms of decisions to de-carcerate and whom in terms of risk assessment has probably been the major impact on the CJS, and especially in terms of risk measurement, particularly with long-time older prisoners (usually with excessive mandatory-minimum or life sentences). Tracking various releasees in terms of recidivism represents an opportunity for research that should be included and emphasized more. COVID-19 outbreaks in detention facilities has also moved courts to rethink pre-trial custody and disincentivized custodial sanctions (Skolnik, 2020). The Supreme Court delayed oral arguments for at least a month – the longest delay in its proceedings since the 1918 Spanish flu. Prisons and jails have suspended visitation and facility transfers, limited attorney entry, and moved to video for personal visits, legal meetings, and telemedicine. Still, contagion in seemingly super-spreader prisons and jails should remain a constant concern. Pressure on correc- tional facilities to release offenders is a focal point of a general “de-carcerating” movement (Sivashanker et al., 2020) though it is the courts and probation and parole offices that actually effect release wherein risk assessment is more needed and vital than ever. Moving Forward The dynamic of the response to the pandemic will certainly have an effect on the changing impacts on the criminal justice system. The first phase of the social distancing with a high rate of staying at home is largely ending. As pressure to restore the economy dominates decisions, the threat of resurgence remains. The pressure to reduce contagion in jails and prisons will present natural experiments around early release policies that may demonstrate reconsideration of the incarceration and public safety relationship that, in turn, invites reconsideration of mass incarceration policies more broadly. It is certainly reasonable to anticipate that recidivism rates will be higher in jurisdictions with more risky release practices, but analyses of these and the justice practices and interventions contributing to them, should provide useful indications of where to rethink current incarceration and release policies. The increasing prevalence of long and life sentences (approximately 15% of the total inmate population) means a large percentage of prison cells are occupied by older and less risky offenders who are reasonable candidates for release to reduce the density of prison population vulnerable to virus contagion. According to the ACLU report “A Living Death: Life Without Parole for Nonviolent Offenses” almost 80% of the over 3000 people serving life without parole will die in prison from nonviolent drug offense convictions (ACLU Foundation, 2013), certainly a basis for review of such life sanctions resulting from naively presumed deterrence effects (which are undercut by the drug markets recruiting replacements) and retributive arguments for the life sentences for a single serious crime.. The second phase for consideration of the interaction between the pandemic and the criminal justice system will be centered around re-opening as bars and restaurants are opened and travel increased. To some extent, the problem of crime and offenders should begin to return as before, but it will certainly be interesting to see the degree to American Journal of Criminal Justice (2020) 45:515–524 521 which crime drops noticed during the separation period are erased and to what extent new crimes that emerged continue. Also, one can anticipate somewhat of a reduction in the staffing levels at different parts of the criminal justice system due to the impact of COVID-19, particularly as a consequence of their interactions as part of carrying out their professional responsibilities. As the stress from the virus intensifies over time, mental health issues will likely increase encounters between officers and those with mental disorders that, in turn, will only compound officer resiliency problems. A third phase that is expected to begin in the mid to late fall of 2020 is the hardest to predict. There is some speculation that the warmth of the summer will diminish the prevalence of the coronavirus, but the cooler weather of the fall will reinitiate the pandemic. One would hope that planning for this phase would involve careful assess- ment of what went well and what went poorly during the previous two phases and how best to prepare for a reemergence of the pandemic and how to respond to it. It is rather early to guess about that, but it is particularly important to analyze the current phase for lessons in dealing with reemergence spikes. As social distancing and the wearing of facemasks become increasingly challenged, there will no doubt be heavy research focus on public health implications, especially as virus impacts spike up. Understanding the impact of social distancing on crime will also be critical for ensuring the safety of police and government capacity to deal with the lingering crisis and provide insights into whether people are complying with public health measures (Usher et al., 2020). Of course, we speculate what is to come on the hopeful assumption that the public will proceed with some collective consciousness of public risk and comply with various constraints on re-opening measures. There is ample evidence that many segments of the population largely ignore virus risks and seemingly have little concern about risk to others and ongoing protests over police misconduct, upcoming political rallies, church re-openings and similar congregant events may prompt unpredictable spikes with some states or cities moving forward with re-opening while others may have to backtrack. Over time, virus crime (coughing or spitting and social ordinance violation) and justice (enforcement of ordinances) will become of increasing concern apart from traditional crime during the virus, per se. It is inevitable that the virus will expose inequalities, vulnerabilities, and related service gaps, attention to the justice system’s performance during the pandemic can be extended to more systematic and serious discussions for broader justice policies. Because of contagion issues, the virus warrants reconsideration of the nation’s current “mass incarceration rates” that are more than quadruple those that prevailed for at least fifty years (Blumstein and Cohen, 1973) when correctional policies were decided by the functionaries within the criminal justice system rather than today’s political mes- saging to the naïve public that more incarceration inherently lowers crime rates, a presumption contradicted by the failure of the drug war that revealed a labor surplus of willing replacement drug dealers (Blumstein & Beck, 1999). And those current rates of about 430 prisoners per 100,000 population are still about the highest in the world and declining at a rate of only 1.5% per year. We need rigorous research to identify evidence-based approaches and inform challenging policy and practice decisions specific to COVID-19 and virus overlap with the opioid, mental health, and now, racism epidemics. Related, this special issue of the American Journal of Criminal Justice addresses a range of leading crime and justice issues presented by the COVID-19 pandemic. Contributions from several leading 522 American Journal of Criminal Justice (2020) 45:515–524 discipline authorities as well as notable rising scholars will hopefully instigate addi- tional discourse and help frame inquiry strategies as we begin to attempt to understand virus crime and criminal justice response and identify appropriate and effective system behavior. References ACLU Foundation. (2013). A living death: Life without parole for nonviolent offenders. ACLU Publications. Adolph, C., Amano, K., Bang-Jensen, B., Fullman, N., & Wilkerson, J. (2020). Pandemic politics: Timing state-level social distancing responses to COVID-19. medRxiv. Berger, J., & Zelditch, M. (1993). Theoretical research programs: Studies in the growth of theory. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press. Blumstein, A., & Beck, A. J. (1999). Population growth in US prisons, 1980-1996. Crime and Justice, 26, 17– 61. Blumstein, A., & Cohen, J. (1973). A theory of the stability of punishment. Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Science, 63(2), 198–207. Bradbury-Jones, C., & Isham, L. (2020). The pandemic paradox: The consequences of COVID-19 on domestic violence. Journal of Clinical Nursing., 29, 2047–2049. Brantingham, P. J. (2020). Impact of social distancing during COVID-19 pandemic on crime in Los Angeles and Indianapolis. Journal of Criminal Justice, 101692. Cohen, L. E., & Felson, M. (1979). Social change and crime rate trends: A routine activity approach. American Sociological Review, 44, 588–608. Gerell, M., Kardell J., & Kindgren J. (2020). Minor covid-19 association with crime in Sweden, a five week follow up. https://doi.org/10.31235/osf.io/w7gka Huizinga, D., Loeber, R., & Thornberry, T. P. (1995). Recent findings from the program of research on the causes and correlates of delinquency (a report to NIJ). Washington, DC: Office of Justice Programs. Miller, J. M., Gibson, C. L., & Byrd, J. (2008). Getting beyond the liberal feel-good: Toward an accountability-based theoretical research program for restorative justice. In Restorative justice: From theory to practice (pp. 261–278). New York: Emerald Group Publishing. Miller, J. M., Miller, H. V., & Miller, B. L. (2019). Envisioning a National Research Program for substance abuse treatment courts. Innovative Approaches for the Treatment Court Field, 5. Mohler, G., Bertozzi, A. L., Carter, J., Short, M. B., Sledge, D., Tita, G. E., & Brantingham, P. J. (2020). Impact of social distancing during COVID-19 pandemic on crime in Los Angeles and Indianapolis. Journal of Criminal Justice, 101692. Payne, J., & Morgan, A. (2020). Property crime during the COVID-19 pandemic: A comparison of recorded offence rates and dynamic forecasts (ARIMA) for march 2020 in Queensland, Australia. Reiss, D., & Price, R. H. (1996). National research agenda for prevention research: The National Institute of Mental Health report. American Psychologist, 51(11), 1109–1115. Skolnik, T. (2020). Criminal law during (and after) COVID-19. Forthcoming: Manitoba Law Journal. Sivashanker, K., Rossman, J., Resnick, A., & Berwick, D. M. (2020). Covid-19 and decarceration. bmj, 369. Usher, K., Bhullar, N., Durkin, J., Gyamfi, N., & Jackson, D. (2020). Family violence and COVID-19: Increased vulnerability and reduced options for support. International Journal of Mental Health Nursing. World Health Organization. (2020). (https://www.who.int/emergencies/diseases/novel-coronavirus-2019. Publisher’s Note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. J. Mitchell Miller (Ph.D., Tennessee, 1996) is the John A. Delaney Presidential Professor in the Department of Criminology & Criminal Justice at the University of North Florida where he teaches and conducts research in the areas of criminological theory, drugs and crime, offender programming, and justice program evaluation. He is a Fellow of the Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences and an ACJS Bruce Smith, Sr. and Founders Award recipient, as well as an inductee in the American Society of Criminology Oral History Project. A past president of the Southern Criminal Justice Association, Dr. Miller is the former editor of the Journal of Criminal Justice Education and the Journal of Crime & Justice and the current Editor of the American Journal American Journal of Criminal Justice (2020) 45:515–524 523 https://doi.org/10.31235/osf.io/w7gka https://www.who.int/emergencies/diseases/novel-coronavirus-2019 of Criminal Justice. Also, he is the current Series Editor of the Wiley Series of Encyclopedias in Criminology & Criminal Justice. An advocate of evidence-based practice, program fidelity, and research-practitioner partnership, he is a subject matter expert and a technical reviewer for NIJ, US BJA, OJJDP, NIDA, SAMSHA, NSF and several states agencies. His recent work has concentrated on implementing substance abuse and mental health treatment programs in underserved rural locations and related services delivery and outcome analysis. Currently, Dr. Miller is conducting mixed methods program evaluations of US Bureau of Justice Assistance Justice Mental Health initiatives in several states. Alfred Blumstein is a University Professor and the J. Erik Jonsson Professor of Urban Systems and Operations Research emeritus and former Dean (from 1986 to 1993) at the H. John Heinz III College of Public Policy and Management of Carnegie Mellon University. He has had extensive experience in both research and policy with the criminal justice system since serving the President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice in 1966-67 as Director of its Task Force on Science and Technology. Dr. Blumstein was a member of the National Academy of Sciences Committee on Research on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice from its founding in 1975 until 1986. He served as Chairman of that Committee between 1979 and 1984, and has chaired the committee`s panels on Research on Deterrent and Incapacitative Effects, on Sentencing Research, and on Research on Criminal Careers. He was a member of the Academy`s Commission on Behavioral and Social Sciences and Education from 1994-2000. In 1998, he was elected to membership in the National Academy of Engineering. His degrees from Cornell University include a Bachelor of Engineering Physics and a Ph.D. in Operations Research. He was awarded an honorary degree of Doctor of Laws by the John Jay College of Criminal Justice of the City University of New York. His research over the past thirty years has covered many aspects of criminal-justice phenomena and policy, including crime measurement, criminal careers, sentencing, deterrence and incapacitation, prison population, demographic trends, juvenile violence, and drug policy. 524 American Journal of Criminal Justice (2020) 45:515–524 Crime, Justice & the COVID-19 Pandemic: Toward a National Research Agenda Abstract Introduction Envisioning a National COVID-19 Research Program Core Concepts Crime & Justice during the Virus Moving Forward References 
work_d53b7ljmm5gmxotttqt53sa434	----	21 Zločini iz mržnje Zlo či ni mr žnje – ame rič ko i bal kan sko is ku stvo Jo vaN ći rić* De ve de se tih go di na pro šlog ve ka, pri me će no je u SAD da je iz ne na da po ras tao broj na sil nih kri vič nih de la u me đu ra snim, me đu et nič kim su ko bi ma. Ta ko đe je evi den- ti ra na i po ja va pa lje nja cr ka va, ver skih i sa kral nih obje ka ta, na ro či to na ju gu SAD, onih obje ka ta ko ji su bi li ko ri šće ni od stra ne cr na ca. Upra vo u ve zi sa tim, u na u ci je, pr ven- stve no u kri mi no lo gi ji ta da i na stao ter min, ko ji se vr lo br zo ra ši rio, ter min „zlo či ni mr žnje“. Ne ko li ko do ga đa ja, a pre sve ga ubi stvo jed nog mla dog ho mo sek su al ca u Va jo min gu, uti- ca li su da u ovaj po jam bu de uklju če no i na si lje i zlo či ni iz vr še ni pre ma ho mo sek su al ci ma, a sve zbog pred ra su da pre ma ovoj sek su al noj ma nji ni. Da nas se ovaj ter min upo tre blja va ne sa mo u SAD i ne sa mo u kri mi no lo škom, već i u či sto prav nom smi slu da ozna či zlo- či ne ko ji su iz vr še ni pod uti ca jem mr žnje pre ma od go va ra ju ćoj ra snoj, et nič koj, ili sek su- al noj ma nji ni. Ovaj ter min se po ve zu je i sa ter mi no lo gi jom, te pro ble mi ma ko ji su u ve zi sa „go vo rom mr žnje“. Autor ovog član ka go vo ri o to me ka ko je uop šte na stao ovaj ter- min, te ko ji se sve pro ble mi po ja vlju ju u ve zi sa zlo či ni ma mr žnje, a pr ven stve no u ve zi sa pro ble ma ti kom ši re nja de mo kra ti je i to le ran ci je, od no sno edu ka ci je, pr ven stve no me đu po li ci jom, i me đu mla dom po pu la ci jom. Autor, ta ko đe, kon sta tu je da se sa mo za ko nom ne mo gu po sti ći ve li ki efek ti na pla nu bor be pro tiv ove po ja ve, te da, pre kri vič no prav ne in ter ven ci je, mo ra se pri stu pi ti ne kim dru gim me ra ma, a tu je reč upra vo o stva ra nju at mos fe re to le ran ci je, te edu ko va nju gra đa na o fe no me nu zlo či na mr žnje. Ključ ne re či: zlo či ni mr žnje, do ga đa ji u SAD, et nič ko na si lje, go vor mr žnje, to le ran- ci ja. Na sa mom po čet ku, ne ko bi, mo žda i s pra vom, mo gao re ći ka ko je ovaj po jam, po jam zlo či na mr žnje u ter mi no lo škom smi slu ve o ma spo ran, jer ti me kao da se ho će re ći da po sto je i ne ki dru gi zlo či ni, zlo či ni lju ba vi, a što bi ipak bi lo ap surd no, osim ako se ne ra di o euta na zi ji – ubi stvu iz sa mi lo sti, ko je bi TEMIDA Decembar 2011, str. 21-36 ISSN: 1450-6637 DOI: 10.2298/TEM1104021C Pregledni rad * Dr Jo van Ći rić je na uč ni sa vet nik i di rek tor In sti tu ta za upo red no pra vo u Be o gra du. Email: jci ric @icl.org.rs Jo van Ći rić 22 još ne ka ko i mo glo da se tre ti ra kao ne ki vid zlo či na iz lju ba vi. Sve osta lo je ste u stva ri ne što što je po de fi ni ci ji ne ga tiv no i kao ta kvo sa svim bli sko mr žnji. Jer o če mu god da se ra di, u kraj njoj li ni ji uvek se ra di o ne koj vr sti ne ga tiv ne ener gi je, ne ga tiv ne emo ci je, ka kva je i sa ma mr žnja. Zar ni je to ka da ne ko ne ko ga ubi ja da bi do šao do nje go vog nov ca, još i go re i ne ga tiv ni je, ne go ka da ne ko ne ko ga ubi ja za to što ga mr zi. Či ni se da iz me đu te dve si tu a ci je i ne ma ne ke ve li ke raz li ke u mo ral nom smi slu te re či. Pre ja ka lju bav pre ma nov cu mo že bi ti isto to li ko ne ga tiv na stvar, mo ral no pro ble ma tič na kao i mr žnja pre ma crn ci ma, Ro mi ma, Je vre ji ma, ili ho mo sek su al ci ma, što je ina če ne što što je ka rak te ri stič no, tj je ste naj če šće za zlo či ne mr žnje. U tom je smi slu za i sta pro ble ma tič no ope ri sa ti sa poj mom zlo či ni mr žnje, jer ti me kao da se ho će re ći ka ko su zlo či ni mr žnje zlo, dok dru gi zlo či ni i ni su baš ta kvo i to li ko zlo, ne go ne što što ipak mo že ima ti ne ka kvu po zi tiv nu ko no ta ci ju. Mo žda je zbog sve ga to ga bo lje go vo ri ti o mo ti vi ma i po bu da ma, a ne o sa moj mr žnji, no, pre ne go što se čo vek upu sti u po drob ni ju ana li zu te ma ti ke zlo či na mr žnje, neo p hod no je da se upo zna sa pri čom o tra gič noj sud bi ni jed- nog ame rič kog mla di ća s kra ja de ve de se tih go di na pro šlog ve ka. Reč je o bru- tal nom ubi stvu jed nog mla dog ho mo sek su al ca, što je kao do ga đaj u zna čaj- noj me ri po tre slo ši ru ame rič ku jav nost, o če mu je sni mlje no ne ko li ko fil mo va i kom po no va no ne ko li ko pe sa ma (iz me đu osta lih, jed nu pe smu je na pi sao i El ton Džon) i do ve lo je do zna čaj nih po li tič kih im pli ka ci ja, a pre sve ga u smi slu do no še nja po seb nih fe de ral nih za ko na u SAD.1 U pi ta nju je mo mak ko ji se zvao Me tju Vejn Še pard, ko ji je ubi jen ok to bra 1998. u ame rič koj dr ža vi Va jo ming. On je bio stu dent i u vre me ubi stva imao je sa mo 21 go di nu. Naj pre je 1995. u Švaj car skoj ma tu ri rao Ame rič ku sred nju ško lu, a za tim je upi sao stu di je po li tič kih na u ka, gde se po seb no ba vio pro ble ma ti kom spolj ne po li ti ke i iz u- ča va njem je zi ka. Bi ran je i za stu dent skog pred stav ni ka u tzv. Sa vet za eko lo- šku za šti tu dr ža ve Va jo ming.2 Po ro di ca i pri ja te lji su ga opi sa li kao ve drog mla di ća, uvek sprem nog da po mog ne dru gim lju di ma, da ih raz u me i ute ši. Go di ne 1995. Še pard je bio na pad nut i si lo van to kom jed ne eks kur zi je u Ma ro ku, pa je taj do ga đaj osta- vio du bo ke po sle di ce na nje ga, jer se po vu kao u se be i po stao de pre si van, te je ne ko li ko da na pre ubi stva, Še pard jed nom pri ja te lju re kao ka ko je HIV 1 Po mno go če mu ovaj do ga đaj je sli čan sa do ga đa jem ko ji se od i grao 1964, ka da je ubi je na Ka ta ri na Đe no ve ze, a to iza zva lo broj ne re ak ci je jav no sti u SAD i do ve lo do raz vo ja sve op šte sve sti o zna ča ju žr tve i nje nih pra va. (Ći rić, 2010, str.127) 2 O sve mu vi de ti na http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Matthew_Shepard Temida 23 po zi ti van i ka ko raz mi šlja o sa mo u bi stvu. U no ći iz me đu 6 i 7. ok to bra 1998. u jed nom klu bu u jed nom me stu u Va jo min gu, upo znao se sa dvo ji com dru- gih mla di ća, ko ji su mu po nu di li pre voz u svom ka mi o ne tu, ka da im je Še pard iz me đu osta log re kao i to da je on „gej“. Ova dvo ji ca su ga me đu tim, na pa li, opljač ka li, tu kli pi što ljem po gla vi, iži vlja va li se nad njim vi še sa ti i na kra ju ko nop cem ve za li za ogra du u jed nom za ba če nom ru ral nom pod ruč ju, osta vi li ga da umre u hlad noj no ći, jer je bi lo oko nu le. Či ta vih 18 sa ti ka sni je, pro na- šao ga je je dan slu čaj ni pro la znik, bi ci kli sta, ko ji je pr vo mi slio da je u pi ta nju lut ka stra ši la za ka če na za ogra du. Še pard je pre ne šen u bol ni cu, gde ni je do la- zio k sve sti i gde je umro 12. ok to bra.3 Po li ci ja je ubr zo uhap si la dvo ji cu na pa da ča, ko ji su po ku ša li da na go vo re svo je de voj ke da im da ju ali bi, me đu tim one su ipak re kle isti nu, is ta kav ši da su im oni, tj. nji ho vi mom ci te ve če ri ka za li ka ko će oti ći u noć ni klub i tu pro- na ći ne kog ho mo sek su al ca ko jeg pla ni ra ju da opljač ka ju. Op tu že ni su na su đe nju iz no si li raz li či ta oprav da nja za svo je de lo. U po čet ku su se bra ni li tvr de ći da su se upla ši li da će Še pard po ku ša ti da ih sek- su al no is ko ri sti, te da su bi li u sta nju pa ni ke i ne u ra čun lji vo sti, a ka sni je su tvr- di li da su sa mo hte li da ga opljač ka ju. Na kon što je je dan od njih pro gla šen kri vim, on je u za me nu za smrt nu ka znu (za me nu u vi du ka zne do ži vot nog za tvo ra), pri stao da sve do či pro tiv svog sa u če sni ka, ko ji je ta ko đe pro gla šen kri vim, ali su ro di te lji ubi je nog Še par da, po sre do va li u skla pa nju na god be, ko jom je i dru gi na pa dač iz be gao smrt nu ka znu u za me nu za do ži vot ni za tvor. Ina če na sa hra ni Me tjua Še par da, ši ra ame rič ka jav nost je upo zna la i iz ve- snog Fre da Felp sa i nje go vu bap ti stič ku cr kvu iz Kan za sa, ko ji su se ta da po ja- vi li sa tran spa ren ti ma „Me tju Še pard go ri u pa klu“ i „Bog mr zi pe de re“. Felps ni je do bio do zvo lu jed nog gra da u Kan za su da po dig ne spo me nik vi sok 1,8 me tar, na ko me bi se na la zi la plo ča na ko joj bi pi sa lo „Met Še pard go ri u pa klu jer ni je slu šao bož ja upo zo re nja – ne le zi sa mu škar cem kao sa že nom“. U sva- kom slu ča ju to kom sa hra ne do šlo je do su ko ba iz me đu dve gru pe – na jed noj stra ni pri ja te lji Še par da, a na dru goj, ra di kal ni pred stav ni ci ove cr kve. Na kra ju je i po li ci ja mo ra la da in te r ve ni še i da po li cij ski kor don raz dvo ji ove dve gru pe. Sa mo ne ko li ko me se ci pre to ga, tač ni je ju na 1998. u Tek sa su je na stra dao je dan dru gi čo vek. U pi ta nju je cr nac Ja mes Byrd Ju ni or, ko ji je bio ubi jen od 3 O do ga đa ju u ve zi sa ubi stvom Še par da, vi de ti i u knji zi maj ke Me ta Še par da, Judy She pard; - „The Me a ning of Mat thew: My Son’s Mur der in La ra mie, and a World Tran sfor med“. Ši ri pri kaz i pre gled ove knji ge do stu pan je na in ter net adre si: www.barnesandnoble.com/w/meaning- of-matthew-judy-shepard/1100316116#Overview Jo van Ći rić 24 stra ne tro ji ce be la ca na ta ko đe bru ta lan na čin, što je isto ta ko us ta la sa lo ame- rič ku jav nost, te je, od go va ra ju ći za kon ski do ku ment ko ji je 2009. go di ne pot- pi sao Pred sed nik SAD Oba ma, do bio po pu lar ni na ziv „The Mat they She pard and Ja mes Byrd Jr. Ha te Cri mes Pre ven tion Act“, ko jim je pret hod no po sto je ći sli čan za kon iz 1990. do pu njen i ino vi ran.4 Dru gim re či ma, o zlo či ni ma mr žnje u SAD u prav nič kim i so ci o lo škim kru go vi ma go vo ri lo se i pre to ga, mi sao, svest o sve mu to me, bi va la je uob li če na, ali su ova dva kri mi nal na do ga đa ja, dva bru tal na ubi stva, ima la po se ban zna čaj i osta la su za pam će na od stra ne naj ši re jav no sti, tj. ima la su di rekt nog uti ca ja na za ko no dav ni pro ces, kao i na raz voj kri mi no lo ške mi sli u SAD. I jed na i dru ga pri ča, o mla dom ho mo sek su al cu iz Va jo min ga i crn cu iz Tek sa sa, po sve mu su vi še znač ne, ali u stva ri sa svim ti pič ne za ono što se na zi va „zlo či ni mr žnje“, a što je po sta lo pred me tom vr lo in ten ziv nog in te re- so va nja tek de ve de se tih go di na pro šlog ve ka, što na rav no ne zna či da se ti de lik ti ni su i ra ni je vr ši li. Na pro tiv, ne ki, sa iz ve snim ci ni zmom is ti ču, da su se ta kve stva ri do ga đa le i u an tič ka vre me na u „ču ve noj“ grč koj de mo kra ti ji, ko ja je po či va la na ne gi ra nju ljud skih pra va, ljud skih oso bi na svih stra na ca, svih, ko ji su tre ti ra ni kao var va ri, ni ža bi ća ko ji ma je ne gi ra no čak i pra vo na go li op sta nak. O In di jan ci ma, tj. sta ro se de o ci ma ame rič kog kon ti nen ta i o od no su pre ma nji ma, da i ne go vo ri mo (Ig nja to vić, 2005: 3). Sve u sve mu, in ten ziv- ni je je ovaj ter min „zlo či ni mr žnje“, po čeo da se upo tre blja va ne gde po sle 1990. go di ne, ka da je ame rič ki Kon gres usvo jio tzv. „The Ha te Cri me Sta ti stics Act“, či ja je pr ven stve na funk ci ja bi la u to me da se vo di sta ti stič ka evi den ci ja o za stu plje no sti zlo či na mo ti vi sa nih, pr ven stve no ra snim, ali i dru gim, et nič kim i sek su al nim pred ra su da ma iz ko jih se ra đa mr žnja (Ko va če vić, 2009: 94). Kao što smo već re kli, za kon ska re gu la ti va u ve zi zlo či na mr žnje, do pu- nje na je 2009. go di ne pu tem tzv. „The Mat they She pard and Ja mes Byrd Jr. Ha te Cri mes Pre ven tion Act“. Su štin ski se ovaj za kon ba zi ra na či ta vom se tu raz li či tih an ti-dis kri mi na ci o nih pro pi sa ko ji su ina če u SAD po če li da se do no se ne gde od še zde se tih go di na i ko ji su ima li za za da tak da, ko li ko god je to mo gu će obez be de uskla đi va nje so ci jal nih, a pre sve ga ra snih od no sa u dru- štvu, tj. sma nji va nje me đu-ra snih na pe to sti. Ra di se i o dis kri mi na ci ji u obla sti za po šlja va nja (Re lja no vić, 2009:111) i o raz li či tim me ra ma afir ma tiv ne ak ci je, kao i uop šte o an ti-dis kri mi na ci ji (Ma ti je vić, Erić, 2010: 85). 4 www.curvemag.com/Curve-Magazine/Web-Articles-2008/Obama-Signs-Matthew-Shepard- Hate-Crime-Bill/ Temida 25 Ipak, i po red svih po ku ša ja da se „zlo či ni ma iz mr žnje“ da jed no prav no obe lež je, či ni se da je ipak ov de po sre di fe no men ko ji je pr ven stve no kri- mi no lo škog, tj. so ci o lo škog, od no sno po li ti ko lo škog ka rak te ra. To se uosta- lom vi di i iz ana li ze od re da ba za ko na iz 2009. go di ne, ko ji je pot pi sao Oba ma. Tim za ko nom se obez be đu je da žr tve ovih zlo či na, do bi ju po se ban sta tus, sta tus fe de ral ne za šti te. Za tim se tim za ko nom da ju ve ća ovla šće nja fe de ral- nim or ga ni ma da se (sa mo i ni ci ja tiv no) uklju če u pred u zi ma nje is tra žnih rad nji, ka da po sto ji sum nja da je po sre di zlo čin iz mr žnje. Ta ko đe se ovim za ko nom obez be đu ju i fi nan sij ska sred stva od po 5 mi li o na do la ra u bu dže ti ma za 2010, 2011 i 2012. go di nu, ko ji ma bi se po bolj ša le is tra žne ak tiv no sti u ve zi sa zlo či- ni ma mr žnje. Za ko nom se FBI-ju, na me će po seb na oba ve za da vo di po seb ne sta ti stič ke evi den ci je i ana li ze zlo či na iz mr žnje. Na rav no, na po čet ku je da ta i sa ma de fi ni ci ja poj ma „zlo či ni iz mr žnje“, u ko ju je sa da, od 2009. go di ne uvr- šte na i žr tvi na stvar na ili pret po sta vlje na sek su al na ori jen ta ci ja.5 Mo glo bi se re ći da se ov de ra di o či ta vom se tu kri mi nal no-po li tič kih me ra. Su štin ski se u stva ri kod zlo či na mr žnje ra di o ne če mu što bi se mo glo na zva ti „et nič ko na si lje“, „ra sno mo ti vi sa ni zlo či ni“, „na si lje pro tiv stra na ca“. Za pra vo, ra di se o to me da je uoče no da je u pe ri o du od 1991 do 1996. za pa- ljen ne u bi ča je no ve li ki broj raz li či tih cr ka va, si na go ga, dža mi ja (110) i to uglav- nom na ju gu i to uglav nom onih sa kral nih obje ka ta u ko je do la ze crn ci. U tom je smi slu do net naj pre Za kon o spre ča va nju pa lje nja cr ka va, a za tim se po če la sve o bu hvat no ana li zi ra ti ova si tu a ci ja i uob li ča va ti fe no men da nas po znat pod ime nom „zlo či ni mr žnje“ (Ig nja to vić, 2005: 4). Vr lo br zo se za klju či lo da ovi zlo či ni re zul ti ra ju stva ra njem at mos fe re stra ha i ne si gur no sti kod ma njin- skih gru pa i iza zi va ju dis har mo ni ju u či ta vom dru štvu (Ko va če vić, 2009: 96). Po li tič kim reč ni kom re če no, Ame ri ka je tih go di na iza šla iz „hlad nog ra ta“ sa SSSR-om kao ap so lut ni po bed nik, ali se isto vre me no po če la su o ča va ti sa iza zo vi ma so ci jal ne dis har mo ni je i pre sve ga „ra snog na si lja“ u „sop stve noj ku ći“. Ne što je tim po vo dom tre ba lo uči ni ti, te su se naj pre po če le vo di ti sta ti- stič ke ana li ze i te o rij ska pro mi šlja nja, a na kra ju se pri stu pi lo i ne kim kon kret- nim za ko no dav nim ak tiv no sti ma, na ro či to na kon tra gič nih ubi sta va Ja mes-a Byrd-a i po go to vu Mat tew-u She pard-a. Ta ko je i u ši ru svet sku li te ra tu ru, pa i u po je di na za ko no dav stva ušao po jam „zlo či na iz mr žnje“, ko ji se da nas na naj op šti ji na čin de fi ni še kao „na pad na žr tvu i nje na do bra, na pad ko ji se 5 O to me na http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Matthew_Shepard_Act Jo van Ći rić 26 pred u zi ma zbog žr tvi nog stvar nog ili pret po sta vlje nog6 pri pa da nja od re đe noj ma njin skoj gru pi, ra si, et nič koj gru pi, po lu, re li gi ji, ili sek su al noj opre de lje no sti (Ig nja to vić, 2005: 5-6). No, za tre nu tak bi ov de bi lo vr lo ko ri sno vra ti ti se iz SAD, tj. Va jo min ga u Sr bi ju, tj. na Ko so vo, ne kih de se tak i ne što vi še go di na pre ne go što se Še par du do go di lo to što se do go di lo. Za me ni mo ime Mat hew She pard ime- nom Đor đe Mar ti no vić i za pi taj mo se u če mu je raz li ka. Pr vog ma ja 1985. go di ne, Đor đe Mar ti no vić je bio na pad nut na svo joj nji vi na ima nju kod Gnji- la na. On je ta da po li ci ji pri ja vio da su ga pre sre li ne ki Al ban ci i da su ga te ško po vre di li, na bi ja ju ći mu fla šu u anus. Po vre da je bi la vr lo te ška, Mar ti no vić je je dva pre ži veo. Ope ri sa li su ga naj pre u obli žnjoj bol ni ci, a za tim i na be o grad- skoj VMA, gde su usta no vi li da je piv ska fla ša bi la na vu če na na je dan štap, a za tim svo jim dnom na bi je na u Mar ti no vi ćev anus, utro bu, gde se raz bi la. Zlo- čin je uz ne mi rio či ta vu jav nost u Sr bi ji, pa su za rad „umi ri va nja“ te jav no sti, ne ki ve šta ci, eks per ti, u kri vič nom po stup ku tvr di li da je po sre di sa mo po vre- đi va nje, jed no stav no za to što je Mar ti no vić to bo že u stva ri bio ho mo sek su a lac ko ji se sa mo za do vo lja vao i na kra ju sa mo po vre dio. Me đu tim, po sled nje dve ope ra ci je nad Mar ti no vi ćem iz vr še ne su u Lon do nu, a le kar ko ji ga je ope ri sao, dr Pi ter Ho li, na pi sao je da je is klju če no sva ko sa mo po vre đi va nje, već da se ra di o zlo či nu ko ji su mo ra li da iz vr še naj ma nje tri na pa da ča. Slo ve nač ki sud ski me di ci nar, ve štak dr Ja nez Mil čin ski, dr Ho li ju je na pi sao pi smo, upo zo ra va ju ći ga da se ne me ša u unu tra šnje stva ri Ju go sla vi je, dok je je dan dru gi Slo ve nac, ta da šnji sa ve zni mi ni star po li ci je, Sta ne Do lanc či ta vu stvar za klju čio ta ko što je na kon fe ren ci ji za štam pu ci nič no re kao ka ko je Mar ti no vić pr vi srp ski sa mu- raj ko ji je iz vr šio ha ra ki ri.7 Slu čaj je za vr šen pre su dom be o grad skog okru žnog su da, gde je utvr đe no da su Mar ti no vi ća na pa li i po vre di li NN iz vr ši o ci. Ver zi ja o sa mo po vre đi va nju, na rav no ni ka da ni je pri hva će na od stra ne naj ši re srp ske jav no sti, te je taj slu čaj do bio jed no vr lo iz ra zi to sim bo lič no zna če nje i na ovaj ili onaj na čin po kre nuo mno ge po to nje do ga đa je.8 Zlo čin nad Mar ti no vi ćem 6 Ov de je va žno is ta ći i sle de če: bit na je i pret po sta vlje na pri pad nost jed noj gru pa ci ji, tj. ni je va žno da li je ne ko stvar no ho mo sek su a lac, va žno je to da na pa da či pret po sta vlja ju da je do tič ni ho mo sek su a lac i da ga kao ta kvog i zbog to ga na pa da ju. 7 O či ta vom slu ča ju u tek stu pod na slo vom „Đor đe Mar ti no vić – mu če nik s Ko sme ta“, do stup- no na in ter net adre si www.riznicasrpska.net/istorija/index.php?topic=21,0 8 Ta ko je i zna me ni ti sli kar Mi ća Po po vić na pra vio sli ku gde je Mar ti no vi ća pri ka zao kao Isu sa Hri sta ko ga ra za pi nju na krst u pri su stvu mi li ci je, a što je sve ima lo mno ga raz li či ta zna če nja. Temida 27 imao je vr lo jak na boj u emo ci o nal nom smi slu i na ne ki na čin po kre nuo je spi- ra lu mno gih ka sni jih me đu-et nič kih na si lja i na Ko so vu i u či ta voj SFRJ. Za ni mlji vo je ov de po vu ći još jed nu pa ra le lu sa SAD. Re kli smo već da je in te re so va nje za zlo či ne mr žnje u SAD za po če lo ta ko što je usta no vlje no da je ne u o bi ča je no ve li ki broj ver skih obje ka ta (cr ka va) u ko je do la ze crn ci, bio za pa ljen na ju gu SAD. I na Ko so vu je na ne ki na čin bi lo slič no. Je dan od pr vih aka ta et nič kog na si lja, bio je po žar ko ji je iz bio u Peć koj pa tri jar ši ji 1981. go di ne, da bi sve kul mi ni ra lo 17. mar ta 2004. go di ne i pa lje njem i uni šta va- njem ve ćeg bro ja srp skih cr ka va i ma na sti ra. Cr kve na rav no ni su naj va žni je in sti tu ci je u jed nom dru štvu, na jed noj te ri to ri ji, ali nji hov sim bo lič ki zna čaj, na ro či to zna čaj za iden ti tet jed ne (ma njin ske) za jed ni ce, vr lo je ve li ki. Ni je da kle slu čaj no što su oni ko ji su po se za li za te ro ri sa njem cr na ca na ju gu SAD, od no sno te ro ri sa njem Sr ba na Ko so vu, naj pre za po či nja li sa pa lje njem nji ho- vih ver skih obje ka ta. Bi lo ka ko bi lo, osam de se tih go di na su ta da šnji po li ti ča ri u Sr bi ji bi li sve sni sve ga što je taj do ga đaj, u ve zi sa Đor đem Mar ti no vi ćem, no sio sa so bom, šta je za srp sku jav nost on zna čio, te su s tim u ve zi po ku ša li da re a gu ju pre sve ga od go va ra ju ćim prav nim sred stvi ma, do no se ći od go va ra ju će iz me ne i do pu ne ta da šnjeg kri vič nog za ko no dav stva Sr bi je. Go di nu da na na kon što se do go di lo to što se do go di lo Đor đu Mar ti no- vi ću, srp ska skup šti na usvo ji la je iz me ne i do pu ne KZ-a. Ta ko je pro pi sa no i no vo kri vič no de lo u čla nu 61-a ta da šnjeg za ko na: „Na si lje ko jim se ugro ža va ju slo bo de i pra va gra đa na, pri pad ni ka dru gog na ro da, na rod no sti ili et nič ke gru pe“, ko je je gla si lo: Ko pre ma dru go me iz vr ši na pad, te ško vre đa nje, zlo sta vlja nje, pri nu du, 1) ozbilj nu pret nju ili dru go na si lje na na čin ili pod okol no sti ma ko je iza zi va ju ili mo gu iza zva ti ne spo koj stvo ili ose ćaj ne si gur no sti ili ne rav no prav no- sti kod gra đa na pri pad ni ka dru gog na ro da, na rod no sti ili et nič ke gru pe, ka zni će se za tvo rom od jed ne do de set go di na. Istom ka znom ka zni će se ko za ga đu je vo du za pi će, ze mlji šte, stoč nu hra nu 2) ili vo du, uni šta va za sa de ili šu me, za u zi ma tu đe ze mlji šte, pri sva ja, ošte ću je ili uni šta va tu đu imo vi nu, iz vr ši iz nu du, uce nu ili dru gi na pad na imo vi nu dru gog, ili po vre di grob, gro blje ili dru go me sto na ko me se umr li sa hra- nju ju,9 na na čin ili pod okol no sti ma ko je iza zi va ju ili mo gu iza zva ti ne spo- 9 Tek se ne ko li ko go di na ka sni je po ka za lo ko li ko je ovo bi lo „vi zi o nar ski“, jer je prak sa uni šta- va nja tu đih gro ba lja na Ko so vu, ali i u dru gim kra je vi ma ra tom za hva će ne SFRJ, po pri mi la ogrom ne raz me re, tj. po sta la uobi ča je no sred stvo pri ti sa ka i et nič kih či šće nja. Jo van Ći rić 28 koj stvo ili ose ćaj ne si gur no sti ili ne rav no prav no sti kod gra đa na pri pad ni ka dru gog na ro da, na rod no sti ili et nič ke gru pe. Ako je iz vr še njem de la iz sta va 1 ili 2 ovog čla na pri pad ni ku dru gog 3) na ro da, na rod no sti, ili et nič ke gru pe sa umi šlja jem na ne se na te ška te le sna po vre da, ili pri či nje na imo vin ska šte ta ve ćeg obi ma, ili je de lo uči nje no u gru pi ili u dru gom oso bi to te škom slu ča ju, uči ni lac će se ka zni ti za tvo rom naj ma nje pet go di na. Ako je iz vr še njem de la iz sta va 1 ili 2 ovog čla na pri pad nik dru gog na ro da, 4) na rod no sti ili et nič ke gru pe, sa umi šlja jem li šen ži vo ta, uči ni lac će se ka zni ti za tvo rom naj ma nje de set go di na ili smrt nom ka znom. U od red ba ma Za ko na o iz me na ma i do pu na ma Kri vič nog za ko na So ci- ja li stič ke Re pu bli ke Sr bi je10, ko je su do ne te 17. ok to bra 1986. pred vi đe na su i dru ga kri vič na de la: „Po seb ni ob li ci ugro ža va nja slo bo da i pra va gra đa na pri- pad ni ka dru gog na ro da, na rod no sti ili et nič ke gru pe“ (čl.61 b) i „Ugro ža va nje si gu r no sti gra đa na pri pad ni ka dru gog na ro da, na rod no sti ili et nič ke gru pe, na pa dom na pol nu slo bo du“ (čl.61 v). Ove za kon ske od red be od sa mog po čet ka su od stra ne struč ne jav no sti, a na ro či to od stra ne prav ni ka sa Ko so va i iz Slo ve ni je, pa i Hr vat ske, bi le pod vrg- nu te znat noj kri ti ci. Sa iz ve snom do zom pod sme ha, jed no od ovih kri vič nih de la je na zi va no „si lo va nje na na ci o na li stič koj osno vi“.11 U kri ti ka ma je is ti ca no ne ko li ko stva ri: ve o ma je te ško utvr di ti stvar ni mo tiv ne kog, bi lo kog kri vič nog de la, te tu uvek po sto ji opa snost od „uči ta va nja“ po bu de ili mo ti va, od no sno od to ga da ne ko ko pri me nju je za kon bez mno go udu blji va nja u su šti nu pro- ble ma, jed no stav no ka že čim su uči ni lac i žr tva raz li či te na ci o nal no sti, da su tu po sre di ova kri vič na de la. Po što su se u prak tič nom smi slu, ove in kri mi na ci je do ne le zbog do ga đa ja na Ko so vu, is ti ca no je da ni je tač no da je broj si lo va nja, ili ubi sta va uop šte na Ko so vu, ve ći od pro se ka u bi lo ko jem dru gom de lu ta da- šnje SFRJ, te da ne ma po tre be za do no še njem ta kve in kri mi na ci je. Is ti ca no je i to da su od red be ovih kri vič nih de la pre ši ro ke i da se u tu ma če nju i pri me ni mo gu zlo u po tre blja va ti. Ova kri vič na de la su me đu tim u for mal nom smi slu op sta ja la u na šem kri vič no-prav nom si ste mu još jed no iz ve sno vre me. Isti na 10 Sl. gla snik SRS, br. 39/86. 11 Ne ko li ko go di na ka sni je, za vre me rat nih do ga đa nja u SFRJ, taj ter min kao i iz ve sna ma ni pu- la ci ja u ve zi sa si lo va nji ma u ra tu, po sta li su sa svim le gi tim ni i če sto ko ri šće ni u pro pa gand ne svr he, a vr lo če sto i od stra ne onih ko ji su se pret hod no pod sme va li ova kvim in kri mi na ci ja ma iz 1986. go di ne. Temida 29 ni je nam po zna to da je iko ika da od go va rao po osno vu ovih kri vič nih de la, ali, for mal no gle da no, ova de la su po sto ja la u na šem prav nom si ste mu, sve do 1994. go di ne, ka da su Za ko nom o iz me na ma i do pu na ma KZ Sr bi je12, čla nom 37 tog za ko na, iz ri či to obri sa ne od red be čla no va 61-a, 61-b i 61-v. Da kle, mo glo bi se re ći i sle de će: on da ka da su se SAD tek spre ma le da do ne su za kon ska re še nja o tzv. zlo či ni ma mr žnje, srp ski za ko no da vac je uki- dao ta kve in kri mi na ci je, in kri mi na ci je ko je su po sve mu bi le pre te ča, upra vo „zlo či na mr žnje“. Ne bi se na rav no mo glo tvr di ti da su Ame ri kan ci „pre pi si va li“ iz srp skog za ko na od red be o zlo či ni ma mr žnje, tj. pre u zi ma li ide je o „zlo či- ni ma mr žnje“, ali sa dru ge stra ne, tač no je i to da ka da se u Sr bi ji za po če lo sa de kri mi na li za ci jom ver bal nog de lik ta ne pri ja telj ske pro pa gan de, u za pad- nim ze mlja ma se ve o ma in ten ziv no po če la uob li ča va ti in kri mi na ci ja „go vor mr žnje“ (Mi lin ko vić, 1994: 93). Ov de je sva ka ko po treb no re ći ne što vi še i o po zna tom de lu ame rič- kog psi ho lo ga Gor do na Ol por ta, ko ji je u svo jim ra do vi ma go vo rio o pred- ra su da ma, o to me ka ko se naj pre pri ča ju vi ce vi o pred stav ni ci ma po je di nih na ro da, za tim se po je di ni pri pad ni ci tih na ro da izo lu ju, eks ko mu ni ci ra ju i sa nji ma ni ko ne će da ko mu ni ci ra, za tim se na ra čun tih na ro da (pri pad ni ka) upu- ću ju te ške re či, uvre de, go vor mr žnje, a na kra ju se pri stu pa i po je di nač nim ak ti ma na si lja, dok kao po sle di ca sve ga ne do đe i do ne ke vr ste ho lo ka u sta (Ći rić, 2006:199). Go vor mr žnje je u tom smi slu te sno po ve zan sa re al nim ak ti ma, sa zlo- či ni ma mr žnje, od no sno sa pred ra su da ma ko je se na la ze u osno vi go vo ra mr žnje, te se u tom smi slu mo že go vo ri ti da se eti o lo gi ja zlo či na mr žnje mo že pro na ći u to me što uči ni o ci ovih de la tra ga ju za uz bu đe njem i za ba vom; po gre šno ve ru ju da im od pri pad ni ka ma njin skih gru pa pre ti ne ka opa snost; ne a de kvat no re a gu ju na po na ša nja ko ja tu ma če kao uvre dlji va po se be i se bi bli ska li ca; ili pak ve ru ju da se na taj na čin bo re za ostva re nje svo jih po li tič- kih i na ci o nal nih ide a la (Ko va če vić, 2009:95). Upra vo nam to me đu tim go vo ri da se sred stvo i na čin za su zbi ja nje zlo či na mr žnje u stva ri ne na la zi to li ko u sfe ri kri vič nog pra va, ko li ko u sfe ri edu ka ci je i raz vi ja nja at mos fe re to le ran ci je, ne di skri mi na ci je i uop šte de mo krat skih dru štve nih od no sa. To nam za pra vo go vo ri da, upr kos mno gim ra ši re nim shva ta nji ma na ro či to u la ič koj jav no sti, prav na nor ma ipak ni je sa mo im pe ra tiv, i da ne mo že bi ti shva ta na sa mo na taj na čin (Vra nja nac, 2010:7). Je ste, za us po sta vlja nje vla da vi ne pra va od ve li- 12 Sl. gla snik RS, br. 47/94. Jo van Ći rić 30 kog zna ča ja su prav ne nor me, ono što pi še u za ko ni ma, ali zna čaj no je i sve- op šte dru štve no okru že nje i mno gi pred u slo vi ko ji iz la ze iz do me na sa mog pra va (Fa u pel, 2009: 7). Upra vo to što srp ske kri vič ne nor me iz 1986. go di ne, ni su po sti gle ne ki ve ći uspeh u za u sta vlja nju et nič kih na si lja (na Ko so vu) po ka zu je ko li ko je efi- ka snost kri vič nog pra va u ta kvim stva ri ma i ta kvim si tu a ci ja ma ogra ni če na. Mo žda je ve ći efe kat u to me da se na ade kva tan na čin, na ro či to mla dim lju- di ma, ob ja sni šta u stva ri pred sta vlja ide o lo gi ja ra si zma, et nič ke ne to le ran ci je, na ci zma. I u slu ča je vi ma go vo ra mr žnje, kao i slu ča je vi ma kri mi nal nog po na- ša nja uop šte, neo p hod na je sve ko li ka me dij ska pro mo ci ja pra vih, so ci jal no pri hva tlji vih vred no sti. Na ža lost u Sr bi ji to u po sled njih ne ko li ko go di na uop- šte ni je bio slu čaj, već se do ga đa lo ne što sa svim obr nu to, pro mo vi sa le su se i ina u gu ri sa le raz li či te „an ti vred no sti“. (Pa vi će vić, 2008:103), a če sto je ono što je na „za pa du“ pred sta vlja lo sa svim mar gi nal nu po ja vu, u Sr bi ji bi lo pri hva ta no, tre ti ra no, pro mo vi sa no kao ne što što je iz ra zi to „in“, ne što što tre ba ko pi ra ti, po dra ža va ti. Od „skin hed sa“ do na vi ja ča – hu li ga na“ (Šu put, 2010:233). Po ne- kad se či ni pot pu no be smi sle nim to da u Sr bi ji, ko ja je iz u zet no mno go stra- da la od na ci zma, po sto ji ne ko, bi lo ko, ko da nas pro mo vi še ide o lo gi ju kraj nje de sni ce i na ci zma i ra si zma. Isto kao što se či ni kraj nje kon tra pro duk tiv nim to da se tim mar gi nal nim sku pi na ma i po je din ci ma pri da je po seb no ve li ki zna čaj i me dij ski pro stor, ti me što će se stal no, pa ma kar to bi lo i sa svim ne ga tiv no, pri ča ti o nji ma, a što do tič ni u svom sa mo lju blju za pra vo i naj vi še že le. Mo glo bi se za pra vo re ći da je ig no ri sa nje ta kvih mar gi na la ca če sto bo lji i efi ka sni ji na čin bor be pro tiv njih sa mih i nji ho ve že lje za ek tra va gant no šću i sa mo i sti ca- njem. U sva kom slu ča ju, reč je o fe no me ni ma ko ji za slu žu ju po drob ni ju ana- li zu, kao što po sto ji i po tre ba da se iz gra di stra te gi ja pre ven tiv nog de lo va- nja. Sam za kon, tj. sa ma pret nja ka znom tu ne mo ra ju zna či ti mno go. Kri vič no pra vo se tu za i sta po ka zu je kao ul ti ma ra tio, kao sred stvo ko je tre ba ko ri sti ti tek on da ka da sva dru ga sred stva bi va ju is cr plje na.13 13 La ko je na pri mer osu di ti mla di ća, ko ji po ne sen svo jim mla da lač kim ža rom, eks tra va gan ci- jom, ide o lo škim sle pi lom, pro mo vi še na si lje i go vo ri go vo rom mr žnje. Ali, da li smo ti me re ši li pro blem? Da li smo do tič nog, nje go ve pri ja te lje i rod bi nu, edu ko va li na pra vi na čin, pre va spi- ta li, ili smo ih u stva ri sa mo da lje gur nu li u još ve ću (sa mo)izo la ci ju, mr žnju i ide o lo ško sle pi lo, iz ko jeg će pro iz i ći ne što još i go re od sa mog go vo ra mr žnje, za pra vo re al ni zlo čin mr žnje. Dru gim re či ma, ako jed nog mla di ća osu di mo na du žu za tvor sku ka znu zbog go vo ra mr žnje pre ma Ro mi ma, on da je pi ta nje, šta će se do go di ti ka da taj iza đe iz za tvo ra – da li će on iz stra ha, ili zbog stvar ne sop stve ne re so ci ja li za ci je re ći: ne, ne ću vi še to da ra dim, ili će, ume sto go vo ra mr žnje, po seg nu ti za zlo či nom mr žnje? Temida 31 Ov de me đu tim još jed no pi ta nje do la zi do iz ra ža ja, a to je pi ta nje ka ko de fi ni sa ti po jam ma nji ne, tj. ka ko od go vo ri ti na pi ta nje ko je ma nji na uop- šte, a po seb no u ne kom kon kret nom slu ča ju. Zlo či ni mr žnje, re kli smo to već, iz vr ša va ju se pre ma pri pad ni ci ma ma nji na, ra snih, ver skih, et nič kih, sek su- al nih. Me đu tim, pro blem je u to me što jed na oso ba mo že bi ti pred stav nik ma nji ne u na če lu, u prin ci pu, ali u jed nom kon kret nom slu ča ju on/ona mo že bi ti pred stav nik ve ći ne, pa se on da po sta vlja pi ta nje šta i ka ko re a go va ti u do tič nom slu ča ju. Crn ci je su ma nji na u ame rič kom dru štvu, te kao ta kvi oni mo gu bi ti naj če šće žr tve zlo či na mr žnje, ali, po ne kad mo že bi ti i obr nu to. Na pri mer crn ci u Har le mu, ili Bronk su, gde je sa svim „ne pre po ruč lji vo“ za bel ce da se še ta ju, da se uop šte po ja vlju ju. Sa svim je re al na mo guć nost da se bel ci tu po ja ve kao „ma nji na“ i kao žr tve zlo či na mr žnje. To ce lu stvar u pri lič noj me ri re la ti vi zu je i kom pli ku je i či ni da je u prav nom smi slu te re či či tav kon- cept „zlo či na mr žnje“, ipak po ma lo pro ble ma ti čan, te da ga tre ba tre ti ra ti, tj. pri me nji va ti kraj nje oba zri vo. Slič no je upra vo ono što se do ga đa lo na Ko so vu i Me to hi ji to kom go di na. Sr bi je su bi li ve ći na, a Al ban ci ma nji na, me re no na te ri to ri ji Sr bi je u ce li ni, dok je to bi lo sa svim dru ga či je ka da se gle da lo na te ri- to ri ju Ko so va. Ima ju ći sve to u vi du, mo že mo li Al ban ce na Ko so vu, od no sno crn ce u Bronk su (Har le mu) tre ti ra ti kao ma nji nu? Od no sno, pi ta nje je, mo gu li crn ci bi ti uči ni o ci zlo či na mr žnje? Ili je mo žda uput ni je upo tre bi ti ne ki dru gi ter min, ne ku dru gu de fi ni ci ju, a ne onu ko ja ope ri še sa poj mo vi ma ma nji ne i ve ći ne. Mo žda u tom smi slu, tre ba ope ri sa ti sa po bu da ma, a ne sa poj mom mr žnje, mr ze ti ni je ne što što je re zer vi sa no sa mo za ve ći nu pre ma ma nji ni. Čak na pro tiv, če sto se u stva ri mo že do ga đa ti sa svim su prot no da ne ko baš za to što je ma nji na mr zi ono ga ko ji je ve ći na i ko ji mu je kao ma nji ni pret- hod no na neo mno go raz li či tih ne prav di i za la, te mu se ovaj sa da zbog sve ga to ga sve ti. Uosta lom, ne ma osve te bez mr žnje. Ta ko u stva ri do la zi mo do čla na 114 Kri vič nog za ko ni ka Sr bi je14, do in kri- mi na ci je „te ško ubi stvo“. Tu se u tač ki 5 ka že i sle de će: „Ko dru go ga li ši ži vo ta iz ko ri sto lju blja, ra di iz vr še nja ili pri kri va nja dru gog kri vič nog de la, iz bez ob zir ne osve te ili iz dru gih ni skih po bu da...“ (ka zni će se za tvo rom naj ma nje 10 go di na, ili za tvo rom od 30 do 40 go di na.) Či ni nam se da ovaj deo re če ni ce, ko ji ka že „iz dru gih ni skih po bu da“, da se taj deo od no si upra vo na to, da su te ni ske po bu de u stva ri mr žnja i to mr žnja po ra snom, ver skom, na ci o nal nom, sek su al nom osno vu, po li tič kom ili ne kom dru gom 14 Sl. gla snik RS, br. 85/05, 88/05, 107/05, 72/09, 111/09. Jo van Ći rić 32 slič nom osno vu (Đor đe vić, 2009:65). I ni je slu čaj no či ni nam se to što te ni ske po bu de do la ze po bro ja ne od mah po sle „(bez ob zir ne) osve te“, jer bez mr žnje, kao što re ko smo ma lo pre, ne ma osve te, to su dve vr lo te sno po ve za ne stva ri. U sva kom slu ča ju, na ma se či ni da oni ko ji ka žu ka ko u srp skom za ko no dav- stvu ne po sto ji od red ba o zlo či ni ma mr žnje, da oni uop šte ni su u pra vu. U srp- skom Kri vič nom za ko ni ku i te ka ko po sto ji od red ba ko jom je in kri mi ni sa no to ka da ne ko ne ko ga ubi je za to što je taj ne ko Rom, Hr vat, ho mo sek su a lac, itd. Tre ba sa mo pri me ni ti po sto je će, ina če do sta stro ge in kri mi na ci je, tre ba sa mo do tič nu stvar okva li fi ko va ti na pra vi na čin, tj. kao ubi stvo iz ni skih po bu da. Stvar je či ni se vi še ne go ja sna, a sa svim je dru go pi ta nje da li se i ko li ko če sto u prak si pri me nju ju ove od red be o ubi stvu iz ni skih po bu da, što je sa mo dru gi, mo žda i bo lji na ziv za ono što se u upo red nom pra vu naj če šće na zi va „zlo čin mr žnje“. No ti me ula zi mo u jed nu dru gu sfe ru, pro ble ma ti ku ko ja se ti če op šte dru štve nih pri li ka i okol no sti pri me ne i ne pri me ne po sto je ćih za kon- skih od red bi, od no sno do la zi mo opet do pi ta nja edu ka ci je gra đa na, ali i su di ja i tu ži la ca, pa mo žda pr ven stve no po li ca ja ca, ko ji bi tre ba lo da pre po zna ju u pra vom tre nut ku i na pra vi na čin ka da se ra di o zlo či ni ma mr žnje i ka ko tre ba (pr ven stve no sa žr tva ma) po stu pa ti u ta kvim slu ča je vi ma.15 I u sfe ri ver bal no sti, in kri mi ni sa ni su zlo či ni mr žnje u srp skom kri vič nom za ko no dav stvu, tj. po sto ji od red ba o go vo ru mr žnje. Ra di se o in kri mi na ci ji iz čla na 317 KZ-a – „Iza zi va nje na ci o nal ne, ra sne i ver ske mr žnje i ne tr pe lji vo sti“ (Vu ko vić, 2009:217). Na pr vi po gled mo glo bi se re ći da srp ski za ko no da vac ni je pred vi deo, tj.in kri mi ni sao „me đu for mu“, tj. si tu a ci ju iz me đu ver bal nog na pa da i ubi stva, od no sno da ni je „po kri ve no“ na no še nje (te ške) te le sne po vre de. Da li ka da ne ko ko je pre tu čen za to što je Rom, da kle „sa mo“ pre tu čen, da li se ta si tu- a ci ja mo že tre ti ra ti kao ne ki vid zlo či na mr žnje, bla ži od ubi stva, ali te ži od go vo ra? Na ma se či ni da od red bu sta va 2 čla na 317, KZ-a tre ba tu ma či ti u smi- slu na no še nje te le sne po vre de iz raz lo ga ra sno-na ci o nal no-ver skih raz lo ga. Me đu tim, mo glo bi se re ći, da bi mo žda mo glo bi ti bo lje či ta vu stvar pre ci- zni je re gu li sa ti u sa mom za kon skom tek stu. Sve to ipak ne zna či da sud ne ma od go va ra ju ćeg oruž ja pu tem ko jeg bi re a go vao ka da ne ko bu de pre tu čen za to što je Rom, ili ho mo sek su a lac, te da sve tre ba re ša va ti (sa mo) na ni vou za ko na. Sud uvek na ras po la ga nju ima ono što se na zi va olak ša va ju će i ote- 15 U tom smi slu ov de pa žnju za slu žu je i „Pro gram obu ke po li cij skih slu žbe ni ka za su zbi ja nje zlo- či na iz mr žnje“, ko ji je sa sta vljen od stra ne OEBS-a. Do stup no na in ter net adre si: www.oesce. org/sr/odhr/20702 Temida 33 ža va ju će okol no sti, tj. in di vi du a li za ci ja ka zne. Ni je, či ni nam se po treb no da u za ko nu po sto ji od red ba o zlo či ni ma mr žnje. Uspe šna kri mi nal na po li ti ka pro- tiv ove ne ga tiv ne dru štve ne po ja ve na sa svim za do vo lja va ju ći na čin se mo že vo di ti pu tem olak ša va ju ćih i ote ža va ju ćih okol no sti, pu tem in di vi du a li za ci je ka zni.16 Sud bi u tom smi slu uvek tre ba lo da iz ri če stro že ka zne, ka da utvr di da je uči ni lac ne ko kri vič no de lo iz vr šio iz ni skih po bu da, tj. iz mr žnje. Uop šte da kle ni je neo p hod no da po sto ji po seb na in kri mi na ci ja, do volj no je sa mo to da sud utvr di da su hu li ga ni pre tu kli ma log de ča ka, za to što je ovaj Rom, pa da to bu de do volj no da ceo slu čaj bu de dru ga či je tre ti ran, od no sno da bu de iz re če na stro ža ka zna. Tu je na rav no edu ka ci ja, o ko joj go vo ri mo, ne što što se pod ra zu me va, ne što što je za i sta neo p hod no. Iz me đu osta log i zbog to ga što se mo že do go- di ti da se po ne kad ne ki slu ča je vi sa svim obič nog kri mi na la, tre ti ra ju kao (te ški) slu ča je vi zlo či na mr žnje, a sve to vr lo če sto za to što me di ji stvo re od go va ra- ju ću at mos fe ru. Na pri mer, ne ko se po sva đa u ka fa ni, lju di se po tu ku, po teg ne se nož, te ako je onaj pro tiv ko jeg je nož upo tre bljen, Rom, on da sud tu si tu a- ci ju mo že tre ti ra ti kao zlo čin mr žnje, a ne kao ubi stvo na mah, ili kao pre ko ra- če nje nu žne od bra ne. Na pri mer, je dan Rom po ku ša da iz vr ši ne ku kra đu, „be- li“ su gra đa nin ga spre ča va ju ći ga u to me, uda ri i na ne se mu te le snu po vre du, – da li je tu u pi ta nju zlo čin mr žnje ili ne što sa svim dru go, mno go be nig ni je. Ne bi bi lo do bro uko li ko bi ne ko, bi lo ko, po ku ša vao da is ko ri sti, zlo u po tre bi zlo čin mr žnje da bi za se be iz bo rio ne ku fak tič ku dru štve nu pred nost, po god- nost, pri vi le gi ju. Ne bi bi lo do bro uko li ko bi sva ki put ka da se po tu ku Sr bin i Rom to bi lo tre ti ra no kao ne ki vid zlo či na mr žnje. To bi bio ap surd svo je vr ste, ap surd ko ji bi pot pu no de za vu i sao či ta vu ide ju o zlo či ni ma mr žnje. U kraj njoj li ni ji, oni ko ji su kri ti ko va li svo je vre me nu in kri mi na ci ju u srp skom za ko no dav- stvu o na si lju nad pri pad ni ci ma dru gih na ro da, ni su bi li sa svim u kri vu. Bi lo bi vr lo ne ga tiv no ka da bi se i uko li ko bi se in kri mi na ci je zlo či na mr žnje, ko ri- sti le kao po li tič ko oru đe, zlo u po tre blja va le u po li tič ke svr he, a to je ne što, što objek tiv no gle da no, po sto ji kao mo guć nost. To, prak tič no zna či da pri pad- ni ka na ci o nal ne ma nji ne ne sme te ne sa mo da vre đa te i tu če te, kao što uosta- lom ni ko ga ne sme te da vre đa te i tu če te, ne go da na kra ju kra je va pri pad ni ka 16 Ne tre ba u tom smi slu ov de gle da ti an glo-sak son sko pra vo, gde po sto ji spe ci fič nost u tom smi slu da se za sva ki mo gu ći slu čaj – pre ce dent pro pi su je po se ban za kon, što uop šte ni je u du hu na šeg, tra di ci o nal nog kon ti nen tal nog prav nog si ste ma. Kod nas, kao što zna mo, sud uvek ima na ras po la ga nju olak ša va ju će i ote ža va ju će okol no sti i pu tem njih mo di fi ku je op šte pra vi lo (za kon) u ovom ili onom prav cu, prav cu, ko ji je u da tom tre nut ku naj op ti mal ni ji. Jo van Ći rić 34 na ci o nal ne ma nji ne ne sme te ni da hap si te, za to što to mo že bi ti pro tu ma- če no kao po li tič ka ne ko rekt nost. Dru gim re či ma, či ta va ide ja, kon cept zlo či na mr žnje u do broj me ri sa dr ži u se bi ele men te po li tič kog, te u tom smi slu tre ba bi ti kraj nje oba zriv, a to zna či da su pi ta nja edu ka ci je i raz u me va nja ide je zlo- či na mr žnje od vr lo va žnog, re kli bi smo pre sud nog zna ča ja. Ve ćeg zna ča ja ne go što je to pi ta nje da li u jed nom za ko no dav stvu po sto ji in kri mi na ci ja ko ja se ta ko ili ne ka ko dru ga či je zo ve. To nam sve go vo ri, iz me đu osta log, da bi u stva ri či tav prav ni si stem tre ba lo tu ma či ti – tre ti ra ti kon tek stu al no. Sva ka po je- di nač na prav na od red ba – re gu la, van od go va ra ju ćeg so ci jal nog kon tek sta, mo gla bi bi ti na ka rad no, zlo na mer no tu ma če na. Ovo po go to vu ka da je reč o zlo či ni ma mr žnje ko ji sa mi po se bi no se u se bi znat nu do zu po li tič kog. Li te ra tu ra Ći rić, J. (2006) Go vor mr žnje. Re vi ja za kri mi no lo gi ju i kri vič no pra vo, 3, str. 199-222. Ći rić, J. (2010) Đe no ve ze sin drom. Stra ni prav ni ži vot, 1, str. 127-143. Đor đe vić, Đ. (2009) Kri vič no pra vo – po seb ni deo. Be o grad: Kri mi na li stič ko-po li cij ska aka de mi ja. Fa u pel, R. (2009) Ru le of law: Not hing pu rely ab stract and no mat ter for Sun day spe- ec hes only. Stra ni prav ni ži vot, 2, str. 7-26. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Matthew_Shepard, stra ni ci pri stu plje no 1.9.2011. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Matthew_Shepard_Act, stra ni ci pri stu plje no 1.9.2011. Ig nja to vić, Đ. (2005) Zlo či ni mr žnje. Prav ni ži vot, 9, str. 3-12. Ko va če vić, M. (2009) Zlo či ni mr žnje. Te mi da, 4, str. 93-103. Kri vič ni za ko nik Re pu bli ke Sr bi je, Slu žbe ni gla snik RS, br. 85/05, 88/05, 107/05, 72/09, 111/09. Kri vič ni za kon So ci ja li stič ke Re pu bli ke Sr bi je, Slu žbe ni gla snik SRS, br. 39/86. Ma ti je vić, M., Erić, V. (2010) Me re afir ma tiv ne ak ci je – ter mi no lo ško od re đe nje i uvod na raz ma tra nja o sa dr ži ni poj ma. Stra ni prav ni ži vot, 3, str. 85-102. Mi lin ko vić, B. (1994) Me đu na rod no prav na i upo red no prav na ana li za go vo ra mr žnje. Stra ni prav ni ži vot, 2-3, str. 93-111. Pa vi će vić, O. (2008) Ulo ga me di ja i pu bli ci sti ke u stva ra nju mi ta o kri mi nal cu – he ro ju. Re vi ja za kri mi no lo gi ju i kri vič no pra vo, 2, str. 103-112. Temida 35 Re lja no vić, M. (2009) Dis kri mi na ci ja na ra du – za ko no dav stvo i is ku stva SAD. Stra ni prav ni ži vot, 1, str. 111-130. Šu put, D. (2010) Prav ni okvir ko ji ure đu je bor bu pro tiv na si lja na sport skim pri red- ba ma u evrop skim dr ža va ma. Stra ni prav ni ži vot, 1, str. 233-263. Vra nja nac, D. (2010) Nor ma kao im pe ra tiv. Stra ni prav ni ži vot, 2, str. 7-24. Vu ko vić, S. (2009) Ko men tar Kri vič nog za ko ni ka Sr bi je sa re gi strom poj mo va, obra sci ma i prav nom li te ra tu rom. Be o grad: Po slov ni bi ro. www.barnesandnoble.com/w/meaning-of-matthew-judy-shepard/ 1100316116 #Overview, stra ni ci pri stu plje no 1.9.2011. www.cur ve mag.com/Cur ve-Ma ga zi ne/Web-Ar tic les-2008/Oba ma-Signs-Mat thew- She pard-Ha te-Cri me-Bill, stra ni ci pri stu plje no 1.9.2011. www.oesce.org/sr/odhr/20702, stra ni ci pri stu plje no 1.9.2011. www.riznicasrpska.net/istorija/index.php?topic=21,0, stra ni ci pri stu plje no 1.9.2011. Za kon o iz me na ma i do pu na ma Kri vič nog za ko na Re pu bli ke Sr bi je, Slu žbe ni gla snik RS, br. 47/94. Jo vaN ći rić Ha te cri mes: ame ri can and bal kan ex pe ri en ce In the ni ne ti es of the last cen tury it was no ti ced in the U.S.A. that sud denly the num ber of cri mes with vi o len ce in the in ter-ra cial and in ter-et hni cal con flicts ro se. Al so the phe no me non of ig ni tion of chur ches, re li gi o us and sac ral ob jects, espe ci ally in the so uth of the U.S.A., ob jects which we re used by black pe o ple, was re cor ded. Di rectly in re la tion to that – the term „ha te cri mes“ then aro se in sci en ce and be ca me out spread very qu ickly, pri ma rily in cri mi no logy. Se ve ral events, and abo ve all the mur der of a young ho mo se xu al in Wyoming in flu en ced for both the vi o len ce and the cri mes com mi ted to wards the ho mo se xu als and all due to the pre ju di ces to wards this se xu al mi no rity to be in clu ded in this term. To day, this term is used not only in the U.S.A. and not only in a cri mi no lo gi cal sen se, but al so in a pu rely le gal sen se to de no te the cri mes which we re car ried out un der the in flu en ce of ha te to wards a cor re spon dent ra cial, et hni cal or se xu al mi no rity. This term is lin ked al so to the ter- Jo van Ći rić 36 mi no logy and thus the pro blems which are re la ted to the „ha te spe ech“. The aut hor of this pa per wri tes abo ut how this term aro se in the first pla ce and which pro blems emer ge re la ted to ha te cri mes and pri ma rily in re la tion to the is su es of ex pan si on of de moc racy and to le ran ce, and al so edu ca tion, pri ma rily among the po li ce for ce and the young po pu la tion. The aut hor al so ascer ta ins that only with the law, no gre at ef fects in the bat tle aga inst this phe no me non can be ac hi e ved and that be fo re the cri mi nal-le gal in ter ven tion so me ot her me a su res ha ve to be ap pro ac hed, li ke the cre a tion of an at mosp he re of to le ran ce and the edu ca tion of the ci ti zens abo ut the phe no me non of ha te cri mes. Key words: ha te cri mes, events in the U.S.A., et hni cal vi o len ce, ha te spe ech, to le ran ce. 
work_dcovxjm4frbxxceplnepvtji54	----	TFJD526-07-164266.tex Issues in Mental Health Nursing, 27:597–604, 2006 Copyright c© Taylor & Francis Group, LLC ISSN: 0161-2840 print / 1096-4673 online DOI: 10.1080/01612840600642877 THE LEGAL DEFINITION OF HATE CRIME AND THE HATE OFFENDER’S DISTORTED COGNITIONS Key Sun, PhD Central Washington University, Lakewood, Washington, USA The legal definition of hate crime (i.e., the offender attacks the victim because of the victim’s actual or perceived race, color, religion, disability, sexual orientation, or national origin) tends to be viewed as a causality description for the offense. This paper maintains that the “because” statement in the legal definition refers to the offender’s criminal intent and distorted cognitions (e.g., blaming the victim and using different group memberships to justify and rationalize their hate crimes), rather than suggests that the different group memberships for the offender and the victim cause hate crime. Clarifying the distinction between the offender’s mental state and reality has implications for understanding and conducting research on hate crime and clinical interventions with the victims. Hate crime is defined as an offense in which the victim is targeted because of the actual or perceived race, color, religion, disability, sex- ual orientation, or national origin of that victim (Sullaway, 2004). This definition is based on Federal legislations that defined hate crime as an offense “that manifests evidence of prejudice based on race, religion, disability, sexual orientation, or ethnicity” (Hate Crime Statistics Act, 1990) or more recently, as a crime in which “the defendant intentionally selects a victim, . . . because of the actual or perceived race, color, reli- gion, national origin, ethnicity, gender, disability or sexual orientation of any person” (Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Public Law 103-322, H.R. 3355). Address correspondence to Key Sun, Law and Justice Department, Central Washington Uni- versity, 9401 Farwest Drive, S. W., Lakewood, WA 98498-1999. E-mail: sunk@cwu.edu 597 598 K. Sun On the basis of the legal definition, most researchers of hate crime tend to conceptualize hate crime as a manifestation of intergroup con- flict or violence (e.g., Levin & McDevitt, 2002; Levin & Rabrenovic, 2001) and as motivated by the distinctiveness of the victim(s), because the offender only targets victims with different group memberships. This type of conceptualization of hate crime has influenced both clin- ical interventions with victims of hate crime and the research focus on the causality of hate crime. For example, intergroup relations, such as racial/ethnic group histories, are viewed as factors to be considered when working with victims of hate crime (Weiss, 2005). Hate crime as intergroup conflict is promoted by several variables, including social learning processes that provide reinforcement and symbolic interaction to continue hate attitude or behavior toward the victim groups, strained economic conditions, and/or historical events such as the destruction of the World Trade Center (see Gerstenfeld, 2002; Levin & McDevitt, 2002). THE PURPOSE OF THIS ARTICLE This article, however, examines the definition of hate crime and its implications for research and clinical interventions from a different per- spective. In this paper, I maintain that what the hate crime legal def- inition specifies is the hate offender’s mental state, including (1) the required criminal intent (mens rea) and (2) the offender’s cognitive distortions. This is in contrast to the position that suggests that dif- ferent group memberships related to the offender and the victim are the causality for hate crime. The offender’s cognitive distortions and prejudice involve misrepresenting the self’s responsibility and inter- group reality and using the distinctiveness of the victim (e.g., ethnic- ity, race, religion, sexual orientation) to rationalize and justify the of- fense(s). Understanding the hate offender’s cognitive distortions also helps in developing therapeutic interventions with the victims. In short, this article intends to provide mental health nurses with new knowl- edge for developing nursing inquiry and interventions related to hate crimes. THE “BECAUSE” STATEMENT IN THE HATE CRIME DEFINITION The legal definition of hate crime is a criminal law definition. According to criminal law, the defendant is guilty of a crime only when the offender’s criminal commission or omission occurred with Hate Crime and Offenders’ Distorted Cognitions 599 a simultaneous mens rea or criminal intent (Scheb & Scheb II, 1999). Hate crimes, like other types of criminal offenses, require a specific criminal intent, or the presence of mens rea as one of the key elements for establishing the perpetrator’s criminal responsibility. The “because” statement in the legal definition of hate crime about the distinctiveness of the victim(s) denotes the offender’s mens rea and perceptions of dif- ferences in group membership. The criminal intent (mens rea) for hate crime is not a causal description for the offense (neither is it supposed to be), just as the mens rea for sex offenders who intentionally and knowingly target certain types of victim (e.g., children or women) does not indicate that the victim is a cause of the crime or that there is an intergroup conflict. In addition, over the years, various scientific theories have been developed to account for criminal behaviors (e.g., strain theories, subculture theories, social bond theories, social reaction theories, and social learning theory). None of the models attempt to use the offender’s mental reasoning as a true scientific explanation for crimes. THE MEANING OF PREJUDICE Another aspect of the hate offender’s mental state is prejudice. Al- though the term “prejudice” may be associated with negative feelings and behavioral tendency, the essence of prejudice involves distorted cogni- tions (Bodenhausen, Macrae, & Hugenberg, 2003; Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Myers, 2002). In general, one’s social cognition includes knowledge structures (schemas) about the self, others, and the world, and related cognitive processes (e.g., encoding, recalling, reasoning, perceiving, and decision- making) concerning the social entities. In particular, prejudice as a type of cognitive schema involves cognitive distortions of social reality, the indicators of which may include erroneous generalization and oversim- plification, the formation of social attitudes before or despite objective evidence and other inaccuracies in categorizing, evaluating, and explain- ing social entities. One’s distorted cognitions about social reality in turn rationalize one’s attitudes and behavior that deviate from a normative standard or moral value, such as the principle of fairness, equity, or equality (Sun, 1993a). From the social cognitive perspective, although the motivation and cognition represent two separate psychological ac- tivities, they are also intimately related. All motivations, including the motivations behind hate crime, operate on the perceiver’s level of aware- ness of human reality. 600 K. Sun MOST HATE CRIMES ARE NOT INDICATIONS OF INTERGROUP CONFLICT Hate crime should not be considered intergroup conflict because a majority of hate offenses do not satisfy the criteria of group actions. In order for an action to be called a group action, it must satisfy the soci- ological and social psychological criteria (Sun, 1993b). In other words, a hate offense can be defined as an instance of intergroup conflict only when it results from the group dynamics, which includes a collection of individuals who interact or communicate with one another accord- ing to their roles or status specified by some explicit or unwritten rules or norms, with their performances characterized by a high level of co- hesion and normative consensus and by shared emotional involvement in evaluation and perceptions about the meanings and missions of the actions. Although a difference in group membership between the hate offender and victim is often a necessary condition for defining hate crime, rec- ognizing the difference is not sufficient for understanding and overcom- ing ambiguities in identifying the transgression (Nolan III, McDevitt, Cronin, & Farrell, 2004). Neither is there evidence suggesting that other people sharing the same group membership with the hate offender(s) endorse the hate crime. For example, far less than 1% of the members of a particular group (e.g., racial or religious one) become involved in hate crimes (National Criminal Justice Reference Service; NCJSR, 2005). Because both offenders for hate crime and law-abiding people share the same group memberships, the commonalty between criminals and non-criminals is an invalid explanation for the offenders’ behavior. In addition, using group differences between the hate offender and the vic- tim to explain hate crimes (e.g., ethnic conflict) only focuses on how the victims are distinctive from the offenders, but this approach ignores the offenders’ individual and situational characteristics that separate them from the rest of the members in the same group. HATE OFFENDERS TEND TO BLAME THEIR VICTIMS The group differences for the hate offender and victim do not explain the causality for hate crime because hate offenders’ explanations for their offenses tend to misrepresent the social reality about what actu- ally causes the crimes. Empirical research shows that hate offenders’ mental state involves using the victim memberships to justify and ra- tionalize hate crime, including applying such methods as denials of injury, the victim, and the responsibility; condemnation of the condem- Hate Crime and Offenders’ Distorted Cognitions 601 ners; and “appeal to higher loyalties” by claiming the so-called “racial” motivation behind their criminal and other activities (Byers, Crider, & Biggers, 2004). Although these techniques of neutralization were first documented in criminological research (Minor, 1981; Sykes & Matza, 1957), these concepts have been a focus of social cognition research using the attribution theories. Research in social cognition has shown that self-serving bias tends to characterize people’s explanations for their actions (Bodenhausen, Macrae, & Hugenberg, 2003; Fiske & Taylor, 1991), which include rationalizing or justifying their actions, making them desirable and rea- sonable from the agent’s viewpoint (Davidson, 1990). In summary, the weaknesses of using different group memberships for the hate offender and victim to explain hate crimes involves a false suggestion that it is the distinctiveness of the crime victims or their different group membership rather than the offender’s individual and situational characteristics that are responsible for the hate offenses, thus taking the responsibility away from the individual offender. In addition, this type of explanation implies that the hatred is innate and permanent, because a group membership (e.g., race, religion, or sexual orienta- tion) involved in hate crime generally represents a stable and ascribed status. IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS This paper has differentiated between the hate offender’s mental state/reasoning and the variable of group memberships of the hate of- fender and his or her victim. It maintains that the “because” statement in the legal definition of hate crime involves the descriptions of the of- fender’s mental state that includes the content of the required criminal intent and the offender’s cognitive distortions (prejudice and reasoning that uses group differences between the self and the victim to rational- ize crime). Understanding the distinctions between the hate offender’s mental state and intergroup reality has several implications: First, it helps focus our research efforts on examining how the of- fender uses different group memberships to explain and justify his or her hate crime. Instead of focusing on differences between group mem- berships of the offender and victim, research needs to investigate how group affiliations, along with social learning environments, economic conditions, and other social variables influence the hate offenders’ mo- tivations through their impacts on developing, validating, and sustaining the offenders’ distorted cognitions of their selves, others, and interper- sonal and/or intergroup realities. 602 K. Sun In addition, the above discussions suggest that research needs to ex- amine characteristics and attributes of hate offenders that separate them from the rest of those who share the same group memberships. These characteristics may include such psychological variables as the offend- ers’ childhood traumas and harsh treatments, rigid thinking, categoriza- tion, deindividuation, dehumanization, and sense of self vulnerability (e.g., Berkowitz, 2005; Staub, 2005). Furthermore, understanding the distinction between the hate of- fender’s mental state and intergroup reality can help mental health pro- fessionals conduct more effective counseling with the victims of hate crime. In addition to psychological distress, including fear, anger, and feeling insecure and unworthy, and the perception that the world is disorderly (Willis, 2004), one of the main mental symptoms of hate crime survivors is self-blame (Herek, Gillis, & Cogan, 1999). The study by Herek et al. showed that hate crime victims demonstrated signif- icantly more symptoms of depression, anger, anxiety, and posttrau- matic stress, and more attributions of their victimization experiences to the self than did non-bias crime victims. Weiss (2005) suggests that therapists working with victims of hate crimes should take into consideration such factors and methods as intergroup relations, fear, anger, racial/ethnic group histories, current concerns, and family con- texts of the victims, legal issues, and mediation between the victim and the offender. However, these clinical approaches, which apparently are based on the assumption that hate crime manifests intergroup con- flict, have difficulty addressing the issue of self-blame and the victims’ misperception that their group membership is the source of their own victimization. This article suggests that clinical interventions need to include teach- ing the survivors of hate crime to attribute their victimizations to the cognitive distortions of the offenders rather than to the distinctiveness of the victims. Although there are no nursing studies on applying the attribution method to help victims of hate crime, research in social cog- nition has produced evidence that the attribution method can alter the negative self-concept and self-blame. For example, attribution retrain- ing, which involves techniques of teaching child victims of sexual abuse to attribute responsibility for the abuse to the perpetrators rather than to the self, has shown some effectiveness (Celano, Hazzard, Campbell, & Long, 2002). This method merits further investigations in clinical interventions with hate crime survivors. In short, the issues examined in the article can benefit nursing inquiry and clinical interventions, because the problem of hate crime is a matter of global health concern. Furthermore, clinical interventions with the Hate Crime and Offenders’ Distorted Cognitions 603 victims fall within the range of psychiatric and mental health nursing (Thomas, 2004; Willis, 2004). REFERENCES Berkowitz, L. (2005). On hate and its determinants: Some affective and cognitive influ- ences. In R. J. Sternberg (Ed.), The psychology of hate (pp. 155–183). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association. Bodenhausen, G. V., Macrae, C. N., & Hugenberg, K. (2003). Social cognition. In T. Millon & M. J. Lerner (Eds.), Handbook of psychology (Vol. 5, pp. 257–282), Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons. Byers, B., Crider, B. W., & Biggers, G. K. (2004). A study of hate crime and offender neutralization techniques used against the Amish. In P. B. Gerstenfeld & D. R. Grant (Eds.), Crimes of hate: Selected readings (pp. 118–129). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Celano, M., Hazzard, A., Campbell, S. K., & Long, C. B. (2002). Attribution retraining with sexually abused children: Review of techniques. Child Maltreatment: Journal of the American Professional Society on the Abuse of Children, 7, 65–76. Davidson, D. (1990). Paradoxes of irrationality. In P. K. Moser (Ed.), Rationality in action: Contemporary approaches (pp. 449–464). New York: Cambridge University Press. Fiske, S. T., & Taylor, S. (1991). Social cognition (2nd ed). New York: McGraw–Hill. Gerstenfeld, P. (2002). A time to hate: Situational antecedents of intergroup bias. Analysis of Social Issues and Public Policy, 2, 61–67. Hate Crime Statistics Act. (1990). 28 U.S.C 534. Herek, G. M., Gillis, J. R., & Cogan, J. C. (1999). Psychological sequelae of hate-crime victimization among lesbian, gay and bisexual adults. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 67, 945–951. Levin, J., & McDevitt, J. (2002). Hate crimes revisited: American’s war against those who are different. Boulder, CO: Westview. Levin, J., & Rabrenovic, G. (2001). Hate crimes and ethic conflict: A comparative perspective. American Behavioral Scientist, 45, 574–755. Minor, W. W. (1981). The neutralization of criminal offense. Criminology, 18, 103– 120. Myers, D. G. (2002). Social psychology (7th Ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill. National Criminal Justice Reference Service. (2005). Hate crime statistics in 2003. Retrieved August 18, 2005, from www.ncjrs.org/hate crimes/facts.html Nolan III, J. J., McDevitt, J., Cronin, S., & Farrell, A. (2004). Learning to see hate crime: A framework for understanding and clarifying ambiguities in bias crime classifica- tion. Criminal Justice Studies: A Critical Journal of Crime, Law and Society, 17, 91–106. Scheb, J. M., & Scheb II, J. M. (1999). Criminal law and procedure. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth. Staub, E. (2005). The origins and evolution of hate, with notes on prevention. In R. J. Sternberg (Ed.), The psychology of hate (pp. 51–66). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association. 604 K. Sun Sullaway, M. (2004). Psychological perspective on hate crime laws. Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, 10, 250–292. Sun, K. (1993a). Two types of prejudice and their causes. American Psychologist, 48, 1152–1153. Sun, K. (1993b). The implications of social psychological theories of group dynamics for gang research. Journal of Gang Research, 1, 39–44. Sykes, G. M., & Matza, D. (1957). Techniques of neutralization: A theory of delinquency. American Sociological Review, 22, 664–670. Thomas, S. P. (2004). From the editor: Rising violence against transgendered individuals. Issues in Mental Health Nursing, 25, 557–558. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994. (Public Law 103–322, H.R. 3355). Weiss, J. C. (2005). Working with victims of hate crimes. In G. L. Greif, & P. H. Ephrosss (Eds.), Group work with populations at risk (2nd ed., pp. 197–221). New York: Oxford University Press. Willis, D. G. (2004). Hate crimes against gay males: An overview. Issues in Mental Health Nursing, 25, 115–132. 
work_dcsxiho46baw5ag26ct3asm4aq	----	Putting victims first? : a critique of Coalition anti-social behaviour policy HEAP, Vicky <http://orcid.org/0000-0003-4311-1758> Available from Sheffield Hallam University Research Archive (SHURA) at: http://shura.shu.ac.uk/13252/ This document is the author deposited version. You are advised to consult the publisher's version if you wish to cite from it. Published version HEAP, Vicky (2016). Putting victims first? : a critique of Coalition anti-social behaviour policy. Critical Social Policy, 36 (2), 246-264. Copyright and re-use policy See http://shura.shu.ac.uk/information.html Sheffield Hallam University Research Archive http://shura.shu.ac.uk http://shura.shu.ac.uk/ http://shura.shu.ac.uk/information.html 1 Putting Victims First? A Critique of Coalition Anti-Social Behaviour Policy Abstract Anti-social behaviour (ASB) policy was not pursued by the Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition Government with the same vigour as their New Labour predecessors. Where developments did take place a clear shift in emphasis was apparent, with the needs of ASB victims elevated to the forefront of policy. This paper critically appraises two major developments that showcase the Coalition Government’s attempts to overhaul ASB policy to 'put victims first', namely: the changes to call handling and case management processes, and the Community Trigger, which forces the authorities to review their responses to complaints of ASB in circumstances where victims feel they have been ignored. These particular policies aim to prioritise victims’ needs, however it is argued the new victim-focus is: diluted by competing Coalition ASB agendas, demonstrates little connection between rhetoric and reality, provides limited redress for all victims and fails to coalesce with established attempts to tackle perpetrators of ASB. Key Words: ASB, disability, politics, victimisation, vulnerability 2 Introduction The evolution of anti-social behaviour (ASB) policy in England and Wales since 1998 has been well documented (Burney, 2005; Millie, 2009; Prior, 2009; Hodgkinson and Tilley, 2011) and there is no intention to cover old ground here. This paper will critically analyse two policy developments introduced by the Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition Government that reflect a shift in ASB policy emphasis to become more victim-focused. Central to these proposals was the desire to focus on the needs of vulnerable and/or repeat victims (Home Office, 2012a) and make the process of obtaining ASB sanctions quicker and easier for the authorities (Home Office, 2011a). The first victim-focused development relates to police recording practices for ASB. Developed and implemented in 2011/12, eight police forces undertook a pilot call handling and case management approach to public reports of ASB to assist the identification of vulnerable and repeat victims. The second development, the Community Trigger, was brought about by the ASB, Crime and Policing Act (2014). In short, the Community Trigger forces relevant bodies to act if victims perceive their reports of ASB have been ignored (Home Office, 2013a). The rationale and timing of the Coalition's victim- focused emphasis will be explored by examining political rhetoric and empirical research to determine why ASB victims have recently been afforded this elevated status. The paper will then analyse the two victim-focused policies outlined above, paying particular attention to notions of vulnerability, before considering the extent to which these new strategies coalesce with more established attempts to curb the perpetrators of ASB incidents, with reference to the Troubled Families Programme. 3 Why Focus on Victims? New Labour's ASB agenda focused on the regulation of nuisance behaviour and a re- moralisation of the cultures associated with socially and economically marginalised communities (Garrett, 2007). The ASB policy rhetoric pursued by the Coalition demonstrated a marked shift in emphasis from previous ASB policies and reflected two distinct themes: families 1 and victims. Perhaps influential in the decision to change policy direction, was the potential for the Government to re-define ASB discourse, allowing the Coalition to put their own ‘stamp’ on a policy area that epitomised New Labour. It is clear from high-profile speeches that different Coalition figures took responsibility for each thematic area. Prime Minister David Cameron championed the family as a site for ASB intervention particularly through the Troubled Families Programme (Cameron, 2011a: 2011b; 2014), and Home Secretary Theresa May concentrated on the needs of vulnerable and/or repeat victims (May, 2010; 2011; 2012a; 2012b). From a political perspective, it is interesting to note how the two primary definers of Coalition ASB policy rarely articulated each other's theme. For example, May did not mention troubled families in any party conference or major ASB speeches during the Coalition. This is in stark contrast to their predecessors Tony Blair and David Blunkett who worked closely together to utilise each other's symbolic capital to define New Labour's approach (Garrett, 2007). The policy split within the Coalition might reflect the cross-governmental nature of ASB, with Cameron's Troubled Families Programme based at the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG), with May's vulnerable victim theme based at the Home Office. However, the practical repercussions of this appear to be the creation of different ASB agendas, especially considering how Cameron's focuses 1 Families did feature in New Labour ASB policy through, for example, the introduction of Parenting Orders and Family Intervention Projects (Millie, 2009), but to a much lesser extent than Coalition discourse where the family was promoted as a cornerstone of domestic policy-making in general (Department for Work and Pensions, 2014). 4 on perpetrators and May's on victims. The capacity of these different agendas to coalesce will be explored later through a victim-focused lens, as the focus of this paper is on the work of Theresa May and the Home Office due to the overarching policy shift. The Home Office's ASB victim policies were heralded by May as a response to a number of high-profile tragic events involving vulnerable and repeat victims. These incidents included the suicide of Fiona Pilkington and her disabled daughter Francecca Hardwick in 2007, following a sustained campaign of harassment (Independent Police Complaints Commission, 2011a). There was also the case of David Askew, a 64-year old with learning difficulties, who died of a heart attack in 2010 after being bullied and harassed by young people over a ten- year period (Independent Police Complaints Commission, 2011b). May referred to these incidents as 'horror stories' (May, 2012a), claiming ASB was 'destroying good people's lives' and generalised her comments to suggest ASB was responsible for 'millions of tarnished lives' (May, 2010). This victim rhetoric concentrated on 'personal' ASB (incidents targeted at an individual rather than a community) and demonstrates how the Coalition attempted to orchestrate public emotions and garner support in its bid to reform ASB, as victimisation and vulnerability are socially constructed for political and economic purposes (Green, 2007). However, instead of the victim focus constituting a responsive policy shift, a more critical appraisal of the policy changes might suggest that such emotive, populist policies provided an ideal opportunity to alleviate some of the damage caused to the Coalition parties during the May 2012 local elections (The Observer, 2012). Historically ASB policy has been heavily related to political posturing and reputation building, with Mooney and Young (2006) suggesting that it was indeed created to build New Labour’s crime-fighting credentials in light of the crime-drop. Furthermore, Squires (2006) contends tackling ASB itself was an 5 attempt to close the ‘justice gap’ by focusing on enforcement action. It appears that an attempt at reputation building is partly responsible for the Coalition’s changes to ASB policy, in a similar way to their predecessors political manoeuvring (Duggan and Heap, 2013; Heap, 2014); highlighted by the implementation date for the Community Trigger falling in October 2014, a little over six months before the 2015 General Election. This is further underlined by the emotion generating focus on personal ASB as part of the victim discourse, which glosses over the statistics that suggest 'nuisance' ASB incidents (behaviour that causes trouble/annoyance to a community) are really causing the most problems as they total more than double the number of personal incidents and have done so on a sustained basis since the categorical measures were first introduced in 2011/12 (Office for National Statistics, 2012; 2013; 2014). Politics aside, evidence from a variety of sources also suggests the profile of ASB victims should be raised and their experiences acknowledged. Initially it was the police that brought the concept of ASB victims to wider attention. The report ‘Anti-Social Behaviour: Stop the Rot’ in 2010 by Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC), examined how the police deal with ASB and highlighted the incongruent status afforded to ASB amongst police officers compared to crime. It suggests that reporting practices relating to potential repeat and/or vulnerable victims ‘contributed to an increasing acceptance or “defining down” of ASB that we should not have grown used to’ (HMIC, 2010: 11). The report proposes a more proactive approach to ASB in order to remedy this, emphasising early intervention and more police ‘feet on the street’ (HMIC, 2010: 7). It also contends that communities have a role to play in tackling ASB, a topic that will be addressed later. Research evidence further supports the policy shift. Clarke et al. (2011) suggest how practitioners think more ought to be done 6 to meet the needs of victims and witnesses, particularly for those who are vulnerable. Research into victims' perspectives of ASB also indicates that victims' needs should be elevated. Heap (2010) found victims held negative perceptions of the authorities’ approach to tackling ASB. Participants cited a lack of response to ASB reports from the authorities (police and social housing providers); generating a strong sentiment that reporting ASB was a waste of time and constrained future reports. This reiterates the work of Squires and Stephen (2005) who draw attention to the gap between public perceptions and enforcement priorities. This highlights how victims’ experiences of ASB are often compounded by unsatisfactory responses from the authorities. These findings indicate that victims of ASB, whether vulnerable and repeat or not, require additional support through policy change, therefore attention will turn to the policy developments themselves to consider whether victims’ needs are being adequately addressed. Recognising and Reconciling Vulnerability In order to ameliorate some of the concerns raised by HMIC (2010), the Home Office alongside the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) supported a number of call handling and case management trials in 2011 to better identify and protect vulnerable and repeat ASB victims. The inclusion of the term vulnerability in the ASB policy discourse was undoubtedly fuelled by the high-profile tragic cases involving vulnerable victims such as Pilkington and Askew. However, the focus on vulnerable victims requires further consideration with the notions of vulnerability and disability examined within an ASB context, because both practical and conceptual difficulties abound. 7 In practice, ACPO led eight forces and their partners (e.g. Community Safety Partnerships) to engage with five core principles to better protect vulnerable and repeat victims. These were: 1) Having an effective call handling system 2) Assessing potential risks to victims early in the call handling process 3) Using simple ‘off the shelf’ IT systems to share information 4) Having shared case management principles between all agencies 5) Having a robust community engagement process to identify community concerns (Home Office, 2012b: 7) Once signed up to these principles the eight police forces utilised a ‘bottom-up’ approach to develop a call handling and case management system considered most responsive to the local context. The results from these trials were considered positive (Home Office, 2012b), although it is difficult to proclaim their wholesale success due to the self-assessment nature of the findings, in contrast to a formal process and/or outcome evaluation. Despite the lack of a methodologically robust evidence base, Theresa May states in the forward to the report that ‘our aim is for other police forces and their partners to see what has worked in practice so that they too can consider introducing a similar approach’ (Home Office, 2012b: 3). This sentiment is further echoed on the Home Office website, which affirms how the aforementioned report ‘sets out our plans to deliver on the commitment to introduce more effective measures to tackle antisocial behaviour' (Home Office 2013b). However the key question is whether this is reflected in reality? 8 In order to assess the uptake of the call handling and case management practices, the author contacted the Home Office via a Freedom of Information request. According to the Home Office (2013c, personal communication), they do not collect information about the number of police forces currently using the call handling and case management practices outlined above. Furthermore, they state it is not a ‘formal requirement’ for all police forces to adopt such practices. Therefore despite the rhetoric surrounding vulnerable and repeat victims, in reality there is little understanding of what is happening in practice and a clear lack of commitment to evaluate the impact of measures to help vulnerable and repeat ASB victims. These surprising findings are somewhat mitigated by figures produced by HMIC (2012), which show that all 43 forces have IT systems in place to identify vulnerable and repeat victims, with 33 forces able to do this automatically for repeat victims and 21 for vulnerable victims. There is also an acknowledgment that improvements in tackling ASB have been made since HMIC investigated the issue in 2010. However, the HMIC (2012) report also highlights how the call handling practices vary significantly between police force areas. For example, there are distinct contrasts between forces who undertook the call handling trials, as well as those who did not, when a sample of 100 calls was examined. Of the trial areas, Lincolnshire checked 75/100 calls for repeat victimisation and 30/100 for vulnerability, compared to South Wales who checked 25/100 and 10/100 respectively. In the remaining forces, Dyfed-Powys checked 82/100 for repeats and 56/100 for vulnerability in contrast to West Yorkshire who checked 29/100 and 18/100 respectively (HMIC, 2012). These wide variations are underlined by the revelation that ‘no force consistently bolster this [the IT] functionality by ensuring that tactful and targeted questioning of the caller takes place’ (HMIC, 2012: 28). This may be a resources issue, particularly when considering the rural nature of some of the police forces mentioned above. However, this will be of little comfort 9 to victims of ASB whose suffering is in no way diminished by their geographic location. In addition, research undertaken by Hopkins Burke et al. (2012) found that numerous cases of ASB recorded by the police could have been recorded as crime. This raises questions about the decline in police recorded crime and extent to which criminal incidents have been (in)advertently classified as ASB. These startling inconsistencies further highlight the lack of commitment to improving the experience of reporting ASB for all victims and demonstrate how reporting ASB is essentially a postcode lottery. Regardless of the issues with the systems in place to identify vulnerable or repeat victims, the implementation overlooks the complexities of vulnerability and in particular, the association between vulnerability and disability within Coalition ASB policy. Conceptually, the policy rhetoric appears to be re-defining ASB as a concern for the vulnerable, but more specifically disabled people due to the foregrounding of the high- profile tragic cases (May, 2010; 2011; 2012a; 2012b). This politicisation of vulnerability may be the type of rhetoric required by the Coalition to bolster public support in light of swingeing budget cuts to the criminal justice system and disability benefits such as Disability Living Allowance (now Personal Independence Payments). Alternatively it might be seen as a way of addressing poor disablist hate crime conviction rates (Roulstone et al., 2011). However, the policy reaction to the Pilkington and Askew cases appears to conflate vulnerability and disability and this needs challenging. Victimologists suggest that vulnerability is based on personal attributes (Sparks, 1982), that encompass a range of internal and external aspects (Killeas, 1990). Disability could be one of these aspects and Garland (2012) makes the salient point that victims such as Fiona Pilkington are not inherently vulnerable, but in fact vulnerable to increased levels of the risk of harassment. 10 Some disabled people are disproportionally vulnerable to a greater risk of ASB harassment/victimisation because we know there are high numbers of disabled social housing tenants that also live in deprived areas (Wood and Edwards, 2005), which are both indicators of exposure to ASB (Nicholas et al., 2007). This shift towards protecting the vulnerable from ASB, particularly disabled people, could be seen as a positive change of perspective based on previous research as there has been a clear policy shift from sanctioning disabled people as perpetrators to focusing on their victim status. However, the policies that disproportionately sanctioned them in the first instance have not necessarily been remedied. For example, the British Institute for Brain Injured Children (2007) found that 5% of ASBOs reported by ASB Co-ordinators and 37% of ASBOs reports by Youth Offending Teams were given to those under the age of 17 with diagnosed mental health problems or accepted learning difficulties, stating these vulnerable young people were easy targets for the sanction. Fyson and Yates (2011) reinforce this by demonstrating a continued lack of awareness and understanding of learning disabilities, within the context of ASB practice. Nevertheless, the real disconnect in the call handling policy and wider ASB discourse is the link between ASB, vulnerability and the hate crime threshold. There is an astounding lack of clarity throughout the policy documents relating to the point at which ASB becomes a hate crime. This issue is further confused because of the references made to the 'targeting' of vulnerable victims in policy documents (Home Office, 2011a) and speeches by Theresa May that refer directly to the Pilkington case (2012a). ASB targeted at a victim due to the perpetrators hostility towards disability (such as Pilkington's daughter) should be identified and addressed as a hate crime under s.146 of the Criminal Justice Act (2003). Therefore, 11 whilst the Pilkington case is held up as the type of ASB incident not to be repeated, it should in fact not have been considered as ASB at all and this is a fundamental flaw of the victim- focused ASB policy. This is particularly pertinent because the Criminal Justice Joint Inspection Review (2013) specifically examined disablist hate crime and proposed that changes need to be made around how the police and Crown Prosecution Service identify and record these incidents, with the follow-up report still insisting there is work to be done in this area (Criminal Justice Joint Inspection, 2015). However, this situation is further complicated by the way the law constructs disablist hate crime as something different from crime (or ASB) targeted at those perceived to be vulnerable (Roulstone et al., 2011). Therefore if a victim is targeted because they are perceived to be vulnerable, which they may be as a result of their disability the behaviour is classed ASB, whereas if the victim is targeted due to the offender being prejudiced against disabled people it is hate crime. It appears the subjective and perceptions-based definitions of ASB, vulnerability, disability and hate crime have been drawn together by their shared blurred boundaries and are further complicated by the suggestion that vulnerability and hate are not mutually exclusive (Roulstone and Sadique 2013). This compounds the practical difficulties mentioned earlier, making cases extremely difficult to accurately identify and for an effective response to be delivered, with issues for crime data manipulation and the accuracy of statistics. These problems have not been adequately addressed by the policy discourse and could still lead to victims falling through the gap between ASB and hate crime provision in a similar way to Pilkington, especially as it relies on the victim's perception of the incident. The statutory guidance document for the new ASB powers produced by the Home Office (2014) briefly mentions hate crime, but does not use the terminology 'hate incident', which relates to non-criminal hate motivated behaviours (Crown Prosecution Service, 2007), which is where the overlap with ASB lies. By 12 neglecting to recognise hate-motivated incidents and retaining these incidents within the jurisdiction of ASB legislation, the seriousness of this victimisation is over-looked and down- graded because the meaning of 'anti-social' is very different to 'hate' (Duggan and Heap, 2013). Failure to use the term 'hate incident' therefore contradicts the increased emphasis and support proffered to vulnerable victims and retains the silos between ASB and hate crime. Those charged with identifying and recording ASB and hate crime need to adopt a shared terminology to recognise the overlap and better serve vulnerable victims, including all victims with the protected identity characteristics set out in s.146. It is interesting politically, as well as disappointing practically, that none of the other protected characteristics have been given the same high profile as disability in the ASB discourse, especially because research that shows Black and Minority Ethnic (BME) groups for example, are more likely to perceive 2 higher levels of ASB (Nicholas et al., 2007). Chakraborti and Garland (2012) argue the interpretation of hate crime should be widened to include vulnerability and this suggestion should be considered in light of ASB policy too. Donoghue (2013) also suggests victim engagement is necessary to develop risk assessment practices and shape professionals' understanding of vulnerability. However this may only capture the views of victims with the capital to engage in such debates, which may dilute its practical value for many vulnerable victims. At this juncture it is also important to remember that ASB is not a concern of the vulnerable alone (whilst acknowledging that vulnerable victims may be less equipped to counteract their victimisation). Other tragic high-profile victims could not be classified as vulnerable or repeat. For example Garry Newlove, was murdered in 2007 following an altercation with a group of alcohol-intoxicated young people he suspected had 2 Due to definitional and counting issues, the British Crime Survey used perceptions of ASB as a proxy measure for experience between 2003 and 2011. From 2012 the Crime Survey for England and Wales has provided ASB incident data, but this does highlight the experiences of different demographic groups. 13 vandalised his wife’s car (The Guardian, 2007) and in 2011 Dr Suzanne Dow committed suicide after suffering months of harassment from her neighbours despite numerous attempts to seek help from the authorities (The Telegraph, 2013). These cases underline how the authorities’ response to all victims of ASB should be improved, in terms of identification and action. The issues with the call handling and case management trials, the conceptualisation of vulnerability and the treatment of all victims are mitigated by wider policy issues. The other aspect raised by the initial HMIC report in 2010 relating to improving the handling of ASB reports, was putting ‘feet on the street’. If the call handling and case management systems are not meeting the needs of victims, frontline police officers could be potentially fill this gap. It appears not. The House of Commons Library (2013) details that police officer strength 3 is currently at the lowest recorded level since 2002 (although it still remains high in historical terms during a period of falling crime). The National Audit Office (2015) reports a 25% reduction in police funding throughout the duration of the Coalition, with a reduction in the size of the police workforce by 36,672. This is the reality of the 23% cuts made to the Home Office budget by 2015, which Theresa May detailed at the National Conservative Convention in 2013, coupled with the announcement that since coming to power the Coalition have overseen reductions in crime of over 10% (May, 2013). However, it is clear from the evidence produced above that victims of ASB, be they vulnerable, repeat, both or none of those categories; are still not receiving a consistent level of service from the police, with reductions in recorded crime potentially attributable to some crimes being classified as ASB. 3 Police officer strength represents the number of full-time equivalent police officers. 14 There are evidently problems with the police delivering effective changes to reporting practices, despite commitments from the Home Office and HMIC to prioritise such developments. This is particularly ironic considering the latter were so critical of the delays and unreactive nature of partnership approaches to tackling ASB in their original report (HMIC, 2010). Therefore it is perhaps conceivable that some of the difficulties associated with recording practices stem from them being too heavily police-led. Heap (2010) found that despite most reports of ASB being made to the police, there were a large number of instances where victims reported ASB to local authorities and social housing providers. Therefore by focusing on the reporting mechanisms of the police, the experience and victim status (vulnerable or repeat) is not under such scrutiny in other areas, creating the possibility of inconsistencies in responses to reports of ASB, dependent on which agency the incident is reported to. The variance in reporting ASB is not a new issue (Wood, 2004; Heap, 2010), but it feeds into the disparity of service received by victims. Although well-meaning, the consequence of the creation of a knee-jerk policy response such as the focus on vulnerability is that it often over-simplifies the problem and signifies a purely performative political gesture. This has occurred here due to the particularly complex framework of ASB and appears to have made matters more complicated. Victims Triggering Responses As part of the ASB, Crime and Policing Act (2014) the Community Trigger forces relevant bodies, such as the police or local authority, to review the responses they have made to complaints of ASB. The caveat for a review of ASB complaints being granted is that the relevant bodies must agree whether a reporting threshold has been met. In the initial 15 consultation document, this threshold was set at five individual complaints from five different households, or three complaints from an individual about the same issue in the same neighbourhood in the last six months where no action had been taken (Home Office, 2011a). However by the time the White Paper had been produced in 2012, these national thresholds had been removed in favour of locally produced criteria to ‘suit local circumstances and focus on local priorities’ (Home Office, 2012a: 12). However, the problem with this approach is ensuring a suitable threshold is locally agreed. It is unclear how this should, and will, be deliberated and formulated in practice. For instance, it seems logical that the more ASB an area suffers from the higher the threshold of the Trigger should be, because more resources will be in place to deal with the behaviour in the first place. However, the greater the amount of ASB and associated resources/personnel involved increases the likelihood that a case may be mismanaged, which indicates the necessity for a lower Trigger threshold. Equally, an area with fewer incidents of ASB could have a lower Trigger threshold to reflect the rarity of the incidents (and perhaps decreased tolerance of ASB from the residents). Alternatively it could be aligned to public perceptions of ASB (which prior to 2011 was the national means for measuring ASB before incident counting). However the Trigger threshold is fashioned, the fundamental problem is that it is unfair that in one location three complaints is enough to Trigger a response by the relevant bodies whereas in another location it is five, particularly when there is no accounting for the severity of the incidents or the vulnerability of the victim. This may simply be an inevitable consequence of Conservative-driven localism, which removes their responsibility for delivery. Nevertheless, it does not seem right that one person’s experiences of ASB can remain untended because they have not reached a crudely constructed threshold, simply because they are not considered to be enough of a victim. A further aspect of location to consider is rurality. With 16 the Trigger being agreed at force level, both urban and rural communities will be served by the same threshold. This reinforces the potential for additional local disparities for victims, because based on the premise that deprived urban areas suffer from relatively more ASB (Flatley et al., 2008), incidents in rural locations may have a greater impact on quality of life. The acknowledgement of ongoing victimisation and the subsequent measures put in place to manage cases more efficiently is effectively an attempt to make the victimisation experience more pleasant, akin to a range of ‘customer experience’ type measures (Duggan and Heap, 2014). This is a purely reactive policy that only operates once multiple incidents of ASB victimisation have occurred. It assumes victimisation is inevitable, particularly as there has been little investment in any type of primary ASB prevention, and therefore contradicts the Coalition's assertion to put victims first. Essentially this power should not have to exist. Every complaint should receive a response, but failures by the authorities particularly relating to vulnerable and repeat victims, has prompted its introduction and the realities of it functioning in practice must be addressed. By focusing on vulnerable victims, as well as introducing arbitrary measures around the threshold, the Coalition has created a new hierarchy of victimisation. The damaging consequence of this approach is labelling one victim as more deserving than another and it can be seen how certain victims are demarcated (vulnerable and repeat victims), prioritised (as per the call handling changes) and responsibilised (charged with activating the Community Trigger if their complaints have not been satisfactorily addressed) (Duggan and Heap, 2014). It can be successfully argued that vulnerable victims of ASB need more support as they may suffer more harm as a consequence of their victimisation (Green, 2007), but this should not be provided at the expense and inequality of others and should certainly not embroil victims in an additional 17 layer of criminal justice bureaucracy. The potential for an unbalanced provision for victims did not go unnoticed and was highlighted by the Home Affairs Select Committee (2013), who suggested that a national (entirely arbitrary) maximum of five complaints was a necessary backstop for these proposals. Already in the pilot project, four different areas implemented three different threshold levels (Home Office, 2013d). However, this issue was not considered serious enough for revision in the ASB, Crime and Policing Bill during its passage through Parliament. The pilot projects generally reported positive findings (Home Office, 2013d), however these self-assessed appraisals (similar to the call handling and case management trials detailed above) do little to assert the external and ecological validity of the findings and whether these policies can be effectively generalised and transferred into practice on a national scale. There are further problems with the Community Trigger. It is unclear how the threshold will be communicated to the public and more importantly, how it will be communicated to vulnerable victims to ensure they are able to take advantage of it. This aspect is crucial if the powers are to translate effectively into practice and could be hampered due to a lack of additional funds being allocated to facilitate the implementation of the new legislation (HC Deb 2013-14). Even if victims are aware of the new power, it is potentially problematic in areas where residents are too afraid to report ASB and cannot achieve the necessary number of complaints to meet the threshold. Conversely, it is also theoretically open to manipulation by persistent complainers. For example, when there is a less serious complaint of ASB where the victim is more vocal, an individual could technically make the required number of complaints simply to provoke enforcement action. It seems a real possibility that the authorities' resources attached to the Community Trigger could be busy responding to 18 those who shout the loudest about relatively trivial issues, to the detriment of the vulnerable and repeat victims the Coalition is so keen to support. The Community Trigger has highlighted the role of the community in tackling ASB. The community has been responsibilised as a site for action against ASB, in the sense that to spark the Trigger the community must play their part through meeting the threshold for review by reporting ASB the prerequisite number of times. This approach is similar to the narrative espoused by the White Paper Respect and Responsibility - Taking a Stand Against Anti-Social Behaviour (Home Office, 2003). However, this idealised view does not necessarily empower communities, failing to take account of the general loss of public confidence in the statutory crime control agencies as well as the development of dismissive attitudes towards the police which creates a culture of non-reporting (Casey and Flint, 2007) and fear (Heap, 2010). This is notwithstanding communities that have always lacked trust in the police (Evans, 2010). In addition to increased co-operation with the police, greater displays of informal social control have been called for by the HMIC (2010: 11) report that states: “individuals and communities must mobilise their defences by re-establishing acceptable rules of behaviours for those in public spaces”. Similarly, Rogers (2010) suggests people should be trained in basic community safety skills to diffuse conflicts associated with ASB, in a similar way to how people are trained in first aid. If a community has been suffering from ASB for a prolonged period of time without adequate assistance from the authorities, they are unlikely to be able to ‘mobilise their defences’, take ownership or intervene when they are too afraid to even report incidents (Heap, 2010; Duggan and Heap, 2014). Such suggestions are unworkable within the current ASB policy framework, particularly amid broader public sector spending cuts associated with the Coalition government. A more realistic solution would be to locate some middle-ground between formal and informal modes of social control to determine 19 whether greater community responsibilisation would work where the community is fragmented and with low engagement and participation, as the above proposals favour stable, middle class communities which are more likely to take action (Hancock, 2006). An additional dimension to consider aside from the threshold itself is the idea that the Trigger will come into effect when ‘no action has been taken’. It is unclear what this means in practice. If this really does mean no action at all in terms of a response from the authorities, the Pilkington case would have not met the criteria for the Community Trigger because action had been taken by the police, albeit unsatisfactorily. This precipitates the question of whether ‘no action’ is based on the perception of the victim, if they feel the response has been unsatisfactory and the problem not resolved, or whether this is solely down to the discretion of the authorities. Greater clarification of this aspect is required, particularly for victims who wish to utilise the Trigger and especially those who may be vulnerable enough to not understand the complexities of this legislation, such as those with poor English language skills, mental health problems and/or learning difficulties. A final point to contemplate is how this policy coalesces with other policies aimed at tackling perpetrators of ASB. It has specific implications for the performance measures associated with the Troubled Families Programme, of which reducing ASB is a key component. The Troubled Families Programme is the Coalition’s version of New Labour’s Family Intervention Programme. It was initiated by David Cameron after the English riots of 2011 and embodies his ASB rhetorical focus on families (Cameron, 2011a: 2011b; 2014) (as opposed to Theresa May's focus on victims). The programme works with families who “are involved in crime and anti-social behaviour, have children not in school, have an adult on out of work benefits 20 [and] cause high costs to the public purse” (DCLG, 2012: 3). This scheme operates under the remit of payment by results, with local authorities receiving payment subsequent to a 60% reduction in recorded ASB incidents across the family within the past six months (DCLG, 2012). By having a threshold value, the Community Trigger incentivises ASB reporting, therefore potentially affects whether a 60% reduction in ASB by the ‘troubled family’ can be achieved, leading to the possible gaming of figures and a pressure not to record. As a result of this paradox, the two policies are effectively competing against each other, with victim success in one (the review of the response) affecting failure in another (greater reports and non-payment). The potential impact of the Community Trigger on the Troubled Families Programme could lead to Local Authorities not being paid for the work they have already undertaken. Consequently any funding deficit could be recouped from wider crime reduction budgets, which may lead to increases in crime and act as a disincentive to work with troubled families long-term. This policy disconnect highlights fractures between Cameron and May's different ASB discourses and how their personal policy foci have not been effectively considered in tandem. This oversight also fails to acknowledge the potential intersection between victims and perpetrators, so whilst vulnerable victims are being prioritised they may be simultaneously under scrutiny as part of the Troubled Families Programme. This drags the victim-focused policies into the highly contested, extensively debated idea that ASB policy acts as a vehicle for governing the poor and marginalised (Carr and Cowan, 2006; Tyler, 2013), much of which is beyond the scope of this paper. However, drawing ASB victims into the politics of the socially marginalised further burdens them with the class-based dogma advocated by the Coalition. This was epitomised by the 'striver versus skiver' rhetoric, which champions 'hard-working families' and discredits those out of work and receiving benefits (The Guardian 2013; Cameron, 2014). Such social divisions have been 21 reinforced by a media discourse that uses the derogatory term chav to caricature negative traits associated with the working class such as violence, fecklessness, delinquency and laziness (Jones, 2011). Indeed, Tyler (2013) suggests how the term chav signifies class struggle within neoliberal society. Valentine and Harris (2014: 91) extend this assertion by reporting how contemporary class-based prejudice has become pervasive within working- class communities, with 'growing social antagonisms about who has the right to make claims on the state'. These findings are reinforced on a larger-scale by the British Social Attitudes Survey, which has shown attitudes towards working-aged benefits claimants are hardening (Taylor-Gooby, 2015). This highlights how victims of ASB may also be vulnerable due to their social class, as well as any other protected identity characteristics mentioned previously. Fundamentally, the rationale behind the Community Trigger is to prevent another tragedy such as the Pilkington case. However, this policy creates numerous ethical and practical tensions, which demonstrate a lack of foresight and bring into question the overall efficacy of the proposals. Conclusion The Coalition has attempted to create its own version of ASB policy by pursuing a route where victims’ needs are prioritised. By deconstructing changes to police call handling and case management and the Community Trigger this paper has suggested how these developments have been poorly conceived and are fundamentally flawed. The call handling and case management changes have been shown to be inconsistently implemented on a national scale, thus creating a postcode lottery for victims in terms of how their complaint is managed, particularly those who are vulnerable and/or repeat. Under scrutiny, the 22 Community Trigger generates numerous questions about the value placed on ASB victimisation for different groups of people, with the potential to create a hierarchy of victims based on factors such as vulnerability and residential location. The inconsistencies between both of the policies appear to have been fuelled by competing ASB agendas from those at the top of the Coalition government, with May focusing on the needs of vulnerable victims and Cameron on perpetrators. Despite both delivering salient political rhetoric, the lack of communication appears to limit the level of redress available to victims when considered in practice, which undermines the intended victims focus. Victims of ASB would be better served by policies that aim to prevent ASB victimisation in the first instance for all types of victims, thus avoiding a concentration on retrospective justice. This could be achieved by increasing opportunities for education, recreation and building community cohesion. Further training for frontline officers and call handlers on a national scale would assist the identification of vulnerable and/or repeat victims, could include emphasising the differences between ASB and hate crime, and promote a shared terminology around hate incidents. These suggestions may not provide vote-winning sound bites, quick results or be cheap to implement, but they are examples of truly putting victims first. Acknowledgements I would like to thank the reviewers for their supportive and constructive comments, as well as David Best, Hannah Smithson, Bob Jeffrey and Samantha Jefferson for their helpful suggestions on earlier versions of this article. 23 References British Institute for Brain Injured Children (2007) Research on ASBOs and Young People with Learning Difficulties and Mental Health Problems. Bridgewater: BIBIC. Burney, E. (2005) Making People Behave - Anti-Social Behaviour Policy and Politics. Devon: Willan Publishing. Cameron, D. 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work_ddgr7wt2drgtxlampzdjhuekfq	----	Region, Social Identities, and Disclosure Practices as Predictors of Heterosexist Discrimination Against Sexual Minorities in the United States Region, Social Identities, and Disclosure Practices as Predictors of Heterosexist Discrimination Against Sexual Minorities in the United States* Eric Swank, Morehead State University Breanne Fahs, Arizona State University David M. Frost, Columbia University Exposure to heterosexist discrimination may vary by a person’s place of residency. Utilizing a minority stress perspective, an online survey of self-identified lesbian, gay, and bisexual (LGB) individuals (n = 285) examined whether rural and small town inhabitants experienced greater exposure to six types of enacted stigma. After comparing the frequency of enacted stigma by community type, findings demonstrated that rural LGBs reported experiencing more homophobic statements, property damage, and employment discrimination than urban LGBs. Small town LGBs also encountered addi- tional amounts of housing discrimination and were more often chased by strangers com- pared with urban sexual minorities. Finally, disclosure practices and hierarchies based on race and social class also influenced exposure to discrimination. The importance of spatial factors often intensified when respondents disclosed their sexual identity more publicly. When exploring racial and class differences, affluent sexual minorities experi- enced less employment discrimination and white sexual minorities were less likely to experience several forms of heterosexist events (especially being punched and kicked). Discrimination against lesbian, gay, and bisexual (LGB) individuals is common and multidimensional. In its most explicit forms, heterosexist behavior manifests itself through physical violence and language that chastises and demeans homosexuality and non-normative gender behavior. In slightly subtler forms, heterosexism and heteronormativity inform many insidious practices that privilege heterosexuality while denigrating sexual minorities. Through these practices, LGBs often endure hostile environments that monitor and penalize homosexual behavior in the United States. LGB individuals’ experiences of stigma, prejudice, and discrimination, which result from heteronormativity and heterosexism,1 have been usefully conceptualized as constituting minority stress (Meyer 2003). Minority stress theory is based in social stress theory, which posits that stressors constitute any factors or conditions that require individuals to adapt to changes intrapersonal- ly, interpersonally, or in their environments. Meyer (2003) posited that minority stressors can be usefully conceptualized along a continuum of proximity to the Sociological Inquiry, Vol. 83, No. 2, May 2013, 238–258 © 2013 Alpha Kappa Delta DOI: 10.1111/soin.12004 self. Stressors most distal to the self are objective stressors based primarily in the environment, such as prevailing stereotypes, prejudice, and discrimination. Most proximal to the self are people’s internalizations of negative social atti- tudes toward their own minority group (e.g., internalized contempt for one’s sexual identity). Institutionalized heterosexism and hate crimes directed toward LGB individuals are located on the most distal end of this continuum, because they stem directly from the social environments in which LGBs experience their lives. Studies on the prevalence of heterosexist discrimination are somewhat common, while research on how victimization rates may vary for different sub- groups is rarer.2 There are some “double oppression” studies that explore the ways that heterosexist discrimination may be modified along race, class, and gender lines (D’Augelli and Grossman 2001; Meyer, Schwartz, and Frost 2008; Szymanski and Sung 2010). Unfortunately, less attention has been paid to the macro and structural factors that predict shifting patterns in heterosexist discrimination. Some initial studies suggest that electoral votes on same-sex marriage (Rostosky et al. 2009) or increases in poverty and unemployment can trigger increased rates of hate crimes against gays and lesbians (Alden and Par- ker 2005; Green, Glaser, and Rich 1998). Even fewer studies have explored the relationship between spatial factors and discriminatory practices (Barton 2012; Gonzalez et al. 2009; Kosciw, Greytak, and Diaz 2009; Waldo, Hesson-McInn- nis, and D’Augelli 1998). To build upon this nascent literature, this article explores the links between sexual minorities’ place of residency and their expo- sure to heterosexist discrimination. Moreover, this study addresses whether urban and rural differences remain important after one controls for race, class, gender, and sexual identity disclosure. Location and Gender Expectations Urban sociologists like Wirth (1938) and Fischer (1975) argue that nations, regions, and localities can distinguish their cultures from one another through the historical interplay of many social processes (e.g., amount of indus- trialization, degree of racial–class–age heterogeneity, migration practices, popu- lation density, type of social networks available). Rural areas, or spaces that have high land-to-human ratios and an economic dependence on farming, min- ing, and forestry, have often been conceptualized as communities that prize cul- tural homogeneity, localism, religiosity, and “traditional values” (Miller and Luloff 1981). In contrast, Wirth (1938) argued that the “urban way of life” gen- erally disrupts ethnocentric and authoritarian perspectives. Due to macro issues of city size, population density, and greater cultural heterogeneity, city dwellers regularly encounter social systems that transmit new, unique, and incompatible moral messages. To cope with diverse and sometimes contradictory social cues, REGION AND EXPOSURE TO HETEROSEXIST DISCRIMINATION 239 city dwellers must learn how to respond to a wider range of opinions as they try to reconcile competing moral and behavioral expectations. This adaptation then normalizes flexibility in thought and a greater tendency to accept practices that could be considered unconventional or strange in more rural and small town settings. Adding to these contextual factors are possible compositional effects; that is, cities or regions may hold higher concentrations of people who possess the traits associated with liberalism—such as higher education levels, less religious fundamentalism, or general inclination to not see diversity as a threat (Moore and Vanneman 2003; Van Dyke, Soule, and Windom 2001). In fact, Johnson and Stokes (1984) contended that the greater conservatism of southern commu- nities is partly due to greater prevalence of personal piety (e.g., prayer) and the acceptance of orthodox-fundamentalist religious beliefs (e.g., the Bible is iner- rant, the ubiquity of human sinfulness, or the fear of eternal damnation at the hands of a punitive God). Studies that link heterosexism to regional variation have mostly followed two approaches. When addressing attitudes toward traditional gender roles and negativity toward heterosexuals, some studies have explored the possibility of gender and sexuality attitudes being spatialized (Baunach, Burgess, and Muse 2010; Carter and Borch 2005; Eldridge, Mack, and Swank 2006; Moore and Vanneman 2003). Several space-based studies note that traditional gender and sexuality scripts are expressed more frequently by people who resided in small town or rural communities (Andersen and Fetner 2008; Bolzendahl and Myers 2004; Loftus 2001; Rice and Coates 1995; Rosenfeld and Kim 2006), and southern or more rural states are more likely to have laws that ban same-sex marriages (Kane 2007; McVeigh and Maria-Elena 2009; Soule 2004). Location and Discrimination Against Sexual Minorities The empirical literature on how discrimination and minority stress vary across community contexts is less prolific. Since the mid-1990s, there has been a small upsurge in the number of qualitative studies of rural sexualities (e.g., Barton 2010; Gray 2009; Kazyak 2011; McCarthy 2000). Rural-living LGBs overwhelmingly described living in bleak and inhospitable social climates. Findings from these studies highlight hostile rural communities that forced sex- ual minorities into silence, social isolation, and fear of hate crimes. In total, the narratives in qualitative studies depict rural landscapes as oppressive places to flee from, while cities are viewed as a better, safer, and more enjoyable context (unfortunately, none of these studies compared these narratives to those of urban LGBs). Quantitative studies that analyze minority stress variation by region are less consistent in their results than qualitative studies (Gonzalez et al. 2009; 240 ERIC SWANK ET AL. Johnson et al. 2005; Kosciw, Greytak, and Diaz 2009; Connolly and Leedy 2007; Waldo, Hesson-McInnnis, and D’Augelli 1998). One study noted that rental discrimination for same-sex parents is worse within certain residential neighborhoods of Canadian cities (Lauster and Easterbrook 2011), while another study discovered spatial variance in the hiring practices of sexual minorities (Tilcsik 2011). With regard to homophobic bullying, a recent study of Canadian LGB adolescents noted that rural youths were confronted more with verbal teasing and physical assaults than their metropolitan counterparts (Poon and Saewyc 2009). Also, LGB high school students who attended urban schools heard less homophobic remarks and dealt with less sexual harassment related to sexual identity compared with their heterosexual counterparts (Kosciw, Greytak, and Diaz 2009). Other survey-based studies partially con- firmed aspects of the rural toxicity argument. A recent sample from Wyoming noted that lesbians, but not gay men, in smaller towns faced greater levels of public discrimination than lesbians in larger cities (Connolly and Leedy 2007). Similarly, rural lesbian mothers experienced more public harassment and rejec- tion than urban lesbian moms, but the spatial differences disappeared when addressing homophobic comments by relatives (Puckett et al. 2011). Finally, heterosexist verbal abuse, but not violent hate crimes, was more common among rural gay men in Kentucky (Tewksbury et al. 1999). In contrast, other studies have detected no urban or rural effects on the experience of minority stress for LGBs (Gonzalez et al. 2009). Weston’s (1995) ethnography suggests that narratives of urban–rural differences are mostly a dream and “sexual imaginaries” of this sort generally lead to great disappointments for rural LGBs who move to the cities. In quantitative litera- ture, a study of LGB senior citizens in nursing homes found that community size did not predict the amount of discrimination they noted from administra- tors, staff, and other residents (Johnson et al. 2005), and a study of LGB col- lege students found urban and rural respondents reported similar levels of verbal or physical harassment (Waldo, Hesson-McInnnis, and D’Augelli 1998). Lastly, another study found that place of residency was unrelated to levels of internalized homophobia, stigma consciousness, and the amount of “outness” among urban and rural lesbian mothers (Puckett et al. 2011). Social identities and Exposure to Heterosexism Sexual minorities who reside in the same area do not always share the same social locations in race, class, and gender hierarchies. For example, due to a “matrix of oppressions,” intersectional theorists argue that affluent white lesbians generally have different life experiences, obligations, and expectations than poor black lesbians and gay men (Collins 1990). While exploring double or interlock- ing oppressions, some studies suggest that sexual minority African Americans, REGION AND EXPOSURE TO HETEROSEXIST DISCRIMINATION 241 Latina/os, and Asian Americans probably face greater stigma and hostility about their sexual orientation than whites (Chae and Ayala 2010; Diaz et al. 2001; Szymanski and Sung 2010). For example, surveys have often found elevated levels of homonegativity among African Americans, Asian Americans, and Lati- na/os (Lewis 2003; Loftus 2001; Schulte and Battle 2004), while black lesbians faced more resentment when they “came out” to family members and friends (Grov et al. 2006; Mezey 2008). Other studies suggest that African American and Latino/a sexual minorities report high levels of racism in the dating scene (Balsam et al. 2011). Additionally, LGBT African Americans and Latina/os may suffer more from lower salaries and fewer career advancements compared with white sexual minorities (Elmslie and Tebaldi 2007; Lombardi et al. 2001; Ragins and Cornwell 2001). Finally, racial backgrounds and exposure to het- erosexist discrimination might also be related. Some studies suggest that white sexual minorities were less likely to experience event-based forms of discrimina- tion and victimization, such as physical or sexual assaults, because of their sex- ual identity (Berrill 1990; Meyer, Schwartz, and Frost 2008), while others suggested that racial differences in hate crimes were much stronger for lesbians (Dunbar 2006). Other studies suggest that homophobic hate crimes and everyday discrimination did not vary by race (Herek 2009; Huebner, Rebchook, and Kegeles 2004; Pilkington and D’Augelli 1995). The gender of sexual minorities can alter the types of discrimination expe- rienced. Numerous studies have found that gay men generally experienced more homophobic threats and fist fights than lesbians (Berrill 1990; D’Augelli and Grossman 2001; Herek 2009; Tewksbury et al. 1999), but stranger-induced sexual assaults happened more to lesbians than gay men (Balsam, Rothblum, and Beauchaine 2005; D’Augelli and Grossman 2001). When dealing with day- to-day interactions, gay men often reported being treated with more respect and courtesy by family members and schoolmates, but gay men often encountered more hostile neighbors than lesbians (Meyer, Schwartz, and Frost 2008; Pil- kington and D’Augelli 1995; Puckett et al. 2011). The discussion on different economic opportunities for gay men and lesbi- ans has yielded even more complications. One study found that lesbian mothers encountered more rental discrimination than gay fathers (Lauster and Easter- brook 2011). When at work, lesbians often reported greater workplace discrimi- nation than gay men (Ragins and Cornwell 2001), but differences in salary between gay men and lesbians were not substantial (Blanford 2003; Elmslie and Tebaldi 2007). These mixed findings suggest that gay men may avoid more blatant forms of workplace discrimination than lesbians, but male privilege in salaries is less consequential for gay than heterosexual men. Membership in certain social classes can influence exposure to heterosexist discrimination (Chae and Ayala 2010). Poor and working-class heterosexuals 242 ERIC SWANK ET AL. were less supportive of same-sex marriages (McVeigh and Maria-Elena 2009) and displayed more hostility toward sexual minorities (Andersen and Fetner 2008). Accordingly, more affluent gays and lesbians may have the money to buy into safer communities, while poorer sexual minorities often cannot afford to live in these more hospitable enclaves (Barrett and Pollack 2005). Because of corporate power structures, it is likely that business owning, managerial, and professional LGBs experience less employment discrimination than sexual minorities with working-class jobs (Diaz et al. 2001; Lombardi et al. 2001). Discrimination and Disclosure Patterns Public acknowledgements of sexual identities are often crafted through a complicated set of disclosure practices (Ward and Winstanley 2006). Some sexual minorities may feel comfortable revealing their sexual identity in most settings, while others may only hint at their sexual identity to a few confidants or nobody at all. Disclosures of sexuality are often strategic, as revealing one’s “real” sexual identity can carry benefits and risks depending on the reactions of audience mem- bers. While being “out” means that people could have greater access to supportive communities, being labeled as a sexual minority also increases the chances of encountering heterosexist rejection and discrimination (Lombardi et al. 2001; Szymanski and Sung 2010). In fact, some studies concluded that LGBs who have been out longer, or tell more people of their sexual identity, were more likely to experience verbal harassment and physical hate crimes than LGBs who reported less disclosure (D’Augelli and Grossman 2001; Huebner, Rebchook, and Kegeles 2004; Taylor and Raeburn 1995; Tewksbury et al. 1999). The Current Study This study addresses possible location-based differences in exposure to forms of enacted stigma by addressing the following research questions: (1) Does living in rural or urban communities influence the amount of discrimina- tory experiences that sexual minorities endure? (2) Does disclosure of sexual minority identity result in increased exposure to cases of enacted stigma? (3) Does the association between location (urban versus rural) and enacted stigma depend on sexual identity disclosure? And finally, (4) Do spatial factors influ- ence the exposure to hate crimes and other forms of enacted stigma even after controlling for race, class, and gender? Method Participants This online study drew from a sample of 285 LGB-identified women and men recruited from throughout the United States in December 2007. Participants REGION AND EXPOSURE TO HETEROSEXIST DISCRIMINATION 243 were recruited through ten e-mail listservs that served self-identified lesbians, gays, and bisexuals. Because the sample was part of a larger study on the politi- cal participation of gay men and lesbians, two of the listservs contained mem- bers of “Fairness Alliances” that sought equality for LGBs. Memberships in these e-mail groups were free, and most of their participants resided in Midwest- ern and Mid-Atlantic states. The other eight listservs provided less explicitly politically engaged networks. When finding these e-mail groups, we selected Yahoo groups that met three criteria. First, the group had to exist for explicitly social purposes (i.e., they did not mention anything political in the description of their listserv). Second, we excluded groups that seemed to serve as romantic or sexual match-making sites to avoid biasing the sample with an overrepresenta- tion of single participants. Finally, to lessen problems of selection bias along spatial lines, we looked for groups that mentioned the regions that were most common in the political listservs (e.g., Queer Kentucky). The cover letters sent via the listservs asked potential respondents to click on a link that took them to the study’s Web site. The letter solicited the involvement of adults who self-identified as LGB. As expected, the letter stated that involvement in this project was anonymous and voluntary. The sample of 285 participants had a preponderance of males (58% male) and a mainly white racial composition (79% European American, 7% Native American, 2% African American, 1% Asian American, 1% Latina/o, and 10% “refuse to answer”). Ages in the sample spanned a wide range, from age 18–75, with 24 percent under age 30, 54 percent ages 30–50, and 22 percent ages 51– 75 (mean = 39.75, r = 12.19). The sample included a diverse array of incomes, including 10 percent below $20,000 per year, 27 percent below $20,000–50,000 per year, 25 percent below 50,000–80,000 per year, and 31 percent over $80,000 per year, with 8 percent missing data. Our sample was highly educated, with 3 percent having earned a high school degree, 58 percent having some col- lege or a bachelor’s degree, and 32 percent having a graduate degree. Partici- pants tended to be distributed in many types of urban and rural spaces, with 26 percent residing in a center city of large urban center, 18 percent residing in a suburb of a large urban center, 18 percent residing in a midsized city, 23 percent residing in small towns, and 9 percent living in rural areas. Because the political listservs were connected to a Kentucky organizations, 65.2 percent of partici- pants lived in the South, 15.7 percent lived in the Midwest, 6.2 percent lived in the West, and 4 percent lived in the East (with Kentucky, Ohio, Indiana, Tennessee, and West Virginia representing the most respondents). Measures Discriminatory Experiences. Gregory Herek (2009) specified methods to estimate the prevalence of discrimination against LGBs (see also D’Augelli and 244 ERIC SWANK ET AL. Grossman 2001). Herek operationalized the concept of “enacted” stigma by measuring manifestations of discrimination directed against people who are presumed sexual minorities. Enacted stigma is defined as the situations in which people, groups, or institutions explicitly dismiss, denigrate, or attack a person because they are not seen as a heterosexual. This study separately analyzed six forms of enacted stigma that had occurred in the past year, as each form of enacted stigma was measured through a single item. Three dependent variables concentrated on personal experiences of interpersonal hate acts. When focusing on being targeted because of their sexual identity, one item asked participants whether they have been “punched, hit, kicked, or beaten,” while other items asked whether they were “chased or followed” or “had personal property destroyed or damaged.” One dependent variable dealt with the frequency of encountering homophobic condemnations. Instances of verbal degradation were assessed through an item on how often participants “confront people who make homophobic statements.” Two variables traced issues of economic discrimination. To measure employ- ment and housing biases, respondents were asked whether they were “denied or fired from a job” or “prevented from moving into an apartment or house” because of their sexual identity. Responses to each item were never, once, or twice or more during the past year. Location. To measure urban–rural distinctions, we asked the question: “What type of community do you currently reside in?” All of the five close- ended responses dealt with the population density of that community: rural, small town, midsize city, suburban metropolitan, and center city metropolitan. Participants’ responses were recoded into a system of dummy binary variables, with city center metropolitan as the referent group. To help participants identify their community type, our item indicated that metropolitan centers had over 100,000 residents, midsize cities had between 20,000 and 100,000 inhabitants, and small towns had populations under 19,999. Gender. A response to the question “What is your gender” was coded as male equals 1 and female equals 0. The nineteen cases with no response for this item were coded as missing data. Race. Race was treated as a dichotomized variable (white = 1, while African American, Asian American, Latina/o, and Native American = 0). This binary approach was used because some of the racial categories had few respondents. Furthermore, this approach has been useful in previous research on exposure to minority stress as it allows for an analysis of exposure differences based on racial/ethnic minority status (Meyer, Schwartz, and Frost 2008). Family Income. Income was determined through a scale of family income in the last year (see Barrett and Pollack 2005). In response to a REGION AND EXPOSURE TO HETEROSEXIST DISCRIMINATION 245 question about their “current annual family income,” there were five categories that started at under $20,000 and ended with above $151,000. Disclosure (Out). Public disclosure of sexual identity was assessed one item from the Public Identification as a Lesbian Scale: “I try not to give any signs that I am gay or lesbian” (Szymanski, Chung, and Balsam 2001). The five-point Lickert scale had strongly disagree coded as 5. Analytical Plan A series of hierarchical OLS regression models tested the relationship between our independent and dependent variables. Model 1 offered an additive analysis of how place of residency and experiences of enacted stigma were connected. Model 2 explored the way in which public disclosures of sexual identities could possibly modify the spatial distribution of heterosexist events (place 9 concealment interactions are added to the regression). In doing so, it was assumed that sexual minorities would face higher levels of direct discrimi- nation if they concealed their sexual-minority identities to a lesser degree. Finally, following the added-burden hypothesis, we tested whether membership in disadvantaged social groups influenced exposure to heterosexist experiences in both models. Participants who were missing data on any one variable were excluded from the analysis (n = 17).3 Results Descriptive Statistics for Enacted Discrimination in the Last Year Table 1 offers the descriptive statistics of the enacted stigma items. Cases of recent enacted stigma are relatively rare in this study, but roughly one quar- ter of the respondents dealt with two or more verbal threats in the last twelve months. Almost ten percent of the sample experienced property damage or were chased because of their sexuality in the same time span, while five per- cent detected heterosexist employment discrimination. Place Variables and Recent Enacted Discrimination Table 2 displays the results of the regressions for the six types of enacted stigma. We entered place of residency along with disclosure, gender, race, and class factors in the first model and entered area–disclosure interactions in the second model. When exploring the coefficients of determination for model 1, the R-square ranged between .047 and .089 for each form of enacted stigma. The cumulative effects for model 1 were significant for economic discrimination (R² = .089, p < .01), homophobic statements (R² = .084, p < .01), and being chased (R² = .062, p < .05), and the combined predictive capabilities of the variables mostly expanded with the addition of space–disclosure interactions in 246 ERIC SWANK ET AL. model 2. This indicates that the regressions that incorporated place–concealment intersections were significant for every enacted discrimination, and model 2 could account for between 8.8 percent and 12.3 percent of the variance in the dependent variables. However, the model containing interaction terms produced lower R-square for employment discrimination and being chased. Spatial Factors. The direction of every coefficient suggested that exposure to heterosexist events increased when people lived in rural and small town areas. However, the associations for location factors were not exceptionally strong when holding the effects of the gender, race, income, and disclosure factors constant. In model 1, rural residencies were significant predictors only of economic employment discrimination (b = .176, p < .01) and small town habitancies reached significance for housing discrimination Table 1 Descriptive Statistics for Enacted Discrimination in the Last Year and Independent Variables Enacted discrimination Never Last year once Twice or more Denied employment 247 (94%) 11 (4%) 3 (1%) Evicted, denied housing 258 (97%) 3 (1%) 2 (1%) Verbal threats and homophobic statements 131 (49%) 56 (21%) 76 (28%) Personal property damaged 239 (91%) 13 (5%) 9 (4%) Chased or followed 243 (92%) 11 (4%) 7 (2%) Punched, hit, kicked, beaten 253 (97%) 6 (2%) 1 (1%) Categorical independents % Yes Rural 9 Small town 23 Midsize city 18 Suburb of large urban center 18 Center city of large urban center 26 Missing location 6 Male 58 White 79 Continuous independents Mean SD Out sexual identity (Scale 5 to 1) 3.34 1.09 Family income (Scale 5 to 1) 2.82 1.08 REGION AND EXPOSURE TO HETEROSEXIST DISCRIMINATION 247 T ab le 2 R eg re ss io ns fo r S pa ti al F ac to rs , D is cl os ur e of S ex ua l Id en ti ty , D em og ra p hi cs an d F or m s of E na ct ed D is cr im in at io n P re di ct or va ri ab le s E m pl oy m en t di sc ri m in at io n H ou si ng di sc ri m in at io n H om op ho bi c st at em en ts P ro pe rt y da m - ag e C ha se d or fo ll ow ed P un ch ed or ki ck ed B b B b B b B b B b B b M od el 1 R ur al .1 76 .1 72 ** .0 68 .0 90 .2 61 .0 79 .1 49 .1 02 .0 59 .0 47 .0 38 .0 59 S m al l to w n .0 13 .0 15 .0 77 .1 16 * .0 83 .0 29 .1 44 .1 17 * .1 47 .1 39 * .0 52 .0 94 M id si ze ci ty �. 04 5 �. 05 9 �. 02 0 �. 03 8 �. 07 6 �. 03 1 �. 07 2 �. 06 7 �. 12 0 �. 12 9* �. 01 5 �. 03 2 S ub ur b �. 07 4 �. 10 1 .0 02 .0 04 �. 29 0 �. 14 1* �. 05 6 �. 05 4 �. 10 2 �. 13 5* �. 04 1 �. 08 7 O ut .0 05 .0 17 .0 08 .0 39 .2 90 .1 21 * �. 00 9 �. 02 2 �0 .3 9 �. 11 2 �. 01 1 �. 05 9 M al e .0 09 �. 01 4 .0 10 .0 24 �. 15 7 �. 10 9 �. 00 3 �. 00 4 �. 09 3 �. 12 3* .0 17 .0 42 W hi te �. 11 9 �. 14 1* �. 09 2 �. 15 7* �. 01 1 �. 00 4 �. 11 3 �. 08 4 .0 50 .0 58 �. 09 8 �. 18 2* * F am il y in co m e �. 03 1 �. 11 3* �. 01 0 �. 59 �. 02 7 �. 02 1 .0 05 .0 13 .0 01 .0 02 .0 02 .0 14 R 2 .0 89 ** .0 52 .0 84 ** .0 47 .0 62 * .0 51 M od el 2 R ur al �. 63 0 �. 61 6* * �. 50 8 � .7 20 ** �. 26 8 �. 07 1 �. 71 0 �. 48 7* * �. 51 7 �. 41 2* * �. 11 9 �. 16 0* S m al l to w n �. 15 4 �. 17 7* * �. 13 9 �. 22 9* * �. 82 4 �. 29 1* * �. 43 7 .2 70 * �. 51 3 �. 48 4* * �. 10 6 �. 19 4* M id si ze ci ty .0 80 .1 06 .0 48 .0 90 .6 66 .2 13 * �. 21 7 �. 19 4* �. 27 6 �. 29 5* �. 18 8 �. 39 1* * su bu rb .0 86 �. 11 8 .0 98 .1 80 .2 37 .0 99 .0 79 .0 75 �. 50 0 �. 55 5* * �. 19 3 �. 41 4* * R ur al 9 O ut .1 43 .4 65 ** .1 38 .6 66 ** .1 63 .1 69 * .3 67 .6 09 ** .1 76 .4 67 ** .0 39 .1 99 * S m al l to w n 9 ou t .0 48 .2 01 ** .0 60 .3 65 ** .2 65 .3 44 ** .1 71 .5 11 ** .1 07 .3 71 ** .0 46 .3 08 ** M id si ze ci ty 9 ou t �. 01 1 .0 53 �. 00 9 �. 05 9 �. 20 1 �. 29 7* .0 72 .2 39 * .0 44 .1 10 .0 51 .3 78 ** 248 ERIC SWANK ET AL. T ab le 2 (c on ti nu ed ) P re di ct or va ri ab le s E m pl oy m en t di sc ri m in at io n H ou si ng di sc ri m in at io n H om op ho bi c st at em en ts P ro pe rt y da m - ag e C ha se d or fo ll ow ed P un ch ed or ki ck ed B b B b B b B b B b B b S ub ur b 9 ou t �. 00 4 .0 21 �. 03 0 �. 10 7 �. 16 0 �. 23 4* * �. 04 2 �. 09 3 .1 13 .4 31 ** .0 45 .3 38 ** O ut .0 08 .0 28 .0 09 .0 47 .1 86 .2 09 ** .0 68 �. 09 8 .0 99 .2 85 * .0 39 .2 15 * M al e �. 00 3 �. 00 5 .0 01 .0 03 �. 12 0 �. 06 0 .0 23 .0 26 �. 07 7 �. 10 1 .0 18 .0 46 W hi te �. 11 7 �. 13 9* �. 08 8 �. 03 7 �. 02 8 �. 01 0 �. 08 5 �. 07 1 .0 55 .0 53 �. 09 5 �. 17 8* F am il y in co m e �. 02 4 �. 08 8 �. 00 4 �. 02 2 �. 03 4 .0 55 .0 00 �. 00 1 �. 00 7 �. 02 2 .0 03 .0 14 R 2 .1 13 ** .1 23 ** .1 13 ** .1 02 * .0 90 * .0 88 * D R ² .0 24 .0 71 .0 29 .0 55 .0 28 .0 37 *p < .0 5. ** p < .0 1. REGION AND EXPOSURE TO HETEROSEXIST DISCRIMINATION 249 (b = .116, p < .05) and property damage (b = .127, p < .05). Additionally, living in larger towns and the suburbs mildly suppressed victimization, but suburban factors were significant predictors only of hearing homophobic statements (b = �.138, p < .05) and being chased–followed (b = �.135, p < .05). Disclosure. As stated earlier, accounting for the interaction between disclosure patterns and spatial factors often augmented the negative effects of rural and small town contexts on exposure to discrimination; that is, more “out” sexual minorities in these settings regularly experienced more discrimination than less “out” sexual minorities in these areas. However, as separate individual variables, disclosure patterns by themselves rarely demonstrated significant associations with the discrimination outcomes. Only in the case of homophobic comments did disclosure by itself demonstrate a significant relationship to an outcome in models 1 and 2 (b = .121 and .200, p < .05, 01). 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 Low Disclosure High Disclosure E m pl oy m en t D is cr im in at io n Urban Rural 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 Low Disclosure High Disclosure H ou si ng D is cr im in at io n Urban Rural 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 Low Disclosure High Disclosure H om op ho bi c St at em en ts Urban Rural 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 Low Disclosure High Disclosure P ro pe rt y D am ag e Urban Rural 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 Low Disclosure High Disclosure C ha se d or F ol lo w ed Urban Rural 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 Low Disclosure High Disclosure P un ch ed o r K ic ke d Urban Rural Figure 1 Plots of Interactions Between Disclosure of Sexual Identity and Loca- tion in Predicting Forms of Enacted Stigma. 250 ERIC SWANK ET AL. Interactions Between Spatial Factors and Disclosure. The main effects of spatial factors and disclosure reported above must be interpreted in light of the fact that the effects of disclosure on all outcomes were dependent on the location in which sexual minorities lived. As presented in Table 2, model 2, the effects of disclosure on exposure to enacted stigma were magnified in non-urban locations. Figure 1 illustrates this pattern of findings with regard to the differential effects of sexual identity disclosure on enacted stigma across rural and urban locations. Increased disclosure was associated with increased experiences of enacted stigma for sexual minorities living in rural locations. Conversely, increased disclosure had little to no impact on experiences of enacted stigma for urban-living sexual minorities. As further evidenced in Table 2, model 2, similar directional patterns were demonstrated in the statistically significant interactions between disclosure and living in small towns versus urban centers, as being out increased exposure to all types of discrimination for small town residents. While greater disclosures generally increased exposure to discrimination for small towns and rural residents, the location–disclosure phenomena was not as consistent in other areas. Greater disclosure increased the likelihood of experiencing property damage and being punched or kicked in midsized cities; however, there was a slight decrease in hearing homophobic statements for “out” midsized city residents relative to those living in urban centers. Similarly, violent acts were more common among public suburban LGBs, but the direction of the relationship reversed for hearing homophobic statements for suburbanites. Social Identities. Each of the social statuses demonstrated different associations with enacted stigma outcomes. White sexual minorities routinely reported fewer cases of heterosexist discrimination than people of color. In both models, whites experienced less heterosexist bigotry in employment (b = �.139, �.141, p < .05) and avoided violent hate acts more often (b = �182, �.178, p < .01) than sexual minorities of color. Whites also dealt with less housing discrimination before the disclosure interactions were entered into the study (b = �.157). Larger family incomes also partially protected many sexual minorities from some forms of discrimination. However, higher social-class standing only significantly diminished the chance of being penalized in workplaces (Model 1, b = �.113, p < .05). Finally, gender had less consistent direct effects as findings indicated that lesbians and bisexual women only reported being chased more often than gay and bisexual men (model 1, b = .123, p < .05), but this difference diminished when concealment interactions were included in the regression. Discussion This study examined sexual minorities’ experiences of heterosexist dis- crimination as it related to spatial, sexual identity disclosure, race, class, and REGION AND EXPOSURE TO HETEROSEXIST DISCRIMINATION 251 gender factors—a combination rarely examined in existing quantitative research. This study explored locational and demographic predictors of six types of discriminatory acts. Special attention was given to the geographic dis- persion of heterosexist experiences as well as the notion that race, class, and gender differences appeared within sexual minority communities. Finally, this study also explored the ways in which public disclosures of sexual identities can influence exposure to minority stress within and across different types of community locations. Overall, geographic and locational factors were often related to amounts of reported heterosexist discrimination. Living in rural and small town contexts routinely increased the chances of being victimized, but the relative strength of these residencies varied by discrimination type and individuals’ disclosure of their sexual minority status. Before addressing issues of space and identity dis- closure interactions, rural residencies were significantly related to employment discrimination, while housing discrimination, property damage, and being chased were significantly connected to small town residencies. After linking location to concealment practices, the impact of small town and rural contexts increased dramatically. “Out” rural and small town sexual minorities confronted all forms of enacted stigma with greater frequency than rural and small-town living sexual minorities who did not disclose their sexual identity. The associa- tion between increased disclosure and experiences of enacted stigma was not nearly as pronounced in urban centers or other more urbanized environments such as midsized cities and suburban locations. These findings provide an interesting window into the role of stigma con- cealment as a minority stressor. Although concealing one’s sexual orientation from others can produce negative mental health outcomes for sexual minorities (Meyer 2003) and can limit the chance of intergroup contact between sexual minorities and heterosexuals (Wood and Bartkowski 2004), concealment may slightly reduce exposure to violent hate crimes and homophobic statements that are more common in rural and small town settings. More research is needed on the interrelations between discrimination and concealment and the degree to which their interrelatedness depends on aspects of social and geographic context. By exploring the “double jeopardy” hypothesis, this study also examined whether heterosexist discrimination followed traditional gender, race, and social class inequalities. For racial differences, some advantages were conferred to whites regardless of their place of residency. White sexual minorities regularly endured fewer discriminatory practices, with the largest racial impact being found in instances of physical violence and discrimination in housing and labor matters. These patterns replicated elements of Jim Crow racism; discrimination toward people of color has historically been most insidious when dealing with 252 ERIC SWANK ET AL. the allocation of scarce financial resources and the infliction of hate crime vio- lence (Green, Glaser, and Rich 1998). Issues of social class were not as paramount in this study, with income only being a significant predictor of employment discrimination. The inverse relationship between salaries and employment biases suggest that heterosexist actions in the workplace were closely related to the authority structure of orga- nizations, as higher echelon employees were treated with more respect. Overall, major differences between gay men and lesbian women were rarely detected when being regressed with covariates, with only the likelihood of being chased being significant for women in the additive model. This suggests that discrimi- natory events were experienced by gays and lesbians at about similar levels, except in the case of stalking practices. This might be related to the findings that women of any sexual orientation are more likely to be stalked than men (Tjaden and Thoennes 1998). It would be interesting to determine whether exposure to minority stress changed for different regional and race/gender/class interactions, but our cell size was too small to adequately run such regressions for race and class interactions. This study’s findings should be interpreted in light of some limitations. A larger random sample would improve the representativeness of this study and would allow for a wider range of regional or racial diversity in our data. Our discrimination items did not examine every sort of heterosexism, and such omissions could influence the impact of the factors examined in this study. For example, we were unable to explore gender differences for sexual violence because only three respondents reported being raped or sexually assaulted because of their sexual orientation. The measure also failed to identify the sex- uality of the perpetrators. Due to patterns of geographic mobility, it is possible that a person’s current residency may not always identify the location of dis- crimination that happened in the past. Consequently, it is possible that a person who lives in a rural area could have experienced discrimination in another geo- graphic area. This study’s measures also relied on the participants’ judgment about whether an event occurred as a result of prejudice and discrimination. This can be problematic because recognition of discrimination is not restricted to only the occurrence of the event, but also to issues of perception, memory, or even social framing necessary to perceive discrimination. Moreover, the focus on heterosexist events ignores more subtle issues of institutionalized dis- crimination not related to a specific incident. Research on workplace sexual harassment has shown that negative climates can be detrimental to everyone, not just the target or victim of the attacks (Miner-Rubino and Cortina 2007). Additionally, rural and small towns may lack the groups and organizational resources that improve the quality of life for sexual minorities (i.e., universities, LGBT centers, heterosexual allies, and “gay-friendly” entertainment REGION AND EXPOSURE TO HETEROSEXIST DISCRIMINATION 253 establishments). Our measure of social class would ideally feature data on occupations, work conditions, and assets, but we are limited to family income as an indicator of social class. Finally, our binary measure of gender could minimize gender diversity for some respondents, and there can be temporal ordering problems in the relationship between discrimination and disclosure patterns. It is possible that sexual minorities disclose sexual identities more frequently after they encountered discrimination. While public disclosures of stigmatized sexual identities often inspired greater amounts of discrimination, these findings should not be seen as sug- gesting that concealment of sexual minority status is a preferred option for sexual minorities. The minority stress literature suggests that concealment lim- its access to important personal and interpersonal resources that improve men- tal health (Diaz et al. 2001; Meyer 2003), and keeping one’s sexuality private stunts participation in political movements that strive for LGB rights (Taylor et al. 2009). While concealment may sometimes prevent direct attacks, it also carries detrimental outcomes that deserve critical examination. Future research should identify the mechanisms that lead to greater overt heterosexism in small towns and rural areas. Initial studies suggest that the link between discrimination and geographic location could be associated with greater concentrations of religious conservatives, homophobic parents, and less educated people in rural areas (Alden and Parker 2005; Barton 2012; McVeigh and Maria-Elena 2009; Moore and Vanneman 2003), less access to economic resources (Green, Glaser, and Rich 1998), or the fact that rural areas have fewer advocacy groups and policies that prohibit sexual orientation discrimination (Grattet, Jenness, and Curry 1998; McVeigh and Maria-Elena 2009; Ragins and Cornwell 2001; Tilcsik 2011). Researchers should also focus on the particular needs of rural LGBs and how they can best receive support in combating heterosexism within their communities. Regardless of the specific topic, research that accurately identifies the factors that allow het- erosexism to flourish—often openly and at the expense of LGBs’ well-being —must be examined to better advance social justice for people of all sexual identities. ENDNOTES *Please direct Correspondence to Eric Swank, Department of Sociology, Social Work & Criminology, Morehead State University, 325 Rader Hall, Morehead KY (e.swank@morehead-st. edu). 1The terms heteronormativity, heterosexism and homophobia are sometimes used interchange- ably when discussing matters of sexual biases. For the rest of this paper we will be using the term homophobia to mean hostile reactions to lesbians and gay men, heterosexism to deal with the 254 ERIC SWANK ET AL. cultural ideology that justifies discrimination against homosexuals who challenge conventional gen- der expectations, and heteronormativity as the assumption that sexuality is dichotomous, most peo- ple are heterosexual, and that anything other than complete heterosexuality is inferior and unnatural (Herek 2004). Enacted stigma, which is the dependent variable of this study, includes situations in which people, groups, or institutions explicitly dismiss, denigrate, or attack a person because they are not seen as heterosexual. 2We cannot cite statistics from earlier studies because we are not aware of any published data on hate crime or discrimination rates by place of residence. We are hopeful that such studies will become a priority within this literature. 3The items for gender and race were skipped the most. 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work_dersy4rekbdnbbf72tccbng5cq	----	PowerPoint Presentation - Gender differences in the effect of birth cohort on risk for alcohol and drug dependence Structural Stigma and the Health of Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual Populations Mark L. Hatzenbuehler, PhD Associate Professor of Sociomedical Sciences Co-Director, Center for the Study of Social Inequalities and Health Columbia University Mailman School of Public Health Continuing Medical Education Disclosure  Program Faculty: Mark L. Hatzenbuehler, PhD  Current Position: Associate Professor, Sociomedical Sciences, Co-Director, Center for the Study of Social Inequalities and Health, Columbia University  Disclosure: No relevant financial relationships. Presentation does not include discussion of off-label products. It is the policy of The National LGBT Health Education Center, Fenway Health that all CME planning committee/faculty/authors/editors/staff disclose relationships with commercial entities upon nomination/invitation of participation. Disclosure documents are reviewed for potential conflicts of interest and, if identified, they are resolved prior to confirmation of participation. Only participants who have no conflict of interest or who agree to an identified resolution process prior to their participation were involved in this CME activity. Learning Objectives By the end of this session, learners will be able to: 1. Define structural stigma and distinguish it from other forms of stigma 2. Describe the role of structural stigma as a determinant of LGB health and health disparities. 3. Discuss ways to integrate research on individual and structural forms of stigma into clinical settings to improve the health outcomes and access to care for LGB patients. Sexual Orientation Health Disparities What is Stigma? (Link & Phelan, 2001, “Conceptualizing Stigma”)  Stigma involves the co-occurrence of several overlapping components, including:  Distinguishing and labeling group differences  Associating differences with negative attributes (i.e., stereotyping)  Separating “us” from “them”  Status loss and discrimination  In a context of power Structural State Policies, Institutional Practices Interpersonal Abuse, Rejection, Discrimination Individual Self-Stigma, Concealing “Societal-level conditions, cultural norms, and institutional policies and practices that constrain the opportunities, resources, and wellbeing of the stigmatized” (Hatzenbuehler & Link, 2014, p. 1). “The under- representation of [structural stigma] is a dramatic shortcoming in the literature on stigma, as the processes involved are likely major contributors to unequal outcomes” (Link et al., 2004, p. 515). Stigma: A Multi-Level Construct Multi-measure, multi-method approach to studying structural stigma and LGB health  Measures of structural stigma:  Social policies (e.g., same-sex marriage laws)  Social attitudes  Social behaviors (e.g., LGBT assault hate crimes)  Methods:  Observational designs (cross-sectional, longitudinal)  Quasi-experimental designs  Laboratory designs Approach #1: Cross-Sectional, Country-Level Are Health Problems Elevated among LGB Populations in High-Structural Stigma Countries? Country-Level Structural Stigma Policy index from International LGBTI Association European Men Who Have Sex with Men Internet Survey (EMIS)  Linked ecologic data on structural stigma at the country level (N=38 European countries) to individual-level HIV risk outcomes among MSM living in these countries (n=174,209 MSM)  Concealment: “Thinking about all the people who know you (including family, friends and work or study colleagues), what proportion know that you are attracted to men?”  Response options: all or almost all; more than half; less than half; few; none  Participants reporting “few” or “none” were classified as high concealment Covariates: Age, relationship status, employment status, education, settlement size, HIV status, Gini index. ** p ≤ .01, *** p ≤ .001, + significant mediation via distribution-of-the-product method Structural Stigma Associated with HIV Risk Outcomes via Concealment Outcomes AOR (95% CI) AOR (95% CI), controlling for concealment Inadequate HIV prevention reach 1.43 (1.27-1.62)*** 1.34 (1.19-1.50) ***+ Incorrect HIV transmission knowledge 1.16 (1.08-1.26)*** 1.11 (1.03-1.20)*+ No HIV test result (12 mo.) 1.14 (1.05-1.24)** 1.04 (0.96-1.13) + No STI screen (12 mo.) 1.21 (1.07-1.36)** 1.12 (0.99-1.26) + Condoms never/seldom used 1.30 (1.10-1.54)** 1.28 (1.09-1.51)**+ No sex/MSM discussion when tested 1.52 (1.29-1.80)*** 1.39 (1.17-1.65)***+ Approach #1b: Cross-Sectional Are Health Problems Elevated among LGB Populations in High- Structural Stigma States? Measure of Structural Stigma: State-Level Policies Red = States with no protective policies Blue = States with at least one protective policy (1) Hate Crimes (2) Employment Discrimination National Epidemiologic Survey on Alcohol and Related Conditions (NESARC)  Wave 2 (N=34,653)  Household and group residents  Face-to-face interviews  Response rate: 81%  Oversampling of Blacks, Hispanics, young adults (18-24 yrs)  DSM-IV diagnoses  Sexual orientation (1.67% LGB-identified [1.86% men, 1.52% women]) Sexual orientation disparity in psychiatric morbidity is higher in states with structural stigma 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 Dysthymia GAD PTSD Comorbidity A O R Protective Policies No protective policies Covariates: sex, age, race/ethnicity, SES, marital status, perceived discrimination Approach #2: Longitudinal Does Structural Stigma Prospectively Predict Health Problems among LGB Populations? Data Sources: General Social Survey/National Death Index  General Social Survey (GSS)  Primary source of social indicator data for social sciences since 1972  Repeated cross-sectional surveys (N=53,043 from 1972-2008)  Representative sample of the US non-institutionalized population  Measure of sexual behavior (N=914 sexual minorities; 4.5%)  National Death Index (NDI)  Participants from 18 waves of GSS are linked prospectively to mortality data by cause of death, obtained from National Death Index  Linkage approach well-validated (e.g., NHANES, NHIS) Shelby County (n=20) Prejudicial attitudes=3.2 2 sexual minorities 1 died San Francisco (n=75) Prejudicial attitudes=0.9 20 sexual minorities 2 died General Social Survey/National Death Index: Community-Level (N=170 PSUs) Prejudicial Attitudes as a Predictor of Mortality Risk among Sexual Minorities Life expectancy difference = 12 yrs. (range: 4-20) **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 Structural Stigma Predicts Increased Mortality Risk Adjusting for Individual and Community-Level Risk Factors Parameters Hazard Ratio 95% Confidence Interval Structural Stigma 3.03 (1.50, 6.13)** Sex (Female) 0.59 (0.39, 0.88)** Race/Ethnicity (Black) 2.87 (1.76, 4.67)*** Age at Interview 1.05 (1.04, 1.06)*** Years of Education 0.99 (0.93, 1.05) Household Income 1.04 (0.86, 1.86) Self-Rated Health (Poor/Fair) 1.04 (0.61, 1.19) Community-Level Income 1.70 (0.56, 5.17) Community-Level Education 0.86 (0.61, 1.19) Survival Time by Community- Level Structural Stigma 70% 75% 80% 85% 90% 95% 100% 1 2 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 22 Pe rc e n t A li ve Time, years Low Structural Stigma High Structural Stigma Additional Results  Descriptive analyses of specific causes of death by ICD-9 code:  Results were not due to HIV-related causes (only 5 deaths)  Suicide, homicide/violence, and cardiovascular diseases were substantially elevated among sexual minorities in high-structural stigma communities  Sexual minorities in high-stigma communities died by suicide at age 37.5 vs. 55.7 among those in low-stigma communities (18-year difference)  Testing alternative explanations  Geographic mobility since age 16 is not associated with:  Self-rated health: r=0.02, p=.16  Mortality risk: HR=1.17 (95% CI: 0.76, 1.78)  Results are robust to selection effects regarding mobility Approach #3a: Quasi-Experimental Do Health Problems among LGB Populations Increase Following Increases in Structural Stigma? Constitutional Amendments Banning Same-Sex Marriage (2004) Red = States passing constitutional amendments Blue = States not passing constitutional amendments NESARC (2001-2005) LGB Adults Living in States that Banned Same-Sex Marriage Experienced Increase in Mood Disorders 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 Gay Marriage Ban (N=135) No Marriage Ban (N=442) M O O D D IS O RD ER STATE OF RESIDENCE Wave 1 Wave 2 AOR = 1.67 (95% C.I. 1.01, 2.77) AOR = 0.69 (95% C.I., 0.47, 1.01) 36.6% increase 23.6% decrease Covariates: sex, age, race/ethnicity, SES, marital status Effect of Marriage Bans Specific to LGB Adults 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 LGB (N=135) Heterosexual (N=9,963) M O O D D IS O RD ER Wave 1 Wave 2 AOR = 1.67 (95% C.I. 1.01, 2.77) AOR = 1.03 (95% C.I. 0.93, 1.15) 36.6% increase 2.6% increase Covariates: sex, age, race/ethnicity, SES, marital status Approach #3b: Quasi-Experimental Do Health Problems among LGB Adults Decrease Following Reductions in Structural Stigma? Methods  In 2003, Massachusetts became the first state to legalize same-sex marriage (Goodridge vs. Department of Public Health)  Community-based health clinic (N=1,211 gay and bisexual men)  Extracted health information in outpatient billing records from 2002-2004  Examined changes in medical and mental health care utilization and expenditures in the 12 months before and after same-sex marriage legalized Reduction in Mental Health Care Utilization in the 12 Months Following Same-Sex Marriage 20.5 21 21.5 22 22.5 23 23.5 24 24.5 25 Pre-Marriage Law Post-Marriage Law # O F VI SI TS F(1,147)=4.60, p=0.03, Cohen’s d=0.35 Reduction in Mental Health Care Costs in the 12 Months Following Same-Sex Marriage 1950 2000 2050 2100 2150 2200 2250 2300 2350 2400 2450 Pre-Marriage Law Post-Marriage Law CO ST S (IN $ ) F(1, 147)=6.32, p<0.01, Cohen’s d=0.41 Costs (in $) Reduction in Health Problems in 12 Months Following Same-Sex Marriage (by International Classification of Diseases-9 codes) 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 % R ED U CT IO N Depression Adjustment Hypertension Addressing Alternative Explanations: Health Care in Massachusetts (2002-2004)  Instituted comprehensive health care reform law  But this occurred in 2006, well outside the study period  Trends in health care costs among Massachusetts residents increased during study period (CMS, 2007)  But we find evidence for decreased expenditures  Cuts to MassHealth insurance program (disabilities, poverty) in 2004  But only 3% of our sample had MassHealth; removing them doesn’t change direction or magnitude of the results Approach #4: Laboratory paradigms to test mechanisms Does Structural Stigma Alter HPA Axis Functioning? Participants  74 LGB young adults from 24 states  Age: M=23.68, SD=4.12  54% female  57% lesbian/gay  60% non-White  Told purpose of study was to “understand connections between daily experiences, your bodily activity, and health” Structural Stigma Measure  Density of same-sex partner households (Census)  Proportion of GSAs in public high schools (GLSEN)  5 state-level policies (e.g., hate crimes, ENDA, same-sex marriage)  Composite index of attitudes from 41 national opinion polls (Lax & Phillips, 2009)  Factor Analysis (loadings range from .79 to .97) Lower scores (lighter blue) indicate higher structural stigma  Ranges from low of -4.46 (Mississippi) to 7.90 (Massachusetts) Methods  Procedure:  Trier Social Stress Test (Kirschbaum et al., 1993)  5-minute speech (identity-relevant topic) in front of 2 evaluators (confederates), followed by 5-minute math task  Collect neuroendocrine samples (cortisol) before, during, and after speech and math tasks Structural stigma associated with blunted cortisol reactivity to Trier Social Stress Test 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 Time 1 Time 2 Time 3 Low Structural Stigma High Structural Stigma C o rt is o l n m o l/ L Cortisol Area Under Curve (AUC) for low structural stigma: adjusted M=124.68 Cortisol AUC for high structural stigma: adjusted M=62.68 Structural stigma associated with HPA axis reactivity independent of perceived stigma Parameters F-statistic P-value Structural Stigma 4.45 0.039 Sex 7.83 0.007 Age 2.01 0.161 Waking Time 4.46 0.039 Smoking 0.96 0.331 Exercise 1.12 0.294 Race 0.66 0.418 Caffeine Use 0.02 0.882 Individual-Level Stigma 3.39 0.071 Interpretations  Blunted cortisol response also observed in:  Youths exposed to extreme life stressors (e.g., childhood maltreatment; Carpenter et al., 2007)  Individuals with PTSD and other forms of severe trauma (e.g., Yehuda et al., 2000)  Females who were randomly assigned to an ostracism condition (Zwolinski, 2012)  The stress of growing up in high-stigma environments may exert biological effects that are similar to other chronic life stressors Structural State Policies, Institutional Practices Interpersonal Abuse, Rejection, Discrimination Individual Self-Stigma, Disclosure Conclusion: Structural Stigma as a Risk Indicator for Poor Health Future Directions for Structural Stigma and LGB Health Research  Evaluate relationships between different forms of stigma across different levels of analysis  Mediation: Structural  Individual  Health Recommendations  Develop greater awareness of stigma as an etiologic factor that contributes to the health of LGB populations, which is necessary for provision of appropriate care  Develop multi-component interventions that address stigma at each level  Individual level: Cognitive-Behavioral Therapy to reduce negative mental health consequences of stigma (e.g., Pachankis et al., 2015)  Interpersonal level: reduce stigma in interpersonal interactions (e.g., mental health counselors; Rutter et al., 2008)  Structural level: Addressing the broad social context (e.g., laws, social norms) in which LGB individuals are embedded (Hatzenbuehler, 2014) Acknowledgments Funders  National Institute on Drug Abuse (K01 DA032558)  National Institute of Mental Health (F31 MH834012)  American Public Health Association (Walter J. Lear Award, Kenneth Lutterman Award)  American Psychological Association (Maylon-Smith Dissertation Award)  Williams Institute at UCLA School of Law (small research grant)  Robert Wood Johnson Foundation  Center for Population Research In LGBT Health Collaborators  Bruce Link, Jo Phelan, Katherine Keyes, Deborah Hasin (Columbia)  Kate McLaughlin (University of Washington)  Jack Dovidio, Susan Nolen-Hoeksema (Yale)  Steve Safren, Ken Mayer, Judy Bradford, Conall O’Cleirigh (Fenway) Structural Stigma and the Health of Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual Populations Continuing Medical Education Disclosure Learning Objectives Sexual Orientation Health Disparities What is Stigma?�(Link & Phelan, 2001, “Conceptualizing Stigma”) Stigma: A Multi-Level Construct Multi-measure, multi-method approach to studying structural stigma and LGB health Approach #1: Cross-Sectional, Country-Level�Are Health Problems Elevated among LGB Populations in High-Structural Stigma Countries? Country-Level Structural Stigma European Men Who Have Sex with Men Internet Survey (EMIS) Structural Stigma Associated with HIV Risk Outcomes via Concealment Approach #1b: Cross-Sectional�Are Health Problems Elevated among LGB Populations in High-Structural Stigma States? Measure of Structural Stigma:�State-Level Policies National Epidemiologic Survey on Alcohol and Related Conditions (NESARC) Sexual orientation disparity in psychiatric morbidity is higher in states with structural stigma Approach #2: Longitudinal �Does Structural Stigma Prospectively Predict Health Problems among LGB Populations? Data Sources:�General Social Survey/National Death Index ��General Social Survey/National Death Index:�Community-Level (N=170 PSUs) Prejudicial Attitudes as a Predictor of Mortality Risk among Sexual Minorities Structural Stigma Predicts Increased Mortality Risk Adjusting for Individual and Community-Level Risk Factors Survival Time by Community-Level Structural Stigma Additional Results Approach #3a: Quasi-Experimental �Do Health Problems among LGB Populations Increase Following Increases in Structural Stigma? Constitutional Amendments Banning Same-Sex Marriage (2004) LGB Adults Living in States that Banned Same-Sex Marriage Experienced Increase in Mood Disorders Effect of Marriage Bans Specific to LGB Adults Approach #3b: Quasi-Experimental �Do Health Problems among LGB Adults Decrease Following Reductions in Structural Stigma? Methods Reduction in Mental Health Care Utilization in the 12 Months Following Same-Sex Marriage Reduction in Mental Health Care Costs in the 12 Months Following Same-Sex Marriage Reduction in Health Problems in 12 Months Following Same-Sex Marriage�(by International Classification of Diseases-9 codes) Addressing Alternative Explanations:�Health Care in Massachusetts (2002-2004) Approach #4: Laboratory paradigms to test mechanisms �Does Structural Stigma Alter HPA Axis Functioning? Participants Structural Stigma Measure Methods Structural stigma associated with blunted cortisol reactivity to Trier Social Stress Test Structural stigma associated with HPA axis reactivity independent of perceived stigma Interpretations Conclusion:�Structural Stigma as a Risk Indicator for Poor Health Future Directions for Structural Stigma and LGB Health Research Recommendations Acknowledgments 
work_df3svrqaezdklfstxiwkq7kydu	----	[PDF] Cybercrime and You: How Criminals Attack and the Human Factors That They Seek to Exploit | Semantic Scholar Skip to search formSkip to main content> Semantic Scholar's Logo Search Sign InCreate Free Account You are currently offline. Some features of the site may not work correctly. DOI:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198812746.013.35 Corpus ID: 53669814Cybercrime and You: How Criminals Attack and the Human Factors That They Seek to Exploit @article{Nurse2018CybercrimeAY, title={Cybercrime and You: How Criminals Attack and the Human Factors That They Seek to Exploit}, author={Jason R. C. Nurse}, journal={ArXiv}, year={2018}, volume={abs/1811.06624} } Jason R. C. Nurse Published 2018 Computer Science, Political Science ArXiv Cybercrime is a significant challenge to society, but it can be particularly harmful to the individuals who become victims. This chapter engages in a comprehensive and topical analysis of the cybercrimes that target individuals. It also examines the motivation of criminals that perpetrate such attacks and the key human factors and psychological aspects that help to make cybercriminals successful. Key areas assessed include social engineering (e.g., phishing, romance scams, catfishing), online… Expand View PDF on arXiv Save to Library Create Alert Cite Launch Research Feed Share This Paper 11 CitationsBackground Citations 9 Methods Citations 1 View All Figures, Tables, and Topics from this paper figure 1 table 1 Cybercrime Human factors and ergonomics Phishing Malware Social engineering (security) Cyberbullying Doxing Phone hacking Revenge porn Denial-of-service attack Internet troll Paper Mentions News Article Working from home risks online security and privacy: How to stay protected Tech Xplore 27 March 2020 News Article MIL-OSI Global: Working from home risks online security and privacy – how to stay protected Foreign Affairs New Zealand 26 March 2020 News Article Working from home risks online security and privacy – how to stay protected Yahoo! News 26 March 2020 News Article Working from home risks online security and privacy – how to stay protected Yahoo! News 26 March 2020 News Article Working from home risks online security and privacy – how to stay protected The Conversation 26 March 2020 News Article Working from home risks online security and privacy – how to stay protected Yahoo! Finance USA 26 March 2020 11 Citations Citation Type Citation Type All Types Cites Results Cites Methods Cites Background Has PDF Publication Type Author More Filters More Filters Filters Sort by Relevance Sort by Most Influenced Papers Sort by Citation Count Sort by Recency Cybersecurity Awareness Jason R. C. Nurse Computer Science ArXiv 2021 1 PDF Save Alert Research Feed The Social and Psychological Impact of Cyber-Attacks Maria Bada, Jason R. C. Nurse Psychology, Computer Science ArXiv 2019 PDF View 7 excerpts, cites background Save Alert Research Feed The Group Element of Cybercrime: Types, Dynamics, and Criminal Operations Jason R. C. Nurse, Maria Bada Computer Science, Sociology ArXiv 2019 6 PDF View 2 excerpts, cites background and methods Save Alert Research Feed Cybercrime Investigators are Users Too! Understanding the Socio-Technical Challenges Faced by Law Enforcement Mariam Nouh, Jason R. C. Nurse, Helena Webb, M. Goldsmith Computer Science NDSS 2019 2019 6 PDF View 2 excerpts, cites background Save Alert Research Feed Catching the Phish: Detecting Phishing Attacks using Recurrent Neural Networks (RNNs) Lukas Halgas, Ioannis Agrafiotis, Jason R. C. Nurse Computer Science WISA 2019 6 PDF View 1 excerpt, cites background Save Alert Research Feed Cybercrime in Online Dating Site: Pornography Business in the Virtual World Rizki Briandana, Irmawati Oktavianingtyas, R. Marta Political Science 2020 View 2 excerpts, cites background Save Alert Research Feed The Data that Drives Cyber Insurance: A Study into the Underwriting and Claims Processes Jason R. C. Nurse, Louise Axon, Arnau Erola, Ioannis Agrafiotis, M. Goldsmith, S. Creese Business, Computer Science 2020 International Conference on Cyber Situational Awareness, Data Analytics and Assessment (CyberSA) 2020 1 PDF View 1 excerpt, cites background Save Alert Research Feed An application of cyberpsychology in business email compromise Shadrack Awah Buo Business, Computer Science ArXiv 2020 PDF View 1 excerpt, cites background Save Alert Research Feed Developing cybersecurity education and awareness programmes for Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) Maria Bada, Jason R. C. Nurse Business, Computer Science Inf. Comput. Secur. 2019 11 PDF Save Alert Research Feed (Smart)Watch Out! encouraging privacy-protective behavior through interactive games Meredydd Williams, Jason R. C. Nurse, S. Creese Psychology, Computer Science Int. J. Hum. Comput. Stud. 2019 1 PDF View 1 excerpt, cites background Save Alert Research Feed ... 1 2 ... References SHOWING 1-10 OF 83 REFERENCES SORT BYRelevance Most Influenced Papers Recency Cyberstalking, a New Crime: Evaluating the Effectiveness of Current State and Federal Laws Naomi Harlin Goodno Political Science 2006 34 View 1 excerpt, references background Save Alert Research Feed The Group Element of Cybercrime: Types, Dynamics, and Criminal Operations Jason R. C. Nurse, Maria Bada Computer Science, Sociology ArXiv 2019 6 PDF View 1 excerpt, references background Save Alert Research Feed The Internet as a Conduit for Criminal Activity D. Wall Political Science 2015 59 View 2 excerpts, references background Save Alert Research Feed Policing Cybercrimes: Situating the Public Police in Networks of Security within Cyberspace D. Wall Political Science, Psychology 2007 104 PDF View 2 excerpts, references background Save Alert Research Feed Trustworthy and effective communication of cybersecurity risks: A review Jason R. C. Nurse, S. Creese, M. Goldsmith, K. Lamberts Computer Science 2011 1st Workshop on Socio-Technical Aspects in Security and Trust (STAST) 2011 41 PDF View 3 excerpts, references background Save Alert Research Feed Baiting the hook: factors impacting susceptibility to phishing attacks Cristian Iuga, Jason R. C. Nurse, Arnau Erola Computer Science Human-centric Computing and Information Sciences 2016 47 PDF View 1 excerpt, references background Save Alert Research Feed On the definition and classification of cybercrime Sarah Gordon, R. Ford Computer Science Journal in Computer Virology 2006 151 PDF View 2 excerpts, references background Save Alert Research Feed The online dating romance scam: The psychological impact on victims – both financial and non-financial M. Whitty, T. Buchanan Psychology 2016 50 PDF View 1 excerpt, references background Save Alert Research Feed Cyberstalking versus off-line stalking in a forensic sample Cristina Cavezza, T. McEwan Psychology 2014 34 View 1 excerpt, references background Save Alert Research Feed Cyberbullying: another main type of bullying? Robert Slonje, P. Smith Psychology, Medicine Scandinavian journal of psychology 2008 1,325 View 1 excerpt, references background Save Alert Research Feed ... 1 2 3 4 5 ... Related Papers Abstract Figures, Tables, and Topics Paper Mentions 11 Citations 83 References Related Papers Stay Connected With Semantic Scholar Sign Up About Semantic Scholar Semantic Scholar is a free, AI-powered research tool for scientific literature, based at the Allen Institute for AI. 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work_dfinelo5uzfzzjsmqmffhv6mkq	----	Lesbian, gay or bisexual identity as a risk factor for trauma and mental health problems in Northern Irish students and the protective role of social support Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=zept20 European Journal of Psychotraumatology ISSN: 2000-8198 (Print) 2000-8066 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/zept20 Lesbian, gay or bisexual identity as a risk factor for trauma and mental health problems in Northern Irish students and the protective role of social support Áine Travers, Cherie Armour, Maj Hansen, Twylla Cunningham, Susan Lagdon, Philip Hyland, Frédérique Vallières, Angela McCarthy & Catherine Walshe To cite this article: Áine Travers, Cherie Armour, Maj Hansen, Twylla Cunningham, Susan Lagdon, Philip Hyland, Frédérique Vallières, Angela McCarthy & Catherine Walshe (2020) Lesbian, gay or bisexual identity as a risk factor for trauma and mental health problems in Northern Irish students and the protective role of social support, European Journal of Psychotraumatology, 11:1, 1708144, DOI: 10.1080/20008198.2019.1708144 To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/20008198.2019.1708144 © 2020 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group. Published online: 03 Feb 2020. Submit your article to this journal Article views: 194 View related articles View Crossmark data https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=zept20 https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/zept20 https://www.tandfonline.com/action/showCitFormats?doi=10.1080/20008198.2019.1708144 https://doi.org/10.1080/20008198.2019.1708144 https://www.tandfonline.com/action/authorSubmission?journalCode=zept20&show=instructions https://www.tandfonline.com/action/authorSubmission?journalCode=zept20&show=instructions https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/mlt/10.1080/20008198.2019.1708144 https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/mlt/10.1080/20008198.2019.1708144 http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1080/20008198.2019.1708144&domain=pdf&date_stamp=2020-02-03 http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1080/20008198.2019.1708144&domain=pdf&date_stamp=2020-02-03 BASIC RESEARCH ARTICLE Lesbian, gay or bisexual identity as a risk factor for trauma and mental health problems in Northern Irish students and the protective role of social support Áine Travers a, Cherie Armour b, Maj Hansen a, Twylla Cunninghamc, Susan Lagdond, Philip Hyland e, Frédérique Vallières f, Angela McCarthyg and Catherine Walshed aThRIVE, Department of Psychology, University of Southern Denmark, Odense, Denmark; bSchool of Psychology, Queens University Belfast, Belfast, Northern Ireland; cDepartment of Psychology, Probation Board for Northern Ireland, Belfast, Northern Ireland; dInstitute of Mental Health Sciences, School of Psychology, Ulster University, Coleraine, Northern Ireland; eSchool of Psychology, Maynooth University, Kildare, Ireland; fTrinity Centre for Global Health, School of Psychology, Phoenix House, Dublin, Ireland; gDepartment of Clinical Services, Dublin Rape Crisis Centre, Dublin, Ireland ABSTRACT Background: People identifying as lesbian, gay or bisexual (LGB) have been shown to experience more trauma and poorer mental health than their heterosexual counterparts, particularly in countries with discriminatory laws and policies. Northern Ireland is a post- conflict region with high rates of trauma and mental health problems, as well as significant levels of prejudice against the LGB community. To date, no studies in Northern Ireland have compared trauma exposure, social support and mental health status of LGB students to their heterosexual peers. Objective: The present study aimed to assess whether LGB status was associated with more trauma exposure and poorer mental health, and whether social support mediated these associations. Method: The sample was comprised of 1,116 university students. Eighty-nine percent (n = 993) identified as heterosexual and 11% (n = 123) identified as LGB. Path analysis was used to test the hypotheses. Results: LGB status was significantly associated with increased trauma exposure and with symptoms of PTSD, depression and anxiety, but not with problematic alcohol use. These associations were mediated by social support from family only. Conclusions: These results evidence vulnerabilities among Northern Irish students identify- ing as LGB in relation to trauma and mental health compared with their heterosexual peers. However, social support from family has the potential to mitigate risk. Educational initiatives should raise awareness of the importance of familial support for LGB youth, and those young people who lack family support should be considered an at-risk group, warranting particularly intensive targeting by relevant supports. Identidad lésbica, gay o bisexual como factor de riesgo de trauma y problemas de salud mental en estudiantes de Irlanda del Norte y el papel protector del apoyo social Antecedentes: Se ha demostrado que las personas que se identifican como lesbianas, gays o bisexuales (LGB) experimentan más traumas y peor salud mental que sus contrapartes heterosexuales, particularmente en países con leyes y políticas discriminatorias. Irlanda del Norte es una región post-conflicto con altas tasas de trauma y problemas de salud mental, así como niveles significativos de delitos de odio dirigidos a la comunidad LGB. Hasta la fecha, ningún estudio en Irlanda del Norte se ha propuesto específicamente comparar la exposición al trauma y el estado de salud mental de los estudiantes LGB con sus pares heterosexuales. Objetivo: El presente estudio tuvo como objetivo evaluar si la condición LGB estaba asociada con tasas más altas de exposición al trauma y peor salud mental, y si el apoyo social mediaba estas asociaciones. Método: La muestra estuvo compuesta por 1.116 estudiantes universitarios de Irlanda del Norte. El ochenta y nueve por ciento (n = 990) se identificó como heterosexual y el 11% restante (n = 126) identificándose como LGB. El análisis de pautas se usó para probar las hipótesis de estudio. Resultados: el estado LGB se asoció con una mayor exposición al trauma y síntomas de TEPT, depresión y ansiedad, pero no con el consumo problemático de alcohol. Las asocia- ciones significativas fueron mediadas solamente por el apoyo social de miembros de la familia. El apoyo familiar se asoció con niveles más bajos de exposición al trauma y síntomas de salud mental para los jóvenes LGB. Conclusiones: los estudiantes de Irlanda del Norte que se identifican como LGB tienen vulnerabilidades en relación con el trauma y la salud mental en comparación con sus ARTICLE HISTORY Received 14 August 2019 Revised 18 November 2019 Accepted 13 December 2019 KEYWORDS LGBT; mental health; trauma; Northern Ireland; sexual minorities; social support; post-conflict PALABRAS CLAVE LGBT; Salud mental; trauma; Irlanda del Norte; minorías sexuales; apoyo social; post- conflicto 关键词 LGBT; 心理健康; 创伤; 北 爱尔兰; 性少数群体; 社会 支持; 冲突后 HIGHLIGHTS • The first study to compare trauma, social support and mental health problems of Northern Irish LGB students with their heterosexual peers. • LGB status was associated with experiencing more trauma and symptoms of PTSD, depression and anxiety. • The relationships between LGB status and trauma and mental health problems were mediated by social support from family, such that familial support reduced the likelihood of experiencing adverse outcomes. CONTACT Áine Travers ainetravers@gmail.com ThRIVE, Department of Psychology, University of Southern Denmark, Campusvej 55, Odense M 5230, Denmark EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHOTRAUMATOLOGY 2020, VOL. 11, 1708144 https://doi.org/10.1080/20008198.2019.1708144 © 2020 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/), which permits unrestricted non-commercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. http://orcid.org/0000-0002-5666-6384 http://orcid.org/0000-0001-7649-3874 http://orcid.org/0000-0002-8328-0807 http://orcid.org/0000-0002-9574-7128 http://orcid.org/0000-0001-6315-3029 http://www.tandfonline.com https://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1080/20008198.2019.1708144&domain=pdf&date_stamp=2020-01-31 compañeros heterosexuales. Sin embargo, el apoyo social de la familia tiene el potencial de mitigar esta relación. Las iniciativas educativas deberían crear conciencia sobre la importan- cia del apoyo familiar para los jóvenes LGB, y aquellos jóvenes que carecen de apoyo familiar deberían considerarse un grupo en riesgo, garantizándoles un apoyo particular- mente intensivo por terceros significativos. 女同性恋, 男同性恋或双性恋身份作为北爱尔兰学生创伤与心理健康问题 的风险因素和社会支持的保护因素 背景: 与异性恋者相比, 身份认同为同性恋或双性恋者 (LGB) 遭受的创伤更多, 心理健康状 况更差, 尤其是在有歧视性法律和政策的国家。北爱尔兰是一个冲突后地区, 创伤和心理 健康问题高发, 而且针对LGB群体的仇恨犯罪率很高。迄今为止, 北爱尔兰尚无专门比较 LGB学生与同龄异性恋者创伤暴露和心理健康状况的研究。 目标: 本研究旨在评估LGB身份是否与较高的创伤暴露率和较差的心理健康相关, 以及社会 支持是否中介了这些关联。 方法: 样本由北爱尔兰的1116名大学生组成。其中 89％ (n = 990) 身份认同为异性恋, 其余 11％ (n = 126) 身份认同为LGB。路径分析用于检验研究假设。 结果: LGB身份与增强的创伤暴露和PTSD症状, 抑郁和焦虑相关, 但与酗酒问题无关。显著 的相关仅被来自家庭成员的社会支持中介。家庭支持与LGB年轻人的创伤暴露水平和心理 健康症状降低相关。 结论: 与同龄异性恋者相比, 身份认同为LGB的北爱尔兰学生在创伤和心理健康方面更脆 弱。但是, 来自家庭的社会支持可能减少这种关联。教育倡议应提高人们对于家庭支持对 LGB青年重要性的认识, 那些缺乏家庭支持的年轻人应被视为高危人群, 确保有针对性地加 强相关支持。 1. Introduction People identifying as lesbian, gay or bisexual (LGB) are at a higher risk of experiencing trauma, mental health problems (Haas et al., 2010; Meyer, 2003; Roberts, Austin, Corliss, Vandermorris, & Koenen, 2010) and suicidal ideation (Haas et al., 2010; Mortier et al., 2018; O’Neill et al., 2018; Raifman, Moscoe, Austin, & McConnell, 2017) than heterosexuals. One US study (n = 34,653; Roberts et al., 2010) found that LGBs were twice as likely to develop post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD; ORs 2.03–2.13). LGBs also tend to exhibit more complex psychiatric presentations, such as presenting with co-occurring substance abuse and mental health disorders (ORs 1.47–2.59; Mereish, Lee, Gamarel, Zaller, & Operario, 2015). Meyer’s (2003) Minority Stress Theory posits that mental health disparities between LGBs and heterosex- uals are caused by stress-inducing environments related to experiences and perceptions of prejudice and discri- mination. LGB status is associated with a range of adverse experiences; LGB and transgender young people in the US have been found to have a 120% increased risk of homelessness, often resulting from familial rejection (n = 26,161; Morton, Dworsky, & Samuels, 2017). They are more likely to experience violence, to be exposed to more traumas and to experience trauma at a younger age (Roberts et al., 2010). The increased violence experienced by LGBs is partly due to hate crime (e.g. Herek, 2009), but the risk of other types of victimization is also elevated (Edwards et al., 2015; Porter & Williams, 2011). Mental health outcomes for sexual minorities are worse in jurisdictions with discriminatory laws and policies (Hatzenbuehler, McLaughlin, Keyes, & Hasin, 2010; Raifman et al., 2017), and exposure to ‘devaluing’ public discourse, such as that related to public votes on same-sex marriage, is associated with reduced mental wellbeing among LGBs (Frost & Fingerhut, 2016). At the time when data for the pre- sent study was gathered, same-sex marriage was ille- gal in Northern Ireland. Although attitudes in the region are now changing (McAlister, Carr, & Neill, 2014), social conservativism and homophobia have historically been very prevalent (Duggan, 2012). There are several indications to suggest that LGB people in Northern Ireland experience significant adversity and poor mental health. LGB status has been found to be associated with suicide and self- harm behaviours among Northern Irish students (Mortier et al., 2018; O’Neill et al., 2018). One survey (n = 31,625), found that Northern Ireland was the most homophobic nation in the Western world (Borooah & Mangan, 2007). LGB young people there are more likely to experience bullying, less likely to receive support at school (McNamee, Lloyd, & Schubotz, 2008) and more likely to leave school early (Gray, Horgan, & Leighton, 2013) than their heterosexual counterparts. Significant levels of homophobic hate crime and other types of sexuality-related victimization have been reported in Northern Ireland (Duggan, 2010; Jarman & Tennant, 2003; O’Doherty, 2009; Quiery, 2002). Between June 2018 and June 2019, 287 hate- motivated incidents were reported to the police (PSNI, 2019). The rates of hate crime are not directly compar- able between Northern Ireland, England, Wales, Scotland and the Republic of Ireland due to definitional and reporting differences. However, the largest UK- wide survey of LGBT issues (n = 108,100; Government Equalities Office, 2018) found that residents of 2 Á. TRAVERS ET AL. Northern Ireland were the most likely of any region in the UK to report experiencing or being offered some form of ‘conversion therapy’ (12%). The next highest rate identified was in the London region (8%). The presence of social support may have potential to partially mitigate adverse outcomes for LGBs, act- ing as a protective factor against the detrimental effects of minority stress (e.g. Meyer, 2003; Mustanski & Liu, 2013). Longitudinal research con- ducted during the ‘emerging adulthood’ developmen- tal period (i.e. between age 18–25; Arnett, 2000) identified that young people in this stage with greater perceived social support reported fewer depressive symptoms (Pettit, Roberts, Lewinsohn, Seeley, & Yaroslavsky, 2011). Potential sources of social support include family, friends and romantic partners (Pettit et al., 2011). Specific research on lesbian and gay individuals in emerging adulthood has also evidenced the protective effects of social support against low self-esteem and depressive symptoms (Spencer & Patrick, 2009). One study found that perceived social support from families, but not peers, acted protectively among LGBs (Mustanski & Liu, 2013), while others have suggested that LGB-specific social support and a sense of connectedness to the LGB community confers stronger benefits (Munoz-Plaza, Quinn, & Rounds, 2002). Trauma experienced by sexual minorities in gen- eral is an under-researched area (Edwards et al., 2015), and this is particularly true within post- conflict settings such as Northern Ireland (Duggan, 2012; McNamee et al., 2008). The present study aims to build on previous findings by investigating trauma, mental health and social support in a large student sample (n = 1,116) comparing LGBs with their het- erosexual peers. Based on existing data, and rooted to Minority Stress Theory (Meyer, 2003), three hypoth- eses were formulated: 1) LGB students will be more likely than their heterosexual peers to report a higher number of potentially traumatic experiences (PTEs); 2) LGB students will report more symptoms of PTSD, depression, anxiety and problematic alcohol use; and 3) The association between LGB status and traumatic experiences and mental health problems will be mediated by social support, whereby social support will be negatively associated with traumatic experiences and mental health problems. 2. Methods 2.1. Participants Data was gathered as part of a larger study on trauma and mental health among students in Northern Ireland (see Lagdon et al., 2018). Data was gathered between October 2014-March 2015; 25,000 invitations to participate were distributed to all students via the inter- nal mailing system of Ulster University. A total of 1,416 students started the survey, con- stituting a response rate of 5.66%. Of these, 1,116 indicated their sexuality. 89% (n = 993) identified as heterosexual, with the remaining 11% (n = 123) iden- tifying as lesbian, gay or bisexual (LGB). Seventy- three percent (n = 818) were women, 25% were men (n = 273). Data on gender was missing for 2.2% (n = 25). The mean age was 24.38 (SD = 7.46; range 18–61). Demographic information of the over- all sample was compared with information from the university about enrolled students. This indicated that the sample demographics were comparable to those of the wider university population. However, representativeness of the LGB community cannot necessarily be inferred. 2.2. Missing data Of the sample of 1,416, 300 individuals did not answer the question about sexual orientation. Chi- square and t-tests showed that this group of 300 individuals did not differ significantly from the rest of the sample on age (t (1128) = .953, p = .50) or sex (χ2 (1) = .027, p = .87). Further investigation showed that 99% (n = 297) of these had provided no responses on measures of trauma exposure, PTSD, and depression, and 99.3% (n = 298) provided no responses on the anxiety, alcohol abuse and social support measures. This precluded statistical analysis of differences between the 300 individuals and the overall sample on the outcome variables due to insuf- ficient power. Little’s Missing Completely at Random (MCAR; Little, 1988) test assessed whether data was missing at random across all variables; this was found to be the case χ2 (6028) = 6022.17, p = .52, suggesting that systematic biases in missing data were unlikely. The 300 individuals with no response for the sexu- ality item were therefore excluded from further ana- lysis, leaving a sample of n = 1,116. 2.3. Measures 2.3.1. Participant characteristics Demographic characteristics included in the analysis were age (treated as a continuous variable) and sex (coded as 1 = female and 0 = male). Participants were asked to indicate whether they identified as gay, les- bian, bisexual or heterosexual (coded as 1 = gay, les- bian or bisexual and 0 = heterosexual). 2.3.2. Potentially traumatic experiences The Stressful Life Events Screening Questionnaire (SLESQ; Goodman, Corcoran, Turner, Yuan, & Green, 1998) is a 13-item measure of lifetime trau- matic exposure, such as having a life-threatening EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHOTRAUMATOLOGY 3 illness, being threatened with a weapon, or experien- cing abuse. The SLESQ shows good test-retest relia- bility (median κ = .73) and adequate convergent validity (median κ = .64). Trauma exposure was trea- ted as a count variable in the present analysis (range 0–13). 2.3.3. Mental health problems Symptoms of PTSD were measured using the PTSD Checklist for the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (5th ed.; DSM-5; American Psychiatric Association, 2013). The PCL-5 (Weathers et al., 2013) is comprised of 20-items with five-point Likert scales where participants indicate the degree to which they have experienced each symptom (0 = ‘not at all’ to 4 = ‘extremely’) in the past month. Scores range from 0 to 80 with higher scores reflecting increased symptoms. Studies indicate that the PCL-5 is a psychometrically sound measure of PTSD sympto- mology (Blevins, Weathers, Davis, Witte, & Domino, 2015); the measure demonstrated strong internal con- sistency in the present sample (α = .96). Depression was measured using the Patient Health Questionnaire–9 (PHQ-9; Kroenke, Spitzer, & Williams, 2001), which assesses the nine DSM-5 symp- toms of depression. Respondents indicate the fre- quency with which they have experienced each symptom in the past two weeks on a four-point Likert scale from 0 (‘not at all’) to 3 (‘nearly every day’). Totals range from 0–27, with higher scores reflecting increased symptoms. The PHQ-9 has been found to be a reliable and valid measure of depressive symptoms (Kroenke et al., 2001). Its internal consis- tency in the present sample was good (α = .92). Anxiety was measured using the Generalized Anxiety Disorder Assessment (GAD-7; Spitzer, Kroenke, Williams, & Löwe, 2006), a seven-item questionnaire assessing symptoms experienced in the previous two weeks. The GAD-7 uses the same Likert response format as the PHQ-9 and total scores range from 0–27. The GAD-7 has been shown to be reliable for use in the general population (Löwe et al., 2008). Internal consis- tency was good within the present sample (α = .92). Problematic alcohol use was measured using the Alcohol Use Disorders Identification Test (AUDIT; Babor, Higgins-Biddle, Saunders, & Monteiro, 2001), a ten-item screener for harmful and hazardous alco- hol use and alcohol dependence. Responses are coded 0–4, where 0 corresponds to never engaging in a particular behaviour (e.g. having a drink containing alcohol) or having a particular experience (e.g. being injured as a result of drinking) and 4 corresponds to the highest frequency or positive endorsement of each statement. Some items ask the respondent to report how they ‘typically’ behave, others ask about the average frequency of certain behaviours ‘during the last year.’ Scores range from 0–40 with higher scores reflecting increased levels of problematic alco- hol use. The internal consistency of the AUDIT in the present study was good (α = .84). 2.3.4. Social support Social support was measured using the Multidimensional Scale of Perceived Social Support (MSPSS; Zimet, Dahlem, Zimet, & Farley, 1988). The MSPSS includes 12 items across three subscales measuring perceived social support from family, friends and a significant other. Participants indicate how they feel about state- ments such as ‘my family really tries to help me’ and ‘there is a special person who is around when I am in need.’ Each subscale has four items, measured using Likert responses from 1 (‘very strongly disagree’) to 7 (‘very strongly agree’). Scores for the total measure are calculated by summing all scores and dividing by 12 (possible range 1–7).Subscale scores are calculated by summing the relevant item scores and dividing by 4 (possible range for all subscales 1–4). The MSPSS has been found to demonstrate good psychometric proper- ties (Zimet et al., 1988; Zimet, Powell, Farley, Werkman, & Berkoff, 1990). Internal consistency was good in the present sample; Cronbach’s alpha for the entire scale was .95 and .94, .95 and .97 for the family, friends and significant other scales respectively. 2.4. Analysis The hypotheses were tested using path analysis, with three nested models. Model nesting is a technique that allows incremental testing of a statistical model, where each model contains all the terms of the last, plus at least one new term. The model with fewer terms (the restricted model) contains all the terms of the complete model, but with constraints placed on some parameters, such as fixing them to zero (Bentler & Satorra, 2010). This allows meaningful comparison as to which model provides the better statistical fit to the data (Widaman & Thompson, 2003). Model 1 in the present analysis investigated the association between sexual orientation and trauma exposure and mental health problems. In this model, sexual orientation (heterosexual or LGB) was specified as a binary predictor, and trauma exposure and mental health problems (symptoms of PTSD, depression, anxiety and problematic alcohol use) were entered as criterion variables. The paths of the covariates (age and sex) and the mediator variables (the three types of social support) were fixed to zero. In Model 2, the paths from age and sex were freed, allowing them to be included as covariates. This model tested whether sexual orientation is associated with trauma exposure and mental health problems, adjusting for sex and age. In Model 3, all paths were freely estimated, allowing for the estimation of the direct effects outlined in Models 4 Á. TRAVERS ET AL. 1 and 2, as well as indirect associations between sexual orientation and trauma exposure and mental health pro- blems via perceived social support (family, friends and a significant other). This model is depicted in Figure 1. The inclusion of multiple criterion variables within the same model corrects for multiplicity and reduces the risk of Type 1 error. Models were estimated with Mplus 8 (Muthén & Muthén, 1998–2017) using the robust max- imum likelihood (MLR) estimator. Model selection was guided by the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) and sample-size adjusted BIC (SSABIC). Lower values on these indices indicate better model fit. 3. Results Table 1 presents the sample characteristics by group (heterosexual and LGB), outlining mean differences in trauma exposure and mental health symptoms. These comparisons indicate significant differences between LGBs and heterosexuals on all variables apart from alco- hol abuse, social support from friends and social support from a significant other. The most common index experiences from the SLESQ (the event causing the most distress within the past month) among the hetero- sexual individuals were: the death of a family member or close friend (16%, n = 158), childhood sexual abuse (3.6%, n = 36) and being present when someone was killed or injured (2.7%, n = 27). Among the LGB group, the most common index experiences were: death of a family member or close friend (24.4%, n = 30), child- hood sexual abuse, (4.9%, n = 6), and rape in adulthood (3.3%, n = 4). Table 2 presents differences between groups on age, sex and each of the criterion variables. Age and sex were significantly associated with several of the criterion variables. Older age was positively associated with trauma exposure, and younger age was associated with increased symptoms of alcohol abuse. Female sex was associated with symptoms of PTSD, depression and anxiety, while alcohol abuse was associated with male sex. Age and sex were therefore included in the model as covariates. Fit statistics for the three models indicated that the full mediation model provided the best fit to the data. Model 3 was selected based on descending values for the AIC, BIC and SSABIC (see Table 3) Model 3 explained 12–14% of the variance in PTSD, depres- sion and anxiety (see Table 4). 3.1. Direct effects Direct and indirect effects from Model 3 are pre- sented in Table 5. The mediation model indicates an association between LGB status and trauma expo- sure and symptoms of PTSD, depression and anxiety (β = .07 – .36), but not with problematic alcohol use. Age was significantly associated with trauma expo- sure (β = .67), whereby older age was related to increased exposure; and with alcohol abuse (β = −.11), where younger age was associated with more alcohol abuse. There were also associations between sex and all mental health variables; female sex was associated with increased likelihood of endor- sing symptoms of PTSD, depression and anxiety (β = .13 – .15), whereas male sex was associated with alcohol abuse (β = −.14). Social support from family was negatively associated with trauma expo- sure and all mental health outcomes except alcohol abuse (β = −.29 to −.57). 3.2. Indirect effects The mediation model indicated indirect effects whereby social support from family partially explained the associations between LGB status and Predictor LGB status Trauma and mental health Trauma exposure PTSD Depression Anxiety Problematic alcohol use Mediators Social support from family Social support from friends Social support from a significant other Covariates Age Gender Figure 1. Final model of direct and indirect effects. EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHOTRAUMATOLOGY 5 trauma exposure, PTSD, depression and anxiety (β = .04 – .07). Social support from family also mediated the relationship between age and each of these variables (β = .02 – .04) There were no signifi- cant indirect effects of social support from friends or from a significant other. 4. Discussion The present study is the first to compare trauma, social support and mental health outcomes of LGB and heterosexual students in Northern Ireland. Our results suggest the presence of profound vulnerabil- ities among Northern Irish LGB students compared with their heterosexual peers. LGB status was asso- ciated with trauma exposure and higher rates of endorsement of PTSD, depression and anxiety symp- toms. The only mental health indicator that was not associated with LGB status was problematic alcohol use. The observed significant relationships were all partially mediated by perceived social support from family, but not friends or a significant other, indicat- ing that the former type of support is protective for LGB students in Northern Ireland. The findings in relation to LGB status as a risk factor for trauma exposure and mental health problems are consistent with previous international research (e.g. Haas et al., 2010; Meyer, 2003; Roberts et al., 2010); and with other Northern Irish research that found LGB status to be related to poorer outcomes with respect to self-harm and suicidality (Mortier et al., 2018; O’Neill et al., 2018) and with general mental health problems (McNamee et al., 2008). The finding in relation to alcohol abuse was somewhat unexpected, although some longitudinal research has suggested that detection of significant differences in alco- hol consumption between LGBs and heterosexuals may be less likely during university years (Hatzenbuehler, Corbin, & Fromme, 2008). Arnett (2000) also noted Table 1. Sample characteristics by sexual orientation. Variable Heterosexual group (n = 993) LGB group (n = 123) Chi-square and t-values p Age M = 24.55, SD = 7.67 M = 22.96, SD = 5.21 t (183.69) = −2.94 0.004 Sex Female N (%) 738 (74) 80 (65) χ2 (1) = 4.28 0.04 Trauma exposure M = 1.55, SD = 1.86 M = 2.37, SD = 2.23 t (122.45) = 3.62 <0.001 No exposure N (%) 324 (33) 30 (24) χ2 (4) = 24.14 <0.001 1 event 197 (20) 15 (12) 2 events 131 (13) 14 (11) 3 events 95 (10) 17 (14) 4+ events 103 (10) 29 (24) PTSD Mean score M = 16.02, SD = 18.20 M = 25.01, SD = 21.62 t (107.51) = 3.83 <0.001 Depression Mean score M = 6.97, SD = 6.38 M = 10.46 SD = 7.37 t (117.60) = 4.51 <0.001 Anxiety Mean score M = 5.83, SD = 5.54 M = 7.38, SD = 5.71 t (848) = 2.56 0.01 Alcohol use Mean score M = 7.93, SD = 5.26 M = 8.83, SD = 6.32 t (101.33) = 1.26 0.21 Social support Mean overall M = 5.14, SD = 1.58 M = 4.71, SD = 1.38 t (120.78) = −2.77 0.006 Friends M = 5.00, SD = 1.75 M = 4.73, SD = 1.65 t (792) = −1.39 0.16 Family M = 4.99, SD = 1.80 M = 4.29, SD = 1.77 t (796) = −3.48 0.001 Significant other M = 5.46, SD = 1.87 M = 5.15, SD = 1.92 t (793) = −1.46 0.15 Significant results highlighted in bold. Table 2. Differences between groups on age, sex and each of the criterion variables. Variable Sex* p Age** p Trauma exposure t (929) = −1.50 0.13 t (524.34) = 5.81 <0.001 PTSD t (430.20) = 4.19 <0.001 t (807) = 0.45 0.65 Depression t (387.96) = 3.45 0.001 t (840) = −1.33 0.18 Anxiety t (828) = 3.84 <0.001 t (819) = 1.28 0.20 Problematic alcohol use t (241.85) = −3.57 <0.001 t (629.32) = −3.34 0.001 *Coded as 1 = female, 0 = male **Using mean age (24) as cut-point Table 3. Fit statistics for the three successive models of associations between LGB status, social support, trauma and mental health. AIC BIC SSABIC Model 1 40735.14 40860.60 40778.02 Model 2 40563.77 40737.48 40623.15 Model 3 40434.92 40724.45 40533.90 Table 4. R2 estimates for the final mediation model. Variable R2 SE p PTSD 0.13 0.03 <0.001 Depression 0.14 0.03 <0.001 Anxiety 0.12 0.02 <0.001 Alcohol problems 0.04 0.02 0.01 Social support (family) 0.02 0.01 0.03 Social support (friends) 0.00 0.00 0.57 Social support (significant other) 0.01 0.01 0.19 6 Á. TRAVERS ET AL. that emerging adulthood is the peak period for engage- ment in risky behaviours such as binge drinking among young people in industrialized societies. This may lend support to the approach of treating mental health pro- blems and alcohol abuse separately, and not using risky behaviour as a proxy for mental health problems, at least within the 18–25 age bracket. The baseline rate of alcohol abuse in the general population in Northern Ireland is also known to be high (13.2% lifetime prevalence, rising to 19.1% in the 18–34 age bracket; Bunting, Murphy, O’Neill, & Ferry, 2012). Despite recent trends towards a general decline in alcohol consumption in the UK (Fat, Shelton, & Cable, 2018; Office for National Statistics, 2013), alcohol-related deaths in Northern Ireland have risen sharply (40% increase from 2001–2017; Office for National Statistics, 2017). Alcohol abuse in Northern Ireland is likely related to the high rates of trauma and PTSD in the region (8.8% lifetime prevalence of PTSD; Bunting et al., 2012). This high rate of trauma might contribute to an equalizing of alcohol abuse problems between LGB and heterosexual students, whereby the post-conflict context produces vulnerabilities leading to problematic alcohol use in young people of all sexualities. Previous research on LGBT populations has sug- gested that psychopathology manifests differently depending on sex (e.g. Cochran, Sullivan, & Mays, 2003). Sex differences were also evident in the present sample; PTSD, depression and anxiety were all signifi- cantly associated with being female. In general, externa- lizing problems such as alcohol misuse are associated with male sex (e.g. Hicks et al., 2007), and this was also true of the present sample. Unfortunately, the number of LGB young people in the present sample precluded separate consideration of lesbian, gay and bisexual indi- viduals, but we suggest that this will be an important priority of future research. Consistent with minority stress theory (Meyer, 2003), social support acted as a buffer against trauma and poor mental health for LGBs in the present study. However, this effect was found only in relation to social support from family, and not from friends or a significant other. This aligns with previous research identifying social support from family as a protective factor for LGB youth (Mustanski & Liu, 2013). There may be grounds to differentiate in future studies between general social support and social support specifically in relation to sexuality in LGB people; such differentiation may uncover a protective role of social support friends or a significant other that was not detected in the present analysis. Table 5. Standardized beta coefficients for the full mediation model. Direct effects Indirect effects Friends Significant other Variable Coefficient (SE) p Family Coefficient (SE) p Coefficient (SE) p Coefficient (SE) p Trauma exposure LGB status a 0.36 (0.08) <0.001 0.07 (0.02) 0.001 0.00 (0.00) 0.75 0.00 (0.01) 0.58 Age 0.67 (0.07) <0.001 0.04 (0.02) 0.04 0.00 (0.00) 0.71 0.00 (0.00) 0.66 Sex b −0.15 (0.10) 0.11 −0.02 (0.02) 0.24 0.00 (0.01) 0.62 0.01 (0.01) 0.54 SS Family −0.57 (0.09) <0.001 - - - - - - SS Friends 0.07 (0.13) 0.58 - - - - - - SS Significant other −0.08 (0.12) 0.54 - - - - - - PTSD LGB status 0.13 (0.04) <0.001 0.04 (0.01) 0.001 0.00 (0.00) 0.70 0.00 (0.00) 0.23 Age 0.04 (0.03) 0.27 0.02 (0.01) 0.04 0.00 (0.00) 0.61 0.00 (0.00) 0.60 Sex 0.13 (0.03) <0.001 −0.01 (0.01) 0.24 −0.00 (0.00) 0.38 0.00 (0.00) 0.14 SS Family −0.29 (0.04) <0.001 - - - - - - SS Friends 0.06 (0.04) 0.08 - - - - - - SS Significant other 0.07 (0.03) 0.05 - - - - - - Depression LGB status 0.14 (0.03) <0.001 0.04 (0.01) 0.001 0.00 (0.00) 0.70 0.00 (0.00) 0.27 Age −0.04 (0.03) 0.18 0.02 (0.01) 0.04 0.00 (0.00) 0.61 0.00 (0.00) 0.61 Sex 0.13 (0.03) <0.001 −0.01 (0.01) 0.24 0.00 (0.00) 0.38 −0.01 (0.00) 0.17 SS Family −0.30 (0.03) <0.001 - - - - - - SS Friends 0.07 (0.04) 0.06 - - - - - - SS Significant other 0.06 (0.04) 0.09 - - - - - - Anxiety LGB status 0.07 (0.03) 0.03 0.04 (0.01) 0.001 0.00 (0.00) 0.69 0.00 (0.00) 0.26 Age −0.01 (0.03) 0.81 0.02 (0.01) 0.04 0.00 (0.00) 0.61 0.00 (0.00) 0.62 Sex 0.15 (0.03) <0.001 −0.01 (0.01) 0.24 0.00 (0.00) 0.39 −0.01 (0.00) 0.16 SS Family −0.30 (0.03) <0.001 - - - - - - SS Friends 0.07 (0.04) 0.08 - - - - - - SS Significant other 0.06 (0.03) 0.09 - - - - - - Problematic alcohol use LGB status 0.02 (0.04) 0.63 0.01 (0.01) 0.27 0.00 (0.00) 0.75 0.00 (0.00) 0.51 Age −0.11 (0.03) <0.001 0.00 (0.00) 0.30 0.00 (0.00) 0.72 0.00 (0.00) 0.68 Sex −0.14 (0.04) 0.001 0.00 (0.00) 0.39 0.00 (0.00) 0.66 0.00 (0.01) 0.44 SS Family −0.05 (0.04) 0.25 - - - - - - SS Friends −0.02 (0.04) 0.64 - - - - - - SS Significant other 0.04 (0.04) 0.39 - - - - - - a Coded as LGB = 1, heterosexual = 0. b Coded as 1 = female, 0 = male. EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHOTRAUMATOLOGY 7 The identified significance of family support for LGB young people in Northern Ireland warrants increased education to develop parents’ awareness of the association between their support and the mental health of LGB young people. Conversely, these find- ings suggest that a lack of family support should be considered a significant risk factor for LGB young people; family rejection is detrimental to mental health in itself, and also puts LGB young people at risk of other adversities, such as homelessness (Morton et al., 2017). Young people in educational settings who have experienced familial rejection should therefore be considered highly vulnerable. The mental health disparities between LGB and het- erosexual students identified in the present study are cause for significant concern. Heterosexist laws (e.g. Hatzenbuehler et al., 2010; Raifman et al., 2017) and de- valuing public discourses (Frost & Fingerhut, 2016) are associated with worse mental health in LGB people. Both of these factors are relevant to the Northern Irish context and it is likely that significant social and poli- tical change will be required to alleviate their adverse impact on the mental health of LGB young people there. 4.1. Limitations Several limitations of the present study should be noted. The cross-sectional design precludes causal inferences. All information was self-report and thus open to biases such as social desirability and recall bias. The survey unfortunately did not allow participants to indicate gender options other than ‘male’ or ‘female’, preventing calculation of outcomes for transgender and non- binary individuals. Assessing mental health outcomes for gender, as well as sexual, minorities in Northern Ireland is an important priority for future research. The data for the present study does not specifically capture victimization based on sexual orientation, preventing consideration of the extent to which experiences such as hate crime contributed to the elevations among LGBs. Further research in the area to elucidate the relationships between trauma expo- sure and the development of psychopathology among LGBs would be useful in this regard. Finally, in relation to the missing data on the sexual orientation item (n = 300), although the MCAR test suggested data in the overall sample was missing com- pletely at random, the possibility remains that some individuals may have dropped out due to discomfort with disclosing their sexuality. Similarly, the narrow way in which this question was presented may have obscured sexuality-related issues among those who iden- tify as mostly heterosexual. Younger people may be less likely to have a fully solidified sexual identity, particularly in a socially conservative context such as Northern Ireland (Schubotz & O’Hara, 2011). Mortier et al. (2018) identified a significant risk among heterosexual individuals who experience same-sex attraction of suici- dal thoughts and behaviours, and of progressing from having suicidal thoughts to suicidal plans. Future research should include a broader range of options for identifying sexual orientation than those used in the present study to improve validity and reliability of results. 5. Conclusions Despite its limitations, the present study was the first to compare trauma exposure, social support and mental health outcomes between LGB and heterosex- ual students in Northern Ireland. The findings indi- cate significant disparities in outcomes such that LGB students are more vulnerable to experiencing multi- ple types of trauma, and symptoms of PTSD, depres- sion and anxiety. The relationship between LGB status and these mental health problems are partially mediated by social support from family, suggesting that familial support is a protective factor against these outcomes. It is likely that political and societal change in Northern Ireland, such as legalization of same-sex marriage and further liberalization of cul- tural norms, will be required to produce increased levels of support and acceptance for LGB youth (Hatzenbuehler et al., 2010; Meyer, 2003). Future research should analyse distinctions between risk and protective factors for lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender students so that public health and educa- tional initiatives may be better specified to meet the challenges of each group. Disclosure statement No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors. Funding This work is supported by the European Union’s Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation Programme, under the Marie Skłodowska-Curie Grant Agreement No. 722523. ORCID Áine Travers http://orcid.org/0000-0002-5666-6384 Cherie Armour http://orcid.org/0000-0001-7649-3874 Maj Hansen http://orcid.org/0000-0002-8328-0807 Philip Hyland http://orcid.org/0000-0002-9574-7128 Frédérique Vallières http://orcid.org/0000-0001-6315- 3029 References American Psychiatric Association. (2013). Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders (5th ed.). Washington, DC. 8 Á. TRAVERS ET AL. Arnett, J. J. (2000). Emerging adulthood: A theory of devel- opment from the late teens through the twenties. American Psychologist, 55(5), 469. Babor, T. F., Higgins-Biddle, J. C., Saunders, J. B., & Monteiro, M. G. (2001). The alcohol use disorders iden- tification test (AUDIT): Guidelines for use in primary care. World Health Organization, Department of Mental Health and Substance Abuse. 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TRAVERS ET AL. https://www.jstor.org/stable/40364353 https://www.rainbow-project.org/Handlers/Download.ashx?IDMF=0f7bac61-c731-4a4b-8f03-f166c12085d8 https://www.rainbow-project.org/Handlers/Download.ashx?IDMF=0f7bac61-c731-4a4b-8f03-f166c12085d8 https://www.rainbow-project.org/Handlers/Download.ashx?IDMF=0f7bac61-c731-4a4b-8f03-f166c12085d8 https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/healthandsocialcare/healthandlifeexpectancies/compendium/opinionsandlifestylesurvey/2015-03-19 https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/healthandsocialcare/healthandlifeexpectancies/compendium/opinionsandlifestylesurvey/2015-03-19 https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/healthandsocialcare/healthandlifeexpectancies/compendium/opinionsandlifestylesurvey/2015-03-19 https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/healthandsocialcare/healthandlifeexpectancies/compendium/opinionsandlifestylesurvey/2015-03-19 https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/healthandsocialcare/causesofdeath/bulletins/alcoholrelateddeathsintheunitedkingdom/registeredin2017 https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/healthandsocialcare/causesofdeath/bulletins/alcoholrelateddeathsintheunitedkingdom/registeredin2017 https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/healthandsocialcare/causesofdeath/bulletins/alcoholrelateddeathsintheunitedkingdom/registeredin2017 https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/healthandsocialcare/causesofdeath/bulletins/alcoholrelateddeathsintheunitedkingdom/registeredin2017 https://www.psni.police.uk/globalassets/inside-the-psni/our-statistics/hate-motivation-statistics/2019-20/hate-motivation-bulletin-jun-19.pdf https://www.psni.police.uk/globalassets/inside-the-psni/our-statistics/hate-motivation-statistics/2019-20/hate-motivation-bulletin-jun-19.pdf https://www.psni.police.uk/globalassets/inside-the-psni/our-statistics/hate-motivation-statistics/2019-20/hate-motivation-bulletin-jun-19.pdf Abstract Abstract Abstract 1. Introduction 2. Methods 2.1. Participants 2.2. Missing data 2.3. Measures 2.3.1. Participant characteristics 2.3.2. Potentially traumatic experiences 2.3.3. Mental health problems 2.3.4. Social support 2.4. Analysis 3. Results 3.1. Direct effects 3.2. Indirect effects 4. Discussion 4.1. Limitations 5. Conclusions Disclosure statement Funding References 
work_dfrqminofnhd3pvsdcyx2p2kuy	----	Pages from J158v05n01-2.pdf (2005) Journal of Forensic Psychology Practice, Vol. 5(1) ___________________________________ AREA REVIEW ______________________________ Assessment of Hate Crime Offenders: The Role of Bias Intent in Examining Violence Risk Edward Dunbar, PhD Jary Quinones, PhD Desiree A. Crevecoeur, PhD ABSTRACT. This study investigated the criminal histories and violence risk of a sample of 204 hate crime offenders. Record review of the offender’s criminal history was rated on the HCR-20 and Cormier-Lang scales. Crime reports were rated for the severity of the bias offense on the Victim Functional Impact scale and the offender’s targeting of outgroup victims–i.e., the bias intent. Findings indicated that 56% of the offenders had prior criminal convictions; HCR-20 ratings were comparable to those found in other offender groups and were correlated with ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Edward Dunbar is affiliated with Pacific Psychological Associates. Jary Quinones is a PhD candidate affiliated with the Los Angeles Police Department. Desiree A. Crevecoeur is a PhD candidate affiliated with the University of California Los Angeles. Address correspondence to: Edward Dunbar, Department of Psychology, University of California Los Angeles, Los Angeles,CA90024USA(E-mail: edunbar@ucla. edu). Journal of Forensic Psychology Practice, Vol. 5(1) 2005 http://www.haworthpress.com/web/JFPP © 2005 by The Haworth Press, Inc. All rights reserved. Digital Object Identifier: 10.1300/J158v05n01_01 1 http://www.haworthpress.com/web/JFPP the severity of the hate crime. The severity of the criminal history as measured on the Cormier-Lang scale, the number of prior arrests, and number of criminal convictions were significantly greater for offenders who targeted racial minority victims. Offenders who belonged to bias oriented groups had more extensive and violent criminal histories and committed more severe hate crimes. Findings are considered in terms of clinical intervention and risk assessment practices with hate crime of- fenders. [Article copies available for a fee from The Haworth Document Delivery Service: 1-800-HAWORTH. E-mail address: <docdelivery@haworthpress.com> Website: <http://www.HaworthPress.com> © 2005 by The Haworth Press, Inc. All rights reserved.] KEYWORDS. Hate crimes, risk assessment, bias motivation In the U.S., a crime that is motivated in whole or in part by the offend- ers animus towards their victims’ social ingroup may be prosecuted un- der either state or federal statutes (Levin, 1999). Since the passage of the Federal Hate Crime reporting act in 1990, bias motivated crimes have been monitored nationally by the criminal justice system. This has spurred research concerning hate crime victimization (Ehrlich, 1992; Herek, Gillis, Cogan, & Glunt, 1996). However, little attention has been given to the offenders of bias motivated crimes. The assessment of these offenders is particularly important given that the majority of hate crimes are not committed for material gain (e.g., robbery) or as a consequence of reactive revenge-type aggression as is found in domestic or work- place violence (Sullaway, in press). The absence of information for this offender group has led to problems in the identification (Jacobs & Pot- ter, 1998) and prosecution (Dunbar, 1999) of suspects of hate crimes. To date there is no available information concerning the risk for vio- lence posed by hate crime offenders. The popular stereotypes of perpe- trators of hate crimes as skinhead youth or psychologically disturbed members of hate groups has not aided criminal justice and mental health professionals in their rehabilitation efforts with this special class of of- fender. Research is needed that addresses the base rates of criminality and violence risk of hate crime offenders. This would contribute to the practical issues of case management and treatment as well as the gener- ation of theoretical questions concerning risk for commission of hate crimes. Without such information it is very difficult to determine whether hate crime offenders constitute a relatively greater risk for 2 JOURNAL OF FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGY PRACTICE http://www.HaworthPress.com recidivistic violence and, concomitantly, are the intervention needs of this offender group. Hate crimes must evidence a clear intent to engage in violence against victims of a specific social group. Accordingly, differences in the offender’s bias intent may be important to the issue of risk assess- ment. This study examined the issue of violence risk with hate crime of- fenders. This was done by investigating the base rates of prior criminal activity and assessing their risk for violent recidivism. This study also considered whether the offenders’ bias intent–as evidenced by the so- cial group of their victim–was related to differences in violence risk and prior criminal activity. VIOLENCE RISK ASSESSMENT WITH HATE CRIME OFFENDERS An important question in the area of hate crime research concerns whether hate crime offenders pose a significant risk for violence. It is not known if offenders of hate crimes frequently perpetrate non-bias motivated crimes and if so, the seriousness of their criminal activity. Additionally determination of the risk for violent recidivism of hate crime offenders needs to be examined vis-à-vis other offender groups (Boer, Wilson, Gauthier, & Hart, 1997; Steadman et al., 2000). Empiri- cally-derived risk assessment incorporates behavioral and development predictors of violence (Menzies, Webster, McMain, Staley, & Scag- lione, 1994). These assessment tools seek to provide a systematic means by which to evaluate violence risk. However, historical, that is static, risk indicators fail to incorporate dynamic–i.e., changeable–elements of risk. Webster, Douglas, Eaves, and Hart (1997) have sought to remedy this problem by incorporating both historical and dynamic elements in the assessment methodology of the HCR-20. Determining risk for vio- lence therefore ought to consider both fixed indicators of risk as well as changeable clinical and contextual characteristics of the offender. A question in the study of violence research that has received little at- tention concerns whether risk estimates are related to the severity of subsequent violent crimes (Clear, 1988). Might the criteria which indi- cate risk for future violence additionally provide information on how vi- olent the hate crime is itself? In other words, do indicators of risk for violence also demonstrate a relationship to the severity of the subse- quent offense, and not simply whether it is more or less likely to occur? Area Review 3 THE QUESTION OF BIAS INTENT AND RISK FOR VIOLENCE By definition hate crimes reflect a discernible intent of the offender to target victims of a specific social outgroup. Intent is an important ele- ment in criminal law (American Law Institute, 1962; Black, 1979). Hate crime offenders intentionally and consciously commit crimes that target members of specific outgroups. Sullaway (in press) has noted that in hate crimes, intent reflects what the offender perceives as the good that will come from their actions; this may include inciting racial unrest in a community, forcing ethnic and sexual minorities out of a neighbor- hood by intimidation (Umemoto & Mikami, 2000), or targeting crime victims–gay men or undocumented persons, for example–who are less likely to seek the assistance of law enforcement personnel. In the case of hate-oriented criminal groups, intent may include efforts to force the out-migration of foreign-born persons from nation states, as well (Watts, 2001). Differences in the bias intent of these offenders may therefore be important in terms of risk assessment. As Sullaway (in press) has noted, “psychology can make a contribution to the develop- ment and refinement of techniques to collect evidence that best captures the various motivations involved in hate crimes.” Dunbar (2003), in a record review of 58 convicted hate crime offenders, found that ratings of a more discernible bias motivation were related to commission of in- strumental violence and an intent to target racial minorities. This find- ing suggests that within-group differences of bias intent may be worth consideration in the assessment and treatment of hate crime offenders. The issue of bias intent has also been considered in terms of societal norms that condone violence against gays, lesbians, and bisexuals. Herek (2000) and Franklin (2000) have suggested that bias against gay men and lesbians constitutes a cultural norm of U.S. society and is not per se deviant from mainstream values. Franklin’s (2000) research with college-age students suggests that harassment and aggression targeting gays and lesbians is quite frequent, and by implication engaged in by otherwise non-criminal individuals. Accordingly, there may be discern- ible offender differences in the risk for violence, if indeed aggression against gays and lesbians is perpetrated by more socially conventional offenders when compared to offenders of religious or ethnic/racial hate crimes. Another potential factor in the assessment of violence risk with this population concerns offenders who associate with other bias-oriented individuals. Members of both hate-oriented groups and members of 4 JOURNAL OF FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGY PRACTICE racialized criminal gangs who engage in hate crimes–i.e., the commis- sion of violence that is not better accounted for by inter-gang conflict but rather the targeting of members of ethnic outgroups–may constitute an important sub-group of hate crime offenders. Offenders who demon- strate a discernible bias motivation, particularly when it results in their involvement with other hate-oriented group members, may engage in distinctly different types of bias motivated violence. As suggested by Ezekiel (1995), attention needs to be given to offenders who belong to racialized or hate-oriented groups which espouse a hate-based ideology may pose a particular risk for recurring hate violence. This study examined the following research questions: (1) what are the base rates for criminal activity–i.e., presence of criminal history–for hate crime offenders? (2) what is the risk for violence of these offenders vis-à-vis other criminal samples? (3) does the seriousness of the of- fender’s history for violence vary based upon their bias intent, as deter- mined via the targeted outgroup? and (4) are empirically-derived risk assessment systems such as the HCR-20 correlated with the severity of violence reported in the hate crime? METHOD Participants Review of 814 reported hate crime offenses during the calendar year of 1999 in a large metropolitan area were reviewed in the current study. The cases were collected by an investigative unit of a law enforcement agency in a community located in the Western United States. Of these 814 cases, demographic information on the offender was available for 581 (71%) of the offenses. A subset of these cases (n = 204) resulted in the apprehension and identification of a suspect of the hate offense. The criminal histories of these 204 hate crime offenders were then reviewed and analyzed. Materials Offender Demographic Characteristics. Information from the crime report was coded for the offender’s age, gender, and ethnicity/race. In addition, the identified bias motivation, reported by the responding offi- cer was also coded in our record review. Area Review 5 Offender’s Criminal History. The criminal histories of the identified bias offenders were tabulated through analysis of state and federal data management systems. Information analyzed included the specific charges that led to arrest or conviction for adolescent and adult offenses in the state of California and in the U.S., motor vehicle infractions, open and closed probation activity, bench warrants issued, probationary vio- lations, and sentencing for federal parole. HCR-20 (Webster, Douglas, Eaves, & Hart, 1997). The HCR-20 is a structured clinical guide, comprised of risk factors for violent behavior. The 20 rating items are classified into a 10-item Historical (H), a 5-item Clinical (C), and a 5-item Risk Management (R) scale. These 20 dimen- sions have been found in prior research to effectively estimate risk of fu- ture violence. The H criteria include ratings for prior violent and risk activities, the C criteria define the attitudes and clinical status of the of- fender at time of the evaluation, and the R criteria reflect the presence of destabilizing factors related to violent recidivism. Each item is scored by the examiner on a 3-point scale to denote if the specific variable (e.g., his- tory of previous violence) is clearly present, somewhat present, or absent (scored 2, 1, and 0, respectively). The HCR-20 integrates static historical indicators with dynamic indicators of risk for future violence. The HCR-20 has been used in studies with offender groups with mixed psy- chiatric diagnoses (Douglas, Klassen, Ross, Hart, & Webster, 1998), yielding an H score of 12.45 (SD = 3.6), C score of 5.47 (SD = 2.46), and R score of 6.64 (SD = 2.3). In the Dunbar (2003) study with convicted hate crime offenders, the HCR scale values were 9.35 (SD = 5.72) for the historical criteria, 6.11 (SD = 1.85) for the clinical criteria, and 6.77 (SD = 2.96) for the risk management criteria. Cormier-Lang Crime Index (Quincey, Harris, Rice & Cormier, 1998). This rating scale is based upon an earlier system developed by Akman and Normandeau (1967) to quantify the severity of the offender’s crimi- nal history. Quincey et al. (1998) note that “this system can be used when only official police ‘rap sheet’ information is available” (p. 250). The rat- ing system is organized into Class One offenses, consisting of 16 individ- ual weighted offense criteria (e.g., assault causing great bodily harm = 5), representing sub-types of violent crimes and Class Two offenses consists of 21 weighted items for non-violent crimes (e.g., theft under $500 = 1; extortion = 5). A total score for all offenses can also be computed. With a sample of 58 convicted hate crime offenders (Dunbar, 2003), the mean for the total Cormier-Lang scales was 15.40 (SD = 18.92). Victim Functional Impact. An estimate of the crime’s impact upon daily life functioning for the victim was determined via a criterion rat- 6 JOURNAL OF FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGY PRACTICE ing method. The professional staff (n = 22) of the Victim Witness Assis- tance Program of the Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office was surveyed to provide a severity of impact rating for the 18 acts of ag- gression noted in the crime reports. These individuals provide direct hu- man service consultation and medical referral to the Victims of Violent Crimes for Los Angeles County. Typically, they interact with clients dur- ing the acute post-event phase of crime victimization. Each act of aggres- sion was rated on a Likert scale, as derived from the Axis 4 rating system for severity of psychosocial stress, as first proposed in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual-Third Edition, Revised (DSM-III-R) classification sys- tem (APA, 1988). The rating range for severity of functional impact for each individual act of aggression ranged from 60 (catastrophic) to 10 (not at all). This rating methodology provided an estimate of the victim’s post-event impairment, based upon the type of aggression reported in the crime report. For example, assault with a deadly weapon had a rating value of 52.23 (falling in the range of catastrophic-to-extreme), physi- cal assault (extreme-to-severe impact) had a mean of 45.47, whereas be- ing the target of printed humor or hate speech had an impact value of 27.28 (moderate-to-mild impact). Using these rating values, an estimate of post-event victim impact was derived. This was determined by ag- gregating the individual acts of aggression identified for the offense, as reported in the crime report. Ratings on the Functional Victim Impact scale produced a mean of 69 (SD = 21) for 1,538 hate crimes as deter- mined via record review with a mean inter-class correlation of .76 for the rating items (Dunbar, 1997). PROCEDURE The methodology incorporated record review and content analysis of the criminal history and the bias (index) crime. Classification of the in- dex offense as being bias motivated employed a multi-step process. First, the index offense had to be identified as bias motivated by the re- sponding officer. This crime report was then reviewed by a precinct hate crime coordinator, who affirmed that the offense met the legal stan- dards to be classified as bias motivated. The crime report was then for- warded to a special investigation unit, where the report was again reviewed to confirm or deny that the index offense met the standards to be reported as a hate crime. This process allowed for the removal of of- fenses that did not meet the legal standard of being both a crime and as being bias-motivated. Information on the index crime was recorded by Area Review 7 the responding officer for bias crime motive (e.g., race/ethnicity, reli- gion), number of offenders involved in the crime, and demographic characteristics (gender, race, and age) of the perpetrator(s). Analysis of the crime reports for the bias offense was conducted by a team of university research assistants under the supervision of the first author. The reports were examined to determine the specific bias intent (religion, sexual orientation, for example) of the crime. Offender char- acteristics of age, race/ethnicity, and gender were also coded. Offenders identified on the crime reports as having been members of hate oriented gangs and groups were also noted. The characteristics of the index crime were rated in terms of a variety of behavioral characteristics, which were used to compute the estimated crime severity on the Victim Functional Impact scale. The first author provided training and consul- tation in the coding of the Victim Functional Impact scale. The criminal histories of the identified hate crime offenders were rated via record review for all crime activity prior to commission of the hate crime. Information included the identified offender’s “rap sheet” of prior state and federal arrests and convictions. The criminal history was searched based on the child/adolescent and adult history of arrests and convictions, the motor vehicle record, and federal crime information. The initial criminal record search was conducted by the second author. The criminal history was then reviewed to establish severity ratings on the Cormier-Lang scale. Content analysis of the criminal records was used for scoring the HCR-20. This was coded in accordance with the rating criteria employed in the respective scoring manuals. These were coded by the first and third authors. The evaluation of the criminal his- tories and assignment of levels of violence risk was done without re- view or knowledge of the index crime, other than that the crime had been classified as being a hate crime. RESULTS The demographic characteristics of the 581 hate crime offenders in- cluded 497 (85.5%) men, 82 (14.1%) women, and 2 offenses were com- mitted by men and women together (.4%). The race/ethnicity of the 581 bias crime offenders included 17.8% African American, 2.3% Asian- Pacific, 44.8% Euro-White, 30.4% Latino, and 4.7% of diverse ethnic and/or multi-racial backgrounds. The distribution of the offender’s race and ethnicity is approximate to that of the demographic representation of the metropolitan area in which the crimes occurred. 8 JOURNAL OF FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGY PRACTICE For the 204 identified hate crime offenders 87% were men and 13% were women. The mean age of the identified bias offenders was 32.69 (SD = 14.04, range = 12 to 81); 84% of the offender sample were adults at the time the crime was committed. The race/ethnicity of this group in- cluded 15% African American, 2.6% Asian-Pacific, 48% Euro-White, 26.2% Latino and 7.2% of diverse or multiracial backgrounds. The of- fenses committed by these identified offenders revealed that 57.6% of the offenses were crimes again the person, 17.9% were property crimes, and 24.5% were verbal threats of harm to the person. There were no signifi- cant differences in the demographic representation of the sample of 581 hate crime offenders and the group of 204 identified (i.e., apprehended) offenders from which they were drawn. Ratings from the crime reports of the hate (index) offense indicated that 16% (n = 31) of the identified of- fenders were members of a hate-oriented criminal gang or group. Base rates were computed for history of arrests and convictions (re- search question one). At the time of the commission of the bias crime, 59% of the 204 identified offenders had a prior history for arrest (M = 4.04, SD = 7.58) with 58 % having had a prior criminal conviction (M = 3.22, SD = 5.98); 33% had more than one prior conviction. For the identi- fied offenders the Cormier-Lang estimates for severity of history for vio- lent offenses was 8.28 (SD = 15.97; range of 0 to 101) and 6.71 (SD = 10.49; range = 0 to 50) for non-violent offenses. Estimation of risk for violence (research question two) was assessed on the HCR-20. For the identified bias offenders, the HCR-20 Histori- cal indicator (H) scale mean was 8.21 (SD = 4.74; alpha reliability coef- ficient = .94), the Clinical (C) risk mean score was 5.39 (SD = 2.46; alpha reliability coefficient = .90) and the Risk Management (R) mean was 5.53 (SD = 2.97; alpha reliability coefficient = .95). The computed mean Co- hen kappa for inter-rater agreement on the HCR-20 was .58 (range of .90 to .33). Cichetti and Sparrow (1981) note that kappa values of .40 to .59 are fair and values from .60 to .74 are considered good. The HCR-20 scores are similar to a sample of 175 offenders with mixed psychiatric di- agnoses (Douglas et al., 1998). The total number of prior arrests and con- victions were significantly correlated with the HCR-20 Historical (r = .60, p < .001, r = .67, p < .001), Clinical (r = .53, p < .001, r = .48, p < .001), Risk Management (r = .55, p < .001, r = .62, p < .001) scale scores. The HCR-20 risk indicators were also correlated with the Cormier-Lang scales. The HCR-20 Historical (i.e., static) indicators were correlated to severity of prior violent crimes (r = .64, p < .001) and non-violent crimes (r = .66, p < .001). The dynamic (i.e., changeable) Clinical (r = .49, p < .001; r = .57, p < .001) and Risk Management (r = .56, p < .001; r = .63, Area Review 9 p < .001) indicators were also correlated with the estimates on the Cormier-Lang for severity of prior violent criminality and non-violent criminality, respectively. These findings are presented in Table 1. The criminal records revealed a variety of historical indicators re- lated to heightened risk for violence. Forty-eight percent of the offend- ers had a prior arrest or conviction for a violent crime; 36% had an offense for violence prior to the age of 20. Twenty-three percent of the sample had a criminal record for substance abuse. A quarter (26%) of the identified bias offenders had family histories marked by parental separation and/or domestic violence; these were typically noted in the criminal record as having had “unfit” childhoods. That is, under the criminal code, the offender required institutional intervention as a mi- nor child. Thirty-eight percent of the offenders had histories which im- plicated significant occupational problems; 45% had had prior super- vision failures (e.g., probation and parole violations) with the criminal justice system. 10 JOURNAL OF FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGY PRACTICE TABLE 1. Criminal History, HCR-20, and Cormier-Lang Risk Indicators of 204 Identified Bias Offenders Percent with one or more offense M SD Range Criminal History Misdemeanor arrests Misdemeanor convictions 42% 45% 1.37 1.29 2.57 2.53 0-18 0-18 Felony arrests Felony convictions 44% 36% 2.04 1.32 3.99 2.57 0-28 0-13 Juvenile convictions 22% .78 2.15 0-15 Prior probation sentencing Probation at time of bias crime 28% 31% .64 .65 0-7 0-1 Motor vehicle infractions Bench warrants issued 32% 14% 1.02 .30 2.43 .98 0-18 0-8 HCR-20 Historical Indicators 8.21 4.74 0-19 Clinical Indicators 5.39 2.46 0-10 Rick Management Indicators 5.53 2.97 0-10 Cormier-Lang: Severity of Criminal History Violent Offenses 8.28 15.97 0-101 Non-Violent Offenses 6.71 10.49 0-50 Research question three examined whether the offender’s bias intent was related to differences in the risk for violence and extensiveness of the criminal history. The bias intent classified in the crime reports in- cluded 116 (54.4%) due to racial or ethnic bias, 25 (11.3%) due to reli- gious bias, 56 (26.5%) of the hate crimes were motivated by the victim’s sexual orientation and 6 (2.9%) were gender bias crimes; one case could not be classified for any of the identified categories. A series of One- Way Analysis of Variance tests were computed for the three primary categories for bias intent (race/ethnicity, religion, and sexual orienta- tion) by the HCR-20 scores, aggregate history of arrests and convic- tions, and the Cormier-Lang estimates of the severity of the criminal history for violent and non-violent offenses. Results revealed that dif- ferences in the offenders’ targeted outgroup were significantly related to the number of prior arrests (F = 3.62, p < .05) and number of convic- tions prior to commission of the hate crime (F = 4.38, p < .01). In both in- stances, Scheffe contrasts revealed that race/ethnic hate crimes were related to more extensive criminal histories than offenders who commit- ted hate crimes due to religious bias. ANOVA results for the Cormier- Lang estimates of the severity of the history of violent offenses by bias in- tent was also significant (F = 4.39, p < .01), with offenders who targeted racial and ethnic minorities having significantly more severe histories of violence than offenders who committed hate crimes due to religious or sexual orientation bias. Table 2 summarizes these findings. A separate series of analyses were computed with bias offenders who were classified on the crime reports as having been a member of a hate-oriented group or racialized criminal gang. When compared to other offenders in the sample, hate gang members had higher scores for total arrests (t = 3.03, p < .003) and total convictions (t = 2.62, p < .008), as well as higher HCR-20 Historical (t = 3.41, p < .001), Clinical (t = 2.01, p < .01), and Risk Management (t = 4.91, p < .001) scores. The hate gang members also had higher Cormier-Lang scores for the severity of violent criminal history (t = 2.12, p < .04) and non-violent criminal history (t = 2.13, p < .03); they also perpetrated significantly more severe hate crimes as measured on the Victim Functional Impact scale (t = 5.71, p < .001). Research question four examined whether empirically-derived risk ratings demonstrated a relationship to the severity of the hate crime of- fense. For the 204 identified bias offenders, the mean Functional Victim Impact score was 93.67 (SD = 28.39; range from 27 to 204) in the com- mission of the hate crime. The HCR-20 Historical (r = . 27, p < .001) Clinical ( r = . 33, p < .001) and Risk Management (r = . 31, p < .001) scale scores were all correlated to the Victim Functional Impact scale. Area Review 11 The Victim Functional Impact score was not significantly correlated to the Cormier-Lang scores for severity of the criminal history or the total number of prior convictions or arrests. DISCUSSION This study examined the issue of risk assessment with hate crime of- fenders from three different perspectives. This included determination of the offender’s criminal history, estimation of the severity of prior of- fenses, and assessment of the relative risk for future violence. Collec- tively findings indicated that the majority of identified hate crime offenders had a prior criminal history and that differences in this of- fender group were related to the targeted outgroup of their victims. Hate crime offenders who committed offense based upon racial ani- mus had more extensive and violent criminal histories. By contrast, of- fenders who evidenced intent to target religious outgroups had fewer prior offenses and less severe criminal histories. Offenders who tar- geted gay and lesbian victims fell in a middle range between these two other offender groups. Record review indicated that many offenders 12 JOURNAL OF FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGY PRACTICE TABLE 2. Identified Bias Offenders Risk Indicators by Bias Intent Racial/Ethnic (n = 116) Sexual Orientation (n = 56) Religion (n = 25) F Criminal History Total Arrests 5.51 2.59 1.17 3.62* Criminal History Total Convictions 4.23 1.95 1.77 4.38** HCR-20 Historical Indicators 8.80 7.74 6.64 1.23 HCR-20 Clinical Indicators 5.48 5.23 5.41 .09 HCR-20 Risk Mgmt. Indicators 5.88 4.81 4.33 1.02 Cormier-Lang Aggregate History Violent Offenses 11.21 4.03 2.81 4.39** Cormier-Lang Aggregate History Non-Violent Offenses 6.90 4.02 3.75 1.11 *p < .05, **p < .01 who targeted gay and lesbian victims had a prior history of violence which was not bias motivated. Thus, while offenders of hate crimes tar- geting sexual minorities had less extensive criminal histories than many other (i.e., racially motivated) hate crime offenders, they were likely to have evidenced prior anti-social behavior. These findings do not, how- ever, conclusively address the proposition of Franklin (2000) that these offenses are committed by individuals with less extensive criminal his- tories when compared to a general criminal population. Our findings also indicated that the members of hate-oriented gangs evidenced significantly greater risk for violence in general and indeed had more extensive criminal histories than other hate crime offenders. They were more violent by their criminal histories, they evidenced more historical and dynamic risk for on-going violent behavior, and they en- gaged in significantly more violent forms of aggression in the commis- sion of the hate crime. This small group of individuals indeed reflects the popular image of the violent hate crime offender as a highly disso- cial and aggressive individual. However, our findings underscore that these offenders constitute a very small percentage of individuals who commit hate crimes. Implications for Clinical Assessment The findings of the risk assessment criteria suggest that hate crime offenders pose treatment and probationary challenges comparable to that found for mentally disordered offenders. The implication of our findings is that hate crime offenders frequently pose a risk for violence based upon both static and dynamic factors. This and the prior study of Dunbar (2003) both found that the static historical risk ratings on the HCR-20 were modestly lower when compared to published data with the measure for other offender groups. By comparison both of the stud- ies using the HCR-20 with hate crime offenders yielded moderately higher estimates for dynamic clinical and risk management factors. That is, prior life circumstance related to violence risk were modestly lower when compared to other samples using the HCR-20 criteria, but revealed somewhat greater risk for violence that was contemporaneous to the commission of the hate crime. The information from our sample indicated many–though by no means all–of these offenders evidenced problems frequently found in patients diagnosed with a personality disorder–i.e., occupational prob- lems, relationship failure, code-breaking behaviors, and impulsivity. The relationship between personality disorders–specifically narcis- Area Review 13 sism–and pathological forms of bias has been discussed by Bell (1979;1978). Pathological forms of bias have been identified as an area warranting further investigation by the DSM-V workgroup (Kupfer, First, & Regier, 2002). At present, however, a program of research has not been established to examine the relationship, if any, between per- sonality disorders and intergroup aggression, yet alone commission of hate crimes. Independent of the serious problems of daily living found with these offenders is their manifestation of aggressive intergroup behaviors. As Dunbar (2003) has suggested, recidivism risk for bias offenders may be further complicated when a discernible hate ideology is also present. These two components–a heightened risk for violence and a discernible hate ideology–may incrementally increase the probability for recidi- vistic bias criminality. Further study of the role of bias motivation as an independent risk factor for this group of offenders is an area in need of examination. The assessment of hate crime offenders needs to be considered in terms of the debate over the relative merits of clinical and psychometric methods versus empirically-derived or “file drawer” approaches to vio- lence risk (Rogers, 2000; Hilton & Simons, 2001). We would hope that both informed clinical opinion and the use of empirically-derived infer- ences will be used in the evaluation of this special class of offender. Re- search-driven methods optimally utilize clinical knowledge in risk determination, even when psychometric measures and clinical inter- views are not part of the assessment methodology. With unique sam- ples, such as offenders of hate crimes, a multi-faceted approach to assessment can provide greater specificity in risk determination. In ad- dition, our findings suggested the importance of within-group factors of bias intent–as evidenced by the offender’s targeting of specific out- group victims–in risk assessment. The relationship between the HCR-20 ratings and the severity of the subsequent hate crime (as determined by a separate rater group) points to other useful applications when historical, clinical, and contextual in- dicators of violence risk are integrated. We found that the aggregated crime histories and the estimated valuations of the severity of the prior criminal offenses were unrelated to the severity of the hate crime itself. This suggests that risk assessment of violence based solely upon the criminal history, even for offenders with extensive histories of violent crimes, may be less clearly related to the severity of future violence than what can be deduced through the use of an empirically-derived rating system. Our findings illustrate how these methods can be employed to 14 JOURNAL OF FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGY PRACTICE identify specific treatment goals (e.g., substance abuse, impulsivity) in the rehabilitation of bias motivated offenders. This is particularly im- portant given that many stakeholder groups involved in responding to bias crimes have limited knowledge of what factors heighten risk for vi- olent recidivism. The utilization of a risk assessment strategy that em- ploys empirically-derived indicators along with crime investigation information can inform both law enforcement professionals and policy makers alike. The violence risk posed by hate crime offenders extends to commu- nities as well as individual victims. Given that hate crime offenders en- gage in violence against social groups, the magnitude of risk is more complex. Bias motivated violence as Bell (2003) has observed, consti- tutes a public health risk. When considered in this light, offenders of hate crimes, like serial rapists, constitute a risk to the community which is dif- ferent by kind when compared to many violent offenders. As such, hate crime offenders constitute an additional societal risk, one that may inflict a substantial social psychological injury to both vulnerable individuals and groups. At present, there is no agreed-upon standard or criteria by which to assign risk to the community, in terms of individual offenders of hate crimes. This is an area in need of future investigation. Implications for Intervention These findings point to the need to reduce identified risk factors of vi- olence for hate crime offenders such as poverty, occupational failure, and problematic familial relationships, as much as to address their cul- tural misperceptions. Comprehensive wrap-around interventions are needed to reduce the recidivistic behaviors of bias motivated offenders. Interventions such as Multi-Systemic Therapy (Henggeller, Melton, Brondino, Scherer, & Hanley, 1997) which have proven effective with young at-risk offenders provide one such example of a viable treatment model. Likewise, innovative criminal justice practices such as drug court programs and specialized probationary monitoring need to be im- ported to the area of hate crime offender management. To date, how- ever, interventions to ameliorate an offender’s intergroup bias have not been shown to contribute to the reduction in re-offense rates or desistance of at-risk behavior for recidivism. We feel that comprehen- sive risk assessment is needed in order to determine the treatment needs of bias motivated offenders. The current findings underscore the serious risk posed by hate crime offenders, one which may be obfuscated by the more controversial issue Area Review 15 of how “criminal” hate crimes really are. This controversy, and on occa- sion dismissal, of bias crimes as not being “real crimes” as Boyd, Berk, and Hammer (1996) note, may lead some law enforcement personnel to not identify the hate element in crimes they report. This may result in the minimization of the seriousness of both the offense and the larger threat posed by the offender to their community. Nolan and Akiyama (1999) note that the effectiveness of law enforcement agencies to en- force hate crime laws is influenced by organizational attitudes and com- mitment, community relations, economic resources, and the individual beliefs of law enforcement personnel. The current findings need to be considered in terms of both the com- munity and institutional forces which shape how hates crimes are iden- tified. In the current study, the large metropolitan agency from which the sample was drawn had several structural advantages in the detection of hate crimes which may be absent in other law enforcement organiza- tions. This included a centralized investigative unit responsible for monitoring hate crimes and the coordination at the precinct level with officers who served as point personnel in crime investigation and inter- diction. The metropolitan area additionally was supported by several victim advocacy and human relations groups who monitored law en- forcement responsiveness to hate crimes. In jurisdictions absent these institutional forces, the identification of hate crimes may well be limited to only the most egregious and sensational events, while failing to iden- tify the numerous offenses of verbal threat and property damage which meet the legal standards as being hate crimes. Limitations in the Current Study This study linked record review of criminal activity with information about hate crime perpetration, as found in the crime report. The use of crime scene data to make inferences about the offender is in many cases highly impressionistic. As Alizun, Bennell, Mukros, and Ormoral (2002) note, the derivation of personality characteristics and other intrapsychic states from review of crime scene evidence is highly subjective and absent any discernible methodology. We have tried to avoid these pitfalls by instead examining objective behavioral elements of the crime. All the same, while a great deal can be determined from the criminal record, other sources of information–which were not collected by law enforce- ment personnel–would have provided additional evidence of prior vio- lence and exposure to destabilizers. These dynamic indicators would have further informed our risk determination in terms of both heighten- 16 JOURNAL OF FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGY PRACTICE ing risk estimates on the one hand (e.g., living with members of a hate group upon institutional release) and lowering risk concerns on the other (e.g., involvement in 12-step sobriety groups). 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work_dfuwce5pxbgtrnsp2mot7ftke4	----	Outgroup Evaluation, Religious Identity, and Acculturation Orientations of the Coptic Minority in Egypt Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences 84 ( 2013 ) 491 – 495 1877-0428 © 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license. Selection and peer-review under responsibility of Prof. Dr. Huseyin Uzunboylu & Dr. Mukaddes Demirok, Near East University, Cyprus doi: 10.1016/j.sbspro.2013.06.590 Outgroup Evaluation, Religious Identity, and Acculturation Orientations of the Coptic Minority in Egypt Zira Hichya*, Sharon Coen b, Graziella Di Marcoa , Mina Halim Helmy Gergesa aUniversity of Catania, Dipartimento di Processi Formativi, via Biblioteca 4 (Palazzo Ingrassia), Catania 94124, Italy bUniversity of Salford, Salford, Greater Manchester, M6 6PU, United Kingdom Abstract The first aim of this study was to explore the acculturation orientations, assessed in employment and endogamy/exogamy domains, adopted by Coptic minority towards Muslims (dominant majority group) and Protestants (another minority group) in Egypt. The second aim of this study was to investigate the relationship between religious identity, evaluative attitude towards outgroup and acculturation orientations of Copts. Results showed that adoption of acculturation orientations differs widely according to domain, while little differences are noticed depending on the outgroup. Moreover, religious identity appears more related to endogamy/exogamy domain, whereas evaluative attitude is more related to employment domain. Keywords: Acculturation Orientations; Religious identity; Outgroup attitudes; National minority; 1. Introduction Christians constitute a significant minority in Egypt; nonetheless the International Religious Freedom Report by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (2010) shows that the Egyptian government failed to redress laws and governmental practices that discriminate against Christians. It is therefore important to be mindful of the complex social composition and intergroup relations in this country. In this study acculturation orientations adopted by Coptic minority towards Muslims (dominant majority group) and Protestants (another minority group) were analyzed. Moreover, some correlates of acculturation orientations (religious identity and outgroup evaluation) were examined. 1.1. Copts in Egypt Egypt has a population of around 86 million, almost 90 percent of whom are Muslims (particularly Sunni). The exact count of Christians is unknown, with estimates ranging from six to ten million (Suad & Afsaneh, 2005), the majority belonging to the Coptic Orthodox Church (almost six/seven millions). Copts originally used to refer to Egyptians in general, but when Arabs invaded Egypt (641 A.D.) and the Egyptian * Zira Hichy Tel.: +39 095-2508021 E-mail address: z.hichy@unict.it 3rd World Conference on Psychology, Counselling and Guidance (WCPCG-2012) © 2013 Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection and peer review under the responsibility of Dr. Melehat Halat Corresponding author name: Available online at www.sciencedirect.com © 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license. Selection and peer-review under responsibility of Prof. Dr. Huseyin Uzunboylu & Dr. Mukaddes Demirok, Near East University, Cyprus http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ 492 Zira Hichy et al. / Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences 84 ( 2013 ) 491 – 495 2 population was converted to Islam, the term Copt was adopted to indicate exclusively Egyptian Christians. Most Copts belong to the Coptic Orthodox Church having its own Pope. Recently, the Coptic community has been targeted by hate crimes and physical assaults. In the months preceding the popular insurgence, Egypt has seen a rise in violence against its Copts. A Christmas Day shooting left six Coptic Christians dead, and 21 people were killed in As Christians, Protestants belong to the Coptic community (in this paper, the term Copt was used to refer to members of the Coptic Orthodox Church, while the term Protestant was used to refer to members of the Coptic Protestant Church), however, their history in Egypt is more recent. The first Protestant missionary arrived in Egypt in 1633. The Coptic Orthodox Church experienced the arrival of this new religion as a threat, because the Protestant missionaries were preaching their message especially among the Coptic Orthodox, rather than among the Muslims. Today, almost 150,000/300,000 Egyptians are Protestants (see The International Religious Freedom Report of Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, 2010 for a more detailed account of the current situation of the religious minorities in Egypt). The Egyptian Constitution guarantees freedom of belief and practice of religion (Article 46); however, Islam is the official state religion, and Islamic law is the principal source of legislation (Article 2). 1.2. Acculturation orientations The term acculturation describes a phenomenon occurring when two ethno cultural groups come into contact with each other (Graves, 1967). One of the most influential models in the acculturation field was proposed by Berry (1997). This model postulates the existence of four acculturation orientations (or strategies): separatism, assimilationism, integrationism, and marginalization. The separation orientation reflects the desire to reject relationships with dominant group members and to maintain all features of the immigrant or minority group culture. Assimilationism is characterized by the desire to relinquish the own minority culture for the sake of adopting the dominant culture. Integrationism reflects the desire to maintain important features of immigrant culture while adopting important features of dominant culture. People who endorse marginalization reject both their own culture and that of dominant group; these people lose contact with both immigrant and dominant group. Bourhis, proposed a refinement of the marginalization strategy by splitting this strategy in two different strategies: marginalization and individualism. The first strategy, reflecting hand, individualism is an orientation endorsed by people who define themselves and others as individuals rather than as members of group categories such as immigrants or dominant majority members. Regarding the adoption of acculturation orientations, studies carried out with university students showed that integrationism and individualism were the prevailing acculturation strategies endorsed by immigrants towards dominant communities in a variety of intergroup settings (e.g., Bourhis, Barrette, El-Geledi, & Schmidt, 2009). On the other hand, some studies, carried out with immigrants from various occupational backgrounds, showed that they endorsed separatism to a moderate degree (e.g., Jasinskaja-Lahti, Liebkind, Horenczyk, & Schmitz, 2003). In this study we expected to find that Copts would prefer to avoid extensive contact with members of other groups (especially Muslims) in order to preserve their religious specificity; as a consequence, the most adopted acculturation orientation could be separatism because this is the only strategy which would allow preserving the Coptic religion and identity intact. Indeed, all the other strategies entail a partial (integration) or substantial (assimilation) alteration of the native religious values, their rejection (marginalization) or they attribute only a minor importance as compared to other, more idiosyncratic, characteristics (individualism). of acculturation strategies has been shown to vary depending on public versus private domains (Phalet & Kosic, 2006). In this study we used a public (employment) and a private (endogamy/exogamy) domain. We expected that separatism would be more endorsed in the private domain than in the public one; regarding other strategies, opposite results are expected. In the workplace, the religious affiliation should not be important, therefore Copts could accept to be integrated with or assimilated to other groups. On the other hand, in the endogamy/exogamy domain Copts should tend to avoid other groups, in order to preserve their own religious identity and practices. 493 Zira Hichy et al. / Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences 84 ( 2013 ) 491 – 495 3 Bourhis, Montaruli, El-Geledi, Harvey, and Barrette (2010) on the basis of the host community being considered. It is possible to hypothesize that also minority endorsement of acculturation strategies might vary according to outgroup; in particular, because Muslims should be more devalued than Protestants, we expected that Copts would wish to maintain more distance from the former rather than from the latter group. Copts would therefore adopt more separatism towards Muslim than Protestants. All other strategies should be equally rejected, regardless the outgroup. Literature in this field examined various intergroup and personal correlates of the acculturation orientations (Bourhis et al., 2009). In this study we focus on religious identity and outgroup evaluation. Regarding the relationship between identity and acculturation orientations, Copts who identify strongly with their religious group might be motivated to preserve their distinctiveness (see Jetten, Spears, & Manstead, 2001) and to maintain their culture (Verkuyten & Thijs, 2002). We therefore expect them to endorse more strongly the separationist orientation, which aims to protect the ingroup from contamination, while they should reject other strategies. As for outgroup attitude, studies carried out with majority groups have found that a positive evaluation of the outgroup is positively related with integrationism and individualism and negatively related with assimilationism, segregationism and exclusionism; the reverse was the case for a negative attitude (Bourhis et al., 2009). Studies concerning minority groups found that assimilationism, individualism, and integrationism were associated with favorable attitudes towards the outgroup; on the contrary, separatism was associated with a negative attitude towards the outgroup (Bourhis et al., 2010). We expected to replicate such findings in our context. 2. Method 2.1. Participants and procedure Participants were 100 Copts (39 males and 50 females, 11 participants did not indicate gender) members of various parishes in The Cairo. The age ranged from 14 to 59, with a mean of 25.92 years (SD = 11.12). Participants were volunteers that completed a questionnaire containing measure of investigated construct. They were informed that their responses would remain strictly confidential and granted anonymity. 2.2. Measures Outgroup evaluation. In order to measure evaluative attitude towards Muslims and Protestants, the Ethnic Thermometer Scale (Haddock, Zanna & Esses, 1993) was used. Participants evaluated both outrgoups using a 100- point scale ranging from 0 (extremely unfavorably) to 100 (extremely favorably). Religious identity. The identification with the Coptic religious group was measured using seven items adapted -point scale ranging from not at all to very much. Reliability was .62. Acculturation orientations Immigrant Acculturation Scale (IAS; Berry, Kim, Power, Young, & Bujaki, 1989; Montreuil & Bourhis, 2004) was used. The IAS comprises five items, representing five acculturation orientations, assessed in the context of eligion of the person I marry is irrelevant because what on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree), with 4 meaning neither agree, nor disagree. 3. Results and Discussion In order to test differences in the adoption of acculturation strategies between employment and endogamy/exogamy domains, a MANOVA with a two-level factor (two domains) and five dependent variables (the 494 Zira Hichy et al. / Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences 84 ( 2013 ) 491 – 495 five strategies) was carried out. Results showed an effect of domain, F (5,95) = 140.94, p < .001, 2 = .88; moreover all univariate tests were significant. As shown in Table 1, Copts adopted separatism more in the endogamy/exogamy values and belief systems - one of the most important of which being religion - play a central role. Therefore, marrying someone of the same religion means that own principles and values are shared and preserved. On the contrary, assimilationism and marginalization were refused more in the endogamy/exogamy domain than in the employment domain. Finally, integrationism and individualism were moderately adopted in the employment domain o be discriminated against in the workplace on the basis of their religious affiliation. Indeed, in the employment domain, the personal characteristics of the individuals are more relevant, while their religious affiliation is less important. Table 1. Differences between employment and endogamy/exogamy domain Employment Endogamy/Exogamy Mean SD Mean SD Separatism 5.00 1.37 6.73 0.67 F (1,99) = 168.33, p < .001, 2 = .63 Integrationism 4.96 1.07 1.53 0.88 F (1,99) = 583.00, p < .001, 2 = .86 Assimilationism 2.60 0.99 1.25 0.46 F (1,99) = 189.95, p < .001, 2 = .66 Marginalization 2.05 1.12 1.28 0.60 F (1,99) = 51.25, p < .001, 2 = .34 Individualism 4.51 1.86 1.37 0.90 F (1,99) = 296.41, p < .001, 2 = .75 To test the differences in the endorsement of acculturation strategies towards Muslims and Protestants a MANOVA with a two-level factor (two groups) and five dependent variables (the five strategies) was carried out. Results showed a main effect of Group, F (5,95) = 9.95, p < .001, 2 = .34. Univariate analyses were significant only for assimilationism [F (1,99) = 38.49, p < .001, 2 = .28] and individualism [F (1,99) = 4.06, p < .05, 2 = .04]: assimilationism was refused more toward Muslims (M = 1.65, SD = 0.61) than toward Protestants (M = 2.21, SD = 0.86), while individualism was rejected more toward Protestants (M = 2.83, SD = 1.30) than toward Muslims (M = 3.05, SD = 1.23). These results can be explained by the fact that both groups are evaluated similarly - and negatively - by the Coptic group; therefore similar strategies were adopted towards them. With regard to outgroup evaluation, both Muslims (M = 19.94, SD = 20.62) and Protestants (M = 35.54, SD = 23.95) were negatively evaluated, but Muslim group was more devalued than the Protestant one, F (1,99) = 4.21, p < .001, 2 = .30. Moreover, participants showed high levels of identification with the Coptic religious group (M = 6.16, SD = 0.70). To test the relationships between acculturation strategies, outgroup evaluation, and religious identity, bivariate correlations were calculated. As shown in Table 2, the more positive was the attitude towards Protestants and Muslims, the more rejected was separation and the more endorsed were other strategies. That is, when a group is positively evaluated, it is more likely for individuals to try to have a relationship with its members, and to consider its members on the basis of their individual characteristics, and/or to adopt aspects of their culture. This pattern is particularly apparent in the employment domain; in the endogamy/exogamy domain, especially with regard to Muslims, outgroup evaluation seems not to be linked to the strategies, probably because in this domain the attitude towards the specific outgroup is less important than the fact that it follows a different religion. Indeed, in the endogamy/exogamy domain, the religious identity was correlated with acculturation strategies, positively with separation and negatively with other strategies: the higher was the religious identification as a Copt, the more Copts desire to preserve their religious beliefs, the more they refuse to have contact with other groups. The religious identity had very few correspondences with acculturation strategies applied to the employment domain, confirming that it is not important in this domain. 495 Zira Hichy et al. / Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences 84 ( 2013 ) 491 – 495 Table 2. Correlations of outgroup evaluation and religious identity with acculturation orientations Muslim Protestant Outgroup evaluation Religious identity Outgroup evaluation Religious identity Employment Separatism -.32*** .07 -.31** .20* Integrationism .28** .06 .26** .06 Assimilationism .37*** -.03 .36*** -.12 Marginalization -.10 -.21* .01 -.29** Individualism .33*** .05 .21* -.02 Endogamy/Exogamy Separatism -.12 .16 -.23* .31** Integrationism .08 -.10 .28** -.24* Assimilationism .20* -.28** .24* -.24* Marginalization .01 -.14 .10 -.34*** Individualism .11 -.21* .15 -.24* * p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001. In general, the results of this research indicate that Copts seem to aim at to preserving their culture and prefer to have little or no contact with other groups. As suggested by Bourhis et al. (2009), the endorsement of separatism may be seen as a coping strategy to avoid contact with a dominant community that discriminates towards a minority community. Further studies should jointly investigate strategies adopted by the Muslim majority and the Coptic minority, in order to have an overview of Egyptian situation and to better understanding the relationship between dominant group and minority groups or indigenous people. References Berry, J. W. (1997). Immigration, acculturation and adaptation. Applied Psychology, 46, 5 34. Berry, J.W., Kim, U., Power, S., Young, M., & Bujaki, M. (1989). Acculturation attitudes in plural societies. Applied Psychology, 38, 185-206. Bourhis, R. Y., Barrette, G., El-Geledi, S., & Schmidt, R. S. (2009). Acculturation orientations and social relations between immigrant and host community members in California. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 40, 443 467. ological approach. International Journal of Psychology, 32, 369 386. Bourhis, R. Y., Montaruli, E., El-Geledi, S., Harvey, S. P., & Barrette, G. (2010). Acculturation in Multiple Host Community Settings. Journal of Social Issues, 66, 780 802. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (2010). The International Religious Freedom Report. Retrieved May 10, 2011, from http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2010/148817.htm. Graves, T. D. (1967). Psychological acculturation in a tri-ethnic community. South-Western Journal of Anthropology, 23, 337 35. Haddock, G., Zanna, M. P., & Esses, V. M. (1993). Assessing the structure of prejudicial attitudes: The case of attitudes toward homosexuals. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 65, 1105 1118. Jasinskaja-Lahti, I., Liebkind, K., Horenczyk, G., & Schmitz, P. (2003). The interactive nature of acculturation: Perceived discrimination, acculturation attitudes and stress among ethnic repatriates in Finland, Israel and Germany. International Journal of Intercultural Relations, 27, 79 97. Jetten, J., Spears, R., & Manstead, A. (2001). Similarity as a source of differentiation: The role of group identification. European Journal of Social Psychology, 31, 621 640. Montreuil, A., & Bourhis, R. Y. (2004). Acculturation orientations of competing host communities towards valued and devalued immigrants. International Journal of Intercultural Relations, 28, 507 532. Phalet, K., & Kosic, A. (2006). Acculturation in European societies. In D. L. Sam, & J. W. Berry (Eds.), The Cambridge handbook of acculturation psychology (pp. 331 348). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Suad J., & Afsaneh, N. (Eds.). (2005). Encyclopedia of Women and Islamic Cultures (EWIC), Vol. 2: Family, Law and Politics. Leiden, Netherlands: Brill Academic Publishers. Trifiletti, E., Dazzi, C., Hichy, Z., & Capozza, D. (2007). A validation of HCAS: The Host Community Acculturation Scale. Testing, Psychometrics, Methodology in Applied Psychology, 14, 1 15. Verkuyten, M., & Thijs, J. (2002). Multiculturalism among minority and majority adolescents in the Netherlands. International Journal of Intercultural Relations, 26, 91 108. 
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work_dk5ewev6pzhhrn62udt6fpq3zi	----	Revisiting the Decision of Death in Hurst v. Florida A N A L Y S I S A N D C O M M E N T A R Y Revisiting the Decision of Death in Hurst v. Florida Brian K. Cooke, MD, Almari Ginory, DO, and Jennifer Zedalis, JD The United States Supreme Court has considered the question of whether a judge or a jury must make the findings necessary to support imposition of the death penalty in several notable cases, including Spaziano v. Florida (1984), Hildwin v. Florida (1989), and Ring v. Arizona (2002). In 2016, the U.S. Supreme Court revisited the subject in Hurst v. Florida. Florida Statute § 921.141 allows the judge, after weighing aggravating and mitigating circumstances, to enter a sentence of life imprisonment or death. Before Hurst, Florida’s bifurcated sentencing proceedings included an advisory sentence from jurors and a separate judicial hearing without juror involvement. In Hurst, the Court revisited the question of whether Florida’s capital sentencing scheme violates the Sixth Amendment, which requires a jury, not a judge, to find each fact necessary to impose a sentence of death in light of Ring. In an eight-to-one decision, the Court reversed the judgment of the Florida Supreme Court, holding that the Sixth Amendment requires a jury to find the aggravating factors necessary for imposing the death penalty. The role of Florida juries in capital sentencing proceedings was thereby elevated from advisory to determinative. We examine the Court’s decision and offer commentary regarding this shift from judge to jury in the final imposition of the death penalty and the overall effect of this landmark case. J Am Acad Psychiatry Law 44:483–90, 2016 Timothy Hurst1 was convicted of murdering his co- worker in 1998. At his first trial, the jury voted 11 to 1 to recommend a sentence of death, but Mr. Hurst’s first sentence was reversed for reasons separate from the current proceedings. On resentencing, a second jury recommended seven to five that Mr. Hurst re- ceive the death penalty. Under Florida’s system, the jurors’ recommendation was considered by the judge, but the judge independently weighed the fac- tors necessary to impose a sentence of death. Florida’s statute did not require that the jury make the critical findings necessary to impose the death penalty. Al- though the jury’s advisory verdict was death at both of Mr. Hurst’s trials, the maximum punishment Mr. Hurst could have received without any independent judicial findings was life in prison without parole. The judge sentenced Mr. Hurst to death based on her independent findings. Two United States Supreme Court cases became important in the subsequent history of Mr. Hurst’s case. In 2000, the United States Supreme Court held in Apprendi v. New Jersey2 that a judge cannot in- crease a defendant’s sentence beyond the statutory maximum based on facts other than those found by the jury. In other words, sentencing enhancements requiring proof of any additional factors must be presented to the jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Independent judicial fact-finding, if used to support an enhanced sentence, violates the Sixth Amendment. In the New Jersey case, Mr. Apprendi was charged with second-degree possession of a firearm after fir- ing into the home of an African-American family. The charge carried a maximum sentence of 10 years. After Mr. Apprendi pleaded guilty, the prosecutor filed a motion to enhance his sentence based on the state’s hate crime statute. New Jersey’s hate crime law allowed the judge to enhance a sentence based on a preponderance of the evidence regarding the motiva- Dr. Cooke is Assistant Professor of Psychiatry, University of Florida College of Medicine, Gainesville, FL. Dr. Ginory is Program Director, University of Central Florida College of Medicine, Hospital Corpora- tion of America Graduate Medical Education Consortium Psychiatry Residency, Gainesville, FL. Ms. Zedalis is Assistant Director of the Criminal Justice Center, University of Florida Levin College of Law, and Affiliate Professor in the Department of Psychiatry, University of Florida College of Medicine, Gainesville, FL. Address correspondence to: Brian K. Cooke, MD, Springhill Health Center, 8491 NW 39th Avenue, Gainesville, FL 32606. E-mail: cooke@ufl.edu. Disclosures of financial or other potential conflicts of interest: None. 483Volume 44, Number 4, 2016 tion for the crime. A hearing was held before the judge based on the state’s motion. Prosecutors ar- gued that Mr. Apprendi’s crime was motivated by racial bias. Mr. Apprendi’s defense argued that his actions were the result of intoxication. The trial court agreed with the prosecution, and Mr. Apprendi was sentenced to 12 years in prison, 2 years more than he could have received based on his guilty plea alone. The Supreme Court reversed Mr. Apprendi’s sen- tence, holding that any finding that increases a sen- tence beyond the statutory maximum must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt and decided on by a jury. The Apprendi decision was cited as precedent by the Court in its consideration of Ring v. Arizona. In 2002, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Ring v. Arizona3 that a jury must make all factual findings necessary to support a death sentence. Mr. Ring was charged with murder, armed robbery, and related charges. At his trial, the jury found Mr. Ring guilty of first-degree murder, but deadlocked on whether the murder was premeditated. Arizona law permitted the judge to hold a separate hearing and determine the presence or absence of aggravating circumstances required for the imposition of a death sentence. At Mr. Ring’s sentencing hearing, the judge made find- ings that Mr. Ring was the actual shooter, a fact contested in the case, in addition to aggravating cir- cumstances sufficient under Arizona law to support a death sentence (Ref. 3, p 584). The Court found that Arizona’s capital sentencing law violated the Ap- prendi rule, because Arizona permitted a judge rather than a jury to find the facts necessary to sentence a defendant to death. In a divided decision, the Florida Supreme Court declined to apply Ring v. Arizona in its 2012 decision regarding Mr. Hurst. The court noted that Florida’s death penalty statute had been upheld by the United States Supreme Court in Hildwin v. Florida4 and that Hildwin had not been expressly overruled by Ring. The court also distinguished Florida’s death penalty proceedings from those at issue in Arizona. In Flor- ida, jurors heard and weighed evidence on aggravat- ing and mitigating circumstances, determined whether an aggravator had been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and rendered an advisory sen- tence. Arizona’s law did not include an advisory sen- tence from jurors. On March 9, 2015, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari and agreed to hear Hurst v. Florida to resolve whether Florida’s capital sentencing law violates the Sixth Amendment. The case was decided on January 12, 2016.5 In an eight-to-one decision, the Court reversed the judgment of the Florida Su- preme Court, holding that the Sixth Amendment requires a jury to find the aggravating factors neces- sary for imposing a death sentence. The case of Mr. Hurst and the Court’s decision are of importance to forensic mental health professionals who provide mitigating evidence at death penalty proceedings. Concerns of testifying experts include an enlarged role for mental health professionals at jury trials and sensitivity to possible differences in the way mental health evidence should be presented and explained to jurors as opposed to judges. Case Background In 1998, Timothy Hurst, age 19, was charged with first-degree murder for the death of Cynthia Harrison. On May 2, 1998, Ms. Harrison’s body was found in the freezer of the restaurant where she worked. She was bound and gagged with electrical tape, and she had been stabbed approximately 60 times with a box cutter. The restaurant’s safe was unlocked and open, with $375 missing. Mr. Hurst was scheduled to work with Ms. Harrison that morn- ing. A nearby worker noted Mr. Hurst arriving at the restaurant earlier that morning and was able to iden- tify him from a police lineup. A friend of Mr. Hurst’s, Michael Williams, testified that Mr. Hurst had previously talked about robbing the restaurant and, after the fact, had also confessed to killing Ms. Harrison. In addition, another friend of Mr. Hurst’s, Lee-Lee Smith, testified that Mr. Hurst said he was going to rob the restaurant. Mr. Hurst later admitted to killing the victim and asked Mr. Smith to dispose of some items and keep the money for him. Several items were obtained from Mr. Smith’s home, includ- ing clothing with Ms. Harrison’s blood, Ms. Harri- son’s driver’s license, and a bank bag from the restau- rant. Mr. Hurst was found guilty of first-degree murder.1 During the penalty phase, the judge instructed the jury to consider several mitigating and aggravating factors, including whether the murder was commit- ted during the commission of a robbery and whether the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, and cruel. The jury recommended the death penalty by an 11-to-1 vote.1 Florida Statute § 921.141 provides that “the court, after weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, shall enter a sentence of Revisiting the Decision of Death in Hurst v. Florida 484 The Journal of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law life imprisonment or death.”6 After a nonjury hear- ing, as provided by Florida law, the judge sentenced Mr. Hurst to death, finding three aggravating cir- cumstances and rejecting most of the mitigating cir- cumstances. A third aggravator found by the judge, which was not argued by the state at trial or consid- ered by the jury, was that the murder was committed to avoid or prevent a lawful arrest.1 In 2002, Mr. Hurst appealed to the Florida Su- preme Court, raising four claims. He argued that the trial court erred in considering the aggravating cir- cumstance that the crime was committed to avoid a lawful arrest, as this aggravator was never presented to jurors and it was not supported by the evidence. He also argued that the court failed to give proper weight to the mitigating factor of his age and that it failed to give weight to evidence about his family background, contributions to the community, and church attendance. He also argued that a death sen- tence was disproportionate in his case. In addition, he averred that failure to require jurors to decide all evidence necessary to support the death penalty vio- lated the rule of Apprendi v. New Jersey, which had recently been decided. The Florida Supreme Court agreed with Mr. Hurst on the first claim. It held that the trial court erred in finding the aggravator that the murder was committed to avoid or prevent a lawful arrest. How- ever, this error was found to be harmless, as the death penalty could still have been imposed on the basis of the other two aggravators (Ref. 1, p 696). On the second point, the Florida Supreme Court found that the trial court did not err in assigning very little weight to the mitigating factors, and even if there were an error, it was harmless in light of the aggra- vating circumstances (Ref. 1, pp 697–700). Mr. Hurst’s argument of disproportionality was rejected after consideration of the two significant aggravators, with the third being struck, and minimal mitigating circumstances. Finally, regarding the fourth point, the court rejected Mr. Hurst’s claim that the Ap- prendi rule applied to Florida’s capital sentencing process (Ref. 1, p 703). Mr. Hurst’s conviction and sentence of death were affirmed. In 2009, Mr. Hurst returned to the Florida Su- preme Court, raising the question of ineffective as- sistance of counsel in addition to claims of newly discovered evidence and that the state withheld fa- vorable evidence from the defense. Mr. Hurst argued that that the state failed to pres- ent favorable material evidence during the guilt phase of his trial: for example, that a witness saw several men in the parking lot or that Mr. Smith was also charged in connection with this case. These claims were rejected.7 Mr. Hurst’s second claim was that there was newly discovered evidence that neces- sitated a new trial. This evidence included changes in testimony and Mr. Smith’s post-trial conviction. This claim was also rejected (Ref. 7, p 990). Mr. Hurst also claimed ineffective assistance of counsel during the guilt phase of the trial, a claim that was also rejected (Ref. 7, p 995). Mr. Hurst received relief on his remaining claim that his counsel was ineffective during the penalty phase in failing to develop and present mental health mitigation. Mr. Hurst’s trial counsel failed to have him examined by a mental health professional to evaluate for low IQ or for possible damage secondary to fetal alcohol syndrome. A mental health evalua- tion had been requested by his previous counsel but not pursued. The Florida Supreme Court agreed that counsel was ineffective during the penalty phase for failure to present mental health evidence. The sen- tence of death was vacated, and Mr. Hurst’s case was remanded for a new penalty phase (Ref. 7, pp 1015–16). In 2012, a new penalty phase was held in which mental health factors, such as Mr. Hurst’s low IQ and the effects of in utero exposure to alcohol, were presented as mitigating circumstances. The judge in- structed the jury that the death penalty could be rec- ommended if it found that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, and the murder occurred while a robbery was committed. The jury voted seven to five to recommend the death penalty. The judge then sentenced Mr. Hurst to death based on the jury’s recommendation, as well as her independent findings that two aggravating circumstances were present. Mr. Hurst’s case was again appealed to the Florida Supreme Court in 2014, and his second death sen- tence was upheld. In this appeal, Mr. Hurst argued that the trial court failed to address evidence of his intellectual disability adequately. This claim was considered and rejected by the court. Mr. Hurst again argued that under Ring, every factor necessary to support a death sentence must be presented to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. He also argued that a unanimous jury verdict was necessary Cooke, Ginory, and Zedalis 485Volume 44, Number 4, 2016 on at least one aggravating factor. The court rejected these arguments and affirmed Mr. Hurst’s sentence. Three justices dissented from the portion of the ma- jority’s opinion finding that Ring was not applica- ble.8 Mr. Hurst then sought relief in the United States Supreme Court. The Decision In an eight-to-one decision, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Florida Supreme Court and remanded the case. Justice Sotomayor, writing for the majority, stated that the necessity was “to resolve whether Florida’s capital sentencing scheme violates the Sixth Amendment in light of Ring” (Ref. 5, p 621). Justice Breyer filed a concur- ring opinion. Justice Alito submitted a dissenting opinion. Justice Sotomayor opined that, “(t)he Sixth Amendment requires a jury, not a judge, to find each fact necessary to impose a sentence of death. A jury’s mere recommendation is not enough” (Ref. 5, p 619). Drawing on Ring as precedent, the maximum punishment Mr. Hurst could have re- ceived without any judge-made findings was life in prison without parole. The Court criticized Florida’s failure to “appreci- ate the central and singular role the judge plays under Florida law” (Ref. 5, p 622). Striking down Florida’s capital sentencing law, Justice Sotomayor focused on a key provision that calls for the judge, and not the jury, to make specific findings. These judicial find- ings are necessary to impose a death sentence in Flor- ida, despite two separate jury proceedings and an advisory sentencing verdict. In Florida’s bifurcated system, jurors determine whether the defendant is guilty of first-degree murder in a guilt phase. In the event of a guilty verdict, jurors then sit through a second penalty phase proceeding. If they determine that at least one statutory aggravating factor has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, they must also weigh any mitigating evidence.6 In Tedder v. State, the Florida Supreme Court found the jurors’ “advi- sory” verdict should be given “great weight” by the judge (Ref. 9, p 910). Florida’s hybrid sentencing proceedings in which the jury provides an “advisory sentence” of life or death without specifying the fac- tual basis for its recommendation6 is insufficient to meet the necessary factual finding required by Ring. The state also argued that stare decisis compelled the Court to uphold Florida’s capital sentencing scheme. The Court acknowledged its own precedent in Florida death cases, Spaziano v. Florida10 and Hildwin v. Florida,4 where it twice upheld Florida’s hybrid scheme and permitted judicial fact-finding for sentencing purposes. Speaking for the majority, Justice Sotomayor wrote, “Time and subsequent cases have washed away the logic of Spaziano and Hildwin. The decisions are overruled to the extent that they allow a sentencing judge to find an aggra- vating circumstance, independent of the jury’s fact- finding, that is necessary for imposition of the death penalty” (Ref. 5, p 624). Justice Breyer wrote a concurring opinion, ex- plaining that he concurred in the majority judgment based on his view that “the Eighth Amendment re- quires that a jury, not a judge, make the decision to sentence a defendant to death” (Ref. 5, p 624). He emphasized that it was quite clear that Florida’s judges, not juries, sentence capital defendants. Justice Alito, writing in dissent, argued that he would not overrule Hildwin and Spaziano without reconsidering later cases on which the Court’s pres- ent decision is based (including Ring). He also would not extend Ring, based on the view that Florida’s sentencing scheme is quite different from Arizona’s, and his belief that the Florida jury “plays a critically important role” (Ref. 5, p 626). Discussion In Hurst v. Florida, the Supreme Court brought forward not only the reasoning of its earlier decisions in Apprendi and Ring, but the theme that jurors, not judges, are the ultimate decision makers in our justice system. The roles of juror and judge are traditionally sep- arate: jurors decide the facts of the case and apply the law to those facts; judges decide the sentence when there is a verdict of guilt. Judges also perform a gate- keeping function in trials, ruling on admissibility of evidence, resolving questions of which laws apply in given situations, and ruling on matters that affect the fairness and integrity of the proceedings. For exam- ple, judges decide whether evidence such as a confes- sion or a recording has been lawfully obtained as a threshold requirement for its use by the state. To make these threshold decisions, judges must often hear testimony and make factual findings. The au- thority to sentence has always been a major role of judges in the U.S. justice system. Revisiting the Decision of Death in Hurst v. Florida 486 The Journal of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law The idea that jurors hold the fate of the accused in their hands has not always been at odds with that of the role of the judge. Until Apprendi was decided, the Court’s safeguarding of the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury stopped short of sentencing. In Ring, the Court recognized this separation of power in the context of death penalty proceedings. The Supreme Court’s review and subsequent re- versal of Apprendi and Ring demonstrate intent to safeguard the jury’s role in the justice system. Defin- ing any factor that subjects a defendant to punish- ment greater than that allowed by verdict alone as “the functional equivalent of an element,” the Court made it clear that the right to trial by jury is a reser- vation of power. Apprendi defines elements as “any facts that increase the prescribed range of penalties to which a criminal defendant is exposed” (Ref. 2, p 490). The Court’s scrutiny of sentencing enhancements in light of Apprendi and Ring is likely to be far reach- ing. When the prosecution seeks to submit sentenc- ing factors to the judge not expressly found by jurors to obtain an enhanced penalty, it will be frustrated by Apprendi and its progeny. Hurst is the latest in this line of cases. Under Hurst, the judge’s independent fact-finding of sentencing factors is contrary to rights guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The Sixth Amendment, as applied to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, guarantees the right to a public trial by an impartial jury. These rights attach to any factor that exposes a defendant to greater punishment than that permitted by the jury’s verdict alone. In any circumstances where the judge imposes a sentence above the statutory maximum allowed by verdict alone, the judge is infringing on these rights (Ref. 5, pp 621–2). The theme of juror supremacy, or of faith in jurors as “more attuned to the community’s moral sensibil- ity,” is far reaching (Ref. 3, p 615, internal citations omitted). The Court’s willingness to recognize dis- tinct limits on judicial power in this context suggests the value it places on participatory justice. Judicial power at sentencing is now circumscribed by facts and circumstances expressly found by a jury: “When the judge inflicts punishment that the jury’s verdict alone does not allow, the jury has not found all the facts which the law makes essential to the punish- ment, and the judge exceeds his proper authority” (Ref 11, p 304). As demonstrated by Apprendi, the same reasoning has been applied in cases where the defendant does not choose to exercise the constitutional right to trial by jury, but instead enters a guilty plea. This point is significant, because it underscores the Court’s view of the Sixth Amendment and its limits on judicial power. In Blakely v. Washington (2004),11 the Supreme Court reversed Ralph Blakely’s 90-month sentence for kidnapping involving domestic violence and use of a firearm because it exceeded the permissible range he could have received after a jury trial by 37 months. Although the case was resolved with a guilty plea as opposed to a trial, 53 months was the statutory max- imum for the offense, absent any exceptional circum- stances. Mr. Blakely did not admit any exceptional circumstances as a condition of his plea, and he did not consent to a nonjury determination of any fac- tors not admitted as part of his plea. Mr. Blakely’s sentencing judge enhanced the sen- tence beyond the 53-month cap after an independent sentencing hearing. During the three-day hearing, the judge heard testimony from Mr. Blakely’s es- tranged wife as well as medical experts. Mr. Blakely had a history of mental illness, and his attorneys called mental health experts on his behalf. The en- hanced sentence was based on the judge’s finding that the acts were committed with deliberate cruelty (Ref. 11, pp 299 –301). Finding this sentencing proceeding in violation of Mr. Blakely’s Sixth Amendment rights, Justice Scalia noted, “Our commitment to Apprendi in this context reflects not just respect for long standing precedent, but the need to give intelligible content to the right of jury trial. That right is no mere procedural formality, but a fundamental reservation of power in our con- stitutional structure” (Ref. 11, pp 305– 6). In this context, we see the Court’s intent to limit judicial power even in cases where a defendant has waived a jury trial. The focus is on the separate role of the judge, and the rulings turn on this question: Is the judge enhancing a sentence based on facts that have not been proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt or admitted by the accused? In the Court’s review of death penalty decision- making, Hurst represents a strong affirmation of the power of the jury. Jurors bring collective experience, attitudes, and reactions into the jury room. In Flor- Cooke, Ginory, and Zedalis 487Volume 44, Number 4, 2016 ida, 12 jurors are empaneled in death penalty cases. Using Florida’s law as an example, jurors may ascribe any weight they choose to mitigating evidence, and they are not limited in their consideration of specif- ically enumerated factors. They may consider “any factor in the defendant’s background that would mit- igate against the imposition of the death penalty” (Ref. 6, (7)(h)). How is the reservation of power in the jury signif- icant? Both the prosecution and the defendant stand in a different posture before a jury than they do be- fore an elected or appointed judge. This difference is especially true because the prosecution is an arm of the state. Through the process of jury selection, both sides play a role in the ultimate makeup of the jury. Once selected to serve, jurors are the collective and diverse eyes, ears, and voices of the community. The right of accused citizens to be judged by their “equals and peers” on any fact or aspect of an offense requir- ing proof has come to us from the common law of England, as noted by Justice Scalia in Blakely (Ref. 11, pp 301–2). The service of jurors in our country was guaranteed at its inception. “The Fram- ers’ paradigm for criminal justice is the common law ideal of limited state power accomplished by strict division of authority between judge and jury” (Ref. 11, p 296). How may these decisions affect mental health pro- fessionals, who are often called to give evidence at sentencing hearings? One outcome will be the in- crease in presentations to jurors, as opposed to judges, on a range of points. For example, if the state seeks an enhanced sentence based on specific find- ings, such as racial motivation or deliberate cruelty, jurors will have the power and the responsibility to weigh the evidence and determine the facts, just as they do other elements of the offense. This weighing of evidence will also be true in death penalty cases, where mental health experts of- ten testify regarding the existence of mitigating evi- dence and the mental state of the defendant at the time of an offense. Jurors will listen, weigh, and eval- uate expert witness testimony in circumstances where judges previously exercised autonomy when considering these claims. Jurors will make their own determinations about the credibility and expertise of the witnesses in this process. They will collectively decide what matters to them in deciding the verdict. In Apprendi and Blakely, mental health experts tes- tified in nonjury hearings (Ref. 2, p 470; Ref. 11, p 300). Although there is no precise way to charac- terize the differences between judicial fact-finding and juror fact-finding, the constitutional right of de- fendants to present this evidence to a jury and the jury’s power over its ultimate value are at the heart of these decisions. In Hurst, advisory juries twice handed down death recommendations (Ref. 5, p 620). It is notable that Mr. Hurst’s second advisory death sentence was rec- ommended by the smallest majority possible, seven to five rather than the earlier vote of 11 to 1. Unlike the first trial, jurors in the second trial were provided with mitigating mental health evidence. No infor- mation is available to indicate the impact of this evidence, and juror deliberations are off limits in general. It is a question of the jury’s role and its power, as opposed to that of the judge. Judges pronounce sentences; they technically im- pose sentences and sometimes have continued juris- diction over aspects of sentences, such as the terms of probation. However, the power to impose punish- ment does not carry with it the independent power to find facts necessary for that punishment. This fact- finding power is guarded by the Sixth Amendment as a power of jurors and not of judges. The blurring of roles is what led to the decisions discussed herein, including the Hurst decision. In addition, the Hurst ruling underscores chal- lenges facing all participants in the court system be- cause of the proliferation of special sentencing laws. State and federal legislators are actively passing laws aimed at increasing punishments for various crimes beyond existing statutory maximums. Florida, for example, now has 16 different statutory aggravating factors in its capital sentencing scheme.6 The New Jersey hate crime law at issue in Apprendi permitted the judge to exceed the statutory maximum of 10 years for a second-degree offense by another 10 years (Ref. 2, pp 468 –9). Now, none of the special sentencing factors ap- pearing across the country can be used by judges alone to increase penalties. This includes the impo- sition of special fines,12 sentencing guidelines that exceed statutory maximums,13 and minimum man- datory terms.14 In Hurst, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the Con- stitution’s reservation of power in the jury already noted in Apprendi, Blakely, and Ring. These cases will continue to raise questions about the use of sentenc- ing enhancement laws. Prosecutors are now faced Revisiting the Decision of Death in Hurst v. Florida 488 The Journal of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law with the task of presenting and proving additional elements to a jury to argue for a sentence that departs upward from the statutory maximum for an offense. Guidelines that provide for terms exceeding the stated maximum based on special criteria will now necessarily be viewed as laws with added elements for jury consideration. The process of seeking enhanced sentences is likely to take more time and more resources. One possible outcome would be an overhaul of the federal sentencing guidelines and any state guidelines with similar provisions. However, whether there will be such a broad revision remains to be seen. It is important to note that Sixth Amendment protections also apply in cases where a defendant enters a guilty plea. Judges may only sentence defen- dants in excess of a statutory maximum where the facts necessary to increase the sentence inhere in the verdict; the defendant expressly waives his right to a jury finding; or the defendant admits the fact neces- sary for the increase (Ref. 11, pp 303– 4). In Hurst, the third condition is relevant; the state argued that the defendant “admitted” a statutory ag- gravator based on his appellate lawyer’s decision not to challenge the judge’s finding that the murder was committed in the course of a robbery. This argument was rejected by the Supreme Court for lack of merit, indicating a defendant’s admission of facts for pur- poses of a sentence enhancement must be of record, knowing, and voluntary. “Hurst never admitted to either aggravating circumstance alleged by the State. At most, his counsel simply refrained from challeng- ing the aggravating circumstances in parts of his ap- pellate briefs” (Ref. 5, pp 622–3). Aftermath of the Decision and Conclusions Hurst and its predecessors have restrained the power of judges over sentencing. The Court has demonstrated a clear intent to place sentencing facts within the jurors’ domain. The decision’s impact on cases now in progress, on appeal, or in collateral pro- ceedings is the next question. The decision in Hurst will affect the long list of capital punishment cases in Florida, which has the second highest number of death row inmates in the United States. As of January 1, 2016, California had 743, Florida had 396, and Texas had 263.15 Will all capital felonies for which death sentences were im- posed under procedures subsequently determined by the U.S. Supreme Court to be unconstitutional have to be resentenced? Although Florida has a “brisk pace of executions”16 among the 32 states that have capital punishment, death penalty cases have mostly stalled in response to the Court’s holding. After the Hurst decision, Florida Governor Rick Scott signed a legislative overhaul of the death pen- alty sentencing law (HB 7101) in March 2016.17 The law took effect as soon as Governor Scott signed the bill. Some have called the new law “hurriedly crafted.”18 Florida’s new capital sentencing law in- cludes, among other changes, the following: Penalty-phase juries must unanimously find a sufficient number of aggravating circumstances for the state to impose a death sentence. Prosecutors must notify defendants before trial that they intend to seek the death penalty and to identify the aggravating circumstances the state intends to prove. The decision to impose a death sentence requires at least 10 of 12 jurors. Judges can no longer override a jury’s recom- mendation of life in order to impose a death sentence.19,20 On May 9, 2016, Florida Circuit Judge Milton Hirsch declared the fix unconstitutional and struck down the new law (Florida Statute § 921.141), be- lieving that anything less than unanimity for penalty phase jury findings of aggravators and the recommen- dation of death would not protect Florida’s capital- case sentencing scheme from further constitutional attack.21 He was the first state judge to rule on the constitutionality of the revised death-penalty sen- tencing law, issuing his order in the case of Fla. v. Karon Gaiter.22 Mr. Gaiter is awaiting trial for first- degree murder for fatally shooting a man in 2012. Circuit Judge Hirsch opined, “[a] decedent can- not be more or less dead. An expectant mother can- not be more or less pregnant. And a jury cannot be more or less unanimous. Every verdict in every crim- inal case in Florida requires the concurrence, not of some, not of most, but of all jurors— every single one of them.” (Ref. 22, p 9). Because even second-degree misdemeanor defendants cannot be convicted except upon the unanimous verdict of a jury, then it follows that, “[w]e take no Floridian’s life upon a less-than- unanimous verdict” (Ref. 22, p 16). Cooke, Ginory, and Zedalis 489Volume 44, Number 4, 2016 If the Florida Supreme Court finds that the deci- sion is retroactive, death row inmates should be af- forded new sentencing hearings or have their death sentences commuted to life. Similar considerations followed the Ring decision, when several states re- wrote their statutes so that juries, not judges, deter- mine when the death penalty will be imposed.23 In response to Ring, the Arizona legislature met and adopted a new capital sentencing procedure, which requires complete jury participation regarding the imposition of the death sentence. The statute also prohibited retroactive application of jury sentencing, limiting the application of Ring to only those cases that were pending on direct appeal at the time Ring was decided.24 Then in 2004, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Schriro v. Summerlin25 that its 2002 decision in Ring is not retroactive to cases already final on direct review, thereby denying new sentenc- ing hearings for death row inmates in states whose sentences were originally imposed by judges. At the least, the Hurst decision will apply to in- mates who, although sentenced to death, have not finished their initial direct appeals to the Florida Su- preme Court. There are 37 direct appeals (so-called pipeline cases) pending before the Florida Supreme Court.26 Delaware and Alabama are now the only remain- ing states that allow judges to override a jury’s rec- ommendation of a life sentence. In contrast to Flor- ida, however, Delaware has only 14 men on death row, and its last execution was in 2012.27 Alabama has 196 inmates on death row.15 All other states with a death penalty require a unanimous jury verdict to impose the death sentence. The Court’s decision in Hurst will affect hundreds of death sentences in the United States, but it is already clear that the interpre- tation of the decision will remain contested. References 1. Hurst v. State, 819 So.2d 689 (Fla. 2002) 2. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) 3. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002) 4. Hildwin v. Florida, 490 U.S. 638 (1989) 5. Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016) 6. Fla. Stat. § 921.141 (2015) 7. Hurst v. State, 18 So. 3d 975 (Fla. 2009) 8. Hurst v. State, 147 So. 3d 435 (Fla. 2014) 9. Tedder v. State, 322 So. 2d 908 (Fla. 1975) 10. Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447 (1984) 11. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004) 12. Southern Union Co. v. United States, No. 11-94 (U.S. June 21, 2012) 13. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) 14. Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013) 15. Death row inmates by state. Available at: http://www.deathpenaltyinfo. org/death-row-inmates-state-and-size-death-row-year/. Wash- ington, DC: Death Penalty Information Center. Accessed June 16, 2016 16. Alvarez L: Florida revamps death penalty, making it harder to sentence someone to die. New York Times, March 3, 2016. Avail- able at: http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/04/us/florida-revamps- death-penalty-making-it-harder-to-sentence-someone-to-die. html?_r�0/. Accessed June 16, 2016 17. Bousquet S: Revamped Florida death penalty on trial before Supreme Court. Bradenton Herald, May 5, 2016. Available at: http://www. bradenton.com/news/local/crime/article75967722.html/. Accessed June 16, 2016 18. Kam D: Florida Supreme Court tries to sort out new death pen- alty law. Orlando Weekly, June 7. 2016. Available at: http:// www.orlandoweekly.com/Blogs/archives/2016/06/07/florida- supreme-court-tries-to-sort-out-new-death-penalty-law/. Ac- cessed June 16, 2016 19. 2016 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 13 (H.B. 7101) 20. Death-penalty law under fire in Florida. Orlando Sentinel, May 20, 2016. Available at: http://www.orlandosentinel.com/opinion/os-ed- death-penalty-the-interview-20160520-story.html/. Accessed June 16, 2016 21. Ovalle D: Judge says state death-penalty law is unconstitutional. Mi- ami Herald, May 9, 2016. Available at: http://www.miamiherald. com/news/local/community/miami-dade/article76520707.html/. Accessed June 16, 2016 22. State v. Gaiter, NO. F01–128535 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 2016) 23. Scott CL, Gerbasi JB: Ring v. Arizona: who decides death? J Am Acad Psychiatry Law 31:106 –9, 2003 24. Shapiro M: Re-evaluating the role of the jury in capital cases after Ring v. Arizona. N.Y.U. Ann Surv Am L 59:633– 66, 2004 25. Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348 (2004) 26. Condemned on Florida’s death row hope to get new sentences. Watertown Herald, Published in the Daily Times, June 12, 2016. Available at: http://www.watertowndailytimes.com/national/ condemned-on-floridas-death-row-hope-to-get-new-sentences- 20160612/. Accessed June 16, 2016 27. Reyes JM: Delaware court considers constitutionality of death penalty. Delaware online, June 15, 2016. Available at: http:// www.delawareonline.com/story/news/local/2016/06/15/arguments- wednesday-over-delawares-death-penalty-law/85885106/. Accessed June 16, 2016 Revisiting the Decision of Death in Hurst v. Florida 490 The Journal of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-row-inmates-state-and-size-death-row-year/ http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-row-inmates-state-and-size-death-row-year/ http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/04/us/florida-revamps-death-penalty-making-it-harder-to-sentence-someone-to-die.html?_r=0/ http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/04/us/florida-revamps-death-penalty-making-it-harder-to-sentence-someone-to-die.html?_r=0/ http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/04/us/florida-revamps-death-penalty-making-it-harder-to-sentence-someone-to-die.html?_r=0/ http://www.bradenton.com/news/local/crime/article75967722.html/ http://www.bradenton.com/news/local/crime/article75967722.html/ http://www.orlandoweekly.com/Blogs/archives/2016/06/07/florida-supreme-court-tries-to-sort-out-new-death-penalty-law/ http://www.orlandoweekly.com/Blogs/archives/2016/06/07/florida-supreme-court-tries-to-sort-out-new-death-penalty-law/ http://www.orlandoweekly.com/Blogs/archives/2016/06/07/florida-supreme-court-tries-to-sort-out-new-death-penalty-law/ http://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/community/miami-dade/article76520707.html/ http://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/community/miami-dade/article76520707.html/ http://www.watertowndailytimes.com/national/condemned-on-floridas-death-row-hope-to-get-new-sentences-20160612/ http://www.watertowndailytimes.com/national/condemned-on-floridas-death-row-hope-to-get-new-sentences-20160612/ http://www.watertowndailytimes.com/national/condemned-on-floridas-death-row-hope-to-get-new-sentences-20160612/ http://www.delawareonline.com/story/news/local/2016/06/15/arguments-wednesday-over-delawares-death-penalty-law/85885106/ http://www.delawareonline.com/story/news/local/2016/06/15/arguments-wednesday-over-delawares-death-penalty-law/85885106/ http://www.delawareonline.com/story/news/local/2016/06/15/arguments-wednesday-over-delawares-death-penalty-law/85885106/ 
work_dk6b6l3xjbhb5moclyaxaj5bre	----	[PDF] Violence against transgender people: A review of United States data | Semantic Scholar Skip to search formSkip to main content> Semantic Scholar's Logo Search Sign InCreate Free Account You are currently offline. Some features of the site may not work correctly. DOI:10.1016/J.AVB.2009.01.006 Corpus ID: 27392509Violence against transgender people: A review of United States data @article{Stotzer2009ViolenceAT, title={Violence against transgender people: A review of United States data}, author={R. Stotzer}, journal={Aggression and Violent Behavior}, year={2009}, volume={14}, pages={170-179} } R. Stotzer Published 2009 Sociology Aggression and Violent Behavior Abstract Transgender people face many challenges in a society that is unforgiving of any system of gender that is not binary. However, there are three primary sources of data in the United States for discerning the rates and types of violence that transgender people face throughout their lives — self-report surveys and needs assessments, hot-line call and social service records, and police reports. Data from each of these sources are discussed in length, as well as some of the methodological… Expand View via Publisher faculty.mu.edu.sa Save to Library Create Alert Cite Launch Research Feed Share This Paper 398 CitationsHighly Influential Citations 37 Background Citations 180 Methods Citations 4 Results Citations 17 View All Tables from this paper table 1 table 3 Paper Mentions Blog Post Violence and Discrimination against Transgender People The Society Pages: All Blogs 25 September 2017 News Article How Society Let This Happen: The Transgender People Killed in 2016 | Broadly Vice 20 November 2016 398 Citations Citation Type Citation Type All Types Cites Results Cites Methods Cites Background Has PDF Publication Type Author More Filters More Filters Filters Sort by Relevance Sort by Most Influenced Papers Sort by Citation Count Sort by Recency Unequal Treatment of Transgender Individuals in Domestic Violence and Rape Crisis Programs Kristie L Seelman Psychology 2015 26 Highly Influenced View 6 excerpts, cites background Save Alert Research Feed Experiences of Violence Among Transgender Women in Puerto Rico: An Underestimated Problem Sheilla L Rodríguez-Madera, M. Padilla, +4 authors Alíxida Ramos-Pibernus Medicine Journal of homosexuality 2017 18 View 3 excerpts, cites background and results Save Alert Research Feed Gender-Based Violence Against Transgender People in the United States: A Call for Research and Programming A. Wirtz, Tonia C. Poteat, Mannat Malik, N. Glass Psychology, Medicine Trauma, violence & abuse 2018 27 View 1 excerpt, cites background Save Alert Research Feed "WE ALREADY BEEN PURGED": VIOLENCE AGAINST BLACK TRANSGENDER WOMEN IN ALLEGHENY COUNTY Noah C. Riley Psychology 2015 Highly Influenced PDF View 6 excerpts, cites background Save Alert Research Feed The Social Costs of Gender Nonconformity for Transgender Adults: Implications for Discrimination and Health† Lisa R. Miller, Eric Anthony Grollman Sociology, Medicine Sociological forum 2015 150 View 1 excerpt, cites background Save Alert Research Feed Reporting on transgender victims of homicide: Practices of misgendering, sourcing and transparency N. Seely 2021 View 1 excerpt, cites background Save Alert Research Feed Investigating Trans People’s Vulnerabilities to Intimate Partner Violence/Abuse J. Walker Medicine Partner Abuse 2015 21 Highly Influenced View 4 excerpts, cites background Save Alert Research Feed Gender Identity and Social Services: Barriers to Care R. Stotzer, P. Silverschanz, A. Wilson Sociology 2013 36 View 2 excerpts, cites background Save Alert Research Feed Counselling Transgender Individuals: Issues and Considerations Cassandra Weir, Noella Piquette Psychology 2018 7 Highly Influenced View 6 excerpts, cites background Save Alert Research Feed Intimate Partner Violence and Sexual Abuse among LGBT People T. Brown, Jody L Herman Psychology 2015 35 PDF View 1 excerpt, cites background Save Alert Research Feed ... 1 2 3 4 5 ... References SHOWING 1-10 OF 51 REFERENCES SORT BYRelevance Most Influenced Papers Recency Gender identity and hate crimes: Violence against transgender people in Los Angeles County R. Stotzer Psychology 2008 52 View 1 excerpt, references background Save Alert Research Feed Health and Social Service Needs of Transgender People in Chicago G. P. Kenagy, Wendy B Bostwick Medicine 2005 148 Highly Influential View 5 excerpts, references background Save Alert Research Feed A Needs Assessment of Transgendered People of Color Living in Washington, DC Jessica Xavier, Marilyn P Bobbin, B. Singer, Earline Budd Psychology 2005 205 View 2 excerpts, references background Save Alert Research Feed Gender Violence E. Lombardi, R. Wilchins, D. Priesing, D. Malouf Medicine Journal of homosexuality 2001 534 Highly Influential View 8 excerpts, references background and methods Save Alert Research Feed Violence, identity and policing L. J. Moran, A. N. Sharpe Sociology 2004 74 View 1 excerpt, references background Save Alert Research Feed Transgender health: findings from two needs assessment studies in Philadelphia. G. P. Kenagy Medicine Health & social work 2005 421 Highly Influential View 6 excerpts, references background and methods Save Alert Research Feed The Health and Social Service Needs of Transgender People in Philadelphia G. P. Kenagy Medicine 2005 68 Highly Influential View 10 excerpts, references background and methods Save Alert Research Feed Hate crimes and violence against the Transgendered T. M. Witten, A. E. Eyler Psychology 1999 70 Highly Influential View 5 excerpts, references background Save Alert Research Feed Transgender HIV prevention: a qualitative needs assessment. W. Bockting, B. Robinson, B. Rosser Medicine AIDS care 1998 283 Save Alert Research Feed Transgender Health and HIV Prevention: Needs Assessment Studies from Transgender Communities Across the United States W. Bockting, Eric Avery Medicine 2006 30 Save Alert Research Feed ... 1 2 3 4 5 ... 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work_dm4quiucljatzjsuztiyhgnpee	----	High Stakes for the Health of Sexual and Gender Minority Patients of Color High Stakes for the Health of Sexual and Gender Minority Patients of Color Judy Y. Tan, Ph.D.1, Arshiya A. Baig, M.D., M.P.H2, and Marshall H. Chin, M.D., M.P.H2 1Division of Prevention Science, Department of Medicine, University of California San Francisco, San Francisco, CA, USA; 2Department of Medicine, University of Chicago, Chicago, IL, USA. As clinicians, educators, and researchers, our ability to provide the best possible care to our patients who are sexual and gender minority (SGM) people of color is in- creasingly challenged. Relative to the general population, SGM patients often have worse health outcomes, and among SGM patients, racial and ethnic minorities are particularly vulnerable. Healthcare policies proposed by the current administration, along with an increasingly hostile and dangerous social climate, have the potential to seriously harm SGM patients of color. In this paper, we discuss these key policy issues impacting the health of SGM patients of color. We then suggest questions for clinicians to consider to help them decide which advocacy activities are right for them, recommending self-examina- tion, skills development, and political action. We end by outlining concrete, actionable steps to advocate for SGM patients of color in patient care, healthcare organizations, medical education, research, and public policy. J Gen Intern Med 32(12):1390–5 DOI: 10.1007/s11606-017-4138-3 © Society of General Internal Medicine 2017 INTRODUCTION As clinicians, educators, and researchers, we promise to heal, cure, and otherwise improve the health of individuals with the utmost respect for human life. Since the 2016 U.S. presidential election, our pledge has taken on new meaning, as we grapple with the impact of unprecedented legislative challenges and a changing social climate on the health of some of the most vulnerable patient populations. Sexual and gender minority (SGM) patients, including those who are lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, or queer (LGBTQ), continually face discrimina- tion and violence across healthcare, employment, housing, and education settings.1 Relative to the general population, SGM individuals are often sicker and poorer, while facing tremen- dous barriers in accessing quality medical care and services.1,2 SGM individuals who also identify as racial/ethnic minorities may be even more vulnerable, because the barriers, discrimi- nation, and violence they face as SGM intersect with and are often compounded by those unique to immigration and/or racial and ethnic minority status.3,4 Under President Trump’s administration, SGM who are also racial/ethnic minorities face new threats to their health and safety due to attacks on protec- tive health and social legislation and the enactment of delete- rious policies.5 Health disparities will worsen without our timely, concerted, and committed advocacy efforts. Here, we discuss harmful proposed health policies that would negatively affect SGM patients of color.6 We explain the health impact of discriminatory policies that create an increasingly hostile and dangerous environment for sexual and gender minorities, racial/ethnic minorities, and individuals who share both sets of identities. We provide concrete, action- able advocacy steps for clinicians, educators, and researchers, outlining a set of questions to consider as they decide which advocacy activities are right for them. We end by discussing specific advocacy actions for patient care, healthcare organi- zation transformation, medical education, and public policy that can enhance the health of SGM patients of color during this critical and challenging time. ATTACKS ON NEW HEALTHCARE GAINS AND LEGAL PROTECTIONS FOR SGM INDIVIDUALS Under the Affordable Care Act (ACA), the proportion of uninsured adult Americans decreased from 20% to 12% be- tween 2010 and 2016.7 The ACA has clear flaws that need addressing, such as stabilization of the health exchange mar- ketplaces, but attempts to repeal the ACAwould reverse gains, increase the number of uninsured, and cost lives.8,9 For exam- ple, the proposed American Health Care Act (AHCA) would have increased the number of uninsured to 24 million by 2026, due largely to states discontinuing their expansion of Medicaid eligibility.6 The ACA’s Section 1557 is a federal civil rights law that bans discrimination based on sex, which the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) interpreted to include discrimination based on gender identity (i.e., citing gender identity as a basis for denying coverage for healthcare services related to gender transition) for health programs or activities that receive federal financial assistance.10,11 Prior to the ACA, being transgender was considered by many private insurance carriers to be a pre-existing condition.10 Since the ACA, the Nondiscrimination in Health Programs and Activities rule Received January 12, 2017 Revised May 9, 2017 Accepted July 7, 2017 Published online August 10, 2017 1390 http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1007/s11606-017-4138-3&domain=pdf proposed by the HHS specifically prohibits medically indicat- ed sex-specific healthcare (e.g., cervical cancer screening in female at birth) from being denied or limited based on current gender identity (e.g., individual’s identification as a transgen- der man).11 Repealing these protective measures under the ACA would compromise healthcare for thousands of SGM individuals. Public policy affects the health of SGM patients not only via healthcare access, but also through attacks on civil liberties.12 Threats to remove legal protection for marriage equality, for example, would decrease access to state and federal healthcare, increase taxes, and diminish social secu- rity and veterans’ benefits to same-sex partnerships.12 Some Cabinet members have supported legislation opposing same-sex marriage, workplace discrimination protection for SGM people, and inclusion of sexual orientation and gender identity in hate crime legislation.13,14 The Texas House Bill 3859 would allow foster care providers to refuse to place children with non-Christians and same-sex couples.15 ATTACKS ON NEW HEALTHCARE GAINS AND LEGAL PROTECTIONS FOR SGM PATIENTS OF COLOR SGM patients who are racial/ethnic minorities are at particu- larly high risk for worsening health disparities if protections are repealed. The personal experiences of people with multiple intersecting social identities (e.g., Asian-American, lesbian, undocumented status) are shaped by interlocking systems of social inequality (e.g., racism, heterosexism, xenophobia).16 Thus, SGM patients of color frequently have worse health outcomes than either white SGM or heterosexual patients of color. For example, LGB Latinos/Hispanics have especially high rates of alcohol abuse,17 cigarette smoking, sexually transmitted infections, and mental health problems.18 Prior to the ACA, LGBTQ racial/ethnic minorities showed lower rates of insurance coverage, less regular healthcare access, and greater reliance on emergency services relative to LGBTQ whites.19 Since passage of the ACA, uninsured rates have declined across racial, ethnic, age, and income groups.20 Un- insured rates dropped from 21% to 13% between 2013 and 2016 among African Americans, and from 36% to 19% among Latinos during the same period.21 Removing healthcare protections is regressive for SGM patients of color and would widen health disparities of the most vulnerable who depend on Medicaid and the ACA.5 Anti-immigration policies under the Trump presidency un- dermine the health of SGM patients of color who may avoid seeking healthcare and public assistance due to fear of depor- tation.22–25 Among those who seek care, some may hesitate to give personal information such as their sexual orientation or gender identity to healthcare and social service providers.23–25 A lack of legal documentation status adversely affects health. Undocumented transgender Latinas are at higher risk for HIV infection due to worse healthcare access, housing, and employment.26 SGM patients of color are targets of an increasingly dangerous and hostile environment. At least eight trans- gender women of color have been murdered since the beginning of 2017.27,28 Following President Trump’s elec- tion, reports soared of random incidents of harassment and intimidation directed at SGM people, people of color, and immigrants.29 WHAT CLINICIANS, EDUCATORS, AND RESEARCHERS CAN DO TO ADVOCATE FOR SGM PATIENTS OF COLOR Our ability to provide quality healthcare to an already under- served patient population is challenged as access to healthcare and other civil liberties of SGM patients of color are threat- ened. However, we can do much to improve the health of our patients.30–33 We offer advice to clinicians to help them decide what advocacy activities are right for them (Table 1).34,35 We also include a compendium of actionable items for advocacy in patient care, healthcare organization, training and mentoring, and policy (Table 2).34 ADVOCACY TO IMPROVE THE HEALTH OF SGM PATIENTS OF COLOR Advocacy may initially seem like an alien or intimidating concept to the clinician.42 However, our experience shows that virtually all clinicians believe it is their responsibility to advocate for their individual patients. Many clinicians even- tually recognize how much they can improve the health of their patients through advocacy at the organizational and policy levels.34 Clinicians have a unique understanding of how policies impact patients, and are respected for their knowledge and experience.34 We recommend a process of self-examination in which you prioritize specific advocacy issues based on their per- sonal meaning and importance, and your opportunity to im- pact them (Table 1).34 Decide which domain or domains of action are right for you in patient care, your healthcare orga- nization or professional society, training and mentoring, or public policy. We can all benefit from developing advocacy skills in writing, speaking, teaching, mentoring, and political organizing. Learn the legislative process and specific policy issues. Understand the social determinants of equity and where you can intervene. Develop leadership skills and le- verage your experience as a clinician to change policy. Voice your opinions and learn how to take collective action with organizations and coalitions. Stay current about policy is- sues, and understand thoughtful views and ideas across the political spectrum. 1391Tan et al.: High Stakes for the Health of Sexual and Gender Minority Patients of ColorJGIM ACTIONABLE ADVOCACY Patient Care. Even the most experienced clinicians can often improve their ability to deliver culturally competent, high-quality healthcare for SGM patients of color (Table 2). Show your willingness to listen to their stories, allow them to self-identify, and encourage them to partic- ipate in healthcare decision making.36 Realize that patients’ lack of trust stems from actual negative experiences and a legacy of discrimination.23,25,43 Similarly, providers should be aware that great diversity exists among SGM patients of color. For example, Asian-American and Pacific Islander sexual and gender minorities represent a group that varies tremendously in income, employment, education, English proficiency, and health status. Review mental health status and needs for social services, and be aware of SGM- specific services. Healthcare Organization. Clinics can transform their culture and structure to provide culturally competent care to SGM patients of color.31 For patients with limited English proficiency, clinics must provide access to medical interpreters and materials in various languages and dialects. Clinics can train clinicians and staff to call patients by their preferred names and pronouns. Electronic health systems can be programmed to collect patient data on race, ethnicity, sex assigned at birth, sexual orientation, and gender identity; use these data to inform clinic practice, identify health disparities, and guide quality improvement efforts.31 Institute screening and offer referrals for SGM patients of color who suffer from trauma, physical and sexual violence, and drug and alcohol abuse. Organize peer support groups.44 Training and Mentoring. SGM patients of color have frequently reported negative attitudes among healthcare workers and lack of skills in SGM health.23 Medical educators can act as role models, individualizing care for SGM patients of color and taking opportunities to teach students about clinical, cultural, and communication issues.34,35 Policy. Realize that your clinical, research, and teaching expertise are powerful tools for changing institutional practices and public policy toward equitable healthcare.34 Clinicians can build or join coalitions, or raise awareness to improve upon the ACA and keep protections for SGM patients of color to ensure that the number of uninsured will not rise.34 Table 1 Advice to Clinicians Considering Advocacy to Improve the Health of Sexual and Gender Minority (SGM) Patients of Color Domains Examples of Clinician Actions Self-Examination 34 Prioritize specific issues based on personal meaning, importance, and opportunity to impact. Choose domain(s) of action: Patient Care, Healthcare Organization, Training and Mentoring, Policy. Recognize that your and your colleagues’ clinical, teaching, and research expertise are powerful tools for political action and changing organizational and public policy. Skills Development 34, 35 Develop skills in writing, speaking, teaching, mentoring, organizing, and advocating. Learn about health disparities, and understand the legislative process and specific policy issues. Understand models of social determinants of equity, such as that of Camara Phyllis Jones, and intervention points: • Decision-making structures (who, what, when, where) • Written policies • Unwritten practices and norms • Values driving decisions Use your experience as a clinician and specific patient examples to tell the story of why SGM patients of color need health insurance coverage and access to high-quality, culturally competent care and services. Develop leadership skills in coalition building. Leverage political capital of coalitions to move policymakers at the local, state, and national levels. Develop leadership, management, and implementation skills to transform clinics and organizations to deliver high-quality, culturally competent care. Learn how to train students, physicians, educators, and researchers in advocacy skills. Political Action 34 Voice opinions. • Vote, call, and/or meet legislators. • Sign petitions and position statements. • Write commentaries. • Give talks. • Communicate through social media. Take collective action. • Participate in organizational advocacy, partnerships, and coalitions, both with organizations already committed to health equity and with influential organizations that should expand their advocacy for health equity. • Organize coalitions of organizations interested in expanding health insurance coverage and high-quality, culturally competent care to SGM people of color. • March, demonstrate, and rally (e.g., Pride Parade, White Coats for Black Lives, March for Science). Volunteer for community- and statewide advisory boards working on healthcare reform and/or health disparity issues. Track policy changes regarding discrimination, health disparities, and health policy via sources such as Health Affairs Blog (http://healthaffairs.org/blog/) and Kaiser Family Foundation (http://kff.org/). Read conservative, moderate, and liberal news and commentary sources. 1392 Tan et al.: High Stakes for the Health of Sexual and Gender Minority Patients of Color JGIM http://healthaffairs.org/blog/ http://kff.org/ Table 2 Actionable Items to Improve the Health of Sexual and Gender Minority (SGM) Patients of Color for Patient Care, Healthcare Organization, Training and Mentoring, and Policy Domains Examples of Advocacy Actions Patient Care34,36–38 Inclusiveness Encourage patients to participate actively in healthcare decisions. Allow patients to self-identify in terms of their race, ethnicity, gender, and sexual orientation. Realize that SGM patients of color may have experiences different from white SGM and heterosexual racial/ethnic minority patients, and that great diversity exists among these patients. Have honest dialogues. Get to know people who are SGM people of color. Support patients by listening to their stories. Assessment Review mental health status and needs for social services (e.g., income assistance, food and nutrition, housing, social support). Provide or refer to services for hormone therapy and gender transition services when appropriate for transgender patients. Realize that patients’ lack of trust in medical systems often stems from injustice to their communities (e.g., Tuskegee syphilis experimentation, governmental delay in addressing HIV at start of AIDS epidemic). Be aware that fear of deportation or prosecution for undocumented status may lead to delayed care, decreased adherence, or poor retention in care. Be aware of risks for depression, anxiety, violence, and sexual assault, and develop skills in diagnosis, communication, and initial treatment or referral. Healthcare Organization31,39 Workflows Institute private, confidential check-in areas and train staff to call patients by their preferred names and pronouns. Health Information Technology Create fields in electronic health records for capturing information on disaggregated race/ethnicity, sexual orientation, sex assigned at birth, and current gender identity. Institute screening for trauma, physical and sexual violence, drug and alcohol use, mental health status, and social service needs (income assistance, food and nutrition, housing, social support). Organizational Structure and Culture Commit to building a culture of diversity and inclusion by completing one of the national benchmarking surveys to assess competence in caring for diverse populations. Provide materials in different languages and dialects; provide easy access to medical interpreters. Offer patient support groups that would facilitate peer-to-peer support/mentoring regarding the discrimination and bias that SGM people of color face. Create inclusive environments specific to SGM people of color by displaying visible signage and symbols that affirm SGM people of color and support diversity issues. Incentives Reward clinicians and staff who provide outstanding care to diverse patients. Training and Mentoring34,40 Participate in and provide training in culturally appropriate care. Mentor SGM students and early career colleagues of color. Support students and colleagues by listening to their stories. Act as a role model in the care of SGM patients of color. Individualize care and take opportunities to teach about patients’ clinical, cultural, and communication issues. Policy5,30,41 Equitable Healthcare Policy Advocate for equitable healthcare policies, such as: • Universal access to affordable health insurance • Medicaid expansion • Essential health benefits including mental health, substance abuse treatment, and adolescent services • Coverage for pre-existing conditions such as HIV • Non-discrimination Section 1557 of the Affordable Care Act. Prohibit discrimination on basis of gender identity. Advocate for insurance coverage of transgender care (e.g., gender-affirming hormone therapy and surgery, gender-at-birth cancer screening). • Funding for safety-net organizations • Incentivizing the reduction of health disparities with equity accountability measures in payment programs Anti-Discrimination Policy Support policies ensuring the rights and well-being of SGM people of color, such as: • Minimum wage • Workplace discrimination protection • Inclusion of sexual orientation and gender identity in hate crime legislation • Adoption policies and laws • Immigration reform • Gender-confirming bathroom access Research Evidence and Policy Advocate for data collection by race, ethnicity, gender identity, and sexual orientation. Protest state and federal efforts to eliminate the collection of health data by race, ethnicity, gender identity, and sexual orientation. Support or defend research funding for SGM people of color. Organize academic conferences and special panels to disseminate evidence and to build research networks. Participate in drafting calls for research proposals or serve as reviewers on these calls for research that aim to eliminate disparities among SGM patients of color. Develop, test, and disseminate effective interventions and treatment practices for SGM patients of color. 1393Tan et al.: High Stakes for the Health of Sexual and Gender Minority Patients of ColorJGIM Clinicians can protest legislation that would harm the health of SGM patients of color by restricting access to healthcare, such as repealing Section 1557 of the ACA or withholding funding from Planned Parenthood clinics that provide essential preventive and primary care to many low-income and racial/ ethnic minority patients.45 E-mail your legislators and support policies that ensure the civil rights of SGM and racial/ethnic minority adults and chil- dren. Protest the removal of gender-matching bathroom access that undermines health and safety.46 Gender-matching bathroom access could be especially important for SGM students of color, who experience harassment, school-based victimization such as being threatened or injured with a weapon,47 and physical and sexual assault from peers and even teachers.1 Protest anti- immigration policies that pose barriers to healthcare access among SGM and racial/ethnic minority patients.25 Advocate for research funding for SGM and racial/ethnic minority health. Support data collection disaggregated by SGM and racial/ethnic minority status.30 Be vigilant for efforts to eliminate data sources on the diversity of SGM patients of color, such as the removal of sexual orientation and gender identity categories from proposed versions of the U.S. Census Bureau, the American Community Survey, and two Depart- ment of Health and Human Services surveys on the health of older adults.48 The stakes are higher than ever for closing the healthcare gap for our SGM patients of color. Our core role and great privilege is to care and advocate for our individual patients. However, pro- posed policy changes pose dangerous threats to the most vulner- able and already underserved patients, and we can do much within and beyond the walls of our clinics and academic institu- tions to support our patients. Many impactful actions along the spectrum of advocacy may be right for you. The more skills and experience one develops in advocacy, the more comfortable one feels and the better one gets at it. Our obligation to our patients includes advocating for them when their health and well-being are threatened. Policies that would harm the health of vulnerable people and create hostile environments are a concern for every- one, not just SGM patients of color. Acknowledgments: We would like to thank Alison El Ayadi, the K- Scholars Program, Daryl A. Mangosing, and our many colleagues from UCSF for their comments on versions of this manuscript, and our many colleagues at the University of Chicago for their review of earlier versions of the tables. Corresponding Author: Judy Y. Tan, Ph.D.; Division of Prevention Science, Department of MedicineUniversity of California San Francisco, 550 16th Street, Box 0886, San Francisco, CA 94158, USA (e-mail: Judy.tan@ucsf.edu). Compliance with Ethical Standards: Conflict of Interest: The authors declare that they have no conflict of interest. REFERENCES 1. Grant J, Mottet L, Tanis J, Harrison J, Herman J, Keisling M. Injustice at every turn: A report of the national transgender discrimina- tion survey. Washington DC: National Center for Transgender Equality and National Gay and Lesbian Task Force; 2011. http://www. thetaskforce.org/static_html/downloads/reports/reports/ntds_full.pdf. Accessed April 24, 2017. 2. Mayer KH, Bradford JB, Makadon HJ, Stall R, Goldhammer H, Landers S. Sexual and gender minority health: What we know and what needs to be done. Am J Public Health 2008;98(6):989. 3. Crenshaw K. Mapping the margins: Intersectionality, identity politics, and violence against women of color. Stanford Law Rev 1991:1241-1299. 4. Ng HH. Intersectionality and shared decision making in LGBTQ health. LGBT Health 2016;3(5):325-326. 5. Byne W. 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Accessed April 30, 2017. 1395Tan et al.: High Stakes for the Health of Sexual and Gender Minority Patients of ColorJGIM http://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/issue-briefs/2017/feb/how-the-aca-has-improved-ability-to-buy-insurance http://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/issue-briefs/2017/feb/how-the-aca-has-improved-ability-to-buy-insurance http://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/blog/2016/aug/latinos-blacks-major-gains-under-aca http://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/blog/2016/aug/latinos-blacks-major-gains-under-aca https://www.thenation.com/article/why-immigrants-in-california-are-canceling-their-food-stamps/ https://www.thenation.com/article/why-immigrants-in-california-are-canceling-their-food-stamps/ https://www.thenation.com/article/why-immigrants-in-california-are-canceling-their-food-stamps/ https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/wp/2017/03/16/seven-transgender-women-have-been-killed-this-year-democrats-want-jeff-sessions-to-investigate/?utm_term=.2bab909510ac https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/wp/2017/03/16/seven-transgender-women-have-been-killed-this-year-democrats-want-jeff-sessions-to-investigate/?utm_term=.2bab909510ac https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/wp/2017/03/16/seven-transgender-women-have-been-killed-this-year-democrats-want-jeff-sessions-to-investigate/?utm_term=.2bab909510ac http://www.local10.com/news/crime/miami-dade-detectives-investigate-transgender-womans-murder http://www.local10.com/news/crime/miami-dade-detectives-investigate-transgender-womans-murder https://www.splcenter.org/hatewatch/2016/11/15/update-more-400-incidents-hateful-harassment-and-intimidation-election https://www.splcenter.org/hatewatch/2016/11/15/update-more-400-incidents-hateful-harassment-and-intimidation-election https://www.splcenter.org/hatewatch/2016/11/15/update-more-400-incidents-hateful-harassment-and-intimidation-election https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/wp/2017/04/13/behind-closed-doors-trump-signs-bill-allowing-states-to-strip-federal-family-planning-dollars-from-abortion-providers/?utm_term=.02de88b215ad https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/wp/2017/04/13/behind-closed-doors-trump-signs-bill-allowing-states-to-strip-federal-family-planning-dollars-from-abortion-providers/?utm_term=.02de88b215ad https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/wp/2017/04/13/behind-closed-doors-trump-signs-bill-allowing-states-to-strip-federal-family-planning-dollars-from-abortion-providers/?utm_term=.02de88b215ad https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/wp/2017/04/13/behind-closed-doors-trump-signs-bill-allowing-states-to-strip-federal-family-planning-dollars-from-abortion-providers/?utm_term=.02de88b215ad http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-lgbt-idUSKBN161243 http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-lgbt-idUSKBN161243 https://www.bostonglobe.com/news/nation/2017/03/29/the-census-wouldn-count-lgbtq-americans-under-proposal/S5TmzHdVNYEF72P5NXFPpN/story.html https://www.bostonglobe.com/news/nation/2017/03/29/the-census-wouldn-count-lgbtq-americans-under-proposal/S5TmzHdVNYEF72P5NXFPpN/story.html https://www.bostonglobe.com/news/nation/2017/03/29/the-census-wouldn-count-lgbtq-americans-under-proposal/S5TmzHdVNYEF72P5NXFPpN/story.html High Stakes for the Health of Sexual and Gender Minority Patients of Color Abstract Introduction Attacks on New Healthcare Gains and Legal Protections for SGM Individuals Attacks on New Healthcare Gains and Legal Protections for SGM Patients of Color What Clinicians, Educators, and Researchers Can Do to Advocate for SGM Patients of Color Advocacy to Improve the Health of SGM Patients of Color Actionable Advocacy References 
work_dme6j7x6krhcdojv2nv2p6yt6y	----	Digital harassment and abuse: Experiences of sexuality and gender minority adults Anastasia Powell Justice and Legal Studies, RMIT University Adrian J. Scott Department of Psychology, Goldsmiths, University of London; School of Arts and Humanities, Edith Cowan University Nicola Henry Centre for Global Research, RMIT University 2 Abstract Digital harassment and abuse refers to a range of harmful, interpersonal behaviours experienced via the internet, as well as mobile phone and other electronic communication devices. While much existing research has focused on the experiences of children and young people (including foremost ‘cyberbullying’), there have been few international studies on adult experiences of digital harassment and abuse. As such, little is currently known about the extent, nature and impacts of digital harassment and abuse on adult victims. In particular, there exists a significant gap in current research into sexual, sexuality and gender based digital harassment and abuse. This article draws on findings from a larger research project in which we surveyed 2,956 Australian adults and 2,842 British adults (aged 18 to 54) about their experiences of technology-facilitated sexual violence (TFSV). The data presented here focus on the experiences of sexuality diverse adults (n = 282) who identified as lesbian, gay, bisexual or heterosexual, as well as gender diverse adults (n = 90), including women, men and transgender individuals. Results suggest that transgender individuals experienced higher rates of digital harassment and abuse overall, and higher rates of sexual, sexuality and gender-based harassment and abuse, as compared to heterosexual cisgender individuals. Implications of the findings are discussed with respect to policy, prevention, and future research. 3 Introduction A key feature of contemporary digital society is the integration of communications and other digital technologies into everyday life, such that many of us are constantly ‘connected’ (Harwood et al., 2014). Yet the entangling of the social and the digital has particular implications for interpersonal relationships. Digital harassment and abuse refers to a range of harmful interpersonal behaviours experienced via the internet, as well as mobile phone and other electronic communication devices. These online behaviours include: offensive comments and name-calling, targeted harassment, verbal abuse and threats, as well as sexual, sexuality and gender-based harassment and abuse. Sexual, sexuality and gender- based harassment and abuse refers to harmful and unwanted behaviours either of a sexual nature, or directed at a person on the basis of their sexuality or gender-identity. Though a variety of concepts and definitions are used in this field, much existing research has focused on cyberbullying and other behaviours experienced by children and young people. Comparatively, there have been few studies internationally that examine adult experiences of digital harassment and abuse. As such, little is currently known about the extent and nature of digital harassment and abuse as experienced by adult victims. Moreover, while the emerging literature has considered the differential experiences of digital harassment and abuse by gender, there exists a dearth of current research that is inclusive of the experiences of sexuality and gender minority adults in particular. Previous research into experiences of hate-based abuse, violence and discrimination has identified that lesbian, gay, bisexual or transgender (LGBT)1 individuals are 1 Here ‘transgender’ refers to individuals whose gender identity or experience differs from the biological sex in which they were assigned at birth. The term includes individuals who were assigned male at birth but who identify as female, individuals who were assigned female at birth but who identify as male, as well as individuals who fall outside the binary categories of female and male (e.g. ‘non-binary’ and ‘genderqueer’) (see Bocking, 2008; 2014). Increasingly the broader acronym LGBTIQ (lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, intersex, queer) is used to include individuals who identify as intersex, gender-queer, and/or gender non-binary. Our study asked participants to select either transgender or another specified gender, yet as very few elected to specify another gender, we use the acronym LGBT throughout this article. 4 disproportionately victimised.2 Studies into discriminatory and hate-based violence in both Australia and the UK have found that sexuality and gender minority individuals experience high rates of intrusive behaviour, verbal abuse, threats, as well as physical and sexual assault (see Guasp et al., 2013; Hillier et al., 2005; Rothman et al., 2011; Sheridan et al., 2016; Sterzing et al., 2017). This victimisation is in turn associated with poor mental health and wellbeing, particularly for youth populations who are at higher risk of self-harm and suicide (Collier et al., 2013; Couch et al., 2007; Dragowski et al., 2011; Johnson et al., 2007; Nuttbrock et al., 2010; Perez-Brumer et al., 2015). The high levels of hate-based abuse, violence and discrimination experienced by LGBT individuals, and its associated impacts, highlights the importance of including these groups in emerging research into technology- facilitated abuse. This article draws on findings from a larger research project in which we surveyed Australian and British adults about their experiences of technology-facilitated sexual violence (TFSV) (see [Removed for Review]). The data presented here focus on the experiences of a subset of lesbian, gay, bisexual or transgender participants. In the first section of the article we provide a brief summary of key literature addressing digital harassment and abuse, including sexual violence as well as gender- and sexuality-based harassment and abuse. Second, we report on our method, including details of our sample matching method for comparative analyses of LGBT and heterosexual, cisgender3 participants, as well as the key 2 We acknowledge that terminology with respect to both sexuality and gender diversity is important and often contested with different terminology preferred by different groups within the broader community and at different times. Though we have used the term LGBT throughout this article, there is some variation in other studies which have referred to other terms or specific sub-groups. We also acknowledge that there is not a homogenous LGBT ‘community’, but rather a diversity of individuals with different sexual orientations, as well as experiences of gender and/or gender-identity. We have sought, where sufficient data allows, to differentiate the experiences of sub-groups, although we recognise that this is difficult, particularly for transgender individuals. 3 Cisgender is a term used to identify individuals whose experience and/or expression of their gender aligns with that assigned at their birth. Though not consistently used in research, and a contested concept, we choose to use it here both to more clearly differentiate between sub-groups of our study participants, and to contribute to the de- centring of hetero- and gender-normativity (see Cava, 2016). 5 results from these analyses. Finally, we discuss the implications of the study findings for policy, prevention and future research. Concepts and definitions As briefly noted above, digital harassment and abuse is an umbrella term referring to a range of harmful interpersonal behaviours experienced via a range of online platforms, as well as mobile phone and other electronic communication devices (including tablets and online gaming consoles). We have written at length previously about the concept and definition of different types of digital harassment and abuse, which can include both non- criminal and criminal behaviours ([Removed for Review]). Examples of non-criminal behaviours include name-calling, offensive language and sexual harassment, while criminal behaviours can include image-based sexual abuse (e.g. taking, distributing or threatening to distribute nude or sexual images without consent, which is increasingly criminalised in many jurisdictions globally, see [Removed for Review]), threats of physical harm, and cyberstalking. Whether criminal or non-criminal, many victims of digital abuse and harassment will experience harm as a result of their experiences, where ‘harm’ is defined as significant emotional distress or physical injury or impairment. While we acknowledge that digital harassment and abuse does not always result in injury or suffering to targets of harassment and abuse, it is important to note that ‘harm’ can also refer to broader societal norms, values and attitudes. In Table 1 we present an expansive list of common concepts and definitions of subtypes of digital harassment and abuse as described in the existing literature. As is evident in the table, although there are some commonalities across definitions adopted, many differ with regard to their specificity as against their generality. For example, while some simply define aggressive or harassing behaviours that occur online or via mobile phones, others are 6 more specific in terms of the range of behaviours constituting different forms of bullying, harassment and/or abuse. Such definitions carry implications for measurement and comparability across studies, making it particularly important for researchers to clearly demarcate where their own concepts, definitions and empirical contributions sit with respect to the broader field. ---Table 1 about here--- It is also noteworthy that, to date, much existing research has focused on the experiences of children and young people with a focus on cyberbullying. The overwhelming interest in children and youth experiences of cyberbullying may be in part driven by their relative vulnerability, as well as a number of high-profile and tragic cases in which young people have taken their own lives following targeted harassment and abuse online (Bailey, 2014; Dodge, 2016; Powell, 2015). Though cyberbullying has been used in some studies to refer to adult experiences of online abuse, particularly among college samples (e.g. Cowie and Myers, 2015; Faucher et al., 2014), different terms and definitions are often used, making comparative assessment of the extant literature difficult. Arguably, in adult contexts, the term ‘cyberbullying’ may have the further effect of minimising the harms experienced by victims, particularly when such behaviours cross-over into stalking and/or domestic abuse situations. Moreover, the term cyberbullying is not without criticism even in the specific context of children and young people’s experiences. For example, Canadian legal scholar Jane Bailey (2014) has identified the problematic ways in which media, policy and law reform have re- framed sexual assaults of young women and girls, as well as the subsequent distribution of images of sexual assault of survivors, as cyberbullying. Bailey argues that labelling sexual and gendered violence under the more generic term of cyberbullying has the effect of both 7 minimising the violence and obscuring the specificity of sexual violence as compared with other non-sexual harms experienced by young people. Some scholars (e.g. Finkelhor et al., 2000; Wolak et al., 2007) have advocated reserving cyberbullying to refer to behaviours experienced specifically by young people, thus distinguishing cyberbullying as a subset of wider behaviours constituting online harassment. Online harassment, Finkelhor et al. (2000: x) suggest, can be defined as ‘threats or other offensive behavior (not sexual solicitation) sent online… or posted online...’. Online harassment can be further distinguished from cyberstalking, a term which, though variably used, typically refers to a narrower legislative definition of repeated and unwanted contact that causes a victim to feel fearful (see Henry and Powell, 2016 for a discussion). Indeed, some scholars advocate that the term cyberstalking be reserved for its legal definition requiring repeated behaviours that cause fear for one’s personal safety and that alternative terms be used to name ‘less severe methods of online pursuit’ that may or may not escalate to cyberstalking (Dreßing et al., 2014: 65; see also Henry and Powell, 2016). Spitzberg and Hoobler (2002), for instance, suggest that the term ‘cyber-obsessional pursuit’ (COP) might better describe repeated and unwanted behaviours that do not meet legal thresholds of threats to, or fear of threat to, personal safety. In recent years research in the social sciences has increasingly moved away from the prefixes of ‘internet’, ‘cyber’ or ‘online’, as these terms refer to a somewhat limited view of online space as though it were a distinct realm of experience, while at the same time potentially excluding other communications and digital technologies. By contrast, contemporary research has sought to understand digital technologies as increasingly embedded in a variety of ways into everyday life, and include a broader set of technologies than the internet or ‘cyberspace’ in isolation (see Stratton et al., 2017). Bluetooth connections between devices, for example, might also be used to send harassing, threatening and/or 8 offensive content to individuals. Likewise, location-based technologies such as Global Positioning Systems (GPS) and radio-frequency identification (RFID) may be used in harassment and/or stalking contexts. In short, there are a wider array of digital technologies that can potentially be used to facilitate harassment and abuse beyond the internet. The shift towards recognising a broader range of technologies in the perpetration of harms is also reflected in an emerging number of studies that adopt the terminology of ‘technology-facilitated’ forms of harassment and/or abuse. For example, in the Australian context, Delanie Woodlock (2013; 2016) refers to ‘technology-facilitated stalking’ to describe unwanted and repeated contact via a range of technologies which cause an individual to feel fearful. Similarly, Anastasia Powell and Nicola Henry (2016; 2017; Henry and Powell, 2014; 2015; 2016) use the term ‘technology-facilitated sexual violence’ (TFSV) (discussed further below) to describe a range of sexually harmful behaviours in which the internet and/or other digital communications technologies are used. Powell and Henry (2016; 2017) argue that TFSV can be understood as sexually-based harms within a wider context of digital harassment and abuse. A number of subfields have emerged in the social sciences that seek to account for the integration of digital technologies in various ways and with implications for everyday life (as in ‘digital sociology’, see Lupton, 2014; Marres, 2017); and everyday crimes (as in ‘digital criminology’, see Smith et al., 2017; Stratton et al., 2017). Digital criminology, as argued by Stratton et al. (2017), suggests a need to expand beyond the relatively siloed foci of conventional ‘cyber’ crime. Not only do they suggest that much criminological research has perpetuated problematic dualisms between ‘cyber’ and ‘real’ crimes, but that few cyber criminological studies intersect with critical criminological concerns regarding inequalities as they relate to crime perpetration, victimisation and the state. In particular, Stratton et al. (2017) argue that there has been a comparative neglect in cybercrime research on the impact 9 of structural inequalities on crime and justice that persist in a digital society, as well as the victimisation experiences of marginalised communities. Drawing together these developments both in criminology and in social sciences more broadly, we use the umbrella concept of digital harassment and abuse here both to acknowledge a wider array of technologies that may be used in harassment and abuse, and to align ourselves with an emerging field of digital criminological scholarship that seeks to include the victimisation experiences of marginalised communities. Prevalence of digital harassment and abuse A small but growing number of international studies have sought to measure the extent of digital harassment and abuse among adult populations. In the United States, for example, a survey of 2,849 adult internet users found that overall 40% had experienced some kind of digital harassment or abuse. The rates were similar for men and women, but much higher for young adults, with 70% of those aged 18 to 24 years reporting experiencing at least one form of digital abuse (Pew Research Center, 2014). Further studies have investigated rates of cyberstalking, predominantly in the United States and largely among college student populations. For instance, a study by Reyns et al. (2012) reported that up to 41% of college students have been a victim of cyberstalking in the past. Some research indicates that women were more likely than men to perpetrate cyberstalking (Alexy et al., 2005) and that men report more online victimisation than women (Bennett et al., 2011). Other studies claim that gendered patterns in cyberstalking are more aligned with sexual violence and harassment generally. For example, in one study, Reyns et al. (2012) found some gender differences with 46.3% of females in their sample of college students (n = 974) reporting cyberstalking victimisation compared to 32.1% of males. Some studies have further sought to investigate different forms of online sexual 10 harassment. For example, a study by Baumgartner et al. (2010: 439) focused specifically on online sexual solicitation, which they defined as ‘receiving unwanted requests to talk about sex or do something sexual’. In their sample of Dutch adults (n = 1,026) they found that only 4.6% of men and 6.7% of women had been sexually solicited online in the past six months. This was compared to 5.6% of male adolescents and 19.1% of female adolescents who had been sexually solicited online in the past six months. Similarly, in an Australian survey of adults aged 18 to 54, Powell and Henry (2016) reported that significantly more females (21.8%) than males (17.7%) surveyed experienced online sexual harassment, further suggesting some gender differences in relation to sexually-based forms of digital harassment and abuse. To date, much of the empirical research on online sexual behaviour has been focused on ‘sexting’ among children and adolescents (see e.g. Crofts et al., 2015; Mitchell et al., 2012). Some focus, however, has been on ‘coercive’ or ‘non-consensual’ sexting. For instance, in a US study of 480 undergraduate students, Drouin et al. (2015) found that one in five respondents had been coerced into sexting. They found that ‘sexting coercion victimisation’ was common among both men and women, and that such individuals were more likely to experience traditional forms of intimate partner violence (see also Drouin and Tobin, 2014; Englander, 2015). Non-consensual sexting, or ‘image-based sexual abuse’, which refers to the non-consensual taking or distribution (including threats to distribute) of nude or sexual images, has also received some attention in the scholarly literature to date. A small number of quantitative studies, for instance, have examined perpetrator or bystander behaviours, such as Garcia et al.’s (2015) study of US adults aged between 21 and 75 (n = 5,805), which found that 22.9% of respondents who had received a sexually explicit text message had shared the image with others. Other similar studies found lower rates of perpetration (see Gámez-Guadix et al., 2015; Morelli et al., 2016; Thompson and Morrison, 11 2013), although these included a smaller number of questions relating to perpetration alone. Research on victimisation of image-based sexual abuse include Powell and Henry’s (2016; 2017) Australian study on TFSV (n = 2,956), which found that 9.3% of participants (aged 18 to 54 years) reported that a nude or semi-nude image of them had been distributed without their permission. They also found that 10.7% said that someone had taken a nude or semi-nude image of them without their consent, and that 9.6% had reported that someone had threatened to distribute or share a nude or semi-nude image of them. Other studies have found similar victimisation rates. For example, Branch et al. (2017) in their study of 470 US college students found that 10.5% of students reported having a private photo shared of them beyond the intended recipient. Similarly, Dir and Cyders (2015) found (n = 611) that 12% of university students surveyed reported that someone had shared a sext of them without their consent. By way of contrast, in a nationally representative survey of 3,002 US residents aged 15 years and over, Lenhart et al. (2016) found comparatively low rates of victimisation, with only 3% saying that someone had threatened to post nude or nearly nude photos or videos of them to hurt or embarrass them, and 2% reporting someone had posted a photo of them online without their permission. A growing literature has also identified the cumulative impacts of victimisation of four or more different types of violence or abuse (Finkelhor et al., 2007; Hamby and Grych, 2012; Mitchell et al., 2007; Scott-Storey, 2011; Sterzing et al., 2017). Though studies vary in the terminology, definitions and measurement, polyvictimisation (Finkelhor et al., 2007; Sabina and Strauss, 2008) has been used to refer to individuals who have experienced multiple victimisation across different subtypes of violence or abuse. Polyvictimisation is furthermore correlated with poor mental health and wellbeing impacts associated with the exposure of an individual to multiple categories of victimisation (Finkelhor et al., 2007). Though there is little research examining the health impacts of polyvictimisation in relation 12 to sexuality and gender minority groups specifically, some studies demonstrate compounding emotional and behavioural impacts of hate crimes for LGBT people. Transgender people in particular experience greater levels of threat, vulnerability and anxiety compared to non- transgender LGB people (see Myers et al., 2017; Walters et al., 2017). Experiences of sexuality and gender minority groups While empirical research into adult experiences of digital harassment and abuse is still emerging, there are even fewer studies that have examined the specific experiences of LGBT adults. Though representing a minority within the general population (see Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2014; Office for National Statistics, 2016), LGBT individuals experience disproportionately high rates of discrimination, marginalisation, harassment, abuse and violence (as discussed above). Emerging research suggests that similar patterns of harassment and abuse may extend, perhaps unsurprisingly, into online and other digital communications. A small number of previous studies have found higher rates of digital harassment and abuse amongst sexuality minority people as compared with heterosexual people. For example, a 2013 report on homophobic hate crime in the UK found that 1 in 20 of the 2,544 LGB participants surveyed had been the target of homophobic abuse or behaviour online in the previous 12 months alone, with higher rates of abuse (7%) experienced by those aged 18 to 24 years (Guasp et al., 2013). Finn’s (2004) study examined prevalence in different sexuality groups, finding that approximately one third of LGBT students reported getting a harassing email from someone they did not know, or barely knew, compared to only 14.6% of heterosexual students. This is not a significant finding, given only 16 students identified as LGBT, yet it is important that further investigation be undertaken in relation to digital abuse against sexual minorities. In another study of 1,182 participants aged between 13 and 25, Myers et al. (2017) found that bisexual, pansexual or queer participants experienced more 13 cyberbullying victimisation compared to both heterosexual or gay and lesbian participants, and that sexual minority participants reported victimisation through significantly more electronic sources. Fewer quantitative studies have examined the experiences of transgender, intersex and non-binary gender individuals of digital abuse (see Myers et al., 2017). This can be partly understood to the extent that these communities represent a very small proportion of the general population (approximately 0.05%). As such, recruiting sufficient numbers for comparative analyses, even in relatively large samples, is difficult and these groups are often excluded from subsequent analyses (Lund and Ross, 2016). Yet there also exist critiques of hetero- and gender-normativity in harassment, abuse and sexual violence research. For instance, Easpaig and Fryer (2011: 168) note that much ‘mainstream...sexual violence research has been constructed and maintained which serves the interests of heterosexism and cisgenderism’. They claim that much research in the field fails to identify the ‘power, privileges, subjectivity and intersections’ that exist between gender and sexual identities which, in turn, are too often othered and exoticised when they are (rarely) discussed in sexual violence research (Easpaig and Fryer, 2011: 168). Leonard et al. (2008) have likewise noted that where research exists into the experiences of gender minority people, it is often specific to violence and harassment directed at their ‘gender-identity’, rather than a more holistic account of the ‘everyday’ abuse individuals experience (see also Fileborn, 2012). Further critiques and limitations of ‘hate speech’ research have also been identified in the broader criminological literature (see Williams and Tregidga, 2014 for a discussion). In short, some scholars recognise that while some harassment and abuse may well be overtly based on the actual or perceived sexuality and/or gender-identity of the victim, other acts may not be explicitly targeted towards a victim’s gender or sexual identity. Nonetheless, these acts may disproportionately affect minorities, and therefore are not wholly unrelated to ‘defined 14 characteristics’ such as disability, race/ethnicity, religion, sexuality and transgender status and/or gender identity (see Leonard et al., 2008). Unfortunately, existing research into experiences of hate-based violence and abuse often narrowly requires participants to report incidences that were specifically based on their sexuality and/or gender identity, while at the same time general surveys of violence and abuse rarely report on intersecting inequalities particularly in relation to gender-identity (Easpaig and Fryer, 2011; Fileborn, 2012). Finally, it is worth noting that a 2013 US Pew Research Centre (2013) survey found that just 43% of LGBT participants reported that they had revealed their sexual orientation and/or gender identity on an online social networking site, and only 16% said that they regularly discussed LGBT issues online. This suggests that for many LGBT people online spaces such as social networking sites may be experienced as exclusionary and/or unsafe places in which to freely express themselves. Yet, online spaces and digital communications tools are frequently identified as providing a number of positive functions for LGBT individuals, such as ‘expressing, constructing, and managing identity, self-disclosure of negative experiences such as bullying, facilitating the coming out process, social activism … relationship processes, including identifying romantic and sexual partners, establishing social capital, and receiving social support’ (Fox and Ralston, 2016: 636; see also Albury and Byron, 2016). The present study This article draws on findings from a larger research project in which we surveyed Australian and British adults about their experiences of digital harassment and abuse (see [Removed for Review]). This larger project sought to investigate five subtypes of digital harassment and abuse: digital harassment (offensive comments and name-calling), digital sexual harassment (unwanted sexual comments and/or sexual requests), image-based sexual 15 abuse (creating, distributing or threatening to distribute a nude or sexual image), sexual aggression and/or coercion (sexual threats, and forced sex acts), as well as gender/sexuality- based harassment (offensive comments, threats, or other harassment directed at an individual’s gender or sexuality identity). While the development of this typology and overall findings for the Australian sample have been published previously ([Removed for Review]), here, we report for the first time on the experiences of a subset of lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender participants across both the Australian and British samples. The present research thus examines sexuality diverse and gender diverse adults’ lifetime prevalence of 26 behaviours associated with the five subtypes of digital harassment and abuse established in our prior research: digital harassment, digital sexual harassment, image-based sexual abuse, sexual aggression and/or coercion, and gender/sexuality-based harassment. Three sets of comparisons are reported between: 1) sexuality minority women (gay/lesbian and bisexual) and heterosexual women, 2) sexuality minority men (gay and bisexual) and heterosexual men, and 3) gender minority women and men (transgender), heterosexual women and heterosexual men. In the following section we briefly report on the method of the larger study from which this article is derived, as well as the specific sample and analyses that are reported in this article. Method Recruitment and participants The present research used data collected by the Tech&Me: Survey of Social Experiences Online (see [Removed for Review]), received University Human Research Ethics Committee approval, and was conducted in accordance with The Australian Code of the Responsible Conduct of Research. The target populations were Australian and British adults aged 18 to 54 years, who were recruited via an online panel provider (Research Now, 16 www.researchnow.com.au). Recruitment invitations were sent to 30,732 Australian and 32,604 British members of the community who met the target sample criteria and resulted in initial samples of 3,963 and 3,914 adults respectively. The response rates were approximately 13% and 12%, which are not unusual when sampling members of the community (see Riggle et al., 2005; Shih and Fan, 2008). The final samples, excluding screen-outs and incomplete responses, comprised: 2,956 Australian adults (1,481 women, 1,451 men, 16 transgender and 8 other) and 2,842 British adults (1,364 women, 1,455 men, 14 transgender and 9 other). Two separate matched samples were then created from these final samples for the present research: one comprising 282 sexuality diverse adults and one comprising 90 gender diverse adults. Sexuality diverse adults The sample of sexuality diverse adults comprised sexuality minority and heterosexual adults: 141 women including 47 gay/lesbian, 47 bisexual, and 47 heterosexual female participants, and 141 men including 47 gay, 47 bisexual and 47 heterosexual male participants. The sub-samples were matched (where possible) on the basis of five demographic characteristics: country (Australia, UK), age (19 and under, 20-29, 30-39, 40- 49, 50 and over), relationship status (single, married/defacto, other), education status (secondary, tertiary), and employment status (employed/volunteer, stay-at-home/unemployed, student). Gender diverse adults The sample of gender diverse adults comprised gender minority and heterosexual adults: 30 women, 30 men and 30 transgender participants. Again, the sub-samples were matched where possible on the basis of five demographic characteristics: country, age, http://www.researchnow.com.au/ 17 relationship status, education status and employment status. Demographic characteristics for the matched samples of sexuality diverse and gender diverse adults are presented in Table 2. ---Table 2 about here--- Measures The survey explored the nature, scope and impact of positive and negative social experiences online and via other communications technologies, such as mobile phones, tablets and gaming devices. Although the recruitment materials acknowledged that the survey would ask questions about participants’ experiences of negative, harassing and abusive behaviours (including questions relating to sexually based harms), it did not identify the research as focusing on ‘online sexual violence and harassment’ to reduce the potential recruitment bias. The survey comprised five parts: 1) technology use, 2) negative online behaviours, 3) TFSV victimisation scale, 4) most recent TFSV experience, and 5) nature and impact of TFSV experience (see [Removed for Review]). The present research examined the lifetime prevalence of five subtypes of digital harassment and abuse: digital harassment (seven behaviours), digital sexual harassment (five behaviours), image-based sexual abuse (three behaviours), sexual aggression and/or coercion (five behaviours), and gender/sexuality-based harassment (six behaviours; see [Removed for Review] for discussion of the conceptual framework). In all instances, participants were asked to select one of two options (‘never’, ‘at least once’) to indicate how often they had personally experienced each of the behaviours either online or via other electronic devices. Data analysis Three sets of data analysis compared sexuality diverse and gender diverse adults’ experiences of digital harassment and abuse (sexuality diverse women, sexuality diverse men, 18 and gender diverse adults) using IBM SPSS Statistics Version 23. Each set of data analysis comprised a series of chi-square tests of independence (χ2), with Cramer’s V (φc) as a measure of effect size, to examine the lifetime prevalence of 26 behaviours associated with the five subtypes of digital harassment and abuse. Analyses were performed for the 26 behaviours rather than the five subtypes of digital harassment and abuse because there is a significant gap in current research. As Cavezza and McEwan (2014) highlighted in the context of cyberstalking, in these instances it is important to report all possible associations to inform future research. Bonferroni corrected alpha values were used to reduce the risk of Type I errors associated with multiple testing: .007 for digital harassment, .010 for digital sexual harassment, .016 for image-based sexual abuse, .010 for sexual aggression and/or coercion and, .008 for gender/sexuality-based harassment. Additional chi-square tests of independence compared sexuality diverse and gender diverse adults’ experiences of polyvictimisation (i.e. having experienced four or more different subtypes of digital harassment and abuse). Results Sexuality diverse women The overall pattern of findings presented in Table 3 shows that bisexual women were more likely to experience digital harassment and abuse than gay/lesbian or heterosexual women. Bisexual women were most likely to experience 13 of the 26 behaviours, compared to gay/lesbian women who were most likely to experience five behaviours and heterosexual women who were most likely to experience three behaviours. However, a series of chi-square analyses with Bonferroni corrected alpha values revealed no significant differences in lifetime prevalence for any of the five subtypes of digital harassment and abuse according to sexuality diversity. 19 ---Table 3 about here--- With regard to polyvictimisation, there was no significant difference in the proportion of gay/lesbian (19.1%), bisexual (17.0%), or heterosexual (12.8%) women who experienced four or more different subtypes of digital harassment and abuse, χ2(2, n = 141) = 0.73, p = .695, φc = .07. Sexuality diverse men The overall pattern of findings presented in Table 4 shows that bisexual men were more likely to experience digital harassment and abuse than gay or heterosexual men. Bisexual men were most likely to experience 21 of the 26 behaviours, compared to gay men who were most likely to experience two behaviours and heterosexual men who were not most likely to experience any behaviours. A series of chi-square analyses with Bonferroni corrected alpha values revealed three significant differences, one relating to the lifetime prevalence of digital harassment, one to the lifetime prevalence of digital sexual harassment, and one to the lifetime prevalence of gender/sexuality-based harassment. ---Table 4 about here--- Digital harassment. Bisexual men (55.3%) were more likely to report having experienced someone harassing them for a sustained period of time than gay (19.1%) or heterosexual (21.3%) men, χ2(2, n = 141) = 17.82, p < .001, φc = .36. Digital sexual harassment. Bisexual men (31.9%) were more likely to report having experienced someone sexually harassing them than gay (10.6%) or heterosexual (8.5%) men, χ2(2, n = 141) = 11.15, p = .004, φc = .28. 20 Gender/sexuality-based harassment. Gay (36.2%) or bisexual (42.6%) men were more likely to report having experienced someone posting offensive and/or degrading messages about their sexuality or sexual identity than heterosexual (10.6%) men, χ2(2, n = 141) = 12.82, p = .002, φc = .30. With regard to polyvictimisation, there was no significant difference in the proportion of men who identified as gay/lesbian (23.4%), bisexual (31.9%), or heterosexual (17.0%) who experienced four or more different subtypes of digital harassment and abuse, χ2(2, n = 141) = 2.87, p = .238, φc = .14. Gender diverse adults The overall pattern of findings presented in Table 5 shows that transgender participants were more likely to experience digital harassment and abuse than female or male participants. Transgender participants were most likely to experience 25 of the 26 behaviours, compared to female and male participants who were not most likely to experience any behaviours. A series of chi-square analyses with Bonferroni corrected alpha values revealed eight significant differences, four relating to the lifetime prevalence of digital harassment, one to the lifetime prevalence of digital sexual harassment, and three to the lifetime prevalence of gender/sexuality-based harassment. ---Table 5 about here--- Digital harassment. Transgender participants (66.7%) were more likely to report having experienced someone spreading rumours or lies about them than female (13.3%) or male (16.7%) participants, χ2(2, n = 90) = 22.52, p < .001, φc = .52. Transgender participants (all 63.3%) were also more likely to report having experienced someone threatening to 21 physically harm them, someone harassing them for a sustained period, and someone sharing embarrassing details about them than female (10.0%, 13.3% and 23.3% respectively) or male (23.3%, 13.3% and 20.0% respectively) participants, χ2(2, n = 90) = 21.16, p < .001, φc = .49, χ2(2, n = 90) = 23.81, p < .001, φc = .51, and χ 2(2, n = 90) = 15.23, p < .001, φc = .41. Digital sexual harassment. Transgender participants (56.7%) were more likely to report having experienced someone sexually harassing them than female (0.0%) or male (6.7%) participants, χ2(2, n = 90) = 34.56, p < .001, φc = .62. Gender/sexuality-based harassment. Transgender participants were more likely to report having experienced someone post offensive and/or offensive messages about their gender (60.0%), someone post offensive and/or degrading messages about their sexuality (63.3%), and someone describing or visually representing an unwanted sexual act against their avatar or game character (33.3%) compared to female (3.3%, 3.3% and 3.3% respectively) or male (6.7%, 6.7% and 13.3% respectively) participants, χ2(2, n = 90) = 33.91, p < .001, φc = .61, χ 2(2, n = 90) = 36.94, p < .001, φc = .64, and χ 2(2, n = 90) = 10.08, p = .006, φc = .34. With regard to polyvictimisation, there was a significant difference in the proportion of female, male and transgender participants who experienced four or more different subtypes of digital harassment and abuse, χ2(2, n = 90) = 9.77, p = .008, φc = .33. Male (20.0%) and transgender (40.0%) participants were more likely to experience polyvictimisation than female (6.7%) participants. Discussion and implications The present research examined sexuality diverse and gender diverse adults’ lifetime prevalence of 26 behaviours associated with five subtypes of digital harassment and abuse. Overall we found that the lifetime prevalence of digital harassment and abuse victimisation 22 for sexuality minority women was not significantly different from heterosexual women, although bisexual women were most likely to experience 13 of the 26 behaviours. There were no significant differences in polyvictimisation for these participants. Meanwhile, lifetime prevalence of digital harassment and abuse victimisation for bisexual men was significantly higher for 3 of the 26 behaviours, and bisexual men were most likely to experience 21 of the 26 behaviours. Again, there were no significant differences in polyvictimisation for these participants. This study found that the lifetime prevalence of digital harassment and abuse victimisation for transgender participants was significantly higher for 8 of the 26 behaviours compared with cisgender heterosexual participants. Transgender participants were most likely to experience 25 of the 26 behaviours, and as such they were also significantly more likely to experience polyvictimisation as compared with cisgender heterosexual participants. Few previous studies on digital harassment and abuse have reported on the experiences of sexuality and gender minority adults. This gap in current research can be understood partly because of low numbers of transgender participants, but also because of hetero- and gender-normativity that dominates much existing research on harassment, discrimination and violence (see Cava, 2016). Indeed, some studies do not ask participants whether they identify as transgender. Furthermore, in the wider sexual violence, harassment and abuse literature, experiences of LGBT people are often reported only as they relate to homophobic or transphobic hate crime; that is, harms that are understood by participants to have been specifically directed at their sexuality and/or gender identity. However the findings reported here indicate an increased risk of victimisation for LGB individuals, and more particularly for transgender individuals, across a range of digital harassment and abuse behaviours. As such, this study highlights the importance of research that seeks both to include sexuality and gender minority individuals, as well as distinguish between the 23 experiences of sexuality minority as compared with gender minority individuals. The present study thus goes some way towards addressing the current gaps in the empirical literature. In many ways the results of this study are unsurprising given the high rates of polyvictimisation among sexuality and gender diverse populations in general. Given that LGBT individuals are more likely to exhibit symptoms of emotional distress, such as depression, anxiety and suicidal ideation, it is likely that experiences of digital abuse and harassment will exacerbate such symptoms, notwithstanding the positive benefits of digital communications technologies impart for identity, expression and community for sexuality and gender diverse individuals. It is thus vital that responses and prevention efforts be tailored to adequately address the needs of this heterogeneous population. First, counsellors and other victim support advocates need to be trained and sensitised to the nature and scope of digital abuse and harassment against sexuality and gender diverse individuals, as well the psychological, social and physical impacts of victimisation (including sexual violence, substance abuse, prostitution and homelessness). Second, improved police training, resources, responses and relationships are likewise crucial for responding to the problems of homophobia and transphobia (see Dwyer, 2011), including when it is manifested in an online context. There are a number of challenges for police in responding to digital harassment and abuse, including lack of resources to conduct forensic investigations, absence of applicable criminal laws, cross-jurisdictional issues (e.g. where the perpetrator is located in an entirely different jurisdiction to the victim) and in some circumstances, low appreciation of the impacts of online abuse and its relationship to other forms of violence, abuse and harassment (see [Removed for Review]). Third, civil and criminal laws on stalking, bullying, harassment, discrimination and other unlawful or criminal acts should be revised to keep pace with the ever-changing nature of cybervictimisation, especially amongst marginalised communities. Although existing laws 24 may be sufficient to address some of these behaviours, in some circumstances the introduction of specific criminal offences, or amendments to legislation within the civil law, will ensure that there is some recourse for victims of online abuse and harassment. Fourth, policies and practices for the prevention of digital abuse and harassment need to be sensitive to the experiences of sexuality- and gender- diverse populations and explicitly prohibit homophobia and transphobia in educational campaigns in schools, universities, workplaces and the community more broadly. Fifth, social media and other online platforms need policies that explicitly prohibit homophobic, transphobic and other forms of hate speech and abuse on the basis of sexuality and gender. Sites need to backup these policies with effective and robust content removal and/or account disabling functions that will to some extent alleviate the problem. Finally, more research needs to investigate the lived experiences of sexuality- and gender-diverse populations in order to more adequately respond to, and prevent, digital harassment and abuse. Limitations and future research The present study has some limitations that should be taken into consideration. First, as highlighted earlier, research suggests that LGB individuals may not disclose their sexuality in their online profile and/or participation. Unfortunately, the extent to which participants disclosed their sexuality and/or gender identity in their online social media profiles or content was not accounted for in this survey. It is thus unclear whether those who reveal their gender or sexuality identity online are more likely to experience abuse and harassment than those who keep their identities hidden. Second, as our broader study was not exclusively focused on the experiences of digital abuse and harassment among sexuality- and gender-diverse populations, we were limited in investigating specific impacts, access to services, actions taken, and effectiveness of actions. Related to this point, our samples of sexuality and gender 25 minority adults were limited in size as a consequence of these communities representing a very small proportion of the general population. Further research is thus needed to explore not only prevalence rates, but also specific experiences of victimisation with larger samples. Finally, while quantitative research is important in identifying overall trends and as a resource for advocacy and policy reform, the experiences of violence, harassment and abuse among marginalised communities are complex and multi-faceted. As such, qualitative research is also needed to fully understand the lived experiences of sexuality- and gender- diverse adults to identify potential courses of action to respond to, and prevent, these behaviours. Conclusion Unsurprisingly the findings of our study suggest that patterns of digital harassment and abuse reflect those in society more broadly. We know, for instance, that street harassment and hate crimes are prevalent for gender variant and sexuality minority communities, and even more so than gender-based harassment generally. Our findings are particularly concerning regarding the experiences of transgender participants. These participants were more likely to experience both a greater range of abusive behaviours, as well as at much greater proportions, being approximately three times as likely to be victimised compared with cisgender heterosexual participants. The nature of that harassment, while greater across the board, was much higher for sexual harassment, gender harassment and sexuality-based harassment, than that experienced by heterosexual men and women. Overall, the findings highlight the importance of actively promoting safe and inclusive online spaces. While the law is one part of the solution (through hate speech and anti-discrimination legislation, for example), the policies and practices of social media and online platform providers are also important for challenging and preventing such behaviour, 26 using tools such as community standards and reporting functions. Other sectors of society, such as police, as well as educational and governmental institutions, likewise play a crucial role in challenging cultures and practices that tolerate digital harassment and abuse. 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Cyberbullying Tokunaga (2010); Willard (2007) Any behaviour performed through electronic or digital media by individuals or groups that repeatedly communicates hostile or aggressive messages intended to inflict harm or discomfort on others / including: flaming, harassment (repetitive, offensive messages), outing and trickery, exclusion, impersonation, cyber- stalking (sending repetitive threatening communications), and non-consensual ‘sexting’ (distributing nude pictures of another individual without that person’s consent). Cyber- obsessional pursuit (COP) Spitzberg and Hoobler (2002) Unwanted pursuit of intimacy through the repeated invasion of a person’s sense of physical or symbolic privacy conducted via digital or online means. Cyberstalking Dreßing et al. (2014); Reyns et al. (2012) Repeated unwanted communication, unwanted contact, unwanted sexual advances, threats of violence/physical 37 harm; and that cause a victim to feel fearful for their safety. Digital harassment and abuse Powell and Henry (2016) Offensive comments and name-calling, social embarrassment, targeted harassment, technology- facilitated sexual violence and hate-based abuse. Electronic aggression Bennet et al. (2011) Experiences include hostility, intrusiveness, humiliation and exclusion. Image-based sexual abuse (IBSA)/Image- based abuse (IBA) Powell and Henry (2016; 2017) Taking, distributing and/or threatening to distribute a nude or sexual image of a person without their consent. Internet Harassment Ybarra and Mitchell (2004) Overt, intentional acts of aggression towards another person online. Online harassment Finn (2004); Lindsay et al. (2015); Finkelhor et al. (2000) Repeated messages that threaten, insult, or harass; threats or other offensive behaviour sent to the victim or posted online for others to see. 38 Technology- facilitated sexual violence (TFSV) Powell and Henry (2014; 2017); Henry and Powell (2014; 2015; 2016) Harmful sexually aggressive and harassing behaviours perpetrated with the aid or use of digital communication technologies, including: sexual aggression and/or coercion; image-based sexual abuse (including ‘revenge pornography’ and ‘sextortion’); online sexual harassment; and sexuality and/or gender- based harassment (including hate-speech). Technology- facilitated stalking Woodlock (2013; 2016) Repeated, unwanted contact that results in a victim feeling fearful. Virtual hate speech Awan and Zempi (2017) Material of a malicious nature that is posted with the intent to promote or justify intolerance, hostility and prejudice towards an individual or group of people. 39 Table 2 Demographic characteristics (%) for the matched samples of sexuality diverse and gender diverse adults Sexuality diverse women Sexuality diverse men Gender diverse adults Gay Bi Hetero Gay Bi Hetero Women Men Transgender Country Australia UK 61.7 38.3 61.7 38.3 61.7 38.3 61.7 38.3 61.7 38.3 61.7 38.3 53.3 46.7 53.3 46.7 53.3 46.7 Age 19 and under 20-29 30-39 40-49 50 and over 12.8 31.9 27.7 21.3 6.4 12.8 31.9 27.7 21.3 6.4 12.8 31.9 27.7 21.3 6.4 12.8 31.9 27.7 21.3 6.4 12.8 31.9 27.7 21.3 6.4 12.8 31.9 27.7 21.3 6.4 30.0 36.7 16.7 13.3 3.3 30.0 36.7 16.7 13.3 3.3 30.0 36.7 16.7 13.3 3.3 Relationship status Single Married/defacto 59.6 36.2 63.8 36.2 59.6 36.2 66.0 31.9 63.8 36.2 61.7 34.0 70.0 20.0 70.0 20.0 70.0 20.0 40 Other 4.3 0.0 4.3 2.1 0.0 4.3 10.0 10.0 10.0 Education status Secondary Tertiary 34.0 66.0 29.8 70.2 34.0 66.0 29.8 70.2 27.7 72.3 36.2 63.8 56.7 43.3 53.3 46.7 56.7 43.3 Employment status Employed/volunteer Stay-at-home/unemployed Student 66.0 25.5 8.5 68.1 19.1 12.8 68.1 23.4 8.5 72.3 10.6 17.0 78.7 14.9 6.4 66.0 23.4 10.6 43.3 23.3 33.3 40.0 20.0 40.0 40.0 26.7 33.3 41 Table 3 Lifetime prevalence (%) of digital harassment and abuse (sexuality diverse women) Gay Bi Hetro χ φc Digital harassment Posted any images of you online without permission Posted embarrassing images of you online without permission Spread rumours or lies about you Used offensive language towards you Threatened to physically harm you Harassed you for a sustained period Shared embarrassing details about you 51.1 38.3 42.6 57.4 34.0 42.6 38.3 42.6 34.0 42.6 38.3 23.4 44.7 42.6 48.9 23.4 36.2 34.0 17.0 27.7 29.8 0.74 2.55 0.57 5.95 3.73 3.42 1.71 .07 .13 .06 .21 .16 .16 .11 Digital sexual harassment Sexually harassed you Posted your personal details online saying you are available to have sex Received unwanted sexually explicit images, comments etc. Experienced repeated and/or unwanted sexual requests 34.0 6.4 21.3 14.9 44.7 8.5 40.4 34.0 38.3 8.5 29.8 21.3 1.13 0.20 4.08 4.99 .09 .04 .17 .19 42 Publicly posted online an offensive sexual comment about you 12.8 21.3 17.0 1.21 .09 Image-based sexual abuse Taken a nude or semi-nude image of you without permission Posted online or sent onto others a nude or semi-nude image of you without permission Threatened to post online or send onto others a nude or semi-nude image of you without permission 10.6 10.6 6.4 12.8 10.6 10.6 14.9 10.6 6.4 0.32 0.00 0.79 .05 .00 .08 Sexual aggression and/or coercion Taken an image or video of an unwanted sexual experience Posted online or sent onto others an image or video of an unwanted sexual experience Threatened to post online or send onto others an image or video of an unwanted sexual experience Unwanted sexual experience with someone you first met online Met a person on an online dating site or app and then had an unwanted sexual experience 4.3 2.1 4.3 10.6 8.5 12.8 10.6 6.4 14.9 17.0 8.5 6.4 10.6 10.6 8.5 2.19 2.85 1.51 0.54 2.26 .13 .14 .10 .06 .13 43 Gender/sexuality-based harassment Posted offensive and/or degrading messages about your gender Posted offensive and/or degrading messages about your sexuality Messages threatening to sexually assault you Described or visually represented an unwanted sexual act against your avatar or game character Described or visually represented an unwanted sexual act against you using an online site etc. Posted offensive and/or degrading messages or comments about your gender in an online gaming space etc. 29.8 38.3 10.6 6.4 8.5 10.6 42.6 31.9 8.5 6.4 27.7 10.6 21.3 19.1 10.6 8.5 10.6 8.5 5.02 4.27 0.16 0.22 7.86 0.16 .19 .17 .03 .04 .02 .03 44 Table 4 Lifetime prevalence (%) of digital harassment and abuse (sexuality diverse men) Gay Bi Hetro χ φc Digital harassment Posted any images of you online without permission Posted embarrassing images of you online without permission Spread rumours or lies about you Used offensive language towards you Threatened to physically harm you Harassed you for a sustained period Shared embarrassing details about you 59.6 25.5 29.8 53.2 27.7 19.1a 25.5 40.4 36.2 44.7 66.0 51.1 55.3a,b 46.8 34.0 19.1 31.9 38.3 27.7 21.3b 29.8 6.71 3.53 2.67 7.22 7.50 17.82*** 5.31 .22 .16 .14 .23 .23 .36 .19 Digital sexual harassment Sexually harassed you Posted your personal details online saying you are available to have sex Received unwanted sexually explicit images, comments etc. Experienced repeated and/or unwanted sexual requests 10.6a 12.8 31.9 21.3 31.9a,b 27.7 29.8 29.8 8.5b 12.8 25.5 23.4 11.15** 4.77 0.48 0.99 .28 .18 .06 .08 45 Publicly posted online an offensive sexual comment about you 12.8 21.3 17.0 1.21 .09 Image-based sexual abuse Taken a nude or semi-nude image of you without permission Posted online or sent onto others a nude or semi-nude image of you without permission Threatened to post online or send onto others a nude or semi-nude image of you without permission 10.6 14.9 6.4 12.8 14.9 19.1 10.6 10.6 8.5 0.14 0.49 4.37 .03 .06 .18 Sexual aggression and/or coercion Taken an image or video of an unwanted sexual experience Posted online or sent onto others an image or video of an unwanted sexual experience Threatened to post online or send onto others an image or video of an unwanted sexual experience Unwanted sexual experience with someone you first met online Met a person on an online dating site or app and then had an unwanted sexual experience 8.5 12.8 8.5 17.0 12.8 17.0 14.9 10.6 21.3 14.9 6.4 8.5 10.6 14.9 10.6 3.13 0.94 0.16 0.68 0.38 .15 .08 .03 .07 .05 46 Gender/sexuality-based harassment Posted offensive and/or degrading messages about your gender Posted offensive and/or degrading messages about your sexuality Messages threatening to sexually assault you Described or visually represented an unwanted sexual act against your avatar or game character Described or visually represented an unwanted sexual act against you using an online site etc. Posted offensive and/or degrading messages or comments about your gender in an online gaming space etc. 14.9 36.2a 12.8 14.9 14.9 17.0 27.7 42.6b 23.4 17.0 19.1 17.0 12.8 10.6a,b 17.0 14.9 10.6 10.6 4.06 12.82** 1.85 0.11 1.34 1.01 .17 .30 .11 .03 .10 .09 47 Table 5 Lifetime prevalence (%) of digital harassment and abuse (gender diverse adults) Female Male Transgender χ φc Digital harassment Posted any images of you online without permission Posted embarrassing images of you online without permission Spread rumours or lies about you Used offensive language towards you Threatened to physically harm you Harassed you for a sustained period Shared embarrassing details about you 33.3 30.0 13.3a 23.3 10.0a 13.3a 23.3a 30.0 23.3 16.7b 33.3 23.3b 13.3b 20.0b 53.3 46.7 66.7a,b 60.0 63.3a,b 63.3a,b 63.3a,b 4.02 3.90 24.52*** 9.07 21.16*** 23.81*** 15.23*** .21 .21 .52 .32 .49 .51 .41 Digital sexual harassment Sexually harassed you Posted your personal details online saying you are available to have sex Received unwanted sexually explicit images, comments etc. Experienced repeated and/or unwanted sexual requests 0.0a 3.3 16.7 10.0 6.7b 13.3 40.0 23.3 56.7a,b 20.0 46.7 33.3 34.56*** 3.94 6.59 4.76 .62 .21 .04 .09 48 Publicly posted online an offensive sexual comment about you 6.7 16.7 20.0 2.34 .16 Image-based sexual abuse Taken a nude or semi-nude image of you without permission Posted online or sent onto others a nude or semi-nude image of you without permission Threatened to post online or send onto others a nude or semi-nude image of you without permission 10.0 3.3 3.3 23.3 6.7 6.7 23.3 23.3 23.3 2.32 6.98 6.98 .16 .28 .28 Sexual aggression and/or coercion Taken an image or video of an unwanted sexual experience Posted online or sent onto others an image or video of an unwanted sexual experience Threatened to post online or send onto others an image or video of an unwanted sexual experience Unwanted sexual experience with someone you first met online Met a person on an online dating site or app and then had an unwanted sexual experience 3.3 3.3 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 13.3 16.7 6.7 20.0 16.7 20.0 23.3 16.7 4.28 2.96 1.26 1.92 1.58 .22 .18 .12 .15 .13 49 Gender/sexuality-based harassment Posted offensive and/or degrading messages about your gender Posted offensive and/or degrading messages about your sexuality Messages threatening to sexually assault you Described or visually represented an unwanted sexual act against your avatar or game character Described or visually represented an unwanted sexual act against you using an online site etc. Posted offensive and/or degrading messages or comments about your gender in an online gaming space etc. 3.3a 3.3a 3.3 3.3a 6.7 6.7 6.7b 6.7b 16.7 13.3b 16.7 10.0 60.0a,b 63.3a,b 33.3 33.3a,b 20.0 33.3 33.91*** 36.94*** 9.27 10.08** 2.34 9.12 .61 .64 .32 .34 .16 .32 
work_dqltel5cmfakro2pmwn2s45hce	----	Making Home-Grown Terrorism More Likely: Send Orders for Reprints to reprints@benthamscience.ae 32 The Open Psychology Journal, 2015, 8 32-37 1874-3501/15 2015 Bentham Open Open Access Domestic Consequences of US Counter-Terrorism Efforts: Making it Harder to Prevent Homegrown Terrorism Alice LoCicero* Boston Medical Center, Boston, MA, USA Abstract: This paper begins by recounting concerns, raised by various American psychologists regarding psychological consequences of US counterterrorism policies following the attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11.) Predictions made by a task force created by the American Psychological Association to consider the likely social effects of US counterterrorism policies have proved accurate. These include not only fear, but widespread crippling panic resulting from vague warnings and lack of suggested actions; discrimination, resulting from increased emphasis on in-group vs. out-group identities; hate crimes against those perceived as members of out-groups, and lack of tolerance for antiwar perspectives. Recent, increasingly radical, changes in policy, such as widespread surveillance of US citizens’ actions and communications by various US agencies, have led to more dire consequences, with many now concerned that the US is at risk of becoming a police state. The combined and interactive effects of earlier and more recent changes in US counterterrorism policies have caused serious, sometimes terrible, consequences. This paper explains how these consequences have become part of a vicious circle: frightened, passive, and unable to collaborate in rational attempts to manage the threat of terrorism, citizens have not begun to consider how to prevent future instances of homegrown terrorism. Keywords: Terrorism, Counter-terrorism, United States, Social Psychology, Unintended Consequences. A well- regarded body of social psychology research can be used to predict how communities will react to shared experiences of war, trauma, disaster, fear, conflict, and the perception of others as insiders or as outsiders [1]. This body of research was initially inspired by the wish to understand how such horrendous events as the Holocaust and World War II could have occurred. The work, which is of great value to society, continued to develop when later wars and conflicts were studied [2]. Following the 9/11 attacks, the American Psychological Association (APA) formed a task force to use this body of research and engage in new research to study and comment on the government’s responses to the terrorist attacks. Members of the task force on the “Psychological Effects of Efforts to Prevent Terrorism” observed early effects and predicted likely longer term, unintended, adverse outcomes of counterterrorism policies. The goal was for APA to be able to advise the government on ways to prevent or at least reduce potential adverse outcomes of counterterrorism policies, while continuing to try to prevent further terrorist attacks. In an unanticipated turn of events that foreshadowed APA’s uncritical support for US counterterrorism actions, the report of the Task Force was detoured, delayed, and then voted down by the APA Board of Directors and by the APA Council of Representatives, and subsequently shelved [3]. *Address correspondence to this author at the Center for Multicultural Training in Psychology, Boston Medical Center, Fuller Building, 9 th Floor, 85 E. Newton St. Boston, MA 02118 USA; Tel: 617-686-6606 Fax: 617-812-582; E-mail: alice.locicero@bmc.org After the APA withdrew support for their work, task force members published the reports in the 2006 book, Collateral Damage [4]. They wrote about specific likely ill effects of policies such as the use of color-coded designations to signal levels of terrorism threat. In the foreword to the book, psychologist Phil Zimbardo argues that these threat level changes generate fear of an undefined danger without providing suggestions for possible actions. This omission inadvertently enhances the intended effects of terrorist actions: psychological terror, crippling anxiety, and difficulty in making decisions on a rational basis. In short, Americans were even more likely to respond to terrorism with panic than with reasonable actions. This panic was a result of being told to be afraid of a vague threat by an unknowable enemy and not being told how to cope or how to reduce the threat [5]. Such unproductive fear of terrorism has been shown to have measurable consequences, such as psychological distress and constriction of activities [6]. Other effects of US counterterrorism policies accurately predicted by the APA task force have also come to pass. These effects include increases in hate crimes against marginalized groups; intolerance for antiwar perspectives; acceptance of measures favoring security over freedom; and enhanced recruitment by terrorist groups, who use negative reactions to US policies as a recruiting tool. The collective adverse impacts of the ongoing counter terrorism policies have had the predictable and predicted deleterious impacts on US society. Domestic Consequences of US Counter-Terrorism The Open Psychology Journal, 2015, Volume 8 33 HATE CRIMES AND HATEFUL BEHAVIOR TOWARD FRIGHTENED CHILDREN Various groups track hate crimes toward Arab Americans and Muslims, and those who look to others like they may be Muslim. These groups report sharp increases in such crimes shortly after 9/11. The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) noted that government leaders are effective in reducing hate crimes when they forcefully speak against discrimination [7]. Still Islamophobia has become a common and familiar phenomenon. The existence of harmful stereotypes and the consequent discrimination and violations of civil rights of Muslims and Arabs in America are largely tolerated without an outcry from non-Muslims [8]. Even worse in its effects than random hate crimes against those who appear to be Muslim or Arab, is the increase in frequency of racial and ethnic "profiling" by American police, border security agents, and airport screeners. Such profiling has frequently been observed. Adding insult to the injurious effect of profiling is the impunity enjoyed by police and security, and the secrecy with which the rules and procedures governing security are held [9]. Besides anti-Muslim sentiment, the US has seen a rise in prejudice toward other marginalized groups. Recently, a nearly unthinkable spectacle highlighted just how far down the road to hatred towards all “outsider” and marginalized groups Americans have come. In a series of horrendous events covered incessantly by mainstream press, ordinary American adults are seen derogating and threatening children who have come from Central American countries to seek asylum in the United States. Many of these children came to the United States for safety because they believed they would be killed by gangs if they remained in their home countries. Ignorance on the part of Americans abounded. Some Americans asserted that the children’s parents had sent them here in an opportunistic spirit. They asserted that the children should simply be put on planes and sent home [10]. In some parts of the country, neither officials nor law enforcement professionals were seen to decry these words or actions. In addition, the government itself has detained mothers and their children who have also come in desperation, placing them in terrible conditions and expediting deportation with little or no legal counsel. This treatment is particularly inhuman and degrading in that reports indicate that sick children are not being given adequate care, a clear violation of international treaties ratified by the United States. The rationale for rushed deportation is reported to be to discourage other mothers and their children from seeking asylum in the US. Government officials have often set extraordinarily high bail for those who argue successfully that they should be allowed to leave the detention centers [11]. SECURITY OVER FREEDOM Thirteen years after the 9/11 attacks, security concerns have led to a monstrously huge security and intelligence apparatus in the US. Citizens, as well as noncitizens, are still being profiled, detained without explanation, inconvenienced, and indeed, hassled without cause. More than a decade after 9/11, even permanent residents of the US worry about traveling outside the country. They fear being viewed with suspicion or having difficulty returning to the country. Law enforcement has been infiltrating Muslim communities, aggressively seeking informants, or creating fake terrorist plots and attempting to draw young Muslims in. Federal agents interview thousands of young Arab American and Muslim men “with no individualized suspicion of criminal activity” [12]. SECURITY OVER PRIVACY In the years since 9/11, Americans have gradually learned of the diminution of privacy. At first, the major concern was that companies would capture all sorts of data based on consumer habits and internet use. Soon Americans learned that data captured by companies was being made available to the government. Ultimately, Americans learned that the government was actively intervening in seeing to it that consumer electronics provided surveillance data, even in the absence of any suspicion, much less evidence, that the user of those electronics had any ill will toward the United States. Indeed, with the revelations by former NSA contractor Edward Snowden and others, Americans and others learned that the NSA and other western security agencies have been collecting mountains of data. This data is not only collected on suspected enemies of the United States, but even on friendly allies, and on innocent Americans themselves [13]. The reaction of Americans has been, it seems, muted. Perhaps this is a result of the gradual erosion of privacy rights over years, or because of the sense that threats abound, without knowledge of the nature of the threat or what to do about it. Americans now have become used to living with fear of an unknown and unknowable enemy, generated by government and media. Thus, it is likely that Americans’ belief in their own ability to make good decisions about what sort of data is needed or might be useful to combat that unknowable enemy is likely to be impaired. In such states of fear, people are apt to expect the authorities to know best about how to counter any threat. VALUING SECURITY ABOVE INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENTS The effects of counterterrorism policies, especially taken together, appear to have deeply scarred the American reputation and psyche. Prisoners of war--who were, in a transparent and ultimately unsuccessful attempt to skirt international treaties—called “enemy combatants,” were detained, often with little or no evidence, and with no charges placed against them. Many “enemy combatants” were detained for years, tortured, and then, when they went on hunger strikes, were force-fed in inhuman ways, further violating international conventions [14]. The highly respected former Four Star American General and later CIA Director David Petraus had stated clearly in 2009 that he believed it likely that the military had violated the Geneva Conventions in the post 9/11 era. (Soon thereafter, revelations about his personal life caused a scandal that led to his resignation in 2012) [15]. Such violations of the Geneva Conventions continue to take place at so called Black Box facilities, such as the prison at Guantanamo Bay, where a Navy nurse, earlier this year, refused to force feed detainees in the inhuman way that has 34 The Open Psychology Journal, 2015, Volume 8 Alice LoCicero become standard there. He is now at risk of having his Navy career terminated resulting from his refusal to obey orders that he was convinced were unlawful [16]. This risk is despite the ratified international principle that following orders is not an acceptable defense for engaging in unlawful behavior, such as cruel and inhuman treatment [17]. It is worrisome to imagine the long-term impact on Americans of seeing authorities endorse a long list of violations of international treaties, engage in torture, and punish those who refuse to violate international treaties to which the US is a signatory. It remains to be seen whether awareness of such violations, without direct experience of terror, will have a brutalizing effect similar to that seen in communities that have experienced trauma and violence firsthand [18]. Considering the media’s focus and sometimes idealization of government-sanctioned violence, such as war and brutal treatment of detainees, one cannot avoid being concerned about the potential emergence of new values and new norms. Such new norms are likely to be driven less by civility and egalitarianism and more by fear and power dynamics. Beyond the effects on ordinary Americans, it is worrisome to imagine the way that these actions in violation of international treaties are perceived outside the US, or by those who may be immigrants to the US, but who have dual allegiances, one of them being to a group that the US has targeted. It seems highly likely that these actions, taken in violation of international treaties, will be used by groups seeking to recruit youth to engage in anti-western terrorist actions. Such recruitment will increase the likelihood of homegrown terrorism. POPULARITY OF PRO-WAR VIEWS, AND UNPOPULARITY OF ANTI-WAR VIEWS US counterterrorism policies have created hostility toward those who express antiwar perspectives. The unpopularity and intolerance for antiwar perspectives were expected. Beyond intolerance for antiwar perspectives, extreme pro-war imagery and enthusiasm has abounded. Military and security forces have become popular topics in Hollywood and on television. Government sanctioned violence, such as war, is idealized, rather than thoughtfully debated. Local police are now in possession of military style weaponry, vehicles, and gear. As witnessed in the summer of 2014, in Ferguson, Missouri, the use of this gear has a predictable effect: it makes the police more aggressive [19]. This could easily have been predicted (and thus avoided) by using principles of psychological science. When pro-war sentiment waned, as a result of the protracted and unsuccessful wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, it was easily regenerated by hysteria created by government and media portrayals of a group calling itself the Islamic State (although it is neither Islamic nor a state.) Although the government could not define or specify any threat to the US by this group, it insisted, and media portrayed, that such a threat was certain. The group calling itself the Islamic State (more accurately called an un-Islamic, non-State) tried to get the US to provide ransom for the release of an American held hostage, James Foley. The government refused, and also informed members of Foley’s family, who considered trying to raise money and provide the ransom themselves, that it would be unlawful to do so [20]. When the group then, in a dramatic and well-publicized procedure, beheaded Foley and other American hostages, the actions of the media and government, rather than putting Americans' fears into perspective in order to prevent panic, increased the panic. At MacDill Air Force Base on September 19, 2014, President Obama made comments, later summarized and distributed by the White House, about the so-called Islamic State, (referred to in the comments as “ISIL”). The puzzling claim that ISIL is definitely threatening America, even though no specific plots have been detected, and no action is recommended, is reminiscent of the problems with color- coded threat levels referred to above. Vague suggestions of something to be afraid of with no suggested action to take, other than, perhaps, to support the bombings targeted at the group calling itself Islamic State, has, as would have been predicted, caused panic and hysteria among Americans. Here is part of a summary of those comments, as distributed by the White House. 1. ISIL is threatening America and our allies. Our intelligence community has not yet detected specific plots from ISIL against our homeland, but they have repeatedly threatened our core interests, including our personnel, our embassies, our consulates, and our facilities in Iraq, Syria, and in the broader Middle East. "If left unchecked, they could pose a growing threat to the United States," he said [21]. The continued generation of fear of this group had the effect anticipated by the APA task force: polls showed that over 50% of Americans favored bombing the group, even though knowledge of the group was limited and the bombing was seen as likely to have complicated consequences. In fact, among Republican party members, 68% approved the bombing and 57% said they would approve sending ground troops to battle this group [22]. CREATION OF TERRORISM HYSTERIA Over the years since 9/11, fear of terrorism has morphed into what might be called hysteria. By hysteria, I refer to two elements: Excessive fear, and inability to assess the fear rationally. While the so-called Islamic State deliberately engenders fear, Americans’ fear of the so-called Islamic State group is disproportionate to the actual risk. That is not to suggest that there is no danger from terrorism. Consider, however, that there is much less palpable panic, much less news reporting, and much less money invested in the dangers of smoking, alcohol use, automobile accidents, firearms, poverty, or obesity, all of which kill far more Americans than terrorism. Terrorism hysteria is just what terrorists want to create: Confusion, panic, paralysis, inability to create an effective response. Reflecting on the origins and maintenance of terrorism hysteria in the US over the years since September 11, 2001, I find multiple likely sources, as described above. (a) Historical use of color-coded “threat levels.” (b) Ill- conceived and poorly executed actions by the FBI where the intent was to capture potential terrorists, but the outcome Domestic Consequences of US Counter-Terrorism The Open Psychology Journal, 2015, Volume 8 35 was to generate an inaccurate perception that the threat of homegrown terrorism was much greater than it actually is [23]. (c) Extreme and unwarranted intelligence gathering by government agencies. (d) Using the term “terrorist” to justify targeting people for detention with concomitant denial of rights mandated by international treaty. (e) Targeting of Arab and Muslim Americans and those resembling Arab or Muslim Americans with the suggestion that they may be a threat, including lengthy unexplained detainments at the border, improbable “random” selection for additional screening at airports, unjustified and repeated interview requests, and infiltration of Muslim-American communities [24]. Factors listed and explained in this paper do not account for all terrorism hysteria. Additional factors that contribute to terrorism hysteria have been noted. They are worthy of consideration, but they are beyond the scope of this paper. (f) Enrichment of private corporations that manufacture weapons and other military equipment by fears that lead to support for military intervention [25]. (g) Demonization and threatened prosecution of people and organizations of good will, such as Humanitarian Law Project, who, the Supreme Court decided, were aiding terrorists by teaching them nonviolent methods to get their grievances addressed [26]. (h) Disproportionate focus on Muslim militant groups when identifying groups as posing terrorist threats [27]. (i) Supplying of arms and money to governments widely perceived as violators of human rights, while publicly referring to them as allies in the fight against terrorism. (j) Use of the term “terrorist” to describe foes in preparing the country to endorse military action against them. (k) Public refusal to talk to terrorists, in spite of the evidence that that has worked in conflicts that previously had seemed intractable, such as in Northern Ireland and South Africa. (This stance appears to many outside and some inside the US to reflect arrogance, stubbornness, and perhaps weak motivation to resolve legitimate grievances.) COMPETENCE AT DISASTER RESPONSE Following the Boston Marathon bombings in 2013, several things occurred that Bostonians could celebrate: A combination of medically trained people and Good Samaritans immediately and effectively attended injured victims. Triage and transport were accomplished efficiently. Medical centers provided excellent care. A simple donation structure (the One Fund) was established, so that those wishing to give money had no doubt about how to do so. Victim service organizations met the immediate needs of those affected. Thousands of Boston area businesses, health care providers, and others provided free services, from medical care to weddings. Boston area residents provided meaningful, unending expressions of warmth, support, and assistance. Besides all that, officials also established a simple, catchy slogan, “Boston Strong,” that conveyed the ability of the public to manage and rebound from the disruption and disturbance caused by this terrible event. As a public health measure, the use of this term has been quite successful. This is not to imply that there was not much suffering, including—but not limited to—long term and ongoing physical, psychological, and economic trauma, experienced by many in Boston. Rather the slogan implied that the city would rebound and now it implies that the city has rebounded. The first anniversary of the bombing was marked with a combination of gravity, awareness of loss, and some celebration of the progress made. It reflected the determination not to be bowed. The 2014 Boston marathon was celebrated and had no significant adverse events. In a commitment to continue its support, the city now has two centers specifically dedicated to providing ongoing services to those affected adversely by the bombings. Lessons learned about the response to the marathon have been incorporated into many cities’ disaster plans. These include lessons learned from the perspective of law enforcement, security, and first response. Lessons learned about long term consequences and needs to be met for those affected are also being recorded in order to be incorporated into planning. WHAT ABOUT EARLY PREVENTION? While much work has been done, thousands have given selflessly, the city has largely rebounded, and lessons have been learned and incorporated, one area has largely remained untouched. That is the area of early prevention of future so- called homegrown terrorism. Early prevention, in this context, means preventing youth from becoming amenable to recruitment to domestic or international terrorist groups. Ordinary Americans—such as parents, teachers, coaches, neighbors, aunts, uncles, mentors, clergy, peers—have the most important role in preventing kids from being recruited, and thus the most important role in preventing so-called homegrown terrorism. This is the conclusion drawn by a variety of researchers in several countries in the EU, and in the US. A document issued by the White House suggests that the US government should support local communities in their efforts to assist kids who appear to be on a path that may lead to recruitment. However, little has been done nationally, and virtually nothing has yet been done in the Boston area [28]. It appears that thirteen years of counterterrorism efforts have largely left American citizens passive, fearful, confused, and irrational—not in their reactions to actual terrorism, but in their reactions to the threat of future terrorism. Well-meaning adults have little sense of how to prevent children in their own communities from being radicalized, recruited, and convinced that the best way to help a cause that they are convinced is a good one is to act in ways that are disruptive, violent, and guaranteed to end their own possibility of having a productive life. Researcher Anne Speckhardt spent a great deal of time talking to terrorists. She has written a compelling account of her work. In it she says “What I learned above all else is that no one is born a terrorist. Something has got to put them on the terrorist trajectory, and if we are clever in our approaches to dealing with terrorists, we can also take them back off of it [sic].” [29]. 36 The Open Psychology Journal, 2015, Volume 8 Alice LoCicero If we can take people off the “terrorist trajectory,” as many in the EU believe, developing ways to do so would be prudent. However, in the US, the tendency is to think of people who become terrorists as somehow having had the seeds of evil in them since birth. Conversations in the city where the accused marathon bombers grew up suggest that people believe the city did everything it could for them, that the community did everything right, and that there is nothing that could have been done differently or that should be done differently to prevent a repeat of this horrible turn of events. This contrasts starkly with the conclusions of researchers around the world. If communities take Speckhardt and other researchers seriously, they must ask questions that have become, in the thirteen years since September 11, counterintuitive. Questions like the following: What can citizens do to see that kids are on a path towards a satisfying and productive life, or to help them return to such a path? What is our responsibility toward youth who might be at risk of recruitment? How can we inoculate youth against recruitment? How do recruiters get the attention of youth in the United States in the first place? What needs are the recruiters promising to meet? How can those needs be met in ways that do not cause violence and end the possibility of productive lives for the youth at risk? The beginning of all efforts toward primary prevention is knowledge. There are multiple case studies of youth who become terrorists. Some are depictions of individuals and others are composite sketches. I have used principles from various social sciences, applied to the accused Boston Marathon bombers and others in Why Good Kids Become Terrorists: Deconstructing the Accused Boston Marathon Bombers and Others Like Them [30]. Research for that book inspired this essay, as I found, in talking to many researchers and many citizens, that there is a serious disconnect between researchers’ understanding of what it will take to prevent homegrown terrorism, and citizens’ (in)ability to imagine themselves having a role. Research suggests that people in communities consider informal and ongoing discussions among themselves, that they not wait for the government or law enforcement to establish avenues for prevention. This might include reading research on young terrorists and even viewing and reading recruitment materials to understand how they might appeal to youth in their own communities. Concerned citizens would be prudent to inform local officials and law enforcement that they are engaging in these discussions. The risk to citizens educating themselves about terrorism is that the very people who want to discourage and prevent terrorism will become the targets of enhanced surveillance and suspicion. The NSA and other security agencies will surely have information that these citizens are being exposed to materials about why terrorism might be appealing, and the possibility that this will lead to misunderstanding is, at present, a consequential risk. Adults who are concerned about youth recruitment will have several challenges. They will have to to overcome thirteen years of unintended consequences of government induced hysteria, passivity, anxiety, and panic. They will have to learn to take a calm, patient, rational, approach to educating themselves about kids, terrorism, and the draw of violence. They will have to be prepared to learn about the existence of legitimate grievances; about the government’s actions that unintentionally aid recruitment, and so on. They will also have to be prepared to endure some degree of suspicion and concern by government agents or others, who may not, initially, readily understand or accept their intentions. Ultimately, they will have to listen to the youth in their communities, hear what is on the minds of the youth, and assist them in finding meaningful, nonviolent approaches to addressing real-life legitimate grievances. In this process, adults and youth alike will engage in critical thinking and engaged citizenship, thus creating the model for sustainable engagement in nonviolent political and social action. Communities that wish to prevent recruitment to terrorism will have one additional challenge: resisting the government’s program called Countering Violent Extremism (CVE). This program, presented as a way to prevent homegrown terrorism, is being planned but has not yet officially launched. It is likely to have the opposite of its intended effect, as, in its present form, it is likely to isolate and demonize youth who are seen as engaging in “suspicious” activity. Rather than strengthening communities in their efforts to support youth and assist them, it is likely to turn communities against young people who are in need of community support [31]. CONFLICT OF INTEREST The authors confirms that this article content has no conflict of interest. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Declared none. REFERENCES [1] Asch SE. Opinions and social pressure. Sci Am 1955; 193: 31-5. [2] Bandura A. Moral disengagement in the perpetration of inhumanities. Person Soc Psychol Rev 1999; 3: 193-209. [3] Welch B. The American Psychological Association and torture: the day the tide turned. huffington post blog. Posted 08-29-2009. Reference available from: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/bryant- welch/the-american-psychologica_b_242020.html. Retrieved on October 19, 2015. [4] Kimmel P, Stout CE, Eds. Collateral damage: psychological consequences of America’s War on terror. Westport, CT: Praeger 2006. [5] Zimbardo P. In: Kimmel PE, Stout CE, Eds. Collateral damage: Psychological consequences of America’s war on terror. Westport, CT: Praeger 2006. [6] Sinclair SJ, LoCicero A. Fearing future terrorism: development, validation, and psychometric testing of the terrorism catastrophizing scale (TCS). Traumatology 2007; 13: 75-90. [7] Murphy L, MacLeod-Ball MW, Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights and Human Rights. Protecting the civil rights of Muslim Americans. March 29, 2011. Available from https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/March_2011_Hearing_on_Musli m_Civil_Rights_Statement.pdf [Retrieved on October 20, 2014]. [8] Arab-American AntiDiscrimination Committee. Legal Advocacy and Policy Review: The 2010 Legal Advocacy Report Available from: http://issuu.com/adcnational/docs/2010adclegalreport?e=2064637/5 378719. [Retrieved on October 20, 2014]. [9] Abdurrahman,S. My detainment story or: How I learned to stop feeling safe in my own country and hate border agents. On the http://www.huffingtonpost.com/bryant-welch/the-american-psychologica_b_242020.html http://www.huffingtonpost.com/bryant-welch/the-american-psychologica_b_242020.html https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/March_2011_Hearing_on_Muslim_Civil_Rights_Statement.pdf https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/March_2011_Hearing_on_Muslim_Civil_Rights_Statement.pdf Domestic Consequences of US Counter-Terrorism The Open Psychology Journal, 2015, Volume 8 37 Media, WNYC Radio, September 20, 2013. Available from: http://www.onthemedia.org/story/my-detainment-story-or-how-i- learned-stop-feeling-safe-my-own-country-and-hate-border-patrol/ [Retrieved on October 20, 2014]. [10] Abdullah, H. Not in my backyard: Communities protest surge of immigrant kids. CNN. July 16, 2014. Available from: http://www.cnn.com/2014/07/15/politics/immigration-not-in-my- backyard/ [Retrieved on October 20, 2014]. [11] American Immigration Lawyers Association. AILA: Expansion of Family Detention Means the United States Will Jail More Victims of Violence. September 23, 2014. Available from: http://www.aila.org/content/default.aspx?docid=50181 [Retrieved on October 20, 2014]. [12] American Civil Liberties Union. Raza v. City of New York - Legal Challenge to NYPD Muslim Surveillance Program. June, 2013. Available from: https://www.aclu.org/national-security/raza-v-city- new-york-legal-challenge-nypd-muslim-surveillance-program. [Retrieved on October 20, 2104]. [13] The NSA Files. The Guardian. 2014. Available from: http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/the-nsa-files [Retrieved on October 20, 2014]. [14] Zapotosky, M. Guantanamo Bay detainee force feeding case continues. Washington Post. October 7, 2014. Available from: http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national- security/guantanamo-bay-detainee-force-feeding-case- continues/2014/10/07/04544bb2-4e52-11e4-aa5e- 7153e466a02d_story.html. [Retrieved on October 20, 2014]. [15] Soltz, J. Petraeus Says U.S. Violated Geneva Conventions - What Will Cheney and Rush Say? Huffington Post Blog. August 29, 2009. Available from: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jon- soltz/petraeus-says-us-violated_b_209215.html [Retrieved on October 20, 2014]. [16] Rosenberg, C. Navy nurse refuses to force feed Guantanamo captive. Miami Herald. July 14, 2014. Available from: http://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation- world/world/americas/article1975643.html [Retrieved October 20, 2014]. [17] United Nations. Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter of the Nürnberg Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal. 1950. Available from: http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft%20articles/7_ 1_1950.pdf [Retrieved on October 31, 2014]. [18] Somasundaram D. Short- and long-term effects on the victims of terror in Sri Lanka. J Aggress Maltreat Trauma 2004; 9: 215-28. [19] Berkowitz L, LePage A. Weapons as aggression-eliciting stimuli J. Person Soc Psychol 1967; 7: 202-7. [20] Callmachi, R. For James Foley’s family, U.S. policy offered no hope. New York Times. September 15, 2014. Available from: http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/16/us/for-hostages-family-us- policy-offered-no-hope.html [Retrieved October 20, 2014]. [21] White House Office of the Press Secretary. Remarks by the President at MacDill Air Force Base. September 17, 2014. Available from: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press- office/2014/09/17/remarks-president-macdill-air-force-base. [Retrieved on September 18, 2014]. [22] Pew Research Center for the People and the Press. Support for U.S. Campaign against ISIS; Doubts about Its Effectiveness, Objectives. October 22, 2014. Available from: http://www.people- press.org/2014/10/22/support-for-u-s-campaign-against-isis- doubts-about-its-effectiveness-objectives/. [Retrieved November 2, 2014]. [23] Human Rights Watch. Illusion of justice: Human rights abuses in US terrorism prosecutions. Report by Human Rights Watch and Columbia Law School Human Rights Institute. Human Rights Watch. 2014. Available from: http://www.hrw.org/reports/ 2014/07/21/illusion-justice-0 [Retrieved on October 18, 2014]. [24] Arab-American AntiDiscrimination Committee. Legal Advocacy and Policy Review: The 2010 Legal Advocacy Report Available from: http://issuu.com/adcnational/docs/2010adclegalreport?e= 2064637/5378719 [Retrieved on October 20, 2014]. [25] Weigley S. Ten companies profiting the most from war. USA Today, March 10, 2013. Available from: http://www.usatoday.com/ story/money/business/2013/03/10/10-companies-profiting-most- from-war/1970997/. [Retrieved October 20, 2014]. [26] Cole D. The first amendment’s borders: The place of Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project in first amendment doctrine. Georgetown Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper No. 12- 047, 2012: 147-177. Available on the internet at http://scholarship.law.georgetwon.edu/facpub/853 [27] Beck CJ, Miner E. Who gets designated a terrorist and why? Soc Forces 2013: 837-72. [28] Norwegian Ministry of Justice and the Police. Security: a shared responsibility. action plan to prevent radicalization and extremism. Available from: http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/JD/Vedlegg/Handlingsplaner/Ra dikalisering_engelsk.pdf [Retrieved October 17, 2014]. [29] Speckhard A. Talking to terrorists: Understanding the psycho- social motivations of militant Jihadi terrorists, mass hostage takers, suicide bombers & martyrs to combat terrorism in prison and community rehabilitation. (Kindle Locations 15908-15910). Villa Park, IL: Advances Press 2012. [30] LoCicero A. Why good kids turn into deadly terrorists: Deconstructing the accused Boston Marathon bombers and others like them. Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger 2014. [31] US Department of Homeland Security. Counering Violent Extremism. October 15, 2014. Available from: http://www.dhs.gov/topic/countering-violent-extremism [Retrieved November 18, 2014]. Received: October 20, 2014 Revised: December 18, 2014 Accepted: December 18, 2014 © Alice LoCicero; Licensee Bentham Open. This is an open access article licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial License (http://creativecommons.org/licen- ses/by-nc/3.0/) which permits unrestricted, non-commercial use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the work is properly cited. http://www.onthemedia.org/story/my-detainment-story-or-how-i-learned-stop-feeling-safe-my-own-country-and-hate-border-patrol/ http://www.onthemedia.org/story/my-detainment-story-or-how-i-learned-stop-feeling-safe-my-own-country-and-hate-border-patrol/ http://www.cnn.com/2014/07/15/politics/immigration-not-in-my-backyard/ http://www.cnn.com/2014/07/15/politics/immigration-not-in-my-backyard/ http://www.aila.org/content/default.aspx?docid=50181 https://www.aclu.org/national-security/raza-v-city-new-york-legal-challenge-nypd-muslim-surveillance-program https://www.aclu.org/national-security/raza-v-city-new-york-legal-challenge-nypd-muslim-surveillance-program http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/the-nsa-files http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/guantanamo-bay-detainee-force-feeding-case-continues/2014/10/07/04544bb2-4e52-11e4-aa5e-7153e466a02d_story.html http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/guantanamo-bay-detainee-force-feeding-case-continues/2014/10/07/04544bb2-4e52-11e4-aa5e-7153e466a02d_story.html http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/guantanamo-bay-detainee-force-feeding-case-continues/2014/10/07/04544bb2-4e52-11e4-aa5e-7153e466a02d_story.html http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/guantanamo-bay-detainee-force-feeding-case-continues/2014/10/07/04544bb2-4e52-11e4-aa5e-7153e466a02d_story.html http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jon-soltz/petraeus-says-us-violated_b_209215.html http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jon-soltz/petraeus-says-us-violated_b_209215.html http://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/article1975643.html http://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/article1975643.html http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft%20articles/7_1_1950.pdf http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft%20articles/7_1_1950.pdf http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/16/us/for-hostages-family-us-policy-offered-no-hope.html http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/16/us/for-hostages-family-us-policy-offered-no-hope.html http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/17/remarks-president-macdill-air-force-base http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/17/remarks-president-macdill-air-force-base http://scholarship.law.georgetwon.edu/facpub/853 http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/JD/Vedlegg/Handlingsplaner/Radikalisering_engelsk.pdf http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/JD/Vedlegg/Handlingsplaner/Radikalisering_engelsk.pdf 
work_dqzq3ln6hbhftnsdl6iwhukebe	----	[PDF] Psychiatric morbidity associated with same-sex sexual behaviour: influence of minority stress and familial factors. | Semantic Scholar Skip to search formSkip to main content> Semantic Scholar's Logo Search Sign InCreate Free Account You are currently offline. Some features of the site may not work correctly. DOI:10.1017/S0033291709005996 Corpus ID: 4802389Psychiatric morbidity associated with same-sex sexual behaviour: influence of minority stress and familial factors. @article{Frisell2010PsychiatricMA, title={Psychiatric morbidity associated with same-sex sexual behaviour: influence of minority stress and familial factors.}, author={T. Frisell and P. Lichtenstein and Q. Rahman and N. L{\aa}ngstr{\"o}m}, journal={Psychological medicine}, year={2010}, volume={40 2}, pages={ 315-24 } } T. Frisell, P. Lichtenstein, +1 author N. Långström Published 2010 Psychology, Medicine Psychological medicine BACKGROUND Increased psychiatric morbidity has been widely reported among non-heterosexual individuals (defined as reporting a homosexual/bisexual identity and/or same-sex sexual partners). However, the causes of this psychiatric ill-health are mostly unknown. METHOD We attempted to estimate the influence of minority stress and familial factors on psychiatric disorder among adults with same-sex sexual partners. Self-report data from a 2005 survey of adults (age 20-47 years, n=17,379) in the… Expand View on PubMed static1.squarespace.com Save to Library Create Alert Cite Launch Research Feed Share This Paper 93 CitationsHighly Influential Citations 5 Background Citations 22 Methods Citations 3 Results Citations 7 View All Tables and Topics from this paper table 1 table 2 table 3 table 4 Mental disorders Physiological Sexual Disorders Attention deficit hyperactivity disorder Morbidity - disease rate Generalized Anxiety Disorder Anxiety Disorders Feeding and Eating Disorders Alcoholic Intoxication, Chronic Depressive disorder Ethanol Hyperactive behavior Experience Attempt Paper Mentions Blog Post Backdoor Entry to Gay Eugenics STRONG SILENT TYPES---STUFF ABOUT MEN 13 February 2010 93 Citations Citation Type Citation Type All Types Cites Results Cites Methods Cites Background Has PDF Publication Type Author More Filters More Filters Filters Sort by Relevance Sort by Most Influenced Papers Sort by Citation Count Sort by Recency Do shared etiological factors contribute to the relationship between sexual orientation and depression? B. Zietsch, K. Verweij, +4 authors M. Lynskey Psychology, Medicine Psychological medicine 2012 59 Highly Influenced PDF View 6 excerpts, cites background and results Save Alert Research Feed Familial Factors, Victimization, and Psychological Health Among Sexual Minority Adolescents in Sweden. K. Donahue, Niklas Långström, S. Lundström, P. Lichtenstein, M. Forsman Psychology, Medicine American journal of public health 2017 13 View 6 excerpts, cites background and results Save Alert Research Feed Same-sex sexuality and psychiatric disorders in the second Netherlands Mental Health Survey and Incidence Study (NEMESIS-2). T. Sandfort, R. de Graaf, M. Ten Have, Y. Ransome, P. Schnabel Medicine LGBT health 2014 25 Save Alert Research Feed Psychiatric disorders, suicidality, and personality among young men by sexual orientation J. Wang, M. Dey, L. Soldati, M. Weiss, G. Gmel, M. Mohler-Kuo Psychology, Medicine European Psychiatry 2014 23 Highly Influenced PDF View 16 excerpts, cites results and background Save Alert Research Feed Mental health among UK inner city non-heterosexuals: the role of risk factors, protective factors and place – CORRIGENDUM C. Woodhead, B. Gazard, M. Hotopf, Q. Rahman, K. Rimes, S. Hatch Medicine Epidemiology and Psychiatric Sciences 2016 10 PDF Save Alert Research Feed Sex, Sexual Orientation, Gender Atypicality, and Indicators of Depression and Anxiety in Childhood and Adulthood Lanna J. Petterson, Doug P. Vanderlaan, Paul L. Vasey Psychology, Medicine Archives of sexual behavior 2017 8 Save Alert Research Feed Is work disability more common among same-sex than different-sex married people? B. Björkenstam, P. Tinghög, S. Cochran, G. Andersson, K. Alexanderson, R. Bränström Psychology 2016 3 PDF View 1 excerpt, cites background Save Alert Research Feed Minority stressors, rumination, and psychological distress in monozygotic twins discordant for sexual minority status. Liam Timmins, K. Rimes, Qazi Rahman Psychology, Medicine Psychological medicine 2018 9 PDF View 1 excerpt, cites background Save Alert Research Feed Mental Health Disparities Mediating Increased Risky Sexual Behavior in Sexual Minorities: A Twin Approach O. Oginni, P. Jern, F. Rijsdijk Psychology, Medicine Archives of sexual behavior 2020 PDF Save Alert Research Feed Anxiety and Depression Among Sexual Minority Women and Men in Sweden: Is the Risk Equally Spread Within the Sexual Minority Population? C. Björkenstam, E. Björkenstam, G. Andersson, S. Cochran, K. Kosidou Psychology, Medicine The journal of sexual medicine 2017 11 PDF Save Alert Research Feed ... 1 2 3 4 5 ... References SHOWING 1-10 OF 38 REFERENCES SORT BYRelevance Most Influenced Papers Recency Same-sex sexual behavior and psychiatric disorders: findings from the Netherlands Mental Health Survey and Incidence Study (NEMESIS). T. G. Sandfort, R. de Graaf, R. Bijl, P. Schnabel Psychology, Medicine Archives of general psychiatry 2001 424 PDF View 3 excerpts, references results and background Save Alert Research Feed Relation between psychiatric syndromes and behaviorally defined sexual orientation in a sample of the US population. S. Cochran, V. Mays Medicine American journal of epidemiology 2000 392 PDF View 1 excerpt, references results Save Alert Research Feed Risk of psychiatric disorders among individuals reporting same-sex sexual partners in the National Comorbidity Survey. S. Gilman, S. Cochran, V. Mays, M. Hughes, D. Ostrow, R. Kessler Medicine American journal of public health 2001 617 PDF View 1 excerpt, references background Save Alert Research Feed Sexual orientation and suicidality: a co-twin control study in adult men. R. Herrell, J. Goldberg, +4 authors M. Tsuang Psychology, Medicine Archives of general psychiatry 1999 249 Highly Influential PDF View 4 excerpts, references results and background Save Alert Research Feed Suicidality and Sexual Orientation: Differences Between Men and Women in a General Population-Based Sample From The Netherlands R. de Graaf, T. Sandfort, M. ten Have Psychology, Medicine Archives of sexual behavior 2006 123 View 1 excerpt, references background Save Alert Research Feed Sexual orientation and suicide attempt: a longitudinal study of the general Norwegian adolescent population. L. Wichstrøm, K. Hegna Psychology, Medicine Journal of abnormal psychology 2003 202 PDF View 1 excerpt, references background Save Alert Research Feed Is sexual orientation related to mental health problems and suicidality in young people? D. Fergusson, L. Horwood, A. Beautrais Psychology, Medicine Archives of general psychiatry 1999 623 Highly Influential PDF View 4 excerpts, references results and background Save Alert Research Feed Mental health correlates of perceived discrimination among lesbian, gay, and bisexual adults in the United States. V. Mays, S. Cochran Psychology, Medicine American journal of public health 2001 1,278 PDF View 1 excerpt, references background Save Alert Research Feed Sexual orientation and mental health in a birth cohort of young adults. D. Fergusson, L. Horwood, E. Ridder, A. Beautrais Psychology, Medicine Psychological medicine 2005 190 PDF View 2 excerpts, references background Save Alert Research Feed Prevalence of mental disorders, psychological distress, and mental health services use among lesbian, gay, and bisexual adults in the United States. S. Cochran, V. Mays, J. Sullivan Medicine Journal of consulting and clinical psychology 2003 1,022 PDF View 1 excerpt, references background Save Alert Research Feed ... 1 2 3 4 ... Related Papers Abstract Tables and Topics Paper Mentions 93 Citations 38 References Related Papers Stay Connected With Semantic Scholar Sign Up About Semantic Scholar Semantic Scholar is a free, AI-powered research tool for scientific literature, based at the Allen Institute for AI. 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work_dzb3bhlfajet7kpboiwk23sooe	----	The Price We Pay: Why the First Amendmet Is Being Used To Protect Violence Against Women THE PRICE WE PAY The Case Against Racist Speech, Hate Propaganda, and Pornography • Edited by Laura J. Lederer and Richard Delgado dID Hill and Wang ,qtf·S' NEW YORK A division of Farrar, Straus and Giroux WHY THE FIRST AMENDMENT IS BEING USED TO PROTECT VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN Twiss Butler Twiss Butler argues that men's control of institutions of communication and education allows them to support speech that harms women and to suppress speech against that harm. She observes that the publishing in- dustry funds legal. journalistic, and nonprofit organizations endorsing a First Amendment absolutist position. She contends that the industry's defense of pornography as protected speech serves the double purpose of dignifying misogyny and establishing the First Amendment as the pub- lisher's product liability shield. • All unequal power relationships must, in the end, rely on the threat or reality of violence to protect themselves. " Despite men's violence against women, the legal system continues to deny women's right to equal protection of the law. In addition, men still frame the public discourse so as to conceal this denial and to prevent our uniting in rebellion against it. As Sally Kempton wrote early in the women's movement, "It is hard to fight an enemy who has outposts in your head."l And, we might add, outposts in the schools, at newsstands, and on TV. If I seem to overstate the conflict, consider that every woman in this country is less free than every man to walk out of the house at night. What is it that so routinely restricts our freedom of movement? Abigail Adams identified it in a letter to Isaac Smith in 1771, saying that she longed to be "a rover," but citing as a deterrent "the many dangers we are subject to from your sex."2 If we admit that sex discrimination exists, it is not men-bashing, but ex- • Lorenne M.G. Clark and Debra J. Lewis, Rape: The Price of Coercive Sexuality (Toronto: Canadian Women's Educational Press, 1977), p. 176. Conceptualizing Harm [ 1 6 1 ] planatory, to address the way that it advantages all men, just as racism advan- tages all whites. Where there is advantage, there is motivation to maintain it. Moreover, there is no point in discussing harm without identifying the ben- eficiaries of it. Traditional First Amendment arguments for freedom of speech take for granted that we inhabit a civil society and meet on a level playing field to contest points on which we disagree. Such an egalitarian view of the Consti- ~tion, however, was hardly what the founding fathers had in mind. Writing m 1776, John Adams argued against permitting women-as well as men with- out property and "lads from twelve to twenty-one"-to have the vote because that would "destroy all distinctions and prostrate all ranks to one common level."3 At the same time, he refused his wife Abigail's demand on behalf of wom~~ that the country's "new code of laws ... put it out of the power of th~ VIC~O~S and the lawless to use us with cruelty and indignity with impunity." HIS chilling assurance to her was: "Depend upon it, we know better than to repeal our masculine systems."4 Both her demand and his response were pri- vately communicated, and her anger found its sole recorded outlet in a letter to he~ frie~d Mercy ?tis Warren. 5 In contrast, his point of view was publicly enshrIned m the Umted States Constitution. ~ century and a half later, in 1920, masculine systems briefly appeared to be m some danger when women won recognition of the right to vote through the passage of the Nineteenth Amendment. Some men sensibly feared that women would use their vote, as Alice Paul urged, to amend the Constitution to secure their right to equal protection of the law. Those fears were unwar- ranted, however. The prolonged campaign for the vote had shown how hard it would be for women to get the information they needed to vote in their own inter~st so long as education and communication were dominated by men, and Issues framed to men's advantage. . The civil rights movement of the 1960s, in a repeat of the post-Givil War campaigns for the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth amendments, did not acknowledge women's virtual exclusion from the Constitution, in addition to that of Afri~an Americans. If society and the law treated women differently from men, m the post-civil rights era, that was presumably because women were different, .not because men were keeping something of value from them- ~lIat is, their rights as citizens. If it were otherwise, surely our school- books would have mentioned it. At public hearings in the 1970s, feminists who provided content analyses to document the trivialization and exclusion of women and girls from educational materials promptly learned that liberal pa- triarchs do not hesitate to use accusations of censorship to chill dissent and maintain a racist, sexist status quo. 6 Feminists expected resistance from the WHY THE FIRST AMENDMENT IS BEING USED TO PROTECT VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN Twiss Butler Twiss Butler argues that men's control of institutions of communication and education allows them to support speech that harms women and to suppress speech against that harm. She observes that the publishing in- dustry funds legal. journalistic, and nonprofit organizations endorsing a First Amendment absolutist position. She contends that the industry's defense of pornography as protected speech serves the double purpose of dignifying misogyny and establishing the First Amendment as the pub- lisher's product liability shield. • All unequal power relationships must, in the end, rely on the threat or reality of violence to protect themselves. " Despite men's violence against women, the legal system continues to deny women's right to equal protection of the law. In addition, men still frame the public discourse so as to conceal this denial and to prevent our uniting in rebellion against it. As Sally Kempton wrote early in the women's movement, "It is hard to fight an enemy who has outposts in your head."l And, we might add, outposts in the schools, at newsstands, and on TV. If I seem to overstate the conflict, consider that every woman in this country is less free than every man to walk out of the house at night. What is it that so routinely restricts our freedom of movement? Abigail Adams identified it in a letter to Isaac Smith in 1771, saying that she longed to be "a rover," but citing as a deterrent "the many dangers we are subject to from your sex."2 If we admit that sex discrimination exists, it is not men-bashing, but ex- • Lorenne M.G. Clark and Debra J. Lewis, Rape: The Price of Coercive Sexuality (Toronto: Canadian Women's Educational Press, 1977), p. 176. Conceptualizing Harm [ 1 6 1 ] planatory, to address the way that it advantages all men, just as racism advan- tages all whites. Where there is advantage, there is motivation to maintain it. Moreover, there is no point in discussing harm without identifying the ben- eficiaries of it. Traditional First Amendment arguments for freedom of speech take for granted that we inhabit a civil society and meet on a level playing field to contest points on which we disagree. Such an egalitarian view of the Consti- ~tion, however, was hardly what the founding fathers had in mind. Writing m 1776, John Adams argued against permitting women-as well as men with- out property and "lads from twelve to twenty-one"-to have the vote because that would "destroy all distinctions and prostrate all ranks to one common level."3 At the same time, he refused his wife Abigail's demand on behalf of wom~~ that the country's "new code of laws ... put it out of the power of th~ VIC~O~S and the lawless to use us with cruelty and indignity with impunity." HIS chilling assurance to her was: "Depend upon it, we know better than to repeal our masculine systems."4 Both her demand and his response were pri- vately communicated, and her anger found its sole recorded outlet in a letter to he~ frie~d Mercy ?tis Warren. 5 In contrast, his point of view was publicly enshrIned m the Umted States Constitution. ~ century and a half later, in 1920, masculine systems briefly appeared to be m some danger when women won recognition of the right to vote through the passage of the Nineteenth Amendment. Some men sensibly feared that women would use their vote, as Alice Paul urged, to amend the Constitution to secure their right to equal protection of the law. Those fears were unwar- ranted, however. The prolonged campaign for the vote had shown how hard it would be for women to get the information they needed to vote in their own inter~st so long as education and communication were dominated by men, and Issues framed to men's advantage. . The civil rights movement of the 1960s, in a repeat of the post-Givil War campaigns for the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth amendments, did not acknowledge women's virtual exclusion from the Constitution, in addition to that of Afri~an Americans. If society and the law treated women differently from men, m the post-civil rights era, that was presumably because women were different, .not because men were keeping something of value from them- ~lIat is, their rights as citizens. If it were otherwise, surely our school- books would have mentioned it. At public hearings in the 1970s, feminists who provided content analyses to document the trivialization and exclusion of women and girls from educational materials promptly learned that liberal pa- triarchs do not hesitate to use accusations of censorship to chill dissent and maintain a racist, sexist status quo. 6 Feminists expected resistance from the PART liTHE HARM conservative patriarchy when we objected to sexist materials, but we were surprised by cries of censorship from the American Civil Liberties Union, People for the American Way, the American Library Association, and the National Council of Teachers of English-none of whom was providing lead- ership in the revision of educational materials that relegated girls and women to subordinate status. Their arguments against change equated criticism-that is, our bringing "more speech" into the vaunted marketplace of ideas-with censorship. At the same time, they acknowledged no de facto censorship in the minimal, stereotyped treatment of women and girls in materials in use. In this fashion, from the beginning of this country, institutions of com- munication directed by men have blocked women's access to information and denied women the opportunity to shape public discourse in response to our experience. That is why it has been possible in this supposedly exemplary democracy not only to deny women their constitutional right to equal protection of the law, but also to keep them largely ignorant of that denial and how it affects their lives generation after generation. So ignorant that even the Equal Rights Amendment campaign could be fatally diverted from every issue that would have made it clear to men that advocates meant business, and clear to women that they could use their vote to establish their right to equality. In the late 1980s, civil rights lobbyists worked together to get homophobic crime added to th~ Hate Crime Statistics Act, which already addressed crimes of racism and anti,-Semitism. But when an advocate for battered women asked that rape be countred as a hate crime against women, coalition members balked, saying that rape was not a hate but a sex crime; that the legislation would never pass with rape included; that rape statistics would outnumber and overwhelm statistics on "real" hate crimes; and that if rape were included, Senator Helms would attach an anti-abortion amendment to the bill. Did the women lobbyists walk out, refuse to help the men get their legislation passed, or go public with the issue to make it possible for women to support political action on their own behalf? No, they did not. So rape, men's quint- essential hate crime against women, the one that defines all women as prey, is still invisible in federal hate crim~ statistics. Now we find ourselves endlessly repeating grim statistics about violence against women in every phase and circumstance of life from childhood to old age. Shouldn't we question why violence against women is treated as sexual chic or a natural occurrence, like bad weather, rather than repudiated as a behavior used by men to control women? Where is our resistance to this normalized subordination, this mun- dane terrorism? Is our only role to be practicing tactics of avoidance or cleaning up the damage? Why must we seek special legislation to go about our daily Conceptualizing Harm business? Where is our entitlement to the bodily integrity and equal protection that is men's constitutional birthright? As John Adams conceded, violence is necessary to enforce subordination of an individual or group. Inevitably, the oppressor objectifies and dehumanizes the target group to justify violence against them. Men use pornography to objectify women, not only making subordination sexy, but effectively defining sexuality as dominance by men and the subordination of women. Calling subordination sex does not make it hurt any less, but in this area, as elsewhere, men's control over information is a critical element in maintaining their power. When feminists criticize pornography as graphic misogyny, they are attacking not only the system of sexism itself, with its economic and social pay-offs for men, not only Playboy's advertising rates, but also publishers' broad First Amendment shield again~t liability for any harm caused by the products that they produce and -sell. The publishing industry and the men in it therefore have a conflict of interest in reporting a critique of pornography as inimical to women's civil rights (unsecured as those rights are by the Constitution). We need to consider how that conflict of interest distorts the information we receive through journalistic coverage of public debate and action on this issue. Publishers protect their liability shield either by silencing feminists while granting speech to those who vilify them, or by misrepresenting the feminist critique of pornography. Women are given credibility and access to speech to the extent that they say what men want them to say. Stray from the script and you will be attacked, misquoted, or simply go unheard. As power brokers in a large industry profiting from sexism, publishers disguise this censorship as selfless concern for the First Amendment and freedom of speech. The Association of American Publishers, the American Booksellers Asso- ciation, and other media trade groups have long promoted an aggressive First Amendment line, particularly since the publication in 1970 of the first report of the President's Commission on Obscenity and Pornography. Pressured by the lobbying of civil libertarian groups, the Commission abandoned its inves- tigation as to whether pornography was harmful. Instead it came up with the fantasy of "pornography as catharsis," and a burgeoning industry was saved. * The self-serving doctrine promoted by publishers and libertarians is sum- marized by law professor Frederick Schauer as follows: "[L]egal toleration of • There are two main models scientists use to explain behavior: the catharsis model-which says the more you see the less you do, and the imitative model-which says the more you see the more you do. Most new research on pornography (and on violence) supports the validity of the imitative model.-Eds. PART liTHE HARM conservative patriarchy when we objected to sexist materials, but we were surprised by cries of censorship from the American Civil Liberties Union, People for the American Way, the American Library Association, and the National Council of Teachers of English-none of whom was providing lead- ership in the revision of educational materials that relegated girls and women to subordinate status. Their arguments against change equated criticism-that is, our bringing "more speech" into the vaunted marketplace of ideas-with censorship. At the same time, they acknowledged no de facto censorship in the minimal, stereotyped treatment of women and girls in materials in use. In this fashion, from the beginning of this country, institutions of com- munication directed by men have blocked women's access to information and denied women the opportunity to shape public discourse in response to our experience. That is why it has been possible in this supposedly exemplary democracy not only to deny women their constitutional right to equal protection of the law, but also to keep them largely ignorant of that denial and how it affects their lives generation after generation. So ignorant that even the Equal Rights Amendment campaign could be fatally diverted from every issue that would have made it clear to men that advocates meant business, and clear to women that they could use their vote to establish their right to equality. In the late 1980s, civil rights lobbyists worked together to get homophobic crime added to th~ Hate Crime Statistics Act, which already addressed crimes of racism and anti,-Semitism. But when an advocate for battered women asked that rape be countred as a hate crime against women, coalition members balked, saying that rape was not a hate but a sex crime; that the legislation would never pass with rape included; that rape statistics would outnumber and overwhelm statistics on "real" hate crimes; and that if rape were included, Senator Helms would attach an anti-abortion amendment to the bill. Did the women lobbyists walk out, refuse to help the men get their legislation passed, or go public with the issue to make it possible for women to support political action on their own behalf? No, they did not. So rape, men's quint- essential hate crime against women, the one that defines all women as prey, is still invisible in federal hate crim~ statistics. Now we find ourselves endlessly repeating grim statistics about violence against women in every phase and circumstance of life from childhood to old age. Shouldn't we question why violence against women is treated as sexual chic or a natural occurrence, like bad weather, rather than repudiated as a behavior used by men to control women? Where is our resistance to this normalized subordination, this mun- dane terrorism? Is our only role to be practicing tactics of avoidance or cleaning up the damage? Why must we seek special legislation to go about our daily Conceptualizing Harm business? Where is our entitlement to the bodily integrity and equal protection that is men's constitutional birthright? As John Adams conceded, violence is necessary to enforce subordination of an individual or group. Inevitably, the oppressor objectifies and dehumanizes the target group to justify violence against them. Men use pornography to objectify women, not only making subordination sexy, but effectively defining sexuality as dominance by men and the subordination of women. Calling subordination sex does not make it hurt any less, but in this area, as elsewhere, men's control over information is a critical element in maintaining their power. When feminists criticize pornography as graphic misogyny, they are attacking not only the system of sexism itself, with its economic and social pay-offs for men, not only Playboy's advertising rates, but also publishers' broad First Amendment shield again~t liability for any harm caused by the products that they produce and -sell. The publishing industry and the men in it therefore have a conflict of interest in reporting a critique of pornography as inimical to women's civil rights (unsecured as those rights are by the Constitution). We need to consider how that conflict of interest distorts the information we receive through journalistic coverage of public debate and action on this issue. Publishers protect their liability shield either by silencing feminists while granting speech to those who vilify them, or by misrepresenting the feminist critique of pornography. Women are given credibility and access to speech to the extent that they say what men want them to say. Stray from the script and you will be attacked, misquoted, or simply go unheard. As power brokers in a large industry profiting from sexism, publishers disguise this censorship as selfless concern for the First Amendment and freedom of speech. The Association of American Publishers, the American Booksellers Asso- ciation, and other media trade groups have long promoted an aggressive First Amendment line, particularly since the publication in 1970 of the first report of the President's Commission on Obscenity and Pornography. Pressured by the lobbying of civil libertarian groups, the Commission abandoned its inves- tigation as to whether pornography was harmful. Instead it came up with the fantasy of "pornography as catharsis," and a burgeoning industry was saved. * The self-serving doctrine promoted by publishers and libertarians is sum- marized by law professor Frederick Schauer as follows: "[L]egal toleration of • There are two main models scientists use to explain behavior: the catharsis model-which says the more you see the less you do, and the imitative model-which says the more you see the more you do. Most new research on pornography (and on violence) supports the validity of the imitative model.-Eds. PART liTHE HARM speech-related harm is the currency with which we as a society pay for First Amendment protection. "7 It is not enough to notice, as Schauer does, that this price is not borne equally when the reality remains unremedied so that license to wield harmful speech only profits the speaker and silences the victim. In the news business as elsewhere, men have long relied on the weapon of pornography to avoid having to compete on their own merits. 8 The role por- nography plays in keeping women journalists at a disadvantage is evident in the experience of Lynn Carrier, an editorial writer for the San Diego Tribune who sued the paper in 1990 for sex discrimination and harassment. Men coworkers attempted to intimidate and segregate Carrier by displaying pornog- raphy in the office, using sexual insults when talking with her, and asking her to run out and buy a copy of Playboy for her supervisor-who also wondered aloud what she would charge Playboy for posing nude for photographs. Carrier won her civil suit (refusing, incidentally, to accept a secret settlement), but the outcome was typical-she no longer works at the Tribune, but is employed instead at a smaller paper in the area. 9 It becomes hard to tell where the news business ends and pornography begins when it is pornography that shapes standards for how women will be depicted. In addition, mainstream media legitimate pornography by touting the Playboy interview or the Sports Illustrated swimsuit issue. The hit-and-run intrusion of pornography into everyday journalism is epitomized by the tactic used by Spy magazine to attack Hillary Rodham Clinton on the cover of its February 1993 issue. In a skillfully doctored color photograph with Oval Office trappings" in the background, her head is united with the body of a woman ~n scanty, black leather dominatrix attire, whip in hand. The studded collar around her neck neatly conceals the splice. Given the value of pornography in supporting men's dominance, pornog- raphers can count on help from publishers and the courts in defending their product from any meaningful legal restraint. 10 But, as I have mentioned, pornography has an even stronger claim on the resources of the publishing industry, because of their mutual interest in denying that published speech can be held accountable for harm .• An ad in an insurance trade periodical for a company whose slogan is "We insure free speech" warns: "Free speech can carry a high price for your media clients because publishers, broadcasters and advertising agencies are vulnerable to lawsuits in ways most companies are not. "II An article in another insurance trade periodical explains: "Everything that is published, broadcast or advertised is protected by the First Amendment ... [A] media liability policy is the only form of liability coverage that relies on constitutional law as a primary defense Conceptualizing Harm [W]hy is the coverage necessary? Because ongoing legal, political and social debate continues about how broad that constitutional protection should be. "12 ' No industry is better situated to lobby the public on behalf of its commercial interests than one whose product consists of speech and images, whether cat- egorized as news, education, entertainment, or advertising. The publishing industry is sparing no expense to control the debate on the breadth of consti- tutional protection of speech. In February 1993, the Freedom Forum Foundation took a full-page adver- tisement in the Washington Post to announce that former Supreme Court justices William Brennan, Jr., and Thurgood Marshall would receive the or- ganization's highest honor, the Free Spirit Award, along with cash awards of $100,000 "in recognition of their extraordinary achievement in promoting the values of free press, free speech, and free spirit. "13 The ad included pictures of the honorees and samples of their wise pronouncements on First Amendment protection of offensive speech and a man's right to read books or watch films of his own choosing in his own house. Not mentioned was that the Freedom Forum is funded by the Gannett Corporation, a media giant that publishes USA Today. Using corporate sponsorship to promote laissez-faire First Amend- ment platitudes from the highest of judicial sources typifies the publishing industry's increasingly bold exploitation of the First Amendment to sanctify its commercial self-interest. Publishers also use grants to infiltrate academic institutions. As talking heads or op-ed writers, academics make classy mouthpieces for publishers' interests. They skillfully transform crass commercial concerns into lofty issues of public policy. Gannett set up Freedom Forum First Amendment centers at Columbia and Vanderbilt universities and gave a quarter of a million dollars to the University of Maryland to put its glossy Freedom Forum insert into the Amer- ican Journalism Review. The Graduate School of Public Affairs at the Uni- versity of Colorado at Denver is headquarters for the First Amendment Congress, with over forty contributing members, including "major print a~d broadcast news media associations," as well as schools of journalism and col- legiate news associations. 14 The list goes on: the University of Virginia has its Thomas Jefferson Center for the Protection of Free Expression, Penn State University has the Pennsyl- vania Center for the First Amendment, the College of William and Mary houses the Institute of Bill of Rights Law, and Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government has its Frank Stanton Professor of the First Amendment and fellow of the Joan SChorenstein Barone Center on the Press, Politics, and PART liTHE HARM speech-related harm is the currency with which we as a society pay for First Amendment protection. "7 It is not enough to notice, as Schauer does, that this price is not borne equally when the reality remains unremedied so that license to wield harmful speech only profits the speaker and silences the victim. In the news business as elsewhere, men have long relied on the weapon of pornography to avoid having to compete on their own merits. 8 The role por- nography plays in keeping women journalists at a disadvantage is evident in the experience of Lynn Carrier, an editorial writer for the San Diego Tribune who sued the paper in 1990 for sex discrimination and harassment. Men coworkers attempted to intimidate and segregate Carrier by displaying pornog- raphy in the office, using sexual insults when talking with her, and asking her to run out and buy a copy of Playboy for her supervisor-who also wondered aloud what she would charge Playboy for posing nude for photographs. Carrier won her civil suit (refusing, incidentally, to accept a secret settlement), but the outcome was typical-she no longer works at the Tribune, but is employed instead at a smaller paper in the area. 9 It becomes hard to tell where the news business ends and pornography begins when it is pornography that shapes standards for how women will be depicted. In addition, mainstream media legitimate pornography by touting the Playboy interview or the Sports Illustrated swimsuit issue. The hit-and-run intrusion of pornography into everyday journalism is epitomized by the tactic used by Spy magazine to attack Hillary Rodham Clinton on the cover of its February 1993 issue. In a skillfully doctored color photograph with Oval Office trappings" in the background, her head is united with the body of a woman ~n scanty, black leather dominatrix attire, whip in hand. The studded collar around her neck neatly conceals the splice. Given the value of pornography in supporting men's dominance, pornog- raphers can count on help from publishers and the courts in defending their product from any meaningful legal restraint. 10 But, as I have mentioned, pornography has an even stronger claim on the resources of the publishing industry, because of their mutual interest in denying that published speech can be held accountable for harm .• An ad in an insurance trade periodical for a company whose slogan is "We insure free speech" warns: "Free speech can carry a high price for your media clients because publishers, broadcasters and advertising agencies are vulnerable to lawsuits in ways most companies are not. "II An article in another insurance trade periodical explains: "Everything that is published, broadcast or advertised is protected by the First Amendment ... [A] media liability policy is the only form of liability coverage that relies on constitutional law as a primary defense Conceptualizing Harm [W]hy is the coverage necessary? Because ongoing legal, political and social debate continues about how broad that constitutional protection should be. "12 ' No industry is better situated to lobby the public on behalf of its commercial interests than one whose product consists of speech and images, whether cat- egorized as news, education, entertainment, or advertising. The publishing industry is sparing no expense to control the debate on the breadth of consti- tutional protection of speech. In February 1993, the Freedom Forum Foundation took a full-page adver- tisement in the Washington Post to announce that former Supreme Court justices William Brennan, Jr., and Thurgood Marshall would receive the or- ganization's highest honor, the Free Spirit Award, along with cash awards of $100,000 "in recognition of their extraordinary achievement in promoting the values of free press, free speech, and free spirit. "13 The ad included pictures of the honorees and samples of their wise pronouncements on First Amendment protection of offensive speech and a man's right to read books or watch films of his own choosing in his own house. Not mentioned was that the Freedom Forum is funded by the Gannett Corporation, a media giant that publishes USA Today. Using corporate sponsorship to promote laissez-faire First Amend- ment platitudes from the highest of judicial sources typifies the publishing industry's increasingly bold exploitation of the First Amendment to sanctify its commercial self-interest. Publishers also use grants to infiltrate academic institutions. As talking heads or op-ed writers, academics make classy mouthpieces for publishers' interests. They skillfully transform crass commercial concerns into lofty issues of public policy. Gannett set up Freedom Forum First Amendment centers at Columbia and Vanderbilt universities and gave a quarter of a million dollars to the University of Maryland to put its glossy Freedom Forum insert into the Amer- ican Journalism Review. The Graduate School of Public Affairs at the Uni- versity of Colorado at Denver is headquarters for the First Amendment Congress, with over forty contributing members, including "major print a~d broadcast news media associations," as well as schools of journalism and col- legiate news associations. 14 The list goes on: the University of Virginia has its Thomas Jefferson Center for the Protection of Free Expression, Penn State University has the Pennsyl- vania Center for the First Amendment, the College of William and Mary houses the Institute of Bill of Rights Law, and Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government has its Frank Stanton Professor of the First Amendment and fellow of the Joan SChorenstein Barone Center on the Press, Politics, and PART I/THE HARM Public Policy. That legal scholar serves, along with two ultraconservative col- leagues, on a university committee appointed to help the Harvard community reflect on free speech questions "in a principled way."15 There are also the Theater of the First Amendment at George Mason Uni- versity in Virginia; the First Amendment Lounge at the National Press Club in Washington, D.G; and the annual Hugh M. Hefner First Amendment Award orchestrated for the Playboy Foundation by the American Civil Liberties Union. The television tabloid Inside Edition recently flashed pictures of women apparently sexually servicing men at a fund-raiser in Los Angeles for the Free Speech Legal Defense Fund to benefit the so-called adult video industry. The self-righteousness produced by this institutional validation can be seen in Chicago Tribune columnist Clarence Page's commentary iIi November 199 1 on the Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyard case, about the use of pornography to harass women tradesworkeis. Gazing at a newsroom colleague's poster-size, full-color photograph torn from the pages of the Chicago Tribune, featuring actress Heather Locklear in a swimsuit, Page cites the judge's finding in the shipyard case that there is no First Amendment right to harass. How long, he worries, can the press "remain free . . . once a court has determined that people can be damaged" by what he calls "non-libelous, non-obscene products of the press. "16 As a multibillion-dollar business, pornography is an extremely popular prod- uct. Masquerading, however, as "the speech we hate, but must defend lest the Constitution be harmed," pornography plays a special role as a worst-case example calling for a heroic First Amendment defense. Any evidence of harm to women and children must be concealed or denied to safeguard the industry mantra, "If it's published, it's protected." That is why press reports on hearings held by the 1986 Attorney General's Commission on Pornography often put the word "victim" in quotation marks to suggest a dubious concept. (The National Coalition against Censorship continues to use this convention in its publications on pornography.) Washington Post reporter Howard Kurtz de- scribed commission witnesses as "a parade of self-described victims who tell their sad stories from behind an op"!.que screen. . . . Many experts on both sides of the question say such anecdotal tales of woe prove nothing about the effect of sexually explicit materials. "17 To protect pornography, women's speech must be carefully controlled. When Linda Lovelace said she loved starring in pornographic films, she was treated as credible; when Linda Marchiano said that she had been beaten raped and, , coerced into making those films, her credibility was questioned. * No risk is • Linda Lovelace was Linda Marchiano's stage name.-Eds. ;Conceptualizing Harm overlooked. At a National Press Club speech by Christie Hefner in 1986, I addressed her "as a pornographer" in a written question about her lawsuit to censor testimony from a federal hearing that referred to Playboy as pornography; when my question was read aloud by the club's president, these three words were deleted. Institutional protection of pornography is strikingly evident in reporting on the Andrea Dworkin/Catharine MacKinnon antipornography civil rights or- dinance, which would have allowed women to seek damages under specific conditions from those responsible for harm proved attributable to pornography. While every media pundit was free to misrepresent the ordinance as ~ "ban" in the style of obscenity law, MacKinnon and Dworkin were never allowed an op-ed in any major newspaper to present it accurately or discuss it in their own words. In 1991, the New York Times asked MacKinnon to write an op-ed column on the Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyard decision, but insisted that she sub- stitute ellipses for graphic language quoted from the trial record as examples of the sexual harassment endured by women shipyard workers. MacKinnon refused to do so and the op-ed was rejected. 18* In March 1993, a conference on speech, equality, and harm brought together distinguished theorists on pornography and hate speech at the University of Chicago Law School. The New York Timesl9 report on the conference gave the lead and five of the first seven paragraphs to statements disparaging the conference and its participants. The lead exemplified the very tactics it pur- ported to reject: "Treading close to what critics consider the land of the thought police, some legal scholars are joining together to fight against images they believe should never be produced and words they believe should never be spoken." Coming before the reader has any factual idea of the subject matter addressed, this statement is fear-mongering. Twenty paragraphs describe the conference or quote participants while thirteen paragraphs focus on critical views on it, a poor ratio of new ideas to status quo defense. Identifying who gets speech when pornography is under attack demonstrates that the First Amendment does the best job of protecting those who need it least. When the Supreme Court agreed in 1986 to review routine obscenity and student speech cases but refused to hear arguments on the Indianapolis antipornography ordinance,20 they showed by their choice that the speech they genuinely hate is that which lets women tell the truth about pornography. • This is a common problem. When pornographers sell violent pornography as entertainment for men, it is protected by the First Amendment. But when feminists such as MacKinnon, Dworkin, or Nikki Craft use that same pornography-or the same pornographic technique-to expose pornographers, they are accused of being lewd and are censored by the media-or, in some instances, even arrested!-Eds. PART I/THE HARM Public Policy. That legal scholar serves, along with two ultraconservative col- leagues, on a university committee appointed to help the Harvard community reflect on free speech questions "in a principled way."15 There are also the Theater of the First Amendment at George Mason Uni- versity in Virginia; the First Amendment Lounge at the National Press Club in Washington, D.G; and the annual Hugh M. Hefner First Amendment Award orchestrated for the Playboy Foundation by the American Civil Liberties Union. The television tabloid Inside Edition recently flashed pictures of women apparently sexually servicing men at a fund-raiser in Los Angeles for the Free Speech Legal Defense Fund to benefit the so-called adult video industry. The self-righteousness produced by this institutional validation can be seen in Chicago Tribune columnist Clarence Page's commentary iIi November 199 1 on the Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyard case, about the use of pornography to harass women tradesworkeis. Gazing at a newsroom colleague's poster-size, full-color photograph torn from the pages of the Chicago Tribune, featuring actress Heather Locklear in a swimsuit, Page cites the judge's finding in the shipyard case that there is no First Amendment right to harass. How long, he worries, can the press "remain free . . . once a court has determined that people can be damaged" by what he calls "non-libelous, non-obscene products of the press. "16 As a multibillion-dollar business, pornography is an extremely popular prod- uct. Masquerading, however, as "the speech we hate, but must defend lest the Constitution be harmed," pornography plays a special role as a worst-case example calling for a heroic First Amendment defense. Any evidence of harm to women and children must be concealed or denied to safeguard the industry mantra, "If it's published, it's protected." That is why press reports on hearings held by the 1986 Attorney General's Commission on Pornography often put the word "victim" in quotation marks to suggest a dubious concept. (The National Coalition against Censorship continues to use this convention in its publications on pornography.) Washington Post reporter Howard Kurtz de- scribed commission witnesses as "a parade of self-described victims who tell their sad stories from behind an op"!.que screen. . . . Many experts on both sides of the question say such anecdotal tales of woe prove nothing about the effect of sexually explicit materials. "17 To protect pornography, women's speech must be carefully controlled. When Linda Lovelace said she loved starring in pornographic films, she was treated as credible; when Linda Marchiano said that she had been beaten raped and, , coerced into making those films, her credibility was questioned. * No risk is • Linda Lovelace was Linda Marchiano's stage name.-Eds. ;Conceptualizing Harm overlooked. At a National Press Club speech by Christie Hefner in 1986, I addressed her "as a pornographer" in a written question about her lawsuit to censor testimony from a federal hearing that referred to Playboy as pornography; when my question was read aloud by the club's president, these three words were deleted. Institutional protection of pornography is strikingly evident in reporting on the Andrea Dworkin/Catharine MacKinnon antipornography civil rights or- dinance, which would have allowed women to seek damages under specific conditions from those responsible for harm proved attributable to pornography. While every media pundit was free to misrepresent the ordinance as ~ "ban" in the style of obscenity law, MacKinnon and Dworkin were never allowed an op-ed in any major newspaper to present it accurately or discuss it in their own words. In 1991, the New York Times asked MacKinnon to write an op-ed column on the Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyard decision, but insisted that she sub- stitute ellipses for graphic language quoted from the trial record as examples of the sexual harassment endured by women shipyard workers. MacKinnon refused to do so and the op-ed was rejected. 18* In March 1993, a conference on speech, equality, and harm brought together distinguished theorists on pornography and hate speech at the University of Chicago Law School. The New York Timesl9 report on the conference gave the lead and five of the first seven paragraphs to statements disparaging the conference and its participants. The lead exemplified the very tactics it pur- ported to reject: "Treading close to what critics consider the land of the thought police, some legal scholars are joining together to fight against images they believe should never be produced and words they believe should never be spoken." Coming before the reader has any factual idea of the subject matter addressed, this statement is fear-mongering. Twenty paragraphs describe the conference or quote participants while thirteen paragraphs focus on critical views on it, a poor ratio of new ideas to status quo defense. Identifying who gets speech when pornography is under attack demonstrates that the First Amendment does the best job of protecting those who need it least. When the Supreme Court agreed in 1986 to review routine obscenity and student speech cases but refused to hear arguments on the Indianapolis antipornography ordinance,20 they showed by their choice that the speech they genuinely hate is that which lets women tell the truth about pornography. • This is a common problem. When pornographers sell violent pornography as entertainment for men, it is protected by the First Amendment. But when feminists such as MacKinnon, Dworkin, or Nikki Craft use that same pornography-or the same pornographic technique-to expose pornographers, they are accused of being lewd and are censored by the media-or, in some instances, even arrested!-Eds. [168] PART liTHE HARM In the case of the ordinance, the Supreme Court summarily affirmed an a eals court's opinion that women were harmed by pornography but th~t a cr~1 rights remedy would hurt the First Amendment. Media reports pr~lsed the Court for preventing a First Amendment catastrophe. At ~he same .tII~e" h d · 'sed the Court for decisions in other cases that rejected plamtIffs t e me la pm . 'd d' £ f arguments that their First Amendment rights were bemg a~n ge . m avor 0 arguments affirming the importance of protecting commercial property values or upholding the authority of school officials. Justice P?tter Stewart to~d us more than he intended about how power defines reahty when he saId ?f b . "I know it when I see it. "21 Concerns about government censorship o scemty, d t th ongovern- of publishers' speech seem irrelevant, however, compare 0 e n t I 'n whl'ch women's speech is suppressed or devalued. men a ways I . d' . I Most censorship, in fact, is carried out privately by those with e .I~ona power. It is not called censorship, and it is subject to no public acco~ntablh~ what~v~r. There is no reason why women must tolerate this exercise o~ p~lvate ~Ig ts a ainst their right to equal protection of the law. The ~uthontatIve.v?lce of h g ks to us through a public television senes charactenzmg the t e status quospea if' Th' Constitution as "a delicate balance"-a warning to kee~,ou.r h~~ds 0 kit. d I,S . . that must be disregarded The corollary to If It am t bro e, on t IS a warnmg . h If h I fix it" is "If it's broke, fix it." If the First Amendment works for .a t e peop e to the detriment of the other half, then the First Amendm~nt IS b~o~en a:d we need an Equal Rights Amendment to fix it. John Adams s convictIon t at masculine systems would be endangered if men could no longer abuse women with impunity holds true centuries later. .' For feminists, the challenge remains how to think and commum.cate freely in a hostile environment that works to control our minds. and Silence o~r speech. If women's votes are to be marshaled to gain legal, SOCial, and eco~omlc equality, we must find ways to overcome the enemy that has outposts m our heads. COMMENTS OF AN OUTSIDER ON THE FIRST AMENDMENT Kimberle Crenshaw Kimberle Crenshaw attacks the logic and political underpinnings of the cross-burning case, R.A V. v. St. Paul, pointing out that it demonstrates much of the perverse. blindness of nineteenth century civil rights cases, including Plessy v. Ferguson's "separate but equal." She shows that conser- vatives now wield concepts like "formal equality" in a way that disempowers African Americans and other people of color, and that this is especially true in the debate about hate speech.* • First Amendment defense of hate speech, and in particular, RA. V. v. St. Paul, shares an ideological lineage with City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co. t and other anti-affirmative action cases. Their common ancestor is Plessy v. Ferguson. t Indeed, the resemblance between Plessy and RA. V. is so striking that those of us who have studied Plessy closely experienced RA. V. as a reincarnation-Plessy raising from the dead. Plessy is the constitutional equiv- alent of the endless series of Friday the Thirteenth/Halloween movies-we just can't kill it. While it would certainly be possible to substantiate what some people will experience as a wild claim by making a point-by-point comparison, I want simply to consider in' broad fashion the descriptive and normative worldview underlying RA. V., one that is common in other cases that have legitimized societal inequality. Ideologically, RA.V. pays tribute to a social vision most frequently found in the "marketplace of ideas" metaphor. This • "Formal equality" means equality without regard to history or cultural practices, as opposed to contextual or realist theory, which takes into account history, cultural practices, and other events that may affect how individuals or groups of people are positioned in society.-Eds. t Croson is a key anti-affirmative action case. The City of Richmond required set-asides for minority contractors, who until then had received few city contracts. In 1989, the Supreme Court overturned that plan as constituting discrimination against white contractors.-Eds. +Plessy v. Ferguson is the famous 1896 case that upheld a "separate but equal" regime in connection with railroad cars. At a later date, the Supreme Court interpreted Plessy as permitting boatds of education to assign black children to all-black schools. It wasn't until Brown v. Board ofEducation in 1954 that ,the Supreme Court reversed its decision in Plessy.-Eds. I. Sally Kempton, "Cutting Loose," Esquire (July 1970), p. 57. 2. Alice Rossi, ed., The Feminist Papers, 1988, p. 9. 3. Ibid., p. 11. 4· Ibid., p. 5· 5. Ibid., p. 6. 6. Larry Green, "Book Censorship Wave Seen in the Wake of Conservative Political Victories," Los Angeles Times, 12 November 1980, p. 18 (an interview with Judy Krug, difector of the American Library Association's Office of Intellectual Freedom; the article was included with a 1981 direct-mail funding solicitation by People for the American Way). 7. Frederick Schauer, "Uncoupling Free Speech," Columbia L. R. 92 (1992), p. 1321. 8. A 1993 Indiana University study shows that women have been kept at 34 percent of the journalism work force for the last ten years. D. Weaver and G. C. Willhoit, "The American Journalist in the 1990'S," cited in The Forum, p. 7, a Freedom Forum Foundation insert in the Washington Journalism Review (January 1993). 9. Brae Canlen, "The Editorial They," SanDiego Reader, 6 December 1987. 10. Saundra Saperstein, "Publishers Joining Playboy in Attack on Group's Letter," Washington Post, 7 June 1986, p. A2. 11. Media/Professional Insurance, National Underwriter, 19 October 1992, p. 47. 12. Bill Bauer, "Media Liability Coverage," Best's Review, August 1992. 13· Washington Post, 11 February 1993, p. A20. 14. Claudia A. Haskel and Jean H. Otto, eds., A Time for Choices, First Amendment Congress, 1991. 15· Harvard Magazine (January/February 1993), p. 74· 16. Clarence Page, "Restriction on Pinups Raises Another Issue," Harrisburg Patriot News (pennsylvania), 11 November 1991. 17. Howard Kurtz, "Pornography Panel's Objectivity Disputed,~ Washington Post, 15 October 198 5. 18. Catharine A. MacKinnon, speech to the National Press Club, Washington, D.C., 22 No- vember 1993. 19. Isabel Wilkerson, "Foes of Pornography and Bigotry Join Forces," New York Times, 12 March 1993, p. B16. 20. American Booksellers Association v. Hudnut, 771 F. 2d 323 9~h Cir. (1985), alf'd, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986). Routine cases heard, for example, City of Renton et al. v. Playtime Theatres, Inc. et al. 475 U.S. 41 (1986) (zoning regulations) and Bethel School District No. 403 35 al. v. Fra"ser, a minor et al. 478 U.S. 675 (1986) (regulating student speech). 21. Catharine A. MacKinnon, "Not a Moral Issue," in Feminism Unmodified (Harvard, 1987), pp. 147-48. 
work_dhx5ugxdovholidc6w75bkmawq	----	House of Commons Women and Equalities Committee Transgender Equality First Report of Session 2015–16 Report, together with formal minutes relating to the report Ordered by the House of Commons to be printed 8 December 2015 HC 390 Published on 14 January 2016 by authority of the House of Commons London: The Stationery Office Limited £0.00 The Women and Equalities Committee The Women and Equalities Committee is appointed by the House of Commons to examine the expenditure, administration and policy of the Government Equalities Office and associated public bodies. Current membership Mrs Maria Miller (Conservative, Basingstoke) (Chair) Ruth Cadbury (Labour, Brentford and Isleworth) Maria Caulfield (Conservative, Lewes) Jo Churchill (Conservative, Bury St Edmunds) Angela Crawley (Scottish National Party, Lanark and Hamilton East) Mims Davies (Conservative, Eastleigh) Mrs Flick Drummond (Conservative, Portsmouth South) Ben Howlett (Conservative, Bath) Siobhain McDonagh (Labour, Mitcham and Morden) Jess Phillips (Labour, Birmingham, Yardley) Mr Gavin Shuker (Labour (Co-op), Luton South) Powers The committee is one of the departmental select committees, the powers of which are set out in House of Commons Standing Orders, principally in SO No. 152. These are available on the internet via www.parliament.uk. Publication Committee reports are published on the Committee’s website at www.parliament.uk/womenandequalities and by The Stationery Office by Order of the House. Evidence relating to this report is published on the relevant inquiry page of the Committee’s website. Committee staff The current staff of the Committee are Gosia McBride (Clerk), Keith Neary (Second Clerk), Ayaz Manji (Committee Specialist), Sharmini Selvarajah (Committee Specialist), Helena Ali (Senior Committee Assistant) and Liz Parratt (Media Officer). Contacts All correspondence should be addressed to the Clerk of the Women and Equalities Committee, House of Commons, London SW1A 0AA. The telephone number for general enquiries is 020 7219 6123; the Committee’s email address is womeqcom@parliament.uk. http://www.parliament.uk/biographies/commons/mrs-maria-miller/1480 http://www.parliament.uk/biographies/commons/ruth-cadbury/4389 http://www.parliament.uk/biographies/commons/maria-caulfield/4492 http://www.parliament.uk/biographies/commons/jo-churchill/4380 http://www.parliament.uk/biographies/commons/angela-crawley/4469 http://www.parliament.uk/biographies/commons/mims-davies/4513 http://www.parliament.uk/biographies/commons/mrs-flick-drummond/4459 http://www.parliament.uk/biographies/commons/ben-howlett/4445 http://www.parliament.uk/biographies/commons/siobhain-mcdonagh/193 http://www.parliament.uk/biographies/commons/jess-phillips/4370 http://www.parliament.uk/biographies/commons/mr-gavin-shuker/4013 http://www.parliament.uk http://www.parliament.uk/womenandequalities http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/women-and-equalities-committee/inquiries/parliament-2015/transgender-equality/ http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/women-and-equalities-committee/inquiries/parliament-2015/transgender-equality/ mailto:womeqcom@parliament.uk 1 Transgender Equality Contents Summary 3 1 Introduction 5 Terminology 5 Our inquiry 6 2 Cross-government strategy 8 3 Gender Recognition Act 2004 11 Providing proof 11 Spousal consent 14 Age limit 17 Data protection 19 Inappropriate requests to produce a Gender Recognition Certificate 19 Section 22 of the Gender Recognition Act 20 4 Equality Act 2010 23 Gender reassignment as a protected characteristic 23 Exemptions in respect of trans people 27 Separate-sex and single-sex services 27 Genuine occupational requirement 30 Separate-gender sport 32 5 NHS services 35 General NHS services 35 General Practitioners’ attitudes towards trans patients 36 Education and training of doctors 40 Professional regulation of doctors 41 Gender Identity Clinics (adults) 42 Treatment protocols 43 Capacity and quality of services 48 The Tavistock Clinic (children and adolescents) 50 6 Tackling everyday transphobia 55 Hate crime 55 Reporting of hate crime 55 Hate-crime prosecutions and convictions 56 Action to deal with hate crime 57 2 Transgender Equality Hate crime legislation 57 Recording names and gender identities 59 Passports 60 National Insurance, tax and benefit records 61 Non-gendering 62 Prison and Probation Services 63 Media 67 Online services 71 Schools 72 Post-school education 75 Social care for young people 77 Conclusions and recommendations 79 Annex: Terms of reference 88 Formal Minutes 89 Witnesses 90 Published written evidence 91 3 Transgender Equality Summary Fairness and equality are basic British values. A litmus test for any society that upholds those values is how far it protects even the most marginalised groups. Britain has been among the countries going furthest in recognising lesbian, gay and bisexual rights, but we are still failing this test in respect of trans people, despite welcome progress. High levels of transphobia are experienced by individuals on a daily basis (including in the provision of public services)—with serious results. About half of young trans people and a third of trans adults attempt suicide. The recent deaths in custody of two trans women, and the case of a trans woman who was placed in a men’s prison, are particularly stark illustrations of the issues. The Gender Recognition Act 2004 was pioneering but is now dated. Its medicalised approach pathologises trans identities and runs contrary to the dignity and personal autonomy of applicants. The Government must update the Act, in line with the principle of gender self-declaration. Trans people feel strongly that the provision on spousal consent under the Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013 gives spouses an effective “veto” on gender recognition. However, marriage is a legal contract between two consenting parties, the terms of which cannot be changed without the consent of both. We do, though, take very seriously the possibility that this provision may be used by spouses with malicious intent. Protection for trans people under the Equality Act 2010 was a huge step forward. However, the terms “gender reassignment” and “transsexual” in the Act are outdated and misleading; and may not cover wider members of the trans community. The protected characteristic should be amended to that of “gender identity”. The NHS is letting down trans people: it is failing in its legal duty under the Equality Act. Trans people encounter significant problems in using general NHS services, due to the attitude of some clinicians and other staff who lack knowledge and understanding—and in some cases are prejudiced. The NHS is failing to ensure zero tolerance of transphobic behaviour. GPs too often lack understanding and in some cases this leads to appropriate care not being provided. A root-and-branch review must be conducted, completed and published by the NHS. We agree with the Chair of the NHS National Clinical Reference Group for Gender Identity Services that: “not treating people [for gender dysphoria] is not a neutral act—it will do harm.” We strongly welcome the trend towards depathologising trans identities. There is a clear and strong case that delaying treatment for young people risks more harm than providing it. We are also concerned that Gender Identity Services continue to be provided as part of mental-health services, giving the impression that trans identity is a disease or disorder of the mind. There are serious concerns about treatment protocols in Gender Identity Services, particularly regarding “Real-Life Experience” prior to genital surgery. However, we are unconvinced by the argument that the NHS should simply grant on demand whatever treatment patients request. 4 Transgender Equality It is also important to build trans people’s confidence in the criminal justice system. We welcome the Government’s willingness to strengthen hate-crime legislation. The existing provisions on aggravated offences and stirring up hatred should be extended to all protected characteristics. The Government’s new hate-crime action plan must include mandatory training for police officers on transphobic hate crime; and the promotion of third-party reporting. The Government must also work with the courts to tackle the issue of trans people being “outed” inappropriately in court. Across the board, government departments are struggling to support trans people effectively, with the 2011 Advancing Transgender Equality action plan remaining largely unimplemented. The Government must agree a new strategy which it can deliver with full cross-departmental support. 5 Transgender Equality 1 Introduction 1. This report, our first, is concerned with equality issues affecting transgender (or “trans”)1 people, an umbrella term describing a diverse minority group whose members often experience very stark inequality. Terminology 2. Each of us is at birth assigned a sex (male or female), based on our physical characteristics. Most people’s gender identity (the gender with which they associate themselves) and gender presentation (how they outwardly show their gender) will not differ from that typically associated with their assigned sex. Trans people, however, have a gender identity which differs from that of their (assigned) birth sex. Trans identities take a wide diversity of forms.2 3. Trans identity can be “non-binary” in character, located at a (fixed or variable) point along a continuum between male and female; or “non-gendered”, i.e. involving identification as neither male nor female. While issues relating to these particular trans identities do feature in this report, it was not possible within the scope of our inquiry to undertake an in-depth consideration of the position of all non-binary and non-gendered people. However, we note that increasing numbers of trans people do identify as non- binary or non-gendered and many of our recommendations will address some of the problems faced by people with these identities. But there is a need for Government policy to address their specific needs. 4. In addition, we are aware that intersex3 people face a number of difficult equalities issues and that some members of this group identify as trans. However, the issues concerned are very distinctive and we decided it would not be possible to do justice to them in the context of an inquiry focused primarily on trans issues. We are aware that for those intersex people who undergo gender reassignment as adults much of what we comment on will be relevant. However, the Government should also consider how best to address the needs of intersex children and adults, including those who identify as transgender. 5. Many trans people change their gender presentation to bring it into alignment with their gender identity. This process is known as “transition”.4 Transitioning may involve various types of medical treatment,5 to bring a person’s physical characteristics more into conformity with their gender identity and presentation. The NHS uses a (mental-health) 1 The term “gender variance” is also used (often in respect of children or adolescents) to refer to behaviour and interests that are outside what is considered “normal” for a person’s assigned (biological) sex. The abbreviation “trans*” is sometimes adopted, to emphasise that the full spectrum of gender variant, gender non-conforming, gender diverse or gender atypical identities is being referred to. 2 A person who is assigned male at birth but identifies as female may be described as a “trans woman”, while someone who is assigned female at birth but identifies as male may be described as a “trans man”. The term “cisgender”— abbreviated as “cis”—is used in the trans community to refer to people who are not transgender. 3 Intersex people are born with ambiguous primary physical sexual characteristics. Until recently they would usually undergo genital surgery at a young age to given them characteristics which are clearly either male or female. Medical professionals are now more likely to advise waiting until the child is older and able to provide informed consent to surgery, because of the implications surgery can have on future health and function. 4 A trans person’s gender after transitioning is often referred to as their “acquired gender”, but the term “affirmed gender” is now preferred by many people. 5 This is usually referred to as “gender reassignment”, although trans people increasingly prefer the term “gender confirmation”. 6 Transgender Equality diagnosis of “gender dysphoria”, which is defined as the experiencing of discomfort or distress because there is a mismatch between one’s biological sex and one’s gender identity. However, transitioning need not involve any form of medical intervention. 6. We are aware that trans people themselves refer to their diverse identities and experiences in many different ways and that use of some terms is contested. We have tried in this report to use terms which are generally accepted and in wide use within the trans community. We ask for understanding if we have not always got this right. Our inquiry 7. Fairness and equality are basic British values. Parliament established this Committee to provide the opportunity for on-going focused scrutiny of where fairness and equality are not yet a reality of day-to-day life. A litmus test for any society that upholds the principles of fairness and equality is the extent to which it supports and protects the rights and interests of every citizen, even the most marginalised groups. Whilst Britain has been among the countries that have gone furthest in recognising lesbian, gay and bisexual rights, our society is still failing this test in respect of trans people, despite welcome progress in recent years. 8. It is telling that there is a lack of good quality statistical data regarding trans people in the UK. Current estimates indicate that some 650,000 people are “likely to be gender incongruent to some degree”.6 9. Trans people have long endured high levels of prejudice (referred to as “transphobia”) and misunderstanding. This is manifested in numerous forms, including discrimination in a wide range of settings (including public services), hostile portrayal in the media, abuse and violence (including, in some cases, sexual assault and murder). This can undermine trans people’s career opportunities, incomes, living standards, access to social capital, quality of life, and physical and mental health. It is a sobering and distressing fact that in UK surveys of trans people about half of young people7 and a third of adults8 report that they have attempted suicide. During the course of our inquiry, the deaths in custody of two trans women, and the case of a trans woman who was placed in a men’s prison, illustrated with particular starkness the issues we were considering. 10. At the same time, there appears to be gathering momentum for change to bring about greater equality for trans people. Issues affecting the trans community are now more widely debated than in the past; and there are growing voices in support of changing how trans people are viewed, portrayed and treated by society. 11. It was with this background in mind that we decided soon after the election of the Committee to conduct an inquiry into trans equality as our first piece of work. Before commencing the inquiry, we consulted informally with representatives of two key stakeholder organisations, Press for Change and Stonewall. 6 Terry Reed (TRA 019); Gender Identity Research and Education Service (TRA 058). In May 2009 the Office for National Statistics published a Trans Data Position Paper which noted the lack of robust data, methodological issues associated with seeking such data and the need for “those more closely associated with the trans community” to explore “alternative measures” of the number of trans people. 7 “Nearly half of young transgender people have attempted suicide – UK survey”, Guardian, 19 November 2015 8 Gender Identity Research and Education Service, Trans Mental Health Study 2012 (September 2012) http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/18922.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19292.pdf http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/guide-method/measuring-equality/equality/equality-data-review/trans-data-position-paper.pdf http://www.theguardian.com/society/2014/nov/19/young-transgender-suicide-attempts-survey http://www.gires.org.uk/assets/Medpro-Assets/trans_mh_study.pdf 7 Transgender Equality 12. In our terms of reference (see Annex), agreed in July 2015, we decided to look at how far, and in what ways, trans people still have yet to achieve full equality; and how the outstanding issues can most effectively be addressed. 13. Our inquiry covered a wide range of policy areas, which are affected in different ways by the current devolution arrangements. We looked at health services, schools and social care in relation only to England, since these are devolved matters in the other countries of the UK. Our comments on the criminal justice system (courts, prisons and probation) relate to England and Wales only, these being devolved matters in Scotland and Northern Ireland. As we note in our chapter on gender recognition, this is affected by the different equal-marriage law which obtains in Scotland. 14. We received over 250 written evidence submissions. Many of these came from individual trans people who wanted to tell us about their own experiences; to them, we are especially grateful. Much of this information was highly personal and sensitive; in making decisions about the publication of evidence, we have been mindful of our duty of care towards people who have entrusted us with such information. We sought to ascertain in all cases the wishes of those who made submissions and we have tried to respect scrupulously all requests for confidentiality or the redaction of information. 15. During the course of the inquiry, we held five oral evidence sessions. Witnesses included: a panel of trans people speaking frankly about their own experiences (whom we thank particularly); organisations conducting representative and advocacy work within and for the trans community; service-providers, of various kinds; academic experts; and six ministers, from a range of government departments, including the Minister for Women and Equalities, Rt Hon Nicky Morgan MP. 16. We have also sought to engage with the wider trans community during the inquiry, through organisations representing trans people, the LGBT press and social media. Where members of the trans community brought issues to our attention during the course of the inquiry, we sought to take account of these in our deliberations. 17. It became apparent during the inquiry that there is a complex and extensive hierarchy of issues that need to be addressed. We have attempted to reflect in this report the relative urgency and importance of these issues, as articulated by the trans community. Of necessity, that has meant that some of the issues raised in the course of this inquiry have not been directly addressed (as well as some topics referred to in our terms of reference).9 The Government will need, in its response, to demonstrate how it will ensure that a comprehensive plan is put in place to address all the issues raised. 18. We are very grateful to our Specialist Advisor, Stephen Whittle OBE, Professor of Equalities Law at Manchester Metropolitan University, for his help and guidance throughout the inquiry. We are also grateful to Claire McCann, of Cloisters Chambers, for giving us her expert legal opinion. 9 For instance, although we called for submissions on trans people in the Armed Forces, we only received two relevant submissions: Sarah Cooper (TRA 037); Caroline Paige (TRA 151). http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19058.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19534.pdf 8 Transgender Equality 2 Cross-government strategy 19. The Government Equalities Office (GEO) is responsible across government for equalities strategy and legislation, and takes the lead on transgender equality issues.10 In December 2011 it published Advancing transgender equality: a plan for action,11 following engagement with a significant number of trans organisations. In the Plan, government departments and other government bodies committed to a broad range of detailed actions, with target dates, which aimed to “improve the lives of transgender people and support businesses and public bodies so they have the right tools to support transgender people”.12 20. Stonewall told us that it had welcomed the Plan: We believe that cross-government working is vital, particularly given that data and expertise on trans issues is limited and that key issues cut across different remits, particularly health, education and justice.13 21. However, witnesses also expressed concern that the plan remained largely unimplemented. Christie Elan-Cane told us that the Plan was, from per14 point of view as a non-gendered person, “all plan and no action, because nothing resulted from it”.15 22. The Minister for Women and Equalities pointed out that a significant number of actions had been taken forward,16 but acknowledged that: There are some things that have not yet been done […] these are issues that have not been widely discussed in society or in [the House of Commons]. I think it is fair to say that, just because there is an action plan, that does not mean there is change or cultural change or necessarily a dialogue. That is what we would very much like to see happening in this Parliament.17 23. The Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC)18 emphasised the importance of “a single, strong and clear strategy to lever progress”.19 Stonewall told us that “establishing a transparent mechanism for cross-government working, with a specific ‘trans equality’ remit, would provide a way to focus expertise and to consult with trans communities”.20 10 The GEO also leads on issues relating to women and sexual orientation. In relation to its remit in respect of trans equality, in November 2015 the GEO published (in association with Gendered Intelligence) Providing services for transgender customers and The recruitment and retention of transgender staff. 11 HM Government, Advancing transgender equality: a plan for action, December 2011 12 The areas covered by the Plan were: early years; education and social mobility; a fair and flexible labour market; opening up public services and empowering individuals and communities (health and social care, identity and privacy, civil society and the Public Sector Equality Duty); changing culture and attitudes; safety and support; equal civil marriage; and promoting rights internationally. 13 Stonewall (TRA 243) 14 Christie Elan-Cane asked us to use the non-gendered pronoun “per”. 15 Q182 16 The Minister included the Government’s 2012 hate-crime action plan (see Chapter Six) when auditing progress made, arguing that of the 103 points in both plans, only 12 had not been started in any way. 17 Q255 18 The EHRC is a non-departmental public body, established under the Equality Act 2006, with responsibility for promoting and enforcing equality and non-discrimination laws in Great Britain. Its publications include Provision of goods, facilities and services to trans people: Guidance for public authorities in meeting your equality duties and human rights obligations, February 2010. 19 Equality and Human Rights Commission (TRA 078) 20 Stonewall (TRA 243) https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/484857/Providing_services_for_transgender_customers-a_guide.pdf https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/484857/Providing_services_for_transgender_customers-a_guide.pdf https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/484855/The_recruitment_and_retention_of_transgender_staff-_guidance_for_employers.pdf https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/85498/transgender-action-plan.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/20371.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/23159.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/24014.pdf http://www.equalityhumanrights.com/sites/default/files/documents/PSD/psd_trans_guidance.pdf http://www.equalityhumanrights.com/sites/default/files/documents/PSD/psd_trans_guidance.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19337.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/20371.pdf 9 Transgender Equality We also heard from various quarters the view that the UK government should adopt the overarching principles on trans equality embodied in two international declarations:21 • the Yogyakarta Principles on the Application of International Human Rights Law in relation to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, adopted by the International Commission of Jurists in 2007;22 and • Resolution 2048: Discrimination against transgender people in Europe, adopted by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe in April 2015.23 These set out an overarching framework for trans equality in law, based on the principle of a universal right for individuals to determine their own gender identity and to have this respected and recognised. 24. There are also certain areas where consistent, general policy lines could be drawn, for instance in relation to the recording of changes of name and trans identities. As we have already mentioned, there is scope for the Government to develop a coherent overall approach to the emerging issue of the position of non-binary and non-gendered people. One aspect of this might be a general “non-gendered” approach to the official recording of information on individuals (see Chapter Six). Another area where an overarching approach would be possible is the incorporation of trans issues into the regulation, education, training and continuing professional development of groups such as healthcare staff (see Chapter Five), prison staff, teachers and social workers (see Chapter Six). 25. The Minister for Women and Equalities told us that she saw her role as follows: First, it is very much to come up with the priorities for the Government Equalities Office for this Parliament. I have already said, shortly after the election when I was reappointed, that issues for transgender people would be a part of that […] It is also about holding other Government Departments’ feet to the fire […] [I]t is about making sure that the Government Equalities Office’s expertise and that of those from outside is available to help other Government Departments develop the right policies.24 26. The Minister for Women and Equalities and the Government Equalities Office have a cross-government role in respect of trans equality. The 2011 Advancing Transgender Equality action plan remains largely unimplemented. Within the next six months, the Government must agree a new strategy which it can deliver, with full cross-departmental support. It must also draw up a balance sheet of the previous transgender action plan, confirm those actions which have been completed and agree a new strategy to tackle those issues which remain unaddressed. This must be done within the next six months. It should set out clearly the areas of responsibility and lines of accountability in the public sector regarding trans equality issues. It should also include a wholesale review of issues facing non-binary and non-gendered people. 21 Qq135, 142, 155; National LGB&T Partnership (TRA 077); LGBT Consortium (TRA 083); UNISON (TRA 116); UK Trans Info TRA 138; Centre for Law & Social Justice, University of Leeds, and Intersex UK (TRA 167); Scottish Transgender Alliance (TRA 225) 22 “The Yogyakarta Principles”, accessed 2 December 2015 23 Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, “Discrimination against transgender people in Europe” accessed 2 December 2015 24 Q256; cf. Government Equalities Office (TRA 245) http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/23159.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19336.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19365.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19481.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19521.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19564.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19659.pdf http://www.yogyakartaprinciples.org/principles_en.htm http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-XML2HTML-EN.asp?fileid=21736&lang=en http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/24014.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/20997.pdf 10 Transgender Equality 27. The Government must also make a clear commitment to abide by the Yogyakarta Principles and Resolution 2048 of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. This would provide trans equality policy with a clear set of overall guiding principles which are in keeping with current international best practice. 28. In the rest of our report we address a range of specific policy areas relating to trans equality issues. 11 Transgender Equality 3 Gender Recognition Act 2004 29. The Gender Recognition Act (GRA) 2004, which came into force in April 2005, allowed, for the first time, trans people whose birth was registered in the UK25 to have their acquired / affirmed26 gender (either male or female) recorded on their birth certificate.27 Under the Act, application may be made to the Gender Recognition Panel (GRP)28 for gender recognition. If successful, the applicant will be issued with a Gender Recognition Certificate (GRC), which permits the holder to be recognised for all legal purposes (including marriage) as belonging to their acquired gender.29 30. When the GRA was drafted it was the first gender-recognition legislation in the world not to require individuals to have undergone surgical sterilisation prior to recognition in their acquired gender.30 At the time, it was thus considered to be world-leading. However, we were told by witnesses that it was now “outdated” and “in need of significant revision”.31 More recent gender-recognition legislation in several countries is widely regarded as providing a more enlightened model for the UK to follow. 31. In this chapter we review the key issues that have arisen in our inquiry in this respect. As we have already stated, the position of people with non-binary and non-gendered identities was beyond the scope of our inquiry, and in particular we note that the Gender Recognition Act makes no provision for this group. The Government must look into the need to create a legal category for those people with a gender identity outside that which is binary and the full implications of this. Providing proof 32. Under the current law, applicants for a GRC are required to prove that they: • are aged over 18; • have, or have had, a documented mental-health diagnosis of gender dysphoria (by producing a statement by a doctor—usually a psychiatrist or sexual-health specialist— or a psychologist on the GRP’s list of experts.); 25 Trans people whose birth was registered outside the UK can still use the provisions of the GRA to have their acquired gender recognised in the UK, where that acquired gender has been recognised in the relevant jurisdiction. 26 The Act itself only uses the term “acquired gender”. 27 The GRA was passed in response to a 2002 ruling by the European Court of Human Rights that the UK Government was in violation of Article 8 (regarding the right to privacy) and Article 12 (regarding the right to marriage) of the European Convention on Human Rights by not allowing trans people to change their gender in law. The Convention was incorporated into UK law through the Human Rights Act 1998. 28 The GRP is a branch of HM Courts and Tribunal Service under the presidency of a judge. It consists of an administrative team and a judicial panel, the latter being made up of legal and medical members. There is no provision for an applicant to appear in person before the judicial panel when it is considering their case. 29 Following the issue of a GRC, the record of the holder’s birth is effectively amended to reflect their acquired gender (if the person’s birth was registered in the UK). This is done by means of an entry in the Gender Recognition Register (which is maintained by the Registrars General for the different countries of the UK, separate from the registers of births). A certificate drawn from this Register is indistinguishable from any other birth certificate. As at the end of June 2015, since the GRA came into force (in April 2005): 4,631 GRC applications had been received; 3,999 full GRCs had been issued; 183 interim GRCs had been issued (67% of which have been converted to full GRCs); 193 applications had been declined; and 110 applications had been received which were still pending – Gires, “Gender Recognition Panel”, accessed 4 January 2016; Ministry of Justice, Tribunals and Gender Recognition Certificate Statistics Quarterly, April to June 2015, September 2015. 30 As at 2015, 12 countries in the European Union still require sterilisation as a precondition of legal gender recognition. 31 Q132; Michael Toze (TRA 001); Charlie Attenborough (TRA 068); Peyton Knight (TRA 128); UK Trans Info (TRA 138) http://www.gires.org.uk/law-archive/gender-recognition-panel http://www.gires.org.uk/law-archive/gender-recognition-panel https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/459787/tribunals-and-gender-recognition-bulletin.pdf https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/459787/tribunals-and-gender-recognition-bulletin.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/23159.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/18822.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19310.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19499.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19521.pdf 12 Transgender Equality • are not married (unless their spouse has given consent to changing the marriage from different-sex to same-sex or vice versa, as appropriate); • are not in a civil partnership; • have lived fully for the last two years in their acquired gender (by producing a selection of items of documentary evidence showing change of name and gender, such as a passport, rent book, wages slip or benefits documentation); and • intend to live permanently in their acquired gender.32 33. The current process of applying for a GRC was described to us as “bureaucratic”, “expensive” and “humiliating”. Witnesses told us that it required the collection and submission of substantial quantities of evidence of a type which ought to have no bearing on the granting of gender recognition.33 34. The Government has justified the £140 fee for GRC applications on the grounds that: charging for a range of official services is normal; the fee helps to cover the administrative cost of the service; and that a large proportion of applicants are exempt from paying.34 35. Although the Act makes no requirement for medical treatment to have taken place, such treatment will be accepted as part of the supporting evidence for a GRC application. It can be proved by means of a letter from the applicant’s GP giving details of treatment. Where no evidence of treatment is provided, the Panel may ask for evidence regarding why treatment has not been commenced. 36. The requirement to provide documentation regarding a diagnosis of gender dysphoria was particularly contentious. Mr Dunne noted that “the continued ‘pathologisation’ of transgender identities [i.e. treating them as a disease or disorder] through the 2004 Act causes significant offence and distress”.35 37. James Morton, of the Scottish Transgender Alliance, explained how distressing the Panel’s approach can be for applicants. His organisation had supported: a number of trans people who have been really traumatised and humiliated by the process where they have [had to say whether they have] undergone various medical treatments. The Act says you should be able to access your gender recognition without necessarily having those, and yet the gender recognition panel has insisted on really intrusive levels of detail about the surgeries that people have undergone or their intentions for future surgery. We have had, for example, a young person in their early 20s who has not yet had any sexual relationships being forced to decide and state categorically whether or not they want genital surgery and being questioned over the fact that initially they wanted breast augmentation but then grew breasts through hormone treatment. Panels have been incredibly pedantic about any perceived inconsistencies in 32 The Act also provides for the recognition of an acquired gender which has already been recognised in a legal jurisdiction outside the UK. 33 Michael Toze (TRA 001); Adrienne Macartney (TRA 046); Anonymised (TRA 055); Zac Snape (TRA 089); National Union of Students (TRA 187); LGBT Liberal Democrats (TRA 197); Steph Farnham (TRA 240) 34 Q273 35 Peter Dunne (TRA 251) http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/18822.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19156.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19276.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19389.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19608.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19620.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19799.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/24014.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/22300.pdf 13 Transgender Equality the medical reports, which means that people end up extremely upset and feel really invalidated.36 38. The requirement for a minimum of two years living “in role” was also seen as arbitrary and unreasonable, and we were told that this caused problems with identity documents (given that this must be done before legal gender recognition has been granted). 39. In a series of countries, gender recognition now takes place on the basis of gender self-declaration by the applicant, without the onerous requirements that exist under the GRA. Mr Dunne explained this to us: In the decade since the 2004 Act was first introduced […] a seismic shift has occurred at the interface between gender identity advocacy and human rights law. Many transgender individuals now view “self-declaration” as the most appropriate vehicle through which the State can recognise preferred gender. In the United Kingdom, advocates support their claim to self-declaration by reference to recent reforms in the Netherlands, Argentina, Denmark, Malta, Columbia and Ireland. Moving away from the pathologisation of transgender identities, these jurisdictions (soon to be joined by Sweden, Norway and Belgium) have embraced a wholly non-medicalised model of legal gender recognition. […] [T]he new Argentine, Danish, Maltese and Irish rules focus exclusively on an applicant’s self-identification.37 40. Mr Dunne further told us that “a model of self-declaration […] really is now the gold standard” for the law on gender recognition in western European jurisdictions. He also drew to our attention the fact that the Council of Europe’s Resolution 2048 on Discrimination against transgender people in Europe calls on member states to “Develop quick, transparent and accessible procedures, based on self determination”.38 41. In July 2015, Ashley Reed initiated a petition on the UK Government and Parliament petitions website advocating that trans people should be able to define their own gender for the purposes of obtaining a GRC, along the lines of the Irish Gender Recognition Act 2015.39 To date, this petition has been signed by more than 30,000 people. We invited Ashley to give evidence to us. She told us: it is humiliating to have your gender assessed by someone else. You are the only person who can come to that realisation, not a panel. It is an outdated system. The current system just does not provide for what is the majority of trans people nowadays. In terms of expense, there is a £140 fee, which can be subsidised or paid for, but it is a system that puts a lot of people off applying. It certainly put me off applying, because I do not feel it necessary to have my gender looked at by a group of people.40 36 Q132 37 Peter Dunne (TRA 251) 38 Q135 39 Petitions, UK Government and Parliament, “Allow transgender people to self-define their legal gender”, accessed 2 December 2015 40 Q132 http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/23159.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/22300.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/23159.pdf https://petition.parliament.uk/petitions/104639 http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/23159.pdf 14 Transgender Equality 42. Ashley Reed’s petition received a Government reply,41 provided by the Ministry of Justice (MoJ). This gave no indication that the Government intends to change the GRA in any respect. 43. Caroline Dinenage MP, Parliamentary Under Secretary of State at the MoJ, appeared open to the idea of change when she appeared before us: We were quite ground breaking internationally in introducing this form of legislation. Because of that, we had very little international basis for comparison when drawing this up […] Since then, we have seen other countries around the world—most recently Ireland—come up with legislation that differs from ours […] These are all really important experiences for us to learn from, to see how that works in countries like Ireland, Malta and Argentina, where […] it is different. We are very much on a journey […] and trying to learn from the best practice around the world, from those who did not start off with this legislation as early as we did but have now done things slightly differently based on the learned information they now have and based on the fact that in the last five years we have moved on such a long way in understanding trans issues.42 44. While we recognise the importance of the Gender Recognition Act as pioneering legislation when it was passed, it is clear that the Act is now dated. The medicalised approach regarding mental-health diagnosis pathologises trans identities; as such, it runs contrary to the dignity and personal autonomy of applicants. 45. Within the current Parliament, the Government must bring forward proposals to update the Gender Recognition Act, in line with the principles of gender self-declaration that have been developed in other jurisdictions. In place of the present medicalised, quasi-judicial application process, an administrative process must be developed, centred on the wishes of the individual applicant, rather than on intensive analysis by doctors and lawyers. Spousal consent 46. During the inquiry, we considered evidence and sought specialist legal advice regarding the issue of spousal consent. Since the passing of the Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013, marriage in the law of England and Wales takes the form of a contract between two people of different sexes or two people of the same sex. Therefore, the law as it currently stands requires both parties to agree to the status of a marriage being changed. 47. Consequently, where one party transitions, the non-trans party must give their consent to the change of marriage status before a full GRC can be issued. If such consent is withheld, the marriage must be dissolved by divorce or annulled43 before a full GRC can be issued. In this circumstance, an interim GRC can be issued, on the basis of which either party to the marriage can apply to have it annulled. 48. Data from HM Courts and Tribunals Service show that 38 full GRCs were issued to married people between 10 December 2014 (when the spousal consent provision came 41 All petitions on the website which receive 10,000 signatures or more must receive a Government response. 42 Q273 43 Where divorce / dissolution occurs, the marriage is ended but its previous existence is still recognised in law. Where annulment occurs, the marriage is rendered null and void; hence it is treated in law as if it had never existed. http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/24014.pdf 15 Transgender Equality into effect) and the end of June 2015—ten up to the end of March 2015 and a further 28 during April to June 2015.44 49. Evidence demonstrated widespread hostility to the need for spousal consent (referred to as the “spousal veto”), which some trans people feel affects their human rights. A trustee of the Gender Identity Research and Education Service (GIRES) told us: Trans people are the only group that can have their civil rights delayed by another […] What is clear is that the effect of the veto is that the “feelings” of the non trans spouse are given more importance than the rights of the trans person to gain full civil participation. This is a clear indication that government considers trans people as less than equal.45 50. Dr Karl Rutlidge pointed out that: This clause gives partners of transgender people power over them that they do not have at any other stage of the process; for example, they cannot stop someone being prescribed hormone therapy or undergoing surgery.46 51. UK Trans Info told us that lack of consent “can delay gender recognition for years if the divorce is a difficult one, and delay it forever if the spouse is in a coma or otherwise unable to consent”.47 52. We further heard that the requirement for consent could lead to domestic abuse. RISE (which supports survivors of domestic violence in Brighton and Hove, and North Sussex) stated that: The spousal veto is extremely concerning and potentially dangerous for trans people who are experiencing domestic abuse. It is known that abusers will commonly try and prevent a trans partner from transitioning, and trans people may experience honour-based violence in response to their wish to transition. Abusive partners will typically be highly controlling and have a sense of entitlement. The spousal veto gives abusive partners a tool to foster the sense that they have ownership and authority over their partner’s body and identity.48 53. We also heard from Galop (which undertakes casework and advocacy for trans people in London) that the consent provision: can be dangerous for transgender people in abusive relationships […] The level of power and control it gives someone over their transgender partner is very concerning. If their partner is abusive, they may use this legislation to further ridicule, deny, and disempower.49 54. Another view expressed in respect of the spousal-consent provision was that it is homophobic.50 It should be noted that spousal consent applies to same-sex marriages 44 Ministry of Justice (TRA 272); Government Equalities Office (TRA 245) 45 Anonymised (TRA 066) 46 Dr Karl Rutlidge (TRA 143) 47 UK Trans Info (TRA 138) 48 RISE (TRA 159) 49 Galop (TRA 183) 50 Anonymised (TRA 066) http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/24910.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/20997.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19306.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19526.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19521.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19548.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19594.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19306.pdf 16 Transgender Equality where one partner transitions, just as it does to different-sex marriages. Moreover, consent from the non-trans partner is also required where a civil partnership is converted to a same-sex marriage and then to a different-sex marriage. 55. The GEO explained to us as follows the Government’s position on the spousal consent provision: [The requirement for consent] does not mean anyone will have a right to prevent their wife or husband obtaining a legal gender change; simply that they will be allowed to decide whether they want their marriage to continue before gender recognition is granted. Marriage is a contract between two individuals and it is right that both spouses should have an equal say in their future when there is a fundamental change […] The Ministry of Justice has committed to monitor issues arising from the spousal declaration of consent. Since the gender recognition provisions of the 2013 Act were only introduced in December 2014, there is not yet enough evidence to review the impact of these changes.51 56. The MoJ Minister Ms Dinenage also told us: If we look at how this system works, nobody has the right to prevent their wife or husband from obtaining a legal gender change [...] This is a really careful balancing act between making sure we understand that any marriage contract is a contract between two people and a spouse’s transition can fundamentally change their relationship. For some people, that will not make any difference. For some people, they married a person; they did not marry a man or a woman [...] For others, that might make a difference, particularly because the law allows the new marriage certificate to show the name of the trans spouse, so it is important that they have given their indication that they are happy for that to go ahead.52 57. Mr Dunne told us that, while he was in favour of changing the law in England and Wales regarding spousal consent: I do not think the English system is open to challenge […] I think the English law does stand up to review under the UK’s obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights [ECHR]. I do not think there is an issue there.53 58. It was emphasised to us in evidence that the marriage law in Scotland is different and more easily accommodates the needs of married trans people who wish to have legal recognition of their acquired gender. Under the Marriage and Civil Partnership (Scotland) Act 2014, which came into force on 16 December 2014, a married trans person whose spouse does not consent to the granting of a full GRC is able to apply to a Sheriff Court for a full GRC, on the basis of an interim GRC, without divorce or annulment having taken place. The process of obtaining a full GRC is thus expedited. The spouse of a trans person is entitled to be notified of the issuing of a GRC and can initiate divorce proceedings on that basis. Data from HM Courts and Tribunals Service show that no full GRC has yet 51 Government Equalities Office (TRA 245) 52 Q278 53 Q165 http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/20997.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/24014.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/23159.pdf 17 Transgender Equality been issued to an applicant in Scotland who has applied to a Sheriff Court having failed to secure spousal consent.54 59. Ms Dinenage did not rule out considering the Scottish approach to this issue: “I am not saying that we will not be listening to how things are done in Scotland and keeping that in mind”.55 60. The question does arise, given the nature of marriage as a legal contract, whether the Scottish law might be subject to challenge by the courts although Mr Morton, of the Scottish Transgender Alliance, told us that “there has been no sign of any legal challenge being considered by anyone”.56 61. We are very aware of the widespread and strongly felt opposition within the trans community to the provision on spousal consent which was introduced by the Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013. We understand that trans people feel this gives their spouses an effective “veto” on the acquisition of a full Gender Recognition Certificate. 62. The nature of marriage (whether same-sex or different-sex) is that of a legal contract between two consenting parties, the terms of which cannot be changed without the consent of both parties. This means that in a marriage where one party transitions, the non-trans spouse does have a legal right to be consulted if it is proposed to change the terms of the marriage contract in consequence—and this right must also be given due weight. 63. We do take very seriously the evidence that we have heard regarding the scope that the spousal-consent provision gives for married trans people to be victimised by spouses with malicious intent. Where this occurs, it is, of course, deplorable and inexcusable. The Government must ensure that it is informed about the extent of this and ways of addressing the problem. Age limit 64. Under the GRA as it currently stands, the minimum age limit for GRC applications is 18.57 We heard in evidence that there is growing support for the reduction of this lower age limit.58 The Scottish Transgender Alliance told us that the current limit does not reflect the fact that many people now transition at younger ages. Younger trans people: often experience significant difficulties with official student records and violations of their right to privacy due to the sex on their birth certificate not reflecting their gender identity. With growing social acceptance, the annual number of children and adolescents coming out as transgender has increased five-fold over four years. We estimate over one thousand transgender young people have now transitioned with the full support of their parents and now require access to legal gender recognition. We call for the GRA standard application route to be opened to 16- and 17-year-olds and a GRA youth 54 Ministry of Justice (TRA 272) 55 Q279 56 Q164 57 Section 1, Gender Recognition Act 2004 58 Qq143–4; Anonymised (TRA 053); Focus: The Identity Trust (TRA 100); LGBT Youth Scotland (TRA 175); Scottish Transgender Alliance (TRA 225); Peter Dunne (TRA 251) http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/24910.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/24014.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/23159.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/23159.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19268.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19441.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19582.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19659.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/22300.pdf 18 Transgender Equality application route with the additional requirement of parental agreement to be created for those under 16 years.59 65. Mr Morton of the Alliance further explained: In Scotland, people get married and make all kinds of important life decisions from 16 onwards60 and, for under-16s, we believe that with parental support people should be able to take forward a change of their legal documents.61 66. Mr Dunne told us: Recent evidence suggests that young individuals hold a stable gender identity from early childhood. Adolescents in the United Kingdom can consent to medical treatment in the United Kingdom from the age of 16 years. Through youth-focused services, such as London’s Tavistock Clinic,62 transgender adolescents are accessing appropriate, supervised healthcare pathways before the age of majority63 and practitioners now understand how these interventions can substantially improve both mental and physical well-being. Transgender young persons are also engaging in earlier social transitions, developing important networks of peer-support and enjoying formative experiences in their preferred gender.64 67. Mr Dunne also summarised for us the trends in legislation in other countries: Eighteen is, I think, the general standard, but […] we have to look at what the reasoning was behind that. If you look at the recent jurisprudence, in Argentina there is no limit but there is a court procedure; in Malta there is an administrative procedure, which involves the parents; Sweden is going to move to a 15-and-over self-declaration, and for 12-to-15 it is going to be with parental consent; and in Norway a similar procedure, but from the age of seven, will exist. I would tend to agree, in terms of 16- and 17-year-olds, on self-declaration, and under that age parental consent.65 68. Mr Dunne explained that, in some jurisdictions, where parental consent was not forthcoming in respect of an application for gender recognition regarding a minor, “a court advocate” was provided. The advocate could “act almost in loco parentis”, appearing before the relevant authority to “provide an objective, professional account, which just means that parental support does not become an ultimate hurdle”.66 69. We received evidence from Focus: The Identity Trust advocating a more radical step, namely: 59 Scottish Transgender Alliance (TRA 225) 60 Scottish law allows a person to marry from the age of 16 without parental consent. In England, Wales and Northern Ireland, marriage between the ages of 16 and 18 requires parental consent. 61 Q143 62 The NHS Gender Identity Development Service. This service now provides cross-sex hormone treatment to adolescents from the age of 16 – see Chapter Five. 63 The “age of majority” refers to the point at which a child legally becomes an adult and thereby assumes full control over their own person, actions and decisions. 64 Peter Dunne (TRA 251) 65 Q144; cf. Peter Dunne (TRA 251) 66 Q144 http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19659.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/23159.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/22300.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/23159.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/22300.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/23159.pdf 19 Transgender Equality The right of Gender Non-conforming Children and Transgender and Intersex Adolescents […] to have their true gender recognised and respected on the same basis of self-determination without regard to age restrictions based on the Gillick principle of informed consent[.]67 70. For some young people the decision regarding gender recognition is straightforward; for some it is not. It is important that clear safeguards are in place to ensure that long- term decisions about gender recognition are made at an appropriate time. Subject to this caveat, a persuasive case has been made to us in favour of reducing the minimum age at which application can be made for gender recognition. We recommend that provision should be made to allow 16- and 17-year-olds, with appropriate support, to apply for gender recognition, on the basis of self-declaration. 71. We are very cautious about recommending gender recognition in respect of children aged under 16 (subject to parental consent or self-declaration on the basis of Gillick competence), and believe the Government should further consider the possible risks and benefits. Data protection Inappropriate requests to produce a Gender Recognition Certificate 72. It was reported in evidence to us that various bodies and authorities make inappropriate requests for the production of a GRC. The LGBT Consortium told us: there are instances where there is misuse of the Gender Recognition Act. Local Authorities, schools and employers for example request a Gender Recognition Certificate from trans individuals […] in circumstances where the person either does not qualify (e.g. being under 18 for instance) or where for genuine reasons, the individual feels they cannot obtain a Gender Recognition Certificate.68 73. It is not unlawful under the GRA to ask a person to produce a GRC,69 but it is in almost all circumstances unnecessary. There are very few situations in which it would be appropriate to ask for proof of legal gender (see Chapter Six). 74. In those circumstances where it is necessary to prove legal gender, it is inappropriate to request production of a GRC, as it is the new birth certificate (issued after the granting of a GRC) that provides evidence of a person’s legally recognised gender. (A trans person whose birth was registered in the UK can actually destroy their GRC as soon as they receive it, if they wish.) The EHRC Statutory Code of Practice in respect of the Equality Act 2010 states: Transsexual people should not be routinely asked to produce their Gender Recognition Certificate as evidence of their legal gender. Such a request would 67 Focus: The Identity Trust (TRA 100). In medical law, “Gillick competence” is a principle used to determine whether a child (aged under 16 years) has the ability to consent to his or her own medical treatment without parental permission or knowledge. It stems from a decision by the House of Lords in the case of Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority (1985), which constitutes a binding legal precedent in England and Wales. Separate legislation applies in Northern Ireland, but the Lords’ decision in the Gillick case is likely to be followed by the Northern Ireland Courts. In Scotland, similar provision exists under the Age of Legal Capacity (Scotland) Act 1991. 68 LGBT Consortium (TRA 083) 69 It was suggested to us that it might be so in the context of the Equality Act 2010 – Jane Fae (TRA 121) http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19441.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19365.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19486.pdf 20 Transgender Equality compromise a transsexual person’s right to privacy. If a service provider requires proof of a person’s legal gender, then their (new) birth certificate should be sufficient confirmation.70 75. It may be necessary to produce a GRC in certain very rare instances in order to establish continuity with a former identity, for example: • to claim an inheritance where a person is named in a will in their former identity; or • where a person was not born in the UK, has been unable to obtain gender recognition in their birth-registration country and needs to demonstrate that they are the same person as that shown on their passport or visa, in order to demonstrate that they are able to work in the UK. Section 22 of the Gender Recognition Act 76. Section 22 of the GRA safeguards the privacy of people with GRCs by defining information in relation to the gender recognition process as “protected information” for the purposes of the Data Protection Act 1998. In this way the Act is intended to protect the privacy rights of trans people under Article 8 of the ECHR.71 77. Under the GRA, anyone who acquires information relating to a person’s gender history in an official capacity is breaking the law if they disclose it without the consent of the person concerned (the “data subject”)—except in certain specific circumstances. Exceptions are set out in Subsection 22(4) and have been expanded and clarified in secondary legislation.72 78. One such exemption relates to “the purposes of the social security system or a pension scheme”. National Insurance and tax records maintained by HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC), as well as benefit records kept by the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP), record changes in legal gender automatically on the issuing of a GRC. Information about customers’ original name and legal gender is retained for a period of 50 years and one day after the death of the customer.73 79. A particular area of concern relates to the provision in Section 22 which allows the disclosure of trans status in court. GIRES stated in evidence to us that: Trans people are frequently “outed” in court situations to create, deliberately, a negative view of them, whether their trans history is relevant or not. The Gender Recognition Act s22(4)(e) has been misused to achieve this. 80. Sir James Munby (President of the Family Division of the High Court) has issued the following statement on this point in respect of family proceedings: The facts of the individual cases in which the disclosure question will arise are likely to vary widely. In some instances it will be relevant to the issues to 70 Equality and Human Rights Commission, Equality Act 2010 Code of Practice: Services, public functions and associations, 2011, para 2.27 71 Gender Identity Research and Education Service, “Gender Recognition Act 2004”, accessed 2 December 2015 72 The Gender Recognition (Disclosure of Information) (England, Wales and Northern Ireland) Order 2005 (SI 2005 No.635) 73 The Queen (on the application of C) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2014] EWHC 2403 (Admin), July 2014. This issue is further discussed in Chapter Six. http://www.equalityhumanrights.com/sites/default/files/documents/EqualityAct/servicescode.pdf http://www.equalityhumanrights.com/sites/default/files/documents/EqualityAct/servicescode.pdf http://www.gires.org.uk/law/gra-2004 http://www.gires.org.uk/assets/Legal-Assets/SI2005-635.pdf http://uktrans.info/attachments/article/152/cvdwp.pdf 21 Transgender Equality know that an individual has a transgender history. In others it will be entirely irrelevant. Disclosure should not [be] permitted in those cases where it is unnecessary and irrelevant to the issues. There is a need for judges to be aware of and astute to the issues.74 81. There are also concerns that misunderstanding of the data protection aspects of the Act inhibits the collection of data on trans people for the legitimate purpose of monitoring inequalities. trans*formation told us: The Gender Recognition Act (2004) s22 has had the effect of discouraging companies from holding information related to a person as trans*. This means many organizations will not, as policy, hold this information, they do not hold this information in their HR systems and do not ask for this information during employee surveys. This lack of information leads to a paucity of data. This allows organizations to ignore the issue.75 Collection of data for this purpose is in fact clearly permitted under the Act, provided that the data subject has given explicit consent or the data is anonymised. 82. Not a single prosecution has yet been brought for breach of Section 22. There is a six-month time limit (from the date the disclosure was made) on bringing a prosecution.76 It is argued that trans people are frequently not aware of the unlawful disclosure having been made until towards the end of, or even after, this six-month period, Although the evidence of unlawful disclosure is generally straightforward, it is said that police officers often do not realise the seriousness of the offence for the victim and are reticent to pursue a prosecution.77 83. Sussex Police told us that they: would welcome a consideration to the 6 month timeframe commencing from the point at which the “victim” first becomes aware of the disclosure/ transgression. The current situation relies on the “victim” acquiring knowledge within a set time period, as opposed to making a decision based on already known information, meaning that if they found out about the disclosure 7 months later—this would be too late to raise a challenge.78 84. Mr Morton, of the Scottish Transgender Alliance, explained that there may also be problems discerning when disclosure actually entails a breach of Section 22: What tends to happen in a service provision or employment is that the person in the official capacity sees that you have changed your name and gender on a document, like your employment records or your DWP file, but they do not necessarily know for sure whether you have a gender recognition certificate or not. Therefore, it is much less clear whether they have or have not violated the gender recognition act Section 22 if they reveal that data. 74 Gender Identity Research and Education Service (TRA 058) 75 trans*formation (TRA 040) 76 Section 127 of the Magistrates’ Court Act 1980 states that for all summary offences (which includes offences under Section 22 of the GRA) the information for a prosecution must be laid before the court within six calendar months of the commission of the offence. 77 Press for Change, “The Gender Recognition Act 2004 and s.22 Privacy” 78 Sussex Police (TRA 174) http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19292.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19109.pdf http://www.pfc.org.uk/GRASection22.html http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19581.pdf 22 Transgender Equality He suggested a provision prohibiting the disclosure of any documented information regarding a person’s change of gender.79 85. When we asked Ms Dinenage about this part of the Act, she told us: Section 22 of the Gender Recognition Act defines any information relating to a person’s application for a gender recognition certificate or to a successful applicant’s gender history as protected information and therefore a trans person’s gender history, regardless of whether they have a gender recognition certificate, can also constitute sensitive personal data as defined by the Data Protection Act 1998. There should be a massive onus on organisations, if requiring trans people to disclose their gender history in any way, to undertake measures to ensure that this information is protected, because there are fines of up to £5,000 for those who do not.80 86. As regards the lack of prosecutions under Section 22, Ms Dinenage responded: I do not really have any evidence to suggest that the reason there have not been any successful prosecutions is because the legislation is not working, but, again, these are things that it is very difficult to get evidence on. If this Committee can produce anything like that, I would be very keen to have a look at it.81 87. Evidence we received demonstrates abuse of confidential information about people’s trans status, contrary to Section 22 of the Gender Recognition Act, which is intended to protect trans people against “outing”. However, we note that not a single prosecution has yet been brought under this Section. There is a grave danger that this provision will become (if it has not already become) a “dead letter”. The Ministry of Justice must investigate why there have not been any prosecutions and take action to address this. It must also work with the courts to tackle the issue of trans people being inappropriately “outed” in court proceedings. 79 Q150 80 Q275 81 Q277 http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/23159.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/24014.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/24014.pdf 23 Transgender Equality 4 Equality Act 2010 Gender reassignment as a protected characteristic 88. The Equality Act 2010 for the first time gave trans people explicit protection in their own right (in Great Britain) against discrimination.82 The UK thereby became one of a small group of countries to have passed such legislation. Protection for trans people was achieved by means of Section 7 of the Act, which refers to the “protected characteristic” of “gender reassignment”.83 A person has this characteristic if he or she: is proposing to undergo, is undergoing or has undergone a process (or part of a process) for the purpose of reassigning the person’s sex by changing physiological or other attributes of sex. Such a person is referred to in the statute as a “transsexual person”. 89. Under the Act, discrimination against people covered by Section 7 can take the following forms:84 • indirect discrimination (where a rule, practice or procedure is applied to everyone, but disadvantages people who have the protected characteristic);85 or • direct discrimination on the grounds that a person: • has the protected characteristic; or • is perceived to have the protected characteristic (regardless of whether that perception is correct); or • is associated with someone who has the protected characteristic.86 The Act also provides those people covered by Section 7 with protection from harassment,87 and victimisation.88 90. The inclusion of gender reassignment in the Act as a protected characteristic was widely welcomed and seen as having made an appreciable difference to the lives of trans people. James Morton, the Manager of the Scottish Transgender Alliance, told us: 82 A landmark case in 1996 before the European Court of Justice (concerning employment discrimination) effectively extended the scope of legal provisions regarding sex discrimination so that discrimination in employment and vocational training on grounds of “gender reassignment” also became illegal. Subsequently, in 1999, secondary legislation extended the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 to cover discrimination on grounds of gender reassignment in employment and vocational training. Secondary legislation in 2008 which extended the law on gender discrimination to cover access to and supply of goods and services also effectively protected people with the characteristic of “gender reassignment”. The legal meaning of “gender reassignment” under these provisions included explicit reference to being under “medical supervision” as part of transition. 83 The use of this term in the Act follows its use in the 1996 ruling by the European Court of Justice. 84 Redress for such discrimination can be sought in a County Court (in England and Wales), Sheriff Court (in Scotland) or Employment Tribunal (Section 113, Equality Act 2010). The Act also creates a “general equality duty” (the Public Sector Equality Duty) for public-sector bodies in respect of all the protected characteristics (Section 149, Equality Act 2010). In addition, the enforcement powers vested in the EHRC can be used by the Commission in respect of discrimination under the Act. 85 Section 19, Equality Act 2010 86 Section 13, Equality Act 2010 87 Section 26, Equality Act 2010 88 Section 27, Equality Act 2010 24 Transgender Equality pulling the trans protected characteristic out from underneath the sex discrimination protected characteristic was really, really helpful in the Equality Act. Although we would like the definition slightly tweaked, it has been really effective in terms of encouraging employers and also service providers to take into account the needs of trans people.89 91. Evidence, and legal opinion, that we received indicate that the protections are not universally seen as legally complete and many trans people still face discrimination in employment and in other aspects of their lives. 92. A major criticism was that, as regards trans equality, the Act is couched in terms that are seen as outdated and confusing, with its references to “gender reassignment” and “transsexual” persons. 90 93. And there is a consequent, apparently widespread, misapprehension that the Act only provides protection to those trans people whose transition involves medical “gender-reassignment” treatment.91 (Likewise, “transsexual”, being primarily a medical categorisation, can be seen as referring specifically to someone who intends to undergo, is undergoing or has undergone such a medical intervention.) 94. It also seems to be widely believed by employers and service providers (as well as some trans people) that the Act only protects trans people who have been granted a GRC.92 95. Our evidence also called into question the extent to which the Act protects people with broader kinds of trans identities, who may not be seeking, or may not have sought, gender reassignment, medical or otherwise.93 We obtained a legal opinion on this point from expert barrister Claire McCann, who told us that people falling within such a broader definition of trans identity could have “no certainty” of being protected from discrimination.94 96. Ms McCann explained that when the Equality Bill was going through Parliament the then Solicitor General had clearly indicated that it was only the provision in respect of discrimination by perception which would protect those members of “the wider transgender community” who did not come under the protected characteristic of gender reassignment.95 That is, they would only be protected if they were discriminated against because they were perceived to be proposing to undergo, to be undergoing or to have undergone gender reassignment. The difficulty with this provision is that there are likely to be cases where an individual from the wider trans community, is discriminated against 89 Q170 90 Gender Identity Research and Education Service (TRA 058); Discrimination Law Association (TRA 165) 91 Unpublished evidence (TRA 263). The Explanatory Notes for the Act make clear that the “process” referred to in Section 7 need not include medical treatment. The following example is given: “A person who was born physically female decides to spend the rest of her life as a man. He starts and continues to live as a man. He decides not to seek medical advice as he successfully ‘passes’ as a man without the need for any medical intervention. He would have the protected characteristic of gender reassignment for the purposes of the Act” – Equality Act 2010: Explanatory Notes, August 2010, para 43. The Act thus, while using the term “gender reassignment” (in line with the EU Equal Treatment Directive 2006/54/EC), in recognising the possibility of transition being just a social process gave it a broader legal meaning than had hitherto been the case, effectively removing the necessity of demonstrating that “medical supervision” is underway – Government Equalities Office (TRA 245). 92 Unpublished evidence (TRA 008); unpublished evidence (TRA 048). On GRCs, see Chapter Three. 93 Such as non-binary people, people who do not live full time in their preferred gender and gender-variant young people with a less well-developed or self-understood gender identity than that of an adult. 94 Claire McCann (TRA 273) para 49 95 Claire McCann (TRA 273) para 10. See Equality Bill Committee, 16 June 2009, col 205. http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/23159.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19292.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19562.pdf http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/15/pdfs/ukpgaen_20100015_en.pdf http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/15/pdfs/ukpgaen_20100015_en.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/20997.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/24915.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/24915.pdf http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmpublic/equality/090616/am/90616s04.htm 25 Transgender Equality because of who they are and not because they are perceived to be transsexual. Mr Morton gave us an example: “if they have come out as non-binary, they are being perceived as non- binary, not as transsexual”.96 97. In its response to the online petition on gender self-declaration (see Chapter Three) the MoJ said: The Equality Act 2010 protects people from discrimination if it arises from their being perceived as either male or female. We recognise that a very small number of people consider themselves to be of neither gender. We are not aware that that results in any specific detriment […]97 98. This statement, which reflects policy that has been current since the Coalition government was in office,98 was very distressing to many non-binary people, who felt that it did not reflect the reality of their day-to-day experience. Mr Morton told us: We are aware that the Ministry of Justice said there is no specific detriment faced by non-binary people. In our survey of 895 non binary people in the UK, within the last five years, 11% said they had been refused services and one third had experienced harassment in services. In employment within the last five years, one fifth had experienced workplace harassment and 95% were worried about disclosing themselves as non-binary in the workplace and being discriminated against if they came out.99 99. Ms Dinenage responded to these criticisms as follows: This was probably a very regrettable example of MoJ officials trying to answer a petition factually and swiftly without really being necessarily as aware of things like understanding and tone as they should be. What they said was that they felt that there was no specific detriment experienced by people who identify as non-binary. What they meant to say was that there is no specific detriment experienced by people who identify as non-binary that is not already covered by existing legislation […] 100. The Minister indicated non-binary people were protected under the discrimination- by-perception provisions of the Equality Act100 and “They may also be protected by other forms of laws, such as employment legislation and hate crime and human rights laws”.101 101. Terry Reed, of GIRES, told us that the GEO believed a legal test case was necessary in order to verify the application of the Act in this respect.102 Peter Dunne, who is conducting doctoral research on gender-identity law, spoke to us about the lack of relevant case law in this respect. He explained that people might be reluctant to initiate test cases for fear 96 Q142 97 Petitions, UK Government and Parliament, “Allow transgender people to self-define their legal gender”, accessed 2 December 2015 98 See, for instance, HC Deb, 30 January 2014, col 1003 [Commons Chamber]. 99 Q171 100 It is noteworthy that the form of words used in the MoJ’s response to Ashley Reed’s petition actually appear to indicate that non-binary people are effectively protected under the discrimination-by-perception provisions as they relate to gender discrimination (“The Equality Act 2010 protects people from discrimination if it arises from their being perceived as either male or female”). 101 Q259 102 Terry Reed (TRA 019); cf. Gender Identity Research and Education Service (TRA 058) http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/23159.pdf https://petition.parliament.uk/petitions/104639 http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmhansrd/cm140130/debtext/140130-0001.htm http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/23159.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/24014.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/18922.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19292.pdf 26 Transgender Equality that they would lose: “Ambiguity is sometimes better than having a bad precedent”.103 Mr Morton added that it was very difficult to persuade people to pursue test cases: It is incredibly emotionally demanding. You would be scrutinised by the press; your identity may well end up mocked. You do not have a guarantee that there would be reporting restrictions […] In addition, undertaking a test case would entail a huge sacrifice of time: “we cannot make someone give up years of their life to that process”.104 102. Many witnesses proposed that, rather than relying on a test case, the Government should instead amend the Equality Act to replace the “gender reassignment” characteristic with a broader definition. The EHRC told us that: a broader definition of who is protected from transgender discrimination would provide more clarity and certainty for those with responsibilities and rights under the Act.105 103. Several witnesses proposed that the protected characteristic in Section 7 of the Equality Act should be changed to “gender identity”—as defined in the Yogyakarta Principles:106 each person’s deeply felt internal and individual experience of gender, which may or may not correspond with the sex assigned at birth, including the personal sense of the body (which may involve, if freely chosen, modification of bodily appearance or function by medical, surgical or other means) and other expressions of gender, including dress, speech and mannerisms.107 We were told that this would also be in accordance with Council of Europe Resolution 2048.108 104. We took detailed advice from Ms McCann on how best to amend the Act. She told us: Clearly, in my view, the addition of “gender identity”—if defined as referring to each person’s internal and individual experience of gender, which may or may not correspond with the sex assigned at birth—will widen the protected characteristic within s.7 of [the Equality Act] to include elements of the “transgender” community more widely.109 105. When we asked the Minister for Women and Equalities about the application, and possible revision of, Section 7, she indicated her willingness to reconsider the wording of the Act, if a case for change were made: 103 Q141 104 Q142 105 Equality and Human Rights Commission (TRA 078) 106 Q142; UNISON (TRA 116); UK Trans Info (TRA 138); Scottish Transgender Alliance (TRA 225) 107 Scottish Transgender Alliance (TRA 225) 108 Scottish Transgender Alliance (TRA 225) 109 Claire McCann (TRA 273) para 51. Ms McCann added that further amendments might also be needed to cover groups such as intersex people and cross-dressers, i.e. people whose gender identity is not variant but who express gender in ways that do not conform to conventional male and female forms of gender expression. However, these groups fall outside of the category of trans people as we defined it for the purposes of our inquiry. http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/23159.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/23159.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19337.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/23159.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19481.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19521.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19659.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19659.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19659.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/24915.pdf 27 Transgender Equality The Act is only five years old and […] the world moves on very swiftly […] The issues of non-binary certainly, as I understand it, were discussed when the Act was debated in both Houses of Parliament and Parliament decided to go with the wording that was put forward by the then Government. I also understand that some of that relates to the Equal Treatment Directive110 and its implementation. What is in the Act does reflect that, but, again, life clearly does move on apace.111 106. Another issue raised with us was the current inability of the EHRC to pursue a complaint by a person aged under 18 without their parents’ consent (see Chapter Six).112 107. The inclusion of “gender reassignment” as a protected characteristic in the Equality Act 2010 was a huge step forward and has clearly improved the position of trans people. However, it is clear to us that the use of the terms “gender reassignment” and “transsexual” in the Act is outdated and misleading; and may not cover wider members of the trans community. 108. The protected characteristic in respect of trans people under the Equality Act should be amended to that of “gender identity”. This would improve the law by bringing the language in the Act up to date, making it compliant with Council of Europe Resolution 2048; and make it significantly clearer that protection is afforded to anyone who might experience discrimination because of their gender identity. 109. The protections afforded by the Equality Act 2010 are intended to be available to all, including children and adolescents. The Equality and Human Rights Commission must be able to investigate complaints of discrimination raised by children and adolescents without the requirement to have their parents’ consent. Exemptions in respect of trans people Separate-sex and single-sex services 110. The Equality Act 2010 allows for the provision of separate-sex113 and single-sex services114 where this is “a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim” (a form of words intended to require the application of an objective standard of justification). The Act also effectively permits service providers not to allow a trans person to access separate-sex or single-sex services—on a case-by-case basis, where exclusion is “a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim”.115 111. We heard a range of views on this difficult and sensitive issue. Some voices were raised in support of the law as it stands. Women Analysing Policy on Women told us: There are situations such as women-only domestic and sexual violence services where vulnerable women surviving in crisis find it very difficult to feel safe. 110 The Equal Treatment Directive of 1976 (76/207/EEC) required that there should be “no discrimination whatsoever on grounds of sex” and that there should also be no discrimination on grounds of “gender reassignment”. In 2006 it was recast as Equal Treatment Directive 2006/54/EC. 111 Q258 112 Mermaids (TRA 156) 113 Paragraph 26, Schedule 3, Part 7, Equality Act 2010 114 Paragraph 27, Schedule 3, Part 7, Equality Act 2010 115 Paragraph 28, Schedule 3, Part 7, Equality Act 2010 http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/24014.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19540.pdf 28 Transgender Equality Some of these women may feel unable to access services provided by or offered jointly to all women including transwomen; this produces a clash with the rights of transwomen to be treated exactly the same as other women. In such cases when the safety, wellbeing and recovery of women are reliant upon their ability to access services the law has created exemptions to allow for women only services that do not include some transwomen, in some circumstances.116 112. Similarly, we heard from the Prison Reform Trust that: Some organisations working with female prisoners, such as those providing support for women who have experienced domestic violence or sexual assault may decide not to provide services to transwomen as long as the decision is legitimate and proportionate. We support the current position.117 113. Providers of services for domestic-abuse survivors were concerned to emphasise their commitment to including trans women as far as possible. One told us: Women’s Aid is committed to ensuring that transgender people are treated with respect and do not experience discrimination and/or harassment on the basis of their gender identity.118 114. However, we also heard from those who see the current legislation as allowing discrimination against trans people and wish to see it repealed. One person who submitted evidence thought the Statutory Code of Practice was in this regard “a disgrace”: Treatment process based on appearance reminds one of apartheid. Trans people are again singled out for special negative treatment. The [Equality Act] has introduced “passing privilege”.119 Indeed, it is the trans folk (with or without a GRC) who do not “pass” that should be especially protected from the excesses of transphobic service providers.120 115. Similarly, the Scottish Transgender Alliance thought the provision: allows wide scope for service providers to identify service users they “suspect” to be trans people, intrusively question them about their gender identity, physical sex characteristics and gender history, and then discriminate against them. We believe this breaches trans people’s right to privacy under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The provision can result in exclusion of vulnerable trans people from vital services such as homeless accommodation, emergency sexual health services and psychological support services. We recommend this single sex services exception be removed.121 116 Women Analysing Policy on Women (TRA 086) 117 Prison Reform Trust (TRA 198) 118 Women’s Aid (TRA 200) 119 The Code of Practice refers (as do the Explanatory Notes) explicitly to trans people being protected by the Act if they can “pass” as the opposite sex. 120 Anonymised (TRA 066) 121 Scottish Transgender Alliance (TRA 225) http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19382.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19621.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19625.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19306.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19659.pdf 29 Transgender Equality 116. Mr Morton of the Alliance elaborated as follows: The exception, as currently drawn, effectively has no limit. You could be decades transitioned, you could be fully integrated and you could still be turned away at your moment of need from a refuge or from a rape crisis service.122 117. He added that if other service-users felt uncomfortable sharing a service with a trans woman: you would not turn [the trans woman] away. You would work to educate, you would work to support and you would work to try to make sure that that service could be accessed by them […] There are services, such as rape crisis services and women’s refuges, that are trans inclusive successfully and have not found it impossible to do. They have done it very successfully, so why can others not? […] [T]here might be some situations and very limited situations where you might have to treat someone differently, but they should not be treated worse.123 118. Others stressed the harm being done by the current arrangements. Galop told us: Knowledge of a person being trans* has been used as a basis for exclusion. This can leave people unable to leave violent situations, putting them at risk of serious harm.124 119. We heard from Ashley Reed that: In gendered refuge centres, it is worth noting that trans people will often be turned away from ones that are protected for either gender, so a trans woman could be rejected from a women’s shelter but would also be rejected from a men’s shelter. Were they to go to a men’s shelter, they would be at serious risk of harassment or physical or verbal abuse, and that would be a major onset of dysphoria.125 120. One service provider, RISE, thought the problem lay in a lack of clarity in the current wording of the Equality Act: there has not been [any] opportunity for case law to be developed […] The lack of clear legislation regarding this issue means that vulnerable trans people may not seek support at all in order to avoid potentially intrusive and inappropriate questions and uncertainty about whether they will be included in sex-specific services […] [The Code of Practice] is problematic because it can be interpreted to mean that we can reasonably expect women to present as “feminine” and men to present as “masculine”. This is restrictive for trans people who wish to develop their own sense of style and presentation […] The lack of clarity within the Act may lead organisations to make assumptions that other service users will react negatively to trans people accessing sex-specific groups, and therefore exclude them.126 122 Q175 123 Q175 124 Galop (TRA 183) 125 Q176 126 RISE (TRA 159) http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/23159.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/23159.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19594.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/23159.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19548.pdf 30 Transgender Equality 121. Mr Dunne told us: [A]ll of the research seems to be saying that if you are able to put in place robust frameworks that explain to people everyone’s presence in the particular shelter and that everyone knows all of the ground rules and has a clear understanding, these facilities work perfectly well and inclusion in no way detracts from the ability of individuals to use the services and their experience.127 122. When we asked the Minister for Women and Equalities how far she thought these provisions were being used proportionately, appropriately and fairly, she told us: I suspect overall they probably are. I am not sure that we have necessarily evidence. There are certainly examples. I have some here: group counselling sessions for female victims of sexual assault; public changing rooms; bathing facilities and toilets, which I know is a huge area; and certain procedures in hospitals where it would be appropriate to have single- and separate-sex services. We should be very clear this is not a green light for discrimination. There is a line between discrimination and legitimately offering single-sex services. We are aware of only one case, which relates to a pub in Halifax, which was heard at Halifax Crown Court last year. That was in relation to the gender reassignment exception. That is the first case that we are aware of.128 123. The Explanatory Notes for the Act give an example as follows: A group counselling session is provided for female victims of sexual assault. The organisers do not allow transsexual people to attend as they judge that the clients who attend the group session are unlikely to do so if a male-to-female transsexual person was also there. This would be lawful.129 124. Ms McCann advised us that “this example is drafted too categorically”. While it demonstrates a “legitimate aim”, it gives “insufficient information […] to show that the exclusion of trans people is appropriate and reasonably necessary (i.e. proportionate) to meet that aim”. She further suggested that in the instance cited it may only be lawful to exclude trans people if they do not hold a GRC: I would doubt that a service-provider of single-sex or separate services could turn away a trans service-user who holds a GRC because this is unlikely to be proportionate. 130 Genuine occupational requirement 125. A further provision in the Act allows employers to stipulate that a post is only open to individuals with a particular protected characteristic, where this constitutes a “genuine occupational requirement”.131 127 Q176 128 Q267 129 Equality Act 2010: Explanatory Notes, August 2010, para 740 130 Claire McCann (TRA 273) para 74 131 Schedule 9, Equality Act 2010 http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/23159.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/24014.pdf http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/15/pdfs/ukpgaen_20100015_en.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/24915.pdf 31 Transgender Equality 126. Ms McCann noted that this had in effect “reduce[d] the protection afforded to trans people”, as the Gender Recognition Act 2004 had previously ensured employers could no longer rely on an occupational requirement for an employee not to be transsexual where that employee held a GRC.132 127. The Explanatory Notes to the Act give the following illustration: A counsellor working with victims of rape might have to be a woman and not a transsexual person, even if she has a Gender Recognition Certificate, in order to avoid causing them further distress.133 Women’s Aid told us that: In recognition of Women’s Aid’s status as the provider of services to, and promoting the welfare of women only, Women’s Aid has chosen to exercise its right under the Equality Act 2010 […] to apply the Gender Reassignment exception to employment posts within the organisation. This policy is under review.134 128. We heard unequivocal opposition to this provision. The Scottish Transgender Alliance told us that they wished to see it repealed: as well as violating trans people’s article 8 human right to privacy [under the ECHR] about their gender reassignment history, [it] is generally unworkable because the only way anyone could prove beyond doubt that they had not undergone gender reassignment would be to submit to an unacceptably intrusive medical examination. 129. The Alliance also advocated the introduction of a legal provision allowing for certain posts, “perhaps where providing support specifically to trans people”, to be available only to trans people, “as exists for other protected characteristics”.135 130. Mridul Wadhwa told us that the provision was: discriminatory to transsexual people especially trans women. I genuinely believe that there is no space for it in the gender-based violence sector and that it has no place in violence against women work. I was unaware of its existence until a few weeks ago. I have worked in the violence against women sector since 2005 and have never known for it to be used. I am disappointed to think that someone has the right to refuse work to me and others like me in my sector just because they think that I might not be a woman.136 131. We asked Ms McCann how the Equality Act might be amended so that single- sex services were no longer able to exclude, on a proportionate and legitimate basis, a transgender or transsexual person with a GRC, from accessing gender-appropriate services and employment. She suggested that the Equality Act might be amended so that: 132 Claire McCann (TRA 273) para 70 133 Equality Act 2010: Explanatory Notes, August 2010, para 789 134 Women’s Aid (TRA 200) 135 Scottish Transgender Alliance (TRA 225) 136 Mridul Wadhwa (TRA 219) http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/24915.pdf http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/15/pdfs/ukpgaen_20100015_en.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19625.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19659.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19653.pdf 32 Transgender Equality the occupational requirements provision and / or the single-sex / separate services provision shall not apply in relation to discrimination against a person whose gender has become the acquired gender under the Gender Recognition Act 2004 […] [With such an amendment,] the [Equality Act] would better align with s.9 of the Gender Recognition Act 2004 (which requires that the acquired gender of an individual with a GRC is recognised “for all purposes”).137 132. Significant concerns have been raised with us regarding the provisions of the Equality Act concerned with separate-sex and single-sex services and the genuine occupational requirement as these relate to trans people. These are sensitive areas, where there does need to be some limited ability to exercise discretion, if this is a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim. However, we are not persuaded that this discretion should apply where a trans person has been recognised as of their acquired gender “for all legal purposes” under the Gender Recognition Act. In many instances this is unlikely, in any case, to meet the proportionate test. We recommend that the Equality Act be amended so that the occupational requirements provision and / or the single-sex / separate services provision shall not apply in relation to discrimination against a person whose acquired gender has been recognised under the Gender Recognition Act 2004. Separate-gender sport 133. The GRA refers to “a gender-affected sport”, which is defined as one where “the physical strength, stamina or physique of average persons of one gender would put them at a disadvantage to average persons of the other gender as competitors in events involving the sport”. In the case of such a sport, a person whose change of gender has been recognised under the Act may be excluded from playing in their acquired gender where this is necessary to ensure “fair competition” or “the safety of competitors”.138 134. The Equality Act 2010: allows separate sporting competitions to continue to be organised for men and women where physical strength, stamina or physique are major factors in determining success or failure, and in which one sex is generally at a disadvantage in comparison with the other.139 135. In addition, the 2010 Act gives effect to the provision in the 2004 Act regarding sport as if it applied to a person with the protected characteristic of gender reassignment, as defined in the 2010 Act.140 136. Ms McCann advised us that a sporting association wishing to exclude a trans person from participating in their acquired / affirmed gender would need to demonstrate firstly that the sport concerned was a “gender-affected” one. This might not be the case in respect of, for instance, under-16s football—as acknowledged by the Football Association in its policy on Trans People in Football.141 Secondly, it must be demonstrated that the exclusion is necessary to secure fair competition or the safety of competitors. Ms McCann noted 137 Claire McCann (TRA 273) paras 93, 96 138 Section 19, Gender Recognition Act 2004 139 Equality Act 2010: Explanatory Notes, August 2010, para 614 140 Claire McCann (TRA 273) para 99 141 Claire McCann (TRA 273) para 106 http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/24915.pdf http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/15/pdfs/ukpgaen_20100015_en.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/24915.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/24915.pdf 33 Transgender Equality that neither the 2004 Act nor the 2010 Act gave any meaningful guidance as to how this might be assessed.142 She thought that: An organiser would need very careful[ly] to review the individual circumstances of (1) the trans competitor who is being considered for exclusion; and (2) the gender-affected competitive event in question; and (3) other competitors in that event; and (4) whether alternatives to exclusion would secure the statutory aims (of fair competition and/or safety of competitors).143 137. Whether or not a trans person had been granted a GRC would not be a relevant consideration for this purpose. Ms McCann emphasised that: “This issue raises difficult and complex questions and, as the [Sports Council Equality Group] acknowledges, understanding of the legal and medical issues continues to develop.”144 138. We heard there are concerns that the legal provisions concerning trans people in sport are being used inappropriately. Dr Jay Stewart, of Gendered Intelligence, told us: We have a real problem here and it is a big issue […] People who only want to have a kick around and who just want to do some sport activity at university are being excluded. They are not allowed to play because there is fear, there is lack of awareness and there is lack of knowledge around being this one thing or the other.145 139. Anna Lee, of Lancaster University Students’ Union, informed us that: [British Universities and Colleges Sport], the governing body for sport for universities and colleges, just defers straight to the national governing bodies and all of those have often unattainable requirements and requirements that just should not be necessary for young trans people.146 140. When we asked Ed Vaizey MP, a Minister at the Department for Culture, Media and Sport, about trans people being inappropriately excluded from playing sport in their acquired / affirmed gender, he told us: It is incumbent on the sporting authorities to call this practice out where they see it happening […] As far as I am aware, [the legal exemption] is based on a strength and stamina test, from what I have read up about it, but clearly there are many, many sports where both sexes can compete on level terms. I would expect bodies like Sport England, for which we are responsible, and some of the national governing bodies for sport, if it is brought to their attention, to point out that, certainly in terms of informal training, non-competitive sporting activity, even though it might be taking place in terms of a competitive sport, there is no reason for people of different sexes not to be playing together. Where it comes across as a clear case of arbitrary exclusion, they can call them out. 141. The Minister thought that “a body like Sport England and the Government Equalities Office” might fund something such as: 142 Claire McCann (TRA 273) para 107 143 Claire McCann (TRA 273) para 111 144 Claire McCann (TRA 273) para 113 145 Q82 146 Q80 http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/24915.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/24915.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/24915.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/21638.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/21638.pdf 34 Transgender Equality a practical guide, particularly to university sports societies, to say, “You may think, perversely, that if you exclude different sexes from sport you are complying with the law. Actually, you are over-interpreting what this section was designed to do.”147 142. We asked the Minister about the issue of trans people’s access to changing rooms. His response seemed to indicate that he was thinking in terms of providing separate changing facilities for trans people.148 He subsequently wrote to us: The Sports Councils’ Equality Group recently published ground breaking guidance for National Governing Bodies of Sport (NGBs) on supporting an increase in the number of transsexuals playing sport. The guidance specifically refers to communal changing facilities and provides options for clubs to consider in provision of facilities for transexual people […] Following the publication of this guidance, Stonewall and Transsexuals in Sport were recently invited to present at a training day Sport England organised for its Equality Standard advisors, in partnership with UK Sport, so when NGBs are working through the Standard process, they are appropriately supported on LGBT issues.149 143. Trans people are being excluded from the health and social benefits of non- competitive sport because of a misunderstanding of the fairly limited legislative exclusions. We welcome the Minister’s suggestion that a practical guide be produced to better inform sporting groups, including university societies. We recommend that the Government work with Sport England to produce guidance which help sporting groups realise that there are likely to be few occasions where exclusions are justified to ensure fair competition or the safety of competitors. 147 Q312 148 Q314 149 Department for Culture, Media and Sport (TRA 270) http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/24176.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/24176.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/24904.pdf 35 Transgender Equality 5 NHS services 144. In this chapter we deal with trans people’s, and gender-variant children’s and adolescents’, experience of NHS services. This subject featured very prominently in our inquiry and is clearly a leading matter of concern for the trans community. We have found that the NHS is letting down trans people, with too much evidence of an approach that can be said to be discriminatory and in breach of the Equality Act. 145. Trans people experience worse health (both physical and mental) than the general population, which is likely to be substantially due to the direct and indirect effects of the inequality which trans people experience.150 Many witnesses told us that trans people face significant difficulties when accessing general NHS services. Jess Bradley, of Action for Trans Health, described a “lack of understanding and lack of cultural competency around trans issues” in the NHS.151 146. Trans people also have specific needs regarding Gender Identity Services, which provide: gender reassignment / confirmation treatment through Gender Identity Clinics (GICs); and the GIDS for children and adolescents. Here too, trans people face a range of problems with services as they are currently provided. We received significant evidence of the toll taken (in poor mental health, self-harming and suicide attempts) by untreated gender dysphoria. We agree with Dr John Dean, Chair of the NHS National Clinical Reference Group for Gender Identity Services, that: “not treating people is not a neutral act—it will do harm.”152 General NHS services 147. During our inquiry we heard evidence that trans people face discrimination in accessing general NHS services. Terry Reed, of GIRES, explained that trans people were often nervous about accessing services because they were “not treated sympathetically [or even] politely”.153 Jess Bradley told us: we do see a lot of trans people being denied treatment, whether that is on the basis that they present at a mental health clinic and the mental health clinicians think, “Okay, this is too complicated for us. We need to pass this on to somebody else.” You find a lot of trans people are passed from pillar to post.154 148. Dr James Barrett, President of the British Association of Gender Identity Specialists (BAGIS) stated that: “The casual, sometimes unthinking trans-phobia of primary care, accident and emergency services and inpatient surgical admissions continue[s] to be striking.”155 150 Suzanna Hopwood (TRA 031); Equality and Human Rights Commission (TRA 078) 151 Q4 152 Sky News, “Demand for Transgender Treatment on NHS Soars”, accessed 9 December 2015 153 Q25 154 Q4 155 British Association Of Gender Identity Specialists / Dr James Barrett (TRA 149) http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19012.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19337.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/21345.pdf http://news.sky.com/story/1577344/demand-for-transgender-treatment-on-nhs-soars http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/21345.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/21345.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19532.pdf 36 Transgender Equality 149. According to CliniQ, a specialist sexual health and wellbeing service provider for trans people: there is at best considerable ignorance and at worst some enduring and mistaken and highly offensive stereotypes about trans people among the public at large, amongst whom we must unfortunately number some health professionals.156 Brook, a provider of sexual health and wellbeing services and advice for young people, also told us that “prejudice against trans people among medical staff ” was one of the reasons for poor health outcomes in trans people.157 150. Dr Dean reminded us that it had not been so long since lesbian, gay and bisexual people regularly reported significant difficulties when accessing the NHS: I hope it is not going to take 10 years to get to the same situation where being trans or nonbinary does not result in an eyebrow being raised when it is not the most important thing about that person’s life; the person is the most important thing. That societal change needs to be led by the NHS.158 151. The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Public Health, Jane Ellison MP, emphasised to us that “the NHS is a needs-driven service”, indicating that the more the needs of trans patients were talked about the better they could be addressed.159 She also mentioned the creation by NHS England160 of the Transgender and Non-Binary Network.161 152. NHS England itself told us about this in written evidence: Historically, transgender and non-binary people have reported poor experience of engagement, with the group becoming “hidden”. NHS England has therefore established a Transgender and non-binary network with over 150 members. Five workshops have been held with the network since June 2013 with the next one planned for December 2015. The group is organised and facilitated by the NHS England Public Participation Team with support and contributions from colleagues in Highly Specialised and specialised Commissioning, NHS Clinicians, transgender and non-binary people, organisations that represent them and providers.162 General Practitioners’ attitudes towards trans patients 153. There appeared to be particular problems with the attitude of some GPs. This can cause significant difficulties given their role as “gatekeepers” to other NHS services, 156 CliniQ (TRA 104) 157 Brook (TRA 182) 158 Q25 159 Q205 160 NHS England is the operating name of the NHS Commissioning Board. It is constituted as an executive non- departmental public body. While it is autonomous in operational matters, it works to an overarching “mandate” set by the Secretary of State for Health. In addition to its role as a direct commissioner of some services, it also has a quasi-regulatory function in respect of Clinical Commissioning Groups, the local GP-led bodies which commission other types of NHS services. 161 Qq214, 218, 251 162 NHS England (TRA 244) http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19448.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19593.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/21345.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/24014.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/24014.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/24014.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/24014.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/20376.pdf 37 Transgender Equality including Gender Identity Services,163 as well as their role in providing continuing hormone treatment as part of gender reassignment / confirmation treatment. Dr Barrett reported: A matter of serious day-to-day importance at a primary care level is the persistent refusal of some General Practitioners to even make referrals to gender identity clinics.164 154. The trans community organisation the Beaumont Society told us about: The astonishingly negative reaction by a few GPs when a trans person appears for the first appointment to ask for an assessment to begin. “You’ll be taking money away from more deserving cancer patients” is one quote that we have heard.165 155. Joseph Daniell told us about his experience: The terms “gender dysphoria” and “transgender” are not fully known throughout the NHS services, or the treatment for such issues. When I first went to my GP, in November 2014, I had to explain what both of these terms meant and had to advise him on where to refer me to next. However he never referred my case on and I had to go back and see another GP and ask her to refer me on. This took a while too as she had no clue who she was meant to refer me to. After some waiting she finally found out and referred me onto the local mental health specialist. I received an appointment in March and she was much more helpful, however she did not know the treatment protocol either and I had to explain it to her.166 156. Jess Bradley told us that “A lot of GPs deny healthcare to trans people illegally, based on the fact that they do not agree with the choices that they have made.”167 157. Michael Toze wrote to us that: Many GPs and other local health services have not been trained in trans health issues and do not understand the new referral pathways [into Gender Identity Services]. I would estimate that I talk to 40–50 people a year who have had their referral delayed or refused for spurious reasons, typically that the GP believes local funding needs to be arranged or that a mental health assessment needs to be carried out, neither of which is true in England since April 2013.168 158. Devi Dunseith likewise told us: In spite of the fact that gender dysphoria is no longer recognised as a mental health condition, many GPs will not refer to a GIC without assessment from 163 Under the Interim Gender Dysphoria Protocol and Service Guideline 2013/14 the referral pathway into GICs is through primary care, with GPs able to refer patients to whichever clinic the patient chooses – Q12. 164 British Association Of Gender Identity Specialists / Dr James Barrett (TRA 149) 165 The Beaumont Society (TRA 099) 166 Joseph Daniell (TRA 011) 167 Q4 168 Michael Toze (TRA 001) https://www.england.nhs.uk/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/int-gend-proto.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/21345.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19532.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19439.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/18878.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/21345.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/18822.pdf 38 Transgender Equality a mental-health team (who are not in any way trained to understand or deal with gender dysphoria and gender issues).169 159. NHS England, which is responsible for commissioning (i.e. planning and purchasing) primary care (including GP services) and specialist services (including Gender Identity Services), admitted to us that there was an “Unwillingness by some general practitioners to prescribe and monitor hormone therapy”.170 160. Dr Barrett, of BAGIS, told us that this unwillingness: is most disastrous when the General Practitioner concerned sits on an important committee and sets the policy for a wider area. One such General Practitioner sat on the committee covering all of one of the Home Counties and as a consequence not a single General Practitioner across the entire county [of] Buckinghamshire is “allowed” to prescribe for any trans person, ever, including after discharge and into old age.171 161. A particular issue is that trans people’s health care needs are too often reduced to a function of their trans status, as Jess Bradley explained: We call it the “trans cold”: if you go to your doctor’s with a cold, it will be a trans cold.172 She also told us: Trans people, when they are at the end of their pathway, want to be released from a GIC clinic on to being within the GIC’s care, because they know that, when they go to their GP, the GP could easily just turn around and say, “Actually, no, we need to talk to your GIC.” It is like, “Well, I was released from the GIC into your care three years ago. Why do I have to talk to them?”173 162. Terry Reed told us that there was “a fixation that [being trans] is the important thing about this person”, and told us that a GP might write a whole page about a person’s gender background even when it was completely unrelated to their treatment. She had even heard of an individual with possible cervical cancer being referred back to a GIC for a further psychiatric assessment before being sent to an oncologist.174 163. Dr Dean said: My experience, working with GPs and secondary care physicians, is that, overall, people working in the service try to be empathic; they are certainly sympathetic, but they lack a great deal of background knowledge about gender incongruence and dysphoria. It is something that is not covered in any detail in medical training […] medical students are very interested in what we do, but they get very little information about gender identity, gender identity developments and the differences and different developmental experiences people have that sometimes lead them to need to use our services. Overall, they 169 Devi Dunseith (TRA 015) 170 NHS England (TRA 244) 171 British Association Of Gender Identity Specialists / Dr James Barrett (TRA 149) 172 Q25; cf. Equality and Human Rights Commission (TRA 078) 173 Q22 174 Q25 http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/18897.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/20376.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19532.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/21345.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19337.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/21345.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/21345.pdf 39 Transgender Equality are empathic and try to be helpful, but are hampered by a lack of knowledge about how to do that and about the services that are available. 164. Dr Dean thought that patients’ perceptions might also be coloured by interacting with: managers, administrative staff and all of the other important contributors to the NHS overall in hospital and out-patient services, who sometimes lack understanding of and sensitivity to the important issues and need to know more so that they can work with respect and understanding of differences related to gender incongruence.175 165. The Royal College of GPs (which sets standards and supervises training for doctors within the specialism) agreed that GPs were “overall empathetic but that their knowledge of how to best support transgender patients could be improved”. To help fill this gap, the College had in July 2015 launched an online training module on Gender Variance. The College in Northern Ireland had also produced guidance (promoted to all members of the College) on caring for trans patients.176 In addition, the College was working with GIRES to produce e-learning modules.177 166. The College also explained to us how GPs might be coming into conflict with trans patients by practising in ways that were entirely appropriate but might be perceived as obstructive or unhelpful by the patient. This might occur, for instance, when a patient who is experiencing a long wait for their first appointment with a GIC asks a GP for interim “bridging” hormones but the GP does not feel able to prescribe under the circumstances.178 However, the UK Intercollegiate Good Practice Guidelines for the Assessment and Treatment of Adults with Gender Dysphoria (developed by the Royal College of Psychiatrists, and endorsed by other Royal Colleges) advise that “bridging” hormones can be prescribed where appropriate “as part of a holding and harm reduction strategy”. It is advised that practitioners “must consider the risks of harm to the patient by not prescribing hormones” where the patient has begun self-medicating.179 167. Regarding the specific role of GPs in providing care for trans people, the Minister told us: we ask a great deal of GPs and realistically we cannot expect every GP to be an expert on everything, particularly on things that they will statistically see far less often. We would expect them to have a good level of awareness, the right approach and attitude and, crucially, understanding of how they can refer people to the right support.180 175 Q2 176 Royal College of GPs (Northern Ireland), Guidelines for the Care of Trans* Patients in Primary Care, 2015 177 Cf. Q1 178 Royal College of GPs (TRA 268) 179 Action for Trans Health (TRA 246); Royal College of Psychiatrists, Good practice guidelines for the assessment and treatment of adults with gender dysphoria, College Report CR181, October 2013, pp 21, 25 180 Q216 http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/21345.pdf http://www.rcgp.org.uk/rcgp-near-you/~/media/Files/Do-Not-Use-RCGP-near-you/Northern%20Ireland/RCGPNI-Guidance-for-the-care-of-Trans-people-in-primary-care-2015-web.ashx http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/21345.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/24278.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/20998.pdf http://www.rcpsych.ac.uk/files/pdfversion/CR181_Nov15.pdf http://www.rcpsych.ac.uk/files/pdfversion/CR181_Nov15.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/24014.pdf 40 Transgender Equality 168. We also heard from Will Huxter of NHS England.181 He stressed that it “is a relatively infrequent thing” for a GP to treat a trans patient.182 169. In written evidence, NHS England conceded that there appeared to be a particular problem with some GPs who refused: to prescribe [hormone therapy] to transgender and non-binary people, and to undertake assessments and investigations, even though they have been advised to do so by physicians in the specialist gender identity clinics. 170. NHS England has responded to this issue by publishing: a Specialised Services Circular (SSC1417, March 2014) which is consistent with the General Medical Council’s good practice guidance in Prescribing and Managing Medicines and Devices 2013. The circular clarifies that general practitioners are responsible for the prescription of hormone therapy as recommended by the specialist gender identity clinics; for patient safety monitoring procedures; for provision of basic physical examinations within the usual competences of GPs; and for blood tests as recommended by the specialist gender identity clinics.183 Education and training of doctors 171. The General Medical Council (GMC) is the independent statutory body which regulates the medical profession in the UK. The GMC sets standards for the delivery of medical education and training; maintains the register of doctors; and issues licences to practice. As part of its licensing function, it sets requirements for the Continuing Professional Development (CPD) that doctors must undergo as part of revalidating their licence. 172. Dr Dean told us that “the General Medical Council would have significant influence over” the inclusion of trans issues in medical training, “because they provide guidance as to what should be contained within the curriculum”: Awareness of gender identity and gender identity development—distinguishing it from sexual identity, noting the interactions between the two—should be a fundamental part of medical training. That is going to take a long time to feed through into those who are currently in practice, so it is important that it is incorporated into continuing professional development activities for existing practitioners. 173. Dr Dean acknowledged that trans issues could easily be crowded out by the many other topics that doctors needed to cover in their CPD. It was “difficult to get them to prioritise it until they are confronted with a patient for the first time”—but this was happening with increasing frequency and it was no longer appropriate to say “This is a 181 NHS England is the operating name of the NHS Commissioning Board. It is constituted as an executive non- departmental public body (a type of arm’s-length body). While it is autonomous in operational matters, it works to an overarching “mandate” set by the Secretary of State for Health. 182 Q216 183 NHS England (TRA 244) http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/24014.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/20376.pdf 41 Transgender Equality terribly rare condition. It is very specialised. I do not have to know about it. It is something for specialists.”184 174. The GMC itself told us that it sets standards and outcomes for undergraduate and foundation training; and standards and requirements for postgraduate training. Curricula and assessment tools must fulfil these, but their actual content is owned by the medical schools, foundation schools and Medical Royal Colleges or faculties. The Council is working with the Academy of Medical Royal Colleges to develop a framework for generic professional capabilities, which will “identify, simplify and clarify the core professional values, knowledge, skills and behaviours” for doctors, to reduce variability in the postgraduate curriculum in this regard.185 175. On the matter of training for doctors, the Minister and Mr Huxter told us about work with the Medical Royal Colleges, Health Education England,186 the GMC, the British Medical Association187 and others around giving guidance and support to primary-care practitioners in caring for trans patients.188 Professional regulation of doctors 176. The EHRC further told us about the GMC’s role as a professional regulator in addressing cases of alleged inappropriate practice (including transphobic attitudes and behaviour), on the part of doctors: Following a survey of problems with healthcare services, resulting in 98 complaints, a dossier of 39 cases warranting further investigation was submitted to the General Medical Council (GMC) in 2013. Those cases involved allegations of sexual abuse, physical abuse, verbal abuse, inappropriate and sometimes damaging treatment, treatment withheld, threats of withholding treatment, poor administration, and acting against patients’ best interests.189 177. There is a strong perception in the trans community that the GMC failed in its duty to take these complaints seriously; and it was suggested to us that the Council needed to change its processes accordingly.190 178. The GMC explained to us that of the 98 cases that were initially brought to its attention, 42 involved allegations which appeared potentially serious enough to warrant further investigation and the complainants were invited to complain direct to the GMC. Any complaints that were made as a result of this would have been passed direct to the GMC’s triage department and so it is not possible to track all complaints from this group in isolation from others. 179. The GMC has, though, identified three complaints that were submitted as a direct result of the survey, since the complainants specifically referred to the survey in their 184 Q11 185 General Medical Council (TRA 267) 186 Health Education England is an executive non-departmental public body which provides leadership and coordination for the education and training of the healthcare and public-health workforce in England. 187 The British Medical Association is the professional association and trade union for doctors in the UK. 188 Qq205, 208 189 Equality and Human Rights Commission (TRA 078) 190 Professor Zoë Playdon (TRA 098); cf. The Heroines of My Life, “Interview with Helen Belcher” accessed 1 December 2015 http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/21345.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/24277.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/24014.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19337.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19437.pdf http://theheroines.blogspot.co.uk/2014/09/interview-with-helen-belcher.html 42 Transgender Equality complaint. One of these was closed as the doctor involved could not be identified. One was closed as the allegations related to incidents occurring too long ago. One was investigated but closed with no further action because it did not meet the GMC’s thresholds for action (which relate to “putting the safety of patients, or the public’s confidence in doctors, at risk”). 43 Transgender Equality 180. The Council also explained that: For us to pursue a complaint, we will also usually need the patient to identify themselves and to consent to disclosure of their complaint to the doctor. This is an unavoidable part of due legal process, but we acknowledge it may be a disincentive to some to pursue complaints, particularly in sensitive aspects of medical treatment.191 181. We welcome the evidence we received from the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Public Health regarding the importance of understanding and addressing the needs of transgender patients. And the creation for this purpose by NHS England of the Transgender and Non-Binary Network is a commendable step. 182. However, it is clear from our inquiry that trans people encounter significant problems in using general NHS services due to the attitude of some clinicians and other staff when providing care for trans patients. This is attributable to lack of knowledge and understanding—and even in some cases to out-and-out prejudice. 183. GPs in particular too often lack an understanding of: trans identities; the diagnosis of gender dysphoria; referral pathways into Gender Identity Services; and their own role in prescribing hormone treatment. And it is asserted that in some cases this leads to appropriate care not being provided. 184. The NHS is failing in its legal duty under the Equality Act in this regard. There is a lack of Continuing Professional Development and training in this area amongst GPs. There is also a lack of clarity about referral pathways for Gender Identity Services. And the NHS as an employer and commissioner is failing to ensure zero tolerance of transphobic behaviour amongst staff and contractors. A root-and-branch review of this matter must be conducted, completed and published within the next six months. 185. The General Medical Council must provide clear reassurance that it takes allegations of transphobia every bit as seriously as those concerning other forms of professional misconduct. Gender Identity Clinics (adults) 186. As noted above, the commissioning of Gender Identity Services is currently undertaken by NHS England. The providers are seven GICs, of varying sizes, each run by an NHS Mental Health Trust192 187. Dr Dean told us: All seven gender clinics in England arose out of the special interest of an individual a long time in the past. There has not been a lot of planning of their development, and there certainly is no training pathway for medical practitioners or others who work in this field. It is very much learning by apprenticeship, working with other people and observing. People working in 191 General Medical Council (TRA 267) 192 These are: Devon Partnership NHS Trust, Leeds and York Partnership NHS Foundation Trust, Nottinghamshire Healthcare NHS Foundation Trust, Northamptonshire Healthcare NHS Foundation Trust, Northumberland, Tyne & Wear NHS Foundation Trust, Sheffield Health & Social Care NHS Foundation Trust and West London Mental Health NHS Trust – NHS England (TRA 244) http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/24277.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/20376.pdf 44 Transgender Equality this field generally in the past have come primarily from psychiatry, but more recently genitourinary medicine and family medicine as well.193 188. Where patients require genital (reassignment / reconstructive) surgery, they are referred on by the GICs to one of three providers who are contracted to provide surgical services.194 189. Demand for the GICs’ services is growing at a significant rate, with referrals increasing by an average 25–30 per cent a year across all the clinics.195 Treatment protocols 190. During our inquiry we heard evidence that there are issues around the treatment protocols which the NHS operates. 191. GIRES explained to us that homosexuality was once classified as a disease, until its removal from the World Health Organization (WHO) International Classification of Diseases (ICD) in 1992. Attitudes in respect of gender identity are now likewise shifting. Under the ICD, “transsexualism” has been, and still is, classified under “Mental and Behavioural Disorders”. Consequently, “treatment in the UK has, typically, been led by psychiatry.” However, the WHO is expected to revise the ICD accordingly. The “psychopathological model” of trans identity will be “abandoned, in favour of a model that reflects current scientific evidence and best practice”. This will accord with the Standards of Care promulgated by the World Professional Association for Transgender Health (WPATH), which describe trans identity as “a common and culturally diverse human phenomenon that should not be judged as inherently pathological or negative”. 192. At the same time, however, GIRES notes that “Removal altogether from the ICD [as occurred with the depathologisation of homosexuality] is not an option, since gender dysphoria frequently requires medical interventions.”196 193. The interim Protocol and Service Guideline is quite clear that gender dysphoria is not synonymous with having a trans identity as such: Gender dysphoria refers to discomfort or distress that is caused by a discrepancy between a person’s gender identity and that person’s sex assigned at birth (and the associated gender role and / or primary and secondary sex characteristic). Trans and gender variant people are not necessarily gender dysphoric.197 194. For a patient to be able to access most forms of gender reassignment / confirmation treatment, two clinicians, one of whom must be medically qualified, have to agree a diagnosis of gender dysphoria. Assessment, diagnosis and confirmation in relation to gender dysphoria “must be by a health professional who specialises in gender dysphoria and has general clinical competence in diagnosis and treatment of mental or emotional 193 Q16 194 These are: Imperial College Healthcare NHS Trust (male-to-female surgery), Nuffield Health Hospitals in Brighton (male-to-female surgery) and St Peters Andrology Centre in London (female-to-male surgery). 195 Q201; cf. Q20 [Steve Shrubb] 196 Gender Identity Research and Education Service (TRA 058) 197 NHS England, Interim Gender Dysphoria Protocol and Service Guideline 2013/14, October 2013, p 7 http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/21345.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/24014.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/21345.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19292.pdf https://www.england.nhs.uk/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/int-gend-proto.pdf 45 Transgender Equality disorders, for example psychiatrists and psychologists” (in accordance with WPATH standards).198 Dr Dean further explained to us: There is a period of assessment, which would normally consist of at least two consultations. There is a huge amount of information to take in from the patient, to understand about their gender identity-relevant health, their networks of support and what their aspirations are, and to communicate to them the risks, benefits and limitations of the various interventions that they want […] It is difficult to give a standard case, but there will be an assessment process, which would usually involve two clinicians and probably take place over a period of about three months, at the end of which, if they wanted hormone therapy and they were of the age of majority, had the correct etc., then we would recommend it.199 195. The Intercollegiate Good Practice Guidance explains that the purpose of requiring clinical opinions is to ensure that: there is “persistent and well-documented gender dysphoria”; the patient has the “capacity to make fully informed decisions and to consent to treatment”; and any “significant medical or mental health concerns” are “reasonably well controlled”.200 196. However, we heard the view that the requirement for clinical assessment is an unnecessary obstacle to treatment which causes delay and distress—and represents the continuation of outdated attitudes of pathologisation and medical paternalism. Michael Toze told us: Assessment procedures in clinics are not transparent and not consistent, and patients are aware of this through informal discussion. For example, Nottingham GIC recently sent new patients a form asking them what video games they play. It is not clear why this is relevant to their assessment or care, and if it is relevant, why other clinics are not asking […] Some clinics ask patients highly personal questions about sex; some ask if patients have gay relatives; some have refused treatment for people who are full-time carers and hence unable to work. Other clinics do none of these things. Because clinics control access to treatment, patients do not feel empowered to challenge being asked irrelevant and highly personal questions, or having judgements made about their lives.201 197. A further precondition for genital (reassignment / reconstructive) surgery is that the patient must undergo at least a year (“typically 12 to 24 months”) of “Real-Life Experience”, i.e. living “in role” in their acquired / affirmed gender. The interim Protocol and Service Guideline explains the rationale behind this as follows: The social aspects of changing one’s gender role are usually challenging—often more so than the physical aspects. Changing gender role can have profound personal and social consequences, and the decision to do so should include an awareness of what the familial, interpersonal, educational, vocational, 198 NHS England, Interim Gender Dysphoria Protocol and Service Guideline 2013/14, October 2013, p 7 199 Q19 200 Royal College of Psychiatrists, Good practice guidelines for the assessment and treatment of adults with gender dysphoria, College Report CR181, October 2013, p 24 201 Michael Toze (TRA 001) https://www.england.nhs.uk/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/int-gend-proto.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/21345.pdf http://www.rcpsych.ac.uk/files/pdfversion/CR181_Nov15.pdf http://www.rcpsych.ac.uk/files/pdfversion/CR181_Nov15.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/18822.pdf 46 Transgender Equality economic, and legal challenges are likely to be, so that people can function successfully in their gender role.202 198. Dr Dean told us that the Intercollegiate Good Practice Guidance sets out in this regard: broad guidelines that need to be interpreted on an individual basis, because it should not be one size fits all […] They were developed by a group of representatives of several professional organisations and medical royal colleges, not just medical organisations, and representatives of the patient community and their supporters. Within that document is the guidance that patients, generally speaking, should have a period of 12 months living in a congruent gender role before they are referred for genital reconstructive surgery, and we follow that, but it does have to be interpreted individually […] [T]here is quite considerable diversity of opinion between different clinicians and different clinics […] As there is not a standard approach or a standard training in how the guidelines are interpreted, there is certainly room for variation in interpretation, so, where you go to different clinics, you may get a different answer with respect to Real-Life Experience.203 199. We heard strong objections to this requirement. Action for Trans Health told us that it meant “forc[ing] trans people to conform to arguably outdated norms of gender and sexual orientation and behaviour in order to receive treatment”.204 There are particular issues around the imposition of this requirement on non-binary people, whose gender presentation by definition does not conform to the norms associated with conventional male or female identity.205 200. A number of witnesses argued for the “informed-consent model”, which is said to be used by some private providers of gender-reassignment / confirmation treatment in the USA. This entails imposing a minimum of clinical preconditions for treatment, on the basis that if the patient is able to give informed consent their wishes should be treated as paramount.206 201. Counter-arguments to this approach focus on: the requirement on clinicians to observe established clinical, professional and ethical standards (including those set by WPATH); and the need to ensure that finite NHS resources are spent appropriately and effectively. In addition, the informed-consent only model is not used in any other area of practice within the NHS.207 202. Issues regarding appropriate clinical practice in this regard have been tested by two cases brought to the GMC, as the Council explained in evidence to us. In one of these cases, a doctor’s: fitness to practise was found impaired in 2007 in relation to complaints that he had initiated hormonal and surgical gender reassignment treatment in five patients without sufficiently careful and thorough initial investigation 202 NHS England, Interim Gender Dysphoria Protocol and Service Guideline 2013/14, October 2013, p 9 203 Q16 204 Action for Trans Health (TRA 230) 205 Q15 206 Q16; Devi Dunseith (TRA 015) 207 Q17; British Association Of Gender Identity Specialists / Dr James Barrett (TRA 149) https://www.england.nhs.uk/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/int-gend-proto.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/21345.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19666.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/21345.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/21345.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/18897.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/21345.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19532.pdf 47 Transgender Equality and treatment. His registration was made subject to conditions; he has since voluntarily removed his name from the Medical Register.208 203. When we asked the Minister and Mr Huxter, of NHS England, about these issues, they replied that they were unable to comment on clinical matters and would have to seek advice from clinicians on the reasoning behind the current protocols. We subsequently received a further written submission from NHS England explaining that the current clinical protocols are in accordance with UK Intercollegiate Good Practice Guidelines and WPATH clinical standards.209 204. The Minister and Mr Huxter did indicate that the current interim Protocol and Service Guideline is under review and is open to challenge and feedback from “critical friends” and others.210 205. NHS England later clarified in writing that: The draft service specification for adult services was subject to public consultation earlier in 2015. It will be tested with people who use transgender services, the Transgender Network, at its next meeting on 3 December 2015 with a view to delivering a final draft product to NHS England by March 2016. 206. NHS England further told us that: A follow-up to the multi-agency symposium that was held in June 2015 will be held on 27 January 2016. This will focus on the development of a national workforce and training plan for gender identity services, the relationship between specialised services for transgender people and primary care services, and improving the patient experience for transgender people across the wider NHS. This will provide an early opportunity to consider some of the concerns the Committee expressed with regard to the attitudes of some NHS staff to transgender people. 211 207. Part of the NHS’s duty regarding equality for trans people is its obligation to provide appropriate Gender Identity Services to meet the needs of the trans community. 208. We strongly welcome the long overdue trend towards the depathologisation of trans identities (decades after the same happened in respect of lesbian, gay and bisexual identities) and the explicit acknowledgement within Gender Identity Clinics that the treatable condition of gender dysphoria is not synonymous with trans identity as such. This approach must be reflected in all areas of Government policy on trans issues, not least in relation to gender recognition. 209. We are concerned that Gender Identity Services continue to be provided as part of mental-health services. This is a relic of the days when trans identity in itself was regarded as a disease or disorder of the mind and contributes to the misleading impression that this continues to be the case. Consideration must be given to the transfer of these services to some other relevant area of clinical specialism, such as 208 General Medical Council (TRA 267) 209 Department of Health (TRA 274) 210 Q214 211 Department of Health (TRA 274) http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/24277.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/25008.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/24014.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/25008.pdf 48 Transgender Equality endocrinology (which deals with hormone-related conditions), or their establishment as a distinct specialism in their own right. 210. We heard that there are serious concerns within the trans community regarding the treatment protocols that are applied by Gender Identity Services, particularly in respect of clinical assessment prior to treatment and the requirement to undergo a period of “Real-Life Experience” prior to genital (reassignment / reconstructive) surgery. This requirement is seen as reflecting outdated, stereotyped attitudes to male and female gender identity. 211. Many people now favour the adoption instead of a model involving only the granting of informed consent, which is said to be used by some providers of private care in the USA. 212. However, we are unconvinced of the merits of the proposed informed consent- only model. While there is a clear case for the granting of legal gender recognition on request, with the minimum of formalities, this approach is less appropriate for a medical intervention as profound and permanent as genital (reassignment / reconstructive) surgery. Clinicians do have a responsibility to observe ethical and professional standards, including their duty of care towards patients. In this particular area of medicine, appropriate practice also entails paying due regard to the internationally recognised guidelines of the World Professional Association for Transgender Health. In addition, clinicians practising in the NHS have a duty to ensure that the service’s finite resources are spent appropriately and effectively. All of the foregoing obligations are incompatible with simply granting on demand whatever treatment patients request. 213. The issues that exist around clinical protocols must instead be addressed through the consistent application of clear and appropriate standards across the Gender Identity Clinics. The situation described to us by Dr John Dean, Chair of the NHS National Clinical Reference Group for Gender Identity Services, whereby “there is not a standard approach or a standard training in how the guidelines are interpreted”, is clearly unacceptable and must change. 214. The Protocol and Service Guideline must make explicit the right of patients to be fully involved in their treatment and to exercise full personal autonomy in respect of their gender identity and presentation. It must be stipulated that treatment criteria are to be exercised flexibly case-by-case on that basis. 215. Assessment prior to treatment must be undertaken in order to meet clinically necessary criteria regarding the patient’s diagnosis, ability to consent to treatment and (physical and mental) fitness for treatment. The requirement to undergo “Real-Life Experience” prior to genital (reassignment / reconstructive) surgery must not entail conforming to externally imposed and arbitrary (binary) preconceptions about gender identity and presentation. It must be clear that this requirement is not about qualifying for surgery, but rather preparing the patient to cope with the profound consequences of surgery. 49 Transgender Equality Capacity and quality of services 216. In our inquiry we also heard of problems in the quality and capacity of NHS services. In evidence to us, NHS England admitted that the following problems existed: • inequitable access and variability across the GICs; • poor patient experience, including communication; • capacity pressures; • workforce pressures; and • long waiting times for initial assessment and genital reconstruction surgery (with a shortage of specialist surgeons).212 217. Unacceptably long waiting times for initial appointments at GICs are clearly endemic. Steve Shrubb, the then Chief Executive of West London Mental Health NHS Trust, which runs by far the biggest GIC (the Charing Cross Clinic), told us that “People are waiting currently between 12 and 18 months.”213 GIRES told us: Recent reports indicate waiting times of 2–3 years for access to some of the adult clinics. The waiting time for genital surgery for trans women is 22 months; without additional services being commissioned, the predicted waiting time is 42 months by 2017 (NHS England).214 218. In addition, we heard about the uneven geographical distribution of GICs, meaning that many people have to travel long distances in order to access treatment.215 219. Poor quality administration is also widely encountered in GICs. Jess Bradley, of Action for Trans Health, told us that the quality of administration was “just completely routinely rubbish”.216 220. Waiting times for initial appointments are in breach of patients’ legal entitlement, under the NHS Constitution, to have their first appointment in a specialist service within 18 weeks of referral. Only in January 2015 did the NHS accept that this principle actually applies to Gender Identity Services.217 221. A further issue that was drawn to our attention concerned the fact that some elements of the gender identity pathway (involving “non-core services”) had to be commissioned by local NHS Clinical Commissioning Groups rather than NHS England. The fact that this made it difficult to access some secondary (but, to the patients concerned, still vital) elements of treatment was a real source of distress for some.218 Dr Dean told us that this 212 NHS England (TRA 244). There is also said to be a shortage of clinicians providing chest reconstruction surgery for trans men, again resulting in long waiting list. 213 Q14 214 Gender Identity Research and Education Service (TRA 058) 215 National LGB&T Partnership (TRA 077), Lancashire LGBT (TRA 122), Anonymised (TRA 126), Anonymised (TRA 135), Unison Bournemouth Higher & Further Education Branch (TRA 190), Brighton & Hove City Council (TRA 211), Trans Yorkshire (TRA 235), Stonewall (TRA 243) 216 Q24 217 Michael Toze (TRA 001); Dr Saoirse Caitlin O’Shea (TRA 013); Eve Ann Wallis (TRA 023); Suzanna Hopwood (TRA 031); Gender Identity Research and Education Service (TRA 058); Jayde Turner (TRA 092); K Eaton (TRA 106); Peyton Knight (TRA 128); Miss Taylor (TRA 137); UK Trans Info (TRA 138); Melanie Bartlett (TRA 147); NHS England (TRA 244). 218 The Royal College of Speech and Language Therapists (TRA 045); Alexis Vanlee (TRA 247) http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/20376.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/21345.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19292.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19336.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19487.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19496.pdf 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http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/18822.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/18894.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/18947.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19012.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19012.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19292.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19408.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19450.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19499.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19520.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19521.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19530.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/20376.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19138.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/21515.pdf 50 Transgender Equality had arisen because of an unforeseen conflict between NHS England’s Interim Gender Dysphoria Protocol and Service Guideline and other policy on commissioning by CCGs. He was confident that the new definitive Protocol and Service Guideline would resolve the matter.219 222. NHS England told us in written evidence that, after hearing about the shortcomings of Gender Identity Services from the NHS Citizen Assembly, it had set up: a dedicated working group, accountable to NHS England’s Specialised Commissioning Oversight Group to identity and implement solutions to the problems that it heard.220 223. Particular attention, we were told, is being paid to the issue of waiting times: NHS England has worked closely with the three providers of genital reconstruction surgery to model the capacity requirements to begin to reduce waiting times for surgery to below 18 weeks. In 2015/16 NHS England has invested an additional £4.4m in genital reconstruction services. We are funding the surgical providers at maximum capacity, which means that the most significant constraint in reducing waiting times more quickly is due to workforce rather than financial constraints […] We also know that there are long waiting times for referrals into the gender identity clinics for initial assessment. In the spring of 2015 we embarked upon an ambitious programme of work to identify the reasons for bottlenecks in the patient pathways; to model scenarios for the clinics in meeting the 18 week standard, and expected growth in demand.221 224. The shortfall in the skilled workforce necessary to address the volume of demand for the service was, NHS England told us, a matter for Health Education England.222 225. When we questioned Ms Ellison, she told us: the NHS is definitely on a journey here [...] there is a real openness to improvement. There is an understanding and acceptance that current services are not good enough and there are some plans in place to improve that.223 226. However, Mr Huxter, of NHS England, seemed more equivocal about criticisms of the quality of the service: I am well aware of individuals who have raised with me and with other commissioners concerns about services, but I was reviewing data from the West London Mental Health NHS Trust gender identity clinic that had been completed by hundreds of their patients that were reporting very high levels of contentment. I do not dispute that there are individuals and groups of individuals who are not experiencing what they would wish.224 219 Q23 220 NHS England (TRA 244) 221 NHS England (TRA 244); cf. Q203 222 NHS England (TRA 244); cf. Q207 223 Q204 224 Q209 http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/21345.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/20376.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/20376.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/24014.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/20376.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/24014.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/24014.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/24014.pdf 51 Transgender Equality 227. Mr Shrubb told us: It never ceases to amaze me, the level of the quality. We serve 2,500 patients. Their views on the clinical quality were extremely high. They had slightly lower views on the administrative quality, if I am honest. I think the quality in real terms is very high, but we really do not have a good grip on the data […]225 228. We received evidence drawing our attention to the possibility of an alternative model of commissioning and provision, involving the delivery of elements of the service away from GICs, at local level and using more non-NHS providers. This had been tried at Calderdale, in Yorkshire (prior to NHS England taking over commissioning), reportedly with some degree of success.226 229. The evidence is overwhelming that there are serious deficiencies in the quality and capacity of NHS Gender Identity Services. In particular, the waiting times that many patients experience prior to their first appointment (in clear breach of the legal obligation under the NHS Constitution to provide treatment within 18 weeks) and before surgery are completely unacceptable. 230. We are also concerned at the apparent lack of any concrete plans to address the lack of specialist clinicians in this field. This will be a serious obstacle to addressing the lack of capacity, which growing demand for the service is sure to exacerbate, and cannot be ignored. The Department of Health must say in its response to us how it will work with Health Education England and other stakeholders to ensure that this is addressed. The Tavistock Clinic (children and adolescents) 231. The GIDS, known as the Tavistock Clinic, is a highly specialised clinic for young people presenting with difficulties with their gender identity, including gender dysphoria and other conditions. The Tavistock Clinic is the only specialist service in the UK providing early-intervention treatment for children and young people. It operates from two main bases (in London and Leeds); and regular outreach clinics are held (in Exeter, Barnstable, Bath, Bristol and Brighton).227 232. The Clinic itself told us: The GIDS interdisciplinary team comprises professionals with specialist child and adolescent training from a range of disciplines including psychiatry, clinical psychology, family therapy, social work, psychotherapy and adolescent endocrinology. Clinicians in the service accept that gender non-conformity cannot be explained adequately within any monolithic theoretical model, and that explanations are probably multi-factorial.228 233. Demand for the clinic’s services is growing rapidly, with referrals increasing by 50 per cent a year in recent years (and at an even greater rate in the current year).229 While the 225 Q24 226 Q24; Trans Yorkshire (TRA 235) 227 NHS England (TRA 244) 228 Polly Carmichael and Bernadette Wren / NHS Gender Identity Development Service – Tavistock Clinic (TRA 236) 229 Qq64, 201 http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/21345.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/21345.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19717.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/20376.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19794.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/21638.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/24014.pdf 52 Transgender Equality majority of referrals involve young people aged between 14 and 16, the service is seeing a marked increase in the number of younger (pre-pubertal) children being referred (even as young as four)—although the numbers remain small.230 234. GPs can refer patients directly to GIDS, but referral takes place chiefly through local Child and Adolescent Mental Health Services (CAMHS). As with adult Gender Identity Services (see above), referral pathways appear to be made problematic by a lack of understanding of gender-identity issues in the wider NHS. Susie Green, the Chair of Mermaids (which represents parents of gender-variant children and adolescents), told us: the GP will turn around and say, “There is nothing you can do until you are 18” or, “No, we cannot refer you to any specialist, because we do not know about it”, so they will refer them to CAMHS.231 She continued: You will then have a six month wait to be seen by a CAMHS counsellor, regardless of whether you are suffering from depression or self harming, etc., and then you get to CAMHS and they go, “We do not know anything about gender, so we are not dealing with it either.” Ms Green also told us that some staff at the Tavistock Clinic itself are unaware that direct referral from a GP is possible.232 235. While GIDS does not suffer from the long waits associated with the adult service, there still appear to be some problems in this regard. Mermaids reported the results of a survey in 2014 of parents of children and adolescents with gender dysphoria: 27% of all those who responded had waited over 18 weeks for their initial assessment with the GIDS. Parents reported that the wait for the first appointment had a negative impact on the mental health and wellbeing of 31 (77.5%) of the 40 young people included in the survey; three (7.5%) had attempted suicide whilst on the waiting list to be seen for the first time.233 236. The Tavistock Clinic explains the basis of its treatment model as follows: The appropriate care of Gender Dysphoria in children and adolescents is contentious and debated in the absence of an adequate evidence base. It is not possible with any certainty to predict the outcome of gender identity development and the evidence available suggests that for the majority of pre- pubertal children their gender dysphoria does not persist into adulthood […] The service aims to ameliorate the potential negative impact of gender dysphoria on general developmental processes. We endeavour to help young people and their families manage the uncertainties inherent in the outcome of gender dysphoria and provide on-going opportunities for exploration of gender identity and support. 230 Q50 231 Q53 232 Q54 233 Mermaids (TRA 156) http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/21638.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/21638.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/21638.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19540.pdf 53 Transgender Equality Each patient has an individual treatment plan, tailored to meet their particular presentation and needs.234 237. The treatment provided by GIDS does not include any form of irreversible (surgical) physical intervention. It does, however, include reversible forms of such intervention for adolescents aged younger than 16; and mostly-reversible forms of intervention for adolescents who are aged 16 and over. 238. Firstly, hormone-blocking medication is available from the onset of puberty (regardless of chronological age); this involves pressing the “pause button” in the process of puberty, allowing the young person concerned the opportunity to address their gender identity issues without the distress that puberty can cause in such circumstances. Pubertal-postponement treatments also, by preventing the development of secondary sexual characteristics, obviate the need for some surgery and other treatments in that regard if the patient later undergoes gender reassignment / confirmation surgery and other treatments. 239. Secondly, cross-sex hormone therapy is available from the age of 16, but only after at least 12 months of hormone-blocking treatment.235 This form of medication will bring secondary physical sexual characteristics into line with the young person’s acquired / affirmed gender. Some of the changes brought about by cross-sex hormone treatment are not reversible, for example the breaking of the voice for trans men and breast growth in trans women. However, other aspects, for example fertility, hair-loss and hair-growth, are reversible within the early years of treatment. 240. Both these forms of treatment are only provided after a substantial period of assessment. All patients are assessed over the course of between three and six appointments with one or two mental-health professionals from the clinic’s team. If the young person is deemed suitable for pubertal-postponement treatment, a further (endocrinological) assessment takes place. The interval between appointments is roughly monthly; they can, however, be less frequent if capacity is strained, which can occur with the rapid growth in demand.236 241. A number of trans advocacy groups told us that, under these current treatment protocols, patients could not access treatment quickly enough. Mermaids said there was a significant risk of self-harm or suicide where hormone treatment is not yet being given;237 they drew attention to evidence that the attempted suicide rate among young trans people is 48 per cent.238 We were also told that, under current protocols: the principle of Gillick competence is not observed in respect of children aged under 16; and parental wishes are not heeded.239 242. We further heard that the fixed requirement for adolescents to undergo at least 12 months of pubertal-postponement treatment prior to being prescribed cross-sex hormones is arbitrary and unreasonable. It means that someone who is quite certain of their gender identity can be placed in a position of not maturing physically at the rate of their peers 234 Polly Carmichael and Bernadette Wren / NHS Gender Identity Development Service – Tavistock Clinic (TRA 236) 235 Polly Carmichael and Bernadette Wren / NHS Gender Identity Development Service – Tavistock Clinic (TRA 236) 236 Q65; GIDS Leaflet: Information for Parents 237 Qq 59, 66, 86 238 Q59; cf. “Nearly half of young transgender people have attempted suicide – UK survey”, Guardian, 19 November 2014. 239 Professor Zoë Playdon (TRA 098), Focus: The Identity Trust (TRA 100); Anonymised (TRA 188) http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19794.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19794.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/21638.pdf http://tavistockandportman.uk/sites/default/files/files/PB%20025%20%2013%20GIDS%20Information%20for%20Parents%20Patient%20Info%20Leaflet%20v4_0.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/21638.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/21638.pdf http://www.theguardian.com/society/2014/nov/19/young-transgender-suicide-attempts-survey http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19437.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19441.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19609.pdf 54 Transgender Equality just as they are entering adulthood. This can result in isolation and prejudice, leading to significant distress and harm.240 243. Mermaids further argued that: pubertal-postponement treatments should be made available to older children (aged 16 and 17) as well as younger ones; and young people should be included in decision-making about both forms of hormone treatment.241 244. Bernadette Wren, Head of Psychology and Associate Director at the Tavistock Clinic, told us that its treatment protocols are based on WPATH guidelines which are almost universally observed in Europe.242 The protocols were subject to change (for instance, the age at which puberty-blockers were prescribed had already been lowered) and the service specification was currently under review by NHS England.243 245. The Tavistock Clinic is aware of an important Dutch long-term study which apparently shows the benefits of early intervention in gender-dysphoric children, with “a staged programme of puberty suppression, cross-sex hormones and gender reassignment surgery” at appropriate ages. This study though, involves a selected group of children showing consistent gender dysphoria from an early age and meeting other treatment criteria 244 246. Another problematic area, we heard, was the transition to adult Gender Identity Services (at the ages of 17 and 18), with a lack of continuity of care for those patients involved, which can lead to their facing a long hiatus in their care as they sit on a waiting list to enter the adult service.245 The NHS Gender Identity Services Clinical Reference Group has recommended an easier transition to the adult service from age 17, without the need for a fresh assessment of the patient by the adult service. The Tavistock clinic told us that it was working with the adult service on this issue.246 247. Mr Huxter of NHS England told us that an extra £1 million had been made available for the Tavistock Clinic in the current year, to help cope with the need for additional capacity.247 248. Ms Ellison, the Public Health Minister, could not comment on the clinical basis for the protocols operated by the Tavistock Clinic but she underlined that the service specification and protocol for GIDS were under review and account would be taken of current clinical thinking and the views of stakeholders.248 Regarding this, Mr Huxter told us: We will be going out for testing with stakeholders on the service spec before the end of November [2015]. That then goes back to the paediatric clinical reference group, which oversees this particular area. We will then go out to formal consultation early in 2016. Hopefully that would fit well with the 240 Qq54, 58, 59, 60, 61, 65, 66 241 Mermaids (TRA 156) 242 Qq55–7 243 Q58 244 Q51; Polly Carmichael and Bernadette Wren / NHS Gender Identity Development Service – Tavistock Clinic (TRA 236) 245 Qq60, 62 246 Polly Carmichael and Bernadette Wren / NHS Gender Identity Development Service – Tavistock Clinic (TRA 236) 247 Q202 248 Qq220–1 http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/21638.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/21638.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/21638.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/21638.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/21638.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/21638.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/21638.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19540.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/21638.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/21638.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/21638.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19794.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/21638.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/21638.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19794.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/24014.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/24014.pdf 55 Transgender Equality timetable of receiving the report from the Committee and our being able to reflect that in our considerations.249 249. We acknowledge the hugely important and pioneering work of the Tavistock Clinic in providing help and support for gender-variant children and adolescents, and their families. 250. We recognise that there are legitimate concerns among service-users and their families about the clinical protocols which the clinic operates regarding access to puberty-blockers and cross-sex hormones. Failing to intervene in this way, or unnecessarily delaying such intervention, clearly has the potential to lead to seriously damaging consequences for very vulnerable young people, including the risk of self- harm and attempted suicide. 251. We also recognise that the clinic has a difficult balance to strike. As with adult Gender Identity Services, clinicians have ethical and professional obligations to ensure that treatment is appropriate; and they must pay due regard to the internationally recognised guidelines of the World Professional Association for Transgender Health. In addition, care must be taken that NHS resources are spent effectively and appropriately. 252. There is a clear and strong case that delaying treatment risks more harm than providing it. The treatment involved is primarily reversible, and the seriously dangerous consequences of not giving this treatment, including self-harming and suicide, are clearly well attested. 253. Accordingly, we recommend that, in the current review of the service specification and protocol for the Gender Identity Development Service, consideration be given to reducing the amount of time required for the assessment that service-users must undergo before puberty-blockers and cross-sex hormones can be prescribed. 249 Q252 http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/24014.pdf 56 Transgender Equality 6 Tackling everyday transphobia 254. Our evidence highlighted the fact that discrimination is a part of daily life for trans people—a reality which many feel they have no alternative but to accept. In this chapter we look at various aspects of this everyday transphobia and how they can be addressed. Hate crime 255. Several people submitted to us harrowing accounts of their experiences of crime linked to their trans status.250 Ryan Hughes wrote to us about: being harassed, spat at, run over in one instance, sexually assaulted, beaten, having dog faeces thrown at me, stones thrown at me, head-butted, even my carer was physically assaulted for associating with me because I am transgendered.251 256. The damaging effect of transphobic hate-crime252 on survivors can go far beyond the immediate impact. The Sussex Hate Crime Project at the University of Sussex told us: Anti-LGBT hate crime has significant impacts upon trans* people’s emotions (fear, anxiety and anger) and behaviours (avoidance and proaction) [...] other studies have shown that trans* people’s experiences of hate crime are marked by high levels of psychological trauma. Our study concurred with much of the current literature on this.253 257. Our evidence makes clear that there are significant problems relating to the reporting and prosecution of hate crime against trans people. Reporting of hate crime 258. Police records show that in England and Wales there were 310 transphobic hate crimes reported in 2011–12; 361 in 2012–13; 555 in 2013–14; and 605 in 2014–15. This amounts to around one per cent of the total number of recorded hate crimes in each of those years.254 But further evidence suggests that transphobic hate crimes are massively underreported.255 Confidential surveys of trans people suggest experience of hate crime is pervasive and everyday. The EHRC told us: [one] study found that 40 per cent of transgender respondents had experienced verbal abuse, 30 per cent had experienced threatening behaviour, 25 per cent had experienced physical abuse and 4 per cent had experienced sexual abuse. While victims of transphobia can be targeted up to 50 times in one year, only three in 10 report the incident. A Fundamental Rights Agency study into LGBT 250 Dr Saoirse Caitlin O’Shea (TRA 013); Barbara Aster (TRA 155) 251 Mr R Hughes (TRA 255) 252 The College of Policing’s Hate Crime Operational Guidance (2014) defines transphobic hate crime as “any criminal offence which is perceived, by the victim or any other person, to be motivated by a hostility or prejudice against a person who is transgender or perceived to be transgender”. 253 Sussex Hate Crime Project / University of Sussex (TRA 093) 254 Government Equalities Office (TRA 245); Home Office, Hate Crime, England and Wales, 2014/15, Statistical Bulletin 05/15, October 2015. Transphobic hate crime has been recognised as a monitored strand of hate crime by police forces in England and Wales since 2008. It has been covered by the Crime Survey for England and Wales since 2009. 255 Qq39–40; Barbara Aster (TRA 155) http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/18894.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19538.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/22674.pdf http://www.report-it.org.uk/files/hate_crime_operational_guidance.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19415.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/20997.pdf https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/467366/hosb0515.pdf https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/467366/hosb0515.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/21345.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19538.pdf 57 Transgender Equality hate crime found that transgender respondents reported the highest levels of victimisation, with almost 1 in 3 being attacked or threatened more than 3 times in the preceding 12 months.256 259. Witnesses explained why survivors were reluctant to engage with the criminal justice system. Helen Belcher, of Trans Media Watch, told us that fear of exposure was a major barrier. A lot of people kept their trans identity a secret and “The moment they get the criminal justice system involved suddenly all of that secret is out and huge emotional upheaval and turmoil could then ensue.”257 260. Low levels of confidence in the outcome were also an issue.258 Professor Neil Chakraborti, Director of the Leicester Centre for Hate Studies, told us that trans people: felt that frontline practitioners often overlooked the everyday challenges of what it is like to be trans and how much courage and resilience you need to report your experiences to a third party. Many of the victims we spoke to just normalised their everyday victimisation; they thought, “Do you know what? This is just something I have to put up with. What is the point of telling anybody because they are not going to do anything about it?”259 261. Police initiatives have been taken to encourage reporting of hate crime generally, such as the police-funded website True Vision.260 Chief Constable Jane Sawyers, National Policing Lead on Transgender for the National Police Chiefs’ Council, told us that national transphobic hate crime training for police officers was essential: most […] do not know anybody who is trans and have not dealt with anybody who is trans. Therefore, talking to members of the trans community, being able to hear life experiences or something as simple as understanding what language is correct to use actually helps officers.261 Hate-crime prosecutions and convictions 262. Crown Prosecution Service data on hate-crime convictions shows that during 2014– 15 there were 37 completed prosecutions which were flagged as relating to transphobic crime. Of these, 28 had successful outcomes, meaning that the conviction rate was 75.7 per cent; the equivalent figure in 2013–14 was just below 74 per cent. Across all strands of monitored hate crime, the conviction rate was 84.7 per cent in 2013–14 and 82.9 per cent in 2014–15.262 263. Professor Chakraborti told us that, if the large number of unreported hate crimes of all types is taken into account, the conviction rate is extremely low—amounting to only 2–3 per cent a year.263 256 Equality and Human Rights Commission (TRA 078) 257 Q39 258 Q40; Barbara Aster (TRA 155) 259 Q40 260 True Vision, “Homophobic and Transphobic Hate Crime” accessed 9 December 2015 261 Qq34, 35 262 Home Office (TRA 271); Ministry of Justice (TRA 275); Crown Prosecution Service, Hate crime and crimes against older people report, 2013–2014 263 Q37 http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19337.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/21345.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/21345.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19538.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/21345.pdf http://report-it.org.uk/homophobic_and_transphobic_hate_crime http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/21345.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/21345.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/24905.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/25094.pdf http://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/docs/cps_hate_crime_report_2014.pdf http://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/docs/cps_hate_crime_report_2014.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/21345.pdf 58 Transgender Equality Action to deal with hate crime 264. The Coalition government published the Hate crime action plan: Challenge it, Report it, Stop it in March 2012; this was followed by a progress report in May 2014. On 12 October 2015 Home Office Minister Karen Bradley MP announced that the Government would be developing a “new hate crime action plan”, linked to plans to tackle extremism.264 She told us in evidence that reporting of hate crime overall was increasing, but conceded that more needed to be done. The new plan, she said, would “really drill down into the issue”, including by trying to tackle fear of exposure in the press, through innovative community partnership work and by working with the police and other law enforcement to increase victims’ confidence in being taken seriously.265 265. The MoJ Minister Ms Dinenage later clarified in writing to us that “The Cross- Government Hate Crime Programme is led from the MoJ”, with involvement from the Home Office and the Department for Communities and Local Government.266 266. Legal changes are critical, but they will only bite if there is cultural change too— by society but also by those who enforce the law. 267. The Ministry of Justice must ensure that it consults fully with the trans community in developing the Government’s new hate-crime action plan, so that the proposals are well-targeted and likely to be effective in increasing levels of reporting. This plan must include mandatory national transphobic hate-crime training for police officers and the promotion of third-party reporting. Hate crime legislation 268. Trans hate crimes do not currently have parity in the law with other hate crimes.267 There is no provision for separate transphobic “aggravated offences”, equivalent to those that now exist under the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 in respect of racist and faith-hate crimes. There are also no offences relating to “stirring up hatred” against trans people, as there are for race, religion or sexual orientation under the Public Order Act 1986. 269. Professor Chakraborti told us that this created “hierarchies of victims”. Ms Belcher also drew attention to practical issues with intersectionality: trans people are not just trans in isolation. You might have trans women of colour or Muslim trans women, and so if they are subject to a hate crime and you start apportioning out, “Is it a transphobic hate crime or is it motivated by religion?”, which box are you going to tick? There are issues if you start segregating [the] reason [for the offence].268 264 HC Deb, 12 October 2015, cols 9–10 [Commons Chamber] 265 Qq231, 232, 238 266 Ministry of Justice (TRA 275) 267 Q38 [Jane Sawyers]. Since 2012, Schedule 21 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 has allowed enhanced sentences to be applied to offences that are aggravated by hostility on the grounds of transgender identity. This places punishment for these crimes on the same footing as punishment for those aggravated by hostility on grounds of disability or sexual orientation. 268 Q43 http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201516/cmhansrd/cm151012/debtext/151012-0001.htm http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/24014.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/24014.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/24014.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/25094.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/21345.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/21345.pdf 59 Transgender Equality 270. We asked Professor Chakraborti why legislation had been drafted in that way. He told us that legislation had “followed tragedy”, with “piecemeal” responses, rather than there being systematic law-making: What we do have is a set of legal provisions that is far better than in most countries, to be honest. We have laws and we have protection in this country. That is very, very important, but I am sure that if we could start again we would use different terminology and we would have different sets of legal provisions.269 271. In its 2014 review of hate crime laws, the Law Commission concluded that aggravated offences should in principle apply equally to hostility based on race, religion, transgender identity, sexual orientation and disability, but recommended that a further, government- sponsored review be undertaken first because of concerns raised about the existing legislation’s complexity. The Commission was not persuaded of the practical need to extend the “stirring up hatred” provisions to disability and transgender identity, arguing that such offences “would rarely, if ever, be prosecuted, and their communicative or deterrent [effect] would therefore be negligible” and that “criminalisation might also inhibit discussion of disability and transgender issues and of social attitudes relating to them”.270 272. Several of our witnesses felt the Law Commission’s report was a “missed opportunity”.271 Chief Constable Sawyers told us: if you are either transgender or disabled, how on earth can you ever believe that the law is fair in relation to you?272 Professor Chakraborti was disappointed at the Law Commission “parking” the idea of extending aggravated offences and challenged the conclusion that there was no practical need for stirring-up offences.273 Ms Belcher, who had made a submission to the Law Commission’s review on behalf of Trans Media Watch, argued that it was “very odd” to decide against parity on grounds of the likelihood of few convictions274 and that relevant legislation would send out a “powerful symbolic message”.275 273. Ms Dinenage told us that the Government was open to the idea of further reform: the Ministry of Justice is really keen to hear the input of this Committee and this inquiry to see where you feel changes might be considered. We already have one of the strongest legal frameworks to combat hate crime, but the Government should never rest on their laurels and never think that they cannot improve the situation.276 269 Q47 270 Law Commission, “Hate Crime”, accessed 9 December 2015; Law Commission, Hate Crime: Should the Current Offences be Extended?, Cm 8865, May 2014 271 Q39 [Neil Chakraborti] 272 Q38 273 Q39 274 Q39 275 Q46 276 Q266 http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/21345.pdf https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/316103/9781474104852_Print.pdf https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/316103/9781474104852_Print.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/21345.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/21345.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/21345.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/21345.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/21345.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/24014.pdf 60 Transgender Equality 274. She further wrote to us that the Government will be responding to the Law Commission’s report when the new hate-crime action plan is in place.277 275. We welcome the Government’s willingness to further strengthen hate crime legislation. We believe the case is overwhelming for protecting all groups concerned, including trans people, on an equal basis. The Government should introduce new hate- crime legislation which extends the existing provisions on aggravated offences and stirring up hatred so that they apply to all protected characteristics, as defined for the purposes of the Equality Act 2010. Recording names and gender identities 276. Trans people in the UK are, like anyone else, entitled under common law to be known by any name they choose (from the age of 16), provided that there is no fraudulent intent. This includes the right to use more than one name (as many people do for professional purposes, such as acting under a “stage name”, or for various personal reasons)278 There is no such thing in UK law as a “legal name” to which one is required to prove one’s entitlement.279 277. As we have noted (see Chapter Three), there does exist in UK law the concept of “legal gender”. However, the circumstances in which it is relevant are limited. These include situations where: • an application is being made for a job which is restricted to a single sex as an occupational requirement under the Equality Act 2010 (see Chapter Four); • calculations in regard to pensions or benefits (or the age at which they can be drawn) would differ depending on the legal gender of the person concerned; • someone has been imprisoned and there is dispute as to which part of the prison estate (male or female) they should be placed in (see below); or • a marriage or civil partnership is being entered into. 278. There is thus no legal requirement to produce a GRC (or a new birth certificate issued after the granting of a GRC) in order to have a change of name and gender recorded in an organisation’s records.280 Nor is there any requirement to have undergone any form of gender-reassignment / confirmation treatment for this purpose. 279. Further, under the Equality Act 2010, all organisations (including employers and public bodies, such as the NHS) must respect a trans person’s acquired / affirmed gender and any associated change of name. Failure to change pronouns, names and gender 277 Ministry of Justice (TRA 275) 278 When someone changes their name, it may be convenient to draw up a document (such as a deed poll or statutory declaration) to help establish their identity in certain circumstances. However, there is no legal obligation to do so; and no official record is kept of changes of name. The use of ordinary titles (Mr, Mrs, Ms, etc.) is also not governed by law in any way and is a matter of custom and practice. Consequently, people may use any of these titles as they choose. Only the use of inherited, appointed and merit titles (such as MP, Lord, Lady, Sir, Dr, etc.) is governed by law. 279 Jane Fae (TRA 121) 280 In fact, living “in role” for two years (which entails changing one’s name and gender identity in most records) is actually a prerequisite for obtaining a GRC. http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/25094.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19486.pdf 61 Transgender Equality markers (including honorifics and pronouns) on records in respect of a trans person would (with a few exceptions)281 constitute unlawful direct discrimination under the Act. 280. Despite these clear legal principles governing records in respect of trans people, we heard significant evidence that trans people encounter problems with “misgendering” (failure to acknowledge a person’s acquired / affirmed gender) and “deadnaming” (failure to acknowledge a person’s change of name) in many situations. It appears to be commonly assumed that there is such a thing in UK law as a “legal name”, when there clearly is not. It also appears to be assumed that legal gender must be proved in many situations when this is in fact neither required nor appropriate.282 281. Jane Fae pointed out to us that many common practices regarding the recording of changes in name and gender: constitute indirect discrimination: the putting in place of rules or arrangements that apply to everyone, but that result in particular disadvantage to trans persons. For such policies to be lawful, they must be a reasonable means of achieving a necessary end. Security alone cannot excuse discrimination: it must be proven that the policy adopted was the best / only policy available to ensure a particular security outcome, and no reasonable alternatives existed.283 282. We were told that the GEO had worked with the trans community on guidelines for employers regarding the recording of data relating to trans employees and customers, but this had still yet to be published.284 Passports 283. Many organisations, including HM Passport Office, still require a declaration of name-change and a doctor’s letter confirming a change of gender which is meant to be permanent.285 Home Office Minister Karen Bradley told us that the Home Office was looking to: provide the customer with a greater choice on what evidence and from what source that they wish to confirm that the change of gender is likely to be permanent. This may include, for example, employers or government agencies. We plan to discuss further with representative agencies how best we can extend customer choice.286 281 Criminal records may retain a reference to an offender’s birth gender and birth name in order to link a record of offending to a particular individual for the purposes of criminal justice, as well as disclosure and barring. Recent changes have allowed an offender to request a change of the gender and name on their record to reflect their change of gender if their crime is a non-sex related offence (i.e. it does not require registering on the Sex Offenders Register). 282 Jane Fae (TRA 121); Stonewall (TRA 243) 283 Jane Fae (TRA 121) 284 LGBT Consortium (TRA 83); Jane Fae (TRA 121) 285 In evidence the Minister claimed that this was not necessary: Qq240–1, 250–2. However, it is clearly still a requirement at present: Home Office (TRA 271); Sue Pascoe (TRA 262); UK Government, “Passports: change your name and personal details”, accessed 9 December 2015 286 Home Office (TRA 271) http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19486.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/20371.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19486.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19365.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19486.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/24014.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/24014.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/24905.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/23927.pdf https://www.gov.uk/changing-passport-information/changing-your-gender https://www.gov.uk/changing-passport-information/changing-your-gender http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/24905.pdf 62 Transgender Equality 284. Some trans people report that they encounter problems when trying to use a passport showing their acquired / affirmed gender (with, for instance, accusations that such a passport is a forgery).287 285. A UK passport cannot be issued without the holder’s gender being recorded as either “male” or “female”. In Australia, by contrast, provision exists for passports to be issued with the holder’s gender recorded as “X” (meaning indeterminate, unspecified or intersex). Bangladesh and New Zealand are reported to have similar arrangements. Several witnesses argued that UK law should be changed in this respect as part of recognising non-binary identities. Dr Ari Gust wrote to us: If passports were to have an “other” or “x” category, it would offer official recognition of my gender identity and help me to be confirmed by others in my gender identity. This would radically relieve the everyday anxiety of living a non-binary gender.288 286. Karen Bradley told us: The gender identifiers are important in making sure that somebody can be identified, and they can assist with border and law-enforcement matters, but we will look carefully at the evidence of the inquiry.289 It was also pointed out that there was some doubt as to whether certain jurisdictions (e.g. the USA) would accept such a passport.290 National Insurance, tax and benefit records 287. As we have noted (see Chapter Three), the DWP records changes in legal gender and retains on a long-term basis information about trans people’s birth names and birth genders. Some trans people strongly resent this “Retention Policy”, arguing that their previous identity should simply be erased from the records. 288. The DWP seeks to provide an extra layer of security for trans customers whose records show the issuing of a GRC. This is done by designating such records using a “Special Customer Record” (SCR) marker, with a high security rating. A “sensitive account” marker is applied to these records so that details of people’s trans status are kept confidential. (This is dealt with in Special Section D of HMRC.)291 However, some trans people report that the DWP fails to keep their trans status confidential.292 289. We also heard that the increasing use of National Insurance records to verify identities for the purpose of matters such as electoral registration, driver and vehicle licensing, and vehicle hire caused significant problems for trans people. The special status of trans people’s records caused delays in the processing of identity checks; and in some cases trans people had their identities doubted after National Insurance records were checked.293 287 Ms Sarah Cooper (TRA 037) 288 Dr Ari Gust (TRA 080); cf. LGBT Liberal Democrats (TRA 197), Qq145, 154–7 289 Q244 290 Q155 291 Q153; Jane Fae (TRA 121) 292 Unpublished evidence (TRA 005) 293 Q152; Michael Toze (TRA 001); unpublished evidence (TRA 064); Jane Fae (TRA 121); Helen Belcher (TRA 150); Scottish Transgender Alliance (TRA 225) http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19058.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19360.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19620.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/23159.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/23159.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/24014.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/23159.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/23159.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19486.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/23159.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/18822.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19486.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19533.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19659.pdf 63 Transgender Equality 290. In 2014 a case was taken to the High Court in which it was argued that the DWP’s Retention Policy was in contravention of Article 8 of the ECHR and of the Equality Act 2010. The Court held that, although the policies about retaining information on a person’s legal gender had a proper foundation, they lacked clarity and precision, were not readily accessible and would need to be kept under review.294 291. The DWP told us in written evidence that it was unable to comment on the court case, as the verdict was being appealed, with a hearing set for early December 2015. On the other matters raised regarding the department’s recording of trans identities, it advised us that SCR markers are applied automatically to accounts, but customers are given the opportunity to opt out. While the extra security arrangement can cause delays (as an SCR record can only be accessed by someone with appropriate access privileges), any delay can be mitigated by ensuring “that the higher User access is already available for when the SCR claimant arrives at the office”. 292. Further, the CIS “no longer automatically display the presence of GRC data on a customer’s record. This ensures that only specialist staff are aware of, or have access to, GRC information for customers”. Similar safeguards were being applied to new services and systems as they were developed and introduced. 293. The DWP denied that any problems with electoral registration could be laid at its door and said that in such cases the individuals concerned were referred to the relevant local authority officer. Also, the department had no knowledge of any problems relating to the hire of motor vehicles resulting from SCR markers on DWP records.295 Non-gendering 294. We heard that it is open to doubt how far it is actually necessary to record people’s genders at all. Michael Toze pointed out that the limited application of legal gender was actually diminishing as a result of pension reforms: With pensions equalisation, gender is irrelevant for pension and tax purposes for most people born after the 1960s. The government should be planning for a future situation where gender will be treated as an equality characteristic to be monitored (similar to ethnicity or religion) rather than a piece of personal information which makes a functional difference to legal or other processes.296 295. We discussed this issue with Ms Morgan: When and why do we need to know about people’s genders? That is a big debate to be had. Thinking about exam certificates and exam entrance, in one way, what does it matter what someone’s sex is? It is their paper, it gets marked and they get a grade. On the other hand, I would like to know which subjects girls are not doing and boys are not doing and which ones they are not doing well in. For research purposes and knowledge, I would like that information.297 294 The Queen (on the application of C) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2014] EWHC 2403 (Admin), July 2014; Q152; Michael Toze (TRA 001); Gender Identity Research and Education Service (TRA 058); LGBT Consortium (TRA 083) 295 Department for Work and Pensions (TRA 269) 296 Michael Toze (TRA 001) 297 Q269 http://uktrans.info/attachments/article/152/cvdwp.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/23159.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/18822.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19292.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19365.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19365.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/24903.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/18822.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/24014.pdf 64 Transgender Equality 296. There is a need for greater awareness of trans people’s legal right in most contexts to have their name and gender recorded as they wish without precondition. It is commonly assumed that there is such a thing in UK law as a “legal name”, when there is not; and that legal gender must be proved in many situations when this is in fact neither required nor appropriate. 297. The Government must take the lead by ensuring public services have clear and appropriate policies regarding the recording of individuals’ names and genders. The requirement for trans people to produce a doctor’s letter in order to change the gender shown in their passport inappropriately medicalises what should be simply an administrative matter. This requirement must be dropped. 298. The UK must follow Australia’s lead in introducing an option to record gender as “X” on a passport. If Australia is able to implement such a policy there is no reason why the UK cannot do the same. In the longer term, consideration should be given to the removal of gender from passports. 299. The Government should be moving towards “non-gendering” official records as a general principle and only recording gender where it is a relevant piece of information. Where information on gender is required for monitoring purposes, it should be recorded separately from individuals’ personal records and only subject to the consent of those concerned. Prison and Probation Services 300. During this inquiry the deaths in custody of Vicky Thompson298 and Joanne Latham299 underlined the overwhelming challenges faced by trans prisoners and the prison service itself. The case of Tara Hudson, who was moved from a men’s prison to a women’s prison only after a national campaign, demonstrates the confusion within the prison system.300 301. There is no reliable data about the numbers of trans people in the criminal justice system. We heard an estimate that there are 100 trans prisoners, but the Prison Service does not currently capture such information.301 302. The Prisons and Probation Ombudsman, whose role is to investigate deaths in detention and complaints by people in detention, told us that the lack of data was a significant problem. The Ombudsman’s: own equality and diversity monitoring is stymied by this lack of information. […] Clearly, more needs to be done by NOMS [the National Offender Management Service], to enable their own monitoring and to facilitate scrutiny bodies such as this office to identify complaints from transgender prisoners. Without this, neither NOMS nor ourselves can be assured that the specific protections afforded to this group under equality legalisation are provided to 298 “Transgender woman Vicky Thompson found dead at Armley jail”, BBC News, 19 November 2015 299 “Transgender inmate found dead in Woodhill prison cell”, BBC News, 1 December 2015 300 “Calls for transgender woman to be moved from male prison”, BBC News, 27 October 2015; “Transgender woman Tara Hudson moved to female prison”, BBC News, 30 October 2015; Q283 301 Qq92, 94; Prison Reform Trust (TRA 198); Bent Bars (TRA 264). The figure of 100 is apparently derived from “Male prisoners jump at transgender privileges”, Sunday Times, 27 July 2014. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-leeds-34869620 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-beds-bucks-herts-34972221 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-somerset-34650486 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-34675778 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-34675778 http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/24014.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/21638.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/21638.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19621.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/24073.pdf http://www.thesundaytimes.co.uk/sto/news/uk_news/article1439313.ece http://www.thesundaytimes.co.uk/sto/news/uk_news/article1439313.ece 65 Transgender Equality them while they are in custody or that broader lessons from our investigations are being learned across the prison system.302 303. Trans prisoners are protected by the Equality Act. At the same time, the provisions on single-sex services (see Chapter Three) apply to prisons: carceral facilities can be provided on a single-sex basis, as this is a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim; and trans prisoners can be excluded from facilities relating to their acquired / affirmed gender where this is a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim. 304. Related issues arise in relation to the placement of trans people in appropriate settings when under the supervision of the National Probation Service (NPS) or Community Rehabilitation Companies (CRCs). 305. The NOMS Prison Service Instruction on Care and Management of Transsexual Prisoners (PSI 07/2011) sets out clear standards, including that: • prisoners must be located according to their gender as recognised under UK law;303 • a trans prisoner may be “sufficiently advanced in the gender reassignment process” that they can be placed “in the estate of their acquired gender, even if the law does not yet recognise they are of their acquired gender” • prisoners wishing to undergo gender reassignment must be allowed to live permanently in their preferred gender, including access to clothes and make up; • convicted trans prisoners are entitled to the same NHS treatment that they would have received if they had not been imprisoned; • trans prisoners must have a management care plan outlining how they will be managed safely and decently within the prison environment; • a change of name which is genuine and permanent must be allowed; • trans prisoners at all stages of the gender reassignment process must be encouraged to enter into a voluntary written agreement on searching arrangements. 306. The Prison Reform Trust described the Instruction as “a significant achievement”, which “went a long way towards protecting the needs and treatment of transgender people in prison”.304 However, we heard that there has been significant inconsistency in the actual application of the Instruction. The Bent Bars Project, an LGBT prisoner advocacy group, told us: Prisoners in some establishments report being supported and recognised and being allowed to express their identities in line with PSI 07/2011. Others are systematically denied the right to wear appropriate clothing, misinformed or lied to about their rights and not given access to appropriate medical treatment. In at least one case, a prisoner was led to believe that the prison had been trying 302 Prisons and Probation Ombudsman (TRA 252) 303 A female-to-male trans person with a GRC may not be refused location in a male prison. A male-to-female trans person with a GRC may be refused location in a female prison only on security grounds, and would then be considered a female prisoner in the male estate and must be managed according to Prison Service Order 4800 Women Prisoners. 304 Prison Reform Trust (TRA 198) http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/22309.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19621.pdf 66 Transgender Equality to make appointments with the NHS Gender Identity Clinic, only to discover on release that no contact whatsoever had been made by the prison at all. The situation could be even worse for those prisoners who began their transition while in custody.305 307. The Prison Reform Trust also expressed concern about un-convicted prisoners usually having to wait for treatment for gender dysphoria, arguing that this appeared to “undermine” the principle of prisoners having equivalent access to healthcare.306 308. Julia Gamble, a prison Equalities and Diversity Officer, expressed her view that there was ambiguity in the Instruction, which led certain prison establishments to think that a diagnosis of gender dysphoria needed to be confirmed before a prison-based care plan could be established.307 309. More significantly, it appeared that all too often the Instruction was simply being ignored.308 The Prison Reform Trust had received complaints about inaction after inappropriate comments from other prisoners or staff, and about lack of access to outside support or specialist organisations. The Trust had also had its letters returned and been told by prison staff that it had to misgender a prisoner.309 (We ourselves discovered that a prisoner had been told that they could not telephone us about our inquiry. The prison authorities concerned only allowed this after the MoJ intervened, having been directly contacted by the prisoner.)310 310. Witnesses told us that there was sometimes scepticism among prison staff about individuals’ motivations for wishing to live in-role in their acquired / affirmed gender.311 The press have reported cis-gendered males claiming to be trans in order to obtain privileges;312 and Dr Barrett, of BAGIS, suggested that there might also be other more varied, and sometimes sinister, motives.313 The Prison Reform Trust, however, felt that the numbers of prisoners in this situation, and the challenges they posed, might have been “exaggerated”.314 311. The Prisons and Probation Ombudsman told us: one theme that does appear to emerge from complaints from transgender prisoners was access to, or restrictions on, make-up or clothing which would help the prisoner to live in their acquired gender […] [I]n two of the three cases [investigated] the prison was required to ensure that their local policy was compliant with the [Prison Service Instruction] or that staff be reminded of the requirements of both local and national policy regarding transgender prisoners. […] [I]t is not unusual for us to make recommendations that prisons 305 Bent Bars (TRA 264) 306 Prison Reform Trust (TRA 198) 307 Julia Gamble (TRA 091) 308 Julia Gamble (TRA 091); Prison Reform Trust (TRA 198) 309 Prison Reform Trust (TRA 198) 310 E-mail from Parliamentary Briefing Team, Department for Education, 29 October 2015 311 Q120; British Association of Gender Identity Specialists / Dr James Barrett (TRA 149); Prison Reform Trust (TRA 198) 312 “Male prisoners jump at transgender privileges”, Sunday Times, 27 July 2014 313 British Association of Gender Identity Specialists / Dr James Barrett (TRA 149) 314 Prison Reform Trust (TRA 198). They told us it appeared “reasonable” to ask experts to make an assessment where there were any doubts about motivation, but these assessments should take place quickly and be centrally monitored to ensure consistency and compliance with the Equality Act. http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/24073.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19621.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19404.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19404.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19621.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19621.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/21638.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19532.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19621.pdf http://www.thesundaytimes.co.uk/sto/news/uk_news/article1439313.ece http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19532.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19621.pdf 67 Transgender Equality should ensure that their staff are aware of, and feel confident in implementing, Prison Service Instructions, but perhaps this is all the more pertinent in the context of transgender issues about which many prison staff may lack awareness and training.315 312. The issues with implementation of the Instruction do appear to be largely down to a lack of understanding, reflecting unacceptable and discriminatory attitudes towards trans people in society.316 Ms Gamble told us that prison staff reaction: has in the past ranged from disbelief (“He’s just trying to get attention”) through concern (“How are we going to put a care plan in place in a sex offenders prison?”) to disengagement (“I’m going to transfer him!”) at no stage is this regarded as a positive change in the life of the prisoners and one that might lead them to have better self perception, increased self confidence and an improvement in their state of mental health.317 313. Megan Key, the lead on trans issues in the NPS, explained that NOMS was currently revising the Instruction on trans prisoners, looking at how it “could be more flexible”, with less emphasis on legal gender status.318 Ms Key also told us that the revised guidance would cover prisoners on remand.319 We were told by the Government that the revised Instruction will in addition extend to the NPS and the 21 CRCs.320 314. The Government further explained to us that in 2014 it had carried out a series of interviews with transgender offenders to inform revision of the Instruction. This had, it said, “provided important insights” which would “enrich” the quality of care provided.321 315. The current Instruction has an “Expiry Date” of March 2015, meaning that the new version is now significantly overdue. This has undoubtedly created some very damaging confusion. During our inquiry we were contacted by a prisoner who had been told that the existing guidance no longer applied and that prisons were now free to set their own rules in this regard. The Justice Minister Ms Dinenage, however, categorically assured us that the original Instruction was “still valid”, pending the new version.322 We were also told the same by the Prisons and Probation Ombudsman.323 316. The Minister told us that the new Instruction would be issued “hopefully, before Christmas [2015]”.324 She subsequently told the House that “The intention is to implement the guidance early in the New Year [2016].”325 317. Later, in response to Ms Thompson’s death, Andrew Selous, Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Prisons, told the House that: 315 Prisons and Probation Ombudsman (TRA 252) 316 Q120 317 Julia Gamble (TRA 091) 318 Qq97, 122 319 Qq122–3 320 Government Equalities Office (TRA 245) 321 Government Equalities Office (TRA 245) 322 Q285 323 Prisons and Probation Ombudsman (TRA 252) 324 Q283 325 Commons written answer, Written question 14133, 5 November 2015 http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/22309.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/21638.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19404.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/21638.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/21638.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/21638.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/20997.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/20997.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/24014.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/22309.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/24014.pdf http://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/written-questions-answers-statements/written-question/Commons/2015-10-29/14133 68 Transgender Equality A review of the current policy began earlier this year, and revised policy guidance will be issued to reflect NOMS’ responsibilities to transgender offenders in the community, as well as in custody. The intention is to implement the guidance in due course. The management and care of trans people in prison is a complex issue, and the review is using the expertise developed by NOMS practitioners, as well as engaging with relevant stakeholders, including those from the trans community, to ensure that we provide prison staff with the best possible guidance.326 Ms Dinenage subsequently wrote to us that “The revised guidance will be implemented in due course.”327 318. Regarding the Probation Service, Ms Dinenage told us: There are very good examples […] of programmes that have been put in place by individual CRCs particularly with the trans community in mind.328 The Minister did subsequently write to us, but only told us in general terms about the requirement in CRCs’ contracts for them to “comply with relevant Human Rights and Equalities legislation”.329 319. Ms Dinenage also told us that a new equality information form would be introduced “very shortly” allowing trans people to voluntarily disclose their status in order to help judges when making decisions, as well as prison governors and staff.330 320. While the safety and welfare of all offenders is paramount, caring for and managing trans offenders appropriately is crucial. There is a clear risk of harm (including violence, sexual assault, self-harming and suicide) where trans prisoners are not located in a prison or other setting appropriate to their acquired / affirmed gender. Neither is it fair or appropriate for them to end up in solitary confinement solely as a result of their trans status. 321. We welcome the revision of the Prison Service Instruction on Care and Management of Transsexual Prisoners to make it more flexible and to extend it to prisoners on remand and offenders in statutory contact with the National Probation Service. The Ministry of Justice, National Offender Management Service and National Probation Service must urgently clarify what the situation is pending the publication of the new Instruction. When the new Instruction is published, they must ensure that staff are trained on it and that its implementation is monitored. Media 322. Witnesses told us that there had been “a positive shift” in the portrayal of trans people in the media.331 The death in 2013 of a trans primary-school teacher who had been outed 326 HC Deb, 20 November 2015, cols 975–976 [Commons Chamber] 327 Ministry of Justice (TRA 275). On 8 December 2015 Ms Dinenage announced that the review would be widened in scope and would complete its work early in 2016 – Commons Written statement HCWS368, 8 November 2015. 328 Q286 329 Ministry of Justice (TRA 275) 330 Q283 331 Trans Media Watch (TRA 162); Qq189, 190 http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201516/cmhansrd/cm151120/debtext/151120-0001.htm http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/25094.pdf http://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/written-questions-answers-statements/written-statement/Commons/2015-12-08/HCWS368/ http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/24014.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/25094.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/24014.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19553.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/23159.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/23159.pdf 69 Transgender Equality by newspapers, and the resulting public outcry, was a turning point.332 In recent months, the press has covered the transitions of celebrities such as Stephanie Hirst, Jack Monroe and Kellie Maloney in a largely sympathetic and supportive manner. The portrayal of trans people on television and radio also appears to be more thoughtful and better informed than previously. “Boy Meets Girl”, the first UK sitcom with a major role for a trans character played by a trans actor, Rebecca Root, launched on the BBC as we began taking evidence for our inquiry and was described by one of our witnesses as an “”utterly superb, sensitive programme”.333 Trans actors playing trans characters now feature in “Eastenders” (Riley Carter Millington) and “Hollyoaks” (Annie Wallace), and both have been welcomed by viewers. 323. However, there was still significant room for improvement. Trans Media Watch reported that some comedy programmes continued to present a problem. Ms Belcher explained why this was difficult to address: A line of defence very often is comedy. If we encounter something that is hateful, the response is almost always, “Oh, it was just a laugh. It was a bit of a joke; we did not mean it seriously” […] How do you then prove a malicious intent when they are saying it was only a joke?334 BBC Radio 4’s Woman’s Hour was also highlighted as having “a history of treating trans people with “incredulity”. Christie Elan-Cane also referred to the “freak show element […] where trans people are essentially just brought there to air their dirty linen for public ridicule”.335 324. Trans Media Watch also told us that tabloids were still outing individuals with no regard to the impact of unwanted attention, hiding behind the defence of “positive” stories. Christie Elan-Cane helped us to understand why this could be so difficult: as someone who was outed in the media years ago, I did not know what I was letting myself in for, which sounds a bit naïve now, but I had no idea about the impact that would have on my life. You think that you are in control, but you very quickly lose control and they will portray you any way they want until you do not recognise that person.336 325. Trans Media Watch told us of a piece published by the Sun in December 2014 which revealed a prospective parliamentary candidate’s trans status and made an insulting reference to this as well as to her disability. They told us that the new self-regulatory press body, the Independent Press Standards Organisation (IPSO), had provided only limited protection.337 IPSO had agreed that the initial article was a breach of the Editors’ Code338, and that a subsequent apology was “insincere” and a “further attempt at humour at Ms Brothers’ expense”. But Trans Media Watch told us that IPSO had not commented on 332 Q28; Trans Media Watch (TRA 162) 333 Q190 334 Q47 335 Q189 336 Q189 337 Q30 338 The Editors’ Code of Practice, enforced by Independent Press Standards Organisation, covers a wide range of guidance including proscribing prejudicial or pejorative reference to an individual’s race, colour, religion, gender, sexual orientation or to any physical or mental illness or disability. http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/21345.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19553.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/23159.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/21345.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/23159.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/23159.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/21345.pdf https://www.ipso.co.uk/IPSO/cop.html 70 Transgender Equality whether the latter article amounted to victimisation.339 Ms Belcher told us that this was deterring other trans people from taking forward complaints: a number of trans people, as people in general, will not take forward complaints because they want the story to die and so a lot goes unchallenged. Anything which then is seen to be further victimising or further unnecessary exposure will act as a major deterrent.340 326. IPSO, however, wrote to us that it “would not agree with Ms Belcher that we have not engaged with the issue or that our actions might be a deterrent to complainants.”341 327. We put concerns about victimisation to Mr Vaizey, who responded as follows: I am very sorry to hear if that is the case. Many people who are transgender live with a great deal of discrimination and a great deal of bullying and victimisation. The last thing we want is for people to feel that somehow, if they raise what I would regard as legitimate complaints or concerns […] that would make things more difficult for them.342 328. Another argument made to us was that the Editors’ Code does not apply to trans people as a group. Ms Belcher told us this meant that the press could use very insulting or inflammatory language against trans people in general without any redress being available. She thought that there was a worrying trend of publishing problematic articles which used that approach, yet Trans Media Watch had not seen any signs that IPSO intended to address this.343 329. On this point, IPSO responded that: contrary to Ms Belcher’s suggestion, IPSO’s rules allow for groups to complain about an article that relates to a broad class of individuals. Indeed, in the last month, IPSO worked with the charity Changing Faces to successfully mediate a resolution on a piece on the Daily Express website about facial disfigurement.344 330. In general, Ms Belcher told us there was an “awful lot of ignorance” in the regulators with a “base level of understanding [that] is very low”. We asked Trans Media Watch whether they consider Ofcom (the statutory regulatory authority for the UK broadcasting industry) to be effective. They had met Ofcom in 2010 and had found trans awareness at a low level, but had not had much contact with them since. They had never received specific feedback following complaints to the BBC.345 331. Mr Vaizey told us that Ofcom was planning to bring out an updated code in spring 2016, with a consultation.346 He subsequently wrote to us that Ofcom were updating their research on what is considered offensive language, with a view to revising Section 2 of the Broadcasting Code, concerning “harmful and / or offensive material”. The research update “includes testing audience attitudes to discriminatory language about trans people and 339 Q30; Trans Media Watch (TRA 162) 340 Q30 341 Independent Press Standards Organisation (TRA 248) 342 Q301 343 Q30 344 Independent Press Standards Organisation (TRA 248) 345 Q31 346 Q303 http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/21345.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19553.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/21345.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/21516.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/24176.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/21345.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/21516.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/21345.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/24176.pdf 71 Transgender Equality will include a sub-group of participants from the trans community”. Ofcom considered that the existing rules themselves: are currently sufficient to ensure that viewers and listeners are protected from offensive or harmful material involving or referring to the trans community that is discriminatory, offensive and not justified by the context in which it is presented.347 332. We also heard that media coverage of trans people remains narrowly focused. Helen Belcher told us that very little was written in the press about the things that “actually affect trans lives”, like the healthcare, discrimination, employment and education issues which we covered in our inquiry. She highlighted the “butterfly syndrome”, and explained why this emphasis on transition was so objectionable to trans people: real life is not like that […] There is a process of realisation; […] of self- acceptance; […] of coming out to those around you and interacting with the world, and it takes time. It is not an immediate switch […] terms like “sex swap” or “sex change” […] indicates an immediate or whimsical decision […] it would be incredibly unlikely that people [...] make this kind of life-changing decision on that basis.348 Christie Elan-Cane echoed these comments, saying being non-gendered was “not a lifestyle choice”, adding that it was “incredibly frustrating” that being non-gendered was always portrayed as a “young person’s issue”,349 with the implication that it might therefore be “a phase”.350 333. We also heard that fictional trans characters were likely to be “one dimensional”.351 Mr Vaizey told us: I would much rather see somebody cast as a doctor, a nurse, a policeman, a lawyer, an MP, who also happens to be transgender. I do think there is something in that critique of broadcasters and I hope that, more and more, we will see people from the transgender community, as, indeed, from other communities that are underrepresented on our screens, cast in mainstream roles and their background is simply irrelevant in that respect.352 334. While coverage of trans people in the media has been improving in recent years, there is no room for complacency—and confidence in regulators still appears low among the trans community. Both the Independent Press Standards Organisation and Ofcom should consider what steps they might take to encourage more trans people to come forward with complaints. 347 Department for Culture, Media and Sport (TRA 270) 348 Qq28–9 349 Q189 350 Qq189, 193 351 Q189 352 Q300 http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/24904.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/21345.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/23159.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/23159.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/23159.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/23159.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/24176.pdf 72 Transgender Equality Online services 335. Trans people often face shocking abuse online.353 Ms Belcher gave us a dreadful example of a Tweet that encouraged trans people to kill themselves.354 336. The DCMS told us that it was “absolutely clear that what is illegal off-line is also illegal on-line”,355 but we heard that successful prosecution of online transphobic hate crime was even less likely than hate crime generally. Chief Constable Sawyers told us: If [online hate crimes] are committed by somebody who is thousands and thousands of miles away, it is really difficult to start to police those things happening.356 337. Most offensive website content stops short of being criminal.357 Many of our witnesses argued that online providers needed to do more in such cases.358 Trans Media Watch told us, for example, that it was very difficult to get Facebook to take offensive pages down. As well as the direct effect of the abuse itself, the posting online of “very personal, possibly inaccurate data” about someone can also have an indirect impact on such matters as trying to get a job or rent a flat.359 338. Mr Vaizey told us he had not found social media companies “particularly forthcoming” in producing clear codes of conduct, which he described as “a straightforward ask, not really of Government, but of society”.360 Trans Media Watch told us that another issue was that many social media companies were based in the US which appeared to be less aware of trans issues.361 339. Since self-regulation does not appear to be working, we asked DCMS and the Minister whether formal regulation was needed. Mr Vaizey told us they had “not gone down the road of seeking formal regulation “.362 DCMS argued: Regulation risks stifling the creativity and innovation that the internet enables, and could be impractical and might impair the technical dynamism of the internet.363 Ms Belcher explained to us that social media companies were not regulated as broadcasters were because social media were seen as more conversations between people than a broadcast mechanism.364 The Minister also told us it was “important to get the balance 353 Q304; Trans Media Watch (TRA 162) 354 Q45 355 Department for Culture, Media and Sport (TRA 259). DCMS pointed to the House of Lords Communications Select Committee’s report into Social Media and Criminal Offences in July 2014, which found that the criminal law was “generally appropriate for the prosecution of offences committed using social media” – House of Lords, Report of the Select Committee on Communications, Session 2014–15, HL Paper 37, para 94. 356 Q47. The UK Supreme Court has indicated that an offence can be committed under UK law where the person posting or controlling illegal material online is present in this country (irrespective of the physical location of the server on which the content is hosted). Home Office rules say that if the location of this individual is not known, then the police force in the area where the complainant lives is responsible for commencing enquiries. 357 Department for Culture, Media and Sport (TRA 259) 358 Trans Media Watch (TRA 162); Qq47 [Jane Sawyers], 304 359 Q45 360 Q304 361 Q45 362 Q304 363 Department for Culture, Media and Sport (TRA 259) 364 Q45 http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/24176.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19553.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/21345.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/23578.pdf http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201415/ldselect/ldcomuni/37/37.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/21345.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/23578.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19553.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/21345.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/24176.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/21345.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/24176.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/21345.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/24176.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/23578.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/21345.pdf 73 Transgender Equality right”, allowing people to speak freely online while also dealing with the “occasional overreaction”.365 340. The Government told us that it was working with social media companies in a number of ways. Under the UK Council for Child Internet Safety (UKCCIS), the Government and OFCOM were working with companies like Twitter, Facebook, Google, Ask.FM, MindCandy and Microsoft to try to develop best practice guidance for children.366 We have also followed the work done on tackling revenge pornography online. We put it to the Minister that it appeared the Government could achieve more for trans people if it made it more of priority. The Minister told us this was “a very fair point”.367 341. Mr Vaizey told us that this area fell within the remit of Baroness Shields, the new Minister for Internet Safety and Security.368 He later wrote to us reiterating that “what is illegal off-line is also illegal on-line” and stating that “robust legislation [is] in place to deal with internet trolls, cyber-stalking and harassment, and those who send messages that are grossly offensive, obscene or menacing”. He drew to our attention the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015, which amended offences in the Malicious Communications Act 1988, and the Communications Act 2003, to allow more time for investigations into offences, as “appropriate for modern communications and the internet”.369 342. The Government’s desire to work with online service providers rather than further regulate them must not be an excuse for inaction. The Government must keep the situation under close review and work proactively with providers to ensure that they take their responsibilities seriously. Schools 343. Gender-variant young people and their families face particular challenges at school. From witnesses we heard that schools often do not know how to deal with matters such as: • recording a change of name and gender; • bullying; • inclusion in sport; and • access to toilets.370 344. Gendered Intelligence explained: There are gender divisions across the whole of our school systems […] uniform policy, Sex and Relationship Education [SRE], Physical Education, sports, toilets, seating plans in the classroom and the ways teachers ask children to line up.371 Each of these situations is potentially problematic for a gender-variant pupil. 365 Q308 366 Department for Culture, Media and Sport (TRA 259) 367 Q308 368 Qq304, 307, 309 369 Department for Culture, Media and Sport (TRA 270) 370 Mermaids (TRA 156); Gendered Intelligence (TRA 163); National Union of Students (TRA 187) 371 Gendered Intelligence (TRA 163) para 24 http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/24176.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/23578.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/24176.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/24176.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/24176.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/24176.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/23578.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19540.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19557.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19608.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19557.pdf 74 Transgender Equality 345. The EHRC told us: Research indicates that 91% of trans boys and 66% of trans girls experience harassment or bullying at school, leading to depression, isolation and a desire to leave education as early as possible. This is a higher rate of discrimination than that faced by young lesbian and gay students. This poor treatment at school has a knock-on effect on their mental health, attendance and ability to learn. Many gender-variant children report hiding their identity, to the detriment of their self-esteem, and leaving school as soon as possible to escape the bullying and harassment that they faced.372 346. Evidence we received during our inquiry suggested that the support and provision for trans school children is uneven, varying from school to school Some schools were “outstanding”373 and “fantastic, […] doing everything they can”. Yet, as, Susie Green, the Chair of Mermaids, told us “too many […] fell short”.374 347. Ms Green gave this illustration: We have had an incident where a child turned up after transitioning over school holidays and the school refused to allow the child entry to the building and insisted on saying that the name and the gender on the birth certificate was the one that was legal and, therefore, they could not and would not respect their gender choices or their name change choices.375 348. We also heard that access to professionals, such as educational psychologists and Parent Support Advisers, was limited.376 Ms Green told us that some schools were adopting a “victim mentality”, seeing the transgender student as the problem and wanting to “get rid” of, rather than accommodating, them and addressing the wider issues. She told us that some schools took the view: “We do not want to be dealing with that, so let us just shuffle it off to one side” or refuse to acknowledge it.377 349. Under the Equality Act 2010 (see Chapter Four), it is unlawful for schools to treat pupils less favourably on grounds of gender reassignment.378 However, as the EHRC pointed out to us, the Act: does not provide protection from harassment related to gender reassignment for students in schools, unlike most other protected characteristics; although such treatment by a school may amount to direct discrimination.379 372 Equality and Human Rights Commission (TRA 078) 373 Gendered Intelligence (TRA 163) para 23 374 Q76 375 Q76 376 Unpublished evidence (TRA 030) 377 Q78 378 The protection of pupils against discrimination on grounds of gender reassignment (under Section 85) now matches the protection in schools in relation to sexual orientation. 379 Equality and Human Rights Commission (TRA 078); cf. Trades Union Congress (TRA 117). The offence of harassment as defined under Section 26 of the Equality Act 2010 does not apply in schools with regard to religion or belief, sexual orientation or gender reassignment. http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19337.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19557.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/21638.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/21638.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/21638.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19337.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19482.pdf 75 Transgender Equality 350. According to the Department for Education, the lack of protection against harassment in this regard is not significant, as the provisions on direct discrimination provide adequate protection in a school setting.380 351. Schools also have to take account of the protected characteristic of gender reassignment when considering their obligations under the Public Sector Equality Duty (PSED).381 The Department for Education has produced guidance for schools to help them understand how the Equality Act affects them and how to fulfil their duties.382 This guidance includes a section on gender reassignment, which explains that this definition does not mean a pupil has to be undertaking a medical procedure.383 352. Mermaids argued that the EHRC’s enforcement powers under the Act were limited by a requirement to have the consent of a young person’s parents in order to pursue a complaint about discrimination: a young person of 16 wanted their name changing at school but their parents did not consent to this. Although the Equality and Human Rights [Commission] found the school’s refusal to comply was discriminatory, they could not proceed with action against the school as the young person was under 18.384 353. Schools also have to have behaviour policies which include bullying. In its written evidence to us the Government stated that: All children and young people should be allowed to be themselves and to achieve all that they are capable of. The Government is determined to stamp out bullying in school (or in higher or further education) because of their gender identity […]385 354. Many witnesses called for a “more coherent and standardised” approach for supporting gender variant people through their education.386 Mermaids described a “lack of even basic understanding of gender variance within many education professionals.”387 They called for staff training around gender identity to be widely available and mandatory for all school staff and to be included during teacher training. 355. The Women and Equalities Minister, Ms Morgan, who is also Secretary of State for Education, admitted to us that “there are clearly some areas where there is a lot of improvement needed.388 356. We asked Ms Morgan what she was doing to make sure that schools were abiding by their responsibilities under the Equality Act. She replied: 380 Department for Education, The Equality Act 2010 and schools: Departmental advice for school leaders, school staff, governing bodies and local authorities, May 2014, paras 1.19–21 381 Schools as public bodies, are required, in carrying out their functions, to have due regard to the need to achieve the objectives set out under Section 149 of the Equality Act 2010 (the Public Sector Equality Duty). 382 Department for Education, Equality Act 2010: advice for schools, February 2013; Department for Education, The Equality Act 2010 and schools: Departmental advice for school leaders, school staff, governing bodies and local authorities, May 2014 383 Government Equalities Office (TRA 245) para 16 384 Mermaids (TRA 156) 385 Government Equalities Office (TRA 245) para 15 386 Gendered Intelligence (TRA 163) 387 Mermaids (TRA 156) 388 Q296 https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/315587/Equality_Act_Advice_Final.pdf https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/315587/Equality_Act_Advice_Final.pdf https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/315587/Equality_Act_Advice_Final.pdf https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/315587/Equality_Act_Advice_Final.pdf https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/315587/Equality_Act_Advice_Final.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/20997.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19540.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/20997.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19557.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19540.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/24014.pdf 76 Transgender Equality we are looking at initial teacher training. At the moment, there is no curriculum as such, but Sir Andrew Carter has been doing a review for my Department on what we think should be in teacher training, without wishing to be too prescriptive, but there are areas where there is more that we could do about getting teachers to be more confident and to support pupils and other members of staff.389 357. Several witnesses argued that schools should provide better education on gender identity, possibly under the SRE component of Personal, Social and Health Education (PSHE). The GEO has recently funded the PSHE Association and sector experts to draw up advice for schools on gender-variant pupils, incorporating a toolkit for schools on supporting gender variant pupils and lesson plans on gender identity for use in PSHE lessons. It also drew attention to the introduction to the new national curriculum, which states that all schools should teach PSHE, drawing on good practice.390 358. Several witnesses pointed out that PSHE is not statutory. Jay Stewart, of Gendered Intelligence, told us: “I would be recommending statutory PSHE across the country [...] it is a brilliant curriculum to support students to know lots of stuff around sexual orientation and also gender identity.”391 Mermaids told us that they supplied resources via councils to schools across the country. However, as they were not national resources, schools often felt no obligation to refer or adhere to the guidance.392 359. We asked Nicky Morgan if she felt that transgender issues should be taught in schools as part of what should be mandatory PSHE. She replied: “PSHE is hugely important […] but just because you say something is statutory [does not mean] it is going to be taught well.”393 360. More needs to be done to ensure that gender-variant young people and their families get sufficient support at school. Schools must understand their responsibilities under the Equality Act. They must abide by their legal responsibility to ensure that all staff receive sufficient training to ensure they are compliant across all protected characteristics, including that which relates to trans people, especially gender-variant young people. In its review of initial teacher training, the Government should consider the inclusion of training on the protected characteristics. 361. Trans issues (and gender issues generally) should be taught as part of Personal, Social and Health Education. Post-school education 362. One in three trans students experience at least one form of bullying or harassment on campus. Research by the National Union of Students (NUS) found that trans students were twice as likely as LGB students to have experienced harassment, threats or intimidations, and physical assault on campus.394 We also heard evidence that in further education, 389 Q296 390 Government Equalities Office (TRA 245) para 15 391 Q79 392 Mermaids (TRA 156) pp 5-6 393 Q298 394 National Union of Students (TRA 187) para 2 http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/24014.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/20997.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/21638.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19540.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/24014.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19608.pdf 77 Transgender Equality the learning environment for LGBT learners might be more hostile than that in higher education. 363. Such experiences impact on trans students’ studies and participation in student life more broadly. The NUS stated that students who had experienced transphobic harassment in higher education were two to three times more likely to consider leaving their course. Students who had experienced transphobia had also reported that it had put them off from participating in sport.395 364. We also heard about other issues which concerned trans students, including lack of gender-neutral toilets, lack of policies to update names and genders in the student register, being repeatedly mis-named or mis-gendered by staff, problems with university security staff, and insufficiently well trained career advisers.396 One trans person told us they had left university after two terms due to bullying from other students and lack of support from lecturers, including frequent mis-gendering. Anna Lee, Vice President, Welfare and Community, Lancaster University Students’ Union, told us that universities were also “not being as accommodating as they should be to trans students requiring time out during their course for mental health reasons or a variety of other reasons, and students having to really fight for their ability to, say, take a degree in one year longer.”397 365. When asked about the provision of gender-neutral toilets in higher education institutions Dr Jay Stewart, Director, Gendered Intelligence, told us that: Genderneutral toilets, genderneutral spaces and genderneutral language need to flow through many of our institutes of education, right through to higher education. There is no reason to say “male” or “female” in many senses, so why should we? […] We should have more genderneutral toilets, the same for everyone. That will help lots of people, including trans and nonbinaryidentified people.398 366. We put the levels or reported bullying and harassment of trans students to Nick Boles MP, Minister of State for Skills at the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills. He told us That, in a sense, is perhaps particularly shocking. Maybe this is naïve of me, but you would rather hope that a younger age group was more aware and more open-minded. We can excuse, perhaps, people who have grown up in a different age and with a different set of attitudes. That is very troubling.399 367. He continued by saying: The higher education sector has a sectorled Equality Challenge Unit and it produces guidance. There is guidance called “Trans staff and students in higher education”, which was updated in 2010, which helps the institutions. There is a gender equality charter. 395 National Union of Students (TRA 187) para 4 The same findings applied to biphobia and homophobia. 396 National Union of Students (TRA 187) para 6 397 Q80 398 Q82 399 Q293 http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19608.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19608.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/21638.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/21638.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/24014.pdf 78 Transgender Equality He said that what was needed was a “challenge to bad behaviour” and a “zero-tolerance regime”. He told us that he was: very happy to take that away and have a discussion with the Universities Minister, Jo Johnson, about whether we can make sure that university vice chancellors, frankly, are taking this seriously and not just thinking, “Oh, well, I have my charter and I have my guidance”, but are doing something about it where these cases are reported.400 368. The GEO, in its written submission, also told us that the Skills Funding Agency had commissioned research in 2011 into sexual orientation and gender identity equality in adult learning. A number of recommendations were made in the report aimed at further education colleges and independent training providers and a range of projects subsequently funded by the Skills Funding Agency, through the Equality and Diversity Good Practice Fund and its predecessor funds. The Institute for Employment Studies had evaluated the fund and found that it has been particularly effective in raising the status of “newer” protected characteristics such as gender identity. The GEO noted that the good practice and resources from each project were “freely available for the whole sector to use”.401 369. The levels of bullying and harassment experienced by trans students in further and higher education are unacceptable. We welcome the offer of the Minister of State for Skills to raise this with university Vice Chancellors and to discuss with them whether enough is being done when complaints are made. We recommend that the Government hold similar conversations with further education providers. The Government should also take steps to ensure all further education and university staff receive gender identity awareness training. Further and higher education institutions should take proactive steps to promote trans equality, including having a Transgender Champions scheme for their non-trans staff. Social care for young people 370. We also heard evidence that there is a lack of appropriate training of social care staff in trans issues, raising particular issues for gender variant looked-after children or gender variant children in secure accommodation Mermaids wrote: [our] experience of children in care or families dealing with social services has been poor. There have been many cases where, if the families support their child’s gender variance, social services have attempted to remove children from the family home by treating this as a safeguarding concern and investigating the parents accordingly. Social workers have no formal knowledge or training around gender variance, and appear to act on their own prejudices rather than researching gender issues. For children and young people in care, no provision or reasonable adjustments are made if a young person is presenting as the opposite gender to their birth gender, and in many cases staff are failing on their duty of care.402 400 Q293 401 Government Equalities Office (TRA 245) para 17 402 Mermaids (TRA 156) para 6 http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/24014.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/20997.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19540.pdf 79 Transgender Equality Conclusions and recommendations Our Inquiry 1. Fairness and equality are basic British values. Parliament established this Committee to provide the opportunity for on-going focused scrutiny of where fairness and equality are not yet a reality of day-to-day life. A litmus test for any society that upholds the principles of fairness and equality is the extent to which it supports and protects the rights and interests of every citizen, even the most marginalised groups. Whilst Britain has been among the countries that have gone furthest in recognising lesbian, gay and bisexual rights, our society is still failing this test in respect of trans people, despite welcome progress in recent years. (Paragraph 7) Cross-government strategy 2. The Minister for Women and Equalities and the Government Equalities Office have a cross-government role in respect of trans equality. The 2011 Advancing Transgender Equality action plan remains largely unimplemented. Within the next six months, the Government must agree a new strategy which it can deliver, with full cross-departmental support. (Paragraph 26) 3. It must also draw up a balance sheet of the previous transgender action plan, confirm those actions which have been completed and agree a new strategy to tackle those issues which remain unaddressed. This must be done within the next six months. It should set out clearly the areas of responsibility and lines of accountability in the public sector regarding trans equality issues. It should also include a wholesale review of issues facing non-binary and non-gendered people. (Paragraph 26) 4. The Government must also make a clear commitment to abide by the Yogyakarta Principles and Resolution 2048 of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. This would provide trans equality policy with a clear set of overall guiding principles which are in keeping with current international best practice. (Paragraph 27) Gender Recognition Act 2004 5. The Government must look into the need to create a legal category for those people with a gender identity outside that which is binary and the full implications of this. (Paragraph 31) Providing proof 6. While we recognise the importance of the Gender Recognition Act as pioneering legislation when it was passed, it is clear that the Act is now dated. The medicalised approach regarding mental-health diagnosis pathologises trans identities; as such, it runs contrary to the dignity and personal autonomy of applicants. (Paragraph 44) 7. Within the current Parliament, the Government must bring forward proposals to update the Gender Recognition Act, in line with the principles of gender self- 80 Transgender Equality declaration that have been developed in other jurisdictions. In place of the present medicalised, quasi-judicial application process, an administrative process must be developed, centred on the wishes of the individual applicant, rather than on intensive analysis by doctors and lawyers. (Paragraph 45) Spousal consent 8. We are very aware of the widespread and strongly felt opposition within the trans community to the provision on spousal consent which was introduced by the Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013. We understand that trans people feel this gives their spouses an effective “veto” on the acquisition of a full Gender Recognition Certificate. (Paragraph 61) 9. The nature of marriage (whether same-sex or different-sex) is that of a legal contract between two consenting parties, the terms of which cannot be changed without the consent of both parties. This means that in a marriage where one party transitions, the non-trans spouse does have a legal right to be consulted if it is proposed to change the terms of the marriage contract in consequence—and this right must also be given due weight. (Paragraph 62) 10. We do take very seriously the evidence that we have heard regarding the scope that the spousal-consent provision gives for married trans people to be victimised by spouses with malicious intent. Where this occurs, it is, of course, deplorable and inexcusable. (Paragraph 63) 11. The Government must ensure that it is informed about the extent of this and ways of addressing the problem. (Paragraph 63) Age limit 12. For some young people the decision regarding gender recognition is straightforward; for some it is not. It is important that clear safeguards are in place to ensure that long-term decisions about gender recognition are made at an appropriate time. Subject to this caveat, a persuasive case has been made to us in favour of reducing the minimum age at which application can be made for gender recognition. (Paragraph 70) 13. We recommend that provision should be made to allow 16- and 17-year-olds, with appropriate support, to apply for gender recognition, on the basis of self-declaration. (Paragraph 70) 14. We are very cautious about recommending gender recognition in respect of children aged under 16 (subject to parental consent or self-declaration on the basis of Gillick competence), and believe the Government should further consider the possible risks and benefits. (Paragraph 71) Data protection 15. Evidence we received demonstrates abuse of confidential information about people’s trans status, contrary to Section 22 of the Gender Recognition Act, which is 81 Transgender Equality intended to protect trans people against “outing”. However, we note that not a single prosecution has yet been brought under this Section. There is a grave danger that this provision will become (if it has not already become) a “dead letter”. (Paragraph 87) 16. The Ministry of Justice must investigate why there have not been any prosecutions and take action to address this. It must also work with the courts to tackle the issue of trans people being inappropriately “outed” in court proceedings. (Paragraph 87) Gender reassignment as a protected characteristic 17. The inclusion of “gender reassignment” as a protected characteristic in the Equality Act 2010 was a huge step forward and has clearly improved the position of trans people. However, it is clear to us that the use of the terms “gender reassignment” and “transsexual” in the Act is outdated and misleading; and may not cover wider members of the trans community. (Paragraph 107) 18. The protected characteristic in respect of trans people under the Equality Act should be amended to that of “gender identity”. This would improve the law by bringing the language in the Act up to date, making it compliant with Council of Europe Resolution 2048; and make it significantly clearer that protection is afforded to anyone who might experience discrimination because of their gender identity. (Paragraph 108) 19. The protections afforded by the Equality Act 2010 are intended to be available to all, including children and adolescents. (Paragraph 109) 20. The Equality and Human Rights Commission must be able to investigate complaints of discrimination raised by children and adolescents without the requirement to have their parents’ consent. (Paragraph 109) Exemptions in respect of trans people 21. Significant concerns have been raised with us regarding the provisions of the Equality Act concerned with separate-sex and single-sex services and the genuine occupational requirement as these relate to trans people. These are sensitive areas, where there does need to be some limited ability to exercise discretion, if this is a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim. However, we are not persuaded that this discretion should apply where a trans person has been recognised as of their acquired gender “for all legal purposes” under the Gender Recognition Act. In many instances this is unlikely, in any case, to meet the proportionate test. (Paragraph 132) 22. We recommend that the Equality Act be amended so that the occupational requirements provision and / or the single-sex / separate services provision shall not apply in relation to discrimination against a person whose acquired gender has been recognised under the Gender Recognition Act 2004. (Paragraph 132) 82 Transgender Equality Separate-gender sport 23. Trans people are being excluded from the health and social benefits of non- competitive sport because of a misunderstanding of the fairly limited legislative exclusions. We welcome the Minister’s suggestion that a practical guide be produced to better inform sporting groups, including university societies. (Paragraph 143) 24. We recommend that the Government work with Sport England to produce guidance which help sporting groups realise that there are likely to be few occasions where exclusions are justified to ensure fair competition or the safety of competitors. (Paragraph 143) NHS services 25. We have found that the NHS is letting down trans people, with too much evidence of an approach that can be said to be discriminatory and in breach of the Equality Act. (Paragraph 144) Professional regulation of doctors 26. We welcome the evidence we received from the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Public Health regarding the importance of understanding and addressing the needs of transgender patients. And the creation for this purpose by NHS England of the Transgender and Non-Binary Network is a commendable step. (Paragraph 181) 27. However, it is clear from our inquiry that trans people encounter significant problems in using general NHS services due to the attitude of some clinicians and other staff when providing care for trans patients. This is attributable to lack of knowledge and understanding—and even in some cases to out-and-out prejudice. (Paragraph 182) 28. GPs in particular too often lack an understanding of: trans identities; the diagnosis of gender dysphoria; referral pathways into Gender Identity Services; and their own role in prescribing hormone treatment. And it is asserted that in some cases this leads to appropriate care not being provided. (Paragraph 183) 29. The NHS is failing in its legal duty under the Equality Act in this regard. There is a lack of Continuing Professional Development and training in this area amongst GPs. There is also a lack of clarity about referral pathways for Gender Identity Services. And the NHS as an employer and commissioner is failing to ensure zero tolerance of transphobic behaviour amongst staff and contractors. (Paragraph 184) 30. A root-and-branch review of this matter must be conducted, completed and published within the next six months. (Paragraph 184) 31. The General Medical Council must provide clear reassurance that it takes allegations of transphobia every bit as seriously as those concerning other forms of professional misconduct. (Paragraph 185) 83 Transgender Equality Treatment protocols 32. Part of the NHS’s duty regarding equality for trans people is its obligation to provide appropriate Gender Identity Services to meet the needs of the trans community. (Paragraph 207) 33. We strongly welcome the long overdue trend towards the depathologisation of trans identities (decades after the same happened in respect of lesbian, gay and bisexual identities) and the explicit acknowledgement within Gender Identity Clinics that the treatable condition of gender dysphoria is not synonymous with trans identity as such. This approach must be reflected in all areas of Government policy on trans issues, not least in relation to gender recognition. (Paragraph 208) 34. We are concerned that Gender Identity Services continue to be provided as part of mental-health services. This is a relic of the days when trans identity in itself was regarded as a disease or disorder of the mind and contributes to the misleading impression that this continues to be the case. (Paragraph 209) 35. Consideration must be given to the transfer of these services to some other relevant area of clinical specialism, such as endocrinology (which deals with hormone- related conditions), or their establishment as a distinct specialism in their own right. (Paragraph 209) 36. We heard that there are serious concerns within the trans community regarding the treatment protocols that are applied by Gender Identity Services, particularly in respect of clinical assessment prior to treatment and the requirement to undergo a period of “Real-Life Experience” prior to genital (reassignment / reconstructive) surgery. This requirement is seen as reflecting outdated, stereotyped attitudes to male and female gender identity. (Paragraph 210) 37. Many people now favour the adoption instead of a model involving only the granting of informed consent, which is said to be used by some providers of private care in the USA. (Paragraph 211) 38. However, we are unconvinced of the merits of the proposed informed consent- only model. While there is a clear case for the granting of legal gender recognition on request, with the minimum of formalities, this approach is less appropriate for a medical intervention as profound and permanent as genital (reassignment / reconstructive) surgery. Clinicians do have a responsibility to observe ethical and professional standards, including their duty of care towards patients. In this particular area of medicine, appropriate practice also entails paying due regard to the internationally recognised guidelines of the World Professional Association for Transgender Health. In addition, clinicians practising in the NHS have a duty to ensure that the service’s finite resources are spent appropriately and effectively. All of the foregoing obligations are incompatible with simply granting on demand whatever treatment patients request. (Paragraph 212) 39. The issues that exist around clinical protocols must instead be addressed through the consistent application of clear and appropriate standards across the Gender Identity Clinics. The situation described to us by Dr John Dean, Chair of the NHS National Clinical Reference Group for Gender Identity Services, whereby “there is not a 84 Transgender Equality standard approach or a standard training in how the guidelines are interpreted”, is clearly unacceptable and must change. (Paragraph 213) 40. The Protocol and Service Guideline must make explicit the right of patients to be fully involved in their treatment and to exercise full personal autonomy in respect of their gender identity and presentation. It must be stipulated that treatment criteria are to be exercised flexibly case-by-case on that basis. (Paragraph 214) 41. Assessment prior to treatment must be undertaken in order to meet clinically necessary criteria regarding the patient’s diagnosis, ability to consent to treatment and (physical and mental) fitness for treatment. The requirement to undergo “Real- Life Experience” prior to genital (reassignment / reconstructive) surgery must not entail conforming to externally imposed and arbitrary (binary) preconceptions about gender identity and presentation. It must be clear that this requirement is not about qualifying for surgery, but rather preparing the patient to cope with the profound consequences of surgery. (Paragraph 215) Capacity and quality of services 42. The evidence is overwhelming that there are serious deficiencies in the quality and capacity of NHS Gender Identity Services. In particular, the waiting times that many patients experience prior to their first appointment (in clear breach of the legal obligation under the NHS Constitution to provide treatment within 18 weeks) and before surgery are completely unacceptable. (Paragraph 229) 43. We are also concerned at the apparent lack of any concrete plans to address the lack of specialist clinicians in this field. This will be a serious obstacle to addressing the lack of capacity, which growing demand for the service is sure to exacerbate, and cannot be ignored. (Paragraph 230) 44. The Department of Health must say in its response to us how it will work with Health Education England and other stakeholders to ensure that this is addressed. (Paragraph 230) The Tavistock Clinic (children and adolscents) 45. We acknowledge the hugely important and pioneering work of the Tavistock Clinic in providing help and support for gender-variant children and adolescents, and their families. (Paragraph 249) 46. We recognise that there are legitimate concerns among service-users and their families about the clinical protocols which the clinic operates regarding access to puberty-blockers and cross-sex hormones. Failing to intervene in this way, or unnecessarily delaying such intervention, clearly has the potential to lead to seriously damaging consequences for very vulnerable young people, including the risk of self- harm and attempted suicide. (Paragraph 250) 47. We also recognise that the clinic has a difficult balance to strike. As with adult Gender Identity Services, clinicians have ethical and professional obligations to ensure that treatment is appropriate; and they must pay due regard to the 85 Transgender Equality internationally recognised guidelines of the World Professional Association for Transgender Health. In addition, care must be taken that NHS resources are spent effectively and appropriately. (Paragraph 251) 48. There is a clear and strong case that delaying treatment risks more harm than providing it. The treatment involved is primarily reversible, and the seriously dangerous consequences of not giving this treatment, including self-harming and suicide, are clearly well attested. (Paragraph 252) 49. Accordingly, we recommend that, in the current review of the service specification and protocol for the Gender Identity Development Service, consideration be given to reducing the amount of time required for the assessment that service-users must undergo before puberty-blockers and cross-sex hormones can be prescribed. (Paragraph 253) Hate crime 50. Legal changes are critical, but they will only bite if there is cultural change too—by society but also by those who enforce the law. (Paragraph 266) 51. The Ministry of Justice must ensure that it consults fully with the trans community in developing the Government’s new hate-crime action plan, so that the proposals are well-targeted and likely to be effective in increasing levels of reporting. This plan must include mandatory national transphobic hate-crime training for police officers and the promotion of third-party reporting. (Paragraph 267) Hate crime legislation 52. We welcome the Government’s willingness to further strengthen hate crime legislation. We believe the case is overwhelming for protecting all groups concerned, including trans people, on an equal basis. (Paragraph 275) 53. The Government should introduce new hate-crime legislation which extends the existing provisions on aggravated offences and stirring up hatred so that they apply to all protected characteristics, as defined for the purposes of the Equality Act 2010. (Paragraph 275) Recording names and gender identities 54. There is a need for greater awareness of trans people’s legal right in most contexts to have their name and gender recorded as they wish without precondition. It is commonly assumed that there is such a thing in UK law as a “legal name”, when there is not; and that legal gender must be proved in many situations when this is in fact neither required nor appropriate. (Paragraph 296) 55. The Government must take the lead by ensuring public services have clear and appropriate policies regarding the recording of individuals’ names and genders. The requirement for trans people to produce a doctor’s letter in order to change the gender shown in their passport inappropriately medicalises what should be simply an administrative matter. This requirement must be dropped. (Paragraph 297) 86 Transgender Equality 56. The UK must follow Australia’s lead in introducing an option to record gender as “X” on a passport. If Australia is able to implement such a policy there is no reason why the UK cannot do the same. In the longer term, consideration should be given to the removal of gender from passports. (Paragraph 298) 57. The Government should be moving towards “non-gendering” official records as a general principle and only recording gender where it is a relevant piece of information. Where information on gender is required for monitoring purposes, it should be recorded separately from individuals’ personal records and only subject to the consent of those concerned. (Paragraph 299) Prison and Probation services 58. While the safety and welfare of all offenders is paramount, caring for and managing trans offenders appropriately is crucial. There is a clear risk of harm (including violence, sexual assault, self-harming and suicide) where trans prisoners are not located in a prison or other setting appropriate to their acquired / affirmed gender. Neither is it fair or appropriate for them to end up in solitary confinement solely as a result of their trans status. (Paragraph 320) 59. We welcome the revision of the Prison Service Instruction on Care and Management of Transsexual Prisoners to make it more flexible and to extend it to prisoners on remand and offenders in statutory contact with the National Probation Service. (Paragraph 321) 60. The Ministry of Justice, National Offender Management Service and National Probation Service must urgently clarify what the situation is pending the publication of the new Instruction. When the new Instruction is published, they must ensure that staff are trained on it and that its implementation is monitored. (Paragraph 321) Media 61. While coverage of trans people in the media has been improving in recent years, there is no room for complacency—and confidence in regulators still appears low among the trans community. (Paragraph 334) 62. Both the Independent Press Standards Organisation and Ofcom should consider what steps they might take to encourage more trans people to come forward with complaints. (Paragraph 334) Online services 63. The Government’s desire to work with online service providers rather than further regulate them must not be an excuse for inaction. The Government must keep the situation under close review and work proactively with providers to ensure that they take their responsibilities seriously. (Paragraph 342) 87 Transgender Equality Schools 64. More needs to be done to ensure that gender-variant young people and their families get sufficient support at school. Schools must understand their responsibilities under the Equality Act. They must abide by their legal responsibility to ensure that all staff receive sufficient training to ensure they are compliant across all protected characteristics, including that which relates to trans people, especially gender- variant young people. In its review of initial teacher training, the Government should consider the inclusion of training on the protected characteristics. (Paragraph 360) 65. Trans issues (and gender issues generally) should be taught as part of Personal, Social and Health Education. (Paragraph 361) Post school education 66. The levels of bullying and harassment experienced by trans students in further and higher education are unacceptable. We welcome the offer of the Minister of State for Skills to raise this with university Vice Chancellors and to discuss with them whether enough is being done when complaints are made. (Paragraph 369) 67. We recommend that the Government hold similar conversations with further education providers. The Government should also take steps to ensure all further education and university staff receive gender identity awareness training. Further and higher education institutions should take proactive steps to promote trans equality, including having a Transgender Champions scheme for their non-trans staff. (Paragraph 369) Social care for young people 68. We have heard worrying evidence about some social workers’ lack of knowledge on gender variance. (Paragraph 373) 69. The Government should seek to address this through formal training as a matter of urgency. (Paragraph 373) 70. A key theme running through this chapter has been lack of sufficient understanding of trans issues by professionals in the public sector, probably reflecting society’s lack of knowledge—and sometimes prejudice. We have already recommended that the Government bring forward a new strategy to tackle issues faced by trans people. (Paragraph 374) 71. Appropriate training of public sector professionals on gender identity issues must be a key part of this new strategy. (Paragraph 374) 88 Transgender Equality 371. In oral evidence Susie Green explained that as a result of such ignorance many trans looked after children felt “very unsafe”. She told us about one individual in Mermaids’ teens’ group who had received “no support, is very frightened of consequences and has had violence against them in that setting where staff have not interceded appropriately”.403 372. We asked Dr Bernadette Wren about the Tavistock Clinic’s experience of young people in care. She replied: We do see people in care, but we see the people we see and who make their way to us. I cannot speak about all the people who are not being referred to us, and they are the people we ought to be worried about. Our experience has been […] a seachange, partly driven by the equalities legislation that enables social workers to have a degree of confidence of knowing what these children are entitled to […] I would say it is a very mixed bag. We have some exemplary cases where social care is incredibly supportive of the young people. There is good practice out there.404 373. We have heard worrying evidence about some social workers’ lack of knowledge on gender variance. The Government should seek to address this through formal training as a matter of urgency. 374. A key theme running through this chapter has been lack of sufficient understanding of trans issues by professionals in the public sector, probably reflecting society’s lack of knowledge—and sometimes prejudice. We have already recommended that the Government bring forward a new strategy to tackle issues faced by trans people. Appropriate training of public sector professionals on gender identity issues must be a key part of this new strategy. 403 Q83 404 Q88 http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/21638.pdf http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/21638.pdf 89 Transgender Equality Annex: Terms of reference Evidence submissions were called for regarding the following issues: • terminology and definitions, and the availability and reliability of data, relating to the trans community; • the relationship between the Government Equalities Office and other government departments in dealing with transgender equality issues and how the UK’s performance compares internationally; • the operation of the Gender Recognition Act 2004 and whether it requires amending; • the aspect of the Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013 which is referred to as the “spousal veto”; • the effectiveness of the Equality Act 2010 in relation to trans people; • employment and workplace issues (including in the Armed Forces) affecting trans people; • transphobia (including the portrayal of trans people in the media) and hate crime against trans people; • issues affecting trans people in the criminal justice system; • issues concerning the diagnosis of gender dysphoria, including the operation of NHS Gender Identity Clinics; • access to gender reassignment treatment under the NHS; • trans people and wider NHS services; • NHS services for trans youth; • issues concerning trans youth in the education system; and • issues concerning trans youth and social care services (including looked-after children). 90 Transgender Equality Formal Minutes Tuesday 8 December 2015 Members present: Maria Miller, in the Chair Jo Churchill Mims Davies Ben Howlett Draft Report (Transgender Equality), proposed by the Chair, brought up and read. Ordered, That the draft Report be read a second time, paragraph by paragraph. Paragraphs 1 to 374 read and agreed to. Annex and Summary agreed to. Resolved, That the Report be the First Report of the Committee to the House. Ordered, That the Chair make the Report to the House. Ordered, That embargoed copies of the Report be made available (Standing Order No. 134). [Adjourned till Tuesday 15 December at 9.45am 91 Transgender Equality Witnesses The following witnesses gave evidence. Transcripts can be viewed on the Committee’s inquiry web page. Tuesday 8 September 2015 Question number Jess Bradley, Member, Executive Committee, Action for Trans Health; Dr John Dean, Chair, Clinical Reference Group for Specialised Gender Identity Services, NHS England; Terry Reed OBE, Co-Founder, Gender Identity Research and Education Society (GIRES); and Steve Shrubb, Chief Executive, West London Mental Health NHS Trust Q1–25 Helen Belcher, Director, Trans Media Watch, Professor Neil Chakraborti, Director, The Leicester Centre for Hate Studies, and Chief Constable Jane Sawyers, National Policing Lead on Transgender for Equality, Diversity and Human Rights Co-ordination Committee of the National Police Chiefs’ Council Q26–47 Tuesday 15 September 2015 Susie Green, Chair, Mermaids, Anna Lee, Vice President, Welfare and Community, Lancaster University Students’ Union, Dr Bernadette Wren, Head of Psychology and Associate Director, Gender Identity Development Service, The Tavistock and Portman NHS Foundation Trust, and Dr Jay Stewart, Director, Gendered Intelligence Q48–90 Professor Michael Brookes OBE, Professor of Forensic Psychology, Birmingham City University, and Megan Key, Equalities Manager, National Probation Service Q91–129 Tuesday 13 October 2015 Peter Dunne, Visiting Researcher, New York University Law School, Karen Harvey, Chair, a:gender, James Morton, Manager, Scottish Transgender Alliance, and Ashley Reed, initiator of online petition on gender self-definition Q130–178 Christie Elan-Cane, Non-Gendered campaigner and Sue Pascoe Q179–197 Wednesday 28 October 2015 Karen Bradley MP, Minister, Preventing Abuse and Exploitation, Home Office, Jane Ellison MP, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Public Health, Department of Health, and Will Huxter, Regional Director of Specialised Commissioning (London), NHS England Q198–252 Rt Hon Nicky Morgan MP, Secretary of State for Education and Minister for Women and Equalities, Nick Boles MP, Minister of State for Skills, Department for Business, Innovation and Skills and Department for Education, and Caroline Dinenage MP, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Women, Equalities and Family Justice, Ministry of Justice and Department for Education Q253–298 Tuesday 3 November 2015 Mr Edward Vaizey MP, Minister for Culture and the Digital Economy, Department for Culture, Media and Sport Q299–315 http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/women-and-equalities-committee/inquiries/parliament-2015/transgender-equality/ http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/21345.html http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/21345.html http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/21638.html http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/21638.html http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/23159.html http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/23159.html http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/24014.html http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/24014.html http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/24176.html 92 Transgender Equality Published written evidence The following written evidence was received and can be viewed on the Committee’s inquiry web page. TRA numbers are generated by the evidence processing system and so may not be complete. 1 Action for Trans Health (TRA0230) 2 Action for Trans Health (TRA0246) 3 Adrienne Macartney (TRA0046) 4 Age UK (TRA0241) 5 Albert Kennedy Trust (TRA0239) 6 Alexis Vanlee (TRA0247) 7 Amy Cohn (TRA0194) 8 Ann Farmer (TRA0016) 9 Anonymised - (TRA0020) 10 Anonymised - (TRA0041) 11 Anonymised - (TRA0043) 12 Anonymised - (TRA0050) 13 Anonymised - (TRA0053) 14 Anonymised - (TRA0054) 15 Anonymised - (TRA0055) 16 Anonymised - (TRA0057) 17 Anonymised - (TRA0061) 18 Anonymised - (TRA0066) 19 Anonymised - (TRA0069) 20 Anonymised - (TRA0070) 21 Anonymised - (TRA0082) 22 Anonymised - (TRA0126) 23 Anonymised - (TRA0133) 24 Anonymised - (TRA0134) 25 Anonymised - (TRA0135) 26 Anonymised - (TRA0170) 27 Anonymised - (TRA0173) 28 Anonymised - (TRA0176) 29 Anonymised - (TRA0178) 30 Anonymised - (TRA0226) 31 Anonymised - (TRA0250) 32 Anonymised - (TRA0260) 33 Anonymised - (TRA0012) 34 Anonymised - (TRA0035) 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http://data.parliament.uk/WrittenEvidence/CommitteeEvidence.svc/EvidenceDocument/Women%20and%20Equalities/Transgender%20Equality/written/19587.html http://data.parliament.uk/WrittenEvidence/CommitteeEvidence.svc/EvidenceDocument/Women%20and%20Equalities/Transgender%20Equality/written/19660.html http://data.parliament.uk/WrittenEvidence/CommitteeEvidence.svc/EvidenceDocument/Women%20and%20Equalities/Transgender%20Equality/written/21734.html http://data.parliament.uk/WrittenEvidence/CommitteeEvidence.svc/EvidenceDocument/Women%20and%20Equalities/Transgender%20Equality/written/23730.html http://data.parliament.uk/WrittenEvidence/CommitteeEvidence.svc/EvidenceDocument/Women%20and%20Equalities/Transgender%20Equality/written/18893.html http://data.parliament.uk/WrittenEvidence/CommitteeEvidence.svc/EvidenceDocument/Women%20and%20Equalities/Transgender%20Equality/written/19043.html 93 Transgender Equality 35 Anonymised - (TRA0049) 36 Anonymised - (TRA0081) 37 Anonymised - (TRA0084) 38 Anonymised - (TRA0095) 39 Anonymised - (TRA0119) 40 Anonymised - (TRA0124) 41 Anonymised - (TRA0136) 42 Anonymised - (TRA0139) 43 Anonymised - (TRA0144) 44 Anonymised - (TRA0146) 45 Anonymised - (TRA0181) 46 Anonymised - (TRA0185) 47 Anonymised - (TRA0188) 48 Anonymised - (TRA0201) 49 Anonymised - (TRA0222) 50 Anonymised - (TRA0233) 51 Bent Bars Project (TRA0264) 52 Brighton & Hove City Council (TRA0211) 53 British Association of Gender Identity Specialists (TRA0149) 54 Brook (TRA0182) 55 Calderdale Council (TRA0111) 56 Campaign to End Rape (CER) (TRA0210) 57 Cecilia Dubois (TRA0060) 58 Cheryl Morgan (TRA0112) 59 Christie Elan-Cane (TRA0266) 60 Claire McCann (Barrister) (TRA0273) 61 Cliniq (TRA0104) 62 Department for Culture, Media and Sport (TRA0270) 63 Department for Culture, Media and Sport (TRA0259) 64 Department for Work and Pensions (TRA0269) 65 Department of Health (TRA0274) 66 Discrimination Law Association (TRA0165) 67 Dr Alex Sharpe (TRA0028) 68 Dr Ari Gust (TRA0080) 69 Dr Arvin Chaudhary (TRA0004) 70 Dr Karl Rutlidge (TRA0143) 71 Dr Saoirse Caitlin O’Shea (TRA0013) 72 Dr Susan Gilchrist (TRA0189) http://data.parliament.uk/WrittenEvidence/CommitteeEvidence.svc/EvidenceDocument/Women%20and%20Equalities/Transgender%20Equality/written/19244.html http://data.parliament.uk/WrittenEvidence/CommitteeEvidence.svc/EvidenceDocument/Women%20and%20Equalities/Transgender%20Equality/written/19361.html http://data.parliament.uk/WrittenEvidence/CommitteeEvidence.svc/EvidenceDocument/Women%20and%20Equalities/Transgender%20Equality/written/19371.html http://data.parliament.uk/WrittenEvidence/CommitteeEvidence.svc/EvidenceDocument/Women%20and%20Equalities/Transgender%20Equality/written/19425.html http://data.parliament.uk/WrittenEvidence/CommitteeEvidence.svc/EvidenceDocument/Women%20and%20Equalities/Transgender%20Equality/written/19484.html 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http://data.parliament.uk/WrittenEvidence/CommitteeEvidence.svc/EvidenceDocument/Women%20and%20Equalities/Transgender%20Equality/written/24903.html http://data.parliament.uk/WrittenEvidence/CommitteeEvidence.svc/EvidenceDocument/Women%20and%20Equalities/Transgender%20Equality/written/25008.html http://data.parliament.uk/WrittenEvidence/CommitteeEvidence.svc/EvidenceDocument/Women%20and%20Equalities/Transgender%20Equality/written/19562.html http://data.parliament.uk/WrittenEvidence/CommitteeEvidence.svc/EvidenceDocument/Women%20and%20Equalities/Transgender%20Equality/written/18980.html http://data.parliament.uk/WrittenEvidence/CommitteeEvidence.svc/EvidenceDocument/Women%20and%20Equalities/Transgender%20Equality/written/19360.html http://data.parliament.uk/WrittenEvidence/CommitteeEvidence.svc/EvidenceDocument/Women%20and%20Equalities/Transgender%20Equality/written/18837.html http://data.parliament.uk/WrittenEvidence/CommitteeEvidence.svc/EvidenceDocument/Women%20and%20Equalities/Transgender%20Equality/written/19526.html http://data.parliament.uk/WrittenEvidence/CommitteeEvidence.svc/EvidenceDocument/Women%20and%20Equalities/Transgender%20Equality/written/18894.html http://data.parliament.uk/WrittenEvidence/CommitteeEvidence.svc/EvidenceDocument/Women%20and%20Equalities/Transgender%20Equality/written/19610.html 94 Transgender Equality 73 Dr Eleanor Burns (TRA0063) 74 Dr Lee Middlehurst (TRA0130) 75 Equaliteach C.I.C (TRA0123) 76 Equality and Human Rights Commission (TRA0078) 77 Equality Challenge Unit (TRA0171) 78 Erin Smith (TRA0097) 79 Erin Smith (TRA0253) 80 Evangelical Alliance (TRA0038) 81 Focus: The Identity Trust (TRA0100) 82 Forum for Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity Equality in Post School Education (TRA0172) 83 Fred - (TRA0204) 84 Galop (TRA0183) 85 Gender Identity Research And Education Society (Gires) (TRA0058) 86 Genderagenda (TRA0224) 87 Gendered Intelligence (TRA0163) 88 General Medical Council (TRA0267) 89 Government Equalities Office (TRA0245) 90 Helen Belcher (TRA0150) 91 Home Office (TRA0271) 92 IPSO (TRA0248) 93 IWW Nottinghamshire GMB (TRA0085) 94 Jack Wolfe (TRA0142) 95 Jacqueline Mearns (TRA0087) 96 Jamie - (TRA0044) 97 Jane Fae (TRA0121) 98 Janella Bell (TRA0029) 99 K Eaton (TRA0106) 100 K&L Gates LLP (TRA0096) 101 Kate Mariat (TRA0166) 102 Kirsty Walker (TRA0025) 103 Lancashire LGBT (TRA0122) 104 Lesbian Rights Group (TRA0164) 105 LGBT Consortium (TRA0083) 106 LGBT Youth Scotland (TRA0175) 107 LGBT+ Liberal Democrats (TRA0197) 108 LGBT+ Society of the University of Strathclyde (TRA0212) 109 Lisa Davies (TRA0237) http://data.parliament.uk/WrittenEvidence/CommitteeEvidence.svc/EvidenceDocument/Women%20and%20Equalities/Transgender%20Equality/written/19300.html http://data.parliament.uk/WrittenEvidence/CommitteeEvidence.svc/EvidenceDocument/Women%20and%20Equalities/Transgender%20Equality/written/19510.html 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http://data.parliament.uk/WrittenEvidence/CommitteeEvidence.svc/EvidenceDocument/Women%20and%20Equalities/Transgender%20Equality/written/19365.html http://data.parliament.uk/WrittenEvidence/CommitteeEvidence.svc/EvidenceDocument/Women%20and%20Equalities/Transgender%20Equality/written/19582.html http://data.parliament.uk/WrittenEvidence/CommitteeEvidence.svc/EvidenceDocument/Women%20and%20Equalities/Transgender%20Equality/written/19620.html http://data.parliament.uk/WrittenEvidence/CommitteeEvidence.svc/EvidenceDocument/Women%20and%20Equalities/Transgender%20Equality/written/19640.html http://data.parliament.uk/WrittenEvidence/CommitteeEvidence.svc/EvidenceDocument/Women%20and%20Equalities/Transgender%20Equality/written/19796.html 95 Transgender Equality 110 Lisa Severn (TRA0129) 111 London Friend (TRA0094) 112 Mermaids (TRA0156) 113 Michael Toze (TRA0001) 114 Michael Toze (TRA0261) 115 Michelle Knight (TRA0257) 116 Ministry of Justice (TRA0272) 117 Ministry of Justice (TRA0275) 118 Mirella - (TRA0214) 119 Miss - Taylor (TRA0137) 120 Miss Alexandra Stone (TRA0022) 121 Miss Emma LLoyd (TRA0215) 122 Miss Jayde Turner (TRA0092) 123 Miss Mel Harris (TRA0067) 124 Mr Bernard Reed (TRA0059) 125 Mr Charlie Attenborough (TRA0068) 126 Mr Joe Daniell (TRA0011) 127 Mr Michael Steven (TRA0191) 128 Mr Peyton Jacob Knight (TRA0128) 129 Mr Zac Snape (TRA0089) 130 Ms Astrid Walker (TRA0192) 131 Ms Barbara Aster (TRA0155) 132 Ms Brenda Smith (TRA0115) 133 Ms Caroline Paige (TRA0151) 134 Ms Eve Wallis (TRA0023) 135 Ms Gillian B (TRA0132) 136 Ms Julia Gamble (TRA0091) 137 Ms Melanie Bartlett (TRA0147) 138 Ms Miranda Yardley (TRA0203) 139 Ms Mridul Wadhwa (TRA0219) 140 Ms Nuala Dowie (TRA0120) 141 Ms Sally Rush (TRA0105) 142 Ms Sarah Cooper (TRA0037) 143 Ms Siobhan Winter-Smith (TRA0003) 144 Ms Sophia Crews (TRA0161) 145 Ms Stephenie Robinson (TRA0034) 146 Ms Suzanna Hopwood (TRA0031) 147 Ms Suzanna Hopwood (TRA0033) http://data.parliament.uk/WrittenEvidence/CommitteeEvidence.svc/EvidenceDocument/Women%20and%20Equalities/Transgender%20Equality/written/19503.html http://data.parliament.uk/WrittenEvidence/CommitteeEvidence.svc/EvidenceDocument/Women%20and%20Equalities/Transgender%20Equality/written/19422.html http://data.parliament.uk/WrittenEvidence/CommitteeEvidence.svc/EvidenceDocument/Women%20and%20Equalities/Transgender%20Equality/written/19540.html http://data.parliament.uk/WrittenEvidence/CommitteeEvidence.svc/EvidenceDocument/Women%20and%20Equalities/Transgender%20Equality/written/18822.html http://data.parliament.uk/WrittenEvidence/CommitteeEvidence.svc/EvidenceDocument/Women%20and%20Equalities/Transgender%20Equality/written/23907.html http://data.parliament.uk/WrittenEvidence/CommitteeEvidence.svc/EvidenceDocument/Women%20and%20Equalities/Transgender%20Equality/written/23317.html 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http://data.parliament.uk/WrittenEvidence/CommitteeEvidence.svc/EvidenceDocument/Women%20and%20Equalities/Transgender%20Equality/written/19012.html http://data.parliament.uk/WrittenEvidence/CommitteeEvidence.svc/EvidenceDocument/Women%20and%20Equalities/Transgender%20Equality/written/19014.html 96 Transgender Equality 148 Ms Victoria Mitchell (TRA0232) 149 Ms Johanna-Alice Cooke (TRA0102) 150 Mx Adam Harper Eaves (TRA0088) 151 Mx Daira Hopwood (TRA0234) 152 Mx Devin Dunseith (TRA0015) 153 Mx Miles Row (TRA0047) 154 Nat T. (TRA0238) 155 National Aids Trust (NAT) (TRA0206) 156 National Lgb&T Partnership (TRA0077) 157 National Union of Students (NUS) (TRA0187) 158 NHS England (TRA0244) 159 Outreach Cumbria (TRA0223) 160 Parents Campaigning for Sex Equality for Children and Young People (TRA0228) 161 ParliOUT: The Houses Of Parliament’s LGBT Workplace Equality Network (TRA0127) 162 Peter Dunne (TRA0251) 163 Polly Carmichael and Bernadette Wren NHS Gender Identity Development Service (Tavistock Clinic) (TRA0236) 164 Prison Reform Trust (TRA0198) 165 Prisons and Probation Ombudsman (TRA0252) 166 Professor Sheila Jeffreys (TRA0131) 167 Professor Zoë Playdon (TRA0098) 168 Radical Feminist Legal Support Network (TRA0052) 169 Rape Crisis England and Wales (TRA0195) 170 Rhianna Humphrey (TRA0265) 171 Rise (TRA0159) 172 Royal College of General Practitioners (RCGP) (TRA0268) 173 Ryan Hughes (TRA0255) 174 Ryan Hughes (TRA0258) 175 Safe T (TRA0090) 176 Sarah Brown (TRA0169) 177 Scottish Transgender Alliance (TRA0225) 178 Scottish Women Against Pornography (TRA0199) 179 Steph Farnham (TRA0240) 180 Stephanie Davies-Arai (TRA0101) 181 Stonewall (TRA0243) 182 Stonewall Housing (TRA0227) 183 Sue Pascoe (TRA0256) 184 Sue Pascoe (TRA0262) http://data.parliament.uk/WrittenEvidence/CommitteeEvidence.svc/EvidenceDocument/Women%20and%20Equalities/Transgender%20Equality/written/19668.html http://data.parliament.uk/WrittenEvidence/CommitteeEvidence.svc/EvidenceDocument/Women%20and%20Equalities/Transgender%20Equality/written/19446.html http://data.parliament.uk/WrittenEvidence/CommitteeEvidence.svc/EvidenceDocument/Women%20and%20Equalities/Transgender%20Equality/written/19388.html http://data.parliament.uk/WrittenEvidence/CommitteeEvidence.svc/EvidenceDocument/Women%20and%20Equalities/Transgender%20Equality/written/19670.html http://data.parliament.uk/WrittenEvidence/CommitteeEvidence.svc/EvidenceDocument/Women%20and%20Equalities/Transgender%20Equality/written/18897.html 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Centre for Law and Social Justice and Intersex UK (TRA0167) 204 University of Sussex (TRA0093) 205 Women & Girls Equality Network (WAGEN) (TRA0207) 206 Women Analysing Policy on Women (TRA0086) 207 Women’s Aid (TRA0200) 208 Women’s Resource Centre (TRA0213) http://data.parliament.uk/WrittenEvidence/CommitteeEvidence.svc/EvidenceDocument/Women%20and%20Equalities/Transgender%20Equality/written/19597.html http://data.parliament.uk/WrittenEvidence/CommitteeEvidence.svc/EvidenceDocument/Women%20and%20Equalities/Transgender%20Equality/written/25403.html http://data.parliament.uk/WrittenEvidence/CommitteeEvidence.svc/EvidenceDocument/Women%20and%20Equalities/Transgender%20Equality/written/19581.html http://data.parliament.uk/WrittenEvidence/CommitteeEvidence.svc/EvidenceDocument/Women%20and%20Equalities/Transgender%20Equality/written/19013.html http://data.parliament.uk/WrittenEvidence/CommitteeEvidence.svc/EvidenceDocument/Women%20and%20Equalities/Transgender%20Equality/written/18922.html 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http://data.parliament.uk/WrittenEvidence/CommitteeEvidence.svc/EvidenceDocument/Women%20and%20Equalities/Transgender%20Equality/written/19642.html FrontCover TitlePage InsertSOPage _GoBack _GoBack _GoBack _GoBack _GoBack _GoBack _GoBack _GoBack _GoBack _GoBack _GoBack _GoBack _GoBack _GoBack _GoBack _GoBack _GoBack _GoBack _GoBack _GoBack _GoBack _GoBack _GoBack _GoBack _GoBack _GoBack _GoBack _GoBack _GoBack _GoBack _GoBack _GoBack _GoBack _GoBack _GoBack _GoBack _GoBack _GoBack _GoBack _GoBack _GoBack _GoBack _GoBack _GoBack _GoBack _GoBack _GoBack _GoBack _GoBack _GoBack _GoBack _GoBack _GoBack _GoBack _GoBack _GoBack _GoBack _GoBack _GoBack _GoBack _GoBack _GoBack _GoBack _GoBack _GoBack _GoBack _GoBack _GoBack _GoBack _GoBack _GoBack _GoBack _GoBack _GoBack _GoBack _GoBack _GoBack _GoBack _GoBack _GoBack _GoBack _GoBack _GoBack _GoBack _GoBack _GoBack _GoBack _GoBack _GoBack _GoBack _GoBack _GoBack _GoBack _GoBack _GoBack _GoBack _GoBack _GoBack _GoBack _GoBack _GoBack _GoBack 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xRec11 xCon11 xRec12 xCon12 xRec13 xCon13 xCon14 xCon15 xCon16 xCon17 xRec14 xRec15 xCon18 xCon19 xCon20 xRec16 xCon21 xCon22 xCon23 xRec17 xRec18 xRec19 xCon24 xCon25 xRec20 xCon26 xCon27 xCon28 xCon29 xRec21 _Copy column_10 xCon30 xRec22 xCon31 xRec23 xCon32 xRec24 xRec25 xRec26 xRec27 xCon33 xCon34 xRec28 xCon35 xRec29 xRec30 xRec31 xRec32 xCon36 xRec33 xCon37 xRec34 xCon38 xRec35 conStart xRec36 conEnd _GoBack Summary 1 Introduction Terminology Our inquiry 2 Cross-government strategy 3 Gender Recognition Act 2004 Providing proof Spousal consent Age limit Data protection Inappropriate requests to produce a Gender Recognition Certificate Section 22 of the Gender Recognition Act 4 Equality Act 2010 Gender reassignment as a protected characteristic Exemptions in respect of trans people Separate-sex and single-sex services Genuine occupational requirement Separate-gender sport 5 NHS services General NHS services General Practitioners’ attitudes towards trans patients Education and training of doctors Professional regulation of doctors Gender Identity Clinics (adults) Treatment protocols Capacity and quality of services The Tavistock Clinic (children and adolescents) 6 Tackling everyday transphobia Hate crime Reporting of hate crime Hate-crime prosecutions and convictions Action to deal with hate crime Hate crime legislation Recording names and gender identities Passports National Insurance, tax and benefit records Non-gendering Prison and Probation Services Media Online services Schools Post-school education Social care for young people Conclusions and recommendations Annex: Terms of reference Formal Minutes Witnesses Published written evidence 
work_e2wjwbht6bba3o6bu5sxavujue	----	Do Police Officers in the USA Protect and Serve All Citizens Equally? $ € £ ¥ social sciences Article Do Police Officers in the USA Protect and Serve All Citizens Equally? William De Soto Department of Political Science, Texas State University, San Marcos, TX 78666, USA; wd02@txstate.edu; Tel: +1-512-245-3279 Received: 2 September 2018; Accepted: 8 October 2018; Published: 9 October 2018 ���������� ������� Abstract: Survey research has clarified the extent to which racial minorities and majority white Americans disagree about whether police should be trusted. Racial minorities are generally far more suspicious of the police officers who serve their communities. Other forms of evidence would appear to corroborate the views of minority citizens in the USA. This requires scholars and others interested in policing to think about reforms that may create a fairer system of law enforcement. Keywords: policing; minorities 1. Introduction The United States appears at times to have two separate policing systems. Journalist Hayes (2017) captures this apparent reality with the title of his recent book, The Colony in a Nation. Racial minorities, Hayes argues, are treated as a subordinate community or colony that must be ruthlessly controlled. Police in these communities are instruments of social control. By contrast, Anglo or white citizens are treated respectfully by police, as though they were part of the nation. Police officers in these communities do “protect and serve” the citizens who pay their salaries. Minority citizens, however, may feel that police subjugate and oppress them. This paper provides evidence that largely confirms Hayes’s thesis. This paper has six sections. First, a brief comparison of the USA with several other countries makes clear that the issue of bias in policing is a pervasive problem. Second, a brief description of the historical context of policing in the USA leads us to wonder whether contemporary police treatment of minority communities has changed over time. The third section of the paper reviews some of the survey research that examines the degree to which attitudes toward police are shaped by one’s race or ethnicity. The fourth section presents findings from an original dataset that represents a sample of students taken from a large U.S. university in the Southwest. The fifth section provides a review of some of the research efforts that have explored the issue of bias in policing in the USA by employing “objective” data such as arrest rates. The final section reviews the most important conclusions and offers suggestions for future research. 2. Global Comparisons Racial bias appears to influence police practices in numerous countries. Understanding these patterns in other countries illuminates crucial issues in the USA. It should be noted that “race” is thought by biologists and anthropologists to lack scientific meaning. It does, however, have a cultural significance that seems to shape how police officers interact with their fellow citizens. Nevertheless, some scholars believe that the term “ethnicity” is a more scientifically meaningful term. For our purposes, “race” can be thought of as a social construct that depends on one’s skin color while ethnicity refers to one’s country of origin. “Hispanic,” for example, can be construed as a racial category because it has a cultural meaning for many Americans. A comparison of the USA with several other Soc. Sci. 2018, 7, 190; doi:10.3390/socsci7100190 www.mdpi.com/journal/socsci http://www.mdpi.com/journal/socsci http://www.mdpi.com http://www.mdpi.com/2076-0760/7/10/190?type=check_update&version=1 http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/socsci7100190 http://www.mdpi.com/journal/socsci Soc. Sci. 2018, 7, 190 2 of 11 English-speaking countries illustrates the point that many (perhaps most) other countries struggle with perceptions that their police systems are unfair. Minority and majority communities frequently perceive their law enforcement communities in quite different ways. This pattern appears in Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom. Oliveira and Murphy (2015) analyze survey data that complicate the general consensus that race or ethnicity is the principal variable distinguishing respondents’ perceptions of police bias. Using a sample of Australian adults, they discover that a respondent’s strength of identification with different groups in society, rather than her ethnicity, predicts her attitudes toward police. Murphy et al. (2008) provide survey evidence from a medium-sized Australian city that shows that cities will help police officers when they view the police as legitimate. A survey of Australian Muslims found that adherents of the Islamic faith perceived that they were viewed as potential terrorists after the attack on the USA on 11 September 2001 (Madon et al. 2017). Canada is also debating its legacy of racism. Chan and Chunn (2014), for example, find that racial bias is still prominent in policing in Canada. Black Canadians make up 8% of the federal prison population, though they are only 3.5% of the overall population. Lana MacLean, a Nova Scotia social worker, gave a cultural impact assessment to the sentencing court following the second-degree murder conviction of a black Canadian man in 2016 (Bascaramurty 2018). She argues that the overrepresentation of black people in the criminal justice system is a consequence of this racial bias, although critics have called the MacLean statement an attempt to get black offenders a “race discount.” Nova Scotia has begun incorporating cultural impact assessments into its sentencing practices. Bias against people of color appears to begin in childhood. During the 2015–2016 school year, for example, 22.5% of the students suspended by the Halifax Regional School Board were black, even though black students only make up 7.8% of the total population (Bascaramurty 2018). This has led to discussion of race in other regions. How would the background of a first-generation Somali immigrant in Edmonton be considered? A second-generation Trinidadian in Toronto? A Moroccan international student in Quebec City? Research in the United Kingdom generally detects a disparity in how minority and majority communities perceive police in their community. Patel (2012) use qualitative analysis to find that ethnic hostility is evident in how “brown” (i.e., those who appear to be from South Asia or the Middle East) residents of Great Britain are treated. “Brown bodies” are marked as suspicious even if they have done nothing to warrant scrutiny. This fear was heightened by Islamaphobia and xenophobia after the 9/11 attack in the USA. A related research effort (Barrett et al. 2014) uses a qualitative sample from 2010 to assess how black minority residents interact with a North of England police force. Giles et al. (2014, p. 198) noted that the Macpherson Report of 1999 was the first official acknowledgement of how deeply engrained racist attitudes were in English policing. Stop and search data indicate the disproportionate impact on BMEs (black minority ethnics). The authors, in contrast to much of what is written about the USA, however, conclude that data suggest that BMEs are becoming more satisfied with the police in their region as communication improves. Curiously, however, Bradford et al. (2017) use the Crime Survey of England and Wales to report that immigrants are actually more trusting of English and Welsh police than are natives. The authors speculate that this may be because new immigrants see British police as more professional than the police in their country of origin. 3. The Historical Context of Police Bias in the USA Studying policing is especially timely given the current national controversy in the USA, but it important to recall that there have long been debates about policing in the USA. Many scholars have argued that the whole criminal justice system has historically been used to maintain racial hierarchies. Robert Perkinson’s Texas Tough: The Rise of America’s Prison Empire (Perkinson 2010), for example, makes the case that Texas police and prisons have been used to suppress ethnic minorities since the era of the Republic of Texas in the 1830s. Slavery ended in 1865, but segregation persisted in the state and Soc. Sci. 2018, 7, 190 3 of 11 across the South for another century. The defeat of the Confederacy did not end bias in the criminal justice system. The chain gangs were used to break the spirits of the incarcerated, who were then and now disproportionately African American. Police, prosecutors, and courts continued to be profoundly hostile to ethnic minority communities. The Civil Rights Cases of 1883 held that the Civil Rights Act of 1875 was unconstitutional because it had said that private businesses could not be prohibited from discriminating against private individuals. “Pig laws” unfairly penalized African Americans for crimes such as stealing an animal. “Black codes” sharply limited the civil rights and liberties of African Americans after Reconstruction ended in the 1870s. As the book Flames Past Midnight made clear, extrajudicial violence reinforced institutionalized oppression of the regular criminal justice system in places like Texas. The Kerner Commission of 50 years ago lamented that institutionalized racism in police practices had alienated non-white communities (Logan and Oakley 2017). Byington et al. describe the vicious murder of James Byrd in 1998. Byrd was tied to the back of a truck by three men who were members of the Ku Klux Klan and dragged to his death. The execution of Lawrence Brewer in 2011 marked the first time in Texas history that a white person was executed for killing a black person. The Matthew Shepard and James Byrd Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act, a federal law, expanded hate crime legislation to include crimes motivated by gender, sexual orientation, gender identity and disability. However, federal prosecutors have pursued fewer than 100 cases since then. While it is likely that the criminal justice system in the USA has been biased against ethnic minority communities throughout the nation’s history, recent debates have attracted unprecedented national attention. Black Lives Matter called attention to the frequency of police officer shootings of sometimes unarmed citizens. These victims have been disproportionately minority. The activists who guide this effort call for fairness in policing and the criminal justice system. President Barack Obama organized the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing in late 2014. Scholars, the media, and political leaders are increasingly interested in the issues raised during this period. Controversy over athletes in the National Football League who have kneeled during the national anthem to protest police abuse has attracted critical commentary from the U.S. president. Defenders of the existing criminal justice system argue that in most cases these actions are justifiable. Blue Lives Matter has organized to respond to the issues raised by the civil rights activists. As Worden and McLean (2017) note, a consensus on how to measure and define legitimacy in policing has yet to emerge. As the authors explain, police must accomplish vague and conflicting goals, and there is difficulty in evaluating the effects of their work given the ambiguous measures of legitimacy. Law enforcement in the USA is decentralized. Federal law enforcement is limited to the FBI, CBP, ICE and a few other federal agencies. States have primary responsibility for most aspects of the criminal justice system. Local governments, in turn, hire most police officers. Sheriffs are often elected and lead county government law enforcement. Cities have their own departments. There are about 3000 county governments and about 19,000 municipal governments. The NYPD has about 40,000 officers; other police departments are often quite small. The country’s nearly 1 million licensed police officers are employed by roughly 19,000 police departments. By contrast, Australia has just nine police departments: one federal and eight regional departments. County sheriff departments in the USA tend to have broader responsibilities than city law enforcement agencies. Among other things, sheriffs have responsibility for jails. This decentralization results in substantial differences in policing styles across the USA. The American tradition of federalism permits enables subnational governments to be “laboratories of democracy,” but it also means that there can be wide variations in how fairly and professionally police departments perform their social roles. It is important at this moment in American history to assess the claims of scholars like Perkinson that the criminal justice system is an instrument for the repression of ethnic minorities. A variety of types of evidence can be useful as we analyze these claims. Survey data can shed insight on how police and other components of the criminal justice system are perceived by different ethnic communities. Soc. Sci. 2018, 7, 190 4 of 11 Are police officers perceived as professional and fair? In addition to these data, we can examine a variety of other data that may reinforce the impressions that we gain from survey data. 4. Survey Research Two research strategies promise to enable us to assess the degree to which policing in the USA is biased against racial minorities. The first strategy is to assess the perceptions of different racial groups. Many scholarly analyses of survey data consistently illustrate the chasm between how white majority and ethnic minority citizens view their criminal justice systems. Peck (2015) provides a helpful and exhaustive assessment of the current state of research on minority perceptions of the police. Status as a racial minority is consistently significant as a predictor of trust in police. While the list of articles that reach this conclusion is long, a few of the representative research efforts include Brunson and Weitzer (2009), Cochran and Warren (2012), MacDonald et al. (2007), and Wu (2014). Brunson (2007) makes the helpful point that we should understand young African American men’s experience of harassment by police as something that accumulates over time. He used in-depth interviews to gain insights into minority perceptions of the police. As other scholars have found, citizen distrust of the police is common among African American young people. It is important to remember that a citizen who has had an unpleasant encounter with a police officer will share her experience with friends and neighbors. Brunson recommends that compliance review processes be opened up to civilians in order to improve the image of the police in minority communities. Gabbison and Higgins (2009) use Gallup survey data to find that blacks are less positive than whites about the police. Smith and Alpert (2007) argued that harsher police treatment cannot be explained by higher levels of minority group criminality. Instead, they theorize that this disparity is caused by stereotypes that result from social conditioning. Hispanics, for example, are stereotyped as gangsters. President Trump, for example, claimed that many Mexican immigrants are rapists. Social identity theory accounts for the power of this discriminatory behavior. Feinstein (2015) interviewed 30 male juveniles who resided in a correctional facility in Minnesota and found that youth of color were less likely to be treated fairly by police or to be given a second chance. She points out that police officers are still disproportionately white males, despite efforts to diversify policing in the USA. She argued that the USA has a double system of justice. Although some studies of Hispanics reported null findings, the most common finding is that Hispanics also share a negative view of the police. Nuno (2018) makes the important point that few existing studies examine the perceptions of Hispanics toward the police. She finds no difference between Hispanic and white perceptions of police legitimacy in Maricopa County. Other scholars find instead that Hispanics are less positive about the police. Garcia and Cao (2005) found that Hispanics had the lowest satisfaction with the police, while whites had the highest satisfaction in a small northeastern U.S. city. Wu (2014) compares the views of Asian, black, Hispanic, and white Americans toward the police. Her survey of Seattle residents concludes that all three minority groups hold more negative views toward police than majority whites. Unfortunately, it appears that more research will be needed before we can confidently generalize about the attitudes of Hispanics toward police officers. Epp et al. (2014) use survey and interview data to make a convincing case that race significantly affects investigatory police stops. About 12% of motorists are stopped per year; this percentage is 24% for ethnic minority drivers. They emphasize that this disparity is not necessarily the result of conscious racism. Instead, police officers are trained to stop individuals whom they believe are most likely to commit crimes. Those who are stopped by these investigations are deeply offended even when the officers involved are professional and polite. Armaline et al. (2014) use interviews to explore the degree to which police in Oakland, California are regarded as legitimate by young people of color. The respondents they authors interviewed believed that Oakland police consistently failed at the task of protecting their communities. In fact, the Oakland Police Department (OPD) was considered by minority respondents to be the “biggest gang Soc. Sci. 2018, 7, 190 5 of 11 in Oakland.” This department was grievously lacking in legitimacy. The documented and persistent abuse of force left residents alienated from local law enforcement. Flexon et al. (2016) found that minority youth resented the likelihood that they would have negative interactions with the police. 5. Present Study Because the issue of police bias has attracted such extraordinary recent attention, an exploration of current attitudes toward police in the USA is warranted. The author obtained survey responses from 264 undergraduate students at a large university in the Southwest in the spring and summer of 2018. The data are obtained from a convenience sample, although the ethnic composition of the respondents appears to be approximately representative of the student body as a whole. The university is designated as a Hispanic serving institution. Forty-four of the respondents are Hispanic; 45% of the respondents reported being non-Hispanic white; and 11% report being African American. Those who reported being Asian American or a member of some other ethnic group were excluded from the analysis because their numbers are so small. The student respondents answered a series of questions about policing. All survey data were gathered in classroom settings with pen and paper survey instruments. Table 1 gives the distribution of responses. Race is coded 1 for African American, 2 for Anglo; and 3 for Hispanic. Table 1. ANOVA results. Race (a) Race (b) N Mean Diff. † (a-b) 95% CI Lower Bound Upper Bound Black vs. Hispanic 120 −0.945 ** −1.333 −0.557 White 115 −1.340 ** −1.730 −0.951 Hispanic vs. Black 29 0.945 ** 0.557 1.333 White 115 −0.395 ** −0.640 −0.151 † Scheffe test of significance. ** Significant at α < 0.01. Given the previous discussion about racial minority citizens’ views of police officers, we hypothesize that minority racial groups will express more negative views about the police than majority white respondents. Analysis of variance is the appropriate statistical technique because the data are parametric and we are interested in examining the difference between mean responses to a series of questions about how the respondents view police officers. Four questions comprised the dependent variable. These are: (1) police are respectful toward people like me; (2) police officers are courteous and communicate well; (3) I do not believe the police are effective in controlling crime in my community; and (4) I do not have much trust in the police in my community. In combination, these questions explore the respondent’s assessment of police officers’ procedural fairness and effectiveness. The four questions were combined into a composite measure of police performance. The primary independent or explanatory variable is respondents’ racial identification. The analysis reveals several distinctive patterns. Students who completed our survey do differ significantly in how they view police. Anglo students consistently express more positive views toward police than either Hispanic and African American students. Although the literature review suggested that Hispanics are not as consistently distrustful of the police as African Americans, our results indicate that both minority groups are less positive about the police than white students. 6. Research Using Objective Data to Assess Minority Perceptions of Police Survey data provide important insights into the nature of policing in the USA today. They tell us that there is a disparity in how members of different communities perceive law enforcement in their communities. Improvements in our understanding of how different ethnic groups perceive law enforcement are surely invaluable in assessing the question of bias in the criminal justice system. However, a second type of research can complement the use of survey data. Other “objective” data can Soc. Sci. 2018, 7, 190 6 of 11 be used to assess the question of bias as well. A variety of other research strategies can shed additional light on this debate. In combination, these approaches shine essential light on the question of whether policing system in the USA is fair toward all racial groups. The scholar might begin with the U.S. Department of Justice (2017) scathing critiques of police practices in Baltimore and Chicago 2017. After federal investigators reviewed police procedure statements, conducted interviews, and observed police on the job, they concluded that poor and ethnic minority communities are overpoliced but underserved. The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 prohibits discrimination based on race, but the DOJ investigators found little reason to believe it was being honored. Rector (2017) offers an account in the Baltimore Sun of a city troubled by allegations that its police are racist. DOJ investigators discovered racial disparities in rates of searches, seizures and arrests. Citizens in minority areas of their cities routinely had their civil liberties violated. The Fourth Amendment ban on unreasonable search and seizure was regularly flouted. Training of the police was poor; oversight of their work was generally limited. Sex crime victims were ignored or even told that they had not suffered a “real” crime. Police would sometimes fire into moving vehicles without knowing whom they might hit. The Community Collaboration Division in the BPD was ineffective. They found that police officers engaged in unnecessary and dangerous foot and vehicle pursuits. Freddie Gray was arrested for having a knife in 2015 and died while in police custody. The six officers who were transporting Gray were acquitted of criminal charges. Beyond the introduction of four “Transformation Zones” in the city, which pair policing resources with those from other city departments to support communities devastated by violence, there is no overarching, well-articulated crime-fighting strategy to address the problems. The current spike dates to Gray’s death and the riots of April 2015. There were 342 homicides in Baltimore in 2017, 56 per 100,000 people (Tkacik 2018). Before 2015, Baltimore had not broken 300 homicides in a year for decades. At the same time, arrests have dropped, continuing a years-long trend. In absolute numbers, Baltimore trailed only Chicago in homicides. Per capita, Baltimore is deadlier. Mayor Catherine Pugh, Johns Hopkins University President Daniels, and Police Commissioner Kevin Davis have led discussions in Baltimore, but little has been achieved. The Chicago Police Department has attempted to implement a series of reforms agreed to in a consent decree agreed to during the presidency of Barack Obama, but progress has been slow (Ruthhart 2018). For example, Illinois Attorney General Lisa Madigan wants Chicago police officers to document every instance in which they draw their gun and point it at someone. She argues that this is needed to ensure that officers are properly using the threat of a gun, given the department’s history of excessive force and mistreatment of racial minorities. Chicago Mayor Rahm Emmanuel and his police superintendent Eddie Johnson suggested that this proposal shows a lack of confidence in Chicago police officers and may put their lives at risk by making them hesitant to respond appropriately in potentially dangerous situations. The gun-pointing debate follows a heated discussion about police reform that began when Laquan McDonald was fatally shot in 2015. The Department of Justice, under U.S. Attorney Eric Holder, documented severe bias against ethnic minorities. Lori Lightfoot, a Chicago mayoral candidate in 2018, chaired the Police Accountability Task Force and has called for the inclusion of the gun-pointing policy. She and Madigan argued that including the provision in the consent decree would not compromise officer safety. Balko (2018b) published a recent review of scholarly research on policing in the Washington Post and concluded, “There is overwhelming evidence that the criminal justice system is racist.” Balko mentioned that even African American U.S. Senator Tim Scott (R-S.C.) reported being repeatedly pulled over by police. Balko notes that just 3% of stops of minority group citizens who are pulled over produce any evidence of a crime. Only 2% of white but 6% of black drivers and 7% of Hispanic drivers are searched by police. Similar patterns occur in study after study. Police are far more likely to solve homicides involving whites than minorities (Fagan and Geller 2018). Smith and Petrocelli (2001) use data from 2673 traffic stops conducted by police in Richmond, VA in 2000. Richmond officers used mobile data computers that recorded each stop. Minority Soc. Sci. 2018, 7, 190 7 of 11 drivers comprised 63% of all persons ticketed or criminally arrested during the data collection period. The authors also note that African Americans outnumber whites as victims of police gunfire by a ratio of 3:1 (Smith and Petrocelli 2001, p. 5). Prosecutors are more likely to decline to prosecute African Americans than whites, suggesting that they were arrested under conditions that could not be used in court to secure convictions (Hepburn 1978). The Florida Highway Patrol (2000) reported that Hispanics constituted 18% of traffic stops even though they were just 12% of the state’s population. Smith and Petrocelli (2001) report that racial bias is evident in traffic stops. Their evidence is substantiated by the case of Philando Castile, a 32-year-old black American, who was shot in a suburb of Minneapolis on 6 July 2016. While his girlfriend videotaped the encounter, Castile was fatally shot. The video of the encounter was viewed more than 2 million times on YouTube. The officer was acquitted of all charges. Castile had been stopped for traffic violations on 52 occasions by police before the final, fatal encounter. Scholars have carefully studied the use of force by police to gain more understanding of the impact of race on policing. Paoline et al. (2018) reviewed police officer use of force records and discovered that white officers are more coercive toward black suspects. Black officers’ use of force, however, is not affected by the race of suspects. Menifield et al. (2018) explored the recent shootings of civilians by police officers. They gathered data on every fatal shooting in 2014 and 2015. Unfortunately, the Death in Custody Reporting Act of 2013 began to report uses of police force only recently. When 18-year-old Michael Brown was shot by police in August 2014, the issue sparked both protests and scholarly attention. The authors show that African Americans are killed far out of proportion to their share of the population. Latinos are also killed more often than one would expect, while Asian Americans and Anglos are killed less than one would expect. Roughly 28% of all shooting victims are black even though African Americans comprise just 13% of the U.S. population. The authors argue that this fact is not the result of a few “bad apples” or racist white cops. Interestingly, civilians of color are as likely to be killed by African American police officers as by white officers, so simply diversifying police departments is not the solution. As the authors note, their conclusion is consistent with the survey data gathered by Epp et al. (2014). It is crucial to address these long-running racial disparities in the way force is applied or the trust between minority communities and law enforcement will continue to erode. As the authors mention, a variety of strategies should be considered. They suggest that the Dallas Police Department has improved public relations for the department by training its officers in emotion management in high-stress situations and in how to deal with suspects with mental challenges. As mentioned above, the frequency of civilian deaths at the hands of police officers has provoked a crisis of legitimacy. The Black Lives Matter protests and the refusal of National Football League players to stand for the national anthem are efforts to draw attention to these deaths. The shooting deaths of five police officers in Dallas in July 2016 fueled the national controversy. What do the data tell us? Are police officers implicitly and perhaps unselfconsciously biased against ethnic minorities? Are they more likely to use deadly force against ethnic minorities as a result? Nix et al. (2017) found evidence of bias in their analysis of civilians killed by police in 2015. They analyzed 990 fatal police shootings in 2015 using data compiled by the Washington Post. They used two indicators of threat perception failure: (1) whether the civilian was not attacking the officer or other civilians just before being fatally shot and (2) whether the civilian was unarmed when shot. The results indicated that civilians from minority groups were more likely than whites to have not been attacking the officer and that black civilians were more than twice as likely as white civilians to have been unarmed. The authors make the undoubtedly valid point that the Department of Justice should publish a use-of-force database that provides extensive information about the circumstances in which officers fatally shoot civilians. Militarized policing has been a striking development in contemporary law enforcement. Mummolo (2018) published a study in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences that examined this trend (Balko 2018a). The study looked at data from Maryland, where a state law required that police agencies in the state submit biannual reports on how and how often they used their SWAT teams. Mummolo performed a statistical analysis of the Maryland data and crime rates, officer safety data, and race. After controlling for variables such as local crime rates, Mummolo found that for every Soc. Sci. 2018, 7, 190 8 of 11 10% increase in the black population of a given zip code, there was a 10% increase in the likelihood of that zip code being raided by a SWAT team. The data showed that 90% of the SWAT raids were to serve search warrants. Mummolo found no change in assaults or deaths of police officers after the introduction of SWAT teams. There was no statistical relationship between violent crime rates and SWAT teams over time. 7. Conclusions and Recommendations Do police in the USA truly protect and serve everyone equally? Qualitative and quantitative social science research has improved our ability to answer this question. The answer seems to depend on one’s race. The survey data consistently show stark contrasts between racial minority citizens and Anglo residents. Minorities frequently believe that the police oppress rather than serve them. The white majority may wonder whether their fellow citizens of color are too sensitive to perceived mistreatment. Law enforcement seems fair to white citizens. The disparity in perception is striking and has been persistent. There is simply no doubt that the police (as well as nearly every other major social institution) was substantially biased against people of color for most of American history. Martin Luther King’s famous protest against racial segregation was just 50 years ago. But are some white citizens correct in believing that bias in law enforcement is entirely in the past? Additional data appear to confirm minorities’ perception of bias in policing. A variety of creative research efforts document the disparity in how different ethnic groups are treated. Data on officers’ killing of civilians and other patterns of interaction of the police with the communities they serve are quite revealing. Future research should use mixed-method research strategies and expand the range of minorities that are the focus of the research. Countries outside the English-speaking world should also be examined. At present, however, the perceptions captured by survey data indicate that policing in the USA does protect and serve white communities, while often oppressing minority communities. This reality makes it imperative that we explore reforms to make policing in the USA fair to all racial groups. Scholars and law enforcement administrators have explored a number of reforms to try to address some of the problems that have recently been identified. Policing reforms have attempted to achieve a variety of goals. Some seek to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the police. Others seek to improve the accountability, representativeness, or reputation of their police to promote effectiveness. The most fundamental purpose the police serves is to protect social order and begin the process of punishing those who commit crimes. Police officers are evaluated by several criteria. One is whether police officers are competent in their jobs. A second criterion is whether the officers have built trust with those whom they serve. Several reforms hold promise. Patil (2018) describes one legacy of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, H.R. 3355, Pub.L. 103–322. Since 1994, the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) has committed more than $14 billion of federal funds. The Trump administration is proposing a 50% cut to the COPS program in the 2019 budget. This is a mistake. By redirecting funding to developing protocols that are proven to work in real-life situations, COPS can truly live up to its mandate. Funds should be redirected to develop and test standard operating procedures that help officers make better decisions under pressure. The current administration’s decision is likely to exacerbate, rather than ameliorate, the current crisis of legitimacy faced by policing in many communities. At least 10 states have passed laws requiring their law enforcement agencies to collect data on the racial demographics of motorists stopped by police (Smith and Petrocelli 2001, p. 5). This increases transparency and the possibility of accountability. This is the first step towards helping us better assess the current fairness and professionalism of policing in the USA. We can begin to accomplish the goal of making police departments serve every race as we improve our understanding of the current experience of ethnic minority communities. Problem-oriented policing (PoP) is an approach to policing in which discrete pieces of police business (each consisting of a cluster of similar incidents, whether crime or acts of disorder, that the Soc. Sci. 2018, 7, 190 9 of 11 police are expected to handle) are subject to microscopic examination (drawing on the especially honed skills of crime analysts and the accumulated experience of operating field personnel) in hopes that what is freshly learned about each problem will lead to discovering a new and more effective strategy for dealing with it (Braga et al. 2014). Problem-oriented policing places a high value on new responses that are preventive in nature, are not dependent on the use of the criminal justice system, and engage other public agencies, the community and the private sector when their involvement has the potential for significantly contributing to the reduction of the problem. PoP carries a commitment to implementing the new strategy, rigorously evaluating its effectiveness, and, subsequently, reporting the results in ways that will benefit other police agencies and ultimately contribute to building a body of knowledge. PoP has the potential for improving contemporary law enforcement if minority concerns are incorporated into ongoing policing strategies. Some strategies may pose the risk of worsening existing inequities in policing. Hotspot policing aims to concentrate police resources in communities with high crime rates. The difficulty is that this strategy may lead to problems similar to those caused by the much earlier broken windows theory developed by James Q. Wilson. The problem with broken windows—the idea that minor symptoms of disorder may lead offenders to commit more serious crimes because they think they can get away with it—is that officers too aggressively punished innocuous offenses. This leads us back to Hayes’s notion that ethnic minority communities are treated as colonies that need to be repressed. Political mobilization may be the most effective way to make policing fair for all racial groups. Roughly 67% of the population of Ferguson, MO is African American, yet at the time of the police shooting of Michael Brown in 2014 just one of seven city council members was black. Electing more Black city council members promises to make future city managers and police chiefs more responsive to the concerns of Black and Hispanic citizens. Unfortunately, civil service protections in some U.S. communities may make it challenging to discipline racist or abusive police officers (De Soto and Castillo 1995). Since all police administrators must respond to democratically elected supervisors, civil rights leaders in the black and Hispanic communities and their allies must become politically active. Logan and Oakley (2017) show that antiracist policy achievements remain fragile. Current U.S. Attorney General Jeff Sessions has generally been hostile to efforts to remedy racial bias in policing. Among his first actions upon being confirmed to his position in 2017 was a review of agreements on police reform that had been agreed to under the Obama presidency. As these authors rightly argue, the only path ahead is to mobilize politically and to search for reforms that can make policing fair and just for citizens of every racial group. The evidence presented here makes it clear that these efforts are necessary. Considering both the survey and other forms of evidence regarding the current state of policing in the United States leads to a clear but tragic conclusion: the hope for a completely fair and just system of law enforcement has not been attained. This reality brings to mind W.E.B. DuBois’s remark that the problem of the 20th century is the problem of the color line. 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work_e3iwo6qg3nh2pj277eb2iakx5e	----	International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health Discussion Gender Identity: The Human Right of Depathologization Maria Elisa Castro-Peraza 1 , Jesús Manuel García-Acosta 1,* , Naira Delgado 2, Ana María Perdomo-Hernández 1, Maria Inmaculada Sosa-Alvarez 1, Rosa Llabrés-Solé 1 and Nieves Doria Lorenzo-Rocha 1 1 Faculty of Nursing N. S. Candelaria, University of La Laguna, Canary Islands Public Health Service, 38010 Tenerife, Canary Islands, Spain; mcastrop@ull.edu.es (M.E.C.-P.); extaperdomo@ull.edu.es (A.M.P.-H.); isalvar@ull.edu.es (M.I.S.-A.); rosallabres@telefonica.net (R.L.-S.); extnlorenzo@ull.edu.es (N.D.L.-R.) 2 Faculty of Psychology, University of La Laguna, 38071 Tenerife, Canary Islands, Spain; ndelgado@ull.edu.es * Correspondence: jesus.garcia.21@ull.edu.es; Tel.: +34-687-007-510 Received: 17 February 2019; Accepted: 13 March 2019; Published: 18 March 2019 ���������� ������� Abstract: Background: Transgender people have a gender identity different from the one allocated to them at birth. In many countries, transsexualism and transgenderism are considered mental illnesses under the diagnosis of gender dysphoria. This pathologization impacts on human rights. Main content: The United Nations (UN) has denounced violations against trans-people, including attacks, forced medical treatments, lack of legal gender recognition, and discrimination in the areas of education, employment, access to healthcare, and justice. The UN has linked these violations directly with discriminatory diagnostic classifications that pathologize gender diversity. Trans-people have been pathologized by psycho-medical classification and laws all around the world, with a different impact depending on countries. This paper argues that pathologization infringes infringes upon a wide range of human rights such as; civil, economic, social cultural and also the access to medical care. Conclusions: The current situation for trans-people with respect to legal healthcare matters, depends on the country. Human rights are universal, not a question for cultural interpretation. They are the minimum that every human being must have assured only by the fact of being human. Countries must protect these rights by regulating trans-pathologization with special attention dedicated to intersex people and their specific needs. Keywords: trans; transgender; gender identity; human rights; right to health; non-discrimination; pathologization 1. Introduction The sex that we are officially assigned at birth (male or female) is based upon our physical features. This might not, however, match our gender identity—that is, the way we feel and think about our gender. A trans person is someone who identifies with a different gender and/or expresses their gender identity differently from the gender assigned at birth [1]. To clarify, in the framework of definitions, the follow must be consider: ‘gender identity’: each person’s deeply felt internal and individual experience of gender, which may or may not correspond with the sex assigned at birth, including the personal sense of the body (which may involve, if freely chosen, modification of bodily appearance or function by medical, surgical or other means) and other expressions of gender, including dress, speech and mannerisms [2]; ‘gender expression’: each person’s presentation of the person’s gender through physical appearance—including dress, hairstyles, accessories, cosmetics—and mannerisms, speech, behavioral patterns, names and personal references, and noting further that gender expression may or may not conform to a person’s gender identity [3]; Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2019, 16, 978; doi:10.3390/ijerph16060978 www.mdpi.com/journal/ijerph http://www.mdpi.com/journal/ijerph http://www.mdpi.com https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5019-0813 https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9362-6496 https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0113-4460 http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/ijerph16060978 http://www.mdpi.com/journal/ijerph https://www.mdpi.com/1660-4601/16/6/978?type=check_update&version=2 Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2019, 16, 978 2 of 11 ‘sex characteristics’: each person’s physical features relating to sex, including genitalia and other sexual and reproductive anatomy, chromosomes, hormones, and secondary physical features emerging from puberty [3]. In the context of this paper, the term ‘trans’ includes people whose gender identities differ from their allocated sex at birth, both female-to-male/FtM and male-to-female/MtF trans persons, and genderqueer (pangender, fluid or otherwise) people who identify beyond binary sex models [4]. Trans experiences around the world are diverse but have something in common: being trans is still considered a pathology [5]. ‘Pathologization’ can be defined as the psycho-medical, legal, and cultural practice of identifying a feature, an individual, or a population as intrinsically disordered. Trans-people are defined as inherently pathological [5]. The consequences of pathologization include human rights violations, which impacts the access to healthcare to trans people, the right to corporal integrity, and limit the right to a legal personality. All these definitions are necessary to understand the timeline of depathologization movements and their implications on change. The aim of this paper is to show the human rights implications of pathologization of gender identity, the impact on healthcare, as well as the need of depathologizing trans people. 2. Depathologization Perspectives The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Paris, December 1948) states the following: “All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood. Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status” [6]. The first article of the constitution of the World Health Organization (WHO) states: “The objectives of WHO . . . shall be the attainment by all peoples of the highest possible level of health” [7]. Thus, all human rights, including the right of recognition before the law, the right to the highest attainable standard of health, the right to body integrity, the right to found a family, and the right to be free from degrading treatment, among others, apply equally to all human beings, including those who may be trans or gender diverse. In the last 10 years, there have been movements in favour of the right of depathologization, based on the right to health and to non-discrimination. With the opportunity of reviewing the ICD and DSM manuals, an international movement for trans depathologization has emerged. This movement demands, among other things, the withdrawal of classification as a mental disorder, of gender transition processes. However, there is a very important issue that is discovered with the action of this movement: the ‘democratization’ in the process of depathologization. Currently, proposals for depathologization in health care, human rights frameworks and processes of legal recognition of gender are changing towards a ‘democratized turn’ [8]. It has been a lengthy process to reach the achievements of present day, where different diversities have been depathologized. Firstly, sexual diversity, later, diversity of gender, in which we are currently immersed and most recently, body diversity with the aid of the intersex movements. 3. Historical Precedent: Depathologization of Homosexuality or Sexual Diversity Instances of criminalization, discrimination, and homophobic violence have occurred throughout the twentieth century. Homosexuality was pathologized as a mental disorder and the application of reparative therapies, aimed at convincing the person to adopt a heterosexual sexuality, was common [9]. From the 1970s to the 1990s, processes of depathologization and protection of rights occurred. Lesbian, gay, and bisexual movements arose. The diagnostic classification of homosexuality was removed from international diseases classifications, and homosexuality was included in an international human rights framework. Concurrently, social and legislative advances were made [9] but not equally distributed worldwide. Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2019, 16, 978 3 of 11 4. Current Moment: Depathologization of Transgenderism or Gender Diversity 4.1. Depathologization as a Healthcare Issue In the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s there were protests against the diagnostic of transsexualism as a mental disorder, a classification that led to pathologization. A critical review of the healthcare model of attention was initiated. Since 2007, coordinated manifestations for trans-depathologization have taken place and activism has occurred on an international scale [10]. Critical challenges by trans people about their healthcare have often evolved through health social movements. In recent years, international activism has been prominent with the Stop Trans Pathologization (STP) campaign (beginning in 2007). The main objectives of STP are the removal of the classification of gender transition processes as a mental disorder from diagnostic manuals, access to state-funded trans healthcare, change of trans healthcare towards an informed consent approach model, legal gender recognition without medical requirements, depathologization of gender diversity in childhood, and protection from transphobic violence [11]. In addition to the STP, GATE [12], ILGA [13] and TGEU [14] stand out. These networks of international activists are succeeding in influencing the policies of countries and organizations such as the WHO or the UN. The demands for depathologization are also supported by European bodies such as the Council of Europe and the European Parliament [15] as well as professional associations such as the WPATH [16]. The case of WPATH is of particular interest because they combine the activism with ‘the promotion of the highest standards of health care for Transsexual, Transgender, and Gender Nonconforming People’ [17]. In that way, the SOC-7 (Standards Of Care, version 7) of the WPATH contains several improvements: the conceptualization of gender transitions as non-pathological, the use of non-discriminatory language, the inclusion of broad expressions of gender, transitions and identities, the need to adapt and make more flexible the trans healthcare pathways, the explicit condemnation of reparative therapies and the recognition of the cultural diversity of trans people [17]. Simultaneously, activist networks criticize the use of a pathologizing diagnostic framework and the use of a process model that moves away from the current model of person-centered care [8,17]. As mentioned above, the contribution of the activist movements has been able to contribute to a ‘democratized turn’ in the process and revision of depathologization proposals to be included in the ICD and the DSM. However, a recent review shows that these movements for depathologization have little impact on the clinical practices of trans-healthcare. But a change towards models of informed consent and person-centered care is being achieves, even in limited health interventions; but in a progressive and growing way [8]. An informed accompaniment and sharing decision-making model is still necessary instead of just an evaluation model. That is, a model of trans-specific healthcare. 4.2. Evolution of the Diagnostic Classification in the ICD and the DSM The International Classification Of Diseases (ICD-10) [18], a standard diagnostic tool published by WHO, lists “Transsexualism” and other “gender identity disorders” in the chapter of “Mental and behavioral disorders”. The American Psychiatric Association publishes the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5) [19] in which the concept is termed “gender dysphoria”. Despite the name change, both are considered mental illnesses, since they are included in this list. Homosexuality was removed from the DSM in 1973 and from the ICD in 1975. In the newest edition of the ICD, ICD-11 [20], which was published in June 2018 and will be presented for approval at the World Health Assembly in 2019, trans identities have finally been removed from the mental health chapter. However, intersex people are still being pathologized and called disordered. (Table 1). Defining gender diversity as an illness or otherwise abnormal is unfounded, discriminatory, and without demonstrable clinical utility. Psychological trauma and suffering are not inherent to trans-people but are the result of society’s failure to embrace body diversity. This has been partially solved in the ICD-11, which now considers “gender incongruence” as a condition instead of an illness. There have been advances in the legal and medical fields regarding the conceptualization of sexual, Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2019, 16, 978 4 of 11 body, and gender diversity, resulting in a shift from considering it a mental disorder to recognizing it as a human right. But there are still actions to take. In the ICD-11 the new condition is “gender incongruence”, it would be pertinent to reflect on what the word “incongruence” means. When does the transsexual-transgender person stop being incongruous with his/her gender? Do they ever stop? When does it begin? Finishing hormonal treatment? When completing surgery? Table 1. ICD and DSM. DSM IV-TR (2001) [21] DSM IV (1994) 11. Sexual and gender identity disorders Sexual dysfunctions Paraphilias Gender Identity Disorders (GID) F.64.2 GID in children F.64.0 GID in adolescents or adults F.64.9 GID not otherwise specified (intersex, cross-dressing behaviour) DSM V (2013) [19] Sexual Dysfunctions Gender Dysphoria (GD) F.64.2 GD in children F.64.0 GD in adolescents or adults F.64.8 GD not otherwise specified ICD 10 (2016) [18] 5. Mental and behavioural disorders Disorders of adult personality and behaviour F.64 Gender identity disorders F.66 Psychological and behavioural disorders associated with sexual development and orientation ICD 11 (2018) [20] 17. Conditions related to sexual health Sexual dysfunctions Gender incongruence (GI) HA60. GI of adolescence and adulthood HA61. GI in childhood 5A71. Adrogenital disorders 20 Developmental anomalies Malformative disorders of sex development pseudohermaphroditism 24. Factors influencing health status and contact with health services Gender incongruence Activism has argued for the withdrawal of the diagnostic classification of gender diversity in childhood. Children are very vulnerable to the dynamics of pathologization, institutional violence and non-consensual treatments. Given that fact, it is necessary to argue that the diagnosis of “gender dysphoria” in children in DSM-V or “gender incongruence” in childhood in ICD-11 has no clinical utility because children do not need treatment (until there are close to puberty). However, psychological support services, if needed, do not require a diagnosis. 4.3. Depathologization as a Human Right Issue Key human rights mechanisms of the United Nations (UN) have affirmed the States members’ obligation to ensure the effective protection of all persons from discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity. However, the international response has been fragmented and inconsistent, creating the need for a consistent understanding of the comprehensive regime of international human rights law and its application to issues of sexual orientation and gender identity [22]. In this context of international human rights law, the depathologization of transsexuality has been discussed in a limited way. Thus, depathologization can be included in Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) that ensures the right to respect for privacy [23]. Gender identity is one of the most intimate aspects of the person. Article 8 protects the right to development and personal identity as well as the physical and psychological integrity of the person. Being labeled with a mental illness threatens the integrity of the person (according to article 8). Depathologization is based on the right to health and non-discrimination, particularly because of the stigma associated with mental illness and how this affects trans people [8,24]. At present, a growing body of norms and laws tries to support these views, an important example being the Yogyakarta Principles [22]. The principles of Yogyakarta are not legally binding but have been widely recognized internationally as an important tool for member states to identify, respect and protect the human rights of all people regardless of their sexual orientation or gender identity [22]. (Table 2). Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2019, 16, 978 5 of 11 Table 2. Yogyakarta Principles. Extract. Principle 3: The Right to recognition before the law (without requirements such as hormone therapy, sterilization or surgery. All of these infringe upon human rights *) Principle 17: The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health Principle 18: Protection from Medical Abuses Principle 31 (YP+10): The Right to Legal Recognition Principle 32 (YP+10): The Right to Bodily and Mental Integrity Principio 37 (YP+10): The Right to Truth (*) note from the author. Despite all of this, discrimination and transphobic violence still exist [25]. Each year, the Transrespect-versus-Transphobia Worldwide (TvT) team publishes the figures of hate crimes against gender-diverse people [26]. The 2018 update informed a total of 369 cases of reported killings between October 1, 2017, and September 30, 2018, constituting an increase of 44 cases compared with the previous year, for a total of 2982 reported cases in 72 countries worldwide since 2008 [26]. 4.4. Depathologization as a Legal Issue With respect to the legal recognition of gender, activism towards trans depathologization demands that future gender identity laws do not contemplate medical requirements or restrictions related to marital status, age or nationality [8]. In fact, activism insists that these requirements need to be removed from existing laws [15]. Activists for depathologization consider that the legal requirements needed for hormonal therapy, sterilization, genital surgery or divorce constitutes a violation of human rights and an attack on the physical integrity and the right to a family life. In addition, the activists emphasize that the medical requirements are contrary to the rights established in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the principles of Yogyakarta [8]. In recent years, a growing number of countries have modified their legislation to accommodate non-binary classifications of sex and gender. According to TGEU, 34 countries in Europe require a mental health diagnosis in legal gender recognition (Figure 1). The TvT published the current situation for legal gender recognition [26] (Table 3). Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2019, 16, x 5 of 10 Principle 3: The Right to recognition before the law (without requirements such as hormone therapy, sterilization or surgery. All of these infringe upon human rights *) Principle 17: The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health Principle 18: Protection from Medical Abuses Principle 31 (YP+10): The Right to Legal Recognition Principle 32 (YP+10): The Right to Bodily and Mental Integrity Principio 37 (YP+10): The Right to Truth (*) note from the author. Despite all of this, discrimination and transphobic violence still exist [25]. Each year, the Transrespect-versus-Transphobia Worldwide (TvT) team publishes the figures of hate crimes against gender-diverse people [26]. The 2018 update informed a total of 369 cases of reported killings between October 1, 2017, and September 30, 2018, constituting an increase of 44 cases compared with the previous year, for a total of 2982 reported cases in 72 countries worldwide since 2008 [26]. 4.4. Depathologization as a Legal Issue With respect to the legal recognition of gender, activism towards trans depathologization demands that future gender identity laws do not contemplate medical requirements or restrictions related to marital status, age or nationality [8]. In fact, activism insists that these requirements need to be removed from existing laws [15]. Activists for depathologization consider that the legal requirements needed for hormonal therapy, sterilization, genital surgery or divorce constitutes a violation of human rights and an attack on the physical integrity and the right to a family life. In addition, the activists emphasize that the medical requirements are contrary to the rights established in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the principles of Yogyakarta [8]. In recent years, a growing number of countries have modified their legislation to accommodate non-binary classifications of sex and gender. According to TGEU, 34 countries in Europe require a mental health diagnosis in legal gender recognition (Figure 1). The TvT published the current situation for legal gender recognition [26] (Table 3). Figure 1. Trans Rights Europe Map (source tgeu.org) Figure 1. Trans Rights Europe Map (source tgeu.org). Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2019, 16, 978 6 of 11 Table 3. The current worldwide situation for legal gender recognition (extracting from TvT). Country Change of Name Change of Gender Yes Pathol. Requirement Sterilization /Surgery Requirement No Yes Pathol. Requirement Sterilization/ Surgery Requirement No Keeping Marriage Possible /Divorce necessary More Than Two Gender Option Argentina (2012) * x x No data two Australia x x marriage three Belgium x x x x divorce two Bulgaria x x divorce two Botswana x (different) x (different) x No data two Chile x x China x x x x divorce two Colombia x x x divorce two Cuba x x x x divorce two Germany x x divorce two Denmark (2014) * x x marriage two Egypt x x Georgia x x x divorce two Greece x x x x divorce two Spain x x x x marriage two Finland x x x divorce two France x x x x divorce two Croatia x x divorce two India x x divorce three Iceland x x x x marriage two Ireland (2015)* x x two Italy x x x x divorce two Japan x x x divorce Two Kenia x x South Korea x x x No data two Malta (2015)* x x marriage three Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2019, 16, 978 7 of 11 Table 3. Cont. Country Change of Name Change of Gender Yes Pathol. Requirement Sterilization /Surgery Requirement No Yes Pathol. Requirement Sterilization/ Surgery Requirement No Keeping Marriage Possible /Divorce necessary More Than Two Gender Option Mexico x x x x marriage two Netherlands x x marriage two Norway x x x marriage two Nepal x x No data three New Zealand x x marriage three Portugal x x marriage two Romania x x x divorce two Russia x x marriage two Sweden x x marriage two Singapore x x x x divorce two Switzerland x x x x marriage two United Kingdom x x divorce two United States x x x (some parts) x (some parts) marriage two Venezuela x x South Africa x x No data two Taiwan x x x marriage two Turkey x x x divorce two (*) Gender Recognition laws without medical requirements, approved in the aforementioned year. Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2019, 16, 978 8 of 11 In recent years, countries worldwide are increasingly expanding male/female binary sex classifications to recognize a third status. This status should include intersex people and, broadly, all non-binary sex and gender classifications. A geographically diverse range of countries, such as Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Canada, Malta, Nepal, New Zealand, and Pakistan allow official registration under a third sex in addition to male and female; treating sex not through biology but by criteria of gender [26,27]. 5. Uncertain Future: Depathologization of Intersexuality or Body Diversity Intersex people are born with physical, hormonal or genetic features that are neither wholly female nor wholly male; a combination of female and male; or neither female nor male. Intersex comprises a range of physical traits or variations that lie between ideals of male and female [28]. With some exceptions, intersex bodies are generally healthy. Infants, children, and adolescents born with intersex bodies are often subjected to medical interventions to “normalize” sex characteristics, which are not based on evidence, but on clinical feelings, beliefs, and narrow social norms [29]. However, there are doubts as to whether these interventions (surgeries) are adequate. Research conducted has shown that early surgery to shape the genitals of intersex children, accompanied by a socialization within the assigned gender, results in a better or more “typical” childhood. On the contrary, these surgeries usually result in psychological difficulties that affect the child and the adult that the child will become [27]. The consequences of interventions and associated examinations include the need for lifelong hormone replacement, repeat surgeries, lack of sexual function and sensation, incorrect gender assignment, and trauma [29]. In recent years, an international intersex movement has emerged due to human rights violations suffered by intersex people, such as genital surgeries and other non-consensual treatments. Activists are demanding a series of measures such as the cessation of non-consensual surgical treatments, depathologization in diagnostic classifications, creation of the category of “third gender” -but only if it is open to all persons, abolition of the civil registry of sex, cessation of practices of stigmatization, and reparation of iatrogenic damage [30]. On 14 February 2019, the European Parliament adopted a landmark resolution on the rights of intersex people [31]. By adopting this resolution, the European Parliament establishes a clear standard within the European Union for the protection of the physical integrity and the human rights of intersex people. The resolution complements the pioneering intersex resolution of 2017: “Promoting human rights and eliminating discrimination against intersex people”, approved by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. In this resolution, the European Parliament “strongly condemns the normalizing treatments of sex and surgical interventions” and urges the Member States to adopt legislation that urgently protects the bodily integrity of intersex people. It also confirms that intersex people are exposed to numerous types of violence and discrimination in the European Union and asks the European Commissions and Member States to propose legislation to address these problems. Other issues addressed by the resolution include the need for adequate counselling and support for intersex people and their families, measures to end the stigma and pathologization faced by intersex people and increased funding for civil society organizations led by intersex people [31]. Sadly, intersex people have been excluded from the process of depathologization and are included in the ICD-11 as “malformative disorders of sex development”. There are still multiple key changes that need to be made 6. Conclusions Historically, transgender and gender diverse people have been faced with social and legal barriers towards their freedom and dignity. United Nations international human rights principles provide protection for people on the basis of sexual orientation, gender identity and intersex status [28]. Over the last decade, international activism has emerged for trans and intersex depathologization with the historical antecedent of the depathologization of homosexuality. Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2019, 16, 978 9 of 11 The primary reason for the discrimination and poor access to healthcare of trans-people lies in the stigma associated with mental illness. There is an obvious connection between pathologization and the difficulties to obtain a change in name or legal gender because a psychiatric diagnosis is needed [24]. It seems contradictory that for a civil, legal, and administrative matter there must be a medical diagnosis. Defining gender diversity as an illness or otherwise abnormal is unfounded, discriminatory, and without demonstrable clinical utility. The fact that only gender diverse people are pathologized constitutes unequal treatment, resulting in a violation of the right to non-discrimination. Another major concern is childhood pathologization. This diagnosis of “gender dysphoria” in children in DSM-V or “gender incongruence” in childhood in ICD-11 has no clinical utility because children do not need treatment. Countries have certain obligations such as to not discriminate and to protect the right to healthcare of their citizens. Thus, trans depathologization as a human right implies the Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health; that is access to trans-specific healthcare. So, the right to access trans-specific healthcare serves as a justification to claim the right to depathologization. Author Contributions: M.E.C.-P.: she has been the main author for all aspects of the work. J.M.G.-A. and R.L.-S.: they have made substantial contributions to conception and design, and analysis of data reviewed; A.M.P.-H., M.I.S.-A. and N.D.: they have been involved in drafting the manuscript or revising it critically for important intellectual content; N.D.L.-R.: she has given final approval of the version to be published. Funding: Not applicable. Acknowledgments: The authors wish to acknowledge the help provided by Transboys, Transgirls and Chrysallis. The advice given by the members of these associations have been very valuable in the construction of this paper. Conflicts of Interest: The authors declare that they have no competing interests. Abbreviations DSM Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders ECHR European Convection on Human Rights GATE Global Action for Trans Equality ICD International Classification Of Diseases ILGA The International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association SOC-7 Standards of Care 7th Edition STP Stop Trans Pathologization TGEU Transgender Europe TvT Transrespect-versus-Transphobia Worldwide UN United Nations WHO World Health Organization WPATH World Professional Association for Transgender Health References 1. FRA European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights. Being Trans in the European Union: Comparative Analysis of EU LGBT Survey Data; FRA European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights: Vienna, Austria, 2014; 129p. 2. The Yogyakarta, Principles. Principles on the Application of International Human Rights Law in Relation to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity. 2018. 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J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2019, 16, 978 11 of 11 29. Carpenter, M. Intersex human rights: Clinical self-regulation has failed. Reprod. Health Matters. 2018. Available online: http://www.srhm.org/news/intersex-human-rights-clinical-self-regulation-has-failed/ (accessed on 20 November 2018). 30. Carpenter, M. The human rights of intersex people: Addressing harmful practices and rhetoric of change. Reprod. Health Matters 2016, 24, 74–84. [CrossRef] [PubMed] 31. Parliament European. European Parliament Resolution on the Rights of Intersex People. 2018. Available online: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/B-8-2019-0101_EN.html (accessed on 8 March 2019). © 2019 by the authors. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/). http://www.srhm.org/news/intersex-human-rights-clinical-self-regulation-has-failed/ http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.rhm.2016.06.003 http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/27578341 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/B-8-2019-0101_EN.html http://creativecommons.org/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/. Introduction Depathologization Perspectives Historical Precedent: Depathologization of Homosexuality or Sexual Diversity Current Moment: Depathologization of Transgenderism or Gender Diversity Depathologization as a Healthcare Issue Evolution of the Diagnostic Classification in the ICD and the DSM Depathologization as a Human Right Issue Depathologization as a Legal Issue Uncertain Future: Depathologization of Intersexuality or Body Diversity Conclusions References 
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work_eabksbojbvb4joyiyjihhyf4ae	----	Amelioration of the Effects of Discrimination Published in: The Counseling Psychologist, 29, 2, 279-307, 2001 Counseling Practices to Ameliorate the Effects of Discrimination and Hate Events: Toward a Systematic Approach to Assessment and Intervention Edward Dunbar University of California at Los Angeles Correspondence should be directed to Edward Dunbar, Ed.D., Department of Psychology and Center of Inter-Ethnic and Inter-Racial Conflict Resolution, University of California at Los Angeles, California, 90024. The author would like to thank Dr. Megan Sullaway for her comments and recommendations in the preparation of this manuscript. Amelioration of the Effects of Discrimination 2 Abstract A treatment model for the psychological sequelae of discrimination is illustrated via three treatment cases in which experiences of racism, gender and/or ethnic/religious hostility were a primary focus of intervention. The client’s level of psychological functioning, acuity of hate victimization, coping and identity re-formation strategies are addressed in this phase-oriented model of counseling. The five treatment phases are: (a) event containment and safety, (b) assessment of client-event characteristics, (c) addressing diversity in the counseling alliance, (d) acute symptom reduction, and (e) identity recovery and reformation. Counseling tasks with clients of hate victimization include the amelioration of acute post-event symptoms, re-framing of aversive outgroup attitudes, alleviating disturbance of ingroup identity, and the eradication of avoidant intergroup behaviors. It is proposed that the effective treatment of victims of chronic harassment and acute hate incidents requires the integration of behavioral, cognitive, and multicultural counseling modalities. Amelioration of the Effects of Discrimination 3 Counseling Practices to Ameliorate the Effects of Hate Events And Discrimination: Toward a Systematic Approach to Assessment and Intervention The past two decades have seen a refinement of theory concerning multicultural counseling and psychotherapy (Comas-Diaz & Jacobsen, 1991; Sue & Sue, 1991, Atkinson, Morten, & Sue, 1993; Sue, 1998). One of the more promising consequences of these efforts has been the articulation of treatment strategies which are exemplars of effective intervention with specific ethno-cultural groups and/or cultural problems (Coleman, 1995). A significant issue for practitioners serving multicultural populations concerns our ability to address our client’s experiences of hate victimization in organizational, community, and interpersonal relationships. This very serious societal problem is most frequently encountered by members of “at risk” minority outgroups; persons of color, the disabled, and gay men and lesbians. Additionally hate aggression mitigates against positive intergroup attitudes for not only victimized individuals but also their families and communities. Social problems of racism, heterosexism, gender, and ethnic bias implicitly have been a topic of concern to multicultural practitioners and theorists. Yet until very recently there has been little effort to explicitly consider this issue in terms of counseling practice. As suggested by community-based research (Carlson & Rosser-Hogan, 1994) the impact of intergroup conflict upon the targeted individual has important implications for psychological practice, particularly for psychologists in multicultural settings (Ryan & Bradford, 1993; Kim-Goh, Suh, Blake, & Hiley- Young, 1995). This paper presents a five-phase intervention model, which integrates cognitive- behavioral and multicultural approaches, to treat clients who have been the victims of harassment and hate crimes. The model is based upon empirical study of hate victimization, consultation with service delivery professionals with hate crime victims, and most importantly treatment with victims Amelioration of the Effects of Discrimination 4 of hate acute aggression and chronic harassment. The contribution of the interventions to the recovery from hate victimization is considered in three treatment case studies. Legal and Behavioral Characteristics of Hate Victimization The treatment of victims of intergroup conflict requires that the practitioner consider not only the psychological but also legal implications of the critical event. In the U.S., federal and state legislation have established legal criteria for bias-motivated crimes. Hate crimes are frequently characterized by physical assault, homicide or attempted homicide, anonymous symbolic forms of harassment, and damage to property (Levin & McDevitt, 1993). The victims of hate crimes are protected under criminal and in many states civil law. To be classified as a hate crime, the offense must evidence an animus by the perpetrator for the victim’s ingroup. By contrast, forms of non- criminal hate victimization which do not result in damage to property or harm (or threat of harm ) to the person are referred to as hate incidents (Los Angeles County Human Relations Commission, 1994). Hate incidents include experiences of interpersonal denigration, occupational discrimination, and more insidious forms of bias (Cervantes, 1995). Determination of community-wide base rates of hate crimes and hate incidents is of value not only to policy makers but also professionals involved in service delivery to at-risk populations. Klonnoff and Landrine (1995) provide evidence of the frequency of gender-based hate incidents experienced by women. Ninety-nine percent of their 631 subjects reported having experienced gender-based discrimination during their lives, with 97 percent having experienced some form of gender-based discrimination during the past year. For gay men and lesbians, the incidence of verbal harassment in a 1 year period was reported as 62% and 52%, respectively; 18% of the gay men and 13% of the lesbians in this same sample reported being the victims of an anti-gay crime in the prior 5 year period (Herek, Gillis, & Cogan, 1999). In a study with 318 practicing psychologists, 52 Amelioration of the Effects of Discrimination 5 percent of the responding practitioners reported that psychotherapy treatment had addressed client experiences of intergroup race/ethnic conflict (Dunbar & Sue, 1996). These studies indicate that hate victimization occurs more frequently than do many of the recognized psycho-social stressors, such as unemployment, identified in the DSM IV (American Psychiatric Association, 1994). Sequelae of Hate Victimization Allport (1954) proposed that victims of discrimination employed an ego defense (or what might now be described as an attributional belief) which was either extrapunitive or intrapunitive. Extrapunitive attributions result in the victim blaming the social environment, while intrapunitive attributions result in victim self-recrimination and denigration. Contemporary researchers have noted that victims of chronic discrimination may experience a constellation of psychological symptoms including feelings of helplessness (Root, 1992), numbing, paranoid-like guardedness (Newhill, 1990), medical problems (Kriegrer, 1990; Shrier, 1990) dysphoria, poorly mediated affects (Wyatt, 1994), and denigration of one’s socio-cultural ingroups (Bell, 1980). In instances of recurring harassment, the victimized individual may become habituated to their victimization, resulting in dis-regulation their harm-avoidance skills. These would include failure to evaluate risk in novel situations or the use of an active coping response to defend against provocation. Root, in her work with victims of chronic racism and ethnic discrimination, has suggested that many clients evidence symptoms characteristic of posttraumatic stress disorder (1994). Other researchers of trauma have proposed a disorder independent from PTSD, which is attributable to chronic psychosocial stressors. Scott and Stradling (1992) have referred to this as the “Prolonged Duress Disorder.” Just as the severity and chronicity of hate victimization may vary, so too differences of individual vulnerability need to be considered in mental health treatment. As I have observed, the Amelioration of the Effects of Discrimination 6 client's level of psychological functioning prior to the hate incident may play a significant role in treatment outcome. Individual difference variables and prior trauma victimization may both heighten vulnerability to subsequent traumatic events (Ullman, 1994). Clinical researchers have noted that clients experiencing problems characteristic of DSM-IV Cluster B personality disorders, such as Borderline (Lonie, 1993) and Narcissistic Personality Disorder (Johnson, 1995), may be particularly prone to evidence trauma-type symptomatology in response to life stressors which are not objectively traumatic in terms of severity of threat to the individual. Furthermore, ingroup identity status may heighten awareness of and response to intergroup conflict. Highly ingroup identified clients marked by ingroup idealization may evidence greater affective disturbance secondary to aversive intergroup hostility (Bell, 1980). Coping with Hate Victimization An issue of significant importance to counseling practice is the client's ability to effectively cope with the experience of hate victimization. The coping research which examines adjustment to normative life tasks is of questionable applicability with clients who have experienced hate victimization. Rather, the individual's ability to effectively engage the perpetrating party, mediate the conflict in situ, or seek institutional redress is of significantly more importance than if the coping response is per se affective or cognitive, for example. In the study of victims of criminal assault, client employment of an active and self-efficacious coping style is related to better recovery (Sales, Baum & Shore, 1984). Additionally, there is evidence that coping with hate victimization varies by race/ethnic and gender groups. Dunbar, Liu, and Horvath (1995) have noted that active coping is more typically employed by members of empowered ingroups, while Liu and Dunbar (1994) reported that for Asian-Pacifics, greater ingroup ethnic identity was related to use of a more active coping response to hate victimization. Amelioration of the Effects of Discrimination 7 Victims of overtly hostile and injurious hate crimes (as in cases of bias-motivated physical assault) often manifest a coping response marked by avoidance of outgroup persons (Dutton, Burghardt, Perrin, Chrestman, & Halle, 1994). As Herek (1999) and his colleagues found, hate crimes against gays and lesbians significantly compromise the level of trust of the larger social environment and yields more chronic psychological impairment than do similar non-hate related forms of criminal victimization. Counseling Interventions to Ameliorate Hate Event Sequelae: A Phase-Specific Approach The effective treatment of victims of hate events incorporates a variety of counseling goals which are subsumed by two superordinate tasks. The first counseling task is the alleviation of the psychological sequelae of hate victimization. This includes reduction of trauma symptoms of intrusive ideation, physiological arousal, numbing and avoidance behavior. The second counseling task concerns the client's re-establishing an adaptive ingroup identity, the employment of culturally congruent coping behaviors, and engagement in benign intergroup contact experiences. The phases of the treatment model are described below and summarized in Table 1. Phase 1: Containment and Safety. As in other crisis intervention models (Parad, 1965; Scott & Stradling, 1992), the initial task of the practitioner concerns client determining safety and capacity for self-care. In this treatment model, practitioner tasks include assessment of client risk for self-injurious/self-defeating behavior, potential for retaliatory aggression, and impairment of basic life functioning (e.g. work dysfunction or school truancy). As my experience has indicated, it is essential that the practitioner determine with the client the risk of further threat from the identified perpetrators. This has been most pronounced in cases of workplace harassment and community-based provocation, where the perpetrating party may continue to have contact with the client. In such instances, physical removal of the client from the environment may be necessary Amelioration of the Effects of Discrimination 8 prior to proceeding with counseling treatment. One of the hallmark features of the hate event experience is its de-humanizing nature. Victims of acute hate events may manifest symptoms typically characteristic of severe psychopathology, even when the client's pre-event level of functioning was highly adaptive. Initial appraisal should therefore explore for the presence of trauma-related symptoms such as intrusive ideation, avoidance of reminders of the event, numbing and dissociation, and physiological arousal. Additionally, in culturally-crossed counseling dyads, the practitioner should discuss the client's options of being in treatment with a person of his/her own race/ethnicity, religion, sexual orientation, or gender group. As discussed below, this issue remains salient throughout the course of treatment. Phase 2: Assessment of Client-Event Characteristics. The comprehensive appraisal of the hate victim includes analysis of the critical hate incident and measurement of the client's symptomatology and defining psychological resources. Practitioner tasks include determining the frequency of hate-based events, behaviorally defining the critical hate event as experienced by the client, and determining what social support is available to assist in the remediation of acute symptoms. In their study of hate incidents Dunbar, Sue, and Liu (1994) identified five factor- derived types of hate victimization. The factor dimensions were described as interpersonal harassment, exclusion from social groups and networks, co-opting of personal achievement, personal invisibility, and restriction of opportunities for personal achievement. Subsequent research identified three factors of affective response to intergroup conflict; these were: anxiety/tension, dysphoria/sadness, and anger/aggression. These affective responses were found to mediate the victim's reported efficacy in coping with the hate event (Liu, 1995). These dimensions of victimization and affect response are used in a clinician rating scale in the proposed model. Client assessment for prior trauma history, as well as determination of the chronicity of discrimination can Amelioration of the Effects of Discrimination 9 assist the practitioner in defining subsequent (phase four and five) counseling intervention goals. It is particularly important to thoroughly explore the client's prior intergroup contact experiences and to determine whether the client was either victim or witness to experiences of violence and abuse. As has been noted, prior history of abuse is prognostically meaningful in terms of less effective help-seeking behavior and recovery from traumatic events (Cascardi, O'Leary, Lawrence, & Schlee, 1995). In phase two, psychometric assessment includes use of symptom-focused measures and clinician ratings scales which specifically pertain to intergroup conflict and/or trauma history. The following case illustrations employed the MMPI, which, in a recent meta-analysis has been deemed a viable clinical measure with persons of color (Nagayama Hall, Bansal, & Lopez, 1999) than other symptom measures. As such, the selection of symptom measures needs to be considered contingent upon the socio-cultural characteristics of a given client (Sue & Okazaki, 1995). Additionally, on- going client assessment is one of the most important tasks of the counseling psychologist (Trevino, 1996). Assessment in treatment of hate events is a particularly dynamic process, in which careful monitoring of change in symptomatology, ingroup identity, and intergroup contact is essential in appraising the efficacy of treatment. Phase 3: Addressing Diversity in the Counseling Alliance. Treatment must explicitly deal with in-the-room issues of diversity as it influences the working alliance. From my experience, the impact of the practitioner's race and ethnicity upon the therapeutic relationship is obviously important. Practitioner-oriented researchers have noted the importance of counselor competence to adequately discuss race with their clients (Brantley, 1983), and to effectively determine the impact of chronic discrimination events upon the client’s level of functioning (Shannon, 1973). Accordingly, the role of the counselor's race, sexual orientation, ethnicity, and gender are often Amelioration of the Effects of Discrimination 10 magnified in instances in which discrimination and hate-related crime are the foci of treatment. The failure of White practitioners to comprehend the experiences of discrimination of their client’s of color has been noted by Ridley (1984), resulting in the reinforcement of a worldview in which intergroup contact is suspect and ineffectual. Furthermore, as has been made clear by the work of Helms (1989), the impact of both the practitioner's ingroup (i.e. race) membership and ingroup (i.e. racial) identity influence counselor efficacy. Phase three practitioner tasks include the self-assessment of competence in terms of culture- related information and capacity to implement interventions in a culturally salient manner (Johnson, 1987). Particularly important in this regard is the practitioner's examination of counter- transference experiences in working with victims of severe hate events. As I have found in consultation with victim assistance staff, practitioner reactions of ingroup guilt, political reification of the client and his/her experience, feelings of helplessness, and heightened awareness of personal biases and prejudice are particularly relationship-damaging in working with victims of hate events. Prior research has indicated that counselors more favorably assess victimized individuals, independent of the level of the client’s psychopathology (Ofri, Solomon, & Dasberg, 1995), and that practitioners may internalize the trauma symptoms of their clients, particularly in cases of violent hate events (Comas-Diaz & Padilla, 1990; Straker & Mossa, 1994). An additional phase three practitioner task is the articulation of culturally salient themes of the client’s ingroup resilience. By this I mean the practitioner actively encourages the client to relate their personal experience of victimization to that of members of their ingroup. This strategy is threefold, in that it serves to: (1) establish a commonality of personal victimization with that of a meaningful social network, (2) draws upon lessons learned from other credible ingroup persons about how to cope with adversity, and (3) reinforce the concept of change and adaptation as being a Amelioration of the Effects of Discrimination 11 desirable means to resolve problems associated with intergroup conflict. These themes of resilience provide the client with a chance to talk aloud how other people like them have dealt with challenge and coped. They may be embedded in folk stories, art, literature, ingroup significant others, music, or culturally proscribed traditions to solve problems. Phase 4: Acute Symptom Reduction. Subsequent to safety determination, initial evaluation, and cultural analysis, the practitioner needs to systematically resolve the cognitive, affective, and behavioral sequelae of the hate incident. These counseling practices are based upon empirically validated models of treatment with crime and sexual assault victims (Foa, Riggs, &Gershuny, 1995). The cognitive model developed by Resick in the treatment of sexual assault victims hold particular value in this regard (Resick & Schnicke, 1993). These include: (1) de- sensitization to intrusions related to the hate incident, (2) reframing the client's self-negations about victimization, (3) skills training in anger/affect modulation, and (4) use of dialogic and dialectic techniques in vivo for perpetrator confrontation. These steps in the treatment process are sequentially inter-related throughout stage four intervention. The employment of stimulus de- sensitization and imaginal prolonged exposure training is recognized as an effective intervention with trauma victims (Barlow & Cerny, 1988; Fairbank & Brown, 1987), and is viewed as a treatment of choice with sexual assault victims (Davidson & Foa, 1991). Multi-modal interventions employing progressive relaxation, visual imagery, and in vivo de-sensitization are all appropriate for use with clients of hate victimization. It is critical that symptom ratings be recorded routinely by the client and counselor in order to determine intervention efficacy. In acute symptom reduction, cognitive re-framing (Meichenbaum, 1977) and contingency- based problem solving (Linehan, 1993) are employed to diminish intrusive ideational material, victim self-denigration, and generalized aversive association to members of the perpetrator's Amelioration of the Effects of Discrimination 12 ingroup. I have observed, however, that the efficacy of these cognitive techniques is significantly mediated by the client's exposure to benign intergroup contact subsequent to the critical event. Training to develop client anger management skills is often required. This provides the client with tools to manage poorly modulated affects, particularly diffused hostility (Williams & Williams, 1993). Self-monitoring activities should be linked to targeted desensitization activities to alleviate anger response (Suinn, 1977). Alternately, the practitioner should also consider the appropriateness of referral for pharmacotherapy if acute post-incident ideation remains prominent. As I have observed, when (phase one) safety needs have been established, the client often attempts to comprehend the motives of their assailant and frequently evidences a desire to express their feelings about if not towards the perpetrator. Counseling should employ what Linehan (1993) calls dialogic techniques in this regard. This may include dialectic and role playing techniques to allow the victim to safely address feelings about the perpetrator. Journal writing and art therapy (Liebmann, 1996) techniques may be employed as well. Dialectic approaches, as defined by scientist-practitioners such as Greenberg and Safran (1989) provide a safe method of articulating, confronting, asserting, and externalizing the client's feelings and beliefs. The cultural appropriateness of this treatment modality must be particularly considered. Imaginal and dialectical forms of in vivo confrontation is not meant to be a prelude to an in situ encounter with the perpetrator. The few programs, which advocate victim-perpetrator interaction, have failed to demonstrate treatment effectiveness with either victims or perpetrators (Fred Persely, personal communication, March 19, 1996). In the absence of convincing evidence to the contrary, such "re- staging experiences" are best seen as counseling-damaging acts and are to be generally avoided. Phase 5: Identity Recovery and Reformation. Intervention tasks of this stage of treatment include measuring and reinforcing symptom reduction and change, reframing distorted outgroup Amelioration of the Effects of Discrimination 13 attitudes, promoting benign intergroup contact experiences, and shaping an adaptive ingroup identity. These tasks are initiated once acute symptoms are in remission. One of the more significant issues in intervention with clients who have experienced hate events concerns the impact of the critical event(s) upon the individual's ingroup identity. One such method of assessment has already been demonstrated in Helms' research concerning racial identity. This ego- status model of racial ingroup identity has direct application for assessment and counseling with hate event victims. Conceptually, hate events pose a critical challenge to the client's self-construal of their relations with outgroup persons. In my clinical experience, post-event intergroup attitudes are significantly mediated by the history of pre-event intergroup contact and the individual’s ingroup identity. Identity recovery solutions sought by the client may yield a regressive shift towards greater outgroup denigration and avoidance of intergroup contact. This would serve to avoid re- experiencing the event and to minimize the likelihood of recurrence of victimization. Concomitant to this is a striving for greater engagement with ingroup members and (depending upon other pre- event factors) an idealization of ingroup values, behaviors, and beliefs. This significantly characterizes the Immersion/Emersion racial identity status as described by Helms. Conversely, clients who experience chronic insidious forms of discrimination may arrive at a very different identity solution. Under these conditions, ingroup denigration or denial is predicated upon the assumption that ingroup memberships are undesirable or ineffective in enhancing the quality of the individual's life. For these persons, an effort to minimize ingroup identity and/or awareness of between-group differences may occur. This identity solution is most characteristic of an Conformity-type racial identity status. Clinically, I have observed that, while more acute and injurious forms of intergroup conflict may result in idealized or exaggerated ingroup identity, more Amelioration of the Effects of Discrimination 14 insidious and recurring discrimination may discourage if not punish ingroup identity development. In clinical practice, these identity solutions are manifested by a marked splitting of ingroup- outgroup associations. Client attributions concerning between-group differences are fueled by affective polarization and the adoption of an outgroup-avoidant lifestyle. Treatment of ingroup- outgroup splitting constitute a critical task in client recovery. In counseling treatment with gay and lesbian clients, the pre-event status of identity development is correspondingly critical to post-event recovery. In the study of gay and lesbian identity formation, Cass (1979) and Troiden (1993) have viewed sexual orientation development as a succession of self-referenced status points, which ultimately result in a more coherent and stable identity. For Cass, gay and lesbian identity development identity includes progression through self- reference of one’s sexual orientation from sensitization, to identity confusion, to identity assumption, and finally resulting in identity commitment. For Troiden, the evolution of a gay or lesbian identity is marked by the employment of various strategies, such as denial, repair, avoidance, redefinition, and acceptance. Only this latter strategy yields a fully-integrated and healthy self-image as a gay male or lesbian. Both of these identity models share with the racial identity model of Helms (1989) recognition of the salience of intergroup contact experiences in identity formation. For clients at an Identity Diffusion stage of sexual identity (i.e. in which ingroup identity membership is ambivalent), as described by the Cass (1979) and Troiden (1993) models of gay/lesbian identity development, hate experiences may prove particularly destabilizing. A regressive identity solution for such a client would typically evidence internalized self-blame, with hate victimization being a consequence of an unhealthy lifestyle, resulting in the integration of societal stigmatization into his/her sexual identity. In contrast, for clients at a fully integrated stage of gay/lesbian identity (in the Cass model this is referred to as Identity Commitment) help seeking Amelioration of the Effects of Discrimination 15 and recovery could be expected to be significantly more efficacious. For persons with effective social supports and healthy self-regard, the discriminatory event may facilitate a more adaptive ingroup identity than had existed prior to the incident. These clients would more readily utilize mental health services and perceive an identified ingroup as a support mechanism. As such, even when the more acute symptoms of the hate event have been effectively ameliorated, further psychological intervention may be required to allow for a full recovery of selfhood and ingroup identity status as found prior to the critical event. Once more it should be stressed that the client's pre-event level of functioning plays a crucial role in treatment outcome. Case Illustrations of Assessment and Treatment Procedure and Assessment Methodology Three counseling cases are presented of clients who voluntarily initiated treatment at a private psychology group in the greater Los Angeles area. The psychology group where the clients were treated serves a heterogeneous socio-demographic client population. Some of the client demographic information was modified to preserve client confidentiality. Each client was initially seen for an individual assessment interview. Demographic information (e.g. client educational level, medical/developmental history, race/ethnicity, etc.) was recorded and DSM IV diagnoses were assigned. Counseling assessment included: (1) defining the presenting problems which precipitated treatment, (2) determination of DSM-IV diagnoses via administration of a modified version of the structured clinical interview for the DSM (First et. al., 1995) at treatment initiation, (3) reported (pre-event) intergroup contact experiences, and (4) psychometric assessment of symptoms and functional impairment. This information has been summarized in Table 2. Amelioration of the Effects of Discrimination 16 Method of Analysis The proposed model of assessment and treatment is considered via a series of case illustrations in which treatment explicitly focused upon client problems related to discrimination and hate-based events. As suggested by Kazdin and Kagan (1994), case-based research can contribute to the study of under-investigated client problems, employing a non-experimental methodology. This idiographic approach can lead to refinement of theory which may be (subsequently) revisited via conventional empirical study. These case analyses follow the recommendations for psychotherapy research as outlined by Kazdin (1992). This included the employment of psychometric assessment methods, ideographic (e.g. client-specific) material, and pre- and post-treatment counselor ratings across multiple cases. These case illustrations integrate behavioral rating and psychometric data in the assessment phase of treatment. These cases also sought to define behavioral features of the hate activity. Assessment included serial measurement of the trauma symptoms manifested subsequent to hate crime events and insidious prolonged discrimination. These cases provide an illustration of differences in the nature of the (hate-based) critical event and subsequent psychological sequelae and are typical if not prototypical of the practice issues which counselors face in working with multicultural populations. They also serve to guide discussion of how counseling interventions can ameliorate client problems, as well as underscore the palliative role of positive ingroup identity and help seeking behavior. Measures Social Group Conflict Scale. The Social Group Conflict Scale (SGCS; Dunbar, Sue, & Liu, 1994) examines the phenomenological characteristics of a specific intergroup conflict event. The SGCS includes 27 ratings of intergroup conflict events (e.g. "I was excluded from a group activity."). Responses are scored to reflect five factor-based conflict dimensions of: (1) Amelioration of the Effects of Discrimination 17 interpersonal provocation/harassment, (2) restriction of information and resources ("Gate Keeping"), (3) personal isolation/minimization, (4) control/co-opting of personal achievement, and (5) social group exclusion. From the original sample, the conflict dimension scale mean scores were 14.04 (SD= 9.80), 9.30 (SD= 7.92), 9.82 (SD= 5.57), 5.63 (SD= 4.56), and 5.60 (SD= 4.88), respectively. Higher scores indicate greater intensity of the experience. Three principal components varimax rotated factor-based dimensions of subjective affective response (Liu, 1995) are also derived from 21 affect ratings, yielding dimensions of: (1) anxiety/tension, (2) dysphoria/sadness, and (3) anger/aggression. The mean scores for these dimensions with the standardization sample were 15.73 (SD= 6.11), 19.51 (SD= 7.02), and 14.57 (SD= 3.73), respectively. Impact of Event Scale. The Impact of Event Scale (IES) is a widely employed measure of trauma symptoms (Horowitz, Wilner, & Alvarez, 1979). This measure has been used to describe features of post-trauma response for clinical samples and trauma victims. The IES consists of two dimensions of post-trauma symptoms, avoidance and intrusion. In the source article the intrusion scale score for a population of psychotherapy outpatients, who were in treatment secondary to the death of a next of kin or a parent, was 21.2 (SD= 7.90) and the avoidance the scale score was 20.8 (SD= 10.2). In a study of intergroup conflict and discrimination experiences of university students, the mean IES scale scores were 9.66 (SD= 5.41) for avoidance and 12.21 (SD= 6.92) for intrusion symptoms (Dunbar & Liu, 1996). Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory. The Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (Hathaway & McKinley, 1983) is one of the most widely used measures of psychological symptoms and personality traits, having been employed in numerous studies addressing psychological problems and subjective well being. The three validity scales and the ten Amelioration of the Effects of Discrimination 18 clinical scales were employed in the current study. The clinical scales of the original form of the MMPI are reported to be significantly correlated with the corresponding clinical scales of the MMPI-2 (Butcher, Graham, & Ben-Porath, 1995). Case Summaries Case One: Workplace discrimination of an African-American Female. This client (referred to as Karen) initiated treatment via referral by her organization's Employee Assistance Program. She was a mid-career masters-prepared engineering professional who was a project manager for a high-technology firm. She initially sought treatment due to complaints of job stress, anxiety, and career concerns. Karen had been married for a decade. She described her marriage as "only adequate," with her husband having not been regularly employed for more than 2 years. Karen also acknowledged a history of sexual abuse by a neighbor. She denied prior psychological treatment. She did not report problems in her relationships with co- workers or issues of racism as being of concern in her referral from her EAP counselor, who was also an African-American woman. Initial assessment included an intake interview and administration of the MMPI. Based upon the interview with Karen, a diagnosis of Anxiety Disorder with Panic Attacks was assigned; the initial GAF score was 48, indicating serious psychological symptoms. Her MMPI profile yielded an elevated 8-4 profile (Scale 8/Sc T-Score = 77; Scale 4/Pd T-Score = 71); the Welsh code for the profile was 84'037-9216/5#LF-K. Treatment with Karen initially focused upon reduction of her anxiety symptoms via relaxation training and cognitive problem-focused interventions. Cognitive intrusions of molestation events (experienced by her as a child) which became prominent in the course of relaxation training necessitated the incorporation of desensitization training, employing autogenic techniques to reduce arousal secondary to the intrusive childhood trauma material. Amelioration of the Effects of Discrimination 19 After nearly three months in (weekly) counseling, Karen described a series of events which led to a change of focus in counseling. Specifically, she noted that she was having problems managing members of a project team that she was leading; she felt that she was not being kept abreast of the progress on the team's activities. Behavioral analysis revealed several issues of concern. She noted that she had not been linked into a company e-mail list, which tracked the activities of project team members. When she met with the other team members and complained about this, one member of the group, a tall White male said, "You don't need to know the technical information, just manage it." Karen felt that this man was frequently provoking and challenging her. At the same time, she indicated that her Director, a White woman, had stated that the project team members had complained about being asked by Karen to attend meetings which they felt that Karen herself should have attended. Karen was angry and upset that her decision making in delegating tasks was being questioned. She was also upset that her Director felt that it was acceptable to have project team members bypass Karen with their criticisms. Karen described her relationship with her Director as being superficially cordial, but felt disengaged and unable to solicit her guidance in managing her group. In terms of phase one tasks, the identified event was evidently recurring but posed neither an imminent threat to physical safety nor to her ability to carry out a variety of routine tasks. From the period when these incidents were first discussed, a gradual worsening of relations with both the team and her Director occurred. Karen felt increasingly isolated from day-to-day operational issues, provoked by the same White male team member, and unsupported by her Director. Further discussion in counseling revealed Karen's history of both positive and ambivalent inter-race relationships. She noted positive contact experiences at her multi-racial church and prior experiences of having successfully worked with and managed White employees. Karen’s initial Amelioration of the Effects of Discrimination 20 work in therapy had made the subsequent discussion about racial harassment viable, even in a racially crossed dyad. Karen also ascribed greater credibility to the practitioner due to the referring EAP counselor at the company who indicated the provided specialized in work with multicultural issues. At this point in treatment, assessment (e.g. phase two) included the SGCS and the IES. Her IES scores (Avoidance scale score of 16 and an Intrusion scale score of 8) were lower than those reported for traumatic symptomatology in the Horowitz et al. (1979) standardization sample. As compared to a non-clinical sample of persons who experienced discriminatory events, her scores were in the mid-range (Dunbar & Liu, 1996). The SGCS scales indicated affective arousal as reflected in the elevated dysphoria (score of 30) and anxiety (score of 22) scales (both of which were more than one standard deviation above scale baseline). SGCS conflict ratings characteristic of provocation, gate keeping, and social isolation were in the mid-range vis-à-vis the baseline values. Karen's help-seeking behavior included the solicitation of the involvement of a human resources manager in her division, who was also an African-American woman. After an initial meeting, however, Karen noted that the manager appeared reluctant to become involved in the dispute with the project team members or Karen's Director. Karen's ability to respond to the problems at work were compromised by her anxiety and panic; she acknowledged that she likely "came across" as scattered and noted being alternately despondent and angered at being left out of both the formal and informal information networks of her organization. Of note is that the IES scores on serial testing became notably elevated as the workplace discrimination worsened. Subsequent (i.e. three month) IES re-testing revealed a substantial rise in both the avoidance (score = 23) and intrusion (score = 14) symptoms. Amelioration of the Effects of Discrimination 21 At this point, counseling interventions emphasized taking behavioral "time-outs" after workplace conflicts (e.g., taking walks during her lunch hour, initiating brief conversations with friends who were outside of her department, and initiating more positive social activities). Treatment also incorporated an in vivo dialogic approach to assist Karen to process her feelings after difficult encounters with other staff. This led Karen to outline ahead of time the content and process of her one-to-one meetings with her Director. Her efficacy in managing these meetings was then examined by her in terms of principles used in assertion and communication training (Bower & Bower, 1980). This provided her with specific behaviors to employ in responding to workplace provocation. These interventions occurred over a 2-week period. Significant consequences of counseling were twofold. Karen responded in a more modulated manner to provocation by her co- workers and project team members. In addition, Karen was able to see that even with improvement in her behavior in the workplace, the attitudes and actions of some individuals did not significantly change. This helped her to redefine what aspects of the problem were rooted in the organizational environment. The progress in her behavioral self-management led to initiation of a workplace intervention, in which Karen secured the involvement of a company-sponsored non-binding dispute resolution program. This was facilitated by the treating psychologist and the organization's internal EAP manager. Through this program, Karen was guaranteed the participation of a senior executive of the organization, who served as her advisor and coach in initiating a review of her complaint. The dispute resolution process included interviews with Karen, her Director, and the project team members. This process occurred over a six-week period. The outcome produced an agreement satisfactory to both Karen and her Director. Although the organization did not formally concede that there had been a violation of its EEO policies, it did find that there had been a failure of her Director to effectively support her and provide assistance in addressing employee complaints. Amelioration of the Effects of Discrimination 22 The solution to Karen's situation is consistent with that found in many organizations today. She was offered a choice of positions in other areas of her company. This included a corporate position which she saw as being highly desirable in terms of her career aspirations and which provided her with significant visibility to senior management. Karen accepted this new position; she was also included in an employee mentoring program and was funded by her company to enroll in an executive MBA program. At the same time, no formal action was taken against her Director or co-workers. While Karen benefited from pursuing an organizational remedy to her race-related work problem, it would be inaccurate to suggest that she evidenced substantial therapeutic gain in terms of her anxiety. Post-conflict events suggested to the contrary. Furthermore, the impact of the workplace dispute was evidenced in her marital relationship, in which her husband proved to be dismissive and unsympathetic to her situation both during and subsequent to her participation in the dispute resolution program. This, interestingly, led her to form stronger relationships with her friends who were mostly Black and Asian. The (phase five) treatment tasks of ingroup identity re- formation and engagement in benign outgroup contact were attained in substantial part to her having maintained positive relationships with non-Blacks throughout her occupational crisis. Case Two: Ethnic and religious-based workplace harassment of a White Jewish male. Jason was a computer repair technician employed with a large manufacturing company. He was referred by a member of his organization's Employee Assistance Program. Initial complaints were explicitly linked to workplace experiences of being harassed by co-workers because he was Jewish. At the initiation of counseling, prominent complaints included sleep disturbance, dysphoria, guardedness, and irritability. He also complained that he had been drinking more than he liked. Specifically, he denied a history of alcohol abuse, noting he had been active in track and field sports for several years. He denied a history of trauma or abuse, and reported having had a Amelioration of the Effects of Discrimination 23 good childhood. Jason reported a good marriage, positive family relations, and a satisfactory friendship network. He indicated a long-standing involvement with his Jewish faith and reported that he had met his wife through his neighborhood synagogue. The determination of safety (phase one) from the perpetrating parties indicated both a chronic and physically non-injurious condition. Jason did not indicate that the harassment posed a threat of physical violence. Behavioral analysis (phase two) indicated that Jason routinely encountered experiences of anti-Semitic provocation and harassment. For example, Jason noted his personal possessions were hidden, vandalized or otherwise tampered with in his work area; he indicated that this occurred several times a week for the better part of two years. He also reported that he was frequently the target of pranks and jokes. These included anti-Semitic jokes directed at him as well as anti-Israel literature being left on his desk. One co-worker pointedly explained that he "went hunting" on Rosh Hashana while another employee explained that Jason was a "cheap Jew" because he did not want to participate in the group's football pool. After more than six months of this harassment, he told his supervisor and co-workers that he wanted the harassment to end. Subsequent to this, his co-workers pointedly avoided him. Jason noted that he had become increasingly isolated from the other employees in his work group. His supervisor, who had been very involved in the harassment, had told him that he "Got what he deserved" for complaining about the other employees' anti-Semitic actions. Jason reported that his supervisor also told him that he would be transferred "because he couldn't get along with anyone." Jason said that this hurt "more than the harassment.” Psychometric assessment (phase two) included the IES, SGCS, and MMPI-1. The MMPI-1 yielded a valid profile with a singular clinical elevation indicating mild depression (scale2/D T- score = 70). His IES scale scores for Intrusions (score of 22) and Avoidance (score of 28) were Amelioration of the Effects of Discrimination 24 comparable to the reported norms for the Horowitz et. al. client sample for trauma symptoms. The SGCS conflict response scores indicated that provocation (score of 11) and group exclusion (score of 6) were critical event characteristics; corroborating his initial complaints of taunting and isolation from co-workers as the situation on-the-job worsened. The SGCS scale depression score of 24 was two standard deviations above the baseline norm as well. In the initial counseling session, Jason specifically wanted to know whether the counselor "knew anything about" Jewish culture and if there were other Jewish persons who were seen at the psychology group practice who had also described experiences of discrimination. As such, phase three tasks of addressing culture were immediate issues at the initiation of treatment. Counselor credibility was enhanced when Jason was provided information by the practitioner concerning civil rights in the workplace from a Jewish rights organization and via discussion of research concerning coping with discrimination. Practitioner credibility was subsequently reinforced via Jason's referral to a Jewish attorney, who took specific interest in the case, for information on fair labor practices. Phase four treatment tasks included defining the coping strategies which Jason had employed and sources of support which he had sought. Help seeking was somewhat limited. Jason noted that he had spoken with his wife and other Jewish friends a good deal but was "embarrassed" and concerned about bringing the issue up at work or with other persons whom he knew socially. He noted that he had initially tried to get the support of his supervisor, but realized that this had probably made matters worse. He felt dismissed by his supervisor and co-workers in the work place as being "someone who had a problem with people talking about Jews." A physician referral for evaluation and treatment via anti-depressant medication was initiated; he was started on a low dose of Trazadone to help improve the quality of his sleep. After two months in counseling, Jason decided to leave his company and initiated legal action. Counseling continued during this time and Amelioration of the Effects of Discrimination 25 included both cognitive- and career-oriented interventions, setting behavioral goals which increased his health-promoting activities. Five month serial testing with the IES revealed a modest reduction in intrusion (with a re-test score of 16) and avoidance symptoms (re-test score of 21). In vivo rehearsal of future contact with former co-workers was instituted. In fact, Jason subsequently encountered several of his former co-workers at local professional meetings. He felt capable of engaging in these activities and felt that he had effectively managed to participate without being significantly aroused by their presence. Jason subsequently initiated labor arbitration, settled his case with his former company and elected not to return to his position. His former supervisor was removed from his position, due directly to the charges brought against him by Jason. Issues of identity re-formation were marked by a heightened awareness of anti-Semitism, as encountered by friends and other family members. Therapeutic interventions after this point (phase five) included the rehearsal and reinforcement of conflict management responses to anti-Semitic stereotypes. Jason noted that he had become more sensitized to such incidents since having begun counseling. He also developed greater interest in social issues related to anti-Semitism. Resilience themes were identified by Jason for both old testament biblical sources and through discussion at his synagogue. Resilience and coping were grounded in traditional parable of anti-Semitism and proximally by events occurring in Israel concurrent with his treatment. By the conclusion of counseling , his depression had remitted (Foa and others involved in trauma treatment have noted the limited evidence that acute stress and trauma symptoms are alleviated by psychopharmacotherapy) and he had secured regular employment in another firm. Case Three: Physical assault of an African-American adolescent male. This case met the criteria of a hate crime for aggravated assault due to the client's race. Initiation of counseling was via referral from the Los Angeles County Human Relations Amelioration of the Effects of Discrimination 26 Commission, a municipal agency responsible for the documentation and monitoring of hate crime activity. The commission had been contacted by the victim’s mother when she was told by her HMO that it would be 2 weeks before her son could be seen by a psychotherapist. The critical event was a physical assault by a group of approximately 10 to 12 young White men (aged 17 to early 20’s) who were subsequently identified as members of a local hate gang. The victim was one of five African-American youths aged 12 to 15 years of age. The assault took place at a public recreation area on a late weekend afternoon. The event began with the perpetrators calling out racial epithets and cursing at the young Black men. This escalated when the hate gang members chased the youths, one of whom (fictitiously called Robert), a thirteen-year-old, was knocked to the ground, and was repeatedly punched, kicked, and beaten. This continued for several minutes. The information was corroborated by the police report and a witness account. The assault ended when one of the perpetrators stopped the attack, saying that Robert was "too young" and "just a kid." Subsequent to the assault, two of the perpetrators were arrested and convicted. One of the individuals was sentenced to three months incarceration and was placed on summary probation at the time of his release. The second perpetrator was not tried, though no explanation was given by the public prosecutor. Initial counseling intervention (stage one) focused upon determination of the risk of recurrence of assault from other members of the hate gang. During the first two sessions, Robert's mother was present in the room; at this time the option of referral to a provider of color was discussed, which was declined by the mother. Initial assessment included an individual interview with the mother, who reported that Robert was unable to sleep at night, did not want to go outside, was fearful, and seemed "in a daze." Both she and Robert denied his having a prior history of hate crime-victimization. Robert indicated having school friends who were Anglo, Latino, and Asian- Amelioration of the Effects of Discrimination 27 Pacific. His mother indicated that Robert had been raised in a multi-racial community and had always attended schools that were culturally diverse. Help-seeking behavior initiated in the weeks following the assault was particularly problematic for a variety of reasons. These included the failure of law enforcement personnel who responded to the incident to apprehend more than two of the dozen or more perpetrators at the scene. Equally, the public prosecutor failed to return telephone calls from the mother and treating psychologist in trying to get additional information on the prosecution of the perpetrators. A particularly confusing issue for Robert and his mother was that one of the two responding officers and the public prosecutor were women of color. As such there was confusion concerning the sense of support from persons of color during the acute phase of the case. Robert completed the IES (avoidance = 24; intrusion = 31) falling in the mid and high ranges respectively for trauma symptoms when compared to the IES sample. The SGCS was administered in an interview format. This revealed elevated affective arousal for anxiety; however, the conflict characteristic scores did not sufficiently portray the nature of the physical assault. The SGCS anxiety scale score was 23; this was one standard deviation above the baseline. Of the five conflict factors, only the personal provocation score was found to be elevated. Early on (phase four) treatment focused upon training in relaxation induction and somatic discrimination techniques. This was subsequently coupled with desensitization and exposure, which was accomplished in vivo via audio recording and play back of the incident as related by Robert. Repeated pre- and post-exposure ratings for subjective unit of distress (SUDS) indicated a gradual reduction in aversive symptoms, arousal, and intrusions. This was accomplished over the first three months of treatment. Amelioration of the Effects of Discrimination 28 After three months of twice weekly counseling there was a measurable decrement in the trauma symptoms. Serial testing of the IES at this point yielded a significant reduction in the intrusion symptoms (re-test score of 5) and a modest reduction in avoidance symptoms (re-test score of 19). With this (partial) remission of the trauma symptoms, Robert initiated a vigorous physical exercise regime and started attending self-defense classes. At this stage in the treatment there was greater emphasis placed upon anger management and defining behavioral options in responding to racist events. In vivo exposure to the assault continued, as did mental imagery practice. SUDS ratings indicated a significant decrement in arousal to assault-related material. This was furthermore marked by resumption of normal recreational and social activities. With the reduction in acute trauma symptoms, there was a shift towards a more inclusive understanding of the nature of race and racism. Robert began drawing images of the gang members and of himself; he also became very interested in the music of Bob Marley and Bunny Wailer (reggae recording artists), who emphasized overcoming adversity and “self-resilience” in their music. Robert said the music helped him in "feeling better about” himself. Dialogic interventions were subsequently introduced, this included role playing of verbal confrontation with members of the hate group and journal writing about the incident. Education about community and national groups opposed to hate groups was also provided and became a source of particular interest to Robert, leading him to write and talk about the topic in his middle school classes. However, while Robert's condition notably improved during the course of treatment, that of his mother became progressively problematic. Having initially sought both legal and mental health support, by the termination of counseling (i.e. five months after the assault) Robert's mother had become hostile and dismissive of "the system." This was principally related to the failure of law enforcement personnel to prosecute other hate Amelioration of the Effects of Discrimination 29 gang members. Robert's mother also stated that his treatment by the police would have been different “if he had been White.” She indicated that if her son were victimized in the future, she would "settle it" on her terms and not seek the involvement of law enforcement persons or "deal with Whites." Fortunately, her feelings of disappointment were in contrast to other family members’ who took pride in Robert’s recovery. Discussion These cases illustrate the variety of experiences which practicing psychologists encounter in working with hate event victims. The client problems reported in all three of the cases meet some of the criteria for Acute Stress disorder and/or Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder. In Case Three (Robert), cognitive intrusion, situational anxiety, and physiological arousal secondary to contact with Whites were observed in the weeks following his hate crime victimization. This was apparently developed through classical conditioning secondary to the bias-motivated assault. Case One (Karen) stands in distinction to the other two cases in regards to the pre-event history of trauma related to childhood sexual abuse, which had been the focus of treatment prior to the worsening of her experiences of workplace discrimination. This case exemplifies the role of racism as a situational stressor and the additive role of prior trauma history (e.g. childhood sexual molestation) in coping and adjusting to the event. The contributory roles of favorable pre-event outgroup contact and organizational supports were noteworthy factors in problem management. Equally, it is interesting that in this case the work place harassment symptoms of trauma were not particularly elevated, even in context of the prior childhood trauma intrusions. It should be noted, however, that on-going psychological problems continued to compromise her level of functioning after resolution of the workplace harassment had been achieved. Amelioration of the Effects of Discrimination 30 In Case Two, chronic anti-Semitic harassment created a symptom constellation which included overtly fearful ideation, dysphoria with sleep disturbance, and ineffectual confrontation the perpetrators prior to beginning treatment. This case is noteworthy in terms of the deleterious effects of prolonged harassment. Specifically, avoidance and intrusion symptoms were only slightly improved after several months of treatment. This stands in distinction to Case Three (acute assault), in which significant symptom reduction was achieved in a comparable period of time. In neither case was there a prior history of harassment or trauma. Cases One and Two yielded symptomatology comparable to if not consistent with situationally conditioned psychological disturbance. As is reflected in the IES scores, both intrusion and avoidance symptoms were comparable to the clinical baseline reported by Horowitz et al. (1979). These three cases reflect distinctly different conditions in which the treatment model was employed. In Case One, intervention occurred over a six-month period, encompassing symptom onset, problem engagement, and problem resolution stages of a workplace discrimination incident. In Case Two, measurement of trauma symptoms occurred two years after recurring acts of anti- Semitic harassment had begun. In Case Three, assessment and treatment were initiated immediately after acute hate crime victimization. In contrast, the IES avoidance symptoms remained quite high. This points to the possibility that victims of hate aggression continue to exhibit an active avoidance response to stimuli associated with the precipitating event and minimize intergroup contact experiences. These cases further raise the question as to the enduring nature of avoidant behaviors employed by victims of hate incidents who do not secure psychological services. Clearly, this issue warrants closer investigation by multicultural researchers and practitioners. As Sue and Zane (1987) have noted, counselor competence and credibility are particularly significant factors in terms of racially- and ethnically crossed counseling dyads. In the cases Amelioration of the Effects of Discrimination 31 described in this paper, the counselor was a member of the perpetrating group (a White male gentile). This most likely had an impact upon the course of treatment. In the current cases, credibility-enhancing activities included the practitioner being identified by the referring parties as experienced in working with hate crime victims and being a university researcher involved with the topic of prejudice. Furthermore, the referring professional in each instance was a person of color. These factors certainly played a part in the clients' willingness to seek treatment with a White service provider. Credibility-enhancing activities also included active case management with community organizations of the clients' ingroup and serving as a resource in linking the client to hate crime prevention services. It must be emphasized that the salience of culture in working with victims of acute hate aggression must at all time be recognized. Personally, I have found it critical with hate victims to know when to set aside the prescribed behavioral treatment (phase four) and directly discuss the client's experiences of discrimination. The strict adherence to a pre-ordained counseling model or manual-driven treatment is less salient to the therapeutic relationship than the counselor's being responsive to the client's safety needs and re-formation of his or her ingroup identity. Finally, in terms of the proposed model of treatment, it must be acknowledged that the efficacy of intervention is mediated by larger social and community factors which control help-seeking. Situations in which harassment, provocation, and threat are tolerated will substantially limit the capacity of any mental health intervention to by itself meet the client’s needs for safety and autonomy. The importance of cultural factors, as I have observed, increases as the acuity of disabling symptoms of intrusion, anxiety, and hyper-arousal diminishes. That is, the incorporation of culturally-salient beliefs, resilience themes, and coping behaviors are needed to bridge treatment from phase four symptom reduction to identity re-formation and competency in outgroup contact Amelioration of the Effects of Discrimination 32 experiences. When these culturally-salient issues of treatment are not addressed either the client or practitioner may incorrectly view the counseling relationship as having produced a positive outcome. Rather, the reduction of acute symptoms should serve as a sign for the practitioner to shift treatment towards phase five tasks. Contrary to the notion that cultural factors are usually most important in establishing the working reliance, in work with hate victims, the role of culture is most critical once ingroup identity issues can become a focus of intervention. Implications for Counseling Research This article has presented case illustrations of counseling treatment in which hate victimization was an explicit focus of psychological intervention. These cases all dealt with problems related to intentional and overt acts of intergroup aggression and hostility. It should be considered that some of the more enduring assumptions concerning the experience of bias and prejudice unwittingly serve to minimize the incident as being either the product of cultural misunderstanding, on the one hand, or have emphasized the pathological selfhood of persons who have suffered from chronic racism, on the other. As Carter (1995) has noted "... many mental health professionals incorrectly assume that all visible racial/ethnic group members have experienced the destructive influences of racism in society and have been psychologically destroyed by them. Although it is important to identify the social obstacles that obstruct and hamper an individual's potential, it should not be assumed that these obstacles result in only negative outcomes" (pp. 40). We agree with Carter and at the same time perceive a need for counseling research to explicitly study what constitutes effective intervention when racism and prejudice do compromise the client's identity, well being, and prospects for survival. Determining the efficacy of the treatment of hate victims is compromised by lack of construct clarity and sampling of viable client groups. As suggested by Meehl (1977), idiographic Amelioration of the Effects of Discrimination 33 case methods are of value in enriching clinical understanding of issues under-represented by conventional empirical research. Additionally as mental health research has become more increasingly rigorous, the difficulty of identifying unitary diagnostic subject groups has been noted. The identification of clients who evidence a unitary presenting problem or diagnosis is questionable, given that individuals seeking mental health services frequently manifest multiple symptoms and concerns (Karon, 1995). There is certainly no reason to believe that persons who experience chronic or acute hate events are an exception to this. Any member of the general population may become a hate crime victim. As Berk, Boyd, and Hammer (1992) have noted "[v]ery little is known about risk factors for hate-motivated crimes. Even in the case of race, where skin color and other physical features are relevant, no quantitative estimates exist that separate the impact of race from other related risk factors" (pp 137). Finally, there is reason to question the accuracy of self-report, particularly in terms of hate victimization. Habituation to chronic discrimination may lead to under-reporting by particularly at-risk individuals. Certainly in terms of a topic of this sensitivity, the counseling researcher needs to be wary of drawing conclusions blindly from community samples or simple self-report methods. Our understanding of the psychological impact of prejudice runs the risk of potentially normalizing (and hence minimizing) the experience of hate as a natural social psychological phenomenon, pathologizing the victim, minimizing other client problems, and/or erroneously subsuming hate victimization as something to be "sensitive to" in terms of practitioner competency. It is hoped that the case material presented here demonstrates that the psychological sequelae may co-occur with other (pre-existing) psychological disorders in such a manner as to be both clinically significant and disabling to the client. The practitioner (and mental health researcher) interested in multicultural issues should therefore be particularly concerned with possible positive counter- Amelioration of the Effects of Discrimination 34 transference and counseling-damaging desires of perceiving their clients as being healthier than they indeed might have been prior to the occurrence of the hate-related event. As such, practitioners may err in the direction of treating all client symptomatology as being causally related to the discriminatory event when it is, in fact, independent and pre-existing. This treatment model incorporates cognitive, behavioral, and multi-cultural treatment approaches. The proposed interventions do not presume that other methodologies may not prove effective in addressing problems related to hate victimization. Rather, existent mental health practices concerning trauma recovery have most clearly addressed the problems and needs of the victims of hate. Opportunities to study interventions with hate victims exist in terms of case study methods (as employed here) or via institutional settings – such as college counseling offices or community mental health centers. Optimally, victim service programs – where they do exist – may provide the best opportunity to systematically conduct clinical trials. In such a setting, the opportunity to employ dismantling strategies (Maher, 1982) in treatment evaluation could serve to determine which components of the intervention made the greatest contribution to the client outcome. There is a clear need for counseling researchers to develop a theory-driven approach in working with victims of hate events. This article has attempted to illustrate a variety of client problems related to acute hate events and chronic discrimination. It has been argued that effective intervention with victimized individuals incorporates a variety of cognitive, behavioral, and multicultural counseling strategies. Through the integration of the "best practices" of these approaches, practitioners may effectively intervene in an area of great concern to both their clients and contemporary society. Amelioration of the Effects of Discrimination 35 Table One: Intervention Phases and Practitioner Tasks in Hate Event Amelioration Phase One - "Event Containment and Safety" Tasks: a. Evaluate and establish client safety from perpetrator(s). b. Determine chronicity vs. acuity of hate incident(s). c. Assess client’s current level of psychological functioning. d. Identify and access client supports and resources. Phase Two - "Assessment of Client-Event Characteristics" Tasks: a. Phenomenological evaluation of event (e.g. behavioral characteristics, affect response, conflict response mode). b. Determine client history of traumatic events. c. Assess client's ingroup identity attitudes. d. Define history of intergroup contact experiences. e. Assess pre- and post-event psychological symptomatology. Phase Three - "Addressing Diversity in the Counseling Alliance" Tasks: a. Practitioner determination of cultural competence. b. Establish practitioner credibility. c. Address practitioner and client counseling-damaging behaviors. d. Assess role of worldviews upon counseling process. e. Articulate themes of ingroup resilience and coping. Phase Four - "Acute Symptom Reduction" Tasks: a. Establish treatment goals and options. b. Skills training in stress inoculation. c. Prolonged exposure and in vivo de-sensitization to critical event. d. Re-frame trauma-induced ideation and attributions. e. Skills training in anger/affect management. f. Measure and reinforce intrusion and avoidance symptom reduction. g. Engage in dialectic and dialogic problem confrontation. h. Monitor symptom change and intergroup contact experiences. Phase Five - "Identity Recovery and Reformation" Tasks: a. Measure and reinforce symptom reduction. b. Re-appraise cultural percepts and assumptions. c. Promote benign contact experiences. d. Assess client ingroup identity attitudes. e. Review outgroup attitudes. f. Establish after-care maintenance goals. Amelioration of the Effects of Discrimination 36 Table Two: Summary of Client Demographic Information, Socio-Cultural Material, DSM-IV Diagnoses, and MMPI data. Client Presenting Post-Event Demographic Focus for Behavioral Axis I & II GAF MMPI Information Treatment Manifestations Diagnoses Score Scores a ________________________________________________________________________________ 1. Adult African- Workplace a. Anxiety Anxiety 48 84'037-9216/5#LF-K American Female Discrimination b. Dissociation Disorder c. Occupational with Panic dysfunction Attacks d. Intrusive ideation 2. Adult Euro- Workplace a. Dysphoria Dysthymia 54 2'061-945738:KF/L: White Jewish Harassment b. Sleep Male disturbance c. Occupational dysfunction d. Guardedness 3. African-American Hate Crime a. Flashbacks PTSD-Acute 41 n/a Adolescent Male Assault b. 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Understanding insidious racism as a relevant context in diagnosis and treatment. Paper presented at the one-hundredth-second Annual Convention of the American Psychological Association, Los Angeles, CA. Amelioration of the Effects of Discrimination 43 Ryan C. & Bradford, J. (1993). The national lesbian health care survey: An overview. In L. D. Garnets and Kimmel, D.C. (Eds.) Psychological perspectives on lesbian and gay male experiences, (pp. 541-556). New York: Columbia University Press. Sales, E. Baum, M. and Shore, B. (1984). Victim readjustment following assault. Journal of Social Issues, 40, 1, 117-136. Scott, M.J. & Strandling, S.G. (1992). Counseling for Post-traumatic Stress Disorder. London: Sage publications. Shannon, B.E. (1973). The impact of racism on personality development. Social Casework, 54, (9), 519-525. Shrier, D.K. (1990). Sexual harassment and discrimination. Impact on physical and mental health. New England Journal of Medicine, 87, 105-107. Straker, G. & Mossa, F. (1994). Interacting with trauma survivors in contexts of continuing trauma. Journal of Traumatic Stress, 7, 457-465. Sue, D.W. & Sue, D. (Eds.) (1991). Counseling the culturally different client, second edition. New York: Wiley and Sons. Sue, D.W. (1998). Multicultural counseling competencies: Individual and organizational development. Thousand Oaks, Ca.: Sage. Sue, S. & Okazaki, S. (1995). Methodological issues in assessment research with ethnic minorities. Psychological Assessment, 7, (3), 367-375. Sue, S. & Zane, N. (1987). The Role of culture and cultural techniques in psychotherapy: a critique and reformulation. American psychologist, 42, (1), 37-45. Suinn, R. M. (1977). Manual - Anxiety Management Training (AMT). Fort Collins: Co. Rocky Mountain Behavioral Sciences Institute. Amelioration of the Effects of Discrimination 44 Trevino, J.G. (1996). Worldview and change in cross-cultural counseling. The Counseling Psychologist, 24, (2), 198-215. Troiden, R. 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Abstract Sequelae of Hate Victimization Case Illustrations of Assessment and Treatment Procedure and Assessment Methodology Method of Analysis Measures Case Summaries Implications for Counseling Research 
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work_ed5fednmzbebflweek2tluufsm	----	Microsoft Word - LB+Article+PHA+Accepted_ University of Birmingham The Protection from Harassment Act 1997 Bliss, Laura DOI: 10.1177/0022018319829262 License: None: All rights reserved Document Version Peer reviewed version Citation for published version (Harvard): Bliss, L 2019, 'The Protection from Harassment Act 1997: failures by the criminal justice system in a social media age', Journal of Criminal Law, vol. 83, no. 3, pp. 217-228. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022018319829262 Link to publication on Research at Birmingham portal Publisher Rights Statement: Checked for eligibility: 03/09/2019 Bliss, L.,The Protection from Harassment Act 1997: Failures by the Criminal Justice System in a Social Media Age,Journal of Criminal Law, Volume: 83 issue: 3, pp. 217-228. Copyright © The Author(s) 2019. DOI:10.1177/0022018319829262. 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Apr. 2021 https://doi.org/10.1177/0022018319829262 https://research.birmingham.ac.uk/portal/en/persons/laura-higsonbliss(7c047745-77c6-48a9-a945-cb4ec715a28f).html https://research.birmingham.ac.uk/portal/en/publications/the-protection-from-harassment-act-1997(85a585e0-4dd8-43b2-a8e1-405ecfc41363).html https://research.birmingham.ac.uk/portal/en/publications/the-protection-from-harassment-act-1997(85a585e0-4dd8-43b2-a8e1-405ecfc41363).html https://research.birmingham.ac.uk/portal/en/journals/journal-of-criminal-law(6ad32e55-7828-4631-a4ed-789b1f1f1840)/publications.html https://doi.org/10.1177/0022018319829262 https://research.birmingham.ac.uk/portal/en/publications/the-protection-from-harassment-act-1997(85a585e0-4dd8-43b2-a8e1-405ecfc41363).html Page 1 of 21 The Protection from Harassment Act 1997: Failures by the Criminal Justice System in a Social Media Age This article will critically examine how the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 is currently being used to tackle online abuse. The use of the internet to abuse another is on the increase, with the police receiving increasing reports concerning abuse conducted online. This article will examine the failures by the criminal justice system to adequately apply the Protection from Harassment Act in a technology-based world. It will be put forward that changes are needed within the criminal justice system in order to better protect victims of cyber harassment and cyberstalking. Keywords: Protection from Harassment Act 1997, social media, stalking, cyber harassment, cyberstalking Introduction The Protection from Harassment Act 1997 (PHA) was enacted into the United Kingdom's legal system by the Conservative Government, to prove to citizens that the state was being tough on crime.1 This followed concerns being raised that the law was failing to adequately protect victims from so-called stalking behaviour: ‘Though the offences under the Public Order Act may provide a sanction against stalkers in some instances, offences under the provisions of sections 4 and 4A would be committed only if the stalker intended his behaviour to cause the victim to believe that immediate violence would be used (section 4) or if harassment, alarm or distress is caused (section 4A). There are problems also in applying other aspects of the criminal law against stalkers. The Malicious Communications Act 1988 requires that the article sent must be indecent or grossly offensive. It must also be proved that the sender's purpose was to cause distress or anxiety. In the situations where stalkers continually send greetings cards, flowers or other unsolicited gifts, such intent cannot be proven. The offence of improper use of a public telecommunication system under the provisions of section 43 of the Telecommunications Act 1984 has apparently been useful in tackling obscene or persistent telephone calls. But this covers only one aspect of stalking behaviour.’2 1 J. Gowland, ‘Protection from Harassment Act 1997: the ‘new’ stalking offences’ (2013) 77(5) Journal of Criminal Law 387. 2 Home Office, Stalking A Consultation Paper (London: Home Office, 1996), para 3.4-3.6. Page 2 of 21 In 1975, Evonne Van Heussen found herself at the centre of a campaign of harassment and stalking by another individual for a period of 17 years.3 For the first three years, she was subjected to silent phone calls, photographs being posted through her door and flowers being left outside her home. During this time, she was unaware of who the perpetrator was. However, one evening in 1978, the man responsible for these behaviours broke into her home, holding her hostage for eight hours, where he attempted to rape and strangle her. Local neighbours heard her screams and alerted the police. Despite, Ms Van Heussen only recognising the man as her lecturer from two lectures she had attended a few years earlier, the police labelled the incident as a domestic issue, resulting in the defendant receiving a caution.4 The stalking continued for a further 13 years, until 1991 when Ms Van Heussen eventually left the country due to the ongoing harassment she was experiencing. As a result of cases similar to Evonne Van Heussen’s, and lobbying by charities calling for a change in the law,5 Parliament enacted the PHA in 1997 to try and successfully prosecute against the behaviours experienced by victims of stalking and harassment. The mischief behind the Acts implementation was to protect victims of unwanted continued contact, stalking type behaviours and issues with neighbourhood disputes.6 However, prior to 2012, stalking and harassment were treated as the same offence under the PHA. Following a government review, stalking was criminalised as a specific criminal offence, being substituted into the Act by section 111(1) of the 3 Available at: http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/stalked-for-years-by-a-man-she-met- once-1569160.html (accessed 4 January 2018). 4 Ibid., 5 For example, the Suzy Lamplugh Trust. 6 HL Deb 24 January 1997, Vol 1, col 917. Page 3 of 21 Protection of Freedoms Act 2012;7 Though there continues to be issues with the distinction between these two types of behaviours. Harassment VS Stalking Harassment can be defined as ‘… repeated attempts to impose unwanted communications and contact upon a victim in a manner that could be expected to cause distress or fear in any reasonable person.’8 Whereas stalking is considered the conduct whereby: ‘… an individual is fixated and/or obsessed with another. This can be exhibited by a pattern of persistent and repeated contact with, or attempts to contact a particular victim.’9 Stalking, therefore, covers several behaviours and includes acts such as: ‘… (a) following a person, … (d) monitoring the use by a person of the internet, email or any other form of electronic communication … [and] (g) watching or spying on a person.’10 Under the PHA, there is currently no strict definition of stalking, instead, the law consists of several behaviours, like those above, which can be considered as amounting to the conduct of stalking.11 The lack of a coherent definition in relation to this type of behaviour has meant that the law has not always been applied adequately when it comes to differentiating between harassment and stalking, this is particularly true in cases where social media has been used to facilitate the offence.12 The following discussion 7 The Home Office, The Protection from Harassment Act 1997: Improving Protection for Victims of Stalking (London: Home Office, 2012). 8 The Crown Prosecution Service, Stalking and Harassment (London: HMSO, 2018). 9 Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/a-change-to-the-protection-from- harassment-act-1997-introduction-of-two-new-specific-offences-of-stalking (accessed 28 June 2018). 10 Protection from Harassment Act s.2A (3). 11 The Crown Prosecution Service, above n.8. 12 Criminal Justice Inspectorates & HM Crown Prosecution Service Inspectorate, Living in fear – the police and CPS response to harassment and stalking (London: HMIC & HMCPSI, 2017) pp. 52-53. Page 4 of 21 will outline the two offences of harassment and stalking and their current application in a technology-based world. Harassment, a course of conduct and social media Section 1 of the PHA forbids the conduct of harassing another person. Under the Act, individuals are prohibited from pursuing ‘… a course of conduct which amounts to harassment of another, and which [a person] knows or ought to know amounts to harassment of the other.’13 Section 2 of the PHA makes it a criminal offence to harass another person. For the actus reus to be established in the offence, it must be found that the behaviour being complained about amounted to both a course of conduct and harassment. If either of these elements is missing, a course of conduct or behaviour constituting harassment, no criminal liability will be placed on the defendant under the PHA.14 A course of conduct is considered contact that occurs on at least two occasions where one person is committing the offence.15 Where two or more people are involved, the law defines a course of conduct as contact ‘… on at least one occasion in relation to each of those persons.’16 A course of conduct has been given a wide definition in law: ‘I fully accept that the incidents which need to be proved in relation to harassment need not exceed two incidents, but, as it seems to me, the fewer the occasions and the wider they are spread the less likely it would be that a finding of harassment can reasonably be made.’17 13 Protection from Harassment Act s.1(1). 14 The mens rea for the offence of harassment is based on the construction of knowledge. Here, it must be proven by the prosecution that the defendant, ‘knows or ought to know that the[ir] behaviour would amount to [the] harassment of another.’ (Protection from Harassment Act 1(1)) This will turn on the reasonable person test, where it must be found that the average person, who in the same position as the defendant, would come to the knowledge or should have come to the knowledge, that their conduct would amount to the harassment of another individual. If both the actus reus and mens rea of the offence can be found, then the defendant is liable for a breach of s.1(1) of the Protection from Harassment Act. 15 Protection from Harassment Act s.7. 16 Protection from Harassment Act s.7(3)(b). 17 Lau v Director of Public Prosecutions [2000] 1 FLR 799 (DC) per Schiemann L.J. at para 15. Page 5 of 21 A minimum requirement has, therefore, been set by Parliament as to when certain behaviours may invoke the PHA. However, in most circumstances, for the criminal justice system to be satisfied that a course of conduct is present in a matter, contact must occur on more than two occasions. 18 Here, the conduct must be close in both time and proximity.19 This can create problems when harassment is pursued via the use of social media: ‘The requirement that the harassee shows a course of conduct amounting to harassment, with the acts forming that harassment equating to actionable criminal acts makes it difficult for someone suffering the posting of slanderous comments, or the taking over of email addresses, or the bombarding with messages, to obtain legal satisfaction …’20 The anonymity of the internet has made it easier for harassment to be conducted21 and has been coined cyber harassment.22 However, the ability to fit section 2 of the PHA to a technology-based world can be difficult when it comes to establishing a course of conduct. In many cases, social media profiles can be created with very few security questions being asked.23 For example, to create a Facebook profile, the user merely needs an email address; all other questions can be answered using an alias.24 18 J. Agate & J. Ledward, ‘Social media: how the net is closing in on cyber bullies’ (2013) 24(8) Entertainment Law Review 263, 266. It is important to note that under s.1(3) of Protection from Harassment Act, there is a defence available with regard to ‘a course of conduct’: ‘… (a) that it was pursued for the purpose of preventing or detecting crime, (b) that it was pursued under any enactment or rule of law or to comply with any condition or requirement imposed by any person under any enactment, (c) or that in the particular circumstances the pursuit of the course of conduct was reasonable.’ 19 Agate & Ledward, above n.18. See also, Lau v Director of Public Prosecutions [2000] 1 FLR 799 (DC) per Schiemann L.J. at para 15. 20 M. Salter & C. Bryden, ‘I can see you: harassment and stalking on the Internet’ (2009) 18(2) Information & Communications Technology Law 99, 100. 21 For example, research conducted by Women’s Aid found that 85% of those surveyed had received online abuse by a partner or ex-partner, available at: https://www.womensaid.org.uk/information-support/what-is-domestic-abuse/onlinesafety/ (accessed 9 October 2018). 22 J. Brannon, ‘Crime and social network sites’ (2013) 1 Judicial Review 41, 43. 23 Salter & Bryden, above n.20 at 99. 24 Available at: https://www.facebook.com/help/345121355559712 (accessed 12 November 2017). Page 6 of 21 Consequently, we have witnessed a rise in fake accounts,25 which can be created solely for the aim of tormenting another individual. The use of fake online profiles and the anonymity of the internet can create difficulties for victims and the police in tracking perpetrators of online harassment, further exacerbated if the perpetrator is unknown to the victim26, despite a digital trace being available. All electronic communications can be traced to an IP address;27 however, if a person has used a public network to facilitate abusive behaviour online, it can become impossible in some instances to track the perpetrator,28 especially if the comments have come from outside of the United Kingdom. Here, the justice system must rely on the cooperation of social networking companies, such as that of Facebook and Twitter, who have been reluctant in the past to release information about its users. 29 For a successful conviction under the PHA, the prosecution must be able to prove a course of conduct that exceeds more than two occasions. Here, each separate complained about behaviour must directly link back to the accused. If a perpetrator of online abuse uses multiple servers, along with fake social media profiles, this can cause issues in establishing a course of conduct, especially in a time when police funding is being reduced.30 25 Between January and March 2018, Facebook removed 583 million fake accounts, available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-44122967 (accessed 17 May 2018). 26 Salter & Bryden, above n.20 at 101. 27 An IP address is a unique code which identifies a computer using a communications network. 28 D.K. Citron, Hate Crimes in Cyberspace (Harvard University Press: USA 2014) 165. 29 Available at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/twitter/9834776/Twitter-refuses-to- hand-member-information-to-police.html (accessed 28 June 2018). 30 It is currently estimated that police funding will be reduced by £700m by 2020, available at: https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/nov/09/britains-police-budgets-to-lose-700m-by- 2020-amid-rising (accessed 1 August 2018). Page 7 of 21 Harassment and social media If a course of conduct can be established, next, the complained about behaviour needs to amount to harassment, as governed under section 1(1) of the PHA. Harassment under the Act includes the behaviours of ‘alarming’ a person or causing them ‘distress’.31 To prove alarm or distress, this will be essentially an evidential exercise, based on the case facts: ‘Where the quality of the conduct said to constitute harassment is being examined, courts will have in mind that irritations, annoyances, even a measure of upset, arise at times in everybody's day-to-day dealings with other people. Courts are well able to recognise the boundary between conduct which is unattractive, even unreasonable, and conduct which is oppressive and unacceptable. To cross the boundary from the regrettable to the unacceptable the gravity of the misconduct must be of an order which would sustain criminal liability …’32 It is clear from previous case law that the matter needs to go beyond what can be deemed as ‘disturbing’ and ‘unpleasant’ behaviour, to ‘cross [a] boundary’ to invoke the criminal law, allowing the criminal justice system to uphold a person’s right to freedom of expression. Under Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, States who are signatory to the Convention must protect a citizen’s right to free speech in order to maintain a democratic society.33 This includes the right to be offensive: ‘Freedom of speech includes not only the inoffensive but the irritating, the contentious, the eccentric, the heretical, the unwelcome and the provocative, provided it does not tend to provoke violence.’34 31 Protection from Harassment Act s.7(2). 32 Majrowski v Guy's and St Thomas's NHS Trust [2006] UKHL 34, [2007] 1 AC 224 per Lord Nicolls at para 30. 33 Handyside v United Kingdom (1976)1 EHRR 737 at para 49. 34 Redmond-Bate v DPP [2000] H.R.L.R. 249 per Sedley LJ at para 20. Page 8 of 21 Despite the need to protect free speech, Akhtar argues that the criminal justice system has ‘tilted’ too much in the direction of freedom of expression when it comes to matters concerning conduct carried out online.35 In a social media age, the high threshold associated with free speech puts further disadvantages on victims of cyber harassment. In many cases, the matter being complained about can be considered as ‘disturbing, unpleasant and may transgress the norms of socially acceptable’36 behaviour, but it is difficult to prove that the conduct crosses the evidential line to be considered as breaching the law. This is further reflected in the work of Basu and Jones, who suggest that conduct carried out via the aid of social media is more sinister than offline behaviours.37 As a result, the criminal justice system is struggling to appreciate the severity cyber harassment can have upon an individual, shown further in the abuse experienced by Caroline Criado-Perez in 2013. Ms Criado-Perez, an active feminist supporter, launched a public campaign in 2013 to get the well-known author, Jane Austin, printed on banknotes in the United Kingdom. Following her launching the campaign, Ms Criado-Perez was subjected to explicit threats of sexual violence online, including threats of rape. Comments encompassed ‘rape her nice ass’ and ‘fuck off and die you worthless piece of crap.’38 In particular, one individual, Peter Nunn, tormented her with a crusade of misogynistic abuse, as detailed in Ms Criado-Perez’s blog: ‘He dug up my work history. He dug up my relationship and family history. He dug up my family’s work history – including publishing home addresses. He 35 Z. Akhtar, ‘Malicious communications, media platforms and legal sanctions’ (2014) 20(6) Computer and Telecommunications Law Review 179, 181. 36 Salter & Bryden, above n.20 at 103. 37 S. Basu & R. Jones, ‘Regulating Cyberstalking’ (2007) 2 Journal of Information, Law and Technology 1 at para 45 38 Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/society/2014/jan/07/jane-austen-banknote- abusive-tweets-criado-perez (accessed 10 October 2016) Page 9 of 21 wrote reams of blogs about me and my every public move. He made numerous videos about me. He set up numerous twitter accounts all of which spoke almost exclusively about me. In these same twitter accounts he detailed the best way to rape and drown a witch, alongside repeatedly naming me as the head of the ‘witches’ coven’. He also boasted on twitter in the same account about having bought a gun, and wondered ‘how much death’ this gun could buy him.’39 [sic] Despite a clear course of conduct being present, Nunn was prosecuted and found guilty of sending grossly offensive communications contrary to section 127 of the Communications Act 2003 (CA). He received a six week custodial sentence. 40 Ms Criado-Perez has been very critical of the Crown Prosecution Services (CPS) charging decision in the matter of Nunn: ‘This man made me fear for my life as no-one ever has before. I felt he was a clear and present threat to me. He made me scared to go outside, to appear in public. He stopped me being able to sleep; being able to work. He seemed obsessed enough to carry out his threats. I am glad he has been found guilty. I am glad he cannot contact me again. I hope he has learnt from this. But I think the CPS got the charge wrong. I don’t feel they understood what happened to me.’41 By applying the actus reus of section 1 of the PHA, it is difficult to distinguish why the case of Nunn was prosecuted under section 127 of the CA as opposed to the PHA. Nunn contacted her on numerous occasions, clearly fulfilling the elements required for a course of conduct. Furthermore, Ms Criado-Perez was made to fear for her own life, with the behaviour she was subjected to having significant effects on her employment and mental wellbeing. Yet, the CPS brought an action before the court under a different Act of Parliament, suggesting that the criminal justice system is struggling to appreciate when the PHA can be used to protect victims of online abuse.42 The case of Nunn 39 Criminal Justice Inspectorates & HM Crown Prosecution Service Inspectorate, above n.12 at 27. 40 R v Peter Nunn unreported 29 September 2014 MC. 41 Available at: https://weekwoman.wordpress.com/2014/09/29/a-brief-comment-on-peter-nunn/ (accessed 29 October 2016) 42 Criminal Justice Inspectorates & HM Crown Prosecution Service Inspectorate, above n.12 at 87 Page 10 of 21 illustrates the continued problems the criminal justice system experiences when it comes to labelling an incident as cyber harassment. This is particularly true when it comes to stalking offences and the use of the PHA in a social media context. Stalking and social media Whereas section 2 criminalises the conduct of harassment, section 2A makes it a specific illegal offence to stalk another person. As previously stated, prior to 2012, stalking and harassment were treated as the same offence and both governed under section 2 of the PHA. However, in 2012 stalking was included in the Act as a separate offence in its own right under section 111(1) of the Protection from Freedoms Act, after concerns were raised that the law was failing to protect stalking victims: ‘The majority of respondents considered that [the] current legislation [PHA] was inadequate for dealing with stalking perpetrators (56%) and 51% felt that stalking needed to be defined in law through a specific offence.’43 Under section 2A of the PHA, it is an offence to pursue ‘… a course of conduct in breach of section 1(1), … [in which] the course of conduct amounts to stalking.’44 Like that of the offence governed under section 2 of the Act, the actus reus consists of a course of conduct that occurs on at least two occasions, where there is one perpetrator, which can be considered as causing alarm or distress upon the victim. In addition, it must be found that the complained about behaviour amounts to stalking under the law. As mentioned previously, the PHA does not contain a specific definition of stalking; instead, the Act encompasses a non-exhaustive list of conducts, which are considered to amount to this type of behaviour: ‘The following are examples of acts or omissions which, in particular circumstances, are ones associated with stalking— (a) following a person, (b) contacting, or attempting to contact, a person by any means, (c) publishing any 43 The Home Office, above n.7 at 14. 44 Protection from Harassment Act s.2A(1). Page 11 of 21 statement or other material – (i) relating or purporting to relate to a person, or (ii) purporting to originate from a person; (d) monitoring the use by a person of the internet, email or any other form of electronic communication, (e) loitering in any place (whether public or private), (f) interfering with any property in the possession of a person, (g) watching or spying on a person.’45 If the issues being complained about can be regarded as stalking, and a course of conduct is present in the matter which amounts to harassment, then the actus reus for section 2A of the PHA will be satisfied.46 Like that of harassment, it has been accepted that stalking can now be pursued online and is commonly referred to as cyberstalking.47 However, cyberstalking, similar to stalking itself, lacks a rigid legal definition.48 Instead, it has been suggested that certain behaviours can be associated with stalking online: ‘seeking and compiling information on the victim in order to harass, threaten and intimidate the victim online or off-line; repeated unsolicited e-mailing and Instant Messaging; electronic sabotage such as spamming and sending viruses to the target; identity theft; subscribing the victim to services; purchasing goods and services in the victim’s name; impersonating another online; sending or posting hostile material, misinformation and false messages (e.g. to Usenet groups); and, tricking other Internet users into harassing or threatening a victim (e.g. by posting the victim’s personal details on a bulletin board along with a controversial invitation)’.49 The internet has now created new and unique ways to stalk another, whilst allowing for direct contact between the perpetrator of the offence and the victim, which in many 45 Protection from Harassment Act s.2A(3). 46 It is important to note that under s.4A(4) of the Protection from Harassment Act, there is a defence available with regard to a course of conduct amount to stalking: ‘… (a) A's course of conduct was pursued for the purpose of preventing or detecting crime or, (b) A's course of conduct was pursued under any enactment or rule of law or to comply with any condition or requirement imposed by any person under any enactment, or (c) the pursuit of A's course of conduct was reasonable for the protection of A or another or for the protection of A's or another's property.’ 47 L. Sheridan & T. Grant, ‘Is cyberstalking different?’ (2007) 13(6) Psychology, Crime & Law 627-629. 48 The lack of a specific legal definition in relation to cyberstalking is supported by Gillespie. See, A.A. Gillespie, ‘Cyberstalking and the law: a response to Neil MacEwan’ (2013) 1 Criminal Law Review 38. 49 Sheridan & Grant, above n.47 at 627-628. Page 12 of 21 cases can occur ‘around the clock’.50 There continues to be, however, issues as to when someone’s continued unwanted contact goes beyond the conduct of harassment to stalking. This has caused several problems in the criminal justice system, as exposed in a report conducted by the Criminal Justice Inspectorates and HM Crown Prosecution Service Inspectorate in 2017: ‘There are many links between harassment and stalking, including the legislation itself. However, we found that the police and the CPS frequently struggled to separate the two offences. We found that stalking in particular was misunderstood by the police and the CPS. As a result, it often went unrecognised. The police sometimes mis-recorded stalking offences, or worse, did not record them at all. Prosecutors on occasions missed opportunities to charge stalking offences, instead preferring other offences, particularly harassment.’51 The report was conducted following the annual Violence against Women and Girls review in 2016.52 The 10th anniversary edition found a drop-in prosecutions brought under the PHA. Consequently, a recommendation was put forward to the Criminal Justice Inspectorates and HM Crown Prosecution Service Inspectorate to investigate why fewer matters were being prosecuted contrary to the PHA.53 During the investigation, it was found that there was a complete failure across all police forces in England and Wales to take the reporting of harassment and stalking behaviour seriously. In addition, 11254 cases of stalking and harassment were examined in detail, with the report concluding that ‘[n]one of these cases had been dealt with 50 N. MacEwan, ‘The new stalking offences in English law: will they provide effective protection from cyberstalking?’ (2012) 10 Criminal Law Review 767, 771. 51 Criminal Justice Inspectorates & HM Crown Prosecution Service Inspectorate, above n.12 at 7. 52 The Crown Prosecution Service, Violence against Women and Girls report: tenth edition (London: HMSO, 2017). 53 Ibid., 7. 54 Of these 112 cases, 82 cases involved social media. Page 13 of 21 well’.55 In many of these matters, police forces misunderstood the differences between these two types of behaviours, as harassment and stalking are inherently interlinked.56 As previously stated, there is no specific legal definition of stalking, instead, the PHA relies on the idea that the conduct falls within the ‘definition of harassment.’57 However, for MacEwan, this ideal is not possible, as certain behaviours which amount to stalking, ‘within a cyberstalking context’, may not pass the threshold of harassment to warrant criminalisation, for instance, ‘watching and spying on a person.’58 This is disputed by Gillespie, who suggests that the PHA is flexible enough to be used to prosecute cyberstalking offences: ‘The law, it is submitted, can protect victims. The flexibility of a ‘course of conduct’, and the interpretation the courts have taken to both the victim impact condition and the mens rea element mean that where covert activity is detected it is highly likely that the offence would be established.’59 Nevertheless, as exposed in the report conducted by the Criminal Justice Inspectorates and HM Crown Prosecution Service Inspectorate, the lack of a coherent definition in relation to stalking, is creating serious misunderstandings in the criminal justice system.60 This is more evident when social media is used to facilitate the offence, as experienced by Nicola Roberts. Ms Roberts, a well-known performer from the band, ‘Girls Aloud’, was subjected to thousands of threatening messages, her social media accounts being used to 55 Criminal Justice Inspectorates & HM Crown Prosecution Service Inspectorate, above n.12 at 13. 56 MacEwan, above n.50 at 769. 57 Ibid., 58 Ibid., 59 Gillespie, above n.48 at 45 60 Criminal Justice Inspectorates & HM Crown Prosecution Service Inspectorate, above n.12 at 7. Page 14 of 21 spy on her and made to fear for her own life, by an ex-partner.61 He stalked her for a period of 10 years. During this time a restraining order was placed upon her ex-partner, which was later broken when he started ‘following’ her on the social networking site Instagram. Subsequently, he was charged for breaching his restraining order; however, these charges were later dropped by the CPS: ‘“The failure in Nicola's [Roberts] case was born out of a lack of understanding about how certain social media platforms work, which resulted in a decision to offer no evidence. Due to how the CPS dealt with this procedurally, no charges can now be brought.”’62 The CPS has since apologised for their lack of understanding ‘about how certain social media platforms work’.63 The criminal justice system, social media and the PHA The Home Office, in July 2012, undertook a complete review of the PHA, paving the way for stalking to be included as a specific offence under the Act. The information gathered from the study, uncovered that 69% of those surveyed (156 people) felt that the criminal justice system did not fully understand stalking. This is even more apparent when the behaviours criminalised under the PHA are conducted online, as reflected in the work of Salter and Bryan: ‘There is also evidence that the concept of cyber harassment is not always taken seriously, with advice to victims being simply to change their email address or to switch off their computers.’64 Sadly, a response which is still given by some police forces: “‘It wasn’t her (the perpetrator’s) fault for sending abusive Facebook messages, it was my fault for being on Facebook … And the only way to stop these 61 Available at, https://www.independent.co.uk/arts-entertainment/music/news/nicola-roberts- stalker-girls-aloud-cps-apology-carl-davies-a8459656.html?amp&__twitter_impression=true (accessed 27 July 2018) 62 Ibid., 63 Ibid., 64 Salter & Bryden, above n.20 at 101 Page 15 of 21 messages is if I deactivate my Facebook account, and come off social media. I didn’t think that was very fair at all.’”65 [sic] Victim blaming is not a new phenomenon within the justice system and is often used to reflect the crime onto the person who has reported the offence.66 For instance, in relation to sexual assaults and rape, victims are often questioned on their choice to walk home alone in the dark.67 In many cases, victims are even judged on their choice of clothing when the incident occurred.68 This attitude has now been reflected towards complainants of social media abuse, who are often blamed for their experiences simply for having a social media profile. The lack of understanding by the criminal justice system, in relation to cyber harassment and cyberstalking is also mirrored in the justice systems approach to cybercrime in general.69 In 2012, an individual had his conviction for the sending of malicious communications under section 127 of the CA overturned by the High Court, after it was concluded that a message he had sent on Twitter was indeed an ‘ill-thought out-joke’ as opposed to a criminal offence.70 Paul Chambers, following the closure of Doncaster Robin Hood Airport, took to Twitter to vent his frustration at not being able to fly to Northern Ireland to meet with his girlfriend: ‘Crap! Robin Hood Airport is closed. You’ve [sic] got week and a bit to get your shit together otherwise I’m blowing the airport sky high.’ At the court of first instance he was convicted and fined £385, 65 Criminal Justice Inspectorates & HM Crown Prosecution Service Inspectorate, n.12 at 52 66 S.E. Ullman, Sexual Assault: Society's Response to Survivors (American Psychological Association: USA, 2010) 67 D.L. Payne, K.A. Lonsway, & L.F. Fitzgerald, ‘Rape myth acceptance: Exploration of its structure and its measurement using the Illinois Rape Myth Acceptance Scale’ (1999) 33 Journal Research Personality 27. Available at: https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/rape-sexual-history-assault-cross-examine-trial- court-voices4victims-plaid-cymru-mp-liz-savile-a7570286.html (accessed 3 May 2018) 68 Payne, Lonsway, & Fitzgerald, above n.67. 69 M. Yar, Cybercrime and Society (Thousand Oaks: London, 2006)16. 70 Chambers v DPP [2012] EWHC 2157 (Admin), [2013] 1 WLR 1833. Page 16 of 21 along with being ordered to pay £600 in court fees. Following this case, and others, 71 guidelines were created for matters concerning conduct carried out online via the use of social media. The guidelines were made publicly available in 2013, later being updated in 2016 and 2018. The purpose of the guidelines was to ‘give clear advice to prosecutors who have been asked either for a charging decision or for early advice to the police …’.72 This was advocated by the then Director of Public Prosecutions, Keir Starmer QC: ‘The guidelines will help prosecutors to make fair and consistent decisions to prosecute in those cases that clearly require robust prosecution in accordance with the Code for Crown Prosecutors …’73 The guidelines themselves, contain information about harassment and stalking, with reference made throughout the document that ‘prosecutors should consider the facts of the case carefully, to determine whether the evidence establishes the offences of harassment or stalking.’74 Yet there continues to be difficulties by both the police and the CPS when it comes to harassment and stalking online. In June 2017, Molly McLaren ended her seven month relationship with Joshua Stimpson, after having concerns about his controlling behaviour. Within days Ms McLaren had to approach her local police force after Mr Stimpson started to harass her via the social networking site, Facebook. She made comments to her friends at the time that he had ‘lost the plot’ and she was in fear of her own life.75 Despite, her concerns for 71 Available at: http://blog.cps.gov.uk/2012/09/dpp-statement-on-tom-daley-case-and- socialmedia-prosecutions.html (accessed 2 July 2018). 72 Crown Prosecution Service, Guidelines on prosecuting cases involving communications sent via social media (London: HMSO, 2013). 73 Ibid., 74 Ibid., 75 Available at: https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/molly-mclaren-stalking-joshua-stimpson- stabbed-theodore-johnson-cps Page 17 of 21 her own welfare, Mr Stimpson simply received a phone call from officers, warning him about his behaviour. A week after the phone call, Mr Stimpson stabbed Molly 75 times outside a gym in broad daylight, resulting in the force reporting itself to the Independent Office for Police Misconduct.76 Sadly, the experiences suffered by Ms McLaren have not been in the minority. Lily Allen, a well-known singer, found herself a victim of online stalking, in 2009. The stalking started with a tweet being sent to her by a stranger. This ended in the perpetrator breaking into her home whilst she and her children slept. Her stalker had the intention to cause her some form of harm that evening but, was fortunately interrupted by a friend of Ms Allen’s who was staying with her at the time.77 Like Ms McLaren, Ms Allen had reported the behaviour to her local police force, however, they were dismissive of her version of events: ‘Calling the police back the next day, Allen told them she thought the intruder could be the same man who had been threatening her. “But they were uncomfortable with the idea. Then I realised my handbag was missing and the change in atmosphere was palpable, it was like a sigh of relief: now it’s burglary – we understand that”.’78 The failures of the criminal justice system to take online conduct more seriously is nothing new. Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary, in 2015, conducted a report examining the policing of digital crime. Here, they raised concerns that the police were not fully recognising the impact of digital crime on victims: ‘We found that some police officers and staff were dismissive of complaints about the misuse of social media sites. We were met with comments such as: a8198836.html?utm_campaign=Echobox&utm_medium=Social&utm_source=Facebook (accessed 3 April 2018). 76 At the time of writing, the Independent Office for Police Misconduct review into the case of Molly McLaren is still ongoing. 77 Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/music/2016/apr/16/lily-allen-stalked-singer- police (accessed 3 April 2018). 78 Ibid., Page 18 of 21 “[w]hat do they [the victim] expect us to do about it?” “I do not use social media; how am I supposed to investigate it?’”79 Three years later, we are seeing similar attitudes to harassment and stalking conducted online. In March 2017, Gemma80 received an anonymous message online, containing explicit material.81 The message was sent from an account she did not recognise via Facebook. Following the first message being sent, the account was deactivated. However, soon after, new social media profiles emerged continuing the abuse against her: ‘The messages included one telling me I should not be afraid of dark alleyways because he preferred the daylight.’ As a consequence of the constant abuse, Gemma reported her online experiences to her local police force but was informed, at first, that there was little they could do because of the multiple accounts and because the perpetrator was using a proxy server. Over the course of a few months, she continued to receive abusive messages, with little help given to her from the criminal justice system: ‘The dismissal by the police made me feel even more isolated.’82 The report conducted by the Criminal Justice Inspectorates and HM Crown Prosecution Service Inspectorate in 2017, goes further to find a failure by some police forces to link all conduct undertaken by a defendant together, despite the social media prosecution guidelines empathising the importance of this: ‘Where an individual receives unwanted communications from another person via social media in addition to other unwanted behaviour, all the behaviour should be considered together in the round by the prosecutor when determining whether or not a course of conduct is made out.’83 79 Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary, Real lives, real crime: A study of digital crime and policing (London: HMIC, 2015) at para 6.14. 80 Please note, this is not the victims real name. 81 Available at, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-hereford-worcester-43291038 (accessed 3 April 2018). 82 Ibid., 83 Crown Prosecution Service, n.72. Page 19 of 21 The guidelines make numerous remarks reminding prosecutors to take into account the PHA, yet there has been a drop-in prosecutions under this Act of Parliament, despite an increase in reports made to police concerning abuse conducted online.84 Protection from Harassment Act: the future The criminal justice system, society, and social networking sites are struggling to keep pace with the advancements of changing technology. The examples above illustrate a failure by the police and the CPS to link online abusive content to the behaviours of stalking and harassment, resulting in devastating consequences for some individuals. Clearly more needs to be done to protect victims from this form of abuse, from changes in the legal system to better education on the impact of social media. Recently, the government has implemented compulsory education for 5 to 16 year olds in relation to online safety and how to use the internet respectfully. The purpose of a compulsory national computer curriculum is to ensure: ‘all young people are equipped to have healthy and respectful relationships in both the online and offline world, and leave school with the knowledge to prepare them for adult life.’85 Whilst compulsory education is a positive step forward, further emphasis has been placed on social networking sites to do more to stop online abuse: ‘The government cannot keep citizens safe on its own, everyone has a role here: government, industry, parents, civil society and citizens. In particular, we need the technical understanding and expertise of the industry. This is why we will work in partnership with social media and other technology companies, working with them to provide safer online platforms for their users and providing support to do this where it is needed.’86 84 Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-41693437 (accessed 30 January 2018). 85 HM Government, Government response to the Internet Safety Strategy Green Paper (London: HM Government, 2018) 31 86 Ibid., 16 Page 20 of 21 Currently, under European Law, social media networks, are protected under the e- Commerce Directive (2000/31/EC), as being regarded as hosts rather than publishers, when certain criterions are met. Put simply, social media companies are only under an obligation to remove content from their sites if they have actual knowledge of its existence. Here, in some Members of States, the court will consider how the Internet Society Service provider was made aware of the illegal content and whether the information given to the provider was sufficient to constitute knowledge.87 If sufficient knowledge is given, service providers must then act ‘expeditiously’ to remove such content from its site. Despite these obligations, social media companies are slow in their response to the removal of online abuse, as exposed in the work of the Fawcett Society. In August 2017, the Fawcett Society reported several abusive tweets to Twitter, including threats of rape, racist commentary and misogynistic abuse. A week after these comments were reported to Twitter, they were still publicly viewable, this included a video of an apparent rape.88 The Home Affairs Committee, in 2017, held a review examining hate crime and extremist content online.89 Representatives from Facebook, Twitter and YouTube90 attended the committee meeting to respond to questions posed to them by MPs about their role in containing abusive and extremist content on their sites, where they were heavily criticised: ‘The biggest companies have been repeatedly urged by Governments, police forces, community leaders and the public, to clean up their act, and to respond 87 I. Walden in A. Büllesbach et al (eds) Concise European IT Law (Kluwer Law International: Netherlands, 2010) 253 88 Available at: https://www.fawcettsociety.org.uk/news/twitter-failing-women-experiencing- online-threats-harassment (accessed 9 October 2018). 89 Home Affairs Committee, Hate crime: abuse, hate and extremism online (London: Home Affairs Committee, 2016). 90 Only these three Social Networking companies were present as they are the only companies with representatives in the United Kingdom. Page 21 of 21 quickly and proactively to identify and remove illegal content. They have repeatedly failed to do so.’91 Social networking companies are, therefore, not only reluctant in working with the criminal justice system to disclose information contained on their sites but also, they are slow in the application of removing abusive content from their network. The law must, therefore, intervene more adequately to protect individuals from online abuse. Better training of legal personnel within the justice system, clearer legal frameworks and improved education is needed to help tackle this growing problem in society. In an era where access to social media sites are only a click away, cyber harassment and cyberstalking are becoming more prominent. Victims can be faced with continued contact around the clock and when they turn to the criminal justice system for help, are often left frustrated at the lack of support given to them. The internet, in particular, social media, has become part of many individuals lives, it can no longer be considered as separate from real-life.92 The law and the criminal justice system must, therefore, change its approach in order to help those who become subject to cyber harassment and cyberstalking. 91 Home Affairs Committee, above, n.89 at 36. 92 Figures released by the Office of National Statistics found that 90% of men and 88% of women were regular internet users, available at: https://www.ons.gov.uk/businessindustryandtrade/itandinternetindustry/bulletins/internetusers/2 017 (accessed 17 May 2018). 
work_egcc4swhxfe37ge3viz4pkrr6i	----	Science Magazine 28 JULY 2006 VOL 313 SCIENCE www.sciencemag.org482 drugs, up from 200 three years earlier. But the national AIDS committee, CONASIDA, estimates that the drugs are reaching only about one-third of those with advanced disease. No convincing studies explain how the virus made so much headway in Honduras, but theo- ries abound. Epidemiologist Manuel Sierra, who headed the Ministry of Health study of the Gari- funa and now works at the National Autonomous University, says in most countries in the region, the virus entered through gay men and then “incubated,” which means it took a long time t o bridge into other communities. The first AIDS cases in Hon- duras were also gay men, he says, but HIV quickly spread through heterosexual sex, both in the Garifuna com- munity and the country at large. “The main d i fference between Honduras and the rest of Central America is the incubation period,” posits Sierra. A key distinguish- ing factor in Honduras, he contends, was the country’s role during the Cold War. Sierra notes that when the first AIDS cases were detected in the early 1980s, the Cold War was raging, and U.S. military person- nel were flooding into Honduras in an attempt to influence the civil wars in neighboring Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala. “Honduras was the center used by the United States to fight all the countries,” says Sierra. The influx of soldiers—including Nicaraguan con- tras who staged attacks from Honduras—led to a boom in sex workers, which in turn played a “major role,” he says. César Núñez, a Honduran epidemiologist who heads the multicountry PASCA study of HIV prevalence in high-risk groups in Central America (see p. 480), says this is “a good hypothesis.” As in other countries, prisoners are another driver of the epidemic in Honduras. A Ministry of Health study found a prevalence of 7.6% in prisons. “That’s the ideal population to spread the virus,” says Sierra. “You have spouse visits, lots of homosexual sex, low access to con- doms, and lots of HIV.” Núñez and Sierra say rampant migration has also played a central role. In particular, the country has a large num- Mission Possible: Integrating The Church With HIV/AIDS Efforts TEGUCIGALPA AND JUTICALPA, HONDURAS—Throughout heavily Catholic Latin America, few topics have riled those working to slow the spread of HIV more than the Vatican’s opposition to condoms. Many HIV/AIDS workers have also decried what they see as the tendency by many denominations to treat as outcasts the two groups especially hard hit by the epidemic: homosexuals and sex workers. But in Honduras especially, church leaders are now trying to become part of the solution with stepped-up efforts that aim to slow HIV’s spread and help the infected. These church representatives are not, by any means, advocating the use of condoms, as Maryknoll sisters in Guatemala do with sex workers and other at-risk people they help (see p. 480). But representatives from four denominations are working with the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), which is famous for promoting family planning, in the year-old Interreligious Committee to contribute to Honduras’s national strategic plan for confronting its HIV/AIDS epidemic. “This is the first time we’ve worked with faith-based organizations, and the nice thing is we put our position on the table,” says Alanna Armitage, who heads the UNFPA office here. “We would not work with them if we couldn’t talk about condoms or they said they weren’t effective. There’s no more time to fight on this.” The representatives from the Episcopal, Evangelical, Adventist, and Catholic churches do not speak with one voice about condoms; some think, for example, that they should be promoted if one partner in a marriage is HIV-infected. Nor do they exactly embrace homosexuality. “We don’t have a specific program with homosexuals, but where we work, there are people with HIV/AIDS, and we treat them like anyone else,” says Elvia Maria Galindo, a committee member speaking for the Episcopal church. “We’re all sinners.” But Javier Medina, a gay activist here, charges that the religious community—particularly Evangelicals—have fanned the rampant homophobia in the country. He points to marches held by Evangelicals that protested the government’s decision in 2004 to officially recognize his group, called Kukulcán, and two other gay organiza- t i o n s . “ T h i s c re a t e d m o re hatred toward us,” says Medina, adding that a few dozen gay men have recently been killed in hate crimes and that his group has received death threats. This does not reflect the opinion of other denominations, however, says Carmen Molina, the committee’s Catholic representative. Although Padre Alberto Gauci, a Franciscan, does not condone homo- sexuality, he’s fervently trying to help thwart HIV at a men’s prison in Juticalpa, 3 hours from the capital. Gauci, who favors flip-flops, jeans, and T-shirts and looks more like an aging hippie than a clergyman, is on a somewhat quixotic quest to build a new prison in Juticalpa, where he runs an HIV/AIDS orphanage and hospice. The prison, built more than 100 years ago for 90 inmates, currently holds more than 400 men who sleep at least two to a bunk. More than 5% are known to have AIDS. In December 2005, no HIV tests or anti-HIV drugs were available. “The church has to play a role because people have lost all hope with politicians here,” says Gauci, a native of Malta. “Illness is spreading in the prison in a very accelerated way.” Gauci supports his efforts by running a bakery and occasionally staging horseraces and dogfights on the grounds of his compound. “Gambling is not a sin if you’re raising the money for good things,” shrugs Gauci. Now that’s working in mysterious ways. –J.C. Crossing the divide. Padre Alberto Gauci provides many HIV/AIDS prevention and care services in Juticalpa. Above and beyond. Honduras has more HIV-infected patients than any country in Central America. They frequently fill the beds at Tegucigalpa’s Torax Hospital. HIV/AIDS: Latin America & Caribbean Published by AAAS o n A p ril 5 , 2 0 2 1 h ttp ://scie n ce .scie n ce m a g .o rg / D o w n lo a d e d fro m http://science.sciencemag.org/ Mission Possible: Integrating the Church With HIV/AIDS Efforts Jon Cohen DOI: 10.1126/science.313.5786.482 (5786), 482.313Science ARTICLE TOOLS http://science.sciencemag.org/content/313/5786/482 CONTENT RELATED file:/content/sci/313/5786/news-summaries.full http://science.sciencemag.org/content/sci/313/5786/467.full http://science.sciencemag.org/content/sci/314/5796/52.1.full http://science.sciencemag.org/content/sci/313/5786/481.full PERMISSIONS http://www.sciencemag.org/help/reprints-and-permissions Terms of ServiceUse of this article is subject to the is a registered trademark of AAAS.ScienceScience, 1200 New York Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20005. The title (print ISSN 0036-8075; online ISSN 1095-9203) is published by the American Association for the Advancement ofScience © 2006 American Association for the Advancement of Science o n A p ril 5 , 2 0 2 1 h ttp ://scie n ce .scie n ce m a g .o rg / D o w n lo a d e d fro m http://science.sciencemag.org/content/313/5786/482 http://science.sciencemag.org/content/sci/313/5786/481.full http://science.sciencemag.org/content/sci/314/5796/52.1.full http://science.sciencemag.org/content/sci/313/5786/467.full http://www.sciencemag.org/help/reprints-and-permissions http://www.sciencemag.org/about/terms-service http://science.sciencemag.org/ 
work_ehhszgksubadhps3p7z3lc7bnq	----	three sections in the edited collection. The first section, Elections, Voting and Representation, examines the changing meanings of basic mechanisms of modern democracy. The second section, Democracy, Citizenship and Scale, is concerned with spaces where democracy is actualized at domestic/national levels and urban/regional/national levels, and with processes of international migration. A key part of this section is the concept of citizenship-formation, highlighting institutions, social relations and embodied practices, which creates and transforms citizenship in different contexts. The final section, Making Democratic Spaces, examines the what and the where of informal types of politics that are crucial to the further understanding of democracy and processes of democratization. The focus is on the public/private distinction and the interplays of the concept of public space, cultural practices and the role of social movements in a global context in developing a democratic public life. Overall, the collection seeks to broaden and deepen the scope of democracy to include the media, social movements, community mobilization, and interplays of associated culture. It also directs new questions to dominant theorizations of state-centred democratic polities to rethink elections and electoral systems, central–local state relations, and citizenship. The consideration of space, place and scale on existing conceptualizations of democracy generates exciting possibilities for normative questions about democracy, justice and legitimacy to be at the centre of critical human geography in its analysis of contemporary socio-economic metamorphoses. Mary Walsh Division of Business, Law & Information Sciences, University of Canberra, Australia. Hiding from Humanity: Disgust, Shame and the Law Martha Nussbaum Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2004, 432pp. ISBN: 0 691 09526 4. Contemporary Political Theory (2006) 5, 226–229. doi:10.1057/palgrave.cpt.9300226 Emotions, Nussbaum claims, are pervasive and it would be difficult to think of law without in some way including them. But they are also problematic. If they concern reasonable beliefs about goods which are important to have, don’t people have different ones, and how then can we enforce them via the criminal law in a liberal society? One way of dealing with that problem has been a form of utilitarianism where deterrence is the only variable, and the actual act, rather than internal Book Reviews 226 Contemporary Political Theory 2006 5 emotions, intentionality, etc., is the focus. But, asks Nussbaum, how can you have such a system without doing damage to the way we ordinarily think of the operation of systems like the criminal law? Nussbaum wants to look at what part the emotions of disgust and shame should play in the institutions, especially the law, of a liberal society. She asks what sort of political and legal culture will be appropriate for enhancing respect for persons in a liberal regime; a society, that is, where we all recognize our vulnerable humanity out of a respect for the equality of each of us in that vulnerability. Her book ultimately looks to the ‘psychological foundations of liberalism, about the institutional and developmental conditions for the sustenance of a liberal respect for human equality’ (p. 16). This is for her Millian in that it emphasizes liberty as well as equality and a space for creativity. Although her answer in substance is a Millian one, she aims to provide a better rationale for it than the famous harm principle. She looks at disgust and shame and the part they should play in the law. Her approach is to look at the emotion and its cognitive content first and then see how that resonates with its use in law. Firstly, she considers disgust. Part of its ‘thought content’ seems to be the idea that we can be contaminated by certain core objects, which are a reminder of our mortality and animal vulnerability. It can extend to other objects by the idea of contagion. Disgusting things, once they have contact with something else, contaminate that object. Indignation and anger can be differentiated because they can rely on public argumentation. But to say something is disgusting is not give public arguments but show how they are connected to things we universally see as disgusting. It is therefore not a good criterion for public policy especially as disgust can be extended to exclude whole groups. Thus, disgust is not a good basis for the criminalization of an act or as something to be used in mitigation or aggravation. Nussbaum carefully discusses cases in respect of ‘ the homosexual provocation defence’, obscenity and cases where disgust is used to decide the severity of homicide. She shows how much of this is based on projection and group denigration. Her view is that in cases where the law appears to use disgust, one can better justify the law’s intervention either by Millian arguments or arguments about respect or equality. In looking at disgust in a variety of areas in the law and especially as an emotion that involves projection and group denigration, she insightfully shows how pornography statues based on disgust in fact project that disgust on to women in general. She also enables us to see the limits of disgust where it appears to be a legitimate category, as in nuisance law, where disgust can be the actual harm. Here, for example, a small amount of faeces in water even if in such quantity as not to contaminate the water could be a nuisance. But we must not include in this the idea of contamination of a lake by, for example, Book Reviews 227 Contemporary Political Theory 2006 5 African-Americans swimming in it for that would be the unacceptable denigration of a particular group. She then turns to shame and looks at what she calls ‘primitive shame’. This is the shame of our imperfectability. This comes about in the child’s anxiety at separation from the time when it was totally cared for and in control. This arouses both anger and love at the carer. Properly handled, the child will be able to accept its imperfectability and this will lead it on to creativeness. But if not, the child develops shame at its imperfectability and this shame leads to rage and impotence in any sort of relation. This, for Nussbaum, is closely connected to shame and humiliation. We rage because we do not live up to perfection. This then leads us to stigmatization, where we desperately seek to make ourselves normal by branding others as deviant. One can see how this makes using shame in the law problematic. She argues against shaming punishments because they are connected with this ‘primitive shame’ and lead to stigmatization of minority groups in a bid to make ourselves normal. Thus, much of punishment by shame inevitably leads to branding of groups who are different as dangerous and as such engenders moral panics. She illustrates this, clearly and usefully, in a discussion of the role shame and disgust play in the moral panic around same sex marriages. There are also implications for law when it comes to building a society where citizens are protected from shame. Firstly, such a society is one that implies a decent living standard for people to prevent the stigmatization and humiliation of poverty. This is an aspect of human dignity, which thus has welfare requirements. Secondly, minorities must be protected from stigma by guarding against discrimination and hate crimes. Finally we must work not to stigmatize the physically and cognitively disabled but rather try to mainstream them into society’s institutions. Otherwise, we risk constructing a false view of ourselves as normal and them deviant and this connects back to primitive shame. This is a fascinating book. What is special about it is the way it uses material from a variety of sources, especially psychoanalytic theory and literature, to enrich the position on the use of law. For Nussbaum, in a liberal society shame and disgust cannot normally be used to punish and she finishes the book with a discussion of whether all her points can be met by Mill’s utilitarianism. She concludes that they cannot, though she agrees with what she sees as his substantive conclusions. However, it does not seem clear to me that she is defending a strictly Millian position by a different route and at times the argument seems forced and irrelevant. But she defends clearly and with great skill her version of a liberal position. And notwithstanding its relation to Mill’s position, her thesis is important and timely in its own right. Not only in its negative thesis, in its Book Reviews 228 Contemporary Political Theory 2006 5 defence of law against those communitarians and others who would let shame and disgust play a role therein, but also for its positive thesis. This has two aspects. Firstly, she shows what the law should positively do to protect people from the negative effects of shame. Here, she is very suggestive when looking at ways of helping the physically and mentally disabled. Secondly, she points the way to the proper institutionalization of emotions in a civilized society. Communitarianism and contractarian liberalism leave deep issues about humans unresolved. The former think of people as either normal or not and the latter sees people as autonomous and independent. But we are all interrelated and vulnerable and indeed equal in our vulnerability. We must design institutions that realize that insight if we are to develop our society into a truly civilized one. What is important is that we are imperfect and fragile beings and it is in that that our beauty and humanity lie. As well as protecting ourselves from some emotions we need also to inculcate others such as love and compassion. This is an important and timely book, written with insight and passion. Zenon Bañkowski University of Edinburgh, UK. The Postmodern Prince: Critical Theory, Left Strategy and the Making of a New Political Subject John Sanbonmatsu Monthly Review Press, New York, 2004, 272pp. ISBN: 1 58367 090 4. Contemporary Political Theory (2006) 5, 229–231. doi:10.1057/palgrave.cpt.9300227 Taking inspiration from Antonio Gramsci’s image of the communist party as a ‘modern Prince’, John Sanbonmatsu clarifies what he regards as some key intellectual preconditions for a contemporary radical left political strategy. The ‘postmodern Prince’ names the movement he encourages his audience — presumably the American left — to understand as a long-overdue point of intellectual and organizational unity to an otherwise disparate collection of social movements, trade unions and radical oppositional groups. Too often in the past, he argues with great effect, these movements have succumbed to an ‘expressivist’ politics that prioritizes ‘authentic self-expression’ over discipline and long-term strategic unification. Thus, they have lost any sense of a common language of opposition and organizational coherence and, as a consequence, they have succumbed to the stronger will of neo-liberal capitalism and conservative reaction. Book Reviews 229 Contemporary Political Theory 2006 5 Hiding from Humanity: Disgust, Shame and the Law 
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work_ej7s6mitcfanxeiewusrty3aum	----	Introduction: Teaching & Immigration Introduction: Teaching & Immigration James Davis, Joseph Entin, Susan O’Malley Radical Teacher, Number 84, Spring 2009, pp. 3-7 (Article) Published by University of Illinois Press DOI: For additional information about this article [ This content has been declared free to read by the pubisher during the COVID-19 pandemic. ] https://doi.org/10.1353/rdt.0.0037 https://muse.jhu.edu/article/262637 https://doi.org/10.1353/rdt.0.0037 https://muse.jhu.edu/article/262637 NUMBER 84 • RADICAL TEACHER 3 Introduction: Teaching & Immigration By James Davis, Joseph Entin and Susan O’Malley This issue of Radical Teacher features work that conveys the urgency of teaching about immigration and offers educators ways of meeting that challenge in its full complexity. In editing this cluster of essays, we have been motivated in part by the vibrancy of the public demonstra- tions of 2006, which generated coalitions and mobilized hundreds of thousands of people in dozens of cities across the United States—a movement on a scale we had not seen since the civil rights era. If its long-term impact is still unclear, this movement intensified the level of resistance to the anti-immigrant legisla- tion and xenophobic public discourse that arose in the wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks. It also registered the griev- ances and hopes of many migrant people caught up in the flows of transnational capital and the vagaries of neoliberal state policies, phenomena that are not eas- ily comprehended through traditional approaches to immigration. Together, the articles that follow suggest the importance of improving our teaching about immi- gration and our teaching of immigrants, students so many of us teach in secondary schools, community colleges and universi- ties; in traditionally immigrant-rich cities and in the small towns and suburbs that they increasingly call home; and in and out of documented status. We are struck by the peculiar, even contradictory, set of immigration-related developments characterizing the current moment in the United States. We have just witnessed the 60th anniversary cel- ebration of the United Nations General Assembly’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which affirms in Article 13 that “Everyone has the right to free- dom of movement and residence within the borders of each state” and “Everyone has the right to leave any country, includ- ing his own, and to return to his country.” We have just witnessed the election of a new President whose very body—if not his politics—seems to be the site of many a progressive’s utopian investment. The son of a man from Kenya and a woman from Kansas, educated in Hawaii and in Indonesia, raised by his anthropologist mother to respect cultural differences, the cosmopolitan Barack Obama represents for many a welcome change from the divisive politics of national chauvinism of the previous administration. His selec- tion of Hilda Solis, a Latina who repre- sented East L.A., as his Labor Secretary has encouraged a belief that low-wage and immigrant workers will benefit from this administration. And on this admin- istration are also pinned the hopes of many for passing federal legislation— the Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors (DREAM) Act—that would streamline the process through which foreign-born students qualify for legal resident status. However, even as the President-elect fills his cabinet as we go to press, we are also rt 84 text.indd 3 3/25/09 12:06:13 pM RADICAL TEACHER • NUMBER 844 mindful of the ongoing U.S. government policies and trade agreements, such as the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Central America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA), through which both Democrats and Republicans have advanced a free-market economic hegemony with devastating effects world- wide and domestically. We are conscious of the many limitations of the DREAM Act, including its inducement to military service as a means of expediting undocu- mented immigrants’ residency and natu- ralization process and its denial of federal financial aid such as Pell grants to undoc- umented students (see Bank Muñoz here- in). We are mindful of the 700-mile wall being erected along the U.S. – Mexico border and the patrols of Minutemen and other vigilantes who prey upon the Latin American workers who cross it.1 In the ongoing raids by the Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agency, we see the federal government’s desperate effort to cast itself as the protector of “the homeland” and to conflate immigration with terrorism. “I am not the impression- able kind,” wrote Erik Camad-Freixas, an interpreter who blew the whistle on a mas- sive ICE raid at Iowa’s Agriprocessors, Inc. in May 2008. “As a professor of interpret- ing [at Florida International University], I have confronted my students with every possible conflict scenario, or so I thought. The truth is that nothing could have pre- pared me for the prospect of helping our government put hundreds of innocent people in jail.” Camad-Freixas described the roundup, which involved 900 fed- eral agents and yielded 306 arrests, as “the saddest procession I have ever witnessed, which the public would never see, because cameras were not allowed past the perim- eter of the compound. Driven single-file in groups of 10, shackled at the wrists, waist and ankles, chains dragging as they shuffled through, the slaughterhouse workers were brought in for arraignment, sat and listened through headsets to the interpreted initial appearance, before marching out again to be bused to dif- ferent county jails, only to make room for the next row of 10. They appeared to be uniformly no more than 5 ft. tall, mostly illiterate Guatemalan peasants with Mayan last names, some being relatives (various Tajtaj, Xicay, Sajché, Sologüí . . .), some in tears; others with faces of worry, fear, and embarrassment. They all spoke Spanish, a few rather laboriously. It dawned on me that, aside from their Guatemalan or Mexican nationality, which was imposed on their people after Independence, they too were Native Americans, in shackles. They stood out in stark racial contrast with the rest of us as they started their slow penguin march across the make- shift court. ‘Sad spectacle’ I heard a colleague say, reading my mind. They had all waived their right to be indicted by a grand jury and accepted instead an information or simple charging docu- ment by the U.S. Attorney, hoping to be quickly deported since they had families to support back home. But it was not to be. They were criminally charged with ‘aggravated identity theft’ and ‘Social Security fraud’—charges they did not understand . . . and, frank- ly, neither could I.”2 Such craven operations indicate the catastrophic failure of the U.S. gov- ernment to provide sensible leadership amidst the complexities of contemporary immigration. Their legitimacy relies on a resurgent form of nativist racism that rt 84 text.indd 4 3/25/09 12:06:13 pM NUMBER 84 • RADICAL TEACHER 5 equates foreignness and non-whiteness with criminality. And they provide tacit encouragement to the backlash we are witnessing against Latinos, whose rate of victimization in hate crimes has increased every year since 2004, according to FBI data.3 As well, the cur- rent economic cri- sis, the likes of which we have not seen since the Great Depression, has far- reaching implica- tions for immigrants. Even before the sub-prime mortgage debacle hit, the financial sector took a nose dive, and the elite and middle classes were compelled to acknowledge a reces- sion, many immigrant communities were already hurting. Between 2006 and 2007, while the median annual income of U.S. households increased 1.3 percent, the median annual income of non-citizen immigrant households dropped 7.3 per- cent. Remittances, a reliable indicator of the financial health of immigrant commu- nities, are in sharp decline: Mexico alone lost an estimated $300 million in the year between August 2007 and August 2008 due to the drop in remittances, which are its second largest source of foreign income after oil exports4 People who work in the service sector and domestic labor, many of whom are immigrants, may not have the stock port- folios and 401K retirement plans whose depletion is now loudly bemoaned by wealthier folks. But their wallets are tak- ing a beating too, and they are often the most vulnerable to an economic down- turn, facing layoffs, work freezes, and salary contractions. Their employers are short on revenue, clients and customers have nowhere near the disposable income they used to, and it is affecting their live- lihoods dramatically. A real estate bro- ker in Westchester County recently told a New York Times reporter about the difficult conversa- tions the economic crisis prompted her to have with her nanny. “We talk about the trickledown effect of Wall Street, how my selling less houses is going to affect her mother living in her hut in Dominica, which is crazy . . . . But her mother is going to get less sugar because she has less money to send home.” An organiz- er at Domestic Workers United, Ai-jen Poo, told the same reporter, “Essentially, 10,000 jobs lost at Lehman Brothers means 10,000 domestic workers’ jobs that are in jeopardy . . . [and] unlike other sec- tors getting hit, domestic workers have no safety net. It’s the invisible, untold story of this crisis. It’s really hitting people hard.”5 Of course, these difficulties temper our optimism regarding the health, wealth, and safety of U.S. immigrant communi- ties and the faith we place in the new President and his administration to address them. However, immigration is one of the few arenas in which it still seems possible to apply public pressure on policy makers and effect social transformation from the ground up, so we are emboldened by the force being exerted by immigrant com- munities and their advocates and place a great deal of faith in them. What models and resources do We need to understand and teach effectively about the neWly emerging patterns of migration, patterns that have outstripped our traditional approaches? hoW do We teach to and about generation 1.5? rt 84 text.indd 5 3/25/09 12:06:13 pM RADICAL TEACHER • NUMBER 846 Finally, we are drawn to immigration as an urgent subject for educators because it does not map neatly along partisan lines (see Hale herein). Its intricacies invite us, and our students, to think critically, his- torically and ethically. A classic example is the strange bedfellows that the immigra- tion debates make of bleeding-heart liber- als and bottom-line conservatives, both of whom tend to favor relaxed immigration policies. Another is the current campaign being run by some environmentalists, traditionally on the left of the political spectrum, who advocate highly restrictive immigration policies and a neo-Malthu- sian view of U.S. population control. It is an issue that opens not only onto questions of nation and culture but also of race, gen- der, religion, language, criminality and class. What models and resources do we need to understand and teach effectively about the newly emerging patterns of migration, patterns that have outstripped our traditional approaches? How do we teach to and about Generation 1.5? How do we teach to and about the estimated 11.2 million undocumented immigrants currently in the United States? Consider the improbable case of Trinity High School of Euless, Texas, where the male children of Polynesian immigrants have turned their school into a football dynasty. In the land of “Friday Night Lights,” the gridiron exploits of students from the Pacific island of Tonga have almost singlehandedly made of Euless (pop. 54,000) a multicultural mecca. Tongans constitute less than seven per- cent of the Euless population (roughly 3,000 to 4,000 Tongans live there, many of whom work at the nearby Dallas - Fort Worth airport), but two-thirds of the players on the Trinity High football team, Texas state champions in 2005 and 2007, are of Tongan descent. Their success has transformed the town. The Hawaiian Market advertises kava root used for a traditional drink. A nonprofit organization called Voice of Tonga addresses concerns about immi- gration, culture, language and health, and broadcasts a program, including Trinity football highlights, on local cable television. The Free Church of Tonga, the Tongan First United Methodist Church and the First Tongan Assembly of God Church—three of nine Tongan- affiliated churches in the area—sit on or near South Main Street. . . . Trinity has a Polynesian Club, and Polynesian students frequently join the choir and participate in the arts. Often, they are chosen homecoming king and queen, coaches said. Ukulele music wafts through the school courtyard at lunch- time and between classes. Occasionally, someone wears a traditional lava-lava sarong. Before and after each football game, Tongan players lead a ceremonial team war dance called a haka. . . . City officials have patiently assisted Tongan residents to acclimate to a new culture. [For example,] compromises have been reached to accommodate large family gatherings at funeral rituals that last for days. And the city has promoted alternatives to the slaughtering of pigs at home for open-pit cooking. A mobile health unit helps to provide free flu shots and medical checkups.6 On one hand, the story of the Texas Tongans affirms everything we like to tell ourselves about the melting pot and the American dream. The locals have not only tolerated cultural difference, they have embraced it. As Trinity’s star run- ning back, an African American, said, “It makes you a better person, learning rt 84 text.indd 6 3/25/09 12:06:14 pM NUMBER 84 • RADICAL TEACHER 7 to accept different people.” On the other hand, one is forced to wonder whether the residents of Euless would extend so enthusiastic an embrace to immigrants who were not furnishing their high school with a steady supply of 200-300 pound linemen. No one in Euless had heard of Tonga when Fotu Katoa, the first Tongan to play football at Trinity, met head coach Steve Lineweaver in 1982. But the 6’2”, 210-pound linebacker quickly put Tonga on Lineweaver’s map: “The first time he hit somebody in spring practice, I knew we had something. He would yell, ‘I love this Texas football’.”7 Are the Tongans of Euless a success story or a cautionary tale? What are the circumstances in which immigrants can make a place for themselves in different parts of this country? How do we account for the paradoxes raised by such a story? The contents of this issue of Radical Teacher include articles that grapple with these questions. Carolina Bank Muñoz addresses the challenges that undocu- mented students face in today’s higher education system. Michael Hale writes of the vitality that the issue of immigration brings to his college composition courses in Ohio. Tryon Woods considers the vexed place of immigration in the field of criminology in which he teaches. Janet Zandy examines the letters of Nicola Sacco and Bartolomeo Vanzetti, written in prison while they awaited their execu- tion in 1927, as powerful primary docu- ments for today’s teachers. James Davis discusses the importance of students’ own social location to their encounters with cultural representations of immigrant experiences. Linda Dittmar’s contribu- tion, a filmography that describes new and old films in several genres and from several different countries, is an invaluable resource for educators at every level. The issue closes with a book review and teach- ing note that extend this conversation. Together, the authors and reviewers help us extricate the dynamics of immigration from the discourse of nationalism and the shallow dichotomies—legal/illegal, us/them—on which public debates have too often foundered. Notes 1 President Bush signed House Resolu- tion 6061, the “Secure Fence Act,” in October, 2006. The projected cost of the construction is 4 - 8 billion dollars. 2 Erik Camad-Freixas, “Interpreting After the Largest ICE Raid in U.S. His- tory: a Personal Account,” 13 June 2008. ht t p: //g r a ph i c s 8 . n y t i m e s . c om / i m a g - e s /2 0 0 8 /0 7/14 /opi n ion /14 ed-ca mayd . pdf. 3 “Anti-Latino Hate Crimes Rise for Fourth Year in a Row,” Southern Poverty Law Center, Intelligence Report 132, Win- ter 2008. 4 Larry Tung, “Immigrants Confront the Recession,” Gotham Gazette, Nov. 2008 http://w w w.gothamgazette.com/article/ immigrants/20081103/11/2735. Non- citizen immigrant households account for 7 percent of all U.S. households and 52 percent of all immigrant households. Data on remittances were provided by the Bank of Mexico. 5 Julie Scelfo, “Trickledown Downsiz- ing,” New York Times, 11 Dec. 2008: D1. 6 Longman, Jere. “Polynesian Pipeline Feeds a Texas Football Titan,” New York Times, 8 Oct. 2008: A1. 7 Longman. rt 84 text.indd 7 3/25/09 12:06:14 pM 
work_elvizew5afgt5dchqofpcub2za	----	econstor Make Your Publications Visible. A Service of zbw Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft Leibniz Information Centre for Economics Endrich, Marek; Michel, Stephan Working Paper The good tourist, the bad refugee and the ugly German: Xenophobic activities and tourism ILE Working Paper Series, No. 16 Provided in Cooperation with: University of Hamburg, Institute of Law and Economics (ILE) Suggested Citation: Endrich, Marek; Michel, Stephan (2018) : The good tourist, the bad refugee and the ugly German: Xenophobic activities and tourism, ILE Working Paper Series, No. 16, University of Hamburg, Institute of Law and Economics (ILE), Hamburg This Version is available at: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/181998 Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your personal and scholarly purposes. You are not to copy documents for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public. If the documents have been made available under an Open Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence. www.econstor.eu INSTITUTE OF LAW AND ECONOMICS WORKING PAPER SERIES The good tourist, the bad refugee and the ugly German: Xenophobic activities and tourism Marek Endrich Stephan Michel Working Paper 2018 No. 16 NOTE: ILE working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peer-reviewed. © 2017 by the authors. All rights reserved. September 2018 The good tourist, the bad refugee and the ugly German: Xenophobic activities and tourism Marek Endrich∗ and Stephan Michel Institute of Law and Economics, Universität Hamburg September 10, 2018 Abstract Germany shows a more welcoming attitude towards refugees than most other European countries. At the same time, the influx of refugees has led to massive protests, demonstrations and attacks against refugees. We look at the economic effects of these demonstrations and attacks on one im- portant industry, namely tourism. Combining a novel, district-level data set on tourism with data on xenophobic activities, we find that xenopho- bic demonstrations have negative effects on tourist arrivals. This effect is found for domestic and foreign tourists. Keywords: Xenophobic activities, refugees, tourism, district-level data JEL Classification: F22, L83 ∗Corresponding author. Email: marek.endrich@uni-hamburg.de. We are grateful to Jen- nifer Sell for excellent research assistance and would like to thank Xiaoge Dong, Jerg Gut- mann,Mahdi Khesali, Hashem Nabas, Konstantinos Pilpilidis and Stefan Voigt for helpful comments. All remaining errors are entirely our own. 1 1 Introduction The large influx of refugees to Germany since the beginning of the Syrian civil war in 2011 has led to the rise of a new right-wing party and xenophobic demon- strations and attacks. While these events have had a large impact on Germany’s political and social landscape, we investigate the economic effects of these re- actions to refugees. Xenophobic activities, such as the violent demonstrations in Chemnitz in August 2018, are widely covered in the (international) media and put the location in a negative spotlight. For the local economy, this image reduces the attractiveness for tourism. Tourism is an important part of Germany’s economy and accounts for almost 5 percent of the overall economic activity (German Travel Association, 2015). So far, the literature has focused on the effects of terrorism (Neumayer, 2004) or political instability (Saha and Yap, 2014) on tourism. We are interested in another dimension, namely xenophobic activities. As used in this note, these in- clude physical attacks, arson, demonstrations and miscellaneous attacks against refugee housing. Among the things tourists look for when planning a vacation is the gen- eral attractiveness of their destination (Neumayer, 2004). Xenophobic activities reduce this value, and for foreign visitors create the perception of danger to themselves during their stay. We use a novel district-level data set on tourism in Germany to analyze the effects of xenophobic activities on local tourism. Looking at the sub-national level has the advantage of institutional homogeneity and mitigates omitted vari- able bias. This research is, to our knowledge, the first that deals with the eco- nomic effects of xenophobic activities. We find that xenophobic demonstrations have an adverse effect on tourism. This effect is visible for both domestic and foreign tourists, but foreign tourists respond with a longer delay. This note can be seen as an addition to the literature on the economics of hate crimes (Gale et al., 2002; Ryan and Leeson, 2011; Mulholland, 2013; Sharma, 2015; Muller and Schwarz, 2018). While the existing literature is concerned with determinants, we focus on the economic effects of xenophobic activities. 2 Empirical specification and data For our analysis of the short-term impact of xenophobic activities on tourism, we focus on the development of tourism in Germany from the fourth quarter 2 of 2014 to the fourth quarter of 2017. This period coincides with the so-called refugee crisis. We have collected information on tourism for the 401 German districts from the statistical offices of the German states. German districts are an administrative level in between the German states and the municipalities and consist of 294 rural districts (Landkreise) and 107 urban districts (Kreisfreie Städte). They fulfill policy tasks including education, public transportation and the development of local tourism. The tourism data is available on a monthly basis and includes information on the number of overnight stays, the number of visitors who spent at least one night in a guest facility and the average duration of stay. For each category, the data allows us to distinguish between domestic and foreign visitors based on their residence. The numbers are reported by the guest facilities and we aggregate the data at the quarterly level.1 TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE We relate the development in tourism to incidents of anti-refugee violence in the districts. The NGOs Amadeu Antonio Stiftung and Pro Asyl keep track of and categorize violence and social unrest aimed at refugees. These activities can be categorized into xenophobic demonstrations, assault, arson attacks, and miscellaneous attacks against refugee housing, and include information on the timing and the location of the events. We extend the dataset gathered by Benček and Strasheim (2016) to the end of 2017 and aggregate it at the quarterly level per district. Our sample includes 4715 cases of miscellaneous attacks, 968 cases of assaults, 272 cases of arson and 423 demonstrations. Figure 1 shows the spatial distribution of the activities by district. Darker shaded areas experienced more xenophobic activities. 1Quarters are defined as January to March, April to June, July to September, and October to December. 3 Figure 1: Cases of xenophobic activity The graph shows the number of aggregated xenophobic activities per district. Darker shaded areas experienced more xenophobic activities. Figure 2 shows the percentage change in overnight stays for the 5 districts with the highest overall number of anti-refugee violence, high, and the group of 5 districts that exhibit the lowest number of incidents, low. Using the quarters of 2014 as the baseline, the growth in tourism in the low districts was consistently above the high districts, and the difference between the two groups increased over time. 4 Figure 2: High and low violence districts and tourist stays The respective quarter of 2014 serves as the baseline comparison for each quarter. High level districts are Berlin, Sächsische Schweiz, Dresden Stadt, Chemnitz Stadt, Erzgebirgkreis and low level districts are Grafschaft Bentheim, Weiden in der Oberpfalz, Coburg, Memmingen, Nienburg. In a next step, we test whether the differences in tourism can be attributed to the varying levels of anti-refugee xenophobic activities. We also take the strong seasonality in tourism data into account. To do this, we estimate the following regression model for the change in overnight stays for district d by quarter q in year t, (1) 4%tourismd,q,t = β0 + 4 4∑ n=1 β1xenod,q−n,t + δt + φq + υd + +φq ×δt + φq ×λs + 4X′d,q,t−1ψ + εd,q,t where the outcome variable tourism is the quarterly percentage change in overnight stays. Subsequent regressions use as the dependent variable overnight stays for foreign and domestic tourists according to their place of residence, the number of guests and the average duration of the visits. xenod,q,t is our main variable of interest and is defined as the number of either xenophobic demonstra- tions, assault, arson attacks or miscellaneous attacks. We look at four quarter 5 lags to take the delayed response in tourism demand into account. District fixed effects υd allow for district specific time trends and net out all time invariant effects that have an effect on the growth rate of tourism. Seasonal fixed effects φq and year fixed effects δt control for seasonal trends in tourism and shocks over time. Quarter- year fixed effects φq × δt cover for changes in seasonal effects over time, and the inclusion of quarter-state fixed effects φq×λs takes account of different tourism seasons across the states. The vector X′d,q,t comprises control variables that may affect tourism de- mand. We include the first difference of unemployment, crime per capita and gdp per capita, 2 all of which are factors that contribute to the attractiveness of a region for tourism. We add indicators for the presence of a federal or state horticulture show (Bundesgartenschau and Landesgartenschau ) as well as a major sports event (Sportevent) in a district as potential tourist attractions. 3 We also created data on hours of sunshine sun, the amount of rain rain and the average temperature temp per district with inverse distance weighting on information collected at weather stations. This weather data is provided by the German Meterological Service (Deutscher Wetterdienst ). 3 Results TABLE 2 and 3 ABOUT HERE The results from our regressions based on how the different categories of xenophobic activities might impact overnight stays are reported in Table 2. Each of the four columns reports the different categories in turn. We find that xenophobic demonstrations are associated with a statistically significant decrease in the number of overnight stays. One additional demonstration in a quarter reduces the growth of overnight stays by roughly one percentage point in the first and by another percentage point in the second quarter after the incident. The impact is statistically strongest in the second quarter after the 2The monthly unemployment numbers stem from the Federal Employment Agency of Ger- many. Annual crime per capita statistics are from the German Federal Criminal Police and GDP per capita is from the Statistical Office of the States in Germany. All data is adjusted to match quarterly frequency. 3Sportevent is defined as a European or World championship in one of the 20 most popular sports in Germany which lasts for at least two days. 6 incidents, which is in line with the expected delay in the reaction of tourists. Regarding the temporal dimension of the effect, we find a significant effect for a partial reversion after four quarters. We do not observe a significant change in tourism as a reaction to the other categories. The analysis is based on data for all publicly known incidents of xenophobic activities. This also includes minor attacks and other minor events. Assuming that demonstrations gain more attention in the media than the other categories makes our result plausible and hints at media outlets as a key transmission channel. In Column 1 and 2 of Table 3 we separately measure the impact of demon- strations by tourists’ place of origin. Domestic tourists adjust their travelling behavior in the first and second quarter after demonstrations, while foreign vis- itors react with a longer delay; we can only see a significant affect in the second quarter after the incident. The quicker reaction of domestic tourism may well be due to a larger proportion of short-term trips, while foreigners plan their trips well in advance. In Column 3 and 4 we find that the effect on overnight stays is mainly driven by a decrease in the number of arrivals and not by a shorter duration of trips. Tourists refrain from visiting a district that exhibits a high number of xenophobic activities, while the average duration of the remaining trips stays the same. 4 Conclusion To sum up, we have shown that demonstrations against refugees have a negative impact on tourist arrivals. This finding highlights an economic externality of xenophobic activities that has not been discussed in the literature so far. Our estimate is certainly a lower bound of the true economic costs of xenophobic activities. Tourism is only part of the story as the diminished attractiveness of a district also has repercussion on potential investors and workers. 7 References Benček, D. and J. Strasheim (2016). Refugees welcome? A dataset on anti- refugee violence in Germany. Research & Politics 3 (4), 1–11. Gale, L. R., W. Carrington Heath, and R. W. Ressler (2002). An Economic Analysis of Hate Crime. Eastern Economic Journal 28 (2), 203–216. German Travel Association (2015). The importance of tourism in Germany. Mulholland, S. E. (2013). White supremacist groups and hate crime. Public Choice 157 (1-2), 91–113. Muller, K. and C. Schwarz (2018). Fanning the Flames of Hate: Social Media and Hate Crime. SSRN Electronic Journal . Neumayer, E. (2004). The Impact of Political Violence on Tourism: Dynamic Cross-national Estimation. Journal of Conflict Resolution 48 (2), 259–281. Ryan, M. E. and P. T. Leeson (2011). Hate groups and hate crime. International Review of Law and Economics 31 (4), 256–262. Saha, S. and G. Yap (2014). The Moderation Effects of Political Instability and Terrorism on Tourism Development: A Cross-Country Panel Analysis. Journal of Travel Research 53 (4), 509–521. Sharma, S. (2015). Caste-based crimes and economic status: Evidence from India. Journal of Comparative Economics 43 (1), 204–226. Table 1: Summary Statistics Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max Nights domestic 5,184 226,462 384,002 5,825 4,762,345 Nights foreign 5,184 49,768 211,430 284 4,309,604 Arrivals domestic 5,178 84,423 147,748 3,731 2,133,668 Arrivals foreign 5,178 22,075 85,538 82 1,520,044 Arrivals 5,178 106,499 226,797 4,457 3,587,795 Nights 5,184 276,230 552,959 7,771 8,975,984 cases 5,187 1.272 3.495 0 115 miscellaneous attack 5,187 0.910 2.522 0 88 arson 5,187 0.052 0.298 0 9 assault 5,187 0.187 0.704 0 14 demonstration 5,187 0.082 0.668 0 23 rain 5,187 62.964 23.935 24.215 190.321 sun 5,187 131.458 65.820 33.016 255.949 temperature 5,187 9.612 5.542 0.377 19.403 Duration 5,178 2.601 0.869 1.413 7.420 Duration foreign 5,178 2.432 0.764 1.255 11.667 Duration domestic 5,178 2.616 0.917 1.397 7.542 crimepc 5,187 0.061 0.026 0.022 0.160 gdppc 5,187 35,124 14,694 14,932 138,664 pop 5,187 204,701 237,776 34,048 3,584,326 Bundesgartenschau 5,187 0.002 0.040 0 1 Landesgartenschau 5,187 0.005 0.065 0 1 Sportevent 5,187 0.001 0.022 0 1 unemp 5,187 0.057 0.027 0.011 0.163 Table 2: Effect of xenophobic activities on overnight stays Dependent variable: (Growth nights) (1) (2) (3) (4) lag(Growth miscellaneous attack, 1) −0.001 (0.002) lag(Growth miscellaneous attack, 2) 0.003 (0.002) lag(Growth miscellaneous attack, 3) 0.0003 (0.002) lag(Growth miscellaneous attack, 4) 0.001 (0.002) lag(Growth assault, 1) 0.001 (0.005) lag(Growth assault, 2) 0.0002 (0.006) lag(Growth assault, 3) 0.002 (0.006) lag(Growth assault, 4) −0.002 (0.007) lag(Growth arson, 1) −0.002 (0.008) lag(Growth arson, 2) −0.011 (0.011) lag(Growth arson, 3) −0.007 (0.014) lag(Growth arson, 4) −0.008 (0.012) lag(Growth demonstration, 1) −0.009∗ (0.005) lag(Growth demonstration, 2) −0.010∗∗∗ (0.004) lag(Growth demonstration, 3) −0.004 (0.005) lag(Growth demonstration, 4) 0.008∗∗ (0.004) District Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Seasonal Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Quarter-Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Quarter-State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes District-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Observations 3,589 3,589 3,589 3,589 R2 0.257 0.256 0.256 0.257 Adjusted R2 0.147 0.146 0.146 0.147 F Statistic (df = 58; 3124) 18.636∗∗∗ 18.551∗∗∗ 18.566∗∗∗ 18.646∗∗∗ Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01 Standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust and clustered at district level. The unit of observation is the district and quarter and covers the period from 2014 quarter 4 until 2017 quarter 4. Table 3: Effect of xenophobic activities on locals versus foreigners and on number of stays versus duration of stay Dependent variable: (Growth nights domestic) (Growth nights foreign) (Growth arrivals) (Growth duration) (1) (2) (3) (4) lag(Growth demonstration, 1) −0.010∗∗ −0.005 −0.012∗∗ 0.001 (0.005) (0.010) (0.005) (0.003) lag(Growth demonstration, 2) −0.011∗∗ −0.023∗∗ −0.012∗∗ 0.001 (0.004) (0.010) (0.005) (0.002) lag(Growth demonstration, 3) −0.006 −0.018 −0.007 0.004 (0.005) (0.012) (0.006) (0.003) lag(Growth demonstration, 4) 0.008∗ 0.002 0.008∗ 0.001 (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.002) District Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Seasonal Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Quarter-Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Quarter-State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes District-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Observations 3,589 3,589 3,581 3,581 R2 0.252 0.206 0.269 0.120 Adjusted R2 0.140 0.088 0.160 −0.011 F Statistic 18.106∗∗∗ (df = 58; 3124) 13.953∗∗∗ (df = 58; 3124) 19.746∗∗∗ (df = 58; 3116) 7.333∗∗∗ (df = 58; 3116) Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01 Standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust and clustered at district level. The unit of observation is the district and quarter and covers the period from 2014 quarter 4 until 2017 quarter 4. Table 4: Table 2 with controls coefficients Dependent variable: (Growth ueb) (1) (2) (3) (4) lag(Growth unemp, 1) 4.456∗ 4.426∗ 4.437∗ 4.424∗ (2.575) (2.570) (2.563) (2.560) lag(Growth crimepc, 1) 0.134 0.138 0.130 0.118 (0.155) (0.155) (0.154) (0.154) lag(Growth gdppc, 1) −0.776 −0.822 −0.795 −0.797 (1.381) (1.387) (1.388) (1.387) Growth sport 0.040 0.050 0.050 0.068 (0.097) (0.101) (0.100) (0.109) Growth landesgs −0.056 −0.057 −0.057 −0.058 (0.063) (0.063) (0.063) (0.063) Growth bundesgs 0.224∗ 0.217∗ 0.234∗ 0.204∗ (0.119) (0.123) (0.121) (0.122) lag(growth temperature, 1) −0.020∗ −0.020∗ −0.019∗ −0.020∗ (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) lag(growth sun, 1) −0.0002 −0.0001 −0.0001 −0.0001 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) lag(growth rain, 1) 0.0001 0.00004 0.00004 0.00004 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) lag(Growth miscellaneous attack, 1) −0.001 (0.002) lag(Growth miscellaneous attack, 2) 0.003 (0.002) lag(Growth miscellaneous attack, 3) 0.0003 (0.002) lag(Growth miscellaneous attack, 4) 0.001 (0.002) lag(Growth assault, 1) 0.001 (0.005) lag(Growth assault, 2) 0.0002 (0.006) lag(Growth assault, 3) 0.002 (0.006) lag(Growth assault, 4) −0.002 (0.007) lag(Growth arson, 1) −0.002 (0.008) lag(Growth arson, 2) −0.011 (0.011) lag(Growth arson, 3) −0.007 (0.014) lag(Growth arson, 4) −0.008 (0.012) lag(Growth demonstration, 1) −0.009∗ (0.005) lag(Growth demonstration, 2) −0.010∗∗∗ (0.004) lag(Growth demonstration, 3) −0.004 (0.005) lag(Growth demonstration, 4) 0.008∗∗ (0.004) District Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Seasonal Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Quarter-Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Quarter-State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Observations 3,589 3,589 3,589 3,589 R2 0.257 0.256 0.256 0.257 Adjusted R2 0.147 0.146 0.146 0.147 F Statistic (df = 58; 3124) 18.636∗∗∗ 18.551∗∗∗ 18.566∗∗∗ 18.646∗∗∗ Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01 Standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust and clustered at district level. The unit of observation is the district and quarter and covers the period from 2014 quarter 4 until 2017 quarter 4. Table 5: Table 3 with controls coefficients Dependent variable: (Growth ueb in) (Growth ueb aus) (Growth ank) (Growth dauer) (1) (2) (3) (4) lag(Growth unemp, 1) 4.034 7.594 7.763∗∗∗ −2.296∗∗∗ (2.615) (4.662) (2.516) (0.465) lag(Growth crimepc, 1) 0.135 0.256 0.151 −0.037 (0.159) (0.301) (0.135) (0.051) lag(Growth gdppc, 1) −0.933 −0.311 −0.417 −0.031 (1.388) (2.240) (1.192) (0.367) Growth sport 0.071 0.120 −0.023 0.072∗ (0.105) (0.131) (0.120) (0.040) Growth landesgs −0.042 −0.180 −0.067 0.007 (0.065) (0.114) (0.053) (0.026) Growth bundesgs 0.235∗ −0.197 0.172∗ 0.053 (0.124) (0.135) (0.102) (0.041) lag(growth temperature, 1) −0.019∗ −0.034∗∗ −0.017∗ −0.004 (0.011) (0.016) (0.009) (0.003) lag(growth sun, 1) −0.0001 −0.001 −0.0001 −0.00004 (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0002) (0.0001) lag(growth rain, 1) 0.00001 −0.001∗∗ 0.00002 −0.00003 (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0001) lag(Growth demonstration, 1) −0.010∗∗ −0.005 −0.012∗∗ 0.001 (0.005) (0.010) (0.005) (0.003) lag(Growth demonstration, 2) −0.011∗∗ −0.023∗∗ −0.012∗∗ 0.001 (0.004) (0.010) (0.005) (0.002) lag(Growth demonstration, 3) −0.006 −0.018 −0.007 0.004 (0.005) (0.012) (0.006) (0.003) lag(Growth demonstration, 4) 0.008∗ 0.002 0.008∗ 0.001 (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.002) District Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Seasonal Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Quarter-Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Quarter-State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Observations 3,589 3,589 3,581 3,581 R2 0.252 0.206 0.269 0.120 Adjusted R2 0.140 0.088 0.160 −0.011 F Statistic 18.106∗∗∗ (df = 58; 3124) 13.953∗∗∗ (df = 58; 3124) 19.746∗∗∗ (df = 58; 3116) 7.333∗∗∗ (df = 58; 3116) Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01 Standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust and clustered at district level. The unit of observation is the district and quarter and covers the period from 2014 quarter 4 until 2017 quarter 4. Working paper Endrich Michel.pdf Introduction Empirical specification and data Results Conclusion 
work_emgio63ws5cpllqyujuagwjpyu	----	The social consequences of race | Social Science homework help HomeworkMarket How it works.Pricing.FAQ.Homework Answers.Log in / Sign up The social consequences of race Fahad502 hate_crime_paper.pdf Home>Social Science homework help>The social consequences of race Hate Crimes: A Critical Perspective Author(s): James B. Jacobs and Kimberly A. Potter Source: Crime and Justice, Vol. 22 (1997), pp. 1-50 Published by: The University of Chicago Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1147570 Accessed: 27/12/2009 17:36 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=ucpress. Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected] The University of Chicago Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Crime and Justice. http://www.jstor.org http://www.jstor.org/stable/1147570?origin=JSTOR-pdf http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=ucpress James B. Jacobs and Kimberly A. Potter Hate Crimes: A Critical Perspective ABSTRACT During the past decade, spurred by claims that the country is experiencing a hate crime epidemic, Congress and the majority of states have enacted laws increasing the punishment for crimes motivated by officially disfavored prejudices. Congress has also mandated a reporting system that aims to provide data on the incidence of hate crime. Some police departments have formed bias crime units. The upshot is the emergence of a new crime category and a new way to think about crime. The definition of hate crime, however, is fraught with problems, the federal data gathering effort has been completely unsuccessful, and enforcement of the hate crime laws has been minimal. Creation of a hate crime category fills political and symbolic functions but is unlikely to provide a useful indication of the state of various prejudices or to reduce crime generated by prejudice. Indeed, deconstructing criminal law according to the dictates of "identity politics" might exacerbate social divisions and conflict. The terms "hate crime" or "bias crime" have established their places in the crime and justice lexicon and appear routinely in the media, scholarly journals, legislation, and judicial opinions. Many advocacy groups, politicians, scholars, and journalists claim that the country is experiencing a hate crime epidemic. A majority of states have enacted substantive hate crime laws or sentence enhancements for crimes moti- vated by officially disfavored prejudices. A few large police depart- ments have formed bias crime units for investigative and data compila- tion purposes. In 1990, Congress directed the Department of Justice to provide a nationwide accounting of hate crimes. James B. Jacobs is professor of law at New York University School of Law and direc- tor of its Center for Research in Crime and Justice. Kimberly A. Potter is a senior re- search fellow at the Center. The authors thank David Garland for his comments. ? 1997 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved. 0192-3234/97/0022-0003$02.00 1 James B. Jacobs and Kimberly A. Potter The goals of this essay are to assess the definition of "hate crime," to present what is known about its incidence, and to analyze how the criminal justice system is adapting to this new offense. Because hate crime is a legal construct, and one that varies from jurisdiction to juris- diction, it is necessary to spend a good deal of time with definitions. Only after that groundwork is laid, does it make sense to ask empirical questions. Section I examines the concept of hate crime. Section II sur- veys different types of hate crime laws. Section III examines First Amendment objections to hate crime laws. Section IV presents what is known about the incidence of hate crime offending, emphasizing the difficulties involved in reliable data collection. Section V focuses on a number of different species of offending, offenders, and victims. Sec- tion VI examines the practical problems faced by police and prosecu- tors in investigating and prosecuting hate crime cases. Section VII speculates on the sociopolitical significance of this new category of crime. Section VIII offers a summary and conclusions. I. What Is Hate Crime? The term "hate crime" is a misnomer. The term actually refers to criminal behavior motivated, not by hate, but by prejudice, although there is undoubtedly some overlap. Generically, "hate crime" is meant to distinguish criminal conduct motivated by prejudices from criminal conduct motivated by lust, jealousy, greed, politics, and so forth. Un- like theft, burglary, or assault, hate crime emphasizes the offender's at- titudes, values, and character. Lobbyists for special hate crime laws be- lieve that prejudice is worse than all other criminal motivations (Crocker 1992/93, pp. 491-94). Whereas the classical and the neoclassical models of criminal justice focus on the crime rather than the criminal, the movement to recog- nize and label hate crimes strives to make criminals' motivations salient and determinative. Hate crime laws condemn discrimination by crimi- nals in the same way that Title VII of the Federal Equal Employment Opportunity Act condemns discrimination by public and private em- ployers. For some people, the importance of a hate crime offense category is that it condemns in the moralistic language of the criminal law values and attitudes already condemned via employment, voting rights, and constitutional laws. For others, hate crime laws are important because they punish prejudiced offenders more severely than other offenders who have less abhorrent motivations. Finally, in the context of the 2 Hate Crimes 3 identity politics that characterize contemporary American society (Bernstein 1994; Gitlin 1995), minority groups perceive it to be in their interest to emphasize and even exaggerate their victimization (Epstein 1989, p. 20; Jacobs 1992/93, pp. 542-43; Sykes 1992; Sleeper 1993). At some level of abstraction all crime, or at least a great deal of it, could be said to be motivated by manifest or latent prejudice-against victims because they are tall, short, rich, poor, good-looking, bad- looking, cocky, vulnerable, smart, dumb, members of one gang or an- other, and so forth. In contemporary American society, however, certain prejudices are officially disfavored-especially those based on race and religion. All hate crime laws include prejudice based on race, color, reli- gion, and national origin (Wang 1995, app. B). However, only eighteen states and the District of Columbia include gender or sexual orientation bias as a hate crime trigger. Prejudice against Native Americans, immi- grants, the physically and mentally handicapped, union members, non- union members, right-to-lifers, and those advocating the right to choose are hardly ever included in hate crime laws (Wang 1995, app. B). Some states punish criminal conduct based on uncommon prejudices such as against service in the armed forces (Vermont Stat. Ann. tit. 13, ? 1455) or "involvement in civil rights or human rights activities" (Mont. Code Ann. ?? 45-5-221). The District of Columbia has the most all encompassing hate crime statute; it covers religion, national origin, gender and sexual orientation, "personal appearance," "family responsibility," "marital sta- tus," and "matriculation." Clearly, the boundaries of hate crime legisla- tion are fixed by political decision rather than by any logical or legal ratio- nale. A. The Nature of Prejudice What does it mean to say that criminal conduct is motivated by preju- dice? Prejudice is an extremely complicated concept which has gener- ated substantial social psychological, philosophical, and other scholarly literatures (Allport 1954; Van Til 1959; Gioseffi 1993).1 A simple definition of prejudice is "a negative attitude or opinion about a partic- 1 "Prejudice is not a unitary phenomenon ... it will take varying forms in different individuals. Socially and psychologically, attitudes differ depending upon whether they are the result of deep-seated personality characteristics, sometimes of the pathological nature, of a traumatic experience, or whether they simply represent conformity to an established norm" (International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences 1968, s.v. "Prejudice," p. 444). James B. Jacobs and Kimberly A. Potter ular group or class of people" (International Encyclopedia of the Social Sci- ences 1968, pp. 439-40). Some commentators would include "irratio- nal" as well. It can result from experience or from fantasies and myths (Ehrlich 1973, p. 15). It can be based partly on fact, or it can be com- pletely fictional. Some people admit to their prejudices, and even es- pouse them as ideologies. Others deny their prejudices, sometimes be- cause they do not recognize them and sometimes because they are ashamed of them. Prejudice can be "subconscious" as well as "con- scious."2 Not infrequently, whether a particular belief or attitude should be labeled as prejudice is a matter on which reasonable people can differ (e.g., Is Z prejudiced if he believes that blacks are more likely to have out-of-wedlock children than whites and Asians and therefore to raise their children less satisfactorily?). There seems to be no agreement on whether "prejudice" includes a negative attitude toward a people which is based in fact (e.g., X does not like or wish to associate with Libyans, because of their govern- ment's sponsorship of international terrorism). Would it be a hate crime if X decided to rob only elderly Asian women because he be- lieved they were likely to resist less than other elderly women? If the definition of prejudice is broad enough, practically everyone could be called prejudiced, or to put the matter differently, practically everyone could be said to hold some prejudiced beliefs and opinions. If so, then every crime in which the perpetrator and victim are members of differ- ent groups could potentially be labeled a hate crime. B. Causality For criminal conduct to constitute a hate crime it must be motivated by prejudice; that is, the criminal conduct must be causally related to the prejudice. How strong must that causal relationship be? Must the criminal conduct have been wholly, primarily, or slightly motivated by the disfavored prejudice? The answer determines how much hate crime there is. If a hate crime must have been wholly motivated by prej- udice, there will be only a very small number of hate crimes-those 2 "Americans share a common historical and cultural heritage in which racism played and still plays a dominant role. Because of this shared experience, we also inevitably share many attitudes and beliefs that attach significance to an individual's race and in- duce negative feelings and opinions about non-whites. To the extent that this cultural belief system has influenced all of us, we are all racists. At the same time, most of us are unaware of our racism.... In other words, a large part of the behavior that produces racial discrimination is influenced by unconscious racial motivation" (Lawrence 1987, p. 322). 4 Hate Crimes 5 perpetrated by individuals whose prejudice amounts to an ideology or perhaps an obsession. By contrast, if a hate crime must have been only in part motivated by prejudice, a significant percentage (possibly nearly all) of intergroup crimes is potentially classifiable as hate crime. What percentage of robberies by black perpetrators against white victims might be classified as hate crime if the key question is whether the robbery or choice of robbery victim was in part attributable to anti- white prejudice? What percentage of violence by males against females ought to be investigated as possible hate crime if the critical question is whether the perpetrator was in part motivated by prejudice against women? II. Types of Hate Crime Laws As of spring 1996, the federal government, thirty-six states, and the District of Columbia have passed hate crime laws that fall into three categories: substantive crimes, sentence enhancements, and reporting statutes. (We exclude antimask and religious vandalism statutes.) A. Substantive Hate Crimes The majority of substantive hate crime statutes are based on the Anti- Defamation League's (ADL) Model Hate Crime Law, which estab- lishes a separate "intimidation" offense: A person commits the crime of intimidation, if, by reason of actual or perceived race, color, religion, national origin or sexual orientation of another individual or group of individuals, he violates Section of the Penal code (insert code provision for criminal trespass, criminal mischief, harassment, menacing, assault and/or other appropriate statutorily proscribed criminal conduct). Intimidation is a misdemeanor/felony (the degree of the criminal liability should be at least one degree more serious than that imposed for commission of the offense). (Anti- Defamation League 1992, p. 4) "Intimidation" is the only prosecutable hate crime under the ADL model law. Thus, in the "ADL states," hate crimes are low-level of- fenses, not the savage violence of organized terror groups but the shoves, pushes, and insults that result from frictions between ordinary, albeit prejudiced people, in a multiethnic, multiracial, multireligious, sexually diverse, and gendered society. James B. Jacobs and Kimberly A. Potter States' hate crime laws differ, not only with respect to which preju- dices transform "ordinary" crime into hate crime, but according to which predicate crimes, when motivated by prejudice, qualify as hate crimes. In Pennsylvania and Vermont, for example, any offense is a hate crime if motivated by race, religion, national origin, and so forth (Pa. Cons. Stat. ? 2710[a]; Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13, ? 1455). Other states limit hate crimes to certain predicate offenses when motivated by a dis- favored prejudice. For example, in New Jersey only simple assault and harassment, when motivated by prejudice, are classified as hate crimes (NJ. Stat. Ann. ? 2C:12-1). Illinois designates nine predicate offenses: assault, battery, aggravated assault, misdemeanor theft, criminal tres- pass to residence, misdemeanor criminal damage to property, criminal trespass to vehicle, criminal trespass to real property, and mob action (Ill. Juris. Crim. Law & Proc. ? 61:02). Oregon provides that a person commits intimidation in the second degree, a misdemeanor, when the offender tampers or interferes with property or subjects an individual to alarm by threatening harm to the individual or his or her property or to a member of the individual's family by reason of race, color, religion, national origin, or sexual ori- entation. Where the offender causes physical injury to an individual or his or her property or places an individual in fear of imminent serious physical injury by reason of these characteristics, intimidation becomes a felony (Ore. Rev. Stat. Ann. ? 166.155[1][c]). Most hate crime laws (and sentencing enhancement provisions) do not employ the word "motivation." Instead, they speak of a person who commits an offense "because of' or "by reason of' one of the disfavored prejudices. The Washington, D.C., and Florida laws require that the offense "demonstrate prejudice" (D.C. Code Ann. ? 22-4001; Fla. Stat. Ann. ? 775.085[1]). Some jurisdictions make it an offense (or an aggravating sentencing factor) for a perpetrator to select a victim by reason of race, religion, and so forth (Ore. Rev. Stat. Ann. ? 166.155 [1][c]; Cal. Penal Code ?? 422.6, 422.7), or to "intentionally select" the victim based on race (Wisc. Stat. Ann. ? 939.645[1][b]). Read liter- ally, this type of statute does not even require a showing of prejudice. Consider a defendant who selected his victim, say, an Asian man, be- cause someone who had just seen the defendant's car broken into told him that the thief was an Asian man, so the defendant attacked the only Asian person in sight. The defendant, although not necessarily prejudiced against Asians, would be guilty of a hate crime because he selected the victim "by reason of' race. If the statute is not meant to 6 Hate Crimes 7 cover this situation (which seems likely), then it is no different than a statute that explicitly requires a bias motivation. Professor Lu-in Wang, author of the only legal treatise on hate crime, explains that state courts have uniformly interpreted hate crime statutes to require proof of a prejudiced motive (Wang 1995, chap. 10, pp. 16, 34-35). B. Hate Crime Sentence Enhancement A second genre of hate crime law is comprised of statutes that pro- vide sentence enhancements for prejudice-motivated crimes (Wang 1995, chap. 10, p. 22). These statutes either upgrade an existing offense (e.g., Fla. Stat. Ann. ? 775.085[1]; Wang 1995, chap. 10, p. 11) or in- crease the maximum penalty for offenses motivated by prejudice (Wang 1995, chap. 10, p. 11; NJ. Stat. Ann. ?? 2C:43-7, 2C:44-3). The enhancement may apply to all or just to some predicate crimes. Under the Pennsylvania statute, for example, the bias offender is charged with a crime one degree higher than the predicate offense (Pa. Cons. Stat. ? 2710[a]). Vermont's statute doubles the maximum prison term for bias-motivated crimes; if the maximum term is five years or more, the defendant's bias motivation becomes a factor for consider- ation by the judge at sentencing (Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13, ? 1455). In Minnesota, the only bias-motivated crimes subject to enhanced pun- ishment are harassment and stalking (Minn. Stat. Ann. ? 609.749). In contrast, Nevada makes twenty crimes subject to enhanced sentences (Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann ? 207.185). Florida subjects any bias-motivated felony or misdemeanor to enhanced punishment (Fla. Stat. Ann. 775.085[1]). State laws vary with respect to the magnitude of the enhancement for bias motivation. The aggravated battery statute before the Supreme Court in Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. 2194 (1993), provided for a two-year maximum prison term, but if the perpetrator was motivated by one of the enumerated prejudices, the maximum punishment soared to seven years. The federal Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 (Pub. L. No. 102-322) mandated a revision of the U.S. sentenc- ing guidelines to provide an enhancement for hate crimes of three of- fense levels above the base level for the underlying offense. The guide- line provides: "If the finder of fact at trial or, in the case of a guilty plea,... the court at sentencing determines beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant intentionally selected any victim or any property as the object of the offense because of the actual or perceived race, color, James B. Jacobs and Kimberly A. Potter religion, national origin, ethnicity, gender [not applicable for sex crimes], disability, or sexual orientation of any person, an additional 3- level enhancement from [the base level offense] will apply" (60 Fed. Reg., May 10, 1995, p. 25,082; emphasis added). In the case of aggravated assault, for example, the ordinary base level offense of 15 is elevated to 18 and the sentencing range is consequently elevated from eighteen- twenty-four months to twenty-seven-thirty-three months imprison- ment. C. Hate Crime Reporting Statutes Many states, as well as the federal government, have enacted hate crime data collection and reporting statutes to generate statistics on the incidence of hate crime (Wang 1995, app. B). Ultimately, these re- porting statutes may have more importance than the substantive laws and sentence enhancement statutes. The old sociological adage "what's counted, counts" suggests that the hate crime reporting statutes will reshape the way that Americans think about crime. The federal Hate Crime Statistics Act of 1990 (HCSA), 28 U.S.C. ? 534 (Supp. IV 1992), mandates the collection of nationwide hate crime data in order to help communities, legislatures, and law enforce- ment personnel appropriately respond to the problem by gathering in- formation on the frequency, location, extent, and patterns of hate crime; increase law enforcement's awareness of and sensitivity to hate crimes in order to improve its response; raise public awareness of the existence of hate crimes; and send a message that the federal govern- ment is concerned about hate crime (U.S. Senate 1989, p. 3). The Act directs the U.S. Department of Justice to collect and report data on hate crimes involving the predicate offenses of murder, non- negligent manslaughter, forcible rape,3 aggravated assault, simple as- sault, intimidation, arson, and destruction, damage, or vandalism of property (28 U.S.C. ? 534 [Supp. IV 1992]). The attorney general, given discretion by the Act to add to or delete from the list of predicate crimes, added robbery, burglary, and motor vehicle theft (Federal Bu- reau of Investigation 1990, p. 4). The HCSA defines a hate crime as "a criminal offense committed against a person or property, which is motivated, in whole or in part, by the offender's bias against a race, religion, ethnic/national origin group, or sexual orientation group." The FBI guidelines implementing 3 The hate crime sentencing guideline is explicitly inapplicable to sex crimes. 8 Hate Crimes 9 the act define "bias" as "a preformed negative opinion or attitude toward a group of persons based on their race, religion, ethnicity/national origin, or sexual orientation" (emphasis added). According to this broad definition, most interracial and other intergroup crimes could be classified as (or certainly be investigated as possible) hate crimes. The guidelines, although quite thorough, leave much ambiguity. For example, what is meant by "ethnic group or national origin"? Are "Hispanics" or "Latinos" counted as one group for purposes of the HCSA? Would an assault by a Cuban against a Colombian count as a hate crime if the assailant was motivated by a belief that Colombians are importing drugs into the community? Are "Asians" (e.g., Syrians, Indians, Vietnamese, Filipinos, Chinese, and Japanese) an ethnic group? Could conflicts between Chinese-Americans and Vietnamese- Americans or between Palestinians and Kuwaitis qualify as hate crimes? III. Hate Speech, Hate Crime, and the First Amendment Defining hate crimes and punishing hate criminals is akin to, but dis- tinct from, the move to criminalize hate speech (Walker 1994; Schweitzer 1995). The anti-hate speech movement asserts that certain kinds of racist, sexist, anti-Semitic, misogynistic, and homophobic ex- pressions and epithets impose emotional damage on persons to whom they are addressed and to other members of the groups to which these persons belong. Therefore, proponents of hate speech restrictions urge that such expressions and epithets be prohibited and that those who utter them be punished (Matsuda 1989; Lawrence 1990). However, hate speech laws have not fared well in the courts, which have declared them unconstitutional on First Amendment grounds (Doe v. University of Michigan, 721 F. Supp. 852 [1989] [declaring unconstitutional cam- pus hate speech code]; UWM Post v. Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin, 774 F. Supp. 1163 [1991] [declaring unconstitutional cam- pus hate speech code]). There is a lively debate among constitutional lawyers and civil liber- tarians over whether hate crime laws, like hate speech laws, should flunk a First Amendment test (Fleischauer 1990; Gellman 1991, 1992/93; Redish 1992; Gaumer 1994). Those who believe hate crime laws to be constitutional emphasize the familiar speech/conduct distinction in First Amendment law; people are entitled to speak their minds but not to impose physical harm on others in acting out their opinions (Crocker 1992/93, pp. 495-500). They argue that while an individual 10 James B. Jacobs and Kimberly A. Potter has a right to his bigoted thoughts, he has no right to act on them. According to this view, hate crime laws punish antisocial conduct just as Title VII provides a remedy against employment discrimination. Those who believe hate crime laws to be unconstitutional argue that generic criminal law already punishes injurious conduct and that re- criminalization or sentence enhancement for the same offense when it is motivated by prejudice amounts to extra punishment for values, thoughts, and opinions which the government deems abhorrent (Free- man 1992/93; Gellman 1992/93; Goldberger 1992/93). These critics ask: if the purpose of hate crimes is to punish more severely offenders who are motivated by disfavored prejudices, is that not equivalent to punishment for "improper thinking?" For example, suppose there are two defendants: A is a white supremacist who only robs black men; B is a communist who only robs rich people. Under the typical hate crime statute, B would be convicted of robbery, while A would be con- victed of a hate crime or be subject to a sentence enhancement. A few scholars have sought to distinguish between different formula- tions of hate crime offenses (Crocker 1992/93, pp. 495-500; Freeman 1992/93, pp. 582-83). They argue that a hate crime statute that does not use the word "motivation," but that prohibits selection of a victim because of or by reason of the victim's race, religion, or sexual orientation and so forth, has nothing to do with punishing ideas or speech, but punishes conduct. While there may be something to this subtle analyt- ical distinction, most commentators and courts have treated such stat- utes as requiring proof of prejudiced motivation. The U.S. Supreme Court so far has struck down one hate crime stat- ute and approved one. In R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992), the Supreme Court was faced with a constitutional challenge to a local ordinance which provided that "whoever places on public or private property a symbol, object, appellation, characterization or graf- fiti, including, but not limited to, a burning cross or Nazi swastika, which one knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, reli- gion or gender commits disorderly conduct and shall be guilty of a misdemeanor" (112 S. Ct. at 2541). R.A.V., a white juvenile, was con- victed under the ordinance for burning a cross on a black family's lawn. The justices unanimously agreed that the ordinance violated the First Amendment, but there were at least two different rationales.4 Justice 4 The majority opinion was joined by Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, and Chief Justice Rehnquist. Justices Blackmun and Stevens filed concurring opinions, in Hate Crimes 11 Scalia's majority opinion pointed out that while the government could criminalize constitutionally unprotected "fighting words" (the ordi- nance applied only to fighting words), it could not criminalize only those fighting words of which the government disapproved. Thus, "the reason why fighting words are categorically excluded from the protec- tion of the First Amendment is not that their content communicates any particular idea, but that their content embodies a particularly in- tolerable . . . mode of expressing whatever idea the speaker wishes to convey. St. Paul has not singled out an especially offensive mode of expression.... Rather, it has proscribed fighting words of whatever manner that communicate messages of racial, gender or religious intol- erance. Selectivity of this sort creates the possibility that the city is seeking to handicap the expression of particular ideas" (112 S. Ct. at 2549). Justice White's concurrence stated that the ordinance could have been struck down simply by holding "that the St. Paul ordinance is fatally overbroad because it criminalizes not only unprotected expres- sion but expression protected by the First Amendment" (i.e., both fighting and nonfighting words [Justice White concurring at 2550]). Therefore, according to Justice White, the majority need not have ad- dressed whether the ordinance affected content-based discrimination. In another concurring opinion, Justice Stevens stated that the ordi- nance did not, as the majority asserted, regulate … Read more Applied Sciences Architecture and Design Biology Business & Finance Chemistry Computer Science Geography Geology Education Engineering English Environmental science Spanish Government History Human Resource Management Information Systems Law Literature Mathematics Nursing Physics Political Science Psychology Reading Science Social Science Home Blog Archive Essay Reviews Contact Copyright © 2019 HomeworkMarket.com .cls-1{fill:none;stroke:#001847;stroke-linecap:square;stroke-miterlimit:10;stroke-width:2px} .cls-1{fill:#dee7ff}.cls-2{fill:#ff7734}.cls-3{fill:#f5a623;stroke:#000} 
work_enbroo6djjfdhgm4bre6tmmwqe	----	Social Policy & Society (2017) 16:4, 607–611 C© Cambridge University Press 2017 doi:10.1017/S1474746417000276 Introduction Migration and Differential Labour Market Participation G i n a N e t t o ∗ a n d G a r y C r a i g ∗∗ ∗The Urban Institute, Heriot Watt University E-mail: G.Netto@hw.ac.uk ∗∗Wilberforce Institute for the study of Slavery and Emancipation, University of Hull E-mail: G.Craig@hull.ac.uk Recent major political developments, including Brexit and the US presidential elections, have been strongly associated with public concerns around levels of immigration. Much of this has centred on the role of migrants in the low-skilled sectors of the economy and concerns that they have displaced members of local communities from jobs and depressed wage levels. This is despite compelling evidence that immigrants rarely take jobs from native workers in OECD countries (Constant, 2014) and that in the long run, the wage and employment effects of immigration in the 1990s and in the 2000s were small and always positive for less educated workers of all OECD countries (Docquier et al., 2014). Recent UK specific studies have found that the impact on wages is considered to be relatively small (Dustmann et al., 2013; Nickell and Salaheen, 2015). Notwithstanding this evidence, hostility to migrants and migration more generally has become increasingly overt, as reflected in a substantial rise in ‘race’ hate crimes before and following the referendum on the UK’s membership of the EU in 2016 (Burnett, 2017). At the time of writing, the government in the UK is negotiating the terms under which the country will leave the European Union, following the triggering of Article 50 of the 2008 Lisbon Treaty. This important juncture makes study of the participation of migrants in the labour market particularly timely, although the upheaval arising from the UK’s withdrawal from the EU in 2019 will probably leave many questions unanswered about its impact for many years beyond this time. Understanding the wide range of societal, institutional and individual factors which contribute to the role that migrants play in the labour market will advance current policy and theoretical debates relating to this area. The aim of this themed section is to review the theoretical directions and recurrent themes in the literature, consider the implications of BREXIT and identify areas for future research as well as present key new studies relating to the highly differentiated levels of participation of migrants within the labour market. In so doing, we seek to contribute to theory-building, more informed, nuanced and balanced policy debates and to help shape future research agendas in this area.1 While migrants can be found in the highly skilled sectors of the economy as well as low-skilled jobs, the focus in this themed section is on the latter for four main reasons. First, migrants have historically been associated with this sector of the economy in many international contexts, and for a very long period of time. Secondly, it is this aspect of migration which has recently raised heightened political and public concern in both the UK and the US, and is most likely to be the focus of continuing public debate 607 https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1474746417000276 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:27, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://doi.org/10.1017/S1474746417000276 mailto:G.Netto@hw.ac.uk mailto:G.Craig@hull.ac.uk https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/S1474746417000276 https://www.cambridge.org/core Gina Netto and Gary Craig and immigration policy.2 Thirdly, and relatedly, there is a strong association between low- skilled work and in-work poverty, and while there are formidable barriers to progression to better paid work for all workers, these are especially challenging for ethnic minorities and recent migrants (Netto et al., 2015). Finally, but not least, individuals who are working in the low-skilled sectors of the economy are more likely to be vulnerable to poor treatment, exploitation and forced labour. The issue of labour market exploitation is discussed in two of the contributions to this themed section, reflecting a growing body of literature addressing issues of modern slavery.3 The articles in this themed section are all geographically contextualised within countries in Western Europe as destination sites for migrants from within and outwith the EU. Many of the issues raised in the articles relate not only to the expansion of the EU since 2004 and the free movement of people from Accession countries, but also to longstanding trends which have been shaped by economically and politically driven immigration policies of Western European nation states, as well as humanitarian obligations to those fleeing from war and political conflict. The history of migration to European countries has been shaped by a number of factors, not least their colonial pasts, but there is a more or less common set of issues which has emerged in each of them, of which issues related to integration – especially within the labour market – feature prominently (Craig, 2015). Our review of the literature reflects the need to advance inter-disciplinary approaches in theorising migrant participation in the labour market and the value of a historical perspective in examining continuities and discontinuities relating to migrant employment. It also considers some of the implications of Brexit for migrant workers in the UK. Five of the articles in the themed section (those by Heather Rolfe; Tomasso Frattini; Fitzgerald and Smoczyński; Louise Waite; and Flynn’s review of resources) are based within the UK; one (by Mullers, Becker and Roos) is focused on the Netherlands and one (by Karen Christensen) adopts a comparative perspective, using the UK and Norway as national case studies of the significantly different welfare regimes for migrant integration. Collectively, the articles contained in this themed section reveal the highly differen- tiated levels of migrant integration within the labour market. At a fundamental level, they call attention to the need to acknowledge the sharply different factors which have con- tributed to forced and economic migration, and the impact of legal status (undocumented migrant, asylum-seeker, refugee, EU migrant, non-EU migrant or third country national) on attachment to the labour market and entitlement to social protection. In doing so, they highlight the need to link enquiry into migratory patterns with an understanding of factors which contribute to the treatment of migrant workers within workplaces and local commu- nities. They also indicate the need for understanding local variation in their participation in the labour market, including demographic factors, levels of regulation, social protection, labour shortages, employer expectations and perceptions of migrants, the (under-) utilisation of the skills, knowledge and experience that migrants bring with them and the aspirations of migrants themselves. Responses to the challenge of integration in the labour market in all European jurisdictions have been very uneven (see for example Craig, 2015). There are sound economic rationales for identifying the sectors in which migrants work and their contribution to the labour market since they constitute an important component of labour and skills supply. Rolfe’s article evidences the growth of key sectors of the UK economy which are linked to migrant presence, explores why employers hire migrant workers and indicates what future immigration policy might look like. Frattini 608 https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1474746417000276 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:27, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/S1474746417000276 https://www.cambridge.org/core Migration and Differential Labour Market Participation examines migrant integration within the labour market, comparing their employment probability, occupational distribution and sectors of occupations relative to those of UK- born natives. His analysis of Labour Force Survey data indicates that new migrants have performed relatively well, obtaining work soon after their arrival, partly as a result of their relative youth and high educational levels. Fitzgerald and Smoczyński’s article points to the wider issues relating to the employment of Central and Eastern European migrants in the North of England since 2005, an area which had little history of accommodating migrants. By exploring the perspectives of government, employers and trade unions, they argue that a major attitudinal shift towards these individuals was discernible following the 2008 financial crisis and cuts to local authority funding despite wide-ranging evidence, including from studies funded by government itself, attesting to their value to the UK labour market. The perspectives of migrants themselves are explored in Christensen’s comparative study of care workers in Norway and the UK, reflecting how migratory patterns contribute to changing gender roles within two countries with significantly different welfare regimes. The life course perspective which she employs in her study is compatible with efforts in some national contexts to recognise the skills, knowledge and competencies that migrants bring with them. This is exemplified in Muller, Becker and Roos’s study of the effectiveness of the infrastructure for recognition of educational and professional qualifications of non- EU nationals, commonly referred to as third country nationals (TCNs), in the health care sector in the Netherlands. Their study reveals that although the country has a relatively well-developed infrastructure for the recognition of such qualifications, TCNs often find that their qualifications are not considered equivalent to relevant Dutch qualifications, a pattern again common in most European states. Further, processes relating to the accreditation and recognition of prior learning are flawed, limiting efforts to address serious labour shortages in the country and the contribution that these individuals could make to the health care sector. In contrast to Muller et al.’s study of issues arising from a highly regulated sector within the Netherlands, Waite’s study focuses on the very difficult conditions of employment in unregulated sectors of the economy, where undocumented migrants and asylum- seekers are forced illegally to find work. Waite argues that these individuals form a ‘hyper-exploitable’ pool of unprotected workers due to the nature of their circumstances, which largely constitutes for-cash labouring in low-paid labour market sectors, and their situation is likely to continue to worsen within the context of an increasing hardening of attitudes towards some categories of migrants. Following this article, Flynn’s contribution of key networks and sources of information and support relating to the employment of migrant workers represents a valuable resource for academics and activists alike. In addition to discussing empirical and highly policy-relevant issues relating to migration and the labour market, the articles make rich contributions to theory building. Rolfe’s article finds little evidence in support of the concepts of ‘ethnic hiring’ or ‘ethnic queues’ (Scott, 2013; McCollum and Findlay, 2015), which suggest that groups are ordered ethnically according to employers’ preferences based on factors such as ‘work ethic’. Instead, the study reveals that it is migrant flexibility to respond to labour market demands and to either increases or decreases in their hours of work that gives them an edge over British workers and makes them seemingly indispensable to employers. The articles of Frattini and that of Christensen enrich understanding of the phenomenon of ‘occupational downgrading’ among migrants where individuals take on jobs for which they are 609 https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1474746417000276 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:27, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/S1474746417000276 https://www.cambridge.org/core Gina Netto and Gary Craig over-qualified. The former reveals that downgrading is higher for more recent arrival cohorts, who are more likely to be working in unskilled occupations despite their higher levels of education, reinforcing the importance of understanding the influence of externalities that impact on migrant employment over time. The latter reveals the complex interaction between country-specific factors, including the role of the state in shifting responsibility on to private households in the care sector and the intersectionality of migrant identity and gender on changing orientations to work. Muller and colleagues’ study of the infrastructure, which has been established in the Netherlands to recognise the skills, knowledge and competencies that third country nationals have acquired in their country of origin, reveals the tensions noted by Zanfrini (2015) between immigration policies, which are driven by the need to meet labour shortages and ensure political viability, and human rights-based motivations to promote solidarity and equal opportunities. The study reveals insights relating to the ‘normal’ functioning of institutions, which tend unintentionally to produce discriminatory processes and reproduce existing patterns of inequality within the labour market, despite the existence of inclusionary policies. The role of the state in marginalising some groups of migrants is also clearly illlustrated in Waite’s study which establishes the concept of ‘hyper-precarity’ to refer to the extremely difficult position of asylum-seekers who have been refused the right to work through increasingly restrictive immigration legislation. When we planned this themed collection of articles, before the outcome of the EU Referendum in June 2016, our hope was that it would help to dispel some of the myths which circulated before and during the Referendum about the drain that migrants placed on the UK economy (and that of other EU countries). Quite the reverse seems to be substantially the case. There are some very serious questions to be answered about the contribution to and impact of migration on national labour markets. Figures recently released by the UK-based Office for National Statistics in 2016 revealed that 11 per cent of the workforce was made up of non-UK nationals. Migrants are currently heavily represented not only in the hospitality, retail and restaurant sectors, but also in key public services, including public administration, education and the health service – often in roles for which they are over-qualified. It is far from clear how their current contribution to the labour market will either be substituted or complemented. Further, issues relating to migrant employment raise other serious concerns, which extend beyond their contribution to the economy, as we will argue in the review following this introduction. At the time of writing, the need for public policy and debate to be underpinned by a more informed understanding of the relationships between migration and labour markets – as communicated through the kind of dispassionate and evidence-based analysis provided by this collection of articles – seems ever-more important. N o t e s 1 Ironically, of course, one impact of the UK withdrawal is that researchers in the UK may have to think of more creative ways to work collaboratively with mainland European colleagues because funding streams may no longer be open to them. 2 See, for instance, Balch (2017), Craig (2015), Dwyer et al. (2011) and Waite et al. (2015). 3 See, for example, Skrivankova (2010) and Waite et al. (2015). 610 https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1474746417000276 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:27, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/S1474746417000276 https://www.cambridge.org/core Migration and Differential Labour Market Participation R e f e r e n c e s Balch, A. R. (2017) Immigration and the State, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Burnett, J. (2017) ‘Racial violence and the Brexit state’, Race and Class, 58, 4, 85–97. Constant, A. (2014) Do Migrants Take the Jobs of Native Workers? IZA World of Labour, https://wol.iza.org/uploads/articles/10/pdfs/do-migrants-take-the-jobs-of-native-workers.pdf?v=1 [accessed 09.05.2017]. Craig, G. (2015) Migration and Integration: A Local and Experiential Perspective, Working Paper 7–2015, Birmingham: IRIS, University of Birmingham. Docquier, F., Çağlar, O. and Peri, G. (2014) ‘The labour market effects of immigration and emigration in OECD countries’, Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, 124, 579, 1106–45. Dustmann, C., Frattini, T. and Preston, I. P. (2013) ‘The effect of immigration along the distribution of wages’, Review of Economic Studies, 80, 1, 145–73. Dwyer, P., Lewis, H., Scullion, L. and Waite, L. (2011) Forced Labour and Immigration Policy: Status Matters?, York: Joseph Rowntree Foundation. McCollum, D. and Findlay, A. (2015) ‘“Flexible” workers for “flexible” jobs? The labour market function of A8 migrant labour in the UK’, Work Employment and Society, 29, 3, 427–43. Netto, G., Hudson, M., Noon, M., de Lima, P. and Kamenou-Aigbekaen, N. (2015) ‘Migration, ethnicity and progression from low-paid work: implications for skills policy’, Social Policy and Society, 14, 4, 509–22. Nickell, S. and Salaheen, J. (2015) ‘The impact of immigration on occupational wages: evidence from Britain’, Staff Working Paper No. 574, Bank of England, London. Scott, S. (2013) ‘Migrant–local hiring queues in the UK Food industry’, Population, Space and Place, 19, 5, 459–71. Skrivankova, K. (2010) Between Decent Work and Forced Labour: Examining the Continuum of Exploitation, York: Joseph Rowntree Foundation. Waite, L., Craig, G., Lewis, H. and Skrivankova, K. (eds.) (2015) Vulnerability, Exploitation and Migrants, Basingstoke: Palgrave. Zanfrini, L. (2015) The Diversity Value – How to Reinvent the European Approach to Immigration, Maidenhead, UK: McGraw-Hill Education. 611 https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1474746417000276 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:27, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://wol.iza.org/uploads/articles/10/pdfs/do-migrants-take-the-jobs-of-native-workers.pdf?v=1 https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/S1474746417000276 https://www.cambridge.org/core Notes References 
work_enih75hzrfc3lb67fntxreh2ee	----	60 Paddy Farr Independent Researcher ORCID: 0000-0002-9059-9381 DOI 10.24917/20838972.16.4 Power and Control: Radical Feminism, State Cooptation and Intersectional Queer Theory in Domestic Violence Praxis Introduction Although the Trump administration’s Justice Department revised the definition in April of 2018, until that point, the Office of Violence against Women states that domestic violence is “a pattern of abusive behavior in any relationship that is used by one partner to gain or maintain power and control over another intimate partner” that “can be physical, sexu- al, emotional, economic, or psychological actions or threats of actions that influence another person” and “includes any behaviors that intimi- date, manipulate, humiliate, isolate, frighten, terrorize, coerce, threaten, blame, hurt, injure, or wound someone1.” These basic building blocks of anti-violence activism are uncontroversial implemented on an inter- national level as the dominant conceptualization of domestic violence. Every person who undergoes training in domestic violence learns to identify these dynamics extracted from the definition of domestic vio- lence. Every domestic violence advocate across the US and around the world undergoes training to identify these aspects of abuse when work- ing with survivors. Every presentation provided by a domestic violence agency begins with these basics. And, every effort to curb domestic vio- lence must first be measured against these concepts. However, in April of 2018, the Trump administration’s Justice De- partment erased this definition to replace it with a statutory definition.2 The reason seems to be that these concepts are not politically neutral. The conceptualizations of domestic violence have come to fruition only as a culmination point of a political movement against violence which took shape through the theory and practice of feminism. By way of po- 1 Domestic Violence. Office of Violence Against Women, n.d. Retrieved 5-13-2015 from: http://www.justice.gov/ovw/domestic-violence 2 Domestic Violence. Office of Violence Against Women. n.d. Retrieved 10-8-2019 from: http://www.justice.gov/ovw/domestic-violence 61 Denial of Consent: The Modern Heir of Sexual Violence within Slavery litical struggle, feminism developed the analysis of domestic violence as the concepts of power and control, and consent and coercion, thereby shaping the understanding of violence across the political spectrum. For this fact, in order to understand the formations of domestic violence and the Trump administration’s Justice Department revision, a review of how feminisms have developed the theories of description and practices of advocacy establishes a base line for comprehension. And yet, the strange conclusion drawn from such a review, as shall be demonstrated below, is that the radical feminist theory and praxis which developed the dia- lectical theory of domestic violence is also to blame for the ironic twist toward the revision. This paper charts a genealogy of the theory of do- mestic violence through the founding theoretical developments within radical feminism and the criminal justice system. The radical feminist theory and praxis associated with domestic violence leads to three key problems including 1) a public policy praxis leading to the strengthening of carceral systems, 2) a universalization of womanhood leading to an im- plicit racism, and 3) a binary dialectic leading to an explicit heterosexism. The paper begins with a discussion of the radical feminist dialectic developed through Marxist dialectical materialism. At this point, the three moments of dialectical materialism – i.e. oppositionary duality, quantitative and qualitative change, and the negation of negativity—are revised from Marxist theory to become the moments of radical feminist critique. Following the discussion of dialectic, the paper moves on to dis- cuss the revision of the Marxist universal class, the proletariat, to wom- an. Here, the feminist dictum of “the personal is political”3 becomes the key concept within feminist praxis leading to both a revolutionary epis- temology and the abolition of the division between the private and pub- lic spheres. And yet, as the paper progresses, radical feminist praxis has the ironic conclusion of expanding criminal justice responses against the oppressed. It is here that the revisionism of the Trump administration’s Justice Department becomes clear. Finally, the paper discusses criticisms posed by women of color feminism and queer theory of radical feminist formulations. This final section discusses potentials for reformulating the radical feminist theory and praxis away from simple gender binaries toward power and control within heteropatriarchy and white supremacy. Where political movement intersects within interpersonal relationships, the feminist dictum, “the personal is political,”4 becomes realized as the demolition of the boundary between the public and the private spheres. 3 Carol Hanisch, “The Personal is Political,” in Notes from the Second Year: Wom- en’s Liberation, ed. Shulamith Firestone and Anne Koedt (New York: Self Published by Shulamith Firestone and Anne Koedt, 1969), 76–77. 4 Ibid., 76-77. 62 Paddy Farr Violence and Dialectic The rise of the anti-rape movement in the 1960s and the subsequent rise of the battered women’s movement in the 1970s were inseparable from the broader radical feminist movement.5 During this period, feminist cri- tique developed a dialectical analysis of patriarchy as the source of wom- en’s oppression. Writers such as Kate Millet,6 Shulamith Firestone,7 An- drea Dworkin8 and Catharine MacKinnon9 argued that gender equality within neither liberal political nor radical socialist ideologies was a pos- sible goal, for in both of these ideologies, the function of production and the distribution of power relies on the subjugation of women. Accord- ingly, patriarchy conditions men and women to correlate gender roles to sex thereby grounding gender inequality and male power in biologi- cal essentialist terms. The fundamental contradiction confronting social inequality is located in this power struggle between men and women. As such, without a fundamental change within the social construct of gender, there could never be a fundamental change in the subjugation of women. As a dialectical theory, the two chief theorists within radical feminism are Shulamith Firestone and Catherine MacKinnon. First, Shulamith Firestone developed from Marxist theory of class based conflict a dialectical theory of radical feminist analysis in her book, “the Dialectic of Sex.”10 According to Firestone, the kernel of dialectical materialism taken from Marxism rests on the conflict between two op- posing powers, the oppressors and the oppressed. For Marxism, this was characterized by the struggle between the bourgeoisie and the proletar- iat as a class based conflict against the capitalist mode of production. Yet, across social modes of production, whether it is socialist or capital- ist, women are subordinate to men. For radical feminists, the dialectic of bourgeoisie and proletariat becomes the dialectic between men and women within a patriarchal society. Thus, the abolition of oppression 5 Susan Schechter, Women and male violence: The visions and struggles of the bat- tered women’s movement (South End Press, 1982), 29–52; Amy Lehrner, Nicole E. Allen, “Still a movement after all these years? Current tensions in the domestic violence move- ment”, Violence Against Women, Vol. 15, No. 6, (Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publishing), 2009, 656–677. 6 Kate Millett, Sexual Politics. (Urbana, Il: University of Illinois Press) 1969, 2000. 7 Shulamith Firestone, The Dialectic of Sex: The Case for Feminist Revolution. (New York, NY: Bantam Books), 1971. 8 Andrea Dworkin, Woman Hating. (New York, NY: Penguin Books), 1974. 9 Catharine MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press), 1989; Catharine MacKinnon, “Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State,” Signs Vol. 7, No. 3. (Chicago, Il: University of Chicago Press), 1982, 515– 544. 10 Firestone, The Dialectic of Sex. 63 Denial of Consent: The Modern Heir of Sexual Violence within Slavery within society depends on the abolition of sex based oppressions over class. Firestone explains, “We have not thrown out the insights of the socialists; on the contrary, radical feminism can enlarge their analysis granting it an even deeper basis in objective social conditions and there- by expanding many of its insoluble.”11 Second, Catharine MacKinnon fur- ther elaborates the dialectical theory in her article “Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State”12 and her book “Toward a Feminist Theory of the State.”13 Mackinnon seconds Firestone by grounding feminism within di- alectical thought revised from Marxist theory.14 According to Mackinnon, there is a central methodological departure which feminism makes from Marxism that cannot be explained through the Marxist dialectic of class struggle thereby fulfilling the role left out by Marxists to account for the subjugation of women as a substantive form of oppression.15 The meth- odology of Marxism focusses on the economic structure of class society that in its vulgar form claims inequalities of gender, race and nationality are merely epiphenomena constructed by bourgeois ideology, and that these epiphenomena would disappear along with class after the commu- nist revolution.16 Accordingly, the central feature of the radical feminism rests on a conceptualization of women’s oppression based in a dialectical struggle appropriated from Marxist dialectical materialism. Within the theory of Marxist dialectical materialism there are three moments: 1) a duality of opposition in which conflict is fundamental to change, 2) qualitative change occurs as a result of quantitative change, and 3) through the negation of negativity – i.e. the destruction of the cause of suffering – a positivity is created in the world.17 Each of these moments draws a line to class struggle. Firstly, there is a dual oppo- sition between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie which defines class struggle as conflict based. Second, through quantitative change of dis- tribution and production, Marxist theory dictates that the quality of so- ciety changes. Finally, through negation as a revolution of the negativity encoded within capitalist society, a new world is born as a positive. As the sublation of the contradiction within the oppositional duality, this final moment occurs through social revolution thereby eliminating the negativity within capitalism in order to bring about the end of suffering. 11 Ibid., 12. 12 Mackinnon, “Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State,” 515–544. 13 Mackinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State, 3–80. 14 Ibid.,13–35; Mackinnon, “Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State,” 515–544. 15 Mackinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State, 4. 16 Ibid., 6. 17 David Macey, The Critical Theory Dictionary (London, UK: Penguin Books, 2000); Friedrich Engels, Dialectics of Nature, trans. by Clements Dutt (New York, NY: Interna- tional Publishers, 1925). 64 Paddy Farr MacKinnon and Firestone expound the feminist dialectic as analogous to the Marxist dialectic thereby establishing a power struggle between the sexes resulting in the oppression of women. Hence, according to the dialectic, the struggle for women’s liberation may be conceptualized through a recreation of the three moments of Marxist dialectical materi- alism within the dialectical theory of radical feminism. In the first moment of an oppositional duality, radical feminism mate- rialized the dialectical movement between men and women as a struggle for power that reproduces the dialectic within Marxism to encapsulate the struggle between men and women. Firestone frames radical femi- nism as a power struggle explicitly stating that, “the goals of feminism can never be achieved through evolution, but only through revolution: power, however it has evolved, whatever its origins, will not be given up without a struggle.”18 Where the struggle between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat is described within Marxism as the fundamental conflict and oppositional duality, radical feminism contends that this position is contradictory. A Marxist revolution that focuses on the struggle between bourgeoisie and proletariat without confronting the issue of male power and women’s oppression results in the reestablishment of male pow- er and women’s oppression within the socialist society. Thus, the class struggle becomes the sex struggle as basis for the oppressors and the op- pressed. The struggle between men and women forms the basis for the continuing subjugation of women within a patriarchal society. In order to abolish oppression, the oppression of women must thus take center stage in the struggle against oppression. This moment is the centrally defining feature of radical feminism and the theory of domestic violence. According to the second moment, where dialectical materialism en- visions the fundamental change occurring at the quantitative level and resulting in qualitative change, the feminist dialectic views the change occurring in the opposite direction. Beginning with Firestone, radical feminism represents a conscious shift toward culture rather than social class. As a turning around of the orthodoxy, the quantitative change re- sulting from a revolutionary movement occurs through the qualitative change within culture. However, like Marxists, the change occurs only through revolution. Firestone explains that “the incorporation of the ne- glected half of human experience – the female experience – into the body of culture, to create an all-encompassing culture, is only the first step, a precondition; but the schism of reality itself must be overthrown before there can be a true cultural revolution.”19 The level of incorporation is the level of the quantitative through which the dialectical materialism envi- 18 Firestone, The Dialectic of Sex, 31. 19 Ibid., 169. 65 Denial of Consent: The Modern Heir of Sexual Violence within Slavery sions the location of fundamental change, for “just as the revolutionary goal of the sexual, racial, and economic revolutions is, rather than a mere leveling of imbalances of class, an elimination of class categories alto- gether, so the end result of a cultural revolution must be, not merely the integration of the two streams of culture, but the elimination of cultural categories altogether, the elimination of culture itself as we know it.”20 Counter to Marxist theory, the feminist revolution thus formulates the theory and praxis of revolution as resulting from the qualitative change within culture, and only through this change can a fundamental change within the quantitative conditions of oppression occur. The final moment of negation of negativity is formed within dialec- tical materialism as the revolutionary event in which the oppositional duality is abolished to establish a third. For Marxists, it is this moment that ushers in the foundations of the future communism through the structure of state socialism: the bourgeoisie is overturned by the prole- tariat thereby abolishing the class distinction of bourgeoisie and prole- tariat. Radical feminists transform this moment to become the feminist revolution against male power. It is here in the abolition of oppression that the feminist revolution locates the negation of the negativity con- tained within patriarchy. In this sense, as with the negation of negativity within dialectical materialism, the revolution brings about the end of undue suffering through a social transformation that ultimately leads to the abolition of oppression. For Marxists, “the end goal of socialist revo- lution was not only the elimination of the economic class privilege but of the economic class distinction itself.”21 For radical feminists, this means the abolition of gender. Firestone succinctly states that “the end goal of feminist revolution must be, unlike that of the first feminist movement, not just the elimination of male privilege but of the sex distinction itself: genital differences between human beings would no longer matter cul- turally.”22 The Personal is Political Extending from the critique of the Marxist dialectic, feminist theories of violence are constructed through experiences within feminist social movements against the oppression of women and this has resulted in the entire anti-violence movement coming to life as a feminist orientation toward the oppression of women. The liberal conception of the division between the private and the public spheres upheld these values and so- 20 Ibid., 176. 21 Ibid., 11. 22 Ibid. 66 Paddy Farr cial mores positing that the private life of the family is not within the scope of state control, and as MacKinnon asserts, “public [complaints] of inequality within the private contradicts the liberal definition of the private.”23 Within the dialectical theory elaborated above, this develop- ment represents a movement from the personal-political foundation of experience as expounded through radical feminist praxis. The dictum of 60s era feminism became “the personal is political,”24 and the battered women’s movement envisioned itself as a personal-po- litical social struggle wherein the direct experience of women with pa- triarchy followed a thread to social action. This fulfillment of building a political movement from personal experience becomes the universal enterprise of women’s liberation through the particular instantiations of women’s personal struggles. Thus, because domestic violence is defined by the experience of the survivor, the movements were envisioned as po- litical movements arising directly from the personal struggles and expe- riences of women in a patriarchal society.25 According to MacKinnon, this transformation of the dialectic becomes a feminist methodological turn that moves away from the object centered approach of Marxist dialecti- cal materialism towards the subjective consciousness of the oppressed.26 Where Marxism focuses on the objective conditions of the working class as a universal class, feminism allows the individual’s own interests to be accounted for through the practice of consciousness raising thereby realizing the personal as political.27 It is in just this way that the subject to object flow transforms Marxist methodologies to embrace the emanci- pation of women as the universal class, and therefore “feminism stands in relation to Marxism as Marxism does to classical political economy.”28 As eluded to in her discussion of consciousness raising, in the 1960s, activists within the anti-rape movement, the battered women’s move- ment and the broader feminist movement organized consciousness rais- ing groups as a personal-political mode of generating feminist critique through personal experiences. The practice of the group purposes itself to bring women together face to face in order to share the connection between their life experiences and the social struggle against patriarchal authority. In this way, the particular personal experiences with patriar- chal structures affirmed feminist theory by developing, from the par- 23 Mackinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State, 190. 24 Hanisch, “The Personal is Political,” 76–77. 25 Kimberly D. Bailey, “Lost in Translation: Domestic Violence, the Personal is Po- litical, and the Criminal Justice System,” Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology, 100(4). Chicago, Il: Northwestern University School of Law, 2010, 1255–1300. 26 MacKinnon, “Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State,” 28–29. 27 Ibid. 28 Ibid., 30 67 Denial of Consent: The Modern Heir of Sexual Violence within Slavery ticular struggles, the universal struggle of women against patriarchy, and thus, the group realizes the feminist dictum through the direct con- nection of politics with women’s personal lives. This becomes the core of feminist praxis: through the group, the theory and praxis of the feminist movement become one through an implicit enactment of the personal as political. For the battered women’s movement, consciousness raising groups act in part as a facilitation of recovery from violence and oppres- sion, but more importantly, as a mode of consciousness raising in which survivors of domestic violence would see their position within a larg- er political framework thereby developing and elaborating on feminist theory. The concept of power and control dynamics in the definition of domestic violence developed as a consequence of consciousness raising groups and survivor advocacy.29 As such, the theory of domestic violence arises in this way through radical feminist theorist-activists building a model from the personal-political experiences of women. First among anti-violence activists to formalize definitions, the Do- mestic Abuse Intervention Program in Duluth Minnesota created the dominant model of domestic violence theory and practice through a cen- tering of power and control as the goal of abuse and reestablishment of power and control in a survivor’s life as intervention.30 In the process of developing pedagogy for batter intervention programs and working within communities of domestic violence survivors, the Domestic Abuse Intervention Program began a study of tactics used by abusers by imple- menting feminist praxis as an epistemological model. The members of the Duluth group actively engaged survivors of violence through study groups that were built out of anti-violence advocacy efforts. Ellen Pence, Michael Paymar and Coral McDonald began attending local Duluth con- sciousness raising domestic violence support groups in order to develop a conceptualization of domestic violence as it was experienced by survi- vors.31 According to Ellen Pence, a founding member of the Duluth Group with Michael Paymar and Coral McDonald, the Duluth Group developed the theory of domestic violence directly from the women’s experiences in the consciousness raising support groups: I remember… saying to Coral [McDonnell] and Michael [Paymar] “We just gotta go to these women’s groups and ask these questions” and so we started going. ‘What’s it like to live with them?’ ‘Describe it.’ And people started to 29 Emerson R. Dobash, Russell P. Dobash, Women, Violence and Social Change (Lon- don and New York: Routledge, 1992), 25–26. 30 Ibid., 174–178. 31 Peter Cohn, [Film] Power and Control: Domestic Violence in America. Hillcrest Films LLC, 2010. 68 Paddy Farr tell stories, and then people, then we got into the word ‘Tactics’. Somehow in the process the word tactics came up and we started asking “What other tactics does he use against you besides violence?” And, um…’Well he never lets us have any friends’, so we’d get all the women to tell a story about that, “Who doesn’t he let you see? When?” and then the word ‘isolation’ started coming up. We lumped all that under ‘Isolation’. And he’s always putting ya down and calling you names and what are all the things that he’s doing that when they talk about that? And then ‘Emotional Abuse’ became that catego- ry. And so…it came from these stories…’Tactics.’32 In Pence’s narrative, She explains that power and control dynamics, the categories of abuse and the concept of domestic violence tactics are all developed through the direct words of survivors. The personal nar- ratives of domestic violence survivors became the fundamental building blocks for the theory of domestic violence. As a consequence of con- sciousness raising affinity groups, the Duluth Group found through survivor narratives a kernel that expresses the centrality of power and control within a violent relationship. The Duluth Group’s work within consciousness raising groups culminated in 1980 with the creation of the Power and Control Wheel in 1980.33 This became what is the most cru- cial piece within the overall theory of domestic violence and connects the definition explicitly to the dialectical theory elaborated above in that it encapsulates both the foundational theory of domestic violence and the enumeration of abuse tactics by the Office of Violence against Women, the National Coalition against Domestic Violence, and all contemporary domestic violence programs. Accordingly, radical feminist epistemolo- gy developed power and control as an explanatory concept through the praxis of anti-violence activism. As a feminist epistemological praxis, this has resulted in the standard definition of domestic violence and the accompanying models of intervention: domestic violence is “a pattern of abusive behavior in any relationship that is used by one partner to gain or maintain power and control over another intimate partner.”34 32 Ibid. 33 Power and Control Wheel [online image]. (Duluth, Mn: Domestic Abuse Inter- vention Programs). 1984. 34 Domestic Violence. Office of Violence Against Women, n.d. 69 Denial of Consent: The Modern Heir of Sexual Violence within Slavery Problematizing Radical Feminist Praxis The primary focus of the battered women’s movement as it emerged from the broader feminist movement was on finding support and safety for survivors.35 This was accomplished through networks of women who were unaffiliated with institutional claims to power.36 There were no grants, there was no support in the criminal justice system or through police, and there was a strong backlash against any effort to make do- mestic violence a public issue. The work of the battered women’s move- ment included providing survivors with access to legal aid, composition of safety plans, providing shelter and safe housing options, and pres- suring the criminal legal system to take domestic violence seriously. It was a truly grassroots movement that operated without either access to the criminal justice system or federally funded granting mechanisms.37 Although this made it difficult to provide resources to survivors, the lack of institutional connections also allowed the movement to be free from governmental restrictions. However, a central goal of the battered women’s movement was instituting systemic changes within the crim- inal legal system to hold male batterers criminally accountable for the perpetration of violence.38 This seemingly innocuous goal has led to the revisionism of domestic violence theory instituted by the Trump admin- istration’s Justice Department. All of this changed with the introduction of statutory policies against domestic violence. Although by the mid-70s most states in the US pro- vided women the right to bring criminal action against an abusive part- ner, it wasn’t until 1994 that the Violence against Women Act was in- troduced and passed through the US congress. For the first time, the Violence against Women Act instituted criminal penalties for domestic violence on a national level. Without a doubt, the formal protection of law against violence and the conceptualization of violence as an exercise of power constitute a major victory for the women’s movement and so- cial progress for all people. And yet, the instituted power, privilege and rights within the Violence against Women Act turn turtle the feminist movement that pressed for power, privilege and rights. It is at this mo- 35 Schechter, Women and male violence, 53–79; Marie Gottschalk, The prison and the gallows: the politics of mass incarceration in America, (UK: Cambridge University Press), 2006, 139–163; Lehrner & Allen, “Still a movement after all these years?”, 656– 657. 36 Schechter, Women and male violence, 53–79. 37 Andrea Smith, “Unmasking the state: Racial/gender terror and hate crimes,” Australian Feminist Law Journal 26(1), 2007, 47–57; Lehrner & Allen, “Still a movement after all these years?” 656–657. 38 Schechter, Women and male violence, 157–184. 70 Paddy Farr ment that the force leading to the Trump administration’s Justice De- partment revision of the standard definition of domestic violence with the statutory definition becomes crystalized within US Federal Statutes. Where the Office of Violence against Women state that domestic vio- lence is “a pattern of abusive behavior in any relationship that is used by one partner to gain or maintain power and control over another intimate partner,”39 contradicting the definition of domestic violence as based in power and control, the Violence Against Women Act of 1994, the same act to which the Office of Violence against Women came to be, states that acts of domestic violence are “felony or misdemeanor crimes of vi- olence by” a person who has an intimate relationship with the victim.40 In a purely legal definition, the Violence against Women Act reports that domestic violence is a criminal act that is marked by a specified domestic relationship to the victim. Domestic violence becomes redefined within the text of the Violence against Women Act: The term ‘‘domestic violence’’ includes felony or misdemeanor crimes of violence committed by a current or former spouse or intimate partner of the victim, by a person with whom the victim shares a child in common, by a person who is cohabitating with or has cohabitated with the victim as a spouse or intimate partner, by a person similarly situated to a spouse of the victim under the domestic or family violence laws of the jurisdiction receiving grant monies, or by any other person against an adult or youth victim who is protected from that person’s acts under the domestic or family violence laws of the jurisdiction.41 As discussed in the introduction, in April of 2018, the Trump admin- istration’s Justice Department replaced the standard definition of domes- tic violence with the statutory definition, and it is the above definition provided in the Violence against Women Act of 1994, word for word, which is now published on the Office of Violence against Women as the definition of domestic violence. At this moment of reconciliation and in- tegration, the criminal legal model of domestic violence eliminates the analysis of power and control dynamics in order to supplant the power of the state to intervene. Though the movement for domestic violence laws and regulations found major success, simultaneously the advocacy for women’s libera- 39 Domestic Violence. Office of Violence Against Women, n.d. 40 United States. Violence Against Women Act of 1994. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Dept. of Justice, Violence Against Women Office). 1996, 40002.a.8. 41 United States, 1996, 40002.a.8. 71 Denial of Consent: The Modern Heir of Sexual Violence within Slavery tion from battering began a process of institutionalization.42 The anti-vi- olence movement made criminal justice demands to political leaders and in the process of conservatization became the vanguard and authors of criminal policies. In a bid to properly distribute and adjudicate servic- es, anti-violence shed its power of critique. Activists, who at once view themselves as a part of a political movement for social change and in struggle against the status quo, become a bureaucratic institution dom- inated by professionals. Growing in influence, anti-violence successes become quantified in terms of criminal legal charges43 resulting in the transformation of the revolutionary dialectic into forms of power held over survivors by the criminal justice machine.44 Through this process, many of the feminists who were before demanding economic justice, racial justice and gender justice became a part of the same system that ensures these social changes do not occur.45 While moments of unrest provide a basis for radical action, the femi- nist revolution leads to strange conclusions that recreate power and con- trol is recreated within the criminal legal context of domestic violence legislation. As such, the focus of the anti-violence movement is moved towards prosecution rather than social, cultural and political change. Thus, where the conceptualization of violence was a political force with insurrectionary potential, through the signification of violence as crime, the means toward political struggle against violence becomes enmeshed within a new power and control over survivors. Accordingly, the defi- nition of domestic violence becomes grounded, not in the dynamic movements of power and control, but in the criminal act as a carceral procedure on the other. Based on empirical work in the Wingspan An- ti-Violence project, Farr explains: Current laws that are meant to protect victims/survivors of hate crimes, domestic violence, sexual assault and discrimination have often not accom- plished the task that the laws were meant to accomplish. Instead, these laws have inadvertently facilitated the revictimization of marginalized and op- pressed peoples through institutional violence. The facilitation of revictim- ization occurs along lines of identity including gender, race, class, sexual 42 Incite Women of Color against Violence. The color of violence: the Incite! an- thology (Cambridge, Massachusetts: South End Press, 2006), 1–11; Smith, “Unmasking the state,” 47–57; Jennifer Wies, “Professionalizing Human Services: A Case of Domestic Violence Shelter Advocates,” Human Organization, Vol. 67, No. 2, (Oklahoma City, OK: Society for Applied Anthropology 2008), 221–233; Lehrer & Allen, “Still a movement after all these years?” 656–657. 43 Gottchalk, The prison and the gallows, 139–163. 44 Incite Women of Color against Violence, The color of violence, 1-11. 45 Smith, “Unmasking the state,” 47–57; Lehrer & Allen, “Still a movement after all these years?” 656–657. 72 Paddy Farr orientation, ability, color, ethnicity and other categories as modes through which a person both self-identifies and becomes identified as possible crim- inals. As such, both institutional violence and discrimination enact the cul- tural and social formations of perpetrator and victim.46 Problematizing Radical Feminist Theory The radical feminist praxis leading to the strengthening of the criminal justice system affects communities of color and lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer and intersex (LGBTQI) people disproportionately. This antipathy towards white supremacy and heterosexism goes deep- er than the feminist praxis leading to institutionalization and lies deep- ly embedded within the genealogy of the radical feminist project. The problematic is centered on the conception of the radical feminist dialec- tic. Within the conception of radical feminism as a dialectical struggle, there must be a unity of opposites, a struggle between men and women as such, and thus a universal position of womanhood as the standpoint of the oppressed. This requirement of unity against patriarchy develops problematic conceptions of power that lead to replications of social op- pression within the revolutionary movement. Firstly, because the dialectical analysis of radical feminism had pro- posed that women’s issues can be universalized through the perpetual struggle between men and women for power, white radical feminists became the vanguard of white women’s liberation over women of color who were then expected to either join the radical feminist movement in the struggle to destabilize patriarchal power or betray women’s libera- tion by remaining on the side of men. At the founding of the radical fem- inist movement, women of color feminism developed a mode of theoriz- ing how various identities never affect a person in isolation but always in combination: oppression correlates to traits of not only gender, but also race, class, sexuality and other identity categories that in combina- tion shape the experience of identity.47 As an anti-essentialist political 46 Patrick Farr, Queer Victims: Reports of Violence by LGBTQI Survivors Result in Violent Assaults by Police, Thesis Advisor Craig Lecroy (Arizona State University, 2016), 1. 47 Demita Frazier, Barbara Smith, Beverly Smith, “The Combahee River Collective Statement,” in This Bridge Called My Back, ed. Gloria Anzaldúa and Cherrie Moraga (Wa- tertown, MA: Persephone Press, 1981), 210–218; Cherrie Moraga, Gloria Anzaldua, This Bridge Called My Back (Watertown, MA: Persephone Press, 1981), xliii–xlvii; Akasha Glo- ria Hull, Patricia Bell-Scott, Barbara Smith, All the Women are White, All the Blacks are Men but Some of Us Are Brave: Black Women’s Studies (New York, New York: Feminist Press, 1982, 2015), xvii–xxxii; Nancy Hartsock, “The Feminist Standpoint: Developing the Ground for a Specifically Historical Materialism,” The Feminist Standpoint Theory Reader: Intellectual and Political Controversies ed. Sandra Harding, (New York, NY: Rout- ledge, 1983), 35–53; Kimberle W. Crenshaw, “Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race 73 Denial of Consent: The Modern Heir of Sexual Violence within Slavery ontology where identity is overdetermined through the intersection of multiple identity categories, women of color feminism provides a theory from which to grasp the different ways each person experiences oppres- sion, and as such, struggle against oppression necessarily leads toward multiple lines of liberation. This critique forms a challenge at the core of the radical feminist dialectic, for at the intersections, there can be no essential duality of particular identities but instead only an analysis of oppressions as they manifest across social organization. And secondly, because the universal standpoint of the oppressed is located in womanhood, and because the fundamental contradiction is between men and women, cisgender radical feminists erase the strug- gle of LGBTQI people against the violence of heterosexism. Like women of color feminism, an equally significant critique of radical feminism is also tracked within queer theory.48 Queer theory as a theoretical posture was conceived of by Teresa de Lauretis in 1991 for the special edition of the journal “Difference: A Journal of Feminist Cultural Studies,” a collec- tion of analytics through which all normative categories begin to appear strange.49 This strange normativity is heteronormativity. Heteronorma- tivity can be described as a conjunction of sexual orientation toward the opposite sex of one’s birth assigned gender, a “biological” sex in agree- ment with one’s birth assigned gender, a gender expression that aligns with one’s birth assignment, and a gender identity that aligns with one’s birth assignment.50 Hence, queer theory poses the challenge that gen- and Sex: a Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics,” University of Chicago Legal Forum, 139, (Chicago, Il: University of Chicago Law School, 1989), 139–67; Kimberle W. Crenshaw, “Mapping the Margins: In- tersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence against Women of Color,” Stanford Law Re- view, 43(6), (Stanford, CA: Stanford Law School, 1991), 1241–1299; Patricia Hill-Collins, Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness, and the Politics of Empowerment. Second Edition (New York, NY: Routledge, 1990, 2000), 1–42. 48 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality: Volume 1 Introduction, trans. Robert Hurley (New York, NY: Vintage Books Random House Publishing, 1976, 1990), 51–73; Eve Sedgewick,. The Epistemology of the Closet. (Berkley, CA: University of California Press, 1990), 67–90; Judith Butler, Gender Trouble (New York, NY: Routledge, 1990), 1–5; Judith Butler, Bodies that Matter (New York, NY: Routledge, 1993), 223–242; Teresa De Lauretis, “Queer theory: Lesbian and Gay Sexualities an Introduction” in Difference: A Journal of Feminist Cultural Studies, ed. Teresa de Lauretis, vol. 3, no.2. (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1991), iii–xviii; Michael Warner, “Introduction: Fear of a Queer Planet,” Social Text, No. 29, (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1991), 3–17; Lisa Dugan, The Twilight of Equality?: Neoliberalism, Cultural Politics, and the Attack On De- mocracy (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 2003), 43–65; Susan Stryker, “Transgender History, Homonormativity, and Disciplinarity,” Radical History Review, 100 (2008), 145–157; Lori Girschick, Transgender Voices: Beyond Men and Women (Lebanon, HS: University Press of New England, 2008), 23–50. 49 De Lauretis, “Queer theory: Lesbian and Gay Sexualities an Introduction,” iii–xviii. 50 Girschick, Transgender Voices, 23–50. 74 Paddy Farr der identity itself cannot collapse into simple biological categories.51 The prescribed gender roles of men and women within Western society, as compared to other socio-historical contexts and the resistance to gender roles by feminist movements, demonstrates that the categorization of gender expression as an essential trait is misleadine. If there is any devi- ation from this binary then the subject becomes queer or estranged from the normative standards.52 Thus, queer theory is concerned with gender identity and birth assignment and the ways in which this becomes a ho- monormativity excluding transgender and gender non-binary people.53 Although the criticisms of radical feminism developed by women of color and queer theory appear to undermine the project of defining do- mestic violence in terms of power and control, the theories developed against radical feminism have an equal ability to enrich the reading of domestic violence. Where radical feminism began from the position that gender equality within society was the central issue confronting the women’s movement, it is women of color feminists’ and queer theorists’ contention that what is necessary for liberation is an embrace of mul- tiple movements against oppression intersecting at womanhood, color, sexual orientation and gender identity. This transformation of theory and praxis is represented within the work of Incite! Women and Trans People of Color against Violence and the National Coalition of Anti-Vio- lence Programs (NCAVP). First, Incite! formed in 2000 after organizers of the Color of Violence conference decided to continue their work against violence as it mani- fests across interpersonal and state violence. This conference resulted in the publication of an anthology by the same title, the Color of Vio- lence: an Incite Anthology.”54 The Incite! framework for anti-violence is described in the document “Dangerous Intersections” describing a vision of the anti-violence movement as an inseparable intersection of institu- tional and gender violence.55 It is at this intersection that people of color experience violence through multiple lines of oppression simultaneously as these are manifested within white supremacy and heteropatriarchy. These dangerous intersections have the result of not only complicating the effectiveness of anti-violence responses but of turning momentum of the battered women’s movement against people of color. They argue that in order to confront the many forms of violence perpetrated against 51 Butler, Gender Trouble, 1–5; Butler, Bodies that Matter, 223–242. 52 Warner, “Introduction: Fear of a Queer Planet,” 3–17. 53 Dugan, The Twilight of Equality?, 43–65; Stryker, “Transgender History, Homonormativity, and Disciplinarity,”, 145–157. 54 Incite Women of Color against Violence, The color of violence, 1–11. 55 Incite Women of Color against Violence, “Dangerous Intersections,” Incite! Wom- en of Color against Violence Website, n.d. 75 Denial of Consent: The Modern Heir of Sexual Violence within Slavery women and trans people of color, it is necessary to reconceptualize vio- lence as a form of oppression expressed through an intersectional fem- inist approach. And thus, there is an implicit connection with intersec- tions of identity wherein oppression and the maintenance of power and control are synonymous. This concept of violence as power and control provides a mode of theorizing the ways in which an intersection of iden- tities and the effect of identity within dynamic of violence results in vio- lent social and political conditions. Second, the NCAVP formed as a coalition of anti-violence programs focused on hate violence and domestic violence within and against LG- BTQI and HIV affected communities in the US. Since 1996, the NCAVP has released two annual reports, one on Intimate Partner Violence in LGBTQI and HIV Affected Communities and a second on Hate Violence in LGBTQI and HIV Affected Communities.56 The NCAVP buiilds directly from praxis and reflected within the combined movements of the strug- gles against hate violence and intimate partner violence that have re- sulted in their twin reports. Central to the NCAVP’s understanding of violence is the intersections between sexual violence, intimate partner violence, hate violence and institutional violence. As such, the NCAVP implements a methodology that transcends the radical feminist theo- ry of domestic violence thereby establishing bias, sexuality, domesticity and governmentality as entwined with violence as a concept. As vio- lence types, each event crisscrosses multiple concepts to varying degrees thereby developing into complicated and dynamic intersections. Hence, violence against LGBTQI people intersects systems of hate violence, do- mestic violence and sexual violence, all of which rest atop the foundation of institutional violence.57 At the theoretical and practical level, each of these different forms of violence can cross into one another so that the motivations involved in different forms of violence may appear as over- determined. Hence, through the critique of violence as intersectional 56 Anthony O. Ahmed et. al., Lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, and HIV affected hate violence in 2014, (New York, NY: National Coalition of Anti-Violence Pro- grams, 2015); Anthony O. Ahmed et. al., Lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, and HIV affected intimate partner violence in 2013, (New York, NY: National Coalition of Anti-Violence Programs, 2014); Anthony O. Ahmed et. al., Lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans- gender, queer, and HIV affected hate violence in 2013. (New York, NY: National Coalition of Anti-Violence Programs, 2014); Anthony O. Ahmed, Lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgen- der, queer, and HIV affected hate violence in 2014 (New York, NY: National Coalition of Anti-Violence Programs, 2015); Emily Waters et. al., Lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, and HIV affected intimate partner violence in 2014, (New York, NY: National Coa- lition of Anti-Violence Programs, 2015). 57 Venn diagram of AVP programs and services [Online Image]. (New York, NY: New York City Anti-Violence Project), 2012. Retrieved 7-13-2015 from: http://www.avp. org/about-avp/faqs 76 Paddy Farr and resting atop the foundation of institutional violence, the critique of institutional violence is represented within the reflexivity of the anti-vi- olence movement. The theory of violence as implemented by Incite! and the NCAVP de- veloped through women of color feminism and queer theory add nu- ance to the goal, strategies and tactics of domestic violence otherwise not possible within the radical feminist paradigm. Domestic violence is not merely caused by the patriarchal family structure, but rather is upheld and bolstered through oppressive conditions. This theory and praxis harmonizes with the definition of domestic violence as based in power and control. The power and control taking form within patriar- chal domesticity is an expression of oppressive conditions. Furthermore, oppression is the dynamics of power and control over others of which domestic violence is an expression. From this definition of violence and oppression, the anti-violence movement can define the struggle against violence as the struggle against oppression wherein there is room to critique the conditions of the patriarchal family, of white supremacy, of heterosexism and of state violence, all of which interact on the theater of domesticity. Lavina Tomer and Cathy Busha, the founders of the Wing- span Anti-Violence Project, an LGBTQI survivor advocacy program in Tucson Arizona and member program of the NCAVP, write: all forms of violence and oppression (sexism, racism, ableism, body image, homophobia, classism ageism…) are connected. Violence occurs when one person, one group, one country believes that she/he/it has the right to con- trol the body, the land, the religion, the lives, the free will of another person, group, country, and so on. The abuser feels superior and entitled to her/his/ its power.58 Conclusion As discussed in the introduction, in April of 2018, the Trump administra- tion’s Justice Department instituted a revision to the Office of Violence against Women’s standard definition of domestic violence. Domestic vi- olence transformed from a conceptualization based in dynamic of pow- er and control to one of “felony or misdemeanor crimes of violence” (VAWA 1994: 40002.a.8). And yet, based on this archeology of radical feminism’s collaboration with criminal justice, implicit racism and ex- plicit heterosexism, this revision is the logical conclusion. On the one 58 L. Tomer, C. Busha, Domestic Violence In The Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual, Trans- gender Community: A Resource (Tucson, Arizona: Wingspan Domestic Violence Project, 2000), 1. 77 Denial of Consent: The Modern Heir of Sexual Violence within Slavery hand, the radical feminist theory and praxis of domestic violence estab- lishes a struggle to end patriarchal power and control over women by establishing lines for an anti-authoritarian consensual politic. While on the other hand, radical feminist theory and praxis is the archeological bedrock of the Trump administration’s Justice Department revisions to- ward law and order. Thus, within the radical feminist project, there are three key problems that are all closely associated. These key problems are 1) a public policy praxis leading to the strengthening of carceral sys- tems, 2) a universalization of womanhood leading to an implicit racism, and 3) a binary dialectic leading to an explicit heterosexism. These three difficulties cut to the heart of the radical feminist project. The theory and praxis of the movement against domestic violence arises through the radical feminist dialectic as an oppositionary duality between the abuser and the survivor of violence. This movement real- izes the feminist dictum that “the personal is political” (Hanisch 1969) demolishing the boundary between the public and the private spheres. And this movement represents a conflict theory where emancipation from violence depends on the feminist revolution that would abolish the conditions of man and woman that give rise to domestic violence. Thus, domestic violence can be neither adequately described nor confronted outside of feminist theory. However, in relation to radical feminist the- ory and praxis, the movement against domestic violence is marred by white supremacy, heterosexism and state collaboration. Through these relationships to bigotry and authoritarianism, radical feminist theory and praxis leads to contradictions. The answer to this problem is found within the work of intersectional feminists and queer theorists who challenge the conditions of oppression that affect domestic life as a re- invigoration of the radical spirit that gave rise to the movement against domestic violence in the first place. This is not possible through the par- adigm of radical feminism, and must become an intersectional queer project confronting multiple lines of oppression. Domestic violence is not simply a problem confronting the binary men and women, but a problem which must be confronted simultaneously at the intersections of white supremacy, heteropatriarchy, authoritarianism, police brutality and economy. 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Professionalizing Human Services: A Case of Domestic Violence Shelter Advocates. Human Organization, Vol. 67, No. 2, Oklahoma City, OK: Society for Applied Anthropology, 2008, 221–233. Władza i kontrola: radykalny feminizm, kooptacja państwowa i przekrojowa teoria queer w praxis przemocy domowej Abstrakt W artykule tym dowodzę, że istnieje związek między radykalną teorią femini- styczną a standardową definicją przemocy domowej. Radykalny feminizm opisa- ny jest przez postmarksistowską dialektykę, w której binarność płci zajmuje miej- sce struktury klasowej. Radykalny feminizm jako taki opisuje teorię konfliktu, w którym walka między płciami wypiera walkę klasową. Konflikt między płciami powoduje zburzenie podziału między sferą publiczną i prywatną w stronę zjed- noczenia prywatnego i politycznego. Standardowa definicja przemocy domowej wynika z tej teorii dialektycznej. Stwierdza się w niej, że przemoc domowa to cykl, 81 Denial of Consent: The Modern Heir of Sexual Violence within Slavery w którym jedna osoba próbuje zdobyć lub utrzymać władzę i kontrolę nad bliskim partnerem. A jednak radykalna koncepcja feministyczna prowadzi do sprzeczno- ści, walka płci ma tendencję do usunięcia innych form ucisku, przede wszystkim przemocy instytucjonalnej, heteroseksizmu i białej supremacji. Radykalny projekt feministyczny wiąże się z trzema kluczowymi problemami: 1) praktyką polityki publicznej prowadzącą do wzmocnienia systemów karceralnych, 2) uniwersali- zacją kobiecości prowadzącą do niejawnego rasizmu oraz 3) dialektyką binarną prowadzącą do jawnego heteroseksizmu. W oparciu o krytykę radykalnego femi- nizmu przez feminizm przekrojowy i teorię queer, w niniejszym artykule dowo- dzę, że rozwiązaniem jest wzmocnienie radykalnego ducha, który doprowadził pierwotnie do rozwoju ruchu przeciwko przemocy domowej. Słowa kluczowe: Przemoc domowa, feminizm radykalny, przekrojowa teoria Queer, teoria Queer, przemoc instytucjonalna Paddy Farr jest niezależnym badaczem, organizatorem i aktywistą zajmującym się przemocą z pogranicza przestępstw z nienawiści, dyskryminacji, brutalno- ści policji, przemocy domowej, napaści seksualnych, więziennych kompleksów. W 2013 Paddy ukończył studia magisterskie z filozofii, co zaowocowało pracą magisterską zatytułowaną „Tragiczna ironia: Sokrates w historii filozofii He- gla”. W latach 2013–2015 Paddy pracował jako koordynator projektu Wingspan Anti-Violence Project w Tucson, kolektywu zorganizowanego przez i dla osób LGBTQI, które doświadczyły przemocy. Paddy pracował również nad projektami z National Coalition of Anti-Violence Programs, które zaowocowały publikacją czterech amerykańskich raportów na temat przemocy wobec osób LGBTQI i IV +: „Raport o przemocy z nienawiści NCAVP 2013”, „Raport o przemocy parnerów seksualnych NCAVP 2013”, „NCAVP 2014” Raport na temat przemocy z nienawi- ści” I „ Raport na temat przemocy partnerów seksualnych NCAVP 2014”. W 2016 r. Paddy ukończył pracę magisterską „Queer Victims: Reports of Violence by LGBTQI Survivors Result in Violent Assaults by Police”. Po opuszczeni Wingspan Anti-Violence Project, Paddy pracował jako psychoterapeuta w ugene Oregon USA w prywatnej praktyce. Paddy uprawia psychoterapię psychoanalityczną in- spirowaną pracą Jacquesa Lacana, Felixa Guattari i Judith Herman. Specjalizuje się w terapii traumy, antypsychiatrii, tożsamościach Latinx i LGBTQIA. Power and Control: Radical Feminism, State Cooptation and Inter- sectional Queer Theory in Domestic Violence Praxis Summary This article argues that there is a connection between radical feminist theory and the standard definition of domestic violence. Radical feminism is described 82 Paddy Farr through a post-Marxist dialectic in which the gender binary takes the place of the class structure. As such, radical feminism describes a conflict theory in which a struggle between genders displaces the class struggle. The conflict be- tween genders realizes a demolition of the division between the public and pri- vate spheres as a unification of the personal-political. The standard definition of domestic violence arises from this dialectical theory. It states that domes- tic violence is cycle of one person attempting to gain or maintain power and control over an intimate partner. And yet, the radical feminist vision leads to contradictions in which the gender struggle tends toward the erasure of other forms of oppression, most importantly institutional violence, heterosexism and white supremacy. The radical feminist project contains three key problems: 1) a public policy praxis leading to the strengthening of carceral systems, 2) a universalization of womanhood leading to an implicit racism, and 3) a binary dialectic leading to an explicit heterosexism. Based on the critique of radical feminism by intersectional feminism and queer theory, this paper argues that the solution is to reinvigorate the radical spirit that gave rise to the movement against domestic violence in the first place. Key Words: Domestic Violence, Radical Feminism, Intersectionality, Queer Theory, State Violence Paddy Farr is an independent researcher, organizer and activist focused on vio- lence at the intersection of hate crimes, discrimination, police brutality, domestic violence, sexual assault and the prison industrial complex. In 2013, Paddy complet- ed an MA in Philosophy which resulted in a thesis titled “Tragic Irony: Socrates in Hegel’s History of Philosophy.” Between 2013 and 2015, Paddy worked as the coor- dinator of the Wingspan Anti-Violence Project in Tucson Arizona, a collective organ- ized by and for LGBTQI survivors of violence. Paddy worked on data projects with the National Coalition of Anti-Violence Programs which resulted in the publication of four US based reports on violence against LGBTQI&HIV+ people: “NCAVP 2013 Hate Violence Report,” “NCAVP 2013 Intimate Partner Violence Report,” “NCAVP 2014 Hate Violence Report,” and “NCAVP 2014 Intimate Partner Violence Report.” In 2016, Paddy completed a Master of Social Work which resulted in a thesis titled “Queer Victims: Reports of Violence by LGBTQI Survivors Result in Violent Assaults by Police.” Since leaving Wingspan Anti-Violence Project, Paddy has worked as a psychotherapist in Eugene Oregon USA in private practice. Paddy practices psycho- analytic psychotherapy influenced by the work of Jacques Lacan, Felix Guattari and Judith Herman. Paddy specializes in trauma recovery, anti-psychiatry, Latinx and LGBTQIA identities. 
work_er2o55lm25dj3ixz2hoy4hbubu	----	142 Book Reviews operating to produce a linear sequence. A different non-semantic sense of ‘information’ is that used in assessing the accuracy of the transmission of electrical signals (Garcı́a- Sancho, p. 65), which Crick claims did not influence him. A final sense of ‘information’ is that used in the later chapters to refer to any item entered into and processed by a computer program. In sum, readers seeking an intellectual and institutional biography of Sanger’s work on sequencing or the early UK perspective on databases, algorithms and machines for sequencings will find it in Garcı́a-Sancho’s book. Lindley Darden University of Maryland, USA doi:10.1017/mdh.2016.115 C. F. Goodey, Learning Disability and Inclusion Phobia: Past, Present, Future (Oxon, and New York: Routledge, 2016), pp. viii, 178, £79.00, hardback, £25.49 kindle, ISBN: 978-0-415-82200-8 (hbk) and 978-0-203-55665-8 (ebk). In his book, Goodey Goodey makes the point that the term ‘learning disability’ is not a fixed, stable concept, but one which has changed and evolved over time. He states his aim as being to not only deconstruct the concept of a learning disability but also to ‘reconstruct the concept as something else entirely’ (p. 2). He argues that learning disabilities are as a consequence of an inclusion phobia which he defines as, a condition which has existed since time immemorial resulting in the identifying and scapegoating of outgroups. He states therefore that social inclusion should be our target in both social and political action. He argues that although we think about ‘learning disabilities’ as being fixed and permanent, a learning disability is in fact a label which shifts over time. For example, he discusses how a previous label applied to this group, ‘feeble-minded’ would have included many groups of people (such as unmarried mothers) who would not be included within our current concept of a learning disability. Goodey cites many examples of inclusion phobia in action, including ‘mild’ phobias such the person in the bank who talks to the member of a person’s support staff rather than the person being supported by the member of staff, tracing this concept through history. In a recent commentary on Goodey’s paper on why we should study the history of learning disability, Bradshaw and McGill point out that staff can also be instigators of social exclusion.1 In this research, the regard for residents was one dimension which emerged from their evaluation of staff culture. This dimension focused on the extent to which people with learning disabilities were seen as being fundamentally different, or as the authors describe in the paper ‘not like us’. This seems to be a very clear illustration of Goodey’s inclusion phobia. He argues that this concept of inclusion phobia pre-exists the label of learning disability. He suggests that classifying a human group by their intellectual abilities is the current method by which this inclusion phobia is manifested. He argues that this representation of status by reference to an internal characteristic of ‘intelligence’ is recent. 1 C.F. Goodey, ‘Why study the history of learning disability?’, Tizard Learning Disability Review 20, (2015): 3–10; J. Bradshaw and P. McGill, ‘Commentary on “Why study the history of learning disability?”’ Tizard Learning Disability Review 20 (2015): 11–14; C. Bigby, M. Knox J. Beadle-Brown, T. Clement and J. Mansell, ‘Uncovering dimensions of informal culture in underperforming group homes for people with severe intellectual disabilities’, Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities 50 (2012): 452–67. https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/mdh.2016.115 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:38, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1017/mdh.2016.115&domain=pdf https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/mdh.2016.115 https://www.cambridge.org/core Book Reviews 143 Goodey suggests that the discrimination, bullying and segregation of people who we label as having learning disabilities are the result of this inclusion phobia. Recent work around hate crime (Richardson et al., 2015) found that just under half of the people with learning disabilities and/or autism who took part in their survey reported experiences of disability hate crime and so Goodey is quite right to point out that this is one of the ways in this group is targeted as ‘different’. Difference is the focus of his fourth chapter.2 Of course it is also the case that staff working with this group of people are often excluded (Bradshaw and McGill, 2015), for example because of their association with people with learning disabilities. Beadle-Brown et al. (2014) found that people who were living or working with this socially excluded group also reported victimisation. Goodey’s book explores the concept of causes, tracing these through history, culminating in parental blame and guilt and finally to the location of learning disability entirely within DNA, therefore locating ‘the problem’ within the child himself or herself. In his chapter on assessment, Goodey argues that we assess what we feel is measurable, hence intelligence becomes something which we assess and therefore refer to as ‘real.’ Finally, he explores his notion of inclusion phobia through the development of the classification and diagnosis of autism spectrum conditions. Goodey ends by suggesting that a solution would be for all ‘vulnerable’ people to be supported by their local communities (as would have been the case historically) and suggests that services are actively contributing to the prevention of people being able to lead ordinary lives. He ends with stating that ‘Inclusion is not a good idea that needs to be promoted, it is the state of nature’ (p. 166). It is the in ingroup, those who do the excluding, where policy change must be targeted. Jill Bradshaw University of Kent, UK doi:10.1017/mdh.2016.116 Loren Graham, Lysenko’s Ghost: Epigenetics and Russia (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 2016), pp. 209, $24.95, hardback, ISBN: 9780674089051. In 1948, at the end of a week-long session of the Lenin All-Union Academy of Agricultural Sciences (VASKhNIL) in Moscow, Trofim D. Lysenko announced that he had received the support of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union for his anti-genetic theories. What followed was not just a purge of genetics and geneticists across the Soviet Union, but the rest of the Communist Bloc as well. Lysenko seemed to have succeeded, as one author put it, in ‘set[ting] the clock back’ by renouncing the most important advance in twentieth-century biology. A lost generation of would-be geneticists were forced to follow other paths of research, and by the time it was over there was a palpable sense of having been left behind. What they were now free to discover was a genetics that to a large extent had been developed in reaction to Lysenko’s crime of exploiting his connections in a totalitarian political system in order to escape having to subject his theories to the judgement of his peers. Historians of the Lysenko controversy owe an enormous debt to Loren Graham. The chapter where Graham covered what was at the time a recent event in Science and Philosophy in the Soviet Union (1966), was part of the first wave of literature on what 2 L. Richardson, J. Bradshaw, J. Beadle-Brown, A. Malovic and J. Himmerlich, “‘I felt that I deserved it”: Experiences and implications of Disability Hate crime’, Tizard Learning Disability Review, 21 (2016) 80–88. https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/mdh.2016.115 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:38, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/mdh.2016.115 https://www.cambridge.org/core *-2.9pc 
work_etb2kftkujb2jnzgw4f4mb3xxu	----	Sitting outside: conviviality, self-care and the design of benches in urban public space This is a repository copy of Sitting outside: conviviality, self-care and the design of benches in urban public space. White Rose Research Online URL for this paper: http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/120891/ Version: Published Version Article: Rishbeth, C. orcid.org/0000-0002-1648-5183 and Rogaly, B. (2017) Sitting outside: conviviality, self-care and the design of benches in urban public space. Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers. ISSN 0020-2754 https://doi.org/10.1111/tran.12212 eprints@whiterose.ac.uk https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/ Reuse This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) licence. This licence allows you to distribute, remix, tweak, and build upon the work, even commercially, as long as you credit the authors for the original work. More information and the full terms of the licence here: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/ Takedown If you consider content in White Rose Research Online to be in breach of UK law, please notify us by emailing eprints@whiterose.ac.uk including the URL of the record and the reason for the withdrawal request. mailto:eprints@whiterose.ac.uk https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/ Sitting outside: conviviality, self-care and the design of benches in urban public space Clare Rishbeth1 and Ben Rogaly2 The urban bench has been romanticised as a location of intimacy and benign social serendipity, and problematised with regard to perceptions of unwelcome loitering. In this paper we explore embodied practices of sitting on benches within an urban context characterised by corporate-led regeneration and impacted by austerity urbanism, imperial history and ongoing racisms. Our schizocartographic methodology enables us to attend to the differentiated and shifting subjectivities and temporalities of bench users, and to emerging counter histories of space. The research is based on the case study of a central square in Woolwich, south-east London. This involved an eclectic combination of methods, including film-making, ethnography and interviews, and a cross-sectoral team of activists, academics and an artist. The paper starts by conceptualising public space with respect to lived experiences of marginalisation, arguing that architectural design is intrinsic to understanding micro-geographies of conviviality and care. The case study material is used first to provide a visual sketch of sitting and watching others in the square and then to address conviviality and the value of visibility and relative proximity in framing a mostly un-panicked multiculture. Third, we discuss agentic, yet critically aware, acts of self-care. Finally, our focus shifts to the design of the benches and the ‘touching experiences’ of bodies sat in various ways, impacted by structural inequalities, yet differentiated by the particularities of individual or collective priorities. In conclusion we argue that attending to the precision of sitting on a bench can illuminate multiple temporalities of urban change in relation to both individual subjectivities and hegemonic structures. Further, the counter histories that emerge can inform policy and practice for inclusive urban design. Key words public space; architecture; conviviality; care; regeneration; London 1Department of Landscape, University of Sheffield, Sheffield S10 2TN Email: c.rishbeth@sheffield.ac.uk 2Department of Geography, University of Sussex, Brighton BN1 9SJ Revised manuscript received 12 June 2017 Introduction What does sitting outside mean for people experienc- ing marginalisation and exclusion in the city? In what ways is this meaning changed by corporate-led regen- eration of urban public spaces, and shaped by urban design? This paper explores these questions, keeping at its heart the urban bench. Benches have been romanticised as sites of benign encounter and con- templation (Wylie 2009), while also problematised as props for ‘loitering’ within broader governmental agendas of surveillance, overt discriminatory regula- tion, privatisation and sanitisation (Crawford and Lister 2007; Minton 2009). As we will argue, these ideas are not necessarily contradictory: benches may have various contrasting meanings and uses simulta- neously, and these will change throughout the day and night as well as over longer periods of time. A multiscalar, spatiotemporal approach is thus crucial in order to understand benches and sitting outside more generally within and against ongoing processes of economic, cultural and political change in and beyond the city (McFarlane 2016, 230; Peck et al. 2013). The paper uses the case study of a specific London site – Gordon Square, Woolwich – to add to literature that takes seriously ordinary, grounded experiences of corporate-led regeneration and gentrification (e.g. Paton 2014). It draws on an innovative, eclectic set of research methods designed through collaboration between academics, a local anti-hate crime organisa- tion and a documentary filmmaker. The resulting multi-disciplinary, situated, close-up view enables us to provide new insights on how people choose where to sit (and who with); the ergonomics of legs, seat-backs and bags; the process of watching; and the subjective experiences of bench users in relation to weather, noise, smells and other people. The research took place in the context of regener- ation that appears to be in step with wider processes of social cleansing in London (Watt and Minton 2016). Yet, paradoxically, as we shall see, in the specific time- frame of our study, increased experiences of respite The information, practices and views in this article are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the opinion of the Royal Geographical Society (with IBG). ISSN 0020-2754 Citation: 2017 doi: 10.1111/tran.12212 © 2017 The Authors. Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Royal Geographical Society (with the Institute of British Geographers). This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ and connectivity were reported by existing residents, particularly those marginalised by unemployment, ill- health, loneliness, over-crowded housing and/or racisms, and affected by the national government’s austerity policies that cut public services and benefits. Time and temporality are crucial to understanding this apparent contradiction. Money from corporate devel- opment in Woolwich largely financed the recent redesign of the case study site. We suggest that while critical urban studies have correctly revealed the destructive and unjust effects of neoliberal urbanism (Peck et al. 2013) especially as austerity policies inten- sified (Peck 2012), possible temporary advantages of certain aspects of urban regeneration to existing residents have been missed (McGuirk et al. 2016), exemplifying a disjuncture between overarching, rhetorical metanarratives and more grounded experi- ences of change (Linebaugh 2010). Our paper contributes further by connecting aca- demic debates on the ‘publicness’ of public space with those relating to geographies of care (Atkinson et al. 2011; Lawson 2007) and urban conviviality (Gilroy 2004; Wise and Noble 2016). Recent work on the geographies of care has sought to bridge the divide between an outward-looking care for the wider world beyond the self, and geographical analysis of experi- ences of care and caring (Lawson 2007). While some have emphasised the historical provision of ‘places to sit’ in urban green space as intended to ‘produce a “kind of regulated, civilised, subjectivity”’ (Brown 2013, 17, citing Osborne and Rose 1999, 744), our multiscalar schizocartography (see Methodology) explores the interaction between design of public space and the subjectivities of people who use it. The latter connects in particular to discussions of self-care (Atkinson 2011; Ball and Olmedo 2013). Self-care forms part of Tronto’s broad definition of care as a species activity that includes everything that we do to maintain, continue, and repair our ‘world’ so that we can live in it as well as possible. That world includes our bodies, our selves, and our environment, all of which we seek to interweave in a complex, life-sustaining web. (Tronto 1998, 15; see also Williams 2017) While we concur with what Massey and Thrift argue is an ‘ambition’ in geography ‘to move away from spaces viewed as if from on high right into the action and especially into the press of embodiment’ (2003, 288), our approach to the relation between self-care and space is not to ‘[privilege] a logic of individual autonomy and choice’ (Atkinson et al. 2011, 564). We would rather invoke Ahmed’s notion (following Audre Lorde) that ‘caring for oneself can be an act of political warfare’ (2014) or at least to view self-care as a form of agency that ‘is less than resistance but not unaware or uncritical of the social relations of hegemony’ (Atkinson 2011, 625, building on Katz 2004). For those who linger, sitting outside on a bench may be the outcome of marginalisation, an agentic choice for self- care or a mixture of both. For people experiencing mental ill-health, Duff’s research on recovery lists ‘spaces of solitude’ as one of the potential recovery-enhancing aspects of outside spaces, but also notes that ‘select sites of sociality and social engagement sustained particular atmospheres of recovery’ (2016, 66–7; emphasis added; see also Philo 2005, 589). We argue in the paper that urban convivi- ality can be part of such productive sociability, in particular when conceived of in the Spanish sense of ‘conviviencia’, which invokes the interactions of ‘prac- tice, effort, negotiation and achievement’ (Wise and Noble 2016, 425; see also Gilroy 2004). After all, one of the ‘paradoxes of convivial coexistence’ is that it is always enmeshed in, mediated by and shadowed by colonial histories, enduring racisms, variegated and uneven belong- ings and the entitlements, and moral panics of the day. (Wise and Noble 2016, 430; see also Back 1996) Conviviality is not necessarily inclusive, it can be otherwise – ‘a shared hatred of the latest newcomers’ (Back and Sinha 2016, 530). However, for the purposes of this paper, we view conviviality, although within the context of structural oppressions (Nayak 2017, 291), as ‘at ease with difference’ (Wise and Velayutham 2014, 407). The counter history to racisms is in part, we argue, extending Gilroy’s (2004, 167) argument, one in which urban multiculture, as experienced through sitting outside, can bring respite, even hope. Our intervention on benches as sites of conviviality relates to our third major theme: design. Here we build on Wise and Noble’s more general insight that spaces and times of convivial relations rest as much on material environs as they do on interpersonal and social relations. The physical organisation of social space, and the ways humans make use of this space, are fundamental to the logic of connection or discrimination. (2016, 427, emphasis added; see also Bowlby 2011, 613) Conviviality thus needs to be understood with regard to the physical design of urban public space – materiality and form, social functions and atmosphere (Koch and Latham 2011). The sensory assemblages of urban places are convened in part through the ‘material affordances of the built environment’ (Degen and Rose 2012, 3278), and shape qualities of both sociability and solitude. Design of urban public space (and in some cases specifically the design of benches) can also have intent to repel, as can be traced in ongoing debates regarding hostile architecture and just cities (Low and Iveson 2016; Petty 2016). This paper starts with a contextualising of the histories and structures of inequality that have shaped 2 Clare Rishbeth and Ben Rogaly ISSN 0020-2754 Citation: 2017 doi: 10.1111/tran.12212 © 2017 The Authors. Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Royal Geographical Society (with the Institute of British Geographers). contemporary Woolwich. This is followed by an over- view of the research methodology. The discussion of the findings is then presented in four sections. The first of these connects the paper’s three themes of convivi- ality, self-care and design through a series of observa- tions on square users’ acts of watching. Conviviality and self-care are each then explored separately before the fourth empirical section, which addresses the processes before, behind and around each individual experience: the priorities and decisions made in the design of urban public space that have hitherto been underexplored in the geographical literature. Context Thirty minutes east by light railway from the ‘City’, London’s financial services centre, Woolwich is located on the south bank of the Thames estuary. Woolwich was a key node in London’s imperial expansion and trade (Back 1996, 14), a place from which arms were shipped for British colonial conquest and domination. Rapid de-industrialisation from the mid-20th century onwards, and the ceasing of arms manufacture at Woolwich’s Royal Arsenal in 1967, were integral to a gradual decline in population in this part of London, as well as increased deprivation. However, Woolwich’s population grew from 20001 due to better transport links to London, an increased availability of relatively low-cost housing and international migration. The latter is also reflected in ethnic diversification, with just 37 per cent of census respondents identifying as white British in 2011 (compared to 45% for London, as a whole), and significant growth in the number of people with Ghanaian, Nigerian, Nepali or eastern European heritage (Bates 2017, 58). Racisms and hate crime have historic precedent in Woolwich. Moreover, reporting and commentary on the horrific killing of Private Lee Rigby, which took place in Woolwich in May 2013, contributed to a national anti-Muslim discourse, which has been asso- ciated with racist attacks in many parts of the country. Economic inequality is an equally important part of the current conjuncture. Most of Woolwich, including residential areas adjacent to Gordon Square, remained in the top quintile (most deprived) according to England’s Indices of Deprivation in 2015. A major new investment in transport infrastructure – the Crossrail station due to open in 2018 – will link Woolwich to central London at faster speeds than ever. Private developers are renovating former warehouses to provide apartments intended to attract high-earning young adults. Their billboard images convey youthful- ness, whiteness, a consumer orientation, speed, social- ity and heteronormativity. At the same time these private corporate developments depend on connections with – affordances given by – the local state at multiple scales. Crucially for our case study, £6.6 million was approved by the Royal Borough of Greenwich and Transport for London in a partnership with private developers to ‘redesign’ both Gordon Square (Fig- ure 1) and adjacent Beresford Square, commissioning Gustafson Porter, a globally renowned landscape architectural practice. The squares were re-opened in 2011. Before it was made into a public space in 1928, Woolwich’s Gordon Square (official name General Gordon Square) had been an open-topped railway cutting known as the ‘smoke hole’ that served Wool- wich Arsenal Station (Gilbert 2012, 47). If memorial- isation is part of the shaping of the urban present (Wilson and Darling 2016, 14), then naming the square after Gordon, who had been born in Woolwich and later became Governor-General of Sudan, emphasised the area’s link to British imperialism. Another echo of a military history is the clustering of Nepali migrants in Woolwich, (over 5000 Nepali-born residents registered in the 2011 census), ex-Gurkhas and their wives/widows who were granted the right to settle in the UK in 2009. In 2015 large groups of these residents, mostly older people on low incomes, spent extended periods of time in Gordon Square, especially over the summer months. We engage with the uneven temporalities at work in these processes through attending to a central irony: Gordon Square was rebuilt as a part of the Royal Borough’s ‘ongoing programme of major renovation’ in Woolwich town centre. Yet, while the broader housing crisis is likely to force increasing numbers out of the area in the future, this paper explores how the ‘improved’ square and its benches are currently expe- rienced by their users, including low-income residents of Woolwich and visitors from neighbouring areas. Methodology The research on which this paper is based can be seen as a kind of schizocartography in process (Richardson 2015). Schizocartography builds on Richardson’s read- ing of psychogeography literature and of Guattari’s schizoanalysis, which, Richardson summarises, challenges dominant powers and offers a process for remodelling their structure, not only to suit heterogeneous voices but also to reflect a history that may be counter to the dominant one. (2015, 188–9) This framing resonates with Stuart Hall’s analytical use of conjuncture (Hall 2011), which similarly conceives of dominant structures as multidimensional and interact- ing. As with Hall’s intellectual project, schizocartogra- phy refuses an artificial separation between ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’, considering instead the relation between them (Hall 2017, 170). Schizocartography is a methodology for enabling the articulation of counter- Sitting outside 3 ISSN 0020-2754 Citation: 2017 doi: 10.1111/tran.12212 © 2017 The Authors. Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Royal Geographical Society (with the Institute of British Geographers). histories of space. It does not necessarily involve a d�erive – Debord’s concept for a psychogeographical walk, a kind of research in motion. Schizocartography does, however, entail ‘the presence of the body in space, subjective reactions to place, or a search for something that may reveal “the other” of a place’. Crucially it ‘reclaim[s] the subjectivity of individuals’ in ‘spaces that have been co-opted by various capitalist oriented operations’ and recognises that ‘the individ- ual’s response to a space will not necessarily be the same at a different moment in time or upon another visit’ (Richardson 2015, 182, 186, 188–9). Engagement with individual subjectivities and with individual bodies in space and the sociality between them was enhanced by the central involvement of a film-maker in the research team and the presence of a video camera for part of the fieldwork. Together, these enabled us to engage with the sensuous elements of the square as experienced by bench-users and others, and to connect the contemporary importance of visual culture with the idea of research as performance (Latham 2003, 2003; Rose 2014, 26). The project’s 18-minute long documentary film, Alone together: the social life of benches (Johnson 2015a), provides urban portraiture of the square, an assemblage of reflections from diverse bench-users, highlighting themes such as the psychological feeling of being in a space, the rhythm and flow of visitors to a place, the importance of design for everyday street furniture and access to communal outdoor space’ (Johnson 2015b, np) The paper thus attends to multiple temporalities through setting the often fleeting temporariness of individual experience (Eldridge 2010; Lim 2010; Wilson and Darling 2016) alongside and juxtaposed with longer historical trends and processes. The research was collaborative, and co-produced, involving academics (from Geography and Landscape Architecture), third-sector colleagues (Greenwich Inclusion Project, The Young Foundation) and the documentary filmmaker, Esther Johnson. Woolwich was one of two London locations, the other a park in Sutton. Samprada Mukhia, a Nepali-speaking female fieldworker (with a background in Law) worked with Jasber Singh from Greenwich Inclusion Project (GRIP), a small activist organisation working against hate crime in the Borough, to undertake ethnographic fieldwork in Gordon Square primarily during daylight hours over a period of five months in spring and summer 2015. The multi-disciplinary and cross-sectoral nature of this work was crucial, drawing differently on the expertise within the team as a whole, mutually developing skills in qualitative interviewing, in inter- preting local politics and urban change, in analysing the built environment, and in noticing sensory and Figure 1 Gordon Square diagram of benches and image Source: Clare Rishbeth Figure 2 The act of sitting Source: Esther Johnson 4 Clare Rishbeth and Ben Rogaly ISSN 0020-2754 Citation: 2017 doi: 10.1111/tran.12212 © 2017 The Authors. Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Royal Geographical Society (with the Institute of British Geographers). temporal dynamics. These shaped the aims, methods and diverse outputs of the project, generating a range of material data: researcher fieldnotes, photographs and on-site drawings (plans and sections), ad-hoc conversations and formally recorded interviews, film rushes and sound files. The majority of ethnographic fieldwork, including 18 days of just being in the square, was undertaken by Mukhia, supported and supple- mented by Singh and the authors. Esther Johnson made three day-long visits to interview and photograph film participants, prior to the intensive engagement with the square over two days of filming dawn to night- time. Engagement with people using the square took a range of forms. Eighteen participants were interviewed, six of them on camera in the square. Each of the latter contributed to varying degrees through mid-edit reviews and feedback at private screenings of the film. Over four months there were a range of on-site informal conversations and interactions with other square users, more than 30 of these being specifically recorded in researcher fieldnotes, as well as a series of six group discussions with older Nepali heritage residents as part of a regular language class at the GRIP premises. Expert insights into intention and iteration in design and management practice were gained through inter- views with two ‘town wardens’, their manager and the landscape architect of the square. These data were analysed to inform understandings, connections and implications, shaping a rich production of knowledge. This was tested and refined through five extended collaborative workshops, bridging traditional distinc- tions between academic research and practice, and between social science and the arts. The next section discusses the dynamics of ‘watch- ing’, prefiguring and connecting the three subsequent sections on conviviality, self-care and design. Sitting and watching When sitting on any of the outer edges of Gordon Square your view takes in a broad panorama. ‘A nice viewpoint’, states Mel, 2 who sits here for long after- noons on sunny days, ‘like a theatre’. The square is designed for flow, accommodating the network of criss- crossings that connect shops, buses, council houses, the Docklands Light Railway station and all the many directions in which people might move. But it is also designed for sitting and watching. The three-metre drop allows clear sightlines to the water feature (children playing) and the large public television screen (Novak Djokovic playing). Unexpectedly, addressing the dynamics of the ‘big telly’ within the square is a useful means of exploring how conviviality and self-care are interrelated. The landscape architects were not briefed on the inclusion of the large screen, which was shoehorned into the nearly completed design on account of the upcoming Olympics. Within urban design discourse, from Whyte (1980) to Gehl (2010), there is a strong emphasis given to the delights of sitting outside combined with ‘people watching’. Against this, the increasing encroachment into public spaces of large, constantly broadcasting television screens can be framed as both a reflection and an indictment of contemporary times and new genera- tions: forever plugged in, short attention spans, unable to entertain themselves, a low common denominator. But by careful listening to participants’ accounts, we found an alternative practice of collective–private interactions of television watching, one which often enabled conviviality and reduced isolation (Widholm 2016). Maurice is a middle-aged UK-born man of Jamaican parentage, well educated but who now ‘knows what it’s like not to have a dicky-bird’,3 and lives in sheltered accommodation. Yesterday I was sitting over there and we were watching the tennis and a chap sat down beside me and he said something and I said something and he said something and I said something and we started to talk and then he told me his name and I told him mine and that was that. Sitting on a bench and telly watching is fundamentally different from doing the same thing from your sofa at home. Aggie and her adult daughter Lorna bring their garden chairs, position them under a tree in good view of the screen and watch whatever is on. The visuals are important for Lorna, who is profoundly deaf. They sometimes make a special trip for sports events, recalling with great enthusiasm their memories of Murray winning at Wimbledon: ‘the atmosphere here was fantastic . . . it was actually better than being at Wimbledon . . . because you could see everything’ (Aggie). Maurice and many others who were inter- viewed stated quite simply that the ‘big screen’ makes a difference; that they would visit the square if it wasn’t there, but not so frequently, and they wouldn’t stay so long. The telly-watching both adds to the interest of their time in the square, and also tacitly legitimises their long-stay presence, not loitering but lingering. It is there to be watched. The big telly provides a gateway to ‘multiple elsewheres’ (Gidley 2013), but this is not at odds with an engaged presence in the square. Fieldnote [Esther, interview via translator, July]: Vikash likes to go to South London College on a Tuesday to pick up a copy of the free Nepalese newspaper. He likes to read this and sit in a group and watch the big screen on Tuesdays – this is a time that makes him feel, ‘at peace’. He likes to see people from all over the world, he finds watching the diversity of people entertaining. Sitting outside 5 ISSN 0020-2754 Citation: 2017 doi: 10.1111/tran.12212 © 2017 The Authors. Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Royal Geographical Society (with the Institute of British Geographers). In this weekly ritual, Vikash describes engaging with two forms of media, his own group of friends and the wider flow and mix of people around him; and the combination of foci and activities engenders a feeling of ‘peace’ – a personal, reflective state. Sitting outside, a field of vision is provisional, shifting. Bench-space allows for both connection and momentary solitude. Conviviality and perceptions of difference Maurice comes alone to the square and sits on one of the benches, as he does most days. He wouldn’t say that he comes to this place for companionship, but he gets drawn into conversations. ‘It’s funny, because when you sit here, people come up to you and talk to you, complete strangers. Some time I tell them though [under breath] “fuck off”‘, but he also recounts amiable interactions, such as when watching a recording of Usain Bolt tear round the 2012 Olympic track on the big telly. ‘A girl sat next to me and asked if me if I was Jamaican, and said how she wished she was also Jamaican’. For those meeting friends in the square, it is a venue for everyday conversations. Overheard conversations ranged from the relative merits of Turkish and Qatar airlines, growing plants from seed and children’s birthday celebrations. ‘And we come here hanging with friends, chill out and that’s it really, init, that’s it really’ (Joe, 18 years old). Home environments, for reasons of size, privacy or flexibility, do not accommodate these groupings; the generosity of the bench space allows appropriation of public space for sort-of private conversations. These can enable bridging across difference. Mel, a self- identified ‘Woolwich Albanian’ in her twenties, who often spends afternoons in the square with her two well-groomed dogs, recounted how an instinctive friendliness towards these dogs provided her with ‘a starting point’ and she now feels that within this place she ‘has made a lot of friends’. Difference in Woolwich is interpreted through ‘multiplicities, potentials and practices’ of social iden- tities (Wilson and Darling 2016, 1): intersections of identity; ethnicity overlayed with length of residence, class and occupations. In the ebb and flow of incidental interactions, convivial behaviours can and do bridge these, reflecting both a ‘commonplace diversity’ (Wes- sendorf 2013) and an everyday pragmatism of what it means to live in this area. Fieldnotes [Ben, July]: While we sat there we witnessed a boy (about fourteen) walking with friends, all black boys in school uniform. He swore as he passed an older white man, in his 60s, who was sitting with other white men of a similar age, all drinking beer from 99p cans. The man shouted after the boy. A couple of minutes later the boys came back and the boy who had shouted apologised and shook hands with the man. The man accepted the apology, gently tugging the boy’s tie and saying ‘you can’t wear a posh school uniform like this and go around doing things like that’. The visibility of difference is undeniable, but there are times when it becomes more explicit, a known and knowing ‘throwntogetherness’ (Massey 2005). Maurice remembered laughing when he saw the array of flags brought to the square by people watching the football World Cup; ‘you thought ahh, I didn’t know there were Uruguayans in Woolwich’. These kinds of cultural events are talked about by many as bringing people together. But ethnic difference was mostly unremarked on (while acknowledging the limitations of our one season timeframe in building trust for more difficult conversations). Casual descriptions of nationality and colour of skin are used to describe situations and as shorthand for group identities. The ‘Nepali elders’ (a term used by Greenwich Inclusion Project) have an unusually distinct visual identification due to their numbers, language and clothing. They commonly, though not exclusively, sit in large fluid groupings on the back edge benches of the square. ‘Nepalese Isle’ Maurice calls it, not unkindly. It is another ‘large group’ of bench-users who most clearly exemplify these intersections, and in particular ‘how class is lived as a complex structure of feeling with networks of interaction as well as structural dimen- sions’ (Back 2015, 833). They are well known locally; a white multi-generational family group, a mix of parents, grandparents and children who spend long periods of time in the square on a daily basis. Other users of the square reported feeling uneasy around this group, referring to drinking of alcohol, smoking and leaving of rubbish, and recounted some incidental conflicts of a more sustained nature in the case of the male skate- boarders. However, this family group, in common with many others, uses Gordon Square as a location for everyday care and sociability, in particular as a place where young children can be cared for while the adults chat. The grandmother, Margaret, in her fifties, also sees the value of the square as a place of ‘general mixing’ and talks about striking up conversations with people she doesn’t know. Mix with all sorts of people. Like, you get to know different things, it could be something you already know that they said, or you could think ‘well, that’s something new that I have learnt today’. She notes how ‘the Gurkhas’ are also here on a daily basis, and some talk English, and if they don’t you’ve got someone who does, so you have a good conversation with them . . . You get to know lots of things around just by sitting here really. There are occasional flashes of ‘trouble’ in Gordon Square, some of which are specifically racially 6 Clare Rishbeth and Ben Rogaly ISSN 0020-2754 Citation: 2017 doi: 10.1111/tran.12212 © 2017 The Authors. Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Royal Geographical Society (with the Institute of British Geographers). motivated, an unsurprising co-existence of racism and multiculture (Back 1996). However, the thrust of the data, observations and interviews from Gordon Square strongly indicate that the space of the public square has the potential to support a positive experience of ‘un- panicked multiculturalism’ (Noble 2009, 51), mostly through acts of informal conviviality. For some, this allows conversations and learning. For others, it has a symbolic resonance: This place is absolutely marvellous, I love the multicultural aspect of it because here it really gives you hope for the future. Here is a start for ending all world wars. I’m not saying it is going to happen tomorrow, or even in our generation, but you’ve got to start somewhere haven’t you? (Aggie) This public presence and visibility of sitting outside has a fundamentally different impact (on both the group itself and the other users of the square) to sitting in a closed-off indoor location. This is explored in the following section as a dimension of self-care. A site for self-care Based on a review of geographical studies, Schwanen and Wang found that ‘access to green space . . . usually has a positive effect on well being and mental health . . . especially when woodlands and parks are visited at least once per week’ (2014, 836). These authors rightly attend to time and temporalities, acknowledging, for example, that wellbeing effects may be short in duration or tied to specific time periods (Crang 2001; Hudson 2015). However, Schwanen and Wang do not explore differences in how the same physical space may be subjectively experienced, the schizocartographies of nature connectedness (Capaldi et al. 2014; Richardson 2015). While for some Gordon Square is perceived as a busy town centre square with a few trees in it, for others it can be, at certain times and in particular seasons, a site of peaceful contemplation and getting away from it all. Many refer to it as ‘a park’. Being in the square with unknown others, watching them and noting the detail of their movement, their lunch, the interaction with their children, the way they smoke or laugh or snooze, this is the essence of what it means to sit on the benches in Gordon Square. A significant minority of visitors spend long periods of time here, regularly up to four hours, and this longevity of engagement is relevant in understanding intersec- tions of solitude and sociability, the importance of a wide and populated field of view, and even the role of the ‘big telly’. In the interviews, participants commonly volunteered understandings of the positive benefits of being outdoors for their own mental wellbeing. You don’t try and think about any problems or anything. You try and keep your mind occupied by looking around – you might see somebody running, or playing, or maybe some other bits and pieces . . . and keep your mind clear. (Bobby) The actions of sitting and watching and the entwine- ment of watching and thinking, combine for Bobby and others into a calmer way of being. This deliberate seeking out of space and time to be sometimes alone but alongside others in the green space of the square, and the health effects that may be experienced as a result, can be seen as acts of agency in spite of the context of austerity politics. Power and Bartlett examined how people with learning disabilities ‘self-build’ their own ‘safe havens’. ‘Self-building prac- tices are taken to mean the progressive forms of “agency” deployed . . . to take control of one’s own life’ (Power and Bartlett 2015, 4). The participants in their study often made their safe havens in ‘prosaic, less official public spaces in which individuals occupy and come into contact with others’ (Power and Bartlett 2015, 12; cf. Amin 2002). Temporality was important here too – rather than spaces being inherently inclu- sionary or exclusionary, participants evoked ‘moments of inclusion’ (Power and Bartlett 2015, 12; emphasis added). Addressing the urban public realm more broadly, this may shape an interpretation of sitting outside as an empowering appropriation, a place characterised both by caring and self-care (Bates et al. 2017). The framing of self-building safe havens is apt for interpreting the actions and values of Aggie and Lorna, the mother and adult daughter who bring their garden chairs to the square a few times each week and enjoyed seeing Murray win at Wimbledon. Unusually among the participants, they referred to having a garden at home, but this was described as a ‘lonely’ place to sit. The pair collaborate on creating what could be seen as a safe haven in the middle of Gordon Square for Lorna, who is profoundly deaf. Aggie discussed a range of contributing factors that she saw as having positive mental health effects: the relaxation of watching the big telly, the amount of ‘space’, the peaceful low-key interaction between people of ‘different cultures’, and the opportunity for Lorna to undertake short indepen- dent visits to familiar shops. Aggie had come to know people by sight and would exchange the occasional smile or wave. She felt this was a ‘blessing’ and related to how she felt the square could contribute to peaceful coexistence in the world. This multi-scalar construction of a safe haven resonates with Tronto’s definition of care as agentic, the ‘weaving’ of a ‘complex, life- sustaining web’ (1998, 15). Mental health and physical health were often discussed in combination and in contrast to an indoor domestic environment. Maurice also visited the square regularly and alluded both to the positive effect on his general wellbeing and on a specific health issue. Being Sitting outside 7 ISSN 0020-2754 Citation: 2017 doi: 10.1111/tran.12212 © 2017 The Authors. Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Royal Geographical Society (with the Institute of British Geographers). outside made him feel better, and walking to and beyond the square made him fitter: It’s boring sitting at home: you can only read so much, eat so much, drink so much. And in the end you think is this all there is? I come out basically to see people, people walking about, all walks of life and basically to get a bit of exercise. . . Bobby, like Maurice, a middle-aged man and frequent visitor to the square, made a direct connection between the atmosphere in the square on the one hand and his mental and physical health on the other. Being home by myself all day is very depressing . . . I’d rather come out here, spend a couple of hours. That will improve my health condition and makes me feel more happy. I would not go home depending on sleeping tablets to sleep in the night. When my body is more relaxed, I can sleep more comfortable. While Power and Bartlett’s study addressed self- building as an individual (or supported) action, we suggest that the affordances and characteristics of Gordon Square may also be conceived as a collective safe-haven for the Nepali elders, ‘built’ through their own preferences for outdoor places and sociable networks. As Atkinson argues, some writers on self- care ‘underplay the role of others . . . [and] an attentive care that may be associative rather than reflexive’ (2011, 625). There’s a lot in the heart when I am home alone. I keep thinking about where to go and I feel restless. When I am outside with my friends, talking and laughing, I forget about everything else and feel at peace. (Sarita) Again this connects conviviality and self-care. Though Sarita and Prithvi chatted about the sadness of not being able to speak English to make friends, they also recognise the value of other forms of connection and the importance of small acts of care for others: On a day such as this, while roaming around this park, if you see a thousand faces then it is good for you. My ancestors used to say that. It might be so. And if you meet a person who does not look good on the street but you exchange a few words and smile, it feels very good. (Sarita) The ‘big telly’ can be significant in this collective process too. Our fieldwork period included the event of the earthquake in Nepal in April 2015. Papastergiadis et al. (2013, 338) discuss large urban screens as pivot points ‘at which private and public spheres interact and from which the cosmopolitan vision unfolds’, and this may be specifically true with regard to news broadcasts. For a week or so, scenes of devastation were a rolling background for the everyday activities of Gordon Square, and a source of transnational emotional connection and information for the Nepali community in Woolwich. Undoubtedly, the role of Gordon Square as a gathering point for the older Nepalis, and as a place in which they are clearly visible as local residents, was strengthened during this time by the global connections visibly articulated by the news channels on the screen. Gordon Square became a site of caring within the Nepali community, but their presence here also engaged a more structural connection of support from the broader population of Woolwich, a location of empathy that led to fundraising activities and setting up of collection points. It seems reasonable to suggest that these activities were made more likely due to the visible shared experiences and connective resources of Gor- don Square. In discussing the functionality and resources of the square, we now consider more closely the role of the design of the square and its benches. ‘Touching experiences’ of bench design In the previous three sections we focused on the experiential qualities of everyday appropriations of public space – the gradients of solitude and sociabil- ity, the paired dynamics of conviviality and racism, and the ways in which individuals find temporary respite and restoration within the busyness. In this final empirical section, we take a turn towards materiality. The multi-disciplinary methodological approach of this research allows an informed critique of the design of benches. ‘Look how long my legs are yeah? For me to sit here I’m practically at a right angle, but up here just nice’ (Joe). Joe and Mohsin sit close together, trainer to trainer, on the broad back wall of the granite bench that runs along the eastern edge of Gordon Square. Over the hours they spend there each day they are joined in fluid clusters of friends and acquaintances, gathering round, standing, smoking, drinking, phone checking. The design of the back of the bench is important, a generous 30 cm wide sitting space, which also acts as retaining wall for a large planter of mixed shrubs. A range of people, not only young men, sit ‘up’ on these back edge benches. It provides a good vantage point and there are other benefits: feet are out of the way of passers-by and it is easier to chat with people standing nearby. The long granite benches in Gordon Square were intentionally designed by Gustafson Porter to be integral to the infrastructure of the square, accommo- dating the level change of the terraces, unable to be taken out in response to future management cuts or complaints. The detailing is thoughtful – backs angled at 9°, generous depth, intermittent armrests, kick backs (underhangs which allow feet to recess behind the knees) – all contribute both to accessibility and the comfort of people sitting here for hours at a time. ‘I got to say, these seats are good, we cannot do any better than this . . . it’s a very solid seat’ (Bobby). Before sitting, individuals make micro-observations to inform the decision of where to sit, weighing up 8 Clare Rishbeth and Ben Rogaly ISSN 0020-2754 Citation: 2017 doi: 10.1111/tran.12212 © 2017 The Authors. Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Royal Geographical Society (with the Institute of British Geographers). prospect, shelter and proximity to favourable or unde- sirable neighbours. Fieldnotes [Esther, June]: Bobby had chosen a bench on the edge of the square, opposite and with a clear view of the Big Screen . . . on the right hand side next to an armrest. Fieldnotes [Esther, interview with interpretation by Sam- prada, July]: When choosing a place to sit down he [Vikash] assesses who is sitting where first before choosing where to sit himself. He tries to sit away from drunk people in the square, wherever they are not around, he will go and sit. He dislikes the drinking and noise that these groups make. So I usually find myself, anyway, sitting near the TV to watch the tennis. I don’t like smoking, so the reason I’m sitting here is that I was sitting and a lady came and started smoking so I moved along and another bloke came and started to smoke so I thought let me move over there because I don’t like smoking, I have to walk away. I don’t like the smell. (Maurice) Proximity to others is a necessity of urban living (Amin 2012; Sandercock 2003; Wilson and Darling 2016); it is keenly felt and (mostly) valued in Gordon Square. But personal space is also relevant; ‘[A]n increased aware- ness of one’s body in space and in relation to others is inevitable’ (Wilson 2011, 638, on sitting on buses; see also Bissell 2007), so the size of the square and the relatively high number of places to sit is significant. There are options to sit further away from groups or people felt to be intimidating or unpleasant. In discussing urban smoking, Tan describes the ‘socio- spatial stratifications of odorous bodies’ (2013, 55), resulting in dynamic micro-geographies of negotiation. Prospect refuge theory of landscape preference (Apple- ton 1975) highlights the importance of ‘edge condi- tions’ that allow a view, but also security. In a dense urban context such as Gordon Square, this may be less related to physical protection and more to a socio- sensory response which enables avoidance from irrita- tion triggers such as smoke, loud conversations, swear- ing or drinking. The visual openness of the square enables this process to largely be conducted discretely; an ethos of civility informs good manners. It is better to seem to randomly choose to sit at a distance than find yourself needing to shift away. The details of architectural design affect social and physical comfort or discomfort, echoing Pallasmaa’s placement of bodies in the city. [E]very touching experience of architecture is multi-sensory: qualities of space, matter and scale are measured equally by the eye, ear, nose, skin, tongue, skeleton and muscle. (2005, 41; cited by Degen 2014, 98) For the users of the Gordon Square benches, the contact of skin and bench was a regular point of discussion. Margaret is a daily user of the square ‘They’re hard and painful when you sit on them for a while, you get a hard bum [laughs]’. The need for shade was a common point even during the mild summer weather of 2015, and highlights the importance of microclimate in shaping the pleasures of sitting outside. The benches are made of granite, a material chosen for durability and ease of maintenance. Maurice recounted When they were doing it I had a few arguments with the blokes here . . . because in Peckham when they did the square at the same time they put wooden backs . . . I would have thought they’d put wooden backs here [too] but the blokes said, ‘this is Woolwich mate, you don’t wanna put wood down in Woolwich, people come and nick it’. Though this implies a stigma relating to the need for robust materials, the choice of granite has different connotations to cheap vandal-proof street furniture in metal or recycled plastic, and reflects contemporary sleekness in aspirational urban design, the aesthetics of gentrification. However, this doesn’t negate the coldness of touch. ‘Cold bums’ was an English phrase learnt by a group of Nepali elders during the process of this research. Thermal comfort is noticed by many people sitting on benches, but is especially important to those who sit outside for longer periods of time and on less than sunny days. A regular practice of some of the Nepali women was to either bring cushions from home, or, more commonly, to source some food packaging or newspaper from the market stalls and use this as a protection from the chill. The action of sitting is one that unifies site users, but also differentiates their experience according to the par- ticularities of their own bodies, preferences and priorities (Degen 2014). Limitations and discomforts in the design resolution may be noticed by all square users, but the attention paid by our schizocarto- graphic approach to differentiated embodied subjec- tivities showed these were more important to ‘longer stay’ bench sitters, often those marginalised from a wider choice of collective environments of work or leisure. Benches clearly do not exist in isolation. Gordon Square is council owned, properly ‘public space’, and is typical of many centrally-located public spaces, with an expensive coordinated system including CCTV surveil- lance, police patrols, daily cleaning and the near constant presence of town wardens who patrol the square from early morning until six in the evening. ‘Responsible drinking’ is allowed, littering carries a fine and skateboarding is forbidden but tacitly accommo- dated around the edges. Since the redevelopment (with associated higher levels of management and surveil- lance) it is highly likely that some activities and people, particularly those engaged in drug use, have been displaced to lower profile outdoor locations (Bates 2017, 67; and reflecting Minton 2009). Sitting outside 9 ISSN 0020-2754 Citation: 2017 doi: 10.1111/tran.12212 © 2017 The Authors. Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Royal Geographical Society (with the Institute of British Geographers). However, many who were in the position to compare the current site with the previous square design said that they now felt more able to spend time here. The Alone together film gives witness to the mundane inclusivity of presence in the square. Women and elderly people on their own use the square, at least during daytime hours, a common litmus test for a perception of safety (Project for Public Spaces nd). A broad range of people can and do hang out here: men and women who are alcohol dependent, who have mental health issues, who in some cases would not manage or want to conform to the codes of behaviour required of indoor public resources such as libraries. Attending to distinctions between outdoor and indoor public spaces is relevant. Though resources such as libraries are commonly framed as key sites of inclusion (Fincher and Iveson 2008), our findings imply that for some, patterns and preferences of socialising exemplified by the use of Gordon Square are better supported by the flexibility and openness of outdoor locations. A focus on benches allows the design of the square to be addressed through haptic relationships, corporeal understandings that frame the ‘right to pause’. In our conclusion we revisit these connections; how a percep- tion of safety and an experience of comfort and conviviality can ease negotiation across difference (Wilson and Darling 2016, 3–4). Conclusion Public squares in cities involve micro-climates of association [that] are never singular or fixed, but rather entail multiple connections between past, present and future and are continuously reworked as different rhythms and temporal- ities converge in urban space. (Pickner 2016, 80, 82) Through attending to and participating in ‘bench conversations’, this research has undertaken a embry- onic schizocartography of Gordon Square: a position- ing of bodies sitting in various ways, a validation of the subjectivity of various moments, and a curating of a conversation between processes of landscape architec- ture and the daily lives of the square’s users. The co- produced nature of the research aided critique and identification of multi-scalar relationships; dynamics of gentrification encompassing top-down corporate-led regeneration and the individual micro-spaces of sitting, smoking and chatting on granite benches. The choice to sit on a bench for longer periods can be circumscribed by outcomes of marginalisation – how hours are passed (time rich, time poor) and the affordances or limitations of a home environment as commonly shaped by income and health. But our fieldwork suggests a more complex dynamic that evokes dimensions of care, self-care and the relevance of being present in the messy interactions afforded by a busy civic place. We extend Massey and Thrift’s framing of ‘the press of embodiment’ as a means of approaching ‘the relationship between self-care and space’ (2003, 288), proposing that the nature of sitting outside in a public space is both deeply personal, ‘touching experi- ences’ of a body seeking a place to pause, and a tacit claiming of belonging within a collective context. The act of caring for oneself becomes tangible through a sequence of seat choices: sitting further away from noise or cigarettes, positioned alongside family or friends, related to provisions of shade, back support or sightlines. Such mundane choices shape an act of ‘occupation’, not necessarily one of resistance or outrage, but conceivably an agentic act, although in the context of structural inequalities, to find a moment of self-care, even a desire for being among others. A comfortable bench, in a safe and interesting location, potentially affords one facet of living in the world ‘as well as possible’ (Tronto 1998, 15). Within a context of health inequalities and longstanding pressures on social care, sharply felt in ‘deprived’ locations such as Woolwich, we suggest that this relationship between ‘self-building of moments of inclusion’ (Power and Bartlett 2015, 12) and architectural practice may shape some specificity into the means by which caring is ‘designed into being’ (Bates et al. 2017, 97). Bench-sitting is not sentimentally divorced from negotiations of equity and uneven belongings. In this paper we have addressed the dynamics of interaction: not merely sitting but also watching, questioning, reading, friend-making, parenting. What does a focus on sitting still (or still-ish) add to understandings of conviviality within a site shaped by corporate-led regeneration, gentrification, marks of imperial history and ongoing racisms? Conviviality should not be framed to be easy, but it may be broadly ‘at ease’ – specifically with difference (Wise and Velayutham 2014, 167), and it is productive to probe deeper into this notion of ease within urban outdoor environments. The observant viewfinder of the film rests on the seated against a twitchy backdrop of passers-through. Yet the square is not merely a functional interchange but a valued place, due in most part to the acts of people staying put. Conversations are longer (between those sitting) or fleeting (seated to passers-by), nods and acknowledgements not necessarily needing a common language beyond the ability to ‘exchange a few words and smile’ (Sarita). Even those who perceive their sitting as solitary loosely expect unexpected interactions ‘because when you sit here people come up to you’ (Maurice). Mostly these are ‘starting points’ (Mel) without longevity, but seemingly cumulative, ‘you get to know lots of things around just by sitting here really’ (Margaret). So Wilson and Darling’s proposal of ‘the city as a site where strangers can mingle without the desire for homogeneity or idealised notions of 10 Clare Rishbeth and Ben Rogaly ISSN 0020-2754 Citation: 2017 doi: 10.1111/tran.12212 © 2017 The Authors. Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Royal Geographical Society (with the Institute of British Geographers). community’ (2016, 3) is refined, sharpened here to a micro scale and the presence of people choosing to sit in relative proximity. Wilson (2016) argues that encounter fundamentally has the potential to surprise, disrupt and make a difference to people. By attending to the voices of bench-sitters, we have articulated this difference through narratives of care, humour, com- panionship, irritation, peacefulness and belonging. A bench here functions not as a still point, but a mundane nexus of un-panicked multiculturalism (Noble 2009). A paper about benches cannot be purely about sitting still. The communal context defies this, always requiring a return not only to the interaction between individual bodies and ‘everyone else’, but also to the multiple temporalities and subjectivities of urban publics. Even as corporate developers seek high rent- payers to increase their profits in the longer term, for now, during the early years of redevelopment, Wool- wich centre continues to be used by all, including people who are likely to be pushed out later by the pincer movement of gentrification, spiralling housing costs and benefit cuts (Peck et al. 2013; Watt and Minton 2016). As such, our findings have implications for policy and public space practice (Bynon and Rishbeth 2016). Public space design that facilitates a mix of activities, comfortable for longer-stay users and accommodating a flow for those ‘just pausing’, can provide a broadly inclusive place within an urban locality. Choice of where to sit is important in supporting a personal agency, easing the mostly unspoken practicalities and challenges of proximity to unknown others. We suggest that lived negotiations of care and conviviality are not only shaped by these ‘material affordances of the built environment’ (Degen and Rose 2012, 3278) but importantly enable ‘counter- memories that challenge normative narratives’ (Wilson and Darling 2016, 6). Temporal imprints of these become part of the materiality of the square, noted by contrasting the 2015 film stills with the publicity images taken immediately after the redesigned square’s com- pletion in 2011: worn grass, the mark of a beer can and the scuff of a skateboard. The act of designing, the top- down architecture of care, is partial. The square is never seen in the purity of the proposed masterplan but re-encountered, re-evaluated, re-purposed on each day and on each visit, a co-production of place: designed, managed and inhabited. Acknowledgements Many thanks are due to all members of the project team for their creative, thoughtful and intellectual contributions to The Bench Project, in particular to Esther Johnson, Samprada Mukhia and Jasber Singh for their roles in fieldwork drawn on in this paper. We are grateful to Helen Wilson for insightful comments on an earlier draft, and to TIBG reviewers for their constructive feedback. This paper is based on research funded by the UK Arts and Humanities Research Council, grant reference AH/M006107/1. Notes 1 For example, the population of Woolwich’s Riverside ward grew by 50 per cent between 2001 and 2011 (Bates 2017, 58). 2 All participants’ names are pseudonyms. 3 ‘Not a dicky-bird’ is colloquial English and in this context means having no possessions. 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work_etg45o6zbnatpobdmsawtzz7hm	----	©2013, ALL RIGHTS RESERVED ISSN: 1555–7855 38 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF BEHAVIORAL CONSULTATION AND THERAPY 2013, VOL. 7, NO. 4 Providing Counseling for Transgendered Inmates: A Survey of Correctional Services Kara Sandor von Dresner1, Lee A. Underwood2, Elisabeth Suarez2, and Timothy Franklin3 1Harvard Medical School Department of Psychiatry, 2Regent University School of Psychology and 3Argosy University Along with the rise of the multicultural move- ment, growing interest in transgender treatment has spread through the mental health and criminal justice community. Over the past 20 years, research has focused on the etiological aspect of transgen- derism. Yet, almost no attention has been directed toward practice and policy standards for this pop- ulation in correctional facilities. While thousands of individuals experience distress or dysphoria concerning their gender identity each year, little progress has been made in achieving standards of care, effective treatment models and programs for training correctional administrators and providers. Individuals with transgender needs (assessment, housing, and treatment) have been largely ignored despite that they remain a key minority population at risk to experience suicide, depression, and hate crimes (Lev, 2004). Many of these individuals are marginalized into areas with high rates of crime, poverty, and drug dealing and abuse. Consequently, transgenders have an increased risk of getting in- volved in the criminal justice system and commit- ted to correctional facilities (Blight, 2000). Although there is no reliable estimate of the per- centage of prison inmates currently requiring trans- gender or transsexual treatment, there is a signifi- cant correlation with criminal behavior (Peterson, Stephens, Dickey, & Lewis, 1996; Walinder, Lund- strom, & Thuwe, 1978), specifically among those experiencing gender dysphoria (Peterson et al.). Other researchers suggest this correlation is a “con- sequence” due to social intolerance in conjunction with comorbid pathological symptoms (Shaylor, 2009, Peterson et al, 1978). As such, an estimated 40 percent of transsexual individuals have been in- volved with prostitution (Hoenig, Kenna, & Youd, 1970; Blight, 2000). Criminal justice administrators and mental health providers are faced with the challenges that arise when dealing with individuals with transgender concerns. Although the literature addressing assess- ment, housing and treatment needs of transgen- dered inmates is limited, administrators and pro- viders must be systematic in their responses. There is a realistic expectation on the criminal justice sys- tem to ensure effective services for transgendered inmates while in correctional facilities. This creates a burden on the corrections system as these admin- istrators and providers are hampered by non-sys- tematic approaches and practices for managing and treating this population (Richard, 2000). Despite literature which correlates criminal be- havior and gender identity disorders (transsex- ual, transgender) with disproportionately high prevalence rates of transsexuals within the cor- rectional system, few studies have been conduct- ed to suggest appropriate models of treatment for transgendered inmates. Numerous studies report transgendered inmates suffer considerably more problems than general population inmates. These include rape (Banbury, 2004), blackmail (Banbury, 2004; Knowles, 1999), contraction of HIV or other sexually transmitted diseases (Stephens, Cozza, & Braithwaite, 1999), relapse or increase of psycho- logical symptoms (Banbury; Knowles; Peterson et al., 1996), lack of social support, limited or inade- quate mental health treatment, denial of hormonal therapy (HRT) (Peterson et al, 1996), and death due to hate crime (Knowles, 1999). Yet the population remains virtually ignored by current researchers. Corrections play a significant role in coordinating treatment services for transsexual and transgender inmates. When inmates with transgender issues are committed to correctional facilities, these in- stitutions should be required to provide effective, adequate, and compassionate care. Sufficient care requires the application of empirically support- ed interventions; however there are few empirical studies which demonstrate best practices for the clinical management of transgendered persons con- fined in correctional facilities. This study surveyed the current assessment, hous- ing and mental health treatment provisions provid- ed to transsexual inmates within state correctional facilities. The literature reviewed epidemiology, prevalence, assessment, and current standards of care. Implications for correctional administrators and mental health providers as well as recommen- dations for future research are provided. � Epidemiology and Prevalence Epidemiology Although several studies seek to estimate the prevalence of transgenderism, there have been no national or world-wide efforts to determine the actual rates of transgenders. Although inter- national estimates differ, several studies indicate approximately 1:40,000 male to female (MtF) and 1:100,000 female to male (FtM) transgen- ders in the general population (Blight, 2000). Information provided by the DSM-IV-TR (2004) confirms these studies however; this estimate excludes transsexuals in early stages of develop- ment who have not fully actualized their gender identity and those who feel they can live as the opposite sex without undergoing surgery. This indicates that the actual numbers of transgenders and transsexuals may be understood. According to Shaylor, (2009) there was an estimated 50,000 post-operative MtF transsexuals within the Unit- ed States. Research indicates there is a higher prevalence of anatomically male transsexuals than female around 3:1 (Meyer, et al, 2001). It is hypothesized that be- cause FtM transsexuals do not receive the same social stigma as MtF, they less often seek treatment and are not accurately accounted for in estimates. Harry Benjamin reports in the Standards of Care for Gender Identity Disorders, Sixth Version, that FtM transsexuals tend to “be relatively invisible to culture, particularly to mental health professionals and scientists” (Meyer et al., 2001, p. 3). Evidence contrary to this ratio is reported in countries out- side the United States. International studies from Europe and Australia indicate that the ratio may be approximately equal (Beemer, 2006). Common Co-morbid Pathology Even the earliest literature pertaining to trans- genderism (Benjamin, 1964; Shively & DeCec- co, 1977; Stroller, 1978; Pauly, 1968) addresses the impact of co-occurring mental health and substance abuse issues.. Bockting and Coleman (1972) stress that it is imperative to distinguish co-occurring symptoms from gender-specific symptoms and that the efficacy of therapy de- pends on treatment of respective pathology. Co-occurring disorders commonly associated with transgender concerns include anxiety, de- pressive, substance-related, personality (Amer- ican Psychiatric Association, 2000), and eating disorders (Sumner, 2010). There are also high prevalence rates of autogynephilia, HIV infec- tion, and suicide attempt among the transsexual population (American Psychiatric Association, 2000). The potential severity of such comorbid pathology further illustrates the importance of provider competency, comprehensive assess- ment, and efficacious treatment. � Interrelated Terms Transgender According to Meyer et al. (2001), the term trans- gender was introduced between the publications of the DSM-III and DSM-IV. It is an umbrella term that refers to individuals who “have gender identities, expressions, or behaviors not tradi- tionally associated with their birth sex” (Gender Education & Advocacy, 2001). Transsexuals only account for a small percentage of the transgen- der population as the term also encompasses transgenderists (individuals who live part or full –time as the opposite sex but do not desire sexu- al reassignment surgeries), and intersex (patients born with atypical chromosomes, genitalia, or reproductive systems), and transvestites (Ke- nagy, Moses, & Ornstein, 2006). Many transgen- der individuals are MtF or FtM, however, some COUNSELING FOR TRANSGENDERED INMATES 39 ©2013, ALL RIGHTS RESERVED ISSN: 1555–7855 identify their gender as both male and female or neither male nor female. Gender Identity Disorder In 1994, the Subcommittee on Gender Identi- ty Issues replaced the DSM-III-R diagnosis of Transsexualism with the broader diagnosis of Gender Identity Disorder in the DSM-IV (Mey- er et al., 2001). According to the committee, the term Gender Identity Disorder (GID) was de- signed to suggest and allow for a “spectrum of gender dysphoria rather than discrete levels of symptoms” and should replace and encompass the DSM-III-R diagnoses of Gender Identity Disorder of Childhood, Gender Identity Dis- order of Adolescence or Adulthood, Nontrans- sexual Type, and Transsexualism (Bradley, et al., 1991; Vitale, 2006). Current diagnoses avail- able to consider when assessing an individual with gender identity or dysphoric issues in the DSM-IV-TR include Gender Identity Disor- der in Children (302.6), Adolescents or Adults (302.85), and Not Otherwise Specified (302.6; DSM-IV-TR, p. 582; Meyer et al., 2001). While a large percentage of empirical literature available pertains to the entire spectrum of GID presen- tation, the focus of the research in the paper will be on specifically on the pathology, adjustment, assessment, and treatment of MtF transsexuals. Transvestite Since the 1900s, the term transvestite has been specified to refer to a person who dresses or represents themselves as a member of the op- posite sex, but identifies as their biological sex. The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders – Fourth Edition (American Psychi- atric Association, 2000) offers the diagnosis of Transvestic Fetishism, which is described as a paraphilia that “involves cross-dressing by a male in a women’s attire” (p. 574). Transvestites, by definition, are heterosexual men, whose re- current sexual fantasies or urges to cross-dress cause them clinically significant distress or im- pairment in functioning (DSM-IV). Transsexual The term transsexual was used to refer to an individual who wanted to live as a member of the opposite sex. In 1980, Transsexualism was listed as a diagnosis in the Diagnostic and Statis- tical Manual of Mental Disorders – Third Edition (American Psychiatric Association, 1980) “gen- der dysphoric individuals who demonstrated at least two years of continuous interest in trans- forming the sex of their bodies and their social gender status” (Meyer et al., 2001). The term transsexual is currently understood as a person who identifies opposite of their anatomic sex, feels betrayed by their body, and often seeks to make their anatomic sex align with their gender identity through various surgical procedures and therapies. Vitale (2006) offers the definition “a state of existence in which one’s sense of gen- der identity differs markedly from that assigned at birth” (p. 2). Transsexualism is opposite to transvestism on the transgender spectrum proposed by Benjamin (Bullough, 2000; Benja- min, 1964) and differs greatly in motivation: a transvestite is a man who is sexually aroused by dressing in women’s clothing and a transsexual is a biological man who feels and believes he is a woman trapped in a man’s body. The terms (MtF) and (FtM) are used to denote respectively an individual’s anatomic sex to gender identity. � Assessment and Interventions When diagnosing individuals referred for trans- gender concerns, assessments are primarily completed through both observation and inter- view which is focused on both current clinical presentation and developmental history. Col- lateral sources may also be consulted or inter- viewed to verify criteria, including caretakers, family members, social workers, and medical/ mental health professionals. Although assess- ment is generally considered to be an ongoing process, the initial interview should also be used to screen for history of abuse, suicidality, and co- morbid pathology common to transgenderism, including anxiety, depression, social phobia, eat- ing disorders, and substance abuse. While sexual orientation and gender identity are considered separate issues in assessment, Harry Benjamin (1977) developed a Gender Disorien- tation Scale of six types based on Kinsey’s Sexual Orientation Scale. His model provides an insight- ful outline of typologies and presentation for prac- titioners to consider. According to Benjamin, the Type One patient (Pseudo Transvestite) identifies and lives as a male, but may find sexual arousal in occasionally cross-dressing. The Type Two patient (Fetishistic Transvestism) also lives and identifies as a man, but dresses more often as a woman and might wear female garments underneath male clothing. The Type Three patient (True Transves- tism) identifies as male, but with less conviction. He dresses consistently as a woman and may live accepted as female. He may seek hormonal or psychological therapy and may assume a double personality. The Type Four patient (Nonsurgical Transsexual) is often undecided about his gender identity. He dresses as a woman as often as possi- ble, but this does not effectively decrease his gender discomfort. He may be interested in gender reas- signment surgery (GRS), but does not request or admit it. The Type Five patient (Moderate Inten- sity True Transsexual) identifies as female, feels as if he is a female trapped in a male body, and often lives and works as a woman. He requests both GRS and hormonal therapy, but frequently rejects psy- chotherapy unless a condition to surgery. The Type Six patient (High Intensity True Transsexual) has urgently requested and obtained gender re-assign- ment surgery and identifies fully as female. He is usually receptive to psychotherapy and risks sui- cide or self-mutilation if he does not receive sur- gery (Benjamin, 1977). In addition to the Gender Disorientation Scale, Benjamin developed the Gender Identity Screening Tool, focused on the differentiation of transvesti- tism and transsexualism. It provides information on four axes and is, to date, the only widely-used assessment tool available to practitioners. It should be noted that the Gender Identity Screening Tool is used only for MtF transsexuals who are attracted to males and may be biased towards those who have had the resources to undergo electrolysis, hormone replacement therapy (HRT), or GRS (Benjamin, 1977). Although gender identity specific assessment tools have not proven necessary to accurately determine the presence of DSM-IV-TR or ICD-10 criteria, many mainstream tools may be used in research or to aid in more accurately identifying symptom- otology if needed. Some of these include: the Ror- schach (Exner System), the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory, and the Coolidge Person- ality and Neuropsychological Inventory, which contains a six-item gender identity disorder scale based on DSM-IV-TR criteria (Coolidge, Thede, & Young, 2002). It is also suggested that the Gender Disorientation and Gender Identity Screening Tool be adminis- tered to help define recommendations for treat- ment if indicated. Inmates exhibiting or reported comorbid pathology should complete personality traditional to correctional settings such as the Ror- schach or MMPI. Providers should be sensitive of issues more common to transgendered individuals such as: anxiety, identity disturbance, autogyne- philia, poor or distorted body image, family dis- cord, trauma history, and suicidality (Blight, 2000). Comorbid pathology should be treated separately with the most efficacious interventions available while keeping the overall mental health issue of gender dysphoria in mind. When conducting as- sessments, providers should maintain awareness of Axis II pathology, specifically antisocial personality disorder, and be careful not to provide a parasitic inmate with information needed to feign addition- al symptoms. � Treatment of Transgendered Individuals within the Community Current Standards of Care Treatment of transgendered individuals requires a comprehensive bio-psycho-social approach often employing a team of multidisciplinary caregivers, including a general physician, en- docrinologist, plastic surgeon, psychiatrist, psy- chologist, electrologist, and social worker. The most widely referenced protocol of treatment for individuals with transgender issues was devel- oped by the Harry Benjamin International Gen- der Dysphoria Association (HBIGDA). Harry Benjamin (1885-1986) was a German sexologist and gerontologist who began treating transsex- ual clients with HRT before gender identity dis- order was recognized by mental health profes- sionals when gender dysphoric individuals were mainly diagnosed with schizophrenia (Benja- min, 1977). HBIGDA released the first version of the standards of care (SOC) in 1979 and continued integration of practice, research, and public policy into revisions published in 1980, 1981, 1990,, and 1998. The most current version (sixth, 2001) of the SOC includes sections ad- VON DRESNER, UNDERWOOD, SUAREZ, & FRANKLIN40 dressing: Introductory Concepts, Epidemiolog- ical Considerations, Diagnostic Nomenclature, The Mental Health Professional, Assessment and Treatment of Children and Adolescents, Psychotherapy with Adults, Requirements for Hormone Therapy for Adults, Effects for Hor- mone Therapy in Adults, The Real-Life Expe- rience (RLE), Surgery, Breast Surgery, Genital Surgery, and Post-Transition Follow-up. These sections can be grouped into five major clinical areas that should be addressed throughout the course of treatment: diagnostic assessment, psy- chotherapy, real-life experience, hormonal ther- apy, and surgical therapy (Lev, 2004). The SOC lists an “overarching treatment goal” of “psycho- therapeutic, endocrine, and surgical therapy” for individuals with transgender needs in order to promote “lasting personal comfort with the gendered self ” and to “maximize overall psycho- logical well-being and self-fulfillment” (Meyer et al., 2001, p. 2). The authors specify that, while the SOC provides guidelines for the spectrum of treatment modalities, not all individuals will re- quire physical therapy or surgery and treatment planning should be determined on an individual basis. Mental Health Individuals strongly identifying with the oppo- site sex, experiencing gender dysphoria, or liv- ing as a transsexual may benefit from an array of mental health services ranging from assess- ment to psychoeducation to intense psycho- therapy. Although the SOC specifies “psycho- therapy is not an absolute requirement for the provision of triadic therapy” (RLE, HRT, and GRS) or effective treatment of individuals with transgender issues, mental health intervention is needed to complete the first three clinical areas outlined (diagnostic assessment, psycho- therapy, and RLE) along with letters of recom- mendation from mental health professionals are required for HRT and GRS (Meyer et al., 2001, p. 13). Mental health services vary depending on the individual’s severity of dysphoria, develop- ment of identity, age of onset, and progression in treatment. Given the frequent occurrence of pathology comorbid to transgender concerns, such as anxiety, depression, substance abuse, personality disorders (DSM-IV-TR), and eating disorders(Shaylor, 2009), treatment may be con- tinued on a long-term basis even after GRS has been competed and the individual is living fully as their identified gender. Referral for Treatment Referral for mental health care of individuals with transgender concerns is often made during childhood by family members who worry that their feminized behavior and interests will have a negative impact on their lifespan development or the family’s reputation. Often parents are un- aware of the distinction between sexual orien- tation and gender identity believe their son is gay and needs to be “fixed,” whereas others seek supportive therapy or treatment for comorbid pathology associated with gender discomfort. Late-onset clients are usually self-referred, al- though some are referred by spouses or life part- ners who are disturbed by their cross-dressing behaviors or lack of interest in the traditional husband role. Transgender-Specific Models of Therapy With the understanding that gender identity issues do not function independent of comor- bid symptomotology, many providers rely on traditional techniques of treating anxiety or de- pression (such as psychodynamic or cognitive behavioral therapy) and attempt to extend these interventions to address or their client’s struggle with gender identity. The SOC indicates effec- tive psychotherapy should provide education, clarify options of transgendered living, improve relationships, explore identity, provide informa- tion about medical and legal resources, support and educate family and loved ones, and facilitate transition, in addition to decreasing problemat- ic symptomotology (Meyer et al., 2001; Rachlin, 2002). These requirements, in conjunction with the need of proficient, detailed knowledge of psychological, medical and psychosocial com- ponents of the transgender experience (Brown, 2001), raise the question of whether traditional theoretical orientations allow for comprehensive treatment. Since the early 1990s, four promis- ing transgender specific models of therapeu- tic treatment have been proposed, including; Harry Benjamin’s model proposed in the SOC (2001), Bockting and Coleman’s comprehen- sive five-task model (1992), Devor’s 14 Stages of Transsexual Identity Formation (2004), and Lev’s Stages of Transgender Emergence (2004). These models of treatment are based on years of clinical experience, treating transgender clients. Because they are only recently available to the mental health community, providers have inte- grated them into practice but no formal empiri- cal research has been published supporting their efficacy. Pharmacological Interventions Of the literature reviewed, no studies directly ex- amined the affects of pharmacological interven- tions on gender dysphoria or transgender issues. The consensus among transgender researchers and health care providers is to refer to main- stream literature for the most effective interven- tion strategies and integrate them into therapy utilizing standard protocol and considerations. Thus, if a client was exhibiting depressive symp- toms, the provider may suggest integrating an antidepressant into treatment, or if the client was experiencing clinically significant anxiety, a benzodiazepine may be considered. However, it is imperative for providers treating transgen- dered individuals to consider contraindications involved with these therapies. For example, hor- monal fluctuations or medications associated with HRT and GRS may negatively impact the effectiveness of traditional psychotropic med- ication (Israel & Tarver, 1997). As transgender specific treatment models become more widely applied and researched, literature concerning the affects of pharmacotherapy should also be addressed. � Current Treatment of Incarcerated Transsexuals Issues and Risks Specific to Inmates with Transgender Needs Recent research identified a significant link be- tween transsexualism and criminality, suggest- ing transsexual inmates are up to 10 times more likely to have committed multiple offenses in the general population (Peterson, Stephens, Dickey, & Lewis, 1996). Many studies correlate gender identity disorders with criminal behavior (Peter- son, Stephens, Dickey, & Lewis, 1996; Walinder, Lundstrom, & Thuwe, 1978), specifically among those experiencing gender dysphoria (Peterson, Stephens, Dickey, & Lewis, 1996). Disregard- ing etiological reasons for the development of antisocial tendencies among the transgender population, there is an apparent proportional need for housing and treatment of those who are committed to correctional facilities. Those creating models for treatment and housing must first assess risk-factors specific to the population that should be addressed. Although all inmates are at a risk of sexual assault, rape, and contracting HIV through sexual contact, the prevalence of sexual assault, sexual promiscu- ity, and associated risk-taking behaviors are con- siderable higher among transgendered inmates. A recent study by Stephens, Cozza, and Braithwaite (1999) examined a population of 153 inmates, 31 of which identified as transgendered. Transgendered inmates were found to be 5.8 times more likely to report having multiple sex partners in prison, two times more likely to have been tattooed while in prison, four times more likely to have received treatment for STDs while in prison, and two times as likely to have used injection drugs while in prison. Additionally, a separate study suggests an estimate of 40 percent of transgendered individu- als have been involved with prostitution (Hoenig, Kenna, & Youd, 1970). In addition to rape (Banbury, 2004), blackmail (Banbury, 2004; Knowles, 1999), contraction of HIV or other sexually transmitted diseases (Ste- phens, Cozza, & Braithwaite, 1999), transgendered inmates are also at a particularly high risk of re- lapse or increase of psychological symptoms (Ban- bury, 2004; Knowles, 1999; Peterson, Stephens, Dickey, & Lewis, 1996). Lack of social support, lim- ited or inadequate mental health treatment, denial of hormonal therapy (Israel, 2002; Peterson, Ste- phens, Dickey, & Lewis, 1996), psychosis, self mu- tilation (Israel, 2002), and death due to hate crime (Knowles, 1999) add to the list of problems to be considered by correctional management. Whether a transgendered inmate is perceived as attractive, weak, victimized, or is using her gender as a sur- vival mechanism, prison officials must account for COUNSELING FOR TRANSGENDERED INMATES 41 these occurrences and provide adequate housing, treatment, and supervision. Current Provisions within Correctional Facilities The term “freeze-framing” is largely the current paradigm of treatment for transgendered inmates. It is argued that inmates should maintain status quo of their physical presentation upon incarcer- ation for several reasons, including: prisons are artificial environments that do not accurately re- flect the outside community, it is difficult to assess symptomotology of transgenderism due to need for protection and possible malingering, and the difficulty of conducting an accurate real life test in an all-male, controlled setting (Peterson, Stephens, Dickey, & Lewis, 1996). While many argue Dickey’s freeze-frame policy provides the most protection and order while allowing those who have already begun HRT to maintain treatment, it condemns transgendered inmates with life sentences who were not previously diagnosed with gender iden- tity disorders to a life without adequate treatment. In addressing current treatment issues and pro- visions allowed to transgendered inmates Gianna Israel (2002) writes: Most prisons do not provide hormones, and some go to great lengths to avoid providing any treatment to transsexual inmates. Most trans- gendered inmates are not receiving appropriate medical and psychological care. Many repeat- edly seek medical treatment, often for years, while enduring administrative harassment and difficult court battles in the pursuit of basic medical and civil rights. Prisons that do pro- vide frequently have policies which allow for the treatment of those who were treated prior to incarceration, but fail to address the medi- cal needs of those who develop gender identity disorder during incarceration or who have no documented proof of their pre-incarceration transsexualism. [Prison officials] sometimes maintain that the prison does not afford the opportunity for the real life experience…conve- niently ignoring the fact that many MtF trans- sexual inmates consistently maintain their female identity year after year in an all male facility (p. 2). Based on the self-report of inmates and relating case law review, Israel projects a grim, but ac- curate, portrait of treatment of transgendered inmates in most correctional facilities. In the provision of safe housing and effective men- tal health treatment for transgenders, many aspects must be considered, including; single cell housing, maintenance of hormonal therapy, possible place- ment in female facilities, provision of clothing and undergarments, differing hygienic needs, protec- tion or seclusion from sexually aggressive inmates, and gender identity disorder-specific psychological and pharmacological treatment. Because treatment in correctional facilities is guided by litigation, of- ficials are reluctant to publish studies or release in- formation concerning policies or guidelines of the treatment of transgendered inmates. Of the research reviewed, only one study directly addressed policies within correctional settings. In 1996, Peterson, Stephens, Dickey, and Lewis pub- lished Transsexuals within the Prison System: an International Survey of Correctional Services Poli- cies, a study focused on the European community, as well as Australia, Canada, and the United States. Of the 103 15-item questionnaires sent out, 64 us- able questionnaires were returned, resulting in a re- sponse rate of 63%. The study concluded that only 20 percent of the 64 corrections departments sur- veyed used a formal model of policy for the treat- ment and housing of transsexual inmates. When questioned how a diagnosis or classification of transgender is obtained, 21 of the 64 respondents reported they used self-report as criteria, 29 report- ed assessment within the correctional facility, 24 reported they referred to previous diagnosis within the community, and 13 reported they used external gender consultants for assessment and diagnosis. Twenty nine respondents indicated they would continue previous HRT, 26 reported they would decide appropriateness of provision on a case by case basis, and 9 reported they would not continue HRT treatments. Fifty three jurisdictions reported GRS would never be considered and 11 indicated it might be an option in specific circumstances. With regard to mental health services and hous- ing, 52 of the 64 respondents indicated they would provide standard counseling available to the entire prison population and only 12 reported they of- fered specialized mental health services for trans- gendered inmates. As for placement based on the inmate’s security, 52 respondents endorsed they would provide housing on a case by case basis, 25 of these considering placement in the general pop- ulation. Only 22 indicated protective custody as on option in deciding appropriate housing needs. The study reflects consistent difficulty in the assess- ment of transgendered inmates, suggesting num- bers presented to not reflect an accurate percentage of inmates with transgender concerns. Respon- dents (60%) who indicated they had no formal pol- icy based this decision on the premises that trans- gendered inmates would receive more adequate care if determined on an individual basis. Those who indicated they would deny transgendered in- mates HRT largely expressed doing so would make the inmate more feminine and a greater risk of physical or sexual assault. Across the board, place- ment was based on the inmate’s genital sex at the time of assessment; however, several jurisdictions indicated they would transfer inmates who under- went GRS to a female facility. The authors stress the confirmation of their hypothesis that almost all correctional facilities reported they provide no spe- cialized counseling or supportive therapy. � Method Procedures Surveys were mailed to 50 mental health direc- tors of each state’s correctional department. The mailing list was compiled by obtaining phone numbers from each state’s website and then calling the mental health department to obtain a current mailing address. In many cases, the acting director was available by telephone. Fifty questionnaires were mailed, including pre-ad- dressed and stamped envelopes. Two months later, a follow up letter was sent, containing a second copy of the questionnaire. Of the 21 re- sponses received, 18 were fully completed ques- tionnaires. The other 3 responses indicated that the states were not able to respond due to on- going litigation concerning transgender issues. No further information was provided. Surveys were sent exclusively to state-level mental health services departments rather than individual prisons or jails. One state forwarded copies of the questionnaire to each facility in an effort to compile the most accurate information. Participants Participants in this study included 18 out of 50 state mental health directors of correctional sys- tems. The majority of the mental health directors were psychologists, however, in some states the psychology department is a division of general health services and the surveys were completed by physicians. The survey included open and closed ended questions and was administered to the mental health directors as they reported on assessment, housing, treatment and training practices and then expressed their opinions on best practices. Additionally, they were invited to share further information they felt should have been addressed by the questionnaire and if they could be contacted. No items required information that could be used as identifiers to link participants to the survey, maintaining an anonymous study in an effort to received higher response. Informed consent ensuring anonymi- ty and confidentiality, as well as instructions on how to complete and return the survey was in- cluded in the survey material. � Research Design Measures A 16-item survey was developed to obtain in- formation about current methods of treatment and policies used by correctional facilities. The survey was comprised of 12 binary response (yes or no) questions with follow-ups for fur- ther explanation depending on the question, in addition to three free form questions. All text responses were coded and categorized. The bi- nary and categorized responses were then ana- lyzed descriptively to find trends by examining every binary data point and free form question for quantitative association between addressing special needs against lower risk factors. Issues addressed by the survey were determined to be need-based through discussions with mental health providers within a southeastern Department of Corrections and review of current literature ad- dressing norms and legal precedent. Items included general, housing, assessment, and treatment issues specific to transgendered inmates, using both open and closed questions. The survey also included an item that encouraged respondents to share in- formation which they felt should have been more adequately addressed by the survey, to which eight clinical directors responded. VON DRESNER, UNDERWOOD, SUAREZ, & FRANKLIN42 Results A total of 50 questionnaires were sent out and 18 usable were received with a response rate of 42%. Of the 18 states that provided usable responses, 45% reported they had no inmates who meet full criteria for gender identity disorders in any facil- ities. Of the 10 states that indicated incarcerating transsexual inmates, 6 states reported less than 5 inmates with transgender issues; 1 state report- ed awareness of seven inmates with transgender concerns, and 3 states reported awareness of be- tween 14 and 20 inmates with transgender con- cerns. 45% of respondents indicated they were aware of several additional inmates who met partial criteria of gender identity disorder or had not yet been formally diagnosed. Out of these 8 states, 5 indicated they could not estimate a number, 1 estimated over 15, another estimat- ed over 50, and the last estimated over 200. This accounts for an estimate 81 inmates who meet full criteria of gender identity disorder within 10 states and another estimated 265 inmates who meet partial criteria or have not yet been diagnosed within 3 states. Despite the fact that 10 states reported housing transsexual inmates, only 6 states endorsed having general guidelines specific to the assessment, treatment, and man- agement of transgendered inmates. Results concerning housing of transgendered in- mates indicated the extent of options was limited to single cells. 9 respondents (50%) reported that their state offered no housing provisions for inmates di- agnosed with gender identity disorder, 7 respon- dents (39%) reported their state offered single cells determined by safety needs on a case to case basis, and 2 respondents (11%) reported their states pro- vided housing on segregation units. Additionally, 1 state that provided single cells also provided the opportunity for transgendered inmates to shower separately from the general population. 12 states (67%) indicated they have no inmates diagnosed with gender identity disorders housed in mental health units (MHUs), 4 states (22%) indicated they housed between two and three transgendered in- mates in MHUs, and 2 states (11%) indicated they housed transgendered inmates in MHUs tempo- rarily as needed for acute symptoms or comorbid disorders. Every state that responded to the survey indicated they had no transgender specific or spe- cial housing units for transgendered inmates, one indicating that many transgendered inmates are housed on a special management unit. Concerning assessment and diagnostic procedures, 2 states indicated they had salaried employees whom they considered “transgender specialists” and 2 states (11%) indicated they worked with psy- chologists in private practice who have experience in transgender issues on a consulting basis. Of the 14 states (78%) that indicated they have no staff or consultant mental health professionals proficient with assessment and treatment of transgender con- cerns, one respondent reported his state consults with a university based endocrinologist for clients who receive HRT. 4 states (22%) indicated they had conducted between 2 and 10 evaluations to assess a diagnosis of transgender concerns, however, every state that responded denied having a standard bat- tery or assessment tool used in evaluation. 14 states indicated they do not administer or refer transgen- der specific evaluations. Regarding treatment, 17 states indicated they have no transgender specific programs or treatment methods. One state indicated there is transgender specific therapy available at every DOC facility in the state, but did not elaborate on what type of treatment or program was offered. 13 states denied providing provisions (such as female undergar- ments or hygiene products) to transgendered in- mates, one of which indicated such provisions were currently under consideration. 4 states indicated providing female undergarments or support bras and the last state indicated any provision would be provided if deemed “medically necessary” by a licensed psychologist or psychiatrist. 12 states reported providing HRT, 2 more states than indi- cated having inmates with transgender issues. Of these 12 states, 2 provide HRT to one inmate, 4 pro- vide HRT to between 2 and 5 inmates, one provides HRT to more than 5 inmates, one provides HRT to more than 25 inmates, and 4 did not provide a specific number. Overall, the most prominent obstacles reported by respondents were issues of housing, staff education, and treatment. 11 states (61%) indicated difficulty assessing the need for and providing single cells. Often, in these cases, transgendered inmates re- portedly end up placed in a higher security level than required or in a segregation unit with little social contact or privileges. Deciding whether to house a MtF transgendered inmate with breasts in a female or male facility and sexual activity were also raised as housing security issues. 8 states (44%) reported obstacles concerning the education of mental health staff, nurses, and correctional offi- cers about transgender specific concerns and relat- ed needs or pathology. Many of these states sited a “lack of understanding” as a significant issue, in- dicating controversy over the existence of the dis- order and frequent reports of verbal abuse by staff members. 7 states (39%) raised concerns about the efficacy of treatment provided to transgendered inmates, explaining that mental health staff is not familiar with transgender specific models of care or effective interventions. 5 states reported that they did not complete the questionnaire due to ongoing litigation, listed lawsuits and legal restraints as sig- nificant obstacles to providing adequate transgen- der treatment. Respondents were asked to list any intervention that had been effective in their facilities, which would be beneficial for other states to implement. Responses included: completing one-on-one con- sultations with medical staff and administration members to explain the criteria and treatment op- tions for individuals with transgender concerns; providing transgendered inmates with individual therapy to address comorbid personality disorders; building a consultation team composed of behav- ioral health psychologists, directors of nursing, medical doctors, health services directors, and oth- er site specific staff to consult regarding interven- tions and plans; acknowledging inmates who have transgender concerns closely monitoring them for persecution and retaliation; and continuing to provide HRT to inmates diagnosed and treat- ed for these concerns prior to incarceration. Four respondents (22%) recommended states should enhance transgender specific training available to staff members, including correctional officers and work supervisors. 5 of the 8 respondents stressed the issue of need- ing evidenced-based guidelines for the treatment of transgendered inmates that could be feasibly applied in a correctional setting, two of which sug- gested states should share their current policies of assessment, treatment, and management. � Discussion The purpose of this study was to survey the current assessment, housing and mental health treatment needs of transsexual inmates within state correctional facilities. The literature re- viewed epidemiology, prevalence, multiple uses of terms, assessment, and current standards of care. The results of the survey indicated not only a lack of psychological and physiological treat- ment, but also a consistent acknowledgement of discomfort with the lack of understanding about transgender specific issues. Fortunately, prison officials appear to be increasingly open to pro- viding services to transgender and transsexual inmates who require special consideration. . Re- sponses also indicated a need for standardized quality of care, education for staff interacting with transgendered inmates, and general physi- ological and mental health guidelines pertaining to specific psychological and medical therapies. � Assessment and Mental Health Services Mental health professionals working with trans- gendered individuals in correctional facilities should complete the 10 tasks outlined by the SOC. Basic standardized national level protocol would provide resources currently unavailable in some state institutions. Such protocols would allow states to share and develop groundbreak- ing methods in an age of limited resources. Tasks one and two (accurate diagnosis of the individ- ual’s gender disorder and comorbid pathology) should be addressed in a basic assessment pro- cess as discussed in the previous section. Task three (counseling the individual about treat- ment options and their implication) may be en- tirely limited by the providing institution. How- ever, if an inmate is found eligible or in need of psychotherapy (task four), the mental health professional providing treatment should discuss with the inmate what interventions and provi- sions are available within the facility. If deemed reasonably necessary for safety or health, it may be appropriate to transfer the inmate to an insti- tution better equipped to handle the treatment of gender identity disorders. Frequent lawsuits from transsexual and transgen- der inmates about reasonable standards of care make it reasonable for states to observe task five (ascertaining eligibility and readiness for hormone or surgical therapy) when providing treatment to COUNSELING FOR TRANSGENDERED INMATES 43 transsexual inmates. Again, the SOC eligibility cri- teria require a documented real life experience or extensive psychotherapy prior to hormone admin- istration. Readiness criteria also require consol- idation of gender identity during RLE or therapy, stable mental health with control of sociopathy, substance abuse, psychosis, and suicidality, and demonstrated evidence that the inmate will take hormones in a responsible manner. � Housing and Provisions The research determined that the largest trans- gender issue faced by corrections facilities is housing. Research indicates that transgender/ transsexual inmates face a greater risk in- mate-on-inmate physical and psychological harm when housed in the general population. However, because not all facilities offer single cell housing, transgender/transsexual inmates are often forced into mental health units, seg- regation, or special assignment units. This leads to a lower quality of life and a greater chance for comorbid symptoms because of the lack of services, social interaction, fewer privileges, and peer interaction. While the development of transgendered units seemingly solves several problems of safety and treatment, it also causes many others. First, trans- gender inmates may prefer to live in the general population, however, their motivations for doing so must be assessed (drugs, prostitution, etc). But, creating special units may attract malingerers and psychopaths who seek special privileges thereby creating a need for exceptional screening to be ac- cepted to a transgender unit. Also, states should de- velop more than one unit located in facilities of var- ied security levels across the state for transfer issues (enemies, institutional infractions, need to be clos- er to family, incident of being attacked or attacking others, level change, etc.). Until topics of housing have been further researched, states should provide the most protective and least restrictive arrange- ment available keeping in mind realistic budgetary and legal constraints. Several respondents also expressed frustration with lack of training and awareness for prison officials, correctional officers, mental health, and support staff about transgender issues. Seemingly all liter- ature stressed the importance of psychoeducation and training. A curriculum of awareness, budget planning, intervention, and identity specific issues should be researched further and presented to all prison staff during diversity trainings. Until trans- gender specific training for correctional settings is developed, mental health directors should assure that staff is familiar with the etiology, epidemiol- ogy, treatment, and management, Because screen- ing and assessment of individuals with transgen- der concerns understandably limited, these issues should be addressed at all levels of the corrections community; city, county, state, and federal. � Implications for Further Areas of Research Because research on the transgender population is in such an infantile stage, any well-conduct- ed, ethical research would be an appropriate addition to the current bed of literature. How- ever, analysis revealed several gaps which may be detrimental to the development or provision of “best care” practices to incarcerated transgen- dered individuals. Clearly, a training model and curriculum for cor- rectional staff concerning transgender issues is an immediate need. Information provided should in- clude the criteria of GID and how gender identity differs from sexual orientation, current etiologi- cal research, and assessment/treatment methods. Training should also address treatments available to transgendered individuals within the commu- nity, as well as, those which are offered within state facilities. Although correctional officers and support staff may not require as in depth clini- cal training as mental health professionals, they should understand RLE and be overtly sensitive to situations which could potentially put any inmate at risk of harm. Most correctional facilities train all employees to be cognizant of transference and countertransference issues when interacting with criminals and psychopaths. The transgender train- ing curriculum should equally address these issues with transsexual inmates. Staff should be encour- aged to explore any transference or counter trans- ference issues with supervisors or mental health staff with no fear of reprisal. Social implications of accepting transgender/trans- sexual inmates reach far beyond prison walls. Ar- guments can be made that prisons and detention centers are not places for social or political exper- iment. However, the reality is that larger popula- tions of inmates are presenting with issues beyond the normally seen. In this case, transgender and transsexual communities, who have long been out- cast, are now integrating into prison populations which forces prison management to address the psychosocial and medical needs of these individ- uals. Once taboo and relegated as an afterthought, this expanding community forces corrections staff, at all levels, to re-examine the safety and security for this group as it would for any other. But, be- cause research is in short supply, more articulate examination must be completed. Because this study had limitations, including a small sample population, and few respondents, similar surveys should be conducted to include individual prisons and jails rather than state level mental health executives. Future surveys should be designed to allow a greater response rate and more specific report of information. There is an emergent need for researchers to estimate a realistic preva- lence of gender identity disorders within correc- tional systems. Also, more research is needed to address the prevalence, assessment, and treatment of comorbid pathology. Studies should include the application of the SOC within correctional facilities and favorable revision should be tested and suggested where needed. Sim- ilarly, further research is needed on the feasibility and effects of embarking on the RLE while incar- cerated. Case studies should be documented and any effective related interventions should be shared nationally. 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work_euaxlwlfcvgjhh44ktbhfu2foa	----	Ethnic antagonism erodes Republicans’ commitment to democracy Ethnic antagonism erodes Republicans’ commitment to democracy Larry M. Bartelsa,1 aDepartment of Political Science, Vanderbilt University, Nashville, TN 37203-5721 Contributed by Larry M. Bartels, July 10, 2020 (sent for review April 29, 2020; reviewed by Donald R. Kinder and Paul Sniderman) Most Republicans in a January 2020 survey agreed that “the tradi- tional American way of life is disappearing so fast that we may have to use force to save it.” More than 40% agreed that “a time will come when patriotic Americans have to take the law into their own hands.” (In both cases, most of the rest said they were unsure; only one in four or five disagreed.) I use 127 survey items to measure six potential bases of these and other antidemocratic sentiments: par- tisan affect, enthusiasm for President Trump, political cynicism, eco- nomic conservatism, cultural conservatism, and ethnic antagonism. The strongest predictor by far, for the Republican rank-and-file as a whole and for a variety of subgroups defined by education, locale, sex, and political attitudes, is ethnic antagonism—especially concerns about the political power and claims on government resources of immigrants, African-Americans, and Latinos. The corrosive impact of ethnic antagonism on Republicans’ commitment to democracy under- lines the significance of ethnic conflict in contemporary US politics. ethnic antagonism | political polarization | support for democracy Political developments in the United States and around the worldhave drawn attention to the question of “how democracies die” (1). While the role of ordinary citizens in democratic backsliding is by no means settled (2, 3), concerns about “democratic deconsolidation” and “democratic erosion” have prompted renewed attention to public attitudes regarding democracy and democratic norms (4–7). The frailty of public commitment to democratic norms in the contemporary United States is illustrated by the responses of 1,151 Republican identifiers and Republican-leaning Independents* inter- viewed in January 2020 to survey items contemplating transgressions of a variety of essential democratic principles, including the rejection of violence in pursuit of political ends and respect for the rule of law and the outcomes of elections†. A majority of respondents (50.7%) agreed that “The traditional American way of life is disappearing so fast that we may have to use force to save it.” A substantial plurality (41.3%) agreed that “A time will come when patriotic Americans have to take the law into their own hands.” A near-majority (47.3%) agreed that “Strong leaders sometimes have to bend the rules in order to get things done.” Almost three-fourths (73.9%) agreed that “It is hard to trust the results of elections when so many people will vote for anyone who offers a handout.” In each case, most of those who did not agree said they were unsure; only 1 in 4 or 5 or 10 said they disagreed. These responses are detailed in Table 1.‡ Why do so many people endorse these undemocratic proposi- tions? Political scientists have mostly conceptualized democratic norms as “consensual” and interpreted lack of commitment to them as a product of insufficient social learning: “Those who are actively interested in political events should encounter little diffi- culty in understanding the principles on which the system oper- ates. Others, less discerning in their powers of observation, more circumscribed in their social roles and experiences, or perhaps more parochial in their perspectives, will be less likely to learn the norms” (ref. 9, p. 403). However, the antidemocratic sentiments reported in Table 1 are not primarily products of social isolation or insufficient education or political interest. Rather, they are grounded in real political values—specifically, and overwhelmingly, in Republicans’ ethnocentric concerns about the political and social role of immigrants, African-Americans, and Latinos in a context of significant demographic and cultural change. Measuring Antidemocratic Sentiment Social scientists analyzing survey data from the 1950s documented the shaky allegiance of ordinary Americans to supposedly consen- sual democratic values. Prothro and Grigg found overwhelming majorities endorsing “the basic principles of democracy when they are put in abstract terms” but observed that “consensus breaks down completely” when “broad principles are translated into more spe- cific propositions” regarding, for example, the rights of communists, atheists, or Negroes (ref. 10, pp. 284–286). Less-educated people were especially willing to abandon democratic principles in specific cases; on average, 58% of those with low education but only 36% of those with high education expressed antidemocratic views. Significance Growing partisan polarization and democratic “backsliding” in vari- ous parts of the world have raised concerns about the attachment of ordinary Americans to democratic institutions and procedures. I find that substantial numbers of Republicans endorse statements con- templating violations of key democratic norms, including respect for the law and for the outcomes of elections and eschewing the use of force in pursuit of political ends. The strongest predictor by far of these antidemocratic attitudes is ethnic antagonism—especially concerns about the political power and claims on government re- sources of immigrants, African-Americans, and Latinos. The strong tendency of ethnocentric Republicans to countenance violence and lawlessness, even prospectively and hypothetically, underlines the significance of ethnic conflict in contemporary US politics. Author contributions: L.M.B. designed research, performed research, analyzed data, and wrote the paper. Reviewers: D.R.K., University of Michigan; and P.S., Stanford University. The author declares no competing interest. This open access article is distributed under Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial- NoDerivatives License 4.0 (CC BY-NC-ND). 1Email: larry.bartels@vanderbilt.edu. This article contains supporting information online at https://www.pnas.org/lookup/suppl/ doi:10.1073/pnas.2007747117/-/DCSupplemental. First published August 31, 2020. *Independents who report feeling closer to one party than the other generally think and behave much like partisans (8). Thus, Republican-leaning Independents are included along with Republicans in all analyses reported here. †The survey was conducted by the online survey firm YouGov. YouGov maintains a large opt-in panel of respondents, using a combination of matching and weighting to produce nationally representative samples. Vanderbilt University’s Institutional Review Board de- termined that the study posed minimal risk to participants and was exempt from the requirement for informed consent (IRB 192011). All analyses reported here are based on weighted data employing weights constructed by the YouGov staff. Further weighting the data to reproduce the distribution of 2016 presidential votes alters average levels of antidemocratic sentiment and the magnitudes of the key parameter estimates relating ethnic antagonism to antidemocratic attitudes by less than 1%. ‡Levels of agreement with the statements in Table 1 are inflated by the general tendency of survey respondents to agree rather than disagree with statements regardless of their content. However, the structure of the survey items arguably reflects the reality of dem- ocratic backsliding, which invites ordinary people to acquiesce in norm violations couched in terms of patriotism, tradition, and social order. My statistical analysis takes explicit account of the impact of acquiescence on response to these items. 22752–22759 | PNAS | September 15, 2020 | vol. 117 | no. 37 www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.2007747117 D o w n lo a d e d a t C a rn e g ie M e llo n U n iv e rs ity o n A p ri l 5 , 2 0 2 1 http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1073/pnas.2007747117&domain=pdf https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ mailto:larry.bartels@vanderbilt.edu https://www.pnas.org/lookup/suppl/doi:10.1073/pnas.2007747117/-/DCSupplemental https://www.pnas.org/lookup/suppl/doi:10.1073/pnas.2007747117/-/DCSupplemental https://www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.2007747117 McClosky found even sharper differences in support for the “rules of the game” between the general public and a sample of “political influentials”—national convention delegates and alter- nates. (An apparently unintentional echo of this finding appears in a recent study comparing support for a variety of democratic norms between the general public and a sample of “expert” political sci- entists; ref. 6.) He concluded that “it is the articulate classes rather than the public who serve as the major repositories of the public conscience and as the carriers of the Creed” (ref. 11, p. 374). These findings helped to spawn a substantial literature focusing on polit- ical tolerance of disliked groups (12); for the most part, however, the broader issue of public support for McClosky’s “rules of the game” was reduced to a fixation on support for democracy in the abstract, neglecting the crucial distinction between “broad princi- ples” and “specific propositions.” More recently, the limitations of Americans’ commitment to specific democratic norms has begun to come back into focus. For example, a series of surveys conducted between 2010 and 2017 employing items originally designed for use in Latin America found 23–36% of US respondents agreeing that a military coup would be justified “when there is a lot of crime” or “when there is a lot of corruption.” Researchers concerned that the respondents might be misunderstanding the questions tested a variety of alternative question wordings—for example, specifying that the military would “take power over the U.S. government by removing the president by force.” However, they concluded that “respondents’ opinions are not conditional on clarifying the target and nature of the coup” (13). In another series of surveys conducted in 2017–2018 as part of the Bright Line Watch project, only 73% of Americans said it was “important” or “essential” that “government does not interfere with journalists or news organizations,” and only 68% said it was “im- portant” or “essential” that “government effectively prevents private actors from engaging in politically-motivated violence or intimida- tion” (ref. 6, pp. 703–704). Unlike surveys in which respondents are asked to assess the “importance” of democratic norms in the abstract, the survey items presented in Table 1 mimic real politics in pitting demo- cratic values against other cherished values such as patriotism, strong leadership, and the “traditional American way of life.” Faced with such trade-offs, relatively few Republicans—1 in 4, or 5, or 10, depending on the item—decline the invitation to “bend the rules” or “take the law into their own hands.”§ Republicans are not alone in their uncertain attachment to democratic values. For example, Kalmoe and Mason found that majorities of Democrats and Republicans alike viewed the other party as “a serious threat to the United States and its people,” while Democrats were slightly more likely to say that “violence would be justified” if the opposing party won the 2020 presi- dential election (ref. 14, pp. 18, 19, 23). In the Bright Line Watch surveys, differences in the perceived importance of a variety of democratic norms between supporters and opponents of Presi- dent Trump were “generally small,” except on specific issues of salient partisan controversy such as foreign influence in elections and partisan gerrymandering (ref. 6, pp. 705, 706). The willingness of both Democrats and Republicans to sanction abuses of democratic procedure is especially clear when survey items refer explicitly to the president. For example, in 2017, with a Republican in the White House, Republicans were twice as likely as Democrats (24–11%) to agree that “when the country is facing very difficult times it is justifiable for the president of the country to close the Congress and govern without Congress.” However, in 2014, with a Democratic president and a Republican majority in Congress, that partisan difference was reversed—30% of Demo- crats but only 6% of Republicans were willing to countenance the president closing Congress (15). While antidemocratic sentiments clearly exist in both major political parties, the nature and bases of those sentiments are likely to differ significantly between Republicans and Democrats. The specific survey items in Table 1, with their references to “the traditional American way of life” and politicians offering hand- outs, tap frustrations that are more common among Republicans than among Democrats. Moreover, the attitudes that turn out to be highly predictive of agreement with these items among Re- publicans are quite rare among Democrats.{ Thus, an examina- tion of Democrats’ allegiance to democratic values would require somewhat different measures and very different expla- nations from those offered here. In any case, the dramatic shifts in public support for closing Congress underline the extent to which the expression of anti- democratic sentiments is likely to depend on specific political con- texts. Perhaps the most important contextual factor facilitating the translation of antidemocratic sentiments into consequential political behavior is political leadership. Because antidemocratic tendencies loom larger in the leadership of the contemporary Republican Party—and especially in the rhetoric of President Trump—than among Democrats, I focus on the willingness of Republicans to countenance violations of democratic norms. Table 1. Republicans’ antidemocratic attitudes (YouGov survey) January 2020 Strongly agree, % Agree, % Neither; unsure, % Disagree, % Strongly disagree, % The traditional American way of life is disappearing so fast that we may have to use force to save it. 24.0 26.7 27.7 15.2 6.5 A time will come when patriotic Americans have to take the law into their own hands. 15.0 26.3 36.3 14.0 8.4 Strong leaders sometimes have to bend the rules in order to get things done. 12.5 34.8 29.2 17.4 6.1 It is hard to trust the results of elections when so many people will vote for anyone who offers a handout. 34.1 39.8 16.2 7.0 2.9 The survey included Republicans and Republican-leaning Independents (n = 1,151). §Graham and Svolik used survey experiments involving fictitious candidates to assess “the commitment to democratic principles among the American public.” They found that “only a small fraction of Americans prioritize democratic principles in their electoral choices when doing so goes against their partisan identification or favorite policies,” suggesting that “conventional measures of support for democracy have a fundamental blind spot: they fail to capture voters’ willingness to act on their commitment to democ- racy precisely when democracy is at stake.” When they limited their analysis to a subset of more realistic candidate pairings, the estimated electoral penalties for norm violations were even smaller—just 3.5 percentage points (ref. 7, pp. 394, 406, 408, 407). {The key explanatory variable in my analysis, ethnic antagonism, has a mean value of zero and a standard deviation of 0.96 among Republicans and Republican-leaning Indepen- dents, and a mean value of −2.21 and a standard deviation of 1.02 among Democrats and Democratic-leaning Independents. Only 2% of Democrats would be in the top half of the Republican distribution, while 87% would be in the bottom decile. Bartels PNAS | September 15, 2020 | vol. 117 | no. 37 | 22753 P O LI TI C A L SC IE N C ES D o w n lo a d e d a t C a rn e g ie M e llo n U n iv e rs ity o n A p ri l 5 , 2 0 2 1 Bases of Republicans’ Antidemocratic Attitudes Fig. 1 shows how Republicans’ antidemocratic responses in the January 2020 survey were related to education, political interest, and locale. These relationships provide only modest support for the hypothesis that allegiance to democratic values is a product of “political activity, involvement and articulateness,” as McClosky had it (ref. 11, p. 374). Although people with postgraduate edu- cation were clearly less likely than those with less education to endorse violations of democratic norms, the overall relationship between education and antidemocratic sentiments is rather weak. Similarly, people in big cities were only about 5% less likely than those in rural areas to endorse norm violations, while people who said they followed politics “most of the time” were about 7% more likely to do so than those who said they followed politics “hardly at all.” Given the distributions of these social characteristics in the Republican sample, the most typical antidemocrats were not “men and women whose lives are circumscribed by apathy, ignorance, provincialism and social or physical distance from the centers of intellectual activity” (ref. 11, p. 375), but suburbanites with some college education and a healthy (or unhealthy) interest in politics. A more promising place to look for the antecedents of anti- democratic sentiments is in the substance of political attitudes (16). Here, I distinguish six latent dimensions of Republicans’ political attitudes: 1) partisan affect, 2) affect toward President Trump, 3) economic conservatism, 4) cultural conservatism, 5) ethnic antagonism, and 6) political cynicism. These six latent dimensions are tapped by 127 distinct items in the January 2020 survey, with an average of 29 indicators per latent dimension. The most important indicators of each dimensions are summa- rized in Table 2, and the complete measurement model and question wording are reported in SI Appendix, Table S1. The most influential operationalization of ethnocentrism in recent political research (17) focuses on stereotypical negative views regarding the personal qualities of people in specific racial and ethnic groups. My measure of “ethnic antagonism” is broader in scope, incorporating not only unfavorable feelings toward Muslims, immigrants, and other out-groups, but also— and especially—concerns about these groups’ political and social claims. Survey items tapping perceptions that immigrants, African-Americans, Latinos, and poor people have more than their fair share of political power and get more than their fair share of government resources are powerful indicators of ethnic antagonism (with item-scale correlations ranging from 0.671 to 0.788).# So are concerns about African-Americans “using racism as an excuse” (R = 0.750), concerns about discrimination against Whites (0.736), and perceptions that “immigrants contribute a great deal to American society and culture” (−0.727) and that “speaking English is essential for being a true American” (0.681). The resulting scale is strongly correlated with the more familiar “racial resentment” scale (18–20), but better reflects the multi- faceted demographic threat currently perceived by many White 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 A ve ra ge a gr ee m en t ( % ) Hard to trust elections Use force to save way of life Strong leaders bend rules Take law into own hands Education Political interest Locale Fig. 1. Social bases of Republicans’ antidemocratic attitudes. #Of course, immigrants, poor people, and welfare recipients are not ethnic groups. How- ever, Republicans’ attitudes toward these groups are correlated with their attitudes to- ward Latinos and African-Americans, suggesting that, for many, views of immigrants, the poor, and welfare recipients are colored by ethnic antagonism. The measurement model in SI Appendix, Table S1 treats perceptions of these groups as potential reflections of multiple latent attitudes. The results indicate that concerns about the political power and access to government resources of poor people are almost equally shaped by ethnic antagonism and economic conservatism, while cultural conservatism tends to mitigate those concerns. In some cases, relationships allowed by the measurement model turn out to be absent in the data. For example, thinking that “people on welfare often have it better than those who work for a living” is strongly affected by ethnic antagonism but unaffected by cultural conservatism. 22754 | www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.2007747117 Bartels D o w n lo a d e d a t C a rn e g ie M e llo n U n iv e rs ity o n A p ri l 5 , 2 0 2 1 https://www.pnas.org/lookup/suppl/doi:10.1073/pnas.2007747117/-/DCSupplemental https://www.pnas.org/lookup/suppl/doi:10.1073/pnas.2007747117/-/DCSupplemental https://www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.2007747117 Americans and their specifically political antagonisms toward a variety of salient out-groups.‖ “Republican affect” is measured by attitudes toward Repub- lican and (especially) Democratic political figures (Obama, Pence, Pelosi), ordinary partisans, and the parties themselves. “Trump affect” is captured by feelings toward President Trump and ratings on a variety of specific traits (“inspiring,” “honest,” “knowledgeable,” “moral,” and the like). “Economic conserva- tism” entails belief in economic opportunity, a preference for limited government (especially in the provision of social welfare and environmental regulation), and sympathy for rich people and businesses vis-à-vis poor people and labor unions. “Cultural conservatism” includes views about patriotism, traditional mo- rality (including abortion and sexual harassment), and disdain for big cities, rich people, journalists, and college professors. “Political cynicism” reflects beliefs that “people like me have no say” and that government is too powerful, ineffective, and cannot be trusted, as well as negative views about “politicians.” Not surprisingly, some of these attitudes are strongly correlated, even within the restricted sample of Republicans and Republican- leaning Independents. The largest correlations are between Re- publican affect and cultural conservatism (0.759), cultural conservatism and ethnic antagonism (0.722), Republican affect and Trump affect (0.699), economic conservatism and cultural conservatism (0.679), and cultural conservatism and political cyni- cism (0.671). (The complete correlation matrix appears at the end of SI Appendix, Table S1.) In light of these correlations, analyses focusing on some of these attitudes while ignoring others are likely to misconstrue the specific bases of antidemocratic sentiments. Here, I guard against that sort of error by relating antidemocratic survey responses simultaneously to all six sets of attitudes. In addition to these substantive differences in political atti- tudes, I take account of acquiescence—individual differences in respondents’ tendencies to agree or disagree with survey items regardless of substantive content. Because all of the items in Table 1 invite respondents to endorse or reject antidemocratic rather than prodemocratic sentiments, controlling for acquies- cence guards against mistaking general agreeableness for will- ingness to violate democratic norms.** Table 3 reports the results of ordered probit regression anal- yses relating each antidemocratic sentiment to this battery of attitudes, each of which is normalized to have a mean of zero and a SD of one within the Republican sample. The apparent importance Table 2. Key indicators of latent dimensions Latent dimension Key indicators Republican affect (+) Feelings toward Pence, Republican Party, Republicans, McConnell; closeness to Republicans; (−) feelings toward Obama, Democrats, Democratic Party, Pelosi, Romney; closeness to Democrats; Democratic trait ratings: tolerant, knowledgeable, patriotic, moral, hard-working, generous. Trump affect (+) Feelings toward Trump; Trump trait ratings: inspiring, honest, knowledgeable, strong leader, intelligent, moral, tolerant, hard- working, patriotic; Trump job approval. Economic conservatism (+) Life is better for most; hard work can still achieve; feelings toward Wall Street bankers, rich people; (−) government should reduce income inequality, provide health care, provide college and childcare, raise taxes on the rich, protect the environment, provide a decent living to those who can’t work; climate change is our greatest threat; Medicare for all; feelings toward poor people, environmentalists, labor unions. Cultural conservatism (+) Respect for the flag; decline of manufacturing due to bad trade deals; unfair government resources to people in big cities, rich people; unfair political power for people in big cities, rich people; feelings toward poor people, NRA; closeness to poor people; (−) closeness to people in big cities, rich people; feelings toward journalists, Black Lives Matter, college professors, Wall Street bankers; sexual harassment; abortion choice. Ethnic antagonism (+) Unfair government resources to immigrants, African-Americans, Latinos, poor people; unfair political power for immigrants, African-Americans, Latinos, poor people; discrimination against whites; welfare recipients better off than people who work; (−) immigrants contribute to society; feelings toward welfare recipients, Muslims, immigrants, poor people; closeness to immigrants, Latinos. Political cynicism (+) People like me have no say; government too powerful; government efforts generally ineffective; (−) government does a good job of providing services; trust in government; feelings toward politicians, Congress. Item wording and complete results for the measurement model appear in SI Appendix, Table S1. kThe correlation between ethnic animosity as measured in 2020 and a three-item racial resentment scale based on responses from the same people in a 2016 survey is 0.754. The racial resentment scale is strongly correlated with specific items in the 2020 survey fo- cusing on African-Americans (R = 0.596 to 0.728), but less strongly correlated with items focusing on immigrants, Latinos, and poor people (R = 0.393 to 0.540). **Acquiescence is estimated from responses to 36 agree/disagree items. Conservative attitudes are tapped by “agree” responses for 16 items and by “disagree” responses for the other 20 items. The correlations between acquiescence and conservative atti- tudes range from −0.210 to 0.243 and average −0.012. The structural equation model used to infer Republicans’ latent attitudes (SI Appendix, Table S1) also includes distinct acquiescence factors for a variety of other survey item formats. Bartels PNAS | September 15, 2020 | vol. 117 | no. 37 | 22755 P O LI TI C A L SC IE N C ES D o w n lo a d e d a t C a rn e g ie M e llo n U n iv e rs ity o n A p ri l 5 , 2 0 2 1 https://www.pnas.org/lookup/suppl/doi:10.1073/pnas.2007747117/-/DCSupplemental https://www.pnas.org/lookup/suppl/doi:10.1073/pnas.2007747117/-/DCSupplemental https://www.pnas.org/lookup/suppl/doi:10.1073/pnas.2007747117/-/DCSupplemental of specific attitudes varies from item to item (across the columns of the table). For example, political cynicism is especially strongly related to distrust of elections, while enthusiasm for President Trump seems to bolster support for strong leaders bending rules and patriots taking the law into their own hands. However, in every case the factor most strongly associated with support for antidemocratic sentiments is ethnic antagonism. These statistical results suggest that ethnic antagonism has a substantial negative effect on Republicans’ commitment to de- mocracy. For example, holding other attitudes constant at av- erage Republican values, the predicted probability of agreeing that “we may have to use force” to save “the traditional Amer- ican way of life” increases from 0.226 at the 5th percentile of Republican ethnic antagonism (−1.43) to 0.813 at the 95th percentile (1.58). The corresponding increase in the predicted probability of agreeing that “patriotic Americans” will have to “take the law into their own hands,” holding other attitudes constant at average Republican values, is from 0.153 at the 5th percentile of Republican ethnic antagonism to 0.718 at the 95th percentile. The estimated impact of ethnic antagonism on the probability of agreeing with each item, based on the statistical analyses reported in Table 3, is shown in Fig. 2, Left. These relationships are not driven solely by extreme high or low values of ethnic antagonism. Fig. 2, Right shows the simple bivariate relationship between ethnic antagonism and the prob- ability of agreeing with each antidemocratic sentiment. (The agreement rates shown in the figure are derived from locally weighted [lowess] regressions employing the nearest 500 re- sponses at each point in the Republican distribution of ethnic antagonism.) The relationships are roughly linear—and similar in magnitude to the relationships implied by the multivariate statistical results—except for a noticeable leveling-off of support among the most resentful Republicans for the notion that “strong leaders sometimes have to bend the rules.”†† Nor is the strong association between ethnic antagonism and antidemocratic attitudes limited to specific segments of the Re- publican rank-and-file. Table 4 presents ordered probit regres- sion parameter estimates for ethnic antagonism paralleling those in Table 3 but for a variety of distinct Republican subgroups— men and women, people with and without college education, those in cities or suburbs and in small towns or rural areas, and those more and less favorable toward President Trump, Fox News, and the National Rifle Association (NRA).‡‡ Some of the parameter estimates are significantly larger for men, people with college education, and (especially) those most favorable toward the NRA. However, in every subgroup ethnic antagonism is strongly related to antidemocratic attitudes, even after statistically controlling for other factors. (The t statistics [based on robust standard errors] for the 48 distinct sub-groups’ ethnic antagonism parameter estimates range from 2.45 to 7.59, averaging 4.94. The complete results appear in SI Appendix, Tables S2–S7.) Discussion The support expressed by many Republicans for violations of a variety of crucial democratic norms is primarily attributable not to partisan affect, enthusiasm for President Trump, political cynicism, economic conservatism, or general cultural conser- vatism, but to what I have termed ethnic antagonism. The single survey item with the highest average correlation with antidemocratic sentiments is not a measure of attitudes to- ward Trump, but an item inviting respondents to agree that “discrimination against whites is as big a problem today as discrimination against blacks and other minorities.” Not far behind are items positing that “things have changed so much that I often feel like a stranger in my own country,” that im- migrants get more than their fair share of government re- sources, that people on welfare often have it better than those who work for a living, that speaking English is “essential for being a true American,” and that African-Americans “need to stop using racism as an excuse.” (The average correlations between these single items and antidemocratic sentiments range from 0.330 to 0.262. The average correlation between Table 3. Political bases of Republicans’ antidemocratic attitudes (ordered probit regression parameter estimates and response thresholds) Use force to save traditional way of life Patriots take law into their own hands Strong leaders sometimes bend rules Hard to trust the results of elections Republican affect 0.129 (0.083) −0.122 (0.087) −0.023 (0.089) 0.116 (0.090) Trump affect 0.042 (0.068) 0.212 (0.065) 0.235 (0.070) −0.097 (0.064) Economic conservatism −0.242 (0.078) −0.036 (0.066) 0.116 (0.073) 0.079 (0.069) Cultural conservatism −0.049 (0.121) 0.008 (0.129) −0.432 (0.121) −0.087 (0.130) Ethnic antagonism 0.547 (0.070) 0.532 (0.069) 0.495 (0.073) 0.440 (0.081) Political cynicism 0.141 (0.070) 0.126 (0.072) 0.042 (0.067) 0.318 (0.071) Acquiescence 0.352 (0.056) 0.237 (0.055) 0.414 (0.058) 0.347 (0.057) Strongly disagree/disagree −1.816 (0.076) −1.623 (0.077) −1.749 (0.072) −2.220 (0.102) Disagree/neither, unsure −0.935 (0.055) −0.888 (0.054) −0.798 (0.052) −1.528 (0.075) Neither, unsure/agree −0.028 (0.050) 0.262 (0.047) 0.080 (0.049) −0.768 (0.055) Agree/strongly agree 0.854 (0.051) 1.223 (0.057) 1.284 (0.053) 0.491 (0.048) Log likelihood −1,549.6 −1,538.3 −1,558.9 −1,348.1 Pseudo R-squared 0.11 0.10 0.07 0.11 n 1,151 1,151 1,151 1,151 Robust SEs are presented in parentheses. ††This leveling-off may reflect the fact that ethnic antagonism is strongly correlated with cultural conservatism (R = 0.722), which significantly depresses support for bending the rules. Adding a squared ethnic antagonism term to the ordered probit regression in the third column of Table 3 produces a parameter estimate of −0.030 (with a standard error of 0.030), barely altering the parameter estimates for ethnic antagonism (0.500) and cultural conservatism (0.419). More generally, the statistical results are surprisingly ro- bust to variations in model specification. For example, analyses paralleling those in Table 3 but with ethnic antagonism as the only predictor of antidemocratic sentiments produce probit parameter estimates that are just 4% smaller on average. Adding the acquiescence factor but no political covariates produces probit parameter estimates for ethnic antagonism that are just 4% larger than those reported in Table 3, on average. ‡‡The sample of Republicans and Republican-leaning Independents is too ethnically ho- mogeneous (78.4% non-Hispanic White) to permit separate analysis of Hispanics (12.6%), African-Americans (1.4%), or others (7.5%). Not surprisingly, the average levels of ethnic antagonism among African-Americans (−0.475) and Hispanics (−0.442) are much lower than among non-Hispanic Whites (0.083), with people in other groups in between (−0.039). 22756 | www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.2007747117 Bartels D o w n lo a d e d a t C a rn e g ie M e llo n U n iv e rs ity o n A p ri l 5 , 2 0 2 1 https://www.pnas.org/lookup/suppl/doi:10.1073/pnas.2007747117/-/DCSupplemental https://www.pnas.org/lookup/suppl/doi:10.1073/pnas.2007747117/-/DCSupplemental https://www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.2007747117 the ethnic antagonism scale and antidemocratic sentiments is 0.382.) The powerful effects of ethnic antagonism on Republicans’ antidemocratic attitudes underscore the extent to which this par- ticular threat to democratic values is concentrated in the con- temporary Republican Party. Seventy-eight percent of Democrats and Democratic-leaning Independents in the 2020 survey had ethnic antagonism scores below the fifth percentile of the Re- publican distribution (−1.43), while 98% had scores below the Republican average. The average score among Democrats (−2.21) barely appears in Fig. 2, which excludes the bottom (and top) 1% of the Republican distribution of ethnic antagonism. In this re- spect, among others, the attitudes of Republicans and Democrats are sharply polarized.§§ The strong association reported here between Republicans’ antidemocratic attitudes and ethnic antagonism reflects a spe- cific social and political context. It certainly does not imply that ethnic antagonism is a necessary basis for antidemocratic senti- ment, or that ethnic antagonism always and everywhere erodes public commitment to democracy. One of the most politically salient features of the contemporary United States is the loom- ing demographic transition from a majority-White to a “majority- minority” country. Several years ago, reminding White Americans of that prospect significantly altered their political attitudes (21). Now, President Trump and Fox News remind them, implicitly or explicitly, on an almost-daily basis.{{ For those who view demo- graphic change as a significant threat to “the traditional American way of life,” the political stakes could hardly be higher. This perspective is forcefully illustrated by an attention-getting essay published pseudonymously during the 2016 campaign on “the Flight 93 election: charge the cockpit or you die” (22). The author, who went on to serve on President Trump’s National Security Council staff, wrote that “a Hillary Clinton presidency is Russian Roulette with a semi-auto. With Trump, at least you can spin the cylinder and take your chance.” He denounced the “tsunami of leftism that still engulfs our every—literal and figurative—shore,” and warned that “the ceaseless importation of Third World for- eigners with no tradition of, taste for, or experience in liberty means that the electorate grows more left, more Democratic, less Republican, less republican, and less traditionally American with every cycle.” “Trump, he concluded, “alone among candidates for high office in this or in the last seven (at least) cycles, has stood up to say: I want to live. I want my party to live. I want my country to live. I want my people to live. I want to end the insanity.” The political impact of this specific instance of ethnocentric alarmism may have been modest, but it is representative of a 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 -2.5 -2 -1.5 -1 -0.5 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 A ve ra ge a gr ee m en t ( % ) Ethnic Antagonism (normalized Republican distribution) Hard to trust elections Use force to save way of life Strong leaders bend rules Take law into own hands 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 -2.5 -2 -1.5 -1 -0.5 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 P re di ct ed a gr ee m en t ( % ) Ethnic Antagonism (normalized Republican distribution) Hard to trust elections Use force to save way of life Strong leaders bend rules Take law into own hands Fig. 2. Ethnic antagonism and antidemocratic attitudes. Predicted agreement based on statistical analyses in Table 3 (Left) and average agreement based on bivariate lowess regressions (Right). §§While the latent attitudes summarized in Table 2 and detailed in SI Appendix, Table S1 are derived from an analysis limited to Republicans and Republican-leaning Indepen- dents, factor scores can be computed from the same indicators for Democrats and In- dependents as well. The only substantial overlap in attitudes between Republicans and Democrats is on political cynicism. The average factor scores for Democrats and Dem- ocratic-leaning Independents on the other five dimensions are two to three standard deviations below the corresponding Republican average scores. {{Attitudes toward President Trump and Fox News are more strongly correlated with ethnic antagonism (R = 0.450, 0.217) than with antidemocratic attitudes (correlations ranged from 0.279 to 0.338 and from 0.093 to 0.175, respectively), and the statistical relationships between ethnic antagonism and antidemocratic attitudes in Table 4 are, on average, similar in magnitude regardless of favorability toward President Trump and toward Fox News. Thus, there is no evidence here suggesting that President Trump or Fox News contributes to Republicans’ translation of ethnic antagonism into antidemo- cratic attitudes. However, detailed data on exposure to specific sources and messages would be necessary to shed light on the impact of political rhetoric on ethnic antago- nism, antidemocratic attitudes, and their association. Bartels PNAS | September 15, 2020 | vol. 117 | no. 37 | 22757 P O LI TI C A L SC IE N C ES D o w n lo a d e d a t C a rn e g ie M e llo n U n iv e rs ity o n A p ri l 5 , 2 0 2 1 https://www.pnas.org/lookup/suppl/doi:10.1073/pnas.2007747117/-/DCSupplemental broadly held and consequential worldview. Analysts of the 2016 presidential election have emphasized the activation of long- standing racial resentment and concerns about immigration as important factors contributing to President Trump’s support (23). The same factors have helped to fuel political polarization more broadly (24). The relationship reported here between ethnic antagonism and expressions of support for violations of key democratic norms suggests that the effects of millions of White Americans’ concerns regarding the prospect of demo- graphic, social, and political change may not be limited to the electoral sphere. Many people who endorse resorting to force or taking the law into their own hands in the context of an opinion survey are unlikely to engage in actual violence or lawlessness. However, the United States has experienced a cataclysmic civil war and a long history of racial and ethnic violence (25), and currently experiences thousands of hate crimes per year##; thus, it is not fanciful to suppose that expressive support for bending the rules or resorting to force to protect one’s “way of life” is consequential for actual behavior—or that it could become even more conse- quential under inflammatory circumstances. It is also possible that antidemocratic attitudes among citi- zens encourage political elites to engage in antidemocratic be- haviors. Systematic attempts to measure democratic performance, while fraught with difficulty, do provide some grounds for concern on this score. For example, Freedom House has reported a sig- nificant decline over the past decade in its rating of the quality of American democracy, from 94 on a 100-point scale in 2009 to 86 in 2018 (27). While acknowledging that “political polarization, declining economic mobility, the outsized influence of special in- terests, and the diminished influence of fact-based reporting in favor of bellicose partisan media were all problems afflicting the health of American democracy well before 2017,” the authors of the report argued that "President Trump exerts an influence on American politics that is straining our core values and testing the stability of our constitutional system. No president in living mem- ory has shown less respect for its tenets, norms, and principles. Trump has assailed essential institutions and traditions including the separation of powers, a free press, an independent judiciary, the impartial delivery of justice, safeguards against corruption, and most disturbingly, the legitimacy of elections." How concerned should we be that a president who assails “essential institutions and traditions” of democracy has found millions of followers willing to endorse significant violations of democratic norms, including resort to force in pursuit of political ends, lawlessness by “patriotic Americans,” and casting doubt on the legitimacy of elections? The simple answer is that no one knows. Antidemocratic forces in well-functioning multiparty systems tend to be isolated in minor parties, shunned as coalition partners and cordoned off from power. In contrast, as the Republican Party establishment learned in 2016, US parties are vulnerable to hostile takeover by political entrepreneurs capable of mobilizing passionate factions. Moreover, the evolution of the Republican Party over the past few years suggests that a hostile takeover may not stay hostile for long, as rank-and-file supporters respond to new leadership and elected officials adapt themselves to new political realities (28). Frances Lee has enumerated a variety of formidable institutional barriers to the consolidation of “authoritarian power over American national government.” Nonetheless, she concluded that “A racial- ized party system in an electorate with a questionable commitment to liberal values is a troubling development. It is difficult to manage racial tensions in a democracy in any case, much less when race becomes a principal line of political cleavage” (29). The findings reported here underline the extent to which race—and, more broadly, ethnic conflict—has indeed become a principal line of political cleavage, not only in American electoral politics but also in America’s broader, ongoing struggle to embrace and instantiate democracy. Data Availability. Survey data, log, and questionnaire files are in the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research openICPSR repository (https://www.openicpsr.org/openicpsr/project/ 120104/version/V1/view). Table 4. Translation of ethnic antagonism into antidemocratic attitudes in Republican subgroups (ordered probit regression parameter estimates for ethnic antagonism by subgroups) Use force to save traditional way of life Patriots take law into their own hands Strong leaders sometimes bend rules Hard to trust the results of elections Some college 0.691 (0.091) 0.568 (0.089) 0.478 (0.100) 0.597 (0.108) No college 0.386 (0.113) 0.480 (0.108) 0.529 (0.110) 0.295 (0.109) (Difference) 0.306 (0.144) 0.087 (0.139) −0.052 (0.147) 0.302 (0.153) Male 0.489 (0.089) 0.632 (0.095) 0.675 (0.112) 0.506 (0.114) Female 0.643 (0.113) 0.420 (0.101) 0.350 (0.100) 0.388 (0.106) (Difference) −0.154 (0.143) 0.212 (0.138) 0.325 (0.150) 0.118 (0.155) City/suburb 0.600 (0.088) 0.561 (0.095) 0.517 (0.098) 0.438 (0.110) Small town/rural 0.466 (0.120) 0.471 (0.098) 0.462 (0.110) 0.414 (0.113) (Difference) 0.134 (0.148) 0.091 (0.136) 0.056 (0.146) 0.024 (0.157) High Trump favorability 0.521 (0.093) 0.639 (0.101) 0.519 (0.100) 0.413 (0.109) Lower Trump favorability 0.592 (0.106) 0.425 (0.096) 0.475 (0.103) 0.485 (0.119) (Difference) −0.071 (0.141) 0.214 (0.138) 0.045 (0.143) −0.073 (0.161) High Fox News favorability 0.467 (0.081) 0.469 (0.085) 0.612 (0.092) 0.449 (0.101) Lower Fox News favorability 0.668 (0.121) 0.589 (0.108) 0.346 (0.115) 0.436 (0.129) (Difference) −0.201 (0.145) −0.120 (0.137) 0.266 (0.147) 0.013 (0.164) High NRA favorability 0.586 (0.096) 0.684 (0.096) 0.635 (0.099) 0.590 (0.107) Lower NRA favorability 0.529 (0.105) 0.397 (0.100) 0.334 (0.099) 0.285 (0.116) (Difference) 0.057 (0.141) 0.288 (0.138) 0.301 (0.139) 0.306 (0.157) Robust SEs are presented in parentheses. Complete results are presented in SI Appendix, Tables S2–S7. ##The FBI Uniform Crime Report for 2018 recorded 5,566 hate crimes against persons (murder, assault, or intimidation), of which 3,445 (62%) were motivated by racial or ethnic bias; 671 (3.4 per million population) were against Whites and 2,774 (21.4 per million) against non-Whites. These figures are substantial underestimates of the actual incidence of hate crimes, since “many cities and some entire states failed to collect or report the data,” and “experts say that more than half of all victims of hate crimes never file a complaint with the authorities in the first place” (26). 22758 | www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.2007747117 Bartels D o w n lo a d e d a t C a rn e g ie M e llo n U n iv e rs ity o n A p ri l 5 , 2 0 2 1 https://www.openicpsr.org/openicpsr/project/120104/version/V1/view https://www.openicpsr.org/openicpsr/project/120104/version/V1/view https://www.pnas.org/lookup/suppl/doi:10.1073/pnas.2007747117/-/DCSupplemental https://www.pnas.org/lookup/suppl/doi:10.1073/pnas.2007747117/-/DCSupplemental https://www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.2007747117 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS. The research reported here was supported by Vanderbilt University’s May Werthan Shayne Chair. 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Bartels PNAS | September 15, 2020 | vol. 117 | no. 37 | 22759 P O LI TI C A L SC IE N C ES D o w n lo a d e d a t C a rn e g ie M e llo n U n iv e rs ity o n A p ri l 5 , 2 0 2 1 https://www.voterstudygroup.org/publication/follow-the-leader https://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights/IMN001en.pdf https://www.dannyhayes.org/uploads/6/9/8/5/69858539/kalmoe___mason_ncapsa_2019_-_lethal_partisanship_-_final_lmedit.pdf https://www.dannyhayes.org/uploads/6/9/8/5/69858539/kalmoe___mason_ncapsa_2019_-_lethal_partisanship_-_final_lmedit.pdf https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/02/16/a-significant-minority-of-americans-say-they-would-support-a-military-takeover-of-the-u-s-in-the-right-circumstances/ https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/02/16/a-significant-minority-of-americans-say-they-would-support-a-military-takeover-of-the-u-s-in-the-right-circumstances/ https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/02/16/a-significant-minority-of-americans-say-they-would-support-a-military-takeover-of-the-u-s-in-the-right-circumstances/ https://claremontreviewofbooks.com/digital/the-flight-93-election/ https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/12/us/hate-crimes-fbi-report.html https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/Feb2019_FH_FITW_2019_Report_ForWeb-compressed.pdf https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/Feb2019_FH_FITW_2019_Report_ForWeb-compressed.pdf 
work_euxo3h2tlnch3kwnjaq4rdh7cy	----	Mentalities and Mind-Sets: The Skeleton of Relative Stability in Psychology’s Closet Editorial Mentalities and Mind-Sets: The Skeleton of Relative Stability in Psychology’s Closet Gordon Sammut* a [a] University of Malta, Malta. Europe's Journal of Psychology, 2019, Vol. 15(3), 421–430, https://doi.org/10.5964/ejop.v15i3.2103 Published (VoR): 2019-09-27. Handling Editor: Vlad Glăveanu, Webster University Geneva, Switzerland *Corresponding author at: Department of Psychology, University of Malta, Msida MSD 2080, Malta. E-mail: gordon.sammut@um.edu.mt This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, CC BY 4.0 (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. Over its brief history, the discipline of psychology has seen its fair share of crises (Farr, 1991). In the grand scheme of academic scholarship, it has sandwiched itself between the natural and the social sciences. This positioning, in itself, has fuelled fierce as well as productive debates concerning the discipline’s scope, its phe- nomenology, epistemology, and methodology (see Toomela & Valsiner, 2010). The latest crisis to afflict the dis- cipline is the infamous ‘replication crisis’, precipitated by the Reproducibility Project which claimed that it was only able to find evidence for successful replication of published psychological findings in 47% of cases (i.e. less than chance, or 50%). No doubt, many expected a higher replication rate, betraying a long held but little researched assumption con- cerning the immutability of psychological phenomena. To put it simply, many expect psychological findings to replicate invariably across diverse sociocultural contexts in the same way that, for instance, medical diagnoses do (see Sammut, Foster, Salvatore, & Andrisano-Ruggieri, 2016). If one is diagnosed with diabetes in the US, one does not expect different insulin uptake upon migration to China. Similar expectations are levelled at psy- chology, based chiefly upon the discipline’s claims to knowledge concerning psychopathology and personality. Like medical research, psychological scholarship here serves to typify and characterize individuals in ways that facilitate treatment of psychological symptoms, conditions, or disorders. Unlike medical research, however, psy- chological functioning seems to be amenable to, if not contingent upon, sociocultural influences. For instance, we are not entirely sure whether the human personality is primarily composed of the Big Five trait constellation (Costa & McCrae, 1992), or whether it becomes Seven if one is socialised in China (Wang, Cui, & Zhou, 2005; Zhou, Saucier, Gao, & Liu, 2009). A recent commentary by Baucal, Gillespie, Krstić, & Zittoun (2019) argues that the discipline has, over the years, entertained three basic assumptions concerning the universality of psychological phenomena and the Europe's Journal of Psychology ejop.psychopen.eu | 1841-0413 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://ejop.psychopen.eu/ https://ejop.psychopen.eu/ https://www.psychopen.eu/ extent to which these demonstrate variable manifestation in diverse ecological contexts (Gigerenzer, 2000). The results emerging from the Reproducibility Project have thrown into crisis research programmes resting on assumptions of immutability. Conversely, they have provided support to research traditions that have assumed otherwise. In this contribution, I propose that the challenge precipitated by the replication crisis may have its silver lining, inasmuch as it requires the discipline to confront a skeleton in its closet – the issue of relative sta- bility. In so doing, I query whether there might be something that psychologists might have missed along the way. Specifically, I propose that psychological research might be converging on a range of phenomena that lie at the heart of the dynamic stability that has long afflicted personality research (see Connelly, Ones, & Chernyshenko, 2014), but that might help explain how humans with genetically-rooted dispositions are capable of adapting to situated circumstances (Gigerenzer, 2000; Sammut, Foster, Salvatore, & Andrisano-Ruggieri, 2016. The Problem of People Who Kill Themselves and a Lot of Others With Them ‘Charlie Hebdo’, ‘9/11’, ‘the London bombings’ – these terms today need no contextualisation; they are remem- bered as terrorist events by virtue of their virality. The issue of individual differences in the endorsement of mili- tant extremist beliefs has been, for some time now, a matter of intensive scientific research (Sageman, 2004). The overarching aspiration in this line of inquiry is to understand the root cause of extremist violence. A promis- ing line of inquiry is the investigation of the extremist mindset. Međedović & Knežević (2019) claim psychopa- thology inspired research amongst militants and terrorists has yielded mixed empirical results. The issue has been noted since Arendt’s (1963) landmark analysis of Eichmann’s trial in Jerusalem, convicted and executed for war crimes perpetrated during his tenure as a Nazi officer. According to Arendt, Eichmann was no deranged psychopath, but “terribly and terrifyingly normal” (p. 276). Međedović & Knežević (2019) investigated the role played by certain personality traits in an effort to identify a constellation marking the militant extremist personality (p. 92). The trait constellation in question is Disintegra- tion, defined as “a proneness to see and feel connections among factually unrelated phenomena” (p. 93). This is investigated in light of the Dark Tetrad of human personality (Paulhus, 2014). The study is moot on the point as to whether this proneness is an individual psychological vulnerability associated with personality structures of a certain type, or whether this is an ideological vulnerability associated with ideologies of a certain type. That is, is extremism a function of the personality structure of the individual, or a function of the radical component in organized beliefs? The authors report that the Militant Extremist Mindset [MEM] is predicted by a subtle balance of dispositions (p. 101), although sadism is demonstrated to be unrelated to psychopathy, which contradicts previous findings. The crucial issue, however, is whether MEM transpires similarly in clinical populations as subclinical ones, that is whether individual differences transpire in degree or in type. If the difference is in degree, then it is fair to investigate clinical traits in subclinical populations focusing on trait-like manifestations, as per the cited inquiry. But if the difference is in type, then the findings concerning one population do not generalise to the other and the expectation of replicating findings across this contextual diversity is misguided. Crucially, in the present case, the authors proffer a situational explanation for militant extremism that is neither construed in terms of a Editorial 422 Europe's Journal of Psychology 2019, Vol. 15(3), 421–430 https://doi.org/10.5964/ejop.v15i3.2103 https://www.psychopen.eu/ characteristic trait constellation marking the extremist personality type, nor in substantive ideological terms typi- fying certain beliefs as radical or extremist. Međedović & Knežević (2019) go on to claim that “In a context where everyone is using others for their own purposes, it becomes justifiable to employ the same strategies in order to change the state of affairs” (p. 100). In other words, in certain situations militant terrorism, terrifying as it may be, is justifiably normal. This construal, however, strikes at the heart of personality research based on the individual differences tradition that also aspires to characterise types. If the predictive value of personality dispositions is contingent on their activation in specific situations, then their predictive validity, along with the expectation of replicability, is neces- sarily limited due to situational contingencies that are in themselves wholly unpredictable. To take stock, per- sonality research has, broadly speaking, discerned trait-like structures that are seemingly associated with de- termined inclinations. The fruition of these inclinations in behaviour, however, is contingent on situational cir- cumstances that are in themselves, open-ended. That is, if the stability of personality structures is only discerni- ble in the specific situation, that is, if stability is relative – not to cultural context, but to situational context – then the burden facing personality researchers to map the precise structure of situational influences acting on the agent at the particular moment in which the structure has evinced becomes, truly, an untenable task. Along with the expectation of trans-situational replicability. Clearly, it is time for the discipline to acknowledge that univer- salistic aspirations regarding human cognition and personality have not been supported and rather than fixing statistics with more statistics (Baucal, Gillespie, Krstić, & Zittoun, 2019), it is time for the discipline to consider more deeply the range of phenomena that enable human adaptation to situational contingencies, given some stability in both personality dispositions and sociocultural contexts. Situated Cognition A critical concern that has underlined numerous other debates in psychology is whether knowledge of psycho- logical structures and processes serves descriptive or predictive purposes. For instance, does knowledge of the existence of racial stereotypes in a population serve to (aside from describing the state of the distribution of racial stereotypes in the specific population at the specific point in time it is investigated) predict correlated out- comes, such as frequency of hate crimes, on the basis of knowledge of the relations between racial stereotypes and hate crimes observed in other instances? The extension from descriptive research to inferential research aspiring to describe underlying and invariant processes has been long challenged theoretically (Harré & Secord, 1972) and, if the findings of the Reproducibility Project are anything to go by, now also empirically (Open Science Collaboration, 2015). A situated view of personality and cognition counterbalances both foci. As Smith & Semin (2007) have argued, the situated view proposes that any description of human behaviour is only meaningful if it serves to establish grounds for communicative mutuality. This is due to the fact that human cognition is motivated (Kunda, 1990) and predisposed towards sociality (Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, & Moll, 2005). Human cognition enables individuals to form social identities around collective interests (Sammut, 2012). This form of sociality is only rel- atively enduring – as individuals’ interests change, the composition of the social group ebbs and flows, resulting in situational influences on group members. The situated view opposes the idea that inclinations flow invariably from autonomous, invariant cognitive processes located within independent agents. It proposes instead that motivated functions determine the nature of these processes. Sammut 423 Europe's Journal of Psychology 2019, Vol. 15(3), 421–430 https://doi.org/10.5964/ejop.v15i3.2103 https://www.psychopen.eu/ For instance, an agent’s emotional state influences behavioural outcomes in the situation aside from sociocul- tural features of the society in which the behaviour occurs, or the personality dispositions of the agent involved. The situated emotional state of the agent is unstable in ways that go beyond general psychological orientations (such as personality structure) and are contingent on the unpredictable. For instance, need for closure research has demonstrated that time pressure (e.g. running late) leads to cognitive shortcuts in decision-making (Kruglanski, 2004). This suggests that if certain behavioural responses do not serve a motivated function, the cognitive processes leading to them will not be activated (Smith & Semin, 2007, p. 133). Consequently, this in- vites researchers to specify not only the psychological processes observed in themselves, but more important- ly, the boundaries limiting their activation. The variable potential that inheres in personality structures, making stability in behavioural influences as a function of trait dispositions merely relative, provides plenty of scope for inquiry in its own right. I propose this might be key to understanding, more deeply, the human potential for sit- uational adaptation. The Explanation of Social Behaviour Psychological researchers investigating stable dispositional orientations in human personality have reliably ob- served, over the years, that personality structures are inherently unstable across variable circumstances. Spe- cifically, it seems that the factor concerned with ‘Openness to Experience’ might have something to do with re- configurations in the personality structure (Connelly, Ones, & Chernyshenko, 2014). I argue that such reconfi- gurations are adaptive and contingent on the individual’s situated circumstances. I propose that personality structure resembles a psychological camouflage by which dispositional inclinations are reconfigured (i.e. the personality structure is re-structured) to match situated ecological demands. As noted, personality researchers looking for stable structures have routinely observed instability in personality dynamics. Conversely, researchers investigating social-psychological dynamics have routinely observed stable structures. By analogy to the Rubin Vase, those looking for a chalice have observed human faces whilst those searching for human faces have observed a chalice. Rather than an empirical inconsistency, I argue that this is a case of convergence in disparate research traditions. The Big Five model of human personality comprised of a five-factor personality structure is very well-known (Costa & McCrae, 1992). The premise underlying this personality model is that human behaviour is genetically- based, at least in part, through inherent dispositions that develop in individuals over the course of maturation. By the time they reach adulthood, human beings develop an idiosyncratic personality, rooted in a constellation of traits shaped by genetic influences, that predisposes them to characteristic behavioural responses. What this model falls short in explaining is how and why these trait-based dispositions may change in the same individual over time, or why behavioural responses shaped by the same trait dispositions are inconsistent across situa- tions for the same individuals. An equally well-known model that is similarly based on factor analytic techniques is the Cultural Dimensions model (Hofstede, 1991). The premise underlying this sociological model is that hu- man behaviour is a function of cultural values transmitted through socialisation. Different cultures prioritise dif- ferent values, depending on which cultural dimensions are salient in different societies, that lead to individuals expressing this cross-cultural variability in behavioural outcomes. What this model falls short in explaining is how and why some individuals demonstrate similar behavioural dispositions across different cultures, or how within a given culture individual differences may be highly marked. These two models are amongst similar ef- Editorial 424 Europe's Journal of Psychology 2019, Vol. 15(3), 421–430 https://doi.org/10.5964/ejop.v15i3.2103 https://www.psychopen.eu/ forts that have aimed to map out psychological and sociological structures in an effort to account for behaviou- ral diversity. Both programmes, however, are prone to relative influences that lead to observed structural changes over time, situations, people, and contexts. On the other hand, three other research programmes have investigated belief dymanics. The symbolic univer- ses programme has investigated dynamics of sense-making in Europe in response to the financial and immi- gration crises. The social axioms programme sought to investigate cross-cultural differences in core beliefs that can account for behavioural diversity within and across cultures. The moral frameworks programme has studied the fundamental moral choices individuals make when they opt for a particular behavioural response that is jus- tified in a given context against similarly justifiable alternative responses that lie at the individual’s disposal. All three programmes have claimed that behaviour is responsive to contextual characteristics that may precipitate changes in the current order. All three have also reported five loosely stable structures that seem to play a role in how individuals respond to other people and the events happening around them. Symbolic Universes Salvatore et al. (2018) propose that human cognition is organised around embodied and affect-laden general- ized worldviews that determine the construal of situations by different individuals. In other words, the same stimulus may be construed as an opportunity by some, or an obstacle by another – depending on the general- ized worldview the individual has privately subscribed to and regardless of their own private personality-based inclinations. According to the authors, these universes foster social engagement due to perspectival solidarity achieved between agents. In their Europe-wide study concerning the effects of the economic and migration cri- ses in Europe, the authors report the presence of 5 universes. The Ordered universe represents adherence to systems-based rules and regulations. The Interpersonal Bond universe represents valorization of social capital. The Caring Society universe is marked by a striving for community. Niche of Belongingness represents the ef- fort to find a legitimate place in life for oneself and one’s loved ones. The Others’ World universe represents an attitude of helplessness and grit in the face of adversity. Social Axioms Leung and Bond (2010) propose that human cognition is structured around generalized beliefs individuals hold about other people, social groups, institutions, society, and the spiritual realm. These general beliefs grant co- herence in thinking about disparate elements in the world around us. Consequently, they are endorsed in an axiomatic fashion and serve to guide everyday conduct that involves the mutual presence of others. The au- thors distinguish between 5 social axioms, which they claim are universal in existence but variable in their man- ifestation: (a) Religiosity, representing an unquestioning attitude towards prescribed dogma; (b) Social Com- plexity, representing an attitude of strategic contingency based on interpersonal situations; (c) Reward for Ap- plication, representing a generalised attitude of striving for the betterment of one’s condition; (d) Fate Control, representing a generalised belief in the necessity to find a place for oneself in a powerful and controlled social order; and (e) Social Cynicism, representing a generalised belief that there is little one can do about the preva- lent order to ameliorate one’s condition. Sammut 425 Europe's Journal of Psychology 2019, Vol. 15(3), 421–430 https://doi.org/10.5964/ejop.v15i3.2103 https://www.psychopen.eu/ Moral Foundations Haidt (2012) claims that human beings are equipped with intuitive ethics that originate in their evolutionary sur- vival. According to Haidt, these moral foundations provide us with flashes of affect in specific situations that serve to guide our conduct and shape our interpretation of the situation. Different cultures use these moral foundations differently to censure or otherwise particular action strategies. In the process of socialisation, indi- viduals learn the normative rules that prevail around them. Violation of these rules triggers affective responses that predispose individuals towards determined responses. Haidt (2012) distinguished between 5 moral frame- works, that is (a) Sanctity, concerned with violations of degradation; (b) Loyalty, concerned with violation of trust and betrayal; (c) Care, concerned with violations resulting in harm; (d) Fairness, concerned with possibilities for cheating; and (e) Authority, concerned with subversion of a prevalent order. Haidt further proposes that addi- tional frameworks may develop as a function of particular sociocultural concerns, such as the framework of Liberty in the US. The Psychological Gearbox: Mentalities, or is it Mindsets? Clearly, a full theoretical rapprochement of these disparate research traditions is beyond the scope of the present contribution. However, the similarities reported in the descriptions of the underlying factors are palpable (see Table 1) and warrant consideration of the possibility of converging evidence. Table 1 Five Factor Outputs in Generalized Beliefs Research Traditions Symbolic Universes Social Axioms Moral Foundations Ordered Religiosity Sanctity Interpersonal Bond Social Complexity Loyalty Caring Society Reward for Application Care Niche of Belongingness Fate Control Fairness Others’ World Social Cynicism Authority All three research programmes have extended psychological inquiry beyond personality-based dispositions to generalized mental frames that mark individuals’ situated positioning relative to others on matters of social con- cern. The central idea investigated in these programmes is whether there are individual differences in how hu- man beings interpret the events that happen to them and the world around them, controlling for personality structure. For instance, we can readily understand cultural differences in preferences for individual behavioural responses. These represent social norms of conduct. We can also readily understand how, within the same cul- ture, different personality structures demonstrated by different individuals may precipitate different behavioural responses to the same stimulus. What we struggle to understand as readily is how the same individual, within the same culture, behaves in one way in one situation and a different way in another situation, when facing the same stimulus. We struggle with this because we expect the phenotype to match the genotype. Unless, that is, one considers a range of phenomena amenable to situational influences that also determine behaviour in part. I propose that mentalities are one such variable and that the three programmes considered above have tapped this very construct and similarly reported the same five-factor structure. Editorial 426 Europe's Journal of Psychology 2019, Vol. 15(3), 421–430 https://doi.org/10.5964/ejop.v15i3.2103 https://www.psychopen.eu/ The notion of mentalities has been proposed by Burke (1986) to delineate a stress on collective attitudes that serve the purposes of practical reasoning and that are structured in terms of how people think as well as what they think. That is, mentalities represent substantive cognition. Etymologically, mentality refers to a ‘thinking style’. A related construct that arguably constitutes the other ground in this Rubin Vase is ‘mindset’, which ety- mologically represents a ‘thinking habit’. We have seen how mindsets extend the search for behavioural dispo- sitions beyond the Big Five, as in the search for a Militant Extremist Mindset [MEM] cited above. I propose that mindsets are akin to specific mentalities and that this range of mentalities in human psychology constitutes the social-psychological mechanism by which individuals with pre-determined inclinations adapt their responses to ecological demands. To use a metaphor, mentalities are like a 5-piece psychological Swiss Army knife that ena- bles individuals to psychologically adapt their mindset to tangibly situated environmental demands. If individual psychological adaptation to situational demands was not a successful strategy, then we would be justified in expecting personality structures to be much more enduring – you would have a knife for a knife job and a fork for a fork job. This is not how human behaviour manifests. To pose an example, G.I. Joe can go from being a foot soldier concerned with obliterating the enemy to a networking strategist coordinating logistics upon receiv- ing a promotion. An adaptation in mindset might be called for, as one cannot adopt a combative stance in logis- tics. Many human beings routinely adapt to similar circumstances without issue. On the other hand, G. I. Joe may adapt by joining a security business at the end of his duty, where the same combative mindset may pay off in a novel environment. What this simple example makes clear is that neither personality structure nor sociocul- tural dimensions are very useful in understanding how an individual actuates their behavioural inclinations in situated circumstances. Conclusion The replication crisis has precipitated renewed concerns about the nature of psychological phenomena and their manifestation in ecologically diverse contexts. Clearly, universalistic expectations concerning the manifes- tation of psychological phenomena are not supported. I have proposed that human psychology may demon- strate phenotype switching, which enables individuals to camouflage their inclinations for adaptation to situated ecological demands. This occurs by adopting a best-fitting mindset out of a range of mentalities that inhere in human psychology. I have argued that research looking at social dynamics suggests that human cognition is structured along five mentalities. I have then argued that this range of mentalities equips individuals with a mul- tipurpose psychological mechanism to suit different ecological demands, like a Swiss Army knife provides a range of instruments to cater to different requirements. Mentalities, therefore, provide human beings with the capacity for environmental calibration. Further research is required to determine what factors precipitate changes in mentality. Presumably, a mentality that is no longer functional due to situational constraints leads to maladaptive behaviour. This should precipitate psychological discomfort, or cognitive dissonance, that is reduced by revisiting the individual’s construal of the event, as per Festinger’s (1957) original findings. Phenotype switching of mentalities, therefore, enables individuals to adapt to changing circumstances. I propose that mentalities work like a psychological gearbox for individuals to cope with their particular life ter- rain. The individual’s personality dispositions, partly rooted in genetics, are like a vehicle. Some vehicles are better than others, given particular environmental demands. A sports car may be a sight to behold at the race- Sammut 427 Europe's Journal of Psychology 2019, Vol. 15(3), 421–430 https://doi.org/10.5964/ejop.v15i3.2103 https://www.psychopen.eu/ track, but in off-road conditions it will likely turn out to be a maladaptive choice. This is individual differences. But human beings demonstrate a capacity for adaptation in the same way that different cars can be driven in ways that accommodate ecological requirements – that is, environmental calibration. If driving a sports car off- road, one is advised to select a lower gear that permits the driver to ride slowly over bumps. If driving an off- road vehicle at the racetrack, one is advised to select a higher gear for the vehicle to increase and maintain velocity. Mentalities, therefore, are like gears – a range of five that enable the particular agent to calibrate their dispositional inclinations to ecological demands. Sometimes, it pays an individual to be open, positive, or inno- vative. This might be due to the fact that the individual finds themselves in a stable environment that provides for the individual’s needs. An open and positive mindset enables the individual to explore and reap opportuni- ties for growth. At other times, it pays an individual to adopt a more cautious demeanour, to consider risk and worst-case scenarios. These help the individual overcome challenges and strife in times of adversity. Necessa- rily, for the behavioural response to be adaptive, the behavioural strategy needs to match the situated ecologi- cal demands. A growth mindset when facing bankruptcy is as maladaptive as a helpless mindset when opportu- nity beckons. Individuals, I argue, calibrate their behavioural strategies to environmental demands by adapting their psychological mindset to the situation, such that uncharacteristically cautious behaviour, for example, might start making sense to the bullish investor. Equally, uncharacteristically positive behaviour might start making sense to the re-settled refugee whose suspicious inclinations paid off in the past when facing a high- risk environment. Clearly, adaptation in the human species is psychologically, not biologically, based – human beings do not dem- onstrate biological camouflage. Rather, in the human species, this involves an ability to change one’s mindset to a more profitable one. The capacity to switch mindsets is observable as situated cognition on the one hand, or relative stability on the other. Further research is required to determine the criteria that precipitate change; to determine whether the range of 5 mentalities is true to every individual or whether, like language, this might be a question of inherent potential contingent on socialisation; to determine whether psychological intervention may help individuals precipitate mentality changes; and to determine which mentalities might be indicated in specific circumstances. In any case, a focus on mentalities may provide answers concerning the potential for human adaptation. Changing one’s mentality or mindset involves the re-construal of particular events that opens up a profitable and cognitively consistent course of action – was this a good thing or a bad thing? Who gains, who loses? Should we act, or stay put? I conclude by suggesting that the study of psychological adapta- tion mechanisms may be key to understanding a host of dynamic behaviours such as creativity, decision-mak- ing, empathy, communication styles, resilience, and other behavioural strategies humans adopt to face the situ- ated challenges they encounter over their lifetime. Funding The author has no funding to report. Competing Interests The author has declared that no competing interests exist. Acknowledgments The author has no support to report. Editorial 428 Europe's Journal of Psychology 2019, Vol. 15(3), 421–430 https://doi.org/10.5964/ejop.v15i3.2103 https://www.psychopen.eu/ R efe re nc es Arendt, H. (1963). Eichmann in Jerusalem: A report on the banality of evil. 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Sammut 429 Europe's Journal of Psychology 2019, Vol. 15(3), 421–430 https://doi.org/10.5964/ejop.v15i3.2103 https://doi.org/10.1007%2Fs12124-019-09499-y https://doi.org/10.1016%2F0191-6599%2886%2990120-8 https://doi.org/10.1080%2F00223891.2013.830620 https://doi.org/10.1002%2Fejsp.2420210502 https://doi.org/10.1037%2F0033-2909.108.3.480 https://doi.org/10.1027%2F1614-0001%2Fa000280 https://doi.org/10.1126%2Fscience.aac4716 https://doi.org/10.1177%2F0963721414547737 https://www.psychopen.eu/ Salvatore, S., Fini, V., Mannarini, T., Veltri, G. A., Avdi, E., Battaglia, F., . . . Valmorboda, A. (2018). Symbolic universes between present and future of Europe: First results of the map of European societies’ cultural milieu. PLoS One, 13(1)Article e0189885. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0189885 Sammut, G. (2012). The immigrants’ point of view: Acculturation, social judgment, and the relative propensity to take the perspective of the other. Culture and Psychology, 18(2), 184-197. https://doi.org/10.1177/1354067X11434837 Sammut, G., Foster, J., Salvatore, S., & Andrisano-Ruggieri, R. (2016). Methods of psychological intervention. Yearbook of idiographic science (Vol. VII). Charlotte, NC, USA: Information Age. Smith, E. R., & Semin, G. R. (2007). Situated social cognition. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 16(3), 132-135. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8721.2007.00490.x Tomasello, M., Carpenter, M., Call, J., Behne, T., & Moll, H. (2005). Understanding and sharing intentions: The origins of cultural cognition. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 28, 675-691. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X05000129 Toomela, A., & Valsiner, J. (Eds.). (2010). Methodological thinking in psychology: 60 years gone astray? Charlotte, NC, USA: Information Age Publishing. Wang, D., Cui, H., & Zhou, F. (2005). Measuring the personality of Chinese: QZPS versus NEO PI-R. Asian Journal of Social Psychology, 8(1), 97-122. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-839X.2005.00158.x Zhou, X., Saucier, G., Gao, D., & Liu, J. (2009). The factor structure of Chinese personality terms. Journal of Personality, 77(2), 363-400. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6494.2008.00551.x A bout the Aut hor Gordon Sammut is Associate Professor in social psychology at the University of Malta and visiting fellow at the London School of Economics and Political Science. His interests concern intercultural and intergroup relations, the theory of social representations, social influence, and issues relating to divergent perspectives in social relations. He is past editor of Pa- pers on Social Representations and chief-editor of The Cambridge Handbook of Social Representations [Cambridge Uni- versity Press], Understanding Self and Others: Explorations in Intersubjectivity and Interobjectivity [Routledge], and Meth- ods of Psychological Intervention: Yearbook of Idiographic Science Vol. VII [Information Age]. Editorial 430 Europe's Journal of Psychology 2019, Vol. 15(3), 421–430 https://doi.org/10.5964/ejop.v15i3.2103 PsychOpen GOLD is a publishing service by Leibniz Institute for Psychology Information (ZPID), Trier, Germany. www.leibniz-psychology.org https://doi.org/10.1371%2Fjournal.pone.0189885 https://doi.org/10.1177%2F1354067X11434837 https://doi.org/10.1111%2Fj.1467-8721.2007.00490.x https://doi.org/10.1017%2FS0140525X05000129 https://doi.org/10.1111%2Fj.1467-839X.2005.00158.x https://doi.org/10.1111%2Fj.1467-6494.2008.00551.x https://www.leibniz-psychology.org/ https://www.psychopen.eu/ Editorial (Introduction) The Problem of People Who Kill Themselves and a Lot of Others With Them Situated Cognition The Explanation of Social Behaviour Symbolic Universes Social Axioms Moral Foundations The Psychological Gearbox: Mentalities, or is it Mindsets? Conclusion (Additional Information) Funding Competing Interests Acknowledgments References About the Author 
work_ewawkh7b2famdgo4iadvdmzptq	----	Microsoft Word - 564150_pdfconv_632543_D9912866-2623-11E8-8758-160D95EF0FC5.docx Differences by Victim Race and Ethnicity in Race and Ethnicity Motivated Violent Bias Crimes: A National Study Robert A. Tessler A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Public Health University of Washington 2018 Committee: Ali Rowhani-Rahbar (Chair) Frederick P. Rivara Monica S. Vavilala Program Authorized to Offer Degree: School of Public Health, Department of Epidemiology © Copyright 2018 Robert A. Tessler University of Washington Abstract Differences by Victim Race and Ethnicity in Race and Ethnicity Motivated Violent Bias Crimes: A National Study Robert A. Tessler Chair of the Supervisory Committee: Ali Rowhani-Rahbar Department of Epidemiology Background. Over 80% of bias motivated violent victimization is motivated by race or ethnicity and over 50% of bias victimization occurs in Non-Hispanic Whites (NHW). Our aim was to determine the risk and health impacts of race/ethnicity motivated violent victimization by victim race/ethnicity. Methods. We examined data from the National Crime Victimization Survey (2003-2015) to estimate violent victimization risk by victim race/ethnicity and type of bias motivation (race/ethnicity or other). We examined incident and offender characteristics for race/ethnicity motivated victimization by victim race/ethnicity. Results. The risk of race/ethnicity motivated violent victimization was greater for Non-Hispanic Blacks (NHB) and Hispanics than for NHWs (IRR=1.4; 95% CI: 1.0-2.0, and IRR=1.6; 95% CI: 1.2-2.1). Violent incidents for NHB victims more frequently resulted in injury or medical care. Nearly 40% of NHB victims reported difficulties at school or work related to the incident where only 21.5% of NHWs and 11.7% of Hispanic victims reported similar problems. Roughly 37% of NHB victims identified a NHW offender and 45% of NHW victims identified a NHB offender. Hispanic victims identified NHB or NHW offenders in over 70% of incidents. Conclusions. Although literature suggests that NHWs account for the majority of bias victimizations, the risk of non-fatal violent victimization motivated by race/ethnicity is greater for Non-Hispanic Blacks and Hispanics. Crimes perpetrated against NHBs are likely more severe and victim/offender racial incongruity is common. Findings provide empiric evidence on race/ethnicity-related structural disadvantage with adverse health consequences. INTRODUCTION The United States Department of Justice prosecutes hate crimes defined as, “…acts of physical harm and specific criminal threats motivated by animus based on race, color, national origin, religion, gender, sexual orientation, gender identity, or disability.”1 Despite an overall trend towards decreasing violent victimizations between 2004 and 2015 in the United States, the rate of hate or bias motivated victimization has remained largely stagnant.2,3 In data from the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) between 2011 and 2015, 80% of all bias crimes were race or ethnicity motivated and nearly 90% of all bias crimes involved violence.2 Violent victimization and chronic community violence are known public health concerns related to physical injury, emotional trauma, and poor health outcomes that ripple throughout networks and communities.4–6 Bias motivated violent victimization may be more severe compared to victimizations of comparable non-bias motivated violent crimes.7,8 A review of hate crime victimizations from Boston area police records has demonstrated evidence of brutality, emotional injury, and psychological trauma associated with these crimes.7 Prior analyses suggest that the risk of injury may differ based on the specific bias motivation.7 Specifically, one reported has suggested that Anti-White violent crimes are associated with a higher risk of severe injury compared to non- bias violent crimes.7 Also, in NCVS data from 2011-2015 Non-Hispanic Whites accounted for over half of all bias violent victimizations.2 This may be counter to commonly held perceptions on bias victimization. With regard to race and ethnicity motivated bias violent crimes, little is known about the risk of victimization across different racial and ethnic groups and if differences exist in the severity or consequences of these crimes for different demographic (Non-Hispanic Black, Hispanic compared to Non-Hispanic White) populations. We analyzed national data to characterize the risk of non-fatal race/ethnicity motivated violent crimes among Non-Hispanic Black and Hispanic individuals compared to Non-Hispanic Whites. Despite the previously mentioned report, given potential sample differences and methodologic limitations from prior work, we hypothesized that Non-Hispanic Black and Hispanic individuals are at greater risk for race/ethnicity motivated violent crime and that those crimes are more severe compared to Non-Hispanic Whites. METHODS Data Source The Bureau of Justice Statistics’ (BJS) NCVS collects annual data on personal and household victimization using a nationally representative sample of United States residential addresses. The survey was first administered in 1973 (named the National Crime Survey) and maintains four principle objectives: 1) collect thorough information on victims of crime and the consequences they suffer, 2) provide estimates of the numbers and types of crime, 3) establish uniform measures for selected crime types, and 4) compare victimization trends over time.9 In addition to collecting detailed information about the characteristics of sampled household members, all persons age 12 or older in sampled households are asked detailed, incident-level questions about experiences with personal and property crimes both reported and not reported to police.9 BJS offers a concatenated file that includes the years 1992 to 2015 as a free download.10 Measures The NCVS contains several variables on bias motivation. Prior reports published by the Department of Justice (DOJ) and BJS define hate or bias crime as an incident perceived by the victim as bias-motivated and confirmed by the presence of hate language or hate symbols, or the event was established separately by the police as a hate crime.2 Categories for potential bias motivation are protected under the federal crime statutes. 11The NCVS includes information on the specific perceived bias motivation such as race, ethnicity, gender, sexuality, religion, disability, an associated person (e.g. the characteristic of a friend, family member, or colleague), or a perceived characteristic of the victim whether or not they actually possess that feature. We define two distinct variables of perceived bias motivation: 1) race or ethnicity motivated, or 2) any other perceived bias motivation (i.e. all other possibilities). We included all perceived bias motivated crimes and did not exclude based on the absence of hate language, symbols, or police confirmation. Incidents not categorized in either bias victimization group comprised the group of non-bias victimizations. The NCVS alters the survey periodically; questions on specific bias motivation were introduced in 2003 and have remained consistent through the available data from 2015. For this analysis, we considered the years 2003 to 2015 only. The exposure variable of victim race/ethnicity was created using two separate variables for race and ethnicity and coded to reflect three mutually exclusive groups: Non-Hispanic White (NHW), Non-Hispanic Black (NHB), and Hispanic. American Indian/Alaska Native, Asian, Hawaiian/Pacific Islander, and all multi-racial combinations were not included due to limited power to detect differences in these groups. The NCVS provides victim education by number of years and specific degrees attained. In balancing granularity of data with practicality of use, we categorized educational attainment as elementary school only, high school (no graduation), high school graduation, some college, associated degree or bachelor’s degree, or an advanced degree. We did not re-categorize marital status or region and the values reflect the raw NCVS responses for those questions. We used standard DOJ definitions of violent crime, serious violent crime, and simple assault (Table 1).3 We included only violent victimizations (both serious violent crime and simple assault) and excluded property crime. Weapons are defined as firearms, knives, sharp objects, or blunt objects, or other. Firearm presence during the incident was a composite variable that included handguns, other guns, or unknown gun types. Injuries are coded separately in NCVS as sexual assault or attempted sexual assault injuries, knife or stab wounds, gunshot or bullet wounds, broken bones or teeth, internal injuries, knocked unconscious, bruises or cuts, or other. Medical care includes self-care, home-based care, and professional care from first-responders or hospital based medical providers. Incident characteristics including the number and race of offenders and the activity at the time of the incident are self-reported by victims. Victims also self-reported whether victimization led to subsequent life difficulties. Statistical Analysis We calculated survey weighted proportions of respondent characteristics based on the NCVS universe for the years 2003-2015 across the three race/ethnicity groups.12 Average annual incidence rates were calculated for each victimization category and for each race/ethnicity group using frequency and survey weights as described in the NCVS User Guide for Direct Variance Estimation.12 We calculated incidence rate ratios (IRR) for each victimization outcome using a survey weighted Poisson regression and a multi-level categorical variable for victim race/ethnicity as the exposure with NHW as the reference group. We estimated incidence rate differences (IRD) using the average marginal effect based on Poisson model results. We calculated estimates using three different statistical models. Model 1 included the race/ethnicity groups only (unadjusted). Given the differences in age distribution between the three race/ethnicity groups, we also calculated estimates after controlling for age (Model 2). Education, marital status, and region may occur on the causal pathway after race/ethnicity and before victimization potentially acting as mediators in the relationship.13 Controlling for these variables may attenuate any association between race/ethnicity and outcomes; however, these are often included in models to assess whether differences in such socioeconomic measures may account for any observed disparities by race/ethnicity.14–16 As such, we calculated estimates (Model 3) that included education, marital status, and region. We also calculated weighted proportions of incident characteristics among all race/ethnicity motivated violent bias crimes across the three race/ethnicity groups. Finally, we estimated yearly incidence rates for each crime type and each race/ethnicity group using two-year rolling averages and fit with natural cubic splines. Natural cubic splines were chosen to minimize the impact of any single yearly estimate given the limited number of observations for each year-group-victimization type combination and to avoid the assumption of linearity in the trends by year.17 RESULTS For the years 2003 to 2015, the NCVS sample included 2,080,786 individuals age 12 years or older with a weighted distribution of 72.3% (95%CI 71.4 -73.3) NHW, 12.6% (95%CI 11.9 - 13.3) NHB, and 15.1% (95%CI 14.3-15.9) Hispanic origin. In this NCVS universe, a smaller proportion of NHB were male, married, and a greater proportion lived in the Southern United States compared to NHW. Non-Hispanic Black and Hispanic populations were younger and smaller proportions had advanced education compared to the population of NHW (Table 2). The overall average annual rate of non-fatal violent victimization for all three race/ethnicity groups was 2525.3 per 100,000 (95%CI 2422.9-2627.6). Non-Hispanic Blacks had the highest average annual rate of non-fatal violent victimization in all three categories: 2768.8 per 100,000 for non-bias violent crime, 92.8 per 100,000 for perceived non-race and non-ethnicity bias motivated violent crime, and 143.8 per 100,000 for perceived race/ethnicity motivated bias violent crime (Table 3). The unadjusted rate of non-bias violent victimization was higher for NHB compared to NHW (IRR 1.2, 95%CI 1.1 -1.3); however, with adjustment for age as a continuous variable, this difference in rate did not persist. Hispanics had a lower risk of non-bias violent victimization compared to NHW in age-adjusted models (IRR 0.7, 95%CI 0.6-0.7). The crude rate of race or ethnicity bias motivated violent victimization was higher for both NHB and Hispanics compared to NHW (IRR 1.4 95%CI 1.0-2.0, and IRR 1.6 95%CI 1.2-2.1). In age- adjusted models, the estimate was attenuated for both NHB and Hispanics. The model that additionally accounted for education, marital status, and region provided similar estimates to the model adjusting only for age (Table 3). There were an estimated additional 46.7 (95%CI 1.4- 92.1) and 60.3 (20.3-100.4) race/ethnicity motivated bias events per 100,000 person-years for NHB and Hispanics, respectively. There was no difference in rate of victimization between groups for non-race/ethnicity bias motivated violent victimization (Table 3). Figure 1 shows changes over time by victimization type and race/ethnicity of the victim. Among race/ethnicity motivated violent victimization, weapon and firearm involvement did not differ between exposure categories (Table 4). Violent incidents more frequently resulted in injury or ended in some sort of medical care for NHB victims. Nearly 40% of NHB victims reported difficulties at school or work related to the incident where this was true in only 21.5% of NHW and 11.7% of Hispanic victims. Between 10% and 25% of victims across all three groups reported that the incident contributed to difficulties with friends or family, with the highest proportions for NHB and NHW victims, and less commonly for Hispanic victims (Table 4). The majority of incidents for all three groups involved a single offender. Single offenders were most commonly of a different race or ethnicity than the victim. For NHB victims, 37.2% identified a NHW offender, and for NHW victims 45.0% identified a NHB offender. Hispanics were more commonly victimized while in transit to work or school 29.1% (95%CI 16.0 -47.0) compared to NHB victims and NHW victims (14.5% and 14.4, respectively). DISCUSSION To our knowledge, this is the first detailed investigation of perceived race/ethnicity motivated violent victimization suggesting differences in risk based on victim race/ethnicity. After age- adjustment, we demonstrate a 30% higher risk of race/ethnicity bias motivated violent victimization for Non-Hispanic Blacks and Hispanics, compared to Non-Hispanic Whites. Despite NHWs accounting for the majority of bias violent crime according NCVS, the unadjusted risk for race/ethnicity motivated violent bias crime is 40% higher for NHBs and 60% higher for Hispanics. In models adjusting for age, marital status, education, and region the risk estimate for NHBs did not change from the model adjusting only for age, however, for Hispanics the elevated risk did not persist compared to NHWs. This may suggest that elevated risk of victimization for Hispanics may be weaved into downstream factors such as education, marital status, and region to a greater extent than for NHBs. In addition to the risk of race/ethnicity motivated bias victimization for NHBs and Hispanics, these data suggest a more frequent serious violent crime, including those entailing weapon and firearm involvement, more injuries, and higher proportions receiving medical care. These data also demonstrate that the downstream impact on work, school, and social life is substantial with the highest proportion of difficulties reported from NHBs. Our results align with but build upon prior published statistics from BJS.2,3 Prior BJS reports have not included annual incidence rates for specific bias motivations. According to BJS, the average annual rate of violent bias crime victimization in the years 2004 through 2015 was 90 per 100,000.2 We report for NHWs (over 70% of the sample) that the average annual rate of violent bias crime victimization was 97.1 per 100,000 for race/ethnicity motivated and 80.1 per 100,000 for other bias motivation (Table 2). Knowing the overall BJS rate is a weighted average of rates by specific motivation (80% are race/ethnicity motivated), our results separated by motivation are congruent with the published overall annual rate of 90 per 100,000. Pezzella and Fetzer analyzed the 2010 National Incident Based Reporting System (NIBRS) to evaluate the risk of severe injury among bias and non-bias violent crime.7 The authors compare specific biases (Anti-White, Anti-Black, Anti-Lesbian, etc.) to non-bias crimes and report the risk of serious injury. In their analysis, only Anti-White and Anti-Lesbian attacks resulted in higher odds of serious injury (OR 2.5 and 2.7, respectively) and Anti-Black attacks had lower odds of serious injury compared to non-bias crimes (OR 0.5). These findings contrast somewhat with our results where we found more injuries in race/ethnicity motivated bias crimes among NHBs than in NHWs and Hispanics. The discrepancy in findings is likely related to different data samples and different definitions used for bias crime. The NIBRS includes only bias crimes reported to the police while the NCVS includes unreported crimes. Additionally, the NIRBS is not a nationally representative sample and most major cities are not included.2,18 The disaggregation of hate crimes into specific bias motivation has led to important public health discoveries. Prior analyses into anti-lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (anti-LGBT) bias motivated victimization demonstrated concerning associations between exposure to bias motivated assault and risk of suicide and substance abuse.19–21 Further, the intersection of sexual orientation, race, and gender, among other identity defining characteristics may be have important public health consequences when considering the effects of, and resilience from, bias victimization.21,22 Detailed and sophisticated analytic approaches are necessary to better understand these relationships and the public health implications knowing that specific bias motivated victimizations may have variable risks and consequences in different scenarios and for different groups. These data demonstrate that victims report a perpetrator from another race/ethnicity group in a majority of cases. Although this finding is expected given the nature of the topic, in the context of other results the implications may be broader. Specifically, although documented race/ethnicity bias victimization is relatively rare, hate crime is known to create personal and community instability, diminish inclusion and trust between groups, and can potentially exacerbate uneven power dynamics at a society level.7 Taking together the higher overall risk of victimization among NHBs and Hispanics, the greater burden of severity for NHBs, and the race/ethnicity profile of offenders suggests an environment of structural disadvantage of certain groups compared to others. For these reasons, taking a public health approach to understanding race/ethnicity motivated violent victimization is an appropriate step to capture how inequity is manifest in health outcomes amidst the complex interactions between social structures, individual risks, identity, and legal frameworks. These data have limitations. The NCVS is a large, multiyear dataset and the data are subject to both sampling and non-sampling survey error.23 Also, the information contained in the NCVS is entirely self-report. While this is an important feature when considering issues around potential underreporting of events to law enforcement, the information provided to this national survey is not verified by outside sources. Also, given the nature of the data collection mechanism, these are exclusively non-fatal events. With the knowledge that bias crimes may in fact be more severe, limiting our outcome to non-fatal victimization would bias our results towards the null if at all. In consideration of the association between victim race/ethnicity and risk of race/ethnicity motivated violent victimization, to interpret the estimates in Model 3 as the direct effect of race/ethnicity several assumptions would have to be met, many of which are difficult to test in these data.13 Additional analyses to elaborate the complex interactions between race/ethnicity, socioeconomic status, and risk of race/ethnicity motivated violent victimization would ultimately be informative. CONCLUSIONS Although Non-Hispanic Whites account for the majority of bias victimizations, the risk of non- fatal violent victimization motivated by race/ethnicity is higher for Non-Hispanic Blacks and Hispanics compared to Non-Hispanic Whites. Also, the crimes perpetrated against Non- Hispanic Blacks are more severe in the immediate and post-victimization period. There is incongruity between victim and offender race/ethnicity in most cases, which, when considering the differential risk and severity of these crimes suggests an environment of structural disadvantage of certain groups compared to others. Programs seeking to attenuate racial or ethnic tensions are likely to create public health benefits, especially for communities of color. REFERENCES 1. Hate Crimes, The United States Department of Justice. https://www.justice.gov/crt/hate- crimes-0. Accessed December 18, 2017. 2. Masucci M, Langton L. Hate Crime Victimization, 2004-2015. U.S. Department of Justice, Offie of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics; 2017. 3. Truman JL, Morgan RE. Criminal Victimization, 2015. US Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics; 2016. 4. Copeland WE, Keeler G, Angold A, Costello EJ. Traumatic events and posttraumatic stress in childhood. Arch Gen Psychiatry. 2007;64(5):577-584. doi:10.1001/archpsyc.64.5.577 5. Schilling EA, Aseltine RH, Gore S. Adverse childhood experiences and mental health in young adults: a longitudinal survey. BMC Public Health. 2007;7:30. doi:10.1186/1471- 2458-7-30 6. Yimgang DP, Wang Y, Paik G, Hager ER, Black MM. Civil Unrest in the Context of Chronic Community Violence: Impact on Maternal Depressive Symptoms. Am J Public Health. 2017;107(9):1455-1462. doi:10.2105/AJPH.2017.303876 7. Pezzella FS, Fetzer MD. The Likelihood of Injury Among Bias Crimes: An Analysis of General and Specific Bias Types. J Interpers Violence. June 2015. doi:10.1177/0886260515586374 8. Fetzer MD, Pezzella FS. The Nature of Bias Crime Injuries: A Comparative Analysis of Physical and Psychological Victimization Effects. J Interpers Violence. October 2016. doi:10.1177/0886260516672940 9. National Crime Victimization Survey, Concatenated File, 1992-2015. United States Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs. Bureau of Justice Statistics: Ann Arbor MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research; 2016. http://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR36456.v1. 10. Nataional Crime Victimization Survey, Concenated File, 1992-2015 (ICPSR 36456). http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/NACJD/studies/36456. 11. Hate Crime Laws. The United States Department of Justice. https://www.justice.gov/crt/hate-crime-laws. Accessed January 29, 2018. 12. Shook B, Couzens GL, Berzofsky M. User’s Guide to National Crime Victimization Survey Direct Variance Estimation. RTI International; 2014. 13. VanderWeele TJ, Robinson WR. On the Causal Interpretation of Race in Regressions Adjusting for Confounding and Mediating Variables: Epidemiology. 2014;25(4):473-484. doi:10.1097/EDE.0000000000000105 14. Samuel CA, Landrum MB, McNeil BJ, Bozeman SR, Williams CD, Keating NL. Racial disparities in cancer care in the Veterans Affairs health care system and the role of site of care. Am J Public Health. 2014;104 Suppl 4:S562-571. doi:10.2105/AJPH.2014.302079 15. Siddiqi AA, Wang S, Quinn K, Nguyen QC, Christy AD. Racial Disparities in Access to Care Under Conditions of Universal Coverage. Am J Prev Med. 2016;50(2):220-225. doi:10.1016/j.amepre.2014.08.004 16. Rangrass G, Ghaferi AA, Dimick JB. Explaining racial disparities in outcomes after cardiac surgery: the role of hospital quality. JAMA Surg. 2014;149(3):223-227. doi:10.1001/jamasurg.2013.4041 17. Durrleman S, Simon R. Flexible regression models with cubic splines. Stat Med. 1989;8(5):551-561. 18. National Incident-Based Reporting System, Data Collection: Methodology. Bureau of Justice Statistics. https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=dcdetail&iid=301#Methodology. Accessed January 29, 2018. 19. Duncan DT, Hatzenbuehler ML. Lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender hate crimes and suicidality among a population-based sample of sexual-minority adolescents in Boston. Am J Public Health. 2014;104(2):272-278. doi:10.2105/AJPH.2013.301424 20. Duncan DT, Hatzenbuehler ML, Johnson RM. Neighborhood-level LGBT hate crimes and current illicit drug use among sexual minority youth. Drug Alcohol Depend. 2014;135:65- 70. doi:10.1016/j.drugalcdep.2013.11.001 21. Mereish EH, O’Cleirigh C, Bradford JB. Interrelationships between LGBT-based victimization, suicide, and substance use problems in a diverse sample of sexual and gender minorities. Psychol Health Med. 2014;19(1):1-13. doi:10.1080/13548506.2013.780129 22. Dunbar E. Race, gender, and sexual orientation in hate crime victimization: identity politics or identity risk? Violence Vict. 2006;21(3):323-337. 23. National Crime Victimization Survey, Technical Documentation.; 2014. https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ncvstd13.pdf. TABLES Table 1. Violent Crime, Serious Violent Crime, and Simple Assault Violent Crimes Completed rape Attempted rape Sexual attack with serious assault Sexual attack with minor assault Completed robbery with injury from serious assault Completed robbery with injury from minor assault 07 Completed robbery without injury from minor assault Attempted robbery with injury from serious assault Attempted robbery with injury from minor assault Attempted robbery without injury Completed aggravated assault with injury Attempted aggravated assault with weapon Threatened assault with weapon Simple assault completed with injury Sexual assault without injury Unwanted sexual contact without force Assault without weapon without injury Verbal threat of rape Verbal threat of sexual assault Verbal threat of assault Serious Violent Crime = Pink Simple Assault = Blue Table 2. Characteristics for Non-Hispanic Blacks, Non-Hispanic Whites, and Hispanic Origin in NCVS (weighted proportions), 2003-2015 Variable Non-Hispanic White (N=1,535,155) Non-Hispanic Black (N=238,003) Hispanic (N=307,628) % 95% CI % 95% CI % 95% CI Male 49.0 [48.9, 49.2] 45.5 [45.0, 45.9] 50.0 [49.6, 50.4] Age, median (IQR) 12 to 19 11.2 [11.0, 11.4] 16.5 [16.1, 17.0] 19.1 [18.7, 19.5] 20 to 29 14.5 [14.1, 14.8] 18.2 [17.8, 18.7] 23.2 [22.8, 23.7] 30 to 39 14.6 [14.4, 14.8] 16.9 [16.5, 17.2] 20.3 [19.9, 20.7] 40 to 49 17.1 [17.0, 17.3] 17.3 [16.9, 17.7] 16.5 [16.2, 16.8] 50 to 59 17.4 [17.1, 17.6] 14.9 [14.6, 15.3] 10.5 [10.3, 10.8] 60 to 69 12.6 [12.3, 12.8] 9.0 [8.7, 9.3] 5.9 [5.7, 6.2] 70+ 12.8 [12.5, 13.1] 7.2 [6.8, 7.5] 4.4 [4.2, 4.6] Educational Attainment Elementary School Only 6.9 [6.8, 7.1] 10.2 [9.9, 10.6] 23.5 [22.9, 24.2] High School (No Graduation) 11.0 [10.7, 11.2] 18.6 [18.0, 19.2] 21.7 [21.3, 22.2] High School (Graduation or equivalent) 27.4 [27.0, 27.9] 29.7 [29.1, 30.4] 25.0 [24.5, 25.6] Some College, Associates, or Bachelor Degree 45.4 [44.9, 45.9] 36.9 [36.1, 37.7] 26.9 [26.3, 27.4] Advanced Degree 9.3 [9.1, 9.5] 4.6 [4.4, 4.9] 2.9 [2.7, 3.1] Marital Status Married 53.6 [53.3, 54.0] 31.0 [30.4, 31.6] 44.9 [44.4, 45.5] Widowed 6.4 [6.2, 6.5] 5.8 [5.6, 6.1] 2.8 [2.6, 2.9] Divorced 10.2 [10.0, 10.3] 10.2 [9.9, 10.5] 6.5 [6.3, 6.8] Separated 1.4 [1.3, 1.4] 4.0 [3.8, 4.2] 3.1 [3.0, 3.2] Never Married 28.5 [28.1, 28.8] 49.0 [48.5, 49.6] 42.7 [42.2, 43.1] Region Northeast 19.6 [18.8, 20.4] 16.0 [14.9, 17.1] 13.9 [12.8, 15.1] Midwest 27.0 [25.9, 28.2] 19.5 [18.1, 20.8] 10.2 [8.8, 11.7] South 33.6 [32.4, 34.8] 55.4 [53.1, 57.8] 36.4 [33.7, 39.2] West 19.8 [18.5, 21.0] 9.2 [8.4, 10.0] 39.6 [37.0, 42.2] Table 3. Perceived Bias in Non-Fatal Violent Crime By Victim Race/Ethnicity, Incidence Rate and (average annual incidence per 100,000 US Population age 12 or older), Incidence Rate Ratios (IRR), and Incidence Rate Difference (IRD) 2003-2015 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Rate* (95% CI) IRR (95%CI) IRD (95%CI) IRR (95%CI) IRD (95%CI) IRR (95%CI) IRD (95%CI) Bias Motivated: Race or Ethnicity Non-Hispanic White 97.1 [79.1, 115.1] Ref Ref Ref Non-Hispanic Black 143.8 [102.1, 185.5] 1.4 [1.0, 2.0] 46.7 [1.4, 92.1] 1.3 [0.9, 1.8] 31.1 [-11.4, 73.6] 1.3 [0.9, 1.8] 29.8 [-14.9, 74.5] Hispanic Origin 157.4 [123.4, 191.4] 1.6 [1.2, 2.1] 60.3 [20.3, 100.4] 1.3 [1.0, 1.7] 31.5 [-3.4, 66.4] 1.1 [0.8, 1.5] 17.0 [-18.9, 53.0] Bias Motivated: Other Bias** Non-Hispanic White 80.1 [61.9, 98.4] Ref Ref Ref Non-Hispanic Black 92.8 [56.0, 129.6] 1.1 [0.7, 1.7] 12.6 [-27.4, 52.7] 0.9 [0.6, 1.4] -1.0 [-39.4, 37.4] 0.9 [0.5, 1.4] -5.2 [-45.6, 35.1] Hispanic Origin 73.7 [39.0, 108.3] 0.9 [0.5, 1.4] -6.4 [-45.3, 32.4] 0.7 [0.4, 1.1] -25.2 [-60.7, 10.3] 0.6 [0.4, 1.0] -31.0 [-65.3, 3.3] Non-Bias Victimization Non-Hispanic White 2269.7 [2162.9, 2376.5] Ref Ref Ref Non-Hispanic Black 2768.8 [2526.1, 3011.5] 1.2 [1.1, 1.3] 499.1 [244.3, 753.8] 1.0 [0.9, 1.1] 92.5 [-143.4, 328.4] 1.0 [0.9, 1.1] -13.7 [-247.8, 220.4] Hispanic Origin 1987.3 [1840.0, 2134.5] 0.9 [0.8, 1.0] -282.4 [-453.5, -111.3] 0.7 [0.6, 0.7] -803.5 [-958.0, -649.1] 0.7 [0.6, 0.7] -865.6 [-1031.0, -700.1] *average annual incidence per 100,000 US Population age 12 or older **Includes religion, disability, gender, sexual orientation, associated person, and perceived characteristics Model 1 = Crude (No adjustment) Model 2 = Adjusted for age as a continuous variable Model 3 = Adjusted for age as a continuous variable, educational attainment, household income, and marital status Table 4. Characteristics of Race/Ethnicity Motivated Bias Crimes by Race/Ethnicity, 2003-2015 Variable Non-Hispanic White Non-Hispanic Black Hispanic % 95% CI % 95% CI % 95% CI Type of Crime Simple Assault 68.88 [60.5, 76.2] 61.06 [47.7, 72.9] 66.27 [55.4, 75.7] Serious Violent Crime 31.12 [23.8, 39.5] 38.94 [27.1, 52.3] 33.73 [24.3, 44.6] Incident Characteristics Involved a Weapon 21.6 [15.7, 28.8] 28.3 [19.2, 39.5] 24.4 [16.0, 35,3] Involved a Firearm 5.9 [3.9, 8.8] 7.8 [4.2, 14.3] 9.2 [5.2, 15.7] Single Offender*** 53.7 [46.5, 60.8] 63.5 [50.5, 74.8] 61.7 [49.0, 72.9] Mutliple Offenders*** 42.6 [35.6, 49.9] 35.7 [24.5,.48.6] 36.9 [26.2, 49.2] Single Offender-White*** 10.8 [5.6, 19.8] 37.2 [18.7, 60.4] 33.6 [16.0, 57.4] Single Offender-Black or African American**** 45.0 [29.7, 61.3] 7.4 [2.2, 22.2] 39.9 [19.5, 64.5] Single Offender - Hispanic or Latino**** 3.5 [1.5, 7.6] 15.5 [5.3, 37.5] 5.5 [1.9, 15.1] Activity at time of Incident Working 22.8 [12.9, 37.1] 12.9 [6.6, 23.9] 9.7 [4.7, 19.1] On Way to/from Work/School 14.4 [8.8, 22.8] 14.5 [7.8, 25.5] 29.1 [16.0, 47.0] Shopping/Errands 7.6 [4.5, 12.6] 8.2 [2.2, 26.1] 8.3 [3.8, 17.3] School 13.3 [5.8, 27.7] 12.2 [5.3, 25.5] 21.4 [8.1, 45.8] Home 21.9 [13.0, 34.5] 30.2 [16.0, 49.4] 20.9 [9.3, 40.6] Leisure-Not at Home 20.0 [13.8, 28.0] 22.0 [12.5, 35.8] 10.5 [5.7, 18.8] Harms Suffered an Injury 20.7 [13.7, 30.1] 31.6 [20.9, 44.7] 19.2 [12.6, 28.1] Being A Victim Led to Problems at School or Work** 22.3 [13.5, 34.5] 39.6 [25.3, 56.0] 11.7 [6.3, 20.7] Being A Victim Led to Problems with Family or Friends** 21.5 [12.8, 33.9] 23.2 [11.5, 41.2] 13.8 [7.8, 23.3] Victim Response Received Medical Care* for Injuries 7.4 [5.2, 10.4] 14.5 [7.8, 25.4] 10.6 [5.4, 19.6] Received Medical Care at a Clinic, Emergency Room, or Hospital 4.8 [3.2, 7.1] 5.9 [2.8, 12.0] 4.1 [2.0, 8.2] Reported Incident to Police 43.9 [35.4, 52.8 47.4 [34.4, 60.8] 46.3 [34.4, 58.7] *Includes Self-Treatment **Variable only available after 2008, 3rd quarter. Estimates are from 2008.3 to 2015 ***Proportions may not =100% due to respondent's not knowing or an uninterpretable entry. See NVCS Codebook for details on Residue entries ****Due to coding changes in offender race/ethnicity in the NCVS, estimates for are based on the years 2012-2015 FIGURE LEGEND Figure 1. Crime Type by Victim Race/Ethnicity by Year (fit with natural cubic spline) 
work_ewqt2mlwdfdbpbm35on6niwvly	----	Zarafonitou-3 CRIMINAL VICTIMISATION IN GREECE AND THE FEAR OF CRIME: A 'PARADOX' FOR INTERPRETATION CHRISTINA ZARAFONITOU Panteion University, Greece * ABSTRACT The measurement of victimisation was rare and sporadic in Greece until 2005 when it was included in the EU International Crime Survey (EUICS). Many findings are highly interesting as for example those concerning corruption. There are also high ratings of feeling unsafe among the inhabitants of Greece, in particular those in Athens, in spite of the relatively low rates of their victimisation. This paper focuses on this point, trying to reveal the factors which could explain this 'paradox'. Keywords: Victimisation — fear of crime — satisfaction with the police — quality of life INTRODUCTION Victimisation surveys have been rare and sporadic in Greece until 2005 when they were included in the European victimisation survey (Van Dijk et al., 2007a; 2007b: p. 30). At the national level, only one victimisation survey has been carried out, in 2001 (Karydis, 2004) but this theme has frequently been examined in the framework of surveys on fear of crime which were carried out in Athens during the last decade (Zarafonitou, 2002, 2004; Zarafonitou and Courakis, 2009) 1 . The most important observation which emerged from those was the relatively low levels of victimisation of Greek citizens in comparison to the high levels of fear of crime revealed. In order for this 'paradox' to be explained, a conceptualisation of fear of crime (Vanderveen, 2006: p. 28) is necessary as well as looking at its attributed 'social meaning' 2 , in the context of the general social framework in which social attitudes are shaped and manifested. Fear of crime is, on the one hand, an important factor in the moulding of people's attitudes and perceptions of crime, and on the other, a product of these based on a process of interaction. These feelings do not relate only to actual situations and the experiences of individuals but also to more general personal and social concerns. Thus, even when fear of crime refers to less serious crime, concern derived from aspects related to criminality can be much stronger. It has International Review of Victimology. 2009, Vol. 16, pp. 277–300 0269-7580/09 $10 © A B Academic Publishers - Printed in Great Britain * Professor in Criminology, Department of Sociology, Panteion University, 136 Syngrou Ave., Athens 176 71, Greece (chrizara@panteion.gr). 278 been ascertained that this concern is sometimes based on the conviction that ethical values have been lost and a pervasive anomie prevails which transforms deviations into the norms (Widmer et al., 2004). In addition, a negative correlation between crime and fear of crime has been noted (Taylor and Hale, 1986; Robert and Pottier, 2004; Crawford, 2007). Especially in the later 1970s, it became obvious that the 'public fear of crime is a measurable phenomenon that is to some degree independent of crime and victimisation rates' (Garland, 2001: p. 122). Fear of crime as 'a rational or irrational state of alarm or anxiety engendered by the belief that one is in danger of criminal victimisation' (McLaughlin and Muncie, 2006: p. 164) can be distinguished from the worry which is caused by the perception of crime as a serious social problem (Furstenberg, 1971; Robert and Pottier, 2004: p. 218). Even though this distinction does not exclude some connection of fear of crime with the crime/victimisation rates in an area, it also demonstrates the role of subjective perceptions of threats based on vulnerability (Killias and Clerici, 2000; Box et al., 1988; Taylor and Hale, 1986) which individuals adopt to themselves or to those close to them. This helps to explain the large number of citizens who claim on relevant surveys and polls that they are afraid of being victimised, thus expressing their general social worries through 'the symbolically dense concept of crime' (Jackson, 2005: p. 963). This tendency to equate personal and collective insecurities with fear of crime, leads, in fact, to extreme assessments of the dimensions and characteristics of criminality, much more so because this situation does not originate wholly from personal experience but from that of others and is often formed from different sources of information (Lupton and Tulloch, 1999: p. 521). The expression of similar feelings is related to a series of different factors 3 such as the elements which compose the quality of life of citizens in an area, their trust in the criminal justice system and even their broader socio-ideological perceptions. Citizens' lack of trust often reflects their general perception about the weakness of the state itself and results in their doubting it. It is also 'representational of a community that lacked trust, moral consensus and informal social control' (Jackson, 2004: p. 960). Because of the variety of its origins, fear of crime requires combined methodological tools and occasionally an interdisciplinary analysis (Gray et al., 2008). This paper is based on data derived from the European Crime and Safety Survey (Van Dijk et al., 2007a), complemented by those included in the International Crime Victim Survey (Van Dijk et al., 2007b) as well as data from Greek surveys. The EU International Crime Survey (EUICS) was carried out in 2004/2005 in the 15 old member states of the European Union as well as in Poland, Hungary and Estonia. The last ICVS (2004/2005) was carried out in 30 countries, including the majority of developed nations and in 33 main cities selected from developed and developing countries (Van Dijk et al., 2007b: p. 11). Country level analysis is based on EUICS data while analysis at city level is based on ICVS data. THE DIMENSIONS OF VICTIMISATION IN GREECE Conventional Crimes 4 As was noted above, the levels of victimisation of Greek citizens are relatively low, even though criminality has constantly risen in the last few years. This is the general picture derived also from the data of the European Victimisation Survey for 2005 (Figure 1), according to which the lowest levels of crime were found in Spain (9%), Hungary (10%), Portugal (10.4%), France (12%), Austria (12.2%) and Greece (12.3%). The risk of victimisation in these countries is significantly below the European average (14.9%) and so they are classified in the 'low crime countries in an EU context' (Van Dijk et al., 2007a: p. 20). A similar picture is also derived from EU ICS data in relation to the victimisation rates of main cities. According to these data, the percentage of people victimised one or more times in 2004 by any of ten common crimes is on average 21.5%. For the citizens of Athens, this rate is much lower (13.5%) and so Athens has a very low standing rate compared to other developed cities (Figure 2). The low victimisation of Greek citizens is also confirmed by the overall data from the last ICVS (Van Dijk et al., 2007b), according to which the overall one 279 Source: Van Dijk et al.(2007a) Figure 1. Prevalence victimisation rates for 10 common crimes in 2004–2005 280 TABLE 1 One year prevalence victimisation rates (percentages) ICVS/EUICS 2004–2005 Conventional crimes Average for countries Greece Average for cities Athens Overall victimization 15.7 12.3 21.5 13.5 Theft of a car 0.8 0.3 1.3 0.7 Theft from a car 3.6 1.8 4.4 3.7 Car vandalism Theft of a motorcycle 0.3 0.6 0.5 0.5 Theft of a bicycle 2.9 2.1 3.3 0.9 Burglary 1.8 1.8 3.2 1.7 Attempted burglary 1.7 1.7 2.9 1.9 Robbery 1.0 1.4 2.4 0.7 Theft of personal property 3.8 5.3 5.9 3.5 Sexual offences against women 1.7 1.7 1.9 1.1 Sexual offences against men 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.0 Assaults and threats 3.0 2.4 4.0 2.4 Source: Van Dijk et al. (2007b). Source: Van Dijk et al. (2007a). Figure 2. Crime prevalence in capital cities. Respondents affected by at least one type of crime in 2003/04 year victimisation prevalence rate in Greece is lower than the average rate of the 30 countries which participated in the 5th sweep of the International Victimisation Survey (12.3% vs 15.7% respectively) (Table 1). With reference to particular offences, only the theft of personal property (including pick-pocketing) has a noticeably higher percentage in Greece (5.3%) in relation to the average for the countries surveyed (3.8%, Table 1). This finding is not valid for Athens which has a rate of 3.5% for this type of offence while the average among developed cities is 5.9%. Of particular significance is the rate of assaults and threats, which is significantly below the average at both the country and city levels (2.4% vs. 3.0% for countries and 2.4% vs. 4.0% for cities, Table 1). Non-conventional Crimes 5 The surveys discussed above clearly show the low victimisation rates of the inhabitants of Greece and of Athens. However, these data are one year victimisation prevalence rates for conventional crimes, such as property crimes or assault. The picture is different in the case of non-conventional crimes, especially consumer fraud, corruption and drugs (Table 2). Consumer Fraud In relation to consumer fraud, the EU ICS data collected for 2004 reveal that on average 12% of the population surveyed claimed in 2005 that someone 'when selling or delivering a service, cheated his/her clients in terms of the quantity or quality of the goods or services'. With a rate of 24.6%, Greece scores very high in this classification, coming second, after Estonia and before Hungary (Van Dijk et al., 2007a; p. 55). At the city level, the ICVS average was 12.4%, with Budapest (25.8%), Tallinn (24.5%) and Athens (24.1%) registering the highest levels of victimisation in consumer fraud (Van Dijk et al., 2007b: p. 87). The fact that Greece is the only country at the top of this list of victimisation which is not an economy in transition from a socialist to a market economy is noteworthy. Corruption The findings related to corruption, from both EU ICS and International Transparency, are even more notable 6 . 13.5% of Greek respondents said that 'during 2004, some government official, for instance a customs officer, a police officer, a judge or inspector in their country asked them or expected them to pay a bribe for his or her services' (Van Dijk et al., 2007a: p. 56) (Table 2). Though ICVS/EU ICS focuses mostly on street-level corruption and its measures 'do not 281 282 TABLE 2 Non-conventional crimes (%), EUICS 2005 Countries Consumer fraud Corruption Hate crimes Drugs Austria 8.1 0.6 1.8 8.0 Belgium 8.0 0.5 4.2 9.0 Denmark 16.5 1.7 4.8 4.7 Estonia 25.7 3.1 Finland 5.2 0.0 1.1 2.0 France 10.2 1.1 4.9 9.4 Germany 11.7 0.6 2.6 7.1 Greece 24.6 13.5 1.6 28.4 Hungary 19.6 4.8 – 2.8 Ireland 8.0 0.3 2.2 7.2 Italy 5.9 0.4 0.9 8.8 Luxembourg 9.8 0.4 4.3 13.3 Netherlands 7.0 0.2 3.6 9.8 Poland 16.1 4.4 – 11.6 Portugal 8.2 1.0 1.5 12.6 Spain 10.8 0.3 2.1 12.9 Sweden 13.7 0.1 3.0 3.1 U.K. 8.3 0.0 4.1 11.3 Average 12.0 1.8 2.8 9.9 Source: Van Dijk et al. (2007a) capture less visible but potentially more damaging forms of high level or grand corruption' (Van Dijk et al., 2007b: p. 65), it is still a very important parameter of everyday life. Data from Greece are indicative of a mentality which reinforces common practices of problem solving via exchanges or bribery. Citizens of the Greek capital also said they had experienced this type of corruption daily to a high extent (13.8%), which is much higher than the average (1.8%) for the main developed cities (Van Dijk et al., 2007b: p. 90). This reflects, on the one hand, citizens' lack of confidence in state services and, on the other, the absence of citizens' consciousness of their rights in every aspect of social life. A convincing explanation of this phenomenon would need to be based on qualitative studies which can reveal the special cultural characteristics of each country. In recent years, an increased awareness of Greek citizens concerning victimisation through various types of corruption has been observed, with this being manifested in the development of stronger consumer associations 7 . Hate Crimes Hate crimes were also examined by the EU ICS (Table 2) and, in contrast to the rest of the non-conventional offences, the recorded rates in Greece were significantly lower (1.6% compared to an average 2.8%). So, Greece, Portugal, Italy and Finland are situated at the bottom of this classification (Van Dijk et al., 2007a: p. 52). This finding is of great importance for all European countries where different expressions of racism appear in the form of xenophobic behaviour or extreme violence. This type of victimisation is especially interesting for Greece since a mass entry of immigrants with different religious beliefs was witnessed during this period of time. However, in this category, apart from crimes motivated by hatred because of race, those motivated by hatred because of religion or sexual orientation or, in other words, 'ideologically motivated personal violence' are included (Van Dijk et al., 2007a: p. 52). When victimisation by hate crimes is restricted solely to immigrants, the picture is completely different, for they are victimised more frequently by this type of offence (10%) compared to non-immigrants (2%). A different ranking of the victimisation rates is also noted according to country, with Belgium, Spain and Greece at the top of the scale with the highest rates of hate crimes reported by immigrants (Van Dijk et al., 2007a: p. 53). The victimisation of immigrants was, moreover, greater for the ten common crimes of 2004 (19%), compared to non-immigrants (15%), a fact which connects immigration with their vulnerability to criminal threats. However, this image is not confirmed by the results of our survey amongst the inhabitants of the greater Athens area, in the same year. According to the latter, the percentage of victimisation of immigrants was only slightly higher than that of Greeks (21.8% vs 20.5%) and at the same time it was not found that they felt vulnerable 283 or unsafe (Zarafonitou, 2006a). Thus, 72.9% of them claimed that they felt quite or very safe when they walked after dark and only 27.1% of them quite or very unsafe (Table 3). On the contrary, in research carried out over the same period of time, the sample of which included only Greek citizens, there was a quite different picture since the percentage of those feeling unsafe was 52.7% (Zarafonitou, 2006b). The immigrants' (un)safety was differentiated on the basis of their ethnic origin, with respondents being classified in the following three categories: high personal safety, which included Albanians (84.8%), Bulgarians (80%) and ex-Soviets (73.1%); relative safety, which included Rumanians (53.1%); and finally feeling unsafe which included only Pakistanis, who expressed feelings of safety at a remarkably low rate (17.6%). Within this framework, a relationship between victimisation and insecurity was revealed since the Pakistanis who expressed more fear also talked about the highest percentages of victimization (52.9%). This relationship, however, is not linear because it is affected by other significant factors such as the degree of immigrants' integration in the reception country as well as other social and cultural factors. Drug-related Problems The last ICVS/EU ICS included a question related to drug-related problems, which proved to be of particular interest for Greece since 28.4% of the respondents said that 'over the last 12 months very often or from time to time they personally came in contact with drug-related problems in the area where they lived (seeing people under the influence of drugs, witnessing others taking 284 TABLE 3 Rates of (un)safety and victimisation of immigrants to Athens in 2004 (%) Total Albanian Bulgarian Ex-USSR Rumanian Pakistanis Safety 72.9 84.8 80 73.1 53.1 17.6 Feeling unsafe 27.1 15.2 20 26.9 46.9 82.4 Victimisation 21.8 20.7 14.3 15.4 16.1 52.9 Source: Zarafonitou (2006a) or using drugs in public places or finding syringes left by drug addicts)' (Table 2). According to these data, the inhabitants of Greece are the highest in the Table and, with the inhabitants of Portugal and Luxembourg, reported higher levels of these problems (Van Dijk et al., 2007b: p. 96). Though the answers to this question give little information about actual trends in drug-related problems 8 , it should be mentioned that this is a phenomenon which has strongly concerned Greek society from 1980 until today. This is also confirmed by both the annual report concerning the extent of drug use at a national and international level and the criminal statistics, since drug use is criminalised in Greece (National university research institute, 2007). Consequently, the cases which were related to drugs and recorded by police in 2005 were 10,450, an increase of 15.4% compared to those in 2004. A similar increase occurred concerning offenders (16.1%) who numbered 14,893 in 2005, following an upward trend from 1995, with the exception of 2004, which was the year of the Olympic Games in Greece. The significantly high rate of people convicted for drug-related offences in 2003, the highest of the last decade (3.2% or 2,324 convicted of drug-related offences from a total of 73,161), shows, moreover, the intolerance of Greek society towards this specific category of offences and is confirmed by the over-representation of these offenders in prisons, where they constitute 43.1% of inmates. The image which is derived from the above data shows Greece as a country with low victimisation for conventional criminality but high rates of victimisation for non-conventional crimes. 285 Source: Van Dijk et al. (2007a) Figure 3. Victimisation rates for non-conventional crimes, Greece 2005. The question which arises at this point is if this evidence can explain the very high percentages of fear of crime shown by Greek citizens or if other significant factors which create this insecurity need to be taken into consideration. FEAR OF CRIME The relationship between victimisation and fear of crime remains contradictory. Research in general confirms the correlation between fear of crime and victimisation, even if it is not a strong one (Quann and Hung, 2002: p. 313). This relationship is differentiated by the effects of other factors, such as the type of crime, while research by Killias conducted in Zurich in 1998 and 1999 linked the fear of crime of the inhabitants of certain areas with their frequent victimisation near their residence (Killias, 2001: pp. 124, 405). However, mitigation of the emotion caused by victimisation results in mitigation of the relevant fear (Box et al., 1988) and the de-dramatisation of criminality (Killias, 2001: p. 400). The ICVS/EU ICS survey has measured fear of crime via two questions. The first asks respondents 'how likely they think it is that their house will be burgled in the coming year' and it is addressed either to countries' or to main cities' citizens. The percentage of the public who perceive there to be a likelihood of burglary (Van Dijk et al., 2007a: p. 64) is, in general, high (on average 30%), but it is even higher in main cities (on average 35%). In Greece, half the respondents (49%) perceived a similar risk and in Athens this rose to three quarters of the inhabitants (73%) 9 (Van Dijk et al., 2007b: p. 127). This question is based on the hypothesis that the perception of risk of victimisation increases respondents' fear 10 ; therefore their answers should be compared to victimisation rates for this type of offence. Greek citizens' victimisation rates for burglary were 1.8% and for attempted burglary 1.7% in 2005 on the national level and 1.7% and 1.9% respectively in Athens. The perception of the risk of victimisation for this type of offence seems very disproportionate compared to the rates of Greek citizens' victimisation. This disproportionate relationship can also be seen from an examination of police statistics (Aebi et al., 2006: p. 47), according to which in 2003, 293 burglaries occurred per 100,000 inhabitants (or 2.9/1,000 inhabitants). There is an intense perceived risk of victimisation which attests to the fear of crime. This exaggerated estimate may be partly due to the inclusion of other forms of offences against property such as thefts in inhabitants' perceptions of risk. The fear of crime hypothesis is also confirmed by the high rates for the population 'feeling unsafe or very unsafe walking alone in their area after dark'. According to the ICVS/EU ICS data for 2004/05, 42% of Greek citizens said that they feel very or a bit unsafe walking in the streets after dark, the highest rate in Europe. On average, at a country level, more than a quarter of the national population (28%) felt unsafe in 2005 (Van Dijk et al., 2007a: p. 66). The rate is 286 higher among inhabitants of main developed cities (32%) with Athens registering 55% at the top (Van Dijk et al., 2007b: p. 131). 287 TABLE 4 Victimisation rates and risk perception for burglary ICVS & EU ICS Victimisation rates Risk perception 2005 Greece* Athens** Greece* EUICS* Countries average Athens** ICVS** Main cities average Burglary 1.8% 1.7% 49% 30% 73% 35% Attempted burglary 1.7% 1.9% Source: * Van Dijk et al. (2007a) ** Van Dijk et al. (2007a: p. 127) Source: Van Dijk et al. (2007a) Figure 4. Percentage of the population feeling unsafe on the streets after dark, results from the 2005 EUICS Clearly, from the above, fear of crime is not proportional to the victimisation which Greek citizens reported. The latter percentages are quite low when they refer to conventional crimes while the former are extremely high in comparison to the other countries at a European or international level. The picture derived from the surveys in Athens is similar since the rate of feeling unsafe walking alone in the streets after dark was 52.7% in 2004 (Zarafonitou, 2004) and 56.5% in 2006 (Zarafonitou and Courakis, 2009). The following factors, derived from the EU ICS (2005) data, appear to contribute to the interpretation of this 'paradox': the very high exposure of Greek citizens to drug-related problems, their restricted security precautions, their dissatisfaction with the police and generally with state services, as well as dissatisfaction with the quality of their life. The importance of drug-related problems has already been shown. The impact of this exposure in terms of the fear of crime comes from perceptions of the dangerousness of addicts. 288 Source: Van Dijk et al. (2007a: p. 68) Figure 5. Correlation of exposure to drug related problems and the fear of crime This assumption is validated by Greek research on fear of crime which shows drugs are considered a very serious social problem and an explanatory factor for the insecurity of the inhabitants of an area. According to Zarafonitou (2004), drugs are reported to be the most important social problem by Athenian inhabitants followed by immigrants and unemployment. Additionally, drug addicts, along with foreigners, marginalised people, and the mentally disturbed form the most negative stereotypes in terms of dangerousness, as is shown by the structures of social representation concerning crime and criminals in a sample of Athenian residents (Zarafonitou and Mantoglou, 2000). National surveys and the last ICVS and EU ICS have revealed that the extent to which Greek citizens resort to technical means of prevention is low. On average in Europe 50% of households possessed special door locks to protect against burglary in 2004/2005. In Greece this rate is 46% and the percentage of households with burglar alarms is much lower. This image seems to confirm the hypothesis that in part explains the positive correlation between victimisation and fear of crime as a result also of not taking special measures to avoid the possibility of subsequent victimisation (Killias, 2001: p. 402). 289 Source: Van Dijk et al. (2007a: p. 117) Figure 6. Risk, fear of crime and preventive measures against burglary In any case, research evidence in Greece has confirmed that the greatest fear of crime is felt by victims (Zarafonitou, 2008; Tseloni and Zarafonitou, 2008) and this fear cannot be explained by only one factor. A series of social changes, such as the numerous arrivals of immigrants from Balkan, Asiatic and African countries, or the financial insecurity of citizens have affected general social attitudes and have shaken citizens' trust in the capability of the state to ensure their safety 11 . Linked to the relationship between the state and the citizens is the issue of lack of confidence in the police and its impact on fear of crime. The first studies on fear of crime noted the decisive role that the presence of police can play, especially if the force is willing, effective, and accepted by the community (Box et al., 1988: p. 353). This role has become even more important in modern urban environments due to a lack of informal social control and the loosening of social bonds. Within this framework, the police are perceived by citizens as 'an organisation in the service of the local population' and, as such, satisfaction with police services 'constitutes a "logical" criterion for its assessment' (Killias, 2001: p. 429). Findings indicate that those who feel more intense fear are those who are also most dissatisfied by the work of the police and who seek greater policing (Zvekic, 1997: p. 8). This image is also verified by Greek research results according to which inhabitants of Athens in 2004 gave a negative assessment of the work of the police (Table 5) with almost three quarters of respondents assessing police work as not very or not at all effective (71.8%). This assessment, however, becomes even more negative in the case of victims (75.8%) or those expressing feelings of lack of security (77.6%). Similar rankings are also given by the EU ICS in 2005; on average, 67% of the public thinks 'the police do a good or a very good job in controlling crime in the local area'. Greece is among the countries where the poorest judgments of 290 TABLE 5 Evaluation of the job the police do in the area where the respondent lives Evaluation Total Those feeling unsafe Victims Effective 122 28.2% 53 22.4% 22 24.2% Ineffective 310 71.8% 184 77.6% 69 75.8% Total 432 100% 237 100% 91 100% Source: Zarafonitou (2004) police performance were expressed (57%). The others were Poland (41%), Estonia (46%), Spain (58%) and France (60%) (Van Dijk et al., 2007a: p. 80). The evaluation of police work in the context of the European capitals is somewhat better. However, the inhabitants of Athens are the most negative since they were last, with only 52% who said that the police do a good job (Figure 7). 291 TABLE 6 Police assessment in European countries, 2005 Assessment EU ICS Average Greece Percentage satisfied with police controlling crime in local area 67% 57% Victims satisfied with report (5 crimes) 55% 28% Source: Van Dijk et al. (2007a) Source: Van Dijk et al. (2007a) Figure 7. Evaluation of police in European capitals (% of residents saying the police do a good job) The EU ICS focused especially on the assessment of police work by victims of five crimes (Table 6). The victims who reported any burglary with entry, theft from a car, robbery, a sexual incident or assault threat were less satisfied in comparison to the general sample (55% on average). The worst assessments came from Estonia (15%)) and Greece (28%) and the best from Denmark (75%). Having specialised support agencies for victims of crime was limited in Hungary (0.4%), Finland, Germany and Greece (2% respectively), Italy and Spain (3%) (Van Dijk et al., 2007a: p. 77). The ICVS provides three measures for the 'quality of public relations of police forces': (a) the reporting rate for victims of recent crimes 12 (an objective behavioural measure of public confidence in the police), b) victims' assessment of their police treatment (a subjective criterion) and c) the assessment discussed above of the general effectiveness of the police in controlling crime (also a subjective criterion) (Van Dijk et al., 2007b: p. 141). According to these data, the ICVS has formulated an index of police performance. The average by countries of the index of ICVS and EU ICS 2004/05 was 75% and Greece is again among the countries with the poorest perceived performance of their police forces with a rate of 59% (Van Dijk et al., 2007b: p. 143). The above criteria show that Greek citizens are dissatisfied with the police and they also question the role of the police in society as the civil service that is particularly responsible for citizens' safety. This factor seems strongly related to the high levels of lack of safety. This position is also related to the general 292 Source: Van Dijk et al. (2007b) Figure 8. Reported crimes and 'police performance index', ICVS 2005 dissatisfaction that citizens feel with state services in relation to health, education, public transportation, and the environment. The above parameters refer to the issue of 'quality of life' that emerged from the research on fear of crime among inhabitants of Athens mentioned above (Zarafonitou, 2004). According to these research findings, quality of life appeared to be an important factor concerning lack of safety since 76.8% of those who expressed feelings of fear were also dissatisfied by the quality of life in their municipality while among respondents who felt safe, the relevant figure was 58.0% (Table 7). TABLE 7 Satisfaction with the quality of life in the area where the respondent lives This finding is also borne out by multiple-regression analysis, according to which those who are satisfied by the quality of life in their residential area feel twice as safe (2.042) as those saying they are unsatisfied. A question concerning the environment, included in the European Victimisation Survey (EU ICS), is relevant to 'environmental disorder' and examines the stance of citizens of European capitals on the basis of certain 293 Source: Zarafonitou (2004) characteristics that delineate the notion of 'a deprived area' (youth on the streets, homeless persons, beggars, littering, graffiti, vandalism and public intoxication: Hideg and Manchin, 2005). Research data rate inhabitants of Athens first in negative assessments with 86%, along with inhabitants of Budapest. These are followed by the inhabitants of Brussels and Paris (84%), while the inhabitants of Lisbon are in last place (and therefore have the most positive image) (56%), (Figure 9). This stance is correlated with (in)security 13 . DISCUSSION In conclusion, it could be argued that the lack of safety which is related to problems of criminality is quite extensive in Greece and particularly in Athens. This lack of safety is disproportionate to the rates of victimisation for conventional crimes, which are relatively low in comparison to those of the rest of European countries. This is correlated to the perception of a number of parameters relating to everyday life, such as exposure to drug-related problems, adverse neighbourhood characteristics, and corruption as well as dissatisfaction with the police services. In reality, this image of high levels of fear of crime among Greek citizens could be better understood as general insecurity rather than a specific fear of victimisation (Kury and Obergfell-Fuchs, 2008: p. 55). The 'paradox' which results from the lack of correlation between low victimisation and high fear of crime may be better interpreted by an examination of subjective and objective parameters which compose it 14 . Psychological 294 Source: Hideg and Manchin (2005), cited in Van Dijk et al. (2007a) Figure 9. Adverse neighbourhood characteristics considerations of vulnerability, wider social attitudes and day to day perceptions of risk compose one side of the 'social significance' of lack of safety (Jackson, 2004: p. 960). The other side is composed of personal and social vulnerability (sex, age, place of residence, neighbourhood characteristics) and of the extent of threats (possibility of crime, seriousness of undesirable consequences and sense of weakness in controlling these situations (Killias, 1990; Killias and Clerici, 2000). Hence, other important personal and social uncertainties are being voiced through the fear of crime 15 . This dissatisfaction is apparent, in particular, towards the police which is considered to be the only appropriate state service for issues of safety given the fact that Greeks rarely resort to technical measures of protection. It is also apparent because of extensive corruption in citizens' daily contact with the state. In both cases, significant inadequacy on the part of the state is detected either because the state does not sufficiently meet its responsibilities towards its citizens, as in the case of the police, or because it 'victimises' its citizens instead of providing the services to which they are entitled, as in the case of corruption by civil servants. Citizens' insecurities expressed via fear of crime have increased due to the social changes which have taken place in the last two decades. One such significant change was the massive influx of economic immigrants originally from the Balkan countries (mostly from Albania) and recently from Asia and Africa. In this manner, Greece, which was in the past an 'immigrant sender' country, has taken on the role of an 'immigrant receiver' 16 . The consequences of this change are visible not only demographically but socially and culturally. Research findings reveal a considerable connection between Greeks' feelings of lack of safety and this phenomenon (Zarafonitou, 2002, 2004, 2009) 17 . Thus, social insecurities are perceived and faced as insecurities derived from immigration (Palidda, 1999: p. 39) and immigrants are seen as responsible for various social problems and the increase of criminality (Tonry, 1998: p. 60). Moreover, the social changes in Greece are linked to negative consequences of globalisation. The increase in the amount of illegal drugs imported and the spread of their use among the population is indicative. Drugs are considered a significant social problem. The drug problem is also connected to fear of crime because a high degree of dangerousness is attributed to drug users. The above parameters create a negative evaluation of quality of life for the citizens. Socio-economic criteria account for the fact that the perceived decline in the quality of life is more intense in some milieux. For example, city neighbourhoods fall into this category because the signs of decline can be more obvious here (Zarafonitou, 2002, 2004; Zarafonitou and Courakis, 2009). On the other hand, the perception of threats as well as the perception of positive or adverse neighbourhood characteristics is also dependent on the level of social integration of the respondents (Kury and Obergfell-Fuchs, 2008: p. 76). In addition to all the above, the role of the media is always important in the construction of social attitudes and representations (Vanderveen, 2006: p. 204; 295 Cario, 2004). In the case of Greece, the number of television channels, radio stations, newspapers and magazines has increased rapidly since 1990. Although Greek studies here found that the objectivity of the media is doubted since the majority of people believe that they exaggerate when dealing with criminal issues, the media constitute people's main source of information concerning crime and criminal justice (Zarafonitou, 2002, 2004; Zarafonitou and Courakis, 2009). The level of fear of crime is generally overestimated in the context of victimisation surveys which include the standard indicators of this feeling (Kury and Obergfell-Fuchs, 2008: p. 79). The previous analysis shows a significant role for the qualitative characteristics in the interpretation of the quantitative dimensions of a compound social phenomenon such as fear of crime (Gray et al., 2008; Kury and Obergfell-Fuchs, 2008). The lack of safety shown by the research evidence obviously reflects not only the existing situation but also a current social phenomenon. The content of this meaning, however, is differentiated significantly by social and cultural factors which are not shown by pure quantitative measurements 18 . Therefore, it is obvious that combined methodological approaches are necessary for the study of compound social phenomena. In conclusion, in the case of Greece, the high level of the fear of crime reflects, on the one hand, the general social and personal insecurities of the citizens which derive from the interaction of various features within Greek society and, on the other, cultural characteristics which justify some exaggeration in the expression of feelings. Thus, one can explain the inconsistency between citizens' significant rate of insecurity and the fact that they do not limit going out nor do they take other precautionary measures in everyday life. NOTES 1 For an overview of the research on fear of crime in Greece, see Zarafonitou (2010). 2 According to Jackson (2004: p. 960) 'worries about crime articulate such social meaning because they are constituted by social meaning'. This way, there is a considerable overlap of the 'experience' aspect of fear with an 'expressive' aspect. 3 For a systematic review of the literature on fear of crime explanations, see Vanderveen (2006) and Lee (2007). 4 The ICVS and EU ICS cover ten conventional crimes: vehicle related crimes (theft of a car, theft from a car, theft of a motorcycle or moped, theft of a bicycle), burglary, attempted burglary, theft of personal property and contact crimes (robbery, sexual offences, assault and threats) (Van Dijk et al., 2007b: p. 11). 296 5 According to the ICVS and EU ICS, the non-conventional crimes are: street-level corruption, consumer fraud, drug-related problems and hate crimes (Van Dijk et al., 2007b: p. 85). 6 According to the latest report on corruption of International Transparency, in 2009 Greece was placed last of the European countries with a CPI of 3.8/10 and below the level of 5 which shows that there is a long road ahead if the situation is to change substantially (http://www.transparency.org). 7 According to recent research findings, Athens' inhabitants are the most punitive on corruption, which is followed by vandalism, drug-trafficking, food fraud, hooliganism, sexual exploitation of children and women, and rape (Zarafonitou and Courakis, 2009). 8 As it is pointed out by Van Dijk et al. (2007b: p. 97), 'contact of the general public with drug-related problems cannot be seen as an indicator of the actual level of drugs consumption' and also 'no strong relationships were found between the extent of the public's exposure to drugs and national rates of cannabis consumption and estimated rates of drug addicts. No relationships were found between exposure to drugs-related problems and levels of property crime'. 9 According to the research findings of the national victimisation survey (Karydis, 2004), 66% of the respondents thought it very or fairly likely that 'someone will try to break into their home, over the next 12 months'. 10 The opposite hypothesis is also suggested in order to test whether risk and fear 'are separate concerns and that risk is not acting as a proxy for fear' (Chadee et al., 2007: p. 147). 11 On this basis, lack of security is connected with the state–citizen relationship. This 'discussion' is more intense in societies with a tradition of a strong state (Robert, 2005: p. 95). 12 According to the Greek research results (Zarafonitou, 2004), the rate of reporting among inhabitants of Athens was relatively high (64.5%), despite their much more negative image of police effectiveness. Concerning the last ICVS/EU ICS data at a country level, almost half the Greek citizens (49%) reported their victimisation to the police in five types of crime and this rate is more than the average of 47% (Van Dijk et al., 2007b: p. 110). 13 On spatial perception and unsafety, see Kaal et al. (2008). 14 Crawford (2007: p. 899) suggests that 'subjective fear of crime may be high amongst those people with little objective risk of victimization'. 15 Rapid social change and uncertainty are correlated with the perception of a 'risk society' (Beck, 1992). 16 The exact number of immigrants living in Greece cannot be precisely calculated because those who do not have a residence permit are also included. In any case, the official data from the 2001 census estimate that immigrants were 8% of the total population (5.3% in 1991), but it is assumed that the number is higher. This development places Greece first among the European countries whose immigrant population has risen so sharply at the end of the 20th century (Pavlou, 2004: p. 371). 17 Vanderveen (2006: p. 219) refers to the 'fear of strangers' as a fear of the unknown. 297 18 A simple but indicative example is the meaning of time in the classic question 'how safe do you feel walking alone in your area after dark', which residents of the Greek capital consider to be after 10 pm. Thus, to the question 'after which hour do you feel unsafe', the majority (75.7%) answered 'after 10 pm', with 21.7% saying 'from 8pm to 10pm' and only 2.6% 'up to 8 pm' (Zarafonitou, 2004). It is obvious that the answers to the above question differed according to the country or city. REFERENCES Aebi, M., Aromaa, K., Aubusson De Cavarlay, B., Barclay, G., Grusczynska, B., Von Hofer, H., Hysi, V., Jehle, J.-M., Killias, M., Smit, P. and Tavares, C. (2006). European Sourcebook of Crime and Criminal Justice Statistics – 2005, 3rd ed. WODC; The Hague. Beck, U. (1992). Risk Society. Sage; London. Box, ST., Hale, C. and Andrews, G. (1988). Explaining Fear of Crime. British Journal of Criminology, 28, 340–356. Cario, R. (2004). Médias et Insécurité: Entre Droit d'Informer et Illusions Sécuritaires. Recueil Dalloz, 2, 75–80. Chadee, D., Austen, L. and Ditton, J. (2007). The Relationship Between Likelihood and Fear of Criminal Victimization. British Journal of Criminology, 47, 133–153. Crawford, A. (2007). Crime Prevention and Community Safety. In The Oxford Handbook of Criminology (M. Maguire, R. Morgan and R. Reiner, eds) pp. 866–909. Oxford University Press; Oxford. Furstenberg, F. (1971). Public Reaction to Crime in Streets. American Scholar, 40, 601–610. Garland, D. (2001). The Culture of Control. Crime and Social Order in Contemporary Society. Oxford University Press; Oxford. Gray, E., Jackson, J. and Farrall, ST. (2008). 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Dossier-Débat: La Sociologie, Les Sociologues et l'Insécurité. Sociologie du Travail, 47, 89–99. Robert, P. and Pottier, M-L. (2004). Les Préoccupations Sécuritaires: Une Mutation? Revue Française de Sociologie, 45 (2), 211–242. Taylor, R. and Hale, M. (1986). Testing Alternative Models of Fear of Crime. Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, 77, 151–189. Tonry, M. (1998). A Comparative Perspective on Minority Groups, Crime and Criminal Justice. European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice, 6, 60–73. Tseloni, A. and Zarafonitou, C. (2008). Fear of Crime and Victimisation: A Multivariate Multilevel Analysis of Competing Measurements? European Journal of Criminology, 5, 387–409. Vanderveen, G. (2006). Interpreting Fear, Crime, Risk and Unsafety. BJU; Den Haag. Van Dijk, J.J.M., Manchin, R., Van Kesteren, J.N. and Hideg, G. (2007a). The Burden of Crime in the EU. A Comparative Analysis of the European Survey of Crime and Safety (2005 EU ICS). Gallup Europe; Brussels. Van Dijk, J., Van Kesteren, J. and Smit, P. (2007b). Criminal Victimisation in International Perspective. Key Findings from the 2004–2005 ICVS and EU ICS. WODC; The Hague. 299 Widmer, E., Languin, N. Pattaroni, L., Kellerhals, J. and Robert, C.-N. (2004). Du Sentiment d'Insécurité aux Représentations de la Délinquance. Déviance et Société, 2, 141–157. Zarafonitou, C. (2002). The Fear of Crime. A Criminological Approach and Inquiry Based on an Empirical Study of the Phenomenon Within the City of Athens. Studies in European Legal Science. A. Sakkoulas publ.; Athens-Komotini. (In Greek and English). Zarafonitou, C. (2004). Anasfa¢ leia, Fo¢ boV tou egklh¢ matoV kai Sta¢ seiV twn Katoi¢ kwn thV Aqh¢ naV ape¢ nanti sto Egklhmatiko¢ Faino¢ meno (Insecurity, Fear of Crime and Attitudes of the Inhabitants of Athens Toward the Criminal Phenomenon). Unpublished research, Panteion University; Athens. (In Greek). Zarafonitou, C. (2006a). La Peur du Crime Parmi les Immigrés et Leurs Attitudes face aux Institutions de la Justice Pénale. In Mutations des Politiques Criminelles en Europe (Th. Papatheodorou and Ph. Mary, eds) pp. 91–113. Papazissis; Athènes. Zarafonitou, C. (2006b).Egklhmatologike¢ V Proseggi¢ seiV tou Fo¢ bou tou Egklh¢ matoV kai thV (An)asja¢ leiaV (Criminological Approaches of Fear of Crime and (Un)safety). Poinikh¢ Dikaiosu¢ nh (Penal Justice), 8/9, 1031–1039. (In Greek). Zarafonitou, C. (2008). Fear of Crime and Victimisation: The Greek Experience. In Fear of Crime-Punitivity. New Developments in Theory and Research (H. Kury, ed.) pp. 159–172. Universitatsverlag Dr. N. Brockmeyer; Bochum. Zarafonitou, C. (2010). Fear of Crime in Contemporary Greece. In Crime and Punishment in Contemporary Greece: International Comparative Perspectives (L.K. Cheliotis and S. Xenakis, eds). Peter Lang AG; Oxford. (Forthcoming). Zarafonitou, C. and Courakis, N. (2009). (An)asja¢ leia, Timwrhtiko¢ thta kai Antegklhmatikh¢ Politikh¢ [(Un)safety, Punitivity and Criminal Policy]. A. Sakkloulas Publ.; Athens-Komotini. (In Greek). For a brief presentation in English, see: http://criminology.panteion.gr/index.php?option=com_content& view=article&id=104:qinsecurity-punitiveness-and-criminal-policyq&catid=39: anakoinoseis. Zvekic, U. (1997). Les Attitudes des Victimes envers la Police et la Punitivité: Résultats des Sondages Internationaux de Victimisation. Revue Internationale de Criminologie et de Police Technique, 1, 3–16. 300 
work_f26xmuormrgtvbnirsic2e5vhe	----	Threat, emboldenment, or both? The effects of political power on violent hate crimes&#x0002A; Received: 20 June 2019 Revised: 14 July 2020 Accepted: 15 July 2020 DOI: 10.1111/1745-9125.12259 ARTICLE Threat, emboldenment, or both? The effects of political power on violent hate crimes* Laura Dugan1 Erica Chenoweth2 1 Department of Criminology and Criminal Justice, University of Maryland—College Park 2 Harvard Kennedy School, Harvard University Correspondence LauraDugan,DepartmentofCriminol- ogyandCriminalJustice,Universityof Maryland,2220LeFrakHall,7251Preinkert Drive,CollegePark,MD20742. Email: ldugan@umd.edu *Additionalsupportinginformationcan befoundinthefulltexttabforthisarticle intheWileyOnlineLibraryathttp:// onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/crim. 2020.58.issue-4/issuetoc. Wegratefullyacknowledgethehardwork byDarenG.FishertoassurethattheGATE datawereaccurately,validly,andreli- ablycollectedandcodedbytheinterns hesupervised.Hisendlessandcreative endeavorstoaccessopen-sourcemate- rialmadethisresearchpossible.Weare alsogratefulforthe39STARTinternsand MichelleFabianiwhoworkedtirelessly tocodetheGATEdata.Furthermore, wethankPhilSchrodtforhiscontinued technicalsupport.Additionally,weare gratefultoMinXieandtheastuteanony- mousreviewerswhohelpedtomakethis abetterpaper.Finally,wewouldliketo dedicatethisresearchtothelateStephen E.Fienberg,whomentoredtheleadauthor instatistics,andhiswife,thelateJoyce Abstract How do expressions of support or opposition by the U.S. federal government, influence violent hate crimes against specific racial and ethnic minorities? In this article, we test two hypotheses derived from Blalock’s (1967) conceptualization of intergroup power contests. Thepolitical threathypothesispredictsthatpositivegov- ernment attention toward specific groups would lead to more hateful violence directed against them. The emboldenment hypothesis predicts that negative gov- ernment attention toward specific groups would also lead to more hateful violence directed against them. Using combined data on U.S. government actions and federal hate crime statistics from 1992 through 2012, vector autoregression models provide support for both hypotheses, depending on the protected group involved. We conclude that during this period, African Americans were more vulnerable to hate crimes motivated by polit- ical threat, and Latinx persons were more vulnerable to hate crimes motivated by emboldenment. KEYWORDS emboldenment, government actions, political threat, violent hate crime This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs License, which permits use and distribution in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, the use is non-commercial and no modifications or adaptations are made. © 2020 The Authors. Criminology published by Wiley Periodicals LLC on behalf of American Society of Criminology 714 wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/crim Criminology. 2020;58:714–746. https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5930-6950 https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3113-2439 mailto:ldugan@umd.edu http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/crim.2020.58.issue-4/issuetoc http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/crim.2020.58.issue-4/issuetoc http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/crim.2020.58.issue-4/issuetoc http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ https://wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/crim Dugan and Chenoweth 715 Fienbergwholostherlifetoaperpetra- torofhateintheTreeofLifeSynagogue inPittsburgh,PA,onOctober27,2018. FundingwasprovidedbytheDepartment ofHomelandSecurityScienceandTech- nologyDirectorate’sOfficeofUniversity Programsthroughawardnumber2012- ST-061-CS0001,aswellasbytheCenter fortheStudyofTerrorismandBehav- ior(CSTAB)2.6,whichwasawardedfor STARTtoinvestigatetheunderstanding andcounteringofterrorismwithinthe UnitedStates.Theviewsandconclusions containedinthisdocumentarethoseof theauthorsandshouldnotbeinterpreted asnecessarilyrepresentingofficialpoli- cies,eitherexpressedorimplied,ofthe U.S.DepartmentofHomelandSecurityor START. Fundinginformation ScienceandTechnologyDirectorate, Grant/AwardNumber:2012-ST-061- CS0001 1 INTRODUCTION Since the election of Donald Trump as President of the United States, the media has reported an increaseinthenumberofhatecrimesagainstmarginalizedgroupsdefinedbytheirrace,ethnicity, sexual orientation/identity, and religion (Burch, 2017; Goldman, 2017; Hauslohner, 2018; Potok, 2017).1 In fact, the Center for the Study of Hate and Extremism found that hate crimes reported to the police rose 12.5 percent from 923 in 2016 to 1,038 in 2017 in the ten largest U.S. cities, with the most common motivations being anti-Black, anti-Semitic, anti-gay, and anti-Latino (Levin & Reitzel, 2018). Although hate crime rates have typically spiked during election years in the United States, 2017 was the first year in which they continued to rise once the presidential election was over (Levin & Reitzel, 2018). Indeed, according to the FBI’s annual Hate Crime Statistics report, hate crimes were 17 percent higher in 2017 than in 2016 (7,175 and 6,125, respectively).2 Scholarly analyses have claimed that President Trump’s hostile rhetoric toward specific groups has emboldened individuals to perpetrate violence against those he mentions (Müller & Schwarz, 2018). Although this may be true, we argue that the rise and fall of violence against marginal- ized groups have long been sensitive to gains and losses of political power for those groups (e.g., Cunningham, 2012; McVeigh, Cunningham, & Farrell, 2014; Van Dyke & Soule, 2002), and that the emboldenment of perpetrators toward violence is just one possible dynamic. When we con- siderBlalock’s(1967)power-threattheory,whichexplicitlylinkspoliticalpowertohostilityagainst 1 We use the words “minority,” “marginalized,” and “protected group” interchangeably to refer to nondominant groups. 2 The reports are found exclusively online, last accessed May 25, 2020 (https://www.fbi.gov/services/cjis/ucr/ publications#Hate-Crime%20Statistics). https://www.fbi.gov/services/cjis/ucr/publications#Hate-Crime%20Statistics https://www.fbi.gov/services/cjis/ucr/publications#Hate-Crime%20Statistics 716 Dugan and Chenoweth marginalized groups, we also anticipate that when marginalized groups gain political power, the established dominant group will become more hostile (Van Dyke & Soule, 2002). For instance, it was immediately after Emancipation in 1865 that the Ku Klux Klan formed as a means to pre- serve white supremacy (Levin, 2002). Similarly, when members of the Black community3 gained economic status in various U.S. cities, the communal backlash against them was often severe. In Tulsa, Oklahoma, for instance, White mobs rioting against the Black community left up to 300 dead and tens of thousands homeless (Ellsworth, 1992; Oklahoma Commission to Study the Race Riot of 1921, 2001). Countless other examples in U.S. history demonstrate this pattern. Prior research typically analyzes the association between political threat and various forms of nonviolent reactionary mobilization, such as social movement formation (Cunningham, 2012; Van Dyke & Soule, 2002) or dominant group voting behavior (McVeigh et al., 2014). But our study turns to Blalock’s (1967) original conceptualization of intergroup power contests—and what became known as “power-threat theory”—to articulate political threat and emboldenment hypotheses that explain changes in patterns of violent hate crimes against specific groups in the United States since the early 1990s. Although all hate crimes are inherently violent, we explicitly focus on violent hate crimes using the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) definition because of the extremity of the acts, because of the enduring relevance of direct violence as a tool by which dominant groups intimidate and control marginalized groups (Müller & Schwarz, 2018; Tolnay & Beck, 1992), and because measures of violent crimes are less subject to underreporting bias than nonviolent crimes (Hart & Rennison, 2003). The political threat hypothesis predicts that violent backlash against specific groups is triggered by political gains made by those groups (e.g., new civil rights protections, meaningful changes in economic and social status, or support among powerful political elites; Taylor, 2016). This inter- pretationwouldcharacterizeviolenthatecrimeasamechanismtoreinforcethedominantgroup’s dominion in the power equilibrium across groups (Blalock, 1967). In this way, perpetrators asso- ciated with dominant groups use violent hate crimes to try to reestablish social dominance when marginalized groups begin to achieve more power (Eitle, D’Alessio, & Stolzenberg, 2002). If polit- ical threat contributes to the variation in violent hate crimes, we would expect to see increases in violent hate crimes against groups that recently gained political power, signaling a potential threat to status quo hierarchies. A complementary approach, which we call the emboldenment hypothesis, predicts that increases in violent hate crimes against certain populations are triggered by government elites who signal supremacy over those groups, emboldening some members of the dominant group to commit violent action. Within the context of intergroup power, we interpret explicit anti-group acts by the government as signals to some members of the dominant group that they can combat the perceived threat of minority power growth without consequence. In other words, some may perceive that the government is giving them a license to act on their anger. Indeed, scholars have tied hate speech—particularly by those in power—to discriminatory action, retaliatory violence, and hate crimes (Gagnon, 1995; Kalmoe, 2014; Kteily, Bruneau, Waytz, & Cotterill, 2015; Müller & Schwarz, 2018). As Sara Lipton argued, “[A] heightening of rhetoric against a certain group can incite violence against that group, even when no violence is called for. When a group is labeled hostile and brutal, its members are more likely to be treated with hostility and brutality” (2015, p.1).Forinstance, formanydecadesaftertheendofdejureslaveryintheUnitedStates,politicians andlawenforcementofficialscondonedthelynchingofBlackAmericans,signalingimpunityand approval for those who would engage in such acts (Bouie, 2017; Tolnay & Beck, 1995). 3 We use the terms Black and African American interchangeably in this article. Dugan and Chenoweth 717 Most existing studies of political threat have been focused on the expansion of wealth, voting, population growth, or political representation among marginalized groups as the main source of political threat (Blalock, 1967; Eitle et al., 2002; Taylor, 2016; Van Dyke & Soule, 2002). But we argue that focused attention from politicians—through their speech and their policy proposals— can induce backlash or emboldenment effects without necessarily creating material benefits or committingmaterialharmtomarginalizedcommunities.Evenwithoutalteringdefactoeconomic opportunities or political power, favorable actions by the federal government may signal the gov- ernment’s commitment to expanding economic and agenda-setting power for African Americans or other marginalized groups. This expectation may result in anticipatory mobilization, mean- ing that backlash could occur without any favorable policies coming to pass. Conversely, focused negative government attention—through officials’ discriminatory or racist speech and policy proposals—might similarly embolden violent hate crimes against the relevant group. Indeed, prior research on emboldenment has often been focused on the ways in which official rhetoric— such as racist or exclusionary language—can propel violence against marginalized communities (Gagnon, 1995; Kalmoe, 2014; Kteily et al., 2015; Lipton, 2017; Müller & Schwarz, 2018). Thus, both policies and rhetoric regarding a protected group can produce political threat, emboldenment, or both effects. Our study therefore assesses these two compatible components of power threat theory, which predict an increase in violent hate crimes both during times of increased political power for spe- cific marginalized groups (political threat) and during times of political retrogression for such groups (emboldenment). We generate hypotheses and test them using vector autoregression on monthly data constructed from recorded events on U.S. federal government actions—including speech and material action—and violent hate crimes specific to Black and Latinx people between 1992 and 2012. Our aim is to assess how political threat and emboldenment relate to changes in violent hate crimes targeting those groups. Although we find different effects across each demo- graphic group, our findings suggest that speech and actions by federal officials toward these groups affect patterns of hate crimes against them. We conclude that during this period, African Americans were more vulnerable to hate crimes motivated by political threat, and Latinx people were more vulnerable to hate crimes driven by emboldenment. 2 INTERGROUP POWER CONTESTS—POWER THREAT THEORY AtatimeofheightenedracialdiscordintheUnitedStates,Blalock(1967) introducedwhatbecame knownas“power-threat theory”in hisbookTowardaTheoryofMinorityGroupRelations. Blalock characterized intergroup power contests by the shifts away from and toward a power equilib- rium where the dominant group maintains greater power relative to the minority group (see also Blumer’s 1958 explanation of group position). Although the theory is meant to be generalized to any set of groups where one dominates over the others, the book and subsequent writings on this topic were focused mostly on Anglo- and African-American majority and minority groups, respectively (e.g., Fossett & Kiecolt, 1989; Giles & Evans, 1986; Jacobs & Helms, 1999; Quillian, 1995, 1996; Taylor, 1998). Blalock (1967) argued that the dominant group in a particular setting acts to maintain a power equilibrium relative to a minority group, and that these power shifts are func- tions of increases in resources and mobilization efforts: “...resources seem to depend primarily on the motivation and goals of persons over whom power is exercised, whereas mobilization is more largely a function of the goals of the persons exerting the power” (Blalock, 1967, p. 114). In other words, as a minority group gains resources, the dominant group mobilizes its resources to 718 Dugan and Chenoweth reestablish its dominance within the power hierarchy (i.e., the political threat hypothesis). This dynamic has been documented by Wacquant (2006) and others, who have shown that Jim Crow laws supplanted slavery, and Western and Pettit (2010), who argued that mass incarceration of African Americans supplanted Jim Crow laws (see also Alexander, 2012). Van Dyke and Soule (2002) similarly showed how increases in perceived political, economic, and demographic threats toWhitesupremacyledtoincreasednumbersofWhitenationalistandWhitesupremacistmilitias inthe1990s.Moreover,Vazquez(2010)arguedthatbyincorporatingimmigrationlawintotheU.S. criminal justice system, dominance was reestablished over Latinx people following major gains in labor and immigration rights. Although the key variables used by scholars in this area are minority resources and dominant group mobilization, Blalock’s (1967) conceptualization of relative power includes resources and mobilization for both groups. Of course, the underlying assumption here is that the equilibrium, as defined by the dominant group, is final. In actuality, systems that preserve one group’s domi- nanceoverothersareincreasinglyinterpretedbysomemembersofthepublicasinherentlyunjust and discriminatory, making them vulnerable to legal challenges and other forms of change over time (Epps, 1998). Theseshifts inperspectivetendtoresult frommobilizationbymarginalizedgroups.Suchmobi- lization is epitomized by the abolition movement with regard to slavery; the civil rightsmovement in response to Jim Crow and racial segregation; and the women’s and lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans- gendered, and queer (LGBTQ) movements in response to laws restricting the rights of women and sexual minorities (Van Dyke & Soule, 2002). Scholars have referred to periods of mobilization that result inmajorgainsforaggrievedgroupsasthe“rightsrevolutions”(Epps,1998).Wecharacterize minority group mobilization as a persistent effort to destabilize the dominant group’s equilibrium of inequality. Just as minority group mobilization is persistent, dominant group resources are plentiful as default narratives have historically favored members of the dominant group, which since at least the nineteenth century in the United States have been White, male, natively born, heterosexual Christians (Doane, 1997). But the dominant group is not monolithic. Instead, it is vulnerable to fragmentation as mobilization and resistance by marginalized groups begin to challenge the sus- tainability of the existing order (Epps, 1998). For example, Whites in the United States split over the abolition of slavery, resulting in a civil war between Union and Confederacy forces. A similar dynamic occurred in South Africa, where White business elites split over the continuance of the apartheid system (Charney, 1999; Fourie & Eloff, 2005). In the twenty-first century United States, immigration is a notably partisan issue, with Whites divided mainly along political party lines concerning appropriate approaches to immigration and immigrants (Pew Research Center, 2018). We argue that the constant threat of fragmentation tends to tame overt expressions of hostility toward marginalized groups, as the dominant group publicly acclimatizes to a growing sympathy among the broader population. Despite having ample resources to reestablish dominance, threat- ened Whites feel regular pressure from minority group resistance and other Whites to accept new equilibria, tempering the capacity to mobilize all available resources to reestablish social domi- nance. It is under this tension that any overt hostile act by an elite member of the dominant group could motivate violence against marginalized groups (i.e., the emboldenment hypothesis). In this article, we focus on Black and Latinx individuals in the United States. We argue that key metrics of federal power for any minority group include material changes implemented at the federal level, as well as public support expressed by federal officials—like the Voting Rights and Civil Rights Acts, which rendered Jim Crow laws illegal; or the DREAM Act, which expressed support for deportation immunity to immigrants who arrived in the United States as Dugan and Chenoweth 719 children. We argue that such changes only result from minority group mobilization and create new resources for ongoing mobilization efforts. For instance, pressure from the Civil Rights movement was mainly responsible for the eradication of legalized segregation and Jim Crow, even as key leadership of the movement negotiated with federal officials regarding the terms of the Civil Rights and Voting Rights Acts. And the Dreamer movement, which mobilized hundreds of thousands of undocumented immigrants to defer deportation and allow undocumented students to attend college in the United States, was responsible for the passage of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) and for increasing support for immunity for illegal immigrants (Pew Research Center, 2018). Yet, such accommodations can provoke backlash as well, as others fear disempowerment by the perceived power growth of minority groups. Bouie (2017) argued that expressions of political racism have been cyclical as African Americans experienced different levels of political gain and loss across different time periods. For instance, the landmark case Brown v. Board of Education (1954) ruled that racial segregation of children in schools was unconstitutional and mandated that they be integrated. Initially hailed as a major step toward justice, the ruling also fueled backlash from pro-segregationists, with some governors defying federal orders to integrate (Fobanjong, 2003). More recently, after the passage of DACA, the Obama administration ramped up deportation of Latin American immigrants, and the Trump campaign tapped into anti-immigrant sentiment by referring to Mexicans as “drug dealers,” “criminals,” and “rapists” and promised to build a border wall to end illegal immigration (Phillips, 2017), rhetoric that he has maintained as president. Therefore, publicly expressed disdain toward minority groups by members of the federal government provides the dominant group a new resource that it can use in its efforts to return to a status quo equilibrium, including an expectation of impunity for crimes committed against the group. Combined,wehypothesizethat increasesinexpressedfederalsupport forspecificmarginalized groups puts members of those groups at risk for violent hate crime victimization (political threat), andthat increasesinfederaloppositiontoprogressforspecificmarginalizedgroupsalsoputstheir members at risk of violent hate crimes (emboldenment). The following sections further delineate the causal mechanisms linking U.S. federal actions to violent hate crime for each hypothesis. 2.1 Political threat hypothesis Blalock (1967) explained that as minority resources increase and are mobilized, they increase political power for marginalized groups and thereby threaten the dominant group’s position of power. This leads the dominant group to mobilize, which in turn reestablishes the power balance preferred by the dominant group. In the same vein, we would expect that evidence of increases in minority mobilization would also raise concerns of possible lost relative power for the dominant group. Empirical evidence has primarily supported this relationship through various operationaliza- tions of minority resources and dominant group mobilization. A commonly used metric of minor- ity resources is the percentage of the population that is Black, which has been found to be associ- ated higher levels of anti-Black prejudice (Quillian, 1995; Taylor, 1998), support for harmful racial policies (Fossett & Kiecolt, 1989; Giles & Evans, 1986; Quillian, 1996), increase in Republican voter registrations in Louisiana (Giles & Hertz, 1994), votes for Wallace in 1968 (Wright, 1977), spending on corrections (Jacobs & Helms, 1999), spending on police (Jackson & Carroll, 1981), support for the death penalty (Baumer, Messner, & Rosenfeld, 2003), and support for other tough-on-crime 720 Dugan and Chenoweth policies (King & Wheelock, 2007). Of particular relevance to the current research is King’s (2007) conclusion that law enforcement in jurisdictions with large Black populations is less likely to comply with federal hate crime law (i.e., classify crimes as hatefully biased). We will return to this observation later as it has implications for the dependent variable in this study. Other scholars measure racial threat through mobilization, such as rioting or protest, and find it associated with spending on corrections (Jacobs & Helms, 1999), support for establishing “law andorder”(Wasow,2020),andpoliceexpenditures(Jackson&Carroll, 1981).Behrens,Uggen,and Manza (2003) measured minority threat by the percentage of the size of the prison population, based on the logic that dominant group mobilization is measured by felon disenfranchisement laws. In other words, as people leave prisons, they will be unable to vote in elections, which dis- proportionately diminishes Black political power because of the disproportionate representation of Black people in prison. Racial threat hypotheses have also been tested using a percentage of the population that is immigrant, finding an effect on the arrest rate for drunkenness (Brown & Warner, 1992) and prejudice against immigrants (Quillian, 1995). Jacobs and Carmichael (2001) found that Black and Hispanic population growth is associated with the growth of the prison population for each group. Finally, Green, Strolovitch, and Wong (1998) found that when minori- ties (Asians, Latinos, and African Americans) moved into New York neighborhoods with White strongholds, hate crimes against these groups increased. This last study most closely aligns with the current research as we also measure dominant group mobilization as a rise in hate crimes targeting specific groups. 2.2 Emboldenment To the best of our knowledge, no other scholarship has framed emboldenment within the con- text of power-threat theory or intergroup power contests. The long-running struggles between the dominant group and different racial, ethnic, religious, and sexual minorities in the United States, however, suggest that mobilization by marginalized groups deserves attention in any study of intergroup power contests. Although dominant group resources remain plentiful, they are also restrained by the risk that their overuse will draw backlash from other dominant group mem- bers, inadvertently empowering targeted minority groups (Dugan, Huang, LaFree, & McCauley, 2008).Inotherwords, ifdominantgroupmembersopenlyattackminorities,othersmightdistance themselves from the dominant group and could even support the mobilization efforts by minori- ties. Therefore, dominant resources are more than just the ability to reestablish dominance, but they also entail the ability to do so without alienating other dominant group members. Thus, continuous pressure of minority mobilization combined with the tempered dominant group resources creates a potential increase of dominant group mobilization when a revered member of the dominant group legitimizes minority group repression. Thus, the emboldenment hypothesis suggests that public action by an established authority against a specific minority group raises the level of dominant group resources enough for some members of the dominant group to counter-mobilize against persistent minority group mobilization. Indeed, Müller and Schwarz (2018) found a rise in anti-Muslim hate crimes after Presi- dent Trump’s tweets on Islamic-related topics—tweets that have typically been hostile toward Muslims—suggesting that the violence was emboldened by Trump’s rhetoric. Kalmoe (2014) tested this relationship more directly by exposing subjects to a political ad that conjured either violent metaphors or nonviolent synonyms. Those with aggressive traits were more likely to sup- port political violence when exposed to the violent metaphors. This provides ostensible support Dugan and Chenoweth 721 for the emboldenment hypothesis for those members of the dominant group who might already feel heightening threats from marginalized groups. If true, the emboldenment hypothesis sug- gests that political elites have the power to exacerbate tensions across groups. In fact, Gagnon (1995) argued that elites are aware of their power and that they intentionally provoke violent con- flict between the dominant group and others because such conflict tends to focus attention exclu- sively on ethnic identity and away from other politically charged topics that could compromise their power. This argument is also made by Tolnay and Beck (1995), who claimed that the White elites of the Antebellum South benefited from the antagonism between African Americans and poor Whites as it kept them from forming a coalition of laborers. By fostering this antagonism, White elites allowed White mob violence that then led to thousands of lynched African Ameri- cans. Indeed, the authors hypothesized that the eventual decline in U.S. lynchings was a result of the discouragement of the White elite, who were trying to entice low-wage Black laborers to remain in the South during the Great Migration (Tolnay & Beck, 1995). In sum, we measure minority and dominant group resources as the number of pro- and anti- group actions by the U.S. federal government each month from 1992 through 2012, respectively. We focus this research on African Americans and Latinx persons because there was significant public attention to movements against racial discrimination and immigration policy, especially regarding immigration from Latin America, during this period. 3 HYPOTHESES The political threat hypothesis expects that as political elites take actions to further empower marginalized groups, violent hate crimes against them would increase. We generalize this approach by considering whether the growth in power of African American and Latinx popu- lations elicits the same response from the dominant group. Combined, the following hypothesis comprise our expectations according to political threat theory. Hypothesis 1. Federal government actions that favor Black or Latinx persons are related to increases in violent hate crimes targeting Black and Latinx persons, respectively. The emboldenment hypothesis expects that as federal officials take actions that undermine marginalized groups, a subsequent increase in violent hate crimes against those groups follows. Once again, we generalize this approach by considering whether federal government actions opposing African American and Latinx persons elicits increases in hate crimes from the domi- nant group. Combined emboldenment leads to the following hypothesis: Hypothesis 2. Federal government actions that oppose Black or Latinx persons are related to increases in violent hate crimes targeting Black and Latinx persons, respectively. 4 DATA AND METHOD 4.1 Data The primary data come from two different sources that chronicle individual events and can there- fore be aggregated to any temporal unit. The dependent variables measure violent hate crimes in 722 Dugan and Chenoweth the United States, which were compiled by the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) program for its Hate Crime Database under the Hate Crime Statistics Act of 1990 (HCSA). The primary independent variables come from the Government Actions in Terror Environments-United States (GATE-USA) data. All events are aggregated to the month and combined for analysis beginning in January 1992, the first month that the UCR hate crime data are available, and ending in Decem- ber 2012, the last month that GATE-USA data are available, totaling 252 months. Other data come from public sources that provide the congressional sessions when each party held the majority in both houses, the number of tax-exempt civil rights or advocacy organizations for each year, and other UCR data. Also, supplemental analyses in appendix E in the online supporting information use data from the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS).4 4.1.1 Violent hate crime rate The HCSA of 1990 authorized the FBI’s UCR program to collect data on “crimes that manifest evidence of prejudice based on race, religion, sexual orientation, or ethnicity” (U.S. Department of Justice, 2009, p. 4). Data collection follows a similar protocol as other UCR data sets, which relies on voluntary reporting of each law enforcement agency to a centralized state repository. However, instead of submitting reports every month, agencies either submit reports every quarter that list details on each incident through an incident report or submit a zero report verifying that no hate crimes were reported to the agency over the last quarter. NIBRS-compliant agencies can forgo these reports by simply marking an indicator that the documented event was a hate biased crime. Despite the similarities in reporting for crimes with and without hateful bias, without fed- eral money allocated to help local agencies with their additional administrative and investigatory burdens,participatinghasbeentenuous—especiallyinthebeginning(McVeigh,Welch,&Bjarna- son, 2003). In 1991, the population represented by participating agencies was less than 50 percent; however, that number rose to 85 percent by 2002 (King, 2007). The absence of additional investigatory support is especially detrimental to compliance. To report a bias in the HCSA, law enforcement must investigate the reasons behind a crime rather than just uncovering the material actions that unfolded (Boyd, Berk, & Hamner, 1996). Without resources for specialized investigations, many departments simply report no hate crimes (Jenness &Grattet,2001;McVeighetal.,2003).Evenwhenmotivesareapparentwithoutadditionalinquiry, different officers interpret similar circumstances differently (Martin, 1995). Furthermore, the con- troversial nature of assigning bias to a perpetrator sometimes makes both victims and officers reluctant to report a crime as hate motivated (Cronin, McDevitt, Farrell, & Nolan, 2007; McVeigh et al., 2003). In fact, because hate crimes are often the result of intergroup conflict, labeling or even failing to label a crime as hate motivated can be interpreted as law enforcement choosing a side, possibly making them vulnerable to protest (Bell, 2002; McVeigh et al., 2003). Concern about biases in the HCSA collection has led scholars to scrutinize the variation in hate crime reporting across jurisdictions. Hate crime data were found less likely to be collected in jurisdictions with larger Black populations (King, 2007) and in the South or Midwest (McVeigh et al., 2003). In fact, McVeigh et al. (2003) interpreted the counties with high numbers of hate crimes as those that have higher compliance (i.e., more support for minorities) rather than simply having more hate crimes. Following this logic, they argued that counties with successful social 4 Additional supporting information can be found in the full text tab for this article in the Wiley Online Library at http: //onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/crim.2020.58.issue-4/issuetoc. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/crim.2020.58.issue-4/issuetoc http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/crim.2020.58.issue-4/issuetoc Dugan and Chenoweth 723 movements would have more advocates lobbying for bias crimes to be recorded in the HCSA. Furthermore, King (2007) used minority threat theory—the same theory used in this article—to argue that the more “threatening” jurisdictions are less likely to participate in HCSA. Indeed, he found that jurisdictions in places with large Black populations are less likely to comply with the hate crime law. Given these and other conclusions from years of scrutiny, variation in counts of U.S. hate crimes is likely driven by a mixture of actual events and the ability and willingness of victims and local agencies to report events as hate crimes. Combined,theseconcernsraiseconsiderabledoubtaboutthevalidityofanyresearchthatrelies on the HCSA data as a dependent variable, especially for time series beginning in 1992, like that which is used in the current research. We recognize this challenge and have included several features of this research that are designed to mitigate this problem. Additionally, we conduct sup- plementary analysis using victim reports of hate crimes and subsets of the HCSA agencies that participated for all or most of the years from 1992 through 2012. First, the main analyses use data aggregated across all jurisdictions to the monthly unit, thus, absorbing all geographic variation and relying entirely on temporal variation in the violent hate crime rates for our estimations. By aggregating across jurisdictions, variation in compliance is less ofaconcern.Thisstrategywouldonlymitigateallconcerns,however, ifcompliancewereconstant over the two decades of analysis; and we know that compliance has increased over this period (Cronin et al., 2007; King, 2007; McVeigh et al., 2003). As crime rates are constructed by calculat- ing the frequency of events in the numerator and the total population at risk in the denominator, erroneously assuming constant compliance over the series leads to systematic bias. To demon- strate, if the true rate was flat over the series, but compliance increased, then by using the total U.S. population in the denominator, the rate would appear to increase over the series. To reduce this type of bias, we generate violent hate crime rates using the populations represented only by those agencies that participated in the HCSA during the quarter associated with each month. We identify those agencies that participate in the HCSA following the practice of King (2007) by using data from the batch header files to identify agencies that turned in either an incident or a zero report that quarter (UCR, 2017). These files also include the population represented by the reporting agencies, regardless of whether they participated.5 We anticipate that this overall strategy improves the accuracy of the rates, yet we also recognize that they are still likely biased downward, as some agencies erroneously report no or low incidents of hate crimes, and there- fore, the dependent variables are still measured with error (Cronin et al., 2007). Furthermore, by limiting the population represented in the denominator to only a subset of the total popula- tion,generalizabilitytotheentirenationiscompromised.Weknowthatgeneralizability,however, is already compromised by using data that rely on selective compliance. By using the reporting agency population in the denominator, the variation over time in the newly constructed depen- dent variables more closely mimics the variation in the underlying actual violent hate crime rates than when we use the total population in the denominator. The results presented here use the agency population in the denominator. A second set of results, however, that uses the total pop- ulation in the denominator is reported in appendix D in the online supporting information. The findings are nearly identical. 5 Someparticipatingagenciesarerecordedashavingzeropopulationevenwhentheirpopulationgroupreportsinhabitants (e.g., under 10,000). Therefore, when the agency population is listed as zero, but the population group indicates a positive population, the maximum population value was used as the population for that agency. Although this likely inflates the population to some degree, we view it as the more conservative strategy as it deflates the violent hate crime rate. 724 Dugan and Chenoweth Furthermore, because of the unavoidable selective compliance, we dedicate appendix B in the online supporting information to assessing the spatial variation of compliant agencies across states. This analysis shows that the distribution of agency participation by state is uneven. For example, the largest proportion of participating agencies is in Texas, whereas agencies in Hawaii, Alaska, Georgia, and Alabama show the least participation. Finally, three variables are added to the models to address potential bias in the estimates. We first include the total number of agencies (measured in the thousands) that submitted either an incident or a zero report that quarter. As the denominators of the dependent variables are cal- culated using only the population from these reporting agencies, that denominator is a function of the participating agencies. Furthermore, an agency’s decision to participate in HCSA could be influenced by attention given to protected groups by the federal government, which would make the number of participating agencies an important control to mitigate possible bias. The second control variable is included because only those participating agencies that submit inci- dent reports (rather than zero reports) can influence the numerator in the violent hate crime rates. Furthermore, it is unclear whether zero reports reflect true zeros or the agency’s reluctance to report biased crimes, which could also be influenced by the tone set by the federal government. Thus, we include the percentage of participating agencies that submitted incident reports as a second control. Third, we follow the lead of McVeigh et al. (2003) by adding the number of civil rights organizations (measured in thousands) from the National Center for Charitable Statistics Core Files data sets for all years, which was calculated for each year using the same protocol as McVeigh and colleagues (NCCS, n.d.). This variable approximates efforts by civil rights organi- zations to lobby law enforcement to comply with the HCSA and report biased crimes as such so they can be prosecuted accordingly. Furthermore, because the number of civil rights organiza- tions also approximates minority mobilization, this variable is also theoretically relevant to the hypotheses. Thus, we expect that some of its variation relates to hate crime reporting (McVeigh et al., 2003) and that some of its variation relates to hate crime perpetration as the number of civil rights organizations approximate minority group mobilization. In each case, we would anticipate that the number of civil rights organizations would be positively related to violent hate crimes. Although we expect that these efforts improve the validity of the findings, we recognize that the data are inherently problematic as they systematically ignore hate crimes unreported and/or unrecognized by law enforcement. Furthermore, it is possible that victims’ and agencies’ motiva- tions to report crime as biased are influenced by changes in the federal attention paid to specific groups, above and beyond the controls described earlier. If local agencies are reluctant to report crimesashatefullybiasedwhenthefederalgovernmentisgivingthetargetedgroupeitherpositive or negative attention, then our results will be biased downward. Unfortunately,thesedataarethebestavailableforourpurposes.TheNationalCrimeVictimiza- tion Survey (NCVS), however, did begin collecting data on hate crimes as reported by the victims in 2003. Unsurprisingly, the estimated number of hate crimes generated from victim reports is substantially higher than that reported by police agencies. In fact, between 2005 and 2015, the NCVS estimates around 250,000 hate crimes each year, whereas the HCSA only reported a little more than 7,000 biased crimes in 2015 (Office of Justice Programs, 2018). Although the estimates from the NCVS data are undoubtedly closer to the actual numbers, limitations in the NCVS data set preclude it from being used in the current analysis. For example, because it relies on sampling, not all months have an episode of violent hate crimes against Black or Latinx persons. This gener- ates many missing values at the monthly level. Also, the rates will exhibit high variation, making estimation at that level difficult. Because the NCVS and the HCSA are both measuring the same underlying dynamic, however, a comparison between the two might help validate the HCSA data. Dugan and Chenoweth 725 Supplemental analyses in appendix E in the online supporting information describe in detail the similarities and differences between the two data sources, estimates their trend and first differ- enced correlation, and re-estimates the main models with the HCSA data, the NCVS hate events known to the police, and the NCVS hate events unknown to the police. Finally, as another check on the validity of these data, we repeat the main analyses using rates generated from only the 741 agencies that participated for all four quarters in all 21 years in the series and the 1,973 agencies that participated in all four quarters for 20 of the 21 years. As a point of contrast, the main analyses rely on data generated from 22,213 different agencies that partic- ipated in at least one quarter during the 21 years. Violent hate crime trends against Black and Latinx persons from all three samples are compared prior to analyses. Appendix B in the online supporting information describes the spatial distribution of those agencies in both subsets, as well as in the main dataset. To test the hypotheses, we rely on the details provided in the HCSA data. Each event includes information on the race of the offender (if known), type of victims, bias motivation, offense type, and location type. Because we are only interested in violent hate crimes as defined by the FBI, we retain only murder, non-negligible manslaughter, negligible manslaughter, kidnapping or abduction, forcible rape, forcible sodomy, sexual assault with an object, forcible fondling, rob- bery, aggravated assault, simple assault, and intimidation. Only those hate crimes that were per- petrated by White or unknown offenders were retained as they are members of the dominant group. Finally, only crimes with biases that were anti-Black, anti-multiracial, and anti-Hispanic were retained for the specific analyses. After applying these criteria, we retain 39,599 violent hate crimes against Black people (including anti-multiracial), aggregate them to the month, and calcu- late the rates per 1,000,000 persons living in participating jurisdictions. Data used for the Latinx models include only violent anti-Hispanic hate crimes resulting in 8,004 violent crimes to cal- culate monthly rates per 1,000,000 persons. We use natural logarithms of these rates to improve normality. 4.1.2 Federal government actions relevant to specific groups These data come from a larger GATE project that documents all actions by the federal U.S. gov- ernment that are relevant to political extremists and their and their constituencies’ grievances (e.g., the far-right; see Dugan & Chenoweth, 2017). The original source of the GATE-USA data collection is all Reuters news articles that mention key federal U.S. government actors between 1987 and 2012 (see Dugan & Chenoweth, 2017, for the complete list of actors). Lead sentences were extracted and coded using Textual Analysis by Augmented Replacement Instructions (TABARI), which searches them and identifies stories that match the criteria of an extensive set of dictionar- ies designed to capture political activity (Schrodt, 2012) and supplemented with names of known extremists in the United States (Freilich, Chermak, Belli, Gruenewald, & Parkin, 2014; Smith & Damphousse, 2001; START, 2016). Final cases were coded by research assistants and cleaned by the investigators. As such, each action was reviewed by at least two persons, one of which was a principal investigator to assure consistency across all cases.6 6 Agreement statistics were not calculated because disagreement in earlier parts of the coding protocol led to greater dis- agreement elsewhere. To assure validity and reliability, the coders and investigators had weekly meetings throughout the project to discuss ambiguous cases. All coding decisions were recorded and applied across all cases. 726 Dugan and Chenoweth For the current project, we kept only actions—which include both speech and material acts— byU.S. federalactorsthatwererelevanttoBlackand/orLatinxpersons(includingall immigration -relevant actions) that occurred between January 1992 and December 2012. These cases were col- lected in the original GATE data because of their relevance to grievances by far-right extremists. The final data includes 148 non-neutral actions that were relevant to Black people; 116 that politi- cally benefited them (e.g., prosecuting White supremacists and promoting racial equality) and 32 thatdisadvantagedthem(e.g.,challengingAffirmativeAction).Wealsoselectedonlythoseevents that were relevant to Latinx persons specifically or immigration more generally, resulting in 220 non-neutral actions with 109 supporting Latinx or immigration rights and 111 against such rights. We retained immigration-relevant actions that were specific to non-Latinx persons because those events are set within the larger context of immigration, as the United States public tends to con- flate immigration policy with Latinx-specific immigration (Lopez, Morin, & Taylor, 2010).7 We aggregated all events to the month and according to whether they favored or disadvantaged the protected groups and used their square roots for analysis to mitigate non-normality. When aggregated to the month, the GATE data are intended to capture the amount of positive and negative attention given to specific marginalized groups. This differs from efforts to delineate relevant legislation because it relates more to the public conversation than to the legislative pro- cess. Nevertheless, legislation is captured indirectly because more attention is given to the group during periods when relevant legislation is introduced and voted on (e.g., during efforts to remove Affirmative Action with the introduction of the 1995 Equal Opportunity Act into the U.S. Senate). Also, GATE captures some of the legislative process, as coders were directed to capture all events that reported 1) the promotion of a policy idea prior to proposal, 2) a Bill proposal, 3) a congres- sional subcommittee vote, 4) a vote by the full House or Senate, 5) the signing of a Bill, 6) the veto of a Bill, 7) the override of a veto, 8) an executive order, or 9) responses to a new policy, law, or act. Appendix A in the online supporting information describes the key patterns of federal attention given to each group in the GATE data. 4.1.3 Sources for other key variables As mentioned earlier, the number of civil rights organizations came from The National Center for Charitable Statistics (NCCS, n.d.), which derives its files from databases maintained by the Inter- nal Revenue Service (IRS) on tax-exempt nonprofit organizations. The number of organizations from the NCCS core files with National Taxonomy of Exempt Entities (NTEE) core code classi- fications that indicate civil rights or advocacy organizations (codes R20 through R30). Because these data are only measured once each year, all tallies for months in the same year are the same, consequently deflating estimated standard errors and risking false significance. In fact, this vari- able only has 21 unique values out of the total number of 252 months. For this reason, we consider the estimated effects civil rights organizations to be informative rather than definitive. We also include controls for whether the White House, House of Representatives, and Sen- ate are all controlled by the Democrats or Republicans as the political climate likely affects both government actions and violent hate crimes. Data on the composition of Senate and House of 7 Nevertheless, earlier models that used an immigration variable that excluded actions that were specific to non-Latinx persons produced substantively similar findings, although the broader measure was more strongly related to violence against Latinx persons specifically. Dugan and Chenoweth 727 TABLE 1 All variables included in model with their operationalizations Variables Operationalization Dependent Variables Ln Violent Hate ln ( freq of violent bias crimes n persons living under reporting agency × 1,000,000 ) Government Actions Sq. rt. Pro-Group GA The square root of the number of U.S. federal government actions that give positive attention to specific group in current month Sq. rt. Anti-Group GA The square root of the number of U.S. federal government actions that give negative attention to specific group in current month Control Variables Civil Rights Groups The number of civil rights or advocacy groups, measured in thousands, registered with the IRS as tax exempt Democratic Controlled A dummy variable (1/0) indicating months when the presidency, Senate and House of Representatives are all controlled by the Democratic party Republican Controlled A dummy variable (1/0) indicating months when the presidency, Senate and House of Representatives are all controlled by the Republican party Violent Crime Rate freq of violent crimes n persons living in US × 1,000,000 Total Participating Agencies (PA) The total number of UCR participating agencies, measured in thousands, that submitted either an HCSA incident or zero report to the FBI in the quarter associated with the current month Percent PA with Incid Reports The percent of total participating agencies that submitted an incident report (rather than a zero report) in the quarter associated with the current month January—November Dummy indicators (1/0) for each month from January through November, using December as the reference month Representativememberswerecompiledfromseveralsourcesaccessedinthefallof2017.8 Further- more, because violent crime rates are likely to be driven by violent crime in general, we control for the monthly violent crime rate using the FBI’s UCR data. Finally, to absorb variation caused by seasonal affects, we include dummy variables for each month using December as reference. See table 1 for a list of all variables and their operationalization. 4.2 Methods Because of the concern for how representative the HCSA data are, we begin the analysis by exam- ining the distribution of participating agencies by state. We do this for the entire data set over the 21 years, and then we examine subsets of agencies that more fully participated over the entire period. 8 These include https://www.senate.gov/history/partydiv.htm; https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/ briefing/senators_changed_parties.htm; https://www.brookings.edu/multi-chapter-report/vital-statistics-on-congress/; http://history.house.gov/Institution/Party-Divisions/Party-Divisions/; http://history.house.gov/Congressional-Overview /Profiles/1st/; and https://www.brookings.edu/multi-chapter-report/vital-statistics-on-congress/. https://www.senate.gov/history/partydiv.htm https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/senators_changed_parties.htm https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/senators_changed_parties.htm https://www.brookings.edu/multi-chapter-report/vital-statistics-on-congress/ http://history.house.gov/Institution/Party-Divisions/Party-Divisions/ http://history.house.gov/Congressional-Overview/Profiles/1st/ http://history.house.gov/Congressional-Overview/Profiles/1st/ https://www.brookings.edu/multi-chapter-report/vital-statistics-on-congress/ 728 Dugan and Chenoweth We next compare the yearly trends for different measures of violent hate crime rates against Black and Latinx persons to assess which rates better measure the underlying pattern of violent hate crimes in the United States. We then compare the yearly trends of the two types of govern- ment actions with their corresponding violent hate crime rate. In this section, we also summarize all key variables to show the average level of each over the entire period. To test our hypotheses, we combine the monthly data from each source that are specific to each protected group to run two distinct models. Monthly units are used to capture close to real- time reactions to government action, while reducing sparseness in the data. Close to real-time reactionsarepreferredashatecrimeoffendersareoftenimpulsive(Levin&McDevitt,2002).Also, King and Sutton (2013), who relied on daily time series of hate crime events following antecedent events, discovered that hate crime spikes a few days after each event and then decays over the next several days. As the current research assesses the effects of cumulative lower level events that we characterize as positive or negative attention, as opposed to single antecedent events (e.g., the O.J. Simpson verdict), we anticipate that their effects on hate crimes will still be detectable during the following month as attention is ongoing. Furthermore, we recognize that government actions could also be influenced by preceding violent hate crimes, which could, in turn, bias our findings through simultaneity. In fact, the GATE-USA data show that after the burning of several Black churches, President Clinton began a national campaign to improve race relations, demonstrating that violent hate crimes affect gov- ernment actions relevant to the victims of those crimes. Therefore, to assure that the specified results estimate the effects of government actions on violent hate crimes, and are not biased as a result of this type of endogeneity, we conduct three-equation reduced form vector autoregression (VAR) analyses with exogenous control variables (shown in equation 1) for Black and Latinx per- sons using monthly data. We see that in these series of equations, VAR simultaneously estimates the effects of lagged pro-group government actions (PGAs) and lagged anti-group government actions (AGAs) on the violent hate crime rate against the specified group (VHCR) while estimat- ing the effects of the same series of lagged variables on each type of government action. In these series, X includes the control variables listed in table 1, the number of civil rights groups, indi- cators of whether the federal government was controlled by the Democrats or Republicans, the violent crime rate, the total number of participating agencies that quarter, the percentage of par- ticipating agencies that report at least one incident that quarter, and indicators for each month, excluding December. Granger causality tests are conducted to assess the directionality of the rela- tionship, and impulse response functions (IRFs) are generated to show how the VHCR responds to the impulses of PGA and AGA, as well as how PGA and AGA respond to the impulse of the VHCR. 𝑉𝐻𝐶𝑅𝑡 = 𝐽∑ 𝑗=1 𝛽1𝑗𝑉𝐻𝐶𝑅𝑡−𝑗 + 𝐽∑ 𝑗=1 𝛽2𝑗𝑃𝐺𝐴𝑡−𝑗 + 𝐽∑ 𝑗=1 𝛽3𝑗𝐴𝐺𝐴𝑡−𝑗 + 𝛃𝟒𝐗 𝑃𝐺𝐴𝑡 = 𝐽∑ 𝑗=1 𝛼1𝑗𝑃𝐺𝐴𝑡−𝑗 + 𝐽∑ 𝑗=1 𝛼2𝑗𝑉𝐻𝐶𝑅𝑡−𝑗 + 𝐽∑ 𝑗=1 𝛼3𝑗𝐴𝐺𝐴𝑡−𝑗 + 𝛂𝟒𝐗 𝐴𝐺𝐴𝑡 = 𝐽∑ 𝑗=1 𝛾1𝑗𝐴𝐺𝐴𝑡−𝑗 + 𝐽∑ 𝑗=1 𝛾2𝑗𝑉𝐻𝐶𝑅𝑡−𝑗 + 𝐽∑ 𝑗=1 𝛾3𝑗𝑃𝐺𝐴𝑡−𝑗 + 𝛄𝟒𝐗 (1) Dugan and Chenoweth 729 BecausetheVHCRsweregeneratedfromachangingmixtureofagenciesthatparticipatedinthe HCSA, we replicate the analyses shown in equation 1 using only those agencies that participated in all four quarters for all 21 years and for at least 20 of the 21 years. Additional sensitivity analyses are conducted and reported in detail in appendix D in the online supporting information to further assess whether the findings hold if we use the entire U.S. popu- lation in the denominator instead of only counting those persons represented by the participating agencies. Also, to better validate the HCSA, we construct total hate crime data from the HCSA and the NCVS and compare the rates from the HCSA with those in the NCVS that were known and unknown to the police in appendix E in the online supporting information. We also run the VAR models shown in equation 1 and compare the IRFs across all three models. We expect that the results generated from the HCSA will be more similar to the NCVS police known hate crimes than to the police unknown hate crimes. 5 RESULTS Before turning to our analysis, we assess how well the distribution of participating agencies rep- resents the entire nation. Detailed analyses are found in appendix B in the online supporting information. The UCR HCSA files used here include information from 22,213 law enforcement agencies from 1992 to 2012. Only 3.3 percent of those agencies (743) participated (i.e., submitted a report) for every quarter during the 21-year period. A larger subset, 8.9 percent or 1,972 agencies, participated in 20 of the 21 years. The states that have the highest average number of participating years per agency are Texas (17.2), Iowa (16.2), and New York (15.9), whereas agencies in Hawaii (0), Alaska (.47), and Georgia (1.95) have the lowest participation. The rates generated from the subsets of participating agencies are dominated by Texas agencies, which account for 36 percent of those that participated for at least 20 years and 66 percent of those that participated for all 21. The main analyses are replicated below using violent hate crime rates generated from these two data sets to assess the robustness of the findings. Figure 1 presents the annual trends of violent hate crime rates against Black (a) and Latinx (b) persons with both the total population and the participating agency population used in the denominators. In each case, the rate using the limited population is larger by a factor that peaks at 2.66 in 1992 and is as small as 1.02 in 2010 for both groups. The dashed line in both cases shows a nearly monotonic decreasing trend from 1992 to 2012. Yet, when we look at the rates that use the entire population in the denominator, we see that they both increase in the beginning of the series, peak in 1996, and then follow a similar trend as the one that uses the limited population in the denominator. The divergence in the beginning of the series mimics what would be expected if agency compliance started low and then grew. The convergence later in the series suggests more of an equilibrium, indicating that the findings generated by each rate might converge. All forth- coming analyses use the rates generated from the agency populations in the denominators. Figures 2a and 2b shows the yearly trends for the specific types of government actions and their corresponding violent hate crime (VHCR) rate per million using the agency populations as denominators. The VHCR is measured on the left axis, and the total number of monthly gov- ernment actions is measured on the right axis. A comparison of government actions shows that that U.S. federal government acted more frequently in support of and against Latinx persons or immigration compared with when African American issues were addressed. More often than not, when federal officials directly addressed issues relevant to Black persons during this period, they did so in a way that supported them. The left axes show that the peak in the VHCR against 730 Dugan and Chenoweth FIGURE 1 Violent hate crime rate per protected group using different populations in the denominator (n = 21) Dugan and Chenoweth 731 FIGURE 2 Government actions and VHCRs relevant to each group (n = 21) 732 Dugan and Chenoweth TABLE 2 Descriptive statistics for key variables (n = 252) Variables Mean St. Dev Min Max p (zero) Anti-Black VHCR .735 .324 .267 .122 .000 Anti-Latinx VHCR .144 .053 .035 .328 .000 Pro-Black GA .460 .898 .000 6.000 .702 Anti-Black GA .127 .480 .000 6.000 .893 Pro-Latinx/Immigrant GA .425 .787 .000 5.000 .694 Anti-Latinx/Immigrant GA .448 .758 .000 4.000 .663 Black people is nearly six times higher than that for Latinx persons. In general, the trends show a greater number of relevant federal actions in the earlier years, which seems to correspond to the downward trends of the VHCR. The first 2 to 3 years of the series, however, show lower numbers of government actions. Next, we summarize the number of government actions and violent hate crimes relevant to Black and Latinx persons. 5.1 Summary statistics Table 2 lists the descriptive statistics for the key dependent and independent variables. Turning firsttothedependentvariables, theaverageVHCR ishighestagainstBlackpeople(.74permillion), whereas that for Latinx persons averages about .14 per million. The average number of government actions (GA) relevant to these groups is less than one per month. Furthermore, the government more often gives positive attention to these groups than negative attention. We see that most actions are relevant to Latinx persons or immigra- tion, with nearly the same average number of actions each month (.43 favor and .45 against). On average there were .46 favorable federal actions per month for African Americans (or one every 2.17 months), and adverse actions once every 7.7 months. The last column shows the proportion of months where no government actions were reported for each protected group. Here we see that in most months, members of the U.S. federal government engage in no actions against these groups. Furthermore, federal officials expressed or implemented favorable actions toward Black and Latinx persons or immigrants in about 30 percent of the months. 5.2 Vector autoregression models Dickey-Fuller tests that allow four lags find that all six variables used in the VAR regression are stationary.Thetest for theVHCRforBlackpersons,however, isonlysignificantat the .10level.9,10 The optimal number of lag lengths is selected by running the VAR models with different lag lengths and comparing the likelihood ratio test statistic, the Akaike’s information criterion, and 9 Because of this and the downward annual trends shown in figure 2, additional tests were run on the two VHCRs. A modified Dickey-Fuller test that applies a GLS transformation shows that both series are stationary in early lags but non- stationary with later lags. The Phillips-Perron test concludes that both are stationary. 10 As a test for robustness, the primary VAR model was rerun using the first differenced anti-Black VHCR; the results remained substantively similar. Dugan and Chenoweth 733 TABLE 3 Granger causality wald tests (n = 250) Black Latinx VHCR Pro-Group Action 21.313** .871 Anti-Group Action 7.112** 5.980* Pro-Group Action VHCR 3.077 2.955 Anti-Group Action 4.056 .968 Anti-Group Action VHCR 1.433 .330 Pro-Group Action 4.191 4.376 *p ≤ .05; **p ≤ .01. theHannan and Quinn’s information criterion. For both groups, the two-lagged model is selected. Tests on the residuals show no autocorrelation, confirming the adequacy of the choice of the two- lagged model for each group. Finally, all eigenvalues generated from the companion matrices fall within the unit root, allowing us to conclude that both VAR models are stationary. Tests for nor- mality show that both VHCRs are normally distributed but the government actions are not. This is unsurprising, given the high proportion of zeros and the square-rooted counts. Findings that use the government actions as the response variable will be interpreted with caution. Their results, however, do correspond to unpublished structural equation models of a similar specification that were estimated using the negative binomial distribution. Table 3 reports the Wald chi-square statistics for tests of Granger causality in both VAR models. Here we find that only the hypothesized relationships show any evidence of Granger causality. Government actions seem to influence the VHCR, but the VHCR does not seem to influence gov- ernment actions. The tests indicate that both pro- and anti-African-American actions relate to the VHCR against Black people, whereas only anti-immigration/Latinx actions relate to the VHCR against Latinx persons. When we consider these results within the context of the hypotheses, Black people might be vulnerable to both political threat and emboldenment and Latinx persons might only be vulnerable to emboldenment. As the Granger causality tests cannot speak to direc- tionality, we turn now to the IRFs to more specifically assess the hypotheses. Figures 3 and 4 show the IRFs (and their 95 percent confidence bounds) of anti- and pro- group government actions as the impulse on VHCR responses (a) and the inverse (b; VHCR as the impulse on government actions responses) for Black and Latinx persons, respectively. In figure 3a, we see that only those acts that give positive attention to African Americans appear to influence the VHCR, despite both types of actions showing Granger causality in table 3. This supports the political threat hypothesis but not the emboldenment hypothesis. The IRF peaks at .03 at the first month after a 1 standard deviation shock in pro-African American actions. It then drops to insignificance in the second month, indicating only a short-term effect. Figure 3b shows that the VHCR against Black people is positively related to pro-African American actions by the federal government, suggesting a simultaneous relationship, despite the Granger results reported above. Here we see that the effect is only significant in the same month as the impulse with a magnitude of .08. Forecast error variance decompositions (FEVD) show that pro-African Americangovernmentactionsaccountforapproximately 8.4percentof thevariation in the VHCR against Black people. 734 Dugan and Chenoweth FIGURE 3 Impulse Response Functions for Black VAR (n = 250) [Color figure can be viewed at wileyon- linelibrary.com] a). Action as Impulse on Violent Hate Crime Response b). Violent Hate Crime as Impulse on Action Response Dugan and Chenoweth 735 FIGURE 4 Impulse Response Functions for Latinx VAR (n = 250) [Color figure can be viewed at wileyon- linelibrary.com] a). Action as Impulse on Violent Hate Crime Response b). Violent Hate Crime as Impulse on Action Response 736 Dugan and Chenoweth TABLE 4 VAR coefficients and standard errors of exogenous variables estimating effects on violent hate crime rates for Black and Latinx persons (n = 250) Black Latinx Variables Coef SE Coef SE Civil Rights Groups −.120** (.040) −.101 (.073) Democratic Controlled −.047** (.018) −.011 (.038) Republican Controlled −.046** (.018) −.101** (.037) Violent Crime Rate .134** (.026) .206** (.051) Total Participating Agencies −.020** (.008) .023 (.016) Percent Agencies w/Incids .032** (.010) .107** (.021) January .340** (.031) .347** (.065) February .379** (.039) .276** (.074) March .458** (.032) .472** (.063) April .391** (.036) .429** (.069) May .358** (.032) .442** (.065) June .324** (.034) .394** (.067) July .322** (.032) .315** (.066) August .352** (.033) .332** (.064) September .370** (.033) .442** (.065) October .356** (.034) .372** (.066) November .163** (.037) .234 (.072) *p ≤ .05; **p ≤ .01 (two-tailed). TheIRFsshowninfigure4asuggestthatLatinxpersonsarevulnerabletoemboldenmentrather thantopoliticalthreat,astheanti-immigrationfunctionspikesintheleftgraph,whereastheother never clears zero. Furthermore, we find no evidence of simultaneity in figure 4b. The magnitude of a 1 standard deviation shock of anti-Latinx government actions also peaks at .03 in the month following the shock, and then it falls to insignificance, suggesting only a short-term effect. FEVD shows that this only accounts for 2.1 percent of the variance of the VHCR against Latinx persons. Table 4 presents the coefficient estimates of the control variables on the VHCR for each group. The coefficient estimates of the control variables on the two types of government actions are reported in appendix C in the online supporting information. Here we find that the number of civil rights groups is negatively, not positively, related to violent hate crimes for Black people. This is surprising because both political threat and research by McVeigh et al. (2003) predict that more civil rights groups would either lead to more violence (political threat) or more reporting of hate crimes (advocacy). The negative effects suggest that the growth in civil rights groups are related to fewer violent hate crimes perhaps because they are effectively changing attitudes or prevent- ing harmful altercations. Although the difference between this finding and McVeigh et al.’s is somewhat puzzling, the sources of variation in the two estimates differ substantially. Their anal- ysis relied on cross-county variation within 1 year (2000), and the variation that contributed to this estimate is the yearly changes in civil rights groups over 21 years. Furthermore, this estimate might have been influenced by the changes in agency participation in the HCSA over time. Given that the different conclusions are based on different sources of the variation and that the current estimate is based on only 21 unique values over the entire series, more research is needed to assess the impact of civil rights groups on the reporting of hate crimes. Dugan and Chenoweth 737 When the federal government was entirely controlled by Democrats, violent hate crimes against Black people were lower; and when Republicans were in control, violent hate crimes against both Black and Latinx persons were lower. This suggests that motivations to attack might be muted when the government is operating more smoothly, which is aligned with Young and Dugan’s (2011) argument that when governments have fewer veto players, domestic terrorists perpetrate fewer attacks. Unsurprisingly, the violent hate crime rate is positively and significantly associated with the VHCR against Black and Latinx persons. The total number of participating agencies is included because we would expect that the more agencies that submit reports to the HCSA program, the more violent hate crimes will be reported; however, this measure is negatively related to violence against Black people and unrelated to violence against Latinx persons. As expected, we see that the percentage of participating agencies that submitted an incident report is positively related to violent hate crimes against both groups. Finally, all months are statistically significant and positive, suggesting that violent hate crimes are less common in December than in other months. Insum,examiningdifferentpatternsinhatecrimesagainstmarginalizedgroups,wefindstrong supportforpoliticalthreattheoryforanti-Blackhatecrimes.Wefindnosupportforpoliticalthreat theory for Latinx persons, however, and instead find evidence of emboldenment. To assess the robustness of these findings to the distribution of participating agencies, we replicate the analysis using hate crime rates generated from only those agencies that participated consistently. First we compare the trends across samples. Figure 5 shows the VHCR rates against (a) Black people and (b) Latinx persons across all three sets of participating agencies. The trends appear remarkably close, especially for the anti-Black VHCRs. The monthly trend correlations between all agencies and the 20+-year agencies are .94 for anti-Black VHCRs and .79 for anti-Latinx VHCRs; and for the 21-year agencies, .89 and .44, respectively. The corresponding first differenced correlations are .65 and .38 for the anti-Black VHCRs and .58 and .35 for the anti-Latinx VHCRs. The IRFs showing the impulse of anti- and pro-group actions on the VHCR response generated from the two subsets of participating agencies are presented in figure 6. Figures 6a and 6b show that the support for the political threat hypothesis in the African American model is robust to the composition of the participating agencies as the pro-Black IRF and its confidence bounds clear the zero line in both models with peaks that are slightly higher than that in the original model (.036 and .037). Figures 6c and 6d show that the emboldenment hypothesis in the Latinx model is also still supported in these models, with the confidence bounds of the IRF clearing zero at the peak in both models (.05 and .10). Additional tests of robustness are found in appendices D and E in the online supporting infor- mation. Appendix D shows that when we use the total U.S. population to generate the VHCR, the results are nearly identical. Appendix E compares the total hate crime rates generated by the UCR HCSAdataandtheNationalCrimeVictimizationSurvey(NCVS)data. Inthoseanalyses,wecom- pare the UCR hate crimes with the NCVS hate crimes known to the police and unknown to the police. The UCR rates are more strongly correlated (both linearly and first differenced) with the rate of police known hate crime events generated by the NCVS than the rate of events unknown to police, although differences remain. Furthermore, a comparison of main results from all three sources shows that the IFRs generated from the HCSA data look more similar to those generated from the police known NCVS data than those unknown to the police. The appendix describes in detail the differences in the two data sources, concluding that the comparison provides some sup- port that the data are measuring the same underlying dynamics. It is only when we consider these 738 Dugan and Chenoweth FIGURE 5 VHCR generated from different sets of participating agencies (n = 21) Dugan and Chenoweth 739 FIGURE 6 Impulse Response Functions for Black and Latinx persons using rates from subsets of participat- ing agencies (n = 250) [Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com] a). Black IRFs using Agencies With at Least 20 Years of Participation b). Black IRFs using Agencies With all 21 Years of Participation c). Latinx IRFs using Agencies With at Least 20 Years of Participation d). Latinx IRFs using Agencies With all 21 Years of Participation 740 Dugan and Chenoweth FIGURE 6 Continued Dugan and Chenoweth 741 results and the other robustness tests, however, that we feel confident that we are estimating the appropriate relationships. 6 DISCUSSION This article began as a search for evidence about whether changes in the political power of dif- ferent marginalized groups in the United States affect the amount of hate-motivated violence directed toward them. We were drawn to this research by the reported rise in hate-based violence against minority groups that drew hostile attacks from the Trump administration. We developed two compatible hypothesespredicting increasedviolence toward minority groups after the federal government takes either favorable or unfavorable action toward these groups. Political threat the- ory concludes that minority groups are at risk of backlash after expanding their political power, as dominant groups use violence to reestablish equilibrium. Indeed, we found an increase in vio- lent anti-Black hate crimes after the U.S. government took actions that were favorable toward African Americans. We extended this theory to account for surges in dominant group resources when political elites openly express hostility toward minority groups. Support for the embolden- ment hypothesis was apparent only in our findings for Latinx persons. As the federal government opposed immigrants generally, or Latinx persons specifically, violent hate crimes against Latinx persons increased. The data used to generate these findings suffer notable limitations as surely some U.S. actions and violent hate crimes are undetected during collection. We feel confident, however, that the GATE data captured the larger patterns of attention given to these groups as the description pro- vided in appendix A in the online supporting information characterizes most of the major events over this period. Also, the GATE data capture more of the subtle attention these groups receive as political leaders promote certain initiatives and Congress considers legislative action. Further- more, the variation used to generate our estimates was based on month-to-month changes, which are less sensitive to undercounting of both sources. Despite this, we recognize that both anti- and pro-group government actions are measured with error, and that this type of measurement error is likely correlated, possibly causing estimation problems. Supplemental analysis not shown here, however, produce the same findings when the VAR models are run with only one type of government action. We also recognize that the estimated positive effects for African Ameri- cans could also be driven by an increased reporting by victims in those groups when the federal government expressly supports their movement. Yet, this bias might also be counterbalanced by reluctant reporting agencies that react to positive attention by dismissing hate crimes as neutrally motivated. The findings hold in our supplemental analyses, when we use subsets of agencies that partici- patedintheHCSAprogramforallornearlyallyearsinouranalysis.Furthermore,acomparisonof hate crime rates generated from both the HCSA and NCVS shows that the HCSA data align more closelyto victimization eventsknown to thepolice thanthose unknownto thepolice, which helps usfeelmoreconfidentthattheHCSAiscapturingtheunderlyingdynamicofhatecrimesreported to the police. Despite the possibility that Black people might be more likely to report hate crimes when the federal government is exhibiting support for civil rights, we find it highly unlikely that Latinx victims of violent hate crime would increase their reporting to police when the political climate is hostile toward immigrants, as research suggests that some Latinx persons in the U.S. view contact with police as risky (Vidales, Day, & Powe, 2009; Xie & Baumer, 2019). While the fed- eral hate crime statistics are far from perfect, the fact that our models—which were derived from 742 Dugan and Chenoweth data combined from two much different collection efforts—are consistent raises confidence that the hate crime data were sufficient for our purposes. Combined, we find support for the political threat hypothesis among hate crimes committed against Black people and for the emboldenment hypothesis among hate crimes committed against Latinx persons. We would be remiss, however, to suggest that these findings can be generalized to all juris- dictions in the United States. The voluntary participation, and differential efforts to investigate crimes for hateful biases undeniably exclude important jurisdictions, which results in selection bias. This raises the question of how selection might affect the main results. If agencies in more biased jurisdictions are reluctant to participate, as suggested in the findings by McVeigh et al. (2003)andKing(2007), thentheeffectsfromonlytheparticipatingagenciesmightbesmallerthan those that would be estimated had all agencies fully participated. In other words, following King’s logic, if those jurisdictions that are more “threatened” by minorities are less likely to participate, then the current set of results that rely exclusively on participating agencies are surely muted. In fact, when we reanalyze the model using data only from agencies that fully participated in the populous for the increasingly racially diverse state of Texas, the African American political threat effect increases by a factor of four (peak = .12). The Latinx emboldenment effect also increases by the same magnitude when we use data from all participating Texas agencies. If jurisdictions in Texas look more like those without agency participation than those with agency participation, then these comparisons do, indeed, suggest that the bias in the primary analyses is downward. The dependency of the findings on the composition of participating agencies reminds us that hatecrimesarelocalphenomena,andthat if theyareresponsivetoactionsbyfederal leaders, then they are likely sensitive to those by nearby officials. Continued research in this area should incor- poratevariationinstateandlocalgovernmentactions, includingeffortstoholdpoliceaccountable for violence against Black people and to remove undocumented individuals from being eligible for statewide benefits. Taken together, what do our findings suggest about the reported increase in hate crimes since Donald Trump was elected as president? Although it is an out-of-sample case, we argue that the rise in hate crimes against Latinx people since the 2016 election appears to be a continuation of patterns that have persisted over recent decades. Since the 1990s, federal government actions targeting immigrants and Latinx persons seemed to have emboldened violent hate crimes against them. Moreover, federal efforts to support Black people are complicated by their risk of backlash, as supportive federal rhetoric, actions, and policies tend to trigger violent anti-Black hate crimes. Theseeffects likely reflect long-simmeringinstitutionalized andinternalizedracism in theUnited States, which is triggered when federal officials send positive cues about this demographic. These mixed findings point to the need to disaggregate the implications of political threat and emboldenment hypotheses by the affected groups, rather than assuming these mechanisms operate identically across groups. Although our data are insufficient to identify specific mecha- nisms that could be driving the differences across groups, one possibility is that White perpetra- tors stereotype Black Americans as “insiders” and Latinx people as “outsiders.” It may be that members of the dominant group commit violence against perceived insiders to punish them for increases in power, whereas members of the dominant group commit violence against perceived outsiders when the federal government signals that the threat from outsiders is growing. Quali- tative data that document the reasoning of hate crime perpetrators could provide insight into the nature of perceived threat or other emotions that leads to this type of violence. Another limita- tion that qualitative data might uncover would be the effects, if any, federal government actions have on people who possess multiple overlapping identities, such as African Americans of Latinx heritage, or whether perpetrators of hate crime substitute one targeted group for another. Dugan and Chenoweth 743 In future research, scholars should replicate this analysis with more recent data to directly assess the degree to which Trump’s election and subsequent presidency has triggered an embold- ening from the far-right. In fact, the daily documentation of the President’s Tweets provide a rich source of information regarding the rhetoric used toward different marginalized groups. Addi- tionally, future research should assess the role of emboldenment on mobilizing acts by organized White supremacist groups. That said, this research, which draws on two decades of U.S. government activity, suggests that federalactions matter in important ways that could motivate violent hate crimes against protected groups—either by supporting them without protecting them from possible backlash or by criti- cizing and undermining them, emboldening perpetrators to commit hate crimes against them. Indeed, our results confirm evidence from other studies suggesting that hate speech among elites canmotivatehatecrimesamongconstituents(Gagnon,1995;Müller&Schwarz,2018).Thesefind- ings have important implications for preventing hate crimes, as well as for assigning culpability when they occur. ORCID LauraDugan https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5930-6950 EricaChenoweth https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3113-2439 REFERENCES Alexander, M. (2012). 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Veto players and terror. Journal of Peace Research, 48, 19–33. https://doi.org/10.1177/ 0022343310386269 AUTH OR BIOGRAPH IES Laura Dugan is Professor and Associate Chair in the Department of Criminology and Crim- inal Justice at the University of Maryland. Her research interests include predictors and con- sequences of extremist and hateful violence, the efficacy of violence prevention/intervention policy and practice, and the intended and unintended consequences of government actions. Erica Chenoweth is the Berthold Beitz Professor in Human Rights and International Affairs attheJohnF.KennedySchoolofGovernmentandaSusanS.andKennethL.WallachProfessor at theRadcliffeInstituteforAdvancedStudyatHarvardUniversity.Theydirect theNonviolent Action Lab at Harvard’s Carr Center for Human Rights Policy, where they are core faculty. Their research interests include mass movements, nonviolent resistance, political violence, state repression, and democracy. SUPPORTING INFORMATION Additional supporting information may be found online in the Supporting Information section at the end of the article. How to cite this article: Dugan L, Chenoweth E. Threat, emboldenment, or both? The effects of political power on violent hate crimes. Criminology. 2020;58:714–746. https://doi.org/10.1111/1745-9125.12259 https://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR30764.v1 https://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR30764.v1 https://doi.org/10.1525/sp.2002.49.4.497 https://doi.org/10.1525/sp.2002.49.4.497 https://doi.org/10.1108/13639510911000740 https://doi.org/10.1108/13639510911000740 https://doi.org/10.1017/S000305542000009X https://doi.org/10.1162/DAED_a_00019 https://doi.org/10.1162/DAED_a_00019 https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055400267415 https://doi.org/10.1111/1745-9125.12204 https://doi.org/10.1111/1745-9125.12204 https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343310386269 https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343310386269 https://doi.org/10.1111/1745-9125.12259 Threat, emboldenment, or both? The effects of political power on violent hate crimes* Abstract 1 | INTRODUCTION 2 | INTERGROUP POWER CONTESTS-POWER THREAT THEORY 2.1 | Political threat hypothesis 2.2 | Emboldenment 3 | HYPOTHESES 4 | DATA AND METHOD 4.1 | Data 4.1.1 | Violent hate crime rate 4.1.2 | Federal government actions relevant to specific groups 4.1.3 | Sources for other key variables 4.2 | Methods 5 | RESULTS 5.1 | Summary statistics 5.2 | Vector autoregression models 6 | DISCUSSION ORCID REFERENCES AUTHOR BIOGRAPHIES SUPPORTING INFORMATION 
work_f3f4svf7vnhtjafe6ezxmrzppe	----	Blessed be the Ties: Health and Healthcare for Migrants and Migrant Families in the United States UC Davis UC Davis Previously Published Works Title Blessed be the Ties: Health and Healthcare for Migrants and Migrant Families in the United States Permalink https://escholarship.org/uc/item/9vv9x54b Journal INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION, 55(5) ISSN 0020-7985 Authors Ervin, Daniel Hamilton, Erin R Lopez-Carr, David Publication Date 2017-10-01 DOI 10.1111/imig.12345 Peer reviewed eScholarship.org Powered by the California Digital Library University of California https://escholarship.org/uc/item/9vv9x54b https://escholarship.org http://www.cdlib.org/ Blessed be the Ties: Health and Healthcare for Migrants and Migrant Families in the United States Daniel Ervin*, Erin R. Hamilton** and David L�opez-Carr* The study of migrant health provides a window into understanding themes related to the human condition. As outsiders and movers, migrants reveal what is normally taken for granted in the places where they settle: the social systems and institutions that replicate and control the social order – and the limits of those systems for the operation of a fair, humane, and healthy society. At the same time, migrants reveal the resilience of social actors navigating those systems. Through the very act of their movement, migrants resist, adapt, and create change. Health, as a basic metric of human wellbeing, and with its concomitant institutions of care and research established to support and improve the public’s health, illuminates these processes as migrants struggle and adapt to their new circumstances. This collection of articles originated in two summer workshops on migration and health run by the University of California’s Center for Expertise on Migration and Health (UC COEMH), one of three Centers of Expertise of the UC Global Health Institute. The COEMH brings together scholars from across the UC campuses and across disciplines, including medicine, public health, geography, and sociology, to discuss research, teaching, and outreach related to the intersection of migration and health. Each summer the COEMH hosts a Summer Institute, including workshops featuring new research by doctoral students and early career scholars on this topic. Several presenters also received grants from the Research Program on Migration and Health (PIMSA) at UC Berkeley. Although most of the presenters (and many of the contributors to this special issue) are from the UCs, some are from Mexican universities or US universities located in states along the Mexican border, who collaborate via PIMSA. Collected here are the best articles among this group from the 2014 and 2015 Summer Institutes. Although the articles focus on Latin America to US migrations, they touch upon issues that are universal. The collection of five articles explores these themes across a variety of contexts and questions. We begin with two articles examining migrant children, or the children of migrants, and issues of health insurance and access to care. This is followed by an examination of the mental and emo- tional health of second-generation migrant teens as mediated by measures of assimilation and national self-identity. We close with two methodological articles, one examining the willingness of migrants to participate in health-related research, and the final a formal examination of bi-national data collections in the last 15 years. The role of child migrants and the children of migrants has been magnified by recent political events. The response to the sharp increase in unaccompanied immigrant minors in 2015 was a prime example of polarization in the national perception of immigration. More broadly, some political groups have capitalized on fear by portraying these migrants as criminals and law-breakers * UC Santa Barbara ** UC Davis doi: 10.1111/imig.12345 © 2017 The Authors International Migration © 2017 IOM International Migration Vol. 55 (5) 2017 ISSN 0020-7985Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd. (and therefore “adult” actors), while others have focused pro-immigrant efforts on the negative effects of harsh policies on mothers and children, as well as the forced dissolution of multi-status families that deportation creates. The Affordable Care Act (ACA), examined in our first article, has also been encompassed in the controversy over immigration. To address (some of) the gaps in coverage, the ACA was passed with the intent to increase enrollment and participation in health care. Although immigrants were not explicitly targeted by this reform, it is well known that they were over-represented among the uninsured in the United States prior to the ACA. The inclusion of immigrants in the ACA was a major political issue, and the current wave of anti-immigrant sentiment makes it likely that any short-term changes to healthcare in the United States will make it less accessible for migrants, per- haps explicitly so. Ethan Evans and Caren Arbeit question whether the ACA’s focus on insurance coverage will resolve inequities in access to care across groups defined by race, ethnicity, and nativity in the United States. Using data on children’s insurance coverage, regular source of care, and delays in needed care, the authors find evidence that universal insurance coverage is not a per- fect solution: disparities in access will still exist. As these disparities are predicted to persist, if not widen, this article is all the more relevant. The article by Evans and Arbeit points to the importance of other sources of disadvantage – lan- guage barriers, familiarity with the system, and experience of discrimination. Facing these disad- vantages, how do immigrants navigate health care in the United States? The article by Krissia Martinez, Michael Rodriguez, Marjorie Orellana, and Marco Murillo describes the role of children of immigrants as language brokers for their parents. These adolescents portray an impressive depth of knowledge about the extremely complex health care payment system in the United States. As they translate for their parents, they become brokers of knowledge and power between immigrant adults and their health care providers. This article speaks to both vulnerability and resilience, for as children of immigrants provide a solution to gaps in service for foreign-language speakers, we can question, as the authors do, whether this solution is the best for immigrants, their children, and the system writ large. The article by Emerald Nguyen and Jo Hale examines the mental and emotional health of the teen children of migrants. Applying a segmented assimilation theoretical lens to data from the Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Study, this article examines how English language, national identity, and other measures of acculturation mediate second-generation Asian and Latino teen’s self-esteem, finding important differences between the two groups. As teens progress through differing assimilation paths, their indicators of mental health vary. The sharp increase in hate crimes and public displays of discrimination will have unknown effects on this generation of immi- grants and their children. How will this group deal with the burden of heightened and negative attention? Will it affect their assimilation path as it must their self-perception? Regardless of the outcome, this article will be part of the needed research on the health of this and future cohorts. While the articles on health and access to healthcare make important contributions to the litera- ture on migrant health, they represent a continuation of the field’s focus. The final two articles move the field forward by considering the role of immigrants in health research and the methods we as researchers use to study them. Together, these articles suggest that our understanding of the resilience and vulnerability of migrants may be limited by those very factors. The article by Obiyo Osuchukwu and his colleagues examines knowledge about tuberculosis and willingness to partici- pate in different tuberculosis screening methods in high-risk migrant workers in Arizona. Declining trust of, and participation in, public health research in the United States is a long-term and worry- ing trend, but one that is thought to be less common among Latino immigrants. Increasing distrust between authorities and immigrants may erode this relationship. Our final article by Margaret Handley and May Sudhinaraset is a literature search and discussion of bi-national studies between the US and Mexico since the new millennium. Of the 59 studies found, they categorize them as parallel, concurrent, or look-back, providing information for and 6 Ervin, Hamilton and Lopez-Carr © 2017 The Authors. International Migration © 2017 IOM valuable descriptions of the three types. This article provides a resource for those working with health and the US-Mexico migration process as well as a potential method for those working in other areas. As a group, these articles move the literature on migrant health forward in a number of crucial ways that highlight the importance of the broader interdisciplinary field of ethnic and migration studies and its implications for policy. The volume brings attention to often-overlooked groups in the literature on migrant health, particularly in the United States. In doing so, they reveal the limita- tions of the positive “paradox” frame of migrant health: in many cases, the story is not so positive. Further, the articles included here bring new insight into the limitations of systems, policies, and providers interested in furthering migrant and, more broadly, the public’s health – of health care reform focused on insurance coverage, of care provision to limited English-language speakers of diverse ethnicities, and of well-intentioned researchers. These articles demonstrate how the study of migrant health reveals the vulnerability and resilience of a key group in society, the movers within our midst, with implications for scholarship and practice on the ground. Blessed be the Ties 7 © 2017 The Authors. International Migration © 2017 IOM 
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work_f4kxrwfbgreqzjhbz3fxqutpva	----	1 Du Bois Review, 14:1 (2017) 1–5. © 2017 Hutchins Center for African and African American Research 1742-058X/17 $15.00 doi:10.1017/S1742058X1700008X Editorial introduction THE EMPIRE STRIKES BACK Fall of the Postracial Myth and Stirrings of renewed White Supremacy Lawrence D. Bobo Department of African and African American Studies and Department of Sociology, Harvard University Distinguished scholar and public intellectual Cornel West has characterized the 2016 U.S. Presidential election as a choice between a “neo-liberal disaster and a neo-fascist catastrophe.” For some, this characterization is unfair to the left and for others it is unfair to the right. I see it as an almost surgically precise analysis of the choices mainstream politics put before the nation in 2016. The clear majority of American voters opted for the neo-liberal disaster of seasoned national politician Hillary Rodham Clinton. As result of the Electoral College system, however, the keys to the White House went to Donald J. Trump, a newcomer to national politics, and standard- bearer for the neo-fascist catastrophe. The thin margin of voters that decided the outcome of the Electoral College ballots, and thus of the election, leaves the door open to many possible accounts of “what happened.” It could be attributable to Russian meddling, FBI director James Comey’s decision to re-open the investigation into Clinton’s emails, media favoritism of Trump, sexism, a failure of messaging by the Clinton campaign, Clinton’s long-time high negative personal poll ratings, or some mix of all of these. Nonetheless, it seems fair to observe, as did Washington Post columnist Eugene Robinson (2017), that: Clinton, with all her vast experience and proven ability, was defeated by Donald Trump, a reality-television star who had never before run for office, displayed near-total ignorance of the issues, broke every rule of political rhetoric, and was caught on videotape bragging of how he sexually assaulted random women by grabbing their crotches. That’s not just unlikely, it’s impossible. At least it should have been, according to everything we knew—or thought we knew—about politics.” At some point we must recognize, at a minimum, that the Trump campaign’s combi- nation of openly anti-minority rhetoric—demonizing both Mexican immigrants and Muslims while grossly stereotyping African Americans and bellowing the political at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1742058X1700008X Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:36, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1017/S1742058X1700008X&domain=pdf https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/S1742058X1700008X https://www.cambridge.org/core Lawrence D. Bobo 2 du bois review: social science research on race 14:1, 2017 code words “law and order” and “build that wall”—coupled with a strong economic appeal to working- and middle-class Americans secured a base of support that was sufficient to decide the outcome of this election. Whether that base is a durable politi- cal coalition and force in American politics is yet to be determined. But intellectual honesty at this point requires acknowledging that issues of race and the economy were major factors in the 2016 election (Bobo 2017). Among the few things we can say with certainty, with Donald Trump in the White House and Republicans in firm control of both houses of Congress, is that the myth of postracialism has been tabled for now. The only folks pleased and cheering after Donald Trump’s multiple responses to the recent violence in Charlottesville, Virginia were White supremacists. As New York Times columnist Charles Blow (2017) put it: “Sometimes you simply have to call a thing a thing, and the thing here is that Trump’s inner racist is being revealed, and America’s not-so-silent racists are rising in applause.” What would prompt a mainstream journalist writing for the premiere “establish- ment” news outlet to effectively label the President of the United States a racist? In short, the answer is Trump’s remarks and record over his comparatively brief time in office to this point. As Blow explained: “Donald Trump continues to say in every way possible that power and privilege in America is primarily the provenance of people who are white, male, Christian, and straight, and that all others should be targeted for denial, oppression, or removal,” (Blow 2017). To wit, Trump has argued for a ban on Muslim entry to the United States and advanced several largely aborted efforts to accomplish this end. His Department of Justice has announced an effort to try to re-kindle the fires of the War on Drugs and to shift Civil Rights Division resources toward investigating and suing universities for potential discrimination against Whites with their affirmative action admission policies. He pardoned Sheriff Joe Arpaio after his conviction for violating a court order prohibiting him from engaging in racial profiling. He then declared an end to the Obama era executive action on Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals, threatening the status of nearly a million registered participants in the program. There is much external evidence to suggest that Trump’s campaign, and his early days of governing, have unleashed forces previously marginalized (and arguably shrinking in influence) in the United States. Perhaps the clearest and most troubling indicator involves the rise in both “hate groups” and hate crimes. The Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC) reports a now back-to-back annual increase in the num- ber of active hate groups, with the current level of 917 approaching that of the all-time high of 1018 seen in 2011 (Potok 2017). More strikingly, there were over a thousand hate crimes reported in the month following Trump’s election in 2016. As the SPLC report explained: The hate was clearly tied directly to Trump’s victory. The highest count came on the first day after the election, with the number diminishing steadily after that. And more than a third of the incidents directly referenced either Trump, his “Make America Great Again” slogan, or his infamous remark about grabbing women by the genitals (Potok 2017). The divisive character of the Trump campaign is implicated in the rise of hate crimes nationally in 2016 and what already appears to be a record pace for such crimes in 2017 (Mathias 2017). As we witness the fall of the postracial narrative and the disturbing recrudescence of White supremacist rhetoric and groups, the need for the perspectives, theories, at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1742058X1700008X Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:36, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/S1742058X1700008X https://www.cambridge.org/core The Empire Strikes Back du bois review: social science research on race 14:1, 2017 3 data, and insights of social science scholarship on race grows ever more acute. Three of the articles in this issue of the Du Bois Review: Social Science Research on Race wrestle with questions of direct relevance to the most recent presidential election and the early days of the Trump presidency. Sociologists Kevin Drakulich, John Hagan, Devon Johnson, and Kevin H. Wozniak assess the impact that encounters with the criminal justice system, beliefs about police, and racial prejudice have on the levels of partici- pation and support for Trump prior to the 2016 primary season. Their results show that support for Trump rests substantially on anti-Black prejudice, whether the con- trast was with other Republican contenders or versus Hillary Clinton. Both anti-Black prejudice (positively) and a perception of police as racially biased (negatively) affected support for Trump versus Clinton. Notably, these effects emerge above and beyond socioeconomic status indicators, political ideology and party identification measures, and other ideological or value-based positions (e.g., a preference for limited role for government). Political scientists Evelyn M. Simien and Sarah Cote Hampson examine the role gender affinity and gender identity may have played in the 2008 Democratic Presidential primary season. Their results point to critically important intersec- tions of race, gender, and features of a specific political contest rather than to singular gender identity processes. Political scientists Logan Strother, Spencer Piston, and Thomas Ogorzalek use three different data sources to examine whether it is a sense of Southern cultural pride or anti-Black racial prejudice that undergirds support for flying the Confederate Battle Flag. Across all of the available data they find that anti-Black racial prejudice is far more important to how Whites think about the Confederate flag than is reverence for some putatively race-neutral southern heritage. Racial inequality plays itself out well beyond politics and political debate, particu- larly in terms of the potential for segregation of neighborhoods and discrimination in the job market (Samson and Bobo, 2014). One critically important arena involves housing and residential mobility processes. Sociologists Maria Krysan, Courtney Carter, and Marieke van Londen provide data from an innovative survey in the city of Chicago on how Blacks, Whites, and Latinos think about desirable and undesir- able neighborhoods, an indicator of tastes that bears on processes that may maintain or break down levels of racial residential segregation. On a more sanguine note they find that most respondents, across racial groups, do create integrated neighborhoods when called upon to describe their most desirable neighborhood. All groups show a tendency to prefer neighborhoods with substantial numbers of same-race neigh- bors. However, White respondents are the group most likely to create a neighborhood where they are in the majority and they prefer considerable distance from African Americans. Black respondents are among the most likely to create highly integrated neighborhoods. Krysan and colleagues point to the clear effects of an American racial hierarchy in accounting for these patterns. It has often been observed that African Americans fare better in public sector employment, in part because enforcement of anti-discrimination measures has been more consistently and effectively applied there (Wilson 1980; 2011). Sociologists George Wilson and Vincent J. Roscigno examine how pressures under a neoliberal- ism regimen to make the government sector function more like the private business sector has had effects on the Black-White pay differential. Using data from the General Social Survey for 1992 through 2012 they examine the race differential in earnings returns to job authority for those working in the public sector. They find, as we move deeper and deeper into the era of neoliberal reform, the Black-White earnings return differential substantially widened. at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1742058X1700008X Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:36, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/S1742058X1700008X https://www.cambridge.org/core Lawrence D. Bobo 4 du bois review: social science research on race 14:1, 2017 The work of Krysan and colleagues and of Wilson and Roscigno suggest that there remain key structural underpinnings and social processes that maintain Black-White inequality. Thinking in such sociological terms about racial inequality varies consider- ably in the public at large. Jason Shelton takes up a novel examination of how more affluent Blacks and Whites go about explaining racial economic inequality. Pooling data across a large number of years from the General Social Survey he is able to gain leverage on the question of how high income and highly educated Blacks differ from less well-off co-ethnics as well as from White respondents. In general, his results sug- gest that income has a stronger and more consistent impact on how Whites think about racial inequality than it does for Blacks, but that in both cases those with higher earnings tend toward a more individualistic, less structural type of account for inequality. A higher level of education, particularly among African Americans, encourages more structural views of racial inequality. One cannot focus on race relations in the United States without engaging the impact that immigration and demographic shifts in the composition of the population have had. Three articles in this issue of Du Bois Review speak to this aspect of the new ethno-racial landscape. Sociologist Abigail A. Sewell takes up the eminently prac- tical question of what impact the push for multilingual public sector work forces has on monolingual English speakers, especially monolingual English-speaking African Americans. Her results from Oakland, California indicate that this well-intentioned policy is indeed having the effect of reducing the number of Blacks hired in pub- lic facing contact positions in local governments. Anthropologists and race relations researchers Angela Stuesse, Cheryl Staats, and Andrew Grant-Thomas provide a portrait of the landscape and potential best practices for building bridges between the Black community and immigrant communities. Sociologist Michelle D. Byng exam- ines how second generation Muslim Americans think about issues of race and identity. She suggests that these Muslim immigrants are aware of a clear American racial hier- archy and think with some complexity about their place within it. Three articles in this issues reinforce the importance of organizational environ- ments and cultural resources in whether or not efforts at progressive racial reform and change ever fully take root. Sociologist Christi Smith provides a fascinating trac- ing of how an early, explicit, and central commitment to racial integration and an elaborate “anti-caste ideology” influenced the early years of Oberlin College, Berea College, and Howard University. The strongly progressive postures on race in the era of Reconstruction and the rise of Jim Crow, while initially enormously influential at each of the institutions of higher learning, eventually fell by the wayside. According to Smith’s careful archival work and analysis this was largely due to changing organi- zational environmental fields in which it became important to compete for different forms of status and different sources of support. In a much more contemporary but conceptually closely related piece, sociologists David Cunningham and Ashley Rondini examine efforts to implement the Mississippi Civil Rights/Human Rights Education law. This bill, passed by the Mississippi state legislature in 2006, was the first state- wide mandate for civil rights and human rights education in K – 12 public schools in the United States. Cunningham and Rondini show, however, the level of success at implementing a plan hinged importantly on prior local levels of civic organization, particularly local civil rights organizing in the past and the degree of prior organized White resistance to civil rights initiatives. Urban planning and public policy scholars Davia C. Downey and Laura Reese examine the fates of two largely Black cities hit by different types of disasters: a long, slow road to bankruptcy in the case of Detroit, MI and the sudden devastation of hurricane Katrina in New Orleans, LA. The intensive coverage, sympathetic response, and huge initial commitment of resources seemed at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1742058X1700008X Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:36, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/S1742058X1700008X https://www.cambridge.org/core The Empire Strikes Back du bois review: social science research on race 14:1, 2017 5 to open the door for a more fundamental realignment of trajectory for the city of New Orleans. Taking stock of the situation ten years after Katrina, however, these researchers find many ways in which the opportunities for improvement in both of these substantially Black metropolises were under resourced, sidetacked, or undercut. Each of these articles thus underscores the multi-pronged and deeply socially embedded character of racial inequality and how even high level institutional man- dates or opportunities for change can founder on the shoals of channeling, resistance, or blockage rooted in related contextual groups, organizations, and cultures (cf. Reskin 2012). Two articles in this issue of Du Bois Review can be seen as examinations of situated cultural identities and practices. African Americanist scholar James R. Jones consid- ers the case of how and, importantly why, Blacks working for U.S. Congress engage in a cultural practice he terms “the Black nod.” He suggests “the nod” takes on and expresses a deeper perspective, set of meanings, and shared understanding than are obvious from mere observation of the gesture itself. Sociologist Chandra Waring plumbs the identities and behavioral strategies of biracial individuals. She finds that they frequently see themselves as having a footing, or special “in” on both sides of the Black-White divide. The research in this volume, whether historical or contemporary in focus, whether quantitative, archival and interpretative, or qualitative in method, reinforces the on-going power of socially constructed race and ethno-racial distinctions on our social world. The case for postracialism, at least strong varieties of it, were certainly pressed too hard, too soon. More distressing still is the sense in which the Trump era seems likely to re-open a veritable Pandora’s box of White supremacist stirrings. Scholarship that poses the tough questions, carries out the needed research, and then speaks with clarity on the import of the results in the arena of race and inequality is needed now more than ever. REFERENCES Blow, Charles M. (2017). Inner Racism Revealed. The New York Times, September 7. < <https:// www.nytimes.com/2017/09/07/opinion/inner-racism-revealed.html?mcubz=0> (accessed September 19, 2017). Bobo, Lawrence D. (2017) Racism in Trump’s America: Reflections on Culture, Sociology, and the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election. British Journal of Sociology (forthcoming). Mathias, Christopher (2017). Exclusive: New Report Offers Proof of U.S. Hate Crime Rise in the Trump Era. Huffington Post, September 17. <http://www/huffingtonpost.com/ entry/hate-crime-rise-2016-united-states-trump_us_59becac8e4b086432b07fed8> (accessed September 19, 2017). Potok, Mark (2017). The Year in Hate and Extremism. Intelligence Report (Spring 2017). <https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/intelligence-report/2017/year-hate-and-extremism> (accessed September 19, 2017). Reskin, Barbara (2012). The Race Discrimination System. Annual Review of Sociology, 38: 17–35. Robinson, Eugene (2017). The 2016 Election was not a Fluke. Washington Post, September 18. <https://washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-2016-election-was-not…a0e-9cb4-11e7-9083- fbfddf6804c2_story.html?utm_term=.b24dff20e709> (accessed September 19, 2017). Samson, Frank L., and Lawrence D. Bobo (2014). Ethno-racial Attitudes and Social Inequality. In Jane McLeod, Edward Lawler, and Michael Schwalbe (Eds.), The Handbook of the Social Psychology of Inequality, pp. 515–545. New York: Springer. Wilson, William Julius (1980). The Declining Significance of Race: Blacks and Changing American Institutions, 2nd ed. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Wilson, William Julius (2011). The Declining Significance of Race: Revisited and Revised. Daedalus, 140(2): 55–69. at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1742058X1700008X Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:36, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/07/opinion/inner-racism-revealed.html?mcubz=0 https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/07/opinion/inner-racism-revealed.html?mcubz=0 http://www/huffingtonpost.com/entry/hate-crime-rise-2016-united-states-trump_us_59becac8e4b086432b07fed8 http://www/huffingtonpost.com/entry/hate-crime-rise-2016-united-states-trump_us_59becac8e4b086432b07fed8 https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/intelligence-report/2017/year-hate-and-extremism https://washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-2016-election-was-not�a0e-9cb4-11e7-9083-fbfddf6804c2_story.html?utm_term=.b24dff20e709 https://washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-2016-election-was-not�a0e-9cb4-11e7-9083-fbfddf6804c2_story.html?utm_term=.b24dff20e709 https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/S1742058X1700008X https://www.cambridge.org/core 
work_f5jlr6gzszcjzdonemwt7unlme	----	Universities, Unjust Law, and Campus Sanctuaries | Departures in Critical Qualitative Research | University of California Press Skip to Main Content Close UCPRESS ABOUT US BLOG SUPPORT US CONTACT US Search search input Search input auto suggest search filter All Content Departures in Critical Qualitative Research Search User Tools Register Carnegie Mellon University Carnegie Mellon University Sign In Toggle MenuMenu Content Recent Content Browse Issues All Content Purchase Alerts Submit Info For Authors Librarians Reprints & Permissions About Journal Editorial Team Contact Us Skip Nav Destination Article Navigation Close mobile search navigation Article navigation Volume 9, Issue 1 March 2020 Previous Article Next Article Article Navigation Research Article| March 01 2020 Universities, Unjust Law, and Campus Sanctuaries A. Naomi Paik A. Naomi Paik A. Naomi Paik is Associate Professor at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign and author of Bans, Walls, Raids, Sanctuary (University of California Press, 2020). Thank you to Karma R. Chávez for the invitation to contribute to this forum. My gratitude as well to friends and to colleagues in Sanctuary for the People UIUC: David Cisneros, Daniel Gonzalez, Kora Maldonado, Mimi Nguyen, Veronica Paredes, Gilberto Rosas, Jason Ruiz, and Siobhan Somerville. Correspondence to: A. Naomi Paik, Department of Asian American Studies, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1208 W. Nevada Street, MC 142, Urbana, IL 61801, USA. Email: anpaik@illinois.edu. Search for other works by this author on: This Site PubMed Google Scholar Departures in Critical Qualitative Research (2020) 9 (1): 95–100. https://doi.org/10.1525/dcqr.2020.9.1.95 Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn Email Tools Icon Tools Get Permissions Cite Icon Cite Search Site Citation A. Naomi Paik; Universities, Unjust Law, and Campus Sanctuaries. Departures in Critical Qualitative Research 1 March 2020; 9 (1): 95–100. doi: https://doi.org/10.1525/dcqr.2020.9.1.95 Download citation file: Ris (Zotero) Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search search input Search input auto suggest search filter All Content Departures in Critical Qualitative Research Search This essay examines the campus sanctuary movement that launched in response to the 2016 US presidential election. It focuses on the case of my employer to illuminate the broader context of the campus sanctuary movement's nationwide emergence, including the neoliberal evisceration of higher education and right-wing attacks on intellectual freedom and demands for social justice. Recognizing that the institution will not save us, sanctuary organizers not only demand that institutions use their resources for the public good, but they also work beyond the confines of institutions to build the resources that we need through community-based organizations. Keywords: Sanctuary movements, Immigration, Neoliberalism, Universities, Donald Trump © 2020 by the Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. Request permission to photocopy or reproduce article content at the University of California Press's Reprints and Permissions web page, http://www.ucpress.edu/journals.php?p=reprints. 2020 You do not currently have access to this content. Sign in Don't already have an account? 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work_f7f4hvepujaihdeowix3btrbaq	----	Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2019, 16, 4899; doi:10.3390/ijerph16244899 www.mdpi.com/journal/ijerph Article Distributional Environmental Injustices for a Minority Group without Minority Status: Arab Americans and Residential Exposure to Carcinogenic Air Pollution in the US Sara E. Grineski 1,*, Timothy W. Collins 2 and Ricardo Rubio 1 1 Department of Sociology/Environmental and Sustainability Studies, University of Utah, 480 S 1530 E, Room 0310, Salt Lake City, UT 84112, USA 2 Department of Geography/Environmental and Sustainability Studies, University of Utah, 332 1400 E, Salt Lake City, UT 84112, USA * Correspondence: sara.grineski@soc.utah.edu; Tel.: +1-801-581-6153 Received: 15 October 2019; Accepted: 27 November 2019; Published: 4 December 2019 Abstract: Distributional environmental injustices in residential exposure to air pollution in Arab American enclaves have not been examined. We conducted our investigation at the census tract- level across the continental United States using a set of socio-demographic variables to predict cancer risk from hazardous air pollutant (HAP) exposure. Arab enclaves had a mean cancer risk score of 44.08, as compared to 40.02 in non-enclave tracts. In terms of the specific origin groups, Moroccan enclaves had the highest cancer risk score (46.93), followed by Egyptian (45.33), Iraqi (43.13), Jordanian (41.67), and Lebanese (40.65). In generalized estimating equations controlling for geographic clustering and other covariates, Arab enclaves had significantly higher cancer risks due to HAPs (p < 0.001) than non-enclaves. When looking at specific ethnic origins, Iraqi, Palestinian, and Lebanese enclaves had significantly higher cancer risks due to HAPs (all p < 0.01) than non- enclaves. Results reveal significant environmental injustices for Arab American enclaves that should be examined in future studies. Results suggest that environmental injustice may be another way in which Arab Americans are disadvantaged as a racialized minority group without minority status. Keywords: Arab Americans; environmental injustice; hazardous air pollutants 1. Introduction Arab Americans are a minority group without official minority status. Discrimination against Arab Americans intensified after 11 September 2001 [1] and has continued in the Trump era. Despite decades of marginalization, there has been little to no environmental justice (EJ) research looking at Arab Americans and exposure to air pollution in the US. EJ research on more visible minority groups in the US, such as Black, Hispanic, and Asian Americans, has demonstrated that they face disproportionate exposure to health-harming air pollution [2–4]. This paper examines whether Arab Americans, including those from specific ethnic origins (i.e., Egyptian, Iraqi, Jordanian, Palestinian, Syrian, Lebanese, and Moroccan), have disproportionately elevated cancer risks from hazardous air pollutants (HAPs) at the census tract-level in the continental US, using bivariate and multivariate methods. 1.1. Race/Ethnicity and Environmental Justice: Current Knowledge and Issues of Measurement Race has been an important focus for the EJ field. The EJ movement began in 1982 in Warren County, NC, when African American residents successfully protested a PCB (polychlorinated biphenyl) landfill and made explicit the link between racism and environmental exposures [5,6]. Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2019, 16, 4899 2 of 16 Consequently, the US federal government requested that this link be analyzed statistically [5]. A Government Accountability Office report was released in 1983, followed by a United Church of Christ study in 1987. Both reports supported the claim that communities of color were disproportionately exposed to environmental pollutants through the siting of hazardous and toxic waste facilities near their communities. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, African American communities mobilized around anti-waste and antidumping campaigns, became experts on toxics, and successfully linked local environmental issues to concerns about housing and economic development [7]. While Hispanic communities were also pioneers of EJ activism, their focus during the early years was on health and occupational safety related to farmworkers and pesticide exposure [5]. As quantitative EJ research developed during the 1990s, Black and Hispanic communities were the focus. Brown’s [8] systematic review documented pervasive race differentials in exposure to toxic hazards in the US. Similar evidence has mounted in the decades since [9–14]. Alongside research documenting inequalities for Black and Hispanic Americans, recent investigations have highlighted risks for Asian Americans [4,15–17]. While White Americans are generally privileged with respect to environmental hazard exposure, a limited number of studies have innovatively examined intra-ethnic inequalities within White populations. In El Paso, Texas, low-class status for Whites did not translate into the spatially- concentrated forms of social disadvantage that underpinned environmental inequalities for low-class Hispanics [18]. At a US-national scale, White deprivation (i.e., a factor combining white-specific poverty, single mother, unemployed, and no high school diploma variables from the 2000 census) was negatively associated with a census tract’s presence in an air-toxic cancer risk cluster, unlike similar measures for Black, Hispanic, and Asian Americans, which were positively associated with air-toxic cancer risk [16]. The very limited evidence that exists suggests that Whiteness is protective against the experience of environmental injustice, even when that Whiteness intersects with other characteristics known to be associated with environmental risks (e.g., low socioeconomic status) [16,18]. Nearly all quantitative EJ research on race/ethnicity relies on geographically aggregated data found in the American Community Survey (ACS) and US Decennial Census. This means that researchers construct racial/ethnic variables based on how the US Census collates the publicly available data. The most common approach is to construct proportion/percentage variables mapping to Hispanic and non-Hispanic populations of varying racial backgrounds (e.g., non-Hispanic white or non-Hispanic black) for US census tracts [19]. Since Arab was not included as a specific racial/ethnic category in Census 2010 or in the ACS, there is limited data available on this group based on locations of residence. In the years leading up to the 2020 Census, the Census Bureau considered including a new racial category (i.e., Middle Eastern or North African (MENA)) that would be highly relevant to demographic studies of Arab Americans. However in January of 2018, the Census Bureau announced that the 2020 Census would not include MENA or an alternative, thus maintaining this group’s invisibility in discussions of race/ethnicity in the US [20]. Given that there is no category on the 2020 Census, the ACS ethnic origin (or ancestry) item will remain, for the time being, the primary way that EJ researchers using tract- level data can examine this important group. The ACS ethnic origin data come from open-ended responses to the question, “What is your ancestry or ethnic origin?” The ACS codes responses and reports data on 173 ancestral groups. These responses gauge ethnic identity and heritage rather than place of birth. This ACS ethnic origin variable has been used in EJ studies to examine Hispanic and Asian American subgroups with respect to the distribution of environmental hazards [21,22]. These studies have shown that Cuban and Colombian neighborhoods in Miami had significantly higher levels of vehicular air pollution, while Mexican neighborhoods had significantly lower levels [22]. Researchers also found that Colombian and Puerto Rican neighborhoods in Miami were disproportionately exposed to inland flood risks in areas without water-related amenities [21]. Increasing percentages of Chinese, South Asian, and Korean Americans in census tracts were associated with significantly greater exposure to cancer-causing chemicals in the US [4]. The 2010 Census also provided data that Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2019, 16, 4899 3 of 16 is relevant to measuring ethnic origin and ancestry, but not for Black, White, or “other race” Americans. These data have been used in EJ studies on Asian Americans [15,17], but are not available for Arab Americans. 1.2. New Directions in Race/Ethnicity and Environmental Justice: A Focus on Arab Americans Studies of Arab Americans in general and Arab Americans of specific ethnic origins represent a new direction in EJ research that the ACS ethnic origin data make possible. The Arab population in the United States is small but growing. Based on Decennial Census numbers, there were 850,000 people with Arab ancestry in 1990 (0.35% of the total population). This increased to 1.2 m (0.42% of the total population) in 2000. The ancestry question was no longer asked on the 2010 census, but according to the 2006–2010 ACS, there were 1.5 m people (0.5% of the total population) with Arab ancestry [23]. A total of 82% of Arab Americans are US-citizens, and most were born in the US [24]. Arab is technically a cultural and linguistic term referring to people from countries that speak Arabic [25]. However, Arab ethnicity is often conflated with the practice of Islam. This connection between practicing Islam and having Arab origins underpins the socio-political marginalization of Arab Americans in the US. Globally, Arabs comprise a small proportion of Muslims, even though most Americans use those two terms interchangeably [26]. Over 90% of residents in the Middle East–North African region are Muslim, yet over 62% of Muslims worldwide live in the Asia-Pacific region [27]. While Arabs are namely Muslim internationally, in the US, over two-thirds of Arab Americans are Christians [28]. There were two socially and temporally district waves of Arab migration to the US [25]. The first wave arrived between the late 1800s and early 1900s. Migrants were mainly from Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine. They came out of economic necessity and for personal advancement [25]. This group was generally poor, with low levels of education, and limited literacy; they were primarily Christian. The second wave of Arab migration began after World War II. This wave is more socially diverse than the earlier arriving migrants. Migrants are both Muslim and Christian, and of varying socioeconomic statuses. Persecution, war, and colonialism in the Middle East have driven many of these migrants to come to the US. In the last 40 years, US-led military action in the Middle East has displaced many people and pushed them to migrate to the US, where they have been not always been welcomed [25]. While the majority of Arab Americans descend from the first wave of mostly Christian immigrants, Arab American Muslims represent the fastest-growing segment of the Arab American community [24]. Racially, Arab Americans usually classify themselves on the US Census and ACS as “White” or as “some other race,” although they are officially “White” based on US Office of Management and Budget federal guidelines on racial classifications [29]. This “White” classification is at odds with the experiences of many Arab Americans. They do not tend to benefit from being classified as White, and they do not tend to identify with the White majority. They face discrimination in the workplace, endure degrading representations in the media, and are victims of hate crimes. They are a minority without official minority status [30]. The events of 11 September 2001 negatively affected how US society represented and treated Arab Americans [30], although anti-Arab stereotypes have been prevalent in government policy and popular culture since the 1970s [28]. Post 9/11, Arabs transitioned from “almost White” and nearly invisible to a racialized group. Racialization occurs when a group of people are made into a “race” [31] and when racial meanings are extended to a previously unclassified group [30]. The events of 11 September 2001 changed anti-Arab racism in the US. Arab Americans went from being stereotypically represented as rich oil sheiks to Islamic fundamentalist terrorists intent on killing Americans [25]. A review of articles in The New York Times, The Los Angeles Times, and The Washington Post found that Muslims were portrayed in a more negative light after 11 September 2001 than before and the dominant-negative terms used to refer to Muslims were as terrorists, extremists, fundamentalists, radicals, and fanatics [32]. The mistreatment of Arab Americans has continued in the Trump era. Republican campaigns for local, state, and national offices have used anti-Arab and anti-Muslim bigotry in an attempt to Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2019, 16, 4899 4 of 16 discredit Democratic challengers [33]. There has been an increase in targeted violence and hate crimes against Arab Americans. Discrimination while travelling via air has continued, which includes the January 2017 executive order termed the Muslim and Refugee Ban, which sought to ban entry of people from seven so-called “Muslim nations” and refugees [33]. It is worth noting that of the seven countries named in the ban—Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen—only Iran is among the ten countries with the largest Muslim populations [27]. The discrimination and mistreatment of Arab communities in the US increases the relevance and importance of considering Arab Americans as an EJ community, especially given the historical connections between the Civil Rights movement and the EJ movement, and concerns about environmental racism more generally. An examination of Arab Americans and environmental injustice necessitates consideration of the role of religion in shaping potential patterns of distributive injustice. While the majority of US Arab Americans are not Muslim, the two terms are conflated in the eyes of most Americans [26]. While EJ research has expanded beyond examining race and class-based injustices to examine other axes of social oppression, very few distributive EJ studies have focused on religion’s role in shaping patterns of environmental injustice [34]. This is despite the fact that religious affiliation is an important dimension of social inequality [34]. While distributive EJ studies have largely neglected religion, the Cerrell Associates report, which was commissioned by the California Waste Management Board and disclosed to the public in 1984, suggests that religion may factor into locational decisions regarding where to locate sources of pollution [35]. Catholic communities were thought to be good potential hosts for toxic waste incineration facilities, based on the notion that they would not be likely to protest [35]. In the only distributive EJ study to examine religion in the US, researchers examined Salt Lake City and found that Mormon prevalence predicted significantly lower levels of outdoor air pollution, independent of potential confounders [34]. This is likely because Mormons are politically, economically, and culturally dominant in the study community. Their collective social power may afford them relative safety from health-harming outdoor air pollution [34]. Despite the relevance, there has been little to no EJ research looking at Arab Americans in the US, despite 11 September 2001 and Trump-era policies that exclude and “other” them. The US National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences (NIEHS) funded a project called “Environmental Impacts On Arab Americans In Metro Detroit” between 2000–2004 [36]. Several publications came from that effort, including one measuring heavy metals in Arab community members [37] and others focused on asthma. The project’s survey of 613 Arab households in metro Detroit found that almost 30% of the adult study population reported some form of respiratory impairment, and 79% of adults with asthma said air pollution exacerbated their symptoms [38]. Specifically, 16% of Arab adults had asthma [39]. In 2010, asthma prevalence rates in the US were almost 9% [40]. This asthma rate for Arab adults is as high as the rate for Puerto Ricans (also 16%), and much higher than the rates for Asian Americans (5%) and black Americans (11%) [40]. While important, this project [38,39] did not examine the distribution of Arab Americans vis-a-vis the location of environmental hazards, even within Detroit. To the best of our knowledge, the only study to examine Arab populations from a distributional EJ perspective was conducted in Israel [41]. In the two Israeli cities under examination, researchers found high degrees of segregation within apartment buildings between Arab and Jewish residents, and that apartments serving the Arab minority group had significantly less access to green space than those serving the Jewish majority [41]. Given the backlash against Arab Americans in the US and the dearth of research on this group from an EJ perspective, our study fills an important gap in EJ research. This paper answers the research question: Are Arab American enclaves exposed to significantly greater cancer risks from hazardous air pollutants (HAPs) in the US relative to non-enclaves? Analyses are conducted for a general Arab American variable, as well as for the seven largest specific ethnic origin groups, and using bivariate and multivariate methods. Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2019, 16, 4899 5 of 16 2. Materials and Methods We conducted our investigation across the continental United States using a set of socio- demographic variables derived from the 2010 Decennial Census and the 2009–2013 American Community Survey (ACS) estimates at the census tract level. To ensure stable proportions for all our variables, we used the 70,733 census tracts with at least 500 people, 200 households, and complete data for all analysis and clustering variables. 2.1. Independent Variables To measure Arab American status, the ACS codes Algerian, Bahraini, Egyptian, Emirati, Iraqi, Jordanian, Kuwaiti, Lebanese, Libyan, Moroccan, Omani, Palestinian, Qatari, Saudi Arabian, Syrian, Tunisian, and Yemeni as “Arab ethnic origins.” They also consider people who write in “Arab” to be included in this group. The ACS aggregates groups with small counts into an “other Arab groups” variable when the data are released to the public. Specific Arab groups with large enough counts to be released as separate categories in the 2009–2013 ACS (used for this paper) are: Egyptian, Iraqi, Jordanian, Palestinian, Syrian, Lebanese, and Moroccan. We utilized dichotomous indicators of enclave status, instead of more traditional proportion/percentage variables, given the small numbers of Arabs in the majority of US census tracts. This approach has been used before for similar studies of groups with small counts in census tracts [42]. Enclaves are also meaningful in their own right to a study of Arab Americans; Arab Americans living in enclaves report more discrimination that those living elsewhere [43]. To break the census tracts into two groups (i.e., enclave vs. not) for each of the eight variables (i.e., Arab and the seven specific Arab origins), we transformed the eight-count variables into proportion variables at the tract-level and then executed k-means cluster analyses. We used the continuous proportion variables in a sensitivity analysis. For the overall Arab variable, only 16 tracts emerged as enclaves when breaking proportion Arab into two groups in the k-means cluster analysis. This is because in Detroit, Michigan, there are 16 tracts with between 43.0% to 74.4% Arab. Due to the fact that other tracts with substantial Arab percentages were not being included in our enclave variable, we ran the k-means cluster analysis for three groups, resulting in a more reasonable break between non-enclaves and enclaves. We recoded the top two groups to create our Arab enclave (n = 2180 tracts in the continental US), and 33.8% of all US Arab Americans live in one of our Arab enclaves. Arab enclaves are depicted in the national map shown in Figure 1. The same process was followed for Lebanese enclaves (since only 13 tracts were initially identified), and it yielded 1590 enclave tracts. For the other origin groups, the k-means cluster analysis broke the data into two clusters with over 300 enclave tracts identified for each group, which we used in the analysis. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the enclave variables. Figure 1 presents a national map of the locations of Arab enclaves. They are prominent in the northeast and Florida, all major metropolitan areas of the west coast, the rust belt, and many major US cities. Figure 2 presents the locations of enclaves pertaining to the seven specific ethnic origins. While many ethnic origin groups cluster together in major cities, others are dispersed from each other. Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2019, 16, 4899 6 of 16 Figure 1. Census tracts that are Arab ethnic enclaves in the United States (data source: 2009–2013 American Community Survey). Table 1. Descriptive statistics for enclave variables (n = 70,377 tracts). Enclaves Yes No Mean % of Group in Enclave Tracts (Range) Arab 2180 68,553 6.3% (3.3%–74.4%) Egyptian 641 70,092 3.3% (1.7%–18.5%) Iraqi 303 70,430 4.3% (2.2%–16.1%) Jordanian 350 70,383 2.2% (1.2%–9.8%) Palestinian 402 70,331 2.6% (1.4%–13.6%) Syrian 312 70,421 3.4% (1.8%–18.6%) Lebanese 1590 69,143 2.5% (1.4%–45.1%) Moroccan 409 70,324 2.4% (1.2%–14.9%) Figure 2. Census tracts that are specific Arab ethnic origin enclaves in the United States (data source: 2009–2013 American Community Survey). Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the control variables used in the statistical model for research question 2, as well as the dependent variable. For race/ethnicity, we used proportion Hispanic and proportions non-Hispanic (NH) black, American Indian, Asian, Pacific Islander, and Other/Multiracial. We also included if the tract was rural vs. urban and population density. These Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2019, 16, 4899 7 of 16 variables came from the 2010 Census. For socioeconomic status (SES), we used median household income, which came from the ACS (along with the ethnic origin variables). Table 2 also compares Arab enclaves to non-enclaves in terms of the control variables. The average median household income is higher in Arab enclaves than non-enclaves. The proportions Hispanic, Pacific Islander, and Other race are nearly equivalent, but Arab enclaves have lower proportions of Black Americans and higher proportions of Asian Americans than non-enclaves. Arab enclaves also have greater population density and are less likely to be rural than non-enclaves. Table 2. Descriptive statistics for dependent variable and control variables (n = 70,733 tracts). Variable Min. Max. Mean Std. Dev. Mean in Arab Enclaves Mean in Non- Arab Enclaves Total cancer risk from HAPs 10.742 826.309 40.144 12.540 44.079 40.019 Median HH Income 4092 247,064 56,255 27,461 66,452 55,931 Proportion Hispanic 0 0.994 0.153 0.209 0.155 0.153 Proportion Black, NH 0 0.992 0.1345 0.221 0.097 0.136 Proportion Am. Ind. NH 0 0.982 0.008 0.0437 0.003 0.008 Proportion Asian, NH 0 0.898 0.041 0.079 0.097 0.040 Proportion Pac. Is., NH 0 0.142 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.001 Proportion Other, NH 0 0.258 0.002 0.005 0.003 0.002 Pop. Density (pers/km2) 1 196,419 2018 4555 3804 1961 Rural (vs. Urban) 0 1 0.200 0.403 0.022 0.209 Note: HAPs= hazardous air pollutants; HH = household, NH = non-Hispanic. 2.2. Dependent Variable We used the US Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA’s) 2011 National Air Toxics Assessment (NATA) database [44] to measure census tract-level cancer risks from HAP exposure. These data have been in used in high-tier environmental health studies [45,46]. Figure 3 depicts cancer risks in US tracts and shows that the southeastern US is the geographical region with the greatest burden, and that urban areas also experience greater burden. We used 2011 NATA data, even though the next wave of data (2014) have been released. This is because 2011 is a better match than 2014 is with the 2010 Census, from which we draw our control variables. The NATA includes substances that are identified in the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990. A multi-step methodology is used to generate estimates of cancer risk [44]. Inputs on HAP emissions in the NATA come from the 2011 National Emissions Inventory, the Mercury and Air Toxics Rule (MATS) test data, the Toxics Release Inventory, and state, local and tribal agencies’ emissions inventories. The 2011 NATA estimates potential cumulative risks to public health from exposure to 71 HAPS from mobile and stationary sources known to cause cancer. The cancer risk score is a measure of the number of residents living in a census tract that would be diagnosed with cancer due to continuous HAP exposure throughout their life, per million residents, above and beyond the cancer rate for an unexposed population. Although cancer risk scores are quantified in terms of lifetime exposure, few people live in the same census tract for an entire lifetime. Therefore, the scores provide estimates of current risks associated with HAP exposures at the census tract level, with higher scores corresponding to greater health concerns. Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2019, 16, 4899 8 of 16 Figure 3. Cancer risks from hazardous air pollutants, 2011 (data source: 2011 National Air Toxics Assessment (NATA)). 2.3. Statistical Methods We first conducted an independent samples difference of means t-test to compare mean cancer risk scores between enclave and non-enclave tracts. Then, we used two generalized estimating equations (GEEs) with robust covariance estimates. The first uses the overall Arab enclave variables to predict cancer risk scores, net of the effect of the control variables. The second substitutes the Arab enclave indicator for the seven specific Arab ethnic origin enclave variables. The findings from the two models are complementary. The first model provides a general picture of exposure in Arab enclaves. While the second model examines specific origin groups, those results do not replace the first model results, given that the overall Arab indicator includes many people that are not members of the seven specific groups included in the second model. GEEs extend the generalized linear model to the analysis of clustered data, and they relax several assumptions of traditional regression models, including normality of variable distribution [47–49]; see Zorn [50]. In order to fit a GEE, clusters of observations must be specified. We defined clusters using 2009–2013 ACS five-year estimates for median year of housing construction (using the provided categories: “2000 or later”, “1990 to 1999”, “1980 to 1989”, “1970 to 1979”, “1960 to 1969”, “1950 to 1959”, “1940 to 1949”, and “1939 or earlier”) by US county (n = 3101). This produced 10,455 clusters with a range of 1 to 749 tracts per cluster. This cluster definition method was selected because it corresponds with spatial and temporal dimensions of the built environment that are associated with the historical-geographical formation of environmental injustice [51]. GEEs require the specification of an intracluster dependency correlation matrix [47,48]. In this case, we specified the exchangeable correlation matrix, which assumes constant intracluster dependency, such that all the off-diagonal elements of the correlation matrix are equal. To select the best fitting models, we estimated a series of GEEs by varying the model specifications. We tested normal, gamma, and inverse Gaussian distributions with logarithmic and identity link functions, which are appropriate options for our dependent variable, which is positively- scaled, continuous, and non-normally distributed. We present results from GEEs with inverse Gaussian and identity link functions, given that this was the best fitting specification based on quasi- likelihood under the independence model criterion (QIC) values. An identity link function means the relationships are predicted directly, without transformation [52]. The quasi-likelihood estimating equations have the general form: 𝜕𝜇 𝜕𝛽 𝑣 𝜇 𝑦 − 𝜇 𝛽 = 0, where 𝜇 = 𝑔 𝑋 𝜷 is the link function with g = identity, the distribution of 𝑦 is inverse Gaussian, and the GEE estimator (𝜷) is the solution to these equations. The resulting covariance of the GEE is given by: Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2019, 16, 4899 9 of 16 𝑉 , = 𝑛 𝑫𝒊𝑽𝒊 𝟏𝑫𝒊 𝑫𝒊𝑽𝒊 𝟏𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝒀𝒊)𝑽𝒊 𝟏𝑫𝒊 𝑫𝒊𝑽𝒊 𝟏𝑫𝒊 , and is assumed to be compound symmetric [17]. The continuous variables were standardized before entry into the models. Models do not suffer from multicollinearity problems, as condition index scores were all under 2.5. For the sensitivity analysis, we ran the same two GEE models, substituting the continuous proportion variables for the dichotomous enclave variables. 3. Results Table 3 presents findings from the t-test analysis. There are significant differences in cancer risk scores between Arab ethnic enclaves and non-enclaves, with the exception of Lebanese enclaves, which have statistically similar risk to non-enclaves. Overall, residents of Arab enclaves have mean cancer risk scores of 44.08 as compared to 40.02 in non-enclave tracts. In terms of the specific origin groups, Moroccan enclaves had the highest cancer risk score (46.93), followed by Egyptian (45.33), and Iraqi (43.13) enclaves. Lebanese (40.65) and Jordanian (41.67) enclaves fall on the low end for cancer risk scores among the groups under study. Table 4A shows that Arab enclaves have significantly higher cancer risk scores than non- enclaves (p < 0.001). Table 4B shows results from the second model. There were three significant enclave findings (p < 0.01): for Iraqi, Palestinian, and Lebanese enclaves. The finding for Moroccan enclaves approached significance (p < 0.10). Table 3. Results of independent samples difference of means t-test comparing cancer risks between enclave and non-enclave tracts (n = 70,733 tracts). Ethnic Origin Group N (Tracts) Mean Cancer Risk Score p Arab Enclave 2180 44.079 <0.001 Non-enclave 68,553 40.019 Egyptian Enclave 641 45.334 <0.001 Non-enclave 70,092 40.096 Iraqi Enclave 303 43.127 <0.001 Non-enclave 70,430 40.131 Lebanese Enclave 1590 40.651 0.08 Non-enclave 69143 40.132 Jordanian Enclave 350 41.672 0.022 Non-enclave 70,383 40.136 Palestinian Enclave 402 42.003 0.003 Non-enclave 70,331 40.133 Syrian Enclave 312 42.213 0.001 Non-enclave 70,421 40.135 Moroccan Enclave 409 46.927 <0.001 Non-enclave 70,324 40.104 Tabular results from the sensitivity analysis are shown in the Supplemental Material. These results revealed that using enclave variables was a more conservative approach to determining disproportionate risk than using proportion variables. Proportion Arab was positive and significant (p <0.001), as was the Arab enclave variable in the parallel (first) GEE in Table 4A. But in the second GEE, six of the seven proportion Arab ethnic origin variables were positive and significantly (p < 0.05) related to greater cancer risk scores, with the exception of proportion Syrian (p = 0.133). In the parallel model using enclave variables in Table 4B, three of the seven were significant (p < 0.05). Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2019, 16, 4899 10 of 16 Table 4. GEE results for model using Arab enclave (A) and specific Arab origins (B) variables to predict total cancer risks from HAPs (n = 70,733 tracts). A B B (Std. Error) Lower 95% CI Upper 95% CI Sig. B (Std. Error) Lower 95% CI Upper 95% CI Sig. Intercept 40.719 (0.1580) 40.409 41.028 <0.001 40.713 (0.1583) 40.403 41.024 <0.001 Median HH Income −0.218 (0.0584) −0.332 −0.104 <0.001 −0.221 (0.0585) −0.336 −0.107 <0.001 Prop. Hispanic 0.904 (0.0955) 0.717 1.091 <0.001 0.902 (0.0954) 0.715 1.089 <0.001 Prop. Black, NH 2.152 (0.1219) 1.913 2.391 <0.001 2.151 (0.1218) 1.912 2.390 <0.001 Prop. Am. Ind., NH −0.339 (0.0337) −0.405 −0.273 <0.001 −0.339 (0.0337) −0.405 −0.273 <0.001 Prop. Asian, NH 1.139 (0.1087) 0.926 1.352 <0.001 1.149 (0.1096) 0.934 1.364 <0.001 Prop. Pacif. Isl. NH −0.001 (0.0567) −0.112 0.111 0.992 −0.001 (0.0568) −0.112 0.111 0.988 Prop. Other, NH −0.001 (0.0602) −0.118 0.118 0.999 0.003 (0.0607) −0.115 0.122 0.954 Rural −5.416 (0.1273) −5.666 −5.167 <0.001 −5.415 (0.1274) −5.665 −5.166 <0.001 Pop. Density 6.939 (0.4146) 6.126 7.751 <0.001 6.923 (0.4146) 6.110 7.736 <0.001 Enclave Variables Arab 1.153 (0.1578) 0.844 1.462 <0.001 Egyptian 0.258 (0.2377) −0.208 0.724 0.278 Iraqi 1.126 (0.3876) 0.366 1.886 0.004 Jordanian 0.223 (0.2268) −0.222 0.667 0.326 Lebanese 0.599 (0.1481) 0.309 0.890 <0.001 Moroccan 0.604 (0.3542) −0.090 1.298 0.088 Palestinian 1.090 (0.2874) 0.527 1.654 <0.001 Syrian 0.408 (0.3654) −0.308 1.124 0.264 Note: Continuous variables are standardized. Models use inverse gaussian distributions with identity link functions and exchangeable correlation matrix; GEE = generalized estimating equation; HAPs= hazardous air pollutants; HH = household, NH = non-Hispanic. . Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2019, 16, 4899 11 of 16 Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2019, 16, x; doi: FOR PEER REVIEW www.mdpi.com/journal/ijerph 4. Discussion Those living in Arab American enclaves in the US experience higher cancer risk scores due to HAPs than those living elsewhere. In terms of the extent of the exposure, Arab enclaves have mean scores of 44.08 (Table 3). This is higher than the US national average of 40.01 and similar, but just above, the value for Hispanic Americans (43.46), as per population-weighted cancer risk scores [4]. This elevated cancer risk score for Arab enclaves is notable as Arab American individuals earn, on average, $4500 more per year than the average American [23]. The scores for Moroccan enclaves (46.93) are higher than the scores for Black (45.64) and Asian (44.39) Americans, which were reported in Grineski et al. [4]. Even the Lebanese enclaves, which have the lowest cancer risk scores of enclaves studied (40.65), still have a score that is above the national average. In the bivariate (Table 3) and multivariate (Table 4A) models, residence in an Arab enclave was associated with increased cancer risk. These findings suggest a heightened risk for those living in Arab American enclaves in the US. These risks, especially in the bivariate model, connect to the urban locations of these enclaves. In the US, 94% of Arab Americans live in metropolitan areas, with concentrations representing one-third of the US Arab population in New York, California, and Michigan [24]. However, given that the multivariate models control for urban context, with the inclusion of population density and a rural–urban indicator, risks in Arab enclaves persist even when accounting for their urban locations, suggesting that urban residence is not the only driver of disparate risk. Arab Americans’ status as a racialized minority may also relate to understanding the risks of living in an Arab enclave. Racialization is the term used to describe the processes of how Arabs are denied access to Whiteness [53]. These processes include rejection from social membership or belonging, acquiring the status of an enemy within, and being viewed as inherently violent and oppressive to women [25]. We must note that it is problematic to write about a universal Arab experience with race because some Arabs pass as White and enjoy privileges of Whiteness, while others do not [53]. Arab Muslims are more likely to self-identify as “other race” even though they are classified as White by the US Census, while Arab Christians are more likely to self-identify as racially White [54]. In other studies of EJ in the US using census/ACS data, many persons of Arab background would be included only as part of the White group, and Whites generally experience environmental privileges and reduced exposure to hazards [34,51]. This speaks to the need for a separate category in the Census and ACS to capture this population, so as to be better able to recognize and understand the injustices they face. The fact that those living in Arab American enclaves experience environmental injustices in the US is another aspect of Arab American socio-spatial marginalization, which also includes discrimination in the workplace, degrading representations in the media, and victimization through hate crimes [30]. The effects of these environmental injustices experienced by residents of Arab enclaves likely interact with these other experiences of injustices. Arab Americans that live in ethnic enclaves report more frequent discrimination than those living elsewhere [43]. Muslim Arab Americans and those who identify as non-White also experience greater discrimination [43]. However, the effects of discrimination were greater in terms of increased psychological distress for Christian Arab Americans, those who racially identify as White, and who live outside the ethnic enclave [43]. While other studies examining environmental injustices within the White American population have found Whiteness to be protective even in the face of socioeconomic marginality [16,18], we did not find that living in Arab American enclaves is protective against residential environmental exposure, even for the most socioeconomically advantaged Arab group under study—the Lebanese. In our multivariate model (Table 4B), Lebanese enclaves were associated with significantly greater cancer risks. In the bivariate model, Lebanese enclaves did not have significantly elevated cancer risks with respect to non-enclaves, suggesting that their risk emerges once we account for urban– rural context, population density, median household income, and other factors. Lebanese are a relatively socially advantaged Arab group. Approximately half are Christian. As per the 2006–2010 Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2019, 16, 4899 12 of 16 ACS, their homeownership rate is above the national average, at 71% [23], and Lebanese households have the highest median income ($67,264) of all Arab groups covered in the ACS [23]. The majority of immigrants from Lebanon (71%) entered before 2000 [55]. Geographically, enclaves (as shown in Figure 2) are predominant in most major US cities (e.g., Los Angeles, San Fran, Seattle, Portland, Phoenix, Albuquerque, Dallas, Austin, Houston, Minneapolis-St Paul, Chicago, Detroit, Boston, Philadelphia, New York, Washington DC, Miami, Tampa, Orlando, and Atlanta). Other specific origin enclaves also experienced significantly heightened cancer risk scores. In the multivariate model (Table 4B), Iraqi enclaves were associated with significantly greater scores, as compared to non-Iraqi enclaves. Based on data presented in Figure 2, Iraqi enclaves are present in Detroit, New York, Washington DC, the San Francisco Bay Area, Chicago, East St. Louis, San Diego, Seattle, Phoenix, and Dallas. Iraqi Americans are a socioeconomically marginalized group: Iraqis have the lowest median income ($32,075) among the Arab groups in the 2006–2010 ACS, and their homeownership rates are 45%, compared to the US average of 67% [23]. Palestinian enclaves were also associated with significantly greater cancer risk scores (Table 4B). While the largest Palestinian population is in California, the greatest concentration of Palestinians can be found in Illinois [24]. Based on data presented in Figure 2, numerous Palestinian enclaves are present in the San Francisco Bay Area, Los Angeles, San Diego, Miami, Tampa, Chicago, Dallas, Detroit, Cleveland, Washington DC, New York, New Jersey City/Newark, Trenton, and Baltimore. While over 90% of Palestinians practice Islam in Palestine, that percentage is smaller among US- migrants. A multimodal survey in English and Arabic (n = 240) conducted in the 1980s found that 25% of the Palestinian community in the US were Christian, and 73% were Muslim [56]. Palestinians have the highest levels of education in the Middle East, and this is reflected in the statistics for US migrants. The survey showed that the college graduation rate for Palestinians in the US was twice the US average [56]. Based on the 2006–2010 ACS, median household income for Palestinians is $55,950, which is above the US average ($51,914), and their homeownership rates are 59.6%, which is 6% below the national average [23]. In spite of some socioeconomic advantages, our multivariate model still revealed disparate environmental health risks for this group. The Moroccan enclave coefficient was nearly significant in the multivariate model (Table 4B), and Moroccan enclaves had the highest cancer risk scores among all enclaves under study in the bivariate analysis (Table 3). Moroccans tend to be socioeconomically marginalized, relative to other Arab groups and average Americans. Moroccan homeownership rates (36.9%) are 30% under the US national average [23]. Moroccans have the second-lowest median household income ($44,521) as compared to the other Arab groups, which is approximately $7400 under the national average, according to 2006–2010 ACS data [23]. In Morocco, Islam is the state religion, and many Moroccan Americans are Muslim. Based on data presented in Figure 2, Moroccan enclaves are present in Minneapolis-St. Paul, Los Angeles, the San Francisco Bay Area, Phoenix, Houston, New York, New Jersey City/Newark, Trenton, Baltimore, Boston, Hartford, Miami, Tampa, and Orlando. The environmental injustices for residents of Arab American enclaves, including those enclaves home to the most social advantaged Arabs (i.e., the Lebanese and Palestinians), may reflect the reality of Arab as a racialized identity, connected to the practice of Islam. Apart from racialization, an element of Shari’a (Islamic law) may also lead Muslims to less expensive and; therefore, more polluted neighborhoods. Owning a home is central to the American dream, yet the Qur’an prohibits payment of interest, which places conventional home financing out of reach for observant Muslims [57]. This may lead relatively well-heeled Muslim Arab Americans seeking to own a home to purchase lower-value homes, since they would need to pay outright. While companies have begun to provide Islamically-acceptable mortgage-based securities, the majority of devout Muslims do not take out home loans [57]. Needing to purchase less expensive homes would exclude Muslim Americans from elite US neighborhoods and push them toward lower-class neighborhoods, which are more likely to contain pollution-generating activities. Of the groups that emerged as having elevated cancer risk scores in the GEE (i.e., Iraqi, Lebanese, Palestinian, see Table 4B), this process is likely most relevant for US Palestinians, who are namely Islamic, from higher SES backgrounds, and have lower than average homeownership rates [23,56]. Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2019, 16, 4899 13 of 16 While the US Census and ACS do not collect information on religion, our findings for Arab ethnic origin enclaves are likely bound up with Islam. While the majority of US Arabs do not practice Islam, the vast majority of Arabs in the Middle East do [27]. Certainly, American public discourse and conventional wisdom surrounding Islam and Arabs are not nuanced enough to support popular recognition of the facts that there are Arabs who are not Muslim, that there are Muslims who are not Arab, and that US Arabs are much more likely to be Christian than Muslim. The three other studies looking at religion and EJ have examined contextually dominant religious groups [34,41,58]. They have found that environmental inequalities based on religion are not driven by affiliation with specific religions, but rather by the power of contextually-dominant religious groups to garner protective resources and externalize risks, such that other groups experience disproportionate environmental burdens [34]. In the case of Arab American enclaves in the US, their environmental marginality seems intimately linked to their (real and mostly perceived) connection with Islam and racialization as “other”. Collins and Grineski [34] hypothesized that Muslims in the US would face heightened exposure to environmental hazards, but that question has never been directly investigated. This analysis of Arab American enclaves leads us to hypothesize that, indeed, Muslims will experience environmental injustices in the US that would be even more extreme than those for Arab Americans as a group. This hypothesis is premised on the reality that Muslim Arab Americans face more discrimination than Christian Arabs in the US [43], that Islam places limits on homeownership opportunities for the devout [57], and anti-Muslim sentiment and policy in the US is currently a hegemonic force. Limitations Due to concerns about error in ACS estimates [59], it has been recommended to calculate coefficients of variation (calculated by dividing the error surrounding the estimate by the estimate) and then to remove tracts with high values [60]. Unfortunately, that was not practical here since the majority of tracts had small counts of Arab Americans. Given that we conducted our analysis at the census tract-level, we are limited in that we cannot generate inferences about individuals, as doing so would commit the ecological fallacy. Being that 34% of Arab Americans live in enclaves (as defined in this paper), the presented results pertain only to that group. However, the sensitivity analysis revealed that increasing proportions of Arab Americans in census tracts were also significantly associated with greater cancer risks, suggesting that the relationships are not restricted only to enclaves. There are also important limitations with the NATA cancer risk scores. Those scores are based only on risks from direct inhalation of HAPs, and they exclude exposure from ingestion and skin contact. Cancer risk scores also only include individual and additive health effects; synergistic interactions among pollutants are unmeasured. The assessment does not include exposure to HAPs generated indoors. Additionally, interpretation of the public health implications of the disproportionate cancer risks from HAPs quantified here should be tempered, as the NATA offers a cumulative lifetime exposure measure, yet we know that people do not remain in their 2010 census tracts of residence throughout their lifetimes [42]. 5. Conclusions This paper revealed significant environmental injustices based on residence in Arab American enclaves. This is the first time such environmental health risks have been highlighted for Arab Americans. Therefore, additional studies are needed to confirm this pattern using alternative datasets and methods. We believe that Arab Americans’ lack of minority status may result in other invisible disparities, besides the residential exposure to HAPs in ethnic enclaves reported in this paper, which had been largely concealed by a lack of data and recognition. If confirmed in future work, findings like these can be practically useful to Arab American communities fighting environmental health hazards in their neighborhoods. The struggle for environmental justice in Black and Hispanic communities has occurred through collaborations between community leaders, neighbors, and academic researchers [35]. Academic studies documenting environmental injustices have been Int. J. Environ. Res. 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work_faqzka55zjd5ncln2stfdxomlm	----	MARCKSlevelswouldbeincreasedinBALcelllysatesfromhorseswith EAS,andthatinhibitionofMARCKSinzymosan-stimulatedBALcells (ex vivo) would diminish respiratory burst. METHODS/STUDY POPULATION: Lysates were prepared from BAL cells isolated from horseswithno,mild/moderateandsevereEAS.RelativeMARCKSpro- tein levels were determined using equine specific MARCKS ELISA (MyBioSource). Cultured BAL cells were pretreated with a MARCKS inhibitor peptide (MANS), control peptide (RNS) or vehicle control and stimulated with zymosan for 5 hours. Reactive oxygenspe- cies levels were determined by luminescence to evaluate respiratory burst. Data were analyzed by One-way ANOVA (p<0.05). RESULTS/ANTICIPATED RESULTS: We determined that normal- ized MARCKS protein expression is significantly increased in BAL cell lysates from horses with mild/moderate or severe EAS, compared to horses with normal BAL cytology. Preliminary findings also suggest that MANS treatment of zymosan-stimulated equine BAL cells ex vivo attenuateslevelsrespiratoryburst.DISCUSSION/SIGNIFICANCEOF IMPACT: These findings point to a possible role for MARCKS protein in the pathophysiology of EAS and support MARCKS inhibition as a potential therapeutic strategy. 4377 Missed Opportunities to Prevent Homicide: An Analysis of the National Violent Death Reporting System Justin Cirone1, Jennifer Cone1, Brian Williams1, David Hampton1, Priya Prakash1, and Tanya Zakrison1 1University of Chicago OBJECTIVES/GOALS: The goal of this study is to better understand the homicide victim population who were institutionalized within 30 days prior to their death. Improved knowledge of this population can potentially prevent these future homicides. METHODS/STUDY POPULATION: A retrospective analysis of the 36 states included in the 2003-2017 National Violent Death Reporting System was per- formed. Demographics of recently institutionalized homicide vic- tims (RIHV) in the last 30 days were compared to homicide victims who were not recently institutionalized. Circumstances of the homicide, such as suspected gang involvement, were also com- pared. Parametric and non-parametric statistical analyses were per- formed. Significance was set at p<0.05. RESULTS/ANTICIPATED RESULTS: There were 81,229 homicides with 992 (1.2%) RIHV. The majority of RIHV were Black (49.6%) and older than victims who were not recently institutionalized (37.2 vs. 34.8, p<0.001). RIHV had a high school degree or higher in 54.8% of cases and the primary homicide weapon was a firearm in 67% of the deaths. They were more likely to be homeless (3.1% vs. 1.5%), have a mental health diagnosis (9.2% vs. 2.3%), abuse alcohol (6.1% vs. 2.2%), or abuse other substances (15.2% vs. 5.8%) [all p <0.001]. These victims were most commonly institutionalized in a correctional facility or a hospital compared to other facilities such as nursing homes. Homicide circumstances for RIHV were more likely to involve abuse/neglect (4.3% vs. 2.2%, p<0.001), gang violence (7.6% vs. 5.6%, p = 0.002), or a hate crime (1.0% vs. 0.1%. p<0.001). DISCUSSION/SIGNIFICANCE OF IMPACT: Contact with an institution such as a hospital or prison provides high-risk patients the opportunity to potentially participate in violence intervention programs. These institutions should seek to identify and intervene on this population to reduce the risk of violent homicides. 4141 Molecular Signatures of Cocaine Toxicity in Postmortem Human Brain and Neurons Emily Frances Mendez1, Laura Stertz1, Gabriel Fries1, Ruifeng Hu1, Thomas Meyer1, Zhongming Zhao1, and Consuelo Walss-Bass1 1The University of Texas Health Science Center at Houston OBJECTIVES/GOALS: The goal of this project is to identify new therapeutic targets and biomarkers to treat or prevent cocaine tox- icity by investigating proteomic, transcriptomic and epigenetic sig- natures of cocaine exposure in human subjects. METHODS/ STUDY POPULATION: Cocaine is a highly addictive neurotoxic substance, and it is estimated that 1.9 million Americans are current users of cocaine. To study the molecular effects of cocaine, we gen- erated preliminary proteomics and next-generation RNA sequencing (RNAseq) data from human postmortem dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (Broadmann area 9 or BA9) of 12 cocaine-exposed subjects and 17 controls. Future directions for this project include RNAseq and DNA methylation analysis of neuronal nuclei sorted from human postmortem BA9 and a human induced pluripotent stem cell-derived neuron (hiPSN) model of cocaine exposure from the same postmortem subjects from whom we have brain samples. RESULTS/ANTICIPATED RESULTS: We found alterations in neu- ronal synaptic protein levels and gene expression, including the sero- tonin transporter SLC6A4, and synaptic proteins SNAP25, SYN2, SYNGR3. Pathway analysis of our results revealed alterations in spe- cific pathways involved with neuronal function including voltage- gated calcium channels, and GABA receptor signaling. In the future, we expect to see an enhancement in neuron-specific gene expression signatures in our sorted neuronal nuclei and our hiPSN model of cocaine exposure. The hiPSN model will help elucidate which effects are due to acute versus chronic exposure of cocaine. DISCUSSION/ SIGNIFICANCE OF IMPACT: Neuronal signatures found with this analysis can help us understand mechanisms of cognitive decline in long-term cocaine users as well as the acute effects on the brain of cocaine taken in overdose. With this work and future proposed stud- ies, we can discover novel clinical biomarkers for cocaine neurotox- icity in patients with cocaine use disorder and determine readouts for future therapeutic development on cocaine addiction and overdose. 4488 Neural Network of the Cognitive Model of Reading† Joseph Posner1, Vivian Dickens, Andrew DeMarco, Sarah Snider, Peter Turkeltaub, and Rhonda Friedman 1Georgetown - Howard Universities OBJECTIVES/GOALS: A particularly debilitating consequence of stroke is alexia, an acquired impairment in reading. Cognitive mod- els aim to characterize how information is processed based on behav- ioral data. If we can concurrently characterize how neural networks process that information, we can enhance the models to reflect the neuronal interactions that drive them. METHODS/STUDY POPULATION: There will be 10 unimpaired adult readers. Two functional localizer tasks, deigned to consistently activate robust lan- guage areas, identify the regions of interest that process the cognitive reading functions (orthography, phonology, semantics). Another task, designed for this experiment, analyses the reading-related 140 JCTS 2020 Abstract Supplement https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/cts.2020.415 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:22, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/cts.2020.415 https://www.cambridge.org/core functional-connectivity between these areas by presenting words classified along the attributes of frequency, concreteness, and regu- larity, which utilize specific cognitive routes, and a visual control. Connectivity is analyzed during word reading overall vs. a control condition to determine overall reading-related connectivity, and while reading words that have high vs. low attribute values, to deter- mine if cognitive processing routes bias the neural reading network connectivity. RESULTS/ANTICIPATED RESULTS: The localizer analysis is expected to result in the activation of canonical reading areas. The degree of functional connectivity observed between these regions is expected to depend on the degree to which each cognitive route is utilized to read a given word. After orthographic, phonologic, and semantic areas have been identified, the connectivity analysis should show that there is high correlation between all three types of areas during reading compared to the control condition. Then the frequency, regularity, and concreteness of the words being read should alter the reliance on the pathways between these area types. This would support the hypothesized pattern of connectivity as pre- dicted by the cognitive reading routes. Otherwise, it will show how the neural reading network differs from the cognitive model. DISCUSSION/SIGNIFICANCE OF IMPACT: The results will deter- mine the relationship between the cognitive reading model and the neural reading network. Cognitive models show what processes occur in the brain, but neural networks show how these processes occur. By relating these components, we obtain a more complete view of reading in the brain, which can inform future alexia treatments. 4341 Neuroclinical fingerprints of risk for psychosis: Profiles of neurophysiology, symptom severity, and cognitive function Keisha Novak1, Sam Buck1, Roman Kotov2, and Dan Foti1 1Purdue University; 2Stony Brook University OBJECTIVES/GOALS: The study aims to utilize event-related potentials (ERPs) coupled with observable reports of symptoms to comprehensively understand neurological and symptomatic profile of individuals at risk for developing psychosis. The study is a short- term longitudinal design which allows for examination of course as well as structure of illness. METHODS/STUDY POPULATION: This study uses a combination of well-validated ERPs (P300, N400, ERN) and symptom data to predict variation in symptoms over time. We parse heterogeneity within a high-risk group to create innovative profiles and predict variation in course of symptoms. Data collection is ongoing (n = 35; target N = 100). Methods include a battery of ERP tasks tracking neural processes associated with attention, language processing, and executive function (P300, N400, ERN), along with assessment of symptom type and severity. Analyses include how ERPs correlate with severity of risk and symp- tom dimensions (positive, negative, disorganized). We examine whether individual versus global ERP aberrations (P300, N400, ERN) predict individual versus global symptom domain severity (positive, negative, disorganized), or vice versa. RESULTS/ ANTICIPATED RESULTS: Symptom domain scores were elevated compared to general population on positive (M = 1.65, SD = .36), negative (M = 1.9 SD = .42), and depressive (M = 1.94, SD = .40) domains. Small to medium effect sizes emerged for P300 profile (r’s = −.001 to −.41) and ERN profile (r’s = −.03 to −.37), though small effect sizes for N400 profile (r’s = −.06 to .29). Analyses were run to determine the degree to which profiles of risk were similar: P300/ERN (r = −.09), ERN/N400 (r = −.39), and N400/P3 (r = −.20). Additional analyses suggest potential mediating effects of cognition on neural activity and symptoms. DISCUSSION/ SIGNIFICANCE OF IMPACT: We use a combination of well-vali- dated ERPs (i.e. P300, N400, ERN) with behavioral and symptom data to predict variation in symptoms over time. A “fingerprint” physiologic aberration may be exhibited within high-risk individuals and can be used as biomarkers to identify those at risk even before onset of observable symptoms. 4532 Pancreatic Cyst Risk Stratification for Early Detection of Pancreatic Cancer Using Quantitative Radiomics and Activity-Based Biomarkers Sophia Hernandez1, Andre Luiz Lourenco, Evan Calabrese, Tyler York, Alexa Glencer, Spencer Behr, Zhen Jane Wang, Eugene Koay, Charles Craik, and Kimberly Kirkwood 1University Of California, San Francisco OBJECTIVES/GOALS: Pancreatic cysts are comprised ofboth precan- cerous mucinous lesions and non-mucinous lesions with minimal malignant potential. Our goal is to improve our ability to classify the type of cyst using a combination of novel radiomic features and cyst fluid proteolytic activity. METHODS/STUDY POPULATION: Preoperative pancreatic protocol CT images from 30 patients with proteolytic assay characterization, followed by surgical resection with a pathologically confirmed pancreatic cyst diagnosis between 2016- 2019will be usedinthisstudy.We will contour imagesusing thewidely available software 3D Slicer, and extract radiomic features using IBEX software. We will analyze area under the ROC curves to identify the radiomicfeatures thatbestdifferentiatemucinousfromnon-mucinous cysts,andidentifyfeaturestobecrossvalidated.Thepredictiveabilityof identified radiomic features combined with proteolytic assay will be determined by performing multiple logistic regression analysis and comparing AUROC analysis. We will determine sensitivity and speci- ficity for individual, as well as combinations of, analytes to determine the optimal classifier. RESULTS/ANTICIPATED RESULTS: We anticipate that the predictive ability, sensitivity, and specificity of uti- lizing radiomic features combined with proteolytic assay data will exceed the performance of any individual test. DISCUSSION/ SIGNIFICANCE OFIMPACT:This work isdesignedto provide a pre- dictive radiomic model that will enable us to better identify mucinous cysts that require further evaluation, and potentially prevent unneces- sary surgery inother patients. Ultimately, we would like to improve the accuracyofnoninvasive radiographicevaluation using radiomicmark- ers.CONFLICTOFINTERESTDESCRIPTION:Dr.CharlesCraikisa co-founder of Alaunus Biosciences, Inc. 4340 Piloting Implementation and Dissemination of Best Practice Guidelines Using BPMþHealth James McClay, MD, MS, FACEP, FAMIA1, and Pawan Goyal2 1University of Nebraska Medical Center - Great Plains IDeA-CTR; 2American College of Emergency Physicians OBJECTIVES/GOALS: Clinical translational studies inform clinical practice patterns through dissemination of clinical practice guidelines (CPG). In EM practices change to rapidly for timely local EHR imple- mentation. We test the OMG BPMþHealth specification for rapid deployment of best practices relevant to EM. METHODS/STUDY JCTS 2020 Abstract Supplement 141 https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/cts.2020.415 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:22, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/cts.2020.415 https://www.cambridge.org/core 
work_fe5dphsjuverrfz7jpmhvbrjie	----	CTL: Sunset 1-212-854-1692 ColumbiaCTL@columbia.edu Columbia University in the City of New York OFFICE of the PROVOST University Policies Academic Calendar Columbia Online Office of the Vice Provost for Teaching and Learning We're Sorry The Wikischolars.com website that you are trying to access is no longer available. The Wikischolars platform was closed by the provider, Tangient LLC. For course-related Wikischolars sites, please contact us at ColumbiaCTL@columbia.edu or call our support number 1-212-854-1692. For all other Wikischolars sites, please contact help-wiki@columbia.edu. Sign Up Join the mailing list to get updates from the CTL. Meet with Us Set up a one-on-one consultation session. Visit Us 212 Butler Library 535 West 114th Street New York, NY 10027 Contact Us ColumbiaCTL@columbia.edu 212-854-1692 
work_fee4dcy2bnfybic66z3zjahami	----	Resident Physician Experiences With and Responses to Biased Patients Original Investigation | Medical Education Resident Physician Experiences With and Responses to Biased Patients Shalila S. de Bourmont, BS; Arun Burra, BA; Sarah S. Nouri, MD, MPH; Neveen El-Farra, MD; Dinushika Mohottige, MD; Caroline Sloan, MD; Sarah Schaeffer, MD, MPH; Jodi Friedman, MD; Alicia Fernandez, MD Abstract IMPORTANCE Biased patient behavior negatively impacts resident well-being. Data on the prevalence and frequency of these encounters are lacking and are needed to guide the creation of institutional trainings and policies to support trainees. OBJECTIVE To evaluate the frequency of resident experiences with and responses to a range of biased patient behaviors. DESIGN, SETTING, AND PARTICIPANTS A retrospective survey was sent via email to 331 second- and third-year internal medicine residents from 3 academic medical centers in California and North Carolina. First-year residents were excluded owing to their limited interactions with patients at the time of participant recruitment. Data were collected from August 21 to November 25, 2019. MAIN OUTCOMES AND MEASURES Descriptive statistics were used to report the frequency of experience of various types of biased patient behavior, residents’ responses, the factors impeding residents’ responses, and residents’ experiences and beliefs regarding training and policies. RESULTS Overall, 232 of 331 residents (70%) participated; 116 (50%) were women; 116 of 247 (47%) were White (participants had the option of selecting >1 race/ethnicity); and 23 (10%) identified as lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, or queer. The frequency of resident-reported experience of types of biased patient behaviors varied. The most common behaviors—belittling comments and assumption of nonphysician status—were reported to be experienced 1 or more times per week by 14% of residents (32 of 231) and 17% of residents (38 of 230), respectively. Women, Black or Latinx, and Asian residents reported experiencing biased behavior more frequently. Forty-five percent of Black or Latinx residents (17 of 38) encountered instances of explicit epithets or rejection of care. All 70 Asian residents reported experiencing inquiries into their ethnic origins. Most women residents (110 of 115 [96%]) experienced role questioning behaviors, and 87% (100 of 115) experienced sexual harassment. The need to prioritize clinical care and a sense of futility in responding were the most common factors (cited by 34% of residents [76 of 227] and 25% of residents [56 of 227], respectively) significantly impeding responses to biased behaviors. Eighty-five percent of residents (191 of 226) never reported incidents to their institution. Eighty-nine percent of residents (206 of 232) identified training and policies as necessary or very necessary. CONCLUSIONS AND RELEVANCE This survey study suggests that biased patient behavior is experienced frequently by internal medicine residents. Non-White and women residents reported experiencing a disproportionate burden of these incidents. Residents’ responses rarely included institutional involvement. Residency programs and health care systems should prioritize training and policies to address biased patient behavior and support affected residents. JAMA Network Open. 2020;3(11):e2021769. doi:10.1001/jamanetworkopen.2020.21769 Key Points Question How often do resident physicians encounter incidents of biased patient behavior, and how do they respond? Findings In a survey study of 232 internal medicine residents from 3 institutions, biased patient behavior ranging from belittling comments to refusal of care was experienced or witnessed by nearly all residents. Forty- five percent of Black/Latinx residents experienced epithets or refusal of care, and most women (87%) experienced sexual harassment; however, most residents (84%) did not report these encounters to their institutional leadership. Meaning Given the high prevalence of biased patient behavior, residency programs that aim to foster inclusive training environments should implement resident and faculty training and create patient reporting mechanisms. + Invited Commentary + Supplemental content Author affiliations and article information are listed at the end of this article. Open Access. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the CC-BY License. JAMA Network Open. 2020;3(11):e2021769. doi:10.1001/jamanetworkopen.2020.21769 (Reprinted) November 23, 2020 1/11 Downloaded From: https://jamanetwork.com/ by a Carnegie Mellon University User on 04/05/2021 https://jama.jamanetwork.com/article.aspx?doi=10.1001/jamanetworkopen.2020.21769&utm_campaign=articlePDF%26utm_medium=articlePDFlink%26utm_source=articlePDF%26utm_content=jamanetworkopen.2020.21769 https://jama.jamanetwork.com/article.aspx?doi=10.1001/jamanetworkopen.2020.21770&utm_campaign=articlePDF%26utm_medium=articlePDFlink%26utm_source=articlePDF%26utm_content=jamanetworkopen.2020.21769 https://jama.jamanetwork.com/article.aspx?doi=10.1001/jamanetworkopen.2020.21769&utm_campaign=articlePDF%26utm_medium=articlePDFlink%26utm_source=articlePDF%26utm_content=jamanetworkopen.2020.21769 Introduction Patients who demean physicians on the basis of physicians’ social characteristics pose multiple clinical and ethical challenges.1,2 Biased patient behaviors arise when patients encounter physicians whose social identity (eg, race, ethnicity, or gender identity) is not compatible with their notion of a competent or appropriate health care professional. Biased patient behaviors can range from offensive quips to outright refusal of care3 and can exact a heavy psychological toll on physicians.2-9 It is possible that physicians’ encounters with biased patients have become more common in recent years: the health care workforce is increasingly diverse along multiple social dimensions, and the number of hate groups and hate crimes in the US has grown during the past 5 years, suggesting increased social polarization.10 Characterizing the nature and frequency of these occurrences may be particularly important for academic medical centers, as these incidents undermine learning for trainees and may result in delayed or suboptimal patient care.3,4 Data on the frequency of these occurrences among trainees—and even more so on physicians’ responses to them—are limited, as much of the literature consists of first-person physician accounts of interactions with racist patients or online surveys of practicing physicians.5-7,11-18 A recent national survey of general surgery residents reported that 43% of residents experienced discrimination on the basis of gender identity and 47% experienced racial/ethnic discrimination from patients or patients’ families.17 The same study also found that residents who experienced demeaning behavior were more likely to experience burnout and to have suicidal thoughts. In a qualitative study, internal medicine residents who encountered biased patients reported experiencing painful emotions including fear, self-doubt, exhaustion, and cynicism; residents who did not have these encounters reported moral distress and uncertainty about how to respond and support their colleagues when these situations arise.3 To create institutional policies to support and teach residents and faculty how to manage these challenging patient encounters, academic medical centers and medical educators need data on the frequency of specific types of biased patient behaviors as well as a better understanding of how resident experience may vary according to social characteristics, such as gender identity and race/ ethnicity. In addition, it is important to know how residents commonly respond to these behaviors and what individual, patient-related, or institutional elements factor into their decisions on how to respond. We conducted a survey of physician residents at 3 large, academic internal medicine residency programs to evaluate the frequency of resident experiences with and responses to a range of biased patient behaviors. Methods Study Setting and Participants We administered an electronic survey to second- and third-year internal medicine residents at 3 academic medical centers in California and North Carolina (University of California, San Francisco; University of California, Los Angeles; and Duke University). We collected data from August 21 to November 25, 2019. We excluded first-year residents owing to their limited interactions with patients at the time of participant recruitment. The institutional review boards at each site approved the study, and all participants provided written informed consent. This study followed the American Association for Public Opinion Research (AAPOR) reporting guideline.19 Survey Development We developed a survey with both multiple choice and open-ended questions based on prior qualitative research exploring the range of demeaning behaviors experienced by physicians and trainees, types of responses to such behavior, and barriers to responding.3 The survey was iteratively revised by the study team. We conducted cognitive testing with residents and faculty from the JAMA Network Open | Medical Education Resident Physician Experiences With and Responses to Biased Patients JAMA Network Open. 2020;3(11):e2021769. doi:10.1001/jamanetworkopen.2020.21769 (Reprinted) November 23, 2020 2/11 Downloaded From: https://jamanetwork.com/ by a Carnegie Mellon University User on 04/05/2021 https://www.aapor.org/Publications-Media/AAPOR-Journals/Standard-Definitions.aspx University of California, San Francisco Department of Medicine to assess the overall coherence, balance, and clarity of the survey. The full survey is available in the eAppendix in the Supplement. Survey Measures Experiences With Biased Patient Behaviors We asked participants to indicate how frequently they had directly experienced the following demeaning behaviors from patients: (1) belittling or demeaning stereotypes (belittling comments, inquiries into racial/ethnic origins, generalizations about social identity, confusing physician with team member of the same race/ethnicity, and nonverbal disrespect), (2) role questioning (credential questioning, assumption of nonphysician status, and addressing less experienced physician or student rather than the participant), (3) explicit epithets or rejection of care (epithets, refusal of care, and request to change physician), and (4) sexual harassment (verbal or nonverbal sexual advances or sexual harassment). Participants were provided the option to describe other demeaning behaviors not defined above. These behaviors are hereafter referred to as “biased patient behaviors.” Participants were asked to indicate how frequently patients targeted their own social identities (race/ethnicity or national identity, gender identity or expression, Muslim faith, non-Muslim faith, sexual orientation, and disability status) and how frequently they witnessed biased patient behavior targeting other physicians’ social identities. Response options were classified as never, sometimes (once to a few times per year), often (once to multiple times per month), or very often (at least once per week). Residents’ Responses to and Training on Biased Patient Behaviors We asked how residents respond to these biased patient behaviors (including types and frequencies of responses, barriers to responding, and confidence in responding), residents’ prior experience with training on how to respond to these behaviors, and the degree to which residents believe that training and institutional policies for guiding responses are necessary. We asked about specific responses (1-on-1 limit setting, debriefing with friends or family, debriefing with a team member, creating a team response plan, reporting to attending physician or chief resident, reporting to the institution, switching the patient to another team member, and not addressing the incident). In addition, we asked about the negative impact (from “no impact” to “significant impact”) of specific barriers on responding (prioritizing clinical care; feeling unsupported by the team, senior physicians, or institution; lack of knowledge or skills; perceived ineffectiveness or sense of futility in responding; and feeling emotionally overwhelmed). Participants could also describe other responses and barriers not defined above. Demographic Characteristics Participants were asked to report their clinical postgraduate year; gender identity; race/ethnicity; identification as lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, or queer (LGBTQ) or as another sexual or gender minority; and whether they were an immigrant to the US. Options were defined by the research team with an open field option for participants to describe demographics outside those listed. These demographic characteristics were collected to understand how residents’ experiences varied by social characteristics. Study Procedures Participants were emailed a link to an anonymous survey via Qualtrics. Follow-up reminder emails were sent to nonrespondents as needed by study authors as well as chief residents at each institution. Participants who completed the survey were emailed a gift card for $10.00 USD to Amazon. JAMA Network Open | Medical Education Resident Physician Experiences With and Responses to Biased Patients JAMA Network Open. 2020;3(11):e2021769. doi:10.1001/jamanetworkopen.2020.21769 (Reprinted) November 23, 2020 3/11 Downloaded From: https://jamanetwork.com/ by a Carnegie Mellon University User on 04/05/2021 https://jama.jamanetwork.com/article.aspx?doi=10.1001/jamanetworkopen.2020.21769&utm_campaign=articlePDF%26utm_medium=articlePDFlink%26utm_source=articlePDF%26utm_content=jamanetworkopen.2020.21769 Analysis We conducted descriptive analyses of (1) the prevalence of residents’ experiences with biased patient behaviors overall that were stratified by resident race/ethnicity and gender identity, (2) the frequency of behaviors targeting specific resident identities, (3) the frequency of witnessed biased patient behaviors targeting other residents’ identities, and (4) the types and frequencies of residents’ responses to biased patient behaviors. Because of small sample sizes, we combined participants who identified as Black and/or Latinx into 1 category (Black + Latinx) for analysis. In reporting the frequency of different categories of behaviors stratified by race/ethnicity and gender identity, we present means of the component behaviors of those categories. Two of us (A.B. and S.S.N.) independently reviewed all responses to open-ended questions about experiences with and responses to biased patient behavior and coded responses using grounded theory.20 The reviewers then met to reconcile discrepancies and define themes, which allowed identification of new categories of patient behavior and resident responses not defined in the survey. Results Participant Characteristics Of 331 residents, 232 (70%) responded to the survey. The response rate (using AAPOR Response Rate Calculation 2) was 70% at each of the 3 participating programs.19 Residents were diverse in gender identity and race/ethnicity (Table 1). Residents identifying as LGBTQ or another gender or sexual minority made up 10% of participants (23 of 232); 16% of participants (36 of 232) identified as immigrants to the US. Respondents were representative of the racial/ethnic and gender identity demographics of their residency programs as a whole. Prevalence of Types of Biased Behaviors Nearly all residents (228 of 232 [98%]) reported experiencing or witnessing biased behavior at least once in the past year. The frequency of specific biased patient behaviors varied (Table 2). A total of 14% of residents (32 of 231) experienced belittling comments at least once a week, 11% (25 of 230) experienced questioning of credentials or abilities, and 17% (38 of 230) experienced assumption of nonphysician status occurring at least once a week. Behaviors reported by one-third of participants as occurring at least once per month included belittling comments (87 of 230 [38%]), assertive inquiries into racial/ethnic origins (75 of 231 [33%]), generalizations about social identity (70 of 231 [30%]), and credential or ability questioning (77 of 230 [34%]). In contrast, epithets, refusal of care, and requests to change physicians were less common yet were experienced at least 1 to 3 times per year by 40% of residents (91 of 230), 30% of residents (69 of 230), and 27% of residents (61 of 229), respectively. Sexual harassment was also common and experienced at least 1 time per year by 60% of participants (138 of 230). Experiences with biased patient behavior were more common for residents who identified as women, Black or Latinx, and Asian (Figure). Most residents identifying as women (100 of 115 [87%]), Latinx or Black (29 of 38 [76%]), and Asian (43 of 70 [61%]) reported experiences of sexual harassment within the last year compared with 32% of those identifying as men (36 of 113) and 54% of those identifying as White (59 of 109) (Figure). In addition, 96% of women residents (110 of 115) reported encountering role-questioning behaviors at least once within the past year compared with 42% of male residents (47 of 113) (Figure). All 70 residents identifying as Asian reported experiencing inquiries into ethnic origins, and 99% (69 of 70) reported being confused with team members of the same race/ethnicity at least once within the past year (eTable 1 in the Supplement). All 115 residents identifying as women reported experiencing assumptions of nonphysician status at least once within the past year (eTable 1 in the Supplement). Experiences of refusal of care and requests to change physicians were more common among residents identifying as Black or Latinx—45% (17 of JAMA Network Open | Medical Education Resident Physician Experiences With and Responses to Biased Patients JAMA Network Open. 2020;3(11):e2021769. doi:10.1001/jamanetworkopen.2020.21769 (Reprinted) November 23, 2020 4/11 Downloaded From: https://jamanetwork.com/ by a Carnegie Mellon University User on 04/05/2021 https://jama.jamanetwork.com/article.aspx?doi=10.1001/jamanetworkopen.2020.21769&utm_campaign=articlePDF%26utm_medium=articlePDFlink%26utm_source=articlePDF%26utm_content=jamanetworkopen.2020.21769 https://jama.jamanetwork.com/article.aspx?doi=10.1001/jamanetworkopen.2020.21769&utm_campaign=articlePDF%26utm_medium=articlePDFlink%26utm_source=articlePDF%26utm_content=jamanetworkopen.2020.21769 38) reported encountering these behaviors within the last year compared with 28% of White- identifying residents (31 of 109) (Figure). In general, physicians reported witnessing all types of biased behavior more frequently than they reported directly experiencing it (eTable 2 in the Supplement). Biased patient behavior directed toward a physician’s race/ethnicity or national identity and gender identity or expression were witnessed very commonly, with 89% of residents (205 of 230) and 74% of residents (169 of 230), respectively, reporting having witnessed at least one instance within the past year. Behavior directed toward a physician’s sexual orientation and Islamic faith were also common, as 42% of residents (95 of 227) and 40% of residents (91 of 228), respectively, reported witnessing that behavior at least once within the past year (eTable 2 in the Supplement). Finally, content analysis of written responses did not reveal any additional types of biased behavior. Responses and Barriers to Responses In response to biased patient behavior, residents used strategies such as limit setting (67 of 227 [30%]), debriefing with friends or family (80 of 227 [35%]), and debriefing with team members (77 of 225 [34%]) most of the time or always (Table 3). Reporting biased patient behavior to the institution or switching the patient to another team member were uncommon: most residents reported never using those options (85% [191 of 226] and 78% [176 of 226], respectively). The factors with the greatest negative association with a resident’s ability to respond to biased behavior Table 1. Characteristics of Participants Characteristic Participants (N = 232) Institution, No. (%) 1 71 (31) 2 79 (34) 3 82 (35) Gender identity, No. (%) Man 113 (49) Woman 116 (50) Other 2 (1) Identify as LGBTQ or gender or sexual minority, No. (%) 23 (10) Race/ethnicity, No./total No. (%)a White 116/247 (47) Black or African American 13/247 (5) Hispanic or Latinx 27/247 (11) Asian 72/247 (29) Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander 3/247 (1) Native American or Alaska Native 1/247 (0.4) Other 15/247 (6) Immigrant to the US, No. (%) 36 (16) Year of residency, No. (%) PGY-2 131 (57) PGY-3 101 (44) Prior training on patient bias during residency, No. (%) None 44 (19) <1 h 49 (21) 1-2 h 94 (41) >2 h 45 (19) Prior training on patient bias during medical school, No./total No. (%) None 65/230 (28) <1 h 60/230 (26) 1-2 h 66/230 (29) >2 h 39/230 (17) Abbreviations: LGBTQ, lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, or queer; PGY, postgraduate year. a Participants had the option of selecting more than 1 race/ethnicity. JAMA Network Open | Medical Education Resident Physician Experiences With and Responses to Biased Patients JAMA Network Open. 2020;3(11):e2021769. doi:10.1001/jamanetworkopen.2020.21769 (Reprinted) November 23, 2020 5/11 Downloaded From: https://jamanetwork.com/ by a Carnegie Mellon University User on 04/05/2021 https://jama.jamanetwork.com/article.aspx?doi=10.1001/jamanetworkopen.2020.21769&utm_campaign=articlePDF%26utm_medium=articlePDFlink%26utm_source=articlePDF%26utm_content=jamanetworkopen.2020.21769 https://jama.jamanetwork.com/article.aspx?doi=10.1001/jamanetworkopen.2020.21769&utm_campaign=articlePDF%26utm_medium=articlePDFlink%26utm_source=articlePDF%26utm_content=jamanetworkopen.2020.21769 included the need to prioritize clinical care and a sense of futility in responding, with 34% of residents (76 of 227) and 25% of residents (56 of 227), respectively, identifying these factors as having significant impact (Table 4). Content analysis of written comments also revealed a few additional responses; most commonly, a witness in the room addressed biased behavior. Rarer responses included documenting biased behavior in the electronic medical record and withdrawing from the interaction with the offending patient as much as possible. Training and Policies Only 32% of residents (73 of 231) were confident or very confident in responding to biased patients (eTable 3 in the Supplement). Most residents (206 of 232 [89%]) identified training for medical students, residents, and faculty on dealing with biased patients as necessary or very necessary; similar numbers believed institutional policies to be necessary or very necessary for addressing biased patient behavior (eTable 4 in the Supplement). With regard to training, 81% of residents (187 Table 2. Prevalence of Direct Experiences of Types of Biased Patient Behavior in the Last Year Type of behavior Respondents, No./total No. (%) (n = 231)a Never Sometimes Often Very often Belittling or demeaning stereotypesb Belittling comments 47/230 (20) 64/230 (28) 87/230 (38) 32/230 (14) Inquiries into racial/ethnic origins 77/231 (33) 68/231 (29) 75/231 (33) 11/231 (5) Generalizations about social identity 41/231 (18) 105/231 (46) 70/231 (30) 15/231 (7) Confusing team members of the same race/ethnicity 53/231 (23) 91/231 (39) 65/231 (28) 22/231 (10) Nonverbal disrespect 95/230 (41) 111/230 (48) 22/230 (10) 2/230 (1) Role questioningb Credential or ability questioning 37/230 (16) 91/230 (40) 77/230 (34) 25/230 (11) Assumption of nonphysician status 77/230 (34) 48/230 (21) 67/230 (29) 38/230 (17) Addressing intern or student because of social bias toward senior resident 98/228 (43) 69/228 (30) 49/228 (22) 12/228 (5) Sexual harassmentb 92/230 (40) 98/230 (43) 38/230 (17) 2/230 (1) Explicit epithets or rejection of careb Epithets 139/230 (60) 79/230 (34) 11/230 (5) 1/230 (0.4) Refusal of care 161/230 (70) 65/230 (28) 4/230 (2) 0 Request to change physicians 168/229 (73) 59/230 (26) 2/230 (1) 0 a Sometimes was defined as 1 to 2 or a few times per year, often was defined as once or more than once per month, and very often was defined as once per week or more. b Because of missing data, the total No. was less than 231 and ranged between 228 and 230. Figure. Percentage of Participants Reporting Ever Experiencing Biased Patient Behavior by Race/Ethnicity and Gender Identity 100 80 60 40 20 0 Pa rt ic ip an ts , % Categories of biased behavior Role questioning Belittling or demeaning stereotypes Sexual harrassment Explicit epithets or rejection of care Participants reporting ever experiencing biased patient behavior by race or ethnicity A Asian (n = 70) White (n = 109)Latinx + Black (n = 38) 100 80 60 40 20 0 Pa rt ic ip an ts , % Categories of biased behavior Role questioning Belittling or demeaning stereotypes Sexual harrassment Explicit epithets or rejection of care Participants reporting ever experiencing biased patient behavior by genderB Women (n = 115)Men (n = 113) JAMA Network Open | Medical Education Resident Physician Experiences With and Responses to Biased Patients JAMA Network Open. 2020;3(11):e2021769. doi:10.1001/jamanetworkopen.2020.21769 (Reprinted) November 23, 2020 6/11 Downloaded From: https://jamanetwork.com/ by a Carnegie Mellon University User on 04/05/2021 https://jama.jamanetwork.com/article.aspx?doi=10.1001/jamanetworkopen.2020.21769&utm_campaign=articlePDF%26utm_medium=articlePDFlink%26utm_source=articlePDF%26utm_content=jamanetworkopen.2020.21769 https://jama.jamanetwork.com/article.aspx?doi=10.1001/jamanetworkopen.2020.21769&utm_campaign=articlePDF%26utm_medium=articlePDFlink%26utm_source=articlePDF%26utm_content=jamanetworkopen.2020.21769 of 232) reported receiving 2 hours or less of training on caring for biased patients during residency (Table 1). Although 72% of residents (165 of 230) had prior training on patient bias in medical school, 74% (150 of 203) rated the content of their prior training as below adequate (eTable 5 in the Supplement). Discussion In this survey study of second-year and third-year residents at 3 large, academic internal medicine residency programs, we found that nearly all residents reported witnessing or experiencing biased patient behavior within the past year. The frequency and extent of specific biased patient behaviors varied substantially, with belittling comments experienced on a monthly or weekly basis by more than half the residents and bias-based requests to change physicians experienced a few times a year by one-third of residents. Although ethnicity/race or national origin and gender identity or expression were the most commonly targeted sociodemographic characteristics, sexual harassment was particularly prevalent. Most residents do not report these encounters to institutional leadership, preferring instead to respond to incidences of patient bias on their own or debrief with friends, family, and team members. To address the issue of biased patient behavior, interventions are needed at the institutional and interpersonal levels. The high prevalence of biased patient incidents may be largely unknown by residency program directors and academic medical center leaders as evidenced by the 80% of residents who stated that they never reporting biased patient behavior “up” within their institution. At the institutional level, low use of a formal structure to address and report incidents may indicate either a lack of formal reporting processes, a lack of knowledge of existing processes, or a reluctance to engage in these processes for fear of negative repercussions. This finding should be explored further and clear reporting mechanisms instituted, while recognizing that reporting systems succeed only when institutional culture encourages reporting without fear of retaliation. Specific policies on approaching patients who explicitly reject or refuse care based on sociodemographic bias requires a Table 3. Frequency of Responses Used to Address Biased Patient Behavior Type of response Respondents, No./total No. (%) (n = 227) Never Sometimes About half the time Frequentlya 1-on-1 Limit setting 22/227 (10) 93/227 (41) 45/227 (20) 67/227 (30) Debriefing With friends or family 36/227 (16) 77/227 (34) 34/227 (15) 80/227 (35) With team membersb 11/225 (5) 72/225 (32) 65/225 (29) 77/225 (34) Creating team response planb 104/226 (46) 79/226 (35) 23/226 (10) 20/226 (9) Reporting to attending physician or chief resident 106/227 (47) 74/227 (33) 20/227 (9) 27/227 (12) Reporting to institutionb 191/226 (84) 29/226 (13) 2/226 (1) 4/226 (2) Switching patient to another team memberb 176/226 (78) 41/226 (18) 6/226 (3) 3/226 (1) Not addressing the incidentb 47/225 (21) 120/225 (53) 29/225 (13) 29/225 (13) a Frequently was defined from survey categories as occurring most of the time or always. b Because of missing data, the total No. was less than 227 and ranged between 225 and 226. Table 4. Factors Impeding Residents From Responding to Biased Patient Behavior Factor Impact, No. (%) (n = 227) None Minimal Some Significant Prioritizing the clinical care of the patient 16 (7) 45 (20) 90 (40) 76 (34) Feeling unsupported by the team, senior physicians, or institution 84 (37) 88 (39) 50 (22) 5 (2) Lack of knowledge or skills about how to properly respond 33 (15) 69 (30) 97 (43) 27 (12) Perceived ineffectiveness of responding 27 (12) 41 (18) 94 (41) 56 (25) Feeling emotionally overwhelmed 42 (19) 71 (31) 77 (34) 37 (16) JAMA Network Open | Medical Education Resident Physician Experiences With and Responses to Biased Patients JAMA Network Open. 2020;3(11):e2021769. doi:10.1001/jamanetworkopen.2020.21769 (Reprinted) November 23, 2020 7/11 Downloaded From: https://jamanetwork.com/ by a Carnegie Mellon University User on 04/05/2021 https://jama.jamanetwork.com/article.aspx?doi=10.1001/jamanetworkopen.2020.21769&utm_campaign=articlePDF%26utm_medium=articlePDFlink%26utm_source=articlePDF%26utm_content=jamanetworkopen.2020.21769 specialized approach to navigate the ethical and legal implications of such behaviors.1 On an interpersonal level, training on dealing with biased patients should be incorporated into resident and faculty development curricula. Most residents described prior training on biased patient behavior as below adequate, and only one-third felt confident in responding to biased patient behavior. Developing a deeper understanding of residents’ sense of futility in responding to bias will be necessary for effective development and implementation of trainings and policies. Well-facilitated team debriefing should be continued through allocated time and space where residents’ experiences can be acknowledged, validated, and addressed.21 Bystander trainings on supporting targeted colleagues should also be encouraged given how frequently residents reported witnessing biased behavior. Our results are consistent with those of prior studies of harassment and discrimination of physicians that have found a disproportionate burden on those identifying as women and/or racial/ ethnic minorities.17,22-28 We found that Latinx and Black residents experienced all types of biased behaviors more frequently than their White counterparts. More than 40% of Latinx and Black residents experienced the more extreme forms of patient bias—racial epithets, bias-based refusals of care, and bias-based requests to change physician—at least once in the last year. Academic medical centers need to communicate clear policies on physician refusal based on race/ethnicity to their patients and key medical educators, including attending physicians, chief residents, and other front- line supervisors.1 Asian residents reported the greatest prevalence of belittling and demeaning behaviors. All Asian respondents surveyed reported bias-based inquiries into their ethnic origins. Asian residents also experienced more role questioning than White residents. Sociologists have highlighted the “perpetual foreigner” status of Asian Americans, wherein Asian immigrants or their descendants are considered to be not fully US citizens or to be more closely tied to their country of origin than to the United States.29 Given the high prevalence of biased patient behaviors experienced by Asian residents—and the common misconception that Asians are a homogeneous, overrepresented group in medicine (in actuality, many Asian subgroups, such as Cambodian Americans, are underrepresented)30—our data highlight the need to consider the Asian American trainee experience when designing programs to address patient bias. Moreover, such support is particularly urgent given the increase in biased behavior and hate crimes toward Asian Americans in the time of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19).31 Consistent with other reports,32,33 we noted a high prevalence of sexual harassment. Eighty- seven percent of female respondents reported experiencing verbal or nonverbal sexual harassment, meaning that this behavior may well be regarded as a norm within clinical practice. We also found that a common barrier to responding to biased patient behavior is a sense of futility, reflecting a culture that rarely holds abusers accountable. Harassment constitutes one of many gender identity– based inequities in medicine alongside gaps in salary, career advancement, and leadership that will require a concerted effort to address.34 Prior qualitative work has shown that individuals reporting multiple marginalized group identities often encounter uniquely complex, compounded discriminatory behavior.3 This concept of intersectionality is critical to understanding, validating, and addressing the multidimensional experiences faced by individuals who are members of multiple marginalized groups (eg, ability status, race/ethnicity, immigration status, nationality, religion, sex, gender identity or expression, and sexual orientation).35,36 Our ability to examine the frequency of biased patient behavior toward these individuals in our study was limited by small sample size. Larger studies are needed to measure the frequency and nature of bias that trainees belonging to multiple marginalized groups experience in the workplace. Limitations Our study has several limitations. First, survey responses are inherently subject to recall bias. Second, as noted, our sample size was too small to analyze the impact of the intersection of identities or JAMA Network Open | Medical Education Resident Physician Experiences With and Responses to Biased Patients JAMA Network Open. 2020;3(11):e2021769. doi:10.1001/jamanetworkopen.2020.21769 (Reprinted) November 23, 2020 8/11 Downloaded From: https://jamanetwork.com/ by a Carnegie Mellon University User on 04/05/2021 evaluate the experience of respondents with less common social identities, such as those who identified as gender nonbinary. Third, while we surveyed residents in 3 urban areas in 2 geographically distinct regions of the US, our findings may not reflect the experiences of residents in other parts of the country. Despite these limitations, our study is, to our knowledge, the first to evaluate the frequency of specific biased patient behaviors and physician responses to these behaviors. Prior studies have shown that asking about specific behaviors greatly increases reporting of harassment,32 suggesting that prior studies without this survey’s level of granularity may have underreported these behaviors. Conclusions In this survey study, resident physicians’ reported that experiences with biased patient behavior were common, varied both in the type of behavior and the intended target, and were disproportionately prevalent for women, Latinx, Black, and Asian residents. Despite the diversification of the physician workforce and the steady work to decrease bias and discrimination within the workplace, there has been a lack of training and policies to address the social, emotional, and clinical challenges that biased patient behavior produces. Addressing biased patient behavior will require medical institutions to bring forth training, policies, and cultural change that support their trainees and workforce and promote an environment free from harassment and bias for physicians and other health care workers. ARTICLE INFORMATION Accepted for Publication: September 7, 2020. Published: November 23, 2020. doi:10.1001/jamanetworkopen.2020.21769 Open Access: This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the CC-BY License. © 2020 de Bourmont SS et al. JAMA Network Open. Corresponding Author: Alicia Fernandez, MD, Department of Medicine, University of California, San Francisco, PO Box 1364, DGIM Zuckerberg, San Francisco General Hospital, San Francisco, CA 94143 (alicia.fernandez@ ucsf.edu). Author Affiliations: San Francisco School of Medicine, University of California, San Francisco, San Francisco (de Bourmont, Burra); Department of Medicine, University of California, San Francisco, San Francisco (Nouri, Schaeffer, Fernandez); Department of Medicine, University of California, Los Angeles, Los Angeles (El-Farra, Friedman); Division of Nephrology, Department of Medicine, Duke University School of Medicine, Durham, North Carolina (Mohottige); Department of Medicine, Duke University School of Medicine, Durham, North Carolina (Sloan). Author Contributions: Ms de Bourmont and Mr Burra had full access to all of the data in the study and take responsibility for the integrity of the data and the accuracy of the data analysis. Ms de Bourmont and Mr Burra contributed equally as co–first authors. Concept and design: All authors. Acquisition, analysis, or interpretation of data: All authors. Drafting of the manuscript: de Bourmont, Burra, El-Farra, Mohottige, Fernandez. Critical revision of the manuscript for important intellectual content: All authors. Statistical analysis: Nouri, Friedman. Obtained funding: Fernandez. Administrative, technical, or material support: de Bourmont, Burra, Mohottige, Schaeffer, Friedman. Supervision: de Bourmont, Nouri, Schaeffer, Fernandez. Conflict of Interest Disclosures: Dr Mohottige serves as a member of a cohort of Duke Department of Medicine faculty and trainees who have been trained to offer informal support in response to incidents of bias, harassment, or other unprofessional behaviors and has lectured in grand rounds format regarding the above program (which JAMA Network Open | Medical Education Resident Physician Experiences With and Responses to Biased Patients JAMA Network Open. 2020;3(11):e2021769. doi:10.1001/jamanetworkopen.2020.21769 (Reprinted) November 23, 2020 9/11 Downloaded From: https://jamanetwork.com/ by a Carnegie Mellon University User on 04/05/2021 https://jama.jamanetwork.com/article.aspx?doi=10.1001/jamanetworkopen.2020.21769&utm_campaign=articlePDF%26utm_medium=articlePDFlink%26utm_source=articlePDF%26utm_content=jamanetworkopen.2020.21769 https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jamanetworkopen/pages/instructions-for-authors#SecOpenAccess/?utm_campaign=articlePDF%26utm_medium=articlePDFlink%26utm_source=articlePDF%26utm_content=jamanetworkopen.2020.21769 mailto:alicia.fernandez@ucsf.edu mailto:alicia.fernandez@ucsf.edu addresses discrimination, bias, and micro-aggressions and macro-aggressions at Duke University, University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill, and the University of Washington. No other disclosures were reported. Funding/Support: The Greenwall Foundation funded this study and supported efforts of Ms de Bourmont and Dr Fernandez. Mr Burra was funded by the PROF-PATH Program, University of California, San Francisco Latinx Center of Excellence (HRSA D34HP31878). Dr Nouri was funded in part by a National Research Service Award fellowship training grant (T32HP19025). Dr Mohottige was funded by training grant T32-DK007731-22 from the National Institutes of Health, National Institute of Diabetes and Digestive Kidney Diseases. Dr Fernandez was funded by grant K24DK102057 from the National Institutes of Health, National Institute of Diabetes and Digestive and Kidney Diseases. Role of the Funder/Sponsor: The funding sources had no role in the design and conduct of the study; collection, management, analysis, and interpretation of the data; preparation, review, or approval of the manuscript; and decision to submit the manuscript for publication. REFERENCES 1. 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JAMA Network Open | Medical Education Resident Physician Experiences With and Responses to Biased Patients JAMA Network Open. 2020;3(11):e2021769. doi:10.1001/jamanetworkopen.2020.21769 (Reprinted) November 23, 2020 10/11 Downloaded From: https://jamanetwork.com/ by a Carnegie Mellon University User on 04/05/2021 https://dx.doi.org/10.1056/NEJMp1514939 https://dx.doi.org/10.1542/peds.2014-2092 https://jama.jamanetwork.com/article.aspx?doi=10.1001/jamainternmed.2019.4122&utm_campaign=articlePDF%26utm_medium=articlePDFlink%26utm_source=articlePDF%26utm_content=jamanetworkopen.2020.21769 https://dx.doi.org/10.4300/JGME-D-19-00218.1 https://dx.doi.org/10.4300/JGME-D-19-00218.1 https://www.webmd.com/a-to-z-guides/news/20171018/survey-patient-bias-toward-doctors-nurses https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-doctors-deal-with-racist-patients-1516633710 https://www.statnews.com/2016/04/27/racism-medicine-lessons/?s_campaign=medscape https://www.statnews.com/2016/04/27/racism-medicine-lessons/?s_campaign=medscape https://dx.doi.org/10.7326/0003-4819-146-1-200701020-00008 https://dx.doi.org/10.7326/0003-4819-146-1-200701020-00008 https://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.62.4.271 https://www.splcenter.org/news/2019/02/19/hate-groups-reach-record-high https://news.aamc.org/patient-care/article/target-bias-doctor/ https://dx.doi.org/10.7326/0003-4819-158-8-201304160-00010 https://dx.doi.org/10.7326/0003-4819-158-8-201304160-00010 https://dx.doi.org/10.1370/afm.1932 https://dx.doi.org/10.1370/afm.1932 https://thehospitalleader.org/i-dont-want-someone-like-you-caring-for-me/ https://dx.doi.org/10.7326/M19-1269 https://www.statnews.com/2017/10/18/patient-prejudice-wounds-doctors/?s_campaign=medscape https://www.statnews.com/2017/10/18/patient-prejudice-wounds-doctors/?s_campaign=medscape https://dx.doi.org/10.1056/NEJMsa1903759 https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF02600186 20. 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Harassment and discrimination in medical training: a systematic review and meta-analysis. Acad Med. 2014;89(5):817-827. doi:10.1097/ACM.0000000000000200 26. Osseo-Asare A, Balasuriya L, Huot SJ, et al. Minority resident physicians’ views on the role of race/ethnicity in their training experiences in the workplace. JAMA Netw Open. 2018;1(5):e182723. doi:10.1001/ jamanetworkopen.2018.2723 27. Wang LJ, Tanious A, Go C, et al. Gender-based discrimination is prevalent in the integrated vascular trainee experience and serves as a predictor of burnout. J Vasc Surg. 2020;71(1):220-227. doi:10.1016/j.jvs.2019.02.064 28. McKinley SK, Wang LJ, Gartland RM, et al; Massachusetts General Hospital Gender Equity Task Force. “Yes, I’m the doctor”: one department’s approach to assessing and addressing gender-based discrimination in the modern medical training era. Acad Med. 2019;94(11):1691-1698. doi:10.1097/ACM.0000000000002845 29. Kim CJ. The racial triangulation of Asian Americans. Polit Soc. 1999; 27(1):105-138. doi:10.1177/ 0032329299027001005 30. Association of American Medical Colleges. Figure 2: U.S. physicians by Asian subgroups and sex, 2013. Accessed October 9, 2020. https://www.aamcdiversityfactsandfigures.org/section-ii-current-status-of-us- physician-workforce/index.html 31. Devakumar D, Shannon G, Bhopal SS, Abubakar I. Racism and discrimination in COVID-19 responses. Lancet. 2020;395(10231):1194. doi:10.1016/S0140-6736(20)30792-3 32. Benya FF, Widnall SE, Johnson PA, eds. Sexual Harassment of Women: Climate, Culture, and Consequences in Academic Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. National Academies Press; 2018. 33. Stop Street Harassment. The facts behind the #metoo movement: a national study on sexual harassment and assault. Published February 21, 2018. Accessed April 24, 2020. http://www.stopstreetharassment.org/wp-content/ uploads/2018/01/Full-Report-2018-National-Study-on-Sexual-Harassment-and-Assault.pdf 34. Choo EK, van Dis J, Kass D. Time’s up for medicine? only time will tell. N Engl J Med. 2018;379(17):1592-1593. doi:10.1056/NEJMp1809351 35. Bowleg L. The problem with the phrase women and minorities: intersectionality—an important theoretical framework for public health. Am J Public Health. 2012;102(7):1267-1273. doi:10.2105/AJPH.2012.300750 36. Crenshaw K. Mapping the margins: intersectionality, identity politics, and violence against women of color. Stanford Law Rev. 1991;43(6):1241-1299. doi:10.2307/1229039 SUPPLEMENT. eTable 1. Percentage of Participants Reporting Ever Experiencing Biased Patient Behavior by Race/Ethnicity and Gender eTable 2. Percentage of Participants Ever Experiencing or Witnessing Biased Patient Behavior Targeted at Specific Social Characteristics in the Last Year eTable 3. Confidence in Responding to Biased Patient Behavior eTable 4. Beliefs Around Necessity of Policies and Training on Addressing Biased Patient Behavior eTable 5. Beliefs on Adequacy of Prior Training on Biased Patient Behavior in Terms of Content and Time eAppendix. Resident Experiences With Biased Patient Behavior Survey JAMA Network Open | Medical Education Resident Physician Experiences With and Responses to Biased Patients JAMA Network Open. 2020;3(11):e2021769. doi:10.1001/jamanetworkopen.2020.21769 (Reprinted) November 23, 2020 11/11 Downloaded From: https://jamanetwork.com/ by a Carnegie Mellon University User on 04/05/2021 https://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511557842 https://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511557842 https://dx.doi.org/10.4300/JGME-D-19-00075.1 https://dx.doi.org/10.4300/JGME-D-19-00075.1 https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11606-009-1103-9 https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/15868767 https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/15868767 https://dx.doi.org/10.1097/00001888-199906000-00018 https://dx.doi.org/10.1097/ACM.0000000000000200 https://jama.jamanetwork.com/article.aspx?doi=10.1001/jamanetworkopen.2018.2723&utm_campaign=articlePDF%26utm_medium=articlePDFlink%26utm_source=articlePDF%26utm_content=jamanetworkopen.2020.21769 https://jama.jamanetwork.com/article.aspx?doi=10.1001/jamanetworkopen.2018.2723&utm_campaign=articlePDF%26utm_medium=articlePDFlink%26utm_source=articlePDF%26utm_content=jamanetworkopen.2020.21769 https://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jvs.2019.02.064 https://dx.doi.org/10.1097/ACM.0000000000002845 https://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0032329299027001005 https://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0032329299027001005 https://www.aamcdiversityfactsandfigures.org/section-ii-current-status-of-us-physician-workforce/index.html https://www.aamcdiversityfactsandfigures.org/section-ii-current-status-of-us-physician-workforce/index.html https://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(20)30792-3 http://www.stopstreetharassment.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/Full-Report-2018-National-Study-on-Sexual-Harassment-and-Assault.pdf http://www.stopstreetharassment.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/Full-Report-2018-National-Study-on-Sexual-Harassment-and-Assault.pdf https://dx.doi.org/10.1056/NEJMp1809351 https://dx.doi.org/10.2105/AJPH.2012.300750 https://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1229039 
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work_fexr2qfxenaqnnd5lvbth4v62u	----	LUND UNIVERSITY PO Box 117 221 00 Lund +46 46-222 00 00 Muslim clothing and Swedish whiteness Becoming Muslim and the mobility of white converts to Islam Jakku, Nina Published in: Tijdschrift voor Genderstudies DOI: 10.5117/TVGN2018.3.005.JAKK 2018 Document Version: Peer reviewed version (aka post-print) Link to publication Citation for published version (APA): Jakku, N. (2018). Muslim clothing and Swedish whiteness: Becoming Muslim and the mobility of white converts to Islam. Tijdschrift voor Genderstudies, 21(3), 265-280. https://doi.org/10.5117/TVGN2018.3.005.JAKK Total number of authors: 1 Creative Commons License: CC BY-NC-ND General rights Unless other specific re-use rights are stated the following general rights apply: Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights. • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research. • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal Read more about Creative commons licenses: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/ Take down policy If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim. https://doi.org/10.5117/TVGN2018.3.005.JAKK https://portal.research.lu.se/portal/en/publications/muslim-clothing-and-swedish-whiteness(c26d1b4b-2d94-4265-8ab2-1c69e63a747c).html https://doi.org/10.5117/TVGN2018.3.005.JAKK Muslim clothing and Swedish whiteness Becoming Muslim and the mobility of white converts to Islam Nina Jakku Abstract This article discusses social positions of Swedish female converts to Islam who have previously passed as white majority Swedes, but whose experiences have changed, sometimes radically, since donning the hijab. It addresses their accounts of being treated and evaluated differently by teachers, co-workers, family and friends, and having their choices questioned by strangers. It also examines the double standards that white converts to Islam must negotiate when dealing with daily life in Sweden, and how becoming a Muslim leads to frequent exclusion from constructed whiteness and Swedishness and the privileges attached to those positions. Keywords: Whiteness, Muslim, Islam, Religion, Mobility, Secularity Introduction The exclusivity of Swedish whiteness has a long history. Through its intersections with other axes of difference such as religion, gender and class, whiteness functions as a system of privilege based on racist exclusionary practices, both in contemporary and historical terms. This study examines how inclusion in, and exclusion from, the category of Swedish whiteness is performed from the point of view of female converts to Islam, meanwhile considering the consequences of exclusion and the ways in which whiteness intersects with other markers of racialisation. This study thus adds to the growing number of studies that address the intersectional positioning of white converted women in Europe (Van Nieuwkerk, 2006; Jensen, 2008; Özyürek, 2010; Vroon, 2014), while also providing an alternative perspective to research that takes whiteness as a point of departure (Franks, 2000; Gallonier, 2015; Moosavi, 2015) in the context of UK, France and the USA. Racialisation operates differently in different European countries and in the USA (Goldberg, 2006), something which needs to be explored further. Hanna Bäckström, who has been conducting interviews with converts to Islam for her master thesis,1 recalls one of the interviewees telling her that she had been asked the question: ‘Were you Swedish before you became Muslim?’ (Bäckström, 2013). This reflects an idea of the improbability, or even impossibility, of a person being both Muslim and Swedish.2 On the other hand, Lena Sawyer (2000) notes in her dissertation3 Black and Swedish how racialised constructions of Swedishness are preventing Afro- Swedish youth from being included in the category ‘Swedish.’ Yet, as we can see from the quote above, blue eyes and blond hair do not in every case qualify an individual for the discursive qualities of white Swedishness. Discussing the many dimensions of the construction of Swedishness, Johan Cato (2012, p. 48) claims that it is often a matter of comparison in which religion tends to play a crucial part, alongside culture, values and appearance. Some of the interviewees claim that, since starting to wear the hijab, they often get the question, ‘Where do you come from?’. This is sometimes followed by, ‘But where do you come from originally?’, together with suggestions of Lebanese or Bosnian origins. These questions imply a perceived distancing of the questioned person from Swedishness and whiteness (Arbouz, 2012, p. 40). In this article I will address the questions: How does conversion and donning the hijab of previous white-passing people affect their daily-life mobility? In which ways does their whiteness, which is understood differently than in their past, lead to almost daily negotiations? Analysing whiteness, Muslim beliefs, and social positions from the point of view of converts will illustrate the women’s shift in positions, from white passing to re-racialised as non-white or not-quite-white (Moosavi, 2015, p. 52). Hijab- wearing women in Sweden are particularly vulnerable to discrimination (Gardell & Muftee, 2017, p. 633) and are often targets of hate crimes (Doubakil, 2018, p. 74), which urges research on the topics addressed here. This article is based on qualitative analysis of in-depth interviews with twelve female converts to Islam who were aged between 23 and 55 years at the time of research (September 2015 to June 2017).4 Four had converted to Islam between 2005 1 Lund University, Department of Gender Studies. 2 Similar reflections have been made regarding the categories White and Muslim in Britain (Moosavi, 2015, p. 45) and Muslim and European (Jensen, 2008, p. 389). 3 Mittuniversitetet, Department of Social Work. 4 All interviewees are anonymised. I recruited the interviewees through snowballing sampling and social media. and 2007, four between 2009 and 2011 and four in 2012. I interviewed two women twice and the rest once; each interview lasted at least one hour, several up to two hours. All interviews were followed by discussions off-record, and in some cases by additional clarifying email correspondence.5 This method was chosen for two reasons: on the one hand, it allowed me to remedy the recognised absence of Swedish female Muslim voices from Swedish public discussions and media (Axner, 2015); and on the other, to gain access to the interviewees’ emic point of view on the racialisation of Islam through their daily-life experiences – a specific knowledge that is only accessible through qualitative methods (Fägerborg, 2011, p. 97). Naturally, the interviews cannot alone account for the complexity of the interviewees’ experiences, nor the topic at hand. However, they do offer fruitful starting grounds to further explore their personal experiences and the meaning making-practices that frame and shape their and other people’s understanding of themselves in relation to Swedish society. Furthermore, by building on previous research on the relation between religion and whiteness, and analysing Swedish media discourse on Islam, I have been able to access dimensions that are often taken for granted and therefore not spoken about in the interviews (Pripp & Öhlander, 2011, p. 114). In this article, I quote five of my respondents, whom I introduce in greater depth; however, all interviews have had an impact on my understanding of the topic. The article starts with an overview of whiteness in the Swedish context, from both a historical and contemporary point of view. Thereafter it will focus on the role of religion within racism mainly from a historical perspective. Then it will describe and discuss how the positions of the interviewees have changed after the conversion and the donning of the hijab. The final part consists of a concluding discussion. Whiteness in the Swedish context ‘A person is deemed visibly white because of a quite complicated interaction of elements, of which flesh tones within the pink to beige range are only one: the shape of nose, eyes and lips, the colour and set of hair, even body shape may all be mobilised to determine someone’s “colour”.’ (Dyer, 1997, p. 42) As Dyer’s definition implies, the concept of whiteness is both complex and diffuse. Ruth Frankenberg (1993, p. 236) has also noted that whiteness changes depending on both 5 The interviews were all conducted in Swedish. Thus, all translations are mine. time and space: a product of local, regional, national and international relations, both contemporary and historical. Thus, whiteness can neither be regarded as static nor assumed to be the same in different countries like the USA, Australia, France and Sweden – although similarities can naturally be found (Hübinette et al., 2012, p. 29). Some groups in Sweden, for instance Finns, who previously experienced being racialised as non-white, have increasingly been included in the constructed Swedishness and its accompanying whiteness on the basis of their phenotypical pale bodies. 6 Tobias Hübinette, Helena Hörnfeldt, Fataneh Farahani and René León Rosales (2012) claim that those immigrants and national minorities who are perceived as whites may, over tim e, become regarded as Swedes, while those perceived as non-whites risk remaining non- Swedes. This suggests that Swedishness is a construction closely interconnected with whiteness. Whiteness consists of a complex set of practices and privileges in a similar way as heteronormativity and masculinity (Hübinette et al., 2012, p. 28). These categories tend to be normative and understood as neutral positions, futher similarities consist in the priviledges often being unaknowledged by those who possess them (Ahmed, 2011). Gender, class and sexuality tends also to play a part in the construction of privileged whiteness which calls for intersectional analyses in the understanding of the complexity of whiteness. Indeed, to be counted as, or able to pass as, white, is not only a matter of hair-eye-skin colour, since the boundaries for whiteness are continuously changing (Hübinette et al., 2012, p. 32). The exclusivity of Swedish whiteness dates back to the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth century when ‘scientific’ race-biology notions were born of the pens of scholars. In 1921 the Swedish parliament made the decision to establish the first race- biology department in the world at Uppsala University. During the decades that followed, national minorities and indigenous peoples – Tornedalers, Sami, Jews, Sweden Finns and Romani people – became the target of a series of racist policies that prevented them from speaking their own language and exposed them to pseudo-scientific endeavours such as skull measuring (Svanberg & Tydén, 1999). While the situation today is not comparable – certainly not in terms of scientific backing – Hübinette and co- authors argue that it is in light of those historical experiences that we may understand 6 Similar accounts from the USA can be found concerning Jews, Irish and Italians (Sullivan, 2006, p. 3). the contemporary role of language in difference making. They add that there is a clear racialising dimension to the idea of who can be expected to speak fluent, ‘correct’ Swedish: bodies coded as white are often associated with fluency in the language, while non-white bodies are not (Hübinette et al., 2012, p. 23). Several of the interviewees in this study have reported occasions when people either speak English to them or speak very slowly, using simple Swedish (c.f. Franks, 2000; Vroon, 2014). Hübinette and co- authors argue that similar everyday occurrences indicate that the ability to speak Swedish and, hence, Swedishness are connected to whiteness. Indeed, as my interviewees’ narratives show, Swedish female converts are often subjected to exclusionary linguistic practices that frame them as non-fluent Swedish speakers, something none of them had experienced before starting to wear hijab. While we cannot know the motivations of people asking questions like ‘But where do you come from originally?’, the impact of racialising structures is there regardless of intent (Habel, 2012, p. 46). When analysing these kinds of interactions, what matters is that they repeat themselves. ‘It may not be that one specific person’s questions are problematic; rather it is the fact that it has happened 20 times before’ (interview with Hanna; c.f. Molina, 2010, p. 79; Arbouz, 2012, p. 40). The uncoordinated repetition of the same questions by unrelated people proves the pattern. Religion and racism Even though the race-biology era has left deep scars, it represents only a short period in the history of racism. The intersection of race and religion can be tracked to at least the fifteenth century and the practice on the Iberian Peninsula of limpieza de sangre, which meant that a person had to prove a long genealogy of Christianity in order to claim purity of blood (Wasniowski, 2017, p. 29). And indeed, the racism targeting Swedish national minorities did not start with the establishment of ideas of biological race or resulting institutions. The respective histories of all the national minorities had long been paved with injustices and abuse, which were often connected to religion and, not infrequently, implemented by the Swedish church (Fur, 2016, p. 241). The hegemony of Christianity in Sweden goes back to the first half of the sixteenth century. Evangelical Lutheranism was declared the state religion in 1593 and beliefs deviating from it were forbidden (Gardell, 2010, p. 25). Mattias Gardell argues that the problem with Jews, Catholics and other deviant believers, from the hegemonic point of view, was not that they did not believe in God, but that they did not practice the right doctrine. In Sweden, Islam used to be considered heretical, and in some Christian circles it still is. However, today it is mainly read against the background of Swedish society’s normative secularity (Gardell, 2010, p. 84; c.f. Fernando, 2014). According to David Thurfjell (2015), the normativity of secularity is connected to the idea or narrative about Sweden and its progress and modernity, which has a self-aggrandizing evolutionary function. Importantly, one of the narrative’s components is the successive liberation from religion, now regarded as something that existed in our history but only lingers on among the ‘others’ in contemporary Sweden (Thurfjell, 2015, p. 111; c.f. Asad, 2009; Mahmood, 2009). In Europe in general Muslims have been made the outsider, a treachery first against Christianity and later against secularist leanings. David Theo Goldberg argues that Muslims have been perceived as contrasting to Europeans’ urbanity, rationality and spirituality within nineteenth century racial historicism.7 As this study testifies, however, dispositions dominate still today (Goldberg, 2006, pp. 344- 5). There is no population registration in Sweden since 1930 over religious belonging, which makes it impossible to give an exact number of Muslims in Sweden. Approximately 500,000 (5% of the population) is a qualified number often referred to in research within the field of religious studies. The number includes though everyone with assumed Muslim cultural background and does not state the number of practising Muslims. Some of the most common representation of Muslims in Sweden includes biases where they are presumed being connected with honour violence, oppression of women and as threats to security, often also represented as a contrast to ‘Western values’. There is also a risk of being exposed to hate crimes, both as individuals and for Muslim institutions, such as mosques (Cato, 2012; Gardell, 2010; Gardell & Muftee, 2017). 7 Racial historicism refers to the prevailing presumptions on the historical immaturity of Europe’s others, understood as an internally coherent group. ‘The group is taken to have coalesced from the fragments of heterogenous dispersals in some distant past into a supposedly geographically bound coherence, with attendant physical traits and cultural habits’ (Goldberg, 2010, p. 95). A change in position Whiteness can be described as an unremarked and invisible position (Essed & Trienekens, 2008; Frankenberg, 1993), although, as Sara Ahmed notes, this invisibility only relates to those who possess whiteness (Ahmed, 2011, p. 136; Arbouz, 2012, p. 41). Ahmed goes on to describe it as a bad habit, ‘as a series of actions that are repeated, forgotten, and that allow some bodies to take up space by restricting the mobility of others’ (Ahmed, 2006, p. 129). Examples of how visibility and mobility can change for someone who went from passing or being regarded as white to wearing the hijab appears in my interviews. Jennifer is 24 years old and lives in a smaller Swedish town. At the age of 17 she converted to Islam and started wearing the hijab. It swiftly became clear to her that, following her conversion, her position in society had changed. Still 17 years old, she began an internship in a retirement home where the staff treated her in a condescending way, addressing her as ‘girl’ rather than using her given name: ‘Girl, come here; girl, do this’ (Jennifer’s interview). One day she was sharing a lunch break with several other staff members, who asked her if she was willing to talk about Islam with them. Jennifer agreed enthusiastically, but she recalls that their questions soon began to challenge her choices: Jennifer: ‘It started with, “What is Islam and why did you want to become a Muslim?” That's OK; they are questions I can answer. But then it turned to probing why I am following a man who lived some 1400 years ago: “How can you do that?” they asked. Then they said, “We don’t understand why you are doing this.” And they went even further. In the end, the way they were talking to me upset me so much that I told them I had to leave. […] They were over 40 years old all of them and there were maybe three or four of them and they were kind of interrogating me.’ A similar event happened in class a short time after. Jennifer studies at Komvux (adult education offered by the municipality) and at the time she still considered herself newly converted. She was the only student wearing a hijab in the classroom, a question about the hijab was raised and was directed to Jennifer. Jennifer: ‘I didn't actually want to answer that question, because I was new [newly converted] and I knew there would be protests and I was not prepared. And I got plenty of counterarguments and many of them [other students] had lots of opinions. Some were trying to defend me, but out of 30, maybe 3-4 were defending me and 26-27 were against me. And the teacher was neutral and didn't say anything. … I just wanted to leave, and I did. I was upset, of course. I dropped out of the course and I didn't finish it until later, when there was a new teacher.’ Finally, Jennifer discussed her grades. She recounts how her Swedish language teacher started to take issues with her after she started wearing the hijab. Jennifer: ‘She graded me with an E. This was Swedish 1; yet when I finished Swedish 2, I got an A. It was very strange. […] Before she graded me, we had a final exam and she didn't believe that I had written my own paper. I had been working on it for two weeks to get it really good, because I was worried that she would fail me. She started questioning the vocabulary [in Jennifer’s test paper], asking me, “Do you understand this word? What is the meaning of that word?”’ Jennifer describes experiences that demonstrate that any everyday situation can turn into a defence of her choice to be a Muslim and wear a hijab. Her mobility in daily life has changed. She claims that before she started wearing the hijab, she had never undergone such questioning of herself as a person, or her choices, especially not by strangers. Now she has a feeling that she should always be prepared to defend her choice to be a Muslim. She also states that she has to perform much better now than before, in order to be seen as equally competent. This is a common experience among interviewees (Jakku & Waara, 2017). More than that, being presumed incompetent is also a common experience within academia among persons who differ from normative white, heterosexual, middle and upper-class statuses, also outside of Sweden (Muhs et al., 2012). Living in Stockholm, 32-year-old Lena has had similar experiences. She converted to Islam aged 20 and for a short while she wore the hijab but does not do so any longer. She recalls a situation similar to Jennifer's, when she was studying for her master’s degree wearing the hijab. Lena: ‘I remember, I came into the classroom wearing my hijab and he [the professor] didn't even try to hide his reaction. He was shocked and gave me a very strange look. Once he was talking about Islam in the classroom and about oppression and he looked at me and it felt very odd. […] Suddenly I felt like I couldn't talk as much as before in the class. I was that girl, you know, the weird girl. I am used to being treated as a talented student, an intelligent girl, I have been told so many times. […] It was such a difference.’ Ahmed (2006) theorizes about normativity as a trajectory maintained by whiteness and heterosexuality, among other things. When a person diverges from normative expectations, it can cause disharmony and, if prolonged, might lead to disciplinary measures. When a trajectory is disrupted, answers are demanded: why has it happened? Jennifer’s experience in the retirement home is an example of this demand for answers in the face of what is perceived as an aberration, as well as a (conscious or unconscious) attempt on the part of the questioners to introduce disciplinary measures. In a study conducted in Britain, Myfanwy Franks researched the experiences of white converts to Islam and raised the question of whether the converting women are considered by others to be transgressing the borders of whiteness. In response to her findings, Franks employs the concept of hybridity when navigating the understanding of whether the women were facing racism or religious discrimination. She notes that: Making an all-time definition of racism is problematic because ’otherizing’ and subsequent discrimination and injustice which take the form of ’racism’ may overlap with discrimination based upon ethnicity, faith community, nationality and so on and is liable to shift. (Franks, 2000, p. 922) She also notes a racism by proxy, whereby white hijab-wearing women in Britain are called ‘white Pakis,’ reflecting racism against Pakistanis with whom the women are accorded an imagined connection because of the hijab. Similarly, some of the interviewees in this study have pointed out that people tend to assume they are married to an Arab and are wearing the hijab for this reason. Several of them have also experienced being regarded as traitors to the nation or ‘the Swedish race’, a popular trope among populist nationalists and racists (c.f. Franks, 2000; Van Nieuwkerk, 2006). For example, Bahaar is 55 years old and lives in a small town in Sweden. She converted to Islam in 2009 and started wearing the hijab a couple of months after her conversion. She tells that she was standing in line at a grocery store. A man behind her suddenly commented loudly: ‘These black people and these white people who try to dress up as blacks by wearing a veil are disgusting (Bahaar’s interview). In both this and Franks’ example, our informants are identified as white, yet both draw attention to how remarks on the hijab and Muslim clothing as markers of otherness contribute to distancing their wearers from whiteness. In some instances, there even seems to be a desire to force a connection to these ‘others’. The remark by Bahaar’s persecutor clearly introduces the notion that some clothes actually can or do instigate a crossing of the borders of whiteness by their wearers – at least in the eyes of some.8 Several hijab-wearing interviewees mentioned the discomfort of being in public spaces after terror attacks, and the curtailment of their mobility this involves. Even before the attack on Drottninggatan in Stockholm on April 7 2017, Bahaar had told me that she prefers to stay at home when something negative has been perpetrated by Muslims, such as the terrorist attacks in Istanbul and Paris. She feels that she is then more than usually exposed to people's suspicions and biases. Bahaar even considers it to have become inevitable that when terror attacks take place she will be the victim of negative reactions, such as someone shouting, ‘Terrorist, go home’. This abuse also carries the idea that Bahaar does not belong in Sweden, that her home is somewhere else. Juliette Galonnier, in a study conducted in France and the USA, states that the ‘Muslim terrorist’ is a prominent figure in the racialisation of converts (Galonnier, 2015, p. 576). Coming out as a Muslim For most of the women that were interviewed, coming out as a Muslim has been complicated in one way or another. Some of them have observed that even though they wear visibly Muslim clothing, ‘coming out’ moments still occur, for instance if they have made an appointment with someone over phone. One of the most remarkable of these was recounted by Hanna, who is 32, lives in Stockholm and converted to Islam in October 2012. She only wears the hijab on very special occasions, never on a daily basis or at work. Although she wears a Fatima's hand necklace, she remarks that it has become a fashion detail and, together with her appearance, she does not believe that people connect it with her being Muslim. In the beginning, right after her conversion, she had thought about the hijab a lot and she had wanted to wear it, but due to the stigma and opinions about the hijab as something negative among her family members, she felt that the disapproval would be too strong to deal with. She works with human rights and democracy issues and, initially, she did not tell many people about being Muslim, apart from her Muslim friends. At some point, however, she felt obligated to tell her boss, who 8 Moosavi (2015, p. 43) also accounts for instances where a conversion to Islam has been perceived in some sense as a ‘racial’ conversion. dealt with it in a positive way but then told Hanna’s colleagues without first gaining her permission. She does not have positive memories of the reactions of some of them: Hanna: ‘I sat at home crying before it was time to go into work, because I didn't know how to stand up for myself, then again I don't have very racist colleagues. But there is always a lot of discussion, because of islamophobia and the context being the way it is. […] I remember that I almost had a burnout, because I got in for having the best answers on every bias. […] To be honest, I believe this is why I couldn't make it; without the stigma I would probably practice the religion more.’ Bahaar tells me that coming out as a Muslim was not a dramatic event for her close family until she started wearing hijab. Her explanation led me to follow up the issue: Nina: ‘I have found from previous interviews that converts feel they must ‘come out’ as Muslims; sometimes they use the expression themselves, or I use it and they understand what I mean by it. If I understand you correctly, the coming out was not so difficult for you, while coming out as a hijabi was harder?’ Bahaar: ‘Yes, because it became visible that I was a Muslim. When I just told them, but it couldn’t be seen, it was like they didn't have to feel ashamed because of me.’ Thurfjell implies that attitudes towards religion in Sweden are in general sceptical and a gently critical approach is common in public discussion (Thurfjell, 2015, p. 29). As already noted, a common self-identification indicates that Sweden is secular, and religiosity is something that belongs to ´others’; it is, therefore, not a forced assumption that bodies that pass as Swedish and white are also read as secular or post-Christian. Coming out as having a religious identity other than post-Christian (Thurfjell, 2015) seems to cause a break in normative expectations, especially when declaring as a Muslim, due to the negative representation of Islam in Sweden (Thurfjell, 2015, p. 219). Moving in and out of whiteness Several interviewees have described a feeling of being in an in-between position: neither fully part of the Muslim community, yet no longer a member of the non-Muslim population. Among other things, this affects the issue of gender roles. Lena felt that her gender position had changed in other people's’ views, especially since she had started to wear the hijab. Lena: ‘Most of the classmates were nice. But – and this might be a subjective feeling of my own – suddenly with the hijab on I felt more like a woman, in a negative way. A bit more unequal. [… ] In some way I felt that the hijab made me more sexualized, that it was [interpreted] as a symbol of this.’ Several other interviewees have also experienced questions, both from people they do not know and from family, friends and colleagues, which are at some level centred on their gender role: whether their husbands beat them, for example, or if their husbands have forced them to wear the hijab.9 In racialising discourses it is also common that non- white women are exotified and sexualised in a way that contrasts to representations of women more common in the spectrum of normative whiteness (Hübinette et al., 2012, p. 26), which might explain Lena’s experience of being more sexualised. Hanna points out that converting means in some senses a radical change in a person’s life: a break from an accustomed position of invisible whiteness. For her, the decisions to abstain from alcohol, read the Qur’an and pray, for instance, were choices aimed at enhancing her happiness. Yet she remarks that along with those choi ces come the interrogations that ultimately result in a feeling of not being accepted. This might also be analysed from the perspective of degree of Muslimness (Cato, 2012). Cato argues that Swedish political discourse accepts an interpretation of Islam that is liberal, moderate and secular; on the other hand, interpretations that fall outside the ‘good and accepted’ are portrayed as radical, conservative, patriarchal and deviant. Moreover, he argues that it is rare within European political discourse that the terms Islam and Muslim are used in a neutral manner, without connections to terms like ‘good’, ‘mainstream’, ‘moderate’ or ‘radical’. In the European context it is also common that Muslim or ex-Muslim voices are promoted by the media when criticising Islam and Muslims (Cato, 2012, pp. 288-9). I have mentioned that for Bahaar’s close family, her conversion was acceptable as long as it was not visible to the rest of the population. In an interview, Hanna tells me about a colleague who was concerned about the conversion itself, but who also marked some sort of limit by asking: ‘But you don’t pray, right?’ She continues: 9 This impacts on gender roles of Muslim or ‘other’ men as well. The idea of Islam as an unchanging, violent and misogynist religion was a common figure during the colonial period. These representations are though older than that and they do in some form still operate today (Gardell, 2010, p. 67; Cato, 2012, p. 275). Hanna: ‘With intellectual people around me, who are not – I mean there are very few Sweden Democrats10 – it should be one of the best environments to be in as a practicing Muslim. But I believe my experience would be different if I had been born a Muslim and it were clearer that I am a Muslim. Then it becomes diversity [she laughs] [… ] So many things are encoded in social situations in which I take part – in which I am perceived as a white, non- religious person, that it is what other people believe I am.’ As we can see, Hanna encounters potential disciplinary measures or remarks, which can be connected to the discourse of normative secularity. Yet she also comments that not being represented as a ‘real’ Muslim means she cannot be regarded as providing a diversity alibi (c.f. Ahmed, 2011, p. 241). Diversity brought to institutions by bodies that break with whiteness, demonstrates the whiteness that is in place in them, thus the need for diversity (Ahmed, 2012, p. 34). However, while Hanna explains that she might be regarded as too white to function as the token ‘other’, 41 years old Rabia from Stockholm, who wears a hijab since 2012, observes that she often gets invited to public events (especially those with political content) to represent diversity. On the other hand, Rabia feels that she is often invited at someone else's expense, mainly because she believes that even other Muslims think that her whiteness gives her a different kind of voice than that of a less white-passing person. Commonly in white experience, whiteness is, in effect, not acknowledged as a privilege, however my interviewees are highly aware of the benefits their whiteness may accord them in some situations, if it is acknowledged. This confirms Franks’ assumption in her study, mentioned earlier, that the situation of her interviewees in England is generally likely to be easier than that of their sisters who never pass as white. Similar accounts has been made in the Netherlands (Vroon, 2014, p. 87) and Germany (Özyürek, 2010, pp. 173-4) Hanna, for example, notes that she has a choice in most situations, either to go with the flow or to stand up for who she is. She also acknowledges that many of the privileges her whiteness and Swedishness bestow are still there. Hanna: ‘I feel like I am bobbing in a position in between. Sometimes I feel like a hypocrite. I can select when to be visible; I can choose [to show] parts of my identity in a way that most people can’t, and it is a huge privilege to be able to 10 Sweden Democrats is a anti-immigration and anti-Muslim party with roots in white supremacy neo-Nazi movement. The party is represented in the parliament since 2010 and they are for the moment among the three biggest parties in Sweden with estimated support from approximately 20 % of the Swedish voters. do that. As you say, I can choose to not say anything [about being a Muslim] in a job interview, yet in other situations I can say I am a Muslim and be part of a religious context.’ Conclusion Racialisation is common in Sweden on both institutional and structural levels, as well as on the everyday level of interactions between people (Hübinette et al., 2012, p. 17). Some of this racialisation is clearly visible in the experiences shared by my interviewees. If one element characterizing whiteness is its invisibility, for the most part, the hijab- wearing women in this study no longer possess it. Meanwhile, becoming a Muslim but not wearing ‘Muslim clothes’ does not change the possibilities for passing as white in the same way, although it still gives rise to the often-actualized process of ‘coming out’, which, in turn may affect mobility. Some might argue, then, that it is all a matter of religion, but this over-simplifies the different ways racism operates. We have instances where whiteness is clearly at the heart of the issue: for example, when it is assumed that a woman in a hijab is unable to speak Swedish or is asked about her origin on the assumption of its being somewhere other than Sweden. A version of this is when the race-traitor discourse is brought to the fore. Then, informants are identified as white but inappropriate in assumed behaviour. Yet the dimensions of religion and secularity clearly relate to the theories of Swedishness and whiteness discussed in this article, since they obviously impact on how people are racialised; consequently, Franks suggestion of applying the term hybrid in analysis of multiple dimensions is a useful one in the context of this study. If we may conclude, as I do, that the hijab essentialises and highlights everything about the converts’ break with normative white Swedishness, what are the outcomes of this? The interviewees repeatedly made it clear that, with the profession of their new faith, but more specifically the donning of the hijab, they have lost at least part of their ‘invisible’ mobility; this is illustrated by their references to obstacles in educational contexts, at work, in daily interactions with strangers and friends and family and so on. It is not seldom that these instances even carry components of violence – physical, verbal as well as psychological (Jakku & Waara, 2017). Racialising practices often incorporate the idea of categories through which we make sense of people, whether consciously or unconsciously, and the interviewees in this study seem to disrupt the discursive categories of Swedishness and whiteness as well as Muslimness. This in turn leads to confusion among the people they meet, a thing which curtails their freedom of activity and speech and, in the long run, often leads to otherising, discrimination and pure racism. About the author Nina Jakku is a PhD candidate in History of Religions with alignment to Islamology at Lund University. nina.jakku@ctr.lu.se Bibliography Ahmed, S. (2006). Queer phenomenology. Durham and London: Duke University Press. Ahmed, S. (2011). Vithetens hegemoni. Hägersten: Tankekraft Förlag. Ahmed, S. (2012). On being included. Durham and London: Duke University Press. 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Crossing the borders of whiteness? Ethnic and Racial Studies 23(5), 917-929. Fernando, M. (2014). The republic unsettled. Durham and London: Duke University Press. Fur, G. (2016). Kolonisation och kulturmöten under 1600- och 1700-talen. In D. Lindmark., & O. Sundström (Eds.), De historiska relationerna mellan svenska kyrkan och samerna (pp. 241-281). Artos & Norma Bokförlag. Fägerborg, E. (2011). Intervjuer. In L.Kaijser, & M.Öhlander (Eds.), Etnologiskt fältarbete (pp 55-72). Lund: Studentlitteratur. Galonnier, Juliette. (2015). The racialization of Muslims in France and the United States. Social Compass 62, 570-583. Gardell, M. (2010). Islamofobi. Stockholm: Leopard Förlag. Gardell, M., & Muftee, M. (2017.) Islamophobia in Sweden: National report 2017. In E. Bayraklı & F. Hafez, European Islamophobia Report 2017. Istanbul: SETA. Goldberg, D.T. (2006). Racial Europeanization. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 29(2), 331-364. Goldberg, D.T. (2010). Call and response. Patterns of prejudice, 44(1), 89-106. Habel, Y. (2012). Rörelser och schatteringar inom kritiska vithetsstudier. In T.Hübinette et al. (Eds.), Om ras och vithet i det samtida Sverige (pp. 45-82). Mölnlycke: Elanders. Hübinette, T., Hörnfeldt, H., Farahani, F & León Rosales, R. (Eds.). (2012). Om ras och vithet i det samtida Sverige. Mölnlycke: Elanders. Jakku, N., & Waara, A. (2017). Muslimsk klädsel i vita rum. In T.Hübinette (Eds.), Ras och vithet (pp. 159-181). Lund: Studentlitteratur. Jensen, T. G. (2008). To be ‘Danish’, becoming ‘Muslim’. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 34(3), 389-409. Mahmood, S. (2009). Religious reason and secular affect. Critical Inquiry 35 (4), 834-862. Molina, I. (2010). Om föreställd vithet, systerligt medlidande och nya husbyggen. Tidskrift för genusvetenskap 1-2, 79-82. Moosavi, L. (2015). The racialization of Muslim converts in Britain and their experiences of Islamophobia. Critical Sociology 41, 41-56. Muhs, G., Niemann, Y., Gonzales, C., & Harris, A. (Eds.). (2012). Presumed incompetent: The intersection of race and class for women in academia. Boulder: University Press of Colorado. Özyürek, E. (2010). German converts to Islam and their ambivalent relations with immigrant Muslims. In A. Shryock (Eds.), Islamophobia/Islamophilia beyond the politics of enemy and friend (pp.172-192). Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press. Pripp, O., & Öhlander, M. (2011). Observation. In L.Kaijser., & M.Öhlander (Eds.), Etnologiskt fältarbete (pp. 113-147). Lund: Studentlitteratur. Sawyer, L. (2000). Black and Swedish. Michigan: UMI Dissertation Publishing. Sullivan, S. (2006). Revealing whiteness. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Svanberg, I., & Tydén, M. (1999). I nationalismens bakvatten. Lund: Studentlitteratur. Thurfjell, D. (2015). Det gudlösa folket. Molin & Sorgenfrei Förlag. Van Nieuwkerk, K. (Eds.) (2006). Women embracing Islam. Austin: University of Texas Press. Vroon, V. E. (2014). Sisters in Islam. Women’s conversion and the politics of belonging: A Dutch case study. Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam. Wasniowski, A. (2017). Rasismens former. In T.Hübinette el al. (Eds.), Om ras och vithet i det samtida Sverige (pp. 25-45). Mölnlycke: Elanders. The exclusivity of Swedish whiteness dates back to the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth century when ‘scientific’ race-biology notions were born of the pens of scholars. In 1921 the Swedish parliament made the decision to establish the first... Religion and racism 
work_ffaw7vzlpbg4fmmwczlbox53ym	----	Discrimination and mental health among lesbian, gay, and bisexual adults in the United States. | Semantic Scholar Skip to search formSkip to main content> Semantic Scholar's Logo Search Sign InCreate Free Account You are currently offline. Some features of the site may not work correctly. DOI:10.1037/h0098851 Corpus ID: 204978721Discrimination and mental health among lesbian, gay, and bisexual adults in the United States. @article{Bostwick2014DiscriminationAM, title={Discrimination and mental health among lesbian, gay, and bisexual adults in the United States.}, author={Wendy B Bostwick and C. Boyd and T. Hughes and B. West and S. McCabe}, journal={The American journal of orthopsychiatry}, year={2014}, volume={84 1}, pages={ 35-45 } } Wendy B Bostwick, C. Boyd, +2 authors S. McCabe Published 2014 Psychology, Medicine The American journal of orthopsychiatry Health disparities among sexual minority groups, particularly mental health disparities, are well-documented. Numerous studies have demonstrated heightened prevalence of depressive and anxiety disorders among lesbian, gay, and bisexual groups as compared with heterosexuals. Some authors posit that these disparities are the result of the stress that prejudice and perceived discrimination can cause. The current study extends previous research by examining the associations between multiple types… Expand View on PubMed europepmc.org Save to Library Create Alert Cite Launch Research Feed Share This Paper 221 CitationsHighly Influential Citations 23 Background Citations 70 Methods Citations 6 Results Citations 16 View All Tables and Topics from this paper table 1 table 2 table 3 table 3 table 4 table 5 View All 6 Figures & Tables mental health Anxiety Disorders Depressive disorder Female Homosexuality Mental association Physiological Sexual Disorders Sense of identity (observable entity) Prejudice 221 Citations Citation Type Citation Type All Types Cites Results Cites Methods Cites Background Has PDF Publication Type Author More Filters More Filters Filters Sort by Relevance Sort by Most Influenced Papers Sort by Citation Count Sort by Recency Discrimination, Mental Health, and Substance Use Disorders Among Sexual Minority Populations. J. Lee, K. Gamarel, K. Bryant, N. Zaller, D. Operario Psychology, Medicine LGBT health 2016 63 Save Alert Research Feed Bisexual individuals are at greater risk of poor mental health than lesbians and gay men: The mediating role of sexual identity stress at multiple levels. Randolph C. H. Chan, D. Operario, W. Mak Psychology, Medicine Journal of affective disorders 2019 8 Save Alert Research Feed Modeling the impact of social discrimination on the physical and mental health of Portuguese gay, lesbian and bisexual people H. Pereira, P. Costa Psychology 2016 13 View 2 excerpts, cites background Save Alert Research Feed Sexual Orientation Identity in Relation to Minority Stress and Mental Health in Sexual Minority Women. Jae A Puckett, Francisco I Surace, H. Levitt, S. Horne Medicine LGBT health 2016 9 View 1 excerpt, cites background Save Alert Research Feed Sexual orientation and vulnerability to chronic disease: understanding cardiovascular risk factors and mental health disparities among lesbian, bisexual and heterosexual women A. Babic Medicine 2016 Save Alert Research Feed Sexual Orientation Identity in Relation to Minority Stress and Mental Health in Sexual Minority Women. A. PuckettJae, I. SuraceFrancisco, M. LevittHeidi, G. HorneSharon Psychology 2016 17 Save Alert Research Feed Predictors of Anxiety Among Sexual Minority Individuals in the Southern US J. A. Griffin, Christopher F. Drescher, Elizabeth D Eldridge, A. Rossi, Megan M Loew, L. Stepleman Psychology, Medicine The American journal of orthopsychiatry 2018 2 View 2 excerpts, cites background Save Alert Research Feed Exploring Discrimination and Mental Health Disparities Faced By Black Sexual Minority Women Using a Minority Stress Framework S. K. Calabrese, I. Meyer, Nicole M. Overstreet, Rahwa Haile, N. Hansen Psychology, Medicine Psychology of women quarterly 2015 72 View 2 excerpts, cites methods and background Save Alert Research Feed Prevalence of Depression and Anxiety Among Bisexual People Compared to Gay, Lesbian, and Heterosexual Individuals:A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis L. Ross, Travis Salway, L. Tarasoff, Jenna MacKay, Blake W. Hawkins, C. Fehr Psychology, Medicine Journal of sex research 2018 124 Highly Influenced View 8 excerpts, cites background Save Alert Research Feed Racial/ethnic differences in unmet needs for mental health and substance use treatment in a community-based sample of sexual minority women. Yoo Mi Jeong, Cindy B. Veldhuis, Frances Aranda, T. Hughes Medicine Journal of clinical nursing 2016 24 View 1 excerpt, cites background Save Alert Research Feed ... 1 2 3 4 5 ... References SHOWING 1-10 OF 63 REFERENCES SORT BYRelevance Most Influenced Papers Recency Mental health correlates of perceived discrimination among lesbian, gay, and bisexual adults in the United States. V. Mays, S. Cochran Psychology, Medicine American journal of public health 2001 1,278 PDF View 3 excerpts, references background and methods Save Alert Research Feed The relationship between discrimination and substance use disorders among lesbian, gay, and bisexual adults in the United States. S. McCabe, Wendy B Bostwick, T. Hughes, B. West, C. Boyd Psychology, Medicine American journal of public health 2010 368 PDF View 2 excerpts Save Alert Research Feed Dimensions of sexual orientation and the prevalence of mood and anxiety disorders in the United States. Wendy B Bostwick, C. Boyd, T. Hughes, S. McCabe Psychology, Medicine American journal of public health 2010 552 View 2 excerpts, references background and results Save Alert Research Feed Social and psychological well-being in lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals: the effects of race, gender, age, and sexual identity. R. Kertzner, I. Meyer, D. Frost, M. Stirratt Psychology, Medicine The American journal of orthopsychiatry 2009 352 PDF Save Alert Research Feed Sexual orientation and mental health: results from a community survey of young and middle-aged adults. Anthony F Jorm, A. Korten, B. Rodgers, P. Jacomb, H. Christensen Psychology, Medicine The British journal of psychiatry : the journal of mental science 2002 449 PDF Save Alert Research Feed Psychosocial concerns of sexual minority youth: complexity and caution in group differences. V. P. Poteat, Steven R. Aragon, D. Espelage, Brian W. Koenig Psychology, Medicine Journal of consulting and clinical psychology 2009 85 Save Alert Research Feed An Exploration of Sexual Minority Stress Across the Lines of Gender and Sexual Identity Amy L Hequembourg, S. Brallier Psychology, Medicine Journal of homosexuality 2009 136 View 3 excerpts, references background Save Alert Research Feed Perceived determinants of mental health for bisexual people: a qualitative examination. L. Ross, Cheryl Dobinson, A. Eady Sociology, Medicine American journal of public health 2010 227 Save Alert Research Feed Minority stress and mental health in gay men. I. Meyer Psychology, Medicine Journal of health and social behavior 1995 2,468 View 3 excerpts, references background Save Alert Research Feed Sexual Orientation and Psychological Distress in Adolescence: Examining Interpersonal Stressors and Social Support Processes Koji Ueno Psychology 2005 205 View 2 excerpts, references background Save Alert Research Feed ... 1 2 3 4 5 ... 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work_ffxfalnkijhcvd6lxg74wla6b4	----	European Union Non-governmental Organizational Coalitions as Professional Social Movement Communities Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=rcis20 Download by: [Maynooth University Library] Date: 15 November 2017, At: 07:12 Journal of Civil Society ISSN: 1744-8689 (Print) 1744-8697 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rcis20 European Union Non-governmental Organizational Coalitions as Professional Social Movement Communities Pauline Cullen To cite this article: Pauline Cullen (2015) European Union Non-governmental Organizational Coalitions as Professional Social Movement Communities, Journal of Civil Society, 11:2, 204-225, DOI: 10.1080/17448689.2015.1052228 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17448689.2015.1052228 Published online: 16 Jun 2015. Submit your article to this journal Article views: 218 View related articles View Crossmark data Citing articles: 1 View citing articles http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=rcis20 http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rcis20 http://www.tandfonline.com/action/showCitFormats?doi=10.1080/17448689.2015.1052228 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17448689.2015.1052228 http://www.tandfonline.com/action/authorSubmission?journalCode=rcis20&show=instructions http://www.tandfonline.com/action/authorSubmission?journalCode=rcis20&show=instructions http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/mlt/10.1080/17448689.2015.1052228 http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/mlt/10.1080/17448689.2015.1052228 http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1080/17448689.2015.1052228&domain=pdf&date_stamp=2015-06-16 http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1080/17448689.2015.1052228&domain=pdf&date_stamp=2015-06-16 http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/citedby/10.1080/17448689.2015.1052228#tabModule http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/citedby/10.1080/17448689.2015.1052228#tabModule European Union Non-governmental Organizational Coalitions as Professional Social Movement Communities PAULINE CULLEN Department of Sociology, Maynooth University, National University of Ireland Maynooth, Maynooth, Ireland ABSTRACT Previous analysis has looked at the interface between organized civil society (OCS) and European Union (EU) institutions and has posed questions about their role as political communicators for the EU project, and consequently their independence, representativeness, and policy influence. While these accounts focus in part on the role of European OCS in helping the EU institutions in the process of identity building, this work differs in offering an account of the internal processes that build identification and community within EU OCS coalitions. These dynamics are examined using social movement theory on coalitions and communities applied to a diverse coalition of OCS working on a range of social change issues at EU level known as the Platform of European Social NGOs (the Platform). Aside from a broad ideological alignment based on support for a stronger social policy at EU level, the composition of the Platform remains diverse. While diverse organizations can cooperate effectively in loose episodic and strategic alliances, the continuity in and density of collaboration within this coalition are notable. In the process of coalition work Platform members are influenced by external frames that circulate at EU level; they are also involved in a process of community building that has emerged between organizations grappling together to develop a shared understanding of an issue and an agreement around its strategic communication. Through an analysis of coalition structures and outputs, this article contributes to debates on transnational OCS coalitions by exploring the conditions for continuity, survival, and the generative properties of coalitions which move transnational civil society actors beyond purely ad hoc and instrumental, coordinated action to more durable identity-based forms of collaboration. KEY WORDS: Coalitions, organized civil society, European Union, non-governmental organizations, collective identification, community Journal of Civil Society, 2015 Vol. 11, No. 2, 204 – 225, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17448689.2015.1052228 Correspondence Address: Pauline Cullen, Department of Sociology, Maynooth University, National University of Ireland Maynooth County Kildare, Maynooth, Ireland. Email: pauline.cullen@nuim.ie # 2015 Taylor & Francis D ow nl oa de d by [ M ay no ot h U ni ve rs it y L ib ra ry ] at 0 7: 12 1 5 N ov em be r 20 17 mailto:pauline.cullen@nuim.ie Introduction European Union (EU) level non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are important com- ponents of a broader network of European organized civil society (OCS) groups that operate within dense networks of information exchange and policy communities populated by national- and local-level social movements, academics, experts, think tanks, and EU and national political elites (Bee & Guerrina, 2014; Ruzza & Bozzini, 2008). Most ana- lyses of EU NGOs focus on questions regarding their capacity to improve the quality of democratic practice, their vulnerability to cooptation through their receipt of EU funds and ultimately their potential to influence policy-making (Bee & Guerrina, 2014; Cullen, 2010; Geyer, 2001; Greenwood, 2007; Kohler-Koch & Quittkat, 2013; Kroger & Friedich, 2013; Ruzza, 2011). What has already been established for these organizations is that their institutional context has a strong structuring influence on their claims making and that forces of selection and incorporation have narrowed their strategies (Cullen, 2005; Dur, 2008; Trenz, 2009). Another analysis has argued that while restricted in large part to insider tactics, the construction of coalitions of interest between EU NGOs has enabled these actors to mobilize in effective ways to influence EU policy processes (Cullen, 2005; Kendall, 2010; Ruzza, 2004, 2011). Ruzza (2004, 2011) assesses these forms of alli- ance building as now constituting a form of associational ecology and multiorganizational field at EU level. Coalitional arrangements between EU NGOs are in turn supported by EU officials who view them as their preferred avenue for consultation as the EU NGOs con- stitute from their perspective an access point to an aggregation of interests from across European societies. This article takes stock of these processes of alliance building, explores how far this collaboration has evolved, and assesses whether it can now be under- stood as constitutive of a form of community. The work of Aunio and Staggenborg (2011) on coalitions and transnational social movement communities and analyses of collective identification within the global justice movement (Flesher Fominaya, 2010; Hewitt, 2011) are used here to assess the mechanisms of collaboration and processes of collective identification that have emerged between a diverse coalition of NGOs working on a range of social change issues at EU level known as the Platform of European Social NGOs (the Social Platform or the Platform). The Platform is an EU-sponsored coalition of diverse European NGO networks and federations of voluntary and social welfare organizations formally launched in 1994 with six members to promote a semi-institutionalized dialogue between NGOs, EU institutions, national governments, and labour and employer interests on social policy matters. The Platform’s official functions are to facilitate informational exchange between its NGO members, encourage their adoption of common policy positions, and engage in regular consultation with the EU on social policy matters. Aunio and Staggenborg (2011) define a social movement community as a network of interactions among individuals, movement organizations, cultural groups, and institutional supporters that share a collective identity and seek to advance movement goals. One of the forms they recognize is that of a professional social movement organization (SMO) com- munity that includes professional activists associated with international governmental organizations (IGOs) and international NGOs (INGOs), grassroots activists participating in SMOs, and movement supporters among the public. Applying this concept to NGOs that mobilize in coalitions around the institutions of the EU allows for an assessment of the patterns of collaboration and forms of collective communication that increasingly European Union non-governmental organizational coalitions 205 D ow nl oa de d by [ M ay no ot h U ni ve rs it y L ib ra ry ] at 0 7: 12 1 5 N ov em be r 20 17 characterize NGO work on the transnational level. This analysis also affords an explora- tion of how processes of Europeanization work to create new strategic but also epistemo- logical opportunities for EU-level OCS. EU social NGOs are relatively resource-poor and weak actors in the larger context of lobbying and advocacy around the EU institutions. In the context of large asymmetries in power within the political opportunity context, it is common for less powerful actors to work together to reduce costs, increase legitimacy, and maximize impact (Guiraudon, 2001; Yanacopulos, 2005). However I argue that the ‘coalition work’ undertaken by the Platform facilitates forms of social interaction and social ties that suggest a form of cooperation that is different from a largely instrumental coalition (Diani, 2013). Through collaborative action or ‘coalition work’ a form of imagined collective identity develops that distinguishes these relationships from more ad hoc and less coordinated forms of alliance (Diani, 2013; Melucci, 1995). While in the process of coalition work Platform members are influenced by external frames deemed salient to their cause, they are also involved in a process of community building constituted in part by the use of frames that communicate a united front for external audiences but work internally to provide a space for capacity building across organizational, cultural, and sectoral bound- aries. The production of an external-facing form of collective identification and commu- nity is essential in a resource-competitive and politically complex multilevel governance environment, where EU social NGOs have less power than other private interests mobiliz- ing around the EU institutions. Although this collective identification is most likely not evenly or uniformly experi- enced by coalition members or in itself a requirement for many forms of coalition that Plat- form members engage in, it does mark a form of continuity in identification over time (Diani & Bison, 2004; Diani & Pilati, 2011). However, it is important to note that the con- struction of a community of EU social NGOs is a goal supported in particular by the Plat- form secretariat for which acts of community are understood to be an important organizational objective. Notably what is constructed here is more of a community of interest rather than a community of equals, and power asymmetries shape coalition dynamics and community-building processes. This article is divided into three parts. The first details the method and case and then reviews social movement scholarship on organizational coalitions and social movement communities, arguing that the location, repertoires, and network structures of the Platform and its members allow them to be understood as a form of transnational professional SMO community. Next an exploration of the concept of collective identity and Platform working group structures and position papers allows for an assessment of whether the Plat- form meets the other criteria for a professional SMO community, i.e. the existence of a form of collective identification understood as a precondition for community. In the third part of the article social movement concepts of framing and collective identity are employed to make sense of the coalition’s use of internal and external framing, commu- nicated here through a combination of oppositional and internally focused frames, for the Platform’s strategic objectives and long-term sustainability. This latter point is timely in that austerity and the neoliberal framework of the EU project more generally mean that the long-term prospects of significant financial support for this sector are under threat, which may have implications for members’ capacities and motivations for collaboration. It is within this hostile political opportunity context that NGO coalitions can benefit from a form of community as coalitions act as a form of political cover. 206 P. Cullen D ow nl oa de d by [ M ay no ot h U ni ve rs it y L ib ra ry ] at 0 7: 12 1 5 N ov em be r 20 17 This work argues for a focus on the interactions and substantive collaborations between EU NGOs as a contribution to more theoretical efforts to assess the influence, representa- tiveness, and democratic potential of these civil society groups at EU level. The Social Platform: Methodological and conceptual considerations Document analysis was the predominant method employed and was informed by interview data to make sense of the understandings and experiences of Platform staff and members as they interact and collaborate to shape EU policy through common campaigns. Internal organizational dynamics and external organizational communications were analysed on the basis of documents including minutes of working group meetings, press releases, policy positions, and annual reports. Publicly available documents were accessed from the Social Platform website and other internal documents were supplied by its secretariat and its member organizations. Interview data provide insights from the perspective of key EU officials, Platform sec- retariat members, and some key members of the coalition. Purposive sampling was used to select interviewees. Interviews were conducted with two officials from DG Justice Funda- mental Rights and Citizenship in September 2011. Face-to-face and telephone interviews were conducted with Social Platform policy and advocacy advisors in September 2011, August 2012, October 2013, and May 2014. Additional interviews were conducted with directors of four NGO Platform members, two from the social service sector and two from the anti-discrimination sector, who asked to remain anonymous due to the sensitive nature of their contributions. Participants offered assessments of the evolution of the Plat- form, its current position as an interlocutor on social policy issues at EU level, and their experiences of participation in working groups and collaboration on campaigns. The advantages of combining interview data and document analysis lay in possibilities to explore the motivations behind specific organizational priorities and strategies. It also allowed for an assessment of members’ efforts to reach forms of shared understanding and ultimately the frameworks employed by the Platform in communicating its position to its membership and externally in EU institutional contexts. The limitations are those attendant to small sample size case study research that cannot provide a comprehensive review of an organization’s activities or an audit of its entire membership but rather an in-depth, if partial, account of organizational dynamics (Berg, 2007). The case: The Platform The Platform emerged in the early 1990s during a period of support within the EU insti- tutions, specifically the European Commission, for the development of an EU social policy. Founding members seized this opportunity, securing funding and an agreement with the EU institutions to extend a form of consultative status to its members on social policy issues. The intervening years saw growing complexity in the opportunity context for its members with the demotion of social policy as an EU priority at the same time as an extension of EU competencies in a range of public policy areas of interest to its members. While the coalition grew in membership, rationalized its structures, and profes- sionalized its secretariat, it also experienced periodic threats to its funding and significant internal disagreements rooted in contests over ideology, strategy, and competition for resources (Cullen, 2010). The EU is the main funding source for the coalition and many European Union non-governmental organizational coalitions 207 D ow nl oa de d by [ M ay no ot h U ni ve rs it y L ib ra ry ] at 0 7: 12 1 5 N ov em be r 20 17 of its members. 1 While stratification still exists between larger and smaller coalition members and ideological and strategic tensions shape coalition dynamics, the Platform has survived for 20 years and now includes 49 organizations. 2 The Platform is characterized by the diversity of its membership (see Table 1). Around 40% of Platform members declare themselves as advocacy groups, while over a third identify as service providers (Johansson & Lee, 2012, pp. 11 – 14). One of the most notable cleavages within the Platform is between social service providers—some with faith-based orientations—and organizations advocating on equality and anti-discrimi- nation issues including feminist, sexual minority, and anti-racism NGOs. 3 For example the European Women’s Lobby (EWL), a founding Platform member, is a feminist organ- ization that holds a different understanding of what constitutes a family than COFACE, a more traditionally oriented family rights organization. CARITAS, the Catholic social service and social justice organization, also holds very different views on a range of issues related to sexuality and sexual orientation than another Platform member, ILGA Europe (European affiliate of the International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans-, and Inter- sex Association). While most members share then a similar strategic orientation, the fact that they are active in different policy sectors and represent a range of constituents in turn affects their conceptualization of social problems. While diverse NGOs can cooperate effectively in loose episodic and strategic alliances, the continuity in and density of col- laboration within this coalition are notable. Importantly, despite this diversity, Platform members can be arranged along a continuum of broad ideological alignment based on support for a stronger social policy agenda at EU level and variants of an anti-neoliberal perspective. As Kendall (2010) suggests, The Social Platform has proved effective and durable in institutional terms bridging diverse NGO constituencies through intelligent, reflexive framing of the social policy agenda in ways which would simultaneously appeal very broadly across both reformist and conservative strands of the third sector. (p. 50) Making sense of how this variegated political formation can cohere in such a sustained manner leads us to explore the relationship between ideational, identity, and instrumental elements in coalition formation and maintenance. In what follows I theorize and explore in empirical terms how sustained interaction over time between organizations on substantive issues facilitated a deepening of a common broad ideological agenda that in turn facilitated a form of imagined collective identity and community. This form of collective identifi- cation and community is constituted in the act of coalition, shaped by the instrumental or organizational objective to strengthen the EU social NGO sector, by ideational commit- ments to the EU as a venue for social justice and redistribution and by the diffusion of expertise and a form of common identification. SMO coalitions and communities A coalition’s durability and depth are issues that social movement scholars have examined in research on the role played by the structure of social ties and networks, shared ideol- ogies and frames in coalition formation and survival (Maney, 2012; Staggenborg, 2010, 2013; Van Dyke & McCammon, 2010). This work has established that the conditions 208 P. Cullen D ow nl oa de d by [ M ay no ot h U ni ve rs it y L ib ra ry ] at 0 7: 12 1 5 N ov em be r 20 17 Table 1. List of member organizations of the Social Platform (as of May 2015) AGE Platform Europe Autism Europe Caritas Europa ATD Quart Monde—Fourth World Movement a CECODHAS—Housing Europe CECOP-CICOPA Europe—European Confederation of Workers’ Co-operatives, Social Cooperatives, and Participative Enterprises CEDAG—European Council for Non-Profit Organisations a COFACE—Confederation of Family Organisations in the EU Dynamo International—Street Workers Network EAEA—European Association for the Education of Adults a EAPN—European Anti-Poverty Network EASPD—European Association of Service Providers for Persons with Disabilities EBU—European Blind Union ECDN—European Consumer Debt Network EDF—European Disability Forum EUCDN—European Community Development Network a ENAR—European Network Against Racism ENSIE—European Network of Social Integration Enterprises EPA—European Parents’ Association EPHA—European Public Health Alliance EPR—European Platform for Rehabilitation ESAN—European Social Action Network EURAG—European Federation of Older Persons EUROCHILD EURODIACONIA—European Federation for Diaconia ERIO—European Roma Information Office a EFOMW—European Forum of Muslim Women a EUROCARERS—European Association Working for Carers a EWL—European Women’s Lobby FAI—The International Federation of Christian Associations of Italian Workers FEANTSA—European Federation of National Organisations working with the Homeless FEFAF—European Federation of Parents and Carers at Home ICSW—International Council on Social Welfare Europe IFSW—International Federation of Social Workers Europe ILGA Europe—The European Region of the International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans- and Intersex Association INCLUSION EUROPE—The European Association of Societies of Persons with Intellectual Disability IPPF-EN—International Planned Parenthood Federation European Network a IUT—International Union of Tenants MHE—Mental Health Europe PICUM—Platform for International Cooperation on Undocumented Migrants Red Cross EU Office a SOLIDAR TGEU—Transgender Europe VOLONTEUROPE WAGGGS—World Association of Girl Guides and Girl Scouts Europe Region YFJ—European Youth Forum YES Forum—Youth and European Social Work Forum a a Associate members. European Union non-governmental organizational coalitions 209 D ow nl oa de d by [ M ay no ot h U ni ve rs it y L ib ra ry ] at 0 7: 12 1 5 N ov em be r 20 17 that allow for the emergence of coalitions such as threats from the external context may differ from those that allow for continuity of coalitions. Threats are likely to influence the timing of coalition emergence and a shared adversary may allow groups to collaborate without sharing a broader ideology, but this only lasts so long (Bandy & Smith, 2005; Van Dyke & McCammon, 2010, pp. 1292 – 1293). The size of the coalition and the diversity of its membership are also relevant factors that influence how members evaluate the benefits and risks of collaboration. Research suggests that although SMOs may lose visibility in large coalitions, they also stand to gain legiti- macy in new areas and to make valuable contacts (Staggenborg, 2010, pp. 322 – 324). In instrumental terms, membership of the Platform has enabled organizations to acquire expertise on and access to EU social policy-making processes and is supported by the sec- retariat and members through a formal organizational goal of creating a cohesive EU social NGO sector. Collaboration between SMOs facilitates the transfer of knowledge between organizations, the acquisition of new expertise, and the diffusion of tactics (Wang & Soule, 2012). However, ideational factors also shape coalition membership and maintenance particu- larly amongst diverse groups of organizations. Some scholars have identified ideology as a core element that allows social movement organizations to aggregate in what are termed social movement families (dellaPorta & Rucht, 1995). This work has focused specifically on identifying ideological coherence or compatibility across different social movement organizations that emerge at a similar point in time and draw on common repertoires and collective action frames (dellaPorta & Rucht, 1995). McCright and Dunlap (2008), in their analysis of the social bases of progressive social movement ideology, argue that the presence of a common ideology is a key element in orienting diffusion processes within a movement family. Their emphasis on the role played by movement ideology in allowing social movement organizations to cohere in strategic terms is useful in placing ideational factors at the centre of a treatment of social movement communities. Inter- movement diffusion of ideology and tactics is multifaceted and involves sharing person- nel, overlapping social movement communities, and organizational coalitions that share a common master frame that works as a central ideational element of an enduring ideology (McCright & Dunlap, 2008, p. 382). The coalition work explored below reveals how Platform members from the two main groupings or social movement families, i.e. anti-discrimination NGOs and service provi- der NGOs, collaborated in a broader social movement organizational community of EU social NGOs. Anti-discrimination NGOs (women’s rights, anti-racism, sexuality, and dis- ability rights) are clearly identifiable allies in ideational terms. Social service provider NGOs (mental health, intellectual disability, faith-based social justice, anti-poverty, etc.) have less explicit ideological coherence but do share a common commitment to social inclusion and social policy at national and EU levels. Collaboration on substantive issues across this divide required the deepening of existing broad ideological similarities through the construction of shared meanings and frames on carefully chosen transversal issues. The emergence of an overarching ideological framework has in this case facilitated processes of capacity building, collective identification, and community. My overall argu- ment is that, while ideological (ideational) factors remain an issue for such a diverse coalition, instrumental concerns (capacity building/shared understandings) and the pro- duction of a deepened collective ideational framework have allowed for a collective identification and community to evolve. 210 P. Cullen D ow nl oa de d by [ M ay no ot h U ni ve rs it y L ib ra ry ] at 0 7: 12 1 5 N ov em be r 20 17 Applied to the EU context Ruzza (2011) argues that civil society coalitions do not necessarily alter the main identity of movement participants; rather, what is generated from such forms of collaboration can have important implications for modes of conceptu- alization and the analytical lenses employed by specific organizational members. In short, organizations can learn from each other. For Platform members, learning from each other and mobilizing together have over time allowed a form of collective identification to emerge. Rather than a deep sense of personal or social identity that may accompany long-term activism at grassroots level, this form of collective identification is rooted in professional social ties, common ideology, and shared organizational and professional socialization specific to the Brussels-based habitus (Favell & Guiraudon, 2011). In this context, the earlier work of negotiation and compromise required at the beginning of a coalition have over time allowed for familiarity, shared understandings, and trust to develop as a set of coalition-based practices, perspectives, and identifications emerges (Van Dyke & McCammon, 2010). Ultimately it is the role of this coalition work and the forms of collective identification that emerge from such engagement that underpin a sense of community that helps to sustain coalitions. In other words, while there are elements of community that emerge in the formation of a coalition, over time coalitions themselves foster further development of community. The Social Platform as a professional SMO community While research on coalitions tells us about how coalitions emerge, develop, and decline, work that looks at the structural or organizational and interactional context of coalitions under the rubric of community is helpful in making sense of how diverse organizations coalesce to maintain a consistent range of movement engagements across a field of action (Staggenborg, 1986,1988; Staggenborg & Taylor, 2005, p. 40). Building on earlier work on social movement communities that assessed movement coalitions in this vein at the national and local level, Aunio and Staggenborg (2011) have more recently speculated on how these processes work in the transnational domain. In their conceptual- ization professional activists associated with IGOs and INGOs, grassroots activists parti- cipating in social movement organizations, and movement supporters among the public are all members of a transnational social movement community. The central element of community membership is a sense of shared identity understood at the transnational level as dependent on a form of ‘imagined community’ formed through social ties, collab- oration on common campaigns, and participation at international conferences (Aunio & Staggenborg, 2011, pp. 365 – 367). 4 Of relevance here is the professional social movement community, composed of SMOs and institutionally engaged activists embedded in pro- fessional and social networks operating in multiorganizational fields of action. According to Aunio and Staggenborg, Institutionalized through their participation in the UN and other global institutions, professional movement communities are comprised of stable networks of pro- fessional activists with expertise on a range of movement issues. In addition to main- taining movements by ongoing lobbying and public relations work, they help to mobilize grassroots and conscience communities by keeping movement concerns on the public agenda and by alerting movement constituents to new issues. (2011, p. 6) European Union non-governmental organizational coalitions 211 D ow nl oa de d by [ M ay no ot h U ni ve rs it y L ib ra ry ] at 0 7: 12 1 5 N ov em be r 20 17 Aunio and Staggenborg claim that professional SMO communities are distinguished by their use of contained as opposed to transgressive contention, the inclusion of knowledge brokers and groups that practice ‘information politics’. They contend that through the act of collecting and disseminating information on salient issues, professional SMOs partici- pate in the all-important process of problem definition and may develop ‘epistemic com- munities’ that leverage expert knowledge on behalf of principled ideas. The Platform enjoys forms of insider access to the regular venues of transnational poli- tics and institutionalized policy-making. Tactics employed include lobbying officials and politicians and the preparation of tool kits for use by national- and local-level members. In this way the Platform plays an epistemic role that is acknowledged in a tradition of formal and informal consultations, commonly referred to as civil dialogue, that exist between its NGO members, EU officials, and Parliamentarians. 5 These functions and tactics suggest a fit between this coalition and many of the elements that characterize a professional SMO community. An additional element of the concept of professional SMO community is the existence of professional leaders who use their expertise within international institutions to develop networks particularly in the context of campaigns (Aunio & Staggenborg, 2011, p. 368). The Platform’s secretariat, director, and the leaders of its member organizations have been instrumental in constructing durable networks for intelligence gathering, sharing, and capacity building across the EU civil society sector more generally (Cullen, 2005, 2010; Johansson & Lee, 2012). Another characteristic of a professional SMO community is that while they develop in international fora they possess the capacity to shift advocacy work ‘up’ or ‘down’ depending on the campaign at hand. Platform campaigns are tied to the serial EU presidencies that shift between member countries in six-month cycles and now work in a trimester process that this coalition shadows as a means to influence EU but also national policy formation. The fact that most EU social NGOs are composed of national chapters or affiliates suggests the potential for a feedback loop that can be variable in its participatory quality but may allow for the transfer of information and expertise from both directions. EU social NGOs are also typical of most professionalized NGOs in having strong institutional structures, resources, and professionalized staff who coordinate often with one another within international venues and in social movement campaigns. In short, in organizational terms, its networked structure, tactics, and output together suggest a fit between the Platform and many of the characteristics of a professional SMO community. However, simple participation in an international event or consultation on matters of policy does not denote community. Participants must establish and maintain networks over time in order to develop the collective identity so essential to the construction of a community (Aunio & Staggenborg, 2011, p. 368). Direct ties are essentially reinforced through regular contact that in itself facilitates the construction of strong networks. In this respect, regular, routinized participation in collaboration fosters long-term engage- ment at the international level that helps professionals build mutual trust, support, insti- tutional knowledge, collective identity, and thus community (Aunio & Staggenborg, 2011, pp. 369 – 370). Platform members do meet frequently as a function of their membership in a series of working groups but also as a consequence of the fact that some of the members hold mem- bership of their coalition partners. For instance, the European Disability Forum (EDF), an important player in the Platform, has a women’s rights committee that also holds member- ship in another Platform partner, the EWL. This is but one example of the overlapping 212 P. Cullen D ow nl oa de d by [ M ay no ot h U ni ve rs it y L ib ra ry ] at 0 7: 12 1 5 N ov em be r 20 17 nature of membership patterns that reinforce the density of interactions and network ties and the flow of communication across and between organizations. Simply put, Platform members encounter each other frequently in face-to-face and virtual interaction as they navigate the EU political context. In empirical terms, the Platform stated that in 2013 it held 8 skills-sharing or capacity-building seminars and 37 internal meetings. Interviewees indicate that outside of this official count they attended additional working group meetings and smaller ‘side’ meetings or contacts with other members on issues raised as part of campaigns associated with the coalition (Social Platform, 2014a; Interview with Platform member, September 2012; Interview with secretariat, September 2013 and May 2014). Whereas a policy network suggests a group of actors aligned by mutual interest and resource dependence, a professional SMO community denotes a more stable set of relations that rest on the crystallization of a form of collective identity (see Table 2). In what follows I explore the structures and outputs of the Platform to understand dynamics of collective identification and community. The Platform and collective identity formation The evolution of the Platform across a 20-year period from its origins as an ad hoc talking shop to its current shape as a formalized and legally established entity with its own internal rules, membership criteria, and governance structures is reflective of a trajectory of com- munity building across the EU social NGO sector. As one of the directors of a long-stand- ing Platform member remarked, There is now in the Platform a sense of community and of shared purpose, this was not always the case but enough time has now passed that even when there is a turn- over of personnel you can still feel that there is that understanding that you don’t have to go back to the beginning on everything and we don’t have to agree on every- thing; we can still share a sense of community. (Interview with Platform member September 2011) This sense of shared purpose was not an easy or inevitable consequence of the proliferation of NGOs at EU level but was rather the outcome of the work of its members and secretariat Table 2. The Platform of Social NGOs as a professional SMO community Professional SMO community Platform of Social NGOS Location International meetings, conferences, events 3 Transnational context, bilateral working groups, general assembly, and campaign- based events Repertoires Information politics, lobbying, networking, contained contention 3 Common positions, invited inputs and consultations, press releases Network structure and ties Transnational network of organizations, strong ties formed through collaboration, high network density 3 Umbrella for transnational network, overlapping memberships, mini-coalitions, bilateral and multilateral alliances European Union non-governmental organizational coalitions 213 D ow nl oa de d by [ M ay no ot h U ni ve rs it y L ib ra ry ] at 0 7: 12 1 5 N ov em be r 20 17 engaging in a carefully managed and at times painful process of coalition building. Over time coalition members participated in growing the coalition, agreeing on a shared vision, and constructing permanent organizational structures. This required the development of trust and a sense of linked fates that rested on a form of imagined collective identification. Aunio and Staggenborg draw on Polletta and Jasper (2001, p. 284) to define collective identity as an individual’s cognitive, moral, and emotional connections with a broader community, category, practice, or institution. It is a perception of a shared status or relation, which may be imagined rather than experienced directly, and it is distinct from personal identities; although it may form part of a personal identity, it is formed through participation. Joint action over time creates the context within which this imagined collective identity can emerge. As Melucci (1995) argues, collective identification is a dynamic process best understood as generated through sustained interaction. Flesher Fominaya (2010) draws on Snow’s (2001) work to indicate an additional element of collective identity, that of product. Snow argues that collective identity is also a product that is generated for movement participants and audiences to react to. This formulation is a key element of Flesher Fominaya’s (2010) analysis of diversity in the global justice movement. She reminds us that movement adversaries and audiences do not respond to the collective identity of a movement as it is experienced by members; rather, they respond to the visible expression and projection of political content which is only in some cases defined in terms similar to the collective identity of the movement. In other words, the process of collective identity formation is an intra- movement phenomenon even though it is conditioned and constructed in interaction with the broader political field. Here she warns against confusing intra-movement collec- tive identity processes with the publicly projected movement identity. However, in some cases the construction of that collective identity is a central, explicit goal of the movement that is then strategically employed as a political tool (Flesher Fomi- naya, 2010, p. 379). Interview data and the Platform’s annual work programme confirm that the coalition states as a core objective that ‘[t]he collective identity of civil society organ- izations (CSOs) is strengthened and communicated effectively’ (Social Platform, 2011a, p. 8). Running an effective Platform is also listed as a core objective to be delivered by ‘com- municating more effectively what Social Platform members intend to achieve together’ (Social Platform, 2011a, p. 9). As a member of the Platform team commented, ‘Our intent is to get our members a bit closer to each other and also to make them aware that their issues are connected to one another’ (Interview with Platform secretariat, September 2012). Growing a form of collective identification for the Platform is to be achieved through ‘[s]upporting members to develop mutual understanding and by sharing information and skills’ (Social Platform, 2011a, p. 6). This focus on growing a sense of solidarity and mutual understanding is connected to one of the Platform’s three strategic goals: that of strengthening the social civil society sector (Social Platform, 2011a, p. 8). In other words, developing a form of collective identification across what has been a fragmented and diverse sector is seen as part of a broader strategic goal to influence EU policy. This objective is even more explicitly detailed in the Platform’s Strategic Orientation 2014 – 2020 that acknowledges the growth in size and complexity of the coalition now requiring ‘a framework to help ensure consistency of purpose and action’(Social Platform, 214 P. Cullen D ow nl oa de d by [ M ay no ot h U ni ve rs it y L ib ra ry ] at 0 7: 12 1 5 N ov em be r 20 17 2013a, p. 2). The framework lists a series of objectives aimed to ‘provide coherence, focus and direction to all of the activities . . . and help create a sense of belonging to a community that encompasses the various identities and interests of our members’ (Social Platform, 2013a, p. 2). Here community is discursively constructed to be broad enough to contain a variety of identities and interests as an intra-movement product but at the same time understood as a prerequisite to outwardly focused strategic efforts. The Platform also reoriented its thematic focus towards five different ‘strands’ that underpin its work programme, namely inclusion, rights, services, employment, and civil dialogue. These strands intersect with specific campaign areas. This cross-cutting of cam- paigns with thematic priorities and elements of EU policy is suggested by the Platform director ‘to provide for more a holistic approach on social policies as this allows us to show the interrelation between the different policy areas of our members and the connec- tion to EU policy’ (Interview with Platform Director, 2012). This effort to tie organizations together and to foster advocacy that reflects the intersec- tional nature of many social problems is also a strategy to advance and broaden members’ reach across a wider area of EU agencies and policy contexts. In this way, growing a sense of imagined belonging to this community is both a strategic and an epistemological goal. It also requires a buy-in to a methodology that asks organizations in this space to seek out interconnections between their issues and constituencies and those of other member organ- izations. Thus, this is also about providing an intellectual context for interrelating different policy areas, a deliberative space for processes to occur that allow participants to become invested in a common decision, and ultimately a context for the crafting of a coordinated or united front to external adherents. We can see the dynamics of collaboration that I argue are constitutive of this form of community when we focus on specific campaigns and common positions that the alliance has generated. Campaigns are a central feature of social movements (dellaPorta & Rucht, 2002; Staggenborg & Lecomte, 2009) and are important not only in achieving goals, but also in mobilizing communities and maintaining movements. The Platform has worked in many of these roles to generate a form of agreement around at times divisive issues includ- ing common positions on the revision of EU legislation prohibiting discrimination. Working groups provide the context where policy issues are debated and common pos- itions are constructed. Common positions take the form of technical documents that aim to provide expert knowledge to policy-makers and politicians but also contain elements of more confrontational campaigning. A closer reading of internal debates within these working groups sheds light on how the processes of constructing a form of collective iden- tity and community are marked with contests over the content and meanings of the common positions that are generated. Working groups Research has affirmed that internal structures are a key element in supporting the mainten- ance of diverse coalitions. Such structures need to be organized in a way that avoids expli- cit competition but allows at the same time for meaningful participation (Staggenborg, 2010, p. 323). Wood’s (2005) work on the transnational coalition Peoples Global Action detailed how diverse organizations developed a strategy of working together on living documents that were continually revised and that provided a mechanism for creating collective identity which helped maintain the coalition. In the Platform’s case, divisions European Union non-governmental organizational coalitions 215 D ow nl oa de d by [ M ay no ot h U ni ve rs it y L ib ra ry ] at 0 7: 12 1 5 N ov em be r 20 17 between Platform members on issues including membership criteria, the primacy of differ- ent aspects of inequality within the Platform’s value statement, and competition for EU funds had periodically threatened to fracture the alliance (Cullen, 2010). One specific innovation introduced by a former director to deal with such conflicts was the introduction of the system of working groups where, in similar terms to Wood’s case, participants worked together on a form of ‘living document’. Working groups 6 give an insight into the central role played by the secretariat in build- ing cohesion, collective identification, and community. When asked about building con- sensus across such a large and diverse membership, a policy officer stated that over time the secretariat had figured out where the fault lines were. In her words, It is now up to us to know where the conflicts are – to diffuse issues early on and, where it makes sense, involve external people to build expertise and diffuse dis- agreement. Working groups have been a good space to achieve this. (Interview with policy officer, May 2014) Platform working groups are open to all members, meet quarterly, and are organized around different core campaigns of the Platform. Their function is to identify and propose areas of work, determine the direction and timing of any action, and ultimately draft policy papers (Social Platform, 2012a, p. 3). Three central working groups that had gained permanent status were the Working Group on Fundamental Rights and Non- Discrimination (WGFRAND) (renamed in 2013 Working Group on Fundamental Rights and Equality [WGFRE]), the Working Group on Social Policy (WGSP), and the Working Group on Social Services of General Interest (WGSSGI). Working group members communicate between meetings but officially interact on a quarterly basis in scheduled meetings where European Parliamentarians, European Commission officials, and experts are invited to contribute. Importantly working groups can be seen as contexts where coalition work takes place and where member organizations debate and deliberate on policy issues. They are also, in a more formal mode, the context through which members can access high-level EU officials, network with other members, and become exposed to specific external forms of expertise. An audit of members’ participation suggests that there is a cross-pollination of social service, advocacy, and anti-discrimination organizations across both WGFRE and WGSP. However, there is slightly less attendance of anti-discrimination NGOs at the WGSP meetings. The WGSSGI attracts few organizations that are not explicitly in the job of providing social services. When asked about their motivations for participating in working groups, one Platform member stated, Our alliances need to push out beyond usual suspects and the Platform and its working groups are good for this. These work well because on the whole there now exists commonality, solidarity and knowledge of each other. (Interview with NGO member, September 2011) The opportunity to attend working groups on issues outside of a member’s traditional focus is also understood here as a chance to move beyond the obvious allies and as a way of ‘educating’ other members on issues that an organization has an expertise in and is eager to gain new sources of support to advance. Another Platform member 216 P. Cullen D ow nl oa de d by [ M ay no ot h U ni ve rs it y L ib ra ry ] at 0 7: 12 1 5 N ov em be r 20 17 remarked that working groups were a ‘place for us to train others on issues like violence against women’ (Interview with EWL, September 2011). Working groups and the web of meetings that accompanied them also provide the context where organizations calibrate their networking in this ideologically diverse coalition. This is particularly important for advocates on issues such as gender equality where some members hold differing positions on issues such as family composition. As the secretary general of the largest gender equality NGO commented, ‘In the Platform we try to participate in as many working group as we can, but fundamentally we tend to use this space to shift between bilateral and multilateral links for different topics.’ She continued, We work with COFACE [a family rights NGO] on some issues. With CARITAS [a Christian social justice NGO] we avoid reproductive rights but link in with them on poverty, and then look to IPPF [International Planned Parenthood] for a different set of connections. (Interview with EWL, September 2011) The EWL also used the working group structures to gain political support for its own cam- paign to combat violence against women, enlisting more than half of the Platform members to sign its petition calling for a European Year on Ending Violence Against Women (Social Platform, 2011e). More recently the EWL working in the context of an Employment Working Party (EMPLWP), a subgroup of the WGSP, raised the issue of a stalled EU maternity leave directive and, in coalition with COFACE, campaigned for a European year for reconciling work and family life (Social Platform, 2013b). Other mini-coalitions emerged around the efforts of Platform members working on discrimi- nation and equality issues within the WGFRAND to influence EU anti-discrimination legislation and funding. The Platform has also worked to craft campaigns that enable its members to transcend specific working groups and identify with broader structural analyses of equality and social justice. Working groups in themselves have worked as sites for the exposure of Plat- form members to academic social scientific expertise with training on concepts including multiple discrimination, equality mainstreaming, intersectionality, bias violence, and care as a social construct. As a member of the Platform secretariat remarked, Working groups now provide a context for training for our members also where they can learn from each other and perhaps acknowledge the interconnected nature of many of the issues they focus upon individually. (Interview with Platform member, September 2011) Platform members do see the coalition as a venue to build capacity, for example, in access to technical expertise. This is made clear by a Platform member referring to the EU over- haul of its economic governance which afforded a degree of public consultation on the highly technical reconfiguration of the market system that governs EU member state econ- omic policy-making. He noted, ‘NGOs are quite new to be consulted on budgetary issues. We have little experience of the technical elements, and the Platform is a good space to help fill this gap’ (Interview with Platform member, 2012). Aside from working group structures, carefully choreographed campaigns and common positions illustrate some elements of how the Platform works as a site where coalition European Union non-governmental organizational coalitions 217 D ow nl oa de d by [ M ay no ot h U ni ve rs it y L ib ra ry ] at 0 7: 12 1 5 N ov em be r 20 17 work takes place, consensus is crafted, and a form of imagined collective identification and community is enacted. The Platform’s recommendations on care The Platform’s annual theme for 2011 was that of care. This theme afforded the coalition a unique opportunity to pull its members ‘closer together’ whereby working group structures and the secretariat collaborated in a year-long process of commissioning external exper- tise, surveying members and developing a concept paper that was then debated to construct a common set of recommendations. This was not without difficulties: The exercise of soli- citing input and evidence for the common position was not an easy one. As one Platform policy officer commented, ‘This is a more diverse and contentious working group with many differences of opinion and tough struggles to agree on a shared approach’ (Interview with policy officer, September 2011). Feantsa, the organization representing service providers for the homeless, and Eurodia- conia, a social service organization from a Catholic social perspective, coordinated the working group on care. While the working group was heavily populated by social service provider members, other equality-oriented NGOs including the EWL, Eurochild, and ENAR were also present. The care paper was, as a Platform member commented, an effort to ‘try and bridge the different fields’ and to provide an opportunity for collaboration between advocacy and social service organizations who often struggled to find common ground. As a member of the Platform secretariat suggested, We are trying to make more and more links between members on the position on care. All three working groups were consulted as care is an equality issue but also a social policy one. (Interview with a member of the Platform secretariat, September 2011) Responding broadly to the breadth of Platform members and their constituents, care givers, care users, and care workers are distinguished in the position paper as central actors. Care is also conceptualized as a gendered phenomenon with references to the gender care burden and the feminized nature of paid work in the care sector. All of these issues are linked in the statement, We call to vindicate the fundamental rights of care users. This can be accomplished when you invest in services, train and provide decent work conditions for care workers and sufficient support for families who care. (Social Platform, 2011b, p. 2) The document also casts a wide net across a range of equality issues including discrimi- nation in access to care services, highlighting also the overuse of residential care in some member states for Roma children and other vulnerable groups (Social Platform, 2011c). The Platform’s recommendations on care exemplify the coalition’s effort to build a community response, and illustrate how members collectively identified as a cross-sec- toral force that could advocate on a complex issue from a variety of perspectives. For the Platform secretariat, the exercise helped to remind members of an added value to 218 P. Cullen D ow nl oa de d by [ M ay no ot h U ni ve rs it y L ib ra ry ] at 0 7: 12 1 5 N ov em be r 20 17 coalition membership by enabling them to make connections between and across their causes. This said, the decision to choose care as a thematic priority does reflect the preva- lence of the social service provider NGOs in the coalition. This theme was also chosen at the height of the Eurocrisis and reflects a strategic effort to ground the Platform and its members at a time when more specific campaigns had found little traction. A second campaign and common position on bias violence illustrates another carefully choreographed effort to pull members ‘closer together’. The Platform’s position paper on bias violence The WGFRAND, constituted by a majority of anti-discrimination and equality NGOs, took a more central role in the Platform’s common position on bias violence. The decision to work on the issue of bias violence was taken as way of activating a number of members’ shared interests in discrimination as a source of violence and of pulling social service NGOs into considering the issue in a cross-sectoral way. It was also a response to stalled efforts to advance EU initiatives on violence against women, a revision of anti-dis- crimination legislation, and to capitalize on EU-level frameworks to protect the victims of hate crimes, including a recent EU Victims Directive (Social Platform, 2012b, p. 3). The process of constructing the common position involved surveying members on their under- standings and approach to the issue of violence and was followed up with a training session conducted by an academic expert on bias violence (Social Platform, 2011d). A concept paper was then drafted by the secretariat and the coordinator of NGOs PICUM and ILGA and used as a reference point for in-depth interviews with members. Reporting the results of the survey, an internal briefing note drew attention to the diver- sity of Platform membership: Platform members have developed specific approaches to violence, because their fields of experience are diverse. Some members are networks of community based organizations, working on one specific ground of discrimination and its associated forms of bias violence. Other members build their actions on the basis of social expertise, related to a profession or a social status. As a result, most members have developed specific but unrelated concepts to name the particular forms of dis- criminatory violence that they want to address. (Social Platform, 2011d, p. 1) As one member of the Platform remarked, In this process we were interested to see how our coalition partners treated the issue of violence and how much it varies differently by these sectors and of course to make the argument for it to be interlinked to a much higher degree. (Interview with Plat- form member, September 2011) Analysis of the minutes of the working group reveals a lively debate on how best to frame a common response. The EDF pushed for violence to be linked to vulnerability understood as a characteristic rather than stemming from a status position. IFSW repre- senting social workers suggested degendering the text as ‘there is too much focus on women’, arguing for perpetrators and victims to be used instead. While ENAR advocated for violence based on religion to be given a higher profile in the document, ERIO (Roma European Union non-governmental organizational coalitions 219 D ow nl oa de d by [ M ay no ot h U ni ve rs it y L ib ra ry ] at 0 7: 12 1 5 N ov em be r 20 17 rights) and PICUM suggested that institutionalized violence (repression by state agents) should be included. The process of constructing the common position also revealed how members were attempting to influence a range of different EU-level initiatives on violence. Aware of the unevenness of these approaches that included, for example, small-scale programmes to combat violence against women and broader European policy on hate-motivated vio- lence and crime, the common statement aimed to push the EU to develop a more coherent and comprehensive strategy by ‘advancing a common agenda of policy recommendations to fight any form of violence’ (Social Platform, 2012c, p. 2). The final definition of bias violence was agreed as, ‘acts of violence with a bias motive, or triggered by prejudice, or ingrained in unequal structures in society that constitute a serious breach of human rights’ (Social Platform, 2012b, p. 3). The process of negotiating the position exposed the members to each other’s specific understanding of violence and then required signees to consent to a document that included an umbrella concept while at the same allowed for an acknowledgment of mutually reinforcing dynamics of vulnerability to violence. For the Platform secretariat, the exercise involved inviting unexpected members to talk about their connections to violence: ‘It could be in relation to poverty, mental health . . . or members that do not work on the issue so much’ (Interview with policy officer September, 2011). This in itself was understood to have increased mutual understanding and an inter- est in potential connections to be made between members unused to collaborating closely. As the briefing note concluded, Further developing our work on violence has the potential to show EU decision makers that we, as the Social Platform, can speak with one voice and promote a con- sistent approach on the basis of rich expertise, instead of simply listing claims for actions to address a range of similar but separated forms of violence. Making this actually happen requires that certain conditions are met.—The Platform’s members have to agree on a common language to build their common position. This means finding common concepts to describe the forms of violence we want to combat, and articulating positions which can be used consistently with the members’ own materials. (Social Platform, 2011d, p. 14) On this latter point the intent is for the common position to have an explicit influence on the content of the materials of individual member organizations. In policy terms the Plat- form’s common position and, in particular, its linking of equality, discrimination, and vio- lence was taken up in EU debate on hate crime legislation and received support from the European Parliament. 7 Allied campaigns include advocacy for EU equality data collection to expose under-reporting of bias violence and hate crimes (Social Platform, 2014a, 2014b). These campaigns also mark a shift in pulling diverse organizations together to generate common understandings and to commit collectively to a community response on complex and contentious issues. Discussion: collective action frames within a professional SMO community A clear objective of the Platform articulated through its campaigns and common positions is to bring ‘its members closer together’. For Aunio and Staggenborg (2011), transnational 220 P. Cullen D ow nl oa de d by [ M ay no ot h U ni ve rs it y L ib ra ry ] at 0 7: 12 1 5 N ov em be r 20 17 social movement communities—although differentiated spatially and tactically—must at a basic level operate a form of ‘imagined community’ forged through a sense of collective identification. For professional SMO communities this may be less about occupying a building or orchestrating a street protest but rather mounting joint campaigns drawing on pooled expertise, shared understandings, and connections, often to elites and insti- tutional contacts. Analysis of the content of Platform positions reveals an explicit effort to ‘strengthen the collective identity of the social civil society sector’ through capacity building aimed at forging a sense of the connections between the specific issues/constitu- ents that organizations represent. One way to make sense of these processes is through a brief analysis of the framing employed. In her work on the alter globalization and transnational feminist movement, Hewitt (2011, pp. 78 – 80) argues that activists in transnational spaces commonly draw on both oppositional or ‘anti’ frames and movement process/capacity-building frames that are internally focused frames in their solidarity efforts. What characterizes ‘anti’ frames is their sole focus on the enemy or the problem; however, they are often short on proposing solutions (Hewitt, 2011, pp.85 – 86). An example of an ‘anti’ frame is an emphasis on the loss of a social dimension within the European project, which is a common frame used by the Platform and its members particularly in its broadest external communications. The strategic advantage of this kind of frame is its solely diagnostic nature and the lack of a requirement for consensus on solutions or even necessarily issue priorities. However, while these broad oppositional frames may serve an important function in promoting dialogue and connection, they suffer from an inherent flaw in that they fail to articulate what a movement is for and offer little to sustain a durable form of allegiance across diverse causes. If movement actors cannot successfully articulate shared solutions to the problems they identify, they may leave themselves vulnerable to external threats that weaken their capacity to resist hegemonic frameworks (Hewitt, 2011, p. 82). In this sense it is a second form of framing—that of capacity-building and process frames—that seems to generate most potential for nourishing and strengthening such coalitions. In this framing, intra-movement difference and diverse expertise are explicitly mentioned as strengths that underpin a movement’s capacity to develop sophisticated yet cohesive campaigns representing a broad spectrum of groups and issues. In the context of the Platform in its positions on care and bias violence, it is the diversity and richness of its members’ expertise and claims that are publicly celebrated while the connections between their causes are emphasized. Care and violence in particular are unpacked as cross-sectoral and intersectional concepts that all members of the coalition are encouraged to find a stake in. As Hewitt (2011, p. 90) argues, inherent in capacity building and movement process work is an understanding that different movement actors play different roles and have different pri- orities and that the broader movement needs all such actors in order to succeed. Conclusion The Europeanization of OCS has included incentives for coalition formation. This article has aimed to make sense of what happens when diverse NGOs collaborate at EU level over a significant period of time. Can collaboration shift identities and problem definitions employed by NGOs? Ultimately, can the forms of coalition that emerge at the transna- tional level between NGOs be understood as a form of professional SMO community? European Union non-governmental organizational coalitions 221 D ow nl oa de d by [ M ay no ot h U ni ve rs it y L ib ra ry ] at 0 7: 12 1 5 N ov em be r 20 17 Drawing on the case of a diverse coalition of EU social NGOs, the Social Platform, this work suggests that in organizational, strategic, and tactical terms this coalition satisfies the criteria for consideration as a professional SMO community working on the transnational level. These criteria include the existence of professional leaders operating in multileveled networks, the use of insider strategies, and in organizational terms, structures where members deliberate and craft common campaigns. An essential component of the pro- fessional SMO community is the existence of a form of collective identification and com- munity constructed through repeated interaction in the context of coalition work. Analysis of the deliberation and outputs of Platform working groups suggest the exist- ence of a form of collective identification and community that allows diverse organiz- ations to deliberate and reach a consensus on complex and potentially contentious issues. Externally, this coalition work has enabled the construction of a cohesive voice for the EU social NGO sector where organizations generate and project a community response to EU officials and member state governments. While the benefits of coalition are clear in terms of greater strength when voicing shared positions, internally this form of community has afforded forms of capacity building including information sharing, pooling of resources, and access to external expertise. However, the construction of this collective identification is not a linear or even finished process, and may be open to charges of homogenization or managerialism that are associ- ated with the organizational isomorphism that accompanies the professionalization of transnational NGOs. Imbalances between larger and smaller member organizations and tensions related to how the most prominent members balance representing their own inter- ests and ‘speaking on behalf of the Platform’ also continue to shape coalition dynamics. Power plays and asymmetries in terms of resources and voice across the membership, although not explicitly examined here, are important factors shaping the internal function- ing and external output of this coalition. From this perspective understanding how collec- tive identification as an internal process and an external product is generated, via internal communicative processes and shaped by organizational imperatives, can help shed light on the internal positioning of actors and external influence of this coalition. This work also suggests that transnational OCS coalition formation should be seen less in terms of loosely connected networks and more as organizational forms with more permanent structures and greater member commitment. Along these lines, while members of the Plat- form have over the years waxed and waned in terms of their commitment to the coalition, levels of attrition have been minimal. Importantly this analysis suggests that analysis of intra-organizational dynamics of coalitions is useful in illustrating how transnational NGO coalitions are increasingly bound by a network of interdependencies that generate opportunities for community building with other organizations that have implications for their capacity to navigate a complex, technocratic, multilevel political opportunity structure. Disclosure statement No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author. Notes 1. Johansson and Lee suggest that two-thirds of the Platform membership receive 50% or more of their budget from the EU, while 40% rely on EU funds for over 75% of their budget (2012, p. 25). 222 P. Cullen D ow nl oa de d by [ M ay no ot h U ni ve rs it y L ib ra ry ] at 0 7: 12 1 5 N ov em be r 20 17 2. Membership criteria include a focus on social issues, commitment to a value statement, and representation in the majority of EU member states. 3. Over half were established between the mid-1980s up to the mid-1990s as a function of EU programmes and the expansion of EU competencies during this period in the area of social and employment issues. Few new groups were established since the late 1990s (Johansson & Lee, 2012, pp.11 – 13). 4. Aunio and Staggenborg (2011) identify different forms of social movement community, distinguishing between professional communities, grassroots communities, and conscience communities, differentiated on the bases of location, repertoire, and networks but all critical to the construction of transnational social movement identities and campaigns. 5. The Platform is represented in 18 EU advisory groups (Social Platform, 2013a, p. 14). 6. In 2014 working groups were reorganized and renamed as task forces. 7. The European Parliament adopted a nonbinding resolution on hate crime and bias violence invoking the demands made in the Platform’s common position on 14 March 2014. References Aunio, A. 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European Union non-governmental organizational coalitions 225 D ow nl oa de d by [ M ay no ot h U ni ve rs it y L ib ra ry ] at 0 7: 12 1 5 N ov em be r 20 17 Abstract Introduction The Social Platform: Methodological and conceptual considerations The case: The Platform SMO coalitions and communities The Social Platform as a professional SMO community The Platform and collective identity formation Working groups The Platform’s recommendations on care The Platform’s position paper on bias violence Discussion: collective action frames within a professional SMO community Conclusion Disclosure statement Notes References 
work_fhbfxn2265ainjzj3m4o7f4au4	----	55 Zločini iz mržnje Zlo či ni mr žnje i nor ma tiv no re gu li sa nje Mi li ca ko va če vić∗ Rad je pre sve ga po sve ćen pi ta nji ma u ve zi sa nor ma tiv nim re gu li sa njem zlo či na mr žnje, sa po seb nim osvr tom na pro pi se Re pu bli ke Sr bi je ko ji se po sred no ti ču ove ma te ri je. Ovu vr stu de li ka ta od li ku ju pred ra su de ko je uči ni o ci ga je pre ma ošte će ni ma kao pri pad ni ci ma po je di nih uglav nom ma njin skih gru pa, usled če ga se zlo či ni mr žnje mo gu na zva ti i zlo či ni ma zbog pred ra su da. U upo red nom pra vu se raz li ku ju dva osnov na usme re nja ka da je u pi ta nju sank ci o ni sa nje zlo či na mr žnje: iz dva ja nje zlo či na mr žnje u po seb nu ka te go ri ju, sa jed ne stra ne, i ka žnja va nje uči ni la ca kri vič nih de la na šte tu pri pad- ni ka ma njin skih gru pa kroz već po zna te in kri mi na ci je da tog kri vič no prav nog si ste ma, sa dru ge stra ne. Autorka na la zi ka ko, bez ob zi ra na ob li ke for mal nog re a go va nja, stvar ni ži vot upu ću je na za klju čak da se zlo či ni mr žnje su štin ski mo gu su zbi ti sa mo pro pa gi ra- njem vred no sti kao što su jed na kost, po što va nje raz li či to sti i to le rant nost, od no sno ne pre- sta nim edu ko va njem jav nog mnje nja o opa sno sti zlo či na mr žnje. Ključ ne re či: zlo či ni mr žnje, po li ti ka su zbi ja nja kri mi na li te ta, pred ra su de, rav no- prav nost. U obim noj li te ra tu ri ko ja se ba vi pro ble ma ti kom zlo či na mr žnje če sto će mo pro či ta ti da ovi zlo či ni ob u hva ta ju ra zno vr sna kri vič na de la ko ja pod ra- zu me va ju pre vas hod no pri me nji va nje na si lja pre ma žr tva ma oda bra nim po kri te ri ju mu ra sne, na ci o nal ne, et nič ke i ver ske pri pad no sti, od no sno žr tva ma iz dvo je nim na osno vu sek su al nog opre de lje nja. U po sled nje vre me ovim se kri te ri ju mi ma mo že do da ti još i in va li di tet. Ne što pre ci zni je, de fi ni ci ja zlo či na mr žnje ko ju je dao ame rič ki FBI gla si da su u pi ta nju kri vič na de la mo ti vi sa na, u ce lo sti ili de li mič no, pred ra su da ma u ve zi sa ra snom, na ci o nal nom i et nič- kom pri pad no šću ošte će nih, od no sno nji ho vim re li gij skim ube đe nji ma, sek su- al nim opre de lje nji ma ili in va lid no šću, te da se ovim kri vič nim de li ma ugro ža- TEMIDA Decembar 2011, str. 55-66 ISSN: 1450-6637 DOI: 10.2298/TEM1104055K Pregledni rad * Mr Mi li ca Ko va če vić je asi stentkinja na pred me tu Osno vi kri vič nog pra va na Fa kul te tu za spe ci- jal nu edu ka ci ju i re ha bi li ta ci ju Uni ver zi te ta u Be o gra du, Email: mi li ca.ko va ce vic @fa sper.bg.ac.rs Milica Kovačević 56 va ju i po vre đu ju fi zič ka li ca, od no sno ošte ću ju i uni šta va ju ma te ri jal na do bra (Shi vely, 2005:2). Mo že se re ći da, i po red od re đe nih ne u jed na če no sti, uglav nom po sto ji sa gla snost po pi ta nju de fi ni sa nja zlo či na mr žnje, te da isto ta ko ne ma ve ćih ne do u mi ca ni ka da je reč o pa siv nim su bjek ti ma ko ji bi va ju ošte će ni ovim kri- vič nim de li ma (pri pad ni ci ra snih, na ci o nal nih i ver skih gru pa ko je su ma njin- skog ka rak te ra u da toj sre di ni, oso be isto pol nog sek su al nog opre de lje nja, oso be sa in va li di te tom, pa sve če šće i gra đa ni u sta ri jem ži vot nom do bu (Broyles, 2009: 50). U tom smi slu se i re zul ta ti op se žnog is tra ži va nja „2008 Ha te Cri me Sur vey“1, spro ve de nog od stra ne or ga ni za ci je Hu man Rights First, od no se na vr še nje kri vič nih de la mo ti vi sa nih kse no fo bi jom, ho mo fo bi jom, in va lid no- šću ili dru gim sta tu som žr ta va, te na ža lost uka zu ju da je u ze mlja ma čla ni- ca ma Or ga ni za ci je za evrop sku bez bed nost i sa rad nju (Or ga ni za tion for Se cu- rity and Co o pe ra tion in Euro pe-OSCE) ova vr sta de li ka ta u po ra stu. Me đu tim, po pi ta nju pro ble ma ti ke su zbi ja nja zlo či na mr žnje, te ško da mo že mo go vo ri ti o ne ka kvoj sa gla sno sti i je din stve nim za ko no dav nim i uop šte kri mi nal no pol- tič kim ten den ci ja ma na uni ver zal nom ni vou. Nor ma tiv no re gu li sa nje zlo či na mr žnje Ka da je reč o kri vič no prav nim sred stvi ma re a go va nja, na la zi mo da po sto je dva glav na pu ta ko ji ma se mo že kre nu ti u ci lju su zbi ja nja zlo či na mr žnje. Je dan pod ra zu me va nor mi ra nje po seb nih kri vič nih de la ko ja će ob u hva ta ti is klju či vo zlo či ne mr žnje. U tom slu ča ju se od po zna tih kri vič nih de la pro tiv ži vo ta i te la (ubi stvo, te ške i la ke te le sne po vre de), kri vič nih de la pro tiv imo- vi ne (uni šte nje i ošte će nje tu đe stva ri, kra đa, raz boj ni štvo) i dru gih de li ka ta pred vi đe nih kri vič nim za ko nom, kre i ra ju po seb na kri vič na de la či ja se spe ci- fič nost ogle da u to me što su ošte će ni pri pad ni ci po je di nih ra snih, na ci o nal- nih i ver skih gru pa, oso be isto pol nog sek su al nog opre de lje nja, even tu al no oso be sa in va li di te tom i slič no. Ta ko, pri me ra ra di, u SAD u 45 sa ve znih dr ža va po sto je raz li či ti pro pi si ko ji ne po sred no in kri mi ni šu zlo či ne mr žnje. Pri to me tre ba ima ti u vi du da raz li či te sa ve zne dr ža ve u SAD pri me nju ju ve o ma he te- ro ge ne na či ne bor be pro tiv zlo či na mr žnje, te da se raz li ku ju i ka te go ri je ošte- 1 Vi de ti: http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/our-work/fighting-discrimination/2008-hate-crime- survey/ Temida 57 će nih ko ji su za šti će ni ovim in kri mi na ci ja ma. U tom smi slu ve ći na od na ve de- nih 45 dr ža va in kri mi ni še kri vič na de la mo ti vi sa na ra snom, ver skom i et nič- kom pri pad no šću žr tve, dok je dan broj dr ža va po seb no pred vi đa i kri vič na de la ko ji ma se ugro ža va ju oso be isto pol nog sek su al nog opre de lje nja, oso be sa in va li di te tom i sta ri ji gra đa ni (Kurtz, 2008). Ka da je u pi ta nju re gu la ti va ne kih dru gih, na ma ge o graf ski bli žih, dr ža va pri me ti će mo da su u ne kim od njih ta ko đe pred vi đe na po seb na kri vič na de la ko ji ma se in kri mi ni šu rad nje ko je ugro ža va ju pra va raz li či tih ma njin skih gru pa. Pri me ra ra di, u ma đar skom kri vič nom za ko nu, član 174/b, pro pi sa no je kri- vič no de lo „na si lje pro tiv čla na na ci o nal ne, et nič ke, ra sne ili re li gij ske gru pe“. Za kon pro pi su je da ovo kri vič no de lo vr ši onaj ko na pad ne oso bu ili je pri nu di da ne što uči ni ili tr pi, a sto ga što žr tva pri pa da od re đe noj ra snoj, na ci o nal noj, et nič koj ili ver skoj gru pi. Te ži ob lik istog kri vič nog de la, za ko ji je pred vi đe na ka zna do 8 go di na za tvo ra, či ni li ce ko je, pri iz vr še nju osnov nog ob li ka kri- vič nog de la, pri me ni si lu, upo tre bi oruž je, na ne se te šku po vre du žr tvi ili je mu či, kao i uko li ko je do šlo do udru ži va nja ra di vr še nja ovih de li ka ta. Sa dru ge stra ne, u po je di nim ze mlja ma, za kon pred vi đa da će se u slu ča ju ka da se već po sto je ći ob li ci kri vič nih de la iz vr še usled mo ti vi sa no sti ka kvom pred ra su- dom, to ce ni ti kao ote ža va ju ća okol nost. Ta ko austrij ski kri vič ni za kon u čla nu 33. pred vi đa da će se ra sna mr žnja i kse no fo bi ja uvek tre ti ra ti kao ote ža va ju ća okol nost, i to bez ob zi ra na kon kre tan ob lik kri vič nog de la o ko me je reč. Dru gi mo gu ći put su zbi ja nja zlo či na mr žnje, pak, ne pod ra zu me va uvo đe- nje po seb nih kri vič nih de la ko ji ma bi se is klju či vo in kri mi ni sa li zlo či ni mr žnje. Na i me, u dr ža va ma ko je ne iz dva ja ju u svo jim pro pi si ma zlo či ne mr žnje na ne po sre dan na čin, svi gra đa ni, pa ta ko i oni ko ji, pri me ra ra di, pri pa da ju na ci- o nal nim ma nji na ma ili su ho mo sek su al nog opre de lje nja, bi va ju za šti će ni već po sto je ćim in kri mi na ci ja ma ko je su deo ukup nog kri vič nog za ko no dav stva u kon kret noj ze mlji. I za ko no dav stvo Re pu bli ke Sr bi je na la zi se u opi sa noj gru pi. Mi šlje nja smo da je pri hva tljiv stav na šeg i dru gih za ko no da va ca ko ji ni su osmi sli li po seb na kri vič na de la, ko ji ma bi se ma ni fe sto va li is klju či vo zlo či ni in spi ri sa ni pre vas hod no pri pad no šću žr tve ka kvoj ma njin skoj gru pi. U tom smi slu se mo že mo oslo ni ti i na sta vo ve po zna tih auto ra ko ji se ba ve ovom pr o ble ma ti kom, po put J. Ja cob sa i K. Pot ter ko ji na la ze da je neo sno va no ube đe nje ka ko zlo či ni mr žnje ne mo gu bi ti ade kvat no sank ci o ni sa ni i mi mo do no še nja po seb nih za ko na. Po me nu ti auto ri uka zu ju da je usva ja nje ta kvih za ko na ne ret ko in spi ri sa no že ljom od re đe nih gru pa da bu du po seb no pre po- zna te i uva že ne, ali i sprem no šću po li ti ča ra da se ta kvoj že lji udo vo lji iz la ko Milica Kovačević 58 ra zu mlji vih po li tič kih raz lo ga (Ja cobs, Pot ter, 2001: 65). Iako sma tra mo da je pre po zna va nje i uva ža va nje gru pa gra đa na, ko je se bo re za svo ja pra va, sva- ka ko do bro do šlo, na la zi mo da se mo že sma tra ti pri hva tlji vim i to što u na šem Kri vič nom za ko ni ku ni je pred vi đe no po sto ja nje ote ža va ju će okol no sti ko ja bi se di rekt no ti ca la mo ti vi sa no sti uči ni o ca pred ra su da ma u ve zi sa lič nim ka rak- te ri sti ka ma žr ta va po je di nih in kri mi na ci ja. Šta je obra zlo že nje za na ve de no re zo no va nje? Bez sva ke sum nje ni ka ko se ne sme i ne mo že ospo ri ti či nje ni ca da pri pad ni ci od re đe nih ma njin skih gru pa je su i mo gu po sta ti žr tve iz ve snih kri vič nih de la sa mo zbog svo jih lič nih od li ka, od no sno zbog pri pa da nja od re đe nim ko lek ti vi ma. Pa ipak, mi šlje nja smo da ne po sto ji va ljan raz log zbog ko ga bi bi lo ko ga tre ba lo po seb no iz dva ja ti, pro- sto za to što sma tra mo da iz to ga ne mo gu da pro i za đu ne ke oso bi to do bre po sle di ce. Na i me, sma tra mo da ne ma va lja nog raz lo ga za is klju či va nje bi lo kog gra đa ni na iz si ste ma pro pi sa, ko jim se šti te osnov na pra va i slo bo de svih nas, pa ta ko raz log za po zi tiv no dis kri mi ni sa nje ne bi tre ba lo da bu de ni pri pad nost ma njin skim, ra snim, na ci o nal nim, ver skim i dru gim gru pa ma. Iz vr še nje kri vič- nog de la je dru štve no ne pri hva tlji vo ko god da je ošte ćen nji me. Na po stu- pa nje ko je se su prot sta vlja pro hi bi tiv nim nor ma ma tre ba da se re a gu je bez iz u zet ka. Stva ra nje bi lo ka kvih ska la po ko ji ma ugro ža va nje jed nog gra đa ni na vre di ma nje ili vi še od ugro ža va nja dru gog gra đa ni na ne mo že da se to le ri še. Dru ga či je sek su al no opre de lje nje, bo ja ko že ili bi lo ko ja dru ga oso be- nost ko ja nas, iz ra zi mo se ta ko, iz dva ja od ve ći ne, ni je oprav dan osnov ni ti za ka žnja va nje, ni ti za pri vi le go va nje po je di na ca. Po seb no is ti ca nje bi lo ko jih gru pa li ca išlo bi sa mo u pri log tvrd nji da po sto ji ne ka su štin ska raz li ka iz me đu kri vič nih de la iz vr še nih pre ma pri pad ni ci ma jed ne od re đe ne gru pe iako, ma kar pred za ko nom, svi mo ra mo bi ti rav no prav ni. Ova kvo pod va ja- nje ne bi mo glo bi ti po god no za za šti tu pra va pri pad ni ka ma njin skih gru pa, ko ji bi se ti me sa mo iz dva ja li u ne ka kvu po seb nu gru pu gra đa na, sa mim tim do dat no dis tan ci ra nu od ve ći ne. Sva ka ko, i Ustav Re pu bli ke Sr bi je2 za bra nju je dis kri mi na ci ju po bi lo kom osno vu, a oso bi to po osno vu: ra se, po la, na ci o- nal ne pri pad no sti, dru štve nog po re kla, ro đe nja, ve ro i spo ve sti, po li tič kog ili dru gog ube đe nja, imov nog sta nja, kul tu re, je zi ka, sta ro sti, i psi hič kog, ili fi zič- kog, in va li di te ta. Da lje, go vo re ći o jed na ko sti pred za ko nom, ni jed nog mo men ta ne tre ba da za bo ra vi mo ka ko dis kri mi na tor sko po stu pa nje ne pod ra zu me va sa mo 2 Sl. gla snik RS, br. 98/06. Temida 59 ne jed na ko po stu pa nje pre ma gra đa ni ma u smi slu us kra ći va nja ili ogra ni ča va- nja pra va od re đe noj gru pi gra đa na, već da ono pod ra zu me va i sva ko da va nje po vla sti ca i pr ven stva jed noj gru pi po je di na ca u od no su na dru gu. U tom smi- slu Za kon o za bra ni dis kri mi na ci je3 u čla nu 2, stav 1, tač ka 1. pred vi đa da iz ra zi „dis kri mi na ci ja“ i „dis kri mi na tor sko po stu pa nje“ ozna ča va ju sva ko neo prav- da no pra vlje nje raz li ke ili ne jed na ko po stu pa nje, od no sno pro pu šta nje (is klju- či va nje, ogra ni ča va nje ili da va nje pr ven stva), u od no su na li ca ili gru pe, kao i na čla no ve nji ho vih po ro di ca, ili nji ma bli ska li ca, na otvo ren ili pri kri ven na čin, a ko ji se za sni va na ra si, bo ji ko že, pre ci ma, dr ža vljan stvu, na ci o nal noj pri pad- no sti ili et nič kom po re klu, je zi ku, ver skim ili po li tič kim ube đe nji ma, po lu, rod- nom iden ti te tu, sek su al noj ori jen ta ci ji, imov nom sta nju, ro đe nju, ge net skim oso be no sti ma, zdrav stve nom sta nju, in va li di te tu, brač nom i po ro dič nom sta- tu su, osu đi va no sti, sta ro snom do bu, iz gle du, član stvu u po li tič kim, sin di kal- nim i dru gim or ga ni za ci ja ma i dru gim stvar nim, od no sno pret po sta vlje nim lič nim svoj stvi ma. Kao što smo već na gla si li, u Kri vič nom za ko ni ku4 ni je pred vi đe no stro- ži je ka žnja va nje za slu čaj da su ošte će ni po je di nim kri vič nim de li ma pri pad- ni ci od re đe nih ma njin skih gru pa. Me ha ni zmi for mal nog re a go va nja jed na ko se pri me nju ju ko god da se na đe na uda ru pre stup ni ka. No, to i da lje ne zna či da glav ni iz vor kri vič nog pra va u na šoj ze mlji ni je pred vi deo po seb ne in kri mi- na ci je u ci lju is ti ca nja ne spor no ve li kog zna ča ja po što va nja pra va pri pad ni ka ma njin skih gru pa. Da kle, pred vi đe na su kri vič na de la ko ji ma se šti ti raz li či tost, ali to se či ni na uop šten na čin, bez ne po sred nog is ti ca nja fi zič kog li ca ko ga od li ku ju po je di ne ka rak te ri sti ke kao pa siv nog su bjek ta kri vič nog de la, u pr vi plan. Ta ko Kri vič ni za ko nik u čla nu 128. pred vi đa kri vič no de lo po vre de rav no- prav no sti, kao jed no od kri vič nih de la pro tiv slo bo da i pra va čo ve ka i gra đa- ni na. Ovo kri vič no de lo vr ši li ce ko je us kra ti ili ogra ni či gra đa ni nu pra va ga ran- to va na Usta vom i za ko nom, ili mu, pak, da je po vla sti ce ili po god no sti, ru ko vo- de ći se pri tom gra đa ni no vom na ci o nal nom ili et nič kom pri pad no šću, ra som, ve ro i spo ve šću, po li tič kim ili dru gim ube đe njem, po lom, je zi kom, obra zo va- njem, dru štve nim po lo ža jem, so ci jal nim po re klom, imov nim sta njem ili ka kvim dru gim lič nim svoj stvom. Kao iz vr ši lac te žeg ob li ka istog kri vič nog de la po ja- vlju je se slu žbe no li ce ko je opi sa ne rad nje pred u zi ma u sklo pu vr še nja slu žbe. 3 Sl. gla snik RS, br. 22/09. 4 Sl. gla snik RS, br. 85/05, 88/05, 107/05, 72/09, 111/09. Milica Kovačević 60 U istom du hu, Kri vič ni za ko nik Re pu bli ke Sr bi je u čla nu 317. pred vi đa i kri- vič no de lo iza zi va nja na ci o nal ne, ra sne i ver ske mr žnje i ne tr pe lji vo sti, u gru pi kri vič nih de la pro tiv ustav nog ure đe nja i bez bed no sti dr ža ve. Na ve de nim se ne dvo smi sle no šti te vred no sti kao što su to le ran ci ja, rav no prav nost i po što- va nje me đu sob nih raz li či to sti, te je pot pu no ja sno da se, bar na nor ma tiv nom ni vou na ko ji se ovom pri li kom ogra ni ča va mo, Sr bi ja za la že za po što va nje istih. Osnov ni ob lik kri vič nog de la iz čla na 317. či ni ono li ce ko je iza zi va ili ras pi ru je na ci o nal nu, ra snu ili ver sku mr žnju ili ne tr pe lji vost me đu na ro di ma ili et nič- kim za jed ni ca ma, ko je na sta nju ju Sr bi ju. Te ži ob lik de la za stu pljen je u slu ča ju ka da su mr žnja i ne tr pe lji vost iza zi va ne ili ras pi ri va ne, pri nu dom, zlo sta vlja- njem, ugro ža va njem si gur no sti, iz la ga njem po ru zi sim bo la da te na ci o nal ne, et nič ke ili ver ske gru pe, te ošte će njem tu đih stva ri i skr na vlje njem spo me- ni ka i gro bo va. Naj te ži ob lik po sto ji u slu ča ju ka da je mr žnja iza zi va na ili ras- pi ri va na, pu tem zlo u po tre be po lo ža ja ili ovla šće nja, ili pak uko li ko su na stu pi li ne red, na si lje ili dru ge te ške po sle di ce po za jed nič ki ži vot na ro da, na ci o nal nih ma nji na i et nič kih gru pa Sr bi je, a za ovaj ob lik je pro pi sa na ka zna za tvo ra od dve do de set go di na. Zlo či ni mr žnje i re al nost Na kon raz ma tra nja nor ma tiv ne stra ne, od no sno na či na na ko ji se za kon ob ra ču na va sa zlo či ni ma mr žnje, tre ba se okre nu ti i stvar no sti, ko ja se, na ža lost, vr lo če sto raz li ku je od ono ga če mu se za ko no da vac na dao i za šta se za la gao. Ta ko, bez ob zi ra na to što Ustav, Kri vič ni za ko nik, Za kon o za bra ni dis kri- mi na ci je i broj ni dru gi pro pi si, ko ji se par ci jal no ba ve pro ble ma ti kom za šti te ljud skih pra va, naj stro že za bra nju ju sva ki ob lik dis kri mi na ci je, ona je i da lje pri- sut na u na šim ži vo ti ma, pa ta ko ima od re đe ne ve ze i sa is po lja va njem kri mi- na li te ta u na šoj sre di ni. I šta god pro kla mo va li pro pi si mi vr lo do bro zna mo da po sto je spe ci fič ni pro ble mi sa ko ji ma se su sre ću pri pad ni ci ma njin skih gru pa, kao i da vr še nje kri vič nih de la na šte tu ovih li ca je ste vr lo če sto in spi ri sa no upra vo či nje ni com da se po ne kim svo jim ka rak te ri sti ka ma ovi gra đa ni raz li- ku ju od, da se ta ko iz ra zi mo, ve ći ne. Ta ko će mo se, pri me ra ra di, pod se ti ti da je u mar tu ove go di ne na pad- nut ma lo let ni uče nik A.O., i to u sa mom cen tru Be o gra da is pred ško le ko ju po ha đa. Uče nik je tom pri li kom fi zič ki po vre đen od stra ne tri mla di ća ko ji su mu se obra ti li na po gr dan na čin, alu di ra ju ći na nje go vu rom sku na ci o nal nu Temida 61 pri pad nost. Sli čan do ga đaj je za be le žen i u ma ju ove go di ne, ka da su ma lo let- nog Ro ma na pa la tri mla di ća u vo zi lu grad skog pre vo za, pri če mu je i put nik ko ji je po ku šao da po mog ne žr tvi ta ko đe za do bio uda rac u gla vu. Da lje, po je- di ni me di ji su pre ne li da je u mar tu ove go di ne u Be o gra du, is pred noć nog klu ba sme šte nog u naj u žem cen tru gra da, u ra nim ju tar njim sa ti ma, od stra ne dva mu škar ca fi zič ki na pad nut mla dić ho mo sek su al nog opre de lje nja. Šta vi še, po sto ji mo guć nost da, ka da je reč o ho mo sek su al noj po pu la ci ji kao ošte će noj na sil nič kim kri mi na li te tom, ima i ne pri ja vlje nih kri vič nih de la, a usled stra ha od oče ki va ne stig ma ti za ci je sa ko jom bi se ošte će ni su sre li. Te ško da osta je bi lo ka kva sum nja u po gle du tvrd nje da su upra vo opi- sa na kri vič na de la in spi ri sa na pre vas hod no či nje ni com da su žr tve bi le pri pad- ni ci od re đe nih gru pa. Da li sto ga na ve de na kri vič na de la nor ma tiv no mo žda ipak tre ba iz dvo ji ti, te raz li ko va ti od sva kog dru gog slu ča ja na no še nja te ških ili la kih te le snih po vre da, ugro ža va nja si gur no sti i slič no? I po red od re đe nih ar gu me na ta ko ji sto je na stra ni nor mi ra nja po seb nih kri vič nih de la, sma tra mo da to ne tre ba uči ni ti, ali sa mo sto ga što ne vi di mo ka ko bi pro pi si va nje ne kih no vih kri vič nih de la na lik na ona iz upo red nog pra va do pri ne lo po pra vlja nju po sto je će si tu a ci je. Na i me, ne ret ko po gre šno ve ru je mo da bes kraj no pro ši ri va nje li ste po sto- je ćih in kri mi na ci ja sa mo po se bi mo že da do ve de do su zbi ja nja kri mi na li te ta. Ovo je po sle di ca pre te ra nog upro šća va nja stva ri ko je, na ža lost, ni su ni iz bli za ta ko jed no stav ne. Su štin sko raz re ša va nje pro ble ma kri mi na li te ta usme re nog ka ma njin skim gru pa ma zah te va ozbilj no raz ma tra nje uzro ka ko ji vo de ka ovim ob li ci ma ne do zvo lje nog po na ša nja. Ta kvo raz ma tra nje bi nas ve ro vat no vo di lo ka za ključ ku da se pra vi pro blem na la zi u si ste mu vred no sti ko jim se mi gra đa ni ru ko vo di mo, kao i ka ne pri jat nom sa zna nju da je po stu pak iz grad nje i me nja nja ta kvog si ste ma iz u zet no slo žen, du go tra jan i ne iz ve stan pro ces, ko ji se uz sve to ni ka da su štin ski ni ne za vr ša va, već ve či to pre la zi iz pret hod ne fa ze u na red nu, pri la go đa va ju ći se ak tu el nom tre nut ku. Pro blem su zbi ja nja kri mi na li te ta usme re nog ka pri pad ni ci ma ma njin skih gru pa otva ra i mno ga dru ga pi ta nja, pa ta ko i pi ta nja u ve zi sa usme re njem i ci lje vi ma po li ti ke su zbi ja nja kri mi na li te ta uop šte no. Na i me, po tra di ci o nal- nom sta no vi štu pred met po li ti ke su zbi ja nja kri mi na li te ta kao na uč ne di sci- pli ne svo di se tek na kri tič ku ana li zu kri vič nog za ko no dav stva i ustroj stva si ste ma dr žav nih or ga na ko ji se su prot sta vlja ju kri mi na li te tu. Sa dru ge stra ne, po sa vre me nom sta no vi štu pred met kri mi nal ne po li ti ke je da le ko ši ri, jer ob u- hva ta in te re so va nje za sve ak tiv no sti usme re ne ka spre ča va nju i su zbi ja nju kri- Milica Kovačević 62 mi na li te ta, uzev ši u ob zir čak i an ga žo va nje ne dr žav nih su bje ka ta (Mi lu ti no vić, 1984: 128, 129). Evi dent no je da je tra di ci o nal no sta no vi šte o pred me tu po li- ti ke su zbi ja nja kri mi na li te ta odav no pre va zi đe no, jer su pro šla vre me na ka da je po li ti ka su zbi ja nja kri mi na li te ta kao svo je je di no sred stvo ko ri sti la re pre- si ju, na da ju ći se da će se ka žnja va njem i za stra šu ju ćim de lo va njem pro pi sa nih sank ci ja ostva ri ti za šti ta dru štva od naj o pa sni jih po na ša nja. Na pro tiv, pu ko ja ča nje re pre si je uka zu je na lo še or ga ni zo va nu dr ža vu, ko ja za ne ma ru je al ter- na tiv ne me ha ni zme so ci jal ne kon tro le i dru ge ob li ke prav ne re ak ci je (Sto ja no- vić, 2005:11). Otu da kri mi nal nu po li ti ku sve vi še oku pi ra ju pro ble mi pre ven ci je u naj ši rem smi slu te re či, pu tem ko je bi tre ba lo ot klo ni ti dej stvo svih onih či ni- la ca ko ji pro du ku ju aso ci jal na po na ša nja, i to pri me nom kon kret nih eko nom- skih, so ci jal nih, edu ka tiv nih i dru gih nu žnih me ra (Mi lu ti no vić, 1979: 34,35). Pri to me, pre ven ci ja se za sni va na uva ža va nju sa zna nja na u ka kao što su so ci o lo- gi ja, kri mi no lo gi ja, psi ho lo gi ja i dru ge na uč ne di sci pli ne ko je na sto je da spo- zna ju uzro ke ko ji vo de kri mi nal nim po na ša nji ma. Sled stve no na ve de nom i pro blem su zbi ja nja zlo či na mr žnje zah te va da le ko slo že ni je ob li ke bor be od pro stog za seb nog nor mi ra nja ovih de li- ka ta bi lo u Kri vič nom za ko ni ku, bi lo u ka kvom dru gom ak tu. Ta ko tre ba te ži ti su štin skom spre ča va nju zlo či na mr žnje, kao re še nju da le ko ce lis hod ni jem od sank ci o ni sa nja već is po lje nih ne do zvo lje nih po na ša nja. Me đu tim, ve o ma je la ko kon sta to va ti po tre bu za pri me nom pre ven tiv nih me ra, dok je ne u- po re di vo te že u prak si pri stu pi ti njho voj pri me ni. No, i po red to ga po sto je do stup ni, pa i jed no stav ni, na či ni i me ha ni zmi da se po stig ne od re đe ni po mak. Naj pre tre ba osmi sli ti me to de za upo zna va nje jav no sti sa pro ble ma- ti kom kri mi na li te ta usme re nog ka ma njin skim gru pa ma. Pri to me ne mi sli mo na spo ra dič no i ne ret ko sen za ci o na li stič ko iz ve šta va nje štam pe i elek tron- skih me di ja o ne mi lim do ga đa ji ma, po put onih ko je smo spo me nu li u ovom ra du, već na od go vor no i sa dr žaj no in for mi sa nje jav no sti o kri mi na li te tu či je su žr tve su gra đa ni sa ko ji ma de li mo sva ko dne vi cu. Ova kav pri stup bi već sam po se bi mo gao uti ca ti na sve ma nji prag to le ran ci je pre ma ovoj vr sti kri vič nih de la. U tom smi slu se mo že, pu tem op šte do stup nih pu bli ka ci ja i or ga ni zo- va njem tri bi na, po pu la ri sa ti ova te ma. U do men pri me ne pre ven tiv nih me ra spa da i otvo re no pro pa gi ra nje vred no sti na ko ji ma bi jed no sa vre me no dru- štvo mo ra lo da se ba zi ra, kao što su: jed na kost, rav no prav nost, po što va nje in di vi du al no sti i raz li či to sti, slo bo da mi sli i iz ra ža va nja i ta ko da lje. Sva ka ko, u na ve de ne ak tiv no sti bi tre ba lo uklju či ti i in sti tu ci je obra zov nog si ste ma. Temida 63 Sa dru ge stra ne, tre ba bi ti sve stan i do ne kle ogra ni če ne de lo tvor no sti edu ka ci je i in for mi sa nja ka da je u pi ta nju su zbi ja nje zlo či na mr žnje. Na ža lost, li te ra tu ra uka zu je da na ve ći udeo zlo či na mr žnje u ukup nom kri mi na li te tu uti ču okol no sti kao što su eko nom ska ne sta bil nost, po li tič ki su ko bi i kri ze (USA Bu re au of Ju sti ce As si stan ce, 1999:19). U dru štve nim pri li ka ma ko je omo- gu ća va ju da sva ko re a li zu je do mak si mu ma svo je po ten ci ja le i da ostva ri svo je am bi ci je, ma nje je ve ro vat no da će se jed na in di vi dua za ma ra ti ti me šta dru gi po je di nac či ni i ka kva su nje go va lič na opre de lje nja i ube đe nja. Sve na ve de no sa mo pod vla či slo že nost pri stu pa ko ji bi tre ba lo da usvo je pred stav ni ci vla sti, kre a to ri me dij ske sli ke, te jed no stav no svi oni ko ji ima ju tu pri vi le gi ju i od go- vor nost da svo jim jav nim istu pa njem mo gu da uti ču na for mi ra nje ko lek tiv ne sve sti u jed noj za jed ni ci. Za ključ na raz ma tra nja Sa nor ma tiv ne stra ne po sma tra no zlo či ni mr žnje mo gu bi ti za seb no pro- pi sa ni, što pod ra zu me va pred vi đa nje po seb nih kri vič nih de la, od no sno ne mo ra ju bi ti di rekt no iz dvo je ni pu tem za seb nih in kri mi na ci ja. U ovom dru gom slu ča ju za ko no da vac ne pred vi đa po seb ne ob li ke u ko ji ma se is po lja va kri mi- na li tet na šte tu pri pad ni ka ma njin skih gru pa, već sa ma prak sa uka zu je da u iz vr še nju kon kret nih kri vič nih de la ključ ni ele me nat pred sta vlja to što su ošte- će ni pri pad ni ci od re đe nih ma nji na. Bez ob zi ra na for mal no prav ne raz li ke u nor mi ra nju zlo či na mr žnje evi- dent no je da su u pi ta nju ne do zvo lje na po na ša nja ko ja ozbilj no na ru ša va ju po stu la te na ko ji ma sa vre me no dru štvo po či va. Uko li ko gra đa ni po sta ju žr tve sa mo zbog is po ve da nja od re đe ne ve re, bo je ko že ili pak sek su al nog opre de- lje nja, to je u di rekt noj su prot no sti sa vred no sti ma kao što su rav no prav nost, te po što va nje ljud skih pra va i slo bo da, od no sno u di rekt noj su prot no sti sa te ko vi na ma o ko ji ma po sto ji kon sen zus i ko je se ni ko ni ne usu đu je da ospo- ra va, ma kar od Dru gog svet skog ra ta pa na da lje. Pri stup za ko ji se za la že mo ne ba zi ra se sa mo na pri me ni re pre siv nih me ha ni za ma, ni ti na pro pi si va nju što ve ćeg bro ja kri vič nih de la ko ji ma bi u bu duć no sti mo gli bi ti po go đe ni uglav nom pri pad ni ci ma njin skih gru pa. Sma- tra mo da re še nje ni je u osla nja nju na za bra ne već u pre ven tiv nom de lo va nju. Šta vi še i po ku ša ji su zbi ja nja dru gih ob li ka kri mi na li te ta ja sno go vo re u pri log tvrd nji da do da va nje no vih in kri mi na ci ja ne stva ra oče ki va ni efe kat za stra ši va- Milica Kovačević 64 nja po ten ci jal nih iz vr ši la ca bu du ćih kri vič nih de la, već sa mo do pri no si kon fu- zi ji o to me šta je uop šte do zvo lje no po na ša nje, te de val vi ra nju vred no sti već po sto je ćih in kri mi na ci ja. Si tu a ci ju u ko joj for mal no po sto ji mno štvo in kri mi na- ci ja, a su štin ski se re a gu je tek u usa mlje nim slu ča je vi ma, tre ba iz be ći. Da kle, ume sto pret nje pri me nom kri vič no prav nih me ha ni za ma i re pre si je, va lja uti ca ti na pro me nu na šeg sta nja sve sti. To će mo po sti ći pod sti ca njem kli me u ko joj se po štu ju pra va i slo bo de in di vi due, od no sno nje no pra vo na sa mo o pre de lje nje u svim sfe ra ma ži vo ta ko je su nje na lič na stvar. Sma tra mo da pri pad ni ci ma njin skih gru pa naj pot pu ni je mo gu da uži va ju svo ja pra va u okru že nju u ko me je i nji ma i osta lim gra đa ni ma omo gu će no da se po sve te pre vas hod no una pre đe nju kva li te ta sop stve nog ži vo ta, te da ova kav kon tekst ta pra va šti ti mno go bo lje od onog ko ji po či va na za bra na ma i pret nja ma pri- me nom fi zič ke si le. Li te ra tu ra Broyles, J. (2009) Ha te Cri mes. New York: Ro sen Pu blis hing. Hu man Rights First (2008) 2008 Ha te Cri me Sur vey, do stup no na: http://www.hu man rightsfirst.org/our-work/fig hting-di scri mi na tion/2008-ha te-cri me-sur vey, stra ni ci pri- stu plje no 15.11.2011. Ja cobs, J., Pot ter, K. (2001) Ha te Cri mes: Cri mi nal Law & Iden tity Po li tics. New York: Ox ford Uni ver sity Press. Kri vič ni za ko nik Re pu bli ke Sr bi je, Slu žbe ni gla snik RS, br. 85/05, 88/05, 107/05, 72/09, 111/09. Kurtz, L. (ed.) (2008) The encyclo pe dia of pe a ce, vi o len ce, and con flict. San Di e go: Aca- de mic Press. Mi lu ti no vić, M. (1979) Kri mi no lo gi ja. Be o grad: Sa vre me na ad mi ni stra ci ja. Mi lu ti no vić, M. (1984) Kri mi nal na po li ti ka. Be o grad: Sa vre me na ad mi ni stra ci ja. Shi vely, M. (2005) Study of Li te ra tu re and Le gi sla tion on Ha te Cri me in Ame ri ca. Fi nal re port sub mit ted to the Na ti o nal In sti tu te of Ju sti ce, Was hing ton DC. Sto ja no vić, Z. (2005) Prav no-fi lo zof ske kon cep ci je u Pred lo gu Kri vič nog za ko ni ka Re pu bli ke Sr bi je i Kri vič nom za ko ni ku Re pu bli ke Cr ne Go re. U: D. Ra do va no vić (ur.) Ka zne no za ko no dav stvo: pro gre siv na ili re pre siv na re še nja. Be o grad: In sti tut za kri mi- no lo ška i so ci o lo ška is tra ži va nja, str. 11. Temida 65 USA Bu re au of Ju sti ce As si stan ce (1999) A Po licyma ker’s Gu i de to Ha te Cri mes. Was- hing ton: U.S. De part ment of Ju sti ce. Ustav Re pu bli ke Sr bi je, Slu žbe ni gla snik RS, br. 98/06. Za kon o za bra ni dis kri mi na ci je, Slu žbe ni gla snik RS, br. 22/09. Mi li ca ko va če vić Ha te cri mes and nor ma ti ve re gu la tion This pa per is pri ma rily de vo ted to is su es re la ted to the nor ma ti ve re gu la tion of ha te cri mes, with spe cial re fe ren ce to the re gu la ti ons of the Re pu blic of Ser bia, which are in di rectly re la ted to this mat ter. This kind of cri mes are cha rac te ri zed by pre ju di- ces that per pe tra tors ha ve to wards in ju red par ti es, as mem bers of cer tain, mostly, mi no rity gro ups, due to which many ha te cri mes co uld be al so cal led cri mes of pre- ju di ce. In com pa ra ti ve law the re are two dif fe rent ba sic di rec ti ons when it co mes to re gu la ting ha te cri mes: se pa ra tion of ha te cri mes in a se pa ra te ca te gory on the one hand, and pu nis hment of per pe tra tors of cri mi nal acts with the de tri ment of mi no- rity gro ups thro ugh the usual char ges of a gi ven cri mi nal ju sti ce system, on the ot her. The aut hor finds that, re gar dless of the for mal re spon se forms, real li fe sug gests that ha te cri mes can be es sen ti ally sup pres sed only by pro mo ting va lu es such as equ a lity, re spect for di ver sity and to le ran ce, and by con ti nu o us edu ca tion of pu blic abo ut the dan ger of ha te cri mes. Keywords: ha te cri mes, cri mi nal po licy, pre ju di ce, equ a lity. 
work_fhxkhu3aurdppl6c7tyzv6qelm	----	Civil Society, ‘Traditional Values’ and LGBT Resistance to Heteronormative Rights Hegemony: Analysis of the UN Universal Periodic Review in the Russian Federation Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=ceas20 Europe-Asia Studies ISSN: 0966-8136 (Print) 1465-3427 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/ceas20 Civil Society, ‘Traditional Values’ and LGBT Resistance to Heteronormative Rights Hegemony: Analysis of the UN Universal Periodic Review in the Russian Federation Paul Chaney To cite this article: Paul Chaney (2018) Civil Society, ‘Traditional Values’ and LGBT Resistance to Heteronormative Rights Hegemony: Analysis of the UN Universal Periodic Review in the Russian Federation, Europe-Asia Studies, 70:4, 638-665, DOI: 10.1080/09668136.2018.1453924 To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09668136.2018.1453924 © 2018 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group Published online: 17 Apr 2018. Submit your article to this journal Article views: 599 View Crossmark data http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=ceas20 http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/ceas20 http://www.tandfonline.com/action/showCitFormats?doi=10.1080/09668136.2018.1453924 https://doi.org/10.1080/09668136.2018.1453924 http://www.tandfonline.com/action/authorSubmission?journalCode=ceas20&show=instructions http://www.tandfonline.com/action/authorSubmission?journalCode=ceas20&show=instructions http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1080/09668136.2018.1453924&domain=pdf&date_stamp=2018-04-17 http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1080/09668136.2018.1453924&domain=pdf&date_stamp=2018-04-17 Civil Society, ‘Traditional Values’ and LGBT Resistance to Heteronormative Rights Hegemony: Analysis of the UN Universal Periodic Review in the Russian Federation PAUL CHANEY Abstract This study of lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender rights in the Russian Federation uses frame analysis of civil society input into the UN Universal Periodic Review. It reveals a stark state–civil society ‘disconnect’ reflecting oppressive government practices, including Law No. 135-FZ on ‘non-traditional sexual relations’. This raises wider questions about the efficacy of the review system, not least because issues of performativity and legitimation can be seen to facilitate authoritarian resilience. This allows the ruling elite to continue to dissemble by espousing universal rights yet strategically framing them as heteronormative, integral to the protection of ‘traditional values’ and inimical to identity-based rights claims. NOTWITHSTANDING THE KREMLIN’S CONTINUING CLAIMS OF COMPLIANCE with its international human rights treaty obligations, over recent years state practices have come under sustained criticism. Russia is at the same time actively neutering rights agreements across the globe and trying instead to insert language about ‘traditional values’ in international agreements. Increasingly, opposition to the rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) people is part of the core definition of Russian identity. Against this backdrop the following analysis is concerned with the contemporary response to state oppression and rights violations. Specifically, it uses frame analysis to explore conflict and resistance over human rights implementation for LGBT people in the Russian Federation, as set out in reports submitted by civil society organisations (CSOs) to the Universal Periodic Review (UPR), the cyclical evaluation mechanism of the United Nations. The principal research question asks how state framing compares to that of civil society organisations in the Russian Federation UPR Review. This matters in a number of key regards. Inter alia, it informs an understanding of the role of civil society in promoting rights and democracy, it provides insight into the efficacy of https://doi.org/10.1080/09668136.2018.1453924 © 2018 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http:// creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. The author gratefully acknowledges the helpful and constructive comments of two anonymous reviewers when revising an earlier draft of this essay. Grant funding for this study by the Economic and Social Research Council under Award No: ES/L009099/1 and Medical Research Council Award No. GCRFNG100259 are also gratefully acknowledged. EUROPE-ASIA STUDIES, 2018 Vol. 70, No. 4, June 2018, 638–665 http://www.tandfonline.com http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ THE UN UNIVERSAL PERIODIC REVIEW IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION 639 international human rights monitoring, and crucially it reveals the issues, patterns and processes of oppression facing LGBT people in Russia today. Moreover, it furthers understanding in relation to how ‘states [that] emerged from communism follow different paths on LGBT rights and attitudes toward LGBT people’. From an international perspective this is significant, for ‘the legacy of communism does not have a uniform grip on the relationship between the state and social perceptions of sexuality’ (Ayoub 2016, p. 16). As will be discussed, the findings show that frame dis-alignment characterises rights implementation in the region. In turn, the endurance of this disconnect over successive UPR cycles raises key questions about performativity, legitimation and poor treaty enforcement. Attention to LGBT rights in the Russian Federation is an appropriate locus of enquiry for, whilst the fall of the Soviet Union saw a significant transformation, not least with the decriminalisation of homosexuality in 1993, as noted, over recent years there has been a major reversal. Horvath’s seminal study describes this shift: under the Putin regime, Russia changed direction, setting in train a reverse spiral. Selective acts of repression were followed by the emasculation of democratic institutions, curbs on civil liberties, vilification of rights defenders, and finally a bold assault on international norms. This assault threatens to narrow and weaken the conceptual framework in which human rights is discussed. (Horvath 2016, p. 888) As Wilkinson (2014) observes, the prevailing political ‘project’ of the Kremlin has been to strategically frame human rights as heteronormative, integral to the protection of ‘traditional values’ and respect for local cultures—and inimical to identity-based LGBT rights claims.1 On the international stage this agenda has been advanced in a range of actions, typified by the Russian UN Security Council motion. This ‘affirm[ed] that … traditional values, [are] shared by all humanity and embodied in universal rights instruments … [and] note[d] the important role of family, community, society and educational institutions in upholding and transmitting these values, [something] which contributes to promoting respect for human rights and increasing their acceptance at the grass roots’. Accordingly, the Russian motion called ‘upon all States to strengthen this role through appropriate positive measures’.2 On the domestic front, the ‘appropriate positive measures’ alluded to in the Resolution include a number of repressive laws. The most notorious is the amendment passed in 2013 to the Code of the Russian Federation on Administrative Offences.3 Initially aimed at curtailing the ‘promotion of homosexuality’, during its passage through the Duma the wording was amended to the broader concept of ‘non-traditional sexual relations’. The resulting enactment is nominally aimed at protecting children from information that ‘promotes the negation of traditional family values’ (henceforth, Federal Law No. 135-FZ).4 In its wake, reports detail an increase in homophobic 1See also Baunov (2013), Feirstein (2013), Stroop (2016). 2See, Resolution adopted by the Human Rights Council, ‘Promoting Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms through a Better Understanding of Traditional Values of Humankind’, A/HRC/RES/16/3, United Nations General Assembly, 8 April 2011, available at: https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/ GEN/G11/124/92/pdf/G1112492.pdf?OpenElement, accessed 1 October 2016. 3Kodeks Rossiiskoi Federatsii ob admininistrativnykh pravonarusheniyakh, available at: http://www. russian-offences-code.com, accessed 13 March 2018. 4Federal’nyi zakon ot 29 iyunya 2013 g. No. 135-FZ ‘O vnesenii izmenenii v stat’yu 5 Federal’nogo zakona “O zashchite detei ot informatsii, prichinyayushchei vred ikh zdorov’yu i razvitiyu” i otdel’nye zakonodatel’nye akty Rossiiskoi Federatsii v tselyakh zashchity detei ot informatsii, propagandiruyushchei otritsanie traditsionnykh semeinykh tsennostei’, available at: http://www.threefold.ru/russian-laws-amended-federal-law-no-135-fz- amending-certain-laws-russian-federation-view-protect-children, accessed 13 March 2018. https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/G11/124/92/pdf/G1112492.pdf?OpenElement https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/G11/124/92/pdf/G1112492.pdf?OpenElement http://www.russian-offences-code.com http://www.russian-offences-code.com http://www.threefold.ru/russian-laws-amended-federal-law-no-135-fz-amending-certain-laws-russian-federation-view-protect-children http://www.threefold.ru/russian-laws-amended-federal-law-no-135-fz-amending-certain-laws-russian-federation-view-protect-children PAUL CHANEY640 hate crimes5 and a series of crackdowns on associative life and campaigning by LGBT people. As Stella’s insightful study explains, contemporary rights suppression … is particularly true for LGBT communities, as homophobic rhetoric and widely documented episodes of discrimination, intimidation and violence, sometimes endorsed by local authorities and state institutions, indicate that homosexuality is still widely seen as a potential threat to the moral fabric of Russian society. In addition, Russia has no legislation to protect citizens from homophobic violence or discrimination on the grounds of their sexual orientation. (Stella 2012, p. 1822). This has resulted in state repression, arrests and detentions. Notably, in Ryazan (in 2009) and St Petersburg (in spring 2012)6—with heavy fines dealt out for individuals peaceably displaying pro-LGBT placards,7 as well as those associated with an online community forum for LGBT teenagers (Luhn 2015). This oppressive rights situation needs to be viewed in the context of extant work that underlines how, ‘effective international [human rights] regimes are likely to emerge only where they have deep roots in the functional demands of groups in domestic and transnational society, as represented by the domestic political institutions [such as civil society] that mediate between society and the state’ (Moravcsik 1995, p. 158). This validates the present study’s focus on civil society and aligns with the ‘polity approach’ in civil society research. The latter underlines that effective governance is shaped by the links and exchanges between state institutions and different sections of society (Evans 1995). As Cox and Gallai cogently observe, it is concerned with ‘examining ways in which political society provides a context and shapes the opportunity structures within which civil society organisations can operate, rather than seeing civil society as a main determinant of democratic consolidation’. A key factor is the extent to which ‘groups [a]re also constrained by the changing character of the political settlement that emerged from the post-communist transformation’ (Cox & Gallai 2014, p. 53). This may be applied to the former Soviet Union. Over recent years Russian civil society has become increasingly constrained owing to political management by the state. This is symbolised by the 2012 enactment, Law No. 121-FZ (popularly dubbed the ‘Foreign Agent Law’).8 Its purpose is to restrict the activity of non- governmental organisations (NGOs) that receive foreign funding and engage in ‘political activities’ (legally undefined). It requires them to register with the government as ‘foreign agents’ (widely seen as a pretext for state harassment and oppression). As Crotty’s account observes, in consequence, ‘in the future, groups will have to contend with Putin’s NGO law and its restrictions and ramifications, in combination with the growing number of Marionette 5See for example Luhn (2013). 6‘Homosexual Propaganda’ Bans in Russia: A UPR Submission by ILGA-Europe, International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association (Brussels, ILGA, 2012, p. 5). 7‘Nikolai Alexeyev, Russian Gay Rights Activist, Fined Under “Propaganda” Law, Huffington Post, 4 May 2012’, in ‘Homosexual Propaganda’ Bans in Russia: A UPR Submission by ILGA-Europe, International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association (Brussels, ILGA, 2012). 8‘Lukin pozhalovalsya v Konstitutsionnyi sud na zakon ob NKO’, BBC Russian Service, 7 February 2013, available at: http://refugee.ru/news/my-ne-agenty-odinnadtsat-nko-napravili-zhalobu-v-evropejskij-sud-po- pravam-cheloveka-na-zakon-ob-inostrannyh-agentah/, accessed 7 August 2016. http://refugee.ru/news/my-ne-agenty-odinnadtsat-nko-napravili-zhalobu-v-evropejskij-sud-po-pravam-cheloveka-na-zakon-ob-inostrannyh-agentah/ http://refugee.ru/news/my-ne-agenty-odinnadtsat-nko-napravili-zhalobu-v-evropejskij-sud-po-pravam-cheloveka-na-zakon-ob-inostrannyh-agentah/ THE UN UNIVERSAL PERIODIC REVIEW IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION 641 Organisations9 dominating Russia’s civil space. [… it constitutes a shift] to what some have termed a “nationalisation” of Russian civil society’ (Crotty 2009, p. 102). In order to explore how state framing compares to that of civil society organisations in the Russian Federation UPR Review the remainder of this essay is structured thus: after a summary of the rationale for the present study, an outline of the research context and methodology is presented. Attention then moves to the findings: first, with initial summary of the Russian state discourse, followed by analysis of the discourse of CSOs. The conclusion offers theoretically informed reflection on the findings and their implications, as well as recommendations for reform of the international rights regime grounded in the present findings. Rationale for the present study It is appropriate to reflect on why the literature needs a study such as this. First, existing studies of LGBT mobilisation have rightly focused on the way that political environments shape the development of gay and lesbian movements (Engel 2001; Barclay et al. 2009; Bob 2012; Ayoub 2014), or have examined NGOs’ perspectives on transnational activism and struggles for decriminalisation (Keck & Sikkink 1998; Adam et al. 1999). The aim here is to complement such work with a transferable discourse-based methodology for studying rights implementation. This is apposite because discourse lies at the heart of the Russian state response to LGBT rights. Fuller understanding of the Kremlin’s hegemonic use of language to recast human rights in an exclusive manner is a knowledge gap that needs to be addressed. Second, allied to this, the extant literature suggests that the efficacy of rights regimes depends on civil society engagement (Moravcsik 1995; Tremblay et al. 2011). As will be seen, this study aims to make an original contribution by showing how, in contexts where abuses are widespread, civil society organisations use the discursive opportunities provided by UN reviews in order to resist state oppression. By analysing civil society’s ‘situated knowledge’ this tells us what frames and issues are important to those seeking to uphold LGBT claims against state repression. Third, in social theory terms, the findings challenge traditional thinking on transitology (see below). Instead, they point to how, in the absence of the necessary enforcement mechanisms, CSOs’ discursive engagement may actually facilitate authoritarian resilience. And fourth, the foregoing factors underpin policy recommendations for rectifying current failings. In these diverse regards the present analysis addresses key lacunae and responds to the call by Rivkin-Fish and Hartblay: ‘we argue that global advocacy for LGBTQ rights has become lost in translation to the Russian context and urge further research into the effects of Western LGBTQ advocacy on Russian society’s acceptance of gay rights and human rights’ (Rivkin-Fish & Hartblay 2014, p. 96). The data sources used in the following analysis are the submissions to the UN’s Universal Periodic Review. They constitute a rich and under-studied dataset, one that informs understanding of the role of civil society as a site of rights conflict and political space for resistance. In order to operationalise this, the following examines ‘framing’ in civil society organisations’ reports submitted to the UN. ‘Framing’ is a means of dissecting the language 9Defined as CSOs ‘closely linked to the operations of the state … usually endowed with office space and other resources either directly or indirectly by the state. Membership … was usually drawn from the ranking official’s circle of associates .… The primary aim … was to support the state in its activities, but they were also recognised as official NGOs and represented civil society organisations in this capacity’ (Crotty 2009, pp. 91–2). PAUL CHANEY642 used by policy actors. It can provide insight into exercising and resisting power by associating ideas and concepts with values and emotions for political ends, as well as imposing limits on deliberation and debate (Snow et al. 1986). In conceptual terms, the application of frame analysis (Alasuutari et al. 2008) to the UPR data is supported by various strands of social theory. These include the interpretive school of policy analysis (Yanow 1999) and the literature on social constructivism (Kukla 2000). Both place emphasis on beliefs, values, interpretations and knowledge relevant to addressing a given policy issue (Eden & Ackermann 2004). As noted, the epistemological grounding here is standpoint theory, and specifically, the notion of ‘situated knowledge’ (Stoetzler & Yuval-Davis 2002). This argues that the first-hand accounts from organisations representing LGBT individuals directly affected by oppression and discrimination are a valuable, if hitherto overlooked complement to administrative studies of case law and institutional procedures. In addition, extant theory also advances the idea of ‘frame (dis-)alignment’ (Snow et al. 1986). This underlines the way that the probability of successful rights implementation increases at the point at which the frames of key policy actors (such as government and civil society) are aligned (dubbed ‘frame alignment’ or ‘frame resonance’). Where this is absent, conflict and oppression endure. This provides a further justification for the present locus of enquiry for, whilst existing studies underline the centrality of framing processes to upholding rights across a number of protected characteristics (Keck & Sikkink 1998; Pollack & Hafner-Burton 2000; Barclay et al. 2009; Chua 2014), their application to LGBT rights has been limited. Given the present focus on UPR discourse it should be noted that whilst the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) does not explicitly mention sexual orientation or gender identity, following an earlier UNHRC ruling in 1994, laws discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation are held to be in violation of the UDHR.10 Specifically, references to ‘universal’, ‘other statuses’ or alternatively, ‘sex’, are taken to include LGBT rights (Wintemute 2002; O’Flaherty & Fisher 2008). The same is true of the UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).11 Notwithstanding this, it is important to note that, from an historical perspective, the United Nations’ past record on LGBT rights is a poor one. Indeed, it was only in 2011 that it passed its first resolution recognising LGBT rights (and published a report detailing violations of the rights of LGBT people, including hate crimes, criminalisation of homosexuality, and discrimination (OCHR 2011a)). Subsequently, further progress has been made with UN Resolution A/HRC/RES/27/32 ‘Human rights, sexual orientation and gender identity’ (adopted 26 September 2014).12 Yet, as Ibhawoh (2014, p. 621) observes, ‘the strong opposition to the inclusion of LGBT rights protection in the UN human rights corpus is a reminder of the historic tensions between inclusionary and exclusionary 10Art. 2. ‘Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms … without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status’. See ‘Toonen v. Australia, Communication No. 488/1992, U.N. Doc CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992 (1994)’, 1995, available at: http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/undocs/html/vws488.htm, accessed 5 October 2016. 11Ratified by Russia in October 1973 and effective from March 1976. 12This refers to ‘combating all forms of discrimination and violence exercised due to discrimination of any kind’. ‘Human rights, sexual orientation and gender identity’, Follow-up to and implementation of the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action Resolution adopted by the Human Rights Council 27/32, UN General Assembly, 2 October 2014, A/HRC/RES/27/32, available at: http://ap.ohchr.org/documents/dpage_e.aspx?si=A/ HRC/RES/27/32, accessed 27 February 2018. http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/undocs/html/vws488.htm http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/undocs/html/vws488.htm http://ap.ohchr.org/documents/dpage_e.aspx?si=A/HRC/RES/27/32 http://ap.ohchr.org/documents/dpage_e.aspx?si=A/HRC/RES/27/32 THE UN UNIVERSAL PERIODIC REVIEW IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION 643 impulses in international human rights practice’.13 From an international perspective, other protections also apply to the present case study. They extend from the Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1950) (Articles 8 and 14);14 although again it should be noted that these do not explicitly provide protections for all categories of LGBT people, with protections stemming from references to ‘other statuses’.15 LGBT rights and civil society in the Russian Federation For much of the twentieth century homosexuality in Russia was illegal.16 It was not only deemed immoral by Stalin’s regime, but also viewed as counterrevolutionary, anti-communist and bourgeois (Engelstein 1995; Healey 2002). According to survey data at the time of the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, ‘homosexuals [were] the most hated group in society’ (West & Green 2002, p. 233). Here it is germane to note that Soviet reticence toward issues of ‘homosexuality’ was common in many parts of the world where it was viewed as a specifically Western encroachment. Notwithstanding periodic episodes of greater tolerance, the issue has continued to be politicised in this way over recent decades. Thus, in the Russian case, following its decriminalisation in 1993 there was an initial move to greater acceptance. Yet this was short lived. As Turbine notes: ‘rather than witnessing the increasing protection of and access to human rights, the post-Soviet period has more often seen the loss, not only of previously held social and economic rights … but also the curtailment of civil and political rights as a result of the development of Russia’s “managed” democracy’ (Turbine 2012, p. 1849). Social attitudes are both a symptom and a cause of the challenges facing LGBT people today. Recent survey data show deeply entrenched homophobic attitudes amongst large sections of the population (Underwood 2011).17 For some supporters of the Putin regime human rights instruments are Western imports that threaten traditional values. As Storch explains, the prevailing view is that ‘the final goal of these encroachments by the West is to impose on Russia a complete set of its “perversions”, which it passes off as cultural values [… including] homosexual marriages’ (Storch 2013, p. 14). 14The key ECtHR case that determined that ‘sexual orientation’ is an anti-discrimination ground for the purposes of Article 14 is ‘Salgueiro da Silva Mouta v Portugal’, available at: http://www.gddc.pt/direitos- humanos/portugal-dh/acordaos/salgueirodasilva.pdf, accessed 5 October 2016. 15In definitional terms this is an issue that applies to the wider literature. Extant work commonly refers to ‘LGBT people’ as a single category, yet the prevailing policy discourse and analysis is sometimes confined to sexual orientation/homosexuality, with no applicability to transgender people. The rationale for the present use of LGBT follows that of Sokal and Sutherland who explain: ‘while the issues of transgender people are not synonymous with LGB issues, they occupy similarly oppressed social locations in a heterosexist, homophobic culture, and LGB has largely given way to LGBT. Being transgender implies that one’s identity violates gender codes, whereas LGB people might be perfectly in sync with every gender norm (apart from same-sex partner choice) that is culturally prescribed for their biological sex. A transgender person might be biologically male but identify as a female in self-concept, behaviour, clothing preferences, and so on; regardless of the sex of her preferred partner, she is so far outside the concept of heterosexuality in our society that she, too, is the target of homophobia and heterosexism’ (Sokal & Sutherland 2003, p. 19). 16Unlawful since 1934. 17For example, in a poll of a sample of 1,600 Russians age 18+ across 130 cities, in July 2010, 74% said ‘gays and lesbians are morally dissolute or mentally defective persons’ (Underwood 2011, p. 43). 13As evidenced by the cancelling of the ILGA consultative strategy, available at: http://ilga.org/what-we-do/ united-nations/, accessed 23 April 2017. http://www.gddc.pt/direitos-humanos/portugal-dh/acordaos/salgueirodasilva.pdf http://www.gddc.pt/direitos-humanos/portugal-dh/acordaos/salgueirodasilva.pdf http://ilga.org/what-we-do/united-nations/ http://ilga.org/what-we-do/united-nations/ PAUL CHANEY644 In this context, Federal Law No. 135-FZ nominally claims to protect children from information that promotes the ‘negation of traditional family values’. As Essig cogently observes, the use [here] of the terms ‘traditional’ and ‘non-traditional’ is no accident but rather the result of a very specific strategy to make Russia not just a straight state, but a particular form of Christian state with complete control over the sexual lives of its citizens. The goal is to thwart not just sex between two men or two women but access to birth control and reproductive rights as well. (Essig 2014, p. 147) Moreover, Federal Law No. 135-FZ is not the only enactment that has resulted in an increasingly oppressive context for LGBT people. Recent years have seen a series of broadly similar measures enacted across regional jurisdictions in the Russian Federation.18 In contrast to the Federal Law No. 135-FZ, some of these are more specific in their targeting of LGBT rights. For example, in the Kaliningrad region a ‘homosexual propaganda’ law was passed;19 whilst in Ryazan Oblast’ another included provisions on administrative liability for public actions related to the propaganda of homosexuality.20 Accordingly, since 2005 the picture for human rights defenders has become increasingly repressive. As noted, Law No. 121-FZ (popularly dubbed the ‘foreign agent law’) restricts the activity of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) that receive foreign funding and engage in ‘political activities’. In its wake, as the account by Van der Vet and Lyytikäinen describes, human rights repression has expanded in a number of ways, including the imposition of ‘rules that enable authorities to inspect organisations [… and] the criminalisation of participation in public demonstrations’. They continue, ‘due to these repressive measures, human rights and protest activism are often classified as high-risk activism. The potential cost of involvement … for the activist—and one’s household or family—is potentially higher than the benefits of openly opposing powerholders’ (Van der Vet & Lyytikäinen 2015, p. 983). All of this points to a clear contrast in the trajectories of Russia and the West. As Kon underlines, in the latter ‘after the processes of decriminalization and depathologization were completed, sexual minorities began to fight to have their human and civil rights recognized .… In Russia, gays … received no rights or guarantees of safety … in regard to social concerns it is as if they did not exist’ (Kon 2009, p. 47). Against this oppressive backdrop, the next section provides an outline of the study methodology, followed by a discussion of how such issues play out in the UPR. Methodology This study uses frame analysis (Wodak & Krzyżanowski 2008; Alexander 2009; Chenail & Duffy 2011). Framing derives from the work of Erving Goffman (1974, p. 21) and refers to a ‘schemata of interpretation’. Crucially, as Snow et al. note, ‘by rendering events or occurrences meaningful, frames function to organize experience and guide action, whether individual or collective’ (Snow 18For example: Zakon Krasnodarskogo kraya ot 3 iyulya 2012 g. No. 2535-KZ ‘O vnesenii izmenenii v otdel’nye zakonodatel’nye akty Krasnodarskogo kraya v chasti usileniya zashchity zdorov'ya i dukhovno- nravstvennogo razvitiya detei; Zakon Arkhangel’skoi oblasti ot 30 sentyabrya No. 336-24-OZ ‘O vnesenii izmenenii i dopolneniya v oblastnoi zakon “Ob otdel’nykh merakh po zashchite nravstvennosti i zdorovya detei v Arkhangel’skoi oblasti”’. 19Zakon Kaliningradskoi oblasti ot 30 yanvarya 2013 g. No. 199 ‘O vnesenii izmenenii i dopolnenii v Zakon Kaliningradskoi oblasti “O zashchite naseleniya Kaliningradskoi oblasti ot informatsionnoi produktsii, nanosyashchei vred dukhovno-nravstvennomu razvitiyu”’. 20Zakon Ryazanskoi oblasti ot 4 dekabrya 2008 g.No. 41-OZ ‘Ob administrativnykh pravonarusheniyakh’. THE UN UNIVERSAL PERIODIC REVIEW IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION 645 et al. 1986, p. 464). Thus, although hitherto this technique has not been applied to comparative state and civil society perspectives on human rights implementation in the Russian Federation, framing is pivotal to understanding rights implementation, particularly as this involves multiple actors working across different domains such as the public and civil spheres. As noted, here we are concerned with the discourse associated with the second cycle UN UPR, the evaluation process that emerged in the wake of the 2006 UN General Assembly resolution (60/251). It is conducted under the auspices of the Human Rights Council (HRC) (Cochrane & McNeilly 2013). According to its proponents, the UPR is not designed to be an elite or technocratic exercise. It not only provides the opportunity for each state to set out the actions they have taken to advance human rights, it also makes provision for civil society input. This matters for understanding and addressing the multiple and inter-connected issues facing LGBT people communities across Russia. The UN policy guidance is unambiguous in espousing civil society input: HRC resolution 5/1 of 18 June 2007 provides that the UPR should ensure the participation of all relevant stakeholders, including non-governmental organizations and national human rights institutions, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 60/251 of 15 March 2006 and Economic and Social Council resolution 1996/31 of 25 July 1996. (OCHR 2011b) UPR reports were coded using inductive coding schemata. This consisted of key themes adapted from the Yogyakarta Principles (ICJISHR 2006) (see Table 1): inter alia: rights, non-discrimination, hate crimes, freedom of opinion and expression, identity, morality, and freedom of assembly. The latter are suited to capturing the values and themes associated with LGBT rights. Their link to UN human rights instruments is explicit (inter alia, Yogyakarta Principles 1–3 set out ‘the universality of human rights and their application to all persons without discrimination, as well as the right of all people to recognition before the law’) (Thoreson 2009).21 The coding frame was quantified by drawing upon the notion of ‘issue-salience’. This measures the level of attention to a given frame in the discourse. It is determined by content analysis, or in other words, the frequency of key words, ideas or meanings in policy documents. This was done by adapting a procedure derived from electoral studies, whereby texts are divided into ‘quasi-sentences’ (or, ‘an argument which is the verbal expression of one political idea or issue’ (Volkens 2001, p. 96)). Dividing sentences in this way controls for long sentences that contain multiple policy ideas. In summary the key data sources in this study are the Russian Federation Ministry of Justice’s report submitted to the United Nations as part of the second cycle UPR,22 and all 29 civil society organisations’ reports on the implementation of human rights in Russia (see the Appendix). In terms of the latter, over recent decades a burgeoning literature has delineated the emergence of ‘global civil society’. This (albeit contested) term denotes how, in various ways and forms, CSOs increasingly operate across national boundaries. As Ayoub explains, the present attention to the interaction between international and ‘domestic’ CSOs helps to explain: ‘variation in the changed legal status and societal perceptions of sexual minorities. Put most 21‘Introduction to the Yogyakarta Principles’, available at: https://yogyakartaprinciples.org/introduction/, accessed 19 September 2016. 22National report submitted to the Human Rights Council Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review, in furtherance of paragraph 5 of the annex to Human Rights of Council resolution 16/21. https://yogyakartaprinciples.org/introduction/ PAUL CHANEY646 TA B L E 1 B R E A K D O W N O F FR A M IN G IN S TA T E A N D C IV IL S O C IE T Y O R G A N IS A T IO N S’ D IS C O U R SE — W IT H E X A M PL E T E X T (N = 3 81 ) F ra m e St at e % C SO % St at e ex am pl e te xt C SO e xa m pl e te xt L G B T ri gh ts (g en er ic ) 0. 0 28 .4 – ‘D es pi te th e co ns tit ut io na l p ro hi bi tio n on d is cr im in at io n, th e w or k of c iv il so ci et y or ga ni sa tio ns w or ki ng to p ro te ct th e ri gh ts o f s ex ua l m in or iti es re m ai ns p ar tic ul ar ly im pe ri lle d in R us si a’ (R us si a: Su bm is si on to th e U N U ni ve rs al P er io di c R ev ie w 1 6t h Se ss io n of th e U P R W or ki ng G ro up , C iv ic us W or ld A lli an ce fo r C iti ze n Pa rt ic ip at io n, N G O in G en er al C on su lta tiv e St at us w ith E C O SO C an d C iti ze ns ’ W at ch a nd G O L O S A ss oc ia tio n (G en ev a, C iv ic us W or ld A lli an ce fo r C iti ze n Pa rt ic ip at io n et a l. 20 12 , p . 4 )) (A nt i) -d is cr im in at io n 13 .0 18 .5 ‘R us si an la w p ro hi bi ts re st ri ct io ns o f a ny k in d on c iti ze ns ’ r ig ht s on th e ba si s of s oc ia l, ra ci al , se xu al , e th ni c, li ng ui st ic , r el ig io us o r a ny o th er af fil ia tio n; it is th us im po ss ib le fo r a p ol ic y of d is cr im in at io n ag ai ns t i nd iv id ua l g ro up s of ci tiz en s to e m er ge . T he re a re a dm in is tr at iv e an d cr im in al p en al tie s fo r d is cr im in at io n’ (U N 20 13 , p . 1 9, p ar a. 1 75 ) ‘A dm in is tr at iv e bo di es re fu se to w ar ra nt o ffi ci al p er m its fo r L G B T- re la te d ev en ts ju st if yi ng th ei r d ec is io ns b y di sc ri m in at or y ju dg m en ts ’ ( U P R S ub m is si on (S t P et er sb ur g, R us si an L G B T N et w or k, 2 01 2, p . 5 )) H at e cr im es / ‘ ho m o’ -p ho bi c b ul ly in g/ vi ol en ce 0. 0 11 .0 – ‘O ft en la w -e nf or ce m en t o ffi ce rs re so rt to u nw ar ra nt ed v io le nc e in th e ab se nc e of a ny th re at s to p ub lic o rd er o n th e pa rt o f t he pr ot es te rs . G en er al v io le nc e an d vi ol en t d et ai nm en ts o ft en e xt en d to th e jo ur na lis ts c ov er in g th e ev en t a nd h um an ri gh ts o bs er ve rs ’ (U P R S ub m is si on , N G O C oa lit io n: C en te r f or th e D ev el op m en t of D em oc ra cy a nd H um an R ig ht s; ‘G ol os ’ A ss oc ia tio n fo r t he Pr ot ec tio n of V ot er s’ R ig ht s, In te rr eg io na l H um an R ig ht s G ro up ; In te rn at io na l Y ou th H um an R ig ht s M ov em en t; Fo un da tio n fo r E nv ir on m en ta l a nd S oc ia l J us tic e; C en te r f or th e D ef en ce o f M ed ia R ig ht s; S O V A C en te r f or In fo rm at io n an d A na ly si s; a nd ‘M em or ia l’ A nt i- D is cr im in at io n C en te r ( M os co w , N G O C oa lit io n, 20 12 , p . 3 )) Fu nd am en ta l f re ed om s/ of o pi ni on a nd ex pr es si on 41 .3 15 .2 ‘T he C on st itu tio n gu ar an te es e ve ry c iti ze n fr ee do m o f s pe ec h. N o on e m ay b e fo rc ed to ex pr es s or re no un ce h is o r h er o pi ni on s an d co nv ic tio ns . E ve ry on e ha s th e ri gh t f re el y to se ek , o bt ai n, tr an sf er , p ro du ce a nd d is se m in at e in fo rm at io n by a ny le gi tim at e m ea ns ’ ( U N 20 13 , p . 1 4, p ar a 12 4) ‘T he R us si an L G B T N et w or k st at ed th at lo ca l m ed ia h ad s to pp ed co ve ri ng it s ac tiv iti es b ec au se th ey w er e af ra id o f b ei ng s ue d. In m an y ca se s, o w ne rs o f l oc al m ed ia w ou ld n ot b e in a p os iti on to p ay fi ne s if fo un d gu ilt y of v io la tin g th e la w ’ ( ‘H om os ex ua l P ro pa ga nd a’ B an s in R us si a: A U P R S ub m is si on b y IL G A - E ur op e, In te rn at io na l L es bi an , G ay , B is ex ua l, Tr an s an d In te rs ex A ss oc ia tio n (B ru ss el s, IL G A , 2 01 2, p . 2 )) (C on tin ue d) THE UN UNIVERSAL PERIODIC REVIEW IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION 647 T A B L E 1 ( C o n ti n u ed ). F ra m e St at e % C SO % St at e ex am pl e te xt C SO e xa m pl e te xt Id en tit y 0. 0 7. 2 – ‘R us si an a ut ho ri tie s de ny th e ex is te nc e of th e pr ob le m w ith di sc ri m in at io n on g ro un ds o f s ex ua l o ri en ta tio n an d ge nd er id en tit y an d ta ke n o m ea su re s to c om ba t h om op ho bi a in th e so ci et y an d pr ev en t h at e cr im es o n gr ou nd s of s ex ua l o ri en ta tio n an d ge nd er id en tit y’ (U P R S ub m is si on , N G O C oa lit io n: C en te r f or S oc ia l a nd L ab or R ig ht s; C en te r ‘ A nn a’ fo r t he P re ve nt io n of V io le nc e ag ai ns t W om en ; ‘ R ig ht s of th e C hi ld ’ C ha ri ta bl e Fo un da tio n; ‘P er sp ek tiv a’ R eg io na l N G O o f P er so ns w ith D is ab ili tie s; L G B T N et w or k; a nd th e C en te r f or th e D ev el op m en t o f D em oc ra cy a nd H um an R ig ht s (M os co w , N G O C oa lit io n, 2 01 2, p . 3 )) M or al ity /v al ue s 0. 0 6. 9 ‘P re se rv in g … tr ad iti on al w ay s of li fe a nd va lu es , b y us in g ta rg et ed s up po rt fr om th e St at e’ (U N 2 01 3, p . 2 0, p ar a 18 7) ‘T he se v io la tio ns a re m an if es te d in re fu sa ls o f r eg is tr at io n no t o nl y on fo rm al g ro un ds b ut a ls o us in g th e ar gu m en ts o f m or al ity , t ra di tio na l f am ily v al ue s, e tc .’ (U P R S ub m is si on , N G O C oa lit io n: C en te r f or S oc ia l a nd L ab or R ig ht s; C en te r ‘ A nn a’ fo r t he P re ve nt io n of V io le nc e ag ai ns t W om en ; ‘ R ig ht s of th e C hi ld ’ C ha ri ta bl e Fo un da tio n; ‘P er sp ek tiv a’ R eg io na l N G O o f Pe rs on s w ith D is ab ili tie s; L G B T N et w or k; a nd th e C en te r f or th e D ev el op m en t o f D em oc ra cy a nd H um an R ig ht s (M os co w , N G O C oa lit io n, 2 01 2, p . 6 )) Fr ee do m o f a ss em bl y 13 .0 6. 6 ‘U nd er a rt ic le 3 0 of th e C on st itu tio n, e ve ry on e ha s th e ri gh t t o as so ci at e, in cl ud in g th e ri gh t to fo rm tr ad e un io ns fo r t he p ro te ct io n of th ei r in te re st s. V ol un ta ry a ss oc ia tio ns a re g ua ra nt ee d fr ee do m to a ct ’ ( U N 2 01 3, p . 1 5, p ar a. 1 39 ) ‘S uc h la w s ru n co un te r t o ev er yo ne ’s ri gh t t o fr ee do m o f ex pr es si on a s w el l a s th e cl os el y re la te d ri gh ts to fr ee do m o f as so ci at io n an d to p ea ce fu l a ss em bl y. T he y ar e si m pl y no t le gi tim at e re st ri ct io ns u nd er in te rn at io na l l aw ’ ( ‘H om os ex ua l P ro pa ga nd a’ B an s in R us si a: A U P R S ub m is si on b y IL G A - E ur op e, In te rn at io na l L es bi an , G ay , B is ex ua l, Tr an s an d In te rs ex A ss oc ia tio n (B ru ss el s, IL G A , 2 01 2, p . 7 )) (C on tin ue d) PAUL CHANEY648 T A B L E 1 ( C o n ti n u ed ). F ra m e St at e % C SO % St at e ex am pl e te xt C SO e xa m pl e te xt H ea lth 4. 3 3. 0 W or k is n ow in p ro gr es s [t o … ] i m pr ov e le ve ls of h ea lth c ar e an d ed uc at io n’ (U N 2 01 3, p . 2 0, pa ra . 1 89 ) ‘T he p ro bl em w ith p ro vi si on o f a cc es s to s pe ci al is ed m ed ic al ca re fo r t ra ns ge nd er p eo pl e do es n ot re ce iv e pr op er a tte nt io n of pu bl ic h ea lth a dm in is tr at io n au th or iti es ’ ( U P R S ub m is si on , N G O C oa lit io n: C en te r f or S oc ia l a nd L ab or R ig ht s; C en te r ‘ A nn a’ fo r t he P re ve nt io n of V io le nc e ag ai ns t W om en ; ‘ R ig ht s of th e C hi ld ’ C ha ri ta bl e Fo un da tio n; ‘P er sp ek tiv a’ R eg io na l N G O o f Pe rs on s w ith D is ab ili tie s; L G B T N et w or k; a nd th e C en te r f or th e D ev el op m en t o f D em oc ra cy a nd H um an R ig ht s (M os co w , N G O C oa lit io n, 2 01 2, p . 4 )) E qu al ity in w or kp la ce / la bo ur m ar ke t 10 .9 2. 1 ‘T he R us si an F ed er at io n is b as ed o n th e pr in ci pl e th at th e pe op le s of th e Fe de ra tio n en jo y eq ua l r ig ht s’ (U N 2 01 3, p . 1 9, p ar a. 1 77 ) ‘3 9. 7% (3 56 p er so ns ) e xp er ie nc ed d if fic ul tie s at th ei r w or k in co nn ec tio n w ith th ei r s ex ua l o ri en ta tio n … ’ ( U P R S ub m is si on (S t Pe te rs bu rg , R us si an L G B T N et w or k, 2 01 2, p . 5 )) E qu al ity in h ou si ng , ed uc at io n an d so ci al w el fa re 17 .4 1. 2 ‘T he m os t i m po rt an t p oi nt er s fo llo w ed in de si gn in g an d ca rr yi ng o ut n at io na l s tr at eg y fo r so ci al s ec ur ity a nd im pr ov in g th e w el fa re o f t he po pu la tio n ar e th e In te rn at io na l C ov en an t o n E co no m ic , S oc ia l a nd C ul tu ra l R ig ht s an d th e U ni te d N at io ns M ill en ni um D ec la ra tio n. B y th e en d of 2 01 1 … th e St at e w as fu lly a ss um in g al l its s oc ia l o bl ig at io ns ’ ( U N 2 01 3, p . 1 6, p ar a. 15 1) ‘P ro hi bi tin g th e di ss em in at io n of a ny in fo rm at io n on s ex ua l di ve rs ity . T hi s w ou ld c ur ta il th e ac tiv iti es o f o rg an is at io ns th at pr ov id e in fo rm at io n an d co un se lli ng o n se xu al a nd re pr od uc tiv e he al th , i nc lu di ng p re ve nt io n of s ex ua lly tr an sm itt ab le in fe ct io ns ’ (‘ H om os ex ua l P ro pa ga nd a’ B an s in R us si a: A U P R S ub m is si on by IL G A -E ur op e, In te rn at io na l L es bi an , G ay , B is ex ua l, Tr an s an d In te rs ex A ss oc ia tio n (B ru ss el s, IL G A , 2 01 2, p . 2 )) THE UN UNIVERSAL PERIODIC REVIEW IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION 649 broadly, it explains changing ideas of the state and society in world politics, using the case of norms governing LGBT rights’ (Ayoub 2016, p. 6). In other words, it furthers insight into: ‘the existential conflict between various actors and the tension between two sets of norms: ideas that are new and international, and ideas that are rooted in the heteronormative nation and local tradition’ (Ayoub 2016, p. 6). In definitional terms international CSOs are diverse and ‘range from large-scale charities with hundreds of staff to transnational volunteer-run networks with no real expenditures at all …’ (Anheier & Themudo 2002, p. 191). In the present case two thirds of the CSO reports were from international CSOs headquartered in jurisdictions outside Russia (for example, Amnesty International, Article 19, Human Rights First). Indigenous CSOs based in Russia made up the remainder. However, in terms of contributing CSOs, 20 were international and 30 were indigenous. The discrepancy in the two measures is due to the fact that eight of the indigenous reports were joint submissions, co-authored by alliances of different Russian CSOs (for example, the Center for the Development of Democracy and Human Rights, Interregional Human Rights Group, International Youth Human Rights Movement, and the Foundation for Environmental and Social Justice). This lends credence to Ayoub’s assertion that ‘norm politics are never a one-way street, and many of the most forward-thinking proponents of LGBT rights are domestic actors within target states who champion the issue, often seeking out transnational ties to further their cause’. In sum, this study’s attention to the ‘interactions between actors … at both domestic and transnational levels [… exposes a] clash of identities and social systems [… and it is by focusing on this nexus that] we learn how worlds change [and] the LGBT rights revolution provides an ideal platform from which to study such interactions’ (Ayoub 2016, p. 6). To operationalise the mixed methodology, electronic versions of the policy documents were analysed using appropriate software. The incidence of frame use was logged in a database. To increase reliability both phases of coding (frames and policy areas) were repeated by a research assistant. This revealed a limited number of discrepancies. In total, three incidences were identified (under 1%), and these were resolved through discussion between coders. State and civil society discourse on human rights treaty implementation State discourse Submitted to the UPR in 2013, and in contrast to the practice of other CIS states,23 the Russian Federation’s National report to the UPR (UN 2013),24 makes no specific reference to LGBT rights. Instead, it advances a discourse of universal rights. This is at once contradictory and paradoxical in nature. In rhetorical terms it can be viewed as a modified and singular version of what Nash describes as the notional pursuit of a ‘communitarian “human rights culture” … [Namely] one in which—for better or worse—an ongoing negotiation of civic solidarity across differences is valued over universal principles of individual freedom’ (Nash 2005, p. 336). Thus, according to the Government of the Russian Federation ‘fundamental rights are inalienable, belong to all people from birth, and are directly enforceable. Rights and liberties are acknowledged and safeguarded in accordance with the generally recognized principles and standards of international law’ (UN 2013, p. 2). In rhetorical terms, the state’s UPR 23See for example the 2014 report submitted by Kyrgyzstan (UN 2014). 24Submitted in accordance with paragraph 5 of the annex to Human Rights Council resolution 16/21. PAUL CHANEY650 submission highlights the role of civil society in realising this vision. For example, it alludes to ‘the Russian authorities’ policy of expanding the scope for cooperation between civil and State institutions, [and] the creation of an “open government” system … [and] constructive dialogue between society and those in authority’ (UN 2013, p. 4). Yet the detailed means by which this is to be implemented are often lacking. Instead, the state submission to the UN contains non-specific references—such as to the school curriculum that is purportedly ‘designed to impart knowledge of different cultures’ (UN 2013, p. 14). A key point here is the highly generalised nature of the language. Heteronormativity is implicit, but there is no reference to, or repetition of, the oppressive language of Federal Law No. 135-FZ with its prescriptions on ‘traditional values’ and ‘respect for local cultures’. Instead, the strategic framing is based on a twin strategy that simultaneously avoids any contradiction of UDHR goals (by ignoring and omitting LGBT issues), whilst making generalised statements that give leeway for further oppressive measures. For example, it alludes to (unspecified) ‘corrections to the Criminal Code’ (UN 2013, p. 18) and the use of ‘compulsory re-education measures’ for offenders (UN 2013, p. 11). Analysis of the level of attention paid to individual frames provides further illumination. It shows ‘fundamental freedoms/freedom of opinion and expression’ to be the lead frame with 41.3% of quasi-sentences (see Table 1). In contrast to the civil society discourse (see below), this is portrayed as a foundational aspect of state policy and practice.25 Repeated reference is made to the legal code and constitution, for example, ‘According to article 2 of the Constitution, the individual and individual rights and freedoms are supreme values. The State is required to acknowledge, uphold and protect human and civil rights and freedoms’ (UN 2013, p. 2). Moreover, whilst a burgeoning literature delineates state repression and restrictions on the media and associative life (Lonkila 2011; Greene 2013; Johnson 2014), such concerns are absent from the state report. Instead, repeated reference is made to the right of freedom of speech. For example, ‘no one may be forced to express or renounce his or her opinions and convictions. Everyone has the right freely to seek, obtain, transfer, produce and disseminate information by any legitimate means’ (UN 2013, p. 14). Thus, the prevailing government approach can be seen as one based on ‘an increasing use of administrative and legal procedures for controlling them [NGOs] … [In turn] these changes are contributing to the “civility of oppression” exerted by the government’ (Daucé 2014, p. 239). The second-ranked frame is ‘equality in housing, education and social welfare’ with 17.4%, although, once again the state discourse is largely declaratory and unsupported by implementation details (for example, ‘the most important pointers followed in designing and carrying out national strategy for social security and improving the welfare of the population are the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the United Nations Millennium Declaration, [b]y the end of 2011 … the State was fully assuming all its social obligations’ (UN 2013, p. 16)). Notwithstanding prevailing concerns over the democratic pathology of ongoing state denial of freedom of association/assembly,26 this is 25Indeed, attention to the wider political discourse reveals that Russia even claims that it is better at defending human rights than the West. Notably, Putin commented at Sochi that several states in the US continue to criminalise homosexuality (Walker 2014). 26Such as ‘free and fair elections are impossible without the instigation of other key aspects of “liberal democracy”, such as … the instigation of basic human rights: such as, freedom of the press, assembly, and association … Russia are still a long way from meeting such criteria’ (Ross 2011, p. 461). See also Arps and Golichenko (2014). THE UN UNIVERSAL PERIODIC REVIEW IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION 651 the joint third-ranked frame. In turn, and reflecting widespread inequalities facing minorities (Arnold 2015; Pankratova & Pankratov 2016), ‘(anti)-discrimination’ is the other third-ranked frame, both with 13%. In the case of freedom of association, as noted, the experience of LGBT people forms part of wider concerns about oppressive state practices and rights violations ‘if the government continues to allow police persecution’ (Preston 2001, p. 773). Here the discourse analysis reveals a clear disjuncture between state rhetoric and the experiences of CSOs (reported on below). It is typified by the following government declarations: ‘everyone has the right to associate …. Voluntary associations are guaranteed freedom to act’ (UN 2013, p. 15), and ‘Russian law guarantees the right to assemble peacefully and unarmed, to hold gatherings, political rallies, demonstrations and marches and to picket’ (UN 2013, p. 16). As Iarskaia-Smirnova and Lyons explain, in its ‘“golden age” (the 1950s and 1960s) the Soviet government built one of the most advanced systems of social assistance in the world in terms of volume and quality of services and access to them .… However, some social problems usually addressed by social professionals were ignored, for example … discrimination’ (Iarskaia-Smirnova & Lyons 2015, p. 431). Today little has changed for, as Osipov observes, ‘the Putin government seems not to need an agenda related to equality, since it effectively manages diversity using political technologies based on the fight against subversive ideas and activities’ (Osipov 2010, p. 58). It is in this context that a solitary reference appears in the state discourse under the (anti)-discrimination frame that applies directly to LGB people, ‘Russian law prohibits restrictions of any kind on citizens’ rights on the basis of … sexual affiliation; it is thus impossible for a policy of discrimination against individual groups of citizens to emerge. There are administrative and criminal penalties for discrimination’ (UN 2013, p. 19). Once again, the language is declaratory in nature. It fails to provide substantive details to support the political elite’s assertions. Importantly, the CSO accounts of discrimination (set out in the following section) offer a starkly contrasting assessment. Overall, in social theory terms the state discourse can be viewed as an example of ‘performativity’ in rights administration. In colloquial parlance, the state is ‘going through the motions’ in order to fulfil its obligations whilst avoiding confrontation with the UNHRC and at the same time concealing underlying heteronormative hegemony. The overall effect is ‘institutional de-coupling’, or the situation in public administration whereby elites pronounce one thing but practice another. In other words, it constitutes a disjuncture between rhetoric, formal rules, informal practices and actual activities (Meyer & Rowan 1991; Dahlström 2004). Civil society discourse As Stella (2012, p. 82) notes, local context and collective agency come together in shaping specific forms of resistance to LGBT rights-denial. In this regard, the Russian Federation is no exception. Civil society organisations’ discourse describes a situation clearly at odds with the official state discourse. ‘Rights’ are the principal frame. It accounts for 27.3% of all quasi- sentences (see Table 1). Understandably, resistance under the frame was principally targeted at Federal Law No. 135-FZ. In this respect the present analysis reveals alignment between the contemporary situation in Russia and the international literature on state legitimisation PAUL CHANEY652 of exclusion. Notably, Schrover and Schinkel’s observation that: ‘as state categorizations [effected through enactments] continuously differ, both the historical analysis of their genesis, functioning and transformation and the contemporary analysis of their effectuation in practices are crucial to an understanding of in- and exclusion’ (Schrover & Schinkel 2013, p. 1123). The foregoing is explicit in the CSO discourse. For example, as the representative of one CSO asserts: ‘It is clear, however, that by adopting such laws, public authorities inscribe discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity in law and thus legitimise social exclusion and stigmatisation of LGBT people’.27 Another core trope was state failure to evidence the need for measures like Federal Law No. 135-FZ (and its regional variants). For example, ‘there is no evidence that public statements concerning same-sex families or relationships or sexual orientation or gender identity pose any kind of threat to the public’.28 Extant scholarly work alludes to a dyad, involving a distinction between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ rights (Cole 2009). The former are legally enshrined and enforceable, whilst the latter are discursive and symbolic. Thus, they ‘may have no legally binding force but may nevertheless have practical effects … [constituting part of a] potentially important normative system employ[ing] non-binding objectives and guidelines to bring about change in social policy and other areas’ (Trubek & Trubek 2005, p. 343). The mere presence of ‘hard’ rights in a country’s legal code is often seen as preferable to ‘soft’ rights. However, it is argued that this is over-simplistic and fails to acknowledge two pathologies. Both are identified in the current civil society discourse. First, effective implementation of rights can have negative consequences and reinforce the exclusion of LGBT people if they are based on heteronormative assumptions (Elman 2000). This is the case with the Federal Law No. 135-FZ. Second, notwithstanding state obligations under universal human rights clauses (see Article 1, UDHR) (and the constitution), their existence does not guarantee protection. Thus, the CSO discourse repeatedly alludes to state implementation failure. For example: ‘the Russian authorities often cite the anti-discrimination norms existing in various laws, but in practice these norms prove to be declarative. Using them in courts to protect real people is impossible. This conclusion follows from a nearly complete absence of discrimination cases in the Russian legal practice’.29 The second-ranked frame in the CSO discourse was discrimination (17.8% of quasi- sentences). Here the civil society discourse alluded to different modes of discrimination: individual, cultural and institutional (Nelson 2015). A key trope was state denial. For example, the Russian authorities deny the existence of the problem with discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity, take no measures to combat homophobia in society and to prevent hate crimes on grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity in spite of widespread homophobia and transphobia in the Russian society’.30 27‘Homosexual Propaganda’ Bans in Russia: A UPR Submission by ILGA-Europe, International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association (Brussels, ILGA, 2012, p. 6). 28‘Homosexual Propaganda’ Bans in Russia: A UPR Submission by ILGA-Europe, International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association (Brussels, ILGA, 2012, p. 7). 29UPR Submission, NGO Coalition: Center for the Development of Democracy and Human Rights; ‘Golos’ Association for the Protection of Voters’ Rights, Interregional Human Rights Group; International Youth Human Rights Movement; Foundation for Environmental and Social Justice; Center for the Defence of Media Rights; SOVA Center for Information and Analysis; and ‘Memorial’ Anti-Discrimination Center (Moscow, NGO Coalition, 2012, p. 3). 30UPR Submission (St Petersburg, Russian LGBT Network, 2012, p. 2). THE UN UNIVERSAL PERIODIC REVIEW IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION 653 Several also alluded to state failure to adhere to constitutional principles. This again underlines the disjuncture between the UPR rights discourse and contemporary state practice. The reasons for the implementation gap offered by the CSOs resonate with the international literature. They include a lack of political will, conflicting political agendas, weak or absent sanctions for non-compliance, and official failure to collect and monitor base data on LGBT rights.31 The discourse is typified by the following observation, the Russian Federation is member to multiple international treaties that establish the principle of equal rights of all humans. The Constitution of Russia also contains a general anti-discriminatory norm .… The Constitutional norm forbidding discrimination provides for expanded interpretation in the sense of inadmissibility of discrimination ‘on any physical or social grounds’.32 Echoing international work on state-sanctioned discrimination against LGBT people (Strand 2011), the CSOs also made the powerful point that the Federal Law No. 135-FZ has had a wider impact beyond public administration. The following examples are typical. One noted that such enactments have had the effect of ‘legitimising discrimination by employers, service providers, health practitioners, teachers and other stakeholders against people on the basis of their sexual orientation, gender identity or gender expression’.33 Another observed that: ‘the Russian LGBT Network reported that clubs have refused to rent them premises for events, even when children were clearly not amongst the potential participants’.34 Freedom of expression was the third-ranked frame (14.2% of quasi-sentences). Attention here centred on the disjuncture between the state’s espousal of such freedoms and failure to back the rhetoric with action. The CSO discourse is explicit, ‘there is no question that the “homosexual propaganda” laws [Federal Law No. 135-FZ] impermissibly interfere with the exercise of the rights to freedom of expression, association and peaceful assembly, because they do not meet the conditions set forth in the ICCPR or the European Convention for limiting these rights’.35 The civil society discourse is also caustic in its criticism of the police: for example, the failure of ‘law enforcement bodies to protect participants of peaceful demonstrations in defence of [the] human rights of homosexual, bisexual, and transgender individuals against any attempts to unlawfully obstruct assemblies or to impede the actual enjoyment of the right to freedom of expression’.36 The foregoing is significant because, as Orbe (1998a) asserts, LGBT freedom of expression is integral to challenging oppressive norms and practices, not least because it shapes civil 31See for example Roper and Barria (2005), Hafner-Burton (2008), Norman-Major and Becker (2013). 32UPR Submission, NGO Coalition: Center for the Development of Democracy and Human Rights; ‘Golos’ Association for the Protection of Voters’ Rights, Interregional Human Rights Group; International Youth Human Rights Movement; Foundation for Environmental and Social Justice; Center for the Defence of Media Rights; SOVA Center for Information and Analysis; and ‘Memorial’ Anti-Discrimination Center (Moscow, NGO Coalition, 2012, p. 4). 33‘Homosexual Propaganda’ Bans in Russia: A UPR Submission by ILGA-Europe, International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association (Brussels, ILGA, 2012, p. 4). 34UPR Submission, NGO Coalition: Center for the Development of Democracy and Human Rights; ‘Golos’ Association for the Protection of Voters’ Rights, Interregional Human Rights Group; International Youth Human Rights Movement; Foundation for Environmental and Social Justice; Center for the Defence of Media Rights; SOVA Center for Information and Analysis; and ‘Memorial’ Anti-Discrimination Center (Moscow, NGO Coalition, 2012, p. 5). 35‘Homosexual Propaganda’ Bans in Russia: A UPR Submission by ILGA-Europe, International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association (Brussels, ILGA, 2012, p. 9). 36UPR Submission (St Petersburg, Russian LGBT Network, 2012, p. 7). PAUL CHANEY654 society groups’ action repertoires, modes of communication and networking. As co-cultural theory explains, the choice of specific communicative practices amongst LGBT groups is based on an assessment of the perceived costs and rewards. They are strategically selected and implemented depending upon their degree of assertiveness and level of resistance to state heteronormative hegemony (Orbe 1998b). In turn, such choices affect the political visibility of oppressed groups such as LGBT people, and are pivotal in dispelling stereotypes and challenging misinformation and propaganda. A further strand of the discourse relates to freedom of the press. In direct contrast to the State UPR Report (inter alia ‘Freedom of mass information is guaranteed. Censorship is prohibited’, Government of the Russian Federation 2012, p. 14, para 129), the CSO discourse repeatedly refers to media harassment in the reporting of LGBT activities. For example, one noted: ‘the Russian LGBT Network stated that local media had stopped covering its activities because they were afraid of being sued. In many cases, owners of local media would not be in a position to pay fines if found guilty of violating the law’.37 This matters because it denies LGBT activists agenda-setting power (Cobb & Ross 1997), and also denies them the basis to garner public support and raise awareness of state oppression (Strand 2011). In the case of the fourth-ranked frame, hate crimes (10.6% of quasi-sentences), a core strand of the discourse was concerned with the lack of protection by police and judiciary. This resonates with the wider academic literature on the potential for disjuncture between general human rights principles and their application in domestic legal codes (Carozza 2003; Merry 2006). For example, one CSO noted that: ‘the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation does not contain any hate motive or preconceived opinion against LGBT individuals as an aggravation of a crime’.38 Another lamented that ‘not a single hate crime against LGBT has been investigated as a hate crime and, of course, no individual has been convicted of a crime on grounds of hatred or preconceived opinion against LGBT individuals’.39 Kuhar and Švab (2013, p. 17) allude to how discriminatory norms and practices force LGBT people to conceal their sexual identities. The current civil society discourse provides further evidence of this in the Russian context. In their UPR submissions CSOs allude to victims’ reluctance to report hate crimes. For example: ‘unfortunately, victims of such crimes are afraid of reporting to the police in most cases as, thereby, they would have to publicly announce their sexual orientation’.40 A further core trope in the discourse resonates with the 37UPR Submission, NGO Coalition: Center for the Development of Democracy and Human Rights; ‘Golos’ Association for the Protection of Voters’ Rights, Interregional Human Rights Group; International Youth Human Rights Movement; Foundation for Environmental and Social Justice; Center for the Defence of Media Rights; SOVA Center for Information and Analysis; and ‘Memorial’ Anti-Discrimination Center (Moscow, NGO Coalition, 2012, p. 3). 38UPR Submission, NGO Coalition: Center for Social and Labor Rights; Center ‘Anna’ for the Prevention of Violence against Women; ‘Rights of the Child’ Charitable Foundation; ‘Perspektiva’ Regional NGO of Persons with Disabilities; LGBT Network; and the Center for the Development of Democracy and Human Rights (Moscow, NGO Coalition, 2012, p. 6). 39UPR Submission, NGO Coalition: Center for Social and Labor Rights; Center ‘Anna’ for the Prevention of Violence against Women; ‘Rights of the Child’ Charitable Foundation; ‘Perspektiva’ Regional NGO of Persons with Disabilities; LGBT Network; and the Center for the Development of Democracy and Human Rights (Moscow, NGO Coalition, 2012, p. 6). 40UPR Submission, NGO Coalition: Center for the Development of Democracy and Human Rights; ‘Golos’ Association for the Protection of Voters’ Rights, Interregional Human Rights Group; International Youth Human Rights Movement; Foundation for Environmental and Social Justice; Center for the Defence of Media Rights; SOVA Center for Information and Analysis; and ‘Memorial’ Anti-Discrimination Center (Moscow, NGO Coalition, 2012, p. 1). THE UN UNIVERSAL PERIODIC REVIEW IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION 655 wider international literature on the need to tackle homophobic stereotyping and bullying in the school curriculum to prevent pupil suicides and negative psychological consequences (Meyer et al. 2011). In the CSO UPR discourse particular reference was made to the state education system: for example, ‘the climate of stigmatisation of LGBT youth, in particular in schools … homophobic and transphobic bullying … undermining the mental and physical well-being of many young people’.41 Allied to the foregoing, ‘identity’ was the fifth-ranked frame (6.7%). CSOs emphasised the oppression facing transgender people. For example, referring to Federal Law No. 135-FZ one noted, ‘we believe that the adoption of such laws contradicts the stipulations of the Report of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights on discriminatory laws and practices and acts of violence against individuals on grounds of their sexual orientation and gender identity …’.42 CSOs also highlighted how Federal Law No. 135-FZ is being ‘used as means for random detention of … individuals on grounds of their sexual orientation and gender identity’.43 True to the notion of Wald et al. (1996) of LGBT activists being drawn into ‘morality politics’, both state and civil society organisations also framed their UPR responses to LGBT identity and denial of it in terms of ‘morals’. On the state side, the text of Federal Law No. 135-FZ itself refers to the unregulated conveyance of information on non-traditional sexual relations ‘by means that make such information publicly accessible and capable of causing harm to health and the moral and spiritual development’. In a similar fashion, the regional enactments also adopt this practice (for example the Law of the Arkhangelsk Region No. 336-24-OZ, 30 September 2011, ‘On Amendments and Addition to the Regional Law “On Some Measures for the Protection of Morals and Health of Children in the Arkhangelsk Region”’).44 Lawmakers’ framing of the enactment in this way suggests intent to exploit UN Treaty provisions allowing states to make adaptations in rights implementation in the name of public morality. However, it should be noted that previous attempts to do this have been viewed with scepticism by the European Court of Human Rights and the UN Human Rights Committee.45 Notwithstanding this, state efforts to frame the debate in terms of ‘traditional’ (that is, heteronormative) morals, are likely to play well with many Russian voters. A recent survey suggested that 81% of Russians view homosexuality as ‘immoral’.46 In response, the civil society UPR discourse alludes to the authorities’ use of specious ‘moral’ arguments to limit LGBT activities: for example, ‘it also has to be noted that public events by LGBT [people] are 41‘Homosexual Propaganda’ Bans in Russia: A UPR Submission by ILGA-Europe, International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association (Brussels, ILGA, 2012, p. 3). 42UPR Submission, NGO Coalition: Center for Social and Labor Rights; Center ‘Anna’ for the Prevention of Violence against Women; ‘Rights of the Child’ Charitable Foundation; ‘Perspektiva’ Regional NGO of Persons with Disabilities; LGBT Network; and the Center for the Development of Democracy and Human Rights (Moscow, NGO Coalition, 2012, p. 8). 43UPR Submission (St Petersburg, Russian LGBT Network, 2012, p. 4). 44Zakon Arkhangel’skoi oblasti ot 30 sentyabrya No. 336-24-OZ ‘O vnesenii izmenenii i dopolneniya v oblastnoi zakon “Ob otdel’nykh merakh po zashchite nravstvennosti i zdorovya detei v Arkhangel’skoi oblasti”’. 45With the former rejecting such a defence in relation to criminalising same-sex sexual relationships (see ‘Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 1981’, European Court of Human Rights, Application no. 7525/76, Judgment, Strasbourg, 22 October 1981, available at: https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{"itemid":["001-57473"]}, accessed 27 February 2018; ‘Norris v. Ireland, 1988’, European Court of Human Rights, Application no. 10581/83, Strasbourg, 26 October 1988). For a discussion see McLoughlin (1996). 46‘The Universal Periodic Review’, Russian LGBT Network, 9 October 2012, available at: https://www. lgbtnet.org/sites/default/files/upr_eng.pdf, accessed 27 February 2018. https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{"itemid":["001-57473"]} https://www.lgbtnet.org/sites/default/files/upr_eng.pdf https://www.lgbtnet.org/sites/default/files/upr_eng.pdf PAUL CHANEY656 continued to be refused official permits by administrative authorities both for formal reasons and on such grounds as public anger, [and] moral considerations’,47 and ‘there is no evidence that public statements concerning same-sex families or relationships or sexual orientation or gender identity pose any kind of threat to public morals’.48 As contemporary application of liberal political theory underlines (Kotef 2015), the nexus between freedom, security and violence leads to different ‘regimes of movement’. These impact on different social groups in contrasting ways. In turn, this furthers understanding of patterns and processes of LGBT exclusion in the modern state. This spatial view of governance and social relations is germane to understanding the situation in today’s Russia. Thus, ‘freedom of movement and assembly’ was the seventh-ranked frame (6.1%) in the CSO discourse. The current analysis reveals a direct contradiction between the experience of civil society groups and the state’s assertions, for example, that ‘Russian law guarantees the right to assemble peacefully and unarmed, to hold gatherings, political rallies, demonstrations and marches and to picket. The right to conduct public events is established in the Constitution …’ (UN 2013, p. 15). Once again, the CSO discourse suggests institutional decoupling in state practices. The civil society discourse repeatedly draws attention to how restriction on movement is used to oppress LGBT people. For example, one CSO alluded to how: … such laws [i.e. Federal Laws No. 135-FZ and 121-FZ] run counter to everyone’s right to … freedom of association and to peaceful assembly. They are simply not legitimate restrictions under international law for three reasons: they are impermissibly vague; they fail the tests of necessity and proportionality; [and] they discriminate against individuals on the basis of sexual orientation, and, in some instances, gender identity as well.49 The discourse under this frame also provides further details of how the state is using bureaucratic means to place limits on LGBT activism: for example, as regards freedom of association, the ongoing practice of refusals to register LGBT organizations and refusals to officially approve amendments to their incorporation documents need to be noted. Violations are manifested not only in refusals justified by allegedly formal reasons, but also in referring in these decisions to considerations of morality, [and] traditional family values.50 ‘Health’ (2.8% of quasi-sentences) was amongst the remaining frames. Discourse under this frame aligned with Lewin and Meyer’s observation that, ‘institutionalized homophobia and heterosexism within health care may contribute directly to the ill-health of LGBT populations’ (Lewin & Meyer 2002 p. 161). CSOs alluded to widespread discriminatory practices. Thus, 47UPR Submission (St Petersburg, Russian LGBT Network, 2012, p. 9). 48‘Homosexual Propaganda’ Bans in Russia: A UPR Submission by ILGA-Europe, International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association (Brussels, ILGA, 2012, p. 10). 49Economic and Social Rights. Situation of Vulnerable Groups: Materials of Russian NGOs for the Universal Periodic Review of the Russian Federation in the United Nations Human Rights Council in 2013, Coalition of Russian NGOs: Centre for Social and Labour Rights; Centre ‘Anna’ for the Prevention of Violence against Women; ‘Rights of the Child’ Charitable Foundation; ‘Perspektiva’ Regional NGO of Persons with Disabilities; LGBT Network; and the Center for the Development of Democracy and Human Rights (New York, NY, UN, 2013, p. 4). 50Materials of Russian NGOs for the Universal Periodic Review of the Russian Federation in the United Nations Human Rights Council in 2013, Coalition of: Interregional Human Rights Group; International Youth Human Rights Movement; Foundation for Environmental and Social Justice; Center for the Protection of Media Rights; SOVA Center for Information and Analysis; and ‘Memorial’ Anti-Discrimination Center (New York, NY, UN, 2012, p. 4). THE UN UNIVERSAL PERIODIC REVIEW IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION 657 for example, one alluded to how: ‘specialized medical care for transgender people does not receive proper attention of public health administration authorities. A range of medical care services essential to transsexual patients (including psychotherapy, hormone-replacement therapy and surgical operations for sex reassignment … are not provided as part of the state guarantees to deliver free medical care’.51 Discussion According to regime theory, international agreements like UN human rights treaties are signed with the bona fide intention that signatory countries will implement their provisions in order to benefit their citizens (Hill 2010). Yet, as the present findings underline, a caveat is required in the case of authoritarian regimes such as the Russian Federation. This is because the theory downplays the possibility that ruling elites may sign without intent to comply. Instead, they do so in order ‘to appease [an …] international constituency’ (Chayes & Handler Chayes, 1995, p. 178). According to this view, signing agreements like the UDHR and ICCPR casts Russia as a responsible member of the international community, whereas, as the UPR discourse attests, the Kremlin selectively interprets its obligation to uphold universal rights and oppresses LGBT citizens. In addition to state-intent, two additional factors are germane to understanding rights observance in the Russian Federation: civil society strength and international rights enforcement. In the latter regard, it is widely acknowledged that UN treaties have limited sanctions for non-compliance (Bowman 2007; Risse et al. 2013). This effectively allows the Russian government to act with impunity with regard to LGBT rights, whilst, in the case of civil society strength, as Neumayer notes, ‘improvement in human rights is typically more likely the more democratic the country, or the more international non-governmental organizations [CSOs] its citizens participate in …. [In short,] ratification [of human rights treaties] is more beneficial the stronger a country’s civil society is’. The troubling upshot of this is, ‘in very autocratic regimes with weak civil society, [human rights treaty] ratification can be expected to have no effect and is even possibly associated with more rights violations’ (Neumayer 2005, p. 921). The civil society discourse confirms that this scenario applies to today’s Russia. Specifically, it reveals how, over recent years the governing elite has simultaneously espoused universal rights and freedoms whilst framing its discourse in narrower terms of ‘the protection of traditional values of mankind and respect for local cultures’. This has been accompanied by repressive measures like Federal Law No. 135-FZ. In this way the Russian state has promoted heteronormativity whilst at the same time rejecting identity-based LGBT human rights claims. It is thus a powerful example of institutional de-coupling. This does not auger well for LGBT citizenship, not least because it resonates with earlier work by Rauhofer who notes that, ‘gay and lesbian politics that focus on merely sharing rights and privileges that come out of a heterocentric system deny the opportunity to make a difference’ (Rauhofer 1998, p. 74). 51UPR Submission (St Petersburg, Russian LGBT Network, 2012, p. 8). PAUL CHANEY658 In turn, the foregoing analysis shows how civil society organisations have responded to this malaise by framing a discourse of resistance. Drawing on situated knowledge, it details the oppression facing LGBT people, something that is clearly at odds with the official state discourse. In it ‘rights’ are the leading frame (unsurprisingly, this strand mainly targets Federal Law No. 135-FZ and allied instruments). Yet, CSOs also use their UPR submissions to focus on diverse pathologies including discrimination, hate crimes and restrictions on freedom of expression, movement and the right to gather peaceably. These findings are consistent with the 2012 ruling of the United Nations Human Rights Committee. It too found that contemporary practices in the Russian Federation violate LGBT peoples’ rights, as set out in the UDHR and International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.52 By showing the endurance of a stark state–civil society disconnect over two cycles of the UPR the present study points to the continuing failure of international attempts at control of Russia’s rights regime. In social theory terms, this challenges the ‘Transitology School’ of thought. The latter asserts that increased civil society contention undermines authoritarian rule paving the way for greater rights and freedoms (Wiarda 2001; Petsinis 2010). Instead, the current findings suggest the need for a more sophisticated interpretation, namely, that the repressive Moscow regime’s qualified tolerance of civil society resistance in their UPR submissions actually boosts its own resilience (Nathan 2003, p. 11). As Froissart cogently observes, to the ruling elite the value of such mechanisms lies in ‘showing the way [… that civil society dissent is] expressed is an integral part of authoritarian governance’ (Froissart 2014, p. 220). In the absence of the necessary rights enforcement, the disjuncture between state and civil society discourse shows performativity and legitimation have taken the place of legitimacy and accountability. Specifically, ‘performativity’ here refers to the ‘reiteration of a norm or set of norms, and to the extent that it acquires an act-like status in the present, it conceals or dissimulates the conventions of which it is a repetition’ (Price & Shildrick 1999, p. 147). In other words, through its submission to the UPR, the Russian government appears to embrace the idea of universal rights and civil society scrutiny in a way that advances political legitimacy, whereas, in reality, as the foregoing analysis shows, it is ‘legitimation’ that best describes the situation. This term refers to ‘communicative actions aimed at managing the perception that government actions are effective in promoting their desired ends, whether that is in fact true’ (Moore 2001, p. 272). In the present case this means the Russian state giving the impression that it is serious about engaging with the UN’s official review of UDHR and ICCPR compliance, when in fact, it is failing to uphold LGBT rights. In short, the ruling elite’s approach is founded on the twin ills of instrumentalism and institutional decoupling. All of this points to the need for revised UN working practices. In response, this study makes four recommendations grounded in the earlier analysis: first, the UN HR Committee must take a more systematic, critical view of the contrasts in the framing of state and civil society submissions to the UPR and require a specific explanation and/or remedial action from state parties; accordingly, second, in future, the UNHRC must ensure that actionable recommendations in light of the UPR are explicitly linked to deliverable and measurable 52Notably, Articles 19(2) and 26. See Irina Fedotova v. Russian Federation: Communication No. 1932/2010, UN GAOR, Human Rights Committee, 106th Session, UN Doc, CCPR/C/106/D/1932/2010 (2012), available at: http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/undocs/1932-2010.html, accessed 30 September 2016. In a similar vein, in relation to a different international rights framework, Russia continues to fail to comply with the European Court of Human Rights judgment (in the case of Alekseyev v Russia). http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/undocs/1932-2010.html http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/undocs/1932-2010.html THE UN UNIVERSAL PERIODIC REVIEW IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION 659 outcomes over a set time period (for example reduction in cases of malicious prosecution, a decrease in alleged illegal detentions and a specified drop in the number of homophobic hate crimes); third, the UN system needs a more robust set of sanctions when state parties are in breach of their UDHR and ICCPR obligations, including suspension of states’ right to participate in the General Assembly, punitive financial measures and personal liability for ministers enforced in the International Criminal Court; and fourth, drawing on the earlier Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, the UN should apply the principles of ‘mainstreaming’ LGBT rights into its UPR processes and outputs.53 In other words, there should be systemic attention to LGBT rights at all stages of the UN review process, including Concluding Observations, General Comments and Individual Communications to states’ parties. An added benefit here is that the latter action would facilitate better consideration of intersectionality, or the way that LGBT rights intersect with other ‘protected characteristics’, such as gender, ethnicity, age and disability. In sum, the present analysis underlines the formidable challenges facing CSOs concerned with LGBT rights in Russia. It also confirms that effective international regimes are likely to emerge only where they have deep roots in civil society. In the case of the Russian Federation, state suppression of the civil sphere means this is absent. CSOs seek to resist state hegemony through their UPR submissions, yet without effective enforcement mechanisms, they are ignored by those in power. 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Submission to the UN Universal Periodic Review of Russian Federation (London, Article 19, 2012). UPR Submission—Materials of Russian NGOs for the Universal Periodic Review of the Russian Federation in the United Nations Human Rights Council in 2013, Center for the Development of Democracy and Human Rights, Institute for Human Rights, ‘Social Partnership’ Foundation, ‘Public Verdict’ Foundation (Moscow, CDDHR et al., 2012). UPR Submission on the Human Rights Violations of Women and Adolescents Living in the Russian Federation, Center for Reproductive Rights (New York, NY, CRR, 2012). UPR Submission, Center for Social and Labor Rights (Moscow, CSLR, 2012). Universal Periodic Review: Submission Regarding the Russian Federation by Church of Scientology International, Church of Scientology International (Los Angeles, CA, Church of Scientology International, 2013). Russia: Submission to the UN Universal Periodic Review 16th Session of the UPR Working Group, Civicus World Alliance for Citizen Participation, NGO in General Consultative Status with ECOSOC and Citizens’ Watch and GOLOS Association (Geneva, Civicus World Alliance for Citizen Participation et al., 2012). The Rule of Law. Liberty and Security of the Person. Materials of Russian NGOs for the Universal Periodic Review of the Russian Federation in the United Nations Human Rights Council in 2013, Coalition of Russian NGOs (CRN): Institute for Human Rights, ‘Social Partnership’ Foundation; ‘Public Verdict’ Foundation; Soldiers’ Mothers of Saint Petersburg; ‘Memorial’ Human Rights Center; Interregional Committee against Torture; and the Center for the Development of Democracy and Human Rights (Moscow, CRN, 2012). https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/17/vladimir-putin-gay-winter-olympics-children https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/17/vladimir-putin-gay-winter-olympics-children PAUL CHANEY664 Alternative Report on Fulfilment of Obligations by Russian Federation Represented with a Limits of UPR Review 2012, Interregional Non-governmental Organization, Committee Against Torture (Nizhniy Novgorod, CAT, 2012). Contribution to the Report of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights on the Implementation of the New Review Mechanism of the Human Rights Council, European Association of Jehovah’s Christian Witnesses (Kraainem, EAJCW, 2012). European Roma Rights Centre Submission Concerning the Russian Federation to the Human Rights Council, within its Universal Periodic Review, for Consideration at the 16th Session, European Roma Rights Centre (Budapest, ERRC, 2012). Submission for the Universal Periodic Review of the Russian Federation (Oslo, Forum18, 2012). Briefing for the Human Rights Council Universal Periodic Review—16th Session, 2013, Global Initiative to End Corporal Punishment of Children (London, CICPC, 2012). UPR Submission on Reproductive Rights in the Russian Federation 16th Session of the Universal Periodic Review—2013, The Federation for Women (Warsaw, FfW, 2012). Submission to the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights Universal Periodic Review: Russian Federation 2012, Human Rights First (New York, NY, HRF, 2012). Submission to the United Nations Human Rights Council Universal Periodic Review Session 16: Russian Federation, Institute for Human Rights and Business (New York, NY, IHRB, 2012). Submission Report to the Universal Periodic Review of the Russian Federation, The Institute on Religion and Public Policy (Alexandria, VA, IRPP, 2012). Submission to the Universal Periodic Review of the Russian Federation, International Commission of Jurists (Geneva, ICJ, 2012). Joint UPR Submission—Russian Federation, International Fellowship of Reconciliation and Conscience and Peace Tax International (Geneva, IFR and CPTI, 2012). ‘Homosexual Propaganda’ Bans in Russia: A UPR Submission by ILGA-Europe, International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association (Brussels, ILGA, 2012). UPR Submission, Interregional Human Rights Group (Moscow, IHRG, 2012). NGO Submission for the 16th Session of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review, L’auravetl’ an Information and Education Network of Indigenous People Russia (Moscow, LIENIPR, 2012). UPR Submission, NGO Coalition: Center for the Development of Democracy and Human Rights; ‘Golos’ Association for the Protection of Voters’ Rights, Interregional Human Rights Group; International Youth Human Rights Movement; Foundation for Environmental and Social Justice; Center for the Defence of Media Rights; SOVA Center for Information and Analysis; and ‘Memorial’ Anti-Discrimination Center (Moscow, NGO Coalition, 2012). UPR Submission, NGO Coalition: Center for Social and Labor Rights; Center ‘Anna’ for the Prevention of Violence against Women; ‘Rights of the Child’ Charitable Foundation; ‘Perspektiva’ Regional NGO of Persons with Disabilities; LGBT Network; and the Center for the Development of Democracy and Human Rights (Moscow, NGO Coalition, 2012). Contribution to the 16th Session of the Working Group of the Universal Periodic Review Submission on the Russian Federation, PEN International and Russian PEN International (Moscow, PEN International and Russian PEN International, 2012). THE UN UNIVERSAL PERIODIC REVIEW IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION 665 Submission to the UN Human Rights Council Universal Periodic Review 16th Session, Reporters Without Borders/Reporters Sans Frontieres (Geneva, RWB, 2012). NGO Submission to the Human Rights Council Universal Periodic Review Mechanism, Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North (RAIPN), International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs, and Institute for Ecology and Action Anthropology (Moscow, RAIPN, 2012). UPR Submission, Russian LGBT Network (St Petersburg, Russian LGBT Network, 2012). Submission by the Society for Threatened Peoples International, Society for Threatened Peoples International (Bern, STPI, 2012). Submission by NGO Stellit Related to Russian Federation for the Universal Periodic Review (St Petersburg, Stellit, 2012). Materials of Russian NGOs for the Universal Periodic Review of the Russian Federation in the United Nations Human Rights Council in 2013, Coalition of: Interregional Human Rights Group; International Youth Human Rights Movement; Foundation for Environmental and Social Justice; Center for the Protection of Media Rights; SOVA Center for Information and Analysis; and ‘Memorial’ Anti-Discrimination Center (New York, NY, UN, 2012). Economic and Social Rights. Situation of Vulnerable Groups: Materials of Russian NGOs for the Universal Periodic Review of the Russian Federation in the United Nations Human Rights Council in 2013, Coalition of Russian NGOs: Centre for Social and Labour Rights; Centre ‘Anna’ for the Prevention of Violence against Women; ‘Rights of the Child’ Charitable Foundation; ‘Perspektiva’ Regional NGO of Persons with Disabilities; LGBT Network; and the Center for the Development of Democracy and Human Rights (New York, NY, UN, 2013). Abstract Rationale for the present study LGBT rights and civil society in the Russian Federation Methodology State and civil society discourse on human rights treaty implementation State discourse Civil society discourse Discussion Appendix. List of CSO submissions to the UPR References 
work_fipwnepijndpnkloisk6gcqthi	----	ARTICLES 248 — AltLJ Vol 34:4 2009 A BLUE WRISTBAND VIEW OF HISTORY? The death of Mulrunji Doomadgee and the illusion of postcolonial Australia SARAH KEENAN O n 27 August 2009 at a Canberra book launch, Prime Minister Kevin Rudd called for an end to the history wars.1 He declared ‘the time has now come to move beyond the arid intellectual debates’ over the interpretation of Australian history and in particular, the impact colonisation has had on indigenous Australia.2 The ‘arid debates’ he refers to are between those who wear a ‘black armband’ to mourn the unspeakable damage colonisation has done to indigenous Australia, and those who think modern Australia has nothing to apologise for. Both the radicals and the pioneers championed by each side are, he claimed, ‘part of the rich fabric of our remarkable story called Australia’.3 In declaring it safe to call a truce in the history wars, Rudd is implying democratic liberal Australia has reached a moment in its history where we can agree to disagree and move forward together.4 The implication is we are now living in thoroughly post-colonial times, and the proponents of the history wars have become irrelevant. But if Rudd rejects both historical views, what view is he putting forward? Now that Australia has a native title regime, a permanent human rights and equal opportunity commission, various laws against discrimination, and has even had a national apology, has the nation indeed reached a point where it can leave its antagonistic colonial history behind and move onto a neutral, multicultural present? Two months earlier, the Queensland Court of Appeal ordered that the coronial inquest into the death of Cameron Mulrunji Doomadgee5 be re-opened. It has been five years since Mulrunji died in a Palm Island holding cell, and this most recent legal decision was barely noticed by the media. Immediately after Mulrunji’s death in November 2004 there had been a frenzy of media attention. Half a decade later and no one is yet to be held responsible for Mulrunji’s death. This new inquest is likely to take years and means the Doomadgee family and Palm Island community will have to re-live, once again, the details of losing their brother. In this article I examine the Mulrunji case in the context of the liberal, postcolonial view of history that I argue is not only being promulgated by the prime minister, but is also being taken up by wider Australia. Drawing on the work of critical geographer Doreen Massey, I define place as a process and Australia as a colonial process rather than a static area or bounded nation-space. Contrary to the postcolonial image suggested by Rudd’s call for an end to the history wars, and liberal reforms such as limited land rights, anti-discrimination laws, equal opportunity commissions and the long-awaited apology, the Mulrunji case demonstrates that Australia today is still very much a colonial place. What is now emerging is a view of history that acknowledges the wrongs done to indigenous Australians in the past but that sees itself as having meaningfully departed from this time of colonial violence. Distinct from both the ‘black armband’ and unreservedly celebratory views of history that competed throughout the Howard years, what is emerging now is a ‘blue wristband’ view of history which denies the existence of colonial power relations while actively reproducing them. Death in custody of Mulrunji Doomadgee Aboriginal deaths in custody are not a new issue for Australia. What was outstanding about the death in custody of Mulrunji Doomadgee was the fact that the arresting officer Senior Sergeant Chris Hurley was actually charged with an offence. Palm Island lies off the northeast coast of Queensland and is home to around 3000 residents, almost all of them indigenous. Located 50 kilometres from the mainland, it is accessible only by a two hour ferry ride that does the return trip three times per week, or a far more expensive 40 minute charter flight. On his way to go fishing on the morning of 19 November 2004 Mulrunji walked past Hurley and Indigenous Police Liaison Officer Lloyd Bengaroo, who were in the process of arresting a young man, Patrick Bramwell, for a public nuisance offence. Mulrunji, who knew Bengaroo, said to him something to the effect of ‘you’re a black man too, why can’t you help the blacks?’6 Seemingly unworried by the comment, Bengaroo told Mulrunji to keep walking, which he did. Hurley took an interest in it and asked Bengaroo what Mulrunji had said. What happened from that point is subject to competing claims. According to Hurley, Mulrunji then turned around and swore at the two police officers. Community witnesses say Mulrunji neither swore nor turned around, but was simply singing as he continued walking down the street.7 At any rate, Hurley drove a police van down to Mulrunji and arrested him. Protesting that he had done nothing wrong, Mulrunji resisted getting into the van and Hurley grabbed him by both legs and forcibly pushed him in.8 When Hurley opened the van upon their arrival at the police station, Mulrunji punched Hurley on the jaw and the two men had what Hurley later described as ‘a struggle’.9 Less than an hour later, Mulrunji was dead in a holding cell. He bled to death from a severe compressive force REFERENCES 1. The history wars famously involved the ‘black armband view of history’; a pejorative phrase used by conservatives to attack historians who they thought focussed too much on the negative impact of colonisation on Australia’s indigenous population, contrasted with the ‘three cheers’ view, which saw Australian history as predominantly something to cheer about. See Graeme Davison, The Use and Abuse of Australian History (2000) and Stuart MacIntyre and Anna Clark, The History Wars (2004). 2. David Mark, ‘Rudd calls for end to “history wars” ’, ABC News online (27 August 2009) <abc.net.au/news/ stories/2009/08/27/2669177.htm> at 27 August 2009. 3. Ibid. 4. Ibid. 5. Hurley v Clements [2009] QCA 167. It is a custom in some indigenous communities to avoid directly naming a deceased person for a period of time after the death, as a mark of respect. Mulrunji was the name nominated by the family and means ‘the departed one’, see footnote 1 of Boe Lawyers Final Submission on behalf of the Palm Island Aboriginal Council (16 August 2006 [query date and web reference]) <boelawyers. com.au/current%20focus.html> at 30 October. Chloe Hooper notes that in fact the indigenous witnesses in the Palm Island case continued to refer to the dead man as Cameron, with only the lawyers and journalists using Mulrunji, which she claims was consistently mispronounced. See Chloe Hooper, The Tall Man: Death and Life on Palm Island (2008). This claim is consistent with the family-supported memorial website for Mulrunji <myspace.com/mulrunji> at 30 October 2009, which directs that the name is pronounced ‘moordinyi’. 6. Boe Lawyers, above no 5, 21–22. 7. Ibid 23. See also Jeff Waters, Gone for a Song: A Death in Custody on Palm Island (2008). 8. Ibid 22. See also evidence of Christopher Hurley in R v Christopher James Hurley, Indictment No. 4/2007 as reproduced in Hooper, above n 5, 229. AltLJ Vol 34:4 2009 — 249 ARTICLES which cleaved his liver in two and ruptured his portal vein. He also had four broken ribs and a black eye.10 A couple of hours after his arrest, members of Mulrunji’s family went to the police station to ask after him. Knowing that Mulrunji was dead, Hurley told the family that he was asleep and that they should come back later.11 Hurley had already notified his superiors in Townsville about the death and two detectives, Darren Robinson and Raymond Kitching, were on their way over to Palm Island. Both knew Hurley as a colleague and it was common knowledge that Hurley and Robinson were close friends. Hurley picked them up at the airport and had them over for dinner at his house that evening.12 Over the course of the following week the detectives conducted an investigation that concluded that Hurley and Mulrunji had had ‘a tussle’ in between the police van and the station; that Mulrunji had accidentally fallen up the single step leading into the police station, and that this fall alone had caused his death.13 It was this version of events that, when it was announced to the community, sparked a riot on Palm Island. A drawn out coronial inquiry eventually led14 to a lengthy and damning report that concluded that Hurley’s actions had caused Mulrunji’s fatal injuries. The report also found that Mulrunji’s arrest was an inappropriate exercise of police discretion, the police investigation was unsatisfactory and deficient, and that Hurley had lied about falling next to Mulrunji and had in fact punched Mulrunji several times while he lay on the floor of the police station.15 Despite the report, it took a significant political battle for Hurley to be charged with manslaughter and assault in February 2007, becoming the first police officer in Australian history to be charged with an indigenous death in custody. The Queensland Police Union (QPU) reacted with vitriolic outrage, threatening to strike16 and launching a huge public campaign in Hurley’s support including radio advertisements, press releases, and the sale of blue awareness wristbands, imprinted with Hurley’s police number, 6747. Hurley stood trial in June 2007 before an all-white jury in Townsville and was found not guilty on both charges. He was immediately welcomed back to policing at a station on the Gold Coast.17 In 2008 Hurley won an unprecedented appeal against the2006 coronial report that had held him responsible for Mulrunji’s death The decision included an order that the costs of Hurley’s appeal be paid by the Doomadgee family and Palm Island community.18 In June 2009 the Court of Appeal overturned parts of the decision. The court subsequently made a costs order granting indemnity certificates to both parties.19 Australia as a colonial process Mulrunji’s death and its legal and political aftermath were not isolated, local issues for Palm Island or for the state of Queensland, but were part of the ongoing, colonial process that is Australia. Geographer Doreen Massey understands place as a process rather than something that is fixed in time.20 Massey uses a diversity of examples to show how place is both spatially and temporally contingent — it changes from moment to moment, constantly evolving into something new. This is an obvious departure from thinking of places as static, bounded areas. The process that is Australia today implicates not only the police officers who work in indigenous communities, but all non-indigenous Australians, whose ‘settled’ lifestyles could not be maintained without the ongoing dispossession of indigenous Australians from their culture and their land. That dispossession has always been and continues to be violent — the popularly- sanctioned violence of the law is what keeps the white Australian state safe from indigenous otherness. It is not a coincidence that indigenous Australians are arrested and imprisoned at wildly disproportionate rates to the rest of the population, nor is it due to the legacy of colonialism. Rather, the over-policing and imprisonment of indigenous Australians is an integral part of today’s Australia. That this process continues unabated at a moment in history when the Australian state has embraced a rhetoric of equality and postcoloniality makes the process all the more harmful and problematic. Further to her understanding of place as a process, Massey understands space as heterogenous and dynamic rather than as essential and static in meaning. Space is embedded in power relations — individuals and social groups are placed in distinctly different positions of power depending on where they are.21 The spatialised power relations within which Palm Island is located are severely colonial. The island was first gazetted as an indigenous reserve in 1914. It functioned as an open-air prison for indigenous persons who were considered dangerous, including ‘half-castes’, who were regarded as not only a social problem, but also a biological threat to the white race.22 Palm Island was seen by the Queensland government as a particularly attractive location to place indigenous people because it isolated them from white people.23 Indigenous people 9. Christine Clements, Findings of Inquest into the Death of Mulrunji Townsville: Office of the State Coroner 27 September 2006 p 14, <austlii.edu.au/au/journals/ AILR/2006/81.html> at 30 October 2009. Note that this decision has been overturned but the second inquest has not yet begun. 10. Ibid, 7–9. 11. Boe, above n 5, 48. 12. Clements, above n 9, 10–11. 13. Waters, above n 7, 73. 14. Almost two years later on 27 September 2006. 15. Clements, above n 9, 10–11. 16. Renee Viellaris, Cameron Atfield and Amanda Watt, ‘Police strike threat in support officer’, Courier Mail (Brisbane) 27 January 2007. 17. Sarah Volger and AAP, ‘Officer welcome back on Coast duty’, Gold Coast Bulletin (Gold Coast) 22 June 2007. 18. Ibid. 19. Hurley v Clements & Ors (No 2) [2009] QCA 207. 20. Doreen Massey, ‘Power-geometry and a progressive sense of place’ in Barry Curtis Jon Bird, Tim Putnam George Robertson and Lisa Tickner (ed), Mapping the Futures: Local Cultures, Global Change (1993), 66. 21. Ibid, 61. 22. Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody 1991, Regional Report of Inquiry into Queensland Appendix 1(a): The Aboriginals in Colonial Society 1840–1897, <austlii.edu.au/au/other/ IndigLRes/rciadic/regional/qld/ch5. html#Heading22> at 10 December 2008. 23. Ibid. The blue wristbands denied the ongoing occurrence of colonial violence (by insisting on Hurley’s innocence) at the same time as they implicitly asserted the need for such violence in the maintenance of the nation. ARTICLES 250 — AltLJ Vol 34:4 2009 from at least 57 different language groups were sent to Palm Island during its life as a penal colony.24 Families sent to the island were separated and only allowed to see each other with permission from a white superior.25 In 1986 the Queensland government relinquished direct control over Palm Island and passed it onto the newly formed community council, which was given title to the land under a ‘deed of grant in trust’26 — a species of land title created specifically for the self-administration of former missions and reserves. Under such a deed the land must be used for the benefit of the community, meaning that private ownership of land is unlawful.27 While these legal moves were positive in terms of indigenous self-government, they were accompanied by a swift withdrawal of government infrastructure from the island.28 The physical isolation of Palm Island combined with the cumbersome legalities of its land tenure scheme have made it very difficult to attract any kind of investment.29 As the residents on Palm Island are either former reserve inmates or their children, there is also no economic base upon which to begin local industry. Palm Island today is a place of severe poverty. Houses are badly overcrowded (averaging 17 people per house),30 run-down,31 and unemployment is over 90%.32 Suicide and domestic violence rates are disproportionately high.33 The persistent conditions of poverty and despair on Palm Island can be attributed in part to the island’s isolation and lack of infrastructure, but in larger part to the fact that the networks of social relations and understandings that constituted Palm Island as a penal colony in the early 1900s have not shifted. For Palm Island to move from being a place of coloniality to one of postcoloniality will require more fundamental and wide-ranging shifts than the granting of limited civil and land rights to indigenous Australians. Those shifts need to be wide-ranging not just in the sense that significant change needs to occur on Palm Island, but also throughout Australia today. Spatialised power relations are not just about certain places being more violent or more impoverished than others. They are about the power and prosperity of some places actively weakening the power and prosperity of others. If place is understood as an ongoing process constructed through networks of social relations and understandings, then it is contingent on and interconnected with that outside of itself. In terms of Australian geography, it is not simply that remote indigenous communities are worse off and subject to greater control than regional towns and cities, but that those towns and cities could not continue to exist as they do without the ongoing displacement and control over remote indigenous communities. Geographies of irresponsibility Spatialised power relations and the inter-connectedness of places of poverty and prosperity suggest a corresponding politics of inter-connectedness which Massey labels geographies of responsibility.34 Embracing such politics would mean recognising the multiple networks of understandings, relations, processes and experiences that intertwine to form place, and drawing lines of responsibility along the multiple trajectories of the networks that extend out from it. Such a model has yet to be widely embraced in Australia. Scott Veitch argues that Australian common law organises irresponsibility, legitimating the ongoing dispossession of indigenous people and the effective disavowal of Australia’s racially violent past on the grounds of equality, freedom and formal justice.35 While the legal system has incrementally moved away from the now unacceptable policies of racial discrimination and genocide, the Australian state still depends on the continued dispossession of indigenous people from their land and their culture. While legal measures such as Mabo, anti-discrimination laws, the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission and the apology do represent movement away from the blatant racism of Australia’s colonial foundations, they also reiterate, as Stewart Motha has argued, that the law of the coloniser is the only valid normative system.36 Indigenous ‘rights’ are recognised only within the white legal system and on terms defined by it, thereby reinforcing the hegemony of that system, the subordination of indigenous laws and the un-thinkability of it being any other way. In recognising indigenous rights, the colonial state is attempting to redefine itself and its legal system as postcolonial. But the legal system that grants indigenous land rights and prohibits racial discrimination37 is the same legal system that incarcerates indigenous Australians at over 15 times the rate of non-indigenous Australians,38 undermines and belittles indigenous ways of knowing,39 and refuses to acknowledge that its foundations lie in violent conquest.40 The Commonwealth government that apologised to the Stolen Generations is the same government that not only maintained but extended the policies of the Northern Territory Intervention41. The Australian government boasts about (some) families in remote communities feeling more safe and secure with increased police presence, but fails to recognise the systemic reason those communities are unsafe and insecure in the first place.42 As Andrea Smith has argued in regards to hate crime law, when a state founded on genocide purports to protect or support racial minorities, it reproduces white supremacy by masking the racism of the state itself.43 The legal reforms ostensibly made in the interests of indigenous Australia have an effect of entrenching the relation of irresponsibility from non-indigenous Australians towards indigenous Australians, by creating the illusion that the law protects or even promotes indigenous interests. Purportedly postcolonial legal measures might be classified as non-performative anti-racism. While there is no doubt that such measures do achieve anti-racist results for particular individuals, they fail to change the fundamentally racist structure of the space in which those individuals live. The stark colonial Australian landscape of prosperous white cities and severely impoverished black areas has not significantly changed since these measures have been instituted. Sara Ahmed explains how acts that acknowledge the existence of 24. Palm Island: Future Directions, Resource Officer Report, State of Queensland (January 2006), 27. 25. RCIADIC, Regional Report of Inquiry into Queensland, Appendix 1(a). 26. Now governed by chapter 3 of the Land Act 1994 (Qld). 27. s 35 Land Act 1994 (Qld). 28. Waters, above n 7, 41. 29. Andrew Boe, ‘Palm Island — Something is very wrong’ Australian National University Public Lecture Series 2005 (28 September 2005), 8. 30. Ibid, 5. 31. Waters, op cit, 150–165. 32. Palm Island: Future Directions, op cit, 35. 33. Boe, above n 5. 34. Doreen Massey ‘Geographies of Responsibility’ (2004) 86B(1) Geografiska Annaler Series B, Human Geography 5. 35. Scott Veitch, Law and Irresponsibility: On the Legitimation of Human Suffering (2007), 99–114. 36. Stewart Motha, ‘The Failure of “Postcolonial” Sovereignty in Australia’ (2005) 22 Australian Feminist Law Journal 107. 37. In certain circumstances. See especially the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) is excluded from the Northern Territory Emergency Response Act 2007 (Cth): s132(2). 38. ‘A statistical overview of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander People in Australia’ (August 2006) Australian Human Rights Commission <hreoc.gov.au/Social_Justice/ statistics/index.html#toc9> at 14 December 2008. 39. See for example the Hindmarsh Island Bridge affair, critiqued in Diane Bell, Ngarrindjeri Wurruwarrin: a world that is, was, and will be (1998). 40. Irene Watson, ‘Illusionists and Hunters: Being Aboriginal in this Occupied Space’ (2005) 22 Australian Feminist Law Journal 15. 41. Northern Territory National Emergency Response Act 2007 (Cth). Section 132 excludes the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) from operation in certain areas of the Northern Territory. AltLJ Vol 34:4 2009 — 251 ARTICLES racism in order to overcome it are generally non-performative, meaning that they do not do what they say.44 Gestures that declare racism has been overcome do not actually overcome racism if the wider space in which that gesture is situated is still embedded in racism. Non-performative anti-racist gestures effectively announce that ‘we know racism exists, and now that we have acknowledged its existence, it doesn’t really exist anymore’.45 Legal anti-racist gestures such as anti-discrimination legislation implicitly assert this message, instituting state mechanisms to address racism and in turn suggesting that racism is something that exists in less enlightened individuals or institutions and not in the state itself. Non-performative anti-racist gestures make white Australians feel better about themselves and their state while both maintaining and hiding the ongoing colonial process. They create the illusion that the state is taking responsibility for racist injustices while in fact entrenching the relation of irresponsibility that exists towards indigenous Australia. Part of police anger over Hurley being charged was that members felt betrayed by the Australian community, particularly those who live in the cities and celebrate non-performative anti-racist gestures, but who are far removed from the indigenous despair that police in indigenous communities face on a daily basis. The Queensland police establishment argued on numerous occasions that Hurley and all police working in indigenous communities are doing it for the rest of us46 — they are out there on our behalf, enforcing our laws, doing our dirty work, taking responsibility for the maintenance of our nation. And this argument has great weight if the collective ‘we’ being assumed in these statements is white Australia. For as long as Australians like Hurley join the police force and are posted to remote places that are sites of indigenous poverty, despair and dysfunction, non-indigenous Australians in settled towns and cities can forget about that despair. The everyday reality of indigenous dispossession is far from the view of most Australians, and is only further obscured by the existence of very public non-performative anti-racist gestures. This is not to deny that there is also support for anti-racist gestures and for increased police presence in remote communities from indigenous Australians — the issue is by no means a settled or straightforward one for indigenous communities.47 But in terms of how these measures relate to non-indigenous Australia, while men like Hurley go to the remote frontiers to deal with the ongoing dispossession, non-indigenous Australians, whose lifestyle depends on ongoing indigenous dispossession, can take comfort in their government’s ‘postcolonial’ reforms and get on with their lives. A blue wristband of history Awareness wristbands have been used in various colours and styles for a range of causes including several incurable diseases, anti-bullying and human rights. The QPU released the first batch of 4000 wristbands imprinted with Hurley’s police number on 8 February 2007, two weeks after it was announced Hurley would face trial for manslaughter. Sold for $5 each at police stations throughout Queensland, the initial 4000 sold out in a day.48 The funds raised from the blue wristbands were put towards meeting Hurley’s legal costs, but QPU vice-president Denis Fitzpatrick stated ‘It’s not a significant amount of money we’re trying to raise. It’s more an issue with regards of support and solidarity of our member’.49 Fitzpatrick called the wristbands ‘a silent protest’.50 The wristbands were silent in the sense that they did not produce an audio sound, and also in that their message was not clearly articulated. In media interviews and advertisements that accompanied the release of the wristbands, QPU representatives spoke about the need for increased police numbers, for better video monitoring in cells and for resources to implement the recommendations of the Royal 42. Jenny Macklin MP, ‘Australian Government Response to the NTER Review’ (23 October 2008) available at <jennymacklin.fahcsia.gov.au/internet/ jennymacklin.nsf/content/nter_measure_ 23oct08.htm> at 12 June 2009. 43. Andrea Smith, ‘Unmasking the State: Racial/Gender Terror and Hate Crimes’ (2007) 26 Australian Feminist Law Journal 47. 44. Sara Ahmed, ‘Declarations of Whiteness: The Non-Performativity of Anti-Racism’ (2004) 3(2) borderlands e-journal. 45. Ibid. 46. See for example the statement of Queensland Police Minister Judy Spence on ‘The Law Report’ (11 November 2008) ABC Radio National <abc.net.au/rn/ lawreport/stories/2008/2416076.htm> at 12 November 2008. 47. Marcia Langton, ‘Trapped in the Aboriginal reality show’ (2007) 19 Griffith Review 145 and ‘It’s time to stop playing politics with vulnerable lives’ The Age (Melbourne) 30 November 2007. 48. Ibid. 49. ‘Police wear colours for colleague: Bands of support’ Cairns Post (Cairns) 10 February 2007. 50. Ibid. Photo by Glenn Hampson, reproduced with permission from News Limited. The blue wristband view of history is dangerous because it creates the illusion that Australia has addressed or is in the process of addressing the wrongs of the past and is now building an anti-racist, socially just postcolonial nation. ARTICLES 252 — AltLJ Vol 34:4 2009 Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody (RCIADIC).51 These claims are both vague and contradictory — the RCIADIC did not recommend increased police numbers. There was video monitoring in Mulrunji’s cell — it showed Mulrunji dying and a junior police officer later kicking his body to see whether he was conscious.52 Yet while the message of the QPU’s ‘silent protest’ was not clearly expressed, it was loudly broadcast — as well as a front page spread on the Gold Coast Bulletin, articles about the wristbands appeared in newspapers across Queensland.53 The tactics, tone and imagery of the campaign expressed a strong set of emotions — an indignant outrage, angry, threatening, and self-righteous. The image of the young white woman54 holding up her bent arm to display her blue wristband resonates strongly with imperial representations of the nation’s woman fighter, who stands in solidarity with her male colleagues but also needs protection from the racialised and sexualised other. White colonising cultures are deeply misogynistic, and as Irene Watson has argued, those cultures administer and police themselves entirely within a patriarchal horizon.55 The use of a young woman as the central image of the QPU campaign denies the patriarchal aspect of colonial violence. Using a male police officer for the publicity would not have achieved this effect — the image of a policeman holding up his bent arm and glaring militantly at the camera would have displayed the patriarchal violence that the use of the woman denied, and would not have had the same affective connotations of the woman as representative of nation. This highly emotive assertion of white nationalism in the context of a white police officer being charged with the assault and manslaughter of an indigenous man intimated the deeper and more unspeakable message that Mulrunji’s death was not a crime, but a necessary part of the maintenance of the nation. The wristband campaign asserted that Hurley was so innocent that it was an outrageous injustice that he should even go to trial; what he was doing that morning was not just innocent, it was a necessary part of the ongoing process that is Australia today. Although a formal complaint was entered with the Queensland police force when police prosecutors wore the blue wristbands to an opening ceremony of an indigenous court,56 the wristband campaign was not met with widespread condemnations of white nationalism or fascism. Of course, not every non-indigenous Australian bought a blue wristband and no doubt many would have been critical of Mulrunji’s death and the QPU’s response. But the fact that there was very little popular outcry suggests that the difference in attitude towards white-indigenous relations in Australia today between those buying the wristbands and those who were indifferent or even quietly critical of the wristband campaign is in practice not as wide as those who celebrate Australian post-coloniality might like to think. The banal liberalism promulgated by postcolonial legal reforms has successfully encouraged most non- indigenous Australians to believe that the mistreatment of indigenous people today is not their responsibility. Against the landscape of severely impoverished indigenous communities and the relatively prosperous white majority, the attitude that indigenous oppression is ‘not my responsibility’ is not that far from the attitude that that oppression is necessary. The blue wristbands denied the ongoing occurrence of colonial violence (by insisting on Hurley’s innocence) at the same time as they implicitly asserted the need for such violence in the maintenance of the nation. Such contradictory and hypocritical politics are consistent with a broader view of Australian history that sees Australia as postcolonial, while actively reproducing colonial power relations. Unlike either the ‘black armband’ view of history or its opponent, which unreservedly celebrated colonisation, this ‘blue wristband’ view of history acknowledges the harm done to indigenous Australians in the past but insists that postcolonial justice is now on its way to being achieved. The blue wristband view of history is dangerous because it creates the illusion that Australia has addressed or is in the process of addressing the wrongs of the past and is now building an anti-racist, socially just postcolonial nation. That illusion is what allows the prime minister to argue that the nation can now safely draw a truce in the history wars, and is part of what prevents the emergence of a resistance movement that is willing to challenge the fundamental racist underpinnings of the Australian state. As the Doomadgee family continue battling the legal system, and indigenous communities around the country continue to live in poverty, the blue wristband view of history not only provides the context in which the Australian landscape of colonial violence and severe inequality continues to occur, but is part of what enables that violence and inequality to continue. SARAH KEENAN is a PhD candidate from the Centre for Law, Gender and Sexuality at the University of Kent, UK. © 2009 Sarah Keenan 51. Ben Dillaway and Geoff Chambers, ‘Copping it on the radio’ Gold Coast Bulletin (Gold Coast) 1 February 2007. 52. Clements, above n 9. 53. Newspapers with articles on the wristbands include the Courier Mail, Townsville Bulletin and Cairns Post. Each article is archived on the QPU website at http://www.qpu.asn.au.unionnews. php#_2007. 54. The QPU did not give copyright permission for the photo described to be reproduced in this article. It can however be accessed online at page 12 of the February 2007 union journal. See http:// www.qpu.asn.au/journal07.php. 55. Irene Watson ‘Aboriginal Women’s Law and Lives: How Might We Keep Growing the Law?’ (2007) 26 Australian Feminist Law Journal 95 at 99. 56. Michael McKenna, ‘Up in arms over thin blue line’ The Australian (Sydney), 26 May 2007. 
work_fivgxrcij5fnvdkmuh4wipkqru	----	282 www. amazoni ainvestig a.in fo ISSN 2322 - 6307 DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.34069/AI/2020.29.05.32 Investigation of Crimes Committed By Members of Youth Informal Groups Расследование преступлений, совершаемых членами молодежных неформальных групп Received: March 5, 2020 Accepted: April 23, 2020 Written by: Mikhail Larkin132 https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4676-460X Olexandr Dudorov133 https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4860-0681 Yuliia Pyrozhkova134 https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4644-6270 Kateryna Dudorova135 https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8416-240X Alina Biryukova136 https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1772-0808 Abstract The deterioration of the criminal situation in Ukraine makes it necessary to intensify the work of law enforcement agencies to combat crime. In particular, there is a need to improve the investigation methods of certain types of crimes. This category of crimes includes crimes committed by members of youth informal groups.The object of the study was public relations in the field of investigation of crimes committed by members of youth informal groups. As a result of the study, the features of proposing a version of the involvement of members of a youth informal group in criminal activity are considered. Initial investigative (search) actions are determined, which serve as the basis for verifying the indicated version. When working on the article, special literature was analyzed devoted to the study of various aspects of the activities of youth informal groups, criminal associations, the fight against crime, the investigation of group crimes, etc.In addition, such scientific methods as observation, analysis, synthesis, and generalization were used. The authors used a combination of methods of scientific knowledge, which together allowed them to achieve the stated results of the study. Among other, the methods of analysis, synthesis, extrapolation, generalization method were Аннотация Ухудшение криминогенной обстановки в Украине обусловливает необходимость активизации работы правоохранительных органов по борьбе с преступностью. В частности, существует необходимость совершенствования приемов и способов расследования отдельных видов преступлений. К такой категории преступлений относятся и преступления, совершаемые членами молодежных неформальных групп. Объектом исследования выступили общественные отношения в сфере расследования преступлений, совершаемых членами молодежных неформальных групп. В результате проведенного исследования рассмотрены особенности выдвижения версии о причастности к совершению преступной деятельности членов молодежной неформальной группы. Определены первоначальные следственные (розыскные) действия, которые служат основой для проверки указанной версии. При работе над статьей была проанализирована специальная литература, посвященная исследованию различных аспектов деятельности молодежных неформальных групп, преступным объединениям, борьбе с преступностью, расследованию групповых преступлений и т.д. 132 Ph. D., Associate Professor of Department of Criminal Law and Justice of Zaporizhzhia National University. 133 Doctor of Legal Science, Associate Professor, Head of Research Laboratory on Crime Prevention, Termination and Investigation by Territorial Authorities of the National Police of Ukraine of Luhansk State University of Internal Affairs named after E.A. Didorenko. 134 Doctor of Legal Science, Associate Professor, Head of Department of Criminal Law and Justice of Zaporizhzhia National University. 135 Ph. D., Associate Professor, Department of Legal Science of Berdyansk State Pedagogical University. 136 Doctor of Legal Science., Associate Professor, vice-rector of Academy of Advocacy of Ukraine. Larkin, M., Dudorov, O., Pyrozhkova, Y., Dudorova, K., Biryukova, A. / Volume 9 - Issue 29: 282-287 / May, 2020 Volume 9 - Issue 29 / May 2020 283 http:// www.a mazoniainve stiga. in fo ISSN 2322 - 6307 used.The empirical basis of the study was the materials of the investigation of crimes committed by members of youth informal groups and associations. Key Words: investigation, crime, youth, informal group, version, special issues. Авторы использовали комбинацию методов научного познания, которые в своей совокупности позволили достичь поставленных результатов исследования. Среди прочего, были использованы методы анализа, синтеза, наблюдения, экстраполяции, генерализации и т.д. Эмпирической основой исследования стали материалы расследования преступлений, совершаемых членами молодежных неформальных групп, объединений. Ключевые слова: расследование, преступление, молодежь, неформальная группа, версия, специальные вопросы. Introduction One of the most difficult categories of crimes, in the context of their investigation, is group manifestations of a protest nature. Most often, these acts are inherent in participants of various kinds of informal groups, associations that try to express certain ideas, views, beliefs (pseudo- beliefs) by any means, including illegal ones. In this regard, there is, without exaggeration, an urgent need to develop methods for investigating of crimes committed by members of youth informal groups and associations. In this case, one should take into account the lack of fundamental scientific and practical research that could serve as the informational basis of these methods. However, the analysis of empirical material, of individual scientific publications makes it possible to highlight certain features of the investigation of crimes committed by members of youth informal groups and associations. Moreover, often these features are associated with the problems that the investigating authorities face in the process of their investigation. The main objective of the study was to analyze the features of the formulation of the version of the involvement in the commission of criminal activity of members of youth informal groups. An additional objective of the study was the formulation of a set of initial investigative (search) actions, which serve as the basis for checking of this version. The authors also tried to group in two blocks special issues that arise in the process of studying information related to the activities of informal youth groups in the context of investigating their criminal attacks: 1) issues directly to be studied; 2) sources of information. At the same time, we should also speak about … the existence of high requirements of civil society for its citizens (Kharytonov, Kharytonova, Tolmachevska, Fasii, & Tkalych, 2019). The standards of modern civil society require not only the fight against crime and the principle of the inevitability of punishment, but also the respect for the legitimate rights of those suspected of committing crimes. Accordingly, the activities of bodies investigating crimes committed by representatives of youth informal groups should clearly comply with procedural law. In no case shall the rights and legitimate interests of the suspected persons be infringed. Theoretical framework When working on the article, special literature was analyzed devoted to the study of various aspects of the activities of youth informal groups, criminal associations, the fight against crime, the investigation of group crimes, etc. Having examined a considerable amount of specialized literature, the authors of the article found, that Gross (2002), Konovalova (2013), Klimenko (2005), Bukaev and Vassalatiy (2010) studied some general problems of the crimes investigation process. 284 www. amazoni ainvestig a.in fo ISSN 2322 - 6307 Moreover, Shepitko (2009), Shrub (2018), and Varfolomeeva (2011) were engaged in the development of domestic forensics in general. In addition, the psychological view on the different sides of the commission of a crime was studied by Kazmirenko (2009), Vasiliev (2008), Vasylchuk (2016), and Lisovets (2011). Furthermore, it should be also noted that Denisyuk and Shepitko (1999), Ershov (2006) in their works revealed the issue of conducting a search in the investigation of crimes committed by members of youth informal groups. Besides, Korshunova (2006) also raised the issue of countering of crimes of. extremist orientation Nevertheless, a number of issues during the investigation of crimes committed by members of youth informal groups haven’t been studied enough in domestic science. In particular, the issues addressed by the authors in this article have not been thoroughly investigated by either domestic or foreign forensic experts. Methodology To write the article, the authors used such scientific methods as: • method of observation (when studying the materials of criminal proceedings, which became the basis for the formulation of certain recommendations); • method of analysis (in the study of scientific sources; the practice of investigating crimes committed by informal youth; the features of verifying the version of the involvement of members of the youth informal group in the commission of a crime); • synthesis method (when summarizing individual recommendations on the investigation of crimes committed by members of youth informal groups); • extrapolation method (in the study of scientific sources devoted to the investigation of crimes); • generalization method (when considering certain features of the tactics of investigative (search) actions, formulating conclusions). The empirical basis of the study was the materials of the investigation of crimes committed by members of youth informal groups and associations. Results and discussion I. The formulation of a version of involvement in the commission of a crime (s) by members of a youth informal group. The primary investigative (search) actions in many respects predetermine the success of the investigation of the indicated categories of crimes, therefore, in no case should we allow an "aristocratically distant relationship" (Gross, 2002) to them. The investigator, operational officers should be incredulous and critical. Hans Gross wrote: "an experienced investigator treats a whole series of crimes with distrust from the very beginning and always leaves the question open whether he is dealing with something completely different" (Gross, 2002). After receiving information about the crime and analyzing the source data, the process of planning the investigation begins. The need for planning arises from the activities of the investigator for the investigation of crimes, which requires organization, speed (Shepitko, 2019). Depending on the content of the source data obtained by analyzing the investigative situation and taking into account typical versions for this category of cases, the investigator plans his actions at a certain stage of the investigation of the crime, determining their circle, sequence, and content (Shrub, 2018). The version (versions) is the basis of the planning of the investigation, it is a mental model of the crime committed, built by the investigator based on initial data, his or her theoretical ideas and practical experience (Konovalova, 2013). However, it should be noted that the version of the crime committed by members of the youth informal community is not typical (despite a wide range of crimes committed by "informals"), and its occurrence is usually associated with the identification of specific traces, that is, traces indicating the involvement of a certain youth informal group to commit a crime (items left at the crime scene with symbols of informal movement, inscriptions, graffiti, leaflets – material traces; showing witnesses, victims, for example, about the presence in the actions of the suspected motive of racial, national or religious hatred due to statements, insults, etc. are ideal traces) (Larkin, 2019). Moreover, as the practice of investigating crimes of this category shows, often these traces are of secondary importance, which leads to an unproven motivational Volume 9 - Issue 29 / May 2020 285 http:// www.a mazoniainve stiga. in fo ISSN 2322 - 6307 component and the group nature of the criminal activity, and, accordingly, distorts all investigative activities. Verification of the version of involvement in the commission of a crime by informal youth, as well as analysis of the traces, is carried out by conducting three main priority investigative (search) actions: an examination of the scene, interrogation of witnesses (victims), and a search (if a suspected person is identified). Tactically competent inspecting the scene of an incident can largely predetermine the further course of the investigation in this category of crimes. It is rightly noted in the legal literature that the inspection of the scene is one of the most complex investigative (search) actions (Klimenko, 2005); (Shepitko, 2009); Varfolomeeva, 2011). The tactics of examining a crime scene during the investigation of crimes committed by members of youth informal groups are determined by the following: 1. The nature of the investigative situation (the circumstances of the commission of criminal acts; the size of the territory to be inspected; the degree of conflict). 2. The level of preparation for its conduct (by the composition of the investigative- operational group (in particular, by the presence in it of a specialist who studies the activities, functioning of various youth non- formal entities), technical equipment, the availability of a plan, etc.). It is the inspection of the scene of the incident, if carried out carefully that can convince the investigator to verify the version of the crime committed by participants in the youth informal community. In practice, often this investigative (search) action is carried out superficially, which cannot but cause concern. After examining the scene, interrogations of witnesses (victims, if possible) should be carried out. It is advisable to conduct them either simultaneously with the inspection of the scene of the incident, or immediately after it (Bukaev, & Vassalatiy, 2010). Considering the interrogation of witnesses (victims) as "a complex act of communicative interaction" (Kazmirenko, 2009), it is necessary to approach its implementation as carefully as possible: 1. Minimize conflict (to convince the interrogated that they and their close relatives will be safe, not enter into various disputes, be tolerant, willing to compromise). The ability to use dialogue to search and establish the truth can be considered a sign of a high culture of investigation (Vasiliev, 2008). 2. Use all the tactical tools that the investigator possesses (in addition to using tactical techniques and tactical combinations, a situation may arise when it is advisable to interrogate the presence of individual specialists, for example, a psychologist, a linguist, a specialist who studies the activity, the functioning of various youth non-formal entities, etc.). 3. Be prepared for opposition to the investigation by interrogated persons (the motives for such opposition may be different, for example, fear for one’s life, the life of close relatives). Interrogations of witnesses (victims) can determine the reality of the version of a crime committed by members of a youth informal group. If the identity of the suspect(s) is established, it becomes necessary to conduct a search. The purpose of the search is to find the instruments of crime, things, and valuables obtained by criminal means, as well as other objects and documents that are important for establishing the truth in the case. The purpose of the search may also be the discovery of corpses, persons hiding from the court and the investigation, other persons (Denisyuk, & Shepitko, 1999). A search in the investigation of crimes committed by members of youth informal groups should be preceded, as far as possible, given the factor of efficiency, thorough preparation. Moreover, all objects of search activity should be divided into: 1) those that are of direct importance for the disclosure and investigation of a crime (crimes), these are fingerprints, biological substances, weapons, ammunition, etc.; 2) those that testify to the involvement of participants in a particular informal community in the commission of a given crime (crimes) or the person (s) belonging to such a community (Larkin, 2020). The optimal composition of the investigative- operational group can also have a significant impact on the effectiveness of this investigative 286 www. amazoni ainvestig a.in fo ISSN 2322 - 6307 (search) action. So, it should include a specialist psychologist and a specialist studying the activity and functioning of various youth non-formal entities. It is the evidence obtained during the search (searches) that can convince the investigator and the prosecutor that members of a youth informal group committed the crime. II. The study of special issues in the investigation of crimes committed by members of youth informal groups. One of the key trends that is inherent in all youth informal communities is their variability (transformation, disappearance, the emergence of new ones, etc.). In order to understand the trends of modern informality, one should constantly monitor its dynamics, qualitative and quantitative indicators, which only a limited number of people can afford (specialists, scientists, etc.). The investigator (prosecutor), faced with practical activities to investigate crimes committed by "informals", is in a kind of information vacuum, which, in the future, cannot but affect the results of the investigation. Therefore, the study by these persons of special issues related to the existence and activities of informal youth is of great importance. To optimize the study of special issues regarding informal youth, in the context of the investigation of their criminal activity, this process should be divided into two blocks: 1) issues to be studied; 2) sources of information. The first block includes the following questions: 1) the history of the youth informal movement, its form; 2) the causes of youth informal groups, their types; 3) the most radical youth informal communities; 4) features of the functioning of youth informal criminal groups in a particular country (region, city, district); 5) sources of financing for youth informal groups (given the specifics of their activities); 6) communication features of participants of individual youth non-formal entities, etc. The second block of this activity has the nature of information content, i.e. obtaining certain knowledge, information. These sources include: 1) consultations with specialists (for example, regarding historical issues – a specialist historian if his studies are devoted to topics of interest to the investigator; types and features of the functioning of youth informal groups – a specialist who studies the activities and functioning of various youth non-formal entities; issues of language communication in the informal environment – specialist linguist; issues of religious studies - a specialist in religious studies, etc.); 2) the study of specific information resources (for example, the works of Andryushchenko (2015); Vasylchuk (2016); Roszak (1969); Lisovets (2011); Schafer and Navarro (2013); Kolomoets, Liutikov and Larkin (2017); Boiarov, Larkin, Legkykh, Melkovskyi and Hromova (2019)). The study by the investigator, the prosecutor of literature devoted directly to the investigation of crimes related to the activities of informal youth (Ershov, (2006) (including crimes of an extremist nature, hateful (Korshunova, 2006; Hate Crime Operational Guidance, 2014), etc.) is also important. Conclusions As a result of the study, the features of the version of the involvement of members of the youth informal group in criminal activity are considered. Initial investigative (search) actions are determined, which serve as the basis for verifying the indicated version. Due the fact that the investigator (prosecutor), faced with practical activities to investigate crimes committed by informals, is in a kind of information vacuum, which can subsequently affect the results of the investigation, the study of special issues related to the existence and activities of informal youth by these persons is of great importance. So the process of studying of special issues regarding informal youth, in the context of the investigation of their criminal encroachments, must divided into two blocks: 1) questions to be studied; 2) sources of information. A promising area for subsequent research is the study of other features of the investigation of crimes committed by members of youth informal groups and associations. Volume 9 - Issue 29 / May 2020 287 http:// www.a mazoniainve stiga. in fo ISSN 2322 - 6307 Bibliographic references Andryushchenko, E.S. (2015). Ukrainian right- radical organizations in the context of socio- political processes (late 1980s – 2015). Zaporozhye: ZNU. Boiarov, V., Larkin, M., Legkykh, K., Melkovskyi, O., & Hromova, M. (2019). Ways to Prevent the Financing Youth Informal Groups of the Extremist. Amazonia Investiga, 8(24), 479- 483. Bukaev, N.M., & Vassalatiy, Zh.V. (2010). Methods of investigation of crimes of a terrorist nature. Moscow: Yurlitinform, 2010. Denisyuk, S.F., & Shepitko, V.Yu. (1999). Search in the system of investigative actions (tactical and criminalistic analysis). Kharkov: Consum. Ershov, V. A. (2006). Methods of investigating crimes against the life and health of citizens committed by members of informal groups (movements). Vladivostok. Gross, G. A. (2002). Guide for Forensic Investigators as a Forensic System. Moscow: LexEst. Hate Crime Operational Guidance. (2014). Pending inclusion into Authorised Professional Practice. College of Policing Limited. Kazmirenko, L.I. (2009). Psychology of investigative activity. Kyiv: Legal Unity. Kharytonov, E., Kharytonova, O., Tolmachevska, Y., Fasii, B., & Tkalych, M. (2019). Information Security and Means of Its Legal Support. Amazonia Investiga, 8(19), 255- 265. Retrieved from https://www.amazoniainvestiga.info/index.php/a mazonia/article/view/227. Klimenko, N.I. (Ed.). (2005). An overview of the scene in the investigation of particular types of crime: a scientific and practical guide. Kyiv: Yurincom Inter. Kolomoets, T., Liutikov, P., & Larkin, M. (2017). Informal youth associations as a business reality. Baltic Journal of Economic Studies, 3(5), 294-297.Konovalova, V.E. (2013). Murder: The Art of Investigation. Kharkov: Yurayt. Korshunova, O.N. (2006). Extremist crimes: theory and practice of counteraction. St. Petersburg: Legal Center Press. Larkin, M.A. (2020). Tactical and criminalistic features of the search during the investigation of crimes committed by members of youth informal groups (associations). Legea si Viata, 1 (2), 56- 59. Larkin, M.O. (2019). Some features of place-of- view investigation of crimes committed by members of youth informal groups (associations). Bulletin of Zaporizhzhya National University. Law, 1, 103-107. Lisovets, O.V. (2011). Theory and methodology of working with children's and youth organizations of Ukraine. Kyiv: Academy. Roszak, T. (1969). The Making of a Counter Culture. Reflections on the Technocratic Society and Its Youthful Opposition. New York. Schafer, R.J., & Navarro, J. (2013). The Seven- Stage Hate Model. The Psychopathology of Hate Groups. FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, 7(3), 1-9. Shepitko, V.Yu. (2009). Forensics. Kharkov: Odyssey LLC. Shepitko, V.Yu. (Ed.). (2019). Criminalistics. Kharkiv: Law. Shrub, M.P. (Ed.). (2018). Forensic technique. Minsk: Academy of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Varfolomeeva, T.V. (2011). Criminalistics. Kyiv: Yurincom Inter. Vasiliev, V.L. (2008). Legal Psychology. St. Petersburg: Peter. Vasylchuk, Ye.O. (2016). Youth political radicalism and extremism in contemporary Ukraine. Kyiv. 
work_fkifgcfjbzbtflukiduttrg7qm	----	O R I G I N A L P A P E R Sexual Assault as a Crime Against Young People Richard B. Felson • Patrick R. Cundiff Received: 21 October 2011 / Revised: 21 July 2012 / Accepted: 30 March 2013 � Springer Science+Business Media New York 2013 Abstract Evidence based on almost 300,000 sexual assaults from the National Incident-Based Reporting System showed that the modal age of victims was 15 years, regardless of the age of the offender, the gender of the offender, or the gender of the victim. We suggest that adolescents have the highest risk of victimization because of their sexual attractiveness, vulnera- bility, and exposure to motivated offenders. As a result of these factors, sexual assault is as much an offense against young people as it is against women. The sexual attractiveness of young people also has implications for the age of offenders. Older men have much higher rates of offending than one would expect, given the age–desistance relationship. Thus, we found that older men have much higher rates of sexual assault than physical assault. Finally, evidence suggested that homosexual men were at least as likely as heterosexual men to commit sexual assault. The pattern suggests that the tendency for sexual assaults to involve male offenders and female victims reflects male sexu- ality rather than attitudes toward women. Keywords Sexual assault � Adolescents � Evolutionary theory � Routine activities � Age Introduction Rape and other sexual assaults typically involve male offenders and young female victims (e.g., Amir, 1971; Felson & Krohn, 1990; Lalumiere, Harris, Quinsey, & Rice, 2005; Palmer, 1991; Spivack, 2011; Thornhill & Thornhill, 1983). In this research, we examined age and gender patterns more extensively. We used an extremely large data set that allowed us to examine incidents involving offenders and victims of different ages, and incidents involving all four gender com- binations. We also compared age patterns in sexual and physical assaults. We argue that these patterns have impli- cations for understanding the basic nature of sexual assault. Age of Victims The tendency for men to sexually assault young women has been attributed to male preference for sexually attractive women (e.g., Ageton, 1983; Felson, 2002; Palmer, 1988). 1 Research has shown, not surprisingly, that young women are perceived as more physically attractive than older women (Harris, 1994; Henss, 2006; Mathes, Brennan, Haugen, & R. B. Felson (&) Department of Sociology and Crime, Law, and Justice, Pennsylvania State University, 211 Oswald Tower, University Park, PA 16803, USA e-mail: rbf7@psu.edu P. R. Cundiff Department of Criminal Justice, East Carolina University, 245 Rivers Building, Greenville, NC 27858, USA e-mail: patrickrcundiff@gmail.com 1 Our emphasis on sexual attractiveness in interpreting age preferences implies that sexual motivation plays a role in sexual assault. The idea is controversial, although considering sexual motivation along with other motives has become more acceptable in recent years (e.g., Bryden & Grier, 2011; Felson, 2002; Kanin, 1985; Mann & Hollin, 2007; Palmer, 1988). We do not deny that a power motive or some combination of motives could also be involved. We focus on sexual attractiveness (and motivation) because it makes sense of the age patterns that we observe. The feminist approach predicts gender not age discrimination in sexual assaults. Where age patterns have been discussed they have been attributed to opportunity factors (Kimmel, 2003; Travis, 2003). 123 Arch Sex Behav DOI 10.1007/s10508-013-0127-8 Rice, 1985; Mathews, Bancroft, & Slater, 1972; Williams, 1975). 2 It is also likely that opportunity factors help to explain why victims tend to be young (Felson, 1998; Kimmel, 2003; Travis, 2003). Young people engage in routine activities that increase their contact with potential offenders and thereby increase their risk of crime victimization generally. For example, going out with friends at night increases dramatically from age 11 until age 18 and then begins to decline (Felson, 1998; Warr, 1993). Night time activity continues to decline in middle age and old age (e.g., Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2011). This pattern would produce a curvilinear relationship between age and victimization. Vulnerability is another opportunity factor that has a curvi- linear relationship with age. Children have greater vulnerability than adults because of their smaller size, naiveté and perhaps their lower credibility, should they report the offense. Evidence suggests they are less likely to resist sexual assault than adults (Siegel, Sorenson, Golding, Burnam, & Stein, 1987). Young adults may be the least vulnerable because of their physical strength and vigor (Palmer, 1988) and their greater tendency to respond to an attack with violence. Montoye and Lamphiear (1977) found that physical strength peaks in the early-20s for males and the mid-20s for females (see also Clement, 1974). Studies of the risk of sexual assault during other crimes sug- gests that young women are much more likely to be victimized than older women even when they have similar levels of contact and vulnerability. For example, Felson and Cundiff (2012) used the National Incident-Based Reporting System (NIBRS) to exam- ine the effects of age of the victim on whether male offenders committed sexual assaults during robberies of female victims. They found that male offenders were most likely to commit sex- ual assault while robbing women between the ages of 15 and 29 years (see also Felson & Krohn, 1990). This pattern was observed regardless of the age of the offender. Other research has shown that female homicide victims who had been raped were younger than female homicide victims who had been the victim of theft (Shackelford, 2002; Wilson, Daly, & Scheib, 1997). The age pattern observed in these studies supports the idea that opportu- nity factors cannot fully explain why the victims of sexual assault tend to be young women. The sexual attractiveness of young women seems to be the most convincing explanation of the strong age pattern that remains when opportunity factors are controlled. Male preference for young women in sexual assault is also observed in consensual sexual activities not affected by the age preferences of the other party. Age-related sexual attractiveness explains why models, prostitutes, erotic dancers, and actresses in the pornography business are overwhelmingly young (e.g., Bogaert, Turkovich, & Hafer, 1993). Age-related sexual attrac- tiveness also explains why compensation for sex work declines as women age (Edlund & Korn, 2002). Age of Offenders The sexual attractiveness of young people may also have implications for the age of offenders. Age has been found to have a strong negative relationship with violent criminal behavior (e.g., Hirschi & Gottfredson, 1983). 3 Felson, Cundiff, and Painter- Davis (2012), however, suggested that sexual assault might be an exception to the age–desistance curve. They examined the issue in a NIBRS-based study of male on male sexual assaults occurring in prisons and jails. Felson et al. suggested that older inmates commit more sexual assaults than expected given the age–desistance curve. They based their argument on Merton’s (1938) blocked opportunity theory. This classic theory suggests that people are likely to turn to crime when their opportunities to achieve their goals using legitimate means are blocked. Felson et al. argued that older men were not able to obtain consensual sexual partners in prison because they were not sexually attractive or sexually tol- erable to other inmates. Younger male inmates were more likely to be viewed as suitable alternatives to women, while older men were beyond the latitude of acceptance. This barrier to opportu- nity increased the tendency of older inmates to commit sexual assault and to target younger inmates. In support, they found that older inmates were much more likely than younger inmates to commit a sexual assault than a physical assault. The comparison between sexual and physical assault permitted them to control for the effects of age–desistance. Felson et al. (2012) suggested that the blocked opportunity approach to sexual assault might apply outside of correctional set- tings. Older men have almost as strong a sexual attraction to younger women as do younger men, according to the literature on sexual attractiveness cited earlier. However, since young women tend not to be sexually attracted to older men, older men do not have sexual access to young women. 4 While prostitutes provide older men opportunities for consensual sex with young women, their services are expensive. As a result, some men use illegitimate means, i.e., sexual assault, to satisfy their conven- tional aspirations. Gender of Offenders and Victims The gender profile of sexual assaults is very different from other violent crime. Sexual assaults are much more likely to involve 2 From an evolutionary perspective the sexual attractiveness of young women and their high risk of rape reflects the association between age and fecundity in ancestral history (e.g., Ellis, 1989; Palmer, 1991; Shields & Shields, 1983; Symons, 1979; Thornhill & Palmer, 2000). We leave it to others to decide the relevance of our results to evolutionary psychology. From our perspective, it seems clear that evolution plays a role in sexuality and that sex differences in sexuality play a role in rape. 3 In addition, male sex drive is related to testosterone levels and testosterone levels begin a slow decline in the early twenties (e.g., Booth, Johnson, & Granger, 1999; Sternbach, 1998). Testosterone, however, is also related to non-sexual offenses. 4 This pattern is likely to be weaker when older men have power and status, if these characteristics affect their sexual attractiveness. Arch Sex Behav 123 male offenders and female victims. We can imagine two explanations for why this gender pattern is distinctive. First, men may target women because of their attitudes toward women. It is variously argued that rapists are men with sexist attitudes who want to dominate women, feel hatred toward women, feel a sense of entitlement, or think that they can evade punishment because society tolerates the offense (e.g., Brownmiller, 1975; Burt, 1980; Koss et al., 1994). Evidence is mixed, but some studies have found correlations between negative attitudes toward women and measures of sexual coercion (e.g., Mala- muth, 1986). On the other hand, it may be that men who commit sexual assaults have anti-social attitudes generally (Lalumiere & Quinsey, 1996; Spivack, 2011). In addition, evidence sug- gests that the predictors of rape and other crimes are similar and that rapists tend to commit other crimes as well. To the extent that rapists are versatile offenders, the role of special attitudes toward women is less significant (Felson, 2002). Gender patterns in sexual assault could also be due to the nature of male sexuality and its relationship to female sexuality. The high rate of female victimization could be due to the fact that most males are heterosexual. Perhaps if rates of heterosexuality and homosexuality were equal, men would have just as high a victimization rate as women. The higher rate of male sexual offending relative to other types of offending could be due to the tendency for males to have a stronger sex drive than females and to their tendency to be much more indiscriminate and casual in their attitudes toward sexual relations (e.g., Baumeister, 2000; Buss, 2000; Schmitt, 2005; Schmitt et al., 2012).The literature showing strong sex differences in sexuality is extensive and consistent. Males think about and desire sex more often, report spontaneous sexual desire more often, initiate sex more often, refuse it less often, rate their sexual urges as stronger, and are less likely to cite lack of interest and enjoyment as a reason for not having sex. Large gender differences in the tendency to engage in masturbation and casual intercourse have been shown in a meta-analysis of a large number of studies (Oliver & Hyde, 1993; Petersen & Hyde, 2010). 5 In contrast, females are more likely to insist on some commitment or closeness before engag- ing in sexual relations (Clark & Hatfield, 1989; Eysenck, 1976; Simpson & Gangestad, 1991). These differences have also been revealed in studies of gender differences in sexual fantasies (Ellis & Symons, 1990). Finally, research has showed that gay men engage in sexual behavior much more frequently than lesbians (Schäfer, 1977). Same-sex liaisons provide a window for viewing male and female sexuality, because they do not reflect a compromise (Symons, 1979). If sexual assault reflects male sexuality rather than male attitudes toward women, homosexual men should be just as likely to commit sexual assault as heterosexual men. Heter- osexual assault is more frequent because most men are het- erosexuals, not because of negative attitudes toward women. On the other hand, if sexual assault reflects male attitudes toward women, we would expect that heterosexual men are more likely to sexually assault women than homosexual men are to assault men. Rates of heterosexual assault should, therefore, be much higher than rates of homosexual assault, once one controls for the fact that most men are heterosexual. Gender and Age Men’s sexual attraction toward young women has sometimes been characterized as a reflection of men’s tendency to treat women as sex objects. Sex objectification supposedly occurs when a woman is viewed primarily as a physical object of male sexual desire (e.g., Bartky, 1990; Fredrickson & Rob- erts, 1997). It may be, however, that male attraction to young people is a characteristic of male sexuality that is observed regardless of whether the object of desire is a male or female. Studies of personal ads have found that gay men have at least as strong a preference for young partners as heterosexual men and perhaps stronger (Burrows, 2013; Hayes, 1995; Kaufman & Phua, 2003; Kenrick, Keefe, Bryan, Barr, & Brown, 1995). We are aware of only two studies that have examined age patterns in male on male sexual assault. Felson and Krohn’s (1990) analysis of 89 incidents from the National Crime Survey Data found that the victims of male on male rape tended to be young. Felson et al.’s (2012) study of sexual assaults in correctional facilities found that male inmates of all ages tended to victimize young men ages 18–19, the youngest age group in the sample. In addition, the victims of sexual assault were much younger than the victims of phys- ical assault, suggesting that the sexual attractiveness of young men played an important role in their victimization. Women also tend to be sexually attracted to young people, but they are less oriented to age and sexual attractiveness than men (Hayes, 1995; Silverthorne & Quinsey, 2000; Townsend & Wasserman, 1997, 1998). If the preference for young people reflects male sexuality rather than attitudes toward women, then men who commit heterosexual or homosexual assaults should prefer young people. Women may also have this preference when they commit sexual assault, but their preference should be weaker than men’s preference. To our knowledge, no one has examined age patterns in offenses committed by women. Current Study We addressed these basic issues by examining age and gender patterns in a sample of sexual assaults and by comparisons of sexual assault with physical assault. We first examined whether heterosexual males were more likely to commit sexual assault than homosexual males. While we did not have a measure of 5 Similar sex differences were observed across ages, years of data collection, educational levels, and nations. A study of a large sample of identical and fraternal twins in Australia suggests that individual differences in interest in casual sex are at least partly genetic (Bailey, Kirk, Zhu, Dunne, & Martin, 2000). Arch Sex Behav 123 sexual orientation, evidence suggests that most men who sex- ually assault other men are homosexuals (Hickson, Davies, Hunt, Weatherburn, & McManus, 1994; Mezey & King, 1989). In addition, NIBRS identifies hate crimes and only one incident of same-sex sexual assault in this data set was identified as a hate crime. Therefore, it was reasonable to assume that men who sexually assaulted men were mostly homosexuals and the men who sexually assaulted women were mostly heterosexuals. We could then compare the percentage of males who sexually assaulted other males to estimates of the percentage of homo- sexuals in the general population. Estimates of the frequency of homosexuality vary depending on the measure used but, according to one authoritative source, 2.6 % of men reported that they had exclusively same sex partners over the past five years (Black, Gates, Sanders, & Taylor, 2000; Laumann, Gagnon, Michael, & Michaels, 1994). Therefore, if 2–3 % of victims of sexual assault are male, it will suggest that homosexual men are just as likely as heterosexual men to engage in sexual assault. That pattern will imply that sexual assaults reflect male sexuality rather than special attitudes toward women. Second, we examined female risk of victimization at differ- ent ages by males at different ages. We expected that men of all ages will tend to sexually assault young women. The literature suggests that young women are victimized because of their sexual attractiveness, but opportunity factors likely also play a role. Third, we examined whether the tendency to sexually assault young people was observed for all four gender combinations. If male attraction to young people reflects male sexuality, we should find that the males target young men and women, and that they show a stronger preference for young people than do female offenders. On the other hand, a finding that male offenders are more likely to target young women than young men, and that female offenders show a weaker preference, implies that the age preference reflects male attitudes toward women. Finally, we examined the effects of age of victims and offenders on whether an assault involved sexual violence. Fol- lowing Felson et al.’s (2012) analysis of assaults in correctional facilities, we estimated a logistic regression where the outcome was sexual assault versus physical assault. We predicted that sexual assaults were more likely to involve younger victims. The sexual victimization of young people reflects the effects of sexual attractiveness controlling for the effects of vulnerability and contact. Note, however, that this is a conservative test since one can assume that young people are more likely to provoke physical assaults. We also hypothesized that older offenders have a relatively high rate of sexual assault because they lack sexual access to young women. Their deficit in sexual attrac- tiveness blocks their opportunity for consensual relationships with the men and women they find to be the most sexually attractive. As a result, they should be more likely to commit sexual assault than one would expect, given that the tendency to commit violence declines with age. A comparison of sexual and physical assault essentially controls for this tendency. In sum, we made six hypotheses about gender and age patterns: H1 Rates of homosexual assault by male offenders are at least as high as rates of heterosexual assault. H2 Male offenders of all ages tend to target young women. H3 The tendency for men to target young people is observed regardless of the victim’s gender. H4 Male offenders are more likely than female offenders to target young people. H5 The victims of sexual assaults tend to be younger than the victims of physical assault. H6 Men who commit sexual assaults tend to be older than men who commit physical assaults. Method Sample The current study was based on eight years (2000–2007) of data from the NIBRS. NIBRS is administered by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. To insure the quality of the data, the FBI con- ducts a series of data quality checks after receiving submissions from reporting agencies. If errors in reporting are found, the incident report is rejected (see Justice Research and Statistical Association, 2012). As of 2007, 6,444 law enforcement agencies contributed to NIBRS, representing 25 % of the U.S. population. Our sample contained 294,484 incidents of sexual assault involving a single victim and single offender. We limited our analyses to offenders over the age of 12 years. Incidents were included if they were categorized as forc- ible sex offenses: forcible rape, forcible sodomy, sexual assault with an object, and forcible fondling. Rapes of female victims involved attempted or actual penile-vaginal pene- tration, whereas rapes of male victims involved forcible sodomy. Other sexual assaults included assaults with an object and forcible fondling. We excluded cases charged as incest or statutory rape, since these were separately identified as nonforcible offenses. Note, however, that some of the sexual assaults involving children could involve manipula- tion or limited force; they may be charged as assaults since the legal system treats children as incapable of consent. NIBRS is well-suited for the current study because it produces a sample large enough to examine sexual assaults involving all four gender combinations. The main limitation of NIBRS for our purposes is that it only included incidents reported to the police. We consider the implications of underreporting in supplementary analyses. Arch Sex Behav 123 Procedure We first computed the percentage of males who sexually assaulted male victims (vs. female victims) and compared it to estimates of the percentage of men who are gay in the popula- tion. We then examined the age distribution of victims for sexual assaults committed by men against women, male offenders of different ages, and sexual assault involving all four gender combinations. Finally, we merged a file of incidents of physical assault to our file on incidents of sexual assault. We then used logistic regression to examine the impact of age of offender and victim on whether the incident involved a sexual assault or a physical assault. Our equations included controls for victim and offender race, victim and offender gender, and victim–offender relationship. Measures For our regression analyses, victim ages were grouped into the following categories: 0–9; 10–14; 15–19; 20–24; 25–29; 30–34; 35–39; 40–44; and 45–98 years old. Offender ages were cate- gorized as follows: 12–17; 18–29; 30–39; 40–49; 50–59; and 60–98 years old. Race of offender and victim were coded as white, black, or other. Gender of offender and victim was coded in terms of gender combinations: male-on-male; male-on- female; female-on-male; and female-on-female. The victim– offender relationship was grouped into four categories: partner or ex-partner; family member; other known; and stranger. Results In Table 1, we present a frequency distribution for rapes and other sexual assaults. The results suggest that 7.72 % of males target other males. Note that that estimate is very close to Felson and Krohn’s (1990) estimate of the percent male victims based on victimization data (7.3 %). The percentage of males who targeted other males was even higher for other types of sexual assault (13.63 %). Since the estimate of the percentage of males who are exclusively homosexual is lower (2.6 %), the pattern supports Hypothesis 1. Rates of homosexual assault were at least as high as rates of heterosexual assault. Table 1 also shows that most offenders were males and that most attacked someone they knew. It also shows that very few offenders used weapons: about 7 % of rapists and 4 % of offend- ers who commit other sexual assaults. This suggests that in most incidents offenders used strong-arm tactics and physical intim- idation. As a result, vulnerability related to physical strength is likely to be an important risk factor for sexual assault. Age and Female Risk of Sexual Assault by Males In Fig. 1, we examined the effect of a female’s age on her risk of rape and other sexual assaults by a male. To adjust for the age distribution in the population, we divided the number of sexual assaults by the number of females in that age group according to the 2000 Census. This age-adjustment allowed us to calculate relative risk ratios for each age group. We then calculated the percentage of victims in each of those age groups. Figure 1 suggests dramatic age differences in risk of victim- ization. Females at ages 15–19 were at the greatest risk of rape by males. For example, a female was 8.93 times more likely to be raped by a male if she was 15 than if she was 35. Victimization rates dropped after ages 15–19 until about age 55, when rape victimization became extremely rare. The results were generally similar for rape and sexual assault. However, they demonstrated that rape peaks at a later age than other sexual assault. Assaults on children were less likely to involve rape while assaults on young women were slightly more likely to involve rape. Surprisingly, females at age 10–14 were at greater risk of both types of sexual assault than females in their early 20s. Thus, a 12 year old girl, who usually is not sexually mature, was at a greater risk of rape and other sexual assault than a 22 year old woman. In addition, the dramatic decline in risk of victimization observed after age 20 was too large and occurred too early to be explained by a decline in sexual attractiveness. For example, a 15 year old girl was 4.76 times more likely to be raped by a male than a 25 year old woman. Age of Victim and Age of Offender Figure 2, depicts female risk of sexual assault at different ages by males of different ages. We combined rape and other Table 1 Statistical characteristics of rapes and other sexual assaults Variable Rape percent Other sexual assaults percent Male offender 98.29 95.46 Male victim 7.72 13.63 Female victim 92.28 86.37 Female offender 1.71 4.54 Male victim 80.40 44.59 Female victim 19.60 55.41 Victim–offender relationship Stranger 9.95 8.07 Non-stranger 90.05 91.93 Weapon-use Gun 1.31 0.15 Other weapon 5.73 3.75 No weapon 92.96 96.10 Modal age of victim 15.00 14.00 Modal age of offender 18.00 14.00 N 151,372 143,112 Arch Sex Behav 123 sexual assault since the patterns were so similar. The results supported Hypothesis 2, which stated that males of all ages are likely to target young women. For example, the modal victim age category for offenders age 50 and older was 15. Only 6.3 % of these offenders assaulted women their own age or older. Over half (53.9 %) of the assaulted victims were under 20 and 72.5 % of them were under 30. Figure 2 also provided some evidence of age homophily: older offenders were more likely than younger offenders to assault older females. The correlation between age of offender and victim (treating both as continuous variables) was r = .31. It may be that older men have more contact with women their own age or that they have a greater latitude of acceptance. Evidence suggests that older men judge the physical attractiveness of older women more positively than do younger men (Harris, 1994; Mathes et al., 1985). Gender Effects Figure 3 depicts the ages of sexual assault victims for different gender combinations. We combined rape and other sexual assault, since the patterns were similar, and we adjusted for age distributions of males and females. The results suggested that same-sex assaults peaked at an earlier age than opposite sex 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 P er ce n ta ge o f A ss au lt s Victim's Age Ra pe Other Sexual Assault Fig. 1 Female’s age and risk of rape and other sexual assault by males (N = 252,674) (age- adjusted) 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 P er ce n ta ge o f S ex u al A ss au lt s Victim's Age 12-17 18-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-98 Offender's Age Fig. 2 Female’s risk of sexual assault at varying ages by males of varying ages (N = 232,254) (age-adjusted) Arch Sex Behav 123 assaults. However, in general, the age patterns were similar for all four gender combinations: offenders targeted young victims. These results supported Hypothesis 3: the tendency for men to target young people was observed regardless of the victim’s gender. This pattern is not consistent with the idea that male preference for young people reflected attitudes toward women. The results did not support Hypothesis 4: male offenders were no more likely than female offenders to target young people. The fact that females also targeted young people does not support the idea that age preferences reflected male sexuality. We also compared the strength of age and gender effects, in an attempt to determine whether young people were as likely as females to be victims of sexual assault. The comparison was difficult, however, since age is a continuous variable and gender is dichotomous; a comparison depends on the ages chosen. 6 If we had considered anyone under 30 as young, then 86 % of sexual assault victims were young, while 88 % of victims were female. If we had considered anyone under 25 as young, then 80 % of victims were young. If we had treated under 21 as the cutting point, then 72 % of victims were young. Another approach is to compare males and females at different ages. For example, a 15-year-old male was 1.15 times more likely to be a victim of sexual assault than a 40-year-old female and 3.77 times more likely to be a victim than a 50-year-old female. The results suggest that gender effects were a bit stronger than age effects but that age sometimes trumped the effects of gender. Sexual versus Physical Assault In Table 2, we estimated age effects on the risk of sexual versus physical assault using logistic regression, where sex- ual assault was coded as 1 and physical assault was coded as 0. Our equations included controls for the race of the offender and victim and the relationship between the offender and victim. The results for male offenders are shown in the panel on the left and the results for female offenders are shown in the panel on the right. Missing coefficients indicate that the variable served as the reference category. The results for male offenders showed strong curvilinear effects of the age of victim for both male and female victims. The risk of sexual assault (vs. physical assault) increased until ages 15–19 and then decreased. For example, the odds that an assault by a male was sexual was 1,011 % lower (odds ratio = .09) for women 45 and older than for girls 15–19 (the reference group). These results supported Hypothesis 5: victims of sexual assaults tended to be younger than the victims of physical assault. However, they suggest that vic- tims’ attractiveness has a strong effect on age preference regardless of the gender of the offender and victim. The results supported Hypothesis 6: older male offenders were more likely to commit sexual assault than physical assault. The effects of the male offender’s age were quite strong, whether the victim was a male or female. For example, the odds that an assault on a female was sexual was more than 256 % higher (odds ratio = 3.56) for offenders 60 and over than for offenders 18–29. The contrast between these positive effects of offender’s age and the negative effects of victim’s age is striking. The effects of offender age appear to be linear, with one exception. Offenders under 18 were slightly more likely to commit sexual assaults against males than offenders 18–29. The age patterns for female offenders were different. We observed a dichotomous pattern rather than linear effects of age of victim. Women were much more likely to sexually assault females under age 20 than those ages 20 and older and they were more likely to sexually assault males under age 15 than those ages 15 and older. The age of female offenders did not have much effect on whether the assault involved a sexual element. The only effect worth noting was that girls under age 18 were less likely to sexually assault males than women ages 18 and older. 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 0-9 10-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-98 P er ce n ta ge o f R ap es Victim's Age MF MM FM FF Fig. 3 Percentage of victims sexually assaulted at different ages by gender combination (N = 291,201) (age-adjusted). In this figure the gender combinations are abbreviated as follows: MF male assaults female, MM male assaults male, FM female assaults male, FF female assaults female 6 We could more easily compare strength if we had data on non-victims and estimated an equation predicting victimization. Arch Sex Behav 123 Additional Analyses In analyses not presented, we examined age patterns taking into account the likelihood that incidents were reported to the police. Underreporting of crime is a well-known problem when one uses official data, and sexual assaults are somewhat less likely to be reported than other violent offenses (Felson & Paré, 2005). We adjusted for possible reporting bias using weights based on estimates of reporting from the NCVS (Hart & Rennison, 2003). The results showed that adjusting for reporting bias yielded a slight increase in the proportion of victims age 15–17 and slightly lowered proportions of 10–14 year olds and victims 21 years and older. Thus the age patterns for victims were even stronger when we adjusted for the fact that sexual assaults are underreported. In other analyses, we compared age patterns for sexual assault and robbery using the NIBRS data. In general, the tendency for offenders to target young people was stronger for sexual assault than robbery. For example, a 15-year-old girl was 12.93 times more likely to be sexually assaulted than a 35-year-old woman and 1.15 times less likely to be robbed. A 20-year-old woman was 9.67 times more likely to be sexually assaulted than a 50 year old, and 2.31 times more likely to be robbed. Table 2 Logistic regression predicting sexual assault versus physical assault for different gender combinations Variable Male offenders Female offenders Female victims Male victims Male victims Female victims b SE OR b SE OR b SE OR b SE OR Victim’s age 0–9 1.98 0.03 7.23 3.78 0.05 43.67 2.76 0.07 15.76 1.57 0.07 4.80 10–14 0.76 0.02 2.13 1.58 0.04 4.85 0.97 0.05 2.64 0.49 0.07 1.64 15–19 – – – – – – – – – – – – 20–24 -0.94 0.02 0.39 -1.11 0.04 0.33 -2.41 0.11 0.09 -1.63 0.11 0.20 25–29 -1.35 0.02 0.26 -1.58 0.05 0.21 -2.25 0.12 0.11 -2.04 0.13 0.13 30–34 -1.60 0.02 0.20 -1.77 0.06 0.17 -2.20 0.13 0.11 -2.00 0.13 0.14 35–39 -1.81 0.02 0.16 -1.99 0.06 0.14 -2.27 0.14 0.10 -2.09 0.14 0.12 40–44 -2.02 0.02 0.13 -2.08 0.06 0.12 -2.38 0.16 0.09 -2.22 0.16 0.11 45–98 -2.37 0.02 0.09 -2.14 0.05 0.12 -2.31 0.12 0.10 -2.06 0.11 0.13 Offender’s age 12–17 -1.07 0.02 0.34 0.33 0.04 1.39 -0.93 0.06 0.39 0.22 0.07 1.25 18–29 – – – – – – – – – – – – 30–39 0.40 0.02 1.50 0.55 0.04 1.74 0.16 0.06 1.17 -0.13 0.07 0.88 40–49 0.47 0.02 1.60 0.79 0.04 2.21 0.02 0.07 1.02 -0.13 0.08 0.88 50–59 0.71 0.02 2.04 1.13 0.05 3.08 -0.11 0.12 0.89 -0.01 0.12 0.99 60–98 1.27 0.03 3.56 1.71 0.06 5.54 -0.17 0.19 0.84 0.32 0.17 1.38 Victim race White – – – – – – – – – – – – Black -0.56 0.02 0.57 -0.66 0.04 0.52 0.20 0.08 1.22 -0.71 0.08 0.49 Other 0.02 0.06 1.02 -0.78 0.15 0.46 -0.15 0.26 0.86 -0.27 0.30 0.77 Offender race White – – – – – – – – – – – – Black 0.36 0.02 1.44 -0.43 0.04 0.65 -1.36 0.08 0.26 -0.04 0.08 0.96 Other 0.17 0.05 1.18 0.03 0.13 1.03 -0.54 0.24 0.58 0.26 0.24 1.30 Victim–offender relationship Partner or ex-partner 3.65 0.05 38.37 -4.46 0.08 0.01 3.04 0.16 20.99 -2.21 0.15 0.11 Family member -0.26 0.02 0.77 -1.24 0.05 0.29 0.32 0.14 1.37 -0.14 0.12 0.87 Other known 0.32 0.02 1.38 -0.18 0.05 0.83 1.07 0.14 2.91 0.62 0.12 1.85 Stranger – – – – – – – – – – – – Constant 1.44 0.02 4.21 -0.28 0.05 0.76 -2.07 0.14 0.13 -1.02 0.13 0.36 N 258,512 149,934 32,001 31,702 * p\.05, ** p\.01, *** p\.001 Arch Sex Behav 123 Finally, we compared the age of offenders who committed sexual assault and robbery. The patterns supported the blocked opportunity hypothesis (H5): men who sexually assaulted women were much older than men who robbed women. For example, a man 60 years or older was 17.07 times more likely than a man 18–29 to sexually assault a woman than to rob her. Discussion These analyses were based on the largest sample of sexual assaults ever analyzed. The strong age and gender patterns they revealed challenge conventional wisdom about this offense. In our discussion below we consider the comparison between heterosexual and homosexual assault, then the age of victims, and, finally, the age of offenders. Heterosexual versus Homosexual Assault Our evidence supported the hypothesis (H1) that rates of homosexual assault by male offenders are at least as high as rates of heterosexual assault. In fact, they suggested that the frequency of homosexual assaults was higher than one would expect given estimates of the number of homosexual men. Evidence that homosexuals were just as likely as heterosexuals to engage in sexual assault contradicts the argument that male attitudes toward women play a strong role in sexual assault. Our results were consistent with prior research that has found that rapists tend to be versatile offenders but inconsistent with studies that have found correlations between men’s attitudes toward women and their tendency to engage in sexual coercion. Of course, it is likely that some of the offenders in our sample were hostile to women. However, if these attitudes were an important causal factor, the rate of heterosexual assault would be higher than the rate of homosexual assault. Our results suggest that the reason sexual assault typically involves a male offender and a female victim is that most offenders are men and most men are heterosexual. Sex dif- ferences in sexuality, physical strength, and the tendency to engage in violence all play a role. They are among the strongest sex differences and they are apparently observed in every society (e.g., Oliver & Hyde, 1993). They lead some males to engage in sexual assault. Of course, a same-sex sexual attack does not necessarily imply that the offender had a homosexual orientation. However, homosexuals may be just as likely to target someone of the opposite sex as heterosexuals are to target someone of the same sex. In addition, the evidence suggested that the homosexual assaults were not hate crimes committed by heterosexuals. While the police may have failed to properly identify some hate crimes, it seems unlikely that enough mistakes were made to reverse the pattern we observed. It is also unlikely that under-reporting can account for the higher rates of homosexual assault. Our estimate of the per- centage of rape victims who are male (7.7 %) was very close to Felson and Krohn’s (1990) estimate based on victimization data (7.3 %). Victimization data include unreported inci- dents. In addition, studies have found that male victims are less likely to report sexual assaults than female victims (Pino & Meier, 1999; Weiss, 2010). If that reporting bias affected our results, it would only make the patterns stronger. It is also possible that estimates of the frequency of homosexuality in the population are low if some participants on anonymous surveys do not reveal their homosexuality. However, no scholarly estimates of rates of homosexuality in the general population were as high as our estimates of the frequency of homosexual assault (10.55 % of all forms of sexual assault committed by males). We, therefore, have some confidence that rates of homosexual assault are at least as high as rates of heterosexual assault; that is the theoreti- cally significant comparison. If homosexual men have higher rates of sexual assault than heterosexual men, it may be because of chivalry, i.e., men’s inhibitions about engaging in violence against women. An extensive literature shows that men’s violence against women is evaluated more negatively and punished more severely (e.g., Felson, 2010). Another explanation is that sexual assaults stem from more limited consensual sexual activities and homosexu- als have higher rates of consensual sex (Laumann et al., 1994). Heterosexual rape often occurs during consensual sexual activity, when the offender wants intercourse and the victim does not (Kanin, 1985). Perhaps many homosexual rapes and sexual assaults involve a similar situation. Young Victims The results showed that the risk of sexual assault victimization for both males and females increased dramatically when they reached puberty and declined dramatically in adulthood. Once people reached middle age, their risk of sexual assault was miniscule. Age had almost as strong an effect on the risk of victimization as gender. The strong relationship between age and victimization was particularly impressive since age is only one factor that affects sexual attractiveness and since men have a tendency to be indiscriminant in their sexual behavior. In support of Hypothesis 2, our results suggested that older offenders have almost as strong a preference for adolescents and young adults as do younger offenders. The pattern was consis- tent with the pattern observed in research on sexual assaults during robberies (Felson and Cundiff, 2012). It is remarkable that the modal age category for a 50-year-old offender was a 15-year-old victim. Older offenders targeted young people in spite of the fact that they have more contact with people their own age, and despite the fact that older people have diminished physical strength (Montoye & Lamphiear, 1977). On the other Arch Sex Behav 123 hand, young people almost never sexually assaulted older peo- ple, in spite of their physical advantage. Older people may be frail and vulnerable in many ways but their risk of sexual vic- timization is trivial. We did not find much evidence of age homophily, the usual pattern one observes in voluntary sexual and romantic relation- ships. Participants in consensual heterosexual encounters tend to be similar in age with males slightly older (e.g., Amato, Booth, Johnson, & Rogers, 2007). Large age differences between husbands and wives are rare. For example, Amato et al. (2007) found that only about one-half of 1 % of marriages involve husbands who are at least 20 years older than their wives. In coercive sexual relationships, on the other hand, where only the offenders’ preferences matter, older men target the young. The finding that girls age 10–14 years were at greater risk of sexual assault than women in their 20s was unexpected. The dramatic decline in risk of victimization after age 20 was too large and occurred too early to be explained by declining attractiveness. We suspect that opportunity factors had signifi- cant effects on these age patterns. Age differences in vulnera- bility and contact with motivated offenders may explain why the risk of victimization declined so early and quickly in the late teenage years. Teenagers are more vulnerable than young adults because they are physically weaker, because they are more easily manipulated, and because their activities put them at greater risk. 7 Vulnerability also helps explain children’s high risk of victimization. 8 In support of Hypothesis 3, we found that the tendency for men to target young people is observed regardless of the victim’s gender. Homosexual men are apparently just as likely as het- erosexual men to prefer young people. The pattern suggests that the tendency for men to treat young women as sex objects does not reflect attitudes toward women. It is more prominent in the treatment of young women because most men are heterosexuals. However, it not clear that the preference for young people reflects male sexuality, since female offenders also showed the preference. In contrast to Hypothesis 4, female offenders were just as likely as male offenders to target young people. Women rarely committed sexual assaults (about 3 % of these assaults) but when they did the modal age of their victims was also 15 years. We did find support for the hypothesis (H5) that victims of sexual assaults tend to be younger than victims of physical assault. These results, along with prior research on sexual assault during robbery, suggest that age patterns reflect the effects of sexual attractiveness as well as the effects of vulnerability and contact. The tendency for assaults with a sexual element to target younger victims was observed for all gender combinations suggesting, again, that female offenders were just as likely as male offenders to respond to age-related sexual attractiveness. A limitation of our study was that it was based only on offenses reported to the police. However, such strong results are difficult to attribute to measurement error. In addition, our supplementary analysis adjusting for age-related reporting bias suggested the patterns may be even stronger than those we presented. Finally, the ages of victims we observed for male on female offenses were consistent with age patterns observed in earlier research based on victimization surveys (e.g., Felson & Krohn, 1990). Old Offenders In support of Hypothesis 6 we found that men who commit sexual assaults tend to be older than men who commit physical assaults. The pattern was strong and it was observed regardless of the victim’s gender. One does not observe this pattern for female offenders, suggesting that the pattern was related to male sexuality. Apparently, when one controls for opportunity and the violent tendencies of young people, a strong positive age- offending pattern emerged for sexual assault. The results sup- port the argument that older men commit sexual assault more often than one would expect because they lack sexual access to young men and women. Older men are sexually attracted to young men and women, but that attraction is not reciprocated. Their legitimate opportunities are blocked. Unable to attain their aspirations, some of them turn to illegitimate means (Merton, 1938). Conclusion Prior research has shown that males tend to be indiscriminate in their sexual behavior. In spite of this tendency, when men have a choice, as they do in sexual assault, they overwhelmingly prefer the young. The risk of sexual victimization increased dramati- cally with sexual maturation and declined dramatically after the teenage years. We suggested that the vulnerability and routine activities of teenagers, as well as their sexual attractiveness, put them at risk. Vulnerability related to disadvantage in physical strength may be particularly important, since sexual assaults take time and since most are committed without a weapon. It might, therefore, be said that the teenage years create a‘‘perfect storm.’’ Teenagers have the highest risk of sexual assault because of their contact with motivated offenders, their vul- nerability, and their sexual maturity and attractiveness. Our results suggest that the attraction to young people was almost as great among older offenders as among younger 7 The argument that husbands protect married women in their twenties from rape (e.g., Mesnick, 1997) cannot explain why the effects were similar for all gender combinations. 8 Of course, some of the offenders who assault children are pedophiles. Their presence in the sample is not relevant to our conclusions. In addition, the patterns do not change much when we only included incidents involving victims 15 years and older. Arch Sex Behav 123 offenders. While the attraction of older men to young women is widespread, we stigmatize it, calling those who express this desire ‘‘dirty old men’’ or ‘‘creepy.’’ Even further, many young people find the idea of consensual sex with older people repul- sive; these scenes are almost never displayed in films. Perhaps this attitude helps explain why young people are disgusted at the thought of their parents engaging in sexual behavior. 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El Paso, TX: LFB Scholarly Publishing. Sternbach, H. (1998). Age-associated testosterone decline in men: Clinical issues for psychiatry. American Journal of Psychiatry, 155, 1310– 1318. Symons, D. (1979). The evolution of human sexuality. New York: Oxford University Press. Thornhill, R., & Palmer, C. T. (2000). A natural history of rape: Biological bases of human sexual coercion. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Thornhill, R., & Thornhill, N. W. (1983). Human rape: An evolutionary analysis. Ethology and Sociobiology, 4, 137–173. Townsend, J. M., & Wasserman, T. (1997). The perception of sexual attractiveness: Sex differences in variability. Archives of Sexual Behavior, 26, 243–268. Townsend, J. M., & Wasserman, T. (1998). Sexual attractiveness: Sex differences in assessment and criteria. Evolution and Human Behavior, 19, 171–191. Travis, C. B. (2003). Evolution, gender, and rape. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Warr, M. (1993). Age, peers, and delinquency. Criminology, 31, 17–40. Weiss, K. G. (2010). Male sexual victimization: Examining men’s experiences of rape and sexual assault. Men and Masculinities, 12, 275–298. Williams, G. C. (1975). Sex and evolution. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Wilson, M., Daly, M., & Scheib, J. (1997). Femicide: An evolutionary psychological perspective. In P. A. Gowaty (Ed.), Feminism and evolutionary biology (pp. 431–465). New York: Chapman & Hall. Arch Sex Behav 123 http://www.jrsa.org/ibrrc/using-data/data_quality.shtml http://www.jrsa.org/ibrrc/using-data/data_quality.shtml Sexual Assault as a Crime Against Young People Abstract Introduction Age of Victims Age of Offenders Gender of Offenders and Victims Gender and Age Current Study Method Sample Procedure Measures Results Age and Female Risk of Sexual Assault by Males Age of Victim and Age of Offender Gender Effects Sexual versus Physical Assault Additional Analyses Discussion Heterosexual versus Homosexual Assault Young Victims Old Offenders Conclusion Appendix References 
work_fklvwlw2jjai5mp6hravfyz5ky	----	Canadian Multiculturalism and the Absence of the Far Right University of Georgia From the SelectedWorks of Cas Mudde 2015 Canadian Multiculturalism and the Absence of the Far Right Cas Mudde, University of Georgia Available at: https://works.bepress.com/cas_mudde/116/ http://www.uga.edu https://works.bepress.com/cas_mudde/ https://works.bepress.com/cas_mudde/116/ Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, 21:213–236, 2015 Copyright © Taylor & Francis Group, LLC ISSN: 1353-7113 print / 1557-2986 online DOI: 10.1080/13537113.2015.1032033 Canadian Multiculturalism and the Absence of the Far Right EMMA AMBROSE and CAS MUDDE University of Georgia The far right has never been a prominent force in Canadian politics or society. Traditionally, they more resembled the North American than the West European model: ideologically dominated by right- wing populism and white supremacy, organizationally character- ized by factionalism and sectarianism. The extreme right seems an almost negligible force today, in part reflecting a similar decline in the United States, while the radical right has so far been unable to build upon the recent upsurge of Islamophobia, as in Western Europe. We argue that the failure of the Canadian radical right is primarily the result of Canada’s unique multiculturalism policy, which is based on a combination of selective immigration, compre- hensive integration, and strong state repression of dissent on these policies. This unique blend of policies has led to a relatively low level of opposition to multiculturalism and has left little legal and political space for far right politics. INTRODUCTION Canada is one of the most culturally diverse advanced industrial countries in the world. In addition to its indigenous First Nations population and its large and powerful French-speaking minority in the province of Quebec, it has a huge more recent immigrant population, increasingly from Asia. Almost half of the population in its biggest city Toronto is foreign-born!1 Canada is a proud immigration country and has for decades promoted one of the most elaborate policies of multiculturalism. And while multiculturalism has come under attack in most West European countries where far right parties have Address correspondence to Cas Mudde, Associate Professor, Department of International Affairs, University of Georgia, Athens, GA 30602-1492, USA. E-mail: mudde@uga.edu Color versions of one or more of the figures in the article can be found online at www.tandfonline.com/fnep. 213 D ow nl oa de d by [U ni ve rs ity o f G eo rg ia ], [M r C as M ud de ] a t 1 1: 09 1 6 Ju ne 2 01 5 214 E. Ambrose and C. Mudde gained significant electoral successes, Canada remains seemingly immune to a far right challenge. What explains this surprising absence of the Canadian far right? Drawing upon literature on both far right parties in Europe and immi- gration policy in Canada, we argue that the failure of the Canadian far right is primarily the result of the country’s unique multiculturalism policy, which is based on a combination of selective immigration policy, comprehensive integration policy, and strong state repression of dissent on these policies. This distinctive blend of policies has led to a relatively low level of oppo- sition to multiculturalism and has left little legal and political space for far right politics. A QUICK WORD ON TERMINOLOGY Scholars of what we here call the far right use a myriad of different terms and definitions with no sign of an emerging academic consensus on both the conceptualization and the categorization of the parties of in- terest. The term extreme right was most popular in the 1980s, while rad- ical right dominated the debates of the 1990s. In the 21st century, radi- cal right and right-wing populism vie for prime position, although various combinations of the two are commonly used. This is not the place for an elaborate discussion of the war of words within the field. Suffice it to say that there is more agreement on the key features of definitions and on the classification of most parties than the terminological confusion seems to indicate.2 At the same time, it is important to provide a clear defini- tion of far right so that readers know what we are, and are not, talking about. We use the far right as a container term for both the extreme right and the radical right. With regard to the terms left and right, we follow the Italian political theorist Norberto Bobbio, who distinguishes between these two key political terms on the basis of the propensity to egalitarianism.3 The term right refers to ideologies that hold that the main differences between groups of people are natural and should not be altered by the state. Or, more broadly and succinctly, according to right-wing ideologies, political order is grounded in nature. We distinguish between the mainstream right and the far right on the basis of their position on liberal democracy, which is accepted by the former and rejected by the latter. More specifically, the extreme right rejects democ- racy per se, that is, both popular sovereignty and majority rule, while the radical right accepts democracy but challenges liberal democracy, in partic- ular pluralism and minority rights.4 While most successful far right parties have been radical right, such as the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) and the French National Front (FN), there are some recent examples of extreme right D ow nl oa de d by [U ni ve rs ity o f G eo rg ia ], [M r C as M ud de ] a t 1 1: 09 1 6 Ju ne 2 01 5 Absence of the Far Right 215 success too, most notably Golden Dawn in Greece and the Movement for a Better Hungary or Jobbik in Hungary. THE FAR RIGHT IN CANADA Overall the Canadian history of the far right resembles that of the United States more closely than that of Western Europe. At the end of the 19th century, populist groups emerged in the agrarian regions of Western Canada and (anti-Asian) nativist groups developed in more urban centers in British Columbia.5 Populism remained influential in Western Canada, in particular the Canadian Prairies, but was not very radical, let alone extremist. While some of the international literature on the radical right refers to the Social Credit Party and the Reform Party,6 these parties were populist and right- wing, but not primarily nativist.7 Canadian extreme right organizations have also been fairly rare and small and have been mostly influenced by developments in the United States.8 The Ku Klux Klan (KKK) garnered some support in the 1920s, small fascist groups existed around the Second World War, notably the Chris- tian National Socialist Party (PNSC) of Adrien Arcand in Quebec, and white supremacist groups emerged in the 1970s. While the number of organiza- tions in the 1980s was quite impressive (ca. 130), the number of identified activists was not (ca. 450).9 In most cases, the organizations were simply branches of US white supremacist groups, counting only a handful of mem- bers. The most (in)famous Canadian extreme right group was undoubtedly the Western Guard, founded in 1972. It no longer plays an important role in Canadian far right politics and neither do its former members.10 Canada also lacks a history of extreme right terrorism and violence. The scant research notes that the Canadian extreme right committed 159 violent acts in the period 1960–90; much less than in the United States or Western Europe.11 Most attacks were in the biggest city of the three most populated provinces: Ontario (49.7%), Quebec (25.8%), and British Columbia (21.4%). Six people were killed and 112 people were injured by extreme right violence in this 30-year period.12 Like in other countries, the typical action was more or less a random assault on a minority bystander. Today, no prominent extreme right organizations exist in Canada, as is often lamented on the “white nationalist” Stormfront website. In fact, the “Stormfront Canada” section mentions very little activities and seems mostly a contact forum for isolated white supremacists.13 Most of the groups men- tioned in the (old) threads are no longer active, such as the Canada KKK (link goes to a relationship therapy group), the Aryan Guard, which disbanded in 2009 after a pipe bomb attempt, and the Heritage Front, which dispersed around 2005. The situation is akin to the far right skinhead subculture. The Anti-Defamation League (ADL) estimated that there were roughly 600 D ow nl oa de d by [U ni ve rs ity o f G eo rg ia ], [M r C as M ud de ] a t 1 1: 09 1 6 Ju ne 2 01 5 216 E. Ambrose and C. Mudde skinheads in Canada in the early 1990s, mostly situated in cities.14 Most Canadian skinheads were associated with US groups that are no longer very relevant (for example, Aryan Nations, RaHoWa, White Aryan Resistance).15 On various Internet forums posters claim that international organizations like Blood & Honour (B&H) and Hammerskins Nation (NHS) have chapters in Canada, but there is little evidence of activity. Far right skinheads on the Stormfront portal are directed to the Ontario National Socialists (ONS) and the National Socialist Party of Canada (NSPC), neither of which is particularly active. There are no clear Canadian equivalents of contemporary radical right parties like the FN and FPÖ. One party that has been linked to the radical right by some Canadian media in recent years is the Wildrose Party (WP), or Wildrose Alliance Party, formerly led by Danielle Smith. The WP developed out of the Alberta Alliance Party in 2008 and has contested elections in the state of Alberta with increasing success. In the 2012 state elections, it placed second with 34.3% of the vote and 17 (out of 87) seats. Individual WP politicians have been criticized for making nativist statements. For example, candidate Ron Leech said in a radio interview: I think as a Caucasian I have an advantage. [. . .] When different commu- nity leaders such as a Sikh leader or a Muslim leader speak, they really speak to their own people in many ways. As a Caucasian, I believe that I can speak to all the community.16 Also, a former WP candidate, Deepshika Brar, withdrew her candidacy and said that the party is anti-immigration and does not want new Canadians as members.17 The official party manifesto does include some strong authoritarian (law and order) points but is relatively moderate on populism and includes no open nativism. Regarding immigration, the party mainly wants Alberta to have the same powers as Quebec has, that is, to independently create an “effective and streamlined immigration policy.”18 Still, the policy it wants to implement is far from restrictive in a comparative perspective (let alone nativist): A provincial immigration system, if administered properly, will greatly benefit Alberta’s economy by making it easier for qualified and finan- cially sponsored working-age immigrants to enter, integrate, have their foreign educational credentials recognized, and contribute to Alberta on a permanent basis.19 The situation is similar with regard to Islamophobia, that is, the irrational fear of Islam and Muslims, the main agenda of the Western far right today. So far, Islamophobia has not been very visible in Canada and Islamophobic D ow nl oa de d by [U ni ve rs ity o f G eo rg ia ], [M r C as M ud de ] a t 1 1: 09 1 6 Ju ne 2 01 5 Absence of the Far Right 217 groups and individuals operate in the margins.20 The English Defence League (EDL) is the model for various radical Islamophobic groups in Canada, most notably the tiny Canadian Defence League (CDL).21 The CDL seems merely to have an Internet-presence, including a Facebook page, which was liked by only 3,908 people in late July 2014.22 While the CDL is only known to a small group of people, the EDL has received significantly more media attention in Canada. In January 2011, the Jewish Defence League of Canada organized a “support rally” for the EDL in the Toronto Zionist Center. As they watched a speech by then EDL leader Stephen Yaxley-Lennon, also known as Tommy Robinson, who spoke through an online video feed from England, anti-racists protested outside of the center.23 While the EDL and militant Islamophobia have been broadly denounced in the Canadian media, they have received quite favorable atten- tion from the right-wing Sun News Network, in particular by controversial British-Canadian journalist Michael Coren.24 The situation is slightly different in Quebec, where, undoubtedly in- spired by developments in France, a debate has emerged over the banning of the veil. In March 2010, Quebec Justice Minister Kathleen Weil introduced Bill 94, which laid out under which conditions public institutions can make accommodations to employees or to the public. The bill was criticized for targeting Muslims and addressing a nonexistent problem; allegedly, only a handful of women in Quebec cover their faces in the name of their faith. One Parti Québécois member of the Quebec Parliament, Louise Beaudoin, supported the bill with the argument: “Religious freedom exists, but there are other values. For instance, multiculturalism is not a Quebec value. It may be a Canadian one, but it is not a Quebec one.”25 Still, Islamophobic groups, like the tiny Ligue de Défense Québecoise (LDQ), were inconsequential in the debate, and the bill was mainly supported on the basis of liberal demo- cratic arguments (among others by the Quebec Council on the Status of Women). THE USUAL SUSPECTS: DEMAND-SIDE AND SUPPLY-SIDE FACTORS A seemingly boundless body of political science literature exists that seeks to explain the electoral success of far right parties.26 Less common, of course, are studies attempting to explain why a far right party does not exist or is not electorally successful, although such occurrences could be equally helpful in further understanding the appeal, mechanics, and sociology of far right politics.27 The absence of a strong far right party in Canada cannot be fully explained by the demand-side and supply-side factors most commonly linked to the emergence of far right parties. D ow nl oa de d by [U ni ve rs ity o f G eo rg ia ], [M r C as M ud de ] a t 1 1: 09 1 6 Ju ne 2 01 5 218 E. Ambrose and C. Mudde FIGURE 1 Foreign-born population as percentage of total population by country. Demand-Side Factors Until recently the electoral success of far right parties was explained almost exclusively on the basis of so-called demand-side factors, which try to com- prehend why there would be a demand for far right parties in the first place. It was simply assumed that once there is a demand for far right politics, such parties will emerge and successfully contest elections. The two most impor- tant demand-side factors, already identified in Klaus von Beyme’s seminal publication on the third wave of the postwar far right in Western Europe,28 are immigration and unemployment. The idea that the postwar rise of far right parties is best understood as a xenophobic response to the increasing levels of immigration is widespread within both academia and the media.29 Canada, however, has accepted a relatively high number of immigrants since the mid-20th century but has not seen any strong political force emerge in opposition. When held up against European countries with and without successful far right parties, Canada has experienced a similar, and at times higher, rate of immigration over the past several decades. Consequently, Canada has one of the highest percentages of foreign-born populations in the West, roughly 150% of the percentages in most West European countries and the United States (see Figure 1).30 Clearly, then, the level of immigration cannot explain the lack of success for the Canadian far right. In fact, the relatively high level of immigration should help create a very favorable breeding ground for far right parties in D ow nl oa de d by [U ni ve rs ity o f G eo rg ia ], [M r C as M ud de ] a t 1 1: 09 1 6 Ju ne 2 01 5 Absence of the Far Right 219 FIGURE 2 Unemployment by percentage of country’s population 1983–2000. Canada. A similar conclusion can be drawn with regard to levels of unem- ployment. While convincing evidence demonstrates that a higher unemployment rate fosters (modest) growth in far right support,31 this explanation sheds no light on the Canadian situation. For the better part of the 1960s and 1970s, unemployment remained fairly moderate, averaging around 7.7% for the latter half of the 1970s.32 In the 1980s, however, Canada saw a serious spike in unemployment levels. This was during a time that the country experienced the effects of a particularly brutal economic recession and unemployment levels reached alarmingly high levels of well over 10%.33 In a comparative perspective, unemployment rates in Canada were much higher than in West European countries and the United States throughout the 1980s and the early 1990s (see Figure 2).34 Towards the turn of the century, these rates began to decline, following the general trend of global unemployment rates. Overall, then, the demand-side factors cannot explain the absence of a successful far right party in Canada. In fact, they rather point to a very fertile breeding ground, given that previous studies have found that particularly the combination of high level of immigration and unemployment is conducive to far right electoral success.35 Supply-Side Factors Several decades of empirical research into the electoral success of far right parties have shown the limitations of the explanatory power of demand- side factors. In understanding the electoral breakthrough of far right parties, D ow nl oa de d by [U ni ve rs ity o f G eo rg ia ], [M r C as M ud de ] a t 1 1: 09 1 6 Ju ne 2 01 5 220 E. Ambrose and C. Mudde so-called (external) supply-side factors are crucial. Of particular importance is the political opportunity structure (POS) for far right parties. Some supply- side factors that shape the POS are similar to all new parties, but some are specific to those of the far right. According to the literature on Western Europe, far right parties profit from electoral systems that are relatively open and party systems with large space on the right side of the political spectrum. The importance of electoral institutions to the success of radical right parties has led to a sustained debate within political science. Most authors agree that proportional representation systems with low electoral thresholds are most favorable, while far right parties are much less likely to emerge, and persist, in “electoral systems that encourage strategic voting.”36 According to Duverger’s Law, plurality systems compel voters to make calculations regarding the most impact of their votes. But, while Canada employs plurality electoral systems at both the national and regional levels, research shows that the potential psychological factors actually run counter to Duverger’s Law.37 The main reason for this is that Canadian politics has always had weak partisan identifications and “national elections are heavily influenced by short-term factors, notably party and leader affect and issues—even, at times, (such as the 1988 election) by single issues.”38 Consequently, Canada’s party system has never been a strict two-party system, as associated with plurality systems, but rather a “two-party-plus” system.39 Initially stable, the party system has witnessed several successful newcomers, though mostly with a strong regional basis, since the late 1980s; most notably the Reform Party in the West and the Bloc Québécois in the East. These parties have been able to profit from the cyclical waves of anti-partyism in the country.40 On top of that, the near annihilation of the governing Progressive Conservative Party in the 1993 elections shows that the Canadian party system is far from frozen. While it is too early to call whether the new equilibrium will be a competitive multiparty system or a “one-party- plus” system, there is no doubt that the Canadian party system is open to massive electoral shocks and (geographically concentrated) challenger parties.41 According to research on Western Europe, the most favorable political space for far right parties exists when the (two) main parties converge ide- ologically and the mainstream right-wing party is relatively centrist.42 This leaves a lot of political space on the right side of the political spectrum, which a far right party can potentially exploit. Despite the multidimensional character of Canadian politics, several studies have noted the ideological convergence of its main parties, starting already before the 1980s.43 At the same time, they note that Canadian parties are not very ideological and reg- ularly change their position on issues.44 This, in combination with the fact that all main parties enthusiastically support Canada’s multiculturalism (see below), would mean that there is a lot of space to stand out for far right parties. D ow nl oa de d by [U ni ve rs ity o f G eo rg ia ], [M r C as M ud de ] a t 1 1: 09 1 6 Ju ne 2 01 5 Absence of the Far Right 221 In short, the usual suspects cannot fully explain the absence of a suc- cessful far right party in Canada. Theoretically, the country’s relatively high levels of immigration and unemployment should create a significant demand for far right politics. And, while new parties have a harder time under a plu- rality system than under a proportional system, several other new parties have been able to gain and sustain electoral success, particularly since the mid-1980s. Finally, while there is no traditional ideological convergence be- tween Canada’s main parties, significant space exists on the right end of the political spectrum, particularly with regard to the immigration issue. LITTLE DEMAND: THE MULTICULTURAL MASSES So, the question remains, why has there not been a successful far right party in Canada? We believe that the main demand-side explanation is the broad popular support for multiculturalism. Multiculturalism and openness towards immigrant communities are principles officially endorsed by most Western countries today. But whereas this support remains largely limited to mission statements and White Papers in other countries, in Canada the public has also bought into it. “Canadians Are the Most Tolerant People in the Developed World: Re- port,” headlined Maclean’s in 2011.45 In the article, the Canadian magazine proudly stated: “At 84 per cent on average, Canadians report the highest community tolerance of minority groups—ethnic minorities, migrants, and gays and lesbians—in the OECD, where the average is 61 per cent.” This was a fairly self-serving conclusion, however, given that the question asks whether citizens “think that the city or area where they live is a good place to live for immigrants from other countries.”46 In other words, Canadians think Canada is a very tolerant place. But is it? According to a 2008 cross-national survey47 on attitudes towards im- migration, Canada is the only Western country in which a plurality of re- spondents says that immigration has a positive impact on their country (see Figure 3). While the percentage falls short of a majority (39%), Canada is the only country where more people see a positive than a negative effect. Though the gap is only +4% in Canada (that is, 39% positive, 35% negative), it stands out strongly in comparison to other countries. The gap is !38% in Germany, !40% in France, !45% in the United Kingdom, and a staggering !63% in Belgium. Perhaps more telling, even other traditional immigration countries, like Australia and the United States, have a clear negative score (!14% and !38%, respectively). Other data confirm that Canada has fostered a much more accepting society for immigrants and their culture than other Western countries. For example, Canadians are the most likely to agree with the statement that immigrants make their country a better place to live and that immigrants are D ow nl oa de d by [U ni ve rs ity o f G eo rg ia ], [M r C as M ud de ] a t 1 1: 09 1 6 Ju ne 2 01 5 222 E. Ambrose and C. Mudde FIGURE 3 “Would you say that immigration has generally had a positive or negative impact on [country]?” good for the economy. They are also the least likely to say that there are too many immigrants in their country, that immigration has placed too much pressure on public services, and that immigrants have made it more difficult for natives to find a job.48 Interestingly, Canadians are the most likely to feel strongly that immi- grants with high educational or professional qualifications should be given priority in entering the country (see Figure 4).49 Support for this is not only (much) higher than in European countries, it is almost twice as high as in the United States (62% versus 33%). In conclusion, the idea that Canada is a very tolerant country toward minorities is not just something that the Canadian elites propagate and the Canadian masses repeat but it is actually supported by survey research. Com- pared to other Western populations, Canadians are much more supportive of immigrants and their culture. In fact, Canada is the only country where more people see immigration as a positive rather than a negative phenomenon. CANADIAN MULTICULTURALISM This leaves one last question: Why are Canadians much more supportive of multiculturalism than citizens in other Western democracies? Cultural and historical narratives, often favored by Canadian elites, conveniently ignore Canada’s racist history towards both indigenous people and immigrants. We argue that the support for multiculturalism, and perhaps more accurately the D ow nl oa de d by [U ni ve rs ity o f G eo rg ia ], [M r C as M ud de ] a t 1 1: 09 1 6 Ju ne 2 01 5 Absence of the Far Right 223 FIGURE 4 “Priority should be given to immigrants with higher education and qualification who can fill shortages among certain professions in [country].” lack of opposition to multiculturalism, is to a large extent a relatively recent political creation. It is the consequence of Canada’s unique multiculturalism policy, which contains three pillars: a selective immigration policy, a multi- culturalist integration policy, and strict state repression of dissent on these policies. A Selective Immigration Policy As a settler nation, Canada encouraged immigration from various groups of settlers to fulfill the needs of the young Canadian nation in terms of labor and settlement throughout the 19th century. The Dominion Lands Act of 1872 opened up the expanses of western Canada to incoming immigrants, granting 160 acres to immigrant families at zero cost. European immigrants became the first settlers in the western part of Canada.50 From the late 1880s until the turn of the century, immigration to Canada consisted largely of the western settlers and contract workers. Immigrants were admitted specifically for the purpose of staffing a particular industry or sector of the economy. These contract workers were a much more diverse group than the largely European population that had settled in the west of the country. Chinese, Japanese, Lebanese, and Sikhs were also recruited to work as contract work- ers in industries such as the Canadian Northern Railway. While Asian contract D ow nl oa de d by [U ni ve rs ity o f G eo rg ia ], [M r C as M ud de ] a t 1 1: 09 1 6 Ju ne 2 01 5 224 E. Ambrose and C. Mudde workers were among the more desirable recruits for manual labor jobs from the perspective of the employers, far more Europeans than other groups were recruited. Undoubtedly more Asian workers would have been recruited, except for the extent of the public’s hostility at that time toward Asians. Both organized labor and nativist groups opposed the contract laborers as being scabs, and these groups put enormous pressure on the Canadian government for exclusionist policies.51 Canadian natives were strongly opposed to immigrants who appeared to place a strain on the country and who did not assimilate well. Public opin- ion and pressure led to increasingly exclusionary immigration policies from the Canadian government. In addition to enacting policies that restricted immigration from less desirable populations, the Canadian government en- acted policies that sought to exclude already existing immigrant populations. Perhaps the most restrictive of these was an amendment to the Franchise Act in 1895. This act, The British Columbia Elections Act, disenfranchised “any persons of Mongolian or Chinese races” from all national elections.52 It was only after the Second World War that they regained the right to vote. Until the end of the Second World War, Canada remained reluctant to admit non- European immigrants and denied entry to most applicants. Hostility towards the existing Asian immigrant population escalated and the government eventually succumbed to popular pressure to restrict immigra- tion, especially from Asia. At the same time, very few Jewish refugees were admitted to Canada. After initially agreeing to accept a modest number of Jewish refugees from Europe, the Canadian government quickly reneged on this policy. Moreover, it enacted policies harmful to the Jewish pop- ulation residing within Canada. As Freda Hawkins details, “The Macken- zie King government in Canada—ultra-cautious, anti-Semitic, hostile to refugees and immigrants from non-traditional sources—resisted all pressures to help, and moved slowly to admit displaced persons from Europe after 1945.”53 It was not too long after the Second World War that Canada began re- versing its closed-door immigration policy. But, while it did open its doors to peoples displaced by the war, this act of generosity was marred by the se- lective procedure of admitting immigrants. An unofficial quota system for In- ternationally Displaced Persons (IDPs) was introduced, placing people from the Baltics and Western Europe at the top and Jews at the bottom of the list of desirable migrants.54 International agencies and the Jewish lobby within Canada had been pressuring the government during and after the war to accept Jewish and other refugees. The Mackenzie King government eventu- ally relented, when it became evident that Canada’s economy was outpacing D ow nl oa de d by [U ni ve rs ity o f G eo rg ia ], [M r C as M ud de ] a t 1 1: 09 1 6 Ju ne 2 01 5 Absence of the Far Right 225 FIGURE 5 Number of immigrants to Canada by region of last residence, 1972 vs. 1999/2000. the rate at which the country could supply laborers. A recruitment program was promptly instituted; one that ushered survivors out of European IDP camps and into the Canadian industrial landscape.55 Representatives from the Canadian government even traveled to Europe to handpick immigrants they thought would best integrate into Canadian society.56 Although Canadian immigration did become more comprehensive as the 20th century wore on, government policy continued to rely heavily on the discretionary powers of the Department of Immigration. As a result, while admitting a larger number, Canada continued to grant admission to immi- grants deemed easy to assimilate. This meant that Canada admitted primarily European immigrants for the greater part of the 20th century, including large numbers of British, Dutch, Hungarians, and Americans. Consequently, the level of “visible minorities” within Canada remained quite low during the 19th and better part of the 20th centuries.57 Figure 5 presents the regional origin of immigrants who arrived in 1972 and in 1999/2000.58 It shows that Canada admitted largely European and American immigrants in the 1970s, but that this had changed at the turn of the 20th century, leading to a massive spike in Asian immigrants.59 This change probably came about as a result of two processes: (a) an ongoing attempt to redress the wrongs committed by past immigration policies and (b) a burgeoning appreciation, at the level of both the governmental and the public, for the need and importance of multiculturalism. Although Canada has opened its doors to more diverse peoples from all corners of the world, the government has maintained a strong focus on the need to import highly skilled and professionally advanced individuals. D ow nl oa de d by [U ni ve rs ity o f G eo rg ia ], [M r C as M ud de ] a t 1 1: 09 1 6 Ju ne 2 01 5 226 E. Ambrose and C. Mudde TABLE 1 Unemployment Rates (in %) of “Native”-Born vs. Foreign-Born Populations in Nine Western Countries. Country “Native”-born Foreign-born Difference “native”-born vs. foreign-born Australia 3.4 8.2 +4.8 Belgium 5.8 15.1 +9.3 Canada 7.2 8.9 +1.7 France 8.5 15.1 +6.6 Germany 5.4 9.4 +4.0 Italy 8.0 11.7 +3.7 Sweden 6.0 16.0 +10.0 United Kingdom 8.0 9.4 +1.4 United States 6.6 7.5 +0.9 Their refugee policy has become increasingly generous, but other forms of immigration emphasize skills, education, and professional experience as part of a points system, which has been in place in Canada since 1967.60 This system awards potential immigrants visas based on their aptitude for integrating into the Canadian society and labor force. Desirable skills include a high level of education, exemplary French or English language skills, and work experience.61 Canada also has arrangements with various individual countries with regard to seasonal migration. One example of this is the Seasonal Agricul- tural Workers Program (SAWP), which grants farmhands from East Caribbean countries a temporary visa to fill seasonal openings.62 This dual system of points and temporary worker programs has enabled the country to cultivate a permanent population of highly trained and skilled professionals, while still using temporary visas to fill necessary job openings that are not desirable to average Canadians.63 Through the careful crafting of immigration policy over the past 150 years, Canada has been able to generate an immigrant popu- lation that meets the needs of the Canadian labor market without creating strong ethnic divisions within Canadian society. Today, immigrants in Canada are highly skilled and educated relative to those in other Western countries, including the United States. However, Canada’s “visible minority” population is relatively high, around 30% of the entire Canadian immigrant population in 2013, of which around half are born in Canada.64 This is much higher than in France, for example, which had an entire “visible minority” population of around 15% in 2011.65 Unlike many European countries with high rates of immigration, the unemploy- ment rate of immigrants is quite low in Canada. Moreover, the discrepancy between foreign-born populations and “native” populations is quite small (see Table 1).66 Even more striking is the fact that the number of recent immigrants with a university degree is twice as high as that of “native” Canadians with a university degree.67 Table 2 compares the number of highly skilled D ow nl oa de d by [U ni ve rs ity o f G eo rg ia ], [M r C as M ud de ] a t 1 1: 09 1 6 Ju ne 2 01 5 Absence of the Far Right 227 TABLE 2 Highly Skilled Immigrants by Total Number, Percentage of Total Immigrants, and Percentage of Total Population in Nine Western Countries Total Number of Percentage of Country High-Skilled Immigrants Total Immigrants Australia 650,562 11% Belgium 125,725 11.2% Canada 1,429,675 20.4% France 1,011,424 14% Germany 1,172,126 12% Italy 246925 5.1% Sweden 125,610 9% United Kingdom 965,693 13.7% United States 5,868,683 13.2% immigrants, that is, immigrants with a bachelor’s degree or other tertiary degree, among several high-immigration countries. After the United States, Canada has the highest total number of highly educated immigrants.68 How- ever, the country truly stands out in terms of the high proportion of highly skilled immigrants among the total immigration population. One in five im- migrants in Canada are highly skilled, which is almost twice as many as in the other Western countries. Previous studies have shown how selective immigration policies can temper opposition to immigration in two different, if related, ways.69 First, by simply having an official immigration policy, the Canadian state signals to its population that immigrants are legal and wanted and that it controls immigration. In sharp contrast, West European countries also have significant immigrant populations but are officially not immigration countries. This sig- nals to the native populations that immigrants are illegal and unwanted and that the state is not in control of its borders. Second, Canada has carefully selected immigrant populations that are most likely to suit the country’s labor market needs and least likely to create sharp cultural or ethnic divisions. In contrast, West European countries try to mold their immigrant populations only once they have already been legally admitted. This logically creates more cultural and economic tensions. A Multiculturalist Integration Policy The integration buzzword was particularly prevalent throughout Western Eu- rope in the 1980s and 1990s. Today many Europeans view the actual success of integration as quite limited.70 Canada, on the other hand, is frequently touted as a country that has genuinely and successfully embraced integra- tion (often referred to as multiculturalism).71 Phrases like the following are ubiquitous in Canadian official government documents: “Through multicul- turalism, Canada recognizes the potential of all Canadians, encouraging them D ow nl oa de d by [U ni ve rs ity o f G eo rg ia ], [M r C as M ud de ] a t 1 1: 09 1 6 Ju ne 2 01 5 228 E. Ambrose and C. Mudde to integrate into their society and take an active part in its social, cultural, economic and political affairs.”72 The country’s embrace of multicultural integration was partially a public response to the increased presence of immigrants, but the Canadian federal government also actively propagated it to quell Quebec separatist sentiments in the east of Canada. In 1971, Prime Minister Trudeau announced a multi- cultural strategy, intended to lessen ethnic divides between Quebec and the rest of Canada, with the following words: The government will support and encourage the various cultures and ethnic groups that give structure and vitality to our society. They will be encouraged to share their cultural expression and values with other Canadians and so contribute to a richer life for all of us.73 The integration policy became gradually incorporated into the worldview of the Canadian population, taken initially as a means for a united Canada and later as a tool for merging the country’s diverse cultural experiences, including those of more recent immigrants. Canada’s contemporary multiculturalism is unique in the world because of the comprehensiveness of the policy, on the one hand, and the po- litical commitment to the policy, on the other.74 Canada was making for- ays into multiculturalism even before the advent of the model in Western Europe. Unlike most countries in Western Europe, however, Canada has maintained a strong commitment to the multiculturalist approach, which is deemed largely successful within the country.75 While multiculturalism was the modus operandi for most West European integration programs through- out the 1970s and the 1980s, a public backlash against the policies and their perceived ineffectiveness led governments to roll back these initiatives and institute more restrictive and rigorous civic integration policies instead.76 In Canada, multiculturalism has remained the official government pol- icy, irrespective of the party composition of the government. Instead of shifting towards a civic integration model, it has maintained its commitment to the pluralistic approach of multiculturalism, characteristic for its reach and rigorous enforcement.77 It is one of only three officially multicultural countries in the world (with Australia and Sweden) and the only to pass a Multiculturalism Act (in 1988).78 Canadian multiculturalism is based on “an inclusive citizenship” that “ensures that all citizens can keep their identities, can take pride in their ancestry and have a sense of belonging.”79 Perhaps most tellingly, Canada does not see multiculturalism as something tempo- rary, which will eventually be replaced by a more assimilationist policy, but as an essential component of Canadian identity.80 As the government website states: “Canadian multiculturalism is fundamental to our belief that all citizens are equal.”81 D ow nl oa de d by [U ni ve rs ity o f G eo rg ia ], [M r C as M ud de ] a t 1 1: 09 1 6 Ju ne 2 01 5 Absence of the Far Right 229 State Repression Although support for immigration and integration is much more widespread than in other Western countries, even Canada harbors a sizeable minority that opposes the multiculturalism policies. This part of the population consti- tutes a potential electorate for a far right party. While the Canadian pluralist electoral system provides a few more hurdles than the more proportional systems in Western Europe, it has proven to be penetrable by new parties. But far right parties confront a specific problem within Canada: one of the strictest and most rigorously enforced antidiscrimination legislation regimes in the world. Canada has one of the highest scores in terms of promoting and up- holding antidiscriminatory legislation.82 In a comparison with other Western countries, Canada received the highest score in the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX), even one point higher than that of Sweden (89 versus 88), widely considered one of the most tolerant and inclusive countries in the world. Unlike other countries, including immigration countries like Australia, Canada awards antidiscrimination legislation a higher status than other leg- islation.83 Public campaigns and mandated programs in the workplace that speak to inclusion and multiculturalism are pervasive in Canada. The state also closely tracks the progress of immigrants and other minority groups so as to better understand if and how its educational campaigns improve their situation.84 In addition to a host of multiculturalism and antidiscriminatory pro- grams, promoted from grade school up to nearly all levels of employment, the Canadian government takes a very active and hard stance against acts of hate speech and hate crime.85 Outlawed by the criminal code, hate crime can refer to any act that harms or threatens to harm the member of a given group. The prison sentence for committing a hate crime in Canada can extend up to five years.86 Because of the (potential) association with violence, the strict hate crime laws are broadly supported within society. While hate crime is not usually a facet of far right parties and most other Western countries take similarly strong measures, these laws are not that important in explaining the lack of far right electoral success in Canada.87 Rather, it is the strict regulation of speech, and the very broad definition of hate speech, that could impact the ability of far right parties to develop, as opposition to immigration can easily be construed as hate speech. Article 318(4) of the national criminal code of Canada defines hate speech as inciting hatred against any “identifiable group” in a public space, which according to Article 319(1a) is punishable by up to two years of imprisonment.88There are a number of additional safeguards against hate speech at the provincial level, usually included in a human rights decree.89 Most contentious, perhaps, is Section 13 in the Canadian Human Rights Act, which prohibits individuals from the use of hate speech both over the telephone and on the Internet. D ow nl oa de d by [U ni ve rs ity o f G eo rg ia ], [M r C as M ud de ] a t 1 1: 09 1 6 Ju ne 2 01 5 230 E. Ambrose and C. Mudde This statute has been twice challenged in court but was upheld both times.90 Canada has also instituted laws that prohibit the spread of any propaganda regarding any ethnic group.91 Research on far right parties in Europe has shown that a repressive legal and social climate can undermine the possibilities for electoral success. Among others, far right parties that are ostracized tend to moderate less (often) than those that are not.92 Partly related to this is that they also have more problems with attracting qualified party members, which hampers their development as an effective electoral and political organization.93 Finally, strict hate speech laws limit the prominence and scope of political and public debates on immigration, the electoral and political bread-and-butter issue of far right parties.94 This is highly apparent in Canada, which, with the notable exception of the province of Quebec, has no real debate on the official multiculturalism policies. CONCLUSION Despite the “insatiable demand” for studies on the far right,95 there is virtu- ally no academic research on the situation in Canada. At first sight, this is perhaps not that surprising, given that the far right has been both electorally and politically marginal in the country. But this at least begs the question why this is the case, particularly given that Canada has one of the largest immigrant populations among Western countries. In fact, according to the most popular theories of far right party success, Canada should prove a fer- tile breeding ground for anti-immigrant mobilization. Levels of immigration have been consistently high, while unemployment has (at times) also been comparatively high. Moreover, while the electoral system is not ideal, new parties have successfully emerged and the party system has proven quite volatile in the past decades. We have argued that the weakness of the Canadian far right is a con- sequence of the unique state policy of multiculturalism. Where in other Western countries multiculturalism has fueled the electoral success of far right parties, in Canada it has prevented its success. Canada’s official policy of multiculturalism has negatively affected both the demand side and the supply side of far right politics. By carefully constructing its immigration pol- icy, admitting types of immigrants that are particularly difficult to critique, the country has been able to prevent a nativist backlash to successive waves of mass immigration. This means that the demand-side for anti-immigrant politics is much smaller in Canada than in other Western countries, includ- ing many countries with much lower levels of immigration. At the same time, the high level of state repression of debate on immigration issues has hindered the development, expression, and mobilization of far right politics. D ow nl oa de d by [U ni ve rs ity o f G eo rg ia ], [M r C as M ud de ] a t 1 1: 09 1 6 Ju ne 2 01 5 Absence of the Far Right 231 These findings are relevant to the broader academic literature on far right parties in at least two important ways. First, as had already been noted in immigration studies, it shows that the link between levels of immigration and demand for far right politics is more complex than is generally stated. There is not just a difference between non-white non-European immigrants and white European immigrants, which has become somewhat less relevant because of intra-EU immigration from Eastern Europe, but also between nonskilled and skilled immigrants. Second, the Canadian case shows the complex interplay of demand-side and (external) supply-side factors. While most studies nowadays do list both demand-side and supply-side factors, they rarely describe the ways in which these factors interact. But the findings also have policy relevance, particularly in light of the growing pressure by major economic players within the European Union to introduce a more open immigration policy, targeting in particular eas- ily employable and highly skilled immigrants—who would obtain a blue card, the EU’s answer to the US green card. So far few political parties have dared to openly support such a policy in public debates, given the widespread anti-immigration sentiments within the populations and the ex- istence of (sometimes well-organized) far right parties eager to exploit these sentiments. It is important to stress that the Canadian approach consists of a com- bination of three policies, and it is the combination that has created the positive results. Simply introducing a selective immigration policy, targeting high-skilled workers, will still lead to conflicts as long as countries do not define themselves as immigration countries and at best halfheartedly support multiculturalist integration policies. Remember that the original guest-worker programs of the 1950s and 1960s were also strictly based on the economic needs of the receiving countries.96 However, outside of a broader ideological context of multiculturalism, guest workers were purely defined in terms of economic need of the host country, which made the later reality of unem- ployed guest workers seem like an oxymoron to many citizens.97 Yet, even if West European countries copy the full Canadian multi- culturalism policy, there are at least temporary problems to overcome. Most importantly, given the different history of immigration in Europe, where tem- porary guest workers became permanent immigrants with hardly any public debate, many Europeans do not trust that mainstream parties are capable and willing to control immigration. It will take a consistent and consequent effort to overcome this distrust, which is particularly high among the potential elec- torate of far right parties. Moreover, in most West European countries, the genie is out of the bottle in the sense that immigration and multiculturalism are now openly and critically discussed and far right parties have in some cases established themselves in the national party systems. This will make the (re-)introduction of state repression, in a similar vein as in Canada, not only more difficult to implement but also harder to get publically accepted. D ow nl oa de d by [U ni ve rs ity o f G eo rg ia ], [M r C as M ud de ] a t 1 1: 09 1 6 Ju ne 2 01 5 232 E. Ambrose and C. Mudde ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The authors want to thank the constructive comments provided by the ref- erees and the help by David Laycock and Shane Singh. NOTES 1. According to the Web site of the Ontario Ministry of Finance, “Toronto’s foreign- born population accounted for 46.0% of its total population in 2011.” See http://www. fin.gov.on.ca/en/economy/demographics/census/nhshi11-1.html (accessed 21 July 2014). 2. For a more elaborate discussion, see Cas Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), Chapters 1–2. 3. Norberto Bobbio, Left and Right: The Significance of a Political Division (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1997). 4. See Mudde, Populist Radical Right, Chapter 1. 5. See, for example, David H. Laycock, Populism and Democratic Thought in the Canadian Prairies, 1910 to 1945 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990); J. F. Conway, “Populism in the United States, Russia, and Canada: Explaining the Roots of Canada’s Third Parties,” Canadian Journal of Political Science 11(1): 99–124 (1978). 6. See, for instance, Neil Nevitte, André Blais, Elisabeth Gidengil, Richard Johnston, and Henry Brady, “The Populist Right in Canada: The Rise of the Reform Party of Canada,” in Hans-Georg Betz and Stefan Immerfall, eds., The New Politics of the Right: Neo-Populist Parties and Movements in Established Democracies (Houndmills: Macmillan, 1998), 173–202; Pippa Norris, Radical Right: Votes and Parties in the Electoral Market (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 7. David Laycock, The New Right and Democracy in Canada: Understanding Reform and the Canadian Alliance (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011). 8. Peter Li, “Racial Supremacism under Social Democracy,” Canadian Ethnic Studies 27(1): 1–18 (1995). 9. Stanley R. Barrett, Is God a Racist? The Right Wing in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987). 10. See Bonnie Burstow, “Surviving and Thriving By Becoming More ‘Groupuscular’: The Case of the Heritage Front,” Patterns of Prejudice 37(4): 415–28 (2003). 11. Jeffrey Ian Ross, “Contemporary Radical Right-Wing Violence in Canada: A Quantitative Anal- ysis,” Terrorism and Political Violence 4(3): 72–101 (1992). 12. Ibid., 92. 13. See www.stormfront.org/forum/f40 (accessed 24 Feb. 2014). 14. Ross did note that skinheads were the single largest group of perpetrators of extreme right violence, believed to be responsible for 16.4% of all extreme right violence in the period 1960–90. See Ross, “Contemporary Radical,” 96. 15. The most notorious Canadian extreme right skinhead group was the Aryan Guard, which was responsible for a campaign of terror around Calgary, before being disbanded in 2009. Michelle Jarvie, “How Neo-Nazis Think: Calgary Photojournalist Spends Three Years Following Skinheads’ Lives,” Calgary Herald, 9 Sept. 2012. 16. Jen Gerson, “‘Caucasian Advantage’ Quip Casts Shadow Over Wildrose Campaign Despite Poll Lead,” National Post, 17 April 2012. 17. See “Wildrose Member Withdraws from Nomination Contest,” www.cbc.ca/news/canada/ calgary/wildrose-member-withdraws-from-nomination-contest-1.1093003 (accessed 22 Feb. 2014). 18. Wildrose Policy: Comprehensive Ideas and Solutions for Alberta (Edmonton: Wildrose, 2011), 79. 19. Ibid. 20. Islamophobic attitudes are much less prevalent among the Canadian public than in other Western countries (most notably Western Europe and the United States), even if some polls show that D ow nl oa de d by [U ni ve rs ity o f G eo rg ia ], [M r C as M ud de ] a t 1 1: 09 1 6 Ju ne 2 01 5 Absence of the Far Right 233 they are on the rise. John Geddes, “Canadian Anti-Muslim Sentiment Is Rising, Disturbing New Poll Reveals,” Maclean’s, 3 Oct. 2013. 21. Joel Busher, The Making of Anti-Muslim Protest: Grassroots Activism in the English Defence League (London: Routledge, 2013). 22. See www.facebook.com/pages/Canadian-Defence-League/196328817044491 (accessed 24 Feb. 2014). Oddly enough, the Facebook page is mostly talked about by Facebook users in the Isle-de-France (Paris) area of France. 23. Stewart Bell, “Anti-Islam Group Draws Fierce Protest,” National Post, 11 Jan. 2011. 24. See, for example, his extremely favorable interview with “Tommy Robinson”; see http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pdxQNZn64w8 (accessed 22 Feb. 2014). 25. See Barbara Key, “Multiculturalism ‘Is Not a Quebec Value,”’ National Post, 19 Jan. 2011. 26. See Mudde, Populist Radical Right, Chapters 9–11. 27. For some exceptions, see Eoin O’Malley, “Why is There No Radical Right in Ireland?,” West European Politics 31(5): 960–77 (2008); Jens Rydgren, “Radical Right Populism in Sweden: Still a Failure, But for How Long?,” Scandinavian Political Studies 25(1): 27–56 (2002). 28. Klaus von Beyme, “Right-Wing Extremism in Post-War Europe,” West European Politics 11(2): 1–18 (1988). 29. Christopher Andersen, “Economics, Politics, and Foreigners: Populist Party Support in Den- mark and Norway,” Electoral Studies 15(4): 497–511 (1996); Matt Golder, “Electoral Institutions, Unem- ployment and Extreme Right Parties: A Correction,” British Journal of Political Science 33(3): 525–34 (2003). 30. The bulk of the data is from OECD iLibrary, International Migration Database, www.oecd- ilibrary.org/social-issues-migration-health/data/oecd-international-migration-statistics_mig-data-en (ac- cessed 22 Nov. 2013) and The International Migrant Stock by Destination and Origin of the United Nations: Population Division, http://esa.un.org/unmigration/TIMSO2013/migrantstocks2013.htm?msdo (accessed 21 Aug. 2014). Additional data for France and Italy (before 2000) come from The World Bank Database and their Data Set on International Migrant Stock, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SM.POP.TOTL (accessed 21 Aug. 2014) and Index Mundi, http://www.indexmundi.com/facts/france/international- migrant-stock (accessed 21 Aug. 2014). 31. For example, Golder, “Electoral Institutions”; Marcel Lubbers, Peer Scheepers, and Merove Gijsberts, “Extreme Right-Wing Voting in Western Europe,” European Journal of Political Research 41: 345–78 (2002). For a more elaborate and critical study, see Tim Spier, Modernisierungsverlierer? Die Wählerschaft rechtspopulistischer Parteien in Westeuropa (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag, 2010). 32. Data are from Statistics Canada, www.stats.gov.nl.ca/statistics/Labour/PDF/UnempRate.pdf (accessed 14 Jan. 2014). 33. David Card and W. Craig Riddell, “A Comparative Analysis of Unemployment in Canada and the United States,” in David Card and Richard B. Freeman, eds., Small Differences That Matter: Labor Markets and Income Maintenance in Canada and the United States (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), 149–90. 34. The data for EU countries come from Eurostat, (epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/ portal/employment_unemployment_lfs/data/database) (accessed 17 Jan. 2014), for Canada from Statistics Canada (www.stats.gov.nl.ca/statistics/Labour/PDF/UnempRate.pdf) (accessed 17 Jan. 2014), and for the United States from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (data.bls.gov/timeseries/LNS14000000) (accessed 17 Jan. 2014). Data for Germany are only available as of 1991. 35. Golder, “Electoral Institutions,” 432. 36. Terri Givens, Voting Radical Right in Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 3. 37. Jennifer Merolla and Laura Stephenson, “Strategic Voting in Canada: A Cross Time Anal- ysis,” Electoral Studies 26(2): 245 (2007). A quasi-experimental study similarly found a weak psy- chological and a moderate mechanical effect of the Canadian electoral system. André Blais, Maxime Héroux-Legault, Laura Stephenson, William Cross, and Elisabeth Gidengil, “Assessing the Psycholog- ical and Mechanical Impact of Electoral Rules: A Quasi-Experiment,” Electoral Studies 31(4): 829–37 (2012). 38. Thomas J. Scotto, Laura B. Stephenson, and Allan Kornberg, “From a Two-Party-Plus to a One- Party-Plus? Ideology, Vote Choice, and Prospects for a Competitive Party System in Canada,” Electoral Studies 23(3): 465 (2004). Emphasis in original. D ow nl oa de d by [U ni ve rs ity o f G eo rg ia ], [M r C as M ud de ] a t 1 1: 09 1 6 Ju ne 2 01 5 234 E. Ambrose and C. Mudde 39. Leon D. Epstein, “A Comparative Study of Canadian Parties,” American Political Science Review 58(1): 46–60 (1964). 40. Éric Bélanger, “Anti-Partyism and Third-Party Vote Choice: A Comparison of Canada, Britain, and Australia,” Comparative Political Studies 37(9): 1054–78 (2004). 41. Scotto, Stephenson, and Kornberg, “From a Two-Party-Plus,” 463–83. 42. See, among many others, Elisabeth Carter, The Extreme Right in Western Europe (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995); Norris, Radical Right. 43. See, most notably, William P. Irvine, “Canada 1945–1980: Party Platforms and Campaign Strate- gies,” in Ian Budge, David Robertson, and Derek Hearl, eds., Ideology, Strategy and Party Change: Spatial Analysis of Post-War Election Programmes in 19 Democracies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 73–94. 44. Ibid.; William Cross and Lisa Young, “Policy Attitudes of Party Members in Canada: Evidence of Ideological Politics,” Canadian Journal of Political Science 35(4): 859–80 (2002). 45. http://www.macleans.ca/general/canadians-are-the-most-tolerant-people-in-the-developed- world-report/ (accessed 5 Aug. 2014). 46. OECD, Society at a Glance 2014: OECD Social Indicators (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2014), 136. 47. With regard to the latter statement, Germany was just below Canada and France, which were tied. See Global Views on Immigration (2011), www.ipsos-na.com/download/pr.aspx?id = 10883 (accessed 23 Dec. 2013). 48. Ibid. 49. Ibid. 50. John M. Bumsted, Canada’s Diverse Peoples: A Reference Sourcebook (Santa Barbara: ABC- CLIO, 2003), 140. 51. Ibid., 160. 52. Freda Hawkins, Critical Years in Immigration: Canada and Australia Compared (Montreal: McGill’s-Queens Press, 1991), 27. 53. Bumsted, Canada’s Diverse Peoples, 165. 54. Ibid., 209–210. 55. Irving Abella and Harold Troper, None is Too Many: Canada and the Jews of Europe, 1933–1948 (Toronto: Lester & Orpen Dennys), 5–6. 56. Bumsted, Canada’s Diverse Peoples, 208. 57. Visible minorities are defined by the Canadian government as individuals who are non- Caucasian in race and also not of aboriginal descent. See Statistics Canada: Classification of Visible Minorities, http://www.statcan.gc.ca/concepts/definitions/minority01-minorite01a-eng.htm (accessed 22 Feb. 2015). 58. Ibid., 282. 59. Ibid, 282. 60. A. E. Challinor, “Canada’s Immigration Policy: A Focus on Human Capital,” Migration Informa- tion Source, www.migrationpolicy.org/article/canadas-immigration-policy-focus-human-capital (accessed 22 Feb. 2014). 61. See “Six selection factors – Federal skilled workers,” www.cic.gc.ca/english/immigrate/ skilled/apply-factors.asp (accessed 22 Feb. 2014). 62. Demetrios G. Papademetriou, Will Somerville, and Hiroyuki Tanaka, Hybrid Immigrant- Selection Systems: The Next Generation of Economic Migration Schemes (Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2008). 63. Heather Antecol, Deborah A. Cobb-Clark, and Stephen J. Trejo, “Immigration Policy and the Skills of Immigrants to Australia, Canada, and the United States,” IZA Discussion Paper Series 363 (2001). 64. Data from Statistics Canada, www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/12-581-x/2012000/pop-eng.htm#c03 (ac- cessed 22 Feb. 2013). 65. Patrick Lòzes, “France’s Minorities Under Fire,” The Guardian, 26 March 2011.Most other countries do not keep statistics on “visible minorities,” which makes a cross-country comparison impossible. 66. Data from the OECD Factbook 2013: Economic, Environmental and Social Statistics, http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/content/book/factbook-2013-en (accessed 14 Jan. 2014). D ow nl oa de d by [U ni ve rs ity o f G eo rg ia ], [M r C as M ud de ] a t 1 1: 09 1 6 Ju ne 2 01 5 Absence of the Far Right 235 67. See Diane Galarneau and René Morissette, “Immigrants’ Education and Required Job Skills,” Perspectives (2008), www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/75-001-x/2008112/pdf/10766-eng.pdf (accessed 23 Feb. 2014). 68. The OECD ascribes the indicator “ISCED 5/6” for an education level of a bachelor’s de- gree or other tertiary degree, which is how we define a “highly-skilled immigrant.” Data are from United Nations International Migrant Stock by Destination and Origin (2010), esa.un.org/unmigration/ TIMSO2013/migrantstocks2013.htm?msdo (accessed 23 Feb. 2014); United States Census Bu- reau: International Data Base, www.census.gov/population/international/data/idb/informationGateway. php (accessed 23 Feb. 2014). Total immigrant numbers are from 2010 and taken from United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, international migrant stock by destination and origin, http://esa.un.org/unmigration/TIMSO2013/migrantstocks2013.htm?msdo (accessed 22 Feb. 2014). 69. See, most notably, Gary P. Freeman, “Modes of Immigration Politics in Liberal Democratic States,” International Migration Review 29(4): 881–902 (1995); Jeffery Reitz, “The Institutional Structure of Immigration as a Determinant of Inter-Racial Competition: A Comparison of Britain and Canada,” International Migration Review 22 (1): 117–46 (1988). 70. Tariq Modood, Anna Triandafyllidou, and Richard Zapata-Barrero, Multiculturalism, Muslims and Citizenship: A European Approach (Abingdon: Routledge, 2006). 71. Will Kymlicka, “Being Canadian,” Government and Opposition 38(3): 370–71 (2003). 72. See Immigration and Citizenship for Canadians (Sept. 2013), www.cic.gc.ca/english/ multiculturalism/index.asp?utm_source=www.cic.gc.ca/multi/index-eng.asp&utm_medium=brochures& utm_campaign=ENG_Multiculturalism (accessed 22 Feb. 2014), emphasis added. 73. Sarah V. Wayland, “Immigration, Multiculturalism, and National Identity in Canada,” Interna- tional Journal of Group Rights 5(1): 33 (2007). 74. Keith Banding and Will Kymlicka, “Canadian Multiculturalism: Global Anxieties and Local Debates,” British Journal of Canadian Studies 23(1): 43–72 (2006). 75. Will Kymlicka. “Multiculturalism: Success, Failure and the Future,” MPI Transatlantic Council on Migration: 1–32 (2012). 76. Civic integration involves a deeper level of government involvement in integration, a role that some claim is increasingly coercive, and a more defined role for immigrant populations. Examples include language requirements, cultural introduction courses for new immigrants or refugees, banning of certain cultural or religious expressions, and citizenship tests to obtain access to permanent residency or nationality. See, for example, Christian Joppke, “Beyond National Models: Civic Integration Policies for Immigrants in Western Europe,” West European Politics 30(1): 1–22 (2007); Ellie Vasta, “From Ethnic Minorities to Ethnic Majority Policy: Multiculturalism and the Shift to Assimilationism in the Netherlands,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 30(5): 713–40 (2007). 77. Banding and Kymlicka, “Canadian Multiculturalism.” 78. Sarah V. Wayland, “Immigration, Multiculturalism and National Identity in Canada,” Interna- tional Journal on Minority and Group Rights 5(1): 33 (1997). 79. http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/multiculturalism/citizenship.asp (accessed 5 Aug. 2014). 80. Wayland, “Immigration, Multiculturalism,” 50. 81. http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/multiculturalism/citizenship.asp (accessed 5 Aug. 2014). 82. See MIPEX Results Anti-Discrimination (2010), www.mipex.eu/play/map.php?chart_type= map&countries=2,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,7,5,6,4,3,1,18,19,20,21,22,23,24,25,26,27,28,29,30,31,32,33,34, 35,36,38,39,37,40,41,42,43,44&objects=220&periods=2010&group_by=country (accessed 23 Feb. 2014). 83. Beth Gaze, “Context and Interpretation in Anti-Discrimination Law,” Melbourne University Law Review 26: 325–54 (2002). 84. Ibid. 85. For example, Philip C. Stenning, “Policing the Cultural Kaleidoscope: Recent Canadian Expe- rience,” The Canadian Review of Policing Research 1 (2004). 86. See the Justice Laws Website of the Government of Canada, laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/C- 46/page-156.html#docCont (accessed 23 Feb. 2014). 87. The Legal Project, “European Hate Speech Laws,” www.legal-project.org/issues/european-hate- speech-laws (accessed 23 Feb. 2014). 88. Justice Law Website. 89. Index on Censorship, “Hate Speech Laws in Canada.” D ow nl oa de d by [U ni ve rs ity o f G eo rg ia ], [M r C as M ud de ] a t 1 1: 09 1 6 Ju ne 2 01 5 236 E. Ambrose and C. Mudde 90. Ibid.; Joseph Brean, “Court Finds Interned Hate Speech Law Section 13 to be Constitutionally Valid, Doesn’t Violate Freedom of Expression,” National Post, 2 Feb. 2014. 91. This decision was upheld in the Supreme Court case Regina vs. Keegstra in 1990, although, together with Section 13, it remains a point of contention within Canadian society. See Alexander Tsesis, “Dignity and Speech: The Regulation of Hate Speech in a Democracy,” Wake Forrest Law Review 497: 523 (2009). 92. Joost van Spanje and Wouter van der Brug, “The Party as Pariah: The Exclusion of Anti- Immigrant Parties and Its Effect on Their Ideological Positions,” West European Politics 30(5): 1022–40 (2007). 93. See David Art, Inside the Radical Right: The Development of Anti-Immigrant Parties in Western Europe (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011). 94. Mudde, “The Single-Issue Party Thesis.” 95. Tim Bale, “Supplying the Insatiable Demand: Europe’s Populist Radical Right,” Government & Opposition 47(2): 256–74 (2012). 96. See, for example, Stephen Castles, “Guestworkers in Europe: A Resurrection,” International Migration Review 40(4): 741–66 (2006). 97. For an excellent discussion of this dilemma, see Daniel Cohn-Bendit and Thomas Schmid, Heimat Babylon: Das Wagnis der multikulturellen Demokratie (Hamburg: Hoffmann & Campe, 1993). Emma Ambrose is an MA student in the Department of International Affairs at the University of Georgia. Previously she worked as an intern at the Migration Policy Institute (MPI) in Washington, DC. Cas Mudde is Associate Professor in the Department of International Affairs at the University of Georgia. He is the author of Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe (Cambridge University Press, 2007), which won the 2008 Stein Rokkan Prize and was named an Outstanding Academic Title by Choice. His recent publi- cations include Political Extremism (Sage, 2014, four volumes) and Youth and the Extreme Right (IDEBATE, 2014). He is currently working on books on populism (for Oxford University Press) and the Israeli settler movement (for Cambridge University Press). He is coeditor of the European Journal of Political Research. D ow nl oa de d by [U ni ve rs ity o f G eo rg ia ], [M r C as M ud de ] a t 1 1: 09 1 6 Ju ne 2 01 5 University of Georgia From the SelectedWorks of Cas Mudde 2015 Canadian Multiculturalism and the Absence of the Far Right FNEP_A_1032033_O 
work_fnoqgegifzgvjnvx7n5bnmlfs4	----	The Developing Habitus of the AntiSocial Behaviour Practitioner: From Expansion in Years of Plenty to Surviving the Age of Austerity The Developing Habitus of the Anti-Social Behaviour Practitioner: From Expansion in Years of Plenty to Surviving the Age of Austerity Brown, K. J. (2013). The Developing Habitus of the Anti-Social Behaviour Practitioner: From Expansion in Years of Plenty to Surviving the Age of Austerity. Journal of Law and Society, 40(3), 375-402. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6478.2013.00631.x Published in: Journal of Law and Society Document Version: Peer reviewed version Queen's University Belfast - Research Portal: Link to publication record in Queen's University Belfast Research Portal Publisher rights Copyright 2013 Wiley. This work is made available online in accordance with the publisher’s policies. Please refer to any applicable terms of use of the publisher. General rights Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Queen's University Belfast Research Portal is retained by the author(s) and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights. Take down policy The Research Portal is Queen's institutional repository that provides access to Queen's research output. Every effort has been made to ensure that content in the Research Portal does not infringe any person's rights, or applicable UK laws. If you discover content in the Research Portal that you believe breaches copyright or violates any law, please contact openaccess@qub.ac.uk. Download date:06. Apr. 2021 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6478.2013.00631.x https://pure.qub.ac.uk/en/publications/the-developing-habitus-of-the-antisocial-behaviour-practitioner-from-expansion-in-years-of-plenty-to-surviving-the-age-of-austerity(0b7f7edc-7c5d-4fdc-91a3-127c4313f363).html The Developing Habitus of the Anti-Social Behaviour Practitioner: From Expansion in Years of Plenty to Surviving the Age of Austerity Kevin J. Brown Queen's University Belfast, k.brown@qub.ac.uk Specialist anti-social behaviour units are common within social housing providers, with many established in response to the policies of the New Labour governments of 1997±2010. These units now find themselves operating in a different political and financial environment. Following the English riots of 2011, the Coalition government, whilst imposing budgetary cuts across the public sector, called on social housing providers to intensify their role in tackling disorder. This article explores the habitus or working cultures within anti-social behaviour units post-New Labour. It does so through empirical research conducted in the aftermath of the English riots. The research finds that practitioners view their work as a core function of social housing provision. They have developed an understanding of human behaviour, which crosses the criminal and social policy fields with a wide skillset to match. A number of factors including national policy, community expectations, and multi-partnership engagement influence their dynamic working culture. INTRODUCTION Following the English riots of summer 2011, the perceived problem of anti- social behaviour (ASB) and disorder once again came to dominate the +The author would like to thank Newcastle University for funding the 2011 research project. Thanks also to those who participated in the research and those practitioners who provided feedback at a subsequent day conference. Final thanks to Richard Collier, Colin Murray, Kathryn Hollingsworth, Jane Donoghue, Chris Chipchase, and the anonymous reviewers for comments on earlier drafts of this article. Any errors remain my own. 1 political and media discourse. 1 In the United Kingdom, ASB represents an umbrella term for low-level criminality, nuisance, and public disorder. 2 How to tackle such behaviour has been the subject of continued debate and political attention in the country for almost two decades. 3 A combination of national and local policy innovation, overseen first by the New Labour governments (1997±2010) and now the Coalition has produced an expanding toolkit of interventions to deal with the perceived problem. 4 Combining social and criminal policy approaches, these interventions ± epitomized by the anti-social behaviour order (ASBO) ± have been the subject of much academic critique. 5 Through this period of hyper-innovation in ASB manage- ment, 6 a cadre of practitioners has developed who implement, interpret, and transform national policy at a local level. They `are the human subjects through whom and by whom . . . [the ASB agenda] has been brought about.' 7 Within this broad family of practitioners, there exist specialist ASB units based within social housing providers. They make for an interesting case study of working culture within the ASB industry as they are dedicated solely to the task of tackling ASB, they have some of the broadest powers to do so and they have been the subject of sustained central government attempts to influence their working practices. This article explores through empirical research, including an analysis of policy documents and semi-structured interviews, the working cultures found within social housing ASB units in 2011, after thirteen years of New Labour and following the first full year of the Coalition government. The approach taken in this article is influenced by the work of Hughes and Gilling who have explored the habitus of a related occupation, the community safety manager. 8 As with their research, this article approaches 2 1 A. Stratton and A. Sparrow, `Cameron and Miliband go head to head over riots' Guardian, 15 August 2011 at <http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2011/aug/15/ cameron-miliband-head-head-riots>. 2 A. Millie, Anti-Social Behaviour (2009). 3 S. Hodgkinson and N. Tilley, `Tackling Anti-Social Behaviour: Lessons from New Labour to the Coalition Government' (2011) 11 Criminology and Criminal Justice 283; Home Office, Putting victims first ± more effective responses to antisocial behaviour (2012; Cm. 8367). 4 Hodgkinson and Tilley, id. 5 E. Burney, Making People Behave: Antisocial Behaviour Politics and Policy (2009); E. Burney and L. Gelsthorpe, `Do We Need a `̀ Naughty Step''? Rethinking the Parenting Order after Ten Years' (2008) 47 Howard J. of Criminal Justice 470; A. Crawford, `Dispersal Powers and the Symbolic Role of Anti-Social Behaviour Legislation' (2008) 71 Modern Law Rev. 753. 6 Crawford, id. 7 D. Garland, The Culture of Control: Crime and Social Order in Contemporary Society (2001) 24. 8 G. Hughes and D. Gilling, ``̀ Mission Impossible''? The Habitus of the Community Safety Manager and the New Expertise in the Local Partnership Governance of Crime and Safety' (2004) 4 Criminology and Criminal Justice 129; G. Hughes, The Politics of Crime and Community (2007). occupational culture from the perspective of Bourdieu's relational theory,9 `which explains cultural practice as the result of interaction between cultural dispositions (habitus) and structural positions (field), [situating] culture in the social and political context.'10 In identifying the habitus of the ASB practitioner, this article is examining the working philosophy ± the inter- nalized rationalities, the taken-for-granted assumptions, and the established routines ± that guide practitioners in their day-to-day work. Bourdieu's concept of habitus recognizes that working cultures are neither static nor uniform. 11 The article situates the habitus of units within the changing fields in which practitioners operate, with particular attention paid to shifts in the national policy agenda, changes in community expectations, and developments in multi-agency working.12 BACKGROUND Following the emergence of community safety officers in the 1990s, the 2000s witnessed `the rise of the ASB officer as a potentially new career path in the local governance of `̀ problematic behaviour''.'13 A survey published in 2002 found that 50 per cent of respondent local authorities had a dedicated team of officers whilst 28 per cent of registered social landlords did so (the total number of agencies contacted was 78).14 More recent data (2011/12) from 148 predominately-larger social housing providers reported that 60 per cent have specialist officers engaged in tackling ASB.15 The cost of manag- ing ASB across the social housing sector in Britain in 2011 was estimated to be nearly £300 million with £145 million on staffing costs alone.16 The management of ASB within areas of social housing has thus grown into a significant industry. In the United Kingdom, social housing providers have a long established role in behavioural management.17 Their most recent high-profile involve- 3 9 P. Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice (1977). 10 J. Chan, `Changing Police Culture' (1996) 36 Brit. J. of Criminology 109, at 112. 11 id.; Hughes and Gilling, op. cit., n. 8. 12 Hughes and Gilling, id. 13 Hughes, op. cit., n. 8, p. 103. 14 J. Nixon and C. Hunter, Initiatives by Social Landlords to Tackle Anti-social Behaviour (2003). 15 HouseMark, ASB Benchmarking: Analysis of Results 2011/12 (2012). This result was consistent with their two previous annual surveys which reported figures of 58 per cent in 2010/11 and 60 per cent in 2009/10. They acknowledge that smaller social housing providers who are less likely to participate in the survey may be less likely to have dedicated ASB staff. HouseMark, ASB Benchmarking: Analysis of Results 2010/ 11 (2011); HouseMark, ASB Benchmarking: Analysis of Results 2009/10 (2010). 16 id. 17 E. Burney, Crime and Banishment: Nuisance and Exclusion in Social Housing (1999); J. Donoghue, Anti-Social Behaviour Orders: A Culture of Control (2010); J. ment in crime reduction began in the 1980s, led predominately by urban Labour-controlled councils that were suffering stubbornly high crime rates. 18 The concept of `community safety' and some of the key principles and practices underlying it, such as multi-agency working, were brought to national attention in the recommendations of a report commissioned and published by the Home Office in 1991. 19 Through the Social Landlords Crime and Nuisance Group (and its predecessor, the Local Authority Working Group on ASB) these forerunner agencies promoted innovation and reform in the tackling of disorder and nuisance behaviour serving as an inspiration for a Labour Party keen to demonstrate it was tough on crime. 20 Although the focus on partnership working was initially on local authori- ties and the police, central government has required providers of social housing, whether local authorities, arm's length management organizations (ALMOs) 21 or registered social landlords 22 to play an increasingly prominent role. 23 Under the New Labour governments of 1997±2010, Parliament provided local agencies including social landlords with a powerful toolkit to manage ASB in their localities with an expectation of use. 24 The New Labour governments were not content simply to encourage local agencies to accept responsibility for the tackling of ASB; instead, they sought through a number of steering mechanisms to influence local responses to the problem. One of the more visible methods for doing so was the promotion of national policy agendas/campaigns on ASB. The first of these was the Together Campaign launched in 2003, which promoted the new ASB enforcement toolkit (which included the ASBO) and sought through various initiatives to educate and train practitioners to use it. 25 In 2006, the New Labour government launched a second campaign, the Respect Agenda, which called for practitioners to adopt a twin-track approach 4 Flint, `Maintaining an Arm's Length? Housing, Community Governance and the Management of `̀ Problematic'' Populations' (2006) 21 Housing Studies 171. 18 A. Crawford, The Local Governance of Crime: Appeals to Community and Partnerships (1999); D. Gilling, Crime Reduction and Community Safety: Labour and the Politics of Local Crime Control (2007). 19 Home Office Standing Conference on Crime Prevention, Safer Communities: the Local Delivery of Crime Prevention through the Partnership Approach (the Morgan Report) (1991). 20 Burney, op. cit., n. 5. 21 A company established and owned by a local authority, whose function is to manage the social housing stock on the authority's behalf. 22 These are predominately housing associations but some are co-operatives, trusts or companies. 23 Registered Social Landlords were formerly included in these partnerships through the Crime and Disorder Strategies (Prescribed Descriptions) (England) Order 2004/ 118. Their membership status was upgraded under the Crime and Disorder Strategies (Prescribed Descriptions) (England) (Amendment) Order 2007. 24 Department of Communities and Local Government, Tackling anti-social behaviour: Tools and powers ± toolkit for social landlords (2010). 25 Home Office, Together Tackling Antisocial Behaviour (2003). combining criminal and social policy responses to tackle the problem. 26 Practitioners were encouraged to combine their enforcement powers with supportive interventions. 27 This campaign was accompanied by the Respect Taskforce, which was headed by Louise Casey who became a high-profile champion of the agenda. 28 Further steering mechanisms employed by the New Labour governments included a statutory obligation to draft and publish policies and procedures on ASB, 29 the temporary funding of specialist posts and initiatives, 30 auditing of adherence to standards of what government considered good practice in the field, 31 and requirements to participate in regular national surveys on the use of ASB interventions. 32 The efforts of successive New Labour governments from 1997 to 2010 contributed to the emergence of what Alison Brown categorized as an emerging profession or discipline. 33 She argued, rather than founding work on the application of professional expertise, its practitioners relied on populist interventions promoted by national government and their own common-sense morality as to what works. 34 This resulted in a blurring of occupational boundaries without sufficient consideration given to the repercussions, which, Brown argued, included increased social control and criminalization of those facing social exclusion. 35 In contrast to Brown, empirical research by Hughes and Gilling on community safety managers found that despite pressures from central government, `many . . . appear to manifest a habitus which accords more closely with the `̀ old'' liberal social democratic mentality than the neo-liberal turn of mind.' 36 Subsequent studies have found variation in the extent to which local agencies embraced the New Labour governments' initiatives, with evidence of a variety of responses ranging from enthusiastic engagement to apathy and resistance, with many in the middle choosing selective adaptation. 37 In part, the variation in findings is due to 5 26 Home Office, The Respect Action Plan (2006). 27 id. 28 D. Walker, `Hard Cases, Hard Casey: Home Office Action Plan's Tough Line on Antisocial Behaviour' Guardian, 8 October 2003, 4. 29 Anti-Social Behaviour Act 2003, s. 12. 30 Home Office, Respect and Responsibility ± Taking a Stand Against Anti-Social Behaviour (2003). 31 Audit Commission, The Community Safety Key Lines of Enquiry and Descriptors for a Cross-Cutting Inspection (2006); Audit Commission, Landlord Services: Tenancy and Management Key Lines of Enquiry (2007). 32 Home Office, CDRP Surveys, at: <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ 20100405140506/asb.homeoffice.gov.uk/members/article.aspx?id=12680>. 33 A.P. Brown, `Anti-Social Behaviour, Crime Control and Social Control' (2004) 43 Howard J. of Criminal Justice 203. 34 id. 35 id. 36 Hughes and Gilling, op. cit., n. 8, p. 144. 37 A. Crawford, S. Lewis, and P. Taynor, Anti-social behaviour interventions with young people (2012); Donoghue, op. cit., n. 17; R. Matthews and D. Briggs, `Lost in Translation: Interpreting and Implementing anti-social behaviour policies' in ASBO studies focusing on different types of practitioners and partnership arrangements at different points in time. The focus of this article is on specialist ASB units within social housing providers post-New Labour. Time and locality impact on working practices; hence, this article focuses on units from different localities and their changing role in recent years. The political field in which practitioners operate has significantly altered recently. Unlike the centralist approach of the previous New Labour admini- strations, the Coalition, elected in 2010, embraces a policy of localism, which advocates less central government intrusion at a local level. 38 In February 2011, the Home Secretary, Theresa May, stated that whilst the government expected that ASB should remain a priority for local agencies, they were keen to promote: A new approach to a problem which is fundamentally local, and which will be different in every area. The answers have to come not from the centre, but from professionals working on the ground and from communities themselves ± the people who know the victims and know the perpetrators. 39 The Coalition government has either curtailed or not deployed some of the steering mechanisms of the previous administration. Importantly, auditing and surveying requirements for agencies hosting ASB units have been curtailed. 40 This does not mean that the Coalition has ignored the subject of ASB. In a response to the English riots of 2011, David Cameron called for an increased focus on tackling disorder with a `security fightback . . . matched by a social fightback', 41 a reworking of Tony Blair's `tough on crime, tough on the causes of crime' 42 mantra. Cameron's `Big Society' discourse, also influenced by communitarianism, bears similarities to the Respect Agenda of New Labour. 43 Indeed the government recently appointed New Labour's Respect Tsar, Louise Casey, to head the newly established Troubled Families Team. 44 In May 2013, the Coalition introduced a Bill to Parliament which seeks to reform the interventions available to tackle ASB, including increased powers for social housing providers. 45 The Coalition has sought to 6 Nation: The Criminalisation of Nuisance, ed. P. Squires (2008) 87; P. Squires and D.E. Stephen, Rougher Justice: Anti-social behaviour and young people (2005). 38 For the statutory embodiment of this, see the Localism Act 2011. 39 Home Office, More Effective Responses to Anti-Social Behaviour (2011) 1. 40 Tenant Services Authority, A revised regulatory framework for social housing in England from April 2012 (2011). 41 D. Cameron, `We are all in this together' at: <http://www.conservatives.com/News/ Speeches/2011/08/David_Cameron_We_are_all_in_this_together.aspx>. 42 Labour Party, New Labour, Because Britain Deserves Better (1997). 43 Hodgkinson and Tilley, op. cit., n. 3. 44 P. Wintour, `David Cameron appoints Louise Casey to lead government response to riots' Guardian, 12 October 2011, at <http://www.guardian.co.uk/society/2011/oct/ 12/david-cameron-louise-casey-riots>. 45 ASB, Crime and Policing Bill 2013-14. K.J. Brown, `Replacing the ASBO with the Injunction to Prevent Nuisance and Annoyance: A Plea for Legislative Scrutiny and Amendment' (2013) 8 Criminal Law Rev. 623. 7 enact these policies within the context of significant financial cuts to the public sector.46 Many agencies across the criminal and social policy fields including social housing providers have been forced to reduce spending and personnel, curtailing the level and range of services they provide.47 The article examines how ASB units, which were largely a creation of New Labour, are adapting to life under the Coalition. METHODOLOGY A broad range of agencies is involved in the management of ASB. This includes social housing providers, local government, the police, youth offending teams, mediators, victim support organizations, probation, and third-sector providers of diversionary and preventative activities. Many of these agencies work in partnership through multi-agency panels and community safety groups. This article focuses on the work of specialist ASB units in social housing providers. The terms `ASB unit' and `ASB practitioner' are used within this context. Whilst the article examines the multi-agency partnership working of ASB units, it is a study of teams that are based within one agency. This article discusses qualitative data involving in-depth semi-structured interviews and an analysis of policy documents. The data, which is the focus of this article, was gathered in late 2011, following the English riots. It involved the participation of ten units and 45 practitioners. This is supple- mented by data from an earlier study conducted in 2007 involving 30 interviewees across eleven units.48 All of the 2011 units and six of the 2007 units were either based within ALMOs (7) or registered social landlords (10). Four of the 2007 units were based in local authorities.49 Seven of the 2011 units are in the North of England with a further two within London and one 46 HM Treasury, Spending Review (2010; Cm. 7942); J. Houghton, `The partnership approach ± an assessment of the present and future' (2012) 11 Safer Communities 105. 47 Family and Parenting Institute, Families on the Frontline? Local spending on children's services in austerity (2012); D. Faulkner, `Criminal Justice reform at a Time of Austerity: What Needs to Be Done' in Lessons for the Coalition: An End of Term Report on New Labour and Criminal Justice, ed. A. Silvestri (2011) 79; J. Yates, `What Prospects Youth Justice? Children in Trouble in the Age of Austerity' (2012) 46 Social Policy and Administration 432. 48 This data was gathered for the author's doctoral thesis. Different units participated across the two periods. The reason that the 2007 units were not revisited in 2011 is that the studies were treated as separate. However, on analysis of the 2011 data, the changing habitus of ASB units emerged as a strong research theme. This encouraged the revisiting of the 2007 data and the contrasting of the two data sets. 49 Of the local authority teams, three did not have responsibility for social housing provision and so caution has been used in contrasting their habitus with that of the 2011 units. in Northern Ireland. All of the 2007 units are in the North of England. Across the two studies, ten units are based within cities and eleven in towns. There is no national register of ASB units and not all social landlords have such teams, so finding and selecting units for participation is heavily dependent on the use of online search engines and speculative invitation emails. Seven units in the 2007 sample agreed to participate following a call made through the email list of the Social Landlords Crime and Nuisance Group. Budgetary constraints meant that there was a focus on units based in the North of England. Sampling was undertaken to ensure that the units were dispersed across a range of localities including different towns and cities and police force areas. The ten units that took part in the 2011 interviews ranged in size from five to 20 members with an average size of ten (Table 3 provides a breakdown of the personnel in the three larger teams). Each unit contained at least one manager (with more in some of the larger teams). The managers have responsibility for the operation of the units including the design and implementation of policy. Seventeen managers were interviewed in 2011 and 13 in 2007. Generic case officers investigate complaints and take actions to resolve them: 34 case officers participated in the research (15 in 2007 and 19 in 2011). Role-specialist officers were common within the larger 2011 units. 50 Some of these officers divided their time between generic ASB case- officer functions and specialist work, whilst others worked solely within their specialism. Eight interviews were conducted with officers with varied specialisms including mediation; preventative measures; the use of noise monitoring equipment; domestic violence; hate crime; and victim support. ASB units sometimes second personnel from other agencies and departments and interviews were conducted with two police officers and one mental health worker. Seconded personnel were always a small minority within the units. Many of the practitioners had prior to joining their ASB unit been in other roles in their organization or elsewhere. Previous occupational experience is likely to shape the habitus of practitioners particularly in a new and developing occupation. 51 In all but five of the interviews, there was discussion of occupational background. Results are shown in Table 1. Each unit was asked to provide data on the extent of use of the different interventions in the two years before the interviews. Whilst units were able to provide data on the use of legal interventions (for example, the number of ASBOs or evictions obtained) there were problems in the supply of data on common non-court based interventions. This was due to a failure of the organizations to collate such data, a common problem in the ASB industry. 52 National-level data from social housing providers is published annually by 8 50 Table 3 provides a breakdown of the personnel roles within the three largest units. 51 Hughes and Gilling, op. cit., n. 8. 52 A criticism made recently in Crawford et al., op. cit., n. 37. HouseMark (a performance benchmarking service) and this is referred to in the article to supplement the interview and policy data. This article focuses upon the commonalities in the habitus across the 2011 units, highlighting differences where space allows. It does not suggest that there was an identical approach to tackling ASB in each unit. Future publications will focus on the analysis of the 2011 data and will explore some of the more subtle differences between the units in greater depth. In the quotations from interviews in the following sections, the job title of each interviewee, and whether from 2007 or 2011 cohort, are noted in order to inform the reader without risking the identification of the individual. Protecting identity in some instances has involved substituting a generic job title for the specific job title of the individual. SURVIVING BY BEING INDISPENSABLE The 2011 interviews were conducted after a prolonged period of successful expansion for the ASB industry.53 Seven of the ten units from 2011 provided comparative data on their change in size from 2006, with all but one showing an increase in the number of personnel; the remaining unit witnessed a small decrease. However, units were now operating in a period of uncertainty following the 2010 spending review.54 Practitioners, particularly managers, were aware that they were likely to face constraints on their budgets and possible reductions in personnel. There was, however, a consensus that their 9 Table 1. The occupational backgrounds of the interviewees Occupational 2011 2007 Total Background Interviewees Interviewees Housing 28 16 44 Criminal Justice 1 6 (2 seconded 7 (including seconded officers) police officers) Welfare or social care 2 (1 seconded 0 2 professions (including mental health seconded staff) worker) Other 6 4 10 No previous occupation 3 4 7 Unknown 5 0 5 TOTAL 45 30 75 53 Nixon and Hunter, op. cit., n. 14; HouseMark, op. cit., n. 15. 54 HM Treasury, op. cit., n. 46. units would survive. This self-assurance is perhaps surprising, given that they are relative newcomers to the ranks of public sector workers. One might have speculated that at times of contraction in the public sector it would be the less established departments within an organization that would face the greatest threat. When asked why they thought they would survive the cuts, a typical response was that tackling ASB now formed a core part of a social landlord's function as it contributed to the objective of building and sustaining stable communities: You might think that [as a social housing provider] we should focus on building houses and repairs and collecting rents [rather than dealing with ASB], but we don't actually build houses any more, and I know it's a bit of a clicheÂ, but we still have a responsibility for building communities. There is still a need out there to work with communities and deliver a service that makes that particular community more confident and stable. (ASB Manager, 2011) Under both Labour and the Coalition, social housing providers have been told that they `shouldn't just be concerned with bricks and mortar, they must also be involved in building better, safer communities'. 55 Tackling ASB thus is `no longer an optional extra' as one local manager phrased it. Successive New Labour governments enforced this message through extensive auditing of social housing providers' ASB policies and practices. 56 Whilst the Coalition government has removed compulsory auditing, they have re- affirmed the expectation that tackling ASB is a service that social housing providers should provide. 57 Despite the fact that not all social housing providers have a specialist unit, practitioners worried that the `essential' work of ASB management would remain undone in their localities if their unit were to be disbanded. They argued that they had developed an expertise in responding to problems of ASB that others had come to rely upon. If they were no longer in place, others would struggle to manage the complex work of utilizing the extensive toolkit of interventions including engaging in multi-agency partnerships: You need to have a specialist team to deal with ASB complaints which is due to the complexities, it's due to being able to have that detailed knowledge of the tools and remedies . . . [I]t's unavoidable having specialist teams. Whether we will all be able to operate to the size and capacity which we've had previously, I don't know, but that applies equally as well to different departments. (ASB Manager, 2011) 10 55 H. Blears, `Help for landlords to tackle anti-social behaviour' (2008), at: <http:// webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.communities.gov.uk/news/ corporate/704905>. 56 Audit Commission, op. cit., n. 31. 57 Home Office, op. cit., n. 3. There was also concern that without specialist officers ASB management would become an organizational `afterthought' as generic housing officers would not be able to dedicate sufficient time to this complex task: When they were dealt with [by generic housing officers], with the best will in the world, ASB often fell off the table and the reason for that was they had to do other things. They had to do allocations, general breaches of tenancy, successions, assignments, whatever it was . . . (ASB Manager, 2011) Furthermore, practitioners stated that as partner agencies such as the police, who had come to rely upon them, cut back on resources due to budget restraints and refocused on their core work (`real crime'), the need for social housing to act upon ASB would be more vital than ever. 58 In defending the continuation of specialist ASB units, practitioners frequently referred to customer surveys, stating that results invariably found tackling ASB to be a high priority: We've had to [accept] cut budgets, but with regards to the ASB service, we have to really do what our customers want and ASB is up there as a priority for our customers. The company knows that they have to buy into [it] because if they don't we will end up with estates where people don't want to live. (ASB Manager, 2011) In an opinion piece for the Guardian, Matt Jones, the Assistant Director of Communities and Neighbourhoods at City West Housing Trust, summarized these arguments as follows: For landlords, the ASB agenda has not gone away. It remains a high priority for our tenants and will undermine the fabric of our communities and core business if we fail to tackle the problem . . . Even in this age of austerity, it is paramount that resources to tackle ASB are protected from the inevitable cuts to frontline services . . . If housing associations take their foot off the pedal and attempt to direct, admittedly scarce, resources elsewhere, our tenants would be the first to tell us what they thought about it. 59 Nationwide studies have consistently shown that individuals living within social housing are more likely than those living in privately rented or owner- occupied accommodation to perceive ASB to be a serious problem in their locality. 60 The previous New Labour governments and the Coalition govern- ment have recognized this, giving social housing providers a prominent role in tackling ASB and encouraging residents to expect their social landlord to act upon such behaviour. 61 11 58 Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary, Policing in austerity: One year on (2012). 59 M. Jones, `Tackling antisocial behaviour is still a priority' Guardian, 4 October 2012, at: <http://www.guardian.co.uk/housing-network/2012/oct/04/antisocial- behaviour-social-housing-budgets> 60 S. Mackenzie, J. Bannister, J. Flint, S. Parr, A. Millie, and J. Fleetwood, The drivers of perceptions of anti-social behaviour (2010). 61 Home Office, op. cit., n. 26; Home Office, op. cit., n. 3. 12 Despite apparent self-assurance, a number of the ASB units were attempt- ing to develop systems to help evidence their value in these times of budget cutbacks. This, however, is not something they found straightforward. The nebulous nature of ASB and the breadth of work they undertake (often in partnership with other agencies) mean there is a difficulty in identifying the appropriate measures of success. Practitioners mentioned a range of measures. This included the number and costs of interventions used; the number of perpetrators who following an intervention have amended their behaviour or at least not come into further contact with the authorities; the number of complainants satisfied with the outcome of a case; and annual surveys of residents' perceptions of ASB in their locality. Even relying on a combination of these measures does not provide an answer to the question of whether particular working practices provide value for money.62 The problem is compounded by a lack of national data which limits benchmarking. HouseMark, who provide an ASB benchmarking service, is attempting to improve this situation although its work on calculations of value for money is still in its infancy.63 Whilst units were confident of surviving the cuts, their problems with evidencing utility and cost effectiveness pose an on-going risk to them and the wider community safety industry. THE DEVELOPMENT OF A BROAD HABITUS At the core of the habitus found within units were three objectives that practitioners saw themselves delivering on behalf of their social landlord: the protection and support of victims and communities from ASB, behavioural transformation and, if necessary, the enforcement of good behaviour. These objectives, which are common to the wider community safety industry,64 are part of what Garland labelled `the new criminologies of everyday life . . . that are quite different from [or at least go beyond] the traditional goals of prosecution, punishment and `̀ criminal justice''.'65 The role of ASB units is in part to act as a new `thin blue line' protecting victims and communities from the chaos of crime and disorder.66 For practitioners, ASB undermines a sense of community and the role of their unit is to assist communities in defending themselves against individuals who seek to undermine it: 62 HC Public Accounts Committee, Forty-fourth Report, Tackling Anti-Social Behaviour, HC (2006±2007) 246; National Audit Office, Tackling Anti-Social Behaviour, HC (2006±2007) 99; D. Prior, `The `̀ Problem'' of Anti-Social Behaviour and the Policy Knowledge Base: Analysing the Power/Knowledge Relationship' (2009) 29 Critical Social Policy 5. 63 HouseMark, op. cit., n. 15. 64 Hughes and Gilling, op. cit., n. 8; Hughes, op. cit., n. 8. 65 Garland, op. cit., n. 7, p. 17. 66 R. Reiner, Policing (1996); R. Reiner, The Politics of the Police (2006). They are damaging the community. They are ruining people's lives. If you like they are treating the community with contempt . . . I think we have got to say to them we are not going to let you treat the community with contempt. (ASB Officer, 2007) The community is seen as a `collective victim' 67 as vulnerable to crime and disorder as individuals. A practical example of this is the Community Harm Statement, which was developed by a local ASB unit and has now been adopted by the Coalition and promoted nationwide. 68 This tool is designed `to highlight the impact of harm on a community caused by ASB' in much the same way as a victim impact statement does for an individual. 69 Practitioners recognized that if too great a focus is placed on the community as a collective victim, there is a risk that individual victim vulnerabilities will be missed. This issue was brought to national attention following the high-profile and tragic case of Fiona Pilkington, who took her own life and that of her severely disabled daughter in 2007 after suffering a sustained campaign of harassment and nuisance behaviour. 70 Criticisms of the failings of local agencies to recognize the complainants' needs in this case have led to a greater focus within the ASB industry on victim vulner- ability. 71 Both in interviews and policy documents there was evidence that units had recently established or improved policies and procedures around victim protection. This includes training officers to provide victim support, establishing dedicated victim support officer roles in some larger teams, and the conducting of risk assessments to identify vulnerable victims. The construction of ASB regulation as offering necessary protection to helpless victims is one that has frequently been relied upon by politicians, who have emphasized that the focus of the ASB agenda must be the delivering of `a quiet life' 72 so that everyone `has the right to feel safe in their home and in their neighbourhood'. 73 In responding to complaints of ASB, practitioners saw their role as tackling the underlying causes of the problem. The typical habitus found within units encompassed a bounded rational-choice understanding of the behaviour of perpetrators, 74 where it is recognized that individuals may not 13 67 Hughes, op. cit., n. 8. 68 Chartered Institute of Housing (CIH), Community Harm Statement: Guidance notes for social landlords (2012). 69 id., p. 2. 70 Independent Police Complaints Commission, IPCC report into the contact between Fiona Pilkington and Leicestershire Constabulary 2004±2007 (2009). 71 id.; CIH, How to Manage Anti-Social Behaviour Cases Effectively (2011); Home Office, op. cit., n. 3; J. Donoghue, `Reflections on Risk, Anti-Social Behaviour and Vulnerable/Repeat Victims' (2013) Brit. J. of Criminology (first published online 14 May 2013, doi:10.1093/bjc/azt023). 72 Labour Party, op. cit., n. 42. 73 Home Office, op. cit., n. 39, p. 1. 74 D.B. Cornish and R.V. Clarke, The Reasoning Criminal: Rational Choice Perspectives on Offending (1986). be able to fully comprehend the implications and rationality of their beha- viour due to pathological or social constraints; however, they maintain some freedom of choice in their actions and are held responsible. In line with government rhetoric, if a change in behaviour does not occur sufficiently quickly, if respite is not delivered, then the interests of victims or the community prevail and enforcement actions are considered: 75 There's usually a reason why somebody behaves in an antisocial manner. They don't just wake up one day and think, `I'm going to be a bloody nuisance to my neighbours today.' There is something going on and once you have established what that something is and you have some kind of a relationship with your subject then, more often than not, you can resolve it by other means. They might need medicating, they might need support, they might be inappropriately housed; they might need to go somewhere else . . . However, sometimes you get them and they are bloody-minded and they do want to just cause a nuisance, but if that's the case . . . I'd be saying to them, `I'm sorry, [we] don't want you as a tenant. If you can't engage with me and you don't want this help and support and you're choosing to behave like this then go and do it somewhere else', and I'd terminate the tenancy. (ASB Manager, 2011) Guided by this rationale, ASB units engage in work which would be con- sidered as combining aspects of policing, social work, housing, environ- mental health, prosecution, mediation, and probation. It is artificial to talk of strict delineations between these different occupations but practitioners were becoming increasingly willing, with or in some cases without cooperation, to cross occupational boundaries. 76 Table 2 provides a breakdown of the different aspects of a typical unit's role and the interventions they may utilize based on the interviews and policy documents. Practitioners borrow interventions from different fields of behavioural management without necessarily understanding fully their theoretical under- pinnings and risks associated with them. The extent and quality of training does not rival that required of traditional disciplinary-based professions (such as the police or social services). Most of the practitioners came from a background in housing (see Table 1) and had no formal qualifications in ASB management. Training varied across the units and was heavily dependent on local budgets (which were shrinking) and the priorities of the units' manager. In the absence of extensive training, institutional history plays an even more prominent part in the development of habitus, with practitioners' mentalities shaped through (direct and shared) experience of the environments in which they operate. 77 To engage adequately in such a diverse range of work requires a com- prehensive knowledge and skill set. Arguably, it becomes difficult and 14 75 Cameron, op. cit., n. 41. 76 See the penultimate section of this article for discussion of the differing responses from other agencies to such expansionism. 77 D. Cooper, `Against the Current: Social Pathways and the Pursuit of Enduring Change' (2001) 9 Feminist Legal Studies 119. inefficient for any one person to possess it all and therefore there has been a move towards specialization of roles within larger units. Such specialization often takes place as occupations develop and expand. 78 Table 3 provides a breakdown of the personnel in the three largest units who participated in the 2011 interviews. This is contrasted with the personnel within those units in 2006. The six larger units from 2011 have witnessed an increasing diversity of specialist roles. Within several of the smaller teams where there was not the capacity to have specialist staff, case officers had taken the lead on a particular aspect of the unit's work (making them the `go to' person in complex cases). Specialization highlights an important aspect of the concept of habitus which acknowledges that not all members within a team will share an identical working culture. 79 The unique aspects of a specialist officer's role mark them out from their generic officer colleagues. They have additional training, although the extent of this varies across the units, and engage with agencies and disciplines to a depth that generalist colleagues do not. The fields in which they operate are different. Specialist officers are particularly useful as expanders of mission, being more likely to push the boundaries of 15 Table 2. Roles and methods employed by ASB Units Role Methods Used Investigation Surveillance Interviews with perpetrators, victims, and witnesses Information sharing with other agencies Use of noise-monitoring equipment Enforcement Warnings ASBOs/injunctions Tenancy demotions Evictions Intervention Behavioural agreements Mediation Referral for support, for example, drug or alcohol problems Family Intervention Projects Victim Support Keeping victims informed Providing counselling Prevention Educational programmes Diversionary schemes 78 G. Hunt and P. Wainwright (eds.), Expanding the Role of the Nurse: The Scope of Professional Practice (1994); B. Loveday, `Contemporary challenges to police management in England and Wales: Developing strategies for effective service delivery' (1995) 5 Policing and Society 281. 79 Chan, op. cit., n. 10. 15 their work in their particular area as they feel they are becoming more expert in it and have the time to develop better links with associated practitioners from other occupations. As remits expand, power becomes more concentrated. As well as exten- sive powers of surveillance and investigation, ASB units can take action to have someone imprisoned, evicted or injuncted as well as the power to require (or at least place substantial pressure) on someone to engage with counsellors, therapists, and mediators. Units have an impressive ability to exert social control on their communities and, in particular, individuals and groups perceived by those communities to be behaving `anti-socially'. The concentration of power is accompanied by a lack of adequate checks and balances. The organic development of the ASB occupation means that, as with other new entrants to the order maintenance field, there is a limited system of supervision and review. 80 The lack of a national or regional hier- archy compounds this as power remains concentrated at the local unit level. The Coalition government's localism approach of regulating less and trusting more requires robust local systems of accountability, which have yet to take root. 16 Table 3. The change in composition of the three largest ASB units 2011 2006 Unit A 2 Managers 2 Managers 7 Case Officers 8 Case Officers 3 Victim Support Officers 1 Perpetrator Support Officer 1 Business Development Officer 1 Child Safety Officer Unit B 1 Manager 1 Manager 12 Case Officers 11 Case Officers 1 Mental Health Officer 1 Youth Officer 1 Intervention Officer 1 Clerical Assistant 1 Clerical Assistant Unit C 3 Managers 3 Managers 12 Case Officers (including hate 8 Case Officers crime specialist) (including hate crime 2 Domestic Abuse Officers specialist) 1 Surveillance Officer 1 Clerical Officer 2 Clerical Officers 80 Crawford, op. cit., n. 18. THE INFLUENCE OF A CHANGING NATIONAL POLICY AGENDA ON THE HABITUS OF UNITS The national policy agenda on ASB promoted by New Labour has undoubtedly been an important influence on units. The steering mechanisms discussed in the background section of this article have been successful in encouraging the establishment of units and shaping the development of the habitus within them. One frequently mentioned mechanism in interviews and policy documents was the Respect Standard for Housing Management.81 This document contains a set of commitments on the management of ASB based on the Respect Agenda. The commitments include protecting com- munities through swift enforcement in combination with prevention and early intervention to tackle ASB.82 Although the standard is voluntary, over 500 agencies have become signatories.83 Once they sign, they may refer to the standard and make use of its branding on their official documentation.84 Being able to advertise that they are meeting this national standard provides a source of legitimacy for units.85 The standard has been a useful tool in encouraging agencies to reform their policies and procedures in line with the national shift from the Together Campaign (which was heavily enforcement focused) to the Respect Agenda (which called for a combination of enforcement, prevention, and intervention): We are attempting in as far as possible to shift from what used to be an enforcement focus to a more preventative focus. Because that's where the government is now saying they want us to be looking at it from. (ASB Officer, 2007) I think what we've seen is a paradigm shift [in approach]. This has been reinforced through central government, through the regulatory regime and certainly the Respect standard. (ASB Manager, 2011) The second quotation uses the phrase `reinforced' which suggests a more symbiotic relationship between central government policy and local practice. In introducing reforms, both Labour and the Coalition have talked of responding to the needs of practitioners. 86 The Social Landlords Crime and 17 81 Department for Communities and Local Government, The Respect Standard in Housing Management (2006). In 2012, as part of its localism agenda, the Coalition delegated responsibility for the standard to the Charted Institute of Housing who issued a redrafted version in 2012. CIH, Respect ± ASB Charter for Housing (2012). 82 id. 83 CIH, id., at <http://www.cih.co.uk/respectcharter>. 84 CIH, `CIH charters frequently asked questions', at: <http://www.cih.co.uk/ resources/PDF/Policy%20free%20download%20pdfs/Frequently%20asked%20 questions.pdf>. 85 Although one should note that social landlords may self-certify their adherence to the standard. 86 Home Office, op. cit., n. 3. Nuisance Group and the Charted Institute for Housing regularly lobby national policymakers on behalf of local practitioners. Given the close association of the ASB agenda with New Labour, there was some doubts among practitioners that the Coalition would remain as `committed to the cause' (ASB Manager, 2011). The current government's localism agenda initially suggested to practitioners that they `would be left to their own devices' (ASB Manager, 2011). However, the 2011 interviews took place in the aftermath of the English riots and following the government consultation document promoting a new package of interventions on ASB. 87 This appears to have provided reassurance to practitioners that central government continues to view the role of social landlords in tackling ASB as important. 88 If the Coalition had not quickly adopted a pro-active role in this policy field, ASB practitioners would for the first time have operated without a strong central government guiding hand, which may have had implications for the future development of their habitus. Despite attention from central government providing practitioners with a level of reassurance, units were willing to adapt and in some cases reject national-level excesses of penal populism or punitive display. 89 One example has been the ASBO, which New Labour governments struggled to persuade practitioners to use despite heavy promotion. 90 In the 2011 cohort, interviewees voiced scepticism towards the Coalition government's proposed policy of removing, in serious cases, the requirement for a social landlord to establish, in proceedings for possession, that the ASB occurred within the locality of the dwelling house. 91 The government announced the proposal in the light of the riots of summer 2011 (it was during this period that the interviews were conducted). The government's argument is that if someone engages in such disruptive or violent behaviour they forfeit their right to housing provided by the state, but practitioners saw problems in pursuing such a policy. There were concerns that such a change would effectively make them moral guardians of their residents rather than simply of their localities, transforming their remit beyond which they were currently comfortable. Practitioners worried that they would face pressure to take action against their tenants no matter where the behaviour in question took place and even if such behaviour had no impact on their housing situation. The fact that the majority of the practitioners had a habitus developed in housing appeared to heighten their attachment to the concept of locality. 92 18 87 Home Office, op. cit., n. 39. 88 G. Shapps, `Letter from Rt Hon Grant Shapps MP ± extending social landlords' powers to seek possession for criminality and anti-social behaviour' (2011) at: <http://www.communities.gov.uk/publications/housing/antisocialbehaviourconsult>; Home Office, op. cit., n. 3. 89 Garland, op. cit., n. 7. 90 Burney, op. cit., n. 5. 91 Shapps, op. cit., n. 88. 92 See Table 1. Some interviewees also expressed concern that the Coalition's policy would lead to the over-policing and over-punishment of those living in social housing suggesting a social democratic influence to their habitus: It's shocking that tenants of social housing are seen to be the scum of the earth. They're not. You know the riots that were held a couple of months ago were student riots from middle class families. Were they threatened with having their home to be taken off them? No. So it's social control, so I'm very opposed . . . So don't demonise our youths and don't demonise social housing tenants. (ASB Manager, 2011) 19 Whilst national policies and initiatives clearly influence the fields in which practitioners operate and ultimately, at times, the development of the habitus within units, to portray them as pawns or dupes of central government would be to misrepresent their work. It would also fail to take account of other influences on units including community expectations and inter-agency relationships. THE INFLUENCE OF COMMUNITY EXPECTATIONS ON THE HABITUS OF UNITS A problem that ASB units face is that while it is easy to say that their role is to defend communities from `ASB', it is more difficult to answer the question of what exactly they mean by the use of this term and thus what it is they are defending against. The label of `ASB' can encompass a wide spectrum of annoying or harassing behaviour, ranging from minor nuisance to serious criminality. The Crime and Disorder Act 1998, s. 1 defines ASB as behaviour likely `to cause harassment, alarm or distress'. An alternative definition is provided in the Housing Act 1996, s. 153A(1)(a) which covers individuals `engaging in or threatening to engage in conduct causing or likely to cause a nuisance or annoyance' to another resident, occupant or person involved in lawful activity on behalf of the social landlord. These definitions are `ill-defined and open to a very shifting agenda'.93 The imprecision of the definition of ASB invites a subjective and diverse range of interpretations from practitioners, government, and communities, which can differ depending on time and locality.94 93 C. Hunter, `Looking two ways at once: anti-social behaviour, law and social inclusion' (2003) 8, at <http://www.york.ac.uk/chp/hsa/papers/autumn03/Hunter.pdf>. 94 R. Atkinson, `Housing and the New Spaces of Disciplinary Control: The Com- pounded Citizenship of Social Renting' in Housing, Urban Governance and Anti- Social Behaviour: Perspectives, Policy and Practice, ed. J. Flint (2006) 99±116; Crawford, op. cit., n. 6; J. Flint, `Surveillance and Exclusion Practices in the Governance of Access to Shopping Centres on Periphery Estates in the UK' (2006) 4 Surveillance & Society 52. Central governments have encouraged practitioners to adopt a responsive approach in defining ASB. A New Labour government minister in 2006 was reported to have stated that `[ASB] is whatever the victim says it is'. 95 The Coalition government proposes the introduction of a `community trigger' that would require practitioners to take action when a certain number of complaints have been received. 96 The White Paper states that: Individuals and communities themselves know exactly what problems they face, and so can often be the most effective actors in establishing what is and isn't acceptable in their neighbourhood . . . 97 In adopting such an approach there is a risk that those with the loudest voices may establish what is normal or acceptable behaviour in their community, while those with no voice will find their behaviour classified as anti-social. The views of adults may be favoured over children, 98 whilst those who are different, such as those with mental health difficulties may be targeted for not being `normal'. 99 Practitioners frequently referred to the difficult role they had in balancing the demands of complainants with the rights and needs of those who were the subject of the complaints. All of the units had actively to manage perceptions and expectations: A lot of it is about perceptions . . . I think you'll find with a lot of people, the minute they see a group of kids, they could be doing nothing, they could be sitting on the ground doing their homework, but because there may be a dozen of them, the perceptions are `oh they'll be drinking, they'll be taking drugs.' And a lot of our work is about reducing those perceptions. (ASB Manager, 2011) A common concern among practitioners was that they were being drawn into an ever-greater range of minor disputes: People are fearful [of repercussions] . . . so they`d much rather ring the council and send the council round to tell off the person across the street, which then causes another set of tensions, because if somebody official knocks on your door and says your kids are causing a problem, it's much worse than if your neighbour does. (ASB Manager, 2007) The majority of practitioners were conscious of this dilemma in their work- ing practice and some units had put in place neighbourhood mediation schemes and forums to encourage self-regulation within communities. 100 20 95 D. Hewitt, `Bovvered? A legal perspective on the ASBO' (2007) 14 J. of Forensic and Legal Medicine 355, at 359. 96 Home Office, op. cit., n. 3. 97 id., p. 18. 98 Squires and Stephen, op. cit., n. 37. 99 N. Cobb, `Patronising the Mentally Disordered? Social Landlords and the Control of `̀ Anti-Social Behaviour'' Under the Disability Discrimination Act 1995' (2006) 26 Legal Studies 238. 100 A.P. Brown, A. Barclay, R. Simmons, and S. Eley, The Role of Mediation in Tackling Neighbour Disputes and Anti-Social Behaviour (2003). There were concerns among some that pressures were increasing because of the current fiscal climate, which was causing partner agencies to reduce or withdraw services, for example, a number of units reported the loss of their local mediation service. Practitioners were having to learn to take a more forthright approach in establishing limits to their roles as in the quotation below: I think initially, we were very much wading through treacle. You weren't sure how to deal with things, or maybe we gave more credence to a complaint than we should have done. Whereas now, we're very clear. A neighbour dispute is not necessarily ASB . . . We're very clear about where the rules lie. That means that we can deal with the lesser issues very quickly, which frees up our time to deal with the more serious issues. (ASB Manager, 2011) Despite expectation management, a responsive approach means that units are dependent at least to an extent on the types of complaints they receive, which is in turn dependent on the types of population and spaces which they govern. 101 In interviews, units that are responsible for significant amounts of communal space were more likely to report problems with congregating youths, whilst those who worked for organizations with a sizeable stock of poorly constructed flats were particularly concerned with reports of noise nuisance. Likewise, units that had responsibility for housing estates that are disparate in terms of age profile found that inter-generational lifestyle con- flicts were a source of complaints, whilst units whose areas covered ethnically diverse communities were more likely to raise the problem of hate crime. Some units reported particular problems with drug abuse whilst others reported alcohol to be a major factor behind complaints. There was evidence of teams tailoring their skills to their workload. Those who had particular problems with noise nuisance, for example, had purchased their own noise monitoring equipment and trained staff to use it. A unit with responsibility for a sizeable number of ethnically diverse neighbourhoods had recruited a hate crime officer. Thus, the experience, skills, and knowledge base within teams varies in response to their communities, ensuring that there is not an identical habitus across the units. Most units had in place a system for categorizing complaints of ASB, which allowed them to quickly prioritize and tailor their response. This included the use of risk assessments on the vulnerability of complainants. 102 A majority of the units utilized electronic databases for the recording of cases suggesting a move towards a more technical approach. 103 Recording and categorization allows units to gather statistics and in turn evaluate and 21 101 Atkinson, op. cit., n. 94. 102 Donoghue, op. cit., n. 71. 103 E. Friedson, Professional Powers: A Study of the Institutionalization of Formal Knowledge (1988). improve practice.104 This allows practitioners to claim that they are increas- ingly basing their work upon verifiable expert knowledge rather than common sense, thus increasing their professional legitimacy.105 However, categorization sits uneasily with the flexible, responsive approach that teams pride themselves on. Due to the wideness of scope and compounded nature of ASB, fitting complaints into discrete categories is not straightforward and other agencies including the police have struggled in this task.106 Furthermore, there is currently no consensus among ASB practitioners as to which case management package to use. A recent survey of 150 agencies found over 20 different software packages in use with in-house IT solutions the most common.107 The lack of compatibility between packages inhibits information sharing (an issue, which will be returned to in the following section) and benchmarking across the sector. THE INFLUENCE OF PARTNERSHIP WORKING ON THE HABITUS WITHIN UNITS The approach has changed because of multi-agency working. (ASB Officer, 2011) From the interviews and policy documents, it was clear that multi-agency co- operation was an integral part of the work of ASB units and a significant influence on their habitus. Practitioners discussed a range of agencies with whom they worked including the police, social services, education and youth services, mediation facilitators, and Victim Support. One forum for co- operation is the Crime and Disorder Reduction partnerships or Community Safety Partnerships, which are mandated by statute. 108 However, ASB practitioners also reported membership of various local partnerships dealing with specific issues such as domestic violence or youth crime. The leader- ship structure within these partnerships differs across localities. In some partnerships there is a designated team or officer who co-ordinates; in other localities it is simply a regular meeting of practitioners from different agencies. Where a locality has a specialist ASB unit, partner agencies can treat it as an important resource. Other agencies struggle to match the versatility of the toolkit available to ASB units and at least until recently they have been a growth industry eager to expand their work. An example was 22 104 A criticism of the practice of ASB units has been the lack of such evaluations. See, for example, HC PAC, op. cit., n. 62. 105 Brown, op. cit., n. 33; Friedson, op. cit., n. 103. 106 Home Office, Focus on the victim: Summary Report on the ASB Call Handling Trials (2012). 107 HouseMark, op. cit., n. 15. 108 Crime and Disorder Act 1998, ss. 5±7. domestic violence, which nearly all interviewees in the 2011 cohort saw as falling within their remit: Domestic violence was our second most investigated category of ASB [last year]. Now you wouldn't have seen that five years ago, because it would have been referred to another agency or it would have been felt it's criminal or it's not related to the housing management function. [But] it is because they are our customers and [where they] experience behaviour or fear within their property . . . there's certainly a role [for us] to play. (ASB Manager, 2011) Practitioners referred to how the establishment of local Multi-Agency Risk Assessment Committees (MARACs), aided by funding from central govern- ment, had encouraged different agencies to cooperate on the issue of domestic violence. 109 The participation of ASB units in this framework had encouraged them to see domestic violence as something they should be tackling. This had, in turn, encouraged other agencies to see the potential role that ASB units could offer in assisting with the problem. According to interviewees from the 2011 cohort, this included the fact that much domestic violence takes place within the home and thus firmly within their space of governance. ASB practitioners argued that their relative ease of access to their tenants' homes put them in an excellent position to play a proactive role in identifying and investigating cases. In addition, the interventions at their disposal allowed them to offer a uniquely holistic response combining enforcement and support. This included assisting with support and/or rehousing of the victim if necessary, whilst taking eviction proceedings and injunctive action against the perpetrator to exclude him from the area. This action was taken with the cooperation of other agencies, with ASB units increasingly taking a higher profile role as their experience with such cases grew. A number of the 2011 units had established the role of dedicated domestic violence officers, which further encouraged other agencies to see the ASB unit as a lead agency on the issue. There was a notable self- confidence in embracing this new aspect to their role. This response to domestic violence provides an example of how multi-agency working can result in partner agencies redefining their relationship within one another and, in turn, redefining their own perception of what it is they do. 110 The most commonly mentioned agency in interviews was the police, with whom generally positive working relationships where reported. Practitioners 23 109 N. Steel, L. Blakeborough, and S. Nicholas, Supporting high-risk victims of domestic violence: a review of Multi-Agency Risk Assessment Conferences (MARACs) (2011); Donoghue, op. cit., n. 71. 110 This phenomenon has been witnessed in other areas of multi-agency working, see R.C. Mawby and A. Worrall, ``̀ They were very threatening about do-gooding bastards'': Probation's changing relationships with the police and prison services in England and Wales' (2011) 3 European J. of Probation 78; B. Reid, `Partnership and Change in Social Housing' in Partnership Working: Policy and Practice, eds. S. Ballach and M. Taylor (2001) 77±96. share with the police the criminal policy aspects of their role, including a mission to protect victims and maintain social order in their communities. 111 Practitioners frequently spoke of how they acted as an important back-up to the police in dealing with behaviour which the police would struggle to commit significant resources to given their need to focus on `serious crime': If you go back even ten years or certainly twenty years . . . the traditional view was that we let the police deal with all of these issues, whatever they were, crime, disorder, ASB, traffic offences, the police dealt with absolutely every- thing. I think we have moved on from that now . . . I think it is no longer practical to leave it all to the police. I think the police themselves want help and want assistance. They are looking for organisations like . . . [us] to assist them. (ASB Manager, 2007) Practitioners, then, were at times an alternative provider of policing in their communities, at least as regards less serious criminality. From receiving complaints, to gathering evidence, to interviewing suspected perpetrators, to issuing warnings, their role shared much in common with that of the police. In some respects, the ASB practitioners' role went further in that, unlike the police, they also made the decision as to whether to pursue legal action against a perpetrator, a role that the police have lost to the Crown Prosecu- tion Service. The logic behind this curtailment of police power applies arguably to ASB practitioners today, which is that it is best to avoid having the same officers investigate and prosecute cases to ensure independent review of a decision to go to court. 112 One practical measure, which four of the 2007 units had taken to improve relations between themselves and the police, was to second police officers to their units. In the following quotation the manager explains the value of having a seconded police officer on their team: We've got police officers in our team which I think is invaluable because on a day-to-day basis once we get the systems up and running we'll have access to the police information that we need. (ASB Manager, 2007) Seconded police officers appeared to play an important role in allowing the translation of information from one discourse and method of governance to another. 113 With no seconded police officers in the 2011 units, one might have expected information sharing to be problematic: however, it appears that as ASB units have become more established they have developed closer relations with the police (including information sharing protocols), which means that formal secondments are no longer necessary. The extent of information sharing varied across the units depending on relations with their 24 111 Reiner, op. cit., n. 66. 112 M. McConville et al., The Case for the Prosecution: Police Suspects and the Construction of Criminality (1991). 113 R.V. Ericson and K.D. Haggerty, Policing the Risk Society (1997). local police force. The closest relationship was reported by a unit in a large urban area who had recently starting receiving daily emails from the police providing information on those in the area who had been arrested or charged: We've started to get overnight reports now . . . so we can see who's been arrested for whatever . . . If it's one of our [residents] we'll think `okay what have they done?'. . . For example if it is shoplifting, we might write to them, but is that worthwhile evicting someone for? Probably not. (ASB Manager, 2011) This process communicates to the tenant that they are subject to a com- pounded system of governance and surveillance. 114 It also allows the police to communicate to the ASB unit their trust and respect for their partners, encouraging them to `buy in' to the policing agenda. The other agency that practitioners frequently referred to was social services. Unlike with the police, relations between the two occupations have not been close: One, they have never heard of partnership working; two, everyone has resource problems, everyone is stretched, but we are seeing things, we refer things to [social services] which you don't do all the time, but they are not interested. (ASB Manager, 2007) Garrett has argued there is an incompatibility between the ASB agenda, which attempts to criminalize social policy, and the habitus of social work. 115 At a national level, the professional bodies representing social work have been openly critical of the measures pursued in the name of tackling the problem of ASB 116 and central government has been equally critical at the perceived resistance of the profession. 117 Social workers sit within the social policy realm whilst ASB practitioners sit both within the social and criminal policy realms. The respective occupations have different priorities, with social workers concerned principally with the welfare of their clients and defending the clients' interests. 118 For ASB units, perpetrators may also be tenants but this does not place on them the same duty of care placed on social workers. ASB practitioners when deciding how to respond in a case will often take a pragmatic approach balancing the rights and welfare of the instigator of 25 114 Atkinson, op. cit., n. 94. 115 P.M. Garrett, `Making `̀ Anti-Social Behaviour'': A Fragment on the Evolution of `̀ ASBO Politics'' in Britain' (2007) 37 Brit. J. of Social Work 839; P.M. Garrett, ``̀ Sinbin'' Solutions: The `̀ Pioneer'' Projects for `̀ Problem Families'' and the Forgetfulness of Social Policy Research' (2007) 27 Critical Social Policy 203. 116 E. Ashenhurst-McGrattan, `Response to the Proposed Draft Anti-Social Behaviour (NI) Order 2000' at <http://www.basw.co.uk/Default.aspx?tabid=54&articleID=197>. 117 C. Jerrom, `Social Workers Should Not Make Excuses for Clients' Behaviour, Says Minister' at <http://www.communitycare.co.uk/Articles/2003/03/17/40032/social- workers-should-not-make-excuses-for-clients-behaviour-says.html>; L. Ward, `Asbo Chief Rounds on Liberal Critics' Guardian, 10 June 2005, 9. 118 British Association of Social Workers, The Code of Ethics For Social Work (2012). the ASB against those of the victim or the wider community. ASB practitioners' lack of professional accreditation and formal qualifications may make social workers sceptical of their capacity to engage competently in interventionist work. Such scepticism has been in evidence in relations between others occupations such as probation and the prison service. 119 Despite such difficulties, the two occupations increasingly work together and there is evidence that this is improving relations: It's got a little bit better more recently . . . for instance, if there is an issue in a family and there is young children there or whatever, we have to do a referral to social services to say this is what's happening. I find that now, they do tend to get back to you. Whereas before, you just never got nothing at all. We didn't even know if they had visited or if they hadn't or if they were working with that family or not. (ASB Manager, 2011) ASB practitioners in 2011 reported regular meetings with social work at various multi-agency panels dealing with domestic violence, racial hatred, and youth offending. A number of units had also worked with social services on family intervention projects, where perceived difficult families receive a holistic and multi-agency response to their behaviour. 120 One unit had a part- time seconded mental health worker, who saw an aspect of the role as improving communications between mental health support, social services, and the ASB team: We all do it, we all start playing games and getting . . . positional, don't we? When we can start relating to one another, either within organisations or between organisations, then change occurs. I mean all different professions still have their own priorities . . . But it's about getting them communicating to one another [whilst] still giving credibility to everybody's professional [perspective]. (Seconded Mental Health Officer, 2011) Other members of the same unit reported that the presence of the mental health worker made a positive difference to inter-agency relations and made them more aware of possible mental health issues that could be affecting victims and perpetrators. Generally, though, reported relationships between teams and social (and related) services remained far from perfect and were certainly not as close as with the police. The overriding viewpoint from the ASB practitioners was that this meant that tackling the underlying causes of disruptive behaviour was made more difficult. Given the reported value of seconded officers, a possible method of improving relations would be to trial the secondment of social workers, at least on a part-time basis, to ASB units. Whilst such a proposal raises ethical issues for social work, it has the potential to give social work a greater influence on the habitus of ASB units. 26 119 Mawby and Worrall, op. cit., n. 110. 120 S. Parr, and J. Nixon, `Rationalising Family Intervention Projects' in ASBO Nation: The Criminalisation of Nuisance, ed. P. Squires (2008) 161±78. 27 CONCLUSIONS ASB practitioners lack important aspects of professional power such as a professional association, accreditation, and a formal period of education or training. 121 However, there was an identifiable shared, if not identical, habitus within the ASB units that participated in the research. The interviews and associated policy documents provide evidence of a common language, knowledge, ways of conceiving, and techniques for acting upon others.122 Practitioners enthusiastically espoused multi-agency working, demonstrating a willingness to pool resources to provide a solution to complex cases. Adopting a `what works' approach, there was a willingness to learn and incorporate the best practice of others. Some of the participating units were innovators, willing to set aside traditional ways of doing things and develop new responses to the problems they faced. This included the establishment of specialist officers who were building expertise in their fields. The work of units in combating domestic violence was an important example of this. Practitioners also demonstrated a willingness to adapt to changes in external pressures upon them, such as reductions in funding or changes in govern- ment policy. They tended to embrace change confidently rather than engage in existential self-doubt, a phenomenon which has been documented in other occupations that have experienced significant change, such as social services and probation.123 The fields in which they operate have influenced the habitus within ASB units. Practitioners are constantly adopting, adapting to, and resisting the expectations upon them from government, their communities, and partner agencies. Due to the lack of a shared embedding within an educational or ethical framework, units are more at risk of succumbing to external pressures to alter their working practices without sufficient thought as to whether such practices are right in any occupationally normative sense. This is heightened by the fact that they float between traditional criminal and social policy fields of practice. In such situations, a lack of self-doubt risks discouraging sufficient self-reflection. Based on a New Labour government initiative,124 the Chartered Institute of Housing has published what equates to a voluntary national Code of Practice for ASB practitioners in social housing.125 This could be taken further by drawing up a code of ethics to encourage debate among ASB practitioners and the wider community safety field as to what, if 121 K.M. Macdonald, The Sociology of the Professions (1995). 122 P. Miller and N. Rose, Governing the Present (2008); N. Rose, Powers of Freedom: Reframing Political Thought (1999). 123 P.J. Baylis, `Social Work's Protracted Identity Crisis' (2004) 11 Psychoanalytic Social Work, 55; Mawby and Worrall, op. cit., n. 110. 124 Department for Communities and Local Government, op. cit., n. 81. 125 CIH, op. cit., n. 81. any, shared ethical principles should underlie their daily decisions. 126 The existence of such a code would not guarantee adherence. However, its production would engender a debate about what ASB units are for and would act as a source to which not only practitioners, but also other agencies, victims, and perpetrators could rely. 127 For politicians of both the centre left and centre right, the appeal of governance through ASB is that it involves a pragmatic multi-agency approach to behavioural management within a populist discourse of zero tolerance of incivilities and criminal behaviour. For social housing providers, establishing and maintaining an ASB unit provides a method for demonstrating to their communities, partner agencies, and government that they are significant players in the populist behavioural management field. ASB units provide an embodiment of Simon's governance through crime thesis, where legitimacy and support (including financial assistance) is more readily maintained by those offering solutions to crime and disorder than those offering solutions to problems couched within a welfarist discourse. 128 This may help to shield units from the worst of the cuts. It is likely, however, that in these austere times teams will need to rely on their versatility and creativity to ensure their survival. If these units do survive, the behaviour they will be dealing with and how they will be doing so is likely to continue to adapt and will serve as a good barometer of the direction of the national discourse on crime, disorder, and community well-being. 28 126 D. Dixon, `The Normative Structure of Policing' in A Culture of Corruption: Changing an Australian Police Service, ed. D. Dixon (1999) 69±97; J.H. Kultgen, Ethics and Professionalism (1988). 127 D. Dixon, `Legal Regulation and Policing Practice' (1992) 1 Social and Legal Studies 515; L. Meskell and P. Pels, `Introduction: Embedding Ethics' in Embedding Ethics, eds. L. Meskell and P. Pels (2005) 1±28. 128 J. Simon, Governing Through Crime: How the War on Crime Transformed American Democracy and Created a Culture of Fear (2007). 
work_frzdscigdvbjdodgkiedh2etkm	----	15.1 Editorial 181 MH NATURE | VOL 427 | 15 JANUARY 2004 | www.nature.com/nature 181 In praise of immigration The United States is a nation of immigrants — and nowhere more so than in the lab. Yet officials of the federal government don’t seem to recognize that the country’s scientific strength depends in large part on foreign talent. 15 January 2004 Volume 427 Issue no 6971 A fter the atrocities of 11 September 2001, it was inevitable that the US government would tighten up its procedures for letting foreign nationals into the country. For the Department of State and consulates abroad, security is now the watchword. No one disputes the need to exclude potential terrorists, but the resulting controls on immigration have become an unwieldy mess, arbitrarily ensnaring individuals who would previously have been welcomed into the country with open arms. Visiting scientists, perhaps more than any other group, have experienced these policies first-hand — leading to missed conferences, lost lab time and delayed graduations for large numbers of scientists and students. Some of the affected individuals have been through a nightmarish experience, their careers thrown seriously off track. But as Nature’s investigation into the issue reveals, the greatest damage may ulti- mately be suffered by the US scientific enterprise (see page 190). If the world’s brightest young scientists turn instead to other academic destinations, the quality of research in US labs will suffer. You might expect to find science-oriented officials within the federal government speaking up to stress the important contribution made by foreign-born scientists, many of whom take up permanent residence in the United States. But in the most part, they have failed to do so. Even Elias Zerhouni, the Algerian-born director of the National Institutes of Health, has had little to say in public on the issue. Some comments by senior officials have added to the impression that foreign scientists aren’t valued. At a press conference in Novem- ber on the status of the US scientific workforce, for instance, Rita Colwell, director of the National Science Foundation, told reporters: “We must end our addictive dependence on foreign workers.” Her words were intended to bolster support for US science education, but they expose a widely held view that researchers from abroad are a stopgap that should be replaced by home-grown talent. History teaches us a different lesson. The first scientific Nobel prize won by the United States went in 1907 to Albert Michelson, a Prussian-born physicist whose measurement of the velocity of light inspired Einstein’s theory of relativity. Since then, immigrant scientists have accounted for more than a quarter of the United States’ Nobels in physics, chemistry and medicine. These scientists’ journeys from their homelands to the United States were not simply about securing superior funding and laboratory equipment. Many fled discrimination, war and genocide. Others were politically active in countries where dissenters were imprisoned or executed. All saw the United States as a land of freedom and opportunity. The experiences of foreign scientists currently attempting to enter the United States are eroding that perception. Visiting scientists are increasingly finding themselves in situations that are stressful or humiliating. Even more worrying are reports of hate crimes commit- ted against Iranian and Arab students. In contrast, over the past decade, other Western nations have worked to make their societies more receptive to talented foreigners by loosening immigration laws for technical workers and trying to combat prejudice in their societies. In the twenty-first century, the United States is just one of many destinations. The US scientific leaders who recognize the important contribu- tion made by foreign scientists are split into two camps. The optimists point out that about 40% of the world’s research dollars are spent inside US laboratories. A few visa delays will do little to change that scientific hegemony, they argue. But the pessimists fear that the world’s rising scientific stars are already starting to turn their backs on the United States. Even a superpower can’t afford to be complacent, they warn. Whoever is right, federal government officials must not seem indifferent to the plight of foreign scientists. They need to take measures to ensure that these valuable assets are treated with dignity and made to feel welcome. ■ A t first glance, it seems to render obsolete the armies of post- grads and postdocs employed in the world’s molecular- genetics laboratories. In this week’s issue (see page 247), a British team unveils an automated system that “originates hypoth- eses to explain observations, devises experiments to test these hypotheses, physically runs the experiments using a laboratory robot, interprets the results to falsify hypotheses inconsistent with the data, and then repeats the cycle”. What’s more, when set loose on experiments to investigate the genetic control of important metabolic pathways in yeast, it performs more cost effectively than scientifically educated human volunteers. The Robot Scientist seems to promise a future of successfully completed research projects, untouched by human mind. Neo-luddites must be unsure whether to curse or celebrate. On one hand, they are obliged to condemn another technology that seems to threaten established patterns of employment. But they may also be glad to see the scientific and technological élite seemingly hoist with its own petard. The truth is rather different. The Robot Scientist does represent an important step forward, but does not spell the end for its human counterpart. The deductive steps required to design experiments for functional-genomic analyses are particularly amenable to solution by computer algorithms. And this is a field in which the deluge of data requiring explanation exceeds researchers’ capacity to cope. The team behind the Robot Scientist argues that such automation “frees scientists to make the high-level creative leaps at which they excel”. Therein lies the challenge. Some lab heads still treat postgrads and postdocs as a cheap source of menial labour, rather than educat- ing them to become tomorrow’s creative research leaders. We can only hope that the Robot Scientist helps to change such attitudes. ■ Don’t fear the Robot Scientist Contrary to first impressions, an automated system that designs its own experiments will benefit young molecular geneticists. © 2004 Nature Publishing Group Don't fear the Robot Scientist 
work_fs73tgxzqrburln2mtnqqxc3ou	----	Violence Against Immigrant Youth in Canada: Why More Research Is Needed Invited Commentary | Public Health Violence Against Immigrant Youth in Canada Why More Research Is Needed Avanti Adhia, ScD; Amiya Bhatia, ScD, MPH; Elizabeth Dawson-Hahn, MD, MPH Immigrant youth are at high risk of experiencing discrimination, harassment, aggression, physical violence, and sexual violence in their destination country.1 These risks affect youth who are refugees or asylum seekers as well as those who experience voluntary or planned migration. The potential risk for harm after immigration demonstrates a clear need for research to inform prevention and intervention efforts to protect the safety and security of immigrant youth. In this context, the study by Saunders and colleagues2 on the risk of experiencing violent injury among immigrant and refugee youth in Canada is timely and important. Canada is a leader in the Americas in accepting immigrant families, and immigrants to Canada constitute nearly one-quarter of the population.3 The study by Saunders et al2 included nearly 23 million person-years for youth aged 10 to 24 years between 2008 and 2016 and found that rates of violent injuries—those requiring acute care (ie, an emergency department visit or hospitalization) or resulting in death—to be 51% lower among immigrant youth compared with Canadian-born youth after adjusting for age, sex, neighborhood income, and rurality.2 Rates of injuries were particularly low among immigrants from South and East Asia, Canada’s largest intake countries. Saunders et al2 explain that Canada accepts a relatively high proportion of immigrants in socioeconomic classes that place them at lower risk of experiencing violence. Additionally, Saunders et al2 posit that other factors, such as the type of social support, family cohesion, and living in communities with other immigrants, may be protective against experiencing violence among immigrant youth.4 However, this study found that refugee status was associated with higher risk of experiencing violent injuries compared with nonrefugee status, while both groups had lower rates of assault than nonimmigrants. This difference in risk may reflect a difference between the experience of arriving in Canada following forced displacement compared with voluntary and planned migration. In addition, refugee and immigrant groups may experience differential rates of xenophobia, discrimination, and harassment. Somali youth were the only immigrant youth who experienced higher rates of violent injuries compared with nonimmigrants. This finding amplifies recent efforts by community-led organizations, such as Youth LEAPS5 in Toronto, Ontario, to raise awareness and address the large burden of violence and homicide—often associated with racism and Islamophobia— that Somali youth face. For example, although Somali people constitute 1% of the population, in 2014, 16% of homicide victims in Toronto were Somali. The ability of Saunders et al2 to link health and administrative data sets (ie, health insurance registry, emergency department visits, hospitalizations, deaths, residence information, and immigration status) fills an important gap in scholarship on violence against immigrant youth. The size of the study sample allowed the authors to evaluate the risk of experiencing violent injury at the level of country of origin. This level of granularity beyond the regional level is unique in population health and critical in understanding health disparities. In a context in which data on immigration status are often scarce, the study by Saunders et al2 provides a blueprint for other researchers on how to use health and administrative data to examine the associations of immigrant and refugee status with a variety of health outcomes. This study also draws attention to several important themes researchers of violence and immigration are grappling with: first, the importance of examining discrimination; second, who may be missing in data; and third, how sociopolitical context is associated with health outcomes. First, + Related article Author affiliations and article information are listed at the end of this article. Open Access. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the CC-BY License. JAMA Network Open. 2020;3(3):e201456. doi:10.1001/jamanetworkopen.2020.1456 (Reprinted) March 4, 2020 1/3 Downloaded From: https://jamanetwork.com/ by a Carnegie Mellon University User on 04/05/2021 https://jama.jamanetwork.com/article.aspx?doi=10.1001/jamanetworkopen.2020.0375&utm_campaign=articlePDF%26utm_medium=articlePDFlink%26utm_source=articlePDF%26utm_content=jamanetworkopen.2020.1456 https://jama.jamanetwork.com/article.aspx?doi=10.1001/jamanetworkopen.2020.0375&utm_campaign=articlePDF%26utm_medium=articlePDFlink%26utm_source=articlePDF%26utm_content=jamanetworkopen.2020.1456 https://jama.jamanetwork.com/article.aspx?doi=10.1001/jamanetworkopen.2020.0375&utm_campaign=articlePDF%26utm_medium=articlePDFlink%26utm_source=articlePDF%26utm_content=jamanetworkopen.2020.1456 while the large sample allowed the data to be evaluated to a more granular level to include country of origin for immigrant groups, it did not include race or ethnicity data. It was not possible to compare the rates of violent experiences between immigrants and nonimmigrants with the same race or ethnicity. This is especially important given that the authors found higher rates of violent injury among Somali immigrant youth than among nonimmigrant youth.2 Research to determine whether Somali immigrant youth have similar rates of experiencing violent injury compared with other individuals categorized as the same race who would have similar experiences of racism may help inform ongoing efforts to address this disparity in experiencing violent injury. Second, as Saunders et al2 note, there were important exclusions in the data: individuals who were included were only those with the most severe violent injuries who reached a hospital and not those who experienced bullying or discrimination, which are also generally acknowledged as harmful to health. Immigration status was only available for permanent residents, so the sample of youth did not include undocumented or temporary residents, asylum seekers, and those who had not yet obtained permanent residency. There are a number of barriers that may make immigrants less likely to seek care within the health care system, including language barriers, limited familiarity with the systems,6 or the sensitive nature of their injury (eg, intimate partner violence or child abuse). Third, research on immigrant health occurs within a sociopolitical context. In 2012, the Canadian federal government instated cuts to the Interim Federal Health Program (IFHP) limiting access to comprehensive health care for refugees and refugee claimants in Canada.7 Although some of these provisions were reinstated after a 2014 court ruling that deemed these cuts a violation of Canada’s Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the IFHP was only fully reversed in 2016 by a new administration.7 Therefore, during the study years when the IFHP was reduced, a higher proportion of refugees may have been excluded from care and would not have been included in this study. The sociopolitical context that allowed the IFHP cuts to move forward in 2012 may also have placed youth at increased risk of violent injury. This large study of youth in Ontario, Canada,2 is important foundational work for understanding the association of immigration status and with experiencing violent injury. It will be critical for future studies in the field to examine the associations of social exclusion, racism, xenophobia, Islamophobia, and other forms of discrimination with risk of experiencing violent injury. Elucidating the role of the ex- planatory factors that Saunders et al2 posit may be protective (ie, education level, language proficiency, trauma history, social support, and family cohesion) will require new approaches to data and measure- ment. Future studies should also evaluate specificity in the types of violence experienced by youth (eg, child abuse, hate crimes, or youth, intimate partner, gang, or bystander violence). Families and commu- nities affected by violence should inform research approaches via community-based participatory re- search, which could both generate critical insights and further inform efforts to use and improve popu- lation data. Additionally, research on how the sociopolitical determinants of health can shape the immi- grant experience will be particularly important to inform policy and hold governments accountable for their responsibility in protecting immigrant health and rights. ARTICLE INFORMATION Published: March 4, 2020. doi:10.1001/jamanetworkopen.2020.1456 Open Access: This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the CC-BY License. © 2020 Adhia A et al. JAMA Network Open. Corresponding Author: Avanti Adhia, ScD, Harborview Injury Prevention and Research Center, University of Washington, Box 359960, 325 Ninth Ave, Seattle, WA 98104 (aadhia@uw.edu). Author Affiliations: Harborview Injury Prevention and Research Center, University of Washington, Seattle (Adhia); Department of Pediatrics, University of Washington, Seattle (Adhia, Dawson-Hahn); Department of Global Health and Development, London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, London, United Kingdom (Bhatia); Center for Child Health, Behavior and Development, Seattle Children’s Research Institute, Seattle, Washington (Dawson-Hahn). JAMA Network Open | Public Health Violence Against Immigrant Youth in Canada JAMA Network Open. 2020;3(3):e201456. doi:10.1001/jamanetworkopen.2020.1456 (Reprinted) March 4, 2020 2/3 Downloaded From: https://jamanetwork.com/ by a Carnegie Mellon University User on 04/05/2021 https://jama.jamanetwork.com/article.aspx?doi=10.1001/jamanetworkopen.2020.1456&utm_campaign=articlePDF%26utm_medium=articlePDFlink%26utm_source=articlePDF%26utm_content=jamanetworkopen.2020.1456 https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jamanetworkopen/pages/instructions-for-authors#SecOpenAccess/?utm_campaign=articlePDF%26utm_medium=articlePDFlink%26utm_source=articlePDF%26utm_content=jamanetworkopen.2020.1456 mailto:aadhia@uw.edu https://jama.jamanetwork.com/article.aspx?doi=10.1001/jamanetworkopen.2020.0375&utm_campaign=articlePDF%26utm_medium=articlePDFlink%26utm_source=articlePDF%26utm_content=jamanetworkopen.2020.1456 https://jama.jamanetwork.com/article.aspx?doi=10.1001/jamanetworkopen.2020.0375&utm_campaign=articlePDF%26utm_medium=articlePDFlink%26utm_source=articlePDF%26utm_content=jamanetworkopen.2020.1456 Conflict of Interest Disclosures: None reported. REFERENCES 1. Pottie K, Dahal G, Georgiades K, Premji K, Hassan G. Do first generation immigrant adolescents face higher rates of bullying, violence and suicidal behaviours than do third generation and native born? J Immigr Minor Health. 2015;17(5):1557-1566. doi:10.1007/s10903-014-0108-6 2. Saunders NR, Guan J, Macpherson A, Lu H, Guttman A. Association of immigrant and refugee status with risk factors for exposure to violent assault among youths and young adults in Canada. JAMA Netw Open. 2020;3(3); e200375. doi:10.1001/jamanetworkopen.2020.0375 3. Statistics Canada. Immigration and ethnocultural diversity highlight tables. Accessed January 31, 2020. https:// www12.statcan.gc.ca/census-recensement/2016/dp-pd/hlt-fst/imm/Table.cfm?Lang=E&T=11&Geo=00 4. Salehi R. Intersection of health, immigration, and youth: a systematic literature review. J Immigr Minor Health. 2010;12(5):788-797. doi:10.1007/s10903-009-9247-6 5. Youth LEAPS. Another day, another Janazah: an investigation into violence, homicide and Somali-Canadian youth in Ontario. Accessed January 31, 2020. https://static1.squarespace.com/static/ 56103920e4b0e1ea752b4c0b/t/5adfc485352f536ee589bd97/1524614283695/Another+Day_working_D3+% 281%29.pdf 6. Yun K, Paul P, Subedi P, Kuikel L, Nguyen GT, Barg FK. Help-seeking behavior and health care navigation by Bhutanese refugees. J Community Health. 2016;41(3):526-534. doi:10.1007/s10900-015-0126-x 7. Antonipillai V, Baumann A, Hunter A, Wahoush O, O’Shea T. Health inequity and “restoring fairness” through the Canadian refugee health policy reforms: a literature review. J Immigr Minor Health. 2018;20(1):203-213. doi:10. 1007/s10903-016-0486-z JAMA Network Open | Public Health Violence Against Immigrant Youth in Canada JAMA Network Open. 2020;3(3):e201456. doi:10.1001/jamanetworkopen.2020.1456 (Reprinted) March 4, 2020 3/3 Downloaded From: https://jamanetwork.com/ by a Carnegie Mellon University User on 04/05/2021 https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10903-014-0108-6 https://jama.jamanetwork.com/article.aspx?doi=10.1001/jamanetworkopen.2020.0375&utm_campaign=articlePDF%26utm_medium=articlePDFlink%26utm_source=articlePDF%26utm_content=jamanetworkopen.2020.1456 https://www12.statcan.gc.ca/census-recensement/2016/dp-pd/hlt-fst/imm/Table.cfm?Lang=E&T=11&Geo=00 https://www12.statcan.gc.ca/census-recensement/2016/dp-pd/hlt-fst/imm/Table.cfm?Lang=E&T=11&Geo=00 https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10903-009-9247-6 https://static1.squarespace.com/static/56103920e4b0e1ea752b4c0b/t/5adfc485352f536ee589bd97/1524614283695/Another+Day_working_D3+%281%29.pdf https://static1.squarespace.com/static/56103920e4b0e1ea752b4c0b/t/5adfc485352f536ee589bd97/1524614283695/Another+Day_working_D3+%281%29.pdf https://static1.squarespace.com/static/56103920e4b0e1ea752b4c0b/t/5adfc485352f536ee589bd97/1524614283695/Another+Day_working_D3+%281%29.pdf https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10900-015-0126-x https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10903-016-0486-z https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10903-016-0486-z 
work_fuc3abk3l5cefbt67merr35dny	----	NimbusRomNo9L-Regu This is an Open Access document downloaded from ORCA, Cardiff University's institutional repository: http://orca.cf.ac.uk/99828/ This is the author’s version of a work that was submitted to / accepted for publication. Citation for final published version: Roberts, Colin, Innes, Martin, Preece, Alun and Rogers, David 2018. After Woolwich: analyzing open source communications to understand the interactive and multi-polar dynamics of the arc of conflict. British Journal of Criminology 58 (2) , pp. 434-454. 10.1093/bjc/azx024 file Publishers page: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/bjc/azx024 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/bjc/azx024> Please note: Changes made as a result of publishing processes such as copy-editing, formatting and page numbers may not be reflected in this version. For the definitive version of this publication, please refer to the published source. You are advised to consult the publisher’s version if you wish to cite this paper. This version is being made available in accordance with publisher policies. See http://orca.cf.ac.uk/policies.html for usage policies. Copyright and moral rights for publications made available in ORCA are retained by the copyright holders. © The Author 2017. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Centre for Crime and Justice Studies (ISTD). All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com AFTER WOOLWICH: ANALYZING OPEN SOURCE COMMUNICATIONS TO UNDERSTAND THE INTERACTIVE AND MULTI-POLAR DYNAMICS OF THE ARC OF CONFLICT Colin Roberts*, Martin Innes, Alun Preece and David Rogers This article is based upon a case study of the 2013 murder of Fusilier Lee Rigby in Woolwich, London. It shows how analysis of open source communications data collected via social media plat- forms can illuminate the inter- and intra-community conlict dynamics arising in the aftermath of such events. Framed by Collins’ recent theoretical work on the escalatory and de-escalatory forces in conlict situations, the empirical analysis brings to the fore some new insights about the ‘arc of conlict’. These frame a conceptual accent upon the interactive sequences of mobilization and counter-mobilization occurring in the moves towards group-based conlicts, and the importance of understanding the multi-polar nature of these involvements. Key words: conlict dynamics, Lee Rigby, terrorism, social reaction, polarization Introduction In his 2011 presidential address to the American Sociological Association, Randall Collins theorized the time dynamics of conlict, and the causes and consequences of violence escalation and de-escalation. Developing themes from his previous work on the rituals and routines of violence (Collins 2008), Collins connects to a long-standing sociological interest in explaining and accounting for conlict. This ranges from the seminal contribution of Coser (1956), stretching back to the foundational statements of Simmel (1922/1955). Collins’ particular contribution to this tradition is a proposition that conlicts progress through three principal temporal phases: explosion, plateau and dissipation. He posits that irrespective of the scale of conlict, there is a generaliz- able process to how violence between engaged actors and groups emerges, unfolds and subsides. Albeit he does not describe it in such terms, it is a model suggesting a pat- terned ‘arc of conlict’. In formulating his ideas, Collins’ drew upon a diverse empirical base from a range of fairly orthodox research methodologies. What he was not in a position to do how- ever, was to be informed by the increasing number of innovative approaches using analyses of open source communications data to trace how particular conlicts adapt and change with the passing of time. For instance, Procter et al. (2013) examined the role that social media played in the social organization of the London riots in 2011. They highlight how Blackberry Messenger in particular facilitated a range of illegal activities. Collectively these studies (see for example Cassa et al. 2013; Brym et al. 2014; LeFebrve and Armstrong 2016), suggest analysis of data derived from social media can afford unique insights into social responses and reactions to high proile crime events in particular. *Colin Roberts, Martin Innes, Universities Police Science Institute, Cardiff University Crime and Security Institute, Cardiff, UK; robertsc10@cardiff.ac.uk; Alun Preece, David Rogers, Cardiff University Crime and Security Institute, Cardiff, UK. doi:10.1093/bjc/azx024 BRIT. J. CRIMINOL Page 1 of 21 mailto:robertsc10@cardiff.ac.uk?subject= One such event that has been subject to relatively intensive investigation is the mur- der of Lee Rigby in Woolwich, London in 2013. There are now ive signiicant studies of this incident. The most detailed of these is the report of the Home Affairs Select Committee enquiry, that focused in particular upon the pre-crime activities of the two suspects, and their radicalization. Relatively quickly after the crime, the think- tank Demos published a report incorporating Twitter data collected following the murder, to argue that police needed enhanced capacity and capability to monitor and analyze social media platforms. Williams and Burnap (2015) focus upon how terrorist attacks such as this, occasion forms of digital cyber-hate. McEnery et al. (2015) use the same case to explore interactions between National Press and social media, inding the former play an important role in steering and guiding the content of the latter in the aftermaths of atrocity events. Most recently, Innes et  al. (2016) have conducted a detailed analysis of social media data collected in the 12 months following the murder of Fusilier Rigby, to distil a new framework for analyzing processes of social reaction. Although differently oriented and positioned, these studies all use high resolution empirical evidence to warrant their claims through collecting and analyzing social communications from a range of social media platforms. At a ‘deeper’ more theoretical level, several recent Criminologically inlected studies have attended to how the disper- sal of social media have altered our ways of knowing about crime, disorder and conlict. Greer and McLaughlin (2011) and Loader and Mulcahy (2003) for example, establish how the ‘police voice’ has undergone a diminution in terms of its previous authoritative status in the ‘hierarchy of credibility’ of media commentating on criminal justice mat- ters. Developing this line of thinking and resonating strongly with the interests of this article, Greer and McLaughlin’s (2010) analysis of the G20 demonstrations in London captures how the police’s role as ‘primary deiners’ in framing the meaning and causes of public order conlicts has been signiicantly reduced by ‘citizen journalists’ using social media platforms to report their alternative interpretations that manifestly inlu- ence the resulting public narratives. For Cottle (2008), the adoption of these technolo- gies is part of how the new media ecology has altered the opportunity structures for dissent and protest, and the ways that demonstrations ‘demonstrate’ their relevance and impact to foster wider interest and mobilization. Informed by the indings of this rapidly evolving literature on the role of digital social communications data in contemporary protest and conlict situations, it is possible to start to construct a preliminary conceptual map, pivoting around a distinction between online and ofline communications and their consequences. As Table  1 depicts, this identiies four key modes of contemporary conlict where digital communications play an important role: Table 1 Conceptualising the digital in conlict Online interactions and communications Online effects and consequences Ofline interactions and communications Cyber conlicts Digitally performed conlicts Ofline effects and consequences Digitally enabled conlict episodes Orthodox conlicts ROBERTS ET AL. Page 2 of 21 Cast in this way, we can differentiate between: digitally dependent conlicts where both their causes and consequences occur in digital spaces (cyber conlicts); and those that are wholly unmediated (orthodox conlicts). For the purposes of this arti- cle however, of more interest are conlicts integrating an interaction between the ofline and online dimensions of the social world. ‘Digitally performed conlicts’ can be understood as those where tensions in ofline relationships present and are manifested in virtual conlict episodes.1 Contrastingly, there are physical conlicts taking place ‘in the real world’, but where their social organization occurs via digital communications. Framed by this analysis, this article focuses upon illuminating the dynamics and mechanics of ‘digitally performed’ and ‘digitally enabled’ conlicts. In so doing, it develops two principal conceptual claims informed by the empirical materials collected via social media in the days, weeks and months following the Lee Rigby murder. The irst of these is based upon analysis of these open source communica- tions data to systematically test the key tenets of Collins’ theory. This relects how such data provide a fairly unique, ‘high resolution’ digital documentary record of how processes of reaction took place, and who did what to whom and why. It is found that whilst the broad frame that Collins sets out is supported, it can be reined and nuanced in several important ways by exposing it to these kinds of empirical resources. In so doing, the analysis speaks to Jock Young’s long-standing admoni- tion to Criminology that it should attend more closely to patterns of social reaction, outwith its more established concerns with processes of moral panic (McLaughlin 2014). The second claim concerns how elaborating and extending Collins’ ideas surfaces the ways that, although the deinition of the situation for the Rigby murder pivoted around a public narrative of an Islamist terrorist act, the conlicts occurring in its after- math involved a diverse range of actors and had little to do with Islamist extremism. This steers our attention to how these new kinds of social data afford ine-grained views of social issues and problems that render hitherto almost imperceptible facets of social life more visible. It is found that contemporary conlicts of this kind are not bi-polar contests between two groups, but rather involve a complex of shifting and adapting ideological positions and multiple groups. Accordingly, we need more sophisticated theoretical models for understanding conlict dynamics in such situations. The article seeks to illuminate and accent an interactive and multi-polar conception of conlict dynamics, following high proile crime and terrorist attacks. The interactive dimension is especially important in capturing the ways that a conlict emerges as an outcome of a choreographed sequence of moves and counter-moves performed by a number of situ- ated actors. The next section lays out the research design and how the data were collected, pro- cessed and analyzed. This is followed by an empirically led exploration of the crime’s initial reporting on social media, and how a particular deinition of the situation was proposed and applied, and the consequences lowing from this. The unique quality afforded by the data is that previously public deinitions of troubling and problem- atic events have typically been studied once they are relatively settled and authorized. Instead, here we can observe the act of deining as an emergent process that is actively 1We deploy the notion of performance here in its dramaturgic sense (Goffman 1959). AFTER WOOLWICH: ANALYZING OPEN SOURCE COMMUNICATIONS Page 3 of 21 negotiated, queried and contested. This highlights how public sense-making under conditions of uncertainty, where it is not entirely clear what has happened, are some- what confused and chaotic. Having considered this issue, the analytic focus switches to providing a detailed account of how violent conlict between two polarized ideological groups arose, and then how it spread and developed. Towards the end of this analysis, which forms the main body of the article, some attention is given to the role played by late-joiners to the conlict and what their intervention did to the social dynamics. The concluding section distils a model informed by this analysis, premised upon accenting the interactive and multi-polar nature of contemporary conlicts with a digital component. Research Design, Data and Method The dataset informing this analysis comprises a total of 35 million data points collected between May 2013 and February 2014, from multiple social media platforms, but mostly Twitter. Initial collection started by chance when the authors were working in South London testing an experimental social media data-mining software program called ‘Sentinel’, the development of which was being funded by a European Commission pro- ject. The software was collecting data when initial social media posts appeared about a signiicant incident occurring in Woolwich. A decision was taken to try and keep the collector running, albeit it had never been run ‘at scale’ before. Collection continued until the conclusion of the suspects’ criminal trial. The research-grade platform used to collect and analyze the data possesses much of the functionality available in similar commercial packages. However, a key feature of Sentinel is it’s design as a ‘glass’ rather than ‘black box’. The purpose being to enable transparency and hence allow for the investigation of how decisions taken to alter data collection or processing protocols shape and guide resulting materials and insights. Thereby engaging with an issue of increasing import about the extent to which deliberately obscured algorithms are subtly and imperceptibly crafting what is rendered visible and invisible, and thus ordering what constitutes knowledge about the social world (Pasquale 2014; Amoore and Piotukh 2015). Sentinel’s data collection plugs directly into social media feeds through free API keys. For this study, this included Twitter and a series of blogs. The stream of data accessed is iltered by a series of ‘channels’ each comprising up to 400 linked search terms cover- ing relevant people, places problems and issues. In this study, the breaking events were picked up on the basis of a pre-built ontology which was rapidly reined to focus upon key terms associated with the speciics of the case including ‘Woolwich’ and ‘soldier’. As more details became available, a second ‘channel’ was brought online focusing upon the activities of the English Defence League (EDL), as it quickly became clear they were key actors in the unfolding narrative. Then a third channel with a lot more speciic situ- ational detail was developed and deployed by the end of the second day—which we label the ‘Rigby’ channel, relecting how details about the victim were a key feature. Figure 1 plots the volume of social media data collected via these channels in relation to the murder of Lee Rigby over a 6-month period. Plotted on the graph are some of the key events that occurred following the initial incident in order that the association between communication volumes and signiicant developments can be ascertained. Many of these relate to speciic ‘conlict episodes’ referred to in subsequent sections of this article. ROBERTS ET AL. Page 4 of 21 It can be observed that there was a massive spike in the volume of communications trafic on the day of the murder. This fell back, albeit remaining at a comparatively high level for a couple of weeks. Subsequently, there was a progressive diminishing in levels of interest, although there were signiicant increases in social media communications relating to several of the key episodes. An interesting question posed by such volumes of data concerns is whether they are an artifact of public interest, or potentially driven by the online activities of a smaller number of highly active and intensively engaged groups? To investigate this, an attempt was made to attribute messages to individual accounts for the irst seven days following the crime. These data are displayed in Figure 2 below, according to whether they were detected using the Woolwich, EDL or Rigby channels. This approach to ‘cutting into’ the data reveals several insights. After the irst 2 days there was a marked decrease in the number of individual social media users engaging in online interactions around the crime. At the same time, there are indications that the activities of the EDL became relatively more important in terms of those people who did remain engaged. This is consistent with indings from additional analysis con- ducted that suggests that, as time passed, levels of participation and engagement from the general public waned. However, there was a small core of individuals who remained vociferously and actively engaged in discussing events relating to the Rigby murder. Over the irst week for example, one individual on the far-right2 made nearly one thou- sand original contributions via their social media accounts. Splitting the data into three ‘streams’: ‘Woolwich’; ‘Rigby’ and ‘EDL, intimates aspects of how the public narrative of the incident evolved over time. Initial public interest on social media gravitated around the place where the crime happened— Woolwich—in the absence of any more detailed information. Once the victim’s iden- tity was publicized on the second day, then ‘Rigby’ became a more important signiier for the story and a focal point for the organization of the public conversation. However, this ebbed away quite quickly, re-emerging at key points, such as around the funeral (Figure 1). Contrastingly however, the ‘EDL Channel’ demonstrates a more sustained level of interest and activity according to the graph. This channel initially picked up in terms of the volume of activity around 4  hours after the murder, as the EDL leadership sought to mobilize their members, whilst other political groupings opposing their views engaged in a counter-mobilization effort. These interactive dynamics continued for several weeks, as an artifact of how the EDL membership sought to exploit the Rigby case as a ‘condensing symbol’ via which to project their ideological agenda.3 A  close reading of the literature on the EDL indicates that, while many afiliating with the movement dispute that it is a ‘Far Right’ political group, most would accept it advo- cates a core set of values opposed to ‘the Islamiication of Britain’, and a perceived failure of the ‘liberal elite’ to respond effectively to a looming threat posed by ‘militant Islam’ (Pilkington 2016; Busher 2016; Copsey 2010, 2016; Jackson and Feldman 2011; Garland and Treadwell 2010). The murder of Lee Rigby was thus constructed as a direct expression of the core threat central to their narrative, and around which mobilization was essential. Importantly for understanding the dynamics of conlict—those on the 2As deduced by the content of the posts made 3The concept of a ‘condensing symbol’ is Edelman’s (1985). AFTER WOOLWICH: ANALYZING OPEN SOURCE COMMUNICATIONS Page 5 of 21 political Left opposed to the EDL, label it ‘racist and facist’(Copsey 2016).4 This process of oppositional labelling keying into an established ‘anti-fascist’ identity narrative cir- culating amongst a diverse coalition of left-wing groups, which recursively became an important rallying point for their own counter-mobilization efforts. Thus the incident energized two groups already strongly positioned in opposition to each other. While much of the literature on these groups traces their history and key internal develop- ments, what we explore here is how a sense of other, being an opposition and within a conlict, functions as a crucible for their respective processes of development. Modes of analysis As implied by the above, Sentinel’s operationalization as a research tool occurred in two modes. There was a dynamic ‘fast time’ mode where, as the case developed over the irst few days, the stream of text and image data was being monitored and queried Fig 1 Data volumes timeline and key events. 4Hope Not Hate http://www.hopenothate.org.uk/hate-groups/edl/ for example, deine the EDL as a ‘racist organisa- tion’, while Unite Against Facism (UAF) call it a ‘racist and facist’ group http://uaf.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/ EDLfactsheet2.pdf. Fig 2 Total number of individual twitter users per channel, per day. ROBERTS ET AL. Page 6 of 21 http://www.hopenothate.org.uk/hate-groups/edl/ http://uaf.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/EDLfactsheet2.pdf http://uaf.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/EDLfactsheet2.pdf in ‘real-time’ by researchers to obtain a sense of what was happening, with interesting occurrences, developments and accounts being noted. Importantly, whilst this fast-time analysis was ongoing, the program was also acting like a digital recorder, storing rel- evant material for a slower-time, more deliberative, analysis. Full analysis of the data commenced by developing a quantitative overview across the event as a whole and then, on the basis of the fast-time analysis and other sources (largely broadcast media and press accounts) identifying key ‘sub-events’ in the case narrative and connecting these to the social media timeline (as plotted on Figure  1 above). Data for more detailed coding were then sampled at points where there were signiicant ‘spikes’ in the volume of social media data, across the 12-month period cov- ered. The focus here was on the build up to and the period of high volume trafic. These periods were divided into 3-hours units and further sub-divided into 15-min sub- units, with the data relating to these times being screened for interest and relevance. This involved researchers reading and ‘screening’ around 500,000 Tweets in total and differentiating those that helped understand the story of the sub-event in question, or appeared to relate to the conceptual themes emerging to orient the study overall. From the resulting dataset, around 17,000 messages were subject to more detailed axial coding (Strauss and Corbin 1988) including: whether the content was extremist, expressing far-right/far left/Islamist views; the presence of emotional attributes includ- ing fear, anger, shock, revulsion; and whether it could be identiied with a particular group. This qualitative analysis was predicated upon an understanding that these data were derived from a new kind of public space where communicative actions are being performed by their authors for an imagined audience, who respond and react to the content that is both intentionally and unintentionally transmitted. This amounts to a ‘digital dramaturgics’ that extends and elaborates the lines of enquiry so fruitfully established by Goffman (1959). Cast in this fashion, the data are understood as inluenc- ers and persuaders that collectively narrate a story of an event, and the separate episodes and encounters that comprise it, as well as how these were interpreted and reacted to. Coherent with this digital dramaturgical frame, an additional 2000 tweets were sub- ject to even more detailed coding to obtain insights into the complex interactional dynamics observed taking place between different ideological groups and positions. By reading large volumes of material, the researchers were able to detect patterns in the material which were coded and subsequently used to derive conceptual categories. One unanticipated inding from this qualitative coding was that approximately 20% of the Twitter messages that the data collection algorithms had connected to the Rigby case, actually emanated from several previous conlicts; in particular, the Boston Bombing from some months earlier. This is of considerable import for more quanti- tative analyses (such as Bartlett and Miller 2013; Williams and Burnap 2015) on the grounds that, the data they are processing may actually contain a lot of ‘noise’, includ- ing communications relating to other similar but distinct events, thereby decreasing the accuracy of the statistical models being developed. In an effort to try and validate aspects of the ‘work’ being performed by social media communications, a request was made and accepted to obtain recorded hate crime data from the Metropolitan Police Service lead on Hate Crime.5 5We wish to record our thanks to the Metropolitan Police for their cooperation. These data were provided a parallel dataset to assess associations between acts of cyber-hate and off-line violence. AFTER WOOLWICH: ANALYZING OPEN SOURCE COMMUNICATIONS Page 7 of 21 A Murder in Woolwich Shortly after 14.00, on the 22nd May 2013, the Metropolitan Police received a 999 call from a member of the public about a violent incident in Woolwich, London. Armed oficers attended and shot two suspects in the street. Lying in the road was the body of Fusilier Lee Rigby who had been subject to an attempted beheading in what was later identiied as an Islamist Extremist terrorist attack. By 21:00 that night, members of the EDL were demonstrating on the streets of Woolwich throwing bottles and stones at police. Over the next 2 weeks, mosques were attacked and those perceived to be Muslims received insults and were subject to physical attack in the street. Additionally, the Al-Rahma Islamic Centre in Muswell Hill, London, was burnt to the ground on 5 June, the walls having been sprayed with EDL grafiti. In Walsall, Wolverhampton and then Tipton, on the 12 July, explosive devices were detonated outside mosques, with the latter one being packed with nails. Pavlo Lapshyn, a white supremacist Ukrainian student, was later charged with those offences, and with stabbing to death an elderly Muslim man in Birmingham near the Green Lane Mosque. Reprising some of the material displayed previously in Figure 1, there is a clear impli- cation that the temporal aspects of the conlict episodes following Lee Rigby’s death are both coherent with aspects of Collins’ (2012) model, but also nuance and reine some of its principal features. Consistent with Collins’ account, there is a clear and obvious ‘explosion’ phase in terms of the amount of data pertaining to the incident. It then plateaus, over an extended period of decline. However, during this phase there were notable ‘surges’ in the material circulating on social media relating to the crime. These appear to be associated with several secondary conlict episodes that occurred— often between the EDL and groups ideologically opposed to them. There was also an ‘upswing’ in communications trafic around the funeral of Lee Rigby. This suggests an opportunity to reine aspects of Collins’ basic model in a number of important respects. Deining the Situation and its Consequences A key factor identiied by the analysis is how the process of deining the situation was a propellant towards conlict. Sociologists, especially those afiliating with the symbolic interactionist tradition, have long demonstrated an interest in how social situations are collectively deined and the consequences that low from these deining actions. The data informing this study illuminates, in ine-grained detail, how the collective work of deining unfolds. For what emerges is a picture of a complex and chaotic process of interactive sense-making where observations are reported, contests over meaning played out and rumours swirl into the mix. Social media played a critical role in making the general public aware that a signii- cant crime event had taken place. One member of the public present at the crime scene functioned as a ‘citizen journalist’, consistent with Greer and McLaughlin’s (2010) anal- ysis, using Twitter to make multiple contemporaneous eyewitness reports to his follow- ers about what he had seen. These were retweeted and shared in signiicant volumes, effectively setting off the ‘information explosion’ depicted in Figure  1. Thus Twitter became a key vehicle via which many people became aware of the events in Woolwich, as information was circulating well in advance of any mass media communications or oficial statements from the police. One consequence of this was that, for a couple of ROBERTS ET AL. Page 8 of 21 hours, there was uncertainty about what had actually transpired in Woolwich and what it might mean, as conveyed in the following messages: Evening Standard is saying the victim might be an army cadet, terrorist incident? (15:54) Is this some sort of terrorist attack?? #woolwich (16:22) One person’s head chopped off, is it really that big a deal? Its not a terrorist attack (16:26) Annoyed that the focus has been given a terrorist angle because a solider was attacked outside the barracks. #woolwich #propaganda (17:15) The irst two messages are clearly speculative. Indeed, they are almost seeking to con- sult the social network about what has happened. The third and fourth messages in the sequence are actively seeking to deny the possibility of a terrorist motivation. Lots of the social media trafic from around this period are in either a speculative or denial mode. A pivotal moment in deining the situation occurred just after 17.00, almost 3 hours after the killing, when London’s LBC Radio started quoting Metropolitan Police sources that they were treating the incident as a terrorist attack. This broadcast had a dramatic impact upon the social media exchanges with this updated information being shared widely. In effect, LBC functioned as a ‘credible voice’ interjecting in a nebulous context to project a more authoritative deinition of the situation: BREAKING: The Met are now treating Woolwich as a terrorist incident. (17:16) COBR A has been called to a meeting and it’s being treated as a terrorist incident #woolwich RIP Soldier (17:28) The establishment of this deinition of the situation shifted the social media discourse, with far-right and anti-muslim voices becoming far more vocal and prominent. Less than an hour after the news breaking about it being a terrorist incident, the oficial EDL account tweeted: @Oficial_EDL: ****CONFIRMED WE HAVE BEEN SUBJECT TO A TERROR ATTACK BY ISLAM, WE ARE CURRENTLY UNDER ATTACK**** (18:06) Two features of this message are important to tease out. First, there is a collectiviza- tion of the threat by invoking that it is ‘we’ who have been attacked, not just the vic- tim. Second, there is an attribution to ‘Islam’ rather than just the two suspects. Both aspects speak to the core ideology of the EDL, as described above. This was a signiicant message in shifting towards a conlict footing, that was shared on a signiicant scale. During this period around 9000 tweets per minute were being sent referencing the Rigby killing. The sheer brutality of the violence enacted on the victim provided the raw ingre- dients for launching a ‘politics of outrage’ amongst those with established far-right sympathies (Greer and McLaughlin 2011). Accordingly, as the rhetoric escalated, EDL supporters started to use Twitter and several other social media platforms to organize and mobilize. At 18.26, the next tweet broadcast an intent to protest in Woolwich: EDL leader Tommy Robinson on way to Woolwich now, Take to the streets peeps ENOUGH IS ENOUGH (18:26) EDL Twitter and Facebook accounts played an important role in the attempts to rapidly mobilize a support group to engage in ofline action. The potential for physical conlict was seeded by these online communications in a manner coherent with the concept of AFTER WOOLWICH: ANALYZING OPEN SOURCE COMMUNICATIONS Page 9 of 21 ‘digitally enabled conlict’ outlined previously. However, before investigating the efi- cacy of these moves and what happened next, it is important to understand the multiple roles and positions that were adopted as conlict dynamics were becoming established. Multi-Polar Conlicts A key axiom of conlict studies is that in conlictual situations there is a compelling ‘norm’ that few people seek to remain in conlict over an extended period (Francisco 2009). As Hardin (1995) asserts, ‘Normal life is a ierce competitor of conlict’; a senti- ment validated by our data. There are countervailing tendencies though, for as Collins (2012 p.2) notes, drawing on Coser (1956), external conlict increases group solidarity, but solidarity also induces conlict. These dynamics and the interplay between them are all present in the data inform- ing this study. Critically however, although the killing was being publicly deined as Islamist terrorism, the secondary conlicts arising in the aftermath, for the most part, did not gravitate around individuals and groups from this background. Instead, the key actors in these conlict dynamics were a coalition of groups on the far-right and far left, as well as a number of institutions. This is important inasmuch as in everyday use, the notion of conlict frequently implies a bi-directional opposition between two par- ties. The data collected for this study suggests this is an over-simplistic representation of what actually happened. Accordingly, in what follows, the accent is upon developing a ‘multi-polar’ conception of the dynamics of conlict. To enable this analysis, a sample of tweets was drawn from across the dataset, and coded according to their authors’ stance or position in the conlict and whether the content of their message was directed at any particular opponent. Based upon this, a number of key ‘acting units’ or groups within the conlict dynamics documented via social media were identiied: extremist groups—including extreme right and left wing, and anarchists; hackers and other ‘digital natives’; conspiricists; faith groups; journal- ists and media groups—the major TV and radio channels, all of the UK newspapers and a wide range of social media channels; groups deined by national identity; the police, security services and military; friends and families of the killers and deceased; campaign groups and charities; politicians and government organisations; and, other ‘spokespeople’ including celebrities, comics and academics. Many of the positions assumed and voices projected during the online response to the Rigby murder pivoted around coalitions involving multiple speciic groups. It was the leaders and supporters of the EDL and other extreme right wing organisa- tions, such as the British National Party, Casuals United, Inidels and other smaller far right groups, who sought to initiate conlict multiaxially against Muslims, their estab- lished foes in the ‘liberal elite’ and the forces of ‘cultural Marxism’ (Busher 2016). Their actions triggered a counter-mobilization effort from a coalition of anti-fascist groups including Unite Against Fascism (UAF), and allied groups, such as Blacbloc, Redbloc and the ‘hacktivist’ collective Anonymous. There is however an important and intriguing quality about how social media plays into such mobilization and counter-mobilization actions. This relates to the public nature of the communications, leading to them being used by both sides to try and motivate and organize their members. For example, in the irst tweet below, it can be observed how the English Defence League tried to mobilize their supporters and others ROBERTS ET AL. Page 10 of 21 who might afiliate with their position, to join a protest on the streets of Woolwich. This was followed shortly by their opponents re-tweeting the same text, in an attempt to inspire their own support base: EDL ARE MARCHING TOWARDS WOOLWICH AS WE SPEAK (18:32) Utterly irresponsible from @Oficial_EDL: “Tommy Robinson on way to Woolwich now, Take to the streets peeps ENOUGH IS ENOUGH (18:50) @Oficial_EDL: Message from Tommy - Feet on the streets anyone want to go to Woolwich contact him/me, he will be there around 9pm (18:59) The third message in this sequence, provides a sense of how repeated calls for support were broadcast via social media. This was a recurring pattern in the data. Social media platforms played an important role in trying to mobilize ofline protests, with the same messages and materials being re-used to occasion counter-mobilization activities. This may be an important issue in the dynamics of contemporary protest movements and warrants further investigation. Shifting from an analysis of the messengers to message contents, as noted above, 5000 Tweets from the irst week in May 2013 when conlict was especially acute were cat- egorized in terms of whether they evidenced an oppositional stance to another group, or ideological position. This analysis revealed several key patterns, that can be sum- marized as follows: • Although present, Islamist extremist messages were not large in number. When pre- sent they tended to assert negative views of ‘moderate’ Muslim communities; • Extreme right-wing communications were far more prevalent, focusing principally upon expressing negative views about mainstream Muslims, and to a lesser extent the police and other governmental agencies. • The extremist right wing communications were met with equally assertive claims from representatives of the anti-fascist coalition. There were also many negative sen- timents expressed about the police. • At this point in the arc of the conlict, journalists featured strongly in the discourse. As well as condemning extremist Islamist groups, there was quite a lot of nega- tive sentiment expressed towards Muslims more generally. This was accompanied by ‘pushback’ from Muslim representatives lamenting the tenor of the coverage by mainstream media. What can be observed from these communication patterns is how the explosion phase is driven by large numbers of ordinary people using social media to try and establish what is going on. However, their engagement with the story passes quite quickly as their interest moves on to gravitate around the next salient event, albeit they may re-engage around key secondary developments. Contrastingly, the people who stay with the story across the extended period of the ‘plateau’ tend to be aligned with political groups at opposing ends of the ideological spectrum. This picture broadly coheres with Sunstein’s (2008: 1) contention that, ‘members of a deliberating group usually end up at a more extreme position in the same general direction as their inclinations before deliberation began.’ In relation to the speciic dynamics of violent extremist radicalization, Nesser (2014) labels this ‘reciprocal radi- calistion’. However, he does not develop this concept owing to the empirical limitations AFTER WOOLWICH: ANALYZING OPEN SOURCE COMMUNICATIONS Page 11 of 21 of his methodology. The advantage of social media materials is how they both evidence and clarify the sequence of actions and reactions that take place between far right and far left groups as they seek to leverage the mobilization of group resources. Within this ‘dynamic polarisation’, we can also observe the workings of what Collins (2008) labels ‘confrontational tension and fear’. Escalation and counter escalation: polarizing solidarity groups According to Collins (2012: 2), when an atrocity is publicly labelled as an attack by one group upon another, a series of feedback loops can be activated that increase feelings of solidarity. This can happen generally, such as in America post 9/11, or it can be conined to certain previously sensitized and polarized groups in society, or both. Solidarity is nev- ertheless a weapon of conlict for Collins, rendering groups more conducive to mobilis- ing and ighting. Co-occurring with increased solidarity is enhanced sensitivity, such that groups become alert to perceived threats to their norms and boundaries. Conlict and soli- darity cause counter mobilization in opposing groups, driving the familiar spiral of con- lict escalation (Collins 2012 ibid). Drawing these strands of the analysis together, in what follows, we refer to ‘polarised solidarity groups’ to articulate how collective identity was being actively formed in opposition to an alternative political perspective and position. Interestingly, the analysis suggests that as group bonds solidify and the sense of oppo- sition becomes more acute, this folds back upon itself, inlecting the language of some participants, building tension further. A  small number of messages on social media began to actively advocate violence. This extreme language was not present in the time- line before this point: Its time we had a national shoot a paki day and have it every year at £5 a head (money to charity) cull them (18:15) I HOPE THE EDL COME AND KILL THESE WANKERS ALL OF THEM. #woolwich #EDL (18:16) #woolwich attack. This is war. First gang raping our children now beheading people on the streets of south London in broad daylight #EDL (18:18) IF AN YONE CANT GET TO WOOLWICH, PETROL BOMB YOUR NEAREST MOSQUE (EDL 18:30 Facebook and Twitter) In one sense, these messages accord with the notion of ‘digitally performed conlicts’— they are ‘acting out’ the social tensions triggered by events. However, intriguingly, there are hints of a recursive relationship at work. Analysis of the Metropolitan Police’s recorded Hate Crime data intimates that expression of these sentiments was closely temporally aligned (within a 40-min window), with the actual commission of violence against Muslims and Muslim buildings. It is suggested tentatively that this might be diagnostic. These mes- sages contain a blend of what Collins (2012) terms ‘righteous anger’ and ‘an atmosphere of sadistic gaiety’ (Horowitz 2001:2–3). For Collins (2012:5), at this ‘high point’ of polari- zation, the ‘enemy’ are cast as completely evil and deserving of what is done to them. During this time, Twitter trafic shot up to over 9000 tweets per minute, with ‘ideological partisans’ piling into the discourse on all sides. This movement in polarity was also seen on Facebook with 30,000 new likes being added to the EDL page during the evening.6 6Reported by Prof Matthew Goodwin, Nottingham University Twitter feed (@Goowin MJ) 22 May 2013. ROBERTS ET AL. Page 12 of 21 An important element of the analysis is showing that such reactions were not geo- graphically conined. By analyzing a subset of ‘geo-tagged’ tweets, it is possible to observe that positive sentiment for the anti-muslim narrative at this point in time was occurring across the country. This was quite rapidly overwhelmed by the online counter-mobilization by anti-fascist groups and the middle liberal groundswell, that ‘drowned out’ the right-wing protagonists, but there was an initial surge in positive sentiment for the far-right and their anti-Islam message. Table 2 below shows a count of geo-tagged tweets conveying support for right wing groups or ideas, coded to speciic geographic regions. Across the country, user interest built from 17:00 to 21:00 when street violence began, before tailing off. These geospatial data are only a minority of the social media communications taking place as estimates suggest only about 1% of Twitter users ‘geo-tag’ messages. Nevertheless, it provides an intriguing indicator of how a surge in expressions of sup- port for far-right racist views occurred across the country almost simultaneously. In turn, this might suggest a potential for violence in these locations. Indeed, this is what happened with violent hate crimes being reported in major towns and cities that night and for several weeks afterwards. Violence Apologies, my last tweet about the Chatham mosque was untrue but in fact it occurred on Canterbury Street in Gillingham. Oh Gillingham. (20:56) Local mosque in Braintree attacked by man with knives + incendiary device. Man arrested. No one injured. Many thx 2 police 4 swift response. (21:36) As the two messages above convey, in addition to tracking and tracing the moves and countermoves performed by different actors in the conlict, these data also enable the piecing together of an understanding of how and when violence occurred. Table 2 Geospatial distribution of geo-tagged tweets in the EDL channel AFTER WOOLWICH: ANALYZING OPEN SOURCE COMMUNICATIONS Page 13 of 21 Extending the qualitative analytic approach demonstrates how the materials col- lated via social media can be used to reconstruct, in ine-grained detail, an under- standing of how a situation of rising social tensions shifted into actual violence. The Tweets reproduced below evidence how, by monitoring EDL messages, their oppo- nents were also seeking to counter-mobilize their support to confront the far-right groups: URGENT: reports (unconirmed) EDL gathering in Wetherspoons in Woolwich #Antifa (21:02) Have it on good authority that #EDL are gathering in the Great Harry Wetherspoons in #Woolwich. Anti-nazis in the area be ready. (21:03) In addition, these channels were being monitored by police and the media, with the latter using the information to position their journalists to acquire a good story: Few EDL activists gathering in Woolwich. Says @EwartRoyale Police presence heavy as International press descend on small, scarred London St (21:04) Shortly after this point in time, multiple messages appear in the dataset reporting vio- lence between EDL supporters who had mustered in Woolwich and police: Clash now on Woolwich New Road. EDL throwing glass missiles at the police (21:46) EDL chants, missiles thrown at police lines. Cops putting on riot gear. came from nowhere. #wool- wich (21:46) EDL marching outside Woolwich DLR. About 60. Throwing bottles. Police lining up. Many black ppl in neighbourhood running away across square (21:48) #Woolwich big crowd of EDL chanting ‘whose streets, our streets’ outside Woolwich Arsenal station. Threw bottles at police. (21:49) Over in a lash. Police lines formed and suddenly withdrawn as edl disappear. Police moving out of #woolwich centre now (21:52) Although our analysis suggests just under 35,000 supporters and opponents of the EDL engaged that evening in emotionally charged exchanges, and virtual interaction ritu- als on Twitter and other platforms, only about 60–100 people actually participated in physical conlict in Woolwich. They were quickly neutralized by a robust police pres- ence. This episode showcases both the strengths and weaknesses of social media ana- lytics applied to conlict situations. Relying purely upon social media data one might over-state the seriousness of the situation, as the volume of communications ampliies the potential implications. But equally, these same materials afford unique insights into how groups with an intent to engage in violence use these platforms to inluence and persuade their afiliates to join the conlict. Tea, Cake and Football Dissipates Conlict In Collins’ (2012) modelling of the temporal development of conlict, the concept of a ‘plateau’ phase implicitly connotes a relatively steady state of social tension below it’s ‘peak’ level. By introducing data distilled from social media, however, we can signii- cantly reine our understanding of what actually happens in the plateau phase. For the key insight that this provides is how this period is punctuated by a series of signiicant episodes, where the potential for further conlict presents. Sometimes violence occurs, but other times it does not. To illustrate this, two case study analyses are presented. The ROBERTS ET AL. Page 14 of 21 irst focuses upon events around York Mosque and the second upon the moment when the hacktivist collective Anonymous entered the conlict. Although following Lee Rigby’s murder, country-wide reports were received of vio- lence against people and buildings afiliated with the Muslim faith, one particular story ‘cut through’ this atmosphere of concern and tension. It told of how an EDL march in York was disrupted when local mosque members had come out and talked with the marchers over a cup of tea, and a friendly game of football had ensued. It was a nar- rative achieving almost iconic status in terms of the restoration of social order at a moment where it was imperilled. It resonated especially deeply and profoundly owing to how it described symbols of English identity (a cup of tea and biscuits, and football) dissipating potential racial conlict. That being said, a careful reading of messages on Twitter suggest what actually happened was substantively different from the mediated narrative propagated subsequently. The story starts on 23 May 2013, following a night of public disorder caused by EDL members, when a message was posted on the Scarborough EDL Division Facebook page: The planned protest was scheduled for the day following a large demonstration in Newcastle, and prior to another the day after in Downing Street. In fact, only ive sup- porters attended on the 26 May in York, from a division capable of ielding many more. The EDL supporters who did show were massively out-numbered by a counter-protest. The Facebook post by the EDL’s Scarborough division on the 23rd had triggered alarm amongst some Twitter users, who had engaged social media channels to mobilize a coa- lition of local groups and institutional representatives willing to confront any potential troublemakers. Indeed, on the day of the demonstration somewhere between 100 and 150 local people and students gathered at the mosque named by the EDL, to demon- strate their solidarity with the local Muslim community. Given the large differences in numbers on the two sides, it is perhaps unsurprising that the small number of EDL activists preferred to have a cup of tea and play football than ferment conlict. Analysis of the Twitter data implies that the counter-mobilization to the perceived EDL threat was ‘scaffolded’ by an extant social network involving members from the mosque, and students and staff of York University. On Saturday 25th, the University’s stu- dent newspaper (which is published online and in print), posted a story with the head- line ‘Twitter raises fears of York EDL rally’.7 It stated that an anti-EDL protest was being organized involving the Student’s Union and the University’s Amnesty International section. Details about the counter-action were widely retweeted. By the morning of the planned EDL demonstration, a sizeable volume of Twitter trafic was disseminating the call to participate in the response to a deliberately provocative move by the far- right group (Figure 3): Fig 3 Scarborough EDL Division Facebook page. 7http://www.nouse.co.uk/2013/05/25/twitter-raises-fears-of-york-edl-rally/ AFTER WOOLWICH: ANALYZING OPEN SOURCE COMMUNICATIONS Page 15 of 21 http://www.nouse.co.uk/2013/05/25/twitter-raises-fears-of-york-edl-rally/ The #York community has been invited for tea at York Mosque (Bull Lane) today from 2pm to stand up to EDL threats. Pls RT YORK PEOPLE: Bull Lane Mosque, just off Lawrence Street has received threats of an EDL action. A counter-demo is assembling. When the small number of EDL members arrived outside the mosque and were con- fronted by a much larger crowd of people, it was reported thus: At #YorkMosque the EDL (we assume) have just appeared. Everything calm. They’re about to be invited to tea. Some EDL at #Yorkmosque. All peaceful now. Tea and biscuits with the fascists. Oh #york. Several tweets and blogs (and subsequently multiple accounts written by journalists) featured a picture of a female EDL supporter taking a cup of tea from a mosque repre- sentative. Later the supporters and protesters dispersed peacefully. It was only after the potential for conlict had been dissipated that the construction of a stylized public narrative started to take hold. That evening, several tweets started to ‘spin’ the earlier events in a particular way. No mention was made of the tiny EDL turn out. Indeed, reading these accounts one might easily be forgiven for inferring that a signiicant risk of violence had been neutralized by the liberal application of tea and cake: Amazing rumours that the EDL has been thwarted in York by a Tea party hosted by the Mosque. Bloody love my home town #EDL showed up for a rally outside a York mosque today only to ind 100 locals deiantly sipping tea and eating cake. These tweets subtly perform some important symbolic work. By linking a quintessential symbol of Britishness—a tea party—to the mosque, they connote a message of how a very different faith tradition has been integrated within the local rituals and rhythms of life in Yorkshire. In so doing, they provide an account of community resilience and how risks of inter-community conlict can be mitigated. In a slightly different concep- tual register, this particular episode showcases the workings of both the ‘digitally ena- bled’ and ‘digitally performed’ dimensions of contemporary conlicts. An Anonymous Intervention Sporadic episodes of violent hate crimes and public disorder continued throughout May 2013. On the 27th of that month, it emerged that the EDL’s webpage had been hacked and ‘taken down’. Responsibility for this was claimed by the online collective Anonymous UK. In the following days, personal addresses and telephone numbers of the leadership and members of the EDL were posted on ‘Pastebin’. Indications that Anonymous were planning to engage in the conlict situation were present in social media messages posted in the days preceding the above action: #EDL racist bastards must be stop. They spread islamophobia in the UK and around the world. #anonymous #OpEDL (14:00 23rd may) #CallToAction #Anonymous! #EDL organize an event in #London. Wear your mask peacefully and help teach some manners! (23rd) ROBERTS ET AL. Page 16 of 21 Aside from a couple of in-depth journalistic accounts of Anonymous (Coleman 2014), relatively little is known about it’s community of membership. Whilst a global commu- nity, UK afiliates or ‘anons’ as they are known, have campaigned against a wide range and sometimes eclectic mix of issues, including: opposition to GM food manufacturer Monsanto; censorship—free speech on the Internet and social media; student rights; and, opposition to several large corporations. The Twitter data suggests they support Anti-fascist groups including Unite Against Fascism and Hope Not Hate. They have also shown support for Wikileaks and its founder Julian Assange, and Edward Snowden. In respect of the Woolwich action, it is not possible to establish how their mobiliza- tion was accomplished or by whom, other than the posts are in English with UK identi- iers. It did have an important impact upon the overarching conlict dynamics however, and highlights the increasing salience of ‘digitally dependent conlicts’ in social scien- tiic analyses of social order more generally. In a manner redolent of the process followed by the other groups in the lead up to engaging in a conlict, prior to their participation, tweets from representatives of Anonymous displayed increasing emotional intensity: #BNP and #EDL accused of attempt to fuel #Racial hatred after #Woolwich #Terror attack @ http://t. co/T1Rg26Tcw1 RT #Anonymous (25th may) Anti #EDL counter protest! Don’t let R ACISTS divide us! Join us tomorrow 2pm Downing Street. #Anonymous (26th) And then just prior to the attack on the 27th, it was clearly signalled that an active inter- vention was imminent. The inclusion of the ‘OpEDL’ hashtag is a signature device that has been used previously to convey that a deined operation is due to be launched: #OpEDL @EDLTrobinson warning, warning, anonymous on this case @EDLTrobinson We have been watching. We have been judging. #OpEDL ENGAGED #Anonymous As can be seen in the tweets above that were widely retweeted, the tone had changed with Anonymous activists moving to an attack posture. The word ‘ENGAGED’ has also been used prior to other Anonymous cyber-attacks. The social reaction to this informal social control intervention by Anonymous was positively received by many Twitter users, with lots of expressions of support being shared. On the 4 June, a second data release was made by #AnonymousUK and #Zhc (Z Company Hacking Crew), this time purporting to identify individual EDL members with criminal histories. The intent here was clearly to systematically discredit the EDL and it’s supporters by publishing information on their convictions. For example, one individual was linked to child pornography, a subject the EDL has campaigned vigor- ously against nationally and locally (Pilkington 2017; Robinson 2015). After this point in June 2013, the Anonymous action declined in intensity, following the trend seen across other community mobilizations in the wake of the Lee Rigby murder. Anonymous, like other communities, moved onto other issues. There are several implications for the analysis of contemporary conlict dynam- ics to be drawn from this episode. First, it demonstrates how the groups engaged in conlict can shift and change over time. In this instance, Anonymous actively entered a conlictual situation relatively late, but had a decisive impact upon its trajectory of development. In so doing, it is possible to distinguish the extent to which informal social control actions are an important part of what drives and mitigates violence. Of AFTER WOOLWICH: ANALYZING OPEN SOURCE COMMUNICATIONS Page 17 of 21 http://t.co/T1Rg26Tcw1 http://t.co/T1Rg26Tcw1 particular interest and salience is how their intervention is purely ‘digital’, but never- theless inluences both the ofline and online consequences. Anonymous’s intervention appears to have played a pivotal role in shifting the conlict towards Collins’ (2012) ‘dissipation phase’. The EDL members whose personal details were published online, became more concerned by the risks to them, making them less able to organize and stay emotionally focused upon conlict actions. The 6-day period following the murder saw daily street protests by the EDL and other far right groups in towns and cities all over the country; some involved over 1000 sup- porters and almost as many opponents. But by early June that intensity had begun to subside. One additional key event in marking the decrease in tension was the funeral of Lee Rigby on 12 July 2013. At this moment, Twitter and the other social media plat- forms became vehicles for acts of collective remembering and digital performance that, for the most part, had a more relective tone: Lee Rigby. You have united this country. You will be remembered with dignity. Your comrades and countrymen salute you. Rest in peace .... hero (10:00) Wearing my union jack dress with pride today #rip #leerigby That said, there were a small number of messages whose purpose seemed to be to try and keep the conlict going, containing links to extreme right wing websites and propaganda: Today, respect the sacriice of Lee Rigby. And then redouble your efforts to stop it ever happening again - XXXXXXX (link redacted to British National Party propaganda page) (11:45) However, despite such attempts to reignite the conlict, and there were subsequent acts of violence, from around this point in time the plateau phase started to weaken and dissipation set in. Conclusion This extended case study suggests Collins’ (2012) three phases of conlict dynamics are supported by the empirical social media data collected following the terrorist murder of Lee Rigby in 2013. Such data provide a high resolution view that can retrospectively track and trace the interactions between different groups as they choreograph their way through sequences of moves and counter-moves, actions and interactive adjust- ments, endowing the resulting conlict episodes with a deined ‘arc’. Equally impor- tantly however, exposure to empirical data allows us to reine and elaborate aspects of Collins’ original model. There is a clear ‘explosion’ as public interest ignites and then develops. Partly this is driven by members of the general public utilizing social media to try and determine what is occurring. Alongside these general participants however, are members of deined ideological interest groups who become activated by the event and contribute to it. From our analysis, it appears that whilst general public interest falls away quite quickly, more ideologically motivated groups stay engaged in the conlict dynamics over an extended period. A second key feature of the analysis is in demonstrating just how signiicant social media has become in the social organization of contemporary conlict. This is a tra- jectory of development especially salient to contemporary criminological analyses, ROBERTS ET AL. Page 18 of 21 which are increasingly alert to how media dynamics are rendering more complex the ways that deinitions of the situation are established and coalitions amongst protesting groups fashioned (Greer and McLaughlin 2010). Procter et al.’s (2013) work started to tease out some of these issues when looking at the London riots of 2011. The current analysis moves this approach on, particularly by integrating the theoretical framework derived from Collins. Other studies have documented how in the aftermath of terrorist attacks digital social media propagates online ‘cyber-hate’. Herein, the role of such plat- forms in the social organization of ofline conlicts has been signiicantly elaborated by attending to the workings of ‘digitally enabled’ and ‘digitally performed’ conlicts. In this respect, the empirical data support two key claims about the social organiza- tion of conlict dynamics. The irst concerns the interactive nature of the conlict, as various actors move and adjust their positions in response to actions performed by other groups to whom they see themselves as either opposed or aligned. A signiicant inding in this respect is how they monitor open source communications data and make use of this to try and discern their opponents’ intents and actions. The second claim concerns how the detail afforded by these digital data provide compelling insights into the complex array of relationships that emerge and evolve over the course of a conlict. There are a multitude of formal and informal social control activities being performed by a whole variety of actors. Contemporary criminological accounts of the workings of informal social control, certainly need to accommodate this digital dimension (Innes 2003). Accordingly, future theoretical modelling work, particularly that relating to political extremism, needs to attend more closely to the interactive and multi-polar aspects of conlict. This analysis has catalogued conlicts between: far-right and left-wing coa- litions; far-right groups and the police; contests over meaning between journalists, citizens and Government on social media. Teasing apart how these conlictual relation- ships are digitally enabled and digitally performed is a necessity for leveraging valid insights from research in this area. These concepts and insights have important policy and practice implications. The murder of Lee Rigby was rapidly and publicly deined as an Islamist terrorist attack. However, the episodes of online and ofline conlict that arose following this crime, involved a multitude of groups, networks and institutions. Critiques of the UK gov- ernment’s Prevent counter-extremism strategy have identiied an over emphasis upon Muslim issues, effectively casting them as ‘suspect communities’ (Pantazis and Pemberton 2009). The analysis set out herein, clearly demonstrates that improving the consequence management of terrorist incidents, requires a more rounded and nuanced approach. Although the initial violence was performed by individuals propounding an Islamist agenda, the subsequent violence was, for the most part, conducted by far-right extremists. There are limits to what a case study analysis can say about the presence or absence of patterned sequences underlying the theory of time dynamics of conlict. As such, any conclusions are necessarily tentative and provisional. But what this analysis has shown is that there are a number of core behaviours that take place on social media that play an active role in shaping and constituting the broader social reaction that occurs. In this respect, engagement in virtual interaction rituals seems to be an important component of conlict dynamics and of the secondary conlict events. In this sense, the contempo- rary ‘arc of conlict’ is increasingly digitally enabled and digitally performed. AFTER WOOLWICH: ANALYZING OPEN SOURCE COMMUNICATIONS Page 19 of 21 References Amoore, L. and Piotukh, V. (2105), ‘Life Beyond Big Data Governing with Little Analytics’, Economy and Society, 44: 341–66. Bartlett, J. and Miller, C. (2013), @metpoliceuk: How Twitter is Changing Modern Policing. Demos. Brym, R., Godbout, M., Hoffbauer, A., Menard, G. and Zhang, T. H. (2014), ‘Social Media in the 2011 Egyptian Uprising’, British Journal of Sociology, 65: 266–92. Busher, J. (2016), The Making of Anti-Muslim Protest: Grassroots Activism in the English Defence League. London: Routledge. Cassa, C. Chunara, R., Mandl, K. and Brownstein, J. (2013), ‘Twitter as a Sentinel in Emergency Situations: Lessons from the Boston Marathon Explosions’, PLOS http:// currents.plos.org/disasters/article/twitter-as-a-sentinel-in-emergency-situations-lessons- from-the-boston-marathon-explosions/ Coleman, G. (2014), Hacker, Hoaxer, Whistleblower, Spy: The Many Faces of Anonymous. Verso. Collins, R. (2008), Violence: A  Micro-Sociological Theory. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Collins, R. (2012), ‘C-Escalation and D-Escalation: A  Theory of the Time-Dynamics of Conlict’, American Sociological Review, 77: 1–20. Copsey, N (2010), The English Defence League: Challenging Our Country and Our Values of Social Inclusion, Fairness and Equality. Posted by Faith Matters, November 20, 2010. https://www. faith-matters.org/. Copsey, Nigel. (2016), Anti-Fascism in Britain. 2th edn. Coser, L. (1956), Functions of Social Conlict. Free Press. Cottle, S. (2008), ‘Reporting Demonstrations: the Changing Media Politics of Dissent’, Media, Culture and Society, 30: 853–72. Edelman, M. J. (1985), The Symbolic Uses of Politics. Political Science. University of Illnois Press. Francisco, R. (2009), Dynamics of Conlict. Springer. Garland, J. and Treadwell, J. (2010) ‘No Surrender to the Taliban’: Football Hooliganism, Islamophobia and the Rise of the English Defence League. Panel paper. Papers from the British Society of Criminology Conference. 10: 19–35. Geertz, C. (1973), Interpretation of Cultures. Basic Books. Goffman, E. (1959), The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life. London: Penguin. Greer, C. and McLaughlin, E. (2010), ‘We Predict a Riot: Public Order Policing, New Media Environments and the Rise of the Citizen Journalist’, British Journal of Criminology, 50: 1041–59. Greer, C. and McLaughlin, E. (2011), ‘Trial by Media: Policing the 24–7 News Mediasphere and the Politics of Outrage’, Theoretical Criminology, 15: 23–46. Hardin, R. (1995), One for All: The Logic of Group Conlict. Princeton University Press. Horowitz, D. L. (2001), The Deadly Ethnic Riot. University of California Press. Innes, M. (2003), Understanding Social Control. Maidenhead: Open University Press. Innes, M., Roberts, C., Preece, A. and Rogers, D. (2016), ‘Ten Rs of Social Reaction: Using Social Media to Measure the Post-Event Impacts of the Murder of Lee Rigby’, Terrorism and Political Violence. Intelligence and Security Committee. (2014), Report on the Intelligence Relating to the Murder of Lee Rigby. House of Commons. ROBERTS ET AL. Page 20 of 21 http://currents.plos.org/disasters/article/twitter-as-a-sentinel-in-emergency-situations-lessons-from-the-boston-marathon-explosions/ http://currents.plos.org/disasters/article/twitter-as-a-sentinel-in-emergency-situations-lessons-from-the-boston-marathon-explosions/ http://currents.plos.org/disasters/article/twitter-as-a-sentinel-in-emergency-situations-lessons-from-the-boston-marathon-explosions/ https://www.faith-matters.org/ https://www.faith-matters.org/ Jackson, P. and Feldman, M. (2011), The EDL: Britain’s ‘New Far Right’ Social Movement. The University of Northampton. LeFebrve, K. and Armstrong, C. (2016), ‘Grievance-Based Social Movement Mobilization in the #Ferguson Twitter Storm’, New Media and Society. Loader, I. and Mulcahy, A. (2003), Policing and the Condition of England: Memory, Politics and Culture. Clarendon Press. McEnery, T., McGlashan, M. and Love, R. (2015), ‘Press and Media Reaction to Ideologically Inspired Murder: The Case of Lee Rigby’, Discourse and Communication, 9: 1–23. McLaughlin, E. (2014), ‘See Also Young, 1971: Marshall McLuhan, Moral Panics and Moral Indignation’, Theoretical Criminology, 18: 422–31. Nesser, P. (2014), Islamist Terrorism in Europe. Hurst. Pantazis, C. and Pemberton, S. (2009), ‘From the ‘Old’ to the ‘New’ Suspect Community Examining the Impacts of Recent UK Counter-Terrorist Legislation’, British Journal of Criminology, 49: 646–66. Pasquale, F. (2015), The Black Box Society. Harvard University Press. Pilkington, H. (2017), ‘Gender and the Radical Extreme Right: Mechanisms of Transmission and the Role of Educational Interventions,’ Journal: Education and Gender, 29: 238–57. Pilkington, H. (2016), Loud and Proud: Passiona and Politics in the English defence League. Manchester: Manchester University Press. Procter, R., Crump, J., Karstedt, S, Voss, A. and Cantijoch, M. (2013), ‘Reading the Riots: What Were the Police Doing on Twitter?’, Policing and Society. Robinson, T (2015), Tommy Robinson Enemy of the State. The Press News Ltd. Treadwell, J. and Garland, J. (2011), ‘Masculinity, Marginalization and Violence: A Case Study of the English Defence League’, British Journal of Criminology, 51: 621–34. Simmel, G. (1922/1955), Conlict and the Web of Group Afiliations. (translated and edited by Kurt Wolff). Free Press. Strauss, A. and Corbin, J. (1988), Basics of Qualitative Research: Techniques and Procedures for Developing Grounded Theory, 2nd edn. SAGE Publications, Inc. Sunstein, C. R. (2008), Why Groups Go to Extremes, Washington, D.C: AEI Press. Wilkins, L. T. (1964), Social Deviance Social Policy, Action and Research. 1st edn. Tavistock Publications. Williams, M. L. and Burnap, P. (2015), ‘Cyberhate on Social Media in the Aftermath of Woolwich: A Case Study in Computational Criminology and Big Data’, British Journal of Criminology, 56: 211–38. AFTER WOOLWICH: ANALYZING OPEN SOURCE COMMUNICATIONS Page 21 of 21 
work_fvlmthuzdvfwfmmexnd6pn2ysa	----	Speaking up for the silent Urgent attention to the mental health needs of refugee children is required and particularly to those who travel unaccompanied. (Arch Dis Child 2002;87:366–70) There are currently over 50 million refugees in the world. Over half of that number are children and, as they represent a silent group, they and their needs are easily overlooked. The authors highlight three key stages where psy- chological trauma is likely to occur to refugee children: (1) while in their country of origin; (2) during their attempted journey to a safe country, and (3) while trying to settle in that country. There is a high prevalence of emotional and behavioural disorders, with post-traumatic stress disorders, anxiety with sleep disorders, and depression representing the most com- mon diagnostic classifications. Factors that enable high risk refugee children to be more psychologically resilient include having a supportive family environ- ment, access to a reliable and stable external person or organisation, or positive personality characteristics. Unaccompanied children are a parti- cularly vulnerable group and are more likely to be neglected, exploited, and abused. Few unaccompanied children are granted asylum, although the major- ity arriving in the UK are given tempor- ary, discretionary leave to remain in the UK until they are 18. Noting that UK immigration law does not seem to always take the best interests of refugee children into account, the authors conclude that ‘‘attention to the mental health needs of this vulnerable group by government and other policy makers is urgently required’’. Recall bias and MMR In 1998 a paper hypothesising a causal association between the measles, mumps, and rubella (MMR) vaccine and autism was seized upon by the British press and given the full tabloid treatment. The resulting furore created a great deal of negative publicity for the vaccine and prompted pronounced uncertainty in parents. The media ignored several subsequent studies that did not demonstrate a link. It now appears that a further effect of that publicity has been to initiate recall bias in parents of autistic children who received the MMR vaccine. (Arch Dis Child 2002;87:493–4) Researchers compared the results of two studies performed before and after the putative autism-MMR association that contained, as elements, recalled measurements of onset of parental concern. They found that parents of children with regressive symptoms who were diagnosed after the publicity tended to recall the onset as shortly after MMR more often than parents of similar children who were diagnosed before the publicity. The authors con- clude that this paper raises the possibi- lity that such a bias could affect future studies, and suggest that the capacity for bias should be examined in studies reliant on clinical histories obtained after a publicised hypothesis. Negativity follows inactivity A recent study suggests the benefits of persistent exercise could be much broader then previously realised. (Br J Sports Med 2002;36:360–4). The study, conducted with a series of three ques- tionnaires concerning leisure time phy- sical activity sent to sets of twins in their late teens, investigates both the link between frequency of exercise and level of health and the associations of exer- cise with smoking, drinking, social relationships, and school grades as well. Dealing mainly with the two extremes present in adolescents, the study observed persistently active (those who exercised four to five times a week) and inactive (those who exercised one to two times a month) teenagers. Examining the characteristics of each category, the persistent exercisers were, in general, non-smokers, regular breakfast eaters, and had better grades at school, whereas the persistently inactive were often smokers with poor perceived health, poorer school grades, and their parents were often of a lower social class. A moderate to high level of exercise therefore seems to promote improved health and an improved lifestyle. Consequently, the authors conclude, health promotion in adolescence must address the health and wellbeing of adolescents as a whole, as promoting physical activity among teenagers could help lead them toward a more positive lifestyle overall. KATRINA WARDROPE 11th September triggered hate crime rise There was a marked increase in hate related violent crime against people from or perceived to be from the Middle East in the month after the terrorist attacks in New York City and Washington DC on September 11 2001. (Injury Prevention 2003;9:187–9) Researchers used the LexisNexis data- base, which provides access to over 30 000 news sources, to collate media reports on violent assaults of Middle Easterners in the USA in the period between 1 September and 11 October 2001. Of 100 incidents of violent crime meeting the case definition (which included homicides, physical assaults, threats with a weapon, or attacks on people in buildings such as drive by shootings, explosions, or arson), only one occurred before 9/11. More than three quarters occurred within the 10 days immediately after the disaster. The researchers recommend that tol- erance promoting interventions must be implemented as quickly as possible by public health and criminal justice offi- cials to be effective in pre-empting such hate crimes. In addition, as many of the crimes were perpetrated in businesses owned or operated by minorities, such as convenience stores and gas stations, an increased police presence at these locations would also be an important step in the prevention of similar crimes after such an event. KATRINA WARDROPE All articles written by Michael Muir unless otherwise attributed. BMJ Journals; mmuir@bmjgroup.com www.jech.com o n A p ril 5 , 2 0 2 1 b y g u e st. P ro te cte d b y co p yrig h t. h ttp ://je ch .b m j.co m / J E p id e m io l C o m m u n ity H e a lth : first p u b lish e d a s 1 0 .1 1 3 6 /je ch .5 7 .1 2 .9 9 6 o n 2 D e ce m b e r 2 0 0 3 . D o w n lo a d e d fro m http://jech.bmj.com/ 
work_fwascxlocneqzad2kt3abyv2di	----	145 145..147 Background The past decade has seen much activity aimed at transforming the experiences of people affected by mental health problems: specifically, trying to reduce the associated stigma. Publication of New Horizons set out a national vision for psychological health in England for 2010 and beyond. One of the aims was to ‘improve the mental health and well-being of the population’ by promoting equality and reducing inequality. 1 In an attempt to achieve this goal, a number of anti-stigma government-funded programmes have been launched over the past few years (Box 1). However, some of the latest empirical evidence of the experiences of people with mental health problems shows some strikingly similar results to evidence gathered 10 years ago.2,3 Similarly, researchers in the Stigma Shout survey4 found that nine out of ten service users reported that stigma had a negative impact on their lives and two-thirds of them cited that fear of discrimination deterred them from doing things they wanted to do. The aims of governmental mental health strategies and the numerous anti-stigma programmes to remove stigma barriers were clear and simple. The problem is that the message may not be reaching those it is intending to reach (i.e. the general public) and/or help (i.e. stigmatised individuals). For example, a recent longitudinal survey looked at the impact of the ‘Time To Change’ campaign in changing public knowledge and behaviour5 and results showed no statistically significant effects in any of the indicators measured (i.e. intended behaviour, public knowl- edge and reported behaviour). Attitudes and behaviours towards stigma or what constitutes stigma may not be as straightforward as anti- stigma programmes conceptualise them. Delving deeper into the background of people with mental health problems reveals that within the stigma of mental illness lies another stigma, which may be as or even more pervasive than that of mental illness; the stigma of membership in a socially excluded group based on some socioeconomic, personal or cultural/ethnic characteristics. Membership of a stigmatised group (not based on mental illness) is often itself a risk factor for developing mental health problems. As Box 2 shows, there are many groups of people who are at risk of developing mental health problems,6 most of which are also at greater risk of stigmatisation because of their group membership. There is evidence that membership of a socially excluded group is associated with diminished economic opportunities, poorer interpersonal relationships Psychiatric Bulletin (2014), 38, 145-147, doi: 10.1192/pb.bp.114.048124 1 BPP University, London Correspondence to Sokratis Dinos (sokratisdinos@bpp.com) First received 19 May 2014, accepted 19 May 2014 B 2014 The Author. This is an open- access article published by the Royal College of Psychiatrists and distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http:// creativecommons.org/licenses/by/ 3.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. Summary Despite anti-stigma campaigns in the UK in recent years, the experiences of people with mental health problems indicate that stigma is still a major problem. The stigma of being a member of a socially excluded group, based on socioeconomic, personal or cultural/ethnic characteristics, should be considered alongside the stigma of mental illness. Membership of a stigmatised group (not based on mental illness) is often itself a risk factor for developing mental health problems. This article discusses the experiences of people from Black and minority ethnic and lesbian, gay and bisexual groups to explore how stigma can create more stigma. Declaration of interest None. EDITORIALS Stigma creating stigma: a vicious circle Sokratis Dinos 1 Box 1 Recent and current anti-stigma and discrimination programmes in the UK and legislation Time to Change: is an £18m charity-sector-led antidiscrimination and well-being campaign. As well as an advertising campaign, its work includes: a mass participation exercise, 28 community- based physical activity projects, a legal unit to pursue test cases of discrimination. Objectives over 4 years include 5% reduction in discrimination for people with mental health problems and 5% improvement in public attitudes. Shift: was a Department of Health funded programme to tackle the stigma and discrimination associated with mental health issues in England. The programme was launched in 2004 by the National Institute for Mental Health in England and ran until 2011). Shift’s work complemented that of Time to Change by focusing on employers and the media. The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: this was ratified by the UK on 8 June 2009 and its Optional Protocol on 7 August 2009. Among its principles the convention aims to promote non-discrimination, full participation and inclusion in society, respect for difference and diversity and equality. 145 and other life opportunities, 7,8 unemployment and income loss,9 constricted social support networks and poorer interpersonal relationships,7 delayed help-seeking and reduced psychiatric medication,10 diminished quality of life11 and other life opportunities,8,12 depressive symptoms and demoralisation,13 and negative constructions of identity including low self-esteem.2,14,15 It can be argued that stigma can create more stigma by placing someone at higher risk of developing mental health problems. Black and minority ethnic and lesbian, gay and bisexual groups Looking at the example of people from Black and minority ethnic (BME) and lesbian, gay and bisexual (LGB) groups, it can be seen that both share some similarities in terms of being socially excluded based on ethnicity and/or sexuality and in having a significantly higher prevalence of mental health problems than the general population (Box 3). Both the results and the similarities between the two groups are clear. Both BME and LGB populations have a significantly higher prevalence of a number of conditions, including common mental disorders, post-traumatic stress disorder, psychosis, attempted suicide and drug dependence. Most research points towards the higher prevalence of mental health problems among these groups being directly related to discrimination and social exclusion. Numerable surveys and systematic reviews have shown that the experience of discrimination or fear of being discriminated against can have deleterious effects on mental health and well-being (Box 4). In addition to campaigns trying to reduce the stigma of mental illness, a number of campaigns have also been launched aiming to tackle stigma and discrimination associated with ethnicity/race and sexuality. However, similarly to the evidence on the less-than-successful outcomes of mental health programmes, research suggests BME and LGB groups still experience a significant amount of discrimination in everyday life. Such prejudice has an impact on well-being and the ability to lead a fulfilling life. EDITORIALS Dinos Stigma creating stigma Box 2 Groups at risk of developing mental health problems Children and young people . Children with parents who have mental health or substance misuse problems . Personal abuse or witnessing parents’ domestic violence . Looked after children . Excluded from school . Teen parents . Young offenders . Young lesbian, gay bisexual and transgender people . Young Black and minority ethnic groups . Families living in socioeconomic disadvantage Adults . Black and minority ethnic groups . Homeless people . Adults with a history of violence or abuse . Adults who misuse alcohol or substances . Offenders and ex-offenders . Lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender adults . Travellers, asylum seekers and refugees . A history of being looked after/adopted . People with intellectual disabilities . Isolated older people Box 3 Prevalence of mental health problems in individuals who are Black and minority ethnic and lesbian, gay and bisexual Black and minority ethnic . Three-fold increase of people with psychosis compared with White British people. 16 The risk in the Black Caribbean group is nearly seven-fold higher 17 . Two-fold increase of common mental disorders in South Asian women 18 . Two- to three-fold increase of post-traumatic stress disorder in Black men 17 . Three-fold increase of drug dependence in Black men18 . On average, three-fold increase of suicide19 Lesbian, gay and bisexual . Two-fold increase of suicide attempts20 . Over four-fold increase of lifetime prevalence of suicide attempt in gay and bisexual men 20 . One-and-a-half-fold increase of common mental disorders and alcohol and substance misuse 20 . 40% of lesbian or bisexual women met criteria for mental disorder and over 30% had attempted suicide 21 Box 4 The relationship between discrimination and mental health in Black and minority ethnic and lesbian, gay and bisexual groups Black and minority ethnic groups . Experience of some form of physical racial attack was associated with a prevalence of depression almost three times and a prevalence of psychosis almost five times that of people reporting no harassment 22 . Experience of racially motivated verbal abuse or physical assault was associated with between a two- and three-fold increase in the risk of common mental disorders and psychosis 23 . Believing the majority of British employers to be discriminatory was associated with around a two-fold increase in risk of common mental disorders 24 Lesbian, gay and bisexual groups . Two in three (65%) lesbian and gay pupils report homophobic bullying, including physical violence (41%) and death threats (17%) 20 . Seven in ten gay pupils feel that homophobic bullying has affected their schoolwork and half of those who have experienced homophobic bullying have skipped school because of it 24 . Experiences of discrimination were significantly and positively associated with depressive symptoms and anxiety symptoms 25,26 . A significant correlation was found between experience of discrimination and having a mental disorder or attempting suicide in lesbian and bisexual women 21 146 For example, surveys conducted by Stonewall 27,28 have found negative or mixed public responses towards BME and LGB groups. A total of 64% of the British population responded that they feel ‘less positive’ about at least one ethnic group.27 The same survey reported the general public believes that minority groups in the UK are receiving preferential treatment compared with the White majority. Although 66% of the general public believes that there is not enough acceptance of LGB people, one in five LGB people reported experiences of homophobic hate crime in the 3 years preceding the survey.27,28 Where next? It seems clear there is a significant gap in the perceptions of the general public and members of stigmatised groups. The former believe such groups receive preferential treatment, whereas the latter believe they are being discriminated against and are caught in a vicious circle of a double stigma. Such beliefs of discrimination are further evidenced by the significantly higher prevalence of mental health problems among these groups. The higher prevalence of mental health problems necessitates a change of practice that will enhance accessibility and inclusion, including appropriate training provided to mental health professionals. For example, cultural and sexuality competency training regarding BME 29 and LGB30 groups respectively and knowledge of needs, beliefs and lifestyles. Similarly, campaigns to educate the public do not always capture the complexity of stigma and mainly target different stigmas in isolation. From a public health point of view, further evidence about the complexity of the issue is urgently needed before any specific recommendations can be made that will feed into future anti-stigma campaigns. About the author Sokratis Dinos is the Head of Psychology and a Senior Lecturer in the Department of Psychology at BPP University. References 1 Department of Health. New Horizons: A Shared Vision for Mental Health. Department of Health, 2009 (http://www.apho.org.uk/resource/ browse.aspx?RID=83907). 2 Dinos S, Stevens S, Serfaty M, Weich S, King M. Stigma: the feelings and experiences of 46 people with mental illness. Qualitative study. Br J Psychiatry 2004; 184: 176-81. 3 Howe L, Tickle A, Brown I. ‘Schizophrenia is a dirty word’: service users’ experiences of receiving a diagnosis of schizophrenia. Psychiatr Bull 2014; 38: 1-5. 4 Time to Change. Stigma Shout. 2008 (http://www.time-to-change. org.uk/sites/default/files/Stigma%20Shout.pdf). 5 Evans-Lacko S, Henderson C, Thornicroft G. Public knowledge, attitudes and behaviour regarding people with mental illness in England 2009- 2012. Br J Psychiatry 2013; 202: s51-57. 6 Bhui K, Dinos S. Preventive psychiatry: a paradigm to improve population mental health and well-being. Br J Psychiatry 2011; 198: 417-9. 7 Link BG, Struening EL, Neese-Todd S, Asmussen A, Phelan JC. Stigma as a barrier to recovery: the consequences of stigma for the self-esteem of people with mental illness. Psychiatr Serv 2001; 52: 1621-6. 8 Corrigan PW. Mental health stigma as social attribution: implications for research methods and attitude change. Clin Psychol 2000; 7: 48-67. 9 Angermeyer MC, Beck M, Dietrich S, Holzinger A. The stigma of mental illness: patients’ anticipations and experiences. Int J Soc Psychiatry 2004; 50: 153-62. 10 Sirey JA, Bruce ML, Alexopoulos GS, Perlick DA, Friedman SJ, Meyers BS. Stigma as a barrier to recovery: perceived stigma and patient-rated severity of illness as predictors of antidepressant drug adherence. Psychiatr Serv 2001; 52: 1615-20. 11 Rosenfield S. Labeling mental illness: the effects of received services and perceived stigma on life satisfaction. Am Sociol Rev 1997; 62: 660-72. 12 Phelan JC, Link BG, Stueve A, Pescosolido BA. Public conceptions of mental illness in 1950 and 1996: what is mental illness and is it to be feared? J Health Soc Behav 2000; 41: 188-207. 13 Ritsher JB, Phelan JC. Internalised stigma predicts erosion of morale among psychiatric outpatients. Psychiat Res 2004; 129: 257-65. 14 King M, Dinos S, Shaw J, Watson R, Stevens S, Passetti F, et al. The Stigma Scale: development of a standardised measure of the stigma of mental illness. Br J Psychiatry 2007; 190: 248-54. 15 Dinos S, Lyons E, Finlay, WML. Does chronic illness place constraints on positive constructions of identity? Temporal comparisons and self- evaluations in people with mental illness. Soc Sci Med 2005; 60: 2239-48. 16 Kirkbride JB, Barker D, Cowden F, Stamps R, Yang M, Jones PB, et al. Psychoses, ethnicity and socio-economic status. Br J Psychiatry 2008; 193: 18-24. 17 Fearon P, Morgan C. Environmental factors in schizophrenia: the role of migrant studies. Schizophr Bull 2006; 32: 405-8. 18 McManus S, Meltzer H, Brugha T, Bebbington P, Jenkins R. Adult Psychiatric Morbidity in England: Results of a Household Survey. The Health & Social Care Information Centre, Social Care Statistics, 2007. 19 Bhui K, Mckenzie K. Rates and risk factors by ethnic group for suicides within a year of contact with mental health services in England and Wales. Psychiatr Serv 2008; 59: 414-20. 20 King M, Semlyen J, Tai SS, Killaspy H, Osborn D, Popelyuk D, et al. A systematic review of mental disorder, suicide, and deliberate self harm in lesbian, gay and bisexual people. BMC Psychiatry 2008; 8: 70. 21 Warner J, McKeown E, Griffin M, Johnson K, Ramsay A, Cort C, et al. Rates and predictors of mental illness in gay men, lesbians and bisexual men and women: results from a survey based in England and Wales. Br J Psychiatry 2004; 185: 479-85. 22 Karlsen S, Nazroo J. Relation between racial discrimination, social class, and health among ethnic minority groups. Am J Public Health 2002; 92: 624-31. 23 Karlsen S, Nazroo J, McKenzie K, Bhui K, Weich S. Racism, psychosis and common mental disorder among ethnic minority groups in England. Psychol Med 2005; 35: 1795- 803. 24 Hunt R, Jensen J. The School Report: The Experiences of Young Gay People in Britain’s Schools. Stonewall, 2007 (http://www.stonewall.org.uk/ documents/school_report.pdf). 25 Feinstein BA, Goldfried MR, Davila J. The relationship between experiences of discrimination and mental health among lesbians and gay men: an examination of internalized homonegativity and rejection sensitivity as potential mechanisms. J Consult Clin Psych 2012; 80: 917-27. 26 Choi KH, Paul J, Ayala G, Boylan R, Gregorich SE. Experiences of discrimination and their impact on the mental health among African American, Asian and Pacific Islander, and Latino men who have sex with men. Am J Public Health 2013; 103: 868-74. 27 Cowan K. Living Together: British Attitudes Towards Lesbian & Gay People. S t o n e wa l l , 2 0 07 ( h t t p : //w w w. s t o n e wa l l . o r g . u k /d o c u m e n t s / living_together.pdf ). 28 Dick S. Homophobic Hate Crime: The Gay British Crime Survey 2008. S t o n e we l l , 2 0 0 8 ( h t t p : //w w w. s t o n e wa l l . o r g . u k /d o c u m e n t s / homophobic_hate_crime__final_report.pdf). 29 Bhui K, Warfa N, Edonya P, McKenzie K, Bhugra D. Cultural competence in mental health care: a review of model evaluations. BMC Health Serv Res 2007; 7: 15. 30 King M, Semlyen J, Killaspy H, Nazareth I, Osborn D. A Systematic Review of Research on Counselling and Psychotherapy for Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual & Transgender People. British Association of Counselling and Psychotherapy, 2007. EDITORIALS Dinos Stigma creating stigma 147 10.1192/pb.bp.114.048124Access the most recent version at DOI: 2014, 38:145-147.Psychiatric Bulletin Sokratis Dinos Stigma creating stigma: a vicious circle References http://pb.rcpsych.org/content/38/4/145#BIBL This article cites 23 articles, 7 of which you can access for free at: permissions Reprints/ permissions@rcpsych.ac.ukwrite to To obtain reprints or permission to reproduce material from this paper, please to this article at You can respond /letters/submit/pbrcpsych;38/4/145 from Downloaded The Royal College of PsychiatristsPublished by on November 28, 2017http://pb.rcpsych.org/ http://pb.rcpsych.org/site/subscriptions/ go to: BJPsych Bulletin To subscribe to http://pb.rcpsych.org/ http://pb.rcpsych.org/content/38/4/145#BIBL http://pb.rcpsych.org/ http://www.rcpsych.ac.uk/ http://pb.rcpsych.org//site/subscriptions/ 
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work_g3hbchbfjzbvtjiiatyipjzsi4	----	Administrations of Memory and Modes of Remembering: Some Comments on the Special Issue Administrations of Memory and Modes of Remembering: Some Comments on the Special Issue Anna Cento Bull1 & David Clarke2 Published online: 9 November 2018 # The Author(s) 2018 Keywords Memory studies . Nation-state . Transnationalism . Cosmopolitanism . Antagonism . Agonism Memory studies as a Bbroad convergence field^ (Erll 2011, p. 11), incorporating a range of disciplines in the humanities and social sciences, has in the last decade or so increasingly sought to free itself from the weaknesses of its Bmethodological nationalism^ (De Cesari and Rigney 2014, p. 11). The myriad of case studies produced by researchers in the field, it is argued, has tended to focus exclusively on memory as a means of fostering the cohesion of the (national) group, drawing on theoretical sources from Maurice Halbwachs, to Pierre Nora and Eric Hobsbawm, to the early work of Jan and Aleida Assmann, in which the national community takes centre stage. This focus on the mobilisation of memory as a means to Bpromote a commitment to the group by symbolizing its values and aspirations^ (Misztal 2003, p. 51) has two significant weaknesses: it tends to work with a Bsimplistic understanding of culture as a reified, clear-cut, territory-based concept,^ while also condemning memory studies itself to endlessly articulate the link between memory and the nation (Feindt et al. 2014, pp. 24–25). Furthermore, this approach often tends to conflate the nation with the nation-state, largely assuming that the latter acts as a container of a homogeneous national identity. However, it is also the case that scholarly work and theorising on transnational memory activism is far from new (Schwelling 2012) and has been gathering momentum since Levy and Sznaider (2002, p. 88) argued strongly that the B‘Container of the Nation-State’ […] is in the process of being slowly cracked^ and that memories of the Holocaust Bprovide the foundations for a new cosmopolitan memory, transcending ethnic and national boundaries^. While the transna- tional frame deserves our attention and the shift in focus is to be welcomed, it also carries with it certain pitfalls. International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society (2019) 32:245–250 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10767-018-9307-9 The authors have been collaborating on the Horizon 2020 research project Unsettling Remembering and Social Cohesion in Transnational Europe (UNREST) (www.unrest.eu). * Anna Cento Bull A.Bull@bath.ac.uk 1 University of Bath, Bath, England, UK 2 University of Cardiff, Cardiff, Wales, UK http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1007/s10767-018-9307-9&domain=pdf http://www.unrest.eu mailto:A.�Bull@bath.ac.uk First, as the editors and authors of the introduction to this special issue, Sara Dybris McQuaid and Sarah Gensburger, point out, moving beyond the nation can quickly become synonymous with moving beyond the state, focusing on transnational cultural practices and civil society activism at the expense of national or sub-national policymaking. The nation-state remains both the historically dominant form of political organisation (Albrow 1998, p. 107) and a key locus of policy-making in relation to questions of memory and heritage (MacMillan 2009, p. 4). Recent works have even questioned the cosmopolitanisation of memory with reference to the Holocaust. Thus Dreyfus and Stoetzler (2011, p. 74) have argued that Holocaust commemorations are usually Bstate-driven, politically motivated^, with state policies and interventions effectively counteracting their globalisation. Welch and Wittlinger (2011) have critiqued the cosmopolitanisation of Holocaust memory’s theory, arguing that it has to be understood from the perspective of the German national interest: BWith that noxious material expelled from the national container, far from the container Bcracking,^ its refurbish- ment could proceed^ (p. 50). Second, particularly in the context of a Bcosmopolitan^ memory project that promotes an allegedly universal remembrance of past atrocities as an antidote to the particularism of nationalist memory cultures (Cento Bull and Hansen 2016), memory studies has moved from a largely descriptive project towards a normative approach that seeks to promote certain kinds of memory culture as more likely to foster human rights and global justice (Sundholm 2011). This normative approach, which relies on supranational peacebuilding practices and parameters, as the authors of the Introduction point out, has important, though not necessarily benign, implications in post-conflict societies undergoing processes of reconciliation. In light of the above, the foremost value of this special issue is twofold. On the one hand, it lies in the recognition that, while the state still matters and continues to exercise a primary role in policy-making, its attempts to Badminister^ memory take place in a context in which memory is also conditioned by Bthe flow of mediated narratives within and across state borders^ (De Cesari and Rigney 2014, p. 14), as well as by interventions from civil society actors at the local, national and transnational level. Work on the international politics of memory (e.g. Langenbacher and Shain 2010) has only just begun to get to grips with the ways in which transnational memory discourses are transformed within the national policy space. This kind of analysis can yield fascinating insights, as Linda Hasunuma and Mary McCarthy show in their contribution to this volume. Focusing on US-based campaigns in relation to the memory of Korean Bcomfort women^ in World War II, an international relations issue fraught with diplomatic tensions between Korea and Japan, the authors highlight how it became transformed into a universalised human rights/sexual violence theme thanks to the transnational memory discourses and local memory activism of an inter-ethnic, pan-Asian American female alliance. Simultaneously, the campaigns successfully targeted local and even nation-level policymakers. Conversely, more work needs to be done on the ways in which national-level policy makers actively seek to co-opt such discourses to project national interests (Clarke et al. 2017). Jacco Visser’s contribution to this special issue is particularly interesting in this respect, in that he shows how national-level political actors can extend their reach outside state bound- aries via links with diasporas and use extra-territorial spaces to project an apparently de- politicised national cultural heritage that belies deeper divisions about the past at home. On the other hand, what is particularly striking and especially welcome about the contri- butions here is their refusal to adopt a normative position in which an implicitly progressive 246 Bull and Clarke transnational memory somehow transcends regressive national memory. As Lea David dem- onstrates in her contribution on Bosnia, attempts by international and supranational organisa- tions to impose transnational memory discourses, in particular the cosmopolitan focus on victims of past abuses, into the national space can be anything but progressive, as they harden ethnic divisions and stances as well as reifying the oppositional categories of victims, perpetrators and bystanders. As David points out, memory is closely aligned with the experience of ontological security, not just at the individual, but also at the state and supra- state levels. As she demonstrates, the ontological security of the EU and its need to counter its role as ineffectual bystander during the war explains much of its human rights-focused approach to memory policies and practices, even at the expense of the ontological security of the Bosnian people. This helps explain why they can also be met with resistance that ultimately deepens antagonistically nationalist framings of the past. By contrast, when human-rights based transnational discourses align with the agenda and values promoted by nation-level policymakers, they are welcomed by the latter as helpful props for the achievement of their own policy goals, as Birgitte Schepelern Johansen and Thomas Brudholm demonstrate in their account of the mobilisation of Holocaust memory in campaigns against hate crime. However, transnational memory discourses can also be experienced as a threat to Bmnemonic security^ (Mälksoo 2015) both by politicians and conservative constituencies within states who see the cornerstones of group identity called into question by, for example, the demand that the nation come to terms with past crimes (Zarakol 2013). The need to pay attention not just to policymakers but to social constituencies is affirmed also in the contribution by Valérie Rosoux, which addresses the reasons for divergent outcomes in France’s post-war negotiation processes concerning the legacy and memory of the past with Germany and more recently with Algeria. While the former resulted in a Treaty of Friendship in 1963, the latter reached an impasse, which should be explained primarily in terms of the domestic resistance of various social groups, Blinked to the anger, grief, resentment, shame of guilt that have been passed on in family circles^. Both Maria Mälksoo and Sarah Maddison, in her contribution to this special issue, have proposed that such regressive counter-reactions to transnational memory discourses might be effectively managed through Bthe politics of agonistic mnemonic pluralism instead of the futile search for a mnemonical consensus^ (Mälksoo 2015, p. 232). Such an approach to the administration of memory holds out the hope of encounters between transnational memory discourses, on the one hand, and national or local identities, on the other, that could avoid the defensive stance observed in Maddison’s and David’s contributions to this special issue. Such plurality and multiperspectivism does not equate, however, to a relativist position in which different memory communities simply get to have their say. Rather, as Cento Bull and Hansen (2016, p. 399–400) have argued, true agonism respects the emotional investments of such communities in particular memories and their attendant identity constructions, while also demanding of them that they recognise as valid the positions of others, ideally creating the conditions for a reflexive engagement with their own memory discourse. It is inevitable, and in no way diminishes from the value of this special issue, that the contributions raise a number of questions requiring further probing and attention as well as deeper theorising. This is especially the case as regards different modes of remembering, specifically the antagonistic, the cosmopolitan and the agonistic. As the Editors state in their Introduction, Bthe tension between antagonism and agonism^ is recurrent throughout the volume, yet none of the contributions explicitly addresses the articulation between institutional levels and modes of remembering. To put it differently, can a pattern be discerned where we can associate specific levels of policy-making with particular approaches to memory policies? Administrations of Memory and Modes of Remembering: Some Comments on the... 247 At a superficial level, it might seem that the answer to this question is relatively straight- forward. Supranational institutions and organisations tend to foster a cosmopolitan approach to memory, while at state level there is still adherence to antagonistic stances and positive, heroic narratives of the past. Social movements and minority groups, on the other hand, especially at local level, are able to open up conflictual dynamics, contesting hegemonic memories in order to claim collective rights in the present. We have seen, however, how the contributions to this special issue belie such a simplistic representation in at least two ways. First, the alignment between governmental levels, civil society groups and modes of remembering is far from clear. Social groups and minority groups can adopt and promote antagonistic modes of remembering as much as agonistic ones, as shown in this volume by Rosoux in the case of French groups resisting a rapprochement with Algeria, and the author is not simply referring to the usual suspects, the Pieds-Noirs. State-level policy-makers, in turn, can themselves promote cosmo- politan practices and themes. Second, the picture is complicated by the fact that social groups and policy-making levels can adopt a particular mode of remembering yet reshape it to suit their specific needs and thus behave in very different ways. Thus, in Northern Ireland, as argued in the Introduction, an overarching cosmopolitan approach to memory work, promoted by the EU, leaves space for agonistic practices and modes, not least in a Bnational policy vacuum^. In Bosnia, by contrast, the cosmopolitan approach is reshaped to suit antagonistic policies and practices by regional-level ethnic leaders. Grasping the wider implications of these and other case studies would bring us closer to understanding the articulations between how we remember the past, which socio-political agents and governmental levels promote certain approaches to memory, and the reasons why they do so. Another set of questions concern agonism itself. While this approach is increasingly being advocated for post-conflict as well as settler colonial societies, not least in this special issue, the issue of agency, especially as regards policymakers, and that of the kind of policies this approach would entail remain unclear. As Sarah Maddison herself points out in her contribu- tion, the Australian government understands reconciliation as closure, as the restoration of a consensual society and has Bsought to use the administration of memory to […] close down space for ongoing political engagement^, refusing to address the issue of material reparations. Similarly, as Tambakaki (2012) has pointed out, both peace-building theorising and interna- tional policy-making acknowledge Bdissent and contestation with the aim of securing recon- ciliation or ‘harmony of selves’^, whereas Bagonistic theorists emphasise dissent, critique and contestation, with the aim of securing political openness^. It is difficult to envisage either the international or the state level switching to promoting an approach that deliberately forgoes closure in favour of ongoing contestation and acknowledges the need for material as well as symbolic reparations for past injustices without the concerted efforts of a diverse coalition of socio-political and cultural agents. It is not simply a question of post-conflict or settler colonial societies though. The contribution by Schepelern Johansen and Brudholm on linking the memory of the Holocaust to present-day campaigns against hate crime, highlights the relevance of this issue also for established and relatively undivided societies. The dilemma they discuss is an important one for understanding the wider relevance of how we remember in relation to politics and policy-making. The authors ask themselves whether we should remember the past with all its complexities and ambiguities, as well as political struggles and power inequalities, or whether we should instead opt for a strategy Bwhere ambiguities and complexities are traded for a univocal moral lesson^ which aims at mobilising people to action. While the conclusion to their piece tends to veer in this second direction, their discussion shows how this strategy ends up putting the onus of action upon social 248 Bull and Clarke individuals and groups, obscuring the role of state actors. Indeed, we would add that such an agenda relieves policy-makers from having to address structural inequalities and material injustices. While ostensibly promoting individual and collective political mobilisation as well as governmental intervention, this approach instead reinforces what Mouffe (2005, p. 58) has defined as Bthe increasing moralisation of political discourse^ and confirms her argument that Bpolitics is now played out in the register of morality ,̂ whereby the B‘good democrats’ who defend the universal values of liberal democracy^ are pitted against the B‘evil extreme right, racist and xenophobic, which must only be ‘eradicated’^. For the reasons outlined above, for the present agonistic memory is less a consistently applied policy approach than an intimation of a potential inherent in often marginalised practices (Aggestam et al. 2015), or emerging at certain moments within otherwise non- agonistic approaches to representing the past (Cercel 2018). The identification of such moments of agonism and the exploration of their potential in memory practices as diverse as artistic creation, museum-making and the exhumation of mass graves has been key to the EU-funded Horizon 2020 research project Unsettling Remembering and Social Cohesion in Transnational Europe (UNREST) (www.unrest.eu), but much work remains to be done in terms of operationalising agonistic approaches at multiple levels, from national and transnational civil society activism to state-led policy and the frameworks provided by regional organisations such as the European Union. The contributions in this special issue offer many starting-points for further research in this regard, above all by revealing the complexity of the relationships between these different levels and reminding us of the need to explore that complexity as a pre-requisite for the identification of meaningful applications of the concept of agonism. Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and repro- duction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made. References Aggestam, K., Cristiano, F., & Strömbom, L. (2015). Towards agonistic peacebuilding? Exploring the antagonism–agonism nexus in the Middle East peace process. Third World Quarterly, 36(9), 1736–1753. Albrow, M. (1998). Abschied vom Nationalstaat. Suhrkamp: Frankfurt a.M.. Cento Bull, A., & Hansen, H. L. (2016). On agonistic memory. Memory Studies, 9(4), 390–404. Cercel, C. (2018). The military history museum in Dresden: Between forum and temple. History and Memory, 30(1), 3–39. Clarke, D., Cento Bull, A., & Deganutti, M. (2017). Soft power and dark heritage: multiple potentialities. International Journal of Cultural Policy, 23(6), 660–674. De Cesari, C., & Rigney, A. (2014). Introduction. In C. De Cesari & A. Rigney (Eds.), Transnational memory: circulation, articulation, scales (pp. 147–168). Berlin: De Gruyter. Dreyfus, J.-M., & Stoetzler, M. (2011). Holocaust memory in the twenty-first century: between national reshaping and globalisation. European review of History: Revue européenne d’histoire, 18, 69–78. Erll, A. (2011). Traumatic pasts, literary afterlives, and transcultural memory: new directions of literary and media memory studies. Journal of Aesthetics & Culture, 3(1), 7186. Feindt, G., Krawatzek, F., Mehler, D., Pestel, F., & Trimçev, R. (2014). Entangled memory: toward a third wave in memory studies. History and Theory, 53, 24–44. Publisher’s Note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Administrations of Memory and Modes of Remembering: Some Comments on the... 249 http://www.unrest.eu Langenbacher, E., & Shain, Y. (Eds.). (2010). Power and the past: collective memory and international relations. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press. Levy, D., & Sznaider, N. (2002). Memory unbound. The holocaust and the formation of cosmopolitan memory. European Journal of Social Theory, 5(1), 87–106. MacMillan. (2009). The uses and abuses of history. London: Profile. Mälksoo, M. (2015). Memory must be defended: beyond the politics of mnemonical security. Security Dialogue, 46(3), 221–237. Misztal, B. A. (2003). Theories of social remembering. Maidenhead and Philadelphia: Open University Press. Mouffe, C. (2005). The ‘end of politics’ and the challenge of right-wing populism. In F. Panizza (Ed.), Populism and the mirror of democracy (pp. 50–71). London and New York: Verso. Schwelling, B. (Ed.). (2012). Reconciliation, civil society, and the politics of memory: transnational initiatives in the 20th and 21st century. Bielefeld: transcript. Sundholm, J. (2011). Visions of transnational memory. Journal of Aesthetics & Culture, 3(1). https://doi. org/10.3402/jac.v3i0.7208. Tambakaki, P. (2012). Agonism in international relations? E-International Relations, 18 September, available at: https://www.e-ir.info/2012/09/18/agonism-in-international-relations/ Welch, S., & Wittlinger, R. (2011). The resilience of the nation state: cosmopolitanism, holocaust memory and German identity. German Politics & Society, 29(3), 38–54. Zarakol, A. (2013). Ontological (in)security and state denial of historical crimes: Turkey and Japan. International Relations, 24(1), 3–23. 250 Bull and Clarke https://doi.org/10.3402/jac.v3i0.7208 https://doi.org/10.3402/jac.v3i0.7208 https://www.e-ir.info/2012/09/18/agonism-in-international-relations/ Administrations of Memory and Modes of Remembering: Some Comments on the Special Issue References 
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work_g5s7ynbwwbaxfdz3ogw5j6elqy	----	74207-King.q41 http://asr.sagepub.com/ American Sociological Review http://asr.sagepub.com/content/74/2/291 The online version of this article can be found at: DOI: 10.1177/000312240907400207 2009 74: 291American Sociological Review Ryan D. King, Steven F. Messner and Robert D. Baller Contemporary Hate Crimes, Law Enforcement, and the Legacy of Racial Violence Published by: http://www.sagepublications.com On behalf of: American Sociological Association can be found at:American Sociological ReviewAdditional services and information for http://asr.sagepub.com/cgi/alertsEmail Alerts: http://asr.sagepub.com/subscriptionsSubscriptions: http://www.sagepub.com/journalsReprints.navReprints: http://www.sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.navPermissions: http://asr.sagepub.com/content/74/2/291.refs.htmlCitations: at Serials Records, University of Minnesota Libraries on January 10, 2011asr.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://asr.sagepub.com/ http://asr.sagepub.com/content/74/2/291 http://www.sagepublications.com http://www.asanet.org http://asr.sagepub.com/cgi/alerts http://asr.sagepub.com/subscriptions http://www.sagepub.com/journalsReprints.nav http://www.sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav http://asr.sagepub.com/content/74/2/291.refs.html http://asr.sagepub.com/ Conflict theories of crime and criminal lawposit that the state largely serves the inter- ests of dominant groups in society (Quinney 1974; Turk 1969; Vold 1958) and this function can be expressed in two distinct ways. On the one hand, the legal apparatuses of the state— law and law enforcement—can be used to sub- ject members of subordinate groups to puni- tive control. Research in the group threat vari- ant of the conflict tradition, for instance, suggests that state social control increases in response to perceived threats from subordi- nate groups (Behrens, Uggen, and Manza 2003; Jacobs and Carmichael 2001; Jacobs and O’Brien 1998; Liska, Chamlin, and Reed 1985). On the other hand, the state can fail to serve the interests of subordinate groups by offering limited protection from harmful and unlawful behaviors. The state can serve dom- inant group interests not only by administer- ing punitive sanctions against a subordinate group, but also by “looking the other way” when civilians discriminate against subordi- nate group members. One of the more egregious examples of such “malign neglect” on the part of the state in U.S. history is the phenomenon of lynching in the late Contemporary Hate Crimes, Law Enforcement, and the Legacy of Racial Violence Ryan D. King Steven F. Messner University at Albany-SUNY University at Albany-SUNY Robert D. Baller University of Iowa This article investigates the association between past lynchings (1882 to 1930) and contemporary law enforcement responses to hate crimes in the United States. While prior research indicates a positive correlation between past levels of lynching and current social control practices against minority groups, we posit an inverse relationship for facets of social control that are protective of minorities. Specifically, we hypothesize that contemporary hate crime policing and prosecution will be less vigorous where lynching was more prevalent prior to 1930. Analyses show that levels of past lynching are associated with three outcome variables germane to hate crime policing and prosecution, but the effect of lynching is partly contingent on the presence of a minority group threat. That is, past lynching combined with a sizeable black population largely suppresses (1) police compliance with federal hate crime law, (2) police reports of hate crimes that target blacks, and in some analyses (3) the likelihood of prosecuting a hate crime case. Our findings have implications for research on law and intergroup conflict, historical continuity in the exercise of state social control, and theories that emphasize minority group threat. AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW, 2009, VOL. 74 (April:291–315) Direct correspondence to Ryan King, University at Albany, SUNY, 351 Arts and Sciences, 1400 Washington Avenue, Albany, NY 12222 (rking@albany.edu). An earlier version of this arti- cle was presented at the 69th Annual Meeting of the Southern Sociological Society, New Orleans, LA, March 22 to 25, 2006. The authors thank Richard Felson, Chris Galvan, Kelly McGeever, and the edi- tors and anonymous reviewers of the American Sociological Review for comments and assistance with this work. at Serials Records, University of Minnesota Libraries on January 10, 2011asr.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://asr.sagepub.com/ nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.1 Lynching “was a powerful tool of intimidation” for the white population to use against the sub- ordinate black population (Brundage 1997:2). Although lynching was not overtly sponsored by the state, lynching incidents were infrequently prosecuted and lynching “was tolerated (and often applauded) by local politicians and law officers” (Garland 2005:810).2 Today, there is a growing interest in hate crime as an extra-legal, indeed illegal, behavior that can be conceptualized as a means of social control. Scholars suggest that, much like lynch- ing, hate crimes do not merely victimize par- ticular individuals. Rather, they constitute a means of controlling the behavior of an entire group through intimidation and often violence (Craig 2002; Perry 2001). While such behavior is hardly a new phenomenon, legislation that mandates additional police attention to hate crimes, and criminal statutes that provide enhanced penalties for crimes motivated by big- otry, are relatively recent concepts in U.S. law. Legal protections “on the books,” however, are not always implemented in practice (Jenness and Grattet 2005). We suggest that racial antagonism is deeply ingrained in some pockets of the country, and there is continuity in how the state, via its law enforcement agencies, reacts to offenses moti- vated by bigotry. Our research investigates the association between legacies of past lynching and contemporary law enforcement responses to hate crimes. We regard the lynching of blacks nearly a century ago as indicative of two con- ditions pertinent to this research. First, lynch- ing was perhaps the most egregious expression of overt prejudice and demands for white supremacy during the Jim Crow era. Second, lynching dramatically depicts the state’s failure to protect a racial minority group from violent, extra-legal social control. Mindful of the categorical differences in race relations when comparing the Jim Crow era with the present, we suggest that racial antag- onism dies hard and may take on new forms in different historical periods. In line with Bobo and colleagues’ (Bobo, Kluegel, and Smith 1997; Bobo and Smith 1998) notion of a shift from Jim Crow to laissez faire racism, we posit that an undercurrent of racial antagonism per- sists in some locales but is now manifested in less overt actions. The spectacle of lynching has given way to less violent expressions of interracial conflict. The state’s past tendency to “turn a blind eye” to anti-black lynching is now expressed through resistance to policies per- ceived as giving special treatment to racial minorities. A logical extension of this notion is that in places where bigotry was culturally accepted and institutionalized in the Jim Crow era, law enforcement is now apt to resist “affir- mative action” policies that give special atten- tion to discrimination against minorities. Hate crime statutes represent one type of law that is likely seen as giving special protection to racial minority groups. Although the written laws must apply equally to majority and minor- ity group victims alike to remain constitution- al (Wisconsin v. Mitchell 1993), we argue that hate crime laws are largely protective of racial minorities for two reasons. First, non-white racial groups (particularly blacks) are statisti- cally most likely to be victims of hate crimes (Messner, McHugh, and Felson 2004). Second, the congressional history of hate crime laws in the United States largely entails testimony by aggrieved minority groups and makes refer- ence to heinous acts ranging from the Holocaust to modern anti-gay violence (see Jenness and Grattet 2001, e.g., pp. 35–37, 55). We argue that past lynching is likely predic- tive of current policing and prosecution of hate crime laws. Our reasoning is based on three premises: (1) racial antagonism was a powerful social force underlying the phenomenon of lynching, particularly, but not exclusively, in the South; (2) racial antagonism tends to be deeply ingrained in culture (i.e., it dies hard); and (3) the manifestations of racial antagonism evolve over time; specifically, an important manifestation of racial antagonism in the con- 292—–AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW 1 Malign Neglect is the title of Michael Tonry’s (1995) book on racial discrimination in criminal jus- tice administration. 2 We are careful to point out that local politicians and law enforcement were not always supportive of this practice, and volumes of the American Negro Year Book from the 1920s and 1930s describe several efforts to prevent lynching. It appears well accepted by scholars of lynching, however, that a significant proportion of the population did not regard the pre- vention of lynching during this era as a high priori- ty. at Serials Records, University of Minnesota Libraries on January 10, 2011asr.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://asr.sagepub.com/ temporary era is resistance to special legal pro- tections for racial minorities. We further argue that the impact of lynching is likely to depend on the relative size of the racial minority, con- sistent with insights from conflict and threat perspectives on social control. PAST RESEARCH, THEORY, AND HYPOTHESES CONTINUITY IN SOCIAL CONTROL— LYNCHING AND ITS LEGACY Prior research shows considerable continuity between past and present levels of social con- trol, and such path dependence is prominently captured in scholarship on past incidents of lynching and contemporary punitive sanctions. Zimring (2003), for instance, finds a statistical association between past lynching and current executions. He suggests that the death penalty is largely an extension of a vigilante tradition, and the racial overtones associated with lynch- ing continue to motivate the legalization and use of capital punishment. To that end, the racial imbalance in capital punishment (Baldus, Pulaski, and Woodworth 1983; Paternoster 1984) is analogous to disproportionate black victimization in past lynchings (Tolnay, Deane, and Beck 1996). Temporal continuity in social control is also the focus of related work on other forms of law and punishment. Wacquant (2000) views the history of social control in the United States as a succession of institutions that disproportion- ately subject minority populations to discrimi- natory punishment. Chattel slavery gave way to Jim Crow, which was then replaced by the “sur- rogate ghetto” of the modern penal apparatus (Wacquant 2000). Such continuity entails instru- mental and emotive characteristics. Punitive control can serve instrumental ends by main- taining existing power arrangements and strate- gically limiting minority group power (Behrens et al. 2003). Punitive acts may also entail sym- bolic and emotional attributes. Lynching served partly as a means of moral enforcement (Wyatt- Brown 1982), consistent with sociological argu- ments that criminal punishment is invested with moral power (Durkheim 1973; Garland 1990). Lynching was not analogous to other homi- cides, as its purpose was to incite terror and send a message beyond the immediate victims (Tolnay and Beck 1995). This practice was also laden with the politics of racial domination (Garland 2005), again akin to contemporary ideas on punishment (Jacobs and Carmichael 2002). The symbolic and cultural framework sur- rounding lynching is central to recent socio- logical research that links past lynching with current violence and sanctioning. For instance, Messner, Baller, and Zevenbergen (2005) pro- pose that lynching was indicative of cultural support for violence. They show that lynching exhibits staying power over several decades, evidenced by the correlation between past lynch- ing and current homicide levels in the American South. Jacobs, Carmichael, and Kent (2005) reach a similar conclusion with respect to puni- tive sanctions. Accounting for other known covariates of death sentences, their research indicates that past lynching is predictive of cur- rent death sentences administered against blacks. Similar to Zimring’s arguments, they conclude that the “tradition of legal vigilan- tism” (Jacobs et al. 2005:672) continues to inform the sanctioning process. While prior research links past lynching with contemporary social control, this body of work focuses almost entirely on violence (e.g., inter- racial homicide) or state sanctions (e.g., exe- cutions) that disproportionately and adversely affect racial minorities. As an extension to this line of research, we suggest that lynching is also predictive of law enforcement actions that are protective of minorities, such as the polic- ing and prosecution of hate crimes, but this association should work in the opposite direc- tion. It is tenable, we suggest, that the legacy of lynching has two simultaneous effects. First, past lynching may predict current racial antag- onism that subsequently manifests in the com- mission of hate-inspired crime. Second, law enforcement agencies may respond to hate- motivated attacks less vigorously under the same conditions, thereby reducing the likeli- hood that such incidents will be reported.3 We are concerned primarily with the latter propo- sition, which raises two additional questions: What mechanisms connect past lynching and PAST LYNCHING AND PRESENT HATE CRIME LAW ENFORCEMENT—–293 3 While these two outcomes are conceptually dis- tinct, distinguishing between them becomes com- plicated in empirical assessments. We address this issue in greater detail below. at Serials Records, University of Minnesota Libraries on January 10, 2011asr.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://asr.sagepub.com/ current law enforcement practices? And what are the specific implications for hate crime laws? FROM EMBRACING OVERT DISCRIMINATION TO RESISTING SPECIAL PROTECTION Lynching was a complex social phenomenon, and the literature advances numerous explana- tions for its prevalence. These include psycho- logical and psychoanalytic accounts, arguments about the reliance on popular or vigilante jus- tice to compensate for the perceived ineffec- tiveness of legal institutions, cultural interpretations highlighting southern notions of chivalry and honor, and “social threat” accounts emphasizing the political and eco- nomic competition between blacks and whites (Brundage 1997; Pfeifer 2004; Tolnay and Beck 1995). Despite disagreements about the relative importance of the various alleged causal factors, the distinctive racial character of lynching is hardly disputed. Beck and Tolnay (1997) esti- mate that of the more than 2,700 southerners lynched between 1882 and 1930, about 8 out of 10 were blacks brutalized by white mobs. Lynching was more than an effort to enforce social conformity in general on behalf of the community. These acts were extreme expres- sions of racial antagonism designed to intimi- date and control the black minority (Brundage 1993, 1997; Tolnay and Beck 1995). A second feature of lynching was the “malign neglect” by the state. The rampant lynching of blacks signified the state’s conspicuous failure to protect a racial minority. Many lynching inci- dents were perpetrated with impunity, as law enforcement either tolerated such behavior or acquiesced to it (Garland 2005). For example, some local law enforcement officials appeared to be complicit in Mack Charles Parker’s abduc- tion from his jail cell immediately before his lynching in 1959 (Smead 1986). Although lynchings were sometimes prevented, and a few organizations overtly sought to end the practice (Tuskegee Institute 1932), lynching was rarely pursued as a criminal offense. Statutes for arrest- ing and prosecuting lynchers were readily avail- able (e.g., homicide statutes), but as Garland (2005:809) notes, laws were rarely enforced against the lynchers. Prosecutions were not brought for lack of politi- cal will at the state level, or for lack of coopera- tion in the local community. In practice, lynchers enjoyed immunity from the state or local prose- cution. Anti-lynching campaigners .|.|. appealed for intervention by the federal government. .|.|. But this appeal to national law also failed. The cultural norms that motivated and per- mitted lynching have clearly changed. Today, lynching rarely occurs in the United States, and when such violent crimes of bigotry are perpe- trated, they are likely to be dealt with prompt- ly and severely by law enforcement. The 1998 lynching of James Byrd, for instance, resulted in prosecutions, convictions, and death sen- tences. The absence of overt Jim Crow racism, however, has not been replaced by ardent sup- port for policies designed to prevent discrimi- nation or compensate for past inequities. Bobo and Smith (1998) refer to this categorical shift in race relations as the movement from “Jim Crow” to “laissez faire” racism. The former refers to “overt bigotry” (Bobo and Smith 1998:185), namely, beliefs that blacks are cat- egorically inferior to whites and the concurrent institutionalization of such sentiments (e.g., segregation). Laissez faire racism rejects the inherent inferiority argument; under this para- digm, whites are likely to attribute inequality to individual shortcomings and to “actively resist meaningful efforts to ameliorate America’s racist social conditions and institutions [e.g., affir- mative action policies]” (Bobo and Smith 1998:186). The relevance of Bobo and colleagues’ ideas in the realm of criminal law is nicely illustrat- ed in Behrens and colleagues’ (2003) work on the changing justifications for felon disenfran- chisement laws during and after Jim Crow. In the course of debates about felon disenfran- chisement in the Jim Crow era, judges and leg- islators made reference to the enrichment of Anglo-Saxon civilization, and they openly labeled blacks as “menacing” and inherently different from whites (Behrens et al. 2003:570). Significant support still exists today for felon disenfranchisement laws, but they are now jus- tified by race-neutral arguments against repeal- ing laws that disproportionately affect blacks (pp. 570–72). We advance a similar argument with respect to law enforcement’s role in responding to crimes of bigotry, or what are now commonly referred to as hate crimes. Prosecutions fol- lowing the lynching of blacks were spotty and 294—–AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW at Serials Records, University of Minnesota Libraries on January 10, 2011asr.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://asr.sagepub.com/ convictions “nearly nonexistent” (Klarman 2000:55) during the Jim Crow era. We expect that in counties with a history of lynching a century ago, there is now a greater proclivity to resist policies that might give special treatment to blacks. In this regard, we draw an analogy with prior research on police use of violence. As Jacobs and O’Brien (1998:842) explain with respect to why police would use more violence against blacks under conditions of minority threat, “it is not necessary to claim that privi- leged groups make direct demands that the police use greater amounts of deadly force. Without restraints, police violence is probable.” When privileged groups are threatened, the powerful are less likely to interfere with police tactics, opening the way for more police vio- lence. With respect to hate crime law, the situation is in some sense reversed. Compliance with and enforcement of hate crime laws place added burdens on police officers and prosecutors. Recording offenses requires complicated judg- ments about motives, which makes proving offenses more difficult. To the extent that racial antagonism is manifested in resistance to spe- cial protections for racial minorities, skepti- cism about the legitimacy of hate crime laws (i.e., Why should there be special statutes designed largely to protect minorities?) and indifference to enforcement of such laws, or compliance with them, is increasingly likely. Furthermore, without support from the gener- al population, police and prosecutors are like- ly to follow the path of least resistance and infrequently put these laws into action. We investigate the following general hypoth- esis: the contemporary enforcement of hate crime laws and compliance with hate crime mandates are inversely associated with prior levels of lynching. Another possibility, which we explicate below, is that the legacy of lynching matters only in the presence of a minority group threat. RACIAL THREAT AND HATE CRIME LAW Theories that emphasize racial threat view law as an instrument for subverting econom- ic and political challenges posed by racial minorities. In line with classic explanations of intergroup relations (Blalock 1967), the racial threat thesis postulates that majority popula- tions and elites perceive a large or growing racial minority group as threatening. Such threats incite a variety of reactions from major- ity groups, such as right-wing voting (Giles and Buckner 1993), prejudicial attitudes (Quillian 1996), and expansive state social control (Jackson 1989). Racial threat is implicated in our assessment of lynching and hate crime law for two reasons. First, black population size as an indicator of racial threat is likely to be predictive of hate- crime law enforcement. Research is mostly sup- portive of racial threat tenets in the realm of criminal law, as evidenced in work on arrest rates (Liska et al. 1985), policing expenditures (Jackson 1992), and the legalization of capital punishment (Jacobs and Carmichael 2002). These findings are generally congruent with research that connects black population size to prejudice toward blacks in the contemporary United States (Quillian 1996) and to lynchings a century ago (Tolnay et al. 1996). We propose that if black population size increases both prejudice and social control that adversely affects racial minorities, it may decrease social control perceived as protecting minorities. This argument is partly supported by research that finds less compliance with feder- al hate crime laws in southern cities and coun- ties with large black populations (King 2007). In line with that work, and in concert with research on the state’s neglect of blacks’ legiti- mate crime control needs (Anderson 1997, 1999; Hawkins 1987), we hypothesize that black population size is inversely associated with hate crime law enforcement and compliance with federal hate crime laws. Beyond this direct link between racial threat and hate crime laws, threat may also condition the effect of lynching. In their work on capital punishment, Jacobs and colleagues (2005:660) suggest that “in the absence of a black popula- tion sufficiently large to pose a current threat, a prior tradition of vigilantism [as indicated by lynching] may not be enough to lead to addi- tional death sentences.” To wit, past lynching only increases the contemporary use of capital punishment in areas with sizeable black popu- lations. It is reasonable to expect that racial composition might also modify the link between lynching and the state’s protective functions for racial minorities, which implies a statistical interaction. Specifically, we hypothesize that PAST LYNCHING AND PRESENT HATE CRIME LAW ENFORCEMENT—–295 at Serials Records, University of Minnesota Libraries on January 10, 2011asr.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://asr.sagepub.com/ the association between hate crime law enforce- ment (including compliance with hate crime law mandates) and lynching becomes increas- ingly negative as the size of the black popula- tion increases. POLITICS, INTERGROUP CRIME, AND HATE CRIME LAW ENFORCEMENT Extant theory and research dictate that our analysis account for political partisanship. Politics is an increasingly salient factor in the study of punishment (Beckett 1997; Sutton 2000). In particular, support for conservative politicians is linked with elevated use of crim- inal punishment (Jacobs and Carmichael 2002; Jacobs and Helms 1996, 1999). Yet conservative politics may decrease hate crime reporting (McVeigh, Welch, and Bjarnason 2003). All our models thus include a measure of political conservatism. Explanations of state responses to hate crimes must also confront the notion that hate crime law enforcement simply reflects the level of inter- group crime in a jurisdiction. This “reactive explanation,” commonly put forth as an alter- native to the threat perspective (Jacobs and O’Brien 1998), suggests that hate crime polic- ing and prosecution are direct functions of the level of intergroup crime motivated by animus. We thus test our hypotheses concerning lynch- ing, racial threat, and law enforcement respons- es to hate crimes while accounting for the level of intergroup violence (to the extent possible with the available data). DATA, MEASURES, AND METHODOLOGY SAMPLE, UNITS OF ANALYSIS, AND THE LYNCHING VARIABLE Our samples and units of analysis are deter- mined by the strategic independent variable— lynching. We assess the effect of past lynching on current law enforcement responses to hate crimes using two different samples and three outcome variables. First, we use rich lynching data for a sample of counties and county clus- ters in 10 southern states: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Tennessee. County-level lynching data for these states come from Tolnay and Beck’s inven- tory of southern lynching.4 Tolnay and Beck (1995:259) developed their inventory by first creating an “unconfirmed master list” of all lynchings that occurred within these states, as reported in previously used and publicly avail- able inventories. They then validated these inci- dents through meticulous cross-checking with newspaper stories “to determine whether the event truly was a lynching and to correct for fac- tual errors that may have been included in the original inventories” (p. 260). Their final prod- uct is “a confirmed inventory” of lynching in the South from 1882 to 1930 (p. 260). Tolnay and Beck’s register is the “gold standard” for research on lynching. Our primary analyses are thus based on the 10 southern states for which these data are available. As noted, counties serve as the focal geo- graphic units. However, because county bor- ders have changed over the past century and thus current boundaries do not always mirror the period from which our lynching data are gen- erated, we aggregate adjacent counties into clus- ters in some cases. We created clusters in accordance with the Horan and Hargis (1995) county template, which includes an aggregation key indicating which counties should be com- bined to account for boundary changes that occurred between 1880 and 1990. To retain as much geographic detail as possible, we do not replace individual counties with county clusters in two situations: (1) when a county cluster had no lynching activity and (2) when such activi- ty occurred only after boundary changes were completed. In these cases we can determine whether a modern county experienced a lynch- ing between 1882 and 1930; where no lynchings occurred, there is no reason to create county clusters. This “southern sample” consists of 726 counties and county clusters.5 296—–AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW 4 Stewart E. Tolnay and E. M. Beck generously pro- vided the lynching data. For a description of data col- lection methods, see Tolnay and Beck (1995). 5 In supplementary analyses, we created addition- al clusters and reestimated the models. We did this because some law enforcement agencies are covered by other agencies in a different county. For example, a few agencies report no crime data to the FBI, but instead send their data to an agency in another coun- ty that submits those data, plus their own, to the FBI. We deal with this in the current analysis by control- ling for general crime reporting as a predictor vari- at Serials Records, University of Minnesota Libraries on January 10, 2011asr.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://asr.sagepub.com/ Because our theoretical argument concerns the legacy of lynching, which constitutes a vio- lent act laden with symbolic power of domina- tion and suppression (Garland 2005), we measure the lynching count rather than the lynching rate. The symbolic significance of lynching is unlikely to be diluted in citizens’ minds by the proportionate representation of lynching in the immediate area (cf. Tolnay et al. 1996). Moreover, we include only those lynch- ing incidents that had one or more black victims. This maintains continuity with our theoretical argument, which concentrates on the racial antagonism associated with lynching. Our main independent variable thus depicts the frequen- cy of lynchings with black victims in county clusters from 1882 to 1930. Although we focus primarily on the 10 south- ern states identified above (because of the high quality of the lynching data), we supplement this set of regional analyses with an assessment of lynching and law enforcement responses to hate crimes for all counties in the United States. Replicating the analysis of 10 southern states speaks to the robustness and generalizability of our findings, with the caveat that the nation- al lynching data are of lesser quality outside the states in the Tolnay–Beck sample.6 For this “national sample,” we catalogued all lynching incidents with black victims for counties outside the aforesaid 10 southern states using data from the NAACP’s 1919 publication, Thirty Years of Lynching in the United States, 1889–1918. This publication’s goal was to compile detailed infor- mation on lynching incidents that had been reported in various sources, such as the Chicago Tribune and the Tuskegee Institute, and to pub- lish these “facts” about lynching without edi- torial commentar y. Appendix II of the publication is a chronological listing of persons lynched in the United States between 1889 and 1918. Nearly all the cases include information on the race of the victims and the city (and typ- ically county) of the lynching.7 We aggregated the NAACP data to the county level and merged these data with the counts based on the Tolnay and Beck inventory to create a national sample. As with the 10-state sample, we formed clusters in other states using the Horan and Hargis tem- plate. The Appendix lists counties that were not formed into clusters because all their lynching activity occurred after modern boundaries were in place. Some clustering was also required to link data for 1990 and 2000 (e.g., in Alaska). These counties are also listed in the Appendix. Because the NAACP data are available for a period of 30 years, whereas Tolnay and Beck’s inventory encompasses 49 years, we annual- ized the lynching counts for the supplementary analyses of all U.S. counties. That is, we divid- ed the NAACP lynching count by 30 and the Tolnay and Beck count by 49 to standardize for the number of years for which data were record- ed. We are thus able to examine whether any effect of lynching observed in the southern sam- ple can be replicated in a national sample of counties and county clusters. DEPENDENT VARIABLES Crime statistics can reflect the actual amount of criminal offending or the reporting practices of law enforcement agencies (Black 1971; Kitsuse and Cicourel 1963); more likely, it will be some combination of the two. This duality with respect to crime statistics complicates our inquiry because we cannot know whether hate crime data furnished by the government reflect the true number of offenses motivated by big- otry (as used by Medoff 1999) or law enforce- ment’s willingness to execute hate crime statutes (the approach adopted by McVeigh et al. 2003). Mindful of this “realist versus constructivist” debate, we use three separate dependent vari- ables that cover two primary institutions of for- PAST LYNCHING AND PRESENT HATE CRIME LAW ENFORCEMENT—–297 able, but there is no substantive difference in the findings when dealing with the issue via additional clustering. The results are consistent for the 10-state and national samples (described below). 6 See Appendix B in Tolnay and Beck (1995) for an extended discussion of the types of errors often found in publicly available inventories on lynching. 7 We recorded 494 lynching incidents with black victims (outside the 10 southern states described above) from the NAACP (1919) publication. In eight cases, no city or county information was provided, and thus we could not code the geographic location of those incidents. In 18 cases, the NAACP listed a city but not a county. With the assistance of second- ary sources (namely Abate 1974; Forstall 1996; Gannett 1902, 1975), we found the corresponding county in two of those cases. We dropped nine other incidents because the county identifier in the NAACP data appears to be wrong. In all, we have county identifiers for 461 incidents. The Appendix provides a full list of changes we made to the NAACP data. at Serials Records, University of Minnesota Libraries on January 10, 2011asr.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://asr.sagepub.com/ mal social control—police departments and dis- trict attorneys’ offices. The police represent the gateway to the crim- inal justice system, and crimes not identified by the police are not likely to receive attention from other law enforcement agencies. Bell (2002), for instance, reports that police inves- tigations of hate crimes have notable implica- tions for charging decisions made later in the adjudication process. We thus measure hate crime policing via two measures. Our f irst policing variable measures compliance with the Hate Crime Statistics Act (HCSA). The HCSA requires the Justice Department to acquire and publish data about crimes that manifest prejudice based on certain group defining characteristics, including race, eth- nicity, sexual orientation, and disability (see Public Law 101-275, section b(1); also Public Law 103-322 and Public Law 104-155). Compliance with the HCSA is recognized as a f irst step toward policing hate crimes (Jenness and Grattet 2001), and it is viewed as “critical” for hate crime law enforcement (U.S. Department of Justice 2002). Such compli- ance indicates a basic recognition of the law, even if a law enforcement agency reports no hate crime offenses. To that end, investigating compliance with the HCSA has the advantage of making no assumptions about the preva- lence of offending motivated by bigotry in an area, because policing agencies can comply with the law even if they report no hate crime incidents. We suggest that failure to comply with the HCSA data collection mandate, par- ticularly when compliance with other federal crime reporting initiatives is in evidence (gen- eral Uniform Crime Report reporting), signi- fies a resistance to or ambivalence about the hate crime law. In addition, this variable is useful because the HCSA applies to all polic- ing agencies in the United States, regardless of state statutes, although compliance is both vol- untary and highly variable (McDevitt et al. 2000). We focus primarily on sheriffs’ departments in this analysis because the lynching data are organized at the county level. Sheriffs largely correspond to counties and, with some excep- tions, their responsibilities include law enforce- ment and crime reporting. Using smaller units of analysis, such as municipal policing agencies within counties, would be problematic because our focal independent variable, lynching, is measured at the county (or county-cluster) level. In singular counties not grouped into clusters, we measure the compliance variable by the number of quarters that the sheriff ’s office sub- mitted hate crime reports in compliance with the HCSA between 1992 and 2003.8 Where coun- ties are clustered because of border changes since 1880, we take the average number of com- pliant quarters for the cluster.9 That period, 1992 to 2003, corresponds to the first year that data were generated as a result of the HCSA and ends with the most recent available year when this analysis began. There is noticeable variation in the degree of compliance during our period of study (see Table 1 for descriptive statistics), with several departments failing to comply for the duration of the study. We suspect that com- pliance with the federal hate crime law is not randomly distributed; rather, we expect it to covary with historical lynching activity and racial demographics. While the compliance variable has the advantage of making no assumptions about the actual prevalence of hate crimes, it fails to capture the degree of actual hate crime report- ing. That is, policing agencies could ceremo- nially “comply” with the letter of the law without recording a single hate crime offense. We thus include a second outcome variable that measures the number of anti-black moti- vated hate crimes reported by police in the county or county cluster. We include hate crimes reported by sheriffs’ departments and local policing agencies within the county clus- ter because the data can be meaningfully aggre- gated to the county (or county-cluster) level.10 Since we focus partly on the concept of racial threat, and because our lynching variable is used to indicate historical tolerance for extra- legal violence against blacks, our “hate crime 298—–AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW 08 The Department of Justice requests that law enforcement agencies submit quarterly hate crime reports. Our data cover 12 years; thus there are 48 quarters in which law enforcement agencies were “at risk” of compliance (12 years � 4 quarters per year). 09 See the Appendix for exceptions and addition- al notes about the law enforcement agencies. 10 We exclude hate crimes reported by state patrols or regional police. at Serials Records, University of Minnesota Libraries on January 10, 2011asr.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://asr.sagepub.com/ reporting” outcome variable focuses specifi- cally on the number of hate crimes that target blacks, as identified by police. This dependent variable represents a count of the crimes moti- vated by animus toward blacks as reported by policing agencies between 1992 and 2003. As depicted in Table 1, this variable includes a tremendous range of hate crime reporting activity. During the 12 years under investiga- tion, the number of anti-black hate crimes reported in the 10 southern states varies from zero in some counties to a high of 480.11 PAST LYNCHING AND PRESENT HATE CRIME LAW ENFORCEMENT—–299 Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for Southern Sample (N = 726) Mean SD Min. Max. Dependent Variables —Compliance with federal hate crime law 20.2 13.41 0 45.00 —Racially-motivated hate crimes that target blacks, as reported by policea 3.53 20.22 0 480 —Hate crime prosecution in 2000 (N = 674) .18 .38 0 1.00 Independent Variables —Lynching 3.37 5.53 0 61.00 —Percent black (1990) 20.17 18.86 0 86.12 —Percent black (2000) 20.31 19.32 0 86.13 —Population logged (1990) 10.32 1.12 7.55 15.62 —Population logged (2000) 10.45 1.14 7.64 15.85 —Percent urban (1990) 32.04 26.65 0 99.96 —Percent urban (2000) 35.54 28.13 0 99.90 —Percent divorced (1990) 9.93 1.62 4.80 19.08 —Percent divorced (2000) 12.46 1.50 7.23 19.79 —Percent ages 15 to 29 (1990) 22.44 3.35 14.03 47.41 —Percent ages 15 to 29 (2000) 20.20 3.36 12.94 44.46 —General crime reporting to UCR – dummy measure .97 .16 0 1.00 —General crime reporting to UCR – ordinal measure 1.34 .53 0 2.00 —Percent voting for Bush in 1992 40.88 9.34 12.94 74.96 —Percent voting for Bush in 2000 54.98 10.72 12.35 84.02 —Black county commissioners per 100,000 (logged) 1.58 1.97 0 6.79 —Any elected black sheriff .06 .23 0 1.00 —White on black homicides .56 3.42 0 83.00 —Percent born in state (1990) 75.78 13.45 17.22 97.24 —Percent born in state (2000) 72.05 13.45 19.42 96.51 —Percent black officers in county cluster (1990) 16.78 21.26 0 100 —White unemployment (1990) 5.80 2.43 1.37 18.39 —White unemployment (2000) 4.80 1.71 .39 12.93 —White poverty (1990) 14.86 6.55 2.29 52.20 —White poverty (2000) 12.63 5.18 2.40 45.31 —Black–white unemployment ratio (1990) 2.7 1.13 0 11.75 —Black–white unemployment ratio (2000) 2.91 1.89 0 26.84 —Black–white poverty ratio (1990) 3.11 1.05 .78 8.96 —Black–white poverty ratio (2000) 2.85 1.00 .56 9.38 —Years under NIBRS 2.29 4.29 0 14 —Police per thousand (agency – Table 2 only) .73 .62 .02 7.45 —Police per thousand (county cluster – Table 3 only) 1.55 .75 .2 7.45 —Hate crimes reported in 2000 .9 5.25 0 121 Note: Missing data on the hate crime prosecution variable decreases the valid N to 674. The N is also smaller for the following variables that were included only in analyses of counties with 500 or more black residents: percent black officers in the county, black–white unemployment ratio, and the black–white poverty ratio. a The maximum value is an outlier, which is omitted from analysis, although the results are consistent when it is included. 11 The high value represents an outlier and corre- sponds to a cluster of counties. We omit that case when estimating the effects of our predictor vari- ables on the outcome of hate crime reporting, although the results are consistent when including the case. The same is true for the supplementary analy- at Serials Records, University of Minnesota Libraries on January 10, 2011asr.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://asr.sagepub.com/ Our assumption is that higher levels of hate crime reporting, in part, indicate greater atten- tion by police to identifying and formally report- ing potential anti-black hate crime incidents.12 Still, we acknowledge that the interpretation of this variable is somewhat problematic because police identification of hate crimes to some extent reflects the actual volume of hate crime offenses. This is, in part, why we examine mul- tiple dependent variables, although we offer two additional arguments in support of using this measure. First, our models include a measure of interracial violence perpetrated by the dominant racial group against a racial minority—the num- ber of white-on-black homicides. To the extent that this measure is correlated with the level of racially-motivated hate crimes, the confounding of offending with police reporting practices should be reduced. Second, we note that the main effect of lynching on anti-black hate crimes may be positive if the variable measuring report- ed anti-black hate crimes captures some actual crimes of bigotry, although it would be consis- tent with our account if the interaction term for percent black and lynching is negative. Because policing captures only one institu- tional facet of law enforcement, we include an additional variable germane to prosecution. Prosecution is arguably a more proximate indi- cator of law enforcement than is compliance with federal reporting statutes or overall hate crime reporting. We estimate the likelihood of a hate crime prosecution, which we measure by the presence (coded 1) or absence (coded 0) of a single hate crime prosecution during a one- year period beginning in 2000.13 An additional analysis of the number of hate crime prosecu- tions would be desirable, but data limitations confine our analysis of this dependent variable to the presence or absence of a prosecution. The only source containing data on prosecutions for all U.S. counties is the 2001 National Prosecutors Survey (NPS; conducted by the U.S. Department of Justice.) The NPS is a bian- nual survey that monitors trends in prosecu- tion. The 2001 survey is a full census of all district attorneys’ offices that operate in state courts with felony jurisdiction in the United States. Among the information included in this survey is whether a district attorney’s office prosecuted special categories of crime, includ- ing hate crime. For the year in question, 18 per- cent of the off ices in our southern sample prosecuted one or more hate crime cases (20 percent in the national sample). We are unable to disaggregate this measure into types of hate crime prosecution (e.g., racial motivation, reli- gious motivation), so this variable includes some additional error compared with the previous two measures. It would, however, be consistent with our theory if past lynching, particularly in combination with current racial threat, decreas- es the likelihood of hate crime prosecution.14 ADDITIONAL INDEPENDENT VARIABLES In addition to lynching, a second focal inde- pendent variable concer ns racial threat. Consistent with prior work on prejudice and punishment, we measure racial threat as the percentage black in a county or county cluster. Because our hate crime policing data begin in 1992, we use 1990 U.S. Census data on racial composition for the policing dependent variables and 2000 data for the prosecution outcome vari- able. We also include a product term for lynch- ing and percent black to test for an interaction effect. We note, however, that the statistical interaction may have different implications for the respective dependent variables. When 300—–AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW sis of all counties in the nation, where one case exceeds a value of 2,000. We removed that case from the analysis, but there is no meaningful change in the coefficients and standard errors when it is included. 12 McVeigh and colleagues (2003:846), for instance, suggest that hate crime reports “reflect dif- ferent incentives to call acts of bias to the attention of local authorities, as well as different incentives that influence law enforcement agents to respond to, and report, hate crimes.” 13 The exact one-year period could vary slightly depending on the date that the National Prosecutors Survey was actually completed, but this period cov- ers 12 months in late 2000 and early 2001 for all offices. 14 We coded clustered counties 1 if any of the counties were under the jurisdiction of a district attorney’s office that prosecuted a hate crime. The NPS data include some missing cases on the hate crime prosecution measure, thus reducing our sam- ple size. We dropped counties in some states from the supplementary analysis of prosecution in the nation- al sample; those cases and the justifications for drop- ping them are discussed in the Appendix. at Serials Records, University of Minnesota Libraries on January 10, 2011asr.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://asr.sagepub.com/ assessing compliance, we expect the effect of lynching to become increasingly negative as the percent black increases. For our measure of anti-black reported hate crimes, where the main effect of lynching is likely positive, we expect this effect to be tempered in the presence of a large black population because of suppressed reporting practices. We thus expect consisten- cy in the direction of the interaction coeffi- cients even if specific tipping points may differ. A negative interaction coefficient would be par- ticularly revealing compared with recent work on other types of social control. Whereas the interaction between lynching and percent black was found to be positive for types of social con- trol that are punitive against blacks (Jacobs et al. 2005), we expect that the same interaction is negative for social control perceived as protec- tive of blacks. Our analysis also accounts for three indica- tors of political control. First, all models con- trol for the general level of political conservatism. For the policing dependent vari- ables, we measure political conservatism as the percentage of a county or county cluster that voted for President George H. W. Bush in the 1992 presidential election. This indicator pro- vides a standardized measure of conservatism since all eligible citizens chose from the same slate of presidential candidates. Because our prosecution measure pertains to the years 2000 to 2001, this set of analyses uses the percentage voting for George W. Bush in the 2000 election as a comparable indicator of conservatism. Second, we use the number of black elected county commissioners per 100,000 residents as an indicator of black political representa- tion.15 Third, all models include a dummy vari- able indicating that the county, or at least one county in a cluster, had a black elected sheriff at some point between 1994 and 2002. These lat- ter two measures are reasonable indicators of black political control, or at least of an under- lying propensity to elect blacks to lead local political institutions, which could potentially mediate the purported effects of black popula- tion size and lynching. It is also imperative to control for character- istics of law enforcement agencies in the respec- tive counties. We control for a sheriff ’s department’s propensity to comply with any data collection mandates when modeling the compliance dependent variable. Using county- level Uniform Crime Report (UCR) data fur- nished by the FBI, we employ two control variables to account for that propensity. First, we coded a general crime reporting dummy variable as 1 if a sheriff ’s department submitted any crime data in accordance with the UCR for 1992 to 2003; we coded complete abstainers 0. Where counties are clustered, we coded the cluster as 1 if any of the sheriffs’ offices report- ed crime information. Second, we include an ordinal variable consisting of three categories: agencies that reported no data for the UCR (“abstainers”), those that reported some of the time (“partial reporters”), and finally depart- ments that always reported general crime infor- mation to the UCR (“consistent reporters”). Our assumption is that this measure will account for a general proclivity to report crime infor- mation and should be strongly and positively correlated with the compliance dependent vari- able. We can then assess the effects of lynching and black population size on hate crime law compliance net of the propensity to report gen- eral crime data.16 Beyond these agency indicators, we also measure the number of years that an agency has submitted crime data as part of the National Incident Based Reporting System (NIBRS). Because hate crime reporting is structurally a part of that system, there should be a positive correlation between participation in NIBRS and hate crime reporting. We calculate this variable by subtracting the year an agency began the NIBRS program from 2004 (agencies not par- ticipating are coded 0). In addition, we use data from the U.S. Department of Justice to measure PAST LYNCHING AND PRESENT HATE CRIME LAW ENFORCEMENT—–301 15 Specifically, we counted the number of black elected commissioners in a county or county cluster for each year between 1994 and 2002, standardized that measure by population size (in 1990), and then logged the variable to reduce extreme skew (we added a constant of 1 before logging). Data for black com- missioners and black elected sheriffs were provided by the Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies. Data are not available for 1992 and 1993. 16 As described below, we use the dichotomous “general crime reporting” variable only to predict “zero-counts” in our zero-inflated negative binomi- al model. We use the ordinal measure to predict the actual number of compliant quarters. at Serials Records, University of Minnesota Libraries on January 10, 2011asr.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://asr.sagepub.com/ the number of officers per capita in the polic- ing agency (for the compliance outcome vari- able) or the number of police officers per capita in the county (for hate crime reporting) as con- trols for law enforcement capacity.17 It is plau- sible that larger policing agencies are better able to absorb additional data collection respon- sibilities. Finally, in some models restricted to counties (or clusters) with 500 or more black residents, we control for the percentage of black police officers using data from the 1990 U.S. Census Equal Employment Opportunity File (ICPSR 9929). It seems reasonable to expect that the policing of hate crimes against a racial minority group will positively correlate with the representation of this group in law enforce- ment. We also control for several other potential correlates of hate crime policing and prosecu- tion.18 All analyses control for the logged pop- ulation of the county or county cluster, along with the percent urban. In addition, we account for the percent divorced and the percentage of the population age 15 to 29 because, in theory, these proxy measures of social disorganization could influence police investigation practices (Borg and Parker 2001). We also control for the percentage of whites in the civilian labor force who are unemployed and the percentage of whites below the poverty line because it is plausible that any effect of racial threat could be attributed to economic competition and adverse economic conditions for the majority group (data are from the 1990 and 2000 U.S. Censuses). In some models restricted to counties with more than 500 black residents, we further test whether black/white unemployment and pover- ty ratios are consequential. We calculate these ratios as the percentage of the black population unemployed divided by the percentage white unemployed and the percentage of blacks in poverty divided by the percentage of whites in poverty, respectively. For each indicator, high- er values indicate that blacks do worse relative to whites. An additional control variable meas- ures the percentage in a county (or cluster) that was born in the state of residence. This meas- ure is potentially important because cultural traditions may change appreciably where there is significant population turnover. As mentioned above, we also include a proxy measure of interracial criminal violence, as indicated by the number of white-on-black homicides using data from Fox (2005). Following standard practices, this measure r e f e r s t o m u r d e r s a n d n o n - n eg l i g e n t manslaughters, as recorded by police in the FBI’s Supplementary Homicide Reports (SHR), that occurred in 1986, 1987, 1992, 1993, 1994, and 1995. We use these years to account for the fact that police in Florida pro- vided no information to the FBI from 1988 to 1991.19 We exclude homicides recorded by state police departments because the county of incident is often missing or may be incorrect. Furthermore, to create an unambiguous meas- ure of interracial homicide, we exclude inci- dents involving more than one victim or offender (Williams and Flewelling 1988).20 Since both ethnic heterogeneity and the lega- cy of lynching predict interracial violence (on lynching, see Messner et al. 2005; on hetero- geneity, see South and Messner 1986) and for- mal social control (on lynching, see Zimring 2003; on race, see Jackson 1989), a viable alternative hypothesis is that racial threat and 302—–AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW 17 Data are missing for a small number of cases (six in the southern sample and 68 in the national sam- ple). We used mean substitution for these cases. Additional models that omit these cases from analy- sis yield the same substantive results and are avail- able from the authors upon request. 18 Given the different time frames for our policing and prosecution dependent variables, we measure the control variables at 1990 for policing and at 2000 for prosecution, unless otherwise noted. 19 Agencies in Kentucky contributed no data to the Supplementary Homicide Reports in 1988. From 1996 to 2003, agencies in Florida provided no data to the FBI, so we use the same 1986 to 1995 meas- ure of white-on-black homicides for the analysis of prosecution. Finally, results presented below hold when white-on-black argument-related homicides, or those that occurred in the context of lovers’ trian- gles, alcohol-induced brawls, narcotics-induced brawls, arguments over money or property, or other arguments, are controlled instead. 20 The homicide measure does not reflect Fox’s adjustment for missing data. In a personal commu- nication with one of the authors, Fox (January 2006) advised that his weighting scheme not be used in county-level analyses. at Serials Records, University of Minnesota Libraries on January 10, 2011asr.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://asr.sagepub.com/ the legacy of lynching increase interracial vio- lence, which in turn influences state respons- es to interracial crimes. We test the impact of lynching and race on our outcome variables net of our indicator of interracial violence. When using hate crime prosecution as the dependent variable, we also control for the num- ber of hate crimes reported by police in a coun- ty (or cluster) for the year 2000. This control variable is important because police reporting of hate crimes is likely to be consequential for prosecution. The policing and prosecution of hate crimes could also be influenced by state laws or direc- tives from state agencies, such as the respective attorneys general. To account for potential state- level influences, we include dummy variables for all states, with one state omitted as a refer- ence category. By fixing the state effect, we essentially investigate within-state variation in our outcome variables of interest. METHODS We use binary logistic regression to assess the effects of our predictor variables on our dichoto- mous outcome variable—hate crime prosecu- tion. The respective measures of hate crime law compliance and police reports of racially-moti- vated hate crimes are continuous, but also high- ly skewed, and they each include multiple zeros. Ordinary Least Squares regression may be prob- lematic when the distribution is positively skewed and heteroskedasticity is present. However, Poisson-based estimators can provide nonbiased estimates for positively skewed event counts (Osgood 2000). We use negative bino- mial models because overdispersion is present in both variable distributions. We estimate the models for hate crime law compliance using zero-inflated negative bino- mial regression because the distribution includes many zeros and several of these cases are sys- tematically related to an agency’s general crime reporting practices (i.e., non–hate crime report- ing to the FBI). As Cameron and Trivedi (1998) spell out in detail, and Jacobs and Carmichael (2004) illustrate for the case of death sentences, the zero-inflated procedure is suitable for a dis- tribution with many zero-counts and where some cases are at reduced risk, or no risk at all, of experiencing an event, such as law enforce- ment agencies that generally do not report crime data.21 The zero-inflated routine simultaneous- ly estimates two models: one on the likelihood of a zero-count and another on the expected count of the outcome variable. When modeling zero-counts, we rely on a single control variable presumed to be strongly correlated with the absence of hate crime reporting—an agency’s general crime reporting record. Agencies that generally fail to report crime data are not expected to report hate crime data, but for rea- sons that may have little to do with racial threat and the legacy of lynching. We use both the negative binomial and the zero-inflated models for the analysis of anti- black hate crimes reported. The models yield nearly identical substantive results, but the zero- inflated model is more appropriate for one analysis, as explained below. RESULTS We begin with an analysis of compliance with the HCSA, measured by the number of quarters a department reported hate crime data for 1992 to 2003 (Table 2). Model 1 reports estimates for additive effects based on our zero-inflated neg- ative binomial model; Model 2 includes the interaction term for lynching and racial com- position; and Model 3 adds race-specific meas- ures such as the black–white unemployment and poverty ratios. Intuitively, the results in Model 1 indicate that the degree of hate crime law compliance increases with the degree of general crime reporting to federal authorities (b = .191), and the likelihood of reporting zero hate crimes decreases substantially if an agency reports general crime data (b = –4.441). The number of compliant quarters also increases with the length of participation in the NIBRS program (b = .082). Our measure of law enforce- ment capacity (police officers per capita) is sig- nificantly and negatively correlated with the outcome variable, which may appear counter- intuitive. Notably, the correlation is positive and significant in models that omit the state dummy variables. One plausible interpretation is that such counties are more invested in puni- PAST LYNCHING AND PRESENT HATE CRIME LAW ENFORCEMENT—–303 21 These agencies would technically still be at risk, but prior research suggests the likelihood of report- ing hate crimes is highly dependent on general crime reporting (King 2007). at Serials Records, University of Minnesota Libraries on January 10, 2011asr.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://asr.sagepub.com/ 304—–AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW Table 2. Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial Regression Coefficients: Number of Quarters that County Sheriffs’ Departments Submitted Hate Crime Reports Regressed on Predictor Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Lynching of blacks –.005 .004 .004 (.003) (.005) (.006) Percent black –.0001 .0006 –.0007 (.001) (.001) (.002) White unemployment –.006 –.006 (.008) (.008) White poverty –.010* –.010* (.003) (.003) Black–white unemployment ratio –.008 (.019) Black–white poverty ratio .042* (.019) Logged population –.004 –.004 –.014 (.022) (.022) (.026) Divorce rate .004 .005 –.0007 (.009) (.009) (.011) Population ages 15 to 29 –.002 –.001 –.001 (.004) (.004) (.005) Percent urban .0001 .00004 .0003 (.0008) (.0008) (.001) Crime reporting (ordinal) .191* .189* .237* (.028) (.028) (.033) Voting for Bush in 1992 –.002 –.002 .0005 (.002) (.002) (.002) White-on-black homicides –.001 –.002 –.0006 (.003) (.003) (.003) Percent born in state –.001 –.0008 –.0002 (.001) (.001) (.001) Years reporting NIBRS .082* .081* .062* (.016) (.016) (.020) Percent black officers .003* (.001) Police officers per capita –.073* –.071* –.099* (.026) (.026) (.036) Elected black county commissioners –.004 –.004 –.0009 (.010) (.010) (.011) Black county sheriffs .025 .045 .036 (.058) (.058) (.062) Lynching of blacks � percent black –.0003* –.0003 (.0001) (.0002) Constant 3.909* 3.835* 3.572* (.261) (.263) (.331) Zero-value Any UCR reporting –4.441* –4.440* –4.145* (.602) (.602) (.612) N 726 726 562 �2 / df 892.41 / 25 896.95 / 26 699.05 / 27 Notes: The state dummy variables, which are included in the model but not shown in the table, are statistically significant, indicating that state effects account for part of the variation in compliance. Many predictor variables, such as political conservatism (–), percent black (–), percent born in state (–), and population size (+) are signifi- cant when the state dummies are omitted from the model. Police force size is positive and significant when state dummies are omitted. Standard errors are in parentheses. * p ≤ .05 (all tests two-tailed). at Serials Records, University of Minnesota Libraries on January 10, 2011asr.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://asr.sagepub.com/ tive social control and concomitantly less apt to comply with civil rights–related laws. The results for the lynching measure and its interaction with racial composition are of par- ticular theoretical interest. Net of the control variables, Model 1 shows that past lynching is negatively associated with hate crime law com- pliance, albeit at a more permissive level of sta- tistical signif icance (b = –.005; p < .10, two-tailed). Counties and county clusters with frequent lynchings in the past are less likely to comply with the HCSA. This coefficient is mod- est with respect to magnitude; an increase of 10 past lynchings yields an expected 5 percent decrease in the number of compliant quarters (1 – e–.005*10). Consistent with our interaction hypothesis, the coefficient for the product term (Model 2) suggests that the legacy of lynching is contin- gent on black population size. In that model, the lynching coefficient is not significantly differ- ent from zero when the black population is zero. However, the interaction coefficient shows that the effect of lynching on compliance becomes smaller and ultimately turns negative after the black population surpasses about 13 percent, and it becomes increasingly stronger in the neg- ative direction thereafter. This contingent asso- ciation aligns with recent arguments that the legacy of lynching is associated with law enforcement outcomes only in the presence of a sizeable black population (Jacobs et al. 2005). Model 3 in Table 2 provides a test of robust- ness by incorporating additional race-specific measures. The interaction coefficient in Model 3 remains significant, albeit at a more modest level of statistical significance ( p < .10, two- tailed). This is based on a smaller N because the sample is limited to counties and clusters with 500 or more black residents to permit the inclu- sion of control variables for black officers and measures of black–white economic inequality. The results in this model also indicate that com- pliance increases with the proportion of black police officers in a county (b = .003). Net of such race-specific measures, a main effects model (without the interaction term) shows that lynching is negatively and significantly corre- lated with compliance (model not shown). Table 3 shows the negative binomial regres- sion coefficients for our second outcome vari- able, the number of anti-black hate crimes reported by police. Looking first at the main effects model (Model 1), a few of the control variables are signif icantly associated with reported anti-black hate crimes. Police report such crimes with greater frequency in more populous areas (b = 1.003), where the number of police officers per capita is higher (b = .609), and where there is a sizeable young population (b = .06). Net of the control variables, and unlike the previous analyses of compliance, the main effects model (Model 1) in Table 3 indicates a positive association between past lynchings and reported hate crimes that target blacks (b = .028). This result is consistent with Messner and colleagues’ (2005) finding that lynching is positively associated with white-on-black argu- ment-related homicides, although at first glance this finding appears to contradict our hypothe- sis. Yet, Models 2 and 3 in Table 3 again point to an interaction between past lynchings and cur- rent black population size. The models suggest that lynching has a positive effect on police reports of anti-black hate crimes where no blacks reside, but this effect diminishes as the percent black increases, ultimately reversing direction as the black population surpasses about 40 percent. In Models 1, 2, and 3 in Table 3, we find little support for our hypothesis that anti- black hate crimes are inversely related to past lynching of blacks, but the direction and sig- nificance of the coefficient for the interaction term is consistent with our hypothesis con- cerning racial threat and the legacy of lynching. Table 3 raises a question that warrants addi- tional scrutiny: Why is the main effect for lynch- ing positive for anti-black hate crimes reported by police, in apparent contradiction to one of our predictions? One possibility is that policing agencies in counties with a history of racial antagonism encounter offenses motivated by racial animus with some frequency. While the inclination in such counties may be to refrain from reporting these as hate crimes, some agen- cies may report them either on their own voli- tion or due to incentives such as state directives or participation in NIBRS. If true, we would expect a legacy of lynching to decrease the like- lihood of reporting any anti-black hate crimes, but to increase reports among counties report- ing one or more anti-black hate crimes. To shed some light on this possible scenario, we turn to Model 4 in Table 3. This model pre- sents a zero-inflated negative binomial model PAST LYNCHING AND PRESENT HATE CRIME LAW ENFORCEMENT—–305 at Serials Records, University of Minnesota Libraries on January 10, 2011asr.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://asr.sagepub.com/ 306—–AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW Table 3. Negative Binomial Regression Coefficients: Number of Racially-Motivated Hate Crimes that Target Blacks Reported by Police, Regressed on Predictor Variables Model 4 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 (zero-inflated) Lynching of blacks .028* .079* .070* .038* (.012) (.025) (.025) (.012) Percent black –.005 –.0006 –.002 –.002 (.008) (.008) (.010) (.009) White unemployment –.024 –.016 –.046 (.051) (.051) (.053) White poverty –.029 –.029 –.021 (.020) (.020) (.021) Black–white unemployment ratio .039 (.101) Black–white poverty ratio .213* (.098) Logged population 1.003* 1.010* 1.006* .801* (.123) (.123) (.134) (.135) Divorce rate –.067 –.059 –.050 –.062 (.055) (.055) (.060) (.057) Population ages 15 to 29 .060* .058* .066* .052* (.020) (.020) (.022) (.020) Percent urban .005 .004 .0004 .006 (.005) (.005) (.005) (.005) Voting for Bush in 1992 .002 .004 .006 .002 (.009) (.009) (.011) (.009) White-on-black homicides –.063 –.064 –.045 –.046 (.033) (.034) (.036) (.033) Police officers per capita .609* .642* .736* .660* (.139) (.139) (.159) (.154) Percent born in state –.002 –.0004 .0007 –.004 (.007) (.007) (.008) (.007) Percent black officers –.009 (.007) Elected black county commissioners .109 .113 .086 .010 (.059) (.059) (.060) (.061) Black county sheriffs .461 .572 .695* .553 (.312) (.311) (.315) (.316) Lynching of blacks � percent black –.002* –.002* (.0008) (.0008) Constant –11.205* –11.778* –13.244* –8.809* (1.496) (1.513) (1.755) (1.656) Zero-count —Logged population –3.354* (1.146) —Lynching of blacks .158* (.081) —Percent black .044 (.026) —Constant 29.560* (10.463) N 725 725 561 725 �2 / df 568.27 / 23 574.59 / 24 487.40 / 25 439.42 / 23 Notes: Dummy variables for states are included in the analysis but not shown in the table. Standard errors are in parentheses. * p ≤ .05 (all tests two-tailed). at Serials Records, University of Minnesota Libraries on January 10, 2011asr.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://asr.sagepub.com/ with lynching and percent black predicting the likelihood of a zero-count for hate crime report- ing (net of population size; bottom part of the table), as well as the number of anti-black hate crimes reported (top part of the table). The results are consistent with the previous account. The odds of reporting zero anti-black hate crimes increase with each past lynching (b = .158). At the same time, when looking at polic- ing agencies that report one or more hate crimes, the frequency of reported hate crimes increas- es with each past lynching (b = .038). We also acknowledge a plausible alternative inter pretation of our f indings in Table 3. Research convincingly shows that hate crimes perpetrated against blacks are more frequent where the black population is small, presumably because whites are emboldened and seek to protect traditionally “white turf ” (Green, Strolovitch, and Wong 1998; Lyons 2007). It fol- lows that a legacy of lynching could be associ- ated with current hate crime behavior against blacks, and that this tendency is exacerbated where the black population is small. The inter- action term in Model 2 is consistent with this explanation if one assumes that official statis- tics reliably measure the prevalence of hate crime offending, and we suggest that the coef- ficients may partly reflect such an account. Still, three sets of findings support our interpretation of the coefficients. First, lynching is negative- ly correlated with compliance (Model 1 of Table 2), a dependent variable that is not contingent on the level of offending. Second, a legacy of lynching increases zero-counts of anti-black hate crimes (Model 4 in Table 3), which is con- gruent with our assumptions. And third, if the reporting data entirely reflect actual offending, and if blacks are more often hate crime victims where they lack numbers and power, then we would expect significant and negative coeffi- cients for the respective main effects of per- cent black, black sheriffs, and black commissioners. Yet Model 1 in Table 3 shows that percent black is not statistically significant and the latter two coefficients are actually pos- itive in direction.22 Table 4 shows logistic regression coeff i- cients for the last dependent variable, hate crime prosecution. Several variables are asso- ciated with prosecution. As expected, a hate crime prosecution is more likely where more hate crimes are reported by police (b = .103). We also find a negative association between political conservatism (voting for Bush) and hate crime prosecution (b = –.036). With respect to the focal independent variables, the evidence is consistent with the racial threat perspective as articulated above; the odds of a hate crime prosecution decrease by about 4 percent for each percentage increase in the black population (100*[1 – e–.039]). Models 2 and 3 in Table 4, however, show that the inter- action coefficient is in the predicted direction but it is not statistically signif icant.23 An important limitation of the hate crime prose- cution variable is that it does not distinguish between racially-motivated hate crime cases and cases not entailing racial bias. The preceding analyses are limited to the South, the region for which the lynching data are of the highest quality. As an additional test to incorporate a wider geographic area, we use data on all counties from the NAACP’s catalog of lynching incidents from 1889 to 1918 to test our interaction models for each dependent vari- able. These results, shown in Table 5, are con- sistent with the analysis of the 10 southern PAST LYNCHING AND PRESENT HATE CRIME LAW ENFORCEMENT—–307 exhibit an interactive effect on crimes based on racial bias. Given the logic of this argument, there is no rea- son to expect an interaction between lynching and black population size when modeling non–racially- motivated hate crimes. Indeed, in additional analyses not shown here but available from the authors upon request, neither the main effect of lynching nor its interaction with percent black is statistically signif- icant when counts of non–racially-motivated hate crimes are regressed on the same set of predictor variables. 23 The interaction coefficient for percent black and lynching is statistically significant and negative in alternative model specif ications in which the dummy variables for states are omitted and the stan- dard errors are adjusted for clustering within states. In these models, the interaction effect is very simi- lar to that found in the analysis of hate crime law com- pliance in Table 2. It is likely that variation in state laws and other state directives covary with both the legacy of lynching and prosecution. 22 One additional point concerning the analysis of anti-black hate crimes is noteworthy. Our argument emphasizes racial antagonism and racial threat, and thus we predict lynching and racial composition to at Serials Records, University of Minnesota Libraries on January 10, 2011asr.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://asr.sagepub.com/ states. In Models 1 through 5, which includes an analysis of hate crime prosecution, the inter- action coefficient is negative and statistically significant ( p value for the interaction term in Model 6 is .064). Bearing in mind our earlier cautions about the quality of this national data set, these results suggest that the joint impact of lynching and racial composition on law enforce- ment responses to hate crimes hold when extending our sample beyond the South. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION The results from our analyses of hate crime policing and prosecution are largely in line with our theoretical premise that the legacy of lynch- ing, which we use as an indicator of historical racial antagonism and the state’s failure to pro- tect a minority group, is predictive of contem- porar y law enforcement responses to hate-motivated crimes. Past lynching is nega- tively correlated with hate crime law compliance 308—–AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW Table 4. Logistic Regression Coefficients: Prosecution of a Hate Crime Case on Predictor Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Lynching of blacks –.008 .045 .021 (.029) (.058) (.061) Percent black –.039* –.034* –.029 (.015) (.015) (.018) White unemployment .043 .043 (.104) (.104) White poverty –.074 –.073 (.045) (.045) Black–white unemployment ratio –.203 (.147) Black–white poverty ratio .410* (.155) Logged population .343 .313 .393 (.231) (.232) (.252) Divorce rate –.087 –.085 –.126 (.094) (.094) (.105) Population ages 15 to 29 .037 .037 .035 (.040) (.040) (.040) Percent urban –.017* –.017 –.018 (.009) (.009) (.009) Voting for Bush in 2000 –.036* –.035* –.022 (.016) (.016) (.020) White-on-black homicides .011 .029 .043 (.086) (.091) (.094) Hate crimes reported in 2000 .103* .105* .103* (.051) (.051) (.051) Percent born in state –.028* –.026* –.029* (.012) (.012) (.013) Elected black county commissioners .065 .064 .066 (.095) (.094) (.097) Black county sheriffs .481 .538 .562 (.545) (.549) (.556) Lynching of blacks � percent black –.002 –.002 (.002) (.002) Constant 1.613 1.554 –.519 (2.845) (2.859) (3.390) N 674 674 538 �2 / df 133.11 / 23 134.31 / 24 103.55 / 24 Notes: Dummy variables for states are included in the analysis but not shown in the table. Standard errors are in parentheses. * p ≤ .05 (all tests two-tailed). at Serials Records, University of Minnesota Libraries on January 10, 2011asr.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://asr.sagepub.com/ by policing agencies (Table 2, Model 1) and increases the likelihood of reporting no hate crimes (Table 3, Model 4). Moreover, for two of the three dependent variables in analy- ses restricted to 10 southern states, and for five of six analyses of the national sample of U.S. counties, the interaction coefficient for past lynching and our measure of current racial threat is negative and significant. In other words, a history of lynching in com- bination with a relatively large racial minor- ity is associated with lesser compliance with, and enforcement of, hate crime legislation. We readily acknowledge several important limitations in this research. First, as dis- cussed earlier, a question that affects virtu- ally all work on hate crime offending and law enforcement responses is whether the num- ber of reported hate crimes and the legal processing of these crimes actually reflect the prevalence of this type of behavior. Or, do reports and prosecutions of hate crimes reflect a willingness to enforce hate crime laws, consistent with the constructivist per- spective? It is difficult to adjudicate between these competing ideas without independent measures of offending and enforcement. Mindful of this difficulty, we examined hate crime law enforcement via multiple outcome variables and multiple institutions (police and prosecutors), and by introducing proxy measures of plausible intervening mecha- nisms to the extent possible. Still, while our measures of reporting and compliance behave in a manner consistent with a con- structivist interpretation of the outcome vari- ables, future work might attempt to replicate our findings with data on related outcomes, such as arrests, judges’ sentencing enhance- ments, and convictions. In addition, qualita- tive inquiry into policing agencies and prosecutors’ offices could shed direct light on the activities and orientations of those who enforce hate crime laws (cf. Bell 2002), thereby enhancing the veracity of our inter- pretations. Second, given the aggregate nature of the data, we are unable to identify the specific actors involved in the enforcement of hate crime legislation, the characteristics of these actors, and the nature of the decision-mak- ing processes associated with the recording and prosecution of hate crimes. A particularly PAST LYNCHING AND PRESENT HATE CRIME LAW ENFORCEMENT—–309 T a b le 5 . C o ef fi ci en ts f o r L y n ch in g, P er ce n t B la ck , an d T h ei r P ro d u ct T er m f o r A n al y si s o f al l U .S . C o u n ti es (M o d el 4 ) (M o d el 2 ) (M o d el 3 ) A n ti -b la ck (M o d el 6 ) (M o d el 1 ) C o m p li an ce A n ti -b la ck h at e cr im es (M o d el 5 ) P ro se cu ti o n C o m p li an ce > 5 0 0 b la ck s h at e cr im es > 5 0 0 b la ck s P ro se cu ti o n > 5 0 0 b la ck s C o rr es p o n d in g m o d el f ro m Ta bl e 2 , Ta bl e 2 , Ta bl e 3 , Ta bl e 3 , Ta bl e 4 , Ta bl e 4 , so u th er n s a m p le M o d el 2 M o d el 3 M o d el 2 M o d el 3 M o d el 2 M o d el 3 C o ef fi ci en ts — L y n ch in g o f bl ac k s .2 4 7 .2 4 2 3 .4 9 9 * 2 .7 9 0 * 5 .1 8 2 * 3 .9 2 8 — — (a n n u al iz ed ) (. 1 6 1 ) (. 1 8 9 ) (. 8 6 5 ) (. 8 5 3 ) (2 .1 5 6 ) (2 .2 3 2 ) — P er ce n t bl ac k .0 0 0 8 – .0 0 0 2 – .0 0 1 .0 0 0 2 – .0 2 1 * – .0 1 5 (. 0 0 0 8 ) (. 0 0 1 ) (. 0 0 5 ) (. 0 0 6 ) (. 0 1 0 ) (. 0 1 1 ) — L y n ch in g * p er ce n t bl ac k – .0 1 3 * – .0 1 3 * – .0 9 3 * – .0 7 2 * – .1 8 4 * – .1 4 4 (. 0 0 5 ) (. 0 0 6 ) (. 0 3 1 ) (. 0 2 9 ) (. 0 7 7 ) (. 0 7 8 ) N 2 ,8 0 1 1 ,3 1 2 2 ,8 2 3 1 ,3 2 6 2 ,5 6 1 1 ,3 1 8 N o te s: A n al y si s in cl u d es d u m m y v ar ia bl es f o r st at es a n d c o n tr o ls f o r al l va ri ab le s in t h e co rr es p o n d in g m o d el s fr o m T ab le s 2 , 3 , an d 4 . A d d it io n al d at a n o te s ar e in cl u d ed i n t h e A p p en d ix . S ta n d ar d e rr o rs a re i n p ar en th es es . * p ≤ .0 5 ( al l te st s tw o -t ai le d ). at Serials Records, University of Minnesota Libraries on January 10, 2011asr.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://asr.sagepub.com/ important issue for future research to investigate is how the individual attribute of race interacts with the features of the larger social context. For example, what political pressures and organi- zational constraints impinge upon black enforce- ment agents (police, sheriffs, and prosecutors) who work in settings characterized by deeply ingrained traditions of racial antagonism? How do such actors adapt to these pressures and, in some cases, overcome organizational constraints that might discourage vigorous enforcement of hate crimes? Finally, our indicator of lynching is ultimately an indirect proxy for an intervening mecha- nism—cultural traditions. We argue that lynch mobs’ actions in the past reflected the racial antagonism of the time and place and the state’s failure to protect the predominant racial minor- ity, and this general cultural orientation has dis- sipated but not completely evaporated over time. Deeply ingrained traditions “die hard,” and we propose that traces of the cultural sentiment that permitted lynching linger into the present and are manifest today via lax enforcement of laws that deal with hate crimes. However, direct measures of such latent cultural traditions and contemporary cultural orientations are unavail- able. We also cannot tally the number of lynch- ings prevented by whites who viewed the practice as contemptible, which could further elaborate our f indings.24 Nevertheless, our results demonstrate a coherent series of rela- tionships involving lynching, racial composition, and multiple indicators of hate crime law enforcement that align with our theoretically grounded account. With these caveats in mind, the analyses fur- ther underscore other researchers’ claims about historical continuity in the exercise of social control (Jacobs et al. 2005; Wacquant 2000; Zimring 2003). They also largely support Bobo and Smith’s (1998) suggestion that race relations have morphed from overt discrimination into skepticism about laws that assume a protective role for racial minorities, in this case evidenced by our focus on blacks. Jim Crow racism has largely ceased, but race and the history of racial antagonism remain vital for understanding vari- ation in state responses to crimes of bigotry. Our finding that the effect of lynching on law enforcement responses to hate crimes is contingent on current racial threat is also con- sistent with recent research on other facets of social control, such as death sentences (Jacobs et al. 2005). It appears, however, that this inter- play increases punitive actions that dispropor- tionately fall on minorities (see, e.g., Jacobs et al. 2005) while decreasing law enforcement protective of minorities. In light of this, our conclusion that the social control of intergroup conflict is in part a function of both current racial threat and a cultural tradition of apathy toward the protection of minorities suggests promising topics for future research on related laws and policies. For example, our model would predict that reports of employment dis- crimination are less likely to be investigated where past lynching episodes are numerous and the current black population is relatively large. The results are also germane to other institutions that often assume a protective function for lower-class minority groups, such as indigent defense systems. It would be consistent with our account if the same counties that scarcely enforce hate crime laws also provide less access to effective defense counsel. These ideas rep- resent a sampling of research topics that might be informed by our model, and empirical work on such issues could further test the credibility of our interpretations. We close by emphasizing that this research partly corroborates prior work on state respons- es to hate crimes by further illustrating the social construction of hate crimes (McVeigh et al. 2003) and explaining the gap between written and practiced law (Jenness and Grattet 2005). We go beyond extant work by drawing theoret- ical and empirical attention to the cultural under- pinnings of state responses to crimes entailing bigotry. Although all states are “at risk” of reporting hate crimes and complying with fed- eral law, substantial intraregional and intrastate variation exists. Laws that remain dormant in some places are enforced, or complied with, in 310—–AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW 24 While we cannot measure prevented lynchings, we did measure the continuation of lynching after the Great Migration began and elites increasingly chal- lenged the practice (Tolnay and Beck 1995). We rees- timated the models using the number of lynchings with black victims from 1916 to 1930 (as opposed to the full 1882 to 1930 period), and the substantive results are consistent with those reported in the text. These results are available from the authors upon request. at Serials Records, University of Minnesota Libraries on January 10, 2011asr.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://asr.sagepub.com/ APPENDIX ADDITIONAL NOTES ON DATA We made the following changes to the NAACP data, using SAS. The following two lines of code assign county identifiers based on city identifiers: if state = ‘Texas’ and city = ‘Hedsville’ then county = ‘ROBERTSON’; if state = ‘Texas’ and city = ‘Lang’ then county = ‘GILLESPIE’; The following lines of code edit the NAACP county identifier to match that found in the Horan and Hargis (1995) template: if state = ‘Illinois’ and county = ‘VERMILLION’ then county = ‘VERMILION’; if state = ‘Illinois’ and county = ‘SAINTCLAIR’ then county = ‘STCLAIR’; if state = ‘Indiana’ and county = ‘WARWICK’ then county = ‘WARRICK’; if state = ‘Maryland’ and county = ‘ALLEGHANY’ then county = ‘ALLEGANY’; if state = ‘Maryland’ and county = ‘ARUNDEL’ then county = ‘ANNEARUNDEL’; if state = ‘Maryland’ and county = “PRINCEGEORGE’S” then county = ‘PRINCEGEORGES’; if state = ‘Missouri’ and county = ‘GREEN’ then county = ‘GREENE’; if state = ‘Missouri’ and county = ‘GREENLEE’ then county = ‘GREENE’; if state = ‘Michigan’ and county = ‘SAINTCLAIR’ then county = ‘STCLAIR’; if state = ‘Missouri’ and county = ‘ST.CHARLES’ then county = ‘STCHARLES’; if state = ‘Missouri’ and county = ‘SAINTLOUIS’ then county = ‘STLOUISCOUNTY’; if state = ‘Oklahoma’ and county = ‘MANNFORDCREEK’ then county = ‘CREEK’; if state = ‘Texas’ and county = ‘FT.BEND’ then county = ‘FORTBEND’; if state = ‘Texas’ and county = ‘BEAVER’ then county = ‘POLK’; if state = ‘Texas’ and county = ‘GARFIELD’ then county = ‘RUSK’; if state = ‘Virginia’ and county = ‘ACCOMAC’ then county = ‘ACCOMACK’; if state = ‘Virginia’ and county = ‘ALBEMARIE’ then county = ‘CHARLOTTESVILLECITY’; if state = ‘Virginia’ and county = ‘ALEXANDRIA’ then county = ‘ALEXANDRIACITY’; if state = ‘Virginia’ and county = ‘ALEGHANY’ then county = ‘ALLEGHANY’; if state = ‘Virginia’ and county = ‘CULPEPPER’ then county = ‘CULPEPER’; if state = ‘Virginia’ and county = ‘FARQUHAR’ then county = ‘FAQUIER’; if state = ‘Virginia’ and county = ‘HOUSELOUISA’ then county = ‘LOUISA’; if state = ‘Virginia’ and county = ‘MEEKLENBURG’ then county = ‘MECKLENBURG’; if state = ‘Virginia’ and county = ‘MERCER’ then county = ‘TAZEWELL’; if state = ‘Virginia’ and county = ‘NOTTAWAY’ then county = ‘NOTTOWAY’; if state = ‘Virginia’ and county = ‘PITTSYLVANIA’ then county = ‘DANVILLECITY’; if state = ‘Virginia’ and county = ‘ROANOKE’ then county = ‘ROANOKECITY’; if state = ‘Virginia’ and county = ‘WARWICK’ then county = ‘NEWPORTNEWSCITY’; if state = ‘Texas’ and county = ‘WENO’ then county = ‘COLORADO’; PAST LYNCHING AND PRESENT HATE CRIME LAW ENFORCEMENT—–311 others. We investigated such variation to shed light on the social control of intergroup conflict and to illustrate the current consequences of conflict-laden histories. History reveals clues to contemporary criminal justice behavior, but a full understanding of such behavior requires consideration of current social structures in combination with cultural legacies. Ryan D. King is an Assistant Professor of Sociology at the University at Albany, State University of New York. His research focuses on crime, criminal law, and intergroup conflict. Current work in this vein exam- ines hate crime law, criminal deportations in U. S. history, and sentencing. Steven F. Messner is Distinguished Teaching Professor of Sociology, University at Albany, State University of New York. His research focuses on social organization and crime, the spatial patterning of crime, and crime and social control in China. In addition to his publications in professional journals, he is coauthor of Crime and the American Dream and Perspectives on Crime and Deviance, as well as co- editor of Theoretical Integration in the Study of Deviance and Crime and Crime and Social Control in a Changing China. Robert D. Baller is an Associate Professor of Sociology at the University of Iowa. His research examines violence, features of social structure, and culture. at Serials Records, University of Minnesota Libraries on January 10, 2011asr.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://asr.sagepub.com/ We did not form the following counties with lynching activity into clusters because the activ- ity occurred entirely after modern county boundaries were in place. In Texas: Reeves, Valverde, Crockett, Kinney, Pecos, Schleicher, and Sutton. In Virginia: Charlottesville City, Albemarle, Pittsylvania, Danville City, Roanoke, Roanoke City, Salem City, Buchanan, Dickenson, Russell, Wise, Norton, Elizabeth City, Newport News City, Warwick, Warwick City, and Hampton City. In Wyoming: Albany, Converse, Goshen, Laramie, Niobrara, and Platte. In Arkansas: Cleburne, Independence, Van Buren, and White. In Florida: Monroe. In Kentucky: Ballard and Carlisle. In North Carolina: Cumberland, Durham, Hoke, Orange, Robeson, and Wake. In South Carolina: Charleston. In Tennessee: Fentress, Overton, and Pickett. We clustered the following counties to link various data from 1990 and 2000. In Alaska, we formed the Yakutat borough, the Skagway- Hoonah-Angoon census area, and the Skagway- Yakutat-Angoon census area into one cluster. Also in Alaska, we clustered Denali, Yukon- Koyukuk, and Southeast Fairbanks. In Virginia, we clustered South Boston and Halifax, as well as Alleghany and Clifton Forge City. In Montana, we clustered Yellowstone National Park (part), Gallatin, and Park. In Hawaii, we clustered Kalawao and Maui. Finally, in New York, we clustered Bronx, Kings, New York, Queens, and Richmond counties. DATA CODING NOTES ON POLICING AND PROSECUTION We used sheriffs’ departments for the compli- ance outcome variable (Table 2). If there was no sheriff ’s department, but a county police depart- ment was available, we used the latter. If no county or reasonable substitute (with county- level jurisdiction) was available, we coded the case as missing. Three states in our supple- mentary analysis of the national sample were particularly problematic: Connecticut, Alaska, and Virginia. In the former two states, sheriffs’ offices were systematically missing because of law enforcement organization in those states, and we could identify no county policing agency or a reasonable proxy. (None of these states are in our focal sample of 10 southern states.) For Virginia, we used the municipal policing agency’s degree of compliance for county FIPS codes greater than 500. The issues described above are relevant only for Models 1 and 2 of Table 5. Table A1 lists additional special cases where, for reasons detailed in the table, we used a non–sheriff ’s department policing agency. With three exceptions, these apply only to the sup- plementary analysis of compliance in the national sample (Table 5, Models 1 and 2). We aggregated counties coterminous with New York City boroughs into one “New York” cluster. Given the unique organization of district attorneys’ offices in Connecticut (correspond- ing to county subunits) and no county-level data in the National Survey of Prosecutors for Alaska, we dropped these states from the analy- sis of prosecution in Models 5 and 6 in Table 5. We had to drop several county clusters for Model 6 in Table 5 because the model is restrict- ed to counties with more than 500 blacks; hence the much smaller N for that analysis. 312—–AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW We dropped NAACP lynchings with the following county identifiers because the identifiers appear to be wrong: if state = ‘Missouri’ and county = ‘LIBERTY’ then drop = 1; if state = ‘Texas’ and county = ‘AVALON’ then drop = 1; if state = ‘Texas’ and county = ‘PASO’ then drop = 1; if state = ‘Texas’ and county = ‘SANPETE’ then drop = 1; *6 lynchings dropped; if drop ne 1; at Serials Records, University of Minnesota Libraries on January 10, 2011asr.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://asr.sagepub.com/ REFERENCES Abate, Frank R. 1974. American Places Dictionary. Detroit, MI: Omnigraphics, Inc. Anderson, Elijah. 1997. “Violence and the Inner- City Street Code.” Pp. 1–30 in Violence and Childhood in the Inner City, edited by J. McCord. New York: Cambridge University Press. ———. 1999. 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work_gd2v7e33kbheti6rynq3e23zvm	----	Aligning Bodies: Collecting, Arranging, and Describing Hatred for a Critical Queer Archives Aligning Bodies: Collecting, Arranging, and Describing Hatred for a Critical Queer Archives Marika Cifor LIBRARY TRENDS, Vol. 64, No. 4, 2016 (“Reconfiguring Race, Gender, and Sexuality,” ed- ited by Emily Drabinski and Patrick Keilty), pp. 756–775. © 2016 The Board of Trustees, University of Illinois Abstract This conceptual paper frames hatred as an organizing principle— a central premise from which other materials by proximity derive classification, arrangement, and value—of LGBTQ archives and col- lections. Recognizing hatred as such points to the need to build queer and critical archives, and to develop archival practices that reflect the experiences and desires and meet the needs of LGBTQ individuals and communities. Examining the arrangement and de- scription of hate mail and messages, archival collecting around hate crimes, and documenting and describing queer and trans self-hatred demonstrates that hatred is a useful lens for examining and decon- structing normative power and its affective circulations and struc- tures. Naming hatred as an organizing principle is key to developing new queer and critical ways of thinking about how to be ethically and politically engaged on behalf of queer and other marginalized knowledge-formations and communities, and new ways of acting on those concepts in archival practice. Introduction “So you are out there leading students, your sons and others to a life- style that leads to Hell. Does that make you feel good about yourself?” “After viewing all of the publicity that has been given to you with re- gards to your despicable life style, I feel compelled to write this letter to you . . . why do you choose to disgrace and dishonor our proud uni- form? Have you no decency??????? . . . If you have chosen this perfidious, malignant, vile and despicable way of life, why do you feel that you must drag our uniform down to that/your level. Why don’t you and your hatred in critical queer archives/cifor 757 kind just go back into the closet, and you can take Ms. Jewish, liberal (bagel eater) Streisand with y’all.” “You are ‘blood guilty,’ for every person, especially for the vulnerable, young you influence by promoting lesbianism! . . . If you do not STOP—the consequences will absolutely come upon you, and your (so-called) partner. To some degree her life, her outcome is in your hands.” “No wonder you served in silence, it goes along with the Bible-based reason for being ashamed, and shamed by Society. Good reason to be embarrassed. GOD OUR CREATOR wants you to be embarrassed. When you came to the point of NOT being ashamed and embar- rassed, you breached THIS scenario.” The excerpts above come from letters sent to Colonel Margarethe Cam- mermeyer following her very public coming out, subsequent challenge to her discharge from military service for being a lesbian, and the airing of the 1995 made-for-television movie of her memoir Serving in Silence. These letters, along with a promotional flier of Cammermeyer with her face crossed out in red pen and covered with the word “lesbo,” fill one small folder of her large collection at the June L. Mazer Lesbian Archives at UCLA.1 In processing her papers, I made the decision to title the folder “Correspondence: Criticism. 1994–1998” while fully recognizing that the contents of the letters called for her to renounce and stop living life as a lesbian, for her to feel shame in her identity and choices, and for her to fear for her soul and the possibilities of a future of eternal damnation. This title reflects my decision not to expand the description to include more affectively charged language, such as “hate.” In trying to think in the ways I believed a professional archivist should, and by following the stan- dards of disimpassioned and distant archival description, I flattened and potentially hid forever deep in box 47 the powerful affects within the let- ters, as well as what they might have meant on an affective level to the rec- ords’ creators and subjects, and their potential for users. Cammermeyer’s decision to save and meticulously organize the letters sparked by hatred di- rected toward her and other queer persons into a separate specific folder and then to donate them to a lesbian community–based archives is signifi- cant. Her life, as well as her collection, is shaped by her alignment through affect (including negative ones) with other bodies, queer bodies. As my descriptive failure indicates, the stakes of acknowledging how hate mail and other manifestations of the affect of hatred emerge in small spurts and unexpected files in lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) archives and archival collections are high. Critiquing hatred as an organiz- ing principle—a central premise from which other materials by proximity derive classification, arrangement, and value—of LGBT archives and col- lections opens the possibility of examining the extent to which institutions and collections have been shaped and reshaped by it. Naming affect is 758 library trends/spring 2016 necessary to fully consider the content, focus, and implications of placing records of hate in conjunction with other artifacts in the file. To develop the critical productivity of hatred, I draw on affect theory —the interdisciplinary corpus of literature developed since the 1990s through humanistic inquiries into affect, feeling, and emotion by scholars across the humanities and social sciences. There is no standard definition of affect; however, its theorists commonly agree that it is a force that cre- ates a relationship (conscious or otherwise) between a body and the world (Gregg & Seigworth, 2010, p. 1). As I utilize it, affect is a category that both encompasses and reaches beyond feelings and emotions. Emotion is used to name that feeling that is given function and meaning and is closely tied to action. In contrast, affect is a less formed, structured, and fixed force that nonetheless shares many of the qualities of emotion (Ngai, 2005, p. 26–27). Affect is deeply implicated in how people form social relation- ships, differences, identities, and subjectivities (Zembylas, 2007, p. 180), as well as how people share or deny resources (knowledge, power, agency). Queer persons, communities, and politics are formed in significant part through affects and therefore demand their consideration to fully and complexly document queer lives and experiences. In An Archive of Feelings, a work that bridges affect and queer studies, Cvetkovich (2003) calls for “a radical archive of emotion” to document “intimacy, love, and activism,” areas of human experience fundamental to LGBT lives, practices, and histories, “that are difficult to chronicle through the materials of the traditional archive” (p. 241). While grounding her work in a number of community-based queer archives, Cvetkovich, like other theorists who draw together queer archives and affect in their work (for example, Love [2007]), has a more expansive definition of archives beyond conceptions of them as actually existing spaces and records. Cvet- kovich and others invested in LGBT archives have emphasized the need for documenting positive affects associated with LGBT lives. Although ha- tred may seem a surprising choice of organizing emotion to illustrate the need for queer archives and queer archival practices that contain and are shaped by affects, its intensity and common and considerable presence make it a strong candidate. Queer people need to reflect on our histories with hatred in order to recognize the ways in which they complexly inform our identities and conditions (Love, 2007, p. 17). Looking for hatred draws attention to the need for queer archives and archiving practices that are open to complex, contradictory affects. Queer theory, an interdisciplin- ary body of theoretical literature that emerged from the study of women, gender, and sexuality in the early 1990s, offers the tools to examine how hatred aligns queer bodies. In turn, this alignment informs the construc- tion, organization, and impact of LGBT and queer identity–based archives and collections. Queer is an umbrella term for describing individuals and hatred in critical queer archives/cifor 759 communities with nonnormative sexualities and/or gender identities and expressions. Queer, as deployed here, is also an open theoretical position that interrogates normativity (Sheffield & Barriault, 2009, p. 120). Follow- ing queer theoretical discourse that has shown that LGBT archives cannot safely be assumed to be already queer, I make a distinction here between LGBT archives and collections and queer archives and archival practices (Cooper, 2015). The distinctions between LGBT and queer also highlight the importance of the situatedness of archives as emerging from and re- maining within the LGBT community, as moved from the community into mainstream institutions, or as formed about the LGBT community from within mainstream institutions.2 This paper focuses on the application of these theoretical works on archives and issues of archival concern. Naming hatred and acknowledging it as an organizing principle of LGBT archives points to the need to build queer and critical archives, and to de- velop archival practices that reflect the experiences and desires and meet the needs of LGBTQ individuals and communities. First, by examining ha- tred as developed in affect and queer theories, I show how these theoreti- cal concepts align queer bodies. Second, I ground this conceptual work in an examination of arrangement and descriptive practices around hate mail and messages in LGBT archives and archival collections. This work shows how queer and critical arrangement and descriptive practices of hate materials can act as forms of “counterpower” (Simpson, 2004, p. 34), disrupting dominant and damaging power structures. Third, I explore mainstream archival institutions’ collecting around hate crimes against LGBT individuals, illustrating how such a collecting focus often reifies dominant power disparities in what and who is recorded in LGBT archives and collections. I also point to where queer archival practices, including participatory archiving, can intervene to direct attention and activism to- ward creating a more just world for LGBT persons. Finally, attention to self-hatred that is instilled from the outside but arises from within LGBT persons and communities as expressed in archival materials is used to examine further the complexities and ambiguities of hatred. An exami- nation of self-hatred points to the inadequacies of standard descriptive practices in accounting for hatred and other affects. Together, this exami- nation of hatred in the collection, arrangement, and description of LGBT archives and archival collections demonstrates that hatred is an organiz- ing principle of LGBT archives and collections. Naming hatred as such is politically necessary to developing new queer and critical ways of think- ing about how to be ethically and politically engaged on behalf of queer and other marginalized knowledge-formations and communities, and new ways of acting on those concepts in archival practice. 760 library trends/spring 2016 Queer Theory and the Affect of Hatred Hatred is, in the words of critical theorist of race, sexuality, and affect Sara Ahmed (2004), the passionate “negative attachment to another that one wishes to expel” from social, psychic, and material existence (p. 55). Re- orienting discourse toward the ugly, unwanted, and oft-hidden “structures of feeling” (Williams, 1977, p. 132) that take shape around socially unsanc- tioned queer desire brings into view the larger ways in which emotions regulate the relations among bodies, people, and records. Showcasing and simultaneously deconstructing hatred and its manifestations has a key role to play in aiding the larger project of building queer archives that have the capacity to contend with and provide a record of the complex interactions of race, class, gender, and sexuality, among other factors. In this section, I frame how affect and queer theory have reoriented hatred from the realm of the private and the individual. Even if hatred is felt and experienced within particular bodies and psyches, it is generated through social, politi- cal, and cultural encounters that are defined by larger power structures. The pathologizing power of naming the nonnormative creates a marker through which queer individuals and communities define and understand ourselves in relation to the normative ( J. A. Lee, personal communication, May 27, 2015). The conceptual work here lays the groundwork for later sections of this paper that examine these theories in relation to archival practices. Hatred both connects and separates us from others; it is a key part of what aligns queer bodies with one another. Hatred “affects the way bodies take shape,” forcing the “bodies of those who become objects of hatred [to] embody a particular identity by and for” the person doing the hating (Ahmed, 2004, p. 55). In other words, hatred forms bodies through the particular alignment with and against certain other bodies; it is through this alignment that the collective takes its shape (p. 54). Hatred’s align- ment works both ways: it aligns not only the individual performing the hat- ing with a collective emotion and connection to particular other bodies, but also the individual who is the object of hatred with the hated group that they are made to represent. Individual queer bodies are thus formed as such and aligned with other queer bodies into a collective, in part by ha- tred against queers and its manifestations in literal and symbolic violence. In turn, the bodies of those who hate queers are aligned through this negative attachment. Queer bodies have often been and continue to be constructed as objects of hatred. Ahmed (2001, p. 360) writes that “hate is not simply a means by which the identity of the subject and community is established (alignment); hate also works to unmake the world of the other through pain.” Hatred is thus a complex affect that “circulates” and “sticks” from within and outside of queer bodies. Affect does not just cir- culate among human bodies but is engendered through the encounter of bodies with objects (Ahmed, 2004, p. 4). hatred in critical queer archives/cifor 761 So-called negative affects, such as disgust, shame, pain, fear, and hatred, have been given deep consideration by theorists, especially those focused on queer topics in relation to affect. Sedgwick (2005, p. 63) notes that queer identity is “tuned most durably to the note of shame” due to the fact that so many queers habitually endure it, or at the very least have done so at formative stages in their self-development (Szabo, 2013, p. 446). Ex- tending Sedgwick’s argument, it is not just shame that is habitually en- dured by queer persons and communities but also hatred. Hatred is part of the everyday experiences of those who are openly nonnormative in the public sphere. Such bodies collect “hateful and hurtful bits and pieces” that become “building blocks” of self-identity ( J. A. Lee, personal com- munication, May 27, 2015). As Love (2007, pp. 20–21) writes, “Feelings of shame [and] self-hatred are still with us [post-gay liberation]. Rather than disavowing such feelings as the sign of some personal failing we need to understand them as indications of [the] material and structural con- tinuities” between eras. The honoring of negative affects has had some traction within queer communities, notably in the gay shame movements of the late 1990s and early 2000s, which were formed out of a willful non- compliance with expectations of “pride” in one’s nonnormative sexual- ity, and against (homo)normative expectation that shame must preclude public exhibition (Szabo, 2013, p. 446). While the privileged position in terms of race, class, and gender that affords many in such movements the space to render affects like shame appealing and even empowering must be recognized, this argument similarly calls for recognition of the impor- tance and value of negative affects for critical and practical productivity. Valuing the expressions of negative affects is both matter and method of survival for queers. Affect and queer theories open up the possibilities for examining the extent to which archival institutions have been and are shaped by hatred and other affects. Explicitly naming hatred and its sisters (shame, fear, and loathing, among other affects) is a means of reorienting archival discourse and practice to be attuned to the ways in which affects regu- late, constrain, and shape the relations among individual and collective queer bodies and other bodies and between people and objects. I apply the conceptualization of the alignment of queer people with one another and with archives through affect to enable critical examinations of how LGBT archives have been constructed and organized in significant ways by and through hatred. In this paper, I turn a critical eye to examples of institutionalized and personal forms of hatred against queer persons and communities in neat folders full of messages of hate, collecting around hate crimes, and in experiences of self-hatred in personal writing within LGBT archival contexts. Queer archives and collections can better docu- ment, critique, and contend with the impacts of the negative affects that align queer persons and communities through their circulation around 762 library trends/spring 2016 and within us. I highlight acquisition, arrangement, and description as archi- val functions with the political potential for “counterpower” (Simpson, 2004, p. 34) to be enacted through queer and critical archiving practices. Counterpower, as defined by Castells (2007, p. 239), is the “capacity of [social actors to] resist and challenge power relations that are institution- alized.” In other words, counterpower is that which enables and is en- acted when queers think and act in manners contrary to normative power structures. Hate Messages and “Spectacles of Counterpower” Hatred is a form of intimacy and an affect seldom explored in archival literature; it is even more rarely associated with LGBT archives and col- lections. The collecting of material instantiations and representations of hatred in the form of “controversial materials” has received minor atten- tion in mainstream archival studies discourse. This literature focuses on the public reactions and relations aspects of these collecting processes and acquisitions. For instance, this discourse includes a discussion on the purchase of Ku Klux Klan membership records at auction by the Clarke Historical Library at Central Michigan University (Boles, 1994). An article on the ethics of collecting Theodore Kaczynski’s papers by the Labadie Collection at the University of Michigan calls for archivists to not only focus on just the “pleasant, the democratic, the pleasing records” (Dev- lin, 2010, p. 126) in the service of collecting a more complete picture of American culture and history. The collecting of such materials is justified by the assertion that they would otherwise be “destroyed out of shame, embarrassment, fear or misunderstanding” (Herrada, 2004, p. 43). The frequent presence of Nazi materials in Holocaust collections raises simi- lar concerns. In an article on the “archiving of hate” based on a study of lynching postcards, Simpson (2004) analyzes the mediating power of archives in reckoning with images of “obscene violence” and hatred. He calls for archives of atrocities that “honor” in their “critical debts” and place their “obscene materials in tension with spectacles of counterpower” (p. 34). Queer and critical archives and their practices can aid in the fight against institutionalized power relations that disempower queer individu- als and communities, speaking against normativized hatred. Simpson also articulates the key question as “what affective and commemorative work might be able to occur through the dialectical encounter of [hatred and] terror with its resistances [in archives]?” (p. 34). The queer archives and archiving practices called for here respond to this question, placing ha- tred in a direct dialectical encounter with its resistances in a generative and complex configuration that leaves space for ambiguous and difficult feelings and relationships. When considering hatred in the context of queer bodies and LGBTQ hatred in critical queer archives/cifor 763 archives, the hatred that comes to mind first is likely the vehement institu- tionalized version practiced by organizations and religious groups against queer people and communities. A search in ArchiveGrid for the Westboro Baptist Church, Family Research Council, and the American Family Asso- ciation—all classified as prominent “anti-LGBT hate groups” (Southern Poverty Law Center, n.d.)—reveals their presences in LGBT archives and archival collections. Queer activist responses of counterpower to the ha- tred from these groups documented in the archives often include ephem- era produced by hate groups and place queer responses side by side with materials spewing antiqueer hatred. In Cammermeyer’s collection, her 2000 radio interview with antigay zealot Reverend Fred Phelps Jr. of West- boro is included.3 Robert Figueroa’s collection of photographs at the ONE National Gay and Lesbian Archives documents Westboro’s protest at gay activist Pedro Zamora’s funeral in November 1994. Figueroa’s bright-color images document protestors with signs reading “God hates fags,” “Pedro in hell,” and “Flee the wrath to come.” These images are neatly contained in Mylar sleeves in a binder placed as to be visible simultaneously with his photos of celebrations at Long Beach Gay Pride and just before shots of the Los Angeles Gay Rodeo.4 Archived within the Matthew Shepard Web Archive is the website of Westboro, whose members protested following Shepard’s death as part of its larger condemnation of homosexuality. The site is classified simply within the first series on “Organizations,” placing it in the same category as the websites of the Matthew Shepard Foundation, National Gay and Lesbian Task Force, and Wyoming Equality. The innu- merable subject files collected by LGBT individuals and organizations are filled with articles, clippings, manuscripts on homophobia, violence, and other manifestations of hatred filed alongside materials aimed at serving the LGBT community. The arrangement of these voices, images, websites, and snippets of hate in such close proximity to other affects and objects demonstrates, both literally and symbolically, the intimate place of hatred in queer lives, communities, and activism. Hate messages are ubiquitous in the personal collections and organi- zational records of many in the LGBT community. AIDS serves as a fo- cal point for much of this hate-based material. The ACT UP Los Angeles Records at the ONE includes hate mail sent to its office. In gay activist Morris Kight’s collection, there are three envelopes with notes containing statements like “you creepy queer bastards are infecting the world. You are scum. You are rotten and immoral,” sent with news clippings related to the spread of AIDS, its relation to homosexuality, and about sex crimes com- mitted by gay men.5 Many of the voice-mail messages saved by the Cobb Citizen’s Coalition, an organization formed in response to a resolution condemning the “gay lifestyle” passed by Georgia’s Cobb County, on its answering machine tape reflect fear and hatred of queers based on their 764 library trends/spring 2016 supposed relation to AIDS. In one such viscerally forceful message, the caller says: Listen you bunch of goddamn faggots, y’all stay the fuck in Atlanta or in LA. We don’t want your gay asses running around here. It is true AIDS stands for another infected dick sucker. Y’all all come messing around here too much we’ll get the boys on you. Y’all need to get your asses out of here. We don’t want you around here. Y’all’s kind don’t belong here, so get the hell on. Bye faggot fairy bastards.6 In a similar message, the caller says, “You faggots don’t deserve to live. You brought disease and pestilence to an otherwise straight and normal, heterosexual society.”7 The imagery of AIDS as a homosexual disease, and of queerness itself as an illness, is pervasive in these messages. The experi- ence of hatred was deemed of archival value by many of these LGBT cre- ators and by archivists in their appraisal, yet like so many human elements of records and archiving, hatred has not been a topic of archival discourse or a consideration in archival functions. The stakes of describing affect are high for queer archives and persons. In sharp contrast to my flat description of the hate mail in Cammermeyer’s collection, in some alternative queer archival practices of description, af- fect is already better accounted for and description serves as a key func- tion of counterpower. At the Sexual Minorities Archives (SMA), which is a grassroots, queer community–based archive, a self-created system of sub- ject classification is used that embraces affectively and politically charged language. It responds to hate, as found in those materials that negatively describe sexual minorities, by classifying it as “bullshit.” The archivist uses the classification of “bullshit” in order to “carefully position those mate- rials as counter to the politics of the collection as a whole,” powerfully demonstrating the alignment of queer communities and collections as a direct response to systems and structures of hatred (Rawson, 2009, p. 132). In this practice, the archivist also speaks to the alignment of queers with archives through affect. Such a queer and critical descriptive practice re- quires archivists to engage affectively, raising important questions about our roles in shaping collective memories and our accountability to archival constituencies. Affectively laden descriptions, such as those of the SMA, break down the false distance created by traditional archival description that does a disservice to affects generated in, by, and through archival rec- ords, such as these that leave traces on all who encounter them. Collecting around Hate Crimes or Power, Value, and Violence On the evening of October 6, 1998, Matthew Shepard, a 21-year-old white gay student at the University of Wyoming, was beaten severely, tied to a hatred in critical queer archives/cifor 765 fence, and left to die by Aaron McKinney (then age 22) and Russell Hen- derson (21) near Laramie. Shepard was found the next day and died six days later as result of his injuries. The Matthew Shepard Collection and Web Archive at the University of Wyoming’s American Heritage Center (AHC) has become perhaps the most notable archive formed out of a hate crime and documents perhaps the most famous case of a hate crime against an LGBT person. There is some recent work that disputes the sta- tus of Shepard’s murder as a hate crime ( Jimenez, 2013), but regardless of the hotly debated particulars of his murder, he remains widely recognized as a hate crime victim. The AHC’s materials are emblematic of one form of hatred’s manifestation in LGBT collections, especially those in main- stream institutions, insofar as the center focuses primarily on the phenom- ena of hate crimes. Along with collecting around Shepard’s murder, the lack of collecting regarding the killing of Brandon Teena and instances of violence against other trans and gender-nonconforming persons dem- onstrates the acute need for developing queer and critical archival ap- proaches to collecting that draw attention to and challenge the structural conditions of harm and disparity faced by queer and trans people.8 Too often, archival practices serve to reproduce and reify damaging dominant power structures from within and outside the LGBT community (Dunbar, 2006, p. 112). Hate crime laws are one of the most commonly articulated legal in- terventions for LGBT rights. The social and legal identification of hate crimes, a label for violence and intimidation directed at individuals due to their perceived membership in a particular “class” of people, came about through the work of social movements, including the civil rights move- ment, the women’s movement, and the gay and lesbian rights movement (Petersen, 2006, p. 10). This approach, which is often pushed by LGBT advocacy organizations, relies upon a framework of individual rights. It emphasizes the harms that are caused to one individual by another in- dividual. This frame of analysis, according to legal scholar Dean Spade (2011), crucially “misunderstands how power functions” and can thus lead to taking approaches to reform that “actually expand the reach of violent and harmful systems” (p. 29). He analyzes how hate crime laws have been offered up as a solution to violence against trans people, and yet they do “nothing to prevent violence” (p. 30). Such laws do not have the deterrent effect promised and distract attention from harmful hegemonic structures (p. 82; J. A. Lee, personal communication, May 27, 2015). There is a deep desire to attribute hate crimes to disturbed individuals, and to identify the justice and criminal punishment systems as the remedy to violence. However, as Spade (2011) argues, trans people are the “frequent targets [of such] systems and face severe violence at the hands of police and in prisons everyday”; therefore, investing in such a system for the prevention 766 library trends/spring 2016 of violence against queer and trans people actually stands to “increase harm and violence” (p. 30). Within a day of the attack against Shepard, it became the subject of considerable public discourse, and for many a locus of national trauma (Petersen, 2006, pp. 65–66). Following his death, the national attention on the attack and Shepard’s family’s feelings manifested itself in messages, the media, and donations sent to the hospital that had cared for Shepard. Affective responses were also manifested in memorial services and vigils across the country. Not all reactions to the event were positive: the local LGBT center received hate mail praising the attack; in at least two cities, LGBT people were beaten following vigils; and at Shepard’s funeral, Rev- erend Phelps of Westboro led a group of picketers with signs suggesting that Shepard had been “damned” and appeared to be fighting the memo- rialization of the victim more generally (p. 67). The public practices of emotion following such an event of violence are telling of a larger political culture; what feelings and whose feelings we provide a platform for and how we do this reveal significant details about ethical and political connec- tions that are valued. This is particularly clear in cases of grief and public grieving, where there is space made “for grieving and memorializing some losses and not others” (p. 72). In mourning Shepard’s death, there was a “public outpouring of grief, rage, and activism” that formed a public in which strangers were suddenly allied with one another “in solidarity and in antagonism, through a common relation to the texts that described Shepard” (p. 76). Responding to violent hatred in this context served as a powerful affect through which bodies, especially queer ones, were aligned and realigned. In the wake of Shepard’s murder, there was much mobili- zation in a neoliberal model of gay and lesbian rights advocacy to pursue hate crime legislation, and, in 2009, a federal law was named after Shepard that added gender identity and/or expression to federal hate crime law (Spade, 2011, p. 80).9 The Matthew Shepard Collection and Matthew Shepard Web Archive are both found under the American Heritage Center’s (AHC) collecting focus on “underdocumented communities”—collecting that is intended to reflect “the multiculturalism of Wyoming” and beyond (AHC, 2008a, 2008b, n.d.).10 The collection contains both public and private documents regarding Shepard’s murder. The materials come from various sources, including the news media; the president’s office of the University of Wyo- ming; and the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Association. It includes correspondence from people across the country, news articles, fliers and posters, editorials, bulletins, and speeches. Also included is in- formation on demonstrations that occurred, the debate about bias and hate crime laws in Wyoming, and memorials to Shepard. Even within an LGBT collection formed as a result of violence, there are folders of hate mail sent to both Shepard’s family and local LGBT organizations sharing hatred in critical queer archives/cifor 767 boxes and server space with lesbian and gay literature, memorial websites, and anti–hate crime legislation petitions. The collection also documents productions of The Laramie Project—a play and film about Shepard. The web archive created in 2008 on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the murder examined the blogs of his family and friends and more than seventy websites for media about and based on Shepard’s murder, aiming to capture a broad and in-depth coverage of the murder, memorials, and related efforts to address gender- and sexuality-based inequalities. While “underdocumented communities,” including LGBT ones, are an articu- lated collecting focus and a reflection of what is considered of value for the AHC, the materials related to the Shepard’s murder represent by far its most extensive collecting in this area, demonstrating the central place of hatred as an organizing principle for LGBT collections, especially in more mainstream archives. Even in documenting violent hate crimes, there are telling disparities about who and what events are recorded in archives. Looking through the lens of hate allows for a more critical understanding of structural dis- parities, archives’ roles in (re)producing them, and how we might address them through queer and critical archiving practices. The murder of Teena attracted national attention. After learning of his variant gender identity and expression, John Lotter (then age 22) and Marvin Thomas “Tom” Nissen (also 22) raped Teena and brutally murdered him and his friends Lisa Lambert and Phillip DeVine on December 31, 1993, in Humboldt, Nebraska (Halberstam, 2013, p. 474). Unlike Shepard’s archives, a search of ArchiveGrid and WorldCat reveals that there is no centralized archival collection on Teena; instead, he appears only in traces in the documenta- tion generated by the popular film Boys Don’t Cry and the documentary The Brandon Teena Story, is represented in a script at the ONE,11 and as a single file in subject collections on crime at Kent State University.12 In spite of the widespread attention that Teena’s murder generated, there is little documentation of such violence, or of trans experiences more broadly, in LGBT archives and collections. This lack is a reflection of dominant systems of power that have marginalized trans people. Thinking care- fully about what is collected, why, and who is doing the collecting mat- ters greatly here. Looking to hate offers one intervention toward a more queer and critical archival practice that is better equipped to address such disparities. Queer theorist Jack Halberstam (2013) writes about the after- math of hate crimes and the struggle over the legacy of Teena and how it testifies to the “political complexities of activism sparked by murder and energized by the work of memorialization” (p. 473). Teena’s story can and should tell a complicated one of hatred, and of white working-class, rural queers and the relations that mark “rural America as a site of horror and degradation in the urban imagination” (p. 478). Such an archive could also tell a more nuanced story about larger and intersectional cultures of 768 library trends/spring 2016 hatred. For example, one of Teena’s murderers, Nissen, was involved on and off throughout his early life in white supremacist groups (p. 480). The “real work of collecting the stories of a Brandon Teena . . . or a Matthew Shepard must be to create a [queer] archive capable of providing a record of the complex interactions of race, class, gender, and sexuality that result in murder, but whose origins lie in state-authorized formations of racism, homophobia, and poverty” (p. 498). Even while organizing around hatred and the ways in which it aligns queer bodies, it is essential to deconstruct, to unravel hatred in order to tell queerer stories that are contradictory, complex, and powerful, thereby opening the archives to what is possible for queers and their futures. A collecting focus on hate crimes as a central subject demonstrates the intense power of hatred as an organizing principle in LGBT archives and collections, and how responses to it align, shape, and impact not only physical bodies, but also bodies of records. Hatred is an affect that may move us affectively as queers, but it is also an affect that “has settled in us and settled us” into compliance with normative social structures ( J. A. Lee, personal communication, May 27, 2015). The focus on collecting related to hate crimes reflects the public and political attention in LGBT advocacy organizations to certain cases of antiLGBT murder, and has the tendency to make hatred against LGBT people visible only in extreme mo- ments of physical violence (Spade, 2011). This selective visibility also often implies that individual, interpersonal violence is the site of homophobia and transphobia, thus obscuring the more pervasive and ordinary forms of hatred, prejudice, and discrimination, and particularly the role of the state and its laws in constructing and authorizing such hatred through discrimination and violence (Petersen, 2006, p. 9). There is great danger in reducing a social phenomenon like hatred to an individual psychologi- cally bounded event (Zembylas, 2007, p. 179). The turn toward participa- tory archival practices in community-based archives offers the opportu- nity to have queer and trans communities develop collection priorities themselves, and for archival repositories to collect with greater complex- ity. Collecting around violence matters, but there is a need to move toward commemorating queer and trans lives that are being lived, and not just those that are brutally cut short. Creating more complex constellations of belonging in queer archives would allow for the navigation of systems of power that inform the dissonances and complexities within queer commu- nities in respect to race, class, gender, and ability, among other categories. Hatred offers a way in which to examine what is being collected, why it is being collected, and who is doing the collecting. The debates that rage on about the productiveness and potential of the focus on hate crimes by those both inside and out of LGBTQ communities are in part archival questions that deserve deeper consideration. While hate-based violence hatred in critical queer archives/cifor 769 against LGBT people must be remembered in the archives, we should employ a queerer and more critical archival practice to contend with ha- tred in all its multiple forms and avoid reflecting and reifying problematic systems of power that operate to harm queer and trans people. Instilled from without, Arising from within: Queer and Trans Self Hatred While in no way negating the vital importance of experiencing, document- ing, and celebrating pride and other queer experiences of “positive” affects like happiness, intimacy, and love, queer political projects and their reflec- tions and manifestations in queer archives often come with the implicit demand that queer individuals and communities only vocalize pride and anything but their unhappiness with other queers, their shared circum- stances, or with themselves (Szabo, 2013, p. 451). Hatred and negative- affect siblings of shame, disgust, and anger directed by the self at the self are most often manifested within the context of queer persons as internal- ized homo- and transphobia. Such phobia is the hatred of the self, of the queer body, as an aligned member of the hated group. Self-hatred is a par- ticular form of the larger category of hatred that is instilled from the out- side, but arises from within; it is often intimately manifested in the despair at the impossibility of distancing oneself from oneself. The community acknowledges all this, but the subject remains insufficiently documented in LGBT and queer archives and collections. Queer Nation, an action- oriented movement formed in New York City in 1990 in response to a sharp increase in violence against LGBT people, sought to increase LGBT visibility and to fight back against hegemonic and mainstream structures of “oppression, homophobia, racism, misogyny, the bigotry of religious hypocrites and our own self-hatred.”13 The movement’s framing of the fight against self-hatred as fundamental to the broader mission of ending hatred and violence against queers points to the significance of this to queer lives, communities, and politics. Searching for self-hatred’s manifestations in LGBT archives is difficult due to its lack of acknowledgment in archival description. However, it sur- faces in many personal writings, both in descriptions of current feelings and in the describing of experiences of overcoming bad feelings. In a letter to ONE’s magazine, “Donny” writes that “I took 10 sleeping pills. I fixed my room extra special. I put my smile on . . . soon sleep came like a sweet dream. . . . I wake up in the hospital. . . . I cried but no tears came. . . . The doctor asked me what was the matter? Did you try to kill yourself. I failed, but next time I won’t. . . . Hate and fury all came in me” (qtd. in Loftin, 2012, pp. 194–195). He goes on to describe his self-hatred and loathing of other homosexuals, warning innocent boys to stay away lest they end up like him (p. 195). Hatred is a social, collective emotion that circulates, 770 library trends/spring 2016 that sticks to particular bodies. Examining self-hatred clearly demonstrates how hatred is not an individual emotion but rather a collective affect that sticks to particular bodies, shaping them in conflicting, painful alignments against parts of themselves and their identities. Like all forms of hatred, self-hatred is complex. The story of Robert Rosenkrantz, a gay teenager who in 1985 shot and killed his schoolmate who gay-bashed and outed him, is archived in a col- lection at the ONE.14 The collection has letters written to Rosenkrantz during the first months of his prison term after an article about the case was published in The Advocate. Many of the letter writers identified with Rosenkrantz and shared their own intimate struggles with coming out, self-hatred, and other negative affects experienced by queers. Many empa- thize with the fear, anger, and self-loathing that in the article he described feeling. Another writer said how the bigotry and hatred of the wider world forced them (queers) to start “internalizing self-hatred and homopho- bia.”15 Another described how Rosenkrantz’s words and experiences were sure to have “a deep effect on the understanding of many people about the legacy of intolerance and hate” that queers experience.16 Another wrote that “homophobia is in the marrow of our parents’ bones, we are their offspring[,] it is in us too. Self-hatred is our legacy.”17 Many of those who wrote offer Rosenkrantz hope, laying out their own experiences with conquering self-hate. This collection formed around violence makes un- usually graphic such stories of negative affects. In the mainstream homo- normative narratives of being out and proud, experiences of self-hatred, internalized homophobia, and other negative affects are silenced in the archives. Self-hatred, like other affects, is complex and conflicted. There is a necessary distinction to be made between the perceptions of self-hatred by others and the feelings and perhaps articulations of that hatred by the person experiencing it. Of all queer bodies, it is arguably the trans body that has been constructed in the popular imaginary as the object of self- hatred. Trans difference is commonly reduced in popular narratives to the proscribed affective experience of “feeling bad”—of having a “dysphoric” body (Keegan, 2013, n.p.). In essence, dysphoria indicates a state of averse or negative affects, unease, and dissatisfaction, and is the diagnosis for most trans people seeking medical care. The association of trans bodies, genders, and identities in much of the medical and popular materials is seen as rooted in bad feelings, be they “rage, sorrow, wishfulness, [or] de- nial,” about their bodies or genders. The trans body is also constructed as a body that needs to move from “negative affect to redemptive affect, from psychosis to mental health, from self-hatred to a celebration of lib- eral individuality” (n.p). There is no Library of Congress subject heading with which to classify and access “internalized transphobia” despite an hatred in critical queer archives/cifor 771 equivalent subject heading for “internalized homophobia,” effectively hid- ing, along with other standard descriptive and classification practices, the presences of these stories of complex embodiments in LGBT and queer archives and collections. Self-hatred is fundamental to the queer experience in a mainstream world that is often homo- and transphobic in deep and profound ways, which in turn act to instill self-hatred in queer subjects. While queer ar- chives should make space for and recognize the productive roles of the affect of hatred from both the outside and as arising within, it is also the work of queer archives to simultaneously expose the contradictions and complications of hatred and its place in queer lives—past, present and future—in their arrangement and description of such materials. Archives can aid in the development of counterstories—those stories that margin- alized and underrepresented communities use to “construct alternative realities to those constructed through social institutions of dominant cul- ture” (Dunbar, 2006, p. 114). Documenting and describing self-hatred is a form of counterstory that allows for the acknowledgment of painful pasts as continuing to affect our identities and conditions in the present (Love, 2007). Such acknowledgment is necessary for reimagining queer presents and futures. Conclusion I want to return briefly to the carefully collected hate messages excerpted at the beginning of this paper. Cammermeyer’s decision to save and metic- ulously organize the letters sparked by hatred against her and other queers into a separate, specific folder, then to donate them to the Mazer Archives is significant. Her life, as well as her collection, is shaped by her alignment with other queer bodies. As articulated by affect and queer theorists, ha- tred is central to that alignment and to the formation of queer collective bodies and identities. Hatred significantly impacted Cammermeyer’s life and identity and shaped peoples’ responses to her. Hatred is not only pres- ent in the letters calling for her to renounce living life as a lesbian, and to feel shame in her identity and choices, but it is also reflected in the many letters of support from other queers who identified with her, in part by their shared experiences of being hated and responding to that hatred. Queer bodies are aligned with archives through hatred. Examining the arrangement and description of such hate messages, as well as the archival collecting around hate crimes, and documenting and describing queer and trans self-hatred demonstrate that hatred is an organizing principle of LGBT archives and collections. As an organizing principle, hatred is a central premise from which other archival materials, by proximity to it, de- rive classification, arrangement, and value. This argument should not be reduced to the fetishization of bad feelings or reduced to this affect merely 772 library trends/spring 2016 by being understood as universally, uniformly, or directly empowering for archives, creators, or users; rather, the argument here has been a call to look to the presences and possibilities of structural and personal hatred in queer lives, archives, and archival practices. Hatred is a useful lens for examining and deconstructing normative power and its affective circula- tions and structures; it moves people toward all kinds of feelings, both good and bad, sometimes simultaneously. When we acknowledge that we are already implicated in hatred and make it visible, then we can begin to contend with it in the archives. Hatred opens up the imaginative space needed to envision new presents and futures. Such space is necessary to develop more queer and critical practices of appraisal, arrangement, and description that are ethically and politically engaged on behalf of queer knowledge-formations and communities. By becoming aware of how bod- ies and objects are put into relation by affect, and by bringing attention to (bad) affects, we can queer—“radically opening”—the archives to contra- dictory, contestable, and nonnormative histories and work toward a more just present and future for queer and trans people (Lee, 2015). There is much work still to be done in conceptualizing how hatred and other concepts developed in queer and affect theories may lead us to reexamine archival scholarship and practice. Multiple case studies are needed to explore how the concepts discussed here from queer and affect theories as approached through appraisal, arrangement, and description can actually be enacted in real-world environments. In particular, work is needed to develop how descriptive practices and standards might account for affects, including hatred. Further exploration of the archives’ produc- tion and reproduction of harmful systems that devalue queer and trans lives, including neoliberalism and the prison-industrial complex, is also needed. This paper is a step forward in what I hope will become a rich trajectory of research and practice for archival studies on queer archives and archival practices that are attuned to affect. Acknowledgments Thank you to Patrick Keilty and Emily Drabinski for organizing the Gen- der and Sexuality in Information Studies Colloquium at which an early version of this paper was presented and for their editorial work on this special issue. The author would also like to acknowledge Michelle Caswell, Anne Gilliland, Jamie A. Lee, Jesse Deshayes, and Mario H. Ramirez for their critical and constructive suggestions. Notes 1. Letters to Margarethe Cammermeyer, 1994–1998, folder 3, box 47, Margarethe Cammer- meyer Papers, Collection 2186, in UCLA Library Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library (hereafter MC Papers/UCLA). 2. Margot Canaday’s The Straight State (2011) and Wendy Brown’s States of Injury (1995) both highlight the state’s role in pathologizing nonnormative bodies and peoples. These authors are used by Jamie A. Lee in her forthcoming work to discuss the desire among hatred in critical queer archives/cifor 773 queer people to belong, and the move of queer community–based collections into the more traditional archives as situated within these same off-putting naming practices. 3. Interview with and speaking engagements involving Fred Phelps Jr. of Westboro Baptist Church, September 2000, folder 6, box 49, in MC Papers/UCLA. 4. Photographs by Robert Figueroa, 1994–1995, Coll2012-064, in ONE National Gay and Lesbian Archives, Los Angeles (hereafter ONE). 5. Hate mail and anonymous mail, 1983–1985, Morris Kight Papers and Photographs, 1920– 2003, Coll2010-008, folder 2, box 4, in ONE. 6. Hate messages to Cobb Citizen’s Coalition, March–April 1994, Olympics Out of Cobb County Records, 1990–1998, Coll2013-0053, AC1831, box 1, in ONE. 7. Ibid. 8. While there are places in this paper where I use diverse nominalized forms, I use “trans” here in an effort to resist the impetus “to identify, consolidate, or stabilize a category . . . of people, things or phenomena that could be denominated as ‘trans,’” in keeping with Stryker, Currah, and Moore’s (2008, p. 11) assertion that “as if certain concrete some- things could be characterized as ‘crossers,’ while everything else could be characterized by boundedness and fixity.” 9. I employ neoliberal here to mean the ideology of social, political, and economic practices and processes that since the 1980s have become increasingly pervasive. Brown (2015) frames neoliberalism as a “governing rationality through which everything is ‘economized.’” I argue that some gay and lesbian activism becomes a vehicle for neoliberal practices and polices rather than for social change that would promote great equality and equity in contemporary society. 10. The Inventory of the Matthew Shepard Collection, 1983–2008, the Inventory of the Mat- thew Shepard Web Archive, 1998–2008, and the “Underdocumented Communities Col- lections” are in the American Heritage Center, University of Wyoming, Laramie (hereafter AHC). 11. Brandon Teena, 1999, inventory of the Gay and Lesbian Drama Scripts Collection, folder 26, box 10, in ONE. 12. Humboldt murders (rural Nebraska, 1993, murderers: Thomas Nissen and John Lotter, subject of feature film Boys Don’t Cry and documentary The Brandon Teena Story), Borowitz Crime Subject Files, 1940–present, folder 3, box 5, Special Collections and Archives, Kent State University, Kent, Ohio. 13. Tom Mertz Collection on Queer Nation, 1990–2000, Coll2014.025, in ONE. 14. Letter to Robert Rosenkrantz, 1986, Robert Rosenkrantz Letters Received, Coll2008-062, box 1, in ONE. 15. Ibid. 16. Ibid. 17. Ibid. Archival Sources American Heritage Center (AHC), University of Wyoming, Laramie Inventory of the Matthew Shepard Collection, 1983–2008 Inventory of the Matthew Shepard Web Archive, 1998–2008 ONE National Gay and Lesbian Archives, Los Angeles ACT UP/Los Angeles Records, 1987–1997, Coll2011-0010 Gay and Lesbian Drama Scripts Collection, Coll2008-003 Morris Kight Papers and Photographs, 1920–2003, Coll2010-008 Olympics Out of Cobb County Records, 1990–1998, Coll2013-0053 Robert Figueroa Photographs, 1994–1995, Coll2012-064 Robert Rosenkrantz Letters Received, Coll2008-062 Tom Mertz Collection on Queer Nation, 1990–2000, Coll2014.025 Special Collections and Archives, Kent State University, Kent, Ohio Borowitz Crime Subject Files, 1940–present UCLA Library Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library Margarethe Cammermeyer Papers, 1963–2012, Collection 2186 774 library trends/spring 2016 References Ahmed, S. (2001). The organisation of hate. Law and Critique, 12(3), 345–365. Ahmed, S. (2004). The cultural politics of emotion. New York: Routledge. American Heritage Center (AHC). (2008a). Inventory of the Matthew Shepard collection, 1983–2008. Retrieved from http://rmoa.unm.edu/docviewer.php?docId=wyu-ah300014 .xml American Heritage Center (AHC). (2008b). Inventory of the Matthew Shepard web archive, 1998–2008. Retrieved from http://rmoa.unm.edu/docviewer.php?docId=wyu-ah300023 .xml American Heritage Center (AHC). (2014). Collection development policy. Retrieved from http://www.uwyo.edu/ahc/_files/policies/collecting-policy.pdf American Heritage Center (AHC). (n.d.). Underdocumented communities collections. Re- trieved from http://www.uwyo.edu/ahc/collections/by-subject/underdocumented.html Boles, F. (1994). “Just a bunch of bigots”: A case study in the acquisition of controversial materials. Archival Issues, 19(1), 53–65. Brown, W. (1995). States of injury. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Brown, W. (2015). What exactly is neoliberalism? 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Marika Cifor is a doctoral student in information studies at the University of Califor- nia, Los Angeles (UCLA), where she is also pursuing a certificate in gender studies and the digital humanities. Her critical archival studies research explores affect, community archives, queer and feminist theories, bodies and embodiment, and col- lective memory. Her work has been published in Archival Science, American Archivist, and TSQ: Transgender Studies Quarterly. She is co–guest editor (with Anne J. Gilliland) of the special issue of Archival Science on “Affect and the Archive,” and an editor of InterActions: UCLA Journal of Education and Information Studies. She holds an MS in library and information science (with a concentration in archives management) and an MA in history, both from Simmons College. 
work_geb3nmc3lveizci744ev5aywdi	----	Packer in Context: Formalism and Fairness in the Due Process Model Packer in Context: Formalism and Fairness in the Due Process Model Hadar Aviram PACKER, HERBERT L. 1968. The Limits of the Criminal Sanction. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Pp. viii + 388. $37.95 paper. Herbert Packer’s The Limits of the Criminal Sanction (1968) has spawned decades of commentary. This essay argues that Packer’s two-model conceptualization of the criminal process is best understood within his profes- sional milieu of doctrinal legal scholarship and the political context of the Warren Court revolution. Within this context, the essay suggests a distinction between two due process visions: formalism and fairness. This distinction is useful for illuminating debates and decisions on criminal procedure matters in the Supreme Court such as Terry v. Ohio (1968) and Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000). I conclude by encouraging sensitivity to legal and historical context in future commentary on Packer’s framework. INTRODUCTIONlsi_1230 237..262 The academic fascination with Herbert Packer’s two models of the criminal process has yielded an amazing thread of scholarship involving a variety of academic disciplines, linking various topics, offering interesting insights on many criminal justice institutions and phenomena, and spanning more than four decades. This fruitful scholarly avenue began with the pub- lication of Packer’s classic article “Two Models of the Criminal Process” (1964a), and continued, more intensely and fiercely, after its reappearance as part 2 of The Limits of the Criminal Sanction (1968). That this enthusiasm and Hadar Aviram is associate professor at the University of California, Hastings College of the Law. I am thankful to Keith Findley, Sam Gross, David Johnson, Richard Leo, Jerry Skolnick, and the audience at the anniversary panel for Packer’s book at the 2009 American Society of Criminology Annual Meeting for their useful comments on an earlier version of this essay. I am also grateful to Jeremy Seymour for his outstanding research assistance and to Chuck Marcus for his excellent library support. Law & Social Inquiry Volume 36, Issue 1, 237–261, Winter 2011 Law & Social Inquiry Journal of the American Bar Foundation © 2011 American Bar Foundation. 237 engagement persist to this day is proof that criminal justice scholarship indeed stands on the shoulders of giants. In joining this commentary shortly after the fortieth anniversary of the book’s publication, I wish to add two arguments to the discussion. The first half of my essay aims to explicate Packer’s scholarship within his professional world—that of doctrinal scholars of criminal law—and the dramatic constitutional reality—the Warren Court revolution—that shaped his under- standing of the criminal process. It is in this context that Packer’s conceptu- alization of the criminal process as a continuum between crime control and due process is best appreciated and admired. Packer was not only an apt interpreter of the constitutional revolution—providing an astute observation of the transition to due process beyond a mere proliferation of pro-defendant decisions—but also a grim prophet who accurately predicted the backlash of the Burger and Rehnquist courts. The models, which were criticized by sociologists and political scientists at the time (and more so since), are, I argue, better assessed in light of their contribution to a more sophisticated doctrinal-legal understanding of the criminal process. The second half of the essay argues that, even within the narrow frame- work of Supreme Court decisions, Packer failed to fully identify the “enemy” of due process. The Warren Court’s due process paradigm was subverted by subsequent courts not just because of crime control–related considerations of efficiency and reliance on the police, but also because of a narrow, formalistic understanding of the meaning of due process. The roots of this adverse interpretation lie in the incorporation debates dating back to the nineteenth century, but these roots can explain much of the pro-government backlash of the post-Warren Courts, and particularly the work of Justice Scalia. In this respect, due process, with which Packer was disillusioned on his deathbed in 1972, seems to have been its own enemy. CRITIQUES OF PACKER’S MODELS Reactions to the models started to appear after the publication of the 1964 article and continued after The Limits of the Criminal Sanction’s publi- cation, in multiple book reviews (Blumberg 1969; Katz 1969; Schwartz 1969; Charles 1970; Golding 1971). While the initial response was mostly favor- able, as time passed, critique of Packer’s framework increased. The type of critique depended greatly upon the discipline and research interests of the critic and, as can be seen from the following discussion, said more about the critics and their professional interests than about Packer. This was com- pounded by the fact that each of the book’s three parts generated interest. Philosophers were drawn to the first part, which provided a diatribe against positivism and a sort of proto-economic argument about utilitarianism (Golding 1971). The enthusiasm about part 3, which argued against using LAW & SOCIAL INQUIRY238 criminal sanctions in victimless crimes, was very timely, coinciding with huge changes in our approach toward, say, drug use (Schur 1965), but fell out of favor in the era of attention to victims’ rights (Roach 1999). What received the greatest amount of attention over the long term, therefore, was part 2, which contained the two models of the criminal process: crime control and due process (Macdonald 2008). These drew much attention from social scientists and were later used to advance a variety of disciplinary and topical agendas that could not have been foreseen at the time of the book’s publication. Packer suggested that we can understand a given criminal process by locating it on a continuum between two extreme characterizations: the crime control model and the due process model. The models focused on different values and, as a consequence, required different preferences and processes. Neither model was supposed to depict an actual criminal justice system, but the balance between them would serve as a useful tool for assessing the values underlying a given system in the real world. The crime control model, argued Packer, is shaped around the notion of procedural efficiency. Crime control means processing as many cases as pos- sible in the fastest, most cost-effective way. This process is likened to a mass-production assembly line (with efficient convictions as the product). As a corollary, problematic cases that raise serious substantive or procedural issues need to be screened out as soon as possible. Packer inventively con- ceptualized the idea behind this screening process as the “presumption of guilt”—a descriptive probabilistic statement according to which a defendant whose case has passed police and prosecutorial muster is highly likely to be guilty. This presumption has several important implications. First, the crime control model places great emphasis on the early stages of the criminal process—police investigation and prosecutorial discretion in charging—as “gatekeepers” of the courts. Because of the importance of efficiency in these early steps, crime control places importance on providing the investigative mechanism with the power, freedom, and authority necessary to find out the truth. Second, the trial, a complicated and expensive stage fraught with technicalities and hurdles, is a less preferred mode for processing cases; instead, prescreened cases should be processed on the “fast track,” through guilty pleas and plea bargains. Third, the model values finality and therefore discourages appellate review of court decisions. By contrast, the due process model emphasizes the presumption of inno- cence and the need to ensure “quality control” in the outcome of criminal trials through a mechanism of fair process. This model has a much more suspicious view of the investigatory stage, regarding it as fraught with biases and potential for abuse. The trial, particularly its adversarial format, is hailed as a balanced mechanism that equips defendants with the necessary tools for effectively challenging law enforcement. These tools include the burden of proof, a series of constitutional trial rights, and effective representation by Packer in Context 239 defense counsel. The due process model is willing to sacrifice efficiency in order to avoid the possibility of an unjust outcome and is particularly con- cerned with preserving the rights of indigent and minority defendants, who are most vulnerable to abuse from the law enforcement apparatus. A due process system provides defendants not only with rights and safeguards during trial, but also with broader opportunities to review convictions. A first family of critiques of the two models emerged from law and society circles, particularly from the community involved in the then-nascent field of criminal courtroom ethnographies. Upon the publication of the book, a review by Blumberg (1969) argued that the models hid a reality that was closer to the crime control model: a system guided mostly by efficiency and plea-bargaining. This was a sociological comment on the detachment of legal scholars from the everyday realities of courtroom dynamics, particularly in lower courts. The point was presented more forcefully by Malcolm Feeley (1979a, 1979b), who argued that the two models were not made from the same fabric. Due process, Feeley argued, was a normative, idealized concept generated by the court, masking the empirical reality, which was actually much closer to crime control. Doreen McBarnet (1981) pushed this angle further by arguing that, in fact, the veneer of due process existed for the purpose of securing convictions under the guise of legitimacy, and therefore “due process [was] for crime control” (156). Another family of critiques addressed the insufficiency of the two models to describe the universe of the criminal process. The first commentary in this vein came from John Griffiths, at the time an unconventional young scholar interested in law and society at Yale Law School. Griffiths addressed the Packer book in two consecutive pieces: a lengthy book review in which he called The Limits “a very disappointing book. . . . very, very bad indeed” (1970b, 1388), and a subsequent piece in which he argued that the models were narrow in their application and in fact presented two sides of the same model: the “battle” between the “police perspective” and the “ACLU per- spective” (1970a, 367). To Griffiths, the choice between the two models consisted merely in the question of which of the two biases was to be built into the system. As an alternative to this framework of battle, Griffiths proposed a “family model.” Under this new paradigm, the state was to approach offenders as it would children, punishing them so that they learn a lesson and helping their reintegration into society. In many ways, Griffiths’s paradigm was a forerunner of three lines of inquiry: the “republican” models presented by Braithwaite and Pettit (1992), the problem-solving courts’ phi- losophy (McCoy 2003), and studies examining whether legal systems outside the United States could be mapped onto the two-model construct (Foote 1992). At the time, however, his intense critique cost him tenure at Yale. Kalman (2005) argues that Griffiths’s tenure vote had a broader context: his attack on Packer was seen as a broader attack on Langdellian law school teaching and as support for the nascent law and society paradigm at the LAW & SOCIAL INQUIRY240 expense of the “old school” doctrinal models, arguably as part of a broader political “purge” of leftist faculty members in the late 1960s. Suggestions for additional models followed. In a broad-ranging piece Michael King (1981) offered an array of alternatives that included the medical model (corresponding to the positivist school in criminology), the bureaucratic model (which could be seen as a variation on the crime control model), the status passage model (focusing on stigma and labeling), and the power model (invoking critical criminology, particularly Marxism). These models were grounded in a variety of broader perspectives (for an excellent discussion of their criminological roots, see Sebba 2006). One additional model that has received much attention in the literature is related to victim perspectives. Douglas Beloof (1999) argued that the victim brings into the process a set of separate interests that did not com- pletely align with either the crime control or due process models and were generated by the secondary harm caused by the process. The victim’s inter- ests could align with those of the state or with those of the defendant with regard to the decision to charge, and they could be diametrically opposed to the state and defendant’s preference for plea bargaining. Kent Roach (1999) elaborated the victim perspective by introducing two victim models: a punitive and nonpunitive one. The punitive model is a variation on King’s status passage model, with an emphasis on victims; a version of this model, which refers not to actual victims but to their invocation by the state, appears later in Simon’s (2007) Governing through Crime. Roach’s second model is an amalgam of restorative justice and Griffiths’s family model. Others such as John Stickels (2008) further refined victim models to address victim satisfaction. A recent contribution to the “additional model/ new paradigm” family is a piece by Keith Findley (2009), which argues that the innocence movement transcends the differences between crime control and due process by strengthening the connection between a rights-based process and reliability. A recent critique by Stuart Macdonald (2008) returns to the basics of “modeling” criminal justice. Macdonald argues, in opposition to Damaska (1973), that Packer’s intent may not have been to provide practical descrip- tions of the process, but rather to present two Weberian ideal types without attaching a value judgment to them. His choice of ideal types, however, was problematic: “Packer’s dialogue between the two models . . . reveals two voices speaking at cross-purposes: a crime control model that fails to articu- late its model clearly, and a due process voice that has failed to understand the model of its opponent” (Macdonald 2008, 276). Building on Nils Jareborg (1995) and others, Macdonald suggests a more consistent approach to mod- eling, offering a typology of models based on a spectrum of the feasibility of their implementation. Some of these models are more useful for evaluation, while others are better suited as a framework for empirical work. As an example of the former, he suggests a set of four pure “ideal types” of the Packer in Context 241 criminal process, exaggerated to the point of impossibility, as the Weberian ideal would require. It is important to point out which of these critiques were leveled directly against Packer and which ones merely used his framework as a structure for pointing out new ideas and institutions as they emerged. The early ethno- graphic critics had reasonable grounds to argue that Packer ignored empirical findings from the field, pointing to the fact that his crime control model was far less of a “model,” and much more of a reality, than his framework would suggest. Similarly, Griffiths’s ideological critique addressed the narrowness of Packer’s conceptual framework. On the other hand, the victim-model critics, especially Roach, are careful to point out that neither sensitivity to victim- related concerns nor skepticism of the concept of victimless crime could be expected from Packer at the time he was writing. This distinction points to an important lesson for today’s readers of Packer’s work: Packer’s models and their limitations should be understood not only in the political context of his time, but also in light of his academic milieu. PACKER IN CONTEXT Macdonald builds his presentation of ideal models on Packer’s explicit intention to create two extreme ends of a continuum, rather than a realistic depiction of the American (or any other) legal system. However, despite Packer’s declarations, the models seem to be more linked to the existing American criminal process. Rather than seeing this as a theoretical limita- tion, as Macdonald does, I see it as evidence of the extent to which Packer’s thinking was influenced by the constitutional revolution he was witnessing, as the Warren Court gradually incorporated the provisions of the Bill of Rights against the states. Within this particular context, Packer’s modeling can be seen as an astute and broad-minded attempt to conceptualize a change that went far beyond merely ruling more often for the defendant in criminal procedure cases: rather than merely being a “pro-defendant” court, the Warren Court was busy creating—through a mechanism of constitutional incorporation and by delivering a substantial blow to federalism—a frame- work of review for criminal procedure that relied on the conceptualization of the adversarial process as the solution for the ills and biases of the investiga- tory prosecutorial approach. It is important to keep in mind that, as exemplified by the Griffiths incident, law schools were far more doctrinal, and much more removed from social sciences, than they are today. Interdisciplinary work was less common, and law and society types such as Griffiths were seen as outliers rather than heralds of an exciting trend. Pathbreaking ethnographies were conducted by political scientists and sociologists including Sudnow (1965) and Foote (1956) and later Feeley (1979a), Heumann (1981), Eisenstein and Jacob LAW & SOCIAL INQUIRY242 (1977), and Nardulli (1978). While these scholars were drawn to courtroom dynamics (Nardulli 1978), plea bargaining (Feeley 1979b; Heumann 1981), and policing (Goldstein 1960; Skolnick 1966), legal scholars had only begun to formulate criminal procedure as a doctrinal field, and as they did, they focused mostly on Supreme Court decisions. Criminal procedure was under- stood to be a subfield of constitutional law, and would remain so, for many scholars and in many schools, for many years to come. It is in this professional context that Packer’s contribution can best be appreciated. Within the context of legal scholarship, Packer may have created the crime control model primarily as an analytic device, a sort of “what are we fighting” straw man, to highlight the dramatic effect of the due process revolution. The concept of a crime control model was new to his doctrinal readers and demonstrates his ability not only to transcend the doctrinal discourse, but also to find interest in the invisible parts of the process: police stations and lower courts. The audacity of using the phrase “presumption of guilt” to describe the system’s perception of the probabilistic realities of the courtroom workday must have seemed revolutionary. Part of this openness may be due to Packer’s broader horizons. In his impressive but short career, Packer served as vice provost of Stanford and must have been exposed to interdisciplinary work more than his colleagues (Ehrlich et al., 1972). His earlier work on ex-Communists (Packer 1958) engaged directly with political topics, as did his analysis of the Warren Commission’s report on the Kennedy assassination (Packer 1964b) and his critique of doctrinal review of police discretion (Packer 1966). Packer was broad minded enough, and enough of a public figure, to be able to transcend the doctrinal discourse and offer a broader way to understand the Warren Court revolution. It is insightful to compare his work to Abraham Goldstein’s; Goldstein (1973) astutely demonstrated how the criminal game was “rigged” on behalf of the state and against the defendant but did not broaden this perspective, as Packer did, to examine the process as a whole beyond who “wins.” When one is considering Packer’s work within the disciplinary realm he occupied, it is clear why the book was such a major success with legal scholars, who considered it novel and refreshing (Katz 1969; Schwartz 1969). By contrast, reviews by social scientists criticized Packer for not engaging more with the nascent world of empirical inquiry of lower courts. In any case, the primary audience for the models was probably the prominent legal scholars at elite law schools, whose gaze was fixed upon the Supreme Court and the Constitution. What did Packer add to the legal dichotomy between progovernment and prodefendant decisions? Some of this, as Goldstein (1973) later pointed out, could be explained as a transition from an adversarial to an inquisitorial process. However, there were some broader issues at stake. Crime control was characterized not merely by sympathy for the government’s position but by a respect for efficiency as a primary goal of the process. This emphasis drives a Packer in Context 243 preference for the less transparent, and more unencumbered, investigatory phase of the process over the hurdles of trial. Due process, while sympathetic to defendants by generating rights, was more than that; it stood for the belief that bright-line rules and hurdles were the best way to guarantee accurate outcomes in the process. The wisdom of Packer’s broader framework made even more sense after his death, when criminal procedure scholars turned their attention to the reversal of the Warren Court trends. That the Warren era was revolutionary in many respects, bringing the Constitution to bear upon issues of defendants’ rights and police regulation, could hardly be disputed. However, few scholars pointed to its demise when analyzing Burger Court decisions. Peter Arenella (1983–1984) recounts the proceedings of a conference featuring prominent scholars such as Yale Kamisar and Jerold Israel, who argued that the Burger Court era could hardly be regarded as a “counterrevolution” and did not produce significantly more pro-government decisions. Arenella provides an excellent critique of these approaches as shallow and one dimensional. Using the broader Packer framework, he demonstrates the dramatic paradigm change by showing how the post-Warren decisions are characterized by a shift away from bright-line procedural rules as a cure for system malfunctions and toward an overarching goal of convicting the factually guilty. The 1970s, and even more so the 1980s, show an increasing pro-government reliance on “totality of the circumstances” tests, which incorporate issues of factual guilt and allow the police broad powers and discretion in determining case dispo- sition prior to trial. Later decisions narrow the broad constitutional protec- tions provided by Warren Court decisions, such as the Miranda warnings and the Gideon right to counsel. In this decision, deference to state mechanisms was an important factor. Finally, the post–Warren Court decisions placed great value upon finality, leading to a significant narrowing of postconviction remedies.1 Packer’s models are therefore both narrower and broader in scope than the comments and critiques would suggest. They are narrower in the sense that they function best, and are best understood, as an explanation of US Supreme Court decisions at a unique moment in time and as a prophecy of a countertrend that occurred after that special moment had passed. However, they are broader in the sense that they offer an understanding of the signifi- cance of Warren Court decisions, and of the subsequent backlash that goes beyond mere shifts between the government’s side and the defendant’s side. The transitions speak volumes about the different Courts’ understandings of the relative importance of different stages of the process, the extent of their willingness to rely on rights discourse as a mechanism for accurate decision making, and their perceptions about objectivity and bias in the process. 1. As Roach (1999) reports, Packer himself felt this transition keenly, and at the end of his life reported disappointment in the failure of the due process model. LAW & SOCIAL INQUIRY244 My own critique of Packer’s models, therefore, resides within this disci- plinary context. Focusing primarily on the transitions in Supreme Court decisions, the question is whether Packer’s one-dimensional spectrum is inclusive enough to explain the Warren Court revolution and the backlash that followed it. TWO DUE PROCESS MODELS, OR WHY THE CRIME CONTROL-DUE PROCESS SPECTRUM UNDEREXPLAINS SUPREME COURT DECISIONS In a scholarly world that recognizes Packer’s models as classic, much of what occurred in the Supreme Court from the 1970s onward is explained, even in law school textbooks, as a shift from due process to crime control (Dressler and Thomas 2006; Whitebread and Slobogin 2006). Much in the vein of Arenella’s analysis, the common wisdom in the field is that the post–Warren Court decisions reflect greater trust in the police (through relaxing the probable cause requirements, allowing for good-faith exceptions to the exclusionary rule, and creating more exceptions to the warrant require- ment); more emphasis on factual guilt than on the normative presumption of innocence (by generating a difference between violations of the voluntary confession requirement, which might compromise actual accuracy, and Miranda violations, which are seen as technical); less intervention in state rules (especially when those might require budgetary expenditure, as in pro- viding counsel for indigent defendants); and more emphasis on finality (by limiting access to appeals, and especially to federal habeas corpus proceed- ings). Law and society scholarship has regarded these doctrinal changes as a symptom of broader political trends prompted by the Nixon era’s “tough on crime” politics (Beckett 1997; Garland 2001; Simon 2007; Lynch 2009). And, indeed, the Supreme Court was not insulated from these broad pro- cesses; Nixon’s appointees—Justices Burger, Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist—constituted a significant change in the Court’s composition, leading the Court toward more conservative decisions, though attitudinal research suggests that these changes should be viewed more subtly (Epstein et al. 1998). However, some trends remain more difficult to explain. One such mystery is Terry v. Ohio (1968), a decision authored by Warren himself, which is largely credited for giving police much leeway in conducting stops and frisks and for enabling pretextual stops and racial profiling (Aviram and Portman 2009). Is Terry a crime control decision? And how do we read some of Justice Scalia’s decisions, such as his insistence upon the right to jury in deciding sentencing enhancements in Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000)? The answer to such mysteries, I argue, lies in a more refined understand- ing of Packer’s due process model. In considering crime control as the antith- esis of due process, Packer failed to identify another “enemy” of the Warren Packer in Context 245 Court revolution: the darker side of due process itself. A careful analysis of the constitutional stances of Supreme Court justices leads to the conclusion that there is not one due process model, but two. The first model emphasizes formalism, whereas the second one emphasizes fairness. Table 1 summarizes the main differences between the two concepts of due process. Advocates of formalism regard due process as adherence to the set of rights provided by the Bill of Rights, to the letter of the law, and in some cases in accordance with their interpretation of the intent of the Framers of the Constitution. Fairness advocates, on the other hand, have a more flexible definition of due process, ascribing more importance to an overall sense of fairness. In contrast to formalists, who provide defendants with all rights in the Bill of Rights and none beyond the official “constitutional package,” fairness advocates might offer some rights beyond those in the Bill of Rights and might also dispense with some of the constitutional guarantees when those are not conducive to a sense that one’s case was considered holistically and fairly, with the defendant’s best interests in mind. In Packer’s original dichotomy, crime control emphasized the investiga- tory stage, while due process emphasized the trial stage. Within the trial phase, formalist due process focuses on the adjudication of guilt as the “main show” of the criminal trial and therefore guarantees rights that are directly related to this phase; the most important of these rights is the presumption of TABLE 1. Formalism and Fairness Formalism Fairness Meaning of due process A guarantee of formal procedural rights Attention to an overall experience of a fair hearing The “constitutional package” Defendants benefit from all rights in the Bill of Rights, and not beyond them Defendants benefit from a general perception of fairness, which may extend beyond the Bill of Rights or exclude rights when they are detrimental to fairness The stage Emphasis on the guilt phase as the “main show” of the criminal process Emphasis on other stages of the process, such as sentencing Presumption of innocence Essential for due process Secondary to other fairness considerations The actors Emphasis on traditional actors: defense attorney and juries Emphasis on pragmatic helpers: judges and therapeutic professionals Notion of equality Constitutional rights are blind to demographics. Model is aware of class, race, and gender differences LAW & SOCIAL INQUIRY246 innocence. Fairness-centered due process, by contrast, focuses more on the pre- and posttrial stages of the criminal process. The possibility of informally dismissing cases based on flimsy evidence or governmental misconduct becomes an important, albeit less visible, arena for fairness (Findley 2009). The sentencing phase in particular becomes more important, and has more consequences, in a realm of plea bargains and a tiny percentage of trials; the focus here is on careful consideration of the individual defendant’s circum- stances, to frame a forward-looking sentence. Consequently, formalist due process places much emphasis on actors pertaining to the guilt-adjudication phase, such as the defense attorney and, even more so, the jury, while fairness- centered due process might dispense with juries when they are perceived to be biased or overly punitive and may place more emphasis on actors who have more discretionary power in the pre- and posttrial stages, such as judges, probation officers, and other therapeutic personnel. Finally, the two conceptions of due process share a concern for equality, but they understand the concept in different ways. Formalist due process perceives equality as the need to provide constitutional rights on a universal basis, blind to the defendant’s demographics. Fairness-based due process, however, brings to the table awareness of defendants’ individual characteris- tics and might differentiate among defendants on the basis of class, race, and gender when these factors contribute to biases or inattentiveness to the defendant’s particular circumstances. As the following discussion will show, the roots of the two due process models lie in the debate over whether the Fourteenth Amendment “incor- porated” the Bill of Rights and therefore applied them to the states. More importantly, the distinction between the two due process models explains some of the previously unexplained transition in Supreme Court decisions, especially when one is considering Justice Warren’s decision in Terry as an example of fairness-based due process, and Justice Scalia’s decision in Apprendi as an example of formalism-based due process. Doctrinal Origins of the Formalism-Fairness Dichotomy The rival understandings of due process precede the Warren Court and can be traced back to the Black-Harlan debate on incorporation. To provide a short background to the debate, court rulings in the nineteenth century, prior to the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, shied away from interpreting the Bill of Rights as applicable to state cases (Barron v. Baltimore 1833). Even after the Fourteenth Amendment provided a doctrinal vehicle for imposing federal constitutional rulings on the states, courts were initially hesitant to do so (as in the case of grand juries; see Hurtado v. California 1884). Gradually, however, two approaches toward incorporation began to emerge. Packer in Context 247 The first approach, advocated by Justice Black, was a formalist under- standing of incorporation. Under this approach, the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the Bill of Rights and had no independent meaning beyond that. Any attempt to read a broader meaning into “due process,” beyond merely being the technical sum of rights in the other amendments, was considered to be “itself a violation of our Constitution, in that it subtly conveys to courts, at the expense of legislatures, ultimate power over public policies in fields where no specific provision of the Constitution limits legis- lative power” (Adamson v. California 1947, 74–75). While this is by no means a crime control approach, it conveys serious concerns about “the conse- quences of the Court’s practice of substituting its own concepts of decency and fundamental justice for the language of the Bill of Rights as its point of departure in interpreting and enforcing that Bill of Rights” (89). The second approach, whose most prominent advocate was Justice Harlan, did not aim at incorporating all federal constitutional rights against the states as a whole; instead, incorporation would depend on the context of the right. Following the reasoning in Powell v. Alabama (1932), advocates of this approach examined the practical effects of trials on certain types of defendants, particularly minorities and the indigent. Constitutional rights would be provided to state defendants on a case-by-case basis, and the judg- ment would be made based on their contribution to the overall fairness of the hearing (Cord 1975–1976; Amar 1998). These two approaches are the ends of a second continuum, one that differs from Packer’s crime control–due process continuum in that it is hard to say which of the two approaches—due process formalism or due process fairness—is better for criminal defendants, and which favors the government. On the one hand, a flexible interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment could mean reading into the term “due process” additional protections beyond those provided by the Constitution, such as a right to a fair hearing during sentencing, or a right to rehabilitation. On the other hand, the flexibility could (and, to Harlan, did) mean that some Bill of Rights provi- sions would not necessarily be applied to the states. It is also important to keep in mind that the “overall fairness” approach had the potential of being more sensitive to the local contexts of different jurisdictions, based on their different population demographics, cultural back- grounds, and law enforcement techniques. Harlan was explicitly concerned about the ultimate result of a wholesale formalist approach, which would be “compelled uniformity, which is inconsistent with the purpose of our federal system and which is achieved either by encroachment on the States’ sover- eign powers or by dilution in federal law enforcement of the specific protec- tions found in the Bill of Rights” (Malloy v. Hogan 1964, 15–16). For Harlan, attentiveness to local context meant more restraint toward certain state practices, but the flexibility could also be interpreted as guaranteeing more protections in some local contexts, such as, for example, defending minorities LAW & SOCIAL INQUIRY248 in places in which their rights were more vulnerable, as in Powell v. Alabama (1932).2 The Terry Decision as an Example of Fairness-Centered Due Process As mentioned earlier, the conventional wisdom in criminal procedure scholarship is to see the Warren Court as embracing due process at the expense of crime control, with subsequent Courts reversing the emphasis. The strong reaction to the due process revolution as it was happening, and the subsequent judicial and political backlash against it during the Nixon administration, may have been aimed at the civil rights movement in general (Beckett 1997), but the rhetoric fueling it was directed against the Warren Court decisions as symbolic manifestations of that revolution (Baker and Blumenthal 1983). This rhetoric targeted several decisions in particular: Mapp v. Ohio (1961), which established the exclusionary rule; Gideon v. Wainwright (1963), which incorporated the right to counsel against the states and at the states’ expense; and especially Miranda v. Arizona (1966), which established the quintessential Miranda warnings. While much subsequent sociolegal evidence showed that the warnings were rendered meaningless by police interrogatory techniques (Leo 1996, 2008), at the time they were both hailed and maligned as symbols of due process. The reasoning in Miranda, written by Warren himself, is a classic Packeresque due process problemati- zation of a biased and dangerous police force, including examples from police manuals to demonstrate the amount of trickery that criminal defendants are subjected to. Given this background and its symbolic importance, many doctrinal scholars are puzzled by the Warren Court’s decision in Terry v. Ohio (1968), which appears to go against the due process grain (Maclin 1998; Katz 2004– 2005; Schwartz 1995–1996). The decision itself dealt with the realm of “lesser” searches and seizures, short of an arrest or a full search, which one might assume were occurring on a regular basis on lesser grounds than prob- able cause and a warrant. Officer McFadden, the officer who conducted the Terry search, spent thirty-five years walking a Cleveland beat but will be forever remembered for the brief detention detailed in the facts. Observing two men standing in the corner who “didn’t look right [to him] at the time,” he deduced that they were casing stores for a robbery, briefly detained them, patted down the outside of Terry’s clothing, and found a pistol. Given these facts, the Court could have adhered to the probable cause requirement for searches, thus rendering Terry’s stop and pat down unconstitutional. Instead, Warren opted for a lower standard, requiring a lesser degree of suspicion— reasonable suspicion—for conducting a mere stop or a frisk. 2. For more on the racial aspect of the decision, see Goodman (1995). Packer in Context 249 One typical interpretation endorsed by critics sees this decision as sup- portive of a crime control model sensitive to the realities of everyday policing (Amar 1998) and therefore empowering police officers to exercise discretion, which can be said to endorse decision making based on criteria such as race (Schwartz 1995–1996; Maclin 1998; Sundby 1998). Warren’s intimate acquaintance with policing, which came from his experience being a pros- ecutor as well as having been victimized by crime (Cray 2008), could provide an explanation for a practical approach based on acknowldedging the realities and challenges of law enforcement. It is evocative of sociolegal discussions of police discretion (Goldstein 1960; Muir 1977). The Court was also not unaware of the political climate surrounding its rights revolution in general and the law of search and seizure in particular. Prior to the incorporation of the exclusionary rule in 1961, most police searches and seizures went unregu- lated. At that time, half of the states had no exclusionary rule for their police (Katz 2004–2005). The criminological attention to the police in the 1960s and 1970s revealed an organizational ethos of “us versus them,” which was not conducive to the need to develop procedures to deal with the new rigid probable cause requirement. The Court came under increasing fire for deci- sions on criminal procedure rights, and police officers faced potentially violent confrontations in the streets. Legislatures authorized increased polic- ing including “stop and frisk” statutes (Dudley 1998). Terry was decided in June 1968, during the presidential campaign in which Nixon and Agnew directed much criticism against the Warren Court. And, indeed, the decision explicitly mentions sympathy to police officers and their dilemmas in the field. This classic interpretation of the case builds not only on Warren’s background and the context of Terry’s outcome at the time, but also on Terry’s progeny: a series of cases expanding police authority for “frisks” beyond the Terry scenario to cars and homes (Michigan v. Long 1983; Maryland v. Buie 1990), minimizing the suspicion required for searches (Adams v. Williams 1972; Alabama v. White 1990), and authorizing racial profiling (Whren et al. v. United States 1996). However, the eventual eight-to-one majority decision, which authorized an entire category of lesser searches and seizures based on less than probable cause, cannot be wholly explained by a crime control paradigm. Warren’s language is clearly sensitive to the plight of defendants, particularly minori- ties, if not predictive of Terry’s potential to generate pretextual stops and racial profiling: The wholesale harassment by certain elements of the police community, of which minority groups, particularly Negroes, frequently complain, will not be stopped by the exclusion of any evidence from any criminal trial. Yet a rigid and unthinking application of the exclusionary rule . . . may exact a high toll in human injury and frustration of efforts LAW & SOCIAL INQUIRY250 to prevent crime. No judicial opinion can comprehend the protean variety of the street encounter, and we can only judge the facts of the case before us. [However,] [u]nder our decision, courts still retain their traditional responsibility to guard against police conduct which is over- bearing or harassing . . . [and] [w]hen such conduct is identified, it must be condemned by the judiciary and its fruits must be excluded from evidence in criminal trials. (Terry 1968, 14–15) While crime control explains the expansion police power in Terry, it does little to explain the Court’s extreme reticence and its desire to narrow its holding. Even the more police-friendly concurrence by Justice Harlan required some level of suspicion before a suspect could be detained and patted down. A better, albeit counterintuitive, understanding of the decision in Terry, therefore, is as a paragon of fairness-centered due process. Its legacy is the Warren Court’s decision to wade into an area of police conduct that it had previously left completely unregulated for state agents and subject to a rigid probable cause analysis for federal agents. In Terry, the justices recognized that it would provide “initial guidelines for law enforcement authorities and courts throughout the land as this important new field of law develops” (31). However, they did not simply rubber stamp police arguments, nor did they rule as widely as they could have on the facts. Rather, the Court crafted a nuanced opinion identifying a narrow standard, and highlighting the impact of excessive police practices on particular communities, while also recogniz- ing the danger to police officers of easy access to firearms and a charged atmosphere in the streets. This nuance was communicated in Warren’s opinion in a variety of ways. First, he explicitly rejected the usage of the terms “frisk” and “stop,” which might have suggested that police authority in Terry was “outside the purview of the Fourth Amendment because neither action rises to the level of a ‘search’ or ‘seizure’ within the meaning of the constitution” (17). Second, he took special care delineating the amount of suspicion necessary, basing it on actual facts, rather than a hunch. Third, he carefully delineated the scope of permissible search to patting the external surface of clothing to detect arms. In short, as the clerk who drafted the decision explained years later, Terry was a first, cautious step along an uncharted path, and I think it fair to say that the opinion’s restraint set an important example for the Supreme Court and lower courts in later cases in their approach to the myriad issues that grow out of what Chief Justice Warren called “the protean variety of the street encoun- ter.” (Dudley 1998, 898). While the eventual ramifications of Terry were very much in the crime control vein, Terry’s initial intent was to make police activity more visible and controllable. Such an interpretation allows us to understand Terry in the Packer in Context 251 context of the overall project of the Warren Court, rather than as an unex- plainable outlier. The Apprendi and Blakely Decisions as a Site of Struggle between Formalism-Centered and Fairness-Centered Due Process As mentioned earlier, conventional wisdom sees the post-Warren Courts as crime control oriented. This analysis holds true with regard to a variety of issues and is easy to overgeneralize because of the pro-government direction of the Burger, Rehnquist, and Roberts Courts. Doing so, however, runs the risk of misunderstanding the source of some of the important and far-reaching pro-government decisions of the post-Warren Courts, specifically those authored by Justice Scalia. Scalia, whom no one would suspect of natural pro-defendant biases, authored an influential concurring opinion and was the decisive swing vote in Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000), which held that any fact (save for the exist- ence of prior convictions) that increases the maximum penalty for a crime must be charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. This decision, as well as a series of dissents by Scalia, would later prompt the Court’s decision in Blakely v. Washington (2004), which extended the Apprendi rule to any fact that must be found in order to increase the sentence, even if it is within a statutorily allowable range of the then- mandatory sentencing guidelines. Long before Apprendi, Scalia sought an end to the extensive use of sentencing enhancements and focused almost exclusively on a due process rationale. Soon after he arrived on the Court, he expressed unease with the Federal Sentencing Commission. He argued that the commission is an unconstitutional delegation of power and cited to the political philosopher John Locke, among other sources, regarding fundamental principles of governance (Mistretta v. United States 1986). By the end of the 1990s, he had refined his focus to the jury trial right (Almendarez- Torres v. United States 1998; Monge v. California 1998; Jones v. United States 1999), upon which he later based his influential concurring opinion in Apprendi. Like Scalia in his concurrence, the Apprendi majority justified the right it announced as firmly rooted in due process. In Apprendi, the relevant criminal statute imposed a ten-year maximum for possession of a gun, but a separate hate-crime statute allowed an increase to twenty years for crimes motivated by racism or intimidation against certain protected categories. The hate-crime statute provided that applicability would be decided by a judge, based on the preponderance of the evidence. The Court held that the finding that a certain offense was a “hate crime” constituted an element of the offense and therefore required a jury decision. LAW & SOCIAL INQUIRY252 The opinion relied on a classic case invoking due process rights, In re Winship (1970), to explain the right. Winship, authored by Justice Brennan, held that proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every element is one of the “essentials of due process and fair treatment” (359) that must be afforded even to juveniles. The reasoning draws heavily on due process model ideas. In a relatively minor juvenile case regarding money stolen from a locker, Brennan discussed extensively the purpose of the criminal justice system itself. He explained that fact finding is inherently subjective and the burden affects the margin of error. Justice Harlan’s concurrence explained further that [I] view the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a crimi- nal case as bottomed on a fundamental value determination of our society that it is far worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free. It is only because of the nearly complete and long-standing acceptance of the reasonable doubt standard by the States in criminal trials that the Court has not, before today, had to hold explicitly that due process, as an expression of fundamental procedural fairness, requires a more stringent standard for criminal trials than for ordinary civil litiga- tion. (372) Contrasting Scalia’s concurring opinion with Justice Breyer’s dissent in Apprendi, and subsequently in Blakely, is a fascinating exercise in distinguish- ing between formalism-centered and fairness-centered due process. In his Apprendi dissent, Breyer expressed concern that extending the jury trial could potentially harm a defendant by placing him in the “awkward (and conceiv- ably unfair) position of having to deny he committed the crime yet offer proof about how he committed it” (Apprendi 2000, 557). In Blakely, which addressed the question of whether the Apprendi right to a jury extends to facts found in the sentencing guidelines, Breyer’s dissent focused particularly on the concern that introducing more formalism into trials would merely strengthen the prosecutor’s position in a system characterized by plea bar- gains. His explanation of these concerns is a classic fairness-centered, outcome-oriented argument: The fairness and effectiveness of a sentencing system, and the related fairness and effectiveness of the criminal justice system itself, depends upon the legislature’s possessing the constitutional authority (within due process limits) to make that labeling decision. To restrict radically the legislature’s power in this respect, as the majority interprets the Sixth Amendment to do, prevents the legislature from seeking sentencing systems that are consistent with, and indeed may help to advance, the Constitution’s greater fairness goals. (Blakely 2004, 345) The argument favors administrative and legislative regulation of sentencing, but to benefit defendants. Breyer’s pragmatist due process is evident Packer in Context 253 throughout the opinion: As he argued, “whatever the faults of guidelines systems—and there are many—they are more likely to find their cure in legislation emerging from the experience of, and discussion among, all ele- ments of the criminal justice community, than in a virtually unchangeable constitutional decision of this Court” (345–46). Scalia’s responses to Breyer’s concerns are a classic example of formalism-centered due process. Scalia directly accuses Breyer of supporting a system that is “an admirably fair and efficient scheme of criminal justice designed for a society that is prepared to leave criminal justice to the State” (498). Breyer, according to Scalia, imagines a “bureaucratic realm of perfect equity” where the facts that determine the length of sentence to which the defendant is exposed will be determined to exist (on a more-likely-than-not basis) by a single employee of the State. It is certainly arguable ( Justice Breyer argues it) that this sacrifice of prior protections is worth it. But it is not arguable that, just because one thinks it is a better system, it must be, or is even more likely to be, the system envisioned by a Constitution that guarantees trial by jury. (498). In an explicit expression of preference for the law-in-the-books set of trial rights over the realities of plea bargaining, Scalia argues that Breyer’s prefer- ence for nonadversarial fact finding is “an assault on jury trial generally” (313). He explains, Ultimately, our decision cannot turn on whether or to what degree trial by jury impairs the efficiency or fairness of criminal justice. One can certainly argue that both these values would be better served by leaving justice entirely in the hands of professionals; many nations of the world, particularly those following civil-law traditions, take just that course. There is not one shred of doubt, however, about the Framers’ paradigm for criminal justice: not the civil-law ideal of administrative perfection, but the common-law ideal of limited state power accomplished by strict division of authority between judge and jury. As Apprendi held, every defendant has the right to insist that the prosecutor prove to a jury all facts legally essential to the punishment. Under the dissenters’ alterna- tive, he has no such right. That should be the end of the matter. (313) What is the meaning of this debate in the context of Packer’s work? As argued by Stephanos Bibas (2001a, 2001b, 2001c) in a series of articles written following the Apprendi decision, it represents a preference for formalism over effective defendants’ rights. In these pieces, later cited by Breyer in Blakely, Bibas explained his opposition to Apprendi as a fairness-centered due process concern stemming from the need to maintain fairness within the constraints of plea-bargaining and mass convictions. Bibas (2001b) suggested that LAW & SOCIAL INQUIRY254 Apprendi is a trade-off of a meaningful sentencing hearing right for a mean- ingless jury trial right for the vast majority of defendants because of plea pressure. For our purposes, Bibas’s argument implies that the Apprendi majority made a choice between two due process model options, by focusing on a formalist, and impractical, insistence on rights at the guilt phase at the expense of a richer, more meaningful hearing at the sentencing phase. Bibas (2001b) states, “the right to trial by jury . . . is the one [right] that undermines defendants’ right to hearings in the world of guilty pleas” (335). Does due process extend to the sentencing phase and require a “more meaningful hearing”? Arguably, if imposing a higher sentence requires proving certain conduct by a certain evidentiary standard, the sentencing hearing merits consideration from the due process perspective. However, other aspects of the hearing constitute an administrative procedure. The hearing must fit the appropriate punishment to the crime. Outcomes form a significant basis for the discussion. The hearing is less formal than the jury trial and many evidentiary rules are relaxed. Court officers, such as probation officers, charged with offender supervision may play as significant a role as the prosecutors in explaining the appropriate punishment. The presumption of innocence or “legal guilt” no longer applies, except to the extent that a rational basis remains after Apprendi. Therefore, the sentencing phase may be more flexible, more open, and more conducive to substantive fairness than the guilt phase, even when guilt is determined through the paragon of formalist due process, the jury trial. Has the adherence to formalist due process in Apprendi really worked to the defendants’ detriment? This question has been the subject of extensive debate (Bibas 2001a, 2001b; King and Klein 2001). Bibas’s argument depends to a large extent on the manner in which judges and prosecutors exercise their discretion. However, debate and later case law did show that for certain types of defendants, Apprendi is a curse rather than a blessing. One such example is proving drug quantity for sentencing purposes in narcotics cases. As early as 2001, speculation emerged that, in light of Apprendi, any drug quantity would be explicitly stated in the indictment and sent to the jury for all drug-trafficking cases (Hrvatin 2001). This possibility created a serious incentive for defendants to plead guilty: proving drug quan- tity before the jury would lead the prosecution to expose the jury to a mountain of narcotics, a sight that might be severely prejudicial in the sentencing phase. This issue is significant because of the large percentage of drug trials, which constitute one-third of the federal courts’ caseload (Bureau of Justice Statistics 2007). In addition, there is Bibas’s practical concern that “in the real world of guilty pleas . . . where fewer than 4% of defendants ever get to juries . . . rhetorical invocation of juries is almost pointless” (Bibas 2001a, 317). Under the new post-Apprendi regime, prosecutors can now force a defendant to concede to a certain quantity of drugs as part of receiving a Packer in Context 255 plea agreement, where previously the defendant could have challenged it at the sentencing. Bibas suggests that the prosecutor can force an all-or-nothing plea deal at an earlier phase of the trial, without having to purchase the waiver of the right to contest enhancements at the sentencing hearing with additional concessions. Ironically, the Apprendi and Blakely decisions eventually served as the doctrinal foundation for subsequent decisions that stripped the sentencing guidelines of their mandatory power (United States v. Booker 2005; Cunning- ham v. California 2007). This outcome, restoring some judicial discretion and potentially weakening the overarching prosecutorial discretion, resonated with the scholarly and judicial critiques of the sentencing guidelines (Com- munity Release Board v. Superior Court 1979; Griset 1991; People v. Begnald 1991; Stith and Cabranes 1998). It was not, however, a natural continuation of the formalist due process reasoning behind Apprendi and Blakely, both of which advocated more, rather than less, structure in decision making. Scalia, who dissented in the Booker decision and in subsequent fairness-centered decisions on the matter, would see them as a sneaky move on the part of fairness-centered due process advocates and would mention in later decisions that he “lamented” the unclear implications of the “different majority” in Booker (Rita v. United States 2007); Justice Thomas’s views are similar (Kimbrough v. United States 2007). CONCLUSION: THE LIMITS OF THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION What do the Terry and Apprendi/Blakely stories teach us about the application of Packer’s models to the Supreme Court’s rulings? While the crime control–due process continuum is a helpful tool for understanding Supreme Court decisions on criminal procedure, it is not inclusive enough to explain some of the pragmatisms of the Warren Court, or some of Justice Scalia’s influential decisions, which relied on formal adherence to the con- stitutional language rather than on the need to assist law enforcement officials in their battle against crime or to protect defendants. These rationalizations were not mere rhetorical devices on the part of Warren and Scalia; they present strongly held convictions about the meaning, adminis- tration, and priorities of procedural justice. While no justice can be said to subscribe exclusively to a certain “model of criminal process,” these examples demonstrate how beliefs about the importance of exact phrasing of constitu- tional rights, or the relative significance of stages in the process, shape Supreme Court decisions, which, as argued earlier, were the natural playing field for Packer’s models. It is important to point out that crime control perspectives matter even within a framework that acknowledges different conceptualizations of due LAW & SOCIAL INQUIRY256 process. Indeed, the formalism-fairness divide is deeply informed by the Supreme Court’s awareness of the realities of crime control. Echoing the social science critiques of Packer from the 1960s and 1970s, both Chief Justice Warren in Terry and Justice Breyer in Apprendi and Blakely aimed at expanding the constitutional set of rights precisely because of what they correctly perceived to be the empirical realities of criminal justice: a powerful and largely unsupervised police force reacting to law enforcement needs in the street and a massive apparatus of plea bargaining that marginalizes much of the constitutional set of trial rights. In some ways, in contrast to McBar- net’s (1981) assertion that “due process is for crime control” (156), it could be said that awareness of crime control has shaped and strengthened the fairness aspect of due process, whereas formalist due process has largely reflected a judicial perception that ignores the realities of lower courts and the need for efficiency. The Warren Court’s enterprise emerges from this analysis as a complex amalgam of the naive belief that rules can overcome deeply engrained realities in the law enforcement field and the realistic assertion that constitutional supervision—when liberally and creatively interpreted—is better than no supervision at all. Some of the newer decisions of the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts, such as the Booker and Cunningham decisions, which undermined the mandatory power of the rigid sentencing structure, might have encouraged Packer, who became disillusioned with the potential of due process to change the criminal apparatus. His exposure to the Warren Court revolution, and to the begin- ning of its downfall after the Nixon election, would lead him to believe that formalism was not the answer to the ailments of the criminal process. However, he might have been excited by the potential to expand the concept of due process beyond the formal language in the Bill of Rights so as to encompass broader notions of fairness and sentencing-oriented concerns. The original incorporation debate, which took place many decades before the publication of The Limits, could have suggested this direction, but its more modern incarnations may have been beyond even Packer’s predictive talents. Finally, examining Packer’s contribution to courtroom research scholar- ship in its disciplinary and political context does not imply fault or poverty in the model—quite the opposite. Indeed, it is a testament of the models’ usefulness, rather than their flaws, that they inspired so much subsequent scholarship, which suggested models and patterns beyond those that Packer could have foreseen in 1964 or 1968. New work should be careful not to unfairly present Packer’s arguments as straw-man arguments or to present new frontiers that were, at the time, beyond most criminal justice scholars’ imagi- nation as direct attacks on his framework. Our use of Packer’s two-model continuum as a proverbial coat hanger for new frameworks and paradigms is a natural and welcome device of critique and analysis. We must not forget the debt of gratitude we owe the useful basic paradigm we have built so much upon. Packer in Context 257 REFERENCES Amar, Akhil Reed. 1998. Terry and Fourth Amendment First Principles. St. John’s Law Review 72 (3–4): 1097–131. Arenella, Peter. 1983–1984. Rethinking the Functions of Criminal Procedure: The Warren and Burger Courts’ Competing Ideologies. Georgetown Law Journal 72 (2): 185–248. Aviram, Hadar, and Daniel L. Portman. 2009. Inequitable Enforcement: Introducing the Concept of Equity into Constitutional Review of Law Enforcement. Hastings Law Journal 61 (2): 413–57. 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work_gg3leuyljvhodd4qejxdwy7jv4	----	Health-related regional and neighborhood correlates of sexual minority concentration: A systematic review RESEARCH ARTICLE Health-related regional and neighborhood correlates of sexual minority concentration: A systematic review Joseph G. L. Lee 1*, Thomas Wimark2, Kasim S. Ortiz3, Kerry B. Sewell4 1 Department of Health Education and Promotion, College of Health and Human Performance, East Carolina University, Greenville, North Carolina, United States of America, 2 Department of Human Geography, Stockholm University, Stockholm, Sweden, 3 Department of Sociology & Criminology, University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, New Mexico, United States of America, 4 Laupus Health Sciences Library, East Carolina University, Greenville, North Carolina, United States of America * leejose14@ecu.edu Abstract Background A growing literature explores spatial patterns of regional and neighborhood correlates of sexual minority (e.g., lesbian, gay, bisexual) concentration. Such patterns have implications for health and wellbeing if there are differences in health-promoting or health-hindering resources in neighborhoods or regions. We conducted a systematic review to assess sexual minority concentration in relation to area unit characteristics. Methods We included only records published after 1973 and made no exclusions by geography or language. We searched 11 databases (Academic Search Complete, CINAHL, Embase, GeoBase, GeoRef, LGBT Life, PsycINFO, PubMed/MEDLINE, Scopus, Sociological Abstracts, Web of Science) on November 19–21, 2016. We searched reference lists of included records. We used the following inclusion criteria: (1) Record is a quantitative study (that is, it uses statistics to describe or associate two or more variables); (2) Record is about (a) migration or internal migration of, (b) area unit selection by, or (c) concentration of sexual minority people (defined by identity, behavior, or attraction); (3) Criterion 2 is linked to the characteristics of regions or neighborhoods (at any spatial scale). Results Dual independent coding resulted in 51 records meeting inclusion criteria from the original pool of 5,591. From these records, we identified the 647 reported results linking sexual minority concentration with area unit characteristics. Of these, 132 were unadjusted relation- ships between sexual minority concentration and four theory-informed domains of neighbor- hood influence on health. We identified greater concentration of sexual minorities in regions with more resources and in more urban regions. A limited but troubling literature at the PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0198751 June 27, 2018 1 / 17 a1111111111 a1111111111 a1111111111 a1111111111 a1111111111 OPEN ACCESS Citation: Lee JGL, Wimark T, Ortiz KS, Sewell KB (2018) Health-related regional and neighborhood correlates of sexual minority concentration: A systematic review. PLoS ONE 13(6): e0198751. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0198751 Editor: Nguyen Tien Huy, Institute of Tropical Medicine (NEKKEN), Nagasaki University, JAPAN Received: August 21, 2017 Accepted: May 24, 2018 Published: June 27, 2018 Copyright: © 2018 Lee et al. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited. Data Availability Statement: All files are available from the University of North Carolina Dataverse (accession number doi:10.15139/S3/GVAIWD) available at https://dataverse.unc.edu/dataverse/ SGM-geography. Funding: The authors received no specific funding for this work. Competing interests: The authors have declared that no competing interests exist. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0198751 http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1371/journal.pone.0198751&domain=pdf&date_stamp=2018-06-27 http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1371/journal.pone.0198751&domain=pdf&date_stamp=2018-06-27 http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1371/journal.pone.0198751&domain=pdf&date_stamp=2018-06-27 http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1371/journal.pone.0198751&domain=pdf&date_stamp=2018-06-27 http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1371/journal.pone.0198751&domain=pdf&date_stamp=2018-06-27 http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1371/journal.pone.0198751&domain=pdf&date_stamp=2018-06-27 https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0198751 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://doi.org/10.15139/S3/GVAIWD https://dataverse.unc.edu/dataverse/SGM-geography https://dataverse.unc.edu/dataverse/SGM-geography neighborhood level suggested potentially higher concentrations of sexual minorities in neighborhoods with fewer resources. Conclusions There are substantial gaps in the literature. We discuss the implications of our findings and gaps in relation to key theories of sexual minority health. Registration The review was not registered with PROSPERO because it was not eligible for registration at the time of the research project’s initiation due to the outcome of interest. Introduction Where a person lives can influence their health in a myriad of ways [1–8]. Where people live is not random. Opportunities and constraints at the macro level as well as resources and restric- tions at the micro level have created and sustained segregation by socioeconomic status and racial/ethnic identity. Economic and social forces have driven migration within countries and regions. Similar forces shape neighborhood selection, preference, and access. Thus, when these economic and social forces differ by identity or class, they can shape the population distribu- tion of exposure to health harming or health promoting neighborhoods [3, 9] and policies [10–12]. Clear evidence suggests residential segregation impacts the health of racial/ethnic minorities, for example [9]. A growing literature extends this work to examine the spatial patterning of sexual minority (e.g., lesbian, gay, and bisexual [LGB]) people. While reviews have mapped the relationship between neighborhoods, ethnic minorities, and health [9] and to a lesser extent the relation- ship between neighborhoods and sexual minority health [4], we know much less about where sexual minority populations live [13]. In fact, a systematic synthesis of this relationship is miss- ing from the extant literature [14]. Spatial patterns of sexual minority populations are important for understanding the sub- stantial health inequities that exist for sexual minority individuals and for developing popula- tion health interventions thereon [14, 15]. If, for example, the average sexual minority individual is living in a region or neighborhood with fewer health-promoting resources, this could contribute to worse health for sexual minority populations. Regional migration may change exposure to policies that influence health, including tax regulations (e.g., state cigarette taxes). For example, the demographic distribution of race and ethnicity in the U.S.A. results in unequal coverage of clean indoor air laws and cigarette tax exposure by race/ethnicity [16, 17]. Differing social climates (e.g., protections from discrimination) could exacerbate minority stress and stigma [18]. Neighborhood access or selection within a region may also influence exposure to other health-related resources and problems. For example, some neighborhoods have more tobacco marketing [19]. Census-tracts with high proportions of same-sex partners are more likely than those with low proportions to have greater amounts of hazardous air pol- lutants [20]. Living in a neighborhood with a larger visible sexual minority population could lead to decreased, as well as potentially increased, homophobic harassment and violence [21– 25]. However, it is difficult for researchers to hypothesize these relationships without knowing correlates of where sexual minority people live. Regional and neighborhood correlates of sexual minority concentration PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0198751 June 27, 2018 2 / 17 https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0198751 A substantial amount of research has examined the formation and characteristics of gay and lesbian neighborhoods using largely qualitative approaches. These studies have argued or shown that gay men’s communal history is linked to urban spaces [26] and that LGB individu- als migrate to larger cities [27–31], to specific tolerant cities [32, 33], and to specific “safe” enclaves in cities [34, 35, 36]. However, a line of research has questioned these conclusions by arguing that the relationship with urban areas is more complex [37, 38–42]. Thus, we sought to systematically identify and assess the existing peer-reviewed quantitative literature on the association between the concentration of sexual minority individuals and regional- and neighborhood-level characteristics. We conducted a systematic review with four aims to identify: (1) spatial scales at which previous research has examined spatiality and migration of sexual minority individuals, (2) correlates of where sexual minority individuals live or migrate to at larger spatial scales (e.g., regions), (3) correlates of where sexual minority individuals live or migrate to at smaller spatial scales (e.g., neighborhoods), and (4) use of lon- gitudinal data and assessment of race/ethnicity. Methods Note that we use the following terminology: A study is a research project from which multiple papers (i.e., records) can be published and in which individual results are reported. We write generally about sexual minority people for readability. When writing about a specific record, we use more precise terminology (e.g., male same-sex couples, lesbian women). We shorthand ways of measuring the density, rate, count, or percentage of sexual minority people as concen- tration; this should not be confused with the formal definition of concentration used in the segregation literature. Also for readability, we write generally about area units in two catego- ries: We shorthand larger spatial scales as regions and smaller spatial scales as neighborhoods. We define regions as larger area units equal to or larger than the equivalent of a U.S. county (e.g., city, census place, municipality, metropolitan statistical area). We define neighborhoods as smaller area units that, while often imperfect, can provide meaningful information about the health of communities [43–45]. These include the census block (U.S.A.), tract (U.S.A.), data zone (U.K.), dissemination area (Canada), output area (U.K.), and postal code. Our inclusion criteria were: (1) Record is a quantitative study (that is, it uses statistics to describe or associate two or more variables); (2) Record is about (a) migration or internal migration of, (b) area unit selection by, or (c) concentration of sexual minority (defined by identity, behavior, or attraction) people; (3) Criterion 2 is linked to the characteristics of regions or neighborhoods (at any spatial scale). One author (KBS), an information specialist/librarian, iteratively designed the search strat- egy using recommended keywords for sexual minority-related searches [46] in PubMed/MED- LINE and translated controlled vocabulary to other databases. The final PubMed/MEDLINE search is available online (Online Data Repository Link, 10.15139/S3/GVAIWD, https:// dataverse.unc.edu/dataverse/SGM-geography). We implemented the search strategy Novem- ber 19–21, 2016, in 11 academic databases (Academic Search Complete, CINAHL, Embase, GeoBase, GeoRef, LGBT Life, PsycINFO, PubMed/MEDLINE, Scopus, Sociological Abstracts, Web of Science). No language, geography, or date limitations were included in the search. One author (KBS) also searched for published books. We excluded all records published prior to 1973 (the year homosexuality was removed from the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual in the United States). Records were de-duplicated with reference management software and manu- ally. We used Covidence cloud-based software (covidence.org) to manage the coding process. The title/abstract of each record was independently reviewed for inclusion or exclusion by two authors (JGLL, KSO, KBS, TW). Conflicts were moved to full-text review or resolved by Regional and neighborhood correlates of sexual minority concentration PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0198751 June 27, 2018 3 / 17 https://dataverse.unc.edu/dataverse/SGM-geography https://dataverse.unc.edu/dataverse/SGM-geography https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0198751 discussion. The full text of each included record was then independently reviewed for inclu- sion or exclusion by two authors (JGLL, KSO, TW). Conflicts in coding were resolved by dis- cussion. We did not calculate reliability in inclusion coding as our goal in dual, independent coding was to be as sensitive as possible in the inclusion process. References in each included record were examined for additional eligible records. A systematic review protocol is available online (Online Data Repository Link, doi:10.15139/S3/GVAIWD). One author (JGLL or TW) abstracted study characteristics (e.g., setting area unit[s], time, analysis strategy, and results of interest to this review), and a second author (JGLL or TW) then verified and cleaned the evidence table. Each result was classified by its statistical signifi- cance at the p>0.05 threshold. Records not in English were only reviewed by one person, and these records were included and abstracted if they met inclusion criteria. One author (JGLL) reviewed included records for risk of bias. To do this, we utilized a four-item index based on the Downs and Black checklist [47]. We could not identify a risk of bias tool that worked for the etiological, descriptive studies included in this review, as most such tools are designed for assessing intervention studies. We selected one item to reflect external validity (“Were the par- ticipants asked to participate in the study representative of the entire population from which they were recruited?”) and three items to reflect internal validity (“Were the LGB participants recruited from the same population as the comparison group?”, “Were the LGB participants recruited during the same time period as the comparison group?”, and “Were the statistical tests used to assess the main outcomes appropriate?”). We coded these so a study with a score of zero was highly biased and a study a score of four was minimally biased. We present all results in an evidence table (Supplemental File 1). We conduct a narrative review of the results and graphically display results using a modified harvest plot [48]. For the harvest plot, we identified results that provided (1) a statistical test with significance and direc- tion, (2) that were not repeated comparisons against a reference category, (3) that were not adjusted for other covariates, (4) that scored a three or four in our risk of bias index, and, (5) that had a clear relevance for health and resources. Thus, we excluded measures such as the age of the housing stock in a neighborhood as it was not clear to us if this was an indicator of valuable historic properties or an indicator of older, distressed housing. We also excluded mea- sures of segregation that simply described the area unit’s segregation as these did not meet our study aims. To create the harvest plot [48], we utilized SPSS v. 24 (IBM, Chicago, Illinois) to plot the sig- nificance and direction of each included result stratified by area unit size, gender, and domains of neighborhood characteristics. That is, the harvest plot presents a count of results by positive, negative, or non-significant effect. We reverse the signs of reported results as necessary to match the harvest plot’s theoretical framework, which is described next. The categorization of the results for the harvest plots builds on theoretical ideas on how neighborhood characteristics affect individuals’ health and socioeconomic trajectories [1, 3]. In line with Galster’s identification of mechanisms for how neighborhood characteristics mat- ter to human development [1], we use his four top-level categories: Social-interactive, Environ- ment, Geographical, and Institutional, as shown in Table 1. Following Bernard et al. [3], we refer to them as domains instead of mechanisms as most of the variables in the articles are not explicitly conceptualized as mechanisms. Drawing on both Galster and Bernard, we categorize results within the categories as follows: Social-interactive domain refers to social processes in neighborhoods [1]. Under the Social-interactive domain, we locate deprivation (e.g., housing values, poverty and income), social cohesion (e.g., vacant housing, rental housing), and diver- sity (e.g., race, ethnicity, foreign-born). The Environment domain signifies the human and physical aspects of the neighborhood [1]. In this category, we find variables related to exposure to violence (e.g., hate crimes, crime), toxic exposure (e.g., air pollution), and minority stress Regional and neighborhood correlates of sexual minority concentration PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0198751 June 27, 2018 4 / 17 https://doi.org/10.15139/S3/GVAIWD https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0198751 (e.g., % voting conservative, lack of other sexual minority populations). The Geographical domain includes factors that can be located at a larger scale than the immediate neighborhood [1]. In this category, we locate the two subcategories; public services (e.g., antidiscrimination legislation/policies) and rurality. The Institutional domain contains decisions and actions by individuals and institutions outside of the neighborhood [1]. In this category, we locate local institutional resources (e.g., schools, parks, theatres, health clinics) and local market actors (e.g., tobacco retailers, health-harming marketing). The harvest plot’s pattern of results did not differ in a substantive way when stratified by same-sex couples versus sexual minority individuals. We thus report results of aggregated gen- ders, female, and male. Due to the heterogeneity of study designs, time periods, and measures in the literature, we did not conduct a meta-analysis. We follow the preferred reporting items for sysemtatic reviews and meta-analyses (PRISMA) guideline [49]. Results We identified 51 records as shown in Fig 1. The mean risk of bias score was 3.37 (sd = 0.80) and ranged from 1 to 4 with 4 being the lowest risk of bias. These records contained 647 results of which 132 (from 36 records) met criteria for the harvest plot. There are distinct quantitative literatures on the spatial patterns of sexual minority lives from different disciplines ranging from HIV studies to transportation planning. The earliest identified record was published in 1985 in response to the HIV epidemic [50]. Most articles were conducted in the United States (76%), but Australia [51], China [52, 53], France [54], Germany [55], Netherlands [56], New Zealand [57], Norway [58], Sweden [31, 58, 59], and the United Kingdom [60, 61] were repre- sented. Seven records reported on migration [29, 52, 62–66]. Five reported on segregation [29, 54, 67–69]. Only 1 record reported on sexual minority lives by racial/ethnic identity [66]. The seven records on migration included work comparing same-sex sexual behaviors of Chinese rural-to-urban migrants against rural and urban non-migrants [52], reasons for mov- ing to or remaining in a sexual minority enclave [62], legal environment of top in- and out- migration by sexual minorities Public Use Microdata Areas (PUMAs) [63], regional character- istics associated with same-sex couple net migration [29], assessing changes in rurality over time in a study comparing risks of depression over time based on changes in neighborhood characteristics among sexual minority adolescents in the National Longitudinal Study of Ado- lescent Health (AddHealth) [64], rurality at age 14–16 and at the time of the survey by sexual behavior [65], and the odds of migration from the birth state by partnership status [66]. The five records on segregation identified dissimilarity indices by partnership type in the USA in Table 1. Categorization and example indicators of neighborhood domains of influence on health. Galster-Bernard Domain Indicator Example Measures Social-interactive Deprivation Housing values, creative class, poverty, income Lack of social cohesion Vacant houses, rental housing Lack of diversity Race/ethnicity, foreign-born, language Environmental Poor physical environment - Toxic exposure Air pollution Violence/crime Hate crimes Social sources of minority stress Conservative votes, concentration of other sexual minorities Geographical Rurality Population density, RUCA, RUCC, city size Limited public services/protections Hate crime legislation, laws Institutional Limited local institutional resources Schools, parks, cultural organizations, health clinics, transportation stations Harmful local market actors Tobacco retailers, marketing of health-harming products https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0198751.t001 Regional and neighborhood correlates of sexual minority concentration PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0198751 June 27, 2018 5 / 17 https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0198751.t001 https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0198751 Fig 1. Inclusion flow diagram, Nov. 19–21, 2016. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0198751.g001 Regional and neighborhood correlates of sexual minority concentration PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0198751 June 27, 2018 6 / 17 https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0198751.g001 https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0198751 2000 [29], changes in segregation (concentration index) of gay men (operationalized as mail- ing addresses for a gay magazine’s subscribers) from heterosexual men in Paris over time [54], correlations between same-sex partner prevalence rates and city same-sex couple exposure indices [67], and changes over time in same-sex couple segregation in the USA [68, 69]. The one record on race/ethnicity identified odds of migration from birth state by the racial compo- sition of partnerships [66]. Studies measured sexual orientation or a proxy thereof in a variety of ways. Twenty-six rec- ords defined sexual orientation by cohabitating same-sex partners [13, 28, 29, 32, 56, 63, 66– 85]. Eleven used individual sexual orientation identity [50, 51, 53, 55, 60, 62, 64, 86–89]. Five used individual sexual behavior [52, 61, 65, 90, 91]. Two used marriage/legal partnership rec- ords [58, 92]. Two used subscriber lists or mailing lists [54, 93]. Five used multiple measures of sexual orientation, including marriage, identity, attraction, behavior, web site membership, and mailing lists [31, 57, 59, 94, 95]. We excluded two innovative studies [96, 97] using real estate listings in gay/lesbian newspapers because they did not meet our inclusion criteria. We first report the spatial scales used in the identified records. We follow with correlates of sexual minority concentration at regional and neighborhood area units. Lastly, we report on the use of longitudinal data and racial/ethnic identity in the literature. Area units Reflecting the heavy influence of U.S. records, the most common area unit was the census tract, which was used in 13 records [68, 73, 76, 77, 79–83, 89, 90, 92, 93]. The second most common area unit was the Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) used in 11 records [13, 28, 32, 71, 72, 74, 84, 85, 88, 91, 95]. Five records used cities or U.S. census places [31, 56, 61, 67, 69]. Four used postal codes [51, 78, 86, 94]. Four used PUMAs [63, 66, 75, 80]. Two used counties [70, 89], and one used block groups [64]. One record used a sampling grid [52]. Data zones were used in Scotland [60], arrondissements in France [54], labor market regions in Sweden [59], and one U.S. record reported using Bureau of Economic Analysis areas [29]. Other stud- ies did not provide a clear definition of the area unit used [50, 53, 55, 57, 58, 62, 65, 87, 89]. Correlates of spatial patterning In the harvest plot (Fig 2) we show significance and direction of unadjusted associations between sexual minority concentration and area unit characteristics. Fig 2a shows these associ- ations at larger area units (e.g., cities, metropolitan statistical areas), and Fig 2b shows these associations at smaller area units (e.g., census tracts, postal codes). The height of the bar can be read as the weight of the evidence for a negative (-), non-significant (NS), or positive associa- tion (+). In the absence of publication bias and in the absence of a “true” relationship between the variables, one would expect just 2.5% of results to fall into the negative and positive catego- ries, respectively, when p was set to 0.05. Several findings are striking: Much research has focused on deprivation and rurality. At the regional level, there is a clear pattern of findings showing sexual minority people are more likely to live in better-resourced regions and more urban regions. Similarly, sexual minority people are more likely to live in regions with more progressive values, thus potentially reduc- ing exposure to minority stressors. At the neighborhood level, there is a clear trend towards a greater diversity of neighborhood residents and toward living in more urban neighborhoods. Given the greater resources at the regional level, it is concerning that the clear pattern of greater resources is not present in the results reported at the neighborhood level. Also con- cerning is that one record reported greater levels of toxic air pollution [77] and evidence sug- gested more limited institutional resources in neighborhoods with greater concentration of Regional and neighborhood correlates of sexual minority concentration PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0198751 June 27, 2018 7 / 17 https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0198751 gay men [73]. There are several notable differences between men and women in the studies, mainly visible through the lack of studies of women on the neighborhood scale. A number of the domains had few or no studies. Longitudinal data and within-group racial/ethnic identity Only three of the papers used longitudinal data [64, 68, 69]. One study used two waves of Add Health data to examine different county characteristics of sexual minority participants over time [64]. One used census data from two time points to assess past same-sex couple Fig 2. Harvest plot (count) of unadjusted relationship between sexual minority concentration and (a) regional area unit characteristics and (b) neighborhood area unit characteristics, by gender, n = 132 results from n = 36 records. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0198751.g002 Regional and neighborhood correlates of sexual minority concentration PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0198751 June 27, 2018 8 / 17 https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0198751.g002 https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0198751 concentration with future neighborhood characteristics [68]. One used census data from two times points to associate census place characteristics with future same-sex couple concentra- tion [69]. The remainder used cross-sectional designs, although sometimes with retrospective reporting [29, 63, 65]. Only one record reported by the racial/ethnic identity of sexual minori- ties [66]. Discussion Principal findings Most of our knowledge on the spatial patterning of sexual minority populations comes from the U.S.A. The available information on the spatial patterning of sexual minority individuals is clearest at larger area units (i.e., regions); there are consistent patterns indicating greater con- centrations of sexual minority populations in more urban regions and in wealthier regions. At the neighborhood level, however, this pattern is not clear. Researchers have long recognized the modifiable area unit problem [98, 99]; that is, the use of different area units may result in different results that may not generalize to other area units. It is not clear to us, given the exist- ing literature, if living in regions with more resources translates into living in better resourced neighborhoods for sexual minority people. What is clear is that there are substantial gaps in the literature regarding health-promoting or health-hindering area characteristics associated with sexual minority concentration. Our results can be used to strengthen the existing literature. For example, work on struc- tural stigma [100] and syndemic theory [101] is tied closely to exposure to policy and internal migration, respectively. Similarly, the commonly used minority stress model [102] suggests (but does not state directly) the importance of where people live: General and distal stressors include the role of policy and the social/political climate in which one lives. Life course and cumulative dis/advantage approaches are linked to the resources and environmental character- istics present at critical developmental stages [103, 104]. Research addressing spatial gaps in this literature could give a clearer population-level view of the role of policy and migration for studies assessing structural stigma, syndemics, and minority stress. A clearer sense of regional and neighborhood patterns across the life-course could inform research on sexual minority aging as well as adolescent development. Further work could be used to refine these theories, identify within-group resiliencies, and address gaps in the literature—particularly the limited quantitative literature about sexual minority internal migration. Notably, our findings show a similar pattern of results by gender. Substantial theorizing has focused on the role of gender in sexual minority neighborhood formation [35]. While our focus on unadjusted, quantitative associations limits what conclusions we can draw, it may be that patterns of regional and neighborhood characteristics by gender are the same but the mag- nitude of the pattern differs. Methods Regarding methods, it is clear that future reviews would benefit from authors and journals fol- lowing reporting guidelines for observational studies that explicitly call for reporting of unad- justed results [105]. We would also suggest greater attention to the perspective that statistically holding constant other neighborhood characteristics produces a counterfactual neighborhood that does not reflect lived experience on the ground [106]. Controlling for neighborhood racial/ethnic composition, for example, may help isolate the contribution of another variable. However, real life is not held constant, and adjusted models can mask disparities that truly exist. Hand-in-hand with the limited use of longitudinal designs and despite substantial quali- tative and theoretical work on migration, there is minimal assessment of migration in the Regional and neighborhood correlates of sexual minority concentration PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0198751 June 27, 2018 9 / 17 https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0198751 identified records. We were surprised by this as longitudinal register data on legalized same- sex partnerships/marriages has been available since the late 1990s in many countries in West- ern Europe, and researchers could make use of this to study migration. Measurement of sexual orientation also presents a challenge. Sexual orientation is considered to have three domains, identity, behavior, and attraction [107], and same-sex partnered individuals should not be equated with LGB individuals [31]. Use of different sexual orientation domains can result in different results even in the same dataset [108]. While HIV researchers typically focus on behavior, tobacco control researchers, for example, typically focus on identity as industry mar- keting is targeted to LGB-identified individuals. This means that the definition of sexuality needs to be critically assessed in future studies. Gaps in the literature By analyzing the different categories in line with Galster [1] and Bernard [3], we can locate several gaps in the evidence base. For example, in the Social-interactive domain, there is a lack of studies that include variables connected to social networks and family support. These are two factors that theoretical studies have argued are important for understanding the wellbeing of sexual minority populations [36, 39, 41]. Further, in the Environment domain, studies highlighting the physical environment and crime are missing. This is surprising for two reasons: (1) there is a substantial “broken windows” line of research in sociology and city plan- ning and (2) there is a theoretical and qualitative literature on gay men as agents of gentrifica- tion [109, 110]. Crime and perceptions of crime are important in how neighborhoods are viewed and change [111]. Furthermore, the social epidemiological literature connects percep- tions of neighborhoods (e.g., perceived neighborhood social cohesion) to a multitude of health outcomes; this has not been explored in the identified literature. However, one recent paper published after our search revealed that sexual minority adults report lower levels of percep- tions of living in close-knit neighborhoods, of the ability to count on their neighbors, of trust of their neighbors, and of people in their neighborhoods helping each other out compared to their heterosexual counterparts [112]. In the Geographical domain, there is a gap of studies emphasizing spatial mismatch between jobs and residential location. There is evidence that sexual minority individuals sort into certain occupations and are subject to employment dis- crimination [113]. Future research should investigate if sexual minority people are forced to look for employment options across larger geographic scales compared to the general popula- tion. For example, how might employment-related factors be driving forces shaping migration patterns across multiple geographic scales? Finally, variables measuring stigmatization are also missing in these studies from the Institutional domain. Beyond these domains, it is clear that very little quantitative work has examined the spatial patterning of racial/ethnic identity within LGB populations. Nor has work examined other within-group variability (e.g., immigration or socioeconomic status) in spatial patterning beyond gender and sexual orientation. The spatial patterns of bisexually-identified or trans- gender people are largely absent, which likely represents a limitation of many data sources to study these populations meaningfully. Strengths and limitations of this review This review had a number of strengths including systematic searching developed by a profes- sional medical librarian, implementation of the search in 11 academic databases, citation searching, dual independent coding, and an interdisciplinary team of authors. However, like all systematic reviews, it has limitations. The results are limited by biases in what is published Regional and neighborhood correlates of sexual minority concentration PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0198751 June 27, 2018 10 / 17 https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0198751 versus what is filed away for not being “exciting enough” (i.e., publication bias). We did not conduct a search of the grey literature or solicit unpublished papers. We visually report only unadjusted results, and a substantial portion of the records did not report their unadjusted results. For example, the classic Gay and Lesbian Atlas reports rich quantitative data but pro- vides no inferential statistical test results [78]. Our results come largely from the U.S.A. and may not generalize to other parts of the world. Because of the limited available literature, we opted to focus on narrow measures of risk of bias. Our risk of bias index rated records as hav- ing high quality based largely on indicators of sampling and statistical methods. This is in part due to the heavy use of census and registry data, which fared well in our risk of bias index. Future reviews should consider unique indicators of risk of bias for spatial studies. Addition- ally, we conducted this research from a post-positivist perspective, and it does not represent other interpretive or critical [114] ways of knowing. Conclusion Even small associations can have a substantial population-level impact [115]. We know more about the regions in which sexual minority individuals live than about the characteristics of neighborhoods. We identified little quantitative evidence regarding the characteristics of neighborhoods or regions associated with sexual minority migration. Large gaps in knowledge remain. While it is promising for health that sexual minority individuals’ regional location is associated with greater resources, it is concerning—given the potential for ecological fallacy— that there is little knowledge about their location within those regions. Supporting information S1 Table. Evidence table. (PDF) Acknowledgments Our thanks to Mellanye Lackey, University of Utah, who kindly helped with developing our LGBT search keywords and Megan DeMarco and Ashley Cabacungan, East Carolina Univer- sity, who helped with finding records and data management. Author Contributions Conceptualization: Joseph G. L. Lee, Thomas Wimark, Kasim S. Ortiz, Kerry B. Sewell. Data curation: Thomas Wimark, Kerry B. Sewell. Formal analysis: Joseph G. L. Lee, Thomas Wimark, Kasim S. Ortiz. Investigation: Joseph G. L. Lee, Thomas Wimark, Kasim S. Ortiz, Kerry B. Sewell. Methodology: Joseph G. L. Lee, Thomas Wimark, Kasim S. Ortiz, Kerry B. Sewell. Project administration: Joseph G. L. Lee. Supervision: Joseph G. L. Lee, Kerry B. Sewell. Writing – original draft: Joseph G. L. Lee, Thomas Wimark, Kerry B. Sewell. Writing – review & editing: Joseph G. L. Lee, Thomas Wimark, Kasim S. Ortiz. Regional and neighborhood correlates of sexual minority concentration PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0198751 June 27, 2018 11 / 17 http://www.plosone.org/article/fetchSingleRepresentation.action?uri=info:doi/10.1371/journal.pone.0198751.s001 https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0198751 References 1. Galster GC. The mechanism(s) of neighbourhood effects: Theory, evidence, and policy implications. 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work_ggftzdo4a5ggvisrjy6lua43wq	----	Azeem Ibrahim, The Rohingyas: Inside Myanmar’s Hidden Genocide, (New Delhi: Speaking Tiger Publishing Pvt. Ltd., 2017), Price: Rs 600.00, Pages: 235. Reviewed by: — Ryan Mitra Under Graduate Student in IR School of Liberal Studies Pandit Deendayal Petroleum University Gujarat The 2017 version of The Rohingyas: Inside Myanmar’s Hidden Genocide by Azeem Ibrahim is a comprehensive and compelling account of the centuries long travesties and crimes committed against the ethnic groups in the Burmese region, mainly focusing on the ethno-religious group that are identified as the Rohingyas. The Rohingya crisis came into the global spotlight due to the mass exodus that occurred in the Rakhine State of Myanmar in 2012, due to the hate crimes being committed against this ethnic group. Villages being pillaged, houses being burned down, unrelenting and irrevocable bloodshed, violence and death is the omnipresent environment in the region since the advent of this decade, which has raised three principal questions that the book cogently attempts to answer: Who are the Rohingyas? What are the reasons behind such inhumane treatment and operations against them? What can be and has been done to rectify or make amends for this dreadful situation? Ibrahim tries to break down the book into three parts, where he covers the history of Myanmar, and traces the Rohingyan presence in it, the current political climate, and the international mechanisms that can help relieve, if not solve, this crisis. The Myanmar government has established a rhetoric around the Rohingyas; of being aliens, stating that they are originally immigrants from India, and now Bangladesh, who were brought in during the colonial period by the British to aid with trade and labor and the government has actually termed them as ‘Bengalis,’ thereby refusing to even acknowledge their ethnic identity. The Myanmar nation-state wishes to be constituted by ethno-religious groups that Liberal Studies, Vol. 3, Issue 1, January–June 2018142 have been present in the region before colonial times; organically and naturally. This book delves into the history of the region and scrutinizes the false accounts presented by the Myanmar government, by providing a compelling and well researched account on the the presence of the Rohingyas in the Rakhine region, that was previously known as ‘Arakan’. The book delves into early colonial records, showing viceroys noting the presence of ethnic groups similar to the Rohingyas, far before the advent of the Buddhist population that is now in power in the State. Furthermore, it objectively fills in the gaps in the historical timeline about the physical presence of the Rohingyas, and provides a cogent reasoning as to why they had been disconnected with the rest of world during the 16th, 17th, and 18th centuries. Whilst tracing their history, Ibrahim actively tries to show how the Rohingyas have been a part of the fabric of the Burmese nation-state right from the times of kings and kingdoms, and only due to sheer geopolitical events and circumstances have been alienated from this fabric; torn apart from their cultural and historical roots, therefore being left without any identity, or a socio-cultural base. The book does an exceptional job in setting up a chronological series of events and eras that clearly place the Rohingyas in the Burmese nation long before the colonial period, therefore putting forth strong contradictions to the rhetoric of the Myanmar government about the Rohingyas’ xenogeny. After creating a fundamental base supporting the original history of the Rohingyas, the book progresses by eruditely juxtaposing the established, static facts in history and the treatment dealt out to them based on false pre- suppositions, personalized and ideologically driven agendas, and that too, largely in the interest of populism and religious majorities. The book objectively analyses the current political scenario from a perspective different from the one picked up by mass media; it delves into the rationalism and ideology held by the governing forces in the State. The book makes note of the Buddhist homogeneity that the State apparatus has tried to achieve under the influence of the ‘Theravada’ Buddhist philosophy. With the overt narrative of the government; about the origins of the Rohingyas, broken down with the primary part of the book, this part looks to investigate into the crimes committed against the Rohingyas in recent times whilst addressing the utter possibility of more malicious, generalized, and anachronistic motives lying underneath such State practice. The book analyzes all governments – both, dictatorial and democratic under the same lens, and finds them at fault on similar grounds – populism. Religious populism has always been and is the principal driving force in the politics of Myanmar, and all the parties in the current political environment continue to 143 exploit this narrow perspective of the masses, at the cost of the basic human rights of the Rohingyas being violated. The travesties and the systematic persecution, that the Rohingyas have been privy to has led to families and communities being torn apart, long cultural settings being uprooted, and an entire nation being forced out of their own ancestral land, all of which, Ibrahim argues, based on the grounds of misconceived facts, intentional negligence and State-wide populist propaganda. It can safely be assumed that while addressing such a heart wrenching and tragic crisis, an element of hubris, and idealism would have naturally surfaced. The objectivity shown by Ibrahim in this part of the book is fairly commendable. He continuously navigates around his hubris, and presents a stark account of why these operations are not only misplaced and unjustified, but also how the Rohingyas are being subjected to an unnecessarily obtuse, and anachronistic ideology that continues to be omnipotent through State-governed institutions. The objectivity shown by Ibrahim for the previous two parts of the book starts to dwindle once he addresses international reactions and international laws pertaining to this crisis. The objectivity and realism that is clearly on display in the first two parts, is awkwardly transformed into basic idealism while talking about international law and criticizing the stance and positions that other States have taken. Presenting the impact that neighbouring States have faced due to a mass influx of fleeing refugees, he goes on to equally compliment and criticize, how other States have reacted to the situation. Countries like Thailand and Australia have faced the brunt of his criticism due to their nationalist and protective policies of turning away any incoming refugees, whereas he wholeheartedly acknowledges the work and input of States like Bangladesh and Malaysia, who have been sympathetic to the plight of the Rohingyas. Ibrahim also speaks of Myanmar’s political and economic relations with States like India, and how these relations could be used to curtail these heinous acts in the Rakhine state and reel back the crisis. The most prominent gaping hole that is present in the book is while addressing international laws pertaining to this crisis, mainly that of genocide, crimes against humanity, and non- refoulment. Ibrahim’s two-chapter long tirade on international law is devoid of the serious considerations and nuances in international law that deal with such sensitive crimes. There is a very fine, but established line between what kinds of acts are to be deemed as genocide and as crimes against humanity. A 7-point metric on which different heinous acts are established and if any one such act is undertaken against a particular group in the sole interest of destroying and eliminating the said group, it is deemed as an act of genocide. Book Review Liberal Studies, Vol. 3, Issue 1, January–June 2018144 This metric has been established by the UN Convention on Genocide, and has been acknowledged multiple times by the International Court of Justice, and other international legislative bodies. The author mentions this metric, but in a very skewed and biased manner placing his arguments to fit the necessary criterion for these acts to be deemed as genocide, whilst ignoring the fundamental necessities and interpretations that have been observed in past cases dealing with similar crimes. There is an obvious and clear gap in the understanding about the mechanisms that work in international law, and the observations that have been established in precedence, that astutely articulate which specific incidents can be termed and claimed as genocide. Ibrahim vehemently tries to justify the title of his book from various angles-political, social and legal. Even though he makes a very convincing argument in favor of the first two, he fails to satisfactorily communicate an adroit account of legal provisions and arguments that can prove that the acts committed in Myanmar, against the Rohingyas, do paramount to acts of genocide. This attempt to show to the world the serious depravity that has ensued in the Rakhine state is highly commendable, and even though this is not an absolutely consummate work of political investigation due to its flaws in the latter end of his project, Ibrahim has presented a comprehensive exposition on the crimes against the Rohingyas, irrespective of it being classified as genocide or not. 
work_gholnedwyvh4diyxy4vkx4vsci	----	2014-018.fm Fire Sci. Eng., Vol. 28, No. 2, pp. 69-75, 2014 69 ISSN: 1738-7167 DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.7731/KIFSE.2014.28.2.069 방화 발생에 영향을 미치는 요인에 관한 연구 김영철·박우성*·이수경 † 서울과학기술대학교 에너지환경대학원, *서울과학기술대학교 일반대학원 A Study on the Factors Affecting the Arson Young-Chul Kim · Woo-Sung Bak* · Su-Kyung Lee † Graduate School of Energy and Environment, Seoul National Univ. of Science & Technology *Graduate School, Seoul National Univ. of Science & Technology (Received February 17, 2014; Revised April 20, 2014; Accepted April 22, 2014) 요 약 본 연구에서는 방화발생에 영향을 미치는 요인을 도출하기 위하여 발생건수를 종속변수로 하고 경제·인구·사회적 요인을 독립변수로 하는 다중회귀분석을 실시하였다. 다중회귀분석은 선형함수, 준로그함수, 역준로그함수, 이중로그함 수 4가지 함수형태에 대해 적용하였으며, 각 단계별로 변수의 선택과 제외를 고려하는 단계적선택 방식을 적용하였다. 다중공선성 문제와 자기상관 문제를 해결하기 위하여 분산확대지수(VIF)와 Durbin-Watson 계수 이용하였으며, 4가지 함 수모형에 대하여 수정된 R 제곱(설명력) 값이 0.935 (93.5%)로 가장 값이 높고 통계적으로 유의한 선형함수모형을 최적 의 모형으로 결정하고 모형에 대한 해석을 진행하였다. 선형함수모형 결과 방화발생에 영향을 미치는 요인은 범죄발생건 수(0.829), 일반이혼율(0.151), 재정자주도(0.149), 소비자물가상승률(0.099) 순으로 도출되었다. ABSTRACT This study derives the factors which affect the occurrence of arson from statistical data (population, economic, and social factors) by multiple regression analysis. Multiple regression analysis applies to 4 forms of functions, linear func- tions, semi-log functions, inverse log functions, and dual log functions. Also analysis respectively functions by using the stepwise progress which considered selection and deletion of the independent variable factors by each steps. In order to solve a problem of multiple regression analysis, autocorrelation and multicollinearity, Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) and the Durbin-Watson coefficient were considered. Through the analysis, the optimal model was determined by adjusted R- squared which means statistical significance used determination, Adjusted R-squared of linear function is scored 0.935 (93.5%), the highest of the 4 forms of function, and so linear function is the optimal model in this study. Then interpreta- tion to the optimal model is conducted. As a result of the analysis, the factors affecting the arson were resulted in lines, the incidence of crime (0.829), the general divorce rate (0.151), the financial autonomy rate (0.149), and the consumer price index (0.099). Keywords : Arson, Motivation factor, Statistical data, Multiple regression analysis 1. 서 론 1.1 연구의 배경 및 목적 데이터의 변화와 함께 통계 및 분석 기술 또한 발달이 되었으며, 이러한 빅데이터 속에서 미래에 실행 가능한 정 보를 추출해 내고 의사결정(意思決定, decision making)을 위한 연구가 다양한 분야에서 활발하게 진행되고 있다. 미 국의 경우, 1976년부터 화재사고 입력 시스템인 National Fire Incident Reporting System (NFIRS) (1) 를 구축하여 미 국 42개 주 14,000여 개의 소방서에서 매년 900,000건의 화재건수가 데이터베이스에 입력되고 있다. NFIRS는 이 러한 module을 통하여 각 소방서별 소방기구, 소방관, 소 방재원 등 소방력의 관리와 소방서의 현재·미래 사안에 대한 의사결정 지원 및 그 결과에 대한 판단을 지원하는 것을 목적으로 하고 있다. 영국의 경우, 1994년부터 Global Telecommunication Network (GTN)으로 온라인을 통한 정보공유 시스템을 추진하여 국민과 연구기관에 정보를 제공하고 있다. 일본의 경우 총무성 소방청소속 소방과학 종합센터에서 소방통계 온라인시스템을 운영 관리하고 있 으며, 화재를 건물, 임야, 차량·선박·항공기, 기타 화재로 † Corresponding Author, E-Mail: lsk@seoultech.ac.kr † TEL: +82-2-970-6374, FAX: +82-2-977-9303 70 김영철·박우성·이수경 한국화재소방학회 논문지, 제28권 제2호, 2014년 구분하고 화재원인을 발화원, 경과, 착화물의 3가지 관점 으로 구분하여 화재정보를 기록·관리하고 있다. 이러한 흐름에 맞춰 소방방재청 (2) 에서 2007년도부터 국 가화재정보시스템(NFDS)을 구축하여 발생한 화재사고에 대하여 국가화재분류체계에 따른 화재조사데이터를 시스 템에 입력하여 데이터를 축적하고 있으며, 이에 따라 시스 템의 화재조사데이터를 활용한 데이터 분석이 가능해졌다. 이에 따라 화재종류에 따른 화재위험 예측모델을 만들어 미래에 발생 가능한 화재를 대비하고 화재정책에 활용할 수 있는 접근 및 시스템 구축의 필요성이 대두되었다. 방화로 인한 화재는 범인이 의도하는 목적에 따라 고의 로 불을 놓아 다수인의 생명과 재산에 대한 예측할 수 없 는 위험을 초래하는 공공위험죄의 특성을 가지고 있기 때 문에 살인·강도·강간과 함께 대한민국 4대 강력 범죄로 취급되고 있다. 그럼에도 불구하고 방화는 다른 범죄들에 비하여 지속적인 관심을 받지 못한 것이 사실이며, 방화범 죄에 대한 경험적인 연구 성과의 부재는 이를 반증하는 것 이라고 볼 수 있다. 방화는 목적을 가지며 고의로 불을 놓 는 행위로서, 정신·심리적인 동기 이외에도 경제적인 이 득을 노린 방화, 범죄은폐를 목적으로 하는 방화 등 그 동 기에 따라 방화 발생에 영향을 받는다. 이에 따라 방화 발 생지역과 발생 시기 뿐만 아니라 인구, 인구밀도, 소비자 물가지수, 취업률, 실업률, 범죄발생건수 등 통계데이터에 따른 방화 발생 요인을 종합적으로 분석하여 방화와 관계 있는 요인을 도출하고 방화의 발생 형태를 도출하여 방화 발생 건수를 추정한다. 이러한 접근은 불확실한 미래를 대 비하는 것으로 현재의 의사결정에 반영이 가능하다. 따라 서 방화 발생 경향성을 파악하는 것은 예방대책의 수립에 있어 필수적인 요소이다. 이에 본 연구에서는 경제·인구· 사회적 요인 중 방화 발생에 영향을 미치는 요인을 확인하 고 그 활용방안도 제시하고자 한다. Table 1. NFDS: Motivation Factors of Arson Accidental Eliminate frustration Family trouble Insane Fight Pessimism suicide Insurance fraud Criminal retaliation (purpose of damages) Crime concealment Political antipathy Claim and obligation Protest Other Unknown Table 2. NFIRS: Suspected Motivation Factors Extortion Labor unrest Insurance fraud Intimidation Void contract/lease Personal Hate crime Institutional Societal Protest Civil unrest Fireplay/curiosity Vanity/recognition Thrills Attention/sympathy Sexual excitement Homicide Suicide Domestic violence Burglary Homicide concealment Burglary concealment Auto theft concealment Destroy records/evidence Other suspected motivation Unknown motivation 1.2 연구 방법 및 범위 본 연구는 방화 발생에 영향을 미치는 요인을 분석하기 위해 방화와 방화 동기의 정의 및 종류를 확인하고, 방화 동기의 경제·인구·사회적 요인과 방화 발생의 관계를 선 행연구 분석을 통해 확인하였다. 이렇게 확인된 변수를 통 계적으로 분석하기 위해 소방방재청 국가화재정보시스템 이 구축된 2007년부터 2011년까지의 행정구역 시·도 단 위의 방화발생건수 데이터를 수집하고, 동일한 단위의 경 제·인구·사회적 데이터를 통계청 국가통계포털에서 수집 하였다. 이후 모델 생성을 위해 선형함수, 준로그함수, 역 준로그함수, 이중로그함수 모형으로 수집한 데이터를 가공 하여 각각 다중회귀분석 방법을 적용하고 가장 설명력이 높고 통계적으로 유의한 최적의 모형을 결정하였다. 결정 된 모형에서 도출된 경제·인구·사회적 데이터를 확인하 고 방화발생에 영향을 미치는 정도를 제시하였다. 2. 방화 발생요인에 관한 이론적 고찰 2.1 방화와 방화 동기 방화(防火, Arson)는 건물이나 물건, 재산에 의도적으로 불을 지르는 행위를 말한다. 즉 목적 대상을 소훼(燒 )하 는 일체의 행위를 말하며, 대상에 직접 불을 지르거나 매 개물질을 이용하여 불을 지르는 등 방화의 방법은 불문한 다. 방화죄는 ‘고의로 불을 놓아 사람의 주거에 사용하거 나 사람이 현존하는 현주건조물, 공용·공익건조물, 기타 일반건조물 또는 물건을 소훼하는 것’으로 실화와는 구분 되는 개념이다. 방화의 일반적 특징은 누구나 손쉽게 할 수 있는 가장 용이한 범죄라는 점이다. 누구나 손쉽게 담배, 성냥·라이 터 등의 방화도구를 휴대할 수 있으며, 우리 주변의 모든 물질이 연료가 될 수 있기 때문에 방화 동기에 따라 항시 Fire Sci. Eng., Vol. 28, No. 2, 2014 방화 발생에 영향을 미치는 요인에 관한 연구 71 발생이 가능하다. 이러한 방화의 동기 또한 매우 다양하다. 일반적 원인으로는 단순우발적, 불만해소, 가정불화, 정신 이상, 싸움, 비관자살 등이며 이외에도 채권채무 및 보험 사기와 같은 경제적 이득, 살인 및 절도 등 범죄은폐, 사회 적 반감, 선동, 방화광 등 매우 다양하다. 방화 사건은 분류체계 매뉴얼에 따라 방화 동기를 입력 하고 있으며, 그 분류체계를 통하여 방화 동기의 분류가 다양하다는 것을 파악할 수 있다. Table 1은 소방방재청 국가화재분류체계 (3) 에 따른 방화 동기이며, Table 2는 미 국의 “NFIRS-11: arson and juvenile firesetter module” 에 따른 방화 동기이다. 2.2 방화 발생의 경제·인구·사회적 요인 방화 발생과 경제·인구·사회적 요인의 인과관계는 연 구결과를 통해 확인할 수 있다. 방화범죄자의 경제수준은 대부분의 연구들에서 낮은 것으로 조사되었다. 김경옥 (2009) (4) 은 방화범죄자의 프로파일링을 위한 연구에서 127건의 방화범죄자 자료를 수집하고 분석하였다. 조사결 과 빈곤이 73.2%로 대부분의 방화범죄자들이 자신의 경제 상태가 열악한 것으로 진술하였다. 다음 Table 3은 문헌에 서 조사한 방화범죄자들의 진술을 나타낸 것이다. 또한, 박형민(2004) (5) 은 방화범죄의 실태에 관한 연구에 서 1990년부터 2003년까지 방화범죄자의 생활수준별 분 포를 확인한 결과 모든 해에 걸쳐 하류층의 방화범죄 비율 이 80%를 전후한 높은 비율로 나타났다. 반면 중류층의 비율은 1993년도에 다소 증가하나 20% 전후의 비율을 유 지하고 있으며, 상류층의 방화범죄는 거의 발견되지 않는 것으로 나타났다. 방화 발생과 범죄의 관계 또한 연구결과를 통해 확인할 수 있다. 범죄행위를 위해 불을 지르는 경우 방화는 2차적 인 범죄행위를 의미한다. 살인, 자살, 무단침입, 강도, 횡령, 기록물 파괴 등의 범죄행위를 위하여 방화를 시도하거나 범죄행위 후 증거를 없애기 위하여 불을 사용한 경우가 이 에 해당한다. 범죄백서(2012) (6) 에 의하면 방화범죄자의 74.6%가 전과 가 있는 것으로 나타났으며, 전과 4범 이상이 37.6%를 차 지하는 것으로 나타났다. 다음 Table 4는 검거된 방화범죄 자의 2011년 전과 횟수 구성비이다. 방화범죄자들의 사례분석 (7) 에서 좌절경험으로 인한 방 화범죄 사례가 존재한다. 이혼 또는 배우자의 가출 또한 커다란 좌절의 경험이 된다. 또한, 가족 간의 의사소통 단 절로 인하여 자신의 분노나 충돌을 조절하지 못하는 경우 방화범죄를 시도하기 쉬운 환경이다. 사례에서는 갈등을 폭력이나 술로 해결하거나, 혼자 해결하려고 했던 사례들 이 있다. 방화범죄자들의 성장 시 부모와의 동거 여부를 살펴보 면 부모 모두 생존하여 동거한 경우는 절반정도이며, 나머 지는 부모의 이혼(또는 별거), 사망 등으로 두 부모와 함께 동거하지 못한 것으로 나타났다. 문헌에서 조사한 성장 시 부모와의 동거 여부는 다음 Table 5와 같다. 3. 연구설계 3.1 변수의 구성 본 연구는 방화 발생에 영향을 미치는 요인을 도출하기 위해 소방방재청 국가화재정보시스템과 통계청 국가통계 포털에서 데이터를 수집하였다. 소방방재청 국가화재정보 Table 3. The Statement of Arsonist Poverty Normal Abundant Unconfirmed Total Frequency 93 28 1 5 127 % 73.2 22.0 0.8 3.9 100.0 Table 5. Whether Live Together with Parents during Growth Classification Frequency Percentage Live together with parents Cohabit 127 054.3 Non cohabit Parents divorce 038 016.2 Death of parents 069 029.5 Total 234 100.0 Table 4. Criminal Record of Arsonists Number of criminal record Frequency Percentage Have no criminal record 0359 025.4 First 0162 011.5 Second 0114 008.1 Third 0107 007.6 More than fourth 0531 037.6 Unidentified 0139 009.8 Total 1412 100.0 72 김영철·박우성·이수경 한국화재소방학회 논문지, 제28권 제2호, 2014년 시스템에서 종속변수인 방화 발생 건수를 시스템이 구축 된 2007년부터 2011년까지의 행정구역 시·도 단위의 데 이터를 수집하였다. 종속변수와 관계를 보기위한 독립변수 는 통계청 국가통계포털에서 동일한 단위의 경제·인구· 사회적 데이터를 수집하였다. 방화 동기에 관련된 연구결 과들을 토대로 데이터를 검색하고, Excel을 활용하여 분석 을 위한 통합데이터를 구축하였다. 경제활동인구조사, e- 지방지표, 인구동향조사, 주민등록인구현황, 경찰청범죄통 계 자료를 활용하였으며, 통계자료에 수록된 28개의 데이 터를 분석에 사용하였다. 3.2 분석모형 방화발생에 영향을 미치는 경제·인구·사회적 요인을 도출하기 위해 다중회귀분석을 적용하였다. 다중회귀분석 은 2개 이상의 독립변수가 종속변수에 영향을 미치는지 파악하고자 할 때 실시하는 분석방법이다. 모델 생성을 위 해 선형함수, 준로그함수, 역준로그함수, 이중로그함수 모 형으로 데이터를 가공한 후, 각각 다중회귀분석 방법을 적 용하여 가장 설명력이 높고 통계적으로 유의한 최적의 모 형을 결정하였다 (8) . 다중회귀분석 수행 시 문제의 발생을 줄이기 위해 단계 별선택(stepwise)방식을 적용하였다. 단계별선택방식을 적 용하여 독립변수 중 종속변수인 방화발생과 가장 설명력 이 높은 독립변수를 순차적으로 선택하여 입력하고, 모형 단계별로 이전 단계에서 입력된 변수의 유의성 검증을 실 시해 유의성이 없는 변수는 제거하는 방법이다. 모형의 생 성은 선택 또는 제거하려는 변수가 더 이상 없을 때 종료 되는 방법으로 가장 효과적이다. 또한, 독립변수간의 다중 공선성과 자기상관의 문제의 발생여부는 분산팽창요인 (VIF, Variance Inflation Factor)과 Durbin-Watson 통계량 Table 6. The Form of Independent Variables Item Classification Unit Economically active population survey Population of 15 and over per thousand Economically active population per thousand Not economically active population per thousand Employed person per thousand Unemployed person per thousand Economic activity rates % Employment rate % Unemployment rate % e - local index Gross regional domestic product (GRDP) one million won GRDP per person one million won Consumer price increase rate % House price increase rate % Financial independence ratio % Financial independence rate % Population growth rate % Aging population rate % Internet use rate % Suicide rate per 100,000 population person Divorce rate per 1,000 population case Incidence of juvenile crime per thousand case Dynamic statistics of population Divorce rate Man per thousand Woman per thousand Marriage rate Man per thousand Woman per thousand Resident registration population Native Total person Man person Woman person Police crime statistics Incidence of crime case Fire Sci. Eng., Vol. 28, No. 2, 2014 방화 발생에 영향을 미치는 요인에 관한 연구 73 을 이용해 판정하였다. 3.3 모형 결정 모형을 결정하기 위한 설명력은 독립변수의 수가 추가 되면 항상 증가되는 R 제곱(R Square)의 결점을 보완한 수정된 R제곱(Adjusted R square)을 결정계수로 사용하였 다. 그 결과 선형함수의 수정된 R제곱 값이 0.935로 가장 높게 나타났다. 이는 모형의 독립변수가 종속변수인 방화 발생에 대한 전체 설명력이 93.5%라는 것을 의미한다. 다 중회귀분석의 다중공선성의 문제는 모든 모형의 분산팽창 요인의 값이 5보다 작아 발생하지 않았다. 모형의 자기상 관 여부는 Durbin-Watson 값이 1.502로 1.5에서 2.5 사이 의 값에 해당되는 선형함수 모형만 자기상관을 무시할 수 있다. 따라서 함수모형 중 결정계수가 가장 높고 다중공선 성의 발생과 자기상관은 무시할 수 있는 선형함수 모형을 최적의 모형으로 결정하였다. 4. 방화발생요인에 대한 실증분석 최적의 모형으로 결정된 선형함수에 대하여, 단계별로 변수의 선택 또는 제거를 고려하는 단계별선택방식으로 다중회귀분석을 실시한 결과 6개의 단계로 변수가 도출되 었다. 첫 번째 단계에서 28개의 독립변수 중 종속변수인 방화발생건수와 가장 설명력이 높은 독립변수로 범죄발생 건수가 입력되었으며, 유의성이 없는 변수가 없어 제거되 지 않았다. 동일한 단계로 일반혼인율, 일반이혼율, 소비자 물가상승률, 재정자주도 순으로 모형에 입력되었으며, 재 정자주도가 입력되며 이전의 입력된 변수들 중 유의성이 없는 변수로 일반혼인율이 제거되었다. 남은 독립변수 중 변수의 F 통계량이 더 이상 유의하지 않아 모형의 생성이 종료되었다. 도출된 모형을 토대로 종속변수인 방화발생건수와 모형 에 입력된 변수인 범죄발생건수, 일반이혼율, 소비자물가 상승률, 재정자주도의 영향관계를 파악하였다. 우선 방화 발생과 범죄발생건수 간의 영향관계를 파악한 결과, t값은 20.407, p값은 .000으로 방화발생 평가에서 유의적으로 나 타났다. 방화발생과 일반이혼율은 t값 4.793, p값 .000으로 유의적으로 나타났다. 방화발생과 소비자물가상승률은 t값 3.176, p값 .000으로 유의적으로 나타났다. 방화발생과 재 정자주도는 t값 3.693, p값 .000으로 유의적으로 나타났다. 독립변수 영향력의 상대적 크기를 나타내는 표준화계수 를 토대로 방화발생에 영향을 미치는 요인은 범죄발생건 수(0.829), 일반이혼율(0.151), 재정자주도(0.149), 소비자 물가상승률(0.099) 순으로 도출되었다. Table 7. Regression Model by Formula Model Formula Remarks Linear function Yi = α + β1X1i + β2X2i + εi Semi-log function logYi = α + β1X1i + β2X2i + εi Natural logarithm of dependent variable Inverse semi-log function Yi = α + β1logX1i + β2logX2i + εi Natural logarithm of independent variable Double-log function logYi = α + β1logX1i + β2logX2i + εi Natural logarithm of dependent variable and independent variable Table 8. Determine the Function of the Model Model R R Square Adjusted R square p-value VIF Durbin-Watson Linear function 0.969 0.938 0.935 0.000 2.002 1.502 Semi-log function 0.867 0.752 0.745 0.000 1.974 1.220 Inverse semi-log function 0.950 0.903 0.898 0.000 1.698 0.741 Double-log function 0.929 0.863 0.856 0.000 1.178 1.358 Table 9. Variables Enter/Removed Model Variables Entered Variables Removed Method 1 Incidence of crime Stepwise (Criteria: Probability-of-F-to-enter ≤ .050 Probability-of-F-to-remove ≤ .100) 2 Marriage rate 3 Divorce rate 4 Consumer price increase rate 5 Financial independence ratio 6 Marriage rate 74 김영철·박우성·이수경 한국화재소방학회 논문지, 제28권 제2호, 2014년 공선성 통계량의 공차한계(tolerance)와 분산팽창요인 (VIF, Variance Inflation Factor)은 독립변수들 간의 다중 공선성 여부를 판단하기 위한 지표이다. 다중회귀분석 결 과 공차한계 값은 0.10보다 훨씬 크며 VIF는 5~10보다 작 으므로 다중공선성이 존재하지 않는다. 분석결과 범죄발생건수, 일반이혼율, 재정자주도, 소비 자물가상승률은 방화발생과 양(+)의 관계이며, 모형에 대 한 회귀식은 상수와 비표준화 계수(B)에 의해 식으로 표현 될 수 있다. 식(1)에서 Y는 종속변수로 방화발생건수를 의 미하며, X는 독립변수로 X1은 범죄발생건수, X2는 일반이 혼율, X3은 재정자주도, X4는 소비자물가상승률이고 각 변 수 앞에 독립변수가 종속변수에 미치는 영향인 비표준화 계수를 의미한다. Y = (− 623.971) + 0.001X1 + 49.295X2 Y = + 18.868X3 + 4.166X4 (1) 5. 결 론 본 연구에서는 방화발생에 영향을 미치는 요인을 도출 하기 위하여 발생건수를 종속변수로 하고 경제·인구·사 회적 요인을 독립변수로 하는 다중회귀분석을 실시하였다. 선형함수, 준로그함수, 역준로그함수, 이중로그함수 4가지 함수형태에 대하여 다중회귀분석을 적용하였으며, 단계별 선택(stepwise) 방식을 선택하여 각 단계별로 방화발생건 수에 가장 큰 영향을 주는 변수 순으로 추가하고 새로 추 가된 변수와 유의하지 않은 기존변수를 제거하였다. 다중 공선성 문제와 자기상관 문제를 해결하기 위하여 분산확 대지수(VIF)와 Durbin-Watson 계수 이용하였으며, 4가지 함수모형에 대하여 설명력이 높고 통계적으로 유의한 최 적의 모형을 선정하고 모형에 대한 해석을 진행하였다. 모형은 수정된 R 제곱(설명력) 값이 0.935(93.5%)로 가 장 높고 통계적으로 유의한(유의수준 99%) 선형함수로 결 정하였다. 분석의 결과를 요약하면 범죄발생건수(0.829), 일반이혼율(0.151), 재정자주도(0.149), 소비자물가상승률 (0.099) 순으로 방화발생에 정(+)의 영향을 미치는 것으로 나타났다. 본 연구는 몇 가지 한계점을 가지는데 첫째, 연구에서 사용된 데이터는 국가화재정보시스템이 구축된 이후인 2007년부터 2011년도의 16개 시·도 데이터로 데이터의 크기가 작아 단순한 인과관계를 규명하여 설명하는 한계 를 가지고 있다. 둘째, 방화 발생에 영향을 미치는 경제· 인구·사회적 요인을 분석에 반영하여야 하나, 통계청에서 수집이 가능한 데이터의 한계가 존재하여 더 많은 방화 동 기를 분석에 반영할 수 없었다. 셋째, 방화의 경우 개인의 동기에 따라 범행의 발생 유무가 결정되므로, 경제·인구· 사회적 데이터만으로 방화발생건수를 도출하는 것에 어려 움이 존재한다. 그럼에도 불구하고 본 연구는 방화 동기를 고려하여 방 화발생에 영향을 미치는 요인을 통계적으로 분석하여 도 출하였다는 점에서 의의를 가진다고 할 수 있다. 향후 축 적된 빅 데이터를 활용하여 방화 발생에 영향을 미치는 요 인을 행정구역별로 세분화하여 도출하는 것은 물론, 시계 열 데이터를 활용하여 방화발생 패턴이나 건수를 예측하 는 연구가 가능하다. 감사의 글 본 연구는 소방방재청 ‘차세대 핵심소방안전기술개발지 원 사업(과제번호2012-NEMA14-009-01020000-2013)’의 지원에 의하여 수행된 것입니다. References 1. FEMA (Federal Emergency Management Agency), “Fire Data Analysis Handbook : second edition”, U.S Fire Administration (2004). 2. NEMA (National Emergency Management Agency), “NFDS (National Fire Data System)”, www.nfds.go.kr. 3. NEMA, National Fire Classification System Manual (2006). 4. K. O. Kim, “A Study for Criminal Profiling of Arsonists - Based on Crime Scene Action”, Kyonggi University, Korea (2009). 5. H. M. Park, “Arson in Korea”, Korean Institute of Crimi- nology, Series of Research, pp. 19-246 (2004). 6. Institute of Justice, White Paper on Crime (2012). 7. S. H. Choi and H. M. Park, “Characteristics of the Serial Table 10. Coefficients of Model Model Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized Coefficients Sig. Collinearity Statistics B Std. Error Beta t Tolerance VIF (Constant) −623.971 106.474 −5.860 .000 Incidence of crime 0000.001 000.000 0.829 20.407 .000 0.499 2.002 Divorce rate 0049.295 010.285 0.151 04.793 .000 0.837 1.195 Consumer price increase rate 0018.868 005.941 0.099 03.176 .002 0.849 1.177 Financial independence ratio 0004.166 001.128 0.149 03.693 .000 0.505 1.980 Fire Sci. Eng., Vol. 28, No. 2, 2014 방화 발생에 영향을 미치는 요인에 관한 연구 75 Arsonists : Focused on the Growth Experience of the Arsonists”, Journal of the Korean Sociological Associa- tion, pp. 29-43 (2012). 8. J. P. Kim and S. J. Hong, “A Study on the Determinants of Housing Price in the Central Area of Metropolitan City : A Case Study of Daegu”, Daegu Gyeongbuk Insti- tute, Vol. 12, No. 2, pp. 113-125 (2013). 9. P. R. Goebel and D. M. Harrison, “Money to Burn : Eco- nomic Incentives and the Incidence of Arson”, Journal of Housing Research, Vol. 21, No. 1, pp. 49-65 (2012). 10. S. H. Lee, “A Study on the Correlation between Fire and Urban Characteristics - Demographic, Social and Eco- nomic Factors”, Local Government Policy Research, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 1-34 (2011). 11. Y. M. Lee, “A Review of the Hedonic Price Model”, Journal of the Korea Real Estate Analysts Association, Vol. 14, No. 1, pp. 81-87 (2008). 
work_gihqq24sfbcotjhwycbbnrycvy	----	Queering Vulnerability: Visualizing Black Lesbian Desire in Post-Apartheid South Africa Queering Vulnerability: Visualizing Black Lesbian Desire in Post-Apartheid South Africa Rachel A. Lewis Feminist Formations, Volume 28, Issue 1, Spring 2016, pp. 205-232 (Article) Published by Johns Hopkins University Press DOI: For additional information about this article [ Access provided at 6 Apr 2021 02:18 GMT from Carnegie Mellon University ] https://doi.org/10.1353/ff.2016.0022 https://muse.jhu.edu/article/629699 https://doi.org/10.1353/ff.2016.0022 https://muse.jhu.edu/article/629699 ©2016 Feminist Formations, Vol. 28 No. 1 (Spring) pp. 205–234 Queering Vulnerability: Visualizing Black Lesbian Desire in Post-Apartheid South Africa Rachel A. Lewis This article examines visual art produced by lesbian human rights activists in South Africa that is emerging to contest racialized, gendered, and sexualized constructions of Black lesbian vulnerability in mainstream humanitarian advocacy. The article focuses particular attention on the work of South African Black lesbian visual artist and activist Zanele Muholi. Muholi’s photographs grapple with the question of what it means to be a desiring sexual subject—to make oneself vulnerable to the other in the context of an intimate relationship—amid the quotidian reality of anti-lesbian violence. Framing Black lesbian vulnerability to sexual violence in relation to issues of economic precarity, Muholi’s work demonstrates the need to link cultural advocacy to questions of political economy and development. By reframing and recontextual- izing Black queer vulnerability in terms of the erotic—or the body’s proximity to both pleasure and pain—Muholi opens up a space for visualizing Black lesbian desire in post-apartheid South Africa. In doing so, her visual activism shows how queer conceptualizations of vulnerability and precarity can provide the basis for the articulation of new sexual rights claims. Keywords: Black lesbians / human rights / Muholi, Zanele / South Africa / visual art / vulnerability / transnational sexualities “In the case of desire, we must ask, what kind of world makes desire possible?” —Judith Butler (1987, 24) 206 · Feminist Formations 28.1 In an article published in the New York Times on July 28, 2013, journalist Clare Carter called attention to the growing vulnerability of Black lesbians within post-apartheid South Africa (2013). Despite South Africa’s move to legalize gay marriage in 2006, the violent attacks against Black lesbians have increased sig- nificantly during the past ten years.1 In her article, “The Brutality of Corrective Rape,” Carter refers to the rape and murder of a number of high-profile Black lesbians in South Africa, including the soccer player Eudy Simelane, who was training to be a referee for the 2010 FIFA World Cup, and Noxolo Nogwaza, an LGBT human rights activist who was brutally raped and stabbed to death in 2011. Carter concludes her article with a statement from the lesbian and inter- sex rights activist Funeka Soldaat, who describes the atmosphere of pervasive fear and violence that underwrites the experiences of Black lesbians living in South Africa: “It’s as if you are sitting like a time bomb. You don’t know when it’s going to explode. You are just waiting for it to be your turn.” Carter’s depiction of Black lesbians in South Africa as disproportionately at risk of rape and sexual violence is characteristic of dominant representa- tions of Black queer vulnerability within mainstream humanitarian advocacy. Indeed, the vast majority of human rights reports repeatedly stress how Black lesbians in South Africa suffer from “triple discrimination” by virtue of being female, Black, and lesbian. In the Human Rights Watch report, “We’ll Show You You’re a Woman: Violence and Discrimination against Black Lesbians and Transgender Men in South Africa” (2011), Black lesbian vulnerability to rape and sexual assault is frequently highlighted throughout the document. Departing from the usual format for human rights reports that typically situ- ates personal narratives of violation within the framework of policy analysis and recommendation, “We’ll Show You You’re a Woman” is organized around a series of graphic descriptions of lesbian rape and murder in a manner that verges on a pornographic eroticization of these hate crimes. In this publication, as in the majority of reports documenting human rights violations commit- ted against women and sexual minorities in South Africa, Black lesbians are framed as weak and vulnerable, while their attackers are presented as powerful and protected (Morrissey 2013).2 While it is certainly true that highlighting the vulnerability of particular groups is a common and often-successful strategy within mainstream humani- tarian advocacy, the Human Rights Watch report inscribes Black lesbians in a cultural narrative of victimization that contributes to their continued oppres- sion. As lesbian human rights activist Zethu Matebeni points out, the term “corrective rape” is itself highly problematic: “Marking certain groups as victims of a special kind of crime can make them vulnerable to unintended further victimization. Knowing that a victim has experienced curative rape immediately identifies her as lesbian, a category many (including certain institutions) still treat with disdain” (2013, 346). By sensationalizing and eroticizing lesbian rape, human rights reports render Black queer women hypervisible, making it difficult Rachel A. Lewis · 207 for the latter to control how others view them.3 These racialized, gendered, and sexualized notions of Black lesbian vulnerability not only construct the frames through which queer women of color in South Africa can and cannot speak, but they actively perpetuate lesbian invisibility by failing to acknowledge the contexts in which Black lesbians assert agency and their identities and desires are affirmed. As Judith Butler (2014) observes, one way of managing marginal- ized populations is to distribute vulnerability and precarity unequally in such a way that essentialist notions of vulnerable populations get established within social discourse and policy. Such discourses, as Butler points out, problematically operate either to target a population or to protect it, strategies that belong to the same normative regime of power (111). In this article I examine visual art produced by lesbian human rights activists in South Africa that is emerging to contest racialized, gendered, and sexualized constructions of Black lesbian vulnerability within mainstream humanitarian advocacy. Given the dangers of using the mainstream media to depict hate crimes committed against women and sexual minorities, it is perhaps not surprising that a number of lesbian human rights activists are turning toward alternative forms of media like photography, digital stories, and documentary filmmaking to represent the complexities of Black lesbian lives in post-apartheid South Africa. In this article, I discuss the work of South African Black lesbian visual artist and activist Zanele Muholi. Seeking to challenge the cultural narratives of victimization that underwrite dominant representations of Black queer women in South Africa, Muholi’s work explores how Black lesbian bodies perform resistance through the mobilization of erotic vulnerability and precarity. Muholi’s photographs grapple with the question of what it means to be a desiring sexual subject—to make oneself vulnerable to the other in the context of an intimate relationship—amid the quotidian reality of anti-lesbian violence. By reframing Black queer vulnerability in terms of the erotic—or the body’s proximity to both pleasure and pain—Muholi’s work opens up a space for visualizing Black lesbian desire in post-apartheid South Africa. In part 1, I discuss Muholi’s first collection of photographs, Only Half the Pic- ture (2006), which engages with the structures of visibility and recognition that underwrite lesbian human rights narratives in South Africa. In part 2, I consider Muholi’s more recent collections of photographs, including Being (2009) and MO(U)RNING (2012), along with the documentary about her work Difficult Love (2010). As I argue, Muholi’s visual activism grounds discursive and cultural struggles for Black lesbian representation in South Africa in the material politics of everyday life and the daily struggles for resources produced by histories of colonialism and apartheid. Framing Black lesbian vulnerability to sexual vio- lence in relation to issues of economic precarity, Muholi’s work demonstrates the need to link cultural advocacy on behalf of human rights to questions of political economy and development. By reframing and recontextualizing Black lesbian precarity in terms of a political economy of erotic vulnerability, Muholi 208 · Feminist Formations 28.1 conceptualizes vulnerability as a source of potential privilege, as well as possible wounding. In doing so, she frames vulnerability not as the opposite of sexual autonomy, but rather as a dialectical construct that underwrites the expres- sion of desire more generally. Muholi’s work thus demonstrates how the Black queer subject’s encounter with erotic vulnerability constitutes a testament to the precarity of sexual autonomy. In this way, her visual art shows how queer conceptualizations of vulnerability and precarity can provide the basis for the articulation of new sexual rights claims. “Thinking Through Lesbian Rape:” Documenting Black Queer Vulnerability in South Africa “As black lesbians, we need to initiate the process of theorizing hate crimes against us so that we may become the agents articulating our sexualities and genders through our own diverse voices.” —Zanele Muholi (2004, 117) Born in Umlazi, Durban, in 1979, Zanele Muholi studied photography at the Market Photo Workshop in Newtown, Johannesburg from 2001–2003. In 2009 she received an MFA in Documentary Media Studies from Ryerson University in Toronto. Since 2009, her photography has been exhibited widely both in South Africa and in numerous galleries throughout the world. Some of her most recent exhibitions of feminist and queer art include Undercover: Performing and Transforming Black Female Identities (2009) at Spelman College Museum of Fine Art in Atlanta; The Progress of Love (2013), a transatlantic collaboration between the Menil Collection in Houston, the Center for Contemporary Art in Lagos, Nigeria, and the Pulitzer Foundation for the Arts in St. Louis; and most recently, Isibonelo/Evidence (2015), an exhibition of Muholi’s latest work at the Elizabeth A. Sackler Center for Feminist Art at the Brooklyn Museum. Prior to her work as a visual artist, Muholi co-founded the Forum for the Empowerment of Women (FEW) in Johannesburg in 2002, one of the leading organizations devoted to eliminating violence against Black lesbians in South Africa. The organization’s vision was to provide a safe space in which Black lesbian women in South Africa could meet and organize— one in which they would not be judged or discriminated against for their sexualities.4 One of the organization’s main goals was to respond to the racial and class inequali- ties resulting from histories of colonialism and apartheid that deprive Black lesbians in South Africa of equal access to citizenship and education.5 In her essay, “Thinking through Lesbian Rape,” which forms the basis of Muholi’s lesbian human rights activism, Muholi argues that in order to combat hate crimes committed against Black lesbians, activists need to address the histories Rachel A. Lewis · 209 of colonialism and apartheid that inform the production of contemporary racial and economic inequalities in South Africa. She suggests that feminist activists need to unpack why Black women’s sexual agency is so threatening to post-apartheid constructions of Black heterosexual masculinity. In “Thinking through Lesbian Rape” (2013), Muholi argues that the rape of Black lesbians constitutes an attempt to discipline African women’s sexual and erotic autonomy by reinforcing their identities as heterosexual women and as mothers. Advo- cating for an intersectional and postcolonial understanding of the concept of patriarchy within transnational feminist organizing, Muholi suggests that it is only through acknowledging the embodied experiences of differently positioned women that feminist activists can begin to effectively challenge patriarchal structures of oppression within South Africa (2004, 122–23). She concludes her essay by calling for feminist activists working against gender-based violence to come into dialogue with Black lesbian activists in South Africa in order to “collectively create the kind of world in which we all feel safe” (123). It is Muholi’s lesbian human rights activism with the Forum for the Empow- erment of Women that informs her work as a visual artist and, more specifi- cally, her decision to document hate crimes committed against Black lesbians in South Africa. As Muholi argues, Black lesbian visibility is crucial to ending the violent attacks against queer women of color in South Africa because of its ability to counter the assumption that lesbian identity is “un-African.”6 In “Mapping Our Histories: A Visual History of Black Lesbians in Post-Apartheid South Africa” (2013), Muholi reflects on the issue of anti-lesbian violence as a problem of (in)visibility and the racialization of discourses of sexuality in South Africa. As Muholi comments, she calls herself a visual activist because of the connections between visibility politics and the politics of visual representation in LGBTI human rights advocacy. Discussing how she moved from being a human rights activist to becoming a visual artist, Muholi argues that cultural articulations of Black queer visibility are central to the project of lesbian human rights activism in South Africa: In the face of all the challenges encountered by Black lesbians daily, I embarked on a journey of visual activism to ensure that there is Black queer visibility. It is important to mark, map and preserve our mo(ve)ments through visual histories for reference and posterity so that future generations will note that we were here. . . . Whatever I have captured and still capture is for the world to see that we exist as Black lesbians, women, trans men, intersexed, bisexuals, trans women—as queer Africans. (2010, 6) The goal of Muholi’s photojournalism was to develop a “critical gaze” along the lines of bell hooks’s notion of the “oppositional gaze,” one that enables economically marginalized queer women to use art and photography as a site of resistance and a tool for social change (hooks 1992). Specifically, Muholi’s aim was to counteract the hypervisibility of Black lesbian vulnerability within 210 · Feminist Formations 28.1 the mainstream media. Instead, Muholi sought to represent anti-lesbian vio- lence in a way that does not revictimize or render queer women hypervisible.7 For Muholi, resisting cultural narratives of Black lesbian victimization meant training the women she worked with to become photographers themselves in order that they might begin to tell their stories in their own ways. As she writes, I began to wonder in 2001 how I could turn myself and my community from being objectified to become the producers of our own histories, knowledges, and subjectivities. I was angry for having been used for the gaze of others. . . . I envisioned us speaking to each other using visuals because anyone can look and have thoughts about a photograph or a film, even if they are illiterate. . . . My objective was to produce work for the very same subjects I would capture . . . working to reduce the dearth of Black lesbian visual histories, narratives, and representation in the archives. Each and every person in the photos has a story to tell, so it becomes a visual narrative of some sort, in which we have to think beyond just the framed image on the wall in the gallery. (2013, 5) In 2006, Muholi founded Inkanyiso, a nonprofit organization designed to teach visual literary and documentary production skills as a way of creating a queer media platform for Black lesbian communities in South Africa. By providing the women with cameras and money for their studies, Muholi engages in a material- ist form of feminist art practice that connects questions of cultural representa- tion and visibility to social and economic rights like access to education, shelter, and resources. She believes that her photographs, which “compel the viewer to see these women beyond the racialised and heterosexualised stereotypes that have been created about Black women in South Africa,” provide “the radical aesthetic for women to speak” (2006, 93). Crucial to Muholi’s notion of developing an oppositional gaze is the idea of resisting the racialized, gendered, and sexualized constructions of queer vulner- ability that inscribe Black lesbians in South Africa in a cultural narrative of victimization. In her photography, Muholi grapples with the question of how to represent hate crimes committed against Black lesbians in South Africa in a way that does not objectify the women who have been sexually assaulted. Muholi is careful not to portray the women in her photographs as victims, noting that the lives of Black lesbians “are always sensationalized and rarely understood” (2004, 123). “Many of them feel violated,” she acknowledges, “and I did not want the camera to be a further violation. Instead, I wanted to establish relation- ships with them based on our mutual understanding of what it means to be female, lesbian and Black in South Africa” (123). By involving the Black queer community in her photography, Muholi’s visual activism circulates differently from the mainstream media’s representation of hate crimes committed against Black lesbians in South Africa. Seeking to counter the media’s objectification of Black lesbians, Muholi’s work embodies an alternative, collaborative feminist art practice that is made specifically by, for, and about Black lesbians. Rachel A. Lewis · 211 Muholi’s first collection of photographs, Only Half the Picture (2006), engages with the complexities of representing Black lesbian lives in post- apartheid South Africa. Exhibited under the heading, “What don’t you see when you look at me?” Only Half the Picture interrogates the frames of recogni- tion and visibility that underwrite representations of Black lesbian desire in South Africa. As Muholi’s work suggests, struggles for lesbian rights in South Africa are haunted by “the contradictions of visibility,” or the difficulties of representing human rights violations in a way that does not render victims of rape and sexual assault hypervisible.8 In Only Half the Picture, Muholi calls attention to the structures of visibility and invisibility, power, and vulnerabil- ity that mark Black lesbians as hypervisible and that fail to acknowledge the contexts in which Black queer women assert sexual agency. As Pumla Dineo Gqola (2006, 84) has argued, Only Half the Picture is “less about making Black lesbians visible than it is about engaging with the regimes that have used these women’s hypervisibility as a way to violate them.” Juxtaposing images of intimate bonds between female lovers with scenes depicting the wounds of hate crimes, Only Half the Picture grapples with the paradoxes of lesbian human rights in South Africa. In the series of photographs from Only Half the Picture that depict the survivors of hate crimes, Muholi’s images testify to the variety of responses Black lesbian women have to rape and sexual assault. In Only Half the Picture, Muholi includes photographs of women who choose to remain silent about their experiences of rape, along with women who are shown reporting hate crimes to the state. The image titled “Hate Crime Survivor I” which is prefaced by a legal case number, demonstrates the treatment of Black lesbian women in the criminal justice system in South Africa. As Muholi’s images testify, Black lesbian survivors of sexual assault are frequently disbelieved when they report their crimes to the state and subjected to further violence as a result of the homophobia they experience at the hands of police. In “Hate Crime Survivor I” which shows a portrait of a woman visible only from her waist to her knees, the woman’s hands are placed over her body, seeking to shield her from falling victim to the spectator’s voyeuristic gaze (figure 1). This image is placed alongside a photograph of another woman who is lying face down on a hospital bed (figure 2). In “Aftermath,” the final image of the sequence of photographs depicting hate crimes committed against Black lesbians in South Africa, we see a large scar on the subject’s thigh, which represents the trace of an older wound from a previous attack (figure 3). Alongside this image, Muholi (2006) includes the text, “Many lesbians bear the scars of their difference, and those scars are often in places where they can’t be seen.” In “Aftermath,” taken two days after the woman was raped for a second time, the positioning of the subject’s hands function to shield and protect her body from the spectator’s voyeuristic and objectifying gaze. The photograph 212 · Feminist Formations 28.1 Figure 1: “Hate crime survivor I” Figure 2: “Hate crime survivor II” Rachel A. Lewis · 213 Figure 3: “Aftermath” 214 · Feminist Formations 28.1 marks the trauma of rape and literalizes the psychic impact of sexual assault, while also showing how the threat of violence extends into the future. Through rendering visible the potential violence that lies beyond the frame of the images, Muholi’s photographs testify to the complexities of bearing witness to rape and sexual assault. As her photographs suggest, while bearing witness to hate crimes could recreate vulnerability for the women involved, the possibility of future violence confirms that remaining silent about such atrocities is not an option. At the same time that Muholi represents the Black lesbian body as vul- nerable to violation, however, she also stresses the female body as a source of erotic agency and power. In Only Half the Picture, images of hate crime survivors washing after an attack are juxtaposed with photographs of women’s menstrual blood, used sanitary towels and tampons, women wearing dildos and images of polyamorous Black lesbian couples. The photographs depicting female menstruation are placed alongside images of blood from the sites where Black lesbians have been raped and murdered. As Muholi (2006, 91) notes regarding the representational dualism of blood as a symbol of both female sexual power and vulnerability to violation, “The same blood that defines us as women is the same blood which we shed in the attacks against us.” In Only Half the Picture, the representation of female nakedness, includ- ing the naked photograph of Muholi herself holding a camera, further testi- fies to the ways in which Black lesbian bodies signify both vulnerability and strength. As Barbara Sutton (2007, 143) has commented regarding the naked body as a vehicle of political protest, “The body (clothed or unclothed) is the tool of protest par excellence. Most political protest is enacted through the body—from marches, to political theatre, to the chaining of the body to a tree or building.” In Only Half the Picture, Muholi’s own naked protest against the violent attacks perpetrated against Black lesbians in South Africa evokes the double meaning of nakedness as embodying both vulnerability and power in the form of resistance. In this way, Muholi uses bodily vulnerability as a mode of resistance, encouraging us to read Only Half the Picture as a visual diary of political protest, while simultaneously revealing how her own work as a visual activist makes her vulnerable to potential violence as well.9 By using vulnerability as a source of political protest, Muholi shows how Black lesbian bodies in South Africa perform resistance through the mobilization of erotic vulnerability and precarity. In Only Half the Picture, Muholi reflects upon the concept of Black lesbian visibility as a source of erotic power and as a site of potential vulnerability to violation. While her images of Black lesbian sexuality gesture toward the promise of pleasure, they also mark the possibility of vio- lence. Through placing strikingly visible images of lesbian desire and pleasure alongside traumatic photographs of violated female bodies, Muholi gives voice to a representational ethics characterized by corporeal and erotic vulnerability. Such bodily vulnerability alludes to the threat of violence at the same time as it articulates vulnerability as the precondition for desire and erotic pleasure. In Rachel A. Lewis · 215 this way, as Brenna Munro (2012, 198) notes, Muholi’s work is “self-reflective about the vulnerabilities that visibility brings.” “Difficult Love:” Human Rights and Erotic Vulnerability “So many representations separate us from each other that we have come to forget the feel of our own skin. . . . Removed from our skin, we remain distant.” —Luce Irigaray (1985, 218) In the documentary Difficult Love (2010), which examines the reception of Muholi’s later works Being (2009) and Caitlin and I (2009), the artist discusses her desire to document Black lesbian vulnerability in South Africa not merely in terms of the quotidian reality of anti-lesbian violence, but as the precondi- tion of desire itself. Difficult Love, commissioned and produced by the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) for national television, situates personal narratives of female same-sex desire in relation to Black lesbians’ col- lective experiences of poverty and lack of access to social citizenship. While the images in Being make visible a distinctly Black lesbian eroticism, they do so in relation to representations of racialized forms of sexual citizenship that deprive Black lesbians of equal access to social protection. In Being, Muholi’s photographs consistently stress the intersectional nature of rights and the gap between constitutional protections (as in legal access to sexual citizenship) and the material realities that expose particular populations to violence without protection. The emphasis on Black lesbian sexuality and erotica in Being caused the South African Minister of Arts and Culture, Lulu Xingwana, to walk out of the Innovative Women exhibition in which Muholi’s and others’ photographs were being displayed in 2009. Xingwana referred to Muholi’s work as “immoral” and “against nation building” (Matebini 2013, 404). She claimed, “This is not art” and conflated the images in Being with pornography (Matebini 2013, 404).10 However, it was precisely such attempts to suppress Black queer women’s sexuality that Muholi sought to redress in Being.11 As the artist states, Being was designed to counteract the absence of erotic, intimate and loving photographs of Black lesbian women in South Africa. Commenting on her decision to represent the Black lesbian body as the subject of desire, she argues that It is through capturing the visual pleasures and erotica of my community that our being comes into focus, into community and national consciousness. And it is through seeing ourselves as we find love, laughter, and joy that we can sustain our strength and regain our sanity as we move into a future that is sadly still filled with the threat of insecurities—HIV/AIDS, hate crimes, violence against women, poverty, and unemployment. (2009) 216 · Feminist Formations 28.1 As in her earlier work, Muholi stresses the need for visual representations of Black lesbian desire in order to disrupt the persistent racialization of discourses of sexuality as white, male, and upper class—a perception of queerness that fuels much of the anti-lesbian violence in South Africa. In Difficult Love, Muholi describes how her goal in Being was to depict Black lesbian vulnerability not merely in relation to hate crimes and eco- nomic precarity, but in terms of the question of vulnerability within intimate relationships—the kind of vulnerability and risks, in other words, that come from making one’s personal feelings public. As such, the documentary records aspects of Muholi’s work that deal with the subject of erotic vulnerability in interracial relationships. In Difficult Love, images from Caitlin and I (2009), a triptych in which Muholi’s Black body is seen intertwined with Caitlin’s white body, are framed in relation to the artist’s own personal narrative about her relationship with her then-partner Liesl Theron. As Muholi’s partner comments in Difficult Love, it was the former’s combination of strength and vulnerability that constituted the source of her attraction: Zanele has some kind of—I don’t know how to put it exactly—I almost want to say a special energy. She has a lively energy. . . . If one really gets to know Z. better, however, you see that she has a sensitive side and vulnerability. And I also know that soft side of her. But it’s much more at an intimate level that I specifically know what affects her, what inspires her and those sorts of things. We’re seventies babies so we come from the same era. She expe- rienced apartheid from one side and I from the other. So I think there are many things we can talk about, many things to sort out. Apartheid definitely left scars. Everything in our life has to do with class and race. So I think it’s just more prominent in our lives that there’s consciousness from both sides. (Muholi 2010) By recording vulnerable, private moments within Muholi’s own relationships, Difficult Love situates the issue of the artist’s sexuality in relation to the ques- tion of what it means to make oneself vulnerable to the other in the context of an erotic encounter. As the above dialogue suggests, strength in the other can enable the acknowledgment of vulnerability on the part of the desiring subject because of the protection and care that expressions of vulnerability inevitably require. Thus, in the context of intimate relationships, the experience of vul- nerability can be symptomatic of a privileged state of being that emerges from the opportunity to work through desire. By conceptualizing vulnerability as a source of potential privilege, as well as possible wounding, Difficult Love frames vulnerability not as the opposite of sexual autonomy, but rather as a dialectical construct that underwrites the expression of desire more generally. Desire and vulnerability are not universal aspects of the human condition according to this analysis but the product of a dialectical juxtaposition of autonomy and relationality. Erotic vulnerability Rachel A. Lewis · 217 constitutes the logical expression of love and desire in this context because of its ability to elicit a heightened sense of self-reflexivity on the part of the desiring subject. As Judith Butler (1987, 39) explains, the feeling of ecstasy produced by desire for the other reveals the desiring subject as intrinsically other to itself. Self-consciousness emerges from the experience of erotic ecstasy, or merger with the other, as a result of the subject’s effort to “think inner difference,” or the “mutual implication of opposites,” as constitutive of the object itself (27). The reflexive project of desire becomes a consequence of the subject’s search for self-recovery. Self-recovery is necessary in this context because the ecstasy that accompanies desire produces the subject as outside itself. This is what Butler means when she argues that what desire seeks, first and foremost, is the illumination of its own opacity (24). Through compelling the subject’s search for self-recovery, desire paradoxically loses its reified character as an abstract and universal experience of merging with the other and becomes instead a highly particularizing condition. The particularity of desire emerges from the experi- ence of erotic ecstasy—of being beside oneself—which produces a heightened sense of self-consciousness or self-reflexivity on the part of the desiring subject. As Butler explains, the self-reflexivity of the subject’s desire for the other is translated via the process of its articulation: “Inasmuch as self-consciousness is characterized by reflexivity, i.e., the capacity to relate to itself, this is conditioned by the power of articulation . . . consciousness reveals itself as an articulated phenomenon, that which only becomes itself as articulation” (31). In this con- text, narrative articulation becomes a way to work through the dynamic and constitutive paradoxes of desire. For Butler, it is these self-reflexive narratives of desire produced by the subject’s encounter with erotic vulnerability that constitute a testament to the precarity of sexual autonomy. As I argue here, by framing desire in terms of erotic vulnerability and self- reflexivity, both Muholi and Butler recast the erotic encounter as a question of ethics, one in which the “working through” of desire presents, as Žižek would say, “an infinite task of translation, a constant reworking of our own particular position” (cited in Corrêa, Petchesky, and Parker 2008, 161). It is only by working through the paradoxes produced by desire and the experience of erotic vulner- ability that the subject exercises social and ethical responsibility in relation- ships. This “working through” of desire is akin to what Hélène Cixous might refer to as an erotic ethics based on the despecularization of the other or, in her words, an erotic ethics that compels us “to love, to watch-think-seek the other in the other” (1976, 893). As Cixous writes about the concept of the maternal caress—a caress that lies beyond the realm of visual identification and thus, by extension, the male gaze, “They do not fetishize, they do not deny, they do no hate. They observe, they approach, they try to see the other woman, the child, the lover—not to strengthen their own narcissism or verify the solidity or weak- ness of the master, but to make love better, to invent” (893). This erotic ethics, or the ethical imperative to “make love better,” as Cixous might say, depends 218 · Feminist Formations 28.1 Fi gu re 4 : “ B ei n g” Rachel A. Lewis · 219 upon a critical awareness of the concept of erotic vulnerability, or the desiring subject’s proximity to both pleasure and pain. I argue that it is this notion of erotic vulnerability—or the body’s proximity to both pleasure and pain—that has the potential to deconstruct the false opposition between vulnerability and autonomy that is central to humanitarian framings—or “misframings”—of sexual rights discourses. In this way, queer conceptualizations of vulnerability and precarity can provide the basis for a new ethics of sexual rights. This is perhaps akin to what Audre Lorde had in mind when she suggested that by being in touch with the power of the erotic within ourselves, we begin to become “responsible subjects” (1984, 342). It is the deconstruction of vulnerability and autonomy as mutually exclu- sive oppositions that constitutes the basis of Muholi’s attempt to resignify Black lesbian desire and sexual rights in Being. The documentary Difficult Love opens with a series of images from Being that reflect upon the concept of erotic vulnerability in intimate relationships: (figure 4). In “Being,” the pose of the two women alludes to the stillness of sleep and reveals the protective tenderness of bodies embracing. The photographs visualize nakedness, vulnerability, and the need for safety and protection. While the images visualize vulnerability, however, they also represent the intimacy of Black lesbian relationships in post- apartheid South Africa, effectively countering the homophobic assertion that lesbian identity is “un-African.” Crucial to Muholi’s representation of lesbian desire and lesbian rights in terms of mutuality and reciprocity is the notion of the desiring touch, or the caress, as that which takes one out of oneself and toward the other. As Kelly Oliver (2001, 205) notes, in the caresses of love, there is no “subject” or “object/ other”: As a caress, touch has no object. . . . The promise and future of the caress are simply the erotic loving relationship itself. The caress seeks the continuation of relationship, the future of relationship, even while it constitutes it. But the caress cannot possess the other or the relationship; this is why it is a future without a content, a promise yet to come. . . . As such, the caress, and the look as caress, does not fix an object for a subject but opens a realm in which the two remain two but cannot be separated (205, 216). By seeking only the continuation of the relationship, the caress, unlike the gaze, does not run the risk of totalizing or objectifying the other. Unlike visual perception, the caress is intimate and does not take place from a distance; it is a non-possessive mode of touching the other, one that signals the impossibility of completely possessing the other. Instead, the caress allows lovers to approach each other through their mutual vulnerability, which is produced as an effect of the erotic relation. Expressions of love and desire as crucial components of a sexual rights discourse grounded in the idea of erotic vulnerability are linked to the reciprocal vulnerability produced by the desire to care and be cared for. 220 · Feminist Formations 28.1 The caress, in other words, which is based on loving looks, moments of intensi- ties, and intimate gazes, is predicated on the despecularization of the other. In Muholi’s photographs, the women do not pose for the camera; they are looking beyond the camera. In this way, Muholi’s images seek to prevent voyeurism; in Being, the voyeur is framed as an unwelcome intruder who is encouraged not to objectify, but rather to witness, Black lesbian vulnerability. Muholi thus uses the ethical provocation of the caress as a symbol of erotic interdependency, one that offers a critique of sexual autonomy as the basis for lesbian human rights advo- cacy. In doing so, her work demonstrates that sexual autonomy is not a solution to the problem of representing Black queer vulnerability in South Africa. Muholi’s use of the caress as a way of visualizing Black lesbian desire in South Africa anticipates the recent turn toward notions of erotic vulnerability and precarity in the work of Judith Butler. However, while a number of scholars have noted Butler’s turn toward the concept of vulnerability to account for contemporary forms of political violence (see, for example, Murray 2011), few have commented on the erotic dimensions of Butler’s theories of vulnerability and precarity. And yet the desiring body is, by definition, a vulnerable and precarious body. As Butler (2006, 20–21) observes, Each of us is constituted politically in part by virtue of the social vulnerability of our bodies—as a site of desire and physical vulnerability. .  .  . The body implies mortality, vulnerability, agency: the skin and the flesh expose us to the gaze of others but also to touch and to violence. . . . Loss and vulnerability seem to follow from our being socially constituted bodies, attached to others, at risk of losing these attachments, exposed to others, at risk of violence by virtue of that exposure. When Butler (2012, 141) writes, “The exposure of the body points to its precari- ousness,” she is thus referring to desire as a site of both erotic ecstasy and possible dispossession.12 While vulnerability is the precondition for desire and eroticism, it is also the condition of injury and violence. For Butler, sexual rights discourses need to reflect the ways in which the body is both “bound” and “unbound” by desire, the body’s proximity to pain and loss as well as pleasure (2011, 384). As she argues, the body survives only by virtue of its “ecstatic existence in social- ity” (384). She writes, “We are always something more than, and other than, ourselves. . . . Let us face it. We are undone by each other. If we are not, we are missing something. If this seems so clearly the case with grief, it is only because it was already the case with desire” (2004, 51). For Butler, desire and mourning, which expose the contingency of sexual and bodily life, constitute the basis for imagining an alternative political community, one that is composed of, as she puts it, “those who are beside themselves” (51). Recognizing how we are “bound up with others” means acknowledging the role played by the body and erotic vulnerability in the field of politics. As Butler (2011, 385) argues, “One’s life is always in some sense in the hands of others. . . . This implies struggling for Rachel A. Lewis · 221 Figure 5: “LiTer III” and against dependency, negotiating exposure to those we know and to those we do not know. Sometimes these are relations of love and even of care, but sometimes they are relations to anonymous others, to institutions, to states, or to nongovernmental agencies.” For Muholi, as for Butler, there is always the possibility that interde- pendency and erotic vulnerability can lead to violence. In Being, we witness the intimacy of relations of love and care between Black lesbians and yet, as 222 · Feminist Formations 28.1 spectators familiar with Muholi’s work, we are also aware of the threat of vio- lence that lies beyond the frame of the photographs, an absent presence that haunts Muholi’s visual representations of lesbian desire. As Sutton (2007, 143) observes, female nakedness can always be received as signifying vulnerability to violation: “Woman’s nakedness entails risks: no matter her own wishes, a naked woman cannot completely control the interpretation that others will ascribe to her naked performance. The slippage from nakedness, to sexualization, to objectification, to violence is always a possibility.” The antithesis between love and violence is further evident in one of Muholi’s more recent photographic exhibitions, MO(U)RNING (2012), in which erotic images from Being are juxtaposed with the media’s spectacular coverage of lesbian rape and murder (figure 6). MO(U)RNING was a response to Muholi’s grief over the theft of twenty external hard drives of photographic and audio material from her home in 2012. As a result of the theft, Muholi lost the Queercide project that was created to record hate crimes committed against LGBTI individuals around the continent, and that included footage from the funeral of Ugandan LGBT rights activist David Kato. In MO(U)RNING, Muholi presents the photographic and visual documentation that was not lost. The exhibition investigates the murders of lesbians and transgender individuals in South Africa and across the continent and seeks to document the power of love in Black lesbian communities amid the brutalities of hate crimes. Some of the antitheses foregrounded in the work are love and hate, life and death, Figure 6: Installation view of MO(U)RNING Rachel A. Lewis · 223 power and vulnerability. Commenting on the sense of antithesis and conflict in her work, Muholi observes that her world is one in which “love is juxtaposed with violence” (Zvomuya 2012). In MO(U)RNING, however, Muholi figures love as an antidote to hate and oppression. In this exhibition, Muholi relies on the transformative power of lesbian love and erotica to counteract the violence of lesbian rape and murder. As Oliver (2001, 216) has commented regarding the ethical and political power of love and its representations to overcome oppression, “The notion of love itself . . . must be open to social and political transformation. Love . . . must be reinterpreted and elaborated, especially in terms of its performative dimension.” Butler (2009, 61) similarly asserts that the ontological condition of precarity is the precondition for erotic love: “The very fact of being bound up with others establishes the possibility of being subjugated and exploited. .  .  . But it also establishes the possibility of being relieved of suffering, of knowing justice and even love.” As Butler intimates, while the body’s precarity through exposure can lead to vulnerability, such exposure and, with it, the risk of dispossession is necessary for knowing love. And it is precisely through knowing love that the subject is able to strengthen its boundaries against the possibility of oppression and exploitation. While MO(U)RNING advocates Black lesbian visibility as a possible solution to overcoming domination, however, Muholi also acknowledges that Black lesbian vulnerability to violence requires social care in order for love to flourish. In the documentary Difficult Love, Muholi comments on the use of the harsh background to frame her images in order to signify the extent to which many Black lesbians are forced to negotiate their sexuality amid conditions of extreme poverty as well as homophobia. The documentary prominently features the story of a Black lesbian couple, Petra and Praline, who were evicted from a homeless shelter for being lesbians. In Difficult Love, Petra and Praline articulate their sexuality in relation to their everyday struggles for survival and access to shelter. As Praline comments regarding the homophobia she experienced from her family and friends because of her relationship with Petra and the extent to which she and her lover had to hide their sexuality to remain within the shelter, My friends blamed me. My family also, when they found out it was a lesbian thing between us. . . . From the time that we were here no one knew we were from this little corner. Many of the people don’t know we’re lesbians. Most think that we’re mother and daughter. So for the seven months that we’ve been here we’ve lived under that little alias, mother and daughter. (Muholi and Goldschmid 2010) In Difficult Love, Muholi comments that the story of Petra and Praline is central to her work as a visual artist and to the project of lesbian human rights activism in contemporary South Africa: 224 · Feminist Formations 28.1 With this documentary . . . I wanted to highlight the issue of those lesbians who have been shunned by their families and have nowhere to turn to. South Africa has shelters for abused women but there are no shelters that are geared towards lesbians or lesbian friendly. When a lesbian accesses these shelters and their sexual orientation is discovered, then their lives are in danger. They also get harassed by the other occupants. For a pro- gressive country like South Africa this is a sad state of affairs. (Muholi and Goldschmid 2010) As Muholi’s narrative in Difficult Love suggests, if Black lesbian vulnerability signals a need for social care, then wounding responses are inappropriate. By framing Black lesbian vulnerability to violence in relation to issues of economic precarity, Muholi stresses the need to connect lesbian human rights advocacy with questions of political economy and development. In doing so, her work begins to articulate a political economy of erotic vulnerability as the basis for sexual rights. A political economy of erotic vulnerability encourages us to resituate sexual rights discourses in relation to the question of privilege, the privilege that comes with access to protected vulnerability, or the ability to pursue intimacy once one’s basic needs have been met. In doing so, a politi- cal economy of erotic vulnerability grounded in the idea of the desiring touch, or the caress, shifts human rights discourses away from notions of autonomy and individualism—the bedrock of liberal humanist thought—and toward an intersectional framing of rights, one that seeks to account for the structural conditions that make desire possible. For, as Muholi’s work suggests, when desire gets abstracted from questions of economics, the privilege of protected vulnerability goes unchecked. Situating visual representations of Black queer intimacy in the context of everyday struggles for survival, Muholi anticipates the turn toward questions of political economy in Butler’s recent work on vulnerability. In “Vulnerability, Precarity, and the Ethics of Cohabitation,” Butler critiques Levinas for failing to link the notion of vulnerability in the context of the face-to-face encounter with a politics of the body (2012, 147). As she argues, precarity only makes sense if we identify access to basic social needs, such as love and shelter, as clearly political issues (147–49). By conceptualizing erotic and bodily vulnerability in terms of social protection and uneven access to sexual citizenship, Butler deconstructs the idea of precarity as an ontological condition and instead reframes universal understandings of human precarity as inherently paradoxical. She argues, As soon as the existential claim is articulated in its specificity, it ceases to be existential. And since it must be articulated in its specificity, it was never existential. In this sense, precarity is indissociable from that dimension of politics that addresses the organization and protection of bodily needs. Precarity exposes our sociality, the fragile and necessary dimensions of our interdependency. (2012, 149) Rachel A. Lewis · 225 In Muholi’s work, Black lesbian precarity in post-apartheid South Africa is similarly articulated according to a paradoxical logic, one that deconstructs the idea of an essentialized queer vulnerability as the basis of human rights. Rather, within Muholi’s representations of queer intimacy, the paradoxes of lesbian human rights are put to productive political use in order to affirm, as Wendy Brown (2000, 228) says, “the impossibility of justice in the present” and “the conditions and contours of justice in the future.” Through her visual articulation of a political economy of erotic vulnerability, Muholi counters the hypervisibility of Black lesbians within post-apartheid South Africa by deconstructing the idea of universal precarity as the basis for human rights. In Muholi’s work, essentialized notions of queer precarity become self-cancelling, as Black lesbian vulnerability is reframed in the language of desire. The result is that Muholi’s visualizations of Black lesbian desire exceed the dominant regimes of representation that attempt to contain them. In doing so, Muholi’s mobilization of erotic vulnerability and precarity as the basis for lesbian human rights activism constitutes an ethical provocation to rethink the kinds of sexual rights claims that are imagined as possible. Conclusion: Toward a Political Economy of Desire, Pleasure, and Erotic Justice “As bodies, we are always for something more than, and other than, ourselves. To articulate this as an entitlement is not always easy, but perhaps not impossible.” —Butler (2004, 59) In Muholi’s recent exhibition, Isibonelo/Evidence (2015), at the Elizabeth A. Sackler Center for Feminist Art in the Brooklyn Museum, the initial image encountered by spectators as they enter is that of a large photograph of a Black woman’s hands holding a South African passport opened to a page stamped with the words “deceased” (figure 7). The passport belonged to Disebo Gift Makau, a South African lesbian who was raped and murdered in 2014 and whose body was found semi-naked on waste ground with a lead pipe forced down her throat. On the other side of the wall is a detailed timeline of hate crimes com- mitted against Black lesbians in South Africa since 2009. Facing the timeline at the other end of the gallery is a blackboard containing anonymous Black lesbian testimonies of rape and sexual assault, all of which are handwritten in chalk. Around the corner, a short video, entitled Being Scene (2012), based on Muholi’s earlier collection of photographs in Being, is playing on a loop. The video contains blurred black and white images of Muholi and her partner having sex alongside an erotically explicit soundtrack. Walking further through the gallery, one encounters colorful photographs of same-sex weddings and a large 226 · Feminist Formations 28.1 installation that includes the video Ayanda and Nhlanhla Moremi’s Wedding (2013). Placed directly opposite the wedding video is a coffin containing flowers and a black and white self portrait of Muholi.13 The coffin is positioned next to another collection of wedding photographs, entitled “Koze Kubenini XX” (“Until When XX”). By juxtaposing images of wedding celebrations with scenes of violence and mourning, Muholi’s recent collection illustrates the precarious path that Black lesbian communities in South Africa must walk between celebration and mourning, between queer visibility and erotic vulnerability. As Muholi’s images testify, while Black lesbian representation is crucial to countering the symbolic violence that renders the lives of queer women of color ungrievable, such vis- ibility also makes Black queer women vulnerable to material, everyday forms of violence and discrimination.14 In Isibonelo/Evidence, the passport with which Muholi opens her exhibition importantly links Black lesbian vulnerability in South Africa to questions of sexual citizenship. Muholi’s call for solidarity with Black queer migrants in Isibonelo/Evidence thus connects the contemporary challenges facing queer refugees, asylum seekers, and undocumented migrants with the kinds of ongoing legacies of apartheid that stratify sexual citizenship and access to social protections. From Black lesbians in South Africa who experience the ongoing inequalities resulting from histories of apartheid, to Black lesbian migrants who attempt to seek asylum in South Africa only to be met with the homophobia and xenophobia of state officials, to Black lesbians who choose to leave the continent and seek asylum in the West and whose fate Figure 7: Installation view of Isibonelo/Evidence Rachel A. Lewis · 227 is often that of detention and ultimately deportation, Muholi’s activist gesture of solidarity with queer migrants is a powerful reminder not to underestimate the role played by citizenship in the transnational production of Black lesbian vulnerability and erotic precarity.16 By beginning from the kind of transnational feminist Black lesbian praxis that understands vulnerability and autonomy as interrelated and intimately tied to issues of sexual citizenship, Muholi’s visual activism opens up a space for conceptualizing lesbian human rights narratives in a way that links cam- paigns for erotic justice to questions of political economy and development. As Amanda Lock Swarr and Richa Nagar (2004) have noted, the subject of female same-sex desire among poor women in the Global South has fallen outside the cracks of both lesbian studies and critical development studies. They argue that whereas lesbian studies has failed to engage with the complexities of living in places where political violence and struggles for resources inform how women articulate their sexualities, development theorists still privilege gender as a central category of analysis with the result that heteronormative presumptions about female sexuality remain intact (495). Swarr and Nagar stress the need for feminist scholars to bridge the gap between development theory and praxis and lesbian studies by conceptualizing new frameworks that attempt to situate the subject of female same-sex desire in relation to questions of economics. Only then, they argue, will lesbian studies be able to productively intervene in current debates within transnational feminist and queer theory about what it means to think female same-sex desire globally and transnationally. By stressing a political economy of erotic vulnerability as the basis for lesbian human rights advocacy, Muholi’s visual art creates spaces for new nar- ratives of female same-sex desire to emerge within transnational feminist and queer activism. Through articulating a conception of lesbian desire that central- izes the question of differential access to social resources, Muholi shows how Black lesbian vulnerability in post-apartheid South Africa cannot be thought outside interlocking structures of oppression, such as heteronormativity, racism, classism, and xenophobia. In doing so, she demonstrates how theories of erotic vulnerability might help to better account for the intersections among gender, race, sexuality, class and citizenship in lesbian human rights narratives. As Muholi’s work also suggests, a theory of sexual rights grounded in the notion of erotic vulnerability, or contingency, allows us to pose the problem of identity in lesbian human rights narratives. In this way, theories of erotic vulnerability and precarity help to open up a space for conceptualizing gender- based forms of persecution without foreclosing the possibilities for the expres- sion of female sexual agency. In the context of South Africa, for example, as Swarr (2012, 963) notes, Black lesbian masculinities signify both erotic power and vulnerability to sexual violence in the form of patriarchal backlash against women’s perceived sexual and gender transgression. A theory of rights grounded in the notion of erotic vulnerability opens up a space for conceptualizing such 228 · Feminist Formations 28.1 gender-based forms of persecution without foreclosing the possibilities for the expression of female sexual agency in lesbian human rights narratives. As Muholi’s work demonstrates, thinking vulnerability and agency together is crucial to effectively mobilizing Black lesbian vulnerability and precarity as a form of resistance. By stressing a dialectics of erotic vulnerability as the basis for sexual rights claims, Muholi demonstrates how cultural advocacy can provide a model through which to account for the paradoxes of lesbian human rights in contem- porary South Africa. Through her work, Muholi teaches us how to recognize worlds in which violence and erotic agency coexist and in which vulnerability can be a source of both pleasure and danger. For, in contemporary South Africa, freedom does not always mean sexual autonomy; it can also refer to the privilege that accompanies the state of protected vulnerability. Translating the concept of erotic vulnerability into lesbian human rights narratives without the former becoming appropriated as a tactic of patriarchal governance is a far from easy or straightforward task, however. As Butler reminds us, women “know” the dilemma, or paradox, of erotic vulnerability only too well. The challenge, as she notes, has to do with demanding a world in which erotic vulnerability is protected without being eradicated and with insisting on a path that must be walked between the pursuit of sexual autonomy and the ecstasy that is produced by desire (2006, 42). As I have argued here, however, by encouraging us to claim something other than sexual autonomy as an alternative to gender-based forms of violence, queer conceptualizations of vulnerability and precarity can help us to come closer to imagining the kind of world that makes desire possible. Rachel A. Lewis is an assistant professor in the Women and Gender Studies Program at George Mason University. Her research and teaching interests include transnational feminisms, queer theory, media and cultural studies, sexuality, race and immigration, human rights and transnational sexualities. She has published articles in Sexualities, Feminist Formations, Social Justice, International Feminist Journal of Politics, Journal of Lesbian Studies, Women & Music: A Journal of Gender and Culture, and Music & Letters. Notes 1. In 1996, the South African Constitution became one of the first in the world to officially prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. This was followed in 2000 by the Equality Act, which specifically outlawed hate crimes. In 2006, South Africa legalized same-sex marriage by way of the Civil Union Act, thereby giving same-sex partners the option to legally register their relationship either as a marriage or as a civil partnership. 2. The Human Rights Watch report, “We’ll Show You You’re a Woman,” reproduces graphic statements from male rapists as well as from male police officers in charge of Rachel A. Lewis · 229 interviewing victims of sexual assault. The report also includes lengthy testimonies from victims regarding their experiences of rape and sexual violence. For further analysis of the kind of rhetoric typically used to frame Black lesbian vulnerability to rape and sexual assault in South Africa, see Morrissey 2013. 3. For a discussion of the hypervisibility of Black lesbians in South Africa and the social movement strategies designed to counteract Black queer women’s oppression, see Currier 2012. 4. The primary aim of FEW, as Ashley Currier (2012, 52) notes, is to offer “protected visibility” for Black lesbians in South Africa. 5. As Muholi (2013, 17) notes, the violence that Black lesbians encounter in South Africa is directly related to their collective experiences of poverty; their lack of access to adequate transportation and housing make them especially vulnerable. 6. Xavier Livermon (2012, 315) similarly argues that in order to create possibilities for freedom, Black queer subjects in South Africa need to disrupt heteronormative constructions of Blackness through enacting cultural visibility in the public sphere. As Currier (2012, 18) also notes in her work on LGBT social movements, the racialization of discourses of sexuality in South Africa necessitates that LGBT movement organiza- tions cultivate “an intentional visibility strategy,” one that promotes “the Africanness of the movement.” 7. As Muholi (2004, 123) comments regarding her desire to act as both witness and advocate for the Black lesbian community within South Africa, “My location as an activist and community worker within the lesbian community allows me to testify to the constant revictimisation that lesbians face after experiencing the trauma of rape. I see first-hand how these women’s sexualities and their genders are questioned and interrogated by police, doctors and the media. I hear my wider African community deny these women the right to live their sexual and gender identities.” 8. For an analysis of how structures of visibility and invisibility characterize human rights discourses more generally, see Hesford 2011, 12. 9. As the artist has written about her position as an “insider” within the Black lesbian community in South Africa, “This insider status also comes with the fear of being the next hate crimes statistic, especially because I am known publicly. Just as there is an issue with the safety of my participants when their faces are recognized in my photos, so there is an issue of safety for me. I too get scarred by fear” (Muholi 2006, 91). 10. As Zethu Matebeni (2013, 406) comments regarding the ways in which Xing- wana’s reception of Being was affected by colonialist and post-apartheid constructions of African womanhood that deny women access to sexual and erotic agency, “The minis- ter’s gaze and self-looking is narrowed and clouded by histories of the violation of Black female bodies. On seeing two Black female bodies together and undressed, she could only imagine pain, violation, torture and a version of pornography. She is unable to see, or rejects the capacity in herself to see, in the images pleasure, joy, beauty, intimacy and eroticism.” Matebeni argues that Xingwana’s response to Muholi’s work is symptomatic of heteronormative presumptions about female sexuality, according to which only the heterosexual male gaze is able to consume the naked female body, a body that remains permanently susceptible to violation as a result of masculine objectification. 11. As Muholi (2009) writes, “The work is aimed at erasing the very stigmatisation of our sexualities as ‘unAfrican’, even as our very existence disrupts dominant (hetero) 230 · Feminist Formations 28.1 sexualities, patriarchies and oppressions that were not of our own making. Since slavery and colonialism, images of us African women have been used to reproduce heterosexual- ity and white patriarchy, and these systems of power have so organized our everyday lives that it is difficult to visualize ourselves as we actually are in our respective communities.” 12. As Butler (2009, 32) explains, precarity is a “politically induced” condition that deprives particular populations of social and economic support, leaving them at height- ened risk of poverty, disease, injury, violence and, in some cases, premature death. For Butler, it is this “legalized violence” by which certain populations are prevented from accessing the resources needed to minimize their precariousness that exposes them to “violence without protection.” 13. At the opening private view of the exhibition, Muholi entered the Plexiglas coffin and lay there naked with flowers strewn across her body. As the artist com- mented regarding her performance of vulnerability, “It’s about a life that’s been ended unexpectedly and violently. . . . Lesbians are victimised and end up lying somewhere in somebody’s yard in some crime scene. In Brooklyn that night, that space will become a crime scene” (Muholi 2015, 11). 14. As Kylie Thomas (2014, 119) points out in her work on visual media in post- apartheid South Africa, we need to keep asking how the legacy of apartheid “continues to negate the possibility for those forms of sociality without which mourning remains impossible.” 15. The Organization for Refuge, Asylum and Migration has documented the precarious position faced by sexual and gender minority refugees in South Africa. As they have observed, not only do queer refugees encounter the kind of xenophobia that all migrants face, but they also risk having their asylum claims dismissed as a result of the homophobia and/or transphobia of the immigration officials evaluating their claims (ORAM 2012). In the case of lesbians, this usually means being accused of not being “lesbian enough.” For a discussion of the challenges to lesbian asylum claims and the social construction of lesbian migrants as “deportable subjects,” see Lewis 2013 and 2014. References Brown, Wendy. 2000. “Suffering Rights as Paradoxes.” Constellations 7 (2): 208–29. Butler, Judith. 1987. Subjects of Desire: Hegelian Reflections in Twentieth-Century France. New York: Columbia University Press. ———. 2004. Undoing Gender. New York: Routledge. ———. 2006. Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence. London: Verso. ———. 2009. Frames of War: When is Life Grievable? London: Verso. ———. 2011. “Remarks on Queer Bonds.” GLQ: A Journal of Lesbian and Gay Studies 17 (2–3): 381–87. ———. 2012. “Precarious Life, Vulnerability, and the Ethics of Cohabitation.” The Journal of Speculative Philosophy 26 (2): 134–51. ———. 2014. “Bodily Vulnerability, Coalitions, and Street Politics.” In Differences in Common: Gender, Vulnerability, and Community, edited by Joana Sabadell-Nieto and Marta Segarra, 99–120. New York: Rodophi Press. Carter, Clare. 2013. “The Brutality of Corrective Rape.” New York Times, July 28. http:// www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/07/26/opinion/26corrective-rape.html?_r=0. Rachel A. Lewis · 231 Cixous, Hélène. 1976. “The Laugh of the Medusa.” Signs: A Journal of Women in Culture and Society 1 (4): 875–93. Corrêa, Sonia, Rosalind Petchesky, and Richard Parker. 2008. Sexuality, Health, and Human Rights. New York: Routledge. Currier, Ashley. 2012. Out in Africa: LGBT Organizing in Namibia and South Africa. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Dineo Gqola, Pumla. 2006. “Through Zanele Muholi’s Eyes: Re/imagining Ways of Seeing Black Lesbians.” In Only Half the Picture, edited by Zanele Muholi, 82–89. Cape Town: STE Publisher. Hesford, Wendy S. 2011. Spectacular Rhetorics: Human Rights Visions, Recognitions, Feminisms. Durham, NC and London: Duke University Press. hooks, bell. 1992. “The Oppositional Gaze: Black Female Spectators.” In Black Looks: Race and Representation, 115–32. Boston: South End Press. Human Rights Watch. 2011. “We’ll Show You You’re a Woman: Violence and Discrimi- nation against Black Lesbians and Transgender Men in South Africa.” http://www .hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/southafrica1211.pdf. International Gay and Lesbian Human Rights Commission. 2007. “Off the Map.” http:// www.iglhrc.org/sites/default/files/6-1.pdf. Irigaray, Luce. 1985. This Sex Which Is Not One. Translated by Catherine Porter. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Lewis, Rachel. 2013. “Deportable Subjects: Lesbians and Political Asylum.” Special issue, “Feminists Interrogate States of Emergency,” guest edited by Jill Bystydzienski, Jennifer Suchlund, and Rebecca Wanzo, Feminist Formations 25 (2): 173–93. ———. 2014. “ ‘Gay? Prove It’: The Politics of Queer Anti-Deportation Activism.” Spe- cial issue, “Queer Migration, Asylum, and Displacement,” guest edited by Rachel Lewis and Nancy A. Naples, Sexualities 17 (8): 958–75. Livermon, Xavier. 2012. “Queer(y)ing Freedom: Black Queer Visibilities in Postapart- heid South Africa.” GLQ: A Journal of Lesbian and Gay Studies 18 (2–3): 297–323. Lock Swarr, Amanda. 2012. “Paradoxes of Butchness: Lesbian Masculinities and Sexual Violence in Contemporary South Africa.” Signs: A Journal of Women in Culture and Society 37 (4): 961–86. ———, and Richa Nagar. 2004. “Dismantling Assumptions: Interrogating “Lesbian” Struggles for Identity and Survival in India and South Africa.” Signs: A Journal of Women in Culture and Society 29 (2): 491–516. Lorde, Audre. 1984. “The Uses of the Erotic: the Erotic as Power.” In Sister Outsider, edited by Audre Lorde, 53–59. San Francisco: The Crossing Press. Matebeni, Zethu. 2013. “Deconstructing Violence Towards Black Lesbians in South Africa.” In Queer African Reader, edited by Sokari Ekine and Hakima Abbas, 343–53. Nairobi and Oxford: Pambazuka Press. Matebeni, Zethu. 2013. “Intimacy, Queerness, Race.” Cultural Studies 27 (3): 404–17. Morrissey, Megan. 2013. “Rape as a Weapon of Hate: Discursive Constructions and Material Consequences of Black Lesbianism in South Africa.” Women’s Studies in Communication 36 (1): 72–91. Muholi, Zanele. 2004. “Thinking Through Lesbian Rape.” Agenda 6 (1): 116–25. ———. 2006. Only Half the Picture. Cape Town: STE Publisher. ———. 2009. “Being.” http://www.stevenson.info/exhibitions/muholi/being.htm. 232 · Feminist Formations 28.1 ———, and Peter Goldsmid, dir. 2010. Difficult Love. Documentary Film. http://www .imdb.com/video/wab/vi3128728089/. ———. 2013. “Mapping Our Histories: A Visual History of Black Lesbians in Post- Apartheid South Africa.” Microsoft Word Document. Unavailable to access. Originally accessed on July, 27, 2013. Munro, Brenna. 2012. South Africa and the Dream of Love to Come: Queer Sexuality and the Struggle for Freedom. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 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work_gj5vrkwx3fbjhh6buxh3bbtksi	----	Long Dark Road: Bill King and Murder in Jasper, Texas (review) Long Dark Road: Bill King and Murder in Jasper, Texas (review) David O'Donald Cullen Southwestern Historical Quarterly, Volume 110, Number 1, July 2006, pp. 157-158 (Review) Published by Texas State Historical Association DOI: For additional information about this article [ This content has been declared free to read by the pubisher during the COVID-19 pandemic. ] https://doi.org/10.1353/swh.2006.0016 https://muse.jhu.edu/article/203048 https://doi.org/10.1353/swh.2006.0016 https://muse.jhu.edu/article/203048 2006 Book Reviews 157 demonstrates the serendipity of life as he recounts, “looking forward to getting his degree and getting a job” behind a desk in a career unrelated to corrections. But, after leaving his part-time job as a gas jockey, Willett found more lucrative employment with the prison system, a coveted job in the 1970s. This is a striking contrast to the present-day shortage of correctional officers that leaves security wanting in a number of the state’s prison units. The author describes a career behind bars as a kind of reverse Stockholm syndrome, explaining, “In an odd way, I felt at home. In some ways, I’d grown as institutionalized as an old convict” (p. 119). Willett describes the changing prison culture, where the young violent prisoners do not respect the older codes of con- duct that were apparently followed by the convicts of yesteryear. It was here that the reviewer hoped that Willett might shed some light on the gang culture that pervades most prisons since the Ruiz decision did away with the building tender system in the 1980s. Willett chronicles his rise through the ranks of TDC, from a lowly corrections officer (CO) handing out medications and chow, to sergeant, lieutenant, assis- tant warden, and finally senior warden at the Walls unit in Huntsville. During his career he saw the reintroduction of capital punishment in Texas in 1982, when he witnessed the first lethal injection in the United States (of Charles Brooks). Willett admits that he was unprepared for dealing with executions since there hadn’t been an execution in Texas in twenty years. However, once it did return he found himself confronted with moral questions that he thought he would never have to face, admitting “it wasn’t something that we did at the Walls” and “never counted on killing people” (p. 141). During his career he would accompany eighty- nine prisoners into the death chamber. Warden recounts the story of a small-town boy who after decades in corrections finds himself in charge of one of the nation’s most infamous prisons. Willett is adept at shifting gears between stories of brutality and malice and moments of surprising humanity. The book is interspersed with his journal jottings and thoughts about several specific executions, in particular the recent executions of Gary Graham and Kenneth McDuff. Willett is never judgmental and often tells his story through the words of the convicts. This book is recommended to general readers, students of corrections, and those interested in Texas history, not just for its descriptions of the state’s pris- ons and inmates, but most of all for Willet’s descriptions of small-town life. His description of growing up in Texas and his affection for the state’s culture is often touching. His eight years as warden between 1993 and 2002 happened to coincide with the ratcheting up of the Texas death row machinery, and while he is too loyal a public servant to admit it, this must have contributed to his retirement. Sam Houston State University Mitchel P. Roth Long Dark Road: Bill King and Murder in Jasper, Texas. By Ricardo C. Ainslie. (Aus- tin: University of Texas Press, 2004. Pp. 254. Preface, acknowledgments, pho- tographs. ISBN 0292705743. $24.95, cloth.) 158 Southwestern Historical Quarterly July Psychological profiles of murderers tend to humanize the criminals, neglect the victims, and suggest that we are closer to the former than the latter. Ricardo Ainslie’s Long Dark Road follows this formula. The murder of an unarmed black man by a group of white thugs, although tragic, is not surprising to historians of the American South or American race relations in general. But this murder captured the nation’s attention not because of the crime itself, but because of the nature of the crime. After a chain was wrapped around his ankles and at- tached to the back of a pickup truck, James Byrd’s body was dragged for over two miles. The man and boy who discovered Byrd near the front of an African American church at first thought the crumpled bundle along the road was the remains of a deer that had been hit by a driver the night before. Within twenty- four hours of the discovery of the body, local police, with the assistance of the FBI, had arrested three men and charged them with murder and committing a hate crime. The Long Dark Road is not the story of these three men, nor is it a history of race relations in Jasper, or a case study of how the relationship between class, race, and poverty produce the societal ingredients that result in fear, racism, and violence. Rather, Ainslie, a professor of educational psychology at the Uni- versity of Texas at Austin, profiles the life and mind of only one of the three convicted killers, Bill King. Based upon twenty hours of interviews and three years of correspondence (the number and length of the letters is not revealed), Ainslie suggests a variety of reasons that might explain why King became a rac- ist and murderer. For example, at the age of thirteen King discovered that he was adopted, and this news, according to Ainslie, dramatically altered King’s perception of himself and resulted in a personality in need of much emotional support. Or, there is the issue that King was bipolar (although who diagnosed King and when this medical analysis was made is not clear), and he often did not take his medication. Then there is the fact that King spent only fourteen months out of prison between the ages of seventeen and twenty-three. And, while in jail, he joined the Confederate Knights of America, tattooed his body with various racist and satanic images, and became friends with one of the two other men who murdered Byrd. King also suggested that he had attempted suicide four times (although whether this pronouncement is true or not is dif- ficult to determine). Thus, Ainslie’s profile suggests that an alienated, inse- cure, medically unstable young man released his anger at himself and the world through the act of murder. Although Ainslie argues that King’s life was a result more of nurture than nature (“our collective failure” he writes on p. xii), he does not provide a comprehensive study of the community that produced King, nor does he provide a comparative study of the three men to explain King’s actions more successfully. Most importantly, Ainslie failed to travel the long dark road of American racism to comprehend better why James Byrd’s walk home in 1998 was as dangerous as a walk home taken by a black man in 1898. Collin County Community College David O’Donald Cullen 
work_fkbvwwdznbhi7lu7v4y6wx5csa	----	Volume 45, Number 4 December 2001 This issue is devoted to HATE CRIMES AND ETHNIC CONFLICT: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE Edited by: JACK LEVIN GORDANA RABRENOVIC Northeastern University CONTENTS The Authors 571 Hate Crimes and Ethnic Conflict: An Introduction JACK LEVIN and GORDANA RABRENOVIC 574 The Persecution of Gypsies in Europe MARGARET BREARLEY 588 Aggressive Youth Cultures and Hate Crime: Skinheads and Xenophobic Youth in Germany MEREDITH W. WATTS 600 The International Commission of Inquiry (Rwanda): Lessons and Observations From the Field ERIC G. BERMAN 616 Hate Crimes Hurt More PAUL IGANSKI 626 Ethno-National Conflict and Hate Crime ROGER MAC GINTY 639 Renaming Violence DEBRA RENEE KAUFMAN 654 The Birth and Maturation of Hate Crime Policy in the United States RYKEN GRATTET and VALERIE JENNESS 668 Consequences for Victims: A Comparison of Bias- and Non-Bias-Motivated Assaults JACK MCDEVITT, JENNIFER BALBONI, LUIS GARCIA, and JOANN GU 697 Extremism and the Constitution: How America’s Legal Evolution Affects the Response to Extremism BRIAN LEVIN 714 american behavioral scientist INTERNATIONAL EDITORIAL ADVISORY BOARD MAX H. BAZERMAN, Northwestern University MARTIN BULMER, University of Surrey KAY DEAUX, City University of New York PAUL DiMAGGIO, Princeton University DANIEL DRUCKMAN, George Mason University TED ROBERT GURR, University of Maryland ROM HARRÉ, University of Oxford MARCEL LAFOLLETTE, The George Washington University HENRY LEVIN, Columbia University SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET, George Mason University PETER LYMAN, University of California, Berkeley DAVID LYON, Queen’s University GARY MARKS, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill JOSEPH E. McGRATH, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign LINDA L. PUTNAM, Texas A&M University RICHARD SCHULZ, University of Pittsburgh NEIL J. SMELSER, Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences MARK SNYDER, University of Minnesota BARRIE THORNE, University of California, Berkeley WILLIAM G. TIERNEY, University of Southern California CHARLES TILLY, Columbia University CAROL H. WEISS, Harvard University JAMES YOUNISS, Catholic University of America VIVIANA ZELIZER, Princeton University For Sage Publications: Sara Miller McCune, Executive Editor Laura Lawrie, Managing Editor Corina Villeda, Designer Jason Dean, Production Editor Rebecca Lucca, Copy Editor AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST (ISSN 0002-7642; ISBN 7619-1702-0) is published monthly by Sage Publications, 2455 Teller Road, Thousand Oaks, CA 91320; telephone (800) 818-SAGE (7243) and (805) 499-0721; fax/order line (805) 499-0871; e-mail order@sagepub.com; http://www.sagepub.com. Copyright © 2001 by Sage Publications. All rights re- served. No portion of the contents may be reproduced in any form without written permission of the publisher. Subscriptions: Annual subscription rates for institutions and individuals are based on the current frequency. Prices quoted are in U.S. dollars and are subject to change without notice. Canadian subscribers add 7% GST (and HST as ap- propriate). 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Change of Address: Six weeks’ advance notice must be given when notifying of change of address. Please send the old address label along with the new address to ensure proper identification. Please specify name of journal. POSTMAS- TER: Send address changes to American Behavioral Scientist, c/o Sage Publications, 2455 Teller Road, Thousand Oaks, CA 91320. Printed on acid-free paper AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTISTTHE AUTHORS The Authors JENNIFER BALBONI is a senior research associate at the Center for Criminal Justice Policy Research and a doctoral student in the Law, Policy, and Society Program at Northeastern University. ERIC G. BERMAN is currently an independent consultant based in Arlington, Massachusetts, having previously worked for the United Nations in Cambodia, Geneva, Nairobi, and New York. He has published widely on UN and security issues, including Peacekeeping in Africa: Capabilities and Culpabilities (with Katie E. Sams) and, most recently, Re-Armament in Sierra Leone: One Year After the Lome Peace Agreement. MARGARET BREARLEY is currently an advisor on the Holocaust to the Archbishops’ Council of the Church of England. She was formerly a university lecturer in medieval and Renaissance German literature and history of ideas (Birmingham); a senior fellow at the Centre for Judaism and Jewish-Christian Relations at Selly Oak Colleges, West Midlands; and a research fellow at the Institute of Jewish Affairs, London. Her publications include The Roma/ Gypsies: A Persecuted People (1995, London: IJA). LUIS GARCIA is an assistant professor of sociology and director of the Crimi- nal Justice Research Center at Suffolk University in Boston. He previously served as director of research and evaluation for the Boston Police Department. RYKEN GRATTET is an associate professor of sociology at the University of California, Davis. His published work includes studies of imprisonment trends, the development of industrial accident laws and worker’s compensation sys- tems, and the legislative, judicial, and enforcement aspects of hate crime laws. He is the author of Making Hate a Crime: From Social Movement to Law Enforcement (with Valerie Jenness, 2001). His articles have appeared in the American Sociological Review, Law & Society Review, Social Science History, the Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, and Sociological Perspectives. JOANN GU is the principal research analyst at the Boston Police Department, Office of Research and Evaluation. PAUL IGANSKI is a lecturer in sociology and criminology at the University of Essex, England, and a civil society fellow at the Institute for Jewish Policy Research. The research for his article was carried out while he was a visiting scholar at the Brudnick Center on Violence and Conflict at Northeastern Univer- sity, Boston. 571 VALERIE JENNESS is chair of the Department of Criminology, Law and Society and an associate professor in the Department of Criminology, Law and Society and in the Department of Sociology at the University of California, Irvine. Her research focuses on the links between deviance and social control (especially law), gender, and social change (especially social movements). She is the author of three books, Making Hate a Crime: From Social Movement to Law Enforcement Practice (2001), Hate Crimes: New Social Movements and the Politics of Violence (1997), and Making It Work: The Prostitutes’ Rights Movement in Perspective (1993), as well as numerous articles on the politics of prostitution, AIDS and civil liberties, hate crimes and hate crime law, and the gay/lesbian movement and the women’s movement in the United States. Her work has been recognized with awards from the Gustavus Myers Center for the Study of Bigotry and Human Rights in North America, the Society for the Study of Social Problems, the Pacific Sociological Association, and the University of California; translated and reprinted in Japanese and German; presented at an array of professional conferences and universities, as well as to the U.S. Con- gress and the National Academy of Sciences; and funded by National Academy of Sciences, the National Science Foundation, the California Policy Research Center, the California Department of Mental Health, the University of Califor- nia, and Washington State University. DEBRA RENEE KAUFMAN is currently the director of Jewish Studies, a Matthews Distinguished Professor, and a professor of sociology at Northeastern University. Her most recent edited volume is Women and the Holocaust, and she was a special guest editor for Contemporary Jewry (1996). Her book Rachel’s Daughters, about newly orthodox Jewish women, was nominated for three book awards. Her current research on Jewish identity among 20- to 30-year-olds was completed when she was a visiting scholar at Oxford University at the Centre for Hebrew and Jewish Studies. She continues to publish articles and chapters in the area of gender and identity politics as well as feminist theory and methodology. BRIAN LEVIN, civil rights attorney and criminologist, is a professor of crimi- nal justice and director of the Center for the Study of Hate & Extremism (www.fighthate.org) at California State University, San Bernardino, where he specializes in analysis of hate crime terrorism and legal issues. Previously, Pro- fessor Levin served as associate director–legal affairs of the Southern Poverty Law Center’s Klanwatch/Militia Task Force in Montgomery, Alabama, and as a New York City police officer. A graduate of Stanford Law School, he is the author or coauthor of various books, scholarly articles, training manuals, and studies on extremism and hate crime. Professor Levin has testified before Con- gress and is a court-certified expert on hate and extremism in the United States and England. JACK LEVIN is the Brudnick Professor of Sociology and Criminology at Northeastern University, where he directs its Brudnick Center on Violence and 572 AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST Conflict. He has written a number of books on hate and violence including The Functions of Prejudice (1982), Hate Crimes: The Rising Tide of Bigotry and Bloodshed (1993), and The Violence of Hate: Confronting Racism, Anti-Semitism, and Other Forms of Bigotry (2001). ROGER MAC GINTY is a lecturer at the Postwar Reconstruction and Develop- ment Unit, Department of Politics, University of York, United Kingdom. He has published extensively on peace processes and issues of ethno-national conflict. His book, The Management of Peace Processes (edited with John Darby) was published by Macmillan in 2000. JACK MCDEVITT is an associate dean and director of the Center for Criminal Justice Policy Research at Northeastern University. He has worked in the area of hate crime research for nearly 15 years and has testified before the U.S. Con- gress on multiple occasions regarding the issue of hate crime. GORDANA RABRENOVIC is an associate professor of sociology and educa- tion and associate director of the Brudnick Center on Violence and Conflict at Northeastern University. She specializes in social analysis in the area of commu- nity studies, education institutions, and intergroup conflict and violence. Her publications include “Women and Collective Action in Urban Neighborhoods,” “The Dissolution of Yugoslavia: Ethnicity, Nationalism, and Exclusionary Communities,” “From Consumers to Co-Producers: Charter Schools and Edu- cation Reform in Massachusetts,” and “Spreading the Wealth: Economic Part- nership and Community Development.” She is also author of the book Commu- nity Builders: A Tale of Neighborhood Mobilization in Two Cities (1996) and coeditor of the book Community Politics and Policy (1999). MEREDITH W. WATTS is a professor of political science at the University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee. His most recent books include Xenophobia in United Germany (1997) and the edited volume Cross-Cultural Perspectives on Youth and Violence (1998). Recent work has also included research on ethnocentrism and democratic values among Japanese youth and a current study of commu- nity-based human rights organizations. THE AUTHORS 573 AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTISTLevin, Rabrenovic / INTRODUCTION Hate Crimes and Ethnic Conflict An Introduction JACK LEVIN GORDANA RABRENOVIC Burdick Center on Violence and Conflict, Northeastern University This issue of American Behavioral Scientist includes articles contributed by many of the leading figures in hate crime research from sociology, law, political science, and criminal justice who have investigated the problem of bias and vio- lence in the United States and around the world. Our comparative perspective therefore encompasses a broad range of conflicts and countries including Gypsies in Europe, skinhead violence in Germany, civil war in Northern Ireland and Yugoslavia, genocide in Rwanda, and hate crimes in the United States. In November 1998, the Brudnick Center on Violence and Conflict at North- eastern University sponsored an International Conference on Hate Crimes, whose participants came from a number of different countries including North- ern Ireland, England, Hungary, Germany, and the United States. The partici- pants were subsequently asked to write papers addressing certain themes about hate crimes and ethnic conflict that emerged during the conference proceedings. A guiding theme for this issue of ABS is the manner in which hate crimes can escalate into widespread intergroup conflict. We address this relationship, first, by emphasizing the distinction between individual-level variables involved in hate crimes and the sociocultural bases for ethnic conflict and, sec- ond, by suggesting how individual hate crimes and large-scale ethnic violence are related. In the process, we also summarize the suggestions for reducing hate and conflict—psychological, social, and legal—discussed in the articles prepared for this issue. HATE CRIMES AND ETHNIC VIOLENCE IN THE UNITED STATES Behavioral scientists have long recognized the individual as a “silent partner” in any process of social change (Allport, 1954). Important structural alterations 574 AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST, Vol. 45 No. 4, December 2001 574-587 © 2001 Sage Publications are aided, if not made possible, by the presence of a sufficient number of individ- uals in a society who are willing to accept or at least not actively oppose signifi- cant change. In addition to coercive policies, social structure depends for its maintenance and modification on the conformity and obedience of the members of society. Without their personal support for change, maintenance of the status quo is more likely; in the absence of support for the status quo, terrorism, civil war, and revolution become more probable. Less obvious, however, is the fact that not all structural change takes the form of pervasive social phenomena. More typically, what begins as individual action is transformed into large-scale social process. The behavior of merely a few members of society has been known to provoke massive modifications in social, economic, and political relations. In the relationship between hate crimes and ethnic conflict, we see clearly the important contribution made by individual conduct to the development of group action. When they are allowed to go unchecked and unpunished, incidents of hate and bigotry can easily become part of a vicious cycle of violence that spirals out of control and ultimately escalates into pervasive intergroup hostilities. This relationship is most likely to occur in hate crimes motivated by ven- geance, where the commission of an offense against a group is regarded as so egregious, so sinister and unjustified, that it inspires “the other side” to get even with the perpetrator by indiscriminately targeting for revenge any member of the perpetrator’s group. The vicious cycle of vengeance may not be broken until for- mal authority has intervened in an effective manner or until all-out warfare has occurred. Moreover, hate crimes that go unchallenged implicitly send a message of support and encouragement to those who would perpetrate violence in the future. An appropriate example of the escalation from hate crimes to ethnic conflict can be found in the Crown Heights section of New York City, which has long had a history of hostility between its Black and Jewish neighbors. In August 1991, a 7-year-old Black child, Gavin Cato, was killed as a result of an accident involv- ing an Orthodox Jewish motorist, whose car had jumped the curb. In retaliation, Black youngsters raced through the streets of Crown Heights, shouting anti-Semitic epithets and threats. Shortly thereafter, a 29-year-old rabbinical student from Australia who just happened to be in the wrong place at the wrong time and was totally unconnected to the accident was stabbed to death. For the better part of a week, Blacks and Jews exchanged insults, broke windows in homes and cars, and threw bottles and rocks at one another. Before the melee finally came to an end, dozens more were injured (Levin & McDevitt, 1993). Intergroup incidents do not always precipitate the sort of warfare associated with Crown Heights and, in certain cases, may even facilitate reconciliation and cooperation between groups. In sharp contrast to the massive outbreak of vio- lence in Crown Heights, community responses were far more muted and reason- able in the aftermath of a vicious 1998 racial incident in the city of Jasper, Texas. James Byrd, a Black resident of this east Texas community of some 9,000, was Levin, Rabrenovic / INTRODUCTION 575 dragged to his death down a rocky country road behind a pickup truck driven by three White supremacists. The perpetrators, who had met in prison and were linked with the Ku Klux Klan, seemed to be sending a message to every Black person in town: Namely, get out of town before the same thing happens to you! Rather than divide the community on racial grounds, however, the murder of James Byrd actually served to bring the Black and White residents of Jasper together. In the aftermath of the slaying, townspeople reported going out of their way to cross racial lines in greeting residents and feeling a new street-level friendliness toward members of the other race. Following the trial and conviction of the first defendant, his father phoned the local radio station not to hurl racial accusations but to urge townspeople to “fill the void made by his mess with love and tolerance” (Shlachter, 1999). Just as in Crown Heights, Blacks and Whites in Jasper had not always been sympathetic toward one another. One issue that had long symbolized the com- munity’s struggle with race relations was the town’s cemetery, where a fence down the middle separated Whites buried on one side from Blacks buried on the other. After Byrd’s murder, however, the town came to an agreement to integrate its cemetery. Many residents of Jasper, Black and White, joined together to pull out the posts and tear down the fence (Labalme, 1999, p. B1). In Crown Heights, mistrust and suspicion were palpable on both sides of the racial ledger. Many Black residents were convinced that the motorist who hit the Black child would get off scot-free due to the perception that Jewish residents enjoyed special treatment from city officials. At the same time, Jewish residents of Crown Heights were certain that the Black mayor of New York City would do little if anything to bring the murderer of the Australian rabbinical student to justice. By contrast, the political leaders in Jasper had strong credibility among both its Black and its White residents. Local government had long been racially inte- grated. Black residents, who composed some 45% of the town’s population, occupied the position of mayor, two of the five city council positions, and the directorship of the Deep East Texas Council of Governments. In addition, school principals and the administrator of the largest hospital were Black. Jasper’s White sheriff went out of his way to inspire confidence among Black residents in the aftermath of Byrd’s slaying. Within 24 hours, he had arrested two suspects and then immediately requested the assistance of the FBI. More- over, Jasper’s local 6,000-watt radio station kept residents informed in an even-handed way about developments related to the murder and the trials, ensur- ing that racially dangerous rumors and anxieties never had an opportunity to spread (Shlachter, 1999). Another important difference between the racial incidents in Crown Heights and Jasper, Texas, involves their residents’ degree of community identification. In Crown Heights, identification seemed primarily to be based on race (“the Black community”), religion (“the Jewish community”), or a shared sense of being part of the much larger New York City population. In this regard, the 576 AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST Crown Heights neighborhood was almost irrelevant. By contrast, Jasper, Texas, represented a primary source of community identity for Black and White resi- dents alike. Even extremists on both sides of the racial ledger were genuinely embarrassed by the cruelty and sadism of James Byrd’s murder. They seemed to unite across racial lines against the very strong stigma imposed on their commu- nity by members of the outside world. ESCALATION OF HATE CRIMES Behavioral scientists have long known that intergroup hostility escalates as a result of increasing intergroup contact, especially in the form of competition for scarce resources (Sherif & Sherif, 1961). Research conducted by The Chicago Reporter (Gordon & Pardo, 1997) suggests that Chicago-area suburbs with growing minority populations have recently experienced increasing numbers of hate offenses against Blacks and Latinos. In many previously all-White subur- ban communities, minorities have reached a critical mass, causing White resi- dents to feel threatened by the influx of newcomers. This seems to be the point at which hate crimes escalate. Those who argue that hate crimes have increased over the past 20 years also note that intergroup competition has been on the rise (Olzak, Shanahan, & McEneaney, 1996). Whether or not economically based, growing threats to the advantaged majority group since the early 1980s may have inspired a rising tide of hate incidents directed against members of challenging groups. Over the past two decades, there have been dramatic increases in interfaith and interrace dat- ing and marriage; migration, especially from Latin America and Asia; newly integrated neighborhoods, schools, college dormitories, and workplaces; and gay men and lesbians coming out (and, in many cases, organizing on behalf of their shared interests). Green, Strolovitch, and Wong (1997) have shown that hate crimes occur most frequently in “defended” White neighborhoods—that is, in predominantly White areas that have experienced an in-migration of minorities. Extending Green et al.’s concept of defended neighborhood to a broader range of perpetra- tors, victims, and situations, it appears that hate violence is likely to occur wher- ever the advantaged or protected status of a group is being threatened—on the block, in the office, or on campus. Under such conditions, offenders seek to reduce a perceived threat by attacking outsiders who have dared to challenge their “birthright.” If the initial hate crime does not succeed in removing the threat, then perpetrators may decide to escalate their attacks until they have achieved their objective. Meredith Watts shows that in Germany the targets of violence have remained relatively constant since 1990. The majority of victims (60%) are foreigners. The perpetrators, young males ages 16 to 30, usually acting in groups, react Levin, Rabrenovic / INTRODUCTION 577 “defensively” to structural changes, stress in employment markets, and a signifi- cant influx of people perceived as foreigners. A different sort of escalation is possible in thrill hate crimes, wherein groups of youthful offenders—to gain some vague sense of their own importance and bragging rights with their friends—seek to victimize the members of a degraded group. They go out with their friends on a Saturday night, looking for the enemy to bash. Their sadistic treatment of victims represents an attempt to feel a sense of power and superiority (Levin & McDevitt, 1993). In thrill-motivated hate crimes, the teenagers or young adults who attack tend to be marginalized young people who may not be getting along at home with their parents and are not doing well at school with their peers. They are totally unsophisticated with respect to the ideology of hate but gain from their violence by feeling a sense of power and belonging that seemed out of their grasp when they behaved themselves and respected people who were different from them. The psychological basis for thrill hate crimes is emphasized in the tendency of perpetrators to adopt the symbols of power associated with organized hate groups. They wear the Nazi uniforms, the swastikas, the White power tattoos. As hate crimes are transformed into intergroup violence, those youngsters who perpetrate thrill hate offenses can easily become the foot soldiers for a ter- rorist group or a revolutionary movement. According to Meredith Watts, the vast majority of German citizens who attacked immigrants and minorities in the 1990s after reunification were under the age of 20—they were teenagers driven more by personal misery than by political ideology. In contrast to their counter- parts operating during the 1980s, fewer had ties to organized hate groups or were sophisticated with respect to Nazi ideology. Data from the United States show a similar trend. In the United States, less than 5% of all hate crimes are mission hate offenses committed by the members of organized hate groups who make a career of expressing their bigotry. Yet, the influence of the perpetrators of mission offenses is much greater than their small numbers might suggest. Most of the young people who commit thrill and defensive hate violence may not be con- nected to organized hate groups, but they are certainly inspired by (and some- times trained by) hardened hatemongers. The large and rapidly growing number of hate Web sites has greatly expanded the influence of White supremacist groups who, with minimal economic and human resources, are now able to reach thousands of alienated youngsters searching for company. HATE CRIMES AND ETHNIC CONFLICT IN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE The most common basis for hate crimes is the animosity that develops between people based on their race, ethnicity, or religion. In times of economic instability, structural changes, or political turmoil, the members of the majority 578 AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST group often react to a real or perceived threat to their position in society by turn- ing against the members of minority groups in their midst. Operating under a zero-sum definition of the situation (i.e., someone else’s loss is viewed as a per- sonal gain), they try to limit the minority’s civil rights and access to their coun- try’s economic resources. The inability of the formal governing structures to protect the human rights of all residents and to address growing social inequali- ties becomes the root cause of many ethnic conflicts. In their extreme forms, such conflicts can lead to expelling and executing minority group members for the purpose of creating ethnically homogeneous societies. Ethnic cleansing and civil war in the former Yugoslavia provide an appropri- ate example of how an escalation of ethnic conflict can be used to impose such an outcome. Post–Second World War Yugoslavia was built based on the ideal of an integrated and ethnically diverse society. However, economic and political crises of the late 1980s challenged this ideal to the extent that incidents of ethnic hatred that had been previously punishable by law were now officially ignored. An increasing number of such incidents reflected a weakening of the social order and of the ideology of ethnic coexistence. The lack of formal response by the police and the courts further undermined the social order by decreasing the average citizen’s trust in the legal system as well as the belief that justice would prevail. Furthermore, the inability of the existing party leaders and the federal government to come up with solutions for the troubled Yugoslavian economy created a power vacuum. By offering solutions to the country’s problems, ethnic leaders emerged who promoted intergroup fears and hatred. Minorities were identified as a threat to the stability and safety of the majority group. Ethnic con- flict thus developed as a part of the process of increased discrimination against minority residents. Multiethnic societies are faced with the problem of how to balance human rights with ethnic rights. Human rights are often defined as individual, citizen- ship rights that theoretically apply to each and every member of society, whereas ethnic rights refer to the special prerogatives granted to a minority group to address its particular needs. Increasing numbers of governments are paying attention to handling intergroup relations by recognizing minority rights and by making special provisions for them. International organizations such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Council of Europe are also actively promoting standards that enhance minority rights such as to “prohibit forced assimilation and population transfers, endorse autonomy for minorities within existing states, and acknowledge that minority claims are legitimate subjects of international discussion at both U.N. [United Nations] and European regional organizations” (Gurr, 2000, p. 55). Ethnic conflict often has its roots in the inability of government to first legiti- mate and then recognize and protect minority rights. Yugoslavia, again, is a good example. In postcommunist Yugoslavia, members of the Albanian minor- ity group lost most of their ethnic rights when Slobodan Milosevic came into power. To consolidate his absolute power and control, Milosevic exploited Levin, Rabrenovic / INTRODUCTION 579 Serbian fears and grievances against Albanians. At the same time, there is also evidence that the Serbian population might—under different circumstances— have supported a more peaceful solution to the problem of majority-minority relations. In 1996, the Helsinki Committee conducted a public opinion poll of 500 Ser- bian respondents on their views of human rights for the ethnic minorities in their country. The question posed was, Should Serbs in Serbia have more rights than members of other ethnic groups? The majority of Serbs (54%) responded by rejecting the unequal treatment of other ethnic groups. More troubling for achieving resolution of ethnic conflict minorities, however, was the finding that 40% of the respondents thought that the members of the majority group should be granted more rights than their minority counterparts. Further results of the poll showed that Serbs were more willing to give minorities some group rights, such as the right to practice their own religion, conduct cultural manifestations, publish their own newspapers, and even have education institutions in their own language. But, the same set of respondents was also against giving minority resi- dents the right to use their own language in formal institutions and local govern- ment, even in the regions where they were in the majority, and in political organi- zations. Serbian respondents saw such rights as potentially destabilizing for the nation as a whole. However, most respondents (72.6%) thought that increasing the standard of living for all residents would decrease tension among ethnic groups. Also, more than a third (37%) thought that the ethnic conflict might be solved by giving minority groups all of the rights enjoyed by other citizens. Therefore, we can see that a large number of respondents provided support for policies that promote accommodation instead of prolonged conflict. At the same time, 29% of the respondents also thought that the solution to ethnic conflict could be secured by encouraging members of the minority group in a peaceful way, to leave the country, and 8% supported the forceful resettlement of minority residents. These results support the argument for an early intervention: The longer the ten- sion between democratic and antidemocratic tendencies is allowed to go unre- solved, the less likely is any chance to come up with a peaceful and democratic solution. How does a country move from peaceful coexistence to ethnic war? Within the Yugoslavian context, the mass media played an important role in promoting ethnic hatred in general and the ethnic rhetoric of nationalistic parties in particu- lar. Although opposition newspapers and radio stations existed, they were no match for the well supported official media. National television stations, for example, broadcast images of suffering members of their own ethnic group, without mentioning the suffering of others. Newspapers published the stories that documented abuses of “their” people at the hands of others, without refer- ring to the abuses to others tolerated or promoted in their own states. Also com- pletely missing from the ethnic rhetoric were examples of cooperation and peaceful coexistence among different ethnic groups in the country. 580 AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST Margaret Brearley’s analysis of the persecution of Gypsies in Europe brings together several of the themes we have mentioned here. The worsening of eco- nomic conditions and political instability in countries of central and eastern Europe where the Roma are a minority group has helped to turn this minority into a national scapegoat, explaining all of society’s ills. Moreover, renewed nationalistic ideologies have helped to channel the displaced hostility of a frus- trated population toward this stigmatized ethnic group. Consequently, the Roma have faced increased discrimination by both national governments and local authorities in places where they reside. They are often victimized by a hostile media, widespread personal hatred, and violence perpetrated by lynch mobs, skinheads, and the police. In addition, when the Roma have sought to flee the danger, they have frequently been denied safe havens as refugees. Even interna- tional organizations often fail to step up and protect them, as the most recent example of continuous harassment and attacks against Roma in Kosovo shows. The limitation of international organizations to resolve and prevent ethnic conflict is the topic of Eric Berman’s article on Rwanda. As a member of the UN International Commission of Inquiry, he provides a firsthand account of the lim- its of this international body to intervene in ethnic conflict. He shows that although it was well aware of unfolding atrocities, the international community did little to stop them. Moreover, when external pressure was finally brought to bear, it was mostly too little too late. In his documentation of the work of the International Commission of Inquiry, Berman shows that without adequate funding and the political will to support UN resolutions, there is very little that this organization can do to prevent atrocities from occurring. POLITICIZING HATE CRIMES A recent article in Foreign Affairs argues that contrary to popular beliefs, there has been a sharp decline in new ethnic wars. Moreover, most such conflicts get resolved not through large-scale physical confrontation but by means of a political process involving accommodation and negotiation (Gurr, 2000, p. 52). It should be noted, in addition, that the success of strategies for the avoidance of warfare depends also on the ability of national governments and their legal sys- tems to recognize hate crimes as precursors of worse things to come and early enough to develop strategies to address them. In recognizing the political functions of hate crimes, we move our analysis from interpreting hate crimes as individual and personal conflicts to regarding them as political acts. Roger Mac Ginty’s article provides evidence for this posi- tion by analyzing examples from deeply divided societies such as Northern Ire- land, South Africa, and Israel/Palestine. He compares what he calls “ethno-national” conflicts with individual acts of hate crimes. Violent conflicts that develop in deeply divided societies, he argues, are carried out by paramili- tary organizations. The level of violence in these conflicts varies in scale, Levin, Rabrenovic / INTRODUCTION 581 complexity, intensity, longevity, the actors involved, and tactics used. However, most of these conflicts are characterized by low-level violence, which Mac Ginty argues is similar in form to hate crimes. Although particular violent incidents are part of a wider conflict, they are perceived by victims as though they constituted individual and isolated hate attacks exclusively against them. Structural factors regulate the level and visibility of hate crimes. Ethno-national violence develops in cycles. Certain stages in a cycle of conflict are especially likely to provide opportunities for hate crimes to develop. What is more, the control of hate crimes in deeply divided societies is based on a high degree of ethnic segregation. Because residents live in sharply delineated areas, there is little daily contact between warring parties of a cooperative or friendly nature that might reduce the sanctioning of hate and bigotry. Another important factor in controlling hate crimes is the paramilitary monopolization of conflict. Intergroup hostilities are frequently regulated by nonstate militant organizations, whose leaders do not regard hate crimes as the most efficient way for realizing their goals. Indeed, reliance on an unsystemati- cally carried-out agenda of hate attacks could, from a paramilitary perspective, even be counterproductive because they can be interpreted as individual and per- sonal rather than a part of political process. Mac Ginty argues, however, that hate crimes increase during peace pro- cesses. Because a primary motivation for ethnic violence is to instill fear, there is often an intensification of the violence meant to exacerbate the fear of political change so long as the process of peace negotiations continues. Hate crimes then become part of a political strategy. They are carried out by individuals or groups of individuals rather than by paramilitary organizations. The timing of much of hate crime incidents is deliberate. It often coincides with major political devel- opments. Mac Ginty warns us that an inflated governmental response to these isolated incidents may give those individuals and groups engaged in hate crimes the legitimacy they crave. Thus, all hate crimes are potentially political. The key difference between hate crimes in the United States and ethnic violence carried out by paramilitary groups in deeply divided societies lies in the context in which the violence takes place and the manner in which the motivation for the violence is articulated. Another interpretation of violence comes from Debra Kaufman’s article. Her examination of violence, gender, and the Holocaust uses role analysis and sociocultural and structural level analyses to explain violent behavior. Gender role theory, she argues, helps us to empirically locate many of the issues neglected or simply unobserved in the study of war. Before we can sociologi- cally understand violent behavior, we must learn how to identify it in all of its dimensions—when it begins, when it ends, where the geographic and time boundaries are, who are the perpetrators, and who are the victims. By showing that hate-motivated violence is multidimensional, Kaufman’s analysis chal- lenges the gender neutral treatment of Holocaust victims and further supports Mac Ginty’s argument that hate crimes are politically motivated rather than 582 AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST merely an end in themselves, that is, hate for hate’s sake. It also deepens our understanding of public and private spheres of life and expands what we mean by victims, survivors, and resisters. LEGAL INTERPRETATION OF HATE CRIMES The persistent question that proponents of hate crime laws face is whether we need to maintain hate crimes as a separate legal category. Although in the United States 41 states have hate crime statutes covering race and religion, the legiti- macy of hate crimes as a legal category is still being contested. To understand these challenges, we need to understand the process under which hate crime laws have emerged. Grattet and Jenness’s article examines the social processes that led to the development and institutionalization of hate crimes as a domain of public policy. To bring the issue of discriminatory violence into public con- sciousness, the authors argue, social movement organizations such as the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) and the Southern Poverty Law Center first had to construct the problem of hate-motivated violence. It was at this point in time that the politicians, the courts, and law enforcement officials had to get involved in the process of defining the policy parameters of hate crimes to investigate and prosecute them. In 1981, the ADL drafted a model hate crimes law. Race-, religion-, and ethnicity-based violence were institutionalized as legitimate subjects for federal discrimination legislation. Over time, however, the concept of hate crimes was expanded to include gender, sexual orientation, and disability status. Based on 1999 federal hate crime statistics, there where 7,876 criminal incidents moti- vated by hate or bias, overall. Of these, 4,295 or 56.3% were based on the vic- tim’s race, 1,411 or 16.5% on religion, 1,317 or 16% on sexual orientation, and 829 or 10.9% on ethnicity (FBI, 1999). Based on FBI data, therefore, we see that sexual orientation may actually be outpacing ethnicity as an important source of hate crimes in the United States. Grattet and Jenness also address some of the major criticisms of hate crime laws, such as the contention that hate crimes represent such a subjective and vague concept that trying to litigate in the hate crime area will inevitably lead to a waste of legal resources. The authors show instead that the ambiguity of the hate crime concept has diminished over time. In fact, Grattet and Jenness argue that it is the “newness” of the concept and not its inherent ambiguity that has cre- ated implementation problems. Brian Levin, on the other hand, addresses another concern about hate crime laws, mainly whether they punish speech (intimidation and harassment) rather than conduct. Levin situates his analysis within a discussion of the First Amend- ment to the Constitution of the United States. The legal issues that he examines are the legal protection of speech and various types of associations, militias and gun rights, civil lawsuits against hate groups, hate crime laws, and the Internet. It Levin, Rabrenovic / INTRODUCTION 583 is clear from Levin’s analysis that the First Amendment plays a much larger role in framing America’s legal response to hate than is the case in European coun- tries where hate speech is unprotected by law. ARE HATE CRIMES DIFFERENT FROM ORDINARY CRIMES? The second most asked question about hate crimes involves whether they are actually separate and distinct from other criminal incidents. The proponents of hate crime legislation challenge the arguments put forward by critics of hate crime laws, mainly that the consequences of such offenses for their victims are essentially the same as the consequences of offenses not motivated by hate or bias. McDevitt et al. and Iganski provide strong empirical evidence for the argu- ment that hate or bias crimes are actually more damaging to their victims, who tend to suffer greater trauma and more serious psychological effects. McDevitt and his collaborators based their study on a survey of victims of both bias and nonbias aggravated assaults in the city of Boston. The authors compiled information about the psychological and behavioral impact of violent crime victimization based on a mail survey instrument. The findings of their study show that the victims of hate crimes reported significantly greater psycho- logical consequences of their victimization experience, including a higher level of intrusive thoughts, feelings of lack of safety, nervousness, and depression, in comparison with other victims of assault. Complementing McDevitt et al.’s quantitative analysis, Paul Iganski’s article offers qualitative data on the same subject. Iganski addresses the question of the justification or logic of punishing the bias motivation underlying hate crimes when the law largely protects this type of speech. Bias crimes, argues Iganski, are qualitatively different from the same act lacking the same motivation. His research data come from in-depth interviews with “elite” informants, the indi- viduals who were actively involved in policy debates and policy activity on hate crimes. Most of the respondents believed that hate crimes are distinct from simi- lar offenses because of the greater harm they inflict on their victims. Because punishment is assigned based on harm, hate crime legislation does not infringe on an individual’s rights of speech or freedom of thought. The need to react more strongly to bias crime than to similar non-hate-moti- vated offenses is also defended by the argument that the punishment of a bias crime also sends a message to members of the offender’s group. As one respon- dent in Iganski’s study argued, by punishing bias crime more severely, the vic- tim’s group is sending back a message to the perpetrator’s group that “we’re not going to stand for this; you’re going to suffer as we did” (p. 630). Therefore, the crime could not be ignored as an isolated incident. Both McDevitt and his collaborators and Iganski argue that hate crimes are also more harmful to the social fabric of the society than comparable crimes 584 AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST without a bias motive. This is due to victim interchangeability. That is, victims are chosen strictly because of their membership in a particular group and not necessarily because of any prior actions they may have taken. Hate crimes also show a greater capacity for producing secondary victimization among the vic- tim’s family and community. And finally, hate crimes have the power to escalate from individual acts of violence to large-scale social conflict. Here again, we see a close connection between hate crimes and ethnic hostilities. RESPONDING TO HATE CRIMES AND ETHNIC VIOLENCE The articles in this issue show that the problems of hate crimes and ethnic vio- lence are not easy to resolve. They require long-term commitment and support by individual citizens, national governments, and international organizations. Some promising signs to this end are discussed in Gurr’s (2000) recent article in Foreign Affairs. The decline of ethnic conflict, he argues, can be attributed to several new developments. First, Gurr sees an increased willingness of govern- ments of multiethnic societies to protect the collective rights of minority groups. Second, he argues there has been an increased democratization of many societ- ies and growing presence of institutional means that allow minority groups to secure their rights and pursue their collective interests. Gurr’s third reason for the decline of ethnic conflict involves the expanding use of the principle accord- ing to which disputes over self-determination are best settled not by physical force but by negotiation and mutual accommodation (p. 58). There is a need for more studies to document these processes and to show how and under which conditions ethnic conflict gets resolved using peaceful means. How are we to explain, for example, why Bulgaria—notwithstanding its proximity to the former Yugoslavia, a potentially explosive ethnic mix, and an impoverished economy—represents the only country in the Balkans that has escaped serious internal conflict? There is also the question of how to achieve postconflict reconciliation. For societies such as Rwanda and Yugoslavia that experience violent conflict, the process of reestablishing the norms of civil society, human rights, and legal envi- ronment is a difficult task. It will require the development of an independent judicial system, a constitution that will guarantee rights of minorities including their equal access to media, and the institutionalization of civil standards for engaging in public discourse. However, there will be no lasting peace among former enemies if they do not confront the past. Truth and reconciliation pro- grams that are supported by grassroots and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in many former conflict areas are an important component of the heal- ing process. Reconciliation is only possible when people know the truth, and their dignity as human beings is restored. Levin, Rabrenovic / INTRODUCTION 585 The role of NGOs in rebuilding postwar societies is well documented. Such organizations have been involved in strengthening the fabric of civil society and in fostering social, economic, and cultural development. Mostly women-led, NGOs are especially important in this process because they have a track record of crossing ethnic boundaries and getting together the opposing groups around shared issues, such as community development, provision of local services, and peace work. The involvement of women in these organizations increases their economic and political role and leads to greater gender equality. This is impor- tant because societies that have greater gender equality are less likely to milita- rize again. The danger to women is, however, that in peace times women are often pushed back into their homes and out of the more public roles that they have assumed during the armed conflict. And finally, because we live in a more connected world, the boundaries between national and international responsibilities are often blurred. As Meredith Watts shows, for example, the suppression of hate literature by one nation is not, in times of global electronic networks, a solution to the problem of ethnic conflict and hate. According to the Wiesenthal Center, there are currently more than 2,000 groups on the Internet that promote anti-Semitism or White supremacist messages. Similarly, Internet-based auction houses sell Ku Klux Klan and Nazi paraphernalia, and booksellers offer hate literature including The Turner Diaries and Mein Kampf (Guernsey, 2000, p. G1). National Web sites that reach an international audience are no match for any nation’s policy of for- mal prohibition and restriction. There has been some effort to regulate Internet content. Most recently, a judge in France ordered Yahoo, an Internet provider from the United States, to block access to Nazi material from its sites available to French citizens. This case opened for scrutiny a new area of legal discussion regarding the connection between freedom of speech and globalization. Some of the questions asked are, “How will the Internet coexist with different countries’ standards of free expres- sion? What, if anything, can or will countries do to block speech that they don’t like?” (Kaplan, 2000). To this point, Internet providers have refused to monitor these hate sites or to take responsibility for their content. Some legal scholars think that this is the wrong strategy. For example, instead of focusing on Internet providers, argues Alan Davidson, a lawyer for the Center for Democracy and Technology, “the focus should be on the end user, so residents of France, for example, would be punished for gaining access to illegal material in their coun- try” (Guernsey, 2000, p. G1). Internet providers, though, are willing to engage in discussions as to how to respond to hate content and to act on complaints by other organizations. This willingness shows that even here, the processes of negotiation and accommodation might represent an effective strategy. The focus on hate speech on the Internet, however, obscures more dangerous developments in Europe. The increase of extremist groups such as racist skin- heads in Germany and Le Pen’s nativist constituency in France suggests the uneasiness of residents with the growing number of immigrants on their soil. 586 AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST Moreover, at the same time that the European Union is making many national borders absolute, there is also growing fear that individual countries will lose their national identities. In such a climate, anti-immigrant outbursts in the form of vicious hate attacks are becoming more frequent. Although they are, for the most part, still isolated incidents, they are increasingly troublesome. Many European countries still have a long way to go in terms of helping to integrate newcomers into their societies. An important first step might be to grant them easier access to citizenship. REFERENCES Allport, G. W. (1954). The nature of prejudice. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. Federal Bureau of Investigation. (1999). Hate crime statistics. Washington, DC: Government Print- ing Office. Gordon, D., & Pardo, N. (1997, September). Hate crimes strike changing suburbs. The Chicago Reporter, p. 1. Green, D. P., Strolovitch, D. Z., & Wong, J. S. (1997, June 23). Defended neighborhoods, integra- tion, and hate crime. Unpublished manuscript, Yale University, Institution for Social and Policy Studies. Guernsey, L. (2000, November 30). Mainstream sites serve as portals to hate. The New York Times, p. G1. Gurr, T. R. (2000, May/June). Ethnic warfare on the wane. Foreign Affairs, 79(3), 52-64. Kaplan, S. C. (2000, December 22). The year in technology law [Online]. The New York Times. Labalme, J. (1999, November 17). Discussion focuses on hate crimes. Indianapolis Star, p. B1. Levin, J., & McDevitt, J. (1993). Hate crimes: The rising tide of bigotry and bloodshed. New York: Plenum. Olzak, S., Shanahan, S., & McEneaney, E. H. (1996, August). Poverty, segregation, and race riots: 1960 to 1993. American Sociological Review, 61(4), 590-613. Sherif, M., & Sherif, C. (1961). Intergroup conflict and cooperation: The Robbers Cave experiment. Norman: University of Oklahoma. Shlachter, B. (1999, February 27). Jasper breathes a sigh of relief [Online]. Fort Worth Star-Telegram. Levin, Rabrenovic / INTRODUCTION 587 AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTISTBrearley / PERSECUTION OF GYPSIES The Persecution of Gypsies in Europe MARGARET BREARLEY Advisor on the Holocaust to the Archbishops’ Council of the Church of England Roma/Gypsies, nomads newly arrived in Europe in the 1400s, endured expulsions, forcible removal of children, servitude in galleys or mines, death sentences for being Gypsy, and absolute slavery in the Balkans from the 16th century onward. Persecution stemmed from highest authorities in State and Church. Following the murder of 200,000 to 500,000 Roma in the Holocaust, persecution persists, especially in Central and Eastern Europe where Roma form up to 10% of population (Bulgaria, Slovakia, Romania). Discriminated against under communism, their plight has dramatically worsened since 1989. Endemic problems (low life expectancy, high illiteracy, dire poverty, poor housing) are now heightened by mas- sive, disproportionate unemployment. Unprecedented persecution has been unleashed by new state nationalism and easing of censorship. Roma are the new scapegoat for post-Com- munist society’s ills. The media commonly stigmatize Roma. Few countries have created laws to protect Roma rights. Some activists fear a potential genocide if conditions worsen. The 600-year sojourn of Gypsies in Europe has been hallmarked by repeated acts of hatred against them, as Grattan Puxon (1987) noted: “The history of the Romani people is a story of relentless persecution. From the Middle Ages to the present day, they have been the target of racial discrimination and outright geno- cide” (p. 1). Since 1987, the situation of Gypsies throughout Europe has deteriorated sharply.1 Numbering 7 to 9 million, they are Europe’s largest and, after the Jews, arguably the second oldest minority. They are now the most persecuted minority by far. Leading Rom activists argue that Roma are, post-1989, in a similar situa- tion to that of Jews in 1937 (Gheorghe, 1992a; Holl, 1993; cf. Margalit, 1996); they face mounting oppression in their own countries, yet if they seek to flee as refugees, other nations close the doors to any possible escape. EARLY HISTORY IN EUROPE2 Roma migrated from India some time before 1000 A.D., moving slowly west- wards. They settled in the Balkans by the 14th century and reached all major west European cities by the 15th century. The initial response to these dark-skinned and exotic nomads was often antagonistic but sometimes warm, 588 AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST, Vol. 45 No. 4, December 2001 588-599 © 2001 Sage Publications both among local populations and church and secular authorities. During the 16th century, however, attitudes hardened. The church feared the very popular- ity of Gypsy fortune-telling and healing and began spreading anti-Gypsy propa- ganda. Early agrarian capitalism and war forced many non-Gypsies to become homeless beggars; harsh legislation against all vagabonds was passed through- out western Europe and had a major impact on Gypsies. They became outlaws. In many countries, including England under Henry VIII, it became a capital offence to be a Rom. If caught, a Rom could be tortured, flogged, branded, and banished. If caught a second time, the penalty was death for men and women. In some countries such as the Netherlands, organized Gypsy hunts became fash- ionable. Male Gypsies could be sent to the royal galleys, chained as oarsmen for decades or even for life. In Hungary, Germany, Spain, and England, Gypsy chil- dren as young as 2 or 4 were taken by force and given to non-Gypsies to rear. (This may well be the source of the myth that Gypsies steal non-Gypsy children. Gypsies are passionately devoted parents and often sought to steal away their own children.) It is noteworthy that this hatred did not stem primarily from local popula- tions, who have traditionally valued Roma for their peripatetic services; techni- cal skills, such as weaving, smelting, basket-making, and expertise with horses; and facility in music and dance. On the contrary, what has been called “sustained genocidal persecution” of Roma stemmed from the highest authorities, from kings and popes. Nobles and magistrates were forbidden to shelter Gypsies on pain of losing their titles and lands. Pope Pius V tried to expel all Gypsies from the domain of the Catholic Church, prompting Spain, Portugal, and France to start shipping Roma to Africa and America as slaves. In large parts of eastern Europe—especially in what is now Romania—Gypsies were enslaved by princes and monasteries from the 14th century onwards; they were freed from the most abject and cruel slavery only in the 1860s, long after slavery had been abolished in the West Indies. During the 18th century, efforts to exterminate or expel Gypsies were gradu- ally replaced by forcible assimilation and eradication of the Romany language and identity. Measures were still brutal: forcible settlement of nomadic Roma, forcible seizure of children by the state (this continued in Switzerland until 1973), and imprisonment simply for being Gypsy. In Spain, all male Roma were sent to prisons or mercury mines for up to 16 years; many died. In the 19th century, persecution of Roma diminished, due partly to Enlighten- ment notions of tolerance and scholarly interest in Romani language, music, and culture and partly to romantic interest in the Gypsy as “noble savage.” However, the Aryan racism of Count Gobineau, Richard Wagner, and others, as well as the social Darwinism that grew from this, resulted in Roma being increasingly stig- matized as racially inferior. In 1876, Cesare Lombroso, in L’uomo delinquente, characterized Roma as atavistic and criminal (Fraser, 1992, p. 249). Brearley / PERSECUTION OF GYPSIES 589 PERSECUTION OF ROMA IN 20TH-CENTURY WESTERN EUROPE Germany in particular acted on such distorted concepts. In 1899, the Central Office for Fighting the Gypsy Nuisance was opened in Munich, closing only in 1970. Increasing persecution of Roma throughout Germany culminated in what Roma call the Porrajmos, or “Devouring,”: the Nazi Holocaust. Between 200,000 and half a million Gypsies were murdered by Nazis in extermination camps such as Auschwitz and Treblinka or in their home countries by, among others, Croats, Slovaks, Hungarians, and Romanians (Kenrick, 1994/1995). Many Roma were subjected to inhumane medical experiments or were forcibly sterilized. More than half of all German, Czech, Austrian, Polish, and Latvian Gypsies were killed, whereas nearly all Roma in Belgium, Holland, Croatia, Estonia, and Lithuania were annihilated. Documentation exists showing that one ultimate aim of Nazism was the “complete extermination” of the Roma peo- ple (Kenrick, 1989; Kenrick & Puxon, 1995; Polansky, 1998). Since the Second World War, life has remained hard for Gypsies. In western Europe, nomadism is allowed but has become increasingly difficult because of oppressive laws. Roma generally live in the poorest housing with limited access to health care or education (CDMG, 1995). Policing can be harsh. National leg- islation and local bylaws increasingly restrict Gypsy life. Roma in western Europe are widely subject to harassment and racism and, especially in Germany, Spain, and Italy, have been victims of significant hate crimes during the 1990s. LIVING CONDITIONS OF ROMA IN CONTEMPORARY CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE In central and eastern Europe, however, conditions are much worse. Indeed, they are so bad that the admission of several former Eastern bloc countries into the European Union (EU) may depend in part on their improving the living con- ditions of Roma. In most countries, Roma form a substantial proportion of the population: from more than 5% in Hungary to 9% to 10% in Bulgaria, Slovakia, and Romania.3 Roma are not only one of the largest ethnic minorities but also the most visible one. Their darker complexion renders them instantly recognizable, and they are often referred to contemptuously as “blacks.” Moreover, they are always the poorest and most stigmatized minority, at the very bottom of the social spectrum, with consistently the worst housing, the highest rates of home- lessness, illiteracy rates as high as 60% in some countries, and with life expec- tancy up to a third lower than that of non-Gypsies. Because of their different cultural and linguistic background, Roma children are commonly classified as retarded; in Hungary in the mid-1980s, for example, 36% of all children in “special educational institutions” for “retarded or difficult children” were Gypsies, and 15.2% of all Rom school children were in schools 590 AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST for the handicapped (Crowe, 1995, p. 95). In the Czech Republic, some 20% of Gypsy children are sent to schools for the mentally handicapped (“European Roma rights,” 1997; for a full account, see European Roma Rights Centre [ERRC], 1999); some special schools have between 60% and 90% intake of Roma children (Kenrick, 1998, p. 59). Few Roma children attend secondary school; in Romania, 27% of Roma have never attended school, and only 4.5% have attended secondary school. Most leave school by age 9, and only 51.3% of Roma children under 10 attend school regularly (British Broadcasting Corpora- tion, 1993). Indeed, in many countries, fewer Roma children are in secondary school now than under communism. Their life expectancy rates are far lower than that of the majority populations,4 whereas their unemployment rates in the postcommunist era are far higher.5 PERSECUTION OF ROMA UNDER COMMUNISM AND POSTCOMMUNISM During the 1990s, Roma have become a near-universal scapegoat for the ills of postcommunist society. Renewed nationalistic ideologies have increased hatred of Roma as a stigmatized ethnic group, indeed as a despised caste of vir- tual untouchables. Hundreds of Gypsies have been murdered in racially moti- vated attacks and thousands of their homes destroyed by arson. One direct cause for this outbreak of anti-Gypsy violence is the growing inse- curity and economic hardship of the majority populations. As Professor Netanyahu (1995) stated in his recent book on the origins of the Spanish Inquisi- tion, “The majority’s toleration of every minority lessens with the worsening of the majority’s condition” (p. 5). Under communism, majority intolerance of Roma had been held in check by strong centralized authority and by the institu- tions of a police state. The state itself was intolerant of Gypsy identity: The Romani language was effectively banned, Roma were allowed to form no politi- cal organizations, and from the 1950s, nomadism was forbidden almost every- where. Roma were often compelled to take on a non-Roma identity and new names as, for example, Bulgarians or Albanians. Self-employment was forbid- den and traditional Roma occupations forcibly stopped. Roma were forcibly set- tled into housing, often in poor shanty towns or factory-owned flats. In Czecho- slovakia, thousands of Gypsy women were forcibly sterilized in the 1970s and 1980s (Pellar, 1995; Tritt, 1992, p. x), and many children were placed in orphan- ages. But, although these assimilationist policies aimed at erasing Gypsy iden- tity, they at least guaranteed to Roma some security (Ofner, 1990). Gypsies did have a modicum of health care, education, housing, and regular paid work as skilled or unskilled laborers. Above all, Gypsies were protected from open dis- crimination and violence from the majority population. This protection has now gone. Following 1989, throughout the former com- munist states, the non-Gypsy majority’s condition has worsened; populations Brearley / PERSECUTION OF GYPSIES 591 have faced unprecedented financial insecurity, food shortages, and unemploy- ment. Large-scale crime, corruption, and fraud have increased massively. For- mer members of the nomenclatura and security forces, indigenous mafia gangs, and international crime syndicates are all involved. Existing justice systems are largely powerless to investigate and prosecute major crime. Yet, petty crime by unemployed Roma—and Roma petty crime undoubtedly has increased since 1989 due to increased poverty and high unemployment rates (Pehe, 1993)—is often tackled by mob violence. HATE CRIMES AGAINST ROMA IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE In 1997 in Bulgaria, where Rom unemployment can reach 95% or even 100% (Project on Ethnic Relations [PER], 1998, p. 12) and many Roma receive no welfare benefits, Romani petty thieves suffered lynch justice that would not have been applied to non-Gypsies. Five men and two girls caught trying to steal five lambs were tied to a tractor and beaten by locals; a Rom was tied to a tree for 7 hours for stealing potatoes and onions (The Sofia Echo, 1997). Other Romani petty thieves were publicly caned. In Hungary in 1992, a farmer shot dead two Roma stealing pears (Braham, 1993, pp. 39-40; Crowe, 1995, p. 104). Popular anger against Gypsies can thus serve to deflect widespread popular anger and frustration at less visible—and far more powerful—non-Gypsy criminals. Hatred of Roma, latent but suppressed under communism, can now be expressed openly. This hatred combines racism, contempt for Roma poverty, resentment for perceived past favoritism toward Roma under communism, and newly found nationalism. A leading Rom activist, Nicolae Gheorghe (1992b), has stated, “Before the revolution, only the police were violent to Romanies. Now the whole population can be.” Individual events can trigger disproportion- ately massive hate crimes against Roma. “An individual mugging, rape or knife fight involving a single Rom can result in the burning of many or all houses of the whole Roma community” (Snagov Conference Report, p. 16). The following is one of many examples: In Bolentina, Romania, in 1991, after a Rom allegedly raped a village woman, 1,000 villagers drove 137 Roma families from their homes and burned the houses of 26 families to the ground as “retaliation” (The Times, 1992). Numerous Roma have died in such arson attacks since 1991. Mob violence also occurs in response to actions by the authorities: For exam- ple, when Roma are forcibly resettled, local villagers or townspeople often vio- lently expel them or set fire to Roma housing. During the 1990s, there have been major pogroms against Rom communities in Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, and Romania (where 30 pogroms occurred between 1990 and 1995, involving lynchings, torching of Rom homes, permanent expulsions, and the deaths of sev- eral Roma) (“Lynch Law,” 1994). Local instigators of mob violence are rarely prosecuted; instead, assaults on Roma communities are often blamed on the 592 AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST victims themselves, whereas racial motives for such attacks are consistently denied by the authorities. THE ROLE OF SKINHEADS The main culprits in hate crimes against Roma are, however, skinheads. Organized groups of skinheads now exist in most former communist states. They are relatively few in number (in the Czech Republic only 5,000), but they enjoy considerable support in the wider population. In Hungary, nearly a quarter of a million young Hungarians fully or partly identify with skinheads (Welfare Ministry statistics, as cited in Kovats, 1994, p. 10). Skinheads are well organized both nationally and internationally and have links to far right political parties. Their ideology is openly neo-Nazi, racist, and violent. In their version of “White supremacy,” there is no room for “black” Roma. A widespread skinhead slogan is “Roma to the gas chambers” (European Centre for Research and Action, 1994, p. 19). Although they have murdered Indians, Turks, and other foreigners, the vast majority of their victims have been Gypsies. In the Czech Republic alone, at least nine Roma have been murdered by skinheads since 1991 (Patrin, 1997). Skinheads have killed dozens more in Bulgaria, Serbia, and Slovakia, and many hundreds of Roma have been badly injured in skinhead attacks across cen- tral and eastern Europe (ERRC, 1997b). ROMA VIS-A-VIS CRIMINAL JUSTICE Few of those responsible are ever brought to justice, partly because many skinheads are still in their teens and partly because of the sympathy they enjoy among the wider population and the police. Indeed, some skinheads are them- selves the sons of policemen. When skinheads are occasionally arrested and found guilty, their sentences are always light. Indeed, one can argue that in many former Eastern bloc countries, the justice system itself and especially the police are guilty of hate crimes toward Roma. There is little tradition in former communist countries of neutral policing; police commonly display the same deep prejudices as those of the wider population. Ample evidence now exists of police contempt for Roma, expressed in racist insults and often violent behavior. In countries such as Romania, for example, there are frequent and violent dawn raids on Roma communities using excessive force to instill fear (ERRC, 1996b, pp. 20-44). One consistent hallmark of police hatred is that if Roma victims of a crime go to the police, they are then frequently accused themselves of having committed that or another crime. Thus, the innocent Gypsy victim becomes the guilty party, whereas the non-Gypsy culprit conveniently goes unpunished. In some coun- tries, police boost their incomes by regularly demanding bribes and extortionate Brearley / PERSECUTION OF GYPSIES 593 fines from Roma and by confiscating their property (Helsinki Human Rights Watch Report, 1996a, 1996b, pp. 15-28, 34-37). There is now substantial evidence from several central and eastern European countries of endemic physical abuse, torture, and indeed killings of Roma both in police custody and in prisons (ERRC, 1996b; Helsinki Human Rights Watch Report 1996a, 1996b).6 There are commonly no legal mechanisms for Roma to instigate proceedings against police involved in such violence. Roma through- out central and eastern Europe have a well-justified fear of police and security forces. It is almost universally the case that minor crime committed by Roma is punished overzealously, whereas serious crime against Roma receives little or no punishment. It is commonplace for police, prosecutors, and judges to down- play or outright deny the existence of hate crimes toward Roma. This, in turn, encourages the perpetuation of hate crimes because perpetrators know that they are likely to remain immune from prosecution. POPULAR “ANTI-GYPSYISM” It is clear from recent public opinion polls that hatred of or contempt for Roma is widespread within the populations of former communist countries. In Croatia, for example, the Roma are the most disliked among all 30 ethnic minor- ity groups, whereas in the Czech Republic, 87% of Czechs polled in November 1996 objected to having Roma neighbors, and about 50% wanted to expel Roma from Czech territory (Institute for Jewish Policy Research and American Jewish Committee, 1997, p. 131). These statistics are typical of most countries in the region. On this basis, one could argue that hate crimes against Roma simply reflect a grassroots phenomenon, an innate antipathy to Roma based on racism and fear of “the other.” The situation is, however, far more complex. Anyone who knows the history of anti-Semitism is well aware that anti-Semitism has generally been inculcated from the top down. From Hellenistic times onwards and especially within West- ern Christendom, state legislation, ideological writings by intellectuals, propa- ganda, and inflammatory speeches have all contributed toward the growth of popular anti-Semitism. So it is with what has been called “Romophobia,” hatred of Gypsies. Since 1989, this hatred has been fanned and even taught by some national govern- ments, by many local authorities, by right-wing political parties, and by the media. Any discussion of violent hate crimes against Roma cannot ignore this complicity by those in positions of leadership. STATE LEGISLATION AND ROMA A few governments, such as Hungary and Slovakia, have passed legislation to protect Roma as a national minority, and several others, including Bulgaria, 594 AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST have restored many civil and political rights to Roma. But other governments have legislated to exclude as many Roma as possible. The prime example is that of the Czech Republic; it became known in 1992 that the Czech government had prepared a secret report planning to expel all Gypsies in the Czech Republic to Slovakia. Eventually, prior to the split with Slovakia in 1993, Czechoslovakia created such stringent citizenship laws that more than 100,000 Roma living in the Czech Republic who could not fulfill the criteria were left stateless. They were unable to claim any social security or welfare benefits (Brearley, 1996, pp. 19-20). In 1999, several thousand Roma in the Republic were still stateless. Western governments have followed similar patterns of excluding and then deporting Roma. Between 1991 and 1993, Austria created new asylum and resi- dence laws enabling it to deport large numbers of Roma who had been living legally in Austria for many years, as well as virtually all Roma asylum seekers (ERRC, 1996a). Germany has repatriated tens of thousands of Roma asylum seekers from Romania, Yugoslavia, and elsewhere. Expulsions of Roma at a national level also occur as part of ethnic cleansing; many were deported from Croatia and Bosnia during the recent Balkan wars, during which Roma were forced to clear mine fields and dig frontline trenches (Liegeois & Gheorghe, 1995, p. 18; Official Bulletin of the International Romani Union, 1992, p. 11.XII; The Times, 1994), and in Kosovo, where tens of thousands of Roma had to flee their homes, they were forced to bury corpses. Local authorities can send similar messages of contempt for Gypsies through their own expulsions of Roma. Throughout eastern Europe, large numbers of Roma have been made redundant by state-owned factories and then expelled from urban work-linked flats owned by municipal authorities. Privatization of much of the housing market and the restoration of publicly confiscated land to its former private owners has led to evictions of many Roma families, particu- larly from rural settlements. Some town mayors have intensified local hostility to Roma, in some cases going so far as to build street walls to divide Gypsies from their neighbors, such as in Madrid, 1994, and Usti nad labem, Czech Republic, 1999; or to evict large numbers of Roma (5,000 from the Selamsiz quarter of Istanbul, 1996). ROMA AND THE PUBLIC RHETORIC OF HATE Moreover, the rhetoric of officials in both local and national government can inflame hatred of Roma. Slovakia is a prime example: In 1993, Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar described Roma as “antisocial, mentally backward, unassimil- able and socially unacceptable.” He demanded a reduction in family welfare payments to lower the reproduction of these “mentally retarded” people (Fakete & Webber, 1994). Right-wing political parties, too, are guilty of hate rhetoric. In Italy, where six Roma children have died in hate crimes since 1994 and several others have been Brearley / PERSECUTION OF GYPSIES 595 seriously wounded, a Northern League member of Parliament described Roma camps outside Florence as “a gathering of thieves and prostitutes, muggers and rapists” and called for Roma to be prevented from entering Florence (Institute of Race Relations European Race Audit, 1995). In Poland, the National Front Party circulated pamphlets demanding that all 90,000 Polish Roma (three times the actual number) be banished and has circulated fly porters with slogans such as “Death to Gypsies” and “Gas the Gypsies” (Braham, 1993, p. 92). Nationalist parties in Romania, Russia, Germany, and elsewhere are responsible for similar anti-Gypsy xenophobia. They, like skinheads and some eastern European gov- ernments, would like Roma to emigrate en masse. THE PORTRAYAL OF ROMA IN THE MEDIA The media also play a major part in creating hatred of Roma. Although since the early 1990s there have been occasional articles about the economic distress of Roma or romantic aspects of their culture such as music, most reporting on Gypsy affairs is sensationalist, exaggerated, and negative. Language typical of anti-Semitism is often used of Roma. In 1992, for example, two leading German newspapers described Gypsies as “a pure disease” and “a serious plague” (Brearley, 1996, p. 23). Throughout Europe and especially in former communist states, Gypsies are commonly presented in the media in gross stereotypes: as parasites, as genetic criminals, as dangerous. In Bulgaria, for example, there has been “persistent media stigmatising of Roma” since 1989. The media portray Roma as inherently deviant, typifying them as “villains,” “incorrigible perpetra- tors,” and “apt to commit crimes.” Crime statistics in newspapers are always pre- sented in two columns, “Roma” and “non-Roma,” with exaggeratedly high rates shown for Roma crime (Anguelova, 1996; ERRC, 1997a, pp. 18-19; Project on Ethnic Relations, 1996).7 The same is true for Romania, where in any report on Roma crime, the ethnicity of the alleged perpetrator is always given. This does not happen with crimes committed by any other ethnic group (PER, 1997, pp. 6-8). There is thus little more neutral journalism than there is neutral policing. The presumption is always on Roma guilt and the innocence of non-Romanies. There is little media interest in positive aspects of Roma life or sympathy with their widespread persecution and no interest in praising Roma values or out- standing public figures (said to include Ava Gardner, Yul Brynner, and Charlie Chaplin). The effect of this undiluted stigmatizing by the media is powerful. Indeed, at a conference in 1996 on the media and Roma in contemporary Europe, organized by the PER, a delegate from the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) argued that according to the OSCE, “anti-Roma violence was the result of racial discrimination in the media, which then became institutionalised in people’s minds” (PER, 1996, pp. I, 4). 596 AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST THE LACK OF NON-ROMA POLITICAL SUPPORT A further element exacerbating hate crimes is the failure of non-Romany leadership to speak out on behalf of Roma. For example, although there are now within the EU, the OSCE, and nongovernmental organizations many national and international initiatives to assist Roma, trade unions and the churches have remained notably silent in the face of anti-Roma violence. Not until March 1998 did a joint conference of Catholic and Moravian bishops in the Czech Republic make a joint appeal on behalf of Roma in their country. Churches in most other states where Roma are persecuted remain silent. In this brief article, it is impossible to give a comprehensive account of the current persecution of Roma in Europe. But, even this short summary should suffice to indicate the urgency of their situation. Facing discrimination by national governments and local authorities; denied safe havens as refugees; tar- geted by a hostile media; and the victim of increasing hatred, violence, and mur- der from lynch mobs, skinheads, and the police, the Roma of Europe face a bleak future. To love liberty should mean to stand with and on behalf of Roma. A Romany prayer states, “A land without Gypsies is a land without freedom.”8 A Romany proverb runs, “Cursed is the land from which Gypsies flee” (O Drom, 1990). But, Gypsies have no land to which they can flee, and in some of the lands where they have lived for centuries there is arguably a genocidal situation in the making. NOTES 1. Noted most recently in an Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe study on Roma prepared by Max van der Stoel (2000). 2. Compare Fraser (1992), Crowe (1995), and Hancock (1987). For a comprehensive bibliogra- phy on Roma, see Tong (1995). 3. Government census figures on Roma populations are often unreliable. For plausible statistics, see Liegeois and Gheorghe (1995, p. 7). 4. E. Kalibova (1995) suggested that Rom life expectancy approximates to that of Czech non-Gypsies in the 1930s, whereas estimates of life expectancy of Hungarian Roma range between 32 and 55 to 60 years (Braham, 1993, p. 42). 5. In the Czech Republic, unemployment rates are 40% to 50% (Obrmann, 1991); in some regions of Hungary, unemployment rates reach 50%, 80%, or even 100% (Braham, 1993, p. 35; Crowe, 1995, p. 103). 6. In Bulgaria, 14 Gypsies died between 1992 and 1998 while in police custody or as a result of police shootings (Manchester Guardian, 2000), and in the first half of 1997 alone, 528 cases of abuse by police officers against Roma were reported (European Roma Rights Centre, 1997a, p. 22). 7. Further examples in The Sofia Echo, September 25 through October 1, 1998, pp. 10-11. 8. Cited in Diveso, a Gypsy newsletter in Albania. Brearley / PERSECUTION OF GYPSIES 597 REFERENCES Anguelova, K. (1996, March-April). Romophobia in the media. Focus: Newsletter of the Human Rights Project [Facts and Fiction], I, 1, 13-15. Braham, M. (1993). The untouchables: A survey of the Roma people of central and eastern Europe. Geneva, Switzerland: Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Brearley, M. (1996, December). The Roma/Gypsies of Europe: A persecuted people. London: Insti- tute for Jewish Policy Research. British Broadcasting Corporation. (1993, April 12). Summary of world broadcasts (SWB). London: Author. Cahn, C. (1996, September). Divide and deport: Roma and Sinti in Austria. Budapest, Hungary: European Roma Rights Centre. CDMG, European Committee on Migration. (1995, May). The situation of Gypsies (Roma and Sinti) in Europe. Strasbourg, France: Council of Europe. Crowe, D. M. (1995). A history of the Gypsies of eastern Europe and Russia. London: I. B. Tauris & Co. European Centre for Research and Action on Racism and Antisemitism. (1994). Political extremism and the threat to democracy in Europe: A survey and assessment of parties, movements and groups. London: Institute of Jewish Affairs. “European Roma Rights Center on Events in Great Britain.” (1997, October 22). Patrin Romani News. European Roma Rights Centre. (1997, January). Time of the skinheads: Denial and exclusion of Roma in Slovakia. Budapest, Hungary: Author. European Roma Rights Centre. (1999, June). A special remedy: Roma and schools for the mentally handicapped in the Czech Republic. Budapest, Hungary: Author. Fakete, L., & Webber, F. (1994). Inside racist Europe. London: Institute of Race Relations. Fraser, A. (1992). The Gypsies. Oxford, UK: Blackwell. Gheorghe, N. (1992a, September 30). Gypsies are now the scapegoats as the Jews were before. The Times. Gheorghe, N. (1992b, September 30). Letter to The Times. The Times. Glenny, M. (1994, April 6). “Time runs out in a Balkin powderkeg”. The Times (Online). Gughinski, N. (1997a, December). Profession: Prisoner. Roma in detention in Bulgaria. Budapest, Hungary: European Roma Rights Centre. Hancock, I. (1987). The pariah syndrome: An account of Gypsy slavery and persecution. Ann Arbor, MI: Karoma. Helsinki Human Rights Watch Report. (1996a). Children of Bulgaria: Police violence and arbitrary confinement. Helsinki, Finland: Author. Helsinki Human Rights Watch Report. (1996b). Rights denied: The Roma of Hungary. Helsinki, Finland: Author. Holl, K. (1993, June-August). The East European Roma have today the same role as the Ostjuden earlier in this century. Regards. Institute for Jewish Policy Research and American Jewish Committee. (1997). Antisemitism world report 1997. London: Author. Institute of Race Relations. (1995, March). European Race Belletin. London: Author. Kalibova, E. (1995). La situation demographique de la population tzigane en Tchecoslovaquie [The demographic situation of the Gypsy population in Czechoslovakia]. In C. Auzias (Ed.), Les familles Roms d’Europe de l’Est [The Romany families of Eastern Europe]. Paris: Editions Michalon. Kenrick, D. (1989). Letter to the editor. Holocaust and Genocide Studies, 4(2), 251-254. Kenrick, D. (1994/1995, Winter). The Nazis and the Gypsies: A fresh look. Jewish Quarterly, 156. Kenrick, D. (1998, July). Gypsies: Life on the edge. Index on Censorship, 27(4), 55-62. Kenrick, D., & Puxon, G. (1995). Gypsies under the Swastika. Hatfield: University of Hertfordshire Press. 598 AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST Kovats, M. (1994). The political development of the Hungarian Roma. Unpublished master’s disser- tation, School of Slavonic and East European Studies, London. LeBore, A. (1992, September 30). Hatred of Gypsies lurks beneath Romania’s surface calm. The Times (Online). Liegeois, J-P., & Gheorghe, N. (1995). Roma/Gypsies: A European minority (Minority Rights Group report). London: Minority Rights Group. “Lynch law: Violence against the Roma in Romania.” (1994, November). Helsinki Human Rights Watch, 6(17). Margalit, G. (1996). Antigypsyism in the political culture of the federal republic of Germany: A par- allel with antisemitism? In Analysis of Current Trends in Antisemitism (No. 9). The Hebrew Uni- versity of Jerusalem: Vidal Sassoon International Center for the Study of Antisemitism. Netanyahu, B. (1995). The origins of the Inquisition in fifteenth century Spain. New York: Random House. O Drom. (1990, April), p.35. Obrmann, J. (1991, December). Minorities not a major issue yet. RFE/RL Research Report, 11. Official bulletin of the International Romani Union. (1992). Berlin: International Romani Union. Ofner, P. (1990, April). O Drom, 34-35. Pehe, J. (1993, February). Law on Romanies causes uproar in Czech Republic. RFE/RL Research Report, p. 19. Pellar, R. (1995). La fecondite n’est plus en vente [Fertility is no longer on sale]. In C. Auzias (Ed.), Les familles Roms d’Europe de l’Est (pp. 66-70). Paris: Editions Michalon. Polansky, P. (1998). Black silence: The Lety survivors speak. Prague, Czechoslovakia: G plus G: Cross-Cultural Communications. Project on Ethnic Relations. (1996, September). The media and the Roma in contemporary Europe. Princeton, NJ: Author. Project on Ethnic Relations. (1997, June 27-28). Images and issues: Coverage of the mass media in Romania [Report of the Project on Ethnic Relations Conference]. Princeton, NJ: Author. Project on Ethnic Relations. (1998, April). The Roma in Bulgaria: Collaborative efforts between local authorities and nongovernmental organizations. Princeton, NJ: Author. Puxon, G. (1987). Roma: Europe’s Gypsies. London: Minority Rights Group. The Sofia Echo. (1997, August 8-14), p. 1. Steele, J. (2000, April 8). “Gypsies feel the lash of everyone’s hatred.” Manchester Guardian, p. 19. Szente, V. L. (1996, September). Sudden rage at dawn: Violence against Roma in Romania. Buda- pest, Hungary: European Roma Rights Centre. The Times. (1992, August 30). Tong, D. (1995). Gypsies: A multidisciplinary annotated bibliography. New York: Garland. Tritt, R. (1992). Struggling for ethnic identity: Czechoslovakia’s endangered Gypsies. New York: Helsinki Human Rights Watch Report. van der Stoel, M. (2000, April 7) Report on the Situation of Roma and Sinti in the OSCE Area, Office of the High Commissioner on National Minorities, The Hague: Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe. Watts, L. (1994, July). Countering anti-Roma violence in Eastern Europe: The Snagov Conference and related efforts. Project on Ethnic Relations Snagov Conference report (p. 16). Princeton, NJ: Project on Ethnic Relations. Brearley / PERSECUTION OF GYPSIES 599 AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTISTWatts / AGGRESSIVE YOUTH CULTURES AND HATE CRIME Aggressive Youth Cultures and Hate Crime Skinheads and Xenophobic Youth in Germany MEREDITH W. WATTS University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee Contemporary bias crime in Germany increased dramatically after unification and remained at a relatively high, though fluctuating, level for the decade. Right-wing skinheads and neo-Nazis played a significant role in the violence, but at least one third of the violent incidents came from informal groups of young males who were not affiliated. This represents a shift in anti-Semitic and antiforeigner violence from the 1980s and earlier, when the perpe- trators were likely to be older and affiliated with identifiable ideological groups. Contempo- rary xenophobia is not only linked to aggressive elements of youth culture but appears to be increasingly connected to local and international ideological networks. Electronic media such as the Internet have given both the political and commercial entities of skinhead and right-wing culture a means of support and growth. Xenophobic aggression in postunification Germany is not identical with what is called hate crime or hate violence in the United States, nor are the official data kept by the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution to monitor bias-inspired crimes directly comparable with U.S. definitions. The law in the Federal Republic of Germany reflects a reaction against the Nazi past and aims to forbid “Nazi” speech and propaganda. The law also provided for the monitor- ing of acts motivated by right-wing extremism, anti-Semitism, and antiforeigner bias. This produces several special categories of crime that may seem unusual to citizens of the United States, such as (a) disturbing or defaming the dead (the charges invoked to sanction desecration of Jewish grave sites and memorials), (b) “public incitement” and “instigation of racial hatred“ (charges used to sup- press racist public speech), and (c) distribution of Nazi propaganda or “literature liable to corrupt the young.” Other aspects of German law forbid the promotion of a Nazi-like political party, denial of the Holocaust, and use of the symbols associated with officially banned groups. The latter provision criminalizes the display of Nazi-era sym- bols (e.g., the swastika, the “Hitler greeting”) but has been steadily expanded to 600 AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST, Vol. 45 No. 4, December 2001 600-615 © 2001 Sage Publications forbid a wide variety of flags, emblems, and other symbols that were employed by groups banned by the Federal Constitutional Court. What these laws do not do (compared to bias crime legislation in the United States) is define hate crime or hate violence as such, nor do they include any spe- cial recognition of gender, disability, or sexual orientation. On the other hand, they go much further than laws in many other contemporary democracies in lim- iting certain types of biased or racist speech, particularly when it is directed at groups victimized in the Holocaust. Although the German law obviously reflects a special set of historical and legal circumstances, it results in an exemplary national data effort in certain cat- egories of bias crime. The law requires national reporting of incidents by all police agencies. This ensures data gathering that is more intensive and more complete than is currently the case in most other nations (particularly in compar- ison with the United States where hate crime reporting is still voluntary and highly variable). As a result, German data provide a better basis than that of most nations for examining trends and developments in certain categories of hate-motivated violence. This feature of the law makes it possible to analyze trends in right-wing and xenophobic1 violence in Germany, developments that reflect a particular national situation but that also show international characteris- tics that may help us understand hate violence in other societies as well. THE COURSE OF RIGHT-WING VIOLENCE Perhaps the first question concerns the basic historical development of right-wing violence in Germany. Table 1 and Figure 1 place the era of “modern” xenophobia in Germany in perspective. In 1989 and 1990, immediately prior to unification, there were fewer than 200 violent incidents per year. That figure more than quadrupled by 1992 and reached its contemporary peak in the follow- ing year. Shock of the German public (expressed dramatically by candlelight processions in sympathy with the victims), consolidation of the criminal justice agencies in the new federal states in the east, and stepped-up enforcement activi- ties by security agencies all played a part in the decline. Since then, there have been oscillations between 600 and 800 violent incidents per year—a decline from the peak but still high compared to the preunification period (for a more extended discussion, see Watts, 1997, chap. 2). A second question concerns the targets of violence. Unlike federal (and some state) hate crime statutes in the United States, German law does not provide for special reporting of violence based on sexual orientation, gender, or disability. However, it is quite specific about crimes that can be attributed to anti-Semitic, antiforeigner, or right-wing motivation. Since unification (beginning officially in 1990), the targets of attack have remained relatively constant. As Table 2 shows, about 60% of the violent incidents have been directed against foreigners. Anti-Semitic attacks, including desecration of graves and memorial sites, have Watts / AGGRESSIVE YOUTH CULTURES AND HATE CRIME 601 accounted for about 2% of all violent incidents. Foreigners are a significant pres- ence in Germany (with a population of more than 7 million) and account for the vast majority (60%) of attacks against persons. By contrast, the number of Jews in Germany is probably not much more than one hundredth that of foreigners, even allowing for a doubling of the Jewish population over the decade (due pri- marily to immigration from the former Soviet Union). Thus, whereas only 2% of the total offenses involve Jewish persons or institutions, the per capita rate is high. Political opponents such as “autonomous” leftist groups and rival youth cul- tures accounted for another 14% of the total. The last category (“other”) con- tained 24% of the incidents; it refers to offenses where the perpetrators were identifiably right wing but the victims were not foreigners, Jews, or political enemies (examples might be damage to property during a demonstration or assaults against police or bystanders). WHO ARE THE PERPETRATORS? But who are these “rightists?” Increasingly, the perpetrators of hate violence of the past decade have tended overwhelmingly to be young males, usually act- ing in groups. But how young? And in what kind of groups—skinheads, neo-Nazis, or informal groups of young men looking for excitement?2 As Table 3 shows, modern xenophobia indeed has a youthful face. Data from 1996 show that 30% of the perpetrators were ages 16 to 17 and that more than two thirds of all perpetrators were 20 years of age or younger. This aggressive activism on the part of teenaged and young adult males repre- sents a historical “modernization” of xenophobic violence. Prior to 1980, those 602 AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST TABLE 1: The Course of Right-Wing Violence in Germany, 1989-1998 Year Number of Violent Acts a 1989 173 1990 178 1991 849 1992 1,485 1993 1,322 1994 784 1995 612 1996 624 1997 790 1998 708 SOURCE: Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz [Federal Office for Protection of the Constitution] (1997, 1998d). See also Watts (1997, chap. 2). a. The official term refers to violent acts “with demonstrated or assumed right-wing motivation.” younger than 20 years of age accounted for only 40% of the incidents (see Watts, 1997, p. 269). The earlier form of rightist activism involved somewhat older per- petrators who were more likely to be associated with neo-Nazi groups (and, pre- sumably, had more developed right-wing ideological positions than today’s younger activists). In comparison with this earlier period, today’s typical activist is much younger3 and less likely to be a member of a neo-Nazi organization. Accompanying this shift toward youthful activism has been a trend away from classic, membership-based organizational forms. The young perpetrators Watts / AGGRESSIVE YOUTH CULTURES AND HATE CRIME 603 1600 1400 1200 1000 800 600 400 200 0 N u m b e r o f V io le n t A ct s 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 Figure 1: Right-Wing Violence SOURCE: Verfassungsschutzbericht (1997, 1998). TABLE 2: Targets of Right-Wing Violence in Germany, 1995-1998 Type Number of Offenses a Percentage of Total Antiforeigner 1,269 60 Anti-Semitic 38 2 Against political opponents 303 14 Otherb 512 24 Total 2,122 100 SOURCE: Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz [Federal Office for Protection of the Constitution] (1997, 1998d). a. The official term refers to violent acts “with demonstrated or assumed right-wing motivation.” b. “Other” includes acts of violence where the perpetrators are identified as “rightists” but where the incident or target does not involve the previous three categories. Examples might be a march in which store windows are broken or a confrontation with citizens or bystanders. are less likely than their predecessors to be ideologically sophisticated and orga- nizationally connected. This does not mean they are isolated; on the contrary, they are part of a xenophobic culture that includes both the older organizational forms and a heterogeneous (and often highly spontaneous) youth culture. This last point is not an obvious one, but we can make sense of it looking at recent skinhead history and at the data on the organization connections of actual perpe- trators. Here, we have two questions: How have developments in the skinhead scene contributed to the subculture of racism? and How much have skinheads contributed to the rise in violence? TRENDS IN EXTREMISM AND AGGRESSIVE SUBCULTURES Historically, only a portion of the skinhead style has been explicitly racist or neo-Nazi. Most histories of the movement point to its British working-class ori- gins and to its multiracialism in membership and music tastes. But, those accounts also point to the split of the skinheads into “left” and “right” factions in the 1980s. Somewhere in between these politicized factions are the apolitical skins (who probably make up the majority). The actual numbers in each group are difficult to identify because the boundaries are fluid, and stylistic variations are not always recognizable to the outsider. To make things more difficult, it is not unusual for German skins to refer to themselves as “more or less left” when they actually mean that they are not right. For young Germans in the east, to be truly left was largely discredited with the fall of the East German regime. This was particularly the case for skinheads, who were likely to see being right as the logical place for rebellion to take place in a socialist society. The right-wing scene has been notorious for its fluidity and unpredictable actionism, a frustration both for the more orthodox rightists who would like to organize them and for the security agencies who would like to monitor them. However, there is a countervailing tendency that seems to have been 604 AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST TABLE 3: Age of Perpetrators (1996) Age Percentage Cumulative Percentage 16-17 30 30 18-20 37 67 21-30 27 94 31-40 3 97 Older than 40 3 100 SOURCE: Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz [Federal Office for Protection of the Constitution] (1996). (For earlier years, see Watts, 1997, p. 269.) accelerating throughout the decade—there are signs that such international groups as the Blood and Honour (British) and the Hammerskins (United States) have added discipline, ideology, and an international network to the right-wing skinhead culture. Not only do both movements have global pretensions, but the latter group refers to itself, ominously, as the Hammerskin Nation. All this points to a rightist milieu that contains a diverse mix of elements— informal groups of xenophobic youth; “subcultures” with a recognizable, aggressive style (such as skinheads); and ideological groups that are disciplined and organized. Those who identify themselves as rightist skinheads are a dra- matic presence among perpetrators (Anti-Defamation League, 1995; Hamm, 1993), but available data suggest that they are only one part of a much broader class of aggressive xenophobes. In his study of perpetrators in the early 1990s, Willems found that 38% of those arrested for antiforeigner violence in the early 1990s were identified as skinheads (Willems, 1995). Heitmeyer and Müller (1995) found that 46% of their interviewees who were involved in antiforeigner violence thought of them- selves as skinheads. Prior to 1990, however, the term skinhead hardly surfaced with respect to anti-Semitic or antiforeigner violence—not only was there a smaller amount of violence, but some 90% of the perpetrators in that earlier period were identified with neo-Nazi or other classic right-wing extremist groups (Kalinowsky, 1990). In other words, the 1990s were characterized by a surge in xenophobic violence that was carried by aggressive subcultures that were different from the traditional ideological groups on the right. In comparison to Germany, information on the role of skinheads in the United States is somewhat less systematic and therefore less conclusive. Levin and McDevitt (1993) estimated that the most ideological perpetrators of hate crimes are probably no more than 1% of the total perpetrators. The authors suggested that skinheads are part of this group of violent perpetrators who attack out of an ideological “mission” to drive out the target group. However, data from Ger- many and elsewhere suggest that skinheads and other aggressive subcultures may not act primarily from racial or ideological motivations but are motivated by “thrill-seeking” and other opportunistic or criminal motives. Thus, it is diffi- cult to estimate the contributions of skinheads in the perpetration of hate crimes or bias-motivated attacks and just as difficult, at the moment, to compare accu- rately the various types of perpetrators from one nation to another. Direct comparison across nations is also made difficult because of the nature of the data (compared to Germany, police reports in the United States are less systematic in establishing the political motivation or membership of the perpe- trators). As a result, figures from the United States are not comparable (either in relative accuracy or in estimated magnitude) with that of Germany; however, it is clear that racist skinheads are involved in a number of dramatically violent incidents nationally and internationally (Anti-Defamation League, 1995; Southern Poverty Law Center, 1998). Watts / AGGRESSIVE YOUTH CULTURES AND HATE CRIME 605 Thus, to reiterate an obvious point: Only some skinheads are racists, and most racists are not skinheads. Yet, skinheads have played a growing role in xenophobic violence. But, what do we know of the “skinhead” contribution to the broader culture of aggressive xenophobia? To put the numbers in perspec- tive, Willems (1995) found that in addition to the 38% who were identifiable with skinhead culture in some way, about 25% of the perpetrators were associ- ated with right-wing extremist groups. Another 19% were members of informal groups or cliques with no specific ideological identification (most of the remain- ing perpetrators not accounted for in the above categories had prior records and were classified as “criminal,” though this category no doubt overlaps the others). Heitmeyer and Müller (1995) found that roughly 27% of the rightist youth they interviewed were associated with neo-Nazi (rather than skinhead) groups. Taken together, these studies indicate that skinheads make up the largest single category of perpetrators in Germany, with members of neo-Nazi organizations a distant second. By either account, at least one third of the attacks are committed by youth who are not associated with these easily identifiable groups. Skinheads have represented a major portion of the problem, but they were still only one part of a much broader pattern of violence. According to the Ger- man Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution, the total estimate of “right-wing extremist potential” in Germany grew steadily in the last half of the 1990s. A closer look at the various groups (see Table 4) shows that the larg- est single numerical change has occurred in the estimated strength of right- extremist political parties (these are parties that are “on watch” by the agency but are not classified/banned as “neo-Nazi”). The number of hard-core ideologues represented by the neo-Nazis has remained relatively constant; other growth areas have been among those classified as “violence-prone rightists” and “other groups” (see Figure 2). The latter category contains a diverse cluster of Kameradschaften, discussion groups, and informal cliques that seem to have proliferated (but whose numbers are notoriously hard to estimate due to their informal organizational forms). Also hard to estimate is the exact number of persons in the violence-prone category; yet, it is on this diffuse group that the federal office has focused much of its concern over the decade. This category contains the heart of the perpetrator category—potentially violent young people (mostly males); its numbers are largely a matter of estimate (because there are no “organizations” to infiltrate or membership records to confiscate). It is this category that contains the skin- heads, the group with the most identifiable style and appearance among the vio- lence prone. Obviously, the German government views this category as a grow- ing source of danger. The rise in the number estimated to be violence prone thus reflects an increase in aggressive youth. It is also likely that the increase in their estimated numbers results from a heightened perception on the part of monitor- ing agencies that the danger from unorganized, aggressive youth is growing. If the numbers are truly on the rise, then it is an increase in the potential—rather 606 AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST than the actual—rate of perpetration. In recent years, the number of violent offenses has declined somewhat (see Table 1). EVOLUTION AND CHANGE IN SKINHEAD CULTURE The skinhead scene actually consists of many scenes with elements borrowed from other subcultures. For this reason, it is impossible to speak of skinheads as if they all shared an identical culture, ideology, or organizational structure; there Watts / AGGRESSIVE YOUTH CULTURES AND HATE CRIME 607 TABLE 4: Estimated Right-Wing Extremist Potential, 1995-1998 Year Extremist Group 1995 1996 1997 1998 Violence-prone rightists 6,200 6,400 7,600 8,200 Neo-Nazis 1,980 2,420 2,400 2,400 Political parties 35,900 33,500 34,800 39,000 Other groups 2,660 3,700 4,300 4,500 Total 46,740 46,020 49,100 54,100 Total minus multiple memberships 44,610 45,300 48,400 53,600 SOURCE: Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz [Federal Office for Protection of the Constitution] (1997, 1998d). E st im a te d N u m b e r 10000 8000 6000 4000 2000 0 1995 1996 1997 1998 Violent Rightists Neo-Nazis Figure 2: Trends in Right-Wing Potential are also evolution and change in the scene. Three types of development are worth noting: The first is adaptation of the skinhead style to fit the local political culture. The second is in the increased networking of skinhead groups; this includes organization diffusion above the local level and reflects the internation- alization of skinhead style. The third is in the commercialization and commodi- fication of skinhead culture. In the first development, the international skinhead style (much like other subcultural styles) can be “downloaded” from international media and adapted to fit local conditions. This produces variation not only in the groups themselves but in their local “partners.” As local variations include cultural elements that respond to the particular culture and community, the network of potential sup- porters varies from one place to another. For example, in the United States, racist skinhead groups may be allied locally with neo-Nazi groups, with traditional organizations such as the Ku Klux Klan, or with such groups as Aryan Nations or the World Church of the Creator. In Germany, rightist skinheads may find political partners with neo-Nazi groups or with Kameradschaften and political “discussion groups.” White supremacist groups (often imported from the United States) also have some appeal because they offer a racist model that is not associ- ated with the Nazi era (thereby avoiding both the stigma of association with the Nazi period and reducing the likelihood of being banned or prosecuted). This ideological and associational variation has counterparts in the United States, as in the example of the Nazi Low Riders of Antelope Valley, California. Although the name conjures up images of Los Angeles Latino subculture, this group combined elements of skinhead culture, Nazi ideology, racism, and a business sideline in the methamphetamine trade (Finnegan, 1997). Local varia- tions such as these show that such subcultures are dynamic and difficult to cap- ture in a simple ideological or political definition. Local scenes show a kind of cultural entrepreneurship that combines national and international models with the political culture of the local community. There also appears to be a growing network of rightist culture on both the local and international levels. Though their impact is difficult to estimate, there is evidence from a number of sources that the right-wing elements of the skin- head scene have become more structured and that they have increased their capacity to cooperate with other groups. Those partner groups often provide the organizational structure, capacity for logistics, and tactical planning (e.g., for demonstrations) that skinheads have traditionally lacked. Most of all, those groups may provide ideological structure and tutelage. The hard street-fighting style of many skins has long been used by other rightist groups for its intimidation value. According to former neo-Nazi Ingo Hasselbach (1996), “The skins were our storm troopers—the idiots who cleared the streets for us and intimidated our enemies—and enjoyed a bit of violence anytime” (p. 171). However, there is evidence that by the end of the decade skins had expanded beyond this role of “useful idiots” (Hasselbach’s term) and that they had done it beyond national boundaries. In early 1999, skinheads from 608 AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST Croatia, Slovenia, and Germany joined neo-Nazis from Hungary and elsewhere for a demonstration in Budapest. Rightist skins were a common sight at Aryan Nation meetings in the United States, the White Aryan Resistance actively recruited violent skinheads in the early 1990s, and a well-known watchdog orga- nization argues that the skinhead scene is moving “from chaos to conspiracy” (Southern Poverty Law Center, 1998, p. 23). In Germany, connections have developed between the skins and various neo-Nazi groups and, more recently, to rightist political parties; in particular, the National Democratic Party and its youth organization, the Young National Democrats, have actively sought con- tact and cooperation with right-wing skins (Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, 1998a, 1998b, 1998c). If the actual extent of political networking is a bit difficult to estimate, the evi- dence for the international commercialization of skinhead culture seems more easily quantifiable. In Germany, data on this trend come from the fact that police and government agencies monitor both “hate speech” and material that is con- sidered “harmful to youth.” For example, music and public speech can be tar- geted for official repression if they are placed by authorities under either of these categories. Thus, in a 1993 operation that would seem unusual to citizens in the United States, German national and provincial agencies prosecuted rightist and “White power” skinhead bands and took legal action against commercial dis- tributors of their music. In a similar action in 1997, police and security agencies in 10 federal states searched the homes and places of business of 24 individual and corporate dis- tributors of music judged to be racist. Confiscated in the action were several thousand CDs and various Nazi memorabilia and propaganda material. Also captured were computers, business files, and, in one case, an automatic weapon with ammunition (Landesamt für Verfassungsschutz, 1998). Despite these periodic waves of concerted suppression and interdiction by authorities, the number of concerts and distributors of skinhead materials (and literature) increased steadily through the late 1990s (see Figure 3). The number of bands also increased, showing a 20% surge in 1 year alone (from fewer than 80 in 1997 to roughly 100 in 1998). Repression efforts run up against two major obstacles. The first is the increase in commercialization and commodification, in which skinhead and racist culture is turned into products (e.g., music, clothes) and marketed for economic gain. This produces an economic incentive for the continuation and exploitation of skinhead and racist culture. The second, interrelated, trend is the internationalization of that commercial culture that allows concerts and distributors to operate effectively from other countries. To escape German sanctions, bands, literature, and concerts are likely to appear in Denmark or Sweden (in fact, it was from Denmark that American neo-Nazi Gary Lauck was extradited to Germany in 1995). Of course, the United States is the prime international center for the distribution of skinhead, White power, and extremist material. The development of electronic networks such as the World Wide Web has promoted this globalization, increased the Watts / AGGRESSIVE YOUTH CULTURES AND HATE CRIME 609 commercial availability of rightist materials, and undermined German attempts to suppress skinhead culture. Ideological/commercial Web sites (usually based in the United States but reachable from virtually anywhere) have expanded; Web sites suppressed in Canada, Germany, and elsewhere reappear in the freer cyberspace of the United States where they exist alongside entrepreneurial American extremists. DISCUSSION Germans are not alone in the surge of xenophobia and hate crime. There are signs that similar developments are occurring throughout industrial societies undergoing modernization and structural change, stress in employment mar- kets, and a significant influx of people perceived as foreign. Though these struc- tural and social problems all affect Germany, they are common throughout con- temporary democracies. So, too, is xenophobic violence and bias crime. The preceding analysis dealt with rightist potential (and the role of skinheads within it) in one country. The German data are more complete than information available in other nations, but they are not identical with what would be catego- rized as hate- or bias-crime in the United States. Notably, offenses based on gen- der and sexual orientation are not included (as indeed they are not in a number of American states). These differences in emphasis make it difficult to compare trends across nations with accuracy. Even so, the data are helpful in pointing out some of the major trends in xenophobic culture in Germany and elsewhere. 610 AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST N u m b e r 120 100 80 60 40 20 0 1993 1994 1995 199819971996 Concerts Bands Distributors Figure 3: Trends in Skinhead Culture Some of our concerns go beyond what the data can clearly tell us. However, we can make some reasonably well-grounded speculations about the role of aggressive youth cultures in contemporary bias crime. I would like to suggest some propositions that seem sensible based in part on the analysis presented here. Each is supported to a greater or lesser extent by current information, but to have more certainty, more comparable data from other nations will be needed. Indeed, we will need far more systematic data for the many jurisdictions of the United States because, unlike Germany, reporting under U.S. hate crime legisla- tion is voluntary and still far from being complete. • First of all, youth cultures are often not just passing fads. The decline of the skin- heads has long been predicted, but it has changed, expanded, and internationalized in the two or more decades since it first appeared. As a style, it has some ephemeral characteristics that will undoubtedly change further and even disappear. But, like rock and roll music (whose death has been predicted for four decades), there is no reason to doubt that this or a similar youth culture will continue to express some form of aggressive xenophobia. • The early skinhead style originally emerged from British working-class culture as an expression of a strong, working-class masculinity. Segments of it later split into politicized left and right, with the racist segment emerging as an amalgam of aggressive masculinity and explicit xenophobia. This racist tendency was aug- mented by a sporadic, but growing, connection with ideological elements of the extreme and racist right. What resulted was a three-part poison of aggression, xenophobia, and ideology that has been much more self-sustaining than any of the individual components alone. Where younger persons, particularly males, are confronted with economic modernization and dislocation for which they are ill prepared, and where scapegoats in the form of various cultural “outsiders” are per- ceived as threats, this three-part poison will continue to produce aggressive sub- cultures (of which skinheads are only one contemporary variant). • The skin/fascho scene has developed elements of a subculture that includes music, fanzines (fan magazines), concerts, and other more or less organized symbolic and cultural events. This helps provide an integration of the scene as well as a sense of identity—of being part of something much larger, more powerful, and even some- what “dangerous.” This provides the basis for a self-sustaining scene—it falls short of being a “movement,” but it provides a network through which move- ment-like connections can develop. • The skinhead scene has broken out of its parochial/provincial boundaries to estab- lish important links to ideological groups—groups that provide the “intellectual” part of the fascho program, offer a “standing organization,” and maintain a durable political opportunity structure. The skins might not be interested in organizing, say, a Rudolf Hess Memorial day (a German neo-Nazi tribute day, substituted for Hitler’s birthday, which cannot be celebrated publicly); the neo-Nazis do that. But, the skins can show up, act badly, and lend a show of force and aggressive power. They typically horrify the orthodox rightists, but both groups gain from the odd alliance. Moreover, skinheads have graduated from being what Hasselbach (1996) called “useful idiots”; some have crossed the ideological line and become part of the organizational neo-Nazi right. They maintain links to the skin scene and pro- vide a bridge from the rowdy skinhead style to the more disciplined structures on the right. Watts / AGGRESSIVE YOUTH CULTURES AND HATE CRIME 611 • The scene of youthful xenophobic aggression has broken out of its provincialism to establish links to international groups. There are many reports of contacts to a variegated international network, particularly in the United States, United King- dom, Scandinavia, the Netherlands, and to a lesser degree Spain (relations with the Czechs, Poles, Hungarians, and other central Europeans are somewhat more strained, but they exist). Explicitly racist groups such as Blood and Honour and the Hammerskin Nation provide an international style that is easily downloaded and adapted from the World Wide Web, music, and literature. In Germany, the govern- ment estimates that there are more than 200 skinhead or racist Web sites (in the United States, there are far more, of course); many of them are in English to broaden their impact (or because they use North American Internet providers to avoid German censorship). • Concerts of White power bands are typically discouraged, even prosecuted, in Germany. Bands are raided, CDs confiscated, concerts broken up or forbidden, and leaders prosecuted under German hate speech laws that forbid glorification of Nazis, racist speech, or defamation of victims of the Holocaust. It is even illegal to deny that the Holocaust existed or to slander Jews in public speech. This suppres- sion is undermined by global electronic networks and by support for the scene from abroad. • The example of skinheads provides some insight into the dynamics of interna- tional commercialization—a phenomenon that appears to help stabilize the scene, allow it to expand, and give it a longer life than might have been expected. The same is true, but more so, for right-wing extremist groups and sentiment. This commercial dimension includes cultural artifacts, memorabilia, music, and litera- ture that provide an economic incentive for widening and deepening the scene. • The structural conditions that produced skinhead groups all over the world are still present. Where they are not solved, skinheads or some other subcultural phenome- non is likely to persist. Status anxiety, identity problems in declining working- class culture, and the compensatory needs of underemployed or threatened young people, particularly males, are continuing problems. These problems, and the youth cultures they produced, extend well beyond the boundaries of the less advantaged. Although the expression of such xenophobia may have significant origins in threatened segments of the housing and labor markets, that xenophobia has been transported politically and culturally to a much broader segment of the population (e.g., middle-class youth, young women, and a variety of nations that have developed “copy-cat” scenes).4 • The psychological need for an identity and sense of meaning remains. Not all youth can answer that need with conventional achievement in work, education, and family, but some find it easier or more exciting to use physical and symbolic aggression against out-groups. This form of identity can be extremely unrealistic and dysfunctional (especially when based on a mythopoetic White race, or the like, which either does not exist or, if it does, hardly appoints these youth as its “sword and shield”). This is not a productive identity search, but it will continue to have power where other sources of positive identity are not available. • Last, although racist skinheads and other aggressive cliques may seem atavistic, they may actually be on the cutting edge of modern xenophobia. Their spontane- ous and unpredictable style was traditionally seen as a disadvantage, but a trend in the far right throughout the decade comes to favor this seemingly primitive form of action. Increased repression of extremist groups by various national gov- ernments has led to organizational innovations. In the United States, the concept of leaderless resistance sprang up on the far right to promote action that is not con- trolled by a specific organizational center. The concept was developed among 612 AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST American extremists to replace the standard organizational model that proved vul- nerable to government infiltration and prosecution. But, small groups of aggres- sive youth had long been the source of spontaneous, “unorganized” violence. Skinheads and other aggressive subcultures are part of a fluid milieu that is held together by symbols, idea fragments, cultural events, and electronic media—but often without any classic organizational structure. This relatively unorganized base then provides a place from which the more ideological of them are likely to find their way into parties, movements, and discussion circles. Thus, the language and symbols may often sound like the “same old thing,” but underlying the famil- iar slogans is a significant change—the right has modernized and adapted, and it has taken on a more youthful face than was the case a generation ago. NOTES 1. The term xenophobia can refer to a generalized antipathy toward out-groups in general or toward a specific target group such as foreigners, Jews, homosexuals, and others. In German usage, the term Fremdenfeindlichkeit refers to antipathy against foreigners, although Xenophobie is increasingly used. I have tried elsewhere to make these distinctions somewhat more carefully. In this discussion, I try (without complete success) to use xenophobia when referring to the more inclusive concept. The terms antiforeigner and anti-Semitic not only denote the more specific antipathies, they also correspond to the primary categories in the official Germany agency reports. 2. This is not the place for an analysis of the causes and appeals of youthful xenophobia, but some useful starting points are Bergmann (1998); Boehnke, Hagan, and Hefler (1998); Hagan, Merkens, and Boehnke (1995); Oesterreich (1998); Watts (1997, 1999); Watts and Zinnecker (1998); and Willems (1995). For a closer look at the role of young females on the right, see Mushaben (1996). 3. Other discussions of aggressive German youth cultures in the early 1990s can be found in Watts, 1997 (particularly in chaps. 1, 6, 7, and 9). For a more detailed analysis of the shift in public opinion and violence during the 1980s and 1990s, see Watts, 1997 (particularly chap. 2). A detailed chronology of postunification xenophobia is provided by Rainer Erb (cited in Kurthen, Bergmann, & Erb, 1997, pp. 263-285). 4. This conclusion obviously refers to the spread of aggressive youth culture, the primary topic of this discussion. I do not mean it to be a global proposition about the origins of xenophobia or to imply that youth are the source of xenophobia. What I have argued from the German data, though, is that xenophobic youth have been the primary source of rightist violence in the past decade. REFERENCES NOTE: Sources are provided in English wherever possible, though in many cases the data reported are available only in German. 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Fremdenfeindliche Gewalt junger Menschen. Biographische Hintergründe, soziale Situationskontexte und die Bedeutung strafrechtlicher Sanktionen [Antiforeigner violence of young people: Biographical background, social context and the sig- nificance of legal sanctions]. (1995). Bad Godesberg, Germany: Forum. Kalinowsky, H. H. (1990). Rechtsextremismus und Strafrechtspflege. Eine Analyse von Strafverfahren wegen mutmaßlicher rechtsextremististischer Aktivitäten und Erscheinungen [Right-wing extremism and the law: An analysis of legal proceedings of suspected right-extrem- ist activities] (3rd ed.). Bonn, Germany: Bundesministerium der Justiz. Kurthen, H., Bergmann, W., & Erb, R. (Eds.). (1997). Antisemitism and xenophobia in Germany after unification. New York: Oxford University Press. Landesamt für Verfassungsschutz. (1998). Landesverfassungsschutzbericht (Report of the Provin- cial Office for Protection of the Constitution, Hamburg) [Online]. Retrieved March 29, 1999, from: http://www.hamburg.de/Behoerden/LfV/v-bericht Levin, J., & McDevitt, J. (1993). Hate crimes: The rising tide of bigotry and bloodshed. New York: Plenum. Mushaben, J. M. (1996). The rise of femi-Nazis? Female participation in right-extremist movements in unified Germany. German Politics, 5, 240-261. Oesterreich, D. (1998). Authoritarianism and aggression: German youth and right-wing extrem- ism. In M. W. Watts (Ed.), Cross-cultural perspectives on youth and violence (pp. 39-51). New York: JAI. Southern Poverty Law Center. (1998, Fall). Chaos to conspiracy: Racist skinhead violence growing more organized. Intelligence Report, pp. 23-24. Watts, M. W. (1997). Xenophobia in united Germany: Generations, modernization, and ideology. New York: St. Martin’s. 614 AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST Watts, M. W. (1999). Xenophobia among young Germans in the nineties. In S. Hübner-Funk & M. du Bois-Reymond (Eds.), Intercultural reconstruction: Trends and challenges (pp. 117- 139). Berlin, Germany: Walter de Gruyter. Watts, M. W., & Zinnecker, J. (1998). Varieties of violence-proneness among male youth. In M. W. Watts (Ed.), Cross-cultural perspectives on youth and violence (pp. 117-145). New York: JAI. Willems, H. (1995). Development, patterns and causes of violence against foreigners in Germany: Social and biographical characteristics of perpetrators and the process of escalation. Terrorism and Political Violence, 7, 162-181. Watts / AGGRESSIVE YOUTH CULTURES AND HATE CRIME 615 AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTISTBerman / INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF INQUIRY The International Commission of Inquiry (Rwanda) Lessons and Observations From the Field ERIC G. BERMAN Independent Consultant; International Commission of Inquiry The author served as the political affairs officer of the United Nations International Com- mission of Inquiry (ICOI) during its most recent tour (May through November 1998). (The political affairs officer is not responsible for the investigation’s findings, which were the responsibility of the commission’s chairman and members.) The author argues that to under- stand the work and findings of the commission, one must first place it within the broader con- text of the UN Security Council’s failure to respond appropriately to the genocide in Rwanda. He concludes that despite appearances to the contrary, there was little enthusiasm to see ICOI succeed in fulfilling its mandate. The commission is another example of the unwilling- ness of the United Nations and the international community to take meaningful action toward Rwanda specifically and the Great Lakes region generally. BRIEF HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL BACKGROUND TO THE COMMISSION On April 6, 1994, the plane carrying the presidents of Rwanda and Burundi was shot down as it prepared to land in Kigali, the Rwandan capital. Within hours, a systematic series of killings had begun throughout the country. The tar- gets of the attacks were moderate Hutus and all Tutsis. Within 3 months, the Rwandan Armed Forces (known by its French acronym FAR for Forces Armées Rwandaises and now called the ex-FAR) and the Rwandan militia (Interahamwe) murdered hundreds of thousands of people—the number is com- monly put at upwards of 750,000. The carnage and mass slaughter were not a secret. A peacekeeping operation, the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), had been deployed in Rwanda since the previous October.1 The international media also 616 Author’s Note: This article is principally based on a presentation before the Geneva Forum, a semi- nar series devoted to contemporary arms control and disarmament issues, on December 7, 1998, and also a shorter version before the International Conference on Hate Crimes at the Brudnick Cen- ter on Violence and Conflict at Northeastern University in Boston on November 7, 1998. AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST, Vol. 45 No. 4, December 2001 616-625 © 2001 Sage Publications reported the unfolding atrocities authoritatively and graphically. Moreover, there are disturbing credible reports that the UN secretariat and some UN mem- ber states knew in advance—or should have known in advance—of the plans for genocide.2 Leaving aside the thorny issue of whether the United Nations and the interna- tional community had prior knowledge of and could have prevented the geno- cide, how did the United Nations and the international community respond to it? The UN Security Council eventually agreed to deploy a more robust force, but only after first reducing the number of Blue Helmets and without the means to implement its decision without a significant delay. It is telling that on April 21, two weeks after the bloodletting commenced, the council decided not to aug- ment UNAMIR but rather to scale back the operation to a maximum of 270 peacekeepers3—roughly 10% of its previously authorized strength. The dimin- ished UN presence proved incapable of halting the killings, the enormity of which was becoming increasingly visible and widely reported. As a result, the council was basically shamed into reversing its decision. On May 17, it chose instead to send a larger force—nearly twice the size of the initial UN mission.4 However, the council did so knowing that it would not be possible to implement its about-face decision for several months. (As an interim measure, on June 22, it authorized France to lead a multinational force, known as Operation Turquoise, for 2 months to provide humanitarian relief while the revamped UNAMIR worked to become operational.5) The resolution calling for a larger peacekeeping force also imposed an embargo on the sale and supply of arms and related matériel to the then govern- ment of Rwanda as well as to the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), the rebel group fighting the government. Subsequently on August 16, 1995,6 the council decided to lift the sanctions against the new government of Rwanda (i.e., the ex-RPF), which had taken control of the country in July 1994. The embargo remains in effect against the ex-FAR and Interahamwe. THE COMMISSION’S CREATION AND FIRST TOUR Among persistent and credible reports that the embargo was not being respected, the council established the International Commission of Inquiry (ICOI) on September 7, 1995.7 For example, Human Rights Watch, a respected nongovernmental organization, accused France of rearming remnants of the for- mer Rwanda government during Operation Turquoise (see, e.g., Human Rights Watch Arms Project, 1995). The commission was given the following mandate: • to collect information and investigate reports relating to the sale or supply of arms and related matériel to former Rwandan government forces in the Great Lakes region in violation of council Resolutions 918 (1994), 997 (1995), and 1011 (1995); Berman / INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF INQUIRY 617 • to investigate allegations that such forces are receiving military training to destabilize Rwanda; • to identify parties aiding and abetting the illegal acquisition of arms by former Rwandan government forces, contrary to the council’s resolutions referred to above; and • to recommend measures to end the illegal flow of arms in the subregion in viola- tion of the council resolutions referred to above. To carry out its investigation, the council recommended the commission be composed of 5 to 10 impartial and internationally respected persons including legal, military, and police experts under the chairmanship of an eminent person and assisted by appropriate support staff. The council also called on states, UN bodies, and others “as appropriate” to collate information in their possession relating to the mandate of the commission and make this information available. It also called on states to cooperate fully with the commission, including: • guaranteeing freedom of access and movement (including border points, airfields, and refugee camps), • providing information on request and access to relevant archives, and • taking appropriate measures to ensure the commission members’ safety and security. The commission conducted its work from October 1995 through October 1996 and issued three reports.8 A fourth report, an addendum, was issued in January 1998. It was primarily a record of correspondence that had been received since the commission had submitted its last report.9 The commission was successful to a surprising degree in fulfilling its man- date. It was able to document in great detail a shipment of weapons from the Sey- chelles to the ex-FAR in contravention of the embargo. It was also able to docu- ment that the ex-FAR and Interahamwe were conducting military training with the intent of retaking Rwanda. The commission’s success in uncovering these events was no doubt made easier by the fact that (a) the government of the Sey- chelles actively and enthusiastically cooperated with the commission and (b) the training being undertaken was an open secret, and in close proximity to refugee camps with large numbers of international humanitarian personnel milling around. The commission also brought to light many lesser or unknown facts such as the ex-FAR/Interahamwe’s extensive fund-raising and recruitment activities in Kenya. The significance of the commission’s work can be gauged in part by the fact that the decision was taken not to issue the report (although it was quickly leaked). Concurrent with the commission’s writing its findings was the advent of a rebellion in Zaire that, unknown at the time, would quickly succeed in ousting President Mobutu Sese Seko from power. One theory put forth to explain the decision not to make the ICOI report public was to refrain from giving Rwanda the pretext to invade Zaire and make an already volatile situation worse. A 618 AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST security council–mandated report concluding that Zaire was being used for (if not actually assisting in) the planned overthrow of the government of Rwanda would have provided Kigali with a casus belli (cause for war). THE COMMISSION’S REACTIVATION On April 9, 1998, the council reactivated the commission.10 Although much had changed in the region as concerned the activities and whereabouts of the ex-FAR and Interahamwe, ICOI’s mandate was pretty much the same as in 1995 (with notable changes underlined): • to collect information and investigate reports relating to the sale, supply, and ship- ment of arms and related materiel to former Rwandan government forces and mili- tias in the Great Lakes region of central Africa, in violation of Security Council Resolutions 918 (1994), 997 (1995), and 1011 (1995); • to identify parties aiding and abetting the illegal sale to or acquisition of arms by former Rwandan government forces and militias, contrary to the resolutions referred to above; and • to make recommendations relating to the illegal flow of arms in the Great Lakes region. Thus, ICOI’s focus was narrowed in the sense that military training was not mentioned but expanded to include explicit reference to the militias (i.e., the Interahamwe). This change was more cosmetic and legalistic than substantive as the lack of explicit reference to the militias had not hindered the commission’s previous investigation or reporting. As concerned the new wording of the request for recommendations, the commission interpreted it to mean that the council intended ICOI to undertake a broader investigation (a view not univer- sally shared in the secretariat). A much bigger difference concerned the commission’s administration. In Resolution 1013, the council encouraged states to make voluntary contributions “to supplement” the UN Trust Fund for Rwanda to finance the commission’s work. In Resolution 1161, however, the council encouraged states to make vol- untary contributions “to provide” the financing for the UN Trust Fund for Rwanda for the work of the commission. As a result, ICOI could not spend money unless it was specifically earmarked for its work. The commission reestablished its operations in Nairobi on May 13 after a week-long series of briefings at headquarters in New York. Over the next 6 months, the chairman, Ambassador Mahmoud Kassem of Egypt, and the three commission members visited nine other countries in the region (Burundi, Ethio- pia, Mozambique, Rwanda, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zim- babwe), as well as two countries in Europe (Belgium and the United Kingdom). These countries were selected because the commission believed it could obtain useful information to further its investigation. A visit did not necessarily signify Berman / INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF INQUIRY 619 that the government was suspected of having violated the embargo. The chair- man and members met with representatives of states and international and inter- governmental organizations, as well as members of civil society, including nongovernmental organizations, research institutes, and the media. THE COMMISSION’S FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS The commission had relatively little success in documenting arms sales in contravention of the embargo. The commission learned a lot about general trends but little about specific incidents that it could report. The region is awash in small arms—the area in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) that borders Rwanda and Uganda was described routinely as the “Wild West” or an “open arms bazaar.” The commission was told of instances when chickens were being bartered for guns. Legal shipments of arms quickly found their way into rebel hands through government policy, corruption, or capture. The commission was told how a rebel group active in the region looked at arms sales to the gov- ernment it was fighting with concern because of the increasing threat they posed—but not for the reasons one might at first expect. The rebels were con- cerned not so much that the weapons might be used against them but rather with the logistical and security problems they would encounter in trying to safely store the additional stocks of weapons that they assumed they would soon cap- ture. The commission also learned that significant shipments of small arms were arriving in the region from eastern European surpluses, but it was not possible to ascertain that such shipments were going directly to the ex-FAR and Interahamwe in contravention of the embargo. Several interlocutors suggested that African arms manufacturers were also selling weapons and ammunition to rebel groups in the region because of economic necessity if not politics, but they could provide no proof and the commission had insufficient reason to visit any arms factories. The commission had some success, however, in tracking the ex-FAR and the Interahamwe. This in itself was an accomplishment and a time-consuming exer- cise as little was known about their whereabouts after the rebellion in Zaire that led to Mobutu’s overthrow. Whereas formed units of ex-FAR/Interahamwe had previously been located principally in eastern Zaire and western Tanzania, they had since scattered throughout the region. Those in eastern Zaire had fled from the advancing rebels that were supported by Rwanda and comprised significant numbers of Banyamulenge Zaireans. The Banyamulenge were seen as having ethnic ties to Tutsis and, therefore, had come under increasing attack by Hutus and other Zaireans sympathetic to the anti-Tutsi propaganda promulgated from the refugee camps as well as from Kinshasa. Retribution was exacted from the entire Rwandan Hutu refugee population without discretion. It is widely believed that many thousands of the Rwandans who had been living in the camps 620 AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST were killed. (Rwandan Hutu refugees in Tanzania, of whom there were fewer, were repatriated with little concern for their ability to be absorbed or for their eventual resettlement—as long as it was not in Tanzania.) The commission there- fore believed that it had to ascertain where exactly the ex-FAR and Interahamwe were, and in what numbers, to better know where to track arms deliveries that were in violation of the embargo. As a result of its independent research and information obtained from a cou- ple of hundred interviews, the commission concluded that at the beginning of August 1998, some 50,000 ex-FAR and Interahamwe were located in sizable organized groups in nine countries. The countries were Angola (1,500); Burundi (500); the Central African Republic (2,000); Congo (Brazzaville) (5,000- 7,000); the DRC (15,000); Rwanda (10,000-15,000); the Sudan (5,000-8,000); Tanzania (3,000-5,000); and Zambia (2,000).11 These numbers should be taken as indicative and not authoritative. Although much anecdotal information was received,12 the genocidaires’ understandable interest in maintaining a low pro- file coupled with their intermingling with other rebel groups and ongoing recruitment made their enumeration extremely difficult. As concerned the loca- tion of the leadership, the commission believed that apart from those that had returned to northwest Rwanda, there were others who remained principally in West Africa, Kenya (although a 1997 crackdown by the Kenyan government had reduced Rwandan extremists’ activities and fund-raising in Nairobi), and South Africa. The commission also had some success in substantiating that the ex-FAR and Interahamwe had entered into alliances with other rebel movements throughout the region. ICOI heard credible reports that they were active with other rebels in Angola, Burundi, Congo (Brazzaville), the DRC, Tanzania, and Uganda. The commission received copies of written agreements between ex-FAR/ Interahamwe and Burundian rebel groups that it believed to be authentic13 and was told by sources rated reliable that written agreements had been concluded between ex-FAR/Interahamwe and the Ugandan Allied Democratic Forces. It was clear that in several instances the rebel groups shared resources and took part together in military operations. However, the outstanding question remained as to exactly how formal were these alliances: simple marriages of convenience or multilayered and long-term relationships? Most, it would appear, reflect the former category. The commission concluded, therefore, that placing an embargo on only one rebel group was not going to stop that group from obtaining weapons from other rebel groups not under embargo. The commission recommended that the coun- cil consider rewording the current embargo that focuses on prohibiting arms sales that are intended for the ex-FAR/Interahamwe for use “within Rwanda.” Having said this, the commission was not so naive as to believe that the embargo was being violated because such a loophole existed or that the placement of additional rebel groups under embargoes would in themselves solve the problem. Berman / INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF INQUIRY 621 The commission noted that none of its recommendations from 1996 had been implemented and, therefore, limited its recommendations. It recognized that without political will on the part of the region’s governments and of the interna- tional community, technical measures would be largely ineffective. The com- mission commended South Africa for its efforts to combat the trade in illegal arms, such as by reducing the number of international airports and creating national legislation aimed to strengthen the government’s control over arms shipments and the supply of military training. Although the efficacy of these policies would not be known for some time, Pretoria’s approach to the problem of illicit arms transfers contrasted sharply with that of many other countries, which believed (incorrectly) either that no problem existed or that their efforts to deal with the problem were sufficient. LESSONS AND OBSERVATIONS FROM THE FIELD Even in the best of circumstances, tasking a four-person team to conduct a 6-month investigation into such a complex and murky matter as illegal arms shipments to the ex-FAR and Interahamwe was extremely optimistic. Six months was barely sufficient time to establish sources and arrange the requisite visits, let alone digest the information obtained. But, the commission was forced to work under difficult conditions—some of them avoidable. The total reliance on the Voluntary Trust Fund was problematic. Nine coun- tries did pledge U.S.$700,000 to the trust fund.14 Although additional funds might have enabled the commission to undertake a fuller investigation and visit more countries, the greater issue was the significant lag time between countries’ pledges and disbursements. The commission could not spend money until it had been actually deposited in its account. The commission wasted an inordinate amount of time waiting for appropriate office equipment because of lack of funds on hand. Bureaucratic squabbles between New York and the UN Office at Nairobi—in large part due to financing questions—resulted in much unneces- sary and unproductive tension and misunderstandings. Granted, the rebellion in DRC that began on August 2, 1998, greatly compli- cated the commission’s work. A trip to Kinshasa that was potentially of critical importance given the reported activities of the Interahamwe and ex-FAR in that country appeared to be imminent. (A lot of effort had been put into making the visit a reality given the tense relations that developed between the United Nations and the DRC during the UN investigation into allegations of massacres of Rwandan refugees.) The rebellion made it impossible to visit Kinshasa, and efforts to meet President Laurent Kabila in Lubumbashi proved unworkable. Also, the attention of Kampala and Kigali lay in events unfolding in their west- ern neighbor and not with an investigation—the effects of which were question- able. The commission managed only one more visit to Rwanda after August 2 and did not return to Uganda. A diplomat from a country in the region, who was 622 AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST reported to be highly reliable and to possess information of direct concern to the commission’s mandate, had prior to August 2 indicated to the chairman his will- ingness to assist ICOI completely. However, when the commission met with the diplomat some weeks after the rebellion had commenced, the chairman found his interlocutor formal and reserved. Nothing of substance was gleaned from the meeting. That country’s policy toward various players in the region had obvi- ously changed dramatically. The commission faced numerous obstacles that called into question the seri- ousness with which the Security Council, the international community, and regional governments viewed the commission’s work. Despite the Security Council’s admonitions for states and UN bodies to cooperate, they rarely did so enthusiastically and without much delay. It was interesting how “popular” the commission became the closer the date approached when it would have to leave Nairobi for New York. For example, on May 22, 1998, the Kenyan foreign minister met with the chairman and agreed to appoint a liaison officer to assist the commission in setting up interviews and meetings with government officials and agencies. This was done on Septem- ber 30. One government responded to the chairman’s request in June that an offi- cial visit be scheduled sometime before the commission had to return to New York in mid-November with the news that the end of November was a good time for the commission to visit the country! A more effective tactic was to express the government’s strong desire to assist the commission and then explain that the proposed dates were not convenient as the foreign minister would be either away on official business or just returning from, or leaving for, official business. Once governments felt the commission would not be able to carry out its work fully because of time constraints, they became increasingly accessible and welcom- ing. States did not want to be seen as having failed to assist ICOI but did not want ICOI to ask too many questions or have access to too many people or places. By granting a meeting toward the end of the commission’s mandate, they could maintain that they had indeed cooperated and would have been pleased to assist the commission further if only the chairman and members had not had to depart the region for headquarters so soon to issue its report. The same is true not just for member states but for UN bodies. Whereas many individuals from the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) were helpful, there was a general reluctance to be expansive and as detailed as possi- ble. This is perhaps understandable given that UNHCR staff members must work in difficult circumstances and would not necessarily be enthusiastic about exposing activities such as recruitment, training, and arming of rebels in and around refugee camps. Nevertheless, the commission certainly found curious the numerous reports of “refugees” fleeing the relative safety and comfort of ref- ugee camps and towns in neighboring countries and choosing to return to DRC to rejoin the conflict. The conventional wisdom has always been that refugees tend to flee from conflicts. This suggested that UN officials from UNHCR and other agencies that worked closely in assisting UNHCR in running the camps Berman / INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF INQUIRY 623 would possess information that might have been extremely useful to the com- mission given its mandate. Unfortunately, obtaining information relevant to the commission’s mandate was difficult. Although the ICOI was not able to identify the specific nature of, and players involved in, arming the ex-FAR and Interahamwe in contravention of the UN embargo, it successfully highlighted that these two groups responsible for the 1994 genocide largely remain a cohesive and destabilizing force. The attitude and predisposition of the Security Council, the international community, and countries in the region toward the commission are equally troubling. Their repeated failures to respond with alacrity and appropriate resolve suggest that a similar tragedy in Rwanda and the Great Lakes region will elicit a similarly tepid response to that which has characterized the limited and delayed undertakings of the ICOI. NOTES 1. The Security Council authorized the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) on October 5, 1993. See UN Document S/RES/872 (1993, October 5). 2. The journalist Philip Gourevitch has been a particularly forceful proponent of this view and has reported that the UNAMIR force commander, Canadian Maj-Gen. Roméo Dallaire, provided the under-secretary-general for peacekeeping operations, Kofi Annan, with an account of the plans for extermination from a well-placed Hutu source he believed to be credible. (See, for example, Gourevitch, 1998, pp. 103-107.) Kofi Annan, UN secretary-general, proposed that the matter be investigated, which the Security Council accepted. A full report was made public in 2000. 3. See UN Document S/RES/912 (1994, April 21). 4. See UN Document S/RES/918 (1994, May 17). 5. See UN Document S/RES/929 (1994, June 22). 6. See UN Document S/RES/1011 (1995, August 16). 7. See UN Document S/RES/1013 (1995, September 7). 8. See UN Documents S/1996/67 (1996, January 26), S/1996/195 (1996, March 14), and S/ 1997/1010 (1997, December 24). 9. See UN Document S/1998/63 (1998, January 26). The International Commission of Inquiry had submitted its final report more than a year before it was published. 10. See UN Document S/RES/1161 (1998, April 9). 11. See UN Document S/1998/1096, Annex. 12. For example, one person with considerable experience in the region said the way to distin- guish between members of the former Zairean army (ex-FAZ for Forces Armées Zairoises) and ex– Forces Armées Rwendaises/Interahamwe, who often congregated together in the northeastern Dem- ocratic Republic of the Congo, was only during combat. Those who ran away from the fighting were ex-FAZ. 13. See S/1998/777, Annex. 14. The commission received $700,000 in new pledges: Belgium ($100,000), France ($40,000), Germany ($50,000), Japan ($40,000), the Netherlands ($70,000), Norway ($90,000), Sweden ($50,000), the United Kingdom ($160,000), and the United States ($100,000). These anticipated contributions supplemented $100,000 already in the trust fund from a donation Belgium had made in 1995. See UN Document S/1998/777 (1998, August 19, paragraph 60) and UN Document S/1998/ 1096 (1998, November 18, paragraph 6). 624 AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST REFERENCES Gourevitch, P. (1998). We wish to inform you that tomorrow we will be killed with our families: Stories from Rwanda. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. Rwanda/Zaire: Rearming with impunity, international support for the perpetrators of the Rwandan genocide. (1995, May). Human Rights Watch Arms Project, 7(4). Berman / INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF INQUIRY 625 AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTISTIganski / HATE CRIMES HURT MORE Hate Crimes Hurt More PAUL IGANSKI University of Essex, United Kingdom Constitutional questions about hate crime laws in the United States were settled in the early 1990s. Yet, critics persist in arguing that the laws punish “improper thinking.” In this con- text, this article addresses the question of the justification of punishing motivation—or bias—behind hate crimes when the type of expression and the thought behind it used to indi- cate motivation are largely protected. There has been considerable legal scholarship on this question but little empirical investigation of how supporters of legislation respond to the question. The article draws from in-depth interviews carried out with a purposive sample of “elite” informants in Boston, Massachusetts, in 1999. A key theme that emerged was that alleged greater harms inflicted by hate crimes—over and above the harms inflicted by the same underlying but otherwise motivated crimes—justify greater punishment. A conceptual- ization is provided of alleged harms involved. THE CONTROVERSY OF “HATE CRIME” LAWS A significant policy response to racist incidents in the United States has been the enactment of laws providing extra punishment for crimes with a racial element than for the same underlying offenses without the racial context. A wide variety of other policy measures has also been established, but laws against “hate crimes” or “bias crimes,” as they are called, have generated the most controversy. Hate crime statutes with provisions for penalty enhancement enacted by most states—and with many covering religion, sexual orientation, and gender (Anti- Defamation League, 1998, pp. 20-21)—have been subject to a fiercely contested debate about whether they are both desirable and constitutional. Despite the U.S. Supreme Court deciding on the constitutional concerns in 1993 (Wiscon- sin v. Mitchell, 1993a), opposition continues to surface, especially in the news media (cf. Jacoby, 1998a, 1998b). Journalistic commentary has drawn consider- ably from academic debate. Primarily legal scholars have set the terms of the debate, and it is now polarized between the advocates (cf. Lawrence, 1999; B. Levin, 1998) and opponents (cf. Jacobs & Potter, 1998) of legislation. Controversy has centered on the alleged restriction by hate crime laws of a fundamental human “right.” Critics argue that the additional punishment of crimes with a bias covered by hate crime laws amounts to the punishment of 626 AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST, Vol. 45 No. 4, December 2001 626-638 © 2001 Sage Publications ideas (Gey, 1997), “improper thinking,” and “extra punishment for values, thoughts, and opinions which the government deems abhorrent” (Jacobs & Pot- ter, 1997, p. 10). Opponents of legislation raise the prospect of the “slippery- slope” in that “if the government can enhance penalties for bigoted motives, it can enhance penalties for any disfavored motive” (Adelman & Moorshead, 1995, p. 21). Such opposition is rooted in the commitment to freedom of speech guaranteed by the First Amendment to the Constitution, and about freedom of the thought—or opinion—that lies behind speech and other expression. Bigoted speech, and the thoughts behind it, provides the main indicator of motivation or bias behind hate crimes. However, without a predicate—or under- lying—offense, such speech is generally protected in the United States. There also appears to be considerable public support for such protection. Recent analy- sis of data from the General Social Survey revealed that a majority of respon- dents—including Black respondents—were opposed to prohibitions against racist speech (Gross & Kinder, 1998). In this context, this article addresses the question of the justification and logic of punishing motivation—or bias—behind hate crimes when the type of speech indicating bias is largely protected. Although there has been some significant legal scholarship on this question, there has been little empirical investigation. The article provides a development of earlier work on the desirability of hate crime laws by providing empirical material to inform normative judgments about legislation. It draws from part of a research program that involved a pilot project consisting of a series of in-depth interviews with “elite” informants (Marshall & Rossman, 1999, p. 113) carried out in Boston, Massachusetts, in the spring and winter 1999.1 Massachusetts has some of the most comprehensive hate crime laws in the United States, and it therefore provides a useful case for policy learning. Focusing on Boston is particularly instructive, for as one of the respondents said, the legislation “was passed state wide, but it was to deal with a problem in the city of Boston” (R13).2 The aim of the pilot was to test out the feasibility of an investigation of the perceived value of hate crime legislation among the key communities with a stake in the debate about legislation. They included minority communities com- monly targeted by hate crimes: law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, victim support agencies, media commentators, and academic commentators.3 The research used sociological tools—qualitative data collection and analysis—to inform debate on normative questions that have a fundamental significance for policy intervention against hate crimes. THE CASE FOR PUNISHING HATE: GREATER HARM A common view among respondents in the Boston pilot was that hate crimes are distinct from the same underlying crimes without a bias motivation because Iganski / HATE CRIMES HURT MORE 627 they inflict greater harms. This view provided the dominant justification for the extra punishment attached to hate crimes. There is a only a small amount of empirical work indicating the harms generated by hate crimes. In this context, it is instructive to conceptualize the harms suggested by respondents in the Boston pilot, as they provide the core of their justification for hate crime laws, and pro- vide the initial step in the logic of their argument. We might think of the harms generated by hate crimes as waves of harm that spread well beyond the individ- ual victim (see Figure 1), and consequently, the targeted individual may be regarded as only the initial victim. THE INITIAL VICTIM For the victimized individual, there are arguably distinct psychological and emotional harms, which have been captured in a limited literature (cf. Garnets, Herek, & Levy, 1992; Lawrence, 1999, pp. 29-44; Virdee, 1997), although the harms have also been disputed in the literature (Jacobs & Potter, 1998). Some of the respondents in the Boston pilot discussed their views of the harms involved for the individual: It scars the victim far more deeply. It is much more difficult I think as a victim to say I was put in the hospital because I’m gay or because I’m Hispanic, or because I’m a woman, than it is to say, you know I was walking down the street and I had my bag around my arm and some guy snatched from me, some guy knocked me over the head and took what I had, because they want property. You’re not being singled out. You are beaten or hurt because of who you are. It is a direct and delib- erate and focused crime and it is a violation of really a person’s essence, a person’s soul, because . . . you can’t change who you. . . . And it’s much more difficult to deal with. . . . Because what a hate crime says to a victim of hate crime is “you’re not fit to live in this society with me. I don’t believe that you have the same rights as I do. I believe that you are second to me. I am superior to you.” (R6) In many occasions victims are more damaged than equal crimes. . . . Why, because there is no way that someone can no longer be Black, and therefore protect them- selves from the vulnerability that lead to their prior attack. And generally hate crimes are for a characteristic that someone can’t change. If someone’s being robbed because they wear a lot of jewelry, then they have the ability to hide their jewelry or not, wear it in a particular area, and therefore feel less vulnerable to rob- bery. That is not true for people, at least in terms of how they internalize it I believe, the sense of being a victim of a hate crime. (R8) I think that one of the thoughts behind hate crime legislation is that the attack or the crime inflicts unique psychological trauma on the victim . . . that’s going to inflict a unique trauma on me because if I were just attacked for whatever reason that’s upsetting, that’s horrible. But now I know I was targeted and I was chosen for something about myself that I can’t change, that is at the core of my being, that I wouldn’t want to change, that is unique to who I am. (R7) 628 AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST Not all individual victims are going to experience the harms in the same way. Victims of hate crimes targeted because of their sexual orientation arguably experience unique conflicts (Garnets et al., 1992): Often times it affects how they view their sexual orientation, and how they view themselves as a result of their sexual orientation. So for somebody who is very comfortable with their sexuality prior to an attack or prior to an incident, this often times challenges that, and they think, “Wow something that I was comfortable with and happy with, something that was a source of so much pride and joy and love for me, is now what caused me to be attacked, and I don’t understand that.” Or for example, somebody who is not really comfortable with their sexuality and who is attacked because of that, it completely shatters them, and often times sends them back into the closet, and that kind of leads to more psychological effects. (R7) THE INITIAL VICTIM’S GROUP IN THE NEIGHBORHOOD The harms generated by hate crimes spread beyond the individual to the ini- tial victim’s “group” or community in the wider neighborhood community who know the victim or hear of his or her experience. Iganski / HATE CRIMES HURT MORE 629 The initial victim The initial victim's 'group' in the neighborhood The initial victim’s ‘group’ beyond the neighborhood Other targeted Communities Societal norms and values Figure 1: Waves of Harm Generated by Hate Crimes There are people out there who say an assault is an assault, a murder is a murder, a robbery is a robbery. But those crimes, as awful as sometimes they can be . . . these hate crimes they take it one step further. They take that robbery one step further, and it just juts out throughout the community. It’s not just one simple thing that’s done and gone. It stays, it lingers and has potential to cause all kinds of problems which come back and haunt the whole community, the whole neighbor- hood. . . . The enhanced penalty speaks to the damage that these types of crimes have the potential of doing. It’s not just a crime that’s done and gone. (R5) The potential for hate crimes to provoke retaliation and communal tension has been clearly demonstrated in the United States. Respondents discussed the processes involved: It tends to get people really anxious and excited and . . . we like to call them domes- tic terrorism because with the attack on one person often times people retaliate against that, people of that group retaliate. So it’s not just one crime. You’ve got the potential for many other crimes, like a ripple effect that’s out there. (R5) A single case can polarize a community. It sometimes causes retaliation by the vic- tim’s group against a member of the perpetrator’s group that is completely inno- cent and disconnected. The reason is because hate crimes are viewed as message crimes, and so the victim group is sending back a message to the perpetrator group “we’re not going to stand for this”; “you’re going to suffer as we are.” It is true, that for example, if a woman is being raped in a community, or there are these rapes of people walking in the park, that everyone feels a sense of nervousness. But I don’t think that that kind of situation causes intergroup tensions, or polarization so that you have the polarization of various ethnic or racial or religious groups in a com- munity as a result of the kind of incidents that you’re talking about. So I think that there is a very clear distinction in terms of the potential consequences on a commu- nity level and often even broader than the individual community. (R8) THE INITIAL VICTIM’S GROUP BEYOND THE NEIGHBORHOOD Other persons who share the victim’s characteristics—and come to hear of the victim’s plight—may potentially be affected by a hate crime.4 They may respond as if they have been victimized themselves. Some of the respondents indicated how hate crimes therefore constitute “message crimes”: If I walk out of . . . [here] . . . and somebody jumps me and beats me up and while they’re beating me up they’re calling me a faggot, and they say, “We saw you come out of . . . [there] . . . we know what you are.” First of all, that’s certainly going to victimize me and my friends and my family. But for people who read about that and hear about that who are gay it’s going to send them a clear message that that could have been them. Because I was targeted not because of my wallet necessar- ily but because they thought I was gay. So that could tell them that they’re a poten- tial victim. (R7) 630 AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST If there’s a couple of African Americans who live in a White neighborhood, and there’s a bias crime committed against one African American, the perpetrator is trying to send a message to all African Americans. (R3) These crimes are also far more damaging to the community because you are not just targeting one person, you are targeting every other person within that victim’s group. (R5) I think there is a special consequence to the victim’s group. . . . I think that they respond in many times as if they’ve been victimized, because they share the same characteristic as that person. They take it personally. (R8) Particular cases of hate crimes given a high profile by the news media can have potentially far-reaching effects. When Matthew Shepard was murdered we got a lot of calls that week from people in Boston who were saying, “You know I’ve read about this murder, I’ve been fol- lowing it on TV and it scares me, I’ve been physically sick. I’m afraid to leave my house.” So we’ve had people who were really exhibiting acute reactions to trauma and they were secondary victims. They weren’t the primary victim. But because Matthew Shepard was targeted because he was gay it sent a clear message to indi- viduals half-way across our country that it could be them. It affected them very intensely. (R7) The Matthew Shepard case, or the James Byrd case, can in fact affect racial rela- tions in this country for example well beyond Jasper, Texas, and I believe it has. And I think that’s why it is special and it’s different. (R8) OTHER TARGETED COMMUNITIES In addition to the impact on the victim’s group, the wave of harm generated by hate crimes can spread to other targeted groups within and beyond the vic- tim’s neighborhood. As suggested by one respondent, Even though you have one person that’s targeted . . . this stuff really incites a lot of tension and people get really crazy. And even if you have, let’s say, an African American person that is targeted in the community who is to say, you know it is sending out a message to that person as well as everyone else in his group, “You’re not wanted here.” But who’s to say that people from another group, let’s say Asians or Hispanics, or gays, or anyone, could say, “Well Jeez if it could happen to him because of who he is who’s to say that it can’t happen to me.” (R5) SOCIETAL NORMS AND VALUES For some respondents, hate crimes strike at the core of societal values, offending the collective moral code: Iganski / HATE CRIMES HURT MORE 631 While all crime may be offensive in a democratic society you do sort of expect that people who want money and don’t have money may knock you over the head and take your wallet, and that robbery is their motive. And as undesirable as that motive might be it is somehow more odious to harm someone for no other reason than because of who they are, not because they have something that you want, that would be bad enough. But to harm someone or hurt someone because of who they are, and it recognizes both the fact that that kind of racially motivated hatred or bias-motivated hatred is offensive to society. (R6) It’s our diversity that makes us so great, and again, for somebody to threaten some- body or act and hurt somebody based on their difference, I think it’s just outra- geous. It really rips at what this country was founded on and I think it really . . . it polarizes communities, it pulls us apart. (R5) THE CHALLENGE OF RIGHTS TO FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION The apparent harms inflicted by hate crimes appear to provide a compelling justification for the punishment of bias motivation behind crimes. However, such a justification would arguably be defeated by the stronger claim to freedom of expression if—as opponents of legislation suggest—hate crime laws punish expression and the thoughts and ideas behind it. Against this claim, however, it may be argued that rather than punishing expression, in the punishment of hate crimes the laws use motivation, generally indicated by speech, as an indicator of the particular act committed. The motiva- tion itself is not punished. This approach was suggested by a number of respon- dents as they reconciled hate crime legislation with a defense of freedom of expression: My view is you are entitled to be a racist . . . as long as you don’t interfere in some- body else’s ability to have access to various things. . . . We have a First Amend- ment, that’s one of the great things about the country. . . . On the other hand . . . you’re not penalizing somebody because of their words, their thoughts. You’re punishing them because of what they did. . . . They assaulted you . . . and we enhance that because as they did that their words indicated an intent to do more. (R1) In my opinion what’s being punished in a hate crime is the action. Now there’s a totally different, if I want to stand on a street corner and say I hate all Jews, under American law that is perfectly legal. If I stand on a street corner and I say I hate . . . because he’s Jewish, and then I hit him, that deserves an enhanced penalty. And that is a hate crime. So I do . . . so I draw the distinction, and I would say that we are not punishing the thought, we’re punishing the action. (R3) And I don’t think that we are punishing the thought so much as we are punishing the act that flows from the thought. We are using the thought to show what moti- vated the crime. . . . You said while you approached the person, “I’m gonna kill 632 AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST you, you faggot,” that tells us that you intended to hurt this person because of who they are or of who you perceived them to be. (R6) It’s not at all penalizing thought or ideas, it’s penalizing behavior. So you can think whatever you want to think about me, just don’t beat me. And the reason that you beat me is because you don’t like me because I’m gay. It has nothing else to do with that. Obviously it’s very clear that that’s what’s happened. “You can think what you want. You can even call me a faggot when I’m walking down the street. But don’t you dare touch me because I’m a faggot.” (R7) You can have that thought. You can express that thought. But you cannot act in fur- therance of that thought, and we are punishing the act. How we know why you did what you did, you told us, you said. (R8) It follows from accepting the legitimacy of using motivation as an indicator of the particular crime that the crime committed is qualitatively different from the same act without the same motivation. As discussed above, respondents believed that hate crimes are distinct from the same underlying crime because of the greater harms they inflict. Although it may be undesirable—and unconstitu- tional in the United States—to impose extra punishment for particular thoughts and speech, greater punishment for greater harm does not infringe on rights to freedom of speech and freedom of thought. The punishment is awarded for the harm inflicted, not for the motivation behind the conduct that inflicts the harm. Motive is only relevant to determine whether the particular act committed is a type of act—bias-motivated crime—that inflicts greater harms than the type of act— the same conduct without a bias motivation—that causes lesser harms. Punish- ment of the greater harm involved in hate crimes was accepted by Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority in Wisconsin v. Mitchell (1993b), the landmark case that settled the constitutional challenge against hate crime legislation.5 There are still a number of difficulties, though, with this position. If it is accepted that extra punishment of hate crimes is justified by the harms they inflict, it could be questioned whether the harms are primarily a reaction to the ideas attached to the underlying offense (Gey, 1997, pp. 1043-1050), or do the harms involve something else? If the harms associated with hate crimes are mostly reactions to the ideas behind them—in other words, offense or dislike of the ideas—the extra punishment would indeed arguably constitute the punish- ment of those ideas. This view was taken by one of the respondents: I think that it may be true in some cases that a racially or ethnically motivated attack offends or hurts members of a community or a subset of the population in a way that a quote-unquote ordinary attack wouldn’t do, but I’m not sure that that should make a difference. In fact I’m sure that it shouldn’t make a difference to the criminal justice system. . . . I find it offensive to say that if you have two victims of a crime, two people who have been beaten bloody, two people who have been assaulted, two people who have been murdered, to say that what was done to one person is worse than what was done to the other because of what was in the mind of the criminal who assaulted the first person, is a terrible injustice. . . . Look at two Iganski / HATE CRIMES HURT MORE 633 victims lying on the ground and bleeding from their wounds and tell one of them we the government will take your wounds more seriously than his, I find very offensive. (R1) The same respondent used the example of Holocaust denial to illustrate their defense of freedom of expression that provides the basis of their opposition to extra punishment for hate crimes: There’s a good illustration. . . . My father is a survivor of the Holocaust, he and his family were in Auschwitz. They were all wiped out, he barely survived, he was on death marches and so forth and so on. If anybody is going to be sensitive to ques- tions of Holocaust denial I would be certainly among them. I find it unbelievably hurtful when someone starts to claim this is all a myth, it’s Zionist propaganda or whatever. But the fact that I find it hurtful in my view doesn’t take away the indi- vidual’s right to say it. As we say in America, it’s a free country. You are free to say what you like. You know there are certain categories of speech that have always been illegal, slander, liable, and fraud, and so on. But if somebody wants to get up and say “Hitler was great man and the Jews deserved it” or “It’s all Zionist propa- ganda and there never was a Holocaust,” as much as I might be offended and pained to hear those views I would be even more offended and pained to think that my government would start punishing somebody for what he said or what he believed, and I take exactly that point of view and apply it to this question of hate crimes legislation. It’s not enough of a reason to invoke the punitive arm of the state to say that a group of people find something painful. In a free society there will always be tensions, that’s part of what freedom entails. (R1) HOW DO HATE CRIMES HURT MORE? One prominent commentator on hate crime laws has recently argued that “hate crimes should be demonstrated to be distinct and more severe than other offenses to warrant differential punishment” (B. Levin, 1999, p. 8). This can be extended by arguing that for differential punishment to be justified, it has to be demonstrated that the greater severity of hate crimes is manifest in ways beyond offense or dislike of the “hate” behind them. There has been a great deal of speculation about what the harms might be but relatively little empirical investigation. And, not all of the alleged harms provide a justification for the additional punishment of a class of crimes. For instance, it has been observed that hate crimes are more likely to involve “excessive vio- lence” (B. Levin, 1999, p. 15); cause injury; lead to hospitalization; and involve multiple offenders, serial attacks, and repeat victimization of the same targets than criminal assaults in general (B. Levin, 1999, p. 15; J. Levin & McDevitt, 1993). Although these harms would obviously merit more severe penalties in the specific cases to which they apply, none of them arguably provides a justifica- tion for the creation of a category of punishment above and beyond the circum- stances of the particular crime. One example may illustrate the point. There would be no logical justification for punishing a perpetrator of a hate crime who 634 AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST acted alone just as severely as a perpetrator who acted in concert with others, solely on the basis that hate crimes on average are more likely to be committed by groups of offenders than is the case for the underlying crime without a bias motivation. Arguably, the distinctiveness of hate crimes is not about the severity of the injury sustained by the individual victim. It is instead about the injuries inflicted over and above the circumstances of any particular crime. At least two inter- related types of injury may fit the bill: psychic injury and the in terrorem effect of hate crimes. These injuries were particularly singled out by Chief Justice Rehnquist in Wisconsin v. Mitchell.6 To take the first type of injury, to justify the establishment of hate crimes as a separate class of crimes deserving of greater punishment, it needs to be demon- strated that hate crimes usually cause psychic injury to victims irrespective of the particular circumstances of the incident in question. There has been some research on the psychological and emotional impact of hate crimes, which indi- cates the effects on particular victims (cf. Herek, Gillis, Cogan, & Glunt, 1997). But, some of the findings are equivocal (cf. Barnes & Ephross, 1994; Craig, 1999), and as a body of evidence not all of the findings to date conclusively dem- onstrate a distinct class of psychic injury associated with hate crimes. In addi- tion, we might also expect the psychic injuries to be mediated by the group expe- rience of the group to which the victim belongs. To take the second type of injury that appears to satisfy the condition for regarding hate crimes as a distinct class of crimes, hate crimes arguably send out a terroristic message to members of the victim’s group in the immediate neigh- borhood and beyond. The damage inflicted therefore goes above and beyond the damage to the individual victim. In the words of one commentator, “violence constitutes a threat of more violence to minority group members” (Weinstein, 1992, p. 8). Again, though, to justify the greater punishment of hate crimes as a separate class of crimes, it needs to be demonstrated that the terroristic impact of a hate crime usually goes above and beyond the perceived threat behind the underlying crime without the bias motivation. Although this is strongly believed to be the case, there has been very little empirical investigation to determine whether this is actually so. One respondent indicated how the particular terroristic impact of hate crimes might work: If you know of a really horrendous crime that takes place, a beating or a rape, or something . . . you listen to the news and you say to yourself . . . part of what your mind is saying, “Could this happen to me?” And if you hear that a beating was over a drug deal, you say, “Nah, that wouldn’t happen to me because a drug deal—I don’t do that stuff.” . . . But these random ones, you can’t find a way to make your- self less vulnerable. It exists, and you say, “Yeh, how can I protect myself?” So one is the random danger. Second, is the group danger. A group of offenders on a single victim is much more scary than a single one to one. So more of these hate crimes are done by groups. And the fact that they’re not for money, they’re not to gain pos- sessions. . . . So if you do the traditional things like not carrying hard cash and all Iganski / HATE CRIMES HURT MORE 635 that it doesn’t make you less vulnerable to them. So that a lot of the characteristics of hate crimes that we know are characteristics of crimes that are more scary to a community. . . . Serial killings are the same way. Serial rapes are the same way. They have a differential impact because they seem to have a shared set of charac- teristics that makes crimes more scary to us as people than do others. (R14) There is an emerging consensus in the literature that little is known about the effects of hate crimes beyond the impact on the initial victims. Even the effects on the initial victims are underresearched. The question is, To what extent are hate crimes more harmful than the same underlying offense without the bias motivation? This is an empirical question, and it is a question that has barely been answered beyond assertion. The omission is significant because the alleged greater harm inflicted by hate crimes provides a key justification for greater punishment. It is also significant because understanding the harm involved will arguably inform effective intervention with victims. NOTES 1. The spring element provided the main body of the pilot project. It was made possible by a grant from the British Academy. The aim of the pilot was to test out the feasibility of an investigation of the perceived value of hate crime legislation among communities with a stake in the debate about legis- lation. Potential respondents were identified on the basis of their involvement in policy debate and policy activity on hate crimes. Academic literature, newspaper reports, and word-of-mouth recom- mendation provided the purposive sample of potential respondents. None of the potential respon- dents approached refused to be interviewed. Fourteen respondents were interviewed using a topic guide. Interviews were tape-recorded and a transcription subsequently prepared for analysis. The analytic strategy drew from a grounded theory approach to data analysis. Open coding was applied to the early interviews followed by axial coding around the category of justification for hate crime laws, which inductively emerged as being significant in the early interviews. This category provided a focus for the later interviews, but the initial topic guide was additionally used. Consequently, the data used for the article constitute only one element of the body of data collected in total. The winter element of the project was undertaken to focus specifically on the issue of harm inflicted by hate crimes. It was made possible by a grant from the Nuffield Foundation. The goal was to clarify some dimensions of the emergent ideas around harm from the first element. Four new respondents were purposively selected for their particular expertise in relation to the issue. Two respondents from the first element were interviewed again. The data from these six interviews were incorporated into the analytic process. 2. Respondent numbers are provided after each verbatim quote in the article to give the reader a sense of the range of respondents from whom the data are drawn. 3. Respondents agreed to be named as participants in the pilot project without statements in the research reports attributed to them by name. They are named below to thank them for participating in the research and to give the reader an indication of the coverage of the sample. Thanks are due to: Leonard Alkins, president, National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, Boston; Daniel Bibel, Crime Reporting Unit, Massachusetts State Police; Christina Bouras, executive direc- tor, Governor’s Task Force on Hate Crimes, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts; Andrea Cabral, chief, District Courts, Suffolk County District Attorney’s Office; Richard Cole, chief of the Civil Rights Division, Office of the Attorney General, Massachusetts; Carmen Curry, Community Disor- ders Unit, Boston Police; Brian Flynn, Boston Police; Steven Freeman, legal director, Anti- 636 AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST Defamation League, New York; Don Gorton, cochair, Governor’s Task Force on Hate Crimes; Scott Harshbarger, former attorney general, Massachusetts, professor of criminal justice and law, North- eastern University; Jeff Jacoby, staff reporter, Boston Globe; Fred Lawrence, professor of law, Boston University School of Law; Jack Levin, director of the Brudnick Center on Violence and Con- flict, Northeastern University; Lauren Levin, Eastern States Civil Rights counsel, Anti-Defamation League, Boston; Jack McDevitt, codirector, Center for Criminal Policy Research, College of Crimi- nal Justice, Northeastern University; David Shannon, Victim Recovery Program, Fenway Health Center; Harvey Silverglate, civil rights lawyer; and Ernesto Whittington, Community Disorders Unit, Boston Police. 4. The U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Assistance (1997), has forcefully made this point in its monograph, A Policymaker’s Guide to Hate Crimes, in which it argues, The simple truth about hate crimes is that each offense victimizes not one victim but many. A hate crime victimizes not only the immediate target but every member of the group that the immediate target represents. A bias-motivated offense can cause a broad ripple of discomfiture among members of a targeted group, and a violent hate crime can act like a virus, quickly spreading feelings of terror and loathing across an entire commu- nity. Apart from their psychological impacts, violent hate crimes can create tides of retal- iation and counterretaliation. Therefore, criminal acts motivated by bias may carry far more weight than other types of criminal acts. (p. x) 5. According to Rehnquist, The Wisconsin statute singles out for enhancement bias-inspired conduct because this conduct is thought to inflict greater individual and societal harm. For example, according to the State and its amici, bias motivated crimes are more likely to provoke retaliatory crimes, inflict distinct emotional harms on their victims, and incite community unrest. The State’s desire to redress these perceived harms provides an adequate explanation for its penalty-enhancement provisions over and above mere disagreement with offenders’ beliefs and biases. (Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 1993b) 6. See Note 4. REFERENCES Adelman, L., & Moorshead, P. (1995). Bad laws make hard cases: Hate crime laws and the Supreme Court’s opinion in Wisconsin v. Mitchell. Gonzaga Law Review, 30(1), 1-27. Anti-Defamation League. (1998). 1999 hate crimes laws. New York: Author. Barnes, A., & Ephross, P. H. (1994). The impact of hate violence on victims—Emotional and behav- ioural responses to attacks. Social Work, 39(3), 247-251. Craig, K. M. (1999). Retaliation, fear, or rage. An investigation of African American and White reactions to racist hate crimes. Journal of Interpersonal Violence, 14(2), 138-151. Garnets, L., Herek, G. M., & Levy, B. (1992). Violence and victimization of lesbians and gay men: Mental health consequences. In G. M. Herek & K. T. Berrill (Eds.), Hate crimes. Confronting violence against lesbians and gay men. Newbury Park, CA: Sage. Gey, S. G. (1997). What if Wisconsin v Mitchell had involved Martin Luther King, Jr.? The constitu- tional flaws of hate crime enhancement statutes. George Washington Law Review, 65, 1014-1070. Gross, K. A., & Kinder, D. R. (1998). A collision of principles? Free expression, racial equality and the prohibition of racist speech. British Journal of Political Science, 28, 445-471. Iganski / HATE CRIMES HURT MORE 637 Herek, G. M., Gillis, J. R., Cogan, J. C., & Glunt, E. K. (1997). Hate crime victimization among les- bian, gay, and bisexual adults. Journal of Interpersonal Violence, 12(2), 195-215. Jacobs, J. B., & Potter, K. A. (1997). Hate crimes: A critical perspective. Crime and Justice, 22(1), 1-50. Jacobs, J. B., & Potter, K. A. (1998). Hate crimes. Criminal law & identity politics. New York: Oxford University Press. Jacoby, J. (1998a, July 20). Kennedy’s destructive hate crimes bill. Boston Globe. Jacoby, J. (1998b, October 15). The lessons of Laramie. Boston Globe. Lawrence, F. M. (1999). Punishing hate. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Levin, B. (1998). Motive matters. Klanwatch Intelligence Report [Online]. Available: http:// www.splcenter.org/klanwatch/kw-4g6.html Levin, B. (1999). Hate crimes. Worse by definition. Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice, 15(1), 6-21. Levin, J., & McDevitt, J. (1993). Hate crimes: The rising tide of bigotry and bloodshed. New York: Plenum. Marshall, C., & Rossman, G. B. (1999). Designing qualitative research (3rd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Assistance. (1997). A policymaker’s guide to hate crimes. Washington, DC: Author. Virdee, V. (1997). Racial harassment. In T. Modood, R. Berthoud, J. Lakey, J. Nazroo, P. Smith, S. Virdee, & S. Beishon (Eds.), Ethnic minorities in Britain. Diversity and disadvantage (pp. 259- 289). London: Policy Studies Institute. Weinstein, J. (1992). First Amendment challenges to hate crime legislation: Where’s the speech? Criminal Justice Ethics, 11(2), 6-20. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (1993a). Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. at 2201 (1993b). 638 AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTISTMac Ginty / ETHNO-NATIONAL CONFLICT AND HATE CRIME Ethno-National Conflict and Hate Crime ROGER MAC GINTY University of York, United Kingdom This article will examine the role of hate crime in situations of ethno-national conflict. It will examine the nature of violence used in ethno-national conflict before going on to examine some of the factors that may limit the incidence or visibility of hate crime in cases of ethnic conflict. These factors include the dynamic of the conflict, ethnic segregation, and paramili- tary monopolization of violence. The article will also examine the impact of peace processes, or attempts to reach political settlements in ethno-national conflicts, on hate crime. It will conclude by highlighting some of the contextual differences between the United States and other deeply divided societies in relation to hate crime. What is the difference between a prejudice-motivated assault in a city in the United States and a similar incident in a deeply divided society such as Northern Ireland or South Africa? At a micro and human level, there will be little differ- ence for the victim. But, the context between the cases is significant and has an impact on the debate on hate crime. Northern Ireland, Israel/Palestine, and South Africa have all had crises of political legitimacy and have hosted sustained, violent conflicts driven by iden- tity issues. All three contain diverse populations living in close proximity to each other. Each area also provides names synonymous with violent acts or mas- sacres such as Omagh, Hebron, or Soweto. In short, all three conflict areas pro- vide an environment conducive to hate crime. The United States, on the other hand, is rarely regarded as a “deeply divided society” in the sense that it is host to a violent and explicit ethnic conflict.1 Yet, death rates from violence in many major U.S. cities regularly outstrip those in Belfast, Jerusalem, and Johannes- burg, even if measured in per capita terms. Furthermore, the United States is host to significant levels of hate crime. Even if the precise levels of hate crime are contested, there is little doubt that the United States has produced particularly high-profile hate crime incidents such as the cases of James Byrd in Jasper, Texas, and Matthew Shepard in Wyoming (Clinton Urges Crackdown, 1998; “Klan: The Next Generation,” 1998).2 The major difference between the United States and the other conflict areas is that the former is host to what may be described as an undeclared war, or an identity-driven conflict that does not possess a cloak of political legitimacy. The other conflict areas are host to more formal and politicized conflicts. This 639 AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST, Vol. 45 No. 4, December 2001 639-653 © 2001 Sage Publications distinction has important implications for the conceptualization of hate crime in situations of ethno-national conflict. An added complication stems from the fact that the term hate crime tends to be most closely associated with the United States.3 It is not, though, solely a U.S.-based phenomenon. The term hate crime is not current in either Northern Ireland or South Africa, where the approxima- tions are sectarian and racial. Whereas the term hate crime suggests a personal- ization of violence, the existence of wider conflicts in situations of ethno-national conflict tends to steer interpretations toward more general and societal views of violence. This article will examine the role of hate crime in situations of ethno-national conflict. It will examine the nature of violence used in ethno-national conflict before going on to examine some of the factors that may limit the incidence or visibility of hate crime in cases of ethno-national conflict. It will also examine the impact of peace processes on hate crime. It will conclude by highlighting some of the contextual differences between the United States and other deeply divided societies in relation to hate crime. VIOLENCE IN ETHNO-NATIONAL CONFLICT Terms such as ethnic or ethno-national conflicts conjure images of war-torn societies beset by humanitarian catastrophe and large-scale population move- ments through ethnic cleansing. Given the experience of the 1990s, such con- ceptualizations are understandable. Much ethno-national conflict is low profile, however. Many ethnically contested societies manage to contain conflicts for extended periods. A closer examination of the nature of violence in ethno-national conflict situations may be worthwhile, particularly in attempting to assess the role of hate crime in such situations. A key point is that violence is not somehow ethnic. Brubaker and Laitin (1998) noted that “the ‘ethnic’ quality of ethnic violence is not intrinsic to the act itself” (p. 444). Instead, the term eth- nic relates to the interpretation of the violence. Often the interpretations of vio- lence are contested. A violent act may have multiple motivations and interpreta- tions; the perpetrator and victim may variously interpret an action as criminal, political, or random or as motivated by religion, ethnicity, race, or identity. The key point is that violence in ethno-national conflict is a complex phenomenon. It may vary in scale, complexity, intensity, longevity, number of actors, degree of external involvement, and military sophistication of the combatants. As a result, seemingly simplistic terms such as hate crime must be approached with caution. Much of the violence in ethno-national conflicts is of a low level, taking the form of intermittent street assaults, rioting, vandalism, and assassinations rather than all-out war between fully mobilized states or highly organized groups. In other words, it is similar in form to much of the hate crime in the United States or other largely stable and plural societies. Often, ethnic violence will not seriously threaten the integrity of the state in which it occurs—this is particularly the case 640 AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST if the violence is geographically limited to certain regions of the state. Further- more, much ethnic violence takes place in concentrated bursts, with long periods of tension leading to relatively short outbreaks of violence. Violence in an ethno-national conflict may also be of a structural nature. It may take the form of a partisan and discriminatory judicial and security sector or of laws deliberately designed to exclude certain sections of society. As a result, hate crime may not necessarily relate to a specific violent incident but instead to more environ- mental conditions that contribute toward violence. This violence may have such an everyday nature that it risks a certain degree of “acceptance” (Collins, 1998, pp. 917-938). The key point is that ethnic tension or friction is often a more common pattern than full-scale violence in an ethnically divided society.4 The centrality of identity in ethno-national conflicts often results in a strong attachment to symbols as a focus for group identification. This may mean the deliberate choice of symbolic targets in hate crime incidents in an attempt to maximize offense and visibility. The importance of symbols may be inflated in ethnically divided societies, with symbols acquiring a real political value. In many stable polities, symbolic issues are often regarded as just that: symbolic, peripheral to the political core, and capable of offering a metaphor for wider political or social developments. In a deeply divided society, heightened sensi- tivity to cultural and identity issues may mean that symbols are drawn into the political core and become credited with an absolute worth (Firth, 1973, p. 427; see also Harrison, 1995). The very fact that certain groups may hold certain types of art or imagery, certain days or certain locations in high esteem, may in turn make these symbolic targets for opposing groups or individuals. The choice of such targets can have an impact far beyond those immediately affected, for example, having a resonance with a Diaspora community. Another feature of the violence associated with ethno-national conflicts relates to the prominent role played by civilians. Ethno-national conflicts are usually distinguished by the fact that they are fought in the territory in which the combatants live. The result may be twofold: the blurring of the demarcation between civilians and combatants that may be found in interstate wars and high civilian casualties. Because the focus of an ethno-national conflict is often a people, culture, and identity, rather than an army, state, or ideology, civilians assume a prominent role as actors rather than bystanders in the conflict. This is reinforced by the part-time, organic, and ad hoc nature of many of the armed groups involved in ethno-national conflicts. This was vividly illustrated in Kosovo in 1999 where Serb militias were said to be little more than local Serb farmers with a police escort. Similarly, the distinction between members of the Kosovo Liberation Army and the local Kosovar Albanian population was often unclear (see, for example, “Ten Years Old,” 1999). A further complication stems from the tendency to interpret hate crime as an individualized or personalized form of violence. In many ethnic conflicts, the individual may hold a quasi-civil- ian and quasi-military position. Combatants or semicombatants operating in largely civilian rather than military environments may find it easier to Mac Ginty / ETHNO-NATIONAL CONFLICT AND HATE CRIME 641 conceptualize violence against them as personal rather than impersonal. So, although part of a wider conflict, a victim may see significant elements of hate crime in a particular violent incident. A final point worth making on the nature of violence in ethno-national con- flicts is that it is often subject to certain regulations or norms of conduct (Glenny, 1996, p. 186). These differ from conflict to conflict and are informed by a wide range of factors including the type of combatants (state or armed group), the level of reciprocity in the conflict, and the degree to which the combatants are influenced by international opinion, international law, and the work of advocacy groups. In some ethno-national conflicts, violence may be restricted to members of armed groups, with the combatants making a conscious effort to avoid civil- ian casualties, perhaps because they are sensitive to international media and nongovernmental organization scrutiny. In other conflicts, however, the target- ing of civilians lies at the core of a military and political strategy, as is the case with ethnic cleansing. These “rules” of ethnic war are rarely written and are sub- ject to change, but it is worth bearing this implicit regulation in mind when thinking of hate crime in ethno-national conflict. Many of the aspects of the violence found in ethno-national conflict situa- tions are also present in more stable societies such as the United States. For example, in the United States, much of the hate crime is low level and persistent. It is often highly symbolic and follows certain norms or patterns such as the repeat targeting of certain individuals or sites, or even the avoidance of certain targets. The key difference seems to lie in the political aspects of the violence. In the context of a deeply divided society with an ongoing ethno-national conflict, violence can assume a mantle of political legitimacy through connections with organized groups or causes articulated in a sophisticated manner. Such options are rarely available in less volatile societies. As a result, incidents of hate crime are often interpreted at the individual and personal, rather than political, level. STRUCTURAL CONTROLS ON HATE CRIME Hate crime is not endemic in ethno-national conflict situations. Instead, structural factors help regulate its level and visibility. Three structural control- ling factors are particularly prominent: the dynamic of the conflict, high levels of ethnic segregation, and paramilitary monopolization. THE DYNAMIC OF THE CONFLICT Conflicts are rarely static. They tend to move along a cycle according to the intensity of violence, the type of violence involved, and the level of political activity. Certain stages of the conflict cycle provide more opportunities for hate crime than others. A range of factors determines the stage that the conflict occu- pies in the conflict cycle. These include the type and intensity of the violence, 642 AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST the violent capacity of the protagonists, state responses to the violence, and the course of political initiatives designed to manage the conflict or secure advan- tage for one protagonist or another. External interventions, seasonal factors, and the development or acquisition of new weaponry may all affect the type or inten- sity of the conflict. An examination of the modern phase of the Northern Ireland conflict, from 1969 onwards, may help illustrate the point that different phases of a conflict offer different opportunities for hate crime. Mass civil rights demonstrations and protests in the late 1960s, mainly by the Catholic nationalist community, led to street conflict with the police force. A reactionary populist response by Protestant unionists led to direct Catholic-Protestant confrontation and vio- lence. Large-scale rioting, particularly in Belfast, resulted in loss of life and sig- nificant movements of population as Protestant and Catholic minorities were intimidated from their homes. Between 1969 and 1973, 60,000 people left their homes in Belfast (Murtagh, 1995, p. 220). Within a relatively short space of time, however, the three main protagonists in the conflict (the British state and the Catholic and Protestant communities) rationalized their involvement in vio- lence. The British state introduced its army to take over from a stretched and par- tisan local police force. In the medium term, this contributed to a sharp increase in death rates. These fell over the longer term as more sophisticated security measures were introduced. The sheer presence of the British Army, interposed between the Catholic and Protestant communities, significantly reduced the opportunity for direct Catholic-Protestant violence (Darby, 1991, pp. 3-4). Apart from the British state, the two other main protagonists were the Catho- lic nationalist and Protestant unionist communities. The majority in both com- munities eschewed violence, or at least direct involvement in it. Substantial minorities, however, were supportive of violence, either explicitly or implicitly. Militant organizations developed within both communities. They organized and orchestrated riots. They assumed responsibility for the defense of their own areas and enclaves. They also armed themselves and soon adopted offensive rather than defensive postures. Stones and bottles gave way to guns and explo- sives. Direct confrontations between Catholic and Protestant mobs gave way to more dedicated and lethal forms of violence such as assassinations or bombings. Quite simply, it became too dangerous for large crowds of rioters to stay on the streets.5 Through the 1970s and 1980s, a direct war developed between the principal nationalist militant group, the Irish Republican Army (IRA), and the British Army and its proxies. Targeting became increasingly specific (see White, 1997). The IRA concentrated on trying to kill British soldiers and members of the local police force and militia. British counterinsurgency measures grew increasingly sophisticated. Blunt instruments such as intensive patrolling and internment without trial were, with time, complemented with the assassination of national- ist militants and electronic surveillance. Mac Ginty / ETHNO-NATIONAL CONFLICT AND HATE CRIME 643 Protestant unionist militant groups were less discriminate in their targeting, often targeting Catholic victims at random.6 Given that the rationale for many loyalist killings was that “any Catholic will do,” it is tempting to categorize much loyalist violence as “hate crime” (Cadwallader & Wilson, 1991). But a deeper, more political, motivation lay behind the loyalist campaign. The target- ing of Catholics was an attempt, albeit bluntly, to discourage Catholic support for the IRA. It also sent out a message reaffirming perceived roles of dominance and subordination in society. The chief point is that much violence became regularized and more profes- sional. What had begun as mainly horizontal violence between communities became vertical violence involving the state and proxies acting on behalf of communities. Horizontal conflict, such as rioting, can reach unsustainable lev- els. In the 1987 to 1993 period, more than 1,500 Palestinians were killed and 12,000 were imprisoned for Intifada-related offenses (King, 1994, pp. 185- 186). It is worth asking if the Intifada could have been sustained in the absence of significant political change. Situations of vertical violence are more easily sus- tained. A division of labor spreads the burden of the conflict among the commu- nity. Importantly, vertical violence also reduces the opportunities for hate crime. A key difference between a violent ethno-national conflict situation and a rel- atively stable society subject to hate crime is the range of movement along the conflict cycle. In the former case, there can be sudden movement from a politi- cally tense stage to more intensive violence. The opportunities for hate crime can change as the nature and intensity of the conflict change, but it is by no means automatic that more intense conflict results in more hate crime. Instead, the various controls on more organized conflict may actually limit or mask hate crime. More stable societies, although prone to hate crime, are unlikely to wit- ness sudden movement along the conflict cycle. As a result, persistent hate crime risks becoming part of the fabric of society and accepted as such. ETHNIC SEGREGATION A primary reason for the control of hate crime in deeply divided societies is the high degree of ethnic segregation. This is often most visible in terms of resi- dential segregation with sharply delineated areas for different communities. Demographic engineering, such as the creation of townships, pass laws, and Group Area Acts in apartheid South Africa, meant the movement of almost 4 million people.7 The very word apartheid means separateness. The issue of land and territory is central to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, with the city of Jerusa- lem providing a classic example of almost total residential segregation (Bollens, 1998, p. 7). In Northern Ireland, residential segregation has increased enor- mously in the past 30 years, to the extent that 50% of people live in an area that is inhabited by 90% or more of their coreligionists (McKittrick, 1993). High levels of residential segregation point to pogroms; deliberate mass clearances, often 644 AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST using violence; and restrictive legislation governing land ownership and tenancy rights. It also points to the centrality of territory in many ethno-national conflicts. A crucial, and often overlooked, point is that residential segregation holds certain advantages. To a certain degree, it is even “popular.” In a deeply divided society, it is often much easier to live within a majority than a minority commu- nity. More pertinently, it is often a good deal safer. Life in a single-community setting is less challenging.8 With residential segregation comes segregation in schooling, shopping, and leisure activities.9 Although much segregation may initially develop because of the need for physical security, it can lead to a self-perpetuating ghettoization. In many cases, ghettos become institutionalized and even encouraged by the state (Bollens, 1998, pp. 7-9). If the ghetto becomes large and secure enough, it can offer a high degree of insulation from the con- flict. Because opportunities for direct intergroup conflict are diminished, hate crime may be minimized. Interface areas on the boundaries of the enclave, shared arterial routes, and town centers become possible areas for conflict and hate crime, leaving the bulk of the enclave area relatively stable.10 Belfast, the capital city of Northern Ireland, provides a good example of seg- regation along sectarian lines.11 The east of the city is almost exclusively Protestant, whereas the west is almost exclusively Catholic. The north contains an uneasy mix of Protestant and Catholic enclaves. Territory is not shared. The two communities live beside one another but not with one another. When the current violent phase of the conflict began in the late 1960s, there were signifi- cant population shifts of minorities either out of the city altogether or into enclaves where they composed the majority. As a result, the vast majority of the city’s population live in areas in which their group is the majority.12 Shops, schools, and leisure facilities that solely serve their enclave mean that it is possi- ble to minimize contact with the other group. Violence, usually in the form of rioting, at the interface of Catholic and Protestant areas led to the erection of high fences between neighborhoods. These so-called peace lines physically divide the city and its people. They are popular among residents who often call for them to be increased in height and made more secure (“Protestants Call for ‘Peace Line,’ ” 1998). The reality of residential segregation is recognized and even institutionalized by the city planners. For example, “neutral space” such as freeways and industrial parks has been deliberately sited between communities to prevent direct Catholic-Protestant interaction. Given sensitivities over terri- tory, the public housing authority is careful not to allocate vacant housing in Protestant areas to Catholic tenants, despite a growing Catholic population (Murtagh, 1995). Such residential segregation is hardly unique to deeply divided societies with ongoing conflict. Many societies contain gated communities (segregation by economics) or areas traditionally favored by particular immigrant groups. In respect of residential segregation, stable societies with hate crime have similari- ties with deeply divided societies. Yet, the boundaries between areas in the latter Mac Ginty / ETHNO-NATIONAL CONFLICT AND HATE CRIME 645 are often more rigidly maintained, and often with a greater degree of intimida- tion and violence. PARAMILITARY MONOPOLIZATION Another control on hate crime in deeply divided societies is the regulation of intergroup hostility by nonstate militant organizations or paramilitaries.13 They tend to monopolize a community’s violent response and are often ruthless toward competitor organizations from within their own community. In a similar way, they frown on lone operators—often a source of hate crime. So-called loose cannons could jeopardize the dominant paramilitary group’s operations and incur disproportionate security responses from state forces. In Northern Ireland at least, revenge attacks by victims’ families, without the help of paramilitary groups, are virtually unheard of. This is despite the fact that the names of sus- pected perpetrators are often well known. Whereas much paramilitary violence may be viewed as deliberately sectar- ian and verging on hate crime, paramilitary organizations are careful to present their violence as politically motivated. For example, in Northern Ireland, IRA attacks on the local police force and economic targets often killed Protestants and damaged Protestant-owned businesses. For Northern Ireland’s Protestant population, these attacks were motivated by sectarian hatred.14 For the IRA, however, these attacks were politically motivated. In the words of one strategist, they were designed to “break the political will of the British government, and the British people, to remain here” (Morrison, 1985, p. 7). Regardless of actual motivation—and it is difficult to know the precise motivations of a secretive, organic organization—paramilitary groups worked hard to present a political motivation for their activities. They adopted militaristic language. The IRA, according to itself, was engaged in a “war.”15 Loyalist (pro-British) and republi- can paramilitary organizations boasted conventional military structures such as brigades and battalions. Paramilitary groups accompanied their attacks with demonizations of their victims. Politically uninvolved victims were accused of being members of rival paramilitary organizations or the state forces. The key to a sustained campaign by a paramilitary organization is continued legitimacy. The sources of legitimacy could be local, earned through the defense of the community, or international, via a diaspora community. Seemingly sectar- ian attacks or blatant hate crimes risk damaging this legitimacy. In short, hate crime makes for bad politics. Furthermore, outright military victory is an unreal- istic goal for many paramilitary organizations. They lack the capacity to defeat conventional, standing armies. Thus, the rationale behind paramilitary cam- paigns is often “armed propaganda” (O’Doherty, 1997, p. 109). The real aim is to keep a situation in the headlines in the hope of an international initiative or raise the costs of occupation to unsustainable levels. Again, the key point is that hate crime was not always the most efficient way for paramilitary organizations to secure their goals. It could even be counterproductive. 646 AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST HATE CRIME IN PEACE PROCESSES The term peace process is often used to describe sustained efforts to reach a political accommodation in a protracted, low-intensity ethno-national conflict. A peacemaking process involves the chief protagonists in the conflict and addresses the key conflict issue(s) in a serious manner. For example, an attempt by a government to reach a deal with a minor insurgency group on cultural inclu- sion issues while ignoring larger groups and major constitutional issues at the heart of a conflict cannot be properly considered a peace process. Peace pro- cesses are often sustained, as the term process suggests, and are able to with- stand occasional outbreaks of violence. Also crucial to a peace process is a sig- nificant voluntary aspect; the protagonists have a real investment in the process. The nature of peace processes has changed over the past decade, with a marked decline in UN involvement and an increase in indigenous initiatives and the efforts of regional organizations. Another trend has been the tendency for peace processes to assume competency over a broader range of issues. Although still concentrating on political and constitutional issues, many modern peace pro- cesses have addressed issues of social, economic, and cultural inclusion as well as economic regeneration and truth recovery (for further coverage of this issue, see Darby & Mac Ginty, 2000). Cease-fires often play a key role in peace pro- cesses; they create a space in which political negotiations can take place. Yet, cease-fires rarely guarantee an end to violence that may persist from a number of sources and for a variety of reasons. The nature of violence, including hate crime, is subject to change during a peace process. There is strong evidence to suggest that hate crime increases during peace processes. Certainly, in Northern Ireland there has been a noticeable increase in arson and vandalism attacks on identifiably Catholic or Protestant property since the peace process has begun. Schools, homes, businesses, churches, church halls, Orange Order halls, and sports halls have all been targeted (see, for example, “Arsonists Hit Churches,” 1995; “Church, Orange Hall Damaged,” 1995; and “Concern at Number of Arson Attacks,” 1995). There has been an increase in direct Catholic-Protestant street confrontations and other protests, such as economic boycotts, articulated in a primarily sectarian format (see, for example, “Protestant Businesses Boycotted,” 1996, and “Drumcree Reaction Leads to Boycott,” 1996). Much of this hate crime–type violence has been related to the parades dispute. This violence marked a distinct change from the pre–peace process phase of the conflict in which sectarian motivations were often masked. In other words, the Northern Ireland peace process has been marked by a decline in violence in which the political motivations of violence were emphasized and an increase in overtly sectarian violence. The transition to majority rule in South Africa was marked by enormous violence, with more than 16,000 people losing their lives in the 1990 to 1994 transition period.16 Most of this violence was Black on Black, between supporters of the African National Congress and the Inkatha Freedom Party, and did not directly involve one of the Mac Ginty / ETHNO-NATIONAL CONFLICT AND HATE CRIME 647 key participants in the peace process, the government. The Oslo process in Israel/Palestine has also heralded renewed upsurges in violence in that area, much of it specifically related to wider political developments and much of it with the characteristics of hate crime. But why would hate crime, or other types of violence, increase during a peace process, a process specifically designed to bring about a political settlement and involving the main protagonists in the conflict? A primary motivation for ethnic violence is fear. Groups or individuals may feel that their relatively privileged economic or political position in society is under threat and take steps to secure it. Alternatively, they make take action as the result of the words or actions of another group. Crucially, a peace process is an extraordinary period of political activity in an ethnic conflict. It may promise and deliver landmark agreements, far-reaching reforms, and symbolic meetings between (former) enemies. It is not surprising, then, that fear of political change, common in many ethnically contested societies, becomes intensified during a peace process. There is a strong tendency, on all sides, to perceive the situation in zero-sum terms. Each side perceives its own concessions as yet another erosion of an already embat- tled political position that is not sufficiently appreciated or reciprocated by the other side. Political change is often viewed as exclusively negative. Given that many peace processes are elongated, it can seem as though the entire peace pro- cess is geared toward the diminution of one’s position. In such an environment, hate crime may be encouraged. A key point about hate crime during peace processes is that it is often carried out by individuals, or groups of individuals, rather than by paramilitary organi- zations. Given that paramilitary organizations will often be party to the peace process, it is in their interest to show a high degree of discipline. The continued involvement of their political representatives in negotiations often requires a strictly observed cease-fire. There was significant evidence of the main republi- can and loyalist paramilitaries “policing” other paramilitary groups within their communities in Northern Ireland during the peace process (see, for example, “Attack on Bar May Signal Beginning of Loyalist Feud,” 1997, and “UVF Will ‘Wipe Out’ Rival Loyalists,” 1997). Paramilitary groups also controlled com- munity protests lest they become violent and jeopardize wider political goals (“Street Patrols Planned,” 1999). Violence, particularly in a gratuitous form such as hate crime, would be regarded as a gross violation of the cease-fire. Where paramilitary groups do engage in violence during peace processes, it tends to become more firmly linked with the political process. It is often timed and modulated in intensity according to political factors. Whereas paramilitary groups privy to political negotiations (often secret talks) may be disciplined during a cease-fire, individuals and groups of individu- als who are not privy to this information may become unnerved by political uncertainty. Mainstream paramilitary control of communities may relax during cease-fire periods, allowing individuals and groups of individuals the opportu- nity to engage in hate crime.17 The peace processes in Northern Ireland, Israel/ 648 AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST Palestine, and South Africa were all accompanied by a greater “informalization” of violence. Attacks were carried out by previously (and subsequently) unheard of paramilitary groups, suggesting that they lacked political legitimacy and mili- tary infrastructure. The choice of target often fitted the hate crime model, eschewing pretensions of a military or political motivation for highly symbolic targets. Crucial to the informalization of violence during peace processes is the development of breakaway or splinter groups from the larger paramilitary orga- nizations. Peace processes place paramilitary organizations under enormous strain. Often, the pressures to call and maintain cease-fires, to negotiate, and to compromise prove too much for some hard-line elements within a paramilitary organization. A split may result. These splinter organizations may have looser lines of command and less rigid rules of engagement. Their very raison d’être is to derail the peace process, hence, the sobriquet “spoiler group” (Stedman, 1997). In attempting to shock people, political parties, and governments away from the peace process, blatant hate crime may be employed. A peace process may thus offer individuals and groups of individuals the motivation and oppor- tunity to engage in hate crime. Furthermore, heightened sensitivities because of possible political change, and the absence of mainstream paramilitary activity, award any hate crime greater significance and headlines. But, peace processes are rarely the scene of unrestrained hate crime, even by spoilers. Again, there are controlling factors. The timing of much hate crime is deliberate, often coinciding with major political developments. The vast major- ity of serious hate crime, such as intimidation from housing, takes place in a 2-week period in Northern Ireland’s marching season. It is no coincidence that a grenade attack aimed at Israeli civilians in the southern Israeli town of Beersheba took place during a 1998 Israeli-Palestinian summit in the United States (“Israel Focuses on Security Issues,” 1998). Nor was it coincidental that Palestinian extremists bombed Jerusalem’s main fruit and vegetable market in November 1998 at the precise moment when the Israeli cabinet was meeting to discuss and ratify the Wye Accords (“Wye Debate Suspended,” 1998). The seeming political sophistication of these attacks raises questions about precise motivation. Such deliberately timed attacks are not carried out for the sake of hate. They are political acts, aimed at influencing wider political developments. A “successful” peace process by no means guarantees an end to hate crime. Xenophobia is widespread in postapartheid South Africa, with immigrants and asylum seekers being particular targets for attack (Morris, 1998). Despite the new political dispensation, old targets retain their salience. Statistically, one member of the White farming community is killed every 3 days (Laurence, 1998). The attacks also raise questions of motivation (Meares, 1998). Are they motivated by hate or robbery or both? Questions of motivation are central to any discussion of the role of hate crime in a deeply divided society. A close examina- tion of many violent acts in deeply divided societies reveals that they are not motivated by simple hate. This is not to deny underlying motivations of Mac Ginty / ETHNO-NATIONAL CONFLICT AND HATE CRIME 649 prejudice. It is, instead, to highlight a more complex motivational environment. Prejudice may well form the basis for many violent actions in a deeply divided society, but hate crime is often an inefficient form of violence. For this reason, political and tactical considerations may come into play. Furthermore, a series of structural factors—the dynamic of the conflict, ethnic segregation, and para- military monopolization—controls levels of hate crime. CONCLUSION The question posed in the introductory sentence is still outstanding: What is the difference between a prejudice-motivated assault in a city in the United States and a similar incident in a deeply divided society such as Northern Ire- land, Israel/Palestine, or South Africa? A key difference is the politicization and scale of conflict in deeply divided societies that host ethno-national conflict, as opposed to the United States. This is not to deny the existence of violent divi- sions in U.S. society. Instead, it is to highlight that the undeclared nature of the conflict in the United States means that interpretations of violence in that case are often seen through the lens of the individual and emotion. As a result, preju- dice-motivated attacks in the United States may be labeled as hate crime, whereas they may be more easily regarded as a more general social and political phenomenon in deeply divided societies. This distinction may be a little artifi- cial, however. An argument can be made that all hate crime is political and that the key difference lies in the context in which the violence takes place and the manner in which the motivation for the violence is articulated.18 All hate crime is political in the sense that it involves a statement that goes far beyond a particular act of violence or intimidation. It involves the identification of a target, the objectification of the targeted individual(s), and the depersonal- ization of the victim. Often, hate crimes have a deliberately public aspect that is meant to convey a warning to a wider community. This is evidenced through the daubing of synagogues with offensive graffiti or the decision to tie Matthew Shepard to a fence post as a deliberate act of humiliation. Again, the humiliation is deliberate and is designed to send out a message of dominance and subordina- tion. Buford O’Neal Furrow, who admitted shooting five people at a Jewish community center in Los Angeles in August 1999, told FBI agents that he wanted to “send a message [italics added] to America by killing Jews” (“US Nazis Find Their Latest Hero,” 1999). In the context of a declared war, such inci- dents move away from simple hate or personalized incidents and are subsumed in a wider conflict. They become institutionalized into military and paramilitary activity and can attain a veneer of political legitimacy. In the United States, where much ethnic violence takes the form of an undeclared war, this option is not open. As a result, there is a tendency to interpret violence in emotional and personal terms: hate. Many of those perpetrating the violence, however, are anx- ious to acquire a political and military legitimacy for their actions. Hence, they 650 AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST consciously ape military uniforms, language, and structures. Those bodies with the task of combating hate crime have a delicate task; clearly, they must take the threat seriously. Yet, inflated governmental approaches to isolated incidents may give those individuals and groups engaged in hate crime the legitimacy they crave. NOTES 1. This is not to say that the United States is a society without divisions. 2. Jacobs and Henry (1996) challenged the notion of a hate crime epidemic in “The Social Con- struction of a Hate Crime Epidemic.” 3. Contemporary U.S.-based literature on the issue includes Czajkoski (1996); Collins (1998); and Green, Glaser, and Rich (1998). 4. Schmid and Jongman (1997) referred to the “political tension situation” in their conflict escalation model. 5. This pattern of the increased use of firearms was replicated in the Palestinian Intifada. Bar-On (1996) noted that “despite the explicit prohibition by the Intifada leadership of the use of firearms, guns were now used with greater frequency” (p. 258). King (1994) noted that the use of guns was “turning the intifada into something more like a conventional uprising” (pp. 186-187). 6. According to Bruce (1992), “republican paramilitaries form only a very small proportion of the victims of loyalist violence. 71.8 per cent were ‘civilian Catholics’ ” (p. 5). 7. The figure comes from Ginwala (1985, p. 12). A comprehensive account of segregation is pro- vided by Davenport (1991, pp. 518-533). Robinson (1996) is also instructive, particularly in relation to specific areas; see, for example, the section on the clearing of Korsten in the mid-1950s (pp. 159-168). 8. Donnan and McFarlane (1983) explored the motivations for segregation in Northern Ire- land—from kinship to intimidation. 9. An excellent account of a single-religion education can be found in Boggs (1985). Boggs noted that he was only taught “Protestant” or British history: “I left school without knowing that there had been a famine in Ireland” (p. 18). 10. According to Bollens (1998), “Jewish casualties were higher in the city of Jerusalem than elsewhere, with many political murders occurring along the old boundary ‘seam’ ” (p. 4). 11. A history of segregation in Belfast can be found in Hepburn (1994). 12. Of Belfast’s 51 electoral wards, 35 are at least 90% one religion or the other (McKittrick, 1993). 13. The term paramilitary is used in Northern Ireland to denote nonstate, guerilla, or insurgency groups. In other contexts, paramilitary refers to groups with links to the state. 14. According to John Dunlop (1995), a former moderator of the Presbyterian church in Ireland, “while republicans have said that their armed struggle is against the British, they have mostly killed their Protestant neighbours, destroyed their businesses and bombed their towns” (p. 124). 15. Hence the War News section in the Sinn Féin newspaper An Phoblacht/Republican News, which listed Irish Republican Army activities. 16. For accounts of violence during the South African transition to majority rule, see Catholic Institute for International Relations (1996, pp. 22-31) and Wilson (1997, pp. 19-23). Hamber (1998) outlined the various types of violence employed and the various motivations in Who Pays for Peace? Implications of the Negotiated Settlement for Reconciliation, Transformation and Violence in a Post-Apartheid South Africa. 17. Cusack (1998) noted that an increase in violence and anti-Catholic intimidation in one hous- ing estate in Northern Ireland is largely due to a fragmentation of command structures in the domi- nant paramilitary group, the Ulster Defence Association. As a result, local commanders acted Mac Ginty / ETHNO-NATIONAL CONFLICT AND HATE CRIME 651 autonomously without reference to the more politically aware leadership. It is important not to regard paramilitary organizations as monolithic. Members may have joined for different reasons, some with ideological principles, others with an interest in racketeering, and others still who are motivated by hate or revenge. 18. Much of this discussion stems from comments from Marie Smyth of the Cost of the Troubles Study, Belfast. REFERENCES Arsonists hit churches, halls and cars in north. (1995, August 22). The Irish Times. Attack on bar may signal beginning of loyalist feud. (1997, August 22). The Irish Times. Bar-On, M. (1996). In pursuit of peace: A history of the Israeli peace movement. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press. Boggs, R. (1985, December 2-15). A Protestant education in Londonderry. Fortnight: An Independ- ent Review for Northern Ireland, 230, 17-19. Bollens, S. A. (1998, Spring). Uncovering the urban dimension in nationalist conflict: Jerusalem and Belfast compared. Terrorism and Political Violence, 10(1), 1-38. Brubaker, R., & Laitin, D. (1998). Ethnic and nationalist violence. Annual Review of Sociology, 24, 423-452. Bruce, S. (1992). Northern Ireland: Reappraising loyalist violence [Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism paper]. Conflict Studies, 249, 5. Cadwallader, A., & Wilson, R. (1991, May). A case of any Catholic will do. Fortnight: An Independ- ent Review for Northern Ireland, 295, 6. Catholic Institute for International Relations. (1996). South Africa: Breaking new ground. London: Author. Church, Orange hall damaged in arson attacks. (1995, August 25). The Irish Times. Clinton urges crackdown on hate crimes [Online]. (1998, October 12). Available: http:// news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/americas/newsid%5F190000/190861.stm (British Broadcast- ing Corporation Web site) Collins, P. H. (1998, September). The tie that binds: Race, gender and US violence. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 21(5), 917-938. Concern at number of arson attacks in north. (1995, August 23). The Irish Times. Cusack, J. (1998, July 22). Police seal off streets in search of estate hit by “orchestrated attacks.” The Irish Times. Czajkoski, E. H. (1996). Criminalizing hate: An empirical assessment. Federal Probation, 56(3), 36-40. Darby, J. (1991). What’s wrong with conflict? (Occasional paper). Coleraine, Ireland: Centre for the Study of Conflict. Darby, J., & Mac Ginty, R. (Eds.). (2000). The management of peace processes. London: Macmillan. Davenport, T.R.H. (1991). South Africa: A modern history (4th ed.). London: Macmillan. Donnan, H., & McFarlane, G. (1983). Informal social organisation. In J. Darby (Ed.), Northern Ire- land: The background to the conflict (pp. 110-135). Belfast, Ireland: Appletree Press. Drumcree reaction leads to boycott of Protestant firms. (1996, August 24). The Irish Times. Dunlop, J. (1995). A precarious belonging: Presbyterians and the conflict in Ireland. Belfast, Ire- land: Blackstaff Press. Firth, R. (1973). Symbols public and private. London: Allen & Unwin. Ginwala, F. (1985). Indian South Africans (Minority Rights Group Report 34). London: Minority Rights Group. Glenny, M. (1996). The fall of Yugoslavia (3rd ed.). London: Penguin. 652 AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST Green, D. P., Glaser, J., & Rich, A. (1998). From lynching to gay bashing: The elusive connection between economic conditions and hate crime. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 75(1), 82-92. Hamber, B. (1998, October 30). Who pays for peace? Implications of the negotiated settlement for reconciliation, transformation and violence in a post-apartheid South Africa. Paper presented at AGM of Catholic Institute for International Relations, London. Harrison, S. (1995). Four types of symbolic conflict. Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institu- tion, 1(2), 255-272. Hepburn, A.C.H. (1994). Long division and ethnic conflict: The experience of Belfast. In S. Dunn (Ed.), Managing divided cities (pp. 88-104). Keele, UK: Keele University Press. Israel focuses on security issues following attack. (1998, October 20). The Irish Times. Jacobs, J. B., & Henry, J. S. (1996). The social construction of a hate crime epidemic. Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, 86(2), 366-391. King, J. (1994). Handshake in Washington: The beginning of Middle East peace? Reading, UK: Ithaca Press. Klan: The next generation. (1998, June 12). Independent (London). Laurence, P. (1998, August 15). Murders of Whites fuel fears of anarchy. The Irish Times. McKittrick, D. (1993, March 21). Apartheid deepens in Ulster. Independent (London). Meares, R. (1998, July 3). Alleged armed robbers shot dead in manhunt. The Irish Times. Morris, A. (1998, November). “Our fellow Africans make our lives hell”: The lives of Congolese and Nigerians living in Johannesburg. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 21(6), 1116-1136. Morrison, D. (1985, September 23-October 6). Confusing and unhappy for loyalists. Fortnight: An Independent Review for Northern Ireland, 225, 7-8. Murtagh, B. (1995). Image making versus reality: Ethnic division and the planning challenge of Bel- fast’s peace lines. In W.J.V. Neill, D. S. Fitzsimons, & B. Murtagh (Eds.), Reimaging the pariah city: Urban development in Belfast and Detroit (pp. 209-230). Aldershot, UK: Avebury. O’Doherty, M. (1997). The trouble with guns: Republican strategy and the provisional IRA. Belfast, Ireland: Blackstaff Press. Protestant businesses boycotted for Drumcree. (1996, August 5). The Irish Times. Protestants call for “peace line.” (1998, August 5). The Irish Times. Robinson, J. (1996). The power of apartheid: State, power and space in South African cities. Oxford, UK: Butterworth-Heinemann. Schmid, A. P., & Jongman, A. J. (1997, Winter). Violent conflicts and human rights violations in the mid-1990s. Terrorism and Political Violence, 9(4), 166-192. Stedman, S. J. (1997, Fall). Spoiler problems in peace processes. International Security, 22(2), 5-53. Street patrols planned. (1999, July 1). [Belfast] Community Telegraph. Ten years old, with a bullet in his arm, he saw 19 of his family killed. (1999, April 6). Guardian. US Nazis find their latest hero. (1999, August 15). Observer. UVF will “wipe out” rival loyalists. (1997, August 25). Irish News. White, R. W. (1997, Summer). The Irish Republican Army and sectarianism: Moving beyond the anecdote. Terrorism and Political Violence, 9(2), 120-131. Wilson, R. A. (1997). The people’s conscience? Civil groups, peace and justice in the South African and Guatemalan transitions. London: Catholic Institute for International Relations. Wye debate suspended after Hamas bombing. (1998, November 7). The Irish Times. Mac Ginty / ETHNO-NATIONAL CONFLICT AND HATE CRIME 653 AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTISTKaufman / RENAMING VIOLENCE Renaming Violence DEBRA RENEE KAUFMAN Northeastern University A gender analysis forces us to measure and define our sociological inquiries in ways that broaden categories of human experiences. In so doing, we are often forced to rename those experiences. In this analysis of violence, gender, and the Holocaust, we will look to the extra burden, in addition to race, that gender forced on women: rape, abortion, sexual victimiza- tion, pregnancy, childbirth, the killing of newborns, and decisions about separation from children. In this analysis, we will look to the ways in which gender forces us to revisit the meaning of violence through the sins of omission as well as commission, through a deepen- ing of the understanding of public and private spheres of life, and to expand what we mean by victims, survivors, and resisters. A recent tribute, of which I was a part, given at the 1999 American Sociologi- cal Association (ASA) meetings to Mirra Komarovsky,1 who had died earlier in the year, took the form of an intellectual foray into the field of gender role stud- ies. From her earliest piece written in 1946, and then onward, Komarovsky gave us the intellectual tools from which the relationships between practice and the- ory, behavior and principle, the individual and the role were to emerge. Prescient is the word many would use of her remarkable insights into role analysis and the consequences these insights were to have for our understanding of the relation- ship between behavior and role—the consequences of gender, class, ethnicity, and context in our understanding of human behavior. In this article, role theory, particularly gender role theory, provides the theoretical analysis of gender and the Holocaust. Several issues raised by Komarovsky about gender role research apply to the analysis of one of the most extreme forms of violence—war. Role analysis forces us to look at the sociocultural and structural level to explain violent behavior rather than prematurely ending, as Komarovsky might put it, with psy- chological explanations. Gender role theory, in particular, helps us to empiri- cally locate many of the issues heretofore neglected or simply unobserved in the study of war. For instance, by focusing not just on the formal roles played by those involved in perpetuating the Holocaust during World War II, but on the informal ones as well, we expand our understanding of the term perpetrators. Unlike role theory, which is often characterized as focusing exclusively on 654 AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST, Vol. 45 No. 4, December 2001 654-667 © 2001 Sage Publications explanations for conformity through internalization of norms or as too focused on consensus, gender role theory, as Komarovsky so early noted, allows us to directly address issues of ambivalence, conflict, deviation, and malintegration. The following discussion of gender issues and the Holocaust will address some of the persistent problems in role analysis, for instance, the disjunction between professed values and actual behavior. By looking at the ways in which public and private were redefined by the SS to reinforce the need for the violence and horror perpetrated, we see how internalization of norms is simply too weak an explanation for the existence of conformity by either perpetrators or victims. Moreover, an analysis of gender role issues shows how violations of gender role stereotypes, as well as gender role conformity, were integral to the persistence and use of violence. A gender role analysis allows us to perceive the ways in which violations of our gender role stereotypes take place through the human capacity to redefine situations and maintain fictions. From Nazi wives and mothers who deliberately ignored or remained ignorant of the violence around them, to the women who were forced to kill their own babies or perform abor- tions on others to save lives, it is clear that theoretical formulations must stay in touch with the “lived experiences” of the role performers in order for us to understand practice. Before we can sociologically understand violent behavior, we must learn how to name it in all of its dimensions—when it begins, when it ends, where the geographic and time boundaries are, who are the perpetrators, and who are the victims. War affects men and women differently. As the introduction to The Women and War Reader (Lorentzen & Turpin, 1998) suggests, women play many more roles during wartime than men. In addition, women are more likely to be killed in war and to become war refugees than men. It is important to note, however, that the profound differences in experience are not to be understood in simplistic gender/sexual dichotomies. Gender, like class, race, ethnicity, and religion, conditions and intersects with our many roles and statuses in complex and multidimensional ways. Therefore, if we use male victims, survivors, and perpetrators as our only normative model, we have an incomplete understand- ing, not only of those roles, but of the experiences that separated women from men. A gender analysis forces us to measure and define our sociological inqui- ries in ways that broaden categories of human experiences. In so doing, we are often forced to rename those experiences. In this analysis of violence, we will look to the extra burden, in addition to race, that gender forced on women: rape, abortion, sexual victimization, pregnancy, childbirth, the killing of newborns, and decisions about separation from children. In this analysis, we will look to the ways in which gender forces us to revisit the meaning of violence through the sins of omission as well as commission, through a deepening of the understand- ing of public and private spheres of life, and to expand what we mean by victims, survivors, and resisters. Kaufman / RENAMING VIOLENCE 655 THE MYTH OF GENDER NEUTRALITY AND OTHER MISNOMERS In her provocative article “Troubling Categories I Can’t Think Without: Reflections on Women in the Holocaust,” Ruth Linden (1996) made clear that “victims and survivors of the final solution have, for decades, generally been represented by an ideal-type figure who appears to be genderless, yet, in fact, is ‘biologically and culturally male/masculine’ ” (p. 19). Linden “troubles” her categories of analysis by asking herself, and all authors writing about the Holo- caust, to begin by signaling their intellectual and political commitments to such categories as “women,” “gender,” “Holocaust,” “Jews,” “power,” “agency,” “victims,” “survivors,” and “memories” (p. 18). Should, for instance, we take for granted that we know when the Holocaust began and when it ended? What con- stitutes Holocaust research? What geographic and time spans are we speaking of when we speak of the Holocaust? Should we, asked Linden, limit our research to women in the ghettos and camps where the focus of traditional Holocaust research has been and thereby maintain a focus on the epicenters of power and destruction? What then do we know about women who lived on the margins of the occupation, those who hid in the countryside and in the cities, those who “passed” on the Aryan side with falsified papers, and those who worked with the resistance?2 Are second and third generations of survivor families considered part of “Holocaust” research? Perhaps an even more elusive question arises when we look at the gendered ways in which we come to understand the terms survivors and victims. In her dis- cussion of the works of Anne Frank and Eli Wiesel, Mary Lagerwey (1996) insisted that whereas both The Diary of Anne Frank and Night are canonical metanarratives about the Holocaust, the gendered nature of each constitutes the ways in which contemporary audiences have popularized and received this pair of stories. She wrote, The initial representative life of an Auschwitz survivor has been male, (i.e., Elie Wiesel). His voice, the voice of a singular man—has become the voice of the Holocaust survivor. In contrast, as a girl frozen in death at the age of fifteen, Frank speaks for the dead, for children, and thus is not so much an exemplary life, but a sympathetic victim. Frank—only a year younger than Wiesel—has come to repre- sent adolescent female victims rather than all Holocaust victims. . . . Elie Wiesel’s story has become the story of Auschwitz survivors, if not the story of Holocaust survivors. (Lagerwey, 1994, pp. 6-7) Lagerwey’s concerns are not about the legitimacy of Frank’s and Wiesel’s voices but about the ways in which gender inferences may take place. Her point is that there are two kinds of voices from the Holocaust: one male voice repre- senting the experiences of survivors, those who were successful and the authors of their own stories, and only one female voice, those who were powerless, rep- resenting the experiences of the many dead victims. The experience of violence 656 AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST is retold in very gendered ways. Frank’s story, insisted Lagerwey, comes to us as a woman’s narrative (a diary) and is less authoritative. On the other hand, the Auschwitz survivor becomes not only Wiesel, but the “archetypical male,” who is in authority and control of the way his life’s story is told. Frank is outside the realm of adult issues of power and control (Lagerwey, 1996). In his perceptive article on violence against women, Michael Smith (1994) suggested something similar in the ways in which women and men are described in the abuse literature. Smith warned that we must be aware of the experiences of violence from the perspectives of women, not just from the perspectives of the researchers who are in authority over their subjects and the ways in which vio- lence is studied. He, like Lagerwey, pushed us to break from master narratives often based on masculine experiences and assumptions, to look to the experi- ences of the women themselves. He, too, suggested we move to the margins of experience to understand its full enormity. For instance, Smith pushed us to the margins of our topic when he identified women who have witnessed abuse against other women as part of our understanding of violence against women. By staying in touch with the experiences of those both in the center and on the margins, we attempt to maintain a continuity between theory and experience (in the everyday lives of both men and women) and to stay in touch with those expe- riences in the rendering of our analyses. Whereas the issues of racism and the Holocaust have been raised by writers, sexism and the Holocaust have been less discussed. Objections to the introduc- tion of sexism into Holocaust research often represent political fears that a focus on sexism might have the unintended effect of reducing the Holocaust to “just” an example of sexism or may detract from the “real” issue of anti-Semitism. The editors of Different Voices offered the following counter to these fears: Precisely because the Nazis targeted Jews and others in racial terms, they had to see those victims in their male and female particularity. Far from reducing the Shoah to an example of sexism, emphasis on what happened to women reveals what otherwise would remain hidden: a fuller picture of the unprecedented and unrelenting killing that the “Final Solution’s” antisemitism and racism entailed. (Rittner & Roth, 1993, p. 4) GENDER AND THE USES OF VIOLENCE Sybil Milton (1993) noted that violence against female political opponents began immediately after Hitler took power. The first targets were socialist, com- munist, and moderate liberal parliamentary deputies on the national, state, and municipal levels. However, not only were women held hostage for their own acts but for “politically active male relatives in flight or in hiding” (p. 215). This “politics of reprisal,” wrote Milton, “led to the arrest of wives, sisters and daugh- ters for the political activities of their absentee male relatives” (p. 215). Interest- ingly, Milton suggested that prior to 1938, Jewish women were more vulnerable Kaufman / RENAMING VIOLENCE 657 to verbal assaults than to physical violence in early encounters with Nazi vigi- lantes. Moreover, Jewish women were arrested in those early years, not as Jews, but as members of these socially despised categories. Normative social inhibi- tions based on cultural understandings of gender still prevented “street violence against even Jewish women, despite their position as social pariahs” (p. 217). Her main point is that prior to 1939, “ideological hostility was not immediately transformed into physical violence,” and despite their despised category, neither “racist propaganda nor government pressure could modify traditional behavior patterns toward ‘weaker’ members of society” (p. 217). It has been hypothesized that one of the reasons for the higher rates of international emigration by Jewish young and middle-aged single men than by women, after 1933, had to do with the mistaken thought that the Nazis would not treat Jewish women, children, and the elderly as harshly as they did the men. In those early years, it was hard to dis- miss notions of traditional gender role behaviors and expectations. Prior to 1939, there is some slight support for this understanding. The inspec- tor of the concentration camps, SS Captain Max Koegel, requested the construc- tion of 30 to 40 detention cells at the new Ravensbruck facility. He wrote, It is impossible to maintain order if the defiance and stubbornness of these hysteri- cal females cannot be broken by strict confinement, since no more severe punish- ment can be used in a women’s camp. Denial of food does not suffice for discipline and order in a women’s camp. (cited in Milton, 1993, p. 222) After an inspection by Himmler, corporal punishment for women inmates was introduced, although, as Milton contended, it had existed in the men’s concen- tration camps almost from the first (p. 223). GENDER: EXPANDING OUR NOTIONS OF RESISTANCE AND SURVIVAL Survival patterns inside the camps after 1939 show that women had “sig- nificantly different survival skills and techniques than did men” (Milton, 1993, p. 227). Milton (1993) wrote that German Jewish women and women of other nationalities used similar strategies for coping with this “unprecedented horror” (p. 227). “Women’s specific forms of survival,” she wrote, “included doing housework as a kind of practical therapy and of gaining control over one’s space, bonding and networks, religious or political convictions” (p. 227). Cleaning, for instance, not only served as therapy but aided in helping to prevent the spread of disease. Often responsible in the past for feeding and caring for their families, women shared recipes, sewing skills (stitching pockets underneath their skirts to carry concealed food back to the camps), and tricks for expanding the meager resources available. Indeed, the clinical research by physicians in the Warsaw Ghetto, suggested Milton, confirms impressionistic data that women were less 658 AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST vulnerable to the effects of short-term starvation and famine than men. Vignettes and diaries by women interned in the camps reveal that women’s traditional domestic roles as wives, daughters, and mothers aided in reducing the spread of disease and consequently decreased mortality in the women’s barracks.3 Because most women had been primarily responsible for the feeding and caring of their families, there was some direct correlation between their own survival and these gendered skills (p. 227). Whereas bonding because of religious or political convictions may not have been specific to women, Milton wrote that the “degree of group cohesion and noncompetitive support available to women seems markedly greater than among men” (p. 230). Again, these observations seem consistent with traditional gender role stereotypes of middle-class women and men of that period of time. The argument rests on the assumptions that gen- der roles, more than instinctual or even psychological and temperamental differ- ences, were at play in accounting for different patterns of survival and resistance. Whether this group cohesion might account for the resourcefulness and skill- fulness women exhibited in passing messages between jail cells and barracks, on work details, and during roll calls is not known, but it appears that women were better at these forms of resistance than men (Milton, 1993, p. 231). Milton (1993) noted that women were “more skilled at trading cigarettes and food to obtain essentials for their friends and prison families” (p. 231). In her paper titled Survival, Resistance and Disguise: Passing for Gentile, Lenore Weitzman (1995) addressed some of the gendered issues around Jewish resistance during the Holocaust. She argued that a “masculine” view is domi- nant in our understanding of resistance. By assuming that the only—or the most important—forms of resistance taken by Jews were those that used guns and weapons excludes and ignores vital roles played by women such as rescuing and saving others as couriers for the underground. Her research explores the resis- tance activities of women who lived outside of the ghettos on the “Aryan side”: women, whom Linden (1996) might describe as portrayed on the margins. Weitzman described women’s activities, such as carrying vital information, smuggling food, and transporting individuals to safe places, as critical forms of resistance. Grounding her analyses in the experiences of women and staying in touch with those experiences in drawing her conclusions about both men and women, Weitzman (1995) asked why such women are not defined as resistance fighters. She wondered why we save that term only for those who aggressively attacked and killed Germans. Why is killing a German more an act of resistance than sav- ing a Jew? Similarly, Nechama Tec (1996), when writing of the experiences of men and women in the forests, concluded that acts of defiance consisted more of acts of survival than outright resistance. That is, even if they wished to engage in armed struggle, women who fled to the forests, in general, were not allowed to carry guns. Similarly, male partisans, who were allowed to carry guns, used their Kaufman / RENAMING VIOLENCE 659 weapons more in the act of scavenging for food and in frightening farmers than in armed struggle with their enemies. In her recounting of the Budy Incident at Auschwitz, Deborah Dwork (1995) asked why this incident was never characterized as a revolt or as an act of rebel- lion. Dwork suggested that because we reconstruct history to reflect our specific disciplinary assumptions and prejudices, especially about gender, we find that no one believed that educated Jewish women would have considered, or were even capable of, such a masculine and aggressive act as a full-fledged revolt. Sorbonne students and artists do not “go down to the level” of vulgar prostitutes, stated one SS lieutenant arrested immediately after the war by the British when he gave his captors a detailed account of the incident. Dwork questioned our reli- ance on this SS lieutenant’s account (p. 17). In a one-line private diary entry, in fact the only contemporary account that we have of the incident, Johanna Kremer, one of the prisoners, names the experience a “mutiny” (p. 21). Dwork wondered, Was it not in the German’s best interest to suppress the very idea of an attempted revolt, and to quell the notion that Jewish intellectual women are capable of vio- lence or concerted action, thus rendering the Jewish women even more powerless? (p. 21) Feminist contributions to the study of the Holocaust, suggested Dwork, locate our inquiries just at the beginning of our understanding of the social history of Europeans—Jewish and gentile—during the Shoah. She claimed we are rewrit- ing history by asking questions related to gender. Once again, we see how the structural conditions might better explain the apparent role reversal of these women, rather than deeply internalized and irreversible gender role norms. GENDER, CLASS, AND RACE: RECOGNIZING THE SINS OF OMISSION AND COMMISSION Playing on the special spheres of influence and holding their expected places in Nazi society, German women sustained the Reich’s racism and genocide, including the ways in which those policies targeted women in particular (Koonz, 1993, p. 287). Koonz (1993) argued that even if the Nazi state gave women little direct political power, women did have their spheres of influence. And although relatively few German women directly participated in the “final solution,” Koonz reasoned that by creating home environments that kept the private, femi- nine world of the family separate and isolated from the masculine sphere of political duty, the elite Nazi wives sustained the Third Reich’s racism and geno- cide. Nazi wives “gave the individual men who confronted daily murder a safe place where they could be respected for who they were, not what they did” (p. 288). Koonz argued that “far from wanting to know the details of their men’s 660 AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST public lives,” these women cultivated instead their own ignorance of public life and thereby further helped their men avoid facing responsibility for participa- tion in the Holocaust (p. 288). The reworking of traditional gender stereotypes around the public and private split is one of the more interesting examples of the ways in which conformity to roles is contextually structured rather than a by-product of early internalization of norms alone. For instance, the ideal of womanhood and traditional notions of the privacy of the family were reworked by the Nazi state depending on whether it was the elite cadre of Nazi leaders or the general population. Koonz (1993) wrote, Paradoxically, the Nazi state, which sedulously undercut all forms of privacy and attempted to destroy parental influence over children, actually encouraged tradi- tional notions of the family when selecting SS commanders who would oversee genocide. For all the emphasis on breeding programs and unwed motherhood, the Nazi leaders and SS chiefs remained as petty bourgeois as they accused their ene- mies of being. They relied on the sheltering family (or on its myth) to keep alive an ersatz sense of decency in the men who would work most closely with mass mur- der. (p. 299) Whereas we might easily dismiss the men who issued and carried out geno- cidal orders as pathological murderers, Koonz (1993) formulated a more devas- tating and even more disturbing picture of the practice of such evil. The Nazis knew that the impact of such brutality on the men would have to be addressed. How could the SS and Nazi leaders manage to remain sane while committing subhuman jobs? We see the interplay between gender and nationalism when Koonz wrote, In the name of obedience to a higher law, officers were admonished to abolish from their hearts “feminine” traits such as sentimentality or squeamishness. They were to think of the long-term gain for all “Aryans,” which vindicated the evil they wrought in the short term. . . . Equally important, leaders encouraged their men to feel proud of their brotherhood—a tough, elite force. To perform well in a concen- tration camp . . . meant to be a “real man,” to be ruthless, obedient, loyal without moral scruples toward subhumans, and scrupulously honorable to equals. (p. 295) Koonz’s analysis allows us to see that overidentification with one’s role is too simple an analysis of the ability to commit genocide. Nazi leaders, contended Koonz (1993), wanted “dedicated, cold administrators of death, not killers among their elite. Nor did they want madmen” (p. 296). By emphasizing the split between their public and private selves, these elite killers were allowed to dis- tance themselves from their actions (role distance) while simultaneously main- taining the image of dedicated professionals, husbands, and fathers. Unlike Koonz, Gisela Bock (1998) placed greater emphasis on the similari- ties than on the differences between the German men and women who carried out their genocidal and brutal jobs. She looked to the ordinary (non-Jewish) Kaufman / RENAMING VIOLENCE 661 German women, not the elite cadre of SS wives and family, who were mobilized to implement Nazi policies. These women, contended Bock, were mobilized on the basis of their worker, not female, status. She posed the undermining of gen- der role stereotypes and the accentuation of nationalist identities as she described some of the women who took part in the antinatalist goals of National Socialism. Prior to 1939, sterilization was the method of elimination of those considered “inferior” for ethnic or eugenic reasons. However, from 1939 on, race hygiene included the killing of inmates of psychiatric asylums. Women were among the perpetrators, as well as the victims, of these crimes (p. 87). Bock wrote, Nurses in the six killing centers assisted the “professional killers” and sometimes killed on their own. They were not forced to perform this task and were not pun- ished if they rejected it, as is evident from many cases when nurses resisted and sometimes were able to help their patients. All Jewish inmates of such asylums were killed. This was the first instance of a systematic massacre of German Jewish women and men. (p. 87) Later, she pointed out that women who actively participated in both eugenic and ethnic racism were often leaders of the Nazi women’s elite groups and authors of the women’s press. They urged women to accept the sterilization policy, identify possible candidates for sterilization, and reject marriage with Jews, Gypsies, and other “racially inferior” persons (p. 87). Once again, we see the reworking and sometimes reversal of role stereotypes to encourage such actions. Wrote Bock, Female “materialism” . . . became the object of racist polemic and was condemned as “sentimental humanitarianism,” as were Christian charity and Marxism. “Women’s materialism” and “the female instinct to care for all those in need of help” were “acts against the race.” Of “women’s particular inclination toward all living beings,” it was said that there was “scarcely any worse sin against nature.” (p. 88) Class clearly played a role in how gender stereotypes would be used (com- pare Bock’s use of stereotypes to Koonz’s cultural construction of womanhood for SS wives). Bock (1998) pointed out that in their roles as workers, as typists stenographers, and as telephone operators, women knew and passed on innu- merable messages and “orders for the implementation of race policies” (p. 89). Bock (1998) challenged the assumption that gender was key in understand- ing how Nazi crimes were perpetrated. Rather, she stressed race. She wrote, “Female perpetrators were perpetrators not so much because they were female but because they believed themselves to be ordinary Germans, like the men” (p. 94). However, Bock was too literal in her understanding of the term gender. It is the uses of gender that were key to Nazi policy, not whether Nazi rule essentially meant a radical cult of motherhood and separation of gender spheres. Looking to 662 AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST traditional spheres of influence for men and women to explain how they contrib- uted to Nazi policies of genocide and murder is to miss the more nuanced ways in which class, race, and gender intersect to explain gender role behavior. Indeed, Bock’s conclusions suggest that she too understood this important inter- action. She asserted, “Not only did racism shape the historical expressions of gender, but gender also shaped the historical expressions of racism” (p. 96). GENDER, THE HOLOCAUST, AND GEOGRAPHIC AND TIME BOUNDARIES The effect of gendered violence against women during the Holocaust knows neither geographic nor time boundaries. The specter of unborn children haunts us as much today as does the number who were killed. Skillfully arguing this point in her analysis of Rebecca Goldstein’s Mind-Body Problem, Emily Budick (1996) wrote of this loss and of Renee, the protagonist, this way: The idea of the unborn children is fraught with implication in relation to post-Holocaust Jewish life. The horror of the brutal, tortuous, extermination of European Jewry contains within it the annihilation as well of the unborn genera- tions, who haunt contemporary Jewish life as powerfully as the ghosts of the six million dead. . . . As a contemporary Jewish woman, Renee inherits the loss of the unborn millions, who were never conceived, never came to term. And this torment of the child who is not, as the book renders it, and I think, as it exists in reality as well, has particular implications for women. (p. 71) Budick (1996) made clear that the overwhelming and sometimes neglected feature of the Holocaust is that the Nazis were willing “to exterminate women and children without differentiation alongside the more traditional male victims of military or political conflict” (p. 67). She wrote, The Nazis did not intend, as in the conventional homo-social policies of war, merely to wipe out male competitors for power. . . . Rather, they sought to annihi- late an entire contemporary population and, beyond that, the possibility of any rebirth of the population later on. In this light, Jewish women might well experi- ence themselves the particular victims of Nazism, an experience that might increase their sense of obligation geared toward procreation. (p. 67) GENDER, SEXUALITY, REPRODUCTION, AND VIOLENCE In her essay on women in the forced labor camps in Poland, Felicja Karay (1998) revealed that prisoner testimonies reveal several allusions to sexual harassment by overseers, despite the fact that Germans were prohibited from Kaufman / RENAMING VIOLENCE 663 such liaisons. Similarly, sexual liaisons between Poles and Jews were forbidden, yet there is evidence that such did occur. The Werkschutz commander Fritz Bartensclager was known to choose “escort girls” for private entertainment. Karay reported that at a feast in his apartment, these escort girls were ordered to serve the guests in the nude and were “ultimately raped by the revelers” (pp. 290-291). In yet another one of his parties, “three women were brutally raped and then murdered” (p. 291). Although the incidence of rape by the Nazis appears to have been rare, it is clear that rumors of rape were used to terrorize many Jewish women. This fear of sexual assault was also experienced by women in hiding (p. 291). In an interview with her, one respondent tells Joan Ringelheim (1993) of sex- ual abuse by a number of gentile men while she was in hiding. She ends her story this way: “It was not important . . . except to me” (p. 376). But why should sexual abuse have no place in the story of violence and the Holocaust? Ringelheim wrote, Almost every woman referred to the humiliating feelings and experiences sur- rounding her entrance to the camp . . . being nude; being shaved all over—for some being shaved in a sexual stance, straddling two stools; being observed by men, both fellow prisoners and SS guards. Their stories demonstrated shared fears about and experiences of sexual vulnerability as women, not only about mortal danger as Jews. (p. 376) The use of narratives such as these points to the need for a fuller and more complete set of experiences before social science theories about the Holocaust construct them. By locating these narratives in time and space and from point of view, we begin, as Linden suggested (1996), to bridge the relationship between storytelling and scholarship. “No one will ever know what it meant to me to destroy those babies” (Perl, 1993, p. 114). Dr. Gisela Perl was an obstetrician and gynecologist who was selected by Josef Mengele to run a “hospital” ward at Auschwitz-Birkenau. Childbirth in the camps presented a particularly pernicious form of gendered violence against women. Perl (1993) recounted that on arrival in Camp C, preg- nant women were encouraged to notify the SS chiefs of their pregnancies under the guise that they would be taken to another camp where living conditions were better. Perl recounted, Even I was naive enough, at that time to believe the Germans, until one day I hap- pened to have an errand near the crematories and saw with my own eyes what was done to these women. . . . They were surrounded by a group of SS men and women, who amused themselves by giving these helpless creatures a taste of hell, after which death was a welcome friend. They were beaten with clubs and whips, torn by dogs, dragged around by the hair and kicked in the stomach with heavy Ger- man boots, then when they collapsed, they were thrown into the crematory— alive. (p. 113) 664 AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST With exquisite pain, Perl (1993) wrote of how she was simultaneously a mid- wife and a murderer: I loved those newborn babies not as a doctor but as a mother and it was again and again my own child whom I killed to save the life of a woman. Every time when kneeling down in the mud, dirt and human excrement which covered the floor of the barracks to perform a delivery without instruments, without water, without the most elementary requirements of hygiene, I prayed to God to help me save the mother or I would never touch a pregnant woman again. And if I had not done it, both mother and child would have been cruelly murdered. (p. 114) Often, violence against women deliberately focused on the gendered conse- quences for them as sexual and maternal beings. The violence to women’s bod- ies came in many forms: the loss of menstruation and eventually, for many, even the loss of breasts. As a 13-year-old, Livia E. Bitton Jackson (1993) described the changes in the bodies of the women around her: The breasts began to sag at first and then became virtual hanging sacks. Some very fat ladies had the most ridiculously hanging empty sacks, like long, narrow, stretched-out empty balloons weighed down by a single marble in each, reaching almost to the navel. Then the empty sacks became shorter. Eventually the skin, too, was absorbed and the breasts disappeared completely. We were all like men. . . . In time the bones began to protrude and shrunken skin lay taut on every pointed bulge. (p. 81) She wrote also of the fear of bromide in the food, which was meant to sterilize women: Married women kept wondering about the bromide in their food again and again. Will they bear children again? What will their husbands say when they find out? Perhaps less of the food will cause less of a damage. Some try to eat less and the conflict is painful. Rejection of a means of survival for the sake of a dubious gain. (Jackson, 1993, p. 80) CONCLUSION This article has been about renaming the experience we call violence: its dimensions, its beginnings, its endings, and its effects. One of the least explored dimensions of the Holocaust is the assumption that there was nothing gendered about this violent experience. A gender role analysis insists that there was noth- ing gender neutral about the Holocaust. The following quotation from Joan Ringelheim (1996), one of the earliest scholars to note that the study of women was an important corrective to the study of the Holocaust, serves as a fitting end- ing to this article. In that the final solution of the Nazis against the Jews was genocide,4 we have come to believe, as scholars and as lay readers, that the Kaufman / RENAMING VIOLENCE 665 Holocaust was gender neutral. In the preface to a special edition of Contempo- rary Jewry, she challenged that assumption with the following: A careful study of National Socialism as theory and practice does not reveal any more gender neutrality than racial neutrality. Theories and policies about gender are always embedded within racial theories. The eugenics program of the Nazis had particular views about men and women—men and women among so-called Aryans and among so called non-Aryans. The prominent analysts of the Holocaust may have erased or ignored gender, but the Holocaust did not. (Preface, p.2) NOTES 1. See, especially, Kaufman (1999). 2. In this article, I will not address these issues but pose the theoretical questions a gender analy- sis forces us to recognize when we analyze violence. Most of these issues are identified in my guest edition of Contemporary Jewry (1996). Some of these issues are also addressed in Women in the Holocaust, edited by Dalia Ofer and Lenore Weitzman (1998). 3. This observation should not be confused with overall survival rates of men and women because young healthy women were almost immediately eliminated on arrival at camps if they arrived with young children or if they were pregnant. 4. Although the Holocaust included persecution of others on political grounds and as homosexu- als, only Roma and Sinti (Gypsies) were subjected to a genocidal policy that parallels the policies against the Jews. REFERENCES Bock, G. (1998). Ordinary women in Nazi Germany: Perpetrators, victims, follower, and bystand- ers. In D. Ofer & L. Weitzman (Eds.), Women in the Holocaust (pp. 85-100). New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Budick, E. (1996). Feminism, Jewish history, and the Holocaust in Rebecca Goldstein’s Mind-Body Problem. Contemporary Jewry, 17, 66-78. Dwork, D. (1995, November). Incident at Budy. Paper delivered at the Association for the Social Scientific Study of Religion, St. Louis, MO. Jackson, L. B. (1993). Coming of age. In C. Rittner & J. Roth (Eds.), Different voices (pp. 73-83). New York: Paragon House. Karay, F. (1998). Women in the forced labor camps. In D. Ofer & L. Weitzman (Eds.), Women in the Holocaust (pp. 285-309). New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Kaufman, D. (1996). The Holocaust and sociological inquiry: A feminist analysis. Contemporary Jewry, 17, 6-17. Kaufman, D. (1999, August). A tribute to Mirra Komarovsky. Paper presented at the ASA meetings, Chicago. Koonz, C. (1993). Consequences: Women, Nazis and moral choice. In C. Rittner & J. Roth (Eds.), Different voices (pp. 287-308). New York: Paragon House. Lagerwey, M. (1994). Gold-encrusted chaos: Memoirs of Auschwitz. Unpublished doctoral disserta- tion, Department of Sociology, Western Michigan University, Kalamazoo. Lagerwey, M. (1996). Reading Anne Frank and Elie Wiesel: Voice and gender in stories of the Holo- caust. Contemporary Jewry, 17, 48-65. 666 AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST Linden, R. (1996). Troubling categories I can’t think without: Reflections on women and the Holo- caust. Contemporary Jewry, 17, 18-33. Lorentzen, L., & Turpin, J. (Eds.). (1998). The women and war reader. New York: New York Univer- sity Press. Milton, S. (1993). Women and the Holocaust: The case of German and German-Jewish women. In C. Rittner & J. Roth (Eds.), Different voices (pp. 213-249). New York: Paragon House. Ofer, D., & Weitzman, L. (Eds.). Women in the Holocaust. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Perl, G. (1993). A doctor in Auschwitz. In C. Rittner & J. Roth (Eds.), Different voices (pp. 106- 118). New York: Paragon House. Ringelheim, J. (1993). Women and the Holocaust: A reconsideration of research. In C. Rittner & J. Roth (Eds.), Different voices (pp. 373-419). New York: Paragon House. Ringelheim, J. (1996). Preface to the study of women and the Holocaust. Contemporary Jewry, 17, 1-2. Rittner, C., & Roth, J. (Eds.). (1993). Different voices. New York: Paragon House. Smith, M. (1994). Enhancing the quality of survey data on violence against women: A feminist approach. Gender and Society, 8, 109-127. Tec, N. (1996). Women in the forest. Contemporary Jewry, 17, 34-47. Weitzman, L. (1995, November). Survival, resistance and disguise: Passing for Gentile. Paper delivered at the Association for the Scientific Study of Religion, St. Louis, MO. Kaufman / RENAMING VIOLENCE 667 AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTISTGrattet, Jenness / HATE CRIME POLICY The Birth and Maturation of Hate Crime Policy in the United States RYKEN GRATTET University of California, Davis VALERIE JENNESS University of California, Irvine To comprehend the contemporary significance of hate crime, it is necessary to understand how the concept emerged and gained acceptance, as well as how its meaning has been transformed over time and across the institutional spheres of the American policy-making process—from social movements to legislatures to appellate courts and, finally, to law enforcement. As the concept traversed these spheres, its definition and the scope of its appli- cation have been substantially clarified. In the process, each institutional sphere placed new constraints on the concept, which restricted its scope in some ways and expanded it in others. The contemporary understanding of hate crime, legally, politically, and culturally, reflects the cumulative efforts of situated actors within and across these spheres. The authors con- sider how awareness of these general patterns is helpful for evaluating the recent criticisms of hate crime policies. It is beyond question that the recent eruptions of racist, anti-Semitic, and antigay violence have focused unprecedented attention on the topic of hate crime. Indeed, the media chronicles of hate crimes are given fresh installments at alarmingly regular intervals. It seems we are in the midst of a hate “crime wave” (Fishman, 1978). It is fitting, then, that a national law journal has dubbed the 1990s the “decade of hate—or at least of hate crime” (Rovella, 1994). Hate-motivated violence, however, is perhaps more accurately characterized as an age-old problem approached with a new sense of urgency. This urgency stems from a social process that was set in motion several decades ago. During the 1980s and 1990s, multiple social movements began to devote considerable material and symbolic resources to the problem. Government agencies analyzed the issue. Legislative campaigns sprang forth from every level of government. New sentencing rules and categories of criminal behavior were established in law. Prosecutors and law enforcement developed training policies and 668 Authors’ Note: An earlier version of portions of this article was presented at the International Con- ference on Hate Crimes held at the Brudnick Center on Violence and Conflict at Northeastern Uni- versity, November 6-7, 1998. We thank Jack Levin, Les Moran, Nancy Naples, and Gordana Rabrenovic for their assistance and comments. AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST, Vol. 45 No. 4, December 2001 668-696 © 2001 Sage Publications specialized enforcement units. The U.S. Supreme Court weighed in with its rejection of one statutory formula and its acceptance of another. Scholarly com- mentary and social science research on the topic, including the work contained in this special issue, have exploded. These extraordinary developments attest to the growing concern with and public visibility of violence motivated by bigotry, hatred, or bias. In the process, criminal conduct that was once undistinguished from ordinary crime has been parsed out, redefined, and condemned more harshly than before (Jenness & Grattet, 2001), reflecting the increasing accep- tance of the idea that criminal conduct is different when it involves an act of dis- crimination. In short, hate crime has clearly secured a place in the American public sphere. In this article, we argue that hate crime cannot be understood solely in terms of its behavioral manifestations, its statistical frequency, and/or its causal pre- cursors. Instead, as the developments catalogued above indicate, hate crime involves a significant mobilization of people, bureaucracies, and institutions. What we are witnessing is a common, but undertheorized, phenomena: the birth and structuring of a domain of public policy. Accordingly, the way this policy domain has emerged, its key players, organizational practices, and substantive foci, form the backdrop against which the behavior and consequences of hate crime can best be understood. CONCEPTUALIZING HATE CRIME AS A POLICY DOMAIN Throughout this article, we frequently refer to hate crime as a policy domain. As Burstein (1991) noted in his review of the literature on the formation and evo- lution of policy domains, “Sociologists interested in politics have increasingly turned in recent years to the study of policy domains” (p. 328). He used the term to denote “components of the political system organized around substantive issues” (p. 327).1 Policy domains are fundamentally rooted in definitional and classification schemes that are properly characterized as social constructions. This means that the substantive focus and boundaries of policy domains are not based on inher- ent qualities of “problems.” Instead, the distinctions reflect dominant modes of conceptualizing issues. Such distinctions are routinely revealed as “con- structed” by social analysts who point out the social conditions are assigned meanings that define their parameters and content (for a review, see Mauss & Jenness, 2001). Therefore, how issues are constructed has clear implications for how policy domains are structured and the kinds of policies that are brought to bear on any particular social problem.2 Our use of the term policy domain implies that the causes and consequences of a problem cannot be fully comprehended apart from an understanding of the larger processes that identified, defined, and ultimately propelled it. More Grattet, Jenness / HATE CRIME POLICY 669 specifically, we use the term policy domain to refer to two things. First, it refers to the range of collective actors—for example, politicians, experts, officials, enforcers, and interest groups—who have gained sufficient legitimacy to speak about or act on a particular issue. Second, it refers to the cultural logics, theories, frameworks, and ideologies those actors bring to bear in constructing the prob- lem and the appropriate policy responses. These dimensions of a policy domain orient us to several considerations with respect to hate crime. Most generally, they suggest that the organization and cul- ture of the hate crime policy domain have shaped the way the problem of hate crime has been defined and the kinds of policies that have been formulated and adopted. Moreover, focusing on policy domains requires recognizing that “pol- icy change takes place through the conjunction of three streams of activity mov- ing fairly independently: problem recognition and agenda setting; the specifica- tion of policy options; and the politics of selecting among proposals and enacting legislation” (Burstein, 1991, p. 346). To these three streams we add one more: Policy change continues throughout the lifecourse of policy as the proce- dures of application in judicial and law enforcement settings are elaborated and refined (Jenness & Grattet, 2001). Finally, the above conceptualization of policy domains implies a focus on the relationship between social organization and meanings; therefore, it suggests that the problem of hate crime is likely to be understood differently over time, across space, and between institutional loca- tions within the domain. Temporal, spatial, and institutional variation in the meaning of hate crime occurs because the formation of a policy domain is rooted in the social processes of innovation, diffusion, and institutionalization. That is, the social construction of hate crime and its official responses diffuse not only across jurisdictional and geographical space, but also across the four streams of policy-making process identified above. This phenomenon is contingent on institutionalization, the process by which the meanings and practices that constitute hate crime stabilize, become cognitively taken for granted by actors, and/or attain a high level of nor- mative consensus (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Powell & DiMaggio, 1991; R. Scott, 1987; Zucker, 1991). It seems clear, then, that studying hate crime requires exploring the birth and evolution of a policy domain. Accordingly, the analysis presented below is moti- vated by a series of questions about how social problems, law, and policy domains come into being, are transformed, and are institutionalized over time. For example, with regard to social problems, why is the concept of hate crime only now being applied to age-old conduct? As for law, how have legal and extralegal subjects and conduct related to hate-motivated crime been con- structed by key players, most notably, activists, lawmakers, judges, and law enforcement agents? To address these and related questions, our approach involves an examination of how the concept of hate crime emerged, how its meaning has been trans- formed across multiple segments of the policy domain, and how it has become 670 AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST institutionalized as a social fact and set of policies. Specifically, we focus on how social movements have constructed the problem of hate-motivated vio- lence, how politicians at both the federal and state level have made legislation that defines the parameters of hate crime, how judges have interpreted those laws, and how law enforcement officials classify and manage that which is defined as criminal by statutes. Summarized in Figure 1, we examine the work of these collective actors to reveal the social processes that have resulted in the pro- duction of hate crime and hate crime policy, both inside and outside of the justice system. THE ROLE OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF HATE CRIME The idea of hate crime emerged through the confluence of several social movement discourses, most notably the Black civil rights movement, the women’s movement, the gay and lesbian movement, the disabilities rights movement, and the crime victims’ rights movement (Jenness & Broad, 1997). These movements converged to compose the modern anti–hate crime movement (Jenness, 1999; Jenness & Grattet, 2001; Maroney, 1998), which in turn proved crucial to the development of hate crime in the United States. The Black civil rights movement of the 1960s was predominantly concerned with the broad issue of discrimination and was therefore geared largely toward establishing and enhancing opportunities within specific sectors of social life, such as employment, education, voting and governmental practice, and public accommodations. There was an understanding within the movement that dis- crimination was the overarching problem and intergroup violence could be miti- gated, at least in part, by using government policy to increase economic opportu- nities and guarantee civil rights. In other words, the systems that maintained Black marginality were seen as the cause, and occasional episodes of violent repression were a symptom (West, 1993). Thus, efforts to curb the violence were central to the broader goal of inclusion. In addition, the “axes” of discrimination focused on by 1960s civil rights campaigns were restricted to race, religion, national origin, and ancestry (Bensinger, 1992; Morsch, 1991). The 1970s civil rights movements, specifically the women’s movement and the gay and lesbian movement, borrowed heavily from the language and strate- gies of the earlier movement (Goldberg, 1991; McAdam, 1982; Morris, 1984). They did so to expand the scope of activism in important ways (Jenness, 1995; Jenness & Broad, 1997; Minkoff, 1995; Vaid, 1995). Most notably, the women’s movement and the gay and lesbian movement enlarged the legal conception of what constitutes standard and legitimate subjects of discrimination. Spe- cifically, the axes of discrimination that the law recognized and sought to ameliorate were broadened to include women, as well as gays and lesbians. Al- though each of these “second wave civil rights movements” (Goldberg, 1991), Grattet, Jenness / HATE CRIME POLICY 671 like the earlier movement, are strongly geared toward expanding opportunities for its constituencies, each movement also sponsors antiviolence projects to combat discriminatory violence directed at its constituency (Jenness, 1995; Jenness & Broad, 1997). The emergence and institutionalization of the anti- violence projects reflect a growing understanding that violence is not merely epiphenomenal to the various systems of discrimination; rather, it is central to their maintenance. The final movement that significantly contributed to the development of the anti–hate crime movement was the crime victims’ movement (Maroney, 1998). The crime victims’ movement is composed of a fairly diverse range of groups, including some of the groups discussed above. The basic grievance put forth by the crime victim movement is simple: Victims of crime, especially violent crime, not only need but are entitled to special assistance, support, and rights as crime victims. From the point of view of those involved in the crime victim movement, “the criminal justice system was not perceived as providing cer- tainty of justice for the criminal or the victim” (Weed, 1995, p. 21). As a result, advocates for victims’ rights argue that legal and extralegal mechanisms are needed to recognize and serve those injured by crime, especially violent crime. Such mechanisms include counseling services and an array of statutes and state constitutional amendments that allow for increased participation of victims in the criminal justice process, protection from retaliation and harassment, and civil actions for compensation (Weed, 1995). The anti–hate crime movement emerged through a fusion of the strategies and goals of several identifiable precursor movements that laid the foundation for a new movement to question, and make publicly debatable, issues of rights and harm as they relate to a variety of constituencies. One of the major achieve- ments of the anti–hate crime movement is that it unites disparate social move- ments, what some would refer to as strange bedfellows (Jenness & Grattet, 2001). As liberal, progressive movements, the civil rights, women’s, and gay 672 AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST Social Movements & Interest Group Politics Legislatures & Policymaking Courts & Statutory Interpretation Law Enforcement & Policing/ Prosecution T1 (1970s) Tn (1990s) Figure 1: Summary of Select Institutional Spheres Composing the Policy Domain of Hate Crime and lesbian movements “called attention to the personal costs of minority groups’ political victimization,” whereas the more conservative victims’ rights movement “called attention to the political context of personal victimization” (Maroney, 1998, p. 579). As portrayed in Figure 2, these liberal and conservative movements combined to instigate public discussions about violence born of big- otry and to demand legal changes, especially in criminal law, to remedy the problem.3 The history of the formation of the anti–hate crime movement directly affected the changing character of the hate crime policy domain. Like the broader history of the modern rights movements, participation in the anti–hate crime movement was staggered. Racially and religiously oriented organizations such as the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) and the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC) led the way, whereas lesbian and gay and women’s groups as well as disability activists joined later. For example, early on, the ADL and the SPLC activity con- centrated on compiling statistical reports to establish the empirical credibility of hate crimes directed at the groups they represented, primarily racial, religious, and ethnic minorities. Gender, sexual orientation, and disability were not incor- porated into their statistics-gathering efforts and, in the case of the ADL, were not included in the early model hate crime statutes promoted in the early 1980s. Thus, early on the empirical credibility of gender-based and antigay offenses as a type of hate crime was not established by the work of these organizations.4 As a result, such acts remained outside the operative construction of hate crime until considerably later in the history of the concept, as we describe below. SOCIAL MOVEMENT MOBILIZATION TRANSLATED INTO FEDERAL AND STATE LEGISLATION Once the anti–hate crime movement was able to bring the issue of discrimina- tory violence into the public consciousness, the struggle turned to creating some sort of legal and policy response. This activity targeted state and federal legisla- tors to enact statutes embodying social movement goals. In 1981, the ADL cre- ated and began to promote a model hate crime law. Five kinds of statutes were included: institutional vandalism (vandalism directed at religious institutions), intimidation (including assault, trespass, vandalism, or harassment), a civil action for both kinds of crime, data collection, and police training law (for a review, see Grattet, Jenness, & Curry, 1998; Jenness & Grattet, 1996). These ele- ments continue to form the core policy agenda for the hate crime policy domain. Proposed early on, however, the ADL model did not initially include sexual orientation, disability, and gender as provisions in hate crime law. Other early advocates, such as the National Institute Against Prejudice and Violence and the Coalition on Hate Crimes5 also operated with an emphasis on hate crime as offenses involving violence stemming from racial, religious, and ethnic Grattet, Jenness / HATE CRIME POLICY 673 prejudice. Later, as the gay and lesbian and women’s activists gained a higher profile on the issue, the ADL modified its model statute to include gender and sexual orientation. This, once again, underscores the staggered way that the dif- ferent movements and hence different categories or persons were incorporated into the concept of hate crime. By the mid-1980s, the issue of hate crime reached the U.S. Congress. As of 2000, nine U.S. Congresses had devoted attention to the task of responding to hate-motivated violence, resulting in hundreds of hours of congressional hear- ings and debates, as well as three new federal laws: Hate Crimes Statistics Act (HCSA), the Violence Against Women Act, and the Hate Crimes Sentencing Enhancement Act (HCSEA). The legislative histories of these laws reveal how the inclusion of status provisions in hate crime law (i.e., “race, religion, and eth- nicity,” “sexual orientation,” and “gender”) ensured that the concept of hate crime expanded to recognize women, gays and lesbians, and people with dis- abilities as constituencies implicated in the hate crime problem (Jenness, 1999). Consistent with the recommendation of the Coalition on Hate Crimes, early claims from local-, regional-, and state-level organizations—especially the ADL—focused on the scope and consequences of race-, religion-, and ethnicity- based violence, thus expressing the parameters of the problem in comparatively narrow terms. A growing awareness of this type of violence became grounds for promoting federal hate crime legislation by a limited number of social 674 AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST Gay/Lesbian Movement Women’s Movement Civil Rights Movement Crime Victim Movement Anti-Hate Crime Movement Figure 2: The Convergence of Civil Rights Movements and the Emergence of an Anti–Hate Crime Movement in the Latter Part of the 20th Century movement organizations and their representatives. This activity cemented a trio of statuses—race, religion, and ethnicity—as the anchoring provisions of all hate crime law. This occurred without controversy over the legitimacy of these status provisions and in light of the fact that race, religion, and ethnicity were already institutionalized as a legitimate subject for federal discrimination law. Later, the character of hate crime law was reshaped when the domain of fed- eral law expanded to include additional provisions. Shortly after federal hate crime law was envisioned, proposals were made by representatives from the gay and lesbian movement to further differentiate hate crime victims by adding sex- ual orientation to the list of provisions in federal hate crime law. Through direct and sustained testimony in federal hearings, social movement organization rep- resentatives were able to bestow empirical credibility on the violence connected with this provision (i.e., antigay violence), just as the ADL and other social movement organizations previously bestowed empirical credibility on violence organized around race, religion, and ethnicity. After much heated debate, advo- cates for the inclusion of sexual orientation in hate crime law convinced legisla- tors that the meaning of sexual orientation was more similar to than dissimilar from the meanings already attached to race, religion, and ethnicity insofar as all are core axes of systematic discrimination. By successfully engaging in these linking strategies, gay and lesbian movement activists and their allies proved crucial to the expansion of hate crime law to cover sexual orientation, despite the fact that sexual orientation has not been recognized as a legitimate provision in previous federal discrimination law. Other provisions initially recommended for inclusion in the law, but not added to the bill prior to its passage, did not attract significant and sustained social movement mobilization in congressional hearings. Prior to the passage of the HCSA, for example, during hearings legislators made passing references to the possibility of including “octogenarians,” “union members,” “children,” “the elderly,” and “police officers” in hate crime law. In the absence of formal hear- ings on violence against these groups, however, there was never an opportunity for representatives from these groups to establish the empirical credibility of the problem as it pertains to their constituencies. Similarly, there was no opportu- nity for representatives of these groups to engage in the necessary claims mak- ing required to legitimate these provisions. As a result, provisions for these con- stituencies have not been written into federal hate crime law. U.S. Representative John Conyers Jr. acknowledged this facet of lawmaking in hear- ings on hate crime when he said, The reason we did not include octogenarians who are assaulted is because there was no testimony that suggested that they ought to be, as awful as the crimes vis- ited upon them are, and the reason we did not account for policemen killed in the line of duty, is that there was no request that they be separated out from the uniform crime statistics. (Cong. Rec. 11395 [1988]) Grattet, Jenness / HATE CRIME POLICY 675 For comparative purposes, an examination of the legislative history of gender as a provision in federal hate crime law reveals that later in the history of federal lawmaking around hate crime, the importance of collective action, as measured through the presence of social movement organizations at congressional hear- ings and in congressional debates, declined. Once a corpus of hate crime law was established and select provisions were cemented in law (i.e., race, religion, ethnicity, and sexual orientation), new provisions—in this case gender—were adopted without direct pressure applied by sustained mobilization from relevant social movement organizations and their representatives, and despite the fact that it was purposely excluded from law in the incipient stages of the lawmaking process. Although there have been many federal hearings on hate crime that address violence against women, none of these hearings have been initiated or sustained by feminist social movement organizations. Instead, lawmakers simply incorpo- rated gender into the existing framework of hate crime laws established in previ- ous hearings, whereas feminist advocates—most notably representatives from the National Organization for Women and the Feminist Majority—gave testi- mony only after the imminent passage of the bill was predicted (Jenness & Broad, 1997). This occurred without much fanfare and without relevant social movement organizations engaging in direct and sustained lobbying work. It was only possible because gender, like race, religion, and ethnicity, was already a standard subject of federal discrimination law. Declining involvement of social movement organizations is also evident in the history of the disability provision. Disability was added to both the reauthorization of the HCSA, the original and final version of the HCSEA, and the current bill pending in Congress: the Hate Crimes Prevention Act (§ 1529). The changing character of the law along these lines occurred despite the fact that federal lawmakers have never held a hearing on violence directed at those with disabilities and no contestation occurred over this provision. Moreover, the offi- cial records of federal-level hate crime lawmaking reveal that representatives from the disabilities movement have yet to make an appearance and offer testi- mony related to federal hate crime legislation. Regardless, disabilities, and thus persons with disabilities, have found a home in hate crime legislation, albeit rather late in the history of lawmaking on hate crime. Here, too, this occurred in light of the fact that disability, like race, religion, and gender, was already a stan- dard subject of federal discrimination law, in large part because of the earlier passage of the Americans With Disabilities Act in 1990 (Shapiro, 1993). This history of status provisions included and excluded from federal legisla- tion is instructive. Theoretically speaking, the pattern described above and sum- marized in Table 1 suggests that the effects of social movements on hate crime lawmaking are twofold. On one hand, those movements give rise to activist organizations that in turn generate the individuals who promote and publicize a particular reform and then testify before Congress and other legislative bodies. 676 AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST This activity affects which groups are visibly associated with an issue and, ulti- mately, which groups are included in the law. On the other hand, in many cases it is really not the mobilization around the specific issue that is crucial, especially once a policy approach is available and established. Later in the formation of a policy domain, the approach and the category of persons must merely be seen as compatible by policy makers (e.g., Does disability “fit” under the hate crimes rubric?). Yet, in order for this to happen, a movement must have been successful over the long term in laying claim to inclusion within these types of issues (e.g., equal rights and violence issues). As social movement goals were translated into a legal and policy issue, the term hate crime was refocused and specified, resulting in changes in its funda- mental nature. In addition to the expansion of the hate crime concept described above, it was necessarily reconstituted in universal terms as concrete groups such as Blacks, immigrants, and Jews were folded into more abstract categories such as race, national origin, and religion. In other words, as the concept was translated into legal discourse, hate crime became something that members of minority and majority groups—Blacks and Whites, homosexuals and hetero- sexuals, immigrants and natives, women and men—could potentially be victims of and were thus given equal protection under the law. Thus, the domain of the concept was expanded beyond the mere addition of new provisions. THE DIFFUSION OF HATE CRIME STATUTES As direct and sustained activism declined in importance with regard to shap- ing the concept, legislative institutions began to determine the precise rules and policies that would constitute the official definition of and response to the prob- lem. The legislative arena subjected the concept to a new set of pressures that Grattet, Jenness / HATE CRIME POLICY 677 TABLE 1: Social Movement Organization (SMO) Mobilization and the Adoption of Select Status Provisions in Federal Hate Crime Law, 1985-1998 Status Provision Proposed Adopted SMO Mobilization Early (pre-1990) Late (post-1990) Early (pre-1990) Late (post-1990) Yes Race/religion/ Race/religion/ ethnicity, sexual ethnicity, sexual orientation orientation No Octogenarians, union Gender, Gender, members, children, disabilities disabilities elderly, police officers reshaped it once again. Here, we focus on the making and remaking of hate crime as a state-level statutory construct and, in so doing, ask a broader question about the formation of the policy domain: Once developed, how do legal con- cepts circulate, take shape, and become institutionalized across distinct, but interrelated, polities (i.e., states)? As of 1999, criminal hate crime laws had passed in 41 states (Jenness & Grattet, 2001; Soule & Earl, 1999). These laws differ in important ways, how- ever. They share the same core elements. In particular, they all create or enhance penalties for criminal behavior motivated by some combination of status catego- ries, such as race, religion, national origin, sexual orientation, gender, and dis- ability. As we describe below, variation in the distribution of status provisions is extensive, but patterned. In particular, the approach an individual state took was largely shaped by when it adopted a law. In other words, the timing of adoption strongly influenced the specific wording used and the content included. For example, hate crime laws have employed four different ways of characterizing the motivational requirement for conviction under the statute. Some states, such as New Hampshire and Rhode Island, use phrasing that requires prosecutors to show that an act was precipitated by “animus, hostility, maliciousness, or hatred.” Such wording implies that a high degree of emotional intensity be behind the offense; thus, a prosecutor must demonstrate the particular subjective state(s) that motivated the crime to obtain a conviction. In contrast, other states, such as California and New York, employ more restrained language that only requires that the perpetrator have an “intent to harass and intimidate the victim.” This too requires the prosecutor to demonstrate that the perpetrator intended (a mental state) to cultivate a sense of fear and intimidation (another mental state) in the victim. And, this too is a difficult requirement to meet. A third type of motivational phrasing contains the least stringent requirement for the prosecu- tor. Louisiana and Ohio, for example, simply require that the offense be commit- ted “because of” race, religion, ancestry, and so forth.6 As Figure 3 shows, the employment of these phrasings is time dependent. Each of these phrasings was employed prior to 1983, reflecting little consensus in the initial wave of adoptions between 1977 and 1987. However, by 1990, two forms—the “because of” wording and “intent to harass or intimidate” wording— began to emerge as the most popular. Finally, after 1993, the because of phrasing became the dominant form, with roughly half of the adopting states using such language. The event responsible for this development was the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Wisconsin v. Mitchell (1993), in which the Court upheld a stat- ute that employed the because of formulation. This ensured that the least strin- gent form of motivational phrasing was increasingly deemed legitimate. The process of convergence around a specific motivational phrasing reflects legislative dynamics that are well known to students of state policy making and the diffusion of innovations (Gray, 1973; Strang & Meyer, 1993; J. L. Walker, 1969). Within the system of state governments, innovative policies evolve through a series of characteristic phases. The initial phase is characterized by a 678 AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST 0 5 10 15 20 25 78 83 88 93 98 Year N um be r of S ta te s "because of" "intent to intimidate or harass" "maliciously and with specific intent to harass" "prejudice, hostility, maliciousness" Figure 3: Cumulative Frequency of Alternative Motivational Phrasings in Hate Crime Statutes, 1978-1999 679 diversity of approaches because there are no clear models or guides on which to act. As time passes, other states begin to respond; however, they no longer oper- ate in the absence of precedent and are instead confronted with various options and the experience of their predecessors about what works and what is a legiti- mate approach (e.g., constitutional or politically). Subsequent policy making results from informed mimicry of early innovators, which tends to lead to one or two approaches becoming understood as the best approach. In the aggregate, this means that a period of experimentation and diversity of approaches tends to be followed by a convergence, or homogenization, of approaches. As we have demonstrated above, hate crime law certainly follows this pattern of homogeni- zation over its life course insofar as approaches to the law were once diverse but are increasingly convergent. Despite the convergence in method of phrasing, however, hate crime statutes have become more expansive in terms of the categories of persons they cover. Figure 4 displays the status provisions included in the laws as of 1988 and then 10 years later in 1998. In both periods, nearly every state law in existence cov- ered acts motivated by race, religion, color, and national ancestry. In 1988, only 11%, 21%, and 26% of the statutes in existence included sexual orientation, gen- der, and disability, respectively. By 1998, however, half of the statutes had sex- ual orientation and disability and 40% had gender included. Figure 4 also makes apparent that many statutes now contain some miscellaneous categories that have not been replicated in any substantial way. Thus, three tiers emerge: cate- gories that are always included, categories that are included with increasing reg- ularity, and anomalous categories that are included but not with any regularity. The interpretation of the pattern of status provisions over time is clear. The most pervasive categories reflect the oldest, most established, and most recog- nized axes of oppression. The salience of these categories reflects the success of the 1960s-era civil rights movement in galvanizing particular categories in the public consciousness and in legal discourse (Grattet et al., 1998). Legislators, by and large, do not contest the prevalence and seriousness of hate crime motivated by these categories (Jenness, 1999). Sexual orientation, gender, and disability reflect more recent, and therefore less embedded, rights movements that still face considerable opposition when claiming membership in issues such as hate crime (Jenness, 1999). Finally, the miscellaneous categories have little or no his- tory to sustain claims for inclusion in the laws and therefore have made much less systematic inroads into the issue.7 Thus far, we have seen that the hate crime concept undergoes a common pro- cess within each new institutional arena into which it is placed. That is, its institutionalization is accompanied by a refocusing of the concept relative to constraints of each new arena into which it moves. Its meaning is sharpened and, as we have seen, expanded and elaborated in novel ways. Indeed, the twin pro- cesses that characterize the evolution of hate crime within the legislative arena, homogenization and expansion, are reiterated as the concept moves into the judicial realm. 680 AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST Grattet, Jenness / HATE CRIME POLICY 681 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% Anyone Armed Services Personnel Involvement in Civil or Human Rights Marital Status Age Political Affiliation Ethnicity Creed Disability Sexual Orientation Gender Ancestry National Origin Color Religion Race Percent of States with Category, n=40. Percent of States with Category, n=19. 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% Anyone Armed Services Personnel Involvement in Civil or Human Rights Marital Status Age Political Affiliation Ethnicity Creed Disability Sexual Orientation Gender Ancestry National Origin Color Religion Race Figure 4: Status Provisions in State Hate Crime Laws, 1988 and 1998 THE RESTRICTION AND EXPANSION OF HATE CRIME IN APPELLATE CASES If legislatures provide the general templates for law, the job of courts, particu- larly appellate courts, is to flesh out the specific meanings of a statute. Between 1984 and 1998, U.S. appellate courts considered the constitutionality of hate crime statutes 38 times.8 As Figure 5 shows, the bulk of these cases occurred over a 3-year period stretching from 1992 to 1995. During this period, hate crime statutes were embroiled in a highly visible constitutional crisis (Bader, 1994; Brooks, 1994; Gaumer, 1994; Grannis, 1993; Kagan, 1992; Morsch, 1991; Strossen, 1993; Tribe, 1993; Winer, 1994). By 1997, however, that crisis was largely resolved, and the frequency of hate crime cases and attendant legal commentary subsided dramatically. This signals that the rules governing hate crime are becoming more “settled” in judicial discourse (Phillips & Grattet, 2000). Before being resolved, however, the constitutional crisis had important effects on the legal conception of hate crime. Namely, appellate judges rejected certain approaches and endorsed others, thus creating a jurisprudential founda- tion for the statutes. Although the statutes are themselves quite broad and poten- tially cover all sorts of things, courts have restricted their meaning in ways that result in the concept of hate crime becoming increasingly delineated and demar- cated. A review of constitutional challenges reveals how this has occurred and with what consequence. The central concern expressed by challengers of the statutes is whether laws punish speech. Indeed, First Amendment violations have been the most success- ful strategy in challenging specific statutory forms (R.A.V. v. Saint Paul, 1992; State v. Kearns, 1994; State v. Talley, 1993). This is not surprising given that almost all of the statutes cover activity that clearly borders on speech, such as intimidation and harassment. In response to these concerns, courts have consis- tently restricted the coverage of hate crime law to the “conduct” side of the speech-conduct continuum (Phillips & Grattet, 2000). This has meant that intimidation and harassment can only refer to speech that involves direct threats. That is, a speech act must qualify as a “true threat,” an established standard that requires demonstration that a speaker has both the intent and the capacity to carry out the threat. It is, in practical terms, a speech act verging on conduct. Racial epithets and taunts that do not meet the legal standard of true threats do not qualify as hate crime under this interpretation. Thus, the possible meanings of hate crime as covering, say, the conscious creation of an intimidating environ- ment or general expressions of a desire to do violence to members of a particular group would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to prosecute under the pre- vailing judicial interpretation of the laws. In contrast to the restrictions implied by considerations of First Amendment violations, there are some identifiable ways in which the settling of the hate 682 AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Year N um be r of C as es Figure 5: Number of Appellate Cases Challenging Hate Crime by Year, 1984-1999 683 crime concept in the hands of judges has led to an expansion of the domain of coverage. This is most evident through an examination of the way the motiva- tional standard has been interpreted. As we detailed in the previous section, there is considerable diversity in terms of the ways statutes define the specific motivational requirements. The because of construction is relevant to the issue of whether hate crime laws punish speech, underlying motives, and political viewpoints. By endorsing the because of phrasing, courts maintain that it does not matter what political views or ideologies motivated the act. Rather, all that matters is that a victim was selected because of his or her race, religion, ancestry, and so forth, quite apart from the degree of malice involved on the part of the per- petrator (Phillips & Grattet, 2000). By endorsing the because of form of the law, courts drew a parallel with established antidiscrimination principles within which it does not matter why a woman is treated differently than a man, a black differ- ently than a white, a Catholic differently than a Jew; it matters only that they are. So also with section 775.085 [Florida’s hate crime statute]. It doesn’t matter that Dobbins hated Jewish people or why he hated them; it only mattered that he dis- criminated against Daly by beating him because he was Jewish. (Dobbins v. State, 1992) This interpretation situates hate crime jurisprudence within the broader and more established body of antidiscrimination law; in so doing, it broadens its applicability by defining biased selection of the victim, rather than hate, as the requisite motivational precursor. The consequence is that acts by virulent racists or offenders with “only” a mild disrespect for the victim’s group are punished equally, with an offender’s underlying philosophy and degree of bigotry being irrelevant. In short, this expands the domain of the law because, properly speak- ing, “hate” is not a necessary element, only bias.9 In sum, as hate crime statutes came under the scrutiny of the courts, yet another round of reworking of the concept was set in motion. As with the social movement and legislative arenas described earlier, a refocusing and sharpening of the concept resulted from the circulation of hate crime within courts. And once again, the institutionalization of hate crime is reflected in its refinement and the emergent consensus about what the laws cover and do not cover. The courts have had a unique influence insofar as judicial discourse regarding hate crime has framed the topic as discriminatory violence, in large part by subsum- ing it under antidiscrimination laws. In the process, its meaning was further delimited, and a range of circumstances was ruled outside of the domain of the concept. Most notably, the judicial translation of hate crime into bias crime has meant that hate crime law might be enforced in circumstances where hate is absent. The remaining question, then, is what happens to the concept once the law is legitimated by the courts and it is placed in the hands of law enforcers? 684 AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST ENFORCING HATE CRIME LAWS If the efforts of legislators in responding to hate crimes peaked in the late 1980s and the court challenges played out mostly prior to 1995, then the late 1990s witnessed enormous attention to law enforcement—especially policing and prosecution—as the principal problem areas with respect to hate crime. At this point in the history of the concept, the legislative issues regarding who and what should be covered by the laws, as well as the judicial issues regarding the legitimacy and constitutionality of the laws, have given way to pragmatic issues about the organizational changes required to enforce the laws. Efforts along these lines are currently ongoing in federal, state, and local policing institutions. Indeed, law enforcement officials at federal (Reno, 1999), state (Lockyer, 1999), and local (Garcetti, cited in Boxall, 1998) levels have recently announced plans to redouble efforts at policy training and the enforcement of hate crime statutes. Much of the social science research on hate crimes focuses on the multitude of ways police departments are responding to the legal mandate to pursue bias-motivated crime (Boyd, Berk, & Hamner, 1996; Martin, 1996; S. Walker & Katz, 1995; Wexler & Marx, 1986). Conducted in the early 1990s when the pre- cise definition of hate crime was still being negotiated in legislatures and courts, these early studies reveal that hate crime policing is quite variable across juris- dictions and across divisions within the same jurisdiction. In large part, this vari- ation is attributable to differences in the philosophies, organizational structures, and routine practices in different departments, as well as the newness of the criminal category itself. Given that the latter is only a temporary condition, there is reason to believe that variation in the policing of hate crime is decreasing and will continue to do so as the concept becomes settled. Just as social movement activism, lawmaking, and judicial decision making around hate crime have done over the past two decades, newfound police practices related to hate crime are likely to become established and taken for granted. Indeed, preliminary evi- dence suggests this is the case.10 In recent years, efforts to formulate uniform police training guidelines have revolved around the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI’s) promotion of its own program (Reno, 1997, 1999). Large states such as California, for example, have revised and updated their police training guidelines to reflect changing def- initions and judicial interpretations of the law and to bring their guidelines into alignment with the FBI’s. In particular, our research on California shows that the FBI and the California guidelines are both aware of the judicial rulings relevant to the question of how to classify cases where bias is only one of several motiva- tions. Reflecting recent court decisions in California, both sets of guidelines— California’s and the FBI’s—stipulate that an incident should be classified as a hate crime when it appears to have been caused “in whole, or in part” by race, Grattet, Jenness / HATE CRIME POLICY 685 religion, and so forth (Jenness & Grattet, 2001). In other words, at both the state and federal levels, training is being altered to reflect the more recent conceptual- ization of hate crime law, with homogenization in policing policy and practice following suit. Many California police departments have recently adopted general orders relative to hate crime. These orders articulate local department policies about hate crime, thus embodying law enforcement’s response to the issue. They typi- cally include a working definition of the concept, as well as a list of indicators reflecting the kinds of evidence that suggest a hate crime has occurred and a set of procedures for processing cases that might be classifiable as hate crimes. Since hate crime constitutes a relatively new criminal category for law enforce- ment, it is not surprising that the production and dissemination of these orders are a recent development. In light of being handed this new crime to enforce, some police officers ex- press complaints about the law, and others comply—to greater or lesser degrees— with the mandate to enforce it. With regard to the former, some officers register complaints that resemble those made in relation to domestic violence laws in the 1970s and 1980s and stalking laws in the 1990s. Namely, opponents argue that hate crime laws are hopelessly vague and too ambiguous to enforce; moreover, law enforcement personnel have more serious problems to contend with (S. Walker & Katz, 1995). In contrast, Boyd et al. (1996) found out that many officers express the opposite view. They do not view the complexities of the cat- egorization processes that surround the enforcement of hate crime as fundamen- tally different from other kinds of crimes and attendant required police work. In part, these contrasting views reflect the newness of the concept and the diversity of police practices and personnel in the United States. The newness of the concept is further reflected in the variation in departmen- tal general orders. For example, as Figure 6 shows, few of the general orders cite anything other than race, religion, and ancestry as relevant status provisions in their definitions of hate crime. These departments are operating with definitions of hate crime that date back to the early 1980s. This is even more surprising when we consider that California has one of the most expansive definitions of hate crime, including coverage of transsexuals and that all the authors of the order needed to do is read the statute to realize the categories of persons covered under the law. With such variations existing at the local level, it is not surprising that there is considerable diversity of interpretations. From a social science point of view, classic and contemporary studies of policing demonstrate that variation in interpretative practices across depart- ments and officers is not uncommon in law enforcement (Kitsuse & Cicourel, 1963; Saunders, 1977). Officers frequently deal with circumstances that are dif- ficult to classify and require them to understand complex motivations and the interpersonal dynamics of the persons involved. Thus, the question that must be asked about hate crime is, Does the variation we currently see correspond to other innovations in crime policy at this stage of their development? In other 686 AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST words, the appropriate comparison for hate crime policing is not crimes such as theft, which is a deeply settled concept in American law and police practice and thus raises comparatively little disagreement about its behavioral attributes, but stalking, domestic violence, and sexual harassment, all of which are recent inno- vations, like hate crime, that have become increasingly settled in law enforce- ment practice. The other side of law enforcement, the prosecution of hate crime, is in roughly the same shape. Prosecutors express mixed opinions about the viability and value of enforcing hate crime law. Some prosecutors have gone on record rejecting hate crime laws as useless and unenforceable (Jacobs & Potter, 1998), Grattet, Jenness / HATE CRIME POLICY 687 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 Gender Disability Sexual Orientation National Origin/Ethnicity Religion Race 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 Gender Disability Sexual Orientation National Origin/Ethnicity Religion Race Percentage of Orders (n=80) Percentage of Orders (n=25) Figure 6: Inclusion of Particular Status Provisions in California Police Depart- ment General Orders Regarding Hate Crimes, 1994 and 1999 whereas others have strongly embraced them as a meaningful response to com- munity strife (Boxall, 1998). With regard to the former, at least in the abstract, hate crime implies greater evidentiary burdens, more effort to spell out the intri- cacies of the law to juries, and more time and energy to prepare cases. For prose- cutors who are understaffed and subjected to heavy caseloads, such laws may represent an extra set of burdens they prefer to avoid in an occupation where one’s work is usually evaluated in terms of conviction rates. Other prosecutors, however, view hate crime laws as an extra tool to contribute to the management of crime and intergroup conflict in their community. Although there is currently little published social science research on hate crime prosecution to draw conclusions about which of these predominates among American prosecutors, the publication of initial statistics on hate crime prosecutions, convictions, and plea bargains is revealing. In particular, four recent years of data on prosecution in California begin to tell the story (see Figure 7). From 1995 to 1998, all of the major indicators of the hate crime pro- cessing have varied. Only about 6% of hate crime incidents in 1995 and 1996 led to successful convictions. In 1997, that figure rose to more than 17%, but in 1998 it fell back to 10%. On the surface, these percentages may seem dismal. How- ever, to put these percentages in perspective, consider that the more recently reported percentages fall between the percentages for aggravated assault (a crime known for being comparatively easy to police and prosecute) and vandal- ism (a crime known for being fairly difficult to police and prosecute). Of course, hate crime runs the gamut from assault to vandalism, so it is not surprising that it is somewhere between the two in terms of the ratio of incidents to convictions. However, these data only tell us about the slippage between the police’s classifi- cation of incidents and the ability of prosecutors to obtain convictions. A more useful way of evaluating prosecution is to determine the proportion of cases that, once filed by the prosecutors, leads to convictions. Although there is again a lot of variability, in general, the ratio has improved and falls within the range of other crimes. This suggests that once prosecutors decide to proceed to prosecute a crime as a hate crime, they do not seem to be struggling greatly with obtaining convictions, at least not any more so than with other crimes. This evi- dence contradicts arguments about the unenforceability of hate crime law. A final piece of evidence worth contemplating is guilty pleas. If, as some have con- tended (Jacobs & Potter, 1998), hate crimes are considerably more ambiguous and contestable than “parallel crimes” (Lawrence, 1999) and thus a misuse of justice system resources, then we would expect that plea bargains rarely happen. Defendants would be encouraged to challenge the charge on constitutional or evidentiary grounds. However, as is the case with most crimes, the majority of hate crime cases result in guilty pleas rather than trials, and that number has increased in recent years. Thus, the pessimistic view of hate crime prosecutions as causing enormous problems for prosecutors is simply not borne out by initial available evidence. Although only a small portion of incidents produces convictions, when 688 AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 1995 1996 1997 1998 Year G ui lt y P le as t o C on vi ct io ns & C on vi ct io ns t o C om pl ai nt s F il ed (c ol um n gr ap hs ) 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 C on vi ct io ns p er 1 00 I nc id en ts (l in e gr ap h) Percent of Convictions Resulting from Guilty Pleas Percent of Complaints Filed Resulting in Convictions Percent of Incidents Resulting in Convictions Figure 7: California Prosecution Data on Hate Crime, 1995-1998 689 prosecutors do decide to file cases as hate crimes they are successful in obtaining convictions, usually by guilty plea. This suggests that the prosecution of hate crime is proceeding in a conservative rather than liberal or indiscriminate fash- ion, something we would expect from a newly initiated policy. Moreover, hate crime prosecutions are beginning to resemble patterns for other crimes, some- thing we would expect to be increasingly the case as the concept becomes more and more settled in the law enforcement arena. In theoretical terms, law enforcement represents the end point of the move- ment of the hate crime concept across the various policy arenas we have dis- cussed. It should not be surprising that it is less institutionalized than the other arenas. Nonetheless, although evidence is only recently beginning to be com- piled, it appears that—as in the legislative and judicial realms—the process of settling of the concept hate crime is occurring within law enforcement. Thus, across the different arenas in which hate crime policies have been defined, we observe a striking similarity in core social processes. Taking these processes seriously has implications for how hate crime statistics are understood, where future social science research might focus next, and what the future might hold for hate crime policy making. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION Over the past three decades, hate crime has been defined, promoted, and addressed as a contemporary social problem. As Senator Edward Kennedy proclaimed, Civil rights are still the unfinished business of America. Hate crimes are uniquely destructive and divisive, because their impact extends far beyond the victim. They poison entire communities and undermine the ideals for which America stands. They deserve to be punished with the full force of law. (cited in Lawrence, 1999, jacket note) Interestingly, it was not until the end of the 20th century that comments like this were expressed by senior elected officials and that policy reform designed to combat discriminatory violence was forthcoming and institutionalized. This marks an important moment in the history of crime control efforts, the develop- ment of criminal and civil law, the allocation of civil rights, and the symbolic sta- tus of select minorities in the United States. So, it is fair to ask, How have the many changes that accompany this moment come about such that an entirely new policy domain has emerged to redefine age-old conduct—discriminatory violence—as a crime problem? From our point of view, an answer to this ques- tion necessarily forms the backdrop against which the behavior and conse- quences of hate crime can best be understood by social scientists and addressed by activists, policy makers, and citizens. 690 AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST As the above discussion illustrates, the birth and structuring of the hate crime policy domain have occurred as a sequence of stages. In its journey from social movement frame to legislative concept to judicial theory to law enforcement practice, the meaning and policy significance of hate crime have undergone a series of transformations. As we have seen, each change reflects the unique demands placed on the concept in the different institutional arenas that compose the American policy process. Its meaning has been pushed and pulled in new directions both within and across each new context, mutating in ways that ensure constancy as well as innovation. As the policy concept circulates within and across institutional spheres, com- mon social processes operate. Specifically, within each arena hate crime begins as an imprecise multivalent concept whose definition and attendant policy implications become more refined and settled over time. This settling takes two seemingly contradictory paths, each of which reflects countervailing forces evi- dent within select institutional spheres as well as between these spheres. On one hand, the concept becomes more specified and restricted in terms of the circum- stances under which it is applicable. That is, it becomes possible to rule out cer- tain behaviors and circumstances from the domain of the concept. On the other hand, the concept becomes more embedded and more established. As it is increasingly applied in novel circumstances, its definition expands as new phe- nomena are assembled under its rubric. Even the process by which a broader foundation or framework is sought can result in enlarging the meaning and implication of the concept. Finally, it is important to understand that the core features of this process—the sequential formation of a policy domain, the solidi- fication of the definition of the policy concept, and its institutionalization occur- ring both through expansion and restriction of its scope—are not unique to hate crime. Indeed, these are characteristics of policy domain formation processes more generally. With these understandings in mind, it is possible to confront some of the major criticisms of hate crime policy. A central concern has been that hate crime is by definition a highly subjective and vague concept and therefore will lead to resource waste as officials strain to determine how best to implement the laws. This research suggests that the ambiguity of the concept is decreasing over time in all of the spheres we have examined. Specifically, social movement players have generally reached agreement on how to operationalize the concept. A dom- inant model of hate crime has emerged in the legislative arena. Judicial interpre- tations of the law have largely converged. And, the law enforcement practices appear to be solidifying. Within this context, to critique a concept because it appears ambiguous to some officials amounts to a critique of the concept’s new- ness, which, in our view, is not a particularly compelling basis for critique. The questions raised by this phenomenon are not whether a concept is hope- lessly ambiguous, but rather, what features of the social organization of various sectors of the legal system influence variation in understandings and uses. Thus, Grattet, Jenness / HATE CRIME POLICY 691 the vagueness of the concept of hate crime must be analyzed longitudinally rather than concluded from a static impression gathered early in the career of a concept. Likewise, comparison cases are extremely important to evaluating hate crime laws. There is heterogeneity in the interpretation of many kinds of laws. The question should not be “Do understandings of hate crime vary across juris- dictions?” but “How does the variability in hate crime compare with other crimes?” To address this question, the comparison case should not be crimes such as assault or burglary, whose meaning and associated policing practices have been institutionalized for centuries. Instead, hate crime should be com- pared with categories of law, such as sexual harassment, stalking, and domestic abuse, which are comparatively new categories that have traveled the same path from social movement construct to law enforcement tool. A similar response is appropriate to the critique of hate crime statistics. Because the statistics are so contingent on the part of the hate crime policy domain that is the least institutionalized (i.e., policing), data collection remains problematic in the pursuit of evaluating the extent and character of hate crime in the United States. But, this should not be the final judgment. In fact, given the efforts to improve the knowledge of law enforcement and to homogenize the data collection techniques currently under way by federal and some state law enforcement agencies, we expect data collection to become more systematic and reliable and, incidentally, more useful for traditional criminological analyses as well. Certainly, this has been the case with other recently invented, diffused, and institutionalized categories of crime, such as stalking. Finally, the policy implications that derive from this analysis are simple. Pro- grams that are designed to facilitate the transfer of knowledge and techniques to prosecutors and police officers are precisely what will hasten the institutionalization process we have discussed. Cautious prosecution is also advisable, not only because case-building strategies and expertise are at an early stage of development but also because the symbolic value of prosecuting cases as hate crimes diminishes with volume and with particular controversial appli- cations. Ironically, hate crimes may be a kind of law that we would not want to see implemented with great regularity. The more it is applied, the more “normal- ized” hate crimes become, and what was once front-page news slips to the third page of the metro section. The symbolic force of law diminishes as a result. NOTES 1. Other terms have been used to describe much the same combination of cultural and organiza- tional elements of political processes (e.g., “policy areas” [Amenta & Carruthers, 1988, p. 666], “sectors” [Freeman, 1985; W. R. Scott & Meyer, 1983, p. 137], “subsystems” [Freeman, 1985], “issue domains” [McDonagh, 1989, p. 121], “fields” [Grattet, 1994, p. 15], and “programs” [Rose, 1985, p. 9]). 2. Recognizing that policy domains are rooted in social constructions does not, however, mean that the social conditions they address are not real or, by extension, that the social facts and attendant 692 AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST suffering underlying a problem are only illusory. Rather, it merely acknowledges that how problems are defined and responded to are contingent on available frameworks of meaning that are appropri- ated and deployed in key institutional settings. 3. In the context of waning legislative support for progressive civil rights–based movements in the early 1980s, enhancing punishments for hate crimes could be justified as part of the larger “get tough on crime” campaign. Under this rubric, it was difficult for conservative policy makers to oppose it. Wittingly or not, hate crime law advocates capitalized on an era in American policy mak- ing in which it would be difficult for members of either party to vote against crime legislation pro- moted by various sectors of the anti–hate crime movement. 4. Establishing empirical credibility for a social problem is crucial to the development of a pol- icy domain. Claims are empirically credible “to the extent that there are events and occurrences that can be pointed to as documentary evidence” (Snow & Benford, 1992, p. 140). 5. The Coalition on Hate Crimes was composed of civil rights, religious, ethnic, and law enforcement groups, as well as a diverse array of professional organizations, including the Anti- Defamation League, the American Bar Association, 30 attorneys general, the National Institute Against Prejudice and Violence, the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force, the American Psycho- logical Association, the American Psychiatric Association, the Center for Democratic Renewal, the American Civil Liberties Union, the American Jewish Congress, People for the American Way, the National Organization of Black Law Enforcement Executives, the U.S. Civil Rights Commission, the Police Executives Research Forum, the Criminal Justice Statistics Administration, the Interna- tional Association of Police Chiefs, the National Council of Churches, the National Coalition of American Nuns, and the American Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee. 6. Although technically speaking these phrasings suggest different requirements for prosecu- tors, appellate courts have tended to view them as meaning the same thing (Phillips & Grattet, 2000). 7. Paralleling the pattern of growth in status provisions, there is a similar pattern of growth in the kinds of activities referenced in hate crime statutes (Grattet, Jenness, & Curry, 1998). As the laws diffused, states began to expand the range of covered crimes from assault, vandalism, and intimida- tion to blocks of crimes (e.g., felonies), and more recently, some states have even passed laws that permit any crime to be converted into a hate crime (e.g., Vermont). 8. This refers only to cases considering the “facial validity” of hate crime laws. 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Chicago: Uni- versity of Chicago Press. 696 AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTISTMcDevitt et al. / BIAS- AND NON-BIAS-MOTIVATED ASSAULTS Consequences for Victims A Comparison of Bias- and Non-Bias-Motivated Assaults JACK MCDEVITT JENNIFER BALBONI Center for Criminal Justice Policy Research, Northeastern University LUIS GARCIA Suffolk University JOANN GU Boston Police Department There has been a great deal of scholarly and practical discussion regarding treating bias crimes as separate and distinct incidents. Critics assert that bias crimes are not inherently different from comparable nonbias offenses and that the consequences for victims are simi- lar. This study presents findings from an analysis of survey data obtained from bias and nonbias assault victims from the city of Boston. Although there are several limitations to the authors’ data, findings from the respondents replicate prior empirical research and indicate that bias crime victims experience more severe psychological sequelae, for a longer period of time, than victims of similar nonbias offenses. Specifically, the level of intrusive thoughts, feelings of safety, nervousness, and depression were all significantly higher for bias crime victims. In the impassioned debate about hate crime legislation, assertions are made on both sides about the consequences of bias-motivated crimes on their victims. In one camp, several scholars claim that bias crimes are a political construct, devised to promote identity politics. Critics argue that distinguishing hate crime from other comparable crimes is superfluous because the bias motivation of the offender does not cause additional injurious impact on the primary victim. Implicit in this assumption is that bias crimes are not intrinsically different from similar nonbias offenses. Legal scholars Jacobs and Potter (1998) cogently summed this argument: “We do not believe that crimes motivated by hate 697 Authors’ Note: This project was sponsored through the National Institute of Justice, Grant #97-IJ- CX-0011. Points of view or opinions in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official position of the funding source. The authors wish to thank Michael Buerger for his very insightful, helpful comments on this article. AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST, Vol. 45 No. 4, December 2001 697-713 © 2001 Sage Publications invariably are morally worse or lead to more severe consequences for the victims than the same criminal act prompted by other motivations” (p. 147). Critics cite the example that a bias murder victim is just as dead as a nonbias murder victim as a reason for treating these crimes similarly. Although the no additional injury argument is based on apparently rational arguments, no empirical evidence is available to support it. Furthermore, this assumption about the differences between murder victims is misleading because, among other things, it does not address the fact that the overwhelming majority of bias crimes in this country involve intimidation, vandalism, or assault, not murder (Uniform Crime Reports, Hate Crime Reports, 1998). Most people readily would agree that a cross burning is different from a typical tres- passing/vandalism offense. In this article, we focus on differences between bias and nonbias crimes in terms of their impact on assault victims, differences that have not been fully explored in prior research. This article reports the findings of our analysis of survey data from bias and nonbias assault victims regarding the psychological consequences of their victimization experiences. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN BIAS AND NONBIAS OFFENSES We posit that hate crimes are inherently more harmful to the social fabric of society than comparable crimes without bias motive. Several authors have sug- gested dimensions of bias crimes that may increase the impact these crimes would have on their victims. The first unique dimension of bias crimes is the aspect of victim interchangeability inherent in many of these crimes (Levin & McDevitt, 1993). Interchangeability means that any individual who possesses, or is perceived to possess, a specific trait could be selected as a target. Bias crime victims are selected for victimization because of some actual or perceived status that they are powerless to change. For instance, an African American person can not change his or her race after an attack to prevent future victimization; he or she will continue to be African American. The second unique dimension of bias crime is the capacity for secondary vic- timization. Bias crime offenders generally intend for their acts to reach far beyond the primary victim, to affect all members of a particular minority group. For example, a cross burning not only affects the immediate family, but any Afri- can American who becomes aware of the incident. Consider the differences in the following scenarios: 1. A teenage couple demonstrates their undying love by spray painting “Joe loves Mary” across the back wall of their community high school. 2. A hate monger professes his views of Nazism by spraying “Hitler was right” on a local synagogue. Technically, both incidents are vandalism. The first scenario presents somewhat of a petty nuisance, whereas the second incident attacks a distinct segment of the 698 AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST population—attempting to intimidate a segment of the community by indicating approval of the annihilation of that group and signaling to all people of Jewish descent that the offender believes they are inferior. It would be difficult to argue that the racial slur does not victimize more people, in a more serious fashion, than the teenagers’ prank in the first scenario. Moreover, the effects of victim interchangeability and secondary victimiza- tion can interact to disrupt the community in serious and often violent ways. The U.S. Supreme Court referred to this dimension of bias crime as “the distinct emotional harm” that such crimes inflict, noting the potential to “incit[e] com- munity unrest” (Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 1993). Civil disturbances following the incidents in Bensonhurst and Howard Beach, New York, as well as the violence and destruction that followed court decisions in the Rodney King case illustrate the courts’ fear that bias crimes could exacerbate existing racial tensions to the point of community violence. The Oregon Court of Appeals refers to this elusive attribute of bias crime as the power to “escalate from individual conflicts to mass disturbances” (Harvard Law Review, 1996). Although the Supreme Court and other courts across the country have noted the difference between the two types of crime, research is scant as to precisely how this type of crime affects the victims. PRIOR LITERATURE ON HATE CRIME VICTIMIZATIONS Research regarding the impact of bias crimes is limited. Although there has been significant research about the general victimization process, very little examines the complex relationship between bias motivation, incidence of crime, and victimization consequences. Moreover, of the few that do examine the extent of psychological and emotional injury suffered by bias crime victims, most fail to provide comparative data for victims of similar non-bias-motivated offenses. Whereas numerous studies have been conducted to describe the psychosocial consequences of particular types of victimization (e.g., Freedy, Resnick, Kilpat- rick, Dansky, & Tidwell, 1994; Frieze, Greenberg, & Hymer, 1987; Kilpatrick, Saunders, Veronen, Best, & Von, 1987; Sales, Baum, & Shore, 1984), only a handful compare symptoms across crime types (Davis & Brickman, 1996; Lurigio, 1987; Resick, 1987; Riggs & Foa, 1995; Wirtz & Harrell, 1987), and even fewer are specific to bias crime victimization (Barnes & Ephross, 1994; Ehrlich, Larcom, & Purvis, 1994; Ephross, Barnes, Ehrlich, Sandnes, & Weiss, 1986; Herek, Cogan, & Gillis, 1999; Herek, Gillis, Cogan and Glunt, 1997). In part due to methodological issues, the results of these studies on bias crime vic- timization are somewhat inconsistent in their conclusions. According to Barnes and Ephross (1994), the most prevalent emotional reac- tion of the 59 bias victim respondents was anger toward the offender, followed by fear. When comparing the victims of bias and nonbias assault, their data indi- cated that McDevitt et al. / BIAS- AND NON-BIAS-MOTIVATED ASSAULTS 699 a major difference in the emotional response of hate violence victims appears to be the absence of lowered self-esteem. The ability of some hate violence victims to maintain their self-esteem may be associated with their attribution of responsibil- ity for the attacks to the prejudice and racism of the perpetrators. (p. 250) Although these data are notable, the purposive sampling technique and small sample of respondents raise questions about the generalizability of the findings. Conversely, Ehrlich et al. (1994) in their national telephone victimization survey (2,078 respondents) revealed marked differences in the traumatic effects of hate violence. They indicated that among four subgroups (i.e., nonvictims, group defamation victims, personal crime victims, and bias crime victims), bias crime victims demonstrated the greatest average number of symptoms and behavior variations on a scale of 19 psychophysiological symptoms of posttraumatic stress and 12 social and behavioral changes. The authors reported a clear overall pattern of pervasive consequences in the lives of victims of bias crime and concluded that “ethnoviolence [bias crime] victims suffer greater trauma than do victims of . . . violence which is committed for other reasons” (p. 27). Specifically, ethnoviolence victims reported experiencing 5.98 negative psychophysiological aftereffects, whereas personal victims had 4.77, and group defamation victims reported 4.02. According to this study, victims of ethnoviolence were also significantly more nervous, lost more friends, had more trouble sleeping or concentrating, had more interpersonal difficulties, and felt angrier than those victims of personal crimes. In a related study to Ehrlich et al. (1994) on the effects of ethnoviolence in the workplace, once again the victims of ethnoviolence reported the greatest num- ber (5.6) of psychophysiological symptoms on the same 19-point list. Whereas personal victims reported only 3.5, victims of prejudicial insults or jokes reported 5.0 (Barnes & Ephross, 1994). The limitation to this study, however, is the broad definition of bias incidents asked of workers during the interview. Par- ticipants were asked, “In the past 3 years, have you ever been mistreated at this company?” They were then asked to determine whether they felt this was due to some prejudice. More recently, Herek et al. (1999) explored the psychological sequelae of gay, lesbian, and bisexual bias crime victims. Recruiting from gay/lesbian com- munity events (i.e., Gay Pride celebration, etc.), gay bars, or community organi- zations, the research team recruited more than 2,000 participants to fill out a self-administered questionnaire. This study marks the most expansive empirical effort to include bias crime victims, and although the sample is somewhat skewed toward gay/lesbians who are public about their sexuality (i.e., are able to attend gay/lesbian/bisexual functions, community organizations, etc.), this research is notable for its sample size. The data indicate that those respondents who reported experiencing a bias crime (compared with victims of nonbias crimes) within the past 5 years consis- tently had more intense feelings of adverse psychological sequelae. Statistically 700 AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST significant relationships were found for depressive symptoms, traumatic stress, and anger. One of the methodological limitations in this study, however, is how the research team coded bias and nonbias events; events were classified as bias or nonbias by asking respondents whether they felt they were victimized because of their sexual orientation. It is possible that this subjective interpreta- tion might be related to other characteristics of the victim, such as the victim’s political orientation toward gay, lesbian, and bisexual issues, and thus may also influence the impact of the crime. Despite this limitation, these data indicate additional support for the belief that bias crime victims endure more intense effects of victimization on several dimensions. With the exception of these few studies, little is known about the differences between bias and nonbias victimization. These studies represent the first attempt by researchers to quantify the psychological and behavioral impact of bias crime victimization. The current study attempts to provide further information on some of these issues. RESEARCH DESIGN/METHOD The present study takes a comparative look into the experience of bias and nonbias victims. One of the primary goals of the design is to be able to make comparisons between similar bias and nonbias crime victims in an effort to understand if bias crime victims experience differential impacts. To achieve this goal, this study surveys a comparable group of violent bias and nonbias assault victims identified from law enforcement and advocacy agency legal records. When designing this study, we estimated that the most powerful data about the victimization experience would be from the victims themselves. To this end, we created a mail survey instrument to be sent to all victims of bias-motivated aggravated assault in the city of Boston1 within the years of 1992 to 1997 and a random sample of nonbias assault victims. The notable exceptions to this list were domestic assaults and child abuse. Because both of these categories touch on specific phenomena, the team felt that their inclusion would be inappropriate. Therefore, all incidents coded as a domestic assault or child abuse (by the responding officers at the Boston Police Department) have been excluded from both the experimental and control groups in this study. Because there were considerably more nonbias assaults during the same time frame, the research team used a 10% random sample of this group. Once the lists were constructed, each name was given a numeric identifier, allowing the research team to track which victims had or had not responded. In addition to the databases accessed through the Boston Police, the research project staff reviewed records from a prominent Boston gay/lesbian community advocacy center. From these records, researchers contacted by mail victims of violent bias crime assaults from the years 1992 to 1997 who had not been previ- ously identified through law enforcement records. McDevitt et al. / BIAS- AND NON-BIAS-MOTIVATED ASSAULTS 701 Several points of contact were made with victims to maximize response rates. First, the research team and advisory board all agreed that victims should be given advanced notification of the study so as not to shock a victim with a highly sensitive survey about his or her victimization. Therefore, victims were sent a preliminary letter, notifying them that they were selected to participate in a study on the effects of victimization. To be sensitive to all victims, victims were given the option to elect not to participate in the study by contacting a representative to remove their name from the list for future mailings. Several victims called to request information, but very few people called to say they did not wish to participate. Next, the self-administered questionnaire was compiled with advice from an advisory board with several distinguished bias crime scholars.2 The final survey instrument employed the Horowitz Impact of Events Scale (Horowitz, Walker, & Alvarez, 1979) to gain insight into the psychological sequelae involved in the victimization process. In addition to being used in several settings to enhance reliability of the instrument, this instrument has also been employed in prior research with bias crime victims (Ehrlich et al., 1994). Also included in the sur- vey packet was a copy of the police incident report3 so that victims could cor- rectly remember the particular incident that we were requesting information about; victims were also encouraged to include any additional information and/ or correct anything on the original police report. For those victims who had experienced more than one victimization, it clarified which incident that our sur- vey was targeting. In addition, to reduce the trauma associated with reliving the incident, a list of social service and advocacy agencies was provided with the questionnaire so that those victims who felt they needed additional help could access support services. Finally, respondents who had difficulty writing were given the option for a member of the research team to assist them either by phone or in person. Unfortunately, nearly 50% of the initial mailings were returned with address unknown; “moved, left no forwarding address”; and so forth. In an attempt to find these victims, the research team used the computer-tracking program Autotrack and was able to locate a little more than half of the unknown addresses. Still, even after locating many of the victims’ addresses, the response rate remained low. In an effort to increase the response rate, the research team decided to offer victims compensation ($15) for their time to complete the survey, a method that has been employed in several previous victim studies (Davis & Brickman, 1996; Herek et al., 1997; Rothbaum, Foa, Riggs, Murdock, & Walsh, 1992). Despite the monetary incentive, the personalization of the second survey mailing, and the repetition of sending another reminder/mailing, the overall response rate did not significantly improve. Unfortunately, the response still remained quite low at approximately 23% for the bias assault victims and 11% for the nonbias victims. It must be noted that with such a low response rate, it is likely that our sample is nonrepresentative in many ways. We do expect, 702 AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST however, that similar response problems will affect both our bias and nonbias assault victim samples. The final draft of the victim survey contained sections about the incident, the psychological and behavioral aftermath, family and community responses to the event, perceptions of police and prosecutors’ roles and efficacy, and demo- graphic information. The survey also attempted to address the impact of the vic- timization by relating the incident to other major life events (i.e., major illness, divorce, death of family member, etc.). Several scales of coping strategies were devised, drawing from a comprehensive review of previous crime victim research literature. This article will focus on the psychological and behavioral impact of violent bias crime victimization. SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS A review of the characteristics of the two samples reveals surprising similari- ties considering the difficulties encountered in obtaining survey responses (see Table 1). About 40% of each sample of victims are female (37.8% vs. 40%), and the racial and ethnic makeups are similar for the two respondent samples. When we consider the age breakdown of the samples, the bias crime sample is slightly younger, with nonbias victims about twice as likely to be older than 45 years. In addition, the samples are very similar in terms of income and education. Finally, as expected, the bias crime sample is more likely to include victims who identify themselves as gay, lesbian, and bisexual. CHARACTERISTICS OF INCIDENT In general, there were few differences between the location of the incident and whether the incident was or was not bias related. It does appear, however, that slightly more of the bias sample were victimized in the area of their home (37% vs. 30%), and nonbias assaults were more likely to occur at work (14% vs. 7%). Our data are consistent with 1997 UCR Hate Crime Reporting data regarding location of the incident. Approximately one third of both samples were victim- ized in the area of their home. The UCR location category “street/transporta- tion” is similar to our category of “enroute to/from somewhere” from our survey. Both measures are imprecise in illuminating whether the particular spot was just outside a victim’s residence or many miles away. For this reason, we speculate that some percentage of those who are victimized “on the street” or traveling are within a very short distance from their homes due to the fact that an individual’s home is usually the pivotal point (going to and coming from) for most travel. Such distance is relevant in interpreting subsequent psychological sequelae for victims. Prior research has looked at the impact of location on victimization and sub- sequent post-traumatic stress disorder. Schepple and Bart (1983) found in their McDevitt et al. / BIAS- AND NON-BIAS-MOTIVATED ASSAULTS 703 study of sexual assault victims that women who believed they were in a safe place during the attack were more likely to experience more severe trauma. The authors speculated that victims who are attacked in a perceived safe place are not able to employ “victim blaming” techniques and thus have no buffer from the severe psychological impact of victimization. Victim blaming allows the victim to feel that if he or she had augmented his or her behavior, he or she could have prevented the incident. The important corollary to this is that victims can use this strategy to reduce their fears about future victimization, asserting that if they change their behavior, they can be safe. However, because it is difficult to deter- mine whether our measure of “passing through the area” indicates near the 704 AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST TABLE 1: Comparative Statistics Between the Samples of Bias and Nonbias Assault Victim Respondents Demographic Bias Victim Nonbias Victim Variables Subcategory Respondents (n = 91) Respondents (n = 45) Gender Male 62.2 60.0 Female 37.8 40.0 Age (years) Younger than 18 12.5 11.1 18-24 11.4 13.3 25-44 62.5 48.9 45 and older 13.6 26.7 Race and Latino ethnicity White 62.2 52.4 Black 23.3 33.3 Asian 6.7 7.1 Other 2.2 2.4 Latino ethnicity 5.6 4.8 Household income ($) < 20,000 42.7 38.9 20,000-39,999 28.0 22.2 40,000-59,999 8.5 13.9 60,000-79,999 12.2 11.1 80,000-99,999 3.7 8.3 100,000 or more 4.9 5.6 Education < high school/NA 26.1 17.8 High school/some college 35.2 46.7 College graduate 22.7 20.0 Postgraduate 15.9 15.6 Sexual orientation Heterosexual 68.8 94.4 Bisexual 2.5 0.0 Lesbian 6.3 2.8 Gay male 22.5 2.8 Transgender 0.0 0.0 victim’s home or not, we are unable to understand the context of location for a substantial percentage of victims. Although the differences between the bias and nonbias group are not significant, it is notable that a larger percentage of bias victims are victimized near their homes, thus making the victims more vulnera- ble to the postincident effects mentioned above. The one measure that more closely approximates the context of whether the place of victimization is considered safe by the victim is the question about fre- quency. We asked victims whether they had been to this location (before the inci- dent occurred) “never,” “a few times,” “quite often,” or “almost every day.” When we collapse these categories into never/a few times and quite often/almost every day, we find that bias victims are more likely to be victimized in locations that are familiar to them. More than three quarters of the bias group tended to fre- quent the location where the incident occurred often, compared to only two thirds of the nonbias group. After the incident, only 28% of the bias victims and 34% of the nonbias victims returned almost every day. Although these differ- ences are not statistically significant, they are instructive in understanding the context of the crime. Next, bias crime victims were also more likely to be attacked by a group of attackers than our comparison sample of nonbias victims (49% vs. 35%). The bias victims had a mean of 2.04 attackers, compared to the nonbias group, who had a mean of 1.84 attackers. It is interesting to note that in this sample, about one quarter of each group were attacked by a group of four or more offenders (23% vs. 25%). RELATIONSHIP TO OFFENDER Several studies have explored the relationship between victim and offender in cases of sexual assault (Katz, 1991; Koss & Cox, 1984; Ullman & Seigel, 1993). Although these studies focus on different aspects of the healing process, Ullman and Seigel (1993) found that fear and anxiety were more common for women sexually assaulted by strangers. Katz (1991), however, found that women victimized by strangers are more likely to retain a positive self-image than women who are raped by nonstrangers. In our sample, bias crime victims were significantly less likely to have a prior relationship with the offender than were nonbias victims (83.5% to 68.2%,). One quarter of the nonbias group reported that they knew their attacker for at least 1 year, compared to less than 7% of the bias crime victims. The survey also asked victims to relay how they describe the nature of the incident. They were asked if the assault was “an unprovoked attack against me,” “an ongoing dispute,” “a minor disagreement that got out of hand,” a case of “mistaken identity,” or “a poor response to a situation by the offender.” This is important because several critics of bias crime legislation have suggested that many bias crimes are simply the result of disputes between individuals of differ- ent groups. The data here contradict this assertion; nearly all the bias crime McDevitt et al. / BIAS- AND NON-BIAS-MOTIVATED ASSAULTS 705 assaults were committed by strangers (84%), and most victims reported that the assault was the result of an unprovoked attack (76%). Only 8% of the bias crime victims reported that the attack was a result of an ongoing dispute. When com- paring the two samples, bias crime victims were more likely to have been attacked by strangers and more likely to see the attack as unprovoked (76% vs. 53%). This supports the prior contention in the literature that bias crime victims are chosen because of their membership in a group and not because of any prior actions they may have taken. As opposed to many other assault victims, bias crime victims are interchangeable; as far as the offender is concerned, any mem- ber of the group could be selected as a target. Whereas these questions are helpful in understanding the qualitative context of the precipitants of the assault, the next set of questions asks the victims to directly attribute levels of responsibility to the victim, offender, or other individ- ual. Specifically, we asked victims to assess responsibility for the incident on a scale of 0 to 10, with 0 indicating that the victim had no responsibility for the attack and 10 indicating that the victim assumed full responsibility. Once again, the responses are consistent with the earlier conclusions. Bias crime victims are more likely to report that they had no responsibility for the incident than nonbias crime victims (76% vs. 58%). This again fits with the prior descriptions of bias crimes that most bias crime victims feel that they did nothing to provoke or initi- ate the attack. Many nonbias victims reinforced the lack of responsibility for the assault in their qualitative remarks when asked how to reduce/prevent these types of crimes in the future. Whereas bias crime victims often pointed to a community responsibility, nonbias victims were more likely to respond that the reduction/ prevention of assault was within their own control, inferring they may have pre- cipitated the crime by their own overt actions. Many responses from nonbias victims involved changing their own behaviors. The following responses were typical for the nonbias group when asked what they might do to prevent such crimes in the future. • “Walk away from the incident.” • “Be polite.” • “Look away, but it is hard not to . . . ” • “Not to settle quarrels physically.” On the contrary, bias crime victims expressed feelings of frustration when asked how to prevent or reduce such crimes in the future. They generally did not indi- cate that their actions had done anything to provoke or exacerbate a situation, confirming the responses from earlier questions about the nature of the assault. Because most bias crime victims did not believe they could do anything to pre- vent future victimization, they felt frustrated. The following response captures many of the bias crime respondents’ feelings about preventing victimization: 706 AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST “Not to be in the wrong place at the wrong time. In other words, it’s impossible.” Such remarks indicate that bias crime victims feel largely powerless to protect themselves in the future. Collectively, the responses to questions about the level of responsibility, pre- cipitating incident events, and prior relationship paint a picture of bias crime assaults that is different in many ways from that of nonbias assaults. These events are less likely to involve victims and offenders who are friends or acquaintances and to be precipitated by any overt actions by the victim, and the onus of responsibility appears to lie much more fully with the offender. MEDICAL TREATMENT We asked victims whether they sought medical assistance as a result of the incident. Because our sample included only aggravated assault victims, we expected that some physical harm would be involved in most of these incidents. There was little difference in the number of victims from each sample who required overnight hospital treatment (15% vs. 16%), but bias crime victims reported that they went to the hospital emergency room for treatment less often (29% vs. 43%). However, less than 60% of the sample answered this question. In retrospect, our measure may have been imprecise, and the low response rate is a reaction to ill-fitting response categories. This conclusion may indicate that nonbias victims in our sample were more likely to suffer serious injury, or it may indicate that bias crime victims are reluctant to go to the emergency room after being attacked. Whatever the reason, definitive conclusions regarding the extent of medical treatment for comparable victims are not supported from these data. Further analysis is necessary to determine if bias crime victims are more likely to receive more serious physical injury in their attacks. REPORTING PRACTICE When victims were asked if they had spoken to anyone prior to reporting the crime to the police, bias crime victims were more likely to report that they had sought out someone to discuss the incident with prior to reporting the assault to the police (40% vs. 29%). In most cases, the victim went to a family member or a friend before he or she reported the crime to the police. The fact that nearly half of the bias-motivated victims report discussing the attack with someone before formally reporting to the police may have important implications for improving the reporting of bias crimes nationally. It may be necessary to broaden the previctimization outreach efforts to include families of victims as well as the victims themselves. In addition, it may be necessary to increase the availability of victim support programs, where victims can go to obtain support and assis- tance before they become formally involved in the criminal justice system. McDevitt et al. / BIAS- AND NON-BIAS-MOTIVATED ASSAULTS 707 VICTIM REACTIONS BEHAVIORAL REACTIONS Twelve separate indicators measured postvictimization behavioral changes, each with a dichotomous variable (yes or no). Surprisingly, there were no signif- icant differences between the bias and nonbias groups. Both groups of assault victims appear to take the same steps postvictimization: The overwhelming majority of victims in both groups (77.4% for bias, 77.8% for nonbias victims) stated that they pay more attention to where they walk now. More than a third of both samples stated that they try to be less visible since the incident (37.8% for bias, 38.6% for nonbias victims). Twenty-two percent of both samples responded that they had become more active in the community because of the victimization. Overall, however, the similarities in behavior modifications between the groups are striking. The same can not be said, however, for the psy- chological sequelae of the bias and nonbias victims. We will return to the find- ings of the behavioral responses during the discussion section of this report. PSYCHOLOGICAL REACTIONS Using Horowitz’s Impact of Event Scale (Horowitz et al., 1979) to under- stand some of the psychological sequelae, we asked victims from both groups the same questions about postevent distress. Horowitz has suggested that the psychological themes in his scale can be grouped into two major components: intrusiveness and avoidance. Our scale incorporated one major change from the original scale; although we used basically the same symptoms, we measured the response differently. Originally, Horowitz employed a “not at all, rarely, some- times, often” response framework for each of the scale items, within a time frame of “within the last seven days.” On the suggestion of our advisory group, we decided to account for differences between the groups while incorporating a time dimension, thus further refining the sometimes category of the original scale. In addition, because our sample included victims who had been victim- ized spanning 1 month to 6 years prior to the administration of the survey, asking whether the respondent encountered the adverse stimuli or reaction always, sometimes, rarely, or not at all as was done in the original Horowitz instrument would conceal the time- sensitive nature of the impact. Respondents were asked whether they experienced the particular emotion or coping technique “not at all,” “for a few days,” “for a few weeks,” “for a few months,” or “for a few years.” In short, our measures represent an attempt to incorporate both a measure of inten- sity and duration. Although there were only six items from Horowitz’s Psychological Scale where significant differences exist between the bias and nonbias victim groups, every psychological impact measure from this scale had a higher mean value from the bias group than from the nonbias group. This means bias crime victims 708 AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST experienced the adverse psychological sequelae more often than the nonbias control group on every item we measured. Although the levels of significance vary, the relationship does not vary; bias crime victims clearly experienced more negative impacts and experienced these impacts for longer periods of time than the nonbias victim group. The psychological impact of crime on the victim is measured in our study by 19 separate scale items. A t test was performed between the bias-motivated and non-bias-motivated assault victim groups on each reaction category. A (moder- ate) statistically significant difference was detected between the two groups within 5 of the 19 categories (p < .05). The largest categorical difference was in “feeling angry” with a t score of 2.625 and a mean difference of .54 on a 5-point scale (i.e., not at all, days, weeks, months, and years). All of the five variables that are statistically significant at the .05 level are related to Horowitz’s intrusiveness theme. Bias crime victims cite that they are more nervous, more depressed, have more trouble concentrating, think about the incident when they do not mean to, and feel like not wanting to live any longer more often than nonbias victims. Collectively, we see that the bias group has more difficulty coping with the victimization and that they appear to have addi- tional problems with their recovery process due to increased fear and more fre- quent intrusive thoughts. One could, however, persuasively argue that due to imprecisely characteriz- ing the mean as an instrument of comparison in the t test, we may have somehow blurred the test of significance. To address this, the research team split these variables in several different ways. First, we collapsed the psychological vari- ables into two categories: either the presence of the symptom (coded as 1) or the absence of it (coded as 0). Collapsing these categories yields very similar results. Once again, feelings of depression, nervousness, difficulty concentrat- ing at work, and feeling ashamed/losing confidence are significant below the .05 level. These results indicate that there is a relationship between the element of bias in assault that is strongly related to whether the victim experiences these adverse psychological sequelae at all. At this point in the analysis, the research team wished to test the bivariate relationships further within the psychological sequelae. Specifically, one could argue that the difference between having symptoms for a few days and not hav- ing them at all is not very remarkable. For this reason, we created a separate dichotomous variable that collapsed categories into not at all/for a few days (coded as 0) and a few weeks, months, years. This division makes the implicit objective assumption that most victims of violence will sustain some impact; however, when the impact duration creeps into weeks or months, there is some- thing notable about it. The results from this analysis are congruent with earlier tests of significance. Four variables—more nervous than usual, thought about when I didn’t mean to, didn’t feel like living any longer, and had trouble concentrating at work—all indicated a Pearson value below the .05 level of significance. Again, we see that McDevitt et al. / BIAS- AND NON-BIAS-MOTIVATED ASSAULTS 709 the level of intrusiveness for the bias crime victim is greater than for the nonbias victims. In this version of the analysis, only more depressed falls from being sig- nificantly different between the two groups. The research team also designed the 19-item Impact of Event Scale into a col- lective score. We did this by taking the mean of each respondent’s 19 answers, excluding surveys where more than 5 answers on the scale were missing. We ran these collective scale scores and found that once again, the differences between the two groups are significant (Pearson’s value .041), with the bias group more likely to have a mean above 1.5 (67% to 48.9%). There is also a significant corre- lation between the mean score for the Psychological Scale and whether the vic- tim is from the bias or nonbias group (.03). Once again, this indicates the strength of the relationship between psychological sequelae and the presence of bias in the incident. By nearly every bivariate measure, the bias victims are affected more intensely, with more intrusive psychological sequelae. FEELINGS OF SAFETY When asked how safe the victims feel after the crime, bias crime victims are significantly less likely to feel safe. Almost one half of the nonbias victims reported feeling less safe after the incident (46%), but a significantly higher number of bias crime victims reported feeling unsafe after their attack (59%). This increased fear is interesting because the nonbias attacks were more likely to have involved reported injury. One possible reason for this increased fear may be that bias crime victims are more likely to be concerned that a similar crime may happen in the future, especially because they have experienced previous attacks more frequently. Fully 52% of the bias crime sample reported that they were very concerned about becoming a victim of a similar crime in the future; this compares to 37% of the nonbias crime sample who reported that they were very concerned about future victimization. In addition, after the incident, bias crime victims were more likely to report that they felt unsafe alone in their neighbor- hood at night (42% vs. 32%) and that they felt unsafe returning to the area of the incident (52% vs. 44%). Taken together, these findings indicate that bias crime assault victims are more likely to experience increased fear and reduced feelings of safety after the crime than nonbias crime assault victims. OTHER VICTIMIZATION CONSEQUENCES We asked both samples if they had experienced other negative life events since the assault. In most areas, the bias crime sample reported that they had endured more negative experiences since the assault. For example, bias crime victims were more likely to report that they had lost employment (50% vs. 34%) since the assault. In addition, bias crime victims reported that they had had significant health problems after the assault (48% vs. 32%). Conversely, the nonbias group was more likely to experience a divorce or separation (15% vs. 7%). Although it is 710 AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST impossible to determine if these changes are related to the assault that preceded them, it is true that many of the bias crime victims in this sample experienced more traumatic events in their lives following the original assault. In addition, we asked each sample a summary question: “Overall, how diffi- cult was it for you to overcome the effects of this incident?” Here again, the bias crime sample was almost three times more likely to report that overcoming this incident had been very difficult (36% vs. 13%). CONCLUSION Our data have several limitations. First, the limited sample size reinforces the need for replication. Second, the nonrepresentative sample raises questions about generalizability. However, the difficulties we encountered in getting vic- tims to respond, and our efforts to improve responses, can inform future research projects. Both bias and nonbias victim groups were hard to locate, and when cor- rect addresses were found, they were hesitant to respond through the mail. This population may need more intensive efforts, such as interviews instead of self-administered questionnaires, as a methodology to encourage participation in sharing their victimization experiences. Despite our methodological difficulties, our data confirm several previously posited hypotheses. First, compared to non-bias-motivated assaults, the inci- dence of bias crime tends to be perpetrated by multiple offenders upon strangers, and the victims of bias crimes are more likely to be victims selected only because they belong to a particular group. Bias crimes are more likely to occur in locations familiar to the victim, and bias crime victims are much more likely to experience increased fear after the incident. In addition, victims of bias assault are more likely to feel the effects of victimization more intensely and for a longer period of time. Whether this is a result of the inability to employ traditional cop- ing mechanisms or due to some other phenomena, bias crime victims suffer more intense intrusive psychological sequelae than do nonbias assault victims. Although the behavioral responses may initially seem surprising, we believe these also confirm earlier hypotheses. First, the element of victim interchangeability injects a unique dynamic into the victimization process. Vic- tims are aware that their overt actions did nothing to precipitate their victimiza- tion; being the “wrong person,” at the wrong time and place, qualifies the bias victim. Therefore, if the impetus for victimization is something that is outside of the bias victim’s control before the incident, it is reasonable that there would be little that the victim would do differently subsequent to the incident. Qualitative responses from open-ended questions on the survey confirmed that victims were aware of their distinct vulnerability, whereas nonbias victims indicated that their behavior may have encouraged the offender or exacerbated a tense situation among acquaintances. Psychological sequelae, however, are less easily con- trolled by the victim. The level of intrusive thoughts created by the incident and McDevitt et al. / BIAS- AND NON-BIAS-MOTIVATED ASSAULTS 711 the feelings of helplessness associated with bias-motivated victimization all point to a unique victimization process for bias victims. This research supports the conclusion that bias crimes affect their victims dif- ferently from nonbias crimes. Victims of bias crimes are more fearful after the incident and are more likely to experience a series of intrusive thoughts. This is true even if we control on the type of crime, in this case, assaults. Although it is beyond the scope of our study to definitively conclude whether various hate crime legislation is justified, it is clear that bias victims have distinct needs. These conclusions support the claim that bias crimes do in fact affect their vic- tims differently and that consequently law enforcement and social service agen- cies should be cognizant of these differences in assisting bias crime victims. Lastly, this project does not begin to address the impact that bias crimes have on the secondary victims, the community. Because bias crimes have the unique impact of reaching far beyond the primary victim, due to the dimension of victim interchangeability, every member of the minority group who is aware of the crime is affected by a solitary crime against one individual minority member. Unfortunately, this is well beyond the scope of the current study. With these con- siderations in mind, we hope that the research community will both attempt to replicate this research with additional bias victim samples, as well as tap into the important dimension of secondary victimization. NOTES 1. The city of Boston was selected due to its comprehensive strategies for investigating bias crimes through the Community Disorders Unit, formed in 1979 in response to heightened racial ten- sions within the city. Because of this, the research team had access to an extensive database of bias crime offenses. 2. The advisory board was composed of representatives from the U.S. Attorneys Office, the Anti-Defamation League, the district attorney’s office, the victim/witness office, the NAACP, gay/ lesbian community centers, the Boston Police Community Disorders Unit, the Massachusetts Office of Corrections, and members of the academic community who specialize in both international and domestic bias crime studies. 3. All offender information was redacted according to the Boston Police Department’s legal guidelines. REFERENCES Barnes, A., & Ephross, P. H. (1994, May). The impact of hate violence on victims: Emotional and behavioral responses to attacks. Social Work, 39(3), 247-251. Davis, R., & Brickman, E. (1996). Supportive and unsupportive aspects of the behavior of others toward victims of sexual and non-sexual assault. Journal of Interpersonal Violence, 11(2), 250-262. Ehrlich, H. 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McDevitt et al. / BIAS- AND NON-BIAS-MOTIVATED ASSAULTS 713 AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTISTLevin / EXTREMISM AND THE CONSTITUTION Extremism and the Constitution How America’s Legal Evolution Affects the Response to Extremism BRIAN LEVIN Center for the Study of Hate and Extremism, California State University, San Bernardino The current protections that American law provides for extremist speech and associations are relatively new developments. These legal protections, along with technological innova- tions, enable modern American hatemongers to promote their agenda efficiently and with minimal governmental interference—up to a point. The courts have balanced the right of free expression and association on one hand with the right of society to protect its citizens from violence and disruption on the other. Everyone in this great nation has the right to think and believe, [and] speak what- ever they want. We are not prosecuting McVeigh because we don’t like his beliefs or even his speech, we’re prosecuting him because his hatred boiled into violence and his violence took the lives of innocent men, women, and children. And the rea- son we’ll introduce evidence of his thoughts is because they reveal his premedita- tion and his intent, and intent is an element of the crime we must prove. —Opening statement of Joseph Hartzler, prosecutor (United States v. McVeigh, 1997) There is no shortage of dangerous, hateful invective in modern American dis- course. These dissident voices can be heard at Klan rallies, in hate rock music, on the Internet, in broadcast statements of foreign terrorists, and in books that unabashedly promote violence and bigotry. This article will focus on a variety of expressive and associational criminal law issues relating to extremism against Americans. Many of these legal explanations will be prefaced by the words of notorious hatemongers, terrorists, and others, to add a relevant present-day con- text to the analysis. The legal issues subject to examination in this article include protected speech and various types of associations, hate crime laws, and regulat- ing expression on the Internet. The current state of First Amendment protections in the United States offers a broad range of protections for even the most offensive kinds of nonviolent activi- ties and speech undertaken by extremists. It is not a rare refrain from people of 714 AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST, Vol. 45 No. 4, December 2001 714-756 © 2001 Sage Publications goodwill to “just do something” about the myriad violent, hateful, false, and offensive messages communicated by extremists. Unfortunately, during the course of American history, punishable “extremism” has often been in the eye of the beholder. Today’s extremists are the beneficiaries of an evolved interpreta- tion of the First Amendment that was not available to controversial figures of earlier eras. American history is replete with politically influenced governmen- tal abuses designed to interfere with the exercise of expressive or associational rights of controversial dissenters. These incidents include governmental target- ing of • government critics under the Alien and Sedition Acts in the late 1790s, • African Americans pursuant to Jim Crow laws after the Civil War, • peaceful antiwar and prolabor activists after America’s involvement in World War I, • the Ku Klux Klan in the 1920s and American Nazis and Bund members in the 1930s, • Jehovah’s Witnesses during the 1930s and 1940s, • leftists and alleged communists in the 1950s, • civil rights activists including Martin Luther King and Malcolm X in the 1960s, and • antiwar activists protesting the Vietnam War in the 1960s and 1970s. When we discuss free expression in the First Amendment context, we are really talking about several closely related protections. Those are the explicitly referenced freedoms of speech, press, and assembly and the implicit rights to association and thought. There are at least three underlying justifications for protecting free expres- sion in a democratic society. The first is that the public’s exposure to a wide range of ideas serves an important truth-seeking function. The theory being that the veracity of a particular idea is best established when it competes in a market- place of ideas. Second, expressive rights are so sacred to individual autonomy, and so subject to abuse by government officials, that severe restrictions on gov- ernmental interference are warranted. Third, the uniform protection of all types of expression prevents the majority or the powerful from conspiring with the government for silencing unpopular speakers of ideas. As legal scholar David Cole (1992) explained, “If the history of political struggles teaches us anything, it is that the majority will often seek to regulate the speech of the politically powerless.” THE GENESIS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT The First Amendment was ratified in 1791 as part of the original Bill of Rights to the Constitution. Thomas Jefferson was among the most zealous believers that the fledgling nation should have a Bill of Rights, and a protection of expression should be first among those rights protected. A skeptical and per- haps prescient Alexander Hamilton had questions about the practical benefit of a Levin / EXTREMISM AND THE CONSTITUTION 715 declared right of free expression. Hamilton explained his position in the context of protecting the press: Who can give it any definition which would not leave the utmost latitude for eva- sion? I hold it to be impracticable; and from this I infer, that its security, whatever fine declarations may be inserted in any constitution respecting it, must altogether depend on public opinion, and on the general spirit of the people and of the govern- ment. And here, after all, as intimated upon another occasion, must we seek for the only solid basis of all our rights. (Van Alstyne, 1984, p. 4) Jefferson acknowledged these criticisms but supported these protections, nonetheless: The declaration of rights, is, like all other human blessings, allowed with some inconveniences, and not accomplishing fully its object. . . . But though it is not absolutely efficacious under all circumstances, it is of great potency always, and rarely inefficacious. A brace the more will often keep up the building which would have fallen, with that brace the less. (Van Alstyne, 1984, p. 4) Not only was the concept of a constitutional protection for speech a revolu- tionary one, the procedure for implementing these protections, an independent judiciary, was a new concept as well. James Madison observed that if the Bill of Rights were added to the Constitution, “independent tribunals of justice will consider themselves in a peculiar manner the guardians of these rights” (Van Alstyne, 1984, p. 4). The First Amendment states, “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assem- ble, and to petition the Government for redress of grievances.” Other amendments guaranteed state militias, due process, speedy public tri- als, jury trials in certain circumstances, and the right to be free from unreason- able searches and seizures as well as cruel and unusual punishments. Most of the Bill of Rights related to limitations on federal authority to interfere with individ- ual rights. The First Amendment’s wording is unique among the Bill of Rights in its apparent clarity and strength. The other amendments in the Bill of Rights were worded to give government a degree of latitude when its action infringed on fun- damental liberties. The Fourth Amendment conditions governmental searches and seizure on standards of probable cause and reasonability. Similarly, the Fifth Amendment allows one’s life, liberty, or property to be taken as long as the gov- ernment adheres to due process. The Eighth Amendment limitation on fines and bail is conditioned on them being excessive, and its proscription on punishments conditioned on them being cruel and unusual. In contrast, the First Amendment’s restriction on Congress is sweeping and unambiguous. Legal scholar William Van Alstyne (1984) explained, “It requires no arcane learning to understand the clear and plain meaning of ‘Congress,’ ‘no 716 AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST law,’ ‘abridging,’ or ‘speech.’ To ‘abridge’ means not merely to forbid altogether but to curtail . . . the imperative is simple, straightforward, complete and abso- lute” (p. 23). Notwithstanding the First Amendment’s wording, disputes over the extent of its protections started soon after ratification and continue to this day. In 1798, Congress enacted several laws known as the Alien and Sedition Acts designed to punish not only antigovernment conspiracies but political dissent against gov- ernment officials (Alien and Sedition Acts, 1798; New York Times v. Sullivan, 1964). Outcry over prosecutorial abuses led to a Jeffersonian sweep in the elec- tions of 1800 as antifederalists took control of Congress and Thomas Jefferson assumed the presidency. Most of the acts’ provisions were either repealed or expired. The Supreme Court never officially overturned the act, but President Jefferson, calling it a “a nullity,” pardoned those individuals sentenced under it and refunded their fines. In 1804, Congress also ordered that fines assessed from those prosecuted be returned (New York Times v. Sullivan, 1964). Almost two centuries later, the Supreme Court noted that there was a “broad consensus that the Act, because of the restraint it imposed upon criticism of government and public officials, was inconsistent with the First Amendment” (New York Times v. Sullivan, 1964, p. 276). The Court further noted that “[a]though the Sedition Act was never fully tested in this Court, the attack upon its validity has carried the day in the court of history” (New York Times v. Sullivan, 1964, p. 276). 19TH-CENTURY FOUNDATIONS Two crucial 19th-century legal developments had a profound and long-last- ing effect on the application of First Amendment protections. Ironically, neither the 1803 Supreme Court decision in Marbury v. Madison nor the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868 explicitly implicated the First Amendment. The Marbury decision is a landmark because it established the doctrine of judicial review. That doctrine holds that the Supreme Court shall interpret the Constitution and statutes and invalidate those statutes in conflict with the Con- stitution (Marbury v. Madison, 1803). Since Marbury, the Supreme Court has struck down more than 130 federal laws and numerous state and local laws that contravened the Constitution. It was not until the 20th century, however, that the Court invalidated laws that impermissibly restricted free expression (Biskupic & Witt, 1997). The second 19th-century legal development that profoundly affected the future of the First Amendment was the ratification of the Fourteenth Amend- ment in 1868. Prior to its ratification, the Supreme Court held that the provisions of the Bill of Rights did not directly restrict state or local governmental conduct that impinged on the Constitutional rights of individuals (Barron v. Baltimore, 1833). Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which reversed that holding, provides in part: Levin / EXTREMISM AND THE CONSTITUTION 717 No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction, the equal protection of the law. Over time, this provision was used as a basis for guaranteeing that nearly every individual right found in the Bill of Rights applied to the conduct of state and local governments. Notwithstanding the First Amendment’s absolutist wording, the Supreme Court during the 20th century established various limitations on its protection of expression. In 1919, Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendall Holmes coined this now famous axiom in Schenck v. United States: “The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theater and causing a panic” (p. 52). It was not, however, until 1925 that the Supreme Court actually held that the First Amendment rights of speech and a free press were “fundamental” ones protected by the Fourteenth Amendment from abridgment by state and local authorities (Gitlow v. New York, 1925). Over the years, the Supreme Court has established new standards relating to expressive rights. Specifically, the Court has identified various circumstances where the government has greater latitude to interfere with expression. Those circumstances relate to the presence of either a compelling state interest, an unprotected area of speech, symbolic conduct, and criminality or the use of time, place, and manner restrictions. Generally, governmental regulations based on the content of the idea expressed will be overturned. In these instances, the stan- dard that courts will employ is called strict scrutiny. Under this standard, the government must establish two things about official restrictions on expression for them to be held constitutional: 1. They are necessary to achieve a compelling state interest, and 2. they are narrowly tailored to achieve that compelling interest. (Widmar v. Vincent, 1981) If expression falls under an “unprotected” area of speech, the government has far greater ability to regulate or proscribe it. Unprotected areas of speech include defamation, fraudulent commercial speech, obscenity, and incitement to crimi- nality. Technically, another unprotected category called fighting words exists, but it is considered by many to be dormant because the Court has refused to invoke the category in upholding a speech restriction in five decades. Fighting words are those words which by their very utterance would arouse a violent response in a listener (Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 1942). Even so-called unprotected speech receives minimal protection. The government may not ban certain specific types of expression within an unprotected speech area because it disagrees with the viewpoint expressed. For example, whereas the government can ban obscene materials, the laws cannot single out certain obscene materials because they satirize government policies (R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 1992). By the same 718 AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST token, laws may punish incitement to criminality, but they can not single out for punishment only those who incite crime in opposition to a particular govern- ment policy, such as involvement in a war. If laws are to punish immediate calls to criminality, they must punish them without taking into account the unpopular viewpoint of the illegal agitator. The unprotected categories of speech that are of particular importance in the area of bigotry are fighting words, defamation, and criminal incitement. FIGHTING WORDS, OFFENSIVENESS, AND BREACHES OF THE PEACE The refusal to suppress offensive speech is one of the most difficult obligations the free speech principle imposes on all of us; yet it is also one of the First Amend- ment’s greatest glories—indeed it is a central test of a community’s commitment to free speech. —Stanford Law School Professor Gerald Gunther, who escaped Nazi Germany as a youth (Gunther, 1990) I’m sure it makes a retarded person feel bad to be told he’s stupid. . . . But you know that’s life. We all put up with a lot of things we don’t like. . . . There’s really some- thing seriously wrong with the people who believe it should be illegal to hurt a homosexual’s feelings, or to stare at a pretty girl—or to call a person who wears glasses “four eyes” for that matter. Neo-Nazi William Pierce (1995) As stated above, fighting words are those words whose very utterance would likely lead to a violent response by the recipient. Presumably, then, very offen- sive speech then could often be banned as fighting words. Although the Supreme Court never officially abandoned this category, its recent opinions cast signifi- cant doubt on its continued vitality. First, the Supreme Court has failed to iden- tify any fighting words fit for governmental proscription for nearly five decades. Second, the Court has since consistently held that the mere offensiveness of speech is not a basis for restricting it—a doctrine that appears to undercut the purpose of the fighting words exception in the first place. When the first fighting words decision in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire (1942) was handed down, the Court appeared to accept the notion that merely offensive speech might be punishable without contravening the First Amend- ment. Interestingly, 2 years prior, the Court in Cantwell v. Connecticut (1940) threw out the conviction of a religious preacher who was charged under a broad breach of the peace statute for playing bigoted and offensive recordings. A Levin / EXTREMISM AND THE CONSTITUTION 719 Jehovah’s Witness who played a record called “Enemies” equating other reli- gions such as Catholicism with the devil was convicted for his actions. The Court found that the preacher’s individual religious and expressive rights were violated, even though his speech was “insulting to some religions.” In Chaplinksy, however, the Court upheld a breach of the peace conviction against a man for calling a city marshal a “damned racketeer and a damned fas- cist” after he was stopped for handing out literature on a city street (Chaplinsky, 1942, p. 569). The opinion indicated that the goals underlying First Amendment protections were not implicated because potentially injurious fighting words have such “slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that might be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality” (Chaplinsky, 1942, p. 572). Several years later, the Supreme Court overturned the breach of the peace conviction of “Father” Terminiello, an agitator who made a rabidly racist speech to a hall of supporters while a large hostile crowd amassed outside. In Terminiello v. Chicago (1949), the Supreme Court maintained that the trial judge’s interpretation of the breach of the peace statute impermissibly punished speech “which stirs the public to anger, invites dispute, brings about a condition of unrest or creates a disturbance” (p. 4). The majority opinion found the judge’s interpretation of the statute, which was relied on to convict the speaker, was overbroad. The legal doctrine of overbreadth in the First Amendment area means that a law punishes both speech that may be restricted along with pro- tected speech that may not be curtailed. Laws that are overbroad will be over- turned by courts. The court failed to address whether Terminiello’s speech was in fact pro- tected, focusing instead on the faulty judicial interpretation of the statute. Dis- puting the trial court’s reasoning, the Supreme Court majority in Terminiello v. Chicago, 1949, found that free speech is necessary to the operation of our soci- etal institutions: [A] function of free speech under our system of government is to invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces . . . unrest, . . . dissatisfac- tion . . . , or even stirs people to anger. Speech is often protective and challenging. It may strike at prejudices and preconceptions and have profound unsettling effects as it presses for acceptance of an idea. (p. 4) The Court’s continuing difficulty in establishing a clear doctrine relating to breaches of the peace is reflected in Feiner v. New York (1951). There, the Supreme Court upheld a disorderly conduct conviction of a college student who ignored a policeman’s order to stop speaking. The man, Irving Feiner, attempted to arouse a mixed race crowd through a combination of denunciations of politi- cal leaders and a plea to Blacks to take up arms in their struggle for equal rights. The majority maintained Feiner’s arrest was to maintain order, not to squelch free speech. The dissent found that the facts of the case indicated no real threat to 720 AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST public order as the crowd was hardly aroused by the monologue. Justice Hugo Black, in a vigorous dissent, maintained the police’s first obligation was to pro- tect speakers from harm, not to silence them. After Feiner, though the Court’s stance became more consistent, it tended to better protect public speakers in their expression of unpopular, even offensive, ideas. The Court abandoned the approach that the expression of mere ideas themselves could be punished as fighting words leading to breaches of the peace. Toward the end of the century, the Court shifted profoundly toward new pro- tection of offensive speech. In a Vietnam War–era case, Cohen v. California (1971), Paul Cohen challenged his conviction under a breach of the peace statute that criminalized “offensive conduct.” Cohen was arrested for wearing a jacket reading “Fuck the Draft” as he walked the corridors of the Los Angeles Munici- pal Court. The Cohen case is considered a landmark not only because it squarely addressed the issue of offensive speech but also for its cogent analysis of a num- ber of other significant free expression issues. Justice Harlan, speaking for the majority, rejected a variety of assertions before addressing the issue of criminalizing offensiveness. He ultimately rejected the notion that government had authority to protect “unwilling or unsus- pecting” people from receiving distasteful messages while in public places. This notion was summarized in another contemporary case: “We are often captives outside the sanctuary of the home and subject to objectionable speech,” the Court held in a case from the previous year (Rowan v. Post Office Dept., 1970, p. 738). Seizing on that notion, Justice Harlan in Cohen (1970) maintained that those in public places “could effectively avoid further bombardment of their sensibilities simply by averting their eyes.” Justice Harlan was particularly forceful in dismissing California’s most broad grab at power—the ability to punish speech on the basis of offensiveness, a notion that he labeled “inherently boundless”: How is one to distinguish this from any other offensive word? Surely the State has no right to cleanse public debate to the point where it is grammatically palatable to the most squeamish among us. For, while the particular four-letter word being liti- gated here is perhaps more distasteful than most others of its genre, it is neverthe- less often true that one man’s vulgarity is another’s lyric. Indeed, we think it is largely because governmental officials cannot make principled distinctions in this area that the Constitution leaves matters of taste and style so largely to the individ- ual. (Cohen v. California, 1971, p. 25) In another landmark case, Texas v. Johnson (1989), the Supreme Court held that the Constitution protects even the most unpopular and offensive type of speech in a case involving flag burning. Gregory Lee Johnson was a young anar- chist who took part in a series of roving political street protests to voice opposi- tion to the policies of the Reagan administration and various corporations in Dallas in August 1984. In prior case law, the Supreme Court held that even though expression was most protected in public places, the government could Levin / EXTREMISM AND THE CONSTITUTION 721 still impose reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions to protect public safety and commerce—as long as those restrictions were not enforced to dis- criminate against unpopular speakers (Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 1981). Furthermore, the Court offered limited protection to those who take part in sym- bolic speech—that is speech that is intertwined with physical conduct, such as marching or banner waving (United States v. O’Brien, 1968). While protesting outside Dallas City Hall, Johnson displayed an American flag that had been stolen by another protester earlier in the day. He then held the flag up, drenched it in kerosene, and set it ablaze as the crowd proclaimed, “America, the red, white, and blue, we spit on you.” After the event, Johnson was charged and convicted under a Texas law that criminalizes the desecration of “venerated objects” such as monuments, houses of worship, and cemeteries. Also included as a protected object is “a state or national flag.” Johnson was the only person at the event who was charged, and he faced only the single desecration charge. The statute said desecration of a cov- ered object means to “deface, damage, or otherwise physically mistreat [it] in a way that the actor knows will seriously offend one or more persons likely to observe or discover his action.” At trial, various observers to the flag immolation stated that they had indeed been “seriously offended” by it (Texas v. Johnson, 1989, p. 399). Johnson was sentenced to 1 year in prison and assessed a $2,000 fine (Texas v. Johnson, 1989, p. 400). On appeal from the Texas state courts, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the law was unconstitutionally used against the flag burner. Technically, the appeal to the Supreme Court addressed only the narrow issue of the statute’s application to Johnson. However, the reasoning of the opinion made it a virtual certainty that the Court would have thrown out the law if it had been asked to do so. Texas offered two defenses for its prosecution of Johnson. First, it maintained that its prosecution protected against breaches of the peace. The Court main- tained that at the time of the flag burning, no breaches of the peace actually occurred. The most authorities were able to establish was that some witnesses were offended. The Court noted that offensiveness was protected speech unlike incitement or fighting words. The Court stated that government may not “ban the expression of certain disagreeable ideas on the unsupported presumption that their very disagreeableness will provoke violence” (Texas v. Johnson, 1989, p. 409). The Court also mentioned the Texas appeals court observation that the law did not narrowly address those flag burnings likely to lead to serious breaches of the peace—but all offensive ones. After rejecting Texas’s contention that offensive flag burnings were equiva- lent to breaches of the peace, the Court addressed the state’s second contention. Texas authorities also maintained that the state had an interest “in preserving the flag as a symbol of nationhood and national unity” (Texas v. Johnson, 1989, p. 410). The majority held that Texas’s interest in that regard directly and impermissibly implicated the idea being expressed. The punishment unconstitutionally was linked to the unpatriotic idea associated with the flag’s offensive destruction. 722 AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST Patriotic burnings of worn flags that conveyed respect for the national symbol would not be punished. Thus, the same act was being treated differently based on the particular idea promoted. Because the state’s action was based on the content of the idea expressed, the Court applied strict scrutiny analysis. Under strict scrutiny, the state must estab- lish that its actions furthered a compelling state interest in the least restrictive way possible. The Court found, as it usually does when applying strict scrutiny analysis, that the state failed to meet its burden. Justice William Brennan, speaking for the five-person majority, stated, “If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the gov- ernment may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable” (Texas v. Johnson, 1989, p. 414). He continued, “To conclude that government may permit designated symbols to be used to communicate a limited set of messages would be to enter territory having no discernible or defensible boundaries” (Texas v. Johnson, 1989, p. 414). The majority also disputed Texas and the minority opinion’s spirited conten- tion that the American flag was in its own specially protected category. In a sepa- rate concurrence, Justice Anthony Kennedy described the majority decision “painful to announce.” Perhaps recognizing the firestorm of popular criticism to come, Justice Kennedy attempted to explain the decision more in philosophical terms than technical legal ones: Though symbols often are what we ourselves make of them, the flag is constant in expressing beliefs Americans share, beliefs in law and peace and that freedom which sustains the human spirit. The case here today forces recognition of the costs to which those beliefs commit us. It is poignant, but fundamental that the flag protects those who hold it in contempt. (Texas v. Johnson, 1989) The Johnson case was a landmark for many reasons, and especially so for those studying extremism. It stands for the proposition that laws cannot single out the nonviolent expression of even the most offensive and disquieting ideas. In light of Cohen, Johnson, and other cases, it is reasonable to ask whether the unprotected speech category of fighting words still exists. Technically, it does because the category has never been officially overruled in any Supreme Court opinions. Realistically, however, subsequent case law to Chaplinsky and Feiner indicates that the conceptual undergirding to the fighting words category has been undermined to the point where current controlling case law is in conflict. That is probably why the Supreme Court has failed to identify and punish a fight- ing words utterance in half a century. LIES AND PUNISHMENT And I’m in deep trouble for saying this around the world, that the eye-witnesses in Auschwitz who claim, like Elie Wiesel to have seen the gassings going on and the Levin / EXTREMISM AND THE CONSTITUTION 723 subsequent cremations, that they are liars. . . . He’s a liar. And so are the other eye-witnesses in Auschwitz who claim they saw gassings going on because there were no gas chambers in Auschwitz, as the forensic tests show. And I’ve got into a lot of trouble saying this. And there are so many survivors of Auschwitz now, in fact, that I get very taste- less about all of this. I don’t see any reason to be tasteful about Auschwitz. It’s baloney, it’s a legend. . . . I’m going to form an Association of Auschwitz survi- vors, survivors of the Holocaust and other liars, or the A-S-S-H-O-L-S. —British Holocaust denier David Irving (Irving v. Penguin and Lipstadt, 2000, § 8.17). Our next topic involves the spreading of falsehoods, an undertaking certainly not limited to extremists. The law does not generally premise punishment of expression based on truthfulness. First Amendment protection of expression is not hinged on “the truth, popularity, or social utility of the ideas or beliefs which are offered” (NAACP v. Button, 1963, p. 445). The underlying notion of a mar- ketplace of ideas implies that false ideas will be cast aside once the public is able to fully scrutinize them and contrast them with opposing truthful ones. In some instances, however, the law allows governmentally sanctioned civil punishment of false statements, such as defamatory communications that injure someone’s economic or reputational well-being. Defamation is a willful untrue statement communicated to someone else about a third party that harms the ref- erenced person’s reputation so that others will be less likely to associate or deal with him or her. Defamation that is written is called libel, whereas spoken defa- mation is known as slander. A person or business who is defamed may bring suit in civil court for monetary damages against those communicating the damaging falsehoods to others. Traditionally, false statements relating to such areas of pro- miscuity, disease, criminality, or dishonest business dealings have been the sub- ject of defamation lawsuits. The Supreme Court has applied certain requirements in defamation lawsuits. To ensure full and unfettered discussion on issues of public importance, the Supreme Court has created two distinct classes of plaintiffs. If someone is a pub- lic official or public figure, he or she has a higher burden to meet to successfully litigate his or her case. In the landmark decision in New York Times v. Sullivan (1964), a unanimous Supreme Court established that the First Amendment sets very high standards on what a government official must establish to prevail as a plaintiff in a defamation case. In addition to defamation, the law permits punish- ment of those who make false statements in official proceedings and fraudulent claims in the course of commercial transactions. A person who lies under oath during official government hearings, at civil or criminal trials, or during deposi- tions before trial is guilty of perjury. Conceptually, the punishment of falsehoods in the context of defamation, perjury, or fraud could be extended to justify the notion that other harmful or untrue statements relating to racial or other groups should be punished as well. 724 AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST THE SHORT EXISTENCE OF AMERICAN GROUP LIBEL LAWS When this incident took place, about . . . 4,000 Jews were not present simulataneously. . . . All of them were absent from the World Trade Center, although they were supposed to be there. So that’s why they think that [the attack] might be from the Jews. —Abdul Rasheed Ghazi, Pakastani Grand Mufti (CNBC television broadcast, “Hardball,” September 27, 2001) If you want to learn and understand why the jews can commit such insane crimes as ritual murder, you must know the jewish secrets. —“Jewish Murder Plan Against Gentile Humanity Exposed” (Jew Watch, 1992) Are ideological falsehoods injected into public discourse categorically dif- ferent from those more narrowly targeted to affect an individual’s reputation or economic status? Or conversely, can lies in the area of public discussion render benefits to society, as Mill (1859/1983) suggested, by causing “the clearer per- ception and livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision with error?” (chap. 2). Specifically, if the government allows punishment of those who spread injurious defamatory falsehoods about one’s business or reputation, why can it not also punish damaging falsehoods relating to racial, religious, and other minority groups? The counterargument is simple: The nonviolent expression of racially based lies and hatred represents broad social and political expression that, although reprehensible, is nonetheless appropriate for the marketplace of ideas, where people of intellect and goodwill rightfully reject it. In the aftermath of violent race rioting, Illinois passed a “group-libel” statute that punished those who make bigoted “defamatory” statements against racial, religious, or ethnic groups. Several other jurisdictions followed, with New Jer- sey passing a similar law in 1934. The New Jersey Supreme Court overturned its state law in 1941 on state and federal constitutional grounds. The case involved a prosecution of German American Bund officials (State v. Klapprott, 1941). Although Massachusetts passed a group libel law in 1943 and Indiana passed one in 1947, attempts in other states and at the federal level failed. Even in states where group libel laws existed, they were rarely used (Walker, 1994). In Beauharnais v. Illinois (1952), the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed Illinois’s group libel statute. Although never technically overturned, subsequent U.S. Supreme Court decisions have clearly rejected all the foundational arguments that were relied on in the Beauharnais decision, and the case is no longer regarded as sound law. Illinois’s group libel law was repealed in 1961 (Walker, 1994). Levin / EXTREMISM AND THE CONSTITUTION 725 GROUP LIBEL IN CANADA AND EUROPE Other western nations with less stringent protections of free speech than the United States, however, presently have group libel or hate speech laws on the books. Canada, the United Kingdom, Germany, and France, among others, have criminal statutes that punish such things as Holocaust denial and fomenting racial hatred, but with the exception of Germany, these laws are rarely enforced. Section 318 of the Canadian Criminal Code criminally punishes those who “advocate genocide” on the basis of color, race, religion, or ethnic origin. Sec- tion 319(1) punishes those who incite hatred on the basis of color, race, religion, or ethnic origin where such incitement is likely to lead to a breach of the peace. Section 319(2) of the Canadian Criminal Code punishes the public communica- tion of statements that willfully promote hatred on the basis of color, race, reli- gion, or ethnic origin. The United Kingdom’s primary racial hatred laws are located in Part III of the Public Order Act 1986 ([1]§§17 et. seq.) and Part II of the Crime and Disorder Act of 1998 (U.K. Public Order Act of 1986; U.K. Crime & Disorder Act of 1998). These statutes punish such things the violence and incitement of racial hatred through words, conduct or the display of written material. The laws expansively defines race as including color, race, nationality (including citizen- ship) and ethnic or national origins. Germany also has a criminal law that punishes inciting racial hatred. In 1996, American Gerhard Lauck was sentenced to 4 years in prison by a German court after he was apprehended by authorities during a European trip. Lauck was con- victed for the mass mailing of hateful neo-Nazi materials to Germany, where it is banned, from his home in Nebraska, where it is legal (Associated Press, 1996). Article 5 of the German Constitution provides limited protection for free speech but only to the extent that the expression is truthful and does not contravene the human rights of others (Kessler & Rosenberg, 2000). GOOD, EVIL, AND ADVOCACY The Americans must know that the storm of airplanes will not stop, God willing, and there are thousands of young people who are as keen about death as Americans are about life. Al Qaeda spokeman Sulaiman Abu Ghaith. (Al Jezerra television broadcast, October 14, 2001) We grid for total war against the Jews and the rest of the goddamned mud races of the world—politically, militantly, financially, morally, and religiously. In fact we regard it as the heart of our religious creed, and as the most sacred credo of all. We 726 AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST regard it as a holy war to the finish—a racial holy war. RAHOWA! [acronym for racial holy war] is INEVITABLE. —Ben Klassen (1987), deceased founder of the original Church of the Creator, whose adherents have been implicated in race murders and other crimes (Southern Poverty Law Center, 1999, p. 29) The scene in the courtyard was one of utter devastation. The Pennsylvania Avenue wing of the [FBI Headquarters] building, as we could then see, had collapsed, partly into the courtyard in the center of the building and partly into Pennsylvania Avenue. A huge, gaping hole yawned in the courtyard pavement just beyond the rubble of collapsed masonry, and it was from this hole that most of the column of black smoke was ascending. —Description of early morning ammonium nitrate and fuel oil truck bombing by White supremacist terrorist in novel The Turner Diaries—one of Timothy McVeigh’s favorite books (Macdonald, 1978) I tried to use an adventure story as a medium for my message. Neo-Nazi leader William Pierce explaining the purpose of his book, The Turner Diaries (Nazi America, A Secret History, 2000). An important free speech issue relevant to bigotry is that of advocacy. As we have seen, the Supreme Court has adopted the view that the First Amendment protects offensive, even vulgar speech, to ensure a full spectrum of expression. In a series of cases starting right after World War I, the Court was forced to deal with people who were charged with promoting harmful ideas that encouraged such things as violence, toppling the government, or opposition to the draft. These prosecutions did not occur in a vacuum. In response to successful com- munist movements in Europe and our war efforts against Germany, many dis- senters expressing unpopular political views were targeted for prosecution as well as others who actually engaged in violent acts. Beginning in 1919, Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer started a massive 2-year long roundup of leftists during the period known as the “Red Scare.” The prosecutions largely targeted dissent and involved abuses of the legal and procedural safeguards intended to protect criminal defendants. The prosecutions also were used as a pretext to deport recent immigrants who were expressing unpopular views. Politically influenced prosecutions involving expressive or associational rights would later target Jehovah’s Witnesses during the 1930s and 1940s, bigots and reactionaries during the 1920s and 1930s, leftists and communists in the 1940s and 1950s, and liberal civil rights and antiwar activists in the 1950s and 1960s. The Supreme Court, under the ominous backdrop of the Red Scare, addressed free speech protections for the very first time in Schenck v. United Levin / EXTREMISM AND THE CONSTITUTION 727 States (1919). Schenck and others were charged with conspiring to violate Title I of the Espionage Act of 1917, which stated in part, Whoever, when the United States is at war, shall willfully cause or attempt to cause insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, or refusal of duty in the military or naval force of the United States, or shall willfully obstruct the recruiting or enlistment service of the United States, to the injury of the service or of the United States, shall be punished by a fine of not more than $10,000 or imprisonment for not more than twenty years, or both. Schenck and his codefendants were convicted under the act for distributing leaflets critical of the draft. Labeling the draft as “despotism” in its worst form, the leaflets urged citizens to peacefully attempt repeal of the draft laws. It further counseled, “Do not submit to intimidation . . . assert your opposition to the draft.“ In a unanimous opinion, Justice Oliver Wendall Holmes held the law to be constitutional: The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circum- stances as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the sub- stantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree. When a nation is at war many things that might be said in a time of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be endured so long as men fight. (Schenck, 1919, p. 52) The Schenck decision established the first constitutional standard used to determine when advocacy of ideas may be criminally punished. This “clear and present danger” standard allowed governmental punishment of expression when the speech created a clear and present danger of unlawful conduct. In Schenck, though, the defendants were critical of government institutions, and their state- ments urged change through lawful, nonviolent use of the legislative process. In reality, the Schenck standard was used over the years, in various permutations and contortions, to justify the criminalization of simple dissent to government policies themselves. In Abrams v. United States (1919), Justice Holmes dissented against a nar- rowing of the clear and present danger standard to include punishment for speech that merely has a “bad tendency”: The ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas—that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market . . . that, at any rate, is the theory of our Constitution. . . . I think that we should be eternally vigilant against attempts to check the expression of ideas we loathe and believe to be fraught with death, unless they so imminently threaten immediate interference with the lawful and pressing purposes of the law that an immediate check is required to save the country. (p. 630) 728 AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST Gitlow v. New York (1925) was the first of a series of cases over a 40-year span where the Court was asked to assess “criminal anarchy” or “syndicalism” stat- utes. These statutes specifically punished in their text the advocacy of violence as a means of governmental, political, or social reform. New York’s criminal anarchy law punished those who advocated the overthrow of the government by force or violence. Gitlow was a socialist convicted of criminal anarchy for his part in publishing “the left-wing manifesto” that called for revolutionary action by such means as coordinated work stoppages. Although the Court ruled against Gitlow, the decision had important broad implications for the protection of individual liberties. The Gitlow (1925) deci- sion was the first where the Supreme Court held that the freedom of speech and of the press which are protected by the First Amendment from abridgment by Congress—are [also] among the fundamental personal rights and “liberties” protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the states. Thus, the Court recognized for the very first time that states were also limited in how they restricted certain fundamental liberties found in the Bill of Rights. This important finding was of little consequence to Benjamin Gitlow, whose conviction was affirmed. The Court refused to invoke the “clear and present dan- ger test” by distinguishing between the Federal Espionage Law and New York’s Criminal Anarchy Statute. Because laws, like the espionage statute, punished specific acts without referencing speech in particular, the Court maintained the clear and present danger test was appropriate to establish when speech is cov- ered under the statute’s scope. In this case, however, the legislature already determined that this type of advocacy was particularly harmful and in fact spe- cifically prohibited it by statute. The Supreme Court maintained it was not the judiciary’s function to second-guess the findings of the legislature in its decision to punish utterances “of substantive evil.” Justice Holmes, in his dissent, main- tained that the clear and present danger test should be invoked and that Gitlow’s documents under that standard were simply not enough of a threat to warrant criminal sanction. In a related case 2 years later, the Court affirmed the conviction of a woman under California’s Criminal Syndicalism Act. In Whitney v. California (1927), the Court found that the defendant’s mere membership in the Communist Labor Party was enough for her to be constitutionally convicted of a crime. The major- ity rejected Whitney’s speech and association claims, even though she person- ally proposed nonviolent party resolutions that ran counter to the organization’s unlawful goals. The Court did overturn a few criminal syndicalism convictions after Whitney, however. The most notable case was Herndon v. Lowry (1937), where the Court abandoned the “bad tendency” guidelines articulated a decade prior in the Levin / EXTREMISM AND THE CONSTITUTION 729 Gitlow case. In Herndon, the defendant’s conviction for “attempting to incite insurrection” was thrown out because the risk from his words was not immediate in nature. A new and significantly revamped version of the clear and present danger standard was unveiled in Dennis v. United States (1951). In Dennis, the criminal defendants were convicted under the federal Smith Act of 1940—a law substan- tially similar to the criminal anarchy statute at issue in the Gitlow case. The defendants were found to have conspired to organize an American Communist Party with the eventual aim of a forceful overthrow of the U.S. government. The Court invoked Court of Appeals Judge Learned Hand’s new version of the clear and present danger test: “In each case [courts] must ask whether the gravity of the ‘evil’ discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of speech as is necessary to avoid danger” (Dennis, 1951, quoting 183 F. 2d 201, 212 [2nd Cir. 1950]). In this incarnation of the clear and present danger test, the Court allowed a gravely evil threat to be punished irrespective of its imminency or probability. Chief Justice Vinson explained why: Obviously, the words [of the test] cannot mean that before the government may act, it must wait until the putsch is about to be executed, the plans laid and the sig- nal is awaited. . . . Certainly an attempt to overthrow the Government by force, even though doomed from the outset because of inadequate numbers or powers of revolutionists, is a sufficient evil for Congress to prevent. The damage which such attempts create both physically and politically to a nation makes it impossible to measure the validity in terms of the probability of success, or the immediacy of a successful attempt. (Dennis v. United States, 1951) In Yates v. United States (1957), the Court interpreted Congress’s “intent in formulating the Smith Act to only cover speech that actually promoted illegality, rather than abstract support for the use of illegal means as a general concept.” In 1969, the Supreme Court finally arrived at its present standard for deter- mining when politically harmful advocacy may be criminalized. In doing so, it identified the unprotected area of speech now known as criminal incitement. In Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969), the Court was asked to review the conviction of a Ku Klux Klan leader prosecuted under a state criminal syndicalism statute. THE CURRENT STANDARD: IMMINENT INCITEMENT In the early 1960s, Klansman Clarence Brandenburg invited a television news crew to film a Ku Klux Klan rally on a private farm in Hamilton County, Ohio. The prosecution of Brandenburg was based primarily on news footage taken at the private event where only Klansmen and the news crew were present. Footage from the rally aired on both local and national news broadcasts. The footage showed a dozen people with hoods assembled around a large wooden 730 AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST cross, which was set ablaze. Some of the Klansmen appeared to be armed, and the microphone picked up only “scattered phrases” that derided African Ameri- cans and Jews. Elsewhere in the film, Brandenburg addressed the assemblage unarmed but dressed in full Klan regalia. In a speech at the rally he said, This is an organizer meeting. . . . The Klan has more members in the State of Ohio than does any other organization, but if our President, our Congress, our Supreme Court, continues to suppress the white, Caucasian race, it’s possible that there might have to be some revengeance [sic] taken. We are marching on Congress July the Fourth, four hundred thousand strong. From there we are dividing into two groups, one group to march on St. Augustine, Florida, the other group to march into Mississippi. Thank you. (Brandenburg, 1969, p. 446) Later, Brandenburg added the following opinion to a substantially similar statement at the same event: “Personally, I believe the nigger should be returned to Africa, the Jew returned to Israel” (Brandenburg, 1969, p. 446). Brandenburg was convicted under Ohio’s Criminal Syndicalism Act, a law nearly identical to the California statute affirmed in Whitney v. California (1927). Ohio’s law punished advocat[ing] . . . the duty, necessity, or propriety of a crime, sabotage, violence, or unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing industrial or political reform [and for] voluntarily assembl[ing] with any society, group, or assemblage of persons formed to teach or advocate the doctrines of criminal syndicalism. Brandenburg was sentenced to 10 years in state prison and assessed a $1,000 fine for his conduct at the rally. A unanimous Supreme Court overturned the statute, without even applying it to Brandenburg’s speech. The opinion articulated what is now the current test to determine the contours of lawful advocacy and illegal incitement to criminality. In order for dangerous advocacy to be classified as illegal incitement, two condi- tions must be met. First, the speech must be directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action, and second, the speech must be likely to incite or pro- duce such action. WORDS AS CRIME REGUARDING [sic] YOUR RESPONSE TO THE LAKE Co. SHERIFFS POSSE COMITATUS, THAT WAS YOUR SIGNATURE TO YOUR DEATH WARRANT. YOU WILL HANG SHORTLY, IF YOU LIVE LONG ENOUGH Levin / EXTREMISM AND THE CONSTITUTION 731 YOUR TREASON WILL BE REWARDED JUST AS TREASON WAS 200 YR [sic] AGO. —Handwritten death threat from racist antitax Posse Comitatus member to unidentified U.S. senator in 1976 (Ridgeway, 1995, p. 128) In the last section, we examined types of expression that are considered unprotected areas of speech. Some communications are considered so danger- ous by their very nature that the law views them primarily as criminal conduct rather than expressive speech. The most prominent examples of this are threats, conspiracies, and criminal solicitation. In law, a threat is defined as a statement communicating an intent to injure another or damage the property of another. The Supreme Court addressed the issue of criminalizing threats in Watts v. United States (1969), where an African American Vietnam War protester was convicted under a law making it a crime to threaten the life of the president. In August 1966, at a Washington, D.C., rally Watts stated, And now I have already received my draft classification as 1-A and I have got to report for my physical this Monday coming. I am not going. If they ever make me carry a rifle the first man I want to get in my rifle sights is L.B.J. [President Lyndon Johnson]. They are not going to make me kill my black brothers. (p. 706) Unbeknownst to Watts, an investigator with the Army Counter Intelligence Corps secretly noted what he was saying. Based on those remarks, Watts was convicted by a jury during a federal trial in Washington, D.C. The Supreme Court threw out Watts’s conviction but upheld the law. Watts’s statement was deemed by the Court to be a “crude offensive” political statement of constitutionally protected speech rather than a genuine threat. The Court said that whereas the law itself was constitutional, its application to Watts’s political expression was not. The government has an overwhelming interest in both pro- tecting the president’s life and in allowing him to perform his duties without the obstruction that results from violent threats, the Court found. In contrast, the Court also invoked its Sullivan ruling in analyzing Watts’s statement: “[There is] a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide open, and that it may well include vehe- ment, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials” (Watts v. United States, 1969, p. 708). Threats are not the only kinds of statements that are criminal by their very nature. Conspiracies and criminal solicitation have traditionally been regarded as crimes. A conspiracy is an agreement by two or more people to commit a crime or to solicit or aid others in the commission of a crime (Model Penal Code § 5.03). Some conspiracy statutes also require an overt step in furtherance of the planned offense by one of the parties, although that step could be a very small one such as obtaining a tool or drawing a sketch. Conspiracy prosecutions do not 732 AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST require that the target crime ever be carried out. In contrast to incitement prose- cutions, then, there is no requirement of imminency at all for a conviction to take place. Conspiracy is a separate offense from the crime actually planned by the instigators. Criminal solicitation punishes those who ask, direct, or encourage another to commit a crime (Model Penal Code § 5.02). TARGETING GROUPS Only God has the right to create a race—not no black and white, not no n—ger, not no Jew. Yes I will use the word n—ger, because its not illegal. . . . Take a stand, join the Klan. Take a stand, join the Klan. It is not against the law to join the Klan! —Jeff Berry, Imperial Wizard, American Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, speaking at Butler, Pennsylvania, rally, March 1998 (Thompson & Weller, 1998, p. 43) Over the past several decades, the Supreme Court has held that the govern- ment can neither outlaw organizations nor criminalize group membership if there is no connection to any illegality. Still, the First Amendment’s right to associate clearly does not extend to every associational relationship. Group members, for instance, do not have the right to plan or commit crimes and terrorism, form private armies, or conduct fraudulent activities. In addition, it is increasingly common for groups and their leaders to be held civilly liable for the conduct of group members. Neither groups nor their members can be criminally sanctioned without proof of active illegal conduct or unlawful incitement (Noto v. United States, 1961). Even when groups engage in criminality, individual people cannot be summarily punished for a relationship with or membership in that group. To be punishable, a person associated with an illegal group must be aware of the group’s criminality and must specifically intend to further the criminality (Tribe, 1988). American law was not always as tolerant of organizations disfavored by the government. As a response to Klan violence in the early 1920s, various jurisdic- tions passed laws designed to specifically combat the Klan. Antimasking laws, which are still on the books today, were enacted in various states. These laws prohibit the nontheatrical wearing of masks in public. Municipal authorities with substantial Catholic populations from New England to the Great Lakes region confiscated Klan materials or banned the group from meeting or parading (Walker, 1994). In 1923, New York enacted a sweeping anti-Klan statute that compelled various “oath-bound” groups deemed illegitimate by the state to reg- ister with authorities and disclose their membership. The statute also banned wearing masks in public. In 1928, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld New York’s restrictions on governmentally disfavored organizations, like the Klan, on the grounds that it was proper to do so as a legitimate exercise of state authority Levin / EXTREMISM AND THE CONSTITUTION 733 (Bryant v. Zimmerman, 1928). By the late 1920s, however, it was not anti-Klan statutes that would cripple the Klan, but rather journalistic and congressional investigations, internal quarrels, corruption, and highly publicized sex scandals (Bullard, 1991). After a lengthy period where governmental abuse of extremists and dissent- ers was judicially sanctioned, the Supreme Court changed its course. In 1958, the Supreme Court revisited a state statute similar to the one at issue in Bryant. The 1958 controversy involved Alabama’s attempt to compel disclosure of the NAACP’s membership lists. In NAACP v. Alabama (1958), the U.S. Supreme Court overturned its decision in Zimmerman. The Court held that concomitant with the freedom of association guaranteed by the First Amendment is the right to privacy in those associations, and the state’s interest in disclosure simply did not overcome that privacy right (NAACP v. Alabama, 1958). In subsequent cases, the Supreme Court severely limited the government’s ability to interfere with unpopular groups without a direct connection to criminality. The criminal law, however, has traditionally targeted various types of group conduct that directly further criminality as well as those who actually commit the prohibited act. Conspiracy is a traditional common law crime that is pun- ished by all states and the federal government. In addition, accomplice liability can extend to those who “aid and abet” by purposefully assisting others in the commission of a crime or their flight from it (Black’s Law Dictionary, 1983, p. 37). More spontaneous conduct involving groups such as incitement, riot, and unlawful assembly is also punished by the criminal law. Riot and unlawful assembly punish various types of disorderly conduct that cause either substan- tial public inconvenience or threaten public safety (Model Penal Code § 250.1). Many states and the federal government punish “misprision of felony.” The stat- ute was used to prosecute Timothy McVeigh’s friend, Michael Fortier, for fail- ing to alert authorities of what he knew after the Oklahoma City bombing (United States v. Fortier, 1998). The federal version punishes those who, having knowledge about a federal felony, conceal this knowledge after the crime by not alerting authorities (18 U.S.C. § 4). In 1970, Congress passed the first federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization (RICO) law as part of the Organized Crime Control Act, 18 U.S.C. 1961-1968, to address ongoing criminal activities by organized groups like the Mafia. RICO law punishes those formal or informal enterprises that employ a pattern of racketeering activity. Of particular relevance to antiterrorism efforts, racketeering encompasses acts or threats involving murder, kidnapping, arson, and robbery. Federal RICO law does not preclude the charging of separate sub- stantive offenses under state law that constitute the pattern of racketeering activity. Federal RICO statutes were used to prosecute members of a terrorist White supremacist gang known as the Order in the 1980s who engaged in murder and robbery. By 1986, more than two dozen states passed RICO laws modeled after the federal legislation (Zawitz, 1988). The Supreme Court has held that federal 734 AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST RICO law covers conduct beyond crimes for economic gain including political extremists. In N.O.W. v. Scheidler (1994), a group of health care facilities suc- cessfully argued that a coalition of antiabortion groups, including the Pro Life Action Network, took part in a national conspiracy to illegally force the closure of abortion clinics in violation of RICO. In a similar vein, various jurisdictions have recently enacted “gang enhance- ment” statutes that target criminal associations like skinhead groups and urban street gangs. These laws increase the penalty for those who are proven to commit crimes in groups. As the Constitution requires, these statutes do not punish mere association. California’s gang enhancement, Penal Code § 186.22, for example states, Any person who is convicted of a felony committed for the benefit of, at the direc- tion of, or in association with any criminal street gang, with the specific intent to promote, further, or assist in any criminal conduct by gang members, shall, upon conviction of that felony, in addition and consecutive to the punishment prescribed for the felony or attempted felony of which he or she has been convicted, be pun- ished by an additional term of one, two, or three years at the court’s discretion. The statute defines “criminal street gang” as any ongoing organization, asso- ciation, or group of three or more persons, whether formal or informal, having as one of its primary activities the commission of . . . [various offenses]. Califor- nia’s law requires knowledgeable and active assistance of the criminal enter- prise in the commission of a crime. CIVIL LAWSUITS AGAINST EXTREMIST GROUPS Don’t think that with the recent court proceedings levied against the White Aryan Resistance in Portland, Oregon, that our activities will cease. In fact this case has convinced us to go the extra mile, take the extra step. We will create a revolution in this country, we will put blood on the streets like you’ve never seen and advocate more violence than both World Wars put together. —White Aryan Resistance, Orange County, California, telephone hotline message discussing an Oregon jury’s assessment of a multimillion dollar verdict against the group and its leaders (personal communication, October 26, 1990) A significant obstacle to the operations of many prominent right-wing extremist groups came not only from prosecutors but private lawyers as well. Starting in the late 1970s, the Alabama-based civil rights group Southern Pov- erty Law Center pioneered a strategy of suing hate groups civilly under tradi- tional tort law claims relating to agency and negligence theories for their part in promoting hate violence. Staggering monetary judgments, usually far in excess of the groups’ assets, bankrupted various Klan factions and neo-Nazi groups Levin / EXTREMISM AND THE CONSTITUTION 735 including White Aryan Resistance, the Church of the Creator, and most recently, Aryan Nations (see Table 1). In October 2001, an unidentified widow became the first individual to file a lawsuit arising out of the World Trade Center attacks suing Osama bin Laden and his organization as well as the Taliban for $5 billion. (Associated Press, 2001) In February 1998, Stephen Flatow won a $247 million against the govern- ment of Iran in a lawsuit in federal district court. Flatow’s daughter Alisa, a Brandeis University student visiting Israel for religious study, was killed by a bomb that destroyed a bus she was on in Israel. Flatow sued pursuant to a 1996 antiterrorism law that allows lawsuits against foreign entities connected to ter- rorism (Jacoby, 1999). Torts are wrongful acts for which the law recognizes a compensatory or remedial civil remedy—usually money damages. Tort law doctrine allows civil liability for wrongful acts to extend beyond the actual aggressors to those who intentionally or negligently further the commission of the wrongdoing, such as those who negligently or malevolently train or supervise others. Negligence occurs when an unreasonable act results in a foreseeable harm to another. The standard of proof a litigant needs to prevail in civil tort cases is that of preponder- ance of the evidence—a much lower evidentiary standard than the one used in criminal trials. In addition, tort law allows an additional monetary recovery in the form of punitive damages to punish wrongdoers. These awards are generally 736 AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST TABLE 1: Major Civil Lawsuits Against Racist Hate Groups, 1980-2000 Year Group/Trial Location Wrongful Act Judgment/Result 1981 Texas Emergency Reserves Intimidation Organization disbanded by court (KKK militia) order 1985 Confederate Knights/White Intimidation Court enjoins paramilitary actions Patriot Party (Alabama) 1987 United Klansmen of America Homicide $7 million (organization disbands) (Alabama) 1988 Invisible Knights KKK (Georgia) Assaults $1 million (organization disbands in 1991) 1990 White Aryan Resistance (Oregon) Homicide $12 million (ongoing restitution) 1992- Church of the Creator (Florida) Homicide $1 million (organization 1995 temporarily disbands) 1998 Christian Knights KKK Church arson $37.8 million (reduced on appeal (South Carolina) to $21 million) 2000 Aryan Nations (Idaho) Assaults $6 million (organization disbands) 2000 Klansman Jeffrey Berry Assault et al. Default judgment of $120,000 SOURCE: Published and unpublished material on file at the Center for the Study of Hate and Extremism, California State University, San Bernardino. NOTE: Year is for judgment. Dollar amount represents total award against all defendants, not just organization. Wrongful act refers to precipitating event and not necessarily the particular cause of action. Figure 1: Hate Groups in the United States by State, 1999 SOURCE: Southern Poverty Law Center (2000). Map generated by Quyen Nhu Nguyen. 737 offered for intentional torts and in negligence cases where the conduct is viewed as particularly blameworthy—characteristics commonly found in hate violence and terrorism cases (Edwards & Edwards, 1998). UNAUTHORIZED MILITIAS The Militia of Montana is against an immoral, illegitimate, bastardized form of government. We believe in the ballot box; we believe in the jury box. We will not give up the cartridge box in the event the first two boxes do not work. —“Taking Aim” (1994) A well regulated militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed. —Second Amendment, U.S. Constitution The government also has broad authority to restrict groups when they engage in conduct that is uniquely within the province of the state. When citizens band together to form private armies or militias, as many hate groups and extremists have done, the government has full authority to disband them and prosecute their members. The federal government and the various states all have laws related to militias. The federal government, for instance, divides the militia into two classes—the organized and the unorganized militia. The organized militia con- sists of the National Guard and the naval militia, whereas the unorganized mili- tia consists of all able-bodied males ages 17 to 45 not otherwise engaged in active military service or the National Guard (10 U.S.C. § 311). Notwithstand- ing the claim of various unauthorized militia members, membership in the unor- ganized militia does not confer any right to organize or own guns. Rather, these laws provide an alternate way for the government to call citizens into mandatory service should exigent circumstances require it. More than 100 years ago in Presser v. Illinois (1886), the Supreme Court held, The right voluntarily to associate together as a military company or organization, or to drill or parade with arms, without and independent an act of Congress or law of the State authorizing the same, is not an attribute of national citizenship. Mili- tary organization and military parade under arms are subjects especially under the control of the government of every country. They cannot be claimed as a right independent of law. Under our political system they are subject to the control of the State and Federal Governments, acting in due regard to their respective prerog- atives and powers. The Constitution will be searched in vain for any support to the 738 AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST view that these are privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States inde- pendent of some specific legislation on the subject. Today, 41 states have laws banning private armies or certain types of danger- ous paramilitary training. There is also a federal law that bans certain types of paramilitary training designed to foment civil disorder. The federal law only punishes instructors, and attempts at a federal ban on private militias failed after the Oklahoma City bombing. Recent efforts to enact additional federal legisla- tion relating to militia’s organizing have failed (Halpern & Levin, 1996). Until recently, contrary to popular opinion, most legal scholars and every federal court ruling have supported the view that the Second Amendment’s “right to bear arms” clause does not support an unfettered right to personal gun ownership—either individually or in an unregulated militia group. In 1999 a federal district court judge in Texas issued a sweeping decision invalidating a firearms law on the grounds that the Second Amendment does not generally allow such restrictions on private gun ownership. On appeal in October 2001, however, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in a ruling only affecting the middle South, held that the Second Amendment does protect an individual right to gun ownership. It further held that the right is subject to nar- rowly tailored government regulation that can restrict private gun ownership in some circumstances (United States v. Emerson, 2001). Previously, every federal court decision rejected the contention that the Second Amendment provides a “fundamental” right to individual gun ownership by holding that the provision applies to a state’s right to maintain a militia or “national guard.” The Second Amendment’s failure to achieve Supreme Court approbation as a fundamental right is significant. When a right is found to be fundamental by the Supreme Court, the government’s ability to interfere with that right is severely restricted absent a showing of the furtherance of a compelling governmental interest and a limited application of the interference. Furthermore, in nearly every instance that a right has been found to be a fundamental one, the limitation placed on government authority was held to apply not only to the federal govern- ment but to the states as well. Unless their state constitution forbids it, states out- side of the Fifth Circuit are currently free to protect or restrict private gun owner- ship as they see fit. The U.S. Supreme Court has consistently refused to invalidate federal firearm laws on Second Amendment grounds. Federal courts have also upheld state laws banning unauthorized paramilitary activity, and the Supreme Court let stand a municipal law that virtually banned private gun own- ership (Person v. Miller, 1988; Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove, 1983; Viet- namese Fishermen’s Association v. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, 1982). Although the U.S. Supreme Court has consistently refused to invalidate gun control measures on Second Amendment grounds, it has not definitively stated the precise counters of the amendment. Levin / EXTREMISM AND THE CONSTITUTION 739 HATE CRIME LAWS Hate crime laws assume that the greater the harm to offenders, the greater the good to victims. But viewing the allotment of punishment as a confirmation of the social and political standing of the victim groups leads to a status competition between victim groups where the losers feel cheated by the lesser penalties their offenders receive. —New York University Law School Professor James Jacobs and attorney Kimberly Potter (Southern Poverty Law Center, 1998, p. 31) Hate crimes are different from many other crimes in at least three ways; they are intended to send a message to the victim and members of the victim’s group; they generate an unusual sense of vulnerability in victims; and they tend to involve more violence than other crimes. —Testimony of Northeastern University Professor Jack McDevitt (Hate Crime Prevention Act of 1997, 1998) Over the past few decades, criminal law has placed a renewed focus on vio- lent bigotry. Congress responded to Klan violence in the South during the civil rights era by enacting 18 U.S.C. § 245 Federally Protected Rights in 1968. Con- gressional action was fueled by extensive hearings on Klan violence in 1965 and the unequivocal Supreme Court approval of two post–Civil War–era statutes, 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242 in 1966. The 1968 statute prohibits interference with vot- ing, obtaining government or federally funded benefits or services, accessing federal employment, or participation in a federal jury. Among other things, the law also punishes the interference with six other federally protected activities, but only when they are committed on the basis of race, color, religion, or national origin. Those protected activities include enrollment in public education, partic- ipation in state programs, obtaining private or state employment, participation in state and local jury service, interstate travel, and the benefits of various types of public accommodations. Despite the assertion by prosecutors and civil rights groups that the statute is too narrow, Congress has failed to pass bills since 1998 to amend 18 U.S.C. § 245. The bills would add sexual orientation, gender, and disability to the protected characteristics and broadly expand the protected rights beyond the narrow list currently enumerated (Hate Crime Prevention Act of 1999). Even with all the limitations it places on federal prosecutors, 18 U.S.C. § 245 remains the most widely used federal hate crime statute. Today, hate crime laws actually reflect a broad category of offenses that cover prohibitions against cross burnings, desecration to houses of worship, as well as antimasking laws, penalty enhancements, and stand-alone civil rights or intimi- dation statutes. It is the last two statutes, the penalty enhancements and the stand-alone statutes, that are the most broadly applicable to the widest range of 740 AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST Figure 2: Hate Crime Laws in the United States SOURCE: Center for the Study of Hate and Extremism, California State University, San Bernardino (fighthate.org); Anti-Defamation League (adl.org); and National Gay and Lesbian Task Force (ngltf.org). Map generated by Quyen Nhu Nguyen. NOTE: Kentucky, Georgia, and Kansas enacted statutes since map was generated, and in spring 2001, Texas passed a statute that now specifies groups covered. 741 criminal conduct and the ones that are most commonly referred to as hate crime statutes. This increased attention resulted in more serious treatment of misdemeanors and other crimes that would have otherwise garnered minimal sanctions. States such as California also enacted hate crime laws that increased the penalty for repeat hate crime offenders or those who commit hate crimes in groups. Other laws also allow victims of hate violence to obtain civil injunctions and monetary damages (Cal. Penal Code §§ 422.6, 422.75; Cal. Civ. Code § 52). By 1991, 28 states had hate crime laws, increasing to 45 by the year 2001 (National Gay and Lesbian Task Force, 2001; National Institute Against Prejudice & Violence, 1986, 1988). At the federal level, four new pieces of legislation were introduced during this period. The first was the Hate Crime Statistics Act signed into law by Presi- dent Bush in April 1990. The bill, initially introduced in 1985, is widely credited for adding the term hate crime to the American lexicon (Jacobs & Potter, 1998). The act initially required the attorney general to collect data on crimes motivated by race, religion, sexual orientation, and ethnicity and was subsequently amended to include disability. The FBI was assigned the task of collecting the data and will continue to do so on a permanent basis. In 1998, 7,755 hate crime incidents were reported to the FBI. Out of 16,000 law enforcement agencies in 742 AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST TABLE 2: Reported Hate Crime in the United States by Year and Bias Motive Year 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Total incidentsa 6,623 7,587 5,932 7,947 8,759 8,049 7,755 7,876 Agencies participatinga 6,181 6,551 7,356 9,584 11,355 11,221 10,730 12,122 Bias motivation Race 4,025 4,732 3,545 4,831 5,396 4,710 4,321 4,295 (56%) Anti-White 1,342 1,471 1,010 1,226 1,106 993 792 781 Anti-Black 2,296 2,815 2,174 2,988 3,674 3,120 2,901 2,958 Anti–Asian/Pacific Islander 217 258 211 355 355 347 293 298 Ethnicity/National origin 669 697 638 814 940 836 754 829 (11%) Anti-Hispanic 369 472 337 516 564 491 482 466 Religion 1,162 1,298 1,062 1,277 1,401 1,385 1,390 1,411 (16.5%) Anti-Jewish 1,017 1,143 915 1,058 1,109 1,087 1,081 1,109 Anti-Christian 46 62 46 67 110 84 120 84 Anti-Islamic 15 13 17 29 27 28 21 32 Sexual orientation 767 860 685 1,019 1,016 1,102 1,260 1,317 (16%) Antigay/antilesbianb 760 830 664 984 991 1,081 1,231 1,288 SOURCE: Federal Bureau of Investigation (1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999). a. Year by year comparisons are discouraged because the number of agencies participating in the hate crime data collection program or reporting incidents varies from year to year. In addition, hate crimes are significantly underreported by victims and police. b. Antibisexual is counted for total for sexual orientation but not for subtotal for antigay/antilesbian. the United States, 12,122 participated in the FBI’s hate crime reporting program, but only 1,815 reported any incidents in 1999. In 1994, the Hate Crime Sentencing Enhancement Act was enacted. The stat- ute, a penalty enhancement law, increases the sentence for underlying federal offenses by about 30% when the fact finder establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that the target is intentionally selected because of race, color, religion, national origin, ethnicity, gender, disability, or sexual orientation. The law’s lim- itation is that it is only applicable to a relatively small number of substantive underlying federal offenses. In 1996, Congress enacted new legislation broad- ening coverage and increasing the penalties for church arsons. That legislation followed a series of well-publicized church arsons that disproportionately tar- geted African American institutions. Initially introduced in 1998, the Hate Crime Prevention Act twice failed to come to a vote in the House of Representatives despite affirmative votes in the Senate as late as June 2000 under a new name. The bill would alter the main fed- eral criminal civil rights statute, 18 U.S.C. § 245, in two significant ways. First, the bill would extend federal legal protection on the basis of gender, disability, and sexual orientation—but only in cases involving interstate commerce. The interstate commerce qualification for those categories is necessary to provide federal jurisdiction under the commerce clause. The other statutory reform the bill provides is a broadening of the circumstances protected. Currently, 18 U.S.C. § 245 requires that prosecutors establish both that the vic- tim was attacked because of his or her status and because of his or her exercise of a particular protected activity listed in the statute. The proposed statute would expand protections beyond the limited number of activities listed in the current statute. THE SUPREME COURT ADDRESSES HATEFUL OFFENDERS JUSTICES UPHOLD STIFFER SENTENCES FOR HATE CRIMES— WISCONSIN LAW AFFIRMED—Unanimous Decision Clears Up Confusion in a Debate Over Freedom of Expression —The New York Times front-page article headline (Greenhouse, 1993) The Supreme Court set limits as to how hateful offenders may be punished for their crimes in several important cases. In Dawson v. Delaware (1992), the Supreme Court overturned a death sentence that was imposed in part on the basis of a convict’s membership in a White supremacist group in a murder case where his racist beliefs and associations were not relevant to the crime. The Court found that a defendant’s abstract beliefs were an impermissible basis to impose criminal punishment. Still, when relevant, the Court maintained that the “ Levin / EXTREMISM AND THE CONSTITUTION 743 Constitution does not erect a per se barrier to the admission of one’s beliefs and associations simply because those beliefs and associations are protected by the First Amendment” (p. 165). In Barclay v. Florida (1983), 9 years prior, the Court ruled that a defendant’s anti-White racial hatred and desire to start a race war were relevant in determin- ing punishment in a racial homicide case. Although the government may not penalize abstract bigoted beliefs, it may introduce evidence of a defendant’s constitutionally protected beliefs to show motive or to establish intentionality. The general rule requires that the evidence not only be relevant but its value be more probative than prejudicial (Federal Rules of Evidence, 2001, p. R. 403). In R.A.V. v. St. Paul (1992), the Supreme Court was asked to rule on the con- stitutionality of a 1989 municipal hate speech ordinance used to prosecute a teenage skinhead for burning a cross in the yard of an African American family with several young children. The Court unanimously invalidated the statute, although the justices were deeply divided as to why. The statute read in relevant part, Whoever places on public or private property a symbol, object, appellation, char- acterization, or graffiti, including but not limited to a burning cross or Nazi swas- tika, which one knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender, commits disorderly conduct and shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. All nine justices agreed that the statute was impermissibly overbroad by pun- ishing speech that merely evoked anger or resentment. The First Amendment has consistently been construed by the Court over recent decades as protecting extremely offensive speech and political discourse that fail to rise to the level of a threat, immediate incitement to criminality, or solicitation of a crime. The offensiveness of an idea is an impermissible basis for the government to punish expression (Texas v. Johnson, 1989). Four of the justices supported the position that it was constitutional to punish expression whose severity went beyond merely offending someone. Because threats and so-called fighting words were traditionally held to be unprotected by the First Amendment, these justices maintained that it was permissible for the government to selectively punish bigoted speech within these categories on the basis of content. The controlling opinion, authored by Associate Justice Antonin Scalia, held differently. These justices believed that even traditionally unprotected areas of speech must be punished without taking into account the content of the idea expressed. They held that punishing certain types of threatening cross burnings, such as those based on racial supremacy, but not others, such as those degrading the mentally ill, violated that principle. The R.A.V. decision invalidated those hate crime laws where the criminality hinged solely on the idea expressed. The ruling also had the additional effect of invalidating speech codes at public 744 AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST universities throughout the United States. Although the case did not overtly overturn the Beauharnais decision, the Court’s rationale would not support the constitutionality of group libel statutes (R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 1992). In 1996, the Court, without comment, refused to grant review of a challenge to a Florida state law that criminalized all hostile cross burnings on the property of another. That law, unlike St. Paul’s ordinance, did not differentiate cross burn- ings on the basis of the hateful idea expressed (State v. T.B.D., 1995, 1996). The issue of the overall validity of hate crime laws as a category was settled in 1993 in Wisconsin v. Mitchell, when the Court unanimously upheld the constitu- tionality of another type of hate crime statute—a penalty enhancement law. Spe- cifically, the enhancement law at issue punished an offender’s intentional selec- tion of a victim or property based on the status characteristics of another person. The characteristics covered by Wisconsin’s law included race, religion, color, national origin, and ancestry. Todd Mitchell was a 19-year-old African Ameri- can Kenosha, Wisconsin, resident angered over a scene in the movie Mississippi Burning, where an African American child was beaten by White supremacists as he knelt to pray. Mitchell incited a crowd to viciously beat Gregory Riddick, a White 14-year-old passerby. He urged the mob to action by stating, “Do you all feel hyped up to move on some white people? You all want to fuck somebody up? There goes a white boy. Go get him.” Mitchell was convicted of aggravated battery—party to a crime and sen- tenced to 2 years for the underlying assault. He was assessed another 2-year term for intentionally selecting his victim on account of race, for a total of 4 years’ incarceration out of a possible 7-year term. In reversing the Wisconsin Supreme Court, the U.S. Supreme Court in an opinion by Chief Justice William Rehnquist cited three basic reasons for affirm- ing the statute. First, whereas the government may not punish abstract beliefs, it can punish a vast array of depraved motives. The Court further found that pen- alty enhancement laws, unlike the statute at issue in R.A.V., did not prevent peo- ple from expressing their views or punish them for doing so. Lastly, the Court pointed to the severity of hate crimes, stating that they are “thought to be more likely to provoke retaliatory crimes, inflict distinct emotional harm on their vic- tims and incite community unrest” (Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 1993). Although a vast consortium ranging from police fraternal organizations to the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) filed briefs supporting the deci- sion, not everyone was pleased with the outcome. Some prominent legal schol- ars contended that punishing discriminatory crimes more severely than other crimes was merely a subtly disguised legalistic end run to punish disfavored thoughts. New York University Law Professor James Jacobs and attorney Kimberly Potter criticized the Mitchell decision: “The very facts of that case present a defendant who is punished more severely, based on viewpoints” (Jacobs & Potter, 1998). Conservative commentator George Will referred to hate crime laws as “moral pork barrel” and an “imprudent extension of identity politics” (Will, 1998). Levin / EXTREMISM AND THE CONSTITUTION 745 After the Mitchell decision, the intentional selection model, presumably because of its affirmation by the Court, became the preferred model for new hate crime legislation (see, for example, Hate Crime Sentencing Enhancement Act of 1994, § 280003 of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994). Following a 1-year hiatus that commenced with the R.A.V. decision, state legislatures once again enacted hate crime laws—using Wisconsin’s model. State courts also upheld similar stand-alone laws modeled after traditional fed- eral civil rights statutes. Laws like these, such as California Penal Code § 422.6, do not require the charging of an additional crime. Stand-alone civil rights stat- utes generally punish the status-based interference with the civil rights of others through force or threat. Although judicial decisions upheld the two most popular types of hate crime laws, important definitional issues remained unresolved. Courts and legislatures still had to address not only what groups to cover but precisely how much of a role the victim’s racial, religious, or other status characteristic played in the offense. In In re M.S. (1995), the California Supreme Court addressed the latter issue by reviewing two of the state’s primary hate crime statutes—one a stand- alone law and the other a penalty enhancer. Each law, enacted in 1987, punished the selection of a victim “because of” a status characteristic. The court ruled that “because of” meant “the prohibited bias must be a substantial factor in the com- mission of the crime” (In re M.S., 1995). To punish offenders who mistakenly attack victims from status groups that they had not intended for attack, legisla- tures included the language “actual or perceived” before listing status character- istics (Code of Ala. § 13A-5-13, 1997; D.C. Code § 22-4004, 1998 [civil reme- dies]; 720 ILCS 5/12-7.1, 1998; La. R.S. 14:107.2, 1998; Minn. Stat. § 609.595, 1997; Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-301, 1997; Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 193.1675, 1997; NY CP § 485.10; 13 Vermont S.A. § 1455, 1998; 14 Virgin Island C. § 707, 1998). Some legislatures further refined their hate crime laws to also protect on the basis of sexual orientation, gender, and disability. “Moral” concerns over the inclusion of sexual orientation at the state and federal level by some conservative lawmakers have either caused bills to fail outright or to pass only with the offending category excluded. Still, by 2001, more than 20 states protected on the basis of gender, disability, and sexual orientation. In July 2000, New York passed an expansive hate crime bill after a decade in the legislature. New York’s new law punishes crimes committed on the basis of race, color, national origin, ancestry, gender, religion, religious practice, age, disability, and sexual orienta- tion (Hate Crimes Act of 2000, Art. 485). Although carefully drafted hate crime laws remained intact, the U.S. Supreme Court limited government authority in two cases decided in the spring of 2000. In United States v. Morrison (2000), the Supreme Court invalidated a provision of the 1994 Violence Against Women Act that allowed victims of gender vio- lence to sue their assailants civilly in federal court. A sharply divided Court split 5 to 4 in favor of throwing out a federal civil lawsuit by a former college student 746 AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST who alleged she was sexually assaulted by a football player. The majority held that sexual assault did not have enough of a nexus to interstate commerce to war- rant federal jurisdiction (United States v. Morrison, 2000). Previously, until 1995, the Court approved of seemingly indirect connections to interstate com- merce as a basis for upholding a variety of criminal and civil rights statutes (United States v. Lopez, 1995). Currently, federal prosecutors assert jurisdiction by relying on an expansive interpretation of the rights protected by 18 U.S.C. § 245 when an attack takes place on a federally funded public street or sidewalk. That widely used prosecution theory is being reexamined in light of the Court’s restrictive holding in Morrison. Shortly after the Morrison decision was handed down, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in New York reviewed the federal civil rights conviction of a youth who killed a rabbinical student dur- ing rioting in Crown Heights, Brooklyn, in 1991 (S. Freeman, Anti-Defamation League, personal communication, July 7, 2000). In June 2000, the Supreme Court struck down a New Jersey hate crime law in Apprendi v. New Jersey that allowed a judge, rather than a jury, to increase the sentence of a convicted defendant beyond the maximum enumerated in the criminal code for an underlying offense on a showing of racial bias by the pre- ponderance of the evidence. The Court held 5 to 4 that when a factor affects a sentence as substantially as racial bias did in Apprendi, it must be established to a jury by a higher standard—beyond a reasonable doubt (Apprendi v. New Jer- sey, 2000). The impact of the decision in the area of hate crime law was limited because the overwhelming majority of hate crime statutes already meet the Court’s heightened requirements. After a series of anthrax cases via the mail greater attention was given to The Biological Weapons Act of 1989 which outlaws the possession, procurement, or manufacture of a “biological agent, toxin, or delivery system” for use as a weapon (18 USC 175). THE INTERNET WHITE PRIDE WORLD WIDE WHITE NATIONALIST RESOURCE PAGE Stormfront is a resource for those courageous men and women fighting to preserve their White Western culture, ideals, and freedom of speech and association—a forum for planning strategies and forming political and social groups to ensure victory. —Current introductory page of Stormfront, which in 1995 became the first “hate” site on the World Wide Web (www.stormfront.org) The use of computer networks by White supremacists dates back to the early 1980s when West Virginia neo-Nazi publisher George Dietz established a com- puter bulletin board system (BBS) to post racist, anti-Semitic, and Holocaust Levin / EXTREMISM AND THE CONSTITUTION 747 denial material. These bulletin boards, accessible to those with a computer and a modem, were text postings arranged by titles that included “The Jew in Review,” “The Holohoax,” and “WVA Real Estate Bargains.” These bulletin boards allowed space for additional comment and the downloading of files by inter- ested users. Shortly thereafter, the Aryan Nations and White Aryan Resistance set up BBSs of their own to spread their ideology. The men behind each BBS, Louis Beam and Tom Metzger, are influential White supremacists whose ideol- ogy promotes random racist violence—a message well situated for the anony- mous and far-reaching medium of computer networks. During the mid-1990s, antigovernment “patriot” groups added this technology to an array of communi- cation media that included fax networks and short-wave radio broadcasts (Berlet, 2001). It was in the spring of 1995 that computer programmer Don Black set up the first, and arguably most influential, hate Web site, Stormfront, from his Palm Beach, Florida, home. Black, a former Ku Klux Klansman and federal felon, was soon joined by other notorious extremists on the Web. Today, there are a vast array of bigots in cyberspace including the neo-Nazi National Alliance, Aryan Nations, White Aryan Resistance, World Church of the Creator, National Asso- ciation for the Advancement of White People, various Klan factions, skinheads, Holocaust deniers, and hate rock promoters. It is estimated that there are about 500 hate Web sites on the Internet in addition to various chat rooms, e-mail ser- vices, and USENET posting locations. Out of those 500 hate sites, there are only a few dozen hub sites that update their content regularly and get a consistent stream of visitors (Perine, 2000). Scholar Roger Eatwell cites the following reasons for the Internet’s popular- ity among hatemongers: (a) the low cost, and potentially high-quality, presenta- tion and distribution of information; (b) the ability to tailor messages to specific audiences who self-select the type of information they seek; (c) the ability to cre- ate an effective image of an ideological community; and (d) the ease of global distribution across jurisdictional boundaries (Griffin, 1997). The Supreme Court addressed the regulation of controversial Internet con- tent in Reno v. ACLU (1997), where certain restrictions on Internet messages were invalidated. The decision in Reno v. ACLU invalidated two parts of the Communications Decency Act dealing with sexual content. However, the deci- sion had a significant impact on Internet regulation in general. In relevant parts, the act punished the “knowing” communication to minors of “obscene or inde- cent” messages. It also banned the knowing communication of messages to minors, or the display of messages in a way that minors could view them. The prohibited messages related to material that was “patently offensive as mea- sured by contemporary community standards, sexual or excretory activities or organs.” The decision was a landmark for two reasons. First, the justices gave broad First Amendment protection to communications, dismissing government claims that the Internet should be restricted in the same manner as radio and television 748 AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST frequencies. The justices also dismissed the notion that the government can ban communications between adults on the grounds that minors might receive mes- sages for which they are unfit. The Court instead contended that the Internet was more like a public square than a television broadcast. In a series of cases dating back for decades, the Supreme Court has consistently held that speech in public forums such as streets and parks was subject to the most protection from content-based government regulation. The Internet thus was a forum where speech would be most protected: Through the use of chat rooms, any person with a phone line can become a town crier with a voice that resonates farther than it could from any soapbox. Through the use of Web pages, mail explorers and newsgroups, the same individual can become a pamphleteer. As the District Court found, the content of the Internet is as “diverse as human thought.” We agree . . . that our cases provide no basis for quali- fying the level of First Amendment scrutiny that should be applied to this medium. The justices found that the Internet differed from television and radio broad- casts because there were unlimited available outlets, there was no precedent of governmental restrictions, and the recipient of the message actively searches for it with foreknowledge of its content. Based on this, the Court invoked the most stringent level of scrutiny to judge governmental restriction on expression over the Internet. The government may only restrict expression on the Internet when it is necessary to further an important governmental interest and is narrowly tai- lored to achieve that interest. The Court also attacked the statute’s vagueness, particularly in its invocation of the words indecent and patently offensive. Pursuant to the Court’s ruling, offensive sites that spewed extremism remained constitutionally protected. The Court’s ruling in Reno, however, did not extend protection to individuals who use the Internet as an instrumentality to commit conduct, such as threats, frauds, or criminal solicitation, that is unlawful irrespective of the context. In fact, Congress has authority under the Commerce Clause to enact new legislation or amend existing laws to more severely punish crimes where the Internet is involved. White supremacist movements and foreign extremists alike have tradition- ally glorified both fraudulent activities and damaging infrastructure targets. The Internet, as a new infrastructure, enables extremists to do both. The advent of the Internet offers virtually unlimited opportunities for a new breed of younger, edu- cated extremists to commit sophisticated fraudulent financial crimes, obtain confidential information, damage private and public computer systems, and efficiently communicate across international borders. Whereas traditional laws can sometimes be used to prosecute computer crime, the federal government and all 50 states now have additional criminal leg- islation specifically addressing computer crime (18 Penn. Con. Stats. 3933; 18 U.S.C. §§ 1029, 1030). Current cyber crime laws punish those who commit fraud by computer as well as those who use or damage data or hardware without Levin / EXTREMISM AND THE CONSTITUTION 749 authorization (Schmalleger, 1999). These new computer laws address such things as unauthorized computer tampering, fraud, trespass, and theft of ser- vices but do not create a new charge for cyber threats. CYBER THREATS Much of the media attention on the Internet and bigotry has focused on offen- sive Web sites. However, the medium has recently emerged as a vehicle for big- ots to transmit illegal threats. The ease in which large numbers of victims can be threatened by mass e-mailings and the potential reach of Web site–posted threats warrant an examination of existing law. The character of certain Web site threats can be more complex than a solitary threat delivered in person or by let- ter. These threats can, and are often designed to, deliver not only a threat to an intended target but also a de facto solicitation to action to numerous other violence-prone extremists. It is this de facto solicitation component and the use of a wide-ranging instrumentality that warrant new legislation specifically addressing Web site threats. Enhancing punishment for a crime because the offender used a particular instrumentality or new technology is nothing new in the criminal law. Existing law enhances punishment when a crime involves an aircraft, automatic weap- ons, or the use of a telecommunication system. Arguably, threats and other online crimes, undertaken by White supremacists and others, are substantively different owing to the ubiquitous nature of the Web. A threat divulging private information, broadcast over the Internet for example, not only can intimidate the target, but it can also be a criminal solicitation to others unknown—complete with valuable information that aids in the proposed crime’s commission. Currently, though, federal prosecutors have tried online bigoted criminals under existing law. On September 26, 1996, Richard Machado, using a univer- sity computer, sent a racist epithet–filled threat to about 60, mostly Asian, stu- dents at the University of California, Irvine, where he had flunked out, that warned, “I personally will make it my life career to find and kill everyone of you personally. OK?????? That’s how determined I am. Get the fuck out, Mother Fucker (Asian Hater)” (United States v. Machado, 1998). In February 1998, Machado became the first individual to be convicted in the United States of a so-called hate crime over the Internet. After a jury deadlock in his first trial, a subsequent jury convicted Machado of violating 18 U.S.C. § 245 for interfering with the students’ right to attend a public college. Machado was sentenced to 1 year in prison (United States v. Machado, 1998). Less than a month later, in March 1998, 67 Latino students and employees of California State University, Los Angeles; Massachusetts Institute of Technol- ogy; and other institutions received a threatening e-mail that read in part, “I hate your race. I want you all to die. will [sic] do kill all your people for me, wetback. . . . I’m going to come down and kill your wetback, affirmative action ass. . . . I hate wetbacks!!! Kill all wetbacks!!!” (United States v. Quon, 1999). 750 AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST In June 1999, Kingman Quon, an Asian American California college student, received a 2-year sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 245 for sending those threatening e-mails. His probation bars him from using a computer or going online for a year once he is released from prison (United States v. Quon, 1999). Online extremists face prosecution not only for violating traditional civil rights statutes but also from other statutes dealing with telecommunications. Under 47 U.S.C. § 223, those who seek to threaten, annoy, or harass another through the use of a telecommunications device by making lewd, indecent, or anonymous contact face up to 2 years in prison. In addition, 18 U.S.C. § 875 pro- vides for up to 2 years’ incarceration for threats communicated in interstate com- merce that can include phone or computer lines. In October 1998, a neo-Nazi hate site, Alpha HQ, run by longtime Philadel- phia racist Ryan Wilson, became the first hate site to be removed by court order from the World Wide Web after the Pennsylvania Deputy Attorney General Trent Hargrove obtained a civil injunction. The attorney general’s office con- tended that the site was in violation of state laws that prohibited harassment, ter- rorist threats, and ethnic intimidation. Wilson failed to appear in his own defense. The site published threats against two Pennsylvania civil rights workers. One was Bonnie Jouhari, a fair housing and hate crime official from Reading. The site showed one photograph of Jouhari and another of her office exploding into flames. The site labeled her a “race traitor,” a term commonly used by White supremacists to label an individual as a target of violence. The site, in referring to Jouhari, also said, “[She] has received warnings in the mail that she is a race traitor. . . . Traitors like this should beware, for in our day, they will be hung from the neck from the nearest tree or lamp post” (Commonwealth v. Wilson et al., 1998). It also stated that Jouhari’s fair housing work was injurious to society. After he was interviewed by the FBI, Wilson put up a disclaimer relating to vio- lent acts, which a judge later held was ineffective (Commonwealth v. Wilson et al., 1998). In July 2000, Department of Housing and Urban Development officials suc- cessfully sued Wilson for using his Web site and other media to violate the Fair Housing Act. The charge states he violated the act by threatening Jouhari and her daughter to prevent Jouhari from enforcing the act and living in her home. Jouhari’s job obligated her to assist victims of housing discrimination in filing discrimination complaints pursuant to the act. Wilson, who did not contest the suit, was held liable for more than $1,100,000 by an administrative law judge (Lichtblau, 2000). In Planned Parenthood v. American Coalition of Life Activists (1999), a jury found a consortium of radical antiabortion organizations liable for $107 million in a case arising out of wanted poster–type literature that was distributed both online and offline. The online literature included detailed personal information about abortion doctors along with a list of doctors that specifically referenced those who had been assaulted or murdered. Although the site did not explicitly Levin / EXTREMISM AND THE CONSTITUTION 751 direct readers to kill the doctors listed, it labeled them as murderers who needed to be brought to justice. After an injunction was issued, the Web site was taken offline but is sporadically available. On March 28, 2001, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the jury verdict and dissolved the lower court’s injunction. The decision reaffirmed protection to “leaderless resistance” type Web activity. Judge Alex Kozinski declared, “Political speech may not be punished just because it makes it more likely that someone will be harmed at some unknown time in the future by an unrelated third party” (Planned Parent- hood v. American Coalition of Life Activists, 2001). In April 2000, two civil rights groups filed a lawsuit in France against the American Internet company Yahoo! for allowing Nazi paraphernalia to be auc- tioned on its Web site. French law prohibits the sale or exhibit of material that incites racism. A French court subsequently fined Yahoo! and ordered the com- pany to find ways to restrict access by French citizens to the controversial site (Yahoo! v. La Ligue Contre Racism, 2001, p. 7565). Yahoo has since attempted to transfer the matter to a court in the United States. Choice of law conflicts currently exist between the United States and other nations whose criminal laws punish hate speech—something protected under American law. Because the United States does not generally extradite people to other nations for offenses that are not crimes here, other nations will have a diffi- cult task of asserting physical custody over vitriolic hatemongers who spread illegal rhetoric from a safe distance. Beginning in the late 1970s a series of laws were passed that established stan- dards for intelligence gathering on American residents and citizens who might be linked to foreign terrorists. Another type of statute, the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986, in relevant part, expanded jurisdiction to cover terrorist acts and their attempts outside the United States where an American is the target. One year after the Oklahoma City Bombing the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 was enacted. Despite the protestations of various civil rights groups, the law imposed extensive restric- tions on the number of appeals and the time allotted to pursue them in death pen- alty cases. The law also expanded the authority of the federal government to pro- scribe domestic fundraising by terrorist groups; to ban suspected terrorists from entering the United States and to expel those foreigners linked to terrorism. A package of comprehensive legislation quickly passed by Congress in Octo- ber 2001 in response to September’s terrorist attacks. The least controversial portions increased enforcement and victim compensation funding. Other provi- sions enhanced penalties and removed the statute of limitation restrictions applied to various terrorism related offenses. More controversial, however, are portions that streamlined and relaxed war- rant, investigative, and detention requirements. The bill allows one federal court to have nationwide authority to approve roving wiretaps, phone record searches, and retrieval of electronic evidence. Roving wiretaps follow a particular person, 752 AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST allowing phone intercepts to proceed against multiple phones across numerous jurisdictions. (HR 2975) Attorney General Ashcroft promoted this measure over the protests of civil libertarians during Congressional testimony: We need speed in identifying and tracking down terrorists. Time is of the essence. The ability of law enforcement to trace communications into jurisdictions without obtaining an additional court order can be the difference between life and death for American citizens. (Attorney General John Ashcroft, prepared remarks, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, September 25, 2001) CONCLUSION Many of today’s most influential extremists apparently have learned a legal lesson from the mistakes of their predecessors. After a series of disastrous crimi- nal and civil judgments over the past two decades, modern American hatemongers have refined their message and their tactics. For a variety of rea- sons, including legal ones, today’s extremists appear as content to inspire vio- lence as their predecessors were to orchestrate it. In the past, groups such as the Klan believed they shared the goals if not the tactics of their overall community. Today, many extremists see their role changed from enforcers of a majoritarian status quo to warriors in a guerrilla insurgency. Technological innovations, such as the Internet, have allowed extremists to inexpensively spread their rhetoric and strategies to would-be terrorists, without the necessity and legal risks of maintaining a more direct relationship with them. Contemporary hate terror groups are no longer insulated from civil suits or prosecution by a sympathetic or insouciant legal system. Existing laws are being enforced with new vibrancy, whereas hate crime statutes and other new laws are being crafted to combat the evolving threat that bigots and other extremists pose. Still, in recent decades the Supreme Court has carved an important niche that protects the rights of extrem- ists to peaceably associate and promote their views, whether it be in cyberspace, handbills, or the town square. REFERENCES Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919). Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798, 1 Stat. 596 (1798). Apprendi v. New Jersey, -U.S.- (2000). Antiterrorism Act of 2001 (H.R. 2975 107th Cong.). Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 [PL 104-132]. Associated Press. (1996, August 22). American neo-Nazi gets four years in Germany [Wire, Berlin, Germany]. Associated Press. (2001, October 16) Attack Briefs [Wire, Fort Pierce, Fl.] Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939 (1983). Barron v. the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243 (1833). Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952). Levin / EXTREMISM AND THE CONSTITUTION 753 Berlet, C. (2001, April 28). When hate went online. 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New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925). Greenhouse, L. (1993, June 12). Justices uphold stiffer sentences for hate crimes. The New York Times, p. 1. Griffin, R. (1997). Caught in its own net: Post-war fascism outside Europe [Online]. Available: www.brookes.ac.uk/schools/humanities/Roger/2457/FASOUT.htm Gunther, G. (1990, Spring). Good speech, bad speech: A debate. Stanford Lawyer, 24, 6-9, 40-41. Halpern, T., & Levin, B. (1996). The limits of dissent: The constitutional status of armed civilian militias. Amherst, MA: Aletheia Press. Hate Crime Prevention Act of 1997: Testimony before the House Judiciary Committee (1998, July 22) (testimony of Jack McDevitt). Hate Crime Prevention Act of 1999, S. 622, 106th Cong. (1999). Hate Crime Sentencing Enhancement Act of 1994, § 280003 of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796, 2096 (1994). Hate Crime Statistics Act of 1990, 28 U.S.C. § 534 (1990). Hate Crimes Act of 2000, NY Crim. Proc. 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Miller, 854 F.2d 656 (4th Cir. 1988). Pierce, W. (1995). Hate speech. Free speech 1995 [Online]. Available: www.natvan.org Planned Parenthood v. American Coalition of Life Activists, 23 F. Supp.2d 1182 (9th Cir. 1999). Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252 (1886). Public Order Act 1986, United Kingdom (1), §§ 17 et. seq. (1986). Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983). R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992). Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997). Ridgeway, J. (1995). Blood in the face. New York: Thunder’s Mouth Press. Rowan v. Post Office Dept., 397 U.S. 728 (1970). Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). Schmalleger, F. (1999). Criminal law today: An introduction with capstone cases. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. Southern Poverty Law Center. (1998, Summer). Klanwatch intelligence report (Issue No. 91). Montgomery, AL: Author. Southern Poverty Law Center. (1999, Summer). Klanwatch intelligence report (Issue No. 95). 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United States v. Morrison, -U.S.- (2000). United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). United States v. Quon, No. 99-76 (C.D. CA. 1999). Van Alstyne, W. (1984). Interpretations of the First Amendment. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Vietnamese Fishermen’s Association v. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, F. Supp. 198 (S.d. Tex. 1982). Walker, S. (1994). Hate speech: The history of an American controversy. Lincoln, NE: Bison Books. Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969). Whitney v. California, 247 U.S. 357 (1927). Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981). Will, G. (1998, October 15). No need to broaden federal hate crime law. Asbury Park Press, p. a13. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (1993). Yahoo! v. La Ligue Contre Racism, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS (2001). Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957). Zawitz, M. (Ed.). (1988). Report to the nation on crime and justice (2nd ed.). Washington, DC: Bureau of Justice Statistics. 756 AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST Contents Editorial Board The Authors Hate Crimes and Ethnic Conflict: An Introduction The Persecution of Gypsies in Europe Aggressive Youth Cultures and Hate Crime: Skinheads and Xenophobic Youth in Germany The International Commission of Inquiry (Rwanda): Lessons and Observations From the Field Hate Crimes Hurt More Ethno-National Conflict and Hate Crime Renaming Violence The Birth and Maturation of Hate Crime Policy in the United States Consequences for Victims: A Comparison of Bias- and Non-Bias-Motivated Assaults Extremism and the Constitution: How America ’s Legal Evolution Affects the Response to Extremism 
work_gkximbmog5cxbmfphen4iaemae	----	Request unsuccessful. Incapsula incident ID: 482000390558938173-1694539193019140549 
work_glbth64cjjbw3fywn3g6bmknc4	----	Untitled Original Paper Intergroup Contact, COVID-19 News Consumption, and the Moderating Role of Digital Media Trust on Prejudice Toward Asians in the United States: Cross-Sectional Study Jiun-Yi Tsai1*, PhD; Joe Phua2*, PhD; Shuya Pan3, PhD; Chia-chen Yang4, PhD 1School of Communication, Northern Arizona University, Flagstaff, AZ, United States 2Grady College of Journalism and Mass Communication, University of Georgia, Athens, GA, United States 3School of Journalism and Communication, Renmin University of China, Beijing, China 4School of Educational Foundations, Leadership and Aviation, Oklahoma State University, Stillwater, OK, United States *these authors contributed equally Corresponding Author: Shuya Pan, PhD School of Journalism and Communication Renmin University of China No. 59 Zhongguancun Street, Haidian District Beijing, 100872 China Phone: 86 10 62511081 Email: shuya@ruc.edu.cn Abstract Background: The perceived threat of a contagious virus may lead people to be distrustful of immigrants and out-groups. Since the COVID-19 outbreak, the salient politicized discourses of blaming Chinese people for spreading the virus have fueled over 2000 reports of anti-Asian racial incidents and hate crimes in the United States. Objective: The study aims to investigate the relationships between news consumption, trust, intergroup contact, and prejudicial attitudes toward Asians and Asian Americans residing in the United States during the COVID-19 pandemic. We compare how traditional news, social media use, and biased news exposure cultivate racial attitudes, and the moderating role of media use and trust on prejudice against Asians is examined. Methods: A cross-sectional study was completed in May 2020. A total of 430 US adults (mean age 36.75, SD 11.49 years; n=258, 60% male) participated in an online survey through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk platform. Respondents answered questions related to traditional news exposure, social media use, perceived trust, and their top three news channels for staying informed about the novel coronavirus. In addition, intergroup contact and racial attitudes toward Asians were assessed. We performed hierarchical regression analyses to test the associations. Moderation effects were estimated using simple slopes testing with a 95% bootstrap confidence interval approach. Results: Participants who identified as conservatives (β=.08, P=.02), had a personal infection history (β=.10, P=.004), and interacted with Asian people frequently in their daily lives (β=.46, P<.001) reported more negative attitudes toward Asians after controlling for sociodemographic variables. Relying more on traditional news media (β=.08, P=.04) and higher levels of trust in social media (β=.13, P=.007) were positively associated with prejudice against Asians. In contrast, consuming news from left-leaning outlets (β=–.15, P=.001) and neutral outlets (β=–.13, P=.003) was linked to less prejudicial attitudes toward Asians. Among those who had high trust in social media, exposure had a negative relationship with prejudice. At high levels of trust in digital websites and apps, frequent use was related to less unfavorable attitudes toward Asians. Conclusions: Experiencing racial prejudice among the Asian population during a challenging pandemic can cause poor psychological outcomes and exacerbate health disparities. The results suggest that conservative ideology, personal infection history, frequency of intergroup contact, traditional news exposure, and trust in social media emerge as positive predictors of prejudice against Asians and Asian Americans, whereas people who get COVID-19 news from left-leaning and balanced outlets show less prejudice. For those who have more trust in social media and digital news, frequent use of these two sources is associated J Med Internet Res 2020 | vol. 22 | iss. 9 | e22767 | p. 1http://www.jmir.org/2020/9/e22767/ (page number not for citation purposes) Tsai et alJOURNAL OF MEDICAL INTERNET RESEARCH XSL•FO RenderX mailto:shuya@ruc.edu.cn http://www.w3.org/Style/XSL http://www.renderx.com/ with lower levels of prejudice. Our findings highlight the need to reshape traditional news discourses and use social media and mobile news apps to develop credible messages for combating racial prejudice against Asians. (J Med Internet Res 2020;22(9):e22767) doi: 10.2196/22767 KEYWORDS COVID-19; prejudice; news exposure; news trust; infodemic; media bias; racism; social media use; intergroup contact; regression; moderation analysis; cross-sectional survey Introduction Background Since the COVID-19 outbreak, the United States has become an epicenter, surpassing 5 million confirmed cases as of August 2020. The behavioral immune system theory posits that people’s tendency to avoid the risk of pathogen contagion is driven by cognitive and affective responses to informational cues [1-3]. Evidence supports that the perceived threat of a contagious virus will provoke strong aversive emotions, leading people to be distrustful of immigrants and out-groups [4,5]. Indeed, reports of anti-Asian racial incidents and hate crimes in the United States reached over 2000 since the term “Chinse virus” was used [6]. A national survey collected in March 2020 found 42% of US residents were likely to engage in discriminatory behaviors toward Asians because of their fear of the virus [7]. Relatedly, the Pew Research Center documented that 40% of Americans believed racial bias against Asians was more common than it was before the outbreak, and 31% of Asian Americans have experienced slurs or racist jokes since the pandemic [8]. Two psychological mechanisms are relevant in explaining the sharp increase in prejudice against out-groups when people cope with high levels of anxiety about infectious diseases. First, the contact hypothesis [9-11] postulates that positive face-to-face intergroup contact will improve out-group attitudes, contributing to prejudice reduction. Conversely, negative intergroup contact could elicit hostility toward out-groups. Because COVID-19 is transmitted through interpersonal interaction, the salience and magnitude of a perceived threat may result in either avoidance of Asians who are historically associated with diseases or hostile attitudes toward Asians [12]. Second, consuming information in news media and social media offers indirect forms of mediated or vicarious contact, thus shaping attitudes toward out-groups when people have minimal direct interaction with minority groups during shelter-in-place orders [13,14]. Early media coverage of the COVID-19 pandemic disproportionately focused on Chinese citizens’ consumption of raw bats and other wild animals [15]. Particularly on the internet, conspiracy theories and racist scapegoating of China arose, with widely shared articles, social media posts, and viral videos blaming Chinese people, and Asians in general, for their “dirty” and “unsanitary” eating habits [16]. At the same time, the US government officials’ politically consequential messages such as referring to the virus as Chinese virus were prevalent in national press briefings [17]. The constant coverage in mainstream news and sharing on social media likely heightened the salience of infection risk and the impression of Chinese and Asian people as a threat to health in the public’s mind. As a majority of Americans have been closely following COVID-19 news from legacy media, local news, and social media [18-21], the prevalent rhetoric blaming China and the negative racial stereotypes can play an influential role in activating prejudice against Asians [22,23]. To date, little research has linked the two aforementioned mechanisms to bias toward stigmatized groups in the context of a global pandemic. Based on a cross-sectional online survey of 430 participants, we jointly examined two psychological mechanisms underlying the activation of prejudice against Asians and Asian Americans in the United States during the COVID-19 pandemic: intergroup contact and indirect contact of media consumption. To reflect the hyper-choice and hyper-partisan news environment, we differentiated three functionally different concepts of media consumption: media use, media trust, and media bias. Next, we compared how traditional news, social media use, and news apps cultivated racial attitudes. Last, this research lent empirical support to the moderating role of media use and trust in prejudice against Asians. Together, the timeliness of our results will yield theoretical and practical insights into developing public health interventions for reducing racial discrimination linked to the COVID-19 pandemic. Intergroup Contact and Prejudice Literature on the behavioral immune system has documented that humans’ subjective risk perceptions of contagious diseases will trigger a series of cognitive, affective, and behavior mechanisms to avoid pathogen infection [1,2]. The tendency of pathogen avoidance is integral to coping with infectious diseases. The salience of disease threats is often activated by situational cues such as media reports of virus outbreaks and disgusting images, thereby triggering pathogen-avoidant cognitions and behavioral avoidance [3]. Empirical evidence shows that salient disease cues increase the tendency to avoid people who are potentially infectious [24]. Moreover, the activation of the behavior immune activity could motivate aversion and prejudicial attitudes toward out-groups, especially minority members historically associated with dirtiness and diseases [24]. In sum, disease threats can sensitize people to risks of intergroup contact with visibly stigmatized members. Despite a lower fatality rate than Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS) and Ebola, the SARS-CoV-2 virus has caused one of the highest death tolls worldwide, and there is still no vaccine available [25]. As the surges of confirmed COVID-19 cases continue to dominate US media attention, the salience and magnitude of the perceived threat is heightened. The sensitivity of intergroup risks activated by constant rhetorical cues of blaming Chinese people can possibly explain J Med Internet Res 2020 | vol. 22 | iss. 9 | e22767 | p. 2http://www.jmir.org/2020/9/e22767/ (page number not for citation purposes) Tsai et alJOURNAL OF MEDICAL INTERNET RESEARCH XSL•FO RenderX http://dx.doi.org/10.2196/22767 http://www.w3.org/Style/XSL http://www.renderx.com/ an increase in prejudice against Asians. Through three online experiments, Huang et al [4] found that participants felt more negative about immigrants after reading a news report about the 2009 swine flu health risks and shortage of vaccine supply. Kim et al [26] conducted a national sample survey of 1000 American adults during the 2014 Ebola outbreak. Findings concluded that vulnerable people had more generalized xenophobia. Given that emotional attitudes toward out-groups are more closely related to subsequent discriminatory behaviors, we focus on affective feelings about Asians as a proxy for measuring prejudice [27]. Role of Media Use, Trust, and Source Bias in Out-Group Attitudes In addition to serving as situational cues to activate aversion of minority groups, news reports offer indirect mediated contact that possibly shapes prejudice toward ethnic minorities [13,14]. Different from prior research, we differentiate three functionally different concepts of news consumption: modalities of media use, media trust, and media bias. We further offer an overview of how each concept relates to negative attitudes toward out-groups. Decades of cultivation theory and news framing research have proved the direct influence of using traditional media, mostly newspapers and TV newscasts, on cultivating audiences’ prejudicial views of out-groups [28]. Persistent stereotypical media coverage of a particular racial group would result in prejudicial beliefs toward individuals of such group. For instance, Dixon [29] found that network TV news exposure resulted in more stereotypical views and negative perceptions of African Americans. Another study [30] examined racialized news framing of President Barack Obama, suggesting that exposure to negative frames about Obama activated underlying prejudicial beliefs and biased evaluations of African Americans in general. Likewise, negative TV portrayals of out-groups such as refugees increased prejudicial attitudes toward refugees based on experimental designs [14]. Therefore, the traditional news coverage of politicized COVID-19 discourses placing blame on China, along with the labeling of the disease as a “Chinese virus” or a “Wuhan virus,” might have a negative impact on racial perceptions and stereotypes of Asian Americans and Asians in general, leading to prejudice against them [22,23]. Although the aforementioned studies are insightful, relying on one average scale to measure individuals’ exposure to traditional media outlets (eg, print newspaper and TV) limits our understanding of how American audiences receive information from hyper-choice, hyper-partisan, networked news environments [13,14,23,29]. The average index approach assumes that modalities of news media consumption associate out-group attitudes equally. However, it is conceivable that different information channels emphasize distinct coverage of the pandemic and differ in the prevalence of anti-Asian discourses. Moreover, it remains unclear how the use of social media and digital outlets might be related to differential attitudes toward out-groups. In addition to the well-documented influence of traditional media exposure on prejudice, the role of social media and digital outlets in shaping users’ views of ethnic minorities cannot be overlooked. Social media was and is an essential source for coping with the MERS outbreak and the ongoing pandemic [31-33]. At the same time, political leaders’ antiminority sentiment tended to circulate widely on social media platforms, contributing to an increase of hate crimes toward minority groups such as Muslims [34]. Although social media provides real-time updates and personally relevant feeds that might reinforce audience’s pre-existing biases, users are more likely to be susceptible to misinformation and racially offensive comments [16,20]. Analysis of 2.8 million COVID-19–related English tweets from February and March 2020 revealed that one of the top topics involved racist attacks and rude comments against East Asians [21]. Budhwani and Sun [35] found that tweets containing “Chinese virus” or “China virus” increased ten-fold after political leaders used the insensitive terms on Twitter. However, findings on linking social media use with attitudes toward stereotyped groups remain inconclusive. One study surveying US college students revealed no significant relationship between getting news from social media and prejudice toward undocumented immigrants [36]. In contrast, one recent online survey showed that believing in social media news was positively associated with the perceptions that American identity and the economic situation were threatened by the presence of Chinese people [37]. To address this gap, we will examine how stereotypes propagated on social media and online news may associate with prejudice toward Asians. Media trust and media use are correlated but conceptually different [38]. A worldwide survey showed that traditional news exposure correlated positively with trust in TV and newspapers, whereas online news use was negatively associated with trust in traditional media [39]. Put differently, when people cope with the evolving situation of COVID-19, not all media types will be trusted equally and have a universal association with activating perceptions of racial stereotypes and prejudicial attitudes. In an increasingly fragmented and polarized media environment, we argue that media use and trust in each information source should be measured separately to generate valid conclusions about their distinct relationships with prejudice. To our knowledge, scant literature has investigated media use and trust simultaneously, nor have they probed the moderation role of viewers’ trust in each medium in the exposure-prejudice relationship. Since the outbreak, the use of TV news, online media, and social media sources grew substantially. At the same time, US public trust in news has hit a new low point. Only 29% of American showed trust in news overall in 2020, a significant decrease of 9% compared to 2017, and 14% of them trusted news from social media [40]. The public might trust legacy media more than social media because of journalists’ gatekeeping function and reporting accuracy [17,19,20]. Considering the polarization in US newspaper and TV network coverage of COVID-19 [41] and the partisan nature of news trust [42], exploring the moderating role of media trust in determining the direction of the influence of media use on prejudicial attitudes is vital. Last, relying on conservative or liberal media could also be a significant determinant of negative attitudes toward out-groups. An online survey with 422 Italians demonstrated a positive relationship between exposure to right wing newspapers and J Med Internet Res 2020 | vol. 22 | iss. 9 | e22767 | p. 3http://www.jmir.org/2020/9/e22767/ (page number not for citation purposes) Tsai et alJOURNAL OF MEDICAL INTERNET RESEARCH XSL•FO RenderX http://www.w3.org/Style/XSL http://www.renderx.com/ TV newscasts, and prejudice against immigrants after controlling for participants’ political ideology. Conversely, using left-leaning news outlets showed a negative association with prejudice [43]. Guided by the behavioral immune system theory [1-5], associated outcomes of prejudice toward out-group members [24-26], and the intergroup contact hypothesis (H) [9-12], we expect that salient perceived risks of contracting COVID-19 when interacting with Asians will positively be related to prejudice. • H1: The frequency of direct intergroup contact will be positively associated with prejudicial attitudes toward Asians. As no prior research distinguishes how modalities of news, news trust, and media bias relate to virus-activated prejudice, we propose the following research questions (RQs): • RQ1: How will media use, media trust, and media bias be associated with prejudicial attitudes toward Asians? • RQ2: How will media trust moderate the relationship between media use and prejudicial attitudes toward Asians? Methods Participants and Procedure In May 2020, we recruited participants from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (Mturk) program, a dominant internet-based platform for gathering online samples in behavioral science fields [44]. A short description containing the research title, keywords, and expected completion time was generated in a coauthor’s Mturk account. Interested participants clicked on an external link that rerouted them to take the Qualtrics survey. Upon completion, the Mturk program generated a random code for participants to receive compensation. The Mturk subject pools demonstrate proven advantages of being more attentive than collegiate populations [44]. Although the representativeness of Mturk samples raise some concerns, Levay et al [45] concluded that Mturk respondents’ attitudes toward social issues did not differ fundamentally from the random sample of the American National Election Studies after controlling for key demographics. Similarly, Mturk samples can generate data quality comparable to representative samples [46]. Moreover, Mturk’s recruitment speed is excellent for study designs that depend on current social events [47]. For instance, Park et al [48] used Mturk samples to study American adults’ information channel preferences during the 2016 Zika virus outbreak. Given that confirmed cases in the United States has surged since March 2020, Mturk samples are suitable for our objectives because of the ability to collect how individuals relied on legacy news and social media to cope with the global pandemic in a naturalistic setting. To determine the required sample size to achieve desired statistical power, we performed an a priori estimate using G*Power version 3.1 (Heinrich-Heine-Universität Düsseldorf) before data collection [49]. A medium regression effect size (R2=0.13) with 99% power and 18 predictors indicated a minimum sample of 275 [50]. To ensure the quality of study results, we limited the sample to people residing in the United States. Only participants who passed attention check questions were included in the analysis, yielding a final sample of 430 (mean age 36.75, SD 11.49 years; n=258, 60% male). The majority of participants were White (n=344, 80%), married (n=313, 72.8%), employed full-time (n=318, 74%), and had received Bachelor’s degrees (n=267, 62.1%), and 11.4% (n=49) reported having been infected by COVID-19. More than half of the participants (n=224, 52.1%) indicated their family income has been impacted by the outbreak. Table 1 summarizes demographic characteristics of the sample. J Med Internet Res 2020 | vol. 22 | iss. 9 | e22767 | p. 4http://www.jmir.org/2020/9/e22767/ (page number not for citation purposes) Tsai et alJOURNAL OF MEDICAL INTERNET RESEARCH XSL•FO RenderX http://www.w3.org/Style/XSL http://www.renderx.com/ Table 1. Demographics of survey participants (N=430). ParticipantsVariables 36.75 (11.49)Age (years), mean (SD) 258 (60.0)Male, n (%) Education, n (%) 15 (3.5)High school or less 50 (11.6)Some college 267 (62.1)Bachelor’s degree 98 (22.8)Postgraduate Racea, n (%) 344 (80.0)White 52 (12.1)Black or African American 34 (7.9)Hispanic and Latino 9 (2.1)Other Marital status, n (%) 313 (72.8)Married or domestic partnership 100 (23.3)Single 17 (3.9)Other Employment, n (%) 318 (74)Employed, ≥40 hours per week 77 (17.9)Employed, <40 hours per week 35 (8.1)Other 224 (52.1)Family income impacted, n (%) 4.08 (2.13)Political ideology, mean (SD) 49 (11.4)Personal infection of COVID-19, n (%) aParticipants could select one or more self-identified races. The Institutional Review Board office of Renmin University of China approved the research protocol, and responses were collected via Qualtrics software (Qualtrics International Inc). The first author at a US university in the southwest was provided with an anonymized data set containing no identifiable private information connected to participants. Ethics exemptions were obtained at coauthors’ institutions before launching the survey. At the beginning of the survey, the respondents agreed to participate in the research voluntarily for receiving compensation. Next, respondents answered questions related to traditional news exposure, social media use, perceived trust, and their top three news channels for staying informed about the novel coronavirus. In addition, the frequency of intergroup contact and racial attitudes toward Asians were assessed. The survey took approximately 16 minutes to complete (mean 15.95, SD 39.34 minutes). Measures Intergroup Contact We used a common measure [13,37,51] to assess the frequency of direct intergroup contact on a 7-point scale: “How much contact do you have with Asian people (a) at work; (b) as neighbors; (c) as close friends?” (1=none at all, 7=a great deal; Cronbach α=.88, mean 4.11, SD 1.63). Media Use Respondents rated how often they get news about COVID-19 from five traditional sources including print newspaper or magazine, radio, local TV, national network television, and cable TV on a 4-point scale with endpoints labeled “never” and “often” (Cronbach α=.72, mean 2.80, SD 0.64). Two single 4-point scales measured social media use (mean 3.12, SD 0.88) and news websites or app use (mean 3.10, SD 0.83). Media Trust To gauge different levels of media trust in news sources, we asked participants to indicate how much they trust information about COVID-19 from the aforementioned media outlets (1=not at all, 7=very much) [38]. Trust in traditional media demonstrated good internal consistency (Cronbach α=.86, mean 4.83, SD 1.20). Two single items were measured: social media trust (mean 4.72, SD 1.67) and trust in websites or apps (mean 5.20, SD 1.26). J Med Internet Res 2020 | vol. 22 | iss. 9 | e22767 | p. 5http://www.jmir.org/2020/9/e22767/ (page number not for citation purposes) Tsai et alJOURNAL OF MEDICAL INTERNET RESEARCH XSL•FO RenderX http://www.w3.org/Style/XSL http://www.renderx.com/ Media Bias Exposure to biased news sources was assessed by asking respondents to select the top three news channels they frequently visited for gathering COVID-19 news. We obtained a list of 31 popular news brands across a wide range of platforms from the Pew Research Center’s survey of US media polarization and the 2020 election [52]. We then determined the political leanings of each news channel based on ratings provided by AllSides [53]. AllSides employs multiple methods to identify comprehensive media bias ratings for 600 media outlets. Next, we used a 5-point scale to represent each source’s ideological placement of left (-2), lean left (-1), center (0), lean right (+1) and right (+2). Exposure to left-leaning sources was calculated by taking the absolute value of the sum of selected channels’ bias ratings (mean 1.62, SD 1.05, range 0-5). Exposure to centrist news was calculated by the raw counts that neutral or balanced outlets were selected by each participant (mean 0.73, SD 0.71, range 0-3). Lastly, exposure to right-leaning media was measured by adding up selected sources’ bias scores (mean 0.70, SD 0.87, range 0-4) Prejudicial Attitudes We modified a measure from [54] to assess prejudicial attitudes toward Asians. The question was rephrased as “Since the COVID-19 outbreak, how much have you felt the following toward Asian people in general?” Respondents indicated, from 1 “not at all” to 7 “very much,” seven negative feelings: (1) jealousy, (2) anger, (3) resentment, (4) discomfort, (5) hatred, (6) despise, and (7) shame. These items formed a reliable scale with higher values representing higher levels of prejudice toward Asians (Cronbach α=.97, mean 3.61, SD 1.83). The phrasing of “since the COVID-19 outbreak” was included to set a standard time frame as a basis for participants to respond to news consumption and disease-linked attitudes. Using specific and concrete wording is a recommended practice for survey designs [55]. Specifying a consistent time frame allowed us to pinpoint the relationships between people’s exposure and trust in COVID-19 news and negative feelings toward Asians during the pandemic. Controls As news consumption is associated with sociodemographic variables, we measured common characteristics for statistical control [13,37,43]. Respondents reported demographic characteristics including age, gender (1=male, 0=female), educational attainment, ethnicity (1=White, 0=others), marital status (1=married or domestic partnership, 0=others), and employment status (1=full-time, 0=others). Personal infection of COVID-19 was measured with one dichotomous item (1=yes, 0=no). Lastly, we measured political ideology on a 7-point scale from 1 “very liberal” to 7 “very conservative” (mean 4.08, SD 2.13). Statistical Analysis Table 2 summarizes bivariate correlations of continuous variables. Next, we performed four-step hierarchical linear regression analyses using SPSS version 26 (IBM Corp) to predict prejudicial attitudes toward Asians since the COVID-19 spread. All variance inflation factor scores among predictor variables were less than 3, indicating there was no multicollinearity. The first models included respondents’ demographic characteristics and history of personal infection as controls. In the second model, we investigated the main effect of direct intergroup contact to test H1. To answer RQ1, media use, trust in each channel, and exposure to news sources with political leanings were entered in the third model. To explore RQ2, we used mean-centered media use and mean-centered trust scores to compute three separate interaction terms, which were then included in the fourth model. Interaction terms were created by multiplying use of a given medium by trust in the given medium. Subsequently, we conducted significant tests of simple slopes with a 95% bootstrap confidence interval approach in Mplus version 8 (Muthén & Muthén). Moderation effects were tested by creating 5000 bootstrap samples. Such an approach is recommended because it leads to less-inflated type I error rates and provides coverage of confidence intervals [56,57]. J Med Internet Res 2020 | vol. 22 | iss. 9 | e22767 | p. 6http://www.jmir.org/2020/9/e22767/ (page number not for citation purposes) Tsai et alJOURNAL OF MEDICAL INTERNET RESEARCH XSL•FO RenderX http://www.w3.org/Style/XSL http://www.renderx.com/ Table 2. Bivariate correlations with P values. 1110987654321Variables 1. Intergroup contact 0.64–0.010.03–0.120.310.480.420.060.110.441r <.001.84.60.01<.001<.001<.001.24.03<.001—aP value 2. Traditional media use 0.340.040.01–0.030.400.500.660.210.3810.44r <.001.46.86.61<.001<.001<.001<.001<.001—<.001P value 3. Social media use 0.07–0.06–0.090.080.200.450.250.1610.380.11r .16.24.06.10<.001<.001<.001.001—<.001.03P value 4. Websites or apps use –0.040.02–0.020.100.300.070.2110.160.210.06r .40.72.72.048<.001<.001<.001—.001<.001.24P value 5. Traditional media trust 0.31–0.130.050.030.560.5110.210.250.660.42r <.001.008.28.53<.001<.001—<.001<.001<.001<.001P value 6. Social media trust 0.43–0.02–0.03–0.060.4410.510.070.450.500.48r <.001.74.53.23<.001—<.001<.001<.001<.001<.001P value 7. Websites or app trust 0.21–0.090.030.0510.440.560.300.200.400.31r <.001.06.54.29—<.001<.001<.001<.001<.001<.001P value 8. Left-leaning –0.18–0.37–0.4510.05–0.060.030.100.08–0.03–0.12r <.001<.001<.001—.29.23.53.048.10.61.01P value 9. Centrist –0.07–0.211–0.450.03–0.030.05–0.02–0.090.010.03r .15<.001—<.001.54.53.28.72.06.86.60P value 10. Right-leaning 0.051–0.21–0.37–0.09–0.02–0.130.02–0.060.04–0.01r .30—<.001<.001.06.74.008.72.24.46.84P value 11. Prejudice 10.05–0.07–0.180.210.430.31–0.040.070.340.64r —.30.15<.001<.001<.001<.001.40.16<.001<.001P value aNot applicable. Results Table 3 presents the results of the hierarchical regression models predicting prejudicial attitudes toward Asians. Demographic variables and COVID-19 infection history significantly explained 25% of the variance in prejudice (F8,421=17.65, P<.001). Specifically, participants who were married (β=.13, P=.001), held conservative beliefs (β=.08, P=.02), and had a personal infection (β=.10, P=.004) reported more negative attitudes toward Asians. J Med Internet Res 2020 | vol. 22 | iss. 9 | e22767 | p. 7http://www.jmir.org/2020/9/e22767/ (page number not for citation purposes) Tsai et alJOURNAL OF MEDICAL INTERNET RESEARCH XSL•FO RenderX http://www.w3.org/Style/XSL http://www.renderx.com/ Table 3. Hierarchical regression analysis predicting prejudicial attitudes toward Asians since COVID-19 (N=430). P valueModel 4b, βP valueModel 3b, βP valueModel 2, βP valueModel 1a, βVariables .54–.02.18–.05.11–.06.001–.15Age .19–.05.10–.06.11–.06.87.01Male .60.02.29.04.29.04.001.15Education .40–.03.46–.03.62–.02.14–.06White .001.13<.001.14<.001.18<.001.27Married .90–.01.83–.01.73.01.15.06Employed full-time .02.08.04.08.01.09.001.14Political ideology .004.10.001.12<.001.13<.001.23Personal infection <.001.46<.001.47<.001.55N/AN/AcIntergroup contact Media use .04.08.04.09N/AN/AN/AN/ATraditional media .06–.06.16–.05N/AN/AN/AN/ASocial media .13–.06.16–.05N/AN/AN/AN/AWebsites or apps Media trust .36.05.59.03N/AN/AN/AN/ATraditional media .007.13.005.14N/AN/AN/AN/ASocial media .26–.05.60–.02N/AN/AN/AN/AWebsites or apps Media sources .001–.15.001–.16N/AN/AN/AN/ALeft-leaning .003–.13.003–.14N/AN/AN/AN/ACentrist .52–.03.35–.04N/AN/AN/AN/ARight-leaning Interaction .57–.02N/AN/AN/AN/AN/AN/ATraditional media use * trust .003–.12N/AN/AN/AN/AN/AN/ASocial media use * trust <.001–.13N/AN/AN/AN/AN/AN/AWebsites/apps use * trust <.0010.56<.0010.53<.0010.49<.0010.25R 2 <.0010.03<.0010.04<.0010.24N/AN/AR2 change aStandardized beta coefficients (β) are reported. bIn models 3 and 4, scores of media use and trust are mean-centered. cN/A: not applicable. Turning to the first hypothesis, we found a positive association between intergroup contact and prejudice (β=.46, P<.001) after controlling for demographic characteristics, supporting H1. Respondents who interacted with Asian people frequently in their daily lives were more inclined to hold unfavorable attitudes toward Asians. For RQ1, media use, trust, and reliance on biased sources showed significantly divergent relationships with prejudicial attitudes toward Asians (R2 change 0.04, F18,411=25.23, P<.001). Reading print newspapers and watching TV newscasts about COVID-19 was positively associated with higher levels of prejudice (β=.08, P=.04). Regarding the main effects of media trust, the results suggested that the more people trusted news circulated on social media, the higher their prejudicial attitudes were (β=.13, P=.007). Trust in traditional media and digital channels had no significant associations with negative feelings about Asians. Notably, relying on liberal media (β=–.15, P=.001) and balanced news sources (β=–.13, P=.003) for staying informed about the COVID-19 epidemic was significantly associated with lower levels of negative attitudes toward Asians. The second RQ explored whether news trust moderated the relationship between media use and prejudice against Asians. Interaction terms explained a 3% increase in variance in prejudice (R2 change 0.03, F21,408=24.33, P<.001). The interaction term of trust and social media use was statistically significant (β=–.12, P=.003). We also found a similar significant J Med Internet Res 2020 | vol. 22 | iss. 9 | e22767 | p. 8http://www.jmir.org/2020/9/e22767/ (page number not for citation purposes) Tsai et alJOURNAL OF MEDICAL INTERNET RESEARCH XSL•FO RenderX http://www.w3.org/Style/XSL http://www.renderx.com/ interaction effect of websites and apps trust and use on prejudice (β=–.13, P<.001). To explore how variation in media trust changes the relationship between use of social media or digital news and prejudice, we conducted simple slopes analyses. As depicted in Figure 1, the negative relationship between social media use and prejudicial attitudes was significantly greater among participants who had higher levels of trust in social media news, when compared to those with medium and low trust in social media (unstandardized simple slope –0.36, 95% CI –0.61 to –0.12). Additionally, Figure 2 illustrates that, at high levels of trust in online websites and mobile apps, frequent use of digital media was related to less unfavorable attitudes toward Asians (unstandardized simple slope for high trust –0.35, 95% CI –0.56 to –0.14). Figure 1. Interaction plot showing predicted values of prejudicial attitudes toward Asians as a function of social media use and trust in social media. J Med Internet Res 2020 | vol. 22 | iss. 9 | e22767 | p. 9http://www.jmir.org/2020/9/e22767/ (page number not for citation purposes) Tsai et alJOURNAL OF MEDICAL INTERNET RESEARCH XSL•FO RenderX http://www.w3.org/Style/XSL http://www.renderx.com/ Figure 2. Interaction plot showing predicted values of prejudicial attitudes toward Asians as a function of websites/apps use and trust in websites/apps. Discussion Principal Findings Drawing from the behavioral immune system theory, intergroup relations, and media psychology literature, this study is a novel attempt to investigate the joint mechanisms of direct intergroup contact and mediated contact offered by diverse news sources on associating with prejudicial attitudes toward Asians during the COVID-19 outbreak. In accordance with previous studies [1-5,7,9-13,24,26], participants who subscribed to conservative beliefs, had personal COVID-19 infection history, and interacted with Asian people frequently in their daily lives reported more negative attitudes toward Asians after controlling for sociodemographic variables. It might be plausible that people with conservative beliefs are more wary of China’s influence, making them more likely to blame visible targets with Asian-looking features during the pandemic. Importantly, the medium effect size between intergroup contact and prejudice underscores the role of direct social interaction in relating to people’s out-group attitudes triggered by pandemic threats. As expected, human tendency to avoid contagious diseases will stimulate aversive emotions when interacting with minorities explicitly associated with spreading COVID-19. Frequent contact with stigmatized Asian members during the pandemic might increase perceived risks of contracting the virus and, thus, link to negative attitudes. We empirically examined the associations between three forms of indirect mediated contact and prejudice. The findings reveal the divergent role of news exposure, trust, and political-leaning media in racial attitudes when political orientation and intergroup contact are controlled for. Relying more on traditional news media was positively related to prejudice toward Asians, supporting the TV news’ capability to activate or reinforce prevalent racial stereotypes [28-30]. In line with a current report [40], the survey participants watched more national, local, and cable television news rather than receiving information from print media. The positive association can be mostly driven by the fact that TV newscasts live streaming the President’s daily press briefings increased viewers’ firsthand exposure to the China-blaming discourses. Participants tend to hold unfavorable attitudes toward negatively portrayed groups on TV because repeated exposure to such politicized messages makes accessible the audiences’ cognitive schemas of associating Asians or Chinese immigrants with disease threats during an unfamiliar pandemic [41,58]. J Med Internet Res 2020 | vol. 22 | iss. 9 | e22767 | p. 10http://www.jmir.org/2020/9/e22767/ (page number not for citation purposes) Tsai et alJOURNAL OF MEDICAL INTERNET RESEARCH XSL•FO RenderX http://www.w3.org/Style/XSL http://www.renderx.com/ Regression results suggest habitual selections of news outlets with ideological leanings are a more driven factor than the modalities of media in associating with disease-activated racial attitudes. Consuming news from left-leaning and neutral outlets was associated with less prejudicial attitudes toward Asians holding other factors constant. Journalistic powerhouses with liberal and centrist perspectives are more critical of the current administration’s effort in curbing the pandemic and attribute the blame to uncoordinated policy responses at all levels of governments. Although conservative news such as Fox and liberal outlets such as CNN shared similar keyword use of mentioning China and the novel virus, a recent study found CNN news stories featured more scientific statements from Dr Anthony Fauci and Dr Deborah Birx, and emphasized more protective responses such as social distancing and lockdowns than their conservative counterparts did [59]. Liberal and centrist media’s emphasis on scientific evidence and prevention strategies possibly explains why those relying on these sources for COVID-19 news hold less prejudice and perceived threats by the presence of Asians. It is worth highlighting the positive link between social media trust and prejudice. Trust in social media was positively associated with prejudicial attitudes toward Asians. The nature of filter algorithms and selective exposure patterns might afford social media users to be exposed to or spread unfiltered discriminating language about Asians. Using social media as news sources increases users’ probability to encounter trending anti-Asian sentiment, even when users do not actively seek such information. People tend to trust information created and shared by friends and family members within homogenous networks [60]. Recent studies [21,35,61] found that hate speech and racist attacks against Asians sharply increased on Twitter after the World Health Organization recognized COVID-19 as a global pandemic in mid-March. Common tweet keywords associated with China were eating habits, animals, virus, blame, and cause, echoing the China-blaming discourses [35,61]. Therefore, the more people trust social media (and thus the stigmatizing comments in this channel), the more likely they would perceive Asian people as the major responsible party for spreading the virus, thereby triggering negative attitudes. Notably, this study contributes to existing literature by identifying trust in social media and digital websites and apps as a boundary condition of the news exposure-prejudice relationship. Among those who used social media infrequently, those who trusted social media more reported higher prejudice against Asians than those who trusted social media less. However, this difference became less pronounced among heavy users. Likewise, for those who had high levels of trust in digital websites and apps, frequent use was related to less unfavorable attitudes toward Asians. It could be possible that heavy users of social media and digital news have advanced media literacy of filter algorithms, equipping them with higher efficacy to move beyond personalized feeds and search for less politicized information and diverse perspectives. In other words, frequent use of social media and digital sources buffers the relationship between trust in social media and digital apps, and prejudice linked to COVID-19. Together, these results suggest that researchers should consider using nuanced measures of media exposure, media trust, and media bias to generate more accurate conclusions. In a hyper-choice networked news environment, Americans’ use of and trust in traditional media, social media, and well-known news brands with distinct political leanings have more complex relationships with their disease-ignited prejudice toward minority groups than previously assumed. Limitations and Future Directions We acknowledge limitations of this study. First, the self-selected sample might reflect respondents’ heightened concerns about COVID-19–related topics. In addition, the cross-sectional study did not guarantee the causal effects of intergroup contact and news use on influencing racial attitudes. Hence, it is possible that participants who held negative views about the Chinese government or Chinese people selected to consume anti-Asian coverage on traditional outlets and social media because those news reports confirmed their existing viewpoints. Given our correlational findings, longitudinal studies will expand upon the results to establish the causal relationships. Second, the study did not directly measure the prevalence of anti-Asian discourses circulated via all media outlets since the major outbreak in the United States. However, a recent study analyzing Google Trends data between December 2019 to March 2020 showed that the “Chinese virus” rhetoric has led to a sharp increase in search rates for anti-Chinese slurs. Therefore, we can confidently infer that an increase in search rates reflected trending news reports and social media discussion related to anti-Asian sentiment and racist attacks [16]. First, in light of these limitations, future research should content analyze the prevalence of anti-Asian sentiment on different types of media and correlate with public attitudes to replicate these findings. Second, as citizens can access the same news content from multiple modalities, conventional categorizations of media use might not capture a full picture of people’s news consumption. A granular examination of website-tracking data to pinpoint what types of news coverage individuals frequently visit for coping with the pandemic will be informative. Last, future inquiries can compare the influence of negative portrayals of Asians circulated through traditional media and social networking sites on out-group attitudes and behavioral avoidance using experimental designs. Conclusions Experiencing racial discrimination among the Asian population during a challenging pandemic could cause poor psychological outcomes and exacerbate health disparities [62]. The results suggest that conservative ideology, personal infection history, intergroup contact, traditional news exposure, and trust in social media positively associate with prejudice against Asians and Asian Americans. Conversely, relying on left-leaning and balanced news outlets is related to less prejudice. For those who have more trust in social media and digital news, frequent use of these two sources is associated with lower levels of prejudice. This research highlights the urgent need to reshape part of the traditional news discourses. Emphasizing scientific evidence and political institutions’ responsibility for creating effective solutions rather than placing the blame on ethnic minorities will decrease the citizens’ perceptions of infection threats, thereby reducing disease-related racial prejudice. It is also critical for J Med Internet Res 2020 | vol. 22 | iss. 9 | e22767 | p. 11http://www.jmir.org/2020/9/e22767/ (page number not for citation purposes) Tsai et alJOURNAL OF MEDICAL INTERNET RESEARCH XSL•FO RenderX http://www.w3.org/Style/XSL http://www.renderx.com/ public health organizations to leverage social media and mobile news apps for developing credible messages to combat racial discrimination against Asians linked to the COVID-19 pandemic. Acknowledgments This project is supported by the fundamental research funds for the Central Universities and the research funds of Renmin University of China (Project Number: 18XNB006). 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[doi: 10.2105/ajph.2020.305698] Abbreviations H: hypothesis MERS: Middle East respiratory syndrome Mturk: Mechanical Turk RQ: research question J Med Internet Res 2020 | vol. 22 | iss. 9 | e22767 | p. 14http://www.jmir.org/2020/9/e22767/ (page number not for citation purposes) Tsai et alJOURNAL OF MEDICAL INTERNET RESEARCH XSL•FO RenderX http://dx.doi.org/10.3758/s13428-015-0578-z http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=25761395&dopt=Abstract http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/2158244016636433 http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/psrm.2018.28 http://people.bu.edu/dinopc/papers/mturkpanels.pdf http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.pubrev.2019.05.015 http://dx.doi.org/10.3758/BRM.41.4.1149 http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=19897823&dopt=Abstract http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/aap0000107 https://www.journalism.org/2020/01/24/u-s-media-polarization-and-the-2020-election-a-nation-divided/ https://www.journalism.org/2020/01/24/u-s-media-polarization-and-the-2020-election-a-nation-divided/ https://www.allsides.com/media-bias/media-bias-ratings http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/ijop.12229 http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=26511584&dopt=Abstract http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00273171.2017.1309261 http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=28463014&dopt=Abstract http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00273170701341316 http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=26821081&dopt=Abstract http://europepmc.org/abstract/MED/17544189 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2007.04.022 http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=17544189&dopt=Abstract https://mediacloud.org/news/2020/4/3/coverage-of-covid-19-and-political-partisanship-comparing-across-nations https://mediacloud.org/news/2020/4/3/coverage-of-covid-19-and-political-partisanship-comparing-across-nations http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jcc4.12185 https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S2589-5370(20)30116-4 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.eclinm.2020.100372 http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=32368725&dopt=Abstract http://dx.doi.org/10.2105/ajph.2020.305698 http://www.w3.org/Style/XSL http://www.renderx.com/ Edited by G Eysenbach; submitted 22.07.20; peer-reviewed by N Martin, O Anikeeva; comments to author 12.08.20; revised version received 26.08.20; accepted 12.09.20; published 25.09.20 Please cite as: Tsai JY, Phua J, Pan S, Yang CC Intergroup Contact, COVID-19 News Consumption, and the Moderating Role of Digital Media Trust on Prejudice Toward Asians in the United States: Cross-Sectional Study J Med Internet Res 2020;22(9):e22767 URL: http://www.jmir.org/2020/9/e22767/ doi: 10.2196/22767 PMID: 32924948 ©Jiun-Yi Tsai, Joe Phua, Shuya Pan, Chia-Chen Yang. Originally published in the Journal of Medical Internet Research (http://www.jmir.org), 25.09.2020. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work, first published in the Journal of Medical Internet Research, is properly cited. The complete bibliographic information, a link to the original publication on http://www.jmir.org/, as well as this copyright and license information must be included. 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work_gmb36gxfzzednfzkm45hszjnam	----	EDITORIAL E D I T O R I A L MARK HILL The legal status of the Church of England, and its idiosyncratic relationship with the state, is anomalous not merely in a global perspective but in relation to other churches in the United Kingdom, including autonomous provinces of the Anglican Communion in Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. But the nature of establishment and its wider consequences are not fully understood. It will be recalled that the Court of Appeal fell into error in the Aston Cantlow litigation in finding that a parochial church council was a public authority for the purposes of the Human Rights Act 1998, basing its assessment principally upon the fact that the Church of England is an established church.1 The House of Lords (Lord Scott of Foscote dissenting in part) unanimously rejected both the reasoning and conclusions of the Court of Appeal.2 This is how Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead put it: Historically the Church of England has discharged an important and influ- ential role in the life of this country. As the established church it still has special links with central government. But the Church of England remains essentially a religious organization. This is so even though some of the emanations of the church discharge functions which may qualify as gov- ernmental. Church schools and the conduct of marriage services are two instances. The legislative powers of the General Synod of the Church of England are another. This should not be regarded as infecting the Church of England as a whole, or its emanations in general, with the char- acter of a governmental organization.3 Lord Hope of Craighead recognised that the Church of England as a whole has no legal status or personality, but that its relationship with the state is one of rec- ognition, not the devolution to it of any of the powers or functions of govern- ment. Lord Rodger of Earlsferry stated that ‘the juridical nature of the Church is, notoriously, somewhat amorphous’ but considered that the mission of the Church is a religious mission, distinct from the secular mission of the 1 Aston Cantlow Parochial Church Council v Wallbank [2001] 2 All ER 363, CA. 2 Parochial Church Council of Aston Cantlow v Wallbank [2004] 1 AC 546; [2003] 3 All ER 1213; (2004) 7 Ecc LJ 364, HL. 3 Per Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead at para 13. (2007) 9 Ecc LJ 1–4 # The Ecclesiastical Law Society doi: 10.1017/S0956618X07000014 1 terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0956618X07000014 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:28, subject to the Cambridge Core https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/S0956618X07000014 https://www.cambridge.org/core government, whether central or local. The ties with the state are intended to accomplish the Church’s own mission, not the aims and objectives of govern- ment. He concluded that the parochial church council exists to carry forward the Church’s mission at the local level. Were it to be otherwise, and the com- ponent institutions of the Church of England classified as public authorities, then, by virtue of the way the Human Rights Act is drafted, those institutions would lose the status of victim, preventing them from complaining of any viola- tion of Convention rights, including that of freedom of religion. This would be an extraordinary conclusion since, as Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead remarked, the Human Rights Act went out of its way in section 13 to single out for express mention the exercise by religious organisations of the Convention right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. The status of ecclesiastical law as part of the law of the land is also of import- ance. Since the Church of England legislates by Measure and since such Measures are classified under the Act as primary legislation,4 they are to be inter- preted, wherever possible, in a manner compatible with Convention rights. This applies also to subordinate legislation, such as Rules and Statutory Instruments. It was therefore a little surprising that, when the Lord Chancellor spoke to the Ecclesiastical Law Society’s Annual Conference on 1 April 2006, he confessed that he was unaware that Church of England Measures were primary legislation. Whilst candour and honesty are endearing characteristics for a cabinet minister, and considered by many to be in short supply, it is of some concern that the Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs should know so little about the state of affairs of the constitution. I note, parenthetically, that the quality of the speeches delivered in the Aston Cantlow case (or in any other case heard by the Judicial Committee of the House of Lords) would not have been any better (or indeed different) had the Lords of Appeal in Ordinary been re-styled Supreme Court Justices and re-located from the Palace of Westminster to Middlesex Guildhall. The adage ‘if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it’ is particularly pertinent when the cost is substantial and the current unmet financial needs of the criminal and civil justice systems are immense and growing. Of more concern, however, was the fact that the Lord Chancellor confessed to having no knowledge that his government had recently passed legislation empowering government ministers by order to amend, repeal or revoke Measures of the Church of England and any orders, regulations or other instru- ments made by virtue of such Measures. For indeed, tucked away in the dark recesses of the Civil Partnership Act 2004, are two sections which run contrary to the emergent autonomy of the Church of England and to the principles of self- determination which have their origin in the Church of England Assembly 4 Human Rights Act 1998, s 21. 2 E D I T O R I A L terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0956618X07000014 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:28, subject to the Cambridge Core https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/S0956618X07000014 https://www.cambridge.org/core (Powers) Act 1919 and live on in the legislative powers now exercised by General Synod. Section 255 of the Civil Partnership Act is anodyne enough, limiting this new form of ministerial intervention to Church legislation relating to pensions, allowances or gratuities concerning the surviving civil partners or dependants of deceased civil partners. However, section 259 goes further and states that a min- ister of the Crown may by order make such further provision as he considers appropriate for the general purposes, or any particular purpose, of the Civil Partnership Act, or for giving full effect to the Act or any provision of it. Such an order may amend, repeal or revoke any Church legislation. Apparently these sections were included with the express knowledge and approval of senior echelons of the Church of England, following assurances that the power would not be exercised without the consent of the Church. This is not the place to speculate upon the value of governmental assurances but, even allowing for such, observers of Church and State will be surprised at the volun- tary surrender of autonomy to the executive by a religious organisation. It may only be a partial surrender, with a distinct specificity of purpose, and made in the expectation of benign and consensual exercise in the future, but nonetheless it creates a precedent and establishes a principle that constitutional historians will come to consider as a watershed in the dynamic of re-establishment in the twenty-first century and an erosion of the right to freedom of religion enunciated in Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The inclusion in this issue of the paper delivered by the Lord Chancellor at the Society’s conference, and of an expanded version of the presentation given by Dr Julian Rivers, together with a spirited alternative view from the Bishop of Winchester, places a strong emphasis upon the position of faith communities in the highly secularised debate on gender equality and individual rights. Also included are full reports of the proceedings of the conference and of the related symposium on same-sex unions and the churches in a European per- spective. It is a topical and lively subject, and doubtless one to which this and other journals will return in the future, but it is not the sole concern of ecclesias- tical lawyers, as the balance of this issue demonstrates. There are contributions on eschatology, the new system of clergy discipline in the Church of England, religious hate crimes and discrimination, together with the customary book reviews, parliamentary, synod and conference reports, and case notes. Whilst the breadth of coverage of this issue and the quality of the contributors will be familiar to regular readers, the Journal differs in size and appearance from previous issues. And from now on it will appear three times a year – in January, May and September – rather than just two as before. This is because, after twenty years of private publication, the Ecclesiastical Law Society has joined forces with Cambridge University Press, who will hencefor- ward be publishing the Journal on behalf of the Society. The Press has an envi- able reputation for the production of academic periodicals and is particularly E C C L E S I A S T I C A L L AW J O U R N A L 3 terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0956618X07000014 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:28, subject to the Cambridge Core https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/S0956618X07000014 https://www.cambridge.org/core strong in the areas of law and religion. I should like to express my thanks to all members of the Editorial Board; to Michael Goodman, my predecessor as editor, for establishing and maintaining the high quality of writing in the Journal; and to Michael O’Connor and Peter Moore for their unstinting work in the pro- duction process. I thank Ella Colvin, Editor-in-Chief, Humanities and Social Science Journals, Cambridge University Press, for the warmth of her welcome and the professionalism of her approach and look forward to collabor- ating with her and her colleagues in the future. The partnership between the Press and the Ecclesiastical Law Society will be fruitful in many ways and, I hope, will work to the advantage of this Journal as it enters its third decade. 4 E D I T O R I A L terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0956618X07000014 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:28, subject to the Cambridge Core https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/S0956618X07000014 https://www.cambridge.org/core 
work_gntdnbbffrgffk4bivebdt7k7u	----	S074808142000020Xjra 250..269 the limits of liberal inclusivity: how defining islamophobia normalizes anti-muslim racism rebecca ruth gould Professor, Islamic World and Comparative Literature, University of Birmingham abstract Responding to recent calls made within the UK Parliament for a government-backed deni- tion of Islamophobia, this article considers the unanticipated consequences of such propos- als. I argue that, considered in the context of related efforts to regulate hate speech, the formulation and implementation of a government-sponsored denition will generate unfore- seen harms for the Muslim community. To the extent that such a denition will fail to address the government’s role in propagating Islamophobia through ill-considered legisla- tion that conates Islamist discourse with hate speech, the concept of a government-backed denition of Islamophobia appears hypocritical and untenable. Alongside opposing govern- ment attempts to dene Islamophobia (and Islam), I argue that advocacy efforts should instead focus on disambiguating government counterterrorism initiatives from the govern- ment management of controversies within Islam. Instead of repeating the mistakes of the governmental adoption of the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA)’s denition of antisemitism by promoting a new denition of Islamophobia, we ought to learn from the errors that were made. We should resist the gratuitous securitization of Muslim communities, rather than use such denitions to normalize compliance with the surveillance state. KEYWORDS: Islamophobia, Islam, British Muslims, hate speech, free speech, regulation, racism, terrorism, ideology, politics of language On April 23, 2018, the All-Party Parliamentary Group on British Muslims (APPG on British Muslims) issued a call for evidence “to facilitate the adoption of a working denition of Islamophobia that can be widely accepted by Muslim communities, political parties, and the Government.”1 In between this call and the release of the report, the mandate switched from a call for a “working denition” into a call for a “legally binding” one.2 In both the United Kingdom and the United States, political mobilization for such a denition is growing, particularly among Muslim advocacy organizations. Although no government agency has adopted any such 1 All-Party Group on British Muslims (@APPGBritMuslims), Twitter, April 23, 2018, 12:29 p.m., https://twitter.com/ APPGBritMuslims/status/988454757084909568. The call was circulated only via Twitter; it was not disseminated elsewhere, either online or in print. 2 All-Party Parliamentary Group on British Muslims [hereafter APPG on British Muslims], Islamophobia Dened: Reporting on the Inquiry into a Working Denition of Islamophobia, 2018, 1–72, 27, https://static1.squarespace. com/static/599c3d2febbd1a90cffdd8a9/t/5bfd1ea3352f531a6170ceee/1543315109493/Islamophobia+Dened.pdf. Journal of Law and Religion 35, no. 2 (2020): 250–269 © The Author(s), 2020. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Center for the Study of Law and Religion at Emory University doi:10.1017/jlr.2020.20 250 journal of law and religion of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/jlr.2020.20 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:23, subject to the Cambridge Core terms https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2198-5406 https://twitter.com/APPGBritMuslims/status/988454757084909568 https://twitter.com/APPGBritMuslims/status/988454757084909568 https://twitter.com/APPGBritMuslims/status/988454757084909568 https://static1.squarespace.com/static/599c3d2febbd1a90cffdd8a9/t/5bfd1ea3352f531a6170ceee/1543315109493/Islamophobia+Defined.pdf https://static1.squarespace.com/static/599c3d2febbd1a90cffdd8a9/t/5bfd1ea3352f531a6170ceee/1543315109493/Islamophobia+Defined.pdf https://static1.squarespace.com/static/599c3d2febbd1a90cffdd8a9/t/5bfd1ea3352f531a6170ceee/1543315109493/Islamophobia+Defined.pdf https://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog?doi=10.1017/jlr.2020.20&domain=pdf https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/jlr.2020.20 https://www.cambridge.org/core denition, UK political parties have.3 Many formulas for dening Islamophobia have been pro- posed. These include “the presumption that Islam is inherently violent, alien, and inassimilable”4 and that it is “an ideology similar in theory, function and purpose to racism . . . that sustains and perpetuates negatively evaluated meaning about Muslims and Islam.”5 Most recently, Islamophobia Dened, the report that resulted from the APPG on British Muslims’ Islamophobia inquiry, has proposed the following denition: “Islamophobia is rooted in racism and is a type of racism that targets expressions of Muslimness or perceived Muslimness.”6 Finally, another approach, closer to the spirit of this article yet less frequently engaged by main- stream media, identies “the state, and more specically the sprawling ofcial ‘counter-terrorism’ apparatus” as “absolutely central to the production of contemporary Islamophobia—the backbone of anti-Muslim racism.”7 This reading, which emerges from “Critical Muslim Studies,” holds that “Islamophobia can perhaps be dened as the disciplining of Muslims by reference to an antagonis- tic Western horizon.”8 In the face of such momentum, I suggest here that well-intentioned efforts to develop a legally binding denition suitable for governmental adoption may have the negative effect of bringing Muslims further under governmental surveillance. Past government efforts to regulate speech tar- geting other minorities and religions indicate that a governmental decision to back a denition of Islamophobia with the coercive force of the law will do more harm than good, to Muslims spec- ically, and for society generally. Finally, and most crucially, I argue that the adoption of such denitions on behalf of any religion or minority group for the purpose of censorship compromises a state’s democratic legitimacy.9 By way of elucidating the intersection between anti-Muslim racism and the policing of contro- versial speech, I consider here the relationship between government-led efforts to protect vulnerable minorities and government-led efforts to persecute them (which also involves viewing them as inherently suspect and placing Islamic discourse under disproportionate scrutiny). I examine how these two agendas, incompatible as they appear on the surface, actually reinforce each other. Beyond considering the mutual reciprocity of efforts to ban Islamophobia and to heighten govern- ment surveillance of Muslim communities, I also consider their convergence in post-9/11 liberal democracies such as the United Kingdom. None of the proposals for a governmental denition of Islamophobia that have been aired to date have taken account of the lessons that should have been learned from the government’s ill- fated adoption of the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance’s (IHRA) denition of 3 The APPG on British Muslims’ denition of Islamophobia was adopted by the UK Labour Party and the Liberal Democrats in March 2019. See Frances Perraudin, “Labour Formally Adopts Denition of Islamophobia,” Guardian, March 20, 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2019/mar/20/labour-formally-adopts-denition- islamophobia. 4 Khaled A. Beydoun, “Islamophobia: Toward a Legal Denition and Framework,” Columbia Law Review Online 116 (2016): 108–25, at 111, https://columbialawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/November-2016-11- Beydoun.pdf. 5 Chris Allen, Islamophobia (Farnham: Ashgate, 2010), 190. 6 APPG on British Muslims, Islamophobia Dened, 11. 7 Narzanin Massoumi, Tom Mills, and David Miller, “Islamophobia, Social Movements and the State: For a Movement-Centred Approach,” in What is Islamophobia? Racism, Social Movements and the State, ed. Narzanin Massoumi, Tom Mills, and David Miller (London: Pluto Press, 2017), 3–32, at 8. 8 Salman Sayyid, “Out of the Devil’s Dictionary,” in Thinking through Islamophobia: Global Perspectives, ed. Salman Sayyid and Abdool Karim Vakil (London: Hurst & Company, 2010), 5–18, at 15. 9 This aspect further develops arguments rst articulated in Rebecca Ruth Gould, “Is the ‘Hate’ in Hate Speech the ‘Hate’ in Hate Crime? Waldron and Dworkin on Political Legitimacy,” Jurisprudence 10, no. 2 (2019): 171–87. the limits of liberal inclusivity journal of law and religion 251 at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/jlr.2020.20 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:23, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2019/mar/20/labour-formally-adopts-definition-islamophobia https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2019/mar/20/labour-formally-adopts-definition-islamophobia https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2019/mar/20/labour-formally-adopts-definition-islamophobia https://columbialawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/November-2016-11-Beydoun.pdf https://columbialawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/November-2016-11-Beydoun.pdf https://columbialawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/November-2016-11-Beydoun.pdf https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/jlr.2020.20 https://www.cambridge.org/core antisemitism in 2016. Yet the problems with such denitions and with their application become more apparent with every censorious exclusion of Israel critics from the public sphere.10 My past work documenting the harms of censoring Israel-critical speech following the government’s adoption of the IHRA’s denition has led me to regard the campaign for a government-backed denition of Islamophobia with reservations.11 The example of the adoption of the IHRA denition shows how government-sponsored censorship inevitably undermines the ght against racism while marginalizing dissidents and further entrenching the boundaries of permissible speech. I outline in these pages why and how such denitions pose a greater threat to civil liberties than appears at rst sight, and scrutinize the (mostly unexamined) assumption that legal denitions pro- tect the communities they are intended to benet. I begin by discussing the problem intrinsic to dening a religious tradition as internally diverse as Islam, and consider the risk that homogenizing denitions pose to Muslims in a pluralistic society. I then turn to the anti-democratic implications of censoring speech, and examine the government’s contradictory position in this regard. I conclude by suggesting more effective means through which the government can combat racism and Islamophobia and promote equality for Muslims within Muslim-minority societies. Among the most pressing, yet most obscured, issues in the debate around dening Islamophobia for legal purposes is how the government’s “sifting of Muslims” transpires amid “a highly securi- tised discourse around Islam.”12 Proposals underway to adopt a government-supported denition of Islamophobia in order to facilitate the criminalization of anti-Muslim speech risk normalizing this securitized discourse under the guise of protecting Muslims. There are many reasons to support efforts to dene Islamophobia for the purpose of critiquing (in contrast to banning) public dis- course, provided we resist falling into “the trap of regarding Islam monolithically.”13 More danger- ous and less helpful are efforts to give any such denition government backing, or otherwise aligning an adopted denition with the coercive force of the law. When it uses a denition of Islamophobia to facilitate the censorship of Islamophobic speech, the state adopts the mantle of dening Islam while evading the most injurious and impactful type of Islamophobia: that fostered by the government itself, through a range of securitizing policies, most notoriously in the UK con- text, Prevent (legislation introduced in 2006 as part of a wider counterterrorism strategy and updated in 2015 in section 26 of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act). While denitions can be useful in identifying harms, when used to silence controversial speech, government-backed denitions undermine democratic governance. A democratic state, I argue, must uncompromisingly uphold the citizen’s free speech prerogative rather than engage in the invidious task of dening Islam. Since pluralistic democracy ought not to police the boundaries of Islam, it therefore also 10 Anshuman Mondal’s documentation of the uneven attention given by government to antisemitic as compared to Islamophobic speech sheds light on some of these issues. See Anshuman A. Mondal, “The Shape of Free Speech: Rethinking Liberal Free Speech Theory,” Continuum 32, no. 4 (2018): 503–17. 11 Rebecca Ruth Gould, “Legal Form and Legal Legitimacy: The IHRA Denition of Antisemitism as a Case Study in Censored Speech,” Law, Culture and the Humanities, published ahead of print, August 18, 2018, https://doi.org/ 10.1177/1743872118780660; Rebecca Ruth Gould, “The IHRA Denition of Palestinians: Dening Antisemitism by Erasing Palestinians,” Political Quarterly, published ahead of print, July 28, 2020, https://doi.org/10.1111/ 1467-923X.12883. 12 “If We Want to Stop Islamophobia, We Have to Challenge the Laws that Enable It,” (blog post), CAGE, November 22, 2018, https://www.cage.ngo/if-we-want-to-stop-islamophobia-we-have-to-challenge-the-laws-that- enable-it. 13 Mohammad H. Tamdgidi, “Beyond Islamophobia and Islamophilia as Western Epistemic Racisms: Revisiting Runnymede Trust’s Denition in a World-History Context,” Islamophobia Studies Journal 1, no. 1 (2012): 54–81, at 76. rebecca ruth gould 252 journal of law and religion at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/jlr.2020.20 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:23, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available https://doi.org/10.1177/1743872118780660 https://doi.org/10.1177/1743872118780660 https://doi.org/10.1177/1743872118780660 https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-923X.12883 https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-923X.12883 https://www.cage.ngo/if-we-want-to-stop-islamophobia-we-have-to-challenge-the-laws-that-enable-it https://www.cage.ngo/if-we-want-to-stop-islamophobia-we-have-to-challenge-the-laws-that-enable-it https://www.cage.ngo/if-we-want-to-stop-islamophobia-we-have-to-challenge-the-laws-that-enable-it https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/jlr.2020.20 https://www.cambridge.org/core ought not to give its backing to any denition of Islamophobia that presupposes a denition of Islam. Instead, it should actively oppose anti-Muslim racism, and refrain from targeting Muslims as racial, cultural, and religious others. pluralism, free speech, democracy Before arguing that a denition of Islamophobia is inconsistent with pluralistic democratic legiti- macy, it is necessary to unpack these concepts. I do so in what follows by examining how two specic theorists—Chantal Mouffe and Eric Heinze—reconcile the mandate of free speech with lib- eral democracy. I focus on Mouffe and Heinze because they usefully straddle a range of different political positions. Both, notably, are critics of political liberalism. Equally, their shared interest in agonistic deliberation as a foundation for democracy illustrates how an emphasis on free speech can promote rather than suppress minority rights. In her political theory of democracy, Mouffe introduces the concept of agonistic pluralism as an alternative to the liberalisms of John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas. Although pluralism is widely recognized as normative within modern political theory, this concept has a foundational status for Mouffe, who understands it is as the “dening feature of modern democracy.”14 Mouffe argues that pluralism is constitutive of contemporary democracy. For Mouffe, a state is either plural, in the sense of being comprised of individuals with conicting aims, backgrounds, and beliefs, and hence democratic, or it is not a democracy at all. Mouffe further rejects a model of democracy (entailed to her mind in both Rawlsian and Habermasian liberalism) that makes differences among citizens politically irrelevant by relegating areas of potential conict to the “sphere of the private.” Mouffe’s account of democracy reinforces Rainer Bauböck’s claim that “the question of who must be included as a citizen in order to achieve democratic legitimacy cannot itself be answered by democratic decision.”15 Bauböck and Mouffe together help us understand the entangled rela- tionship between pluralism and democracy. On Mouffe’s account, a state populated by like-minded citizens who follow the same creed will be unable to sustain democratic legitimacy because it would lack the necessary difference that makes deliberation possible. This is the case even when free speech is nominally enshrined in law. Mouffe’s concept of agonistic pluralism is thus both consti- tutive of democracy and prior to it. Mouffe views her project of agonistic pluralism as radical because it questions “the objective of unanimity and homogeneity, which is always revealed as ctitious and based on acts of exclu- sion.”16 Yet at the same time, the pluralism Mouffe values so highly is given at least nominal rec- ognition in generalized terms in most contemporary liberal democratic states. Few democratic theorists reject pluralism, or argue for its diminution. The major challenge within democratic polit- ical theory is to maximize pluralism without compromising state security, or citizens’ right to equal representation. Mouffe’s concept of agonistic pluralism is premised on the existence of protest, for an agonistic public sphere requires that opposing viewpoints can be freely expressed, in public forums and through all modes of public discourse. Thus, while liberal democratic theorists may encourage pluralism, Mouffe makes clear that pluralism without active dissent is democratically empty. Although Mouffe does not single out free speech as a condition for her concept of 14 Chantal Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox (London: Verso, 2000), 19. 15 Rainer Bauböck, “Global Justice, Freedom of Movement and Democratic Citizenship,” European Journal of Sociology 50, no. 1 (2009): 1–31, at 16. 16 Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, 19. the limits of liberal inclusivity journal of law and religion 253 at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/jlr.2020.20 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:23, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/jlr.2020.20 https://www.cambridge.org/core democracy, the right to dissent is a type of freedom of expression, a fact that highlights the impor- tance of free speech for Mouffe’s agonistic pluralism. The link between free speech and democratic legitimacy is more forcefully outlined by legal the- orist Eric Heinze, who considers free speech to be constitutive of democracy in much the same way that Mouffe understands pluralism to be its condition of possibility. Heinze argues that the citizen’s prerogative of free public expression is the only distinctively democratic value, from which all other democratic values derive, including voting rights. As Heinze writes, “Voting remains derivative of something more foundational, something constitutive of it. It derives from, as a formalized proce- dure for, expression within public discourse,” more simply termed free speech.17 He reasons that the “non-viewpoint punitive expression within public discourse” is “even more primordial than voting”; it “cannot legitimately be regulated for the sake of democracy because it signally consti- tutes democracy.”18 While Mouffe and Heinze consider the forms of democracy they endorse to be emergent rather than established, both thinkers insist on the foundational status of their favored concept, and argue that democracy cannot be conceptualized apart from it. In this article, I draw on the insights of Mouffe regarding pluralism and Heinze regarding free speech, while also broadening their implications. I link both approaches in an effort to develop a solid foundation for pluralist democratic legitimacy that does not use government-backed deni- tions of racism to censor controversial (or even racist) speech. In a society wherein everyone thinks the same way, follows the same religion, or adheres to the same ideology, free speech might have symbolic meaning, but it would lack political value due to the absence of public disagreement. Under such hypothetical conditions, freedom of expression is reduced to a mere ornament of civility rather than the foundation of political existence. A state can easily uphold the citizen’s prerogative of free expression when all citizens agree with each other. The proposed denitions of Islamophobia and antisemitism present a radically different scenario: they bring into focus ineluctable differences that cannot be rationalized away through enlightened deliberation. Although it comes under greater stress the more diverse society becomes, a state’s ability to uphold free speech in a pluralistic context is sine qua non for its democratic legitimacy. A state acquires democratic legitimacy by maximizing the scope for political difference through fostering pluralist norms. Such a state must also permit forms of public discourse that challenge its existence and legitimacy. Further, it must permit forms of public discourse that challenge its pluralist commitments, including the bigotries of xeno- phobic discourse. Hateful speech (more commonly called “hate speech”) has increasingly become a battleground for democratic legitimacy in pluralistic societies.19 The harms that are associated with such speech have often been used to justify the suppression of controversial or offensive speech. Adapting and broadening the frameworks offered by Mouffe and Heinze, I here examine hateful speech pertain- ing to Muslims and involving stereotypes of Islam in an effort to scrutinize the implications for democratic legitimacy of legally suppressing such speech. While hateful speech is often adjudicated 17 Eric Heinze, Hate Speech and Democratic Citizenship (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 47. 18 Heinze, Hate Speech and Democratic Citizenship, 47 (emphasis added). 19 As noted by Katharine Gelber, the use of “hate” to index hate speech is problematic because “it implies that the dening feature of hate speech is virulent dislike of a person for any reason.” Katharine Gelber, “Hate Speech— Denitions and Empirical Evidence,” Constitutional Commentary 32, no. 3 (2017): 619–29, at 627. Gelber else- where notes that “the use of the term ‘hate’ to categorise ‘hate speech’ . . . implies that any expression of antipathy or dislike towards any target is substantively the core of the phenomenon.” Katharine Gelber, “Incitement to Hatred and Countering Terrorism: Policy Confusion in the UK and Australia,” Parliamentary Affairs 71, no. 1 (2018): 28–49, at 31n3. I take these reservations further by forming a copula that ensures that “hate” is not treated separately from “speech.” rebecca ruth gould 254 journal of law and religion at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/jlr.2020.20 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:23, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/jlr.2020.20 https://www.cambridge.org/core in the abstract, anti-Muslim racism has a unique place in the hate speech debate, due to its unfor- tunate ubiquity across Europe, North America, and Oceania. However the question is examined, the role of the state in shaping public opinion and in fostering hateful speech must never escape scrutiny. Whether or not we adopt the premises of Mouffe and Heinze, their shared focus on the role of agonistic deliberation in constituting democracy offers a means of reconceptualizing free speech such that its exercise promotes rather than suppresses minority rights. defining and countering hateful speech Is dening racism effective in countering hateful speech? Central to the function of denitions is boundary creation, the policing of the borders of what is and is not permissible and the exclusion of that which is deemed impermissible. Inevitably, government sponsored denitions will silence those who disagree with its mandates. The question then to pose is to what extent does this inhibit democratic deliberation, and what level of inhibition is good for democracy? The recent political turbulence and occasional censorship attending the adoption of a denition of antisemitism on which the denition of Islamophobia is explicitly based illustrates in amplitude the dangers of government-backed denitions. On December 12, 2016, the United Kingdom became one of the rst governments in the world to formally adopt a controversial denition of antisemitism proposed by the IHRA, which is an intergovernmental body founded in 1998 to “strengthen, advance, and promote Holocaust educa- tion, remembrance, and research worldwide.”20 Neither the denition nor the process of its adop- tion was subjected to parliamentary scrutiny (arguably a key criteria for democratic legitimacy). Along with the denition’s contentious content, these procedural failures have contributed to numerous ongoing violations of freedom of expression. The cancellation of events seen as poten- tially offensive to supporters of Israel, inquiries into controversial social media postings, and cen- soring of publications by academics on the topic of Israel/Palestine are just some of the more measurable ways in which the debate around Israeli policies has been constrained by the deni- tion.21 Amid these censorious acts, few voices have spoken out in defense of freedom of expression. Most institutions and most individuals in positions of authority have not hesitated to compromise on free speech when under pressure to conform to the government’s convoluted policy. Among the problematic aspects of the IHRA’s denition is its presumptive stigmatization of views on Israel that are not necessarily motivated by racial animus. Marked by a clear political slant, the IHRA’s denition in effect excludes many Jewish points of view, especially those that are distant from or hostile to Zionism. While many critiques of this denition have been aired in recent years, its lessons for the comparative study of group-specic denitions of racism have been undertheorized. One lesson we can take from this example while deliberating on a denition of Islamophobia is that the tensions that have emerged in connection with the IHRA denition are 20 “IHRA 2020 Ministerial Declaration Adopted in Brussels,” International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance, January 19, 2020, https://www.holocaustremembrance.com/press-releases/ihra-2020-ministerial-declaration- adopted-brussels. 21 The fullest legal engagement with this document to date has been Hugh Tomlinson, “In the Matter of the Adoption and Potential Application of the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance Working Denition of Anti-Semitism,” Free Speech on Israel, March 8, 2017, https://freespeechonisrael.org.uk/ihra-opinion/#sthash. kft5TkDo.dpbs. See also Sir Stephen Sedley, “Dening Anti-Semitism,” London Review of Books, May 4, 2017, 8. the limits of liberal inclusivity journal of law and religion 255 at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/jlr.2020.20 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:23, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available https://www.holocaustremembrance.com/press-releases/ihra-2020-ministerial-declaration-adopted-brussels https://www.holocaustremembrance.com/press-releases/ihra-2020-ministerial-declaration-adopted-brussels https://www.holocaustremembrance.com/press-releases/ihra-2020-ministerial-declaration-adopted-brussels https://freespeechonisrael.org.uk/ihra-opinion/%23sthash.kft5TkDo.dpbs https://freespeechonisrael.org.uk/ihra-opinion/%23sthash.kft5TkDo.dpbs https://freespeechonisrael.org.uk/ihra-opinion/%23sthash.kft5TkDo.dpbs https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/jlr.2020.20 https://www.cambridge.org/core likely to appear in connection with any group-specic denition of racism. Such denitions are use- ful only when they address the systematic structures and social norms within which such bigotry is normalized. Dismantling the processes through which racial and religious hatred is constituted will neutralize the power of prejudice more effectively than any act of banning can achieve. Having examined the politics of denitions from the point of view of their implications for dem- ocratic governance, I offer an immanent critique of recent efforts to dene Islamophobia that is informed by the history of Muslim integration into Muslim-minority societies. As noted above, any legal denition begins by considering the role of the state in dening its object. Muslim scholars such as Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na‘im have argued that the very idea of an Islamic state is a contra- diction in terms, because a genuinely Islamic understanding of the state cannot be assimilated into modern bureaucratic structures.22 Legal scholar Wael Hallaq has developed this argument further. Hallaq criticizes the projection of the nation-state onto classical Islamic political formations. In Hallaq’s view, “any conception of a modern Islamic state is inherently self-contradictory.”23 An-Na‘im’s argument has helped scholars challenge the postures adopted by regimes such as Saudi Arabia and Iran, which commit human rights violations while claiming to represent a certain kind of Islam. Hallaq’s argument concerning the impossibility of achieving Islamic governance is explicitly made with reference to modern theories of the state. In Hallaq’s view, “modern forms of globalization and the position of the state in the ever increasing intensity of these forms are sufcient to render any brand of Islamic governance either impossible or, if possible, incapable of survival in the long run.”24 While these arguments have been inuential within Islamic Studies, less attention has been given to how the impossibility of Islamic governance pertains to the internal logic of secular European states seeking to represent the political prerogatives of their Muslim citizens. As Hallaq maintains, “for Muslims today to seek the adoption of the modern state system of separation of powers is to bargain for a deal inferior to the one they secured for themselves over the centuries of their history.”25 In con- trast to the sharı ̄ʿa in its historical meaning, which “did not—because it was not designed to—serve the ruler or any form of political power,” the modern state can only serve itself.26 Hallaq recognizes contemporary nation-based sovereignty as a state’s primary mechanism of self-preservation and, by implication, as the means through which the state surveils its citizens. Democratic legitimacy requires that all citizens be represented in lawmaking. It entails, above all, consent, however mediated. For a government act to be legitimate, there must be a plausible basis for assuming that the procedure from which the action arises was consented to by those most directly affected by it, and that they have opportunities to meaningfully contest the laws they are expected to obey.27 In order to be legitimate, a governmental denition of Islamophobia would need to be able to reasonably claim to represent all Muslim citizens within this denition. The het- erogeneous constitution of the modern pluralist state makes such representation impossible. In con- sequence, any governmental denition of Islam (or of Islamophobia) would be illegitimate because 22 Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na‘im, Islam and the Secular State: Negotiating the Future of Shariʿa (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008). An-Na‘im’s argument is also developed in his Carl Heinrich Becker Lecture. Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na‘im, “Shari’a and the Secular State in the Middle East and Europe,” in Carl Heinrich Becker Lecture der Fritz Thyssen Stiftung 2009 (Berlin: Fritz Thyssen Stiftung, 2009), 105–40. 23 Wael Hallaq, The Impossible State: Islam, Politics, and Modernity’s Moral Predicament (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013), xi. 24 Hallaq, The Impossible State, xiii. 25 Hallaq, 72. 26 Hallaq, 72. 27 For one statement of this position from a free speech perspective see James Weinstein, “Hate Speech Bans, Democracy, and Political Legitimacy,” Constitutional Commentary 32, no. 3 (2017): 527–83. rebecca ruth gould 256 journal of law and religion at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/jlr.2020.20 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:23, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/jlr.2020.20 https://www.cambridge.org/core the criteria imposed by representation and consent in order to attain to legitimacy are impossible to satisfy in a pluralistic state. In Islamophobia Dened, the APPG on British Muslims advocates for a government-backed denition on the grounds that “[a]dopting a denition of Islamophobia not only identies a wide- spread phenomenon, but sends a positive message to all those communities and individuals who suffer from it.”28 The report’s call for a “legally binding denition,” suggests that the benets of “identifying a widespread phenomenon” and “sending a positive message” were deemed to out- weigh the dangers registered in these pages.29 Yet the report does not consider how, in dening a group as vulnerable, and in enshrining that group’s characteristics in law, the state further increases that group’s vulnerability by placing it under more extensive surveillance. Not all Muslim groups in the United Kingdom have welcomed the reifying inuence of a gov- ernmental denition. Among the most outspoken and articulate of the groups who have raised nec- essary yet—for the government—uncomfortable questions is CAGE. CAGE describes itself as “an independent advocacy organisation working to empower communities impacted by the War on Terror.”30 In responding to the APPG on British Muslims’ call for evidence, CAGE argued that the government’s use of counterinsurgency methods and tactics to treat the “wider [Muslim] pop- ulation as an enabler and supporter of insurgency and terrorism” illustrates how “institutionalised Islamophobia is linked to the erosion of the rule of law.”31 Overall, CAGE’s substantive and detailed response to the call for evidence effectively exposes what they refer to as the “strong stench of Islamophobia” in British government policies relative to Muslims.32 In its response to the APPG on British Muslims’ report, CAGE noted that the “War on Terror” has ushered in “a raft of counter-terrorism legislation . . . and policies such as PREVENT, which reinforce securitised narratives about Islam, and compel public sector workers to implement a dis- criminatory approach to Muslims, which has seen children as young as four criminalised.”33 From the viewpoint of CAGE, governmental efforts to dene Islamophobia are best treated with skepti- cism as long as the more basic structural phobias introduced by the War on Terror remain unad- dressed. Asim Qureshi, research director of CAGE, was quoted as stating in response to the report, “If the denition of Islamophobia cannot hold those in power to account for their role in manufac- turing Islamophobia, then it is inadequate.”34 Unsurprisingly, although CAGE submitted written evidence to the APPG on British Muslims as part of its Islamophobia inquiry, CAGE’s evidence was not engaged with or referenced in the report. Any assessment of a democracy’s success in protecting minority groups—and thereby in uphold- ing its pluralist mandate—must consider how government involvement affects those on the margins of the protected group as well as those within that group’s mainstream. We should also ask whether all members of the protected group can reasonably—even if only potentially—be understood to 28 APPG on British Muslims, Islamophobia Dened, 32. 29 The call for a “legally binding denition” is repeated in APPG on British Muslims, Islamophobia Dened, 17, 30, 32, 42, 43, although the precise type of legal obligation envisioned is never reected on. 30 “About Us: Striving for a World Free of Injustice,” CAGE, accessed May 8, 2020, https://www.cage.ngo/about-us. 31 CAGE, “CAGE Response to a Call for Evidence on a ‘Working Denition of Islamophobia/Anti-Muslim Hatred’” (London: CAGE, 2018), 9, https://www.cage.ngo/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/CAGE-Response-to-‘Working- Denition-of-Islamophobia_Anti-Muslim-hatred.pdf. 32 CAGE, “CAGE Response to a Call for Evidence,” 9. 33 CAGE, “If We Want to Stop Islamophobia.” 34 CAGE, “Discussions around the Denitions of Islamophobia Skirt the Real Issues We Need to Address,” Press release, November 29, 2018, https://www.cage.ngo/discussions-around-the-denitions-of-islamophobia-skirt-the- real-issues-we-need-to-address. the limits of liberal inclusivity journal of law and religion 257 at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/jlr.2020.20 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:23, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available https://www.cage.ngo/about-us https://www.cage.ngo/about-us https://www.cage.ngo/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/CAGE-Response-to-&lsquo;Working-Definition-of-Islamophobia_Anti-Muslim-hatred.pdf https://www.cage.ngo/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/CAGE-Response-to-&lsquo;Working-Definition-of-Islamophobia_Anti-Muslim-hatred.pdf https://www.cage.ngo/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/CAGE-Response-to-&lsquo;Working-Definition-of-Islamophobia_Anti-Muslim-hatred.pdf https://www.cage.ngo/discussions-around-the-definitions-of-islamophobia-skirt-the-real-issues-we-need-to-address https://www.cage.ngo/discussions-around-the-definitions-of-islamophobia-skirt-the-real-issues-we-need-to-address https://www.cage.ngo/discussions-around-the-definitions-of-islamophobia-skirt-the-real-issues-we-need-to-address https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/jlr.2020.20 https://www.cambridge.org/core have consented to be dened in the way presupposed by the denition. Race and gender-based dis- crimination are readily identiable on grounds that are relatively (if not absolutely) easy to specify. Hateful discourse that targets more amorphously constituted groups, for which membership is determined by a system of beliefs, pose greater challenges to the state’s aspiration to democratic legitimacy. A pluralistic democracy must oppose racism, but it must also avoid censoring purely discursive speech. Legal theorist Ronald Dworkin helpfully distinguishes between downstream laws, that target hate crimes, and upstream laws, that target hate speech.35 Jeremy Waldron further develops this distinction, while drawing a conclusion the opposite of my own as regards hate speech. While downstream laws in Dworkin’s formulation are “enacted” by the political process, upstream laws “affect” the political process.36 Were the proposed governmental denition of Islamophobia to be ratied as law (as the APPG on British Muslims’ report advocates), it would necessarily be in the form of an upstream law that, in the words of Jeremy Weinstein, could “poten- tially annihilate the legitimacy of downstream antidiscrimination laws.”37 As such, identitarian group-based denitions of racism pose unique challenges to most accounts of pluralistic democratic representation. Although they differ both as regards their internal logic and substantive content, both the deni- tion of Islamophobia that has been recommended for adoption and the adopted denition of anti- semitism share a classication that is both excessively broad (in that they extend to ideational characteristics, belief systems, and political alliances) and excessively narrow (in that they exclude members of the community whose views may not match up with the denition). Democratic legit- imacy is violated in both respects. Chris Allen, a scholar of hate studies who has written prolically on Islamophobia, and who served as a member of an earlier iteration of the APPG on British Muslims, the cross-government Anti-Muslim Hatred Working Group, has proposed to dene Islamophobia as an ideology “similar in theory, function and purpose to racism.”38 As does CAGE, critical race theorist Khaled Beydoun recognizes the role of government policies in fostering Islamophobia. Beydoun even incorporates governmental complicity into his denition of Islamophobia as an attitude “rooted in understand- ings of Islam as civilization’s antithesis and perpetuated by government structures and private cit- izens.”39 He also goes beyond the APPG on British Muslims report in examining the intersection of Islamophobia and the War on Terror.40 However, Beydoun’s contribution to the denition of Islamophobia is constrained by his failure to address the issue of free speech directly, by a conation of the attitudinal (“Islam as civilization’s antithesis”) with the infrastructural (“government struc- tures”), and by an inadequate contextualization of Islamophobia within a more structural account of anti-Muslim racism. 35 Ronald Dworkin, foreword to Extreme Speech and Democracy, ed. Ivan Hare and James Weinstein (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), v–ix. For a more extended discussion of this distinction as it relates to hate crime and hate speech, see Gould, “Is the ‘Hate’ in Hate Speech the ‘Hate’ in Hate Crime?” 36 Jeremy Waldron, The Harm in Hate Speech (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012). 37 Weinstein, “Hate Speech Bans,” 532. Given that pluralism is as foundational for democracy as the citizen’s pre- rogative of dissent, I do not follow Weinstein in making the legitimacy of antidiscrimination laws conditional on the absence of speech regulation. I do, however, agree that the undemocratic implementation of upstream laws potentially impugns the legitimacy of downstream laws. 38 Allen, Islamophobia, 190. 39 Beydoun, “Islamophobia,” 111. 40 Khaled A. Beydoun, “War on Terror, War on Muslims,” in American Islamophobia: Understanding the Roots and Rise of Fear (Oakland: University of California Press, 2018), 92–124. rebecca ruth gould 258 journal of law and religion at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/jlr.2020.20 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:23, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/jlr.2020.20 https://www.cambridge.org/core Having discussed the proposed governmental denition of Islamophobia from the standpoint of democratic legitimacy, the second half of this article will develop an epistemological account of the limitations of governmental denitions of group-specic bigotry. Denitions developed by believers to describe and dene themselves are intrinsic. They acquire legitimacy simply through usage. Governmental denitions ought to be subject to different criteria. They are extrinsic, and are intended to dene others in a certain way for others. The legitimacy of extrinsic denitions, by con- trast with intrinsic ones, is undermined when they infringe on the rights of others. Every believer is entitled to dene themselves and their religion as they see t; occasionally, a pluralist state must dene religious communities for instrumental ends. The two types of denitions should not be conated. Because there can be no transhistorically valid extrinsic denition of a religion, it follows that there can be no transhistorically valid extrinsic denition of animosity toward specic religious communities. Within any pluralistic democratic state, legal denitions of religion (like those of ide- ologies that oppose them) will always carry signicant risks and potentially negative consequences, for adherents of those religions, particularly on its fringes, or whose afliation is otherwise contested. As the APPG on British Muslims’ Islamophobia report illustrates, the exclusivity of group- specic denitions is further exacerbated when the government becomes involved. The number of Muslim groups excluded through this report is striking, as is the negative pressure faced by APPG members in prior years for associating with Muslim groups deemed to lie beyond the pale of mainstream Islam. At one point in her advocacy on this issue, MP Anna Soubry, who later co-authored the Islamophobia report, cut her ties with Muslim Engagement and Development (MEND), a group that has ghting Islamophobia as its primary mission, because, as she explained to the press, it did not “have the best of reputations.”41 Such media-driven exclusions reveal struc- tural problems of representation within the law as well as within democracy. While any denition of racism may have heuristic value by encouraging or stigmatizing certain discursive norms, when used as instruments of coercion, and aligned with the force of the law, group-specic denitions of racism may inhibit the development of an egalitarian ethos in relation to the groups targeted for protection. Denitions erect borders around concepts that otherwise overlap. While the borders they create impart cognitive coherence, the identities they capture undergo simplication when they are constrained to t narrow denitions. Religions in particular confound most reasonable attempts at denition. The three major Abrahamic religions—Judaism, Christianity, and Islam—each admit of such diversity in doctrinal and other realms, that all efforts at denition are bound to be contested, by gatekeepers and by dissenters. Historically, monotheistic religions have often embraced exclusive denitions, but pluralist states are compromised by such border policing of identities. While aspects of each of these religions can be captured within the pluralist state, the selection process—which considers some characteristics more relevant than others, and denes groups according to these values—is necessarily hierarchical, political, and affected by bias. From a pluralistic and democratic perspective, religions can be thickly characterized; they cannot be comprehensively dened. To the extent that we dene religions by contrasting them with what 41 Quoted in Iram Ramzan and Andrew Gilligan, “MPs Ditch Meeting with Muslim Group Mend over Islamist Claims,” Times, October 29, 2017, https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/mps-ditch-meeting-with-muslim-group- mend-over-islamist-claims-rgxqn0s05. Further background is provided in a report by the Henry Jackson Society, which has the clear aim of discrediting MEND. Tom Wilson, MEND: “Islamists Masquerading as Civil Libertarians” (London: Henry Jackson Society, 2017), http://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/ 2017/10/HJS-Mend-Report.pdf. the limits of liberal inclusivity journal of law and religion 259 at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/jlr.2020.20 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:23, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/mps-ditch-meeting-with-muslim-group-mend-over-islamist-claims-rgxqn0s05 https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/mps-ditch-meeting-with-muslim-group-mend-over-islamist-claims-rgxqn0s05 https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/mps-ditch-meeting-with-muslim-group-mend-over-islamist-claims-rgxqn0s05 http://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/HJS-Mend-Report.pdf http://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/HJS-Mend-Report.pdf http://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/HJS-Mend-Report.pdf https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/jlr.2020.20 https://www.cambridge.org/core they are not, we are engaging in theology, not legal or political reason. No extrinsic verbal formu- lation—whether a simple sentence or a book-length report—can denitively capture what it means to identify as Jewish, Christian, or Muslim (or to belong to any other religion). In each case, the range of valid meanings exceeds the scope of any denition. We might more usefully aim for what Clifford Geertz has described as “thick description” in the context of ethnographic eldwork than aspire to generate nalizing denitions for legal ends.42 While individuals may align with specic political ideologies, the ascription of a religion to indi- viduals automatically xes our sense of the communities to which they belong, the identities to which they can lay claim, and the activities they may engage in. Believers may seek self-denition for the purposes of clarifying their faith. No pluralist state, however, can dene religions for every- one, for legal ends, without undermining its democratic legitimacy. It may be objected that a range of pluralist non-Western states, including a range of Islamic empires, did formalize denitions of the religions that operated within their polity (for example, through the Ottoman concept of millet, reli- gious community, or the broader Islamic concept of ahl al-dhimma, protected people). Notably, however, such restrictive denitions were conned to minority religions, not to Islam; their net effect was to reify the communities under consideration. Even when the negative consequences of such reication were not always in evidence, they remained a perpetual possibility and a source of anxiety. Also worth noting is how this denitional framework created a basis for discrimination against non-Islamic religions, which then, as now, was justied under the rubric of “protection.” From the premise that a pluralist democracy cannot denitively dene religions, it follows that bigotry against members of a religion should be prosecuted as a hate crime when it involves oth- erwise criminal violence or destruction to a person or property based on the characteristics associ- ated with members of a religion. There is also scope for criminalizing anti-religious bigotry in the context of anti-discrimination legislation.43 To the extent that they pertain to material harms, nei- ther hate crime nor anti-discrimination legislation need infringe on freedom of expression. But when bigotry is expressed purely discursively because it is grounded in racist stereotypes and relies on ctions concerning the object of contempt, any justication for its censorship is inherently sub- jective. The specic content of bigotry’s fabrication is incidental to its denition; if it conforms to an identiable pattern that is both predictable and devoid of evidence, it is reasonable to describe that attitude as bigoted, regardless of the object of its animus. Such an approach counters a tendency to identify the source of bigotry in the victim by recognizing the origin of the prejudice in the bigot. By permitting hateful speech that does not result in material harms, a pluralistic democracy can reveal how bigoted discourse is disconnected from reality and thereby sever any perceived link with the ostensible target of animus more effectively than it might by criminalizing such expression. The above pertains to bigotry against people perceived to belong to certain races. But what of hostility toward religions? We can arrive at a plausible denition of such hostility only through a workable and widely accepted denition of what Islam (or Judaism or Christianity) is. Here the problems begin. For a pluralistic democracy cannot dene a religion. Yet any denition of 42 Clifford Geertz, “Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture,” in The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays (New York: Basic Books, 1973), 3–30. This point is further developed in Rebecca Ruth Gould, “Does Dening Racism Help Overcome It? Thick Descriptions in Lieu of Thin Denitions,” in Antisemitism, Islamophobia, and the Politics of Denition, ed. David Feldman and Marc Volovici (London: Palgrave MacMillan, forthcoming). 43 For a discussion of how hate crime legislation can be used to oppose anti-Muslim racism, see Jason A. Abel, “Americans under Attack: The Need for Federal Hate Crime Legislation in Light of Post-September 11 Attacks on Arab Americans and Muslims,” Asian American Law Journal, no. 12 (2005): 41–66. rebecca ruth gould 260 journal of law and religion at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/jlr.2020.20 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:23, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/jlr.2020.20 https://www.cambridge.org/core Islamophobia presupposes a denition of Islam. While believers may dene these concepts in the ways that make the most sense to them, the moment the state becomes involved in mandating or even preferring certain denitions over others is the moment when a government-backed denition of Islamophobia begins to pose a threat not only to free speech but also to freedom for Muslims within that state to dene themselves as they choose. Here we see how free speech violations threaten pluralistic legitimacy and vice-versa. Such maneuverings limit the autonomy of individual Muslims, particularly in Muslim-minority societies such as the United Kingdom, to dene Islam for themselves and on their own terms. They also compel such individuals to align with specic Muslim groups and specic versions of Islam. regulating islam In order to illustrate how a denition of Islamophobia could be harmful to Muslims, below I exam- ine the recent history of governmental efforts to counter Islamophobia within the United Kingdom. The APPG on British Muslims was formed in July 2017, with the aim of informing “Parliament and parliamentarians of . . . the aspirations and challenges of British Muslim communities” and of investigating “the forms, manifestations and extent of prejudice, discrimination and hatred against Muslims in the UK.”44 Although the APPG on British Muslims is not solely focused on dening Islamophobia, this is a large part of its mandate. This group has been haunted by denitional ambi- guity from its inception. Following public pressure, six MPs afliated with the APPG on British Muslims abruptly cancelled their plans to attend an Islamophobia Awareness event sponsored by MEND on the grounds that the group did not “have the best of reputations,” as quoted above.45 The earlier All-Party Parliamentary Group on Islamophobia was also derailed because of its afliation with this same group (when it was called iENGAGE).46 The basis for the MP’s recusal remains obscure. News reports suggest that it was linked to Tom Wilson’s report for the Henry Jackson Society, MEND: “Islamists Masquerading as Civil Libertarians.” The society describes the report as “demonstrate[ing] that MEND meets the Government’s own denition of extremism—even while local authorities, police, teachers and MPs have been working with the organisation.”47 Moreover, according to the report (which is strikingly hostile toward its subject), “Mend [sic] and its employees and volunteers have on numer- ous occasions attacked liberal Muslim groups and Muslims engaged in counter-extremism, and on occasion, Mend volunteers have expressed intolerance towards other Muslim denominations.”48 The terms highlighted here reveal a pronounced tendency to police the boundaries of Islam, such that only “liberal” Muslim groups that reject “intolerance” and support “counter-extremism” are deemed worthy of support. Pluralistic democratic legitimacy requires a much more inclusive approach than that proposed by the Henry Jackson Society and apparently internalized by the APPG on British Muslims. A pluralistic democracy will inevitably include among its members 44 House of Commons [United Kingdom], Register of All-Party Parliamentary Groups [as at 28 September 2017], https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm/cmallparty/170928/british-muslims.htm. 45 For a detailed account see Chris Allen, A Momentous Occasion: A Report on the All Party Parliamentary Group on Islamophobia and its Secretariat (Birmingham: Institute of Applied Social Studies, 2011), http://conservative home.blogs.com/les/appgislamophobia-allen-2011-2.pdf. For a summary of Allen’s prolic work on Islamophobia and a discussion of the denition, see Allen, Islamophobia, 187–92. 46 Allen, A Momentous Occasion, 21–23. 47 Wilson, MEND. 48 Wilson, MEND, 81 (emphasis added). the limits of liberal inclusivity journal of law and religion 261 at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/jlr.2020.20 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:23, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm/cmallparty/170928/british-muslims.htm https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm/cmallparty/170928/british-muslims.htm http://conservativehome.blogs.com/files/appgislamophobia-allen-2011-2.pdf http://conservativehome.blogs.com/files/appgislamophobia-allen-2011-2.pdf http://conservativehome.blogs.com/files/appgislamophobia-allen-2011-2.pdf https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/jlr.2020.20 https://www.cambridge.org/core individuals who are neither liberal nor tolerant, yet whose speech is as deserving of protection as anyone else. The internal differences given in Wilson’s report as a reason for the government to distance itself from MEND illustrate why a democratic state should refrain from endorsing any denition of Islamophobia that would legitimate one specic Muslim group while delegitimizing others. Within a pluralist democracy, the authority to address internal differences within Islam is best left to Muslims themselves. According to this standard, a government that intervenes in such affairs by refusing to align with certain groups on reputational grounds and in response to media pressure is made less democratic by virtue of such intervention. The government’s adoption of the IHRA denition provides ample evidence concerning how government involvement in dening prejudice against a religious community can work to that community’s detriment. Many Jewish organiza- tions and Jewish individuals have voiced their opposition to the IHRA denition, even as their objections have gone ignored, by the conservative-leaning Board of Jewish Deputies, which spear- headed the IHRA adoption and, following their lead, the government itself.49 Whatever their purportedly extremist views, MEND has a legitimate place within the Muslim community. To prefer a “liberal” Muslim group over a group guilty of “intolerance” (to borrow the language of Wilson’s report) is to propagate a “good” versus “bad” Muslim paradigm that fur- ther entrenches the securitization matrix that is implicated in the production of Islamophobia.50 Private groups are entitled to divide Islam in this way, just as other groups and individuals are enti- tled to disagree with such divisions, but a pluralistic government has no such entitlement. The report by the APPG on British Muslims itself curiously evades any serious discussion of sectarian- ism within Islam, simply asserting, “it would be misleading to interpret Islamophobia as a tool that can capture, together with the issues of racialisation, issues of sectarianism.”51 This caveat is unten- able, however, because once Islam is dened by a denition of Islamophobia, sectarian divisions inevitably follow. Given her role within the APPG on British Muslims, Soubry’s decision to sever ties with MEND is a sectarian gesture, however it was intended. Soubry is within her rights as a private citizen to decide which Muslim groups to afliate with or distance herself from, just as the Henry Jackson Society is legally permitted to publicly denounce MEND within a pluralistic democracy. But when the state chooses sides, as any denition of Islam or Islamophobia would compel it to do, it also necessarily excludes many Muslims. Beyond what it reveals concerning alliances between government and certain special groups—in this case with the Henry Jackson Society and against MEND—this exclusion illustrates broader dynamics. The problem here is not rooted in the specic groups that a state aligns with or disavows; rather it is tied to the very principle of selectivity from the point of view of pluralistic democratic legitimacy. A democracy that endorses freedom of expression and which supports Islam in terms appropriate for a pluralistic state must refrain from elevating certain types of Islam over others. Contrary to then prime minister David Cameron’s insistence that the government would “actively encourage the reforming and moderate Muslim voices,”52 within British society while refusing to 49 At least three UK Jewish groups have been outspoken in their opposition to the IHRA denition: Free Speech on Israel, the Jewish Socialists Group, and Jewdas. 50 For further on this pattern within Islamophobic thought, see Mahmood Mamdani, Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: America, the Cold War, and the Roots of Terror (New York: Three Leaves Press, 2005). 51 APPG on British Muslims, Islamophobia Dened, 41. 52 David Cameron, “Extremism” (speech, Ninestiles School, Birmingham, UK, July 20, 2015), https://www.independent. co.uk/news/uk/politics/david-cameron-extremism-speech-read-the-transcript-in-full-10401948.html. Cameron deliv- ered this speech prior to the government’s introduction of enhanced Prevent legislation. rebecca ruth gould 262 journal of law and religion at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/jlr.2020.20 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:23, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/david-cameron-extremism-speech-read-the-transcript-in-full-10401948.html https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/david-cameron-extremism-speech-read-the-transcript-in-full-10401948.html https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/david-cameron-extremism-speech-read-the-transcript-in-full-10401948.html https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/jlr.2020.20 https://www.cambridge.org/core engage with “extremist groups and individuals,” a pluralistic democracy must not simply cater to liberal Islam, or to Islam that avoids extremism and reects British values. Viewpoint-punitive expression on the part of the government constrains Islam rather than allowing it to ourish on its own terms, as a pluralistic democracy must do. While government neutrality on all issues is nei- ther possible nor desirable, pluralist democracy lives and dies according to its ability to maintain government neutrality toward religion. Two approaches are inevitably brought into conict by UK governmental efforts to regulate and protect Islam. In the rst instance, the state endorses certain kinds of Islam over others in an effort to assimilate Islam to British cultural norms, and to continue the War on Terror. The APPG on British Muslims declares its support for this agenda specically regarding the curtailment of the citi- zen’s prerogative of free expression when it states, “qualications to the exercise of free speech abound . . . for example, in counter-terrorism legislation, including statements that encourage, either intention- ally or recklessly, the commission of terrorist acts and which ‘glorify’ acts of terrorism.”53 In the second instance, the British state claims to protect Muslims whom it surveils by proposing to criminalize Islamophobia, notwithstanding the state’s own substantial contributions to this form of bigotry. While CAGE’s public statements cited above have exposed the government’s contradictory stance, aca- demic specialists of Islamophobia have had curiously little to say concerning the hypocrisy of liberal states that claim to protect Islam while also criminalizing its departures from liberal norms on the grounds of securitization. The tension between these two views is evident in Soubry’s call for a deni- tion of Islamophobia, as well as in the stances of Muslim organizations, including the Muslim Council of Britain, asking the government to formally endorse denitions that stigmatize certain Muslims. A denitional framework leads us to focus on Islam as a religion, when it would be more pro- ductive to focus on anti-Muslim racism (in the case of discrimination) and on violence directed against Muslims (in the case of hate crimes) and on neutralizing the discursive and material power of such expressions of bigotry. The denitional framework situates the legal system within a victim-blaming epistemology, whereby any offense against a religious community is turned into an occasion for scrutinizing this community, often in the name of its protection. When sympathetic politicians engage in such scrutiny, it may appear favorable and intended to reinforce Islam’s pos- itive qualities. It would be a mistake, however, to take comfort in the simulated benevolence of the neo-liberal state. Even David Cameron had positive words for Islam in his paternalistic 2015 speech on extremism that set the stage for future government policy on British Muslims, including Prevent. As I have argued here, regardless of how such a rapprochement might appear to support the inte- gration of Muslims into European societies, it can be harmful to Muslims minorities in the long run, particularly when the same agencies mandated to protect Islam disproportionately surveil Muslims, even while categorizing Islam as a religion they must protect. making islamophobia attractive Having discussed how a governmental denition of Islamophobia would compromise democratic legitimacy and place Muslim communities under further surveillance, I now consider how the potential harms of hate speech regulations limit efforts to challenge and oppose racism. A 2006 article by Mark Steyn, “The Future Belongs to Islam,” published in the Canadian magazine 53 APPG on British Muslims, Islamophobia, 37. the limits of liberal inclusivity journal of law and religion 263 at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/jlr.2020.20 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:23, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/jlr.2020.20 https://www.cambridge.org/core Maclean’s offers a case in point.54 The article became the subject of a complaint to the Canadian Human Rights Commission led by the Canadian Islamic Congress. Steyn made a series of claims that, in the words of the commission, were “obviously calculated to excite discussion and even offend certain readers, Muslim and non-Muslim alike.”55 No less disturbing than the article is the complaint against it, which qualies the complainant as someone who is empowered to com- plain “on behalf of all Muslim residents of British Columbia,” notwithstanding that, as founder of the Canadian Islamic Congress, he has no such representative status according to any Islamic institution or tradition.56 Lacking any clear community mandate, the Canadian Islamic Conference was dissolved in 2014, yet it presented itself to the Canadian Human Rights Commission as the authorized representative of all Muslims. As among British Muslims, in which context, in the words of Kenan Malik, “what is deemed an ‘offence to a community’ refers in reality to debates within communities,” this case exemplies the basic challenge of communal representation in the democratic pluralist state.57 No individual Muslim can legitimately complain “on behalf of all Muslim residents,” any more than can individ- ual Christians or Jews, or women or men, complain on behalf of the communities to which their identities are attached. In fact, Islam as a religious system provides even less support for identity- based understandings of representation due to its decentralized structures of authority: there is no priesthood or clerical class, let alone a pope licensed to speak ex cathedra. The fact that, in order to exonerate Steyn’s article, the Canadian Human Rights Commission had to determine that “the views expressed . . . when considered as a whole and in context, are not of an extreme nature, as dened by the Supreme Court”58 testies to the compromises with democratic legitimacy entailed in Canadian hate-speech legislation. Although on this occasion the commission chose to uphold the citizen’s prerogative of free expression, the commission’s reasoning and procedures remain problematic. Far from protecting controversial speech, this precedent creates a legal justi- cation for future attempts to censor materials deemed to be “of an extreme nature,” and addition- ally resonates with the United Kingdom’s subsequent approach to policing forms of Islam deemed to be “extremist” from the point of view of the counterterrorism matrix. Although the Canadian Human Rights Commission ultimately ruled against the complainer, damage was done, both to the cause of freedom of expression and to the cause of freedom to prac- tice religion. It is difcult to demonstrate harm in the case of speech suppression because the damage is often not expressed in material form. Yet, it is clear that the Canadian Islamic Conference might instead have concentrated their legal advocacy work on the actual disenfranchise- ment of Muslims, and on their persecution by government agencies and the security state brought 54 Mark Steyn, “The Future Belongs to Islam,” MacLean’s, October 20, 2006, https://www.macleans.ca/culture/the- future-belongs-to-islam/. 55 Canadian Islamic Congress v. Rogers Media Inc., at 4 (Canadian Human Rights Commission, June 25, 2008), quoted in “Human Rights Complaint against Maclean’s Dismissed,” Globe and Mail, June 28, 2008, https:// www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/human-rights-complaint-against-macleans-dismissed/article18452636/. Although the decision was widely reported and quoted in the Canadian press and law blogs at the time, the unpub- lished decision is no longer publicly accessible. 56 Elmasry and Habib v. Roger’s Publishing and MacQueen (No. 4), 2008 BCHRT 378, at ii, 1, http://bccla.org/wp- content/uploads/2012/03/2008-BCCLA-Argument-Elmasry-Decision.pdf (accessed October 14, 2019). 57 Kenan Malik, “Fear, Indifference and Engagement: Rethinking the Challenge of Anti-Muslim Bigotry,” in Islamophobia: Still a Challenge for Us All, ed. Farah Elahi and Omar Khan (London: Runnymede Trust, 2017), 73–77, at 74, https://www.runnymedetrust.org/uploads/Islamophobia%20Report%202018%20FINAL. pdf. 58 Canadian Islamic Congress v. Rogers Media Inc., quoted in “Human Rights Complaint against Maclean’s Dismissed.” rebecca ruth gould 264 journal of law and religion at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/jlr.2020.20 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:23, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available https://www.macleans.ca/culture/the-future-belongs-to-islam/ https://www.macleans.ca/culture/the-future-belongs-to-islam/ https://www.macleans.ca/culture/the-future-belongs-to-islam/ https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/human-rights-complaint-against-macleans-dismissed/article18452636/ https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/human-rights-complaint-against-macleans-dismissed/article18452636/ https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/human-rights-complaint-against-macleans-dismissed/article18452636/ http://bccla.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/2008-BCCLA-Argument-Elmasry-Decision.pdf http://bccla.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/2008-BCCLA-Argument-Elmasry-Decision.pdf http://bccla.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/2008-BCCLA-Argument-Elmasry-Decision.pdf https://www.runnymedetrust.org/uploads/Islamophobia%20Report%202018%20FINAL.pdf https://www.runnymedetrust.org/uploads/Islamophobia%20Report%202018%20FINAL.pdf https://www.runnymedetrust.org/uploads/Islamophobia%20Report%202018%20FINAL.pdf https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/jlr.2020.20 https://www.cambridge.org/core about by the transnational War on Terror. Such cases of misdirected advocacy in the name of pro- tecting Islam suggest that the mobilization by some Muslim organizations in favor of governmental denitions of Islamophobia is in fact an admission of weakness and an endorsement of Muslims’ subordinate status within Muslim-minority states. Muslim organizations that promote the criminalization of hateful Islamophobic speech often do this as part of a trade-off that involves ignoring the harms done to Muslim citizens by the War on Terror. They are willing to tacitly permit surveillance by the government in exchange for the gov- ernment’s commitment to penalize those who make statements deemed offensive to Islam. Such a trade-off is undemocratic, as well as a dangerous bargain from a Muslim point of view, which may well undermine their security over the long term. Ironically, the trade-off calls to mind the manage- ment of religious minorities in early Islamic empires, wherein non-Muslims (Christians, Jews, Zoroastrians) were granted limited rights as long as they agreed to follow restrictive behavioral and dress codes, and to refrain from blaspheming Islam.59 In a more contemporary context, the impulse to dene religious difference calls to mind Kenan Malik’s characterization of the neoliberal state as one that manages diversity by “putting individuals from minority communities into partic- ular ethnic and cultural boxes, dening needs and aspirations by virtue of the boxes into which peo- ple are put, and allowing the boxes to shape public policy.”60 The proposed governmental denition of Islamophobia is the most recent expression of this mode of public policy making. Muslim organizations that concentrate their advocacy efforts on persuading the state to censor Islamophobic speech inevitably surrender their democratic rights as citizens in exchange for neolib- eral protections. conflating terrorism and hateful speech The strongest argument against a governmental denition of Islamophobia lies with the govern- ment itself. UK government policy and legislation in relation to Muslims conates religious incite- ment with the propagation of hate speech. The Racial and Religious Hatred Act of 2006 (RRHA), drawn up shortly after the London bombings of July 2005, exemplies this conation. “A person who publishes or distributes written material which is threatening is guilty of an offence if he intends thereby to stir up religious hatred,”61 the legislation reads. With such a formulation, the legislation denes “religious hatred” as a form of expression that is subject to criminal sanc- tions.62 Among the side effects of this conation is a focus on (Islamist) terrorism (the backdrop 59 In the extensive literature on the “people of the book” within Islamic history that delineates these sociological dimensions in greater detail, key works include the following: Mark Cohen, Under Crescent and Cross: The Jews in the Middle Ages (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994); Yohanan Friedmann, Tolerance and Coercion in Islam: Interfaith Relations in the Muslim Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Milka Levy-Rubin, Non-Muslims in the Early Islamic Empire: From Surrender to Coexistence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011). For a case study of these discriminatory regulations, see Rebecca Ruth Gould, “Wearing the Belt of Oppression: Khāqānı’̄s Christian Qası̣d̄a and the Prison Poetry of Medieval Shirvān,” Journal of Persianate Studies 9, no. 1 (2016): 19–44. 60 Malik, “Fear, Indifference and Engagement,” 76. 61 Racial and Religious Hatred Act, 2006, c.1, § 1 (Eng.), https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/1/schedule/ data.xht?view=snippet&wrap=true. 62 This provision is discussed and critiqued in S. Chehani Ekaratne, “Redundant Restriction: The U.K.’s Offense of Glorifying Terrorism,” Harvard Human Rights Journal, no. 23 (2010): 205–21, at 212; Gelber, “Incitement to Hatred and Countering Terrorism,” 33–34. the limits of liberal inclusivity journal of law and religion 265 at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/jlr.2020.20 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:23, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/1/schedule/data.xht?view=snippet&wrap=true https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/1/schedule/data.xht?view=snippet&wrap=true https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/1/schedule/data.xht?view=snippet&wrap=true https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/jlr.2020.20 https://www.cambridge.org/core against which the RRHA was created) as an ideology, rather than as a mode of violence, and an assumption that the best way of combating it is to wage ideological warfare on certain varieties of Islam. Human rights advocates have criticized this ideological turn, with Conor Gearty noting that the “evolution of the term ‘terrorism’ from describing a kind of violence to a morally loaded condemnation of the actions of subversive groups regardless of the context of their actions—or even sometimes their non-violent nature . . . is a movement in language that operates wholly in favour of state authorities.”63 Government efforts to broaden the meaning of terrorism are related to the drive to broaden the meaning of Islamophobia. In both cases, broadening the denition extends the remit of the state and enhances its coercive powers. While the association between terrorism and Islam is widespread among the public and is prop- agated by media coverage, most problematically from the point of view of democratic legitimacy, it is also entailed in the RRHA. Without naming Islam, the legislation criminalizes the propagation of religious hatred on the grounds of its association with incitement to violence. This association recalls the guidelines drafted by the government to assist in the implementation of Prevent. One for- mula that features in such guidance runs as follows: “non-violent extremism . . . can create an atmo- sphere conducive to terrorism and can popularise views which terrorists then exploit.”64 Another Prevent guidance document registers this change in policy, while repeating the same formula: “the Prevent strategy was explicitly changed in 2011 to deal with all forms of terrorism and with non- violent extremism, which can create an atmosphere conducive to terrorism and can popularise views which terrorists then exploit.”65 In both the RRHA and the Prevent guidelines, the denition of dangerous discourse is purposively extended to cover a wide range of perspectives, and to encompass views which are not prima facie supportive of violence. As long as they fall under the rubric of “extremist,” such views, according to this government policy, should be sanctioned and suppressed. Of course, views are not “extremist” in the abstract; they necessarily have substan- tive content. In the understanding of the government as well as in the popular imagination, the sub- stantive content of extremism overlaps with Islam. Aware perhaps that “extremism” may seem impossibly vague, the government has (predictably) offered a denition. According to the Prevent duty guidance, extremism is “vocal or active oppo- sition to fundamental British values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs.”66 Echoing Cameron’s 2015 speech, this denition blurs analytically distinct boundaries while nationalizing ideological warfare as the defense of “British values.” Elided from this equation are the “British values” that encompass racism, contempt for the poor, colonialism, homophobia, and sexism. Generations of scholarship support such characterizations, even though these aws are not uniquely British. Is the scholarship on British colonialism, austerity, homophobia, and misogyny “extremist”? Why assume without demonstration that “British values” are epitomized by “mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs”?67 Worst of all, why embed such loaded language in legislation? The 63 Conor Gearty, “Human Rights in an Age of Counter Terrorism,” in War on Terror: The Oxford Amnesty Lectures, ed. Chris Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 83–98, at 85. 64 H. M. Government, Prevent Duty Guidance, 2015, at 6 (UK), http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukdsi/2015/ 9780111133309/pdfs/ukdsiod_9780111133309_en.pdf. 65 This specic formulation is scrutinized in Conor Gearty, On Fantasy Island: Britain, Europe, and Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 206. 66 Prevent Duty Guidance, 6. 67 This dimension of the legislation is critiqued in Suke Wolton, “The Contradiction in the Prevent Duty: Democracy vs ‘British values,’” Education, Citizenship and Social Justice 12, no. 2 (2017): 123–42. rebecca ruth gould 266 journal of law and religion at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/jlr.2020.20 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:23, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukdsi/2015/9780111133309/pdfs/ukdsiod_9780111133309_en.pdf http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukdsi/2015/9780111133309/pdfs/ukdsiod_9780111133309_en.pdf http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukdsi/2015/9780111133309/pdfs/ukdsiod_9780111133309_en.pdf https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/jlr.2020.20 https://www.cambridge.org/core government’s denition of extremism leaves these questions unresolved, resulting in a state dis- course that is concerned above all to protect the status quo, even at the cost of denying its own history. Further contributing to an impression of double standards in regards to Muslims, the section of the RRHA that protects freedom of expression focuses on the protection of anti-Muslim sentiment without extending comparable protections to the expression of non-violent Islamic belief. In terms that, considered in the context of the War on Terror, clearly evoke (and render immune from pros- ecution) criticism of Islam, the legislation stipulates, “Nothing in this Part shall be read or given effect in a way which prohibits or restricts discussion, criticism or expressions of antipathy, dislike, ridicule, insult or abuse of particular religions or the beliefs or practices of their adherents.”68 By contrast, no provision within the RRHA protects Islam from being vilied through its asso- ciation with violent incitement and hate speech. This would appear to be a textbook case of prej- udice inscribed within the law, since the free expression of anti-Muslim sentiment is protected by this legislation, which has as its primary purpose the censorship of hateful speech that speaks in the name of religion, and which the government has already associated with Islamic discourse. No explanation is given for further criminalizing hateful speech on the grounds of its religious con- tent or for perceiving Islamic discourse as more dangerous than that of white supremacist bigotry. It can be argued that, far from countering Islamophobic prejudice, such confusing provisions within the RRHA legitimate passive racism and anti-Muslim bigotry. Equally, it is at least arguable that the claims made in the Prevent guidance concerning “British values” stem from nationalist prejudice regarding the superiority of British culture to other cultures that is itself bigoted. What if “Islamic values” were demonstrably shown to represent an improvement over “British values”? Once again, generations of scholarship can be drawn on in support of such a view. Would such a position be deemed “extremist”? Why should a government that enshrines a double standard of suspicion against Islam into its legislation be trusted to protect this religion through a legal deni- tion of Islamophobia? Would it not be more sensible to critically scrutinize the Islamophobic dimensions of a state’s legislation rather than entrust it to criminalize views that are in fact rein- forced and legitimated by its War on Terror? constraining the state’s monopoly on violence Taking proposals for a governmental denition of Islamophobia as a case study, I have considered the ways in which suppressing hateful speech compromises pluralistic democratic legitimacy. I have argued that many well-intentioned advocacy efforts to protect Muslims from Islamophobic views fail to acknowledge the government’s role in propagating Islamophobic discourse. Even had the domestic War on Terror not already compromised the United Kingdom’s relationship with its Muslim citizens, a government denition of Islamophobia could never reach a democratically legit- imate consensus among the group targeted for protection. Just as right-wing bigots homogenize Muslims as a unied demographic, so do denitions of Islamophobia impose a false unity on a diverse community. It is unacceptable for democracies to micromanage conicts within Islam, nor should states align with certain Muslim groups while excluding others, as occurred when 68 Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006, c. 1, schedule § 29J (England & Wales), http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ ukpga/2006/1/contents (amending the Public Order Act 1986, c. 64). the limits of liberal inclusivity journal of law and religion 267 at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/jlr.2020.20 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:23, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/1/contents http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/1/contents http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/1/contents https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/jlr.2020.20 https://www.cambridge.org/core the MPs involved in drafting the proposed denition cut their ties with MEND in response to neg- ative media coverage. Populist political pressure—some of which is rooted in bigotry, and some of which is simply driven by self-interest—can all too easily compromise the democratic legitimacy of pluralist democ- racies. Once such legitimacy is undermined, there is practically no democracy left to defend, because non-democracies do not willingly consent to being shaped by their citizens. A state that operates through censorship creates the conditions for violence. The genre of political reasoning that is linked to contemporary debates around free speech pre- supposes the state’s democratic legitimacy. Because the modern state is uniquely entrusted with a monopoly on violence, and imposes its norms through coercive means, all citizens should be wary of gratuitously amplifying the state’s coercive capacities. Endowing the state with the author- ity to discriminate among different kinds of Islam empowers the state and disempowers Muslims, and potentially leads to further violence. The argument advanced here has relevance beyond Muslim communities; reconceptualizing free speech as intrinsic to the pluralist mandate and as a necessary component of minority rights can help with identifying and rectifying the harms inicted on vulnerable communities. In seeking to establish a clear understanding of hateful speech, Gelber suggests that we rely on “a conception of hate speech as speech that is directed at historically identiable minorities” because only such speech “discursively enacts discrimination that is analogous to other forms of systemic discrimina- tion.”69 The qualier “historically identiable minorities” importantly signals that hateful speech cannot apply to groups that have not suffered from historical discrimination. If a member of a group not known to be discriminated against is offended by a given statement, there are no grounds to classify that expression as hateful speech; equally, the mere taking of offense by an historical minority does not render a discourse hateful speech. In order to meet the bar for government sanc- tion, it must be demonstrated that such speech can inict substantial harm. Historical discrimina- tion generally refers to state policy, as endorsed by legislation, ratied by government, and adopted, tacitly or explicitly, by public bodies. Gelber’s formulation can therefore be rephrased. Hateful speech is “speech that is directed at historically identiable minorities” who have historically been discriminated against by the state. In the absence of state persecution, such minorities would not be vulnerable targets for hate speech. Government policy makes minorities likely targets of hateful speech in the rst place. The power of hateful speech derives from the disenfranchisement, state-sanctioned discrimina- tion, and legally codied racism that ethnic and sexual minorities have endured throughout history. Far from existing in opposition to it, hateful speech derives its power from governmentality. A gov- ernment that targets Islam for suspicion (including “non-violent” extremist Islam, as per the 2015 revised version of the Prevent strategy) has no legitimate authority to dene Islam for the purposes of its protection, and any such efforts should be regarded with suspicion. Inasmuch as Islamophobic discourse derives its power from government policies and practices, the ght against Islamophobia should prioritize opposition to those policies, rather than tacitly consenting to them in exchange for “protection” by a discriminatory state. The actions of the UK and the US governments in this arena in recent decades provide ample grounds for being wary of allocating to government the authority to dene Islam and Islamophobia, not least due to the harm that is likely to accrue to Muslims through such denitions. Bigotry is intersectional: antisemitism often accompanies Islamophobia, and misogyny frequently is 69 Gelber, “Hate Speech,” 626. rebecca ruth gould 268 journal of law and religion at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/jlr.2020.20 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:23, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/jlr.2020.20 https://www.cambridge.org/core manifested alongside homophobia.70 Hence, the strategies we develop to overcome Islamophobia are relevant to resisting all forms of racism, and the means of addressing anti-Muslim racism have bearing on other vulnerable communities. The strategies include more representation of indi- viduals from minority groups within government, compulsory education concerning other societies and cultures for all members of society, and revising the government’s counterterrorism legislation to disambiguate it from the persecution of Islam. Most importantly, it involves abolishing Prevent, an agglomeration of policy and legislation that unjustiably criminalizes Muslims. It means devel- oping a school curriculum that recognizes the diversity of Islamic culture across its historical and contemporary manifestations, and which embraces this heterogeneity as part of its pluralistic dem- ocratic mandate, rather than seeking to discriminate among the many varieties of Islam. acknowledgements This article owes a great deal to exchanges with Riz Mokal, Asim Qureishi, and Eric Heinze, none of whom are implicated in the views expressed here. I also thank Silas Allard for his careful reading. 70 See James Renton and Ben Gidley, eds., Antisemitism and Islamophobia in Europe: A Shared Story? (London: Springer, 2017). the limits of liberal inclusivity journal of law and religion 269 at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/jlr.2020.20 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:23, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/jlr.2020.20 https://www.cambridge.org/core THE LIMITS OF LIBERAL INCLUSIVITY: HOW DEFINING ISLAMOPHOBIA NORMALIZES ANTI-MUSLIM RACISM Abstract Pluralism, Free Speech, Democracy Defining and Countering Hateful Speech Regulating Islam Making Islamophobia Attractive Conflating Terrorism and Hateful Speech Constraining the State's Monopoly on Violence Acknowledgements 
work_gptaplbdxjhgxmvl3udil5wwm4	----	http://rac.sagepub.com Race & Class DOI: 10.1177/030639680604800116 2006; 48; 85 Race Class Scott Poynting What caused the Cronulla riot? http://rac.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/48/1/85 The online version of this article can be found at: Published by: http://www.sagepublications.com On behalf of: Institute of Race Relations can be found at:Race & Class Additional services and information for http://rac.sagepub.com/cgi/alerts Email Alerts: http://rac.sagepub.com/subscriptions Subscriptions: http://www.sagepub.com/journalsReprints.navReprints: http://www.sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.navPermissions: http://rac.sagepub.com/cgi/content/refs/48/1/85 Citations at King's College London - ISS on May 5, 2010 http://rac.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://www.irr.org.uk http://rac.sagepub.com/cgi/alerts http://rac.sagepub.com/subscriptions http://www.sagepub.com/journalsReprints.nav http://www.sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav http://rac.sagepub.com/cgi/content/refs/48/1/85 http://rac.sagepub.com 4 Ibid. 5 Harmit Athwal, ‘Two asylum seekers took their own lives within 24 hours’, IRR News (21 September 2005), <http://www.irr.org.uk/2005/september/ha000021.html>. 6 See <http://www.paih.org> for more details. 7 ‘Sheridan arrested at asylum demo’, BBC News (21 November 2005), <http://news. bbc.co.uk/1/hi/scotland/4455950.stm>. What caused the Cronulla riot?What caused the Cronulla riot? By Scott Poynting Abstract: The outbreak of mass racist violence against young men of ‘Middle Eastern appearance’ on Cronulla beach, Sydney, in December 2005 was the culmination of a campaign of populist incitement waged in the media and by the state. The battle to reclaim control of the beach for white Australia mirrored, it is suggested here, the battle that the Howard government has waged to reclaim control of the nation itself from asylum seekers and the Muslim/Middle Eastern ‘enemy’. Keywords: asylum, far Right, Lebanese, populism, racial violence, Sydney, Tampa On 11 December 2005, images from Australia, a country rarely the focus of world media, flashed around the globe in a way that was remi- niscent of the ‘Tampa crisis’ in 2001. They made an ugly picture: a vio- lent, frenzied mob of 5,000 ‘white’ Australians, fuelled by alcohol, attacking anyone of ‘Middle Eastern appearance’ that they could find near Sydney’s Cronulla beach.1 It was not a ‘race riot’ in the sense that we are used to in countries like the UK and France, where immigrant minorities are discriminated against until they reach breaking point, or the US, where the legacies of slavery and segregation spill on to the streets in violent outbursts after the latest ‘last straw’. We think of the Watts riots, the Brixton riots, the LA riots after the police beating of Rodney King, the riots in Oldham and Bradford in 2001, the November 2005 riots in France. The Cronulla riot was rather, as historian Dirk Moses has pointed out, in the nature of a pogrom: a violent attack by members of a dominant ethnic group against a minority, in order to put them back in their place.2 Historically, such violence has been represented by authorities and their ideologues as an unlawful but understandable response to some, often minor, transgression which triggers it. Commentary 85 at King's College London - ISS on May 5, 2010 http://rac.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://rac.sagepub.com Immediate causes The proximate causes of the Cronulla disturbance have been exten- sively canvassed. A fight between three surf lifesavers and a group of four Lebanese-background young men had occurred on the beach the weekend before. In the process of some youthful masculine contestation over space, the lifesavers had reportedly insulted their assailants with public taunts that ‘Lebs’ can’t swim. Consequently, two of them were brutally bashed. The popular commercial media, notably the tabloid newspapers and talkback radio, spent the following week whipping up hysteria. It can be difficult to demonstrate that such populist racialisation, even incitement, in the media, actually produces racist hate crime, though to the victims it seems obvious. Many of the respondents in a Human Rights and Equal Opportunities Commission research project on racism against Arab and Muslim Australians saw media vilification as causing the racial violence they had been increasingly experiencing since 11 September 2001.3 Such causal connections, however, can be very difficult to trace; rarely is there such clear-cut causality as evinced in the Cronulla riots. After the beating of the lifesavers at Cronulla, Rupert Murdoch’s Sydney tabloid, the Daily Telegraph, embarked on one of its classic morally outraged campaigns and demanded a tough crackdown on hooligans like the ‘Middle Eastern’ assailants. The right-wing Labor government of New South Wales (NSW) responded with its now customary reaction to tabloid crime-fear campaigns – aggressive bid- ding in the ‘law and order auction’. Premier Morris Iemma proposed a ludicrous twenty-five year maximum jail sentence for assaults on life- savers. A rally was organised for the following weekend to ‘reclaim’ Cronulla beach, through what ‘shock jock’ Steve Price of commercial radio station 2UE called ‘a community show of force’. The Daily Tele- graph announced ‘the battle of the beach’. The assistant commissioner of police, remarking that he grew up surfing at Cronulla, instructed Telegraph readers on what was the ‘Australian way’ at the beach; some- thing the front-page headline said he vowed to defend. A campaign of mobile phone text messaging was orchestrated, targeting residents of the surrounding Sutherland Shire (in south Sydney) and inciting racial violence for the coming weekend. There is evidence that far- right white supremacist groups were involved in circulating these messages; certainly members of those groups played a prominent role in inciting to violence the 5,000-strong mob that participated in the Cronulla riots. The Telegraph dutifully reprinted one such text message in its pages, conveying it to the readership of the largest-circulation newspaper in Australia: ‘This Sunday every Aussie in the Shire get 86 Race & Class 48(1) at King's College London - ISS on May 5, 2010 http://rac.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://rac.sagepub.com down to North Cronulla to help support Leb and wog bashing day . . . Bring your mates and let’s show them that this is our beach and they are never welcome . . . let’s kill these boys’.4 On the day before the riots, the broadsheet Sydney Morning Herald, in more disapproving tones, also published this text, up to its exhortation: ‘Let’s show them that this is our beach . . . Let’s claim back our shire.’5 Right-wing talkback radio commentator Alan Jones read out the same text message during his high-ratings breakfast programme on the commercial 2GB station, beginning with ‘Come to Cronulla this weekend to take revenge’ and responding to calls from racist vigilantes with approbation.6 In fact, when the campaign to ‘reclaim’ Cronulla beach was burgeoning during the week after the assault on the lifesavers, his instinct for self-promotion led him boastfully to remind his audience: ‘I led the charge.’ Folklore had circulated about how, for years, young ‘Aussie’ women had been offended and insulted and made to feel unsafe on the beach by the young men of an essentially misogynistic and unAustralian culture. According to this story, the locals of Sutherland Shire, an exceptionally white, Anglo area in culturally diverse Sydney, had for years been ‘putting up with’ immigrant outsiders from the working-class western suburbs who, in addition to affronting ‘our women’, were exclusively responsible for littering the parks and beaches; uniquely involved in boisterousness and skylarking; played football on the sand; and dressed inappropriately for the beach by wearing too many clothes. This sort of myth was retold by some academic ‘socially accredited experts’,7 who should have known better, in an appalling example of what has been critiqued as ‘the poverty of tabloid sociology’.8 Dr Mark Lopez, author of The Origins of Multiculturalism in Australian Politics, said locals in the Sutherland Shire had taken ‘a lot of shit’ from Muslim youths’.9 On the basis of what research – urban myth digested from afar? From what is said to have happened to some- one’s sister-in-law/daughter’s friend/neighbour’s wife, passed around the pubs, cafes and water-coolers, repeatedly augmented, amplified and broadcast on talkback radio? In Britain in November 2005, rumour-mongering, amplified by calls to pirate radio stations, led to a ‘race riot’ in Birmingham, when a gang rape was said to have been perpetrated on a teenage girl by a group of men in an Asian hair and beauty shop. Investigations by police and journalists could find no evidence of any such event, nor could they find a victim. The mortal stabbing, numerous assaults, arson and other property damage that resulted, however, were real.10 Perhaps the iconic status of the bronzed Aussie lifesaver and of the beach as a national symbol added to the emotional reaction over Cronulla. Every summer, for some years now, there has been media hype and police statements about ‘invasions’ of young men of Commentary 87 at King's College London - ISS on May 5, 2010 http://rac.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://rac.sagepub.com ‘Middle Eastern appearance’ misbehaving on Bondi beach, in particu- lar, but also on Cronulla. The crowd chanting racist slogans and attacking beach-goers and passers-by suspected of having a ‘Middle Eastern appearance’ at Cronulla beach, on that shameful Sunday, had waved and even wrapped themselves in Australian flags. Whatever the symbolism of the lifesaver and the surf, the call was raised to ‘take back’ ‘our’ beach. The photographed line in the sand traced the words ‘100% Aussie pride’. T-shirts were proudly worn with the words ‘ethnic cleansing unit’. Permission to hate The day after the riot, two-thirds of callers to 2GB radio apparently supported ‘what happened’.11 To understand this, we need to grasp its longer-term and more underlying causes; these include the ‘permis- sion to hate’ conferred by the state. Canadian criminologist Barbara Perry argues that such ‘permission’ is delivered by states, which indulge hate crime by declining to act against it, and whose officers provide a model for hate crimes by practising racial discrimination and violence on the state’s behalf.12 State racism in the form of ethnically targeted covert surveillance, ongoing harassment, secret police, dawn raids carried out by heavily armed officers, arrest and detention without proper trial and the like seems to be interpreted by outraged self- appointed guardians of white Christian ‘Australianness’ as some sort of moral licence for their own violent racial attacks.13 Thus, if the state assaults, harasses and vilifies Muslims as the enemy in the war on terror and thereby terrorises whole communities, then perhaps white-thinking citizens feel justified in personally attacking this enemy wherever they might encounter it. So, in a moral panic about the purported bad behaviour of ‘Lebs’ at the beach, a bystander of Bangladeshi background was chased, mobbed and assaulted. The Arab ‘other’ has morphed into the Muslim ‘other’. This process is not new – Indonesian women in hijabs had their veils torn off in Australia during the 1991 Gulf War – but it has been greatly exacerbated since September 11. ‘Clear off’ was education minister Brendan Nelson’s message, mega- phoned via the media in the midst of a panic about ‘home-grown terrorists’, in the weeks after the July 2005 London bombings. The message was ostensibly addressed to Muslims who refused to assimi- late; it was also intended for other ears. It reached them. ‘Fuck off Lebs’ was chanted by the racist crowd at Cronulla Beach. F-word aside, they were saying the same thing, to the same people. Since the mid- to late 1990s, the folk demon of the Middle Eastern/ Muslim ‘other’ has been constructed, in societies like Australia, as backward, uncivilised, irrational, violent, criminally inclined, misogy- 88 Race & Class 48(1) at King's College London - ISS on May 5, 2010 http://rac.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://rac.sagepub.com nistic and a terrorist threat – a whole litany of evil attributes. Since 2001, the Australian government has manipulated the media to propa- gate untruths about desperate and imperilled asylum seekers attempt- ing to reach Australia by sea, including the survivors rescued by the Tampa, and others who have attempted the journey in small boats. The military has been used to repulse these vessels and to detain the asylum seekers on board. This cynical, clever populism was followed by thoroughgoing engagement in the US-led ‘war on terror’, with all the ethnic targeting and demonising propaganda that it entailed. An election victory was delivered where previously defeat had been all but guaranteed. ‘We will determine who comes to this country and the circumstances under which they come’ was a key Howard slogan during the 2001 election campaign. On the face of it, it is an unexcep- tional statement about immigration controls, applied by all contempor- ary nation states. The message for the less liberal and rational, those nostalgic for the relaxed and comfortable days of ‘White Australia’ and white picket fences, was that the coalition would move to keep out the dangerous Middle Eastern/Muslim ‘other’. This ‘dog-whistle’ tactic of sending an ‘inaudible’ and thus plausibly deniable signal was, nevertheless, powerfully effective.14 The connection between this playing of the ‘race card’ and the Cronulla riots was eloquently made by the cartoonists of both broad- sheets, the Sydney Morning Herald and the Australian, on the day after the beach-side racist mob violence. (Cartoonists have been an admirable source of criticism of the global and domestic ‘war on terror’ in an otherwise largely supine and domesticated media.) ‘We shall determine who comes to our suburb and the manner in which they come’, they both incanted, more or less in unison. The day after the attacks, the prime minister was dog-whistling again. He declined to use the R-word. He thought that racism ‘is a word that’s flung around carelessly and I’m simply not going to do it’.15 In refusing to recognise the obvious, that racism was a major causal factor of the riot, Howard doubtless appealed to those attracted by the ongoing right-wing attack on a so-called ‘elitist’ ‘political correctness’. The attack on multiculturalism and on laws against racist vilification have been successfully adopted and manipulated by the Howard coalition since the political advent of former Liberal Party candidate Pauline Hanson in 1996 and her founding of the anti-immigration One Nation party. Unequal response Of course the governments, both federal and state, have not been will- ing to accept any responsibility for Cronulla. Nor have the mainstream media, which have tended to follow both governments’ line that there Commentary 89 at King's College London - ISS on May 5, 2010 http://rac.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://rac.sagepub.com was no deep-seated racism causing the Cronulla attacks; rather it was ordinary criminality and the understandable exasperation of the locals, fuelled by alcohol. (In the Australian, occasional columnist and academic David Burchell has also castigated ‘the Left’ for its ‘half- baked reaction’ to One Nation; downplayed the role of racism in the riots; ridiculed the anti-racist response; blithely asserted, in apparent ignorance of a mounting body of research, that no evidence exists of an increase in racism; and counselled us to ‘break out a cold one’ – cold comfort for Australia’s Muslims.) Indeed, since 12 December 2005, the media and the NSW opposition have turned the public con- cern around, remarkably, from initial shame and remorse over the racist mob violence, to a disproportionate focus on reprisal attacks the night after the riot. Assaults and property damage by carloads of young men, taken to be Lebanese immigrants from the western sub- urbs, were associated with a reawakening of the moral panic about ‘ethnic crime’, which has been surging on and off since the mid- to late 1990s. In manipulating the fear of ‘ethnic crime gangs’ and engaging in the associated law-and-order auctions and populist finger-pointing at immigrant communities, the Labor government of NSW has contributed as much as the federal coalition to the racialisa- tion that lay behind the riot. The NSW Liberal opposition, for its part, asserts that the government is to blame for treating ‘ethnic criminals’ with kid gloves and for under-policing through a fear of political correctness – a chorus dutifully taken up by right-wing columnist ideo- logues. But nothing could be further from the truth: for three terms of office, the NSW government has matched and outbid the opposition in the racialisation of crime and associated ‘get-tough’ gestures.16 In response to this moral panic, a Lebanese Australian young man has been sentenced to three months in prison for burning the Australian flag, an act whose symbolism meant that the ‘emotional injury’ was ‘amplified’, according to the sentencing magistrate. Mean- while, a young white Anglo man, arrested in a car with a drum of petrol, riot helmets, a two-way radio and a knife, and found to have in his bedroom an unlicensed pistol, smoke grenades, capsicum spray, mace and a computer with internet links to a white supremacist web- site, was granted bail, despite the Iemma government’s reversal of the presumption of bail in riot cases. There will be much more of this. Rioting racist mobs have been rare in Australia, although, as the originary racism of invasion and colonisation continued, massacres of Aboriginal people were perpetrated until as late as the 1920s. Racism against foreigners also broke out in some notorious pogrom- like riots. In the nineteenth century, there were violent anti-Chinese riots on the gold-fields, as well as a riot, fights, a mortal shooting and arson over the immigration of Afghan cameleers and their families. Anti-immigrant ‘race riots’ took place in Kalgoorlie, in 1934, when 90 Race & Class 48(1) at King's College London - ISS on May 5, 2010 http://rac.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://rac.sagepub.com workers reacted against some mining companies’ policy of only employing immigrant labour from southern Europe. Yet there has not been anything comparable since the advent of multiculturalism in the early 1970s. In a country which has seen the largest immigration programme per capita of population anywhere in the world (with the singular exception of Israel), the absence of such mass racial violence bespeaks the remarkable success of Australian multiculturalism. The various manifestations of the policy have had bipartisan support from both the Labor and Liberal parties for the best part of three decades. Since the Hansonites’ attack on multiculturalism – at the same time as attacks on Aboriginal land rights, self-determination and affirmative action – and the mainstreaming of many of their poli- cies by the Howard government, Australian multiculturalism has been wound back. This has been effected with the, at best, faint-hearted and, at worst, complicit reticence of Kim Beazley’s Labor Party, which has not differentiated itself or provided real opposition. The Cronulla riots are a symptom, a highly disturbing one. Scott Poynting is associate professor in the school of humanities and languages at the University of Western Sydney. References 1 An earlier version of this article first appeared in the March 2006 edition of Nexus, the newsletter of the Australian Sociological Association. 2 D. Moses, ‘Pogrom talk’, On Line Opinion (11 January 2006), <http://www. onlineopinion.com.au/view.asp?article=4038>. 3 S. Poynting and G. Noble, Living with Racism: the experience and reporting by Arab and Muslim Australians of discrimination, abuse and violence since 11 September 2001 (Sydney, Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, 2004), <http:// www.humanrights.gov.au/racial_discrimination/isma/research/index.html>. 4 L. McIlveen and S. Downie, ‘Second beach brawl – police call for calm as locals plot revenge’, Daily Telegraph (8 December 2005), p. 2. 5 N. McMahon, ‘A lesson in beach etiquette, Shire-style’, Sydney Morning Herald (10–11 December 2005), p. 3. 6 D. Marr, ‘One-way radio plays by its own rules’, Sydney Morning Herald (13 December 2005), p. 6. 7 S. Cohen, Folk Devils and Moral Panics: the creation of the Mods and Rockers (New York, St Martin’s Press, 1980), p. 9. 8 S, Poynting, G. Noble, P. Tabar and J. Collins, Bin Laden in the Suburbs: criminal- ising the Arab other (Sydney, Institute of Criminology, 2004), pp. 149–151. 9 J. Kerin and N. Leys, ‘We’re not a bunch of racists, PM says’, Australian (13 December 2005), p. 4. 10 E. Vulliamy, ‘Rumours of a riot’, The Guardian (29 November 2005), <http:// www.guardian.co.uk/g2/story/0,,1652950,00.html>. 11 D. Marr, op. cit. 12 B. Perry, In the Name of Hate: understanding hate crimes (New York and London, Routledge, 2001), pp. 179–223. 13 Poynting, et al, op. cit. Commentary 91 at King's College London - ISS on May 5, 2010 http://rac.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://rac.sagepub.com 14 Ibid. 15 Kerin and Leys, op. cit. 16 J. Collins, G. Noble, S. Poynting and P. Tabar, Kebabs, Kids, Cops and Crime: youth, ethnicity and crime (Sydney, Pluto Press, 2000). 92 Race & Class 48(1) at King's College London - ISS on May 5, 2010 http://rac.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://rac.sagepub.com 
work_gqbahe63lffkfjs7tpyy2c7gte	----	The Imperative of Dissecting Anti-Black and Anti-Indigenous Meritocracy in Communication Studies and Beyond | Departures in Critical Qualitative Research | University of California Press Skip to Main Content Close UCPRESS ABOUT US BLOG SUPPORT US CONTACT US Search search input Search input auto suggest search filter All Content Departures in Critical Qualitative Research Search User Tools Register Carnegie Mellon University Carnegie Mellon University Sign In Toggle MenuMenu Content Recent Content Browse Issues All Content Purchase Alerts Submit Info For Authors Librarians Reprints & Permissions About Journal Editorial Team Contact Us Skip Nav Destination Article Navigation Close mobile search navigation Article navigation Volume 8, Issue 4 Winter 2019 Previous Article Next Article Article Navigation Research Article| December 01 2019 The Imperative of Dissecting Anti-Black and Anti-Indigenous Meritocracy in Communication Studies and Beyond Luis M. Andrade ; Luis M. Andrade Luis M. Andrade is Assistant Professor in the Communication and Media Studies Department at Santa Monica College. Correspondence to: Luis M. Andrade, 1900 Pico Boulevard, Santa Monica, CA 90405, USA. Email: andrade_luis@smc.edu, luismanuelandrade1@gmail.com. Search for other works by this author on: This Site PubMed Google Scholar Deven Cooper Deven Cooper Deven Cooper is a Faculty member and Director of Debate in the Communication Studies Department at California Sate University, Long Beach. Correspondence to: Deven Cooper, Communication Studies Department, California State University, Long Beach, 1250 Bellflower Boulevard, Long Beach, CA 90840, USA. Email: deven.cooper@csulb.edu, devenc325@gmail.com. Search for other works by this author on: This Site PubMed Google Scholar Departures in Critical Qualitative Research (2019) 8 (4): 23–29. https://doi.org/10.1525/dcqr.2019.8.4.23 Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn Email Tools Icon Tools Get Permissions Cite Icon Cite Search Site Citation Luis M. Andrade, Deven Cooper; The Imperative of Dissecting Anti-Black and Anti-Indigenous Meritocracy in Communication Studies and Beyond. Departures in Critical Qualitative Research 1 December 2019; 8 (4): 23–29. doi: https://doi.org/10.1525/dcqr.2019.8.4.23 Download citation file: Ris (Zotero) Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search search input Search input auto suggest search filter All Content Departures in Critical Qualitative Research Search In this essay, we argue that we have an imperative to dissect how global anti-Blackness and anti-Indigeneity unfold in academic institutions and how these ideologies emerge in local, precise phenomena, such as the recent National Communication Association's Distinguished Scholars (DS) controversy. We provide descriptions of anti-Blackness and anti-Indigeneity ideologies and explain how meritocracy in academic institutions and the DS controversy are entrenched in both. The study of the ideologies together—in the same way that we, a Mexican man and a Black man, converge as researchers from distinct positionalities—is important because both intersect from similar roots, such as White settlerism, and foment solidarity. Keywords: Anti-Blackness, Anti-Indigeneity, Meritocracy, White settlerism © 2019 by the Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. Request permission to photocopy or reproduce article content at the University of California Press's Reprints and Permissions web page, http://www.ucpress.edu/journals.php?p=reprints 2019 You do not currently have access to this content. Sign in Don't already have an account? Register Client Account You could not be signed in. Please check your email address / username and password and try again. Email address / Username ? 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work_gs5viwddrbgh3el2lvtacmbnyy	----	socf_068 379..389 (Dis)unity and Diversity in Post-9 ⁄11 America Robyn M. Rodriguez 1 Drawing inspiration from the work of Robin M. Williams Jr., I map out the complexities of ethnic and racial relations in the contemporary United States by focusing on the impacts of 9 ⁄ 11—particularly in relation to immi- gration policy. Because the attackers entered the country through regular immigration channels (i.e., as foreign students) the U.S. government has introduced policies to enhance border security, restrict immigration, increase the surveillance of immigrant populations, and more actively enforce immi- gration policy. These national-security-related immigration policies, however, are exacerbating existing tensions and producing new sets of ethnic and racialized conflicts in the United States. In this article, I first provide an overview of the key national-security-related immigration policies that were passed in the wake of September 11, 2001. Then, I review some of the recent sociological literature, as well as draw from my own preliminary research in the State of New Jersey, to illustrate the social impacts of these policies on ethnic and racial relations. I conclude with an outline of the ways the socio- logy of ethnic and racial relations specifically, as well as other subfields of the discipline, might approach analyses of social conflict in the contemporary United States, post–September 11. KEY WORDS: ethnicity; immigration; national security; public policy; race; Robin M. Williams Jr. INTRODUCTION Fifty years ago, in an essay entitled, ‘‘Unity and Diversity in Modern America,’’ Robin M. Williams Jr. wrote, ‘‘there exists a great need to periodically examine our assumptions as to the sociological meaning of 1 Department of Sociology, Rutgers University, 54 Joyce Kilmer Avenue, Piscataway, New Jersey 08854-8045; e-mail: rrodriguez@sociology.rutgers.edu. Sociological Forum, Vol. 23, No. 2, June 2008 (� 2008) DOI: 10.1111/j.1573-7861.2008.00068.x 379 0884-8971/08/0300-0031/0 � 2008 Eastern Sociological Society unity-in-diversity’’ (Williams, 1957). The ‘‘unity-in-diversity’’ to which Williams refers is the idea of the United States as a ‘‘nation of nations, a multiple melting pot, a cultural medley,’’ in other words, the United States as a country of immigrants. Indeed, throughout his career as a sociologist, Williams showed keen interest in ethnic relations and, concomitantly, race relations. In ‘‘Unity and Diversity in Modern America,’’ Williams outlined a research agenda for sociologists concerned with the ways immigration had shaped the United States. Drawing inspiration from the scholarly work of Robin M. Williams Jr., I map out the complexities of ethnic and racial relations in the con- temporary United States by focusing on the impacts of 9 ⁄ 11—particularly in relation to immigration policy. Because the attackers entered the country through regular immigration channels (i.e., as foreign students) the U.S. government has introduced policies to enhance border security, restrict immigration, increase the surveillance of immigrant populations, and more actively enforce immigration policy. Indeed, as terrorist threats continue to plague the United States, the enforcement of immigration policies, whether at the borders or internally, remains significant. These national-security-related immigration policies, however, are exacerbating existing tensions and producing new sets of ethnic and racialized conflicts in the United States. The social landscape of post-9 ⁄ 11 America raises new sets of chal- lenges for sociologists of ethnic and racial relations in particular, and for all sociologists concerned about broader processes of exclusion in the con- temporary moment. In this article, I first provide an overview of the key national-security-related immigration policies that were passed in the wake of September 11, 2001. Then, I review some of the recent sociological literature, as well as draw from my own preliminary research in State of New Jersey, to illustrate the social impacts of these policies on ethnic and racial relations. I conclude with an outline of the ways the sociology of ethnic and racial relations specifically, as well as other subfields of the discipline, might approach analyses of social conflict in post-9 ⁄ 11 America. ‘‘HOMELAND SECURITY’’ AND THE SECURITIZATION OF MIGRATION In the immediate wake of the 9 ⁄ 11 attacks on the World Trade Cen- ter and the Pentagon, the U.S. government introduced numerous laws that would impact foreigners attempting to enter the country as well as immi- grants (both noncitizen and citizen) currently residing in the United States. The USA Patriot Act is among the most significant of these legislative 380 Rodriguez initiatives. Signed into law on October 26, 2001, just weeks after the bombing of the Twin Towers, the Act enhances the surveillance of immi- grants living in the United States and allows officials to track down and deport those suspected of having terrorist links (Fekete, 2004; Waslin, 2003). Moreover, the Act exempts these cases of deportation from pro- cesses of judicial review (Mantle, 2003). Almost 1 year later, on November 25, 2002, the Homeland Security Act was passed. This Act led to the dissolution of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), replacing it with the newly formed Depart- ment of Homeland Security (DHS). Notably, under the new DHS, the policing and enforcement functions of immigration authorities, both exter- nal and internal, were increased (Martin, 2003). For instance, the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) was established to handle immigra- tion enforcement at U.S. borders (land borders like the U.S.–Mexico bor- der, as well as U.S. entry points via airports). The U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) office was created to deal with the enforce- ment of immigration policy within the interior United States. Moreover, local police units could now be forced to cooperate with federal agencies in immigration enforcement, further extending the government’s policing apparatuses (Martin, 2003; Schoenholtz, 2003) These changes made U.S. national security policy increasingly interiorized and localized. The interiorization and localization of immigration enforcement marks a trend toward the ‘‘securitization’’ of migration in the United States. Thomas Faist defines the securitization of migration as the construction of ‘‘security, the collective management of subnational or transnational threats and the policing of borders and internal realm, rather than just the defense of territory against external attack’’ (Faist, 2002). With the securitization of migration, noncitizens, particularly immigrants (i.e., those seeking to settle in the United States permanently, as opposed to tourists, temporary work- ers, or other kinds of noncitizens), have become the subjects of state surveil- lance. National security or, in its more recent appellation, ‘‘homeland security,’’ is not merely concerned with securing national borders against external threats; it is aimed at the perceived threat posed by noncitizens living within U.S. national borders. Some scholars suggest that post-9 ⁄ 11 policies simply make existing immigration laws more efficacious. Debates of the mid 1990s surrounding undocumented Mexican immigrants led to the introduction of Proposition 187 in the State of California; this legislation would have barred from public services those suspected of illegal immigration (Calavita, 1996). At the national level, the U.S. government responded to public tensions over undocumented immigration, passing the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA). But the post-9 ⁄ 11 (Dis)unity and Diversity in Post-9 ⁄ 11 America 381 expansion of the internal and local enforcement capacities under the DHS allowed the government to better execute IIRIRA provisions (Cornelius, 2004a,b). Peter Andreas suggests, ‘‘take the word ‘terrorism’ and put in the words ‘drug trafficking’ or ‘illegal immigration’ and the new discourse of border security is remarkably similar to the older discourse that has defined U.S. border relations with Mexico’’ (Andreas, 2002). I would suggest, however, that the securitization of migration also describes the process by which the work of national security (i.e., the sur- veillance and policing of immigrants) is normalized and taken up by ordinary U.S. citizens. For instance, the DHS actively encourages individ- uals to report ‘‘suspicious activity,’’ while state and local authorities ask that ‘‘if you see something, say something.’’ Many U.S. citizens have taken up this call. Consider the ‘‘Minutemen,’’ who pledge to ‘‘use every legal means at our disposal to assist law enforcement authorities in identi- fying and apprehending those who violate our borders’’ (Minutemen Civil Defense Corps, 2007). Exclusionary immigration policies and cultures of social exclusion work in tandem. NEW COMPLEXITIES OF ETHNIC AND RACIAL CONFLICT IN POST-9 ⁄ 11 AMERICA Much current scholarship characterizes post-9 ⁄ 11 U.S. policies as particularly ‘‘anti-Muslim’’ and ‘‘anti-Arab.’’ Moreover, this scholarship suggests that these policies have created a hostile social climate for Mus- lims and Arabs. For instance, legal scholar Karen Tumlin argues that what has emerged since 9 ⁄ 11 is an ‘‘immigration-plus profiling regime,’’ that is, immigration and immigrant policy after 9 ⁄ 11 targets immigrants based on their presumed national origins (i.e., Arab or North African countries) and Muslim religious identity. Tumlin examines executive and legislation actions after 9 ⁄ 11, and offers a close study of judicial actions (Tumlin, 2004). The interiorization of immigration enforcement coupled with the emergence of a highly securitized immigration policy has had specific effects for Arab and Muslim immigrants in different communities. For instance, in the wake of September 11, immigrants residing in Jersey City, New Jersey (which lies right across the Hudson River from the site of the World Trade Center), starting calling their city ‘‘Terror City’’ to describe the widespread sense of fear many immigrant community members felt as a consequence of the government’s local antiterror campaign. According to one report, immediately after the 9 ⁄ 11 attacks, military helicopters hovered over Jersey City’s Journal Square as FBI agents forced their way 382 Rodriguez into a nearby apartment building, arresting Muslim immigrant men living there (Din, 2004). Although the government admits that the post-9 ⁄ 11 anti- terror sweeps in New Jersey and New York, along with the arrests resulting from them, did not have links to terrorist groups, the detention and deportation of immigrants has persisted (Danen, 2006). Sociologist Louise Cainkar, like Tumlin, argues that ‘‘homeland secu- rity’’ policies have specifically targeted Muslims and Arabs. Moreover, she suggests that as a consequence, Muslims and Arabs have become socially marginalized from mainstream U.S. society. Their marginalization is intensified by negative media portrayals, job discrimination, hate speech, and, in extreme cases, hate crimes. Homeland security policies, in effect, have produced a great deal of homeland insecurity for specific groups of people living in the United States (Cainkar, 2004). Evidence from New Jersey suggests that South Asians, both Muslims and non-Muslims, are experiencing increasing tensions from other groups in the form of bias and hate crimes since 9 ⁄ 11 (Crouse, 2006). The terrorist attacks elicited specific governmental responses after 9 ⁄ 11. These actions clearly impacted Arabs and Muslims. But the more aggressive enforcement of bureaucratic immigration policies (e.g., the change of address policy, which requires that immigrants report a change of address to immigration authorities within 10 days of moving), the enlisting of local and state police in workplace raids, and airport security sweeps have also affected the Mexican immigrant community (Waslin, 2003). Consequently, many have been detained and deported en masse across the United States (Hemingway, 2007). Indeed, if 9 ⁄ 11 produced public anxieties toward Arabs and Muslims, it also exacerbated already existing tensions around Mexican immigration. These tensions have triggered new legislative debates, the most notable surrounding bill H.R. 4437, introduced by Wisconsin Congressman James Sensenbrenner. (The bill was passed by the House of Representatives in December 2005.) Some of the key provisions of the bill included the inten- sive militarization of the U.S.–Mexican border and the further expansion of technologies of policing immigrants in the interior. The bill, further- more, sanctioned local authorities to carry out immigration enforcement. (Under the present immigration regime, local authorities are often enlisted to aid in immigration enforcement, but they are not legally required to do so.) One of the most problematic provisions of the bill, from the perspective of immigrant organizations and their supporters, was the criminalization of undocumented immigrants. The bill requires that immigrants found without documentation be charged with a criminal offense and serve a minimum of 1 year in prison and ⁄ or pay a fine before being deported. Moreover, the bill requires that offenders be barred from reentering the United States again. In (Dis)unity and Diversity in Post-9 ⁄ 11 America 383 addition, individuals or organizations that provide support or advocate on behalf of the undocumented could also be criminally charged. Though H.R. 4437 never became law, it triggered widespread public debate about immigration in the United States and worsened nativist sen- timent among U.S. citizens (mainly whites). Around the country, anti- immigrant groups like the Minutemen Project mentioned earlier were formed to drive out immigrants in their localities. In New Jersey, for example, chapters of the New Jersey Citizens for Immigration Control have been forming. The group is specifically aimed at supporting anti- immigration federal legislation and anti-immigration legislators; it also fights to limit state and local benefits for immigrants. Their web site declares: The Migration Policy Institute reports that it costs New Jersey taxpayers about $400 million annually to support immigrants with pubic benefits! Help us fight free hospital care, disability, and other benefits for illegals. We also oppose legislative proposals to give them favorable in-state college tuition and driving ‘privileges.’ (New Jersey Citizens for Immigration Control, 2007). In some cases, local governments, emboldened perhaps by national developments toward the localization of immigration enforcement, are taking action. These governments use municipal ordinances to regulate the lives of immigrants in their localities and enhance the enforcement capaci- ties of municipal police. In Morristown, New Jersey, for instance, Mayor Donald Creitello openly called for the ‘‘vigilant enforcement’’ of immi- grant law locally. Initially, Creitello was not explicit about his aims. He introduced measures to better enforce the town’s laws against overcrowd- ing in rental properties and to organize the procurement of day laborers away from the town’s train station. Immigrant groups, however, criticized the mayor’s initiatives as having particularly negative impacts for Latino immigrants living in Morristown; it is generally Latinos who live in rental properties and work as day laborers. As social tensions mounted, Creitello became more direct regarding his aim to crackdown on undocumented immigrants living in the community (Tapaoan, 2004). While local nativist groups and governments attempt to further regu- late the lives of immigrants, existing immigration laws continue to be in force. Indeed, local New Jersey newspapers frequently feature articles about local raids being conducted by ICE teams. Their objective: to track down out-of-status and undocumented immigrants. Post-9 ⁄ 11 immigration legis- lation expands the processes of ‘‘illegalization,’’ that is, legal immigrants can easily be rendered ‘‘illegal’’ or undocumented and therefore deportable. De Genova suggests, for instance, that illegal immigration ‘‘is produced and patterned … the law defines the parameters of its own operations, engen- dered the conditions of possibility for ‘legal’ as well as ‘illegal’ practices’’ 384 Rodriguez (De Genova, 2002). Though the legal production of ‘‘illegal’’ immigrants has a long history in the United States (see, e.g., the work of historians such as Mae Ngai), I contend that what exists today is an immigration regime that expands the possibilities for immigrants’ illegalization in ways never before experienced (Ngai, 2004). This is due not only to the introduction of restrictive immigration policies, but also to expanding surveillance mecha- nisms enabled by today’s information technologies and to the use of local police units in immigration enforcement. NEW AGENDAS FOR RESEARCH The post-9 ⁄ 11 political and social landscape requires our close atten- tion as sociologists. In the following sections, I outline the kinds of contri- butions that can be made to our existing understandings, particularly to immigration and race relations scholarship and to research on post-9 ⁄ 11 ethnic and racial conflict. The Immigrant Second Generation Research on post-9 ⁄ 11 ethnic and racial conflict can contribute to theories of the second-generation, native-born children of immigrants, particularly with regard to the role ethnic identity plays in their lives. Zhou and Portes, for instance, propose that the second-generation children of immigrants either: (1) acculturate and achieve a level of economic integra- tion that compares with the white middle class, (2) become a permanent segment of the underclass, or (3) achieve a kind of ‘‘middle ground’’ in that they achieve middle-class status through ethnic networks (Portes and Zhou, 1993). They call these different paths ‘‘segmented assimilation’’ (Portes and Zhou, 1993). Bandana Purkayastha finds that a model of ‘‘racialized ethnicity’’ better explains how the middle-class, second-generation South Asian Americans she interviews achieve middle class-ness (i.e., living in predominantly white communities and mainly interacting with whites) while continuing to draw on their ethnic identities. Purkayashtha’s notion of racialized ethnicity suggests that ethnic identities are sustained by sec- ond-generation immigrants, not as a means of securing social resources for integration, but rather as a consequence of racializing processes (Purkayas- tha, 2005). Future research can assess how well these models apply among a diverse set of second-generation immigrants who must contend with a post-9 ⁄ 11 social environment charged with new kinds of anxieties. Indeed, examining the second generation alongside both naturalized citizens and (Dis)unity and Diversity in Post-9 ⁄ 11 America 385 noncitizen immigrants is important for understanding the significance of citizenship (defined as both legal formal membership and as an identity) and in helping people to negotiate with the challenges of their daily lives. Citizenship, Belonging, and Political Incorporation Future research can also contribute to understanding how different immigrant groups construct meanings of citizenship and belonging. Consider studies like that of Caroline Brettell. Brettell compares four immigrant populations in the Dallas-Forth Worth metropolitan area, and distinguishes the ways immigrants define citizenship. Models like Brettell’s are important models on which to build if we wish to track the extent to which immigrant perspectives on citizenship and, ultimately, belonging may have changed after the 9 ⁄ 11 attacks (Brettell, 2006). Findings from this sort of research may help scholars to better understand the processes of political incorporation as experienced by different immigrant groups under changing social conditions. Citizenship scholars have generally focused on either the legal-formal aspects of citizenship or, in contrast, the ways national cultures define who belongs and how these cultural understandings might shape notions of citizenship (Joppke, 1999, 2000). These views of citizenship ultimately come from the perspective of the nation-state and its dominant groups. Alternatively, researchers can examine citizenship and belonging from the perspective of individuals who might be (or aspire to be) formal members of a polity—even though they reside outside its cultural boundaries. With its focus on the everyday life experiences of immigrants of dif- ferent legal statuses, Ceclia Menjivar’s recent work examines ‘‘how the impact of legal status extends far beyond labor force participation and access to services—areas that have been researched—to encompass socio- cultural spheres as well’’ (Menjivar, 2006). This work provides another important starting point for future studies. Documenting citizen and non- citizen experiences of exclusion on a daily basis becomes vital to better understand how social divisions based on race, religion, and immigration shape social membership and belonging. Racial Formation It appears that new racial formations may be emerging in the United States. The state’s racial classificatory system officially categorizes as ‘‘white’’ such groups as Arabs. Yet Arabs are simultaneously constructed as an 386 Rodriguez ‘‘other’’ and ultimately undesirable group in more everyday deployments of race. Moreover, Arabs are being lumped together with those (namely, Indians) who have been classified as ‘‘Asian’’ in the state’s racial classifica- tory system. Comparing the racialization experiences of these groups can powerfully contribute to race relations scholarship. Eduardo Bonilla-Silva suggests that comparative work allows analysts to determine the ‘‘specific character of the racial structure—the mechanisms, practices and social relations responsible for the production and reproduction of racial inequality’’ (Bonilla-Silva, 1999). Understanding the specific nature of the U.S. post-9 ⁄ 11 racial structure requires that we do comparative racial and ethnic studies. Counterterrorism and ‘‘Securitization’’ By examining immigration policy as it is experienced ‘‘on the ground,’’ sociologists can also offer a perspective on immigration policies as they are being approached by local governments and police. Analyses of post-9 ⁄ 11 and 7 ⁄ 7 legislation suggests that the new laws do, in fact, enable local authorities to play a more central role in immigration and national security enforcement. There are as yet no studies documenting exactly how this plays out in local communities. Findings from this sort of research can contribute to an emergent sociology of counterterrorism. Mathieu Delfem suggests that the bureaucratization theory of policing, ‘‘predicts a high degree of institutional autonomy of police to determine the means and objectives of its counter-terrorist activities on the basis of professional expertise and knowledge’’ (Delfem, 2004). In other words, Delfem suggests that though post-9 ⁄ 11 policies have tended to be highly politicized, local police units are likely to operate independently from national politics as their activities are governed by logics of professionalism and know-how. Delfem acknowledges, however, that this theory requires close empirical study—work that sociologists have yet to do. Findings from research of local communities can be used to test the extent to which this theory applies in relation to post-9 ⁄ 11 local immigration enforcement. Though counterterrorism campaigns are generally carried out by local police authorities, my own research suggests that some ‘‘policing’’ functions (particularly surveillance) are often done by nonstate actors. By examining whether immigrants’ relationships with shopkeepers, neighbors, public transport workers, co-workers, teachers, or classmates (i.e., nonstate and nonpolice actors) are characterized by logics of suspicion and scrutiny, this study can contribute to an alternative theory of ‘‘securitization’’ (Walters, (Dis)unity and Diversity in Post-9 ⁄ 11 America 387 2004). What may be emerging in the United States is a ‘‘securitization’’ of everyday life fueled by fears of terrorism. REFERENCES Andreas, Peter. 2002. ‘‘The Re-Bordering of America after 11 September,’’ Brown Journal of World Affairs VIII: 195–202. Bonilla-Silva, Eduardo. 1999. ‘‘The Essential Social Fact of Race,’’ American Sociological Review 64: 899–906. Brettell, Caroline B. 2006. ‘‘Political and Cultural Belonging: Immigration Status, Citizen- ship, and Identity among Four Immigrant Populations in a Southwestern City,’’ American Behavioral Scientist 50: 70–99. Cainkar, Louise. 2004. ‘‘Post 9 ⁄ 11 Domestic Policies Affecting US Arabs and Muslims: A Brief Review,’’ Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East 24: 245–248. Calavita, Kitty. 1996. ‘‘The New Politics of Immigration: ‘Balanced-Budget Conservatism’ and the Symbolism of Proposition 187,’’ Social Problems 43: 284–305. Cornelius, Wayne. 2004a. Controlling ‘‘Unwanted’’ Immigration: Lessons from the United States, 1993–2004. San Diego, CA: Center for Comparative Immigration Studies, Univer- sity of California, San Diego. Cornelius, Wayne A. 2004b. ‘‘Controlling Immigration and Fighting Terrorism: The Uncertain Connection,’’ Paper presented at the Migration & Terrorism: US & European Perspectives Conference, University of California, Davis, CA. Crouse, Douglass. 2006. ‘‘Bigots Target Hindu Family,’’ In North Jersey Media Group. Danen, Christina. 2006. ‘‘NJ Protests against Detention of Arabs and South Asians Defend- ing the Disappeared,’’ Star-Ledger, March 30: 2. De Genova, Nicholas P. 2002. ‘‘Migrant ‘Illegality’ and Deportability in Everyday Life,’’ Annual Review of Anthropology 31: 419–447. Delfem, Mathieu. 2004. ‘‘Social Control and the Policing of Terrorism: Foundations for a Sociology of Counter-Terrorism,’’ American Sociologist 35: 75–92. Din, Suleman. 2004. ‘‘Terror City,’’ Colorlines, Summer. Faist, Thomas. 2002. ‘‘ ‘Extension du domaine de la lutte’: International Migration and Security before and after September 11, 2001,’’ International Migration Review 36: 7–14. Fekete, Liz. 2004. ‘‘Anti-Muslim Racism and European Security State,’’ Race & Class 46: 3–29. Hemingway, Sam. 2007. ‘‘Mexican Workers Fear Deportation,’’ In Association Press State and Local Wire. Burlington, VT: Associated Press. Joppke, Christian. 1999. ‘‘How Immigration is Changing Citizenship: A Comparative View,’’ Ethnic and Racial Studies 22: 629–652. Joppke, Christian. 2000. ‘‘Mobilization of Culture and the Reform of Citizenship Law: Ger- many and the United States,’’ In R. Koopmans and P. Statham (eds), Challenging Immi- gration: Ethnic Relations Politics: Comparative European Perspectives: pp. 145–161. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. Mantle, D. Ray. 2003. ‘‘What Foreign Students Fear,’’ BYU Education and Law Journal 815–834. Martin, David. 2003. Immigration Policy and the Homeland Security Act Reorganization. Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute. Menjivar, Cecilia. 2006. ‘‘Liminal Legality: Salvadoran and Guatemalan Immigrants’ Lives in the United States,’’ American Journal of Sociology 111: 999–1037. Minutemen Civil Defense Corps. 2007. Minutemen Civil Defense Corps Border Operations Headquarters. Minutemen Civil Defense Corps. Retrieved September 21, 2007 (http:// www.minutemanhq.com/hq/borderops_pledge.php). New Jersey Citizens for Immigration Control. 2007. New Jersey Citizens for Immigration Control Stop the Invasion. New Jersey Citizens for Immigration Control. Retrieved Sep- tember 21, 2007 (http://www.njcitizensforimmigrationcontrol.com/). 388 Rodriguez Ngai, Mae M. 2004. Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and the Making of Modern America. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Portes, Alejandro, and Min Zhou. 1993. ‘‘The New Second-Generation: Segmented Assimila- tion and Its Variants among Post-1965 Immigrant Youth,’’ Annals of the American Acad- emy of Political and Social Science 530: 74–98. Purkayastha, Bandana. 2005. Negotiating Ethnicity: Second-Generation South Asian Ameri- cans Traverse a Transnational World. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press. Schoenholtz, Andrew I. 2003. ‘‘Transatlantic Dialogue on Terrorism and International Migration,’’ International Migration 41: 173–192. Tapaoan, Emelyn. 2004. ‘‘NY-Based Filipino Art Group Joins Manila Exhibit,’’ Filipino Express, August 23–29: 19. Tumlin, Karen. 2004. ‘‘Suspect First: How Terrorism Policy is Reshaping Immigration Pol- icy,’’ California Law Review 92: 1175–1239. Walters, William. 2004. ‘‘Secure Borders, Safe Haven, Domopolitics,’’ Citizenship Studies 8: 237–260. Waslin, Michele. 2003. Counterterrorism and the Latino Community Since September 11. Washington, DC: National Council of La Raza. Williams, Robin M. Jr. 1957. ‘‘Unity and Diversity in Modern America,’’ Social Forces 36: 1–8. (Dis)unity and Diversity in Post-9 ⁄ 11 America 389 
work_gthzrkc2vfhtxboys6ai7fjfna	----	Whatever happened to repeat victimisation? Ken Pease1 Derby University Dainis Ignatans Huddersfield University Lauren Batty Independent researcher Abstract Crime is concentrated at the individual level (hot dots) as well as at area level (hot spots). Research on repeat victimisation affords rich prevention opportunities but has been increasingly marginalised by policy makers and implementers despite repeat victims accounting for increasing proportions of total crime. The present paper seeks to trigger a resurgence of interest in research and initiatives based on the prevention of repeat victimisation. A Brief History of Repeat Victimisation Research and Practice The last decade of the twentieth century witnessed a vogue for applicable research and action against repeat victimisation by crime, documenting its extent, distribution across time, and the opportunity for focused crime prevention. With hindsight, two studies piqued interest in the approach. First, a residential burglary prevention project on the Kirkholt estate in Rochdale UK brought about dramatic reductions in that crime. While the project was contentious at the time, the premise on which it was based, namely that for many homes victimisation presages further victimisation, was well evidenced. On the Kirkholt estate, long identified as a high crime area, prior burglary was found to be the best single predictor of burglary. The scale of repeat victimisation was found to be immense. 1 k.pease@derby.ac.uk It can be illustrated as follows. If one started counting burglaries in January, by December of the same year the majority of all burglaries would be of homes that had been burgled at least once before during that year. In other words, preventing only repeats would, within twelve months, come to prevent the majority of all burglaries. Given scepticism that the dramatic reductions achieved were the result of the strategy of protecting homes against repeat offences, the Home Office commissioned a review of the data. This confirmed that the reduction was indeed driven by a decline in repeats. Despite its inevitable imperfections as the first project of its kind, Kirkholt can safely be taken as proof of concept, that prompt action to prevent repeat crime was a promising crime prevention tactic. The Kirkholt estate forms one small part of one town in the north of England. Attempts at replication enjoyed mixed success. The more disappointing results were often attributable to implementation failure (see Tilley 1993 for a discussion). The key question immediately post-Kirkholt concerned the general relationship between repeats and an area’s total crime rate. If it turned out that high crime areas were those hosting most repeats, the prevention of repeats could do service generally as a crime reduction policy, with the crucial advantage of automatically directing effort to the most crime challenged areas, without stigmatising them, the focus being on the victim not the area. At Kirkholt, the risk of a repeat was found to diminish with time elapsed since the previous crime. If this were the case elsewhere, it would mean that attention to victimised homes need only be temporary. This has obvious importance for optimising the deployment of scarce policing and other resources. The approach was characterised as drip feeding crime prevention effort because it simply set up a process whereby effort was focused upon recent victims and their immediate neighbours. The effort thereby tracks the changing scale and location of the problem. By identifying recent victims as those at greater risk, victim support and crime prevention functions are brought together (Farrell and Pease 1997) But here we get ahead of ourselves in stressing the advantages of an approach yet (in 1990) to be found relevant across the board. The speculation that had to be tested was that high crime areas were characterised by a high proportion of repeats. If that were the case, then prevention of repeats as a strategy was up and running. Trickett et al. (1992) sought to test the idea. They analysed the national victimisation survey (then called the British Crime Survey, latterly the Crime Survey for England and Wales). They looked at the extent to which two variables contributed to any small area’s crime rate. The first variable was the proportion of people or households victimised (prevalence). The second was the number of victimisations per victimised person or household (concentration). Either or both could in principle yield the observed inter-area variation in crime rates. They concluded that an area’s rate of crime was determined substantially, arguably primarily, by its rate of repeats (concentration at the individual level). It should be stressed here that the Trickett results suggested that repeats were the primary determinant of crime rate. The conclusion is here stated over-cautiously, to preclude descent into diversionary methodological niceties about the counting of repeats. The work was described by the distinguished criminologist Wesley Skogan in the following terms “Probably the most important criminological insight of the decade has been the discovery in a very systematic fashion of repeat multiple victimization. This has tremendous implications both for criminological theory and...practice in the field” (Skogan, cited in Brady 1996 p3). By the turn of the millennium one might reasonably have foreseen the emergence of a crime reduction policy with the prevention of repeats at its core. Extensive attempts were made to bring the findings of research and initiatives on the ground to a wider audience. In the early 1990s a Home Office crime prevention circular to all chief officers of police recommended the approach and included a recent review of the evidence (Farrell 1992). A Home Office team was set up to roll out the strategy to police forces, followed by the introduction of repeat victimisation as a performance indicator nationally (Bridgeman and Sampson 1994; Tilley 1995; Bridgeman and Hobbs 1997; Pease 1997; Laycock 2001; Farrell, Hobbs, Edmunds and Laycock 2001). The UK repeat victimisation story to that time is best told in Laycock’s (2001) which also summarises key research findings and publications. Repeat victimisation research was affecting policy internationally including in the United States (Pease and Laycock 1996; Weisel, Clarke and Stedman 2001) where the Department of Justice developed guidelines for police first responders (Herman et al. 2001; Weisel 2005). A series of Australian studies (Townsley, Homel and Chaseling 2000, 2003; Morgan 2001; Budd, Pegnall and Townsley 2003) advanced research and practice, and key studies included those that examined repeat victimisation experiences in the Netherlands (Kleemans 2001), across Western and Eastern Europe (Mawby 2001) and internationally (van Dijk 2001). A systematic review that followed found that preventing repeat victimisation could pose some practical difficulties in terms of implementation and evaluation but that most efforts succeeded that that the strategy offered significant reductions in crime (Farrell and Pease 2006). Despite the substantial research and practice base, the first two decades of the new millennium have seen a progressive decline in attention to repeat victimisation in policy formulation, although not in research. Later in this paper we will bemoan the decline of policy interest in repeat victimisation and argue for its resurrection. At this point we present a brief outline of some post 2000 advances in understanding repeat victimisation. The purpose in mentioning them here is to assert that if the strategy were fit for purpose in 2000, it is far more so now. Some of the more important advances are as follows. 1. Wherever crime data permits its identification, repeat victimisation accounts for a non-trivial proportion of total crime (Farrell and Bouloukos 2001; Kleemans 2001; Mawby 2001; Tseloni et al. 2004; Farrell et al. 2005; Sidebottom 2011). Further work reporting similar results in Nigeria is in preparation. 2. Two ways of thinking about repeats have been distinguished. The first, the ‘flag’ account, contends that repeats simply flag people or places that were always vulnerable to crime. The alternative (the ‘boost’ account) proposes that victimisation increases the risk of further victimisation (Tseloni and Pease 2003; Johnson 2008). There are plausible reasons for the belief that the boost account contributes very substantially to patterns of repeat victimisation For example an offender’s increased knowledge of the target and of goods worth stealing which remain in the home invites repetition by the offender. As one Glasgow burglar tersely put the reason for returning, ‘big house, small van’. Returning may also target replaced goods (Clarke et al. 2007). In short, the evidence is unsurprisingly that both flag and boost factors contribute to repeat victimisation patterns. Those who commit repeats are overwhelmingly the same people as those who committed the first (Bernasco 2008). This is further suggestive evidence of boost factors being at work. If the flag account were the whole story, one would expect more cases in which different offenders committed initial and repeat offences (under any tenable assumption about the population of active burglars). For offences like domestic violence, the boost account is self- evidently important. 3. Extensive repeat victimisation has been demonstrated for offences other than burglary, for example robbery (Matthews et al 1999), criminal damage to schools (Burquest et al 1992) and personal violence (Tseloni and Pease 2003, 2004). Clearly domestic violence represents the most obvious example of chronic victimisation (Walby and Myhill 2001; Walby and Allen 2004; Walby et al. 2016). Intensive study of hate crime and cybercrime through a repeat victimisation lens is overdue. 4. Decay curves found in burglary events, wherein repeats are shown to occur swiftly, have also been identified for other offences; bank robbery (Matthews et al 2001), networks attacks on computer systems (Moitra and Konda 2004) and domestic violence (Pease, in preparation). Johnson and Bowers (2014) provide additional evidence of the decay curve for domestic burglary. 5. A systematic review of initiatives attempting crime reduction by the prevention of repeats confirms the viability of well- implemented enterprises of this type (Grove et al. 2014). The above outlines only some of the progress in understanding repeat victimisation realised over the last twenty years. More recent and comprehensive treatment of applicable research is to be found in Farrell and Pease (2017) and Pease and Farrell (2017). To reiterate, the reason for including the above list is that however attractive repeat victimisation prevention was as a strategy when it was in vogue, its attraction should be greater now. Let us now return to the topic promised by the title. Figure 1 shows trends in published research on repeat victimisation, in relation to attention to near repeats. The numerical resurgence of repeat victimisation publications shown surprised the writers but affords them hope that the time is ripe for an attempt to revive policy interest in the approach. One may speculate that the rise in the study of near repeats has evoked renewed interest in direct repeats. A search of the Google Scholar database using an advanced search tool identified the number of articles published each year as work on repeat victimisation really took off in the 1980s. Whilst it is clear that these works exclude those which have not been made accessible online, it gives a good indication of the trends in interest about this topic. The advanced search tool was used to identify the papers with the following phrases in their titles; ‘Repeat Victimisation’, ‘Repeat Victimization’ and ‘Near Repeat’. It became clear that the difference in spelling of victimisation was important to consider if all results were to be found. The importance of this will later be discussed. Figure 1 shows the number of papers meeting the criteria found via Google Scholar, by year. It is clear that research on repeat victimisation rapidly increased until the millennium and then saw a fall in the early 2000’s; around the time when research on near repeats began to emerge. This could suggest that research on near repeats could have been viewed as an extension of that on direct repeats although the two phenomena differ in their operational implications. The first entry for research on near repeats on Google Scholar was in 2003 since when their numbers have consistently increased. The trends suggest that published research on near repeats will come to exceed that on direct repeats within a few years. Interestingly there is a minimal overlap between the two research agendas. Only 8% of Google Scholar entries captured in this exercise addressed both repeat and near repeat victimisation in the title. Research appears to be addressed to one or other of the phenomena, few to both. The alternative spellings of victimisation/victimization offers a little insight as to where the interest in the topic lies. Victimization is nowadays mostly an American variant so we would assume that 74% of the entries for direct repeats would be of US or Canadian origin in authorship or place of publication. The US variant has dominated in recent years. So, does this mean that direct repeat research from the UK is decreasing? Well, no. Further investigation of the ‘Victimization’ entries reveals that some of the them were cited as being published in the UK. So, we cannot gauge a true perception of continental trends because this could mean that the affiliations of the authors of the articles remain substantially in UK institutions. Figure 1. Trends in Repeat and Near Repeat Publications on Google Scholar 1988-2017 Whilst Google Scholar is useful for indicating trends of research it has its limitations. It is not clear what the absolute figure of articles is year by year based on not all of them being available online. This can specifically be an issue in the case of earlier years. There have also been issues regarding accuracy of citations reported by users in the past. Many users contend that entries are not reflective of the true number of publications per country and citations can be missed due to the insertion of punctuation (not applicable in this case due to absence of punctuation in search) (Konkiel, 2014: Martín-Martín, Ayllón, Orduña-Malea, Delgado López-Cózar, 2014) Paradoxically, as noted earlier, the reduction in attention to direct repeats in policy pronouncements might be a function of an increase in attention to near repeats, the phenomenon that risk leaks from one victimised location to those nearby. The near repeat phenomenon is one of the pillars on which predictive police 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 1988-92 1993-97 1998-02 2003-07 2008-12 2013-17 G oo gl e S ch ol ar E nt ri es Repeats Near Repeats patrolling rests. The immensely useful near repeats calculator2 devised by Jerry Ratcliffe of Temple University operates purely on distance between events. It does not distinguish between same and different victimised people or homes. Looking at direct repeats as the extreme case of near repeats loses a great deal, as will be argued later. Disappearance of Repeat Victimisation from Official Discourse We turn now to document our claimed neglect by government of repeat victimisation. In annual published crime statistics we have moved from an explicit consideration of the topic to its total disappearance from recent volumes. What remains are tables allowing a reader with the necessary skills to make calculations which yield a partial representation of the extent of repeat victimisation. Even when repeat victimisation featured in official statistics, it did so in a form some way distanced from a depiction commensurate with its scale. The crucial figure in Crime Statistics documented the proportion of households which suffered more than one victimisation of the same type, irrespective of how many times it had been victimised, so a home burgled ten times was counted the same as a household burgled twice, an assault victim attacked ten times as one attacked twice. Let us not neglect the first problem noted in that sentence. Only repeats within a crime category were counted as such. A household suffering one car theft, one criminal damage and a burglary was not repeatedly victimised when counted in this way. So even in the heady days when repeat victimisation was getting some attention in crime statistics and policy, the statistics misrepresented the reality on the ground. 2 http://www.cla.temple.edu/cj/resources/near-repeat-calculator/ accessed Jan 22, 2018. http://www.cla.temple.edu/cj/resources/near-repeat-calculator/ The most dramatic illustration of how marginalised the topic of repeat victimisation has become in official thinking may be found in the Home Office’s Modern Crime Prevention Strategy of 2016 (Home Office 2016). In a document of fifty pages we find a single mention of repeat victimisation which reads as follows. We seek “more efficient identification of victims and potential victims, and reducing repeat victimisation” (p28). Disappointing as this meagre mention is in itself, the whole point of repeat victimisation is that it provides operationally useful identification of potential victimisation. Such identification occurs by dint of a call for police service. It is thus simple, usually prompt and does not entail any disclosure of personal information beyond report to the police. The promptness is especially important given the time decay curve of victimisation described earlier. Returning to the scanty treatment of repeat victimisation in the Home Office’s Modern Crime Prevention Strategy, the section in which repeat victimisation is (briefly) mentioned is truly bizarre. It strongly suggests that its writer has no appreciation of the extent and implications of the body of research and practice available. The section in which repeat victimisation is to be found is about “Profit as a Driver of Crime”. The section focuses on “preventing crime by targeting criminal profits” (p27). This makes sense as a context for discussion of repeat victimisation only insofar as any successful crime reduction tactic denies criminals the profits of crime. In brief, while its disappearance from Crime Statistics marks the demise of repeat victimisation from official thinking, the Modern Crime Prevention Strategy marks the burial of the prevention approach that was so lauded two decades earlier. Is there less of it about? The reader familiar with the cross-national crime drop of the last thirty years will at this point be wondering whether the drop makes advocacy of a neglected crime reduction strategy unnecessary or unimportant. In fact what has happened (in England and Wales at least) is that while repeat victimisations have fallen in absolute terms, they have fallen proportionately less than one-off victimisations, with the consequence that the prevention of repeats is now even more important as a crime control tool than it was when the crime drop began. We rehearse relevant evidence below. Analyses of the Crime Survey for England and Wales (CSEW) have shown that the chance of being victimised has fallen. Alongside this, repeat victims are victimised less frequently now. The average number of victimisations of the ten per cent most victimised households in England and Wales has dropped from 7.7 in 1994 during the ‘crime peak’ to just 3.2 in 2012. Over the same period, the proportion of total victimisation experienced by the same people has increased from 57% in 1994 to 72% in 2012 (Ignatans & Pease, 2015) indicating that inequality in victimisation has increased. A closer look into the distribution of victimisation amongst those most victimised reveals that just one per cent of the population is now accounting for over a half of all personal victimisation (53% in 2017 up from 42% in 1994), and over a quarter of property crime (37% up from 22%) and vehicle related victimisation (31% up from 16% in 1994) (Ignatans & Pease, 2016a). The total burden of crime has declined but the most victimised are accounting for an increasing proportion of that burden. Those repeatedly victimised differ in their socio-demographic in respect to age, marital status, employment characteristics, occupancy numbers within a residence and property composure (Ignatans & Pease, 2015, 2016a). So what? How can we think of repeat victimisation in terms of distributive justice? In general, repeat victims have the same characteristics that distinguish victims from non-victims. They just have more of those attributes. Differentially providing subsidised crime prevention goods and services on the basis of demography is divisive and probably impractical. Distributing on the basis of prior victimisation is not because it is done on the basis of their misfortune not their personal attributes. A parallel may be made with the provision of medical help. Some have criticised the repeat prevention strategy as allowing an offender ‘one free go’ because it does not deploy prevention until after an offence. However, just as in public health, the provision of crime prevention goods and services to everyone in advance of a victimisation where economically practicable is not excluded by the strategy outline here, though it is easier to envisage for property than personal crime. The balance between universal provision of help and the prevention of repeats becomes increasingly tilted in favour of the latter, the lower the prevalence of victimisation. If one household in two is victimised, the anticipatory provision of help is irrelevant in 50% of cases. If only one household in ten is victimised, the anticipatory provision of help is irrelevant in 90% of cases. To return to the CSEW data, the increase in the proportion of victimisation experienced by the most victimised top one per cent of the population after the crime peak is graphically represented in Figure 2 below. Figure 2. The Unequal Distribution of Crime (CSEW Sweeps 1994- 2017) The seriousness of crime suffered by repeat victims, as per their own judgements, is also found to be disproportionately high. Utilizing an underused measure of CSEW, victim judgements of offences they experienced, the most ‘harmed’ 10% of the population suffered 45% of total harm (Ignatans and Pease, 2016b) further expanding the research evidence base for the proposal to focus crime prevention effort on those previously victimised. Utilizing the International Crime Victims Survey (ICVS) where data from fifteen countries were comparable across sweeps encompassing the crime peak and drop period, it was found that the proportion of total personal victimisations experienced by the most victimised 1% increased from 32 per cent in 1992 to 36 per cent in 2000. The proportion of property related victimisation experienced by the one per cent of most victimised increased from 33 to 48 per cent with vehicle related victimisation also increasing from 18 to 22 per cent in the same time period. Similar personal and socio- demographic characteristics were found to differ between the ‘super-target’ victims and the general population (Pease and Ignatans, 2016). There surely could not be a more obviously relevant enterprise than reducing the concentration of crime on super-targets. With repeat victims being an easily identifiable ‘vital few’ without whom most crime would not be taking place, it is inevitably to be expected of the criminal justice system that it focuses on these people in order to reduce crime in a cost efficient manner while utilising the vast body of evidence available and to distribute risks and harms more equitably (Ignatans and Pease, 2018). Why Resurrect Repeat Victimisation as a Crime Prevention Approach? While the concentration of crime across the population has become more unequal and despite a systematic review showing that the prevention of repeats is a viable approach to crime reduction (Grove et al. 2014), it is demonstrated above that policy attention to repeat crime has diminished to the point of almost total disappearance. In the case of government attention, it has sunk with little trace, only a few bubbles on the surface indicating where it foundered. It is asserted here that a renewed emphasis on the reduction of direct repeats as an essential part of any crime reduction strategy is overdue. The argument for this is as follows. For much emerging crime, spatial proximity is irrelevant so repeat victimisation is the primary, often the only, useful index of crime concentration.. This means that, while the notion of near repeats in spatial terms becomes less applicable, the notion of direct repeats does not. It may be that near repeats can be reconceptualised in other terms (for instance in terms of IP addresses) but the processes of target selection in cybercrime and cyber-enabled crime are distinctive in ways which make direct repeats more important. For example, one to many communications are easy in cyberspace and difficult in physical space. This means that while in physical space, offenders select targets, in cyberspace targets select themselves. Send emails to a thousand people offering untold wealth in exchange for a smaller sum necessary to release that wealth (the advance-fee scam). The ten people who are gulled have selected themselves. Insofar as they are gullible generally, they will become repeat victims. There is no reason to suppose there is a strong spatial correlate of gullibility (Titus and Gover 2001). In violent or sexual crime in physical space, people carry their vulnerability around with them. While some crimes have spatial referents (attacks on mosques or synagogues or convenience stores run by people of Asian origin), others do not. Women carry their risk of sexual assault around with them. The prior victim provides the narrowest and most useful focus for optimising preventive help. The current interest in identifying vulnerable people often involves their personal characteristics or behaviour, which they possess (Keay and Kirby 2017). . The more precise the location, the clearer are the action possibilities. Simply identifying the elderly or the mentally disordered as vulnerable yields a number of false positives so massive as to render unfeasible the practical resourcing of help to people deemed vulnerable. Predictive patrolling algorithms may be criticised for stigmatising whole areas. In contrast, attention to recent victims is justifiable in terms of the risk at which they stand. The fourth writer when faced with a police audience often asks ‘Mapping has just identified a crime hot spot. Go and stand in the middle. What do you do next?’ David Weisburd, properly regarded as doyen of criminologists of place, has framed a low of crime concentration (Weisburd 2015). It states that ‘‘for a defined measure of crime at a specific micro geographic unit, the concentration of crime will fall within a narrow range of bandwidths of percentages for a defined cumulative proportion of crime’’(p138). We note in passing the observation made earlier that location is of little or no relevance to cybercrime and of limited relevance to hate crimes where sexual orientation or ethnicity marks someone as more generally vulnerable. The point here is that hot spots are slippery across time and date. Weisburd law of crime concentration well reflects the issues of clustering. Cory Haberman and colleagues (Haberman et al. 2016) tested Weisburd’s Law for street robberies across different ‘temporal scales’, i.e. clock time, date and season. Their data supported the Law. However although the same small proportion of street segments hosted a large proportion of street robberies, they were not necessarily the same street segments. The hot spots were slippery. Crime comes in spates. The parallel with animal foraging, where an animal stays in an area until circumstances change (habitat becomes less nourishing, the risk of predation increases) demands movement within and across areas, generating the observed slipperiness (Johnson 2014). Individuals are not slippery in the same sense and hence provides a more circumscribed focus for preventive attention. Here we close. There seems no reason to reprise the argument of this paper. It is to recognise the prevention of repeat victimisation as an important, neglected enterprise. 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work_gtjdiuxszbfahfmjeq4uountlm	----	LGBT in Turkey: Policies and Experiences Soc. Sci. 2015, 4, 838–858; doi:10.3390/socsci4030838 social sciences ISSN 2076-0760 www.mdpi.com/journal/socsci Article LGBT in Turkey: Policies and Experiences Ceylan Engin Department of Sociology, Texas A&M University, 311 Academic Bldg, 4351 TAMU, College Station, TX 77843-4351, USA; E-Mail: cengin@tamu.edu; Tel.: +1-205-821-8524 Academic Editor: Melanie D. Otis Received: 10 July 2015 / Accepted: 15 September 2015 / Published: 18 September 2015 Abstract: While LGBT studies have been problematizing normative categories of sexuality primarily in Western cultures, the status of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) individuals in non-Western societies remains understudied. This study examines the political attitudes toward LGBT individuals in Turkish society and explores the experiences of transgender individuals. While Turkey holds a strong economic position among Western countries, the situation of sexual minorities lags behind international standards. This study explores two research questions. First, what is the Turkish government’s outlook for the LGBT community? Secondly, what kind of problems and challenges do trans-individuals experience in Turkey? This study first introduces a macro-level analysis of the politics of gender identity in Turkey by analyzing the debates of four deputies in the Turkish Parliament, each representing their parties’ disparate viewpoints. Secondly, a micro-level analysis of previously collected interviews with twenty-five trans-individuals are also examined that shed light on the difficulties of being a trans-individual in Turkey. The content analysis shows that trans-individuals experience physical, sexual, and emotional violence, in addition to experiencing discrimination in employment, housing, and healthcare. The findings of this micro-level analysis elucidate the continuous discrimination, inequality, and violence that these individuals experience, while the macro-level analysis portrays the state’s discriminatory policies toward LGBT individuals in Turkey. Keywords: LGBT; Turkey; transgender; sexual minority; LGBT rights; political policy OPEN ACCESS Soc. Sci. 2015, 4 839 1. Introduction Bihter, a transwoman from Ankara, was attacked with a knife by four men in April 2015. She received 172 stiches as a result of this incident [1]. The same year, Ipek, another transwoman, was also hospitalized after an attack by two men. She was beaten, stabbed, and left to die in a deserted area in Mersin [2]. Another transwoman B. E. was choked to death by a man. The perpetrator hid B. E.’s body under a pull-out couch and fled the city. B. E’s body was later discovered by the police when her neighbors complained about the putrid odor coming from her apartment [3]. These horrific stories typify common experiences of transwomen in Turkey. Sexual minorities, and transwomen in particular, regularly experience sexual, physical, and emotional violence as a result of their sexual orientation and gender identity. This study explores the Turkish government’s attitude toward the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) community and the difficulties and challenges trans-individuals experience. Turkey currently has the 6th largest economy in Europe, and the 17th largest in the world [4]. While Turkey holds a strong economic position among Western countries, the situation of sexual minorities lags behind standards that are claimed to be essential by human rights organizations like the General Assembly of the United Nations, the European Court of Human Rights, and the Supreme Court concerning LGBT issues. Although the Turkish Republic was founded as a secular state, traditional Islamic values remain omnipresent in most government and societal institutions. The influence of these values on Turkish policy making has resulted in further marginalization, stigmatization, and socially-disadvantageous outcomes for those who do not fit the dominant hetero-normative gender norms and sexual identities. This study asks two research questions. First, what is the Turkish government’s outlook toward the LGBT community? Secondly, what kind of problems and challenges do trans-individuals experience in Turkey? This study first introduces a macro-level analysis of the politics of gender identity in Turkey by analyzing the debates of four deputies in the Turkish Parliament, each representing their parties’ disparate viewpoints. It then reviews a 2013 bill that promoted the improvement of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) rights in Turkey. The findings indicate that the tenets and beliefs of political parties are strongly correlated with laws and regulations established by the Turkish Constitution. The government’s macro level discrimination leads to detrimental consequences for LGBT individuals, while perpetuating gender inequality in Turkish society. Recent parliamentary debates on LGBT rights in Turkey portray a government that is failing to secure the civil and political rights of LGBT individuals. Secondly, a micro-level analysis of previously collected interviews with twenty-five transgender individuals in Turkey is examined. Seventeen interviews were compiled through snowball sampling as part of a Social Justice and Art Project called Proudly Trans in Turkey. The rest of the interviews and testimonies are derived from stories published in LGBTI News Turkey. The content analysis shows that trans-individuals experience physical, sexual, and emotional violence in addition to experiencing discrimination in employment, housing, and healthcare. The findings of this micro-level analysis elucidate the continuous discrimination, inequality and violence that these individuals experience, while the macro analysis portrays the state’s discriminatory policies toward LGBT individuals in Turkish society. Both macro-level and micro-level discrimination influence one another, creating perpetual gender inequality in Turkish society, which consequently leads to detrimental outcomes for LGBT individuals. Soc. Sci. 2015, 4 840 2. Historical Background Turkey has long been considered of strategic geographic importance because its landmass serves as a bridge between Europe and Asia. It is often viewed as an example of a modern Muslim state, with a secular, functioning democracy, in stark contrast to many other Middle Eastern governments that are run by dictatorships and religious fundamentalism [5,6]. Turkish culture is greatly influenced by European values as a result of its geographical position; however, traditional Islamic values also remain deeply ingrained in most of the country’s social institutions [7]. In order to understand how gender inequality and a hetero-normative value system persist in Turkish society, it is pertinent to examine the political, economic, and social changes that Turkey has experienced since its formation in 1923. Turkey was established as a secular democracy after the fall of the Ottoman Empire under the leader Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. The cultural and political climate of Turkish society was strongly influenced by the Kemalist movement that idealized modernization, secularization, and democracy, largely shaping what it meant to have a Turkish identity in the 20th century [8]. During the 1920s and 1930s, Turkish society experienced dramatic cultural, political, and economic transitions which resulted in the implementation of a wide range of social and political reforms. These policies aimed to weaken the power of religion, promote modernization, and spread a common sense of Turkish national identity [8,9]. Ataturk’s political reforms began with the abolition of the Caliphate and adopting the secular European model of the Swiss civil code. Modernization efforts also consisted of implementing secular public education, adopting the Latin alphabet, and changing the official national language to Turkish. Religious attire such as headscarves and fezzes were also banned in government institutions. Improving the position of women in society was another objective of the newly formed Turkish government. Polygamy was banned, and women were given equal access to divorce and inheritance. They became eligible to vote and to hold public office. These reforms aimed to weaken the power of religion in government institutions, infusing Turkish culture with Western liberal ideas to create a new type of citizenship and a modern society. The goal was to remove Islam from public affairs through state control [7,10]. However, anti-discrimination laws that would protect the rights of LGBT individuals were not included in these reforms. 3. Current Status of the LGBT Population Although homosexual relationships were evident in the Ottoman era prior to the establishment of the Turkish republic, the emergence of non-heteronormative identities as a personal and collective identity did not occur until the 20th century [11,12]. This was mainly a result of rising globalization, industrialization, and urbanization in contemporary Turkey. As a result, there was a growing public visibility of homosexuality and gay identities with a mainstream understanding [12–14]. However, increasing visibility of same sex relations did not translate into an increasing public tolerance toward homosexuality. A global study conducted by Pew Research Center in 2013 reports that acceptance of homosexuality remains at a mere 9 percent. This is 5 percent lower than the year 2007. The low tolerance toward homosexuality has resulted in many forms of violence and discrimination against the LGBT population, both legally and socially [15]. While homosexuality is not banned in Turkish society, it is largely viewed as immoral and unnatural behavior. The government does not have anti-discrimination laws that prohibit discrimination on the Soc. Sci. 2015, 4 841 basis of sexual orientation and gender identity. As a result, the discrimination and violence experienced by LGBT individuals remain institutionalized problems. For instance, the military specifically disapproves of gay males serving in the Turkish armed forces because it considers homosexuality a psychosexual disorder. The Turkish military have a long history of protecting the gendered binaries of the Turkish nation by excluding women and homosexual men. It is a social institution that promotes hegemonic masculinity by excluding feminine bodies from service. As Basaran points out, “the active/passive (penetrator/penetratee) binary correlates with the masculine/feminine binary regulating the dominant understanding of homosexuality” in Turkey, similar to some Caribbean and South American cultures [16]. Accordingly, the military performs medical inspections on those who are seeking an exemption from mandatory military service because of their sexual orientation. These inspections mainly include psychological testing, interviews, and rectal examinations. Some are also asked for photographs of themselves having homosexual intercourse and in which they can be seen as the passive partner [16–18]. Individuals who succeed in convincing military psychologists of their homosexuality are then given a curuk raporu; a certificate that labels biological men as “rotten.” Homosexual men often apply for this ineligibility report because they fear experiencing homophobic violence in the military. Individuals construct and reconstruct their gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender identities, creating their own narratives consistent with their culture and experiences. However, gay people are often stereotyped as effeminate and are presumed to hold passive roles in homosexual intercourse in Turkish culture [12,13,16]. While homosexual men who are not “feminine enough” are treated with skepticism by the military psychologists, feminine homosexual men are more likely to be considered to be ineligible for military service [16]. Gender inequality in the military is a persistent problem in and of itself, but it also has broader social repercussions due to the large role military service plays in defining masculinity in Turkish society. The intersectional framework encourages us to think critically about how oppression manifests in societies. Social taxonomies of race, class, and gender discrimination are not independent from one another and should be examined as interlocking systems of oppression [19,20]. In predominantly-Muslim societies like Turkey, the role of religion plays a greater intersecting role with gender and sexuality than in most Western societies, resulting in alarming levels of institutionalized discrimination. LGBT individuals have a minority status because they have been systematically oppressed as a result of their sexuality and gender identity. Their oppression is a result of the patriarchal regime that punishes same-sex relations under Islamic beliefs. Religiosity contributes to the social and legal punishment of those who do not conform to rigid gender norms. Individuals who fall outside the categories of socially-accepted norms of gender binaries are ostracized, often subjected to emotional and physical violence. The data available on sexual minorities are very limited and difficult to access. This is because once LGBT individuals reveal their nonconforming gender identity or sexual orientation, their most basic rights such as the right to life, to labor, to housing, to healthcare, and to education are greatly compromised [21]. Between January 2010 and November 2014, 47 individuals were killed in Turkey due to their sexual orientation and gender identity [22]. LGBT individuals also experience discrimination in employment. A study conducted by Mustafa Bilgihan Ozturk examines sexual orientation discrimination in the workplace by interviewing twenty lesbian, gay, and bisexual individuals in Turkey. He finds that most of the participants hide their sexual orientation from their families and workplace due to fear of abuse or violence. Meanwhile, individuals Soc. Sci. 2015, 4 842 who did come out expressed experiencing severe discrimination, often resulting in termination of their jobs [23]. Other individual cases of discrimination have also been reported in the news media. For instance, police officer F.E was dismissed from his duties because he revealed his sexual orientation. When F. E. went to court to appeal for the state’s discriminatory action, the Ministry of Internal Affairs provided him the following response: “The law foresees that these kinds of officers are to be cleaned out immediately!” [24]. There is lack of official data on hate crimes and discrimination against sexual minorities due to the systematic lack of attention by Turkish mainstream media outlets. As a result, most cases of hate crimes and discrimination against the LGBT population remain undocumented. The data on LGBT individuals are predominantly collected by volunteers of LGBT organizations [22]. The stories of transgender individuals are particularly disturbing. Transgender individuals are often subjected to physical violence as well as discrimination by the police and other members of Turkish society as a result of their gender identity. They are denied a safe working environment and are discriminated against on a daily basis [23,25,26]. The experiences of these individuals highlight the inequalities they face as a result of living in a homophobic culture that marginalizes and discriminates against them. The alienation that transgender individuals experience from their families and communities begins at an early age, and most often continues into an adult life in which there are often no other viable economic opportunities available aside from various types of sex work. The Human Resource Development Foundation (IKGV) reported that in 2011 there were about 4000 transgender sex workers working in Istanbul, constituting 15 percent of the total number of sex workers operating in Turkey [27]. The stigma, discrimination, and violence experienced by transgender individuals are, of course, not unique to Turkey. A low tolerance regarding their gender expression leads to a lack of employment opportunities for many transgender women and to living their lives below the poverty line [28,29]. While race, class, and gender can be seen as different axes of social structure, individual persons experience them simultaneously [19,20]. Social taxonomies of race, gender, religion, and class concurrently play a role in the experiences of LGBT individuals in Turkey. These categories operate together, influencing and shaping one another and consequently producing mechanisms of social inequality. For instance, racial and class differences can play a prominent role in transgender women’s experiences [28,29]. Transgender women of color often experience multiple forms of discrimination as a result of their race, class, and gender identity. Studies and reports conducted by LGBT and human rights organizations in Turkey [26,30,31] and research in other countries [28,29,32] document that transgender individuals are subject to harassment, verbal attacks, arbitrary arrests, and physical violence. In addition, they are discriminated against in employment, education, housing, and healthcare. Transgender Europe’s Trans Murder Monitoring Project reports more than 1500 trans-individuals were murdered in 57 countries since January 2008 [33]. These homicides were recorded by trans-organizations and activists. Most instances of trans-gender homicide take place in Central and South America. In Turkey there have been 34 reported murders of transgender individuals since 2008, more than any other European country. The murders range from multiple stabbings and shootings to death by castration and decapitation [33]. Although Turkey often prides itself for being a secular democracy with equal rights for women, when it comes to transgender women, the state lacks the protection of these individuals’ rights. The general lack of tolerance toward LGBT individuals in Turkish society manifests itself in the form of hate crimes and discrimination. Research collected by Lambda, an LGBT activist organization in Turkey, surveyed Soc. Sci. 2015, 4 843 116 transgender women through a snowball sampling in 2012. Approximately, 67.2 percent of the respondents identified their occupation as sex workers, and 82.8 percent (96 individuals) participated in sex work at least once in their lifetimes. The findings of the report also show that 90.5 percent of the respondents were subjected to physical violence and 92.2 percent had experienced verbal and sexual assault by police officials. In addition, 79.3 percent of transgender women reported experiencing physical violence, and 89.7 percent reported experiencing verbal and sexual assault from people they do not know [30]. Moreover, the Turkish legal system “under-punishes” those who commit hate crimes against LGBT individuals, often imposing only small fines or minor jail time [34,35]. The reductions in punishments are vindicated by judges because LGBT status is considered an abnormality in the eyes of the state law. Political leaders often intertwine gender identity with sexual orientation when they are discussing issues related to the LGBT population. Most state leaders also share the viewpoint that both homosexuality and trans-identity are immoral. In 2010, Aliye Kavaf, the former State Minister of the Affairs of Women and Families, said “homosexuality is a biological disorder, a disease. It is something that needs to be treated. Therefore I do not have a positive opinion of gay marriage” [36]. In 2012, Ankara mayor and a JDP Party member Melih Gökçek remarked: Each society has its own moral values. Especially for our Turkish society, it is not possible for us to be together with the gay culture in Europe. It is also not possible to approve of this. How we have been brought up, our brand of morality, our views are a little different. I hope to God that in Turkey there will not be a gay and there should not be [37]. Furthermore, on June 2015, Efkan Ala, the former minister of Internal Affairs and a current Justice and Development Party (JDP) candidate for the parliament openly opposed gay marriage, stating that gay marriage is the destruction of humanity. He also criticized the Peace and Democracy Party (PDP) for promoting transgender and homosexual candidates for office. He stated, “For God’s sake, look at these candidates that the PDP put forth. I can’t even bring myself to say it. They have put forth candidates that our citizen cannot accept.” He then argued that our society’s morality and tradition rejects men marrying men and women marrying women [38]. In the next section, I discuss the data collection and methodology of this study. Drawing from parliamentary debates, I elucidate the Turkish government’s contemporary political discourse toward the LGBT population. I then extend my analysis by examining the testimonials of twenty-five transgender individuals. This study will highlight the intersections between the institutionalized discrimination faced by LGBT individuals in general and the individual discrimination experienced by transgender individuals in particular. 4. Methods This study first introduces a macro-level analysis of the debates of four members of parliament representing their parties in the Turkish government. Republican People’s Party (RPP) Deputies Binnaz Toprak and Aykan Erdemir, PDP Deputy Ertugrul Kurkcu, and JDP Deputy Turkan Dagoglu, are analyzed concerning their attitudes towards LGBT rights in Turkey. These discussions took place on Wednesday 29 May 2013 at the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (GNAT). English translations of Soc. Sci. 2015, 4 844 the parliamentary debates were available through LGBTI News Turkey. As a native Turkish speaker, I made small changes to the available translations if I felt a certain part of what the respondent said had been omitted. This is the first government discussion about a 2013 bill that promotes the implementation of LGBT rights in Turkey. Secondly, a micro-level analysis of previously collected interviews with twenty-five trans-individuals are also examined that shed light on the difficulties of being a trans-individual, and particularly of being a trans-woman in Turkey. Seventeen of these interviews were part of a social justice project called Proudly Trans in Turkey, and were compiled by Gabrielle Le Roux with the support of Amnesty International and the Consulate General of the Netherlands. The collection of these interviews was made possible by trans-activists Sevval Kilic and Kemal Ordek’s connections within the trans-community in Turkey. Participants were recruited through snowball sampling. The research respondents shared their intimate stories, considering themselves to be activists who chose to participate in this research in order to make their voices heard. These interviews were collected in March 2012 and made available as an online report by Amnesty International. Each respondent was asked between twenty-five to thirty open-ended questions that capture a different aspect of the respondents’ testimonies. These questions include some demographic inquiries about age, gender identity, and occupation, as well as other questions concerning the ways in which respondents are affected by hate crimes and discrimination, what the influence of religion is on their lives, what doors their gender identity opens and closes, what the condition of trans-individuals in Turkey is, what their dreams and aspirations are, and what repressive things they would like to see changed. Part of the interviews with each respondent were also video recorded with the exception of one individual who decided to reveal his name and voice but not his face. These video interviews include 18 video clips; ranging from three to 45 min, totaling four hours and 30 min. All the interviews were collected in the respondents’ native language, Turkish. While the videos included English subtitles, I translated the rest of the interviews. I use these interviews in my analysis because the report is solely available in a raw interview format and the participants’ responses have never been subjected to critical analysis under a sociological lens. In addition to these participants, the remaining interviews and testimonies of Turkish trans-individuals were retrieved from a website called LGBTI News Turkey. LGBTI News Turkey is a volunteer run organization that is dedicated to providing English translations and sources on issues related to LGBTI individuals living in Turkey. These testimonies strongly capture the difficulties of having a trans-gender identity in Turkish culture. It should be noted that the data that is available on sexual minorities in Turkey is very limited and very hard to access. This study does not aim to generalize to the experiences of all trans-individuals in Turkey. Instead, it aims to share some of the difficulties trans-people experience as a result of living in a staunchly heteronormative culture. The data used for the content analysis in this study thus consist of a total of twenty-five testimonials from two different sources. The study is focused on the intersection of micro-level data provided by these individual accounts and macro-level political attitudes that have a distinct impact on the lives of LGBT individuals. The parliamentary debates focus on the larger issue of institutional discrimination against LGBT individuals in Turkey, whereas the interviews encompass issues facing the general transgender population. Soc. Sci. 2015, 4 845 5. Findings 5.1. Political Parties’ Attitudes and Policies toward LGBT Individuals The ideals and beliefs of political parties in the Grand National Assembly of Turkey are strongly correlated with laws and regulations that are established by the Turkish constitution. There are currently a total of 550 senate members in the Grand National Assembly. Elected political parties include (1) Justice and Development Party (JDP), with 258 members; (2) Republican People’s Party (RPP), with 132 members; (3) Nationalist Movement Party (NMP), with 80 members, and Peace and Democracy Party, (PDP) with 80 members [39]. The distribution of the female members among political parties is shown in Table 1 (17.82 percent, totaling 98 individuals). Table 1. GNAT deputy distribution by gender [39]. Party Name Female Members Male Members Party Total Count Percentages Count Percentages AKP 41 15.89% 217 84.11% 258 RPP 21 15.91% 111 84.09% 132 NMP 4 5% 76 95% 80 PDP 32 40% 48 60% 80 Total 98 17.82% 452 82.18% 550 The political speeches of four Turkish parliamentary members: Binnaz Toprak (RPP Deputy), Aykan Erdemir (RPP Deputy), Ertugrul Kurkcu (PDP Deputy), and Turkan Dagoglu (JDP Deputy) are analyzed concerning their attitudes towards LGBT rights in Turkey. This was the first government discussion in regard to LGBT rights that took place in the Turkish Government. Members of the Nationalist Movement Party (NMP) were not present during the discussions and remained absent from the voting. On 12 February 2013, Binnaz Toprak with the support of 54 deputies of CHP requested a Parliamentary inquiry in order to determine the problems of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and trans individuals in accordance with Article 98, and standing rule 104 and 105. The proposed bill aimed to investigate the causes of these problems in terms of political, economic, social, and psychological aspects so as to prevent discrimination and violence against LGBT individuals. Their motion included a brief description of types of violence, discriminatory practices, and stigmatization experienced by LGBT individuals both on the state and the individual level [40]. The Republican People’s Party’s introductory bill criticized the Turkish constitutional law of equality and argued that the law is not holding up to the standards of the European Union and the United Nations clauses on prohibiting discrimination against LGBT individuals. Article 10 of the Constitution proclaims that, “Everyone is equal before the law without distinction as to language, race, color, sex, political opinion, philosophical belief, religion and sect, or any such grounds” [41]. Supporters of the proposed bill argue that “Article 10 and Article 70” of the Constitution of the Republic of Turkey, and “Article 5” of the Labor Law should also broaden its categories to sexual minorities in order to reduce gender discrimination. Legal guarantees on behalf of sexual orientation and gender identity must be provided for LGBT individuals [40]. Soc. Sci. 2015, 4 846 On behalf of the Republican People’s Party (RPP), both deputies Toprak and Erdemir spoke in favor of the proposed bill. Erdemir stated: They could not find a place for my child in this huge world,’ distinguished members of the parliament, these are the words of the mother of our citizen with a different sexual orientation who was murdered in September 2010 in Bursa. Today we are talking about opening a tiny space in this huge world to fit these parents’ children. Is there a tiny space for the ones who have been murdered by 12 stab wounds, 40 stab wounds, or for the ones whose bodies have been inflicted by wounds that will not heal, whose wounded hearts will not heal [42]? Erdemir (2013) then discussed the progress of LGBT rights in Turkey by saying, (…)The world is changing. Taboos are breaking. A better, freer, and more equal world is possible. Unfortunately, Turkey is not moving forward in the same speed as the Western systems in regard to freedom of gender expression (…) As Republican People’s Party, we wish that in Turkey, we would not move with anger and hate. As we have also engaged in our election report; we are demanding the creation of a legal arrangement for the fight against discrimination and hate crimes as soon as possible. We want that, we hope that one day in the huge agenda of the assembly a tiny space and time will be created for hate crimes [42]. Before Erdemir could finish his speech a deputy of the Justice and Development Party (JDP) Ibrahim Korkmaz interrupted Erdemir’s speech three times by shouting, “What you are talking about is immoral”. Korkmaz left the assembly room without hearing the rest of Erdemir’s speech. The Peace and Democracy Party (PDP) deputy Ertugrul Kurkcu also expressed his supportive views of the Toprak’s bill proposal by stating that, “There is a group of people who are pushed to the margins of society because of public bias, traditional behaviors, legends, and negative myths. Special precautions need to be taken in order to make them equal with the rest of the society. This is why this inquiry is necessary” [43]. In addition, Kurkcu argued that the state cannot protect people’s rights if it neglects or denies the rights of certain groups. To support his point of view he argued: When we said, we are Kurds in Sisli and gays in Taksim during gay pride, media outlets propagandized against this said, “they are homos too”. In truth, it would not have matter even if I were; however, the issue here is to ask for protection of the rights of homosexuals even if one does not consider himself as one. The day we protect the rights of those who are not like us, then we are going to see a real change in this country (…). Otherwise, things will stay the same. You will continue to stone homosexuals, and in places where you cannot stone them, you will insult them and leave the assembly room [43]. After Kurkcu’s speech, Turkan Dagoglu, a physician, spoke against the proposal of Toprak’s motion on LGBT equality on behalf of the Justice and Development Party. She began her speech by questioning what it means to have an LGBT identity, asking whether it is a biological deficiency, a sociological appearance, or a psychological problem. Dagoglu stated that “women marrying women, or men marrying men is not a right, on the contrary it is a proposal that converts accepted sexual understandings that smooths the path of degeneracy of society” [44]. The JDP deputy continued her speech by arguing that Soc. Sci. 2015, 4 847 LGBT identity is an abnormal behavior that is proven by research that was presented in 1972 and 1992. She argued that: Researches on this topic has been done previously in both in the US in 1972, and by the European psychological association in 1992. They found that what we consider an LGBT status is not normal behavior [44]. Dagoglu also labeled homosexuality as a degeneration of society by stating: Affiliates of the JDP, regularly express valuing humans simply because they are humans, treating everyone equal under the law, loving every creature because of the creator. Social measures that are taken are not for a specific sexual orientation, it is for the benefit of all humanity. Nonetheless, these attributes cannot be used as a door opening to lifestyles that our society disapproves of or as an encouragement for the sort of behavior that triggers the degeneration of the population, and cannot be assessed as a criterion for democracy [44]. The suggested bill that promoted the inquiry into LGBT individuals’ problems and needs did not receive enough votes that day in the parliament. Only 59 parliamentary members voted in favor of the bill that would safeguard the rights of the LGBT population. No further developments or measures have been taken by the Turkish government since the parliamentary debates to protect and recognize the rights of the LGBT citizens. In fact, current Minister of Family and Social Policy, Aysenur Islam noted homosexuality as preference instead of sexual orientation [45]. It should be noted that while gender identity and sexual orientation should be treated as distinct identity categories, the Turkish political representitives do not make this distinction in their discourse. Instead, they often treat transgender status, a distinct gender identity, similar to having a gay, bisexual, or a lesbian sexual orientation. Some scholars argue that LGBT rights have not been recognized in Turkish society because LGBT issues challenge the Justice and Development Party’s modern conservative agenda. JDP’s conservatism considers the family to be the primary social institution and sees its values and traditions as essential to nation building and maintaining peace. Modern values are thus perceived as a threat to the disintegration of traditional social values. Many conservative political leaders emphasize the need for Westernization to be a selective process in order to prevent social degeneration in Turkish society [46]. As JDP political representatives and supporters such as Dagoglu, Islam, Ala, and Kavaf confirm in their speeches, sexual deviance is considered a gateway to the degeneration of society. As a result, the recognition and protection of LGBT rights have not been granted because such legislation would defy the JDP’s conservative democratic identity. In a similar way, the Nationalist Movement Party (NMP) has remained silent on issues related to homosexuality and LGBT rights. However, they showed their support for the JDP by not voting in favor of the bill that would improve the rights of LGBT individuals. The NMP’s presidential candidate Ekmelettin Ihsanoglu has also denied that homophobia was a universal issue [47]. According to both the JDP’s and the NMP’s conservative agenda, traditional family values trumps civil rights issues such as LGBT rights. Instead of ameliorating LGBT issues, the government considers legitimizing civil rights a deterioration of moral values. Although homophobic attitudes are not limited to conservative circles, representatives of both the RPP and the PDP have been more prone to form strategic alliances with LGBT rights organizations and promoting LGBT candidates in local and national elections. Two years ago, Kemal Kilictaroglu, the Soc. Sci. 2015, 4 848 leader of the RPP, stated in regard to gay marriage and gay political representation: “I do not think the society of Turkey has reached this level of maturity. Because of this, it is not possible for the RPP to declare a gay candidate as mayor or establish gay marriage in a legal framework” [48]. Despite his previous response, Kilictaroglu later had met with representatives from the Platform for LGBT Political Representation and Participation. Social Policies, Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity Studies Association (SPoD) also prepared an LGBTI Rights Pledge and called on political candidates and parties to work towards the inclusion of LGBTI individuals in decision and policy-making before the 2015 general elections. Sixty-four candidates for parliament, twenty-three from the RPP, twenty-five from the PDP, and two from other parties, signed SPoD’s LGBTI Rights Pledge before the recent elections and promised to safeguard the rights of the LGBTI individuals [49]. Moreover, the Peace and Democracy Party and its leader Selaattin Demirtas have been actively speaking to eliminate discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity. The PDP is known as a voice of the Kurdish minority, aiming to stop discrimination against Kurds in Turkey. The party’s political agenda has been a pluralist form of government that represents economic, political, and social demands of marginalized populations such as Kurds, women, workers, Alevis, and LGBT individuals [47]. The PDP and its representatives have been stressing the importance of fighting against all ethnic, religious, sexual, gender, and class discrimination. At a recent press conference, in regards to discrimination against LGBTI individuals, Demirtas said: LGBTI individuals who are targeted, killed, repressed, or ostracized because of their sexual orientations and sexual identities are ignored by the system. LGBTIs’ mere existence is seen as a crime. Homophobia and transphobia are fed. “New Life” calls for equal citizenship rights for all sexual identities to live free and honorable lives in society without fear of discrimination [47]. The Turkish government continues to deny civil rights to those who hold an LGBT identity and homosexuality remains to be considered a disease and abnormality in the eyes of the Turkish government. The state justifies its discriminatory actions by supporting their arguments with outdated scientific evidence on sexuality, or religious arguments considering homosexuality as immoral. Consequently, the state also fails to address the needs of this particular population. While a small minority of the parliamentary members promotes the rights of the LGBT individuals, the majority of the deputies are not supportive of homosexuality. These parliamentary debates elucidate the hetero-normative values that remain very present in the country’s social institutions. 5.2. Experiences of Transgender Individuals in Turkey The next part of this study discusses the findings of a micro-level analysis of experiences of twenty-five transgender individuals. Among the twenty-five respondents, seven identified themselves as transsexual women, one identified as a female-to-male transsexual, fourteen referred themselves as transwomen, one defined himself as a trans-man, and two referred to their gender identities as just “trans”. For the purposes of this study, the word transgender is used interchangeably with the words transsexual, trans-woman, trans-man, and trans, when referring to individuals in this study. Eight individuals identified themselves as transsexual. However, it is not clear for some individuals whether they have gone through Soc. Sci. 2015, 4 849 sexual reassignment surgeries, are undergoing hormone therapy, or they prefer solely cross-dressing. Although every trans-person’s story is unique for each individual, various experiences stand out when comparing the experiences of transgender individuals in Turkey. Physical violence, discrimination, emotional and verbal abuse on both the state and individual level are among the common themes of experiences of transgender individuals in Turkey because of their gender identity or sex worker status. When individuals were asked about their gender identity, some expressed that they do not like to stereotype themselves. For instance, Buse said, “I am who I am. I am labeled as trans so I’m just carrying the label” [50]. Destina said, “I am a heterosexual transsexual in full acceptance of the world” [50] and Belgin said, “I’m a transsexual woman. I’m a woman. I’m a woman in my mind and soul” [50]. The interviewees’ ages range from 24 to 57. However, three of the women specifically did not want to provide their ages. Selay noted, “I don’t want to tell my age. I’m exactly as old as I look and not so old as you see” [50]. Three of the trans-women also identified their Kurdish background. The respondents’ occupations consisted mostly of activists, sex workers, or a combination of both (Table 2). Table 2. Demographic distribution. Names Gender Identity Age Race Occupation Aras Transman 28 Turkish Activist B.E. Transwoman Unknown Turkish Sex Worker Belgin Transsexual woman 57 Turkish Sex Worker/Activist Bihter Transwoman Unknown Turkish Sex Worker Buse Trans-woman Did not want to answer Turkish Sex Worker/Activist Demet Transsexual woman 50 Turkish Ex-Sex worker/Activist Demet Y. Transwoman Unknown Turkish Activist/Sex Worker Deniz Transwoman 28 Turkish Activist/Part-time Sex Worker Destina Transsexual woman Did not want to answer Turkish Sex Worker/Activist Doga Transwoman Unknown Turkish Former Commander Esmeray Transsexual woman 38 Kurdish Sex Worker/Actor/Activist Eylul Transwoman 25 Turkish Sex Worker/Activist Eylul Cansin Transwoman 24 Turkish Sex Worker Gani Transwoman 40 Turkish Sex Worker, Activist Gorkem Transwoman Unknown Turkish Sex Worker Ilksen Trans 26 Turkish Musician/Activist Inan FTM Transsexual 24 Turkish Activist Ipek Transwoman Unknown Turkish Sex-Worker Oyku Transsexual woman 41 Turkish Ex-sex worker/Activist Ruzgar Trans 24 Turkish Activist Selay Transsexual Woman Did not want to answer Turkish/Kurdish Sex Worker/Activist Sema Transwoman 24 Turkish Student/Activist Sevval Kilic Transwoman 50 Turkish Activist Sinem Transsexual 39 Turkish/Kurdish Sex Worker/Activist Su Transwoman 26 Turkish Sex Worker/Activist Soc. Sci. 2015, 4 850 Family abuse tends to be a common problem in transgender individuals’ lives. Coming out to their families is a very stressful event for transgender individuals. Since traditional norms of gender binaries are still a prominent part of Turkish culture, even the person’s own biological family can turn to violence once individuals verbally express their nonconforming gender identity. Sinem’s eyes got watery when she talked about the brutal tragedy she experienced when she first opened up to her family: After I told my parents about my gender identity, the family assembly got together and agreed upon my death. I was chained to a twelve meter iron chain for 3 days. I was also terribly beaten. On the third day, my older brother unchained me and threw me out at the railroads and told me I had a better chance to survive there [50]. Another woman named Su who also currently works as a sex worker and an activist told a similar story: After I came out to my parents, my brother threatened to kill me. He cut my hair and I was chained to a radiator for eight months. The chain was only long enough to reach the toilet. I lived like that, without any human interaction. It was a very traumatic experience for me [50]. It is not uncommon for trans-individuals to experience violence and isolation from family members. Most of the respondents explained that they feel closer to the trans-community than to their biological parents. For instance Sinem claimed that, “What life taught me is that a trans-woman’s only real friend is another trans-woman. Trans-women supported me in my most difficult times. They are the reasons why I am still alive” [50]. On the other hand, not every transgender individual experiences violence in their family homes. Some parents are prone to empathize with their children in addition to providing emotional, financial, and legal support. Families that are supportive of their children’s transition period have positive effects on their children’s development and can alleviate much of the pressure of living in a heteronormative culture. For instance, Pinar, a mother of a trans-woman asserts that: The thing we most want for our children is for them to be able to act with more freedom in this country we live in. We are fighting for our kids legal rights because all of our kids are victimized. We have children that are afraid to go outside because they are treated roughly in every step they take. We do not want our children to go through this [50]. The isolation, discrimination, and violence transgender individuals experience continues in their adult life and often results in participating in sex work. The Turkish government further facilitates job discrimination of transgender individuals by not employing policies that support the freedom of gender identity and expression. These inequalities block transsexual individuals’ paths to economic opportunity and social mobility. Destina notes that: All trans tell similar stories. I experienced a lot of work discrimination. I was fired from multiple jobs specifically because of my gender identity. I had no other choice but to participate in sex work. The good part is that I have united my body and soul. The bad part is I’m forced to do sex work and that’s horrible. Being a woman and having to be a sex worker tears me apart inside [50]. Su also agrees with Destina by saying, “I engage in sex work because of survival needs. It’s not something I would like to be doing” [50]. Demet, an ex-sex worker and currently a human rights activist, Soc. Sci. 2015, 4 851 argued that trans-individuals have very limited working opportunities. Her only alternative thirty years ago was to work as a sex worker and this still continues to be the case for most trans-woman in Turkey today. Sinem (a former teacher currently working as a sex worker) also protested the fact that she was discriminated against at her workplace as a result of her transgender identity. Consequentially, she was left with no choice but to return to work as a sex-worker. She said: Even though I have been experiencing many types of discrimination as a result of my gender identity, I graduated from university and became a teacher. While I was on my fourth year of teaching in Mus, Ministry of Education began preliminary field investigation on behalf of me. My teaching location was changed multiple times. I loved my job, but because of the endless pressures I experienced, I resigned from my job crying. I knew my only other alternative would to be back to participating in sex work [50]. Doga, a former military commander faced discrimination and inequality once she came out as trans. She said: I was a commander in the state’s military at age 18. The youngest soldier was 21. There were other soldiers in lower ranks. At age 18, I was above so many people in this ridiculous way. They expected me to manage them, and be a harsh man. I was successful in terms of work. Because I worked as a gendarmerie, we dealt with judicial things such as traffic accidents and murders. I had all these badges. Even though I was so successful, when I came out as trans, all those certificates, praises, badges were zeroed [51]. Although this study does not account for every transgender individual, the findings also correlate with previously collected research on transgender individuals. Collected research both in Turkey [26,30] and in other countries [29,32,52] elucidate that transgender individuals work in dangerous environments and regularly experience harassment, verbal and emotional abuse, violence, and arbitrary arrests in addition to the fact that they frequently experience discrimination in employment, housing, education, and health care. Some Turkish transwomen have a more positive and professional outlook of their work regardless of the social pressures they experience. These results also support Don Kulick’s findings on transvestites who participate in prostitution in Brazil [29]. Regardless of the dangers of their work environments, Kulick’s respondents did not perceive being a sex-worker as a demeaning occupation. Some of them stressed that they like the fact that they can be their own boss. They also believe that sex work provides a greater opportunity to earn a higher income than other types of employment that are available to them. Similarly, Turkish trans-woman Eylul argued that: I’ve been working in a variety of jobs since I was 14, including fast food chains, restaurants, hotels, etc. I remember a time when I worked for 20 hours and got paid 20 liras (about 13 dollars). But I’ve been a sex worker for the last two years and I’m making good money. I like this job since I earn what I deserve [50]. Selay, also transsexual sex worker living in Istanbul said: I’m a sex worker. This is what I’ve studied for the past fifteen years and that’s why I’m good at it. I respect others in this industry. Some are forced to do it. They cry and take drugs to Soc. Sci. 2015, 4 852 tolerate it, but I’m proud of what I do and I can shout it out. So I want to keep doing my job but I want protection and a safety net because ultimately I am providing a service [50]. Whether these women consider their job oppressive or empowering, safety is a major concern that all of them have in common. Many of the respondents expressed the fact that they live with a constant fear of death. Some of the individual comments capture this sense of anxiety. For instance Destina states that “Whether or not I work on the street, a violent act towards a friend affects me too. I know if it’s happening to one person today, and it might happen to me tomorrow” [50]. Selay also states that “I feel afraid to go out because anything can happen at any time. We are abused all the time”. Sinem also said: “Hate crimes control my life. I’ve been working as a sex worker for thirteen years, and each night before I go out, I take a last look at my house. Each night without exception I feel like I won’t be back. I put many of my flat mates and best friends underground. I buried them myself” [50]. Additionally, some women express their sadness at the fact that these crimes often go under-punished. Esmeray, a former sex worker and a current sex activist, stated that: The murderer can easily get off by saying “I visited this person thinking that it was a she but it turned out to be a he and I killed him”. And the judge takes that into account and extenuates the punishment. There are so many cases of this. But nowadays most cases go unclosed without even being investigated [50]. Agreeing with Esmeray, Buse also protested this phenomenon by saying, We live in a country where people murder trans-individuals and justify it by saying “I killed her because she was transgender” [50]. Inan, one of the trans-men, expresses these feelings in regard to hate crimes: As long as it’s not obvious that I’m a trans, and that I refuse to identify my gender identity, I am safe as a part of the masculinity. But at the moment that I come out or my gender identity is revealed, I became subject to violence [50]. When individuals were asked what repressive practices they would like to see changed, they provided some intriguing answers. The conventional family, religion, and heteronormativity were among the common themes. Aras said, “The institution of family. We are haunted by it. It’s like an evil curse, a great burden that can’t easily get rid of” [50]. Inan expressed that he finds masculinity to be the most repressive, arguing how “patriarchal politics impose male pressure to be more masculine” [50]. Deniz and Belgin portrayed similar views to Inan and found the heterosexual and male-dominated lifestyle to be the most repressive aspect of Turkish society. In addition, Sevval Kilic stated that, “I find religion to be the most repressive. After that the government, and then the traditional family structure. These institutions constantly tell you what is right and what is wrong” [50]. In regard to the current status of transgender individuals in Turkey, most respondents had a negative outlook and argued that the treatment of trans-individuals is deteriorating. For instance, Inan argued that most trans-individuals in Turkey are unhappy because they do not have any space to live freely. Soc. Sci. 2015, 4 853 He said, “We do not want much. Like we want to be able to walk on the road or ride the bus (without getting harassed)” [50]. Moreover, LGBT individuals also suffer from increased risk of suicide and depression. Studies show suicide rates for LGBT youth are higher than their heterosexual counterparts. Attempted suicide is even higher for transgender individuals [53–55]. A Turkish transwoman Eylul Cansin committed suicide in January in 2015 by jumping off of the Bosphorus Bridge in Istanbul. Cansin left a suicide video saying she is doing what everyone wanted her to do. In tears, she recorded: I was born in 1992. Now I must be 24 and I’m ending my 24 years. Kisses to everyone. I couldn’t. I couldn’t because people did not let me. I couldn’t work, I wanted to do stuff, I couldn’t…You get me? They impeded with me many times; they made me suffer a lot. I leave everyone alone with God and now I’m going to the Bosphorus Bridge. Kisses to all, God bless you [56]. In addition to Cansin, a trans-boy named Okyanus Efe Ozyavuz from Izmir, trans-activist Figen from Mersin and an Iranian gay refugee in Denizli were among the ones who committed suicide in 2015 [43]. Previous studies point out that institutionalized and internalized homophobia and discrimination can lead to serious mental health problems [57–59]. At the micro level, the findings of this study demonstrate common difficulties of transgender individuals in Turkey. First, a lack of family support combined with cultural homophobia that is present in Turkish society creates socially disparate outcomes for transgender individuals. Experiencing violence and discrimination as a result of their gender identity, respondents often struggle to secure employment opportunities and thus participate in prostitution out of economic necessity. The low tolerance towards their gender identity can result in anything from verbal attacks to physical violence to brutal homicides. Discrimination and violence trans-individuals experience at the micro-level continues at the macro-level. Lack of safety is a predominant concern for transgender individuals. The Turkish government’s criminalization policies toward prostitution combined with lack of protection of civil rights perpetuate the economic deprivation, social marginalization, and violence against transgender individuals. 6. Conclusions LGBT rights in Western societies have been progressing more rapidly since the 1970s, while public attitudes and government policies in Turkey are not making such rapid strides toward tolerance. This study examines political attitudes toward the LGBT population in Turkish society by first analyzing the debates of four cabinet members, each representing their party’s point of view. The results of the parliamentary debates show that the majority of Turkish representatives are not supportive of LGBT rights. As a result, the Turkish government fails to protect the rights of sexual minorities. This study also documents twenty-five transgender individuals’ experiences of discrimination, abuse, and violence as a result of living in a staunchly hetero-normative culture. One of the limitations of this study is the possibility of community bias. Since most participants in the secondary-data analysis identified themselves as activists, they may have produced biased results. The small number of observations is another limitation in this study. A larger sample size and the selection of individuals from all ethnic, age, and class groups, proportionally, may reduce this sampling Soc. Sci. 2015, 4 854 bias. Further research that encompasses a larger number of interviews with a probability sampling technique to produce data that is representative of the LGBT population in Turkey is also needed. However, quantitative research on hidden populations are difficult to obtain since these populations are not included in large datasets. While this study methodologically poses challenges, it still enables us to learn about a vulnerable population that is outside mainstream social research and is extremely difficult to access. Although this micro level analysis cannot be generalized for every trans-individual in Turkey, an overwhelming majority of them work in dangerous environments and regularly experience harassment, violence, and abuse. They also experience discrimination in employment, housing, education, and healthcare. This is not a unique circumstance to transgender people in Turkey. Global research on transgender individuals also supports this phenomenon. Accordingly, certain reforms and policy changes need to be adopted by the Turkish government in order to reduce discrimination and safeguard the equal protection of LGBT individuals in general and trans-individuals in particular. One of the reforms that would ameliorate the rights of LGBT individuals is the adoption of anti-discrimination laws on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity. “Article 10 and Article 70” of the Constitution of the Republic of Turkey, and “Article 5” of the Labor Law should aim to broaden its categories to sexual minorities in order to reduce discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity. Secondly, proportional legal punishment of those who commit crimes against the LGBT population is crucial for combating hate crimes. The government also needs to expand social services available to the LGBT population such as suicide prevention, job placement, and housing. 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work_gtx3d7orlvcmvnz4rqasi5mwne	----	<303730365FB4D9C2F7BCF6C1A45FB9CCB1B9C7D02033342D312E687770> Fear and Loathing in America after 9/11: Terrorism, Racism, and the Need for New Beginnings Moustafa Bayoumi Every year after the terrorist attacks of 2001, New York City has commemorated its grievous losses from that terrible day with a kind of quiet dignity. Since September 2003, the city has lit the “Tribute in Light,” two powerful spotlight beams that soar into the night air where the World Trade Center once was1) (the “Tribute in Light” was first launched on March 11, 2002, for an initial period of one month).2) On the actual anniversary, New York has hosted a prayer service and public reading of the names of the dead. The simplicity of these gestures has endowed the day with feelings of mourning and loss, and these have been the dominant emotions in New York on 1) David W. Dunlap, “‘Tribute in Light’ Will Keep Shining, This Year and The Next,” Cityroom, The New York Times, September 10, 2001, http://cityroom.blogs. nytimes.com/2010/09/10/tribute-in-light-will-keep-shining-this-year-and-the-next/. 2) Terence Smith, “Tribute in Light,” Online News Hour, PBS.org, March 11, 2002, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/terrorism/jan-june02/light_3-11.html. the anniversaries of the September 11 attacks, at least until 2010. On September 11, 2010, rage took to the streets in ways that stunned many observers. The New York Times described “heated demonstrations” that illustrated “political and religious tensions and an unmistakable sense that a once-unifying day was now replete with division,” further characterizing the darkening atmosphere of the day as “hard to envision just a year ago.”3) The most publicly acknowledged cause for the change in the mood was the announcement that a “mosque” would be built at Ground Zero, which seemed to light a fire under some Americans (the Arab American comedian Dean Obeidallah writes that “Some people truly appear to hate Muslims more than they love the ideals of our country”).4) When first reported in December 2009,5) the planned construction of the “Ground Zero Mosque,” as it has come to be called (although it is not at Ground Zero and will not in fact be a mosque)6) caused little controversy, but staring in the early summer news of the project 3) Anne Barnard and Manny Hernandez, “On Sept. 11 Anniversary, Rifts amid Mourning,” The New York Times, September 11, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/ 2010/09/12/nyregion/12sept11.html. 4) Dean Obeidallah, “Why Building the Mosque is Good for America,” The Huffington Post, August 16, 2010, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/dean-obeidallah/ why-building-the-mosque-i_b_683060.html. 5) Ralph Blumenthal and Sharaf Mowjood, “Muslim Prayers and Renewal near Ground Zero,” The New York Times, December 8, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/ 2009/12/09/nyregion/09mosque.html. 6) Park51, commonly known as the “Ground Zero Mosque,” models itself after the 92StreetY, a prominent Jewish cultural center in Manhattan. Park51’s design includes a prayer space, but it also includes recreation facilities, a restaurant, and an auditorium to host cultural events and lectures, making it a cultural center rather than a mosque. The site is located two blocks north of where the World Trade Center stood. snowballed into a major scandal that became a cultural debate about the nature of American society and the rights of American Muslims therein. Quickly, a kind of rank populism directed against Muslims seemed to be spilling out everywhere. I went to observe two of the demonstrations in New York on September 11 2010, although more may have been held. At City Hall Park, people had assembled to voice their support for the construction of the Muslim Cultural Center, first called Cordoba House but now renamed Park51. Two long city blocks and a world away (and much closer to “Ground Zero”) was the anti-Park51 demonstration. In between them was a smaller but not insignificant demonstration of 9/11 “truthers,” those who believe that the official narrative of the terrorist attacks is doubtful and imply that the U.S. government itself was behind the attacks. What I saw at the first demonstration was familiar. What I witnessed at the second, however, was frightening. What I will dub the “pro-tolerance” demonstration was peopled by a cross-section of New York City. It was noisy, it was disorganized, and it felt hastily brought together. A quickly constructed stage was at one end of the demonstration and speakers from a wide variety of political causes took their turns proclaiming upon it such things as a belief in multicultural America, opposition to bigotry and racism, criticism of American imperialism, and support for workers’ struggles in the city and around the world. The mood here was one of solidarity in spite of the protestors’ differences. Multi-ethnic, multi-religious, multi-racial, young and old, the assembled group was made up of many different kinds of people, dressed in a variety of attire. It seemed, in short, to be a pretty fair representation of New York City. The “anti-tolerance” demonstration was something else entirely, a representation of some other side of New York and the United States. Organized by a radical rightwing group called “Stop the Islamization of America,” this assembly was completely high-tech, with a large stage and a massive television monitor above that beamed in satellite feeds of John Bolton and other staunch conservatives to offer their “anti-Ground Zero Mosque” message. Men with suits and walkie-talkies were shuffling people and speakers around. Large swaths of the crowd were wearing the same anti- mosque t-shirts. The money behind the event was plainly evident, as was the constituency it attracted. Unlike the pro-tolerance demonstration, this group was overwhelmingly white and mostly older. American flags were everywhere, as were signs expressing the anti-Islam sentiment of the demonstration. Some were directed against the religion: “Hey Islam, we will never submit,” “What would Jesus Do? Have his throat slit by Mohammed,” and “Sharia” written in bloodlike letters. Others were directed against immigration policy: “Why give terrorists the rights of US citizens they are sworn to kill,” “Terrorist Sleeping [sic] Cells in America are Muslims! Wake Up America!!!!” and “Illegal Aliens were Responsible for the 9/11 Attacks. The Solution is Simple. Close the Borders. No Immigration = No Terrorism” (As a point of fact, none of the 9/11 hijackers entered the country illegally).7) And then there were the simple three-word signs: “No 7) “Identity and Immigration Status of 9/11 terrorists,” The Federation for American Immigration Reform website, February 2004, http://www.fairus.org/site/ PageServer?pagename=iic_immigrationissuecentersc582. Victory Mosque,” “No Obama Mosque,” and “No Bloomberg Mosque.” At the height of the demonstration, thousands of people yelled “No Mosque! No Mosque!” I also observed one man participating in an increasingly heated conversation with passers-by. The exchange was sparked by the fact that he was wearing a placard that on one side depicted a toilet (labeled “toilet bowl”) and on the other was a Qur’an (labeled “toilet paper”) hanging off the placard by a hook. He had been walking the street yelling, “Get your toilet paper here! That’s what it’s good for. I’ve been using the shit book since Sept. 12, 2001!” Asked by a journalist to identify himself, he refused. A passer-by started berating him by asking if he knew how racist he was being. “You want to call me a racist? Yes, I’m a racist,” he declared. “I hate Muslims. I do, and you should too. I hate them as much as they hate me.” I have lived in New York City for twenty years, and I have never seen this kind of blatant and braying prejudice before. It was raw and completely in your face. Directed not only at Muslims, their animus was also aimed at the few political leaders, such as Mayor Bloomberg, who publicly supported Park51. The entire episode left me depressed. What has enabled such a radical change in mood over such a short time? For one thing, most of the country’s professional politicians, both Democrats and Republicans, had been either extremely timid in their defense of religious freedom or downright hostile to the idea that Muslims have the same rights as others to property and the free exercise of religion. Former Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich likened Muslims to Nazis (“Nazis don’t have the right to put up a sign next to the holocaust museum in Washington,”),8) and Sarah Palin accused Muslims of being “insensitive,” in a way that makes it hard to see how she doesn’t equate all Muslims with terrorists.9) As Gingrich and Palin’s statements suggest, timidity is not the only cause of this unleashed animus. Today, rightwing defenders of the United States from demagogic politicians to street demonstrators see themselves as charged to keep the country from becoming an Islamic state. What used to be a minority opinion endorsed only by the radical fringe of the right namely that a “stealth jihad” is being waged by ordinary Muslims in the country to overturn the constitution and enshrine Sharia law throughout the land10) has now entered the mainstream. As further evidence of this, consider how, in November 2010, Oklahomans voted overwhelmingly in favor of a state constitutional amendment, State Question 755, which would ban the use of Sharia law (i.e. Islamic jurisprudence) in their courts.11) Voters in that state, after being inundated by a well-funded campaign, were reacting to what one Republican State Representative, Rex Duncan, has called “a war for the survival of the United States.”12) On November 29, a 8) Qtd. in Matt DeLong, “Newt Gingrich Compares ‘Ground-Zero Mosque’ to Backers of Nazis,” The Washington Post, August 16, 2010, http://voices.washing tonpost.com/44/2010/08/newt-gingrich-compares-ground.html. 9) Karen Tumulty, “Some Republican Figures Urge Candidates not to Focus on NYC mosque issue,” The Washington Post, August 18, 2010, http://www.washing tonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/08/17/AR2010081705860.html. Neither Palin nor Gingrich was in or officially running for office when commenting on Park51. 10) Robert Spencer, Stealth Jihad: How Radical Islam is Subverting America Without Guns or Bombs (Regenery: Washington D.C.: 2008). 11) The amendment can be viewed at the Oklahoma State Government’s website: https://www.sos.ok.gov/documents/questions/755.pdf. federal judge temporarily blocked the amendment as unconstitutional. Thirteen other states have followed with their own versions of anti-Sharia legislation.13) Nor is this anti-Muslim and anti-mosque sentiment limited to Oklahoma and the charged area around Ground Zero. According to a news survey conducted by the Pew Research Center’s Forum on Religion & Public Life in September 2010, at least 35 mosques around the country have faced opposition over the past two years.14) In one case in California, mosque opponents were advised to bring dogs to their demonstration, because the leader of their group claimed that Muslims “hate dogs.”15) Meanwhile, Terry Jones, a ridiculous leader of a fringe religious group in Florida garnered international coverage of his plan to burn Qur’ans on September 11, 2010; he was ultimately talked out of his plan by Robert Gates, the Secretary of Defense, no less.16) In October 2010, conservative talk-show host Bill 12) James McKinley, Jr. “Judge Blocks Oklahoma’s Ban on Using Shariah Law in Court,” The New York Times, November 29, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/ 11/30/us/30oklahoma.html. 13) Zaid Jilani, “At least thirteen states have introduced bills guarding against non-existent threat of Sharia law,” ThinkProgress, February 8, 2011, http:// thinkprogress.org/2011/02/08/Sharia-states. 14) Pew Research Center’s Forum on Religion and Public Life, Controversies Over Mosques and Islamic Centers Across the U.S., September 24, 2010, http://features. pewforum.org/muslim/assets/mosque-map-all-text-10-5.pdf. 15) Phil Whillon, “Islamic Group Denounces planned Temecula mosque protest.” The Los Angeles Times. July 28, 2010, http://articles.latimes.com/2010/jul/28/ local/la-me-mosque-protest-20100728. 16) Damien Cave and Anne Barnard, “Minister Wavers on Plans to Burn Koran,” The New York Times, September 9, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/10/ us/10obama.html. In March 20, 2011, Jones did stage a “mock trial” of the Qur’an which culminated in his public burning of the holy book and which subsequently ignited deadly protests in Afghanistan (Eneyat Najafizada and Rod O’Reilly appeared on the popular daytime television show The View, where he stated that “Muslims killed us on 9/11,” causing two of the hosts, Whoopi Goldberg and Joy Behar, to walk off set in anger.17) The Texas State Board of Education voted to limit references to Islam in their high-school textbooks, even though, as the Associated Press noted, “the resolution cites world-history books no longer used in Texas schools.”18) According to the Texas Freedom Network, which advocates for religious freedom, the resolution was “based on superficial and grossly misleading claims,” including allegations that the textbooks “whitewash” Islam while vilifying Christianity, and that Arab investors are taking over the American publishing industry.19) What is going on here? In short, the fear of terrorism has been usurped by a very popular fear of Muslims. The question is not just why this has happened, by why it has taken nine years for this dramatic change to occur in the United States. The answer to these questions, I believe, is intimately connected to the election of Barack Nordland, “Afghans Avenge Florida Koran Burning, Killing 12,” The New York Times, April 1, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/02/world/asia/02afghanistan. html.) 17) Devon Thomas, “Bill O’Reilly On ‘The View’: ‘Muslims Killed Us on 9/11’; Co-Hosts Walk Off,” CBSNews.com, October 14, 2010, http://www.cbsnews.com/ 8301-31749_162-20019660-10391698.html. 18) April Castro, “Texas Ed Board Adopts Resolution Limiting Islam in Textbooks,” USA Today, September 25, 2010, http://www.usatoday.com/news/religion/2010- 09-26-textbooks25_ST_N.htm. 19) “Attacking Religious Freedom: the Anti-Islam Resolution,” The Texas Freedom Network website, http://www.tfn.org/site/PageServer?pagename=issues_sboe_islam_ resolution. The accusation was based on a 2008 decision by Dubai’s royal family to invest heavily in a company that owns Houghton Mifflin Harcourt; but the family had already lost its stake in the company. See James McKinley, Jr., “A Claim of Pro-Islam Bias in Textbooks,” The New York Times. September 22, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/23/education/23texas.html. Obama as President of the United States. Since 2001, many scholars, myself included, have written about the rebirth of Orientalist clichés and the rise of the Clash of Civilizations thesis in American popular and political discourses.20) There is of course good reason for this. It is certainly true that new forms of racism and hostility against Arabs and Muslims have exploded since the terrorist attacks. Polling data bears this out. According to an annual Washington Post-ABC News poll, approximately 39% of Americans held unfavorable opinions of Islam in 2001. Dipping for a few years, the number rose to 46% in 2006. In 2010, it reached 49%.21) According to a poll by The Economist magazine in the summer of 2010, the number hovers at around 55 percent.22) Such enmity is expressed in a variety of ways, from the often invisible workings of employment and housing discrimination to the more visible instances of hate crime attacks, mass arrests, and curtailments of civil liberties for Muslim Americans. The Tea Party Nation, a political organization, even demanded during the 2010 election that the African American Muslim Congressman Keith Ellison be ousted from his seat because he is a Muslim.23) 20) See, for instance, Moustafa Bayoumi, “A Bloody Stupid War,” Middle East Report and Information Project 231 (Summer 2004): 36-45. 21) “Washington Post-ABC News Poll,” The Washington Post, September 2, 2010 version, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/polls/postpoll_09072010.html? sid=ST2010090806236. 22) “Mosque Building and Its Discontents,” The Economist, August, 19, 2010, 2011, http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2010/08/islamic_cultural_centre_ sorta_near_ground_zero. The 55% figure adds the 27.7% of “Somewhat unfavorable” with the 27.7% of “very unfavorable.” 23) Justin Elliot, “Tea Party Leader: Defeat Ellison because he’s Muslim,” Salon.com. October 26, 2010, http://www.salon.com/news/politics/war_room/2010/ But the scholarly reliance on Orientalism a long tradition in Western thought, identified by Edward Said, of conceptualizing and stereotyping the Orient at the inferior Other to the superior West, and thus of “dominating, restructuring, and having authority” over the Orient24) for an explanation of this development misses other traditions in American thought that are equally if not more relevant to the situation in the United States today. The first tradition to consider is the long and sordid history of nativism in American thought and practice. The inflamed politics of today may blind us to the ways that other groups in the United States have encountered very similar opposition to their presence in the country and have had their American credentials questioned at every turn. A look at John Higham’s classic work from 1955, Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American Nativism 1860-1925, makes this point clear. Higham describes the ways that Catholics, Germans, Communists, blacks, Jews, Asians, and immigrants of all sorts have all been vilified by a doctrine known by such names as Know- Nothingism, 100 Per Cent Americanism, and the Anglo-Saxon ideal. “Nativism,” Higham writes in the preface to the second edition of his book, “was a defensive type of nationalism, but the defense varied as the nativist lashed out sometimes against a religious peril, sometimes against a revolutionary peril, sometimes against a racial peril.”25) Muslim Americans today are cast as the latest villains in the grand nativist epic about the downfall of the United States, and they are 10/26/tea_party_nation_phillips_ellison_muslim. 24) Edward W. Said, Orientalism (New York: Vintage, 1979), 3. 25) John Higham, Strangers in the Land: Patterns in American Nativism 1860-1925, 2 Edition (New York: Antheum, 1977), ii. seen as the bearers of a combined religious, revolutionary, and racial threat. As the signs at the anti-Park51 demonstration indicate, it is not uncommon to find this anti-Muslim discourse connected directly with a broader anti-immigrant sentiment in the country, most clearly expressed by Arizona’s law SB1070, the toughest piece of anti- immigrant legislation in the country today, which hands to the police the broad power to detain anyone they believe is in the country illegally.26) “Why They Won’t Assimilate” is the title of a 2007 article by Selywn Duke, a failed tennis pro turned rightwing blogger, for the online daily American Thinker. Duke argues that Muslims and Mexicans, whom he derisively refers to as M&Ms, are abusing en masse the proud tradition of American immigration. “Today’s M&M influx (Moslems and Mexicans) is distinguished from previous immigrant waves by a sense of entitlement,” he writes. “Where Mexicans exhibit ethnic patriotism, Moslems manifest religious chauvinism. Far too many pious Moslems believe they have been enjoined to impose their faith on others by any means necessary; this is why they will unabashedly demand concessions, such as their own dormitories at colleges and an Arabic public school in New York City. It’s also why they have fought for the right to use sharia law to settle civil disputes in Canada.”27) Muslims and Mexicans are in the spotlight today, and they are seen as being as unassimilable now just as Irish Catholics were in the nineteenth century. New York Reverend Kevin Madigan, Pastor 26) The bill for the law can be viewed at the Arizona State Government’s website: http://www.azleg.gov/legtext/49leg/2r/bills/sb1070s.pdf. 27) Selwyn Duke, “Why They Won’t Assimilate,” American Thinker, May 21, 2007, http://www.americanthinker.com/2007/05/why_they_wont_assimilate.html. of St. Peter’s Roman Catholic Church in Lower Manhattan, made the connection clear. Researching his church’s past (which is also about two blocks from Ground Zero), the reverend wrote a letter to his parishioners and delivered several sermons and lectures regarding the similarity of opposition this his church once faced and that Muslim American are confronting today. The New York Times reported on his letter as follows: On Christmas Eve 1806, two decades after the church was built, the building was surrounded by Protestants incensed at a celebration going on inside a religious observance then viewed by some in the United States as an exercise in ‘popish superstition,’ more commonly referred to as Christmas. Protesters tried to disrupt the service. In the melee that ensued, dozens were injured, and a policeman was killed. ‘We were treated as second-class citizens; we were viewed with suspicion,’ Father Madigan wrote in his letter to parishioners, adding, ‘Many of the charges being leveled at Muslim- Americans today are the same as those once leveled at our forebears.’28) 28) Paul Vitello, “In Fierce Opposition to a Muslim Center, Echoes of an Old Fight,” New York Times, October 17, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/08/ nyregion/08zero.html. What is surprising about the emerging anti-assimiliationist narrative for American Muslims is that the mainstream right has resisted it for a long time, and many still do. For these conservatives, American opportunity is what separates the United States from Europe (see Radley Balko, “The American Muslim Success Story,” Reason.com, blog, August 17, 2010, http://reason.com/blog/2010/08/17/the-american-muslim-success-st). How America treats its Muslims thus becomes part of American identity, away from the coddling and cultural suicide of Western Europe and its effete welfare policies. More disturbingly is the emergent if not now dominant trend among American conservatives to connect their paranoia about Muslims to European rightwing movements and leaders. Evidence of this can is that the Dutch anti-Muslim and anti-immigrant politician Geert Wilders was the guest speaker at this year’s September 11th “anti-mosque” demonstration, and books such as Bruce Bawer’s While Europe Slept: How Radical Islam is Destroying the West from Within are popular in the United States. What should thus give us considerable cause Nativism, in other words, offers a clue into the present climate in the United States, but to understand the situation more fully we need to turn to a related phenomenon, what Richard Hoftstadter, in a classic essay of American political theory, calls “the paranoid style in American Politics.”29) In his 1964 essay, Hoftstadter argues that a recurring motif in American conservative discourse is a “paranoid style” of politics. He uses the term “paranoid” because he believes it best describes “the heated exaggeration, suspiciousness, and conspiratorial fantasies”30) of rightwing conservatives. As Higham does, Hofstadter reaches back into the nineteenth century to provide a genealogy of his subject, but he is most interested in the Cold War politics of his age. The “paranoid style” was evident everywhere he turned. What drove Joseph McCarthy and those like him, Hofstadter argues, was the belief that they was surrounded by “a conspiracy on a scale so immense as to dwarf any previous such venture in the history of man.”31) The paranoid disposition is driven by “catastrophe or the fear of catastrophe,” which “is most likely to elicit the syndrome of paranoid rhetoric.”32) for concern is that the paranoid style of American politics has meant that conservatives in the United States are seeking out and making connections with Europe’s extreme rightwing groups and political parties, such as Wilders’ Freedom Party, on the basis of their shared anti-Muslim, anti-immigrant beliefs. See “The Flying Dutchman,” Newsweek, February 16, 2009, http://www.newsweek. com/2009/02/16/the-flying-dutchman.html. 29) Richard Hofstadter, “The Paranoid Style in American Politics” in ‘The Paranoid Style in American Politics’ and Other Essays (New York: Vintage, 2008), 3. 30) Ibid. 31) Ibid., 27. 32) Ibid., 39. The paranoid style of American politics propels the fear and loathing of American Muslims today. The irrational fear that Sharia law is on the cusp of conquering the nation has its roots in the Cold War conservative belief that the minions of the Soviet Union were deeply entrenched in the American ruling class and ready to turn on a Ruble. Immigration in the past and politically correct multiculturalism today have left the nation nearly defenseless to the true and existential threats of the hour. The modern anti-Muslim crusader in the United States believes that Islam is on the march in the country, and that he and like-minded Americans are the last resistance. They believe that the conspiracy itself reaches high into the upper echelons of the ruling class. How better to explain the fact that twenty-four percent of the electorate, according to a Time poll from August 2010, believe that the president is himself a Muslim?33) There is certainly a kind of implied racial coding going on here being Muslim also means that Obama is simply not one of “us” but the feeling that a cabal of internationals and Muslims have or are ready to take over the country is implicit in rightwing rhetoric today, from Republican leader Sarah Palin’s exhortation to “take our country back”34) (from what, one might ask?) to the frequently heard demands to see Barack Obama’s birth certificate to the labeling of Park51 as the “Obama 33) Alex Altman, “TIME Poll: Majority Oppose Mosque, Many Distrust Muslims,” Time, August 19, 2010, http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,2011799, 00.html. 34) Dean Reynolds, “Palin: ‘It’s Time to Take Our Country Back,’” CBSNews.com, September 17, 2010, http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_162-20016903-503544. html. Mosque.” The routine and copious debunkings and the offerings of proof of Obama’s credentials are superfluous in this fantasy. It’s all a kind of political paranoia of Muslims. As Hofstadter writes, “what distinguishes the paranoid style is not the absence of verifiable facts but rather the curious leap in imagination that is always made at some critical point in the recital of events.”35) Almost the same attack is leveled against Mayor Bloomberg for his support of Park51. The fantasy here is that his endorsement of the project is a trade-off for a major business deal in the Middle East for Bloomberg News.36) Understanding the paranoid style, in other words, is as relevant today to understanding rightwing conservatives and how they see the world as if it was 1964. Consider this paragraph from Hofstadter’s essay: The modern right wing feels dispossessed: America has been taken away from them and their kind, though they are determined to try to repossess it and to prevent the final act of subversion. The old American virtues have already been eaten away by cosmopolitans and intellectuals; the old competitive capitalism has been gradually undermined by socialist and communist schemers; the old national security and independence have been destroyed by treasonous plots, having as their most powerful agents not merely outsiders and foreigners but major statesmen seated at the very centers of American power. Their predecessors discovered foreign conspiracies; the modern radical right finds that conspiracy also embraces betrayal at home.37) 35) Hofstadter, “The Paranoid Style,” 37. 36) Noel Sheppard, “Is Bloomberg Supporting Ground Zero Mosque for Business Reasons?” Newsbusters, August 27, 2011, http://newsbusters.org/blogs/noel- sheppard/2010/08/27/bloomberg-supporting-ground-zero-mosque-business-reasons. 37) Hofstadter, “The Paranoid Style,” 24-25. It became commonplace this past summer to argue that former President George W. Bush, despite his launching of two wars on Muslim-majority countries and frequent mentions of “Islamofascism” and the “axis of evil”, had been more “respectful” towards Islam (consider Peter Beinart’s article “America Has Disgraced Itself”38) as an example), as if words can be as easily dislodged from actions, But this misses the point. Conservatives were driving the anti-Muslim agenda this summer, but under Bush’s leadership their notion of an imminent takeover of the United States’ government held little credence and made little sense (that particular conspiracy theory was left to Michael Moore’s documentary Fahrenheit 911, which illustrated a kind of paranoia of the left.) On those few occasions when Bush did speak out for Muslim Americans and against hate crimes, the underlying point was not really tolerance but, as Max Weber would see it, the state’s monopoly on violence.39) The fact is that until recently, the American Muslim community was most concerned about state repression and racial profiling. Now, they have state repression, racial profiling and a stoked populist fear and anger to worry about. How do we get out of this situation, where the political rhetoric of the country threatens not only today’s immigrant communities (Muslims, Mexicans and others) but also the very fabric of the country and its 38) Peter Beinart, “America Has Disgraced Itself,” The Daily Beast, August 17, 2010, http://www.thedailybeast.com/blogs-and-stories/2010-08-17/ground-zero-mosque-con troversy-america-has-disgraced-itself. 39) Max Weber, “Politics as a Vocation,” in The Vocation Lectures, ed. David Owen and Tracy Strong, trans. Rodney Livingstone (Indianapolis, Indiana: Hacket, 2004), 32-94. own ideals? One way that Arab and Muslim Americans, and many others, have been attempting a solution is through the redemptive power of the arts. We have witnessed over the last few years a remarkable increase in counter-hegemonic works of the imagination in the United States, which increasingly attempt to represent the reality of American Muslims. Works of fiction such as Randa Jarrar’s A Map of Home,40) non-fiction books such as Alia Malek’s A Country Called Amreeka,41) films such as Cherien Dabis’s Amreeka, and popular music by artists like The Narcicyst point to a growing body of work that seeks complexity and coexistence through mutual respect. Likewise, the political satire of Jon Stewart and Stephen Colbert frequently take on today’s anti-Muslim prejudice with pointed critique, and major organs of the cultural establishment, from the Kennedy Center to the New York Public Library to the Metropolitan Museum of Art have all held major exhibitions or symposia on Islam, Arab culture, or a broadly defined “Muslim culture” (which, by defining culture as “Muslim,” is unfortunately often tinged with its own kind of liberal Orientalism). This past summer, the Asia Society in New York also held a Sufi Music Festival in Union Square, attracting 5,000 people to its events. Zeba Rahman, one of the organizers, recently told me that she sees her work as a cultural producer as crucial in reducing the tensions of the moment and building bridges of sympathy in a climate of extreme polarization. The arts will always have a role to play in any society, helping that society determine its values, forge connections for its own future, 40) Randa Jarrar, A Map of Home (New York: Other Press, 2008). 41) Alia Malek, A Country Called Amreeka (New York: Free Press, 2009). and delegitimize its paranoid fantasies. But it is likely too easy to overstate the value of the arts, for the conflicts of today are ultimately political and not aesthetic questions. The totality of the well-meaning work of dialogue and accommodation can easily end in a poof of smoke. All it takes is one unmanned drone dropping a bomb on civilians in Afghanistan or another terroristic attack on the streets of the United States to inflame passions beyond comprehension. Only a politics dedicated to reducing conflict and enlarging justice and equality can solve the problems of political violence and ameliorate or at least diminish the allure of racism. As seductive as it is, relying on the arts to solve the problems of the day is rather like reading Shakespeare in a lawn chair during the Siege of Leningrad. “The classics can console,” Derek Walcott writes in his poem “Sea Grapes,” “but not enough.”42) 42) Derek Walcott, “Sea Grapes,” Collected Poems: 1948-1984 (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1986), 297. Altman, Alex. “Majority Oppose Mosque, Many Distrust Muslims.” Time, August 19, 2010. http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,2011799,00.html. “Attacking Religious Freedom: the Anti-Islam Resolution.” The Texas Freedom Network website. http://www.tfn.org/site/PageServer?pagename= issues_sboe_islam_resolution. Balko, Radley. “The American Muslim Success Story.” Reason, August 17, 2010. http://reason.com/blog/2010/08/17/the-american-muslim-success-st. Barnard, Anne and Manny Hernandez. “On Sept. 11 anniversary, rifts amid mourning.” The New York Times, September 11, 2010. http://www. nytimes.com/2010/09/12/nyregion/12sept11.html. Bawer, Bruce. While Europe Slept: How Radical Islam is Destroying the West from Within. Anchor Books: New York, 2007. Bayoumi, Moustafa. “A Bloody Stupid War.” Middle East Report and Information Project 231 (Summer 2004): 36-45. Beinart, Peter. “America Has Disgraced Itself.” The Daily Beast, August 17, 2010. http://www.thedailybeast.com/blogs-and-stories/2010-08-17/ground-zero -mosque-controversy-america-has-disgraced-itself. Blumenthal, Ralph and Sharaf Mowjood. “Muslim prayers and renewal near Ground Zero.” The New York Times, December 8, 2009. http://www. nytimes.com/2009/12/09/nyregion/09mosque.html. Castro, April. “Texas Ed Board Adopts Resolution Limiting Islam in Textbooks.” USA Today. September 25, 2010. http://www.usatoday.com/ news/religion/2010-09-26-textbooks25_ST_N.htm. Cave, Damien and Anne Barnard. “Minister Wavers on Plans to Burn Koran,” The New York Times, September 9, 2010. http://www.nytimes. com/2010/09/10/us/10obama.html. DeLong, Matt. “Newt Gingrich compares ‘Ground-Zero Mosque’ to backers of Nazis.” The Washington Post, August 16, 2010. http://voices. washingtonpost.com/44/2010/08/newt-gingrich-compares-ground.html. Duke, Selwyn. “Why They Won’t Assimilate.” American Thinker, May 21, 2007. http://www.americanthinker.com/2007/05/why_they_wont_assimi- late.html. Dunlap, David W. “’Tribute in Light’ Will Keep Shining, This Year and The Next.” Cityroom, The New York Times City, September 10, 2001. http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/09/10/tribute-in-light-will-keep- shining-this-year-and-the-next/. Elliot, Justin. “Tea Party Leader: Defeat Ellison because he’s Muslim.” Salon.com, October 26, 2010. http://www.salon.com/news/politics/war_ room/2010/10/26/tea_party_nation_phillips_ellison_muslim. “The Flying Dutchman.” Newsweek, February 16, 2009. http://www.newsweek. com/2009/02/16/the-flying-dutchman.html. Hartenstein, Meena. “Republican Sen. Mitch McConnell on if Obama is Muslim: ‘I take him at his word’ he’s Christian.’” New York Daily News, August 22, 2010. http://articles.nydailynews.com/2010-08-22/ news/27073315_1_obama-muslim-islamic. Higham, John. Strangers in the Land: Patterns in American Nativism 1860-1925. 2 Edition. New York: Antheum, 1977. Hofstadter, Richard. “The Paranoid Style in American Politics.” In ‘The Paranoid Style in American Politics’ and Other Essays, 3-40. New York: Vintage, 2008. “Identity and immigration status of 9/11 terrorists,” The Federation for American Immigration Reform website. http://www.fairus.org/site/ PageServer?pagename=iic_immigrationissuecentersc582. Jarrar, Randa. A Map of Home. New York: Other Press, 2008. Jilani, Zaid. “At least thirteen states have introduced bills guarding against non-existent threat of Sharia law.” ThinkProgress, February 8, 2011. http://thinkprogress.org/2011/02/08/Sharia-states. Malek, Alia. A Country Called Amreeka: New York: Free Press, 2009. McKinley, James, Jr. “A Claim of Pro-Islam Bias in Textbooks.” The New York Times, September 22, 2010. http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/ 23/education/23texas.html. . “Judge Blocks Oklahoma’s Ban on Using Shariah Law in Court.” The New York Times, November 29, 2010. http://www. nytimes.com/2010/11/30/us/30oklahoma.html. “Mosque Building and Its Discontents.” The Economist, August, 19, 2010. http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2010/08/islamic_c ultural_centre_sorta_near_ground_zero. Najafizada, Eneyat and Rod Nordland. “Afghans Avenge Florida Koran Burning, Killing 12.” The New York Times, April 1, 2011. http://www. nytimes.com/2011/04/02/world/asia/02afghanistan.html. Obeidallah, Dean. “Why building the mosque is good for America.” The Huffington Post, August 16, 2010. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ dean-obeidallah/why-building-the-mosque-i_b_683060.html. Pew Research Center’s Forum on Religion and Public Life. Controversies Over Mosques and Islamic Centers Across the U.S. September 24, 2010. http://features.pewforum.org/muslim/assets/mosque-map-all-text-10-5.pdf. Reynolds, Dean. “Palin: ‘It’s Time to Take Our Country Back.’” CBSNews.com, September 17, 2010. http://www.cbsnews.com/8301- 503544_162-20016903-503544.html. Said, Edward W. Orientalism. New York: Vintage, 1979. Sheppard, Noel. “Is Bloomberg Supporting Ground Zero Mosque for Business Reasons?” Newsbusters, August 27, 2011. http://newsbusters. org/blogs/noel-sheppard/2010/08/27/bloomberg-supporting-ground-zero- mosque-business-reasons. Spencer, Robert. Stealth Jihad: How Radical Islam is Subverting America Without Guns or Bombs. Regenery: Washington D.C., 2008. Smith, Terence. “Tribute in Light.” Online News Hour. PBS.org. March 11, 2002 Broadcast. http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/terrorism/jan-june02/ light_3-11.html. Thomas, Devon. “Bill O’Reilly On ‘The View’: ‘Muslims Killed Us on 9/11’; Co-Hosts Walk Off.” CBSNews.com, October 14, 2010. http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-31749_162-20019660-10391698.html. Tumulty, Karen. “Some Republican figures urge candidates not to focus on NYC mosque issue.” The Washington Post, August 18, 2010. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/08/17/AR2 010081705860.html. Vitello, Paul. “In Fierce Opposition to a Muslim Center, Echoes of an Old Fight.” The New York Times, October 17, 2010. http://www.nytimes. com/2010/10/08/nyregion/08zero.html. Walcott, Derek. “Sea Grapes.” In Collected Poems: 1948-1984, 297. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1986. “Washington Post-ABC News Poll.” The Washington Post, September 2, 2010 version. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/polls/ postpoll_09072010.html?sid=ST2010090806236. Weber, Max. “Politics as a Vocation.” In The Vocation Lectures, edited by David Owen and Tracy Strong, translated by Rodney Livingstone, 32-94. Indianapolis, Indiana: Hacket, 2004. Whillon, Phil. “Islamic Group Denounces planned Temecula mosque protest.” The Los Angeles Times, July 28, 2010. http://articles.latimes.com/ 2010/jul/28/ local/la-me-mosque-protest-20100728. Fear and Loathing in America after 9/11: Terrorism, Racism, and the Need for New Beginnings No single event has dominated an American decade the way the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 have for the 2000s, at least not for a very long time. Completely surprising most Americans, the attacks seemed to signal a rupture from the easy living and prosperity of the past decade and an entry into darker and more difficult times. The attacks became occasions for grief and mourning, self-reflection and self-absorption, paranoia, jingoism, dissent, and new kinds of racisms along with elaborate clampdowns on civil liberties. By 2010, fear of Muslim Americans had escalated to the point where a proposed Islamic cultural center to be built in lower Manhattan became a divisive public issue across the nation. This essay charts some of the contemporary opposition to Muslim Americans and Muslim immigration to the United States and suggests that American traditions of nativism and paranoia have played a role in the conservative rhetoric often heard in the United States today. The essay concludes by examining the possibilities and limitations of cultural production to forge greater understanding in times of political conflict. Muslim Americans, Paranoia, Racism, Cultural Production, Terrorism, Civil Rights 
work_gv5khmtsa5gqhn5goevgkou42a	----	BIROn - Birkbeck Institutional Research Online Jacobson, Jessica and Hough, Mike (2018) Missed opportunities and new risks: penal policy in England and Wales in the past 25 years. Political Quarterly 89 (2), pp. 177-186. ISSN 1467-923X. Downloaded from: http://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/id/eprint/20518/ Usage Guidelines: Please refer to usage guidelines at https://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/policies.html or alternatively contact lib-eprints@bbk.ac.uk. http://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/id/eprint/20518/ https://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/policies.html mailto:lib-eprints@bbk.ac.uk 1 Missed opportunities and new risks: penal policy in England and Wales in the past 25 years Jessica Jacobson and Mike Hough Abstract This paper discusses trends in criminal justice and penal policy over the past 25 years. This period has been characterized as a time of penal populism, which originated in the failure of the 1991 Criminal Justice Act, and the competition between the main political parties to be ‘tough on crime’. However, this is not the only trend to be found in penal policy. There has continued to be a strong undertow of support for rehabilitation and community penalties, including restorative justice. There has been pressure from the left as much as the right to take domestic violence, sexual offences against women and children and hate crimes more seriously. There have been pressures to meet performance targets – which gradually transformed into calls to build the legitimacy of the justice system. Finally there have been pressures to privatize criminal justice agencies. These various impulses have sometimes amplified and sometimes counteracted the pressures towards tough penal policy. If the period of intense penal populism ran from 1993 to 2007, inertia in the system has ensured that there have been no significant attempts to row back from tough policies, and to reassert the values of penal parsimony. Given that money has been tight since 2007 and crime has continued to fall, this must amount to a lost opportunity of significant proportions. Key words: penal policy, sentencing, populism, sentencing guidelines Introduction This paper considers trends in criminal justice and penal policy in England and Wales over the last quarter of a century. The period since 2010 is of primary concern to us here, but in order to make sense of policy over the past seven years we need a longer perspective, and our starting point is 1993. This was the year when the policies underpinning the 1991 Criminal Justice Act started to unravel, and a marked disjunction from previous policies – and political mindsets about justice – began to emerge. The 1991 Criminal Justice Act was the culmination of political initiatives to embed a low-key penal policy that stressed parsimony in the use of imprisonment. A year after the Act’s introduction in 1992 the two main political parties started to lock themselves into a competition to ‘out-tough’ each other on penal policy. A simple reading of the following twenty-five years is that this punitive turn has characterized penal policies ever since. 2 This article offers a ‘yes, but…’ qualification to this generalization. We shall identify five political impulses that have been present in penal policy throughout this period: the impulse to punish and protect; the impulse to reform, rehabilitate and restore; the impulse to use the justice system to improve the quality of social relations; the impulse to enhance accountability and legitimacy of criminal justice agencies; and the impulse, grounded in neo-liberalism, to reduce the size of the state and privatize public services. The impulse to punish and protect has been amplified by aspects of the other impulses, while there are also obvious tensions within and between these differing trends. The article proceeds as follows. First, we trace the various manifestations of the impulse to punish over the last twenty-five years, arguing that the ‘punitive turn’ has been manifest in a consistent pressure on politicians to adopt tough penal policies. Then we examine how the other four impulses have played out over the period. We conclude the article with some thoughts on directions that penal policy could take over the coming twenty-five years that would avoid – or a least contain – the penal excesses of the last quarter-century. The pre-history to the ‘punitive turn’ Before the 1990s, Conservative and Labour politicians alike generally avoided eye-catching penal policies. Admittedly, the Conservatives presented themselves as the ‘party of law and order’, but they did very little of substance that could be read as populist penal policies. One exception to this was when in 1979 the then Home Secretary William Whitelaw announced his ‘short sharp shock’ policy of toughening up detention centres for young offenders. The tough quasi-military regimes in pilot institutions turned out to be ineffective, and the policy was abandoned. Despite rising crime, he and his successors, Leon Brittan and Douglas Hurd, subsequently pursued policies that aimed to reduce the use of imprisonment, contain expenditure and deal with prison overcrowding – a policy approach that has sometimes been called ‘doing good by stealth’i. This had some success, especially in relation to young offenders. In the late 1980s, attention shifted to penal policy for adult offenders, and the Home Office developed a set of policies designed to create a new sentencing framework that would simultaneously deflect offenders from custody, reduce re-offending and end prison over-crowding. Key elements were discouraging sentencers from passing prison sentences and promoting ‘punishment in the community’ as an alternative, with new and tougher penalties overseen by the probation service. At the time, stressing the punitive element of sentences provided by the probation service was regarded as a dramatic shift in policy, and was resisted by many probation officers – even if the thrust of the policy was to reduce the prison population. The Conservatives were probably able to get away with this sleight of hand, initially at least, because the Labour opposition were reluctant to challenge them on this, reckoning that their core supporters had little appetite for tough penal policies. In the late 1980s Douglas Hurd and his officials laid the 3 groundwork for what was intended to be a landmark piece of legislation – the 1991 Criminal Justice Act, which sought to establish a clear sentencing framework and to consolidate a parsimonious approach to the use of custody as a sanction. The Act was implemented in late 1992, by which time Ken Clarke was Home Secretary. Early indications were that the provisions of the Act were operating exactly as intended: prison numbers started to fall. Home Office officials took some satisfaction in their success in getting a progressive piece of legislation onto the statute bookii. The emergence of the punitive impulse By Easter 1993, the 1991 Act was in tatters. Recorded crime had continued to rise steeply in 1992, and public anxiety had been further heightened by two very high-profile crimes: first, in January 1993, the shooting and death of a fourteen-year-old boy, Benji Stanley, in Moss Side in January 1993 and then, in February, an even more shocking murder by two ten-year-olds of a two-year old boy, James Bulger. The media portrayed crime as being out of control, and the 1991 Criminal Justice Act became one of their targets, as being simultaneously soft and incompetent. There was no serious political defence of the Act from Home Secretary Ken Clarke, who quickly distanced himself from it. Tony Blair, then shadow Home Secretary, was placing further pressure on the Government with his effective advocacy of polices that would be ‘tough on crime, tough on the causes of crime’. Ken Clarke used the 1993 Criminal Justice Act to dismantle key parts of the 91 Act; however, what was really lost in the process was not so much the specific provisions, but the underlying philosophy, that parsimony in the use of custody should be a central plank of penal policy. Michael Howard took over from Ken Clarke in May 1993, and delivered his ‘Prison Works’ speech at the Conservative Party conference later that year, which was an unapologetic call for greater use of imprisonment. And this is exactly what happened. The fiasco associated with the 1991 Criminal Justice Act marked a very clear turning point in penal politics. Thereafter, neither of the main political parties has been prepared to run the risk of being seen to be soft, or incompetent, on crime. Both parties will have drawn the lesson that it does not take much to destroy the credibility of a government’s record on crime – and that the objective reality may not offer much protection against this. The ‘public mood’ whether real or created by the media, can be more significant. Both parties shifted from a long-standing approach that involved managing public opinion about crime and justice to one of responding to public opinioniii. Also important is that the public reception of the Act damaged levels of trust between Home Office ministers and their officials, and reduced the standing of the various experts – senior civil servants, their in-house researchers and academics – who had hitherto made a significant contribution to the formation of penal policy. 4 Certainly, in radio interviews, Michael Howard’s accounts of the briefings he received from Home Office official show little regard for their expertise. From 1993 onwards the Conservative government faced an effective challenge from New Labour on crime. Both Tony Blair, as leader of the Labour Party from 1994, and Jack Straw, as shadow Home Secretary, continued to talk ‘tough on crime’ until Labour’s election victory in 1997. Many of us hoped that once in power, Labour would continue to talk only as tough as was necessary, whilst doing good by stealth. As things turned out, Jack Straw and his successor, David Blunkett, put in place a series of penal reforms that were just as tough as they had promised; another tough-minded Home Secretary, was John Reid, succeeding Charles Clarke in 2006; Reid declared the Home Office ‘unfit for purpose’, announced 8,000 more prison places and laid plans to set up a separate Ministry of Justice. After his resignation in 2007, when Gordon Brown became Prime Minister, Jacqui Smith served for two years without distinction, and Alan Johnson took over after her resignation over an expenses scandal. Jack Straw was the first Secretary of State for Justice from 2007 to 2010. Over the latter years of the Labour administration there was no attempt to return to penal parsimony. Box 1 summarizes many of the key political initiatives that are recognizably ‘tough on crime’, covering the Conservative administration from 1992 to 1997, and the three Labour governments from 1997 to 2010. 5 Box 1: Key penal moments since 1992 1993 1991 Criminal Justice Act amended by 1993 Criminal Justice Act. 1993 Tony Blair announces Labour’s Policy of ‘tough on crime, tough on the causes of crime’; Michael Howard announces that ‘Prison works’. 1997 Crime (Sentences) Act introduces automatic life sentences for second serious violent and sexual offences and mandatory minimum terms for third-time drug traffickers and burglars. 1998 Crime and Disorder Act introduces: Anti-Social Behaviour Orders; racially and religiously aggravated offences; and executive recall to custody for offenders on medium -term sentences. 2000 Prison population shows 41% increase on 1990 2003 Tony Blair and David Blunkett launch the Anti-Social Behaviour White Paper and Action Plan. 2003 Criminal justice Act introduces: indeterminant sentence of Imprisonment for Public Protection (IPP), extended tariffs for life sentences (Schedule 21), mandatory minimum terms for possessing an illegal firearm; tougher provisions on post-custody licence and recall; harsher sentences for offences motivated by hostility towards disability or sexual orientation; and doubling of the maximum sentence for causing death by dangerous driving and related offences. 2003 Sexual Offences Act reforms the law on sexual offences and strengthens public protection measures. 2004 Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act extends legal measures to tackle domestic violence and protect victims. Includes provision for the Code of Practice for Victims of Crime, the first edition of which is issued in 2005. 2005 Launch of ‘Community Payback’: a national strategy to make unpaid work by offenders on community sentences more visible. 2006 Violent Crime Reduction Act includes provisions relating to alcohol-related crime and disorder and offensive weapons 2006 Road Safety Act introduces offence of causing death by careless driving and related offences. 2008 Emphasis on deterrent sentencing for possession of knives through landmark case of R v Povey & others and Sentencing Guidelines Council guidance for magistrates’ courts on Possession of bladed article/offensive weapon 2008 Launch of Youth Crime Action Plan – cross government initiative tackling youth crime, with ‘punishment and enforcement’, ‘prevention’ and ‘support’ strands. 2010 Prison population shows 85% increase on 1990. 2010 Sentencing Council replaces Sentencing Guidelines Council 6 As is often the case in policies that have a flavour of populism about them, it is hard to judge the balance of motivation between sincere conviction and political calculation lying behind the tough penal measures introduced by Tony Blair and his successive Home Secretaries. Only an incompetent politician would leave a clear audit trail of the latter. However New Labour were – more than most administrations – preoccupied with the message as much as the substance of policy. This is well illustrated by a leaked memo from Blair in 2000, when there was a panic about street crime, which read: “We should think now of an initiative, for example, locking up street muggers. Something tough, with immediate bite which sends a message through the system”. In interviews about their periods as Home Secretary, Michael Howard, Jack Straw and David Blunkett have never recognised that they collectively fueled a penal frenzy that needlessly doubled the prison population (from around 44,000 in 1993 and to nearly 87,000 in 2012iv). Howard continues to take credit for reversing the upward trend in crime by encouraging greater use of custody – even if the same crime trends have been observed across industrialised Western countries. Jack Straw has shown no misgivings about his foray into mandatory imprisonment – or indeed about his youth justice policies, now corrected, that swept large numbers of teenagers unnecessarily into the formal justice system (see below). David Blunkett has recognised that his IPP sentence was poorly implemented – but not poorly conceptualized, and has certainly not retreated on his decision to ratchet up massively the tariffs for life sentences in Schedule 21 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. The punitive impulse should not be characterized as being about punishment alone: protection of the public has been an abiding theme within punitive penal policy. The IPP sentence provides a vivid example of this, as the sentence explicitly comprised a punitive component (the minimum custodial term, or tariff) and a protective element (the indeterminacy of the sentence, which meant that IPP prisoners could only be released once Parole Board judged that they represented no danger to the public). More broadly, the laudable goal of public protection has been a recurring feature of many criminal justice policy initiatives. From the mid -1990s to late-2000s, anti-social behavior was a particular focus of government, and much of the associated political rhetoric placed a heavy emphasis on the need for local ‘communities’ to be helped to tackle the individuals and behaviours that were causing them harm. A related strand of punitive policy has been to improve provision for victims of crime, based in part on arguments for ‘rebalancing’ of the justice system away from a perceived over- emphasis on the rights of defendants or offenders. Victim-oriented initiatives include the introduction of Victim Personal Statements in 2001, and the production by the Home Office of the Code of Practice for Victims of Crime in 2005. 2011 saw the appointment of Louise Casey as the first Victims’ Commissioner. 7 The period from 2010 onwards has not been characterized by notable tough penal initiatives – but neither has there been any determined effort to pull back from the penal rhetoric of the previous two decades. The main reason for this is probably to be found in the fact that whilst not all politicians are prepared to reap an electoral harvest from penal populism, very few are prepared to sacrifice their political careers by correcting the penal excesses of their predecessors. Admittedly, at the start of the coalition government, Ken Clarke expressed his astonishment on becoming Justice Secretary at the doubling of the prison population since his time as Home Secretary, and suggested that less use could be made of short prison sentences. He also took a principled stand on IPPs – one of David Blunkett’s worst penal excesses – and abolished the sentence. (However, no one has yet done anything to address the fact that very large numbers of IPP prisoners are still serving grossly disproportionate sentences.) Ken Clarke’s period as Justice Secretary seemed for a time like the prologue to a more serious debate about reducing the prison population – but the debate never really started, and in 2012 he was replaced by Chris Grayling. Grayling adopted a much tougher tone on penal policy – even if he steered away from any significant changes to the sentencing framework. Most of his energies appeared to be directed towards plans to privatize elements of the prisons and probation services, discussed below; however, he also notoriously reduced prisoners access to books, and introduced a manifestly unjust system of court charges. His successor, Michael Gove, reversed the books policy and abolished the worst features of the court charges. Gove was in office for little more than a year, being sacked after the Brexit vote in July 2016. During this time, however, his track record on justice gained him unexpected – if tentative – support from liberal reformers. The two justice secretaries appointed by Theresa May, Liz Truss and David Liddington, have not changed the penal landscape significantly (the latter having been in post for only a few months at the time of writing). The period from 2010 onwards has thus seen elements of continuity and some signs of change – at least at the level of political debate. In terms of changes in penal practice little has happened. The prison population has remained at historically high levels (despite continued falls in crime). There were some signs of rediscovery of penal parsimony, but these were rapidly extinguished. What this suggests is that once the genie of penal populism is released from the bottle, it is very hard to force it back in. The past decade has offered an ideal opportunity for both the main political parties to do something constructive to tackle overuse of custody: there was a fiscal crisis, and public acceptance of the need for ‘austerity’; crime had fallen by unprecedented amounts; and public concern about crime was much lower than in the 1990s – as evident in the fact that crime and criminal justice barely featured in the 2015 and 2017 national electoral campaigns and debates. Yet nothing of significance happened – surely a missed opportunity. However, as we indicated earlier, the punitive turn and its consequences do not by themselves account for trends in penal policy. 8 The impulse to rehabilitate A striking fact of the development of penal policy over the last twenty-five years is that the impulse to punish has co-existed – albeit uncomfortably – with the aims of rehabilitating offenders and of promoting restorative justice (RJ). The principle of ‘punishment in the community’ that was an integral part of the 1991 reforms was not abandoned by Kenneth Clarke and Michael Howard, and it was also adopted by the three Labour administrations. And over the decade from 1992, the use of community penalties continued to grow in parallel with the increase in custodial sentences. The 2003 Criminal Justice Act established a new structure for community-based sentencing, with the introduction of the new Community Order to replace various existing community sentences, and revival of the suspended sentence in the form of the Suspended Sentence Order. Both types of sentence were meant to provide a robust alternative to the use of short-term prison sentences, and provided for a wide range of requirements (relating, for example, to drug, alcohol or mental health treatment) to be attached to any individual order. The numbers of both sentences passed by the courts rose rapidly in the years after implementation of the Act – without, however, exercising the downward force on the prison population that was anticipated. One might question whether the political commitment to rehabilitatio n was any more than skin-deep over this period. Certainly, the push for better punishment in the community was an integral part of the 1991 reforms, and associated work continued on this well into the 2000s, with tough-sounding policies providing sufficient cover to let the Home Office carry on ‘doing good by stealth’. It should also be remembered that New Labour attached priority to tackling drug-related crime, and invested heavily in probation programmes for dependent drug users as well as in third-sector drug treatment services – arguably a wise investment, according to Home Office research into the causes of the crime drop. There have also been determined efforts to reduce the number of people with mental health problems coming before the courts, as exemplified by the Bradley Review and the development and widespread roll-out of police- and court-based criminal justice liaison and diversion schemes, as well as initiatives to reduce the number of women being sent to prison, and to ensure that they have better community-based services. It has to be said that political will to make these initiatives successful has fluctuated, and their funding has often fallen casualty to ‘austerity’, as was the case with ‘Corston one-stop-shops’ that provided support for women offenders. Whatever the case, a great deal of energy within the Home Office and probation service was expended on structural reforms designed to enhance probation capacity. In the 1980s the service had become firmly aligned with social service values and practice. The workforce – and the National Association of Probation Officers (NAPO) – were professionally and ideological hostile to the more penal role that 9 was being designed for them, even if senior probation managers ‘saw the writing on the wall’ and after some resistance caved into to Home Office demands. A series of centralizing initiatives that gave more power to the Home Office and more central government control over policy and practice. The (unfortunately named) National Offender Management Service (NOMS) was set up in 2004. The reform process continued, culminating in 2017 in the replacement of NOMS with the National Prison and Probation Service. It is hard to offer clear evidence to this effect, but it seems to us that the probation service was badly incapacitated in the course of this process – which was, of course, intended to enhance capacity. Senior managers were preoccupied with successive reorganisations, and the workforce was demoralized. This is not to say that demands on them dried up. The reverse was the case, as both prison and probation services grew, at the expense of other less serious disposals, notably fines. With the wisdom of hindsight, community penalties and the rehabilitative ambitions of successive governments would have been better served by incremental change, rather than a rolling boil of reform. Significantly, the process also involved the part-privatization of the probation service, but that will be considered later in the paper. A further dimension to policies driven by the impulse to rehabilitate is to be found in the promotion of restorative justice. Both New Labour and the Coalition government lent their support to restorative justice initiatives – particularly, but not only, within the youth justice system. Twenty years on, there is not a great deal of effective practice to show for it. Politicians and practitioners alike were convinced by the evidence in favour, which provides instrumental reasons for its use that are at least as persuasive than those for imprisonment or conventional rehabilitative programmes, and they were also attracted to the moral case for principles of restorative approaches. The disappointing levels of implementation are to be found partly in practical problems, exacerbated by resource shortages within probation, police and third sector bodies that might provide RJ. The likelihood is that RJ will only implemented on any scale when it is routinely mandated by the courts. The impulse to improve social relations One significant facet of cultural change over the past 25 years has been a decline in levels of social tolerance of a range of violent and sexual behaviours, which has led to greater use of the criminal process to tackle these behaviours. These include domestic abuse, which is now conceptualized in a much broader way than in the past, and in relation to which a range of policy and practice developments have promoted greater reporting by victims and increasingly robust prosecution and sentencing. Predatory sexual behavior, particularly by adults towards children, has been an even greater focus of 10 public attention and criminal justice activity, and reporting and prosecution of historic sexual offences against children has grown exponentially – particularly in the wake of high profile cases involving ‘celebrity’ offenders, most notably Jimmy Savile. The digital revolution, meanwhile, has introduced entirely new forms of sexual offending and new social problems (and types of criminal evidence) with which the justice system must grapple, as in the case of the exchange of explicitly explicit images, or ‘sexting’, among children via social media platforms. Hate crime has also become more prominent on the policy agenda and, like domestic abuse and sexual offending, is subject to widening definitions – for example, while the Crime and Disorder Act 1988 introduced the category of racially and religiously aggravated offences, a statutory obligation has since been imposed on the courts to increase sentencing for offences motivated by hostility towards disability, sexual orientation and transgender status. The internet and social media have also multiplied the ways in which hostility can be expressed, and hence widened the range of hate crimes that are prosecuted by the courts. However, it would be a mistake to describe the growing policy emphasis on domestic abuse, sexual offending and hate crime as simply part of the ‘punitive turn’. The sentiment underlying the push for formal and tougher action against these behaviours is in large part a desire to recognize and address the harms caused to victims, including those who are highly vulnerable. Accordingly, what might previously have been tolerated or largely overlooked forms of bad behavior are now treated as crimes, with the expectation that perpetrators should be brought to justice - albeit many cases, especially those involving allegations of historic abuse or in which the central question is whether there was consent to sexual activity, raise profound evidential difficulties. In other words, this impulse to utilize the criminal justice system to improve the quality of social relations stems from entirely different motivations to the populism that has driven the ‘punitive turn’. Nevertheless, while many of the – generally liberal and left-learning – advocates of firmer action against domestic violence, sexual crime and hate crime are likely to have little sympathy for other ‘tough on crime’ measures, their efforts have necessarily contributed to the overall increase in the quantum of punishment meted out by the courts. While the scope of formal criminal justice responses to social harms has vastly expanded over the past 25 years, the way that the justice system operates is itself often regarded as contributing to social inequalities and exclusion. In particular, an abiding feature of system is the marked disproportionate representation of black and minority ethnic (BAME) groups within it. However, there have been signs of political will to tackle BAME over-representation in the criminal process. Examples of this can be found in Theresa May’s position, when Home Secretary, on the over-use of stop-and-search tactics, and the commissioning by David Cameron, as Prime Minister, of a review by the Labour MP David Lammy into over-representation of Black and Minority Ethnic groups in the criminal process.v 11 The impulse to manage performance and enhance accountability Although the Thatcher administration set a great deal of store in securing ‘value for money’ from public services, the justice system managed until the early 1990s to escape the managerialist regime of targets and key performance indicators that was imposed elsewhere, notably in health and education. Under both the Major and Blair administrations, however, the probation and prison services, and the courts service and the police service, in particular, were subject to elaborate systems of performance management. The techniques of New Public Management have since been largely discredited: the quantitative targets usually failed to capture the central purposes of the organisations being managed, and the workforces involved were usually adept enough to ‘game’ the system. Overall, the impact of NPM on policing was malign, damaging to relations between police and public. Whilst there were various unintended consequences that depressed the quality of policing, some targets had a particular impact on the criminal process. “Bringing offenders to justice” became an increasing salient target in the early and mid 2000s, and interacted with juvenile justice reforms that limited the use of informal and formal warnings, to sweep large numbers of teenagers and young adults unnecessarily into the courts. As the unintended consequences of poorly thought-through targets was increasingly recognized, greater priority was given to policies designed to improve ‘public confidence’ or trust in the justice system. When Gordon Brown became prime minister in July 2007, an early initiative was to announce a ‘bonfire of public sector targets’; within criminal justice, public confidence targets for the police were some of the few that survived. The importance of securing and maintaining public trust in the police has remained salient in the coalition and Conservative governments from 2010 onwards. HM Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) mounted a series of inspections on stop-and-search practice, for example, that informed the robust approach by Theresa May as Home Secretary to ensure that these powers were used legally, and in ways that did not squander police legitimacy. HMIC now routinely rates police forces on their policies for ensuring their legitimacy as part of their PEEL assessmentsvi. An associated policy trend entailed efforts to ensure that services were ‘responsive’ to the needs, priorities and expectations of local people and to secure this through mechanisms by which local people held the services ‘to account’. This was evident, for example, in neighbourhood policing initiatives over the course of the 2000s, which placed a heavy emphasis (in theory, at least) on responding to specific needs identified by local communities. Under the Coalition government, the principles of responsivity and accountability were reiterated within policing policy. Most significantly, 2012 saw the introduction of elected Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs), although limited public interest in, or awareness of, the role was evident in a mere 15% turn-out rate at the first PCC elections. 12 Although the courts system had (and still have) targets relating to timeliness, sentencers were not exposed to any direct form of control over this period, although the establishment of the Sentencing Guidelines Council in 2003 and its replacement body the Sentencing Council in 2010 were significant developments. Reflecting the limited resources available to it, the Sentencing Council has focused its efforts on producing guidelines. It has taken a cautious review of its remits, and has aimed simply to codify and reflect current sentencing practice. This would have been no bad thing if the guidelines had been produced in the 1980s, but the Council’s overall approach ensured that the consequences of the punitive turn from 1993 onwards were incorporated into their guidance. This problem may have been compounded by the possibility that sentencing guidelines tend to draw lenient sentencers up to the going rates embedded in the various guidelines, whilst their more tough-minded colleagues continue to sentence well above the going rates.vii There has been no review of the Council’s performance. A more robust – or better resourced – Sentencing Council might be able to undertake more imaginative work, such as examining the scope for reducing prison sentences in general, or assessing the full impact on sentencing of the life-sentence tariffs set out in Schedule 21 of the 2003 Criminal Justice Act. The Council could undertake such exercises only if it could rely on significant political will to reassert principles of penal parsimony, and to date this has not been forthcoming. The impulse to shrink the state and to contract out public services The impulse to shrink the size of the state, and to transfer functions discharged by public services to non-statutory and particularly private providers, has been on the political agenda since the 1990s. Within criminal justice, there were moves to establish private prisons, or to have prisons managed by the private sector, since the 1990s. If one can accept the premise that the state’s duties to exercise coercive power can properly and ethically be contracted to private companies, then early experience of privatization was not catastrophic. Private prison staff emerged as exercising authority less effectively than employees of the Prison Service, but at least in some, the quality of treatment of prisoners was better, judged on criteria of civility and respect. However, experience since 2010 has shown serious failures in standards of treatment that various private sector providers have delivered in prisons, s ecure training centres and immigration detention centres. Opening up the delivery of public services to non-statutory providers was a core policy commitment throughout the New Labour administration, with the rationale that this would deliver greater effectiveness, efficiency and innovation. Key developments included the creation of NOMS in 2004, among the aims of which was the introduction of greater ‘contestability’ within prison and probation services. The Coalition government sustained the momentum on the contracting out of criminal justice provision (as has the current administration), as evident for example in the local structures for 13 commissioning victims’ and community safety services that were established with the Police and Crime Commissioner role. Arguably the most obviously ideological commitment to privatisation was apparent during Chris Grayling’s tenure as Justice Secretary. His decision to open up the majority of community- based probation services to competition under the Transforming Rehabilitation programme, which split functions between new ‘community rehabilitation companies’ and a rump National Probation Service, has been much criticized. It is hard to say whether the shift from statutory to non-statutory delivery of criminal justice services has amplified or contained the dominant punitive tendencies in penal policy. In our view, however, the damage done to the probation service has very probably damaged its capacity to provide effective alternatives to custody. Conclusions: assessing penal policy since 2010 We have argued that the period since 2007, when the financial crisis emerged, and especially since 2010, offered clear opportunities to any reforming government. Crime had been falling for over a decade, and the public were becoming less concerned about crime. People showed signs of tolerating the need for ‘austerity’ following the financial crisis. It was surely an ideal time for floating the idea – as Ken Clarke tentatively did in 2010 – that the justice system might be making excessive use of custody. But nothing came of this, and the inertia of the penal system ensured that a very high rate of imprisonment continued. One can find excuses for this failure. The coalition government was insecure, and David Cameron’s Conservative government had a majority of only twelve seats. Penal policy was certainly not a priority. If opportunities to move away from ‘more of the same’ have so far been missed, the next few years may yet offer a real chance of more coherent policy development and the emergence of a justice system that is nimbler and fairer – if crime levels remain at current levels, the numbers of offenders entering the justice system continue to fall, and the temperature of public debate about crime and punishment does not start to rise. However, we do not hold out much hope for optimism. Whatever happens over the next five years, Brexit is likely to dominate the political agenda, and whichever government is in office, they are likely to shy away from risky policies in less contentious arenas that aren’t attracting public concern. i Green, D. (2016) ‘Liberty, Justice and All: the Folly of Doing Good by Stealth’, in (eds.) Dzur, A. W., Loader, I. and Sparks, R., Democratic Theory and Mass Incarceration. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ii For a fuller account of penal policy then and thereafter, see Faulkner, D. (2006) Crime, State, and Citizen: A Field Full of Folk. Winchester: Waterside Press. iii For a fuller discussion of public opinion on penal issues, see Hough, M. and Roberts, J. V. (2017) ‘Public Knowledge and Opinion, Crime, and Criminal Justice’, in (eds, Liebling, A., McAra, L. and Maruna, S.) The Oxford Handbook of Criminology. Sixth Edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 14 iv Figures taken from the World Prison Brief: http://www.prisonstudies.org/ v The Lammy Review: An independent review into the treatment of, and outcomes for, Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic individuals in the Criminal Justice System, reported in September 2017. vi PEEL stands for HMIC’s police effectiveness, efficiency and legitimacy programme. vii For a fuller discussion, see Allen, R. (2016), The Sentencing Council for England and Wales: brake or accelerator on the use of prison? London: Transform Justice. http://www.prisonstudies.org/ 
work_gy45sf2bknfylj4ml4qag45dya	----	Microsoft Word - C_Glenn_Scripting_2014.docx Scripting Hate Crimes: Victim, Space and Perpetrator Defining Hate By: Andrew R. Spieldenner, Cerise L. Glenn This is an Author's Accepted Manuscript of an article published in Spieldenner, A.R. & Glenn, C.L. (2014). Scripting hate crimes: Victim, space and perpetrator defining hate, Continuum: Journal of Media & Cultural Studies, 28(1), 123-135. doi: 10.1080/10304312.2013.854873 as published in the Continuum: Journal of Media & Cultural Studies 2014 [copyright Taylor & Francis], available online at: http://www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/10304312.2013.854873 Abstract: Hate crime legislation is meant to address discrimination at a community level. The hate crime categorization involves the justice system and the media – who play a key role in the community's understanding of the act. In 2008 in Washington, DC, two separate attacks on gay men – one White, one African-American – were categorized differently. One was a hate crime; the other was not. This paper looks at the social scripts employed within the media and police statements that contextualize these events in terms of neighbourhood as well as the race, gender and sexuality of the victims and perpetrators. Keywords: Media | Hate Crimes | Gender | Race | Sexuality Article: In the United States capitol, the District of Columbia, the press labelled two separate crimes as hate crimes in the fall of 2008 with very different prosecutorial outcomes. Within a month, two gay men were attacked in the streets after hours near nightclubs – one a Black gay man, the other a White gay man. The incidents involved Black assailants who spouted homophobic epithets during the violent attacks. In one, the (Black) victim was robbed and killed; in the other, the (White) victim was knocked unconscious. The Black perpetrators were also different: with the Black victim, the perpetrator is another African-American man; with the White victim, the perpetrators are two Muslim African immigrants. Curiously, the judicial system did not label the robbery/murder a hate crime, yet did categorize the assault as one. In observing both media and judicial practices concerning the two cases, the differences in the events seem to be central in the construction of the hate crime designation. The victims and the neighbourhoods become part of the rhetoric determining the nature of the crime. The term ‘hate crimes' refers specifically to criminal acts rooted in or augmented by identity differentials such as ability, gender, race, age and sexuality. This legislation is specifically meant to deter bias crimes from happening by identifying them as hate crimes and enhancing punishment guidelines. While hate crimes may be a legal construct, it is a term used by the media and within the vernacular to describe events. In her research on hate crimes, Mason points out that, ‘Hate crimes laws are an interesting example of how harsher forms of punishment may be deployed in the name of social justice' (2009, 276). In the two cases analysed in this project, the term ‘hate crime' is employed quite differently. When conducting an analysis of how these events are constructed as rhetorical events in the media, we aim to understand what factors play a role in defining the ‘hate crime'. Cultural and critical studies have a place in the examination of human rights and social justice. While these areas are the primary concern for community groups, governmental agencies and other academic disciplines (like legal studies, political science, social work and sociology), there remains some concern about how a cultural studies and critical approach would engage these areas (Coombe 2010). We would argue that cultural and critical approaches are useful tools in looking at real-world cases to examine power and multiple identity lenses. Gies asserts that ‘the media distort people's understanding of the law … audiences are almost by default overly media dependent because they lack any relevant first-hand legal experience with which to offset distorted media representations' (2005, 171). For this project, we employed media reports, interviews with the victims, statements made by the police and government statistical data to interpret the possible factors interpreting the events. Constituting hate Legislation concerning hate crimes carries particular importance to marginalized communities. The protected classes in current hate crime statutes – race, ethnicity, age, sex, sexuality, gender identity and political affiliation – are conceptually part of socially disenfranchised groups in the United States. This disenfranchisement is personal as well as institutional, and has historically resulted in discrimination, stigmatization and violence. Hate crime legislation is a social pact between larger mainstream society and the marginal group, and can therefore signify some form of institutional acceptance (Moran 2004). Hate crime statutes have been passed in 45 states and the District of Columbia (Anti-Defamation League 2006). In the nation's capitol, the hate crime law is referred to as ‘The Bias-Related Crime Act of 1989' (DC Code §§ 22-4001 to 22-4004) and includes protection on the basis of perceived race, colour, religion, national origin, sex, age, marital status, personal appearance, sexual orientation, family responsibility, physical handicap, matriculation or political affiliation. These statutes specify that crimes against and motivated by the protected class of identity will have enhanced sentencing at conviction. While all of these cover race and ethnicity as protected classes, only 32 include sexual orientation and disability and 28 include gender. A meagre 13 protect age, 11 include transgender or gender identity, and 5 allow political affiliation as a class. Hate crimes, also known as bias crimes, are not part of any federal acts, but the Federal Bureau of Investigation does collect statistics on victim and perpetrator demographics, as well as reported bias-motivations. The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) points out that, without federal provisions, criminal prosecution is left up to local and state jurisdictions (ACLU 2007). In some crimes, the local police may not investigate certain crimes due to their own biases or beliefs about certain groups – in fact, they may not identify the event as a crime. In testimony to the United States House of Representatives, the ACLU pointed out several cases of rape, assault, harassment and murder that were left uninvestigated by local law enforcement. As Mason points out, ‘the question of which groups are publicly recognised as the bona fide victims of hate crime, or given ‘protected status' under the hate crime law is far from an objective one' (2007, 251). Public outcry can play a key role in constructing the crime as a ‘hate crime' through the insistence that the victim's identity is protected, and that law enforcement and the justice system have an obligation to intervene. The seriousness of the crime in the United States is determined by both the wrongfulness of the act and the culpability of the perpetrator (Harel and Parchomovsky 1999). Hate crime legislation does identify some motivations and actions as more morally wrong, in terms of the act itself and individual accountability. Mason asserts, the capacity of victim groups to contribute to the moral claims embodied in the concept of hate crime, and thereby be accorded victim status, is shaped in part by our emotional responses to those groups and their demands for social justice'. (2007, 251) Unfortunately, identifying prejudice in an act is often left up to the criminal offender. State of mind is evidenced through confession and testimony. This focus ‘seems to facilitate a dual concern for both the perpetrator of the crime (via its emphasis on culpability) and the victim (via its emphasis on wrongfulness)' (Harel and Parchomovsky 1999, 520). The government's concern with social equality is not part of the definition. Bias crime statutes are based in the belief that additional punishment is required to deter future crimes, either by the initial perpetrator or by other like-minded individuals in the community. The United States is ostensibly a nation of people from various migration routes and histories and, in the post-Civil Rights era, with equal rights. Therefore, crimes based on difference are considered particularly heinous and media noteworthy (Bittle 2002). Proponents of hate crime legislation believe that enhanced punishment works towards social equality by deterring crime. Hate crime designation is also seen as a way to close holes in existing judicial system procedures and out-of-date sentencing guidelines (Adams 2005). In this view, a crime is a crime, regardless of the motivation. The problem lies not with the victim or the motivation, but the acts. Media coverage of hate crimes is a key part of the community understanding of the event (Bittle 2002, 48). There are considerable differences in framing, depending on outlet and distribution audience. A local newspaper may portray the crime and its victim as less sympathetic than a national news agency (Husselbee and Elliott 2002). Similarly, media outlets that service particular constituents may focus on a shared identity characteristic. Whether a news outlet chooses to ascribe blame to the victim or to the perpetrator does affect the audience understanding of the crime as a bias crime (Quist and Wiegand 2002, 103). The community becomes an important actor in organizing around the crime, its victims, law enforcement and the criminal justice system. Hate crime legislation seems to rest on the rhetorical assumption that some violent crimes – those that are based on personal characteristics of the victim and fuelled by some discriminatory power – deserve harsher punishment. Most acts determined today as ‘human rights' are positioned as a ‘selective tolerance of difference' through their inconsistent standards and irregular implementation (Hawes 2010, 268). The lack of consistency in protected classes in bias crimes is itself a complication. While race and ethnicity are covered in each of the legislative statutes, other identities are not. In one case, the killer of an African-American gay man attempted to appeal the hate crime designation of his conviction because ‘the evidence established, if anything, that he beat [the victim] because he believed him to be a homosexual and not because he was Black' (ACLU 2007). The rhetorical construction has deep implications on the cultural construct of the terms: hate, crime and identity. In this case, the state prosecutor pointed out that the perpetrator had let a White gay man escape, and focused the violence on the African-American gay male victim. The media – in terms of community papers, university papers, large local papers and local news affiliates – play an integral role in crafting messages and social scripts, as well as providing public voice on these issues. Identity, difference and scripting Social scripts are a useful way to explore social interactions. As a concept, social scripts have been developed in various social sciences, and describe rules that interactants understand and follow; they provide clues for behavioural norms, responses and cultural frames (Parker 2010). Social scripts have been used to research – amongst other areas – intercultural communication, management technique in organizations and conflict studies (Avery et al. 2009). Scripts rely on the understanding of situational norms for identities. History and popular media fuel concepts of identity norms. Knowing the identity norm, and practising it, dynamically involves the individual (through actions and beliefs) and the larger society (through community interaction or media portrayal). Borrowing from sociology and theatre, Jackson calls this practice scripting, where the body both is and carries the text (2006). The social activity of scripting ‘someone else's body is to actively inscribe or figuratively place one's self, worldview, or ascriptions onto another projected text, which often requires dislocating the original text and redefining the newly affected or mirrored text as the counterpositional or oppositional Other' (Jackson 2006, 53). Scripts are knowable, performed and restricted. These scripts become the shorthand to interpret an event (Jackson2006, 58–59). African-American men have particular scripts in the United States. Jackson identifies these as: exotic and strange; violent; incompetent and uneducated; sexual; exploitable; and innately incapacitated (Jackson 2006, 75). The scripts are historically rooted racial projections onto the Black male body. Regardless of whether an individual expresses or experiences any of these conditions, they remain part of the text that surrounds them. These scripts become the lenses that interpret African-American men's actions (Jackson 2006, 99). Therefore, regardless of an African-American man's purpose or capacity, he will likely be perceived as an outsider (‘exotic and strange'), aggressive (‘violent' and ‘sexual'), or unskilled and ignorant (‘incompetent and educated', ‘exploitable' and ‘innately incapacitated'). The media articulates mainstream norms about identity: often ones that can be limiting in scope. Harper criticizes the front-page New York Times Magazine article ‘When plagues end' by Andrew Sullivan for its tendency to mainstream the gay experience in America (1997). Sullivan insists that mainstream America has a home for gay men, one where gay men live as publicly open and in normative ways (e.g. single partner domesticity, capital consumption, performing hegemonic masculinity) (Harper 1997, 10–12). Politicized as a Black gay man, Harper finds himself outside of Sullivan's assimilationist rhetoric and, as such, cannot be interpellated as a subject within it (Harper 1997, 18). Harper notes the similarity in the rise of homeless people in the United States and their concurrent economies (transforming begging to selling newspapers, for instance) (1997, 25). This forces a visibility on the largely invisible. Rather than causing massive acceptance, homeless people are again demonized in the press as visible targets, obstacles to traffic in everyday living for ‘normal' people. Ironically, while walking with his partner in New York's Village, Harper finds himself as part of a conversation with a homeless man who wonders why the couple is not holding hands. The experience shows how those outside normative discourses can engage in rhetorical practices that interpellate their subjectivity in positive ways. Harper points to the exclusionary practices that normativity entails and the complicated ways that this norm is promoted. Disciplining masculine bodies Foucault posits that social norms create processes that serve to both discipline and punish difference (Foucault1977/1995, 182–183). Discipline relies on a system of surveillance and enforced order. Punishment occurs as threat and actual punitive measures when social norms are violated. Through these two interactive processes, social norms are maintained and reified. Individuals choose to subscribe to the norm in order to avoid disciplining and punishing actions. All parts of a society have norms that are presented as unassailable truths – even how people act as men or women, how sexuality is expressed and even who is marked as an outsider or insider. Gender, the determination of what is masculine or feminine, is not technically tied to biological sex or even an index of physicality. Butler problematizes these relations by asking: Is ‘the body' or ‘the sexed body' the firm foundation on which gender and systems of compulsory sexuality operate? Or is ‘the body' shaped by political forces with strategic interests in keeping that body bounded and constituted by the markers of sex? (Butler 1990, 175) The body is defined as masculine or feminine – even gay or straight – within multiply indexed moments crafted between cultural and institutional schemes. Trying to define the limits of these schemes is perhaps most evident in analysing specific moments. Sloop calls attention to ‘cases of “marginalized” identities … existing publicity is even more important in providing individuals with ways to understand their own subjectivity' (2004, 21). By exploring specific moments where the body – sexed, gendered, raced and sexualized – is situated, the mechanisms of control and rewards are made transparent. By adhering to gender and sexual norms, the individual avoids disciplinary action. This punishment is enacted through other people, institutions, media, sex practice and even family. Normative behaviour is rewarded as another method of control; the process of fitting in is considered a benefit socially. Physical violence is perhaps the most heinous example of punishing those who deviate from the heterosexual norm. Although homophobic violence is not new, the media attention in recent decades has provided movement and attention on policy changes to address this phenomenon from cultural, institutional, legal and social frameworks. Hate crime legislation has been one tactic towards social justice. The two cases: Tony Randolph Hunter and ‘David' This project looks specifically at the media coverage and legal outcomes of two cases of homophobic violence that occurred in the United States capitol Washington, DC, in 2008. In the cases, the different media frames and differential legal outcomes are centred on the social norms. Through these two examples, the race, gender, sexual and neighbourhood schemes – as well as their potential impact – become more pronounced. The two cases are selected because of their proximity in terms of time (they occur within a month of each other) and space (within the same city). If those elements are the same, then what makes each case different? On 7 September 2008, Tony Randolph Hunter and his friend – both African-American gay men – were in the proximity of a gay club in the Shaw neighbourhood in the District of Columbia. Hunter had an altercation with a group of African-American youth, while his friend fled the scene. The Washington Blade, a gay newspaper, reported that police, missing his wallet, had found Hunter, a native of Maryland, in a coma on the sidewalk. Ten days after the attack, Hunter died while still in a coma (Chibbaro 2008a). The police arrested 18-year-old African-American Robert Hannah, a local resident, for the crime. Although initial media reports allege Hannah used homophobic slurs during the attack, the courts did not see the event as a hate crime. In fact, the police investigation found Hannah culpable only for the beating – not the theft or the hate crime. Fox 5 News reported that Hannah testified that Hunter propositioned him in front of his friends with lewd grabbing, embarrassing him, and thus initiating the fight (2008). Although The Washington Blade refuted the allegation with testimony from Hunter's friends praising him as church going and unlikely to solicit a strange young man on the street, the paper also reported that Hannah and other witnesses described Hunter as intoxicated (Chibbaro 2008a). In the second case, on 3 October 2008, Georgetown medical student ‘David' (an alias given to him by the press) left a nightclub with an unidentified male companion in Georgetown. According to an interview in The Washington Blade's interview of ‘David', the two sat near two African men who were drinking out of a liquor bottle on the street and smoking some unidentified substance. When questioned about their sexuality, David admitted he and his companion were gay. The other men became volatile, invoking the Quran, insulting David and his friend, and in the end, hitting David over the head with the liquor bottle, leaving him unconscious on the street. His two assailants are identified as 22-year-old African immigrants Saad Elarch and 19-year-old Ruddard Abdulgadar (Lynsen 2008). Perception and prosecution The media serves multiple roles in perception of hate crimes – including acting as the voice for the legal system, larger social norms or the community's view. The media frames the perpetrator, the victim and the police actions for the public (Bittle 2002, 48–49). In these two cases, the media acts as the voice of the legal system and the interpreter for the public. As such, some of the depictions must be understood as a choice of the journalists and editors. The two cases were covered in The Washington Blade, The Washington Post, Georgetown Voice and local broadcast news affiliates of ABC and Fox. Even with this diversity of outlets, the coverage remained consistent, regardless of where it emerged. In the case of Tony Randolph Hunter, the prosecutor did not seek hate crime penalty enhancement, partially due to Hannah's alleged neighbourhood gang connection – which repositioned the crime from bias to gang-related. The presiding judge reduced Hannah's charge from voluntary manslaughter to involuntary manslaughter after hearing testimony from Hannah and his friends that Hunter allegedly made sexual advances on Hannah. The robbery charge was dropped completely, although Hunter's wallet remained missing. Hunter's companion was not called to testify. In addition, Hannah was released to a halfway house pending trial (Chibbaro 2008b). In the coverage on Fox and ABC local affiliates, Hunter is counter-positioned from victim to participant in the crime. He is identified as drunk and sexually aggressive towards the 18-year- old. Since these local media affiliates highlight the conflict, both actors are cast as violent – unsurprising, considering those social scripts operating on Black men's bodies. Oddly, the perpetrator, victim and even the victim's friend are all clearly and equally identified by name and picture. This flattening of identifiers connotes equal participation in the event. In addition, the location of the crime – District One in the District of Columbia – is referenced in the media coverage leading to a larger context to defining the event. Hunter is identified as coming in from Maryland, and Hannah is a local. The event is labelled a hate crime by the gay media coverage, but not by other media or the police. In the case of ‘David', ABC News coverage of the event identifies the attack in Georgetown as a hate crime. The victims are an unnamed Georgetown medical student and a male friend who were ‘accosted for being gay' by two Muslim men drinking vodka. In addition, the two perpetrators are identified by name, immigrant status and Muslim background. Considering the current anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim perception in the United States (Ali 2012), these identifiers enhance the perception of violence, and are integral to framing the interpretation of the acts. The police identified the event as a hate crime, and the presiding judge held the two men without bond because of the ‘degree of depravity and danger' (ABC 7 News 2008). Abdulgadar plead guilty to the crime and faces up to five years in prison under hate crime enhancement (Chibbaro 2008c). In addition, the District Attorney requested deportation proceedings for both assailants after imprisonment. The coverage maintains the anonymity of the victim. It situates ‘David' within the community of Georgetown as a resident and student at a prestigious medical school. The attackers are identified by full name, age, religion and birthplace. In addition, the perpetrators are described as drunken, violent and smoking some unknown substance. ‘David', on the other hand, wonders how people could target him and his friend since he did not cast aspersions on the attackers for being Black, Muslim or heterosexual. In addition, ‘David' asserts that he and his friend were not overtly engaged in homosexual acts like (in his words) ‘holding hands' (Lynsen 2008). ‘David' is permitted to be a victim in the event and control his ‘outness' as a gay man – his event is labelled as a hate crime by the media and police. While the two cases occur within weeks of each other in the same city, they are depicted in different ways by the media and understood by the police as two unrelated events. One of the victims is African-American, while the other is racially unidentified. Often in United States communication, when race is not disclosed, it is assumed to be White (Nakayama and Martin 2007, 111–115). One of the events occurs in the Shaw neighbourhood, the other in Georgetown – these neighbourhoods have distinctive characteristics and racial narratives. One of the victims is dead and disparaged by his attacker as partly culpable for the crime; the other victim testifies to his innocence and normative behaviours. One of the victims is named (and thus revealed as a gay man); the other maintains anonymity. Each of these differences becomes part of the way that we understand the occurrence and severity of the crime. Construction of a crime: victim and location The two neighbourhoods where the events took place – Georgetown and Shaw – have distinct histories and racial demographics. In the District of Columbia, Georgetown is predominately White, while Shaw is a historically Black neighbourhood. Georgetown is unique in being the one neighbourhood without direct access through the city's rail system, limiting its accessibility and furthering the perception that it is removed from the District of Columbia. Shaw, on the other hand, has three stops along two of the District of Columbia's rail system, and is a major thoroughfare of buses. Both neighbourhoods are home to major universities: Georgetown has the prestigious Jesuit school Georgetown University; and Shaw is home to the largest historically Black college and university in the United States Howard University. Race and neighbourhood complicate identity in interesting ways. The Black male body is scripted differently than White or other males, replete with a whole other set of expectations and norms. Unlike ‘David', Hunter – the victim in the Shaw neighbourhood crime – is not permitted to be a victim. While Hunter is cast in Fox and ABC local news as first the victim, he is then portrayed as the sexual aggressor to Hannah in subsequent newscasts. In the first broadcasts, Hannah is seen as a violent gangster, and then a victim to Hunter's perversions. This is integral to understanding the interpretation of the crime. In her analysis of the ‘gay gang murders', Davis states, ‘perpetrators' construction as “gang members” served to further locate them within discourses of criminality, monstrosity, and beastiality' (2007, 503). As Hannah shifts from gang member to victim, the crime shifts from a discourse about Hannah as menacing to Hannah as sexual victim to Hunter. The assailants of ‘David' are cast within The Washington Blade and Georgetown press as Muslim, ‘smoking a mysterious substance' and foreign (Chibbaro 2008c). The media scripting remains consistent concerning each of the Black men involved: sexually aggressive, deviant and outsiders, ineffectual and incapable, and violent. Different neighbourhoods and spaces contain codes that identify socio-economic, racial, ethnic and gender norms. A business office and a party, for instance, would require various dress codes and mannerisms to ‘fit in'. In a similar sense, the neighbourhood is similarly scripted. In some neighbourhoods, gay men and lesbians are more the norm than in other places (Chauncey 1995, 227–270). In this case, the Shaw neighbourhood is slowly being gentrified. In Shaw, there is an emerging racially diverse gay and lesbian population. Historically, Shaw has been one of the poorer neighbourhoods in the District of Columbia's northwest quarter. Georgetown is considered affluent, and has a more visible presence of White gay and lesbian individuals. Crime and violence can also be a norm depending on the history and other social conditions (including the presence of law enforcement). According to District of Columbia Metropolitan Police reports, the neighbourhoods have vastly different crime rates. Shaw is in District One and, as of September 2008, the area reported 11 homicides and 331 assaults with a deadly weapon for the 2008 year (‘Metropolitan Police Department' 2009a). Georgetown is in District Two and, as of September in the same year, the area reported 3 homicides and 137 assaults with a deadly weapon for the 2008 year (‘Metropolitan Police Department' 2009b). The context of these events situates one as a typical crime in the neighbourhood, and the other as atypical for the neighbourhood. The judicial system – as represented by the judge and prosecuting attorney - identifies Hunter's assault and death as unacceptable, but understandable within the domains of Shaw: the judge and prosecuting attorney do not pursue hate crime enhancement in the case of Hannah. The attack on ‘David' is considered depraved and dangerous in the judge's statements to the media, which makes sense in the context of the relatively low crime rates of Georgetown. The neighbourhoods play a role in the social scripts. Georgetown is considered an affluent and racially less diverse with a high proportion of White residents in Washington, DC, whereas the Shaw neighbourhood is historically African-American and is only recently part of the District of Columbia's gentrification efforts. As such, Shaw has a far more diverse socio-economic range than Georgetown, and remains majority Black. The differential crime rates underscores these, as violence and crime is considered more normative than in the other, even by the agents of the criminal justice system – such as the judge and police. Law enforcement forces play a key part as the surveillance arm of disciplining society, and the judge is a core player in punishment, as Foucault frames it, by deciding sentencing. Through the two arms, the overarching discourse is able to force behaviours, conditions and expected outcomes within the community. The differing norms in each neighbourhood cue the police how and what to enforce. Scripting the body Scripts play a key role in interpreting each man's body. These provide the social schema as to the norms and expectations that the participants, media and law enforcement use to determine who acted in what capacity. Each participant seems to act, respond, understand and are understood through the lenses that frame their bodies. As such, we need to understand the many ways that these men are scripted – by context, race, sexuality and anonymity. These men's bodies are also scripted by sexuality. When asked, ‘David' openly discloses his sexuality to the two assailants – thus indicating his comfort being out as a gay man in Georgetown. Hunter is leaving a gay bar in the Shaw neighbourhood, giving some indication to those watching that he is a gay man. The disclosure of sexuality is apparently the catalyst to the Georgetown assault; in Shaw, the sexuality seems to serve as a trigger to escalate a robbery into a murderous beating. In the aftermath of the crimes, sexuality remains important. ‘David' employs sexuality as a means to organize gay media outlets – giving repeated interviews to the District's leading gay print newspaper, the Blade. His sexuality is also used in the Georgetown University student paper to radicalize the community into action. On the other hand, Hunter's sexuality becomes part of the problem. Hannah and his attorney portray Tony Hunter in the media as sexually aggressive to his young assailant, brazenly grabbing Hannah on the buttocks and genitalia on the street. In their research on large-scale lesbian and gay community events, Tomsen and Markwell assert, ‘varied homo and hetero-erotic pleasures of this event are both feared and desired by observers' (2009, 209). As a Black gay man, Hunter is understood within a larger range of framework of Black gay male images. Black gay men are often seen as sexually obsessed and sexually exotic within a framework of socio-economics, sexuality and pornography, regardless of the purported intent of the individual Black man (Harris 2008, 10– 20). Anonymity is only granted to ‘David'. In this way, he still has the agency to disclose or conceal his sexuality with the public, his educational institution and amongst his family. Hunter is not given this right. His picture appears on the front page of the Blade and alongside articles in the Washington Post. Whether Hunter was out as a gay man to his family, job and friends or not, his identity is broadcast through the media coverage. He is ‘outed' as part of the process of the justice system. Being ‘outed' denies the person the choice of disclosure; when that identity is stigmatized (as homosexuality remains), the media disclosure could trouble the professional, familial and social relations (Howard 2012, 130–132). Because he did not survive his attack, Hunter does not even control how he is remembered. While the law is not concerned with protecting the future rights of the deceased, the media's coverage – and the provision of anonymity – is integral to this discussion. The media determines that Hunter can be revealed. Without any portrayal of interviews with the family, the public is left without the knowledge of whether Hunter was out to them. Race is part of how the two victims differ. Hunter is clearly African-American. ‘David', on the other hand, is consistently anonymous, even racially. In the absence of racial marking, the default racial identity is White in the United States. Racial scripts are complex, often framing the interactions with prior experience and lessons gleaned from others (‘I heard from a friend …'). Race becomes a marker for our expectations and interpretation. ‘David's' apparent Whiteness is part of his encounter with his assailants. He is comfortable approaching two Black men to solicit them for drugs in Georgetown after the bars close. His race grants him the entitlement in Georgetown to make contact with anyone. Hunter's picture indicates he is Black, thus sharing a racial identity with Hannah – but the implications of the shared racial identity is not part of the media discourse. As Black men, Hunter and Hannah are situated within a complicated frame of race and masculinity. Since masculinity is performed, we can only infer from media typology of the two men. Hannah is identified as someone with gang ties and past criminal experience. These two factors imply that Hannah's masculinity is hard, able to fit in with other young urban men and potentially violent. Hunter, on the other hand, is only identified by his exit from a gay bar, his drunkenness and his friend abandoning him. Through Jackson's view of African-American masculinity, Hunter is scripted as a weak, ineffectual, even bumbling. In addition, we see Hunter and Hannah's interaction within the backdrop of the rise of the Black bisexual ‘down low' myth in popular culture. In popular culture, ‘down low' men are those who practice homosexual sex but identify publicly (and in some cases, psychologically) as heterosexual men. The ‘down low' casts hyper- masculine men as potential sexual objects and participants in homosexual sex (McCune 2008, 299–304). Within the Black community, this hyper-masculinity is often typified by athletics, hip- hop or connections to gangs or other street crime (Jackson 2006, 107–109). Hunter, therefore, is either: sexually obsessed, believing in the myth of the down-low hidden bisexuality potential in the young man, or both. The context provides clues as to who is considered local and who is not. Within Georgetown's homogeny, the two African assailants stand out as alien. ‘David' describes them as mysterious figures in the night and smoking some unidentified strange substance: they do not belong in Georgetown. In all media interviews, ‘David' is a sympathetic victim who was stumbling home. He is a successful medical school student at a prestigious private institution. The assault acts as an invasion on his body, and by extent, the wider body of Georgetown from the Muslim immigrants smoking an ‘unknown substance'. This juxtaposition reifies David as familiar and somehow normal. Hunter, on the other hand, is identified as a Maryland resident coming into Shaw to go to a gay bar. He emerges from the bar drunk and somehow begins interacting with Hannah. In the narrative provided by Hannah and his attorney, this interaction was sexually aggressive on the part of Hunter. The assailant is defined as a local, as if Hannah is somehow defending his home neighbourhood from the invading homosexual. The body is the place where this crime is acted out. Both assailants interpret their role – and their victim's role – through their homophobia. Hunter and ‘David' are both attacked for being gay. ‘David' is a medical school student at Georgetown and comfortable in a gay bar. The lack of a racial identifier would seem to indicate that ‘David' is White, especially as his assailants are identified by religion, race and country of origin. The Georgetown assailants are African and Muslim, and cited as having quoted the Quran during the assault. Tony Hunter, on the other hand, has a picture on the front page of multiple papers identifying him as a Black gay man, murdered outside of a gay bar. The sensationalist aspects of these headlines aside, Hunter is clearly labelled within domains of his race, sexuality and gender. Tony Hunter's assailant is, like him, another African-American man. The similarity in race and gender between victim and perpetrator in the Shaw neighbourhood is not an unfamiliar narrative in the media or popular culture: Black on Black crime. Conclusions The two cases have very different prosecutorial outcomes. For the murder of Tony Hunter, Robert Hannah served six months in jail. For the assault on ‘David', the assailants were sentenced in 2009 for three years in prison, and the United States Department of Homeland Security has initiated deportation procedures. The classification of the crime as a hate crime seems to both satisfy the community need for closure and enhance the sentencing. The disciplining force of law enforcement operates on multiple levels when invoked with the ‘hate' designation. When the hate crime designation is not present, the penalty enhancement meant to disrupt these persistent criminal cycles is unavailable. In the case of Robert Hannah, his cycle continues. In 2011, Robert Hannah was arrested for attempted murder of his girlfriend, and his defence remains that she ‘started it' (Najafi 2011). Neither crime is justified. We do not consider one as more serious than the other. Rather, we explore the similarities and differences that nuance each event's coverage. The media coverage surrounding the events may not determine the outcome of the events, but it is symptomatic of the construction in each event of the nature of the acts and the parties involved. In fact, the persistent use of expected scripts seems to indicate the importance of understanding these scripts as interpretive lenses in order to develop any discursive intrusion. The media portrayal relies almost exclusively on relying on traditional roles of the assailants, victims and neighbourhoods. The White victim's interactions are never questioned even though he admits to asking his assailants for illicit substances; instead, he is seen as a sympathetic player. The Black victim is cast in multiple roles – from hapless victim to lascivious homosexual – depending on who promotes the narrative. The Black assailants are interpreted in similarly odd manners: the Muslim Africans have acted in egregious and monstrous manners, whereas African-American Robert Hannah is seen first as a gang banger, than as a potential victim of unwanted homosexual advances. Unfortunately, only one side of Tony Hunter's case will be heard in the media and within the judicial system. Tony Hunter's performance as a gay man is situated within his Black male identity in a predominately Black neighbourhood. Hunter is punished permanently for this trespass. Whereas ‘David' is permitted to tell his story in repeated interviews, Hunter is silenced and his assailant, Hannah, is permitted to control the narrative of the night's events. We will never know what happened between Hannah and Hunter, only that it resulted in Hunter's death. What we do know is that Hannah, news outlets and the judicial system follow a trajectory that allows for victim to become culpable in the crime. In order to unpack the rhetoric, we highlight the socio-historical factors and positions. Black men, in these events, are scripted in specific ways that limit the interpretation of their actions. The seeming conflict between the potential for being exotic, impaired, violent, exploitable or uneducated are fully realized in the media coverage of these two crimes. The analysis of these events is not simply an exercise in critical analysis; it is part of determining the ways that gender and sexual identity conflict, restrain and deny aspects of a home where that identity is safe, celebrated and makes sense. It provides a way of understanding how identity is practised, performed, valued and punished within bodies. Critical and cultural studies can serve as discursive interventions within human rights discussions. In the cases of Tony Hunter and ‘David', cultural and critical approaches enable an understanding that the victim, perpetrator and neighbourhood are part of the interpretation of the hate crime legislation. Through these lenses, we can problematize the outcomes when these factors are not adequately considered. Coombe posits that ‘clearly human rights are the fulcrum of a pervasive, powerful and authoritative normative discourse that requires the same powerful instruments of analysis that a critical cultural studies brings to bear on other discourses' (2010, 235). The exploration of local incidents of hate crimes and other human rights violations through critical cultural studies approaches connects the material act, the legislative prosecution and the media depictions, regardless of the conflicts between these prospective poles. Through the exploration of these crimes, we recognize that sexuality and race remain difficult to discern and analyse. In the context of hate crimes, these identity factors remain integral to understanding the crime and its subsequent prosecution. Media coverage and law enforcement seemed to collude in defining the two crimes separately. The label of ‘hate crime' is assigned to ‘David', but not in the case of Tony Hunter. 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work_gypecrqeybcfna2s6e3yphi54q	----	RCRC_1345966__ak_rlar edited ARTICLE http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02560046.2017.1345966 Transnational Pride, Global Closets and Regional Formations of Screen Activism: Documentary LGBTQ Narratives from Turkey Cüneyt Çakırlar Nottingham Trent University, United Kingdom cuneyt.cakirlar@ntu.ac.uk Abstract This study explores three documentary projects from Turkey, namely Proudly Trans in Turkey (by Gabrielle Le Roux, 2012), My Child (by Can Candan, 2013), and Trans X Istanbul (by Maria Binder, 2014). Attempting to make visible various spaces and formations of LGBTQ activism in Turkey, these collaborative projects can be considered as practices of screen activism that critically reflect on their own circulation, spectatorial address, ethnographic accent, and documentary aesthetic. Attempting to contest modes of the transnational gaze which reifies the saviour discourses of the Gay International and its globalised imperatives of liberation and pride, this discussion examines the extent to which the regional complexities of intersectional LGBTQ activism are compromised by the investment in these activist subjects’ global humanitarian value and international intelligibility. Questioning the ways in which these documentaries tackle their spectatorial address as well as the global and local complexities of sexual politics, this study aims to demonstrate how various forms/styles of documentary could contest, negotiate, and re- invent a transnational gaze that critically engages with the ethnographic constructions of sexuality, community, identity, and nation. Keywords: documentary; ethnography; LGBTQ activism; Turkey; transnationalism; artivism The recent turns of events in global sexual politics in various international frameworks of human rights activism, and the increased attention given to LGBTQ studies in various transregional networks of academia, have complicated the universalizing debates addressing cultures and categories of sexual identity/identification. Rendering visible the complex geopolitical, multi-scalar dynamics of sexual politics, the new formations of LGBTQ cultures in the non-Western world trigger an urgency to address the voices of regional actors by rethinking the epistemologies of sexual subjectivity within intersectional frameworks. What makes LGBTQ documentary filmmaking a crucial field of knowledge production is this urgency to encourage communities to produce alternative truths that would critically respond to neo-colonial ideologies appropriating sexuality as a political instrument for “democratizing” and “civilizing” certain nations or regions (Haritaworn 2015; Massad 2002). Focusing on three documentary projects, namely Trans X Istanbul (Binder 2014), Proudly Trans in Turkey (Le Roux 2012), and My Child (Candan 2013), this study explores the ways in which discourses of affirmation and empowerment are appropriated in the practices of LGBTQ documentary filmmaking from Turkey. These documentaries focus on an Islamicate and precariously secular national context. The regional actors on screen defend an inclusive and dissident queer politics that does not prioritize an agenda shaped by faith as the primary marker of LGBTQ identity and community. Attempting to make visible various spaces and formations of LGBTQ activism in Turkey, these collaborative projects can be considered as practices of screen activism which critically reflect on their own circulation, spectatorial address, ethnographic accent, and documentary aesthetic. Attempting to prioritise a focus on the regional complexities of intersectional queer activism, these documentaries seem to contest and negotiate transnational discourses of LGBTQ identities that reify the globalized imperatives of liberation, pride, and humanitarian intervention. The critical regionalism at work in these projects, however, neither fetishizes its national/ethnic referent nor constructs a radical alterity by enacting a “third eye” through its ethnographic gaze (Rony 1996). Exposing the spectator to intersectional LGBTQ politics and its actors, these works treat their subjects as active interlocutors of community and as performers of ethnographic knowledge. Through an analysis of these three documentaries, this study proposes a discussion of the ways in which various transnational registers of LGBTQ documentary production engage with the ethnographic site, the regional context, and the narrative framing of sexual subjectivity on screen. Hence, the selection of these three films relies on their shared transnational production context —in terms of both spectatorial address and funding. Although the low-budget, regionally circulated, activist productions of earlier LGBTQ documentaries from Turkey— such as Aykut Atasay’s Yürüyoruz (We’re Marching, 2006), Travestiler (Transvestites, 2007), and Beyaz Atlı Prens Boşuna Gelme! (Prince Charming Don’t Bother to Come, 2009), as well as Melisa Önel’s Ben ve Nuri Bala (Me and Nuri Bala, 2009) — could contribute to this discussion in productive ways, this paper capitalises upon the more recent transnational productions and their logic of regionality. Therefore, the films selected here not only demonstrate effectively the ideological operation of such global production registers, but also facilitate a wider critical debate on the increasingly globalised discourses of intersectional LGBTQ activism in Turkey. Ethics of collaboration in Maria Binder’s Trans X Istanbul (2014) In her critical examination of the “documentary logic of sobriety,” Pooja Rangan takes into account a particular mode of humanitarian “seriousness” in ethnographic filmmaking, where the discourse of sobriety operates “not merely as an ideological ruse but as the symptom and mandate of a humanitarian ethical paradigm—one in which the urgent, immediate task of saving human lives legitimates and even actively defers all other considerations, including the aesthetics and politics of representation” (2014, 2; see also Bandi 2016). Resonating with Rangan’s critique of humanitarian intervention and the ethnographic/documentary gaze it produces, Hart and Dillwood’s reading of Call Me Kuchu (2012), a documentary focusing on the struggle of Ugandan LGBTQ activists with anti-homosexuality legislation, proposes a critical mode of analysis that prioritizes an interrogation of the ways in which the film’s humanitarian discourse engages with “time, contact, context and scale” (2015, 1012). Treating Call Me Kuchu as “a dynamic artefact of transnational and post-colonial contexts” (2015, 1009), these scholars argue that the formal and narrative choices in the film fail to provide depth in terms of how the regional actors of LGBTQ activism engage with the local specificities of sexual politics. This critical evaluation can also be taken as a wider critique of the genre of rights- based documentary filmmaking and its neoliberal logic of transnational humanitarianism (see, for example, Bandi 2016), which, in the case of Call Me Kuchu, “underscores the potential to misread the social and political oppression their subjects experience as symptomatic of a globally undifferentiated homophobia” (Hart and Dillwood 2015, 1020). Being critically attentive to the ideological risks of rights-based documentary filmmaking in obscuring relations of “time, contact, context and scale” (Hart and Dillwood 2015, 1012), my discussion of Maria Binder’s Trans X Istanbul (2014) and Gabrielle Le Roux’s Proudly Trans in Turkey (2012) explores how these documentary projects give an account of their own ethnographic gaze and collaborative approach. Maria Binder’s Trans X Istanbul focuses on the life of Ebru Kırancı, an Istanbul-based trans activist. Through Ebru’s eyes, the documentary aims to explore the trans community’s struggle with hate crimes, urban segregation, and the exclusionary practices of urban regeneration projects in Istanbul. This exploration incorporates multiple modes of representation in documentary filmmaking, as identified by Nichols: expository, observational, interactive, and reflexive modes (1992, 32). The combined framework enables the filmmaker to negotiate the ethical complexities of the film’s transnational production context, its ethnographic focus, and the filmmaker’s status as an outsider. In the introductory part of Trans X, Binder makes use of her footage from nine years ago (when Ebru used to do sex work to earn a living) and her voice- over in this part emphasizes how her friendship with Ebru initiated their collaboration for this film: This is Ebru nine years ago when we first met in Istanbul. At that time, she wanted to become a politician. “Our lives aren’t worth anything” she said to me. If you really want to find out, come with us. Hours later, I found myself hiding in a bush feeling very scared. But at a critical moment just when a car tried to run over three friends, I wasn’t filming and Ebru cursed me. It was around this time, however, that our friendship began. […] One day back in Berlin, I got a flood of messages that Ebru had been killed in her flat. Unable to believe it, I called her and found out that she was still alive. But one of her friends had been stabbed to death. It was then that we decided to make this film. I left Berlin and my mother joined me. We moved to Istanbul with a fully packed car to become a part of Ebru’s life and her struggle. (Binder 2014) Rather than concentrating on the scene of queer activism which Ebru is a part of, the film’s primary focus is on the spatial production and structural operation of exclusion that trans communities experience in Istanbul. Binder seems to follow an episodic narrative in Trans X, where each episode focuses on a different spatial/scalar dimension of the film’s subject. In the first part, the film focuses on the ways in which trans communities become precarious citizens subject to ostracization, segregation, lynching and hate crimes within the current practices of urban regeneration in Istanbul. With the guidance of Ebru, the film first documents testimonies of the trans residents of Meis Sitesi in the Avcılar district, where the conservative majority protest against trans residents and their rumoured engagement with prostitution. Binder’s documentary incorporates (i) footage from news, (ii) vérité coverage of LGBT activists’ public press statements, as well as Binder’s footage of the anti-sex-work protests taking place in front of the apartments where the trans people reside, and (iii) talking head conversations with trans residents who have experienced various forms of violence and lynch events in the district. Ebru acts as the leading filmic embodiment, and a catalyst, in Binder’s collaborative vérité framework. Binder’s use of her own reflective voice- over, which may be said to run the risk of reiterating the logic of humanitarian saviour discourses, is reciprocated by the central focus on Ebru’s presence in the film—as the guiding agent and partner of collaboration. Represented as a confident, self-empowered trans activist, Ebru not only intervenes in moments of conflict to defend and support her trans friends, but also actively engages with the process of filmmaking. There are several moments in the film where Ebru, as the central figure of various activist interventions, asks Binder to shoot particular scenes of conflict and confrontation. Apart from the amorous relationship between them, the ongoing exchange between Ebru and Binder throughout the documentary reminds the audience of the collaborative partnership, the claim of which is, I would contend, constitutive of the film’s ethical accountability. Furthermore, the fact that Ebru actively addresses Binder as the filmmaker negotiates the absence of the filmmaker’s body in front of the camera, which may be taken as a potentially hegemonic, objectifying—if not colonizing—mode of authorial invisibility. Contrary to Hart and Dillwood’s (2015) critique of the disembodied, non-reflective directorial discourse in Call Me Kuchu, the on-screen relational dynamic in Trans X, as well as the emphasis on Binder’s 10-year-long friendship with Ebru, partially eliminates the ethical risks of the documentary filmmaker’s relative invisibility in the film. The film moves from the inner-district cultural conflicts and oppression that trans people face in the Avcılar district to another territory of exclusion, displacement, and marginalisation that the community has been experiencing within the current state-led urban transformation projects in Tarlabaşı. In their study on the post-2000 shift to neoliberal governance of urban land in Turkey, Kuyucu and Ünsal provide a detailed account of the history of Tarlabaşı and how, by the mid-1990s, it “remained an inner- city slum inhabited by disadvantaged transient populations,” including the trans community (2010, 1488). The scholars note that these urban renewal initiatives “suffer from a total lack of social projects and economic programmes for the inhabitants creating a serious risk of displacement, dispossession and geographical relocation of poverty” (2010, 1491). Binder’s Trans X offers the audience intimate contact with the trans inhabitants of Tarlabaşı and with Ebru’s struggle to help them negotiate eviction orders and the imposed relocation deals. Binder uses footage from radio, TV interviews, and public demonstrations, wherein Ebru—among other activists—notes that the relocation of trans people to the peripheries of the city (as part of the demographic upgrade of various locations subject to gentrification in Istanbul, including Tarlabaşı) escalates hate crimes and creates a more vulnerable community in exile. The film treats the condition of trans people as a symptom of a wider ideological continuum that produces homophobia and transphobia through hate speech, medical neglect, the non-recognition of sexual orientation as a constitutional status, the ambiguous references to “family values” and “general morality” in Turkish criminal law, and so on. In addition to incorporating Ebru’s conversations with the trans inhabitants of Avcılar and Tarlabaşı to address their precarious, economically disadvantaged situation, the film’s representational discourse pays particular attention to the urban landscape. By juxtaposing the ruins of demolished buildings on various construction sites, gentrification, and renewal with a selection of conventionally exoticized, postcard-like images of Istanbul, as well as the imagined/idealized cityscapes promoted by the campaigns for urban transformation projects, Binder captures a demystified image of Istanbul which operates as a visual supplement to dramatise the structural violence and exclusion queer people face in the city. However, Binder’s vérité style and her use of Ebru as informant as well as the key narrative motor enable the film to present an image of the city as not only a space of victimization and precarity, but also a space of dissidence and resistance. While the first half of Trans X represents Ebru as an expansive subject of activism and the “native” party of the film’s collaborative narration, Binder later shifts the film’s frame from the portrayal of a vulnerable queer community to Ebru’s individual life story. “Underneath her lightness,” Binder’s voice-over notes, “Ebru allowed [her] to see her wounds: the loss of a mother who forbade her to enter the house again, the loss of a brother who threatened to kill her …” (Binder 2014). The trip to Ebru’s hometown in Zonguldak and the visit to her mother switches the focus and scale by moving the film’s identity politics from a collective portrayal of the marginalized trans community in an urban sphere to an individual register of storytelling, addressing the familial exclusion and denial Ebru has experienced. Binder’s documentation of Ebru’s visit to her hometown in Zonguldak and the confrontation with her mother after 30 years provides the film with a scalar dynamism rather than a narrative diversion. The film reminds the viewer of the spatiotemporal range of homophobia and transphobia, where the familial order of kinship operates as the core apparatus of oppression. Ebru’s tense exchange with her mother and sister reveals their complicity in Ebru’s exclusion from the family, due to their fear of Ebru’s brother and the wider social pressure they internalized when coming to terms with Ebru’s transgender identity. Binder’s switch from the communal to the familial/individual operation of identity and body politics turns her portrayal of Ebru into a multi-layered representation that does not reduce the characterization of the film’s central figure to an inert and personally detached native informant. Ebru becomes the actor who facilitates the scalar mobility in Binder’s documentary gaze. The final shift in the film’s focus (and scale) takes place when Binder moves the focus from Ebru’s hometown to the Gezi Park protests in Istanbul. A symptom of the “frustrations and tensions caused by the AKP [Justice and Development Party]-led neoliberal and neoconservative regime in Turkey,” the protests started as a reaction against the urban transformation project that the government aimed to implement in the park; yet, it soon turned into a spectacle of mass dissidence where “the composition of the protestors was wildly heterogeneous” (Gambetti 2014, 92). Binder’s focus on these protests and her documentation of the LGBTQ protestors’ presence in this heterogeneous space of mass dissidence attempts to demonstrate the intersectional framework in which queer activism operates in Turkey. As also mentioned by Ebru in her exchange with the younger LGBTQ crowd in the park, a collective queer memory is inscribed in Gezi Park, as the park has been a place of cruising for years. Binder combines her footage of the protests with the Istanbul Pride marches of the same year. Although the footage from the Occupy Gezi protests in Binder’s film seems to function as a tokenistic inclusion that ignores the inner complexities of the protests as well as the role of LGBTQ activists in the park, it effectively supplements Binder’s representation of Istanbul as a site of dissidence and resistance against the city’s aggressive neoliberal transformation. Ebru’s exchange with younger trans people in Gezi park and her friendship with Didem (a young trans person who recently moved to Istanbul) provide a narrative closure that suggests the continuity of the queer struggle and the hope that it will persist across generations. In his incisive discussion of “image ethics” in post-Stonewall lesbian and gay documentary film, Thomas Waugh suggests that a generation of lesbian and gay documentary film “past the stages of self-recognition and of self-valorisation” should prioritize “an ethical imperative [that is] the kind of self-analysis, self-criticism, self-evaluation necessary to any healthy community” (2011, 203). According to Waugh, “confusion over audience goals on the part of filmmakers, or the appeal to multiple or overlapping audiences” may lead lesbian and gay documentary practice to avoid presenting inner-community conflicts and to accommodate a kind of pluralism in representation (2011, 203–217). The transnational address in Trans X accommodates a similar risk in representational ethics. Applying Waugh’s critique to different geo-temporal registers of documentary representation may be ideologically problematic; however, the collaboration between Ebru and Maria Binder in Trans X Istanbul could have resolved the absence of self-analysis in the film by reflecting on the inner tensions of the trans community, and thus addressing the messiness of sexual dissidence within the local context, rather than presenting a uniform, and perhaps globally more intelligible, struggle and solidarity against transphobia. Documentary artivism, the politics of sampling, and strategic diversity in Gabrielle Le Roux’s Proudly Trans in Turkey (2012) In his exploration of contemporary art’s relation to cultural alterity in its various ethnographic turns, Hal Foster critiques the figure of “the artist as ethnographer” and proposes a “parallactic work that attempts to frame the framer as he or she frames the other,” in order to eliminate ideological patronage or a “reductive over-identification with” and “a murderous disidentification from” the other (1996, 203). Such a notion of a self- framing artist with a parallactic gaze should incorporate “a multiscalar consciousness that reflects on the productions and constructions of scale within the mechanism by which contemporary art’s so-called internationalism produces simultaneously the (local) other and the (global) political” (Çakırlar 2013, 687). Noting the medium-specific focus of Foster’s critical framework, namely site-specific installation art, George Marcus argues that the ethnographic fieldwork that film/video and theatre—as medium—could appropriate is less vulnerable to Foster’s critique and “not as easily assimilated as the cultural capital of more powerful and sponsoring institutions” (2010, 87). In this regard, the contemporary formations of multi- and trans-media documentary practices deserve particular attention in terms of the ways in which they reconfigure art, ethnography, and screen activism, and offer an alternative to the globally hyper-commodified space of contemporary arts and its valuation of the ethnographic through the engagement with transnational capital. In this regard, practices of digital artivism, which “signifies work created by individuals who see an organic relationship between art and activism” and employs “a form of political activism that seeks egalitarian alliances and connections across difference [within a cross-media setting of convergence]” (Sandoval and Latorre 2008, 83), function as a contemporary mode of creative expression responding effectively to the intersections between art, ethnography, and documentary. Gabrielle Le Roux’s Proudly Trans in Turkey (2012) is a multimedia project of documentary artivism which its producers present as “a cultural intervention for social justice inspired by, created in collaboration with, and dedicated to the courage of trans and gender-variant people in Turkey and other parts of the world.” Realized with the support of Istanbul LGBTT, Pembe Hayat, Amnesty International Turkey, The Human Resource Development Foundation, and the Consulate of the Netherlands, the project consists of 17 paintings and 18 videos by Le Roux, as well as transcriptions of in-depth interviews with trans and intersex people responding to open-ended, semi-structured questions on identity, sexuality, religion, and hate crimes in Turkey. This section will explore Le Roux’s discourse of representation in her collaborative ethnographic approach, which Ortega identified as of “a pedagogic dispositive … because of [the project’s] mid-way position between art and activism, personal account and collective memory, and also between diverse geopolitical and intercultural contexts of production and enunciation” (2014, 88). Le Roux’s primary focus on trans activists in this collaborative project deserves particular attention. Rather than attempting to entirely contain the trans identity under the national referent of Turkey, the project’s core aim is to work with activists and address their struggle by creating a horizontal ethnographic setting where Le Roux’s role as artist/ethnographer is reciprocated by the activists as interlocutors of knowledge and experience, rather than objects of information and representation. In this sense, though operating within a transnational human rights framework, the project’s focus on activism and its discourse of sampling prioritizes struggle and empowerment over victimhood. Rather than being framed as passive recipients of global sexual politics and its mandates of progress or liberation, the participants are presented as subjects who claim ownership of their struggle in Turkey and its regional political intricacies. Their responses to the open-ended questions shape the 18 videos, which do not necessarily reveal to the viewer a trans community with a coherent identity, but an ideologically diverse network of connectivity, solidarity, and intersectional politics. A selection of these questions are as follows: How old are you? How do you describe your gender identity? How do hate crimes affect you? Who and what qualities do you find attractive? What is the role of religion and spirituality in your life? What would like to share about your story? How would you describe the state of trans people in Turkey? What is your occupation? How does your gender affect your work? What is your dream job? What repressive things would you like to see changed? What motivated you to get involved in trans activism? Who were your role models as youth? What are your dreams and inspirations? Who are your family, friends and supporters? Why did you choose to be a part of this project and whom do you want it to reach? What doors did your gender identity open or close for you? (AI Turkey 2012) The activists’ responses to these questions, which are inter-cut within a talking-head format, demonstrates Le Roux’s representational framework, which can be considered as a form of “strategic diversity.” Not necessarily reiterating the generic register of confessional documentary, the responses used in these videos show the differences among the subjects’ gender and sexual identifications, family values, faith or religious beliefs, ethnic and class backgrounds, ages, professions, political ideals, and personal aspirations. This diversity also invites the viewer to a dynamic scalar register of interpretation that shifts from personal to regional/national to global. This decolonized feminist setting of collaboration invests in the very failure of closure, and the refusal of discursive containment, the productivity of which occurs with the deliberate crossings of fiction, storytelling, and ethnography (Visweswaran 1994). In describing their gender identity, some of the participants claim ownership of “womanhood.” Others are more thorough in their descriptions of why they identify as a trans man or a trans woman. Some participants, however, stress the ways in which they acquire an identity as a political choice, despite their reluctance to reproduce normative gender categories. Reflecting on their sexual orientation, some participants give a clear account of their heterosexuality, while others describe their versatility in object choice or refrain from defining their orientation in a gender-specific way. In her playful response, Sema says: “I like human beings and to me there are two types of people: those who attract me and those who don’t. So I’m attracted to those who attract me and I’m not attracted to those who don’t attract me.” (AI Turkey 2012) Commenting on the role of religion and spirituality in their lives, the participant activists reflect on their family backgrounds and their current approach to faith. Their backgrounds range from conservative Muslim families to more liberal/secular ones. While the majority of responses range from identification with atheism and deism to identification with Islam, most of the participants clearly state that the idea of a religion contradicts their being and their happiness. Şevval says: The environment I grew up in wasn’t religious. … I think that religious pressure and prejudices as well as the radical belief are the grounds for a big part of the tragedy that the world sees. The traditional family structure is also nourishing a lot of bad things. Acquiring a binary gender system as well as categorizations such as black–white, good–bad, sin–moral are fruits of that. These affect us a lot. … I identified myself as an atheist at the age of nineteen relying on the level of intellect I had at the time. Since then, there is no religion in my life. (AI Turkey 2012) Some other participants, however, draw a distinction between Islam as religion and Islam as a geopolitical ideological construct. These participants express their discomfort about the ways in which Islam is experienced on a sociocultural level. Selay says: I believe in God and Islam. I always open my hand for God and pray. I believe in our prophet. But I definitely don’t believe in what they call Islam now in 2011. If this is Islam, then I am not a Muslim. Lynch, abuse, murder … these are what’s going on. But Islam is the most tolerant religion. You shall not abuse anyone, you shall not despise anyone, you shall not outcast anyone. … This is what I know of Islam. That is the religion I believe in. (AI Turkey 2012) A similar diversity is at work in the participants’ responses to questions on the ways in which they relate to family, transnational solidarity, and work. Although the level of belonging to their biological families vary, most of the participants have a strong sense of community, friendship, and solidarity, which they prioritise as family. “What brings us together may be politics but we share an emotional bond too,” says Şevval, explaining her conception of family (AI Turkey 2012). Referring to the precarity of trans people, some participants explain how they need to re-appropriate “family” and invest in alternative forms of kinship within their own community. However, in some interviews, the participants also demonstrate a strong sense of a transnational solidarity as a crucial part of their values of activism. “No matter where we are on this world, we TTs [transvestites and transsexuals] are the biggest family,” says Belgin (AI Turkey 2012). Similarly, Sinem explains why the potential global reach of Le Roux’s project matters to her: I would like this exhibition to reach out to as many trans people as possible, and raise awareness in them about trans activism. There are about ten thousand trans people in Turkey but the activists make up to barely fifty people. … Trans people have a fear of taking political action. … It might be encouraging to see other trans people fighting for their rights. The murder of David Kato affects me too. I cried for him. If the struggle of a Turkish trans person can be seen somewhere in Africa, South America, or Bangladesh, the trans, the sex-workers, the human rights activists can feel a little inspiration and come out knowing there are many others like them. (AI Turkey 2012) Talking about their occupations and professional backgrounds, the majority of participants consider sex work as an occupation which functions almost as a forced option for trans women due to the structural homophobia and transphobia in Turkey. However, in parallel to the strategic diversity Le Roux seems to target in this project, the attitudes in the participants’ responses to sex work vary as well. While some participants consider sex work as the only way for them to earn a living, others express their sense of pride and empowerment as sex workers, and argue that it should be acknowledged, rather than stigmatized, as a form of labour. Although the majority of trans women in this project have sex work in their personal history, a fair number of them now work in human rights organizations. The ethic of collaborative ethnography, the primary address aimed at activists, and the strategic diversity in Le Roux’s artivist practice intervene in “a politics of pity … [that] situates the sufferer as passive and the one who observes the suffering as obliged to act” (Kara and Reestorff 2015, 5). Besides the content and Le Roux’s discourse of representation, the project also generates a multimedia platform. It is exhibited as an installation containing the compilation of video interviews and Le Roux’s paintings of each participant. In addition, the videos have been published via the Youtube account of Amnesty International Turkey. The transcripts of the interviews (and additional materials, including the first-person story of the intersex activist Belgin and interviews with three parents of trans people) are made available in the exhibition monograph published online on the project’s page on Tumblr (see Le Roux 2012). Le Roux’s portrait paintings, as part of the project, contributes to her discourse of documentary artivism which, through documenting the activists themselves, pursues a match between form and content. Le Roux incorporates a selection of the participants’ own words into each painting and makes their bodies part of their own slogans, which could also be seen as an attempt to create a collaborative setting in the process of portraiture. Refusing to position herself as an artist who “gives voice to and empowers people whose voices are not heard” (Le Roux and Şeker 2013, 259; my translation), Le Roux notes that her choice to make portrait paintings as part of the stories told in the first person is a way for her to show her personal respect and admiration for the courage of people standing against prejudice and injustice (Le Roux 2012, 142). My account of Le Roux’s methodological approach in Proudly Trans in Turkey resonates considerably with Whiteman’s coalition model, which proposes ways of understanding and interpreting the political impact of activist documentary films and videos. Such interpretation, according to Whiteman, must “incorporate (a) the production as well as the distribution process; (b) the full range of potential impact on producers, activist organizations, and decision makers; and (c) the efforts of social movements to create and sustain alternative spheres of public discourse” (2004, 51–52). Le Roux’s collaborative ethnographic framework and multimedia approach facilitate a notion of political effect/impact that “directs our attention to the potentially important role of activist groups, initially as participants in the production process and then more importantly as catalysts in the distribution process, when documentary films become tools available to activist groups as they seek political impact” (Whiteman 2004, 51). The ethics of collaboration, as well as the focus on activism as the primary documentary subject, in both Binder’s Trans X Istanbul and Le Roux’s Proudly Trans in Turkey, demonstrate critical efforts to articulate a discourse of representation that goes beyond the global humanitarian framings of victimhood in conventional rights-based documentaries. While these projects demonstrate powerful interventions in the hegemonic conventions of the ethnographic gaze—which appropriates others through inventing an authentic foreignness—the presentation of the cultural alterity on screen still seems to prioritize a global/transnational gaze (by critiquing it from within) rather than various modes of a local/regional gaze. Avoiding a critical look at the inner tensions and conflicts of LGBTQ activism in Turkey, these projects choose to represent a community of people whose political struggle and personal empowerment need to be acknowledged and celebrated globally. This investment in global intelligibility may be said to risk, if not dilute, the ethical accountability of its regional political impact. Coming out and instrumental parenthood in Can Candan’s My Child (2013) The post-2000s consolidation of the LGBTQ activist movement, the increased public visibility of LGBTQ cultures, and the proliferation of discourses on gender and sexuality in contemporary Turkey could be taken as symptoms of the early, inclusive years of the AKP’s (Justice and Development Party) governance and its “conservative-liberal synthesis” (Birdal 2013, 120). However, the ideological ground of the LGBT movement “significantly challenged [this synthesis] … and reveal[ed] the fault-line between a liberal narrative based on universal human rights and democracy, and a conservative narrative based on particular values and identities” (Birdal 2013, 120; see also Çakırlar and Delice 2012). In his detailed analysis on the ways in which LGBTQs operate, increasingly, as the “constitutive others” of AKP’s political model, Birdal argues as follows: While politicians must respond to these demands of identity politics, they must do so without alienating and othering certain identity groups. Thus, in order to maintain social peace, conservative democracy needs to create a pluralistic political environment in which all identity groups feel mutual respect. This environment is reinforced by “national values” (milli değerler), a central pillar of Turkish conservatism. This reliance on a set of substantive values is the crux of conservative democracy’s incompatibility with liberal democracy (2013, 120–1). As the obsession with “national values” in Turkish politics has consistently accommodated references to “family values” and “general morals” in various legal constitutions of censorship, misogyny, and transphobia/homophobia, the formation of the voluntary support and solidarity group LISTAG (Families and Friends of LGBTIs in Turkey) facilitated an interesting platform for regional activist practice. It mobilises the parents of LGBTQ people in Turkey and subverts the conservative discourse of “family values” from within by including mothers and fathers of LGBTQ people as active collaborators of the LGBTQ movement. Can Candan’s documentary My Child narrates these parents’ own “coming out” stories—coming out as parents of LGBTQ subjects, and coming out as supporters of LGBTQ activism. My Child has an episodic narrative structure where the choices of mise- en-scène and framing, across episodes, register a sense of “coming out” in an audiovisual context. The film starts with shots of the families’ living rooms—as markers of domestic family settings—where the parents tell their stories in front of the camera in a talking-head format. While giving an account of their (ethnic and sociocultural) backgrounds and their experiences as young mothers and fathers, these parents demonstrate, in their storytelling, a critical awareness of the ways in which they, from the early years of parenthood, were implicated within a patriarchal conservative national culture and its norms of gender/sexuality. Nearly half of Candan’s feature contains inter-cut mid-shots of talking heads which document the parents’ struggle in coming to terms with their children’s sexual and/or gender identity (i.e., homosexuality and/or trans identity) and their “coming out.” The intimate “confessional” setting with talking heads then shifts to a vérité framework documenting LISTAG’s social organization as a group, including group meetings, workshops with CETAD (Society for Sexual Education, Treatment and Research), dinner parties, and Istanbul Pride events. In the group meeting, the members discuss issues regarding dissemination and organization, including brochures, helplines, training workshops for parents of LGBTQs, budget concerns, LISTAG’s forthcoming visit to parliament, and potential international networks with other groups of parents. The film moves from the meeting to a workshop with CETAD, where volunteer psychiatrists provide the parents with various definitions of and distinctions between the concepts of sex, gender, and sexual orientation, and the ways in which LGBTQ subjects could be framed within these identity markers. The film then moves to a dinner party where LGBTQ activists meet the parents and discuss various issues, including hate crimes against gay and trans people, the safety of LGBTQs in workplaces and schools, the non- inclusion of sexual orientation in the constitution, anti-discrimination legislation, and the coverage of LGBTQs in the mainstream media. Next, the film shows the day of the Istanbul Pride. While preparing their banners for the pride march, parents watch the news covering their visit to parliament. This is followed by Mehmet’s and Metehan’s comments on the transformative power of LISTAG’s presence which, through its strategic appropriation of family and parenthood, reinforces the visibility of the LGBTQ movement and its demand for rights in the mainstream public: Instead of choosing an easier life in the society, you went there and stood in the center. Saying, “Here, we are!” That was a tremendous support. We went to the parliament, too. Nobody held our hands like that. They could do that only with a mother. (Mehmet in My Child [Candan 2013]) Two years ago, at the Pride March, there were two young men passing by. One said to the other: “The faggots are walking again … Wait, look at that man’s banner! It says ‘my son is homosexual.’ What a father! Bravo! I appreciate honesty.” I saw something melt away there. The guy’s discourse changed in two seconds! (Metehan in My Child [Candan 2013]) There is a performative element in the ways in which Candan deploys an audiovisual narrative trajectory throughout My Child to provide a match between the documentary form and the parents’ stories of “coming out” (and of becoming activists). Starting with the mid-shots of talking heads in the intimate domestic settings of the parents’ living rooms, and ending with the crane shot of the Istanbul Pride march in Taksim, My Child narrates the parents’ gradually expanding relationality: the filmic form registers, in enacting, their own “coming out” story. The accelerating rhythm of the montage and the use of camera, sound, and mise-en-scène function as aesthetic tools to (i) mimic the politicized shift from the private (family/individual/closet/shame) to the public (streets/community/liberation/pride) and (ii) reflect LISTAG’s urge to grow, expand, raise awareness, and create change. In addition to the textual and formal operation of My Child as a documentary that accommodates an ethnographic drive to present a solidarity group (rather than a clearly defined community), the register of the film’s production and circulation deserves particular attention in order to understand its regional political impact. The project owes its success to its initial crowdfunding campaign on Indiegogo, which became “a transformative apparatus in its public relations work” (Koçer 2015, 238). Comparing the project with Whiteman’s coalition model, Koçer argues that My Child’s crowdfunding not only paved the way for institutional donations, including those from Amnesty International, the British Embassy, and the Consulate of the Netherlands, but also “further engendered a social space that circumscribed the film’s audience [who are transformed] into an active public … through the circulation of discourse about [the film’s] collective financing in social and traditional media” (2015, 240). This collective ownership of the project turned My Child into a political instrument for the major opposition parties: the film was screened in Ankara as part of LISTAG’s visit to parliament, which enhanced the group’s visibility in the media and triggered further dialogues with parents from various locations in Turkey. While the multimedia platform of artivism in Le Roux’s Proudly Trans in Turkey resonates with Whiteman’s coalition model through its discourse of collaboration, spectatorial access, and representational diversity, My Child accommodates further potentials of political impact: by investing in the strategic value of non-LGBTQ parents of LGBTQ people, the film’s visibility in the media helped LISTAG expand its networks of parents, nationally and globally. The ethical accountability, the documentary/ethnographic gaze, and the dynamic of identity politics in My Child do not easily compare to Trans X Istanbul and Proudly Trans in Turkey, simply because Candan’s film prioritises a portrayal of a group of parents rather than a particular LGBTQ community in Turkey. Documenting the organization of a group of “catalyst-actors” rather than the actual actors of LGBTQ activism in a particular national context, My Child (as an instrumental discursive filmic text/object) (i) bypasses the issues and risks of a unitary LGBTQ representation and its ethical accountability in a local–global framework, (ii) becomes a catalyst media form itself, and thus (iii) facilitates a potential to grow and confuse its audiences within its intersectional framework. Although it has been screened in not only particular local events in various regions of Turkey (including Ankara, Artvin, Bursa, Diyarbakır, Kayseri, Samsun, Tunceli, and Van) but also various international film festivals as well as academic events, My Child as a project has prioritized its potential community-making impact in a regional context. Rather than adapting a global discourse of LGBTQ politics into a particular regional–national context, the film’s point of departure is the local. Thus, it expands from within the local, as it addresses the ways in which the regional organization of solidarity networks could result in creative intersectional discourses of queer dissidence—by politically appropriating and subverting ideologies of nation, tradition, religion, and family. Conclusion Through the analysis of three documentary projects, this study explores the ways in which the complex regional/local formations of sexual dissidence emerge, if not being instrumentalized, as objects of various ethnographic gazes and inquiries. Questioning the ways in which these documentaries tackle issues of access, political impact, spectatorial address, and the global and local complexities of sexual politics, this discussion demonstrated possible ways in which various forms/styles of documentary could contest, negotiate, and re-invent the ethnographic constructions of community and identity. Capitalising upon the geopolitics, ethics, and aesthetics of documentary mediation in regional and transnational contexts of academic/artistic production, this study explores the critical yet shifting meanings of “pride” and “empowerment” in LGBTQ documentary practice. Exposing the spectator to intersectional LGBTQ politics and its actors, the three case studies in this project provide a platform from which one could explore the limits and potentials of treating documentary subjects as active interlocutors of community and as performers of ethnographic knowledge. Binder’s focus on the intersectional operations of queerness, class, and neoliberal politics of urban regeneration in Trans X Istanbul, Le Roux’s ethnographic orienting of trans activism through “strategic diversity” in Proudly Trans in Turkey, and the inter-regional mobility in Candan’s making of My Child as a filmic object of activism demonstrate various possibilities and political paradoxes of representing LGBTQ activism in both regional and transnational registers of documentation and address. Nick Mai suggests that the global politics of sexual humanitarianism “recreate[s] the notion of a unified, West-centric and hierarchical humanity around essentialized and moralised understandings of secularism, gender and sexuality” (2014, 176). Sexual humanitarianism, according to Mai, “acts as a form of symbolic governance … by separating the extreme victimhood of targeted others from a moralized, globalised and unified humanity,” which “prevents [the privileged] citizens of the global North … from reflecting on their own increasing exploitability, commodification and alienation in neoliberal times” (2014, 176–7). In this sense, the transnational LGBTQ documentaries, within their various textual, discursive, and political operations, bear contradictory ideological affinities. While these practices accommodate the potential to intervene in the global symbolic governance of sexual humanitarianism, they also run the risk of reproducing its discourse of victimhood. Schoonover and Galt open a similar critical debate that addresses queer world cinema’s potential to “elaborate new accounts of the world, offering alternatives to embedded capitalist, national, hetero- and homonormative maps; revising the flows and the politics of world cinema; and forging dissident scales of affiliation, affection, affect, and form” (2016, 5). Resonating with this take on “queer worlding,” but departing from its comparative ethic of sampling-from-the-world, this article strategically fixes the geographic reference in its sampling/exemplification and then explores the geopolitical operations of its regional/transregional documentary references in terms of affiliation, address, representation, and ethnographic framing. Acknowledgements: This work is dedicated to the memory of Zeliş Deniz, Boysan Yakar, and Mert Serçe, who lost their lives in a car accident in 2015. Boysan and Zeliş have been inspiring and courageous figures of LGBTQ activism in Turkey, whose generous and fiercely inclusive queer work gave hope and strength to many people in the queer community. I also would like to thank Maria Binder, Gabrielle Le Roux, Can Candan, Metehan Özkan, and Sema Yakar for the generous support they have offered me for this study. References AI (Amnesty International) Turkey/Uluslararası Af Örgütü Türkiye. 2012. Proudly Trans in Turkey—Trans Onurlu ve Türkiyeli. Youtube. https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PL2512E7325A011C0D Bandi, S. 2016. “Sober Encounters: The Neoliberal Logics of Human Rights Documentary and Indian Feminist Documentary Filmmakers.” Feminist Media Studies 16 (2): 223–238. https://doi.org/10.1080/14680777.2015.1105839 Binder, M. dir. 2014. Trans X Istanbul. Istanbul and Berlin: Cornix Film. http://www.transxistanbul.com/ Birdal, M. S. 2013. “Queering Conservative Democracy.” Turkish Politics Quarterly 11 (4): 119–129. Çakırlar, C. 2013. “Aesthetics of Self-Scaling: Parallaxed Transregionalism and Kutluğ Ataman’s Art-Practice.” Critical Arts 27 (6): 684–706. https://doi.org/10.1080/02560046.2013.867591 Çakırlar, C. and S. Delice, eds. 2012. Cinsellik Muamması: Türkiye’de Queer Kültür ve Muhalefet [The Sexuality Conundrum: Queer Culture and Dissidence in Turkey]. Istanbul: Metis. Candan, C. dir. 2013. My Child. Istanbul: Sürela Film. http://www.mychilddocumentary.com/ Foster, H. 1996. The Return of the Real: The Avant-Garde at the End of the Century. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Gambetti, Z. 2014. “Occupy Gezi as Politics of Body.” In T h e M a k in g o f a P r o te s t M o v e m e n t in T u r k e y : # O c c u p y g e z i, edited by Umut Özkırımlı, 89–102. Oxford: Palgrave-Pivot. Haritaworn, J. 2015. Queer Lovers and Hateful Others: Regenerating Violent Times and Places. London: Pluto Press. Hart, C., and R. Dillwood. 2015. “Call Me Kuchu: Post-colonial Dynamics in Transnational LGBT filmmaking. Feminist Media Studies 15 (6): 1009–25. https://doi.org/10.1080/14680777.2015.1008535 Kara, Selmin, and Reestorff, Camilla Møhring. 2015 “Introduction: Unruly Documentary Artivism.” Studies in Documentary Film 9 (1): 1–9. https://doi.org/10.1080/17503280.2014.1002665 Koçer, S. 2015. “Social Business in Online Financing: Crowdfunding Narratives of Independent Documentary Producers in Turkey.” New Media & Society 17 (2): 231–48. https://doi.org/10.1177/1461444814558913 Kuyucu, T., and Ö. Ünsal. 2010. “Urban Transformation as State-Led Property Transfer: An Analysis of Two Cases of Urban Renewal in Istanbul.” Urban Studies 47 (7): 1479–99. https://doi.org/10.1177/0042098009353629 Le Roux, G. 2012. Trans, Onurlu ve Türkiyeli: Sosyal Adalet için Sanatsal Bir Müdahale [Proudly Trans in Turkey: An Artistic Intervention for Social Justice]. Istanbul: Amnesty International Turkey (also available as an open-access online source on http://transonurluveturkiyeli.tumblr.com/). Le Roux, G., and B. Şeker. 2013. “Trans, Onurlu ve Türkiyeli: Gabrielle Le Roux ile Söyleşi.” In Başkaldıran Bedenler: Türkiye’de Transgender, Aktivism ve Altkültürel Pratikler [Revolting Bodies: Transgender Subjecitivity, Activism and Subcultural Practices in Turkey], edited by B. Şeker, 251–68. Istanbul: Metis. Mai, N. 2014. “Between Embodied Cosmopolitism and Sexual Humanitarianism: The Fractal Mobilities and Subjectivities of Migrants Working in the Sex Industry.” In Borders, Mobilities and Migrations, Perspectives from the Mediterranean in the 21st Century, edited by V. Baby-Collins, and L. Anteby-Yemini, 175–92. Brussels: Peter Lang. Marcus, G. E. 2010. “Affinities: Fieldwork in Anthropology Today and the Ethnographic in Artwork.” In Between Art and Anthropology: Contemporary Ethnographic Practice, edited by A. Schneider, and C. Wright, 83–94. Oxford and New York: Berg. Massad, J. 2002. “Re-Orienting Desire: The Gay International and the Arab World.” Public Culture 14 (2): 361–85. https://doi.org/10.1215/08992363- 14-2-361 Nichols, Bill. 1992. Representing Reality: Issues and Concepts in Documentary. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Ortega, Abeyami. 2014. “Looking into the Eye of the Process: Intercultural Art activism, Trans*lations and Intersex/tions in the Global South.” Agenda: Empowering Women for Gender Equity 28 (4): 86–93. Rangan, P. 2014. “For a Critique of the Documentary Logic of Sobriety.” World Picture 9: 1-7. Rony, F. T. 1996. The Third Eye: Race, Cinema and Ethnographic Spectacle. Durham: Duke University Press. Sandoval, C., and G. Latorre. 2008. “Chicana/o Artivism: Judy Baca’s Digital Work with Youth of Color.” In Learning Race and Ethnicity: Youth and Digital Media, edited by A. Everett, 81–108. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Schoonover, K., and R. Galt. 2016. Queer Cinema in the World. Durham: Duke University Press. Visweswaran, K. 1994. Fictions of Feminist Ethnography. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Waugh, T. 2011. The Right to Play Oneself: Looking Back on Documentary Film. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Whiteman, D. 2004. “Out of the Theaters and Into the Streets: A Coalition Model of the Political Impact of Documentary Film and Video.” Political Communication 21 (1): 51–69. https://doi.org/10.1080/10584600490273263-1585 
work_gysbaefm55hizoftmuqrwb6uvy	----	04 Recensiones.indd 555Revista de Derecho Universidad Católica del Norte - Año 21 Nº 1 (2014) Revista de Derecho Universidad Católica del Norte Sección: Recensiones Año 21 - Nº 1, 2014 pp. 555-557 STORINI, CLAUDIA y ALENZA GARCÍA, JOSÉ FRANCISCO (2012) Ma- teriales sobre neoconstitucionalismo y nuevo constitucionalismo lati- noamericano. Pamplona. Th omson Reuters - Aranzadi, Universidad Pública de Navarra, 496 páginas. Desde hace algunos años a la fecha, se ha venido construyendo la concepción de “Nuevo Constitucionalismo Latinoamericano” para refe- rirse al movimiento constituyente y constitucional originado a partir de las Cartas Fundamentales de Venezuela (1999), Bolivia (2006) y Ecuador (2009). Ello, aun cuando, algunos autores agregan las constituciones de Colombia (1991)1 y Perú (1993)2. Dicho movimiento tiene algunos caracteres constituyentes relevantes, vale decir, aquellos vinculados con el origen o gestación de las respectivas cartas, marcados por procesos deliberativos amplios, con extensa participa- ción de los pueblos indígenas, de comunidades campesinas y, en general, de diversos sectores del país. A su vez, cuenta con rasgos constitucionales, esto es, relacionados con su contenido, como una concepción de Estado de De- recho material o sustancial basado en criterios de justicia y buen vivir, una ampliación del catálogo de derechos, plena efectividad de los derechos socia- les, incorporación de mecanismos de democracia directa y deliberativa, y re- conocimiento explícito de derechos de las minorías, particularmente étnicas. En este contexto, es escaso el estudio exhaustivo en torno a este fenó- meno, salvo el trabajo aislado de algunos autores tales como el del profe- sor ecuatoriano Ramiro Ávila o el español Roberto Viciano. Por lo mismo, el libro “Materiales sobre neoconstitucionalismo y nuevo constitucionalismo latinoamericano”, coordinado por los profeso- res Claudia Storini y José Francisco Alenza resulta ser un aporte impres- cindible para el estudio del Nuevo Constitucionalismo Latinoamericano. El texto contiene dieciséis trabajos de autores de nacionalidad espa- ñola, ecuatoriana, brasileña, colombiana, peruana e italiana, los cuales se organizan en cuatro partes o capítulos. La primera parte denominada “Elementos esenciales del nuevo constitucionalismo en América Latina”, contiene cinco artículos. En el primero de ellos, Alberto Pérez Calvo en “Características del nuevo Cons- titucionalismo Latinoamericano”, nos ofrece una visión panorámica sobre este fenómeno constitucional, enfatizando sus aspectos formales (textos 1 Noguera, Albert (2011): “La Constitución colombiana de 1991 como punto de inicio del nuevo constitucionalismo en América Latina”, Revista de Estudios Socio-Jurídicos, Vol 13, Nº 1, pp. 15-49. 2 Carnero, Ena y Gálvez, José (2012): La Concesión de los recursos naturales y los contra- tos-ley en la Constiución peruana de 1993, en Materiales sobre neoconstitucionalismo y nuevo constitucionalismo latinoamericano, Dir: Storini, Claudia y Alenza García, José Francisco, Th omson Reuters-Aranzadi, pp. 479-496. Hugo Tórtora Aravena 556 Revista de Derecho Universidad Católica del Norte - Año 21 Nº 1 (2014) demasiado largos), la concepción del Estado de derecho, democrático y social que se incorpora en estas constituciones, la base social y plurilin- güismo, y la organización territorial de los Estados. Luego, el ecuatoria- no Enrique Ayala Mora se concentra en la Constitución ecuatoriana al presentar su trabajo “Rasgos de la reciente experiencia constitucional del Ecuador”, con un completo análisis histórico del establecimiento de la Carta Constitucional de 2009. A continuación, el profesor Gonzalo Maestro Buelga describe el modelo económico ecuatoriano y boliviano en el marco del Estado Social y de sus regulaciones constitucionales, en “El nuevo constitucionalismo económico latinoamericano”. Después, una de las coordinadoras del libro en análisis, la italiana Claudia Storini describe en “Derechos y garantías en el nuevo Constitucionalismo Latinoamericano”, las garantías normativas y judiciales de los derechos fundamentales, en espe- cial dentro de la Constitución ecuatoriana. Finalmente, Francisco Palacios Romeo inserta el trabajo más extenso del libro, denominado “La reivindi- cación de la polis: crisis de la representación y nuevas estructuras constitucio- nales de deliberación y participación en Latinoamérica”, con atención a las Constituciones ecuatoriana y venezolana, analizando la crisis del modelo representativo, los nuevos modelos constitucionales incorporados en estas cartas, y la participación política en ambos países. La segunda parte lleva por nombre “Constitucionalismo, igualdad y nuevos derechos”, y está compuesto por cinco artículos, los cuales abor- dan temáticas muy específi cas, posiblemente desconectadas con el eje central del libro, por cuanto no se centran en lo que técnicamente se le ha llamado Nuevo Constitucionalismo Latinoamericano. Los dos primeros escritos pertenecen a autores brasileños. En el primero, Adriano Sant’ana Pedra escribe sobre los cambios jurisprudenciales en la interpretación de ciertos términos y preceptos constitucionales, vinculados con el hogar, las penas, y las amnistías, en su trabajo “Mutación constitucional y progre- sividad de los derechos fundamentales”. En el segundo, Julio Pinheiro Faro aborda conceptualmente la temática del deber de contribución al gasto en materia de derechos sociales, en su trabajo titulado “Una perspectiva desde los deberes fundamentales respecto del costo fi nanciero y social de los derechos fundamentales”. El tercer artículo pertenece al profesor español Fernando Reviriego Picón quien se hace cargo de la protección que requieren los privados de libertad en “Constitucionalismo, igualdad y nuevos derechos, igualdades y desigualdades en el contexto de América Latina; a propósito de los derechos de los reclusos”. La cuarta investigación (“Derechos emergentes de la igualdad constitucional. Problemática jurídica actual”) pertenece a Catalina Ruiz-Rico Ruiz y se centra en la legislación española relativa a la igualdad, en especial en lo concerniente a materias de género y multicul- turalidad. Por último, David Martín Herrera analiza un problema muy particular en su artículo “Defi ciente confi guración normativa de los delitos de odio ‘hate crimes’ en América Latina y Europa”. Storini, Claudia y Alenza García, José Francisco (2012) Materiales sobre neoconstitucionalismo… 557Revista de Derecho Universidad Católica del Norte - Año 21 Nº 1 (2014) La tercera parte “Constitucionalismo y descentralización” está com- puesta por dos estudios. Ambos de dos profesores españoles: Alberto del Real Alcalá y Jorge Arias Calderón. En el primero, Del Real, revisa la idea de “plurinacionalidad” de la Constitución boliviana de 2009 en “Neocons- titucionalismo con descentralización como mecanismo de generalización de los derechos. El caso de Bolivia”. En el segundo, en tanto, Arias Calderón revi- sa el caso colombiano como paradigma de descentralización, no obstante su carácter unitario, en su artículo “La autonomía y la descentralización como principios constitucionales en un Estado unitario: caso colombiano”. La cuarta y última parte es denominada “Constitucionalismo, medio ambiente y economía sustentable”. El primero de los trabajos se concentra en el derecho español y es de autoría de José Francisco Alenza que analiza conceptual, normativa y jurisprudencialmente el principio de desarrollo sos- tenible en el artículo “La sostenibilidad como principio jurídico”. El segundo trabajo se denomina “La dimensión ambiental en la Constitución de Colom- bia”, escrito por la profesora de dicho país Diana María Vásquez, donde se estudia tanto el establecimiento, como el contenido y la aplicación del dere- cho al ambiente sano en la Carta colombiana de 1991. El tercer artículo de la también colombiana Raquel Ceballos Molano se denomina “La protección ambiental en la constitución colombiana frente a la suscripción de tratados de libre comercio” y versa sobre el tratamiento que se le otorga a las cuestiones medioambientales en los referidos tratados suscritos por Colombia. Para fi na- lizar, la profesora peruana Ena Carnero y el estudiante José A.Gálvez analizan la situación específi ca de aquel Estado en “La concesión de los recursos naturales y los contratos-ley en la Constitución peruana de 1993”. En general, el libro resulta ser un texto importante para quienquiera aproximarse a la temática del Nuevo Constitucionalismo Latinoamerica- no, pero debe advertirse que su heterogeneidad de contenidos y el análisis de realidades a veces disímiles entre sí, impide comprender a cabalidad las circunstancias que rodean lo que estrictamente ha sido denominado Nue- vo Constitucionalismo Latinoamericano. Sin embargo, con la salvedad antes expuesta, es un texto de extraor- dinaria utilidad, para hacer un análisis histórico del establecimiento de las nuevas constituciones, en especial, de Bolivia y Ecuador, así como las orientaciones principales contenidas en ellas, tanto en lo relativo a dere- chos fundamentales, como en torno a las nuevas concepciones referidas al modelo de Estado. HUGO TÓRTORA ARAVENA* * Abogado, Licenciado en Ciencias Jurídicas Universidad de Valparaíso, Magíster en Derecho Constitucional Universidad de Talca, doctorando en Derecho por la Universidad de Valparaíso. Profesor Jornada Completa de la Universidad Andrés Bello. Correo electrónico htortora@unab.cl. 
work_gz2gll7cbnfbhfztl5w3ripst4	----	[PDF] HIV and trans and non-binary people in the UK | Semantic Scholar Skip to search formSkip to main content> Semantic Scholar's Logo Search Sign InCreate Free Account You are currently offline. Some features of the site may not work correctly. DOI:10.1136/sextrans-2018-053570 Corpus ID: 49194067HIV and trans and non-binary people in the UK @article{Jaspal2018HIVAT, title={HIV and trans and non-binary people in the UK}, author={R. Jaspal and K. Nambiar and V. Delpech and S. Tariq}, journal={Sexually Transmitted Infections}, year={2018}, volume={94}, pages={318 - 319} } R. Jaspal, K. Nambiar, +1 author S. Tariq Published 2018 Medicine Sexually Transmitted Infections > What message are we sending to young people who are trans or gender nonconforming when we don’t even count them? We suggest their identities don’t even matter. >  —Laverne Cox, 2015 Social Good Summit Trans and non-binary people are key populations whose HIV prevention and treatment needs have been neglected. A 2013 meta-analysis of data from 39 studies conducted in 15 countries reported a global HIV prevalence among trans women of nearly 20%, with trans women estimated to be 49 times more… Expand View on Publisher irep.ntu.ac.uk Save to Library Create Alert Cite Launch Research Feed Share This Paper 10 Citations View All Topics from this paper Sexually Transmitted Diseases Paper Mentions Blog Post Exploring the low uptake of sexual health services among trans people Journal of Family Planning and Reproductive Health Care blog 13 November 2019 Blog Post HIV and trans and non-binary people in the UK information for practice 14 June 2018 10 Citations Citation Type Citation Type All Types Cites Results Cites Methods Cites Background Has PDF Publication Type Author More Filters More Filters Filters Sort by Relevance Sort by Most Influenced Papers Sort by Citation Count Sort by Recency Human Immunodeficiency Virus and Trans Women: A Literature Review R. Jaspal, Lauren Kennedy, S. Tariq Psychology, Medicine Transgender health 2018 10 PDF View 4 excerpts Save Alert Research Feed Impact and acceptability of HIV self-testing for trans men and trans women: A mixed-methods subgroup analysis of the SELPHI randomised controlled trial and process evaluation in England and Wales T. Witzel, T. Wright, +16 authors A. Rodger Medicine EClinicalMedicine 2021 Save Alert Research Feed Psychosocial and sexual factors associated with recent sexual health clinic attendance and HIV testing among trans people in the UK M. Hibbert, A. Wolton, +4 authors V. Hope Psychology, Medicine BMJ Sexual & Reproductive Health 2019 3 PDF Save Alert Research Feed Transgender people living with HIV: characteristics and comparison to homosexual and heterosexual cisgender patients in two Italian teaching hospitals C. Papalini, F. Lagi, E. Schiaroli, G. Sterrantino, D. Francisci Medicine International journal of STD & AIDS 2020 Save Alert Research Feed Sexual and Mental Health Inequalities across Gender Identity and Sex-Assigned-at-Birth among Men-Who-Have-Sex-with-Men in Europe: Findings from EMIS-2017 F. Hickson, M. Appenroth, U. Koppe, A. Schmidt, D. Reid, P. Weatherburn Medicine International journal of environmental research and public health 2020 1 PDF Save Alert Research Feed Sexually transmitted infection diagnoses, sexualised drug use and associations with pre-exposure prophylaxis use among men who have sex with men in the UK M. Hibbert, C. Brett, L. Porcellato, V. Hope Medicine International journal of STD & AIDS 2020 PDF Save Alert Research Feed HIV prevalence and HIV clinical outcomes of transgender and gender‐diverse people in England P. Kirwan, M. Hibbert, +7 authors V. Delpech Medicine HIV medicine 2020 Save Alert Research Feed Non-binary and genderqueer: An overview of the field S. Monro Sociology, Medicine The international journal of transgenderism 2019 11 Save Alert Research Feed Researching HIV and Trans Women R. Jaspal Sociology 2020 Save Alert Research Feed Understanding Trans Women and HIV R. Jaspal Psychology 2020 Save Alert Research Feed References SHOWING 1-10 OF 18 REFERENCES SORT BYRelevance Most Influenced Papers Recency Experiences of stigma and discrimination in social and healthcare settings among trans people living with HIV in the UK M. Hibbert, A. Wolton, +16 authors V. Delpech Medicine AIDS care 2018 10 PDF Save Alert Research Feed Worldwide burden of HIV in transgender women: a systematic review and meta-analysis. S. Baral, T. Poteat, S. Strömdahl, A. Wirtz, T. Guadamuz, C. Beyrer Medicine The Lancet. Infectious diseases 2013 814 PDF Save Alert Research Feed Estimating HIV Prevalence and Risk Behaviors of Transgender Persons in the United States: A Systematic Review J. Herbst, Elizabeth D. Jacobs, +4 authors for the Hivaids Prevention Research Synthesis Team Medicine AIDS and Behavior 2007 728 PDF Save Alert Research Feed Sex Work and HIV Status Among Transgender Women: Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis D. Operario, Toho Soma, K. Underhill Medicine Journal of acquired immune deficiency syndromes 2008 241 PDF Save Alert Research Feed HIV infection risk factors among male-to-female transgender persons: a review of the literature. J. De Santis Medicine The Journal of the Association of Nurses in AIDS Care : JANAC 2009 73 Save Alert Research Feed HIV infection risk factors among male-to-female transgender persons: a review of the literature. J. Santis Medicine 2009 100 Save Alert Research Feed Family Rejection as a Predictor of Suicide Attempts and Substance Misuse Among Transgender and Gender Nonconforming Adults. A. Klein, S. Golub Medicine LGBT health 2016 127 Save Alert Research Feed HIV pre-exposure prophylaxis in transgender women: A subgroup analysis of the iPrEx trial Madeline B. Deutsch, D. Glidden, +6 authors R. Grant Medicine The lancet. HIV 2015 148 Save Alert Research Feed Stigma, mental health, and resilience in an online sample of the US transgender population. W. Bockting, M. Miner, Rebecca E Swinburne Romine, A. Hamilton, E. Coleman Medicine American journal of public health 2013 769 Save Alert Research Feed Sexual health of transgender sex workers attending an inner-city genitourinary medicine clinic S. C. Hill, J. Daniel, A. Benzie, J. Ayres, G. King, A. Smith Medicine International journal of STD & AIDS 2011 13 Save Alert Research Feed ... 1 2 ... 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work_gz3kveqm6faktixjtpoqtm4xxe	----	4 The study of neighbourhoods is well and truly on the research agenda of social and behavioural scientists, including anthropologists, criminologists, de- mographers, economists, political scientists, psychologists, and sociologists. This research activity has emphasized not only that neighbourhoods matter, but that their study raises a number of speci!c theoretical and methodological issues, which require a sophisticated and eclectic approach if we are to approach a full understanding of myriad ‘neighbourhood effects’. In this Special Issue of the International Journal of Con"ict and Violence we focus speci!- cally on neighbourhood effects on violence, studied in a rich array of contexts. The !rst two articles make use of extensive survey data available from the United States of America. Ami M. Lynch’s article uses nationwide data on U. S. cities and their residential segregation levels (Lynch 2008). There is an extensive literature on the consequences of racial segregation, but her paper focuses on whether hate crime and neighbourhood con"ict are important factors in perpetuating residential segregation. Using sophisticated statistical analyses, she concludes that they indeed are. As hate crime increases, white/black segregation increases; thus race-based violence in"uences where racial minorities can and cannot live, and is used by some majority group members as a way to defend their neighbourhoods from ‘racial in!ltration’. David J. Harding (2008) analyses survey data from a national study of adolescent health in the U. S. to examine the relationship between neighbourhood violence and adolescent friendships. Using complex multi-level models, he reports no evidence that violence and the fear of victimization systematically impact on the closeness of adolescent friendships for boys or girls. But, more subtly, and especially for boys, these factors are associated with friendships outside of school, probably with older individuals, which can help them to stay safe. The next two articles each focus, albeit on very different research questions and in very different ways, on aspects of violence in one speci!c city. Katharina Schmid and colleagues investigate the impact on ethno-religious prejudice of living in segregated and mixed neighborhoods in Belfast, Northern Ireland (Schmid et al. 2008). Using adult data from a cross-sectional survey, they report that living in mixed neighborhoods was associated with reduced ingroup bias and fewer offensive action tendencies. These effects were partially mediated by positive intergroup contact. However, their analysis also shows that respondents living in mixed neighborhoods also reported higher exposure to political violence and higher perceived threat to physical safety. These !ndings demonstrate the importance of examining both social experience and threat perceptions when testing the relationship between social environment and prejudice. Celina Del Felice’s article describes and analyses youth criminality in the city of Rosario, Argentina, and includes an analysis of direct, structural, and cul- tural forms of violence (Del Felice 2008). She draws on a range of qualitative approaches (including observations, semi-structured interviews, and analysis of policy documents) to consider how the structural adjustment policies imposed in many Latin American economies during the 1990s affected levels of public violence. She highlights the link between social, political and economic exclusion and crime involving urban youth (with some violent offenders as young as 8 years). I J C V : Vol. 2 ( 1) 2008, pp. 4 – 5 Guest Editorial Guest Editorial Miles Hewstone, University of Oxford, UK Douglas S. Massey, Princeton University, USA 5I J C V : Vol. 2 ( 1) 2008, pp. 4 – 5Guest Editorial The last two papers in this Special Issue address somewhat more subtle, perhaps even unexpected, effects of neighbourhood violence. Netsayi M. Mudege and colleagues – using data from two slum areas of Nairobi, Kenya – assess how perceptions of personal security can affect whether children are registered for and attend school (Mudege et al. 2008). Feelings of insecurity can arise in relation to the journey that must be undertaken to get to school (where girls sometimes fear rape), what goes on at school itself (including relations with both teachers and other students), and in their homes. Qualitative data gleaned from individual interviews and focus groups reveal the negative impact of insecure neighbourhoods on whether schooling is taken up, and whether students complete schooling, or drop out. Finally, Emily Moiduddin and her coauthor investigate the effect of neighbourhood violence on the birth weight of newborns (Moiduddin / Massey 2008). Using data from a large-scale survey of a birth cohort of parents and children in 20 U. S. cities, they report that the effect of structural neighbourhood conditions on birth outcomes is not, however, direct. Rather, it occurs via their immediate effect on mothers’ perceptions of neighbourhood danger. Moth- ers who live in an unsafe neighbourhood are more likely at risk of a raised allostatic load, and are more likely to smoke cigarettes and use illegal drugs as coping devices; these behaviours themselves were strongly associated with reduced birth weight. As a whole, these six articles address a range of social and psychological consequences of neighbourhood violence. Some analyse data from large, multi- site surveys, others focus in on one speci!c city. They start from a variety of theoretical approaches, and employ a wide range of methodologies, from survey methods using sophisticated multivariate analyses, to more qualitative approaches, which emphasize different experiences and interpretations of violence. They also embrace cities in both the developing and developed world. One common theme is that the magnitude of neighbourhood effects may not always be large, and effects are sometimes indirect and subtle, rather than direct and obvious. Nonetheless, there clearly are relationships between neighbourhood measures and a variety of types of violence, and these effects have been found in a diverse collection of settings, ranging over several countries and continents. Finally, this collection of articles contains many implications for policy, some explicitly drawn out by authors, some more implicit. June 2008 Miles Hewstone Douglas S. Massey miles.hewstone@psy.ox.ac.uk dmassey@princeton.edu References Lynch, Ami. !""#. Hating the Neighbors: $e Role of Hate Crime in the Per- petuation of Black Residiential Segregation. International Journal of Con- !ict and Violence ! (%): & – !' Harding, David. !""#. Neighborhood Violence and Adolescent Friendship. International Journal of Con!ict and Violence " (%): !# – (( Schmid, Katharina, Nicole Tausch, Miles Hewstone, Joanne Hughes, and Ed Cairns. !""#. $e e)ects of living in segregated vs. mixed areas in Northern Ireland: A simultaneous analysis of contact and threat e)ects in the context of micro-level neighbourhoods. International Journal of Con!ict and Violence ! (%): (& – '% Del Felice, Celina. !""#. Youth Criminality and Urban Social Con*ict in the City of Rosario, Argentina. International Journal of Con!ict and Violence ! (%): '! – +' Mudege, Netsayi N., Zulu Eliya, and Izugbara Chimaraoke. !""#. How Insecurity impacts on school attendance and school drop out among urban slum children in Nairobi. International Journal of Con!ict and Violence ! (%): +# – %%! Moiduddin, Emily, and Douglas S. Massey. !""#. How Neighborhood Disad- vantage Reduces Birth Weight: $e Mediating E)ects of Perceived Danger and Negative Coping Behaviors. International Journal of Con!ict and Violence ! (%): %%, – %!+ ijcv.org.Seite 4: 
work_h2cwfcvpujhj3fux6iqi74qfii	----	BIROn - Birkbeck Institutional Research Online Monk, Daniel (2011) Challenging homophobic bullying in schools: the politics of progress. International Journal of Law in Context 7 (2), pp. 181-207. ISSN 1744-5523. Downloaded from: http://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/id/eprint/3806/ Usage Guidelines: Please refer to usage guidelines at https://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/policies.html or alternatively contact lib-eprints@bbk.ac.uk. http://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/id/eprint/3806/ https://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/policies.html mailto:lib-eprints@bbk.ac.uk BIROn - Birkbeck Institutional Research Online Enabling open access to Birkbeck’s published research output Challenging homophobic bullying in schools: the politics of progress Journal Article http://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/3806 Version: Published (Refereed) Citation: © 2009 Cambridge University Press Publisher version ______________________________________________________________ All articles available through Birkbeck ePrints are protected by intellectual property law, including copyright law. Any use made of the contents should comply with the relevant law. ______________________________________________________________ Deposit Guide Contact: lib-eprints@bbk.ac.uk Birkbeck ePrints Birkbeck ePrints Monk, D. (2009) Challenging homophobic bullying in schools: the politics of progress – International Journal of Law in Context 7(2), pp. 181-207 http://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/irstats.cgi http://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/3806 http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1744552311000061 http://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/deposit_guide.html mailto:lib-eprints@bbk.ac.uk Challenging homophobic bullying in schools: the politics of progress Daniel Monk School of Law, Birkbeck, University of London1 Abstract In recent years homophobic bullying has received increased attention from NGOs, academics and government sources and concern about the issue crosses traditional moral and political divisions. This article examines this ‘progressive’ development and identifies the ‘conditions of possibility’ that have enabled the issue to become a harm that can be spoken of. In doing so it questions whether the readiness to speak about the issue represents the opposite to prohibitions on speech (such as the notorious Section 28) or whether it is based on more subtle forms of governance. It argues that homophobic bullying is heard through three key discourses (‘child abuse’, ‘the child victim’ and ‘the tragic gay’) and that, while enabling an acknowledgement of certain harms, they simultaneously silence other needs and experiences. It then moves to explore the aspirational and ‘liberatory’ political investments that underlie these seemingly ‘common-sense’ descriptive discourses and concludes with a critique of the quasi-criminal responses that the dominant political agenda of homophobic bullying gives rise to. The article draws on, and endeavours to develop a conversation between, critical engagements with the contemporary politics of both childhood and sexuality. Introduction Homophobic bullying has become a legitimate object of social concern within civil society. In recent years it has been explicitly addressed not only by numerous non-governmental children’s rights and sexual health organisations2 but also by government policy and guidance documents3 and, albeit not explicitly, in statutory provisions.4 It is also an issue that crosses political and traditional moral divides as supportive expressions of concern have been made not just by the Liberal Democrats and the Labour Party5 but also by the Conservative Party (2008, p. 9) and 1 Earlier versions of this article were presented at a seminar convened by the Birkbeck Institute of Gender and Sexuality and the Thomas Coram Institute, Institute of Education (April 2008) and at the Socio-Legal Studies Conference (De Montfort University, 2009) and the European Sociological Association Conference (Lisbon, 2009). I am grateful to the participants for their insightful comments. Special thanks are also due to Professor Leslie Moran and Helen Reece for their encouragement and detailed and constructive comments on earlier drafts. 2 See, for example, Blake and Plant (2005), Save the Children (2008), CRAE (2009), Terence Higgins Trust (2009), Claridge (2008). 3 DfES (2002), DfES (2003a; 2003b), DCSF/Stonewall (2007), DCSF (2009). See also: <www.teachernet.gov.uk/ wholeschool/behaviour/tacklingbullying/homophobicbullying/> (last visited 18 November 2010). 4 The Schools Standards and Frameworks Act 1998, Section 61 (now section 98 of the Education and Inspections Act 2006) refers to ‘encouraging good behaviour and respect for others on the part of pupils and, in particular, preventing all forms of bullying among pupils’ as factors to be taken into account by head teachers and governing bodies in designing and implementing discipline policies. As homophobic bullying is referred to explicitly in guidance documents relating to bullying, it can consequently be argued that the statutory references can also be interpreted to include this form of bullying. 5 The 2010 general election manifestos of both the Liberal Democrats (2010, pp. 35, 73) and the Labour Party (2010, Chapter 3:5) made explicit references to tackling homophobic bullying. International Journal of Law in Context, 7,2 pp. 181–207 (2011) Cambridge University Press doi:10.1017/S1744552311000061 religious bodies6 (Catholic Education Service, 2007; Church of England, 2010) – organisations with little (or a relatively short) history of sympathy to lesbian and gay issues. It was also deemed significant enough to warrant an explicit reference in the current government’s Coalition Agreement.7 The mainstreaming of the issue, the fact that the concern is expressed as an unproblematic ‘common-sense’ good, represents a success for lesbian and gay rights organisations – in particular Stonewall – for whom the issue has been a key plank in campaigns relating to young people (Hunt and Jensen/Stonewall, 2007). Moreover, the reliance by campaigners and policy-makers on the extensive academic literature8 about the issue can be understood as a successful example of research impact.9 For it could be argued that ‘evidence-based’ research has revealed a problem; that this knowledge has been widely and effectively disseminated; and that this has led to the introduction of policies that will result in an improvement in the wellbeing of children’s lives.10 The aim of this article is not to test this hypothesis. It does not attempt to demonstrate, either way, the potential impact on real children. Rather, the aim here is to examine the discursive means by which the issue has become perceived as a legitimate issue of concern; in other words, to identify the ‘conditions of possibility’11 that have enabled homophobic bullying to become a harm that can be spoken of. A key starting point for this line of enquiry is to think of ‘homophobic bullying’ not simply as a neutral descriptive label for factual incidents but as a more complex phenomenon. In other words, that the act of naming a wrong or a harm and the identification of perpetrators and victims is a productive process that is contingent on a complex concatenation of cultural and political factors. This perspective serves to shift the focus away from the ‘homophobic bully’ and instead towards the expressions of concern about homophobic bullying. In doing so it seeks to question whether the coupling of ‘youth’ and ‘homosexuality’ by the mainstreaming of this concern represents a ‘liberated’ and fearless break from traditional homophobic narratives of seduction and abuse.12 And, in doing so, it questions whether the readiness to speak of homophobic bullying represents the opposite to prohibitions on speech (such as the notorious Section 28 of the Local Government Act 200813) or whether it itself contains or relies on more 6 Catholic Education Service statement re: Education & Skills Select Committee report on bullying (26 March 2007). Statement issued in response to the House of Commons Education and Skills Committee Third Report of Session 2006–07 on bullying: <www.cesew.org.uk/standardnews.asp?id = 52544> (last visited 18 November 2010). Church of England (2010) Frequently Asked Questions: ‘Do CoE schools encourage homophobia?’ </www.cofe.anglican.org/info/education/faqcofeschools/#homophobia> (last visited 18 November 2010). 7 The agreement states that: ‘we will help schools tackle bullying in schools, especially homophobic bullying’ (HM Government, 2010, p. 29). 8 See, for example, D’Augelli, Hershberger and Pilkington (2001), Ellis and High (2004), Hunter (2008), Molloy and McLaren (2004), Phoenix, Frosh and Pattman (2003), Rivers (2001a; 2001b), Rivers and Duncan (2002), Rivers and Noret (2008), Trotter (2006), Warwick, Goodrich, Aggleton and Chase (2006), Watkins, Mauthner, Hewitt, Epstein and Leonard (2007). 9 Indeed, the fact that there is much literature about homophobic bullying but almost no critical engagement with the agenda itself serves to reinforce the unquestioned nature of its premises. A notable exception is Ellis (2007). 10 This account, moreover, fits well within an academic context where demonstrable ‘impact’ has become a criteria for the evaluation of research. 11 The notion of ‘conditions of possibility’ refers here to Michel Foucault’s understanding of discursive frameworks of knowledge as those grounded in and made possible by a particular historical epoch (Foucault, 1980). 12 Weeks (1985, p. 224). 13 Section 28, which prohibited the ‘promotion’ of homosexuality by local authorities, was repealed on 21 June 2000 in Scotland, and on 18 November 2003 in the rest of the UK by the Local Government Act 2003 s 122. 182 daniel monk subtle and implicit heteronormative14 assumptions and premises. In asking these questions, this project draws on a shift in focus from scholars of the politics of sexuality who, like Stychin for example, suggest that it is ‘time to turn the glare of analysis away from the conservatives and towards the reformers’ (2003, p. 26).15 It is important to make clear from the outset that asking critical questions about homophobic bullying, placing it in a broader political and cultural context, and thinking about it primarily as a discourse as opposed to simply a harm, does not suggest that the real-life experiences of young people are being taken in any way less seriously. Nor is it to suggest that demands for intervention and both national and local action are necessarily misguided. On the contrary, enquiring into the speakability of homophobic bullying raises the question as to what happens and what is enabled when this discourse becomes the key plank for challenging homophobia in schools. Bravmann argues that a problematic, but dominant, trope in many gay and lesbian political narratives, in particular historical accounts, is that: ‘a politics of visibility is an adequate and self-explanatory form of resistance to the very processes that construct the “invisibility” these projects aim to counter.’ (1997, p. 128)16 In exploring the unquestioned progress of visibility (and speakability) this project is one that takes seriously the injunction from the feminist legal scholars Diduck and Kaganas that: ‘While giving a voice to any previously disempowered or marginalized constituency is important, and listening to children is long overdue, we must be alert to the discourses through which that voice is heard and interpreted.’ (2004, p. 981) Homophobic bullying is heard through a concatenation of numerous discourses and this article does not claim to be comprehensive. It starts by identifying three key discourses: ‘child abuse’, ‘the child victim’ and the ‘tragic gay’. It then moves to explore the aspirational political investments that underlie these seemingly descriptive discourses and concludes with an examination of the quasi- criminal responses that the dominant political agenda of homophobic bullying gives rise to. In doing so, the article draws on and endeavours to bring together critical understandings of the politics of both childhood and sexuality. ‘Child abuse’ Homophobic bullying, however defined, is not new. Consequently, it is possible to talk of the recent concern as representing a ‘discovery’ and in this respect there are informative parallels to be drawn 14 For a definition of this complex but frequently used concept see Berlant and Warner: ‘the institutions, structures of understanding, and practical orientations that make heterosexuality seem not only coherent — that is, organized as a sexuality — but also privileged. Its coherence is always provisional, and its privilege can take several (sometimes contradictory) forms: unmarked, as the basic idiom of the personal and the social; or marked as a natural state; or projected as an ideal or moral accomplishment. It consists less of norms that could be summarized as a body of doctrine than of a sense of rightness produced in contradictory manifestations . . . One of the most conspicuous differences is that it has no parallel, unlike heterosexuality, which organizes homosexuality as its opposite. Because homosexuality can never have the invisible, tacit, society founding rightness that heterosexuality has, it would not be possible to speak of “homonormativity” in the same sense’ (1998, p. 548). 15 See also Brown (1995). 16 See also Reilly (2007). challenging homophobic bullying in schools 183 with earlier ‘discoveries’ such as domestic violence and child abuse. Two distinct points will be made here. The first explores the contingency of the ‘discovery’ of harms and the second the contingency of the notion of harm itself. The notion of ‘discovery’ refers to the significance of the political context within which feminist, children’s rights and lesbian and gay activists and campaigners have enabled harms to be spoken of and understood as social ills that demand public action (Parton, 1985, Part One). In this way, it represents a shift in awareness of a violence and relations with that violence. The ‘discovery’ of domestic violence and child abuse both effectively challenged the idealised representation of the family as the ‘haven in the heartless world’. In a similar fashion, homophobic bullying challenges the idea that the ‘school years are the best years of your life’. The latter proverbial truism was arguably always more an adult reflection on adult life and an instruction to children, but in both cases these crude statements reflected ideological myths that legitimised silences in order to reinforce cultural norms. Whereas the reluctance to acknowledge the dangers in the home served to uphold an ideological investment in a patriarchal norm of the family, the reluctance to acknowledge homophobic bullying, and indeed bullying in general, can be seen to reflect the investment in schooling per se as a site of production of a particular norm of childhood17. Finch reminds us that ‘there are very good reasons for doubting whether any type of educational provision can be regarded as solely and unambiguously for the benefit of its recipients’ (1984, p. 85), and in the nineteenth century the reconstruction of children from workers to pupils was not always embraced by children or their parents (Hendrick, 1997, pp. 39–42, 45–47). But the silence and collective amnesia about this attests to the extent to which the school has become perceived, like the family, in universal ahistorical terms as an almost ‘natural’ a priori institution.18 That this perception has at times been complicit with the silencing of speaking of the harms within the school is clear from the influential child psychologist John Bowlby’s explanation of the causes of school phobia. In 1973, he stated with confident authority that: ‘there is widespread agreement that what a child fears is not what will happen at school, but leaving home . . . almost all the students of the problem conclude that the disagreeable features of school, for example a strict teacher or teasing or bullying from other children, are little more than rationalizations.’ (1978 [1973], p. 301, emphasis added) This statement seems strikingly at odds with the current speakability of homophobic bullying, and bullying generally, within schools. But whereas there has been a clear shift in relation to the school, the impact of parental homophobia on children, which is arguably at least as, if not more, significant, remains an issue that is not addressed by organisations like Stonewall and children’s rights organisations. And the fact that the ability for public concern about the effects of homophobia can be entertained in the school but not the home attests to the fact that the speakability of concern is contingent on its location.19 In other words, in seeking to explain why homophobia in the school space has become open to widespread political criticism, it is necessary to look beyond a concern about the wellbeing of children. 17 As Walkerdine comments, ‘it was generally agreed’ that it ‘brought about the idea of childhood as something separate’ (2009, p. 113). 18 This is particularly evident in the work of the child psychologists Donald Winnicott and John Bowlby, for whom the child’s initial journey to the ‘the school’ is invested with the a priori naturalness akin to a child’s journey to ‘the mother’ or ‘the father’; see Monk (2004). 19 There are clear parallels here with legal challenges to physical chastisement which similarly continue to distinguish between the home and the school; see Fortin (2009, pp. 329–34). 184 daniel monk Taking a long view here is informative. For whereas the dominant postwar child psychologists’ masking of child harms within schools cohered with political and social shifts unrelated to children’s needs (Finch, 1984, p. 85; Monk, 2004), so too does the new-found ability to do otherwise. While it is important to avoid simplistic causal explanations, it is possible to see the new concern, if not enabled, at least not unconnected to broader political and socioeconomic shifts in the perception of schooling. In particular, the increased questioning of the public interest in education and its reinscription as a private rather than a public good (Kymlicka, 1999; Chitty, 2009), the political construction of parents no longer as passive recipients but as consumers supported by the rhetoric of choice (Harris, 2007), increases in home education as a legitimate option and, more broadly, the cultural impact of the phenomenon of school shootings (Warnick, Johnson and Rocha, 2010), have all in different ways rendered the school potentially dangerous, open to question and at odds with the earlier constructions of it as an unquestionable and natural good. Significantly, they serve too to explain the dichotomy referred to above between the speakability of homophobia within the school and the home, for these broader shifts in many respects have served to reinscribe the home and parental child relations as safer places. Albeit that the changing perceptions of the parental role in education, while enhanced within political discourses, do not in any way represent a straightforward increase in parental autonomy or rights (Monk, 2009). Extent and definition are key issues in the literature about homophobic bullying and here too important parallels can be drawn with domestic violence and child abuse. For surveillance and the accumulation of knowledge of a subject are a crucial part of the process of ‘discovery’; they do not construct a problem but, rather, reflect already problematised issues. As Hunter argues in the context of the history of education: ‘the role of social statistics is not so much to represent reality as to problematize it, to call into question, to hold it up for inspection in the light of what it might be, to picture its reconstruction around certain norms of life and social well being – norms derived of course from the social, economic and political objectives of government.’ (1996, p. 154) In this vein, when Archard asks the question, ‘Can child abuse be defined?’, he acknowledges the extent to which attempts to do so are never in any way neutral exercises but inherently political and social. Archard acknowledges Gough’s concern that, ‘at worst an over intellectual questioning of the meaning of abuse implies that abuse does not really exist’ (1996, p. 13, quoted in Archard, 1999, p. 75) but he concludes that: ‘the increasing versatility of the concept of child abuse – its ability to pick out more and more types of wrong done to children – has only been purchased at the cost of its increasing vacuity, its lack of any distinctive content possessing clear evaluative connotations.’ (1999, p. 88) This concern is critical when reading the literature about homophobic bullying. The campaigns by Stonewall refer to homophobic bullying as being ‘endemic in schools’ and cite statistics that 65–98 per cent of pupils experience it at one time or another (Hunt and Jensen/Stonewall, 2007, p. 3).20 Yet these statistics are based on an extremely broad definition of homophobic bullying. One that 20 The language used here to describe the extent – ‘endemic’ – is also significant. Moran, in the context of homophobic hate crime, argues that ‘the exceptional is figured in the suggestion that this violence represents a crisis and an epidemic. Epidemic stands for novelty. This is not so much the novelty of the appearance of homophobic violence, but the novelty of its characterization as disorder and the novelty of an awareness of the scale of this violence’ (2004, p. 935). challenging homophobic bullying in schools 185 stretches from, at one end of the spectrum, extreme repeated systematic violence, to, at the other end, overhearing the word ‘gay’ being used in a pejorative way, being socially excluded and experiencing a sense of being different. Significantly, the empirical literature which is cited to support these statistics, while not downplaying the significance of homophobic bullying, also cites comparative studies with very different results and, as explored below, is more cautious about causal claims made as to the effect of homophobic bullying (Rivers, 2001a; Warwick et al., 2006). This selective statistical representation coheres with and appeals to the broader cultural shifts within which schooling itself is increasingly perceived as a dangerous space. More particularly, it attests to the extent to which the homophobic bullying agenda utilises and is spoken of through the dominant image of childhood as vulnerable and one premised on the status of the child as innocent victim. ‘The child victim’ Empirical research about homophobic bullying frequently identifies causal links between homophobic bullying and alcoholism, suicide, low school attendance and a variety of emotional disorders (Rivers, 2001a; Warwick et al., 2006). Mirroring in this way the literature on child abuse, it enables homophobic bullying to be included discursively within this ever-expanding category. This is strategically important, for under the label of child abuse, homophobic bullying is represented as an unquestioned wrong, a legitimate and, crucially, a depoliticised harm and one therefore able to garner widespread sympathy (Parton, 1985, Part Two). One of the reasons why this discursive categorising of homophobic bullying achieves this status is because it draws on familiar images of the child as innocent victim. And these images reassure as much as they appal. As Patricia Holland has argued: ‘Without an image of an unhappy child the concept of childhood would be incomplete. Real children suffer in many different ways and for many different reasons, but pictures of sorrowing children reinforce the defining characteristics of childhood – dependence and powerlessness. Pathetic images of children create a desired image in which childhood is no longer a threat and adults are back in control.’ (2004, p. 143, emphasis added) This perspective represents a provocative challenge to the work of certain aspects of children’s rights agendas and it is not unreasonable to question why, strategically, it matters. In other words, if the effects of homophobic bullying are suffering and unhappiness and emphasising this interpretation of the literature in campaigns brings the issue to a wider audience, why should this be an issue of concern? A key argument here is that it matters because enabling the speakability of homophobic bullying through the imagery of the child as victim renders silent other concerns. The most notable silence is about sex. One of the most striking aspects of the homophobic bullying agenda is the extent to which it speaks of lesbian and gay youth through a desexualised discourse. For example, the Stonewall website page that addresses school issues is dominated by homophobic bullying but has no mention of young people’s needs for information about safer sex and education about HIV.21 Similarly, the Conservative Party report More Ball Games (no pun intended) supports tackling homophobic bullying, but in the broader context of a nostalgic support for children to play more sports (Conservative Party, 2008). As Ellis argues, the approach adopted here is ‘a plea for tolerance that doesn’t speak about what is to be tolerated’ (2007, p. 23).22 21 See <www.stonewall.org.uk/at_school/> (last visited 18 November 2010). 22 See also Ingham (2005). 186 daniel monk While challenging homophobia in schools and providing information about HIV are arguably distinct, this does not explain the silence. Both bullying and access to information about HIV can be understood as basic human and children’s rights (Harris, 2005; Veerman, Talsa, Druzin and Weinstein, 1999; Packer, 2000). And the harm suffered by the absence of the latter is arguably as significant as the former, if not more so, as recent UK statistics about HIV infections indicate that gay teenagers are increasingly the most at-risk group.23 Consequently, the argument here is that the distinction between challenging bullying and providing information about HIV is not an obvious or neutral one, but rather one that is indicative of the extent to which the homophobic bullying agenda coheres with and is contingent on the ‘reassuring’ image of the brutalised child. For to speak of safer sex would require speaking of sexual agency, pleasure and choice, and in doing so would challenge the ideal of the child as ‘innocent’ and non-sexual (Stainton Rodgers and Stainton Rodgers, 1999; Waites, 2005). This silencing is not new, as Piper has observed, in tracing the origins of the dominant norm of childhood sexual innocence and its relationship with the development of welfare policies: ‘There is a sense in which the price paid by children over the last 150 years for the presumed benefits of child welfare legislation and provision has been their “de-sexing”.’ (2000, p. 40)24 ‘The tragic gay’ While the child as victim resonates with dominant constructions of childhood, in the context of homophobic bullying there is a double victimhood. For what is striking from the research, in particular from accounts of its effects, is the extent to which the image of the lesbian and gay child mirrors the dominant image of the homosexual in 1950s popular discourses: depressed, lonely, isolated, suicidal (Rebellato, 1999; Cook, 2007). And while critical engagements with the discourse of the child as victim demonstrate how that image reassures and reinscribes a social and cultural binary (in that case between adult and child), the gay victim also provides an image of the homosexual as a reassuringly distinct and tragic ‘other’ from that of the heterosexual. Victimhood as the basis of the call for tolerance enables religious groups to distinguish between protecting the sinner and condemning the sin. And the extent to which conservative and religious groups’ recognition of homophobic bullying reflects a highly limited shift in thinking was clear when the Conservative Party and the majority of Bishops in the House of Lords successfully opposed provisions in the Children, Families and Schools Bill 2010 to extend the provision of sex education in such a way that would have ensured that information about HIV and discussions about sexuality would have been more firmly embedded in the curriculum.25 Moreover, as Quinlivan argues, identifying lesbian and gay youth as at risk ‘allows them to be classified as fitting within a deviant model which argues that they “need help”’ (2002, p. 25). 23 The National Aids Trust (NAT) notes that ‘There has been a worrying increase in diagnoses amongst young gay men’ <www.nat.org.uk/HIV-Facts/Most-affected-by-HIV/Gay-and-Bisexual-Men.aspx> (last visited 18 November 2010); see also statistics from the Terence Higgins Trust (THT): <www.ygm.org.uk/home/ professionals/sexhiv/> (last visited 18 November 2010). 24 While policies introduced by New Labour acknowledged the reality of sexual activity amongst young people, it did so primarily to reduce teenage pregnancy and to advocate delay; see Monk (2001). Moreover, the Labour Party 2010 Manifesto stated that it would provide support for parents who wished to challenge ‘aggressive or sexualised commercial marketing’ and ‘ask Consumer Focus to develop a website for parents to register their concerns about sexualised products aimed at their children (2010, para. 6:3). 25 Children, Families and Schools Bill 2010, clauses 13, 14. While the Bill was enacted Conservative opposition ensured that these provisions were dropped during the ‘wash-up’ period prior to the General Election. challenging homophobic bullying in schools 187 Victimhood also has a reassuring role within lesbian and gay political discourses. Bravmann, in developing a critical queer historiography that disrupts a linear progressive narrative, quotes D’Emilio’s assertion that gay liberationists of the 1960s and 1970s constructed a mythology that ‘until gay liberation, gay men and lesbians were always the victims of systematic, undifferentiated, terrible oppression’ (1983, p. 101, quoted in Bravmann, 1997, p. 26). This political move is reflected in Stonewall’s representation of contemporary school life as overwhelmingly one of hardship and of bullying of ‘endemic’ proportions. But there is an unremarked tension here, for this very representation was criticised in recent research commissioned by Stonewall about young people’s responses to images of gays and lesbians in the media; a key finding being that the representations focused too much on the negative aspects of gay lives – to the point of caricature – and failed to present positive images (Stonewall, 2010).26 Once again the paradoxical uses of symbolic representations indicates the contingency of narratives about young gays and lesbians. It is important to emphasise that the point here is not that real suffering does not exist but the extent to which the dominance of the tragic image is a condition of possibility for the speakability of homophobic bullying and the extent to which it effectively silences other voices and reduces the experience of lesbian and gay young people to one of passive victimhood.27 The reality of young people’s sexual activity is one such silence but others can be detected that relate to the causal claims made about homophobic bullying. Ian Rivers, the leading empirical researcher in the area, whose work is relied on by Stonewall and campaigning groups, recently argued that: ‘despite the nature and severity of bullying participants experienced at school, many overcame it successfully . . . [there was] little evidence of long-term anxiety or indeed insecurity within intimate relationships . . . and that given some of the positive outcomes found, researchers should begin to focus more intently upon coping strategies and resilience and seek to determine why some former victims of bullying successfully negotiate adulthood while others do not.’ (Rivers and Cowie, 2006, p. 38) A similar point is made by Blackburn (2007) in relation to developments in the USA. What they both suggest is that much of the research in this area looks for harm and that the stories not only of resilience but also of those who do not experience homophobic bullying are never mentioned by campaigners.28 Two possible alternative narratives that give voice to more complex subject positions can be identified; first, through a rethinking of the causal linkage between homophobic bullying and educational attainment and, second, by exploring the concept of shame. Educational attainment Existing research frequently identifies the gym and physical sports as the most uncomfortable and feared space for lesbian and gay young people (Rivers, 2001a; 2001b; Rivers and Duncan, 2002; Warwick et al., 2006). But we are not directed towards thinking about the least feared space. If asked, it might be that the library would be identified as the safest place. If so, it might complicate 26 Examples of typical statements by young people in this report are: ‘They never seem to be happy’ (William, aged 13, p. 7); ‘TV gives the wrong view of gay people because every storyline is about them being beaten up and discriminated against. They are never accepted by their family’ (Ishani, aged 16, p. 7). 27 Indeed, it is in part a recognition of the problematic discursive power of ‘homosexual victimhood’ that, arguably, informs much of the recent queer historical scholarship that endeavours to complicate these earlier dominant narratives of the past, see Bravmann (1997), Cook (2007), Houlbrook (2005). 28 A similar point has been made in relation to the experiences of children post-divorce; see Smart, Neale and Wade (2001). My thanks to Helen Reece for making this link. 188 daniel monk the dominance of ‘tragedy’ in the context of educational attainment. Much of the literature identifies low educational achievements and school refusal (truancy) to be a result of bullying. The confident statements that homophobic bullying is ‘endemic’ could give the impression that lesbian and gay youth are, consequently, particularly disadvantaged in education. But other statistics give a significantly different impression. Research undertaken by SIGMA in 2008 found that the proportion of homosexually active men in post-compulsory education was higher than the national average (Weatherburn, Hickson, Reid, Jessop and Hammond, 2008, para. 2.4).29 And, this finding is congruent with the data from the first National Survey of Sexual Attitudes, which suggested that homosexually active men had been in full-time education longer than other men (Johnson, Wadsworth, Wellings, Field and Bradshaw, 1994, p. 209). The aim here is not to set up a competing claim to truth about the real educational attainments of lesbian and gay youth, nor indeed to challenge the suggestion that there is a relationship between homophobic bullying and educational attainments. An attempt to explore with any rigour the connections between sexual orientation and educational outcomes would need to address the complex intersections of gender and, most crucially in this context, socioeconomic background. Consequently, in introducing the other ‘evidence’ here, the aim is simply to complicate the representation of tragedy. Educational statistics that demonstrate that girls do better than boys in examinations are loudly proclaimed on a seemingly annual basis. These statistics are, of course, crude, and mask complex social and political narratives (significantly there is never any mention of sexual orientation, which begs the question about the educational attainments of young lesbians).30 But it is their power to produce and signify a very particular and restricted notion of a ‘crisis in masculinity’ that dominates (Collier, 2001). The statistics referred to above, that, equally crudely, could suggest that gay men achieve better educational attainments than heterosexual men currently receive no such attention, and yet they too could problematise dominant masculinity. It is interesting to note that such a ‘conclusion’ would not be new, for, from the late nineteenth century, American medical discourses routinely identified homosexuals as being intellectually gifted as a compensatory result of their homosexuality (Franklin, 2003). Again, the point here is not that this approach is in any way a more accurate picture; on the contrary, this medical model simply reaffirmed a scientific belief in the unnaturalness and abnormality of homosexuals. The point here is that any attempt to speak of the educational attainment of a highly unheterogenous group as an indicator for the experiences of that group demonstrates the extent to which the ‘facts’ are used to confirm rather than to inform a discursive construction. Consequently, the relative silence about alternative narratives of educational attainment are, it is suggested, not simply the result of a lack of methodological rigour, but rather attest to an investment within contemporary lesbian and gay politics in the gay child as tragic victim. Shame The concept of shame can also be utilised to complicate the dominant narrative of tragedy. Shame is a complex concept that is understood in different ways across a number of disciplines (Probyn, 2005). In the context of homophobic bullying it has been identified as one of the detrimental effects (McDermott, Roen and Scourfield, 2008). McDermott et al. make the important point that shame/ pride discourses establish a binary, which ‘appears to allow for only two subject positions: the successful, proud-self who can cope with homophobia; and the failed, ashamed-self who is 29 See also Weatherburn, Davies, Hickson and Hartley (1999). 30 There is an extensive literature about this; see, for example, O’Flynn and Epstein (2005), Epstein, Maw, Elwood and Hey (1998), Youdell (2005). challenging homophobic bullying in schools 189 distressed by homophobia’ (p. 822).31 Excluding the possibility of shame and pride co-existing, or neither being present, this binary, ‘tends not to allow for more nuanced and complex manoeuvring within these discourses to subject positions which may be proud in some spaces, but less so in other situations’ (p. 822). This is an important distinction that to some extent echoes Rivers’s suggestion that responses to homophobic bullying are more complex than the ‘evidence’ suggests. But the argument here raises a more fundamental question by suggesting that shame is not simply a negative outcome, evidence of the harm caused by homophobic bullying, but a more complex emotion and sensation and, crucially for this argument, not one from which lesbian and gay childhood can, or necessarily should, be removed, overcome or liberated. This use of the concept of shame draws on the queer theoretical approach of Munt, who reminds us that ‘the foremost shame narrative of Western culture’ is The Fall of Adam and the expulsion from Eden and that: ‘the ensuing rejection by God instigates Man’s individuation; his self-consciousness occurs because of his separation. This is the vacillation of subjection and individuation.’ (2007, p. 80) She argues that a proud, defiant sexuality is ‘premised on an uncomfortable historically discursive shame’ and that: ‘In any personal trajectory, the growing consciousness of same-sex desire must, in a Western context, give rise to feelings of difference and exclusion . . . The presence of shame has been repressed in the discourse of homosexual rights in an unhelpful way, in order to gain greater agency, we must learn to revisit its ambivalent effects.’ (p. 95, emphasis added) The argument here is that attempts to remove, outlaw or silence shame-inducing practices through expansive definitions of homophobic bullying is an example of rights discourse overlooking the productive role of shame. Definitions of homophobic bullying are broad, and the focus here is on the lower end of activities. Name-calling, identifying oneself and being identified as different, and experiencing difference as exclusion and as uncomfortable – these practices share much with the emotion of shame. The blush of recognition as different (whether or not self-identified as ‘gay’ or ‘lesbian’) might sometimes be a painful sensation, but one that plays a role in identity formation. Silencing the speakability of this experience of shame as anything other than a form of violence, as abuse or harm, coheres both with the notion of the child as innocent victim and with a particular construction of ‘liberated’ gay identity, noted above, which is dependent on the uniformed oppressed pre-liberated representation. Moreover, it mirrors broader fears that underlie contemporary attempts to construct childhood spaces as harm- and pain-free (Gill, 2007; Guldberg, 2009). This utopian desire is not surprising; as queer theorists Bruhm and Hurley argue, ‘Utopianism follows the child around like a family pet’ (2004, p. xiii). But, in the context of ‘shame’, by way of stark contrast, the playground represents here a paradise, an Eden, pre-The Fall, pre-Shame: a space premised on welfarist understandings of protection but within which children are denied productive individuation, denied self-consciousness and the ‘blush of recognition’, and one that reinforces homogeneousness. A political agenda Revealing the contingent representations of lesbian and gay youth through which homophobic bullying is made speakable (and its silencing of alternative narratives) demonstrates how the 31 The use of shame here resonates with the concept of internalised homophobia discussed below. 190 daniel monk agenda is concerned not solely with addressing harms inflicted on children but is intimately interlinked with broader political strategies and imaginations of the future. In the context of historical scholarship, Bravmann argues that: ‘we need to look at how images of the gay and lesbian past circulating among us animate the present and to read lesbian and gay historical self-representation as sites of ongoing hermeneutic and political struggle in the formation of new social subjects and new cultural possibilities.’ (1997, p. 4) Reading contemporary debates about homophobic bullying as a ‘history of the present’, this perspective can be applied here. Indeed, homophobic bullying is a particularly rich site for this form of political meaning-making, located as it is at the intersection of discourses of education and childhood. The perception of education as the key tool for unlocking individual potential and for creating a fairer society remains an article of faith within liberal and progressive political paradigms (Finch, 1984; Hendrick, 2003), and the predominant social construction of childhood is one of ‘not-yets’, ‘becomings’, ‘empty vessels’, always to be understood as something in the future and for the future of society as a whole (Jenks, 1996; Lee, 2001; James, Jenks and Prout, 1998). Research about homophobic bullying is inherently and inevitably a political project. Yet while issues such as gay marriage and gays in the military are campaigns that have been exposed to lively critique within the LGBT community and academic literature, there has been very little similar debate about homophobic bullying, located as it is within the ‘benign’ emancipatory liberal discourses of education and future-focused discourses of innocent and universal childhood. In identifying and making visible the aspirational political implications, the focus here turns first to imaginations and representations of a post-homophobic time, and second to an examination of the role that collective memory plays within advanced or post-liberal societies where therapeutic correctness functions as a key form of governance. The liberated gay? One way of exploring the broader political and emancipatory role of the homophobic bullying agenda is by identifying exactly what homophobic bullying is understood to be the cause of. What this line of enquiry reveals is that while there has been a demonstrable shift in political and public attitudes, to the extent that it is now homophobia that is identified as the problem and not homosexuality, at the same time there is in important respects no change as to what is problematised, merely the cause. For, drawing implicitly on a child developmentalist model, homophobia takes on, with a twist, the psychoanalytical role formerly played by the Freudian concept of ‘arrested development’. ‘Arrested development’ famously sought to explain what made a person homosexual. For lesbian and gay rights campaigners this very question is highly problematic, as the innateness of homosexuality is both an article of faith and strategically essential for human rights claims within a liberal political paradigm (a position explored by numerous queer critiques). Yet the argument here is that ‘arrested development’ has not been rejected but reformulated. Development into successful normal adulthood is not ‘arrested’ by parental or maternal attachment, but rather by homophobia itself. In other words, the developmental question now is not, ‘What makes someone homosexual?’, but instead ‘What makes someone behave in a way that fails to conform to heteronormative behaviour’. It is no longer homosexuality that can be cured but the attributes and behaviours of those whose lives have been blighted by homophobia. As Harwood argues, this ‘post-pathological’ intelligibility of homosexuality, ‘superficially appears not to situate homosexuality as mental illness, but rather situates mental illness as the risk wrought by homosexuality’ (2004, p. 102). What is at stake here are imaginations of what it might be to be a ‘liberated’ gay. While never addressed explicitly, this challenging homophobic bullying in schools 191 emancipatory projection can be identified within the empirical literature about homophobic bullying and in a variety of other cultural texts. Rivers and Cowie’s work calculates the impact of homophobic bullying against assessments of ‘psychopathology in adulthood’ – a concept that, amongst other things, is evaluated by relationship status and duration of relationships (2006, p. 29). This seemingly neutral psychological assessment is emblematic of a form of child developmentalism which has been subject to sustained critique by numerous theorists of childhood. Underlying their critiques, often informed by Foucauldian insights about the power of a depoliticised psy-expertise and knowledge, is a willingness to question the norms against which psychological functioning adulthood is evaluated. As Walkerdine argues: ‘The subject is not made social, but rather the social is the site for the production of discursive practices which produce the possibility of being a subject’ (2009, p. 19).32 Consequently, while Rivers, as quoted above, argues that research should explore in more detail why some victims of bullying appear able to ‘successfully negotiate adulthood’, what is left unanswered are critical questions about what that ‘successfully negotiated’ adulthood might look like and who defines it. These critical perspectives have a particular resonance with queer theorists such as Eve Sedgwick, who demonstrated how the removal of homosexuality from the catalogue of psychological disorders has been followed by the discovery and inclusion of new (‘DSM recognised’) pathologies (1991). What is significant in this context is the extent to which these neutral scientific perceptions cohere with dominant political discourses new-found concern with homophobia. Rivers and Cowie’s (2006) use of relationships as an indicator of ‘successful adulthood’ is particularly relevant here. Within new ‘psychological disorders’, the inability to form ‘stable’ adult relationships is frequently a key component and this problematisation coheres with the widespread political support for the Civil Partnership Act 2004 (CPA). For support was frequently premised, often explicitly, on the view that it would enable and support lesbian and gays to establish stable relationships. Indeed, some Conservative politicians have explicitly linked their support for the CPA with expressions of regret that the attitudes underlying their earlier support of Section 28 may have prompted promiscuity amongst gay men.33 As Stychin argues in relation to the CPA: ‘there is a message within the Act . . . that the encouragement of the rights and responsibilities of civil partnership through law will provide a disincentive for “irresponsible” behaviour. In the context of New Labour politics, irresponsibility seems to include promiscuous sex, relationship breakdown at will, and the selfishness of living alone (or perhaps even living with friends and acquaintances).’ (2006, p. 30) This approach is also adopted by some marriage-equality advocates within the LGBT community. Duggan argues that ‘many have couched their advocacy in language that glorifies marital bliss, sometimes echoing the “family values” rhetoric of their opponents’. As an example she quotes the Roadmap to Equality: A Freedom to Marry Educational Guide, which states that: ‘Denying marriage rights to lesbian and gay couples keeps them in a state of permanent adolescence’ (Duggan, 2004).34 What is significant here is that while the failure to allocate rights is linked to pathological 32 See also Harwood (2004) and Talburt (2004). 33 See, for example, an interview with Conservative Party Chairman Francis Maude MP (2006): ‘Tories’ Gay Stance was “Wrong”’, BBC News, Thursday, 9 February 2006. Available at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/ uk_politics/4696236.stm> (last visited 19 November 2010). 34 Another recent example of this approach from within the lesbian and gay community is the fact that promiscuity was described as being a ‘negative’ portrayal in the report of the representations of lesbians and gays in the media, as opposed to ‘suffering’, which was described as ‘negative but realistic’ (Stonewall, 2010, p. 3). 192 daniel monk development, this is not an uncomplicated form of passive victimhood, for the demand of responsibility with rights both acknowledges and demands action on behalf of the new rights holders. As Rose argues, ‘Citizenship becomes conditional on conduct’ (2000, p. 335). Stychin’s analysis of debates about the CPA went beyond sexual practice to incorporate broader economic calculations and the extent to which ‘stable relationships’ cohered with neoliberal discourses about the privatisation of care. Echoes of this can also be identified here. Rivers’s assessment of psychopathology in adulthood also includes employment status and this linkage reinforces Ellis’s observation that concern about homophobic bullying cohered neatly with New Labour’s managerialist calculations and broader education reforms premised on clearly identifiable outcomes and audits of economic citizenship. In this vein, he asks rhetorically: ‘Is it a coincidence that recent policy and guidance from both a neo-liberal government and from the voluntary sector focus on how risky and disruptive identities might be managed safely to ensure the production of auditable outcomes? (2007, p. 23, emphasis added)35 Alongside concerns about promiscuity, other cultural texts also provide insight into the extent to which the rejection of homophobia coheres with pathologising understandings of non-conformist practices. For example, a causal link is often identified between the experience of homophobic bullying as a child and an adult preference for sado-masochistic (SM) sexual activity. In the documentary Pleasure and Pain, flashbacks to being bullied at school are linked to sexual submissiveness – the depravity of SM being perceived as a direct result of the bullying (Sullivan, 2003, p. 154). Significantly, here, and in other contexts,36 it is the submissive role that is the remarked upon and pathologised position. And the silence about the desire to dominate attests to the extent to which psychological perceptions of normality are informed by cultural norms – in this case of a particular construct of masculinity. The empirical literature on homophobic bullying frequently reveals that sports and changing rooms are the most feared places within the school (Rivers and Duncan, 2002; Warwick et al., 2006). And, as referred to above, the Conservative Party’s policy document about children was entitled More Ball Games, in order to present a reassuring image of normal stable childhood. But, in this context, what is noticeable is that other cultural texts present a tantalising representation of a post-homophobic world within which the playing of sports features highly – in order to present a reassuring image of a ‘liberated’ normal stable homosexuality. An example of this is two soap operas, Eastenders on BBC1 and The Archers on BBC Radio 4. In both of these programmes, the public broadcasting company, in an almost Reithian educational role, portrays their resolutely ‘out and proud’ gay characters playing sports alongside the heterosexual male members of their respectively urban and rural communities (Christian playing five-a-side football in the former and Adam cricket in the latter), and both are star players in their teams.37 A telling silence here is that popular media representations of lesbians – of which there are far fewer – never emphasise sporting prowess. Such a portrayal would, of course, conform to a 35 In the context of economic citizenship it is interesting to note that the only reference to lesbians and gays in the Conservative Party general election manifesto was to tax benefits for those in civil partnerships (2010, p. 35). 36 Franklin, in his analysis of the famous trial of Leopold and Loeb, reveals how medical discourses pathologised Leopold’s desire to be a ‘submissive slave’ to Loeb as evidence of his emotional and sexual depravity (2003, p. 139). 37 That the playing of sport – and playing well – functions as a key motif for the portrayal of confident post- homophobic identity is similarly demonstrated by the fact that annual international LGBT Human Rights conferences are now coupled with Out Games – a sporting competition. challenging homophobic bullying in schools 193 stereotypical image of adult lesbians or, in children, of tomboys (Cockburn and Clarke; 2002; Halberstam, 2004). Consequently, the portrayal of a lesbian in a media drama ably playing sport has none of the ‘liberatory discursive power’ that it has with a gay man. In other words, liberation in this discourse is profoundly heteronormative, linked as it is to binary gender conformity. The coupling of sporting prowess with ‘liberation’ is not new. Most striking is the extent to which it mirrors constructions of Jewish masculinity. The similarities here are far from coincidental. As Gilman has demonstrated, for much of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, ‘Jew’ and ‘homosexual’ were virtually synonymous and interchangeable categories of social and sexual difference (Gilman, 1993, pp. 36–48, 132–68). Significantly, as with homosexuality and homophobia now, the causal link made between the unliberated, weak and feminine male Jew and anti-semitism was frequently espoused by those explicitly concerned with challenging anti-semitism.38 That both individual and collective ‘liberation’ is linked to (and conditional on) a particular performance of masculinity is not surprising. Sedgwick reminded us long ago that ‘the gay movement has never been quick to attend to the issues concerning effeminate boys’ (1991, p. 20).39 Similarly, Weiss comments that ‘the celebration of effeminate flamboyance – femininity in the face of “male power” – is precisely what is excluded from homonormativity gay activism’ (2008, p. 92). Linking this silence with broader political strategies, Bell and Binnie argue that: ‘When sexual dissidents make use of rights-based political strategies to demand citizenship, they must conform to a prevailing model of acceptability that is “privatized, de-radicalized, de-eroticized, and confined”.’ (2000, p. 3) There is then a paradox: failure to conform to particular ideals of behaviour are read as indicators of the harmful effects of bullying, but, at the same time, freedom from bullying is evaluated against an ability to conform to those same ideals. Nevertheless, queer perspectives that seek to reveal these tensions do not discard homophobia or deny that it causes real harm and suffering. Moreover, they sometimes offer simply an alternative causal reading of its effects. So, for example, embracing sado-masochism and celebrating promiscuity (Sullivan, 2003, 151–67; Thompson, 1995) and rejecting the hyper-masculinity of many forms of contemporary gay male culture (Muñoz, 2009, pp. 78–79) are often provided as evidence of ‘liberation’ from heteronormativity.40 The aim here is not to attempt to arbitrate or judge these competing truth claims but to be attuned to their discursive power and, in particular, to make visible the political dynamics underlying homophobic bullying agendas which are masked by developmentalist modes of thinking and investment in the child as future.41 ‘Responsible’ memories? One might reasonably ask whether in highlighting the existence of homophobia in schools and developing strategies that enable it to be acknowledged by policy-makers it is necessary to engage 38 For example, Elisha Friedman argued in a US medical journal that Jewish predominance in scholarly and mercantile pursuits was the result of anti-semitic exclusions (1923, pp. 352–53, quoted in Franklin, 2003, p. 143). 39 Another recent example is the finding that femininity is perceived as ‘negative’ in a report of the representations of lesbians and gays in the media: (Stonewall, 2010, p. 6). 40 For a particularly nuanced overview and analysis of the debates and ‘productive’ tensions between ‘gay’ and ‘queer’ and ‘assimilation’ and ‘transgression’ see Stychin (2005). 41 See Lesnik-Oberstein and Thomson (2002) for an analysis of how queer theory premised on challenging heteronormativity is deeply wedded to psychoanalytical discourse. 194 daniel monk with conflicting imaginations about an idealised post-homophobic world. The argument here is that it is, for if homophobic bullying is made speakable through discourses of heteronormativity, then those outcomes become the form through which its success is evaluated. In other words it can lead to a pathologising of behaviours – ironically those that often signify resistance to homophobia. Moreover, this form of pathologising is a particularly invasive form which resonates with broader shifts in governance within contemporary advanced liberal societies (Rose, 1999). Garland argues that ‘where the state once targeted the deviant for intensive transformative action, it now aims to bring about marginal but effective changes in the norms, routines, and the consciousness of everyone’ (1996, p. 454). Reece has analysed this form of governance as a form of ‘(post) liberalism’. This concept is distinct from both conservative morality and laissez-faire liberalism as it imposes a demanding model of ‘responsibility’ to the extent that it demands that the individual internalise responsibility rather than simply conform to hierarchical juridical commands. Within this model, Reece argues that ‘psychological norms have replaced social norms, and therapeutic correctness has become the new standard of good behaviour’ (2003, p. 217). For Rose, this represents a form of ‘government at a distance’ which, through concepts of ‘empowerment’ and ‘self-esteem’, serves to mask strategies of control: ‘the beauty of empowerment is that it appears to reject the logics of patronizing dependency that infused earlier welfare models of expertise. Subjects are to do the work themselves, not in the name of conformity, but to make them free . . . High self-esteem is linked to the power to plan one’s life as an orderly enterprise and take responsibility for its course and outcome.’ (2000, pp. 334–35) These broader insights into this shift in governance clearly cohere with queer theoretical concerns about the conditions of inclusion within civil society. For therapeutic correctness requires individuals to explain and to account for their failure to conform to traditional relationship models, their sexual ‘perversions’ and, indeed, their unhappiness, by connecting with childhood trauma. The relatively recent predominance of the expression ‘internalised homophobia’ as a widely understood phenomenon within both pyschotherapeutic circles and LGBT communities more widely, not only attests to homophobia as an external force to be challenged but also, implicitly, places a burden on the individual to unravel and question its negative impacts.42 As Kitzinger argues, ‘Instead of going to heterosexual therapists to be cured of our homosexuality, now lesbian and gay men are supposed to seek out lesbian and gay therapists to be cured of internalized homophobia’ (1997, p. 211). In this context it is significant that much of the research on homophobic bullying draws on adult lesbian and gay accounts of their childhoods (Rivers and Cowie, 2006) and, similarly, to note the preponderance of queer theorists drawing on their own personal narratives (Warner, 2004; Muñoz, 2009, pp. 67–73). In these narratives memory plays a crucial role. Carol Smart, drawing on the work of Misztal (2003), argues that we need to ‘grasp the chameleon nature of memory’, that it, ‘works in unstable ways, notwithstanding that it almost always appears to have the status of the most authentic and most signifying act of identity creation’ (2007, pp. 40–41). In foregrounding the fact that ‘even individual memory is social’, she argues that ‘Memories can change to suit an 42 For a nuanced critique of this concept see Williamson (2000). The aim here is not to dismiss the potential benefits of psychological perceptions or calculations, but rather to identify, as Adam Phillips argues, the ways in which, at least explicitly, psychology concerns itself far more with disavowal and lack than it does with affirmation and world making. Moreover, as Phillips argues, ‘if we are living in the age of the specialist, then psychoanalysis can be useful as a critique of the whole project of wanting authorities’ (1995, pp. xx1 and xiii). challenging homophobic bullying in schools 195 audience or to fit a newly crafted identity’ (2007, p. 41, emphasis added).43 The aim here is not to discount memories but to be attuned to their productive role and their dependence on the availability of language and dominant discourses and, in particular, to look beneath individual accounts to reveal the collective political meaning-making inherent in the project of naming, challenging and resisting homophobic bullying. Lawful violence: institutional homophobia and the criminal gaze In this final section the focus shifts from the bullied to the bully. In contrast to the construction of the ‘responsible victim’, here we find a return to the subject of traditional hierarchical forms of control: the demonised criminal other. Yet, while the role of the state in this context is more direct, more explicit, it, similarly, is heard through ‘common-sense’ narratives that have the effect of masking the political. ‘Bullying’ and homophobia A key way in which the homophobic bullying agenda is depoliticised is through the discourse of bullying itself. History is significant here, for while homophobia in schools has been written about in earlier periods (particularly in the context of Section 28), the fact that bullying is now the key focus remains unremarked upon. The argument here is that the coupling of ‘homophobic’ with ‘bullying’ is not straightforward, but, rather, a linkage that plays a productive role in determining the construction of the harms focused on and the legitimacy of the means used to challenge them. Bullying is spoken of not just in the context of children, but also in relation to adults’ lives, particularly in the workplace. In recent years there has developed what is fair to describe as a vast industry defining, deploring and highlighting the ills of bullying (Smith, 2005; Rigby, 2002).44 It is beyond the remit of this article to attempt to explore the genealogy of bullying as a discourse. That said, however, an attempt to do so could locate its ascendancy within the broader developments of neoliberal individualistic governance, the increasing dominance of psy-discourses and, of particular relevance here, a reinscription of the political as primarily private. The workplace provides a good example of this. In the vast majority of incidences now labelled as bullying, the bully is the employer; indeed, a report by the Institute of Management suggested that bullying was part of the new management credo (2000). A political response would be to see such relationships as reflecting broader structural inequalities within the workplace and society more generally; in other words, as a labour relations issue.45 Read through the narrative of bullying, however, and this political potential is lost and the issue is individualised as the bully is constructed through a pathological gaze. This is not to suggest that psychology, broadly defined, has nothing to offer in explaining why a particular individual might behave towards colleagues or staff in a particular way. But it is important to be attuned to what is at the same time silenced through such an account.46 If homophobic bullying is caused by homophobic bullies, consequently is individualised, what gets overlooked are structural forms of homophobia. Many of these are implicit and subtle; in other words the opposite to explicit juridical prohibitions such as Section 28. Examples are the 43 See also Talburt (2004). 44 See also <www.antibullyingalliance.org> (last visited 18 November 2010). 45 A report by the Institute of Management suggested that bullying was part of the new management credo (IOM, 2000). 46 For example, research undertaken by the TUC suggests that the groups most likely to be bullied are women, ethnic minorities and people with disabilities <www.tuc.org.uk/h_and_s/index.cfm?mins = 30> (last visited 18 November 2010). 196 daniel monk emphasis on parental involvement in sex and relationship education and the privileged space (and contingent definition) of biology within the curriculum (Monk, 1998). Beyond the formal curriculum numerous commentators have long identified the existence and observed the impact of the ‘hidden curriculum’ in relation to heterosexism and gender more generally across almost every aspect of school life (O’Flynn and Epstein, 2005; Kehilly, 2002). One aspect of the ‘hidden curriculum’ is school dress codes. These have a particular relevance in this context as they are highly gendered and conforming to gender stereotypes is identified in much of the literature as being a critical factor in homophobic bullying (Phoenix et al., 2003). The Equalities and Human Rights Commission recently argued in relation to school dress codes that because trousers are conventional dress for women and jewellery is equally conventional dress for men, ‘there is a strong argument that it would be unlawful sex discrimination to deny’ these forms of dress for children in school.47 Such an argument has yet to be tested, but on the basis of increased support for school dress codes, and stricter application of them, coupled with an extreme reluctance of the courts to intervene in ‘educational’ matters, it is unlikely to succeed (Monk, 2005). Indeed to describe dress codes as an ‘informal’ aspect of education can be misleading as they are understood to be a key aspect of school discipline and one that can warrant the ultimate penalty of permanent exclusion. That government and individual schools’ commitment to rigorously enforcing gendered dress codes can co-exist with an explicit commitment to challenging homophobia, despite the repeated evidence of the connections between heteronormativity and gender performance, demonstrates the highly restrictive manner in which challenging homophobic bullying is heard. Bullying narratives – individualistic, depoliticised and, increasingly, drawing on pathological explanations of inappropriate behaviour – cohere and lend themselves with great ease to a criminal law paradigm. Critical legal commentators have for many years examined the ways in which legal causation is distinct from factual causation, to the extent that the former goes backwards – which is say that it starts with the harm, identifies the individual perpetrator and then stops – and that in doing so it does not ask or enquire and does not need to examine broader, political cultural factors that influenced the behaviour of the perpetrator. In this way, like bullying discourses, it simplifies and individualises, requiring simply the identification of a victim and a perpetrator (Norrie, 2001, pp. 134–40). Furniss has argued in favour of criminal law responses to bullying in order to challenge the extent to which ‘teachers may see bullying as an inevitable part of growing up’ (2000, p. 17). Moreover, echoing long-standing debates about domestic violence and the physical chastisement of children, she argues that: ‘By treating attacks on adults as worthy of a serious response, but attacks on children as not, this sends out the message that the bodily integrity of children is not as important as that of adults.’ (p. 24) Criminal law is not, however, the only form of legal redress: provisions under the European Convention of Human Rights and the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child can be interpreted to create positive obligations on the state to prevent bullying; civil law claims can be brought by parents and children based on the duty of care of schools to pupils; and quasi-criminal law sanctions in the form of school exclusions can be used against individuals (Harris, 2005).48 Yet despite these different forms of legal interventions, in reality it is the quasi-criminal form of 47 <www.equalityhumanrights.com/advice-and-guidance/education-and-training-providers/fair-treatment- when-in-education/school-uniform/> (last visited 12 August 2010). 48 For comparative approaches see Ananiadou and Smith (2002). challenging homophobic bullying in schools 197 redress that is the most accessible. The case of Bradford-Smart v. West Sussex CC in 2002 extended a school’s duty of care to taking reasonable steps to prevent bullying within the school and made clear that this was an educational as well as a health and safety issue.49 But in practice it is exceptionally difficult to satisfy the doctrinal requirements that there be evidence of the breach of duty and a causal connection between the breach of duty and the harm. Furthermore, where the harm is psychological it is necessary to show that it takes the form of a clinically recognised mental health problem. The contrast between the difficulties facing a child or parent attempting to bring a school or teacher to account in a civil action and the remarkable ease with which a school can discipline a pupil is stark. The underlying similarity is that in both contexts the courts can be seen to err on the side of schools, for it is as hard for parents to challenge an exclusion as it is to bring a claim for negligence. What is significant here is that both legal doctrine and practice reflects and bolsters the inherent tendency of the bullying narrative to focus on an individual perpetrator and in doing so shift the focus away from institutional and more complex structural understandings. It is possible to view the intervention of law as a form not only of individual redress but also as justice for all lesbian and gay children. A right to be free from homophobic bullying in this way fits neatly with rights-based discourse. There are significant parallels here with lesbian and gay campaigns for the recognition of homophobia as a form of hate crime. While demanding widespread support – often of an unquestionable ‘common-sense’ nature – this recourse to law and, once again, the criminal paradigm, like campaigns for gay marriage, and gays in the military, has not been without its critics. Before turning to these critics it is informative to locate these developments in both the local context of the school and in broader criminological debates. School discipline The only statutory reference to bullying is in the context of school discipline,50 and this focus has been clearly espoused in recent political statements. For example, in More Ball Games the Conservative Party suggest that in tackling bullying there should be increased use of exclusions and firmer use of parent contracts (2008, p. 10). Moreover, in the 2010 general election both major parties argued in support of head teachers’ extensive disciplinary powers; the Conservative Party stated that it will ‘stop them being overruled by bureaucrats on exclusions’ (2010, p. 51), and the Labour Party, under the heading ‘Zero Tolerence of Poor Behaviour’, stated that it will ‘bring order and discipline back to young people’s lives’ (2010, Chapter 3:5). In these political responses there is no mention of institutional homophobia. Moreover, the repeated calls for zero tolerance in relation to bullying reveals how homophobic bullying is made speakable in this way through its ability to cohere with a conservative law and order discourse. As a result the significant race and class dimensions of exclusions (Parsons, 1999; Parsons and Harris, 2001; Parsons, 2009) and the impact on poor parents (almost always the mothers), who through parenting contracts are increasingly held responsible for their children’s behaviour, are overlooked and silenced in this account (Gillies, 2005; Gewirtz, 2001). As Harris argues, the disciplinary response to bullying risks the ‘complete abandonment of the perpetrators of bullying who . . . often have mental health or behavioural problems themselves’ (2005, p. 57). Law and order The inability to reduce the use of exclusions and increased assertions of the necessity for ever more draconian school discipline in schools resonates with broader criminological developments. 49 Bradford-Smart v. West Sussex CC [2002] ELR 139. 50 The Schools Standards and Frameworks Act 1998, Section 61 (now section 98 of the Education and Inspections Act 2006). 198 daniel monk The criminologist Rutherford describes increased penality as a form of managing social behaviour as the re-emergence of the ‘eliminative ideal’. An ideal which ‘strives to solve present and emerging problems by getting rid of troublesome and disagreeable people with methods that are lawful and widely supported’, he argues, ‘sits all too comfortably with contemporary pressures for social exclusion, with notions of a culture of containment’ (1997, pp. 117, 132). Expressing a similar concern, Bauman refers to an emergence of the notion of ‘disposability’, and argues that the possibility for harsh sanctions rests upon ‘twin assumptions: a clean-cut territorial division between the “inside” and the “outside”; and of the completeness and indivisibility of the sovereignty of the strategy-selecting power inside its realm’ (2003, p. 137). Rutherford argues that the eliminative ideal provides a seductive but dangerously false sense of collective certainty and security,51 and that challenges to this trend need to address both the instrumental and the expressive dimensions of the eliminative ideal. The expressive dimension owes much to Durkheim’s classic rejection of utilitarian explanations of punishment; that it is never ‘a rational social defence against harm done or threatened’ but, ‘a passionate reaction, a matter of feelings’. While his subsequent application of this idea has been much critiqued, this, still bold, assertion is particularly pertinent here and, indeed, recognising the emotional dimension of penality coheres with much of the critical thinking about homophobia as hate crime.52 In keeping with her argument that it is important to be attuned to the ambivalent effects of shame, Munt argues that: ‘Shame puts us in our place, but the spaces of subjectivity are not wholly fixed or predetermined; shame’s loss carries uncertainty, but it also presages a desire for reconnection. It is this desire for re-attachment that has the precarious potential for violence or love.’ (2007, p. 103, emphasis added) The potential for violence in the context of challenging homophobia consequently coheres with calls to utilise both school discipline policies and the criminal law as a political tool in the demand for rights and protection by the state. Murphy and Hampton argue that: ‘criminal law institutionalizes certain feelings of anger, resentment and even hatred that are typically directed towards wrong doers, especially if we are the victims of those wrong doers.’ (1988, p. 63, quoted in Moran, 2004, p. 940) Moran, in examining the implications of this in the context of demands for hate crime legislation has sought to make visible and encourage reflection on the ‘alliances that lesbian and gay men are making with law and order’ (2004, p. 942)53 Visibility, naming and recognising the violence of law is critical here. For penalising hate crime and, in this context, school disciplinary action against homophobic bullies, as acts done in the name of law and order are emptied of, and indeed perceived as the opposite of, emotions and disorder. As Moran argues: 51 Garland similarly argues that punitive responses are frequently ‘barely considered attempts to express popular feelings of rage and frustration’, but are at the same time ‘a form of denial which appears increasingly hysterical’ about the state’s limitations in respect of crime control (1996, pp. 459–60). 52 For a detailed analysis and an apologist for Durkheim’s perspectives on social solidarity and crime, see Cotterrell (1999). 53 Nancy Fraser (1995) has explored in depth the tensions inherent in developing a critical theory of recognition, one which identifies and defends only those versions of the cultural politics of difference that can be coherently combined with the social politics of equality. challenging homophobic bullying in schools 199 ‘as dimensions of retribution, they become civilised by being made in the image of reason and rationality and are thereby made to disappear. Through this process they take their place as a part of law’s legitimacy.’ (p. 925) It is important to acknowledge here that this act of legitimation equally masks the ‘homophobic violence’ of head teachers rigorously enforcing gendered dress codes: ‘law’s violence becomes good violence’ (p. 925). But, in relation to the disciplined, excluded, punished ‘homophobic’ pupil, the legitimate violence of law serves to not only mask its own homophobia but positions it elsewhere, outside, onto an ‘uncivilised other’. And once again it is important to recognise that school discipline and exclusions, as with criminal justice generally, has a hugely disproportionate classed dimension (Parsons, 1999). As Munt observes, in what she describes as ‘shame logic’: ‘Violence is transposed onto these marginal spaces in a discursive shift that empties middle class life of any accountability . . . Dominant discourse has long conflated non-normative subjectivities with criminality and threat; indeed, there is a kind of discursive contagion operating in which shame is infectiously displaced.’ (2007, p. 99) This concern resonates with current debates about the construction of Islam as the ‘uncivilised other’ to secular liberal human rights; and here again school dress codes have been a critical site for this conflict (Motha, 2007; McGoldrick, 2006). That liberal agendas in the name of human rights have served to cohere with and play a role in increasing hate underscores Brown’s question: ‘What kinds of attachments to unfreedom can be discerned in contemporary political formations ostensibly concerned with emancipation?’ (1995, p. xii). This concern suggests that it is worth reflecting, at the very least, on the fact that mainstream concern with homophobic bullying coheres with concerns about Islamic fundamentalism. ‘Attachment to unfreedom’ can also be detected in the attempt to contain and control the use of the word ‘gay’ being used within schools. Much of the literature on homophobic bullying emphasises its use as a derogatory term (Rivers, 2001a; Matthews, 2001; DCSF/Stonewall, 2007; Winterman, 2008)54. Incidences of this are used to assess the extent of homophobic bullying in schools and its apparent widespread use in this way is consequently a key factor in the ability to present homophobic bullying as being ‘endemic’ and thus plays a role in extending the category of ‘abuse’. The aim here is not to deny that young people may experience it as hurtful, and far less to deny that speech itself can be harmful. Rather, the argument here is that it might not always have that impact and that attempts to curtail speech may have contradictory effects. Many young people, including young lesbians and gays, confronted with the use of the word ‘gay’ as a derogatory term suggest that they ‘don’t mean it in that way’, and that it does not reflect a negative view of lesbians and gays. The silencing of this account reinforces the concern that the homophobic bullying agenda, while premised on research with young people, looks for harm and, like much research with children, fails rigorously to engage with the ‘life-world’ of young people themselves (Blackburn, 2007). Acknowledging the complexity of children’s experiences has practical implications, for, as Blackburn argues, ‘when youth claim multiple subject positions, they are better able to identify, name and work against oppression’ (p. 50). Being sensitive to the ability of the word ‘gay’ to have different and contextualised meanings is important. As Butler argues, drawing on Austin’s concept of performative utterance, the context-specific meaning of speech is a critical factor to take into account in evaluating the uses of censorship (Butler, 1997). She also makes the strategic argument that any attempt at censorship, legal or otherwise, 54 See also ‘Challenging Homophobic Language, Stonewall Education Guide’ available at <www.stonewall.org. uk/at_school/education_for_all/quick_links/education_resources/4006.asp> (last visited 20 November 2010). 200 daniel monk necessarily propagates the very language it seeks to forbid (pp. 129–33).55 A similar argument, by Jacobs and Potter, is made in relation to hate crime generally. They argue that it mobilises new prejudices and ‘exacerbate[s] rather than ameliorate[s] social schisms and conflicts’ (1998, p. 144, quoted in Moran, 2004, p. 945). Mindful of the dangers of ‘investment in simplistic violent hierarchies of politics as either progressive or reactionary’ (Moran, 2009, p. 312), and in recognition of the ambivalent impact of hate crime, Moran has argued that ‘using violence as a resource to make a claim on the state becomes a way of gaining back the control that has been lost through violence itself’, that law can play an important educational role and that it need not promote the status quo but ‘offer a significant challenge to its heterosexism’ (2004, p. 942). In a similar vein, Grabham suggests alternatives to readings of identity-based legal rights claims as always an investment in powerlessness and injury, arguing that: ‘subjects make an impression on law when they make rights arguments, and these impressions circulate within law as traces of the hurt and trauma that they have experienced . . . They may not be expressly counter-cultural, but they do give rise to a “public culture”.’ (2009, p. 199) Identifying potential concerns about lesbian and gay engagement with law and order agendas (in this context demands for recourse to disciplinary responses to homophobic bullying) is, consequently, not to argue against these forms of engagement, but rather to suggest a need for reflection about them, in order to question the implicit political alliances that underpin them and to locate lesbian and gay political agendas within broader social and economic structures. Conclusion ‘Children are forced to solicit our anxieties, our delights, our ethics, our love, or really any form of our attention, especially when politics and moral values are made an issue.’ (Cobb, 2005, p. 119) The increased attention to and concern about homophobic bullying is a welcome development. And this article should not be read as an abstract criticism of the necessarily messy and pragmatic business of influencing policy-makers. Rather, its aim has been to raise a different set of questions. Highlighting how the twin constructions of victimhood – the innocent child and the tragic gay– dominate both academic and political narratives about homophobic bullying is not to deny real harm but to reveal the conditionality of what, on the surface, appears to be an inclusive progressive politics. The political is similarly revealed by identifying how concerns about lesbian and gay children operate as a site for broader aspirations, imaginations and contestations about a post- homophobic world and the ways in which these contestations require a form of active citizenship in accordance with the subtle shifts in governance in post- or advanced liberal societies. Finally, bringing the notion of victimhood together with an examination of the disciplinary (quasi- criminal) responses, questions have been asked about the political alliances and broader social developments that underlie seemingly ‘common-sense’ narratives of harm and causation. The fact that, in relation to legal responses, the emphasis is exclusively on disciplinary measures is far from straightforward, but, rather a reflection of precisely the way in which the harm is constructed and how it is produced by and within broader political narratives. 55 In a similar way, in examining the implications of a particular form of recognition politics, Fraser argues that ‘the practice of affirmative redistribution, as iterated over time, tends to set in motion a second – stigmatizing – recognition dynamic, which contradicts universalism’ (1995, p. 85). challenging homophobic bullying in schools 201 It is too early to tell how the issue will be addressed in the future, and the very real shift in mainstream thinking about sexuality, which this article does not underestimate, demonstrates the potential for change. But it may be that the very means by which the issue has been made speakable could limit more radical developments. 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Benjamin, johnson, A. and rocha, Samuel (2010) ‘Tragedy and the Meaning of School Shootings’, Educational Theory 60(3): 371–90. warwick, Ian, aggleton, Peter and douglas, Nicola (2001) ‘Playing it Safe: Addressing the Emotional and Physical Health of Lesbian and Gay Pupils in the UK’, Journal of Adolescence 24(1): 129–40. warwick, Ian, goodrich, Rosalind, aggleton, Peter and chase, Elaine (2006) ‘Homophobic Bullying and Schools – Responding to the Challenge’, Youth and Policy 91: 59–73. watkins, Chris, mauthner, Melanie, hewitt, Roger, epstein, Debbie and leonard, Diana (2007) ‘School Violence, School Differences and School Discourses’, Educational Research Journal 33(1): 61–74. weatherburn, Peter, davies, Peter, hickson, Ford and hartley, Mike (1999) A Class Apart: The Social Stratification of HIV Infection among Homosexually Active Men. London: SIGMA Research. weatherburn, Peter, hickson, Ford, reid, David, jessop, Kathy and hammond, Gary (2008) Multiple Chances: Findings from the United Kingdom’s UK Sex Survey 2006. London: SIGMA Research. weeks, Jeffrey (1985) Sexuality and its Discontents: Meanings, Myths and Modern Sexualities. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. weiss, M. D. (2008) ‘Gay Shame and BDSM Pride: Neoliberalism, Privacy, and Sexual Politics’, Radical History Review 100: 87–101. williamson, Ian (2000) ‘Internalized Homophobia and Health Issues Affecting Lesbians and Gay Men’ Health Education Research 15(1): 97–107. winterman, Denise (2008) ‘How “Gay” Became Children’s Insult of Choice’, BBC News Magazine, 18 March, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/uk_news/magazine/7289390.stm> (last visited 18 November 2010). youdell, Deborah (2005) ‘Sex-Gender-Sexuality: How Sex, Gender and Sexuality Constellations are Constituted in Secondary Schools’, Gender and Education 17(3): 249–70. challenging homophobic bullying in schools 207 
work_h2l27jokdrhphpwbgdxgh35jiq	----	ED 472 893 AUTHOR TITLE PUB DATE NOTE AVAILABLE FROM PUB TYPE EDRS PRICE DESCRIPTORS IDENTIFIERS ABSTRACT DOCUMENT RESUME IR 058 598 Hart, Edward T. A Look at Changes in Government Information Policies after September 11. 2002-08-00 10p.; In: Libraries for Life: Democracy, Diversity, Delivery. IFLA Council and General Conference: Conference Programme and Proceedings (68th, Glasgow, Scotland, August 18-24, 2002); see IR 058 549. For full text: http://www.ifla.org. Information Analyses (070) Speeches/Meeting Papers (150) EDRS Price MF01/PC01 Plus Postage. *Access to Information; Change; *Federal Government; Government Publications; *Information Policy; Library Policy; Library Role; *Policy Formation; Privacy; *Public Policy; Terrorism; World Affairs September 11 Terrorist Attacks 2001 One critical area in government campaigns to combat terrorism is the management and manipulation of information. This is information which is both produced by governments and private information that governments believe will be useful in the fight against terrorism. Governments are reviewing their information policies regarding access and privacy. Some countries' policies have already been directly influenced by the events of September 11 and have changed to meet the perceived new demands of combating terrorism. There are two very important areas of information policies that have changed in many countries: access to information, whether government produced or not, and privacy from government intrusion into personal information. This paper focuses on access to information. Playing a critical role implementing in these measures are information specialists and librarians who are being told to deny their patrons information while at the same time being forced to surrender information long thought of as confidential. This paper looks at the considerations and changes regarding government information made by a number of countries after September 11, as well as examining several examples of the government seeking to control private information sources, commercial and nonprofit, on grounds of security or the need to prevent "hate crimes" against threatened minority populations. (AEF) Reproductions supplied by EDRS are the best that can be made from the original document. 00 0'1 00 41') 1=1 OLASGOW 2??? 68th IFLA Council and General Conference August 18-24, 2002 Code Number: Division Number: Professional Group: Joint Meeting with: Meeting Number: 129 Simultaneous Interpretation: Yes 110-129-E 1 V Government Information and Official Publications PERMISSION TO REPRODUCE AND DISSEMINATE THIS MATERIAL HAS BEEN GRANTED BY S. Koopman TO THE EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION CENTER (ERIC) A look at changes in government information policies after September 11 Edward T. Hart Acquisitions/Government Documents Librarian New England School of Law Boston, Massachusetts, United States Introduction U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION Office of Educational Research and Improvement EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION CENTER (ERIC) This document has been reproduced as received from the person or organization Originating it. Minor changes have been made to improve reproduction quality. o Points of view or opinions stated in this document do not necessarily represent official OERI position or policy. In the aftermath of September 11, governments around the globe have reassessed their security protections in light of the extreme measures that the followers of Osama bin Laden are willing to take to carry out their anti-American campaign. If civilian planes can become missiles, what other instruments of everyday life may be used to wreck destruction? In response many governments have launched campaigns to combat this new level of terrorism. One critical area in government campaigns to combat terrorism is the management and manipulation of information. This is information which is both produced by governments and private information that governments believe will be useful in the fight against terrorism. Governments are reviewing their information policies regarding access and privacy. Some countries' policies have already been directly influenced by the events of September 11 and have changed to meet the perceived new demands of combating terrorism. There are two very important areas of information policies that have changed in many countries: access to information, whether government produced or not, and privacy from government intrusion into personal information. We will focus on access to information. Playing a critical role implementing in these measures are information specialists and librarians who are being told to deny their patrons information while at the same time being forced to surrender information long thought of as confidential. 2 BEST COPY /MIME 1 Access to Information Many countries have had a long tradition of providing access to information through regular publication of information and also public use of freedom of information statutes. Such practices are earmarks of a democratic government by providing a way for the people to check the actions of their governments. These measures have always been limited by such constraints as "national security" and privacy, but in the aftermath of September 11 new limitations on government information are being adopted by countries. Government agencies are arguing that a new level of scrutiny is needed, since some published information could aid the efforts of terrorists. This paper will look at the considerations and changes regarding government information made by a number of countries after September 11. We will also look at several examples of the government seeking to control private information sources, commercial and nonprofit, on grounds of security or the need to prevent "hate crimes" against threatened minority populations. The United States government has had a history of being one of the most open governments in the world with its diverse programs for distribution of government information and freedom of information acts (FOIA). Historically, government information is distributed through the Federal Depository Libraries program, but recently the use of the Internet has provided an increasing amount of direct public access to agencies' information sources. FOIA requires Federal agencies to provide answers to individuals' requests for information held by the agencies or provide statutory cause for not giving an answer. These acts almost put agencies on the defensive when information requests are made of them. We will now focus on information published by the United States government whether required by statute or as a matter of internal policy of the agencies to provide that information and how access to information has changed.' In the aftermath of September 11 there was a concern over the use of published government information by terrorists to cause further damage and harm to the country. Here are just a few examples of some of the information pulled from public access according to the watchdog group OMBWatch. The Department of Transportation has removed mapping information of pipelines because of the pipelines' vulnerability to attack.3 The Environmental Protection Agency is limiting the content of and the access to its databases and requiring registration protocols to track users of the information.4 The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission has removed its information on energy facilities from its website.5 It is not only from the internet that information is being removed and restricted by government 1Publishing means any distribution or making widely available for public use of information held by the government. Means of publishing includes the federal depository program, direct issue by an agency of a printed item, or posting on the internet. 2 See OMB Watch at http://ombwatch.ore for further details of this organization and its reports on access to government information post September 11th. 3 Office of Pipeline Safety, Department of Transportation at http://www.npms.rspa.dot.gov/data/npms_data_down.htm. 4OMB Watch, Access to Government Information Post September I at http://www.ombwatch.ore/article/articleview/213/1/104/ and Environmental Protection Agency, Envirofacts, at http://www.epa.gov/enviro/htm1/1 of access.htm. 5David P. Boergers, Statement of Policy of Previously Published Documents, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 97 FERC 61,030 (Oct. 11, 2001) at http://cips.ferc.fed.us/Q/CIPS/MISC/PL/PL02-1.000.TXT. 2 3 agencies. The United States Geological Survey requested the removal of a CD-ROM sent to libraries through the Federal Depository Library Program run by the Government Printing Office.6 The National Archives and Records Administration has removed access to materials within its holdings.' The Federal Depository Library Program (FDLP) looked at the issues of removing government information from public access in the November 15, 2001 issue of Administrative Notes.8 The remarks of the Superintendent of Documents Francis J. Buckley, Jr. at the Depository Library Council Meeting on October 15, 2001 reminded the librarians that the Government Printing Office (GPO) through the FDLP seeks to carry on the statutory duties of distributing government information to the people of the United States.9 He reminds government documents librarians, "The purpose of the Federal Depository Library Program is to make Government publications available for the free use of the general public and restricting such access is a direct violation of Title 44 [of the United States Code]."16 Issues of distribution and content of government publications were still being reviewed by the publishing agencies at the time of the council meeting. Buckley reminded the librarians that documents have previously been requested to be removed from depository libraries, averaging a couple such requests each year over the last few decades." The procedures for removing a document from a collection received through the program could only be done with permission of the Public Printer, the Superintendent of Documents, or their agents. The publishing agency could order a publication to be removed, but only the directions of the GPO and its officials should be followed concerning depository materials.I2 Probably the most striking change in the stance of government officials was Attorney General John Ashcroft's direction to heads of all federal departments and agencies. In a memorandum he told the 6Ariana Eunjung Cha, Risk Prompt U.S. to Limit Access to Data: Security, Rights Advocates Clash Over Need to Know, WASHINGTON POST, Feb. 24, 2002 at A01. 7National Archives and Records Administration, Access to Archival Materials in the Context of Concern about Terrorism, at http://www.nara.gov/research/accessfactsheet.html. 8 Federal Depository Library Program Government Printing Office, ADMINISTRATIVE NOTES, Nov. 15, 2001. Available at http://www.access.gpo.gov/su_docs/fdlp/pubs/adnotes/ad111501.html. 9 Francis J. Buckley, Jr., Developments in the FDLP: Remarks by Francis J. Buckley, Jr., Superintendent of Documents. ADMINISTRATIVE NOTES, Nov. 15, 2001, at 6. 10Ibid. Section 1902 of Title 44 of the United States Code reads: Government publications, except those determined by their issuing components to be required for official use only or for strictly administrative or operational purposes which have no public interest or educational value and publications classified for reasons of national security, shall be made available to depository libraries through the facilities of the Superintendent of Documents for public information. Council. I I Id. 12 Id. Buckley lays out the procedure for removing a publication in his statements to Depository Library 4 3 federal officials to resist any request for information made under FOIA procedures.13 If an agency was to deny a request, he states, "You can be assured that the Department of Justice will defend your decisions unless they lack a sound legal basis or present an unwarranted risk of adverse impact on the ability of other agencies to protect other important records."14 He points to the exception given to confidential advice and counsel given by lawyers in the FOIA as a reason for a denial of releasing information.15 Supporters of FOIA have called Ashcroft's decision undemocratic. On Public Broadcasting Corporation's show Now, Jane Kirktley, Professor of Media Ethics and Law at the University of Minnesota, said about Ashcroft, What he's saying is, the deliberations of the agencies, the information that they obtain and exchange, the whole, how we get to where we are in our governmental policy is not gonna be something that will be readily available to the public. That's not democracy in my view. It may be an efficient way for a government to operate, but I don't think we can call it a democracy.' In Canada, the federal government has its own debate about government information in light of the terrorist attacks. Canada's response to September 11 was the Anti-Terrorism Act of 2001 which received royal assent on December 18, 2001.17 The act has at least three impacts on the government's information policy. First, greater allowances are given to the Attorney General in issuing certificates to prohibit the disclosure of government information in proceedings under the Canadian Evidence Act.18 Second, limitations on telecommunication speech are extended against "spreading repeated hate messages. ,19 Three, greater allowance for law enforcement to monitor telecommunications and business records for suspicious activities.20 The first two points we will now examine while the last point will be discussed in the next section of this paper. The government of Canada on October 15, 2001 introduced bill C-36 in the House of Commons. On October 19, 2001, Canada's privacy commissioner George Radwanski said that the bill would lead to 13 Memorandum from John Ashcroft, United States Attorney General, to Heads of all Federal Departments and Agencies (Oct. 12, 2001), at http:// www. usdoj. gov /foiapost/200Ifoiapostl9.htm. 14 Id. 15 Id. 16 Jane Kirktley, Remarks on Secret Government, NOW WITH BILL MOYERS, (April 5, 2002) (transcript at http://www.pbs.org/now/transcript/transcript_secretgov.html.). 17Anti- Terrorism Act, S.C. ch. 41 (2001) (Can.). Available at http://www.parl.gc.ca/37/1/parl bus/chambu s/ho use/b ills/govern ment/C-36/C-36_4/C-36_cover-E.html. 18 Department of Justice, Amendments to the Anti-Terrorism Act, at http://canada.justice.gc.ca/en/news/nr/2001/doc_27904.html. 19 Department of Justice, Anti-Terrorism Act Receives Royal Assent, at http://canada.justice.gc.ca/en/news/nr/2001/doc_28215.html. 20 Id. 4 "widespread denial of access to government information."21 He pointed to the provisions of the bill concerning the Attorney General's certificates saying the bill would put "federal departments and agencies . . . entirely outside the reach of privacy law. Where a certificate is issued, privacy law would not apply at all."22 After the passage of the bill, Val Werier wrote in the Winnipeg Free Press, "In an over reaction to Sept. 11, the government can now do away with any independent review and appeal under the new antiterrorist act. No longer will there be independent scrutiny to determine if secrecy is justifiable on government records."23 There is concern that the elected Attorney General will abuse this new policy preventing independent review of requests of information disclosure by the privacy commissioners or the courts. The Canadian Association of Journalists (CAJ) stated, "the federal government's new antiterrorist legislation is a draconian step that severely limits access to government information."24 The president of CAJ said, "Citizens use the Access to Information act routinely, and anyone who cares about government or how we are governed should be concerned."25 In Scotland, the issue of access to government information was debated during the Scottish Parliament's consideration of that nation's Freedom of Information (Scotland) Bill which was passed January 17, 2002.26 It was taken for granted the public should have a right to access information held by the government; however, there was debate over limitations to this right. The Scottish National Party expressed concern over class exemptions, ministerial vetoes, and the cost of accessing information." It is the use of the ministerial vetoes which impacts the topic of this paper. Can ministers use the fear of terrorism to withhold information? The Campaign for Freedom of Information (CFOI) addressed this issue in December 2001 in its "The Ministerial Veto Overseas: Further evidence to the Justice 1 Committee on the Freedom of Information (Scotland) Bill."28 Mention is made of the new Canadian amendment allowing a veto on grounds of security.29 CFOI feels that no ministerial veto is necessary since several other democratic 21Canada's Privacy Commissioner says Act Would Deny Access to Information, CANADIAN PRESS, Oct. 19, 2001 at 2001 WL 29536639. 22Id. 23 Val Werier, Focus: Open Government Shuts Down, WINNIPEG FREE PRESS, Jan. 10, 2002, at Al2. 24Erik Denison, Anti-terrorism legislation too restrictive: CAJ, CBC NEWS, Oct 29, 2001. Available at http://vancouver.cbc.ca/template/servlet/View?zone=Vancouver&filename=bc_caj011029. 25Id. 26 BBC News, MSPs vote in favour of information bill, Jan. 17, 2002 at http://news.bbc.uk/hi/english/uk/scotland/newsvid-17650000/1765101.stm. 27Id. 28 The Campaign for Freedom of Information, The Ministerial Veto Overseas: Further evidence to the Justice 1 Committee on the Freedom of Information (Scotland) Bill, available at http://www.cfoi.org.uk/vetopaper.pdf 29Id. at 1. 6 5 states have not included such a measure in their FOIAs.3° The Campaign feels that government ministers should not have unchecked authority to veto information access. CFOI would not allow vetoes in relation to policy formulation, the burden of proof would be placed on ministers to show that there is a need for non disclosure, and the costs of judicial review of minister veto certificates should be met by public funds.3' The Scottish FOIA is felt to be a model for the rest of Britain even with the problems mentioned by its detractors.32 Governments are also seeking to prevent the distribution of private information on grounds of security and protection of minority population. The Canadian government shut down at the request of the United States the site www.overthrow.com on grounds, described not too specifically, of sedition, hate, and terrorism.33 The British government reportedly shut down the website of Sakina Securities because of its content of bomb making lessons for young Muslims.34 Another site was closed down because of links with Azzam Publications urging support for Muslims and calling for donations to the Taliban.35 The Electronic Frontier Foundation feels the post September 11 stance by many governments is causing the greatest challenge ever to freedom of speech and its related right of access to information whether provided by governments or private parties.36 The United States military did its own preventive steps to deny the public information from private sources regarding the fight against terrorism. It took the unusual step of buying all images of Afghanistan taken by a private satellite Ikonos instead of using its authority over "shutter control" of the satellite's imaging systems. Buying the images allows the government to control them denying any use of the images like revealing military forces locations while avoiding constitutional arguments of free speech.37 Arguments against the restriction of government information come from a broad spectrum of individuals and organizations. Jeremiah D. Baumann, the Environmental Health Advocate for the United States Public Interest Research Group (PRIG), made a statement before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure on November 8, 2001 against some of 30 Id. at 7. 31 Id. at 7-8. 32BBC News, MSPs vote in favour of information bill, Jan. 17, 2002 athttp://news.bbc.uk/hi/english/uk/scotland/newsvid-17650000/1765101.stm. 33Bill White, Canadian Feds Shut Down Overthrow.com, INDEPENDENT MEDIA CENTER-WEBCAST NEWS, Nov. 9, 2001 at http://www.indymedia.org/front.php3?article_id=86499&group=webcast 34 Reteurs, Britain Closes Extremist Site, WIRED NEWS, Oct. 4, 2001, at p://www.wired.com/news/print/0,1294,47307,00.html. 35 Johnson Hor, Chilling Effects of Anti-Terrorism: "National Security" Toll on Freedom of Expression, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION at http://www.efforg/Privacy/Surveillance/Terrorism_militias/antiterrorism_chill.html#websiteshutdownothergov. 36 Id. 37 Duncan Campbell, US Buys Up All Satellite War Images, GUARDIAN, Oct. 17, 2001 at http://www.guardian.co.uk/waronterror/story/0,1361,575594,00.html. 6 7 BEST COPY ACOLABLE the new restrictions on government information.38 He argues that while the government should be taking steps to protect government information from use by a terrorist, it should not do so at the cost of lost protection of the general public. His concern deals with the Environmental Protection Agency's discontinuation of posting on the agency's web site information about chemical storage. The public can no longer keep itself informed about the possible hazards in their communities. Restricting the data makes it harder for local communities to be prepared for emergencies, including attacks by terrorists. The restriction also eliminates a check on industry by allowing it to escape scrutiny of the public. Baumann believes that the grounds for excluding publication of information already in freedom of information acts provide enough protection for security. Baumann offers three factors for determining the withholding of information. First, what is the benefit to public safety by making available to the public the information in question? Second, what type of information is being withheld, whether it is general enough to alert the public while not being specific enough to aid terrorists? Third, what is the availability of the information from other sources?39 Roles of Librarians When Joy Suh, the government documents librarian at George Mason University, received a letter telling her to destroy a CD-ROM containing details of the country's water supply, she complied without hesitation, but now she worries that this move represents the beginning "of a more secretive period in American society."4° Suh said, "I debate both sides in my mind. I see the government aspect of it. I also see how researchers and the public might need this data."41 This dilemma faces all librarians. Librarians contend with changes in government information policies from both sides. They seek to provide full access to information for their patrons while also protecting their patrons' privacy from government intrusion. For U.S. librarians there are concerns that the USA Patriot Act intrudes upon the confidentiality of patrons' records of use of library resources. Miriam Nisbet, the legislative counsel for the American Library Association, holds that the act gives law enforcement the right to access to business records which could include patron records kept by libraries.42 The typical practice at American academic libraries is to destroy any record of a use of a library item after the item's return. At Cornell University, Ross Atkinson, deputy university librarian, finds it troublesome that records of patrons' transactions are kept for thirty-five days on backup tapes. These are needed in case of computer crashes and the time lag before the tapes' destruction cannot be shortened. Probably greater concerns for privacy are the probable login records kept of library users accessing electronic information resources from off campus. These 38 Jeremiah D. Baumann, Right to Know Details of Chemical Supplies, CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY BY FEDERAL DOCUMENT CLEARING HOUSE, Nov. 8, 2001, 2001 WL 26187661. 39 Id. 40Ariana Eunjung Cha, Risk Prompt U.S. to Limit Access to Data: Security, Rights Advocates Clash Over Need to Know, WASHINGTON POST, Feb. 24, 2002, at A01. 41 Id. 42 Scott Carlson and Andrea L. Foster, Colleges Fear Anti-Terrorism Law Could Turn Them into Big Brother: Provisions about networks and library records raise privacy and academic freedom issues, CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUCATION, March 1, 2001, at A32. a records could even track what information the users are accessing.43 Atkinson expresses concern that this act moves American society toward an Orwellian future." During consideration of the antiterrorism bill, representatives of the American Association of Law Libraries, the American Library Association, and Association of Research Libraries addressed in an open letter to members of Congress the concerns of librarians regarding the measures being undertaken!' Attached to the letter was a memorandum entitled Library Community Statement on Proposed Anti- Terrorism Measures." Directly affecting librarians were concerns about the expanded use of pen registers and tracing devices on library computer networks and the easier access to business records including library circulation records. Recommendations were made that asked that law enforcement agencies be required to continue having to meet the high standard of obtaining a court order to access information and that law enforcement searches and intrusions should be as narrowly focused as possible!' In Scotland, the Scottish Library and Information Council and Scottish Library Association made a response to the proposed Freedom of Information (Scotland) Bill during the consultancy stage.48 The council and the association felt that the adoption of the Scottish FOIA is a welcome step in meeting the public's rights to and needs for information available for government agencies. Their concerns were the cost to individual members of the public seeking information and the recognition that an information commissioner was needed to govern the FOIA's provisions and to ensure full disclosure of information allowed by law and not politics.49 Librarians do need to be careful of being overzealous in denying users access to information. The FDLP reminded government documents librarians that it was the only body with authority to order withdrawal of documents in libraries collections. This reminder was issued after Mary Bennett, government documents librarian at State University of New York/Oswego, sent an email to fellow librarians urging them to withdraw from their collections documents from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Only the United States Government Printing Office may tell government documents 43 Id. 44 Id. 45 Letter from Mary Alice Baish, Associate Washington Affairs Representative, American Association of Law Libraries; Lynne Bradley, Director, Office of Government Relations, American Library Association; and Prudence S. Adler, Associate Executive Director, Association of Research Libraries, to Members of the United States Congress 1 (Oct. 2, 2001) (available at http://www.ala.org/washoff/terrorismletter.pdf). 46 Statement from the American Association of Law Libraries, American Library Association, and Association of Research Libraries, to the United States Congress (Oct. 2, 2001) (available at http://www.ala.org/washoff/terrorism.pdf). 471d. 48 Scottish Library and Information Council and Scottish Library Association, An Open Scotland: Freedom of Information: A Consultation: Response by Scottish Library and Information Council and Scottish Library Association, at http://www.slainte.org.uk/Slicpubs/FreedomInfo.pdf. 49 Id. 9 8 librarians to deny users access to government information.5° Conclusion The impact of September 11 on information policies of governments continues and probably will so for the foreseeable future. There is risk of providing helpful information to terrorists when governments share with the public details of government resources and the results of government studies on a nearly unlimited number of subjects. But democratic governments cannot cut off the public from government information or invade the information privacy of the public without some harm to the freedom that a democratic government allows a country to have. Librarians and information professionals need to be in the vanguard of protecting access to public information and intrusion of private information. This is a duty that every librarian around the globe should embrace and fulfill as much as they can in their libraries, in the nations, and across national borders. 50 American Library Association, GPO Turns Tables, Calls on Librarians Not to Restrict Access, AMERICAN LIBRARIES: NEWS, March 4, 2002 at http://www.ala.org/alonline/news/2002/020304.html. 0 U.S. Department of Education Office of Educational Research and Improvement (OERI) National Library of Education (NLE) Educational Resources Information Center (ERIC) NOTICE Reproduction Basis Edseatitmal Beacon =Mos CalaBeacon This document is covered by a signed "Reproduction Release (Blanket)" form (on file within the ERIC system), encompassing all or classes of documents from its source organization and, therefore, does not require a "Specific Document" Release form. This document is Federally-funded, or carries its own permission to reproduce, or is otherwise in the public domain and, therefore, may be reproduced by ERIC without a signed Reproduction Release form (either "Specific Document" or "Blanket"). EFF-089 (1/2003) 
work_h4ryup7wwnh3zp3zzwz2odfj5e	----	Seeing Red Over Black and White: Seeing Red Over Black and White: Popular and Media Representations of Inter-racial Relationships as Precursors to Racial Violence Dr. Barbara Perry University of Ontario Institute of Technology Dr. Michael Sutton Nottingham-Trent University The recent murder in the UK of Anthony Walker attests to the lingering antipathy, indeed hostility, toward intimate inter-racial relationships, especially those involving black men and white women. Seventeen year-old Walker was brutally beaten then fatally assaulted with an axe to his head - the “provocation” for the attack was this young black man’s relationship with his white girl friend. This paper assesses the historical and contemporary images and mythologies that continue to stigmatize inter-racial relationships. Specifically, we look at the representations disseminated through varied popular media forms. The paper suggests that these mediated constructs condition an environment that facilitates, if not encourages, violence against those in inter-racial relationships. Remember those wonderful Saturday mornings as a child, when you were firmly planted in front of the television watching cartoons? Do you remember, specifically, watching Krazy Kat? It was a typical cat and mouse cartoon, much like Tom and Jerry, right? Apparently not. In retrospect, with the wisdom of middle age, we can now see the raced, gendered and sexed undertones that permeated that “study in black and white.” While not the first, Krazy Kat was perhaps the most creative “documentary” of images of intimate inter-racial relationships (IIR) in the media. The authors of this chapter have been exploring the issue of public responses – including violent responses – to IIRs for some time now. One of the issues that arises with some regularity is the foundation for what have typically been negative reactions to black-white IIRs. Undoubtedly, the basis is to be found in associated cultural images. And while these emerge in myriad sites – legislation, political rhetoric, and white supremacist websites, for example – our present interest is in media representations of IIRs that reinforce the images of IIRs as dysfunctional at best, dangerous transgressions at worst. The prevailing trend has been to either Pre-Print deny the existence of IIRs by rendering them invisible, or to portray them as “unnatural” border crossings. What we offer here are some tentative first thoughts on media representations of IIRs. We say “tentative” here because there is a glaring paucity of literature from which we are able to draw conclusions. While racialized images have been the focus of considerable inquiry, this analysis has not extended to how these images bleed into representations of inter-racial relationships. Our paper opens with a consideration of the role of controlling myths in shaping our perceptions of difference. In particular, we emphasize the ways in which cultural constructions of race and gender set up the context in which IIRs are subsequently enacted and perceived. We turn then to the heart of the paper: observations on the ways in which the noted images are portrayed in one cultural form, that is, the media. While there are some exceptions, the tendency has been to portray IIRs in very derogatory ways, whether as inherently doomed, or as inherently dangerous to “racial purity.” We close with a brief discussion of how these widespread mythologies might inform subsequent violence against those involved in IIRs in the real – as opposed to mediated – world. Border Crossing The hostility toward interracial relationships and interracial sexuality is ultimately grounded in the essentialist understanding of racial difference. Boundary crossing is thus not only unnatural, but threatening to the rigid hierarchies which have been built around these presumed differences. This sentiment is evident in a letter to the editor written in response to a photo of black and white youths dancing together: Interracial marriages are unbiblical and immoral. God created different races of people and placed them amongst themselves . . . There is nothing for white Pre-Print Americans to gain by mixing their blood with blood of other peoples. There will only be irreversible damage for us (cited in Mathabane and Mathabane, 1992: 186). The essentialist, mutually exclusive categories of belonging that frame hostility toward those in IIRs assume an either/or understanding of identity, in which one is forced to choose “a side.” Discrete, “normally” impermeable boundaries are assumed. Consequently, identity formation is often concerned with “drawing boundaries, engaging in boundedness, configuring rings around” the categories of difference (Weis, Proweller and Centrie, 1997:214). The task of difference, then, is to police the borders between categories. There is no room for elision or “border crossing,” since this would threaten the “natural” order. Either side of these borders is significant to the extent that each is “posted” with exclusionary signs that keep whites on one side of the fence, and blacks on the other. They are integral, then, in creating the boundaries that inform public responses to IIRs. When speaking of IIRs, sexuality becomes a particularly important “construction site.” Every culture can be characterized by a series of definitions of “appropriate” and “inappropriate” sexual forms. Specifically, those definitions “provide permissions, prohibitions, limits and possibilities” with respect to activities, partners and objects of sexuality (Messerschmidt, 1993:73). Given these definitions - which typically include prohibitions on interracial couplings - certain behaviors and identities become marginalized at best, stigmatized and demonized at worst. Again, whatever is outside the norm is considered deviant, the negative Other, and therefore subordinate on the hierarchy of sexuality. Popular culture – including the media – is integral in reinforcing these prohibitions. Goldberg (1990: 297) describes a relatively consistent discursive formation characterized by Pre-Print ... a totality of ordered relations and correlations - of subjects to each other and to objects; of economic production and reproduction, cultural symbolism, and signification; of laws and moral rules; of social, political, economic or legal inclusion and exclusion. The socio-discursive formation consists of a range of rules: “is’s” and “oughts,” “do’s” and “dont’s,” “cans” and “cannots,” “thou shalts” and “thou shalt nots.” Popular culture thus plays a vital role in reminding black and white people alike that “thou shalt not” cross the boundaries of sexuality which have been built up since the first black slave was brought to these shores. From the perspective - historical and contemporary - of white Americans, one of the most palpable realms of difference between “us” and “them” lies in sexuality. And it is in this context that people of color – and people who transgress the boundaries - are often subject to the most vicious opprobrium and hostility precedent to racial violence. While they are perceived generally as threatening - in economic, political and social terms - they are especially to be feared, ridiculed and censured on the basis of their presumed sexualities. Black male sexuality is constructed as a “dangerous, powerful and uncivilized force that is hazardous to white women and a serious threat to white men” (Daniels, 1997: 93). Moreover, women of color are also feared and reviled on the same basis: they are racialized, exotic Others who do not fit the Western ideal of womanhood. Whether male or female, people of color – and their white partners - are most at risk of public opprobrium when they visibly cross the racialized sexual boundaries by engaging in interracial relationships. On the basis of these controlling images of people of color, white women and especially white men are fearful and suspicious of the sexualities of the Other. Speaking of the white fear of black bodies in particular, West (1993: 119) contends that this Pre-Print . . . fear is rooted in visceral feelings about black bodies and fueled by sexual myths of black men and women . . . either as threatening creatures who have the potential for sexual power over whites, or as harmless, desired underlings of a white culture. White Western culture has long held to paradoxical controlling images of the sexualities of people of color. Foremost among these has been the tendency to imagine people of color as “excessive, animalistic, or exotic in contrast to the ostensibly restrained or “civilized” sexuality of white women and men” (Frankenberg, 1993: 75). At different times, in different contexts, most non-white groups have been perceived as sexual predators, guided by their animal-like instincts. Since all but the white race were historically held to be subhuman creatures anyway, it was a small step to paint the Others’ sexuality in similar terms. Unlike their white superiors, people of color had not learned to tame their sexual desires, nor to direct them toward “appropriate” objects, i.e., members of their own race. Nowhere have white fears been more palpable than in their historical relationship with black males. No other group has been so narrowly defined by their sexuality as have black males. This was clear under slavery, where “bucks” were valued for their breeding capacity, but also where black male subordination was justified on the grounds of his savage and beastly nature. As Messerschmidt (1997: 23) contends, black masculinity was irrevocably defined in terms of black sexuality, which in turn, was seen as “animalistic and bestial.” Thus, the unrestrained instincts and desires of black men could be reined in only through the use or threat of violence. The sexualized image of black males was reproduced in post-bellum culture. In fact, to the extent that black sexual independence was correlated with their economic and political Pre-Print freedom, they presented an even greater threat to white masculine superiority. The fact that alleged black rapists were as often castrated as lynched suggests an attempt to emasculate the “savage” by symbolically (and literally) erasing his identity - much as one would control a wild dog. The vicious forms of punishment meted out to black males served to highlight their animal nature, at the same time that it reinforced the power and hegemony of white males. Consequently, Both race and masculine difference were reproduced through the practice of lynching and castration and ultimately emasculating the African American male body (Messerschmidt, 1997: 36). The presumption of black male as sexual predator continues to underlie racial difference and racial violence in the contemporary era. In fact, the myth of lascivious, rapacious and insatiable black sexuality is perhaps one of the most enduring themes in Western racialized cultures. It emerged in the 1988 Willie Horton ads; it was also evoked even by Clarence Thomas’ claim that he was the victim of a “hi-tech” lynching; and it ensured Mike Tyson’s conviction for sexual assault. The image of the black sexual predator is the cultural lens through which whites perceive blacks. It is difficult, if not impossible, to see interracial relationships as anything other than a threat under the weight of such an age old historical legacy. Creating the Images The above mentioned popular images of IIRs find their way into the popular imagination in myriad ways. They float freely in casual conversation; they find their way into sermons from the pulpits of many religions; they have, in the past, been embedded in anti-miscegenation legislation. The focus, here, however, is on the ways in which the media (mis)represent IIRs. Most striking, perhaps, is the relative absence of IIRs across media forms. As bell hooks reminds Pre-Print us, “True love in television and movies is almost always an occurrence between those who share the same race. When love happens across boundaries as in The Bodyguard, Zebraland, or A Bronx Tale, it is doomed for no apparent reason and/or has tragic consequences” (hooks, 1995, 113). This contrasts with data on the actual rates of inter-racial marriage, for example. U.S. census figures reveal that approximately 10 percent of marriages are inter-racial (Nagel, 2003, p24). In the U.S., in marriages between Black and White people, the odds are 3 to 1 that the wife will be White. In the UK, specifically in Greater London, twice as many Black men as Black women are in an IIRs. Out of the 363,000 Black/White marriages in existence in the U.S. in 2000, 73.8 percent of them were comprised of a Black husband and White wife. These patterns tend not to be reflected in media representations of IIRs. Such media couplings have been rare historically. This invisibility has, in fact, been mandated by various state and local laws. A 1930 Mississippi state law expressly forbade and literature involving inter-racial marriage. Hollywood’s Production Code banned “miscegenation” in film from the 1930s until the 1950s. Ironically, the medium which seems to have garnered the most scholarly attention is the medium that probably has the least impact on audiences. Analyses of IIRs in literature are arguably the most common academic forays into this area. Yet readership remains very low in both the United States and the UK. A recent report by the National Endowment for the Arts, found that less than half of the population polled in 2002 had read any literature (i.e., novels) in the preceding year – down 10 percentage points from 1992. Only 12% and 4%, respectively, indicated that they had read poetry or plays (National Endowment for the Arts, 2004). While tragic for a number of reasons, the low levels of reading also suggest that looking to literature as a key source and support for popular images of interracial mixing is misplaced. Pre-Print The irony is that this has, historically, been among the richest sources of both the celebration and denigration of IIRs. Anti-slavery literature, for example, was replete with characters who successfully crossed the colour line; of course, detractors also had their literary outlets (Sanchez- Eppler, (2000). “Southern fiction” generally tended to explore almost obsessively interracialism, intimate and otherwise (Arbery, 2000). So threatening was even the hint of miscegenation that Mississippi, for one, legislated in 1930 against the mention of interracial marriage in any piece of literature. Ironically, in light of such legislation, positive portrayals of IIRs were rare even then. Both white and black writers railed against mixed-race relationships in their fiction. Jerome B. Holgate’s A Sojourn in the City of Amalgamation (1935) was an early dystopian novel featuring rampant IIRs; a modern parallel is to be found in William Pierce’s The Turner Diaries (1978). Black authors, too, wrote disparagingly of boundary crossing. A 1967 novel by John Olliver Killens, ‘Sippi, “portrays interracial intimacy as an infantile phase that many black men go through before taking on the serious responsibilities of racial loyalty and leadership” (Kennedy, 2003: 134). Sadly, even those novels whose central theme revolves around a critique of racism – like those of William Faulkner – tend to reproduce images of IIRs that treat it as “a problem – a problem, moreover, surrounded by shame, misery, ostracism, violence, and death” (Kennedy, 2003: 135). In short, pessimism prevails even in those works that recognize the cultural constructs that give rise to the divisions between black and white. Contemporary audiences are much more likely to turn to electronic media for their entertainment (NEA, 2004).1 TV and film are the media of choice for the vast majority of 1 The NEA report claims that “the decline in reading correlates with increased participation in a variety of electronic media, including the Internet, video games, and portable digital devices” (NEA, 2004: xii). This paper makes no attempt to explore the themes of IIRs in these electronic alternatives, focusing instead on television and film. If the literature on these is sparse, that on new electronic media is virtually non-existent. Pre-Print Americans and Brits. And looking at these, it is clear that depictions of IIRs are rare, and where they appear, not entirely flattering. We look first at television programming. In the opening paragraph, we referred to the Krazy Kat cartoon. Meant as much – perhaps more – for adults as for children, Krazy Kat was a conscious statement on race and gender by its creator, George Herriman. It is remarkable, in retrospect, that it survived the censors’ scissors. This is perhaps testament to the subtlety of the cartoon’s writing. Here we have a complicated interspecies – and interracial - love triangle involving a black (African American judging by the dialect) cat, a white mouse, and a white dog (also a police officer). In some respects, the cartoon was self- consciously autobiographical: “the playful universe of Krazy Kat can be linked to Herriman’s life as a mixed race individual living in a world where people were forced to be either black or white” (Heer, 2005: 11). Krazy Kat is particularly refreshing if one considers its counterparts of the day. Written during the 1930s and 1940s, this was a subtly anti-racist tract, surrounded by largely conservative comic strips, as evidenced, for example, but the frequently racist caricatures and dialogue of the likes of Bugs Bunny cartoons. After Krazy Kat, it would be many years, decades, in fact, before IIRs would be even suggested on the small screen. The historical trend has been toward marginalizing, if not excluding IIRs generally. In the contemporary era, consider the ever popular soap operas. In spite of their daytime showing, these programs do not shy away from highly charged intimate relationships or overt sexuality. Among TV genres, they excel in the portrayal of intimate relationships generally. Yet they rarely feature inter-racial relationships. General Hospital did carry an interracial story line for some time. However, this was the exception, rather than the rule. Bramlett-Solomon and Farwell (1997) found no examples of IIRs in their study of 132 Pre-Print hours of soaps, over an 8 week period. Even for this often risqué genre, IIRs appear to be a taboo subject area. Day time talk shows are especially complicit in characterizing IIRs as inherently dysfunctional and in fact dangerous for those engaged in such. Motivated by the desire to provide titillating morality plays, shows like Geraldo, Dr. Phil, even Oprah, tend to be dominated by inter-racial couples who have experienced censure rather than support, tragedy rather than joy. The message that results from this consistently negative imagery is that IIRs are “unnatural” and incapable of long term success. So great is the raced and gendered border crossing that participants could not hope to survive the leap. In Race Mixing, Renee Romano reports the experiences of IIR couples she had interviewed. Many of these had been rejected from inclusion on such shows because their stories were not exciting, that is, because they had not experienced widespread problems in their interactions with others or between themselves: A white man married to a black woman felt as though he and his wife had been asked to participate in a freak show rather than a serious discussion of the issues of being an interracial couple. Producers of the Geraldo show were “very disappointed that there was nothing weird about our relationship and that we were accepted by all the people that we socialize with and work for” ( Romano, 2003: 277-278). This is obviously not the stuff of day time TV, which thrives on controversy and pain. The audience does not tune in to hear about others’ successes, but about their failures. Consequently, as Romano concluded from her interviews, “a show on dysfunctional interracial relationships may serve to stigmatize all who are intermarried by giving credence to negative stereotypes that still circulate in the wider society” (Romano, 2003: 278). To be fair, recent years have seen some shift, some willingness to push the boundaries of Pre-Print viewers’ tolerance. Prime time television, for instance, has moved toward greater diversity in it portrayal of intimate relationships. Some very popular and very successful television shows have integrated either ongoing or single episode relationships between black and white individuals. As Romano (2003: 275) notes, While a single touch between black and white singers on a television show elicited howls of protest in the 1960s, by 1975 it was possible to feature a married interracial couple on a regular television series. The Jeffersons, which premiered in 1975 and ran for ten years, featured Tom and Helen Willis, a white man and black woman, who were the neighbors and friends of George and Helen Jefferson. More recent programming has also introduced interracial story lines. Ratings winners like LA Law, Ally McBeal, West Wing, and Sex in the City have all featured interracial relationships with little evidence that they suffered subsequent loss of viewers. While generally portrayed as relatively unproblematic relationships, the fact that they are treated as exceptional within the plot attests to the fact that they continue to be seen as abnormal, if not “freakish.” Rather than being woven seamlessly into the ensemble of the cast, they become the storyline. The advertising that accompanies television programming adds an interesting piece to the mix. Typically, couples shopping for cars, or appliances, or other household goods are same race, and also typically, white. Few campaigns risk social censure – and worse, loss of consumers – by featuring characters who do not represent the norm. Consider Visa’s commercials featuring the New York Yankees’ Derek Jeter. He is seen to be out on the town, moving from up-scale bar to up-scale bar, always in the company of very light skinned but still “black” women. This stands in stark opposition to his “real life” experiences, in that Jeter is well known to have had relationships with white women as well as women of colour – so well known Pre-Print that he has received death threats accusing him of being a race traitor. It suggests that this very mainstream corporation was unwilling to risk a campaign that might challenge the public’s tolerance for racial transgression. To be commercially successful, cinematic films also tread a very thin line around racial themes. This has not always been the case. In the early days of film, the likes of D.W. Griffith were not at all demure in their attacks on interracial relationships. In 1915, Griffith’s Birth of a Nation offered what amounted to the very first cinematic scene of interracial sexuality. However, what was portrayed was not so much a loving IIR as a stereotypical representation of the salacious black male (white actor in blackface) stalking and threatening the virginal white woman. This fit quite nicely with the sentiment of the day, reinforcing as it did the standard perception of animalistic black men. It would also set the tone for film treatment of IIRs that emphasized the historical continuity of the predatory black male, but not the parallel theme of the sexual exploitation of black women. That we have not come very far is evident in the 1995 movie, Just Cause, which is the modern day parallel to Birth of a Nation. Here, too, sexual relations between blacks and whites are characterized as violent, involuntary couplings dominated by the “black rapist-cum-murderer” (Courtney, 2005: xvi). In the interim between Birth of a Nation and Just Cause, there have been successive attempts to present both disparaging and sympathetic portrayals of IIRs, with the former predominating. As noted previously, there was a gap between the 1930s and the 1950s when the Production Code mitigated against movies with “offensive” themes like miscegenation. Not surprisingly, perhaps, with the eradication of the Code in 1950, Interracial tropes examined in earlier periods return with a vengeance in attempts to fortify increasingly beleaguered white male subjects facing increasing demands for racial justice Pre-Print and a host of gender pressures. And when old methods repeatedly fail, new and sometimes drastic measures are taken to restore white male privilege and vision (Courtney, 2005: 16). The demise of the Production Code unleashed a veritable duel between pro- and anti- miscegenation themes. Most memorable and lasting was of course, Guess Who’s Coming to Dinner. This was a ground-breaking film, in that it directly confronted the American psyche with the “challenge” of interracial marriage. It offered a fictional scenario responding to the often asked question “what if your daughter wanted to marry a black man.” More significantly, it “represented a very public refutation of the long-accepted white position on interracial marriage. It not only argued that interracial relationships could be healthy, but also suggested that social opprobrium should not prevent couples from marrying and placed whites who opposed interracial relationships as wrong” (Romano, 2003: 204). Yet it did so in a relatively safe, neutral way. There was no intimation of sexuality. The relationship between the central characters was chaste, with only fleeting kiss seen through a rear view mirror. Thus, the “threat” was minimized. Contrast Guess Who’s Coming to Dinner to more recent fare, which is characterized by some diversity in its treatment of IIRs. There are those that seem to reproduce the 1950s “innocence.” In The Pelican Brief, for example, Denzel Washington and Julia Roberts’ characters share only a platonic relationship, while the novel featured a romantic involvement. Jungle Fever, on the other hand, has been widely criticized for denying the viability of black- white relationships. Different still are feature films in which the relationships between black and white characters are explicitly eroticized – films like Bad Company, One Night Stand, and Bulworth. Perhaps more promising are those, such as The Bodyguard, in which “interracial intimacy is of little or no significance. This is an important development because presuming the Pre-Print normalcy of interracial intimacy – treating it as “no big deal” – may be more subversive of traditional norms than stressing the racial heterodoxy of such relationships” (Kennedy, 2003: 133). Still, such representations are disturbingly few. From Image to Action White and black people learning lessons from mass media about racial bonding are taught that curiosity about those who are racially different can be expressed as long as boundaries are not actually crossed and no genuine intimacy emerges (hooks, 1995: 113). Should the “lessons” alluded to by hooks not be learned – whether on the screen or on the street – the potential consequences are dire. Both on film and on the street, those engaged in or perceived to be engaged in, intimate interracial relationships are subject to ridicule, abuse, even violence. This was the tragic lesson learned by black murder victims Anthony Walker, killed in Merseyside (UK) in 2005 and Jody-Gaye Bailey, killed in Florida in 2006. Both were killed by young white men offended by their relationships with white men and women. The most dramatic illustration are the murders committed by Joseph Paul Franklin – it is estimated that between 1977 and 1980 he took the lives of thirteen the black and white victims, all of whom had been involved in interracial relationships. Among the potential effects of the media tendency to stigmatize or demonize IIRs is that it contributes to a culture that bestows “permission to hate,” indeed, permission to engage in hate crime. As Snow et al. (1986: 464) have argued, the media frames that we have pointed to here do more than provide entertainment, and even more than shape perceptions; they can also serve as a “guide to action.” Media constructs define and assess their objects, but they also “suggest remedies” (Entman, cited in Greenberg, 2002). Among the remedies available for re-aligning intimate relationships that have blurred raced and sexed positions is bias motivated violence. Pre-Print That media images are at least complicit in this is clear, though not self-evident. Earlier, we referred to Romano’s (2003) interviews with interracial couples. One such couple claimed that the film Jungle Fever had given racists – black and white alike – a weapon to use against them. They were frequently met with taunts using the title as a sobriquet for their transgressive behaviour. Similarly, Mark Mathabane, writing of his own experiences as part of a mixed race couple, found that he and his wife became the focus of attention as they left the theatre after viewing the same movie. To the extent that individuals or groups “perform” in ways that corresponds to the “mythical norm” or in ways that correspond to normative – as given by the media - conceptions of one’s identity construct, they are held to be doing difference appropriately (Messerschmidt, 1997). In so doing, they uphold the boundaries that separate them from the Other, and ultimately the social relations of power. Conversely, when individuals or groups cross those boundaries, when they fail to perform their identity in normative ways, they are held to be doing difference inappropriately, and thereby leave themselves open to censure. Indeed, where they appear to personify the stigmatized characterizations seen through the media lens, they are especially likely to evoke hostility, and occasionally, violence: Racialized depictions of sexual purity, dangerousness, appetites, desirability, perversion are part of the performative construction of sexual respectability and disreputability, normalcy and deviance. Ethnosexual frontiers are exotic, but volatile social spaces, fertile sites for the eruption of violence. Racial, ethnic, or nationalist defense and enforcement of in-group sexual honor and purity strengthens ethnic boundaries and subjugates members enclosed inside ethnic borders. . . Negative images or accusations about the sexuality of ethnic Others contribute to the creation of disreputable and toxic outgroups and can be Pre-Print used to justify their exclusion, repression, or extermination (Nagel, 2003: 55). In such a context, those perceived to be publicly involved in IIRs may become vulnerable to attack. With this in mind, Miller’s (1995:57) questions can be answered: ... when does ... confrontation with difference have negative effects: when does it lead to great difficulty, deterioration, and distortion, and to some of the worst forms of degradation, terror and violence - both for individuals and for groups - that human beings can experience? The answer: when boundaries are threatened, when men or women, black or white, forget their place, when they reach across raced borders and dare to become intimately involved with the “wrong” person. The threat must be repressed, and, in the context of IIRs, raced boundaries of sexuality preserved. It is here that hate crime can emerge as a response to in the media portrayal of these “unnatural” relationships, as a punishment for those in the real world who have chosen an inappropriate partner. Within the essentialist understanding of identities, there is very little space for ambiguity, or for crossing the boundaries between categories of difference. In other words, accountability involves the assessment of behavior as either conforming or deviating from culturally normative standards. Whenever we “do difference” - which is a recurring effort - we leave ourselves open to reward or censure. So it is that we are discouraged from the “attempt to cross the line, to transgress, desert or quit” (Bourdieu, cited in Fine, 1997:58). One of the threads that binds together the cultural images highlighted above is the co- construction of the black sexual predator and the white savior. At the height of white resistance to black citizenship, South Carolina Senator Bill Tillman expressed the black threat and the white response: Pre-Print The white women of the South are in a state of siege . . . Some lurking demon who has watched for the opportunity seizes her; she is ravished, her body prostituted, her purity destroyed, her chastity taken from her . . . So far as I am concerned he has put himself outside the pale of the law, human and divine . . . We revert to the impulse to “kill, kill, kill” (cited in Wiegman, 1993: 237-238). Only through avenging the “defilement” of the white woman can the white male reclaim his appropriate position as the “protector” and “savior” of white women. This simultaneously reflects the black male image of “evil” and the white male image of “goodness” (and of course white women as defenseless). As noted above, especially in discussing film portrayals, this theme has been an historical constant. Fine et al. (1997: 57-58) uncovered contemporary evidence of this dichotomization in their interviews with white male high school students, who proclaimed both their right and duty to preserve the chastity of white girls, for themselves: Much expressed racism centers on white men’s entitled access to white women, thus serving the dual purpose of fixing black men and white women on a ladder of social relations . . . This felt need to protect white girls translates as a code of behavior for white male students. It is the fact that Black men are invading White women, the property of White men, that is at issue here. In defending their white girls from the unrestrained sexuality of black boys, the white boys are also defending themselves - that is, the sanctity of their own carefully restrained, “civilized,” normative sexuality. These youths are reacting to messages received from the broader culture, including the popular media forums discussed above. Few other interpretations are available to them when a high school principal can ban interracial dating with the disclaimer Pre-Print that “It is not that I have anything against interracial dating . . . It’s just that those black boys really want our white girls” (cited in Fine, 1997: 59). Next Steps What we have offered here is not the definitive last word on the issue of media representations of IIRs. On the contrary, our remarks must be seen as very tentative preliminary observations. What is drastically needed is more extensive research like that done by Bramlett- Solomon and Farwell (1997) on day time soaps, for example. There have been very few such concrete analyses of media treatment of people in IIRs, or on the media treatment of the dynamics of those relationships. It is quite likely, as we have alluded to, that different media may, in fact, offer quite different representations. 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work_h5byuwonlrgapp6fc6mdfnetlu	----	C:\iTools\WMS\TandF-Journals\4743659\WorkingFolder\HPPC_A_869337.dvi This article was downloaded by: [University of Michigan] On: 20 February 2014, At: 10:44 Publisher: Routledge Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK Popular Communication: The International Journal of Media and Culture Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/hppc20 Arabs and Muslims in the Media: Race and Representation after 9/11, by Evelyn Alsultany Anamik Saha a a Goldsmiths, University of London Published online: 11 Feb 2014. To cite this article: Anamik Saha (2014) Arabs and Muslims in the Media: Race and Representation after 9/11, by Evelyn Alsultany, Popular Communication: The International Journal of Media and Culture, 12:1, 65-68, DOI: 10.1080/15405702.2013.869337 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15405702.2013.869337 PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the “Content”) contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sources of information. 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Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms- and-conditions http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/hppc20 http://www.tandfonline.com/action/showCitFormats?doi=10.1080/15405702.2013.869337 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15405702.2013.869337 http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions Popular Communication, 12: 65–68, 2014 Copyright © Taylor & Francis Group, LLC ISSN: 1540-5702 print / 1540-5710 online DOI: 10.1080/15405702.2013.869337 BOOK REVIEW Arabs and Muslims in the Media: Race and Representation after 9/11. By Evelyn Alsultany. New York, NY: New York University Press, 2013, ISBN 9780814707326, 239 pages, $23.00 (paperback); ISBN 9780814707319, 239 pages, $75.00 (hardback). Anamik Saha Goldsmiths, University of London In the aftermath of 9/11, the American media was not in fact saturated with the incendiary images of Arab and Muslims that one might have suspected. In a country that has during times of war seen particular migrant populations excessively policed and governed (as in the case of Japanese Americans during the Second World War or Russians during the Cold War), it is perhaps surpris- ing that the American Arab and Muslim communities were not more demonized in the media. On the contrary, there appears to have been a more measured response from both the government and the media who were quick to stress that despite having a handful of terrorists in its midst, the vast majority of Muslim and Arab Americans are peaceful and fully assimilated into the American way of life. Apart from the predictable reactionary response from Fox News and other far right news outlets, there was an attempt, particularly in television popular dramas, to present more measured representations of Arabs and Muslims, or at least more complex narratives that seemed to want to make a point of not tarnishing an entire “race” or religious group as terrorists, as savage or barbaric. For many, this sympathetic portrayal of Arab and Muslim identities repre- sented progress in the United States’ troubled relationship with race and racism, even suggesting that it was indicative of a new postrace era, following the election of the first black president. In Arabs and Muslims in the Media: Race and Representation after 9/11, Evelyn Alsultany interrogates these supposedly more rounded representations through case studies of television dramas such as 24, Sleeper Cell, Law and Order, news coverage of the War and Terror, par- ticularly relating to domestic affairs, and public service announcements. Coming from a radical cultural studies perspective, Alsultany argues that what appear as positive representations of Arab and Muslim identities in the media obscures the very real instances of racial violence, and civil liberty and human rights violations encountered by Arab and Muslim (and South Asian) in US communities. Alsultany’s argument is that these phenomena, rather that appearing to contra- dict each other, are in fact interconnected. As she states, “government and media discourses” together form a “hegemonic field of meaning” (p. 7); that is, they are inextricably intertwined. As such, the task for Alsultany is to explain how sympathetic representations of Arab and Muslim American identities circulate within this wider field of meaning, and how this particular discursive D ow nl oa de d by [ U ni ve rs it y of M ic hi ga n] a t 10 :4 4 20 F eb ru ar y 20 14 66 BOOK REVIEW formation feeds into government policy. Indeed Alsultany’s unique contribution to the expand- ing field of literature on representations of Islam in the Western media (see also Morey & Yaqin, 2011; Birkenstein, Froula, & Randell, 2010; Poole, 2002) is in treating equally seriously both gov- ernmental and media discourses, and the representations of Arab and Muslim identities contained therein. What makes Arabs and Muslims in the Media a potentially important intervention is in how it focuses as much on the destruction of civil liberties as it does on textual representations. Chapters of the book focus on different dimensions of media representations of Muslim and Arab Americans identities, such as the Muslim-as-terrorist stereotype, Arabs and American civil rights, and public service announcements on American Muslim (rather than Muslim American) identity and US citizenship. Two of the chapters each examine the specific representation of Muslim/Arab women and men. As stated, Alsultany wants to complicate the idea that the less obvious, more apparently complex narrativization of Muslim and Arab experience in the United States represents progress. She sees this instead as a new mode of racial representation that serves a specific ideological function. For instance, Alsultany is particularly interested in the sympathetic portrayal of Muslim and Arab Americans that feature in contemporary US television drama; her argument is that what once appeared a novel storyline has now become a standardized trope post 9/11. Within this discourse, Arabs and Muslims appear as victims of hate crimes, as oppressed women, or as true patriots (often working for US security agencies). We even find instances where the Islamic terrorist is humanized, or the enemy is flipped, with the former Muslim/Arab/South Asian suspect innocent all along. But rather than representing a more enlightened view of Muslim and Arab Americans identities, Alsultany argues that such a trope has an ideological effect, a way of appearing multiculturalist and sensitive to cultural issues, while the state continues to practise racialist policies. As Alsultany states, what appears as progressive is in fact “a new kind of racism, one that purports to be antiracist while perpetrating and justifying racism” (p. 50). Alsultany describes how the ideological function of this new representational mode works in two ways. The first is through a discourse of “simplified complexity,” which Alsultany describes as signifying “a new era of racial representation” (p. 21). Representations formed within this dis- course appear to challenge stereotypes and gross simplifications of Muslim and Arab American identities, but actually produce the effect of reinforcing the Othering of Arabs and Muslims and in turn justifying and legitimating racist policies and practices in real life. For Alsultany, “simplified complex racial representations [ . . . ] performs the ideological work of producing a post-race moment in which denying the severity of the persistence of institutionalized racism becomes possible” (p. 28). The second way in which the ideological function of this new mode of racial representation operates is through affect. Alsultany explains how the affective responses that rep- resentations of “Good Muslim” and “Bad Muslim” evoke are carefully managed and controlled. She is particularly interested in the ideological underpinning to sympathy achieved through “benevolent emotions that connect the viewer’s feelings of sympathy, remorse, and mourning to the identity of the nation” (p. 68). For Alsultany feelings of regret over the treatment of Arabs and Muslims produced through television dramas and news coverage operate to relieve viewer- citizens of any blame: viewer-citizens can feel bad, remorseful, and apologetic for the plight of Arab and Muslim Americans while having faith that this moment will eventually pass once the terrorist threat has been eradicated. In other words, through controlling the affective responses to particular storylines and characters, racial profiling is presented as a highly unfortunate but necessary policy in these supposedly exceptional times. D ow nl oa de d by [ U ni ve rs it y of M ic hi ga n] a t 10 :4 4 20 F eb ru ar y 20 14 BOOK REVIEW 67 Alsultany provides a highly compelling case for the emergence of a new representational mode post 9/11 that also makes a concerted attempt at unravelling the complex relations between media representations and the actual treatment of Arabic and South Asian minorities in the United States (Muslim or otherwise). The book draws from an impressive range of texts, tak- ing in a variety of media forms, making for a rich and detailed sweep of representations of Arab and Muslim American identities in the North American mediascape post 9/11. But fur- ther to its equal emphasis on media representation and government policy, the book’s most unique and important contribution to this debate is its stress on the affective responses evoked by the seemingly sympathetic portrayal of Arab and Muslim American identities, and how the pity such images arouse conceals the exclusionary logics that these representations actually in fact produce. This is a convincing argument that provides an original and telling explana- tion of the apparent contradiction between the “positive” ways in which Arabs and Muslims are represented in the media, and their negative treatment at the hands of the US state in everyday life. Alsultany to her credit also attempts to engage with the consumption and, to a lesser extent, production dimensions of the politics of representation. However, considering the level of detail entailed in Alsultany’s textual work, these two aspects of the argument, perhaps inevitably, feel underdeveloped. For instance, Alsultany analyses online forums in order to examine and interpret audience reactions to particular news stories or television dramas, but there is so only so much space she can afford to this, and these sections can feel a little cursory rather than a key com- ponent of the analysis. In addition with regard to questions of production, there are occasional references to how the “simplified complex” representations of Arabs and Muslim Americans are a product of the profit-making imperative of the cultural industries, but these are only ever fleet- ing. Admittedly focusing on production is not necessarily the author’s main concern. However, considering that one of the book’s key theoretical touchstones is the work of Herman Gray, whose major contribution to the study of cultural politics is in precisely grounding the analy- sis of media texts within their institutional as well as social contexts (see Gray, 2004, 2005), adopting a similar approach would allow Alsultany to more effectively unpack the relations between neo-colonialism and neo-liberalism, something that is alluded to but never quite followed through. In the book’s epilogue, Alsultany calls for a more progressive cultural/representational politics that decouples Muslim and Arab identities from the War on Terror—something that depicts the complexity and diversity and richness of Muslim American experience—but it is only in paying closer attention to the conditions of cultural production through which repre- sentations get made that effective counter-strategies can be conceptualized and then put into practice. Nonetheless, as a critical account of the ways in which racialized minorities are represented in the Western media in contemporary times, Arabs and Muslims in the Media: Race and Representation after 9/11 is a further valuable contribution to the field. In particular, it pro- vides a vital critique of what appear as “positive” and progressive representations of Arab and Muslim American identities, while exposing the contradictions between media representations and the actual “reality” of Muslim and Arab, and South Asian experience in the United States. Alsultany has produced a detailed yet highly readable and accessible book of value to students and researchers alike, and even general readers interested in the media’s implication in the War on Terror. D ow nl oa de d by [ U ni ve rs it y of M ic hi ga n] a t 10 :4 4 20 F eb ru ar y 20 14 68 BOOK REVIEW REFERENCES Birkenstein, J., Froula, A., & Randell, K. (2010). Reframing 9/11: Film, popular culture and the ‘war on terror.’ New York, NY: Continuum. Gray, H. S. (2004). Watching race: Television and the struggle for blackness. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. Gray, H. S. (2005). Cultural moves: African Americans and the politics of representation. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Morey, P., & Yaqin, A. (2011). Framing Muslims. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Poole, E. (2002). Reporting Islam: Media representations and British Muslims. London, England: I.B. Tauris. D ow nl oa de d by [ U ni ve rs it y of M ic hi ga n] a t 10 :4 4 20 F eb ru ar y 20 14 
work_h5rbq2prrzapdhtb3zvgsz4v5m	----	doi:10.1016/j.futures.2004.10.015 Trajectories Spirituality as the fourth bottom line? Sohail Inayatullah* Graduate Institute for Futures Studies, Tamkang University, Taiwan and Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, University of the Sunshine Coast, Australia Available online 26 January 2005 1. Times have changed In Australia, Westpac Bank recently issued an expanded approach to traditional accountability standards. They now measure their progress through three criteria: prosperity, social justice and environment. Their recent corporate report [23] includes claims of ethical business, transparency, human rights, environmental concerns, caring for employees, and more. Suddenly the bottom line is not so simple—it has become the triple bottom line. Organizations have their own interests—profit, survival—but as well they live in a local and global community, and are increasingly being forced to become accountable to them. These demands by shareholder groups and social movements have led to the need for social justice and social measures. Organizations and communities live with and in a natural world, and believe that they have a responsibility towards planetary sustainability—environment is no longer something out there for others to solve, an economic externality, rather, it has become defining for the success of an organization, certainly for its public persona. Along with external issues (impact of company policy on the environment, ethical investing) have been internal issues (employee absenteeism, illness and the cost savings associated with having wellness-based organizations). With over 45% of the world’s top companies publishing triple bottom line reports, the triple bottom line movement has taken off [4]. Even nations are following suite with broader indicators. Bhutan has developed a gross happiness index. While OECD nations have not gone this far, the UK is taking happiness seriously. “In the UK, the Cabinet Office has held a string of seminars on life satisfaction... [publishing] a paper recommending policies that might increase the nation’s happiness.” [20]. These include quality of life indicators when making decisions about health and education, and finding an alternative to Futures 37 (2005) 573–579 www.elsevier.com/locate/futures 0016-3287/$ - see front matter q 2004 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.futures.2004.10.015 * Address: 29 Meta Street, Mooloolaba, 4557 Qld, Australia. E-mail address: soahil@mail.tku.edu.tw http://www.elsevier.com/locate/futures S. Inayatullah / Futures 37 (2005) 573–579574 gross domestic product as a measure of how well the country is doing—one that reflects happiness as well as welfare, education and human rights.” [3]. There are even professors and journals [19] of happiness. Happiness can be considered an inner measure of quality of life, moving away from the quantity of things. As nations move to postmodern economies, other issues are becoming more important, along with the iconic/dream/aesthetic [15] is the spiritual. It is ceasing to be associated with mediums or with feudal religions, but with life meaning, and Ananda, or the bliss beyond pleasure and pain. But while indicators are broadening and the single bottom line is being supplanted by the triple bottom, and there may be a subtle shift toward the spiritual, can it become the fourth bottom line? We certainly do not see stakeholders holding long meditations outside of corporate offices and government buildings? By spiritual I mean four interrelated factors. (1) A relationship with the transcendent, generally seen as both immanent and transcendental. This relationship is focused on trust, surrender and for Sufis, submission. (2) A practice, either regular meditation or some type of prayer (but not prayer where the goal is to ask for particular products or for the train to come quicker). (3) A physical practice to transform or harmonize the body—yoga, tai chi, chi kung, and other similar practices. (4) Social—a relationship with the community, global, or local, a caring for others [8]. This differs from a debate on whose God, or who is true and who is false, to an epistemology of depth and shallow with openness and inclusion toward others.[10] 2. Indicators Are there any indicators that spirituality can become a bottom line and evidence? First, we need to admit that we are on dangerous ground. Languaging the Transcendent more often than not leads to genderizing, and thus immediately disenfranchises half the world’s population. Along with the problem of patriarchy, comes the problem of caste/class, elite groups claiming they can best interpret the transcendental. The transcendent becomes a weapon, linguistic, political, economic; it becomes a source of power and territory, to control. And yet, this is the nature of our world. All concepts can be utilized as such, especially, profound ones. The key, as Ashis Nandy [14] points out, is that there will be escape ways from our futures—that contradictions are built into all of our measures and methods and that we need competing views of the spiritual. Taking a layered view might be the most appropriate way to consider measuring the immeasurable. Using the metaphor of the iceberg of spirituality, the tip of the iceberg of could be measurable, as that is the most visible. A bit deeper are the social dimensions of the spiritual—community caring, even group meditations, shared experiences—the system of spirituality. This too can be evidenced. Deeper is the worldview of spirituality— ethics, ecology, devotion, multiple paths, transcendence—and deepest is the mythic level, the mystical alchemy of the self. As we go deeper, measurement becomes more problematic, and the deepest is of course impossible to measure. Is there any evidence that spirituality as an issue is gaining in interest? There appears to be. As anecdotal personal experience, workshop after workshop (in Croatia, Pakistan, S. Inayatullah / Futures 37 (2005) 573–579 575 Malaysia, Australia, Thailand, Germany, Taiwan, New Zealand, Hawaii, for example) the spiritual future comes out as the desirable [9]. It generally has the following characteristics. (1) Individual spirituality. (2) Gender partnership or cooperation. (3) Strong ecological communities. (4) Technology embedded in society but not as the driver. (5) Economic alternatives to capitalism. (6) Global governance. Other significant futures also emerge, particularly that of societal collapse and that of ‘global tech’—a digitalized, geneticized, abundant and globally governed world. Importantly, the spiritual (Gaian) vision of the future confirms the qualitative and quantitative research work of Paul Ray and Sherry Anderson [18]. They document a new phenomena, the rise of the cultural creatives. This new group challenges the modernist interpretation of the world (nation-state centric, technology and progress will solve the day, environment is important but security more so) and the traditional view of the world (strong patriarchy, strong religion, and strong culture, agriculture based and derived). Ray and Anderson go so far as to say that up to 25% of those in OECD nations now subscribe to the spiritual/eco/gender partnership/global governance/alternative to capitalism position. However, they clearly state that cultural creatives do not associate themselves as a political or social movement (for example while near American president, Al Gore meditates, he does not use his spirituality as part of his politics, while Bush using traditional religion does). Indeed, cultural creatives represent a potential paradigm change, a change in values. It is this change in values that Oliver Markley, Willis Harmon and Duane Elgin and others have been spearheading [21]. They have argued that we are in between images. The traditional image of ‘man’ as economic worker (the modernist image) has reached a point of fatigue, materialism is being questioned. Internal contradictions (breakdown of family, life style diseases) and external contradictions (biodiversity loss, global warming) and systemic contradictions (global poverty) lead to the conclusion that the system cannot maintain its legitimacy. The problem, especially for the rich nations, along with security from terrorism, has become a hunger for meaning and a desire for the experience of bliss. There is data that confirms that materialism does not lead to happiness. “One study, by Tim Kasser of Knox College in Galesburg, IL, found that young adults who focus on money, image and fame tend to be more depressed, have less enthusiasm for life and suffer more physical symptoms such as headaches and sore throats than others.” [2]. Indeed, Kasser believes that advertising, central to the desire machine, should be considered a form of pollution, and be taxed or advertisers should be forced to include warning messages that materialism can damage one’s health. Equally important to spiritually becoming a fourth bottom line is that spiritual practices can now be empirically witnessed. Recent advances in brain research show the brain being lit up in areas related to positive moods. Studying Buddhist monks while they meditate in MRI machines has led to startling conclusions, among them that the “monks’ meditation practice, which changes their neural physiology, enables them to respond with equanimity to sources of stress.” [5]. This was true not just for monks but for middle class Americans as well. Richard Davidson, a professor of psychology and psychiatry at the University of Wisconsin at Madison, found out that “after a short time meditating, meditation had profound effects not just on how they felt but on their brains and bodies.”. Meditation appears to stimulate the left prefrontal lobe, which is related to feelings of well-being and happiness [7]. Another study of Buddhists by scientists at the University of California has S. Inayatullah / Futures 37 (2005) 573–579576 also found that meditation might tame the amygdala, the part of the brain involved with fear and anger. The key is that spirituality and meditation is brought into the visible world. “Meditation can help you train your mind in the say way exercise can train your body.” [6]. These studies have gained currency for two reasons. First, with over 200 billion$ lost in the USA because of stress related illnesses, meditation is gaining interest as a way to reduce costs and enhance productivity. Second, is the emergence of the brain discourse, the search for validity of emotions/senses at the neurological level (similar to the gene discourse, with the search for the genetic basis of behavior). However, spirituality, while enhancing, economic productivity, social connectivity, inner and outer health should not be confused with economic materialism or indeed any type of materialism (even the spiritual variety, that is, collecting gurus, mantras, or using the spiritual to accumulate ego). 3. Spirituality and educational-life transformation The emerging image of cultural creatives may not have enough staying power as it is largely associated with the baby boomer generation [1]. While the spiritual is linked to personal health, it is yet to be linked to economic justice and social inclusion. Spiritual practices often lead to an escape from the material world. Moreover, the languaging of the spiritual remains nationalistic or groupist, and not neo-humanistic (i.e. outside of the dogma of class, varna, nation and gender). But as philosopher P.R. Sarkar has argued, a new theory of economy would make the spiritual central [17]. This is partly evidenced by reports from the TM organization [22] which documents hundreds of scientific studies claiming increased IQ, productivity and even increased community peace. But for Sarkar, spiritual practices lead to clarity. It is this clarity which can enhance productivity. Spiritual practices allow clarity of intent (and a slowing of time) thus enhancing productivity. Sarkar’s model of political-economy, PROUT, is based on this—increasingly using intellectual and spiritual resources for the good of all. Along with the progressive use of resources is a clear ceiling and floor of wealth—a progressively linked top and bottom. Meditation, importantly, impacts the ‘bottom’ of society, with meditation leading to decreased recidivism among prisoners, among other benefits [11]. 4. Grand patterns For those who study the grand patterns of change, this is not surprising. Modernity has brought the nation-state, stunning technology, material progress but the pendulum has shifted so far toward sensate civilization that it would be surprising if the spiritual as a foundational civilizational perspective did not return. In this sense, spirituality as fourth bottom line should not be seen as selling to global ‘corporatopia’ but in fact ensuring that the pendulum does not take us back to medieval times but spirals forward. This means keeping the scientific, inclusionary, mystical parts of spirituality but not acceding to S. Inayatullah / Futures 37 (2005) 573–579 577 the dogmatic, the sexist, the feudal dimensions. That is, all traditions grow up in certain historical conditions, once history changes, there is no need to keep the trappings, the message remains important but there is no need to retreat to a cave. It is also not surprising that it is gender that defines cultural creatives. Modernity has been defined by male values as were earlier eras, there is likely gender dialectic at work. Patriarchy has reached its limits. It is often those outside the current system who are the torch bearers for the new image of the future. In this case, gender is crucial. Of course, the system remains patriarchy laden. Individuals may change but the system, for example, city design, remains faulty. However, the triple bottom line, and spirituality as the fourth, may be a way to start to change the system so that it is spiritual-friendly, instead of ridiculing and marginalizing it. This could be the very simple use of Feng Shui to a rethinking of shopping to suburban planning. And, individuals want this change. Phillip Daffara in his research on the future of the Sunshine Coast reports that over 30% desire a Gaian coast—a living coast where technology and spirit are embedded in the design and policies of the area. Others preferred the triple bottom line sustainability model and the linked villages model. Only a few percent still desire business as usual [13]. The evidence does point to a desire for a spiritual future, throughout the world. Indeed, sociologist Riaz Hussain writes that this complicated matters for Al-Qaeda. They become even more radicalized as the Islamic world is in the process of a religious revival [16]. However, religiousity is not necessarily spirituality. They overlap. But one is exclusive, text-based only and generally closed to other systems and worldviews. The spiritual is not linked to race or nation. However, it is certainly the deeper part of every religion. For spirituality to become part of the global solution it will have to become transmodern, moving through modernity, not rejecting the science and technology revolution and the Enlightenment, nor acceding to postmodernity (where all values and perspectives are relativized) or the premodern (where feudal relations are supreme). 5. Measures But for spirituality to become associated with the quadruple bottom line, the bottom line will be finding measures. Measuring the immeasurable will not be an easy task. We need to ensure that measures match the four dimensions—transcendental, mind practice, body practice, and relationship, the neo-humanistic dimension of inclusion, an expanded sense of identity. Measurements as well would need to be layered, touching on the easiest and obvious— the ice berg metaphor—physical practices (% in a locale engaged in regular meditation or disciplined prayer) to systemic measurements (city design) to worldview ones (neo- humanism as demonstrated in educational textbooks). Of course, this is for spirituality generally, for organizations, we would need measures that showed the movement from the command-control model to the learning organization model, to a vision of a living, learning and healing, conscious organization. S. Inayatullah / Futures 37 (2005) 573–579578 What are some potential indicators? There are positive indicators such as well- being, happiness (qualitative measures) and negative ones (far easier to collect). Death by lifestyle diseases to measure worldview and system contradictions. Suicide indicators to measure societal failure. Hate crime indicators and bullying in schools and organizations that help us understand levels of inclusion. Cooperative growth, looking at economic partnership, at new models of economy. Cigarette consumption. Treatment of animals (wider ethics). These are just a few. This is not an easy process at any level. For example, some believe that enhanced spirituality in itself can lead to reduction in automobile fatalities [12]. While practicising meditation leads to less road rage, more clarity, less drunken driving, changing transportation systems is equally important. Finally, there is an additional challenge. In spiritual life there can be dark nights of the soul, where one wrestles with one’s own contradictions—it is this that cannot be measured, nor can the experience of Ananda. However, after the experience of bliss, there is the issue of translating, of creating a better world. Even with a world engulfed by weapons sales, by killing, even in a world of rampant materialism, of feeling less, of unhappiness, even in communities beset by trauma, what is clear is that the spiritual is becoming part of a new world paradigm of what is real, what is important. What is needed is a debate on indicators that can evaluate this new paradigm in process. References [1] And the research is far from established! [2] M. Bond, “The pursuit of happiness”, 43. See, Tim Kasser, The High Price of Materialism, MIT Press, 2002. [3] M. Bond, “The pursuit of happiness”, New Scientist 4 October 2003; 40. [4] L. Colquhoun, “Corporate social responsibility”, Silverkris August 2003; 57. [5] M. Conlin, “Meditation,”, Businessweek 30 August 2004; 98–99. [6] M. Conlin, “Meditation”, 99. [7] S. Conner, Can Buddhists transcend mental reservations?, Science 22 May 2003;. [8] R. Eisler argues in The Power of Partnership that this caring for others is central to creating a partnership spirituality-with nature, society, family, and self. “Partnership spirituality is both transcendent and immanent. It informs our day-to-day lives with caring and empathy. It provides ethical and moral standards for partnership relations as alternatives to both lack of ethical standards and the misuse of “morality” to justify oppression and violence.” Eisler, The Power of Partnership, Novato, New World Library, 2003, 185 [9] For more on this, see reports and articles at www.metafuture.org and www.ru.org [10] For more on this, see P.R. Sarkar, Neo-Humanism: the Liberation of Intellect. Calcutta, Ananda Press, 1982. [11] http://www.globalideasbank.org/site/bank/idea.php?ideaIdZ4302. Meditation in prisons is explored on this page. Write the authors: “These courses have been the subject of several sociological studies which have concluded that Vipassana has a marked positive impact on behavior and attitude. One very common feeling—the desire for revenge—is noticeably reduced or entirely eliminated when prisoners practice Vipassana. Relations among the prisoners and jail staff become much more harmonious, and self-discipline dramatically improves, decreasing the need for aggressive supervision and punishment by the jail officials.” Accesses 9 September 2004, The work of Dr. Kiran Bedi is exemplary. [12] http://www.tm.org/charts/chart_48.html [13] S. Inayatullah, Scanning for City Futures, Brisbane City Council, Brisbane, 2002. [14] A. Nandy, Traditions, Tyranny and Utopias, Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1987. http://www.metafuture.org http://www.ru.org http://www.globalideasbank.org/site/bank/idea.php?ideaId=4302 http://www.tm.org/charts/chart_48.html S. Inayatullah / Futures 37 (2005) 573–579 579 [15] See J. Dator and Y. Seo, “Korea as the Wave of the Future: The Emerging Dream Society of Icons and Aesthetic Experience,” Journal of Futures Studies (Vol. 9, No. 1, August 2004), 31–44. [16] See Hasan’s Faithlines: Muslim Conceptions of Islam and Society, Oxford University Press, forthcoming. [17] www.anandamarga.org [18] www.culturalcreatives.org [19] www.kluweronline.com/issn/1389-4978 [20] www.number-10.gov.uk/su/ls/paper.pdf [21] www.owmarkley.org [22] www.tm.org [23] www.westpac.com.au http://www.anandamarga.org http://www.culturalcreatives.org http://www.kluweronline.com/issn/1389-4978 http://www.number-10.gov.uk/su/ls/paper.pdf http://www.owmarkley.org http://www.tm.org http://www.westpac.com.au Spirituality as the fourth bottom line? Times have changed Indicators Spirituality and educational-life transformation Grand patterns Measures References 
work_hcpmsy76dfb3nmqqujfobvjogm	----	Black Boys’ and Young Men’s Experiences with Criminal Justice and Desistance in England and Wales: A Literature Review genealogy Article Black Boys’ and Young Men’s Experiences with Criminal Justice and Desistance in England and Wales: A Literature Review Laura Robertson and John Peter Wainwright * School of Social Work, Care and Community, University of Central Lancashire, Preston PR1 2HE, UK; laura.robertson@povertyalliance.org * Correspondence: jpwainwright@uclan.ac.uk Received: 16 March 2020; Accepted: 5 April 2020; Published: 15 April 2020 ���������� ������� Abstract: Black boys and young men are over-represented in the youth and adult justice systems in England and Wales. Despite the Lammy Review (2017) into the treatment of and outcomes for Black, Asian, and minority ethnic individuals (BAME) in the criminal justice system, the disproportionate numbers of Black boys and young men at all stages of the system continue to rise. There has been limited qualitative research of Black boys’ and young men’s experiences with the justice system in England and Wales. In particular, there is a lack of evidence on their experiences with sentencing and courts. What is known tends to focus on Black, Asian, and minority ethnic and/or Muslim men’s experiences more generally. A lack of critical understanding of the specific experiences of desistance by young Black men has been criticised in the literature. Set in this context, this review of UK literature focuses on the following questions: (1) What are Black boys’ and young Black men’s experiences with the youth and criminal justice systems in England and Wales? (2) What does research tell us specifically about their experiences with desistance? Keywords: black boys and young men; youth and criminal justice; desistance 1. Introduction This paper will explore, through a literature review, how the genealogy of race1, of racialising ethnic difference of Black, Asian, and minority ethnic (BAME) boys and young men, is experienced by them in the criminal justice system (CJS). Despite downward trends in the numbers of children and young people in the youth and adult CJS in England and Wales, the proportion of Black and dual ethnicity boys and young men has been increasing. Black children/young people are over-represented in every stage of the youth and adult justice systems in England and Wales. Despite recognition of this disproportionality by successive governments, there is a lack of qualitative research on the subjective and lived experiences of Black boys’ and young men’s experiences. The existent literature tends to focus on the experiences of BAME and/or Muslim men rather than young Black men. The literature on BAME experiences with the justice system has emphasised a need to consider intersecting identities, particularly in relation to understanding young Black men’s experience with resettlement and desistance. However, desistance literature has lacked a specific focus on young Black men’s experience of desistance. Whilst recent reviews of evidence have highlighted the complex and multitude of factors that underpin disproportionality in the system (Mullen et al. 2014; Hunter 2019), there is a need to 1 Race is not a satisfactory term, as it is a social construction based on negative ethnic characteristics. However, it is used in this article as a means of articulating differentiation and othering through power and as a tool for analysis of this difference. Genealogy 2020, 4, 50; doi:10.3390/genealogy4020050 www.mdpi.com/journal/genealogy http://www.mdpi.com/journal/genealogy http://www.mdpi.com https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8190-0144 http://www.mdpi.com/2313-5778/4/2/50?type=check_update&version=1 http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/genealogy4020050 http://www.mdpi.com/journal/genealogy Genealogy 2020, 4, 50 2 of 14 also understand what research tells us about their specific experiences of desistance. This literature review was conducted to address the following questions: (i) What are Black boys’ and young men’s experiences with the CJS in England and Wales? (ii) What does research tell us about their specific experiences with desistance? 2. Literature Review Method This literature review was originally conducted in 2016 and updated in December 2019. Relevant databases were searched including the following: Criminal Justice Database, Criminal Justice abstracts, Scopus, and Socindex. Search terms included “Black and minority ethnic”, “African or Caribbean”, “youth justice system”, “criminal justice system”, “young men”, and “desistance”. Due to time constraints, it was not possible to conduct a systematic review of the literature. Therefore, the limitations of this literature review should be acknowledged, including the facts that only four databases were searched, a systematic record of papers was not made, and the research studies included were not critically appraised. Given the dearth of literature in this field, the aim was instead to identify the key issues and gaps in knowledge in the field. This literature review was specifically focused on the experiences of Black (African/Caribbean) boys and young men, but due to a lack of literature specifically on this group, this review also drew on studies more broadly focused on the experiences of BAME groups. This review drew on literature published in England only, as the focus was to understand experiences specifically in the English and Welsh youth and criminal justice systems. An initial scoping of the literature revealed a lack of recent, qualitative empirical studies. Therefore, it was decided to include literature published over the last 15 years despite recognition of the changes to the youth and adult CJS during this time. 3. Summary of Literature Review Themes This literature review was focused on addressing two key questions: (i) What are Black boys’ and young men’s experiences with the CJS in England and Wales? (ii) What does research tell us about their specific experiences with desistance? Across the literature, several key themes can be identified. First, that black boys and young men experience discriminatory practices is evident in official statistics and studies conducted across all stages of the youth and adult criminal justice system. A wider body of literature on BAME experiences, drawn on for the purposes of this review, more broadly and clearly conveys experiences of differential treatment as a result of race, ethnicity, and faith (May et al. 2010; Mullen et al. 2014; Hopkins 2015; Barn et al. 2018). Second, a small but important body of research has highlighted that the gangs label is disproportionately attributed to BAME people (Williams and Clarke 2016). Lastly, a key focus of this review on desistance, whilst resting on a small body of studies, reveals significant gaps in the resettlement provision for BAME people leaving custody, with evidence of struggles to access accommodation and employment (Calverley 2013). A lack of knowledge specifically on how identity change may operate as a mechanism in the desistance of UK-based minority ethnic groups has also been raised (Calverley 2013; Glynn 2014). Deficiencies in current understandings of desistance in relation to BAME people has led to calls for an “intersectional model of desistance” (Glynn 2016). This review of the literature, whilst not systematic, clearly identifies the need for further research particularly on black boys’ and young men’s experiences with court and custody as well as evidence on what works specifically in prison and probation settings (HMIP 2019). Genealogy 2020, 4, 50 3 of 14 4. Background and Context 4.1. Young Black Men in the Youth and Adult Criminal Justice Systems in England and Wales Black boys and young men are over-represented in the youth2 and adult criminal justice systems in England and Wales. Differences in outcomes between ethnic groups over time reveal that disparity between Black people and white people in the CJS is also widening (Ministry of Justice 2019). For example, in the last five years, whilst the proportion of stop and searches conducted on white suspects decreased (from 75% in 2014/15 to 59% in 2018/19), the numbers increased from 13% to 22% for Black suspects (Ministry of Justice 2019). From the first point of contact in the youth justice system, there are a disproportionate number of Black children and young people entering the system as a result of discriminatory police stop and search practices. The most recent published statistics (for the year ending in March 2018) show that Black children (aged 10–17) were four times more likely than white children to be arrested. Second, the number of Black children and young people given a caution or sentence was also three times higher than that of the general 10–17-year-old population. Third, whilst there has been a reduction in the number of white children and young people sentenced for indictable offences between 2013 and 2018, the proportion of all occasions where Black children were sentenced for indictable offences increased from 13% to 21% over the same period. Analysis conducted by The Independent, which investigated how sentences given to Black children convicted of homicide compared with white children between 2009 and 2017, found that one in four Black teenage boys, found guilty of manslaughter, were given maximum jail terms, whilst white children were sentenced to no more than 10 years, with the majority getting less than four (Bulman 2018). Children from a Black minority ethnic background now make up one-third (33%) of the custodial remand population. The proportion of children in youth custody from a Black background has been increasing and now accounts for a quarter of the youth custody population (Youth Justice Board and Ministry of Justice 2019). This disproportionality continues into the adult CJS (Ministry of Justice 2019). For example, in the year ending in March 2019, those who identify as Black or Black British were 9.7 times as likely to be stopped than those who identify as white (Home Office 2019a). Analysis shows that stop and searches for drugs are more disproportionate than stop and searches for other offences: Black people were stopped and searched for drugs at almost nine times the rate of white people in 2016/17 (Shiner et al. 2018). In the same year, persons who identified as Black (or Black British) were over three times as likely to be arrested than those who identified themselves as white. Research has shown that discrimination continues for BAME groups when they leave the CJS (Stacey 2019). A survey of 221 BAME individuals found that over three-quarters (78%) felt that their minority ethnic background had made the problems they face as a result of their criminal record harder, with the vast majority (79%) citing employment as one of the key difficulties they experienced as a result of their criminal record and exacerbated by their ethnicity (Stacey 2019). The survey found that African and Caribbean individuals were more effected. Black people are also simultaneously more likely to be victims of crime, with race as the most commonly recorded motivation for hate crimes in England and Wales. Race hate crimes accounted for around three-quarters of hate crime offences in 2018/19, increasing by 11% from 2017/18 (Home Office 2019b). 4.2. Experiences of Multiple Disadvantage Young Black men experience disadvantage across indicators of economic and social wellbeing, including education, employment, housing and living standards, and in health settings, in particular, mental health (The Bradley Commission 2013; Equality and Human Rights Commission 2016). Black Caribbean and dual Black Caribbean/white children have rates of permanent exclusion at about three 2 In England and Wales, the youth justice system deals with children and young people aged 10–17. Genealogy 2020, 4, 50 4 of 14 times those for all pupils (Equality and Human Rights Commission 2016). Moreover, young Black people are over-represented in poor neighbourhoods where children are less well provided for and routes for advancement in education are constrained (Youth Justice Board 2010). Under-attainment of Black boys is a “major cause of entry into the criminal justice system” ((House of Commons Home Affairs Committee 2007), paragraph 113). Research evidence also suggests that children are still victims of bullying because of their ethnicity or religion (Ditch the Label 2015 cited in (Equality and Human Rights Commission 2016)). Research by the Equality and Human Rights Commission (2016) found that white people had a higher employment rate (at 74.7%) than ethnic minorities (59.3%) (cited in (Equality and Human Rights Commission 2016)). A study by the Trades Union Congress found that BAME workers are one-third more likely than white workers to be underemployed (Trades Union Congress 2016). Further, Black young men are also over-represented in mental health care (The Bradley Commission 2013; Wainwright et al. 2019). Black men are two times more likely to be referred to mental health services through police or court services (Mullen et al. 2014). In research on the needs of young African and Caribbean men and mental health, findings indicate a wide range of causes of mental health problems, for example, abusive family upbringing, trauma, bullying, and stress. Barriers to accessing support were identified, including an inability to recognise the signs that more specialist support might be needed and concerns around reputation and stigma (Allen and Williams 2015). 4.3. Political and Policy Context Concerns about the disproportionate numbers of young Black men in the youth and adult criminal justice systems in England and Wales have been raised in successive governments over several decades. In January 2016, David Cameron invited David Lammy MP to conduct a review of the treatment of and outcomes for BAME individuals in the CJS in England and Wales (Lammy 2017). The review covered the role of key criminal justice institutions in both the adult and youth justice systems, but Lammy stated that his “biggest concern” was with the youth justice system due to significant increases in disproportionality (Lammy 2017, p. 4). The report highlighted the complex, multitude of factors that influence disproportionate representation of BAME people and made 35 recommendations at targeted various institutions in both the adult and youth justice systems. In 2018, the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) reported on progress made in relation to each recommendation of the Lammy Review (Ministry of Justice 2018). Examples highlighted by the MoJ focused on specific stages of the criminal justice system (prevention and charging decisions, courts, prisons and rehabilitation, and youth justice specifically). The progress identified was wide, ranging from funding for prevention programmes through the Early Intervention Youth Fund and the publication of guidance by the Crown Prosecution Service in relation to gangs (Ministry of Justice 2018). A number of bodies have also been set up to support recommendations made by the Lammy Review, for example, the Youth Justice Policy Unit in the MoJ and the External Advice and Scrutiny Panel established by Her Majesty’s Prison and Probation Service (Mullen 2018). The response of the third sector has been somewhat critical of MoJ for not actively partnering with or specifically resourcing any organisations working directly with BAME groups as part of the implementation of the Lammy Review (Mullen 2018). In response to the Lammy Review, Clinks (2017) called for a clear strategy for the BAME population in the youth justice system focussed on testing interventions and staff training to support improved outcomes for BAME children. Rising disproportionality in the youth justice system since the Lammy Review was published has led to criticism that the government and justice agencies have not done enough (Parkes 2019). The Lammy Review proceeded the Young Review, which set out to highlight the specific experiences and needs of Black and Muslim men aged 18–24 in the CJS (Mullen et al. 2014). The task group for the Young Review highlighted concerns regarding the disproportionate use of stop and search and the risk-driven nature of policing in the context of gang and anti-terrorism policies. A key aim of the Young Review was to consider how existing knowledge regarding the disproportionately negative Genealogy 2020, 4, 50 5 of 14 outcomes experienced by Black and Muslim male offenders may be applied in the significantly changed environment of probation introduced under the Transforming Rehabilitation reforms (Mullen et al. 2014). The negative implications of the Transforming Rehabilitation agenda for minority groups and for voluntary sector organisations who work to deliver specific projects has been raised in the literature (see, for example, (Martin et al. 2016) and (Clinks 2018)). The Transforming Rehabilitation programme has been widely criticised for lacking attention to diversity with concerns raised from the beginning of a “one size fits all approach to offender supervision” (Frazer et al. 2014, p. 93). Research also suggests that specialist local services provided by third-sector organisations to BAME communities have suffered under the Transforming Rehabilitation agenda (Clinks 2018; National Audit Office 2019). Alongside this, the new Payment by Results system, a target-setting approach, particularly presents challenges for third-sector organisations. It means that community rehabilitation companies are dependent on meeting quantitative targets and outcomes. Hough (2016) pointed to the negative implications of Payment by Results on third-sector organisations in her research with a charity for BAME and Muslim Offenders, Arooj. Hough (2016, p. 76) stated that their programme “is likely to prove incompatible with the Payment by Results regime of cost-cutting, value-for-money and meeting targets within a specific time-frame”. Additionally, Through the Gate resettlement services, introduced through the Transforming Rehabilitation reforms to support the transition from prison to the community, regarding accommodation, employment, finance, mental health, and substance misuse, have been failing to meet offenders’ resettlement needs (National Audit Office 2019). A HM Inspectorate of Prisons (HMIP) inspection of Through the Gate services found that individual resettlement plans were process driven rather than focused on meeting individuals’ needs; for example, many prisoners were released without accommodation, and none of the prisoners had been helped into employment (HMIP 2016). 5. Intersectionality The literature in this field has emphasised the need to focus on the fluid, intersectional identities of Black and minority people living in Britain today (Apena 2007; Durrance et al. 2013; Glynn 2014, 2016; Wainwright and Larkins 2020). Both the Lammy and Young reviews were critical of a lack of recognition of the diversity of this group in the CJS in England and Wales and were critical of the lack of data on diversity (e.g., religious identity) gathered by criminal justice institutions. The Young Review describes the diversity among this group: “Young Black and/or Muslim men are far from a homogenous group and the intersection of ethnicity, faith, culture and age makes these social identities multi-faceted and shifting” (Mullen et al. 2014, p. 19). This idea of “shifting” or “fluid” identities emphasises that young people have multiple identifications and that an exclusive focus on ethnicity can ignore wider factors such as socio-economic status (White 2008; Webster 2012). As Durrance et al. (2013, p. 138) suggest, articulating what it means to be from a Black and minority ethnic group in Britain today is a complex task demanding “recognition of various intersecting identities drawing on ethnic, religious, national and cultural reference points”. Glynn (2016, p. 24) defines intersectionality as “an understanding of human beings as shaped by the interaction of different social locations”. Central to this is an understanding that these interactions “occur within a context of connected systems and structures of power” (Glynn 2016, p. 24). Apena (2007) argues that racial identity is an important part of self-perception and that this needs to be taken into account when working with young Black people in the CJS. 6. Experiences with the Youth and Adult Criminal Justice Systems in Wales Due to the lack of research specifically exploring boys’ and young Black men’s perceptions and experiences of the youth and adult criminal justice systems in England and Wales, this review also draws on research that has focused on the experience of other ethnic minorities (particularly young non-Black Muslim and Asian men). The literature is extremely limited in providing the voices of young Black men on their own experiences. Some of the available evidence is out of date and cannot account for changes in criminal justice systems/processes. Genealogy 2020, 4, 50 6 of 14 Research evidence on BAME experiences highlights a lack of trust in the justice system in England and Wales. The Young Review, based on evidence gathered from a range of sources (e.g., previous research, discussion groups with service users in prison and community settings) found that experiences of discrimination and racism were common amongst those spoken to (Mullen et al. 2014). Drawing on a range of factors, Mullen et al. (2014, p. 32) state the following: “The evidence is clear that racism in custody can take different forms; directly from other inmates; directly from staff; and less overt discrimination in decision making”. For example, BAME men spoken to in prison said that they were more likely to receive warnings and adjudications than their white counterparts, more likely to be found guilty than white prisoners even when they had been involved in the same incident, and that opportunities for purposeful activity that would allow them to work towards enhanced status were not equally distributed across prisoners of different ethnicities (Mullen et al. 2014). A lack of ethnic diversity of staff within criminal justice organisations was also raised. In Hunter’s (2019, p. 119) research, youth justice professionals viewed discriminatory practices as both “widespread and important for understanding ethnic disproportionality” in the youth justice system. The majority of interviewees viewed stop and search as an intervention that has been used excessively on BME children and young people. In the Young Review, concerns were raised that policing and criminal justice is dominated by a risk-based operating model, which particularly impacts individuals whose behaviour is too often understood by society on the basis of stereotypical and prejudiced perceptions. As a result, Mullen et al. (2014) state that young BAME men are often assessed to be of a higher level of risk than their white counterparts. Published in 2007, research on young Black men’s and other minority ethnic groups’ experience with policing in the West Midlands found a lack of trust and confidence in the police. Amongst the participants in the study, there was a belief that the police service has nothing to offer to them or to their communities (Sharp and Atherton 2007). In a mixed methods study examining stop and search and custody records in three police forces in England, May et al. (2010) found evidence that at some stages of the youth justice system, there may be discrimination against ethnic minorities. For example, dual ethnicity offenders and suspects were more likely than white people to be prosecuted than to be reprimanded or warned; Black and dual ethnicity defendants were more likely to be remanded in custody than white defendants; and, at the sentencing stage, dual ethnicity teenagers were more likely than others to be given a community sentence rather than a less serious first-tier penalty, such as referral orders and fines (May et al. 2010). Hopkins’ (2015) research investigated whether defendants who were recorded by police officers as being from a BAME3 background were more likely to be sent to prison than those who were recorded as being from a white background in England and Wales. Logistic regression was employed to explore whether any independent associations were found between 12 broad offence groupings4, criminal history, gender, age, nationality, ethnicity, and being sentenced to prison compared with being sentenced to a community order or another type of disposal. A small but significant association was found between being from a BAME background (compared with being from a white background) and being sentenced to prison (compared with being sentenced to a community order or another type of punishment) (Hopkins 2015). There are relatively few studies that focus on how ethnicity is experienced in prison, particularly by young Black men, and even fewer on young Black men’s experience with the court system in England and Wales. Hunter’s (2019) research, involving interviews with youth justice professionals, found evidence of harsher sentencing for BAME children in practice. A rapid evidence assessment of the effectiveness of correctional interventions in reducing reoffending or substance misuse among BAME people was conducted in 2018 (Shingler and Pope 2018). It included international literature 3 Hopkins (2015) notes that ethnicity was recorded using the five categories: White, Black, Asian, Other, and Unknown. Black, Asian, Other, and Unknown were combined to make the “BAME” category used here. Police officers also record nationality using over 300 categories. 4 These groups did not take into account degrees of offence seriousness. Genealogy 2020, 4, 50 7 of 14 due to the lack of studies in England and Wales—only five studies included in the 11-study review were conducted in the UK. The review concluded that “there is still insufficient evidence relevant to understanding how to improve outcomes for individuals from a BAME background” (Shingler and Pope 2018, p. 2). A key finding of the review was that despite some evidence that the content of “standard correctional programmes” can be experienced as relevant to BAME participants, some studies suggest that programmes that are “culturally aware” and “sensitive and inclusive” and “delivered by culturally aware and sensitive staff” are likely to have better outcomes (Shingler and Pope 2018, p. 2). This review provides little insight into the specific experiences of young Black boys/men due to its focus on all BAME groups and males/females. In the Young Review, most of the prisoners interviewed said that they experienced differential treatment as a result of race, ethnicity, or faith (Mullen et al. 2014). Barn et al.’s (2018) research explored Black and minority ethnic boys’ perceptions of their experiences with custody using Inspectorate of Prisons’ reports and associated surveys. Based on analysis of survey data (N = 600), they found that BAME boys’ experiences were consistently more negative at every stage of the custody process. Of several example of differential experiences, key examples included the following: BAME boys were significantly less likely than white boys to report being treated with respect when being searched upon entering a Youth Offender Institution or being offered help and support with smoking, loss of property, feeling scared, or feeling worried and upset/needing someone to talk to; in relation to physical restraint, just over half of BAME boys reported experiences of physical restraint (53% BAME vs. 36% white) and relatively high levels of victimization by other young people because of ethnicity (7% BAME vs. 2% white), religion (5% BAME vs. 1% white), or nationality (4% BAME vs. 0% white) (Barn et al. 2018). Research on media representations of young Black men has shown that young Black men are often associated with gang membership (Cushion et al. 2011). Research by Williams and Clarke (2016) found that that the gang label is disproportionately attributed to BAME people, when compared to both the size of BAME populations and the numbers of white British people flagged or registered as involved with gangs. Based on analysis of a range of official data sources (including police gang lists and comparative data on gangs and youth violence alongside a Joint Enterprise5 prisoners’ survey), Williams and Clarke’s (2016) examined the extent to which gang discourses influence the processes of criminalisation of young Black men and revealed that contemporary policing and prosecution strategies in relation to youth violence in England and Wales continue to be underpinned by racialised stereotypes. In a comparative analysis of gangs and serious youth violence cohorts by ethnicity in Manchester and London, they found that BAME people are overwhelmingly identified and registered to “gang” lists, although they make up a much smaller proportion of those perpetuating youth violence. Williams and Clarke (2016) write that this means it cannot be assumed that the construction of police gang lists is an objective response to violence occurring within particular communities when the lists fail to map onto serious youth violence incidents. In their survey with Joint Enterprise prisoners, of which just over half (53.1%) self-disclosed as belonging to a BAME group, Williams and Clarke (2016) found that the BAME group was serving longer sentences on average (22.3 years) when compared to the white group (19.6 years) and that BAME prisoners had on average 4.11 co-defendants compared to a figure of 3.19 for white British prisoners. It has been argued that anti-gang intervention based upon a type of social profiling can lead to net-widening and can potentially compound the problem it is intended to address through social profiling, leading to “non-gang members” becoming part of the profile (White 2008). In discussions as part of the Young Review with community-based organisations, concerns about gang policy and the resulting police response, which identifies young BAME people as a risk rather than in need, were 5 Joint Enterprise is a doctrine of common law that has been developed by the courts in cases where more than one person is to be prosecuted for the same offence, and it has emerged as a prosecution tool for the collective punishment of groups where it can be proved that the suspects were “in it together” (Williams and Clarke 2016). Genealogy 2020, 4, 50 8 of 14 raised (Mullen et al. 2014). There were indications that this focus on risk has led to younger BAME people entering the CJS, including those who are only on the periphery of gang activity. 7. The Needs of Young BAME People Involved in Offending The Youth Justice Board aimed to explore whether there was a need for BME-specific interventions, specifically whether young offenders thought their needs would be better met through the provision of targeted interventions (Youth Justice Board 2010). In interviews with 93 young people largely from BAME backgrounds, 96% believed that the Youth Offending Team treated all young people fairly, regardless of their ethnicity (Youth Justice Board 2010). The literature shows that the needs of BAME and/or Muslim young people in custody and leaving prisons are different from the general population (Youth Justice Board 2010). In a survey undertaken by Arooj, a charity that works with BAME and Muslim offenders, into the experiences of South Asian and Muslim ex-offenders in prison and resettlement, 36% of the 115 respondents stated that “specialist cultural and religious support would help them to stay out of trouble” (Mahmood and Hanif 2014). A study of Youth Offending Team case files from 2006 specifically examined ASSET data to assess the difference in the needs of young males and females (Youth Justice Board 2010). Twelve factors relating to needs and risks were assessed in the ASSET tool, for example, living arrangements, family and personal relationships, education, training and employment, and emotional and mental health. The data suggested that dual ethnicity offenders had the greatest needs across the categories and displayed the greatest risk of reoffending. 8. Desistance from Crime—Seeking to Understand the Experiences of Black Boys and Young Men Put simply, desistance literature has sought to understand the circumstances in which people stop offending. In 2007, in a paper exploring the impacts of desistance research for policy, McNeill and Weaver (2007) wrote that few studies have addressed the relationship between ethnicity, “race”, and desistance. They stated that it is not an over-generalisation to suggest that almost nothing is known about the differences in desistance from crime between ethnic groups. More recently, academics in the field have argued that the possible role of “ethnic social structural differences” and their potential effect on desistance have been neglected (Calverley 2013, p. 7; Durrance et al. 2013). Wainwright and Larkins (2020) highlight that the words “race” and “racism” are not present in the HMIP (2016) review of UK desistance interventions and that the Youth Justice Board’s library of effective practice contains only one resource that mentions how addressing the experience of racism can reduce offending. They called for guidance on how addressing race can enhance work with young people who have been involved in offending behaviour. The work of Farrall and colleagues has demonstrated that the desistance process is likely to involve relapses and that one-size-fits-all interventions are unlikely to be effective and should instead be replaced by individual, holistic services (2002, 2006 cited in (Moffatt 2014)). Researchers in the UK have argued that cognitive behavioural programmes, used within the “What Works” initiative, inadequately take into consideration the specific problems face by Black and Asian offenders (Durrance and Williams 2006 cited in (Calverley 2013)). Wider use of culturally appropriate “empowerment” programmes, taught alongside promoting a positive view of ethnic identity, has been advocated. Calverley (2013) writes that such local programmes run by the probation service have often been small scale and short lived. Over the last two decades, a body of work on desistance has evolved to focus on interpreting desistance research for practice (McNeill 2012). McNeill (2012) identifies six key emphases of this work: it must (1) consider issues of identity and diversity, (2) take into account the development of not only motivation but also hope, (3) be understood within the context of human relationships, (4) consider offenders’ strengths and resources both personal and in their social networks, (5) involve interventions that work with offenders not on them, and (6) incorporate interventions that work on building human and social capital. McNeill and Maruna (2008) write that desistance is best understood within the context of Genealogy 2020, 4, 50 9 of 14 human relationships—that social bonds can generate social capital, which leads to increased participation and inclusion in wider society (McNeill and Maruna 2008). More recently, McNeill (2018) has called for an understanding of rehabilitation focused on social relationships. He writes that “correctional agencies” must look beyond “personal rehabilitation” and consider the relational impacts of wider structural problems. The Young Review highlights the importance of social capital in creating resilient communities and the challenges of social deprivation (Mullen et al. 2014). As young BAME people often come from communities experiencing high levels of deprivation this is particularly pertinent. For example, employment has been found to be a key factor in the desistance process. Holding a criminal record has been shown to limit employment opportunities, which is particularly an issue for young BAME people. Durrance et al. (2013, p. 146) argues that attention should be focused on the ‘complex individual identities’ of offenders from BAME backgrounds. Calverley (2013) states that consideration must also be given to differences in patterns of desistance between different ethnic groups. Durrance et al. (2013), citing Ward and Maruna (2007) and Maguire (2007), argue that alongside an assessment of risk, there is a need to explore offenders’ values, goals, and strengths. An essential aspect of working towards these individual goals, Durrance writes, is through exploring the role of social networks of family and community as supports and dangers, which are not central to current assessment tools. Both Durrance and Calverley provide some examples in practice of a desistance-focused approach to working with minority ethnic offenders and argue that such an approach must be creative and focus on the multifaceted identities of minority ethnic offenders. Calverley (2013, p. 4) states: “Ethnicity must not be seen as an essential entity responsible in itself for producing differences. Instead, ethnicity is arguably best understood as an interactive factor with other determinants of desistance, as a significant co-variant”. The research of Glynn (2014, 2016) and Calverley (2013) has been critical to the development of knowledge regarding the desistance process for minority ethnic groups in the UK. Calverley’s (2013) work has been central to theorising around desistance and race. His review of the literature on desistance and ethnicity found that most studies come from the U.S. Based on this review, he argued that there is a gap in knowledge regarding how identity change may operate as a mechanism in the desistance of UK-based minority ethnic groups (Calverley 2013). Calverley’s (2013) own research explored the factors and processes associated with desistance from crime amongst Black, Indian, and Bangladeshi offenders in the UK. The aim of his study was to first, gain deeper insight into the experiences of minority ethnic offenders as they try to desist from crime and, second, to examine the effect the community to which these offenders belong had on shaping their desires, actions, and efforts to stop offending. Based on 33 interviews with offenders (either residing in the community, sentenced to community sentence, or released from prison on licence), Calverley (2013) specifically explored the reasons why Black and dual heritage offenders do not desist as well as why they do desist. In contrast to the experiences of two South Asian groups in the sample, Calverley (2013) writes that the families of Black and dual heritage offenders provided fewer resources and lower levels of social capital. He outlines the major obstacles that Black and dual heritage members faced in their efforts to desist, for example, that resettlement was particularly difficult for this group, as they were often unable to return to the family home (Calverley 2013). Navigating the procedure of finding accommodation and employment impeded motivations to desist (Calverley 2013). The attempts of the 14 Black and dual ethnicity interviewees to secure employment were impeded by a lack of education qualifications and employment experience, as well as having little social or human capital with which to secure work. Calverley (2013) writes that there is certain evidence that the process of removing oneself from peers still involved in crime, a key process accompanying desistance, may be more problematic for Black and dual heritage offenders than other ethnic groups. A key conclusion made by Calverley (2013) was that the experiences of desistance amongst Black and dual heritage participants were individualistic as opposed to the more collective, collaborative experiences of the South Asian participants. Glynn’s (2013, 2014) research explored Black men’s understandings and experiences of the racialisation of the crime/criminal justice systems and its impacts on the desistance process. His research Genealogy 2020, 4, 50 10 of 14 found that many Black men re-entering the community from prison face obstacles to desisting from further offending based on “racialised barriers” encountered in the CJS and post-release (Glynn 2014). Glynn (2013) writes that the men he spoke to in his research faced a series of systemic, structural failures that restricted how they could actualise their desistance journey. For example, he highlights that whilst some of the former prisoners underwent skills training in preparation for work, they did not then get work on release. He also highlights that whilst training was given on social skills, relationships etc., there was no work alongside this to mitigate the stigma of having been in prison (Glynn 2013). As a consequence, Glynn (2013, p. 227) states that the “onus of desistance” is placed on Black men “without having any material means of re-incorporation”. Issues of identity were also prevalent. Many of the Black men spoken to in the research believed that there was a lack of appreciation of what it means to be Black and British. He writes that many of the Black men spoken to felt “stripped of their identity” due to experiences of “invisibility” (Glynn 2013, p. 231). A study exploring adult BAME offenders’ experiences with resettlement on leaving prison, involving interviews with BAME prisoners and ex-prisoners and statutory and non-statutory providers of resettlement services, found that resettlement needs were generally spoken about as generic rather than “ethnically-specific” (Jacobson et al. 2010, p. 1). This led Jacobson et al. (2010) to argue that most resettlement needs of BAME offenders do not fundamentally differ from the needs of other offenders. However, whilst (ex-)prisoner respondents did not call for specialist resettlement provisions for BAME offenders, they felt that ethnic diversity and cultural sensitivity among resettlement staff was extremely important (Jacobson et al. 2010). Specialist provision of support for BAME offenders was also advocated for by most service providers in order to ensure that cultural differences in approaches to resettlement are sensitively dealt with. Glynn (2016) has called for an intersectional model of desistance to be adopted to understand experiences of multiple oppression by offender groups. Glynn (2014, 2016) highlights that Black men’s experiences in the CJS cannot be explained by race as a single category but, rather, by considering the interconnected issues associated with race, masculinity, poverty, and social disorganisation. He posits that the practical implications of taking such an approach to desistance for Black offenders would require “culturally competent rehabilitative processes” through networks and activities that support their desire to desist, which radically reframe interlocking oppressions of criminal justice processes that render them subordinate (Glynn 2016). Glynn (2016) posits that central to the intersectional model of desistance is a consideration of power and privilege in society in order for desistance research to move from a theoretical to a transformative paradigm rooted in the pursuit of social and racial justice. His intersectional model of desistance contains 11 elements that should be addressed in taking an intersectional approach to understanding Black men’s desistance. These include a focus on the intersectional experiences of Black men in relation to their desistance from crime and a more multidimensional approach to understanding Black men’s experiences with the CJS. 9. Conclusions Race, racism, and ethnicity and the way the genealogy of these divisions is experienced within (in particular) the CJS is evidenced at each level of intervention. Despite continued awareness of discrimination and disproportionality in the English and Welsh youth and adult justice systems, there are significant gaps in knowledge, most notably on young Black men’s experiences with court processes and in evidence of what works in prison and probation services. The voices of Black men have hardly been heard within discussions of desistance. A key limitation of this review was that many of the studies included here focused on BAME experiences more broadly rather than specifically on Black boys and young men. Whilst in the last decade the literature has begun to highlight the importance of considering intersectionality in order to understand the specific experiences of desistance amongst BAME men (Calverley 2013; Glynn 2014, 2016), youth and adult criminal justice responses in England/Wales arguably continue to be generic. The context of wider criminal justice reform, through Transforming Rehabilitation, has hindered the development of interventions/services that have a Genealogy 2020, 4, 50 11 of 14 culturally focused approach. Whilst limited, the research evidence clearly shows a need for services that are culturally aware, sensitive, and inclusive to meet the needs of BAME groups (Shingler and Pope 2018). A recent summary of evidence stated: “overall there is insufficient robust evidence about ‘what works’ for BAME people in prison or on probation” (HMIP 2019). More research is needed to understand how Black and dual ethnicity boys and young men can be better supported by prison and probation services. With a focus on desistance, there is a clear need for greater investment in youth and adult justice rehabilitation services in England and Wales that are focussed not only on personal rehabilitation but also on the relational aspects of rehabilitation and the influence of social structures and cultural conditions (McNeill 2018). With the ending of community rehabilitation contracts brought forward to 2020 and the renationalisation of the probation system announced in 2019, there is an opportunity for change in the delivery of probation services in England and Wales. Alongside ensuring that the recommendations of the Lammy Review related to discrimination and fairness across the youth and criminal justice system are met, changes to the probation system must enable the provision of localised voluntary sector and smaller providers to provide “culturally competent rehabilitative processes”, founded on an intersectional perspective of desistance (Glynn 2016). Finally, to enable these changes to the youth and criminal justice system to be meaningful for BAME children and young men, much more participatory co-produced research led by them needs to be undertaken to ensure that their voices and experiences are at the centre of these reforms. Author Contributions: Conceptualization, L.R. and J.P.W.; methodology, L.R.; validation, L.R. and J.P.W.; formal analysis, L.R. and J.P.W.; writing—original draft preparation, L.R.; writing—review and editing, L.R. and J.P.W. All authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript. 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This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/). https://www.runnymedetrust.org/uploads/publications/pdfs/CriminalJusticeVRacialJustice-2012.pdf http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1473225408091375 https://www.crimeandjustice.org.uk/sites/crimeandjustice.org.uk/files/Dangerous%20assocations%20Joint%20Enterprise%20gangs%20and%20racism.pdf https://www.crimeandjustice.org.uk/sites/crimeandjustice.org.uk/files/Dangerous%20assocations%20Joint%20Enterprise%20gangs%20and%20racism.pdf https://www.crimeandjustice.org.uk/sites/crimeandjustice.org.uk/files/Dangerous%20assocations%20Joint%20Enterprise%20gangs%20and%20racism.pdf https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/354686/yjb-exploring-needs-young-Black-minority-ethnic-offenders.pdf https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/354686/yjb-exploring-needs-young-Black-minority-ethnic-offenders.pdf https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/354686/yjb-exploring-needs-young-Black-minority-ethnic-offenders.pdf https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/774866/youth_justice_statistics_bulletin_2017_2018.pdf https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/774866/youth_justice_statistics_bulletin_2017_2018.pdf http://creativecommons.org/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/. Introduction Literature Review Method Summary of Literature Review Themes Background and Context Young Black Men in the Youth and Adult Criminal Justice Systems in England and Wales Experiences of Multiple Disadvantage Political and Policy Context Intersectionality Experiences with the Youth and Adult Criminal Justice Systems in Wales The Needs of Young BAME People Involved in Offending Desistance from Crime—Seeking to Understand the Experiences of Black Boys and Young Men Conclusions References 
work_hfqosocrwbbdnp2sqaw56cx2re	----	Hate, Threats, and Violence. A Register Study of Persons Suspected of Hate Crime This article was downloaded by: [University of Stockholm] On: 19 December 2011, At: 05:12 Publisher: Routledge Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK Journal of Scandinavian Studies in Criminology and Crime Prevention Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/scri20 Hate, Threats, and Violence. A Register Study of Persons Suspected of Hate Crime Lena Roxell a a Department of Criminology, Stockholm University, Stockholm, Sweden Available online: 02 Nov 2011 To cite this article: Lena Roxell (2011): Hate, Threats, and Violence. A Register Study of Persons Suspected of Hate Crime, Journal of Scandinavian Studies in Criminology and Crime Prevention, 12:2, 198-215 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14043858.2011.623391 PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE Full terms and conditions of use: http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents will be complete or accurate or up to date. The accuracy of any instructions, formulae, and drug doses should be independently verified with primary sources. The publisher shall not be liable for any loss, actions, claims, proceedings, demand, or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material. http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/scri20 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14043858.2011.623391 http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions Hate, Threats, and Violence. A Register Study of Persons Suspected of Hate Crime LENA ROXELL Department of Criminology, Stockholm University, Stockholm, Sweden Abstract Introduction ‘A man who was in the company of his boyfriend was gashed with a knife in the Pride Festival area in Tantolundenon Sunday night. The couple were attacked by three unknown assailants in their twenties’. (Dagens Nyheter 2008) ‘The fires on Parkvägen in Hagforson Friday night were started deliberately. And the motive may be racist. . . . No suspect has yet been identified and investigations are ongoing’ (Värmlands Folkblad 2009) The above media reports describe serious offences that could also represent examples of what are referred to as hate crimes. The hate crime concept is relatively new to both the criminal justice system and the research community. These offences represent what have been referred to as motive crimes, which involve violating people, or groups of people, by means of various criminal acts. People are violated because of their origin, religion, or sexual disposition— because they are perceived to be homosex- uals or Muslims, for example. In Sweden, if a person is subjected to a hate crime, this should lead to the application of the This article focuses on individuals suspected of hate crimes with xenophobic, Islamophobic, and homophobic motives. The objective is to fill a gap in the knowledge left by existing research, which has primarily focused on victims and definitional problems. This article’s genuine contribution to new research is the comparative perspective and the study of co- offending and specialization in offences for persons suspected for hate crimes. To find persons suspected for hate crimes, register data relating to hate- crime-motivated assault and unlawful threats/molestation offences from 2006 have been used. The study is based on a total of 1,910 offence reports together with information from the Registers of Suspected and Convicted Offenders for 558 persons suspected for hate crimes. Xenophobic hate crimes are over-represented in the material by comparison with homophobic and Islamophobic hate crimes. In the reports that have information about the relation between victim and perpetrators, it is more common for the perpetrators to be known than unknown to the victims. In cases where a suspected person has been identified, males are in a clear majority. Those suspected of homophobic hate crimes have the lowest mean age. Only a small number of offence reports include information on suspected co- offenders. Fifty-five per cent of the suspected people have prior registered convictions. It is very uncommon for them to be specialized in violent offences or unlawful threats/molestation, however. It is not possible to generalize the results to perpetrators of hate crimes, because 70% of the offence reports did not have information of suspected persons. KEY WORDS: Islamophobic and homophobic hate crimes, Perpe- trators, Register study, Xenopho- bic 198 Journal of Scandinavian Studies in Criminology and Crime Prevention ISSN 1404-3858 Vol. 12, pp. 198–215, 2011 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14043858.2011.623391 q 2011 Taylor & Francis D ow nl oa de d by [ U ni ve rs it y of S to ck ho lm ] at 0 5: 12 1 9 D ec em be r 20 11 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14043858.2011.623391 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14043858.2011.623391 sentencing severity clause found at Chapter 29, Section 2, Paragraph 7 of the Swedish Penal Code (Tiby 2006:9). In the media texts presented above, the perpetrators are described as being unknown to both the victims and the police. The question is whether this constitutes a representative depiction of hate crimes and the perpe- trators who commit them. Or does it rather represent a media image of hate crimes always involving serious offences com- mitted by unknown perpetrators (Tiby 2010)? Previous research has shown that hate crimes can vary a great deal with regard to the types of crime that are involved (Brå 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010a). They can take the form of anything from offensive remarks and vandalism, to threats and lethal violence. It has also been noted that the perpetrators may be found in both the immediate environments of the victims and in more peripheral positions (Mason 2005a, 2005b; Tiby 2010). Existing research on hate crimes has primarily focused on victimization (see e.g. Tiby 1999; Brå 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010a; Herek 2009). The issue of victimization has been examined with a focus on different research questions and using a variety of methodologies. In Sweden, hate crime studies have for the most part been directed at charting the offences involved and the experiences of victims, while in the USA research has also focused on different explanatory models for homophobic hate crimes (Dahl 2005:21). Existing research has also emphasized the issue of defini- tional problems and has further included studies of hate crime legislation and of how these laws are applied in practice (Jenness 2001; Sullaway 2004). Some of these studies have adopted a more critical approach to the question of whether it is possible to legislate away feelings such as hatred (Sullaway 2004). Research that has focused on persons suspected of hate crimes is not as common, however, and in order to fill this gap in the knowledge base, the current article focuses on persons suspected of hate crimes. Another issue that has rarely been the subject of research studies involves the different motives underlying hate crimes (Mason 2005a: 843). For this reason the study will also focus on a comparison of xenophobic, Islamophobic, and homophobic hate crimes. The objective of the article is to present a comparative study of persons suspected of threatening behaviour, molestation, and assaults involving xenophobic, Islamopho- bic, and homophobic motives. The inten- tion is in part to examine whether there are differences between persons suspected of different types of hate crime, in part to provide a description of the criminal activities of these individuals. The com- parison presents background facts such as the age and sex of the perpetrators, as well as examining previous involvement in crime, co-offending, and specialization in the offence categories assault and threaten- ing behaviour/molestation. This article’s genuine contribution to new research is the comparative perspective and the study of co-offending and specialization in offences for persons suspected for hate crimes. The primary data in the current study are from the national Registers of Suspected and Convicted Offenders. ‘In statistics a person suspected of offences is defined as a person who at the time of committing the offence is 15 years or older and who by police or a prosecutor is considered to be suspected after a completed investigation’ ROXELL: REGISTER STUDY OF PERSONS SUSPECTED OF HATE CRIME Journal of Scandinavian Studies in Criminology and Crime Prevention 199 D ow nl oa de d by [ U ni ve rs it y of S to ck ho lm ] at 0 5: 12 1 9 D ec em be r 20 11 (Brå 2011a). ‘Statistics relating to persons convicted for criminal offences present those found guilty either by court (county court convictions) or by prosecutors (through prosecutor fines or waivers of prosecution)’ (Brå 2011b). To find persons suspected for hate crimes the offences reported to the police in 2006 that have been classified as hate crime have been used. In this case it means that they have been suspected by the police during the investigation. Problems associated with using this type of data linked to this study will be discussed in the methodology section. Previous research and theoretical perspectives Who commits crimes with hate crime motives? Are there any common denomi- nators among these people? Since this article will be focusing on individuals who have been suspected of committing hate crimes, it is reasonable to begin by looking at existing research in this area. In order to study these persons, they must be known to the victim and/or to the police. In the most recent survey of hate crimes published by the Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention (Brå 2010a), a suspect has been linked to the crime in just under one-third (32%) of reported hate crime incidents. It has also been noted that it is more common for crimes to be reported when the perpetrator is not known to the victim than when perpetrator and victim are acquainted (von Hofer 2006). This means that important information about certain types of perpetrator is missed in research based on officially registered crimes. By utilizing the data provided by victims in questionnaire surveys, for example, it is possible to obtain other types of infor- mation (Tiby 1999). Even in data of the latter kind, however, the problem remains that the victim must have some knowledge of the perpetrator. As was noted in the introduction, there is a perception that the perpetrators of hate crimes are usually unknown to the victims. Over recent years, however, this view has been called into question (Mason 2005a, 2005b; Tiby 2010). There may be vari- ations in how victims define the known and unknown. The way in which known and unknown persons are defined can also vary between different studies, which can itself affect the results. The same is true of differences in the categories employed by researchers and how they choose to present results. Results can also be affected by respondents who have been victimized repeatedly being asked to restrict them- selves to the most serious incident when they describe the perpetrator (Tiby 1999). This can lead to results which produce an image of an unknown perpetrator, rather than of someone closer to the victim who may, for example, be subjecting them to harassment. Instead of focusing on the neighbour or schoolmate who has repeat- edly been harassing the victim, the focus is instead directed at the unknown perpe- trator who has perhaps assaulted the victim on a single occasion. A register study from USA also shows that most of the perpe- trators were unknown to the victims (McDevitt et al. 2010). This finding is problematized by the study’s authors, who argue that it depends on what is meant by being previously unknown to the victim. Several of the perpetrators lived in the same area, went to the same school, or worked in the same organization as the victim. This would indicate that the victims know who the perpetrators are, even though they are ROXELL: REGISTER STUDY OF PERSONS SUSPECTED OF HATE CRIME Journal of Scandinavian Studies in Criminology and Crime Prevention200 D ow nl oa de d by [ U ni ve rs it y of S to ck ho lm ] at 0 5: 12 1 9 D ec em be r 20 11 not directly acquainted with them, and that this is the reason they report that the perpetrator is not known to them. In other words, there are a lot of things to take into account in studies of the relations between victims and perpetrators. The annual report on hate crimes published by the Swedish National Council for Crime prevention includes a description of the persons suspected of hate crimes (Brå 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010a). Having only presented information on the suspects’ age and sex distributions in the first report, descriptions of the suspects have included more details in recent reports, including information on the nature of the offences involved and the suspects’ previous regis- tered criminality. The results show that males are suspected of hate crimes more often than females, and that middle-aged suspects are most common in relation to xenophobic/racist and religion-based hate crimes and least common in relation to homophobic and transphobic hate crimes.1 The most common offence types that these suspects have been registered for commit- ting as hate crimes are violent offences and unlawful threats/molestation. The offence distribution differs by comparison with that for registered hate crimes as a whole, which may be due to differences in the risk for detection associated with different types of crime. The results show further that the majority of those suspected of committing hate crimes have no prior convictions for criminal offences (ibid.). Questions have also been posed about perpetrators in questionnaire surveys focused on exposure to homophobic hate crime (e.g. Tiby 1999:153 ff.). For the most part the perpetrators were young males, most often more than one, 20% of the cases involved perpetrators with an over- seas background, and the perpetrators were intoxicated in connection with approximately half of the cases described. Among the female victims in the study, lone perpetrators, perpetrators who were older, and also perpetrators who were acquainted with the victim were all more common than they were among the male victims. Studies of lethal violence towards homo- sexual men show the same thing with regard to the perpetrators (Lander 1996; Bartlett 2007). They were young men with different kinds of problems like drug problems, criminal records, and unemployment. Perpetrators of hate crimes have also been studied in the USA (McDevitt et al. 2010). A study based on 2,976 hate crimes registered between 1997 and 1999 found that it was for the most part males that were registered as perpetrators in connec- tion with hate crimes. The majority of them were young men and were previously unknown to the victim. In three-quarters of the reported cases, the perpetrator was alone at the time of the offence. The study’s authors argue, however, that it should be noted that more than one person may be involved in the crime, even though they did not participate directly at the time the crime was actually committed. Others may have provided help and support to the perpetrators, for example. When studying the perpetrators of hate crime it is important to understand the underlying factors that lead to the commis- sion of hate crimes. Research has noted that youths with intolerant attitudes towards one minority often also have intolerant attitudes 1 In 2009 the perpetrators’ mean age was 31 for xenophobic/racist and religion-based hate crimes, 28 years in relation to homophobic hate crimes, and 26 for transphobic hate crimes (Brå 2010a). ROXELL: REGISTER STUDY OF PERSONS SUSPECTED OF HATE CRIME Journal of Scandinavian Studies in Criminology and Crime Prevention 201 D ow nl oa de d by [ U ni ve rs it y of S to ck ho lm ] at 0 5: 12 1 9 D ec em be r 20 11 towards other minority groups (Ring and Morgentau 2004; Ring 2006). High levels of intolerance appear to be associated with low levels of parental educational attainment and social class, problematic family con- ditions, individual-level factors such as restlessness, aggression, and a lack of empathy, and low levels of school achieve- ment. Stereotyped gender norms, feelings of being an outsider in relation to society, and frequently associating with friends in the evening are also associated with intolerance. These same factors are also viewed as involving a risk for criminal behaviour (Loeber and Farrington 1998). It has been noted in the literature that theoretical explanations of the origins of hate crime are a rarity (Craig 2003). Thus the core question in this research field— that of why hate crimes occur—remains under-theorized. One of the reasons for this may be that much of the focus of the research community has been directed at the issues of unclear definitions and the difficulties associated with attempts to measure the extent of the problem (Perry 2003:93). Another reason may be that the perspective of the victim has been central to theoretical efforts, which means that the perpetrators, along with the related issue of the causes of hate crime, have been neglected. Since the subject of hate crimes is a complex one, covering a range of offence types that can take place anywhere and can be committed by anyone, and where the strength of the causal links between hate and the criminal acts can vary substantially, it would probably be overly optimistic to expect to produce a single theory that can explain the entire field (Tiby 2010:191). One perspective that has been dis- cussed, however, involves the view that there is a hegemonic conception of ‘how the world should be’ which is based on dominant structures such as work, power, sexuality, and culture (Perry 2003:100). Within these structures, norms are con- structed as to how individuals should be. This means that we differentiate between people who follow these norms and those who deviate from them. A hate crime then involves the perpetrator demonstrating his/her identity and at the same time punishing the victim because he or she is perceived to deviate from the established norms (ibid.:105). It may also be the case that the perpetrator of a hate crime wants to make it clear that he/she is not a member of the group to which the victim belongs (Craig 2003). Viewed in this way, hate crimes may be regarded as a special form of aggression. The act has a symbolic function. For the perpetrators it does not matter whether or not the victim identifies him/herself as a member of a specific group. Instead, what is important to the perpetrators is making the statement that they are not themselves part of the group of which they perceive the victim to be a member. Craig also means that hate crimes differ from other aggres- sive offences because they typically involve multiple perpetrators. She also notes that hate crimes appear to be crimes carried out by young men against young men. Hate crimes can also be discussed on the basis of the concept of ‘message crimes’ (Iganski 2003). These crimes not only injure the initial victim but also the group to which the victim belongs or is presumed to belong. Since people are subjected to crimes on the basis of who they are perceived to be, or the group to which they belong, this causes greater suffering, which should result in a more severe sanction (ibid.). ROXELL: REGISTER STUDY OF PERSONS SUSPECTED OF HATE CRIME Journal of Scandinavian Studies in Criminology and Crime Prevention202 D ow nl oa de d by [ U ni ve rs it y of S to ck ho lm ] at 0 5: 12 1 9 D ec em be r 20 11 On the basis of register data, Levin and McDevitt have produced a typology of hate crime perpetrators (Levin and McDevitt 2002; McDevitt et al. 2003). The data were drawn from the Boston police, where investigators have been trained to identify hate crimes. Levin and McDevitt’s point of departure was to look at the motives behind the hate crimes. In the majority (66%) of cases, the motive for the hate crime was sensation seeking. In 25% of the cases the motive was defensive, in 8% revenge, and in 1% of cases the perpe- trators were on a mission to ‘save the world’ from undesirable groups. What makes the study interesting is that it makes an attempt to look at the underlying motives for hate crimes. That is to say, there is an assumption that the hate motive itself is not the critical element in whether or not the crime is committed. However, the study does not problematize the question of what the underlying factors behind the hatred might be, or how important these factors might be, for whether or not a hate crime will be committed. McDevitt et al. (2010) have subsequently argued that the typology needs to be developed further. Amongst other things, they note that one motive need not exclude another, and that a hate crime may rather be a product of several motives. They also feel that attention should be focused on individuals who do not directly participate in hate crimes but who are present to provide support. McDevitt et al. also discuss whether incidents such as the 9/11 attacks may affect the distribution over time of the motives that are most commonly associ- ated with hate crimes. Following this incident it is conceivable that hate crimes motivated by defence or revenge may have become more common. As has been noted above, survey studies have shown that people who have a hostile attitude towards one minority group are usually also hostile towards other minorities (Ring and Mor- gentau 2004; Ring 2006). Thus people with xenophobic attitudes are commonly also hostile towards LGBT people. In order to make progress and advance our knowl- edge of this phenomenon it is possible that other methods than those based on register data and questionnaire surveys may be required, such as interviews, for example. Previous research shows that there are some findings about perpetrators or sus- pected people of hate crimes. But there is no research about registered co-offending and specialization in crime for people suspected for hate crimes. Therefore it is relevant to do this study to get more knowledge about people who are suspected for hate crime. To answer this question, data from the national Registers of Suspected and Convicted Offenders will be used. Although this type of data has certain limitations, it is preferable instead of using interviews, for example. The aim is to find some patterns in the suspected people’s criminality, which motivates the choice of data. What type of results can be expected in the current study on the basis of the research and theoretical assumptions pre- sented above? The finding that individuals who are intolerant towards one minority group usually also hold intolerant attitudes towards several minorities would suggest that we may find perpetrators in the data set who have been suspected of committing offences against a number of different minority groups. There might also be an expectation that the suspected persons will be relatively young. It may be more ROXELL: REGISTER STUDY OF PERSONS SUSPECTED OF HATE CRIME Journal of Scandinavian Studies in Criminology and Crime Prevention 203 D ow nl oa de d by [ U ni ve rs it y of S to ck ho lm ] at 0 5: 12 1 9 D ec em be r 20 11 important for younger people to act in a way that shows them to be distancing themselves from groups like homosexuals or people of a different religion. By means of such actions the perpetrator establishes that he does not belong to the group in question. There might also be an expec- tation that it will be common with co- offenders. Method In order to find people suspected2 for hate crimes the offences reported to the police in 2006 that have been classified as hate crime have been used. The classification is made by the Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention on the basis of the offence descriptions contained in the offence reports (Brå 2007:31). On the basis of offence description they also categorize the relationship between the victim and the offender. This study is limited to hate crimes with xenophobic, homophobic, and Islamophobic motives.3A further restric- tion has also been made with regard to the offence types included in the study. These are unlawful threats, molestation, and assault. Unlawful threats and molestation are the most common offences types found among the classified hate crimes, followed by assault (ibid.:43). Offence types such as defamation and agitation against a national or ethnic group have been excluded. In other words, the study includes the most common hate crime motives and the most common and more serious offence types found among the hate crimes. In 2006 a total of 1,910 offence reports relating to assault or unlawful threats/ molestation were coded as hate crimes with xenophobic, Islamophobic, or homopho- bic motives (Brå 2007:42). Table 1 presents the distribution across the different hate crime motives. As can be seen from the table, xenopho- bic hate crimes are over-represented by comparison with those based on other motives. Only 7% of the hate crimes have been classified as Islamophobic. For the purposes of this study, incidents involving assault, unlawful threats, and molestation have been selected. The distri- bution of these offence across the different motive categories (xenophobic, homophobic, and Islamophobic) is presented in Table 2. Table 2 shows that unlawful threats or molestation are more common than assault among registered hate crimes. The pro- portion of incidents of unlawful threats and molestation is higher among the Islamophobic hate crimes than it is among the two other categories of hate crimes. The primary data have been collected from the national Registers of Suspected Table 1. Number of reported hate crimes in the form of assault and unlaw- ful threats/molestation, by xeno- phobic, Islamophobic, and homophobic motives, 2006 (%) n % Xenophobic 1320 69 Islamophobic 140 7 Homophobic 450 24 Total 1910 100 2 In this case it means that they have been suspected by the police during the investigation. 3 Anti-Semitic hate crimes were excluded since the number of such offences was very small. These offences comprised only 4% of the total number of hate crimes (Brå 2007:42). ROXELL: REGISTER STUDY OF PERSONS SUSPECTED OF HATE CRIME Journal of Scandinavian Studies in Criminology and Crime Prevention204 D ow nl oa de d by [ U ni ve rs it y of S to ck ho lm ] at 0 5: 12 1 9 D ec em be r 20 11 and Convicted Offenders. At the time the data were collected from these registers, the Register of Suspected Offenders con- tained information for the period 1995 – 2006. The Register of Convicted Offenders contained information for the period 1973 – 2006. Data from the first of the two registers have been employed to study the question of possible suspected co- offenders. Data from the convictions register have been employed to examine the issues of prior involvement in crime and specialization in offending among those suspected of hate crimes. Previous studies that have examined specialization in offending have done so on the basis of different points of departure (see e.g. Wikström 1987; Kyvsgaard 1998). In part the crime types examined have varied, and there are differences in the definitions of specialization employed. The current study focuses on the offence types assault, unlawful threats, and molestation. Given that these are the offence types chosen for the study, it is of interest to see whether the suspected offen- ders are specialized in just these types of crime. According to previous research I have decided the following: To be included in the analysis of specialization, the offender has to have been convicted on at least three occasions. This restriction was introduced in part in order to avoid classifying indivi- duals with only one or two convictions as specialists, in part because it has been used in other studies focused on the issue of specialization (Wikström 1987). Further, the individuals are only included in the analysis if they have been convicted of one of the three offence types noted above. In this study, all the individuals included have been suspected of assault, unlawful threats, or molestation. This does not necessarily mean that they have been convicted of these offences, however. The suspected hate crime offenders’ convictions have been divided into four categories: violent offences, threats and molestation, violence and threats/molesta- tion against public servants, and other offences.4 For a person to be classified as a specialist, some of his/her convictions must involve the same types of crime. In this study, the cut-off has been set at two-thirds (following Wikström 1987). This means that in order for an individual to be classified as a specialist, over 66% of the individual’s convictions must be violent offences, unlaw- ful threats or molestation, or violence/ threats/molestation against public servants, respectively. The use of the two-thirds cut-off means that for a person convicted of three offences, two of these convictions must relate to the same category for the individual to be counted as a specialist. As has already been noted, the Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention has Table 2. Number of hate crimes involving assault or unlawful threats/mo- lestation by hate crime motive— xenophobic, Islamophobic, and homophobic, 2006 (%) Assault Unlawful threats or molestation n % n % Xenophobic 470 36 850 64 Islamophobic 34 24 106 76 Homophobic 163 36 287 64 Total 667 35 1243 65 4 The categorization employed means that it is not possible to differentiate between violence and threats/molestation against public servants on the basis of offences that have resulted in convictions. ROXELL: REGISTER STUDY OF PERSONS SUSPECTED OF HATE CRIME Journal of Scandinavian Studies in Criminology and Crime Prevention 205 D ow nl oa de d by [ U ni ve rs it y of S to ck ho lm ] at 0 5: 12 1 9 D ec em be r 20 11 studied hate crimes every year since 2006. This might indicate that the current study is superfluous. The motivation for conduct- ing the current study, however, is that the National Council’s 2006 study presents very few results about suspected people (Brå 2007:86 ff.). This article will also examine the issues of co-offending relations and specialization which have not been studied by the National Council. Problems associated with studies of this kind Using registered crime in the context of research is associated with certain limi- tations. It is widely known that not all crime is brought to the attention of the police or other authorities and thus remains unregis- tered (Brå 2006; von Hofer 2006). It is also known that some types of crime are registered more often than others. More serious crime is generally reported more often than less serious offences. Reporting propensities are also affected by the relationship between perpetrator and victim. Crimes are more often reported where the victim is not acquainted with the perpetrator. Confidence in the justice system may also influence the extent to which victims report offences, and the resources and prioritiza- tions of the police and other agencies also affect which offences are registered. When it comes to hate crimes, there are additional factors that affect the validity of the data, i.e. that we are really measuring what we intend to measure. For the National Council for Crime Prevention to register an offence as a hate crime, the offence must either have been registered under one of the offence codes which are included in the National Council’s hate crime sampling frame, or have been identified as a suspected hate crime in the police’s offence registration system RAR (Brå 2010a:20). The police must also have recorded relevant information in the offence description included in the police report, and have included words from the list employed in the National Council’s electronic search procedure. Finally, the coder must interpret the incident and assess it to constitute a hate crime. At the present time we have no information as to the significance of the various stages in the hate crime registration process for the question of whether or not an offence will finally be registered as a hate crime (ibid.:22). The National Council for Crime Prevention states that users of the hate crime statistics need to bear in mind that the statistics present a minimum estimate of the number of hate crimes reported to the police. It could also be a problem to separate Islamophobic hate crimes from xenopho- bic hate crimes, if it is not clear that the victim is a Muslim. The consequence will be that some Islamophobic hate crimes will be registered like xenophobic hate crimes (Brå 2007:26). Previous studies have shown that the dark figure for hate crimes is large (Tiby 2006). It is also conceivable that the size of this figure varies between different types of hate crime. This knowledge, together with the factors described above as affecting the hate crime statistics in various ways, means that it is important to bear in mind that this article focuses on registered crime and nothing else. As you will see in the findings, of the 1,910 hate crime reports included in the analysis, a suspected person has been identified in connection with 579, or 30%. This means that it is difficult to generalize the results to perpetrators of hate crime. Instead it will be better to talk about trends in this study. ROXELL: REGISTER STUDY OF PERSONS SUSPECTED OF HATE CRIME Journal of Scandinavian Studies in Criminology and Crime Prevention206 D ow nl oa de d by [ U ni ve rs it y of S to ck ho lm ] at 0 5: 12 1 9 D ec em be r 20 11 Findings This section presents the results relating to suspected persons who were registered for hate crimes in 2006. The presentation begins by describing the relationship between the victims and the perpetrators. This is followed by results relating to the age and sex of the suspected persons, suspected co-offenders, previous convictions, and possible specialization in crime. Relationship between the victims and the perpetrators The offence reports sometimes contain information on the relationship between the victims of hate crimes and the perpetrators. Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention categorizes the relationship between the victim and the offender. Table 3 presents the distribution for both the different hate crime motives and the number of hate crimes in total. The different kinds of relations have also been categorized into four groups according to the Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention (Brå 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010a). The groups are Related, Superficially acquainted, Unknown, and Missing data. Table 3 shows that the perpetrator was unknown to the victim in one-third of the reported hate crimes. In almost one-quarter of the offence reports there is no infor- mation on the relationship between the victim and the perpetrator. In nearly 43%, there is information showing that the identity of the person who has subjected the victim to the hate crime is known. In this case it means that the perpetrator has been classified to be related or superficially acquainted to the victim. In the reports where the Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention have been able to categorize the relationship between victims and perpetrators, it is slightly more com- mon for the victim to be related or super- ficially acquainted with the perpetrator than it is for the perpetrator to be unknown to the victim. It should be remembered in this context that it is more common to report offences when the perpetrator is unknown to the victim than when he or she is an acquaintance of the victim (Brå 2006; von Hofer 2006).The results are in line with previous research that has shown that the perpetrators may be found in both the immediate environments of the victims and in more peripheral positions (Mason 2005a, 2005b; Tiby 2010). Persons suspected for hate crimes Of the 1,910 hate crime reports included in the analysis, a suspected person has been identified in connection with 579, or 30%. This means that the suspected individual’s personal identification number is registered in the offence report. The material includes a total of 558 such individuals. Of these, 17 have been registered in connection with two or more of the offence reports. One of the 17 has been registered as a suspect in connec- tion with one crime with a xenophobic motive and one with a homophobic motive. Another is suspected for one xenophobic hate crime, one Islamophobic, and one with a homophobic motive.5 The remainder of the individuals in the material have been suspected of offences with a single motive. In other words this is an unexpected result, given that previous research has shown that those with intolerant attitudes towards one minority group are usually also intolerant towards other minorities (Ring and 5 This means that in some calculations the number of suspects will be 561, since two individuals appear in two and three hate crime categories respectively. ROXELL: REGISTER STUDY OF PERSONS SUSPECTED OF HATE CRIME Journal of Scandinavian Studies in Criminology and Crime Prevention 207 D ow nl oa de d by [ U ni ve rs it y of S to ck ho lm ] at 0 5: 12 1 9 D ec em be r 20 11 Morgentau 2004; Ring 2006). Given this we might have expected to find more individuals who had been suspected of hate crimes with different underlying motives. It may also be that intolerant attitudes need not necessarily lead to criminal activities. It should be remembered that in the majority of the reports, 70%, the police have not identified a suspected person. Therefore it will be difficult to generalize the results to perpetrators of hate crimes. But it is also an interesting result that the police have found a suspected person in only 30% of the cases. The reports with an Islamophobic motive include a smaller proportion of registered suspects, at only 21%, than the reports associated with the other two hate crime motives. The corresponding figure for both the xenophobic and the homo- phobic hate crimes is 30%. The sex distribution of the suspected persons of hate crime has also been examined. Table 4 presents the results by the different hate crime motives. Since there are individuals who have been suspected of crimes with different motives, the same individual may be present in two or three hate crime categories. As expected, men are over-represented among the persons suspected of hate crimes. This is in line with the findings presented in previous research (see e.g. McDevitt et al. 2010). The mean age of the individuals suspected of hate crimes is 31 years. Looking to the different hate crime motives, those suspected Table 3. Relationship between victims and perpetrators in reported hate crimes in the form of assault and unlawful threats/molestation, by crimes with xenophobic, Islamophobic, and homophobic motives, 2006 (%) Xenophobic Islamophobic Homophobic Total n % n % n % n % Related 78 5.9 8 5.7 39 8.7 125 6.5 Cohabitant/partner/ spouse 7 0.5 1 0.7 0 0 8 0.4 Former partner 35 2.7 1 0.7 8 1.8 44 2.3 Family member/relative 12 0.9 4 2.9 10 2.2 26 1.4 Acquaintance/friend 24 1.8 2 1.4 21 4.7 47 2.5 Superficially acquainted 507 38.4 33 23.6 150 33.3 690 36.1 Colleague 12 0.9 3 2.1 1 0.2 16 0.8 Schoolmate 101 7.7 7 5.0 46 10.2 154 8.1 Neighbour 165 12.5 7 5.0 38 8.4 210 11.0 Known person 229 17.3 16 11.4 65 14.4 310 16.2 Unknown 423 32.0 60 42.8 172 38,2 655 34.3 Public agency staff/ Service provider 62 4.7 2 1.4 9 2.0 73 3.8 Unknown person 361 27.3 58 41.4 163 36.2 582 30.5 Missing data 312 23.6 39 27.9 89 19.8 440 23.0 Total 1320 100 140 100 450 100 1910 100 ROXELL: REGISTER STUDY OF PERSONS SUSPECTED OF HATE CRIME Journal of Scandinavian Studies in Criminology and Crime Prevention208 D ow nl oa de d by [ U ni ve rs it y of S to ck ho lm ] at 0 5: 12 1 9 D ec em be r 20 11 of homophobic hate crimes have the lowest mean age, at 25 years. The corresponding mean ages for persons suspected of xeno- phobic and Islamophobic hate crimes are 34 and 32, respectively. These figures also correspond with those presented in the National Council’s reports of hate crimes over recent years (Brå 2008, 2009, 2010a). It is interesting that those suspected of homo- phobic hate crimes are on average younger than those suspected of crimes based on the other hate crime motives. One possible explanation could be that young people are keen to make it clear that they are not homosexuals (Craig 2003). This would then lead to a younger mean age among those suspected of homophobic hate crimes by comparison with the other types of hate crime. However, this explanation needs to be explored further. Twenty of the reports include infor- mation on suspected co-offenders. This represents just 3% of the 579 offence reports which include a personal identifi- cation number for a suspect. The material includes a total of 25 suspected co- offenders. Together these individuals are suspected of a total of 24 offences. The number of co-offenders associated with a single offence varies between one and three. Thus at most four individuals have been suspected of committing a hate crime together in this study. In other words, it is uncommon for individuals to be registered as suspected co-offenders regarding hate crimes. This result is not in line with previous research (Levin and McDevitt 2002; Craig 2003; McDevitt et al. 2003). Tiby found in a survey about homosexuals that several perpetrators were more com- mon than lone perpetrators (Tiby 1999: 154). However, one should consider that the information about perpetrators/suspected people is from different sources, from victims in Tiby’s survey and from the police in this study. It is difficult to draw conclusions about reported hate crimes involving co-offen- ders on the basis of the distribution presented in Table 5, nor is there very much to be gained from a more detailed examination of these offence reports. What can be noted, however, is that it is very uncommon for two or more individuals to be registered for having committed hate crimes together. Prior convictions The next stage of the analysis involves studying whether the suspected people of hate crime had been convicted of offences during the period 1973 – 2006. A total of 345 of the hate crime suspects had records in the convictions register.6 These had together been registered in connection with Table 4. Sex distribution among individ- uals suspected of assault and unlawful threats/molestation offences with hate crime motives, 2006. Presented by xenophobic, Islamophobic, and homophobic hate crimes (%) Males Females n % n % Xenophobic 321 81 73 19 Islamophobic 26 87 4 13 Homophobic 111 81 26 19 Total 458 82 103 18 6 Of these 345 individuals, 1 had been suspected both of a hate crime with a xenophobic motive and of one with a homophobic motive. This individual is therefore counted twice, and the number of individuals with prior convictions sums to a total of 346 in certain contexts. ROXELL: REGISTER STUDY OF PERSONS SUSPECTED OF HATE CRIME Journal of Scandinavian Studies in Criminology and Crime Prevention 209 D ow nl oa de d by [ U ni ve rs it y of S to ck ho lm ] at 0 5: 12 1 9 D ec em be r 20 11 a total of 2,620 convictions. Table 6 presents the prior convictions, i.e. for the period prior to the hate crime, of those registered as hate crime suspects.7 The results have been broken down on the basis of the number of convictions for which the individuals in question had been registered prior to the commission of the suspected hate crime included in the study. It can be seen from the table that 55% of the persons registered in 2006 for hate crimes in the form of assaults, threats, and molestation have prior convictions. This finding does not correspond with the results of the National Council’s more recent studies (Brå 2008, 2009, 2010a). The National Council’s studies include all types of crime. This may be due to the fact that the current study is focused only on more serious offences. It is conceivable that those suspected of more serious crimes have prior convictions to a greater extent than others. Among those suspected of homophobic hate crimes, however, it is more common for the suspects to have no prior criminal record. This may be linked Table 5. Number of offence reports involving one suspect offender and suspected co- offenders in connection with assaults and unlawful threats/molestation with hate crime motives, 2006. By crimes with xenophobic, Islamophobic, and homophobic motives (%) One suspect Suspected co-offenders Total n % n % n % Xenophobic 394 97 14 3 408 100 Islamophobic 31 94 2 6 33 100 Homophobic 134 97 4 3 138 100 Total 559 97 20 3 579 100 Table 6. Number of prior convictions among individuals suspected of hate crimes involving assault or unlawful threats/molestation in 2006, by whether the hate crime was based on a xenophobic, Islamophobic, or homophobic motive (%, 1973 – 2006) Xenophobic Islamophobic Homophobic Total No. of prior Convictions n % n % n % n % 0 162 41 12 40 76 55 250 45 1 – 2 88 22 7 23 35 26 130 23 3 – 4 42 11 4 13 9 7 55 10 5 – 9 43 11 2 7 6 4 51 9 10 – 59 15 5 17 11 8 75 13 Total 394 100 30 100 137 100 561 100 7 This analysis includes a total of 2,472 convictions. ROXELL: REGISTER STUDY OF PERSONS SUSPECTED OF HATE CRIME Journal of Scandinavian Studies in Criminology and Crime Prevention210 D ow nl oa de d by [ U ni ve rs it y of S to ck ho lm ] at 0 5: 12 1 9 D ec em be r 20 11 to the fact that this group is on average somewhat younger than those suspected of hate crimes with xenophobic or Islamo- phobic motives. It is thus possible that other measures are taken in connection with their offending rather than prosecut- ing and convicting them. One other explanation could be that they maybe are less criminal. The question of whether there are differences between the different categories of hate crime suspects with regard to the types of crime for which they are com- monly convicted has also been examined.8 Among those suspected of xenophobic hate crimes, the most common type of prior conviction is for motoring offences, fol- lowed by theft offences and violent offences. For those suspected of Islamo- phobic hate crimes, it is theft offences, violent offences, and drug offences. The corresponding ranking for those suspected of homophobic hate crimes is theft offences, followed by motoring offences and violent offences. In other words, the different groups of hate crime suspects have prior convictions for the same categories of crime. The ranking of the different categories of prior convictions varies somewhat between the different groups of hate crime suspects, however. If we compare these results with the official crime statistics relating to all persons convicted of offences over recent years, we find that the same offence types are also common there (Brå 2010b). In other words, the population examined in this article, i.e. persons suspected of hate crimes, is not distinctive as regards the types of offences for which the suspects have previously been convicted. The final analysis focuses on whether the individuals suspected of hate crimes were specialists in the crime categories violence or threats and molestation. The analysis includes those hate crime suspects con- victed of at least three offences and who had also been convicted of violent crimes and/or threats or molestation—a total of 141 individuals. In order to be classified as a specialist, two-thirds of the individual’s offences had to have comprised incidents of violence or threats/molestation, respect- ively. The results show that four individ- uals, or 3%, qualify as specialists according to this definition. All four are males. Three of them are specialized in violent offences, and one in threats and molestation. All four have been convicted of three offences, of which two were violent offences or threats/molestation, respectively. In the original hate crime material, all four are suspected of hate crimes with xenophobic motives. The analysis thus shows that it is uncommon for persons suspected of hate crimes to be specialized in assault or threats/molestation. This finding corre- sponds with the results of existing research on specialization in general, which also show that it is uncommon for individuals to be convicted repeatedly in connection with only one specific type of crime (Wikström 1987; Kyvsgaard 1998). Summary and discussion In summary, this study has shown that there was an over-representation of xeno- phobic hate crimes in relation to homo- phobic and Islamophobic hate crimes among the molestation/threat and assault offences reported to the police in 2006. 8 The analysis focuses only on the principal offence in a given conviction, i.e. the offence associated with the most severe sanction in its sentencing scale. This means that less serious offences will be under-represented in relation to more serious types of crime. ROXELL: REGISTER STUDY OF PERSONS SUSPECTED OF HATE CRIME Journal of Scandinavian Studies in Criminology and Crime Prevention 211 D ow nl oa de d by [ U ni ve rs it y of S to ck ho lm ] at 0 5: 12 1 9 D ec em be r 20 11 In those cases where the reports contain information on the relationship between the victim and the perpetrator, it is more common for the perpetrator to be known than to be unknown to the victim. Thirty per cent of the offences have been linked to an identified suspect. As mentioned before, it leads to difficulties to generalize the results to perpetrators of hate crime. Not unexpectedly, there is an over-represen- tation of males among the perpetrators. The average age of the suspects is lowest among those suspected of homophobic hate crimes. Only a few reports, 3% of those which included an identified suspect, contain information about suspected co- offenders. The study has also shown that 55% of the suspects have prior convictions. Those with records in the convictions register have primarily been convicted of motoring offences, thefts, violent offences, and drug offences. Finally, it could be noted that is rare for those suspected of hate crimes to be specialized in assault or molestation/threat offences. What tendencies can we see in these results? Firstly, we see no conspicuous differences between those suspected of xenophobic, Islamophobic, or homophobic hate crimes with regard to age, sex, or prior involvement in crime. Secondly, the reported hate crime offences are almost exclusively linked to a single suspect. This is to say that it is uncommon for two or more individuals to be suspected of committing hate crimes together. Thirdly, the suspected persons of these types of hate crimes are not ‘specialists’. The study has not shown that the perpetrators are specialized and focus on the commission of a certain type of crime against certain types of individual. In order to examine this question in more detail, however, it would be of interest to study hate crimes over a longer period of time. In order to understand better the findings presented in this study, it would also be appropriate to conduct interviews with persons suspected of hate crimes, for example (see Tiby 2006). This is particu- larly the case in relation to the question of the underlying causes of this type of criminality, since interview studies could examine the questions of what gives rise to feelings of hatred towards certain groups, and what it means to feel this kind of hatred. Are these crimes always governed by feelings such as hatred? Or are they governed by other feelings, other factors, or other combinations of feelings and factors? In order to improve the available knowledge on hate crime it is also important to discuss these questions. One of the factors that make this subject a complicated one to study is that the crimes, in addition to the presence of criminal intent, are also characterized by a specific underlying motive. The investi- gation of different types of crime can be more or less complex. In the context of hate crimes, it is not only the offence itself that has to be examined, but also the motive behind the crime. Research into hate crimes thus requires us to ask different questions and to use other methods than those commonly employed in criminological research. As has already been noted, it is important to remember that this article focuses exclusively on information relating to registered crime. This involves limi- tations when it comes to interpreting and understanding these crimes. Thirty per cent of the offence reports included in this study include registered information on sus- pected offenders. This naturally gives rise to the question of who the offenders ROXELL: REGISTER STUDY OF PERSONS SUSPECTED OF HATE CRIME Journal of Scandinavian Studies in Criminology and Crime Prevention212 D ow nl oa de d by [ U ni ve rs it y of S to ck ho lm ] at 0 5: 12 1 9 D ec em be r 20 11 are in the 70% of cases where we have no information. There are also very few reports that include information on sus- pected co-offenders. It would therefore be interesting to look in more detail at individuals who are perhaps not directly involved in the hate crime incident itself, but who are in the company of the suspected persons (see McDevitt 2010). What is the significance of the support provided by these people prior to, during, and after the hate crime itself? A major problem is that we cannot follow hate crimes from police report through to court judgement by means of register data. Thus we cannot see whether the individuals registered as suspects are also convicted of these crimes. Nor does the convictions register contain information on whether or not the convictions relate to hate crimes. In other words, it would be very useful if the data registered by the justice system were to contain more information that facili- tated research of this kind. References Bartlett P (2007). Killing Gay Men, 1976 – 2001. British Journal of Criminology 47(4):573 – 595. Brå (2006). 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Svensk våldtäktsstatistik i internationell belysning [Swedish rape stat- istics in the international lighting]. In: Roxell L, Tiby E (eds). Frågor, fält och filter. Kriminologisk metodbok. Lund: Studentlit- teratur. Iganski P (2003). Hate crimes hurt more. In: Perry B (ed.). Hate and Bias Crime. A Reader. pp. 131 – 138. New York: Routledge. Jenness V (2001). The Hate Crime Canon and Beyond: A Critical Assessment. Law and Critique 12:279 – 308. Kyvsgaard B (1998). Den kriminelle karriere [The Criminal Career]. Köpenhamn: Jurist- og Økonomforbundets Forlag. Lander I (1996). Dödligt våld mot homosex- uella män—en registerstudie [Lethal violence against gay men—a register study]. In: Tiby E, Lander I (eds). Hat, hot, våld—utsatta homosexuella kvinnor och män. En pilotstudie i Stockholm. Report 1996:84. pp. 103 – 140. Stockholm: Folkhälsoinstitu- tet. Levin J, McDevitt J (2002). Hate Crimes Revisited. America’s War on Those Who Are Different. Colorado: Westview. Loeber R, Farrington D (eds) (1998). Serious and Violent Juvenile Offenders. Risk Factors and Successful Interventions. Thousand Oaks: SAGE. Mason G (2005a). Hate Crime and the Image of the Stranger. British Journal of Criminology 45:837 – 859. Mason G (2005b). Being Hated: Stranger or Familiar?. Social & Legal Studies 14(4): 585 – 605. McDevitt J, Levin J, Bennett S (2003). Hate crime offenders: an expanded typology. In: Perry B (ed.). Hate and Bias Crime. A Reader. pp. 109 – 116. New York: Routle- dge. McDevitt J, Levin J, Nolan J, Bennett S (2010). Hate crime offenders. In: Chakra- borti N (ed.). Hate Crime. Concepts, Policy, Future Directions. Devon: Willan Publishing. Perry B (2003). Introduction. Causes and consequences. In: Perry B (ed.). Hate and Bias Crime. A Reader. pp. 93 – 108. New York: Routledge. Ring J (2006). Intolerans. Att mäta ungas attityder till och upplevelser av antisemitism, homofobi, islamofobi och invandrarfien- tlighet [Intolerance. Measuring young persons’ attitudes to and experiences of anti-Semistism, homophobia, Islamophobia, and anti-immigrantism]. In: Roxell L, Tiby E (eds). Frågor, fält och filter. Kriminologisk metodbok. Lund: Studentlitteratur. Ring J, Morgentau S (2004). Intolerans. Anti- semitiska, homofobiska, islamofobiska och invandrarfientliga tendenser bland unga ROXELL: REGISTER STUDY OF PERSONS SUSPECTED OF HATE CRIME Journal of Scandinavian Studies in Criminology and Crime Prevention214 D ow nl oa de d by [ U ni ve rs it y of S to ck ho lm ] at 0 5: 12 1 9 D ec em be r 20 11 http://www.dn.se/sthlm/man-utsatta-for-hatbrott-1.635846 http://www.dn.se/sthlm/man-utsatta-for-hatbrott-1.635846 http://www.dn.se/sthlm/man-utsatta-for-hatbrott-1.635846 [Intolerance. Anti-Semitic, Homophobic, Islamophobic and Xenophobic Tendencies among Young]. Stockholm: Brottsförebyg- gande rådet och Forum för levande historia. Sullaway M (2004). Psychological Perspectives on Hate Crime Laws. Psychology, Public Policy and Law 10(3):250 – 292. Tiby E (1999). Hatbrott? Homosexuella kvin- nors och mäns berättelser om utsatthet för brott [Hate Crime? Homosexual Women and Men’s Narratives of Victimization]. Stock- holm: Kriminologiska institutionens avhan- dlingsserie nr 1, Stockholms universitet. Tiby E (2010). Hatbrott. Monster, mönster & möjligheter [Hate crimes. Monster, patterns and possibilities]. In: Deland M, Hertzberg F, Hvitfeldt T (eds). Det vita fältet. Samtida forskning om högerextremism. Uppsala: Opuscula Historica Upsaliensis 41. Värmlands Folkblad (2009). Available at: http://www.vf.se/Nyheter/Varmland/ Rasistiska-motiv-kan-ligga-bakom- branderna-090915.aspx (accessed 29 Sep- tember 2009). Wikström P-OH (1987). Patterns of Crime in a Birth Cohort. Age, Sex, and Social Class Differences. Project Metropolitan no. 24. Stockholm: Department of Sociology, University of Stockholm. LENA ROXELL Department of Criminology Stockholm University 106 91 Stockholm SWEDEN Email: lena.roxell@criminology.su.se ROXELL: REGISTER STUDY OF PERSONS SUSPECTED OF HATE CRIME Journal of Scandinavian Studies in Criminology and Crime Prevention 215 D ow nl oa de d by [ U ni ve rs it y of S to ck ho lm ] at 0 5: 12 1 9 D ec em be r 20 11 http://www.vf.se/Nyheter/Varmland/Rasistiska-motiv-kan-ligga-bakom-branderna-090915.aspx http://www.vf.se/Nyheter/Varmland/Rasistiska-motiv-kan-ligga-bakom-branderna-090915.aspx http://www.vf.se/Nyheter/Varmland/Rasistiska-motiv-kan-ligga-bakom-branderna-090915.aspx 
work_hir3qbfimfgbvbg7zpnenqd5zy	----	S0956618X18000467jra 278..289 Oppositional Religious Speech: Understanding Hate Preaching P E T E R W E D G E Professor of Law, Oxford Brookes University Hate preaching is capable of constituting both hate crime and hate speech, lies at the centre of many religions’ understanding of the manifestation of their religion, and frequently raises the contentious issue of regulation of the use of sacred scriptures. This brief article explores the regulation of hate preaching by criminal law, discussing the particular problems posed by oppositional religious speech, before concluding with suggestions for a number of ways to reduce these problems. Keywords: hate speech, hate crime, preaching, scriptures, law and religion INTRODUCTION In February 2017 two Christians were convicted of a religiously aggravated public order offence – a hate crime – for street preaching.1 The prosecutor emphasised that the defendants had quoted from the King James Bible: ‘although the words preached are included in a version of the Bible in 1611, this does not mean that they are incapable of amounting to a public order offence in 2016’.2 In a two-day hearing before Bristol Crown Court, the convic- tions were quashed, on the basis that the defendants had not been hostile towards another religious group, but had been doing no more than expressing their sincerely held religious beliefs.3 Cases such as theirs reveal the complexity of hate preaching. Hate preaching is capable of constituting both hate crime and hate speech,4 lies at the centre of many religions’ understanding of the manifest- ation of their religion, and frequently raises the contentious issue of regulation of the use of sacred scriptures. 1 An earlier draft of this article was made available to the defence team between the conviction and the appeal. 2 Cited by Christian Concern, ‘Street preachers who quoted Bible convicted in “modern-day heresy trial”’, 28 February, 2017, available at ,http://christianconcern.com/our-concerns/freedom-of- speech/street-preachers-who-quoted-bible-convicted-in-modern-day-heresy-trial., accessed 2 March 2018. 3 Overd and Stockwell, Bristol Crown Court (29 June 2017). The judgment of Picton J is not reported, and the transcript of the hearing is not in the public domain, but the appeal is discussed in the Bristol Post, 29 June 2017. 4 See further P Iganski, A Sweiry and J Culpeper, ‘A question of faith? Prosecuting religiously aggra- vated offences in England and Wales’, (2016) Crim LR 334 – 348. (2018) 20 Ecc LJ 278 – 289 # Ecclesiastical Law Society doi:10.1017/S0956618X18000467 278 terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0956618X18000467 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:27, subject to the Cambridge Core http://christianconcern.com/our-concerns/freedom-of-speech/street-preachers-who-quoted-bible-convicted-in-modern-day-heresy-trial http://christianconcern.com/our-concerns/freedom-of-speech/street-preachers-who-quoted-bible-convicted-in-modern-day-heresy-trial https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/S0956618X18000467 https://www.cambridge.org/core This article will explore the regulation of hate preaching by criminal law, with a particular focus on hate law.5 It begins with an introduction to oppositional religious speech and the possibility of such speech being hateful. This is fol- lowed by a brief discussion of hate law, with a focus on hate speech and hate crime which can be committed by speech. The article then shows the particular problems posed by the regulation of oppositional religious speech as hate speech, before concluding with a consideration of ways forward. OPPOSITIONAL RELIGIOUS SPEECH One important definition of religion requires a belief system that ‘teach[es] its adherents how they are to live their lives’.6 This emphasis on a code of conduct is sometimes used to distinguish religion and race.7 A code of conduct may fit neatly with state values at any given time. Of much more signifi- cance are the occasions when the religious values clash with state values. Consideration of this sort of clash tends to focus on the benefits of expression to the speaker, the costs to the speaker of restricting their expression, and the costs to targets of such expressions and others.8 The recent Law Commission report on hate crime rarely discusses religiously motivated conduct, but the clearest example is chosen to bring this out: D, a preacher, says that gender reassignment surgery is an abomination in the eyes of God, and compares those who undergo it to the cult eunuchs of pagan religion. This is an argument that certain behaviour is sinful and abhorrent but, without more (for example, a demand that transgender people should be executed), would be protected by the right to freedom of expression (and freedom of religion).9 This neglects the bigger picture. Religious critique is one way in which the values of a particular society may be challenged, and perhaps come to be changed, through ‘influential, voluntary contributions to debate on matters of profound public controversy’.10 As Gozdecka puts it, ‘Pluralism in its thickest 5 It does not consider incitement to violence or criminal acts more generally, on which see A Buyse, ‘Dangerous expressions: the ECHR, violence and free speech’, (2014) 63 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 491 – 503. 6 R (on the application of Hodkin and another) v Registrar General of Births, Deaths and Marriages [2013] UKSC 77 at para 57. 7 Eg I Hare, ‘Crosses, crescents and sacred cows: criminalising incitement to religious hatred’, (2006) Public Law 521 – 538 at 534. 8 Eg K McGuire and M Salter, ‘Legal responses to religious hate crime: identifying critical issues’, (2014) 25 Kings Law Journal 159 – 184. 9 Law Commission, Hate Crime: should the current offences be extended?, report no 348 (London 2014), p 200. 10 Hare, ‘Crosses, crescents and sacred cows’, p 535. E C C L E S I A S T I C A L L A W J O U R N A L 2 7 9 terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0956618X18000467 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:27, subject to the Cambridge Core https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/S0956618X18000467 https://www.cambridge.org/core form is . . . a dynamic force that allows for constant challenges and creates a space for all forms of renegotiation that can slowly transform and shake the status quo.’11 Critique provided by religious communities should be seen as a public good. No human society is perfect,12 and some religious traditions see challenging social imperfections as an important contribution that religious individuals and communities can make to their societies.13 Religious critique is one way in which the values of a particular society may be challenged, and perhaps come to be changed, through ‘influential, voluntary contributions to debate on matters of profound public controversy’.14 Accepting critique as a public good is not the same as accepting that it should always be permitted. In particular, critique can have an individualised cost borne by those subject to the critique. Taking proper account of these costs means that it does not always follow that victims ‘who detest hate speech should just learn to live with it’.15 It does mean, however, that oppositional religious speech has particu- lar value because it is oppositional. The same perspective sees critique of religious values as a community good. The importance of such critiques has been recognised by, for instance, the European Court of Human Rights in Otto-Preminger Institut v Austria, where the court found that Those who choose to exercise the freedom to manifest their religion . . . cannot reasonably expect to be exempt from all criticism. They must toler- ate and accept the denial by others of their religious beliefs and even the propagation by others of doctrines hostile to their faith.16 Recognising the value of critique of shared values makes this more than simply a burden to be borne, instead constructing it as a private good to the religious community. Such critique can come from outside a religious community but also from within the community itself. Religious resources can be, and are, used not only as a critique of secular values but also as a critique of the values of co-religionists. I return to this below. This oppositional religious speech may be based upon religious scripture, which can be central to understanding the beliefs of a community.17 It is possible 11 D Gozdecka, Rights, Religious Pluralism and the Recognition of Difference: off the scale of justice (Abingdon, 2016), p 94. 12 My argument here draws on Mill, and in particular concerns about infallibility, and is subject to the criticisms of P Wragg, ‘Mill’s dead dogma: the value of truth to free speech jurisprudence’, (2013) Public Law 363 – 385. 13 Within many strands of Christianity, for instance, prophets are seen as important challengers to social values: see 2 Chronicles 24:19. 14 Hare, ‘Crosses, crescents and sacred cows’, 535. 15 J Waldron, The Harm in Hate Speech (Cambridge, MA, 2012), p 3. 16 Otto-Preminger Institut v Austria App no 13470/87 (ECtHR, 20 September 1994) at para 47. 17 Cha’are Shalom ve Tsedek v France App no 27417/95 (ECtHR, 27 June 2000) at paras 13 – 16. 2 8 0 O P P O S I T I O N A L R E L I G I O U S S P E E C H terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0956618X18000467 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:27, subject to the Cambridge Core https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/S0956618X18000467 https://www.cambridge.org/core to identify a wide range of instances in which religious scripture appears to justify or require hostility towards a protected group, or their practices, in a way which fails to mirror current state policy on equality and non- discrimination. Particular religious practices are condemned by the Qur’an;18 racial discrimination has been justified by reference to the scripture of the Latter-Day Saints;19 and despising disabled people has been justified by refer- ence to Hindu scripture.20 Turning to the highest-profile contemporary issue, on sexual orientation many Jews and Christians would treat as scripture the passage in Leviticus which states ‘Thou shalt not lie down with mankind as with womankind; it is an abomination.’21 The status of this scripture will vary enormously, even within those commu- nities which see it as an authentic part of their religious worldview. So self- identifying Christians will give varying weight to, for instance, the Old Testament, the New Testament, the teachings of the Catholic Church, the pro- phetic insights of the President of the Church of Jesus Christ of the Latter-Day Saints and the conscience of the individual. Similarly, the origins of scripture will vary enormously across different religions. The largest world religions have significant bodies of scripture which were generated in the distant past, but others have created their bodies of scripture within living memory. Particularly in the case of the older bodies of scripture, however, inter- pretation of them has been a substantial intellectual project, in some cases one that has taken place over millennia. This project will, on occasions, generate an understanding of the body of scripture which may differ considerably from that of an outsider exposed to the bare words of the text for the first time.22 These factors run counter to a monolithic view of particular religious people, religions or families of religions. The examples above are intended to illustrate the resources available to those within or without the community which, on a bare reading of the text, may be apt to show that the religion is hateful. It should be stressed, however, that these examples should not be taken as indicat- ing that every person who self-identifies as a member of the religious group in question would condemn in the terms outlined. There are, for instance, self- identifying Christians who do not see any distinction between homosexual and heterosexual relationships, including but not limited to LGBT Christians;23 and there are Jews who do not regard witchcraft as contrary to 18 Qur’an 2:102. 19 1 Nephi 12:23. 20 Manusmrti XI, 53. 21 Leviticus 12:22. 22 Church of the New Faith v The Commissioner for Pay-Roll Tax (Victoria) (1983) 154 CLR 120 (High Court of Australia). 23 See further P Edge, ‘Let’s talk about a divorce: religious and legal wedding’ in J Miles, P Mody and R Probert (eds), Marriage Rites and Rights (Oxford and Portland, OR, 2015), pp 255 – 274. E C C L E S I A S T I C A L L A W J O U R N A L 2 8 1 terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0956618X18000467 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:27, subject to the Cambridge Core https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/S0956618X18000467 https://www.cambridge.org/core their religion, including Jewitches who identify as both Jews and witches.24 Nonetheless, it is clear that there is real potential for preaching of scriptures revered by significant communities in the UK to constitute condemnation of groups, and practices by members of those groups, protected by comparative recent developments in equality law. One thread of equality law is the protection of groups sharing a protected characteristic from hate speech and hate crime. The next section considers the development of this area of law. INTRODUCING HATE SPEECH AND HATE CRIME COMMIT TED BY SPEECH Hatred law in England and Wales has two main branches: hate crime and hate speech. A hate crime is a crime aggravated by the existence of a proscribed type of hostility. Some crimes can be committed by speech alone, and in those cases the speech crime may constitute a hate crime. Thus hate crime blurs easily into hate speech. The distinctive feature of hate speech is communication apt to create hatred in the minds of others in relation to a prohibited ground. In purely numerical terms, prosecutions and convictions for hate speech offences are very much less common than hate crimes.25 Before 2001 only hostility on the grounds of race could form the basis of a hate crime. The Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (hereafter CDA 1998) took two distinct routes to increase the punishment of racial hate crime.26 It created sub- stantive hate crimes, which required racial aggravation of a particular basic offence and carried substantially higher maximum sentences. The basic offences included public order offences involving harassment, alarm, distress, fear or provocation of violence,27 as well as the statutory offences defined under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997.28 This part of the Act was focused on offending previously identified by the judiciary as meriting extra punishment if racially motivated.29 For almost all other offences, the legislation provided that racial aggravation was to be treated as a factor increasing the ser- iousness of the offence,30 with no change to the maximum penalty.31 The racial hatred provisions were intended to apply to ethno-religions such as Judaism,32 but not to religions such as Islam, categorised as ‘a poly-ethnic religious 24 M Raphael, ‘Goddess religion, postmodern Jewish feminism and the complexity of alternative reli- gious identities’, (1998) 1:2 Nova Religio 198 – 215. 25 Law Commission, Hate Crime, para 7.70. 26 Repeated by the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000, s 153; Criminal Justice Act, s 145. 27 CDA 1998, s 31. 28 CDA 1998, s 32. 29 See P Edge, ‘Extending hate crime to religion’, (2003) 8 Journal of Civil Liberties 5 – 27. 30 CDA 1998, s 82(1). 31 Law Commission, Hate Crime, consistently treats this as the most significant difference between the two routes, for instance at paras 4.114 – 4.130. 32 Alun Michael MP, HC Deb 8 April 1998, vol 310, col 451. 2 8 2 O P P O S I T I O N A L R E L I G I O U S S P E E C H terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0956618X18000467 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:27, subject to the Cambridge Core https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/S0956618X18000467 https://www.cambridge.org/core community and not a racial group’.33 The concept of hate crime has been expanded into grounds other than race: religion in 2001,34 sexual orientation and disability in 200335 and transgender identity in 2012.36 Only for religion was the distinction between aggravated offences and sentence enhancement retained, despite arguments for parity across the different grounds.37 Turning to hate speech, again the crime was initially restricted to racial hatred. The key modern legislation,38 the Public Order Act 1986 (hereafter POA 1986), created a number of offences, of which the most significant is the use of threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour which is either intended to stir up racial hatred or is likely to stir up racial hatred.39 This incite- ment offence requires that the defendant intended to stir up racial hatred, or was reckless as to whether this was the result. Also significant to later discussion is the offence of possessing written material or audio-visual recordings which are threatening, which the person holds with a view to distribution or publication, and which the person intends to use to stir up hatred.40 Such materials may be seized and forfeited.41 The original provisions did not cover religion, but were extended to religion in 2006 and to sexual orientation in 2008.42 The Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006 added a new Part IIIA to the 1986 Act, which includes both the use of threatening or abusive words and behaviour which are intended to stir up religious hatred,43 and a range of ancillary offences.44 Incitement to religious hatred represents ‘a considerable dilution of earlier and parallel incitement to “racial hatred” laws’.45 Incitement to racial hatred can be committed by merely insulting or abusive words or behaviour, while incitement to religious hatred cannot. Incitement to racial hatred can be committed intentionally or recklessly, while incitement to religious hatred can only be committed intentionally. Additionally, the religious incitement provision has a special saving clause in section 29J, which provides that nothing in Part IIIA prohibits or restricts 33 Iganski, Sweiry and Culpeper, ‘Question of faith’, p 334. 34 See A Roulstone, P Thomas and S Balderston, ‘Between hate and vulnerability: unpacking the British Criminal Justice System’s construction of disablist hate crime’, (2011) 26:3 Disability and Society 351. 35 Criminal Justice Act 2003, s 146. 36 Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012, s 65. 37 See C Heard, ‘Hate crime law: more incrementalism or time for reform?’ (2014) 7 Archbold Review 4 – 5. 38 For antecedents, see P Leopold, ‘Incitement to hatred: the history of a controversial criminal offence’, 1977 Public Law 389 – 405; Hare, ‘Crosses, crescents and sacred cows’. 39 POA 1986, s 18. Part 3 also contains prohibitions on publishing material, possessing material, per- formance of plays, distributing and showing recordings, and broadcasting. 40 POA 1986, s 29G. 41 Ibid, s 29H – I. 42 Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008, s 74. 43 POA 1986, s 29B. 44 Ibid, s 29C – G. 45 McGuire and Salter, ‘Legal responses’, p 163. E C C L E S I A S T I C A L L A W J O U R N A L 2 8 3 terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0956618X18000467 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:27, subject to the Cambridge Core https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/S0956618X18000467 https://www.cambridge.org/core discussion, criticism or expressions of antipathy, dislike, ridicule, insult or abuse of particular religions or the beliefs or practices of their adherents, or of any other belief system or the beliefs or practices of its adherents, or proselytising or urging adherents of a different religion or belief system to cease practising their religion or belief system. OPPOSITIONAL RELIGIOUS SPEECH, SCRIPTURAL CITATION AND HATE LAW Applying hate law to oppositional religious speech based upon scriptural citation brings out potential problems, some of which may be capable of being resolved by particular interpretations of the current law, while others are not. Criminal prosecution for citation of scripture In Kirk Session of Sandown Free Presbyterian Church, the Kirk Session had placed a newspaper advert condemning homosexual acts, making use of biblical quota- tions.46 The Advertising Standards Authority initially upheld complaints that the advert was homophobic and had caused serious offence. The independent reviewer noted that the advert used ‘selective quotations from the Bible’, noting particularly the omission of the call for execution in Leviticus 20:13. He also thought that ‘it was reasonable for the Council to consider that codes of conduct and sanctions laid down in biblical works from several millennia ago cannot be communicated verbatim and indiscriminately in twenty first century advertising’. The Kirk Session was thus criticised for both selectivity and lack of discrimination. The Kirk Session appealed, the key issue being whether the restriction was proportionate. The judge noted that the ‘essence’ of the applicant’s religious beliefs was based on scripture: ‘One effect of the impugned decision is to materially inter- fere with and inhibit their use of certain biblical scripture.’47 The judge found that the restriction was disproportionate, in part because the advertisement ‘con- stituted a genuine attempt to stand up for their religious beliefs and to encour- age others to similarly bear witness and did so by citing well known portions of scripture which underpinned their religious faith and their call to witness’.48 The court in Kirk Session treated the use of scriptural quotations as criticism as significantly different even from religiously motivated criticism simpliciter. How would this scenario be dealt with by hate law? 46 Kirk Session of Sandown Free Presbyterian Church [2011] NIQB 26, 22 March 2011. 47 Ibid, para 71. 48 Ibid, para 73. 2 8 4 O P P O S I T I O N A L R E L I G I O U S S P E E C H terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0956618X18000467 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:27, subject to the Cambridge Core https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/S0956618X18000467 https://www.cambridge.org/core The provisions regarding the stirring up of hatred would not apply. The provi- sions on stirring up hatred on the grounds of sexual orientation have demand- ing mens rea and actus reus requirements.49 Reinforcing this view is the specific statutory provision which states that ‘for the avoidance of doubt, the discussion or criticism of sexual conduct or the urging of persons to refrain from or to modify such conduct or practices shall not be taken of itself to be threatening’.50 The exclusion of this scenario from hate crime is, however, much less obvious. If the citation of the scripture was in circumstances which rendered it a criminal offence, most likely as a public order offence, then the words of the scripture could be read as a demonstration of hostility towards the protected group. Hate crime, in sharp contrast to hate speech, does not require that hostility actu- ally exists (discussed more fully below), nor does it provide the statutory saving for criticism of sexual conduct or practices found in hate speech law. As well as being cited, scripture has a physical existence. In Kirk Session, the speakers omitted a scriptural call for execution contained in the Bible. Is it a crime to possess a scripture containing such a call? Hate crime has little appli- cation here, but hate speech may. For stirring up racial hatred, the law crimina- lises the possession of written material or audio-visual recordings which are threatening, which the person holds with a view to distribution or publication, and which the person intends to use to stir up hatred.51 A similar offence was later added for stirring up religious hatred,52 and for stirring up hatred on the grounds of sexual orientation. The later additions are, however, subject to the specific saving clauses (quoted above) which protect criticism of practice. Calls for the death of those who carry out particular sexual practices would seem to go well beyond the type of speech envisaged by the statutory savings, however, and could easily constitute threatening materials: the key issue will then be the mens rea of the person possessing the scripture. Misconstruing hostility towards a protected characteristic A growing concern in the UK is the relative lack of religious literacy in a complex, religiously plural, society. Religious speech may be perceived, when shorn of context, as prohibited hostility when it is not intended in this way at all. A holy symbol of the Raelian Movement is an intertwining of the Star of David with the Swastika.53 Although positive and sacred to Raelians, others see it as a tremen- dously offensive symbol. How would displaying the symbol be treated? Religious hate speech is unlikely to apply. A Raelian displaying the symbol would be able to argue that the display did not reach the level of threatening 49 Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008, s 74, amending POA 1986, part 3A. 50 POA 1986, s 29JA, as amended. 51 Ibid, s 29G. 52 Ibid, s 29C – G. 53 Discussed in Mouvement raelien Suisse v Switzerland App no 16354/06 (ECtHR, 13 July 2012). E C C L E S I A S T I C A L L A W J O U R N A L 2 8 5 terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0956618X18000467 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:27, subject to the Cambridge Core https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/S0956618X18000467 https://www.cambridge.org/core words and, crucially, that they lacked the intention to stir up religious hated.54 Jewish communities, however, are an example of ethno-religions, where the community is defined simultaneously as an ethnic group and a religion. The law on inciting racial hatred is notably less protective of the speaker than that of religious hatred – in particular, the mens rea requirement is satisfied by reck- lessness as to stirring up racial hatred; and merely insulting or abusive conduct can constitute the actus reus.55 A finder of fact may be prepared to find that in this scenario the defendant was reckless as to stirring up racial hatred against Jewish people, and that the display was insulting to Jewish people. In relation to hate speech, this scenario is only problematic because of the ethno-religious status of Judaism. The application of hate crime, however, goes wider. Under section 28(1)(a) of the CDA, religious and racial hate crime can be satisfied by a demonstration of hostility even in the absence of actual hos- tility.56 Not all offences can be based upon demonstrating hostility towards the victim of the offence,57 but the religiously or racially aggravated public order offences involving harassment, alarm, distress, fear or provocation can.58 In these cases, the aggravated penalty would be applicable if the display of the holy symbol was found to demonstrate racial or religious hostility, even if the defence were to prove the absence of any hostile motivation. Misconstruing the religious element in desacralised symbols and language What of scripture which has become unmoored from its religious context and is being used simply as a convenient mode of expressing hostility towards an indi- vidual? Hare has suggested that ‘[all] members of the criminal justice system must . . . be very wary of reading alleged statements out of the context in which they were originally articulated’.59 This is particularly important in relation to lan- guage derived from some religious traditions but which has retained a secular meaning that may be divorced entirely from any religious context. The Italian government in Lautsi argued for a desacralised meaning of the crucifix.60 If a cru- cifix can be desacralised, what of religious language and citation of scripture? During the passage of the 2001 legislation, the example was given of a footballer abused as ‘Judas’ because he had changed clubs.61 ‘Judas’ may be a desacralised equivalent to ‘betrayer’. If there is no recognition of the desacralisation of prima facie religious language, the scope of demonstration may be considerably expanded. In that case it may not be enough to find that the defendant was not consciously 54 POA 1986, s 29B. 55 POA 1986, s 18. 56 Green [2004] EWHC 1255. 57 Howard [2008] EWHC 608. 58 CDA 1998, s 31. 59 Hare, ‘Crosses, crescents and sacred cows’, p 430. 60 Lautsi and Others v Italy App no 30814/06 (ECtHR, 3 November 2009). 61 HC Deb 19 November 2001, vol 375, col 69. 2 8 6 O P P O S I T I O N A L R E L I G I O U S S P E E C H terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0956618X18000467 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:27, subject to the Cambridge Core https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/S0956618X18000467 https://www.cambridge.org/core aware of the religious connotations of the term, as cases on racial epithets have sug- gested that this is irrelevant in determining their liability under demonstration. State involvement in intra-communal disputes Oppositional religious speech can be a communal good generated by disputes within a religious community.62 Additionally, there is a strong theme in court decisions on the importance of the autonomy of religious organisations, which suggests that the state should be particularly cautious to intervene in a doctrinal dispute within a religious community. The courts have found that hos- tility towards an individual on the basis of their membership of a group can occur even where the defendant is also a member of that group.63 One positive feature of this approach is that complex issues of religious identity – for instance, whether Protestants and Catholics share a religion64 – do not need to be resolved in order to apply hate law to a scenario. The inclusion of intra-group interaction may fairly be seen as a recognition of the ongoing, intimate, nature of some hate crime offending.65 In relation to intra-religious conflict, however, it could lead to the state punishing conflict within a religious group more seriously than other conflict. In this scenario, the state is not acting to protect members of the group from outsiders, but instead from one another. This raises significant issues concerning the autonomy of religious commu- nities to determine their internal values and structures free from state control. WAYS FORWARD? The previous sections raised concerns around two important elements of reli- gious liberty: the right to manifest religious belief, and the right to autonomy of religious organisations and communities. We should consider ways to min- imise the burden on the religious preacher and their community while giving proper weight to the importance of hate law. An emphasis on religious rights can justify departing from balances of proportionality struck for freedom of expression alone, and directs attention to specific features of the preaching moment which are relevant to proportionality. There are five features that a court should be mindful of in this proportionality exercise. First, the significance of the exercise of religious rights by the preacher needs to be recognised. The general cases on mixed motives,66 would suggest that an 62 Otto-Preminger Institut v Austria, para 47. 63 White [2001] EWCA Crim 216, 1 WLR 1352, CA. Cf Pal [2000] Crim LR 756. 64 D Abrams, H Swift and L Mahmood, Prejudice and Unlawful Behaviour: exploring levers for change, EHRC Research Report 101 (2016), p 78. 65 See, for instance, M Walters, ‘Why the Rochdale Gang should have been sentenced as “hate crime” offenders’, (2013) Crim LR 131 – 144 at 139. 66 Eg Mihocic [2012] EWCA Crim 195 (CA). E C C L E S I A S T I C A L L A W J O U R N A L 2 8 7 terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0956618X18000467 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:27, subject to the Cambridge Core https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/S0956618X18000467 https://www.cambridge.org/core intention to manifest religion is irrelevant if it can be shown that there is any element of the prohibited mental element or, for hate crime, a demonstration of hostility even in the absence of actual hostility. To give proper weight to freedom of religion, however, the courts should be prepared to depart from this and to accept that the required hostility or intent to stir up hatred can be entirely displaced by the intention to manifest religion; and that what is prime facie a dem- onstration of hostility can best be understood as a manifestation of religion. The context in which a statement is made – which can include, for instance, being ‘the wider context and circumstance of him delivering a sermon wherein he was trying to communicate strong and robust beliefs that the God in which he believed was the only true God and that the worship of any other god was idolatrous’67 – is crucial to understanding whether hate law applies. In particular, the courts need to be sensitive to the context when deciding whether a particular manifestation of religion constitutes a demonstration of hostility under hate crime law. Sensitivity is also needed around desacralised language. Second, one of the specific concerns raised above was the application of hate law to internal conflicts and debates within a religious community. If, as I have suggested, it is possible to understand a transaction as turning not on prohibited hostility but on an intent to manifest religion or belief, it is at least as easy to understand intra-group hostility as based on personal animus, or personal conduct, to the exclusion of the shared group identity. Emphasising, once again, the distinctive place of freedom of religion, it would be possible for the courts to depart from this line and to favour an approach where, for intra-religious offending, the natural finding of fact in most cases would be to exclude the transaction from the reach of hate law. Third, some religious people who use biblical texts to condemn same-sex activity distinguish strongly between condemning a person and condemning their actions. One way of putting this is to talk of hating sin but loving sinners. It may be easier to justify the condemned sharing the cost of condem- nation when it is possible for them to respond to the condemnation. This is not necessarily because they are to be held at fault, so that they have a duty to change. Rather, it is because the public good of being condemned is something which it is comparatively easy for them to take advantage of. A smoker who is convinced by the condemnation that they are at fault can take advantage of this by ceasing to be a smoker. It is notably less easy for a person who becomes convinced that they should not be a man, or that they are homosexually orientated, to take advantage of a condemnation of either of those characteristics. This absence of a benefit to the target of the criticism should be taken into account in gauging proportionality. 67 McConnell [2016] NIMag 1 at para 22. 2 8 8 O P P O S I T I O N A L R E L I G I O U S S P E E C H terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0956618X18000467 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:27, subject to the Cambridge Core https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/S0956618X18000467 https://www.cambridge.org/core Fourth, the court should not take account of the religious methodology of a user of scripture. It is tempting to treat scriptural citation as an exercise of sci- entific judgement. Taking this approach, a speaker who makes fair use of their sources may be able to rely upon their reporting of these sources, while one who distorts the sources by unfair use may not. This approach would entangle the state in determining the true reading, or range of true readings, of religious texts – a function it is not well placed to carry out. Finally, the court needs to be aware that the citation of scripture is a contem- porary moment, regardless of the antiquity of the source used. The court needs to keep a focus on the actions and motivation of the human being making use of the sources and may find it useful to consider the extent to which the speaker owns the scripture. This focus on ownership has an important implication for the discussion on materials given above. An individual must take ownership of the condemnatory words to be held to account for them. In the examples given above, the particularly condemnatory words form part of a considerable corpus of sacred texts. An individual may distribute this corpus without neces- sarily owning every part of it, even if in principle they would assert that they do. This emphasis on ownership would not be a complete innovation in religious hate law: for the offence of presenting a play intended to stir up religious hatred, an actor is only liable if they make the hateful performance their own by ignoring direction.68 Even if the courts were prepared to take the principles outlined in this section and apply them as fully as possible to preachers faced with prosecutions under hate law, the current statutory framework is itself problematic. Offences of stir- ring up hatred have particular protection for oppositional speech, in relation to the specific saving clauses for religion and sexual orientation. There is an argu- ment, made particularly pressing by the position of the ethno-religions, for con- sidering whether inciting hatred against racial practices should have similar savings to those for religious and sexual orientation practices. There is also an argument for considering whether speech which would fall within a saving clause in relation to hate speech should be excluded from the context which may be used to find a hate crime. Such reforms are likely to be very contentious, particularly if they are understood as protecting oppositional religious speech against the application of state values. The key point here is that the conflict between oppositional religious speech and state values is only on the surface. Recognition of the special status of religion or belief in the life of our fellow citi- zens, and accommodation – in appropriate circumstances – of their religious interests, is a fundamental state value in the UK. 68 POA 1986, s 29D(3)(b). E C C L E S I A S T I C A L L A W J O U R N A L 2 8 9 terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0956618X18000467 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:27, subject to the Cambridge Core https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/S0956618X18000467 https://www.cambridge.org/core Oppositional Religious Speech: Understanding Hate Preaching 
work_hj6lia5vvvf4fbwz6mrrr2svna	----	Review Living alterities: Phenomenology, embodiment, and race Emily S. Lee State University of New York Press, Albany, NY, 2014, 292 pp., ISBN: 978-1438450155 Contemporary Political Theory (2016) 15, e11–e14. doi:10.1057/cpt.2015.11; published online 24 February 2015 Critical race theory often finds itself in the paradoxical position of denying the ontological weight of race: if (as is well-established) race is not a biological fact then, it is often asserted, it is does not ‘really’ exist; it is but a contingent cultural construction which may – and should – be eliminated in a new post-racial order. In contesting such ‘racial eliminativism,’ many of the authors in this edited volume seek to reaffirm the role of human bodies as sites of racialized perception and experience in ontologically significant and yet non-biologistic ways. To do so, most of them draw insight and inspiration from the rich resources of the French phenomenological tradition. This is a tradition that focuses on the meaningfulness of ‘lived’ sentient and affective experience, insisting that the significance of such embodied experience should not be displaced by privileging the traditional Western thinking subject (or, one might now add, by privileging the functions of discursivity, as some post-structuralists are wont to do). In her Introduction, Emily S. Lee stresses the importance of Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology as a resource for exploring the ways in which race today acquires embodied, ontological weight. In addition, Frantz Fanon, Simone de Beauvoir, Jean-Paul Sartre and Henri Bergson, as well as recent phenomenologically-inspired feminist theorists, are sources of insight for various of the authors. However, what is presented under the rubric of ‘phenomenology’ in this volume is methodologically quite diverse. For some authors phenomenological method is a formal technique for the systematic disclosure of pre-cognitive phenomena. Notable here is Alia al-Saji’s wonderful account of the moment of temporal ‘hesitation’ that accompanies perception, a moment, which, she argues, may enable one to disrupt habitually racist ways of seeing others. For others, however, phenomenology serves as a loose label for exploring the generalized meanings of social phenomena, as in David Carr’s rich meditations on the fluid meanings of ‘edges,’ ‘frontiers’ and ‘borders’ with reference to the US-Mexican ‘Frontera.’ Some authors proceed from their own experience and write in the first person, as George Yancy © 2016 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1470-8914 Contemporary Political Theory Vol. 15, 1, e11–e14 www.palgrave-journals.com/cpt/ http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/cpt.2015.11 http://www.palgrave-journals.com/cpt does in his account of how he, a black man, comes to experience himself as ‘fixed’ in the ubiquitous white racist gaze. Others, in contrast, write in an impersonal vein; they do not locate themselves in their work or indicate a racial identity of their own. The 11 essays assembled here are not only methodologically but also topically heterogeneous. Topics range, among others, from personal narratives of lived experience to Charles Mills’s reflections on how an enlarged conception of Marxist materialism could help to elucidate how race operates, Donna-Dale Marcado’s discussion of how presumptions about a person’s intellectual capacity are shaped by perceived racial and gender differences, Namita Goswami’s meta-reconsideration of Gayatri Spikak’s anlysis of sati, and David Haekwon Kim’s reflections on the shame and self-contempt that may accompany efforts by Asian-Americans to assimilate to whiteness. However, while each essay in the volume is in itself both interesting and high quality, the fact that each focuses on ‘race’ in some manner and that most in some sense engage with ‘phenomenology’ does not provide the volume with a great deal of coherence. It is thus unfortunate that Lee did not do more work in her Introduction to draw out some of the ways that various articles ‘converse’ with each other and invite to further discussion. Conversations that weave through the volume include, among others, whether or how unconscious, habitual racism may be disrupted; diverse ways to theorize the interplay between lived experience and large-scale structural constraints; and how far white responsibility for racism is an individual matter. However, the predominant ‘conversation’ in the volume concerns the extent to which racial identities may (or may not) be immobile substances. For Yancy, in White Gazes: What it Feels Like to be an Essence, black and white positions are so over- determined that subjection to the white gaze leaves him no escape from his essentialist designation as an animalistic black man, a potential rapist. He describes entering an elevator in which an already-present lone white woman clutches at her bag as he arrives. He insists that even if this particular woman’s action might not have been racist he is justified in presuming it was. ‘And what if I’m mistaken about her?’ he asks, replying: ‘being epistemologically mistaken does not make a difference in terms of the lived experience of what it means to undergo the experience of being stereotyped.’ Rather, ‘ “knowing”, within the context of the elevator, has to do with the larger community of intelligibility within which people of color come to understand white ways of being, white ways of stereotyping, and modes of white racist comportment’ (pp. 60–61). Here, the woman can no more avoid being stereotyped by him as a white racist than Yancy can avoid being the stereotypical hyper-sexual black male. Both he and the white woman are locked (albeit from radically different positions of power and privilege) in a wider, socially constituted, vicious circle of essentialized identity. An analogously essentialized identity is attributed to white people in Lee’s own article, ‘Body Movement and Responsibility for a Situation,’ where she argues that white privilege is ubiquitously expressed in certain styles of movement and ways of occupying space, in embodied habits which it is the duty of ‘responsible race traitors’ Review e12 © 2016 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1470-8914 Contemporary Political Theory Vol. 15, 1, e11–e14 (p. 245) to reveal and resist. However, other authors in the volume seek to stress, indeed to celebrate, the fluidity or ambiguity of identities. For example, Gail Weiss argues that one should not try to pin down Jewishness, for there is ‘an essential indeterminacy as a constitutive and positive feature of Jewish identity’(p. 214); while identifying herself as a ‘ Nicaraguan-born, bilingual, lesbian, academic Latina, living in the United States’ (p. 177), Mariana Ortega celebrates ‘multiplicitous selves,’ and argues against the search for safe ‘homes’ by people of color. She instead urges employing ‘hometactics’ whose aim is ‘the production of a sense of familiarity in the midst of an environment or world in which one cannot fully belong, due to one’s multiple positionalities’ (p. 182). Within the US context some racial identities, notably blackness, do appear to be more monolithic while others are more mobile and ambiguous. Quite a few of the authors in the volume also present whiteness, as well as blackness, as monolithic. Whiteness is presented as an essential identity: A unified, hegemonic oneness, it oppressively constitutes various non-white identities as its ‘others.’ Thus, the final article in the volume, Linda Martín Alcoff’s ‘The Future of Whiteness,’ breaks radically new and important ground in insisting on the growing ambiguities and potential value of whiteness itself. ‘Being white these days,’ Alcoff quotes Nell Painter as saying, ‘is not what it used to be’ (p. 256). Alcoff certainly does not want to deny the persistence of white privilege and white racism, and of what she calls ‘white vanguardist ideologies.’ However, demographics are shifting so that within a few decades whites will cease to be the racial majority in the United States, while spatial and material boundaries are becoming more permeable, and, for many whites, their whiteness assures them fewer privileges than in the past. In such a situation, white identity is becoming increasingly insecure and complicated. For many whites, she argues, a variant of what W.E.B. Du Bois called ‘double consciousness’ is emerging. Although, unlike blacks, whites are not oppressed by a racist gaze, they increasingly experience ‘a split consciousness between the way they see themselves and the way they are seen by non-white others’ (pp. 272–273). Some responses to this ‘incoherence’ may be regressive (increasing hate crimes; Tea Party politics). But the discomfort of split consciousness may offer others an opening toward progressive political activism. Alcoff agrees with other authors in the volume that racial eliminativism is not an option, but she poses the rarely-asked question whether, this being the case, there may not be grounds for reassessing the meaning of whiteness positively. ‘What,’ she asks, ‘would it mean for whites to become more positively embodied as white within a multipolar social landscape?’(p. 278). While urging that whiteness needs to be displaced from its ‘vanguardist’ claims to be the universal site of ‘civilization,’ instead accepting its place as ‘a particular among other particulars,’ she also insists that ‘despite the ample evidence of white delusions, it is a mistake to assume, as some critical race theorists do, that the first-person lived experience of whiteness should be approached only as something that needs to be deconstructed and critiqued’ (p. 262). Review e13© 2016 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1470-8914 Contemporary Political Theory Vol. 15, 1, e11–e14 Alcoff’s provocative claim here poses a challenge to many of the other authors in the volume. Her essay thus provides the book with a finale that ought also to become the beginning of a significant new conversation. Sonia Kruks Oberlin College, Oberlin, OH, USA sonia.kruks@oberlin.edu Review e14 © 2016 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1470-8914 Contemporary Political Theory Vol. 15, 1, e11–e14 Living alterities: Phenomenology, embodiment, and race 
work_hju75ccu25d65iyxbm5pu26upi	----	White Supremacist Danger Narratives 60 contexts.org c culture One year ago, James Fields, Jr. drove his car into a group of anti-racist protestors in Charlottesville, Virginia. In a widely circulated press photograph taken ear- lier that day, Fields, a White man with a history of domestic violence against women, is holding up a homemade, cardboard shield as he stands alongside other members of the neo-Nazi group Vanguard America. This White national- ist group attempts to recruit “men of action” with slogans including “Blood and Soil,” “Imagine a Muslim-Free Amer- ica,” and “For Race and Nation.” In an effort to reach women, their website urges: “White women make the call—for race, family, and nation!” Fields took the life of Heather Heyer, a 32-year-old White anti-racist counter- protestor, and caused injuries to 19 oth- ers. He is now charged with a federal hate crime. Given that he was the uncon- tested perpetrator of the violence, Fields’ defensive posturing earlier in the day—as he held a symbolic shield—is ironic, but not surprising. The shield represents a purported need for protection against an imminent threat, consistent with the racialized fear mongering upon which White supremacist politics have long relied in their justifi cations for violence and terror. Such “danger narratives” cast racially and religiously oppressed groups as innately violent, uncivilized, and threat- ening to the (White) public. The belief that White violence against people of color should be viewed as a legitimate form of “pre-emptive self-defense” comprises a core princi- ple through which Whiteness has long been constituted. In particular, images depicting men from racially, ethnically, and religiously minoritized populations as sexual and physical threats to “White society”—specifi cally to White women— have been invoked to support both his- torical and contemporary expressions of violent White masculinity. This was evident in 2015, when Dylann Roof, a young White man who relished Confed- erate memorabilia and White supremacist ideologies, murdered nine Black people in a Charleston, South Carolina church. In what sociologist Lisa Wade characterizes as a lethal display of White male “benev- olent sexism,” Roof told his victims: “I have to do it. You rape our women, and you’re taking our country. And you have to go.” Danger narratives justify state-sanc- tioned and vigilante forms of violence against oppressed communities while also implicitly functioning to assert the “rightful” place of White men in posi- tions of power. By casting men of color as innately predatory, White men set themselves up as the logical defenders of a civilized White society. History bears out this pattern repeatedly. Under settler colonialism, “moral” justifi cations for the displacement and genocide of Indigenous populations dur- ing westward expansion relied upon simi- lar ideas. Depictions of “savage” Native American men attacking “civilized” White women vindicated the brutal con- sequences of Whites’ “manifest destiny” for Indigenous peoples. At the same time, as Evelyn Nakano Glenn’s work illustrates, Native women suffered well-documented physical and sexual abuse at the hands of White colonizers, for which no conse- quence would ever be met. Years before the genocidal mass murders of the Holocaust, the Nazi party distributed Anti-Semitic propaganda depicting caricatures of animal-like Jewish men with exaggerated facial features and darkened skin. They were often portrayed preying on White, Aryan women, who were depicted as either virtuous maternal fi gures or as sexualized “pinup girls.” As historians Claudia Koonz (1988) and Jill Stephenson (2001) illustrate, these images became both symbols of the “pure” ideals soldiers were purportedly protecting and the sexualized “reward” they would receive for their efforts. In the same era, an estimated 2 million of the 6 million Jews systematically murdered by the Third Reich were women. As ethnic studies scholar Yen Le white supremacist danger narratives by ashley c. rondini “War and Pestilence! Horrible and Unparalelled Massacre! Women and Children Falling Victims to the Indian's Tomahawk.” ca. 1800 Li b ra ry o f C o n g re ss , 2 0 0 7 6 7 8 0 5 9 . N o k n o w n c o p yr ig h t re st ri ct io n s. http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1177%2F1536504218792532&domain=pdf&date_stamp=2018-08-01 61S U M M E R 2 0 1 8 c o n t e x t sContexts, Vol. 17, Issue 3, pp. 60-62. ISSN 1536-5042, electronic ISSN 1537-6052. ©2018 American Sociological Association. http://contexts.sagepub.com. DOI 10.1177/1536504218792532. Espiritu highlights, early 20th century popular culture depicted dark-skinned caricatures of Japanese men attacking or abducting White women. The ideologies reflected in these images helped pave the way for the mass internment of Japanese American men, women, and children during the Second World War. U.S. war bonds evoked fears of the “yellow peril,” with messages such as, “Keep This Horror From Your Home.” Decades of scholarship—by Angela Davis, bell hooks, Patricia Hill Collins, and others— document that U.S. history is rife with the consequences of widespread White complicity in the propagation of racist stereotypes portraying Black men as beast-like sexual predators, lying in wait to violate White women. White people have used this particular danger narrative as the ultimate “pre-emptive self-defense” rationale behind maintaining a White supremacist social system through which the state has justified slavery, segregation, and complicity with White-mob lynching. In addition to the potentially fatal consequences of what Davis famously called “the myth of the Black male rap- ist,” characterizations of Black sexuality as animalistic and uncontrollable have rendered the sexual violence perpetrated against Black women invisible. There was no legal recourse for enslaved Black women who were systematically raped by the White men who claimed their bodies as chattel. Historian Danielle McGuire’s work further details how White men’s pervasive sexual violence against Black women has persisted well past emancipa- tion, functioning as a cornerstone of Jim Crow segregation and bolstered by racist legal systems that shielded perpetrators from accountability. Scholars including Michelle Alex- ander, Victor Rios, and Abigail Sewell now document the disproportionate rates of arrest, police violence victimiza- tion, and incarceration experienced by men of color in the U.S. Modern-day iterations of the “Black men as violent predators” trope have been deployed to justify the non-indictment of White police officers such as Darren Wilson, Timothy Loehmann, Frank Garmback, and Dan- iel Pantaleo in the deaths of the Black victims they, respec- tively, killed: Michael Brown (age 18), Tamir Rice (age 12), and Eric Garner (age 43). Despite their victims having been unarmed, these police officers c l a i m e d t h a t t h e y feared for their lives in these encounters, and grand juries found insufficient evidence to prosecute them for criminal behavior. These cases again legitimated the pre-emptive self- d e f e n s e r a t i o n a l e s behind the White men’s deployment of lethal violence. Contempo- rary social movement activism demanding accountability for fatal police brutality against Black men and women vis-à-vis #BlackLives- Matter and #SayHer- Name is thus situated in the context of longstanding ideological and structural legacies. As evidenced by Donald Trump’s 2016 election, danger narratives con- tinue to function as a powerfully effective political strategy for mobilizing a White, Christian constituency fearful of racial, ethnic, and religious others. Long before he ran for office, Trump leveraged his race, class, and gender privilege to take out a full-page ad in the New York Times, in which he demanded the death penalty for the “Central Park Five”—a group of young men of color falsely convicted and wrongly imprisoned for allegedly raping a young White woman in 1989. When the men were exonerated by DNA evidence 13 years later, Trump defiantly clung to his U.S. Office for Emergency Management, U.S. War Production Board, 1942-1943. “Die Spinne,” WWII-era cartoon by Philipp “Fips” Rupprecht for Nazi publication Der Sturmer. N at io n al A rc h iv es a t C o lle g e Pa rk , 5 3 4 1 0 5 , U .S . G o v’ t W o rk 62 contexts.org culture assertions of their guilt, critiquing the civil rights settlements they were awarded by the city of New York as a “disgrace.” In a 2014 op-ed addressing the settlement, he asserted, “These young men do not exactly have the past of angels,” despite the fact that none had a criminal record, and implied that, if they were not guilty of these charges, surely they had committed- -or would have committed--other crimes.. Now, from the White House, Trump draws upon the legacy of White suprem- acist danger narratives to garner sup- port for “tougher” policing practices, racial and religious profiling, militarized border security, xenophobic immigration restrictions, family separation protocols, and child detainment as necessary mea- sures to “Make America Great Again.” Trump’s espousal of racialized pre-emp- tive self-defense policy strategies relies upon the implicit assumption that the “real” America is homogenously White— and, as such, in need of his protection from racial and religious “others.” An advertisement released by Trump’s reelec- tion campaign in 2018 drives this point home: the video shows the murder trial of an undocumented Mexican man rant- ing unrepentantly about killing police officers, while the voiceover accuses Democratic lawmakers who oppose Trump’s border wall of being “complicit” in this violence. Meanwhile, the adminis- tration has issued new guidance for bor- der officials to automatically reject asylum requests of migrants claiming domestic or gang violence, many of whom are Latinx women and children. When Trump calls for a wall to keep out Mexicans—to whom he has publicly referred as “bad hombres,” “rapists,” and “animals” who “slice and dice” young girls—he invokes racist danger narratives. This rhetoric stokes nationalist fears that position Trump as a “righteous” crusader for Whites and as a paternalistic protector of White women in particular. Consider- ing his own public record of degrading and assaulting women, Trump’s posturing with regard to women’s safety recalls the insidious ways in which hetero-patriarchal White supremacist political tactics have long underscored White men’s claims of entitlement to control women’s bodies. Like James Fields, Jr. and Dylann Roof, Donald Trump demonstrates, through his actions, how danger narratives can be invoked to obscure White men’s violence and abuse against those that they claim to “protect.” It has always been those groups targeted by danger narratives that have faced the greatest societal dan- gers—whether the dangers of system- atic economic marginalization; political disenfranchisement; ideological dehu- manization; eugenic population control policies; family separation; structural, interpersonal, and state violence; or the denial of civil rights, civil liberties, and protections of law with regard to physi- cal safety and bodily autonomy. Con- trary to his hyperbolic self-assessments of extraordinary political acumen and lead- ership skills, Trump cannot claim credit for his own primary rhetorical strategy. His xenophobic and racist grandstanding is not unlike the cardboard shields held by Neo-Nazis in Charlottesville: despite being substantively flimsy, both signal a position of defense against a supposedly dangerous enemy on behalf of a purport- edly threatened majority. When violence and injustice are “justified” by the fears of the privileged, it is actually the feared who should be most fearful. Ashley C. Rondini is in the sociology department at Franklin & Marshall College. She studies social policy, social justice, and intersectionality. Title page, What Miscegenation Is!, by L. Seaman, LL. D., Waller & Willetts, Publishers. 1864. How Sleeps the Beast, Don Tracy, 1937. Lion Books. B o st o n P u b lic L ib ra ry , C al l # 3 9 9 9 9 0 5 6 7 7 0 9 5 9 , n o k n o w n c o p yr ig h t re st ri ct io n Ji m C ro w M u se u m o f R ac is t M em o ra b ili a, F er ri s U n iv er si ty 
work_hlrxo2wnxzamxmemlxjbnsvt2a	----	S1742058X1600014X.indd 221 Du Bois Review, 13:2 (2016) 221– 236 . © 2016 Hutchins Center for African and African American Research 1742-058X/16 $15.00 doi:10.1017/S1742058X1600014X TOWARD A CRITICAL ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE STUDIES Black Lives Matter as an Environmental Justice Challenge David N. Pellow Department of Environmental Studies , University of California , Santa Barbara Abstract In this paper I expand upon the recent use of the term “Critical Environmental Justice Studies.” This concept is meant to capture new developments in Environmental Justice (EJ) Studies that question assumptions and gaps in earlier work in the field. Because this direction in scholarship is still in its formative stages, I take this opportunity to offer some guidance on what Critical Environmental Justice (CEJ) Studies might look like and what it could mean for theorizing the relationship between race (along with multiple additional social categories) and the environment. I do so by (1) adopting a multi-disciplinary approach that draws on several bodies of literature, including critical race theory, political ecology, ecofeminist theory, and anarchist theory, and (2) focusing on the case of Black Lives Matter and the problem of state violence. Keywords: Environmental Justice , Black Lives Matter , State Violence , Racism , Speciesism , Scale , Expendability , Indispensability INTRODUCTION Black Lives Matter (BLM) is a social movement centered on the problem of state- sanctioned racist violence. The movement began as a response to the acquittal of George Zimmerman, a man who killed Trayvon Martin, a seventeen-year old African American boy in Sanford, Florida, in 2012. From that moment on, social media, mainstream media, and the Black Lives Matter movement would routinely inten- sify the national focus on racialized state-sanctioned violence when yet another video or testimony surfaced featuring an African American being shot, beaten, choked, and/or killed by police or White vigilantes. The role of social media tech- nology was pivotal. As one writer put it, “Social media could serve as a source of live, raw information. It could summon people to the streets and coordinate their movements in real time. And it could swiftly push back against spurious media narratives . . .” (Bijan 2015 ). BLM co-founder Alicia Garza explained what the movement stands for: “Black Lives Matter is an ideological and political intervention in a world where Black lives are systematically and intentionally targeted for demise. It is an affirmation of Black at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1742058X1600014X Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:22, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/S1742058X1600014X https://www.cambridge.org/core David N. Pellow 222 DU BOIS REVIEW: SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH ON RACE 13:2, 2016 folks’ contributions to this society, our humanity, and our resilience in the face of deadly oppression” (Garza 2014 ). In this paper, I draw links between what I view as the most important insights and questions that emerge from the Black Lives Matter movement and the strug- gle against environmental racism. This is a connection that many scholars might not make at first glance because police brutality and environmental politics would appear to be only tangentially related, but I argue they are in fact closely intertwined and that we must explore their myriad connections in order to excavate the roots of racist violence no matter the form it takes. The questions I explore here include: How can Black Lives Matter’s emphasis on police violence against African American communities inform our understanding of the scourge of ecological burdens facing those same communities? Conversely, what can the violation of Black bodies and spaces by ecologically destructive agents produced by states and corporations tell us about the violation of those same bodies by police and law enforcement agents? I find that a “first-” and “second-generation” Environmental Justice Studies frame- work can assist in this effort, but can only take us so far. Therefore, I propose that a Critical Environmental Justice Studies framework can more fully address these pressing concerns. ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE STUDIES The Environmental Justice (EJ) movement is composed of people from communities of color, indigenous communities, and working-class communities who are focused on combating environmental injustice—the disproportionate burden of environmental harm facing these populations. For the EJ movement, social justice is inseparable from environmental protection. In the early 1970s, researchers in the United States found strong correlations between social class status and air quality in the United States. As a result of social movement activism, however, the focus began to broaden from social class to race and from air pollution to a range of environmental hazards (Pulido 1996 ; Walker 2010 ). For example, in 1982, hundreds of civil rights leaders and community activists protested a toxic waste dump in the majority African American community of Warren County, North Carolina. That action sparked the discourse of environmental rac- ism and the growth of Environmental Justice Studies, and since that time, scholars and other researchers have documented the reach of environmental racism/inequality in the United States and around the globe, as well as the social movement that has emerged to highlight and challenge this phenomenon (Bullard 2000 ; Cole and Foster, 2000 ; Pellow and Brulle, 2005 ). Thus, hundreds of studies have documented that people of color, people of lower socioeconomic status, indigenous and immigrant populations, and other marginalized communities are disproportionately affected by ecologically harmful infrastructures, such as landfills, mines, incinerators, polluting factories, and destructive transportation systems, as well as by the negative consequences of ecologically harmful practices, such as climate change/disruption and pesticide exposure (Ringquist 2005 ). Much of this work has documented the troubling depths and breadth of environmental injustice’s impact on the lives of people—including public health and mental health effects—and on how these communities make meaning out of these assaults while organizing for environmental justice. And while EJ Studies may have earlier focused on the United States, scholars are also documenting environmental inequalities and EJ move- ments’ responses to them around the globe (Agyeman et al., 2010 ; Pellow 2007 ; at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1742058X1600014X Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:22, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/S1742058X1600014X https://www.cambridge.org/core Critical Environmental Justice Studies DU BOIS REVIEW: SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH ON RACE 13:2, 2016 223 Roberts and Parks, 2006 ). A small but growing group of researchers—including and especially environmental humanities scholars—have focused on the ways that gender, sexuality, citizenship, indigeneity, and nation shape the terrain of eco- logical inequalities, but those areas of scholarship remain in need of further devel- opment (Adamson 2011 ; Bell 2013 ; Buckingham and Kulcur, 2010 ; Gaard 2004 ; Smith 2005 ). TOWARD A CRITICAL ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE STUDIES Recent scholarship divides EJ Studies into two phases: (1) the “first-generation,” which was focused primarily on documenting environmental inequality through the lens of race and class; and (2) “second-generation” studies that extend beyond questions of distribution to incorporate a deeper consideration of theory and the ways that gender, sexuality, and other categories of difference shape EJ struggles (Buckingham and Kulcur, 2010 ; Walker 2010 ). In our book Power, Justice, and the Environment , Robert Brulle and I used the term “Critical Environmental Justice Studies” (Pellow and Brulle, 2005 ), which has since been adopted by other scholars working to expand the academic field and politics of environmental justice (Adamson 2011 ; Holifield et al., 2010 ). This concept is meant to build on recent scholarship in EJ Studies— “second-generation” writings—that questions assumptions and gaps in earlier work in the field by embracing interdisciplinarity and methodologies and epistemologies including and beyond the social sciences. As this direction in scholarship is still in its formative stages, I take this opportunity to offer some guidance for what a Critical EJ Studies might look like. Critical EJ (CEJ) Studies is a perspective intended to address a number of limita- tions and tensions within EJ Studies. These include, for example: (1) questions con- cerning the degree to which scholars should place emphasis on one or more social categories of difference (e.g., race, class, gender, sexuality, species, etc.) versus a focus on multiple forms of inequality; (2) the extent to which scholars studying EJ issues should focus on single-scale versus multi-scalar analyses of the causes, consequences, and possible resolutions of EJ struggles; (3) the degree to which various forms of social inequality and power—including state power—are viewed as entrenched and embed- ded in society; and (4) the largely unexamined question of the expendability of human and non-human populations facing socioecological threats from states, industries, and other political economic forces. On the first point above, EJ scholars have a tendency to focus on only one or two forms of social inequality in studies of environmental injustice. For example, some scholars continue to debate the relative importance of race versus class in terms of which category is most important with respect to the distribution of environmental hazards, while only a small group of scholars have explored the role of gender and sexuality in EJ Studies (Buckingham and Kulcur, 2010 ; Smith 2005 ). Moreover, the key social category species remains, at best, at the margins of the field of EJ Studies, despite the fact that, generally, when and where humans suffer from environmental inequalities, so does the more-than-human world (and vice versa) and often as a result of ideological frameworks that link marginalized humans to “nature.” My point here is that since multiple forms of inequality drive and characterize the experi- ence of environmental injustice, the field would do well to expand in that direc- tion. Thus CEJ Studies brings greater attention to how multiple social categories of difference are entangled in the production of environmental injustice, from race, gender, sexuality, ability, and class to species, which would attend to the at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1742058X1600014X Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:22, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/S1742058X1600014X https://www.cambridge.org/core David N. Pellow 224 DU BOIS REVIEW: SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH ON RACE 13:2, 2016 ways that both the human and the more-than-human world are impacted by and respond to environmental injustice. With respect to the second point above concerning scale , the EJ Studies literature tends to be characterized by research at one scale or another, rather than a multi-scalar approach. In other words, most researchers focus on the local, regional, national, or sometimes transnational or global scale, but few studies attempt to grasp how EJ struggles function at multiple scales, from the cellular and bodily level to the global level and back (Herod 2011 ; Sze 2016 ). Some scholars have addressed this important question by exploring cases in which pollutants produced in one part of the world travel across national borders and impact human and ecological health in another hemisphere (Sze 2006 ). Scale is of critical importance because it allows us to under- stand how environmental injustices are facilitated by decision-makers who behave as if sites where hazards are produced “out of sight and out of mind” are somehow irrel- evant to the health of people and ecosystems at the original sites of decision-making power and consumption. Attention to scale also assists us in observing how social movement responses to environmental injustices draw on spatial frameworks, networks, and knowledge to make the connections between hazards in one place and harm in another. CEJ Studies thus advocates multi-scalar methodological and theoretical approaches to studying EJ issues in order to better comprehend the complex spatial and temporal causes, consequences, and possible resolutions of EJ struggles. Regarding the third point above—the degree to which various forms of inequality and power are viewed as entrenched in society—this concern stems from my conclu- sion that the vision of change articulated by EJ Studies scholars and most EJ activ- ists generally looks to the state and capital to accommodate demands via legislation, institutional reforms, and other policy concessions. The concern here is that such an approach leaves intact the very power structures that produced environmental injus- tice in the first place. Yes, it names those institutions and structures as sources of the problems and seeks to reform them, but by working in collaboration with those entities, such efforts ultimately risk reinforcing their legitimacy. CEJ Studies urges a deeper grasp of the entrenched and embedded character of social inequality—including speciesism and state power—in society and therefore a reckoning with the need for transforma- tive (rather than primarily reformist) approaches to realize environmental justice. In other words, Critical EJ Studies seeks to push our analyses and actions beyond the human, the state, and capital via a broad anti-authoritarian perspective. Regarding the fourth point above, EJ Studies suggests that various marginalized human populations are treated—if not viewed—as inferior, and less valuable, to society than others. This point is largely undertheorized in the literature (Mills 2001 ; Pulido 1996 ). Critical EJ Studies makes this theme explicit by arguing that these populations are marked for erasure and early death, and that ideological and institutional other- ing is linked to the more-than-human world as well. Moreover, CEJ counters that dominant perspective with a framework that contends that these threatened bodies, populations, and spaces are indispensable to building socially and environmentally just and resilient futures for us all. The above constitute what I call the four pillars of CEJ Studies. CEJ Studies draws from the work of scholars across numerous fields that only periodically inter- sect, such as Environmental Justice Studies (Adamson 2011 ; Bell 2013 ; Bullard 2000 ; Cole and Foster, 2000 ), Critical Race Theory (Goldberg 2002 ), Critical Race Feminism (Hong 2006 ; Smith 2005 ), Ethnic Studies (Márquez 2014 ), Gender and Sexuality Studies and Ecofeminism (Buckingham and Kulcur, 2010 ; Gaard 2004 ), Political Ecology (Bennett 2009 ), and Anti-Authoritarian/Anarchist Theory (Scott 2010 ; Smith 2011 ). Furthermore, CEJ Studies is interdisciplinary, multi-methodological, and at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1742058X1600014X Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:22, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/S1742058X1600014X https://www.cambridge.org/core Critical Environmental Justice Studies DU BOIS REVIEW: SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH ON RACE 13:2, 2016 225 is activist-scholar inspired in that it seeks to bridge and blur the boundaries and borders between the academy and community, theory and practice, analysis and action. Critical EJ Studies is only intended to be one of many possible approaches to environmental justice scholarship and action. It is neither prescriptive, nor is it a declaration of where the field should be headed. In the following sections, I apply a CEJ Studies framework to the Black Lives Matter movement to demonstrate the importance of encouraging scholars and activists to think through linkages across theory and social change politics that might not usually emerge from “traditional” EJ Studies or from within many social change movements. CRITICAL EJ STUDIES AND BLACK LIVES MATTER In order to examine Black Lives Matter as a CEJ case study, I gathered data from the BLM website, archives, and social media, as well as major essays published in national and international media outlets by BLM advocates and supporters. This selection of data is not intended to be strictly representative, but rather, as a purposive sample it speaks to the core BLM frames and the four pillars of CEJ Studies. The First Pillar: Intersectionality and the Racial Discourse of Animality CEJ Studies recognizes that social inequality and oppression in all forms intersect and that members of the more-than-human world are subjects of oppression and agents of social change. Black Lives Matter is a social movement organized primarily around the social category of race, but extends the analysis to multiple categories of difference, reflecting an emphasis on intersectionality . Intersectionality is a concept intended to explain the ways that many identities and social categories work together to produce advantages and disadvantages across bodies and space, and that inequalities do not act independently of one another (Collins 2008 ; Hong 2006 ). The founders of BLM present a deeply intersectional approach to the problem of devalued Black life that is inclusive of class, gender, sexuality, immigration status, citizenship, age, ability, and other differences and social categories. All three founders of BLM are women of color. One of them—Alicia Garza—identifies as a queer woman of color, while another—Opal Tometi—is the daughter of Nigerian immigrants and works for an organization focused on the human rights of Black immigrants. The third founder—Patrisse Cullors—who also identifies as queer, organizes support for incar- cerated persons and their families, with a focus on mental health. Thus their political and professional work itself is a study in intersectional theory and practice. As BLM co-founder Alicia Garza writes, “Black Lives Matter affirms the lives of Black queer and trans folks, disabled folks, Black-undocumented folks, folks with records, women, and all Black lives along the gender spectrum” (Garza 2014 ). Critical EJ Studies speaks to the ways in which various social categories of dif- ference work to place particular bodies at risk of exclusion, marginalization, erasure, discrimination, violence, and othering. These insights are important for building an understanding of the ways that intra-human inequality and oppressions function and how they intersect with human-nonhuman oppression. As David Nibert and Michael Fox put it, “[T]he oppression of various devalued groups in human societies is not independent and unrelated; rather, the arrangements that lead to various forms of oppression are integrated in such a way that the exploitation of one group frequently augments and compounds the mistreatment of others” (Nibert and Fox, 2002 , p. 13). “Various devalued groups in human societies” frequently include women, immigrants, at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1742058X1600014X Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:22, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/S1742058X1600014X https://www.cambridge.org/core David N. Pellow 226 DU BOIS REVIEW: SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH ON RACE 13:2, 2016 LGBTQ persons, people of color, indigenous peoples, disabled persons, the elderly, low-income people, and nonhuman species. And while the experiences of these groups are qualitatively distinct (i.e., not equivalent), the logic of domination and othering as practiced by more powerful groups, the state, and capital provides the common thread of intersectionality through each of their oppressions. Law enforcement personnel routinely engage in violent acts against humans and nonhumans, even when no threat is evident, thus revealing the ways that state violence produces intersecting oppressions. A 2015 Baltimore Sun investigation of the Baltimore, Maryland Police Department (the same town where Freddie Gray was murdered), detailed numerous incidents in which vulnerable people and nonhumans were the sub- jects of brutal and sometimes lethal force at the hands of police in that city. The report notes that young African American males were the targets of such violence, and so were elderly people, women, children, and nonhuman animals (Friedersdorf 2015 ). The report discusses, for example, the use of a dead rat to intimidate a police officer working on a police brutality case and the murder of a dog by an officer to intimidate his girlfriend. The Baltimore Sun investigation appears to reflect what scholarly studies have long revealed: that there is a well-documented link between the use of violence against nonhuman animals and efforts to exert control over other humans, whether in the destruction of livestock and other food sources during wartime and conquests or through domestic violence directed primarily at women, children, and nonhuman companion animals or pets (Adams 2010 ; Ascione 1997 ; Smits 1994 ). This brings us to what I call the racial discourse of animality , a term meant to capture the language that people use to describe human behavior using nonhuman references and analogies, signaling a set of assumptions surrounding what we view as acceptable “human” versus nonhuman behavior and how different bodies are valued. It reveals the means through which we discuss race, racism, and racial politics in more-than-human terms, as a way of defining the limits and boundaries of the human. This discourse is common in discussions around racial politics and flared up many times around BLM protests against police brutality. What is fascinating is that people on all sides of the issues—activists, lawyers, and agents of the state—use this language. In other words, people deploy the racial discourse of animality in the service of White supremacy and in the service of racial justice. Consider the following examples: Lesley McSpadden, the mother of Michael Brown (an African American teenager killed by a police officer in Ferguson, Missouri) spoke to reporters at a public dem- onstration to call attention to the tragedy of her son’s death. She spoke to the bleak outlook of young African Americans facing police brutality: “You took my son away from me! You know how hard it was for me to get him to stay in school and gradu- ate? You know how many Black men graduate? Not many! Because you bring them down to this type of level where they feel they don’t got nothing to live for anyway!” While other protesters around McSpadden peacefully raised their hands in symbolic surrender, a police officer’s voice was heard and recorded yelling at them, calling them “animals” (Fantz et al., 2014 ). In early 2015, Freddie Gray, a twenty-five year old African American man was taken into police custody in Baltimore, Maryland, and, in the process, incurred severe spinal cord and neck injuries and died shortly afterward, sparking nationwide protests. In Baltimore, the protests, led by African Americans and many supporters of the BLM movement, were mainly peaceful but were marred by property destruction, looting, and a number of police officers being injured. Many Whites took to social media— including Baltimore County police officer Jennifer Lynne Silver—and displayed their views on the matter referring to the people involved as “animals” and, in her words, a “disgrace to the human race” ( Change.org 2015). at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1742058X1600014X Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:22, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/S1742058X1600014X https://www.cambridge.org/core Critical Environmental Justice Studies DU BOIS REVIEW: SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH ON RACE 13:2, 2016 227 The racial discourse of animality is also used to combat racism. An article in The Guardian responded to Jennifer Silver’s epithets regarding protesters in Baltimore by arguing that police and society often treat nonhuman animals better than African Americans: But ‘animals’ is a misnomer. People—including police officers—are punished for killing or doing harm to domestic animals. Baltimore has busted dog fighting rings and sent offenders to prison for animal cruelty. In 2014, former Baltimore City police officer Alec Taylor was sentenced to a year behind bars for killing a dog. That might not seem like much, but it is longer than the sentences given to the killers of Michael Brown, Eric Garner, Trayvon Martin, Rekia Boyd, or seven-year old Aiyana Stanley-Jones (Nichols 2015 ). In the spring of 2015, a police officer shot Walter Scott, an unarmed African American man in North Charleston, South Carolina, after he fled his car during a traffic stop. Malik Shabazz, president of Black Lawyers for America and former chairman of the New Black Panther Party, appeared on “CNN Newsroom” and stated, “Black men are being killed and hunted down like deer and like dogs” (Griswold 2015 ). That same month, Democratic Congressman Hank Johnson of Georgia took to the floor of the House of Representatives to urge his colleagues to confront police brutality. Drawing on a phrase usually reserved for hunting nonhuman animals, he stated, “It feels like open season on Black men in America” (Griswold 2015 , emphasis added). In these last examples, references to nonhumans are used to communicate the sentiment that African Americans—like all human beings, presumably—should not be treated like nonhuman animals. The assumption here is also problematic because it is speciesist in that it implies that it is acceptable to wantonly hunt and slaughter nonhumans, even if the primary aim is to counter racist violence. My point is that we cannot understand racist violence, and the way we think, talk, and enact it, with- out paying attention to the relationship between humans and nonhumans, as these examples illustrate. Finally, the role of agency is key to the first pillar of CEJ, since African Americans and other marginalized populations are not just the targets of oppression but also regularly resist their subjugation. While traditional elements of what sociologists call “resource mobilization” (Morris 1984 ) are on full display with the Black Lives Matter movement—including the mobilization of human bodies, ideas, words, discourses, tactics, and strategies in protest—it is also the case that the urban built environment, information technology, and other forms of more-than-human objects and natures are also integral to that agency and therefore central to making this vision and practice of social change possible (Bennett 2009 ). The Second Pillar: Scale, Race, and Difference CEJ Studies embraces multi-scalar methodological and theoretical approaches in order to better comprehend the complex spatial and temporal causes, consequences, and possible resolutions of EJ struggles. Scale is deeply racialized, gendered, and classed. The impacts of climate change offer a telling example of how environmental racism reflects this fact. While the conclusions of climate scientists are remarkably clear that anthropogenic climate change is occurring at a dramatic pace and with increasing intensity, this is also happening unevenly, with people of color, the poor, indigenous peoples, peoples of at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1742058X1600014X Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:22, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/S1742058X1600014X https://www.cambridge.org/core David N. Pellow 228 DU BOIS REVIEW: SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH ON RACE 13:2, 2016 the global South, and women suffering the most (Harlan et al., 2015 ). Thus, while climate change matters for all of us, it impacts people and nonhumans with dif- ferent levels of intensity. If one only pays attention to the global scale, it appears that the worst effects of climate change are not yet upon us. But if one examines what is occurring in neighborhoods, barrios , indigenous peoples’ lands, and much of the global South, the picture is quite different because the impacts are extensive and ongoing. As Keith Ellison and Van Jones ( 2015 ) put it, “[O]ur kids are being poisoned by the air they breathe. Environmental injustices are taking Black lives— that’s why our fight for equality has to include climate and environmental justice too.” Social cognition studies find that “implicit bias” among White research sub- jects results in perceiving threats to their wellbeing when they see Black and Brown people when no such threat exists (Kang 2005 ). While this research is highly con- sequential for everyday microsociological interactions across the racial spectrum (especially in the case of gun violence in the name of White “self defense”), it has major macrosociological implications as well. Therefore I find that implicit bias is useful for thinking more deeply about the intersection of race and scale. In other words, if these studies find that people of color are implicitly viewed as threaten- ing, then their presence is perceived to be much larger in the social-cognitive terrain of Whites. Thus race and scale intertwine to reveal also that when Black people respond to racism (whether by police or via environmental racism), their actions may be viewed as a threat that is disproportionate and outsized. We can see this, for example, in the militarized response by police departments when interacting with the Black Lives Matter movement. Many supporters of the Black Lives Matter movement, and even military veterans, decried these practices when disturbing images of police and pro- testers clashing in Ferguson, Missouri, in response to the police killing of Michael Brown, seemed to be indistinguishable from media images of civilians being repressed by an occupying military force in some far away land. This fact begs for a scalar analy- sis that links militarized oppression of African Americans to the U.S. military’s treat- ment of people of color elsewhere in the world—in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Pakistan, Yemen, Palestine, and many other nations where the United States uses military force directly or by proxy to protect its interests. This is also an environmental justice issue because the U.S. military is one of the largest sources of pollution on earth (Nazaryan 2014 ) and because militarism and masculinist politics tend to go hand in hand and both tend to result in socially and ecologically harmful practices. Finally, BLM’s work speaks to the myriad ways that scale can be thought of and articulated temporally . In fact, the entire point of the BLM movement is, in some ways, an intervention to remind us that blatant acts of anti-Black violence are not a thing of the past and are still quite rampant in what some observers had hoped would be a “postracial” era. BLM co-founder Alicia Garza uses time as an indicator of the inter- section of race, sexuality, and scale’s intersections, but does so linking history to an imagined future: But what I can say to my child, just like my mom says to me, is that there was a time when it wasn’t OK for people to be out [about their sexuality]. There was a time when black people were being slaughtered. And I hope that the end to that story is, ‘and then we organized, and we built a vibrant international movement, and we really changed conditions for black people in this country, and for every- body.’ And I’m hoping that the story that I’m also able to tell is that our demands went beyond ‘stop killing us,’ to ensure the quality of life for everybody. And that we won that (Brydum 2015 ). at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1742058X1600014X Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:22, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/S1742058X1600014X https://www.cambridge.org/core Critical Environmental Justice Studies DU BOIS REVIEW: SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH ON RACE 13:2, 2016 229 The Third Pillar: An Anti-Statist/Anarchist Reading of BLM Social inequalities—from racism to speciesism—are not aberrations, but rather are deeply embedded in society and reinforced by state power and market systems. There- fore, the current social order stands as a fundamental obstacle to social and environ- mental justice. A logical conclusion of this observation is that social change movements may be better off thinking and acting beyond the state and capital as targets of reform and/or as reliable partners. Racism, for example, is a foundational component of the political, legal, economic, and cultural systems in the United States. African Americans, for instance, enjoy fewer rights and significantly lower social value than Whites, suffering deep economic, educa- tional, public health, and environmental inequalities; earning far less income and owning far less wealth and property than Whites; and being more likely than Whites to attend low quality, segregated schools and live in residentially segregated communities marked by financial disinvestment, a brutal occupying police force presence, and environmental racism (Bullard 2000 ; Cacho 2012 ; Gilmore 2007 ; Vargas 2010 ). Public health dispari- ties impact African Americans dramatically, as homicides, infant mortality, life expec- tancy, asthma, and a range of other illnesses and life events reveal a much lower statistical value of Black life (Williams and Collins, 1995 ). And millions of African Americans are either confined to prisons via mass incarceration or subjected to routine surveillance and control through the system of mass probation. Thus, racism is, for Black Lives Matter co-founder Alicia Garza, “a disease that this country has in our very DNA” (Garza 2015 ). In a statement posted on the Black Lives Matter website, activists contend that the current state of racist violence against African Americans is a core component of American life, a form of oppression that Blacks have consistently challenged: “Rooted in the experiences of Black people in this country who actively resist our de-humanization, #BlackLivesMatter is a call to action and a response to the virulent anti-Black racism that permeates our society” ( BlackLivesMatter.com 2016). Debates often center on whether social movements should seek to reform or trans- form the legal system. BLM is an important part of that conversation because it is a movement whose participants often embrace the state, but frequently do so in a critical fashion. For example, much of the chanting and protest calls at BLM events include demands to “prosecute the police” and implement stronger laws against hate crimes and police brutality (Furst 2016 ). 1 The BLM’s “National Demands” document reads, in part, “We will help develop a network of organizations and advocates to form a national policy specifically aimed at redressing the systemic pattern of anti-Black law enforcement violence in the U.S.” (Moore and Cullors, 2014 ). In November 2015, after a group of White supremacists shot and wounded several activists who were pro- testing the police killing of an unarmed African American man named Jamar Clark in Minneapolis, BLM released a statement declaring, “The Black Lives Matter Network urgently calls upon the Department of Justice to investigate this shooting as a hate crime” ( BlackLivesMatter.com 2015). Finally, BLM activists have regularly called for greater oversight over police and for increased presence of Black people in govern- ment decision-making bodies. For example, in the wake of numerous police killings of African Americans in recent years, the Los Angeles chapter of BLM demanded that the mayor appoint activists from the Black community to key city commissions, and a number of BLM activists are running for political office. When BLM demands inclusion in governmental bodies and invokes the language of hate crimes and terrorism, such efforts may appear to reflect the power of grass- roots movements to move state actors on important progressive issues, but it also indicates the movement’s willingness to expand troubling, controlling, authoritative, and at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1742058X1600014X Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:22, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/S1742058X1600014X https://www.cambridge.org/core David N. Pellow 230 DU BOIS REVIEW: SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH ON RACE 13:2, 2016 lethal state power. BLM is therefore not asking how we might build safe communities beyond the state, but rather how we might do so with greater state intervention. BLM co-founder Patrice Cullors’ vision of social change includes a plan to “divest from policing and divest from this prison system . . . and reinvest into poor communities, reinvest into allowing us to have access to healthy food, access to jobs, access to shelter” (Cullors 2015 ). From a pluralist perspective, states are sites where citizens and other stakeholders converge to elect representatives and make their voices heard and shape public policy (Dahl 2005 ). Departing from that view, a power elite perspective casts states as sites of power struggles, where certain interest groups tend to dominate others, setting public policy agendas and unevenly shaping life chances for members of society (Domhoff 2013 ). From Women of Color Feminist, Critical Race Theory, and Anarchist per- spectives, states are also institutions that, by definition, practice exclusion, control, and violence (in addition to their other functions) (Goldberg 2002 ; Hong 2006 ; Mills 2001 ; Scott 2010 ; Smith 2011 ). Thus, the very purpose of a state is to exert dominance over populations, resources, and territory, among other things. If Black Lives Matter was founded to challenge state-sanctioned violence then it makes sense to extend the reach of this movement’s analysis and action to the prob- lem of environmental racism. Since environmental racism is often a form of state- sanctioned violence via the harm that state agencies and state-regulated companies perpetrate in communities of color, then BLM might do well to pay greater attention to this issue. If we think of environmental racism as a form of violent control over bodies, space, and knowledge systems then we can more effectively theorize it as a form of state violence, a framework that is absent from most EJ scholarship. 2 More- over, as some BLM activists urge us to think about how to make our communities safe “beyond policing” (Tometi 2015 ), both BLM and EJ activists and scholars might begin to think about how to make our communities sites of EJ and racial justice beyond the state . In fact, the BLM movement, the EJ movement, and EJ scholarship generally look to the state and its legal systems to deliver justice and to regulate industry. Thus far, however, the track record of state-based regulation and enforcement of racial and environmental justice policies in communities of color has been abysmal (Cole and Foster, 2000 ; Gilmore 2007 ; Lombardi et al., 2015 ). The Fourth Pillar: Indispensability Critical EJ Studies centers on the concepts of racial and socioecological indispensability . In Black and Brown Solidarity ( 2014 ), John Márquez introduces the concept “racial expendability” to argue that Black and Brown bodies are, in the eyes of the state and its constituent legal system, generally viewed as criminal, deficient, threatening, and deserving of violent discipline and even obliteration. Márquez and other ethnic studies scholars contend that, in a White supremacist society, people of color are constructed as and rendered expendable (Cacho 2012 ; Márquez 2014 ; Mills 2001 ; Vargas 2010 ). Ruth Wilson Gilmore speaks to this point in her book Golden Gulag ( 2007 ), in which she argues that the massive build up of prisons to warehouse people of color in the state of California and the United States nationally was a public policy deci- sion designed to contain and control populations whose very existence is viewed as troubling. Extending this logic to the problem of environmental racism, philosopher and critical race theorist Charles Mills argues that people of African descent are con- sidered “trash” by policy makers and institutions promoting discriminatory envi- ronmental policies because these populations are associated with filth, waste, and uncleanliness in the popular imagination—thus locating pollution in their com- munities actually makes cultural common sense (Mills 2001 ). at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1742058X1600014X Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:22, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/S1742058X1600014X https://www.cambridge.org/core Critical Environmental Justice Studies DU BOIS REVIEW: SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH ON RACE 13:2, 2016 231 Critical EJ Studies builds on the work of these scholars by countering the ideology of White supremacy and human dominionism and articulating the perspective that excluded, marginalized, and othered populations, beings, and things—both human and more-than-human—must be viewed not as expendable but rather as indispensable to our collective futures. This is what I term racial indispensability (when referring to people of color) and socioecological indispensability (when referring to broader commu- nities within and across the human/more-than-human divide and their relationships to one another). Racial indispensability is intended to challenge the logic of racial expendability and is the idea that institutions, policies, and practices that support and perpetrate anti-Black racism suffer from the flawed assumption that the future of African Americans is somehow de-linked from the future of White communities. People of color are members of our society, are core participants in our social systems, and are members of our socioecological systems, and are therefore key to ensuring the contin- ued functioning, sustainability, and resilience of our society and planet. The idea of indispensability is distinct from an assimilationist perspective, which seeks to (often involuntarily and violently) incorporate “others” into one’s own vision of a society (Smith 2005 ). Rather, indispensability honors key EJ and ecological prin- ciples by seeing all communities (more-than-human and human) as interconnected, interdependent, but also sovereign and requiring the solidarity of others. Indispens- ability should also not be confused with a Functionalist view of society and socio- ecological relations as it recognizes that social roles, positions, and behaviors among various populations can and do conflict and change over time, and that the character of inequality and state and market power in most societies is highly unjust and must be confronted. Functionalism, on the other hand, posits that whatever the character of inequality, social roles, and behaviors may be, it must be positive for society and there- fore is in no need of change (Parsons 1954 ). Indispensability argues against that logic because CEJ Studies is fundamentally focused on securing justice and sustainability in a highly unjust and unsustainable system. Thus indispensability demands dramatic change but does so from the perspective that all members of society and socioecologi- cal systems have something to contribute to that process and to our collective futures. Socially, politically, philosophically, and ecologically, what this means is that we are all linked in webs of social interdependence, so that what happens to one group affects, in some way, all others. As Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. famously wrote in his landmark “Letter from Birmingham Jail” with regard to racism and the future of the United States: “Injustice anywhere is injustice everywhere. . . . In a real sense all life is inter-related. All men are caught in an inescapable network of mutuality, tied in a single garment of destiny. Whatever affects one directly, affects all indirectly. Never again can we afford to live with the narrow, provincial ‘outside agitator’ idea . . .” (King 1963 ). Thus the importance of CEJ studies here is to underscore that social systems predicated on the annihilation of Black life reveal a self-defeating error. In other words, the idea that Whiteness can only triumph and survive via the annihilation of Black life commits the classic ecological error of dualism or separation . Dualism is the idea that we see various categories of existence as separate and arranged in oppo- sitional hierarchies, such as culture/nature, man/woman, European/non-European, human/animal, White/Black, heterosexual/homosexual, etc., when in fact these cate- gories are constantly blurred, transgressed, and revealed to be socially constructed and highly fluid and malleable. So CEJ Studies facilitates an understanding that a vision of White supremacy premised on the destruction of people of color is as illogical and self-defeating as a vision of an economy and a nation-state premised on the destruc- tion of ecosystems. In a sense, this observation demonstrates a reality of social systems as ecosystems, and vice versa: that everything in the universe is hitched to everything at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1742058X1600014X Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:22, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/S1742058X1600014X https://www.cambridge.org/core David N. Pellow 232 DU BOIS REVIEW: SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH ON RACE 13:2, 2016 else, so that what affects one member or element affects all of them. The destruction of people of color harms White people and it harms the more-than-human world, and vice versa, so CEJ Studies affirms that Black lives, the lives of people of color, are indis- pensable . Going further, the idea of socioecological indispensability reflects the CEJ Studies perspective that the wellbeing of all people, species, and ecosystems is indispensible . This is both a socioecological reality and an affirmation of a politics of solidarity and coalition building that firmly states “All of us or none!” Black Lives Matter activists routinely speak to this issue as well. In 2015, BLM issued a “State of the Black Union” in which they wrote, “None of us are free until all of us are free” ( DeclarationProject.org 2015). This is a variation on a quote that has been attributed to the likes of the poet Emma Lazarus, the Reverend Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., and many others. It is also articulated powerfully in the Barry Mann song “None of Us Are Free,” which includes the chorus, “None of us are free, none of us are free, if one of us is chained, none of us are free.” Expressing this view more than a century ago, African American historian Anna Julia Cooper told a group of Black clergymen in 1892, “Only the Black woman can say ‘when and where I enter, in the quiet, undisputed dignity of my womanhood, without violence and without suing or special patronage, then and there the whole . . . race enters with me’” (Bailey 2004 , p. 56). A year later, making this claim even stronger, at the 1893 World’s Congress of Representative Women, Cooper stated: Let woman’s claim be as broad in the concrete as the abstract. We take our stand on the solidarity of humanity, the oneness of life, and the unnaturalness and injus- tice of all special favoritism, whether of sex, race, country, or condition. If one link of the chain is broken, the chain is broken. A bridge is no stronger than its weakest part, and a cause is not worthier than its weakest element. Least of all can woman’s cause afford to decry the weak. We want, then, as toilers for the universal triumph of justice and human rights, to go to our homes from this Congress demanding an entrance not through a gateway for ourselves, our race, our sex, or our sect, but a grand highway for humanity (Cooper 1892 ). BLM co-founder Alicia Garza echoes and articulates this idea as follows: #BlackLivesMatter doesn’t mean your life isn’t important—it means that Black lives, which are seen as without value within White supremacy, are important to your liberation. Given the disproportionate impact state violence has on Black lives, we understand that when Black people in this country get free, the benefits will be wide reaching and transformative for society as a whole. When we are able to end hyper-criminalization and sexualization of Black people and end the poverty, control, and surveillance of Black people, every single person in this world has a better shot at getting and staying free. When Black people get free, everybody gets free . This is why we call on Black people and our allies to take up the call that Black lives matter. . . . Our collective futures depend on it (Garza 2014 , emphasis added). DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION Critical Environmental Justice Studies seeks to expand the field of EJ Studies to move beyond its conceptual, theoretical, disciplinary, and methodological limitations. Since that path is still very much in formation, this paper is an effort to chart one course in that direction with greater specificity. Critical EJ Studies draws from numerous fields at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1742058X1600014X Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:22, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/S1742058X1600014X https://www.cambridge.org/core Critical Environmental Justice Studies DU BOIS REVIEW: SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH ON RACE 13:2, 2016 233 of scholarship in order to produce more robust accounts for why environmental injus- tices occur and persist, for how human and nonhuman forces shape and are shaped by them, and for what environmental justice might look like. That is, the promise of CEJ Studies lies in its capacity to more fully explain the sources and consequences of our socioecological crises and develop more generative analyses of how social change efforts within and across species may meet those challenges. Finally, CEJ Studies can aid scholars and advocates in thinking through a redefi- nition of the concept of environmental justice itself . Perhaps any discussion regarding the future of EJ Studies and the EJ movement might begin by connecting early EJ scholarship, which centers primarily around the intersection of social inequality and environmental harm, with the concept of ecological justice , which centers on the rela- tionship of human beings to the broader nonhuman world. By the term ecological justice, I mean to suggest a more respectful and egalitarian relationship of human beings to one another and to the greater more-than-human world. This model of analy- sis and politics begins with humans taking responsibility for practicing transforma- tive socioecological political work and extends to understanding inequalities within and across species and space to imagine and struggle for a more democratic multi- species world. Nonhuman species and ecosystems may not engage in politics the way humans tend to, but they can and do exert influence and power over the world (Bennett 2009 ): for example, consider the impacts of fossil fuels on the daily lives of human beings and on the political systems and economies of every nation on Earth. Ecological justice destabilizes the notion of the human as a biological category at the apex of a human/nature hierarchy and, instead, embraces it as a political cat- egory that engages with the broader ecological community. This model of politics also rejects the state as an arbiter of justice and inclusion. The state has managed, included, excluded, homogenized, and controlled humans and nonhuman natures for the benefit of a small elite. That should be reason enough to consider the merits of an anarchist or anti-authoritarian approach to socioecological change. Curiously, this concept of ecological justice closely mirrors and parallels the Principles of Envi- ronmental Justice—a sort of founding document of the U.S. EJ movement, suggest- ing that, in many ways, the EJ movement and EJ Studies have yet to catch up to the vision of the movement’s founding principles, which are largely aligned with a CEJ Studies perspective. In this paper, I applied a Critical Environmental Justice perspective to the phenomenon of the Black Lives Matter movement, demonstrating how attention to multiple categories of difference and inequality (including more-than-human species and the built environment); an emphasis on the role of scale as a way of understanding the violence of racism and the promise of resistance movements; a focus on linking the entrenched character of social inequalities with transformative, anti-authoritarian and anarchist perspectives; and an application of the concepts of racial and socioecological indispensability can produce an enriched account of that movement’s core concerns, its limitations, and its possibilities. Black Lives Matter challenges the scourge of state- sanctioned violence against diversely constituted communities of African descent, with a primary emphasis on police brutality and mass incarceration. I argue that if we think of environmental racism as an extension of those state-sanctioned practices—in other words a form of authoritarian control over bodies, space, and knowledge systems— then we can more effectively theorize it as a form of state violence, a framework that is absent from most EJ scholarship. Corresponding author : David N. Pellow, Environmental Studies Program, University of California Santa Barbara, 4312 Bren Hall, Santa Barbara, CA 93106-4160. E-mail: pellow@es.ucsb.edu at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1742058X1600014X Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:22, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/S1742058X1600014X https://www.cambridge.org/core David N. Pellow 234 DU BOIS REVIEW: SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH ON RACE 13:2, 2016 NOTES 1. 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work_hlssdjyqe5h33o5f4i3tfqh4eu	----	TLDR Commentary TITLE What are the support needs of women with learning disabilities who have been abused? ABSTRACT Purpose: In discussing some of the issues arising from the article by X, this commentary aims to draw readers’ attention to the various support needs women with learning disabilities may have. Design/methodology/approach: Critical analysis based on review of literature and the author’s research and practice based experience. Findings : Women with learning disabilities have similar support needs to other women who have experienced violence and abuse. However, in order to get their needs met, they need access to information, support from professionals and to share experiences with other women. Originality/value: This commentary encourages readers to view the abuse of women with learning disabilities in a broad social context and to use all the knowledge available to protect and empower individuals, whilst at the same time demanding social changes to end discrimination and abuse. KEYWORDS Women with learning disabilities Violence and abuse Support needs TLDR Commentary What are the support needs of women with learning disabilities who have been abused? Accessible information As for other women who experience rape, domestic violence or abuse, women with learning disabilities are likely to have a whole range of short and long term needs. As the paper by X demonstrates, the need for accessible information is foremost amongst them. Not too long ago, accessible information was thin on the ground, but today there are many examples of leaflets, books, videos, audio files, which have been produced by, with and for people with learning disabilities on the subject of abuse. (A list of some of these is found below). The central messages of these resources tend to be:  that the individual was not to blame for their abuse  that what happened to them is commonly experienced by others too  to encourage them to take action to stop the abuse or remove themselves from risk  to explain what kinds of help and support are available and how they can access these. The value of such accessible information cannot be overstated. Without such information putting their experiences in context and alerting them to the existence of support agencies, women with learning disabilities are left to cope alone and thus remain vulnerable to further abuse. Seeking help Using the telephone as a first point of contact When accessible information encourages women with learning disabilities to seek help, telephone numbers are usually given so that people can access that support. However, X’s paper highlights the difficulties some women with learning disabilities have with automated phone systems which require the caller to listen to a range of options , before selecting the right one. This same difficulty is also highlighted by learning disabled researchers from RESPOND in their research on disability hate crime (Mantovani and Wallis 2014). If services are striving to meet their legal obligations under the Equality Act 2010 (which encompasses previous anti-discrimination legislation, including the Disability Discrimination Act 1995), then they are failing some disabled people if they cannot get past the first barrier they face. Just as some organisations provide easy read versions of their written information as a reasonable adjustment, then perhaps they need to consider ‘easy dial’ versions for their telephone services? Indeed the Equality and Human Rights Commission specifically states that “when you provide services over the telephone, you must make reasonable adjustments for disabled people who would otherwise face a barrier to accessing the service” (Equality and Human Rights Commission 2014:32) and provides guidance for statutory and voluntary organisations in doing so. What kind of help can women with learning disabilities expect? There are undoubtedly some excellent specialist services available to women with learning disabilities who have been abused. These tend to be learning disability specific services, such as RESPOND (which provides psychotherapy, advice support, training) or Beverly Lewis House (a specialist Refuge for women with learning disabilities who have been abused). However, not all women with learning disabilities can use the relatively few specialist services available, therefore generic domestic violence or sexual assault services must make every effort to ensure women with learning disabilities can access them. Evidence suggests that best practice is achieved when disability equality training is provided in mainstream domestic violence services and domestic violence training is provided in learning disabilities services (Woodin and Shah 2011). When health and social care professionals are not adequately trained in domestic violence issues, they often do not act on the knowledge they have about their clients’ experiences of abuse. If the information about abuse is gained in indirect ways and the women do not specifically ask for help in escaping a violent relationship, then little or nothing may be done. This has been shown in relation to women with learning disabilities (McCarthy, Hunt and Milne-Skillman in press), women with physical and sensory impairments (Hague et al 2011) and women in the general population (SafeLives 2015). Yet NICE guidelines clearly state that staff in a variety of services, especially those working with vulnerable adults, should be trained to ask service users about experiences of violence and abuse and that this should be seen as a “routine part of good clinical practice” (2014:12). A recent international study looking at violence against disabled women (including women with learning disabilities) in four European countries (Austria, Germany, Iceland and the UK) gathered evidence from women who had experienced violence and those who provide services to them. Austria, Iceland and the UK were criticised for not paying adequate attention to, or providing sufficient services for, disabled women who had experienced violence. Germany, on the other hand, was praised for its 2007 National Action Plan on Violence Against Women. The report singles out the UK government’s austerity agenda and cuts to public services as having a particularly negative effect on abuse services to disabled women (Planitzer 2011). The negative effects of service cuts were identified by women with learning disabilities themselves in a recent study of their domestic violence experiences (McCarthy, Hunt and Milne-Skillman in press). Health and social care professionals have a role in making women with learning disabilities aware of relevant laws and how they can seek legal help. For example, knowledge of the Domestic Violence Disclosure Scheme – commonly known as Clare’s Law – could be very useful to women with learning disabilities when they begin a new relationship, if they are worried about their partner’s behaviour. However, the process of applying for disclosure, as well as the rights and responsibilities attached to it are not at all straightforward and so, once again, the need for accessible information and support is clear. Women’s groups Whilst the support of professionals in the statutory and voluntary sectors is crucial for women with learning disabilities who have been abused, it is important not to overlook more informal and naturally occurring supports too. Friends and family have an obvious role to play in helping women to overcome negative experiences. Women’s support groups for women with learning disabilities are also potentially very valuable and for decades they have been advocated as a safe and confidential space for women with learning disabilities (Millard 1994, McCarthy 1999). More recently, examples can be found in the literature of practitioners using the women’s group model to help women overcome abusive experiences (Peckham et al 2007, Martin et al 2012, Walter Brice et al 2012). As well as providing the opportunity for individual women to discuss private and personal issues, a well facilitated group can enable the sharing of experiences, so that women make the connection between what happened to them and broader social problems (eg understanding that rape is common, or that the Police often do not respond effectively to domestic violence). The international study referred to above reported that women with disabilities found this kind of intervention helpful: “In all countries most women reported that peer support groups, empowerment groups and peer counselling were helpful. They also valued opportunities to provide support to other women in similar situations to their own.” (Woodin and Shah 2011:7) The reality for many women with learning disabilities who have experienced violence or abuse is often that they are socially and psychologically isolated and lack information about the fact that help exists and how to access it. It is therefore incumbent upon those who support women with learning disabilities to enable them to reflect on what has happened, to become aware that help is available and how to access it and to develop some protective skills for the future. Examples of relevant accessible resources ARC easy read information on mate crime http://arcuk.org.uk/safetynet/files/2012/08/Friend-or- Fake-Booklet.pdf Cambridgeshire Domestic abuse and Sexual Violence Partnership have produced posters for people with learning disabilities. Can be downloaded from here http://www.cambridgeshireandpeterboroughccg.nhs.uk/downloads/CCG/Adult%20Safeguarding/Do mestic%20Abuse%20Poster%20men%20and%20women%20versions.pdf Don’t Put Up With It! A video for women with learning disabilities about domestic violence. Can be seen online here https://vimeo.com/116967832 1 Don’t Put Up With It! A leaflet for women with learning disabilities about domestic violence. Can be downloaded from here http://www.kent.ac.uk/tizard/research/research_projects/domviolence.html?tab=accessible- resources Easy Health have collected together a whole range of accessible resources on abuse http://www.easyhealth.org.uk/listing/abuse-(leaflets) Enable Scotland easy read leaflet on surviving sexual abuse http://www.enable.org.uk/enabledirect/publications/Documents/FL%20- %20Abuse_booklet_easyread.pdf RESPOND easy read information on abuse http://respond.org.uk/easy-read/what-is-abuse-1/ Surrey Police easy read leaflet on internet safety http://www.surrey.police.uk/Portals/0/pdf/easy- read/internet_safety_July13.pdf 1 Hard copies of the DVD can be obtained, free of charge, from the author. http://arcuk.org.uk/safetynet/files/2012/08/Friend-or-Fake-Booklet.pdf http://arcuk.org.uk/safetynet/files/2012/08/Friend-or-Fake-Booklet.pdf http://www.cambridgeshireandpeterboroughccg.nhs.uk/downloads/CCG/Adult%20Safeguarding/Domestic%20Abuse%20Poster%20men%20and%20women%20versions.pdf http://www.cambridgeshireandpeterboroughccg.nhs.uk/downloads/CCG/Adult%20Safeguarding/Domestic%20Abuse%20Poster%20men%20and%20women%20versions.pdf https://vimeo.com/116967832 http://www.kent.ac.uk/tizard/research/research_projects/domviolence.html?tab=accessible-resources http://www.kent.ac.uk/tizard/research/research_projects/domviolence.html?tab=accessible-resources http://www.easyhealth.org.uk/listing/abuse-(leaflets) http://www.enable.org.uk/enabledirect/publications/Documents/FL%20-%20Abuse_booklet_easyread.pdf http://www.enable.org.uk/enabledirect/publications/Documents/FL%20-%20Abuse_booklet_easyread.pdf http://respond.org.uk/easy-read/what-is-abuse-1/ http://www.surrey.police.uk/Portals/0/pdf/easy-read/internet_safety_July13.pdf http://www.surrey.police.uk/Portals/0/pdf/easy-read/internet_safety_July13.pdf References Equality and Human Rights Commission (2014) What equality law means for your voluntary and community sector organisation (including charities and religion or belief organisations). Available from http://www.equalityhumanrights.com/sites/default/files/publication_pdf/What%20equality%2 0law%20means%20for%20your%20vol%20or%20community%20sector%20organisation.pdf (accessed 18.9.15) Hague, G., Thiara, R. and Mullender, A. (2011) Disabled Women, Domestic Violence and Social Care: The Risk of Isolation, Vulnerability and Neglect, British Journal of Social Work 41,1, 148-165. doi: 10.1093/bjsw/bcq057 Mantovani, C. and Wallis, L. (2014) London Calling: Local Authority Responses to Disability Hate Crime An Exploratory Study. London: RESPOND Available from http://www.respond.org.uk/watch- listen-learn/londoncalling/ (accessed 11.9.15) Martin, C., Shelmerdine, J and Hollingworth, E. (2012) Hurtful relationships: a group intervention for women with learning disabilities, Clinical Psychology and People with Learning Disabilities, 10,3,36- 41. McCarthy, M., Hunt, S. and Milne Skillman, K. (in press) ‘I know it was every week, but I can’t be sure if it was every day: domestic violence and women with learning disabilities, Journal of Applied Research in Intellectual Disabilities. McCarthy, M. (1999). Sexuality and women with learning disabilities. Jessica Kingsley Publishers. Millard, L. (1994). Between ourselves: experiences of a women’s group on sexuality and sexual abuse. Practice Issues in Sexuality and Learning Disability. London: Routledge. NICE (2014) Domestic violence and abuse: how health services, social care and the organisations they work with can respond effectively. NICE Public Health Guidance 50. Available from https://www.nice.org.uk/guidance/ph50/resources/guidance-domestic-violence-and-abuse-how- health-services-social-care-and-the-organisations-they-work-with-can-respond-effectively-pdf (accessed 11.9.15) Peckham, N. G., Corbett, A., Howlett, S., McKee, A. and Pattison, S. (2007) The delivery of a survivors’ group for learning disabled women with significant learning disabilities who have been sexually abused, British Journal of Learning Disabilities, 35: 236–244. doi: 10.1111/j.1468- 4187.2006.00426.x Planitzer, J. (2011) Access to specialised victim support services for women with disabilities who have experienced violence: Comparative Report. JUST/2011/DAP/AG/3293. Available from http://women- disabilities- violence.humanrights.at/sites/default/files/reports/ws_1_comparative_report_2.pdf SafeLives (2015) Getting it Right First Time: Executive Summary. Available from http://www.safelives.org.uk/sites/default/files/resources Downloaded 4.4.15 http://www.equalityhumanrights.com/sites/default/files/publication_pdf/What%20equality%20law%20means%20for%20your%20vol%20or%20community%20sector%20organisation.pdf http://www.equalityhumanrights.com/sites/default/files/publication_pdf/What%20equality%20law%20means%20for%20your%20vol%20or%20community%20sector%20organisation.pdf http://www.respond.org.uk/watch-listen-learn/londoncalling/ http://www.respond.org.uk/watch-listen-learn/londoncalling/ https://www.nice.org.uk/guidance/ph50/resources/guidance-domestic-violence-and-abuse-how-health-services-social-care-and-the-organisations-they-work-with-can-respond-effectively-pdf%20Downloaded%20on%204.4.15 https://www.nice.org.uk/guidance/ph50/resources/guidance-domestic-violence-and-abuse-how-health-services-social-care-and-the-organisations-they-work-with-can-respond-effectively-pdf%20Downloaded%20on%204.4.15 Woodin, S. and Shah, S. (2011) Access to specialised victim support services for women with disabilities who have experienced violence: Comparative Research Report: Austria, Germany, Iceland and United Kingdom. JUST/2011/DAP/AG/3293. Available from http://women-disabilities- violence.humanrights.at/sites/default/files/reports/comparative_empirical_report.pdf (accessed 11.9.15) http://women-disabilities-violence.humanrights.at/sites/default/files/reports/comparative_empirical_report.pdf http://women-disabilities-violence.humanrights.at/sites/default/files/reports/comparative_empirical_report.pdf 
work_hnakhb7rrjfdhjaoeb7bzm5j2y	----	MARCKSlevelswouldbeincreasedinBALcelllysatesfromhorseswith EAS,andthatinhibitionofMARCKSinzymosan-stimulatedBALcells (ex vivo) would diminish respiratory burst. METHODS/STUDY POPULATION: Lysates were prepared from BAL cells isolated from horseswithno,mild/moderateandsevereEAS.RelativeMARCKSpro- tein levels were determined using equine specific MARCKS ELISA (MyBioSource). Cultured BAL cells were pretreated with a MARCKS inhibitor peptide (MANS), control peptide (RNS) or vehicle control and stimulated with zymosan for 5 hours. Reactive oxygenspe- cies levels were determined by luminescence to evaluate respiratory burst. Data were analyzed by One-way ANOVA (p<0.05). RESULTS/ANTICIPATED RESULTS: We determined that normal- ized MARCKS protein expression is significantly increased in BAL cell lysates from horses with mild/moderate or severe EAS, compared to horses with normal BAL cytology. Preliminary findings also suggest that MANS treatment of zymosan-stimulated equine BAL cells ex vivo attenuateslevelsrespiratoryburst.DISCUSSION/SIGNIFICANCEOF IMPACT: These findings point to a possible role for MARCKS protein in the pathophysiology of EAS and support MARCKS inhibition as a potential therapeutic strategy. 4377 Missed Opportunities to Prevent Homicide: An Analysis of the National Violent Death Reporting System Justin Cirone1, Jennifer Cone1, Brian Williams1, David Hampton1, Priya Prakash1, and Tanya Zakrison1 1University of Chicago OBJECTIVES/GOALS: The goal of this study is to better understand the homicide victim population who were institutionalized within 30 days prior to their death. Improved knowledge of this population can potentially prevent these future homicides. METHODS/STUDY POPULATION: A retrospective analysis of the 36 states included in the 2003-2017 National Violent Death Reporting System was per- formed. Demographics of recently institutionalized homicide vic- tims (RIHV) in the last 30 days were compared to homicide victims who were not recently institutionalized. Circumstances of the homicide, such as suspected gang involvement, were also com- pared. Parametric and non-parametric statistical analyses were per- formed. Significance was set at p<0.05. RESULTS/ANTICIPATED RESULTS: There were 81,229 homicides with 992 (1.2%) RIHV. The majority of RIHV were Black (49.6%) and older than victims who were not recently institutionalized (37.2 vs. 34.8, p<0.001). RIHV had a high school degree or higher in 54.8% of cases and the primary homicide weapon was a firearm in 67% of the deaths. They were more likely to be homeless (3.1% vs. 1.5%), have a mental health diagnosis (9.2% vs. 2.3%), abuse alcohol (6.1% vs. 2.2%), or abuse other substances (15.2% vs. 5.8%) [all p <0.001]. These victims were most commonly institutionalized in a correctional facility or a hospital compared to other facilities such as nursing homes. Homicide circumstances for RIHV were more likely to involve abuse/neglect (4.3% vs. 2.2%, p<0.001), gang violence (7.6% vs. 5.6%, p = 0.002), or a hate crime (1.0% vs. 0.1%. p<0.001). DISCUSSION/SIGNIFICANCE OF IMPACT: Contact with an institution such as a hospital or prison provides high-risk patients the opportunity to potentially participate in violence intervention programs. These institutions should seek to identify and intervene on this population to reduce the risk of violent homicides. 4141 Molecular Signatures of Cocaine Toxicity in Postmortem Human Brain and Neurons Emily Frances Mendez1, Laura Stertz1, Gabriel Fries1, Ruifeng Hu1, Thomas Meyer1, Zhongming Zhao1, and Consuelo Walss-Bass1 1The University of Texas Health Science Center at Houston OBJECTIVES/GOALS: The goal of this project is to identify new therapeutic targets and biomarkers to treat or prevent cocaine tox- icity by investigating proteomic, transcriptomic and epigenetic sig- natures of cocaine exposure in human subjects. METHODS/ STUDY POPULATION: Cocaine is a highly addictive neurotoxic substance, and it is estimated that 1.9 million Americans are current users of cocaine. To study the molecular effects of cocaine, we gen- erated preliminary proteomics and next-generation RNA sequencing (RNAseq) data from human postmortem dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (Broadmann area 9 or BA9) of 12 cocaine-exposed subjects and 17 controls. Future directions for this project include RNAseq and DNA methylation analysis of neuronal nuclei sorted from human postmortem BA9 and a human induced pluripotent stem cell-derived neuron (hiPSN) model of cocaine exposure from the same postmortem subjects from whom we have brain samples. RESULTS/ANTICIPATED RESULTS: We found alterations in neu- ronal synaptic protein levels and gene expression, including the sero- tonin transporter SLC6A4, and synaptic proteins SNAP25, SYN2, SYNGR3. Pathway analysis of our results revealed alterations in spe- cific pathways involved with neuronal function including voltage- gated calcium channels, and GABA receptor signaling. In the future, we expect to see an enhancement in neuron-specific gene expression signatures in our sorted neuronal nuclei and our hiPSN model of cocaine exposure. The hiPSN model will help elucidate which effects are due to acute versus chronic exposure of cocaine. DISCUSSION/ SIGNIFICANCE OF IMPACT: Neuronal signatures found with this analysis can help us understand mechanisms of cognitive decline in long-term cocaine users as well as the acute effects on the brain of cocaine taken in overdose. With this work and future proposed stud- ies, we can discover novel clinical biomarkers for cocaine neurotox- icity in patients with cocaine use disorder and determine readouts for future therapeutic development on cocaine addiction and overdose. 4488 Neural Network of the Cognitive Model of Reading† Joseph Posner1, Vivian Dickens, Andrew DeMarco, Sarah Snider, Peter Turkeltaub, and Rhonda Friedman 1Georgetown - Howard Universities OBJECTIVES/GOALS: A particularly debilitating consequence of stroke is alexia, an acquired impairment in reading. Cognitive mod- els aim to characterize how information is processed based on behav- ioral data. If we can concurrently characterize how neural networks process that information, we can enhance the models to reflect the neuronal interactions that drive them. METHODS/STUDY POPULATION: There will be 10 unimpaired adult readers. Two functional localizer tasks, deigned to consistently activate robust lan- guage areas, identify the regions of interest that process the cognitive reading functions (orthography, phonology, semantics). Another task, designed for this experiment, analyses the reading-related 140 JCTS 2020 Abstract Supplement https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/cts.2020.413 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:31, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/cts.2020.413 https://www.cambridge.org/core 
work_hofd7nghjng3llmipw6iax7s7m	----	Howe, C., & Rigi, J. (2009). Transnationalizing Desire: Sexualizing Culture and Commodifying Sexualities. Ethnos, 74(3), 297–306. http://doi.org/10.1080/00141840903053071 Transnationalizing Desire: Sexualizing Culture and Commodifying Sexualities Cymene Howe & Jakob Rigi Rice University, USA & Central European University, Budapest, Hungary Sexuality, as a conceptual framework, has become a site for several social, moral, and political controversies, economic strategies, existential anxieties and ontological uncertainties. The transformation of sexuality, semiotically and in practice, particularly since the 1950s, reveals itself to be part of wider social and economic processes that have been variously described under the rubrics of ‘globalization’ (Appadurai 1996; Featherstone 1990; Hannerz 1989; Sassen 1998) and ‘transnationalism’ (Blanc et al. 1994; Glick Schiller et al. 1992), or the kindred categories of ‘post-modernity’ (Jameson 1991), ‘late capitalism’ (Mandel 1975) and a ‘new imperialism’ (Harvey 2005). In this special issue, we are interested in how sexuality as commodity and practice has come to stand for vast categories of meaning and experience in a transnational context. We explore how various forms of sexuality and desire inform national identities, the sexual policies of the state, and concepts surrounding commodifi cation and subjectivity. We understand ‘transnationalizing desire’ to be the locus of several overlapping political and cultural processes regarding the intimacies of sexuality: how desire and subjectivity are understood on ‘local’ levels, and in turn, how these categories of meaning and experience become appropriated and re-articulated in transnational exchanges. Central to the analytical frame works included here is how individuals and collectivities imagine the horizons of sexuality and desire, whether through legal interventions of sexual rights and responsibilities, interactions in the international marriage ‘market,’ or in modifying local hierarchies of sexual identity. Resonating in each of these discussions is a tension between ‘local’ practices, identities and values and those that are seen to be transnationally ‘imported’ varieties. Intersecting systems of economic and cultural priorities have induced moments of global ‘friction’ (Tsing 2005). So too can sexuality be said to [End Page 297] produce similar sorts of http://doi.org/10.1080/00141840903053071 ‘heat:’ where the rub produces sparks and ultimately, fire. Sexuality — that putatively private and intimate terrain of the self — creates cultural heat in various forms, producing friction against reproductive imperatives, family forms, nationalism and cultural proprieties. As Jean and John Comaroff have described, it is ‘interpersonal relations — above all, sexuality— [that have] come to stand metonymically, for the inchoate forces that threaten the world as we know it’ (Comaroff & Comaroff 2000:305). Sexuality, as it is deployed in sexual rights movements, as a sign of western encroachment, or as an ideal of ‘modernity,’ poses dilemmas for the public and private as well as what constitutes the ‘local’ as opposed to the ‘global.’ Precisely because sex, sexuality, sexual ‘deviation,’ and the reproductive mandates of much of nation building have often benefited from sequestering sexuality as a proximate, controllable, intimate and personal terrain, the transnational dimensions of conceiving ‘desire’ and sexuality allow us to envision new forms of intimacy, politics and ways of understanding sexuality. In this special issue, we discuss how sexuality challenges assumptions of the proximate and the intimate, or how the transnationalization of desire troubles the borders between the ‘local’ and the ‘global.’ Provocative pandering, as with the global circulation of pornography, is one arena where sexuality circulates. But sexuality is also transformed through identity politics and social movements (Blackwood & Wieringa 1999; Boellstorff 2003; Carrillo 2002; Howe n.d.; Lancaster 1992; Manalansan 2003; Parker 1999; Rofel 2007; Rubin 1984; Sinnott 2004), sex work (Brennan 2004; Chernoff 2003; Frank 2002) and claims of sexual subjectivity and the right to pleasure (Foucault 1985). Our discussions center on two mutually constituted processes, one bolstering the other: the sexualization of culture and the commodification of sexuality. The sexualization of culture, as we understand it, is the way in which the culture concept — as it is variously deployed in different national and transnational settings — has become saturated with sex and sexuality; it represents the ways in which sexuality is made to stand for many things, including accusations of western imperialism and infection, as well as notions of freedom and identity. The increased commodification of sexuality appears in obvious ways in terms of images (advertising and pornography) and bodies (prostitution or sex work). The aesthetic and often consumption-driven arenas of fi lm, music, literature, art, academic discourses, and popular culture illustrate much of the market ‘impulse,’ crafting ever-more desirable commodities. But commodification is also at work as sexual identities gain further traction, becoming sites [End Page 298] of consumption, and global dating and marriage industries continue to grow (Constable 2003). Conveying particular kinds of sexuality, through dress, performance and body language, may alternately facilitate or prohibit access to social networks and employment opportunities. The articles included in this issue thus address the sexualization of culture and the commodification of sexuality, in tandem, signaling new iterations of this ‘variegated traffic’ in sexuality as it appears across transnational terrains (Povinelli & Chauncy 1999: 441) often shuttled by the traffic in images produced by global media sources, whether in the form of pornography (Williams 2004) or modesty campaigns (Mahmood 2005). Diasporas of sexual cultures, such as lesbian and gay rights movements, transnational marriage markets, or ideals surrounding sexual freedom, are changing sexual politics within and across nation states. From a politically progressive point of view some of the changes surrounding sexuality and rights have yielded contradictory results. On the one hand, new forms of sexual liberty have emerged. Women’s sexual agency has come to be more widely recognized and sexual ‘minorities’ have, in many places, gained recognition as subjects worthy of rights. The advent of sexual rights suggest that local practices may alternately copy or confound well- circulated forms of Euro-American sexual identity, citizenship and subjectivity. Shifts in how sexuality is conceived and practiced are often sites of conflict, trauma, violence and struggles waged upon symbolic and political landscapes. Moral panics that pivot upon media representations of sexuality, abortion provision, sex education, same-sex marriage, or moves to protect the sexual sanctity of the nation’s women and children from ‘imperial’ or ‘western’ contaminative effects are but some of the ways that the sexualization of culture operates in fraught and politicized terms. Politically progressive movements have largely welcomed what appear to be substantive changes regarding sexuality, particularly those that advocate sexual and reproductive rights, access to sex education and medical interventions for HIV and STDs. However, socially conservative forces have resisted such changes because they allegedly destroy traditional values. Herbert Marcuse (1974), a socially radical commentator of his time, was perhaps particularly insightful on this count. He both welcomed the notion of sexual change and was, at the same time, critical of shifts taking place on the ground because they too neatly matched the horizon set by capitalist values that would lead to alienation. Like Marcuse and others, we find that sexual subjects are better understood as produced through histories of power and differentially married to changing particularities of ‘desire.’ [End Page 299] The global emergence of movements based on sexual rights, including those of women and gays and lesbians, is a result of the confluence of feminism and sexual liberationist movements in the West and elsewhere. Sexuality, in these instances may serve as a semiotic site where political and citizen subjects are formed and find traction — precisely at a time when the nation state feels its grip faltering. These movements serve to radically unsettle explicitly ‘territorialized’ identities associated with family, community, state and nation, thereby creating new spaces to articulate the self in relation to society under the sign of sexuality. Achieving happiness and fulfilling personal desires may challenge deeply-rooted obligations to family, reproduction, heterosexual marriage, kinship, community, nation and state. Ideologies of honor and shame may be problematized, re-thought and, sometimes, re-entrenched. It comes as no surprise that the rise of religious fundamentalism and ethnic nationalism has been described as an expression of fear provoked, at least in part, by changes in the realm of sexuality (Hobsbawm 1990; B. Turner 1994, 2002). Socially conservative forces often consider women’s reproductive labor as central to the reproduction of the nation. Women’s bodies, and the sexualities associated with these bodies, represent honor to such communities and mandate the surveillance of sexuality and the policing of propriety in the name of family, God, culture and nation. Fundamentalist movements, particularly as they have been recently conceived by Christianity and Islam, have been perhaps the most outspoken and globally recognized forces in sexual policing. But anxieties about freedom and sexuality are not limited to priests, mullahs or their lay followers. Conservative public intellectuals such as Bell (1996), Huntington (2002), Fukuyama (1992), and Al-e-Ahmad (1982 [1963]) furnish these movements with quasi-theoretical tapestries. Sexual politics, in the west and the rest of the world, illustrate internal divisions and shifting power relations. While hegemonic Western powers may hope to impose their particular vision on other nation states, there are strains of resistance to these processes. These include subalterns in the West who both inspire emancipatory impulses elsewhere in the world and at the same time take inspiration from outside the west in a reciprocal process. It has become somewhat de rigueur for conservative or reactionary forces to ostracize progressive movements — particularly those that are believed to have an impact on sexuality in some way — by stigmatizing them as Western or ‘liberal.’ Nationalists, for example, often construct dichotomies between ‘good’ and ‘evil’ in regards to sexual politics, contrasting putative ‘tradition’ against ‘modernity’ and native-ness against the West. The ‘West’ may come [End Page 300] to represent Evil while autochthonous and native-culturalist values come to stand for Good. Because the family is often conceived as a major pillar of the state and nation, claims are asserted that women’s bodies and sexualities ought to serve the common good of the nation and state. By nationalizing women’s sexuality, sexual liberty, prostitution, interventions by U.S. and European NGOs, gender and sexual rights campaigns may be framed as weapons of the West, attacking a supposedly more pure and tradition-bound non-West. Putatively ‘local’ values are made to stand in stark opposition to ‘global’ or transnational discourses and practices, although people’s quotidian experience may not reveal the fissures such claims would suggest. Global communication technologies and the romantic and communicative strategies that characterize a burgeoning global marriage industry demonstrate the sexual sweep of transnational processes and the ways in which desire is negotiated. Jennifer Patico’s article addresses the entrenched notion that marriages between American men and Russian women are simply tales of exploitation, a rote oscillation between instrumental interests and affective desire. Complicating the overly simplistic story of ‘love’ versus ‘interest,’ Patico addresses transnational marriage as an interface where complex global processes, institutional crises, and individual expectations around romance and desire meet. Russian women’s relative material poverty operates in the context of a wider post-Soviet social and cultural context, where there is a perceived crisis, or moral panic, around notions of gender, family and masculinity. The relatively recent emergence of consumer culture — often tied to notions of sexuality — indexes a certain ‘cultured’ acumen. Patico underscores how the apparent dichotomies between the ‘material’ and the ‘emotional’ are integral to the configuration of desire in transnational processes. International marriage practices, in both the emotional and economic work that they do, suggest ways of deterritorializing marriage and the presumptions of locality and nation that are so often implicated in sexual and marital norms. Anti-sexual rhetoric has varied across the board, as have the tropes it mobilizes. But there is a familiar call: one that advocates control of sexuality in the name of cultural authenticity, religious purity, family values, anti-imperialism and the interests of state and nation. Saida Hodžić documents the contours of these phenomena in Ghana where a Domestic Violence Bill that included the criminalization of marital rape incited debates between women’s activists, NGOs and the government. She demonstrates how the government’s opposition to the Bill, grounded in Ghanaian ‘tradition,’ was not meant to protect Ghanaian communities, but rather to fracture women’s [End Page 301] political advocacy. Women’s right to determine and exercise their sexuality, drawn from transnational discourses of women’s rights, become framed as detrimental to the nation’s right to cultural and political autonomy. The Ghanaian case resonates with similar confl icts in the Middle East, Southeast Asia (Ahmed 1992; Kandiyoti 1996) Central Asia (Nazpary 2001), and elsewhere. As transnationally circulated iterations of rights are reconfigured in Ghana, so too does the nation’s history become rearticulated to emphasize tradition, with women’s sexual autonomy and rights as the pivot point for these interventions. As local tradition, practices and national identity are more loudly asserted, ‘imported’ values of rights and sexual autonomy thus become their nemesis. Hodžić questions the nativist logic which positions Western influences as unproblematically negative. The politics of sexuality provoke a thorny political question: on whose ‘side’ does one stand in the embattled arena of ‘tradition’ and ‘progress’ in the domain of sexuality and desire? The oscillation between the rights of individuals and rights held by collective entities (or ‘culture’ — often claiming autochthonous and deeply historical tradition) poses several quandaries about how to adjudicate benefit and harm. Individual and collective rights have been perennial questions and the subject of much controversy in international human rights discourses, anthropological analyses and legal debates: whose human rights, the one or the multitude, has priority? Legal questions notwithstanding, the situation is further complicated as the sanctity of culture, as such, is deployed to substantiate rights claims. Contemporary anthropology, with some notable exceptions (T. Turner 1997; Turner & Nagengast 1997; Merry 2005) has often evaded the question of rights by resorting to a truism: the discourse of rights may be productively re-appropriated, as a form of resistance, in the service of ‘local cultures.’ An inventory of cultures around the world would undoubtedly show that cultures everywhere have some antecedents that dovetail well with contemporary rights discourses. However, the ease with which ‘cultures’ are amenable to human rights should not blind us to the fact that around the world, there are surfeits of proponents of (so-called) cultural authenticity who find the discourse of ‘rights’ to infringe upon cultural autonomy. The historical significance of these sorts of clashes should not be underestimated. When oppositions between the West and the Other, or between sexual libertinage and cultural propriety, occur on the periphery with spokespersons wrapping their claims of authenticity in anti-imperialist rhetoric, the situation becomes yet more complex and value-loaded. Ambiguities and contradictions arise when rights models, identity politics [End Page 302] and new sexual subjectivities intersect. Cymene Howe finds that in the case of Nicaragua, legal tropes, sexual rights activists’ strategies, and forms of sexual identity are transforming the ways that Nicaraguans imagine sexuality as a category. Howe describes the case of a Nicaraguan woman, known in her small town as a cochóna (‘dyke’), who was murdered by her female lover’s husband. In the past, this woman’s murder would have been understood as a ‘crime of passion’ and redemptive of masculine honor. However as human rights and identity politics operate more profoundly in the Nicaraguan milieu the murder came to be understood, and indeed adjudicated, on the basis of sexual identity. Drawing from a global repertoire of sexual rights, activists initiated a turn in Nicaraguan sexual politics where hate crimes against sexual minorities became newly imaginable. The recognition of sexual desire and identity allows the prosecution of discriminatory crimes; but these new modes of recognition also usher in something heretofore largely unimaginable: killing someone for ‘being’ a lesbian, or what Howe calls an ‘epistemology of the hate crime.’ As sexual rights become further transnationalized, the sexual subject as a legal entity offers both new horizons to establish equality for sexual ‘minorities’ and threatens longer standing notions of ‘tradition’ and moral hierarchy. Sexuality, as it is increasingly tied to consumptive practices, may also become a site for challenging gender, kinship and status hierarchies. Sasha Newell describes in the case of Côte d’Ivoire that urban Ivoirian sexual antagonisms are mediated by a particular social and sexual economy, one that is all-consuming: ‘the bluff.’ Les bluffeurs are men and women who successfully enact urban savvy, deftly imitate western consumption, and mimic ‘modernity’ most convincingly. They are thus able to access sex, social networks and often, future economic sustenance. By performing certain nuances of western consumption — dressing up to move-up so that they may dress-up again — bluffeurs, male and female, challenge concepts of modernity and reality because the bluff itself becomes undressed: bluffeurs and their interlocutors are well aware that this is a game of disguises, if a serious one. The bluff in urban Ivoirian’s lives troubles the neat distinctions between sex work and social networks, blurring the line between selling one’s body and selling the image of the self as a sexual subject. The spectacle of the bluff reveals western consumption itself as spectacle, but one framed by the imperatives of economic, sexual and social contingencies. Between desire and economy, Newell’s work suggests, there is little separation, and the bluff captures both of these transnational economies of exchange: carnal and cash-based. [End Page 303] With increased economic globalization, the distinction between economic and emotional decision making is transformed; oftentimes these choices are seen to indicate shifts in social values surrounding sexuality. Thai women’s marital preferences and sexual practices are the focus of Pilapa Esara’s analysis of women living in a government-designated migrant ‘slum community’ in Bangkok. Many women, Esara finds, aspire to marry a foreign (faraŋ) husband — idealized as a light-skinned, financially successful man from a western industrialized nation. Thai media sources and popular narratives equate women’s sexual agency, autonomy and literal mobility — moving from rural to urban settings and potentially to foreign lands — as a threat to Thai tradition. But these women’s aspirations also confront local constraints on women’s upward mobility as they tap into, and embrace, globally circulated images, ideals and communications technologies in pursuit of foreign husbands. Esara argues that it is not that the ‘West’ influences or exercises a contaminative effect on Thai women, but rather women themselves engage their knowledge of ‘the west’ to affect changes in their own partnership decisions. Ultimately their decisions challenge values of gender, race, region and socioeconomic class in Thai society. Similar to the cases described by Hodžić and Patico, the women whose lives Esara documents engage a discursive context where western and material values are perceived as a threat to the moral order. However, in the Thai case, women’s choices and marital strategies offer critiques of their structurally unequal position showing that they are not sycophants to western materialism, but interlocutors who negotiate desire, status and marital norms. The transnationalization of desire and the global emergence of ‘sexuality’, semiotically and in practice have motivated new interrogations of national identity, ideals of propriety and cultural morality. At the same time, ‘sexuality’ has provided fertile political and semantic ground for rights bearing subjects and bodies invested with meaning. The (nearly) always heated debates surrounding sexuality suggest that intersecting moral, cultural, and political priorities challenge assumptions regarding the intimate. Just as other transnational processes have troubled the borders between the ‘local’ and the ‘global,’ so too do sexuality and desire illustrate the intimate ways in which people negotiate new identities, practices and opportunities. Tectonic shifts in the global political economic order appear in the most ‘private’ of places, demonstrating how consumption, kinship and politics become mediated through sexuality. This special issue of Ethnos aims to better understand how sexuality, commodification and cultural practices converge to produce a ‘heat’ that both sustains and proves incendiary to the ways we imagine desire. [End Page 304] References Ahmed, Leila. 1992. Women and Gender in Islam: Historical Roots of a Modern Debate. New Haven: Yale University Press. Al-e-Ahmad, Jalal. 1982. Plagued by the West (Gharbzadegi). Transl. Paul Sprachman. Delmor, NY: Caravan Books. First published in Iran 1963. Appadurai, Arjun. 1996. Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Bell, Daniel. 1996. The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism. New York: HarperCollins. Blackwood, Evelyn & Saskia E. Wieringa (eds). 1999. Female Desires: Same Sex Relations and Transgender Practices Across Cultures. New York: Columbia University Press. Blanc, Christina Szanton, Nina Glick Schiller, & Linda Green Basch. 1994. Nations Unbound: Transnational Projects, Postcolonial Predicaments, and Deterritorialized Nation-States. New York: Routledge. Boellstorff , Tom. 2003. I Knew It Was Me: Mass Media, ‘Globalization,’ and Lesbian and Gay Indonesians. In Mobile Cultures: New Media in Queer Asia, edited by Chris Berry, Fran Martin & Audrey Yue, pp. 21–51. Durham: Duke University Press. Brennan, Denise. 2004. What’s Love Got to Do with It? Transnational Desires and Sex Tourism in the Dominican Republic. Durham: Duke University Press. Carrillo, Hector. 2002. The Night Is Young: Sexuality in Mexico in the Time of AIDS. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Chernoff , John M. 2003. Hustling Is Not Stealing: Stories of an African Bar Girl. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Comaroff , J. & J. L. Comaroff . 2000. Millennial Capitalism: First Thoughts on a Second Coming. Public Culture, 12(2) : 291–343. Constable, Nicole. 2003. Romance on a Global Stage: Pen Pals, Virtual Ethnography, and ‘Mail-order’ Marriages. Berkeley: University of California Press. Featherstone, Mike. 1990. Global Culture: Nationalism, Globalization and Modernity. London: Sage. Foucault, Michel. 1985. The History of Sexuality: The Use of Pleasure, Vol. ii. New York: Pantheon Books. Frank, Katherine. 2002. G-Strings and Sympathy: Strip Club Regulars and Male Desire. Durham: Duke University Press. Fukuyama, Francis. 1992. The End of History and the Last Man. New York: Free Press. Glick Schiller, Nina, Linda G. Basch & Cristina Szanton Blanc. 1992. Towards a Transnational Perspective on Migration: Race, Class, Ethnicity, and Nationalism Reconsidered. New York: New York Academy of Sciences. Hannerz, Ulf. 1989. Notes on the Global Ecumene. Public Culture, 1(2): 66 –75. Harvey, David. 2005. The New Imperialism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hobsbawm, Eric. 1990. Nation and Nationalism since 1780. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Howe, Cymene. n.d. Mediating Sexuality: Activism and the Politics of Sexual Rights in Nicaragua. Durham: Duke University Press. Huntington, Samuel P. 2002. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order. New York: Free Press. Jameson, Frederic. 1991. Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism. Durham: Duke University Press. Kandiyoti, Deniz A. 1996. Gendering the Middle East: Emerging Perspectives. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press. Lancaster, Roger. 1992. Life is Hard: Machismo, Danger, and the Intimacy of Power in Nicaragua. Berkeley: University of California Press. Mahmood, Saba. 2005. Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Manalansan, Martin F. IV. 2003. Global Divas: Filipino Gay Men in the Diaspora. Durham: Duke University Press. Mandel, Ernest. 1975. Late Capitalism. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press. Marcuse, Herbert. 1974. Eros and Civilization. Boston, MA: Beacon Press. Merry, Sally Engle. 2005. Human Rights and Gender Violence: Translating International Law into Local Justice. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Nazpary, Joma. 2001. Post Soviet Chaos: Violence and Dispossession in Kazakhstan. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Parker, Richard. 1999. Beneath the Equator: Cultures of Desire, Male Homosexuality, and Emerging Gay Communities in Brazil. New York: Routledge. Povinelli, Elizabeth & George Chauncey. 1999. Thinking Sexuality Transnationally: An Introduction. GLQ, Special Issue: Thinking Sexuality Transnationally, 5(4): 439–50. Rofel, Lisa. 2007. Desiring China: Experiments in Neoliberalism, Sexuality and Public Culture. Durham: Duke University Press. Rubin, Gayle. 1984. Thinking Sex: Notes for a Radical Theory of the Politics of Sexuality. In Pleasure and Danger: Exploring Female Sexuality, edited by Carole S. Vance. New York: Routledge. Sassen, Saskia. 1998. Globalization and its Discontents: Essays on the New Mobility of People and Money. New York: New Press. Sinnott, Megan. 2004. Toms and Dees: Transgender Identity and Female Same-sex Relationships in Thailand. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. Tsing, Anna. 2005. Friction: An Ethnography of Global Connection. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Turner, Bryan S. 1994. Orientalism, Postmodernisim, and Globalism. London: Routledge. —. 2002. Cosmopolitan Virtue, Globalization and Patriotism. Theory, Culture & Society, 19(1–2): 45–63. Turner, Terrence. 1997. 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work_hrztqxtthvh7xjsymn2xtdo3hi	----	Discussing Emotions in Digital Journalism Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=rdij20 Digital Journalism ISSN: 2167-0811 (Print) 2167-082X (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rdij20 Discussing Emotions in Digital Journalism Kristin Skare Orgeret To cite this article: Kristin Skare Orgeret (2020) Discussing Emotions in Digital Journalism, Digital Journalism, 8:2, 292-297, DOI: 10.1080/21670811.2020.1727347 To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/21670811.2020.1727347 © 2020 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group. Published online: 09 Mar 2020. Submit your article to this journal Article views: 1574 View related articles View Crossmark data Citing articles: 2 View citing articles https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=rdij20 https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rdij20 https://www.tandfonline.com/action/showCitFormats?doi=10.1080/21670811.2020.1727347 https://doi.org/10.1080/21670811.2020.1727347 https://www.tandfonline.com/action/authorSubmission?journalCode=rdij20&show=instructions https://www.tandfonline.com/action/authorSubmission?journalCode=rdij20&show=instructions https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/mlt/10.1080/21670811.2020.1727347 https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/mlt/10.1080/21670811.2020.1727347 http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1080/21670811.2020.1727347&domain=pdf&date_stamp=2020-03-09 http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1080/21670811.2020.1727347&domain=pdf&date_stamp=2020-03-09 https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/citedby/10.1080/21670811.2020.1727347#tabModule https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/citedby/10.1080/21670811.2020.1727347#tabModule COMMENTARY Discussing Emotions in Digital Journalism Kristin Skare Orgeret Department of Journalism and Media Studies, Oslo Metropolitan University, Oslo, Norway ABSTRACT Until recently, the notion of emotion in media studies and commu- nication research was mostly examined through the lens of cultural studies, media effects, and visuals. Research on emotion in journal- ism has been slow to arrive, as Karin Wahl-Jorgensen shows in this special issue. However, this is radically changing. Contributions by Hassan, Kilgo, Lough, Riedl, Sanchez Laws, Waddell, and Zou high- light how the affordances of digital journalism have an impact on the space for emotion in evaluating the relationships between jour- nalists, journalistic content and their audiences. Embracing emo- tions as a dimension in digital journalism studies contributes to opening up interesting approaches towards concepts such as objectivity, and for more nuanced research on the power hidden in the ‘taken for granted’ in classic liberal journalism. While highlight- ing the liberating and empowering potential in the inclusion of emotions in journalism, there is also a need to focus on how affect- ive dynamics can be spurred by phenomena such as conflict and hate. When introducing emotions in the journalistic loop, new questions arise, and perspectives of power and negotiations must be included in these discussions. KEYWORDS Emotions; participation; safety; empathy; power Until recently, the notion of emotion in media studies and communication research was mostly examined through the lens of cultural studies, media effects, and visuals. Research on emotion in journalism has been slow to arrive, as Karin Wahl-Jørgensen (2019) shows in this special issue. However, this is radically changing. Contributions by Hassan (2019), Kilgo, Lough, and Riedl (2017), S�anchez Laws (2017), Waddell (2017), and Zou (2018) highlight how the affordances of digital journalism have an impact on the space for emotion in evaluating the relationships between journalists, journalistic con- tent and their audiences. Embracing emotions as a dimension in digital journalism stud- ies contributes to opening up interesting approaches towards concepts such as objectivity, and for more nuanced research on the power hidden in the ‘taken for granted’ in classic liberal journalism. While highlighting the liberating and empowering potential in the inclusion of emotions in journalism, there is also a need to focus on how affective dynamics can be spurred by phenomena such as conflict and hate. CONTACT Kristin Skare Orgeret kristo@oslomet.no This article has been corrected with minor changes. These changes do not impact the academic content of the article. � 2020 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, and is not altered, transformed, or built upon in any way. DIGITAL JOURNALISM 2020, VOL. 8, NO. 2, 292–297 https://doi.org/10.1080/21670811.2020.1727347 http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1080/21670811.2020.1727347&domain=pdf&date_stamp=2020-03-24 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ https://doi.org/10.1080/21670811.2020.1727347 http://www.tandfonline.com Emotions have traditionally been understood as private and highly personalized experiences and, as such, seen as out-of-place in public debate. Often overshadowed by more dominant ideas of objectivity and impartiality, emotions have – as Charlie Beckett reminds us – always been part of journalism: through “inspiration, creation, style, appeal and its resonance or impact” (Beckett 2015). Some scholars have argued that the quest for objectivity may itself be a frame, resulting in news stories that reflect particular criteria of newsworthiness. In the words of feminist scholar Donna Haraway, objectivity tends to privilege the views of dominant groups at the expense of others, as “only partial perspective promises objective vision” (Haraway 1988, 190). The absence or misrepresentation of women in mainstream news media may be seen as a result of such perceived objectivity, reproducing certain power structures. The #metoo campaign, which was enabled by hashtag activism, involves a change in pub- lic focus towards more open discussions about the experiences of victims of sexual assault or unwanted sexual attention. Hostile reactions to the campaign show how revolutionary it is to put the consideration of a vulnerable person’s emotions first. With the arrival of digital journalism emotions have gained significant new atten- tion. Wahl-Jorgensen explains how “the expanded opportunities for participation have contributed to question traditional distinctions between news audiences and pro- ducers and have ushered in new and more forms of emotional expression that have spilled over into practices of news production” (Wahl-Jørgensen 2019). The current media landscape with its new “cycle of sensitive content creation” (Beckett 2015) is facilitating more personalized, participatory forms of journalism. Beckett (2015) describes how, with digital journalism, events are often reported and discussed on social media and journalists’ work is subject to comments and sharing – in fact, they share this process with the public, live, as they are working. As emotion becomes a more significant factor in this process for both the newsmaker and the news consumer or sharer, there is an interesting feedback loop to the profession that increasingly impacts on how future news is produced. DIGITAL JOURNALISM 293 Emotional pressures of digital journalism practice A focal aspect here is the emotional pressure the digital journalist is exposed to and what may be called the emotional pressures of work. As digital journalism is inter- active, multi-platform, multi-linear and participatory, audiences’ emotions are projected back to the journalist more or less immediately. This may also include aggressive or violent emotions. Within the field of journalist safety, we see how an increasing num- ber of reporters are attacked and how a rising number of journalists who are killed are reporters whose primary platform is internet based (Henrichsen, Betz, and Lisosky 2015). Journalists have become the customary target of online attacks and female journalists often face a double-burden: being attacked both as a journalist and as a woman. Threats of rape, physical violence and graphic imagery constitute a horrifying ‘new normal’ for female journalists worldwide, as reporting on digital platforms push journalists to be more personal. In addition, as journalists are often urged by their institutions to be visible and responsive to the audience as much as possible, they are ever more vulnerable to the emotions of readers. Therefore, it is important to be aware that the cycle of sensitive content creation may be used to spur hate and con- flict, as well as more positive audience perspectives. L€unenborg and Maier (2018) show how current phenomena like hate speech and “shitstorms” via social media are to be understood as “explicit public articulations of emotions; at the same time they produce affective dynamics, which can be described as contagious and viral”. Hence, at the reverse side of the optimism surrounding the early days of digital media, many of the enthusiastic theoretical concepts on user engagement did not endure close empirical inspection (Quandt 2018). There is now an ever-increasing fear of populist turbulence, viral panics, experts under attack, and disinformation. Quandt introduces the concept of ‘dark participation’, where user engagement “instead of positive, or at least neutral contributions to the news-making processes” is characterized by “negative, selfish or even deeply sinister contributions” and how this development seems to grow parallel to the recent wave of populism in Western democracies (2018, 40). Some fear a perverted image of the new openness, where instinct and emotion overtake facts and reason in the digital age. In particular, the combination of strong emotions and a lack of media and digital literacy may lead to populist turbulence. Ferdous (2019) describes how millions of people in Bangladesh started to use the Internet without knowing much about fact- checking content or sources, making them easy targets for extremist Islamists. Instead of increasing freedom of expression through new media channels, these channels allowed for a rapid radicalization of people, and a quick erosion of moderate, know- ledge-based and secular mentality. This is not unique to Bangladesh – rapid peer-to- peer information transmission has manufactured hate crimes in Germany, as well as resulted in ethnic violence in Sri Lanka, Myanmar and India. Journalists and other con- tent producers need to be aware of the explosive potential of online rumours that may trigger physical mobilisations. As studies of Twitter content have confirmed, “emotive falsehood often travels faster than fact” (Davies 2018). Chantal Mouffe’s (2013) long-standing claim that democracies are in need of emotions and confrontations instead of just rationality and consensus – and how she draws on seventeenth century philosopher Spinoza’s two core emotions of fear 294 K. S. ORGERET and hope – gain new importance here. What we see with emotions in the digital sphere is that the confrontationally oriented content often wins terrain in the public sphere. As algorithms increasingly steer journalistic content to tap into readers’ emotions, values and identities, a central question for further research is whether this will lead to more bias and divide or to more engaging content and promote understanding. Emotional intelligence and empathy The algorithmic turn in digital news production was a key topic of the 2019 special issue of Digital Journalism, titled ‘Algorithms, Automation and News’. To continue to exist “outside the realm of what we can expect from robots”, Lind�en believes journal- ists will be forced by algorithms “to think harder at defining their core human capabil- ities such as developing emotional and social intelligence, curiosity, authenticity, humility, empathy and the ability to become better listeners, collaborators and learners” (Lind�en 2017, 71). The role of immersive virtual reality journalism in creating empathy is of great interest – as discussed by S�anchez Laws (2019) and Hassan (2019) in this special issue. Feelings of concern and compassion are emphasized, reflecting the ‘hope’ side of Spinoza’s oppositional pair. However, a crucial topic, which is only mentioned in passing in the conclusion of S�anchez Laws’ article, is how internal repre- sentations of emotions can also involve negative ones where audiences respond “with hatred and anger towards the world within and outside virtual reality” (S�anchez Laws 2017, 11). The need to introduce a higher degree of conflict awareness to these dis- cussion gains magnitude as the potential to create action in the real world potentially increases with immersive journalism. Other contributions place more emphasis on the perspective of fear or negativity, such as Zou (2018) when studying the role of fear as contributing to civic engagement and Waddell (2017), who finds that audience feed- back on news teasers on social media are often uncivil. Continuing from this, we need to ask more nuanced questions related to whether a cycle of emotionally driven content creation will open up for a broader spectre of more diverse voices in the news or only give room to the loudest ones. And what happens to the ‘boring but important’ information in this process? Such discussions are so far largely missing. Beckett’s (2015) feedback loop says little about the relationship between emotion driven sharing and bringing involvement or action in the real world. Exploring the impact of different types of constructive news stories on readers’ motivation, Baden, Mcintyre, and Homberg (2019) found that news stories that evoked negative emotions reduced intentions to take positive action to address the issues. In contrast, solution- framed stories that evoked positive emotions resulted in a more positive affect and higher intentions to take positive action. As an increasing number of scholars and journalists argue that remaining impartial is an inadequate response to challenges such as sexism, racism or climate change, I would argue that there is a vital need for more discussion of what an “innate sense of right and wrong” (Gl€uck 2019) is involved in the context of emotionally driven, normative journalism. DIGITAL JOURNALISM 295 Including perspectives of power and negotiations Research in neuroscience and psychology shows that emotions are not the enemy of reason, but rather a crucial part of it (e.g. Bandes and Salerno 2014). As human beings we understand the world both cognitively and emotively. Therefore, it is both reason- able and commended to continue including emotions in the field of digital journalism studies (DJS), while at the same time arguing that values, such as accuracy and factu- ality, remain in a mix that can strengthen and safeguard the ever-important credibility of journalism. When introducing emotions in the journalistic loop, new questions arise, and I have emphasized the need to increasingly include perspectives of power and negotiations in these discussions. Future research questions may include, for example: Whose emotions are guiding the various phases of the cycle of content creation? How is power negotiated in this process? Perhaps Mouffe’s (2013, 7) conflict model aimed at enabling a manageable conflict between opponents (agonism) instead of an out-of- control and irreparable enmity (antagonism) may gain new importance in further refinements of the field. Disclosure statement No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s). References Baden, Denise, Karen Mcintyre, and Fabian Homberg. 2019. “The Impact of Constructive News on Affective and Behavioural Responses.” Journalism Studies 20 (13): 1940–1959. Bandes, Susan A., and Jessica M. Salerno. 2014. “Emotion, Proof and Predjudice.” Arizona State Law Journal 1003. Beckett, Charlie. 2015. “How Journalism is Turning Emotional and What That Might Mean for News.” http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/63822/ Davies, William. 2018. “How Feelings Took over the World.” The Guardian, 8 September. Ferdous, Jana Syeda Gulshan. 2019. “Bangladesh: Social Media, Extremism and Freedom of Expression.” In Transnational Othering. Global Diversities, edited by E. Eide and K. S. Orgeret 101–118. Gothenburg: Nordicom. Gl€uck, Antje. 2019. “Should Journalists Be More Emotionally Literate?” European Journalism Observatory. https://en.ejo.ch/ethics-quality/should-journalists-be-more-emotionally-literate Haraway, Donna. 1988. “Situated Knowledges. The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial Perspective.” Feminist Studies 14 (3): 575–599. Hassan, Robert. 2019. “Digitality, Virtual Reality and the ‘Empathy Machine.” Digital Journalism 8 (2) Henrichsen, Jennifer R., Michelle Betz, and Joanne M. Lisosky. 2015. Building Digital Safety for Journalism: A Survey of Selected Issues. Paris: UNESCO. Kilgo, Danielle K., Kyser Lough, and Martin J. Riedl. 2017. “Emotional Appeals and News Values as Factors of Shareworthiness in Ice Bucket Challenge Coverage.” Digital Journalism 8 (2): 1–20. Lind�en, Carl-Gustav. 2017. “Algorithms for Journalism; the Future of News Work.” The Journal of Media Innovations 4 (1): 60–76. L€unenborg and Maier. 2018. “The Turn to Affect and Emotion in Media Studies.” Media and Communication 6 (3): 1–4. Mouffe, Chantal. 2013. Agonistics: Thinking the World Politically. London: Verso. Quandt, Thorsten. 2018. “Dark Participation.” Media and Communication 6 (4): 36–48. 296 K. S. ORGERET http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/63822/ https://en.ejo.ch/ethics-quality/should-journalists-be-more-emotionally-literate S�anchez Laws, Ana Luisa. 2017. “Can Immersive Journalism Enhance Empathy?” Digital Journalism 8 (2): 1–17. doi:10.1080/216.70811.2017.1389286. Waddell, Franklin T. 2017. “The Authentic (and Angry) Audience.” Digital Journalism 8 (2): 236–255. Wahl-Jørgensen, Karin. 2019. “An Emotional Turn in Journalism Studies?” Digital Journalism 8 (2): 1–20. Zou, Cheng. 2018. “Emotional News, Emotional Counterpublic.” Digital Journalism 8 (2): 1–20. DIGITAL JOURNALISM 297 https://doi.org/10.1080/216.70811.2017.1389286 Abstract Emotional pressures of digital journalism practice Emotional intelligence and empathy Including perspectives of power and negotiations Disclosure statement References 
work_hso7sgo7fbcalegvicp7ck55tu	----	European journal of American studies , Reviews 2017-1 European journal of American studies Reviews 2017-1 Frederick E. Hoxie, ed. The Oxford Handbook of American Indian History Caroline Williams Electronic version URL: http://journals.openedition.org/ejas/11963 ISSN: 1991-9336 Publisher European Association for American Studies Electronic reference Caroline Williams, « Frederick E. Hoxie, ed. The Oxford Handbook of American Indian History », European journal of American studies [Online], Reviews 2017-1, document 4, Online since 14 March 2017, connection on 19 April 2019. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/ejas/11963 This text was automatically generated on 19 April 2019. Creative Commons License http://journals.openedition.org http://journals.openedition.org http://journals.openedition.org/ejas/11963 Frederick E. Hoxie, ed. The Oxford Handbook of American Indian History Caroline Williams 1 Frederick E. Hoxie, ed. The Oxford Handbook of American Indian History 2 Oxford University Press, 2016. 30 chapters. Pp. 644. ISBN: 9780199858897. 3 Caroline Williams 4 University of East Anglia 5 Often, students try and understand Native American histories through the eyes of the colonizer, leaving so many gaps and silences left up to the imagination, that are consequently fueled by imagery and misperceptions in popular culture. The surface histories seem well-known— wars, trails of tears, casinos—but the sub-surface culture and knowledge—economic infrastructure based on knowledge of the land, religion, kinship, interrelatedness— what makes a society or a nation, rarely gets seen or heard. What these chapters collectively do, is scratch away at that surface culture we are all so familiar with, uncovering what it is to be Native American in the 21st century, by providing multiple voices on the overarching theme of American Indian History. The authors are careful to illustrate the agency and activism enacted by indigenous peoples as players in their own history, employing varying techniques Frederick E. Hoxie, ed. The Oxford Handbook of American Indian History European journal of American studies , Reviews 2017-1 1 such as storytelling to illustrate their points. The Oxford Handbook of American Indian History offers three very different ways of understanding the diverse histories of what are today 567 distinct indigenous nations. Split into three parts—the chronological, the regional, and the thematic histories—the authors of this collected works each bring unique perspectives and voices together to showcase the diversity of experiences, reactions, and continued adaptations that indigenous peoples faced as players in the global economies. 6 While part 1—consisting of 8 chapters—is essential reading for any scholar wishing to teach Native American history, and provides a great starting point for students wishing to launch into any of the many topics covered, the voices of Native American peoples are missing; incidentally this is exactly what Wesson states in his opening chapter: “the most meaningful sources of information about the ancient past may prove to be living Native American peoples” (35). Starting with creation stories, oral traditions, or voices of elders, would have grounded this volume, by placing the history from an Indigenous point of view. That being said, part 2—which has 11 chapters—does exactly that, it relates the regional and tribal histories in specific stories of the people. Students studying a particular time (part 1) and place (part 2) would be wise to read the corresponding chapters in conjunction with each other. For students who are learning about regional histories, the chapters in part 2 provide a much needed context of not just the historical events that underpin todays nations, but the sacred history, ceremony, language, and ties to the land, which underpin indigenous worldviews and provide any student with the base knowledge needed to then be able to critically understand the history. The big themes section— totaling 11 chapters—connects the topics from the past into the contemporary, with the often unforgotten history between World War II and the present day. While this book could never be a comprehensive history of everything, a mention of some of the cutting edge research from the past few years on Native Designers of High Fashion, American Indian graffiti muralism, and advertising and television, would have nicely complimented the existing scholarship on indigenous peoples as players in the global economies. 7 Overall, the strengths of the edited collection are the attention payed to gender, agency, and activism, and the approach that Native Americans continually adapted their Frederick E. Hoxie, ed. The Oxford Handbook of American Indian History European journal of American studies , Reviews 2017-1 2 economies and infrastructure from time immemorial in order to meet the needs of their communities. This transformation has continued into the present day, and is the only reason that Native American peoples did not vanish, but continue to thrive as players in a global world. As the first of its kind, and written by the leading experts in the field, this book is a must for scholars who are introducing Native American history to students who may not have otherwise been taught the subject from an indigenous point of view. What follows is a chapter-by- chapter breakdown. Introduction (pages 1-14) 8 Hoxie has written the complex introduction in an approachable manner, making it easy for American History scholars to understand the flawed scholarship based from the Turnerian framework which underpins the publics ongoing perceptions about Native Americans. Hoxie explores the new questions arising from Native American scholarship of the 70s onwards, and lays out the necessity for this book, giving an overview of what the important questions are for anyone teaching American history today. This book is a must for American Historians. The introduction ends with an example from Louise Erdrich's the Round House written as a visualization of Tribal/Federal jurisdiction in terms that the readers can understand. The example echoes Hoxie's point, the need for students to both understand the genocide that has taken place while simultaneously recognizing the "remarkable story of indigenous survival" (13). Part 1: Major Chapters in the Native American Past (pages 15-169) 9 Cameron B. Wesson starts the chronological historiography chapters, with the normal western academic choice, the archaeological examination of pre-contact. By examining the problems faced by archaeologists in regards to data and theory, Wesson makes some very sound arguments that resonate across every disciplinary field; the historic and prehistoric archaeologists "had little contact with each other or with the Native American societies they studied" (19). The chapter has some great starting points for anyone wanting to explore this era further, and introduces readers to the complexities of relying on archaeological findings to Frederick E. Hoxie, ed. The Oxford Handbook of American Indian History European journal of American studies , Reviews 2017-1 3 substantiate culture in contemporary Native American societies. The analysis of the archaeological information is crucial as it underpins everything we think we know about Native American cultural history, and could easily be the topic of its own book. After giving "the faintest outlines regarding the diversity of cultural practices in North America immediately prior to sustained contact with Europeans" Wesson leaves the reader with a lasting thought: "In the end, the most meaningful sources of information about the ancient past may prove to be living Native American peoples" (35). 10 Robbie Ethridge introduces the "shatterzone" in his chapter on invasions and early settlements. This concept is a useful tool to help students understand the regional areas in which life dramatically changed. Ethridge provides useful statistics and dates that scholars have agreed on, for instance the "90 percent loss of Native life after contact" but breaks down the contributing factors, such as "incorporation into the modern world economy, slaving, internecine warfare, dropping fertility rates, violent colonial strategies such as genocide, and general cultural and social malaise from colonial oppression" (45). In this chapter, Ethridge paints a unique picture of agency within Native Nations, and collaboration across nations, showing indigenous people as players in this historical story, while simultaneously reinforcing the diversity of experiences depending on geographical region, economy, gender, and societal governance. 11 Kathleen DuVal challenges common perception of the eighteenth century by explaining it as "reorganized but still [a] Native world" (58). Elaborating on the theme of Native American peoples as players in a global economy, DuVal explores themes of global consumerism, highlighting the choices made by Nations to seek weapons, horses, to expand territory, to make alliances, and to forge alliances and fight back against European invasion. This chapter is a great reminder of the deliberate and strategic planning that Native American peoples enacted as players in the eighteenth century global history. 12 Moving forward to the American Revolution, Claudio Saunt offers a new term for the diverse experiences during the era, suggesting that it "might be better understood as the Age of Imperial Expansion" (77). While this is an impossible task to complete in ten pages, Saunt offers an important overview of the differences experienced between Frederick E. Hoxie, ed. The Oxford Handbook of American Indian History European journal of American studies , Reviews 2017-1 4 the small bands in California all the way up to Alaska, compared to the Plains Nations, and Nations in the East. Together with DuVal's chapter, the reader is able to form a picture of just how different and unique each Nation's experience was depending on political and economic structures. This chapter is a must read for students who have a tendency to underestimate the different Native American experiences prior and during independence. 13 John P. Bowes' chapter takes a geographical look "east from Indian country" between the War of 1812 and the massacre at Wounded Knee (1890) to explore the era through a frame work of not just the wars themselves, but the violence and genocidal acts initiated through federal Indian policy in an effort to free land for both natural resources and later the "desire for land" (93-109). Bowes highlights acts and policies such as removal, and as with other authors in this collection, gives specific examples of how removal played out in the lives of Native American peoples at different times and at different ways. The Oregon Trail, and the California Gold rush as well as Richard Henry Pratt's infamous boarding school experiment are introduced, giving students a starting point for further research. One of the strengths of this chapter is the detailed overview of an era that "did everything in its power to curb Indian freedom and to eliminate Native people as a physical and cultural presence in the American landscape" and yet despite best efforts to "Kill the Indian," "American Indians survived the assault" (106). 14 Paul C. Rosier's chapter exploring the adaptation of Native American peoples between 1890 and 1960 creates a much needed narrative to replace the more commonly known story of the "vanishing Indian." Rosier looks historically at events throughout this seventy-year period, highlighting a few prominent political organizations: The Society of American Indians and The National congress of American Indians—to show the agency and active political participation of American Indian peoples in their own history. Rosier also explains the Federal Government policies: Allotment, Federal Indian Boarding Schools, New Deal, Indian reorganization Act, Voluntary Relocation Program, and Termination—to show the diversity of reactions to such policies. This important chapter—which explains the beginning of the Pan-Indian identity—places American Indian people as players in American history, with their own distinct identity as both Nations, and as a Pan- Indian community. Frederick E. Hoxie, ed. The Oxford Handbook of American Indian History European journal of American studies , Reviews 2017-1 5 15 Choosing to start the chapter with a sport theme—Billy Mills winning the 1964 gold medal at the Tokyo Olympics— and ending with Chris Eyre's iconic film Smoke Signals, Robert Warrior's chapter "The Indian Renaissance, 1960-2000: Stumbling to Victory, or Anecdotes of Persistence" paints a picture of the era in American history which is best known for its occupations and activism. After using Mills to introduce the era, Warrior moves onto the various movements that took place during this period. From the NIYC (National Indian Youth Council) which began in 1961, and led its support to activists fighting for treaty rights, the first occupation at Alcatraz Island (1964), and moving on to Deloria's tenure in the NCAI (National Congress of the American Indian), Warrior points to the "the most significant areas of American Indian activism in that period" (131). As the 60s turned to protest, and the Civil Rights movements took centre stage in the USA, Warrior turns his attention to the most recognizable events of the era such as the Alcatraz occupation, the rise in visibility of American Indian scholars and artists, the Trail of Broken Treaties Caravan, the Wounded Knee occupation, and the American Indian Movement (AIM). By highlighting these events, Warrior (as with other scholars in this collection) place American Indian peoples as players firmly within the American master narrative. While mentioning the various self-determination legislation—the 1978 American Indian Child Welfare Act, the 1978 American Indian Religious Freedom Act, the 1990 Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, the 1990 Native American Languages Act—Warrior is quick to point out the deficiencies in the Rehnquist court, which led to limitations on tribal laws and consequently self-determination. In short, what this chapter illustrates for the reader is the inequality of American Indian life in the USA and the incredible ongoing efforts of activists to bring attention to and remedy such inequalities. 16 Paul DeMain who incidentally "ran the vice-presidential campaign of Green Party candidate Winona LaDuke," concludes the Major Chapters in the Native American Past by bringing us up to 2015. DeMain, continues along the activist theme by highlighting successful campaigns such as Idle No More, explaining the role that new media has had and continues to have in not just activism, but in the creating awareness of Native America. DeMain is quick to point out that when problems occur, Native Nations are of Frederick E. Hoxie, ed. The Oxford Handbook of American Indian History European journal of American studies , Reviews 2017-1 6 the first to respond—the 2010 Gulf Oil Spill—and that American Indian peoples are actively leading the way in environmental issues. The strength of this chapter to complete the historical section is that it firmly places American Indian peoples and Native Nations in the present day, destroying imagery that the earlier chapters could verify, and instead showing a separate but equal race of people who are continuously adapting new technologies, the same as they have since time immemorial. Part 2: Regional and Tribal Histories (pages 171-393) 17 Jill Doerfler and Erik Redix begin part two with a much needed Native perspective, starting their chapter on The Great Lakes with an Ojibwe creation story. This grounding in oral tradition will not suit those who feel that history is all about quantifiable facts; which they address promptly by quoting Gerald Vizenor's stance that stories are about people (173). As a Native Studies scholar, I found this chapter refreshing and the style familiar as Doerfler and Redix normalized practices and terminology—such as oral tradition, ceremonies, kin networks, and utilizing Native American names—providing an informative and detailed history of the Great Lakes. Starting with the fur trade—and giving an example of Bamewawageshikaqay (Jane Johnston Schoolcraft)—moving on to removal, treaties, Dakota 38 "the largest mass execution in US history" (184), allotment, boarding schools, WW I, WW2, and the Vietnam war, termination, relocation, AIM, and casinos, this chapter provides a much needed solid foundation for students in introductory courses. 18 Timothy J. Shannon complements the previous chapter with an in-depth history of the Iroquoia. Examining the Iroquois League through its origins, warfare, diplomacy, and through the treaty-making process and the creation of reservations and international boundaries, Shannon explains some of the fundamental structures to Iroquoian society; the importance of ceremony. Building off this, Shannon explores how the Iroquois gained attention across the Atlantic, as literature was published on the "eloquence and gravitas" of their treaty making process (209). 19 James Brooks turns attention to The Southwest with his general overview of the area. Starting the chapter with the concept of "life as movement" Brooks explains the history of the nations in the region who are often seen as "sedentary Frederick E. Hoxie, ed. The Oxford Handbook of American Indian History European journal of American studies , Reviews 2017-1 7 agriculturalists" (218). Paying particular attention to the Zunis, Hopis, Hohokam, Oo'dham, Western Apaches, and Navajos, Brooks takes the time to explain the importance of ceremony to the Hopi—and Southwest—ecosystem (224), the "centrality of women" within Apache life (226), and the Navajo Long Walk and Stock Reduction Program (229). This short chapter would have benefited from a few more current aspects of life in the Southwest, such as the hate crimes in Farmington, uranium mining, second generation Navajo relocates, and the increased use of Peace Maker courts on the Navajo Nation, as well as topics such as the increasing use of tradition food to combat high levels of diabetes among the Tohono O'odham, and the boarder issues within the Tohono O'odham nation. 20 Jeffrey Ostler introduces the reader to the history of The Plains with a short passage by N. Scott Momaday. Using this literary text as a starting—and ending—point, Ostler tells the reader more than just a plotted history, he interweaves place, sacred history, ceremony, and language (the peoplehood matrix) as a way to understand the people and the region. For students and scholars who are unfamiliar with the interwovenness of ceremony into everyday life, this chapter provides some concrete examples to explore from—Old Woman Who Never Dies (235). The chapter covers all of the expected history, horticultural nations, equestrian nations, small pox epidemics, conflict, peace, reservations, boarding schools, Wild West shows, the Ghost Dance, paying attention to the sometimes forgotten role of women in the plains nations. Ostler ends his chapter by providing some great primary and literary resources for further research. 21 Andrew H. Fisher begins the chapter with a scene from Smoke Signals pointing out that the history of the Pacific Northwest is often passed by because the nations there did "more fishing than fighting and produced fewer of the feathered braves on horseback that the Americans so admire" (253). That is not to say that the history of the Pacific Northwest is not without bloodshed; Indian fishing rights spurred some of the most violet hate crimes, such as "Native fishers being clubbed, tear-gassed, and dragged" (267) from areas which had been reserved for "off- reservation rights to hunt, fish, and gather at 'usual and accustomed' places" (261), which is reminiscent of the Tribble brothers (181). The chapter sees all too familiar stories of adaptation, conflict, assimilation, reservations and reserves, treaty making and breaking, battles and wars, Frederick E. Hoxie, ed. The Oxford Handbook of American Indian History European journal of American studies , Reviews 2017-1 8 allotment, termination, and tribal sovereignty. This chapter offers a unique strength: The Pacific Northwest nations cross the boundaries between Washington, British Columbia and Alaska, and as such the author explains how this unique area was affected by and is a player in the global economy. 22 William J. Bauer Jr. takes us down coast to California where the history of indentured servitude and casinos is explained in relation to the indigenous population. After giving a brief introduction, Bauer tells the Tongva creation story, to illustrate the connection to place, to people's experiences, and to show the importance of indigenous knowledge. Californian natives offer another example of people who "changed their economic strategies in order to secure political sovereignty and maintain social cohesion" (275); they could not do so this without this indigenous knowledge. California natives were successful acorn harvests, using advanced prescribed fire techniques to cultivate the land, and creating a currency to trade throughout the region (279). The arrival of Spanish into the region changed all this as the "Spanish cut down oak trees and their livestock consumed grasses and acorns on which California Indian subsisted" (283). The indigenous population once again adapted, working for the Spanish, when the gold rush hit California. This was another turbulent time, when women and children were taken on as indentured servants, up to the ages of 25 or men and 21 for women (286). Genocide took hold, as ranchers tried to rid the native Californians from their land, leading to reservations, and treaties in a government effort to protect indigenous peoples. The story ends—after the termination of Rancherias and their reinstatement—with the "California Indians' ability to adapt and seek control over their lives" this time in the form of casinos and the Cabazon decision (293). 23 Rosita Kaaháni Worl gives an account of Russian and American influences on the Alaska Native groups, and the near annihilation of the Aleut. While explaining the subsistence lifestyle and the different worldview—“it is not the people who govern land, but rather land and the spiritual beings of the land [who] prescribe relationships among humans as well as human relationships to the land" (311)—Worl takes the reader through the main landmarks in Alaska Native history: Russian traders, the sale of Alaska, the continued and all too familiar threats on subsistence Frederick E. Hoxie, ed. The Oxford Handbook of American Indian History European journal of American studies , Reviews 2017-1 9 life, the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, before ending with some cultural problems—"depressed economies in rural villages"— and cultural solutions—"cultural and linguistic revitalization" (312). Worl's chapter is strengthened by three strong examples of successful Alaska Native activism: the fight against Project Chariot and the Rampart Dam, and the "restrictions on the sale of stick and tax exemption for underdeveloped lands while also allowing for the enrollment of… those Natives born after 1971" (309, 311). 24 Christine Snyder writes a very comprehensive history of The South explaining the regional distinctiveness through the local creation stories, linking the history of the people to the land. Snyder is quick to point out the continued adaptation of people from that region, highlighting the move to village life after the ice age. Snyder incorporates the ceremonial aspect of Mississippian culture, and thoroughly explains the leadership and politics of the once "smaller, independent communities" (319) into the "handful of powerful nations" (322) that we would recognize today. Highlighting some of the well-known historical landmarks— disease, wars, slavery, treaty-making, the Marshall Trilogy, removal, and ending with the increased economic benefits of casinos—Snyder also tells of the changes in gender roles with in the region. As this chapter continually tells the importance of place, ceremony, sacred history, and language this is a must read for students who sometimes struggle to understanding indigenous cultures from their own western framework. 25 Neal Salisbury provides a much needed history of The Atlantic Northeast; an area in which the indigenous population often vanish from the American history books after the 1800s. The chapters start with the Ice Age and provides the adaptation that the regional groups went through up to the present day. Highlighting, as in previous chapters, the change to cultivated crops, and women's roles as the "principle food producers" (337) in societies, Salisbury explains the importance of wampum as a ceremonial object, and later as a currency, and a product to be sold in the global markets. Attention is paid to the languages, leadership, and economies, as the Atlantic Northwest peoples worked in conjunction and against the increasing newcomers to their lands. The ensuing invasions, wars, trading, land loss, removal, dispersion, and intermarriage, are all discussed as Salisbury explains the effect on the genders: women remaining "the principle Frederick E. Hoxie, ed. The Oxford Handbook of American Indian History European journal of American studies , Reviews 2017-1 10 source of continuity in Native communities," while men were fighting in the wars (348). As the numbers of non- native people continued to increase and America won the war of Independence, the indigenous population steadily declined until the beginning of the twentieth century, when "Native peoples devised striking new means of engaging with one another and with the non-Native world," such as the "Mohawk 'high steel' workers" (354). The 1960s brought the new wave of indigenous activism as AIM and others used the anniversary of the Mayflower and Thanksgiving to bring to light issues of injustice and civil rights (355). Again, ending with the casinos as a source of renewed economic stability, Salisbury manages to explore the all too common historical patterns, while still showing the cultural uniqueness of the groups in this area as well as the regional similarities encountered. 26 Troy D. Smith gives a brilliant overview of Indian Territory and Oklahoma, paying attention to the original inhabitants, as well as the nations who were removed to the area. Explaining in detail the Wichita-Caddo Confederacy, "probably the largest indigenous group occupying the land that would later become Indian Territory," (361) Smith explains the interactions with the first visitors to the area, before continuing on to explain the Spanish, French, Spanish, and American possession of the region. The chapter swiftly moves on to removal, as the details around the "Five Civilized Tribes" expedition to Indian Territory are explored, paying careful attention to the internal decision making process and the piecemeal way that groups moved to the area. Two main strengths of the chapter are the way that Smith then continues with the other tribes that were removed to the region (366), and the affect that the Civil Ware had in Indian Territory, particularly in light of the slave trade within Native Nations (368). The allotment process and particularly the Curtis Act which "enforced allotment on all member of the Five Tribes" (374) is explained at bring more upheaval to economic life as the land was opened up to settlers. Before the chapter closes, Smith introduces the reader to the Meriam Report, explaining the failure of allotment and the boarding school system, which leads to the "revival of tribal governments and tribal culture in the formal Indian Territory" (375). Smith skips forward a few decade as the chapter ends with some figures from the 2010 census. 27 Gregory E. Smoak finishes the regional section with The Great Basin history which illuminates the environmental Frederick E. Hoxie, ed. The Oxford Handbook of American Indian History European journal of American studies , Reviews 2017-1 11 "obstacles and possibilities that human actors—both Native and non-Native—engaged with, transformed, and were transformed by, within the context of their own cultures and historical experiences" (377). Offering a Coyote creation story to link the local groups to the land, Smoak explains that life in the basin region was based on "small 'family clusters' … as much artifacts of history as they were the result of an unforgiving environment" (379). There were key differences in the diverse groups living in the region, from those who lived in the heart of the basin, and subsided on pinon nuts to the fishing communities who lived on the edges of the basin (381). Smoak points out that the kinship system in the region was bilateral, with many people multilingual, which made movement easier as need arose (381). Although no one came to the Great Basin before 1776, the local communities had felt the effects of "disease, horses, guns, and the market economy" (382). The introduction of horses divided the region into two; "the groups to the north and east… because the Utes… and those to the south and west [the] Paiutes" (382). An accelerated change occurred when the need for labor arose, and the Utes took advantage of this economic opportunity, aiding nearby Paiutes and Shoshones (383). Smoak gives a thorough overview of the interactions with the Mormons and the local communities, explaining the creation of a Mormon reservation (384), before the federal government made and ratified treaties creating further reservations (386). Of particular interest is Smoak's explanation of Wovoka and the Ghost Dance (387). Smoak gives an interesting examination of the litigation brought forward by the Western Shoshones, as a way to gain compensation for broken treaties, ending in the forced settlements (390), before ending with a list of potential sources and scholarship for those wishing to conduct further research. Part 3: Big Themes (395-614) 28 Brenda J. Child begins part 3 with a review of gendered work roles within Ojibwe culture. Using the story of Naynaabeak's quest for a fishing permit, Child highlights women's "spiritual and economic responsibility for water" and land, explaining that "water was a gendered space… [and that this] was a feature of an indigenous legal system that marked territory on a lake and demonstrated the power of women" (398). The chapter explores how the reserved rights of the Ojibwe included wenji- bimaadiziyaang (from what or where we get our living, our Frederick E. Hoxie, ed. The Oxford Handbook of American Indian History European journal of American studies , Reviews 2017-1 12 life) and the conflict over fishing rights—as a result of the reservation and allotment systems—which directly relates to changes in "women's economic authority, family relationships, and patterns of work and subsistence" (402). Child then uses this analysis to explain gender and labor in other indigenous communities, offering a review of some of the more seminal works. 29 David Jones offers a strong and insightful argument into the competing narratives of the causes and consequences of the populations decreases in the early contact periods. Starting off with the debate on population figures pre- contact, Jones explains that the well-known "virgin soil epidemic" theory is detrimental to the agency and resilience shown by indigenous peoples, producing a long- lasting racist attitude—leading to the view that Americans are Superhuman with their natural immunity and divine right to the land—that echoes into the current day. Jones offers an opposing theory of depopulation: "the epidemics among American Indians, despite there unusual severity, were caused by the same forces of poverty, malnutrition, social stress, dislocation, economic inequality, and environmental vulnerability" (422). This latter theory would account for the differing times, rates, and responses to diseases across the indigenous populations of the Americas. 30 David Delgado Shorter takes the reader on a historical analysis of the term "spirituality," arguing that the use of the word "misconstrue[s] indigenous realities and therefore further[s] the colonization of Native peoples and their land" (440). Arguing instead that the term "related" should be used, Shorter states that the supernatural/ natural binary that occurs from the use of the term spirituality can never really rely in complexity of non-hierarchical relations to "humans and other-than-humans sharing and withholding power" (449). The strength of this chapter is the relationship between terminologies—that are widely used and accepted in academia—and the constant reimagining of the imagery with popular culture, which has a detrimental effect on "public policy and legal discourse" (441). 31 Anya Montiel's chapter "Native American Expressive Arts" "serve[s] as a beginning point for an exploration of the breadth of Native expressive culture over the past century" (455). Chronologically reviewing the scholarship in the field, Montiel "addresses some of the discussions surrounding the 'Indianness' of Native art as well as the tensions artists felt regarding outsiders' expectations for Frederick E. Hoxie, ed. The Oxford Handbook of American Indian History European journal of American studies , Reviews 2017-1 13 their creations" (455). For anyone who needs a starting point, this chapter "provide[s] an overview of the critical scholarship in the field produced by Native and non-Native practitioners, academics, and curators" (455). What Montiel does well in this chapter, is to introduce the reader to the issues of racism faced in the world of art, and the continued expectation that one has to be "traditional" to be an Indian artist. 32 Scott Manning Stevens gives a reflection on the usefulness of museums as a tool for decolonization. Taking the stance that museums "will likely always be there" (475), Stevens argues that they provide an "important opportunity and means of cultural self-representation" (492). By giving a historical account of museums, explaining the importance of NAGPRA, and ending with the economic impact of casinos for creating tribally owned cultural centers, Stevens also intertwines the impact of identity—in a similar way to the previous author—on what shapes a museum and the ongoing fight between what is expected—and not expected—of Native American culture. This chapter along with the others in this section, provide a much needed analysis of the twenty-first century American Indian experience. 33 Alexandra Harmon provides a historic account into the actions of indigenous peoples as active participants in the economic development of their nations. While stating that anthropologists have largely been responsible for "describing cultures" as opposed to "chronicling change," and that historians have been ambivalent on the "strategic Indian engagement with European-initiated market economy," (497) Harmon asserts that Native Americans have always been economic actors, continually adapting to changing circumstances from first contact to the present day. Harmon also argues that some individuals did and do work for their own gain, but that others worked for the good of the community, "after all, they could not fulfill the ideal of generosity without acquiring wealth to share" (503). Harmon pay attention to the recent surge of economic activity among casino tries, showing the difference in ethos between western and indigenous cultures, enterprises owned by a nation for the good of local communities. 34 Lisa Brooks' chapter provides the reader with an overview of prominent indigenous intellectuals, using two specific works—"the Quiche Maya Popol Vuh and the Frederick E. Hoxie, ed. The Oxford Handbook of American Indian History European journal of American studies , Reviews 2017-1 14 Iroquois Great Law of Peace—as important hubs in the network of an indigenous American intellectual tradition" (513). Paying specific attention to the problems that women have faced trying to be heard as intellectual voices in the Victorian era—a time when women were not afforded a say in American politics—Brooks points to various prominent people and organizations—from Winnemucca to NAISA— and their unique ways of adding to the ongoing conversations surrounding indigenous intellectual history. This is a must read for students who often think of indigenous peoples in a separate realm from American intellectuals. 35 Colin G. Calloway takes the reader through the history of treaty-making, starting with the colonial era and finishing with present day executive orders. Offering a scene of treaty-making from 1833, Calloway explores the interactions between the two sovereign nations as equal entities, each trying to understand the others rituals and processes—for example the importance of wampum and the importance of the written word, as two systems which each group had to come to understand in order to continue negotiations. While Calloway attributes the nations agency in negotiating treaties in the colonial era, attention is paid to the divisive tricks used to negotiate treaties post 1783. The role of the Supreme Court in interpreting treaties— domestic dependent nations, wards to guardian, plenary power, cannons of construction, reserved rights—is laid out, as treaty-making and its successors—agreements and executive orders—are explored in modern America. 36 Coll Thrush makes some relevant and interesting points about the lack of scholarship on "Urban Native Histories." Stating that there is a growing literature on urbanities before European arrival and after the second world war, yet the period in between is missing. As a way to fill in the gaps, Thrush suggests an agenda for the field of Native urban history, including "Native biographies of major American cities… Native histories of urban space beyond the big cities… Histories of diverse Native urbanities… and Native histories of empire's metropoles" (561-563). This chapter is again one of those that students or scholars new to American Indian history/ literature/ studies should consider reading as it informs the reader on some of the key aspects of the twenty-first century American Indian experience. Frederick E. Hoxie, ed. The Oxford Handbook of American Indian History European journal of American studies , Reviews 2017-1 15 37 Dustin Tahmhkera provides a review of the scholarship on "pop cultural representations of American Indians" (573). Starting and ending with a tribute to Sherman Alexie —the author of the most watched film by Native Americans: Smoke Signals—Tahmhkera frames this chapter through the term "recognizably Native" as it corresponds to three waves of scholarship: "(1) non-Native producers' distorted nonrecognition and exclusion of the recognizably Native… (2) Natives' negotiations in pop culture amid mixed perceptions of the Indian… and (3) prorecognizably Native representation and expression in pop culture" (574). This chapter reviews some of more well-known scholarship on Native pop culture studies, and ends by suggesting what the future might hold; more investigations into non-Native perceptions, but also a deeper focus on decolonizing pop culture. 38 Michael Witgen ends the collection by placing "American Indians in the World History." Exploring the history in terms of "mutual discovery," (591) as opposed to the distorted history of a "meeting of the savage and the civilized" (599), Witgen suggests that historians complete a reading without "privileging the ideological fantasies of discovery, conquest, and erasure" (600). Throughout this chapter—as with other in the book—Witgen places Native Americans as players in the global market, once again showing their agency, and active participation in their—and America’s—history. AUTHOR CAROLINE WILLIAMS University of East Anglia Frederick E. Hoxie, ed. The Oxford Handbook of American Indian History European journal of American studies , Reviews 2017-1 16 Frederick E. Hoxie, ed. The Oxford Handbook of American Indian History Introduction (pages 1-14) Part 1: Major Chapters in the Native American Past (pages 15-169) Part 2: Regional and Tribal Histories (pages 171-393) Part 3: Big Themes (395-614) 
work_htfjze5tubfgjmbc2ybjjvkh44	----	Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=wjhm20 Download by: [ Jorge Fuentes] Date: 28 July 2017, At: 02:02 Journal of Homosexuality ISSN: 0091-8369 (Print) 1540-3602 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/wjhm20 Harassment Patterns and Risk Profile in Spanish Trans Persons José Devís-Devís, Sofía Pereira-García, Alexandra Valencia-Peris, Jorge Fuentes-Miguel, Elena López-Cañada & Víctor Pérez-Samaniego To cite this article: José Devís-Devís, Sofía Pereira-García, Alexandra Valencia-Peris, Jorge Fuentes-Miguel, Elena López-Cañada & Víctor Pérez-Samaniego (2017) Harassment Patterns and Risk Profile in Spanish Trans Persons, Journal of Homosexuality, 64:2, 239-255, DOI: 10.1080/00918369.2016.1179027 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00918369.2016.1179027 Accepted author version posted online: 19 Apr 2016. Published online: 19 Apr 2016. Submit your article to this journal Article views: 161 View related articles View Crossmark data Citing articles: 1 View citing articles http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=wjhm20 http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/wjhm20 http://www.tandfonline.com/action/showCitFormats?doi=10.1080/00918369.2016.1179027 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00918369.2016.1179027 http://www.tandfonline.com/action/authorSubmission?journalCode=wjhm20&show=instructions http://www.tandfonline.com/action/authorSubmission?journalCode=wjhm20&show=instructions http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/mlt/10.1080/00918369.2016.1179027 http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/mlt/10.1080/00918369.2016.1179027 http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1080/00918369.2016.1179027&domain=pdf&date_stamp=2016-04-19 http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1080/00918369.2016.1179027&domain=pdf&date_stamp=2016-04-19 http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/citedby/10.1080/00918369.2016.1179027#tabModule http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/citedby/10.1080/00918369.2016.1179027#tabModule Harassment Patterns and Risk Profile in Spanish Trans Persons José Devís-Devís, PhDa, Sofía Pereira-García, MSca, Alexandra Valencia-Peris, PhDb, Jorge Fuentes-Miguel, MPhilb, Elena López-Cañada, MSca, and Víctor Pérez- Samaniego, PhDa aDepartamento de Educación Física y Deportiva, Facultad de Ciencias de la Actividad Física y el Deporte, Universitat de València, Valencia, Spain; bDepartamento de Didáctica de la Expresión M. P. y Corporal, Facultad de Magisterio, Universitat de València, Valencia, Spain ABSTRACT This article describes the harassment patterns and the risk pro- file in trans people living in Spain. A sample of 212 trans persons, aged 10–62, participated in this cross-sectional study. Results showed a high percentage of harassment (59.9%) and frequency of daily harassment (12.6%), especially verbal attacks (59%) that occurred in public spaces (49.1%) and within educational con- texts (46.2%). Harassment is more prevalent in trans women than men. Those who disclose their gender identities at a younger age experience higher percentages and frequency of harassment than those who disclose at an older age. They also suffer more harassment of different types. The risk profile of harassment indicates that older trans women are more likely to suffer harassment than younger ones, and the risk decreases each year they delay their gender identity disclosure. The elim- ination of transphobic attitudes and the promotion of gender justice should be priority strategies in Spain. KEYWORDS Bullying; harassment; transgender; transphobia; transsexuals Harassment is a widespread phenomenon in Western societies (Juvonen & Graham, 2001; Monks et al., 2009; Pörhölä & Kinney, 2010). It is a harmful action or actions based on a power imbalance of different kinds between the aggressor and the victim (Holmes & Holmes-Lonergan, 2004). Vulnerable groups are more prone to suffer harassment because they lack the necessary resources to deal with difficult situations. Particularly, vulnerability of trans people (persons whose gender do not conform to the biological sex assigned at birth) is increased by social stigmatization, as well as a weak institutional and legal support. For instance, discrimination and harassment against trans people has not been yet addressed by the enactment of certain Spanish laws about sex rectification and sex equality promotion (see Ley, 2007; Ley Orgánica, 2007). Moreover, the public display of trans identities also pro- duces transphobic attitudes because cisgender identities (non-trans) are CONTACT José Devís-Devís jose.devis@uv.es Departamento de Educación Física y Deportiva, Facultad de Ciencias de la Actividad Física y el Deporte, Universitat de València, C/Gascó Oliag, 3, 46010 Valencia, Spain. JOURNAL OF HOMOSEXUALITY 2017, VOL. 64, NO. 2, 239–255 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00918369.2016.1179027 © 2016 Taylor & Francis challenged, gender hierarchies are threatened, and cisgender people lose their gendered privileges existing within sociocultural contexts in which a binary sex/gender system is prevailing (Nagoshi et al., 2008; Witten & Eyler, 1999). Some authors consider harassment against trans people a structural violence or systemic oppression that punishes whoever transgresses gender social rules (Kidd & Witten, 2010; Lombardi, Wilchins, Priesing, & Malouf, 2002; Puche, Moreno, & Pichardo, 2013). Others emphasize the consequences of harassment on the health of trans persons (suicide, drug use, alcohol con- sumption, anxiety, or depression) as well as the effects harassment has on their future social development (e.g., school dropout, choice of spaces or types of leisure activities) (Doan, 2010; Grant et al., 2011; Haas et al., 2010; Kosciw, Greytak, Bartkiewicz, Boesen, & Palmer, 2012). Several empirical studies highlight prevalence data on the harassment experienced by trans people. For instance, Lombardi et al. (2002) found, in a survey study, a harassment prevalence of 59.6% in the United States between 1996 and 1997. Xavier and Simmons (2000) showed that 43% of 252 trans residents in the District of Columbia (Washington, DC) suffered some kind of violence, 75% of them for transphobic or homophobic reasons. A recent European study with 6,579 trans participants from 28 European Union countries revealed a harassment prevalence of 58% (FRA, 2014). Moreover, according to Factor and Rothblum (2007), trans people are subject to a higher percentage of harassment or discrimination than cisgender people (non-trans). Certain studies focus on the different types of harassment according to social categories such as age, ethnic group, socioeconomic status, and gender identity that trans persons are victims of. Some researchers have indicated that harassment is more frequent in trans women than trans men (Cano Oncala et al., 2004; Factor & Rothblum, 2007). Others have pointed out that it depends on the context in which harassment occurs and the age and ethnicity of the victims. For instance, more trans men than women suffer harassment in schools and other educational settings (Grant et al., 2011), the youngest have a higher probability of suffering different kinds of violence than the oldest (Cano Oncala et al., 2004; Lombardi et al., 2002), and Black people receive more attacks in certain contexts than other ethnicities (Grant et al., 2011). In addition, trans people with high economic levels have a significantly lower probability of experiencing some kind of violence (Lombardi et al., 2002). Regarding the contexts of harassment, the Report of the National Transgender Discrimination Survey provides relevant results. Based on data from 6,456 participants, this report indicates that 78% of North American students who disclose their gender identities during primary and secondary education suffer some kind of harassment, and, in particular, 35% of them suffer physical harassment (Grant et al., 2011). The fifth National School 240 J. DEVÍS-DEVÍS ET AL. Climate Survey of North America points out that 87% of trans students (aged 14 to 20) suffered verbal harassment due to their gender identity or expres- sion, and 53% of them were physically attacked for the same reason (Greytak, Kosciw & Díaz, 2009). In public spaces, such as parks, streets, bus stops, and other public areas, research reports 55.5% of verbal harassment, especially insults and negative comments in the streets (Lombardi et al., 2002). Within a family setting, 57% of American trans people are rejected by their relatives, and 19% of them are victims of domestic violence (Grant et al., 2011). Additionally, 66% of them are physically harassed within their own families (Kenagy & Bostwick, 2005). As the inclusion of trans persons in the work environment grows, recent research reports that 50% of trans men and women surveyed at their jobs suffer different kinds of harassment, and 7% of them are victims of physical aggressions (Grant et al., 2011). In other contexts such as the health system, sport facilities, and prisons’ premises, harassment is documented to a lesser extent. Available research has indicated that 28% of trans people in the United States suffer harassment in the health system (Grant et al., 2011). In penitentiaries, the Silvia Rivera Law Project Organization (2007) evidenced a higher vulnerability of transsexual women, although all interviewees denounced some kind of verbal, emotional, physical, and sexual harassment. In a study carried out in Australia, 25% of trans participants admitted to receiving verbal harassment within sport facilities (Symons, Sbaraglia, Hillier, & Mitchell, 2010). In fact, verbal is the type of harassment that most of the recent research has focused on. This is the sort of harassment more frequently reported in educational, health, work, and family contexts (Grant et al., 2011; Greytak et al., 2009; Grossman & D’Augelli, 2007; Lombardi et al., 2002; Reback, Simon, Bemis, & Gatson, 2001; Symons et al., 2010). According to this review, although internationally a great interest in harassment experienced by trans people is observed, there is still a dearth of research in many countries. In the case of Spain, although 2014 police records show that 39.9% of all hate crime is sexuality/sexual identity related (Ministerio del Interior, 2015), the specific characteristics of harassment suffered by trans persons are still unknown. The current study To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first empirical approach on harassment experienced by trans people in Spain. Moreover, this is the first study to undertake a wide variety of types of harassment within different contexts, as well as to consider a sensitive variable in the study of harassment among trans people, such as the age of self-defined gender disclosure (ASEGDI). Particularly, the purpose of this cross-sectional study is twofold. First, it describes the patterns of harassment experienced by trans people: its JOURNAL OF HOMOSEXUALITY 241 prevalence, frequency, types (physical, verbal, gestural, and with material damage) and contexts (public, educational, family, work, health, sport, reli- gious, and penitentiary) where harassment happens, according to sociode- mographic variables of interest (self-defined gender identities, chronological age, and the ASEGDI). Second, it describes the risk profile of harassment in trans people based on the probability to experience harassment by types, contexts, and sociodemographic variables. Methodology Participants A sample of 212 trans persons, aged 10 to 62 (M = 30.6, SD = 10.7), from different regions of Spain participated in this study during the years 2012 and 2013; 44.1% defined themselves as a trans woman or girl, and 51.1% as a trans man or boy. Also, 4.7% of this sample defined themselves in a different category. The process of gathering a sample was influenced by the fact that public institutions and private associations do not register trans people in Spain, and trans persons do not leave a record of their transition process. Therefore, the research team used a sampling procedure formed by volunteers who were given no economic incentive for participation. The research team contacted Spanish lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transsexual (LGBT) associations to recruit voluntary members and then used a snowball strategy to ask participants to facilitate contact with other trans persons or groups who might voluntarily participate in the study. This strategy has been used in other studies with hidden or low visibility groups such as sex workers, drug consumers, or trans people (e.g., Grossman & D’Augelli, 2007; Stotzer, 2009; Xavier & Simmons, 2000). In our case, this granted us access to a number of trans persons who attended various Gender Identity Units, care programs for trans people, and participants in different conferences and meetings about this issue, as well as other persons individually. Some people, such as health professionals or other participants, facilitated the access to participants not linked to any LGBT associations or health system. Measures and procedure A survey to obtain information about different psychosocial issues related to trans people’s experiences in different moments and contexts of their daily life was elaborated. This study uses only the data from perceived harassment items. In contrast to other surveys based on data collected by telephone, e-mail, or other electronic media, in order to achieve reliable and valid data in this 242 J. DEVÍS-DEVÍS ET AL. study the survey was self-administered to individuals or small groups (n ≤ 4) monitored by at least one member of the research team. Questions were informed from harassment literature and revised several times to facilitate participants’ understanding. To refine the questionnaire, to avoid misunder- standings, and, of special importance, to agree on possible answers to gender identity of participants (see below), a pilot test with 12 trans persons from a LGBT association was performed. A diary was kept during the entire ela- boration process to improve the survey and its application. Questions of varying structures (closed, semi-closed-ended, and open questions) were designed to satisfy the purposes of the study. Examples of these are (a) Closed: “Have you ever been harassed?”; (b) Semi-closed-ended: “Which of the following expressions do you use to refer to your actual gender identity? (1) woman; (2) man; (3) other—specify)”; and (c) Open: “How old were you when you first disclosed your new gender identity?” Information on the specific meaning of the kinds of harassment inquired (physic, verbal, gestural, or with material damage) was included in the written survey and also was clarified by members of the research team when needed. At the end of the survey, some space was provided to add any extra information participants deemed relevant. Additionally, a survey protocol was established with information about its administration and application instructions for the team members in charge of this task. During the survey procedure, participants were encouraged to pose questions to resolve any doubts they might have, thus improving its understanding. They fulfilled the survey in 35 minutes on average. Materials and procedures were approved by the Ethics Committee of the Universitat de València to guarantee ethical principles in social research with human beings. The survey respected the self-determination of trans people gender identities, and no personal data were requested. Informed consent forms authorizing the research team to publish the data of this study were signed by adult participants or by their parent or guardian if under 18 years of age. The surveys and informed consent forms were kept separately, and the data were entered in a database for its subsequent statistical usage. Variables and data analysis Study variables (or dependent variables) in this study were (a) harassment (experienced or not); (b) frequency of harassment (every day, once a week, several times a month, occasionally); (c) types of harassment (physical, verbal, gestural, or material damage); and (d) harassment contexts (work, educational, health, religious, penitentiary, sport, family, and public areas). Sociodemographic variables (or independent variables) were (e) self-defined gender; (f) age; and (g) ASEGDI. JOURNAL OF HOMOSEXUALITY 243 Data analysis used the IBM SPSS 22.0 statistical program. Variables were encoded, and data were typed into the program. Afterwards, some variables were recoded to facilitate the analysis and data comparison. In particular, age, harassment frequency, and the ASEGDI were subsequently regrouped to avoid decrease of subgroup size and to facilitate comparisons. The statistical analysis consisted in the calculation of frequencies and percentages, and the findings were presented in figures and tables. Chi- square tests of independence were carried out to determine the existence of significant differences (p < 0.05) among the variables. The corrected stan- dardized residuals were calculated to establish in which categories significant differences (corrected standardized residuals ± 1.96) emerged. Binomial logistic regression was used to define the probability of experiencing harass- ment by types, contexts, and sociodemographic variables. The odds ratios were also determined, using 95% confidence intervals (CI). Results Harassment prevalence and frequency The results indicate that 59.9% of the participants have experienced some kind of harassment at some point in their lives. Moreover, 12.6% of them suffered harassment daily, 12.1% once a week, and 35.2% occasionally. Harassment variability and its frequency by sociodemographic variables are observed in Table 1. Chi-square analysis showed significant differences in perceived harassment according to gender (χ2(1) = 3.991; p < 0.05; V = 0.141) and the ASEGDI (χ2(2) = 6.519; p < 0.05; V = 0.177). The study of corrected standardized residuals revealed differences in the following categories: female and male and the ASEGDI (≤16 and 17–24 years of age). That is, harassment Table 1. Percentage of harassment and frequency of harassment by sociodemographic variables. Frequency of Harassment Harassment Every day Once a week Occasionally n % n % n % n % Gender Identity Trans woman 62 66.7 12 19.0 13 20.6 38 60.3 Trans man 57 52.0 10 20.0 10 20.0 30 60.0 Age ≤20 years old 24 61.5 4 19.0 6 28.6 11 52.4 21–39 years old 71 57.3 16 23.5 13 19.1 39 57.4 ≥40 years old 29 64.4 3 10.0 4 13.3 23 76.7 ASEGDI ≤16 years old 51 70.8 15 32.6 10 21.7 21 45.7 17–24 years old 34 50.0 3 8.8 8 23. 23 67.6 ≥ 25 years old 39 57.4 5 12.8 6 15.4 28 71.8 The groups where standardized residual show ± 1.96 are marked in bold lettering. ASEGDI: Age of self-defined gender disclosure. 244 J. DEVÍS-DEVÍS ET AL. was experienced more often by trans women (66.7%) than trans men (52.8%) and also more frequently by trans people who disclosed their gender iden- tities at a younger age (70.8%) than by those who disclosed their identities between 17–24 years of age (50%). Significant differences are observed in the frequency of harassment, according to the ASEGDI (χ2(4) = 10.468; p < 0.05; V = 0.210). Specifically, the study of corrected standardized residuals found differences only in the category of those who disclosed their gender at ≤16 years of age. Therefore, people who disclosed their gender identities at a younger age suffered harassment occasionally (45.7%) as opposed to on a daily basis (32.6%). Types of harassment The types of harassment that trans people reported are seen in Figure 1. Verbal harassment was the type experienced the most (59%), followed by gestural (47%), physical (28%), and harassment that involved material damages (19%). The different harassment types according to the demographic variables from our study are shown in Table 2. Chi-square analysis revealed significant differ- ences in harassment types according to gender identity and the ASEGDI. Particularly, differences derived from the study of corrected standardized resi- duals indicated that physical harassment (χ2(1) = 4.325; p < 0.05; V = 0.147) and verbal harassment (χ2(1) = 3.878; p < 0.05; V = 0.139) were suffered by more trans women (33.3% and 65.6%) than trans men (20.4% and 51.9%). Moreover, the different sorts of harassment (physical: χ2(2) = 12.933; p < 0.05; V = 0.249; verbal: χ2(2) = 7.494; p < 0.05; V = 0.190; gestural: χ 2 (2) = 6.624; p < 0.05; V = 0,178; material damage: χ2(2) = 6.883; p < 0.05; V = 0.182) were experienced by more trans people who disclosed their gender identities at an early age (≤16 years old) than at an older age (17–24 years old and ≥25), such as is indicated in Table 2. n=59 n=125 n=101 n=41 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% Physical Verbal Gestural Material damages Figure 1. Percentage of types of harassment. JOURNAL OF HOMOSEXUALITY 245 Contexts of harassment Trans people experienced harassment in the contexts or areas of social life as indicated in Figure 2. Public space was the context where more trans people experienced harassment (49.1%), closely followed by the educational context (46.2%). The third context where trans people suffered more harassment was in the family setting (31.1%), followed by health system (24.1%) and sport (18.9%) contexts. Religious (11.8%) and penitentiary (3.8%) contexts showed the lowest percentage of trans people who suffered harassment. It is also important to highlight that 8.5% (n = 18) of trans people suffered harassment in only one context, 20.8% (n = 44) in two or more contexts, and 30.7% (n = 65) suffered it in four or more contexts. The variability of harassment contexts according to sociodemographic variables can be seen in Table 3. Chi-square analysis showed significant differences by gender in public spaces (χ2(1) = 4.611; p < 0.05; V = 0.151), Table 2. Types of harassment according to sociodemographic variables. Physical Verbal Gestural Material Damage n % n % n % n % Gender Identity Trans woman 31 33.3 61 65.6 49 52.7 20 21.5 Trans man 22 20.4 56 51.9 44 40.7 17 15.7 Age ≤20 years old 11 28.2 24 61.5 16 41.0 6 15.4 21–39 years old 36 29.0 69 55.6 60 48.4 28 22.6 ≥40 years old 10 22.2 29 64.4 23 51.1 6 13.3 ASEGDI ≤16 years od 31 43.1 51 70.8 42 58.3 20 27.8 17–24 years old 12 17.0 33 48.5 25 36.8 13 19.0 ≥ 25 years old 15 22.1 38 55.9 31 45.6 7 10.3 The groups where standardized residual show ± 1.96 are marked in bold lettering. ASEGDI: Age of self-defined gender disclosure. n=104 n=98 n=66 n=51 n=46 n=40 n=25 n=8 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% Figure 2. Percentage of harassment by contexts. 246 J. DEVÍS-DEVÍS ET AL. Ta b le 3. H ar as sm en t co n te xt s b y so ci od em og ra p h ic va ri ab le s. W or k Ed uc at io n al H ea lt h Re lig io us Pe n it en ti ar y Sp or t Fa m ily Pu b lic sp ac es n % n % n % n % n % n % n % n % Ge nd er Id en tit y Tr an s w om an 21 22 .6 42 45 .2 21 22 .6 11 11 .8 5 5. 4 18 19 .4 31 33 .3 52 55 .9 Tr an s m an 19 17 .6 48 44 .4 24 22 .2 12 11 .1 2 1. 9 19 17 .6 28 25 .9 44 40 .7 Ag e ≤ 20 y. o. 2 5. 1 23 59 .0 8 20 .5 6 15 .4 2 5. 1 6 15 .4 5 12 .8 16 41 .0 21 – 39 y. o. 33 26 .6 61 49 .2 33 26 .6 15 12 .1 3 2. 4 30 24 .2 44 35 .5 61 49 .2 ≥ 40 y. o. 11 24 .4 11 24 .4 10 22 .2 3 6. 7 3 6. 7 4 8. 9 16 35 .6 26 57 .8 AS EG DI ≤ 16 y. o. 18 25 .0 45 62 .5 22 30 .6 13 18 .1 6 8. 3 22 30 .6 25 34 .7 39 54 .2 17 – 24 y. o. 10 14 .7 28 41 .2 14 20 .6 6 8. 8 2 2. 9 10 14 .7 19 27 .9 30 44 .1 ≥ 25 y. o. 17 25 .0 22 32 .4 13 19 .1 6 8. 8 0 0 8 11 .8 21 30 .9 33 48 .5 Th e g ro up s w h er e st an d ar d iz ed re si d ua l sh ow ± 1. 96 ar e m ar ke d in b ol d le tt er in g . A SE G D I: A g e of se lf- d ef in ed g en d er d is cl os ur e. JOURNAL OF HOMOSEXUALITY 247 and corrected standardized residuals indicated that more trans women suffered harassment (55.9%) than trans men (40.7%). Analysis also showed differences by age in work (χ2(2) = 8.132; p < 0.05; V = 0.198), family (χ2(2) = 7.588; p < 0.05; V = 0.191), and educational (χ 2 (2) = 11.573; p < 0.05; V = 0.236) contexts. The study of corrected standardized residuals revealed that the younger group of participants (≤20 years old) experienced a lower percentage of harassment in work (5.1%) and family (12.8%) contexts compared to the other groups (21–39 years old and ≥40 years old). In contrast, the older group (≥40 years old) suffered a lower percentage of harassment in educational context (24.4%) than the younger participants. Furthermore, significant differences were observed in sport (χ2(2) = 9.282; p < 0.05; V = 0.211) and educational (χ2(2) = 13.633; p < 0.05; V = 0.256) contexts related to the ASEGDI. Corrected standardized residuals suggested that trans persons who disclosed their identities at an early age (≤16 years old) suffered more harassment in sport (30.6%) and educative (62.5%) con- texts than the rest of the participants who disclosed their identities at a later age. Chi-square analysis also displayed significant differences in penitentiary contexts (χ2(2) = 6.791; p < 0.05; V = 0.181) according to the ASEGDI of participants. Nevertheless, the existence of some cells with fewer than five subjects (see Table 3) could cause overestimation of statistical significance. Risk profile of harassment Binomial logistic regression analysis was employed to determine the prob- abilities of suffering harassment according to sociodemographic profile and the types and contexts of harassment. The risk profile of harassment comes from the analysis of prediction model indicated in Table 4, once the sig- nificant differences were identified in women (see Table 1). It revealed that trans women were more likely to suffer physical harassment (OR = 2.15) than trans men. Moreover, the likelihood to suffer different types of harassment in different contexts decreased each year that a trans person delayed the dis- closure of his or her gender identity. Particularly, gestural harassment toward trans people diminished by 4%, and material damage diminished by 8%. The risk of harassment was also reduced by 6% in educational contexts and 15% in penitentiary settings, as well as 6% in sport contexts. Chronological age emerged as variable to predict harassment in work contexts since the risk of harassment increased 1.07 times as trans people got older. Discussion Data reveal that harassment is a serious problem for trans people in Spain since 59.9% of the sample are victims of harassment. This percentage is 248 J. DEVÍS-DEVÍS ET AL. substantially higher than total hate crimes committed for sexuality/gender identity (39.9%) and racist/xenophobic (37%) reasons in Spain. And it is far above the 15.5% of hate crimes committed toward other vulnerable persons and groups such as disabled people (Ministerio del Interior, 2015). Compared to other countries, this behavior is more prevalent in Spain than in Europe as a whole, which registers an average 43% of harassment (FRA (European Union Agency for the Fundamental Rights), 2014). It is also more prevalent than 58% of violence or crime against trans people in the United Table 4. Prediction model of harassment experience (n = 195). B (SE) Wald OR 95% CI p Physical Harassment Gender(1) 0.77 (0.35) 4.71 2.15 1.07–4.29 0.03 Age (years old) 0.02 (0.02) 0.77 1.02 0.98–1.05 0.38 Age of Identity Disclosure −0.08 (0.02) 11.10 0.92 0.88–0.97 <0.01 Gestural Harassment Gender(1) 0.47 (0.31) 2.41 1.60 0.88–2.92 0.12 Age (years old) 0.03 (0.02) 2.16 1.03 0.99–1.06 0.14 Age of Identity Disclosure −0.04 (0.02) 4.90 0.96 0.92–0.99 0.03 Harassment with material damage Gender(1) 0.36 (0.39) 0.83 1.43 0.66–3.07 0.36 Age (years old) 0.02 (0.02) 0.55 1.01 0.97–1.06 0.46 Age of Identity Disclosure −0.08 (0.03) 8.61 0.92 0.87–0.97 <0.01 Work Context Gender(1) 0.01 (0.39) 0.00 1.01 0.47–2.15 0.99 Age (years old) 0.07 (0.02) 10.53 1.07 1.03–1.11 <0.01 Age of Identity Disclosure −0.04 (0.02) 3.54 0.96 0.92–1.00 0.06 Educational Context Gender(1) 0.22 (0.32) 0.49 1.25 0.67–2.33 0.49 Age (years old) −0.02 (0.02) 1.74 0.80 0.94–1.01 0.19 Age of Identity Disclosure −0.06 (0.02) 7.31 0.94 0.90–0.98 <0.01 Penitentiary Context Gender(1) 0.94 (0.88) 1.12 2.55 0.45–14.40 0.29 Age (years old) 0.06 (0.04) 2.51 1.06 0.99–1.13 0.11 Age of Identity Disclosure −0.16 (0.07) 5.52 0.85 0.75–0.97 0.02 Sports Context Gender(1) 0.27 (0.39) 0.48 1.31 0.61–2.78 0.49 Age (years old) −0.02 (0.02) 0.47 0.98 0.94–1.03 0.49 Age of Identity Disclosure −0.07 (0.03) 5.15 0.94 0.89–0.99 0.02 Trans women. OR = odds ratio. CI = confidence interval. Physical Harassment: R2 = 0.09 (Hosmer and Lemeshow), 0.09 (Cox & Snell), 0.13 (Nagelkerke). −2Log = 204.97. Model χ2(3) = 19.14, p < 0.001. Gestural Harassment: R2 = 0.03 (Hosmer and Lemeshow), 0.04 (Cox & Snell), 0.05 (Nagelkerke). −2Log = 260.31. Model χ2(3) = 8.53, p < 0.05. Harassment with material damage: R2 = 0.06 (Hosmer and Lemeshow), 0.06 (Cox & Snell), 0.09 (Nagelkerke). −2Log = 174.76. Model χ2(3) = 11.77, p < 0.01. Work Context: R2 = 0.06 (Hosmer and Lemeshow0.06 (Cox & Snell), 0.09 (Nagelkerke). −2Log = 186.02. Model χ2(3) = 11.87, p < 0.01. Educational Context: R2 = 0.08 (Hosmer and Lemeshow), 0.10 (Cox & Snell), 0.14 (Nagelkerke).-2Log = 245.54. Model χ2(3) = 21.56, p < 0.001. Penitentiary Context: R2 = 0.21 (Hosmer and Lemeshow); 0.05 (Cox & Snell), 0.20 (Nagelkerke). −2Log = 49.67. Model χ2(3) = 10.65, p < 0.05. Sports Context: R2 = 0.06 (Hosmer and Lemeshow); 0.05 (Cox & Snell), 0.09 (Nagelkerke). −2Log = 177.97. Model χ2(3) = 11.50, p < 0.01. JOURNAL OF HOMOSEXUALITY 249 States (Xavier & Simmons, 2000) and similar to 59.5% of violence or harass- ment experienced by trans persons in the same country (Lombardi et al., 2002). However, it is the frequency that is so alarming since 12.6% of trans persons suffer harassment on a daily basis. It is not possible to compare these percentages to the harassment experienced specifically by the cisgender population in Spain due to a lack of studies on this issue. Nevertheless, it is assumed that more trans people suffer harassment than cisgender people do as reported in other studies from the United States (Factor & Rothblum, 2007). The results also indicate that the important transphobic environment existing in Spain spreads through different primary and secondary socializa- tion contexts. However, not all the contexts are affected in the same way. This study finds a different prevalence of harassment depending on the contexts where the social interactions with trans persons take place. Particularly, the highest percentage of harassment experienced by trans people in Spain is found in public areas with 49.1%. Nevertheless, this is lower than the 53% and 55.5% of harassment reported by two North American studies of the same context (Grant et al., 2011; Lombardi et al., 2002). The educational environment also registers a high percentage of harassment, 46.2%, which is much more than the 25% reported for primary, secondary, and higher education as a whole in Spain (Oñate & Piñuel, 2007). Although harassment drops to 31.1% within the family setting, these situa- tions are probably even harder to determine considering the protective function trans persons assign their families regarding harassment (Simons, Schrager, Clark, Belzer, & Olson, 2013). However, this percentage is lower than the 66% in the United States, particularly in the city of Chicago (Kenagy & Bostwick, 2005). Results also indicate a 24.1% of harassment within the health system, a percentage slightly different than the 28% identified in the United States (Grant et al., 2011). Participants in our study report 18.8% of harassment in sports, 11.8% in religious, and 3.8% in penitentiary contexts. These percentages are lower than the 25%, 29%, and 14% reported, respec- tively, in the United States (Minter & Daley, 2003; Pew Research Center, 2013; Symons et al., 2010). Regarding types of harassment, 59% of trans people suffer verbal harass- ment, which represents the highest percentage among the participants in this study. It is worth noting that this result is consistent with data from other studies since verbal harassment is the most common type of harassment within the different contexts (educational, health, work, and family) (Grant et al., 2011; Greytak et al., 2009; Grossman & D’Augelli, 2007; Lombardi et al., 2002; Reback et al., 2001). The 28% of physical harassment reported in this study falls between the 3% and 66% of harassment found in North American and Australian studies (Grant et al., 2011; Kenagy & Bostwick, 2005; Symons et al., 2010). 250 J. DEVÍS-DEVÍS ET AL. Variability analysis by sociodemographic variables of interest indicates that harassment is more prevalent in trans women than men, as suggested by other studies (Cano Oncala et al., 2004; Factor & Rothblum, 2007). This result is also supported by binomial logistic regression since trans women are more likely to be harassed than men. Moreover, women are specifically more prevalent to be verbally and physically harassed than men, and also in public spaces or areas. On the contrary, age does not affect overall harassment and the frequency harassment, results which are similar to other studies (Cano Oncala et al., 2004; Lombardi et al., 2002). Neither is the type of harassment affected by age. However, younger participants (≤20 years old) claim to suffer less harassment within work and family contexts than older trans people. This is probably due to the current tendency of younger people to enter the workforce later and also because the younger generations of trans persons may receive more support from their families than the older ones, as pre- viously observed (PFLAG Transgender Network, 2007). It is worth high- lighting that older participants (≥40 years old) experience a lower percentage of harassment than younger ones within educational context. A possible explanation to this is that the ASEGDI is decreasing, meaning that older trans people probably disclosed their gender identities after finishing com- pulsory schooling (Gobierno de Canarias, 2013; Reguero, 2014). This makes protecting trans persons at a younger age even more important for two reasons. First, older trans persons experience less harassment in educational settings, and, second, those who disclose their gender identity at a younger age are more likely to suffer different types of harassment than those who disclose their gender identity at an older age. In summary, the results of this study indicate that the inclusion of trans people into the Spanish society is an uncompleted task. Spain has a higher frequency of harassment and prevalence than other European countries and the United States and is probably higher than cisgender harassment. Verbal is the highest type of harassment experienced by trans people in Spain, as in other countries. Those who disclose their gender identities at a younger age experience higher percentages and frequency of harassment than older trans. The findings also indicate the presence of transphobic attitudes in Spanish society. Harassment is especially suffered by trans youngsters and women, who are also more likely to suffer physical harassment than trans men. Finally, harassment is still present in all social contexts examined in this study, and it is increasing within educational contexts. Limitations and implications Some potential weaknesses need to be considered in this study to accurately interpret the results. First, it was not possible to establish a representative sample due to the inexistence of a register or reliable estimation of the JOURNAL OF HOMOSEXUALITY 251 number of trans people who reside in Spain. Furthermore, because of the procedure followed to recruit participants, some marginalized trans persons with presumably different profiles of harassment may have been disregarded in the sample. However, this limitation is a common factor in most studies concerning trans people (FRA (European Union Agency for the Fundamental Rights), 2014; Grant et al., 2011; Grossman & D’Augelli, 2007; Lombardi et al., 2002), and a more comprehensive sample would have probably increased the figures of the types of harassment reflected in this study. Second, the measurement of harassment was based on the percep- tion of participants gathered in the survey instead of an objective measure based on the researchers’ observations. Nevertheless, in the case of trans participants, the limitation is not an overrepresentation as often happens in other pattern studies. On the contrary, a risk of data underrepresentation exists with this population since trans people are more likely to perceive harassment as normal in some situations (Browne, Bakshi, & Lim, 2011). Third, comparisons to some studies framing the discussion of results need to be cautiously considered. It must be taken into account that crime and harassment, though related, are not exchangeable realities. Therefore, specific figures of crime rate would illustrate consequences that some forms of harassment may have. Likewise, as long as our study is specifically focused on harassment, it must be considered more restricted than others also including violence and crime rates (e.g., Lombardi et al., 2002; Xavier & Simmons, 2000). Moreover, our informants were asked whether they had ever experienced harassment and not whether they had experienced harass- ment for a certain period of time (e.g., 5 years, last year, last month), as is the case in other studies (e.g., FRA (European Union Agency for the Fundamental Rights), 2014; Greytak et al., 2009; Pew Research Center, 2013). Despite these limitations, this study offers useful insights about the patterns of harassment experienced by trans people and the risk profile of harassment in Spain. This is one of the first studies to empirically address the issue of harassment in trans people living in Spain and the first one, nationally and internationally, to examine harassment according to the ASEGDI. Moreover, it analyzes the types and contexts of harass- ment according to sociodemographic variables of interest. Future research needs to provide in-depth understanding on how harassment actually affects trans people’s lives or how they dealt with it and its consequences. Therefore, further qualitative studies that focus on the social and personal circumstances and consequences of harassment are necessary. The results of this study also urge development of intervention programs at individual, community, social, and intersectional levels, as it has been suggested for sexual minorities elsewhere (Hatzenbuehler, 2009). Harassment in public spaces, educational, and family contexts require special attention through a combined prevention strategy among local, regional, and national Spanish 252 J. DEVÍS-DEVÍS ET AL. institutions. As Álvarez (2015) recently proposed, beyond medical atten- tion and legal issues, integral trans policies become urgent in order to prevent discrimination and harassment, as well as to promote positive social attitudes and values to facilitate the inclusion of trans people in the Spanish society. Community and school interventions with families, students, teachers, and teacher educators emerge as paramount to prevent harassment among young trans people. Finally, the findings compel us to develop and debate strategies among politicians, social workers, police departments, justice staff, and Spanish social agents to promote social justice for trans people. This study aims to contribute to such ends since the results confirm that transphobic attitude change is a priority to prevent harassment of trans persons. 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Retrieved from http://goo.gl/zCilQU JOURNAL OF HOMOSEXUALITY 255 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.avb.2009.01.004 http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11199-008-9458-7 http://goo.gl/pJnHGZ http://goo.gl/pJnHGZ http://goo.gl/RS6Ye3 http://goo.gl/YVmY4Y https://goo.gl/rNKuzr https://goo.gl/rNKuzr http://goo.gl/OIiGp7 http://goo.gl/OIiGp7 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jadohealth.2013.07.019 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.avb.2009.01.006 http://goo.gl/hSuGLE http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10402659908426291 http://goo.gl/zCilQU Abstract The current study Methodology Participants Measures and procedure Variables and data analysis Results Harassment prevalence and frequency Types of harassment Contexts of harassment Risk profile of harassment Discussion Limitations and implications Acknowledgments Funding References 
work_hvck4r72qbbx5n6qn5mjmy2cxi	----	Social evolution in the shadow of asymmetrical relatedness D ow nl oa de d fr om h tt ps :/ /r oy al so ci et yp ub li sh in g. or g/ o n 05 A pr il 2 02 1 rspb.royalsocietypublishing.org Research Cite this article: Krupp DB, Taylor PD. 2015 Social evolution in the shadow of asymmetrical relatedness. Proc. R. Soc. B 282: 20150142. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2015.0142 Received: 21 January 2015 Accepted: 7 April 2015 Subject Areas: behaviour, evolution, theoretical biology Keywords: altruism, spite, genetic relatedness, phenocentrism Author for correspondence: D. B. Krupp e-mail: dbkrupp@saltlab.org Electronic supplementary material is available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2015.0142 or via http://rspb.royalsocietypublishing.org. & 2015 The Author(s) Published by the Royal Society. All rights reserved. Social evolution in the shadow of asymmetrical relatedness D. B. Krupp1,2,4 and Peter D. Taylor1,3 1Department of Mathematics and Statistics, 2Department of Psychology, and 3Department of Biology, Queen’s University, Kingston, Ontario, Canada K7L 3N6 4Program in Evolution and Governance, One Earth Future, Broomfield, CO 80021, USA The persistence of altruism and spite remains an enduring problem of social evolution. It is well known that selection for these actions depends on the structure of the population—that is, on actors’ genetic relationships to reci- pients and to the ‘neighbourhood’ upon which the effects of their actions redound. Less appreciated, however, is that population structure can cause genetic asymmetries between partners whereby the relatedness (defined relative to the neighbourhood) of an individual i to a partner j will differ from the relatedness of j to i. Here, we introduce a widespread mechanism of kin recognition to a model of dispersal in subdivided populations. In so doing, we uncover three remarkable consequences of asymmetrical related- ness. First, altruism directed at phenotypically similar partners evolves more easily among migrant than native actors. Second, spite directed at dissimilar partners evolves more easily among native than migrant actors. Third, unlike migrants, natives can evolve to pay costs that far outstrip those they spitefully impose on others. We find that the frequency of natives rela- tive to migrants amplifies the asymmetries between them. Taken together, our results reveal differentiated patterns of ‘phenocentrism’ that readily arise from asymmetries of relatedness. 1. Introduction For 50 years, inclusive fitness theory [1,2] has proved invaluable to our under- standing of the evolution of cooperation and conflict. In its simplest form, it states that a social action will evolve when RijB 2 C . 0, where C is the lifetime fitness cost of the action to an actor i, B is the lifetime fitness benefit to a reci- pient j and Rij is the genetic relatedness of i to j. This principle, known as Hamilton’s rule, provides a powerful account of the evolution of altruism (C . 0, B . 0) and spite (C . 0, B , 0)—namely, that actors can compensate for their costs by helping recipients who may bear identical copies of causal alleles and by harming those who may not. A resurgence of interest in the effects of population structure has, however, refined our understanding of Hamilton’s rule. Interactions not only have conse- quences for actors and recipients, but also for the neighbourhood, which consists of those individuals whose fitness is affected by any altered level of local competition resulting from an interaction [3 – 10]. In many simple popu- lation structures, we can capture this with Hamilton’s rule by defining Rij ¼ (Gij � �Gij)=(1 � �Gii), where Gij is the coefficient of consanguinity (CC) between i and j, and �Gii and �Gij are, respectively, the average CCs between i and i’s neighbourhood and between i and j’s neighbourhood [8]. Formalized in this way, relatedness accounts for both the primary (actor – recipient) and secondary (neighbourhood) effects of an interaction. Moreover, it supplies an intuitive interpretation of ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ relatedness: Rij . 0 when i is more likely to share alleles with j than with j’s neighbourhood, and Rij , 0 when i is more likely to share alleles with j’s neighbourhood than with j. So specified, relatedness changes both with the consanguinity between actor and recipient and with the consanguinity between actor and neighbourhood. Significantly, such relatedness will tend to be asymmetrical (Rij= Rji) [11,12] whenever partners have different consanguinities to the other’s neighbourhood http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1098/rspb.2015.0142&domain=pdf&date_stamp=2015-04-29 mailto:dbkrupp@saltlab.org http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2015.0142 http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2015.0142 http://rspb.royalsocietypublishing.org http://rspb.royalsocietypublishing.org A B Figure 1. Symmetrical and asymmetrical relatedness in the model. Consider a focal pair of partners living on two different demes, A and B. In both demes, consanguinity is known with certainty and the partners act simul- taneously on each other, as indicated by the arrows. We also assume that the secondary effects of the primary interaction evenly affect the entire deme. The sole difference between demes A and B is the composition of the neighbourhood. Deme A consists of an even mixture of native (blue cir- cles) and migrant offspring (red circles), whereas deme B consists of four times as many native as migrant offspring, and it is this difference that causes asymmetries of relatedness between the partners. In deme A, related- ness between the native and migrant partners is symmetrical. That is, relatedness is the same from the native actor/migrant recipient perspective as from the migrant actor/native recipient perspective. In deme B, however, relatedness between the native and migrant is asymmetrical: relatedness is much lower from the native actor/migrant recipient perspective than it is from the migrant actor/native recipient perspective. rspb.royalsocietypublishing.org Proc. R. Soc. B 282: 20150142 2 D ow nl oa de d fr om h tt ps :/ /r oy al so ci et yp ub li sh in g. or g/ o n 05 A pr il 2 02 1 ( �Gij = �G ji), despite having the same consanguinity to one another (Gij ¼ Gji). Thus, when partners take both the roles of actor and recipient, i may value j less than j may value i for reasons that are not intrinsic to either party. Limited dispersal will cause such an asymmetry, because the genotypes of native-born individuals will be better represented in their neigh- bourhood than those of recent immigrants. We illustrate this phenomenon in figure 1, which considers interactions between native and migrant partners in two different neighbourhoods. To allocate altruistic and spiteful behaviour, many species rely on mechanisms of kin recognition [11,13 – 15]. These mech- anisms exploit natural covariation between genetic identity and cues—both contextual and phenotypic—to regulate an actor’s behaviour. For instance, juvenile Belding’s ground squirrels (Spermophilus beldingi) tend to emerge from their bur- rows 25 days from birth, and so can accidentally find their way into the burrows of non-relatives. Consequently, dams will foster about 75% of unrelated juveniles experimentally intro- duced into their burrows within 25 days of having produced a litter, but will reject nearly 80% of unrelated juveniles intro- duced outside of this temporal window [16]. Moreover, female yearlings appear to distinguish full- from half-sisters, despite having been reared together as littermates [16]. The latter finding suggests that, in addition to other cues, female Belding’s ground squirrels use phenotype matching, a mechanism of kin recognition common to a wide range of taxa (including mammals, birds, amphibians, insects and possibly microbes [11,13 – 15]) that generates estimates of relat- edness by comparing actor, recipient and neighbourhood phenotypes that are correlated with genotypes [11,17]. Impor- tantly, the genotype – phenotype relationship need not be causal, but simply correlational. Hence, individuals can acquire phenotypes through the local environment (e.g. a nest-specific song), and they can learn the phenotypes of others. In pheno- type matching, similar partners ( judged relative to the neighbourhood phenotype) are perceived as positively related and dissimilar ones as negatively related [11,17,18]. Conse- quently, asymmetrical perceptions of relatedness should occur when one phenotype of a pair is better represented in the neigh- bourhood than is the other phenotype [11]. Hence, individuals bearing more common phenotypes should behave differently from individuals bearing rare phenotypes when interacting with similar and dissimilar conspecifics. The relevance of the neighbourhood is often overlooked, and we believe that it can have profound consequences for the direction in which social evolution proceeds. Our objective here, then, is to assess the effects of asymmetrical relatedness—caused by variation among actors in consangui- nity to the neighbourhood—on the evolution of social behaviour. We study this in a subdivided population with partial migration that generates genetic and phenotypic vari- ation. Actors can then use this variation to decide how much to help or harm their partners. Our analysis employs a simple inclusive fitness model. 2. Material and methods (a) Population structure We work with an infinite island model with demes of K randomly mixing haploid, asexual breeders. We use a Wright – Fisher model [19,20] with non-overlapping generations. In each generation, the breeders produce a large number of offspring and then die. The offspring interact in random pairs on the natal deme, after which they disperse to a random deme at a small rate m. Migration intro- duces genetic and, as we show below, phenotypic variance into the neighbourhood: most demes will be uniform but a small number will have individuals with locally rare genotypes and phenotypes. We suppose that migrating offspring from a single breeder travel in a ‘bud’ so that in the rare cases when a bud succeeds in finding a distant deme, a significant number of clonal immigrants join the deme offspring population. We let q be the average size of a successful bud, measured as a proportion of the total deme off- spring. Thus, following a budding event, q is the probability that an immigrant will occupy each breeding spot. Following migration, the offspring on each deme (native and recent immigrant) compete for the K breeding vacancies, based on their fitness as determined by the interactions. We label both parental and offspring generations by the dispersal status of the parent (native or migrant) and distinguish them by their class: breeder ( parent) and actor (offspring). Thus, a ‘migrant actor’ is the offspring of a migrant breeder. (b) Social Interaction At the interaction stage, each offspring gives a fitness bonus B to its partner at a cost C, where B and C are constrained to lie on a trade-off curve ( figure 2a). The choice of the (B, C) pair for each actor is based on its estimate of relatedness to its partner. To determine the evolutionary stability of a (B, C) pair, we calculate the inclusive fitness effect WIF of a mutant actor who plays a var- iant strategy (B þ b, C þ c) for small increments b and c (see the electronic supplementary material). If this is non-zero, the (B, C) pair cannot be convergence stable [21] and the population can be invaded. Using Hamilton’s rule, the inclusive fitness effect of an interaction will have the form WIF ¼ Rb � c ¼ G � �G 1 � �G b � c ¼ (Gb � c) � �G(b � c) 1 � �G : (2:1) The numerator of the last expression displays the effect as the sum of the primary (the first term) and the secondary (the second term) inclusive fitness effects of the interaction. Here G is the CC of the actor to its partner (chosen at random from the offspring on the B C 0 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0 –3 –2 –1 0 1 2 3 4 5 pr ob ab il it y de ns it y signal value, s (a) (b) Figure 2. Assumptions of the model. (a) We assume that the actual benefit – cost ratio shows diminishing returns and so is constrained to a trade-off curve like the one depicted (C ¼ B 2). The actual benefit – cost ratio is the slope B/C of the (blue) line drawn from the origin, whereas the marginal benefit – cost ratio is the slope b/c of the tangent (red) line. (b) For the signalling system, we assume that native signals (blue curve) are distributed with mean 0 and variance s2 ¼ 1 and migrant signals (red curve) are distributed with mean m ¼ 2 and variance s2 ¼ 1. rspb.royalsocietypublishing.org Proc. R. Soc. B 282: 20150142 3 D ow nl oa de d fr om h tt ps :/ /r oy al so ci et yp ub li sh in g. or g/ o n 05 A pr il 2 02 1 deme) and �G is the CC of the actor to those offspring whose prob- ability of winning a breeding spot will be affected downstream by the primary fitness effects (i.e. the secondary recipients). In this case, these are the offspring, native and migrant, who will be com- peting for the next-generation breeding spots on that deme. (c) Phenotype matching While we are assuming that interactions are at random, we will also assume that actors have information about their relatedness to their partners and are able to use that to condition their behav- iour. In our model, this is gained through phenotype matching. To build a phenotype matching mechanism into our model, we suppose that an offspring produces a signal (such as a contact call [22]) learned from its parent as a function of the parent’s deme of origin. Since migration is rare, we can assume that native offspring on a deme are clonal, and of course any immi- grant bud will also be clonal. Thus, a deme with a migrant bud has two kinds of signals (native and migrant) and we assume that the immigrants keep the migrant signal for only one generation. That is, an immigrant who becomes a breeder has migrant offspring, but any of these who become breeders in the next generation adopt the native signal. We take the signals to be normally distributed with variance s2 and means of 0 and m for the native and migrant signals, respectively (figure 2b). We also assume that native and migrant offspring know their own identity (as native or migrant) and, in addition, that natives know whether or not there is a migrant bud on the deme. How- ever, the identity of a partner can only be estimated from the partner’s signal. Although these assumptions do not necessarily reflect the mechanistic details of phenotype matching in any par- ticular species, they do provide a simple way to rigorously model the essential parts of a phenotype matching system: a reliable correlation between consanguinity and signal value, information about own phenotype, information about partner phenotype and information about the distribution of phenotypes in the neigh- bourhood [11,17]. In any case, our model is biologically plausible because this kind of information is readily available and the mechanism for its use is cognitively simple. On demes containing an immigrant bud, with proportion q migrant and 1 – q native offspring, the inclusive fitness effects (equation (2.1)) for a native and migrant actor are WN(s) ¼ GN(s)b � c � �GN(b � c) ¼ GN(s)b � c � (1 � q)(b � c) (2:2) and WM(s) ¼ GM(s)b � c � �GM(b � c) ¼ GM(s)b � c � q(b � c): (2:3) Here GN(s) and GM(s) are the CCs of a native and migrant actor to a partner bearing signal s, and since migration is rare and can be neglected for this purpose, the secondary effect CCs �GN ¼ (1 � q) and �GM ¼ q are simply the proportion of the deme offspring that are of the actor’s genotype. We are interested in the sign of the inclusive fitness effect, and so equations (2.2) and (2.3) work only with the numerator of equation (2.1), as is common practice. The CCs GI(s) are calculated from the probability densities PN(s) and PM(s) that an offspring bearing a signal s is a native or a migrant, respectively. Since migration is rare, we can assume that in a deme that has just received a migrant bud, the native and immigrant populations are both clonal and GN(s) ¼ PN(s) � 1 þ PM(s) � 0 ¼ PN(s) and GM(s) ¼ PN(s) � 0 þ PM(s) � 1 ¼ PM(s): ) (2:4) We obtain the PI(s) from Bayes’ Theorem PN(s) ¼ P(sjN)P(N) P(s) and PM(s) ¼ P(sjM)P(M) P(s) , 9>>>= >>>; (2:5) where P(sjN) and P(sjM) are the probabilities that a native and a migrant bear a signal s, and P(N) ¼ 1 2 q and P(M) ¼ q are the frequencies of native and migrant offspring on the deme. Assum- ing, as seems reasonable, that P(sjN) and P(sjM) are proportional to DN(s) and DM(s), the density functions for native and migrant signals, we have PN(s) ¼ DN(s)(1 � q) DN(s)(1 � q) þ DM(s)q and PM(s) ¼ DM(s)q DN(s)(1 � q) þ DM(s)q : 9>>>= >>>; (2:6) 3. Results Our purpose here is to compare the behaviour of native and migrant offspring when interacting with partners of the same perceived CC. That is, where on the B – C graph (figure 2a) will a native and a migrant play when interacting with a part- ner of CC GN(s) ¼ GM(s) ¼ G? The answer, from equations (2.2) and (2.3), is that a native actor will play where the slope of the B – C graph is dB dC ¼ b c ¼ q G � (1 � q) , (3:1) Table 1. Evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) conditions for social interactions on a deme of size K when partner identity is known and there is no budding (q ¼ 1/K ). The ‘marginal ESS’ portion at the left presents the ESS conditions for the marginal effects and the ‘actual ESS’ portion at the right presents the corresponding payoffs for the trade-off curve C ¼ B 2 (see the electronic supplementary material). Although interactions between individuals of the same type (open cells) share the same ESS conditions, those between individuals of different types (shaded cells) do not. marginal ESS actual ESS native recipient migrant recipient native recipient migrant recipient native actor b . c 2b . c/(K 2 1) B . 2C 2B . 2C/(K 2 1) migrant actor 2b . c(K21) b . c 2B . 2C(K 2 1) B . 2C 1 0 –1 –2 –3 –4 –5 0 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.0 consanguinity of actor to partner, GN(s) or GM(s) ev ol ut io na ri ly s ta bl e C /B Figure 3. Evolutionarily stable cost/benefit (C/B) ratios change with consanguinity and deme size K. Evolutionarily stable C/B ratios for the signal model with no bud- ding (q ¼ 1/K ) are plotted against consanguinity G between interactants for native (blue) and migrant (red) actors for the trade-off curve C ¼ B2. The C/B ratios increase with G for both types of actor. However, these ratios differ between native and migrant actors when interacting with partners of the same CC (i.e. GN(sN) ¼ GM(sM)). Finally, deme size (solid lines, K ¼ 5; dashed lines, K ¼ 10) has a greater effect on native than on migrant behaviour. rspb.royalsocietypublishing.org Proc. R. Soc. B 282: 20150142 4 D ow nl oa de d fr om h tt ps :/ /r oy al so ci et yp ub li sh in g. or g/ o n 05 A pr il 2 02 1 and a migrant actor will play where the slope is dB dC ¼ b c ¼ 1 � q G � q : (3:2) As expected, equations (3.1) and (3.2) show that the equilibrium (B, C ) pair for a native differs from that for a migrant when inter- acting with a partner of the same CC. Note that when the denominator of either of these expressions is zero (G ¼ 1 – q or G ¼ q) the strategy will sit on the vertex of the curve (figure 2a) at the transition point between altruism and spite. In the standard case of no budding, there will only be a single migrant breeder and we have q ¼ 1/K. A significant special case arises when signals have vanish- ingly small variance so that the actor knows the identity of its partner. Putting the GIJ in place of the GI(s) in equations (2.2) and (2.3) gives us the inclusive fitness effects WNN ¼ q(b 2 c), WNM ¼ 2 (1 2 q)b 2 qc, WMN ¼ 2 qb 2 (1 2 q)c and WMM ¼ (1 2 q)(b 2 c), and these provide the evolutiona- rily stable strategy (ESS) conditions for the marginal effects. For the case of no budding (q ¼ 1/K ), these conditions are presented in table 1 alongside the payoffs when constrained to the trade-off curve C ¼ B2. These results show, not surprisingly, that inter- actions between like partners (native/native and migrant/ migrant interactions) are altruistic, while those between unlike partners (native/migrant and migrant/native interactions) are spiteful. In the latter case, however, they display two striking asymmetries. First, the ESS conditions for native actors differ from the ESS conditions for migrant actors. Indeed, only when the neighbourhood is restricted to the actor and recipient alone (K ¼ 2) do migrant and native behaviours become symmetrical, as expected. Second, and by corollary, native actors can evolve to absorb costs that exceed those they spitefully impose on migrant partners, whereas migrant actors must inflict larger costs on native partners than they are themselves willing to bear. In other words, natives can evolve spite more easily than migrants, and can tolerate ‘extreme’ costs in the process. In the electronic supplementary material, we show that these asymmetries hold over a range of benefit – cost trade-off functions. More generally, evaluation of equations (3.1) and (3.2) establishes three significant patterns when native and migrant actors are interacting with partners of the same CC: (i) migrants are more altruistic than natives, (ii) natives are more spiteful than migrants and (iii) natives are often able to absorb costs that surpass the harm inflicted on recipi- ents, whereas migrants are not. These patterns are illustrated in figure 3 for the trade-off curve C ¼ B2. This figure also dis- plays the effect of K on the C/B line. It shows that the asymmetries between native and migrant actors grow with deme size, which, of course, is already predicted in the ‘actual ESS’ column of table 1. Moreover, deme size has a larger effect on native than on migrant behaviour. This is because, with increasing deme size, the range of evolutiona- rily stable costs borne by a native actor increases towards infinity while the range of evolutionarily stable costs borne by a migrant actor decreases towards zero. 4. Discussion Our work extends prior analysis of the effects of dispersal on social evolution in subdivided populations [4 – 6,9,10,23] by demonstrating that differing consanguinities to the neighbour- hood cause asymmetries of relatedness between partners that rspb.royalsocietypublishing.org Proc. R. Soc. B 282: 20150142 5 D ow nl oa de d fr om h tt ps :/ /r oy al so ci et yp ub li sh in g. or g/ o n 05 A pr il 2 02 1 are subsequently realized by kin recognition systems. Put simply, we found that individuals bearing locally common phenotypes (natives) were less helpful to similar partners and more harmful to dissimilar ones than were individuals bearing locally rare phenotypes (migrants). Our purpose was to show how social evolution can depend on an actor’s relationships to both its partner and to the neighbourhood, which may be as broad as an entire population or as narrow as a nest. To the extent that the neighbourhood extends beyond the interacting pair, is geneti- cally structured, and information about this structure is available and used, we can anticipate asymmetries in the be- haviour of locally common and rare phenotypes. Taken together, our findings reveal alternative patterns of behaviour that can be described, by the way of analogy to human ethnocentrism, as phenocentric: cooperation evolves between phenotypically similar partners and conflict evolves between dissimilar ones. Holding ecological conditions constant, our model generates three clear predictions. First, actors bearing rare phenotypes will tend to be benevolent (and more so) towards a wider range of partner phenotypes than will actors bearing common phenotypes. Second, actors bearing common phenotypes will tend to be maleficent (and a great deal more so) towards a wider range of partners than will actors bearing rare phenotypes. Third, an increase in the pro- portion of individuals who bear common phenotypes will magnify these differences. In the model, we assumed that the native knows there is a migrant on the patch. This comes from the assumption that among the large number of offspring, individuals have many opportunities to observe signals in the neighbourhood. If such opportunities are limited, a native actor’s assessment of the prob- ability that there is a migrant on the patch will be based on sampling a reduced number of signals and this will affect both the actor’s estimate of its consanguinity to its partner as well as its estimate of its average consanguinity to the neighbourhood, and that enters into the inclusive fitness calculation through the secondary effects of the interaction. The overall effect of redu- cing this information by a factor of, say, 2 or 5 is to increase the actor’s estimate of its consanguinity to both its partner and its neighbourhood, but in such a way that its behaviour—its tendency to be altruistic or spiteful—sees little change. Our findings depart in interesting ways from previous models that considered only the actor – recipient relationship or that assume actors have at best limited information about their partners or the neighbourhood. For example, El Mouden & Gardner [10] also produced an inclusive fitness model of dispersal in a subdivided population; however, actors were endowed with the knowledge that they had (or had not) emigrated but could not infer the genetic identities of their partners beyond chance expectation. Hence, native actors would rightly assume that they were more closely related to their partners than would migrant actors. The authors found that altruism evolves among natives and self- ishness (but not spite) evolves among migrants, a pattern that is nearly opposite to our own. The key differences between the two models revolve largely, if not exclusively, around the kinds of information that individuals use: actors in our model could discriminate their partners more precisely than could actors in the El Mouden and Gardner model. Conse- quently, we expect that examples of behavioural distinctions between common and rare phenotypes in the real world will better conform to our model than to another only to the extent that individuals fully use phenotypic information of both partner and neighbourhood to estimate relatedness. This supposition may go some way to explaining why spite evolves so easily in our model when performed by natives—far more so than does altruism when carried out by either native or migrant—than it seems to in nature. Spite may in fact be rare, but this may only be because the cir- cumstances in which we might observe it are specific. For instance, the extreme spite of our model requires (i) the use of a phenotype matching mechanism that is conditioned on local neighbourhood phenotypes, (ii) a phenotypically common actor and (iii) a phenotypically rare recipient. Inter- estingly, some species of bacteria that discriminate positive from negative relatives do tend to behave more spitefully than altruistically [15]. It is hence possible that relevant cases of spite have been overlooked. Consequently, the best hope of testing our model is in species that show genetic structure to their social networks and that use phenotype matching mechanisms that rely on both partner and neighbourhood phenotypes. For example, there are species, such as the great reed warbler (Acrocephalus arundinaceus), the Columbian ground squirrel (Spermophilus columbianus) and the weaver ant (Oecophylla smaragdina), that appear to integrate neighbourhood phenotypes into at least some evaluations of relatedness [17]. But the clearest evidence in support of our predictions comes from the Argentine ant (Linepithema humile). When placed together in an arena, individuals drawn from genetically homogeneous colonies are more aggressive towards conspecifics drawn from heterogeneous colonies than the converse, often with fatal results [24]. Moreover, increasing experience with mem- bers of hostile colonies attenuates this asymmetry [25]. Humans, too, parallel our results—particularly when differ- ent ethnic groups come into contact. Ethnic majority groups manifest greater prejudice against minorities [26]. Indeed, individuals of the majority ethnic group are most often the perpetrators and individuals of minority groups the victims of ethnically motivated hate crimes (see the electronic sup- plementary material). Conversely, minority groups show more favouritism towards members of their own groups than do majority groups [27]. Furthermore, ethnic minorities are more likely to co-reside with individuals outside of the nuclear family in cooperative relationships, even after researchers have accounted for demographic and acculturation effects [28,29]. Finally, increasing contact with ethnic out-groups reduces prejudice against them [30] and changes ethnic categorization [31]. Despite the evolutionary novelty of encounters between genetically distant ethnic groups, these arrangements may nevertheless be attributable, at least in part, to shifting percep- tions of relatedness produced by a phenotype matching mechanism. Whether this is the case remains to be seen. Acknowledgements. We thank Emma Luker for assistance with acquiring and compiling hate crime reports, and Jean-Pierre Larroque and Andrea Jovanovic for developing the animated supplementary figure. Funding statement. We acknowledge funding from the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada to P.D.T. and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada to D.B.K. Authors’ contributions. The authors contributed equally to the work. D.B.K. conceived of the analysis, D.B.K. and P.D.T. designed the model, P.D.T. analysed the model, and both authors wrote and approved the paper. Competing interests. We have no competing interests. 6 D ow nl oa de d fr om h tt ps :/ /r oy al so ci et yp ub li sh in g. or g/ o n 05 A pr il 2 02 1 References rspb.royalsocietypublishing.org Proc. R. Soc. B 282: 20150142 1. Hamilton WD. 1964 The genetical evolution of social behaviour (I and II). J. Theor. Biol. 7, 1 – 52. (doi:10.1016/0022-5193(64)90038-4) 2. 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work_hz2s2odg6bgifd7txgzmb2hequ	----	untitled Stonewall Susan Quilliam Writer, Broadcaster, Consultant and Trainer, Cambridge, UK Correspondence to Ms Susan Quilliam; susan@susanquilliam.com; http://www.susanquilliam.com Received 29 July 2013 Accepted 29 July 2013 To cite: Quilliam S. J Fam Plann Reprod Health Care 2013;39:302–303. WHO ARE YOU? Stonewall is the lesbian, gay and bisexual (LGB) equality charity. Based in London, Edinburgh and Cardiff, Stonewall cam- paigns for legal and social equality for LGB people across Britain. We are also using our established lobbying skills to make sure the UK Government and European Union do all they can through their diplomacy and international aid pro- grammes to support LGB equality world- wide. This includes sharing our lobbying approach and tools with activists in other countries who are fighting for their rights and risking their lives to enjoy the same levels of equality as LGB people in Britain. HOW DID YOU START? Stonewall was founded in 1989 as a direct response to Section 28 of the Local Government Act. Section 28 was an offensive piece of legislation designed to prevent the so-called ‘promotion’ of homo- sexuality in schools. As well as stigmatising gay people it also galvanised the gay community. The aim from the outset was to create a professional lobbying group that would prevent such attacks on lesbians, gay men and bisexuals from ever occurring again. Stonewall has subsequently put the case for equality on the mainstream political agenda by winning support within all the main political parties. WHAT IS STONEWALL’S MISSION? We work to secure legal and social equal- ity for LGB people. Stonewall focuses on three key areas for equality: at home, at school and at work. LGB people still face very real inequality in all three areas. For example, at home LGB people’s experience of using health care services can be extremely poor, homophobic hate crime is still prevalent, and the denial of goods or services because of a person’s sexual orientation is still an issue. At school, anti-gay bullying and language is still widespread. Gay pupils who are bullied are at higher risk of suicide, self- harm and depression. There are challenges too for schools in recognising that children now come from families that contain sexual diversity, with same-sex parenting becoming more visible. At work, we know that LGB people perform better when they can be them- selves; so we work with employers across Britain to make sure that their workplaces will support LGB people to achieve their full potential. WHAT SERVICES DO YOU PROVIDE? Our free Info Line offers advice and information on issues affecting LGB people. We respond to resource requests and can signpost people on if it’s a request that we’re unable to answer our- selves. All our resources can also be ordered through our website and most can be downloaded from there too. In addition, Stonewall’s ‘Healthy Lives’ programme supports health organisations to improve their workplaces and their ser- vices for LGB people. Our Health Champions Programme, funded by the Department of Health, is providing free support for 1 year to 20 National Health Service (NHS) organisations in England to improve health services for LGB people. The programme offers member organisa- tions practical advice to help them achieve real improvements in the care they provide to local LGB people and their families. Each Health Champion receives consult- ancy support, a free initial needs assess- ment based on Stonewall health research, support to establish a LBG network group for staff, and access to NHS-specific train- ing on sexual orientation equality. There’s also support in entering the Stonewall Healthcare Equality Index, an annual exer- cise to benchmark and track health care organisations on how well they are meeting the health needs of LGB people. WHAT’S BEEN YOUR BIGGEST TRIUMPH OVER THE YEARS? Most recently, seeing the Same Sex Marriage Act become law was a real triumph. ORGANISATION FACTFILE 302 Quilliam S. J Fam Plann Reprod Health Care 2013;39:302–303. doi:10.1136/jfprhc-2013-100736 co p yrig h t. o n A p ril 5 , 2 0 2 1 b y g u e st. P ro te cte d b y h ttp ://jfp rh c.b m j.co m / J F a m P la n n R e p ro d H e a lth C a re : first p u b lish e d a s 1 0 .1 1 3 6 /jfp rh c-2 0 1 3 -1 0 0 7 3 6 o n 2 3 S e p te m b e r 2 0 1 3 . D o w n lo a d e d fro m http://www.susanquilliam.com http://www.susanquilliam.com http://jfprhc.bmj.com/ Over the years Stonewall has also helped secure many steps forward for equality such as the equalisa- tion of the age of consent, lifting the ban on lesbians and gay men serving in the military, securing legisla- tion allowing same-sex couples to adopt, repeal of Section 28, and outlawing discrimination by goods and service providers against LGB people on the grounds of their sexual orientation. Even our less well known successes have had a huge impact. The Human Fertilisation and Embryology (Parental Orders) Regulations has extended the group of people who can apply for a parental order follow- ing surrogacy to include both unmarried couples and same-sex partners. We also achieved a change to the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority’s pol- icies, removing the requirement from clinics to con- sider the ‘need for a father’ before granting treatment and instead focus on ‘supportive parenting’; this dis- mantled a discriminatory barrier against lesbians (and single women) accessing infertility treatment. WHAT’S BEEN YOUR BIGGEST PROBLEM? Lesbians and bisexual women have specific health needs, but there can be a real lack of understanding among NHS and health care staff that these needs exist. Our lesbian health research – which surveyed over 6000 lesbians and bisexual women across Britain – found high levels of poor resourcing in areas such as mental health, and poor access and uptake of cervical screening. Since we published that research we have worked closely with the NHS and health agencies to raise awareness of lesbian and bisexual women’s health, but there is still more work to do. WHAT ARE YOUR MOST EXCITING PLANS AND BIGGEST HOPES FOR THE FUTURE? We’re really excited and inspired by the progress that our Health Champions have made. In 2014 we’ll be working with 20 new NHS organisations in England, and it’s always good to see the positive changes they make through the Health Champions Programme. WHAT DO YOU WANT TO SAY TO JOURNAL READERS? We want to assure you that everyone can make a posi- tive difference to the experience LGB people have when they’re interacting with health services. Even simple steps – such as making sure that staff don’t assume that when a patient says ‘partner’ they mean someone of the opposite sex – play a role. HOW CAN JOURNAL READERS AND THEIR CLIENTS CONTACT YOU? Stonewall’s free Info Line (details below) is open during office hours Monday to Friday. You can find out more about the Healthy Lives Programme from the website (http://www.healthylives. stonewall.org.uk) where you can find advice and guid- ance for staff, patients and organisations, together with research into health inequalities experienced by LGB people and best practice and case studies from across the NHS. FURTHER INFORMATION Who: Stonewall Where: Floor 14, Tower Building, York Road, London SE1 7NX, UK. Tel (admin): 020 7593 1850. E-mail: info@stonewall.org.uk Contact: Free Info Line. Tel: 0800 050 20 20. Monday to Friday 9.30am to 5.30pm Website: http://www.stonewall.org.uk Facebook: http://www.facebook.com/stonewalluk Twitter: http://www.twitter.com/stonewalluk Competing interests None. Provenance and peer review Not commissioned; internally peer reviewed. Editor’s note This article is one in a series of occasional articles on key health organisations worldwide. The Journal would be pleased to hear from other organisations, particularly those based outside the UK, that would like to be similarly profiled. Organisation factfile Quilliam S. J Fam Plann Reprod Health Care 2013;39:302–303. doi:10.1136/jfprhc-2013-100736 303 co p yrig h t. o n A p ril 5 , 2 0 2 1 b y g u e st. P ro te cte d b y h ttp ://jfp rh c.b m j.co m / J F a m P la n n R e p ro d H e a lth C a re : first p u b lish e d a s 1 0 .1 1 3 6 /jfp rh c-2 0 1 3 -1 0 0 7 3 6 o n 2 3 S e p te m b e r 2 0 1 3 . D o w n lo a d e d fro m http://www.healthylives.stonewall.org.uk http://www.healthylives.stonewall.org.uk http://www.healthylives.stonewall.org.uk http://www.stonewall.org.uk http://www.stonewall.org.uk http://www.facebook.com/stonewalluk http://www.facebook.com/stonewalluk http://www.twitter.com/stonewalluk http://www.twitter.com/stonewalluk http://www.twitter.com/stonewalluk http://jfprhc.bmj.com/ 
work_i3gsby6cc5dnrhntij75dnzwba	----	orth_1104.qxd Hate crimes constitute a special class of violence. In the United States, since the enactment of federal hate crime laws in 1990, bias-motivated crimes have garnered national attention. Although social psycho- logical research concerning hate crimes has provided insight into the factors that lead to intergroup violence (Ehrlich, 1992; Green, Glaser, & Rich, 1998; Herek, Gillis, Cogan, & Glunt, 1996), information concern- ing individual difference variables of bias offenders is to date unavailable. There is significant debate about whether an of- fender’s bias motivation can be reliably identified (Sullaway, in press). This has led some theorists to argue for the repeal of hate crime laws altogether (Jacobs & Potter, 1998). The successful prosecution of the bias-motivated offender requires that there is a discernible behavioral and volitional component pre- sent in the offense. This is essential if the offense is to meet the standard of legal intent, as defined under state and federal laws (Levin, 1999). Determining the validity of the bias motivation is compromised by the limited information concerning the perpetrators of hate crimes. This knowledge gap has allowed for psychological theory to be used in arguing against an offender’s culpability (Dunbar, 1999). This study ex- amined bias motivation through behavioral analysis of the offense and examination of the histories of con- victed hate crime offenders. Symbolic, Relational, and Ideological Signifiers of Bias-Motivated Offenders: Toward a Strategy of Assessment Edward Dunbar, EdD University of California, Los Angeles Developmental, ideological, and behavioral characteristics of 58 convicted hate crime offenders were examined. Ratings on the Psychopathy Checklist: Screening Version, HCR-20, and Bias Motivation Profile (BMP) were made via record review. Offense characteristics were rated on the Cornell Aggression Index and Cormier–Lang Crime Index. Results indicated that offenders with higher BMP scores engaged in more instrumental (i.e., premeditated) aggression and targeted racial–ethnic minority victims. Significant within-group variation in the prominence of offender bias motivation on the BMP was observed. Bias Motivation as a Multidimensional Construct In the United States, a crime that is motivated in whole or in part by the perpetrator’s bias toward the victim’s social in-group may be prosecuted as a hate crime. Acts of bias speech that do not occur in con- junction with a separate criminal offense are pro- tected free speech under the First Amendment. These acts are identified as “hate incidents” and are not prosecuted under state or federal law. A hate crime must include both a criminal offense (i.e., physical assault) and evidence of a bias motivation (e.g., bias toward gay men that led to the selection of a specific crime victim). However, what indicates an offender’s bias motiva- tion in the commission of a hate crime? Routinely, law enforcement officers and prosecutors consider bias motivation in terms of the presence of hate speech, which occurs concurrently with the perpetra- tion of a crime. This constitutes an unduly narrow standard under the current statutes. A more compre- hensive understanding of bias motivation would use a systematic analysis of the offender’s attitudes and be- haviors. It is proposed that, in addition to hate speech, valid bias signifiers include the offender’s articulated beliefs of in-group superiority, their affiliation with social cohorts who espouse a hate-based worldview, the display of symbols that communicate this hate- based worldview (e.g., dress, iconography, and art), and a history of (perpetrating) bias-motivated aggres- sion. These symbolic (dress) and relational (affiliation with members of a hate-motivated gang) components may indicate a more enduring form of bias motivation than hate speech. Symbolic and relational signifiers 203 American Journal of Orthopsychiatry Copyright 2003 by the Educational Publishing Foundation 2003, Vol. 73, No. 2, 203–211 0002-9432/03/$12.00 DOI: 10.1037/0002-9432.73.2.203 For reprints and correspondence: Edward Dunbar, EdD, Department of Psychology/Center for the Study and Resolution of Interethnic/Interracial Conflict, University of California, Los Angeles, California 90024. E-mail: edunbar@ucla.edu orth_1104.qxd 4/10/03 11:23 PM Page 203 204 DUNBAR underscore the desire of the offender to impact his or her social environment as well. Inclusion of these behavioral, relational, and sym- bolic components allows for a more precise analysis of both the presence and degree (i.e., prominence) of bias motivation in hate crimes. This information can assist in the determination of offender culpability, appropriate sentencing options, and logic of prosecu- tion under the penalty enhancement established under hate crime laws. Treating bias motivation as a multi- dimensional construct can additionally assist in tailoring rehabilitation efforts to reduce offender bias orientation. Behavioral Characteristics of Bias Aggression Given that the majority of hate crimes are violent acts against the person (Levin, 1999), analysis of the characteristics of aggression in these cases is par- ticularly important. The bias-motivated offender fre- quently acts as either a defender of his or her in-group or plays the role of the aggressor against members of a competing social out-group. The motivation to perpetrate a hate crime is characteristic of reactive (i.e., defending) and instrumental (i.e., socially dominant) violence, respectively (Berkowitz, 1993). Instrumental aggression is marked by planning (i.e., premeditation) and goal pursuit (i.e., achievement of a desired outcome or experience). By comparison, reactive crimes are spontaneous and characterized by aggression against perceived provocation. Research on instrumental aggression has suggested that it con- stitutes an enduring behavioral strategy of the indi- vidual. The numerous studies of Pulkinnen and her colleagues (Pulkinnen, 1987) with children and ado- lescents indicate that instrumental aggression is observable in the first decade of life (Price & Dodge, 1989). In adult offender samples, instrumental ag- gression is frequently perpetrated by highly dissocial and predatory offenders (Cornell, Warren, Hawk, Stafford, Oram, & Pine, 1996). Cornell et al. (1996) found a positive relationship between the commission of instrumental crimes and offender scores on the Psychopathy Checklist–Revised (Hare, 1991). Deter- mining the differences between aggression that is sec- ondary to perceived provocation (reactive aggression) and that which is premeditated, volitional, and pur- suant of specific goals (instrumental aggression) can be useful in understanding patterns of intergroup vio- lence within a community, as well as providing in- sight into the motivations and behavior of the violent bias offender. Instrumental and reactive forms of aggression illustrate two prototypical forms of bias-motivated aggression. In reactive aggression, hate crimes are committed defensively and without preplanning in the name of in-group protection, what Green, Strolovitch, and Wong (1997) have referred to as the “defended neighborhoods” hypothesis. In reactive bias crimes, provocation of the offender is frequently secondary to benign contact with members of a denigrated out-group. The preexisting assumption of threat to the offender’s in-group is an important moti- vator in such pseudorevenge bias offenses. Reactive bias crimes are also seen in interethnic gang conflict, in which protection of illicit markets may result in aggression against out-group persons. The protective reactive bias criminal may assume a role as a member of a hate-motivated vigilante mob or as a councilper- son of a community watch group or may engage in “lone wolf” vandalism against minority members of a community. In contrast, bias-motivated instrumental aggression is marked by the premeditated and preda- tory pursuit of out-group persons. The goal orienta- tion of instrumental bias aggression may reflect the offender’s demonstration of social dominance and underscore a greater ideological resolve that guides the offender in selection of a victim. The intensity or prominence of bias motivation of the offender may influence the form of aggression (e.g., the goal direct- edness) found in the commission of a hate crime. Assessing Violence Risk of Bias-Motivated Offenders Although many hate crimes are indeed violent, it is unclear whether the bias-motivated offender poses a significant risk for violence. Given the unique moti- vation for commission of a hate crime, it is uncertain whether offenders are comparable to other criminal groups in regards to risk for violent recidivism. The recent advent of actuarial risk assessment methodologies makes clear the role of childhood and development problems in estimating risk of violence (Menzies, Webster, McMain, Staley, & Scaglione, 1994). Actuarial models provide a criterion-rich and systematic approach to evaluating the relative level of risk for violence. An important issue in violence risk assessment concerns the presence of psychopathy in an offender group, such as spousal batterers (Coan, Gottman, Babcock, & Jacobson, 1997), sexual offenders (Boer, Wilson, Gauthier, & Hart, 1997), or hate crime perpetrators. As has been documented by Hare (1991), psychopathy consists of two primary dimensions, aggressive narcissism and a chronically orth_1104.qxd 4/10/03 11:23 PM Page 204 SIGNIFIERS OF BIAS-MOTIVATED OFFENDERS 205 antisocial lifestyle. This widely researched construct has been found to be a valid predictor of future violence and postincarceration recidivism (Salekin, Roger, & Sewell, 1996). Conceptually, psychopathy may share some characteristics associated with out-group hostility, which are independent of an ideo- logical or bias motivation. Bell’s (1980) clinical for- mulation of this disorder proposed that in-group entitlement, narcissism, and grandiosity constitute core diagnostic characteristics of the aggressive racist. Additionally, Ezekiel (1995) has provided vivid evidence of the economically marginalized, par- asitic, and rootless lifestyles of many members of hate gangs. Taken together, the work of Bell and Ezekiel suggest that although psychopaths are typically bereft of an ideological worldview per se, they do share many of the same clinical characteristics found in the pathological racist as described by Bell and like- wise engage in a dissocial and tumultuous lifestyle as evidenced by many hate group members. As law enforcement has become more committed to prosecuting hate crimes, the identification of the offender’s bias motivation becomes more important. The analysis of the development history, patterns of aggression, and risk for future violence can provide guidance about the rehabilitation needs of bias offenders. In the current study, the following ques- tions were examined: (a) Can the bias motivation of hate crime offenders be understood as a multidimen- sional construct, and, if so, what are the base rates for the signifiers of their motivation? (b) Are differences between reactive and instrumental aggression related to the degree or prominence of the offender’s bias motivation? and (c) Do actuarial assessment systems reveal substantial risk for violent recidivism for such offenders, as characterized on the HCR-20 and Psychopathy Checklist: Screening Version (PCL:SV) rating systems? Method Sample The sample consisted of 58 convicted hate crime offend- ers in Los Angeles County, California. The offenders were identified via review of court records for the calendar years from 1995 to 1997. The sample constituted all of the con- victed bias offenders in Los Angeles County during this period, yet made up only 3.24% of the total reported hate crimes in which there was an identified perpetrator. This small percentage of attained convictions out of the total re- ported bias crimes is consistent with California state data. In 1997, for example, there were 1,831 hate crimes reported to law enforcement in the state of California, with an additional 313 complaints for offenses identified as being bias moti- vated that were filed with city and county district attorney offices. Of these 2,144 offenses, 223 led to convictions as hate crimes. In other words, only 12% of the statewide reported hate crimes resulted in criminal convictions (California State Department of Justice, 1998). Measures Bias Motivation Profile (BMP). On the basis of record review, four signifier variables of bias motivation were recorded. Ratings were assigned for (a) a history of bias- motivated aggression, (b) membership in a hate group or gang at time of commission of the index crime, (c) articu- lated hate speech during the commission of the crime, and (d) the presence of hate iconography (literature, art, music, body tattoos, or neo-Nazi garb) at the time of the crime. Each of these signifier variables was rated on a 3-point scale (i.e., 2 � signifier is clearly present, 1 � signifier is possibly present, and 0 � signifier is absent), with a potential range of 0–8. For the current sample, the mean score of the aggre- gated BMP signifier variables was 4.00 (SD � 1.75). The clear presence of one of more of these signifiers was used to classify offenders who evidenced a prominent bias compo- nent vis-à-vis other members of the sample group. PCL:SV (Hart, Cox, & Hare, 1995). The PCL:SV is a modified version of the Psychopathy Checklist–Revised (PCL-R, Hare, 1991). The PCL:SV has been used in numer- ous research programs, including the Macarthur Violence Study (Steadman et al., 2000). The PCL:SV consists of 16 items, which measure the core characteristics of psy- chopathy. Like the PCL-R, the PCL:SV yields a two-factor model of psychopathy. Section 1 represents characteristics of narcissistic personality disorder. It describes an individual’s tendencies to be selfish, remorseless, and exploitative of oth- ers. Section 2 measures an asocial, unstable, and antisocial lifestyle. As reported in the technical manual, the PCL:SV has a total mean score of 16.41 with a forensic–nonpsychiatric sample (SD � 3.49, SEM � 1.80). The recommended cut score for diagnostic purposes is 18 to classify a subject as a prototypical psychopath. With the current sample, the total scale score was 16.48 (SD � 3.27). The mean score of Sec- tion 1 was 7.43 (SD � 1.83), and for Section 2, the mean score was 9.32 (SD � 2.17). The internal (alpha) reliability for the PCL:SV was .84; the interrater coefficient was .80. The correlation of Section 1 and Section 2 of the PCL:SV was .39. As has been established in prior research on offenders, the study of psychopathy can be accomplished via record review (Harpur, Hare, & Hakstian, 1989). There have been numer- ous published studies that have used ratings based on record review methods for the classification of psychopathic offenders (Harris, Rice, & Cormier, 1991; Wong, 1988). HCR-20 (Webster, Douglas, Eaves, & Hart, 1997). The HCR-20 is a 20-item rating scale concerned with identifying the risk factors of violent behavior. The 20 items are classi- fied into a 10-item Historical (H) scale, a 5-item Clinical (C) scale, and a 5-item Risk Management (R) scale. These 20 dimensions have been found in prior research to predict orth_1104.qxd 4/10/03 11:23 PM Page 205 206 DUNBAR future violence. The H criteria include ratings for prior vio- lent and risk activities, the C criteria define the attitudes and clinical status of the offender at time of the evaluation, and the R criteria reflect the presence of destabilizing factors related to violent recidivism. Each item is scored by the examiner on a 3-point scale to denote whether the specific variable (e.g., “history of previous violence”) is clearly present, somewhat present, or absent (scored 2, 1, and 0, respectively). The HCR-20 integrates static and unchange- able historical criteria with dynamic criteria of current risk status. The HCR-20 has been used in studies with mixed offender groups (Douglas, Klassen, Ross, Hart, & Webster, 1998), yielding an H score of 12.45 (SD � 3.60), a C score of 5.47 (SD � 2.46), and an R score of 6.64 (SD � 2.30). The HCR-20 scales were found to correlate with ratings for psychopathy and psychopathology. With the current sample, the mean H scale score was 9.35 (SD � 5.72; interrater reli- ability � .94; � � .94), the mean C scale score was 6.11 (SD � 1.85; interrater reliability � .88; � � .92), and the mean R scale score was 6.77 (SD � 2.96; interrater reliability � .91; � � .86). Cornell Aggression Index (Cornell et al., 1996). This rating scale examines the salient features of a specific crimi- nal event, specifically in terms of distinguishing between instrumental and reactive aggression. The rating system as- sesses the form of aggression evidenced by the perpetrator. The Cornell Aggression Index consists of nine rating dimen- sions. The first dimension identifies whether the crime constitutes instrumental or reactive aggression. The four rat- ing values for this criteria range from clearly instrumental, primary instrumental/secondary reactive, primary reactive/ secondary instrumental, to clearly reactive. The remaining eight secondary rating dimensions then consider specific characteristics of aggression, some of which are used to distinguish between instrumental and reactive criminal behavior. For example, planning and goal directedness are typically related to instrumental crimes, whereas the offender’s perceived provocation and level of arousal are features of reactive aggression. This rating system has been used to evaluate mixed offender groups with both adults and adolescents. In the current study, the mean interrater coeffi- cient of reliability for all nine dimensions was .84, with a range from .98 (presence of psychosis) to .76 (level of offender arousal). Cormier–Lang Crime Index (Quincey, Harris, Rice, & Cormier, 1998). This rating scale is derived from an earlier system developed by Akman and Normandeau (1967) to quantify the criminal history of the offender. As Quincey et al. (1998) noted, “This system can be used when only offi- cial police ‘rap sheet’ information is available” (p. 250). The rating system is organized into Class 1 offenses, representing values assigned to violent and aggressive crimes, Class 2 of- fenses for nonaggressive crimes (e.g., theft, fraud), and a total score for all offenses reported. In the current study, the Cormier–Lang Crime Index values were computed for the hate index crime, the total prior criminal history of the hate crime perpetrators, and for the Los Angeles County baseline sample for the hate (index) crime. Aggregate values for Class 1 (violent), Class 2 (nonviolent), and total scores were computed for each of these groups. With the convicted offender sample, the aggregated total score for the criminal history was 15.40 (SD � 18.92). For the hate (index) crime, the total Cormier–Lang Crime Index score was 11.43 (SD � 6.49); the Los Angeles County baseline index crime score on the Cormier–Lang Crime Index was 8.00 (SD � 3.65). Procedure All of the offenses that led to conviction were identified as bias motivated through a multistep classification process. For an offense to be classified as a hate crime, the victim had to report the incident to law enforcement, have the respond- ing officer note the incident was bias related on the crime report, have the precinct hate crimes coordinator review and affirm that the offense was bias motivated, and then, in turn, report the crime to the Los Angeles District Attorney’s Office. The crime report was then reviewed by a staff attor- ney of the District Attorney’s Office Hate Crime Unit, who determined whether the offense provided sufficient grounds to be prosecuted under the state hate crime statutes. This multistep process allows for the removal of events that do not meet the legal standard of being both a crime and bias motivated. Information on the index crime was recorded, as reported by the responding officer, for bias crime motive (e.g., race–ethnicity, religion), number of offenders involved in the crime, and demographic characteristics (gender, race, and age) of the perpetrator(s). Offender personal history was determined via record review of the crime report, review of the offender’s rap sheet of prior arrests and convictions, and evidence presented in the trial proceedings. The criminal history was coded in accor- dance with HCR-20 and PCL:SV rating criteria; this included determining the number of prior convictions and the number of prior violent convictions. Review of crime reports and tes- timony from the trial transcripts were coded by four members of a research team, all of whom were students enrolled in psychology training programs at the time. From these two sources, ratings were assigned for the Cormier– Lang Crime Index and Cornell Aggression Index. I provided training and consultation in the coding and rating of these measures. Analysis of the offender’s developmental history, inclu- sive of childhood and adolescent problems, was recorded from review of the probationary record. Ratings were assigned in accordance with HCR-20 criteria for family problems (divorce and violence in the home), educational problems, history of psychiatric treatment, drug–alcohol dependence, and employment problems noted in the work history. Content analysis of the records was used for scoring the PCL:SV, BMP, and actuarial scales; I coded these. Results The demographic characteristics of the offender sample indicate that these offenses were overwhelm- ingly perpetrated by young men. Of the 58 convicted orth_1104.qxd 4/10/03 11:23 PM Page 206 SIGNIFIERS OF BIAS-MOTIVATED OFFENDERS 207 hate offenders, 91.4% (n � 53) were men and 8.6% (n � 5) were women. The mean age of the offenders was 24.5 years (SD � 8.07, range � 16–44). Eighty- eight percent of the offenders were adults at the time of the hate crime. The race–ethnicity of the offenders included 15.5% African American, 3.4% Asian Pacific, 32.8% European White, and 48.3% Latino. The distribution of the offender’s race and ethnicity is approximate to that of the demography of Los Angeles County. The first research question sought to determine the base rates of the individual signifiers of bias motivation in the commission of a hate crime. Analy- sis of the BMP dimensions indicated that 13.8% (n � 8) of the offenders belonged to an organized hate gang or group, that 22.4% (n � 13) possessed hate paraphernalia–iconography (books, graphic images, or hate tattoos on their body) at the time of the crime, and that 10.3% (n � 6) of the individuals had a history of prior hate-motivated violence. The mean inter- correlation for the four BMP variables was .21, rang- ing from .08 to .43. When considered collectively, there was compelling evidence that 25.9% (n � 15) of the offenders clearly evidenced (i.e., score of 2 on the BMP criteria) one or more of the signifiers of a bias motivation. The hate crimes included physical assault (48.3%), attempted murder (5.2%), and homicide (3.4%); a minority of the offenses (17.3%) were property crimes (i.e., vandalism or hate graffiti). Only 25.8% of the crimes included charges of robbery or extor- tion, that is, the majority of the crimes were unrelated to the pursuit of material or financial reward. Roughly one quarter of the index crimes included charges of restriction of federally protected civil rights (22.4%). Victim selection was predominantly related to race and ethnicity—accounting for 80% of the current cases (n � 46). Another 11 (19%) of the hate crimes were motivated by the victim’s sexual orientation; there was one case motivated by gender bias, and no cases of religious bias crimes. Patterns of aggression based on Cornell Aggression Index ratings of the offense revealed the majority (79%) of the offenders engaged in instrumental forms of aggression. The majority of the bias crimes were committed by multiple perpetrators (M � 2.29, SD � 1.58). Only 27.6% of the offenders in the current sample acted alone. The number of offenders involved in the index crime was correlated with the Cornell Aggression Index ratings for the degree of instrumentality (r � .36, p � .01), planning (r � .21, p � .05), (heightened) level of offender arousal (r � .27, p � .05), (heightened) severity of violence (r � .26, p � .01), lower levels of prior relationship familiarity (r � .27, p � .04) with the victim, and (lower) levels of individual offender psychopathol- ogy (r � �.36, p � .01). The second research question sought to determine whether the type of aggression varied by level of bias motivation. Chi-square analyses were computed for the offenders who clearly evidenced one or more of the bias motivation dimensions (n � 15) in com- parison with different offenders who did not clearly evidence one or more of the BMP criteria (n � 43) groups with the Cornell Aggression Index ratings. Results revealed that the highly bias-motivated offenders engaged in more instrumental (i.e., preda- tory and premeditated) crimes than reactive crimes, �2(3, N � 58) � 5.32, p � .02; evidenced greater goal orientation, �2(3, N � 58) � 8.62, p � .05; and were less likely to have had a prior relationship with their victims, �2(4, N � 58) � 5.94, p � .03. In addi- tion, highly bias-motivated offenders exclusively perpetrated race–ethnic-motivated crimes, �2(2, N � 58) � 5.48, p � .02, rather than sexual-orientation or gender-motivated crimes. Table 1 summarizes these findings. Estimation of risk for violence for the hate offenders (the third research question) was assessed on the HCR-20 and PCL:SV rating scales. Findings indicated that the risk indicators were, as would be anticipated, intercorrelated with one another. The PCL:SV was significantly correlated with the HCR-20 H (r � .51, p � .01), C (r � .42, p � .01), R (r � .49, p � .01), and total scale scores (r � .52, p � .01). Review of the probationary records revealed a variety of develop- mental problems related to risk for violence and anti- social behavior in general. Fifty-eight percent of the sample had a history of substance abuse; nearly 1 in 4 had a history of psychiatric treatment prior to com- mission of the bias crime (22.4%); and a similar number (24.1%) evidenced educational problems, in- cluding failure to complete high school, enrollment in special education programs, and/or school suspen- sion. Approximately one third (37.9%) of the sample had family histories marked by parental separation and/or domestic violence. At the time of commission of the hate crime, 6.9% of the offenders were employed in regular (i.e., full time) work, 42.4% were in marginal or part-time occupations, and 45.5% were unemployed (though some of these were likely employed in illicit work as career criminals). At the time of the hate crime, 87% of the offenders had prior criminal convictions, and 60% had one or more prior violent convictions. The mean number of prior convictions was 5.38 (SD � 0.98). For the current sample, developmental orth_1104.qxd 4/10/03 11:23 PM Page 207 208 DUNBAR Table 1 Cornell Aggression Index Violence Ratings With Offender Number and Bias Component Bias Total no. component Ratings for hate crime n % offendersa �2 Instrumental vs. reactive aggression .36** 5.31* Instrumental aggression 29 50.0 Primarily instrumental/some reactive qualities 6 10.3 Primarily reactive/some instrumental qualities 11 19.0 Clearly reactive hostile aggression 12 20.7 Planning .21* 0.86 Extensive planning/rehearsal 7 12.1 Moderate planning (more than 24 hr) 2 3.4 Some planning (action within 24 hr) 6 10.3 Very little or no planning 43 12.1 Goal directedness .37** 8.62** Clear unequivocal goal directedness 31 53.4 Primary goal directedness, w/other motives 11 19.0 Secondary goal directedness 9 15.5 No apparent goal directedness 7 12.1 Provocation �.03 1.91 Exceptionally strong/repeated assault/abuse 0 Very strong provocation (assault) 1 1.7 Strong 0 Moderate provocation/serious argument/threat 2 3.4 Mild provocation/minor argument 12 20.7 No apparent provocation 43 74.1 Offender arousal .21* 4.18 Enraged, furious/“out of control” 15 25.9 Angry, mad, extremely frightened 7 12.1 Excited, very nervous/anxious 25 43.1 Calm or tense at most 11 25.9 Severity of violence .26* 4.07 Extreme homicide (multiple victims/mutilation) 0 Homicide 2 3.4 Severe injury/lasting impairment 3 5.2 Serious injury requiring substantial hospitalization 6 10.3 Minor injury requiring minor medical treatment 18 31.0 Assault without injury 9 15.5 No assault/threat 20 34.5 Relationship with victim �.27* 5.93* Very close relationship/family member 1 1.7 Close relationship 1 1.7 Specific relationship 11 19.0 Acquaintance 2 1.7 Stranger 44 75.9 Intoxication .16 2.02 Severe intoxication/very impaired 1 1.6 Intoxicated 18 31.0 Mild intoxication 2 3.4 Not intoxicated 37 63.8 Presence of psychosis �.36** 1.40 Substantial psychotic symptoms 0 — Moderate psychotic symptoms 1 1.7 Nonpsychotic disturbance/depersonalized 4 6.9 Not psychotic 53 91.4 aZero-order correlations. *p � .05. **p � .01. orth_1104.qxd 4/10/03 11:23 PM Page 208 SIGNIFIERS OF BIAS-MOTIVATED OFFENDERS 209 risk indicators on the HCR-20 H scale were in the low–average range when compared with a sample of 175 criminal insanity acquittees (Douglas et al., 1998). For the current sample, 27 (47%) of the offenders had PCL:SV scores falling at or above the diagnostic cut score, suggesting that psychopathy may indeed be a risk issue for this population. The issue of offender violence risk was additionally examined in regard to the severity of the bias crime. The risk assessment measures and the number of prior criminal acts were examined in relation to the severity of the hate crime. The HCR-20 total score was corre- lated with the total number of prior offenses (r � .48, p � .01) and the number of prior violent crimes (r � .54, p � .01). The PCL:SV was also correlated with the offender’s number of prior convictions (r � .27, p � .01) and number of prior violent con- victions (r � .29, p � .01). The relationship of these risk predictors to the level of severity of the hate crime (determined on the Cormier–Lang Crime Index) was, however, less consistent. Severity of the hate crime was not significantly correlated with the three HCR-20 scores; the PCL:SV Section 1 score (the narcissism factor) was modestly correlated (r � .25, p � .05) with the severity of violence against the person. Severity of the hate crime was correlated with the number of prior violent convic- tions (r � .46, p � .01) but not with the total number of all (violent and nonviolent) criminal convictions. The severity of violence of the criminal history scores of the offenders, as determined through the aggrega- tion of the Cormier–Lang Crime Index scores, were in all cases correlated with the HCR-20 risk appraisal values. These findings are reported in Table 2. Discussion These findings illustrate that there is significant within-group variability for the degree of bias moti- vation for hate crime offenders. Additionally, the low intercorrelation of the four BMP variables indicates there is only a modest overlap between the identified signifiers of the offender’s bias motivation. This sug- gests that the level of bias motivation for perpetrating a hate crime varies within a unique offender group, as represented by the current sample, and that the dis- cernible indicators of hate motivation vary substan- tially in terms of how it is identified. It is noteworthy that when one or more of these signifiers of bias motivation is clearly present (e.g., prior bias crimi- nality; membership in hate groups; vociferated hate speech; or symbolic representation of hate beliefs in physical garb, literature, or other iconographic form), the nature of aggression is significantly more instru- mental, that is, premeditated. These bias-prominent offenders additionally select their victims because of racial animus. This raises the issue as to whether the motivation for perpetrating a sexual-orientation- or religious-based hate crime is distinctly different from the motivations of those targeting victims on the basis of their race or ethnicity. In the current sample, instrumentally aggressive bias offenders typically engaged in the pursuit of so- cial dominance rather than monetary or material gain. As such, goals of extrinsic reward are largely sup- planted by a goal of aggressive domination of out- group victims. These offenders perpetrated crimes against out-group persons in contexts of benign inter- group contact. Of interest, unlike Cornell et al. (1996, Table 2 Zero-Order Correlations for HCR-20 Risk Appraisal and Psychopathy Checklist: Screening Version (PCL:SV) Psychopathy Ratings With Cormier–Lang Crime Index and Total Prior Criminal Convictions Cormier–Lang Crime Index Total prior Total prior Aggregate Criminal History criminal violent Measure Hate Class 1 (Index) Class 2 Crime total Class 1 Class 2 total convictions convictions HCR-20 Historical .04 .13 .17 .39** .54*** .68*** .51*** .54*** Clinical �.07 .10 .05 .30** .47*** .56*** .44*** .47*** Risk .10 .14 .18 .19* .34** .45*** .33** .35** Total score .04 .13 .15 .33* .50*** .63*** .48*** .54*** PCL:SV Section 1 .21* �.03 .18 .05 .13 .23* .24* .23* Section 2 .17 �.03 .12 .02 .08 .09 .31** .33** Total score .25* �.04 .19* .01 .15 .29** .27* .29** *p � .05. **p � .01. ***p � .001. orth_1104.qxd 4/10/03 11:23 PM Page 209 210 DUNBAR in the study of non-bias-motivated criminals), the cur- rent findings did not reveal a relationship between psychopathy and instrumental aggression. It may be that the bias-motivated offender as a rule is more likely to evidence premeditation in the commission of the hate crime, irrespective of his or her level of psychopathy. A fairly distinct picture of multiple-offender hate crimes emerges from the data. Multiple-offender hate crimes are significantly more planful, more goal directed, and marked by greater levels of arousal. Ad- ditionally, offenders of multiple-perpetrator crimes are less likely to have had a prior relationship with their victim and evidence significantly fewer symp- toms of psychopathology than individuals who perpetuate bias crimes. This composite is largely con- sistent with the study of group-based social bias, most notably in the study of deindividuation (Festinger, Pepitone, & Newcomb, 1952). Janis (1982) has described the process of deindividuation as the abandonment of individual responsibility and instru- mentality, which, in these cases, resulted in the perpe- tration of violence against out-group persons. These findings suggest that multiple-offender hate crimes are characterized by a dehumanization of both the offender via deindividuation and the target through the targeting of (relationally) unknown victims. A great deal needs to be understood about the developmental, cognitive, and conative dynamics of offenders of bias crimes. The current findings reveal a markedly antisocial and psychopathic component in a significant number of the offenders of bias crimes. When considered in terms of individual difference factors that are related to future violence, such as childhood problems, the data suggest that hate of- fenders pose a significant recidivism risk, comparable with that found with many other violent offender groups. The presence of prior violence coupled with a discernible hate ideology should be given consider- able attention by prosecutors, probation officers, and mental health professionals alike. These two compo- nents together may reveal a great deal about risk for recidivistic bias criminality. Furthermore, these find- ings underscore the impoverished social and eco- nomic realities of many offenders of bias crimes. These social psychological barriers to the reduction of violence risk need to be addressed as well. An unexpected finding concerns the absence of a relationship between the estimated risk for violence— as found in the HCR-20 criteria—and the severity of the hate crime itself. This indicates that the severity of bias-motivated crimes may be unrelated to the offender’s risk for violence in general. Rather, the egregiousness of the hate crime may be a product of the strength of the animus of the offender or the social psychological influence of deindividuation. In this sense, hate crimes may indeed be a special case crime, as Herek et al. (1996) have suggested, when consid- ered in context of the larger population of offenders who frequently demonstrate a pattern of criminality and recurring violence. Given the high incidence of psychopathic indica- tors in the sample, it may be that bias-motivated offenders are particularly immune to rehabilitation efforts. This may also be true given the presence of numerous developmental factors associated with vio- lence. This is particularly important given that bias crimes are frequently considered to be a product of educational deficits (e.g., a failure to appreciate diver- sity in society) that is fueled by self-alienation (and hence addressed via therapeutic efforts to develop greater interpersonal capacity) more so than criminal malice. The use of psychoeducational programs that incorporate tolerance education, interpersonal skill development, and anger management has yet to be proven efficacious in reducing recidivism risk of hate crime offenders. These findings challenge our assumptions that bias offenders frequently belong to hate groups or are thrill-seeking adolescents who demonstrate a lapse in their cultural sensitivity. Rather, the current findings point to the need to address issues of substance abuse, poverty, and re- liance on violence as important treatment goals for reduction of recidivism risk. This study has examined the bias motivation of hate crime offenders via a multidimensional approach. This strategy permits for the determination of the offender’s bias motivation through identification of behaviors and articulated attitudes that are inherently hate based. Future research needs to examine both nonviolent (i.e., symbolic) and extremely violent forms of hate criminality with this methodology in the study of offenders of bias-motivated crimes. References Akman, D. D., & Normandeau, A. (1967). The measurement of crime and delinquency in Canada: A replication study. British Journal of Criminology, 7, 129–149. Bell, C. C. (1980). Racism: A symptom of the narcissistic personality disorder. Journal of the National Medical Association, 72, 661–665. Berkowitz, L. (1993). Aggression: Its causes, consequences, and control. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. Boer, D. P., Wilson, R. J., Gauthier, C. M., & Hart, S. D. (1997). Assessing risk for sexual violence: Guidelines for clinical practice. In C. D. Webster & M. A. Jackson (Eds.), orth_1104.qxd 4/10/03 11:23 PM Page 210 SIGNIFIERS OF BIAS-MOTIVATED OFFENDERS 211 Impulsivity: Theory, assessment, and treatment (pp. 326– 342). New York: Guilford Press. California State Department of Justice. 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work_i4vfjis6qbgg5lsuqbw5becgfe	----	SS125-chap06.qxp We provide a brief overview of Muslim college students and the issues they face on campus. Specific practical sug- gestions are given on what student affairs professionals can do to combat hostility toward Islamic religious groups through the use of dialogue and to create safe spaces for Muslim students to engage in spiritual exploration. Practical Suggestions to Accommodate the Needs of Muslim Students on Campus Saba Rasheed Ali, Elham Bagheri Within higher education, Muslim students face internal and external chal- lenges to adherence to Islam. These students report feeling judged by oth- ers because of their religious affiliation (Nasir and Al-Amin, 2006). Many Muslim students report apprehension and discomfort in performing Islamic duties that are visible to the public, including prayer, fasting, modest dress, and nonconsumption of alcohol (Nasir and Al-Amin, 2006). A lack of ac- commodation for religious practices such as a safe space for prayer, meal accommodations, and acknowledgment of Islamic practices and holidays by administrators and professors can also be problematic for Muslim students (Nasir and Al-Amin, 2006). Given these challenges, it is important that student affairs practition- ers find ways to assist Muslim students in their adherence to their religion as they pursue their degree. In this chapter, we present a brief introduction to Islamic tenets, discuss challenges facing Muslim college students, and offer practical strategies and suggestions for student affairs practitioners to better assist Muslim students. We conclude with a discussion of ways that student affairs practitioners can combat hostility toward the Islamic religion and Muslim students. 47 6 NEW DIRECTIONS FOR STUDENT SERVICES, no. 125, Spring 2009 © Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Published online in Wiley InterScience (www.interscience.wiley.com) • DOI: 10.1002/ss.307 48 INTERSECTIONS OF RELIGIOUS PRIVILEGE NEW DIRECTIONS FOR STUDENT SERVICES • DOI: 10.1002/ss Introduction to Islam The religion of Islam has an estimated 1 billion followers (called Muslims), making it the second largest religion in the world. Islam is growing in the United States and is soon projected to be the second largest faith group in the country. Currently there are approximately 6 to 8 million Muslims liv- ing in the United States (U.S. State Department, 2001). Muslims in the United States are a diverse group and are associated with various racial/ ethnic backgrounds, including Arabs (26.2 percent), South Asians (24.7 per- cent), African Americans (23.8 percent), Caucasian and Native Americans (11 percent), Middle Eastern non-Arabs (10.3 percent), and East Asians (6.4 percent; U.S. State Department, 2001). It is estimated that approximately seventy-five thousand Muslim students are enrolled in American colleges and universities (Rossi, 2002). Islam is a monotheistic Abrahamic religion. Islam means “surrender,” and Muslim means “one who submits to the will of Allah.” Muslims use the word Allah to refer to the God of all humanity (Ali, Liu, and Humedian, 2004). The Qur’an is the holy book for Muslims and is believed to be the fundamental source of Islamic principles and values. There are two sects of Islam, Shia and Sunni, which resulted from disagreements in the late sev- enth century among Muslims regarding the religious and political leader- ship of the Islamic community. Although there are some differences between the two sects, the core beliefs of Islam are the same for both. In Islam there are five articles of faith, commonly referred to as the five pillars of Islam: (1) Iman or faith (belief in One God), (2) prayer five times daily (salat), (3) zakat or charity, (4) sawm or fasting from sunrise to sun- set for thirty days during the month of Ramadan, and (5) hajj or a once-in- a-lifetime pilgrimage to Mecca. Although the five pillars are the same for all Muslims, there is a wide variety of nationalities, ethnic backgrounds, and different sects represented within Islam. There are also many differences in terms of the traditions and customs that are followed. The Context of Islamophobia In the United States, Islam has tended to be a religion that has not been well understood, and the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, resulted in an increase in the marginalization and discrimination of Muslims. The tragedy of 9/11 was unique in that an entire group of individuals, Muslims, were considered the perpetrators and an entire nation, which is majority Chris- tian, was considered the victim. Therefore, the events of 9/11 sparked not only a political conflict but also a theological conflict. While Islam was misunderstood prior to 9/11, the media coverage of the tragedies focused on the extreme differences between Muslims and Western traditions and religious beliefs. Although Muslims believe Islam is a continuation of Judaism and Christianity, the media and many high- 49PRACTICAL SUGGESTIONS TO ACCOMMODATE THE NEEDS OF MUSLIM STUDENTS NEW DIRECTIONS FOR STUDENT SERVICES • DOI: 10.1002/ss profile evangelical figureheads characterized Islam as a religion that is in considerable conflict with Christianity. In their characterization, they often exacerbated problems in understanding the religion of Islam and brought more attention to a minority of extremists while ignoring the voices of the majority of Muslims who do not adhere to extremist beliefs and behaviors (Takim, 2004). After September 11, 2001, an increase in Islamophobia became an unfortunate reality for Muslims and those who resembled individuals from Muslim countries (Council on American-Islamic Relations, 2007). The neg- ative beliefs and perceptions about Islam and the Middle East caused indi- viduals to retaliate against those who appeared to be the cause of the terrorist tragedies (Henderson and Sims, 2004). Hate crimes “have consisted of tele- phone, internet, mail, and face-to-face threats; minor assaults as well as assaults with dangerous weapons and assaults resulting in serious injury and death; and vandalism, shootings, arson and bombings directed at homes, businesses, and places of worship” (U.S. Department of Justice, 2007). Muslims on College Campuses. Muslims on college campuses are not immune to these personal threats and discrimination in spite of the pretense that most college campuses produce an environment tolerant of differences. Muslim students who have been victims of hate crimes suffer from signifi- cant physical, psychological, and emotional consequences. Threat to phys- ical well-being is the most obvious negative consequence of hate crimes for victims; however, there are also significant psychological effects for vic- tims. Victims of hate crimes have been shown to incur long-term posttrau- matic stress disorder and need longer to recover from the incident than victims of crimes that were not motivated by bias and hate (Herek, Gillis, Cogan, and Glunt, 1997). Victims of hate crimes may also believe that all individuals who are of the perpetrators’ social group hold the same harm- ful intentions as the perpetrator (Henderson and Sloan, 2003). Hate Crimes in the Classroom. Hate crimes are one way in which anti-Islamic sentiment has been manifested, but more subtle anti-Islamic sentiment may also be present in the classroom. Universities are hotbeds for debates concerning politics and religion. Many classes are focused exclu- sively on such topics, and the current political climate can make discussions in the classroom a difficult experience for Muslim students. Although classroom discussions should be challenging and students have the right to express their beliefs and opinions, if such discussions are not monitored properly by professors, they can lead to the expression of ridicule and discrimination toward Muslims and Islam (Speck, 1997). Mus- lim students have also reported hesitance in correcting professors due to viewing the professor as an authority figure with power over their grades and class standing (Speck, 1997). Anti-Islamic sentiment in the classroom can also contribute to feelings of isolation among Muslim students, especially if a student is the only Mus- lim in the class. The simple fact of being a minority in the classroom can 50 INTERSECTIONS OF RELIGIOUS PRIVILEGE NEW DIRECTIONS FOR STUDENT SERVICES • DOI: 10.1002/ss create an uncomfortable learning environment. In classes that discuss social, cultural, and religious topics, the potential for discrimination is always present. Because Muslim students are typically a minority in classrooms, they often feel obligated to be representatives of their religion and culture (Nasir and Al-Amin, 2006). Representing an entire group of people and feeling responsible for disconfirming stereotypes can be a daunting task for stu- dents in the classroom. Institutional Policies and Barriers to the Practice of Islam One of the most apparent manifestations of Christian privilege in universi- ties is the academic calendar. It is centered on Christian holidays and fails to recognize holidays of other faiths, including Islam. In Islam there are two holidays that are celebrated by all Muslims and other events that are con- sidered holidays by some Muslims. Because universities in non-Islamic countries, such as the United States, do not officially recognize Islamic hol- idays, Muslim students struggle with the decision of fulfilling their academic responsibilities or observing their religious holidays. Such a decision can be a stressful and difficult experience for Muslim students who value both their academic obligations and their religious duties. Another institutional barrier for practicing Islam on college campuses is lack of a safe space for prayer (Blumenfeld, 2006). Islamic prayer is a rit- ual that needs to be conducted five times a day at specific times. When safe and established places are not available, Muslim students have reported dis- comfort and anxiety from searching for a place to pray on campus (Nasir and Al-Amin, 2006). They feel that other students and faculty do not under- stand the process of Islamic prayer, and this makes praying in public spaces an uncomfortable experience for them (Nasir and Al-Amin, 2006). Another barrier to conducting prayer is when academic obligations, such as class or meetings, overlap with prayer times (Speck, 1997). Dietary Restrictions. In Islam there are certain dietary restrictions that some Muslims strictly follow while others may not. These include the consumption of halal meat, which is slaughtered in the name of God, and prohibition against eating pork. For Muslim students who do adhere to the dietary restrictions, dining options on college campuses may not be ade- quate. Dining availability also becomes an issue for Muslim students dur- ing the month of Ramadan when they fast from sunrise to sunset, and dining hall schedules may not be accommodating. Islam forbids the consumption of alcohol. Given that a source of enter- tainment on college campuses involves drinking, Muslims may feel socially isolated from their peers. They may also have very few choices in entertain- ment and social outlets. 51PRACTICAL SUGGESTIONS TO ACCOMMODATE THE NEEDS OF MUSLIM STUDENTS NEW DIRECTIONS FOR STUDENT SERVICES • DOI: 10.1002/ss Female Muslim Students. Female Muslim students may need addi- tional support because of the issues they face in terms of cultural expectations and discrimination experiences. These students may need safe spaces to dis- cuss their concerns about religious practice. An issue of particular significance for Muslim women on college campuses is that of choosing to wear the hijab (veil). There is not one universally accepted definition of hijab in Islam, which is why women who choose to wear the hijab may look different depending on their nationality and culture. In most instances, the hijab involves cover- ing the hair with a veil and modest dress that covers most of the body. Student affairs practitioners may be able to establish support groups for Muslim women who are struggling with issues concerning hijab, especially in dormitories or other student housing facilities. These groups may be able to bring together women from across campus to help them negotiate their religious identity and the ways in which they choose to express it. It may also strengthen their ability to provide information about this practice to the non-Muslim community. Practical Suggestions Student affairs practitioners can assist Muslim students in overcoming bar- riers to spiritual exploration and religious adherence in many ways. In addi- tion, they can be instrumental in improving campus climate for Muslim students by directly addressing Islamaphobia and misunderstandings between Muslim and non-Muslim students. We provide strategies for improving Muslim students’ experiences, as well as the campus climate: • One simple way that universities can create a climate conducive to religious adherence among Muslims students is to include Islamic religious holidays on the academic calendar. Although the holidays may not be officially rec- ognized by the university, an alternate calendar with a description of the hol- idays can educate faculty and administrators on this topic. It is important that faculty and administrators show public support for Muslim students. • Student affairs practitioners can create safe places for Muslim students to pray and hold services. Campuses across the United States have created student centers or provided available spaces to Muslim students for the purpose of religious gatherings and prayer (Eckstrom, 2000). Muslim stu- dents have found this to be a significant sign of support on behalf of their college community (Eckstrom, 2000) that leads to an improvement in morale and communicates to non-Muslim students an appreciation for religious diversity. It is also important to provide adequate accommoda- tions for students to pray during the required prayer time. One way this might be accomplished is for college student practitioners to survey Mus- lim students on campus in order to investigate their specific needs for accommodation (Speck, 1997). 52 INTERSECTIONS OF RELIGIOUS PRIVILEGE NEW DIRECTIONS FOR STUDENT SERVICES • DOI: 10.1002/ss • Evaluate dining options and consider whether the dietary needs of Mus- lim students are being met. Dining hall accommodations include provid- ing adequate nonpork meals, providing halal meat (kosher meat is acceptable), and adjusting the schedule during the month of Ramadan. • Set up alcohol-free social experiences that might not only benefit Muslim students but attract other students who do not drink alcohol. A side ben- efit may be promotion of commonalities between Muslim students and other students who choose not to drink. • Organize panel discussions and educational opportunities that open up for discussion the role of women in Islam and the role of hijab to help clear up misunderstandings and correct misinformation. Allowing non- Muslims to ask questions without fear of evaluation or defensiveness may directly address the concerns and biases that non-Muslim students have about the practice of hijab. The following suggestions can assist student affairs practitioners to fos- ter better relations among Muslim and non-Muslim students: • Work directly with Muslim student associations to provide information to non-Muslim students. Panels and guest speakers are ways of providing information. However, simple exposure through social experiences may also go a long way in promoting an appreciation for diversity. Social expe- riences centered around the Islamic holidays can be organized in collab- oration with these associations. These celebrations could be fun experiences that increase the casual contact of people of different faiths and improve relations between Muslim and non-Muslim groups. • Sponsor a “fast for a day” event during the month of Ramadan in which students are encouraged to refrain from drinking and eating from sunrise to sunset for one day (this is the fasting that Muslims practice during the thirty-day period of Ramadan). After sunset, sponsor an iftar, the tradi- tional evening meal for breaking the daily fast. Iftar is often done as a community, with Muslims gathering to break their fast together. The sponsorship of this event promotes an understanding of Islam and the practice of fasting that extends beyond lectures and panel discussions to promote an actual experience for non-Muslim students. • Create safe dialogue. Most college campuses strive to educate students and encourage critical thinking about global and local events. Given the cur- rent political climate and world events, heated discussions about political issues that are intertwined with religious conflicts may be inevitable. These discussions, if not carefully handled, can lead to increased hostility between Muslim and non-Muslim students. Therefore, it is important to provide safe spaces for these discussions and ensure they are properly mediated. • Train professors to manage difficult political and religious disagreements in class, especially classes where group discussion participation is one facet of grading criteria. Training should address educating faculty in how 53PRACTICAL SUGGESTIONS TO ACCOMMODATE THE NEEDS OF MUSLIM STUDENTS NEW DIRECTIONS FOR STUDENT SERVICES • DOI: 10.1002/ss to mediate discussions between Muslim and non-Muslim students and how to implement appropriate strategies to include Muslim students who may feel alienated in classroom discussions. These trainings can be offered through centers for teaching or international services. • Dialogue and collaboration between Muslims and non-Muslims can be facilitated through student organizations. For example, encouraging var- ious religious communities to participate in interfaith dialogues and social service projects can spark common ground between Muslims and other religious communities. Interfaith service projects in which two or more faith groups collaborate on a community-enhancing project are being practiced in a variety of settings and often take people from different reli- gious backgrounds beyond discussions into social action. These interfaith groups can also serve as a safe space for Muslim students to find support and allies outside their own faith community. Conclusion Fostering a multicultural environment must be a priority for college cam- puses as their campuses become more diverse. In particular, with the cur- rent political and social climate, multicultural awareness surrounding Islam and the experiences of Muslim students has become increasingly important. Raising awareness and increasing knowledge is the first step; however, tak- ing action is the most effective means by which campuses can become advo- cates for Muslim students. It is action that will provide evidence that the campus is committed to creating an environment that not only acknowl- edges and appreciates the diversity that Muslim students contribute to cam- pus, but is also dedicated to ensuring that Muslim students are recognized as valued members of the campus community. References Ali S. R., Liu, W. and Humedian, M. “Islam 101: Understanding the Religion and Ther- apy Implications.” Professional Psychology: Research and Practice, 2004, 35, 635–642. Blumenfeld, W. J. “Christian Privilege and the Promotion of ‘Secular’ and Not-So ‘Secu- lar’ Mainline Christianity in Schooling and the Larger Society.” Equity and Excellence in Education, 2006, 39, 195–210. Council on American-Islamic Relations. “Islamophobia.” 2007. Retrieved Jan. 15, 2007, from www.cair.com/Issues/Islamophobia/Islamophobia.aspx. Eckstrom, K. “More Colleges Becoming Muslim Friendly.” Staten Island Advance, Apr. 8, 2000. Henderson, K. C., and Sims, M. B. “An Investigation of African American College Stu- dents’ Beliefs About Anti–Middle Eastern Hate Crime and Victims in the Wake of Sep- tember 11th.” Western Journal of Black Studies, 2004, 28, 511–517. Henderson, K. C., and Sloan, R. “After the Hate: Helping Psychologists Help Victims of Racist Hate Crime.” Clinical Psychology: Science and Practice, 2003, 10, 481–490. Herek, G. M., Gillis, J. R., Cogan, J. C., and Glunt, E. K. “Hate Crime Victimization Among Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual Adults: Prevalence, Psychological Correlates and Methodological Issues.” Journal of Interpersonal Violence, 1997, 12, 195–215. 54 INTERSECTIONS OF RELIGIOUS PRIVILEGE NEW DIRECTIONS FOR STUDENT SERVICES • DOI: 10.1002/ss Nasir, N. S., and Al-Amin, J. “Creating Identity-Safe Spaces on College Campuses for Muslim Students.” Change, 2006, 22–27. Rossi, H. L. “Muslim Chaplains a New Priority for College Campuses.” Pew Forum for Religion and Public Life. 2002. Retrieved Jan. 10, 2007, from http://pewforum.org/ news/display.php?NewsID=1203. Speck, B. W. “Respect for Religious Difference: The Case of Muslim Students.” In D. L. Sigsbee, B. W. Speck, and B. Maylath (eds.), Approaches to Teaching Non-Native English Speakers Across the Curriculum. New Directions for Teaching and Learning, no. 70. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1997. Suad, N., and Al-Amin, J. “Creating Identity-Safe Spaces on College Campuses for Mus- lim Students.” Change, 2006, 22–27. Takim, L. (2004). “From Conversion to Conversation: Interfaith Dialogue in Post 9–11 America.” Muslim World, 2004, 94, 343–355. U.S. Department of Justice. ”Post 9/11 Activity Update.” Enforcement and Outreach Fol- lowing the September 11 Terrorist Attacks, 1997. Retrieved Jan. 10, 2007, from http:// www.usdoj.gov/crt/legalinfo/discrimupdate.htm. U.S. State Department. Fact Sheet: Islam in the United States. 2001. Retrieved December, 12, 2001, from http://uninfo.state.gove/usa/islam/fact2.htm. SABA RASHEED ALI is an assistant professor of counseling psychology in the Department of Psychological and Quantitative Foundations at the University of Iowa. ELHAM BAGHERI is a doctoral student in the counseling psychology program in the Department of Psychological and Quantitative Foundations at the Univer- sity of Iowa. 
work_iew5drfet5cmhfnx7ub7ycqpay	----	JSI Violence 2-col Preprint.doc Pr e- Pu bli ca tio n D ra ft 1 Victim Experiences in Hate Crimes Based on Sexual Orientation* Gregory M. Herek University of California, Davis Jeanine C. Cogan Washington, DC J. Roy Gillis Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, University of Toronto This is a preprint of a paper that will appear in Journal of Social Issues (2002), 58(2), 319-339. Please do not quote or cite without the author’s explicit permission. * Data collection and preparation of this paper were supported by grants to Gregory Herek from the National Institute of Mental Health (R01-MH50185 and K02-MH01455). We thank Robyn Caruso and David Webb for their special assistance with coding and analyzing the interview narratives. We also thank Jennifer Lyle, Camille Barber, Rebecca Blanton, Aaron Carruthers, Mary Ellen Chaney, Yancey Cuyugan, Gricelda Espinoza, Fred Fead, Gregory Gadwood, Adela Gayton, Eric Glunt, Gisi Gonzales, Rebecca Hill, Kim Lasdon, Gerardo Medina, Kyle Pham, Clarmundo Sullivan, Paula Urtecho, and David Welton for their invaluable contributions to the project. Correspondence should be sent to Gregory Herek, Psychology Department, University of California, 1 Shields Avenue, Davis, CA 95616- 8686, USA. Abstract Using interview data from a convenience sample of 450 lesbian, gay, and bisexual adults, the varieties of victim experiences in hate crimes based on sexual orientation are described. Most crimes were perpetrated in public settings by one or more strangers, but victimization also occurred in other locales and perpetrators included neighbors, coworkers, and relatives. In deciding whether a crime was based on their sexual orientation, victims tended to rely primarily on contextual cues and perpetrators’ explicit statements. Victims’ concerns about police bias and public disclosure of their sexual orientation were important factors in deciding whether to report antigay crimes, as were beliefs about the crime’s severity and the likelihood that perpetrators would be punished. Crimes that target individuals because of their sexual orientation – commonly referred to as hate crimes or bias crimes – are now understood to be a serious social problem (Jenness & Broad, 1997). This recognition has been facilitated, in part, by empirical research showing that hate crime victimization is widespread among lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals and that hate crimes are less likely than other crimes to be reported to police authorities (e.g., Berrill, 1992a; Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1999; Herek, 1989, 1993; Herek, Gillis, & Cogan, 1999; Herek, Gillis, Cogan, & Glunt, 1997; Pilkington & D’Augelli, 1995). In addition to documenting the prevalence of antigay hate crimes, social scientists have begun to attempt to understand the consequences of such crimes for the victim. This line of study represents a melding of research traditions, integrating scientific inquiry about the psychological consequences of severe trauma and crime (e.g., Bard & Sangrey, 1979; Janoff- Bulman, 1992), prejudice against sexual minorities (e.g., Herek, 1992, 2000), and the effects of prejudice on its target (e.g., Swim & Pr e- Pu bli ca tio n D ra ft 2 Stangor, 1998). Although still preliminary, theoretical and empirical work suggest that victims of antigay bias crimes are at risk for greater and perhaps longer lasting psychological distress than are gay and lesbian victims of comparable non-bias crimes (e.g., Garnets, Herek, & Levy, 1990; Herek et al., 1999). Because research on the psychosocial impact of antigay crimes is still in its early stages, systematic description of the experiences associated with such crimes is needed. However, such description is difficult to obtain through self-administered questionnaires, the method used in most published studies of antigay hate crime victimization. Questionnaires are an efficient means for collecting readily quantifiable responses from large numbers of gay men, lesbians, and bisexuals (Herek & Berrill, 1992), but yield only a limited understanding of the intricacies of hate crimes. Among their shortcomings are that they require respondents to have at least basic literacy skills, do not allow for follow-up probes, and are practical only when most questions are closed rather than open-ended. For these and other reasons, face-to-face interviews – in which respondents can give spoken, narrative responses and which allow for extended follow- up questions – can be a valuable complement to self-administered questionnaires. This paper describes insights into the nature of hate crimes that we gained from personal interviews with gay men, lesbians, and bisexuals. We focus on three questions: (1) What are the varieties of hate crime victimization experienced by sexual minorities? (2) How do victims decide that a crime is based on their sexual orientation? (3) Why do many victims choose not to report an incident to police authorities? METHOD Interviewees were 450 volunteers from a larger convenience sample. The larger sample (N = 2,259) consisted of sexual minority adults in the greater Sacramento (California) area who completed a lengthy self-administered questionnaire about victimization and mental health. They were recruited through a variety of strategies including outreach at community events, organizational contacts, local advertising, and personal networks. (For details about the larger sample and findings from the questionnaire study, see Herek et al., 1999.) Questionnaire respondents who indicated their willingness to be interviewed were contacted by a member of the research team (matched to the respondent’s sex and race) who explained the interview procedures and, for those deciding to participate, arranged the interview time and location. We originally planned to conduct 150 interviews with victims of antigay hate crimes, 150 with victims of nonbias crimes, and 150 with individuals who had never been criminally victimized. However, most interviewees who reported no crimes in their screening questionnaire subsequently recalled some type of victimization experience during their interview. This discrepancy was probably an effect of the extensive questioning and many memory cues provided during the interview. As a result, about 94% of interviewees described at least one crime experience. Most recalled multiple victimizations (median = 4; maximum = 8). Interviews were conducted by college- educated staff members who had completed extensive training in interview methods and procedures for protecting the welfare of interviewees. They were completed in the participant’s home, our research office in Davis, or another suitable location chosen by the participant. The interview lasted 2-4 hours, depending on the number of victimizations described by the respondent. Interviews were audiotaped with the consent of respondents and answers to open-ended questions were transcribed. Each interviewee was paid $15. The final interview sample (N = 450) consisted of 224 men (204 gay, 20 bisexual) and 226 women (202 lesbian, 24 bisexual), ranging in age from 19 to 73 (mean = 37 years) with a median annual income between $15,000 and $25,000. Approximately 81% were non-Hispanic White, with another 7% Latino, 3% Asian/Pacific Islander, 3% African American, 1% Native American, and 5% of mixed race or ethnicity. One half had earned at least a Pr e- Pu bli ca tio n D ra ft 3 bachelor’s degree. After they briefly described each crime, we asked respondents if they felt “that the incident occurred mainly because the other person(s) believed that you were [lesbian/gay/bisexual], that is, because they wanted to victimize a [lesbian/gay/bisexual] person.” The majority (57% of the sample) described one or more nonbias victimizations, but none that were bias motivated. Another 3% had experienced at least one bias victimization but no nonbias incidents. One third (34%) had experienced both types of victimization. Those who experienced a bias crime were asked what it was “that made you realize or believe that the incident was related to your sexual orientation.” We then asked follow- up questions about the crime and whether it was reported to the police. After respondents had thus described each of their victimization experiences (to a maximum of 8), we asked a series of more detailed questions about the one antigay crime in which the interviewee felt he or she was in the greatest danger. For interviewees who did not report any crimes based on their sexual orientation, the follow-up questions referred to the nonbias crime in which they felt they were in the greatest danger. A total of 154 interviewees provided detailed information about a completed or attempted bias crime (52 a property crime, such as robbery or vandalism; 102 an assault, rape, or robbery, hereafter referred to as person crimes) and another 244 described a completed or attempted nonbias crime (111 a property crime; 133 a person crime). Another 25 described no victimization experiences. The remaining 27 interviewees either declined to designate one crime as the most serious or named an incident that we later decided could not unambiguously be classified as a crime, such as witnessing an assault or receiving a harassing telephone call. RESULTS Because of the small number of nonvictims in the sample, we report comparisons between victims of bias and nonbias crimes, and between victims of person and property crimes. Before making such comparisons, we assessed the severity of bias and nonbias crimes. For person crimes, we asked victims how much they feared that they would be injured during the attack, how much they feared they would be killed, and the extent of their actual injuries. Survivors of bias and nonbias person crimes did not differ significantly on any of these indicators. In both groups, about 88% said that they had feared being injured to at least some extent during the incident they described. One half (50%) of nonbias crime survivors and 66% of bias crime survivors said that they “felt a lot of danger” of injury. Approximately one half (51%) of bias crime victims and 42% of nonbias crime victims feared that their life was in danger during the incident, with 27% of nonbias crime victims and 36% of bias crime victims reporting that they felt “a lot of danger” of being killed. In both groups, slightly more than 40% of survivors reported some physical injury as a result of the attack, with 8% of nonbias crime victims and 14% of bias crime victims characterizing their injuries as “fairly serious” or “very serious.” Whereas the severity of bias and nonbias person crimes was comparable, bias and nonbias property crimes differed somewhat in form. Most bias property crimes were acts of vandalism: 81% included vandalism, compared to 39% of nonbias property crimes. By contrast, 64% of the nonbias property crimes involved theft, compared to 27% of bias crimes. This difference should be recalled when property crimes are compared below. Describing Crimes Against Lesbians, Gay Men, and Bisexuals Settings and Perpetrators We categorized each interviewee’s most serious crime according to whether it occurred in a public setting (e.g., a street, a commercial establishment), an interior private setting (a home or office), a school campus, another institutional setting (jail, military base), a rural area, or immediately outside the victim’s home (e.g., a driveway or front yard). Compared to nonbias crimes, bias person crimes occurred disproportionately in public places (60%, versus 32% of nonbias person crimes and 32% of Pr e- Pu bli ca tio n D ra ft 4 nonbias property crimes). By contrast, nonbias person crimes took place significantly more often in an interior private setting than did bias person crimes (53% versus 27%, respectively). Property crimes were more likely than person crimes to occur immediately outside one’s home (respectively, 15% and 12% of bias and nonbias property crimes, compared to 1% and 2% of bias and nonbias person crimes). For the comparison of the four crime types by location, Χ2 (15, n = 398) = 55.67, p < .001. Of the 320 respondents who could specify the number of perpetrators, most (68%) were victimized by a lone assailant. However, bias crimes were more likely than nonbias crimes to have multiple perpetrators. For person crimes, 46% of bias crimes had two or more perpetrators, compared to only 17% of nonbias crimes. And whereas 68% of bias property crimes had two or more perpetrators, this was true of only 33% of nonbias property crimes. For the comparison of crime type by number of perpetrators, Χ2 (3, n = 305) = 33.26, p < .001. In nearly two thirds of crimes (62%), the victim did not know the perpetrator(s). This pattern differed according to crime category, however. In 70% of bias person crimes, 66% of bias property crimes, and 79% of nonbias property crimes, the perpetrators were strangers. By contrast, 58% of nonbias person crimes were committed by someone known to the victim. The difference between nonbias person crimes and the three other types of crime was statistically significant, Χ2 (3, n = 364) = 34.52, p < .001. Most perpetrators were adolescents or young adults. Of the 304 victims who were able to estimate the perpetrator’s age, 61% placed him or her in the range of 13 to 25 years. The majority of perpetrators were White. Of the 302 interviewees who could identify at least one perpetrator’s race, 69% reported one or more White perpetrators, 17% reported at least one Black perpetrator, and 19% reported at least one Hispanic perpetrator. Few respondents reported an Asian-American (n = 4) or Native American/Indian (n = 2) perpetrator. Perpetrator race did not appear to vary according to the victim’s race or ethnicity. However, because most victims in the interview sample were non- Hispanic Whites, we could not adequately assess this relationship. Regardless of the crime type or the victim’s sex, most perpetrators were male. Of the 302 victims who knew the perpetrator’s sex, 99% of men and 90% of women named at least one male perpetrator. The relatively few incidents that included a female perpetrator tended to be female-on-female crimes. Across crime categories, the sex of perpetrators differed significantly between men and women interviewees only for bias person crimes. In that group, 91% of women respondents were victimized by at least one man and 17% were victimized by at least one woman. By contrast, all of the men respondents were victimized by males and only 2% by females. Among the victims of bias person crimes, the difference between men and women respondents was significant for male perpetrators, Χ2 (1, n = 100) = 5.75, p < .05, and for female perpetrators, Χ2 (1, n = 100) = 7.39, p < .01. The Varieties of Hate Crime Victimization Victimization in Gay-Identified Settings Consistent with previous research (e.g., Berrill, 1992a) and the analyses reported above, many interviewees described antigay crimes that were perpetrated by groups of strangers in proximity to a gay-identified venue. The severity of such attacks ranged from harassment and threats to physical assault and, in the case of one interviewee, the murder of a friend. The story told by one lesbian was typical of many incidents described by interviewees. I was parked in the lot of a gay bar and if you were parked there it was obvious you were in the gay bar…. And I came out to my car and my front windshield was smashed in by what appeared to be a baseball bat. The side mirrors were beat, it was totally shattered …. Some victims suffered assault but were not seriously injured. One respondent, for example, Pr e- Pu bli ca tio n D ra ft 5 described being followed by a truck as he walked home one night from a gay bar. These 4 guys started yelling these great slurs at me, called me “faggot….” Then I started getting scared. The next thing you know, that truck stops, this guy jumps out. He has an egg in his hand. First I didn’t know it was an egg in his hand. I didn’t see the egg, I saw his hand. Now everybody else didn’t get out of the truck, but you know that was a possibility that could have happened too, wasn’t there? He then called me faggot and he threw the egg and hit me right here, it hit me right here in the chest…. You tell me if I wasn’t scared. None of the other guys got out of the truck, and then he simply calmly got back, jumped back into the truck and sped off. This man’s story highlights the fear associated with such an experience. Most likely, he was aware that such incidents often end in serious injury or even death for the victim. During the crime, he could not know that only one of the truck’s occupants would attack him or that he would be struck with an egg rather than a more lethal weapon. Thus, despite the absence of serious physical harm, the attack evoked considerable fear. Because fears of serious injury and death during a crime are associated with the degree of psychological trauma it inflicts (Kilpatrick et al., 1989), even seemingly minor incidents can have a negative aftermath for the victim. Many attacks caused serious injury and some had deadly consequences. One man described how he was assaulted and his friend was murdered while visiting a Southern city. [We] walked outside the bar and there were about six guys standing on the corner down from the bar. Our car was parked right on the corner of where they were. As we were walking towards them, they saw us coming and started walking towards us. They started calling us “fags,” saying “fags,” “look at the fags” and “nigger fag.” …They said “We’re going to kill us some faggots today” and “we don’t want fags in [this city]” ….They attacked us with bricks and clubs. [My friend] was hit in the head with a brick, and when he went down, they hit him more in the head with bricks and clubs till he stopped moving. I was hit in the legs with a club, and broke my knee cap. The other two friends got away and went back into the bar to call the police, and came out with more people from the bar, and chased the attackers away until the police got there. The police took about 20 minutes to get there and the ambulance almost a half an hour. By that time [my friend] had already expired. He died in my arms. Victimization in Other Public Spaces Going to a gay-identified establishment carries the risk of verbal harassment, vandalism, and physical assault. However, the interviews also made it clear that any public space is potentially dangerous. One woman, for example, described her experience in a public park with a group of women friends when three men walked past and harassed them. When they reached me … they pinched me on the butt. And my girlfriend saw this and said “Get your hands off her.” So they stopped, turned around and said “Want to fight, bitch?” We kind of circled up and, you know, we were all facing them and said “No, leave us alone, get out of here.” We tried to get them to leave and they wouldn’t. When she said she didn’t want to fight, he just stuck his fist out and broke her nose…As he was getting ready to throw the punch … he said “fucking dykes….” One person [got] a cut open on their cheek, face. And another one had her collarbone broken and got knocked unconscious. I got kicked in the knee and upper thigh and was severely bruised. And Pr e- Pu bli ca tio n D ra ft 6 then somebody came by and helped scare them away for us. A man described his experience while jogging near a river, wearing a singlet with a lavender triangle emblem. There were five or six youths between 18 and 22. They were drinking and I had stopped to cool off at the river. They grabbed stones and were cornering me against the river and the dam, with threats and comments…. Their comments were “We hate you gays….” They threw stones, large riverbed stones at me…. To leap into the river would have been to go over the dam, and it’s a very deadly dam.… I knew that was no route to escape. And so the only possibility was to leap and escape running. I tried to distract them in some way, verbally, and move away from the river to sprint away from them. Another woman was harassed while riding her bicycle one afternoon. I heard some guys kinda’ yelling and screaming. I tried to ignore them. Then suddenly beer cans were being thrown at me. They pulled up next to me and they were throwing beer cans at me and making derogatory remarks…. “fucking faggot,” “fucking queer”…. “fucking dyke”…. They stopped in back of me and I continued riding away from them. And they started up again, coming up from behind, continuing with derogatory remarks and then saying “Let’s get her and let’s get that bike.” They made a motion as though some of them were going to get out of their car, and that’s when I took off on my bike and got the hell outta’ there. In these situations, the victims were not in a gay-identified setting but their sexual orientation was assumed by the perpetrators on the basis of contextual cues. The woman in the park was with a group of women, the jogger was wearing a singlet with a gay symbol on it, and the bicyclist was wearing a shirt with the word “lesbian” prominently displayed. Their experiences suggest that, although gay venues are often sites of attacks, being identified as gay or bisexual in any public setting carries a risk. Victimization At Home Nor is one’s home a safe refuge. Many interviewees had their house, car, or other personal property stolen, vandalized, or destroyed in antigay incidents. One man described the events on a day when he and his lover were leaving on a fishing trip. We got up very early that morning and got in the car and backed out of the garage. And it has an automatic closer and it went down and it said – I don’t remember the words but it was something about “fag” or “faggot.” Several words, but I don’t remember what they were, sprayed onto the redwood garage door in black paint. Another woman described how vandals filled her car with grass clippings, put nails in the tires, and “spray painted ‘queer’ all over my car.” In some cases, the incident was part of an ongoing pattern of harassment. One woman described a series of incidents in which teenage neighbors vandalized her mailbox, threw rocks at her daughter, shouted obscenities at them, and left burning dog feces on her front porch. Another woman reported that a new neighbor “took an immediate dislike” to her and her female partner. He “began an endless onslaught of verbal harassment, ‘Dykes, sick love, queers,’” and threatened them and their pets. They began to find their property vandalized in small ways and were convinced that the neighbor was responsible. Several respondents described having their property vandalized after they made a public gesture that identified them as gay. One woman, for example, flew rainbow and American flags outside her house but one day “Somebody burned my rainbow flag and apparently stuck a sticker on my car that was parked in the driveway…. It said ‘homo’ on it.…” In other Pr e- Pu bli ca tio n D ra ft 7 cases, respondents were threatened and harassed after they had been publicly identified with a local gay or lesbian event or organization. One man, for example, received threatening telephone calls after his name was published as a contact for the gay student organization on his campus. Some incidents were potentially deadly. One man described having his house fire bombed and the windows smashed on two of the family cars. I was asleep on the front porch and a Molotov cocktail was lobbed up onto the second story front porch where I was at…. And it immediately ignited the porch. I was asleep in that porch. As the building was burning I could hear the windows being broken out of the cars. And the people doing it laughing and screaming “faggot” at the top of their lungs…. There was a note attached to the windshield of my car: “The faggot that lives here will be dead within a week.” Victimization in Schools Middle and secondary schools routinely are sites of harassment for students who are gay or deviate from gender norms (e.g., Smith, 1998). One interviewee related how he had been the target of ongoing antigay harassment in his high school. Late one night, he went to a convenience store to buy milk for the family’s breakfast. He saw two classmates in the store’s parking lot. And as I got out of the car, they came up to the car, and approached me and said the usual “Hey, faggot” and started asking me what I was doing out…how would I like to be beat up. And they cornered me against the car and started beating on me. He escaped into the store. When he asked the clerk to phone the police, the clerk refused. I had a black eye, bloody nose, split lip, and some other bruises on my body. My parents called the police. They didn’t even want to take a report. Their comment was “They’re just a couple of good all-American boys out for some fun….” Both the guys who assaulted me often called me “faggot” and things like that in [my high school]. Such harassment occurs in college as well (Berrill, 1992a, 1992b; D’Augelli, 1989; Herek, 1993). One respondent and his lover experienced ongoing harassment on campus. Just on a daily basis we were taunted, called “fags” to the point where … we didn’t even want to go to the cafeteria, we’d just go out to eat. Then nightly we pretty much, we never knew what we were going to wake up to or be awakened by in the night, like someone urinating on the door or sticking stuff, something on the door. …When people write “fag” on your door and that was one of the main things…. Put a gay sticker on the door with one guy bent over and another behind him with a big line through it…. It was so awful. The narrative also illustrates the stresses that such harassment places on the victims. In this case, that stress had a negative impact on the victims’ relationship. According to the interviewee: [The harassment] made… the two of us ... fight all of the time because our stress level was so high. I actually quit school twice but ended up going back ’cause of all this…. It was to the point where you’d be in your dorm room and you felt like a prisoner because you didn’t even want to go out, because it just seemed everyone was your enemy and no one would help. Victimization In The Workplace Most descriptions of crime on the job came from women respondents working in historically male settings. For example, one woman described how she was harassed and her car was vandalized with anti-lesbian graffiti while she was training to become a police officer. Another woman related her experiences Pr e- Pu bli ca tio n D ra ft 8 in the Army after her sergeant read some love letters written to her by another woman. The sergeant… called me into his office, and told me to explain the letters. When I refused to explain the letters, he grabbed me by the collar and threw me up against the wall and told me he wasn’t going to have any dykes in his company. He took me outside and said get in the jeep. Took me to the top of [a mountain]. Got out, pushed me against the side of the jeep and said he was going to show me what a real man could do. Said he was sick of all these lesbians. He said what I needed was a real man to bring me out of this gay shit. I refused to cooperate, to make a long story short, and I threatened to kill him or us both. I don’t know, I guess that scared him, cause I was looking real mean about that time and a little scared. He said just forget it, he got in his jeep and drove off. And I walked back down the mountain, which was about 40 miles. Victimization By Friends and Family Members Family members, friends, and acquaintances also were perpetrators of harassment and violence. Several women described incidents in which a male acquaintance or friend sexually assaulted them, sometimes after a failed attempt to seduce them. Many reported that their attacker seemed to be trying to prove that the woman was actually bisexual or simply needed the right man in order to become heterosexual. One woman, for example, described what happened when, during dinner with a male former school friend, she refused his sexual invitation. I tried to talk to him and explain that I didn’t want any man at all. He figured I was bi. I kept trying to leave because I had things to do and errands to run, and he wouldn’t let me out. I became very frightened and I broke a window to get out. I got out the window, he chased me down and grabbed me, threw me up on a vehicle and, as I was sliding down, he grabbed me again and threw me down so that my head hit the speed bump. Then proceeded to beat me. In other cases, a former husband or male partner attacked a woman, seeking revenge for his perceived rejection by the victim. Parents and siblings also were perpetrators. One man recounted being accosted by his father and brother after they overheard him talking to his mother about his weekend: They got up, both very angry – you could see it in their face with the blood vessels sticking out of their necks and on their foreheads. And it was what they said and their body language, it was pretty scary: “Queer, faggot, you’re going to get what you deserve, you’re going to get that AIDS….” They came in here, there was some grabbing of my clothing….I was able to defuse it, and let them know I was going to stand my ground. I was going to defend myself. A woman described what happened after her mother read her diary, which included details about her sexual involvement with another woman. She went out and got drunk and then came home and started yelling and screaming at me about sleeping with women. Actually, it was girls at the time…. She was pissed off at me because I was gay or I chose to sleep with women…. She said stuff like “bumping pussies” and just stuff like that…. And how sick it was, unnatural. … And then she just started getting really crazy and hitting me and knocking me around. And actually I was pretty scared…. Summary Mass media depictions of antigay crimes often focus on street attacks that are perpetrated by groups of young men who have no prior acquaintance with the victim. Among our interviewees, bias crimes were indeed most Pr e- Pu bli ca tio n D ra ft 9 likely to occur in those circumstances. But many other scenarios were also described. In addition to strangers, the perpetrators included parents, siblings, former spouses, peers, supervisors, coworkers, and neighbors. Many incidents occurred in gay-identified venues and other public settings, but others took place in and around the victim’s home or in campus or workplace settings. Clearly, antigay crimes occur in many settings and are perpetrated by individuals with a variety of relationships to the victim. Labeling the Crime Researchers who study antigay crimes inevitably must rely on victims’ self reports to determine that a crime was antigay. But how do people determine that a crime is based on their sexual orientation? Does such labeling result from unambiguous events during the crime, or does it reflect the victim’s interpretations, inferences, or projections? This question has implications not only for social psychological research but also for policy makers and criminal justice personnel, who often determine whether an incident will be classified as a hate crime. ________________________________ Insert Table 1 about here ________________________________ To shed light on the attributional processes underlying self-reports of victimization, we asked each respondent who described a bias- motivated crime “What was it that made you realize or believe that the incident was related to your sexual orientation?” Interviewees with multiple bias victimizations were asked this question about each crime. The responses described 272 crimes, and displayed many of the same general patterns as noted in an earlier pilot study (Herek et al., 1997). We identified 6 categories: (1) explicit statements by the perpetrator or other unambiguous information from a third party such as the police; (2) the location of the crime in a gay-identified venue; (3) other contextual cues; (4) the victim’s inference or hunch; (5) revenge from a male former partner (women only); and (6) victimization in conjunction with a sexual pickup (men only). In addition, some respondents characterized a crime as based on their sexual orientation because it was perpetrated by another gay person (and thus did not fit our definition of a hate crime). Transcripts were coded by two independent raters and responses were assigned to one of these categories; inter-rater agreement was 92% (disagreements were discussed and jointly coded). Table 1 reports the frequency with which each explanation was cited. Explicit Statements or Other Unambiguous Information In slightly more than half of the crimes, respondents had an unambiguous indication that the incident was antigay, usually from the perpetrator’s explicit statements. One woman, for example, described an attack while she and a companion were driving in an urban area. I was with another woman who was very dykey looking and very androgynous. We were in a car and these young teenage boys started screaming “Dykes! Look at the dykes,” blah blah. Then one got out of his car and physically attacked our car, shattering its windows, kicking them in….There was glass everywhere. It looked as if we had crashed. A man who was the victim of a physical assault reported that he was “leaving a gay establishment and the men were yelling obscenities and derogatory anti-gay names, name-calling.... ‘You fucking faggot.’” In several cases, an act of vandalism or burglary included antigay epithets or threats. One male burglary victim reported that he “came home from work, my front door was kicked in and everything was gone. Just a note tacked on the door facing: ‘This is what happens to faggots.’” In a few cases, the victim received information from the police that the crime was one in a series of anti-gay offenses by the perpetrator. After being assaulted and robbed, for example, one man was informed by the prosecuting official that his attackers had similarly victimized other gay people. A robbery victim reported, “When I went to the police and Pr e- Pu bli ca tio n D ra ft 10 identified him in their notebooks, they told me that he was known as someone who preyed on gay people.” Crime Location In 9% of the crimes, victims decided that the incident was based on their sexual orientation because it occurred outside a gay-identified bar, church, or similar venue. A male assault victim, for example, reported “I was leaving a gay bar. They attacked me. They were going to beat the tar out of me and I got away from them.” Theft and vandalism were also common in such settings, especially involving respondent’s vehicles. One woman, for example, reported: I parked my truck in a parking lot right next to a lesbian bar in downtown [Sacramento]. Went in, came out a couple hours – no, two hours – later. My truck was gone. There was broken glass in the parking lot where my truck had been. She added that vandals broke the windows of several cars parked outside the same bar on the following evening. Other Contextual Cues Other respondents based their attribution on the fact that the attack occurred after they (or others with them) had somehow made their gay or lesbian identity visible. For example, the victim was holding hands with a same-sex partner, had affixed a gay bumper sticker to her or his car, or displayed a rainbow flag at her or his home. Contextual cues of this sort were used by the victim in categorizing 10% of the crimes. One woman reported: I was driving in my car, and me and my girlfriend kissed at a stop light. Then this car of guys pulls up next to us and is screaming and yelling and flailing about and throwing eggs at us…. They followed us for awhile. [Why attributed to sexual orientation?] Because it happened right after I kissed my girlfriend. There was a rainbow flag sticker on the car. A gay man reported: Someone during the night egged my car…. I had a gay flag on my car.… And my car was the only one with any type of gay decal or anything… and it was the only one that was egged. We were also known in the neighborhood as being a couple, a gay couple… and the car was definitely identified with me. A lesbian reported that her car was one of several that were all vandalized in a single incident. “My car was vandalized, a bunch of cars were vandalized because of the pink triangle…. We had our windows smashed in, where the pink triangle was.” The common theme was that all of them displayed a pink triangle sticker, which is widely recognized as a symbol of the lesbian and gay community. Hunch In 16% of the crimes, respondents based their judgment simply on a hunch or inference. Such hunches often reflected the timing of the incident or a belief that the perpetrators recognized the respondent’s sexual orientation. One woman, for example, related how several young men attempted to assault her in a parking lot. When asked why she attributed the incident to her sexual orientation, she replied, “Because of where I was, I was in a place in the city where there was a lot of gay bashing going on and I looked like a dyke.” Some victims noted that they were singled out for attack. One lesbian described a recurring pattern of vandalism: Mailboxes here are in clusters, and there are three mailboxes together. Two of them belong to lesbian households. Routinely someone would come along with a baseball bat and bash two of them. We’d replace them, they’d bash them, and on the fourth of July, they blew them up. And they only blew up the ones of the lesbians’ houses. Revenge From a Male Former Partner (Women Only) In 4% of the crimes against women, the victim reported that a former husband or male lover attacked her out of revenge. One woman, Pr e- Pu bli ca tio n D ra ft 11 for example, was assaulted by her ex-husband: We were getting a divorce over my lesbian relationship and he was really angry….[He] accused me and [a woman friend] of being lesbians. Beat the shit out of me. I was holding the baby and he shoved me into the bathtub. I was amazed at how I saw stars when I was hit in the face. Entrapment (Men Only) Two percent of the crimes against men were perpetrated by another man in a sexual context, such as a sexual cruising area. The perpetrator(s) made a sexual advance and, in some cases, had sex with the victim before robbing or assaulting him. I had gone to a rest stop… and a male asked me if I wanted to have sex. I said yes…. There were two males, I followed both of them. We went up in the woods and got out of the car. We – I started having sex with one male. Without my knowledge, the other male came up behind me with a bowie knife type of weapon, and cut both of my hands, stole my car keys, and stole my car. I got away from them and the [police] found my car the next day, burnt – completely…. Misclassified Crimes Finally, it was clear from some interviewees’ responses that the incident they described was not a bias crime. Most such incidents were perpetrated by another gay or lesbian individual, and many involved unwanted sexual advances or contacts. Based on our pilot study results (Herek et al., 1997), we tried to minimize this type of response by framing the question about the basis for the crime to refer specifically to incidents in which the perpetrator “wanted to victimize a [lesbian/gay/bisexual] person.” Some respondents nevertheless interpreted the item differently than we intended. This finding points to the value of collecting data in face-to- face interviews. Without the respondents’ narratives about the crime and their reasons for categorizing it as based on their sexual orientation, we would not have identified this small subset of responses. Conclusions The patterns observed here are similar to those noted in our pilot study (Herek et al., 1997) and suggest that most victims who categorize their crime as antigay have good reasons for doing so. Typically, the perpetrators made explicit statements, the attack occurred in a gay-identified location, or the crime was closely associated with behaviors by the victim that identified her or him as gay. Only 16% of interviewees based their attribution merely on a hunch, and in many cases their reasons for believing that they were targeted because of their sexual orientation seemed highly plausible. Reporting the Crime Service providers, researchers, and activists have all noted that hate crimes are less likely than other crimes to be reported to law enforcement authorities (e.g., Berrill, 1992a; Herek, 1989). Estimates of nonreporting among gay and lesbian hate crime victims have ranged as high as 90% (Berrill & Herek, 1992; Herek, 1989). The explanation most commonly offered for the high rate of nonreporting is victims’ fear of what Berrill and Herek (1992) labeled secondary victimization: discrimination and mistreatment by police authorities, or negative consequences as a result of having one’s sexual orientation publicly revealed. Systematic data documenting the actual extent of nonreporting and the reasons for it have been lacking. Several questionnaire studies have estimated the prevalence of nonreporting (Berrill & Herek, 1992), but many of them combined data about crimes with data about minor incidents (e.g., name-calling). Although often distressing, the latter are usually not criminal offenses and in many cases are probably perceived by the target as too trivial to report. Studies that count such incidents probably overestimate nonreporting rates. In addition, previous studies have not obtained data about reporting rates for crimes not based on sexual orientation. Such comparison data are important for determining whether nonreporting is a problem specifically for hate crimes, or if all gay and bisexual crime victims are reluctant to Pr e- Pu bli ca tio n D ra ft 12 interact with police. To the extent that members of sexual minorities fear secondary victimization, they may avoid reporting any crime, regardless of whether or not it is hate- motivated. ________________________________ Insert Table 2 about here ________________________________ In our questionnaire study, therefore, we assessed nonreporting for both bias and nonbias crimes and found that it was disproportionately associated with bias crime victimization. As shown in Table 2, hate crimes were less likely than nonbias crimes to be reported to police authorities by lesbians (who reported 36% of person and property hate crimes to police versus 68% of other victimizations), gay men (who reported 46% versus 72%), bisexual women (35% versus 62%), and bisexual men (24% versus 61%). In contrast to the questionnaire sample, the interviewees’ reporting rates did not differ between bias and nonbias person crimes. They reported fewer than one third of person crimes (32% of nonbias person crimes, 29% of bias person crimes) to the police. Nonbias property crimes were significantly more likely to be reported (68%) than bias property crimes (54%) and person crimes, Χ2 (3, n = 397) = 45.01, p < .001. Although the interviewees did not display the same patterns as the questionnaire sample, their comments provide insights into the reasons for nonreporting. For those who did not report their most serious victimization, we asked about the extent to which concerns about police prejudice influenced their decision. Such concerns played an important role for bias crime victims but not for nonbias crime victims. Among victims of bias person crimes who did not report, 68% said that concerns about the police played at least some role in their decision, compared to 18% of victims of nonbias person crime. Among victims of bias property crimes, 44% said that such concerns affected their decision, compared to 6% of nonbias property crime victims. The difference between bias and nonbias crimes was statistically significant, Χ2 (3, n = 216) = 57.25, p < .001. The interview narratives demonstrate respondents’ concerns. One woman said she “didn’t want to deal with police in West Sacramento; they were known to not be friendly to gays.” A man recalled a case of a local lesbian police officer who was fired because of her sexual orientation, and said that he consequently did not trust the police to act properly. Another man commented “Being a gay male, I figured the cops wouldn’t really give a shit about it anyway.” Another man said that it hadn’t occurred to him to report his victimization to the police because he “felt as though that kind of went along with the territory of being gay.” A woman said that she didn’t report her victimization because of “the fact we were lesbians. They wouldn’t take it seriously at that time, and the fact that we were in a straight bar and therefore were ‘asking for it.’” Another man stated: “I was afraid that the police was going to gay bash me, and that everybody would know that I’m gay because I was in the closet.” One consequence of reporting a bias crime is that the victim’s sexual orientation is likely to become known to the police. We asked interviewees who had reported a crime whether they believed that the police had recognized their sexual orientation. Significantly more bias crime victims believed that the police had perceived them to be gay, lesbian, or bisexual: 79% of bias person crime victims versus 29% of nonbias person crime victims; 56% of bias property crime victims versus 21% of nonbias property crime victims (totals include 9 participants who volunteered that they were unsure whether the police had perceived them to be gay, lesbian, or bisexual). For the comparison across crime categories, Χ2 (6, n = 171) = 37.81, p < .001. Of those who believed the police had perceived (or might have perceived) that they were not heterosexual, victims of bias person crimes were the most likely to believe that this perception possibly affected their treatment by the police (52% believed it affected the way they were treated, compared to 42% of nonbias person crime victims, 23% of bias property Pr e- Pu bli ca tio n D ra ft 13 crime victims, and 14% of nonbias property crime victims). The differences among crime groups were marginally significant, Χ2 (3, n = 60) = 6.48, p = .09. Another reason for not reporting was that victims did not wish to be outed. Most interviewees who cited concerns about public exposure of their sexual orientation focused on the consequences for their employment. One woman, for example, noted that “I was in my [work] uniform and I wasn’t out to the people at [work].” Another man responded “In those days you didn’t want anybody to know you were gay.… I had a secret clearance for where I was working and I would have lost that and my job and everything else.” Other interviewees were on active military duty and noted the likelihood of secondary victimization if they had reported the incident: I was in the military, in the Army. And I would’ve gotten more trouble than him [the perpetrator] for being a lesbian. I would have gotten 7 years imprisonment for homosexual tendencies and he knew that. We were in a foreign country and we were in the military. When in the military you don’t go to the police and say “Oh, they harassed us because we are gay.” Concerns about police harassment and public disclosure of one’s homosexuality clearly are important reasons why gay men, lesbians, and bisexuals do not report victimizations to the police. Yet, the interview narratives also highlighted many other considerations that play a role in deciding whether or not to report. We transcribed responses to the open-ended question about why a crime wasn’t reported and coded them for the presence or absence of 23 different reasons. Two independent raters coded the transcripts (rate of agreement = 83%), with disagreements resolved by a third coder. Other than fear of secondary victimization, the reasons most often cited for not reporting were: (1) The incident did not seem sufficiently important, or reporting seemed futile because the police were unlikely to catch the perpetrators. (2) The victim considered the incident a personal matter (e.g., between friends or family members) rather than a reportable crime. (3) The victim judged the incident to be her or his own fault or was embarrassed about being victimized (for reasons not having to do with her or his sexual orientation). (4) When the incident happened, the victim did not believe it was a reportable offense. (5) The victim took some action on her or his own to avoid future incidents or to alleviate the problems caused by the incident, and consequently did not believe it was necessary to involve the police. In general, victims appear to have engaged in a cost-benefit analysis. They tended not to report the crime if reporting seemed unlikely to produce a satisfactory outcome but could be unpleasant, time consuming, or even risky. Fear of secondary victimization was an important factor, but was not the only consideration. GENERAL DISCUSSION The data reported here corroborate and extend the findings of past research. They also paint a rich portrait of hate crime victimization. As in earlier studies, the hate crimes described by interviewees most commonly occurred in public locations and were perpetrated by one or more males who were strangers to the victim. Yet, as the narratives make clear, it would be inaccurate to conceptualize bias victimization only in terms of street crimes. Members of sexual minorities face harassment and violence in schools, in the workplace, and in and around their homes. Whereas they are often targeted by strangers, they are also victimized by neighbors, schoolmates, coworkers, and relatives. Indeed, the respondents’ stories dramatically show that people risk victimization whenever they are labeled gay, lesbian, or bisexual. Although hate crime victims in the interview sample reported slightly higher levels of fear during their attack, bias-motivated and nonbias person crimes did not differ significantly in their general severity. Nevertheless, we were struck by the physical and psychological brutality of the hate crimes described in the interviews. This brutality has important consequences. For victims, it results in Pr e- Pu bli ca tio n D ra ft 14 heightened and prolonged psychological distress after the crime. In our questionnaire study we found that victims of recent (i.e., occurring in the previous 5 years) bias person crimes manifested significantly higher levels of psychological distress than did victims of nonbias person crimes during the same period. We speculated that this difference might be due in part to slower recovery among bias crime victims (Herek et al., 1999). The brutality of hate crimes also has consequences for the entire gay community. It is not an exaggeration to conclude that bias- motivated attacks function as a form of terrorism, sending a message to all lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals that they are not safe if they are visible. Thus, even when one does not personally know the victim, hate crimes can threaten the illusion of invulnerability that is so important in one’s daily life (Janoff-Bulman, 1992). In addition, the ubiquity of hate crimes might make even minor instances of harassment more frightening for the victim. As noted above, a gay or bisexual person who encounters an expression of hostility because of her or his sexual orientation does not know in advance how the incident will end. She or he may be attacked with words, a raw egg (like one of the interviewees), or a deadly weapon. Consequently, an incident that appears minor in retrospect might nevertheless have considerable psychological impact on the victim. Lesbian, gay, and bisexual people appear not to have difficulty recognizing when a crime is based on their sexual orientation. In most incidents described by interviewees, the perpetrators made explicit antigay statements in the course of the crime. The remainder often occurred in a context or setting in which the victim’s sexual orientation was made known to the perpetrator through the victim’s actions, the presence of gay-identified symbols on the victim’s clothing or property, or the setting of the crime itself (e.g., outside a gay bar). Thus, the incidents described by most respondents appear to have been bias crimes. Nevertheless, follow-up questioning revealed that a small proportion of the incidents that respondents characterized as based on their sexual orientation were not bias crimes. This finding highlights one of the difficulties inherent in hate crime research. Directly asking respondents if they were the victim of a hate crime or bias crime is problematic because those terms may have different meanings for different respondents. In addition, some victims may avoid explicitly labeling their experience a hate crime out of a need to preserve a sense of personal safety or a feeling of control over events in their life. Research with women and ethnic minorities suggests that labeling an incident as discrimination may reduce an individual’s sense of personal control (Ruggiero & Taylor, 1997). Consistent with this finding, we have observed that gay men and lesbians who generally attribute negative events in their lives to sexual prejudice have a lower sense of personal mastery and more psychological distress than those who do not make such attributions (Herek et al., 1999). Thus, labeling an incident a hate crime may have a disempowering effect on the victim. Researchers face the dilemma that using terms such as hate crime in interview or questionnaire items may lead to underreporting, but framing the question more broadly and in neutral terms is likely to result in some participants reporting incidents that are not hate crimes. We do not have a ready solution for this problem, but recommend that other researchers be aware of it when interpreting their findings. We note that it can be detected more readily in a face-to-face interview than in a self- administered questionnaire. In our questionnaire study, we found that bias crime victims were considerably less likely to report the incident to police than were victims of nonbias crimes. As Table 2 shows, the exact magnitude of this discrepancy varied by victim sex and sexual orientation but was substantial in all groups. The interview data clearly show that concern about secondary victimization is an important reason for nonreporting but not the sole basis for it. The reasons cited by interviewees suggest a complex calculus in which victims considered the other costs and benefits of reporting (e.g., whether or not the perpetrators could be apprehended and Pr e- Pu bli ca tio n D ra ft 15 punished) and whether the crime could appropriately be considered a police matter. Because the interview and questionnaire data included crimes that occurred in the distant past, we do not know if they accurately describe current patterns of crime reporting. During the past decade, many police departments in the United States have taken measures to respond to the problem of hate crimes, often with assistance from state and federal governmental agencies. Police officials increasingly are working with minority communities to improve their response to bias crimes. Undoubtedly, police personnel in many jurisdictions still need clearer policies and better training for dealing effectively with hate crimes based on sexual orientation. But to the extent that nonreporting persists as a problem, effective remedies will have to come from the gay community as well as the criminal justice system. Outreach to gay men, lesbians, and bisexuals is necessary to overcome their longstanding suspicions of the police. Such efforts will have to originate not only in criminal justice agencies but also in community organizations. Because the present study was conducted with a convenience sample, generalizations from our findings must be made with caution. We hope that other researchers will attempt to replicate our results with samples from other geographic areas that include lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals from diverse backgrounds. We also hope that hate crime researchers will conduct more studies using face-to-face interviews as an alternative to or in conjunction with self-administered questionnaires. As we have tried to demonstrate here, bringing victims’ voices directly into our research yields a more differentiated and nuanced understanding of the nature of hate crimes. References Bard, M., & Sangrey, D. (1979). The crime victim's book. New York: Basic Books. Berrill, K.T. (1992a). Antigay violence and victimization in the United States: An overview. In G. Herek & K. Berrill (Eds.), Hate crimes (pp. 19-45). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Berrill, K.T. (1992b). Organizing against hate on campus: Strategies for activists. In G. Herek & K. Berrill (Eds.), Hate crimes (pp. 259-269). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Berrill, K., & Herek, G. M. (1992). Primary and secondary victimization in anti-gay hate crimes. In G. Herek & K. Berrill (Eds.), Hate crimes (pp. 289-305). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. D’Augelli, A. (1989). Lesbians’ and gay men’s experiences of discrimination and harassment in a university community. American Journal of Community Psychology, 17, 317-321. Federal Bureau of Investigation. (1999). Hate crime statistics 1997. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice. Garnets, L., Herek, G. M., & Levy, B. (1990). Violence and victimization of lesbians and gay men: Mental health consequences. Journal of Interpersonal Violence, 5, 366-383. Herek, G. M. (1989). Hate crimes against lesbians and gay men: Issues for research and policy. American Psychologist, 44, 948-955. Herek, G. M. (1992). Psychological heterosexism and anti-gay violence. In G. Herek & K. Berrill (Eds.), Hate crimes (pp. 149-169). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Herek, G. M. (1993). Documenting prejudice on campus: The Yale Sexual Orientation Survey. Journal of Homosexuality, 25(4), 15-30. Herek, G. M. (2000). The psychology of sexual prejudice. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 9, 19-22. Herek, G. M., & Berrill, K. (1992). Documenting the victimization of lesbians and gay men: Methodological issues. In G. Herek & K. Berrill (Eds.), Hate crimes (pp. 270-286). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Herek, G. M., Gillis, J. R., & Cogan, J. C. (1999). Psychological sequelae of hate crime victimization among lesbian, gay, and bisexual adults. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 67, 945-951. Herek, G. M., Gillis, J. R., Cogan, J. C., & Glunt, E. K. (1997). Hate crime victimization among lesbian, gay, and bisexual adults: Prevalence, psychological correlates, and methodological issues. Journal of Interpersonal Violence, 12, 195-215. Janoff-Bulman, R. (1992). Shattered assumptions. New York: Free Press. Jenness, V., & Broad, K. (1997). Hate crimes: New social movements and the politics of violence. New York: Aldine de Gruyter. Kilpatrick, D. G., Saunders, B. E., Amick- McMullan, A., Best, C. L., Veronen, L. J., & Resnick, Pr e- Pu bli ca tio n D ra ft 16 H. S. (1989). Victim and crime factors associated with the development of crime-related post-traumatic stress disorder. Behavior Therapy, 20, 199-214. Pilkington, N. W., & D'Augelli, A. R. (1995). Victimization of lesbian, gay, and bisexual youth in community settings. Journal of Community Psychology, 23, 34-56. Ruggiero, K. M., & Taylor, D. M. (1997). Why minority group members perceive or do not perceive the discrimination that confronts them: The role of self-esteem and perceived control. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 72, 373-389. Smith, G. W. (1998). The ideology of “fag”: The school experience of gay students. Sociology Quarterly, 39, 309-335. Swim, J.K., & Stangor, C. (1998). Prejudice: The target’s perspective. San Diego, CA: Academic Press. Pr e- Pu bli ca tio n D ra ft 17 Table 1 Why Respondents Perceived Crime Was Based on Sexual Orientation (Interview Sample) Women Men Total Reason N of % N of % N of % crimes crimes crimes ___________________________________________________________________________ Explicit statements or other unambiguous information 56 51% 89 55% 145 53% Crime location 11 10% 14 9% 25 9% Other contextual cues 19 17% 8 5% 27 10% Hunch 19 17% 25 15% 44 16% Revenge from former male partner (Females) 4 4% 0 0% 4 2% Entrapment (Males) 0 0% 3 2% 3 1% Misclassified crime 1 1% 23 14% 24 9% TOTAL 110 100% 162 100% 272 100% ___________________________________________________________________________ Note. Table entries reflect the number and percentage of victimizations that respondents attributed to their sexual orientation for each reason. Based on interview responses from 76 women and 90 men who reported one or more criminal victimizations because of their sexual orientation. Pr e- Pu bli ca tio n D ra ft 18 Table 2 Proportion of Bias and Non-Bias Adulthood Victimizations Reported to Police Authorities (Questionnaire Sample) Type of Crime Lesbians Gay Men Bisexual Women Bisexual Men ____________________________________________________________________________________________________________ Crimes Against Person Bias 30.4% 38.4% 28.6% 17.2% (n = 79) (n = 138) (n = 14) (n = 29) Non-Bias 47.5% 58.0% 45.1% 55.3% (n = 118) (n = 88) (n = 51) (n = 38) Property Crimes Bias 41.9% 58.2% 44.4% 35.3% (n = 74) (n = 79) (n = 9) (n = 17) Non-Bias 76.3% 77.2% 78.9% 68.8% (n = 316) (n = 250) (n = 52) (n = 32) ____________________________________________________________________________________________________________ Any Crime Bias 36.0% 45.6% 34.8% 23.9% (n = 153) (n = 217) (n = 23) (n = 46) Non-Bias 68.4% 72.2% 62.1% 61.4% (n = 434) (n = 338) (n = 103) (n = 70) ____________________________________________________________________________________________________________ Each cell reports the percentage of respondents in that category who reported the crime to law enforcement authorities and, in parentheses, the total number who experienced that type of crime and were asked about police reporting. 
work_ifuxk2upl5h3feukjha3z7cyo4	----	Guess Who’s Coming to Therapy? Getting Comfortable With Conversations About Race and Ethnicity in Psychotherapy Esteban V. Cardemil Clark University Cynthia L. Battle Brown University and Butler Hospital Despite the fact that clinical psychology training programs now typically offer course work in multi- cultural issues, many professional psychologists may continue to feel unsure about how and when to incorporate multicultural awareness into their everyday clinical work. Having open discussions with clients regarding issues of race and ethnicity is one way to actively include a multicultural element into psychotherapy, as well as to strengthen the therapeutic alliance and promote better treatment outcome. The authors make several recommendations designed to provoke thought and stimulate conversation about race and ethnicity in the context of psychotherapy. The ability to conduct psychotherapy effectively with racially and ethnically diverse populations is becoming increasingly im- portant given the changing demographics of this country. Recent estimates of population trends suggest that by the year 2050, non-Hispanic Caucasian Americans will constitute approximately 50% of the United States population, as compared with the current 72% of the population (U.S. Census Bureau, 2001). The American Psychological Association (APA) has recognized the critical na- ture of integrating issues of race and ethnicity into the field of psychology by encouraging attention to these issues in clinical training programs (APA, Committee on Accreditation, 2002), cre- ating therapist competency guidelines for working with racial and ethnic minority populations (APA, 1993), and sponsoring profes- sional meetings to identify strategies to promote sensitivity to diversity in psychology (McGuire, 1999). It is likely that most clinical psychologists have acquired an intellectual appreciation of the salience of race and ethnicity in the therapeutic context and are motivated to be sensitive to these issues in their own practice. However, for many psychologists, a general appreciation regarding the importance of race and ethnicity does not equate to a clear understanding of whether, when, and how to bring up these issues in the actual practice of clinical work. For example, many therapists may agree that it is important to examine one’s personal assumptions and recognize the value of cultural beliefs and traditions other than those embraced by the dominant European American culture (APA, 1993; Comas-Dı́az, 1992; Pinderhughes, 1989). Still, many therapists may not know how to incorporate their appreciation of racial and ethnic diversity into therapy in a tangible way. We believe that having open conversations about race and ethnicity is one way for therapists to more fully incorporate diver- sity issues into their work. Demonstrating a willingness to engage clients in these dialogues can promote an environment of trust and understanding that will ultimately help the treatment process. A stronger therapeutic alliance could, in turn, reduce problems such as premature termination (S. Sue, 1988) and underutilization of mental health services (Cheung & Snowden, 1990) that are often observed among racial/ethnic minority clients. There is a variety of reasons why psychologists may be missing opportunities to have these conversations. Some therapists may feel uncomfortable discussing racial and ethnic issues with their clients of color due to the emotionally charged nature of race relations or concerns about saying something that could be viewed as offensive. Others may simply not know when these conversa- tions are relevant or how to initiate the discussion. Still others may choose to wait until their clients raise the topic before engaging in such a conversation. Unfortunately, this approach neglects the possibility that many clients will themselves not broach issues related to race and ethnicity for various reasons (e.g., their own discomfort with the topic, being unsure of therapist perspective or bias). We believe that therapists would benefit from taking a more active stance by initiating discussions about race and ethnicity with their clients, particularly early in psychotherapy. This active stance would thus allow for opportunities to explore the possible rele- vance of these issues to the psychotherapy process. ESTEBAN V. CARDEMIL received his PhD in clinical psychology from the University of Pennsylvania in 2000. He is an assistant professor at the Frances L. Hiatt School of Psychology at Clark University. His research focuses on racial/ethnic minority mental health issues and depression prevention. CYNTHIA L. BATTLE received her PhD in clinical psychology from the University of Massachusetts, Amherst in 2000. She is an assistant professor (research) in the Department of Psychiatry and Human Behavior at Brown University Medical School. Her research interests include women’s mental health, family functioning, and diversity issues in psychology. PREPARATION OF THIS ARTICLE was supported by a National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) Career Development Award K01 MH67571 and a NARSAD Young Investigator Award to Esteban Cardemil and an NIMH Career Development Award K23 MH66402 to Cynthia Battle. We wish to express our appreciation to Ivan Miller, Lisa Uebelacker, and Benjamin Johnson for their helpful comments on an earlier version of this article. We also thank Emily Dings and Leslie Graham for their editorial assistance. CORRESPONDENCE CONCERNING THIS ARTICLE should be addressed to Es- teban V. Cardemil, Frances L. Hiatt School of Psychology, Clark Univer- sity, 950 Main Street, Worcester, Massachusetts 01610. E-mail: Ecardemil@clarku.edu Professional Psychology: Research and Practice Copyright 2003 by the American Psychological Association, Inc. 2003, Vol. 34, No. 3, 278 –286 0735-7028/03/$12.00 DOI: 10.1037/0735-7028.34.3.278 278 Therefore the purpose of this article is to encourage increased therapist– client dialogue about race and ethnicity in the real-world practice of psychotherapy. Initiating this type of dialogue can be anxiety provoking, and our intention is not to minimize the con- cerns of psychologists who find it challenging to have conversa- tions about race and ethnicity with their clients. However, because as psychologists we are trained to be skillful in listening, perspective-taking, and developing empathy, we have a unique opportunity to embrace potentially difficult conversations about race and ethnicity and to use these experiences to grow profes- sionally and personally. In this article, we provide several recom- mendations designed to provoke thinking and stimulate conversa- tions about race and ethnicity that can be incorporated throughout the treatment process. We have deliberately chosen to direct our comments to Caucasian therapists who work with racial/ethnic minority clients; however, many of the issues we raise are appli- cable regardless of the racial/ethnic identity of therapist or client. Definitions There are many different cultural and demographic characteris- tics (e.g., social class, gender, race, ethnicity, sexual orientation, disability status) that may significantly influence the life experi- ences of clients and therapists as well as their approaches to psychotherapy. To narrow our focus, we emphasize issues related specifically to the race and ethnicity of clients and therapists. Definitions of the terms race and ethnicity are varied; distinctions between these two concepts can also be ambiguous, as indicated by the fact that the terms are at times used interchangeably (Atkinson, Morten, & Sue, 1998; Helms & Cook, 1999). Historical definitions of race have tended to focus on physical or biological character- istics (Atkinson et al., 1998; Betancourt & Lopez, 1993). Although the term ethnicity has included references to physical characteris- tics, for the most part it refers to the historical cultural patterns and collective identities shared by groups from specific geographic regions of the world (Betancourt & Lopez, 1993; Helms & Cook, 1999). Ethnicity and race have significant overlap but are clearly not the same constructs (Alvidrez, Azocar, & Miranda, 1996; Betancourt & Lopez, 1993). Because of the lack of language that allows for discussions that are simultaneously inclusive and sensitive to the varied ways in which individuals conceptualize their identity, we describe issues of race/ethnicity collectively, understanding that at times our def- inition may apply more aptly to conceptions of race and at other times to ethnicity. We have chosen to take this more encompassing approach because the scope of this article prevents us from fully examining and elaborating on the varied definitions of these two terms. Moreover, we also liberally use the term minority, although we recognize that those who are categorized under the term mi- norities in fact constitute the majority of the overall world popu- lation (see Tatum, 1997). However, because we are writing from our experiences as clinicians in the United States, we have chosen to use the term minority, given the demographic breakdown of this country. Recommendations for Discussing Race and Ethnicity in Psychotherapy We believe that there are many helpful ways in which therapists may engage in conversations about race/ethnicity with their cli- ents. With some clients, therapists will broach the topic once and have a brief discussion, simply putting the topic “on the table” should it be relevant in the future. With other clients, therapists will find themselves engaged in a series of important conversations about possible influences of race/ethnicity on the client, the client– therapist relationship, and the therapy process. With still others, the frequency and intensity of conversations on these topics may develop gradually and change over time, with ebbs and flows. The variability in how these conversations develop will be due to a range of factors, including a client’s level of trust in the therapist, a client’s understanding of his or her own racial/ethnic identity, and the overall salience that racial/ethnic issues have for a given client. Thus, sensitivity to the appropriateness, timing, and pace of the conversations over the course of a therapeutic relationship is important. There are clearly no universal rules for how and when to have these conversations. Still, we hope that the following general recommendations will provide some guidance to therapists who are interested in more fully integrating multicultural issues into their everyday clinical practice. 1. Suspend Preconceptions About Clients’ Race/Ethnicity and That of Their Family Members Our first recommendation is to remember that the racial/ethnic background of clients may not be obvious. Assuming that a client is from a particular racial or ethnic group, or that a client has had certain past experiences, may lead to misunderstandings that could derail the therapy process. Most psychotherapy training empha- sizes the suspension of assumptions and preconceptions about clients, and therefore this recommendation is hardly new. How- ever, there are several situations in which well-intentioned thera- pists may make incorrect assumptions with regard to race/ethnicity that would hinder the development of the therapeutic relationship. For example, therapists may be particularly prone to incorrect assumptions and labels regarding biracial or multiracial clients or clients whose racial/ethnic identity is not obvious from physical characteristics (e.g., African American or Latino clients with light skin tone). Similarly, clients who have a partner or other family member (e.g., adopted children) from another racial or ethnic group may appreciate efforts on the part of the therapist to not make assumptions about the backgrounds of their family members. Given that these personal characteristics may not be readily apparent, we recommend that clinicians directly ask their clients how they identify their race/ethnicity. Asking clients early in the therapy process can help therapists avoid making false assump- tions or using terminology that may be inaccurate and/or offensive to clients. This is particularly important because not all individuals from the same racial/ethnic background prefer the same terminol- ogy to describe their identity (e.g., some individuals may prefer the term African American, whereas others might prefer Black). Ask- ing clients about their race/ethnicity could easily be woven into the larger intake or assessment process and could be a natural supple- ment to questions that a therapist might ask about a client’s social and family history. So, for example, a therapist might broach the topic in the following manner: Often, I ask my clients about their racial and ethnic background because it helps me have a better understanding of who they are. Is that something you’d feel comfortable talking about? 279RACE AND ETHNICITY IN PSYCHOTHERAPY In addition to learning about the client’s racial/ethnic back- ground, therapists may find it useful to directly ask clients what terms they prefer to use when describing themselves. Questions like “How do you identify your racial or ethnic background?” can be a relatively neutral way to continue the conversation. In our experience, these opening queries can lead to a narrative that includes information about familial origin, language, and religion. 2. Recognize That Clients May Be Quite Different From Other Members of Their Racial/Ethnic Group One significant benefit of engaging in conversations about race and ethnicity with clients is that it reduces the likelihood of stereotyping and the assumption that clients possess certain group characteristics. Obviously, wide variability exists within a racial or ethnic group and can include differences based on an individual’s personality, country of origin, sense of racial/ethnic identity, ac- culturation status, gender, and socioeconomic status. For example, a low-income African American woman whose family has lived in the United States for several hundred years may experience some life stressors that are more similar to those of a low-income Caucasian woman than to those of a wealthy Black business- woman who recently immigrated to the United States from Kenya. It would also be naive to assume that Japanese Americans share a common cultural background with Chinese Americans or Filipino Americans (Kim, Yang, Atkinson, Wolfe, & Hong, 2001). Some within-group differences are less readily apparent than others, and therefore therapists may need to be creative in their ways of accessing this information. For instance, it is likely that most psychologists would take gender into consideration when working with racial/ethnic minorities and not assume that men and women from the same group would necessarily respond similarly. Many psychologists, however, may be less familiar with some other characteristics that also vary within racial/ethnic group. We briefly describe two important characteristics with which clini- cians may not be familiar and which likely warrant some consid- eration: racial identity development and acculturation. Racial identity development. A large literature within the field of counseling psychology persuasively argues that all humans, including Caucasians, go through a process of developing a sense of racial or ethnic identity (Cross, 1971; Helms, 1995; D. W. Sue & Sue, 1990). Although these models differ in their specific explanations of the identity development process and conceptual- ization of critical stages, a theme common to these models is that individuals at different stages of identity development assign dif- ferent degrees of importance to the concept of race/ethnicity. For example, D. W. Sue and Sue’s (1990) racial/cultural identity development model posits that racial/ethnic minority individuals move from an initial, more self-deprecating conformity stage (preference for dominant cultural values), through a dissonance stage (questioning and challenging beliefs of the conformity stage), a resistance and immersion stage (endorsement of minority views and rejection of dominant society), an introspection stage (less rigid in resisting dominant society views), and finally to an integrative awareness stage (appreciation of unique aspects of both the minority and the dominant culture). Other racial identity development models (e.g., Cross, 1971; Helms, 1995) describe a similar process by which stages of de- velopment influence attitudes, outlooks on life, and behavior. Theorists are also devoting increased attention to identity devel- opment of individuals from more than one racial/ethnic back- ground (e.g., Herring, 1995; Poston, 1990). Racial identity is relevant to the therapeutic process in that minority clients at various developmental stages may have different attitudes about working with a psychotherapist from another racial/ethnic back- ground. Moreover, a therapist’s own process of identity develop- ment may affect how he or she approaches these issues with clients (Helms & Cook, 1999; D. W. Sue & Sue, 1990). Acculturation. Acculturation refers to the gradual physical, biological, cultural, and psychological changes that take place in individuals and groups when contact between two cultural groups takes place (see Chun, Organista, & Marı́n, 2003). When one group (or individual) moves to an area dominated by an existing cultural group, there is pressure on the newcomers to conform and accommodate to the dominant culture’s way of life and to abandon or devalue their own cultural roots (Berry & Kim, 1988; Chun et al., 2003). Although typically conceptualized for individuals from immigrant groups (e.g., Asian, Latino immigrant populations) ad- justing to novel environmental situations (e.g., Rogler, Cortes, & Malgady, 1991), concepts of acculturation have also been applied to racial/ethnic minority groups (including African American) interacting with the larger American Caucasian culture (e.g., Anderson, 1991). Such pressures are navigated differently by different individuals, and research has demonstrated that “accul- turation stress” can create vulnerabilities to certain health prob- lems, as well as susceptibility to increases in psychological symp- toms (Cuellar, 2000). Various theorists have developed models and instruments of acculturation that attempt to capture and quantify individuals’ level of acculturation. For example, Berry and Kim (1988) argued that the extent to which individuals retain valued aspects of their original culture, and the extent to which they seek positive rela- tions with the larger (dominant) society, determine their mode of acculturation. They define four modes of acculturation: integration (both the individual’s own culture and the dominant culture are valued), assimilation (the dominant culture is valued, but the individual’s original culture is devalued), separation (the individ- ual’s original culture is valued, and dominant culture is devalued), and marginalization (both the individual’s original culture and the dominant culture are devalued). It is not difficult to imagine how racial identity development and acculturation might influence psychotherapy. D. W. Sue and Sue (1990) have suggested, for instance, that racial/ethnic minority clients in the conformity stage of identity development may prefer Caucasian therapists, viewing them as more competent than racial/ ethnic minority therapists. Conversely, clients in the resistance and immersion stage may prefer a non-Caucasian therapist and may conceptualize psychological problems as stemming solely from oppression and racism. Similarly, with respect to acculturation, a client who has fully integrated elements of different cultures might feel comfortable working with a therapist of any racial/ethnic background, whereas a client who has devalued the dominant culture may prefer a therapist from his/her own background. Racial identity development and acculturation are two promi- nent ways in which individuals from the same racial/ethnic group may differ from one another, but they are certainly not the only ways. Moreover, researchers are beginning to consider how these variables may interact with each other and other within-group 280 CARDEMIL AND BATTLE differences (e.g., Chun et al., 2003; Ponterotto, Casas, Suzuki, & Alexander, 2001). Being able to discuss a client’s individual experience of his or her race/ethnicity may prevent the client from feeling stereotyped and may open the door to more intimate conversations. The following is one way a therapist might encour- age a client to talk about these issues: You’ve told me a bit about your racial/ethnic identity. It would be helpful for me to get your sense of how you see your racial/ethnic background contributing to your development over the years—your sense of self, as well as relationships with family members, friends, and other members of your community. Has your sense of racial/ ethnic identity always been this way, or has it changed or developed over the years? Although encouraging clients to discuss their racial/ethnic iden- tity can lead to interesting insight for clients and therapists alike, we also caution therapists to be sensitive to the fact that there will likely be wide variation in the depth of conversations that emerge. Some clients may feel quite comfortable discussing their perspec- tives and feelings regarding their racial/ethnic identity, whereas others may want to engage in a briefer or more superficial con- versation or may prefer not to discuss the issue at all. Allowing clients the opportunity to have this conversation and then respect- ing their decisions regarding self-disclosure can be a positive way for clinicians to demonstrate their willingness to delve into these issues while conveying a sense of respect for clients’ wishes and personal boundaries. 3. Consider How Racial/Ethnic Differences Between Therapist and Client Might Affect Psychotherapy Engaging clients in conversations about their racial/ethnic back- ground is critical, but it is equally important to openly recognize the therapist’s racial/ethnic identity and any racial/ethnic differ- ences that might exist between the client and the therapist. Clients may never raise these issues explicitly; however, racial/ethnic differences may still play an important role in the therapy process. Numerous investigators have examined how such differences be- tween clients and therapists affect the psychotherapy process (e.g., Atkinson, 1983; S. Sue, 1988). Some of these differences arise with regard to attitudes and expectations toward mental health services (e.g., S. Sue, 1988), conceptions of the self in relation to family and community (e.g., Marsella, 1985), and communication and interaction styles (e.g., D.W. Sue, 1990). Differences in conceptualization of mental health and mental illness. Racial/ethnic differences in conceptualizations of mental health can play a significant role in the psychotherapy process. For example, Lee (1996) has noted that many traditional Asians may understand mental illness through concepts like balance of yin and yang, disturbances of chi energy, or supernatural intervention. Therapists who are unaware of these perspectives on mental health are likely to have trouble effectively engaging these clients. Dif- ferences can also be found in expectations of the role that mental health services will play in their lives. For example, some re- searchers have suggested that members of certain racial/ethnic minority groups may be more likely to engage in therapy when in a current life-crisis and then withdraw when the crisis passes (Garcı́a-Preto, 1996; Treviño & Rendón, 1994). Others have noted that some members of racial/ethnic minority groups may view the therapist as an expert and, accordingly, expect concrete advice and help, an expectation that runs contrary to many traditional Western approaches to psychotherapy (Tsui & Schultz, 1985). Differences in conceptions of self in relation to family and community. A second way in which differences between clients and therapists could interfere with therapy concerns cultural dif- ferences in conceptions of the self in relation to family and community (D. W. Sue & Sue, 1990). Although Western psycho- therapy tends to be very individualistic, many cultures have more collectivistic perspectives (Helms & Cook, 1999). Caucasian ther- apists who fail to consider how a collectivistic perspective may affect approaches to therapy may run the risk of alienating certain clients (Dwairy & Van Sickle, 1996; Helms & Cook, 1999). For example, a Caucasian therapist who conceptualizes a Mexican American woman’s depression as being related to her dissatisfac- tion at work might encourage her to look for another job or career. Although this intervention might ultimately prove useful, the ther- apist might consider the ways in which the client’s strong sense of obligation to her family is met by continuing in this seemingly unsatisfying position. Differences in communication styles. D. W. Sue (1990) de- tailed a variety of ways in which cultural differences in commu- nication can come into play during therapeutic interactions. He noted that different styles of nonverbal communication, including proxemics (perception of personal and interpersonal space), kine- sics (facial expressions, posture, movement, gestures, eye contact), and paralanguage (vocal cues such as loudness of voice, use of silence and pauses) can lead to miscommunication and gradually infringe on the therapeutic relationship. For example, although some Japanese or Mexican Americans may actively avoid direct eye contact as a sign of respect, a Caucasian therapist may interpret this behavior as a sign of shyness or guardedness, lack of asser- tiveness, or depressed mood. Preferences for amount of interper- sonal space, which tend to vary across racial/ethnic groups, can also lead to misunderstandings. A Caucasian therapist may be accustomed to more physical space between himself and others than may an African American client, who may be more accus- tomed to closer interpersonal spaces. Thus, a therapist who backs away from an African American client may send the unintentional message that the therapist is cold, aloof, and uninterested in communicating or connecting. Dwairy and Van Sickle (1996) described similar miscommunications that can take place between Caucasian therapists and Arabic clients that arise from different styles of eye contact, different conceptualizations of time and time commitments, and different values placed on verbal communica- tion and self-disclosure. It is impossible for even the most experienced and well- intentioned therapists to identify every between-group difference that might emerge over the course of therapy. The critical element, rather, is espousing and conveying a willingness to consider the relevance of racial/ethnic differences with clients. One way to open this type of conversation might be as follows: I know that this can sometimes be a difficult topic to discuss, but I was wondering how you feel about working with someone who is from a different racial/ethnic background? I ask because although it is cer- tainly my goal to be as helpful to you as I possibly can, I also know that there may be times when I cannot fully appreciate your experi- ences. I want you to know that I am always open to talking about these topics whenever they are relevant. 281RACE AND ETHNICITY IN PSYCHOTHERAPY This type of conversation may lead to more therapist self- disclosure (e.g., direct identification of therapist racial/ethnic iden- tity) than some therapists might prefer. Even so, we strongly encourage therapists to consider how not engaging in these con- versations might impede the development of trust. Not acknowl- edging racial/ethnic differences could send an implicit message to the client that the therapist is uncomfortable discussing certain topics or does not view them as important—a message that is likely to hinder the therapy process. 4. Acknowledge That Power, Privilege, and Racism Might Affect Interactions With Clients Beyond addressing issues particular to any specific racial/ethnic group, therapists should also recognize that racism, power, and privilege can affect the therapeutic process (Pinderhughes, 1989). Many Caucasian psychologists are certainly aware of and sensitive to these issues, but it is likely that minority clients will have experienced them more directly, on a personal level. Moreover, minority clients may have had negative experiences in which the effects of racism, power, and privilege on their lives have been minimized or denied. Failing to acknowledge these societal issues in the context of psychotherapy could unwittingly invalidate pain- ful personal experiences and thus alienate minority clients. Racism. Although institutionally sanctioned racial discrimina- tion is now illegal in the United States, it is an unfortunate reality that racism, prejudice, and discrimination do continue to exist. In 2000, the Federal Bureau of Investigation reported on 8,055 hate crimes; a significant percentage of these crimes (65.1%) were determined to be motivated by racial, ethnic, or national-origin bias (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2001). At more individual levels, many members of racial/ethnic minority groups will have had some personal experience with racism and prejudice in their own lives or in the lives of family and friends. For example, many African Americans report having experienced racial profiling by police conducting traffic stops (e.g., Meredith, 2001). Other racial/ ethnic minorities living along the U.S.–Mexico border report being routinely stopped by officers of the Immigration and Nationaliza- tion Service who are searching for illegal immigrants (Silko, 2001). People of color may also experience more subtle forms of racism in everyday activities, such as being watched closely by security personnel while shopping, or overhearing racial slurs or jokes in the classroom or workplace (Rothenberg, 2001). Although these experiences may not always be as extreme or overt as job discrimination or hate crimes, they can still have a lasting and cumulative negative effect. Considering how these types of experiences affect the therapeutic process is critical. Racial/ethnic minority clients may have the (often correct) percep- tion that Caucasian therapists do not adequately understand these types of experiences or the emotions they can evoke both imme- diately and over time. Thus, we strongly encourage therapists to try to understand how repeated experiences with racism can create vastly different experiences and a different outlook on life for racial/ethnic minority clients. Power and privilege. In addition to overt experiences with racism and discrimination, it is important for therapists to consider how power and privilege may influence work with racial/ethnic minority clients (Pinderhughes, 1989). One way in which power might manifest itself in therapy is through the construct known as white privilege, or the set of advantages that are automatically afforded to those who share the dominant European American culture (McIntosh, 2001; Tatum, 1997). Caucasian Americans may fully acknowledge, and seek to rectify, what they see as disadvan- tages experienced by those in a minority group, but it is often more difficult to see the reverse: The advantages afforded to those who share the dominant culture. Some examples of these “invisible” privileges include seeing people of one’s own race/ethnicity well represented in film, TV, magazines, and other media; never being asked to speak “on behalf” of one’s racial/ethnic group; and trusting that in school, one’s children will use curricular materials that contain images of people who look like them (McIntosh, 2001). Conversations about racism, power, and privilege can be diffi- cult, particularly when a therapist is a member of the group benefiting from power discrepancies. It is much easier to engage clients in abstract discussions or even to empathize with clients’ own personal experiences than it is to explore the effects of power, privilege, and racism on the therapeutic relationship. The benefits to the therapeutic alliance from having such conversations, how- ever, are invaluable. The following is an example of how a Caucasian therapist might engage a client who recently discussed personal experiences of prejudice: Today we have been talking about your sense that many of your coworkers are prejudiced. What has this conversation with me been like for you? What has it been like for you to share experiences of discrimination with a White therapist who hasn’t had those kinds of experiences? Although there may be relatively little that a Caucasian therapist can do on a macro level to rectify the racial/ethnic inequities that exist in today’s society, acknowledging clients’ feelings of frus- tration and helplessness and being willing to discuss these feelings openly on a micro level can yield great benefits to the therapy relationship. In this way, simply demonstrating a willingness to discuss these difficult topics may be the critical component. 5. When in Doubt About the Importance of Race and Ethnicity in Treatment, Err on the Side of Discussion; Be Willing to Take Risks With Clients Although we do not suggest that extended discussions of race/ ethnicity are necessary in every therapy relationship, we believe that these issues warrant more attention than they are currently given. It can be difficult for both clients and therapists to determine when it will be useful to openly discuss issues regarding race and ethnicity in the course of psychotherapy. Some clients may directly bring up issues relating to race (e.g., by noting an apparent differ- ence between the race/ethnicity of client and therapist; by express- ing anger regarding racial discrimination; by making a racist remark deriding a member of another group). In these cases, it may be more apparent that race and ethnicity will be important topics to address. Other clients may never directly raise the issue of race/ ethnicity; however there may be subtle indicators that it is an important issue. When in doubt about the salience of these issues in treatment, we suggest that therapists initiate discussion in order to provide an opportunity for direct discussion should it be rele- vant. Broaching the topic directly and matter-of-factly can convey 282 CARDEMIL AND BATTLE a sense of openness to your client, inviting future discussion on these issues as necessary. Conversations about race/ethnicity can be uncomfortable due to anxiety about offending or alienating another person or being judged for “saying the wrong thing.” The issue may carry a strong emotional valence (e.g., anger, fear, shame, guilt) due to both historical and current race relations and events in this country (Helms & Cook, 1999), as well as previous personal experiences with individuals from different racial/ethnic groups. In addition, some clients may simply prefer not to discuss race and ethnicity issues with their therapist. The more comfortable therapists are with conversations about race and ethnicity, the more easily they will be able to respond appropriately to clients who are them- selves uncomfortable or uninterested in participating in these conversations. In the event that a client expresses reticence or even frustration when a therapist raises the topic of race and ethnicity, we recom- mend responding as openly and as nondefensively as possible, in the same way that a therapist would engage with a client in order to overcome any other breach in the therapeutic alliance. One possible response to a client who reacts negatively to a therapist who initiates a conversation on racial/ethnic issues might be as follows: My intention was not to offend you when I brought up the topic of race and ethnicity. As we’ve discussed before, I want therapy to be a place where you can talk about anything that might be relevant to your life. In this case, I wondered whether anything related to our racial/ ethnic differences might be affecting our therapy process. If this is not relevant, or if it’s not something you wish to talk about here, I certainly respect that decision. We recommend getting practice talking openly about these issues by having conversations about race and ethnicity with interested family members, colleagues, friends, and coworkers and participating in relevant race-related workshops when available. Understandably, many therapists may still feel that raising issues of race/ethnicity with a client in therapy constitutes a risk, no matter how much practice they get with colleagues or at work- shops. Nevertheless, we maintain that broaching issues of race and ethnicity, even if the therapist is not sure of exactly what to say, is better than ignoring the topic. 6. Keep Learning Our final recommendation to psychologists is to keep learning about issues of race and ethnicity. Because the United States has a long history of oppression of racial minority groups and incidents of racism and discrimination still frequently occur (e.g., Rothen- berg, 2001), many opportunities to learn will inevitably arise. For example, we urge psychologists to consider how the therapy pro- cess might be affected by relevant current events related to racism and discrimination (e.g., instances of race-based hate crimes, na- tional debate regarding civil rights legislation or policies). We also suggest that therapists increase their awareness regard- ing some recurring sociopolitical events. For example, despite the fact that Martin Luther King, Jr., Day is a national holiday, many hospitals, universities, and institutions around the country do not recognize it. What message does it send to an African American client if a Caucasian psychologist works on Martin Luther King, Jr., Day and does not acknowledge the importance of this holiday? In addition, certain months of the year have specific cultural designations (e.g., African American Heritage Month, Latino Her- itage Month), and others have religious significance to certain groups (e.g., Ramadan, Lent). Failing to be aware of these cultural celebrations could be negatively perceived by some racial/ethnic minority clients. A wealth of resources exists for those interested in learning more about specific racial/ethnic groups, their traditions, and their current and historical experiences in the United States. And al- though it is clearly not the job of psychologists to learn about every possible cultural celebration, it is likely that psychologists who take the extra step of learning about significant cultural and so- ciopolitical events will convey a message of sensitivity and aware- ness that many clients will appreciate. In addition to information on sociopolitical and historical events, much has been written about issues that may be of partic- ular interest to psychologists, including identity development, po- tential for bias in assessment and diagnosis, and the psychological impact of bias and prejudice on groups and individuals. We have included a listing of selected articles and resource materials that may be useful for psychologists interested in expanding their knowledge base in these areas (see the Appendix). As we have emphasized throughout this article, though, learning concrete information about different racial/ethnic groups is not enough. Equally important is the process of considering and chal- lenging one’s own personal worldview, assumptions, and preju- dices about other racial/ethnic groups (Helms & Cook, 1999; Tatum, 1997). Participating in workshops and taking advantage of literature that promotes self-exploration regarding race and race relations may be helpful. Involvement in professional meetings sponsored by groups such as APA’s Division 45 (Society for the Psychological Study of Ethnic Minority Issues) or more informal discussions with colleagues of other racial/ethnic groups who have similar interests in exploring these issues may be another useful strategy. This self-exploration may not only be helpful in one’s role as a clinical psychologist but may also be deeply fulfilling on a personal level. Conclusion Sensitivity to issues of race and ethnicity is becoming increas- ingly emphasized in psychology and has been described by some leaders in the field as an ethical imperative (Mays, 2000). How- ever, many practicing psychologists may be uncomfortable ad- dressing these issues openly with their clients. Often, therapists make the error of omission in not raising these topics rather than risking an error of commission by initiating such a conversation. We believe that, in most cases, racial and ethnic differences between clients and therapists are relevant and have an impact on the therapeutic process, and therefore it is important for psychol- ogists to be able to discuss these topics with their clients as the need arises. In addition, engaging in these conversations could potentially lead to improvement in treatment retention, therapy alliance, and treatment outcome. Being able and willing to have conversations about issues of race and ethnicity, including difficult topics like one’s own as- sumptions and personal prejudices, is an important skill that does not develop overnight or without effort. In addition to actively 283RACE AND ETHNICITY IN PSYCHOTHERAPY learning about topics relevant to specific racial/ethnic minority groups, one must make a shift in both attitude and behavior. This approach requires psychologists to acknowledge the limitations of their own worldview and to tolerate the anxiety that may accom- pany broaching these topics in psychotherapy. Nevertheless, these skills can be relatively easy to practice, requiring only two moti- vated individuals who are willing to invest the time and energy to listen to each other’s viewpoints. References Alvidrez, J., Azocar, F., & Miranda, J. (1996). Demystifying the concept of ethnicity for psychotherapy researchers. Journal of Consulting and Clin- ical Psychology, 64, 903–908. American Psychological Association. (1993). Guidelines for providers of psychological services to ethnic, linguistic, and culturally diverse pop- ulations. American Psychologist, 48, 45– 48. American Psychological Association, Committee on Accreditation. (2002). Guidelines and principles for accreditation of programs in professional psychology. Washington, DC: Author. Anderson, L. P. (1991). Acculturative stress: A theory of relevance to Black Americans. Clinical Psychology Review, 11, 685–702. Atkinson, D. R. (1983). Ethnic similarity in counseling psychology: A review of research. The Counseling Psychologist, 11, 79 –92. Atkinson, D. R., Morten, G., & Sue, D. W. (1998). Counseling American minorities (5th ed.). Boston: McGraw-Hill. Berry, J. W., & Kim, U. (1988). Acculturation and mental health. In P. R. Dasen, J. W. Berry, & N. Sartorius (Eds.), Cross-cultural research and methodology series: Vol. 10. Health and cross-cultural psychology: Toward applications (pp. 207–236). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Betancourt, H., & Lopez, S. R. (1993). The study of culture, ethnicity, and race in American psychology. American Psychologist, 48, 629 – 637. Cheung, F. K., & Snowden, L. R. (1990). Community mental health and ethnic minority populations. Community Mental Health Journal, 26, 277–291. Chun, K. M., Organista, P. B., & Marı́n, G. (2003). Acculturation: Ad- vances in theory, measurement, and applied research. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association. Comas-Dı́az, L. (1992). The future of psychotherapy with ethnic minori- ties. Psychotherapy, 29, 88 –94. Cross, W. E. (1971). The Negro-to-Black conversion experience: Towards a psychology of Black liberation. Black World, 20, 13–27. Cuellar, I. (2000). Acculturation and mental health: Ecological transac- tional relations of adjustment. In I. Cuellar & F. A. Paniagua (Eds.), Handbook of multicultural mental health: Assessment and treatment of diverse populations (pp. 45– 62). New York: Academic Press. Dwairy, M., & Van Sickle, T. D. (1996). Western psychotherapy in traditional Arabic societies. Clinical Psychology Review, 16, 231–249. Federal Bureau of Investigation. (2001). Hate crime statistics, 2000. Re- trieved April 15, 2002, from http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/ucr.htm Garcı́a-Preto, N. (1996). Puerto Rican families. In M. McGoldrick, J. Giordano, & J. K. Pearce (Eds.), Ethnicity and family therapy (2nd ed., pp. 183–199). New York: Guilford Press. Helms, J. E. (1995). An update of Helms’ White and people of color racial identity models. In J. G. Ponterotto, M. J. Casas, L. A. Suzuki, & C. M. Alexander (Eds.), Handbook of multicultural counseling (pp. 181–198). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Helms, J. E., & Cook, D. A. (1999). Using race and culture in counseling and psychotherapy: Theory and process. Needham Heights, MA: Allyn & Bacon. Herring, R. D. (1995). Developing biracial ethnic identity: A review of the increasing dilemma. Journal of Multicultural Counseling and Develop- ment, 23, 29 –39. Kim, B. S. K., Yang, P. G., Atkinson, D. R., Wolfe, M. M., & Hong, S. (2001). Cultural value similarities and differences among Asian Amer- ican ethnic groups. Cultural Diversity and Ethnic Minority Psychol- ogy, 7, 343–361. Lee, E. (1996). Asian American families: An overview. In M. McGoldrick, J. Giordano, & J. K. Pearce (Eds.), Ethnicity and family therapy (2nd ed.). New York: Guilford Press. Marsella, A. J. (1985). Culture, self, and mental disorder. In A. J. Marsella, G. DeVos, & F. L. K. Hsu (Eds.), Culture and self: Asian and Western perspectives (pp. 281–307). New York: Tavistock Publications. Mays, V. M. (2000). A social justice agenda. American Psychologist, 55, 326 –327. McGuire, P. (1999). Multicultural summit cheers packed house: The two- day dialogue aimed to foster creative strategies of inclusion. APA Mon- itor, 30(3). Retrieved April 3, 2002, from http://www.apa.org/monitor/ mar99/foster.html McIntosh, P. (2001). White privilege: Unpacking the invisible knapsack. In P. S. Rothenberg (Ed.), Race, class, and gender in the United States: An integrated study (5th ed., pp. 163–168). New York: Worth Publishers. Meredith, R. (2001). DWB: Driving while Black. In P. S. Rothenberg (Ed.), Race, class, and gender in the United States: An integrated study (5th ed., pp. 197–199). New York: Worth Publishers. Pinderhughes, E. (1989). Understanding race, ethnicity, and power: The key to efficacy in clinical practice. New York: Free Press. Ponterotto, J. G., Casas, J. M., Suzuki, L. A., & Alexander, C. M. (2001). Handbook of multicultural counseling (2nd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Poston, W. S. C. (1990). The biracial identity development model: A needed addition. Journal of Counseling & Development, 69, 152–155. Rogler, L. H., Cortes, D. E., & Malgady, R. G. (1991). Acculturation and mental health status among Hispanics. American Psychologist, 46, 585– 597. Rothenberg, P. S. (Ed.). (2001). Race, class, and gender in the United States: An integrated study (5th ed.). New York: Worth Publishers. Silko, L. M. (2001). The border patrol state. In P. S. Rothenberg (Ed.), Race, class, and gender in the United States: An integrated study (5th ed., pp. 211–213). New York: Worth Publishers. Sue, D. W. (1990). Culture-specific strategies in counseling: A conceptual framework. Professional Psychology: Research and Practice, 21, 424 – 433. Sue, D. W., & Sue, D. (1990). Counseling the culturally different: Theory and practice (2nd ed.). New York: Wiley. Sue, S. (1988). Psychotherapeutic services for ethnic minorities: Two decades of research findings. American Psychologist, 43, 301–308. Tatum, B. D. (1997). Why are all the Black kids sitting together in the cafeteria? New York: Basic Books. Treviño, F. M., & Rendón, M. I. (1994). Mental illness/mental health issues. In C. W. Molina & M. Aguirre-Molina (Eds.), Latino health in the U.S.: A growing challenge (pp. 447– 475). Washington, DC: Amer- ican Public Health Association. Tsui, P., & Schultz, G. L. (1985). Failure of rapport: Why psychothera- peutic engagement fails in the treatment of Asian clients. American Journal of Orthopsychiatry, 55, 561–569. U.S. Census Bureau. (2001). United States Census 2000. Retrieved De- cember 28, 2001, from http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/Basic- FactsServlet 284 CARDEMIL AND BATTLE Appendix Race and Ethnicity Issues in Psychotherapy: Professional Resources and Recommended Reading General Information Atkinson, D. R., Morten, G., & Sue, D. W. (1998). Counseling American minorities (5th ed.). Boston: McGraw-Hill. Chun, K. M., Organista, P. B., & Marı́n, G. (2003). Acculturation: Ad- vances in theory, measurement, and applied research. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association. Helms, J. E., & Cook, D. A. (1999). Using race and culture in counseling and psychotherapy: Theory and process. Needham Heights, MA: Allyn & Bacon. McGoldrick, M. (1998). Re-visioning family therapy. New York: Guilford Press. Ponterotto, J. G., Casas, J. M., Suzuki, L. A., & Alexander, C. M. (2001). Handbook of multicultural counseling (2nd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Rothenberg, P. S. (2001). Race, class, and gender in the United States: An integrated study (5th ed.). New York: Worth Publishers. Sue, D. W., & Sue, D. (1999). Counseling the culturally different: Theory and practice (3rd ed.). New York: Wiley. Tatum, B. D. (1997). Why are all the Black kids sitting together in the cafeteria? New York: Basic Books. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. (2001). Mental health: Culture, race, and ethnicity—A supplement to mental health: A report of the Surgeon General. Rockville, MD: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Admin- istration, Center for Mental Health Services. Information for Working With Specific Racial/Ethnic Groups Choney, S. K., Berryhill-Paapke, E., & Robbins, R. R. (1995). The accul- turation of American Indians: Developing frameworks for research and practice. In J. G. Ponterotto, J. M. Casas, L. A. Suzuki, & C. M. Alexander (Eds.), Handbook of multicultural counseling (pp. 73–92). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Chung, R. C.-Y., Bemak, F., & Okazaki, S. (1997). Counseling Americans of Southeast Asian descent. In C. C. Lee (Ed.), Multicultural issues in counseling (2nd ed., pp. 207–231). Alexandria, VA: American Coun- seling Association. Erickson, C. D., & Al-Timimi, N. R. (2001). Providing mental health services to Arab Americans: Recommendations and considerations. Cul- tural Diversity and Ethnic Minority Psychology, 7, 308 –327. Mezzich, J. E., Ruiz, P., & Muñoz, R. A. (1999). Mental health care for Hispanic Americans: A current perspective. Cultural Diversity and Ethnic Minority Psychology, 5, 91–102. Wilson, L. L., & Stith, S. M. (1991). Culturally sensitive therapy with Black clients. Journal of Multicultural Counseling and Develop- ment, 29, 32– 43. Competency Guidelines American Psychological Association. (1993). Guidelines for providers of psychological services to ethnic, linguistic, and culturally diverse pop- ulations. American Psychologist, 48, 45– 48. Organizations Asian American Psychological Association PMB #527 5025 North Central Avenue Phoenix, AZ 85012 Tel.: 602–230 – 4257 www.west.asu.edu/aapa Association of Black Psychologists P.O. Box 55999 Washington, DC 20040-5999 Tel.: 202-722-0808 http://www.abpsi.org National Alliance for Hispanic Health 1501 Sixteenth Street, NW Washington, DC 20036-1401 Tel.: 202-387-5000 http://www.hispanichealth.org National Center for American Indian and Alaska Native Mental Health Research University of Colorado Health Sciences Center Department of Psychiatry Nighthorse Campbell Native Health Building P.O. Box 6508, Mail Stop F800 Aurora, CO 80045-0508 Tel.: 303-724-1414 Fax: 303-724-1474 http://www.uchsc.edu/ai/ncaianmhr/ Center for Multicultural and Multilingual Mental Health Services 4750 North Sheridan Road Suite 300 Chicago, IL 60640 Tel.: 773-751-4081 Fax: 773-271-7261 (Appendix continues) 285RACE AND ETHNICITY IN PSYCHOTHERAPY National Center for Cultural Competence Georgetown University Center for Child and Human Development 3307 M Street, NW, Suite 401 Washington, DC 20007-3935 Tel.: 800-788-2066 Tel.: 202-687-5387 Fax: 202-687-8899 http://www.georgetown.edu/research/gucdc/nccc/ APA Division 45 Society for the Psychological Study of Ethnic Minority Issues Division 45 Administrative Office American Psychological Association 750 First Street, NE Washington, DC 20002-4242 Tel.: 202-336-6013 http://www.apa.org/divisions/div45/ Received April 24, 2002 Revision received December 20, 2002 Accepted January 14, 2003 � 286 CARDEMIL AND BATTLE 
work_ih2upr72fffaxgh5pkwcn7kdy4	----	Islamophobia, Representation and the Muslim Political Subject. A Swedish Case Study societies Article Islamophobia, Representation and the Muslim Political Subject. A Swedish Case Study Nina Jakku Center for Theology and Religion Studies, Lund University, 221 00 Lund, Sweden; nina.jakku@ctr.lu.se Received: 29 September 2018; Accepted: 6 December 2018; Published: 10 December 2018 ����������������� Abstract: Applying media analysis, this article addresses how the exclusion of Muslim women from fields of common public interest in Sweden, such as partaking as an active citizen, is materialized. Focusing on a specific event—the cancellation of a screening of Burka Songs 2.0—and the media coverage and representation of the cancellation, it discusses the role of discourses of gender equality, secularity and democracy in circumscribing space for Muslim political subjects. It casts light on Islamophobic stereotyping, questionable democracy and secularity, as well as the over-simplified approaches to gender equality connected to dealings with Muslim women in Sweden. Besides obstacles connected to Muslim political subjects, the study provides insights into media representation of Muslim women in general, specially connected to veils and the role of lawmaking connected to certain kind of veiling, in Sweden and Europe. Keywords: Islamophobia; Muslim political subjects; Burka Songs 2.0; representation; gender equality 1. Introduction Islamophobia is of rising concern in Sweden, manifested, for example, in hate crimes [1–3], discrimination in the labor market and housing [3,4] (pp. 11, 117), and racial profiling [5] (pp. 24–26). Hate crimes in the country increasingly target Muslim women [2,6] (pp. 54, 74), especially women who wear some kind of veil, thereby enhancing their visibility as Muslims. According to Mattias Gardell and Meheke Muftee [7], Islamophobia has also entered mainstream politics, in line with which, this article argues that one of its aspects concerns matters which result in excluding Muslims from active citizenship. There are numerous ways to implement such exclusion, three of which are discussed below: by law, through representation and as a result of political decisions. The study adds to a growing body of research analyzing the impact of Islamophobia on Muslim women [8–16], which remains largely understudied in the context of Sweden [2,17–20]. It therefore constitutes a significant contribution to analysis of several aspects of the complex phenomenon of contemporary Islamophobia in Western countries. Islamophobia as a concept will be discussed and defined below. I begin by focusing on one specific event, occurring in March 2018, that serves to illustrate how exclusion materializes and operates in Sweden and how decisions framed as protecting democratic values, instead risk dominating, and hence producing inequality. Hanna Högstedt’s film, Burka Songs 2.0, was scheduled for screening in Gothenburg on 14 March as part of a pre-Europride program arranged by the Municipality of Gothenburg. The director, Hanna Högstedt, describes the aim of the film: The movie and the conversation afterwards are about interpretative prerogative: who can speak for whom, who is considered credible and not; about the difficulty of seeing structures in which oneself is part of the power, such as seeing white racism’s effects as white; about Europe’s colonial history and how it affects our society today [21,22]. Societies 2018, 8, 124; doi:10.3390/soc8040124 www.mdpi.com/journal/societies http://www.mdpi.com/journal/societies http://www.mdpi.com http://www.mdpi.com/2075-4698/8/4/124?type=check_update&version=1 http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/soc8040124 http://www.mdpi.com/journal/societies Societies 2018, 8, 124 2 of 17 On 1 March, the Municipality of Gothenburg announced that the screening of Burka Songs 2.0, with its following panel discussion, had been cancelled due to critique of the focus of the arrangement and composition of the panel. In August 2018 it happened again. Reclaim Pride Gothenburg had planned a screening of Burka Songs 2.0 with a discussion to follow between the filmmaker and Fatima Doubakil, who features in the film; the day before the screening the organizers were called to a meeting with the Municipality of Gothenburg and told that the event could not go ahead [23]. Before examining the implications of this double cancellation, I discuss increased hostility and Islamophobia in Sweden in more general terms. Legal bans on aspects of Islam, such as items of dress, most of which were instituted after 9/11 [24] (p. 5), also play a part in normalizing the exclusion of Muslims; I therefore include an overview of the legal situation in other European countries, as well as Sweden. While studies of specific contexts, Sweden in this case, are necessary given Europe’s heterogeneity, insights into the broader context are also valuable due to similarities which have an impact on Europe more generally; for instance, via EU legal rulings, which are applicable in many European countries, including Sweden. I conclude by highlighting some media events and political processes—a ban on the niqab [25] (veil) and concrete proposals in favor of bans—connected to representation and gender. The examples presented in this article are analyzed with a focus on Islamophobia and ideas of gender equality; taken together they demonstrate that forbidding certain items of clothing is also about baring certain people from participation, hence denying them the right of expression and drawing attention to democratic shortcomings. The principal questions addressed below are the following: In which ways do liberal arguments favoring a niqab ban and actions taken against political subjects identifying actively as Muslims relate to the discourse of Islamophobia? How are the critiques of niqab and Muslim political subjects represented? How do ideas of gender equality operate in the representation and exclusion of Muslim women? I start with a part clarifying my materials and methods, followed by a short background to the film Burka Songs 2.0. After that I will give a background to the terms “Islamophobia” and “gender equality”, followed by both a background and analyses connected to the cancellation of the film screening and to the media debate in connection to it. This will be followed with a background to the Swedish and European legal discourses connected with veiling. This is then followed by two parts that give both background and analyses connected to gender and representation and to the concept of “white men and women saving Muslim women”. The final discussion is mainly used as an analytical conclusion. 2. Materials and Methods This study comprises media analysis of representations and the political agency of Muslims in Sweden. Studying media discourse has offered a fruitful method for such exploration, supplying tools with which to access structures of knowledge regimes inherent in the data used in the study, and uncovering the rationales whereby some dicta are accepted as the truth, while others are silenced. Discourse analysis specifically aims to show how the cognitive, social, historical, cultural or political contexts of language use and communication impinge on the contents, meanings, structures, or strategies of text and dialogue, and vice versa, how discourse itself is an integral part of and contributes to the structures of the context [26] (p. 45). Teun A. van Dijk describes Critical Discourse Studies as an approach for studying social problems and political issues that can be used for analyzing how discourses (re)produce social domination, in one group’s power abuse over another, as well as how the dominated part responds. The study and analyses aim to contribute to the understanding of social problems, especially those caused by public talk and text, and to point out social inequalities [27]. The material cited in this article consists of fourteen articles from the principal Swedish newspapers (four editorials [28–31]; eight debate articles [32–39]; one culture review [40]; one news story [41]; three radio reports [42–44]; three press releases [23,45,46]: seven blog posts [47–53] from Societies 2018, 8, 124 3 of 17 the Social Democratic Municipal Commissioner in Gothenburg, Ann-Sofie Hermansson; and, finally, two bills passed in the Municipality of Norrköping [54,55]. I have, however, been following the Swedish debates connected to the niqab in the principal Swedish newspapers since at least 2009, which means reading every article connected to banning face veils and discussions connected to incidents where niqab has been pointed at as a problem in educational and work-related situations. In addition to the elements discussed here, there have been three coherent and nationwide waves, spurred by three separate incidents: in 2003 two students at a high school were asked to remove their niqab while in school; this was repeated in 2009, involving a student in a municipal adult education program; and, in 2015, a preschool teacher was told that she could not wear a niqab at work. These debates have been largely similar to those discussed here in terms of speakers and content, with few exceptions. This article does not provide detailed accounts of the debates; I have instead chosen three articles that discuss common features within the debate [56]: compulsion connected to face veiling, connections with phenomena such as honor violence, secularity and gender equality. The material connected to the cancelling of Burka Songs 2.0 has been chosen because it is written by the main actors connected to the cancellation, but also because they bear parts of “making of an Islamist” [57] which I refer to in my analyses. Available media research in Sweden concludes that a stereotyping representation of Muslims is common in Swedish media. The representation reinforces already existing negative ideas of Muslims, which tends to result in factual representation also being affected by negative associations [58–61]. 3. Burka Songs: A Short Presentation of the Content and the Idea Behind Whose voice may be heard in public space? What stories can be told in Sweden today? What happens to the artistic process when it gets caught up in these issues? Burka Songs 2.0 is a film about a film that went wrong, about white spaces, about solidarity and fear. Hanna Högstedt received funding to make a film, following the burqa ban in France in 2011, in which she would walk along the Champs-Élysées singing the French national anthem and wearing a face veil until she was arrested. That film was never made. Burka Songs 2.0 begins with a protest against the French face veil ban on the Champs-Élysées, followed by a talk about representation, racism and the stories that may be told in Sweden today. In the course of the documentary, director Hanna Högstedt speaks to Athena Farrokhzad (poet), Baker Karim (film consultant) and Fatima Doubakil (human rights activist), among others. The debate organized after the screening was supposed to address issues such as power structures and interpretative prerogatives. Maimuna Abdullahi, who was one of the planned panelists, is a social work student, writer and secretary to the Antiracist Academy in Sweden. Fatima Doubakil is a human right activist and a commissioner on the Muslim Human Rights Committee (MHRC). They are two of the most influential Muslim debaters/lecturers in Sweden. 4. Background Gender Equality and Islamophobia It is challenging to discuss matters of Islamophobia, because as Salman Sayyid puts it: “Islamophobia, both as a term and a concept, is widely used, hotly disputed and frequently disavowed” [62] (p. 1). There have been several attempts to define Islamophobia, one by Mattias Gardell, who suggests that it comprises “socially reproduced prejudices of and aversions against Islam and Muslims, as well as acts and practices that assail, exclude or discriminate people on the basis that they are or are believed to be Muslims and associated with Islam” [56,63] (p. 17), I will use Gardell’s definition when analyzing Islamophobia but, fruitfully for this study, Sayyid adds to that definition with a discussion of what Islamophobia seeks to discipline. He argues that it is present whenever Muslims or Islam are described as antithetical to Western [64,65] values and emerges in contexts where being Muslim has political significance [66] (p. 17). In the context of the screening of Burka Songs 2.0 and its attendant panel session, it strongly accentuates the significance of analyzing actions taken in connection with the Muslim political subject. Societies 2018, 8, 124 4 of 17 Defining Islamophobia is also challenging because it tends to be absorbed into a discourse of “racism without racists” [62], which differs from racism in which biological difference is in focus, such as Nazism, in that it can be explained as religious critique. The question of whether Islam may be criticized occurs often and the answer should be that of course it can and, indeed, should be; the problem is, however, that much of the criticism directed towards Islam and Muslims is not free from Islamophobia. Conforming to the profile of racism without racists, it bears colonial and orientalist connotations harking back to projects of “civilizing” unruly Muslims [62], and is often justified in terms of democratization and the defense of Western values. There are no reliable figures for the size of the Muslim population in Sweden. A study from 2007, based on country of birth or origins, estimated it to be in the region of 400,000 persons [67], a figure that has increased since then; currently a credible estimate would be around 5% of the population in total, but that includes people with an assumed Muslim cultural background, not only those practicing Islam, and it excludes people who are living in Sweden but have not yet received (or been denied) a permanent or temporary residence permit. As Jonas Otterbeck argues: Sweden has become obsessed with its Muslim population. Blogs, newspapers, TV shows, debaters, artists, politicians, interfaith activists, academics in the social science field, school personnel, comedians, right-wing Christians and, of course, people with a Muslim family history are active participants in an endless discourse about Muslims. Integration, criminality, honor, sexism, undemocratic thinking, rape, nativity, radicalization, etc.—everything is given a Muslim angle [4] (p. 103). The subjects of discussion in Otterbeck’s quote also offer a sample of some of the most common biases and stereotypes that flourish in understandings of Muslims in Sweden. Further, Islamophobia makes use of gendered practice; in effect the stereotyping and biases differ depending on a person’s sex. Muslim women, specially veil-wearing women, are largely constructed as a homogenous group in terms of lack of agency as well as being oppressed [10] (p. 313). The discourse of a unique Swedish gender equality contrasted with stereotypical representation of Muslim gender relations is something that matters in analyzing the parts where gender equality is discussed [56]. In this context stereotypes of both “us” and “them” are in use, which may prevent us from seeing things in their whole complexity. 5. Burka Songs 2.0: The Media Discussions and the Political Processes On 27 February 2018, the liberal writer Jenny Sonesson wrote an editorial in Göteborgs Posten with the title, “The critics of the burka must also be invited”; even if the title indicates that the concern is face-veils, she states in the article that the panel should also include credible critics of veils in general [28]. She claims that the problem consists of the combination of Abdullahi and Doubakil who, together with Högstedt, were to participate in the panel after the screening. Sonesson argues that Abdullahi and Doubakil do not problematize forced veiling; in her view, what they do—labelling as colonialists and racists those Europeans who invoke the oppression of Muslim women—is the opposite of this. She does not give her source, but it is fair to assume that she is referring to an article by Maimuna Abdullahi, Zaynab Ouahabi, Aftab Soltani and Fatima Doubakil [68], written in response to an article by journalist Lars Åberg with the title, “The veil as a weapon against secular democracy”, that critiques a conference named “The hijab as political resistance” [38]. The article by Abdullahi and her co-writers posits a problem with policies and representation that are used as tools to promote women to take off their veils; clearly this differs from what Sonesson suggests they advocate. In some ways it is quite the contrary. Sonesson also refers to Lars Åberg’s article when arguing that Abdullahi and Doubakil relativize honor-related oppression and equate anti-terror measures with racism; specifically, she quotes Åberg’s interpretation of an Alternative Report to the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) (written by Doubakil et al.), rather than referring to the report itself. She thereby presents Åberg’s interpretation as a “truth” on which the reader may depend when determining who Societies 2018, 8, 124 5 of 17 Abdullahi and Doubakil are: a common device in discourse-making [69]. As Åberg’s article is central to the resulting furor, it is worth summarizing and analyzing its content, which is principally devoted to claiming that that there is an Islamist network in Sweden of which Doubakil is a central figure. But what has Doubakil done in order to be labeled in such manner? In 2013 Doubakil was a member of a group entitled Muslims in Cooperation Network (MCIN) that wrote the Alternative Report to CERD. Åberg claims that the report demanded that the state should monitor and control the media on matters connected to Islam. In the part of the report that concerns this issue, however, Islam is not mentioned; rather, Muslims and, more specifically, freedom of speech, are the topics raised: The government through its various branches, such as the chancellor of Justice, must ensure that the freedom of speech and freedom of the press is balanced by respect for the rights and reputation of others. In particular the Chancellor of Justice must use its discretion to prosecute offences against the freedom of the press and freedom of expression targeting Muslims. Special attention also needs to be paid to the commentary fields of Internet media outlets [70] (p. 7). Responding to Doubakil et al.’s Alternative Report, the CERD recommendation reads: That the State party effectively investigate, prosecute and punish all hate crimes and take effective measures to combat hate speech in the media and on the Internet, including by prosecuting the perpetrators, where appropriate, regardless of their official status. The Committee urges the State party to take the necessary measures to promote tolerance, intercultural dialogue and respect for diversity, aiming those measures at journalists, inter alios [71]. CERD repeats basically the same statements in its concluding observations for 2018 [72], and the same kinds of concerns were highlighted by the United Nations Association of Sweden in their alternative report to CERD in 2008 [73]. Åberg also expresses dissatisfaction with the report’s concerns about the Government’s work with issues connected with the honor culture, work which is criticized both for being ineffective and for its imbalance: [T]hese policies are stigmatising Muslims since the practices they target are perceived to be linked to Muslims in the public imagination. Given this stigmatisation downside, it is important that the policies address real societal problems instead of just giving the impression that these practices are common features among certain people [70] (p. 36). One question that arises here concerns who should be allowed to criticize how the work against honor violence is carried out. Åberg himself has written several newspaper articles and co-written a book [74] criticizing the conduct of measures against honor violence by the authorities, for instance for their ineffectiveness. Concerns that resonate with the views of the MCIN regarding representations of stigmatization can also be found in a different Alternative Report to CERD, written by the United Nations Association of Sweden in 2008 [73] (p. 34). Åberg argues that some of what he regards as Islamist propaganda is fundamentally a critique directed at improved anti-terrorism laws. The MCIN’s Alternative Report of 2013 presses for the creation of an independent truth commission to investigate the effects of anti-terror laws and their compliance—or otherwise—with human rights. In response to this, CERD states in its concluding observations in 2018 that: The committee is concerned at reports that at present the Terrorism Act disproportionately targets Muslims, while crimes committed by other groups, such as neo-Nazi groups, are not investigated as terrorism. . . . the Committee recommends that the State party ensure that measures to combat terrorism are undertaken in such a way as to protect fundamental human rights, including the right of equality [72]. Societies 2018, 8, 124 6 of 17 Notwithstanding this similar framing by a high-ranking body of concerns that replicates those expressed by the MCIN five years earlier, Åberg ended his article by stating that individuals in the Islamist group he references seem to dislike the society (Sweden) in which they live: a society that provides greater equality than most, as well as freedom of speech, freedom of association and funding. What we may observe from this is that, when expressing their views—for instance, when writing an Alternative Report requesting equality, fair treatment and practices in according human rights—Muslim political subjects must be prepared to be criticized and described as Islamists in one of the country’s mainstream newspapers. I have failed to find a similar critique when it comes to the United Nations Association of Sweden or to CERD, who have both expressed similar concerns. Another important aspect of this exchange is that media actors such as Sonesson and Åberg use their platforms in order to take part in, and attempt to shape, agenda planning resulting in limitations being placed on the space in which Muslim political subjects may act as active citizens. The cancellation of the Burka Songs 2.0 screening soon became a political matter. The decision was not made by politicians, but by public officials; nevertheless, the (former, after the elections in September 2018) Social Democratic Municipal Commissioner, Ann-Sofie Hermansson, has been one of the most influential opponents of the screening and the panel discussion to follow, stating unequivocally that, “These kinds of arrangements are totally unacceptable” [34]. Furthermore, she writes that the City of Gothenburg should never be a platform for extremists. Her rhetoric concerning Abdullahi and Doubakil has followed the same pattern in several interviews, as well as on her private blog [75]. She has stated that both have expressed religious extremism, although, when asked to provide specific examples, she merely replied that they could easily be found on Google [39]. Meanwhile, the furor over Burka Songs 2.0 is becoming heated. On 27 March 2018, Swedish Television announced that the film would be screened at Gothenburg Literature House on April 16th [41]; on 28 March, Swedish Radio reported Hermansson’s statement that the Municipal Cultural Affairs committee would be inspecting municipal funding arrangements for the venue [43]. Meanwhile the Cultural Affairs Director in Gothenburg, Anna Rosengren, defended both the film screening and the Literature House, asserting that neither have overstepped the mark [44]. The debate continued between Hermansson and a politician for the liberal party, Helene Odenjung, in which Odenjung claimed that the MHRC is known for inviting hate preachers, spreading anti-Semitic propaganda and expressing hatred toward women and homosexuals [37]. Similar statements were issued from Gothenburg Municipality when it attempted to stop Doubakil from participating in a discussion in August 2018; they could not be sure that Doubakil agrees with principles of democracy and human rights [46]. Odenjung did not present any proof for her allegations. Abdullahi and Doubakil were not formally accused of anything; rather, Sonesson and Hermansson used guilt by association to affirm their theses. Gothenburg Municipality in their press release (and Hermansson in her blog) referred to debaters, terror experts and police while stating that Doubakil can be associated with the Muslim Brotherhood, extremists and non-democratic organizations. These evocative terms were not defined, nor their referents explicated; it is enough for the purposes of tarring Abdullahi and Doubakil with the brush of Islamophobic discourse that such notions should be associated with them in readers’ minds. There appears to be no foundation for these statements, however, and the organizers of the projected August screening requested Gothenburg Municipality to produce the documents on which the statements about Doubakil were purported to be based [23]. Finally, they decided to stage the event despite the Municipality’s embargo. The actions and responses in connection with screening Burka Songs 2.0 clearly resonate with the underlying aim of the film, highlighting issues such as who is to be considered credible and by whom. These questions did not arise on a theoretical level in the form of debate, but in very concrete form in, for example, the cancellation of events due to who was supposed to be participating. In many of the arguments against the screening and the panel conversation, the criticism also seemed to work on autopilot via the thoughtless application of Muslim stereotypes. From an analytical point of view, Societies 2018, 8, 124 7 of 17 it needs to be highlighted that an accusation of someone being Islamist happens in a context where the term Islamist, since 9/11, has in much media debate lost many of its necessary nuances, and gets easily connected to a person being a terrorist [76]. It is therefore a serious accusation, especially when it is used without a definition. I call the process “making of an Islamist”. It successfully undermines someone’s credibility and it proceeds without clear evidence or explanations of exactly why the person deemed an Islamist deserves the label. It is further a claim that you are Islamist in all aspects of your character. Common here are also references to democratic core values, as something that needs to be protected, again without specification of the ways in which “the Islamist” is threatening them. This takes place in an already hostile environment where Muslim stereotyping is a common feature, hence leading to decreasing space for Muslim political subjects. All the above creates a polarized political and medial public sphere, where those with interpretative prerogative use their platform to overshadow and potentially also prevent those inadequately defined as Islamist to respond and participate. The process of “making of an Islamist” has happened on several occasions in the Swedish political sphere. Connections to the Muslim Brotherhood, in particular, are often repeated when discrediting Muslim political subjects, but so far have appeared without references [76]. This needs to be seen as a part in the discourse of Islamophobia, where both stereotypes and restrictions of political subjects are used as tools, resulting in decreased space for active citizenship. As an aside, it should be noted that the film is not about forced veiling and, as far as I have been able to ascertain, neither Abdullahi nor Doubakil have indicated they are in favor of it. It needs to be mentioned, however, that this article does not have the intention of passing judgements regarding the overall political work of Abdullahi and Doubakil, but to analyze how their practice of active citizenship is met. 6. Niqab and Hijab within Legal Discourse and the Law—In Sweden and in Europe There are no general, national or specific, local laws in Sweden that forbid the wearing of the niqab or hijab. The only context in which such bans can be put in place is within private companies in accordance with a general policy that forbids philosophical, religious and political symbols for staff members coming into contact with customers, based on an EU Court of Justice ruling on 14 March 2017, in Case C-157/15, Samira Achbita vs. G4S Secure Solutions, and Case C-188/15, Asma Bougnaoui vs. Micropole Univers. Several proposals have been put forward in favor of a legal ban of face veils, however, the first by two MPs for the Centre Party in 2009. Other attempts have been made in parliament by Liberals, Moderates and Swedish Democrats [6] (p. 74). Until 2011 (when France and subsequently Belgium introduced a national ban on covering the face), there were no national prohibitions against the practice in Europe; however, there were local prohibitions of various degrees, which prohibited specific ways of covering the face in specific contexts in Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy, Switzerland and Catalonia [77] (pp. 4–6). Bulgaria introduced a general national ban on the niqab in 2016, Austria in 2017 and Denmark in 2018. In Finland, Germany, Latvia, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Spain there are pending legislative proposals that seek to ban face veils; in Belgium, Spain and Germany at least one type of legal ban is already in place [24] (p. 11). In Estonia and Hungary, the governments are working on a bill aimed at banning the niqab in public places, while in the non-EU country of Norway, the government plans to introduce a ban on wearing face veils at schools and universities and, in Switzerland, the lower house has approved a ban on wearing the niqab in public places. In France, it is forbidden to wear the veil in schools (together with other religious symbols), while national bans on religious clothing can also be found in Denmark and Spain in specific settings and sectors, and local bans prohibiting religious symbols exist in 8 out of 16 states in Germany [24] (p. 10). Common to the processes in the EU member states mentioned here has been the role played by nationalist and far-right parties in proposing, promoting and introducing the legal bans, even if, in most cases, it has been mainstream parties enacting the restrictions [24] (p. 5). Societies 2018, 8, 124 8 of 17 7. Gender and Representation in Media In the New Cambridge History of Islam, Manuela Marín [78] raises an essential issue concerning scholarly representations of Muslim women that she claims have tended to lack intersectional analysis. Historical research—which is scarce—has treated Muslim women as a discrete and uniform category, yet Marín urges the importance of exploring further dimensions. Differences between women’s lives, positions and opportunities are difficult to understand only by means of the single analytical category of gender; social and economic factors are also very important, as well as, historically, whether the individual was free or enslaved. Furthermore, marital status has likewise played a crucial role, along with issues of ethnicity, urban or rural residence, a nomadic lifestyle, and so on. These factors are not important only in historical studies, but are also highly relevant to contemporary research; class, age and functionality comprise further considerations. In order to put this into context, I continue this discussion by highlighting material from Swedish media contexts which exemplifies facets of how Muslim women are represented in Sweden. I start with a debate article in Svenska Dagbladet in which Ghazala Chaudhry reflects on her own perceptions: Something that can be seen in Swedish society is that Muslim women are usually seen as puppet dolls. A person who is a puppet doll does not stand up for something of her own, lacks character, and lets herself be led and guided by others. The veil is seen as something imposed and women who wear it appear to be ruled by others or indoctrinated to believe that the veil is something that is good [32,79]. The voices of Muslim women, often in the form of debate articles, have become more common in Swedish media, often testifying to similar experiences as Chaudhry, and not rarely to their vulnerability to threats and violence [2,80]. In sharp contrast to these voices there are others (debate articles, editorials, columns, etc.) that discuss Muslim women—and especially the clothes that some of them wear—from a very different perspective. I explore this discourse below, highlighting its common themes through a number of profiled debaters. Sophia Jarl is a right-wing opposition commissioner in the Municipality of Norrköping in Sweden, who published a debate article in Aftonbladet on 2 August 2016, entitled “The burka and niqab are symbols of oppression”. Not only aimed at the face veils, the article advocates a ban on wearing veils of any kind in schools. After stating that the face veils are not religious symbols, she continues by discussing the struggle against honor-related violence in Sweden. This resonates with the introduction to Jan Guillou’s column in Aftonbladet, “Sweden should not allow the degradation of women in schools”, which reads, “There is a minority in the world who believes that it is God’s will that young women should be genitally mutilated” [33]. Guillou stated later in the article that genital mutilation and the face veil cannot be considered equally serious tendencies, but Jarl does not clarify how the veil and honor-related violence have any relevant connection at all. Rhetoric that links veiling or specifically the niqab to genital mutilation and honor-related violence is rather common in similar contexts [56] (pp. 174–177). In an article in Göteborgs Posten, “Why not sit naked in the classroom?”, Lars Åberg (2012) argues, much like Jarl, that the niqab is a quasi-religious phenomenon, adding, “[w]ith reference to religious freedom, any craziness can now be justified if given a religious meaning” [40]. Although Jarl observes that the veil is not about religion, but, rather, “originates in cultural, traditional and patriarchal structures” [36], she continues with the statement that Sweden should, as a secular society, “put the law before religious freedom” [36]. In addition, Jarl believes that the veil manages, simultaneously, to encourage shyness and the diminishment of the sexuality of those wearing it, while sexualizing girls. “In Sweden, neither men nor women are seen as representatives of their gender. Our identity is so much more than sexuality. We meet as equals based on free and individual choices of whom we want to be” [36]. Apart from painting a far too ideal image of “our” gender-blindness in Sweden, the liberal tolerance discourse appears in its most clearly contradictory form when free and individual choices become the slogan with which to ban people dressing the way they wish. Societies 2018, 8, 124 9 of 17 Wendy Brown (2006) argues that tolerance as discourse requires dichotomies such as civilized, free and tolerant on the one hand and barbarians, fundamentalists and intolerant on the other. Discursively, civilization and tolerance have been identified (by Western scholars) with the West, both historically and in the present time [81] (p. 6), while non-Western societies or people are (discursively) sorted into illiberal categories. In this way tolerance can be used as an argument for phenomena as diverse as bans on the hijab/niqab and military invasions [80] (p. 2). Jarl’s argumentation asserts the idea of a form of gender equality that is specific and unique to Sweden [56,82] (p. 7), meaning that, as Gardell argues, “[t]hrough the patriarchy associated with Islam and Muslims—among those who are not like us—gender discrimination becomes an ethnically and religiously coded problem, an immigrant problem that does not concern us equal Swedes” [56] (p. 182). What Marín emphasized regarding the lack of intersectional analysis in scholarly texts is also clearly present throughout Jarl’s debate article. For instance, although Jarl claims that multi-dimensional identities are the norm in Sweden, the Muslim women in her text are described only in terms of their assumed gender roles and sexuality that then become parts of a sexistic and Islamophobic representation, presenting the Muslim women through stereotypical understandings of her as passive and controlled by men’s desires. Further, the representation touches upon a common discourse, discussed by Mayanthi Fernando, where a successful integration happens through an undressed female Muslim body, together with a successful heterosexuality (Fernando 2013). The discourse also plays a part in differentiating the West from the rest, through what Fernando calls “a sexual clash of civilizations” [83]. Something else that is remarkable in these texts is that neither Guillou, Åberg, nor Jarl include the perspectives of women who have experience of wearing the niqab, yet, although access is rather limited, such views are available in Sweden via blogs, newspaper interviews, television shows and debate articles. These writers impose their own interpretations of what religiosity means on these women when stating that the niqab does not qualify as a religious symbol, completely disregarding and silencing the possible objections of niqab-wearers themselves. Nor do they take into consideration their own participation in meaning-making connected to the niqab. Consequently, Heidi Safia Mirza (2013) argues that it is actually through discussions like these that the complex dress of Muslim women has been given a meaning greater than its religious or social status. These texts together also contain many of the ingredients that have been used in the broader context of European countries when arguing in favor of banning face veils: the drive for gender equality, secularity and the inclination for homogeneity [24] (p. 7). Besides writing debate articles, Jarl has in her capacity as a politician written two bills [51,52] in the Municipality of Norrköping, together with Pär Linderoth, one of which aims to forbid face veils for employees within the municipality. Here again they connect their arguments to honor culture by claiming that wearing face-veils is the result of its presence in Norrköping. The bill does not mention religion at all, rather describing the veil as an item of cultural and traditional clothing. The second bill aims at investigating the possibility of the municipality of Norrköping’s imposing regulations banning children under the age of 15 from wearing the hijab when taking part in any of the municipality’s activities. The city council of Norrköping has rejected both proposals with references to the Discrimination and Education Acts. The texts of Guillou, Åberg and Jarl make similar arguments in their statements regarding connections between honor-related violence and the oppression of women, on the one hand, and representations of the Swedish self as gender equal on the other. There is very little evidence put forward to support either claim, however, underlining the fact that some dicta are expected to be naturally accepted [69] (p. 11). 8. White Men and Women Saving Muslim Women from Muslim Men? In her essay, “Can the subaltern speak?” Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak coined the phrase: “white men saving brown women from brown men” [84] (p. 93). Saving Muslim women from Muslim men is Societies 2018, 8, 124 10 of 17 a practice and motif present both in historical and contemporary instances, and one in which the veil has also played a central role. The unveiling of Algeria [85] (p. 103), the war on Afghanistan [86–88] (p. 29) and the French veil debate(s) [89] all bear elements that reference gender equality as seen through the lens of a Western viewer. The texts that I have analyzed for this study are similarly distorted, as I have indicated, and all demonstrate shortcomings in understanding the diversity within veiling. Lila Abu-Lughod, however, emphasizes the importance of taking into account the different circumstances and heterogeneity of women wearing veils, observing that it is a reductive oversimplification to analyze a large number of women simply on the basis of a single piece of cloth that they all wear [86,90–93] (p. 40). Abu-Lughod goes on to add that veiling tends to be described as evidence of a lack of agency. Åberg assumes, for instance, that the niqab can never be a free choice made by the person wearing it [37,77,94–97] while Guillou states that, “[i]t is time to free the schoolgirls [98] who are either forced by their parents to wear the niqab or burqa in school, or possibly themselves imagine that [it is part of] being grown up (adult), cool, exclusive or God’s will” [33]. Finally, Jarl describes the niqab as a manifestation of women’s inferior position [33], and then all three writers reach the same conclusion: banning the niqab is the correct way forward in terms of gender equality, secularity and freedom of choice. This claim is made without considering the consequences such bans have had in countries like France and Belgium [96,99,100]. Over the past two decades, scholars have also challenged the conventional narrative connected to secularity as simply a separation between church and state, religion and law, political and church-based authority. It cannot be understood as a pillar upon which the disappearance of religion is leaning on, but as a historical product containing its own epistemological, moral and political parts—which in turn cannot be understood simply by describing a modern state’s retreat from religion [101]. Using this understanding of secularity provides the insight that the term is, in a similar way to the term Islamist, used in ways that do not provide any depth to the understanding of what is meant when secularity is used as an argument for banning certain clothes. There is also a clear difference in representations of nameless hijab-wearing women and the Muslim political subject. Even if both stereotypes carry socially reproduced prejudices and hence lean on Islamophobic ideas, the actions taken to exclude them differ. The oppressed hijab-wearing woman must be saved by us, while the Muslim political subject is a person from whom we (or the democracy) needs to be saved. Relevant to this, Mirza discusses the dual roles of the nameless hijabis—who have, in light of the “war against terrorism”, become some sort of obsession in which all the measures taken against them, such as banning veils, appear in endless discussions and debates—being concurrently portrayed as voiceless victims in need of saving, and at the same time dangerous and a potential threat [10] (p. 304). The representations can be connected to the Islamophobia seeking to discipline political subjects, understood as if there is a will of her own, there is a threat. The ambivalence also became clear in France during 2004 in connection to the banning of the wearing of religious symbols at schools. Muslim women were often represented as not having a choice or lacking will-power to decide when it came to wearing the hijab. When it gradually became clear that the hijab was also worn as a result of the women’s free will, representations of them shifted from being a victim to being dangerous—she has chosen it, therefore she is a threat [102]. Different aspects of Islamophobia are mobilized to interpret the actions of a woman who exercises her own will and those of a woman presumed to lacking one. As an aside, it is also worth noting that the construct of our remarkable Swedish equality should be problematized with vigor, due to the outcome of #MeToo, which demonstrated the extent to which women, regardless of their positions in Sweden, are exposed to sexual harassment and abuse—not by “the others” but by men in every walk of life. Most of the articles discussed here are written prior to #MeToo, and hence have not taken the movement into consideration. I might have left some stone unturned, but a regular search indicates that of the journalists mentioned in this article, only Sonesson has written something related to #MeToo, while Guillou has given an interview in which he stated that he is nowadays afraid of hugging female friends [103]. This leads me back to Abu-Lughod’s reflections Societies 2018, 8, 124 11 of 17 that saving “the other women” is a mainstream global issue for white men and women, which elides the women’s will to be “saved” and the consequences of the saving, while demonstrating an inability or unwillingness to see shortcomings in the gender equality they advocate [86] (p. 166). 9. Discussion When liberal discourses such as tolerance are used to ban, or argue for a ban on, a certain kind of clothing, and when freedom and gender equality serve as rhetorical tools to convince audiences of the correctness of the proposed prohibition, it demonstrates who the discourse considers able to practice tolerance. Within such discourses tolerance is an undisputed Western norm together with freedom and equality, accompanied by a drive to eradicate their presumed opposites, forbid them, take measures to hold them back. In the cases I have discussed here, stereotypes are used to justify these dichotomies; further, communication is most often only in one direction—from majority to minority. This though does not happen without a resistance, which is, for instance, shown in the increasing amount of Muslim women voices in media advocating their own understandings of both veiling, Muslim political subjecthood and the Islamophobic environment in Sweden. But in the case of debates, liberal majority voices tend to ignore the actual arguments of Muslim intellectuals or wearers of niqabs and rather resort to character assassination as a strategy. The language of stereotypes and the casting of suspicion have been used in all the fields that I have described in this article: in arguments in favor and justifications of face-veil bans and hence lawmaking; in representations in mainstream Swedish media; in the cancellations of screenings of Burka Songs 2.0. All instances have produced similar results: suggestions to restrict or actually forbid certain clothes, bodies, voices, ideas, actions—or put differently, attempts to disqualify certain people from their sought role as active citizens, not for their ideas but for whom they are presumed to be. If we approach the topic of (face) veiling from outside the described discourses, Mattias Gardell interprets the laws relating to clothing in diametrically oppositional terms to the voices that advocate these bans: This wave of laws and authoritarian decrees that govern the dress a Muslim woman may wear if she leaves her home and enters public places, has led many European democracies to embrace a policy that was previously restricted to authoritarian regimes in the Muslim world, such as Iran, Afghanistan, Sudan and the countries on Arabian Peninsula, where the state has long been dictating Muslim women’s clothing [56,104] (p. 166). This observation once again strikes at the very heart of the contradictions of so-called liberal tolerance. In Jarl’s text we may see references to Sweden’s secularity, what it is committed to and what it cannot include. Secularity understood in this way creates an internal contradiction between secularism’s ideal of freedom of religion and the state’s desire for regulations that break down the public/private barrier, thus directly opposing ideas of the individual’s freedom [101] (p. 4). Attitudes connected to “saving” Muslim women follow a secular epistemology within which there are clear tendencies towards translating religion-based truths/interpretations as compulsion [105] (p. 11). Indeed, secular epistemology is closely linked to the liberal tolerance discourse [105] (p. 3), something which became clear in the French veil debate, where the idea of Laïcité as opposing religious symbols in public spaces played a central role [88], as it seems to play even in the case of Sweden. The problematization of veils and the propagation of suspicion that tends to lead to exclusion are performed in the name of secularity and democracy, which are presented as inherently Swedish values; discourses colored by historical and cultural specificity are also part of this representation. The forced or false connections made between face veiling and practices such as honor violence, extremism and Islamism are often repeated, but seldom come supported by any evidence, constituting a discourse because the rhetorical patterns seem to be taken for granted to the point that no further explanations or evidence are required. Societies 2018, 8, 124 12 of 17 How and where to delineate what fits within both democracy and secularity seems very unclear. As the space for participation among Sweden’s Muslim population decreases, so too may their sense of belonging, something already affected by Islamophobic victimization in the country [8]. 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Sayyid, S.; Vakil, A. Thinking through Islamophobia; Hurst & Company: London, UK, 2011; ISBN 978-1-84904-004-4. 63. My translation. Original: Socialt reproducerade fördomar om och avsersioner mot islam och muslimer, samt handlingar och praktiker som angriper, exkluderar eller diskriminerar människor på basis av att de är eller antas vara muslimer och associeras till islam. 64. Sayyid points out that ’the west’ does not refer to a geographical entity, but rather an ideology [101] (p. 309); this is also how I understand the term. 65. Sayyid, S. Islam(ism), Eurocentrism and the World Order. Def. Stud. 2007, 7, 300–316. [CrossRef] 66. Sayyid, S. Racism and Islamophobia. In MnM Commentary No.4. International Centre for Muslim and Non-Muslim Understanding; University of South Australia: Adelaide, Australia, 2011. Available online: http://130.220.0.27/Documents/EASS/MnM/commentaries/sayyid-racism-islamophobia.pdf (accessed on 27 September 2018). 67. Larsson, G.; Sander, Å. Islam and Muslims in Sweden: Integration or Fragmentation? A Contextual Study; Lit Verlag: Berlin, Germany, 2007; ISBN 978-3825805814. 68. Abdullahi, M.; Ouahabi, Z.; Soltani, A.; Doubakil, F. Av-slöjarna har inte förstått någonting. Göteborgs Posten. 15 March 2016. Available online: http://www.gp.se/debatt/av-slöjarna-har-inte-förstått-någonting-1.4939? noAccess=true&aId=1.4939 (accessed on 27 September 2018). 69. Winther Jørgensen, M.; Phillips, L. Diskursanalys som teori och metod; Studentlitteratur: Lund, Sweden, 2007; ISBN 987-91-44-01302-2. 70. Swedish Muslims in Cooperation Network Alternative Report. In Response to the Swedish Government’s Nineteenth, Twentieth and Twenty-First Report to CERD; Stockholm, Sweden, 2013; Available online: https://tbinternet. ohchr.org/Treaties/CERD/Shared%20Documents/SWE/INT_CERD_NGO_SWE_14627_E.pdf (accessed on 27 September 2018). 71. International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination. CERD/C/SWE/CO719-21. 23 September 2013. Available online: https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybodyexternal/Download. aspx?symbolno=CERD%2FC%2FSWE%2F19-21&Lang=en (accessed on 27 September 2018). 72. International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination. CERD/C/SWE/CO/22-23. 11 May 2018. Available online: https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx? symbolno=CERD%2FC%2FSWE%2F22-23&Lang=en (accessed on 27 September 2018). 73. The United Nations Association of Sweden. Alternative Report; July 2008. Available online: https://tbinternet. ohchr.org/Treaties/CERD/Shared%20Documents/SWE/INT_CERD_NGO_SWE_73_10089_E.pdf (accessed on 27 September 2018). 74. Grutzky, E.; Åberg, L. Heder och samvete; Fri Tanke: Stockholm, Sweden, 2013; ISBN 9789186061845. 75. In March 2018 Hermansson wrote about extremism in five out of six of her blog posts. Several of them discuss the planned panel connected to Burka Songs 2.0, but the same rhetoric is used, for instance, in texts that discuss people from Gothenburg who have joined IS in Syria. The work against extremism that she advocates in these posts cuts across an extremely wide range of areas, and as the term appears without any form of definition, the panelists risk being bracketed with agents such as IS. 76. Sorgenfrei, S. Islam i Sverige de första 1300 åren; DanagårdLitho: Helsingborg, Sweden, 2018; ISBN 978-91-983453-2-2. 77. Brems, E. The Experiences of Face Veil Wearers in Europe and the Law; Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, UK, 2014; pp. 1–15. ISBN 978-1-107-05830-9. 78. Marín, M. Women, gender and sexuality. In The New Cambridge History of Islam Vol 4: Islamic Cultures and Societies to the End of the Eighteenth Century; Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, UK, 2010; ISBN 9781139056144. 79. Quotes from Swedish newspapers are my translations from Swedish to English. 80. Salihu, D. Hatet mot slöjan. Expressen. 30 January 2015. Available online: https://www.expressen.se/ nyheter/hatet-mot-slojan/del-1/ (accessed on 27 September 2018). 81. Brown, W. Regulating Aversions; Princeton University Press: Princeton, NJ, USA, 2006; ISBN 978-0-691-12654-8. 82. Hübinette, T.; Lundström, C. Den svenska vithetens melankoli. Glänta 2011, 2, 28–35. 83. Fernando, M. Save the Muslim Woman, Save the Republic: Ni Putes Ni Soumises and the Rise of Neoliberal Sovereignty. Mod. Contemp. France 2013, 21, 147–165. [CrossRef] http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14702430701559222 http://130.220.0.27/Documents/EASS/MnM/commentaries/sayyid-racism-islamophobia.pdf http://www.gp.se/debatt/av-sl�jarna-har-inte-f�rst�tt-n�gonting-1.4939?noAccess=true&aId=1.4939 http://www.gp.se/debatt/av-sl�jarna-har-inte-f�rst�tt-n�gonting-1.4939?noAccess=true&aId=1.4939 https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CERD/Shared%20Documents/SWE/INT_CERD_NGO_SWE_14627_E.pdf https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CERD/Shared%20Documents/SWE/INT_CERD_NGO_SWE_14627_E.pdf https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CERD%2FC%2FSWE%2F19-21&Lang=en https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CERD%2FC%2FSWE%2F19-21&Lang=en https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CERD%2FC%2FSWE%2F22-23&Lang=en https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CERD%2FC%2FSWE%2F22-23&Lang=en https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CERD/Shared%20Documents/SWE/INT_CERD_NGO_SWE_73_10089_E.pdf https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CERD/Shared%20Documents/SWE/INT_CERD_NGO_SWE_73_10089_E.pdf https://www.expressen.se/nyheter/hatet-mot-slojan/del-1/ https://www.expressen.se/nyheter/hatet-mot-slojan/del-1/ http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09639489.2013.776733 Societies 2018, 8, 124 16 of 17 84. Spivak, G.C. Can the subaltern speak? In Colonial Discourse and Post-Colonial Theory: A Reader; Williams, P., Chrisman, L., Eds.; Harvester Wheatsheaf: Hertfordshire, UK, 1994. 85. Fanon, F. Algeriet av-slöjat. In Globaliseringens Kulturer; Eriksson, C., Eriksson Baaz, M., Thörn, H., Eds.; Nya Doxa: Nora, Sweden, 2005; pp. 103–116, ISBN 91-578-0312-9. 86. Abu-Lughod, L. Do Muslim Women Need Saving? Harvard University Press: Cambridge, MA, USA; London, UK, 2015; ISBN 978-0-674-72516-4. 87. Mishra, S. “Saving” Muslim Women and Fighting Muslim Men: Analysis of Representations in The New York Times. Glob. Media J. 2007, 6, 1–20. 88. Cloud, D.L. “To veil the threat of terror”: Afghan women and the (clash of civilizations) in the imagery of the U.S. war on terror. Q. J. Speech 2004, 90, 285–306. [CrossRef] 89. Wallach Scott, J. Slöjans Politik; Tankekraft Förlag: Hägersten, Sweden, 2007; ISBN 978-91-86273-08-0. 90. Ahmed, L. A Quiet Revolution; Yale University Press: New Haven, CT, USA, 2011; ISBN 978-0-300-17095-5. 91. Heath, J. The Veil; University of California Press: Berkeley, CA, USA, 2008; ISBN 978-0-520-25040-6. 92. Tarlo, E. Visibly Muslim; Berg: New York, NY, USA, 2010; ISBN 978-1-84520-432-7. 93. El Guindi, F. Veil. Modesty, Privacy and Resistance; Berg: Oxford, UK, 1999; ISBN 1859739245. 94. The available research about face-veiling in Europe does not indicate coercion as a reason for wearing the niqab. In many cases the niqab is worn against the wishes of the niqabi’s near family [77,102–104]. 95. Bouteldja, N. Unveiling the Truth: Why 32 Women Wear the Full-Face Veil in France; Open Society Foundations: New York, NY, USA, 2011; Available online: https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/reports/unveiling- truth-why-32-muslim-women-wear-full-face-veil-france (accessed on 27 September 2018). 96. Bouteldja, N. After the Ban: The Experiences of 35 Women of the Full-Face Veil in France; Open Society Foundations: New York, NY, USA, 2013; Available online: https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/after- the-ban-experience-full-face-veil-france-20140210.pdf (accessed on 27 September 2018). 97. Bouteldja, N. Behind the Veil: Why 122 Women Choose to Wear the Full Face Veil in Britain; Open Society Foundations: New York, NY, USA, 2015; Available online: https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/ default/files/behind-veil-20150401.pdf (accessed on 27 September 2018). 98. By the time the article was written there had been two public cases with three niqabis involved. One of them concerned a 23-year-old woman. The second concerned two students at a high-school in Gothenburg, aged 16 and 19 years. All three have stated that wearing the niqab was their own choice. 99. 27 out of 32 interviewees in a French study have claimed that their social lives were negatively affected and their activities outside the home were circumscribed. The fear of the police’s ID checks and verbal abuse prevents the interviewees from leaving their homes. Freedom of movement has also been restricted for those participants who chose to stop wearing the niqab because they do not feel comfortable in public without covering their faces. Only one person said that she socializes more since she stopped wearing the niqab. Several respondents argue that restrictions on freedom of movement have led to less physical activity, which in turn has resulted in physical and mental problems. Interviewees have also reported that they have suffered from depression and felt anxiety in connection with venturing outside their homes [96] (pp. 2–3). The Belgian ’burka ban’ confronted with inside realities written by Eva Brems et al. [100] deals with similar issues as the French report after the ban. The informants in the Belgian study experienced indignation, frustration and humiliation and felt worried about the future after the ban came into force. 100. Brems, E.; Janssens, Y.; Lecoyer, K.; Chaib, S.O.; Vandersteen, V.; Vrielink, J. The Belgian ‘burqa ban’ confronted with insider realities. In The Experiences of Face Veil Wearers in Europe and the Law; Brems, E., Ed.; Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, UK, 2014; pp. 77–114, ISBN 978-1-107-05830-9. 101. Mahmood, S. Religious Difference in a Secular Age; Princeton University Press: Princeton, NJ, USA, 2016; ISBN 978-0-691-15327-8. 102. Asad, T. French Secularism and the “Islamic Veil Affair”. Hedgehog Rev. 2016, 8, 93–106. 103. Rydhagen, M. Jan Guillou vågar inte krama kvinnliga vänner. Expressen. 20 November 2017. Available online: https://www.expressen.se/nyheter/jan-guillou-vagar-inte-krama-kvinnliga-vanner/ (accessed on 27 September 2018). http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0033563042000270726 https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/reports/unveiling-truth-why-32-muslim-women-wear-full-face-veil-france https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/reports/unveiling-truth-why-32-muslim-women-wear-full-face-veil-france https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/after-the-ban-experience-full-face-veil-france-20140210.pdf https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/after-the-ban-experience-full-face-veil-france-20140210.pdf https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/behind-veil-20150401.pdf https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/behind-veil-20150401.pdf https://www.expressen.se/nyheter/jan-guillou-vagar-inte-krama-kvinnliga-vanner/ Societies 2018, 8, 124 17 of 17 104. My translation. Original: Denna våg av lagar och myndighetsdekret som reglerar vilken klädsel en muslimsk kvinna får bära om hon beger sig hemifrån, ut i det offentliga rummet, har medfört att många europeiska demokratier kommit att anamma en politik som tidigare varit begränsad till auktoritära regimer i den muslimska världen, som Iran, Afghanistan, Sudan och länderna på Arabiska halvön, där staten sedan länge dikterat muslimska kvinnors klädsel. 105. Mahmood, S. Politics of Piety; Princeton University Press: Princeton, NJ, USA, 2005; ISBN 978-0-691-08695-8. © 2018 by the author. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/). http://creativecommons.org/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/. Introduction Materials and Methods Burka Songs: A Short Presentation of the Content and the Idea Behind Background Gender Equality and Islamophobia Burka Songs 2.0: The Media Discussions and the Political Processes Niqab and Hijab within Legal Discourse and the Law—In Sweden and in Europe Gender and Representation in Media White Men and Women Saving Muslim Women from Muslim Men? Discussion References 
work_ihuco73rofenrfsuqi5z25rmwm	----	59 Sekundarna viktimizacija i podrška žrtvama Evi den ti ra nje po da ta ka o zlo či ni ma iz mr žnje: pre po ru ke me đu na rod nih te la i nji hov zna čaj za Sr bi ju1 Mir ja na Dok Ma no vić* Pri ku plja nje po da ta ka i vo đe nje zva nič ne je din stve ne evi den ci je kri vič nih de la uči nje-nih iz mr žnje do pri no si po ve ća nju vi dlji vo sti ovog ob li ka kri mi na li te ta i for mu li sa nju efi ka sne po li ti ke su zbi ja nja dis kri mi na ci je, ra si zma i ne to le ran ci je. Kra jem 2012. go di ne Re pu bli ka Sr bi ja je uve la ote ža va ju ću okol nost pri li kom od me ra va nja ka zne za kri vič na de la mo ti vi sa na mr žnjom uči ni o ca pre ma žr tvi zbog nje ne pri pad no sti od re đe noj ra si i ve ro i spo ve sti, na ci o nal ne ili et nič ke pri pad no sti, po la, sek su al ne ori jen ta ci je ili rod nog iden ti te ta. Ak ci o nim pla nom za spro vo đe nje Stra te gi je pre ven ci je i za šti te od dis kri mi na- ci je (2014) pred vi đe no je da se je din stve na evi den ci ja o zlo či ni ma iz mr žnje us po sta vi do kra ja 2016. go di ne. Pred met ovog ra da je ana li za zna ča ja us po sta vlja nja ova kve evi den- ci je iz per spek ti ve ostva ri va nja pra va žr ta va i pred sta vlja nje ak tiv no sti i pre po ru ka Agen- ci je Evrop ske uni je za osnov na pra va (FRA) i Or ga ni za ci je za evrop sku bez bed nost i sa rad- nju (OEBS) ra di una pre đe nja ove obla sti. Cilj ra da je da se do pri ne se raz vi ja nju me to do lo- gi je evi den ti ra nja kri vič nih de la uči nje nih iz mr žnje u Re pu bli ci Sr bi ji. Ključ ne re či: zlo čin iz mr žnje, ote ža va ju ća okol nost pri od me ra va nju ka zne, evi den- ti ra nje kri mi na li te ta, Agen ci ja Evrop ske uni je za osnov na pra va, OEBS. 1 Pisanje rada je rezultat rada na projektu br. 179044 Razvoj metodologije evidentiranja kriminaliteta kao osnova efikasnih mera za njegovo suzbijanje i prevenciju koji finansira Ministarstvo, prosvete, nauke i tehnološkog razvoja Republike Srbije, a implementira Fakultet za specijalnu edukaciju i rehabilitaciju Univerziteta u Beogradu. Rukovoditeljka projekta je prof. dr Vesna Nikolić­Ristanović. TE MI DA Jun 2015, str. 59-78 ISSN: 1450-6637 DOI: 10.2298/TEM1502059D Pre gled ni rad Pri mlje no: 20.3.2015. Odo bre no za štam pu: 2.7.2015. * Dr Mir ja na Dok ma no vić je van red na pro fe sor ka na Fa kul te tu za evrop ske prav no­po li tič ke stu di je EDU CONS Uni ver zi te ta u No vom Sa du. E­mail: mi ra d@e u net.rs. Mirjana Dokmanović 60 Uvod Pod zlo či nom iz mr žnje se pod ra zu me va ob lik de vi jant nog po na ša nja mo ti vi sa nog pred ra su dom, ne to le ran ci jom ili mr žnjom pre ma od re đe noj gru pi či ji se član vik ti mi zi ra (No lan, Akiyama, Ber ha nu, 2002: 136; Cun neen, 2009: 132; Trip ko vić, 2011: 39; OSCE, 2012a: 7; Bar jak ta ro vić, 2013: 250). Po je­ di ni auto ri (Ma ro ney, 1998: 564; Sib bit pre ma Ga vri e li des, 2011: 7) de cid no na bra ja ju osno ve pred ra su da ko je na vo de vi nov ni ke na na sil no po na ša nje, kao što su ra sa, bo ja ko že, pol, rod, na ci o nal na ili et nič ka pri pad nost, ve ro i­ spo vest, sek su al na ori jen ta ci ja, rod ni iden ti tet, in va lid nost, uz rast i mi grant ski sta tus. Agen ci ja Evrop ske uni je za osnov na pra va (Euro pean Union Fun da men- tal Rights Agency – FRA) de fi ni še ova de la kao „na si lje i kri vič na de la mo ti vi­ sa na ra si zmom, kse no fo bi jom, ver skom ne to le ran ci jom ili pred ra su da ma na osno vu in va li di te ta, sek su al ne ori jen ta ci je ili rod nog iden ti te ta po je din ca“.2 Pre ma YUCOM­u (2013: 2), to je kri vič no de lo mo ti vi sa no mr žnjom pre ma ne ko me sa mo za to što je dru ga či ji. Zlo či ni iz mr žnje se mo gu is po lji ti u ra znim for ma ma, od za stra ši va nja, zlo sta vlja nja, fi zič kog na pa da i uni šta va nja imo vi ne, pa do ubi stva. Iako se na zi va zlo či nom iz mr žnje, ni je od bit nog zna ča ja da vi nov nik stvar no ose ća mr žnju pre ma žr tvi. U osno vi nje go vog de lo va nja je, za pra vo, pred ra su da ko ju ima pre ma žr tvi kao pri pad ni ku od re đe ne gru pe ili za jed ni ce. S ob zi rom na to da je uzrok vr še nja ova kvih de la ono što pred sta vlja od re đe na oso ba, gru­ pa ili nje na imo vi na, po či ni lac ne mo ra pre ma njoj da ima po seb ne ose ća je (OSCE, 2012a: 7). Sto ga je, pre ma Ći ri ću (2011: 22), bo lje go vo ri ti o mo ti vi ma i po bu da ma, a ne o mr žnji. Za raz li ku od žr ta va dru gih ob li ka na si lja, žr tve zlo či na iz mr žnje su vik ti mi zi ra ne upra vo zbog ne kog svog lič nog svoj stva ili pret po sta vlje nog lič nog svoj stva, kao što su na ci o nal na i et nič ka pri pad nost, ver sko ube đe nje, rod ni iden ti tet i sek su al na ori jen ta ci ja. Po či ni lac ne bi iz vr šio od no sno kri vič no de lo uko li ko ni je pret po sta vljao da žr tva ima ne ko od re­ đe no lič no svoj stvo pre ma ko jem ima ne ga ti van stav. Sto ga, sva ko mo že da bu de žr tva zlo či na iz mr žnje, iako su to naj če šće pri pad ni ci ma njin skih i mar gi­ na li zo va nih gru pa u jed noj za jed ni ci. Sa zna nje da je vik ti mi zi ra na zbog ne kog svog lič nog svoj stva ili pret po­ sta vlje nog lič nog svoj stva ne ga tiv no uti če na žr tvu. Ona na po sto ja nje tog lič­ nog svoj stva ne mo že uti ca ti. Kri vič no de lo je pre ma njoj uči nje no ci lja no, a ne 2 Dostupno na: http://www.fra.europa.eu/en/theme/hate­crime, stranici pristupljeno 10.1.2015. Temida 61 ne kim slu ča jem, što je iz la že ri zi ku od da lje vik ti mi za ci je. Zbog to ga žr tve če sto is ka zu ju raz ne simp to me, kao što su ozbilj na tra u ma, de pre si ja, sum nji ča vost pre ma dru gi ma, sa mo op tu ži va nje, ula zak u izo la ci ju od dru štva, ose ćaj po ni­ že nja, stra ha, pa ni ke i slič no. Nji ho va is ku stva se raz li ku ju od is ku sta va žr ta va dru gih kri vič nih de la. Po red to ga, ova vr sta vik ti mi za ci je uti če ne sa mo na žr tve, već i na nji ho ve po ro di ce, bli žu i da lju za jed ni cu (OSCE, 2009: 16; FRA, 2012: 17­23). Strah od vik ti mi za ci je se, sto ga, ši ri me đu pri pad ni ci ma te za jed ni ce ili li ci ma ko ja ima ju iste ka rak te ri sti ke kao žr tva, na ro či to uko li ko iz o sta ne ade­ kvat no re a go va nje dr ža ve i žr tvi se ne omo gu ći pri stup prav di. Po red to ga, pri­ zna va nje zlo či na iz mr žnje i pra va žr tve nu žno je ra di ostva ri va nja nje nih dru gih pra va, kao što su pra vo na raz ne ob li ke po dr ške, zdrav stve nu po moć i ne gu. Kri vič na de la mo ti vi sa na pred ra su da ma su po seb na po to me što uči ni lac ša lje po ru ku žr tvi da ni je po želj na u dru štvu ko jem pri pa da i uči ni lac. Sto ga se ta kva de la, po po sle di ca ma, raz li ku ju od osta lih kri vič nih de la i ti me oprav­ da va ju dru ga či ji prav ni pri stup (Ma ro ney, 1998; Wang, 2002; OSCE, 2009: 15). S ob zi rom da se ra di o te škom ob li ku dis kri mi na ci je ko ji uklju ču je i ra si zam i kse no fo bi ju, su zbi ja nje zlo či na iz mr žnje je pred met ne sa mo kri vič nog za ko­ no dav stva, već i an ti di skri mi na ci o ne le gi sla ti ve i po li ti ke. Ade kvat no re a go va nje dr ža ve na ovaj fe no men zah te va da po li ci ja, tu ži la­ štvo i sud evi den ti ra ju ovu okol nost, raz ot kri va ju ći po sto ja nje od re đe ne pred­ ra su de po či o ni o ca ko ja ga je pod sta kla da iz vr ši od no sno kri vič no de lo. Evrop­ ski sud za ljud ska pra va je, u jed nom bro ju pre su da, oba ve zao dr ža ve da ski nu ma sku sa mo ti va ci je ko ja le ži u osno vi ra si stič kih kri vič nih de la3. Sud je is ta kao iz u ze tan zna čaj raz ot kri va nja pred ra su da kao mo ti va iz vr še nja kri vič nih de la. Da bi se for mu li sa la i vo di la efi ka sna po li ti ka su zbi ja nja i pre ven ci je zlo­ či na iz mr žnje, kao i da bi se obez be di lo da žr tve ostva ru ju svo ja pra va, dr ža va mo ra ima ti ja snu sli ku o ras pro stra nje no sti, uzro ci ma i po sle di ca ma ovog de vi jant nog po na ša nja. Dru gim re či ma, dr ža va mo ra ras po la ga ti ve ro do stoj­ nim i sve o bu hvat nim po da ci ma. Pred met ovog ra da je ana li za zna ča ja us po­ sta vlja nja evi den ci je o zlo či ni ma iz mr žnje iz per spek ti ve ostva ri va nja pra va žr ta va, te pred sta vlja nje ak tiv no sti i pre po ru ka FRA i Or ga ni za ci je za evrop­ sku bez bed nost i sa rad nju (OEBS) ra di una pre đe nja ove obla sti. Cilj ra da je da se do pri ne se raz vi ja nju me to do lo gi je evi den ti ra nja kri vič nih de la uči nje nih iz mr žnje u Re pu bli ci Sr bi ji. 3 Euro pean Co urt of Hu man Rights (ECtHR) Nac ho va and Ot hers v. Bul ga ria, Nos. 43577/98 and 43579/98, 6 July 2005 and Sto i ca v. Ro ma nia, no. 42722/02. Mirjana Dokmanović 62 Zna čaj evi den ti ra nja zlo či na iz mr žnje Pri ku plja nje i evi den ti ra nje objek tiv nih i ve ro do stoj nih po da ta ka je neo­ p hod no ra di for mu li sa nja od go va ra ju ćeg za ko no dav stva, po li ti ka i me ra. Po da ci su po treb ni i za in for mi sa nje jav no sti o ras pro stra nje no sti i pri ro di dis kri mi na ci je, ra si zma i zlo či na iz mr žnje, nji ho vim uzro ci ma i po sle di ca ma. Prak sa po ka zu je da mo ti vi iz vr še nja ta kvih kri vič nih de la če sto ni su is tra že ni i raz ob li če ni (FRA, 2012: 27). Ti me stvar ne po bu de vi nov ni ka tih de la osta ju ne vi dlji ve, po či o ni ci ne ka žnje ni ili ne a de kvat no ka žnje ni, a žr tve us kra će ne za svo ja pra va. Sve o bu hvat ni po da ci su neo p hod ni i ka ko bi se skre nu la pa žnja jav no sti na stvar ni ste pen dru štve ne opa sno sti ova kvih kri vič nih de la. Pri mer do bre prak se u ovom po gle du su Sje di nje ne Ame rič ke Dr ža ve za hva lju ju ći pri me ni tzv. Ha te Cri me Sta ti stics Act4 i Na ci o nal nog pro gra ma za pri ku plja­ nje po da ta ka o zlo či ni ma iz mr žnje raz vi je nog od stra ne Fe de ra lnog is tra žnog bi roa (Fe de ral Bu re au of In ve sti ga tion – FBI). Na ve de ni Akt oba ve zu je dr žav­ nog tu ži o ca da pri ku plja po dat ke o zlo či ni ma mo ti vi sa nim ra snim, ver skim, sek su al nim i et nič kim pred ra su da ma, a do pu na ma Za ko na iz 1994. go di ne i o zlo či ni ma iz mr žnje pro tiv oso ba sa invaliditetom5. Pri ku plja ju se po da ci o ti pu pred ra su de ko ja je mo ti vi sa la na zlo čin (npr. an ti ra sni), me stu iz vr še nja (npr. uli ca, cr kva, ško la), vr sti kri vič nog de la (npr. ubi stvo, fi zič ki na pad, si lo va nje), ra snoj pri pad no sti po či ni o ca i žr tve. Su mi ra ne po dat ke FBI re dov no ob ja vlju je u svom go di šnjem iz ve šta ju Ha te Cri me Sta ti stics6, a na osno vu ko jeg se mo gu iz vu ći za ključ ci, iz me đu osta lih, o naj če šćim pred ra su da ma ko je mo ti vi šu na iz vr še nja ovih de la, ka rak te ri sti ka ma po či ni la ca i ko re la ci ji ras pro stra nje no sti ovog ka žnji vog de la sa ra stom ili sma nji va njem kri mi na li te ta (No lan, Akiyama, Ber ha nu, 2002: 147­149). Po red to ga što je ovaj Za kon do pri neo ve ćoj vi dlji­ vo sti i raz u me va nju zlo či na iz mr žnje u jav no sti, pod sta kao je for mu li sa nje po seb nih pro ce du ra za pri me nu za ko na i pro gra ma pri ku plja nja po da ta ka, 4 Ha te Cri me Sta ti stics Act 1990 as Amended, 28 U.S.C. § 534, usvo jen od stra ne Kongresa SAD 23. aprila 1990. go di ne. Opširnije videti: No lan, Akiyama, Ber ha nu, 2002 i Ći rić, 2011. 5 SAD su, inače, donele čitav set različitih propisa pro tiv zlo či na iz mr žnje sa prvenstvenim ci ljem sma nji va nja međurasnih napetosti u dru štvu. Dostupno na: http://www.civilrights. org/hatecrimes/llehcpa/legislation, stra ni ci pri stu plje no 7.5.2015. 6 Fe de ral Bu re au of In ve sti ga tion. Dostupno na: http://www.fbi.gov/news/sto ri es/2014/de cem­ ber/la test­ha te­cri me­sta ti stics­re port­re le a sed/la test­ha te­cri me­sta ti stics­re port­re le a sed, stra ni ci pri stu plje no 10.5.2015. Temida 63 kao i struč no ospo so blja va nje pro fe si o na la ca da iden ti fi ku ju, is tra žu ju i pra­ vil no re a gu ju na zlo či ne iz mr žnje (No lan, Akiyama, Ber ha nu, 2002: 149­150). FRA (2007: 4) ta ko đe is ti če da je ba za po da ta ka po treb na ra di for mu li sa nja i po dr ža va nja im ple men ta ci je po li ti ka su zbi ja nja dis kri mi na ci je, ne rav no prav­ no sti, dru štve nog is klju či va nja i so ci jal ne ne prav de; ona je ko ri sna i za jav ni i pri vat ni sek tor kao sred stvo pro ve re u ko joj me ri su nji ho ve unu tra šnje po li­ ti ke pra vič ne, efi ka sne i u skla du sa le gi sla ti vom jed na kih mo guć no sti. Evi den ti ra nje zlo či na iz mr žnje do pri no si raz u me va nju uzro ka i po sle di ca dis kri mi na ci je i na si lja za sno va nog na pred ra su da ma, što je osno va za nji ho vu pre ven ci ju i su zbi ja nje i za šti tu ljud skih pra va svih gra đa na na rav no prav­ noj osno vi. Ovo je u skla du sa in si sti ra njem Evrop skog su da za ljud ska pra va da pra va ga ran to va na Evrop skom kon ven ci jom o ljud skim pra vi ma ne bu du sa mo te o ret ska, već da po sta nu prak tič na i de lo tvor na.7 Sud, sto ga, na la že dr ža va ma da pred u zi ma ju od go va ra ju će me re i eli mi ni šu pre pre ke ko je ote­ ža va ju ili one mo gu ću ju žr tva ma da za šti te i ostva re svo ja ga ran to va na pra va. OEBS is ti če da je pri mer do bre prak se da se od su do va zah te va „da raz mo­ tre sve do ka ze o po sto ja nju pred ra su de kao mo ti va i da u spi su evi den ti ra ju raz­ lo ge za pri me nu ili ne pri me nu od red bi o uve ća nju ka zne. Na taj na čin se osi gu­ ra va vo đe nje evi den ci je o pro ce su od lu či va nja su da, te se stva ra ju pret po stav ke za upo zna va nje or ga na za pri me nu za ko na sa even tu al nim po sto ja njem ra ni je po či nje nih kri vič nih de la. Ta kvo po stu pa nje, ta ko đe, mo že pred sta vlja ti na čin da se pa žnja su da skre ne na od re đe no pi ta nje, te da se žr tve uve re da je sud uzeo u raz ma tra nje mo tiv po či nje nog kri vič nog de la“ (OSCE, 2009: 31). Pro ble ma ti ka evi den ti ra nja zlo či na iz mr žnje u Sr bi ji Iz me na ma i do pu na ma Kri vič nog za ko ni ka iz de cem bra 2012. go di ne8 Re pu bli ka Sr bi ja je uve la po seb nu okol nost pri li kom od me ra va nja ka zne za kri vič na de la mo ti vi sa na mr žnjom, ne tr pe lji vo šću i pred ra su da ma. Pre ma čla­ nu 54a Kri vič nog za ko ni ka, uko li ko je „kri vič no de lo uči nje no iz mr žnje zbog pri pad no sti ra si i ve ro i spo ve sti, na ci o nal ne ili et nič ke pri pad no sti, po la, sek­ su al ne ori jen ta ci je ili rod nog iden ti te ta dru gog li ca, sud tu okol nost tre ba da 7 European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) Nachova and Others v. Bulgaria, Nos. 43577/98 and 43579/98, 6 July 2005 and Stoica v. Romania, no. 42722/02. 8 Službeni glasnik RS, br. 85/05, 88/05 ­ ispravka, 107/05 ­ ispravka, 72/09, 111/09, 121/12, 104/13 i 108/14. Mirjana Dokmanović 64 ce ni kao ote ža va ju ću pri li kom od me ra va nja ka zne, osim ako ona ni je pro pi­ sa na kao obe lež je kri vič nog de la“. Ova kva po seb na okol nost za od me ra va­ nje ka zne uve de na je u ci lju pre ven ci je i su zbi ja nja na si lja za sno va nog na mr žnji, ne tr pe lji vo sti i ne to le ran ci ji či je su žr tve naj če šće pri pad ni ce i pri pad­ ni ci ma njin skih i mar gi na li zo va nih gru pa. Re pu bli ka Sr bi ja je ti me po zi tiv no od go vo ri la na Pre po ru ku br. 1 Evrop ske ko mi si je pro tiv ra si zma i ne to le ran­ ci je (Euro pean Com mis sion aga inst Ra cism and In to le ran ce, 1996) ko ja na la že dr ža va ma čla ni ca ma da se po sta ra ju da se na ci o nal no kri vič no pra vo iz ri či to su prot sta vlja ra si zmu, kse no fo bi ji, an ti se mi ti zmu i ne to le ran ci ji. Ovim su is po­ što va ni i Za ključ ci Sa ve ta Evrop ske uni je o bor bi pro tiv zlo či na iz mr žnje u Evrop skoj uni ji od de cem bra 2013. go di ne (Co un cil of the Euro pean Union, 2013). Ova kav po tez za ko no dav ca oce njen je kao na pre dak u obla sti an ti di­ skri mi na ci o ne le gi sla ti ve od stra ne Evrop ske ko mi si je u nje nom Iz ve šta ju o na pret ku Re pu bli ke Sr bi je za 2013. go di nu (Euro pean Com mis sion, 2013). Dr ža va je ovim po sla la po ru ku jav no sti da ne će to le ri sa ti de struk tiv no po na ša nje za sno va no na mr žnji, ne tr pe lji vo sti i pred ra su da ma, da će se po či o­ ni ci ka zni ti, a žr tve za šti ti ti. Po red to ga, sma tra se da će stro ži je sank ci o ni sa nje na sil nih de la mo ti vi sa nih pred ra su da ma do ve sti do sma nji va nja na si lja u dru­ štvu. Usva ja nje stro gih za ko na u ve zi kri vič nih de la po či nje nih iz mr žnje ima i sim bo li čan zna čaj, jer se nji ma šti te pri pad ni ci mar gi na li zo va nih za jed ni ca (OSCE, 2009: 16).9 Da li je usvo je no za kon sko re še nje efi ka sno sred stvo za ostva ri va nje na ve de nih ci lje va? Uko li ko se po ka že da ni je, šta je po treb no me nja ti i na ko ji na čin? Ima ju ći u vi du po tre bu stal nog pra će nja i pe ri o dič ne re vi zi je le gi sla ti ve, na red ni ko rak tre ba da bu de us po sta vlja nje me ha ni zma me re nja efi ka sno sti čla na 54a KZ. To pret po sta vlja uvo đe nje i pri me nu od go va ra ju će je din stve ne i sve o bu hvat ne evi den ci je kri vič nih de la mo ti vi sa nih mr žnjom, ne tr pe lji vo šću i pred ra su da ma, uz ja sno is ti ca nje mo ti va iz vr še nja ovih de la. Bit no je raz ot kri ti, evi den ti ra ti i uči ni ti vi dlji vim pred ra su du ko ja je mo ti vi sa la po či ni o ca da iz vr ši od no sno kri vič no de lo, jer je to osno va za pri me nu ote ža va ju će okol no sti pri­ li kom od me ra va nja ka zne. Sto ga se mo tiv mo ra ja sno na zna či ti i evi den ti ra ti u svim fa za ma is tra ge, pro ce su i ra nja i od me ra va nja ka zne po či ni o cu. U Re pu bli ci Sr bi ji in ci den te i slu ča je ve na si lja ko ji ma se iza zi va na ci o nal na, ra sna i ver ska mr žnja evi den ti ra ju dr žav ni or ga ni (po li ci ja, tu ži la štvo, su do vi) 9 Ovim se ne isključuje činjenica da se kri vič na de la počinjena iz mr žnje i ne tr pe lji vo sti mo gu počiniti i pro tiv čla na/članova većinske populacije. Temida 65 i ne za vi sna te la (Po ve re nik za za šti tu rav no prav no sti, Za štit nik gra đa na, Po kra jin ski om bud sman) (Stra te gi ja pre ven ci je i za šti te od dis kri mi na ci je, t. 4.2.2.210). Dr žav ni or ga ni do sta vlja ju po dat ke o in ci den ti ma zlo či na iz mr žnje OEBS­u ko ji ob ja vlju je go di šnje te mat ske iz ve šta je ob u hva ta ju ći sve dr ža ve čla ni ce11. Po dat ke pri ku plja ju i do sta vlja ju i or ga ni za ci je ci vil nog dru štva.12 Me đu tim, još ni je uve de na je din stve na i sve o bu hvat na evi den ci ja o in ci­ den ti ma zlo či na iz mr žnje ko ja bi da la uvid u broj pod ne tih kri vič nih pri ja va, broj osu đe nih li ca, vi si nu od me re ne ka zne, ras pon ka zne pred vi đen za ko­ nom, mo tiv iz vr še nja kri vič nog de la, od no sno osnov/i za kon ske za šti te ka ko to na bra ja član 54a KZ (pri pad nost ra si i ve ro i spo ve sti, na ci o nal na ili et nič ka pri pad nost, pol, sek su al na ori jen ta ci ja ili rod ni iden ti tet), kao i od go va ra ju će po dat ke ve za ne za osu đe nog i žr tvu/e, te o nji ho vim od no si ma, a ko ji su re le­ vant ni za ot kri va nje i raz u me va nje po sto ja nja ne ke pred ra su de ko ja je po či ni­ o ca pod sta kla da iz vr ši kri vič no de lo. Ak ci o ni plan za pri me nu Stra te gi je pre ven ci je i za šti te od dis kri mi na ci je za pe riod od 2014. do 2018. go di ne13 pred vi đa da se ova kva je din stve na evi den­ ci ja o zlo či ni ma iz mr žnje za kon ski us po sta vi do kra ja 2016. go di ne.14 Pre ma ovom do ku men tu, ba zu po da ta ka će či ni ti po da ci o „pod ne tim kri vič nim pri­ ja va ma po vo dom aka ta na si lja (i pret nji) iza zva nih lič nim svoj stvom, bro ju osu­ đe nih li ca i ra spo nu sank ci ja za iz vr še na kri vič na de la, kao i dru gim iz re če nim sank ci ja ma u ve zi sa ak ti ma na si lja i ne to le ran ci je pre ma ose tlji vim dru štve nim gru pa ma15, na osno vu pret hod no slo bod no da tog pri stan ka li ca, sa svr hom pre ven ci je i su zbi ja nja aka ta na si lja, ne to le ran ci je i pret nji pre ma ose tlji vim 10 Slu žbe ni gla snik RS, br. 60/2013. 11 Videti sumirane po dat ke o Sr bi ji u: OSCE/ODI HR, 2012: 127­128; OSCE/ODI HR, 2013: 127­128. Po da ci su dostupni i na sajtu OEBS­a: http//www.hatecrime.osce.org/serbia za go di ne od 2009. do 2013. 12 OSCE/ODIHR Hate Crime Reporting. Dostupno na: http://www.hatecrime.osce.org/resources/ ngos­and­civil­society­organizations­2013, stranici pristupljeno 16.2.2015. 13 Vlada Republike Srbije (2014) Akcioni plan za primenu Strategije prevencije i zaštite od diskriminacije za period od 2014. do 2018. godine, usvojen 3.10.2014. 14 Jedan od zadataka Strategije prevencije i zaštite od diskriminacije odnosi se na „iskorenjivanje govora mržnje i akata fizičkog nasilja i uništavanja imovine lica/grupi lica s obzirom na njihovo lično svojstvo i privođenje pravdi učinilaca takvih akata i radnji“ (t. 3.2, st. 5). 15 Stra te gi ja pre ven ci je i za šti te od dis kri mi na ci je konstatuje da su diskriminatorskom postupanju posebno izloženi pri pad ni ci nacionalnih manjina, žene, LGBT osobe, osobe sa in va li di te tom, starije osobe, deca, izbeglice, interno raseljena li ca i dru ge ugrožene migrantske gru pe i li ca či je zdravstveno sta nje ili ver ska pripadnost mo že biti osnov dis kri mi na ci je. Mirjana Dokmanović 66 dru štve nim gru pa ma u skla du sa na če lom sra zmer no sti ob ra de“. Ova ak tiv­ nost je pred vi đe na u okvi ru me re pod tač kom 3.2.2 Ak ci o nog pla na: „Su zbi ti ak te na si lja, ne to le ran ci je i pret nje pre ma osetlјivim dru štve nim gru pa ma spro­ vo đe njem efi ka snih is tra ga i pred u zi ma njem me ra kri vič no­prav ne i dru gih ob lika za šti te i vo đe nje evi den ci je“. Kao glav ni re a li za to ri ove me re ime no va ni su Mi ni star stvo prav de i Mi ni star stvo unu tra šnjih po slo va, uz uče šće Vi so kog sa ve ta sud stva, Vr hov nog ka sa ci o nog su da, su do va, Dr žav nog ve ća tu ži la štva, Re pu blič kog jav nog tu ži la štva, udru že nja su di ja i tu ži la ca i or ga ni za ci ja ci vil­ nog dru štva. Na ve de na ak tiv nost je po ve za na sa Ak ci o nim pla nom u okvi ru pre go vo ra Re pu bli ke Sr bi je o pri dru ži va nju EU za Po gla vlje 23. Vo đe nje evi den ci je je po treb no i ra di obez be đe nja po da ta ka neo p hod nih za pe ri o dič no iz ve šta va nje o ra du pra vo sud nih or ga na, tu ži la šta va i po li ci je, kao i o iz ve šta va nju dr ža ve Ko mi te tu UN o eli mi na ci ji svih ob li ka ra sne dis­ kri mi na ci je, Evrop skom ko mi te tu za ra si zam i to le ran ci ju, OEBS­u i Evrop skoj ko mi si ji o na pret ku Sr bi je u po gle du pri me ne an ti di skri mi na ci o nih po li ti ka i ade kvat nog su zbi ja nja zlo či na iz mr žnje.16 U na stav ku ra da dat je re zi me sta nja u ovoj obla sti u Evrop skoj uni ji i pred sta vlje ne su pre po ru ke FRA i OEBS ko je su ova me đu na rod na te la upu ti la dr ža va ma čla ni ca ma ra di una pre đe nja evi den ti ra nja po da ta ka o zlo či ni ma iz mr žnje, a ko je mo gu da po slu že Re pu bli ci Sr bi ji kao smer ni ca u iz ra di je din­ stve ne evi den ci je u ovoj obla sti. Is tra ži va nje FRA o ras po lo ži vim zva nič nim po da ci ma u dr ža va ma čla ni ca ma EU Je dan od za da ta ka FRA, for mi ra nog 2007 go di ne17 kao suk ce so ra Evrop­ skog cen tra za mo ni to ring ra si zma i kse no fo bi je (Euro pean Mo ni to ring Cen­ tre on Ra cism and Xe nop hbia – EUMC), je da raz vi ja me to de i stan dar de ra di 16 Izveštavanje o ovoj problematici navedeno je u merama protiv rasizma i ksenofobije i u Nacrtu akcionog plana Republike Srbije za Poglavlje 23 u procesu pridruživanja Evropskoj uniji. Dokument je dostupan na: http://www.mpravde.gov.rs/tekst/7715/drugi­nacrt­ akcionog­plana­za­poglavlje­23.php, stranici pristupljeno 24.1.2015. 17 (EC) No 168/2007 of 15 February 2007. EN L 53/4, Official Journal of the European Union 22.2.2007. FRA je jedna od decentralizovanih agencija EU sa specifičnim zadatkom pružanja nezavisnih stručnih saveta institucijama i državama članicama EU o sprovođenju EU legislative u pogledu pitanja vezanih za ljudska prava. Osnovni cilj FRA je da podržava članice EU u poštovanju ljudskih prava prilikom formulisanja mera i politika. Opširnije videti na: Temida 67 po bolj ša nja upo re di vo sti, objek tiv no sti i ve ro do stoj no sti po da ta ka na ni vou EU, u sa rad nji sa Ko mi si jom EU i dr ža va ma čla ni ca ma. Od svog osni va nja, FRA ra di na re vi zi ji me to do lo gi ja pri ku plja nja po da ta ka i is tra ži va nja u skla du sa spe ci fič nim po tre ba ma EU. FRA je na sta vi la da ra di na pi ta nji ma ra si zma i kse­ no fo bi je, s tim da je pro ši ri la de lo krug pri ku plja nja po da ta ka na dru ge obla­ sti osnov nih ljud skih pra va i na ši ri op seg osno va dis kri mi na ci je, sve sa ci ljem una pre đe nja pri ku plja nja i evi den ti ra nja objek tiv nih, ve ro do stoj nih i upo re­ di vih po da ta ka (FRA, 2007). De lat nost FRA je usme re na, iz me đu osta log, i na zlo čin iz mr žnje.18 Sve dr ža ve čla ni ce EU sank ci oni šu zlo čin iz mr žnje, no nji hov od go vor na ovu pro ble ma ti ku ni je jed noo bra zan. Okvir na od lu ka Sa ve ta EU 2008/913/JHA od 28. no vem bra 2008. go di ne o su zbi ja nju od re đe nih ob li ka i iz ra ža va nja ra si­ zma i kse no fo bi je pu tem od red bi kri vič nog pra va19 do zvo lja va ovu ra zno vr­ snost, osta vlja ju ći otvo re ne mo guć no sti za ko no dav cu ka ko će re gu li sa ti zlo čin iz mr žnje. I po red evi dent nih na po ra ko je dr ža ve čla ni ce EU či ne ra di su zbi ja nja dis kri mi na ci je i ne to le ran ci je, uklju ču ju ći zlo čin iz mr žnje, ras po lo ži vi in di ka­ to ri po ka zu ju da se si tu a ci ja ne po pra vlja. Na pro tiv, po sled njih go di na su sve če šća kr še nja ljud skih pra va gra đa na u EU pu tem ver bal nih i fi zič kih na pa da, pa čak i ubi sta va, mo ti vi sa nih pred ra su da ma (FRA, 2012: 3). Su zbi ja nje ta kvog ob li ka na si lja zah te va po ve ća nje nji ho ve vi dlji vo sti i ka žnja va nje po či ni la ca. Tre nut no, ve ći na dr ža va u EU to me ne po sve ću je do volj nu pa žnju. Po la ze ći od ova kve oce ne i in si sti ra ju ći na od go vor no sti dr ža va da efi ka­ sno šti te osnov na ljud ska pra va, FRA (2012) je spro ve la is tra ži va nje u 27 dr ža va čla ni ca EU o me ra ma ko je pred u zi ma ju ra di po ve ća nja vi dlji vo sti zlo či na iz mr žnje i sank ci o ni sa nja po či ni la ca. FRA is ti če da žr tve i po či ni o ci zlo či na iz mr žnje po ti ču iz svih slo je va ra zno vr sne evrop ske za jed ni ce. Na su prot uvre že­ nom mi šlje nju da po či ni o ci na sil nih de la za sno va nih na pred ra su da ma uglav­ nom pri pa da ju eks tre mi stič kim gru pa ma, ova kvo po na ša nje se ja vlja ši rom dru štva. Sa mim tim, fo ku si ra nje na eks tre mi ste do vo di do to ga da „sva ko­ dnev ni“ ob li ci pred ra su da i zlo sta vlja nja, pri me ra ra di, oso ba sa in va li di te tom, osta ju ne vi dlji vi, te da dr ža va na njih ne re a gu je (FRA, 2012: 3; OSCE/ODI HR, http://www.fra.europa.eu/en/about­fra, stranici pristupljeno 17.12.2014. Republika Srbija je podnela zahtev za status posmatrača u FRA. 18 Videti: http://www.fra.europa.eu/en/theme/hate­crime, stranici pristupljeno 10.1.2015. 19 Council Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA of 28 November 2008 on Combating Certain Forms and Expressions of Racism and Xenophobia by Means of Criminal Law. Mirjana Dokmanović 68 2013: 6). Ve ći na žr ta va i sve do ka ta kvog na si lja mo ti vi sa nih pred ra su da ma, sto ga, ne pri ja vlju je te slu ča je ve. Po či ni o ci osta ju ne ka žnje ni i ti me ohra bre ni da na sta ve sa ta kvim po na ša njem. Is tra ži va nje FRA je po ka za lo da se me ha ni zmi pri ku plja nja i evi den ti ra nja po da ta ka20 u dr ža va ma čla ni ca ma EU mo gu raz vr sta ti u tri ka te go ri je, shod no nji ho vom op se gu i tran spa rent no sti (FRA, 2012: 8, 36): 1) Po da ci su ogra ni če ni; evi den ti ra se ma lo slu ča je va, s ob zi rom da se zva­ nič na evi den ci ja o zlo či ni ma iz mr žnje vo di sa mo na osno vu ne ko li ko pred­ ra su da ko je su mo ti vi sa le zlo čin, kao što su to, na pri mer, ra si zam i kse­ no fo bi ja; po da ci se obič no ne ob ja vlju ju (Bu gar ska, Ki par, Esto ni ja, Grč ka, Ma đar ska, Ir ska, Ita li ja, Le to ni ja, Luk sem burg, Mal ta, Por tu ga li ja, Špa ni ja, Slo ve ni ja); 2) Po da ci su do bri; evi den ti ra se ši rok op seg mo ti va za sno va nih na pred ra­ su da ma, po pra vi lu, po da ci se ob ja vlju ju (Austri ja, Bel gi ja, Če ška, Dan ska, Fran cu ska, Ne mač ka, Li tva ni ja, Polj ska, Slovačka21); 3) Po da ci su sve o bu hvat ni i re dov no se ob ja vlju ju, evi den ti ra se ši rok op seg mo ti va za sno va nih na pred ra su da ma, vr ste kri vič nih de la i ka rak te ri sti ke slu ča je va (Fin ska, Ho lan di ja, Šved ska i Ve li ka Bri ta ni ja). Me đu tim, čak i me đu dr ža va ma u ovoj gru pi po sto je od re đe ne raz li ke. Je di no Ho lan di ja evi den ti ra po dat ke o zlo či nu iz mr žnje po svim osno va ma dis kri mi na ci je (ra si zam i kse no fo bi ja, an ti se mi ti zam, sek su al na ori jen ta ci ja, eks tre mi zam, ver ska ne to le ran ci ja, isla mo fo bi ja, an ti­rom sko ras po lo že nje, in va li di tet, rod ni iden ti tet i dru gi ob li ci) (FRA, 2012: 9). Su mi ra no, na ni vou EU zva nič ni po da ci se naj če šće vo de za kri vič na de la ve za na za ra si zam i kse no fo bi ju (25 dr ža va čla ni ca EU), an ti se mi ti zam (12 dr ža va), kri vič na de la mo ti vi sa na žr tvi nom sek su al nom ori jen ta ci jom (8 dr ža va), kri vič na de la mo ti vi sa na eks tre mi zmom (7 dr ža va), re li gij skom ne tr­ pe lji vo šću (7 dr ža va) i isla mo fo bi jom (6 dr ža va). Sve ga če ti ri dr ža ve čla ni ce EU vo de zva nič nu evi den ci ju o zlo či ni ma mo ti vi sa nim ne či jim rod nim iden ti te­ tom, pri pad no šću rom skom et ni ci te tu ili zbog in va li di te ta (FRA, 2012: 9, 31). 20 Pod „zvaničnim podacima“ ovaj Izveštaj podrazumeva podatke koje prikupljaju sudovi, tužilaštva, policija i relevantna ministarstva. Zvanični izvori podataka su bili i kaznene ustanove, nacionalni statistički zavodi, nacionalna tela za ravnopravnost i nacionalni instituti ljudskih prava. 21 U slu ča ju Rumunije ni su nađeni nikakvi po da ci o prikupljanju po da ta ka o zlo či nu iz mr žnje. Temida 69 Na osno vu ovog is tra ži va nja, FRA za klju ču je da me đu čla ni ca ma EU po sto je zna čaj ne raz li ke u po gle du pri ku plja nja i evi den ti ra nja po da ta ka ko ji se od no se na zlo čin iz mr žnje. Iz tog raz lo ga po da ci ni su upo re di vi. Zbog nji­ ho ve ne pot pu no sti, ni je mo gu će usta no vi ti pra vo sta nje stva ri u po gle du ras­ pro stra nje no sti, obi ma i mo ti va zlo či na iz mr žnje, kao ni u po gle du žr ta va i po či ni la ca tih de la. Bi lo bi po gre šno za klju či ti da je zlo čin iz mr žnje ras pro stra­ nje ni ji u dr ža va ma ko je be le že vi sok broj pred ra su da ma mo ti vi sa nih kri vič nih de la. Jed no stav no, ra di se o to me da te dr ža ve pri lje žni je re a gu ju na ta kva de la i vo de o nji ma evi den ci ju, za raz li ku od onih dr ža va ko je pri ka zu ju ma li broj ova kvih in ci de na ta. Ove po to nje dr ža ve, za pra vo, pro pu šta ju da is pu nja­ va ju oba ve zu raz ot kri va nja i re a go va nja na zlo čin iz mr žnje. Sa mim tim, žr tve ta kvih kri vič nih de la ima ju ote žan pri stup prav di i za šti ti svo jih pra va, a ti me su sma nje ne mo guć no sti pra vo sud nog si ste ma da go ni po či ni o ce. FRA je de tek to va la ne ko li ko osnov nih pro ble ma ko ji ote ža va ju dr ža va ma čla ni ca ma EU da pri ku plja ju i evi den ti ra ju po dat ke o zlo či nu iz mr žnje. Ti pro­ ble mi se od no se na pri ro du po da ta ka ko ji se pri ku plja ju; vre men ski okvir evi­ den ti ra nja; pe ri o dič ne pro me ne u me ha ni zmi ma pri ku plja nja po da ta ka; pro­ me ne za ko na ko je uti ču na pri ku plja nje po da ta ka; dru štve no­isto rij ski kon­ tekst i ste pen efi ka snog od go vo ra dr ža ve na zlo čin iz mr žnje (FRA, 2012: 10). Osnov ni za klju čak ove ana li ze je da se op seg pri ku plja nja zva nič nih po da ta ka u ve ći ni dr ža va čla ni ca EU mo ra pro ši ri ti iz tri raz lo ga: ra di po ve­ ća nja vi dlji vo sti zlo či na iz mr žnje, omo gu ća va nja žr tva ma da tra že za šti tu, te ra di ka žnja va nja po či ni o ca i osi gu ra nja da dr ža va efi ka sno re a gu je na zlo čin iz mr žnje kao kr še nje osnov nih ljud skih pra va. OEBS i evi den ti ra nje po da ta ka o zlo či nu iz mr žnje Od 2009. go di ne, Kan ce la ri ja OEBS­a za de mo krat ske in sti tu ci je i ljud­ ska pra va (OSCE Of fi ce for De moc ra tic In sti tu ti ons and Hu man Rights – ODI HR) pri ku plja od dr ža va čla ni ca sta ti stič ke i dru ge po dat ke o zlo či nu iz mr žnje i ob ja vlju je ih na svom saj tu22 na Me đu na rod ni dan to le ran ci je (16. no vem bar). Po red dr žav nih or ga na, po dat ke i in for ma ci je do sta vlja ju ne vla di ne or ga ni za­ 22 OSCE/ODIHR Hate Crime Reporting. Dostupno na: http://www.hatecrime.osce.org/what­do­ we­know i http://hatecrime.osce.org/what­do­we­know/our­mandate, stranicama pristup­ ljeno 24.1.2015. Informacije vezane za Republiku Srbiju su dostupne na sajtu: http:// hatecrime.osce.org/serbia?year=2013, stranici pristupljeno 24.1.2015. Mirjana Dokmanović 70 ci je, a OSCE/ODI HR ih pri ku plja i od me đu vla di nih or ga ni za ci ja i te la kao što su Sa vet UN za ljud ska pra va, Ko mi tet UN za eli mi na ci ju ra sne dis kri mi na ci je, FRA i Evrop ska ko mi si ja pro tiv ra si zma i ne to le ran ci je.23 Po red to ga, od 2006. go di ne, OSCE/ODI HR pu bli ku je go di šnje iz ve šta je o slu ča je vi ma zlo či na iz mr žnje i od go vo ri ma dr ža va (OSCE/ODI HR, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012), ko ji sa dr že, iz me đu osta log, pre po ru ke dr ža va ma za una­ pre đe nje pri ku plja nja po da ta ka, za ko no dav stva, ra da is tra žnih i pra vo sud nih or ga na i sa rad nje sa ci vil nim dru štvom. U tom smi slu, Re pu bli ka Sr bi ja ta ko đe sa ra đu je sa OEBS­om i do sta vlja ras po lo ži ve po dat ke (OSCE/ODI HR, 2012: 127­ 128; OSCE/ODI HR, 2013: 127­128). Pre po ru ke me đu vla di nih te la u ci lju una pre đe nja evi den ti ra nja zlo či na iz mr žnje Pre po ru ke FRA Na osno vu ana li ze prak si i me to do lo gi ja evi den ti ra nja po da ta ka o zlo či nu iz mr žnje 27 dr ža va čla ni ca EU, FRA (2012: 11) im je upu ti la ne ko li ko struč nih mi šlje nja za una pre đe nje te de lat no sti. FRA je po zva la dr ža ve čla ni ce EU da pri zna ju žr tve zlo či na iz mr žnje, obez be de efi ka snu is tra gu i go nje nje, ka zne po či ni o ce i po ve ća ju vi dlji vost ovih de la. Osnov na je pre mi sa da dr ža ve čla­ ni ce EU tre ba da pre du zmu sve o bu hvat ne me re i po li ti ke ka ko bi za šti ti li ljud­ ska pra va svih ko ji ži ve u EU. Sto ga su mi šlje nja, za ključ ci i pre po ru ke FRA re le­ vant ni i za Re pu bli ku Sr bi ju u pro ce su pri dru ži va nja EU. a) Pri zna va nje žr ta va Žr tve i sve do ci zlo či na iz mr žnje se mo ra ju ohra bri ti da pri ja vlju ju ta kva de la, a to se po sti že po ve ća njem nji ho vog po ve re nja u kri vič no prav ni si stem, pra vo su đe i or ga ne go nje nja. Pod se ća ju ći na oba ve zu po što va nja čla na 14 Evrop ske kon ven ci je o ljud skim pra vi ma24 i čla na 21 Po ve lje EU o osnov nim 23 OSCE/ODIHR Hate Crime Reporting, dostupno na: http://www.hatecrime.osce.org/what­do­ we­know/our­methodology, stranici pristupljeno 24.1.2015. 24 Council of Europe, European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as amended by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14, 4 November 1950, ETS 5. Temida 71 pra vi ma25, FRA is ti če da kri vič no prav ne od red be ko je se od no se na zlo čin iz mr žnje mo ra ju rav no prav no tre ti ra ti sve osno ve dis kri mi na ci je. Za ko ni tre ba da oba ve zu ju na pri ku plja nje i ob ja vlji va nje po da ta ka o zlo­ či nu iz mr žnje. Ovi po da ci ne sme ju do pu sti ti iden ti fi ka ci ju po je di na ca, već tre ba da se pri ka zu ju kao sta ti sti ka. Ova sta ti sti ka tre ba da sa dr ži, kao mi ni­ mum, broj pri ja vlje nih i za be le že nih slu ča je va, broj pre su da, osnov po ko ji ma su ova kri vič na de la utvr đe na kao dis kri mi na tor na i kri vič ne sank ci je iz re če ne po či ni o ci ma. U slu ča ju da ve ru ju da jav ni tu ži lac ili sud ni je od go va ra ju će re a go vao na zlo čin iz mr žnje, žr tve tre ba da ima ju pri stup prav nim le ko vi ma ka ko bi ostva­ ri le svo ja pra va na osno vu čla na 14 Evrop ske kon ven ci je o ljud skim pra vi ma. Ova kva re še nja, po mi šlje nju FRA, do pri no se pri zna va nju žr ta va zlo či na iz mr žnje u skla du sa oba ve za ma dr ža va čla ni ca EU da raz ot kri ju mo ti ve ova kvih kri vič nih de la, a na osno vu pre ce dent nog pra va Evrop skog su da za ljud ska pra va. b) Obez be đe nje efi ka sne is tra ge i go nje nja U to ku is tra ge, go nje nja i pro ce su i ra nja kri vič nih de la po li ci ja, su do vi i tu ži la štva mo ra ju obra ti ti pa žnju na sva ku in di ka ci ju ko ja uka zu je da je ne ka pred ra su da bi la mo tiv iz vr še nja kri vič nog de la. De ta lji o ta kvim slu ča je vi ma se mo ra ju be le ži ti ka ko bi se iden ti fi ko va lo po sto ja nje ne ke od re đe ne pred ra su de. c) Ka žnja va nje po či ni la ca Za ko no da vac tre ba da raz mo tri mo del stro ži jeg ka žnja va nja u slu ča ju zlo či na iz mr žnje. Su do vi tre ba da jav no ob ja ve da je pred ra su da bi la oki dač za iz vr še nje od no snog kri vič nog de la, te da ja sno obra zlo že da je upra vo to do ve lo do stro že ka zne. d) Uči ni ti zlo čin iz mr žnje vi dlji vim Gde god je to mo gu će po do ma ćem za ko no dav stvu, po da ci o zlo či nu iz mr žnje tre ba lo bi da bu du raz vr sta ni po po lu, uz ra stu i dru gim ka rak te ri sti­ ka ma uči ni la ca i žr ta va, ra di bo ljeg raz u me va nja obra sca vik ti mi za ci je i iz vr še­ 25 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Official Journal of the European Communities, 2000/C 364/01. Mirjana Dokmanović 72 nja de la. Zva nič ni sta ti stič ki po da ci tre ba da se do pu ne an ke ta ma o vik ti mi za­ ci ji ko je do pri no se bo ljoj vi dlji vo sti pri ro de i op se ga ne pri ja vlje nih slu ča je va, is ku sta va žr ta va sa po li ci jom, tu ži la štvom i su do vi ma, raz lo zi ma ne pri ja vlji va­ nja zlo či na iz mr žnje i sve sti žr ta va o svo jim pra vi ma. Pre po ru ke OEBS-a Go di šnji iz ve šta ji OSCE/ODI HR o zlo či nu iz mr žnje u re gi o nu, ta ko đe, po ka zu ju da su po da ci do bi je ni iz dr ža va čla ni ca ne u po re di vi (OSCE/ODI HR, 2014: 11). Sto ga je OEBS (OSCE/ODI HR, 2014) pri pre mio sve o bu hvat ni prak­ tič ni pri ruč nik u ci lju us po sta vlja nja je din stve nog i funk ci o nal nog si ste ma pri ku plja nja po da ta ka i usta no vlja va nja me ha ni za ma za nad zi ra nje zlo či na iz mr žnje. U po gle du me re nja efi ka sno sti re ak ci je kri vič no prav nog si ste ma na pred ra su da ma mo ti vi sa na kri vič na de la, OEBS za klju ču je da po da ci o kri vič­ nom go nje nju i osu đi va nju obez be đu ju pot pu nu sli ku o to me ka ko se od go­ va ra ju će za kon ske od red be ko ri ste od stra ne tu ži o ca i ko ji su ne do sta ci i sna­ ge u pri me ni za ko na i po li ti ka u ovoj obla sti. Ovim se po ma že za ko no dav cu da oce ni efek te usvo je nog za kon skog re še nja i da pred lo ži even tu al nu nje­ go vu mo di fi ka ci ju ili re lo ka ci ju re sur sa, pri me ra ra di, u ci lju struč nog ospo so­ blja va nja tu ži la ca da pre po zna ju pred ra su du ko ja se na la zi u mo ti vu kri vič nog de la (OSCE/ODI HR, 2014: 27­28). Po li ti ke una pre đe nja evi den ti ra nja zlo či na iz mr žnje u EU Uva ža va ju ći na ve de ne oce ne i pre po ru ke FRA, Sa vet EU je u svo jim Za ključ ci ma o su zbi ja nju zlo či na iz mr žnje u Evrop skoj uni ji (Co un cil of the Euro pean Union, 2013) is ta kao „po tre bu za efi ka snim i si ste ma tič nim pri ku­ plja njem ve ro do stoj nih i upo re di vih po da ta ka o zlo či nu iz mr žnje, ko ji će uklju či ti, u me ri u ko joj je to mo gu će, broj ta kvih slu ča je va pri ja vlje nih od stra ne jav no sti i evi den ti ra nih od stra ne vla sti; broj pre su da; pred ra su de kao mo ti ve iza ovih de la i sank ci je iz re če ne po či ni o ci ma“. Sa vet EU je po zvao dr ža ve čla ni ce, Ko mi si ju EU i re le vant ne evrop ske agen ci je da raz vi ju me to de ohra bri va nja pri ja vlji va nja zlo či na iz mr žnje i od go va ra ju će evi den ci je ve ro­ do stoj nih i upo re di vih po da ta ka. Po red to ga, Sa vet EU je po zvao FRA da po mog ne dr ža va ma čla ni ca ma EU da raz me nju ju do bre prak se i una pre de me do to lo gi je evi den ti ra nja zlo či na iz mr žnje. Temida 73 Iste go di ne, FRA je, u sa rad nji sa Sa ve tom EU, or ga ni zo va la kon fe ren ci ju o su zbi ja nju zlo či na iz mr žnje u EU (FRA, 2013) ko ja je evi den ti ra la pro pu ste u nje go vom evi den ti ra nju i pred lo ži la sle de će: 1) for mi ra nje eks pert ske rad ne gru pe na ni vou EU za re vi zi ju si ste ma pri ku­ plja nja i evi den ti ra nja po da ta ka i for mu li sa nje pre po ru ka za nji ho vo una­ pre đi va nje; 2) sta ti stič ki po da ci mo ra ju po kri va ti sve osno ve dis kri mi na ci je za šti će ne čla­ nom 21 Po ve lje EU o osnov nim pra vi ma;26 3) po da ci o pri ja vlje nim slu ča je vi ma, is tra žnim i kri vič nim po stup ci ma mo ra ju se pri ku plja ti i go di šnje ob ja vlji va ti; 4) tu ži la štva mo ra ju go di šnje ob ja vlji va ti po dat ke o bro ju op tu žni ca i bro ju op tu že nih; 5) su do vi mo ra ju go di šnje ob ja vlji va ti broj pre su da, uklju ču ju ći oslo ba đa ju će pre su de, kao i broj op tu že nih, od no sno oslo bo đe nih li ca; 6) su do vi mo ra ju ob ja vlji va ti pre su de za zlo čin iz mr žnje uz na vo đe nje osno ve kri vič nog de la, mo ti ve i iz re če nu sank ci ju; 7) spro vo di ti an ke te o vik ti mi za ci ji ra di sti ca nja de talj ni jeg zna nja o is ku­ stvi ma žr ta va sa or ga ni ma go nje nja i su do vi ma. Po red to ga, ova te mat ska kon fe ren ci ja je od re di la pri o ri tet ne obla sti de lo­ va nja dr ža va: a) raz vi ja nje za jed nič kog raz u me va nja ter mi na „zlo čin iz mr žnje“ u na ci o nal nom ko ntek stu (ka ko se kri vič na de la mo ti vi sa na pred ra su da ma de fi ni šu i tre ti ra ju od stra ne po li ci je i or ga na kri vič no prav nog si ste ma); b) una­ pre đe nje mul ti sek tor ske sa rad nje; c) ohra bri va nje pri ja vlji va nja slu ča je va zlo­ či na iz mr žnje od stra ne žr tve, sve do ka, tre ćih li ca ili ano nim no; i d) obu ka po li cij skih slu žbe ni ka, su di ja i tu ži la ca (FRA, 2014: 2). Ove pre po ru ke su još uvek ak tu el ne, tim pre što je Rad na gru pa za una­ pre đe nje iz ve šta va nja i evi den ti ra nja zlo či na iz mr žnje u EU kra jem 2014. go di ne kon sta to va la niz pro pu sta u ovoj obla sti (FRA, 2014a). Iz me đu osta lih, ovo se od no si na ne do sta tak po ve re nja žr ta va zlo či na iz mr žnje da pri ja vlju ju in ci den te, ne do sta tak ko or di na ci je iz me đu po li ci je, or ga ni za ci ja ci vil nog dru­ štva i slu žbi za po dr šku žr tva ma da obez be de da lje po stu pa nje po iz ve šte­ nim in ci den ti ma, ne do sta tak jed no o bra znog raz u me va nja zlo či na iz mr žnje od stra ne po li ci je i tu ži la štva (što do vo di do kon tra dik tor nih oce na slu ča ja), 26 Pol, rasa, boja kože, etničko ili socijalno poreklo, genetske karakteristike, jezik, veroispovest, političko ili drugo mišljenje, pripadnost nacionalnoj manjini, svojina, rođenje, invalidnost, uzrast i seksualna orijentacija. Mirjana Dokmanović 74 ne do sta tak prav nog okvi ra ko ji omo gu ću je stro ži je ka žnja va nje u slu ča ju kri­ vič nih de la mo ti vi sa nih pred ra su da ma, ne do sta tak po vrat nih in for ma ci ja pre­ ma žr tva ma o sud bi ni pri ja vlje nih in ci de na ta, te ne do sta tak an ke ta o vik ti mi­ za ci ji na na ci o nal nom ni vou, što do vo di do to ga da ve ći na zlo či na iz mr žnje osta je ne vi dlji va (FRA, 2014a: 2). Raz ma tra ju ći ovu pro ble ma ti ku, OEBS (OSCE, 2015) je za klju čio da dr žav ni or ga ni mo ra ju sa ra đi va ti sa ci vil nim dru štvom u ci lju us po sta vlja nja ve ro do stoj ne evi den ci je o zlo či nu iz mr žnje. Za klju čak Pre gled sta nja i pro ble ma u po gle du evi den ti ra nja zlo či na iz mr žnje u dr ža va ma čla ni ca ma EU uka zu je da je ova pro ble ma ti ka ve o ma kom plek sna i da uvo đe nje je din stve ne ba ze po da ta ka u ovoj obla sti u Sr bi ji zah te va mul­ ti sek tor ski pri stup, uz vi so ki ste pen sa rad nje po li ci je, su do va i tu ži la šta va. Pr vi ko rak u tom ci lju tre ba da bu de for mu li sa nje i usva ja nje je din stve ne me to do­ lo gi je pri ku plja nja i evi den ti ra nja po da ta ka po la ze ći od na ve de nih pre po ru ka i smer ni ca FRA i OEBS­a. Po li ci ja, tu ži la štva i su do vi tre ba lo bi da be le že de ta­ lje o sva koj in di ka ci ji ko ja uka zu je da je iz vr še nje kri vič nog de la mo ti vi sa no ne kom pred ra su dom po či ni o ca. Ra di in for mi sa nja jav no sti, po da ci tre ba da se pri ka zu ju i pe ri o dič no ob ja vlju ju kao sta ti sti ka ko ja bi sa dr ža la, kao mi ni mum, broj pri ja vlje nih i za be le že nih slu ča je va, broj pre su da, osnov po ko jim su ta kri vič na de la utvr đe na kao dis kri mi na tor na, ras pon ka zne za od no sno kri vič no de lo i iz re če nu pre su du, uz ja snu na zna ku obra zlo že nja pri me ne ote ža va ju će okol no sti pri li kom od me ra va nja ka zne. Po da ci tre ba da bu du raz vr sta ni po po lu, uz ra stu i dru gim re le vant nim ka rak te ri sti ka ma uči ni o ca i žr tve. Po di za nje vi dlji vo sti i do sled no ka žnja va nje kri vič nih de la mo ti vi sa nih pred ra su da ma tre ba lo bi da do pri ne se spre ča va nju i sma nji va nju obi ma ovog ti pa kri mi na li te ta. U tom ci lju, bi lo bi ko ri sno pe ri o dič no spro vo di ti an ke te o vik ti mi za ci ji. Pri me na ove teh ni ke ne sa mo što bi do pu ni la po dat ke zva nič ne sta ti sti ke, već bi do pri ne la po ve ća nju sve sti žr ta va o nji ho vim pra vi ma i raz ot­ kri va nju raz lo ga ne pri ja vlji va nja zlo či na mo ti vi sa nih mr žnjom. Temida 75 Li te ra tu ra Bar jak ta ro vić, D. (2013) In kri mi na ci ja zlo či na iz mr žnje – mo guć put ka jed na ki jem dru štvu. Kul tu ra po li sa, 21, str. 249­272. Char ter of Fun da men tal Rights of the Euro pean Union. Of fi cial Jo ur nal of the Euro- pean Com mu ni ti es, 2000/C 364/01. Ći rić, J. (2011) Zlo či ni mr žnje – ame rič ko i bal kan sko is ku stvo. Te mi da, 4, str. 21­36. Co un cil of Euro pe (1950)  Euro pean Con ven tion for the Pro tec tion of Hu man Rights and Fun da men tal Fre e doms, as amen ded by Pro to cols Nos. 11 and 14, 4 No vem ber 1950, ETS 5. Cun neen, Ch. (2009) Ha te Cri me. U: A. Wa ke fi eld, J. Fle ming (ur.) The Sa ge Dic ti o nary of Po li cing. Lon don: Sa ge, str. 132­135. 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Te mi da, 4, str. 7­19. Kri vič ni za ko nik Re pu bli ke Sr bi je, Slu žbe ni gla snik RS, br. 85/05, 88/05­is prav ka, 107/05­is prav ka, 72/09, 111/09, 121/12, 104/13 i 108/14. Ma ro ney, T.A. (1998) The Strug gle aga inst Ha te Cri me: Mo ve ment at a Cros sro ads. New York Uni ver sity Law Re vi ew, 2, str. 564­620. No lan, J., Akiyama, Y., Ber ha nu, S. (2002) The Ha te Cri me Sta ti stics Act of 1990. Ame ri- can Be ha vi o ral Sci en tist, 46, str. 136­153. OSCE (2009) Ha te Cri mes Law: A Prac ti cal Gu i de. War saw: OSCE. Mirjana Dokmanović 76 OSCE/ODI HR (2008) Ha te Cri mes in the OSCE Re gion: In ci dents and Re spon ses - An nual Re port for 2007. War saw: OSCE/ODI HR. OSCE/ODI HR (2009) Ha te Cri mes in the OSCE Re gion: In ci dents and Re spon ses - An nual Re port for 2008. War saw: OSCE/ODI HR. OSCE/ODI HR (2010) Ha te Cri mes in the OSCE Re gion: In ci dents and Re spon ses - An nual Re port for 2009. War saw: OSCE/ODI HR. OSCE/ODI HR (2011) Ha te Cri mes in the OSCE Re gion: In ci dents and Re spon ses - An nual Re port for 2010. War saw: OSCE/ODI HR. OSCE/ODI HR (2012) Ha te Cri mes in the OSCE Re gion: In ci dents and Re spon ses - An nual Re port for 2011. War saw: OSCE/ODI HR. OSCE/ODI HR (2012a) Un der stan ding Ha te Cri mes. War saw: OSCE/ODI HR. OSCE/ODI HR (2013) Ha te Cri mes in the OSCE Re gion: In ci dents and Re spon ses - An nual Re port for 2012. War saw: OSCE/ODI HR. OSCE/ODI HR (2014) Ha te Cri me Da ta - Col lec tion and Mo ni to ring Mec ha nisms: A Prac ti- cal Gu i de. War saw: OSCE/ODI HR. Stra te gi ja pre ven ci je i za šti te od dis kri mi na ci je, Slu žbe ni gla snik RS, br. 60/2013. Trip ko vić, M. (2011) Eks pan zi ja mr žnje: osnov na obe lež ja ma sov nih zlo či na mr žnje. Te mi da, 4, str. 37­54. Vla da Re pu bli ke Sr bi je (2014) Ak ci o ni plan za pri me nu Stra te gi je pre ven ci je i za šti te od dis kri mi na ci je za pe riod od 2014. do 2018. go di ne, usvo jen 3.10.2014. Wang, L. (2002) Ha te Cri mes and Everyday Di scri mi na tion: In flu en ces of and on the So cial Con text. Rut gers Ra ce & the Law Re vi ew, 4, str. 1­31. YUCOM (2013) Zlo čin iz mr žnje – Bro šu ra za gra đa ne. Be o grad: YUCOM. In ter net iz vo ri Co un cil Fra me work De ci sion 2008/913/JHA of 28 No vem ber 2008 on Com ba ting Cer­ tain Forms and Ex pres si ons of Ra cism and Xe nop ho bia by Me ans of Cri mi nal Law. Do stup no na: http://www.con si li um.euro pa.eu/uedocs/cms_da ta/docs/pres sda ta/ en/jha/139949.pdf, stra ni ci pri stu plje no 24.1.2015. Co un cil of the Euro pean Union (2013) Co un cil con clu si ons on com ba ting ha te cri me in the Euro pean Union, Bru xel les, 5 and 6 De cem ber 2013. Do stup no na: http://fra. euro pa.eu/si tes/de fa ult/fi les/ha te­cri me­se mi nar­re port­2014_en.pdf, stra ni ci pri stu­ plje no 24.1.2015. Temida 77 Euro pean Union Agency for Fun da men tal Rights. Do stup no na: http://www.fra. euro pa.eu/en/abo ut­fra, stra ni ci pri stu plje no 17.12.2014. Euro pean Union Agency for Fun da men tal Rights, Ha te Cri me The me. Do stup no na: http://fra.euro pa.eu/en/the me/ha te­cri me, stra ni ci pri stu plje no 10.1.2015. FRA (2007) Da ta col lec tion and re se arch ac ti vi ti es on ra cism and xe nop ho bia by the EUMC (2000­2006). FRA Wor king Pa per, Vi en na: FRA. Do stup no na: http://fra.euro pa. eu/fra Web si te/at tac hments/EUMC_met ho do logy_pa per_en.pdf, stra ni ci pri stu­ plje no 10.1.2015. FRA (2013) Con fe ren ce con clu si ons, FRA con fe ren ce 2013 “Com ba ting ha te cri me in the EU – Gi ving vic tims a fa ce and a vo i ce”, 12­13 No vem ber 2013, Vil ni us, Lit hu a nia. Do stup no na: http://fra.euro pa.eu/si tes/de fa ult/fi les/frc2013­con clu si ons.pdf, stra ni ci pri stu plje no 17.12.2014. FRA (2014) How Can EU Mem ber Sta tes Com bat Ha te Cri me Ef fec ti vely? En co u ra ging Re por ting and Im pro ving Re cor ding – Se mi nar re port. Do stup no na: http://fra.euro pa. eu/si tes/de fa ult/fi les/ha te­cri me­se mi nar­re port­2014_en.pdf, stra ni ci pri stu plje no 10.1.2015. FRA (2014a) Wor king Party – Im pro ving Re por ting and Re cor ding of Ha te Cri me in the EU - Ina u gu ral Me e ting Re port. Do stup no na: http://fra.euro pa.eu/si tes/de fa ult/fi les/fra_ wor king_party_on_ha te_cri me_­me e ting_re port.pdf, stra ni ci pri stu plje no 10.1.2015. Mi ni star stvo prav de Re pu bli ke Sr bi je. Do stup no na: http://www.mprav de.gov.rs/ tekst/7715/dru gi­na crt­ak ci o nog­pla na­za­po gla vlje­23.php, stra ni ci pri stu plje no 24.1.2015. OSCE (2015) Ci vil So ci ety and Go vern ment Aut ho ri ti es Must Work To get her to Ac cu­ ra tely Re cord Ha te Cri me in Euro pe, Say Con fe ren ce Par ti ci pants. Do stup no na: http://www.osce.org/odi hr/143656, stra ni ci pri stu plje no 9.3.2015. OSCE/ODI HR Ha te Cri me Re por ting, Re so ur ces. Do stup no na: http://www.ha tec ri me. osce.org/re so ur ces/ngos­and­ci vil­so ci ety­or ga ni za ti ons­2013, stra ni ci pri stu plje no 16.2.2015. OSCE/ODI HR Ha te Cri me Re por ting, What Do We Know. Do stup no na: http://www. ha tec ri me.osce.org/what­do­we­know, stra ni ci pri stu plje no 24.1.2015. OSCE/ODI HR Ha te Cri me Re por ting, Our Met ho do logy. Do stup no na: http://www. ha tec ri me.osce.org/what­do­we­know/our­met ho do logy, stra ni ci pri stu plje no 24.1.2015. OSCE/ODI HR Ha te Cri me Re por ting, Our Man da te. Do stup no na: http://ha tec ri me. osce.org/what­do­we­know/our­man da te, stra ni ci pri stu plje no 24.1.2015. Mirjana Dokmanović 78 OSCE/ODI HR Ha te Cri me Re por ting, Ser bia 2013. Do stup no na: http://ha tec ri me.osce. org/ser bia?year=2013, stra ni ci pri stu plje no 24.1.2015. The Fe de ral Bu re au of In ve sti ga tion, Ha te Cri me Sta ti stics. Do stup no na: http://www. fbi.gov/news/sto ri es/2014/de cem ber/la test­ha te­cri me­sta ti stics­re port­re le a sed/ la test­ha te­cri me­sta ti stics­re port­re le a sed, stra ni ci pri stu plje no 10.5.2015. The Le a dershp Con fe ren ce on Ci vil and Hu man Rights, Ha te Cri me Le gi sla tion. Do stup no na: http://www.ci vil rights.org/ha tec ri mes/llehcpa/le gi sla tion/, stra ni ci pri­ stu plje no 7.5.2015. Mir ja na Dok Ma no vić Ha te Cri mes Re cor ding: Re com men da ti ons of the In ter na ti o nal Bo di es and The ir Sig ni fi can ce to Ser bia Da ta re cor ding and ke e ping the of fi cial uni que da ta ba se on ha te cri mes con tri­ bu tes to in cre a sing vi si bi lity of this type of cri mes, as well as to for mu la ting ef fec ti ve po li ci es of pre ven ting di scri mi na tion, ra cism and non­to le ran ce. At the end of 2012, the Re pu blic of Ser bia in tro du ced the ag gra va ting cir cum stan ce in sen ten cing cri­ mes mo ti va ted by ha tred on the ba sis of ra ce, re li gion be li ef, na ti o nal or et hni cal be lon ging, sex, se xu al ori en ta tion or gen der iden tity. The Ac tion Plan of the Im ple­ men ta tion of the Stra tegy of Pre ven tion and Pro tec tion aga inst Di scri mi na tion (2014) fo re se es in tro du cing the uni que da ta ba se on ha te cri mes by the end of 2016. The su bject of the pa per is the analysis of the im por tan ce of esta blis hing this type of da ta ba se from the per spec ti ve of ac know led ging vic tims’ rights. The re le vant ac ti vi­ ti es and the re com men da ti ons of the EU Fun da men tal Rights Agency (FRA) and the OSCE to the mem ber sta tes, with re spect to ef fi ci ent re cor ding da ta on ha te cri mes, ha ve been al so in tro du ced. The aim of the pa per is to con tri bu te de ve lo ping of the met ho do logy of da ta re cor ding of ha te cri mes in the Re pu blic of Ser bia in li ne with the gi ven re com men da ti ons of the FRA and the OSCE. Keywords: ha te cri mes, ag gra va ting cir cum stan ce, cri me re cor ding, Fun da men­ tal Rights Agency, OSCE. 
work_ii53wbryqbd5vif2ta53fha6fu	----	Migrant mental health and representation in routine administrative registers Close, C., Bosqui, T., O'Reilly, D., Donnelly, M., & Kouvonen, A. (2017). Migrant mental health and representation in routine administrative registers. International Journal of Migration, Health and Social Care , 14(1), 1-31. https://doi.org/10.1108/IJMHSC-09-2016-0035 Published in: International Journal of Migration, Health and Social Care Document Version: Peer reviewed version Queen's University Belfast - Research Portal: Link to publication record in Queen's University Belfast Research Portal Publisher rights © Emerald Publishing Limited 2018. This work is made available online in accordance with the publisher’s policies. Please refer to any applicable terms of use of the publisher. 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Apr. 2021 https://doi.org/10.1108/IJMHSC-09-2016-0035 https://pure.qub.ac.uk/en/publications/migrant-mental-health-and-representation-in-routine-administrative-registers(69889ac5-4a3a-4552-bfbe-37b923c5226a).html International Journal of M igration, H ealth and Social C are Migrant mental health and representation in routine administrative registers Journal: International Journal of Migration, Health and Social Care Manuscript ID IJMHSC-09-2016-0035.R1 Manuscript Type: Academic Paper Keywords: migrant, health, social care, representation, registers International Journal of Migration, Health and Social Care International Journal of M igration, H ealth and Social C are Table 1: Migrant focus group demographics Focus group 1 (n=10) Focus Group 2 (n=7) Overall Mean age (years) 46.8 50.5 48.3 (range 19-66) Gender 1 male and 9 females 1 male and 6 females 15 females and 2 males Born outside UK/Ireland Yes=4No=6 Yes=2 No=5 Yes=6,No=11 Page 1 of 36 International Journal of Migration, Health and Social Care 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 International Journal of M igration, H ealth and Social C are Table 2: Details on focus group participants job roles Participant number (PN) Job role Length of time in this role 1 Community Development Worker 12 years 2 Manager of a Migrant and Ethnic Minority Support organisation 10 years 3 Health Improvement Worker 10 years 4 Community Interpreter 12 years 5 Migrant/ ethnic minority support worker 7 years 6 Volunteer migrant/ Ethnic minority support worker 2 years 7 Migrant/ ethnic minority Support Worker 5 years 8 Volunteer migrant/ ethnic minority support worker 1 year 9 Health Improvement Worker/ Complementary therapist 6 years 10 Migrant/ ethnic minority Support Worker 0.5 years 11 Manager of a Migrant and Ethnic Minority Support organisation 4 years 12 Manager of a Migrant and Ethnic Minority Support organisation 5 years 13 Manager of a Migrant and Ethnic Minority Support organisation 6 years Page 2 of 36International Journal of Migration, Health and Social Care 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 International Journal of M igration, H ealth and Social C are 14 Manager of a Migrant and Ethnic Minority Support organisation 5 years 15 Community Development Worker for migrants/Ethnic Minorities 2 years 16 Health Improvement Worker 1 year 17 Health improvement Worker 3 years Page 3 of 36 International Journal of Migration, Health and Social Care 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 International Journal of M igration, H ealth and Social C are Table 3: Themes and sub-themes identified through framework analysis of transcription Major theme Sub theme 1.Issues with the use of GP registration, Census and hate crime data for researching migrant health 1.1 Migrants experience difficulties completing the Census and do not recognise its importance 1.2 Migrants experience issues with registering with a GP 1.3 Underrepresentation of some migrant groups in routine administrative registers 1.4 Challenges in reporting hate crime 2. Barriers to HSC service use 2.1. HSC staff lack cultural awareness 2.2. Issues accessing interpreters 3. Risk factor exposure and mental health status in migrant communities 3.1. Low paid jobs and poor working conditions 3.2. Isolation and lack of support 3.3. Racism/discrimination/negative behaviour towards migrants Page 4 of 36International Journal of Migration, Health and Social Care 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 International Journal of M igration, H ealth and Social C are Page 5 of 36 International Journal of Migration, Health and Social Care 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 International Journal of M igration, H ealth and Social C are 1 Migrant mental health and representation in routine administrative registers Abstract Purpose: There has been an increase in the use of registers and record linkages to study migrant mental health. However, the accuracy of these registers and the degree to which they are representative of the migrant population in Northern Ireland (NI) are unclear. This study explored: (i) the coverage of the NI migrant population in GP data and Census records, (ii) the issues faced by migrants in terms of registering and accessing the local health system; and (iii) the reporting of racial hate crimes against migrants to police. Design: Two focus groups of professionals (n=17) who worked with migrants were conducted. Group discussions were guided by a research-informed topic guide and the data were analysed using thematic analysis. Findings: Three main themes emerged: (i) Issues with the use of GP registration, Census and hate crime data for researching migrant mental health (ii) Barriers to health service use (eg low cultural awareness among health staff and access to interpreters) and (iii) Risk factor exposure and mental health status in migrant communities (e.g. poverty, isolation and poor working conditions). Originality/ value: Record linkage and registry studies of migrant health and well-being using Census and health service sources need to be mindful of the likelihood that some migrants may be missed. The possible underrepresentation of migrants in health registers may be explained by reduced use of such services which may be caused my encountering staff with limited cultural competency and the inability to access an interpreter promptly. Page 6 of 36International Journal of Migration, Health and Social Care 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 International Journal of M igration, H ealth and Social C are 2 Migrant mental health and representation in routine administrative registers Introduction Migration to many European countries has increased substantially in recent years (Dustmann and Frattini, 2011). For example migration to Northern Ireland (NI) more than doubled between 2001 and 2011 (Krausova and Vargos Silva 2014). Such population changes mean that there is an immediate need to improve our understanding about the health of migrants in order to aid research-informed decision making in policy development and service improvement. Migrant health has previously been studied in several Scandinavian countries using register based linkage studies (Hollander 2013, Norredam 2014) and in an attempt to replicate this type of research in a NI context researchers at the Administrative Data Research Centre Northern Ireland (ADRC-NI) at Queen’s University Belfast (QUB) are planning to conduct a large-scale linkage study into the health of migrants, initially focusing on mental health. The proposed registers for linkage are the Census, General Practitioner medical doctor (GP) and the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) hate crime data registers. These registers allow individual prescription medication, for example antidepressants, to be linked to individual socio-demographic and economic data from the Census, as well as to neighbourhood data such as area deprivation from the Census, and neighbourhood hate crime levels from the PSNI. This linkage study could therefore provide high quality data on the incidence of mental health disorders amongst migrant groups in NI, and may also set an example to other European Union (EU) countries wishing to gather an updated evidence base on migrant mental health. Page 7 of 36 International Journal of Migration, Health and Social Care 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 International Journal of M igration, H ealth and Social C are 3 The quality of these register-based studies is thought to be high due to the often whole population coverage, making generalization of findings reliable. These samples are highly representative, have low levels of missing data, and reduce the likelihood of research biases because they are drawn from real life data. Many of these studies have been conducted in Nordic countries where data linkage methodologies are well-established, and these datasets are known to have a high level of quality and accuracy (Patel et al., 2017). Less is known about countries with less-established systems. The risk of compromised data from low quality data – due to poor record keeping, inconsistencies in prescription coding and dispensation (such as cross-border agreements) and differences in the accessibility and availability of health services, Census information, and Police for migrant groups – is higher. The Administrative Data Research Centre in NI (ADRC-NI) is a relatively recent development, along with Centres across the UK, that specifically focuses on using whole population register-based datasets. This Centre brings together researchers from Queen’s University Belfast (QUB), the University of Ulster (UU) and the government body Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency (NISRA), to conduct research in the public interest using primarily GP and Census registers, among others. We are interested in determining the strengths and caveats of the Census and GP registers for accurately quantifying migrants and their need for, and use of, mental health services, to inform future research on migrant populations and their mental health needs. Determining the accuracy of these methods for quantifying migrants is important as it will help shape policy and resource allocation. Despite the fact that many countries such as the UK, France and Spain rely primarily on the Census for quantifying their migrant population, the method may underestimate migrant populations. Research from the United States has shown that non-English speaking individuals are less likely to complete the Census than English speakers and this is likely the case in the UK (US Census Bureau 2012). In NI the use of GP register data may be a more Page 8 of 36International Journal of Migration, Health and Social Care 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 International Journal of M igration, H ealth and Social C are 4 accurate method of quantifying the migrant population given the current need for residents of NI to be registered with a GP in order to access primary and secondary care services. However, it is important to bear in mind that there is wide variation in health care systems around the world and only some countries (e.g. within the UK) health care system includes a GP as the central point for accessing primary and secondary care services, including mental health services. Research suggests that some migrant groups living in the UK, such as asylum seekers and refugees, experience difficulties registering with a GP and may be less likely to be registered with a GP (Refugee Council 2013). Limited English language skills and poor access to appropriate interpreters has been suggested as one such barrier for migrants trying to register with a GP (HealthWatch 2015) as well as discrimination and prejudice at the point of access (Phillimore, 2011). Aside from quantifying migrants in Census and health registers, using these registers to assess mental health, and mental health service needs, faces further challenges. Limited cultural competency of health professionals has been highlighted as a major barrier to migrants accessing mental health services. Some migrant groups may also be particularly suspicious of mental health services and some may have had previous negative experiences of services; all of which are likely to negatively impact migrants’ access of mental health services (Franks et al. 2007, Keynejed, 2008). Furthermore, mental illness is described differently in different cultures and terms frequently used to describe mental ill-health in English e.g.: “feeling down” or “blue,” when translated directly to another language may yield meaningless expressions (Matsumoto, 2010). Without basic knowledge on how mental ill- health is described and perceived in specific cultures health professionals may fail to identify migrants suffering mental illness and migrants may be deterred from accessing professional support for mental illness. In addition to quantifying migrants and their mental health and mental health service needs, the ADRC-NI studies plan to explore the effect of common risk factors on migrant mental Page 9 of 36 International Journal of Migration, Health and Social Care 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 International Journal of M igration, H ealth and Social C are 5 health, including socio-economic disadvantage using the Census and exposure to hate crime using PSNI crime registers. Migration has been linked to increased risk of mental ill-health in many countries (Lindert et al. 2009, Bronstein and Montgomery 2011, Borque et al. 2011), and one of the largest contributory factors, alongside socio-economic disadvantage, has been found to be exposure to racism and discrimination (Veling et al. 2007, Be`cares et al. 2009). Quantitative data on the occurrence of racial hate crime in NI, held on the PSNI regional hate crime register, suggests that racial hate crime has increased in recent years (Police Service of Northern Ireland, 2014). However, it is unclear how accurate these figures are, and it is possible that a proportion of hate crime goes unreported. A report “Voices for change” (NICEM, 2014a) which included some qualitative research with Black and Minority Ethnic (BME) groups, suggested that racism was a growing issue in NI, but was often not reported to authorities. The report highlighted that this under reporting was due to beliefs that reports would not be believed or that reporting would make no difference. Further qualitative exploration of racial hate crime reporting in NI may be helpful as it will allow a greater understanding of the level of underreporting, which could better inform the proposed register- based linkage study by NI researchers on migrant mental ill-health and its risk factors. Migrant support organisations employ professionals in roles such as interpreters, nurses, volunteers and community development workers who provide support to migrants. These professionals, many of whom are migrants themselves, may be able to offer important insights into migrant health and well-being and issues related to using routine administrative registers for conducting migrant health research. Discussions with such professionals could help improve our understanding on migrant health issues e.g.: experiences of the health system, filling out the Census or reporting a hate crime. These are the kinds of issues that professionals working with migrants are faced with every day. Page 10 of 36International Journal of Migration, Health and Social Care 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 International Journal of M igration, H ealth and Social C are 6 Aim To elicit views about (i) the coverage of the NI migrant population in GP and Census records, (ii) the issues faced by migrants in terms of accessing and using the local health system; and (iii) the reporting to police of racial hate crimes against migrants. Methodology The reporting of this study was guided by the consolidated criteria for reporting qualitative research, COREQ (Tong et al. 2007). This 32-item checklist for interviews and focus groups, allows for the clear and complete reporting of qualitative studies Study design This study used focus groups to elicit professionals’ views on the topics under investigation. The purpose of this focus group study was to inform a linkage study on the quantification of migrants in registers and the mental health and mental health service need of migrant groups, which plans to utilise GP, Census and hate crime registers to determine if migrants are at risk of mental health inequalities and to determine the strengths and caveats of these registers for capturing migrants’ use of and need for mental health services. Focus groups undertook a simple qualitative descriptive approach. This approach is recommended when a direct description of a specific phenomenon is required and such methods are particularly helpful for researchers wishing to find out the, who, where, what of experiences and events (Sandelowski, 2000). Ethical approval Page 11 of 36 International Journal of Migration, Health and Social Care 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 International Journal of M igration, H ealth and Social C are 7 This focus group study was given ethical approval by the School of Medicine, Dentistry and Biomedical Sciences Ethics Committee at Queen’s University Belfast (Reference number 14/54v2). The associated linkage study was given ethical approval from the Office for Research Ethics Committee Northern Ireland (ORECNI) (Reference Number 15/WM/0212). Inclusion/ Exclusion criteria Potential participants invited to take part in focus groups were adults (aged 18 years or older, male and female); and were professionals working with migrants in a supportive role (paid/voluntary) or a manager of an organisation that supports migrants. Recruitment Professionals were invited to participate via the research teams’ existing collaborative connections with migrant and health organisations in Northern Ireland including the Northern Ireland Council for Ethnic Minorities (NICEM) and The Public Health Agency (PHA) in NI. Managers and migrant support workers in these settings disseminated a participant information sheet to relevant professionals. Professionals interested in participating then contacted the researcher directly or contacted the Migrant Support Worker/ Manager who provided them with the study information. At this point, participants were given an opportunity to ask further questions. At recruitment the participants were made aware that the researcher conducting the focus groups had a specialised interest in migrant mental health and the focus group findings would be used to inform a related register-based linkage study. Page 12 of 36International Journal of Migration, Health and Social Care 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 International Journal of M igration, H ealth and Social C are 8 Data collection Participants provided written consent on the day of the focus group indicating that they were willing to participate voluntarily in the focus groups and they agreed to the discussions being recorded. Focus groups were conducted in 2015, one was conducted in a migrant support organisation and the other was conducted in a health organisation. Only the participants and moderator were present at both focus groups. Focus groups were recorded with the use of an electronic audio digital recorder and were moderated by a female researcher, Ciara Close (CC, PhD). CC has received training in qualitative research as well as conducting various qualitative studies including focus groups for previous research projects. CC had not met any of the study participants prior to the focus groups commencing. A pre-determined topic schedule used to guide focus groups (appendix 1). The researcher took notes during focus groups and these were later added to the transcripts. Focus groups are normally ongoing until data saturation has been reached, which is often after three focus groups. Unfortunately, due to the time restrictions of this project, this meant that that the number of focus groups had to be restricted to two. Data analysis and rigour Focus group findings were analysed using the Newell and Burnard (2006) framework for thematic analysis. Two researchers (CC and TB) analysed the findings using this framework independent of one another and then came together to agree codes, categories and themes. Page 13 of 36 International Journal of Migration, Health and Social Care 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 International Journal of M igration, H ealth and Social C are 9 Ensuring the rigor of qualitative research is very important if qualitative research is to be considered credible and as such several of the strategies recommended by Creswell and Miller (2000) for improving the rigor of qualitative studies were used in the current study. This included member checking, completing a detailed audit trail and peer debriefing. Results Focus group participants The purposive sample of participants that took part in the focus group study included 17 professionals, 2 others had agreed to participate but failed to attend, one of whom contacted the researcher and informed her she was sick. The two focus groups lasted 60 and 75 minutes respectively and generated lively discussions. A summary of the transcripts were sent via email and confirmed by each study participant. The participants were both female (15) and male (2). Most participants worked in paid employment (15) and just two worked in volunteer roles. All participants were either working directly to support migrants or were leading an organisation that supports migrants and had been on average 5.4 years in their current role. Ten professionals attended focus group one, and seven attended focus group two. The mean age of participants was 48.3 years (age range 19-66 years) and several were migrants themselves (6/17) (Table 1). Specific details of each focus group participant’s job roles are detailed in Table 2, which highlights the wide range of participant experience and expertise on the challenges facing migrants living in NI. Analysis and Themes Page 14 of 36International Journal of Migration, Health and Social Care 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 International Journal of M igration, H ealth and Social C are 10 The data was coded by two researchers independent of one another; this was done manually without the use of specific software. Three major themes and nine sub-themes became clear on examining and coding the focus group data (Table 3). Major theme 1: Issues with the use of GP registration, Census and hate crime data for researching migrant health. When focus group participants were asked questions around the representativeness and accuracy of GP, Census and hate crime registers, a key theme that emerged was “Issues with the use of GP registration, Census and hate crime data for researching migrant health,” under this major theme, four sub-themes became apparent: Sub-theme 1.1: Migrants experience difficulties completing the Census and do not recognise its importance. Some focus group participants indicated that some migrants have issues completing the Census and these included language barriers and issues in accessing an interpreter: “The language barrier ).phone [call for Census completion] is in English and you never know will people do it [access an interpreter]...it’s another step for them [non-English speaking migrants],” PN1 “I think I do have a comment on this. For the past two Census’ they have used interpreters and my problem is that these centres in the community - they don’t help people. As [sic] although the Census did a super job there are some people that did ring for an interpreter and it didn’t happen,” PN 2 Some participants indicated that the importance of the Census, and the need to complete it, is not recognised by some migrants: Page 15 of 36 International Journal of Migration, Health and Social Care 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 International Journal of M igration, H ealth and Social C are 11 “Some people don’t have the status to stay here so they don’t see it as important to fill in the Census,” PN 15 “Sometimes when a person comes here as a migrant worker and in their heart they don’t plan to stay long, but the reality might be different, but when you asking them for their data they will say ‘but I haven’t been here that long’,” PN12 Sub theme 1.2: Migrants’ experienced issues with registering with a GP. It became clear that some groups of migrants encountered difficulties registering with a GP. For EU migrants this centred on being asked to produce paperwork to register with a GP that EU migrants are not required to possess in order to reside in NI: “Mostly Portuguese working in factories in the Dungannon area). Some of them had tried to register for the local practices but for different reasons were not able to. For example for some of them it was because they didn’t have a passport because they travelled on an ID card so that was a problem,” PN4 “Sometimes it’s an awareness issue when they go to reception. Sometimes they are asked for ID or sometimes they would ask for a visa or a document. But for me as a Polish person I don’t have a document with a visa as I don’t need it ).but they could say because you don’t have a document with a visa then you can’t register )so it is really down to lack of awareness )and if someone had an issue with a visa this would put them off registering,” PN 14 Page 16 of 36International Journal of Migration, Health and Social Care 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 International Journal of M igration, H ealth and Social C are 12 There was also an apparent lack of awareness about the local health system in NI, with some migrants unaware they had to register with a GP and others unclear about what to do and where to go when a GP surgery is unable to take on new patients: “At the beginning when they are applying for asylum)even just the knowledge and awareness of how to register with the GP [is lacking], and it really depends on what GPs [sic] and some GPs have no space)who [sic] have too many and can’t take on anyone new,” PN1 “They don’t know where to go, that is a barrier [to GP registration],” PN9 “The other barrier is not realising that they have to do it [GP registration],” PN16 There was also sense that many migrants do not see the importance of registering with a GP and some go elsewhere if they have a health problem: “Yes in India you don’t have your GP only if you were sick would you go to the GP and then you could go to a consultant to see an ENT consultant [or] whatever it is that is wrong with you, so you don’t have to wait for you GP to refer )so if they come healthy they may not see the need to register,” PN12 “I would say that some migrant workers may be late to register with the GP - they are young and healthy they come to work and then there is no urgency there to register and they will just go to pharmacy and get some medicine,” PN15 Page 17 of 36 International Journal of Migration, Health and Social Care 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 International Journal of M igration, H ealth and Social C are 13 Sub theme 1.3 Underrepresentation of some migrant groups in routine administrative registers. There was a sense that some migrants may not appear in registers that collect routine data of the population because they do not have legal access to services: “But some of them [undocumented migrants] don’t want to come out )because if they use health services then you may become known to immigration )and that’s why people may be just washing dishes for hours to keep them in money,” PN1 “It very difficult to pinpoint the undocumented ones but I would say it’s mainly in the fishing and hospitality industries you would find that those are [sic] but generally people don’t speak about that ) but definitely it’s the fishing and hospitality that I feel they are mostly in,” PN4 “There will be a lot of Philippine people who come over to work on the boat and are not able to access any services except A & E,” PN5 1.4 Challenges in reporting hate crime. There was a general consensus that that hate crime was frequently underreported to authorities, for various reasons. Some migrants felt disheartened by the lack of prosecution of perpetrators of hate crime and this was a commonly cited factor in underreporting: “The PSNI [Police Service Northern Ireland] set up a bilingual advocacy service, from which we are part of, you know one of the tasks is to encourage the reporting of hate crime so people are there trying to encourage people to report, but the reporting is one thing, but then if they don’t get prosecuted then, or prosecuted for a lesser offence than the hate crime, or the charges have been dropped, then that discourages people [to report] again,” PN12 “They [a migrant family] have been getting these comments for years but the police said unless there is something written on the wall or the property is damaged there is nothing we Page 18 of 36International Journal of Migration, Health and Social Care 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 International Journal of M igration, H ealth and Social C are 14 can do about it. It’s been to court and Victim Support have been sending them letters to say I am sorry about what is happening to you, and they went and got their own solicitor and everything, and she was absolutely devastated when she was here the other night, it’s just that feeling of complete powerlessness and not knowing what to do and who to turn to, they have been given this advice and exhausted all avenues that they [can] think [of], [then] for the same thing to happen two nights later,” PN 7 Other focus group participants reported that they believed that in NI there was a higher tolerance for verbal abuse and this may play a role in underreporting: “But then again when you look at it in comparison with the indigenous population - from my nursing [experience] those who have got a good kicking or a head injury being in the wrong place, that was already tolerated [before migration increased] and in existence between the two sides [Catholic and Protestant communities] so that wasn’t very healthy to begin [with],” PN5 “I was at a conference 18 months ago and some of their remarks by people from other countries and other ethnic backgrounds is that when they first came here, that in NI we had a very high tolerance for verbal abuse and people slinging insults at one another, and I suppose that’s a legacy of the Troubles [civil conflict in NI] for want of a better word, so there is this polarisation already in society)somehow they have normalised a level of conflict that would be unacceptable in most other societies,”PN3 Other narratives suggested that for some migrants underreporting may be related to fear of drawing attention to themselves, and that initial reporting of racial hate crime tends to be to community leaders as opposed to formal authorities: Page 19 of 36 International Journal of Migration, Health and Social Care 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 International Journal of M igration, H ealth and Social C are 15 “It’s [underreporting] also is related to the fear of drawing attention to themselves,” PN16 “Sometimes they [migrants] may feel more comfortable going to someone in the community that has their language [to report hate crime],” PN12 Major theme 2: Barriers to local health service use. Participants discussed at length migrants’ experiences of the NI health system, and these discussions were focused on areas in need of improvement: Subtheme 2.1: Lack of cultural awareness among health staff. Large differences between GPs in Great Britain and NI in the quality of health staff knowledge about health issues more prominent in migrant communities, particularly Female Genital Mutilation (FGM), were identified: “An example of one of the women who would be more vocal where she was in with the Doctor - and they had to call another Doctor in as they had never seen anything like this [FGM] before whereas in the [rest of the] UK it is completely different [better],” PN7 Some participants identified that the lack of cultural awareness of health staff may be related to limited cultural competence training in NI: “It’s the perception that we don’t have that problem here [FGM] it is a learning curve and [health] Trusts need to have some training on FGM to make staff aware of this issue,” PN1 Page 20 of 36International Journal of Migration, Health and Social Care 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 International Journal of M igration, H ealth and Social C are 16 “They [social workers] don’t know a lot about the issues these people [migrants] face)part of it is about competence, we are not training social workers up on this [cultural awareness],” PN2 Sub theme 2.2. Issues accessing interpreters. For some migrants they may have to wait long periods of time for health service appointments due to difficulties in accessing interpreters in a timely fashion: “But what I am saying is that for some languages it is taking up to a week to get an interpreter in the appropriate language,”PN6 Other interpreter issues identified were non provision of interpreters and the inappropriate use of telephone interpreting: “The issue of accessing interpreting goes in circles. It was good for a while but because of the [government financial] cuts and the drive for savings on cost effectiveness it’s been pulled back again, and now there is more pressure on using telephone interpreting very inappropriately, as there is a time and place for everything,” PN4 “I was with a girl [on the phone] and her friend was at the doctors and was trying to make an appointment and they won’t provide an interpreter)and she is having to give the information on her behalf,” PN7 Major theme 3: Risk factor exposure and mental health status in migrant communities in the NI context. Although not the primary focus of this study, the challenges facing migrants in NI and the impact on their wellbeing clearly emerged as a theme and area of Page 21 of 36 International Journal of Migration, Health and Social Care 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 International Journal of M igration, H ealth and Social C are 17 great concern for participants in the focus groups, particularly in relation to specific differences in the NI context compared to other regions and countries. Sub theme 3.1. Low paid jobs and poor working conditions. It became apparent during focus groups that migrants may be more exposed to risk factors for mental ill-health in NI. Some participants discussed how migrants were subjected to poor working conditions and low paid jobs: “You have more Moypark [food factory] type working sometimes in 24 hour shifts and very extreme working conditions,” PN2 “Also for those working in those jobs [factory work], sickness are part of disciplinary procedures, these people would rather go to work than risk this, they miss a day’s work then it’s a disciplinary,” PN4 “Recent groups that have come in and mostly to very low wage jobs,” PN3 “[The year] 2000 onwards a lot of low paid jobs that migrants are doing)we are now facing huge problem in acute poverty and debt, and add in [it has an impact on] the big issue health and well-being,” PN2 Subtheme 3.2 Isolation and lack of support It became evident that migrants’ across the board may be isolated living in NI, and a few participants identified that support structures for migrants may be an area for development: “I think in relation to those [undocumented migrants] no one has any real support, not from the police and not from society,” PN2 Page 22 of 36International Journal of Migration, Health and Social Care 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 International Journal of M igration, H ealth and Social C are 18 “This is where I would love to see structures put in place)I mean people who are isolated in this country. Even if they look like the local indigenous population there are still issues,” PN5 Sub theme 3.3. Racism/discrimination/negative behaviour towards migrants. There was a strong sense from focus group participants that racism/ discrimination and other negative behaviours towards migrants were ongoing and growing issues in NI: “Add in the big issue health and well-being which takes in [is impacted by] all these issues, mental health being one of the key ones, and the increasing polarisation between the local [majority population] and those minority because of the mentality ‘they take our house, they take our jobs,’ so you have all those racist attack, hate crime, and discrimination,” PN2 “Yeh [sic] there will be children playing with each other until one day the child says I can’t play with you no more because my mummy said you are all bad,” PN12 “My sense is that racism is increasing particularly with all the publicity at the moment about the Syrian refugees needing supported [sic] and countries to take them, there seems to be a huge polarisation of views from people who want to help to others that don’t want this to happen, and some of the remarks people will make quite openly saying quite racist things,” PN3 Discussion This study used a qualitative methodology to explore the barriers and challenges facing migrants in responding to the Census, registering with the health service and reporting hate crimes, in order to inform population research using administrative data registers in NI. A key theme that emerged from the present study is that the use of data from registers for Page 23 of 36 International Journal of Migration, Health and Social Care 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 International Journal of M igration, H ealth and Social C are 19 researching the number, mental health and needs of migrants in NI may be problematic with the potential for missing specific groups of migrants. The use of GP and Census registers for quantifying the size of the migrant population may lead to an underestimation as several issues related to migrants’ ability to register with a GP and to complete the Census were identified. The findings regarding the inability of some migrants to register with a GP in NI concurs with existing research elsewhere. HealthWatch (2015), a UK organisation set up to make sure that the local health systems listens to people’s views and experiences, found that only one out of 36 practices offered an interpreter for non-English speakers when trying to register with a GP, and 19 practices advised patients to come back with a friend or family member who spoke English. The use of family members as interpreters, particularly children, is a concern as it is likely to reduce help seeking for sensitive health issues such as mental health (Kirmayer et al. 2011). The findings regarding EU migrants being refused registration at GP surgeries in NI due to not holding a passport or visa document is alarming. This suggests that there are inconsistencies and lack of knowledge in the GP registration process between GP surgeries. Therefore, to ensure consistency and improve the quality of health- based registers, it may be beneficial for GP surgeries to receive training in the rights of EU and other migrant groups to access primary care services, particularly reception staff that frequently assist patients with registration. Research using this register in its current form must acknowledge these biases and inconsistencies in their interpretation of findings. Migrant numbers in GP records are likely to be underestimated. Consequentially, incidence of mental health disorders is likely to be affected. From the findings of this research, underestimation of mental health difficulties for undocumented migrants (such as rejected asylum seekers) and short-stay migrants (such as seasonal workers or students) are probable, whilst healthy migrants who are unfamiliar with the NI GP registration system may also be underestimated in health records. Register-based research in NI must take this into account, with particular attention to the underrepresentation of undocumented migrants who Page 24 of 36International Journal of Migration, Health and Social Care 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 International Journal of M igration, H ealth and Social C are 20 are likely to have worse mental health given their insecure circumstances and lack of access to support (Gray, 2012). In addition to barriers in registering for health services, this study also highlighted many negative experiences in accessing health care services, which may also reduce the accuracy of GP records, such as the issuing of antidepressant prescriptions, with a knock on effect on research that uses this data to identify individuals suffering from mental ill health. The findings of this study highlighted sub-optimal access to interpreters and lack of cultural competence within the health care workforce. Research strongly supports that culturally competent health staff has many benefits for patients which include increased health care- seeking behaviour and better adherence to medical advice (Lehman, et al. 2012). The lack of cultural awareness of health staff in NI reported by study participants suggests that health professionals may require additional training in cultural awareness. Despite an increased emphasis on cultural competence training for health professionals in recent years, the implementation of this training varies widely across programmes (George et al. 2015). This study suggests that NI has not kept up with population changes with respect to different migrant groups and their needs. Increasing the cultural competency of health staff will likely lead to improvements in migrant’s experience of the health system, which will encourage help seeking, make GP records more reflective or reality and ultimately lead to improved migrant mental health. In terms of the Census as a source of information on migrants in NI, our study suggests there are challenges in completing the Census for these groups. Our findings in relation to language being a barrier to Census completion are supported by research conducted by the US Census Bureau (2012). Over 3% of the NI population do not speak English as their main language and in England and Wales the percentages of residents reporting that English is not their main language is even higher at almost 8% (NISRA, 2011, ONS 2011). Without Page 25 of 36 International Journal of Migration, Health and Social Care 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 International Journal of M igration, H ealth and Social C are 21 having adequate knowledge of the official language of the country a person is residing in, the additional steps required to obtain the Census in the appropriate language may prove difficult and may explain why those migrants not fluent with the official language of a country may not be fully represented in the Census. Similar to our findings, the research by the US Census Bureau (2012) found that migrants may not recognise the importance of completing the Census and some may perceive the Census as being only relevant for the settled majority. Findings in relation to migrants’ difficulties completing the Census suggest that better support systems are needed to ensure that those with limited skills in the main language of the country are helped to complete the Census. It may also be important to ensure that migrants are better informed about the purpose of the Census and the importance of its completion. Implementing these steps may aid improved representativeness of these migrants in future Censuses and improve the quality of future linkage studies using Census registry data. This is important as the current quality of register-based linkage studies using Census will be greatly affected by the likely underrepresentation of several migrant groups. Those most likely to be unrepresented in the Census are those with limited skills in English. This is of particular importance for research on migrant mental health as those with limited host country language skills have been shown to be at additional risk of acculturation stress, which has been linked with poor psychological well-being (Liebkind et al. 2000, Yeh and Inose 2003). Therefore, underrepresentation of non-English speakers in the NI Census could mean that those at higher risk of mental ill-health may not be accounted for within the linkage study, which potentially may lead to inaccurate interpretations when comparing the risk of mental ill-health in the migrant versus the settled majority population. Aside from GP registration and Census completion, this study aimed to explore the reporting or underreporting of hate crime in order to inform register-based research on the effect of hate crime on the mental health of migrants. Global research strongly indicates that hate crime, racism and discrimination impact negatively on migrant mental well-being (Veling et al. 2007, Bécares 2009, Bosqui et al. 2014).Therefore, it is imperative that research into migrant Page 26 of 36International Journal of Migration, Health and Social Care 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 International Journal of M igration, H ealth and Social C are 22 mental health take these into account when conducting migrant mental health research. In many countries residents are encouraged to report experiences of racial hate crime to police authorities, who frequently compile a register of reported racial hate crimes. This is considered important in helping police authorities keep a check on whether racial hate crime is being tackled effectively. However, concerns were raised by focus group participants regarding the use of the hate crime register data in assessing the impact of hate crime on migrant mental health, with many participants drawing attention to the fact that hate crime is often underreported. This is supported by research in England and Wales which suggests that only 40% of hate crime is brought to the attention of police and just 20% is officially recorded (College of Policing, 2014). Our findings in relation to the reasons for underreporting of racial hate crime also concur with previous research conducted in NI and in the EU (European Agency for Fundamental Rights 2012; NICEM 2014). Commonly cited reasons for not reporting a racial hate crime to police were due to failure of a previous report of hate crime/racism leading to prosecution, or specific to the NI context, due to legacy issues related to civil conflict known as “The Troubles.” This was thought to lead higher tolerance to abuse. Tackling racial hate crime and increasing the reporting of racial hate crime are seen as important priorities in many EU counties and steps are continually being taken to eradicate racial hate crime and to make countries more cohesive. However, despite concentrated efforts in recent years in NI to encourage the reporting of racial hate crime e.g.: hate crime telephone line, the present findings strongly suggest that more work is needed. For register-based research using hate crime data, researchers must acknowledge the limitations of these data and that recorded hate crimes are likely to underestimate the reality of hate crimes, racism, prejudice, hostility and discrimination faced by migrants in NI every day. The final theme which emerged from this study indicated that the mental health of migrants and their exposure to risk factors was of particular concern to our participants, and highlights Page 27 of 36 International Journal of Migration, Health and Social Care 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 International Journal of M igration, H ealth and Social C are 23 the importance and need for good quality robust research on the mental health of migrants in NI. Migrants were identified as being more likely to be exposed to risk factors which increased their risk of mental ill-health including low paid jobs and poor working conditions, isolation, lack of social support and experiences of racism. The poor working conditions that many migrants in NI experience was highlighted by several participants who reported on circumstances where migrants worked long hours for low wages and were also unable to take off work to visit the doctor for fear of disciplinary action. These experiences could have a serious impact on migrant mental health. Poor working conditions of migrants in the UK have been shown to be associated with depressed mood and hopelessness (Wu et al. 2010). Low paid jobs that many migrants enter into when they arrive in NI may mean they are more likely to be living in poverty and more likely to experience debt, all of which are associated with mental ill health (Jenkins et al., 2008). The findings regarding migrants being isolated and lacking social support is also concerning, as are the findings on racism being an ever present and growing issue. These findings suggest that the current systems in place to make NI a more cohesive society after the Good Friday Peace Agreement in 1998 are failing and further efforts may be needed to improve migrant integration with the settled NI population. The need for robust research on the mental health of migrants in this context is clear. To conclude, findings from this study suggest that research drawing on data from routine registers such as Census and GP registration to research migrants and their respective mental health needs may underestimate the size of the migrant population, the incidence of mental disorders compared to the settled majority, and migrants’ need for mental health services. Our findings suggest those migrants which appear most likely to be unrepresented in these registers are non-English speaking migrants, recently arrived migrants with limited knowledge of the health system and undocumented migrants. The under-representation of these particular groups of migrants is concerning as these migrants are likely to be the most adversely affected by traumatic migration routes and acculturation stress. It is therefore important that the possible underrepresentation of the mental health needs of these Page 28 of 36International Journal of Migration, Health and Social Care 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 International Journal of M igration, H ealth and Social C are 24 populations is considered carefully when interpreting the findings of register-based studies in NI. Finally, the findings from the study also identified a need for further research on migrant mental health, highlighting higher exposure to risk factors for mental ill-health. Limitations The primary limitation of this study is the fact that the findings are only directly applicable to the NI population. However, they may prove helpful for guiding researchers proposing similar linkage studies in other countries. Furthermore the study is limited by the fact that the focus groups did not continue to the point of data saturation, and focused only on professional’s views. Due to time and resource constraints it was not possible to organise groups with migrant groups themselves, with a particular need to speak to undocumented, short-term and non-English speaking migrants. Future register-based research would benefit from these insights. References Bécares, L., Nazroo, J. and Stafford, M. (2009), “The buffering effects of ethnic density on experienced racism and health”, Health Place, Vol. 15, pp. 700–708. Borque, F., Van der Ven, E. and Malla, A. 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(2012), “Diversity & Cultural Competency in Health Care Settings”, available at; http://www.matherlifewaysinstituteonaging.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/diversity- and-cultural-competency-in-health-care-settings.pdf (accessed 16 April 2016) Liebkind, K., and Jasinkaja-Lahti, I .(2000), “Acculturation and Psychological Well-Being among Immigrant Adolescents in Finland.A Comparative Study of Adolescents From Different Cultural Backgrounds”, Journal of Adolescent Research, Vol 15, No. 4, pp. 446-469. Page 31 of 36 International Journal of Migration, Health and Social Care 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 International Journal of M igration, H ealth and Social C are 27 Lindert, J., Ehrenstein, O.S., Priebe, S., Mielck, A. and Brahler, E. 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(2012), “Census 2011: Key statistics for Northern Ireland”, http://www.nisra.gov.uk/Census/key_report_2011.pdf (accessed 23 March 2016) Norredam, M., Agyemang, C., Hoejbjerg Hansen, O.K., Petersen, J. H., Byberg, S., Krasnik A. and Kunst, A. E. (2014), “Duration of residence and disease occurrence among refugees and family reunited immigrants: test of the ‘healthy migrant effect’ hypothesis”, Tropical Medicine & International Health, Vol. 19, pp. 958–967. Ozbay, F., Johnson, D.C., Dimoulas, E., Morgan, C.A., Charney, D.and Southwick, S. (2007), “Social Support and Resilience to Stress: From Neurobiology to Clinical Practice”, Psychiatry (Edgmont), Vol. 4, No.5, 35–40. 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Craig (2007), “Consolidated criteria for reporting qualitative research (COREQ): a 32-item checklist for interviews and focus groups”, International Journal for Quality in Health Care, Vol. 19, No. 6, 349 – 357. US Census Bureau. (2012). Observing Census Enumeration of Non-English Speaking Households in the 2010 Census: Evaluation Report, available at: http://www.census.gov/2010census/pdf/2010_Census_Enumeration_Non- English_Speaking_Households.pdf (accessed 23 May 2016). Page 33 of 36 International Journal of Migration, Health and Social Care 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 International Journal of M igration, H ealth and Social C are 29 Sandelowski, M. (2000), “Focus on Research Methods: What ever happened to Qualitative Description?”, Research in Nursing & Health, Vol. 23, pp.334-340. Veling, W., Selten, J.P., Susser, E., Laan, W., Mackenbach, J. P. and Hoek, H.W. (2007), “Discrimination and the incidence of psychotic disorders among ethnic minorities in The Netherlands”, International Journal of Epidemiology, Vol 36, No. 4, pp.761-8. Wu, B., Sheehan, J. and Guo, L. (2010), “ Economic Recession, Employment and working conditions of Chinese migrant workers in the UK”, available at: The University of Nottingham, China Policy Institute. https://www.nottingham.ac.uk/cpi/documents/briefings/briefing-62-ilo-migrant- workers.pdf (accessed 23 May 2016) Yeh, C. J., Inose, M. ( 2003), “International students' reported English fluency, social support satisfaction, and social connectedness as predictors of acculturative stress”. Counselling Psychology Quarterly, Vol. 16, No. 1, 15-28. Page 34 of 36International Journal of Migration, Health and Social Care 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 International Journal of M igration, H ealth and Social C are 30 Appendix 1: Topic schedule 1. Tell me about the diversity of migration experiences in Northern Ireland which you are aware off 2. Tell me about your knowledge of the scale of undocumented or irregular migration to Northern Ireland 3. Describe to me what you know about migrant’s general knowledge, experience and perceptions of the Census- prompt- Are there any groups of migrants that may not be complete the Census? 4. Describe to me what you know about migrant’s general knowledge, experience and perceptions of registering with a GP practice- Prompt- Tell me about any groups of migrants that may not be registered with a GP? 4. Tell me about migrants’ experiences of the health and social care system-Prompt-Tell me any areas of the Health and Social Care system that may require improvement in order to enhance migrants’ experiences of Health and Social Care? 5. Tell me what you know about the scale of unreported experience and exposure to racism and discrimination- Prompt-Tell me your views on whether incidences of racism and discrimination are increasing or decreasing? 6. Tell me what you know about migrant’s experience and perceptions of reporting racism and racist hate crimes-Prompt-Tell me about your views on whether racial hate crime is being reported accurately? Page 35 of 36 International Journal of Migration, Health and Social Care 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 International Journal of M igration, H ealth and Social C are 31 Page 36 of 36International Journal of Migration, Health and Social Care 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 
work_ikeh4y6ihzbxrk3chabo4osjay	----	10.11648.j.hss.20200801.12 Humanities and Social Sciences 2020; 8(1): 7-19 http://www.sciencepublishinggroup.com/j/hss doi: 10.11648/j.hss.20200801.12 ISSN: 2330-8176 (Print); ISSN: 2330-8184 (Online) Unravelling Relations Between Immigration, Crime and Superdiversity in the United States of America, Europe, Australia and New Zealand Carl Hermann Dino Steinmetz Expats & Immigrants Besloten Vennootschap, Amsterdam, The Netherlands Email address: To cite this article: Carl Hermann Dino Steinmetz. Unravelling Relations Between Immigration, Crime and Superdiversity in the United States of America, Europe, Australia and New Zealand. Humanities and Social Sciences. Vol. 8, No. 1, 2020, pp. 7-19. doi: 10.11648/j.hss.20200801.12 Received: December 19, 2019; Accepted: January 6, 2020; Published: February 4, 2020 Abstract: A substantial number of western cities and its neighbourhoods, in Europe, the United States of America, Australia and New Zealand became super diverse, majority-minority cities and in most of these cities the “true” citizen is an immigrant (old- and newcomer) who lives in these cities for four generations. This change in western cities with a long mostly unknown tradition of immigration [1, 2] to majority-minority cities may have an impact on the development of crime. Scheffer claimed that newcomers unfamiliar with the habits, norms and values of their new fatherland first do become victims of crime, and then become more susceptible to witness perpetrators committing crime [3]. Both victimization and witness experiences can lower the threshold for committing a crime. This cycle is documented for bicycle theft [4]. The assumption is that immigrants, refugees and expats are vulnerable as newcomers in western countries. On top of these newcomers’ experiences with crime, the first up to fourth generation is excluded, discriminated and polarized in education, healthcare, workplace and neighbourhoods [5]. Possible causes are clashes between individualism and collectivism, racism and exclusion, a difference between mother and fatherland cultures concerning requirements, norms and values, polarization between WE (Our Kind of People) and THEM (Other Kind of People) and for African immigrants and refugees a community law system versus a criminal justice system [6]. The consequences of the above-mentioned system errors for the way in which immigrants, refugees and expats experience crime are documented in Dutch books and dissertations, like ‘Moroccan in Europe, Criminal in the Netherlands’ [7] more family violence [8] among Dutch-Moroccans then original Dutch and more short-term psychosis among people of colour [9]. This article suggests that victimology as a science has failed to reflect the contemporary transitions of cities and neighbourhoods where immigrants, refugees and expats together became a clear majority in super diverse cities and neighbourhoods [10]. Secondly this article presents international data about the suggestion that immigration causes more crime, with the champion of this message Donald Trump. In the United States of America and Europe there is no proof for an increase of crime as a consequence of newcomers. The opposite might even be true. Newcomers and immigrants however are more often victims of crime than original indigenous people [11, 12]. Keywords: Super Diverse Cities and Neighbourhoods, Crime, Immigrants, and Refugees 1. Introduction This article first of all outlines indirectly the consequences of super diversity, in particular to the regular influx of small groups of immigrants, refugees and expats, on crime. Indirectly, there is no data available on the effect of a regular and continuous increase in immigrants, refugees and expats in metropoles, cities and neighbourhoods on the nature and extent of crime. This article secondly pays mainly attention to the cycle of victimization, becoming a bystander and sometimes an offender. Crime has its roots in learning processes that are part of human relationships. Superdiversity might also take a prominent place in near future in the existing old and new metropoles, cities and neighbourhoods of these metropoles and cities along the New Silk Roads between China, Russia, Southeast- and Central Asia, Turkey, the Middle East, Europe and both America’s [2]. 8 Carl Hermann Dino Steinmetz: Unravelling Relations Between Immigration, Crime and Superdiversity in the United States of America, Europe, Australia and New Zealand Figure 1. The new Silk Roads. Because many crime data do not make a structural distinction between indigenous and originally non- indigenous residents of a country, metropolis / city and neighbourhood as perpetrator, victim and / or witness, visualizing crime trends is provisional. Several hypotheses have been formulated for the relation between crime, superdiversity and immigration. Donald Trump for instance tweets, that immigrants from South- America are criminals. Literally Trump said: “when Mexico is sending its people, they are not sending the best. They are sending people that have lots of problems, and they are bringing those problems with us. They are bringing drugs, they are bringing crime, and they are rapists” [2, p. 47]. Trump’s view evokes the suggestion that the relationship between crime and immigration is positive. Other hypotheses are that crime rates drop after immigration or remains at the same level. These hypotheses are further investigated in this article. This is done on the basis of a literature study on the United States, Europe, Australia and New Zealand, in particular on the basis of police data, victim surveys and data on detainees. Bell [16] said, “There is no simple link between immigration and crime. Most studies find that larger immigrant concentrations in an area have no association with violent crime and, overall, fairly weak effects on property crime. However, immigrant groups that face poor labour market opportunities are more likely to commit property crime. But this is also true of disadvantaged native groups. The policy focus should therefore be on the crime-reducing benefits of improving the functioning of labour markets and workers’ skills, rather than on crime and immigration per se. There is also a case for ensuring that immigrants can legally obtain work in the receiving country, since the evidence shows that such legalization programs tend to reduce criminal activity among the targeted group. the evidence, based on empirical studies of many countries, indicates that there is no simple link between immigration and crime, but legalizing the status of immigrants has beneficial effects on crime rates.” Caution with available criminal justice data is required. Accumulated research indicates that police and criminal records (suspect rates, crime rates, conviction rates and prison populations) are biased against immigrants (including short-term and undocumented immigrants) and refugees: i. “Immigrants and their native-born children are generally found to be overrepresented among crime suspects and convicted offenders in Europe. We reasoned that official crime figures are likely to be biased against newcomers and their children, and that such biases may explain part of the transatlantic differences in the relationship between immigration and crime, as indicated by official data [13, pp. 1 & 17].” ii. “Immigrants from certain parts of the world are more likely to be incarcerated than others. Of all legal immigrants, those from Latin America, Other Asia (not Indian and East-Asia), and Africa have the three highest incarceration rates. For illegal immigrants, those from Latin America have the highest incarceration rate of any group—in part because they are more likely to be incarcerated for immigration offenses and in ICE detention facilities than immigrants from any other region—followed by those from Africa [14, p. 4].” “The younger the immigrants are upon arrival in the United States and the longer they are here, the more Humanities and Social Sciences 2020; 8(1): 7-19 9 likely they are to be incarcerated as adults. Possible discrimination by the judicial system may result in higher number of convictions [14, p. 7].” iii. Suspects and immigrants. “The prejudice that many native Dutch citizens have against immigrants could cause the police to more closely monitor ethnic groups, especially Moroccans. The most common stereotype attributed to Moroccans by native Dutch citizens is that they are violent and engage in crime: in other words, they are the criminal other. Consequently, research is needed to assess whether native Dutch citizens are more likely to perceive behaviour as ‘suspicious’ if they associate the behaviour with Moroccans rather than native Dutch citizens. Additionally, scholars need to investigate whether the native Dutch are more likely to report what they perceive to be ‘suspicious’ behaviour to the police if they attribute the behaviour to immigrants rather than to native Dutch citizens [15, p. 15].” 2. Population Changes European Countries, Metropolises, Large Cities and Its Neighbourhoods 23% of the Dutch population in the Netherlands was in 2018 of non-Dutch origin [17]. The largest cities in the Netherlands are super diverse. Superdiversity is a concept invented in 2007 by Steven Vertovic that describes the changing immigration patterns and their impact on (British) society. Vertovic defines superdiversity as follow [18, p. 3]: “Superdiversity points out that the new immigration patterns not only entail variable combinations and dynamic interactions of the following traits, such as differential legal statuses and their concomitant conditions, divergent labour market experiences, discrete configurations of gender and age, patterns of spatial distribution, and mixed local area responses by service providers and residents, but that their combinations produced new hierarchical social positions, statuses or stratifications. These, in turn, entail: new patterns of inequality and prejudice including emergent forms of racism, new patterns of segregation, new experiences of space and “contact”, new forms of cosmopolitanism and creolization (including what’s more recently discussed in terms of conviviality and multiculture), and more.” Since 2007 superdiversity is being used more and more, Crul developed this concept for the European mainland [10]. With this new paradigm, the focus is on two crucial changes. The starting point is a quantitative transition, with the sharp increase in the number of people with an immigrant background in recent decades. A qualitative transition also plays a role: superdiversity of the 21st century differs from the immigration of the 20th century through a fundamental change in immigration patterns and its impact on society. Diversification of diversity is the new reality. “One of the great benefits of a superdiversity lens is that it has the virtue of bringing new perspectives to familiar issues and advancing our understanding of social processes by reconstituting our perceptual field and identifying connections not previously seen or emphasized. However, the superdiversity lens often overlooks power differentials at a level beyond the neighbourhood. Or to phrase it somewhat differently, the superdiversity lens has so far been less able to capture the vertical phenomena that reflect the social, economic, and political power of the native majority. This may be partly because this would require a lens operating on a macro scale, rather than a micro one [19, pp. 3 and 12].” Table 1. Countries and cities, total population, year and percentage of immigrants. Country/city Total population Year % immigrants EU-28 512.400.000 2018 12 Netherlands 17.412.00 12 December 2019 23 Amsterdam 862.965 2019 54,4 The Haque 537.833 2019 54,7 Rotterdam 644.618 2019 51 Utrecht 352.866 2019 35 Belgium 11.561.953 2019 25 Antwerp 526.000 2019 39 Brussels 2.065.284 2019 70 Germany 82.790.000 2018 14,8 Berlin 3.556.792 2019 20 Munich 1.542.860 2017 28,3 United Kingdom 66.440.000 2018 14 London 8.900.000 2018 2011: 36,7 France 66.990.000 2019 12,2 Paris 2.141.000 2019 60 Spain 46.660.000 2018 12,8 Madrid 6.550.000 2018 16 Barcelona 5.515.000 2018 49 Italy 60.480.000 2018 10 Rome 4.234.000 2018 12,8 Milan 3.132.000 2018 14,5 10 Carl Hermann Dino Steinmetz: Unravelling Relations Between Immigration, Crime and Superdiversity in the United States of America, Europe, Australia and New Zealand The average number of immigrants in the EU-28 is 12% (in 2018 the number of immigrants are 38.2 million non-EU citizens and 21.8 million inhabitants were born in a different EU member state [20, p. 11]. This percentage of immigrants is larger for large cities. In 2019 54,4% 1 of the Amsterdam population, the capital of the Netherlands with almost 860 thousand inhabitants in 2018, is originally from another country than the Netherlands. Under 15 years two thirds of children and youngsters in Amsterdam do have an origin other than Dutch. In Rotterdam and The Hague, just over half of the population comes from abroad. Furthermore, in the Randstad with around 8.2 million people in 2016, the number of residents original from other countries then the Netherlands is in between 40% and 47% 2 . In Utrecht, more than one third of the population is of foreign descent. Are big cities in the Netherlands an exception with regard to a superdiverse composition of the population? What about other European cities? In Belgium the number of original foreign born Belgians is 25% 3 , mainly French, Italian and Dutch people and a smaller number non-western. In Antwerp 4 , a city of half a million inhabitants in 2017, 75% of residents between 0-9 years of age are of non-Belgian origin. In 2020 55% of the Antwerp inhabitants will be of non- Belgium origin (with a large population of Turks, Romanians and Bulgarians). In Brussels 5 , the EU capital city, with a population in 2016 of more than 2 million people, 30% was foreign born and 25% Muslims. Eurostat estimated the foreign-born population in France to be 8.18 million 6 (12.2% of the French population). 3.2% was born in another EU country. In Paris, a city of 2, 2 million people and the Paris Region of 12.7 million in 2019 7 , the estimated number of people of non-French descent of the first generation is 20% for Paris and 40% of the children in Paris have at least one parent as a first-generation immigrant. In France, it is forbidden by law to ask in population screenings about religion and ethnicity. The aforementioned estimates of immigrants, refugees and expats are probably based on the place of birth, which is an indirect indication of the extended families origin of (grand) children of immigrants, refugees and former expats. In Barcelona, a city of around 1.7 million people in 2016, the number of immigrants in 2013 8 is nearly 49%. In Madrid, the capital of Spain with approximately 3.3 million 9 inhabitants, estimations in 2019 show that 16% van the total population is of foreign descent (mainly South- 1 http://www.republiekallochtonie.nl/blog/feiten/samenstelling-van-de- amsterdamse-bevolking 2 https://www.pbl.nl/sites/default/files/cms/afbeeldingen/015i_rpg13.pdf) 3 https://www.statista.com/statistics/517235/foreign-population-of-belgium-by- origin/; https://www.indexmundi.com/belgium/demographics_profile.html 4 https://sceptr.net/2018/03/antwerpen-bijna-75-inwoners-0-9-jaar-allochtone- origine/ 5 http://worldpopulationreview.com/world-cities/brussels-population/ 6 https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/images/c/c6/Foreign- born_population_by_country_of_birth%2C_1_January_2018_.png 7 http://worldpopulationreview.com/world-cities/paris-population/ 8 https://homagetobcn.com/barcelona-immigration-statistics/ 9 http://worldpopulationreview.com/world-cities/madrid-population/ Americans, East-Europeans, and Moroccans etc.). “Immigrants are largely concentrated in specific districts of Madrid, including Usera (28.4%), Centro (27%), Carabanchel (23%), and Tetuan 22%).” In Rome, Italia’s capital city of approximately 2.9 million 10 inhabitants in 2016 and 4.3 percent in the metropolitan area, 9,5% is non-Italian mainly East-European (Romanian, Ukrainian, Polish and Albanian). In Germany the number of foreign born Germans in 2018 (population in 2019 is 83.6 million) is 13.7% 11 of which 9.2% was born outside the EU. Specifically, Germany will have 20.8 million immigrants (25%) in 2019. Berlin, German’s capital city had in 2016 3, 5 million inhabitants 12 and in “the Berlin-Brandenburg Metropolitan Region with a population of 5.8 million the populations comes from more than 180 countries.” In 2016 Stockholm Sweden’s capital city had a population of 935.000 and now 1,6 million, 27% of the Stockholm inhabitants were in 2016 of a non-Swedish origin. London, the capital city of the United Kingdom, is one of the most ethnically diverse cities in the world. A 2000 survey of school children in London reported that over 300 languages were spoken at home. “At the 2011 census 13 , London had a population of 8,173,941. Of this number of people, 44.9% were white British, 37% of the population were born outside the UK, including 24.5% born outside Europe.” A preliminary conclusion based on the aforementioned data is that superdiversity is an existing phenomenon or a phenomenon that might soon arise in more western cities. 2.1. The Social Consequences of Superdiversity The focus of the aforementioned data has been on ethnic differences in the superdiverse ‘New World in Western metropoles, cities and neighbourhoods’. Other immigrant (old- and newcomers) characteristics of superdiverse metropoles, cities and neighbourhoods are socio-legal, political status, socio-cultural (like language and religion), economic status, and opportunities for earning a livelihood (taking into consideration socio-economic inequality), gender and the interaction between two or more of these characteristics [21]. Another characteristic of superdiverse metropoles, cities and neighbourhoods is the relation between immigration (new- and oldcomers) and crime, in particular for those cities with immigrants, refugees and expats who developed from a minority to joint majority. Superdiversity is considered as a complex concept since immigration changed in the last two decades: not anymore large groups of immigrants are moving to a new fatherland but small pockets of immigrants from a multitude of countries. The concept superdiversity contains at least 10 dimensions. These dimensions are mobility diversity, legal status diversity, educational diversity, income diversity, 10 http://worldpopulationreview.com/world-cities/rome-population/ 11 https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/images/c/c6/Foreign- born_population_by_country_of_birth%2C_1_January_2018_.png 12 http://worldpopulationreview.com/world-cities/berlin-population/ 13 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ethnic_groups_in_London Humanities and Social Sciences 2020; 8(1): 7-19 11 generational diversity and ethnic diversity according to Steven Vertovic, Daniel Hiebert, Alan Gamlen, and Paul Spoonley in their presentation ‘Superdiversity [22]. Their statement about Australia, Canada and New Zealand, in particular Sidney, Vancouver and Auckland and its neighbourhoods is that today's migration has made cities more diverse than ever—in multiple ways’. They differentiate between the national, metropolitan and neighbourhood level. They introduced in 2018 a multivariate geographical mapping tool containing many of the aforementioned characteristics of immigrants and original indigenous people but also motives to immigrate, like humanitarian, family, economic and other [22]. 2.2. Comments This article on the relationship between immigration, refugees and crime unfortunately only focuses on retaliatory justice and not on restorative justice, particularly unfortunate for immigrants, refugees and expats from non-Western countries and continents who are used to restorative justice. The Tutu’s [23] said that the eye-for-an-eye treatment is the basis of restorative justice. In western counties, the responsibility for restorative justice has been transferred to state and justice system. When the law is broken, it is a crime against the State. Crime in Western countries is seen as an individual act with consequences for the individual criminal, victim and bystander. Restorative justice, however, uses as a starting point that crime is not an act against the state but against one or more human beings and against the community to which these humans belong. Accountability in this model is that the offender takes responsibility for the harm she, he or they caused and for taking actions to repair the hurt. Victims are not peripheral in the restorative justice system.” 3. Immigration and Crime in the United States of America When drawing conclusions our eyes should be wide open because of the danger associated with generalization. It is my firm conviction that customization is necessary. An educational example from the United States of America is: “athletic extracurricular activity involvement is an insulating factor for White Americans but a potential risk factor for Latino Americans and Asian Americans. After all, youth who misbehave have an increased exposure to violence and victimization [24].” “It is since colonial days in the United States of America a common believe that immigrants are members of a criminal class who threaten community cohesion by committing a disproportionately large number of violent and property crimes. Violent crimes include homicide, rape, robbery, and assault. Property crimes include theft and fraud. Some offenses are crimes of habitation that involve threats against a person and their property (for example, burglary). American citizens believe that immigrants are a threat to their safety and engage in many violent and property crimes [11, pp. 1- 2].” According to Bernat [11, p. 2] immigrants in the US used to be Europeans (60% in 1960 to 11% in 2015) and new immigrants (newcomers) in the US are coming from Asia, South-America, Afrika and the Middle-East (35% of the foreign born). The Migration Policy Institute (2015) estimates that “Immigrants and their U.S.-born children now number approximately 80 million persons, or one-quarter of the total U.S. population [11, p. 2).” Immigrants are more likely to be victims of crime (violence, hate crime, state-crime and property crime) [25, 26, 8]. Crime victims born abroad may not report their victimization because they fear that they will experience negative consequences if they contact the police. Recently, concerns about immigration and victimization have been targeted at refugees who are at risk of being harmed by human traffickers, who warehouse them, threaten them, and physically abuse them with impunity [11, p. 1). Along the United States–Mexico border, thousands of immigrants from Central and South America are kidnapped, extorted, and physically abused by Mexican gangs who benefit from their exploitation [11, p. 18). Fussell found, for example, that the threat of deportation may result in illegal immigrant workers in the United States refraining from reporting their victimization and abuse in the workplace, and that such victimization is therefore not justified in official crime statistics [11, p. 6]." The sentencing of Afro-Americans and Latino’s in the United States is disproportionate. While the disproportionate sentencing of African-Americans has been documented for many years, Mauer and King [27] note that there has been recently a disproportionate increase in the number of Hispanic persons sentenced in state and federal prisons [27, pp. 4-7]. They found that, in 2005, Hispanics comprised 20% of the U.S. prison population, an increase of 45% since 1990. Table 2. Racial and Ethnic Rates of Incarceration in the US [27, p. 4). Racial/ Ethnic group Rate per 100.000 White 412 Black 2.290 Hispanic 742 Blaming immigrants, refugees and possible also expats for increasing crime rates in the United States of America, is the result of either racial bias or social disorganisation [11]. The Social Disorganisation theory was developed by the Chicago school and is in essence a theory that links crime to unfavourable neighbourhood conditions, like lower social class residents, unemployment, school dropouts, poverty, racial conflicts, unhealthy eating habits, addition to alcohol and drugs, absence of proper culturally differentiated healthcare etc. [28, pp. 122-123] According to the ‘Social Disorganisation theory’ residents in these neighbourhoods might come into contact with illegal activities, solicited and unsolicited. The social disorganisation theory might be the result of scientific racial bias. Racial bias that is often measured using the Implicit Association Test is a type of implicit bias that refers to the attitudes or stereotypes that 12 Carl Hermann Dino Steinmetz: Unravelling Relations Between Immigration, Crime and Superdiversity in the United States of America, Europe, Australia and New Zealand result from individual or collective misunderstanding, actions and decisions that occur unconsciously [29]. This bias, which encompass unfavourable assessments, are often activated involuntarily and without the awareness or intentional control of the individual or collective. This bias is deep in the subconscious mind and differs from known prejudices of individuals or collectivists who, through this bias, can choose to hide in the guise of social and / or political correctness. Police officers for instance, come from all walks of life and they too have implicit bias, regardless of their ethnicity. Racial bias in criminal news is another manifestation of this bias. Illegal immigration which is classified as a criminal offence can be seen as a racial preference, taking into consideration the long legal bureaucratic procedures to get asylum. A very striking quote about racial bias and microaggression is: “To be black in the United States today means to be socially minimized. For each day blacks are victims of white ‘offensive mechanisms’ which are designed to reduce, dilute, atomize, and encase the hapless into his ‘place.’ The incessant lesson the black must hear is that she/he is insignificant and irrelevant [30, p. 3]” Barnet differentiates between gateway and traditional cities. Gateway cities are cities with a relative large number of newcomers [11, p. 7]. Crime in immigrant neighbourhoods in gateway cities is not increasing or decreasing because newcomers are less willing to report a crime to the police. Vélez and Lyons said according to Barnet that social support infusion protects immigrants in gateway cities against crimes [11, p. 7, see [31]]. Barnet finally concludes that “researchers in the United States have pointed out that the urban crime problem is not generated by immigrants, legal or undocumented, and that immigrants do not raise crime rates. Socially disadvantaged neighbourhoods may, however, make immigrant groups more susceptible to crime victimization when social support networks do not exist or are lacking. Despite the research findings on crime and immigration, the U.S. public mistakenly believes foreign-born immigrants to be dangerous criminals. To respond to undocumented immigration and the public fear of crime, anti-immigration laws enacted in the early 21st century attempt to hasten the deportation processes for undocumented immigrants. Such laws have increased the workload in the U.S. courts and consequently deportation is likely when the undocumented immigrant has committed a serious violent crime or agrees to removal. Immigration laws and policies should take into account the unintended consequences of crime victimization on undocumented immigrants and global conditions that cause mass immigrations of people across dangerous borders” [11, p. 19]. What does this conclusion of Barnett means for the relationship between superdiversity and crime? The hypothesis is that this relation is negative, in other words, The hypothesis is that this relationship is negative, in other words, the more diverse the population is in terms of composition, the less crime. That might in particular be true for gateway cities. After all, immigration is a buffer against crime for at least the first generation newcomers [11, p. 8]. 4. Immigration and Crime in Europe Is Barnet’s [11] conclusion applicable to Europe, is the next question that has to be answered. In the United Kingdom with the largest number of immigrants (Europeans, Africans and Asians) a drop was noticed in crime rates (official registered crime) compared to the areas with the second largest number of immigrants [25]. Secondly, there are relatively low crime rates in areas with a large proportion of immigrants [25, pp. 14-15). Nunziata shows that an increase of immigrants since 2000 in European countries 14 has not led to more crime victimization. However, it leads to more fear of crime, which is consistent on the relation between immigration and crime in the United States of America. The results of Nunziata are consistent with the results found in the United States of America, namely a positive correlation between negative attitudes about immigrants and fear of crime [12, pp. 24-25]. Economic cost-benefit theory is according to Nunziata debatable. Economic cost-benefit theory is not favourable for immigrants since this theory (racial biased?) claims that immigrants and refugees may enter in illegal activities (read more crime) because opportunities for the first up to the fourth generation to go to school, get a job and lead a peacefully life in a neighbourhood are limited [12, p. 2]. This economic cost-benefit theory suggests that immigrants and refugees estimate their opportunities to participate in society higher and costs to commit crime lower than indigenous people when they might consider engaging in crime. Furthermore, this economic cost-benefit theory holds immigrants and refugees responsible for the drop in wages and an increase of illegal employment opportunities committing illegal activities. These accusations of cost- benefit economists are deepened by placing the following comment: “Immigrants are younger than the indigenous population with the consequences that they may enter in more criminal activities than the indigenous people [12, p. 4].” Nunziata uses on behalf of economists (not cost-benefit oriented) a counterargument, namely that immigrants and refugees when engaging crime, might not be able to find good legal defence and must face severe consequences like deportation to their motherland when convicted. One of the conclusions arising from the investigation of Nunziata is that economic cost-benefit theories are not able to predict whether immigrants and refugees commit more crime, and whether they are more often victimized by crime and/ or being a bystander of crime then indigenous people. The final conclusion of Nunziata is: “Our empirical findings call for a better public assessment of the immigration phenomenon in western Europe, in particular 14 “The baseline sample consists of individuals residing in the period 2002-2008 in 16 western European countries, i.e. Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden and the UK, and 127 regions [32, p 47].” Humanities and Social Sciences 2020; 8(1): 7-19 13 with regard to the implications for crime and for a more transparent approach to the discussion about the costs and benefits of immigration in host countries” [12, p. 28]. When studying crime and immigration it is also important to take prison population into consideration. The average proportion of foreign nationals’ prisoners in Western European prison systems is currently 26 percent [32]. According to Eurostat 22.3 million people (4.4%) of the 512.4 million people living in the EU on 1 January 2018 were non-EU citizens 15 . Apparently there is an overrepresentation (5.9 times more) of immigrants in European prisons. 5. Victimized Immigrant Students and Hate Crimes First of all, in this section attention is paid to international students who might be labelled as Australian expats, and secondly hate crime in the EU in order to study the relation between crime on the one hand and immigrants and expats on the other. International students are rarely considered when it comes to insecurity [33]. In 2016 the number of international students worldwide add up to 4,9 16 million. International Indian students in Melbourne (capital of the state Victoria in Australia) are overrepresented as victims of crime (among which violence and hate-crime) [33]. An explanation is that these international students lack support of their extended families. Australia had in 2017, 554,179 international students. “At the 2011 census, nearly 35 percent of Melbourne’s population was born outside Australia, 45 percent reported both parents were born overseas and nearly one-third of the population spoke a language other than English at home” [33, p. 613). The International students and Indian students live in social disorganised neighbourhoods, mostly western ones in Melbourne with the cheapest thinkable housing in Australia. The conclusion of this study is: “For our participants, the neighbourhood contexts where international students resided rendered them vulnerable to racially motivated and/or opportunistic street crimes committed by delinquent young males from a variety of backgrounds. Although the relationship between racial crimes and crimes of opportunity was difficult to unpack, we argue that the attacks against students were targeted and non-random. Being an Indian student in a disadvantaged community context signalled vulnerability, which in turn led to victimisation. On some occasions, this vulnerability stemmed from the student’s lack of family support and low levels of informal social control in the neighbourhood. For others, their ethnicity provided the motivation for other young men in the neighbourhood to attack them [33, p. 623].” 5.1. Hate Crimes In 14 European countries hate crimes were studied against 15 https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics- explained/index.php/Migration_and_migrant_population_statistics 16 https://migrationdataportal.org/themes/international-students mainly immigrants via two surveys 2004-2005 and 2010 [26]. The risk to become a victim of hate crime is caused by a young age, by being an immigrant and to lesser extent by (large) cities [26, p. 13]. The question in the International Crime Victims Survey of hate-crime is [26, p. 4]: “In the past 5 years, did you, or any member of your immediate family fall victim of a crime because, or partly because of your nationality, race or colour, religious belief or sexual orientation?” The operationalization of the question of being an immigrant is operationalized as follows [26]: “Do you consider yourself or anyone in your family an immigrant in [country of residence]?” The results are [26, p. 10]: “On average, 2.8% of the West European population said they were victim of a hate crime in the course of 2004. Among the 15 ‘old’ member states of the EU, there is considerable variation in the extent of hate crime. The highest percentages are found in France, Denmark, Luxembourg, Belgium, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands (above 4%). Rates of hate crime below 2% are found in Finland, Italy, Portugal, Greece, and Austria [34]. On average 10% of the immigrant population have been victims of hate crime in 2004, compared to 2% of non- immigrants.” These hate-crime results collected in a classical victimological tradition (opportunity theory) corresponds to EU research that shows that the Netherlands discriminates an excludes Muslims. The Netherlands is in the top two in the EU after Greece [35]. 5.2. Theoretical Explanations for Hate-crimes Van Kesteren [26] suggests that hate-crime might be explained by the opportunity theory [36]. Van Kesteren is not explicit about how to operationalize the opportunity predictive factors of hate-crime, namely attractiveness, proximity and exposure. Exposure might be the number of contact between immigrants, refugees and indigenous people in a defined region or city and proximity for instance the number of immigrants and refugees (but also expats) in one’s own neighbourhood, community, apartments complex or street. Attractiveness is not easy to operationalize when it comes to hate-crimes. A possible operationalization (to be jealous) is the number of immigrants and refugees in neighbourhoods who are favoured or not when receiving a house, job and other benefits such as unemployment benefits [37]. Other theoretical frames suggested by Van Kesteren [26, p. 8] are the so called scapegoat theory, economic threat or resource competition hypothesis and sheer hatred or otherness. The last one, sheer hatred of otherness, has also been labelled as cultural ‘THEY-US’ characteristics. In the United Kingdom the economic threat theory has been elaborated by Wessendorf in her study about equal versus unequal distribution of houses for immigrants, refugees and indigenous people with a high priority on the housing list [37]. Another hypothesis for the existence of hate-crime can be deducted from the results of the Implicit Association Test. The results of a meta-analysis of the Implicit Association 14 Carl Hermann Dino Steinmetz: Unravelling Relations Between Immigration, Crime and Superdiversity in the United States of America, Europe, Australia and New Zealand Test for intergroup discrimination are: “both studies agreed that, when considering only findings for which there is theoretical reason to expect positive correlations, predictive validity of Black–White race IATs is approximately r =.20. Second, even using the two meta-analyses’ published aggregate estimated effect sizes, the two agreed in expecting that more than 4% of variance in discrimination-relevant criterion measures is predicted by Black–White race IAT measures. The correlational predictive validity of IAT measures represents … a discriminatory impact with very substantial societal significance [38].” This meta-analysis might be considered as support for the pure hatred hypothesis against immigrants and refugees. In other words, immigrants are paying a high price for immigrating to western countries, the countries where they hope to get a second chance, especially in social disorganized neighbourhoods, like the dominant white neighbourhoods in Melbourne. The data in this paragraph suggest that for victimization the relation between superdiversity and crime (victimization) is positive. 6. Neighbourhoods, Immigration and Crime Rates This section examines the relation between newcomers and crime in neighbourhoods. Wessendorf points out how recent immigrants (newcomers) settle in superdiverse neighbourhoods [39]. She introduces ‘new glasses’ to observe immigration in the ‘New World’ where immigration has been going on for much longer. Her in-depth interviews are based on newcomers who settle down in Birmingham (46,9% of the 1,073,045 people is of foreign origin) and East London (Borough of Hackney with 63,8% of 257,379 inhabitants of foreign origin), both superdiverse, however East-London more than Birmingham. In this article, the assumption is undermined that the settling process of newcomers in a new fatherland, is mainly determined by the motherland descent and ethnicity of the newcomer. In order to demonstrate the foregoing, Wessendorf uses a subdivision of immigration in three phases: initial, group and mass immigration. Immigration of newcomers starts according to Wessendorf as an initial pioneer phase, and might lead to group and mass immigration via information and feedback loops about their new fatherland. She considers immigration as a system where people, goods, information, and services continuously move back and forth from fatherland (s) to motherland (s) countries and/or continents [39, pp. 6-7]. Up to date information about their new fatherland can be seen as 'gasoline' for family members, friends, villagers and city dwellers of the former newcomers. This mechanism is called the immigration chain. This immigration chain provides newcomers in the new fatherland with information about where they can live, receive education, work and how transportation is arranged. Her comparative study shows that newcomers have to deal with five mechanisms. “These mechanisms are: a) deskilling and employment (new work experiences seldom matches the old work and education experiences). Work is found via the immigration chain, either via another former immigrant or someone of the same or other ethnic group, b) legal status (being undocumented or an asylum seeker often means a ban on working legally, with the result, that opportunities to build networks are declining), c) social networks and friends (newcomers rely on foundation networks for work, education, housing and leisure. Speaking the same language might be important), d) sense of belonging in the neighbourhood (if a neighbourhood is ‘too white’, the sense of belonginess will be lacking. Humans wish to see and meet in their own neighbourhood ‘Our Kind of People’), e) multicultural adaptation (in particular East and South Europeans have to get used to the big differences between their relatively cultural homogenous motherland and their superdiverse fatherland).” These five mechanisms show that neither London nor Birmingham deal with the available social capital of newcomers. Not dealing might be called intended or unintended exclusion. Balancing on a cord has consequences for the behaviour of newcomers, in particular risk-taking behaviour, such as committing crime. Newcomers therefore tend to be careful. A proof can be found in Light [40, p. 6]. “Many immigrants are driven by the pursuit of economic and educational opportunities for themselves and their families, and clandestine immigration requires a substantial amount of motivation and planning. As such, undocumented immigrants may be selected on attributes that predispose them to low criminal propensity, such as high motivation to work and ambition to achieve. Related to this point, unauthorized immigrants, much more so than lawful immigrants, have strong incentives to avoid criminal involvement for fear of detection and deportation. In both scenarios, increases in undocumented immigration should decrease violent crime over time.” The key question that still needs to be answered is, what is the relationship between immigration (old and newcomers) and crime on the neighbourhood level? Crime is defined as all kinds of experiences with crime, such as being a victim, being a witness and committing a crime. It was stated earlier in this chapter that the relationship between being a refugee and committing crime is negative. This result has been confirmed by a longitudinal study in the United States of America from 1990 to 2014 in about fifty states about the relation between undocumented immigration and violent crime [40]. This conclusion is based on victimization data, showing that this result may be caused by underreporting or selective immigration to avoid crime.” A serious accusation though of general exclusion of undocumented immigrants in the United States of America is: “between 2005 and 2010, state legislatures enacted more than 300 anti-immigration laws, including regulations that deny public benefits, services, and health care to Humanities and Social Sciences 2020; 8(1): 7-19 15 unauthorized immigrants, as well as laws that punish employers who hire undocumented workers and landlords who rent to unauthorized immigrants. For undocumented immigrants, these laws exacerbate the fact that they are denied almost all forms of federal aid and by definition have no political representation. According to Menjívar and Abrego, the cumulatively injurious effects of immigration laws on the daily lives of unauthorized immigrants represent a form of “legal violence” or what Kubrin, Zatz, and Ramirez called “state-created vulnerabilities.” Regardless of the term, the lack of legal standing may have several important implications for criminal behaviour [40, p. 4).” Another confirmation of the afore mentioned results including new- and oldcomers and property crime is the statement: “Metropolises with higher percentages of foreign-born populations had consistently lower rates of murder, robbery, burglary, and larceny [41, p. 71].” Hardly any reliable data is available about the relationship between crime and immigration at the neighbourhood level. Crime at the neighbourhood level is often defined as police data that are no more than a selective fraction of ‘reality’. An example of outcomes between crime (= police data) and immigration can be found in the following Belgium article [42]: “Our analysis of crime rates in Belgium, however, did not reveal any meaningful significant relationship between the presence or the inflow of ethnic minorities and the rates of registered property and violent crime. Unemployment rates clearly are the most important determinant of property and violent crime. For the two largest ethnic minority groups in Belgium (Turkish and Moroccan communities), we did not observe any significant relationship with crime rates.” Another source is the following one: “Sampson and Raudenbush, see Bernat, [11, p. 6] reviewed the concept of “broken windows” in order to ascertain if a community’s view (perception) of social disorder is shaped by racial bias. Utilizing four data sets for Chicago’s neighbourhood blocks in the 1990s, Sampson and Raudenbush found that community residents’ and leaders’ views of their neighbourhood were influenced by the community’s racial composition. They suggest that negative perceptions of neighbourhoods are shaped by racial bias rather than by observations of disorder. In this regard, Latinos (a large number of whom were Mexican immigrants) in Chicago perceived their neighbourhoods to have significantly more social disorder when the neighbourhood was at least a 25% African American.” 7. Micro Dutch Studies About the Victim, Bystander and Offender Cycle Researchers from Europe and United States of America who investigated the relationship between immigration and crime focussed on the question: “Is there a relationship between committing crime and immigration?” Fact finding is necessary because political leaders like Donald Trump, Viktor Orbán, Giuseppe Conte, Matteo Salvini, Björn Höcke, Udo Landbauer, Geert Wilders and Thierry Baudet supported by populist media have a political program that tells us that newcomers and oldcomers increase and will increase national and local crime rates. Because of this dominant immigrant and refugee hostile statements, concrete victim experiences of immigrants and refugees are not fully reflected. Apart from the above, the emphasis has shifted to crime trends and the number of people (read immigrants and refugees) in prisons. This section therefore focusses on micro studies in the Netherlands into experiences with victimization that took place in starting and advanced super-diverse cities and the consequences thereof. Such studies are undoubtedly also available in other European countries and the United States of America; however I do not have them. Provocative is the title of Frank Bovenkerk's book 'Moroccan in Europe and criminal in the Netherlands' in which the relationship between immigration and crime is investigated [7].” Bovenkerk’s data show that “the Netherlands is under the spell of a unique and persistent social problem of crime among boys of the second (and third) generation of immigrants with a Moroccan background. These boys cause nuisance in the neighbourhood, commit robberies and are prominent in the world of drug trafficking.” These facts are astonishing since Moroccan immigration (mainly oldcomers) in the Netherlands is at least 50 years old. Quite a number of the Moroccan immigrants (mainly Berbers) in Europe are rooted in the Rif (north part of the Moroccan Kingdom). “The Rif 17 has some fertile plains and stretches from Cape Spartel and Tangier in the west to Berkane and the Melwiyya River in the east and from the Mediterranean in the north to the Ouergha River in the south. It is separated into Eastern Rif (Al Hoceima, Driouch, Nador, Berkane) and Western Rif (Tanger, Tetouan, Achaouen, Taounate).” Bovenkerk compares crime trends of the Netherlands (Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague and other large cities) with Germany (Dusseldorph and Frankfurt), Belgium (Flanders), France (partly absence of registering ethnic origin) and also Spain and Italy who have to do with recent immigration of Moroccans in order to find traces of crime committed by Moroccan boys [7]. Bovenkerk found in a selection of northern and southern European countries that Moroccan boys were involved in drugs trade. These boys were also a role model for part of the second generation Moroccan boys. The traces of criminality in the Netherlands of Moroccan boys rose far above the other European countries that were studied. Bovenkerk (2014) said that in between half and two third of the Moroccan boys less than 23 years in the Netherlands can be found in the police recognition service system (in Dutch: politie herkenningsdienst systeem) as a suspect of at least one serious criminal crime. The cause for the impact on crime rates in European countries of Moroccan boys could be that caregivers feel that they lost control of their sons [7]. Again, Moroccan boys had a considerable impact on the nature and number of criminal incidents in the Netherlands in 17 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rif 16 Carl Hermann Dino Steinmetz: Unravelling Relations Between Immigration, Crime and Superdiversity in the United States of America, Europe, Australia and New Zealand contrast to other northern and southern European countries [7]. Why is a legitimate question? Bovenkerk raised several explanations. Some of them will be discussed. The first explanation is that these Moroccan sons lost respect for their fathers, especially when their fathers lost their jobs after the oil crisis (1973) and restructuring of the economy (early 1980s). Their fathers became unemployed after a life of heavy and hard work. Moreover, they spoke virtually no Dutch and were not familiar with the socio-economic structure in the Netherlands. The second explanation is that the Dutch healthcare and welfare institutions pasted the label ‘child abusers’ on these fathers. This label deteriorated their position as patriarch of the family. Youth care invaded regularly their homes and accused these fathers of child abuse. A pedagogical blow was common. But the Dutch health and welfare institutions did not know that at the time Although the explanation for the significant impact of Moroccan boys on crime in the Netherlands is both socio- economic and pedagogical, in my opinion that impact can also be described as the mass victimization of Moroccan fathers and their sons indirectly. The Dutch official response to these Moroccan fathers can possibly be seen as incompetent and ignorant and not as pure racial hatred. “The Netherlands at the time was a country with libertine views and seemingly unlimited personal freedom [7].” Scheffer claims the following relationship between immigration and crime in the Netherlands [3, p. 34]: "crime did not come to the Netherlands with immigration, but is the product of confusion caused by the clash of very different forms of law enforcement. Young people from immigrant families who are raised fairly authoritatively are used to laughing at police officers who prefer to negotiate rather than arrest. In addition, Scheffer mentions [3, p. 33]: “Many Moroccan youth feel victimized. A victim feels abused, misunderstood and not safe. They have to get rid of that victim role to find an identity. These words summarize what is often associated with immigrants. Some are worried about the resentment and aversion they feel in their own community towards society. Many of these 'victims' have a fast career as perpetrators, which is also deceptive for immigrant communities in the Netherlands. The fear of Moroccan youth in Amsterdam is now proverbial." Scheffer’s arguments and those of Bovenkerk about the impact of Moroccan boys on crime might be the result of a clash between cultures (the majority of the Moroccans are living in the Randstad). Lahlah tried to provide an answer in her dissertation (PhD) about the question [8]: “is the overrepresentation of juvenile delinquency of Moroccan boys (second and third generation) associated with victimization at home?” This question fits perfectly with the subject being studied in her research, namely transitions between becoming a victim, bystander and perpetrator. Lahlah studied almost 500 Moroccan or Dutch- Moroccan boys (in between 15 and 18 years) from five high schools and two youth probation services, located in three major cities and two rural districts and compared them with Dutch boys. The results speak for themselves. According to Lahlah, 60,7% of the Moroccan boys did experience parental physical violence. This figure was for Dutch boys of almost the same age, 6%. Furthermore, 17% of the Moroccan boys experienced sexual abuse by a family member. This is for Dutch boys 4,9%. On top of this all, 45,5% of Moroccan- Dutch boys experienced physical violence between parents. This number is for Dutch boys 17,8%. These outcomes can be seen as a confirmation of transitions in the cycle of becoming victimization, bystander and perpetrator. These results are a disgrace for the victim surveys. Dutch victim surveys clearly don’t detect these trends which is surprising since the number of Moroccan-(Dutch) becoming a victim of violence (in society, at school, and extended family) is large. Two other sources, based on a dissertation (PhD), are added in order to reveal the relationships between becoming a victim, bystander and offender. The first one is that of Ftitache [43] and the second one that of Van der Ven [9]. One of the first longitudinal study of primary school pupils had as an striking outcome [43]: “immigrant Dutch children arrive at primary school compared to original Dutch pupils with more externalizing problem behaviour (this is a label been used by Dutch teachers and pupils). Their behaviour is labelled as aggressive, oppositional-rebellious and less pro- social behaviour. Moreover, immigrant Dutch children are more often bullied by their peers.” This behaviour was not noticed by teachers and fellow-pupils during the whole school carrier of these immigrant children. Fellow-pupils isolated these children in the class. They are, as it were, not part of primary school, are not appreciated and are rejected by their peers. Primary school teachers did not intervene, with the result that this externalizing problematic behaviour of immigrant children is still present when these children leave primary education at the age of twelve (this transition at 12 years old from primary education to high school exists only in the Netherlands).” Ftitache, also labels these results as the consequences of mislabelling. Westerns label ‘normal’ behaviour of immigrants as ‘abnormal’ since they are not used to experience this behaviour and according to their cultural standards this behaviour is ‘abnormal’. Ftitache's data can be seen as a confirmation of the cycle of becoming a victim, bystander and perpetrator, but also adds a cultural component that has not yet been revealed, namely the cultural labelling of the other's behaviour in a colour-blind manner as if all behaviour can only be assessed according to the Dutch standard. The second source is that of Van der Ven [9] who found that immigrants (first and second generation) with a dark skin are running a five time higher risk of psychotic disorders than original Dutch people and immigrants with a white skin twice as higher risk. Psychotic symptoms are for instance delusions and hallucinations. This is the case for 7% of the Dutch population and disappears in 75% of those who experience these psychotic symptoms (based on research of Jim van Os see, [9, p. 169]. Furthermore immigrant males run a twice as high risk of psychotic hallucinations and delusions than immigrant females. For immigrant children the hallucinations and delusions are caused by bullying and Humanities and Social Sciences 2020; 8(1): 7-19 17 for adult immigrants by polarization, discrimination and racism (excluding the other) [9]. It is striking that these five Dutch scientists mainly write about Moroccans. The data in this chapter is a demonstration of the so called victim, bystander and offender cycle [4]. This research by these Dutch scientists is explicit about the relation between victimization and crime. Becoming a bystander remains out of the picture. This is the missing part in research. But the aforementioned researchers revealed several psychological mechanisms that might explain how victimization might turn youngsters in perpetrators. The first mechanism is continuously experiencing discrimination, exclusion and polarization in Dutch society. The second mechanism is psychotic attacks as a result of the first mechanism. The third psychological mechanism that ruins the basic scheme of trust and safety between humans, is family violence and sexual abuse. This psychological mechanism also violates collectivist principles, such as respect for elderly and the group that has in collectivism a higher priority than an individual. The fourth mechanism is pedagogical, and states that caregivers of immigrant children are abusers instead of saying they give a corrective tap. 8. Conclusions The goal of this article was unravelling relations between immigration and crime at the level of a continent, state, (superdiverse) city and neighbourhood. This article focusses on the United States of America, Europe (with a special paragraph about the Netherlands), Australia and New Zealand, western countries and continents. Direct relations are not yet measured in research. Since I am a psychological victimologist I will use victimology as a reference for the main outcomes. Victimology has three goals. The first goal is research into victimization, its consequences and possible solutions. The second goal is victim advocacy, like improving victims’ rights. Unfortunately, the main scope in this article is the retributive western criminal justice system. The third and last goal is improving psychosocial and psychic healthcare, like for instance victim schema’s [44]. The aforementioned reasoning in this article falls within the scope of research and victim advocacy. Populist political leaders and media are blaming immigrants (old and newcomers) for an increase in committing crime. The unfortunate facts are that old and newcomers are overrepresented in the prison system in the United States of America and Europe. Factfinding in the United States of America and Europe shows a slight trend that more immigrants (new- and oldcomers) may result in less crime. An unexpected by-product of the aforementioned populist opinions is an increase of fear of crime. Correcting incorrect images about offences and perpetrators is a possible intervention for repairing the distortion of these relations between crime and immigration [45]. The main conclusions of unravelling the relations between crime and immigration are: 1. The relation between immigration and crime trends has a covariate namely superdiversity. 2. Ignoring immigrants in research and policy should be out of the question since they together outnumber in superdiverse cities in western countries and continents the indigenous people. 3. The relation between immigration and committing crime is negative. 4. The more immigrants (old- and newcomers) the higher the fear of crime rates. 5. The relation between immigration and victimization is positive in particular at the superdiverse neighbourhood level if those neighbourhoods are dominant white, socially disorganised, and if support for newcomers is more or less absent because of no connection with a founding-networks, extended families or the lack of state-organized support. I like to raise the following statement: old- and newcomers are not protected by governments. They feel that notifying a crime to the police might lead to ethnic profiling or simply forcing them to return to the unsafe motherland. Immigrants (old- and newcomers) are furthermore victimized because they are discriminated, polarized or excluded in many societal systems like neighbourhoods, education, workforce, health systems and on top of that by their own extended families. These forms of victimization worsens if immigrants (old- and newcomers) are Muslims. In other words, immigrants are victimized by human trade, illegal work and the most heavy and dirty work that exists in western society. These victims come into contact with a society that does not protect them against mass victimization. Some of them are pushed over the edge and may commit crimes themselves. You can speculate about their motives. Possible motives are revenge and wrong role models. This immense number of victim experiences of immigrants, refugees and expats (children and adult) are not yet included in victim surveys. We might speculate about the reasons. Most probably do these surveys suffer from cultural bias with regard to sampling and survey questions. This chapter also pays attention to the relation between immigration and crime at the superdiverse level of neighbourhoods in western cities. Attention is paid to a major change in immigration patrons. The 20 th century immigration consisted of large group of immigrants coming to new western fatherlands and superdiverse cities, hoping that they might have a more prosperous live, better education for their children, work etc. The 21th century immigration however consists of large numbers of small groups of newcomers coming from several continents like South-America, Africa, South-east and East-Asia and in Europe mainly East-Europe and states in these continents. Key-mechanisms of the latter immigration in the 21th century is the immigration chain with information, feedback loops and founding-networks in the new fatherland (Our Kind of People who provide information about resources and support). I only found Belgium and Australian research showing that superdiverse 18 Carl Hermann Dino Steinmetz: Unravelling Relations Between Immigration, Crime and Superdiversity in the United States of America, Europe, Australia and New Zealand neighbourhoods who are either socially disorganized and too white criminalize immigrants (old- and newcomers and international students, [33]. In the old and new super-diverse cities, also along the New Chinese Silk Roads, more attention should be paid to negative labelling of immigrants, refugees and expats. Negative labelling has also an impact on fear of crime among the public. This should be done on the basis of well- monitored research that also takes into account the growth towards super-superdiverse cities. References [1] Frankopan, Peter (2016). The Silk roads. A new history of the world. Alfred A. Knopf. [2] Frankopan, Peter (2018). The new silk roads. The present and future of the world. Bloomsbury. [3] Scheffer, Paul (2010). Het land van aankomst. De Bezige Bij. [4] Steinmetz, Carl H. D. (1985). Bystanders of crime: Some results from a national survey. Victimology; an international journal. Volume 10, 1985. Number 1-4. Pp. 441-460. @Victimology. Printed in the USA. 0361-5170/85/$1 + 0.10. [5] Steinmetz, Carl H. D. (2018). Voorkom discriminatie, uitsluiting en polarisatie. Sociaal bestek. Tijdschrift voor werk, inkomen en zorg. DOI: 10.1007/s41196-018-0101-z [6] Ramose, Mogobe (2017). Ubuntu. Stroom van het bestaan als levensfilosofie. Ten Have. [7] Bovenkerk, Frank (2014). Marokkaan in Europa, crimineel in Nederland. Boom Lemma uitgevers. [8] Lahlah, A. (2013). Invisible Victims? Ethnic differences in the risk of juvenile (violent) offending of Dutch and Moroccan- Dutch adolescent boys. Doctoral dissertation. Ridderkerk: Ridderprint. [9] Van der Ven, Elisabeth Maria Anna (2016). Ethnic minority position as risk indicator for autism-spectrum and psychotic disorders. Doctoral Academisch proefschrift. Universiteit van Maastricht. [10] Crul, Maurice, Schneider, Jens, & Lelie, Frans (2013). Super Diversiteit. VU University Press. [11] Bernat, Francis (2019). Immigration and crime. Oxford Research Encyclopaedia of Criminology. DOI: 10.1093/acrefore/9780190264079.013.93. [12] Nunziata, Luca (2014). Immigration and Crime: New Empirical Evidence from European Victimization Data. IZA DP No. 8632. Discussion Paper No. 8632 November 2014: http://ftp.iza.org/dp8632.pdf. [13] Leerkes, Arjen, Martinez, Ramiro & Groenevel, Pim (2018). MINORITY PARADOXES: ETHNIC DIFFERENCES IN SELFREPORTED OFFENDING AND OFFICIAL CRIME STATISTICS. British Journal of Criminology. DOI: 10.1093/bjc/azy021 [14] Landgrave, Michelangelo & Nowrasteh (2019). Incarcerated Immigrants in 2016. Their Numbers, Demographics, and Countries of Origin. Immigration. Research and policy brief. Cato Institute. [15] Unnever, James D. (2018). Ethnicity and Crime in the Netherlands. International Criminal Justice Review, 1-18. DOI: 10.1177/1057567717752218. [16] Bell, Brian (2014): Crime and immigration, IZA World of Labor, ISSN 2054-9571, Institute for the Study of Labour (IZA), Bonn, Iss. 33, http://dx.doi.org/10.15185/izawol.33 Bernat, Frances (2019). Immigration and Crime. Oxford Research Encyclopaedia of Criminology. Online Publication Date: Apr 2017 DOI: 10.1093/acrefore/9780190264079.013.93. [17] CBS (2018). Jaarrapport Integratie 2018. Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek. Henri Faasdreef 312, 2492 JP Den Haag. Retrieved from www.cbs.nl. [18] Vertovic, Steven (2019). Talking around superdiversity. Ethnic and Racial Studies 2019, vol. 42, NO. 1, 125–139. https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2017.1406128 [19] Foner, Nancy, Duyvendak, Jan Willem, and Kasinitz, Philip (2019). Introduction: superdiversity in everyday life. Ethnic and Racial Studies. 2019, VOL. 42, NO. 1, 1–16. https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2017.1406969 [20] Eurostat (2019). 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Drawing a bridge between first generation immigrant concentration and recorded crime rates. Applied Criminology and Policing Centre, University of Huddersfield. DOI: 10.5920/css.2018.03 [26] Van Kesteren, John (2016). Assessing the risk and prevalence of hate crime victimization in Western Europe. International Review of Victimology. DOI: 10.1177/0269758015627046. [27] Mauer, Marc, and King, Ryan S. (2007). Uneven Justice: State Rates of Incarceration By Race and Ethnicity. The Sentencing Project. www.sentencingproject.org. [28] Kubrin, Charis E. and Wo, James C. (2016). Social Disorganization Theory’s Greatest Challenge: Linking Structural Characteristics to Crime in Socially Disorganized Communities. In Alex R. Piquero (Eds.) The Handbook of Criminological Theory, First Edition. Edited by. © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Published 2016 by John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Humanities and Social Sciences 2020; 8(1): 7-19 19 [29] Richeson, Jennifer, A. and Nussbaum, Richard, J. (2003). The Impact of Multiculturalism versus Colour-blindness on Racial Bias. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 40 (2004) 417–423. doi: 10.1016/j.jesp.2003.09.002. [30] Huber, Lindsay, Pérez and Solorzano, Daniel G. (2014). Racial microaggressions as a tool for critical race research. Race Ethnicity and Education, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13613324.2014.994173. [31] Vélez, M. B., & Lyons, C. J. (2012). Situating the immigration and neighbourhood crime relationship in multiple cities. In R. Martinez, M. S. Zatz, & C. E. Kubrin (Eds.), Punishing immigrants: Policy, politics, and injustice (pp. 159–177). New York: New York University Press. [32] Ugelvik, Thomas (2015). Global Prison Ethnography. Department of Criminology and Sociology of Law. University of Oslo. In The Palgrave Handbook of Prison Ethnography, DH Drake, R Earle and J Sloan (eds), Basingstoke: Palgrave. [33] Forbes-Mewett, Helen, and Wickes, Rebecca (2012). The neighbourhood context of crime against international students. Journal of Sociology. 2018, Vol. 54 (4) 609–626. © The Author (s) 2017. Article reuse guidelines: sagepub.com/journals-permissions. DOI: 10.1177/1440783317739696 journals.sagepub.com/home/jos. [34] Van Dijk, Jan, Van Kesteren, John, and Smit, Paul (2007). Criminal Victimisation in International Perspective. Key findings from the 2004-2005 ICVS and EU ICS. Boom Juridische uitgevers. [35] EU (2017). Second European Union Minorities and Discrimination Survey. Muslims – Selected findings, © European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2017. [36] Steinmetz (1979). An (empirically tested) analysis of victimization risks. Research and Documentation Centre of the Ministry of Justice, The Hague, the Netherlands, National Criminal Justice Reference Service (NCJRS). Microfiche. United States Department of Justice Washington, D. C. 205&1. [37] Wessendorf, Suzanne. (2014) ‘Researching social relations in super-diverse neighbourhoods: Mapping the field’, IRiS Working Paper Series, No. 2/2014. Birmingham: Institute for Research into Superdiversity. www.birmingham.ac.uk/iris. [38] Greenwald, A. G., Banaji, M. R., & Nosek, B. A. (2015). Statistically small effects of the Implicit Association Test can have societally large effects. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 108 (4), 553-561. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/pspa0000016. [39] Wessendorf, Suzanne. (2018). Pathways of Settlement among Recent Migrants in Super-diverse Areas. IRIS WORKING PAPER SERIES, NO. 25/2018. www.birmingham.ac.uk/iris. [40] Light, MICHAEL, T. and Miller, Ty (2017). Does Undocumented Immigration increase Violent Crime? Criminology. 2017 May; 56 (2): 370–401. doi: 10.1111/1745- 9125.12175. [41] Adelman, Robert, Reid, Lesley, Williams, Markle, Gail, Weiss, Saskia & Jaret, Charles (2017). Urban crime rates and the changing face of immigration: Evidence across four decades. 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work_impicm5mx5gmfenuf2mmlbbpf4	----	Association of Reported Concern About Increasing Societal Discrimination With Adverse Behavioral Health Outcomes in Late Adolescence Association of Reported Concern About Increasing Societal Discrimination With Adverse Behavioral Health Outcomes in Late Adolescence Adam M. Leventhal, PhD; Junhan Cho, PhD; Nafeesa Andrabi, BA; Jessica Barrington-Trimis, PhD IMPORTANCE Public expressions of discrimination may generate stress and behavioral health problems, particularly in racial/ethnic minority or socioeconomically disadvantaged youths. OBJECTIVES To determine whether concern about increasing discrimination in society reported among adolescents during 2016 and the magnitude of increase in concern from 2016 to 2017 were associated with behavioral health outcomes by 2017 and to examine racial/ethnic or socioeconomic differences in associations. DESIGN, SETTING, AND PARTICIPANTS This prospective cohort survey collected data at baseline from January 2 through September 28, 2016 (11th grade), and at follow-up from January 1 through August 10, 2017 (12th grade), at 10 high schools in Los Angeles, California, recruited through convenience sampling. A total of 2572 students completed both surveys. EXPOSURES Reported concern, worry, or stress regarding “increasing hostility and discrimination of people because of their race, ethnicity, sexual orientation/identity, immigrant status, religion, or disability status in society” were scored as “not at all” (0) to “extremely” (4). Mean ratings were calculated in a 3-item composite (range, 0-4). MAIN OUTCOMES AND MEASURES Self-reported days of cigarette, alcohol, or marijuana use in the past month (range, 0-30 days), number of substances used in the past 6 months (range, 0-27), mild to moderate depression (yes or no), and attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) (yes or no) at follow-up. RESULTS The sample of 2572 students (54.4% female; mean [SD] baseline age, 17.1 [0.4] years; 1969 [87.7%] had at least 1 parent with high school diploma) included 2530 with race/ethnicity data (1198 [47.4%] Hispanic; 482 [19.0%] Asian; 104 [4.1%] African American; 155 [6.1%] multiracial; 419 [16.6%] white; 172 [6.8%] other). Appreciable numbers of students reported feeling very or extremely concerned (baseline, 1047 [41.5%]; follow-up, 1028 [44.6%]), worried (baseline, 743 [29.7%]; follow-up, 795 [34.7%]), or stressed (baseline, 345 [13.9%]; follow-up, 353 [15.5%]) about increasing societal discrimination. Each 1-SD increase on the societal discrimination concern composite in 2016 was associated with more days of past-month cigarette (incidence rate ratio [IRR], 1.77; 95% CI, 1.42-2.20; P < .001), marijuana (IRR, 1.13; 95% CI, 1.01-1.26; P = .03), and alcohol (IRR, 1.11; 95% CI, 1.02-1.21; P = .01) use, more substances used (IRR, 1.07; 95% CI, 1.01-1.17; P = .04), and greater odds of depression (odds ratio [OR], 1.11; 95% CI, 1.01-1.23; P = .04) and ADHD (OR, 1.12; 95% CI, 1.01-1.26; P = .04) symptoms in 2017. The magnitude of increase in societal discrimination concern from 2016 to 2017 was also associated with several behavioral health problems in 2017; some associations were amplified among teenagers who were African American (IRR for cigarette smoking, 2.97; 95% CI, 1.45-6.09) or Hispanic (IRR for cigarette smoking, 1.30; 95% CI, 1.09-1.54) or had parents with less educational attainment (IRR for alcohol use, 1.41 [95% CI, 1.14-1.74]; OR for ADHD, 1.81 [95% CI, 1.13-2.89]). CONCLUSIONS AND RELEVANCE Concern over societal discrimination was common among youths in Los Angeles in 2016 and was associated with behavioral health problems 1 year later. Adolescents’ behavioral responses to recent societal expressions of discrimination may warrant public health attention. JAMA Pediatr. 2018;172(10):924-933. doi:10.1001/jamapediatrics.2018.2022 Published online August 20, 2018. Editorial page 910 Supplemental content Author Affiliations: Department of Preventive Medicine, Keck School of Medicine, University of Southern California (USC), Los Angeles (Leventhal, Cho, Barrington-Trimis); Department of Psychology, USC, Los Angeles (Leventhal); USC Norris Comprehensive Cancer Center, Los Angeles (Leventhal, Barrington- Trimis); Department of Sociology, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Chapel Hill (Andrabi). Corresponding Author: Adam M. Leventhal, PhD, Department of Preventive Medicine, Keck School of Medicine, University of Southern California, 2250 Alcazar St, Room CSC 271, Los Angeles, CA 90033 (adam.leventhal@usc.edu). Research JAMA Pediatrics | Original Investigation 924 (Reprinted) jamapediatrics.com © 2018 American Medical Association. All rights reserved. Downloaded From: https://jamanetwork.com/ by a Carnegie Mellon University User on 04/05/2021 https://jama.jamanetwork.com/article.aspx?doi=10.1001/jamapediatrics.2018.2022&utm_campaign=articlePDF%26utm_medium=articlePDFlink%26utm_source=articlePDF%26utm_content=jamapediatrics.2018.2022 https://jama.jamanetwork.com/article.aspx?doi=10.1001/jamapediatrics.2018.2335&utm_campaign=articlePDF%26utm_medium=articlePDFlink%26utm_source=articlePDF%26utm_content=jamapediatrics.2018.2022 mailto:adam.leventhal@usc.edu http://www.jamapediatrics.com/?utm_campaign=articlePDF%26utm_medium=articlePDFlink%26utm_source=articlePDF%26utm_content=jamapediatrics.2018.2022 P ublic expressions of resentment, discrimination, andhostility toward minority and disadvantaged popula-tions have become increasingly prominent.1 Several events leading up to 2016 exemplify such trends, including highly publicized incidents of police violence toward racial/ ethnic minorities, backlash against same-sex marriage legis- lation, and the largest number of hate crimes against Ameri- can Muslims since the period immediately following September 11, 2001.2-4 The social climate intensified during 2016 and 2017, when the Trump presidential campaign and administration released several statements and social policy proposals perceived by many as discriminatory. Because polarizing societal events have historically been linked with stress and behavioral health problems,5-7 the ramifications of recent dis- crimination-associated societal events may be a public health concern, particularly for vulnerable populations, such as adolescents. Whether the extent of concern adolescents attribute to in- creasing discrimination in society is of an appreciable level to heighten risk of behavioral health problems is unknown. Con- cern over societal discrimination could cause distress, impair concentration, and lead to hopelessness about the future among teenagers on the cusp of adulthood, especially among racial/ethnic minority and socioeconomically disadvantaged youths who may be worried about being directly targeted by discrimination. Distress, concentration impairment, and hope- lessness increase the incidence, persistence, and exacerba- tion of behavioral health problems that are prevalent in late adolescence, including substance use, depression, and atten- tion-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD).8-13 If concern over societal discrimination is common among adolescents and associated with adverse behavioral health outcomes, preventive measures to protect the current genera- tion of youth exposed to public expressions of hostility and discrimination toward minority populations may be war- ranted. This study investigated whether concern over increas- ing discrimination in society reported among 11th grade stu- dents in L os Angeles, C alifornia, during 2016 and the magnitude of increase in concern from 2016 to 2017 were as- sociated with behavioral health outcomes by 2017 and whether associations were amplified among youth from racial/ethnic minority groups or youth with less educated parents. Methods Participants and Procedures Data were drawn from a prospective cohort survey of behav- ioral health, which enrolled students from urban and subur- ban public high schools in Los Angeles County in 2013.14 Ap- proximately 40 public high schools in the Los Angeles metropolitan region were contacted about participating in this study because of their diverse demographic characteristics and proximity to the study institution. Ten schools agreed to par- ticipate (school characteristics in context of Los Angeles city public schools appear in eTable 1 in the Supplement). All 9th grade students in standard educational programming within these schools in 2013 who provided assent and who had writ- ten or verbal parental consent were eligible to join the cohort. The institutional review board of the University of Southern California approved the study. Paper-and-pencil surveys were administered semiannu- ally in classrooms from 9th through 12th grade. Students not in class during data collections completed abbreviated sur- veys by telephone, Internet, or mail that included only behav- ioral health measures. The measure involving concern over societal discrimination was included in the full-length base- line survey from January 2 through September 28, 2016 (11th grade), and the 12-month follow-up survey from January 1 through August 10, 2017 (12th grade). Measures Societal Discrimination Concern In 3 separate items, students rated their level of concern, worry, or stress regarding “increasing hostility and discrimination of people because of their race, ethnicity, sexual orientation/ identity, immigrant status, religion, or disability status in so- ciety” (scored 0 for “not at all”; 1 for “slightly”; 2 for “some- what”; 3 for “very”; and 4 for “extremely”). We calculated the mean of the 3 ratings to quantify the overall magnitude of so- cietal discrimination concern (range, 0-4) in a composite in- dex that had high internal consistency at baseline (Cronbach α = 0.88) and follow-up (Cronbach α = 0.90). Difference scores were also computed (follow-up – baseline) to operationalize the change in societal discrimination concern level from 2016 to 2017. Substance Use Cigarette, marijuana, and alcohol use were measured using well-validated items15,16 instructing students to select the number of days they used each substance in the past 30 days. Past 6-month use (yes or /no) of 27 different substances (eg, cigarettes, alcohol, marijuana, prescription painkillers, in- halants, ecstasy, or cocaine) were summed to create a cumu- lative substance use index (range, 0-27). Mental Health Students were administered the Center for Epidemiologic Stud- ies Depression Scale17 appropriate for adolescent use,18 which collects past-week frequency ratings of experiencing 20 Key Points Question Is concern about increasing discrimination in society associated with behavioral health outcomes among adolescents? Findings In this cohort survey of 2572 adolescents, self-reported level of concern about increasing societal discrimination was associated with higher frequency of substance use, a greater number of different substances used, and 11% higher odds of depression and 12% greater odds of attention-deficit/ hyperactivity disorder symptoms. Meaning Public health and policy interventions may be warranted to address the potential adverse effect of increasing public expressions of discrimination on adolescent behavioral health. Concern About Societal Discrimination and Adverse Behavioral Health Outcomes Original Investigation Research jamapediatrics.com (Reprinted) JAMA Pediatrics October 2018 Volume 172, Number 10 925 © 2018 American Medical Association. All rights reserved. Downloaded From: https://jamanetwork.com/ by a Carnegie Mellon University User on 04/05/2021 https://jama.jamanetwork.com/article.aspx?doi=10.1001/jamapediatrics.2018.2022&utm_campaign=articlePDF%26utm_medium=articlePDFlink%26utm_source=articlePDF%26utm_content=jamapediatrics.2018.2022 http://www.jamapediatrics.com/?utm_campaign=articlePDF%26utm_medium=articlePDFlink%26utm_source=articlePDF%26utm_content=jamapediatrics.2018.2022 depressive symptoms (eg, sadness, sleep and appetite prob- lems, or psychomotor slowing) on a scale of 0 to 3 (0 indi- cates 0 days; 3, 5-7 days). Sum scores were used to classify whether students met or exceeded the recommended screening cutoff indicative of mild to moderate depressive symptoms (score, ≥16).17 The 18-item Current Symptoms Scale–Self Report Form,19 which screens for Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (Fourth Edition) (DSM-IV)-defined ADHD, was administered. Respondents indic ated the past 6-month frequency of experienc ing inattention (ie, difficulty organizing and completing tasks) and hyperactivity and/or impulsivity (ie, difficulties remain- ing still or with task persistence) ADHD symptoms. Consis- tent with DSM-IV criteria,19,20 adolescents who reported experiencing at least 6 inattention or at least 6 hyperactivity and/or impulsivity symptoms often or very often were clas- sified positive for ADHD symptoms. Covariates and Descriptive Measures Covariates to address the potential confounding influence of sociodemographic variation included age, sex, race/ ethnicity, and highest parental educational level, which were assessed with investigator-defined, forced-choice items (re- sponse categories are given in Table 1). Additional measures include perceived frequency of personal discrimination using the Everyday Discrimination Scale,21 reported birth country of students and their parents (United States vs other), and accul- turation using the Short Acculturation Scale for Hispanic Youth22 that assesses the extent of use of non-English lan- guages across settings (eg, at home, with friends) (sum of 1 [only another language] to 5 [only English] for 4 items; Cronbach α = 0.82). Statistical Analysis Negative binomial regression models23 were used to obtain incidence rate ratios (IRRs) and 95% CIs for associations of the (1) baseline societal discrimination concern composite score and (2) change in societal discrimination concern score from baseline to follow-up, with substance use out- comes at follow-up. Logistic regression was used to obtain odds ratios (ORs) and 95% CIs for associations of the base- line and change in societal discrimination concern score Table 1. Sample Characteristics and Societal Discrimination Concern Composite Scores by Sociodemographic Groupa Baseline Variable Responseb Baselinec Changed Composite Score, Mean (SD) P Valuee Composite Score, Mean (SD) P Valuee Sex, No. (%) Female 1400/2572 (54.4) 1.82 (1.20) <.001 0.11 (1.27) .05 Male 1172/2572 (45.6) 1.24 (1.14) 0.01 (1.24) Age, y, No. (%) 16 1063/2518 (42.2) 1.57 (1.19) .17 0.11 (1.25) .1617 1388/2518 (55.1) 1.56 (1.20) 0.03 (1.27) 18 67/2518 (2.7) 1.38 (1.37) 0.27 (1.29) Race/ethnicity, No. (%) Hispanic 1198/2530 (47.4) 1.53 (1.21) .01 0.14 (1.28) .001 Asian 482/2530 (19.0) 1.72 (1.15) −0.09 (1.16) African American 104/2530 (4.1) 1.54 (1.24) 0.34 (1.04) White 419/2530 (16.6) 1.42 (0.06) 0.11 (1.07) Multiracial 155/2530 (6.1) 1.66 (1.23) −0.14 (1.17) Otherf 172/2530 (6.8) 1.56 (1.21) 0.03 (1.25) Highest parental educational level, No. (%)g 8th Grade or less 80/2244 (3.6) 1.72 (1.13) .66 0.17 (1.20) .84 Some high school 195/2244 (8.7) 1.67 (1.28) 0.06 (1.34) High school graduate 348/2244 (15.5) 1.53 (1.21) 0.08 (1.34) Some college 430/2244 (19.2) 1.56 (1.21) 0.12 (1.30) College graduate 743/2244 (33.1) 1.54 (1.18) 0.03 (1.22) Graduate degree 448/2244 (20.0) 1.58 (1.21) 0.12 (1.22) Everyday Discrimination Scale score, mean (SD)h 8.52 (8.15) NA NA NA NA Short Acculturation Scale for Youth, mean (SD)h 16.70 (2.89) NA NA NA NA Born outside United States, No. (%)h Student 262 (10.5) NA NA NA NA Mother 1383 (56.3) NA NA NA NA Father 1417 (58.8) NA NA NA NA Abbreviation: NA, not applicable. a Calculated as the mean of concern, worry, and stress ratings (0 indicates not at all; 1, slightly; 2, somewhat; 3, very; and 4, extremely). b Denominators vary owing to nonmissing data. Percentages have been rounded and may not total 100. c Scores range from 0 to 4. d Calculated as change from baseline to 12-month follow-up. Scores range from −4 to 4. e Calculated using analysis of variance omnibus test of differences in baseline or change in societal discrimination concern composite index by sociodemographic variable. f Includes Native American or Alaskan, Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander, and other races. g In addition to 22 students who did not respond to the survey question, 302 who marked “don’t know” are not included in the denominator. h Available (nonmissing) data range from 2409 to 2560 students. Research Original Investigation Concern About Societal Discrimination and Adverse Behavioral Health Outcomes 926 JAMA Pediatrics October 2018 Volume 172, Number 10 (Reprinted) jamapediatrics.com © 2018 American Medical Association. All rights reserved. Downloaded From: https://jamanetwork.com/ by a Carnegie Mellon University User on 04/05/2021 http://www.jamapediatrics.com/?utm_campaign=articlePDF%26utm_medium=articlePDFlink%26utm_source=articlePDF%26utm_content=jamapediatrics.2018.2022 with ADHD and depression symptoms. For each outcome, separate models were tested for the societal discrimination concern baseline and change scores. Models were adjusted for the respective behavioral health outcome at baseline and sociodemographic covariates. To facilitate interpretation of ORs and IRRs, the societal discrimination concern composite was standardized (mean [SD], 0 [1]) for regression modeling. The χ2 difference test of goodness of fit from multigroup analysis24 was used to determine whether associations esti- mated in regression models differed by race/ethnicity or high- est parental educational level (ie, high school graduate or higher degree vs no high school diploma). We used Mplus, version 7 (Muthen & Muthen)25 with complex analysis to account for nesting by school. The 2572 participants with data on baseline societal discrimination concern and at least 1 behavioral health outcome constituted the analytic sample. Additional missing data were managed with full-information maximum-likelihood estimation (eTable 2 in the Supplement provides numbers of participants with available data for key variables). Statistical significance was set at P < .05 (2 tailed). Benjamini-Hochberg corrections for multiple testing26 were applied for primary tests of association of baseline soci- etal discrimination concern with outcomes. Other (second- ary) tests were uncorrected. Findings from sensitivity analy- ses are summarized below and detailed in eMethods in the Supplement. Results Study Sample A m o ng e l i g i b l e 9 t h g r a d e s t u d e nt s ( N = 4 1 0 0) , 3 3 9 6 enrolled in the cohort in 2013. Societal discrimination con- cern data were collected from 2735 students in 2016 (base- line), of whom 2572 (94.0%) completed follow-up (2017) (1400 female [54.4%] and 1172 male [45.6%]; mean [SD] age, 17.1 [0.4] years). eFigure 1 in the Supplement provides participant accrual details. Descriptive Results The sample was heterogeneous with regard to sex and parental educational level and had a plurality of Hispanic students, with an appreciable representation of students of Asian, Afric an Americ an, multirac ial, and white race/ ethnicity (Table 1). Of students with parental education data, 1969 (87.7%) reported having at least 1 parent with a high school diploma. The mean (SD) level of acculturation was moderate relative to standardized reference samples of Hispanic youth (16.70 [2.89]).22 Although most students were born in the United States, a substantial proportion of students’ parents were born outside the countr y (1383 mothers [56.3%] and 1417 fathers [58.8%]). Responses on the Everyday Discrimination Scale (mean [SD], 8.52 [8.15]) indicate considerable interindividual variability in the fre- quency of personal discrimination in the sample. Descriptive data on depression, ADHD, and substance use at baseline and follow-up are reported in Table 2 and are com- mensurate with estimates in other population-based adoles- cent studies.27 From baseline to follow-up, increases were ob- served in the number of past-month days of cigarette (baseline vs follow-up mean [SD], 0.27 [2.36] vs 0.41 [2.73]), marijuana (mean [SD], 1.26 [4.55] vs 1.89 [5.76]), and alcohol (mean [SD], 0.85 [2.57] vs 1.16 [2.76]) use and number of past 6-month sub- stances used (mean [SD], 1.57 [3.07] vs 2.01 [3.30]), whereas the prevalence of ADHD (baseline vs follow-up, 188 [7.4%] vs 174 [7.4%]) and depression symptoms (1004 [39.3%] vs 1033 [40.7%]) did not change. Characterization of Students’ Level of Societal Discrimination Concern Sizeable proportions of the overall sample reported feeling ver y or extremely concerned ( baseline, 1047 [41.5%]; follow-up, 1028 [44.6%]), worried (baseline, 743 [29.7%]; follow-up, 795 [34.7%]), or stressed (baseline, 345 [13.9%]; follow-up, 353 [15.5%]) about increasing societal discrimina- tion; each rating inc reased from baseline to follow-up (Table 2). Overall concern quantified by the 3-item compos- ite varied substantially across students and increased from baseline (mean [SD], 1.56 [1.21]) to follow-up (mean [SD], 1.71 [1.24]). The baseline societal discrimination concern composite score and change f rom baseline to follow-up by race/ ethnicity are reported in Table 1 and eFigure 2 in the Supple- ment. Societal discrimination concern composite scores did not differ by parental educational level and were modestly cor- related with Everyday Discrimination Scale scores at baseline (Pearson r = 0.14; P < .001). Associations of Societal Discrimination Concern With Behavioral Health in the Overall Sample Primary Tests of Baseline Societal Discrimination Concern Regression models adjusted for sociodemographic covari- ates and the respective outcome at baseline showed that the baseline societal discrimination concern composite score was associated with greater odds or frequency of behavioral health problems at follow-up for each outcome (Table 3 and eTable 3 in the Supplement). For example, each 1-SD increase in base- line societal discrimination concern was associated with 77% more days of past-month cigarette smoking (IRR, 1.77; 95% CI, 1.42-2.20; P < .001) and 12% greater odds of ADHD symp- toms (OR, 1.12; 95% CI, 1.01-1.26; P = .04) at follow-up. Change in Societal Discrimination Concern From Baseline to Follow-up The magnitude of change in societal discrimination concern composite score from baseline to follow-up was positively associated with cigarette smoking, marijuana use, and the number of substances used at follow-up after adjusting for sociodemographic factors and the respective baseline sub- stance use variable (Table 3). For example, each 1-SD increase in the societal discrimination concern composite scores from baseline to follow-up was associated with 18% more days of c igare tte smoking in the past month at follow-up (IRR, 1.18; 95% CI, 1.03-1.42; P = .02). Change in societal discrimination concern was not associated with alcohol use, depression, or ADHD at follow-up in the overall sample. Concern About Societal Discrimination and Adverse Behavioral Health Outcomes Original Investigation Research jamapediatrics.com (Reprinted) JAMA Pediatrics October 2018 Volume 172, Number 10 927 © 2018 American Medical Association. All rights reserved. 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The association of change in societal discrimination concern from baseline to follow-up with past-month marijuana use days at follow-up signific antly differed between students with parent(s) who completed high school (IRR, 1.05; 95% CI, Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of Societal Discrimination Concern Measure and Behavioral Health Outcomes Variable Survey, No. (%)a P ValueBaseline Follow-up 3-Item composite score, mean (SD)b 1.56 (1.21) 1.71 (1.24) <.001c Item Responses Concerned Not at all 581 (23.0) 467 (20.3) .009d Slightly 294 (11.7) 252 (10.9) Somewhat 601 (23.8) 555 (24.1) Very 554 (22.0) 558 (24.2) Extremely 493 (19.5) 470 (20.4) Worried Not at all 685 (27.4) 579 (25.3) .003d Slightly 434 (17.3) 388 (17.0) Somewhat 640 (25.6) 527 (23.0) Very 411 (16.4) 459 (20.1) Extremely 332 (13.3) 336 (14.7) Stressed Not at all 1174 (47.2) 1016 (44.7) .005d Slightly 549 (22.1) 484 (21.3) Somewhat 419 (16.8) 419 (18.4) Very 160 (6.4) 168 (7.4) Extremely 185 (7.4) 185 (8.1) Behavioral Health Outcomes Cigarette use in the past 30 d Mean (SD) d 0.27 (2.36) 0.41 (2.73) NA 0 d 2474 (96.8) 2415 (95.1) <.001d 1-2 d 44 (1.7) 53 (2.1) 3-5 d 15 (0.6) 23 (0.9) ≥6 d 24 (0.9) 48 (1.9) Marijuana use in the past 30 d Mean (SD) d 1.26 (4.55) 1.89 (5.76) NA 0 d 2180 (85.2) 2002 (79.1) <.001d 1-2 d 135 (5.3) 218 (8.6) 3-5 d 94 (3.7) 99 (3.9) ≥6 d 150 (5.9) 211 (8.3) Alcohol use in the past 30 d Mean (SD) d 0.85 (2.57) 1.16 (2.76) NA 0 d 2007 (78.5) 1753 (70.0) <.001d 1-2 d 350 (13.7) 507 (20.2) 3-5 d 114 (4.5) 139 (5.5) ≥6 d 86 (3.4) 107 (4.3) No. of substances used in past 6 moe Mean (SD) 1.57 (3.07) 2.01 (3.30) NA 0 1506 (58.7) 1285 (50.4) <.001d 1 341 (13.3) 401 (15.7) 2 179 (7.0) 156 (6.1) 3-5 320 (12.5) 402 (15.8) ≥6 220 (8.6) 308 (12.1) Depression symptomsf 1004 (39.3) 1033 (40.7) .59h ADHD symptomsg 188 (7.4) 174 (7.4) .99h Abbreviations: ADHD, attention-deficit/ hyperactivity disorder; NA, not applicable. a Available (nonmissing) data for variable and categorical variable denominator for within-column percentages can be found in eTable 1 in the Supplement. Unless otherwise specified, values represent No. (%). Percentages have been rounded and may not total 100. b Calculated as the mean of concern, worry, and stress ratings (0 indicates not at all; 1, slightly; 2, somewhat; 3, very; and 4, extremely). c Calculated using the paired-sample t test for mean differences between baseline and follow-up. d Calculated using the Wilcoxon matched-pair signed rank test for change in rank order between baseline and follow-up. e Answers range from 0 to 27 substances. f Measured using the Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale total score of at least 16, indicating mild to moderate levels of depressive symptoms. g Measured using the Current Symptoms Scale–Self Report Form for Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (Fourth Edition)–defined ADHD diagnostic threshold. h Calculated using the McNemar test for change in prevalence between baseline and follow-up. Research Original Investigation Concern About Societal Discrimination and Adverse Behavioral Health Outcomes 928 JAMA Pediatrics October 2018 Volume 172, Number 10 (Reprinted) jamapediatrics.com © 2018 American Medical Association. All rights reserved. Downloaded From: https://jamanetwork.com/ by a Carnegie Mellon University User on 04/05/2021 http://www.jamapediatrics.com/?utm_campaign=articlePDF%26utm_medium=articlePDFlink%26utm_source=articlePDF%26utm_content=jamapediatrics.2018.2022 0.98-1.14) vs those did not (IRR, 1.33; 95% CI, 1.08-1.65; dif- ference in associations by parental education, P = .04). Among youths whose parent(s) did not complete high school, the es- timated mean past-month days of marijuana use from these regression models was successively higher across students who, for example, reported no change (1.37 days; 95% CI, 1.18-1.51), a 2-point increase (eg, from slightly to very con- cerned; 2.17 days; 95% CI, 1.76-2.64), and a 4-point increase (eg, from not at all to extremely concerned; 3.36 days; 95% CI, 2.37-4.72) in the societal discrimination concern score from baseline to follow-up (Figure 1A). Among youths whose par- ent(s) completed high school, the estimated mean days of past- month marijuana use days at follow-up differed less substan- tially across youths who reported no change (1.05 days; 95% CI, 0.91-1.21), a 2-point increase (1.22 days; 95% CI, 0.95- 1.52), and a 4-point increase (1.39 days; 95% CI, 0.91-2.10) on the societal discrimination composite. Associations of soci- etal discrimination concern change scores with past 30-day al- cohol use and ADHD were significantly stronger in youths whose parent(s) did not complete high school (IRR for alco- hol use, 1.41 [95% CI, 1.14-1.74]; OR for ADHD, 1.81 [95% CI, 1.13-2.89]) than in youths whose parents completed high school (IRR for alcohol use, 0.95 [95% CI, 0.89-1.02; difference in as- sociations by parental education, P = .02]; OR for ADHD, 0.98 [95% CI, 0.81-1.20; difference in associations by parental edu- cation, P = .03]) (Figure 1B and C). The association of change in societal discrimination con- cern from baseline to follow-up with past-month smoking days at follow-up differed by race/ethnicity (Figure 2). Each 1-SD increase in societal discrimination concern from base- line to follow-up was associated with significantly more past- month smoking days at follow-up in Afric an Americ an (IRR, 2.97; 95% CI, 1.45-6.09) and Hispanic (IRR, 1.30; 95% CI, 1.09-1.54) youth, whereas in other racial/ethnic groups, associations were nonsignificant (IRR, ≤1.23; P > .13) (differ- ence in associations by race/ethnicity, P = .04). Associations of societal discrimination concern composite change score with other outcomes did not differ by parental educational level or race/ethnicity. Sensitivity Analyses Sensitivity analyses showed negligible effects of using alter- native methods of addressing missing data or omitting covar- iates on study findings, modest differences between cohort en- rollees included vs excluded in the analytic sample, low likelihood that unmeasured confounding explains the re- sults, and that the association of baseline societal discrimina- tion concern composite scores with 5 of 6 behavioral health outcomes at follow-up did not differ across youth who did and did not report frequently being a direct target of discrimina- tion. Data are given in eMethods and eTables 4 to 7 in the Supplement. Discussion Concern, worry, and stress attributed to increasing societal dis- crimination during the recent sociopolitically charged period was common and associated with adverse behavioral health outcomes in this adolescent cohort. Polarizing societal events before 2016 may have generated concern over societal dis- crimination reported by students at baseline, including hate crimes, instances of police violence toward racial/ethnic mi- norities, and hostility toward minorities expressed among pub- lic figures in the media.2-4 From the spring of 2016 to the spring of 2017—a timespan coinciding with the 2016 presidential cam- paign and first several months of the Trump presidency— reported concern increased predominantly among Hispanic Table 3. Associations of Societal Discrimination Concern Composite Scores With Behavioral Health Outcomes Outcome at Follow-up Regressora Baseline Scoreb Change in Score, Baseline to Follow-upc Estimate of Association P Value Estimate of Association P Value Past-month days of cigarette use, IRR (95% CI)d 1.77 (1.42-2.20) <.001e 1.18 (1.03-1.42) .02 Past-month days of marijuana use, IRR (95% CI)d 1.13 (1.01-1.26) .03e 1.10 (1.01-1.21) .04 Past-month days of alcohol use, IRR (95% CI)d 1.11 (1.02-1.21) .01e 1.00 (0.93-1.10) .85 Number of substances used in past 6 mo, IRR (95% CI)d 1.07 (1.01-1.17) .04e 1.06 (1.01-1.13) .04 Depression symptoms, OR (95% CI)f,g 1.11 (1.01-1.23) .04e 1.01 (0.92-1.10) .87 ADHD symptoms, OR (95% CI)f,h 1.12 (1.01-1.26) .04e 1.06 (0.88-1.29) .54 Abbreviations: ADHD, attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder; IRR, incidence rate ratio; OR, odds ratio. a Results of regression models are adjusted for parental educational level, youth age, sex, and race/ethnicity at baseline and the respective behavioral health variable at baseline; separate models were tested for each combination of regressor and outcome. The regressor is standardized (mean, 0; SD, 1) such that ORs and IRRs can be interpreted as the difference in odds or frequency rate of outcome with 1-SD difference in the regressor. b Calculated as the mean of concern, worry, and stress ratings (0 indicates not at all; 1, slightly; 2, somewhat; 3, very; and 4, extremely). c Calculated as the change score (baseline to 12-month follow-up). d Calculated from negative binomial regression models of association with past 30-day cigarette, marijuana, or alcohol use (range, 0-30 days) or number of substances used in the past 6 months (range, 0-27) at follow-up. e Statistically significant after Benjamini-Hochberg corrections for multiple testing to control false discovery rate at .05 (based on 2-tailed corrected P value). f Calculated from binary logistic regression of association with depression and ADHD symptom status at follow-up. g Measured using positive (vs negative) screen for mild to moderate depressive symptoms or higher on the Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale. h Measured using positive (vs negative) screen for ADHD symptoms using the Current Symptoms Scale–Self Report Form for DSM-IV–defined ADHD diagnostic threshold. Concern About Societal Discrimination and Adverse Behavioral Health Outcomes Original Investigation Research jamapediatrics.com (Reprinted) JAMA Pediatrics October 2018 Volume 172, Number 10 929 © 2018 American Medical Association. All rights reserved. Downloaded From: https://jamanetwork.com/ by a Carnegie Mellon University User on 04/05/2021 https://jama.jamanetwork.com/article.aspx?doi=10.1001/jamapediatrics.2018.2022&utm_campaign=articlePDF%26utm_medium=articlePDFlink%26utm_source=articlePDF%26utm_content=jamapediatrics.2018.2022 http://www.jamapediatrics.com/?utm_campaign=articlePDF%26utm_medium=articlePDFlink%26utm_source=articlePDF%26utm_content=jamapediatrics.2018.2022 and African American students. During this period, President Trump pledged to enact new policies that may have height- ened concern about intensifying discrimination in society, including proposals to construct a US-Mexico border wall to deter undocumented immigration, repeal the Affordable Care Act that provides health insurance to millions of low-income Americans, and prohibit entry into the United States from sev- eral countries with high religious minority populations. Con- sequently, the adolescents concerned about societal discrimi- nation in early 2016 may have been especially reactive to the events transpiring during the subsequent year, which may, in turn, had implications for their behavioral health. Figure 1. Behavioral Health Outcomes as Function of Change in Societal Discrimination Concern From 2016 to 2017, by Parental Educational Level 5 4 3 2 1 0 M ar iju an a U se a t Fo llo w -u p, d Change in Societal Discrimination Concern Score Parent(s) did not complete high school 42–4 –2 0 Marijuana useA 5 4 3 2 1 0 M ar iju an a U se a t Fo llo w -u p, d Change in Societal Discrimination Concern Score Parent(s) completed high school 42–4 –2 0 5 4 3 2 1 0 A lc oh ol U se a t Fo llo w -u p, d Change in Societal Discrimination Concern Score 42–4 –2 0 Alcohol useB 5 4 3 2 1 0 A lc oh ol U se a t Fo llo w -u p, d Change in Societal Discrimination Concern Score 42–4 –2 0 50 40 30 20 10 0 Pr ev al en ce o f A D H D a t Fo llo w -u p, % Change in Societal Discrimination Concern Score 42–4 –2 0 Prevalence of ADHDC 50 40 30 20 10 0 Pr ev al en ce o f A D H D a t Fo llo w -u p, % Change in Societal Discrimination Concern Score 42–4 –2 0 Graphs depict the estimated outcome value at follow-up as a function of magnitude of change from baseline to follow-up on the societal discrimination composite score (mean rating of concern, worry, and stress on scales ranging from 0 to 4, with 4 indicating extremely) derived from regression models in subsamples stratified by parental educational level. Marijuana (A) and alcohol use (B) are measured in the past 30 days; attention-deficit/ hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) (C), as estimated prevalence of screening positive for ADHD symptoms on the Current Symptoms Scale–Self Report Form for Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (Fourth Edition)–defined ADHD. The solid lines indicate estimated alcohol or marijuana use frequency level or ADHD prevalence; shaded areas, 95% CI. Research Original Investigation Concern About Societal Discrimination and Adverse Behavioral Health Outcomes 930 JAMA Pediatrics October 2018 Volume 172, Number 10 (Reprinted) jamapediatrics.com © 2018 American Medical Association. All rights reserved. Downloaded From: https://jamanetwork.com/ by a Carnegie Mellon University User on 04/05/2021 http://www.jamapediatrics.com/?utm_campaign=articlePDF%26utm_medium=articlePDFlink%26utm_source=articlePDF%26utm_content=jamapediatrics.2018.2022 Several explanations for the associations found in this study may apply. Cross-student differences in willingness to report behavioral health problems and express feelings about the social climate could have affected study results. How- ever, reporting tendencies are implausible explanations of why the change in societal discrimination concern from 2016 to 2017 was associated with certain behavioral health outcomes and why associations were amplified among racial/ethnic minority and socioeconomically disadvantaged youth in sev- eral cases. A preexisting liability toward behavioral health problems and sensitivity to environmental stress caused by endogenous (eg, genetics) or exogenous (eg, neighborhood deprivation) factors28,29 could have influenced associations between societal discrimination concern and behavioral health. Shared liability would presumably be reflected, to some extent, by students’ baseline behavioral health and sociodemographic status, and findings with vs without adjusting for these factors did not differ (eTable 4 in the Supplement). Perhaps the measure of youths’ perceptions of discrimination in society is a proxy for discrimination di- rectly experienced, and being the direct target of discrimina- tion, per se, may worsen behavioral health.30 However, the as- sociations predominately generalized across youths who did vs did not report frequently experiencing discrimination (eMethods in the Supplement). Although inferences regarding whether the demon- strated associations are causal cannot be made from this observational study, perceiving discrimination in society may play a direct role in the behavioral health of youth. Stress in any form may cause depression and interfere with the development of sustained attention, impulse control, and decision-making skills, which in turn may heighten the risk of ADHD and substance use.11-13,31-34 During the age cap- tured in this study (11th to 12th grade), most adolescents began to face impending adult responsibilities, such as inde- pendent housing, obtaining full-time employment, financial independence, and embarking on higher education or other forms of career training. Many of these responsibilities are essential to identity formation during this developmental s t a g e a n d t h e t r a n s i t i o n f r o m a d o l e s c e n c e t o yo u ng adulthood.35 Consequently, youth concerned about the social climate may become discouraged about future opportunities for social advancement, less apt to successfully progress toward an adult identity, and more inclined to engage in risky behaviors they otherwise would not have, including sub- stance use.8,9 In the overall sample, youth who became more con- cerned over societal discrimination during this period accel- erated their cigarette and marijuana use frequency by follow- up. The reason why this association was specific to these 2 substances and did not extend to alcohol or to depression or ADHD symptoms is unknown and warrants further inquiry. The association between change in societal discrimination con- cern and several behavioral health outcomes was heightened among African American, Hispanic, or socioeconomically dis- advantaged youths. Youths from these populations may be- lieve that the consequences of shifting social trends are more likely to affect their communities. Consequently, the extent to which accelerated societal discrimination concerns trans- late into behavioral health problems may be more powerful for these youths. The pattern of stronger associations between changes in societal discrimination concerns and study out- comes was particularly pervasive in adolescents with less edu- cated parents, extending across 3 of the 6 behavioral health problems. Compared with [12.3%] other demographic fac- tors, parental educational level and other socioeconomic in- dicators are especially indicative of social disadvantage.36 So- cial disadvantage per se may be a key source of vulnerability to behavioral health consequences of societal discrimination concerns. Figure 2. Cigarette Smoking as Function of Change in Societal Discrimination Concern From 2016 to 2017, by Race/Ethnicity 1.2 0.8 0.4 0 Ci ga re tt e U se a t Fo llo w -u p, d Change in Societal Discrimination Concern Score 42–4 –2 0 African American studentsA 1.2 0.8 0.4 0 Ci ga re tt e U se a t Fo llo w -u p, d Change in Societal Discrimination Concern Score 42–4 –2 0 Hispanic studentsB 1.2 0.8 0.4 0 Ci ga re tt e U se a t Fo llo w -u p, d Change in Societal Discrimination Concern Score 42–4 –2 0 White studentsC Graphs depict the estimated number of days of cigarette use in the past 30 days at follow-up as a function of magnitude of change from baseline to follow-up on the societal discrimination composite score (mean rating of concern, worry, and stress on a scale of 0 to 4, with 4 indicating extremely) used to derive regression models in stratified subsamples of African American (A), Hispanic (B), and white (C) students. The solid lines indicate estimated cigarette use frequency level; shaded areas, 95% CI. Concern About Societal Discrimination and Adverse Behavioral Health Outcomes Original Investigation Research jamapediatrics.com (Reprinted) JAMA Pediatrics October 2018 Volume 172, Number 10 931 © 2018 American Medical Association. All rights reserved. Downloaded From: https://jamanetwork.com/ by a Carnegie Mellon University User on 04/05/2021 https://jama.jamanetwork.com/article.aspx?doi=10.1001/jamapediatrics.2018.2022&utm_campaign=articlePDF%26utm_medium=articlePDFlink%26utm_source=articlePDF%26utm_content=jamapediatrics.2018.2022 https://jama.jamanetwork.com/article.aspx?doi=10.1001/jamapediatrics.2018.2022&utm_campaign=articlePDF%26utm_medium=articlePDFlink%26utm_source=articlePDF%26utm_content=jamapediatrics.2018.2022 http://www.jamapediatrics.com/?utm_campaign=articlePDF%26utm_medium=articlePDFlink%26utm_source=articlePDF%26utm_content=jamapediatrics.2018.2022 Limitations A limitation of this research was the application of an adver- sity approach to understanding this phenomenon. Resil- iency, connectedness, and other potential buffers of the association between societal discrimination concern and be- havioral health warrant future study. This investigation could not biochemically verify substance use or obtain clinician di- agnoses of depression or ADHD. Although the societal dis- crimination concern items exhibited high internal reliability in this study, they have not been subject to extensive psycho- metric evaluation. These items assess concern over increases in societal discrimination, yet some youth may not perceive societal discrimination to be increasing. Whether findings would generalize to other geographic locations or other de- velopmental periods is unknown. Conclusions Recent societal increases in hostility and discrimination di- rected toward minorities may be a significant source of con- cern in youth that is associated with adverse behavioral health outcomes, particularly in teenagers of color or from socioeco- nomically disadvantaged families. Although some of the as- sociations were of small magnitude, even modest increases in the risk of adolescent behavioral health problems may pose im- portant public health consequences given that increasing so- cietal discrimination can be a nationwide (and to some de- gree international) phenomenon. The behavioral consequences of adolescent exposure to public expressions of discrimina- tion may warrant public health attention. ARTICLE INFORMATION Accepted for Publication: May 9, 2018. Published Online: August 20, 2018. doi:10.1001/jamapediatrics.2018.2022 Author Contributions: Dr Leventhal was the principal investigator. Drs Leventhal and Cho had full access to all the data in the study and take responsibility for the integrity of the data and the accuracy of the data analysis. Concept and design: Leventhal, Cho. Acquisition, analysis, or interpretation of data: All authors. Drafting of the manuscript: Leventhal, Cho, Andrabi. Critical revision of the manuscript for important intellectual content: Leventhal, Cho, Barrington-Trimis. Statistical analysis: Cho. Obtained funding: Leventhal. Administrative, technical, or material support: All authors. Supervision: Leventhal. Conflict of Interest Disclosures: None reported. Funding/Support: This study was supported by grant R01-DA033296 from the National Institutes of Health. Role of the Funder/Sponsor: The sponsor had no role in the design and conduct of the study; collection, management, analysis, and interpretation of the data; preparation, review, or approval of the manuscript; and decision to submit the manuscript for publication. REFERENCES 1. Williams DR, Medlock MM. Health effects of dramatic societal events: ramifications of the recent presidential election. N Engl J Med. 2017;376(23): 2295-2299. doi:10.1056/NEJMms1702111 2. Swaine J, Laughland O, Lartey J, McCarthy C. Young black men killed by US police at highest rate in year of 1134 deaths. 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The heritability of hedonic capacity and perceived stress: a twin study evaluation of candidate depressive phenotypes. Psychol Med. 2009;39(2):211-218. doi:10.1017 /S0033291708003619 30. Unger JB, Soto DW, Baezconde-Garbanati L. Trajectories of perceived discrimination from adolescence to emerging adulthood and substance use among Hispanic youth in Los Angeles. Addict Behav. 2016;53:108-112. doi:10.1016/j.addbeh.2015 .10.009 31. Charles ST, Piazza JR, Mogle J, Sliwinski MJ, Almeida DM. The wear and tear of daily stressors on mental health. Psychol Sci. 2013;24(5): 733-741. doi:10.1177/0956797612462222 32. Quinn ME, Joormann J. Control when it counts: change in executive control under stress predicts depression symptoms. Emotion. 2015;15(4):522-530. doi:10.1037/emo0000089 33. Sinha R, Jastreboff AM. Stress as a common risk factor for obesity and addiction. Biol Psychiatry. 2013;73(9):827-835. doi:10.1016/j.biopsych.2013.01 .032 34. Duckworth AL, Kim B, Tsukayama E. 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work_io277joyifavjhcg6wb45z366a	----	Brexit: the country goes, but UK public health principles remain E D I T O R I A L Brexit: the country goes, but UK public health principles remain Céline Miani1 • Yudit Namer1 • Judith Wenner1 • Oliver Razum1 Received: 18 July 2017 / Accepted: 21 July 2017 / Published online: 26 July 2017 � Swiss School of Public Health (SSPH+) 2017 On 23 June 2016, the citizens of the United Kingdom (UK) voted in favour of the so-called ‘‘Brexit’’ when they were asked in a referendum if they wanted their country to remain in or leave the European Union (EU). Since the vote, the political debate has been tense, showcasing the opposition of two irreconcilable views of the British soci- ety and of the role of the UK in Europe. In the Remain camp, it is believed that the common market and free movement of persons will contribute to greater social progress and economic opportunities. The Leavers, or Brexiteers, expect that a more independent nation in con- trol of its borders and migration influx will be stronger and more likely to thrive economically. In reality things are still uncertain, and the conditions of the ‘‘exit’’ are yet to be negotiated. This transition period has seen so far an increase in hate crimes and other aggressive behaviours toward those with a migration background, or thought to have a migration background such as ethnic minorities (NPCC 2016), encouraged by the discourse of anti-immigration, anti-multiculturalism which fuelled the referendum outcome in the first place (Hobolt 2016). In the meantime, anxiety has reached new heights among migrants from the EU and beyond who reside in the UK and now fear to see their prospects darkened, jobs threatened, and rights dented. The trigger of Article 50 marking the beginning of a 2-year exit negotiations process in March 2017, and the 8 June 2017 general elections which saw the victory (albeit not as large as expected) of the Conservative Party, have allowed even further the hard stance on Brexit to prevail. Driven by the good intention of making the most out of the inevitability of Brexit, some prominent figures of the UK public health community are arguing that now is the time to start working in favour of a ‘‘soft’’ Brexit rather than oppose the Brexit as a block. They hope that a soft Brexit would at least soften the blow for UK citizens’ health (Horton 2017). Their plea for a constructive approach is motivated by mounting concerns about the fact that Euro- pean health workers may desert or be forced to desert the National Health Service (NHS), that access to healthcare for British people residing in other European countries may become more challenging, and that EU funding for UK- based public health research may vanish. Unlike the partisans of the pragmatic solution, we believe that there is still an urgent need to clearly position oneself against the underlying arguments of Brexit. Indeed, even its softest version will have far-reaching conse- quences for bystanders such as refugees and immigrants, and even for non-British EU citizens in the UK. It is this aspect that we are missing in the discussions about the soft Brexit. By focusing principally on the interests of the British people, a soft Brexit will equally contribute to building an othering, ‘‘us versus them’’ narrative that is divisive, contradicting the principles of global health and likely to compromise even further the health of less pro- tected groups such as refugees and immigrants. Our argument is based on the following possible public health outcomes. First, second-class resident status, or absence of legal status, force people out of preventative and curative care systems, jeopardizing their health and potentially ending up costing more to the health systems than it should have due to emergency procedures. Second, ‘‘othering’’ runs the risk of increasing mental illness among & Oliver Razum oliver.razum@uni-bielefeld.de 1 Department of Epidemiology and International Public Health, School of Public Health, Bielefeld University, P. O. Box 100131, 33501 Bielefeld, Germany 123 Int J Public Health (2017) 62:717–718 DOI 10.1007/s00038-017-1024-z http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1007/s00038-017-1024-z&amp;domain=pdf http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1007/s00038-017-1024-z&amp;domain=pdf those who are flatly rejected by society because of their country of origin (Grove and Zwi 2006). Third, stricter immigration rules are likely to further endanger the health status of those who will be prevented from entering the UK, either because they will make greater use of unsafe passages or because they will remain longer in transition spaces not fit for purpose (Razum and Bozorgmehr 2015). We agree that some pragmatic steps must be taken to ensure UK population health, for example to secure EU funding for science partnerships with the UK (Galsworthy and McKee 2017), but this should not end in cherry-pick- ing. Promoting a soft Brexit ultimately promotes also the xenophobic agenda of Brexiteers. It is part of the European public health professionals’ role, in particular of those from the UK, to insist that the UK continue sharing responsi- bilities in an interdependent and interconnected world, which includes healthcare for, and integration of migrants and refugees (Razum et al. 2016). An important first step in this direction would include supporting both targeted health and social interventions that address the specific challenges of migrants’ health and access for immigrants and refugees to the same healthcare entitlements as the general population. There is an urgency to take action and rise above the political paralysis, not to negotiate access to health on Brexiteer terms, but with the ultimate aim to reinstate the shared value of health as a universal human right (Knipper 2016). Compliance with ethical standards Conflict of interest Oliver Razum is member of the UK Society for Social Medicine Working Group on Brexit and Health. The other authors declare no conflict of interest. References Galsworthy M, McKee M (2017) A plan for U.K. science after the European Union referendum. Science 355:31–32. doi:10.1126/ science.aal1423 Grove NJ, Zwi AB (2006) Our health and theirs: forced migration, othering, and public health. Soc Sci Med 62:1931–1942. doi:10. 1016/j.socscimed.2005.08.061 Hobolt SB (2016) The Brexit vote: a divided nation, a divided continent. J Eur Public Policy 23:1259–1277 Horton R (2017) Offline: B-day—time to get real. The Lancet 389:2091. doi:10.1016/S0140-6736(17):31426-5 Knipper M (2016) Migration, public health and human rights. Int J Public Health 61(9):993–994. doi:10.1007/s00038-016-0893-x NPCC (2016) Hate crime undermines the diversity and tolerance we should instead be celebrating (July 8, 2016). National Police Chiefs’ Council [NPCC], London. https://news.npcc.police.uk/ releases/hate-crime-undermines-the-diversity-and-tolerance-we- should-instead-be-celebrating-1. Last accessed 14 July 2017 Razum O, Bozorgmehr K (2015) Disgrace at EU’s external borders. Int J Public Health 60(5):515–516. doi:10.1007/s00038-015- 0689-4 Razum O, Barros H, Otok R, Tulchinsky TH, Lindert J (2016) ASPHER position paper on refugee health. Eurohealth 22:36–38 718 C. Miani et al. 123 http://dx.doi.org/10.1126/science.aal1423 http://dx.doi.org/10.1126/science.aal1423 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2005.08.061 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2005.08.061 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(17):31426-5 http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00038-016-0893-x https://news.npcc.police.uk/releases/hate-crime-undermines-the-diversity-and-tolerance-we-should-instead-be-celebrating-1 https://news.npcc.police.uk/releases/hate-crime-undermines-the-diversity-and-tolerance-we-should-instead-be-celebrating-1 https://news.npcc.police.uk/releases/hate-crime-undermines-the-diversity-and-tolerance-we-should-instead-be-celebrating-1 http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00038-015-0689-4 http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00038-015-0689-4 Brexit: the country goes, but UK public health principles remain References 
work_iphpjkwp5fcqzaf2lsjeh7ez54	----	Microsoft Word - GayandLesbian cops (1).docx Gay and Lesbian Cops: Diversity and Effective Policing, by Roddrick A. Colvin (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc., 2012 This book confronts an area of police organisation which has received scarce empirical research ‒ the experiences of gay and lesbian officers. Colvin’s study is a comparative one focusing on the UK and USA police, comprising of fieldwork in specific locales in both countries (Hampshire and Wiltshire in the UK, and Washington DC in the USA). This included a non-random survey of gay, lesbian and bisexual officers in the UK (n=243) and in the USA (n=66), together with qualitative interviews and focus groups with a smaller number of officers ‒ totalling the largest single study of gay and lesbian officers conducted. Situated within the broad theme of community policing, Colvin charts the ways the diversity of the police organisation has evolved, and the political processes which have structured this. Colvin’s analysis is focused principally around the roles of gay and lesbian police officers and their cultural competency to deal with crimes involving the gay, lesbian, bisexual and transgender community (GLBT). In the context of previous hallowing works charting systematic homophobia within the police (e.g. Burke, 1993, Leinen, 1993), the book reads very optimistically in many sections, charting the numerous strides taken to improve the experiences of gay and lesbian officers in the police. Much of the book is focused on the role of specific units established within the police organisation to respond to crimes impacting on the GLBT community. These police initiatives include Lesbian and Gay Liaison Officers (LAGLOs) evident in many police departments in England and Wales, and Gay and Lesbian Liaison Units in Washington D.C. These initiatives are analysed through the police’s roles and effectiveness in both engaging with GLBT communities, and responding to homophobic- orientated crimes. In both situations, the police have historically failed to establish trust with such communities. Colvin describes the organisational changes which have given rise to a much more progressive police response in both the UK and US field sites. The changes within the Washington D.C Police Department were attributed to several high profile incidents of police corruption and systematic failures to respond to hate crimes involving the GLBT community, where the then chief of police, Charles Ramsey implemented an organisational ‘shake-up’ of the department to improve its relations with minority communities. By contrast in the UK, Colvin attributes the police’s organisational changes to the McPherson Report and its provision of guidelines to improve relations between the police and minority communities. In the U.K field sites these were also supported by sexual health agencies whose evidence gathering helped uncover a reliable picture of needs and experiences of the GLBT community which was subsequently used by the police to help devise policies in these areas. As evidence of such progress made by the police, Colvin points to factors including higher rates of hate crime reporting, a greater level of trust between the police and GLBT community, and higher rates of crimes solved, particularly homicides. The overall argument of the book is a mixed picture of the genuine recognition of sexual diversity within the police. The success appears to be more for GLBT communities than for the actual officers responding to such crimes. The survey responses included significant numbers of respondents reporting discrimination in terms of employment and promotion opportunities, feelings of isolation due to their sexual orientation, as well as instances of receiving homophobic slurs against them from other officers. However, whilst these findings are woven into latter chapters in the book, analysis of these issues were minimal by comparison to documentations of the progress, and opportunities for further improvements to the sexual diversity of the police organisation. This was expressed both in relation to the volume of serving gay and lesbian officers, and the values driven through policies and procedures designed to investigate crime and victimisation involving GLBT communities. A particular strength of the book was the repeated attempt to connect the plight of gay and lesbian officers with other minorities within the police organisation (namely involving race, ethnicity and gender). Here many similarities are discovered in terms of discrimination, characterised by the general underrepresentation of these groups within the police. Colvin assesses the status of community policing as a mechanism through which to situate and enact specific responses to the GLBT community, highlighting some of the critiques of this model of policing, most notably the implementation gap between the intentions and the actual practices of community policing. What Colvin does not develop however is an analysis of whether the rather normative construct of ‘community’ displayed and enacted within community policing can embrace the multitude of minority identities and experiences both of and within GLBT groups, including the potential outcome of this ‘community’ model for excluding and marginalising particular voices and experiences (see also Moran, 2007). Colvin also develops the analysis of the experiences of gay and lesbian officers into a number of useful policy recommendations, focusing on leadership, planned change, recruitment and retention of police officers. At the core of Colvin’s argument is the belief that ‘a diverse police force will enhance an agency’s understanding of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) community’ (p153). Firstly, change within the police must be driven by senior officers in a noncoercive manner, guiding and not driving through reforms as a way of re-aligning rank and file officers’ beliefs and values. Secondly, planned change should be strategic and seek to establish a climate of change which accommodates diversity and inclusion. Thirdly, recruitment drives should apply ‘population-specific strategies’ (p.164) as a way of improving the pool of possible police recruits. Finally, retaining officers once they arrive should be developed through strategies including financial compensation and incentives, training and education, promotion streams, mentoring and officer associations to provide support for GLBT officers when in post. Whilst supportive of the central contentions of the book regarding the changing diversity of the police through the experiences of gay and lesbian officers, there were certain features of the analysis which were less convincing. One reservation concerns the role of specific lesbian and gay policing units involved in delivering strategies of engagement and investigation of crime and victimisation within GLBT communities. As previously mentioned, such units are repeatedly referred to in the text as success stories in improving the diversity of the police and their responsiveness to crimes impacting on the GLBT community. Without doubting the benefits of such initiatives for the police and the community, this argument is difficult to make unless a comprehensive analysis of the attitudes and working practices of non-gay and lesbian officers is made. No doubt the units can play a key role in inspiring cultural change within the police, but given recent research highlighting the continuation of many dominant elements of police culture which have been well attributed to homophobic police officer behaviour (Loftus, 2008, 2010), the analysis would have profited from a closer connection with these bodies of literature. These include a resistance to ‘outsiders’ (non-white, male and heterosexual officers), strong officer solidarity, a masculine ethos encouraged by the perception of conflict and violence in policing, and shared conservative values systems both in the political form, but also in terms of resistance to many police reforms. Whilst organisational change in the police is undoubtedly complex, one such manifestation of the McPherson Report’s attempt to improve police responses to diversity issues has been a growing sense of anxiety for its traditional officer demographic ‒ namely white, working class male officers. This anxiety can often lead to resistance and even more attenuated homophobia (and racism and sexism) in certain situations, what Loftus (2008) argues is symptomatic of what she terms ‘white victimhood’. In short, although the progress charted in the book of the police’s engagement with diversity issues is significant, it remains to be seen whether the current austerity cuts to police budgets will genuinely accommodate such diversity, or rather lead to growing instances of cynicism and resistance at a rank and file officer level. Daniel McCarthy University of Surrey, UK References Burke, M (1993) Coming out of the Blue: British Police Officers Talk about their Lives in “The Job” as Lesbians, Gays and Bisexuals, New York, Cassell Publishing Leinen, S (1993) Gay Cops, New Brunswick: NJ, Rutgers University Press Loftus, B (2008) ‘Dominant Culture Interrupted: Recognition, Resentment and the Politics of Change in an English Police Force’, British Journal of Criminology, Vol 48, 756-777 Loftus, B (2010) Police Culture in a Changing World, Oxford, Oxford University Press Moran, L (2007) ‘Invisible Minorities’: Challenging community and neighbourhood models of policing, Criminology and Criminal Justice, 7 (4), 417-441 
work_isrhnv43erbhzceekqqq676rny	----	Do Laws Shape Attitudes? Evidence from Same-Sex Relationship Recognition Policies in Europe DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES IZA DP No. 11743 Cevat G. Aksoy Christopher S. Carpenter Ralph De Haas Kevin Tran Do Laws Shape Attitudes? Evidence from Same-Sex Relationship Recognition Policies in Europe AUGUST 2018 Any opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author(s) and not those of IZA. Research published in this series may include views on policy, but IZA takes no institutional policy positions. The IZA research network is committed to the IZA Guiding Principles of Research Integrity. The IZA Institute of Labor Economics is an independent economic research institute that conducts research in labor economics and offers evidence-based policy advice on labor market issues. Supported by the Deutsche Post Foundation, IZA runs the world’s largest network of economists, whose research aims to provide answers to the global labor market challenges of our time. Our key objective is to build bridges between academic research, policymakers and society. IZA Discussion Papers often represent preliminary work and are circulated to encourage discussion. Citation of such a paper should account for its provisional character. A revised version may be available directly from the author. Schaumburg-Lippe-Straße 5–9 53113 Bonn, Germany Phone: +49-228-3894-0 Email: publications@iza.org www.iza.org IZA – Institute of Labor Economics DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES IZA DP No. 11743 Do Laws Shape Attitudes? Evidence from Same-Sex Relationship Recognition Policies in Europe AUGUST 2018 Cevat G. Aksoy EBRD, London School of Economics and IZA Christopher S. Carpenter Vanderbilt University, NBER and IZA Ralph De Haas EBRD and Tilburg University Kevin Tran DIW Berlin ABSTRACT IZA DP No. 11743 AUGUST 2018 Do Laws Shape Attitudes? Evidence from Same-Sex Relationship Recognition Policies in Europe* Understanding whether laws shape or simply reflect citizens’ attitudes is important but empirically difficult. We provide new evidence on this question by studying the relationship between legal same-sex relationship recognition policies (SSRRPs) and attitudes toward sexual minorities in Europe. Using data from the European Social Surveys covering 2002- 2016 and exploiting variation in the timing of SSRRPs across countries, we show that legal relationship recognition is associated with statistically significant improvements in attitudes toward sexual minorities. These effects are widespread across demographic groups, emerge only after the policies are adopted, and are not observed for views on other social issues. Our results suggest that laws can exert a powerful influence in shaping societal attitudes. JEL Classification: F5, K36 Keywords: public opinion, same-sex relationship recognition policies, LGBT attitudes Corresponding author: Cevat Giray Aksoy European Bank for Reconstruction and Development One Exchange Square London EC2A 2JN United Kingdom E-mail: aksoyc@ebrd.com * We are grateful for helpful comments from Nathan Anderson, Marcus Dillender, Sergei Guriev, Cindy Kam, Berkay Ozcan, Nathaniel Young, and conference and seminar participants at Vanderbilt University, the 2018 AEA/ASSA meetings, the 2017 CREST/IZA/OECD Conference on Discrimination, and the 2017 APPAM Fall Research Conference. Results do not imply endorsement from the EBRD or any other organization. All interpretations, errors, and omissions are our own. 1 1. Introduction Scholars have long recognized the importance of understanding whether laws shape or simply reflect societal attitudes (Downs 1957, Besley and Case 2003, and others), but providing credible empirical evidence on this question has proven difficult. We present new evidence on this topic by using the gradual rollout of same-sex relationship recognition policies throughout Europe as plausibly exogenous policy variation to understand whether laws shape attitudes toward sexual minorities. Studying these policy changes is timely because advancements in civil rights for lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) individuals throughout Europe and the Americas have been some of the most striking social changes in recent decades. As recently as 2000, same-sex marriage was not legal in any European country; as of the time of this writing, same-sex couples can legally marry in 17 countries throughout Europe while same-sex registered domestic partnerships/civil unions are available in 11 others. Figure 1 shows that over this same period, the share of citizens who agree with the statement that “Gay men and lesbians should be free to live their own life as they wish” increased considerably – by about ten percentage points. How might same-sex marriage and same-sex registered domestic partnership policies (henceforth: same-sex relationship recognition policies, or SSRRPs) affect attitudes toward sexual minorities? Flores and Barclay (2016) discuss four possibilities: backlash, legitimacy, polarization, and consensus. A 2 backlash model predicts that attitudes toward LGBT people might become substantially more negative following legal recognition of same-sex relationships, especially in the case of judicial rulings. A legitimacy model predicts that legal rulings may increase acceptance and approval of LGBT populations as people infer the laws as increasing social legitimacy. A polarization model predicts that focusing on events such as major same-sex relationship policies may reduce ambivalence toward LGBT people and increase both social approval and disapproval of sexual minorities. Finally, a consensus model predicts that attitudes shape policy but that policy has no effects on attitudes. These alternative hypotheses make clear that ultimately the relationship between legal same-sex marriage and attitudes towards gay men and lesbians is an empirical question. We provide direct evidence on this question by using variation in the timing of the adoption of SSRRPs across a large set of European countries. SSRRPs remain high on the policy agenda across the world, including in Australia, Europe, and Latin America. Understanding the impact of such policies on public attitudes is important for policymakers trying to gauge their social implications – particularly with respect to the risk of backlash and/or polarization. Our data allow us to examine whether relationship recognition policies have unintended negative effects on views toward sexual minorities for particular demographic groups such as men, rural populations, and religious individuals. 3 Knowing whether there are adverse attitudinal effects for specific groups can help design policies to counterbalance any such spillover effects from SSRRPs. Our analysis uses data from the 2002-2016 European Social Surveys which asked over 325,000 individuals across Europe identically worded questions about a range of social and economic issues. Of particular interest is a specific question on whether the respondent agrees that “Gay men and lesbians should be free to live their own life as they wish”. We use cross-country variation in the timing of SSRRP adoption to estimate difference-in-differences models while controlling for individual demographic characteristics, country characteristics, other LGBT policies (such as nondiscrimination laws, adoption policies, and hate crimes legislation), country, year, and month fixed effects, and linear country- specific time trends. To preview, we find that – consistent with a legitimacy model – laws do cause changes in attitudes. The introduction of a relationship recognition law for same-sex couples is associated with a statistically significant 3.6 percentage point increase in the likelihood that a respondent agreed that gay men and lesbians should be free to live their own life as they wish. This effect is about five percent of the baseline average. These results mean that the adoption of expanded relationship recognition policies for same-sex couples can explain 36 percent of the ten-percentage point increase over our sample period in the share of adults 4 agreeing that gay men and lesbians should be free to live their own life as they wish (Figure 1). Event study models confirm that the effects we identify emerge only after policy adoption, suggesting that the policies cause changes in attitudes (and not vice versa). We also show that the effects of same-sex relationship policies are unique to LGBT attitudes: there is no systematic relation between these policies and people’s views on other social and economic issues (including attitudes toward other minority groups such as immigrants). Moreover, we document that the effects we identify are widespread across many demographic groups. Our results also illustrate the importance of accounting for time invariant country-specific effects. Models that rely only on cross-sectional differences in the presence of SSRRPs across countries return associations between policies and attitudes that are three to ten times larger than our two-way fixed effects estimates. Thus, we find that policies both reflect and affect attitudes. Regarding the latter, our results suggest that attitudes toward sexual minorities are likely to improve further as the trend toward more countries adopting SSRRPs continues. We proceed as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on same-sex relationship recognition policies and attitudes toward LGBT people. Section 3 then describes the data and outlines our empirical approach. Section 4 presents the results after which Section 5 concludes. 5 2. Related literature Only few papers have examined how same-sex relationship policies may be related to public opinion and attitudes. Like us, Takács and Szalma (2011) and Hooghe and Meeusen (2013) use European Social Survey (ESS) data but instead rely on cross-sectional designs. They find that individuals in countries with marriage equality had significantly more pro-LGBT attitudes than individuals in countries without relationship recognition for same-sex couples. Takács et al. (2016) use the 2008-2010 European Values Survey (EVS) to show that legislation permitting same-sex couples to adopt children is associated with respondents’ views about whether homosexual couples should be allowed to adopt children. However, the cross-sectional nature of these research designs limits their ability to make credible causal claims. Our study is more closely related to a recent working paper by Kenny and Patel (2017) who use the 1989-2014 World Values Survey data and the 2006- 2016 Gallup World Poll data to estimate difference-in-differences models relating legalization of homosexuality to attitudes toward sexual minorities. They find evidence that when countries make homosexuality illegal, individuals are significantly more likely to state that they would not like to have a gay neighbor, less likely to state that homosexuality is justifiable, and more likely to state that their area is a bad place for gay men and lesbians to live. 6 Our contribution differs in several respects. First, and most importantly, we focus on relationship recognition policies instead of policies to make homosexuality illegal. Our results are therefore more germane for understanding shifts in attitudes in North and South America, where relationship recognition has recently been adopted or is on the current political agenda. We also employ different data (the European Social Survey, which we describe below) including a novel measure of attitudes toward sexual minorities. Importantly, we also explore heterogeneity in the effects of policies on attitudes toward sexual minorities to see whether policies widened or reduced pre-existing gaps in these views. Our study is also related to two recent papers in political science that use individual-level panel data to examine the effects of same-sex marriage policies. Kreitzer et al. (2014) study a panel of individuals before and after Iowa’s state Supreme Court legalized same-sex marriage. They examine stated support for various relationship recognition statuses for same-sex couples and find that the law signaled new social norms which pressured some respondents to modify their expressed support. Flores and Barclay (2016) examine the effects of the 2013 rulings on same-sex marriage in the United States on attitudes toward LGBT people as measured by ‘feeling thermometers’ (in addition to questions about support for same-sex marriage). They find that people in states that introduced same-sex marriage saw the greatest reduction in anti-gay attitudes. They interpret 7 this evidence as consistent with a legitimacy model and inconsistent with backlash or polarization models. Unlike these two studies, we lack panel data to follow the same individuals over time. Our data and setting, however, do provide some unique advantages that allow us to complement prior work. Relative to the Kreitzer et al. (2014) study, for example, our paper examines effects of policies on mass attitudes toward LGBT people as opposed to support for specific policy proposals such as marriage equality. And unlike Kreitzer et al. (2014) and Flores and Barclay (2016), we are also able to test for heterogeneity in the relationship between same-sex relationship recognition policies and attitudes toward LGBT people. Our work also contributes to recent research examining the determinants of homophobia and transphobia. Broockman and Kalla (2016), for example, performed a randomized experiment and find that conversations with residents in South Florida that asked participants to take the perspective of others significantly reduced prejudice, and that the effect persisted for three months. They also show that the intervention increased support for a nondiscrimination law. In contrast, this paper asks if public policies related to relationship recognition independently lead to meaningful changes in attitudes toward sexual minorities. Finally, our paper is related to State and Wernerfelt (2017) who use data from Facebook profiles. The authors examine how state and federal court rulings 8 on same-sex marriage impact individuals’ social-media behavior including using the ‘rainbow filter’ to show support for same-sex marriage, ‘liking’ a page for LGBT rights organizations, or changing one’s relationship status. They find sharp changes in these LGBT-support measures coincident with the timing of legal same-sex marriage in the United States. 3. Data description and empirical approach Our data on attitudes toward sexual minorities come from the 2002-2016 European Social Surveys (ESS). These surveys are fielded every year in over 30 European countries and include questions on a range of topics.1 Our main sample includes over 325,000 respondents age 18 and older from 32 European countries. The key outcome variable in this paper comes from a question asked to all ESS respondents: “Do you believe that gay men and lesbians should be free to live their own life as they wish?”.2 We also examine responses to other questions 1 The sample is an unbalanced panel because not all countries contribute data in every year. 2 Other European surveys also ask questions about homosexuality and/or sexual minorities but do not provide sufficient coverage, in terms of countries and years, to support the two-way fixed effects empirical framework we use. Despite this, we have confirmed that our ESS ‘free to live their own life as they wish’ question is strongly correlated with questions from other European surveys when aggregated by country-year. For example, the 1990, 1999, and 2008 European Values Survey (EVS) asked: “On this list are various groups of people. Could you please sort out any that you would not like to have as neighbors?” ‘Homosexuals’ was one response option, so we can identify individuals who would prefer not to live next to a gay person. The 2010 and 2016 Life in Transition Survey (LiTS) includes a similar question. The EVS also included a question about the ‘justifiability of homosexuality’ on a scale of 1 to 10, with 1 being ‘always justifiable’ and 10 being ‘never justifiable’. The Gallup World Polls asks respondents whether their city or area is ‘a good place to live for gay men and lesbians’. Appendix Table A1 presents a correlation 9 about immigration and related social issues as placebo outcomes. We do not have information on the sexual orientation of ESS respondents, but most credible population-based surveys indicate that sexual minorities constitute a very small share of the overall population (generally between 1 and 3 percent of adults). To estimate the effect of relationship recognition policies for same-sex couples on attitudes toward sexual minorities, we estimate standard difference-in- differences models that rely on plausibly exogenous variation in the timing of policy adoption across countries. These models take the form: Yict = β0 + β1Xict + β2SSRRPct + β3Zct + β4Cc + β5Tt + β6Cc*Trend + εict (1) where Yict is a variable indicating positive attitudes toward sexual minorities for individual i in country c at time t. Xict is a vector of standard individual characteristics: a Male dummy; Age and its square; dummy variables for Education categories (secondary and tertiary schooling, with less than secondary education as the excluded category); dummy variables for Marital/partnership status; a dummy variable for living in an Urban area; and dummy variables for religion (Orthodox Christian, Catholic, Protestant/Other Christian, Muslim, and Other religion, with atheist/agnostic/None as the excluded category). Same-Sex Relationship Recognition Policy (SSRRP) is an indicator variable equal to one in matrix for our ESS measure and these other variables and shows that they are all strongly correlated in predictable ways. 10 the countries and periods when same-sex marriage and/or same-sex registered partnerships/civil unions are legally available to same-sex couples.3 We estimate linear probability models for ease of interpretation. The coefficient of interest is β2, which in the presence of country and year dummies and country-specific trends (described below) is identified from sharp within- country changes in outcomes coincident with variation in the timing of policy adoption across countries. The key identifying assumption is that LGBT attitudes would have evolved identically in countries with and without relationship recognition policies had they not been adopted. Zct is a vector of other country-time varying policies and characteristics that may correlate with the policies we study. The data come from the International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association (ILGA) and various government webpages. These variables indicate whether the country has an explicit ban on same-sex marriage, whether the country's antidiscrimination protections include sexual orientation, whether the country permits adoption by same-sex couples, whether the constitution explicitly protects sexual minorities, 3 We experimented with separate variables for same-sex marriage and same-sex registered partnerships/civil unions, but we do not have enough power to separately identify their effects. Also, in a few countries there was a lag between the legalization of same-sex marriage (enactment date) and the issuance of the first same-sex marriage licenses (effective date). For example, Finland approved same-sex marriage in December 2014, but marriage licenses for same-sex couples were not available until March 2017. Given that same-sex couples constitute a small fraction of the population and given that we think the treatment is mainly about the legitimization of same-sex couples by the government, we code the policy variables according to the enactment dates. In most cases, there was little time between the enactment and effective dates. 11 and whether the country allows sexual orientation-based crimes to be classified as hate crimes. Zct also includes the log of GDP per capita (in 2010 US Dollars). Cc and Tt are a full set of country and year dummies, respectively. The former absorb time-invariant variation in the outcome variable caused by factors that vary across countries while the latter eliminate time-varying shocks that affect all countries simultaneously. We also include calendar month-of-interview dummies (not shown in equation 1). Lastly, we control for country-specific linear time trends by interacting each country fixed effect with a variable Trend that equals 1 in the first year of the sample, 2 in the second, and so forth. These trends remove variation in within-country attitudes toward sexual minorities due to factors that are country-specific over time. Sample weights make the data representative at the country level, and we cluster standard errors by country (Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan, 2004). 4. Results 4.1. Descriptive statistics We first present descriptive statistics for the policy variables, LGBT attitudes, and individual demographic characteristics in Table 1. We provide means for the full sample in column 1, for countries that had adopted SSRRPs by the end of our sample period in column 2, and for countries that did not adopt SSRRPs by the end of our sample period in column 3. 12 The majority of respondents in our sample live in a country that had adopted legal same-sex marriage or registered domestic partnership/civil unions by 2016. Table 1 also shows that countries with legal relationship recognition for same-sex couples by 2016 were much more likely to have adopted other pro- LGBT policies such as employment protection for sexual minorities, the establishment of hate crimes laws covering sexual orientation, explicit constitutional protection for sexual minorities, and adoption rights for same-sex couples. Moreover, these differences are large, in the order of 30-50 percentage points between countries with and without legal relationship recognition policies for same-sex couples by the end of the sample period. This pattern suggests that unobserved fixed differences across countries may be important as well, an issue we address by using a quasi-experimental approach. Table 1 also shows that individuals in countries with relationship recognition policies for same-sex couples were much more likely (40 percentage points or twice as likely) to agree with the statement that gay men and lesbians should be free to live their own life as they wish. These differences are much larger than the differences for questions related to immigrants (which are not very different across columns 2 and 3). We also see that differences in demographic characteristics across countries with and without legal relationship recognition for same-sex couples are small, with a few exceptions. One notable difference is the share of individuals who identify as religious: while less than 80 percent of 13 individuals in countries that had same-sex marriage or registered domestic partnerships/civil unions by 2016 report a religion, the share reporting a religion in countries without legal relationship recognition for same-sex couples by 2016 is significantly higher at 91 percent. This pattern also underlines the importance of accounting for country fixed effects. 4.2. Main results Table 2 presents our baseline estimates, based on equation (1), of the link between relationship recognition policies and attitudes toward sexual minorities. Each column reports a separate regression model, and we report the coefficient on the SSRRP indicator and the associated standard error. Column 1 reports results from a model where we only include the indicator for SSRRPs. We find that individuals in country/year combinations with same-sex relationship recognition have significantly more positive attitudes toward sexual minorities than individuals in country/year combinations without these policies. Specifically, we estimate that the presence of SSRRPs is associated with a statistically significant 40 percentage point higher likelihood of agreeing that gay men and lesbians should be free to live their own life as they wish. In column 2 we control for individual characteristics, country characteristics, and other LGBT-related public policies. When we add those covariates, the size of the association between SSRRPs and attitudes toward sexual minorities declines substantially. Yet, we 14 still find that individuals in country/year combinations with SSRRPs are 9.3 percentage points more likely to agree that gay men and lesbians should be free to live their own life as they wish, as compared with otherwise similar individuals in places without SSRRPs. The results in column 3 of Table 2 speak directly to the importance of accounting for time-invariant country-specific unobserved heterogeneity as well as smooth country-specific linear time trends. In this augmented model the SSRRP dummy is identified from sharp deviations off smooth trends in outcomes coincident with the timing of the relationship recognition policies across countries. These country-specific time trends are jointly significant predictors of the sexual minority attitude outcome (p-value < 0.01). Once we account for year and month fixed effects, country fixed effects, and linear country trends, we find that the association between same-sex relationship recognition policies and attitudes toward sexual minorities is reduced further in magnitude: it is about a third of the size of the model in column 2 and one tenth of the size of the model in column 1. This is consistent with the idea that unobserved permanent cross- country differences and country-specific trends explain a substantial portion of the variation in support for sexual minorities, or put differently that laws reflect attitudes. We nevertheless continue to find that same-sex relationship recognition is associated with a statistically significant increase in the likelihood of agreeing with the pro-LGBT statement, an effect of about 3.6 percentage points. Relative 15 to the base year sample mean, this is an effect of 5.3 percent. This pattern is consistent with the idea that laws affect attitudes. We consider the estimate in column 3 of Table 2 as our baseline estimate. Figure 2 shows event-study estimates of the relationship between the adoption of legal SSRRPs and improved LGBT attitudes. The figure is based on our baseline specification (column 3 in Table 2) with linear country trends, a battery of individual covariates, and the full set of fixed effects. The sample consists of all countries that ever adopted a same-sex relationship recognition policy during our sample period. We follow Adukia et al. (2018) and exclude as our reference periods the year just prior to SSRRP adoption and the period for three or more years prior to SSRRP adoption. The event study estimates in Figure 2 provide evidence that relationship recognition policies for same-sex couples led to improved attitudes toward sexual minorities. Although few of the individual event time estimates are individually statistically significant, there is a noticeable immediate estimated increase in the likelihood of reporting that gay men and lesbians should be free to live their lives as they wish. The broad pattern and magnitude matches the baseline difference-in-differences estimates in Table 2. Returning to Table 2, we present in column 4 the results from a model where we exclude all of the LGBT policy controls except the relationship recognition variable to address possible concerns about collinearity among the various policies (though these models retain all the fixed effects and country- 16 specific time trends). We continue to find that same-sex relationship recognition policies are associated with statistically significant improvements in attitudes toward sexual minorities. Columns 5 and 6 of Table 2 shows estimates based on a sample of only those 23 countries that ever adopted a relationship recognition policy (column 5)4 or only the 13 counties that ever adopted a relationship recognition policy within our sample period (column 6).5 Our core findings are robust to these sample restrictions. Next, in column 7 of Table 2, we show estimates for the sample of individuals in countries that were observed for at least 12 years during the 2002- 2016 ESS period. Our result is robust to this sample restriction as well. Finally, in column 8 of Table 2 we report results from a model where we use the Wild Cluster bootstrap procedure with 999 repetitions to account for the small number of clusters, and again our main finding is robust. In Table 3, we strengthen inference further by showing that the relationship between SSRRPs and attitudes toward sexual minorities is unique to the LGBT domain. Specifically, we estimate similar models where we consider other outcome variables related to attitudes about non-LGBT issues such as immigration. If the timing of same-sex relationship recognition policies were 4 These countries are Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, England, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Northern Ireland, Norway, Portugal, Scotland, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and Wales. 5 These countries are Austria, Czech Republic, England, Estonia, Hungary, Ireland, Luxembourg, Northern Ireland, Scotland, Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland, and Wales. 17 correlated with other unobserved factors associated with more liberal or accepting societies in general, it would be incorrect to interpret the findings in Table 2 and Figure 2 as the effect of the relationship recognition policies on improving attitudes toward LGBT people. In this case, we might expect that the coefficient on same-sex marriage policies would be significantly related to more liberal attitudes on a range of issues and minority populations.6 Each row of Table 3 presents a separate regression model using the fully saturated specification with country-specific linear trends as in column 3 of Table 2. We report the pre-reform outcome means in column 1. Column 2 shows the coefficient estimates for the key indicator variable of interest: whether the country has legal same-sex relationship recognition. We begin by reprinting the baseline estimates for the “gay men and lesbians should be free to live their own life as they wish” question in the top row of Table 3. Row 2 then shows results for an outcome that equals one if the individual agreed that the country would be better if most people shared the same values. Row 3 shows results for an outcome that equals one if the individual agreed that immigrants cause crime. Row 4 shows results for an outcome that equals one if the individual agreed that immigrants put in more than they take out. Row 5 shows results for an outcome that equals one if the individual agreed that immigration enriches cultural life. Row 6 shows results 6 Of course, it is also possible that there are ‘real’ spillover effects of the treatment effects of relationship recognition policies at improving attitudes on other social issues, but we would expect any such spillovers to be small relative to the findings in Table 2. 18 for an outcome that equals one if the individual agreed that it is important to understand different people. Lastly, row 7 shows results for an outcome that equals one if the individual agreed that it is good to have a law against ethnic discrimination at the workplace. Together, these results confirm that the significant associations documented in Table 2 are unique to views about sexual minorities: we find no statistically significant associations between the availability of same-sex relationship recognition and any of the other attitudes in column 2 of Table 3.7 In Table 4, we investigate heterogeneity in the effects of same-sex legal relationship recognition policies on attitudes toward sexual minorities. The format is the same as that of Table 3 except that we now examine associations for various demographic groups. In each case, the outcome in Table 4 is the same outcome as in Table 2 (i.e., agreeing that gay men and lesbians should be free to live their own life as they wish). Column 1 reports the mean of the LGBT attitude question for 2002-2004 (the beginning of the sample) for the sub-group identified in each row. We report the relevant policy coefficient estimates on the SSRRP indicator in column 2. As in Table 3, each row reflects a separate regression that is fully saturated with controls for individual and country characteristics, country and time fixed effects, and linear country-specific time trends. 7 We are admittedly limited in the range of ‘placebo’ questions we can examine because over the sample period the ESS did not consistently ask questions about, for example, views on women or disabled individuals. 19 Column 1 of Table 4 reveals interesting descriptive heterogeneity in attitudes toward sexual minorities. For example, there is a notable gender difference: men report significantly more negative attitudes toward sexual minorities than women. There is also a substantial age effect: older individuals have significantly more negative attitudes toward sexual minorities than younger ones. Partnership, education, religion, and urban/rural differences are also observed clearly in the data. All of these differences are statistically significant at the 5 percent level. The regression results in column 2 indicate that legal same-sex relationship recognition policies were associated with statistically and economically significant improvements in attitudes toward sexual minorities across a broad demographic spectrum. We do, however, find some interesting heterogeneity in the impact of relationship recognition policies. For example, column 1 showed that partnered individuals (i.e., those married or with a cohabiting partner) hold significantly more negative attitudes toward sexual minorities than non-partnered people. Importantly, in column 2 we also find that relationship recognition policies have larger effects at improving attitudes toward sexual minorities for partnered people than for non-partnered people. In contrast, however, we do not find similar evidence that relationship recognition policies work to “close the gaps” associated with age, education, or religious affiliation. 20 5. Discussion and conclusion Do laws shape attitudes? Or do they simply reflect them? The results in this paper provide evidence that cross-country variation in policies toward sexual minorities reflects attitudes of the citizenry but also that such policies do have real effects in terms of shaping attitudes. Over our sample period, 13 countries adopted relationship recognition policies for same-sex couples. Our 2002-2016 data return evidence that such policies significantly improved attitudes toward sexual minorities. We also show that cross-sectional designs used in some of the prior literature tend to dramatically overstate the true causal relationship between policies and attitudes. Event study estimates confirm that improvements in attitudes toward sexual minorities only occur after policy adoption, further suggesting that the policies change attitudes. The effects are unique to attitudes about sexual minorities and are broad-based across gender, age, education, and relationship status. We do, however, estimate notably stronger responses for partnered individuals who had systematically more negative attitudes toward sexual minorities at the beginning of the sample period. What do our results suggest about the underlying structure of policies and attitudes? Recall that the political science literature on same-sex marriage and attitudes toward sexual minorities has considered four somewhat competing models of how legal same-sex marriage might be related to attitudes: backlash, 21 legitimacy, polarization, and consensus (Flores and Barclay 2016). Our findings provide direct commentary on these candidate models. First, the findings from Europe – like those in Flores and Barclay (2016) for a single state in the United States – do not support the backlash model. In no case do we find that policies to legally recognize same-sex relationships are associated with a significant worsening of attitudes toward LGBT people. Second, the results also are broadly inconsistent with a model of polarization. That model would predict that some groups’ attitudes would worsen while others would improve. We did not find much evidence for this at least as proxied by base period differences in attitudes toward sexual minorities. Third, the findings are also generally not supportive of the consensus model which predicts that there will be no effect on attitudes as the policies simply reflect changes in attitudes (and not vice versa). Instead, we find evidence that legal adoption of same-sex relationship recognition increases agreement with pro-LGBT views. This finding is most consistent with the legitimacy model whereby legal status confers legitimacy toward a particular group (here, sexual minorities), and attitudes adjust in response. Our results suggest that as marriage equality and other relationship recognition policies continue to expand throughout the world, we might expect to observe continued improvements in attitudes towards sexual minorities. This could translate into less discrimination (or more inclusion) in labor and housing 22 markets, improved mental health for sexual minorities, and a range of other potential benefits associated with less anti-LGBT sentiment. 23 References Adukia, Anjali, Sam Asher, and Paul Novosad (2018). “Educational Investment Responses to Economic Opportunity: Evidence from Indian Road Construction,” working paper. Bertrand, Marianne, Esther Duflo, and Sendhil Mullainathan (2004). “How Much Should We Trust Differences-in-Differences Estimates,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119(1): 249-275. Besley, Tim and Anne Case (2003). “Political Institutions and Policy Choices: Evidence from the United States,” Journal of Economic Literature, 41: 7- 73. Broockman, David and Joshua Kalla (2016). “Durably Reducing Transphobia: A Field Experiment on Door-to-Door Canvassing,” Science, 6282. Downs, Anthony (1957). “An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy”, Journal of Political Economy, 65(2): 135-150. Flores, Andrew R. and Scott Barclay (2016). “Backlash, Consensus, Legitimacy, or Polarization: The Effect of Same-Sex Marriage Policy on Mass Attitudes,” Political Research Quarterly, 69(1): 43-56. Hooghe, Marc and Cecil Meeusen (2013). “Is Same-Sex Marriage Legislation Related to Attitudes Toward Homosexuality? Trends in Tolerance of Homosexuality in European Countries Between 2002 and 2010,” Sexuality Research and Social Policy, 10(4): 258-268. Kenny, Charles and Dev Patel (2017). “Norms and Reform: Legalizing Homosexuality Improves Attitudes,” Center for Global Development Working Paper 465. Kreitzer, Rebecca J., Allison J. Hamilton, and Caroline J. Tolbert (2014). “Does Policy Adoption Change Opinions on Minority Rights? The Effects of Legalizing Same-Sex Marriage,” Political Research Quarterly, 67(4): 795-808. State, Bogdan and Nils Wernerfelt (2017). “Tipping in Social Norms: Evidence from the LGBT Movement,” working paper. 24 Takács, Judit and Ivett Szalma (2011). “Homophobia and same-sex partnership legislation in Europe,” Equity, Diversity and Inclusion: An International Journal, 30(5): 356-378. Takács, Judit, Ivett Szalma, and Tamás Bartus (2016). “Social Attitudes Toward Adoption by Same-Sex Couples in Europe,” Archives of Sexual Behavior, 45(7): 1787-1798. 25 Figure 1 Trends in Attitudes Toward Sexual Minorities Outcome is share of people in the country who agree that “Gay men and lesbians should be free to live their own life as they wish” 2002-2016 European Social Survey Data, Adults age 18+ Note: This figure includes all countries that were observed during at least 10 years of the ESS. We further restrict the sample to observations used in the full-sample estimation. 26 Figure 2 Event Study for Same-Sex Relationship Recognition 2002-2016 European Social Survey Data, Adults age 18+ Note: This figure is based on the specification in column 3 of Table 2, which contains linear country-specific time trends. The sample consists of countries that ever adopted legal same-sex marriage between 2001 and 2016. 27 Table 1: Sample Characteristics 2002-2016 European Social Survey Data (1) (2) (3) Variables Full sample Countries that had relationship recognition for same-sex couples by 2016 Countries that did not have relationship recognition for same-sex couples by 2016 LGBT public policies Same-sex marriage/domestic partnerships legal 0.56 (0.49) 1 -- Constitutional ban on same-sex marriage 0.14 (0.34) -- 0.31 (0.46) * LGBT employment protection 0.69 (0.46) 0.92 (0.27) 0.40 (0.49) * Hate crimes law for sexual orientation 0.34 (0.47) 0.56 (0.49) 0.05 (0.22) * Adoption legal for same-sex couples 0.25 (0.43) 0.45 (0.49) 0.01 (0.04) * Constitutional protection for sexual minorities 0.20 (0.40) 0.36 (0.48) 0.01 (0.10) * Attitudes toward minority groups Gay men and lesbians should be free to live their own life as they wish 0.62 (0.48) 0.80 (0.39) 0.40 (0.49) * Better for a country if almost everyone shares customs and traditions 0.46 (0.49) – N: 75,281 0.41 (0.49) – N: 45,493 0.55 (0.49) – N: 29,788* Immigrants put in more than they take out 0.15 (0.36) – N: 71,901 0.15 (0.36) – N: 43,951 0.15 (0.35) – N: 27,950 Immigrants make crime problems worse 0.06 (0.24) – N: 73,076 0.06 (0.24) – N: 44,573 0.06 (0.23) – N: 28,503 Immigration enriches cultural life 0.35 (0.47) – N: 310,764 0.41 (0.49) – N: 186,630 0.27 (0.44) – N: 124,134* Individual demographics Age 48.70 (17.95) 49.64 (17.84) 47.51 (18.04) * Male 0.45 (0.49) 0.47 (0.49) 0.43 (0.49)* Less than degree level education 0.69 (0.46) 0.72 (0.44) 0.65 (0.47) Partnered 0.53 (0.49) 0.53 (0.49) 0.54 (0.49) Urban 0.33 (0.47) 0.30 (0.46) 0.36 (0.47) * Any religion 0.84 (0.36) 0.79 (0.40) 0.91 (0.28) * N 326,069 191,840 134,229 Notes: Weighted means (standard deviations). * indicates the difference in means between column 2 and column 3 is significant at p<.05. 28 Table 2: Relationship Recognition Policies for Same-Sex Couples Significantly Improve Attitudes Toward Sexual Minorities 2002-2016 European Social Survey Data, Adults age 18+ Outcome is indicator for agreeing with “Gay men and lesbians should be free to live their own life as they wish” (1) No controls (2) (1) plus controls for individual Xs, country- specific X’s, and other country- specific LGBT policies (3) (2) plus month and year FE, country FE, and linear country- specific time trends [Baseline model] (4) (3) but exclude all other LGBT policies (5) (3) but only countries that ever adopted relationship recognition for same- sex couples (6) (3) but only countries that adopted relationship recognition for same- sex couples within our sample window (7) (3) but only countries observed in at least 12 of the 14 years (8) (3) but use Wild cluster bootstrap with 999 repetitions Mean, 2002-2004 .691 .691 .691 .691 .729 .683 .716 .691 Relationship recognition for same-sex couples .400*** (.068) .093** (.040) .036** (.014) .030*** (.011) .025** (.011) .025* (.012) .032** (.014) .036** (.018) R-squared 0.168 0.277 0.303 0.302 0.143 0.152 0.162 0.303 N 326,069 326,069 326,069 326,069 255,307 112,623 165,853 326,069 Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The individual characteristics are: a male dummy, age and its square, a dummy variable for being unemployed, dummy variables for education categories (secondary and tertiary schooling, with less than secondary education as the excluded category), a dummy variable for being partnered (married or living with a partner), a dummy variable for living in an urban area, and dummy variables for religion (Orthodox/Catholic, Protestant, Jewish, Islamic, and other, with no religion as the excluded category). Country characteristics include GDP per capita (in 2010 US Dollars). Other LGBT-related policies are: LGB employment protection, hate crimes law for sexual orientation, adoption legal for same-sex couples, and constitutional protection for sexual minorities. Results are weighted, and standard errors are clustered at the country level. 29 Table 3: No Effects on Placebo Outcomes 2002-2016 European Social Survey Data, Adults age 18+ Baseline Model from Column 3 of Table 2 (1) (2) Mean of outcome (2002-2004) Coefficient on Relationship Recognition for same-sex couples (standard error) Gay men and lesbians should be free to live their own life as they wish .691 .036** (.014) Better for a country if almost everyone shares customs and traditions .513 .235 (.122) Immigrants put in more than they take out .137 -.089 (.256) Immigrants make crime problems worse .053 .087 (.070) Immigration enriches cultural life .408 -.032 (.021) Important to understand different people .955 .005 (.008) Good to have a law against ethnic discrimination at the workplace .626 -.255 (.247) Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. See notes to Table 2. 30 Table 4: Effect Heterogeneity 2002-2016 European Social Survey Data, Adults age 18+ Baseline Model from Column 3 of Table 2 (1) (2) Average of ‘gay men and lesbians should be free to live their own life as they wish’ (2002-2004) Coefficient on Relationship recognition for same-sex couples (standard error) Full sample .678 .036** (.013) Males .666 .039** (.016) Females .714 .035** (.014) Above median age .612 .030 (.020) Below median age .762 .041*** (.011) Less than degree level .659 .032* (.016) Degree level education .809 .053*** (.013) Partnered .670 .046*** (.016) Not partnered .717 .025* (.014) Rural .675 .035** (.016) Urban .728 .034* (.015) Any religion .672 .035** (.013) Atheist or no religion .789 .043** (.016) Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. See notes to Table 2. 31 Appendix Table A1: ESS Measure is Strongly Correlated with LGBT Attitudes Questions from Other Surveys ESS ‘Gay men and lesbians should be free to live their own life as they wish’ question LiTS ‘don’t want homosexuals as neighbors’ question Gallup ‘area is a good place to live for gay or lesbian people’ question EVS ‘justifiability of homosexuality’ EVS ‘homosexuality is never justified’ EVS ‘homosexuality is always justified’ ESS ‘free to live’ question 1 -- -- -- -- -- LiTS ‘neighbor’ question -0.919*** 1 -- -- -- -- Gallup ‘area’ question 0.958*** -0.906*** 1 -- -- -- EVS ‘justifiability’ question 0.870*** -0.881*** 0.923*** 1 -- -- EVS ‘never justified’ -0.876*** 0.878*** -0.925*** -0.974*** 1 -- EVS ‘always justified’ 0.884*** -0.781*** 0.834*** 0.947*** -0.853*** 1 Notes: *** significant at 1%. Author calculations, various datasets. Do Laws Shape Attitudes? Evidence from Same-Sex Relationship Recognition Policies in Europe Cevat G. Aksoy, Christopher S. Carpenter, Ralph De Haas, and Kevin Tran Abstract JEL codes: F5; K36 3. Data description and empirical approach Our data on attitudes toward sexual minorities come from the 2002-2016 European Social Surveys (ESS). These surveys are fielded every year in over 30 European countries and include questions on a range of topics. Our main sample includes over 325,0... 4. Results 5. Discussion and conclusion Trends in Attitudes Toward Sexual Minorities Outcome is share of people in the country who agree that “Gay men and lesbians should be free to live their own life as they wish” Figure 2 Event Study for Same-Sex Relationship Recognition Table 1: Sample Characteristics Notes: Weighted means (standard deviations). * indicates the difference in means between column 2 and column 3 is significant at p<.05. Table 3: No Effects on Placebo Outcomes Table 4: Effect Heterogeneity 
work_iwjtn3zosvh57fnevsndrpv374	----	-----------I=IELD NOTE The State of the LGBT Community and Homophobia in Ul\raine Tamara Martsenyul( Although Ukraine was the first of the former Soviet republics to repeal criminal sanctions for consensual homosexual intercourse between adults, many Ukrainians still regard homosexuality as deviant behavior, and public tolerance has even decreased in recent years. TAMARA MARTSENYUK teaches at the Department of Sociology at Kyiv- Mohyla Academy. Problems of Posi·Communism. vol. 59, no. 2, March/flpril2012. pp. 51-62 © 2012 Mt Sharpe, Inc. All rights reserved ISSN 107&~8216/1012 $9.50 '000 DOI10.2753/PPC!075·8216J9D205 U KRAINE decriminalized homosexuality after gaining independence in December 1991. 1 But homophobia remains a challenge for Ukrainian society2 The results of public opinion surveys demonstrate that the population is not ready to accept lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgen~ der (LGBT) people as citizens of Ukraine with human and civil rights, even though Ukraine-in transition to democracy, an open society, and equality-officially declares that all people have human rights. Integration with Europe demands the recognition of rights for LGBT people. Sooner or later, the Ukrainian authorities will face major conflicts of opinion over the LGBT community and the recognition of that community, the homophobic at- titudes and even hate crimes of Ukrainian society, church and moral/family values issues, media and hate speech, the international community, and human rights. In 2006, a group of international human rights experts met in Yogyakarta, Indonesia, to outline a set of interna~ tiona! principles related to sexual orientation and gender identity. The result was "The Yogyakarta Principles: Principles on the Application of International Human Rights Law in Relation to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity." The introduction to the Yogyakarta Principles states: "all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. All human rights are universal, interdepen- dent, indivisible, and interrelated. Sexual orientation and gender identity are integral to every person's dignity and humanity and must not be the basis for discrimination or abuse" (Yogyakarta Principles 2007, p. 6). The Yogyakarta Principles were again discussed in October 2008 at the international conference "Gay and Lesbian Rights Are Human Rights." The development of LGBT human rights Martsenyuk LGBT Community in Ukraine 51 legal doctrine can be categorized as: (I) nondiscrimina- tion; (2) protection of privacy rights; and (3) ensurance of general human rights protection to all, regardless of sexual orientation or gender identity (O'Flaherty and Fisher 2008). Amnesty International believes that all people, regard- less of their sexual orientation or gender identity, should be able to enjoy the full range of human rights (Amnesty International USA 201 J ). Although the Universal Dec- laration of Human Rights does not explicitly mention sexual orientation or gender identity, evolving concepts of international human rights Jaw in a broader interpre- tation include the rights and the protection of the rights of LGBTI (lesbian gay bisexual transgender intersex) people around the world. Amnesty International is calling on states to take all necessary legislative, administrative, and other measures to prohibit and eliminate prejudicial treatment on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity at every stage of the administration of justice; it also seeks to end discrimination in civil marriage laws on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity and to recognize families of choice, across borders where necessary (Amnesty International 2009). Terminology and Methods In this article, I focus on the gay and lesbian communi- ties. The LGBT community is both marginal to Ukrai- nian society and internally structured. Transgender and bisexual people (on whom we have the least information and the fewest sociological data) are the marginal group within the LGBT community, since they are mostly in- visible among so-called "sexual minorities" in Ukrainian society in the public sphere as well as inside the LGBT community. In public opinion surveys, Ukrainian sociolo- gists predominantly use the words "homosexuals" and "homosexuality" (not LGBT people), because Ukrainians hardly identify the full variety of gender identities and sexual orientations. In Ukraine, a number of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) represent the LGBT community, which is in the midst of institutionalization. On the whole, LGBT NGOs are the only groups conducting or commissioning research on homosexual issues, discrimination, and human rights violations (Martsenyuk 2009). In this article, I present and discuss the results of this small number of studies. One sociological method used here is primary and secondary quantitative data analysis (which depends on database accessibility). The data are mainly public opin- ion surveys on attitudes toward homosexuals in Ukraine 52 Problems of Post-Communism March/April 2012 (conducted by such sociological institutions as the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology [KJJS)) and on atti- tudes toward discrimination based on sexual orientation in the European Union. Moreover, I analyze data from national (e.g., Nash Mir 20 I 0) and international reports (provided by Amnesty International, ILGA Europe, and other organizations). In addition, in April-May 2010, I conducted nine in- depth interviews with LGBT activists from Kyiv, Kharkiv, Lviv, Donetsk, and Cherkasy. The data I gathered reveal Ukraine's regional diversity. I used "snowball" sampling in conjunction with a "key informant" strategy. Respon- dents had differing levels of experience in the Ukrainian LGBT movement: four experts had more than ten years (they were involved in activism in the 1990s), four had approximately five years (their formal engagement dated, as a rule, from early in 2000), and one had Jess than five years (Martsenyuk 20 J 0). Since 2005, I have also participated in academic events hosted by the LGBT community in Kyiv, Ukraine. Such events have included national and international confer- ences, discussions, Queer Week, and film festivals. My involvement has let me "observe" the community and the attitudes expressed toward it by journalists, human rights activists, and others. For the last five years, I have taught university-level courses in which I discuss LGBT issues with my students. These courses have helped me reflect and broaden my perspective on the issue of sexual identity. In brief, I address several major questions in this article. First, it is evident that, in general, Ukrainian society is ho- mophobic. But Ukrainian society is also diverse in terms of gender, region, age, education, and other factors that influence public opinion. It is important to know whether Ukrainian society has become less or more homophobic and which social groups are the most (in)tolerant. So I examine how attitudes toward homosexual people have changed in Ukrainian society during the years of inde- pendence and try to determine which sociodemographic characteristics influence attitudes toward homosexuals in Ukrainian society today. Second, I evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of the contemporary LGBT community in Ukraine and consider its possible impact on the perception of homosexuality in Ukrainian society. Third, I discuss the issue of homopho- bia in Ukrainian society and the support it garners from some state officials, politicians, NGOs, media, and the church. This part of the discussion draws on qualitative case studies of "key" examples (mentioned by my respon- dents in our interviews). Finally, I consider the limitations of my research while presenting my conclusions. Ukrainian Attitudes Toward l-lomosexuality In its 20 I 0 "Overview of the LGBT Human Rights Situation in Ukraine," the Nash Mir Gay and Lesbian Center concludes, "Ukrainian society has become more homophobic .... Throughout 20 I 0, the situation sub- stantially worsened" (Nash Mir 20 10). An analysis of public opinion surveys on attitudes toward homosexuality demonstrates that Ukrainian society in 2007 was less tol- erant than it had been five years earlier. The 2007 findings showed that the number of people opposed to granting homosexual people the same rights as the heterosexual majority increased from 34 percent to 47 percent.' In general, one-third of the Ukrainian population supports equal rights for homosexual citizens (Nash Mir 2007, p. 67). In 2007, only 16 percent of respondents supported the idea that the state should formally recognize homosexual relationships, whereas the propmtion of those opposed to this idea rose from 40 percent to 52 percent (Table I). As the survey results show, the question of whether homosexuals have the right to raise children was the most sensitive measure of tolerance (Table 2). The proportion of Ukrainians opposed to granting this right increased from 49 percent in 2002 to 60 percent in 2007 (Nash Mir 2007, p. 67). According to KIIS, the level of tolerance toward ho- mosexuals has not changed significantly in the fifteen years of Ukrainian independence-' But results show that homosexuals as a group are still stigmatized. When respondents were asked, "Do you agree or disagree that 'Society should treat homosexuals the same as other peo- ple'?" the proportion of those who disagreed decreased slightly, from 34.9 percent in 1991 to 28.5 percent in 2006, while the proportion of those who agreed remained the same-33.7 percent in 1991 and 33.3 percent in 2006. More recent surveys prove that Ukrainian society remains rather homophobic. A public opinion poll con- ducted by the Sotsis Sociological Center in September 2010 showed that about 66.5 percent of Kyiv residents consider homosexuality a perversion or a mental illness (Vse novosti 201 0). We may, however, criticize the choice of survey ques- tions as stereotypical, even homophobic. The survey included three questions presenting negative perceptions of homosexuality ("Do you view homosexuality as a perversion I evidence of dissolute character I a mental illness?") and, as expected, the respondents mostly said yes. A telephone poll, "Morals in Ukraine," conducted by the Gorshenin Institute in December 2010, showed that Table 1 Registered Same-Sex Partnerships for Homosexuals in Ukraine(%) Should homosexual citizens have the same right to register their relation- March March ships as heterosexual couples do? 2002 2007 Yes, they should 18.8 15.8 No, they should never have such a right 40.2 52.3 There should be exceptions (on a case-by- case basis) 13.6 11.4 Not sure 27.4 20.5 Table 2 Homosexuals' Right to Raise Children in Ukraine(%) Should homosexual citizens have the March March right to raise children? 2002 2007 Yes 21.5 17.1 No 49.2 60.2 Not sure 29.3 22.7 72 percent of Ukrainians feel negatively about sexual minorities (Unian Information Agency 2010). According to the February 2011 data in "Human Rights in Ukraine, Levels of Xenophobia, Attitudes Toward Dif- ferent Social Groups, and Regional Tolerance," more than one-third (39 percent) of respondents support (and about one-third disagree with) the statement that "homosexuals should be ostracized" (KJJS 2011 ). The same survey asked a question designed to measure extreme views among the Ukrainian public regarding specific social groups, includ- ing homosexual people. Twenty-one percent of respon- dents agreed that homosexuals "pose a threat to human existence and development, and it would be better to get rid of them." The report's authors note that these data measure cognitive but not behavioral intolerance (KIIS 2011 ). In general, Ukrainian women favor equality for homo- sexual people more than men do. People with a higher edu- cation showed greater tolerance of homosexuals, with twice as many affirmative answers coming from people with a higher education than from respondents with a primary or incomplete secondary education (in 2007, 39 percent of those with an incomplete or complete higher education supported equality for gays and lesbians, whereas only 22 percent of respondents with a primary or incomplete secondary education did-almost half as many). On average, respondents in all age groups became more Martsenyuk LGBT Community in Ukraine 53 homophobic between 2002 and2007. People between the ages of sixteen and twenty-nine remain the most tolerant. The report, however, states: "Here the most obviously negative tendencies can be seen. Whereas in 2002 respon- dents favoring equality for homosexuals made up 63.2 percent of those between sixteen and nineteen [years of age] ... (with 19.5 percent opposed), by 2007 we can sec that the proportion of positive answers from this cohort has decreased to 40 percent (42 percent opposed). This trend is one of the most dangerous uncovered by the poll" (Nash Mir 2007, p. 68). If tolerance among teenagers can decrease so sig- nificantly in five years, the trend poses a challenge to Ukrainian democratic society in the future. We can draw a parallel to the assessments of xenophobia and anti- Semitism levels that Volodymyr Paniotto (2008, p. 213) of KIIS has produced according to the Bogardus Social Distance Scale. On the whole, from 1991 to 2007 levels of xenophobia and anti-Semitism increased. Of the changes Paniotto noticed over the last ten years, the one that par- ticularly worried him was that anti-Semitism rose fastest among eighteen- to twenty-year-olds. 5 An important issue that merits discussion in another venue is the intersection and overlapping of intolerance based on gender, sexual orientation, age, ethnicity, religion, and other factors. In Ukraine we can also see distinct regional differences in attitudes toward LGBT rights. Inhabitants of Kyiv and Crimea show the greatest tolerance, residents of eastern Ukraine demonstrate less, and the most homophobia occurs in western and northern Ukraine. For example, the proportion of respondents who support equality for LGBT people is 58.2 percent in Kyiv-as compared to 25.4 percent in eastern Ukraine, 15.6 percent in the northern regions, and 27.2 percent in the western part of the country (Nash Mir 2007, p. 68). Urbanization can explain a large part of these re- sponses. Citizens of western (and northern) Ukraine hold more conservative views on gender and sexuality and, in general, traditionally exhibit higher religiosity than those of other regions (Parashchevin 2009, p. 20). Few NGOs serving the LGBT community operate in western Ukraine (sec below). In brief, Ukrainian citizens have become less tolerant of LGBT people since Ukraine gained its independence, although attitudes are not homogeneous and depend on sociodemographic characteristics, and 20-30 percent of respondents can give no firm answers on these questions. There may be a lack of debate in Ukrainian society on homosexuality as a whole and on the human rights of the LGBT community. 54 Problems of Post-Communism March/April 2012 The question of interest here is what caused the change in attitudes toward homosexuality. I have identified two factors that may have stimulated greater intolerance (ho- mophobia) among Ukrainians: (I) the increasing activism of the LGBT community in the post-Soviet period, espe- cially during the last ten years; and (2) the rather negative portrayal of LGBT issues (as deviant or abnormal) in the media, hate speech (regarding sexual orientation) by some Ukrainian politicians, the churches' negative stance on homosexuality, and the views expressed by certain political groups and NGOs, such as the self-proclaimed "movement" Love Against Homosexuality. The LGBT Community in Ukraine: Numbers, Activities, Structures The contemporary Ukrainian LGBT community is in- stitutionalizing. Throughout the years of independence, LGBT NGOs expanded in numbers and geographic terms and diversified their activities. According to March 2011 data provided by the Gay Forum of Ukraine, the country has thirty-two officially registered LGBT organizations, one association of LGBT organizations, and twenty-six informal LGBT groups." The biggest success in LGBT community institutionalization is the registration (in January 2011) of the first national association of LGBT organizations: the Council of LGBT Organizations of Ukraine. We may consider the appearance of an NGO serving LGBT Christians as another prominent success, expanding the LGBT community's activities to the reli- gious sphere. In 20 I 0 and 20 II, ten regional LGBT organizations opened in the cities of Poltava, Zaporizhzhya, Vinnytsya, Odesa, Kherson, Uzhgorod, Zhytomyr, and Donetsk. Al- though the first LGBT NGOs were established only in the latter half of the 1990s (the Nikolacv Association of Gays, Lesbians, and Bisexuals "LiGA'' [www.gay.nikolacv.ua] in 1996 and Nash Mir Gay and Lesbian Center [www.gay. org.ua] in 1999), approximately one-third of the current LGBT NGOs have been registered in the last two years. Now there are LGBT NGOs at all levels: national (the Gay Forum of Ukraine [www.lgbtUA.com], the Gay Alliance of Ukraine [http://ga.net.ua[, and others-five altogether), interregional (Nash Mir Gay and Lesbian Center for Kyiv, Donetsk, and Lugansk oblasts, etc.) and local (either oblast or city levels). Although LGBT NGOs are active in most regions, we can perceive differences. Western Ukraine has the smallest number of NGOs (two), compared to seven in the north (six of which are in the capital, Kyiv), seven in the south, five in the center, and five in the east. 7 New LGBT organizations appeared predominantly in the south and center (three each). The difficulty of organizing public actions can explain the disproportion in the more religious and traditional west. That is, it is harder to mobilize members of the LGBTcommunity, and this type ofNGO generally favors peaceful operations. In western Ukraine, people tend to support traditional patriarchal family values more than in other regions. In addition, according to the Gay Forum of Ukraine, there are thirty-two organizations working with men who have sex with men (MSM), twelve of which also serve the LGBT community-' Western Ukraine has only two MSM service NGOs, which means that in this region of the country it is difficult to gather a "critical mass" of people who are coming out and need support. LGBT activists join forces and establish organizations to acquire a legal opportunity to defend their human rights, particularly at the state level. There are approximately 150 activists within the LGBTcommunity, and LGBTorgani- zation members represent approximately sixty Ukrainian cities (Women's Network 2009). According to Sviatoslav Shercmet, the leader of the Gay Forum of Ukraine, the LGBT community as a whole includes anywhere from 800,000 to I ,200,000 people. There are, however, no official state statistics on the size of Ukraine's LGBT community. The only figures available relate to people who identify themselves as practicing homosexual "risk behavior" for HIY I AIDS in- fection. The International HIV I AIDS Alliance in Ukraine conducts research and evaluates the size of populations most at risk of HIV infection, including MSM (AIDS Alliance Ukraine 2008, p. 86). According to various flndings-and taking into consid- eration the high level of stigmatization of MSM, which promotes underestimation of the group's size-estimates of the total number of MSM at the national level range between 117,000 and 430,000 people (Balakireva et a!. 2006, p. 38). Although most research on homosexual behavior aims at evaluating risk behaviors for HIV infec- tion, LGBT NGOs conduct their own research on LGBT issues (sometimes in cooperation with other NGOs, mostly international ones). But the attention paid by the international community (NGOs that finance HIVIAIDS prevention in Ukraine) to research risk behavior among homosexual men) may encourage the victimization of the LGBT community (which could be seen as problematic and sick). Not all the results of international involvement are negative. Some leaders of Ukraine's LGBT movement believe that the LGBT community would have less fund- ing and fewer human resources without international HIV I AIDS support. MSM service NGOs provide not only medical support but also information (for example, legal consultations and essential information) and mobilize activists for various events. So even if MSM groups work only on behalf of homosexual men and mainly on HIV I AIDS issues, these NGOs expand the activities of and support for the LGBT community as a whole (as noted above, twelve of the thirty-two MSM service NGOs work on general LGBT issues). The main difference is that MSM service NGOs focus on behavior and LGBT organizations on identity. The LGBT NGOs that are most active in the public sphere aim to serve the needs of the LGBT community and those of Ukrainian society and the state as a whole. According to Sviatoslav Sheremet, the LGBT movement in Ukraine has two main goals: internal (developing the LGBT community as a public force in civil society) and external (achieving equal rights and opportunities for LGBT people). But not all LGBT movement leaders sup- port this division of aims, which may seem too diffuse. The LGBT community of Ukraine has, with some success, conducted several campaigns to lobby for the recognition of sexual orientation in Ukraine and in the international arena. On March 31, 20 I 0, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe (CE) unanimously (meaning with Ukraine's support) adopted the Recom- mendation on Measures to Combat Discrimination on Grounds of Sexual Orientation or Gender Identity (Nash Mir 201 0). The document recommends that CE member- states (including Ukraine) implement measures to im- prove human rights legislation and policies toward LGBT people in the workplace, the freedom to associate and to hold peaceful meetings, private and family life, education, health care, sports, the prevention of hate crimes, and so on (Council of Europe 20 10). On April 29, 2010, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) followed the CE Committee of Ministers by adopting two documents deploring discrimi- nation based on sexual orientation and gender identity (PACE 201 Oa, 2010b). Like the Committee of Ministers' resolution, these documents aim to ensure civil rights for LGBT people and recommend measures to prevent human rights violations based on sexual orientation and gender identity and hate crimes toward LGBT people in the CE member-states. In addition, the CE addressed the issue of same-sex partnerships for the first time (Nash Mir 2010). Nartsenyuk LGBT Community in Ukraine 55 In April 20 I 0, the Ukrainian LGBT organizations again appealed to the Speaker of the Ukrainian parliament and the heads of the relevant parliamentary committees to introduce changes into the first reading of the bill on the Labor Code (Nash Mir 20 I 0). In line with the CE Com- mittee of Ministers' resolution, the LGBT leaders asked lawmakers to add sexual orientation and gender identity to the list of prohibited types of discrimination in the workplace. This time, however, in contrast to previous occasions, the LGBT community did not receive even a formal response from members of the Ukrainian parlia- ment (Nash Mir 201 0). Three years earlier, the LGBT community had submit- ted a bill of the Labor Code for parliamentary review; it was adopted on first reading on May 20,2008. In this bill, the antidiscrimination clause did not prohibit discrimina- tion on the grounds of sexual orientation. One of the bill's authors, Chair of the Parliamentary Committee on Labor and Social Policy Vasyl Khara (Party of Regions), said in an interview: "Personally, I think that gays and lesbians violate all moral norms. It [homosexuality] is a physical defect that should be concealed, not flaunted. On the other hand, what they [sexual minorities] are demanding is a European norm that is likely to be included in the draft of the code. I am against it, though." Despite numerous appeals concerning the urgent need to ban workplace discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation, the bill did not address this issue (Nash Mir 2008). The most famous openly homosexual leader, Sviatoslav Sheremet, tends to compromise with the state authorities. Specifically, he docs not organize large, public gay pride demonstrations, because Ukrainian society is not "ready" for them; and he does not demand legal marriages but rather registered partnerships (Sheremet 2008). In com- munications with church and religious organizations, Sheremet supports the idea of neutrality. Being familiar with the results of public opinion surveys, Sheremet believes that it is important to follow people's attitudes. But not all LGBT organizations and their leaders support compromise. Some think, given that society may never be ready, it is better to lead than to follow. The LGBT community is stratified along gender identity and age lines and by the duration of individuals' activism. Gender experts and lesbian activists in Ukraine pay attention to the marginality of nongay organiza- tions in Ukraine. Gender and queer studies expert Maria Mayerchyk notes: "For quite a while, the lesbian civil rights movement has been developing into the vanguard of gay organizations, which address women's issues only when they coincide with the aims of homosexual men. 56 Problems of Post-Communism March/April 2012 An independent lesbian movement emerged only at the beginning of 2000" (Mayerchyk 2009, p. 333). Of the thirty-two LGBT organizations, only two focus on lesbian and gender inequality issues. One of them, the Informational and Educational Center Women's Network (www.feminist.org.ua/english/basic.php) works on gender issues, feminist theory and practice, and hu- man rights within the lesbian community of Ukraine. Its strategic goals are to shape state policy on lesbian issues; to promote public tolerance of lesbians; and to provide informational, educational, and consulting services to lesbians, their relatives and friends, and interested special- ists. Because they are not associated with MSM groups, lesbian NGOs are less "visible" and receive less financial support from international NGOs. But homosexual men, being more visible in society, are also more stigmatized than lesbians. Insight (www.insight-ukraine.org.ua)-an NGO founded in June 2007 and officially registered on May 26, 2008-is one of the few LGBT organizations that also represents transgender people and the only one with an ideology that includes queer issues. Insight (20 I 0) presented Ukraine's first research findings on transgender people. Transgender and bisexual people are the least visible and recognized group even within the LGBT community. The ghettoization of the LGBT community is another problem. On the one hand, self-isolation or a concentra- tion on working inside their specific field may be consid- ered an acceptable strategy during institutionalization. On the other hand, in the latter half of 2000, Layma Geydar, Ukraine's most famous openly lesbian and feminist leader, and two lesbian NGOs urged the addition of other topics to the LGBT playbook. They had in mind gender sensi- tivity or feminism, topics that would address the double discrimination faced by lesbian women in a patriarchal and heteronormative society. The idea of mainstreaming sexual orientation and gen- der identity issues into the antidiscrimination discourse is rather new for Ukraine. At the beginning of 2011, the Donbas-SocProject Interregional Center for LGBT Re- search instituted a new project, Antidiscrimination Action, in cooperation with the Gay Forum of Ukraine-" Another example in which gender and sexual identity issues inter- sect is Za Ravnye Prava (For Equal Rights) and Insight's "Shadow Report: Discrimination and Violence Against Lesbian and Bisexual Women and Transgender People in Ukraine," prepared in January 2010. In the report, Za Ravnye Prava mentions that it "has documented cases of violence toward lesbian and bisexual people, including rapes, beatings, and psychological pressure, as well as domestic violence" (Za Ravnye Prava and Insight 2009, p. 2). This was the first time when reports from diflerent Ukrainian NGOs (including LGBTones) were submitted to the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). As a result of the data in the shadow report, CEDAW (20 10) concluded, "the commit- tee regrets the lack of detailed information in relation to vulnerable groups of women, such as ... female sexual minorities and notes with concern that these groups of women may be subjected to multiple forms of discrimi- nation." This case illustrates the importance of moving LGBT issues to the international arena. In general, the Ukrainian LGBT community has yet to coordinate its goals with other institutions of civil society, such as NGOs that work on human rights or women's issues. To avoid marginalization, the LGBT community should move closer to Ukrainian civil society. In my opinion, the LGBT community should link homophobia to the broader issue of xenophobia (racism, ageism, sex- ism, etc.) to teach Ukrainian society (above all, the young) to tolerate others. According to the executive director of the Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union, Volodymyr Yavorsky, the LGBT community has not prepared an appropriate (high-quality) report on violations of LGBT human and civil rights that he could include in his annual human rights report.'" Although the LGBT community of Ukraine is large, it remains rather marginalized and hidden. Even in Kyiv there are no openly gay-friendly places (with LGBT symbols posted outside and visited by people outside the gay community). Members of the LGBT community are hardly ready to stand up for their civil rights. Because of the belief that "society is not ready" and its low level of mobilization, the community seldom protests. Rather than engage in grass-roots activism, it prefers to host academic events (conferences, discussions, film festivals, etc.). 11 The Center for Society Research's Ukrainian Protest and Coercion Data Project found that since September 2009, only twenty-two protests have been connected with LGBT issues (of more than thirty-six hundred protests recorded between September 2009 and December 20 I 0). 12 Most of these twenty-two protests were anti-LGBT activities launched by religious people against homosexuality and to support family values. Special dates and events have been set aside to draw attention to homophobia throughout the world, including in post-Soviet countries. May 17 marks the International Day Against Homophobia. The International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans, and Intersex Association (ILGA) chose this time of the year to release a report on state homophobia around the world to raise awareness of the extent of institutionalized homophobia (ILGA 2007). In Ukraine on this day LGBT NGOs (or other NGOs that work with human rights issues) organize special events (such as Queer Week, an annual festival ofLGBTculture) to fight stereotypes about the LGBT community and pay attention to the problem of homophobia in Ukrainian society. But such initiatives have mostly local import. Official organizations (even those that deal with human rights as a whole) regard LGBT community rights as a marginal and largely invisible problem. In sum, the LGBT community itself has strengths and weaknesses that may influence public attitudes toward people with alternative sexual orientations. Compared to twenty years ago, the community has acquired greater visibility among society and state officials, increased in size, and intensified its activity. But it continues to be mar- ginalized by Ukrainian society (and even by LGBTpeople themselves) and victimized by an international commu- nity that inhibits public tolerance of LGBT people. Ukrainian Media, Politicians', and Church Views of Homosexuality One reason f(Jr Ukrainian intolerance of LGBT people be- comes clear from an analysis of the official state discourse (shaped by the media) on this issue. A content analysis of coverage in the Ukrainian press reveals that the press, especially the regional press, presents LGBT topics in a neutral way, primarily in an entertaining context (Stulova et al. 20 I 0, p. 7). Most publications compile articles from the foreign press and write about the sexual orientations of famous people. There is a lack of educational information about sexual orientation issues and the LGBT community (Stulova et al. 20 I 0, p. 7). An ILGA press release titled "Hate Speech by High- Ranking Politicians in Ukraine" (ILGA Europe 2007a) provides information about this problem. ILGA is an LGBT NGO that monitors examples of "hate speech" in Ukrainian society (nationwide homophobia, including the actions of several governmental bodies, as well as antigay statements made by political. leaders and homophobic groups)." Ukrainian politicians of all stripes demonstrate ho- mophobia. Since 2006, the mass media have covered many statements by politicians about homosexuals and their rights (Nash Mir 2007, p. 75). In February 2007, we saw a clear example of "hate speech" aimed at the homosexual community from an official charged with Mar\senyuk LGBT Community in Ukraine 57 protecting human rights in Ukraine. Leonid Grach, chair of the Committee on Human Rights, National Minorities, and Interethnic Relations and a member of the Commu- nist Party, stated in his official capacity, "The state must protect society against evil, violence, and particularly against homosexuality and lesbianism" (ForUm 2007). In response to this statement, Ukrainian LGBTorganiza- tions sent Grach a letter in which they called on him to respect and protect the rights of homosexual people, but Grach not only did not change his attitude but continued to utter hate speech against homosexuals. When asked about same-sex marriages, Olexandr Turchynov (second-in-command of the Yu!ia Tymoshenko Bloc) declared: "We are categorically against! It is a big sin." After the reporter commented that such an answer was more typical of the conservative party, Turchynov added: "I do not agree. If a man has normal views, you label him a conservative, but those who use drugs or promote sodomy you label as progressives. All of these are perversions" (Nash Mir 2007, p. 69). Other politi- cians have made similar comments about homosexuality. My kola Danilin, a socialist member of parliament, stated in 2006: "Personally, I won't support the political ideas and demands of homosexuals .... I believe we need to protect the family and the spiritual values of Ukrainian society" (Nash Mir 2007, p. 73). I have already mentioned Vasyl Khara's remark that gays and lesbians violate all moral norms. Even the president of Ukraine has made some troubling comments. When asked during an Inter- net conference on December 14, 2006, "What do you think about same-sex marriage legislation in Ukraine?" President Viktor Yushchenko answered: "Can I answer in one word? Complicated." He added, "Although in this context I would not like to offer an opinion different from that given by the society and the law" (Nash Mir 2007, p. 69). One positive aspect of LGBT community work, how- ever, is the appearance of some tolerant politicians in Ukraine. Before the elections of 2009, Anna German of the Party of Regions answered the question "What is your attitude toward gay people?" by saying: "Everyone has his or her own choices in life, and everyone should have the right to choose. It is difficult for me to understand this. But my political views are those of a democrat. I believe people should have the right to choose and society should respect the choices they make" (Korrespondent 2009b). In a similar Web chat, the presidential candidate Sergii Tygypko said: "I am rather tolerant. I believe it [sexuality] is personal. And I am not God to judge anybody in this re- gard. At least it's not a crime, that's for sure. Let everyone 58 Problems of Post-Communism March/April 2012 decide for him- or herseJr' (Korre.1ponden1 2009a). Hate speech on the basis of sexual orientation has become normal stale discourse, especially in the media. It gains additional support from such initiatives as Love Against Homosexuality (http://love-contra.org). Since 2003, this homophobic group has been active (publicly and through press statements) in Kyiv.ln 2007, it launched an initiative to establish criminal prosecution for propa- gandizing and popularizing homosexual behavior that threatens the national security of Ukraine (Nash Mir 2007, p. 75). It sent its appeal to all the institutions that can initiate legislation: the president, the prime minister, and members of the Ukrainian parliament. On October 2007 in Kyiv, another group, the Embassy of the Blessed Divine Kingdom for All People, organized a march "For the Moral Cleanliness of Ukrainian Society." Almost five hundred people marched from Kyiv's central square to the Ukrainian Presidential Administration building. Love Against Homosexuality also announced that it had in its possession a letter from the Parliamentary Committee on the Freedom of Speech and Information about increased propaganda for sexual perversion in the mass media: "The situation requires the govern- ment to take resolute and immediate measures to stop the popularization of homosexuality, lesbianism, and other sexual perversions that do not conform to society's moral principles" (Love Contra 2008a). Moreover, Love Against Homosexuality blames homosexual people for disseminating HIV I AIDS in Ukraine and publishes on its official Web page such articles as "AIDS Is 'Mowing Down' Gays" (Love Contra 2008b). Another argument that the media employ against the LGBT community is demographic (and simultaneously nationalistic): its existence allegedly threatens the survival of the Ukrainian nation. The demographic crisis in post- Soviet Ukraine and other former Soviet states supports the formation of a negative image of homosexuals as people who cannot create a "normal" reproductive family." After the authorities registered the nationwide Council ofLGBT Organizations of Ukraine, Love Against Homosexuality sent a statement to the president and the minister of jus- tice, insisting that "homosexuality is acquired and has no genetic component; it spreads in response to a number of factors, especially propaganda" (Love Contra 2011 ). Again according to Love Against Homosexuality, the "spread of homosexuality conflicts with the national inter- ests of Ukraine" (Love Contra 2011 ). The main evidence of this conflict is H1V/ AIDS dissemination, a worsening demographic crisis, the destruction of the family as an institution, the restriction of citizens' constitutional rights, I I I 1 I l I l l I I I i l l 'i -1 1 I l ! and the elimination of freedom of religion. Certain Ukrai- nian political parties (mostly ultraright groups) make similar arguments against homosexuality (and sometimes against gender equality).ln December 2010, for example, the Kyiv city organization of Svoboda (Freedom) held a demonstration against homosexuality "in support of traditional family values and against the propaganda of perversion." 15 Homosexuality and homosexual people are used as a "common enemy" to bind young people to churches. In March 2011, certain NGOs, well known in Lviv, mounted a protest against homosexual propaganda and the juvenile justice system. The organizers included the student unions of certain Lviv universities, as well as the student govern- ment and student mayor-who underlined the "position of Lviv youth and the younger generation of Ukraine: let's preserve Christian and traditional family values in Ukraine" (Eiita natsii' 2011 ). Other slogans of the pro- test were: "Today the rescue of Ukraine and of yourself depends on you! Say yes to God and no to perversion!" (Elita natsii' 2011 ). In June 2010, the high-ranking clerics attending the Council of Christian Churches of Ukraine adopted a draft declaration "condemning the sin of homosexuality, its propagation in society, and attempts to legalize same-sex marriages (register same-sex partnerships)" (RISU 20 I 0). Ukrainian churches continue to focus on the "Christian notion of marriage, family, and society, propagating sin and disguising it as democratic tendencies." Meanwhile, the LGBT community has been trying to flll the important gap between sexuality and religion and to explain that religious groups and churches can toler- ate other forms of sexuality. On August 2 I, 2006, LGBT NGOs sent an open Jetter to the president of Ukraine and to the legislative and executive branches that underlined the important role of churches in forming public opinion toward homosexual people: "We treat all religious orga- nizations registered in Ukraine with respect and toler- ance. Without question, the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church and other religious organizations have the right to formulate and to express their views on homosexual- ity and homosexual behavior. But we must consider that intolerant statements can incite hatred of homosexual citizens and lead to violence against them" (Nash Mir 2007, p. 7 I ). 16 Same-sex marriage is one of the most "subtle" disputes in Ukraine involving the LGBT community, the state, and churches. The LGBT community estimates that Ukraine has a hundred thousand to two hundred thousand same-sex couples (Maimulakhin 2009, p. 25). I-llY/AIDS preven- tion experts place the number of male same-sex families between forty thousand and a hundred thousand (Nash Mir Donbass-SocProject 2009). So, the Ukrainian LGBT community is working to establish human and civil rights law to protect privacy in terms of sexual orientation and gender identity. Yogya- karta Principle no. 24, 'The Right to Found a Family," states: "Everyone has the right to found a family, regard- less of sexual orientation or gender identity. Families exist in diverse forms. No family may be subjected to discrimination on the basis of the sexual orientation or gender identity of any of its members" (Yogyakmta Principles 2007, p. 27). LGBT NGOs \for example, Nash Mir) stress the need for discussion of human rights in state policies on sexuality and the family. Above all, they note the absence of antidiscrimination articles in the Consti- tution of Ukraine (article 24), the Code of Labor Law (article 2-1), and the Criminal Code (article 161) (Nash Mir 2007, p. 81 ). Specifically, the list banning unequal treatment and discrimination does not contain the phrase "sexual orientation." Compared to other social problems in Ukraine, the protection of LGBT human rights seems less urgent. As Yuri Pavlenko, minister for family, youth, and sport, put it in an interview with NTN News on November 16, 2006: "Today the question of legalizing same-sex marriage is not timely. And personally I oppose such legalization." State officials responsible for human rights do not provide statistics on violation of LGBT people's rights. If we are to combat discrimination against vulnerable social groups (including the LGBTcommunity), we must study public opinion on this issue. According to the European Commission report "Discrimination in the European Union," discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is the third most widespread form (after discrimination based on ethnic origin and on disability). Fifty percent of respondents (EU citizens) perceived discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation as widespread (European Commission 2007, p. 4). In 2011, Ukrainians often used the issue of sexual identity to raise questions about morality, demography, and even threats to the nation (see Martsenyuk 2011 ). Six Ukrainian parliamentary deputies from all the major political parties (Yevhen Tsarkov, Katerina Lukianova, Pavel Ungurian, Yulia Kovalevska, Taras Chornovil, and Liliia Grygorovych) argued for the "morality" of Ukrai- nian society and against a "threat to national security." Even though Ukraine has ratified numerous international and European legal documents on human rights, including the United Nations Resolution on Sexual Orientation and Martsenyuk LGBT Community in Ukraine 59 ,,,., ------------------------------------------- ''' -~~- ----l I Gender Identity, in June 20 I I, the parliament recorded a bill "On the Introduction of Changes to Certain Laws of Ukraine (Regarding the Protection of Children's Rights to Safe Information)." Their rationale is: "The bill ... is designed to strengthen protection from homosexual propaganda in Ukraine and establish a legal framework to prosecute violations of the laws that protect public order and morality in Ukrainian society. The spread of homosexuality is a threat to national security, as it leads to an epidemic of HIV I AIDS, destroys the institution of the family, and could cause a demographic crisis."" LGBT activists believe that this bill absolutely con- tradicts the Constitution of Ukraine and the European Convention on Human Rights. On October 17, 20 II, Human Rights Watch sent its "Letter to Chairman of Parliament Yolodymyr Lytvyn Regarding Proposal for a Bill on Banning 'Propaganda of Homosexualism'<l>" (Human Rights Watch 20 II). In response to this "dis- criminatory and stigmatizing legislation," Human Rights Watch urges Lyt vyn to call for the rejection of the bill on the grounds that it is incompatible with a large number of rights protected by international treaties to which Ukraine is a party. The provisions of the proposed bill would violate the protec- tions on freedom of expression and assembly as well as create an unacceptable environment of state-promoted discrimination against lesbian, gay, bisexual, and trans- gender (LGBT) people, including those under eighteen years of age. It would endanger the rights of human rights defenders to promote rights protections and engage in free discussion about rights principles. It would threaten the health and well-being of Ukrainians, including children, by restricting their access to information necessary for them to make critical decisions about their lives, and could potentially have life-threatening effects by censor- ing accurate information about HIV and AIDS. This bill is still awaiting further consideration, which could come in 2012. In sum, the general situation regarding attitudes toward homosexuality can be seen in international reports. For example, a submission to the Parliamentary Assembly Monitoring Committee rapporteurs addresses the situ- ation of LGBT people in Ukraine (2009) and stresses the need for strong recommendations on combating discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity." The report notes that homophobia in society is intensifying; mainstream politicians increasingly oppose the fundamental rights ofLGBT people, and their intoler- ant statements go unchallenged by persons in authority; the Legal Department of the Supreme Court, instead of 60 Problems of Post-Communism March/April 2012 upholding fundamental rights and defending a vulnerable minority, opposes proposals to protect LGBT people from discrimination; and all leaders of mainstream religious organizations in Ukraine have united in opposing the rights of LGBT people, expressing their opposition in disturbingly bigoted language. Conclusion Society's attitudes toward homosexuality have become more homophobic. According to the results of public opin- ion surveys, levels of tolerance depend on respondents' sociodemographic characteristics: women are more toler- ant than men; citizens of western Ukraine less tolerant than easterners; young people are the most tolerant among age groups. But public opinion surveys also show Ukrainian teenagers are half as tolerant of homosexuals as they were a few years ago, just as they are now less tolerant of dif- ferent ethnic groups. This issue needs further discussion and research. Given the increased visibility and activity of radical groups in the last ten years, the trend toward intolerance among the young can be perceived as posing a challenge to Ukrainian democratic society in the future. I must emphasize that sexual orientation (heterosexual, homosexual, or bisexual) is a difficult and sensitive topic to research, especially by interviewing respondents. As noted above, the choice of survey questions can be criti- cized as stereotypical, even homophobic. Should we ask the public questions it can understand, even if that means using a more homophobic terminology? Do sociologists form public opinion through their research, and if so, can they make it more tolerant? Moreover, levels of ho- mophobia (and xenophobia [Paniotto 2008]) are difficult to measure with a couple of questions. Sociological re- search on sexual orientation and gender identity, attitudes toward these phenomena, and the like should rely on both quantitative and qualitative methods. Although in recent years the LGBT community in Ukraine has dramatically increased in size and diversified its main spheres of activity, it retains certain weaknesses (internal stratification, the ghettoization of the commu- nity, limited street activism and willingness to stand up for the group's human and civiLrights) that hinder the development of tolerance toward LGBT people. Ukraine's regional diversity is reflected in the activities of the LGBT community: the more traditional western region has fewer organizations and activities than other regions. Input from the international community and the threat of HIV I AIDS have conferred more resources and power on gay organizations while stigmatizing LGBT issues. ' l ! I I I I I I One reason that Ukrainian society remains homophobic is the influence on state discourse of politicians who arc themselves homophobic. Svoboda and Love Against Ho- mosexuality fight for the moral cleanliness of Ukrainian society. The churches use images of a "common enemy" (LGBT people) to attract youth. Hate speech by Ukrai- nian activists-particularly those from youth NGOs and ultraright organizations-and the point where it intersects with Ukrainian nationalism is another topic that demands analysis. Also interesting is the way in which some groups or individuals who oppose homosexuality link it with gender politics and the juvenile justice system as issues that are violent and alien to Ukrainian society. Notes !. 1 presented much of this article at the Sixteenth Annual World Con- vention of the Association for the Study of Nationalities (ASN), held at the Harriman Institute, Columbia University, on April 14-16, 20 II. The Carnegie Fellowship Program has supported my research. All translations from Russian and Ukrainian arc mine. 2. In this article, I employ a rudimentary dc!inition of homophobia as an irrational fear of, aversion to, or discrimination against homosexuality or homosexuals. 3. The survey, which included twelve hundred respondents aged between sixteen and seventy-five, was representative in terms of age, sex, and types of seu!cmcnt. The findings have a mathematical accuracy of± 3 percent. A similar survey was conducted in March 2002. 4. In November 2006, the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS, hllp://kiis.com.ua) presented the results of a large survey "Opinions and Views oft he Ukrainian Population on the Eve of the Referendum on Independence and Fifteen Years Later," in which one block of questions addressed levels ofhostil- ity shown toward people with a homosexual orientation and with AIDS. 5. The survey included no respondents younger than eighteen. 6. For a list of LGBT organizations in Ukraine, sec the Gay Forum of Ukraine database at hllp://ga.net.ua, accessed March 29, 20 I I. 7. This information comes from the person who interviewed Sviatos!av Sheremet on March 29, 20 I I. The regions arc defined as follows: west (Volyn- ska, Zakarpatska, lvano-Frankivska, Lvivska, Rivncnska, Tcrnopilska, and Chernivetska oblasts); south (the autonomous republic of Crimea, Zaporizka, Mykolayivska, Odeska, and Khersonska oblasts, and Sevastopol); north (Zhyto- myrska, Kyivska, Sumska, and Chernigivska oblasts and Kyiv); cast (Donetska, Luhanska, and Kharkivska oblasts); and center (Vinnytska, Dnipropctrovska, Kirovogradska, Poltavska, Khmc!nytska, and Chcrkaska ob!asts). 8. MSM includes men of any sexual orientation who identify themselves as engaging in homosexual risk behavior for HJV/AIDS infection. Here we should distinguish between identity and behavior, because people can engage in homosexual behavior without identifying themselves as homosexuals. Not all MSM identify themselves as homosexual. For a Jist of MSM service orga- nizations of Ukraine, sec the (iay Forum of Ukraine database at http://ga.net. ua, accessed March 29, 20 II. 9. Personal communication from one of the project coordinators. I 0. Yavorsky made these comments during an online interview conducted by e-mail, March II, 20 II. I I. In 2005, Nash Mir held a large international conference, "Our World: Extending the Borders," which included a round-table discussion among LGBT activists and scholars on "New Homophobic Trends in Central and Eastern Europe." Another international conference at the end of2008, "Gay and Lesbian Rights Are Human Rights," covered a range of issues from human rights and homophobia to tolerance in education. 12. The Center for Society Research (CSR, http://cedos.org.ua) is an independent nonprofit organization researching social problems and collet> tivc protests. Since September 2009, the CSR has studied protests and the authorities' reaction to them, applying the European Protest and Coercion Data methodology and monitoring more than a hundred national, regional, and activist media outlets. The project leader, Volodymyr lshchenko, supplied the data on numbers of protests. !3. Sec also, for example, Nash Mir (www.gay.org.ua). 14. For data on the demographic crisis, sec the Stale Statistics Commillec Web site (www.ukrstat.gov.ua). 15. Svoboda is an ultraright party in Ukraine. For more information, sec its party platform at www.svoboda.org.ua/pro_partiyu/prohrama, accessed February 14,2012. The quotation is from Svoboda 2010. 16. The heads of the Gay Forum of Ukraine, the Women's Network, LiGA, Nash Mir, the Gay Alliance, and Chas Zhyttya Plus signed the lc!tcr. 17. For the Ukrainian text of the bill, sec w I.e l.rada.gov.ua/pls/zweb_n/ webproc4_1 ?pf35! I =40734, accessed February !4, 2012. 18. The administration of the Nash Mir Gay and Lesbian Center in Kyiv, Ukraine, provided these findings in a personal communication. References AIDS Alliance Ukraine. 2008. "Monitoring povcdcniia muzhchin, kotorye pniktikuiut scks s muzhchinami kak komponent cpidnadzora vtorogo poko!cniia" (Monitcr:ng of the Behavior of Men Who Have Sex with Men as a Component of Second-Generation Epidemic Control), at www. a ids a II ia nee. or g. ua/ru/1 i brary /ou r/mon i I oring_ reports/ pd f/rcport_M S M _ rus.pdf, accessed April 2, 2011. Amnesty International. 2009. "Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity," at http:// amnesty.org/cn/scxual-orientation-and-gender-idcntity, accessed April 2, 20 II. Amnesty International USA. 2011. "Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Trans gender Human Rights," at www.amnestyusa.org/lgbt-human-rights/about-lgbt- human-rights/page.do? id= II 06573, accessed April 2, 20!!. Balakireva, O.M., et al. 2006. "Evaluation of the Size of Most-at-Risk Populations Vulnerable toHJV Infection in Ukraine." Kyiv: lCFlntcrnational HlV/AIDS Alliance in Ukraine, at www.aidsalliancc.org.ua/ru/library/our/ monitoring__rcpons/pdf/sizc_cn.pdf, accessed April2, 2011. Commillcc on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). 2010. "Concluding Observations of the Commillce on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women." Forty-Fifth session, January IS-February 5, at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N 1 0/242/88/PDF/ N !024288.pdf?OpenElcrncnt, accessed April 2, 20 1!. Council or Europe. 2010. "Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)5 of the Com- millec of Ministers to Member States on Measmes to Combat Discrimination on Grounds of Sexual Orientation or Gender Identity." Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on March 31 at the !081st meeting of the Ministers' Deputies, at https://wcd.coc.int/wcd!ViewDoc.j sp?id= l606669&Sitc=CM&BackColorlntcrnct=C3C3C3&BackColorlnt ranet=EDB021 &BackCo!orLogged=F5D383, accessed April 2, 2011. Elita natsi'l. 2011. "Lvivska molod zakupila vaselin dlia dcputativ" (Youth in Lviv Bought Vaseline for the Deputies) (April 3), at hllp://clitanatsii. com/artic!cs/ukrainians/377-youth-bought-vaseline-for-mcmbcrs.html, accessed April 3, 20 l I. European Commission. 2007. "Discrimination in the European Union: Summary. Special Eurobaromcter," at http://cc.europa.cu/public_opinion/ archives/cbs/ cbs._263_sum_cn.pdf, accessed April 2, 201 I. European Parliament. 2006. "Joint Motion for a Resolution on Homophobia in Europe." PE 368.248, January 16, at www.europar!.europa.eu/ sides/ gctDoc. do ?pub Ref=-/ /EP I IN 0 N S G M 1.+ M OTI 0 N + P6- R C- 2006-0025+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN, accessed February 14, 2012. The resolution, adopted January 18, is P6_TA[2006[0018, at www.curoparl. europa.eu/sidcs/getDoc.do?pubRcf=-/IEP//TEXT+TA+P6-TA-2006- 00 18+0+D0C+XML+V0//EN, accessed April 2, 20 II. ForUm. 2007. "LlaPota za tizhden: Zbochcntsi Gracha, kulbiti Kirilcnka, pokusanii Chernovctskii, igri Zvaricha" (Slip-up of the Week: Perverts of Grach, Rolls of Kirilcnko, Billen Chcmovctskii, Games of Zvarich) (February 14), at http://ua.for-ua.com/analytics/2007/02/l4/112933.html, accessed April II, 2007. Martsenyuk LGBT Community in Ukraine 61 Human Rights Watch. 201 I. "Ukraine: LcUer !0 Chairman of Purliamcnt Volodymyr Lytvyn Regarding Proposal for a Bill on Banning 'Propaganda of Homoscxuulism'" (Ocwbcr !7), at www.hrw.org/news/201 l/IO/J6/ ukra i ne-1 et ter-c hair man- par I i amen t- vol od ymy r-1 yt vy n- regarding- proposal-bill-banning-, accessed Fcbnwry 14,2012. International L.csbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association (JLGA). 2007. "State-Sponsored Homophobia," at www.ilg.a.org/news_results.asp? FilcCategory==9&ZonclD=7&Fi!clD=l058 (accessed August I, 2009). ILGA Europe. 2007a. "Hate Speech by High-Ranking j)oliticians in Ukraine," at www. i I ga -cu rope.org/europe/ gu i dc/cou n try_ by_ cou n I ry /ukraine/hate_ specch ... by_high_)"<mking__politicianjn_ukraine, accessed September I, 2009. ---~. 2007b. "Marriage and Partnership Rights for Same-Sex Partners: Country by Country,'' at www.ilg.a-curope.mg/europe/issues/lgbt_fami lies/ marriage _and _ _part n crsh i p _ri gh l s -· for_s a me _sex _partners_ country_ by_ country, accessed August I 0, 2009. Insight. 2010. "Situatsila transgendcrov v Ukraine: Otchct po issledovaniiu" (Situation of Transgcnder People ill Ukraine: Research Report). Kyiv: Insight. Korrespondellf. 2009a. "Tigipko: Mcnia prosto pre-t ot politikl. Mne v k<tiC' (Tygypko: I' rn Rushing from Politics, I' 111 So Bu;>.zed) (November 27), at h!! p ://korrcs ponde n t. nct/u k rai nc/po I it i cs/ I 02204 7 -I i g i pko- men ya- prosto- prel-ot-politiki-mne-v-k<\if, accessed March I 3, 2011. ---. 2009b. "German: lanukovich vyigract vybory i poobshchactsia s vmni v chate" (Gcnnan: Yanuk.ovich Wins the Elections and Promises to Chat with You) (December 14), at http://korrespondcnt.net/uk!"ainc/politics/!026877- gcrman- yan ll k ov i ch- vy i gntct- v y bory- i- poobs hchac tsy <1-s- Vl\111 i- v -chnt e, accessed March 13,2011. Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS). 2011. "Prava !iudyny v Ukra"ini, riven ksenofobii, stnvlcnnya do riznykh sotsia!nykh grup Ia rcgiona!na tolcnmtnist" (Human Rights in Ukwinc, Levels of Xenophobia, Attitudes Toward Different Social Groups and Regional 'l"blcrancc), c-lile pr"ovided by !he Institute of Humnn Rights and the Prevention of Extremism und Xenophobia. Love Contnt. 2008a. "P;t!ka v kolesa sodomii ot ukrainskikh narodnykh dcputatov" (The Ukrainian People's Deputies Dump Grit in Sodomy's Machine), at http://](WC··contra.org/indcx.php/ncws/issue/146, accessed July 30,2009. "···--·-. 2008b. "SPID 'kosi!' gecv" (AJDS Is "Mowing Down" Gays), at hUp://!ovc-contra.org/indcx.php/cxpcrl/issue/195, accessed July 30, 2009. . 201 l. ''Zaiava Rukhu LPG shcho stvorcnnya 'Rady LGBT Orga- nizatsii UkraYny" (LAI-I Movemelll Statement on the Registration of the Union of LOBT Organizations of Ukraine), at http:!/love-contrn.org/in- dcx.php/docs/issue/720, accessed April 2, 20 II. Mainwlakllin, A.lu., M.G. Kasinnchuk, and JiB. Lcshchynskyy. 2009. "Odnopoloc partncrstvo v Ukraine: Otchct po isslcd(W<lniiu" (Same-Sex Parlnership in Ukraine: Research Report). Donetsk. Martscnyuk, Tmnanl. 2009. "Strakh ro7Jllaittia: natsionalni vlastyvosli to!erantnosti i khomofobii" (Fear of Diversity: Nationn! Peculiarities of Tolerance and Homophobia). Kryryka 13, nos. 11--12: 145-46. --~. 20 I 0. "LGBT-dvizhcnie v Ukraine: I 0 let spustia" (The LGBT Movement of Ukraine: Ten Years Later), Gendernye is.l"/ed(J\'tmiia, nos. 20-21: I 34--48. ---. 2011. 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()'Flaherty, Michael, and John Fisher. 2008. "Sexual Orientation, (lender Identity, and International Human Rights Law: Contcxtualizing the Yog- yakarla Principles." !Jumwl Rights Law Rel'iew 8, no. 2: 207-48. 62 Problems of Post-Communism March/April 2012 Paniouo, Volodymyr. 2008. "Dinamika kscnofobii ta an!iscmitizmu v UkraYni (1994-2007)" (Dynamics of Xenophobia and Anti-Semitism in Ukruinc, l 994-2007), Sorsio/ogiia: teoriitl, melody, 1//arkering, no. J: !97~214. Parashchevin, Maksym. 2009. Religiio ttl religiinisr v Ukmiiu' (Religion and Religiosity in Ukraine). Kyiv: Jnst"llutc of Sociology, Ukrainian National Academy of Sciences, at www.kiis.com.u:J!xt/doc/02042009/brosh.pdf, accessed February 14,2012. Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE). 2010a. "Discri- mination on the Basis of Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity." Resolution no. 1728, at htl p://asscm\)1 y.coc.in!/Ma"lnf.asp?link=!Doctlll1ents/ AdoptedText/tal 0/ERES I 728.htm, accessed April 2, 20 I l. ---. 20J0b. "J)i~criminmion on the Basis of Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity." Recommendation no. 1915, at hltp://assembly.coe.int/Mainf. asp?link=/ Documcnts/AdoptedText/taiO/HREC l 915.htm, accessed April 2, 2011. Religious Jnformalion Service of Ukraine (RISU). 20!0. "Christian Church- es of Ukraine Express Negative Auitudc to Sin of Homosexuality" (June ll), at http;//risu.org.u<Jen/indcx/all_newslconlmunity/rcligiorumd_soci- ety/36070, accessed February 14, 20!2. Shcrcmct, Sviatoslav. 2008. Address by S. Sheremct, President of tile Gay Forum of Ukraine, to the intemational conference "Gay <llld Lesbian Rights Arc Human Righg." Held in Kyiv, Ukraine, October 4-5. Stlllova, !·Ianna, Maksym Kasianchuk, and Svitlana Shymko. 2010. Seksua!nisr u ZMJ: Fen omen gomoseksualnosti 1/(/Sforinkakh ukmii1skoi pre,1y: Ll'if iz. rt.'z.ulraril' conrenr-anali(\'dlllogo doslidz.hennya (Sexuality in the Media: The Phenomenon of Homosexuality in the Ukrainian Press. A Report of Conlent-Analy~is Research Results). Donetsk. Svoboda. 2010. "Akt;;iia za traditsiini simeini lsinnosti Ia proti propagandi zbochen 11 Kievi" (Protest for Traditional Fnmily Values and ngainst Propaganda of Perversions in Kyiv). (December I I), at www.svobodn. org.ua/diyalnist/anonsy/0 I R 168, accessed April 3, 20 II. Unian InfOrmation Agency. 2010. ''lak uknl!nlsi stavlial~ia do prcdtavnikiv sckmenshin (oputyvannia)" (What Is Ukrainians' Attitude Townrd Sextlal Minorities? IPollj) (December 24), at www.unian.net/ukr/news/ncws- 413l71.html, accessed March 10,2011. Vse 1/0l'Osri. 2010. "Opros: 66.Y..f'1 kicvlian nazvali gomoscksualizm izvrashchcniem i psikhiche~kirn Zt!bolcvanicm" (Survey: 6().5 Percent or Kicvans Call Homosexuality a Perversion and Mental Illness) (September 28), at www.vsenovosti.in.ua/ncws/ 095469, accessed March I 0, 201 I. Women's Network (Ukraine). 2009. "LGBT-organizatsii, initsiativnyc gruppy v Ukraine" (LGBT Organit.ations and Initiative Groups in Ukraine), at www.fcminist.org.u<Jinfo/!gbtinfo.php# I, accessed August 2, 2009. Yogyakarta Principles. 2007. "The Yogyakarta Principles: Principles on the Application of International Human Rights Law in Relation to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identily." Adopted by the Intcrmuiona! Panel of Experts in I ntcrnational Jurisprudence in Yogyakarta, Indonesia, November 6-9, 2006. Full text at www.yogyakarlaprinciples.org/principles_cn.pdf, accessed August I, 2009. Za Ravnyc Prav<l and Insight. 2009. "Shadow Report: Di>;:>crimination and Violence against Lesbian and Bisexual Women and Transgender People in Ukraine," submiued to the Forty-Fifth CEDAW Session, at www2.ohchr. org/english/bodies/ccdaw/docs/Za_Ravnic .. _Pravaandlnsight-LGBT_ focus_Ukrainc.pdf, accessed April 2, 20 I I. To order reprints, call 1-800-352-2210; outside the United States, call 717-632-3535. 
work_ixoaywfe5zcgfhggzkywcj6pve	----	http://cjr.sagepub.com Criminal Justice Review DOI: 10.1177/0734016808326373 2009; 34; 267 Criminal Justice Review John M. Hagedorn Thomas. xiii, 237 pp View: The Story of Superintendent Terry G. Hillard. Springfield, IL: Charles C. Book Review: Jurkanin, T. J., & Hillard, T. G. (2006). Chicago Police: An Inside http://cjr.sagepub.com The online version of this article can be found at: Published by: http://www.sagepublications.com On behalf of: Georgia State University, College of Health and Human Sciences can be found at:Criminal Justice Review Additional services and information for http://cjr.sagepub.com/cgi/alerts Email Alerts: http://cjr.sagepub.com/subscriptions Subscriptions: http://www.sagepub.com/journalsReprints.navReprints: http://www.sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.navPermissions: at Univ of Illinois at Chicago Library on June 18, 2009 http://cjr.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://chhsweb.gsu.edu/ http://cjr.sagepub.com/cgi/alerts http://cjr.sagepub.com/subscriptions http://www.sagepub.com/journalsReprints.nav http://www.sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav http://cjr.sagepub.com Book Reviews 267 groups, such as Al Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah, from traditional ones like the Irish Republican Army. One of the important factors of new terrorist groups is that they indis- criminately target the general public to cause mass destruction. The handbook provides a comparative perspective among the nations with Anglo-Saxon tradition. However, it would have been better if the authors discussed victim protection sys- tems in non-English speaking nations like Germany, France, Japan, and so on. Also, the book did not present a detailed discussion on the victimization from a wide array of crimes, such as murder, robbery, child abuse, school violence, and sexual harassment. Thus, it might not be an ideal victimology textbook for undergraduate students. However, victimology class instructors may use the handbook as a supplemental resource. Also, the handbook should be helpful for the researchers who are interested in getting detailed information on such areas as the relationship between feminism and victimology, theoretical perspectives on victimology, measurement issues in victimization, comparative studies of victim protection laws and poli- cies, and victimization from hate crimes, corporate crimes, and terrorism. Don Chon Keiser University, Tallahassee, FL Jurkanin, T. J., & Hillard, T. G. (2006). Chicago Police: An Inside View: The Story of Superintendent Terry G. Hillard. Springfield, IL: Charles C. Thomas. xiii, 237 pp. DOI: 10.1177/0734016808326373 “To write,” C. Wright Mills says, “is to raise a claim for the attention of readers.” Mills goes on to ask three questions of an author: “1. How difficult and complex after all is my subject? 2. When I write, what status am I claiming for myself? 3. For whom am I trying to write?” Despite the fact that Chicago Police: An Inside View: The Story of Superintendent Terry G. Hillard is not a work of social science, Mills’s notes on intellectual craftsmanship are useful. The book’s answer to the first question is that the Chicago Police Department (CPD) is a straightforward organization of dedicated professionals who “have a long history of work- ing proactively with the community to identify problems and to find solutions” (p. 158). Cops are the thin blue line that keeps us from barbarism. “We curse them until we need them. Then we call them heroes” (p. 183). While racism is still a problem and police make mis- takes, brutality and corruption are “isolated incidents” (p. 159). During Terry Hillard’s time as chief “there was not a hint of scandal” (p. 192). If that reads like a press release, you get the flavor of the book. The text intersperses an iconographic tale of Terry Hillard’s life with superficial history, anecdotes of major Chicago crimes, and bad poetry. Unfortunately for the authors, this is a story of the Chicago police, and we have a substantial public record that suggests that things may be a bit more com- plicated than the rosy portrait painted by Jurkanin and Hillard. Terry Hillard is called a “cop’s cop.” He rose through the ranks to become superinten- dent in 1999, retiring in 2003. Although the book does not mention it, one measure of his influence may have been a decline in police killings. From 1999 to 2003, Chicago police at Univ of Illinois at Chicago Library on June 18, 2009 http://cjr.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://cjr.sagepub.com 268 Criminal Justice Review killed an average of 9 civilians per year, almost a third less than in the decade before. Hillard’s ubiquitous presence in the Black community during his tenure may have had some effect in restraining the proclivity of his Chicago police to shoot and kill its Black citizens. The claim, however, that Hillard “changed the culture of the CPD” (p. 199) stumbles on the continuing saga of CPD brutality and corruption. Whereas in 1999, it was Hillard who promised reform, today a new Superintendent, Jody Weis, chants the same mantra. Whereas Hillard wrote a memo ordering CPD to stop ille- gally holding suspects more than 48 hours without charges, today Weis writes the same memo once again. The recent dismantling of the Special Operations Squad (SOS) after charges of misconduct demonstrates that corruption and brutality have continued unabated. The murder of a Chicago police officer this year (2008) is widely seen as related to the victim’s forthcoming testimony against other officers in wrongdoing that took place, in part, on Hillard’s watch. It is likely the only unsolved murder of a Chicago police officer in history. Astoundingly, another CPD officer has already been charged by federal prosecu- tors with hiring a gang member to kill a fellow officer who was preparing to testify about SOS wrongdoing. To give another example, one name never mentioned in the book is Jon Burge. Hillard certainly knew Burge, a highly decorated, high-profile commander who tortured more than a 100 Black men during the 1970s and 1980s. Hillard worked gang crimes and Area Two; so did Burge. Burge’s use of torture tactics learned in Vietnam came to light after an exposé, not by the CPD, but by Northwestern University lawyers. The Goldston Report, commissioned by the CPD to investigate claims by Northwestern and several journalists, found that CPD torture was “systematic.” Hillard as Superintendent incredibly claimed in sworn testimony, “I don’t know nothing about the Goldston report.” Hillard’s testimony was taken in a lawsuit over the equally incredible CPD charging of two children, aged 7 and 8 years, for murder. Chicago Tribune columnist Eric Zorn pointed out that Hillard stood by “like a potted plant” as his department rushed to charge the two children and bask in the publicity about “young predators.” Before long, semen was found on the victim and DNA evidence linked an adult to the crime. The children were exonerated and sued the city. Hillard’s comments on the police work that led to the bogus charges were as follows: “There has been no—I repeat—no misconduct on the part of any member of the Chicago Police Department.” It would be hard to find anyone familiar with this case who would agree. Mills’ two other questions, what status do I claim and for whom do I write, can now be more easily answered. Hillard as Superintendent and Jurkanin, a former mayoral press secretary, are consummate insiders. Their book, however, is not an “inside view” but an official one that keeps the public in the dark about the “dark side” of the CPD. Reading Chicago Police shows how difficult it is to get the CPD to admit its “systematic” problems. John M. Hagedorn University of Illinois, Chicago at Univ of Illinois at Chicago Library on June 18, 2009 http://cjr.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://cjr.sagepub.com 
work_iynfifyr3zahrh7ylwrihrvw2e	----	1 CIVILISED COMMUNITIES Reconsidering the ‘Gloomy Tale’ of Immigration and Social Order in a Changing Town Abstract Immigration and its effects on crime, social disorder and community tensions remains a pervasive feature of public, government and academic discourse. This discourse often considers immigration, and immigrants themselves, as a threat to the community’s existing moral and social order. This paper presents the findings of a case study that used quantitative and qualitative methods to explore the experiences of social order following a recent wave of Polish migration in a small working class town in the North West of England. The key findings show that the assumed association of migration with a disruption to social order receives little support. Rather, the social order in the studied locale is predominantly managed and maintained through ‘civilised relationships’ between migrants and established residents, thus failing to culminate into conflict between the two groups. This situation of ‘civility’ provides an alternative to the preponderance of previous research telling a ‘gloomy tale’ of immigration and its impact on local communities. Keywords: Polish Immigration, Strangers, Civilised Communities, Conflict, Social (Dis)Order Introduction Debates surrounding immigration and its effects on crime, social disorder and community tensions (whether actual or perceived) have been a pervasive feature of public, government, and academic discourse for many years, and remain important to this day (Hughes, 2007). Concern over segregation, conflict and the 'parallel lives' that diverse cultures lead has indeed been high on the political agenda ever since the 2001 riots in the Northern towns of Oldham, Bradford and Burnley, where various government policies have focused on trying to encourage greater 'community cohesion' (Griffiths, 2013). Recent waves of migration to the UK from Central and Eastern Europe have once again stimulated this debate on immigration and its imagined 'threat' to social order. In May 2004, the European Union opened its doors to eight new accession countries that were granted full access to the UK labour market. Although it is difficult 2 to determine the exact numbers of migrants who moved to the UK during and after this time (see Office for National Statistics et al, 2011 for a discussion of migration data limitations), what is clear is that substantial and rapid changes have been witnessed in local neighbourhoods throughout the country, and this contemporary migration is arguably “one of the most important social phenomena in recent years” (Pollard et al, 2008: 54). The limited data that is available on such migration flows demonstrate that of these new migrants, the overwhelming majority have migrated from Poland (Home Office et al, 2006; Stenning et al, 2006; Burrell, 2009). Although Poland has a long established history of migration, some commentators have deemed this a ‘new migration’ due predominantly to its size and rapidity, with many suggesting it is the largest wave of migration in British history (Stenning et al, 2006: 9; The Economist, 2008; Burrell, 2009). An important feature of this so-called ‘new migration’ (Stenning et al, 2006: 9) therefore was its geographical dispersal with many small towns and more rural areas experiencing international migration for the first time. As Stenning et al (2006: 10) emphasise however, “[n]otwithstanding this changing geography, the vast majority of research, empirical and anecdotal material relates to new migrants in London, the east and south east. As a result, far less is known about A8 migrants in more northern and western regions.” This paper seeks to address this by presenting the findings of a case study carried out in Crewe, a small working class town in the North West of England that witnessed an unexpected and unprecedented in- migration of Polish migrant workers and their families. The initial media response to this migration was, both locally and nationally, rather negative with these new migrant groups being associated with rising crime, disorder and fear: ‘has Eastern European immigration fuelled a crime wave in Britain?’ (Campbell, 2012); ‘mass immigration to blame for knife culture, Chief Constable warns’ (Slack, 2008); ‘Britons have “greater fear” of immigration’ (Sinclair, 2011). While some have suggested that this ‘new’ migration has “gone some way to decoupling the issue of immigration from that of race” (The Economist, 2008: 33), the perceived association of ‘immigrants’, ‘strangers’ or ‘outsiders’ with a disruption to social order remains a prevalent research issue (Elias and Scotson, 1965). There is a plethora of research on the negative attitudes of majority or ‘established’ populations towards the ‘immigrant’ 3 or the ‘stranger’ (Hughes, 2007); yet there remains little criminological research on the lived experiences and subjectivities of new migrant communities themselves (Phillips and Bowling, 2003). The contribution of this paper therefore is to provide one of the few empirical and in-depth case studies that explores how both ‘established’ residents and new migrants perceive, adapt and negotiate their social relationships with each other in their day to day lives. Adding to the body of literature that tells a ‘gloomy tale’ of immigration, this paper aims to instead show that tension and conflict is not inevitable in all contexts. Using findings from a mixed methods case study in Crewe, the paper demonstrates how positive and civil social interaction can occur in communities undergoing rapid social change through immigration. Although claims of representativeness cannot be made here, the results are in line with a tentative but growing body of academic research. The paper begins by providing a review of the academic literature on this gloomy tale. It then moves on to describe both the geographical and migration context in which the current study takes place, along with the research methods it incorporated. The paper ends by presenting the quantitative and qualitative findings that show the nuances of social relationships and suggest the assumed association of immigration with a disruption to social order receives little support in the current context. Instead, ‘civilised relationships’ between the two groups exist as the norm in this neighbourhood. The 'Gloomy Tale' of Immigration and Social Order The 'stranger', the 'immigrant', the 'alienated other', are themes that have preoccupied sociologists for many years (Simmel, [1908] 1971; Bauman, 1997; Young, 1999) and remain important to this day. Much of this research has linked the increased presence of strangers in an area to negative public perceptions of crime, 'incivility’, and the moral indignation of others' public behaviour, resulting in disintegrated and strained inter- community relations (Lupton and Tulloch, 1999 cited in Farrall et al, 2009: 107). According to Bauman (1997: 17), strangers are people who “do not fit the cognitive, moral and/or aesthetic map of the world … whose sheer presence causes anxiety, obscurity and confusion, as they transcend and eclipse boundary lines.” The ‘ambient fear’ (Bauman, 1997: 22) that is experienced, due to the permanent presence of 4 strangers in neighbourhoods, obstructs collective efforts and a sense of solidity. In sociological terms, the perceived problem of the stranger, therefore, is their closeness in physical contact, but distance in social contact (Simmel, [1908] 1971; Wirth, 1938: 14). Dating back to the Chicago School studies from the 1920s onwards, immigration has predominantly been found to disrupt bonds of 'kinship', ‘neighbourliness’ and ‘sentiments’ (Wirth, 1938: 11) that ultimately weaken social solidarity and disintegrate the social and moral order leading to competition for resources, crime and conflict (Thomas and Znaniecki, [1918-1920] 1996; McKenzie, [1924] 1971; Park et al, 1925; Burgess, 1925; North, [1926] 1971; Wirth, 1938). Robert Putnam (2007) has famously contributed to this debate in more recent years with his ‘hunkering down’ thesis. Here he makes rather dystopian claims of a ubiquitous cynical society whereby individuals initially ‘hunker down’ as a direct consequence of immigration and increased diversity. Putnam (2007) contends that such diversity and mass immigration can, in the short-term at least, have detrimental effects on trust, social cohesion and the production of social capital for all groups within communities, resulting in altruistic behaviours and the overall moral fabric of communities to be in decline. Putnam’s (2007) latest ‘hunkering down’ thesis is therefore considered a contemporary account of the classic idea of ‘community lost’, whereby immigration and diversity are seen as being the modern day sources of transience, segmentation and impersonality that disrupt social interaction in local neighbourhoods (Sampson, 2012). Such tension and strained social relations can stem from communities’ wider sensibilities regarding social change. In Stoke-on-Trent for example, just 15 miles away from Crewe, Gadd et al (2005) found that local residents often associate concerns with community deterioration and decline, and increasing crime and disorder, with ‘immigrants’. In the working class town studied, those most socially marginalised or disadvantaged were found to attribute the perceived decline and social problems in their community with an increasing mass of ‘foreigners’ or ‘immigrants’ taking over ‘their’ neighbourhood. The authors found that feelings of powerlessness and status insecurity were shared by both the perpetrators of ‘hate crime’, as well as the wider white working class community, which allowed for a scapegoat to be formed in the all- 5 encompassing image of the ‘foreigner’. This resonates with the ‘social threat’ hypothesis, whereby immigrants or strangers are perceived as a ‘realistic’ and ‘symbolic’ threat. The former argues that established groups perceive a threat to the already strained economic and social resources in disadvantaged neighbourhoods experiencing immigration (Bobo, 1983; Herreros and Criado, 2009; Meuleman et al, 2009). This perceived threat to resources can take either an individual-level (based on self-interest) or group-level (based on societal-interest) form, leading to conflict and competition for resources (McLaren and Johnson, 2007). Such perceptions of threat can also be ‘symbolic’ in nature. In their seminal study The Established and The Outsiders, Elias and Scotson (1965: 147) show how newcomers act as a ‘symbolic’ threat to the established social and moral order of the neighbourhood. For these authors, established neighbourhood inhabitants are besieged by their status anxieties of class and respectability, and newcomers are perceived negatively as a threat to such status aspirations with the potential to lower their community down the status hierarchy. Established residents were thus found by Elias and Scotson (1965: 149) to exhibit particularly low levels of tolerance towards the social conduct of the newcomers and to engage in any activity that set themselves apart from these ‘outsiders’ to “confirm their own superiority in morals and manners, symbols of their own respectability, of their claim to a higher social status, of the existing social order.” Elias and Scotson (1965: 153) called this a process of forming ‘civilising differentials’ between the established groups’ perceived ‘superior’ civility as compared to the newcomers’ ‘inferior’ civility. The unavoidable interdependence between established and newcomer groups as a result of migration thus culminated into tension and conflict between the groups in Elias and Scotson’s study. These collection of studies therefore predominantly tell a gloomy tale of immigration and its perceived social order consequences, whereby immigrants are often cast as ‘outsiders’ in their new neighbourhoods and as representatives of ‘uncivil’ behaviour. This, it is argued, ultimately results in tension, conflict and animosity between these diverse groups in contemporary changing neighbourhoods. There is some tentative, but ever growing, body of literature across various disciplines and in a variety of social contexts that counter this assumed gloomy tale however. A 6 recent article in The Guardian for example reports on a study that shows living in diverse areas makes individuals more, not less, tolerant (Bunting, 2014). The authors of the study suggest that simply observing diverse individuals interacting positively with each other has the potential to ‘rub off’ on others. They term this ‘passive tolerance’ and liken it to passive smoking, whereby individuals in diverse communities cannot avoid being influenced by positive social interaction just like those who are surrounded by smokers cannot avoid passively taking in smoke (Christ et al, 2014). Such findings are in line with Allport’s (1958) contact theory that proposes prejudice and intolerance are reduced the more individuals come into contact with members of different ethnic and cultural groups. Earle and Phillips (2009: 128) similarly highlight the potential of ‘multicultural conviviality’ albeit in a very different social setting. The authors were concerned with exploring concepts of ‘local liveability’ and how the “daily negotiation of ethnic difference” is managed in a prison environment (Amin, 2002 cited in Phillips, 2008: 316). The authors found that social interaction between prisoners was much more complex and nuanced than previously assumed. Although prisoners at times suggested they felt more at ease with those from their own ethnic group based on feelings of commonality, they did express tolerant views whereby difference was considered rather unremarkable. Contact with those from different ethnic backgrounds was again found to encourage empathy with others and a convivial environment could be maintained. The current paper aims to add to this body of literature by exploring the nuanced sensibilities and social relationships that exist amongst groups after a period of mass migration. In line with Elias and Scotson (1965: 167), who advocate a ‘configurational’ study of communities, this paper departs from existing research that has typically focused solely on the established community by recognising the ‘interdependencies’ of groups living within the same neighbourhood. The paper therefore aims to explore how both ‘established’ and ‘migrant’ groups perceive, adapt and negotiate their social relationships with each other, illustrating how 'civility' rather than conflict can exist. To do this, the paper reports on quantitative and qualitative data collected in a small town that experienced an unexpected and rapid ‘shock’ migration of Polish workers and their families. 7 The Setting The historical and social context of a locale has important implications for the social relationships that exist within it; that is, in the criminological study of social change and social order, the distinctiveness of ‘place’ matters (Bottoms, 2009: 50). The current research took place in Crewe, a small working class town in the North West of England that is surrounded by wealthy Cheshire countryside. Crewe is famously characterised by its industrial past and in particular as a railway town ‘par excellence’ (McKenna, 1908 cited in Drummond, 1995: 1). The legacy of these earlier industrial eras still live on to this very day, and Crewe’s reputation as a ‘workingman’s town’ (Drummond, 1995: 133) remains, with one author likening the area to “a soiled mechanic working hard in the middle of a grassy lawn” (Christiansen, 1993: 9). In 2001, Crewe had a population of just over 100,000 residents and over 45,000 households. Overall, Crewe could be characterised as a fairly typical homogeneous working class town with the majority of its residents being born in the UK (UK Census, 2001). These 2001 statistics do little to describe the situation in Crewe at the time of the research however, where the preoccupation of local inhabitants, local institutions, and the local and national media, was on the rapidly changing population with the increasing presence of Polish migrants. According to Worker Registration Scheme (WRS) data obtained from the Home Office UK Border Agency, between May 2004 and June 2008, over 4,000 A8 migrants applied to work in the Crewe area. Of this number, approximately 90% were from Poland; over three quarters were aged between 18 and 34 years; around two thirds were male and were employed in factory work. The demographics of A8 migrants in Crewe thus generally reflected the national picture (see Stenning et al, 2006; Pollard et al, 2008; Burrell, 2009). These local figures are nevertheless still claimed to underestimate the true scale of Polish migration with anecdotal accounts suggesting the number was in fact much higher. Regardless of the exact numbers, local accounts emphasised the 'felt' change in the area with many different accents and different appearances in a town that had very little diversity previously. 8 The Methodological Approach Minorities’ and migrants’ experiences and perceptions are vastly underexplored in contemporary quantitative criminological research due, in the most part, to the immense challenge and expense of doing so (see Phillips and Bowling, 2003). The present research therefore attempted to fill this void by capturing the perspectives and experiences of both the local established residents (subsequently termed the ‘local’ group) and the new Polish migrants (subsequently termed the ‘migrant’ group). In recognition of Phillips and Bowling’s (2003: 270) plea to reconcile ‘criminological data’ and the ‘lived experiences’ of minorities, a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods and analyses were considered the appropriate research strategy to do this. The Survey To compare the two groups’ attitudes, perceptions and experiences, a bilingual survey was designed, translated and administered to ‘local’ and ‘migrant’ populations throughout the selected neighbourhoods in Crewe via a ‘random walk’ sampling design, whereby every 5th household was selected to partake in the survey (see Farrall et al, 1997 for a description). It was originally planned to obtain a random, but not proportionate, equal sample of respondents from the Polish community and from the local community. However, the practice of sampling is not comparable to its theory and it soon became apparent during the research that this would be an unachievable target. While the random sampling method was adhered to for the local population, this method alone was not possible in reality for the migrant population due to the need to oversample this group. Faugier and Sargeant (1997) stress the need for a mixture of methods to be used when researching ‘hidden populations’, i.e. those where no sampling frame exists (Birman, 2006) as once random sampling approaches have been saturated, non-random methods often need to be utilised (Dahinden and Efionayi-Mäder, 2009). A targeted sampling approach was therefore adopted which involved the recruitment of migrant respondents at sites identified as salient from ‘ethnographic mapping’ (Watters and Biernacki, 1989; Heckathorn, 1997: 175). Through using a range of methods and sampling strategies therefore, the researcher was able to include the voices of this 9 rather transient and hidden Polish migrant community in the research (see Griffiths, 2014 for further discussion of the sampling strategy and its limitations). The Sample The final sample included a total of 250 respondents: 78 migrant respondents, the ‘migrant’ group; and 172 local respondents, the ‘local’ group. Table I below illustrates the composition of the two groups in their socio-demographic characteristics. [Table I Here] As seen in table I, the significant differences between the two groups are in their age, level of education, employment status, length of residence, and household tenure. The migrant group are slightly younger, better educated, more likely to be in paid work, to have lived in the neighbourhood for a much shorter amount of time, and to rent their property, as compared to the local group. The socio-demographic characteristics of the migrant group sample in the current research do therefore appear to closely resemble those of the wider migrant population throughout the UK (see Stenning et al, 2006; Burrell, 2009). Measures Perceptions of immigration as a 'realistic' threat Following the social threat hypothesis (McLaren and Johnson, 2007), groups’ perceptions of immigration as a 'realistic' threat to resources was measured by asking survey respondents how much they agreed or disagreed with the statements, ‘immigration has put pressure on local public services like schools, hospitals and public housing’ and ‘Polish immigration is good for Crewe's economy’. Respondents could answer on a five-point scale ranging from ‘strongly agree’ to ‘strongly disagree’. Perceptions of immigration as a 'symbolic' threat Secondly, to measure perceptions of immigration as a ‘symbolic’ threat to the social order of the neighbourhood, respondents were asked the extent to which they agreed or disagreed that ‘Polish immigration has changed this neighbourhood for the better’, and ‘the presence of different groups in this neighbourhood is a good thing’. Again, 10 respondents could answer on a five-point scale ranging from ‘strongly agree’ to ‘strongly disagree’. Perceptions of groups’ public behaviour Next, to understand how 'locals' and 'migrants' perceive the social conduct and public behaviour of various groups in the neighbourhood, respondents were asked, ‘who would you say are the main people who engage in disorderly behaviour and petty crime in your neighbourhood? By disorderly behaviour I mean drinking or being rowdy in public, being noisy, etc.’ Responses included ‘young people’, ‘men’, ‘British people’, ‘women’, ‘Polish people’, ‘students’, and ‘outsiders’. This was a multiple response item, whereby respondents could tick as many options as they wished. This item therefore captures perceptions of ‘uncivil’ behaviour in line with Elias and Scotson (1965). Community relations and group conflict The final step is to assess how group perceptions translate into community relations. Four items were incorporated in the questionnaire to capture both positive and negative community interaction. Firstly, to measure group tension, respondents were asked how much they agreed or disagreed with the statements, ‘sometimes I feel tension with neighbours that are not [British/Polish1]’ and ‘there are ethnic groups living in this neighbourhood that I do not think positively of’. Secondly, to measure perceptions of community cohesion, respondents were asked the extent to which they agreed or disagreed that ‘this is a close-knit neighbourhood’ and ‘people in this neighbourhood generally get on well with each other’. Respondents could answer on a five-point scale ranging from 1 (strongly agree) to 5 (strongly disagree). Supplementing the Survey: Qualitative Methods As a supplement to the quantitative component of the study, additional qualitative methods were incorporated to provide a more in-depth and interpretive account. Two focus groups were additionally carried out, one with members of the ‘local’ community and one with members of the ‘migrant’ community. Interviews with experts and key representatives from local institutions and organisations were conducted to gain the institutional perspective, including interviews with the local police, the local Borough 1 ‘British’ in local group questionnaire, ‘Polish’ in migrant group questionnaire. 11 council, and local landlords. Finally, field observations were recorded in a field diary from such sources as local newspapers, Neighbourhood Action Meetings (NAMs) organised by the local Borough Council, and conversations with people in their neighbourhoods. The qualitative data will be incorporated throughout the findings section to add greater depth and understanding to the quantitative data. Findings Immigration as a ‘Realistic’ Threat Table II displays the differences between local and migrant respondents’ attitudes toward immigration as a ‘realistic’ threat. As seen, locals’ and migrants’ perceptions differ most markedly when asked whether ‘Polish immigration is good for Crewe’s economy’. [Table II Here] As table II shows, 50.9% of the local group consider that Polish migration has had a negative impact on Crewe’s economy, demonstrated through disagreement with this statement. In contrast, 82.1% of the migrant group believe that Polish migration has had a positive effect on the local economy, demonstrated through agreement with this statement. This difference between the two groups is highly significant. A migrant survey respondent who has lived in Crewe for over 18 years provides an account of how the more recent Polish migration has benefited the area: “I think that England benefited from Polish immigration in my town, in Crewe. In a very fast pace empty houses are renovated for Polish families. Also, a few new neighbourhoods were built and new trade is emerging. The town is growing” [Migrant Survey Respondent]. This respondent, who is part of the more established Polish migrant generation living in Crewe, believes that the recent influx of young Polish workers and families has revitalised the town, bringing with it increased trade, redevelopment of properties, and 12 increased neighbourhood organisation. However, perhaps unsurprisingly, local residents do not agree with this perspective. Table II further demonstrates that 76.2% of the local group express a concern over the increased demand on local resources resulting from migration, stating that they either agree or strongly agree with the statement, ‘immigration has put pressure on local public services like schools, hospitals and public housing’. A local focus group participant captures some of this concern: “I think that the main problem is ... that we’ve had a very large increase in population ... over a period of probably up to five years, less than five years ... they don’t all necessarily speak English and with the children they put extra demands on schools, they put extra demands on doctors on the health facilities in the town, and I think to have such a large increase over such a short period of time puts a great strain on the normal structure of everyday living” [Keith, Local Focus Group]. Local residents are thus overwhelmingly in agreement that recent migration has placed extra demands on the town. However, 65.3% of the migrant group similarly agree on the resource strain such migration can induce, and no significant difference between the two groups is found (see table II). These findings provide supporting evidence of immigration as a perceived ‘realistic threat’ to limited economic and social resources by the established population (Blalock, 1967, cited Herreros and Criado, 2009; King and Wheelock, 2007; Meuleman et al, 2009). Nevertheless, while some would argue this constitutes a form of ‘subtle’ (Meuleman et al, 2009: 353) or ‘popular’ (Kundnani, 2001: 43) prejudice against immigrants, the current findings are less supportive of this view, as new migrants agree that their presence threatens and places extra pressure on access to social and welfare services. Immigration as a ‘Symbolic’ Threat Focusing more specifically on how locals and migrants perceive migration to have impacted ‘symbolically’ upon the social order of their neighbourhoods, table III shows 13 that nearly two thirds of the local group perceive that Polish migration has changed their neighbourhood for the worse (63.4%), compared to a third of the migrant group (35.1%). However, table III also shows that the migrant group responses are evenly distributed across the response categories, with a third of the migrant group stating immigration has changed their neighbourhood for the better, and a further third expressing no opinion. While local residents are thus in strong agreement that immigration is a ‘symbolic’ threat to their neighbourhood social order, the migrant group hold more heterogeneous attitudes and appear to find it more difficult to assess the impacts of immigration for neighbourhood social order as compared to assessments of the economy, for example. [Table III here] Next, when asked whether ‘the presence of different groups in this neighbourhood is a good thing’, 66.2% of the migrant group perceive that living in a heterogeneous neighbourhood with a variety of other groups living there is a positive consequence of immigration compared to just 40.1% of the local group. Again this difference is significant (see table III). As McLaren and Johnson (2007: 13-14) recognise, the threat posed by immigration for local residents can be “... symbolic in nature and may stem from concerns about the loss of certain values or a way of life because of the presence of minority groups and immigrants.” Established local residents in Crewe therefore typically view the recent Polish migration as both a ‘realistic’ threat to economic and social resources, as well as a ‘symbolic’ threat to the ‘veneer of civility’ (Innes, 2004: 341) and hence the social order of the neighbourhood. So far, the current findings are in line with the gloomy tale told in the current academic literature of immigration and its perceived consequences for social order. Perceptions of Groups' Public Behaviour Taking this a step further, the paper now turns its attention away from exploring perceptions of immigration more generally to assess how groups perceive each other. Focusing firstly on the local group, those most commonly perceived by local residents as 14 ‘disorderly’ in their neighbourhood (with a third of total responses) are young people (see figure I). [Figure I Here] Of all the groups considered as sources of disorder, figure I shows the subsequent highest share of responses are for men (16.6%) and British people (12.5%). The local group rank their Polish neighbours as the fifth most likely group to behave in a disorderly manner in the neighbourhood, with only 10.3% of responses. Therefore, it could be suggested that local residents generally perceive acts of disorder in their neighbourhood to mostly be committed by those within the community boundaries - young people, men, British people and women. Groups beyond their own community - Polish people, students and outsiders - are considered less problematic and disorderly in their neighbourhood. This finding echoes those presented by Girling et al (2000), whereby in a community in ‘middle England’, the everyday mundane crime talk typically centred on the perceived uncivil behaviour of local youth within the community. Crucially, although earlier findings illustrate that local residents hold negative perceptions of migration as a ‘realistic’ and ‘symbolic’ threat to the neighbourhood, the current findings suggest these local residents do not attribute the everyday sources of disorder in their neighbourhood to migrants themselves. This asserts that locals do not necessarily hold prejudicial attitudes toward their migrant neighbours, but do associate the general process of migration, as a mass influx of individuals, as having negative social order impacts. This is a subtle yet important differentiation between perceptions of migration and perceptions of migrants as sources of disorder. Kumlin’s (2004) conceptualisation of ‘sociotropic’ and ‘egotropic’ attitudes can be applied here, whereby a distinction exists between negative ‘sociotropic’ attitudes regarding migration as a general social process, and more positive ‘egotropic’ attitudes regarding migrants as neighbours (see also Griffiths, 2013 for a further discussion of this distinction in attitudes). 15 There is indeed a possibility that the local group had already settled on a different targeted 'other' that was not included in the responses to this question. There is no opportunity for respondents to give a racist response here for example. However, there is very little evidence of hate crime as a particular problem in Crewe with the official police statistics showing low levels recorded throughout the area. Local police accounts confirm this: "I mean one of our roles here is to monitor the number of race hate type incidents ... I would’ve expected it to be a hot-bed of race hate crime and quite honestly it isn’t and I think the statistics prove that” [Crewe Police Sergeant 2]. While there are of course problems with hate crime data, this fits with the wider picture that has emerged in Crewe with no strong or convincing evidence of generalised inter- community conflict. Next, when the migrant group were asked which group of people they felt were the most likely to engage in disorderly behaviour and petty crime, the most common response, again, is young people (31.8%; see figure II). [Figure II Here] Figure II shows that the subsequent highest share of responses for the migrant group is for British people as sources of disorder (23.7%), closely followed by Polish people (18.7%). Men (16.2%), women (7.1%), students (1.5%) and outsiders (1.0%) are considered disorderly to a less extent. For the current purposes, the most interesting aspect of these findings is the difference between groups in their perceptions of British people and Polish people as sources of disorder. The proportion of the migrant group who perceive both British and Polish people as sources of disorder is nearly double that of the local group. This finding counters existing research. It demonstrates that rather than the local ‘established' population holding negative out-group attitudes toward the ‘encroaching group’ (Skogan, 1990: 44), it is the ‘encroaching group’ themselves who hold slightly 16 more negative assumptions regarding the social misconduct of both the out-group (British people) and the in-group (Polish people). One explanation for this comes from Lenski’s (1954) idea of ‘status inconsistency’. According to Zhou (2005), new migrants are typically considered middle class and highly educated before migrating to their new country. Upon arrival in the new place of residence, however, these migrants are initially more likely to receive a low income (Zhou, 2005). The changing status or ‘status inconsistency’ (Lenski, 1954) of migrants with a high education but current low income can thus be said to result in a greater intolerance towards the social misconduct of their new neighbours. Despite this, although Polish migrants seem to express more negative attitudes toward both Polish migrants and established residents in Crewe, the percentage who do so still remains relatively low. Community Relations and Group Conflict The final task is to consider how these perceptions translate into inter-community relations. Table IV below displays the results. [Table IV Here] Firstly, a small but significant difference between the local and migrant groups’ experiences of tension within the neighbourhood is found (p < .05). As shown in table IV, 28.8% of the local group either ‘agree’ or ‘strongly agree’ that they sometimes experience tension with their non-British neighbours, compared to a total of 14.6% of the migrant group who state that they sometimes experience tension with their non- Polish neighbours. This finding suggests that the local group experience significantly more inter-group tension than the migrant group, although it is ultimately still a rather small percentage of the local group who report such tension as the small difference shows. It is also not clear with whom this tension exists. Nevertheless, over half of the local group and nearly three quarters of the migrant group in fact state that they do not experience tension with members of the out-group. Secondly, no significant difference between the two groups is found for the item ‘there are ethnic groups in this neighbourhood that I do not think positively of’. Here, in total, 17 only 18.6% of the migrant group and 23.5% of the local group express negative out- group attitudes by stating that they either agree or strongly agree with this statement. Similarly, no significant difference is found between the groups on either of the final two items measuring perceptions of community cohesion. Nearly half of both the local group (45.3%) and the migrant group (44.9%) do not perceive their neighbourhood to be a close-knit place to live but despite this, over three quarters of each group either agree or strongly agree that people generally get along well with each other in their neighbourhood (82.5% of the local group and 75.6% of the migrant group). These findings therefore suggest that norm coherence exists between the local and migrant groups in Crewe, where groups perceive their neighbours and neighbourhood in a similar light – not as a close-knit place to live, but where groups do get along well with each other. For example, comments from Polish migrants during a focus group demonstrate civil experiences of social exchange with local residents: Dorota: I have once left my keys in the door, which were very visible as I had a small teddy bear attached to it. After a while I heard a knocking at my door. I was looking for the keys to open the door, however, at first I was reluctant to open it because there were many youths outside the door. When I finally grabbed the handle, the door was open and one of the youths handed the keys over to me. I was taken aback that I didn't even say anything. I was expecting something different. This happened to me twice. Wojciech: I remember a situation in my previous neighbourhood, where we had a lawn which wasn't fenced off, when two boys came knocking at our door... Olga: (interrupting Wojciech) ... I opened the door and one of the boys was saying something to me, which I couldn't understand. Finally, the boy pointed at the ball on our lawn and I realised that he wanted his ball back. I was amazed that the boys didn't simply take the ball themselves but instead they asked my permission. 18 This discussion is just one of many examples provided by migrants during a focus group of civil and courteous experiences with local residents in Crewe. Many migrants express how polite and pleasant they find local people, with small gestures and minor courtesies having a positive impact on migrants’ experiences in Crewe. Other examples of these small but important gestures include helping with car problems, the giving of car parts, being addressed in a polite way, waving, saying hello or simply smiling to each other in the street: Wojciech: Even though I don't meet my neighbours very often, things like holding the door or patiently waiting for a parking space are common and nice to experience. Szymon: English people are generally more approachable and open than Poles. Even strangers greet each other on the streets. These minor courtesies of everyday life amongst ‘strangers on the streets’ may be taken for granted amongst local residents as the norm in their neighbourhood, but for new Polish migrants in Crewe they mean so much more and allow for positive and civilised relationships to exist between groups rather than conflict and animosity. Furthermore, the local group provide various examples of civility and courtesy with Polish migrants. The first example comes from an elderly local woman who, in an informal conversation with the researcher during the survey fieldwork, described an incident of civility with one of her Polish neighbours. This local resident was walking to the supermarket one day when it began to rain heavily. A Polish woman hurried across and escorted her with an umbrella to the supermarket. The Polish woman did not speak any English but the two women have since met on the street in their neighbourhood and have smiled and said ‘hello’ to each other. A second example comes from a local resident during a focus group discussion: ‘I was doing something on my van and the battery had gone flat so I was gonna charge it and was taking it off and it snaps and I thought “oh my goodness what am I am going to do here?” And the Polish neighbour, I mentioned it to him and he took 19 it off, got in the car, went off, came back, had a piece for me, put it on, there you go. The Polish neighbours are quite startlingly different to what I expected, they’ve been very very helpful and friendly’ [Nigel, Local Focus Group]. These accounts demonstrate how although there are language barriers, friendly communication and minor courtesies do transcend cultural boundaries in Crewe. What is interesting about this latter story and the ones offered by Dorota and Olga from the migrant focus group is that the positive episodes experienced between the local residents and the new migrants were unexpected. In all accounts, participants report feeling surprised by the others’ actions. According to the focus group accounts, these ‘small manifestations of civility’ (Wuthnow, 2002: 218) have the potential for dissipating any prior negative assumptions of the expected out-group behaviour. Discussion Civilised Communities: Towards a New Modus Vivendi? "...human nature seems, on the whole, to prefer the sight of kindness and friendliness to the sight of cruelty. Normal men everywhere reject, in principle and by preference, the path of war and destruction. They like to live in peace and friendship with their neighbors; they prefer to love and be loved rather than hate and be hated" (Allport, 1958: x). This paper provides one of the few in-depth empirical case studies that explored how both 'established' residents and new migrants perceive, adapt and negotiate their social relationships with each other after a period of mass migration. Rather than supporting the traditional 'gloomy tale' told regarding immigration, diversity and community relations, the current paper instead tells a more nuanced and subtle story. Although intangible, or ‘sociotropic’, perceptions of immigration as a general social process were found to be associated with a perceived disruption to neighbourhood social order amongst established residents in Crewe, tangible or ‘egotropic’ experiences of migrants as neighbours were not. There is an argument looming in much academic and vernacular discourse as to whether negative attitudes and concerns regarding immigration and its impacts constitute an ‘implicit’ (Sampson, 2009: 20), ‘sophisticated’ 20 (Bobo, 1983: 1201), or ‘popular’ (Kundnani, 2001: 43) form of racism or prejudice. The present findings highlight an interesting paradox in the public opinions of immigration however. While the majority of the ‘local’ group express concerns regarding migration as a mass social movement of people and its 'realistic' and 'symbolic' consequences for Crewe, they express tolerant, and in some instances even favourable, views toward the orderly behaviour of migrants as neighbours living alongside them. Through small norms of courtesy and politeness, the social order in the studied locale was managed and maintained through weak but ‘civilised relationships’ between migrants and established residents, thus failing to culminate into conflict between the two groups. In contrast to Elias and Scotson’s (1965: 153) notion of ‘civilising differentials’ that sustain hostile boundaries between social groups, local and migrant groups in Crewe instead strive to find the ‘civilising equivalences’ that exist between them. In the current research therefore, ‘othering’ is related to sociotropic migration, but not to egotropic experiences of it. What exists instead is an effort to find common ground or shared social norms between established and newcomer groups; that is, rather than adopting a process of ‘othering’, local residents and new migrants in Crewe engage in an ‘equivalising’ process. Crucially, such 'small manifestations of civility' (Wuthnow, 2002: 218) were able to counter any prior negative assumptions. This can help explain the discrepancy between negative sociotropic, but positive egotropic, attitudes. It also shows the importance of encouraging contact between diverse groups and how living in diverse areas has the potential to result in 'passive tolerance' (Christ et al, 2014). As the quote from Allport (1958) at the beginning of this section similarly highlights, there is evidence that in general people act in positive 'other-regarding' ways, and that they engage in self-sacrificing behaviours that benefit others more so than they act in a purely rational self-interested fashion (Sampson, 2012: 214). Sampson interestingly suggests that such a culture of altruism and 'other-regarding' norms are likely to exist in immigrant neighbourhoods, thus countering Putnam's (2007) dystopian claims in his 'hunkering down' thesis. Others have also countered the 'gloomy tale': "even in the bleak and unforgiving landscape of prison, a convivial imagination is actively fostered by prisoners and refuses to be extinguished by the enormous morbid and melancholic 21 force of imprisonment" (Earle and Phillips, 2009: 136). However, Phillips (2008: 320- 321) did find that racism had a 'hidden presence' which did not surface in day to day relations but could during times of conflict. It is very difficult to know for sure if this 'civility' amongst groups in Crewe was a false exterior or one that ran deep to the core of individuals' values and beliefs. Either way, such "ordinary, spontaneous anti-racism, that generate the little triumphs that bring real pleasure ... that foster the small arts and crafts of living-with-others" (Gilroy, 2004 cited in Earle and Phillips, 2009: 135-136) still have value in making life viable in diverse communities. While there is a growing body of literature that supports the findings here, it is important to note that this is a single case study that cannot make claims to generalisability. Nevertheless, understanding the distinctiveness of 'place' has important implications for the social relations that exist within it. As Girling et al (2000: 11) note, "if we wish to understand the filtration of generic social representations of crime [or indeed immigration] ... into everyday sensibility we will also need to comprehend the situated character of their reception and appropriation by people in the practical and mundane contexts of their daily life." It is therefore entirely possible that the findings of 'civility' here are determined by the specific migration and social context in which the research took place. Why was it then that the 'gloomy tale' did not generally exist between these groups in Crewe unlike other areas nearby? Gadd and Dixon (2011) found in Stoke-on-Trent for example that immigration was entangled with wider concerns around unemployment, crime, and inadequate housing and health care provision whereby the white working class considered themselves to be the "losers' or cultural and economic failures" (Gadd and Dixon, 2011: 21). Concerns over realistic and symbolic threats of immigration were indeed found to result in race hate crime based on the 'unacknowledged shame' that can be experienced amongst the marginalised and deprived established communities where new immigrants settle (Ray et al, 2004). This relates to the idea of 'status insecurity'. Such feelings of powerlessness and political abandonment did on the one hand help explain feelings of racism and prejudice amongst the established residents in Stoke-on- 22 Trent that allowed a blame to be targeted on 'foreigners', 'immigrants' and 'strangers'. On the other hand though, Gadd and Dixon (2011) showed how it also allowed these same individuals to, in some cases, 'identify with the other'. Those who had experienced some warmth or generosity "from those they might otherwise have regarded as outsiders" were generally left feeling uncomfortable about engaging in prejudiced generalisations (Gadd and Dixon, 2011: 230). As Phillips (2008: 325) therefore suggests, it is perhaps 'class' that should remain central here in understanding the nuances of such social relationships, whereby class-based solidarity or identification is more important than ethnic identification. Therefore, Gadd and Dixon (2011: 21) argue for the importance of 'identifying with the other'. This is difficult with demonised others that are unknown or unknowable, but does again show the importance of contact and striving for some common sentiment. Perhaps with the Polish migrant community in Crewe, establishing some common sentiment was easier to do. As shown earlier, Crewe's distinctiveness lies in its strong identity as an industrial and railway town. Crewe's history of a strong work ethic thus may play a part in shaping contemporary 'civilised relationships' that manifest amongst diverse social groups in the current research. Perhaps the established community in Crewe were less 'status insecure' than those in other areas, such as Stoke-on-Trent for example. Furthermore, this contemporary migration is argued to be a ‘new’ type than that upon which previous research is based, resulting in an alternative public discourse (Stenning et al, 2006; The Economist, 2008; Burrell, 2009). The lack of a ‘racial’ element and the further ‘invisibility’ of Polish migrants based on religion and social values; the demographics of migrants as young, without dependents, highly educated, and with strong aspirations to work; and the long established history of Polish migrants in the UK following WWII (Stenning et al, 2006; The Economist, 2008; Pollard et al, 2008; Burrell, 2009), may help to explain why ‘civilised relationships’ exist in Crewe rather than a process of ‘othering’. Other migrant communities may not share such a strong normative consensus with the established community, thus civilised relationships and a lack of inter-group conflict may be less achievable in situations of ‘shock’ migration in other forms. In other neighbourhoods, with different historical contexts and with different social groups, immigration may be experienced and perceived in a differential way. Nevertheless, there remain important lessons to be learned here. For example, it 23 remains important to allow for diversity and alternative voices to speak out in plural communities, while at the same time celebrating common ground and stressing the shared, rather than diverse, social values groups possess. Emphasising and promoting mutuality, collective sentiment and commonality is therefore crucial rather than focusing on difference (Young, 2003). This paper has also shown the importance of localism and how the complex wider historical and social context helps us to understand groups' differential responses to migration and how everyday mundane civility between strangers can be the result. 24 References Allport, G.W. (1958) The Nature of Prejudice. USA: Addison-Wesley. Bauman, Z. (1997) Postmodernity and Its Discontents. Cambridge: Cambridge Polity Press. Birman, D. (2006) ‘Ethical Issues in Research with Immigrants and Refugees’, in Trimble, J.E., and Fisher, C.B. (Eds.) 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New York: Palgrave. https://webmail.keele.ac.uk/src/download.php?startMessage=31&passed_id=1&mailbox=Research+Contacts&ent_id=2&passed_ent_id=0 https://webmail.keele.ac.uk/src/download.php?startMessage=31&passed_id=1&mailbox=Research+Contacts&ent_id=2&passed_ent_id=0 27 Kundnani, A. (2001) ‘In a Foreign Land: The New Popular Racism’, Race and Class, 43(2): 41-60. Lenski, G.E. (1954) ‘Status Crystallization: A Non-Vertical Dimension of Social Status’, American Sociological Review, 19(4): 405-413. McKenzie, R.D. ([1924] 1971) ‘The Ecological Approach to the Study of the Human Community’, in Short, J.F. (1971) The Social Fabric of the Metropolis. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. McLaren, L., and Johnson, M. (2007) ‘Resources, Group Conflict and Symbols: Explaining Anti-Immigration Hostility in Britain’, Political Studies, 55(4): 709-732. Meuleman, B., Davidov, E., and Billet, J. (2009) ‘Changing Attitudes toward Immigration in Europe, 2002-2007: A Dynamic Group Conflict Theory Approach’, Social Science Research, 38: 352-365. North, C.C. ([1926] 1971) ‘The City as a Community: An Introduction to a Research Project’, in Short, J.F. (1971) The Social Fabric of the Metropolis. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Office for National Statistics, Home Office, and the Department for Work and Pensions (2011) ‘Migration Statistics Quarterly Report - User Information’, Retrieved From: http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/taxonomy/search/index.html?pageSize=50&sortBy=n one&sortDirection=none&newquery=Migration+Statistics+Quarterly+Report+- +User+Information%E2%80%99&content- type=publicationContentTypes&nscl=International+Migration Park, R.E., Burgess, E.W., and McKenzie, R.D. (1925) The City. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Phillips, C. 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(2003) ‘Racism, Ethnicity and Criminology: Developing Minority Perspectives’, British Journal of Criminology, 43: 269-290. Pollard, N., Latorre, M., and Sriskandarajah, D. (2008) Floodgates or Turnstiles? Post-EU Enlargement Migration Flows to (and From) the UK. London: Institute for Public Policy Press. Putnam, R.D. (2007) ‘E Pluribus Unum: Diversity and Community in the Twenty-First Century. The 2006 Johan Skytte Prize Lecture’, Scandinavian Political Studies, 30(2): 137-173. Ray, L., Smith, D., and Wastell, L. (2004) 'Shame, Rage and Racist Violence', British Journal of Criminology, 44(3): 350-368. Sampson, R.J. (2009) ‘Disparity and Diversity in the Contemporary City: Social (Dis)order Revisited’, The British Journal of Sociology, 60(1): 1-31. Sampson, R.J. (2012) Great American City: Chicago and the Enduring Neighborhood Effect. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Simmel, G. ([1908] 1971) ‘The Stranger’, in Georg Simmel: On Individuality and Social Forms. 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Edited by Eli Zaretsky. Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press. UK Census (2001) ‘Neighbourhood Statistics’, Retrieved From: http://neighbourhood.statistics.gov.uk/dissemination/LeadHome.do;jsessionid=ac 1f930cce610b3a5d8ce1f4958bfa6cde45e8890fc.e38Qa3mPbh4Kai0Ma30Sa3uSch mSe6fznA5Pp7ftolbGmkTy?bhcp=1. Watters, J.K., and Biernacki, P. (1989) ‘Targeted Sampling: Options for the Study of Hidden Populations’, Social Problems, 36(4): 416 – 430. Wirth, L. (1938) ‘Urbanism as a Way of Life’, The American Journal of Sociology, 44(1): 1- 24. Wuthnow, R. (2002) Loose Connections: Joining Together in America’s Fragmented Communities. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. Young, J. (1999) The Exclusive Society. London: Sage. Young, J. (2003) ‘To These Wet and Windy Shores: Recent Immigration Policy in the UK’, Punishment and Society, 5(4): 449-462. Zhou, M. (2005) ‘Ethnicity as Social Capital: Community-Based Institutions and Embedded Networks of Social Relations’, in Loury, G.C., Modoud, T., and Teles, S.M. http://www.ncl.ac.uk/curds/publications/pdf/A8Final.pdf http://neighbourhood.statistics.gov.uk/dissemination/LeadHome.do;jsessionid=ac1f930cce610b3a5d8ce1f4958bfa6cde45e8890fc.e38Qa3mPbh4Kai0Ma30Sa3uSchmSe6fznA5Pp7ftolbGmkTy?bhcp=1 http://neighbourhood.statistics.gov.uk/dissemination/LeadHome.do;jsessionid=ac1f930cce610b3a5d8ce1f4958bfa6cde45e8890fc.e38Qa3mPbh4Kai0Ma30Sa3uSchmSe6fznA5Pp7ftolbGmkTy?bhcp=1 http://neighbourhood.statistics.gov.uk/dissemination/LeadHome.do;jsessionid=ac1f930cce610b3a5d8ce1f4958bfa6cde45e8890fc.e38Qa3mPbh4Kai0Ma30Sa3uSchmSe6fznA5Pp7ftolbGmkTy?bhcp=1 30 (Eds.) Ethnicity, Social Mobility and Public Policy: Comparing the US and UK. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 31 Table I: The Socio-Demographics of the ‘Local’ and ‘Migrant’ Groups Item ‘Local’ Group ‘Migrant’ Group Age*** Mean Age = 48 years Mean Age = 36 years Gender 61.1% Female 52.6% Female Education*** 16.9% University/Postgraduate Degree 30.2% University/Postgraduate Degree Income 44.2% Earn < £1000 a month 36.8% Earn < £1000 a month Employment*** 47.6% In paid work 64.1% In paid work Length of Residence*** 58.4% > 10 years 3.8% > 10 years Household Tenure*** 83.6% Own Property 7.7% Own Property N 172 78 * Significant at p < .05;** Significant at p < .01; *** Significant at p < .001. 32 Table II: Locals & Migrants: Immigration as a 'Realistic' Threat (% of Responses) Immigration is good for Crewe's economy Immigration has put pressure on local public services Local % Migrant % Local % Migrant % Strongly Agree/ Agree 24.2 82.1 76.2 65.3 Neutral 24.8 15.4 11.3 17.3 Strongly Disagree/ Disagree 50.9 2.6 12.5 17.3 N 243 243 Significance *** NS NS Non-Significant, p > .05; *** Significant at p < .001 Table III: Locals & Migrants: Immigration as a 'Symbolic' Threat (% of Responses) Immigration has changed neighbourhood for the better The presence of different groups in neighbourhood is a good thing Local % Migrant % Local % Migrant % Strongly Agree/ Agree 11.0 33.8 40.1 66.2 Neutral 25.6 31.1 18.5 18.9 Strongly Disagree/ Disagree 63.4 35.1 41.4 14.9 N 238 236 Significance *** *** NS Non-Significant, p > .05; *** Significant at p < .001 33 16.6% 12.5% 10.3% 9.0% 4.3% 11.7% 35.6% Table IV: Locals & Migrants: Community Relations and Group Conflict (% of Responses) Sometimes I feel tension with neighbours that are not [British/Polish] 2 There are ethnic groups living in this neighbourhood that I do not think positively of This is a close-knit neighbourhood People in this neighbourhood generally get on well with each other Local % Migrant % Local % Migrant % Local % Migrant % Local % Migrant % Strongly Agree/ Agree 28.8 14.6 23.5 18.6 37.8 25.7 82.5 75.6 Neutral 18.4 14.7 24.7 25.3 16.9 29.5 5.2 10.3 Strongly Disagree/ Disagree 52.7 70.6 51.9 56.0 45.3 44.9 12.3 14.1 N 238 237 250 250 Significance * NS NS NS NS Non-Significant, p > .05; * Significant at p < .05 Figure I: 'Local Group': Groups Perceived as Disorderly (% of Responses) 2 British’ in local group questionnaire, ‘Polish’ in migrant group questionnaire. KEY Young People Men British People Women Polish People Students Outsiders 34 18.7% 31.8% 23.7% 7.1% 1.5% 16.2% 1.0% Figure II: 'Migrant Group': Groups Perceived as Disorderly (% of Responses) KEY Young People British People Polish People Men Women Students Outsiders Figure I: 'Local Group': Groups Perceived as Disorderly (% of Responses) Figure II: 'Migrant Group': Groups Perceived as Disorderly (% of Responses) 
work_j32dizlekzgv5ak57bikdcadby	----	Portraying Islam and Muslims in MEDLINE: A content analysis Social Science & Medicine 65 (2007) 2425–2439 Portraying Islam and Muslims in MEDLINE: A content analysis Lance Daniel Laird a,� , Justine de Marrais b , Linda L. Barnes a a Boston University School of Medicine, Boston, MA, USA b Boston Medical Center, MA, USA Available online 4 September 2007 Abstract The growing number and diversity of Muslims in the United States and Western Europe challenge clinicians and researchers to understand this population’s perspectives and experiences regarding health and biomedicine. For information about Muslim patient populations, clinicians and researchers routinely consult medical literature. To examine how this literature portrays Muslims, we conducted an ethnographic content analysis of 2342 OVID MEDLINE-indexed abstracts from 1966 through August 2005, derived from a Boolean search for ‘‘islam or muslim or muslims.’’ Manifest (explicitly stated) themes included Muslim religious practices, Islamic law and ethics, history of Islamic medicine, public health, social medicine, and cultural competence. Latent (underlying) themes implied that being an observant Muslim poses health risks; Muslims are negatively affected by tradition, and should adopt modernity; and that ‘‘Islam’’ is a problem for biomedical healthcare delivery. A countervailing latent theme implies that being Muslim may promote good health. We discuss ambiguities in uses of the term ‘‘Muslim;’’ implications of Muslim practices for health management and healthcare delivery; and ways in which MEDLINE-indexed literature intersects with orientalist and colonialist discourse about religious Others. Such intersections highlight connections with potential structural inequalities in healthcare delivery to Muslim patients. r 2007 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. Keywords: Ethnographic content analysis; Islam; Muslims; Religion; MEDLINE Introduction Popular media and political rhetoric devote grow- ing attention to Muslims and Islam, while Muslim populations in the US and Western Europe continue to rise. The hostility and suspicion facing Muslims following September 11, 2001, and Western military interventions in Muslim-majority countries, challenge clinicians, researchers, and policymakers to better understand diverse Muslim perspectives, experiences, and ways of practicing Islam relative to health and biomedicine. Researchers seeking such information regularly consult medical literature. Yet this literature is not produced in a vacuum. Media reports, political rhetoric, and legislative action regularly promote negative stereotypes that characterize Muslims as an out-group (Runnymede Trust et al., 2004). Such portraits both reflect and filter into Western policy interests in the Middle East (Gerges, 2003; McAlister, 2005) and affect Muslims in Western societies (Shaheen, 2003). ARTICLE IN PRESS www.elsevier.com/locate/socscimed 0277-9536/$ - see front matter r 2007 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.socscimed.2007.07.029 � Corresponding author. Tel.: +1 617 414 3660; fax: +1 617 414 3679. E-mail addresses: lance.laird@bmc.org (L.D. Laird), justine.demarrais@bmc.org (J. de Marrais), linda.barnes@bmc.org (L.L. Barnes). www.elsevier.com/locate/socscimed dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2007.07.029 mailto:lance.laird@bmc.org mailto:justine.demarrais@bmc.org mailto:linda.barnes@bmc.org US polls indicate that from one-quarter (Council on American-Islamic Relations, 2004, 2006a) to one-half (Dean & Fears, 2006) of Americans hold negative views of Islam and Muslims. Islamophobia and anti-Muslim hate crimes have increased sig- nificantly in the US (Council on American-Islamic Relations, 2006b) and in Europe (Allen & Nielsen, 2002; Runnymede Trust et al., 2004). Islamophobic discourse portrays Islam as monolithic and threa- tening, Muslims as using their religion to gain advantages, and Muslim cultures as significantly different from other cultures. Anti-immigrant atti- tudes frequently accompany such messages (Com- mission on British Muslims and Islamophobia, 1997), building on a history of orientalist represen- tations of Muslim societies as deficient or deviant versions of a modern, rational, Europe (Said, 1978). Medical literature includes studies involving ‘‘Islam,’’ a religious tradition, and ‘‘Muslims,’’ the people who follow this tradition. We hypothesized that a systematic content analysis of MEDLINE- indexed abstracts might illuminate meanings as- signed to both terms in health-related contexts and in scientific writing. To that end, we examined such abstracts from over a 40-year period, looking for recurring themes or ‘‘frames.’’ We asked, which themes are manifest (explicit), and which, latent (underlying, and perhaps unintended)? We won- dered whether trends in Western media and popular culture about Muslims might enter biomedical discourse. If so, how, and what might be their implications for healthcare settings? Medical anthropologists argue that the ‘‘biome- dical gaze’’ (Foucault, 1973; Lock & Gordon, 1988) pathologizes and Otherizes its objects. Yet does this tendency adequately explain possible negative re- presentations of Muslims and Islam? One study of ‘‘Chinese people’’ in North American social work literature, for instance, suggests that professional service providers often replicate cultural biases that ‘‘otherize’’ and ‘‘essentialize’’ ethnic minorities (Tsang, 2001). When biomedical pathologizing tendencies intersect with discourses about margin- alized minorities, they can reproduce cultural prejudices and reinforce disparities in health out- comes and healthcare access. We propose, therefore, not to demonstrate that Muslims are treated uniquely in medical literature, but to explicate how representations of Muslims and Islam in medical literature may intersect with broader cultural discourses within which readers of these texts are situated. Methods Ethnographic content analysis of texts (Altheide, 1996) derives from a combination of literary content analysis (Downe-Wamboldt, 1992) and ethno- graphic interview analysis (Weston et al., 2001). For example, ethnographic content analyses of cancer-related stories in mainstream print media have shown how dominant discourses, disparity of coverage, and the lack of ethnically specific infor- mation shape public awareness and influence healthcare delivery (Clarke, 2004; Clarke & Everest, 2006; Hoffman-Goetz & Friedman, 2005). Ethnographic content analysis aims to define and describe patterns within a set of documents. Through reiterated comparison and contrasting of data, researchers identify themes that shape the discourse related to their inquiry. Subsequent analysis differentiates between manifest and latent themes (Altheide, 2002), and between explicit and implicit meanings. One cannot infer the intentions of the authors, which in this case we presumed to be beneficent and compassionate. When citing exam- ples, therefore, we comment only on subtle, textured meanings within the abstracts before us. While implicit meanings may be unintentional, they invariably interact with textual and cultural con- texts that shape readers’ attitudes in ways that may generate or reinforce bias. This is potentially significant, because unexamined provider biases are known to affect access and treatment (Burgess, Fu, & van Ryn, 2004; Schulman et al., 1999). Sample selection A Boolean search in OVID MEDLINE (1966- present), on August 26, 2005, using the keywords, ‘‘islam or muslim or muslims’’ produced 2342 abstracts, after excluding duplicates and non- pertinent Boolean hits (e.g., ‘‘Islam’’ as an author’s surname). Abstracts are more available than articles to most clinicians, and limn the broad, initial portrait we analyze here, so we limited the study to these results. (Following completion of our analysis, we discovered that inclusion of the alternate spelling ‘‘Moslem’’ would have yielded another 89 results.) Although most MEDLINE users filter search results, we could not predict individual search para- meters, and so included all results to avoid selection bias (del Pozo & Fins, 2005). We did not limit by article type, assuming that full representation of any ARTICLE IN PRESS L.D. Laird et al. / Social Science & Medicine 65 (2007) 2425–24392426 https://isiarticles.com/article/1240 
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work_j5kqckhrkjer5gicv7jpaqkeuq	----	The Sexual Orientation Matrix for Supervision: A Tool for Training Therapists to Work with Same-Sex Couples By: Janie K. Long and Elizabeth Lindsey Long, J., & Lindsey, E. (2004). The sexual orientation matrix for supervision: A tool for training therapists to work with same-sex couples. Journal of Couple and Relationship Therapy, 3(2/3), 123-135. Made available courtesy of Taylor and Francis: http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals/WCRT ***Reprinted with permission. No further reproduction is authorized without written permission from Taylor and Francis. This version of the document is not the version of record. Figures and/or pictures may be missing from this format of the document.*** Summary: The Sexual Orientation Matrix for Supervision (SOMS) was created in order to assist supervisors and trainers in preparing supervisees to work with lesbian, gay, and bisexual (LGB) clients. The SOMS was developed around two core concepts: (1) degree of heterosexual bias, and (2) degree of acceptance of LGB orientations and behavior. Supervisors can employ the matrix to explore both their own and their supervisee’s levels of comfort, knowledge, and experience in working with LGB clients including same-sex couples. This article describes the development of the matrix, an exploration of the concepts underlying this tool, and an explanation of how to use the matrix, including suggested tasks for supervision of therapists working with same-sex couples. Keywords: Sexual orientation, supervision, training Article: It is estimated that approximately 50 million people in the United States are lesbian, gay, or bisexual (LGB), or are closely related to someone who is (Patterson, 1995). A recent random sample of 457 clinical members of the American Association for Marriage and Family Therapy indicated that 72% of the respondents reported one- tenth of their practices included lesbian and gay clients (Green & Bobele, 1994). Yet, many authors have questioned the preparedness of family therapists to deal with LGBT clients (Laird & Green, 1995; Long, 1996; Long & Serovich, 2003; Ritter & Terndrup, 2002). Doherty and Simmons (1996) found that a little more than 50% of marriage and family therapists (MFTs; N = 526) felt competent in treating lesbians and gay men. Malley and Tasker (1999) suggest, “. . . family therapy in general has been slow to consider sexuality as an influence on family life, and in particular to address the issues raised by families led by a lesbian or gay parent or a lesbian or gay couple” (p. 3). It has been the experience of both authors that trainees from across the mental health disciplines are inadequately prepared to deal with LGB clients and their families. Even those students who feel that they are well prepared are often limited in knowledge, skills, and/or experience. Are mental health training faculties reluctant to deal with this topic or just ill prepared to do so? We suggest that both these reasons are plausible given that issues of same-sex relationships and sexual identity were probably rarely addressed when many current faculty were in training. Thus, their comfort level and knowledge base are likely to be limited (Long & Serovich, 2003). Supervisors and trainers who are committed to preparing supervisees to work with a diverse client population will want to ensure that supervisees have both an adequate knowledge base and clinical skills to work with lesbian, gay, and bisexual clients. Brown (1991) suggests that when supervisors fail to introduce supervisees to LGB issues, do not encourage supervisee self-examination regarding sexual orientation, and fail to do consciousness raising regarding sexual minorities, 1 they allow “. . . the development of professionals who are not only deficient in their ability to work with sexual minorities ... but in the creation of therapists who are uncomfortable with ambiguities and questions regarding sexuality” (p. 237). Supervisors who address issues related to sexual orientation encourage supervisees to learn about and accept differences and develop an http://libres.uncg.edu/ir/uncg/clist.aspx?id=1286 http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals/WCRT awareness of their personal biases regarding sexual orientation. DEVELOPMENT OF THE SEXUAL ORIENTATION MATRIX FOR SUPERVISION The Sexual Orientation Matrix for Supervision (SOMS) evolved out of discussions between a supervisor and three supervisors-in-training, while we were conducting supervision of therapy with LGBT clients. We were struggling with how to discuss with our supervisees a topic about which most persons socialized in the United States have intense feelings (Greene, 1994). We realized that just as supervisees approach lesbian, bisexual, and gay clients with varying levels of acceptance, comfort, and knowledge, so did we as supervisors. We wanted to examine our own biases in order to work more honestly and effectively with our supervisees, as well as with any future LGB clients. We agreed that not talking with supervisees about this topic would be unethical, both from a training standpoint and in the interest of the welfare of the clients. Establishing and maintaining trust and mutual respect and providing a safe environment for the supervisees to examine their beliefs was foremost in our minds (Long, 1997). We were interested in exploring with supervisees their levels of comfort in working with sexual minority clients, as well as their levels of experience and knowledge of the gay community including same-sex couple relationships, gay and lesbian parenting, and historical, social, and legal trends. In recent years, the literature related to working with LGB clients in therapy has increased (Bepko & Johnson, 2000; Bernstein, 2000; Greene, 1994; Kurdek, 1994; Ritter & Terndrup, 2002). We found little specific guidance, however, about how to deal with these issues in supervision especially when there were potential differences in values and beliefs between supervisors and trainees. We began meeting as a group to discuss how we could best supervise trainees working with this client population. Our discussions often revolved around two core concepts: (1) the degree of heterosexual bias, and (2) the degree of acceptance of lesbian, gay, and bisexual orientations and behaviors. Heterosexual Bias Heterosexual bias, a form of multicultural bias, has the potential to harm future clients and supervisees (Long, 1996). Heterosexual bias has been defined as ,“... conceptualizing human experience in strictly heterosexual terms and consequently ignoring, invalidating, or derogating lesbian, gay, and bisexual orientations, behaviors, relationships, and lifestyles ” (Herek, Kimmel, Amaro, & Melton, 1991, p. 958). Heterosexism is an ethnocentric lens through which much of the culture has traditionally viewed the world (Long, 1997). This heterosexist lens has historically been employed by mental health professionals to evaluate, analyze, research, and work in therapy with lesbians, gays, and bisexuals. Evidence of the presence of heterosexism in the mental health arena includes the following beliefs: (a) heterosexuality is normal and healthy and gay, lesbian, and bisexual orientations are deviant or pathological (Brown, 1989); (b) the assumption that theories and research findings based on studies of heterosexuals are applicable and generalizable to gays, bisexuals, and lesbians (Kitzinger, 1987); and (c) the presumption that heterosexuality and its accompanying lifestyle provide normative standards against which the lives of lesbians, gays, and bisexuals need to be compared in order to be understood (Cabaj, 1988; Goodrich, Rampage, Ellman, & Halstead, 1988). Levels of Acceptance Both supervisors and supervisees possess varying levels of acceptance of lesbian, gay, and bisexual orientations. These levels of acceptance can be manifested both consciously and unconsciously during the supervisory process. Some supervisors and supervisees view gays, lesbians, and bisexuals negatively, perhaps even as repulsive, immoral, or sick, and encourage supervisees to establish the goal of therapy as changing the person’s orientation (Rosik, 2003). Other supervisors or supervisees consider bisexuals, gays, and lesbians to be developmentally stymied from reaching their “full heterosexual” potential (Yarhouse, 1998). These supervisors would focus on ways therapists can encourage their clients to “grow out of it.” The potential for “becoming straight” is thus reinforced in supervision. Some supervisees display a pseudo-accepting attitude of “I can work with gays, lesbians, and bisexuals in therapy as long as it is not the focus of our work.” Therapy would be characterized by statements like: “You’re not a lesbian to me, you are a person,” and “I’m very comfortable in interacting with you so let’s not focus on your sexual orientation.” These supervisees dismiss sexual orientation as an issue to be addressed (Long, 1997). Other supervisees and supervisors may be accepting of lesbian, bisexual, and gay orientations but, due to a lack of knowledge and/or exposure, are unaware of having heterosexual bias. Once heterosexism is discovered, they are willing to examine their own attitudes, values, and behaviors. Some supervisors and supervisees value diversity in relationships and see sexual minorities as a valid part of that diversity and as indispensable in our society. They are willing to become allies and advocates to ensure that gays, lesbians, and bisexuals prosper in society. These supervisors encourage therapists to work with sexual minority clients and to increase their knowledge and skills with this group. THE SEXUAL ORIENTATION MATRIX FOR SUPERVISION Because we believed that levels of acceptance and heterosexual bias were intertwined, we developed a matrix to help us examine how these two concepts might, in combination, influence the supervision process (see Figure 1). The vertical axis represents the level of heterosexual bias, and the horizontal axis indicates the person’s level of acceptance of LGB orientations, lifestyles, and behaviors. In this way, we attempted to account for both beliefs/values (heterosexual bias) and behavior (level of acceptance). The quadrants represent four intersections of levels of bias and acceptance. We do not believe that persons always fall neatly into one of these quadrants but rather that beliefs and values are more discontinuous and pastiched than steady state. However, we developed the matrix as a beginning tool for supervisors and supervisees to explore these issues. The quadrants 2 are as follows: Quadrant A Persons are very nonaccepting of LGB sexual orientations and/or behaviors and are very heterosexist in their behavior. These persons are likely to vilify lesbian, gay, and bisexual orientations, relationships, and lifestyles. Issues that therapists and supervisees in this quadrant might face when working with gay and lesbian couples include: Therapist Issues • Do I want to work with gay and lesbian couples? • If not, do I feel the freedom to say so? What are the ramifications of being honest about my feelings with my supervisor? • Do I want to learn more about gay and lesbian relationships? Supervisor Issues • Is it ethical to allow the therapist who falls in this quadrant to work with same-sex couples? • If this therapist wants to work gay and lesbian couples, is s/he trying to undermine their relationship or change someone’s sexual orientation, consciously or unconsciously? • Is it acceptable for the therapist to decline to learn about lesbian and gay couples? Quadrant B Persons behave in a relatively nonheterosexist manner, but have moral objections to LGB sexual orientations and/or behaviors. Therapist Issues • Do I want to work with same-sex couples? Can I be effective considering my moral objections to their sexual orientation? • If I do want to work with them, what are my motivations? Am I interested in undermining relationships or changing sexual orientation? • Can I work with gay and lesbian couples around issues that are not related to their sexual orientation? What would I do if subsequently sexual orientation became an important factor in the work we were doing? • If I decide I will not work with same-sex couples, how do I handle the situation when I learn that a potential client or a client I have been seeing is gay, lesbian, or bisexual? What if I decided I needed to do couple therapy with them after I had already begun therapy? • Should I tell my same-sex couples my feelings about their sexual orientation? Is it ethical to work with them if I do not? Supervisor Issues • How do I talk with a therapist about how his/her moral objections might influence the therapeutic relationship and direction? • Can therapists who morally disapprove of gay, lesbian, and bisexual sexual orientations effectively work with these couples on any issue? • Is it ethical to allow a therapist to work with same-sex couples if they morally disapprove of their sexual orientation, even if the person is respectful in their attitude and demeanor toward the clients? • How do I determine when or if to encourage therapists to work with lesbian and gay couples with whom they may feel uncomfortable? How do I discover the nature of their uncomfortableness? • How do I prepare therapists to refer same-sex couples? Quadrant C Persons are consciously accepting of LGB sexual orientations and/or behaviors, but are unaware of heterosexist bias that manifests in their behavior. Therapist Issues • What blind spots do I have in terms of my biases, and how are they manifested in my thinking about and working with gay and lesbian couples? • What knowledge and skills do I need to be more effective with same-sex couples? • What can I do to gain more exposure to lesbian and gay couples? • How well does my model(s) of therapy allow me to address issues, which may be encountered in same- sex relationships, e.g., oppression, invisibility, discrimination, and hate crimes? Supervisor Issues • How and when do I provide needed information for students about same-sex relationships? • How have I fostered relationships with the gay, lesbian, and bisexual community so trainees will have the opportunity to work with same-sex couples? • How effective am I at recognizing unconscious heterosexual biases on the part of therapists and helping them to address these issues? Quadrant D Persons are very accepting of LGB sexual orientations and/or behaviors and are relatively nonheterosexist in behavior. Therapist Issues • What knowledge and skills do I need to be more effective with same-sex couples? • What can I do to gain more exposure to lesbian and gay couples? • How well does my model(s)of therapy allow me to address issues, which may be encountered in same- sex relationships, e.g., oppression, invisibility, discrimination, and hate crimes? • Do I have unconscious biases that affect my working with gay, lesbian, and bisexual clients (this is a lower priority than for therapists in Quadrant C)? Supervisor Issues • Does my knowledge of the therapist’s openness toward gays, lesbians, and bisexuals cause me to assume that the therapist is totally unbiased when working with same-sex couples? • What can I learn from this supervisee who may know more about same-sex couples and the issues they face than I do? UTILIZING THE MATRIX Supervisor Self-Assessment Family therapy supervisors are not immune to the influence of the ubiquitous existence of heterosexist bias in the dominant culture (Long & Serovich, 2003). Heterosexism can be exhibited in many ways including: outright prejudice or discrimination; ignorance of the special issues of gays, bisexuals, and lesbians; stereotypical thought processes; and insensitivity. Therefore, self-examination is an important step in preparing to work with supervisees around issues of heterosexism and sexual orientation. This matrix has been designed to provide supervisors with a tool that can be used to prompt self-examination as well as to work with supervisees. Self-examination of heterosexism on the part of the supervisor may occur as the result of self-awareness of bias or may occur as a result of interactions within the supervisory process. This awareness might be prompted in several ways including: (a) a supervisee who differs from the supervisor in acceptance of gays, lesbians, and bisexuals; (b) a supervisor who discovers that she or he has inadequate knowledge related to HIV/AIDS in the advisement of a supervisee concerning a case; or (c) a supervisee who encourages a bisexual client to adopt a straight lifestyle and ignores the fact that the person has identified as bisexual (Long, 1996). Supervisors can then employ the matrix to begin to scrutinize their own levels of bias and acceptance by placing themselves in a quadrant of the matrix and identifying the issues they need to address related to their location on the matrix. Some possible questions for supervisors to ask themselves related to their own knowledge, skills, beliefs, and practices include: Knowledge • Have I consistently read publications on working with LGB clients and couples in therapy? Is my knowledge base current? • Am I aware of the suggested best practices in working with LGB clients including the guidelines provided by my professional organizations, e.g., most major mental health organizations (ACA, APA, NASW) have taken a strong stance against the practice of reparative therapy. • How much have I read about LGB lifestyles and relationships including their historical struggles with oppression and discrimination? Have I considered the multiple levels of discrimination experienced by inter-racial and intercultural lesbian and gay couples? • How many personal and professional relationships have I had with lesbians, gays, and bisexuals? Skill • How comfortable am I in working with same-sex couples? • How much experience do I have with these couples and families? • How comfortable am I and how much experience do I have in working with LGB supervisees? Stereotypical Thought Processes • Do I equate same-sex attraction with pathology (use terms like sexual deviants)? • Have I examined my own use of language for heterosexual bias. For example, when comparing gay or lesbian couples and families to other family types, do I use parallel terms such as “heterosexual couples” as opposed to “normal couples”? • Do I assume that clients and supervisees are heterosexual? Discriminatory Practices • Do I encourage the acceptance and employment of sexual minorities in the work environment? • Do I use examples in supervision that include same-sex couples being careful not to only present them as dysfunctional? • Do I include partners in social functions; recognize commitment ceremonies between partners; display understanding during the illness or death of a partner or co-parented children; support insurance coverage and other benefits for partners and any co-parented children? • Do I ask LGB supervisees to cover holidays because “they don’t have to worry about family” (Long, 1997)? Using the Matrix for Supervision Once supervisors have examined their own values, beliefs, knowledge, and skills, they can move into helping supervisees examine their issues in working with same-sex couples. The matrix can be discussed with the supervisee as a standard part of supervision or employed when the supervisee first begins to work with sexual minority clients. Initially, the supervisor and supervisee could spend time discussing the supervisee’s level of comfort in working with clients from varied backgrounds. As no other time in the history of the U.S., there is an increased chance that supervisees will work with couples from varied racial and cultural backgrounds. Pearlman (1996) suggests that lesbians, like everyone else, are meeting and entering into relationships with women from varied cultural backgrounds including race, ethnicity, and class. The same could be speculated about gay male couples. As a part of the above discussion the matrix could be used to focus on sexual orientation. We believe that it is helpful for supervisees to know where their supervisors place themselves on the matrix and how they believe it affects their ability to supervise these cases. Supervisors can encourage supervisees to pinpoint the sources of their discomfort (lack of knowledge, lack of exposure, conflict with personal values, lack of skill, ties to their own personal experience). It should be noted, however, that even though a personal examination of one’s own beliefs and biases is necessary, supervisees might not choose to share all reflections with their supervisors. 3 When supervisors and supervisees have very different levels of acceptance and bias, supervisors should explore how those differences will affect their supervision on any given case. For example, a supervisor who places themselves in quadrants A or B may not be effective when supervising a LGB supervisee, particularly with same-sex couples. Likewise, a LGB supervisor may feel uncomfortable supervising persons who place themselves in quadrants A or B. In addition to bringing forth both therapist’s and supervisor’s issues, the matrix also offers a beginning point for developing tasks of supervision when working with LGB clients. Some of the potential learning tasks for supervisees in each quadrant include: Quadrant A • Substantive knowledge building (aspects of gay, lesbian, and bisexual orientations, lifestyles, and relationships). • Identification and clarification of biases and their origins. • Opportunities for the therapist to observe other clinicians working with gays, lesbians, and bisexuals (e.g., behind the mirror or videos). Quadrant B • Help therapist identify under what circumstances a referral should be made and under what circumstances, if any, s/he can work with same-sex couples. • Focus on how therapists can communicate their decision to not work with same-sex couples. • If the therapist and supervisor agree that the therapist will work with lesbian and gay couples, supervision should focus on how to minimize the likelihood that heterosexual bias will be manifested in the therapy and on knowledge building concerning gay, lesbian, and bisexual issues, as well as specific treatment issues. Quadrant C • Identification and clarification of therapist’s unconscious heterosexist biases (high priority). • Substantive knowledge building concerning special issues in gay, lesbian, and bisexual relationships and identity development. • Knowledge building concerning treatment issues and strategies. Quadrant D • Substantive knowledge building concerning special issues in gay, lesbian, and bisexual relationships and identity development. • Knowledge building concerning treatment issues and strategies. • Continuing identification of conscious and unconscious areas of hetero-sexism (lower priority than in Quadrant C). • Encourage therapists to reflect on the process by which they have been able to minimize heterosexual bias. CONCLUSION As noted previously, we developed the Sexual Orientation Matrix for Supervision to assist supervisors in preparing supervisees to work with lesbian, gay, and bisexual clients, including same-sex couples. We caution the reader to remember that sexualities are fluid and pastiched, therefore, the matrix is best utilized not as a fixed instrument but as a starting point for exploration (Simon, 1996). We have found it to be a very valuable tool in facilitating discussions around the issues of sexual orientation, both among ourselves as supervisors and with our supervisees. On occasion, we have also employed the matrix with our bisexual, lesbian, and gay clients who, just as heterosexuals, have been influenced by a heterosexist society. In these instances the matrix was implemented to examine clients’ levels of self-acceptance and bias, thus providing important insight into the stories they told themselves about who they were. Through our employment of the matrix, we have encouraged supervisees and ourselves to honestly examine who we are and what we believe, to learn about and accept differences, to develop an awareness of personal biases regarding sexual orientation, and to learn ways to work more effectively and respectfully with same-sex couples. NOTES 1. The term, sexual minority, is used with caution in recognition of the belief that sexual orientation for humans is fluid and changeable. Therefore, it is difficult to determine who is in the minority. For further discussion of this topic see Simon (1996). 2. The quadrants are designated by the letters A,B,C, and D in order to avoid the use of labels. 3. For further discussion of the potential complications of self-disclosure see Laird and Green, 1995 and Long, 1996. REFERENCES Bepko, C., & Johnson, T. (2000). Gay and lesbian couples in therapy: Perspectives for the contemporary family therapist. Journal of Marital and Family Therapy, 26, 409-419. Berstein, A. C. (2000). Straight therapists working with lesbians and gays in family therapy. Journal of Marital and Family Therapy, 26, 443-454. Brown, L. S. (1991) Commentary on the special issue of The Counseling Psychologist: Counseling with lesbians and gay men. The Counseling Psychologist, 19,235-238. Brown, L. S. (1989). New voices, new visions: Toward a lesbian/gay paradigm for psychology. Psychology of Women Quarterly, 13, 445-456. Brown, L. S., & Zimmer, D. (1986). An introduction to therapy issues of lesbian and gay male couples. In N. S. Jacobson & A. S. Gurman (Eds.), Clinical handbook of marital therapy. (pp. 451-468). New York: The Guilford Press. Cabaj, R. P. (1988). Homosexuality and neurosis: Considerations for psychotherapy, Journal of Homosexuality, 15, 13-23. Goodrich, T. J., Rampage, C., Ellman, B., & Halstead, K. (1988). Feminist family therapy: A casebook. New York: W. W. Norton & Co. Green, R. J. (1996). Learning about lesbians and gays. Family Process, 35. Green, S. K., & Bobele, M. (1994). Family therapists’ response to AIDS: An examination of attitudes, knowledge, and contact. Journal of Marital and Family Therapy, 20, 349-367. Greene, B. (1994). Lesbian and gay sexual orientations: Implications for clinical training, practice, and research. In B. Greene & G. M. Herek (Eds.), Lesbian and gay psychology: Theory, research, and clinical implications (pp. 1-24). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Herek, G. M., Kimmel, D. C., Amaro, H., & Melton, G. B. (1991). Avoiding heterosexist bias in psychological research. American Psychologist, 46, 957-963. Kitzinger, C. (1987). The social construction of lesbianism. London: Sage. Kurdek, L. A. (1994). Social services for gay and lesbian couples. New York: The Haworth Press, Inc. Laird, J., & Green, R. J. (1995). Introduction. Journal of Feminist Family Therapy, 7, 3-13. Long, J. K. (1996). Working with lesbians, gays, and bisexuals: Addressing hetero-sexism in supervision. Family Process, 35, 1-6. Long, J. K. (1997). Lesbian, gay, and bisexual orientations: Implications for the supervisory process (pp. 59-7 1). In C. Storm & T. Todd (Eds.), The complete systemic supervisor: Philosophy, methods and contexts, New York: Allyn & Bacon. Long, J. K., & Serovich, J. M. (2003). Incorporating sexual orientation into MFT training programs: Infusion and inclusion. Journal of Marital and Family Therapy, 29, 59-68. Malley, M., & Tasker, F. (1999). Lesbians, gay men and family therapy: A contradiction in terms? Journal of Family Therapy, 21, 3-29. Patterson, C. (1995). Sexual orientation and human development: An overview. Developmental Psychology, 31, 3-11. Pearlman, S. F. (1996). Loving across race and class divides: Relational challenges and the interracial lesbian couple. In M. Hill & E.D. Rothblum (Eds.), Couples therapy: Feminist perspectives (pp. 25-35). New York, NY: The Haworth Press, Inc. Ritter, K.Y., & Terndrup, A. I. (2002). Handbook of affirmative psychotherapy with lesbians and gay men. New York: The Guilford Press. Rosik, C. H. (2003). Motivational, ethical, and epistemological foundations in the treatment of unwanted homoerotic attraction. Journal of Marital and Family Therapy, 29, 13-28. Roth, S. (1989). Psychotherapy with lesbian couples: Individual issues, female socialization, and the social context. In M. McGoldrick, C. M. Anderson, & F. Walsh (Eds.), Women in families: A framework for family therapy (pp. 286-307). New York: Norton. Simon, W. (1996). Postmodern sexualities. New York: Routledge. Yarhouse, M. A. (1998). When clients seek treatment for same-sex attraction: Ethical issues in the “right to choose” debate. Psychotherapy, 35, 248-259. 
work_j5uizzbuvvbibfpp2huxihyupu	----	1 Guest Editor’s Introduction The idea for a special issue of the European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research on 'Crime, Ethnic Minorities and Procedural Justice in the Balkans’ came about/immersed at the journal’s Editorial Board annual meeting during the 12th European Society of Criminology Conference in Bilbao (at a restaurant with delicious traditional Bask dishes, gratuity of Springer). Almost two years on and the special issue is completed thanks to the impeccable time keeping of the Editorial office and the contributors. This time gap from inception to production is an achievement in its own right. More so considering that there is no universal agreement as to the exact geographical and administrative delimitation of the Balkans, and language barriers, compounded by the fact that Criminology has been historically a poor relation to Criminal Justice and Law studies outside the Anglo-Saxon world, have hindered on-line searches for potential contributors from the Balkan academia. The call for contributors was thus distributed by the European Society of Criminology (ESC) e-bulletin (thanks to Professor Kerner) and various social networks linked to the ESC. With regards to what consists the Balkans, the geographically-challenged Guest Editor, despite living part-time perhaps in the Balkans (Thessaloniki), learnt from Encylopaedia Britannica that the Balkans or the Balkan Peninsula usually includes Albania, Bulgaria, Romania, Moldova and the modern states of the Former Yugoslavia, that is Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, [Former Yugoslavic Republic of] Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia. ‘However, there is not universal agreement on the region’s components. … Generally, the Balkans are bordered by Italy on the northwest, Austria and Hungary on the north, Ukraine on the north and northeast, and Greece and Turkey on the south. The region is washed by the Adriatic Sea in the west, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/297474/Italy http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/44183/Austria http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/276730/Hungary http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/612921/Ukraine http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/244154/Greece http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/609790/Turkey http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/6550/Adriatic-Sea 2 the Ionian Sea in the southwest, and the Black Sea in the east. In the north, clear geographic delimitation of the Balkans becomes difficult because the Pannonian Basin of the Great Alfold (Great Hungarian Plain) extends from central Europe into parts of Croatia, Serbia, and Romania. To the south Greece is primarily a Mediterranean country … although its northern regions of Epirus and Macedonia [with Thessaloniki being the main city and Greece’s second capital] can be considered parts of the Balkans.’ (Crampton 2014: online entry). The reader surely noticed the word ‘usually’ in the Encylopaedia Britannica’s definition above. A helpful map of the region albeit with a slightly different delimitation of the Balkans is given in the first Figure of the first article to this Special Issue, based on UNODC. The rarity of long-established stand-alone Criminology departments in Balkan academia highlights the need for a Special Issue of the EJCPR on 'Crime, Ethnic Minorities and Procedural Justice in the Balkans’ to showcase some of the criminological thinking and research as well as inform about crime and criminal justice in the area. The Balkans’ recent history of dramatic economic, political and social changes, not to mention civil war, since the 1990’s (some perhaps still on-going) exacerbates the interest and originality of the current EJCPR Special Issue’s focus. The recent historical changes may have potentially created new or expanded existing crime opportunities nationally due to anomie (Merton 1938) and cross- nationally due to weakened border controls, which warrant more or new criminal justice responses. But the same changes according to the civilising perspective (Elias ([1939]1978) also have the potential to reduce crime and promote accountability of criminal justice agencies. The unprecedented influx of immigrants to Greece and Italy, the first entrance points to the EU and allegedly a prosperous life during the 1990’s, mostly from Albania ‘exported’ the development of new crime opportunities (for instance, hate crime against non- nationals) and need for increased criminal justice responses. The strain to limited economic http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/292915/Ionian-Sea http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/68234/Black-Sea http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/195686/Europe http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/190156/Epirus 3 resources, social welfare and experience as host countries (and for Greece the substantial numbers of newcomers compared to the country’s size) has perhaps hindered complete assimilation of Balkan emigrants and more than twenty years after the first wave xenophobia against ‘ethnic minorities’ persists. The themes explored in the following seven original contributions to the Special Issue fall into three main topics:  Political accountability and violence (Favarin);  New crime opportunities (Arsovska, Kambellari, Muftić); and  Attitudes towards the criminal justice system and criminal justice responses (Reisig et al., Maljević and Muftić, Muftić, Antonopoulou and Pitsela). In the first article to this Special Issue, in addition to, as mentioned, providing an informative map, Favarin explores the association between democracy and crime (via the polity democratisation score and homicide rates, respectively) in 10 countries from 1955 to 2011. She employs (fixed effects panel) regression analysis and instrumental variables methodology to test how much democracy affects homicides, controlling for other macro contributors to homicide rates. She finds that consolidated democracy together with increased wealth and employment levels of young people considerably reduce homicides cross-nationally. The next three articles deal with new crime opportunities focussing on Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina. The first two studies of this set follow purely qualitative analysis methodology. Kambellari discusses how lack of regulation and /or weak law enforcement have created opportunities for corporate crime in Albania resulting in considerable environmental and financial costs. She analyses the current law against corporate crime and 4 makes recommendations for transforming an effectively ineffective law to empower law enforcement agents and promote corporate responsibility. On a related issue Arsovska explores the opportunities and pathways for ethnic Albanians’ involvement in transnational organised crime in their own country and/ or as migrants in the host country. She concludes that such an involvement is the result of a mixture of limited alternatives for legitimate employment, opportunities created by globalisation and ethnic social networks. Trafficking of human beings for sexual exploitation is one type of organised crime that seems to thrive since the fall of the communist regimes (TRANSCRIME et al. 2004). Based on cross-section data from interviews of border officers in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Muftić investigates (a) their knowledge about legislation and investigation techniques to deal with this crime type and (b) whether such knowledge and /or training affected their ability to recognise and control sex trafficking. She employs bivariate analyses and limited dependent variables (ordinal and logit) regression modelling of a number of indicators of sex trafficking knowledge and experience over training and other relevant officers’ characteristics to conclude that training plays an important role in the border officer’s ability to perform their duties but there is a long way to go until the crime of sex trafficking is recognised as a priority and the needs of victims are met. This fourth article links the topics of new crime opportunities and criminal justice responses. The final set of works presented here focusses entirely on criminal justice attitudes and responses. Staying on in Bosnia and Herzegovina Maljević and Muftić explore students’ attitudes towards electronic monitoring of offenders via descriptive and bivariate analyses. They find that this type of punishment is considered appropriate for low level crime involvement, soft and ineffective without any degrading connotations. Reisig, Tankebe and 5 Mesko test the Tyler’s hypothesis of law compliance based on attitudes and beliefs about procedural justice and police legitimacy. They analyse a cross-section data set of young people’s attitudes in Slovenia via regression analyses of compliance with different laws against low-level crime over respondents’ perceptions of police legitimacy and other relevant characteristics. The results indicate that the Tyler hypothesis does not hold universally and requires further investigation and refinement. The final contribution to the Special Issue comes from Greece on account of that its North and North West regions are perhaps situated in the Balkans. Antonopoulou and Pitsela explore the prevalence of non-Greeks in the different stages of the criminal justice system, from stop and search to imprisonment, since 1990 via descriptive analyses. They find an overwhelming presence of foreign nationals in the country’s criminal justice system with sometimes an exponentially increasing trend, especially since the economic recession. The authors explore the role of political discourse and crime media coverage for this trend and touch upon the dark figure of criminal victimisation against non-Greeks, ending with policy recommendations. I hope you enjoy reading the current Special Issue of the EJCPR on 'Crime, Ethnic Minorities and Procedural Justice in the Balkans’ as much as I enjoyed editing it. It includes original contributions that expand knowledge in criminology and criminal justice disciplines, whether the reader has a special interest in the Balkans or not. 6 References Crampton, R. (2014) Balkans. Encylopaedia Britannica. http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/50325/Balkans. Accessed 25th March 2014. Elias, Norbert. (1978 [1939]) The Civilising Process. Two volumes. Translated by Edmund Jephcott. New York: Urizen Books. Merton, Robert K. (1938) Social Structure and Anomie. American Sociological Review 3: 672-82. TRANSCRIME (Italy), HEUNI (Finland) and Research Centre on Criminology, University of Castilla-La Mancha (Spain) (2004) A Study for Monitoring the International Trafficking of Human Beings for the Purpose of Sexual Exploitation in the EU Member States. http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/50325/Balkans 
work_j6pzsnq3pvhu5dk6smmicg3oo4	----	Deserving Victims?: Sexual Status and the Social Construction of Violence Deserving victims?: sexual status and the social construction of violence Diane Richardson and Hazel May Abstract Theoretical understanding of the meaning of the term violence is under- developed. This paper examines the question of how violence to the per- son is socially defined, and in particular how understandings of violence are both gendered and sexualised. It highlights how victim characteris- tics, as well as the social and interactional contexts in which violence occurs, influence interpretative frameworks, with specific reference to the binary distinction between the public and private and to notions of cul- pability and victimisation. This entails a consideration of the social meanings which constitute notions of a ‘person’ with a ‘right to life’ and occupation of ‘public space.’ The importance of the victim/perpetrator dichotomy in theorising violence is also considered. These themes and issues are examined in relation to a relatively new area of study; the case example of public violence towards lesbians and gay men. Introduction The question of how violence is socially defined has important implications for understanding the context in which violence is experienced and more or less ‘tolerated’ or rejected. This may have consequences for our understanding of the causes and pre- vention of violence. One of the deficiencies identified within the literature, however, is the undertheorised meaning of the term violence. This article examines the social construction of violence, in particular how understandings of violence are both gendered and sexualised. More specifically, it highlights how interpretations of violence to the person are connected to the binary distinction between the public and private, and to notions of culpability and victimisation. © The Editorial Board of The Sociological Review 1999. Published by Blackwell Publishers, 108 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 1JF, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA. Social definitions of violence revolve around culpability, victimi- sation and what is deemed socially appropriate behaviour in partic- ular contexts. The perception of the likelihood of violence in various situational and interactional contexts renders victimisation marginal. In this way, we construct violence towards some individu- als as more or less intelligible than others. As will be discussed later in the article, such different meanings suggest that some individuals are seen as more ‘deserving’ of violence and less deserving of victim status than are others on the basis of their ‘behavioural responsibil- ity’ for risk avoidance. A further concern of this article is how characteristics of the vic- tim, as well as the circumstances in which violence occurs, influence understandings of violence; in particular the processes by which blame and responsibility are attributed to both the perpetrator and the victim. In looking at this question we can see how the notion of deservedness, the idea that to a greater or lesser extent a person ‘deserves’ the violence they experience, is not only related to under- standings of the social contexts in which violence is thought likely to occur, but is also mediated through social characteristics of the victim. For the purposes of clarity these two aspects, the social con- text of violence and victim characteristics, will be examined sepa- rately, although it is recognised that in practice they are often inter-related. For example, as will be discussed in the following sec- tion, gender of the victim is significant in terms of expectations of ‘behavioural responsibility’ for avoiding social contexts commonly associated with the potential for violence. Consideration of how we understand and explain violence differ- ently in relation to who the victim is, rather than the circumstances in which the violence occurs, raises the question of the social recog- nition and worth accorded certain individuals or social groups and, related to this, the degree to which they are considered to have ‘lives worth living’ (Proctor, 1995). The concept of a ‘mercy killing’, for example, reflects the idea that under certain conditions ending someone’s life can be understood as ‘just’. Underlying the issue of how violence is socially defined and understood, therefore, are fun- damental assumptions about humanity, in particular what consti- tutes a ‘person’ with a ‘right to life’. In the following discussion these themes and issues are examined in relation to the case example of public violence towards lesbians and gay men, in order to further elucidate the socially constructed meanings of violence. The discussion will address how such mean- ings are mediated by sexual status as a victim characteristic, in Deserving victims? © The Editorial Board of The Sociological Review 1999 309 particular through the effects on attributions of culpability and vic- timisation. It will also focus on what we have identified as the other key aspect of interpretative frameworks of violence, the social con- text of violence, through an examination of sexualised and gendered understandings of the public/private divide. The focus on lesbians and gay men is extremely useful in highlight- ing how interpretations of violence are mediated through notions of culpability and victimisation. As a marginalised and stigmatised group within society, lesbians and gay men are unlikely to be con- strued as ‘innocent’ victims. On the contrary, the idea of the ‘homo- sexual’ as dangerous, a threat both to individuals they have contact with, especially children, and to national security and social order, has a long history (Edelman, 1992). As a consequence of this stereo- typing of lesbians and gay men as a potential threat, their status of victim is problematic. Social responses to AIDS have demonstrated this extremely well. The dominant view in early accounts of AIDS was that gay men, along with other groups such as Black Africans, prostitutes and injecting drug users, were culpable for the spread of AIDS. The term ‘innocent victims’ was reserved for groups such as haemophiliacs, children with AIDS and those who had contracted HIV through blood transfusions (Patton, 1994). Analysis of the meanings attributed to violence towards lesbians and gay men, there- fore, helps to make explicit the normative processes by which we define someone as an ‘undeserving’ or ‘deserving’ victim. Another important reason for focusing on violence towards lesbians and gay men is that, as a relatively new area of study, the analysis of forms of violence which have previously gone unrecog- nised and/or undetected broadens our knowledge and understand- ing of violence. This may influence what is socially defined as violence and what may be rationalised as acceptable and unaccept- able behaviour. Furthermore, in addition to addressing gaps in our knowledge and understanding, the value of analysing lesbians’ and gay men’s experience of violence is that it provides a particularly useful lens through which to critically examine what is a predomi- nant feature of current literature relating to violence: the division of the social world into the public and the private. In particular, the dominant construction of homosexual relationships as ‘properly’ belonging to the private sphere, as institutionalised in British law,1 raises interesting questions for current explanations of public vio- lence. For this reason, the analysis will specifically focus on how violence towards lesbians and gay men in public settings is defined and interpreted. Diane Richardson and Hazel May 310 © The Editorial Board of The Sociological Review 1999 First, however, there is a brief examination of the ways in which feminist researchers have drawn attention to the relationship between gender and understandings of violence. This is an issue which should be addressed, since we need to consider the intersec- tions of gender and sexuality. In addition, we believe that such work provides a useful emergent framework for integrating sexuality into analyses and critiques of violence. The social construction of violence What constitutes a violent act? Although to some the answer to this question may seem self-evident, definitions of violence are problem- atic. In seeking an answer, one could resort to the power of the law to define the boundaries of unacceptable and acceptable violence, as well as what is recognised as violence. However, despite the fact that legal codes and practices have a certain authority, since they ‘deter- mine whether agencies such as the police, social services and courts of law are able to intervene or prosecute’ (Maynard, 1993: 101), there are problems with such definitions of violence. Research by feminist writers in particular, has pointed out how legal definitions of vio- lence, as well as those employed by professionals and researchers, may omit acts which many people understand and experience as violence (Kelly, 1988; Stanko, 1990; Maynard, 1993). Such work has critiqued the focus on violence in the public sphere within crimino- logical research and government policy making, drawing attention to forms of violence that occur in private. In so doing, feminists have attempted to develop a much broader social definition of violence that encompasses a wide spectrum of behaviours which are not nec- essarily reflected in legal codes or ‘expert’ accounts. Liz Kelly (1988), for example, argues that ‘commonsense’ definitions of what consti- tutes violence reflect a focus on male behaviour that is considered to be a threat to public safety. Analysing accounts of what women experience as violence, based on in-depth interviews, Kelly argues that such definitions are inadequate in accounting for the ‘contin- uum of violence’ reported. This and other studies of women’s experi- ence of violence have shown not only the extent to which the threat or fear of violence is a part of many women’s everyday lives, but also the complex range of activities which are included in definitions of violence (Hanmer and Saunders, 1984; Stanko, 1985; McNeill, 1987; Wise and Stanley, 1987). In attempting to establish broader definitions of violence, Deserving victims? © The Editorial Board of The Sociological Review 1999 311 feminist perspectives have highlighted how socially constructed meanings of violence are mediated through the use of the public and private divide. The interrelationship between what is under- stood as public and private is extremely complex. As a normative ideal, however, the private sphere is associated with home, domestic- ity, care and ‘safety’, whereas risk of violence has traditionally been associated with public places (Duncan, 1996). Accordingly, it can be argued that this public/private dichotomy limits both definitions of violence and what may be regarded as unacceptable or acceptable behaviour. One example of the influence of the public/private divide on interpretative frameworks, is the response to domestic violence and sexual abuse of women and children within the home. Until relatively recently such forms of violence largely went socially unrecognised, remaining a private and hidden problem (Bell, 1993; Plummer, 1995; Maynard and Winn, 1997). In this way, the demar- cation of the public and private as distinct spheres may allow or even legitimate the occurrence of violence in particular contexts. This resistance to seeing the private space of the home as a place of violence is in contrast to the recognition given to violence occur- ring in public spaces. What this suggests is that violence is to some degree defined in relation to specific places and spaces: outside of these contexts it may be harder to make sense of events as violent. Even within the public sphere, which has traditionally been theo- rised as the primary site of violence, certain spaces and places are labelled as potentially more dangerous than others. For example, in one study of experiences of and the precautions used to avoid per- sonal violence, ‘safety’ strategies commonly used in urban areas included avoiding dimly lit areas, bus stops and train stations, run down areas, and selecting parking spaces carefully (Stanko, 1990). The association of violence with different spaces and places is not necessarily static; there may be temporal limits to this process. Thus, some public places or areas may be construed as ‘safe’ during the day, yet potentially dangerous at night. That temporal and spatial markers are part of what one might term ‘commonsense’ notions of violence, is further evidenced in the ways in which the context within which violent acts occur frequently shapes our responses to the victim. As Elizabeth Stanko states: If people frequent places that are known to be dangerous or they do not follow exactly the rules for precaution then we implicitly hold them responsible for whatever happens to them. (Stanko, 1990: 49) Diane Richardson and Hazel May 312 © The Editorial Board of The Sociological Review 1999 This is a highly gendered process. Women are more likely than are men to be blamed for making themselves vulnerable to violence by being in the ‘wrong’ place at the ‘wrong’ time . This attribution of greater culpability can, in part, be explained in terms of the assump- tion that women are more likely to be at risk . Women commit far fewer serious and violent crimes than men and, related to this, are more likely to be seen as potential ‘victims’ of violence than are men (Newburn and Stanko, 1994). This is despite evidence from criminal surveys that men are commonly the victims as well as the perpetra- tors of serious interpersonal violence. What this illustrates is the importance of the victim/perpetrator binary in theorising violence, whereby individuals and social groups are positioned as either victims or as perpetrators. In addition, it is also commonly assumed than women will be less able than men to protect themselves if they are attacked. As a conse- quence of this gendered construction of the concept of ‘potential vic- tim’, there is a greater expectation on women to protect themselves from violent attack through modifying their behaviour in social con- texts associated with risk of violence. This is reflected in common self blame among women who are victims of violence (Kelly, 1988), suggesting that such ‘commonsense’ notions play a powerful role in shaping the social reality of violence. Research has also documented how this extends to gendered understandings of perpetrator’s actions, whereby the victims’ behaviour may be perceived as a miti- gating factor in ‘justifying’ various forms of male violence towards women (Dobash and Dobash, 1992; Godenzi, 1994). As was pointed out in the introduction to the paper, understand- ings of violence are mediated not only through evaluations of victim status in terms of ‘behavioural responsibility for risk’, but also by the social characteristics of the victim. Although these two variables may be inter-related, as in the case described above where expecta- tion of risk and responsibility are related to the victim’s gender, they can operate independently. This is evidenced, for example, in situa- tions where an individual is identified as a ‘type of person’ who is a ‘legitimate target’ for violence. The term ‘hate crime’ has been used to refer to violence motivated by hatred of a particular class or ‘type’ of people. Hate crimes have been defined as ‘threats of vio- lence, intimidation, property crimes, or crimes of violence motivated by prejudice.’ (National Research Council, 1990: 121). Thus, for example, in racially motivated violence different skin colour may be enough to justify an attack (Willis, 1977). In addition to racist violence, the term ‘hate crime’ has also been used in relation to Deserving victims? © The Editorial Board of The Sociological Review 1999 313 homophobic violence (Messerschmidt, 1994; Toolis, 1995; Mason and Palmer, 1996). These are crimes of violence motivated by fear and hatred of sexual difference. Sexual status and understandings of violence Although feminist work has challenged the dominant criminologi- cal perspective in defining violence, making visible women’s experi- ence of especially non-stranger, private violence, and research has increasingly emphasised the importance of investigating racially- motivated violence, relatively little attention has been given to theo- rising violence directed against lesbians and gay men. That the marginalisation of such violence is not confined to ‘mainstream’ accounts but extends to feminist critiques is perhaps particularly suprising, given that sexuality as well as violence has been a primary focus of much feminist writing. Discussion of possible reasons for this are beyond the scope of this paper, however one explanation for the omission may be the emphasis on violence within the family as central to feminist work. At the time of writing, there are no official reports or statistics on the occurrence of public violence towards lesbians and gay men in Britain. The British Crime Survey, for example, whilst it includes questions dealing with racial motivation for violence experienced, whether or not it has been reported to the police, does not enquire about homophobic motivation. Similarly, there has been relatively little research to date on how lesbians and gay men define and expe- rience violence, in both public and private contexts.2 Nonetheless, high levels of victimisation have been reported by lesbians and gay men in UK survey studies that have been carried out. The Social and Community Planning Research study found that one in four respondents had been physically threatened or attacked (SCPR, 1995 reported in Mason and Palmer, 1996), whereas in a locally based survey of 178 lesbians and gay men in the Manchester area, 38% of men and 21% of women said they had been ‘queer bashed’ (Truman et al, 1994). However, the sample size in these surveys was relatively small. In a much larger national sur- vey, over 4,000 lesbians and gay men were asked about their experi- ences of homophobic violence, harassment and verbal abuse. One in three gay men and one in four lesbians reported that they had expe- rienced at least one violent attack in the last five years, mostly by unknown attackers in public places. Nearly one in three respondents Diane Richardson and Hazel May 314 © The Editorial Board of The Sociological Review 1999 had experienced some form of harassment such as, for example, graffiti, vandalism, hate mail, threats or blackmail, and 73% had been verbally abused, in the last five years because of their sexuality. Higher levels of violence and harassment were reported by young people, Black, Asian and disabled respondents. In the case of vio- lent attacks, for example, 48% of under eighteen year olds, 45% of Black respondents, 40% of Asian respondents, and 50% of disabled respondents said they had experienced homophobic violence com- pared with 32% overall (Mason and Palmer, 1996). Here it is impor- tant to recognise that constructions of ‘race’, sexuality, disability and gender are not separate from one another, but are informed by and inform each other (Bhavnani, 1997). Typically perpetrators of anti-gay violence are reported to be strangers, young and over- whelmingly male. However, some studies suggest that whilst gay men are primarily attacked by other men, alone or in groups, attacks on lesbians are carried out by both men and women (Comstock, 1991; Mason and Palmer, 1996). Similar high levels of victimisation have been reported by lesbians and gay men in surveys carried out in the United States. In their comparison of thirteen major surveys of anti-gay violence, for instance, Herek and Berrill (1992) found that 80% of lesbians and gay men surveyed had been verbally harassed, 44% had been threat- ened with violence, 33% had been chased or followed, 25% had been pelted with objects and 19% were physically assaulted. Similarities also exist in the social contexts in which violence towards lesbians and gay men occurs. The majority of violent attacks are carried out by unknown assailants in public places. However, gender differences exist in the geography of homophobic assaults (Valentine, 1996). Lesbians report more violent encounters in ‘the street’ than gay men, who appear to be more at risk of being attacked in the vicinity of gay venues, neighbourhoods, cruising areas or other public places where gay men are known to meet (Comstock, 1991; Berrill, 1992; Mason and Palmer, 1996). (In part, this may reflect the fact that there are more public spaces available to gay men therefore they are easier to ‘target’ in this way.) This suggests that far from being ‘safe spaces’ from the threat of violence and abuse, areas where lesbians but more especially gay men socialise, work and reside may be used to locate victims. It is in this sense that some writers refer to ‘queer spaces’ as ‘hunting grounds’ (Myslik 1996: 168). This brief overview of the limited research on violence towards lesbians and gay men informs the discussion in the following sec- tions. First, sexual status as a salient victim characteristic will be Deserving victims? © The Editorial Board of The Sociological Review 1999 315 considered in relation to normative ideas and beliefs about sexual- ity. Interwoven with this analysis will be the ways in which funda- mental notions of ‘personhood’, ‘humanity’ and ‘right-to-life’ both inform and are informed by what is considered to be ‘natural’ and ‘normal’ sexuality. Second, and following on from this, we will examine the social contextualisation of homophobic violence. Victim characteristics: personhood and the right to life The term human is commonly used to refer to group membership based on biological criteria; the belonging to a particular species. The term ‘person’, whilst it is based upon the construction of being human, relates to notions of individuality and subjecthood; residing in our uniqueness, our separateness from others. This idea of the person has been conceptualised as grounded in human nature. As John Shotter describes, it represents the belief that ‘human beings are born “naturally” as already individuals, possessing (also, “natu- rally”) within themselves the “potential” for an authentic inner self, a potential which in itself owes nothing to society’ (Shotter, 1993: 117). The social conditions of life are here seen as acting upon the expression of this natural, pregiven ‘self ’ that is part of human biol- ogy. Thus, it is the inhuman conditions of life which are regarded as somehow repressing or preventing the expression of the authentic nature of human being, dehumanising us and the way we relate to each other as ‘persons’. In recent years, the concept of ‘the person’ has emerged as a con- tested term within social theory. In particular, the idea of people born with an inner potential for personhood rooted in their human biology has been challenged, giving rise to a different view. This view suggests that ‘personhood’, as well as our sense of ourselves and others as human, should be thought of as socially constructed. Rather than conceptualising the development of individuality as a process of discovering and becoming aware of our pregiven selves, identities and subjectivities are treated as ‘inventions’ which are (re)produced in the ongoing relations between people. We become ‘persons’, we become human, through the process of social inter- action whereby the categorisations ‘person’ and ‘human’ are attrib- uted to individuals (Shotter, 1993). This is significant, for it suggests that as a socially constructed border some individuals or groups may be seen as at the margins of humanity and personhood, ie they occupy what David Sibley refers Diane Richardson and Hazel May 316 © The Editorial Board of The Sociological Review 1999 to as a lower ranking in a socially constructed ‘hierarchy of being’ (Sibley, 1995: 14). This has been particularly evident in relation to the representation of colonised peoples, especially Australian Aborigines and African slaves, as well as other groups such as Jews and Gypsy communities. For example, in his analysis of the Nazi programme of racial hygiene and racial destruction during the 1930s and 1940s in Germany, Robert Proctor quotes a key spokes- person on ‘the Jewish question’, Eugen Fischer, as claiming that Jews were of ‘such a mentality that one can only speak of inferiority and of beings of another species’ (Proctor, 1995: 186). The construction of some people as ‘less than human’ can be observed in relation to sexual as well as ethnic and racial minorities. In both instances, concepts of nature and disease have been identified as dominant themes in dehumanising and depersonalising processes of exclusion (Sibley, 1995). In the case of homosexuality, exclusions can be explained in terms of normative beliefs about sex- uality, where sexuality is understood to be the basis for human iden- tity, prior to other cultural and social affiliations (Kotz, 1993). That is, we commonly believe that sexuality is associated with human nature and this ‘nature’ is normally interpreted as heterosexuality (Richardson, 1996a). Thus, in the case of homosexuals, who are not a part of nature so defined, social exclusion is expressed via being constructed as abnormal and un-natural. The naturalisation of heterosexuality not only serves to dehu- manise lesbians and gay men, it also provides the context in which attributions of ‘personhood’ are established and understood. As Goffman has argued, to possess a ‘discrediting characteristic’ ren- ders one vulnerable to a social devaluation process whereby the whole person is reduced to a tainted, discounted one (Goffman, 1990: 12). Historically, as noted above, lesbians and gay men have been defined primarily in terms of sexual pathology (Weeks, 1990). A person who is identified as ‘homosexual’ is therefore at risk of no longer being seen as a whole person, but in terms of a sexualised and stigmatised category which, in many if not all contexts, becomes all defining (Richardson, 1996a). Such exclusionary practices have important implications for understandings of and responses to violence. (The social construc- tion of murder, for example, is based on an assessment that a ‘per- son’, another ‘human being’, is killed.) For instance, dehumanising and depersonalising processes of exclusion can be observed in rela- tion to legitimations of violence and attribution of victim status. The relegation of some individuals and groups to the borders of Deserving victims? © The Editorial Board of The Sociological Review 1999 317 human existence, often expressed in the representation of people as animals, is one way of rendering victimisation intelligible. The vic- tim can be construed as more ‘deserving’ of violence than others – a ‘legitimate target’ of violence – which in turn can significantly influence assessments of the degree of culpability attributed to per- petrators. It is important to recognise that at its most extreme the idea of ‘deserving victims’ of violence raises the question: ‘Should they live?’. That is, to put it a slightly different way, attributions of victim status are linked to notions of a ‘right-to-life’ and the idea of ‘lives worth living’ (Proctor, 1995). The social construction of a ‘person’ normally implies a right-to- life. However, an individual may forfeit their right-to-life through her or his actions, for example by being found guilty of murdering someone in states where murder carries the death penalty. Their right-to-life may also be threatened or even denied them as a conse- quence of their marginal status as ‘persons’ who are a recognised and socially valued sector of humanity. This is clearly evident in analyses of state violence involving the destruction of certain groups of people in euthanasia and ethnic cleansing programmes, such as those witnessed recently after the collapse of former Yugoslavia as well as in Nazi Germany earlier this century. Unwanted ethnic minorities, in particular Germany’s Jewish and Romani Gypsy pop- ulations, and those who were physically or mentally handicapped were not the only groups singled out for such programmes. Social historians documenting the Nazi destruction of ‘lives not worth liv- ing’ have in recent years pointed to the inclusion of homosexuals as a pathological and ‘inferior’ people (Proctor, 1995), resulting in the detention and extermination of thousands of lesbians and gay men (Grau, with Schoppmann, 1995). The linking of concepts of right-to-life with a sexual ideology in which heterosexuality is both naturalised and normalised, can be observed in other contexts besides ‘social-cleansing’ attempts to eliminate homosexuals from society. It may, for instance, be institu- tionalised through laws which include the death penalty for homo- sexuality. In the past, under English law concerned with genital relations between men the maximum punishment for ‘buggery’ was death by various means: burying alive, burning at the stake and death by hanging (for a discussion see Moran, 1996). While in most countries capital punishment for ‘homosexual offences’ no longer exists, there are some exceptions. For example, in 1993 Iran’s repre- sentative at the United Nations, Rajaie Khoransi, confirmed that people convicted of same-sex sexual activity four times could be Diane Richardson and Hazel May 318 © The Editorial Board of The Sociological Review 1999 executed (War on Want, 1996). In many other parts of the world, state-sponsored and state-tolerated violence towards individuals because of their sexual identity and/or practices has resulted in lesbians and gay men being imprisoned and tortured (see Rosenbloom, 1996; War on Want, 1996, Amnesty, 1997). The struggle to get lesbian and gay rights recognised as human rights reveals how the concept of human rights has historically developed in ways that have failed to recognise many of the abuses perpetrated against certain social groups (Rosenbloom 1996). This raises the question of whether such discourses serve not only to authorise which human rights claims are recognised as basic to humanity, but also to actively shape the social meaning and con- struction of what it means to be a ‘person’ who is recognised, to greater or lesser extent, as ‘human’ (Herman, 1994). The history of the AIDS epidemic also demonstrates a lack of concern for the loss of gay and lesbian lives (Watney, 1991), with some Right-wing groups and individuals claiming in the early years, when AIDS was commonly perceived as a ‘gay plague’, that AIDS was a form of ‘natural justice’, deserving retribution for un-natural and immoral ‘lifestyles’ (Richardson, 1996b). As a social phenome- non, then, the ‘homosexualising of AIDS’ has served to articulate deep-seated views about ‘the right-to-life’ of lesbians and gay men. Indeed, Simon Watney has gone so far as to argue that the presen- tation of AIDS as a ‘gay plague’ can be seen as ‘the viral projection of an unconscious desire to kill gay men.’ (Watney, 1991: 171). Finally, responses to recent scientific investigations of homosexu- ality provide further evidence for the argument that notions of right-to-life, and to social membership, are, fundamentally, hetero- sexualized. For instance, in the early 1990s a research study was published which suggested that brain structure, in particular the size of a small cell group in the hypothalamus, helps to determine whether a person is heterosexual, gay or bisexual (LeVay, 1991). The study attracted considerable media attention and stimulated public debate over how such scientific findings might be used, in particular to eliminate homosexuality. (For a critical discussion of the possible uses of such research see Le Vay, 1996.) Similar reactions were evoked after the publication of a report two years later, which claimed to have discovered evidence of a gene sequence that predisposed males to become either heterosexual or gay (Hamer, 1993). In this case, debate focused on the possibility of developing genetic tests to try to assess a person’s current or future sexual orientation. In addition to use in, for example, selection for Deserving victims? © The Editorial Board of The Sociological Review 1999 319 employment or insurance purposes, the possibility of applying such tests to foetuses has been raised (The Guardian, 7 December 1996). Behind such a suggestion is the belief that it may be possible to pre- vent ‘homosexuals’ from being born by aborting foetuses identified as having ‘gay genes’. This is not the first time this has been suggested. In the late seventies media attention focused on causal explanations of homosexuality which asserted the importance of hormonal levels during foetal development (Dorner et al., 1975); suggesting that it might be possible to prevent homosexuality by monitoring and, where necessary, injecting the predetermining hormones for hetero- sexuality or, failing that, to terminate the pregnancy.3 In a similar vein, the history of attempts to ‘cure’ lesbians and gay men can also be understood as a form of social extermination; motivated by a desire to rid society of the ‘disease’ of homosexuality. These debates about the nature of homosexuality and research into its alleged biological roots draw attention to the fact that the ‘right-to-life’, as well as ones ‘personhood’, as a lesbian or gay man can be questioned. As has already been outlined in the previous sec- tion, this can be observed at interpersonal as well as an institutional levels, in particular in ‘hate crimes’ of violence directed at lesbians and gay men. As one young man put it: ‘My friends and I go “fag- hunting” around the neighbourhood. They should all be killed’ (Weissman 1992: 173). Such victimisation reflects, and serves to reaffirm, normative het- erosexuality (Messerschmidt, 1994). That is to say, the view of les- bians and gay men as ‘deserving victims’ of violence and, connected to this, social definitions of homophobic violence as ‘justified’, derives at least in part from their attributed sexual status as inferior and immoral beings within a social order which privileges hetero- sexuality as ‘natural’ and ‘normal’. This is compounded by the dominant construction of lesbians and gay men as social groups defined almost exclusively in terms of (same-sex) sexual desires and behaviours. As a consequence of this process of establishing ‘homo- sexuals’ as a sexually inscribed class, sexual status becomes a pri- mary defining victim characteristic. The social context of violence: public and private spheres The public and the private have often been conceptualised as being independent and discrete: the public sphere appertaining to ‘the objective, masculine and non-sexual, and the private sphere which is Diane Richardson and Hazel May 320 © The Editorial Board of The Sociological Review 1999 assumed to be inherently feminine, concerned with privacy, and the sexual’ (Carabine, 1996: 56). However, in recent years the idea of the ‘public’ has become a contested term within social theory; different theorists adopting different conceptions of the public as well as the private sphere. The distinction between the public and the private, the idea of two separate spheres, has also been challenged. Feminist writers in particular have played an important role in developing critiques of the private/public division, arguing that the separation of the public and the private is a patriarchal construction (Nicholson, 1984; Walby, 1990). Despite these trends, it is impor- tant to recognise ‘the ideological and normative power’ of the public/private divide (Cooper, 1993). For instance, it continues to exert enormous influence on major social institutions such as the law, education and the welfare state. The public/private dichotomy is both gendered and sexualised. As Nancy Duncan (1996) puts it: ‘This binary opposition is employed to legitimate oppression and dependence on the basis of gender; it has also been used to regulate sexuality’ (Duncan, 1996: 128). A notion of privacy closely linked to sexuality, in conjunction with the fact that ‘homosexuality’ as a social category is defined primarily in sexual terms, helps to maintain the dominant construction of lesbian and gay relations as belonging to the private sphere. Thus, for example, the 1967 Sexual Offences Act legalised some male homosexual relations, those between consenting adults over the age of twenty one, on condition that they were conducted ‘in private’.4 One of the controlling effects of the introduction of this law, there- fore, was to ‘increase the ‘privatisation’ and moral ‘segregation’ of homosexuals’ (Weeks, 1990: 275). Such examples serve to highlight the idea of homosexuality as appropriate only in private spaces. They also expose a contradiction in the idea of the private sphere as the site of sexual relations. While lesbian and gay relations are expected to be conducted in private spaces, expressions of heterosexuality are everyday occurrences within the public arena. ‘Heterosexuals kiss in public, they hold hands in public, they dance together in public, they flirt in public. They celebrate their relationships in public.’ (Mason and Palmer, 1996: 76). This sexual double standard is based on the naturalisa- tion of heterosexual norms in the public sphere. That is to say that, although the conceptualisation of the private/public binary has led to the public sphere generally being thought of as asexual, hetero- sexuality is inscribed in the public as the dominant ideology (Bell, 1995; Duncan, 1996; Valentine, 1996). Deserving victims? © The Editorial Board of The Sociological Review 1999 321 The institutionalised heterosexualisation of the public sphere has had important consequences for the regulation of lesbian and gay behaviour in public places and spaces (Bell, 1995). The vast major- ity of lesbians and gay men conceal their sexuality in public by avoiding public displays of affection, such as kissing or holding hands, and avoiding appearing gay in other ways. Although there are a number of reasons for this, fear of violence or harassment is a major factor. In a national survey, 25% of lesbian and gay men said they never kiss or hold hands with their partner in public, whilst another 55% reported that they sometimes avoid doing so, in order to avoid homophobic violence and harassment (Mason and Palmer, 1996). As one gay male respondent remarked: ‘For me personally, the only place I feel totally safe is on the gay scene or in my own home. Although I don’t let this bother me, I think this is at the back of nearly every gay or lesbian person’s mind’ (Mason and Palmer, 1996: 61). In addition to being important in the social construction of the fear of violence and notions of safety, the assumption that homo- sexuality should be confined to private spaces frames understand- ings of actual violence. In particular, the demarcation of the public as heterosexual territory means that lesbians and gay men who ‘trespass’ may be blamed for making themselves vulnerable to vio- lence by being in the ‘wrong’ spatial location. This echoes the gen- dered meanings of victimisation and culpability, as discussed in the first part of this paper. In this case, however, it is argued that the public/private divide serves to construct lesbians and gay men as ‘deserving’ or ‘guilty’ victims of public violence towards them. As has been noted previously, this could be seen to mitigate offenders’ culpability and, in some contexts, may even allow acts of public vio- lence to be construed as legitimate. This view is clearly evident in accounts of homophobically motivated attacks on lesbians and gay men. For example, in a recent case in England, on November 13th 1995, three young men attacked two gay men in Central Park, Plymouth, killing one and severely injuring the other. Soon after the attack vandals sprayed graffiti at the site where the attacks had taken place: ‘No Queers Here. You Are Banned Or Face Death’ (The Pink Paper, 17 November, 1995). It is important to recognise that in many cases of violence towards lesbians and gay men the ‘provocation’ is not public dis- plays of same sex desire, but rather the public labelling of someone as ‘homosexual.’ In these cases, it is the (assumed) identity of an individual which determines publicly expressed homosexuality and, Diane Richardson and Hazel May 322 © The Editorial Board of The Sociological Review 1999 as such, is considered to be inappropriate in what is presumed to be ‘heterosexual space’. As a consequence, a person may be attacked because they say they are lesbian or gay or because they look like ‘one’ (Valentine, 1996). Significantly, trying to avoiding looking ‘obviously’ gay and avoiding telling people that they are gay have been found to be common tactics used by lesbians and gay men in avoiding violence and harassment in public settings (Mason and Palmer, 1996). It is the case, however, that demands for lesbian and gay rights, since the 1970s, have increasingly been about an equal rights in the public sphere and not merely the right to a privatised social exis- tence (Tucker, 1995). Analyses of social and legal responses to such demands provide further evidence of the construction of lesbians and gay men as ‘deserving’ victims of violence. For example, Jackie Stacey, in her examination of governmental and media debates over section 28 of the Local Government Act 1988,5 shows how lesbians and gay men are frequently constructed as a social group who if they do not ‘keep themselves to themselves’, have only themselves to blame for the consequences. By demanding ‘rights’ as an oppressed minority, by attempting to open up discussions about sexuality and by trying to challenge definitions of themselves as unacceptable or undesirable, lesbians and gay men were seen to be ‘going too far’ and thus ‘asking for’, and indeed ‘deserving’, any trouble which might come their way (Stacey, 1991). The idea that the public existence of ‘homosexuals’ represents some form of provocation, which renders violence and harassment intelli- gible is evident in institutional as well as informal assessments of public violence. This is supported by the literature on homophobic violence, discussed earlier, which draws attention to the failure of the police to acknowledge the significance of recording ‘sexual ori- entation’ among the reasons which motivate attackers to abuse and kill, and the reluctance of the courts to impose harsh sentences on the perpetrators of such crimes (Tucker, 1995; Mason and Palmer, 1996; Minter, 1996). In Britain this has been particularly evident in relation to homi- cide, where a ‘homosexual panic’ defence may be used. A homosex- ual panic defence is a defence which only applies on a charge of murder, and is a variation on the defence of provocation. If success- ful, it reduces the charge from murder, which carries a mandatory Deserving victims? © The Editorial Board of The Sociological Review 1999 323 life sentence, to manslaughter, where a sentence of five to seven years is typical. (In practice this means that most of those prose- cuted serve three to five years.) Recent research has revealed the suc- cess of many pleas of provocation in homicide cases where the victim is gay (Toolis, 1995). Typically, in a defence of homosexual panic the accused seeks to establish that they were provoked by the victim making a ‘homosexual advance’, which caused them to lose control and attack them (Toolis, 1995). By claiming ‘provocation’ in this way the implication is that the perpetrator is somehow less cul- pable for what they did and therefore eligible for a lesser charge. Such practices are evidence of the way in which certain forms of violence are ‘normalised’,6 in this case through sexualised construc- tions of the right to safely occupy public space. This is further underlined when one considers the likelihood of the criminal justice system accepting a defence of ‘heterosexual panic’ in the case of a woman claiming that she was provoked into killing a male victim as a result of his allegedly making an unwanted sexual advance. Conclusion In this paper we have outlined how the characteristics of the victim, as well as the social and interactional contexts in which violence occurs, are important factors in the social construction of violence. In particular, it is argued that not only are notions of victim status gendered, as feminist research has previously outlined, they are also sexualised, which has implications for the attribution of culpability in both the perpetrator and the victim. This account also focuses on how the public/private divide influences constructions and rationali- sations of violence. This is examined in relation to the connection between the public/private binary and the institutionalisation of heterosexuality. More specifically, we have highlighted some of the ways in which the assumption that homosexuality should be confined to the private sphere, frames understandings of the fear of, and actual violence towards, lesbians and gay men in the public sphere. In addition to addressing these questions, it is recognised that there is a need to consider the wider social consequences of recognising sexual status, and its relationship to the public/private divide, as important in how violence is socially defined. This is rele- vant not only in terms of lesbians and gay men who seek legal redress for the violence that they encounter, but also, more broadly, at the level of the production of social conditions which contribute Diane Richardson and Hazel May 324 © The Editorial Board of The Sociological Review 1999 to the public construction of lesbians and gay men as somehow ‘deserving’ of anti-lesbian and anti-gay practices, including violence to the person. What are the research implications of taking account of these themes and issues? The extent of research-based knowledge varies between different forms of violence; ‘some are grossly under-studied and under-theorised, while others are sufficiently developed to war- rant further research’ (ESRC, 1996: 3). What has been highlighted in this article is the relative neglect of research which addresses social divisions based on sexualities and the urgent need for information on the occurrence and experience of homophobic vio- lence and harassment, as well as for policy analysis in this area. This could be pursued through in-depth studies which aim to increase understandings of the meanings to homophobic violence for both victims and perpetrators. In this way, such research would help to identify possible narratives of violence which both encourage as well as discourage violence to the person. Additionally, there has been little research which has attempted to evaluate community responses to such forms of violence. A comprehensive study focus- ing on how violence is systematically and routinely negotiated by those who identify as lesbian or gay would provide valuable information on the impact of homophobic violence on people’s everyday lives and identities. What are the self-imposed sanctions and prohibitions utilised in negotiating risky social interactions or situations in relation to both self and others? Do individuals from different social groups use similar or different sanctions and/or pro- hibitions in different contexts? At another level, studies of violence directed at specific social groups – in this case lesbians and gay men – could usefully examine the costs to social integration and cohesion. Finally, as we have made clear in this article, there is a need to evalu- ate institutional responses to homophobic violence, both at the level of official reporting and in terms of research aimed at promoting pol- icy development which will assist in its detection and prevention. The focus in this article has been on the case example of public violence towards lesbians and gay men. The issues that it raises, however, demand that we consider the implications for understand- ing forms of violence to other individuals and social groups. An examination of literature in the area of violence to the person reveals that definitions of violence are problematic; informed by socially and culturally derived definitions of culpability and victimisation. This suggests a need for future research to identify the social and interac- tional contexts in which acts are defined or experienced as violent, Deserving victims? © The Editorial Board of The Sociological Review 1999 325 rather than focusing exclusively on stereotyped and/or pathologised groups and individuals. This general theme of examining the nature and explanations of violence could be pursued through studies focusing on situational and contextual aspects of violent acts, as well as research focused on neglected victims of violence. Such examinations would contribute to further conceptual devel- opment and analyses of the experience and meaning of violence, in particular within feminist theory. As acknowledged earlier, there are important parallels with feminist work, which informs this paper, but there are also some critical differences in emphasis. Feminist research on violence has also been concerned with how socially con- structed meanings of violence are mediated through the use of the public/private binary. In addition, there has been a focus within such work on investigating forms of violence that have previously gone unrecognised. However, whereas a dominant emphasis in femi- nist accounts has been on analysing violence within domestic and private spheres,7 the primary purpose here is to examine how the public/private divide is significant in certain forms of public vio- lence going unrecognised. This paper therefore raises important questions concerning how the public and the private are theorised and used as concepts and social definitions of space and place. As we have argued, gendered and sexualised notions of both spaces and places, as well as victims and perpetrators, serve to ‘nor- malise’ certain forms of violence. This process of normalisation has important implications for assessments of the intelligibility of vio- lence, based upon interpretations of both victimisation and culpa- bility (May, 1997). Social and cultural norms of violence provide an interpretative framework for understanding and evaluating violent episodes. Those forms of violence which are ‘normalised’ are more intelligible, within the boundaries of what one might term ‘accept- able’ violence. Other forms of violence, which are transgressive of social norms, are less meaningful and may be more likely to attract social approbation. This can be observed in the different meanings attached to homicide carried out by children such as, for example, in the Bulger case8 which provoked a public outcry, compared to homicide carried out by an adult man. Whereas violence is to some extent ‘normalised’ for young men (Maynard and Winn, 1997), the dominant status for young children is ‘innocent victim’ rather than guilty perpetrator. A child who commits a homicide transgresses these conceptual boundaries and social norms of violence. Analyses of responses to women who commit violent crime further substanti- ates this argument. Women who kill, for instance, are often Diane Richardson and Hazel May 326 © The Editorial Board of The Sociological Review 1999 described as ‘doubly deviant’, particularly in relation to violence carried out towards strangers in public places (Winn, 1998). Finally, it is important to consider how social norms of violence structure lesbian and gay men’s ‘right to justice.’ Marshall described civil citizenship as being related to individual freedom, including liberty of the person and the ‘right to justice’ (Marshall, 1950). For women, it is recognised that the right to justice from male violence is ‘not fully secured’ (Walby, 1994: 388). A further related question, which has rarely been explored, is how access to such rights of citi- zenship are sexualised as well as gendered. It can be argued that les- bians and gay men do not have full access to the right to justice in that they do not have the right to be free from violence towards them by those who would deny them personhood and a right to existence, more particularly in the (heterosexualised) public sphere. Most governments are complicit in the violence faced by women and men because they have a lesbian or gay identity/relationship, indeed very few have specifically outlawed discrimination on the basis of ‘sexual orientation’. If forms of abuse and violence, at least in certain contexts, are seen as ‘normal’ and understandable, in terms of the conditions of a publicly restricted homosexual citizen- ship, it is far more difficult to argue for protection in law. On the contrary, it can be argued that through its laws and social policies the state encourages a cultural context which both reinforces and reproduces the public construction of lesbians and gay men as, to a greater or lesser extent, ‘deserving’ victims of violence. University of Newcastle Received 20 April 1998 Finally accepted 28 October 1998 Notes 1. The 1967 Sexual Offences Act decriminalised consensual sexual acts between men over the age of 21 in private. 2. This paper is concerned with violence in the public sphere. There is a similar lack of literature on violence towards lesbians and gay men in the private sphere, although the subject of domestic violence in lesbian and gay relationships has begun to be addressed more recently (see, for example, Lobel, 1986; Renzetti, 1992). 3. For a discussion of Dorner’s work see Richardson, 1981. For a critique of LeVay and Hamer’s research see Byne, 1995; Doell, 1995. 4. In 1994, the 1967 Act was reformed and the legal age of consent for sexual rela- tions between two men reduced from twenty one to eighteen years of age. 5. Section 28 of the 1988 Local Government Act outlawed, amongst other things, the ‘promotion’ of homosexuality in local authority schools. Deserving victims? © The Editorial Board of The Sociological Review 1999 327 6. Many men who kill their wives or female partners resort to the defence of ‘provo- cation’, most commonly on the grounds that the woman was unfaithful or had nagged them. The relative success of such defences, as analyses of such cases has revealed (McNeill, 1996), is further evidence of the way in which certain forms of violence are ‘normalised’. 7. We are not suggesting that feminist work has ignored violence in the public sphere, analyses of sexual harassment in the workplace and understandings of rape are examples of this. 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work_ja4byumpgrbyjicpazpymowlse	----	Settler Colonialism, Policing and Racial Terror: The Police Shooting of Loreal Tsingine Vol.:(0123456789) Feminist Legal Studies (2020) 28:1–20 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10691-020-09426-2 1 3 Settler Colonialism, Policing and Racial Terror: The Police Shooting of Loreal Tsingine Sherene H. Razack1 Published online: 7 April 2020 © Springer Nature B.V. 2020 Abstract On 27 March 2014, Loreal Tsingine, a 27-year-old Navajo woman was shot and killed by Austin Shipley, a white male police officer, also 27 years old, who said he was trying to apprehend her for a suspected shoplifting. Shipley was never charged, and the Department of Justice declined to investigate the Winslow police on the mat- ter. This article explores Shipley’s killing of Loreal Tsingine and the police investi- gation of the shooting as quotidian events in settler colonial states. Police shootings of Indigenous people and the legal response to police use of force (along with eve- ryday settler violence) are a part of the racial terror that is a central part of settler colonialism. Both the shooting and the official narratives of it as a justifiable use of force reveal the psychic and material underpinnings of a settler state, a state that continually imagines and consolidates itself as a community of whites imperiled by Indians among others. White settler violence directed at those imagined as threats lives just beneath the surface of everyday settler life, and importantly, flows through institutions such as policing, embedding itself in everyday professional routines. The extractive relations that are the basis of settler colonialism require and produce white subjects for whom Indigenous lands and bodies are the resource for white identity; policing is one site where white men and women (as well as those aspiring to white- ness), can enact racial hierarchy on behalf of the colonial state with impunity. Keywords Indigenous women · Policing · Racial violence · Settler colonialism On 27  March 2014, Loreal Tsingine, a 27-year-old Navajo woman was shot and killed by Austin Shipley, a white male police officer, also 27  years old, who said he was trying to apprehend her for a suspected shoplifting. In Shipley’s account, Tsingine “came at me” with scissors, “I felt a fear and a threat” and “I did what I had to do” (Jacobs 2014a, 24–25). Since Shipley was never charged, and the Department * Sherene H. Razack sherenerazack@ucla.edu 1 Department of Gender Studies, UCLA, 1120 Rolfe Hall, Box 951504, Los Angeles, CA 90095-1504, USA http://orcid.org/0000-0001-7861-3753 http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1007/s10691-020-09426-2&domain=pdf 2 S. H. Razack 1 3 of Justice declined to investigate the Winslow police on the matter, concluding that there was insufficient evidence to disprove Officer’s Shipley claim that he shot Tsingine in self-defence, Shipley’s three-step account became the scaffold of the official story (Felte Jr. 2017). A prototypical police narrative, and virtually identi- cal to police accounts justifying the shootings of black men and women, Shipley’s account depends upon Tsingine being reconstructed after the fact as an unstoppable force of nature, an animal provoked. Since police shooting encounters typically take place in less than a minute, and in the case of Tsingine, in under 22 seconds, police accounts legitimating the use of force emphasise threat and in ways that cast the person who is shot in both superhuman and subhuman terms. Inescapably racial, the scenario of a 100-pound young woman holding a pair of inch-long medical scissors, an object plainly visible to the 200-pound police officer gripping her wrists after he has wrestled her to the ground, is scripted as a story of a crazed woman wielding a lethal weapon, a force that only bullets can stop. I propose to explore Shipley’s killing of Loreal Tsingine and the ensuing police investigation as a violence that lies at the heart of settler colonialism. I maintain that police shootings of Indigenous people and the legal response to police use of force (along with everyday settler violence) are a part of the racial terror that is a central part of settler colonialism. Both the shooting and the official narratives of it as a jus- tifiable use of force reveal the psychic and material underpinnings of a settler state, a state that continually imagines and consolidates itself as a community of whites imperiled by Indians among others. Following Taussig (1987), who reminds us that terror is the mediator of colonial hegemony, we can consider the scene in Winslow, Arizona where Loreal Tsingine was killed, as a space of death that sustains the colo- nial order. White settler violence directed at Indigenous peoples lies just beneath the surface of everyday settler life, and importantly, flows through institutions such as policing, embedding itself in everyday professional routines. The extractive relations that are the basis of settler colonialism require and produce white subjects for whom Indigenous lands and bodies are the resource for white identity; policing is one site where white men and women (as well as those aspiring to whiteness), can enact racial hierarchy on behalf of the colonial state with impunity. To make the argument about the police shooting of Loreal Tsingine as illustrative of the racial terror that lies at the basis of settler colonialism, in Part One I empha- sise that settler colonialism is an ongoing racial project of accumulation and one that is structured by Indigenous dispossession and slavery. Settler colonial regimes require the daily exercise of racial terror not only because dispossessed and enslaved peoples must be kept in line, their communities weakened, but also because the white settler subject is an anxious subject who is compelled to assert himself in his encounters with racial Others. Racial terror is productive, reassuring the settler subject that white entitlement is protected, the racial threat contained. Settler colo- nialism’s economic processes require and produce subjects who understand their own racial superiority in gendered ways through violence, a process memorably described by Richard Slotkin (1973, 5) as “regeneration through violence.” We see more readily the macro aspects of the colonial project, resource extraction, ongoing land theft, and so on, and pay less attention to these everyday extractive relation- ships, the ways, that is, in which Indigenous bodies (violated, neglected, annihilated) 3 1 3 Settler Colonialism, Policing and Racial Terror: The Police… become the raw material for the making of the settler subject and the settler state. In those spaces where settlers must manage daily encounters with Indians, as is the case in towns bordering reservations such as Winslow, Arizona where Tsingine was shot, settlers and police assert their right to the land through anti-Indigenous vio- lence. If the extractive relations that are the basis of settler colonialism require and produce white subjects for whom Indigenous lands and bodies are the resource for white identity, policing is one site where white men and women (as well as those aspiring to whiteness), can enact and consolidate racial hierarchy on behalf of the colonial state with impunity. In Part Two, attending to the microprocesses through which settlers “regenerate through violence,” I consider Shipley’s account of the shooting of Tsingine and the official response to it, examining the narratives “I felt a fear and a threat” and “I did what I had to do” the defence offered by Officer Shipley for the racial and colo- nial lines of force they construct and the masculine colonial subjectivity they reveal (Jacobs 2014a, 24–25). Notwithstanding the choreographed nature of the police nar- rative, I suggest that we take Officer Shipley at his word. The fear of Indians and the threat that they are imagined to pose underwrite a white colonial masculinity that seeks confirmation of dominance and that is easily unhinged in the hysteria of the colonial encounter. Policing the reservation border town sets the stage for such gen- dered colonial dramas to unfold and for their deadly consequences to ensue. Official investigations of such events confirm the racial logic embedded in the narratives “I felt a fear and a threat” and “I did what I had to do” institutionalising settler regen- eration through violence. Racial violence, whether on the part of individual settlers or police is a feature of daily life in regimes based on white entitlement to land and property and is integral to white settler society. Thielen-Wilson (2018) reminds us of Fanon’s observation in the Wretched of the Earth that the settler’s violence lies just under the skin (499). Unpacking three Canadian cases where white men killed Indigenous people who were perceived as encroaching on white settler spaces, she argues that property produces “racialized feeling—and, perhaps, madness,” feelings that are at the heart of settler subjectivity (495). Drawing on my own theorisation of the relation between space, subjectivity, and violence, Thielen-Wilson emphasises the violence that settlers are driven to commit in order to announce and consolidate themselves as owners of the land. Ominously, both the settler’s coherence as a sub- ject and white property interests are secured through violence. Police, entrusted with protecting the white property regime that is settler colonialism engage in an often lethal violence that is directed at Indigenous peoples, a violence that often meets with understanding in law. If it is censored at all, the violence is attributed to indi- vidual psychopathology (the poorly trained or inexperienced police officer) and is carefully disconnected from the racial and structural context of settler colonialism itself. In the case of the police, as I show in Part Two, legal and societal approbation for these acts of violence is easily secured given that the very definition of policing is to keep in line the natives, who are imagined as animalistic threats to the white property order. Police killings of Indigenous people garner little attention in spite of the fact that proportionally, in the United States, more Native Americans and African Americans 4 S. H. Razack 1 3 are killed by police than any other groups.1 Indigenous invisibility as racial targets suggests a settler colonial dynamic at play, where all the Indians are presumed dead or dying, and the land and resources considered already belonging to settlers and the settler state. Ghosted while still alive, Indigenous lives not only count for less, but are not even counted, an invisibility that is essential to the story of settlers as the presumed original citizens who have rightfully replaced the region’s premod- ern inhabitants. The mythologised invisibility of Indigenous people requires con- siderable psychic and material effort. “When European Americans speak of Native Americans, they always use the language of ghostliness,” writes Renee Bergland (2000, 1). The Indigenous must either have disappeared or be disappearing, for the settler to understand that he is the legitimate owner of the land, a mythology that structures the law both in land claims and in inquests and inquiries into deaths in custody (Razack 2015). Ghosts haunt, however. They are to be understood within a “dynamic of unsuccessful repression” (Bergland 2000, 5). She elaborates: Ghosts are the things we try to bury, but that refuse to stay buried. They are our fears and our horrors, disembodied, but made inescapable by their very bodilessness. Ghostly Indians present us with the possibility of vanishing our- selves, being swallowed up into another’s discourses, another’s imagination. When ghostly Indian figures haunt the white American imagination, they serve as constant reminders of the fragility of national identity. (2000, 5) What to do with fear, memory and desire, the very things that hegemonies and ghosts are made of, as Bergland suggests? How to contend with white feelings of fear and threat when these feelings constitute a circulating colonial affect that solidi- fies as a nationalism that is intrinsically white? How to deal with ghosts that refuse to stay buried? Mythology notwithstanding, Indians have not disappeared and in places such as Winslow, Arizona, they are close to 25% of the population. Adjacent to a large Nav- ajo reservation, Indigenous presence in Winslow is often greater than the Census figure indicates. Officer Shipley, as I suggest below, is a man haunted by Indians, a man whose masculinity gains a firm footing through violence against Indians, and 1 Statistics of police killings by race are notoriously complicated. In 2016, The Guardian reports that of the 2016 people killed by police, 24 were Native Americans and 266 were African American. When considered relative to percentage of the population, Native Americans who constitute 0.8 % of the population comprise 1.9% of police shootings while African Americans comprise 13% of the popula- tion and comprise 26% of police shootings. These figures suggest comparable rates of police shootings. An important issue to consider is who is counted as Native American or African American. A second important point is whether Native Americans are more likely to die in cells rather than in police shoot- ings. Additionally, see: Mike Males, “Who are Police Killing”, Center on Juvenile and Criminal Justice (August 26, 2014), https ://www.cjcj.org/news/8113 This study using data from the federal Centers for Disease Control, showed that over a 12-year period, Native Americans were statistically more likely to be killed by police than any other group, including African-Americans. John Swaine et al. “The Counted, 2015 and 2016 datasets”, The Guardian (2017) https ://www.thegu ardia n.com/us-news/ng-inter activ e/2015/jun/01/the-count ed-polic e-killi ngs-us-datab ase This study revealed that between 2015 and 2016, Native Americans were the only racial group to see their death toll due to police shootings go up, even as the number of officer-involved shootings across the country fell. https://www.cjcj.org/news/8113 https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/ng-interactive/2015/jun/01/the-counted-police-killings-us-database https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/ng-interactive/2015/jun/01/the-counted-police-killings-us-database 5 1 3 Settler Colonialism, Policing and Racial Terror: The Police… particularly against young Indian women. Violence dissolves the threat that both ghosts and live Indians pose; it serves to convince the settler of his legitimacy at the same time that Indigenous people are actually, and not only metaphorically, removed or made unsovereign. An Indian fighter turned cop, Shipley enjoyed the protection of the Winslow police force and the Department of Justice. His account of the shoot- ing, one carefully choregraphed by the police, contributes to a collective and sanc- tioned white terror. Part One Policing as Indian Fighting It is useful to think of policing as racial infrastructure, that is, a part of the material systems that organise primitive accumulation and the racial hierarchy on which it depends. In this sense, colonial policing is state organised Indian fighting. In keep- ing with Yazzie’s reminder that police in towns such as Winslow assist white settlers to contain the Indian threat (Yazzie 2014), we can consider policing in Winslow as a part of the infrastructural ground on which settlers’ quest both for coherence and land are played out. What first marks the scene of the shooting as a fully colonial and racial encounter is the familiar signpost of colonial policing, namely that it is organised around maintaining the racial lines of force of the settler town. Patrolling the streets of the settler town, as I have shown elsewhere (Razack 2015), maintains public space for white inhabitants, producing Indigenous people as permanently out of place, herded, hunted, evicted, and marked for slow death. The police, it should be remembered, knew that they were looking for an “Indian woman shoplifter on a beer run” the category announced over the police radio and one that Shipley revealed as a part of his everyday lexicon when he unselfconsciously categorised Tsingine as “killing me for a beer run” (12). If we take Shipley at his word, that he felt a fear and a threat from a small, defiant young woman with a blunt pair of small scissors for a weapon, and put into context his repeated encounters with Indians, several of which seemed to be marked by the defiance of Indigenous youth, we can note the infrastructure of policing in which such scenarios of imperiled white mas- culinity are played out. The streets and the prison are two sites where the contours of the racial order are written on the bodies of Indigenous women and men, and in spe- cific ways, on the bodies of Indigenous children and youth. In a reservation border town (a town that is adjacent to a reservation and not to the actual border) such as Winslow, Arizona, policing, barely altered from its nineteenth century form, has as its primary objective, the disciplining and surveillance of Indians, and their eviction from the settler town. Shipley’s daily life as a police officer reveals as much, and the making of settler spaces through violence against Indigenous people confirms the systematised features of his activities and its connection to primitive accumulation on Indigenous land. The ongoing theft of land and the racial terror that accompanies it are easily traced for Winslow and surrounding areas. In Wasi’chu: The Continuing Indian Wars, Bruce Johansen and Roberto Maestas (1979) write of “the theft of life, land 6 S. H. Razack 1 3 and resources from America’s first inhabitants” (18). They recount in detail the insti- tutional, cultural and physical violence directed against the Navajo people over cen- turies. Wasi’chu, explained in the foreword by John Redhouse as a Lakota word for “greedy one who takes the fat,” (Redhouse 1979, 11) carefully documents the acres of land stolen by white settlers, and intensified resource extraction on Indian land of the late 1970s when coal and uranium formed the basis of an energy policy that required an even more vigorous pursuit of Indian land than in earlier decades. Put- ting the American Indian Movement (AIM) of the 1960s and 1970s in this context, Redhouse introduces the book’s equally carefully mapping of the persecution of Indian leaders and activists and an escalating racial terror that accompanied what he called “a full scale anti-Indian movement” comprising agencies of the federal gov- ernment as well as settlers (cited in Johansen and Maestas 1979, 13). Between 1973 and 1974, the bodies of ten Navajo were discovered, among them the bodies of middle-aged men who were sexually mutilated and tortured. Three non-Indian juveniles were arrested for the crime, tried and sent to a juvenile reformatory for two years, the light sentence sparking an Indigenous protest move- ment. Describing the “mutilation murders” of the 1970s, Redhouse, then the associ- ate director of the National Indian Youth Council of Albuquerque, New Mexico, notes that Indian activists understood clearly that the violence was not simply the acts of crazy kids but instead “part of a whole racist picture” (cited in Johansen and Maestas 1979, 62). The tapestry of racial violence Johansen and Maestas pre- sent in Wasi’chu, and that Redhouse references, includes the activities of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, the justice system, the Public Health Service, the multinational energy companies, and everyday encounters with white settlers. Johansen and Maes- tas meticulously document the removal of Indian children from their families, the sterilisation of Indian women, the denigration of Indian children in the school sys- tem and the insidious effects of a colonial police force dedicated to targeting activ- ists and sowing the seeds of internal discord on reservations. The mechanisms that by the middle 1970s enabled 63% of Indian owned agricultural land to be cultivated by non-Indians complete the “whole racist picture,” (82) leaving little doubt about the full-on colonial project in operation and the tremendous racial violence required to sustain it. The epicenter of such patterns of accumulation by dispossession is the border town, those spaces marked by a sustained and violent encounter between white settlers and Indians. The Border Town: A Place Where You Can “Get Away With Anything” Against Indians Reminding us to attend to the materiality of colonialism, Daniel Nemser (2017) observes that “infrastructure can serve not only as a signal of identity or belong- ing … but also as a condition of possibility for the emergence of groupness as such, engendering social relations and structures of feeling”(17). Along these lines, “the things on which the process depends” such as railroad lines, roads, surveys, museums, fences and so on, are the foundation for rule and racialisation (18). The reservation border town, a product of the confinement of Indigenous peoples to 7 1 3 Settler Colonialism, Policing and Racial Terror: The Police… reservations, offers a clear example of the racial infrastructure on which settler colo- nialism rests and the racial “groupness” that it requires and sustains. Diné historian Jennifer Nez Denetdale (2016), examining the historical and lived experiences of Indigenous people in towns that border the Navajo Nation (including the town of Winslow) and the tremendous racial violence reported to the Navajo Human Rights Commission, traces the emergence of reservation border towns as white settler cent- ers that profited off Indian trade, and, early on, from ever expanding alcohol sales to Indians coming into town to purchase supplies. When continuous erosion of the Navajo land base drove many Indians off the reservation to seek work in the settler town, as a 1953 survey of reservation border towns confirmed, Indians began to set- tle in the settler town enduring the most abject conditions. Not surprisingly, alcohol abuse, homelessness and deep poverty continue to plague Indians in border towns and Indians remain confined to the edges and most marginal spaces of the settler town (Denetdale 2016). Then as now, the spatial arrangements of settler colonial- ism, arrangements that emerged with land dispossession and that Cheryl RedHorse Bennett (2018) describes as “predatory,” generate and require considerable racial violence (24). Lisa Donaldson (2006) has shown, for instance, that the practice of ‘Indian Rolling’, racially motivated assaults committed by white youth against Indi- ans in Farmington, a border town, is a rite of passage for white youth, and a practice with deep historical roots. Donaldson suggests that this degree of racial violence (which she terms hate crime) results from the situation where whites have total eco- nomic and political power over Indians. Along the same lines, Barbara Perry (2008) has explored the extent of hate crime in reservation border towns, noting their con- nection to settler colonialism and to an ongoing genocide, an argument also sup- ported by Cheryl Redhorse Bennett’s (2010) PhD dissertation on hate crimes in Farmington. As Perry (2009, 401) notes: The very motive and intent of racialised violence is to protect carefully crafted boundaries, in the physical and social sense. It is a purposive process of polic- ing the line between white/not white, between dominant and subordinate. It stands, then, as both punishment for those who dare to transgress, and those who are considering it. Revealing for its generative features, namely its role in producing young white men as white and affirming settler power, Indian rolling is sufficiently practised as to have its own colloquial term, in much the same way as the term ‘Starlight tours’ is the label for the sometimes lethal Canadian police practice of driving Indigenous people outside of towns and leaving them to walk back into town in sub-zero tem- peratures, and often without shoes or coats (Razack 2015). Reservation border towns are places where an intense anti-Indian policing takes place, and where anti-Indige- nous settler violence is considerable. Denetdale notes that anti-Indigenous violence in towns such as Winslow, Holbrook, Flagstaff and Page, Arizona, is nonetheless routinely attributed to the Navajo themselves and settlers are represented in law and society as the innocent and injured party. Although research into border town violence is sparse, scholars and journalists have reported on the same features Denetdale and Donaldson describe, noting in particular that the gendered pattern of the violence has changed little for a century. 8 S. H. Razack 1 3 Anti-Indigenous violence in border towns retains its early colonial character in that it is white men’s violence (both police and settler) directed at Indigenous men and women alike. Writing one of the few in depth explorations of ‘The Police Killings No One is Talking About’, journalist Stephanie Woodard (2016) notes that police killings of Native Americans is greatest in border towns such as in New Mexico near the Navajo reservation, in South Dakota near Sioux reservations and in Montana near the Crow and Northern Cheyenne reservations. Woodard chronicles the range of police killings of Indigenous men and women, from the shooting of a Suquamish woman, Jeanetta Riley, pregnant, homeless and mentally ill, who threatened suicide and who was shot when she refused to drop the knife she held to herself, to Sarah Lee Circle Bear who died in her cell after telling her jailors that she was in excru- ciating pain. Commenting that the deaths she investigated “sound like tales from the pre-civil rights deep South,” (Woodard 2016) Woodard draws a grim picture of Indigenous deaths in custody that often occur in border towns. Importantly, police violence has generated strong resistance from Native people. Woodard describes the Puyallup tribe’s efforts to support a Washington State ballot initiative that seeks greater police accountability for lethal use of force. The Tribe’s spokesperson whom Woodard interviewed, tribal elder Ramona Bennett, outlined the historical and gen- dered features of the violence and their connection to white men’s sense of entitle- ment. Offering the example of railroad deaths a century ago, Tribal Elder Bennett explained the phenomenon: Fishing and trapping were outlawed so the men went out at night, making the cabins very dangerous. White men would come, kick the doors in, rape and murder the [women] and throw their bodies on the railroad tracks, where they’d be called ‘railroad accident deaths’. We discovered in our tribal enroll- ment office a stack of ‘railroad death’ documents from 1912 to 1917 (Woodard 2016). Racial violence that emerges in the context of white claims for land and resources has remained constant up to the present. For instance, Traci Brynne Voyles (2015) charts how sexual violence against Indian women skyrocket with the influx of white miners in reservation border towns. American Indian women also have the highest rate of violence perpetrated against them, as Sarah Deer has shown, violence that is both internal and external, the lat- ter at rates higher than it is for other groups of women (Deer 2015). Framing the violence of white men towards Indian women as ‘hate crime’, Cheryl Redhorse Ben- nett (2018) notes that there has been little attention paid to the specific space of the reservation border town as a place where you can “get away with anything” against Indians (24). Confirming this conclusion, Amnesty International (2007) has reported widespread police harassment, and shootings and young white men regularly target- ing Indigenous women in border towns. Although less reported and examined than it is in the Canadian Indigenous context, missing and murdered Indigenous women are also a phenomenon in the US. Alleen Brown (2018) describes the legal and political structures that inhibit investigations into Indigenous women who have disappeared. Farley et  al. (2011) reporting on sex trafficking and Native women, document the 9 1 3 Settler Colonialism, Policing and Racial Terror: The Police… tremendous violence that is aimed at Indigenous women in prostitution, a violence that Indigenous sex workers describe as specifically aimed at them as Indian women. Although Native Americans account for 25% of Winslow’s population, they averaged nearly 64% of arrests from 2012 to 2015, according to police filings (Newton 2017). Indigenous youth and women have a particular place in these statistics. If sexual violence from white men and police is not empirically vali- dated for Winslow specifically, the Navajo community expresses tremendous fear for its girls and women when they venture into Winslow. (Indeed, one unchari- table commentator at a Navajo public forum at which I was present even blamed Tsingine for having gone to live in Winslow in the first place, knowing what the town is like for young Indian women, while another speculated that Tsingine might have been one of the women the police routinely take outside of the city to rape). Although it is hard in these informal conversations to confirm sexual violence and to delineate the role of the police from internal sexual violence, it is clear, as Shannon Speed (2016) has argued, that internal violence within Indig- enous communities is linked to state violence in complex ways. Tsingine lived in Winslow and in that environment, she had a great deal of police contact, contact that sometimes occurred when she encountered sexual assaults from Indigenous and racialised men. Shipley, for example, was the police officer who responded to a call about domestic violence involving Tsingine, an event he claimed that he could not recall. He encountered a naked and evidently frightened Tsingine fleeing her abusive boyfriend, a man onlookers described as “Hispanic” (Rank Tribe 2017). Reading police reports of these events, one readily sees ongoing dis- placement and its consequences in Tsingine’s life, the role of sexual violence and both Indigenous and police involvement in it. The violence in her life that came from all directions, and the sheer difficulty of surviving and thriving in a system premised on her destruction is evident in her short life. Her descent into drugs, for instance, her attempts to get help for mental illness, the sexual violence from Indigenous men, and her previous contacts with police all reveal the outlines of a life lived amidst considerable violence. It is critical to consider the violence that is written on the Indigenous woman’s body as a multiscalar imprinting of colonial power. In her analysis of Linda Hogan’s novel Solar Storms, Mishuana Goeman (2017) emphasises that in order to under- stand the role of gender based violence in reproducing colonialism, it is essential that we consider the body as it journeys through temporalities and spaces. Hogan’s protagonists are women whose individual bodies are linked to the social body of the Native community and the national bodies of the United States, Canada and Que- bec. Thus extensive physical and sexual abuse at the hands of colonising men and the violence within their own communities that native women endure must be con- nected to the making of the settler collectivity, an unfolding of colonialism over time on land and on bodies. Interviewing Indigenous women asylum seekers in detention, Shannon Speed (2019) found confirmation that gang violence, drug violence, mili- tarisation and state violence were all inextricably linked to intra familial violence ensuring that Indigenous women were consistently more likely than any other group of women to be victims of gender violence. Reporting that the US National Institute of Justice confirms that four out of five Native women experience violence in their 10 S. H. Razack 1 3 lifetime and that 97% of these crimes are committed by non-Indians (Rosay 2018, cited in Speed 2019, 16), Speed emphasises we should not lose sight of the mutually constitutive nature of most gender violence. Domestic violence, for example, is in part generated by state violence (2019, 30). White men are an important link in the chain of events that culminate in excessive violence in the lives of Indigenous women. The asymmetrical intimacies of the bor- der town reveal that what we know as the excessive use of force by police towards Indigenous peoples is a daily gendered enactment of colonial power on the part of white men. The police files detailing Shipley’s encounters with Indians, record the traces of the fear, memory and desire to which Bergland refers when she describes the colonial subject attempting to bury what cannot be buried. An organised and continuing dispossession unfolds in everyday and institutional extractive relation- ships between white men and women, and Indians, a dispossession in which polic- ing has a central role to play. Institutionally sustained and integral to the extractive economy and spatial arrangements of settler colonialism, Shipley’s use of force is important to the circuit of ongoing dispossession, assuaging colonial fears and anxi- eties, and, simultaneously, consolidating dispossession. Part Two The Official Story: Imperiled White Masculinity The colonial underpinnings of Shipley’s encounter with Loreal Tsingine are visible from the outset. If Tsingine arrived at the encounter already scripted as “an Indian on a beer run,” (Jacobs 2014b, 118) Shipley came to it as a white man drawn to guns and to Indians. He enters the scene as a prototypical Indian fighter at risk from a wild Indian. At first glance, it is tempting to attribute Shipley’s relationship to Indi- ans to white extremism. Photographed at an earlier event wearing a t-shirt of the Three Percenters, a movement organised around patriotism and the idea of a consti- tutional right to bear arms, Shipley can be seen as someone whose allegiances are to what Kathleen Belew (2018) has described as the white power movement and paramilitary America. Belew is careful to note the expansive and contradictory cat- egory denoted by the term white power movement, a movement that brings together “members of the Klan, militias, radical tax resisters, white supremacists, neo-Nazis, and proponents of white theologies such as Christian identity, Odinism, and Dualism between 1975 and 1995” (2018, ix). She advises that not all members of this group advocate white nationalism and cannot be easily pinned to the right of the political spectrum. Importantly, Shipley, as an insightful reviewer of this article pointed out, does not have to be a member of white nationalist/right wing groups in order to fulfil the colonial role I am suggesting he plays. His allegiance to the Three Percenters merely confirms the colonial features of his character. One has only to reflect on the historical origins of the right to bear arms and the concomitant movement against big government to note the colonial underpinnings of such beliefs. As Dunbar-Ortiz (2018) has shown, the right to bear arms gave settlers the right to attack Indians and take their land. Settler insistence on the right to overthrow oppressive governments 11 1 3 Settler Colonialism, Policing and Racial Terror: The Police… grew out of settler resistance to British authorities who sought to regulate the extent to which settlers could seize Indian land. The Three Percent movement insists that it is neither a militia nor white supremacist, merely nationalist. Yet, critics have pointed out that heavily armed three percenters have actively tried to infiltrate the US military and have provided armed security to white supremacist groups at ral- lies, including at the 2017 Charlottesville rally of white supremacist groups in which an anti-racist protester was killed. Although the group subsequently distanced itself from the rally and from related events, local affiliates are known to be involved in mosque bombings and other violent racial incidents (Sankin and Carless 2018). The Three Percenters have declared themselves solidly in favour of Donald Trump, and particularly so in the matter of stricter immigration controls and the building of a wall  along the Mexico-US border. A land/race/arms nexus lies at the core of their white nationalism and there is little doubt that Shipley found himself comfortable with its chief tenets. If Shipley’s affiliations announce his white supremacist lean- ings, it is also the case that his devotion to guns and his political position concern- ing protecting white America are foundational ideas in a settler society born of the dispossession of Indigenous populations. It is difficult to untangle the white extrem- ist and white nationalist from an ordinary patriot and equally, to separate extrem- ist anxieties and anger from the resentment that emanates from an ordinary white entitlement. Indeed, as Inderpal Grewal has argued in her discussion of mass shoot- ings in America “the angry, white, Christian man who sees himself as dispossessed from his rightful place of power in the nation and exerting the sovereignty given to him by virtue of his gender and race,” is now so familiar a figure that when mass murders occur, the killer is simply called a shooter, and not a killer, murderer or criminal (Grewal 2017, 185). Shipley, then, would seem to personify the unexcep- tional white subject for whom the Indian remains the archetype of all those (Black people, Brown people and racialised foreigners) who are imagined and experienced as a threat to white settler entitlement. Rather than extremist, the Indian fighter and the Indian fighter turned cop should be seen as foundational figures in the national imaginary, inhabiting and structuring the institution of policing among other places. Shipley’s record as a police officer offers glimpses of frustrated colonial desire and the violence it inspires, the figure Richard Slotkin describes as the subject for whom Indians lurk everywhere in society and in the recesses of one’s own mind (Slotkin 1973, 564). Here one thinks of Shipley’s service record, revealing his interest, if not obsession, in expressing power over Indigenous people, and Indig- enous youth and girls in particular, groups that often refused to grant his author- ity. Equipped with extra guns, an illegal practice for which he was not sanctioned, Shipley could indulge himself with impunity in a twenty-first century version of Indian wars. Struggling to maintain his own coherence as colonial subject, fend- ing off any intimacies that threaten colonial arrangements, Shipley can be seen to preserve coherence through violence. In his three years as a police officer, Ship- ley’s service record hints at a volatility that easily led to an undue use of force par- ticularly directed at young Indigenous people in whom he seemed to have inspired neither fear nor respect, responses that appear to have enraged him. As journalists reported, Shipley was first disciplined when the mother of a 15-year-old girl, com- plained that Shipley “slammed her daughter against a squad car and made a ‘rude, 12 S. H. Razack 1 3 ugly comment…’” (Farzan 2017). The girl apparently taunted Shipley by referring to him as a rookie. Shipley acknowledged responding harshly and was suspended, but the Department did not find evidence of excessive force. In another event, Ship- ley used a taser on a teenage girl, arguing that he felt threatened by her friends, and that she possibly had a weapon. The girl in question refused to obey his order to sit on the curb. Finding no evidence of a weapon in the video taken by the police body  camera Shipley wore, and no evidence that the group in question behaved in an aggressive or hostile manner, the Department gave Shipley a one-day suspension. In this encounter recorded on the body camera, the youth in question can be heard calmly intervening on behalf of the young woman, one man admonishing Shipley, “Dude, she’s a girl” (Farzan 2017). To place this imperiled whiteness and masculinity within a more collective con- text, we can consider what daily policing entails in Winslow, the relentless cycle of evicting Indigenous people from the town, and the making of white settler mas- culinity (and femininity) through these practices. If Shipley’s service record offers evidence that he was a haunted man, an aggressive police officer who was easily provoked and who had a particular interest in asserting his power over Indians, and young Indian women in particular, it also confirms that his violence was sanctioned. Shipley’s record of multiple incidents of use of force against Indians did not overly trouble the police department, inviting only minor rebukes. In 12 other instances Shipley was found to have used force on suspects, (including tasering an Indige- nous man waiting on a hospital trolley for medical treatment) actions for which he faced few consequences. He was, however, required to complete diversity training, presumably because all these use of force incidents involved Indians (Jeong 2016). When the violence finally ended in the loss of life, the Department offered its assis- tance in constructing the legal basis for his exoneration. For example, Shipley car- ried extra, unauthorised guns in his car. The matter of his authorisation to carry the guns was quickly dispensed with during the investigation of Tsingine’s death. Ser- geant Tolliver could not remember authorising any training in the use of these weap- ons but then later claimed he could have forgotten. Tellingly, Shipley’s personnel records begin with the fact that a supervisor recommended that he not be hired on the grounds that he was emotionally volatile and used force inappropriately. He was nevertheless hired and remained on the force in spite of this history. Protected to the end, in spite of documented irregularities, it should also be noted that it was Ship- ley’s superior officer, Sergeant Cano, who advised him not to bother with bandages for Tsingine and who backed up his story about a justified use of force. It is also his police Chief who advised him “don’t say anything” immediately after the shooting (Arizona Dept. of Public Safety 2016). Finally, it was the Department of Justice that refused to investigate the Winslow Police. The Encounter and the Incident Review An aggrieved, anxiety ridden and colonial subject confronting an imagined ‘wild Indian’ is the narrative that gives coherence to Shipley’s shooting of Tsingine. Its intrinsic racial logic is evident both in Shipley’s behaviour at the scene and in the 13 1 3 Settler Colonialism, Policing and Racial Terror: The Police… account he gives during the interrogation where, with assistance from the police themselves, it becomes the story of record. The story rests on the idea that Shipley is a man guided by rational aims, acting professionally to confront a threat, manifest or latent in any Indian who crosses his path. The visual record of the shooting avail- able from Shipley’s body camera is enlisted to give substance to the story of fear and threat. The manner in which this occurs during the investigation of Shipley’s actions reveals the structuring role of racial logic and offers hints of the racial fantasy and racial feelings that marked the encounter. It was a mere 22 seconds from the time Officer Shipley made contact with Loreal Tsingine to the time he fired his gun five times and killed her. Police typically defend shootings with recourse to a codified narrative about use of force, one that typically invokes the phrases ‘edged weapons’ and ‘the 21 foot rule’, and a newly emerging discourse about ‘persons in mental health crisis’ in formulaic ways that frame the victim as a threat (emanating from the irrational behaviour of a mentally ill person), a threat that only deadly force could contain (Racial Violence Hub 2020). Scholars have noted the importance of race to the police narrative of containing deadly force through violence. For instance, the iconic moment when, twenty-five years ago the beating of Rodney King by ten police officers was captured on a bystander’s video of the event, the Los Angeles police defended their actions as necessary to contain the threat that King posed. Addressing the problem of how King came to be seen on the videotape as the agent rather than the victim of violence, Judith Butler (1993) describes the visual field itself as a racial formation or episteme (as Fanon first argued) in which white paranoia transforms King’s blows into the “blows he never delivered, but which he is, by virtue of his blackness, always about to deliver” (19). In his analysis of the video of the King beating, Feldman (1994) adds that increas- ing objectification increases our capacity to inflict pain and, crucially, to render the Other’s pain as inadmissible. To achieve the transformation “where King’s body could be processed as a racial, a disciplinary, and a legal object,” his body had to be rendered pre-social. The police were merely taming and caging King, achieving “the neutering of the animalized body” (211). King is rendered bestial to the point that he could not feel. The police reenact their violence in court, performing King’s body as a spectrum of aggressive movements. It is easy to spot the police coding schemes that Butler and Feldman identify with respect to the beating of Rodney King, in the police narration of the video- tape of the shooting of Loreal Tsingine. The 22  seconds that elapses between the time Shipley first encounters Tsingine and when he fires five bullets is narrated sec- ond by second and each second becomes an event that conveys professional action on the part of the police. Police language assists with this endeavour. Twenty-two seconds stretch much longer and it is easy to forget that such an abbreviated time span cannot contain the reasoned, professional practices itemised by the police. The police’s narration begins with the note that the first thirty seconds of the recorded film contain no audio. Audio begins at the 30 second mark, a scant 8 seconds after the shooting has occurred. The Incident Review offers this fact in the passive voice, “At approximatively thirty seconds, the audio was turned on,” (Jacobs 2014c, 20) and we are not directed to the fact that Officer Shipley himself had to turn it on before it changed from buffering mode to event mode when audio begins, as the 14 S. H. Razack 1 3 User Manual instructs (TASER International 2014). The first ‘event’ of the shooting is of Shipley exiting his vehicle and approaching Tsingine who was walking on the sidewalk. The writer of the Review, Officer Aaron Jacobs, volunteers the following information: “Tsingine appeared to be a Native American female with black hair” (Jacobs 2014c, 17)  - a racial categorisation that comes easily given that the police radio announced that the suspect was a Native American who “did a beer run” (Jacobs 2014a, 24). At the four second mark, Shipley is described as having reached Tsingine’s left side, and at the five second mark, he has moved to her back. At six seconds, he is described as attempting to gain control and by the ten second mark, Shipley has grabbed her collar and hood and pulled Loreal to the ground, standing over her by the 12  second mark. She spends the next three seconds, at the 15  sec- ond mark, attempting to stand and the Review notes that a “pair of silver scissors” is then visible (Jacobs 2014b, 121). At the 13  second mark, Officer Cano’s patrol SUV enters the frame. At 17  seconds, the Review records that “a plastic bag was visible in Tsingine’s right hand” (Jacobs 2014c, 18). Imputing motive and purpose to Shipley, the report notes: “Shipley pushed Tsingine away in an easterly direc- tion in an attempt to create distance from her” ([Jacobs 2014c,  18), an action that resulted in items falling from her purse including the pill bottles that would later be used to emphasise her problems with mental illness. At 18 seconds, the Report notes that Tsingine got up and began walking toward Shipley. At 19 seconds, he draws his handgun. Cano has arrived at this point and was nearly directly behind Tsingine by a few feet. He is described as walking faster at this point. Shipley is described as walking backwards while Tsingine is described as “lunging” at him when he fires his weapon three times at the 22 second mark (Jacobs 2014c, 19). The video cannot easily confirm these descriptions of movement but the narration slows down a story frame by frame about a menacing, advancing threat that two police officers cannot contain except through shooting. Even after she is shot five times, Tsingine continues to be described as advancing threat. As in the King video, where small movements are enlisted to tell a story of overwhelming threat, Tsingine is described as active and as “holding her body off the ground with her right hand, while her left hand was draped over her body,” a position she holds for two seconds (Jacobs 2014c, 19). The narration isolates each actor in the frame and the two seconds, from the 25 second point to the 27 second  point is broken down by actor so that we have a sense that a great deal is going on: At approximately twenty-seven seconds, Cano was still talking on the radio, and Tsingine still held her body up. Shipley’s weapon was still trained on Tsingine. Shipley could be seen removing his left hand from his weapon, and appeared to be bringing it back to the TASER camera “on” switch. (Jacobs 2014c, 20, emphasis added) Rendered as a force that will not stop coming, even after five bullets, perhaps even a supernatural force, Tsingine remains the aggressor from whom Shipley is defending himself by moving backwards and even attempting to taser (something the evidence does not support). If Tsingine’s hand rises after she is shot, and she remains for an uncanny amount of time as someone who “still held her body up” (Jacobs 2014c, 20), this is not narrated as the involuntary movements that are the 15 1 3 Settler Colonialism, Policing and Racial Terror: The Police… response of someone suffering, someone who has been shot multiple times. It is, instead, a threat subsiding. If, as Butler argued with respect to Rodney King, the raising of his hand after suffering numerous blows was read as evidence that King was in control, it is the brutality that King was said to embody that transforms him into the author of his own misfortune. Rodney King, Butler (1993) suggests becomes in this moment “reduced to a phantasm of white racist aggression,” his body at once the site upon which white racist violence disavows itself and the place where desire is similarly disavowed through violence (20). Colonialism, Meyda Yegenoglu (1998) reminds us, is structured by unconscious, sexualised processes where fantasy and desire play a fundamental role. The colonial subject is constituted through an encounter with the racial/cultural Other, becoming through an active denial of the Other’s difference but nonetheless disturbed and haunted by masculine dreams of possession. Tsingine’s body is reduced to a phantasm and the desire that circulates and is disavowed, an amalgam of desiring and imperiled white masculinity, is appar- ent in Shipley’s own narrative below. “I Felt a Fear and a Threat” Feeling both the fear that Tsingine refuses to recognise him as authority and the threat that is a projection of his own fear, Shipley narrates himself in the police inter- view as a professional confronted by a wild Indian, a thread enabled by the ques- tions that are asked and those that are not asked by his interviewers (Jacobs 2014d). As above, in the official narration of the video, equipped with the stock arsenal of the 21-foot rule and related police concepts, Shipley presents himself, and is pre- sented, as the police professional who utilised everything he had been taught about how to confront an overwhelming threat. The narrative is based on what Shipley is feeling, the feeling offering the basis on which we understand what he is doing. As the story of Shipley’s feelings, it is always defensible, and made more so by the historical storyline about the irrational savage, maddened with fury, and assaulting the white man. Its gendered dimensions are apparent in the sense that Tsingine does not belong to the feminine gender in the narrative. She is not a petite young woman in a ponytail but rather a near unstoppable force of nature, a force only bullets can contain. As in the incident review, the narrative force of the interview derives from the presentation of Shipley’s professional behaviour, and Tsingine’s irrationality. As the video recorded, it took four seconds for Shipley to reach Tsingine once he parked his car and yelled “Police. Stop!” (Jacobs 2014d, 5) In six more seconds, he has posi- tioned Tsingine on the ground, an action that one witness described as “slamming her to the ground” but which Shipley describes as a series of professional actions: “I gave verbal commands;” (Jacobs 2014d, 5) “I tried to put her arms behind her back; I tried to get her on her stomach; I used the ‘soft holds’ technique and did not apply my full force because I didn’t want to hurt her” (Jacobs 2014d, 13). As the sec- onds go by in slow motion, the next ten seconds also entail a series of professional 16 S. H. Razack 1 3 calculations. Shipley, for instance describes that he kept the 21-foot rule in mind when he assessed the level of threat. The situation is nevertheless so tense that he develops “tunnel vision” (Jacobs 2014d, 2)2 and is not sure of where his partner is, his eyes focused on the threat in front of him. Solicitous of their interviewee, espe- cially when he appears early on to be overcome with emotion, and sharing the same bank of professional knowledge, the police appear to bond over the shared language of edged weapons and the 21-foot rule. There can be no other role for Tsingine but that of an out of control, irrational threat and Shipley’s account is shaped by a careful and judicious sprinkling of adjectives to describe Tsingine’s state of mind. Tsingine is in his view “actively resisting;” “making furtive movements”; “aggressively walking” (Jacobs 2014d, 6). Her demeanor is “blank” and she is silent (Jacobs 2014d, 9). Recalling her “blank” demeanor, Shipley remembers the prescription pill bottles falling out of her purse and we and the interviewers are left to connect the dots, lines that will explain Tsingine’s irrationality as due to mental illness. Impressing upon the interviewers Tsingine’s aggression and instability, Shipley recalls his own state of mind at the time: “What the hell, why is this lady resisting?” “Why did this have to happen? Why does this woman have scissors? Why was she trying to kill me?” (Jacobs 2014d, 12) Tsingine’s behaviour was incomprehensible, Shipley concludes, especially when he considered that this was only a misdemeanour crime (Jacobs 2014d, 12). She com- mitted aggravated assault on a police officer, he concludes, and apparently for no reason. In the end, all he could have wished for, was that he didn’t come to work that day. Tsingine’s body, converted into threat and disposed of, generates Shipley, the police professional confronted with crazed and unruly Indians on a regular basis, people doing a beer run. Apparently traumatised by the encounter, it is Shipley, his narrative insists, for whom we should feel sorry. As with King, imagined, in Feld- man’s (1994) words as a “resistant body without senses and without corresponding judgment” (213). Tsingine is narrated as an animalised body that feels no pain, a body that holds within it an intrinsic violence created by alcohol. What gives the story its appeal, as Feldman memorably observed with respect to King, is “unfin- ished history as mise-en-scene” (1994, 209). We might consider, then, the unfin- ished history in which Shipley, a white man and a police officer, and Tsingine, a Navajo woman, both feature, the ongoing extractive regimes and the racial terror on which they depend, and the colonial subjects whose anxieties are assuaged, and who regenerate, through violence. 2 Police narratives frequently mention tunnel vision which suggests that it is a concept that police learn in training. See: Force Science Institute, “New Findings Expand Understanding of Tunnel Vision, Audi- tory Blocking and Lag Time,” Police One, Aug 1, 2005. https ://www.polic eone.com/offic er-shoot ings/ artic les/12470 87-New-findi ngs-expan d-under stand ing-of-tunne l-visio n-audit ory-block ing-and-lag-time/ See also, David Montero, “’Why Am I Going to Die Today?’: The Words of First Responders to Deadly Las Vegas Shooting,” Los Angeles Times, May 25, 2018. https ://www.latim es.com/natio n/la-na-vegas -polic e-shoot ing-2018-story .html. https://www.policeone.com/officer-shootings/articles/1247087-New-findings-expand-understanding-of-tunnel-vision-auditory-blocking-and-lag-time/ https://www.policeone.com/officer-shootings/articles/1247087-New-findings-expand-understanding-of-tunnel-vision-auditory-blocking-and-lag-time/ https://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-vegas-police-shooting-2018-story.html https://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-vegas-police-shooting-2018-story.html 17 1 3 Settler Colonialism, Policing and Racial Terror: The Police… Conclusion Colin Dayan (2011) has powerfully argued that white vulnerability to Black sav- agery is a baseline narrative in the law, whether with respect to police shootings or to cruel and unusual punishment. This is also the narrative that fuels gun culture and that gave rise to the second amendment’s right to bear arms (Dunbar-Ortiz 2018). Commenting on Dayan’s (2011) book The Law is a White Dog, discussing the legal rituals that transform prisoners into “unpersons” against whom all force is justi- fied, Angela Davis observes that the logic of prisoners as less than human shows us “how the ghosts of slavery animate institutions” (cited in Dayan 2011, back cover). If we see the afterlives of slavery in prisons and in police shootings, both in their frequency and in police impunity, how might we understand the police shooting of a young Navajo woman and the legal narratives that justify it? Although it is cer- tain that a justice system that is organised around the disposability of Black bodies sweeps up in its ambit all racialised persons, when the target is a young, Navajo woman, it is necessary to consider what settler colonialism has to do with the vio- lence Shipley enacted and the legal and social approval of it. Settler colonialism is an ongoing project that preserves intact its colonial, spatial and legal structures. Dispossession continues apace with extraction as the engine that drives the racial project of accumulation. We can expect, then, that both the ghost of slavery and the ghost of settler colonialism animate institutions such as prisons and policing. I have argued that, with its emphasis on extraction, a white settler society targets Indigenous land and Indigenous people. In this regard, police shootings of Indig- enous people and the legal response to police use of force (along with everyday set- tler violence) are a part of the racial terror that is a central part of settler colonial- ism. As an ongoing racial project of accumulation, settler colonialism requires the enforcement of colonial lines of force. This is abundantly in evidence in the reser- vation border town where policing entails the eviction of the native from the set- tler town, a perpetual drawing of the lines of power between settlers and natives. The settler imagines himself or herself threatened at every turn by the native and obliged to use extreme force. A circulating colonial affect, threat narratives produce embattled colonisers who feel a fear and a threat and who do what they have to do, as Shipley did when he shot Loreal Tsingine. In the settler’s psyche as in the streets of the border town, wild Indians are everywhere and can only be controlled through force. There is plenty to indicate that Officer Shipley undertook his daily duties within such a colonial imaginary. As Slotkin (1973) has shown, the Indian fighter remains a central figure in American national mythology, requiring settlers to bear arms and to defend white property through violence. As Indian fighter turned cop, Shipley is able to count on institutional support for his activities; indeed, Indian fighting is his job. The story in police shootings of “I did what I had to do” and “I felt a fear and a threat” (Jacobs 2014b, 24–25), official statements made by Officer Shipley in referring to his shooting of Loreal Tsingine is one that is powered by race, dependent as it is on the idea that Indians always pose a threat to the settler, a threat that only considerable force can dissolve. Scripting himself as imperiled, 18 S. H. Razack 1 3 and sustained institutionally for doing what he had to do in the wake of such a racial threat, Shipley can exercise force against Tsingine with impunity. The last word to Loreal Tsingine: Indigenous Refusal In the 22 seconds of the police encounter captured on the police body camera, one of the first things I imagine I see in Tsingine’s face is fear. The last thing I think I see of her is defiance. Perhaps even the blank stare Shipley describes is evidence of this defiance. Initially walking away from Shipley, who pursues her and throws her to the pavement, she stands up and walks towards him, apparent determination in her stride. I think of this moment as one that shares the sentiment of the hashtag #Iftheygunmedownwhichpicturewouldtheyuse (Stampler 2014). The inevitability of the moment, the end that those who are racially targeted anticipate, finally comes. Is this refusal, a final bringing to an end of a life of endless confrontation, a defiant inhabiting of the category of disposable? Even as I imagine refusal, I think about my own stakes in the story. The sources I mine for the police narratives discussed here do not easily give up insights either into Loreal Tsingine’s humanity or her suffer- ing. They do, however, reveal the contours of a colonial encounter, one structured by violence and terror. Yet I betray her if I don’t find ways to resurrect the person who was killed, the person who struggled with racial terror and who may have found this last moment to confront it. Constructed by the police as animalistic threat who rises up after five bullets to confront a police officer seeking to apprehend her, I want to re-write this narrative, leaving an image not of superhuman aggression but of an insistence on being recognised and perhaps a taunt and despair: I am (still here). 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Wastelanding: Legacies of Uranium in Navajo Country. Minneapolis: Uni- versity of Minnesota Press. What is the Three Percenters? n.d. The Three Percenters—Original. https ://www.theth reepe rcent ers.org/ about -us. Accessed 11 Mar 2020. Woodard, Stephanie. 2016. The Police killings No one is Talking About: A Special Investigation. In These Times, October 17. http://inthe setim es.com/featu res/nativ e_ameri can_polic e_killi ngs_nativ e_lives _matte r.html. Accessed 11 Mar 2020. Yazzie, Melanie K. 2014. Brutal Violence in Border Towns Linked to Colonization. Indian Country Today, August 22. https ://www.india nz.com/News/2014/08/22/melan ie-yazzi e-borde r-town-vio.asp. Accessed 11 Mar 2020. Yegenoglu, Meyda. 1998. Colonial Fantasies: Towards a Feminist Reading of Orientalism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Publisher’s Note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. http://www.akh99.com/2017/08/17/a-navajo-womans-death-highlights-increase-of-police-violence-against-native-americans/ http://www.akh99.com/2017/08/17/a-navajo-womans-death-highlights-increase-of-police-violence-against-native-americans/ https://www.revealnews.org/blog/hate-report-get-to-know-the-three-percenters/ https://time.com/3100975/iftheygunnedmedown-ferguson-missouri-michael-brown/ https://fccid.io/X4G-S00146/Users-Manual/Users-Manual-3252977 https://fccid.io/X4G-S00146/Users-Manual/Users-Manual-3252977 https://www.thethreepercenters.org/about-us https://www.thethreepercenters.org/about-us http://inthesetimes.com/features/native_american_police_killings_native_lives_matter.html http://inthesetimes.com/features/native_american_police_killings_native_lives_matter.html https://www.indianz.com/News/2014/08/22/melanie-yazzie-border-town-vio.asp Settler Colonialism, Policing and Racial Terror: The Police Shooting of Loreal Tsingine Abstract Part One Policing as Indian Fighting The Border Town: A Place Where You Can “Get Away With Anything” Against Indians Part Two The Official Story: Imperiled White Masculinity The Encounter and the Incident Review “I Felt a Fear and a Threat” Conclusion The last word to Loreal Tsingine: Indigenous Refusal Acknowledgements References 
work_jdakrfahzrhx3pa6hjjlnqrmti	----	331 прегледни научни рад UDK: 343.6:177.82(497.11) 177.82 343.971 Рад примљен: 10.10.2019. Рад прихваћен: 11.12.2019. 10.5937/zrpfn0-23537 * zdravko.grujic@pr.ac.rs ** Рад је саопштен на међународној научној конференцији „Право и мултидисци- плинарност”, која је одржана 12. и 13. априла 2019. године на Правном факултету Универзитета у Нишу. Др Здравко В. Грујић,* Доцент Правног факултета, Универзитет у Приштини са привременим седиштем у Кoc. Митровици ЗЛОЧИНИ МРЖЊЕ КАО СПЕЦИФИЧАН ОБЛИК КРИМИНАЛНОГ ПОНАШАЊА** Апстракт: Мржња представља специфичан мотив за вршење кривичних дела. Поред злочина који се врше из мржње извршиоца према индивидуализираној жртви (са којом постоји претходни однос из којег се развила негативна емоција − мржња), историја нам указује на бројне примере прогањања, нападања, угрожавања или уништавања усмерених ка жртвама због њихове, стварне или претпостављене, припадности одређеној раси, националном или етничком пореклу, религији или другом својству групе (колективитета). Предрасуда извршиоца о припадности жртве одређеној групи и мржња према том колективитету, агресија, бруталност и насиље, напади на живот, физички интегритет и имовину жртава, стварање осећаја несигурности, представљају само неке од карактеристика овог посебног облика криминалног понашања – злочина мржње. Појам „злочини мржње” појављује се половином 80-их година XX века у САД, након чега започињу емпиријска истраживања феномена и покушаји да се пронађу делотворни механизми кривичноправног реаговања. Овај рад посвећен је критичкој анализи проблема појмовног одређења злочина мржње, феноменолошком аспекту, типологији извршилаца, жртвама и виктимизираним групама и другим специфичностима овог облика криминалног понашања, као и представљању кривичноправних начина реаговања на ове злочине у кривичном законодавству Републике Србије. Кључне речи: злочини мржње, жртве злочина мржње, отежавајућа околност. Зборник радова Правног факултета у Нишу | Број 85 | Година LVIII | 2019 332 1. Увод Мржња представља специфичан мотив за вршење кривичних дела и, посматрајући ретроспективно, преовлађујућу детерминанту у генези најтежих масовних злочина извршених у историји људске цивилизације. Прогони припадника новоосноване хришћанске религије у Римском царству, крсташки походи, поступање инквизиције према јеретицима, злочини према домородачком становништву приликом процеса колонизације, злочини извршени током светских ратова, апартхејд или геноцид, представљају само неке од историјских примера злочина извршених из мржње према „другим” (или другачијим) појединцима или колективитетима. Мржња је, како се истиче у литератури, „антрополошка грешка – врста афективне померености, или поремећај „афективне равнотеже”. Сатанизација другога, који се доживљава као непријатељ, као странац, представља увод у заједнички предмет мржње, у аверзију према колективној „другости”, у колективну мржњу (Милашиновић, Симеуновић Патић, 2010: 390). Колективна мржња извршилаца према припадницима група које су виктимизиране и предрасуде према њима, истовремено, у социолошком и културолошком смислу, представљају изговор и оправдање за њихово поступање и вршење злочина. Неспорно је да је монструозност злочина и масовност жртава обележила читав XX век, као што је и чињеница да је у том временском оквиру ток догађаја пресудно утицао на промену свести целокупног човечанства и стварање предуслова за развој кривичноправних механизама заштите од колективних злочина извршених из мржње и предрасуде према другачијим колективитетима. Савремена кривична законодавства (као и међународни кривичноправни извори) данас пружају заштиту припадницима одређених група чија сигурност може бити угрожена вршењем масовних злочина. Тим инкриминацијама штите се човечност и основна људска добра заштићена међународним правом, као што су живот, телесни интегритет, слобода, част, углед, достојанство и имовина припадника одређених колективитета. С друге стране, мржња је, свакако, мотив извршења традиционалних кривичних дела према појединачној жртви (са којом извршилац има претходни однос). Извршење таквих злочина карактерише насиље и агресивност извршиоца, детерминисано и консеквентно степену мржње према жртви. Кривичноправна релевантност мржње као мотива у извршењу кривичног дела је многострука и значајна – утврђује се не само З. Грујић | стр. 331-349 333 у поступку откривања и доказивања дела, и утврђивања степена кривице учиниоца, већ и у поступку изрицања казне, као околност коју суд посебно оцењује приликом одмеравања казне. Савремена искуства и емпиријска истраживања потврђују да постоје кривична дела која се врше из мржње и предрасуде учиниоца према припадницима одређених група или колективитета, као и да и у развијеним друштвима постоје групе (колективитети) које су посебно угрожене и вулнерабилне.1 Припадност жртве колективитету може бити стварна или претпостављена, али су предрасуде и мржња извршиоца према том колективитету кључни мотив извршења. У питању су дела насилничког карактера усмерена на живот, физички интегритет, сигурност, слободу или имовину припадника виктимизиране групе. Злочини мржње, најчешће, нису плод ранијег познанства или везе између извршиоца и жртве – напротив, они су пример онога што се у криминологији назива stranger danger (Павловић, 2008: 857). Иако би се кривична дела мотивисана мржњом извршиоца према одређеном колективитету могла проучавати као део насилничког криминалитета, јер по свом основном садржају то и јесу, постоји читав низ особености ове врсте криминалног понашања због чега сматрамо да се оно мора посматрати као посебан, специфичан, облик криминалитета.2 То су, пре свега: 1. висок степен друштвене опасности ових дела; 2. колективна виктимизираност припадника групе и стварање климе опште несигурности; 3. деперсонализација жртве; 4. стварна или претпостављена припадност жртве одређеној групи; 5. мржња као мотив извршења; 6. предрасуде извршиоца према одређеном колективитету; 7. насилнички карактер дела, агресивност и деструктивност; 8. дискриминација припадника одређене групе и успостављање односа „ми и они”; 9. лично својство жртве као заједничка карактеристика групе; 10. постојање стереотипа о припадницима одређених група и креирање модела „културе мржње”; и 11. висока тамна бројка криминалитета. 1 У питању су нпр. народи или мањинске етничке заједнице на територији насељеној већинским народом, мањинске верске заједнице у окружењу доминантне религије (нпр. хришћани у муслиманским државама, припадници исламске вероисповести у „државама запада”), припадници мањинске расе, припадници мањинских сексуалних група, као и других „специфичних” колективитета у друштвеној заједници, према којима се врше злочини мотивисани мржњом и предрасудама. 2 У литератури, свакако, постоје и супротни ставови о томе да је потребно посебно издвајати и истраживати злочине мржње због потенцијалних негативних консеквенци таквог приступа (нпр. урушавање принципа једнакости грађана пред законом; поспешивање сукоба друштвених група; утицај на успостављање заштите одређеним колективитетима, диференцијација друштвених колективитета, и др.). Зборник радова Правног факултета у Нишу | Број 85 | Година LVIII | 2019 334 Циљ овог рада је да укаже на ове и друге специфичности феномена злочина мржње, као аргументе да се ради о посебном облику криминалитета и које нам могу послужити и за дистинкцију у односу на насилнички и друге облике криминалитета. У том контексту, неопходно је осврнути се на проблем појмовног одређења злочина мржње, указати на феноменолошки аспект проблема и типологију извршилаца. На крају рада биће представљени и модалитети кривичноправног реаговања на злочине мржње, уз указивање на пионирске кораке у савременој судској пракси у Републици Србији. 2. Дефинисање појма злочини мржње У литератури се појављује мноштво дефиниција злочина мржње од којих нити једна „не оспорава да су у питању злочини мотивисани предрасудама” (Ковачевић, 2009: 93), али које се разликују у односу на почетни приступ у дефинисању овог феномена. Социолошке дефиниције, нпр., полазе од савременог друштвеног контекста и описују шири аспект феномена злочина мржње. Тако Bowling указује да злочине мржње не треба посматрати као догађај већ „као друштвени процес који се никад не дешава у друштвеном вакууму” и да је за њихово разумевање битно схватити историјски и друштвени контекст односа између супротстављених заједница, посебно процесе физичког насиља, претњи, застрашивања и систематске виктимизације (Bowling, 1993: 238, према: Лалић, 2013: 21), док Sheffield сматра да злочини мржње „не представљају изоловане инциденте него последицу политичке културе која додељује права, привилегије и друштвени углед на основу биолошких или друштвених карактеристика”, и посебно истиче „значај дубоко укорењене хијерархије идентитета као основе за злочине мржње” (Shefild, 1995: 438, према: Лалић, 21). У објашњењу узрока проблема појмовног одређења, у литератури се наводи да је „за разлику од других облика криминалитета – попут организованог, криминалитета белог оковратника, криминалитета насиља, насиља у породици и слично – који су прво теоријски дефинисани у криминологији, а након тога нормативно операционализовани у кривичном праву, код злочина мржње овај процес је ишао обрнуто. Прво су законодавци у САД и Великој Британији, реагујући на тешке злочине ове врсте, који су довели до озбиљних друштвених напетости, увели категорију злочина мржње у кривично право и правосудну праксу, да би, након тога, криминолози приступили научном уобличавању овог појма. Таква пракса довела је до низа дилема и непрецизности у дефинисању појма злочина мржње (Игњатовић, 2005: 4).” З. Грујић | стр. 331-349 335 Наиме, термин злочини мржње настао је у САД половином 80-их година прошлог века како би се њиме објаснила серија инцидената извршених против лица јеврејског и азијатског и афроамеричког порекла, и, убрзо, као такав, почео да се користи у политичком речнику и масовним медијима, затим и у правној и криминолошкој доктрини и истраживањима.3 Прецизније, амерички конгрес је 1985. године усвојио закон који је утврдио обавезу вођења статистичких евиденција о злочинима који су мотивисани расним, верским и етничким предрасудама и мржњом извршиоца према жртви,4 док је пет година касније усвојен закон о превенцији ових злочина.5 Конгрес је 1993. године усвојио закон којим се прописује строже кажњавање учинилаца дела злочина мржње,6 и тиме заокружио систем кривичноправног реаговања на овај облик криминалитета у САД на федералном нивоу. У Енглеској и Велсу је од 1998. године могуће строже кажњавање учинилаца уколико се утврди да кривично дело представља злочин мржње, расне или верске,7 односно по основу предрасуда према инвалидности и сексуалној оријентацији жртве.8 Злочини мржње убрзо постају предмет легислативног регулисања у упоредном законодавству, а термин (преведен на националне језике) постаје готово општеприхваћен. 3 Поред термина злочини мржње, као синоним се користи и термин злочини из мржње. Упоредо се за злочине мржње користе и термини злочин мотивисан предрасудама или злочин из предрасуда – bias motivated crimes, bias crimes. И ови термини се могу сматрати синонимима, имајући у виду да злочине мржње карактеришу мржња и предрасуда извршиоца према појединцу као, стварном или претпостављеном, припаднику одређеног колективитета. 4 H. R. 2455 — 99th Congress: Hate Crime Statistics Act.” www.GovTrack.us. 1985. https:// www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/99/hr2455, (21. 09. 2019); И пре усвајања закона на федералном нивоу било је држава које су законски уредиле питања која се односе на откривање и спречавање злочина мржње. У Калифорнији је закон усвојен 1978. године, а у државама Вашингтон и Орегон три године касније − 1981. године. 5 Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act. Више о томе: https:// w w w.justice.gov/crt/ mat thew-shepard-and-james-byrd-jr-hate-crimes-prevention- act-2009-0, (21. 09. 2019); Законом се предвиђа надлежност у поступању према овим кривичним делима и у случајевима предрасуда и мржње у односу на инвалидитет и сексуално опредељење жртве (од измена и допуна закона из 2009. године и на род и полни идентитет жртава). 6 H. R. 1152 (103rd): Hate Crimes Sentencing Enhancement Act of 1993. 7 Crime and Disorder Act (1998), https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/e15559/pdf/, (21. 09. 2019); 8 Criminal Justice Act (2003). http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2003/44/pdfs/ ukpga_20030044_en.pdf, (21. 09. 2019); Зборник радова Правног факултета у Нишу | Број 85 | Година LVIII | 2019 336 Амерички ФБИ (Federal Bureau of Investigation − FBI), који је на федералном нивоу надлежан за истраживање злочина мржње, сматра да ову врсту чине „традиционална кривична дела попут убистава, подметања пожара или вандализам, уз додатни елемент – предрасуду извршиоца” и дефинише злочине мржње као „кривична дела усмерена против особа или имовине која су, у целини или делимично, мотивисана предрасудама извршиоца у односу на расу, религијска уверења, инвалидитет, сексуалну оријентацију, етничку припадност, род и полни идентитет”.9 Министарство правде САД (U. S. Department of Justice), даје објашњење да термин „мржња” може бити погрешно протумачен јер се под њим, код дефинисања појма злочини мржње, „не подразумева бес, љутња или опште незадовољство, већ се односи на предрасуде извршиоца према појединцу или заштићеном колективитету са специфичним карактеристикама.”10 Levin и McDevitt дефинишу злочине мржње као „кривична дела која су, у целости или делимично, мотивисана чињеницом или предрасудом да је жртва различита од извршиоца дела.” Ови аутори наглашавају да оваква дефиниција има три значајна елемента и да је из тог разлога широко прихваћена: „прво, да укључује радње које су већ предвиђене као кривична дела (већина законодавстава не инкриминише ново понашање као кривично дело, уместо тога предвиђа могућност пооштравања казни за дела која су већ противправна и предвиђена у закону као кривична дела); друго, наглашава мотивацију за извршење кривичног дела (расну, верску, етничку или другу идентитетску разлику између жртве и извршиоца); и као треће, не идентификује нити један колективитет који има ексклузивно право заштите од злочина мржње” (Levin, McDevitt, 2002: 2,3). У домаћој литератури наводи се описна дефиниција злочина мржње према којој су то она поступања којима се испољава „показивање предрасуда базираних на раси, религији, неспособности, сексуалној опредељености или етничкој припадности, укључујући, када је то подесно, убиства, убиства из нехата, силовања, тешке телесне повреде, телесне повреде, застрашивање паљевином, као и уништење и оштећење имовине и вандализам” (Titus Reid: 2003, према: Константиновић Вилић, Николић Ристановић, Костић, 2010: 148), али је у потпуности прихватљива и, истовремено, довољно широка дефиниција према којој злочини мржње представљају „дела која се врше из мржње, одбојности или негативне настројености извршиоца према групи или колективитету којима жртва, по његовом мишљењу, припада” 9 Federal Bureau of Investigation, Defining a Hate crime, https://www.f bi.gov/investigate/ civil-rights/hate-crimes, (21. 09. 2019). 10 https://www.justice.gov/hatecrimes/learn-about-hate-crimes, (21. 09. 2019). З. Грујић | стр. 331-349 337 (Игњатовић, 2018: 108), која се у раду користи приликом употребе појма злочини мржње. Овако дефинисан појам злочина мржње уједно омогућава дистинкцију између различитих других облика кривичних дела учињених из мржње (као што су нпр. геноцид или злочини против човечности), која подразумевају мржњу, непријатељство или негативан став извршилаца према жртвама, с једне стране, и „говора мржње”, којим се може „утицати” на извршење злочина мржње (уколико „говор мржње” није инкриминисан), с друге стране, у односу на дела која према свом карактеру представљају тзв. типичне злочине мржње. 3. Феноменологија злочина мржње Према статистичким подацима у системима у којима се ови подаци прикупљају, обрађују и приказују, може се утврдити да злочини мржње представљају насилничка кривична дела уперена против живота, телесног интегритета, сигурности, слободе или имовине припадника специфичних (заштићених) група, чије је извршење мотивисано предрасудама према вероисповести, раси, националној или етничкој припадности (пореклу) или сексуалној оријентацији жртве, односно ређе према роду, полном идентитету, језику или другом својству припадника колективитета. Према подацима који су представљени у Uniform Crime Reports – Hate Cri- me Statistic за 2017. годину, у САД је пријављено укупно 7.175 злочина мржње, од којих је у 7.106 случајева у питању предрасуда према једном од мотива (који укључује 8.126 извршилаца (6.307 познатих) и 8.493 жртве), док у преосталих 69 постоје вишеструке предрасуде које укључује 311 извршилаца (63 позната) и 335 жртава ових дела. Од 7.106 пријављених злочина (појединачна предрасуда – single bias incidents) 58,1% мотивисано је расном, националном или етничком предрасудом, 22% предрасудом по основу вероисповести жртве, 15,9% на основу сексуалне оријентације, 1,7% на основу полног идентитета, 1,6% на основу инвалидитета и 0,6% на основу предрасуде према полу жртве. Од 4.832 злочина мржње чије је извршење мотивисано расном, националном или етничком припадношћу или пореклом, 48,8% мотивисано је предрасудама према Афроамериканцима („црнцима”), 17,5% према припадницима беле расе, 10,9% према Латиноамериканцима и Хиспаноамериканцима, 5,8% према лицима индијанског порекла, 4,4% према лицима чије порекло чини више од једне расе, 3,1% према Азијатима, 2,6% према Арапима и 6,9% према осталим. Зборник радова Правног факултета у Нишу | Број 85 | Година LVIII | 2019 338 Од 1.679 злочина мржње мотивисаних предрасудом на основу веро- исповести, 58,% извршено је против Јевреја, 18,7% против припадника исламске вероисповести, 4,5% против католика, 2,4% пропив протестаната, 1,4% против православаца и 15% према припадницима других мањинских религија. Када је у питању сексуална оријентација жртве, од укупно 1.303 пријављених злочина мржње 58,2% извршено је из предрасуда према хомосексуалцима, 12,6% према лезбејкама, 2,8% према хетеросексуалцима, 2,1% према бисексуалним и 24,6% због мржње према свим мањинским сексуалним групама (LGBT ). Од 132 злочина извршена због предрасуда према полном идентитету, 118 је извршено према трансродним особама. Од 128 дела извршених из предрасуда према инвалидитету, 93 извршено је према лицима са менталним, а 35 са физичким недостацима. Од 54 злочина извршених због предрасуда везаних за пол, 28 је извршено због предрасуда према женама, а 25 према мушкарцима. Према типологији извршених дела, од укупног броја пријављених дела 60,3% је извршено према лицима (особама), 36,9% према њиховој имовини и 2,8% према друштвеној заједници (колективитету). 27,6% чине насилничка кривична дела и вандализам, 27,1% претње и застрашивање, 20,7% увреде и вређање, 11,7% вређање и насилничко понашање према жртви.11 Подаци о злочинима мржње у Енглеској и Велсу, прикупљени у периоду од 2014. до 2016. године, приказани у Crime Survey (CSEW) показују да је у том периоду извршено 204.000 злочина мотивисаних предрасудама. Од тог броја 104.000 дела извршено је из предрасуде према раси, националном и етничком пореклу или припадности, 31.000 према вероисповести, 27.000 према сексуалној оријентацији и 67.000 из предрасуда према инвалидитету жртве. Према званичним полицијским подацима, у 2015. години извршено је укупно 62.518 злочина мржње, и тај број је за 19% виши него у 2014. години (Walters, Wiedlitzka, Owusu-Bempah, Goodall, 2017; 52−55). Број званично пријављених дела je знатно мањи у односу на податке приказане у CSEW, што само говори у прилог тези да је тамна бројка криминалитета код овог облика криминалног понашања јако велика. Канцеларија за демократске институције и људска права Организације за европску безбедности и сарадњу (OSCE − Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR)) прикупља и објављује податке о злочинима мржње 11 Uniform Crime Reports – Hate Crime Statistic 2017. (2018). U. S. Department of Justice – Federal Bureau of Investigation https://ucr.f bi.gov/hate-crime/2017/topic-pages/incidents- and-offenses.pdf, (21. 09. 2019). З. Грујић | стр. 331-349 339 у више од педесет држава. Када је у питању Република Србија, према овом извору, достављени су подаци и званичних органа и партнерских организација о делима пријављеним у периоду од 2013. до 2017. године. Према званичним подацима у 2013. години извршено је 64 злочина мотивисаних предрасудама, 2014 − 87 злочина, 2015 – 79 злочина, 2016 – 9 злочина и 2017 − само 5 злочина мржње. Исти извор наводи да за 11 кривичних дела пријављених полицији у 2017. години (!) нема података о мотиву извршиоца. Од овог броја, 8 представљају кривична дела вандализма, док се код 3 дела користи претња жртви или долази до угрожавања сигурности жртве. Према незваничним изворима који се односе на исти период, евидентирано је 25 злочина мржње (!), од чега 20 чине кривична дела мотивисана предрасудама према сексуалној оријентацији жртава (10 насилничких дела, 9 претњи насиљем и 1 дело усмерено против имовине жртве), 3 злочина је мотивисано предрасудама према Ромима, једно дело мотивисано је расизмом и ксенофобијом, док је једно дело мотивисано антисемитизмом и било је усмерено на уништавање имовине припадника јеврејске заједнице.12 Представљени подаци морају бити прихваћени са скептицизмом, имајући у виду неуједначеност методолошких поступака за прикупљање и представљање података о злочинима мржње у различитим државама. Неспорна је чињеница да је стваран број ових злочина знатно већи и може се претпоставити да је пропорционалан степену нетрпељивости доминантних друштвених група према мањинским и маргинализованим колективитетима. За разумевање феноменолошких карактеристика злочина мржње и појавних облика ових дела, битно је указати и на класификацију ових злочина коју су представили Levin и McDevitt. Према овим ауторима, постоје четири основна типа злочина мржње у односу на конкретизовану мотивацију извршиоца дела. Злочини извршени из забаве (thrill hate crimes) − истраживања обављена у Бостону су показала да су три од пет злочина мржње извршена из забаве, при чему су извршиоци најчешће били тинејџери беле расе који раније нису познавали жртве које нападају. Највећи ризик од виктимизације забележен је код лица чије је порекло из Азије и Латинске Америке. Узбуђење и забава били су конкретни пориви извршења злочина мотивисаних предрасудама, а место извршења области у којима су настањени мањински колективитети. 12 http://hatecrime.osce.org/serbia, (21. 09. 2019). Зборник радова Правног факултета у Нишу | Број 85 | Година LVIII | 2019 340 Одбрамбени злочини (defensive hate crimes) – представљају дела која настају као последица одређеног догађаја након којег почиње да се испољава мржња и бес извршиоца који „рационализује” да наступа заштитнички и „брани” статус своје заједнице од припадника мањинских колективитета („црнаца”, „Азијата”, Латино или Хиспаноамериканаца). Извршилац оправдава своју активност, чак и осећа обавезу да је брани. Злочини се најчешће извршавају у непосредном животном окружењу извршиоца, где свака промена (нпр. досељавање породице афроамеричких корена, унапређење колеге азијатског порекла) представља потенцијалну претњу. Злочини освете или одмазде (retaliatory hate crimes) представљају дела која се јављају као реакције на „доживљени” злочин мржње. Извршиоци најчешће делују самостално, а дело се врши у области у којој борави жртва. Злочин се врши из одмазде за претходно претрпљени злочин мржње према ма ком припаднику таргетиране групе. Број ових злочина значајно је порастао (чак за 1.600%) према припадницима муслиманске вероисповести и арапских заједница у САД након терористичких напада на зграде Светског трговинског центра у Њујорку 2001. године. Мисионарски злочини (mission hate crimes) представљају злочине код којих су извршиоци убеђени да су припадници виктимизираних група подљудска раса (или демони) који су послати да униште културу, економију или „чистоту” расног наслеђа доминантне групе, због чега њихов циљ није само елиминација неког од припадника другачијег колективитета („црнаца”, „латиноса”, Азијата или јевреја) из свог окружења, већ „виши циљ или мисија за коју их је одабрао Бог”. Извршиоци се најчешће организују у групе и злочине врше колективно, као нпр. припадници Ku Klux Klana (Levin, McDevitt, 2002: 10−14). 4. Типологија извршилаца злочина мржње Управо та чињеница, да постоје организоване групе извршилаца злочина мржње о којима се често говори у медијима и које имају изграђену идеологију, ритуализам, симболику активизма и униформност чланова, навела је на општи закључак да ове злочине најчешће врше припадници организованих екстремистичких група (hate groups) или појединци који су нису чланови али су индоктринирани њиховом идеологијом. У том контексту, извршење злочина мржње према одређеним колективитетима − припадницима црне или других раса у Америци, верских заједница, Јевреја или Рома, емиграната или припадника мањинских сексуалних група, може се поистоветити се активностима група као што су озлоглашени Ku Klux Klan, White Aryan Resistance, Posse Comitatus, Хришћански патриоти, З. Грујић | стр. 331-349 341 неонацисти, скинхедси, радикални десничари, радикални исламисти и бројне друге. У САД је у 2018. години, нпр., према подацима Southern Poverty Law Centre, праћено 1.020 различитих група укључених у вршење злочина мржње,13 од којих многе нису имале више од двадесетак чланова. Екстремистичке групе представљају, дакле, социјалне групе које заговарају и спроводе мржњу, непријатељство и насиље према припадницима других раса, лицима другачије националне или етничке припадности, вероисповести, рода, полног идентитета, сексуалне оријентације или друге карактеристике. Примарни циљ њиховог постојања је промовисање анимозитета, непријатељства и мржње према припадницима колективитета чије се неко својство разликује од својстава припадника екстремистичке групе (hate group) и вршење злочина мотивисаних предрасудама и мржњом према припадницима таквих колективитета. Међутим, истраживања која су спровели Levin и McDevitt о извршеним злочинима мржње показала су супротне резултате од очекиваних. Наиме, највећи број злочина мржње није извршен од стране припадника неке од екстремистичких група, напротив. Њихово учешће не прелази 10−15% укупног броја регистрованих случајева злочина мржње. На пример, у Јужној Каролини је две трећине злочина извршено од стране тинејџера или млађих особа жељних узбуђења и забаве. Иако су неки од њих подржавали симболизам Кју Клукс Клана, дела су извршавали као појединци без било каквог утицаја неке организоване екстремистичке групе. Дакле, злочине мржње најчешће врше појединци који нису повезани ни са једном организованом криминалном групом (Levin, McDevitt, 2002: 9). У складу са представљеном типологијом злочина мржње у односу на конкретизовану мотивацију извршилаца дела, ови аутори представљају и типологију извршилаца злочина мржње. То су: 1. извршиоци из забаве и узбуђења (thrill-seeking offenders), 2. „браниоци” (defensive offenders) 3. извршиоци из освете, „осветници” (retaliatory offenders), и 4. мисионари (missioners). Иако ова подела има одређене недостатке, највећи број извршилаца злочина мржње може бити сврстан у једну од категорија према конкретизованој мотивацији у вршењу дела. 5. Остале специфичности злочина мржње као посебног облика криминалног понашања У ранијем делу рада указали смо да, иако постоје извесна оспоравања, највећи број аутора сматра да се злочини мржње разликују од осталих 13 https://www.splcenter.org/hate-map, (21. 09. 2019). Зборник радова Правног факултета у Нишу | Број 85 | Година LVIII | 2019 342 облика криминалног понашања, пре свега насилничког криминалитета. И за такав став има пуно аргумената. Висок степен друштвене опасности дела. Као основно, степен друштвене опасности кривичних дела извршених из мржње и предрасуда према припадницима одређеног колективитета несумњиво је већи од дела које је извршено према конкретизованој жртви без обзира на њено лично својство јер, осим жртве, погађа и утиче на све чланове колективитета који деле заједничке карактеристике (расу, националну или етничку припадност или порекло, вероисповест, сексуални идентитет, инвалидитет, род, полни идентитет, језик или друго својство). Колективна виктимизираност припадника групе. Злочини мржње, како потврђују емпиријска истраживања, изазивају осећај колективне несигурности и угрожености колективитета над чијим је припадником извршено кривично дело, што доводи до колективне виктимизације припадника одређене групе. Колективна виктимизираност припадника групе указује, најчешће, и на њихове урођене виктимогене предиспозиције, јер је одређена својствима на коју жртва није могла да утиче (као што су раса, национално порекло, етничка припадност, пол, и др.). Деперсонализација жртве. Жртве злочина мржње најчешће представљају лица која немају претходно успостављени однос за извршиоцем дела.14 Припадништво колективитету, према мишљењу извршилаца дела, мржња и предрасуде према својствима специфичне групе кључне су у таргетирању и одабиру жртве. Жртва злочина мржње практично је деперсонализована, идентитетски одређена на основу својстава других чланова колективитета или спољашње симболике која упућује на припадништво колективитету. Жртва може постати било који припадник колективитета, односно пасивни субјект се код злочина мржње најчешће бира потпуно насумично. Стварна или претпостављена припадност жртве одређеном колективитету. Припадништво колективитету дефинисано је ставовима извршиоца према идентитету жртве. Жртва је стварни или претпостављени припадник колективитета, то искључиво зависи од предрасуда и ставова извршиоца према статусу појединца као припадника групе. Мржња као мотив извршења. Основни мотив за извршење ових кривичних дела је мржња извршиоца према припадницима других група или колективитета. Мржња представља негативну емоцију према другим колективитетима и она је консеквенца унутрашњег доживљаја и 14 Осим код предрасуда по основу инвалидитета, где је извршилац, најчешће, лице из непосредног окружења жртве. З. Грујић | стр. 331-349 343 субјективног вредновања других од стране извршиоца. Као емоција, мржња може да има различити интензитет − од одбојности, аверзије, негативне настројености, негације других, до отвореног непријатељства према другом или другачијем. Код злочина мржње она је последица предрасуда извршилаца према специфичним колективитетима. Предрасуде извршиоца према одређеном колективитету. Предрасуде, према дефиницији, представљају ставове који нису истинити, односно који нису засновани на разумним доказима. Предрасуде су неутемељена негативна мишљења о појединцима, догађајима, процесима или друштвеним групама, и укључују и мржњу и спремност на угрожавање или уништавање других или другачијих. Предрасуде према другачијим колективитетима не представљају, дакле, истините садржаје о специфичностима одређеног колективитета, напротив. Оне представљају ставове неистинитог и неисправног садржаја, који чине катализатор мржње према другим и другачијим припадницима група и покретач насиља, али, уједно, и оправдавајући фактор за извршиоце злочина мржње. Насилнички карактер дела, агресивност и деструктивност. Предрасуде и мржња као мотивациони механизми злочина мржње према другим и другачијим одређују и карактер ових злочина. Оне су иманентне насиљу и агресији, па тежина извршених кривичних дела зависи од интензитета испољене мржње извршилаца дела. Феноменолошки посматрано, злочине мржње чине насилничка, агресивна и деструктивна кривична дела уперена против појединаца као чланова групе, њихове имовине или симбола колективитета. Истраживања показују да је највећи број злочина мржње извршен против особа као припадника колективитета, затим њихове имовине (око 35%) и најмање против колективитета (групе) у целини. Злочине мржње чине традиционална кривична дела насилничког (и имовинског) карактера, којима се угрожава живот, телесни интегритет, сигурност, слобода и имовина припадника колективитета, мотивисана предрасудама и мржњом извршилаца. Чине их најразличитија кривична дела од узнемиравања, увреда, прогањања, уништавања имовине, вандализма, напада на заједничке симболе колективитета, скрнављења, крађа, разбојништва, наношења телесних повреда, злостављања, силовања до убистава. Њихово набрајање има за циљ да укаже на разноликост појавних облика, а не да прецизно наведе одређена кривична дела. Кључна чињеница за утврђивање садржаја злочина мржње су предрасуде и мржња извршиоца према неком колективитету, док је идентификација злочина мржње неопходан предуслов другачије кривичноправне реакције на дела и према извршиоцима. Зборник радова Правног факултета у Нишу | Број 85 | Година LVIII | 2019 344 Дискриминација припадника одређене групе; Успостављање односа „ми и они”. Злочини мржње имају ту специфичност да су „резултат друштвених подела, структуралних неједнакости, а тиме и насталих друштвених антагонизама. Посматрајући шире, злочини мржње су последица онога што бисмо могли назвати парадигмом различитости, односно дихотомијом групних подела на „ми и они”, која је присутна у свим друштвима, у свим историјским периодима” (Лалић, 2014: 39). Такви односи у друштву базирани су на дискриминацији припадника маргинализованих друштвених колективитета. Степен дискриминације и сегрегације различитих мањинских колективитета може бити различит и зависи, првенствено, од креираних културних модела и образаца, степена толеранције различитости и развоја модела општег друштвеног благостања. У системима у којима нема прихватања различитости и инклузивног приступа другачијим и мањинским колективитетима, дискриминација маргиналних друштвених група је израженија, а тло за вршење злочина мржње погодно. Лично својство жртве као заједничка карактеристика припадника групе. Несумњиво је да данас, и у најразвијенијим државама и друштвеним системима, хијерархија идентитета, заснована на биолошким или друштвеним карактеристикама појединаца као делова колективитета, представља основ различитости. Лично својство жртве представља, у ствари, део заједничких карактеристика колективитета, односно идентитетско обележје групе које, истовремено, представља и основ предрасуда извршилаца злочина мржње. Раса, национално и етничко порекло или припадност, вероисповест, сексуална оријентација, род, полни идентитет или инвалидитет представљају карактеристике којима се пружа заштита од злочина мржње у већини савремених кривичноправних система. Иако је проширивање заштите на неке од колективитета у литератури оспоравано, у односу на род, полни идентитет или инвалидитет, тенденција је да и ове карактеристике групе буду предмет заједничке заштите. Стереотипи о колективитетима и креирање модела „културе мржње”. Важна карактеристика злочина мржње јесте постојање и ширење стереотипа о другим и другачијим групама и „опасностима” које доносе „различити”. Стереотипи имају одлучујућу улогу у стварању предрасуда према одређеним колективитетима. Уколико у савременим друштвима не постоје механизми помоћу којих се утиче на уклањање стереотипа и ширења лажне слике о опасности од другачијих, долази до креирања модела „културе мржње” према којој мржња и њено испољавање постају нормалан део општих образаца понашања. Игњатовић, у том контексту, З. Грујић | стр. 331-349 345 преноси став да „у Америци расте култура мржње: од хумора, преко музике, до религије и политике … чињеница да се она или он разликују од људи у нашој групи, користи се све више као основ за негирање људских својстава и вређање таквих појединаца” (Игњатовић, 2018: 110). Висока тамна бројка криминалитета. Последња карактеристика овог облика криминалног понашања јесте изузетно висока тамна бројка криминалитета. Злочине мржње чине кривична дела мотивисана предрасудама и мржњом према припадницима другачијих колективитета и њихов број ће увек зависити од односа већинских група према маргинализованим, мањинским колективитетима. Дискриминаторски однос, недостатак толеранције на различитост, ширење стереотипа и стварање модела „културе мржње” према одређеним расним, верским, националним, етничким и другим колективитетима увек ће представљати погодан терен за вршење злочина мотивисаних мржњом, без обзира на прикупљене или приказане податке о броју евидентираних злочина. О њиховом стварном броју, у овој фази истраживања феномена злочина мржње можемо само размишљати. Уколико само погледамо званичне податке који су представљени у овом раду, где се у САД бележи само око 7.000 злочина мржње на годишњем нивоу, док је у Енглеској и Велсу тај број скоро 10 пута већи (према независним изворима чак и 30 пута већи), а да се број званично пријављених дела у Србији у 2017. години може избројати прстима једне руке, можемо закључити да злочине мржње карактерише висока тамна бројка криминалитета и да постоји потреба потпунијег проучавања феноменолошких карактеристика овог облика криминалног понашања. 6. Злочини мржње у Републици Србији – нова легислативна решења и пракса Иако се мржња као мотив извршења кривичних дела према домаћем законодавству узима у обзир приликом одмеравања казне на основу општих правила о одмеравању казне, као отежавајућа околност − побуда из које је учињено кривично дело, уколико не представља елемент бића кривичног дела (као код нпр. изазивања националне, расне и верске мржње и нетрпељивости из члана 317, или убиства из других ниских побуда из члана 114, став 5), изменама и допунама Кривичног законика15 из 2012. године дошло је до усвајања новог легислативног решења које се односи на злочине мржње. 15 Кривични законик „Службени гласник Републике Србије” број 85/2005, 88/2005 - испр., 107/2005 - испр., 72/2009, 111/2009, 121/2012, 104/2013, 108/2014 и 94/2016. Зборник радова Правног факултета у Нишу | Број 85 | Година LVIII | 2019 346 Новим чланом 54а предвиђена је „посебна околност за одмеравање казне за кривично дело учињено из мржње”, према којем „ако је кривично дело учињено из мржње због припадности раси и вероисповести, националне или етничке припадности, пола, сексуалне оријентације или родног идентитета” ту околност ће суд ценити као отежавајућу околност, осим ако она није прописана као обележје кривичног дела. Усклађујући домаће законодавство са релевантним међународним изворима и упоредном праксом, законодавац се определио за решење којим се за кривично дело учињено из мржње учинилац строже кажњава, и да се та чињеница мора узети у обзир као обавезна отежавајућа околност. На тај начин обезбеђена је додатна кривичноправна заштита одређених колективитета (Стојановић, 2016: 263), на основу њихове расе, вероисповести, националне и етничке припадности, пола, родног идентитета и сексуалне оријентације, док је изостала заштита колективитета на основу инвалидитета. Иако је ново нормативно решење усвојено 2012. године, тек након шест година у Републици Србији донета је прва пресуда у којој је мржња учиниоца узета као отежавајућа околност.16 Наиме, Први основни суд у Београду је 2. новембра 2018. године донео пресуду за кривично дело насиље у породици којим је условно на годину дана затвора осудио извршиоца који је дело извршио према свом сину, утврђујући да је дело мотивисано мржњом према његовој сексуалној оријентацији. 7. Закључак Мржња је, посматрајући ретроспективно, преовлађујућа детерминанта у генези најтежих масовних злочина извршених у историји људске цивилизације. Истовремено, мржња представља мотив извршења традиционалних кривичних дела према жртви са којом учинилац има претходно успостављен однос. Међутим, савремена искуства и емпиријска истраживања потврђују да постоје кривична дела која се врше из мржње и предрасуде учиниоца према припадницима одређених (другачијих) група или колективитета, односно из мржње према групи или колективитету којима жртва, по мишљењу извршиоца, припада. Реч је о злочинима мржње. 16 Комитет правника за људска права (ЈУКОМ), Саопштење за јавност – прва пресуда за злочин из мржње од 7. новембра 2018. године, http://www.yucom.org.rs/saopstenje- za-javnost-prva-presuda-za-zlocin-iz-mrznje/, (21. 09. 2019). З. Грујић | стр. 331-349 347 Иако њих чине традиционална насилничка (и нека имовинска) кривична дела, у раду смо покушали да изнесемо специфичности злочина мржње и представимо их као аргументе да се ради о посебном облику криминалног понашања. Висок степен друштвене опасности злочина мржње, колективна виктимизираност припадника групе, деперсонализација жртве, стварна или претпостављена припадност жртве одређеној групи, мржња као мотив извршења, предрасуде извршиоца према одређеном колективитету, насилнички карактер дела, агресивност и деструктивност, дискриминација припадника одређене групе и успостављање односа „ми и они”, лично својство жртве као заједничка карактеристика групе, постојање стереотипа о припадницима одређених група и креирање модела „културе мржње” и висока тамна бројка криминалитета представљају специфичности које су морају узети у обзир приликом проучавања феномена злочина мржње и то као посебног облика криминалног понашања. На крају рада представљено је ново нормативно решење у кривичном законодавству Републике Србије, према којем се мржња према заштићеним колективитетима мора узети у обзир као обавезна отежавајућа околност приликом одмеравања казне, и наведен је пример прве пресуде у којој је мржња према сексуалној оријентацији жртве окарактерисана као злочин мржње. Литература/References Bowling, B. (1993). Racial Harassment and the Process of Victimization. British Journal of Criminology 33(2). Crime and Disorder Act.(1998); https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/e15559/pdf/, (Preuzeto 21. 09. 2019 ). Criminal Justice Act (2003). http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2003/44/ pdfs/ukpga_20030044_en.pdf, (Preuzeto 21. 09. 2019). https://www.cps.gov.uk/hate-crime, (Preuzeto 21. 09. 2019). Federal Bureau of Investigation, Defining a Hate crime, https://www.fbi.gov/ investigate/civil-rights/hate-crimes, (Preuzeto 21. 09. 2019). H.R. 2455 — 99th Congress: Hate Crime Statistics Act.” www.GovTrack.us. 1985. https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/99/hr2455, (Preuzeto 21. 09. 2019). H. R. 1152 (103rd): Hate Crimes Sentencing Enhancement Act of 1993. https://www.justice.gov/hatecrimes/learn-about-hate-crimes, (Preuzeto 21. 09. 2019). Зборник радова Правног факултета у Нишу | Број 85 | Година LVIII | 2019 348 http://hatecrime.osce.org/serbia, (Preuzeto 21. 09. 2019). https://www.splcenter.org/hate-map, (21. 09. 2019). Игњатовић, Ђ. (2005). Злочини мржње. Правни живот. 9(1), 3−12. Игњатовић, Ђ. (2018). Криминологија. Београд: Правни факултет; 109−110; Ковачевић, М. (2009). Злочини мржње. Темида. бр. 4, 93−103. Комитет правника за људска права (ЈУКОМ), Саопштење за јавност – прва пресуда за злочин из мржње од 7. новембра 2018. године, http://www.yucom. org.rs/saopstenje-za-javnost-prva-presuda-za-zlocin-iz-mrznje/, (Preuzeto 21. 09. 2019). Константиновић Вилић С., Николић Ристановић В., Костић, М. (2010). Криминологија. Београд: Прометеј. Кривични законик „Службени гласник Републике Србије” број 85/2005, 88/2005 - испр., 107/2005 - испр., 72/2009, 111/2009, 121/2012, 104/2013, 108/2014 и 94/2016. Лалић, В. (2014). Злочини мржње у Босни и Херцеговини. Докторска дисертација. Универзитет у Београду, Факултет безбедности. Levin, J; McDevitt, J. (2002). Hate Crimes. Northeastern University. (Prepared for Encyclopedia of Peace, Violent and Conflict (2008). 2nd editi- on. Academic Press) https://jacklevinonviolence.com/articles/HateCrime- sencyc92206FINAL.pdf, (Preuzeto 21. 09. 2019). Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act. www.justice. gov/crt/matthew-shepard-and-james-byrd-jr-hate-crimes-prevention-act 2009- 0, (Preuzeto 21. 09. 2019). Милашиновић С., Симеуновић Патић, Б. (2010). Злочини мржње. Култура полиса.13−14, (VII), 389–412; Павловић, М. (2008). Злочини мржње у контексту ресторативне правде. Зборник радова Правног факултета у Новом Саду бр. 1−2/2008, 857−872. Стојановић, З. (2016). Коментар Кривичног законика. Београд: Службени гласник; Sheffield, C. (1995). Study of literature and legislation on hate crime in America. Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice. Titus Reid, S. (2003). Crime and Criminology. New York: McGraw-Hill. З. Грујић | стр. 331-349 349 Uniform Crime Reports – Hate Crime Statistic 2017. (2018). U. S. Department of Justice – Federal Bureau of Investigation; https://ucr.fbi.gov/hate-crime/2017/ topic-pages/incidents-and-offenses.pdf, (Preuzeto 21. 09. 2019). Walters A. M; Wiedlitzka S; Owusu-Bempah A; Goodall Kay; (2017). Hate Crime and the Legal Process.US University. Doc. Zdravko Grujić, LL.D., Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Priština, Temporary Head Office in Kosovska Mitrovica HATE CRIMES AS A SPECIAL FORM OF CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR Summary Hate is a specific motive for the commission of criminal offenses. In addition to the crimes committed due to the perpetrator’s hatred towards the individual victim (based on the prior relationship which triggers the negative emotion of hate), the history of crimes points to numerous examples of oppression, assault, threat or destruction directed towards the victims because of their actual or presumed affiliation with a particular race, national or ethnic origin, religion or other cha- racteristic of a group (collectivity). Some common features of hate crime as a particular form of criminal behavior are the perpetrator’s presumption about the victim’s belonging to a particular group; hate, aggression, brutality and violence towards this collectivity; attacks on life, physical and mental integrity and property of the victims, and creating a sense of insecurity. The term “ hate crimes” appeared in the mid-1980s in the United States, which initiated empirical research on this phenomenon in an attempt to find effective criminal justice mechanisms. This paper provides a critical analysis of the problem of conceptual definition of hate crimes, the phenomenological aspect of this type of crime, the typology of perpetrators, victims, victimized groups, and presents criminal justice mechanisms aimed at counteracting hate crimes in the criminal legislation of the Republic of Serbia. Keywords: hate crimes, victims of hate crime, aggravating circumstances. II РАДОВИ СТУДЕНАТА ДОКТОРСКИХ СТУДИЈА 
work_jiv5fcs7nzcptknrl4e735zlru	----	Free speech or hate speech? A legal analysis of the discourse about Roma on Twitter http://www.diva-portal.org This is the published version of a paper published in Information & communications technology law. Citation for the original published paper (version of record): Enarsson, T., Lindgren, S. (2019) Free speech or hate speech?: A legal analysis of the discourse about Roma on Twitter Information & communications technology law, 28(1): 1-18 https://doi.org/10.1080/13600834.2018.1494415 Access to the published version may require subscription. N.B. When citing this work, cite the original published paper. Permanent link to this version: http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-150044 Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=cict20 Information & Communications Technology Law ISSN: 1360-0834 (Print) 1469-8404 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/cict20 Free speech or hate speech? A legal analysis of the discourse about Roma on Twitter Therese Enarsson & Simon Lindgren To cite this article: Therese Enarsson & Simon Lindgren (2019) Free speech or hate speech? A legal analysis of the discourse about Roma on Twitter, Information & Communications Technology Law, 28:1, 1-18, DOI: 10.1080/13600834.2018.1494415 To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/13600834.2018.1494415 © 2018 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group Published online: 02 Jul 2018. Submit your article to this journal Article views: 1927 View Crossmark data Citing articles: 1 View citing articles https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=cict20 https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/cict20 https://www.tandfonline.com/action/showCitFormats?doi=10.1080/13600834.2018.1494415 https://doi.org/10.1080/13600834.2018.1494415 https://www.tandfonline.com/action/authorSubmission?journalCode=cict20&show=instructions https://www.tandfonline.com/action/authorSubmission?journalCode=cict20&show=instructions http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1080/13600834.2018.1494415&domain=pdf&date_stamp=2018-07-02 http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1080/13600834.2018.1494415&domain=pdf&date_stamp=2018-07-02 https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/citedby/10.1080/13600834.2018.1494415#tabModule https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/citedby/10.1080/13600834.2018.1494415#tabModule Free speech or hate speech? A legal analysis of the discourse about Roma on Twitter Therese Enarssona and Simon Lindgrenb aDepartment of Law, Umeå University, Umeå, Sweden; bDepartment of Sociology, Umeå University, Umeå, Sweden ABSTRACT This article draws on material gathered from Swedish tweets about the Roma population, in order to map different discourses. Based on this material, a legal analysis was made focusing on how the legal protection under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and Swedish law for such types of expression may vary depending on the wider discursive context. This article concludes that the legal protection for hateful expressions against for instance Roma, will vary depending on the discursive context. When the expression is a direct part of a political discussion, the protection of freedom of expression will be higher. However, emphasis must also be placed on the aim, value, and accuracy of the statement, even in a political context. This will increase the possibilities to legally intervene against speech that may perhaps be triggered by an ongoing political debate, but is hateful and without value to that debate. KEYWORDS Hate speech; freedom of expression; Roma; social media; discourse; text analysis Introduction The problem of online hate speech has become a new factor to handle legally, in Sweden as well as in other countries. An overarching question in doing so is what should be pro- tected as free speech and what should not, due to the victimization of groups or individuals that some expressions could cause. In social media, many ethnic and religious groups have been subjected to discussion and hatred, such as for example Muslims1 and people of Jewish descent.2 In Sweden, particularly in recent years, one such targeted group is the Roma population. Sweden, which is a signatory state to the European Convention on Human Rights3 (ECHR, the convention), has a legal responsibility not to enact any law or regulation in breach of the convention. The convention has been incorporated as law in Sweden since 1994 and has a strong constitutional status. It has been implemented in fundamental law through © 2018 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/ licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. CONTACT Therese Enarsson Therese.enarsson@umu.se 1See for example Anton Törnberg and Petter Törnberg, ‘Muslims In Social Media Discourse: Combining Topic Modeling And Critical Discourse Analysis’ (2016) 13 Discourse, Context & Media 132–142. 2Amos Guiora & Elizabeth A. Park, ‘Hate Speech on Social Media’ (2017) 45 Philosophia, September 2017, Volume 45, Issue 3, 957–971. 3The Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, drafted in 1950 and came into force in 1953. INFORMATION & COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY LAW 2019, VOL. 28, NO. 1, 1–18 https://doi.org/10.1080/13600834.2018.1494415 http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1080/13600834.2018.1494415&domain=pdf http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ mailto:Therese.enarsson@umu.se http://www.tandfonline.com the Instrument of Government, which means that legislating in breach with the convention is an unconstitutional act.4 Sweden, like other signatory states, must take the convention and the rulings made by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR, the Court) into con- sideration when enacting or applying legislation in regard to expressions online, for instance. The Court’s rulings and reasonings do, as will be shown, take into consideration many contextual factors – such as the wider discourse in which a statement is made – when deciding if a limitation of a persons’ freedom of expression is legitimate, and maybe even strongly called for. This study analyses discussions about Roma in social media. More specifically, it draws on material gathered from Swedish tweets that mention the Roma population in Sweden. We map what different discourses are expressed, with a particular focus on seeing whether, or to what extent, the identified discourses contain hateful speech or expressions against Roma. The aim is to provide an analysis of how the legal protection under the ECHR and Swedish law for such types of expression may vary depending on the wider discursive context. For instance, if aggressive tweets identified in on-going political discussions enjoy stronger pro- tection, and if aggressive ones without such a context could be intervened against more easily. The present article is part of two larger research projects, where one focuses on understandings of victimization online5 using a combination of sociology and victimology, and the other highlights legal aspects of racially motivated victimization6 – especially against Roma and Sami in Sweden – by combining legal studies with victimology. Background: Roma in Sweden The Roma are a national minority in Sweden, and their history in the country, as well as in other European countries, is marked by oppression, threats, hate speech and discrimination against them, from both individuals and the state. Today, Roma are still a group that is subject to discrimination on, for example, the labour market. The situation with a larger number of Roma people travelling to Sweden from poorer countries in the EU has also added a dimension of vulnerability for Roma people, and this has made the debate on Roma interconnect with the broader issue of street begging.7 A political debate about the Roma has been ongoing in Sweden over the last few years, and in the autumn of 2017, the Moderate Party suggested that begging on the streets should be made illegal, causing that issue to yet again be discussed by the media, politicians and on social media.8 Victimization of the Roma people in Sweden can therefore be seen both historically and today. Studies have also shown that victimization can raise feelings of insecurity, difficulty in understanding information, and poor self-esteem, although the extent of these reac- 4See The Instrument of Government, Chapter 2, Section 19, and Lag (1994:1219) om den europeiska konventionen angående skydd för de mänskliga rättigheterna och de grundläggande friheterna. 5The project ‘Understandings of online victimization’, funded by The Swedish Crime Victim Compensation and Support Authority, was carried out between 2011 and 2016 at the Department of Sociology, Umeå University, Sweden. 6The ‘Victims of Racism’ (swe. Offer för rasism) project is a research project combining legal analysis with victimology, and focuses especially on the victimization of Roma and Sami.The project is conducted by five researchers at the Department of Law, Umeå University, and is funded by the Swedish Research Council. 7Jacqueline Bhabha, ‘Realizing Roma Rights: An Introduction’, Realizing Roma Rights (University of Pennsylvania Press 2017) 17–56; Karin Åström, ‘Skyddet För Utnyttjade Tiggare Är Statens Ansvar’ (2015) 92 Socialmedicinsk Tidskrift 286–295. 8See for instance SVT Nyheter, ‘Moderaterna Vill Ha Ett Nationellt Tiggeriförbud’ (5 September 2017 updated 23 October 2017) <https://www.svt.se/nyheter/inrikes/moderaterna-vill-ha-ett-nationellt-tiggeriforbud>; Svenska Dagbladet, ‘M vill förbjuda tiggeri – får kritik’ (5 September 2017) <https://www.svd.se/just-nu-m-presenterar-ny-kriminalpolitik>. 2 T. ENARSSON AND S. LINDGREN https://www.svt.se/nyheter/inrikes/moderaterna-vill-ha-ett-nationellt-tiggeriforbud https://www.svd.se/just-nu-m-presenterar-ny-kriminalpolitik tions at the individual level may be due to both the offense and the personal character- istics of the victim.9 Being exposed to a racially motivated crime, which targets something deeply personal such as skin colour, ethnicity, cultural origin or religion, can cause an even greater pain and more harm to the victim. This may be because the crime is motivated by hatred directed towards a deeply personal part of an individual, something that the victim cannot influence or change. Studies have also shown that people within targeted groups experience fear and anxiety, and that such victimization can linger in a community at large, even with people that have not themselves been victimized, and can also lead to people from such groups or communities keeping parts of themselves hidden, and not show religious or cultural symbols or avoiding certain contexts and spaces where an increased risk of victimi- zation may be suspected.10 One such space could then be the internet, since social media plat- forms have become a new arena for not only political discussions but also victimization.11 Hate speech on the internet During the last couple of decades, the internet has given rise to a new arena where it is easy to share information, opinions and thoughts. This availability can have a positive effect on people’s lives since it offers accessible ways and means of self-expression, hence giving people a chance to access and participate in society and politics. However, it has also led to the spread of hatred and also a whole new arena for networks spreading messages based in hate, such as racist propaganda, to get a foothold and share their views quickly and widely.12 The occurrence of hate speech has raised the question of the responsibility of social media platforms for facilitation of the distribution of such speech, and since 2016 there is an agreed Code of Conduct between some of the largest social media platforms (Twitter, Facebook, YouTube and Microsoft) and the European Commission, where the social media platforms agree to strive to remove hateful content defined as hate speech within 24 hours. In the fall of 2017 these efforts intensified in an attempt to decrease the amount of speech inciting hatred and violence,13 and in the spring of 2018 the issue got even more attention when both Facebook and YouTube received severe criticisms for not removing hateful content.14 9Jo Goodey, Victims and Victimology: Research, Policy and Practice (Pearson Education Limited 2005) 121–122; Christian Diesen, Terepeutisk juridik (Liber 2011) 109; Annemarie ten Boom and Karlijn F Kuijpers, ‘Victims’ Needs as Basic Human Needs’ (2012) 18 International Review of Victimology 155–179. 10Paul Iganski, ‘Hate Crimes Hurt More’ (2001) 45 American Behavioral Scientist 626. 626–638; Paul Iganski and Spiridoula Lagou, ‘Hate Crimes Hurt Some More Than Others: Implications for the Just Sentencing of Offenders’ (2015) 30 Journal of Interpersonal Violence 1696–1718; Mika Andersson and Caroline Mellgren, ‘Anmälningsbenägenhet vid utsatthet för hat- brott’ (2015) 3–4 Socialvetenskaplig tidskrift 283–301. 11Teo Keipi et al, Online Hate and Harmful Content: Cross-national perspectives (Routledge 2017). 12Daniel J Solove, The Future of Reputaion: Gossip, Rumor, and the Privacy on the Internet, (Yale University Press 2007) 17; The Swedish Government, A Comprehensive Approach to Combat Racism and Hate Crime: National Plan Agains Racisms, Similar Forms of Hostility and Hate Crimes (2016) 60. 13For more on this, see European Commission, Press release, Security Union: Commission steps up efforts to tackle illegal content online, Bryssel September 28, 2017, European Commission, Press release, Countering online hate speech – Com- mission initiative with social media platforms and civil society shows progress, Bryssel June 1, 2017. 14See for instance The Verge (Adi Robertson), ‘YouTube bans neo-Nazi channel after criticism over hate speech rules’ (28 February 2018) <https://www.theverge.com/2018/2/28/17062002/youtube-ban-atomwaffen-neo-nazi-channel-hate- speech-rules>; The Guardian, ‘Myanmar: UN blames Facebook for spreading hatred of Rohingya’ (13 March 2018) <https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/mar/13/myanmar-un-blames-facebook-for-spreading-hatred-of- rohingya>. INFORMATION & COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY LAW 3 https://www.theverge.com/2018/2/28/17062002/youtube-ban-atomwaffen-neo-nazi-channel-hate-speech-rules https://www.theverge.com/2018/2/28/17062002/youtube-ban-atomwaffen-neo-nazi-channel-hate-speech-rules https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/mar/13/myanmar-un-blames-facebook-for-spreading-hatred-of-rohingya https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/mar/13/myanmar-un-blames-facebook-for-spreading-hatred-of-rohingya At a more profound level, this development has to do with how the internet and social media have crucially transformed the conditions for social interaction. First of all, the ways in which people communicate things to each other have become increas- ingly asynchronous. Even if people may use texting, chats, direct messaging, emails, and even discussion forums, for communicating at a steady pace, or to respond to each other the very moment that they receive a message, the digital tools and platforms allow for delays. These possibilities for asynchronicity lead to a ‘conversational relax- ation’.15 Asynchronicity makes it possible for large groups of people to have sustained interaction. This is what happens on social media such as Twitter, and in various online forums and communities. Asynchronous communication also means that one does not have to deal with the immediate reaction of those that one is interacting with. Psychologist John Suler argues that this makes users disinhibited. The possibility of moving in and out of a conversation – returning when and if we want to – and the absence of ‘a continuous feedback loop that reinforces some behaviours and extinguishes others’ – enables us to feel safer, and to for- mulate our thoughts more freely.16 Online interaction can therefore be more democratic than face-to-face interaction. At least in some contexts, it can contribute to minimizing the role played by status and authority. Suler’s overarching argument is that people will say and do things online that they would not say and do in offline and face-to-face settings. He writes of the online disinhibition effect – the effect that people tend to be less restrained and to express themselves more openly online. Obviously, this has its advantages and disad- vantages: It might enable hate speech, as well as it may promote participation, intimacy and self-disclosure. Another characteristic of digital sociality, especially when communication is text- based, is that is makes embodied people largely invisible. When one uses services, such as Twitter, one cannot be seen directly by others, nor can we see who else is there at the same time. Even though some sites, platforms, and services have indicators that display whether people are online or not, one is still physically invisible (though sometimes represented by a profile photo or other avatar). As dis- cussed earlier, the lack of non-verbal cues and other information about the communi- cation partner, and the social context of interaction, has been thought by some to increase uninhibited communication, such as being aggressive or using harsh language.17 Anonymity can be both good and bad for social interaction. As psychologist Philip Zim- bardo showed in the infamous Stanford prison experiment, anonymity in groups can lead to de-individuation – the process by which individuals, unknown to each other, and with concealed identities become immersed in a group dynamic – a state where people can be impulsive, blatantly aggressive towards one another and even sadistic.18 On the internet, the ‘illusion of large numbers’ might make us overestimate how many people share 15Joseph B. Walther, Joseph B. ‘Computer-Mediated Communication: Impersonal, Interpersonal, and Hyperpersonal Inter- action’ (1996) Communication Research 23(1) 3–43, 26. 16John Suler ‘The Online Disinhibition Effect’ (2004) Cuberpsychology & Behavior 7(3) 321–325, 323. 17M.J Culnan & M-L Markus, ‘Information Technologies’ in L. Putnam & D. Mumby (Eds.), Handbook of Organizational Com- munication (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage 1987) 420–443, 429. 18Philip Zimbardo ‘The Lucifer Effect: Understanding How Good People Turn Evil’ (New York Random House 2013). 4 T. ENARSSON AND S. LINDGREN our views.19 We might see, for example, the number of views of a YouTube video or the number of times a tweet has been retweeted and make a rough translation between such numbers and the general legitimacy of the content. When anonymity removes personal responsibility and generates a perceived loss of indi- viduality, it can also lead to people becoming more altruistic and more willing to help others. In digital society then, anonymity can be a force of unity and solidarity as well as of fragmen- tation and nihilism. This is a long-standing debate. Some claim that anonymous interaction in digital media is a major cause of hate speech, racism, sexism etc., while others like to focus on how anonymity online can facilitate things like grassroots political action in places where censorship and surveillance make such mobilization difficult. The question of anonymity online has many dimensions, as seen above, and another one is that of anonymity in relation to victimization. Experienced victimization online or a generally hateful environment can cause someone to feel that they either have to hide their identity or withdraw from the internet. This can be the case when people feel threatened online, causing them to limit or miss out on taking part in participatory social and political aspects of the internet.20 This, and the issue of victimization online, its effects, and how to tackle it have been the focus of intense legal debate in Sweden and other European and western countries over the last decade, and the demand for leg- islative actions has been prominent. The legal aspects that have been focused on in this debate have taken their starting point in the need to protect people from victimization. However, one constantly relevant and overarching question has also been that of reaching a careful balancing by international and national courts between the right to freedom of expression and the right for people to be protected from such hateful expressions that should be prohibited in a democratic society.21 Data and method In terms of methodology, this study positions itself within the wider field of critical dis- course studies (CDS), aiming to analyse the process by which social reality is ‘conceptually mediated’. It is about analysing how language use relates to the symbolic construction of institutions, ideologies, power relations, and identities.22 CDS does not dictate any one specific research method, but this study combines computational topic modelling with legally oriented close readings of the data. Such combinations of methods within CDS are not novel, as there has long been talk of research in the vein of corpus-assisted dis- course studies, or CADS.23 In line with the argument of Baker and colleagues, that none 19Katelyn YA McKenna and John A Bargh, ‘Plan 9 From Cyberspace: The Implications of the Internet for Personality and Social Psychology’ (2000) 4 Personality and Social Psychology Review 57–75, 64. 20Danielle Keats Citron, ‘Civil rights in our information age’ in Saul Levmore and Martha C Nussbaum (Eds.) The Offensive Internet (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 2010) 31–49. 21See for instance Michael Salter and Chris Bryden, ‘I Can See You: Harassment and Stalking on the Internet’ (2009) 18 Infor- mation & Communications Technology Law 99–122. In Sweden severel legeslative changes has come into force over the last few years, and the balancing of freedom of expression and the protection of victims’ privacy has had a prominent place in the legal working leading up to it, see for example: The Swedish Government, Prop. 2016/17:222 Ett starkt straffr- ättsligt skydd för den personliga integriteten. 22Norman Fairclough ‘Critical Discourse Analysis’ In The Routledge Handbook of Discourse Analysis, James Paul Gee and Michael Handford (Eds.) (Routledge Handbooks in Applied Linguistics. London: Routledge 2012) 9–20, 9. 23Nicholas Close Subtirelu and Paul Baker ‘Corpus-Based Approaches’ in John Flowerdew and John E. Richardson (Eds.) The Routledge Handbook of Critical Discourse Studies (Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY: Routledge 2017) 106– 119. INFORMATION & COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY LAW 5 of the methods ‘need be subservient to the other (as the word ‘assisted’ in CADS implies)’,24 this study sees the computational analysis and the close readings as contribut- ing ‘equally and distinctly to a methodological synergy’. The empirical procedure for this study can be described in terms of three different phases: (1) data collection and text pre-processing; (2) topic modelling; and, (3) interpret- ation and critical legal analysis. Data collection and text pre-processing Data for this study was accessed through Twitter’s public Search API, which provides a near- complete sample of real-time tweets for most queries that do not return huge data volumes. Data was streamed for a set of filter words related to Roma issues, during a week in Septem- ber (8th – 15th) of 2017. The particular week was randomly chosen, but coincidentally hap- pened to include the heated debate about the Moderate Party’s suggestion about imposing a ban on street begging. The collection resulted in a dataset consisting of 19,474 tweets. The data was then processed through a set of text cleaning procedures which were applied in order to transform the tweets into the appropriate format for further processing. Such oper- ations were implemented in Python using relevant libraries, most prominently NLTK (Natural Language Toolkit).25 The cleaning pipeline included lowercase conversion, whitespace strip- ping, removal of punctuation, filtering of stopwords (a generic Swedish list) and sparse terms. Topic modelling The next phase employed topic modelling through Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA), to identify common thematic categories in the tweets, and to map how they were distributed across them.26 This provided an overview and insight into the corpus that helped spot areas of interest for the following closer critical analysis. LDA assumes, first, that there are a fixed number of topics by which a corpus can be described. Topics are defined as patterns or groups of terms that have a tendency to appear together in the documents. Second, it assumes that each document in the ana- lysed collection exhibits the topics in different degrees. The result of an LDA is information about the topical structure: Which set of topics is likely to best describe the corpus? How are the topics distributed across documents? The LDA analysis was performed using the gensim library for Python.27 There are some statistical metrics that can be calculated and used to validate the relevance and coherence of topic models. In the case of this analysis, a set of models with different numbers of topics (5–150) were created and evaluated using the CV coherence metric. 28 This indicated the best model coherence at 20 topics, and this was the number of topics chosen for the 24Paul Baker and others, ‘A Useful Methodological Synergy? Combining Critical Discourse Analysis and Corpus Linguistics to Examine Discourses of Refugees and Asylum Seekers in the UK Press’ (2008) 19 Discourse & Society 273–306, 274. 25Steven Bird, Ewan Klein, and Edward Loper Natural Language Processing with Python (Cambridge MA: O’Reilly 2009). 26David M Blei, Andrew Y. Ng, and Michael I. Jordan ‘Latent Dirichlet Allocation’ (2003) Journal of Machine Learning Research 3, 993–1022. 27Radim Rehurek and Petr Sojka. ‘Software Framework for Topic Modelling with Large Corpora’ (2010) in Proceedings of the Lrec 2010 Workshop on New Challenges for Nlp Frameworks 45–50. 28Michael Röder, Andreas Both, and Alexander Hinneburg. ‘Exploring the Space of Topic Coherence Measures’ (2015) in Proceedings of the Eighth ACM International Conference on Web Search and Data Mining, ACM 399–408. 6 T. ENARSSON AND S. LINDGREN model analysed in this present paper. Furthermore, experimental research has shown that such measures tend to be vastly outperformed by evaluation through actual human judg- ment.29 When it comes to the different configurations that can be made in order to arrive at a reasonable set of topics, it has been commonly suggested that ‘human-in-the-loop methods’ are recommendable.30 Critical close reading and contextualized analysis of the texts makes it possible to go past the topic structure to discuss what the algorithmically extracted categories express in the social context that the analysed corpus was constructed to represent. Such analysis entails paying attention to intertextual, historical, and political contexts – and in our case, the legal context – that go way beyond the mere analysis of linguistic units. Interpretation and critical legal analysis Traditionally, legal methodology can be described as the qualitative analysis of legal material for which there are established interpretation methods based on an internal judi- cial assessment – a theoretical hierarchy of the status of legal sources.31 For this study, this will be done by analyzing the mapping of correlations between hateful or aggressive speech and certain topics where such expressions where more frequently occurring, in relation to the ECHR and court rulings from the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR, the Court). Since this study positions itself in a Swedish context and Swedish tweets, this will be exemplified in relation to Swedish legislation, its underlying purpose and relevant court rulings. The main focus in doing so will, however, be the scope of freedom of expression in article 10 ECHR and what can and can’t be included in this as part of a political discussion online. Legally, the field of political discourse demands a contextual analysis, taking into account such factors as the value and relevance of the expression for a political debate, and also who or what the discourse is targeting.32 For an understanding of this contextuality, court rulings of the ECtHR, and exemplifying court rulings from Swedish courts, will be of great signifi- cance in identifying and analyzing discourses. This will enable an analysis of the level of aggressive tweets – based on the frequency of typically aggressive words – concerning Roma, and if they especially occur in a discourse which revolve around current political dis- cussions and thus within a context in which they enjoy stronger protection. Identifying discursive themes through topic modelling The created topic model was explored using the Python version of the LDAvis tool.33 Using the visualization technique suggested by LDAvis enables interpreting the meaning, 29Jonathan Chang, Sean Gerrish, Chong Wang, Jordan L. Boyd-graber, and David M. Blei. ‘Reading Tea Leaves: How Humans Interpret Topic Models’ (2009) in Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 22, Y. Bengio, D. Schuurmans, J. D. Lafferty, C. K. I. Williams, and A. Culotta (Eds.), 288–296. 30Tak Yeon Lee and others, ‘The Human Touch: How Non-Expert Users Perceive, Interpret, and Fix Topic Models’ (2017) 105 International Journal of Human-Computer Studies 28–42, pp. 29–30. 31Aleksander Peczenik ‘Vad är rätt?: om demokrati, rättssäkerhet, etik och juridisk argumentation’ (Stockholm, Norstedts juridik AB 1995). 32Therese Enarsson and Markus Naarttijärvi, ‘Is It All Part of the Game? Victim Differentiation and the Normative Protection of Victims of Online Antagonism under the European Convention on Human Rights’ (2016) 22 International Review of Victimology 123–138. 33See https://github.com/cpsievert/LDAvis, and https://github.com/bmabey/pyLDAvis. INFORMATION & COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY LAW 7 https://github.com/cpsievert/LDAvis https://github.com/bmabey/pyLDAvis prevalence, and relationships of topics. Figure 1 shows the topics in our dataset visualized as circles in a two-dimensional plane, where the sizes of circles indicate the overall prevalence of each respective topic in the model. The distances between topics are determined, in LDAvis, by computing the so-called Jensen-Shannon divergence between topics, and then projecting the inter-topic distances onto two dimensions using multidimensional scaling.34 The visual- ization reveals how the discourse about the Roma population in Sweden on Twitter at the time of this study can be represented through a set of topics and topical clusters. The most prevalent single topic is the one representing a general political debate about street begging. Indeed, the issue of street begging among the Roma population – which also runs through most other topics – is the key topic in the analysed discourse at the time of this study. Tweets rating high within this topic expressed various opinions and cri- ticisms relating to how the street begging problem should be addressed by political means. Many of these tweets were part of a discussion about the issue of whether begging should be prohibited by law or not, and to what extent a ban would be an ade- quate way of addressing the issue. By extension, this debate also concerned if street Figure 1. LDA topic model of Roma tweets. 34Sievert Carson, and Kenneth Shirley ‘LDAvis: A Method for Visualizing and Interpreting Topics’ (2014) in Proceedings of the Workshop on Interactive Language Learning, Visualization, and Interfaces, 63–70, 63. 8 T. ENARSSON AND S. LINDGREN begging among Roma in Sweden is a case of organized crime, or if that view is a myth. In these polemic discussions, left- and right-wing parties in the Swedish parliament were often mentioned, compared and pitted against one another. In relation to the debate about how Swedish politicians have, or should, deal with street begging, there is also the topic of the situation in Sweden as compared to in Europe in general. This part of the discourse is generally connected to the argument that Swedish policy is not doing enough to deal with the issue. Tweets related to this topic express things such as that street begging is more commonly seen in Sweden than in other European countries, and once again to the discussion about whether a ban would be the right way to go or not. Furthermore, the two-topic cluster connecting discourse about the role of news media includes tweets of a similar character, but which are to a larger degree responding to state- ments made in opinion pieces in mainstream media outlets. This general debate was also sometimes expressed by comparing the Roma minority to other minority groups, such as Muslims (cf. the topic Islam). The debate became the most heated and polemic in tweets related to the topic which was connected to the debate about right-wing extremism in relation to migrants, where some of those in opposition of passing a law against street begging questioned why ‘Nazis’ were allowed to hold political manifestations, while ‘poor people’ should not be allowed in public. Conversely, those in favour of a ban ques- tioned whether anyone not defending street begging was automatically to be categorized as a ‘Nazi’. Some of the issues covered in the topics outlined above were dealt with in more detail in the five-topic cluster collecting discourse on the issues of poverty, shelters, and vulner- ability in relation to the social and political issue of street begging among the Roma popu- lation in Sweden. Basically, all of the tweets connected to these topics are variants of comments to either the issue of whether a ban would solve the problem of poverty, whether it is reasonable to use government funding to build shelters for street beggars, or to what extent street begging is an expression of organized crime or of true vulnerability. The most prominent – and for this study also the most interesting – pattern illustrated in Figure 1 is however the 9-topic cluster collecting expressions of anti-Roma and anti- begging discourse. This group of topics include rather aggressive expressions of opinions related to the character of the issue of street begging, as well as to the character of Roma as a group. For instance, in our dataset, one person who commented on the issue of begging in regard to Roma focused the tweet on comparing beggars with vermin, and that the problem therefore should be ‘treated accordingly’. On a similar note, another tweet described begging as a disease that could not be cured. Yet another wanted to kill all beggars, however, in that tweet it was not clearly stated that the person connected begging particularly to Roma or any other particular group, leaving the expression wider and less likely to be seen as targeting a national group or ethnic group. By using the methods used in this study it was also not possible to connect certain tweets to a possible string of tweets from that same individual, and then, by context clarifying if that was the intended meaning. Yet another tweet stated that ‘gypsies’ do nothing but deceive, lie and beg. It is on these types of tweets that we focus the critical legal analysis to follow. INFORMATION & COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY LAW 9 Contextualization and legal analysis of identified discourses To avoid that any tweets be identifiable in relation to specific individuals we are not citing complete specific tweets in this text. Instead, we discuss the importance of the context in which hateful or aggressive expressions and discourses take place, when determining whether expressions in tweets might be legally protected or not. In doing so, we will provide indirect examples from specific tweets. Freedom of expression in relation to different discourses To understand the question of context and victimization in regard to the identified dis- courses, one must understand the legal concept of freedom of expression. As mentioned, this study has a Swedish and European outlook and will therefore be based in article 10 of the ECHR. The article states that everyone has the right to hold and express their opinions, to receive and convey information, and form and give expression to ideas, without inter- ference of the state. The ECtHR has stated that this entails airing such ideas and expressions that can be seen as offensive by the State or a group in society, as well as expressions that shock or disturb people – all in order to protect an open democratic society, that enables pluralism and diversity of thought.35 This means that political discus- sions – like the different political discourses identified about Roma on Twitter, regarding such overarching issues as immigration, whether street begging should be allowed or not, or if politicians are doing a good job – fall under the protection of article 10 on a more general level. However, if individual expressions in such discussions are protected is another matter. This is due to the fact that the protection for expressions in article 10 is highly contextual and in no way absolute.36 Having the right to freedom of expression carries with it duties and responsibilities, and signatory states are allowed to make a number of exceptions with regards to the freedom of speech, to protect other interests, such as for example that of national security, the prevention of disorder or crime and for protection of health or morals as well, as the protection of reputations or rights of others. States are allowed to impose restrictions, penalties etcetera that are necessary in a democratic society and prescribed by law (ECHR article 10:2). However, article 10 also has the purpose of strengthening other rights under the convention, making sure that people can access, and exercise other rights as well, mainly article 8, with the right to respect for private and family life, article 9 and its protection of freedom of thought, conscience and religion, and article 11 that specifically protects the freedom of assembly and association. This shows the scope of the purpose of freedom of expression: Individuals are supposed to be protected within their private sphere, but also to freely practice their religion with others, to speak up in public, and enjoy the freedom of assembly.37 35Handyside v. United Kingdom (App no 5493/72) ECHR 7 december 1976 § 49. 36Therese Enarsson and Markus Naarttijärvi, ‘Is It All Part of the Game? Victim Differentiation and the Normative Protection of Victims of Online Antagonism under the European Convention on Human Rights’ (2016) 22 International Review of Victimology 123–138. 37Alastair Mowbray, Cases, Materials, and Commentary on the European Convention on Human Rights (Oxford University Press 2012) 694–730; Macovei, Monica, ’Freedom of expression: a guide to the implementation of Article 10 of the Euro- pean Convention on Human Rights’ Human Rights Handbooks No. 2 (Council gf Europe Publishing 2004). 10 T. ENARSSON AND S. LINDGREN Generally speaking, expressions that in some way contribute to, or are part of, political discussions, social debate or an exchange of information will be protected to a larger extent, whereas for expressions of a commercial nature, for instance, the opposite is the case.38 This especially strong protection for expressions of value in a public or political debate is due to the fact that the Court has defined this as essential in a democratic, plur- alistic society, and a foundation in protecting human rights in a broader sense.39 For that reason, this stronger protection includes expressions that criticize, for instance, a govern- ment.40 This can be exemplified by the case of Lindon, Otchakovski-Laurens and July v. France, where the Court states that, There is little scope under Article 10 § 2 of the Convention for restrictions on freedom of expression in the area of political speech or debate – where freedom of expression is of the utmost importance […] – or in matters of public interest […]. Furthermore, the limits of acceptable criticism are wider as regards a politician as such than as regards a private individual. Unlike the latter, the former inevitably and knowingly lays himself open to close scrutiny of his every word and deed by both journalists and the public at large, and he must consequently display a greater degree of tolerance.41 Such identified debates on Twitter as mentioned above, of polemic discussions where left- and right-wing parties in the Swedish parliament were discussed, compared and pitted against one another, should therefore – generally speaking – have a strong protection, in order to promote an open discussion. That also means that political figures may have to endure more criticism and harsh statements about them, because of the protection of political debates and since they have willingly put themselves in a public role.42 However, the opposite can be the case if an expression is directed at, and expresses intolerance against, certain protected individuals or groups in society. Such intolerant expressions can, according to the ECtHR, be limited by signatory States to a larger extent, as discussed in Gündüs v. Turkey: … the Court would emphasise, in particular, that tolerance and respect for the equal dignity of all human beings constitute the foundations of a democratic, pluralistic society. That being so, as a matter of principle it may be considered necessary in certain democratic societies to sanction or even prevent all forms of expression which spread, incite, promote or justify hatred based on intolerance (including religious intolerance), provided that any ‘formalities’, ‘con- ditions’, ‘restrictions’ or ‘penalties’ imposed are proportionate to the legitimate aim.43 The case revolves around Mr Gündüs, who appeared on television, speaking out as a member of an Islamist sect, and his statements were critical against democracy and secular institutions. Mr Gündüs was prosecuted and convicted in Turkey on the grounds that the statements made on the television show had incited to hatred and hostility. 38Bernadette Rainey and others, Jacobs, White & Ovey, The European Convention on Human Rights, (Oxford 2014) 438. 39See for instance Lingens v. Austria (App no 9815/82) 8 july 1986; Brasilier v. France (App no 71343/01) 11 April 2006; Alas- tair Mowbray, Cases, Materials, and Commentary on the European Convention on Human Rights (Oxford University Press 2012) 627. 40See for instance Castells v. Spain (App no 11798/85) 23 April 1992. 41Lindon, Otchakovski-Laurens and July v. France (App no 21279/02) 22 October 2007 § 46. 42Lingens v. Austria (App no 9815/82) 8 July 1986; Lindon, Otchakovski-Laurens and July v. France (App nos. 21279/02 and 36448/02). This is developed further in Therese Enarsson and Markus Naarttijärvi, ‘Is It All Part of the Game? Victim Differ- entiation and the Normative Protection of Victims of Online Antagonism under the European Convention on Human Rights’ (2016) 22 International Review of Victimology 123–138. 43Gündüs v. Turkey (App no 35071/97) 14 June 2004 § 40. INFORMATION & COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY LAW 11 However, the ECtHR argued that Turkey had violated Mr Gündüs’ freedom of expression under article 10 and that Gündüs expressions did not constitute hate speech.44 This, even though the Court did state that Turkish people could feel attacked in their way of living in an offensive manner. The Court placed weight on the fact that it was a live broad- cast where he did not have time to rethink and rephrase his answers, and that he took part in a ‘lively public discussion’ at the time.45 The Gündüs case demonstrates the contextual nature when determining if States have legitimate reasons for limiting citizens freedom of expression. This means that other expressions in other contexts, that target ethnicity or religion, can be limited or restricted, as seen in Norwood v. the United Kingdom. In Norwood a man had placed a picture in his window, in the months after 9/11, that portrayed the Twin Towers in flames, a symbol of a prohibition sign with a crescent and a star together with the words ‘Islam out of Britain – Protect the British People.’46 This was seen as a public expression and an attack of Muslims in general, linking this group to a terrorist attack. The Court therefore agreed with dom- estic courts in that this should not fall under the protection of article 10. Similarly, in Garaudy v. France, a historian had authored a book in which he denied the Holocaust. The Court stated that the denial of well-documented crimes against humanity must be seen as the most serious racial defamation of Jewish people, and that such state- ments also incited hatred towards this group.47 In both Norwood and Garaudy, the Court made this assessment in accordance with article 17 of the ECHR, that states that no person, group or State can rely on the protection of the convention to perform ‘any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms’ stated in the convention.48 This means that the protection of expressions targeting, for instance ethnicity or religion, it not limit- less, and some will be removed from the protection of article 10 altogether.49 The Court has nevertheless made it clear that such remarks, even under article 10, must not go beyond certain limits, particularly as regards respect for the reputation and rights of others. In the case of Jersild v. Denmark, the Courts stated that ‘it is of the utmost impor- tance to combat racial discrimination in all its forms and manifestations.’50 Statements that generally constitute a breach of article 10 are such that incite or endorse violence against the state or citizens. This is seen in, inter alia, Zana v. Turkey, where a man proclaims support for the PKK, a terrorist organization, and the Court does not consider imprisoning him for such an endorsement in conflict with article 10. They found that it was legitimate in protecting national security and public safety, but also emphasized that the statement must be seen in its context of extreme political tension at the time of the statement.51 44Gündüs v. Turkey (App no 35071/97) 14 June 2004 § 51–52. 45Gündüs v. Turkey (App no 35071/97) 14 June 2004 § 49. 46Norwood v. the United Kingdom (App no 23131/03) 16 November 2004. 47Garaudy v. France (App no 65831/01) 7 July 2003 § 23. See also, for example, Witzsch v. Germany (App no 7485/03) 13 December 2005 (decision). 48For more on this balancing and the relation between article 10 and 17, see Inessa Shahnazarova, ‘Criminalisation of Gen- ocide Denial and Freedom of Expression’ (2013) 1 International Journal of Human Rights and Constitutional Studies 322– 340 (note 328–330) and Clotilde Pégorier, ‘Speech and Harm: Genocide Denial, Hate Speech and Freedom of Expression’ (2018) 18 International Criminal Law Review 97–126. 49Also note the case of Glimmerveen and Haqenbeek v. the Netherlands (App nos 8348/78 & 8406/78) 11 October 1979 in regard to incitement to discrimination and the exclusion of protection under article 10 by virtue of article 17. 50Jersild v. Denmark (App no 15890/89 23) 23 September 1994 §§ 30–31. 51Zana v. Turkey (App no 69/1996/688/88) 25 November 1997 §§ 58–61. 12 T. ENARSSON AND S. LINDGREN Hateful expressions against Roma in the context of article 10 have also be actualized in case law from the ECtHR. In the case Le Pen v. France the applicant claimed that there had been an interference with his freedom of expression when he was convicted for state- ments about the Roma population. In an official speech the former leader of the National Front, Jean Marie Le-Pen, made remarks about Roma, indicated that they did not want to integrate into European societies. The Court noted that even though these remarks were made in a political context, and even though he referenced facts on alleged delinquency amongst Roma to support his case, the remarks could not be seen as having a value strong enough for the public debate, and the factual basis could not be seen as substantial enough to question the judgment made by national courts. The ECtHR expressed that the remarks by Le Pen must be seen as potentially invoking feelings of hostility towards Roma. Therefore, the Court rejected his complaint as manifestly ill-founded, and declared the application inadmissible.52 The ECtHR has also identified, through its case law, several groups that require special protection, such as Roma. In this context, the court has stated ‘as a result of their turbulent history and constant uprooting the Roma have become a specific type of disadvantaged and vulnerable minority’53 and that they, because of this, also should have stronger pro- tection.54 Several other groups have also been identified as vulnerable, due to other reasons, such as the mentally disabled or children, who in different ways can have difficul- ties protecting their rights.55 So whom an expression targets can make a difference in deciding its legitimacy, and also, as seen above, cultural, historical, and religious factors can be relevant in deciding if an expression is protected under article 10. Swedish legislation in relation to hateful tweets in identified discourses As seen above, the protection for expressions is strong but not unlimited, and, as seen above, highly contextual. If States enforce restrictions, limitations or penalties these must therefore be in order to uphold democratic values and be prescribed by law. In some cases, States are not only allowed to impose laws that protect people from victimiza- tion, they have an obligation to do so. Sweden, like other signatory states to the conven- tion, has positive obligations as well as negative obligations, where the latter entails that States must, themselves, refrain from human rights violations. The positive obligations, however, also entails that States actively must take measures that protect and enable access to these human rights, which can include criminalizing behaviour that restricts people’s rights under the convention or otherwise tries to undermine the protected values under the convention, and also that States provide law enforcement agencies 52Le Pen v. France (App no 45416/16) 23 March 2017. 53D.H and others v Czech Republic (App no 57325/00) 13 November 2007 § 182. 54D.H and others v Czech Republic (App no 57325/00) 13 November 2007 § 182. 55See for instance K.U v. Finland (App no 2872/02) 2 December 2008 about children, and Alajos Kiss v. Hungary (App no 30696/09) 20 May 2010§ 44 about the mentally disabled. See also a more extensive discussion about identified vulner- ability under the convention in Lourdes Peroni and Alexandra Timmer, ‘Vulnerable Groups: The Promise of an Emerging Concept in European Human Rights Convention Law’ (2013) 11 International Journal of Constitutional Law 1056–1085; Therese Enarsson and Markus Naarttijärvi, ‘Is It All Part of the Game? Victim Differentiation and the Normative Protection of Victims of Online Antagonism under the European Convention on Human Rights’ (2016) 22 International Review of Victimology 123–138. INFORMATION & COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY LAW 13 with legal tools to satisfactory investigate crime.56 This means that Sweden, for instance, should have an effective legal framework to handle hateful, racially motivated incidents, that also allows for a balancing with the freedom of expression. As mentioned, the most prevalent single topic of tweets in this study is the one repre- senting general political debate about street begging. Within this topic we found represen- tations of this spectrum, with expressions that should fall under the protected area of article 10, such as those generally debating solutions to the issue of street begging or how politicians have worked with or discussed the matter, but also hateful and aggressive ones that might not fall under the protected area. It has not been possible to identify threats or statements about, or directed at, specific individuals in the discourses studied.57 That means that the hateful and aggressive speech found will be analysed in relation to agitation against a national or ethnic group. This is criminalized and regulated in the Swedish penal code (SFS 1962:700), Chapter 16 Section 8, and states that, someone who, in public, spreads statements or other forms of communication that threatens or expresses contempt for a group of people based of their nationality, ethnic origin, religious beliefs or sexual orientation will be sentenced for agitation against a national or ethnic group (Swedish: ‘hets mot folkgrupp’).58 The focus of this provision is, and historically was, to prevent defamation and hate propaganda against groups of people based on their national or ethnic heritage or religion. This provision had its origin in the 1940s when more political attention was given to the spreading of anti-Semitic propaganda.59 In 1948 a bill was passed, criminalizing spreading such propaganda, and it has been illegal in Sweden since, and Roma as a group are one such group that is protected under this law.60 Several cases of agitation against a national or ethnic group in Sweden has been against Roma,61 but none of them has later been tried by the ECtHR. However, in 2003 sexual orientation was included in the provision,62 and one case of anti-gay propaganda, that was deemed agitation against a national or ethnic group in Sweden, has made it all the way to the ECtHR. In this case, Vejdeland v. Sweden, several people left anti-gay propaganda leaflets in school lockers, with statements such as AIDS and HIV having a foothold in society due to a ‘promiscuous lifestyle’ carried out by gay people, and claims that ‘homosexual lobby organizations’ try to down play paedophilia. The ECtHR stated that Sweden were within its right to sanction this speech, and that in doing so they did not restrict the rights under article 10 in an unlawful manner. This case is interesting both in a broader way in that it examines whether or not homophobic 56This development of positive obligations have mainly emerged through case law, and contuniues to do so: See for instance Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v. United Kingdom (App nos 9214/80; 9473/81 & 9474/81) 28 May 1985; X and Y v. the Netherlands (App no 8978/80) 26 March 1985; Christine Goodwin v. United Kingdom (App no 28957/95) 11 July 2002; K.U v. Finland (App no 2872/02) 2 December 2008. 57If such statements do exist, they could also be of a nature that would be criminalized and a racial motive could be seen as an aggravating circumstance when assessing penal value under Swedish law (Swedish penal code, Chapter 29 Section 2). 58The sentence for agitation against a national or ethnic group is imprisonment for, at most, two years or, if the crime is petty, a fine. 59Karin Åström & Görel Granström, ‘Den svenska regleringen av hatmotiverade brott: i linje med internationella normer?’ in Jubileumsskrift till Juridiska institutionen 40 år (2017) Örjan Edström, Johan Lindholm & Ruth Mannelqvist (Eds.) Umeå: Juridiska institutionen, Umeå universitet 285–301. 60See judgement by the Swedish Supreme Court: NJA 1982 s. 128. 61Over the years 2012 and 2016 there were between 12 and 44 reported incidents every year in Sweden of agitation against a national or ethnic group with anti-Roma motives. The Nation Council for Crime Prevention (BRÅ), ’Rapport 2017:11, Hatbrott 2016, ‘Statistik över polisanmälningar med identifierade hatbrottsmotiv och självrapporterad utsatthet för hatbrott’ 77. 62See SFS 2002:800. 14 T. ENARSSON AND S. LINDGREN statements can amount to hate speech (the Court ruled not in this case), but also since the Court declares that: […] inciting to hatred does not necessarily entail a call for an act of violence, or other criminal acts. Attacks on persons committed by insulting, holding up to ridicule or slandering specific groups of the population can be sufficient for the authorities to favour combating racist speech in the face of freedom of expression exercised in an irresponsible manner63 Therefore, this case demonstrates that signatory States have a real possibility in limiting hateful expressions against individuals or groups, even if the expressions do not, for instance, incite to violence. Just like the case law from the ECtHR, the Swedish case law reflects the contextuality that needs to be taken into account when handling cases concerning freedom of expression. What constitutes an expression according to article 10 is very wide, and basi- cally anything can be an expression under the ECHR64 and the Swedish penal code, in regard to the crime of agitation against a national or ethnic group. This means that tweets clearly stipulate expressions in that sense and would as such fall under such regu- lation. But as shown, whether or not individual statements expressed in the tweets could be seen as protected by freedom of expression must be assessed on a case to case basis. Tweets, even aggressive and offensive ones, connected to the identified anti-begging dis- course for example, containing criticism about a political situation, or about how political parties handle the question of begging Roma, for instance, could then be seen as having a stronger protection. This can however be contrasted with the previously mentioned Vejde- land v. Sweden, where the claimed purpose of leaving such leaflets in schools was to stir up a political debate of the ‘objectivity’ of what the school was teaching, but looking at the entire context of the situation – that the recipients of the messages where children, that the school was an arena relatively free from politics and that the leaflets were offensive in an unmotivated way – caused for a sanction against it.65 But, some expressions would – according to the analysis of ECtHR case law above – be seen as having significantly weaker protection under the convention, and Swedish law. Those are generally hateful ones, that do not contribute to a democratic discourse, and has no value in a political debate, and that also attack a minority such as Roma. Such expressions like the previously mentioned tweets comparing beggars with vermin, or that ‘gypsies’ do nothing but deceive, lie and beg. To decide if such expressions could be seen as agitation against a national or ethnic group a first step is to consider whether or not a tweet could be seen as spreading a statement in public, and according to both case law and preparatory work to the existing legislation, this form of publicly posting a statement on Twitter could – in general – be seen as in public. This is due to the fact that it should be enough with a quite limited group of people for this to be actualized, as long as it is more than a few, and not strictly in a private conversation between a group of people.66 The potential group of people that could access public tweets must cer- tainly be regarded as large enough.67 It is also not required that the people that in some 63Vejdeland v. Sweden (App no 1813/07) 9 February 2012 § 55. 64Hashman and Harrup v. United Kingdom (App no 25594/94) 25 November 1999. 65See the judgement from the Swedish Supreme Court: NJA 2006 s. 467. 66See judgement by the Swedish Supreme Court: NJA II 1988 s 541. 67See a similar reasoning in the judgement by the Court of Appeals (Svea Hovrätt), Case nr. 11651-17, date 2018-01-22, where posts on Facebook where made within a closed group that had thousands of members. INFORMATION & COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY LAW 15 way were targeted with this message – like all of the tweeters’ own followers or the fol- lowers of a certain hashtag – necessarily accessed the content.68 However, to establish if tweets like the above mentioned could fall under the scope of agitation against a national or ethnic group one must also consider if such statements threaten or express con- tempt for a group of people, the Roma, in this case. And the Swedish case law must relate to the case law of the ECtHR, meaning that Swedish courts in these cases must make an overall balancing between the freedom of expression and the protection of vulnerable groups, and in doing so seeing to the wider discursive context in individual cases, with factors such as the content of the expression, who it is targeting, the context in which it was stated and who is spreading it.69 The courts in Sweden have handled several similar cases over the last decade, where people have been charged for hateful speech online. One such case is that of a politician posting negative comments about the Koran and Islam. The overall message of the post was that Muslims coming to Sweden would consider it their right to rape women, and that this was in accordance with the Koran. This post was made in a clear political setting, since it was posted on a Facebook page of a political party where he himself was active as a politician, but the Court of Appeals stated that this post was not part of an ongoing debate in the party or related to a clear political idea, but instead was offensive to the targeted group. The court also stated that there, of course, must be room for a critical dis- cussion about religion, but that the statements made by the politician not could be seen as such.70 In another case, a man posted several posts on Facebook in which Muslims, Africans and refugees were targeted with allegations such as raping woman and children, that they were traitors in their home countries and in different ways implying that they trick the Swedish state or Swedes for money. This was regarded as agitation against a national or ethnic group due to the facts that he clearly was portraying Muslims, Africans and refu- gees as living criminal lifestyles, it was not within the scope of objective criticism and he must have understood the great reach these messages were going to get.71 In a similar case, a man expressed disrepute towards Muslims and Africans on Facebook, claiming, inter alia, that there was a connection between immigrating Muslims and the number of rape-cases in Sweden. The court devoted some reasoning to the question on the validity of the statements. The accused claimed to believe that the statements that he had made were factually true, and that he did not intend to agitate against these groups. However, the Swedish court ruled that he had not provided any evidence for these claimed factually correct statements, and he was therefore convicted.72 Such assessments by the Swedish courts could be seen as in accordance with how the ECtHR have reasoned over the years, where the Court has differentiated between expressions that are purely a value statements, which are subjective and cannot be proven, and such expressions that claim to be factually correct. When making such statements a 68See for instance judgement by the Swedish Supreme Court: NJA 1999 s.702 and The Swedish Government, ‘Prop. 2001/ 02:59 Hets mot folkgrupp m.m.’ 15. 69See judgement by the Court of Appeals (Svea Hovrätt), Case No. 11651-17, date 2018-01-22, and judgements by the Swedish Supreme Court: NJA 2006 s. 467 och NJA 2007 s. 805. 70Court of Appeals (Svea Hovrätt), Case No. B 4509-16, date 2016-12-20. 71Court of Appeals (Svea Hovrätt), Case No. 11651-17, date 2018-01-22 72Court of Appeals (Hovrätten över Skåne och Blekinge), Case No. B 1632-17, date 2017-11-06. 16 T. ENARSSON AND S. LINDGREN person could be asked to prove or show that there are valid reasons to make such a statement.73 This exemplification shows that tweets, similar to the studied ones, in some cases could be seen as illegal under Swedish law, especially when they do not contribute to a political discussion, are beyond objective criticism, not factually true (or substantiated) and degrad- ing to, for instance, Roma. Worth noting in regard to both Swedish legislation and the handling of this issues in Swedish courts, as well as the case law of the ECtHR, is that cases like those mentioned above rarely lead to more severe penalties than fines. The pro- portionality of the criminal sanction and the offense will be examined extra closely by the ECtHR, and imprisoning someone for such offenses will be harder to justify for the signa- tory States. The seriousness of the offense and any previous offenses by the applicants will be taken into account in doing so.74 Conclusions It is important to keep a strict balancing in regard to freedom of expression, where indi- vidual victims or targeted groups also have strong protection. Since, in not doing so, indi- viduals as well as larger communities may suffer great emotional damage, and loss of freedom themselves, such as withdrawing from social media or hiding parts of themselves as not to be subjected to hateful behaviour. From this study, it is clear that the legal pro- tection under the ECHR and Swedish law for such types of hateful expression against a group of people such as Roma, on basis of their cultural or ethnical origin for example, varies a great deal depending on the wider discursive context. When an expression can be seen as a direct part of a political discussion, is presented in a way that is not unnecess- arily offensive, or when it presents objective criticism that is in some way factually true and substantiated – then the protection of freedom of expression, such as a tweet about Roma, must be higher. Even though that same tweet may be perceived as offensive to a reader or viewer. However, it is not in any way impossible to protect people and groups of people from hateful speech against them, on the contrary the signatory States must do so. Many of the studied tweets about Roma, if not all, could be said to have some kind of basis in a political debate, and could therefore have a stronger protection, but as shown by, for instance, both the case of Le Pen v. France and that of the Swedish politician, the courts will place emphasis on the aim, value, and accuracy of the statement as well, making it poss- ible to legally intervene against speech that is perhaps triggered by an ongoing political debate, but hateful in nature and without value to that debate as such. That a statement was made within the scope of a political discourse may not make the tweet itself a political statement. That would also mean that tweets containing, for instance, political hashtags will not automatically become ‘political’ in nature. The complexity and the fact that any tweet, or other expressions online, must be viewed and assessed individually to be able to take into account the surrounding context and discourse, also makes it hard to give clear guidelines for what expressions are allowed and not. That is a challenge for courts 73David Harris and others, Harris, O’Boyle & Warbrick: Law of the European Convention on Human Rights (Oxford University Press 2014) 697–707. 74Bernadette Rainey and others, Jacobs, White & Ovey, The European Convention on Human Rights, (Oxford 2014) 451. INFORMATION & COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY LAW 17 and law enforcement agencies faced with countering hate speech. In a time where large social media platforms are criticized it is also worth noting that it can be a challenge for them as well, since it in some cases can be very difficult to draw a line between offensive, but protected speech, and plain hateful speech. In regard to the arena of the crime, i.e. hateful speech online, one could also raise the question of what type of communication tweets really are? Are they always as static as we tend to perceive written messages as, where people should be expected to have time to take a step back and reflect on the wording and expressions used? Or could tweets, when they are part of a continuous debate on Twitter, be seen as a kind of ‘live-debate’ in line with the case of Gündüs v. Turkey? No answers can be given to that questions here, but it is clear that the internet truly has changed and challenged the landscape of communication and therefore also have challenged and will continue to challenge the legal handling of communication between people. Legally we are, and have been for several years, facing a new arena – in Sweden and in the rest of Europe. To access this arena and, if necessary, make legal adjustments we might need to expand our methodological approach. The tools used for this study could help legislators identify problem areas that need addressing (legally) and could also be used as a political tool in terms of showing the discourses surrounding certain people or groups of people, in order to address those discourses.75 Disclosure statement No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors. Funding This work was supported by Brottsofferfonden [grant number 2605/2013] and Vetenskapsrådet [grant number 2016-04195_VR]. 75Note of course, that there are other ways to find out if and what kind of illegal, or potentially illegal, content exists on social media platforms, such as statistics of reported crimes, interviews or questionnaires focusing on victimization etc. However, the tweets that were identified as potentially unlawful were mainly to be considered as hate speech, which in Sweden is believed to be massively underreported. It is important to reveal some content behind these hidden statistics. See Sveriges Radio, (Gustav Wirtrén) ‘Stort mörkertal för hatbrott på nätet’ (18 October 2018) <http://sverigesradio.se/ sida/artikel.aspx?programid=96&artikel=6801370>. 18 T. ENARSSON AND S. LINDGREN http://sverigesradio.se/sida/artikel.aspx?programid=96%26artikel=6801370 http://sverigesradio.se/sida/artikel.aspx?programid=96%26artikel=6801370 Abstract Introduction Background: Roma in Sweden Hate speech on the internet Data and method Data collection and text pre-processing Topic modelling Interpretation and critical legal analysis Identifying discursive themes through topic modelling Contextualization and legal analysis of identified discourses Freedom of expression in relation to different discourses Swedish legislation in relation to hateful tweets in identified discourses Conclusions Disclosure statement 
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work_jjwca3ag5baa3fxkxswbpyvfcu	----	For Peer Review https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/sro Sociological Research Online For Peer Review 1 'New directions in hate reporting research: agency, heterogeneity and relationality' Key Words: Hate crime/incidents, sexuality and transgender identities, race/faith, disability, transformative identities, hate relationships. Abstract The third party hate reporting project Arch, based in the North East of England, has one of the largest datasets on third party reporting of hate incidents/crime in the UK. Spanning a 10 year period from 2005, this dataset, though limited, provides a unique opportunity to trace the patterns of those reporting hate, based on ‘race’ and faith, sexuality and trans gender identity, and disability. Focussing on reports of hate, based on perceived sexuality and/or transgender identities, the article considers the timing, location and nature of hate crimes/incidents reported, as well as some of the patterns in the repeat reporting data. This is done to suggest three features of those who are victimised by hate crime/incidents. First, they can be understood as agentic, indeed, of inhabiting transformative identities: not only do they challenge their perceived stigmatised identities by reporting their hate experiences, but by doing so they reframe the identities of those normals who enact hate as stigmatised. Second, they are heterogeneous, with multiple, intersecting identities, different experiences of hate and responses to them. Third we suggest that, by drawing on the parallels between domestic violence and hate, it might be more fruitful to think of those who report repeat victimisations, especially of apparently ‘low level’ experiences, as being caught up in hate relationships. In conclusion, a new agenda is suggested for hate research to include a focus on agency, heterogeneity and relationality. Introduction In this article we draw on our quantitative analysis of a 10 year data set from a third party hate reporting project in the North East of England to outline three features arising from the dataset that we believe point to future research agendas for the field of hate. In doing so we consider the data primarily of those reporting hate based on sexuality and transgender identities, but also draw on comparisons across the other protected strands to reinforce the points being made. The first feature is of the agency exercised by different reporters of hate crime/incidents. Here we take a sociological approach to theoretically challenge existing understandings of those victimised by hate as non-agentic. Instead we suggest that there is evidence that at least some of those who report hate crime/incidents might be exhibiting transformative identities, simultaneously resisting their own perceived identities as stigmatised and claiming that the identities of normals who enact hate are / should be stigmatised. The second feature is that those reporting experiences of hate are heterogeneous with multiple, intersecting identities, different experiences of hate and different responses to them; and that heterogeneity occurs both across and within those groups currently protected under hate crime legislation. A third feature of the data on repeat reporting leads us to suggest that it might be useful to draw on some of the parallels Page 1 of 20 https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/sro Sociological Research Online 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 For Peer Review 2 that exist between hate and domestic violence, to consider ‘hate relationships’ in those instances where experiences of hate are characterised by repetition – either in association with an individual or a specific location. In what follows there is first a very brief history of the way that hate legislation has appeared in the United Kingdom (UK) and a discussion about how hate has been conceptualised. Here we introduce a sociological take on stigma and Goffman’s notion of transformative identities to point to the agency demonstrated by those reporting hate crime/incidences. A discussion about heterogeneity follows to highlight how different responses to hate might be shaped by resources that can be drawn on as a result of inhabiting multiple, intersecting identities as well as the targeted, stigmatised one. We also consider the utility of a focus on hate relationships rather than incidents of hate to facilitate a better understanding of the impacts of hate for some of those victimised. Throughout these discussions we refer primarily to the literature on hate based on sexuality and/or transgender identities (see Authors 2016, 2017 for analysis focussing on ‘race’ and faith, and disability respectively). The methodology includes discussion about the limitations attached to using quantitative data not collected with a research agenda in mind. The findings focus on the types of hate reported, the locations and times in which hate crimes/incidents occurred and repeat reporting. This then allows us to discuss the heterogeneity of those victimised by hate, the agency of those victimised who, we argue enact transformative identities, and the importance of relationality for the impacts of hate crime/incidents for some of those victimised by what we call hate relationships. This is followed by the conclusion in which we return to considering the implications for future research. Making sense of hate motivated crime/incidents and state responses The relatively recent enactment of hate crime legislation in the UK can be understood in at least two interconnected ways: as symbolic of an increasingly liberal and tolerant society; and as an attempt to address particular kinds of violent/abusive behaviours experienced by groups that are marginalised or stigmatised in society. This is unusual. Not because it is unusual for legislation to have multiple purposes but because the illiberalism and intolerance being addressed in hate legislation used to be supported, reinforced and embedded in discriminatory legislation against the same groups who, in the parlance of the legislation, display or inhabit the protected characteristics of ‘race’, faith, disability, ‘sexual orientation’, or transgender identity. For example, until the 1967 Sexual Offences Act, the state legitimised the persecution of, as they were termed then, homosexual men, not only by criminalising their sexual activities, but also by pronouncing on their moral degeneracy and the threat they posed to young boys and to society. Hate crime legislation can, therefore, be seen as enacted by a state explicitly wishing to atone for, as well as address, institutionalised discriminatory behaviours against these groups. Whilst this might be a welcome addition to the range of motives for criminalising behaviours, it also presents a particular framework for understanding, defining, measuring and addressing the problem Page 2 of 20 https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/sro Sociological Research Online 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 For Peer Review 3 and opportunities for alliance or partnership building between groups representing the protected strands and the state. Such debates and policy developments have been activated by key or fateful moments (Giddens 1992): events when extreme acts of hate have captured public attention and demanded state action. In the UK, the death of Stephen Lawrence and the subsequent Macpherson Report are credited by many as key moments in the beginning of the process (Chakraborti and Garland 2015) leading to racially aggregated offences being legislated for in the Crime and Disorder Act (1998). Later, the nail bomber attacks on ‘gay’ spaces and geographical areas associated with high proportions of residents from Black, Asian and other ethnic minority groups led to the identification of religion as a monitored strand (in the Anti-terrorism Crime and Security Act 2001), whilst, sexuality, transgender identity, and disability became monitored strands in section 146 of the Criminal Justice Act (2003). For the police this meant that lesbian, gay, bisexual and/or trans (LGB and/or T) i individuals, especially men who have sex with men, were to be seen, not as potential criminals, but potential victims of crime (see Authors 2011). These key moments revealed what individuals within these communities have long understood and campaigned about: not just that they are vulnerable to being attacked but that their perceived vulnerability is the result of broader, socio-economic and heteronormative structures and ideological (moral, faith driven) factors, that, historically and cumulatively, have positioned their communities as subordinate to dominant social groups (Perry 2001; Chakraborti and Garland 2014). What has made matters worse, especially for addressing hate through the criminal justice system is that there are those representing the state who enact hate or discriminatory behaviours themselves. For example, James Anderton, Chief Constable of Greater Manchester between 1975-1991, was renowned for his Christian-fuelled homophobia. He began to use a Victorian law against ‘licentious dancing’ to criminalise gay men and lesbians who danced together and in 1986 at a seminar on how the police might treat those with Aids said: Everywhere I go I see evidence of people swirling around in the cesspool of their own making. Why do homosexuals freely engage in sodomy and other obnoxious sexual practices knowing the dangers involved? (Clews 2014) Later, in 2012, The Manchester Evening News reported on documents they had secured showing how much the then prime minister, Margaret Thatcher, intervened to protect Anderton from heavy criticism from Senior Civil Servants and Chief Constables who felt that he was threatening the reputation of the police (in The Telegraph 2012). With this social problem, perpetrators of hate crimes/incidents are not so easily isolated as being ‘other’ to, and therefore outside, so called ‘respectable society’. Those who identify as LGB and/or T have historically had a troubled relationship with the UK state. Legislated against as (legal, moral) outlaws, discrimination against them has not only been legitimised but enacted by representatives of the state at every level. Thus whilst the legislative landscape has changed in ways that were unimaginable less than twenty years Page 3 of 20 https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/sro Sociological Research Online 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 For Peer Review 4 ago (Authors 2001), there remains what Authors (2011) call a ‘gap of trust’ between mainstream agencies, particularly the police, and those identifying as LGB and/or T (see also Walters et al. 2017). As such there has been a debate about the extent to which LGB and/or T people should adopt the systems of the state, specifically the criminal justice system, to address hate crime/incidents (see Moran and Skeggs 2003; Moran 2004 for an overview of this discussion). Others, taking a view from outside the criminal justice system, argue that, rather than closing language down by designating it as ‘hate speech’, a better response might be to engage with language more fully, to put it ‘to its communicative purpose so that it opens the subject [of homophobia] to the social world’ (Harvey, 2012: 203) until hate speech becomes defunct (see Harvey 2012, for an overview of this debate). Browne et al. (2011) have also argued that focusing on what the impacts of hate crime/incidents are, rather than on what is experienced, would allow for a broader social, rather than a narrow criminal justice system response, prioritising the needs of the victimised alongside the societal need for perpetrator accountability. Such an approach would be aware that the reactions of those victimised are heterogeneous in order to avoid ‘generalis[ing] victimisation to all LGBT people’ (Brown et al. 2011: 745; see also Harvey 2012). Stigma, Transformative Identities and Agency The work of Link and Phelan (2001) provides a sociological take on stigma to conceptualise the ways in which hate crime/incidents are targeted at those with perceived stigmatised identities. Drawing from Goffman (1963) they argue what is important in defining stigma is its impact on those with perceived stigmatised identities and the operation of power within society that enables discrimination and status loss for those stigmatised; they say: ‘stigmatization [sic] is entirely contingent on access to social, economic and political power that allows the identification of differentness, the construction of stereotypes, the separation of labeled [sic] persons into distinct categories, and the full execution of disapproval, rejection, exclusion, and discrimination.’ (Link and Phelan 2001: 367) Structural power is thus essential to understanding how behaviours that might be called hate crime/incidents can be considered otherwise by those perpetrating the behaviours. The latter might perceive their behaviours as resulting from entitlements accruing from their membership of social groups located in more privileged positions in the social structure of society generally, as well as in specific social and spatial contexts. Using Goffman’s (1963) analysis of stigmatised identities we can see that perpetrators of hate believe themselves to be normals, whilst those they see as embodying stigmatised identities are not believed to be ‘quite human’ (Goffman 1963: 14). We can see this playing out since the decriminalisation of homosexuality. Violence was historically enacted through the state, towards who we would now term gay men (and lesbians) i.e. imprisonment, chemical castration and aversion therapy; and legitimately Page 4 of 20 https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/sro Sociological Research Online 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 For Peer Review 5 reinforced in everyday life, particularly through violence. Normals enacting violence (‘stigmaphobia’ (Goffman 1963: 28)) on members of a stigmatised group, were without fear of prosecution and could understand themselves to be reinforcing moral values. Goffman also refers to ‘atrocity tales’ told by the professionally stigmatised. These are representatives of stigmatised groups who promote social justice for these groups. However, Goffman never unpacks either what ‘stigmaphobia’ or ‘atrocity tales’ might entail other than ‘extreme mistreatment by normals’ (Goffman 1963: 23). We are left to deduce that they include the range of behaviours we now call hate crimes/incidents. Throughout his work Goffman (1963) suggests a fixedness in the stigmatised and normals’ social positioning because the majority of the identities he refers to are those that are structurally rather than individually produced (see Tyler and Slater, 2018 for a discussion of this limitation of Goffman and a broader discussion of the need to understand stigma as a cultural and political economy). This, reflects the structural power relationships between social groups that Link and Phelam (2001) refer to as crucial in understanding stigma. Nevertheless, Goffman does leave open the possibility that relationships between the stigmatised and normals can change both at the group level over the history of a society and at the individual level over a lifetime. Legislation cementing the right to equal legal treatment of all, regardless of sexuality and/or transgender identity, evidences the ways in which these identities are being transformed and becoming ‘respectable’. With respectability comes protection under the law and legitimate victim status which can act as an empowering process for some of this group to enact transformative identities in their use of hate legislation. Yet this transformative process is not linear. The dynamism and complexity of hate crimes/incidents illustrate this through the relative visibility of different stigmatised groups within specific social, spatial and, indeed, temporal contexts. We come back to this below. Authors such as Orne (2013; and see Siegel et al. 1998) have been exploring the extent to which Goffman’s (1963) stigmatised identities can illuminate the ways in which LGB and/or T people manage their identities in the face of varying degrees of hostility and/or homo-bi- transphobia. Orne argues that Goffman’s offer of two responses from ‘normals’ – hostility and acceptance - is limited and that, in fact, LGB and/or T people face challenges or reactions lying somewhere in between. Likewise, he argues that Goffman’s management strategies for those with stigmatized identities are also limited because they are all assumed to be motivated by a shared understanding between those with stigmatized identities and normals that the formers’ identities are stigmatized. However, he found evidence of LGB and/or T people who have ‘an alternative world view’ (Orne 2013: 230). Rather than avoiding their identities being revealed (i.e. by ‘passing’ as Goffman would have it 1963: 57) some participants challenge others’ worldviews of them as having stigmatized identities by coming out. Such transformative strategies are what underpin the discussion of data in this article with respect to those reporting hate crime/incidents to a third party reporting project. Page 5 of 20 https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/sro Sociological Research Online 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 For Peer Review 6 We suggest that two conditions are required to facilitate a process resulting in transformative identities. First, a formal process by which transformative identities are legitimised, for example, through hate crime legislation. Second, a transformation in the underlying assumptions made about the victimhood of stigmatised identities. Both processes are social and require some degree of structural change in the power relations in society in relation to subordinated groups. Heterogeneity and Victimhood When expressions of hate target perceived stigmatised identities, there is an expectation that those victimised will conform to a stigmatised/victim identity. Victimology in its earliest incarnation focussed on victim-blaming presumptions. Whilst victimology has changed to include analyses that are more critical of such essentialist and individualistic approaches (e.g. Christie 1986; Walklate 2016), we would argue that there is still a dominant construction of victimhood associated with a particular construction of femininity: weak, vulnerable, without agency. Stigmatised identities can be socially and materially ‘othered’ and feminised by both normals seeking to enact hate and help providers after a hate crime/incident. Yet, what hate crime/incident reporting systems allow for and encourage is those being victimised to take action. Reporting then can be seen as evidence of those with stigmatised identities rejecting acceptance of stigmatised identities and instead framing those who have enacted hate as having a stigmatised identity: that of somebody who has potentially committed a crime. Of course the ability to report depends on the resources of the person victimised that accrue from the multiple identities they inhabit: for example, they might be a gay man but they might also be white and middle class. The work of Meyer (2010) focusses on intersectionality to begin to unpack the heterogeneity of those victimised by hate crime/incidents based on sexuality and transgender identity. He found that ‘race’ and social class were key shapers not only of how LGB and/or T people made sense of their experiences but, importantly what they then did about them. Broadly speaking, those who were poor or working class LGB and/or T people of colour all experienced physical hate violence whilst those who were white and middle class LGB and/or T people mostly experienced verbal abuse (see also Browne et al. 2011), yet the latter were much more likely to report and/or seek help/support from mainstream agencies – and were encouraged to by their informal support networks. The former – the poor and working class - told friends and family but neither reported to any mainstream services nor received any support to do so. Meyer suggests that those who report might be characterised as having more social capital and a sense of entitlement to better treatment than those who do not (Meyer 2010). Hate Relationships Hate crime/incidents have been theorised as emblematic of structurally embedded social inequalities and hierarchies of power and privilege. Perry (2001: 1-2) goes further arguing Page 6 of 20 https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/sro Sociological Research Online 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 For Peer Review 7 that hate is a mechanism of oppression. The broader social context (which is itself the product of its national, socio-economic and cultural history of hierarchical relationships with colonies and indigenous, minoritised groups) within which hate occurs is understood to be causally related to, and therefore in part responsible for, hate crime/incidents. In other words, hate crime/incidents are an almost inevitable outcome of societies in which structural differences shape, reflect and reinforce hierarchies of power based on ‘Othering’ minoritised groups. As Ahmed (2001) has cogently argued, hate does not reside in any one individual but is part of an affective economy based on historical attachments and relationships between individuals as members of social groups. Such approaches to understanding hate have parallels in feminist approaches to understanding domestic violence. The definition of domestic violence used here is that of the Home Office definition: an incident or pattern of coercively controlling or threatening incidents exerted by an intimate partner or family member and which can include physical, emotional, sexual, psychological and economic violence (Home Office 2013). This definition has been influenced by feminist scholarship and activism (Author 2017) and emphasises the repeat victimisation that characterises the power dynamic in the relationship. Feminists have provided an analysis of these behaviours that focuses on the violence of the individual (man) as understood to be a result of a patriarchal and hierarchical social context in which women and dominant constructions of femininity have been positioned as subordinate to, and of less worth than, men and dominant constructions of masculinity (Authors 2014). Thus male violence is understood to be the result of structural factors and everyday practices that reproduce and reinforce gendered inequalities within both public and private spheres and result in individual men being violent towards individual women. Hate crime is, thus, also as much a result of socio-historical-economic-cultural factors as it is the result of an individual’s decision to enact hate. Understanding the interconnectedness of violent behaviours and the socio-cultural support for violence is crucial in understanding that violence is socially performed and experienced. Much of the hate that is reported is enacted by people known to those victimised (Stanko 1997) and this in itself suggests social relationships yet these does not seem to be taken into account in studies that consider hate crime perpetrator typologies (McDeavitt et al. 2002; Roberts et al. 2013). Being ‘known’ covers a range of relationships from neighbours, shop keepers, other school students, to family members. In disability hate crime, ‘mate hate’ is a specific type of hate that those with learning disabilities might be particularly susceptible to (e.g. Thomas 2013) wherein the individual who would enact hate ‘befriends’ a person with learning disabilities and subsequently exploits them in financial, material and in other ways. This draws attention to specific and complex configurations of social and geographical relationships and the manner in which individuals might be socially and spatially positioned in situations that facilitate or guard against potential victimisation. As Nayak (2017) has shown in his study of ‘race encounters’ in Sunderland, it is in the racist/hate encounter that stigmatised identities are produced rather than them pre-existing that encounter. Thus Page 7 of 20 https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/sro Sociological Research Online 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 For Peer Review 8 stigmatisation can be understood as a non-linear process that is context and relationship driven where the relationship between the stigmatised and normal is understood as a socially, culturally, and politically unequal one. In addition, as Ahmed (2001) points out, some social groups come to be known in ways that reflect historical socio-cultural stories, that have accumulated and sedimented over time into ‘truths’, that then individual members are not only perceived to represent, but also be responsible for. Thus hate relationships might not only exist between individuals but with locations associated with individuals, such as gay pubs and clubs or local cruising areas, for what they are perceived to represent and/or provide a ‘home’ for. The research suggests that when hate incidents occur that are one-off and between strangers this is most often the case for those reporting hate based on sexuality and/or transgender identity (see Browne et al. 2011; Chakraborti et al. 2014; Walters et al. 2017); possibly the result, we suggest, of the hate relationship perpetrators have with a geographical location associated with LGB and/or T people. Naming these as hate relationships might enable a better understanding of what is being reported – that instead of focussing on apparently separate or isolated incidents that are typically ‘low level’ and beneath the threshold of a crime, the focus should be on a relationship of hate being constructed over time. Methodology Arch is a third party reporting project based in the North East of England, originally set up in 2002 and funded by four of the local authorities in the Tyne and Wear area of the region as a 24-hour telephone racist incident reporting project. Later, the project expanded when faith, sexuality, disability and transgender identities became protected strands under hate crime legislation. By 2006 ninety-three reporting centres had been recruited as part of a model of working based on community engagement and community intelligence gathering that could allow ‘hot spots’ of hate incidents to be identified and addressed with training in conflict management. The database was developed to collect data on hate across the four authorities but the data from Sunderland and Newcastle, the two largest cities in the Tyne and Wear region, are the most carefully and consistently collected and this paper draws from an analysis of the data from those two cities, over ten years for Newcastle and over three years for Sunderland. The Arch database was not set up with quantitative data analysis in mind and the partnership between Arch and the research team was based on an ‘action oriented’ piece of research (Pain 2003) intended to enable Arch to better develop and use the database as a tool of analysis as well as develop more qualitative research questions to make sense of the quantitative data. Unfortunately these aims could not be met because in 2015 the funding for the project workers at Arch was cut. Whilst the Arch database remains and a telephone helpline exists to log third party reports of hate, the unique model of working that the Arch project had developed based on community engagement was ended. Page 8 of 20 https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/sro Sociological Research Online 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 For Peer Review 9 Despite these caveats the data provide a unique, longitudinal profile of reporting across the main hate strands and form a database that is amongst the largest in the UK: the database holds data on 3,908 incidents of which just over a fifth (22%, n=860) are repeat incidents. Hate incidents motivated by ‘race’ and faith make up the largest proportion of the reports (82%) with those motivated by hate on the grounds of sexuality and transgender identity making up 10% (these groups were combined because there were only three cases of hate based on trans gender identity) and hate on the grounds of disability the remaining 8%. Descriptive statistics were used in the form of cross-tabulation tests to examine the frequency distribution of cases when examining the correlation between two or more variables. Two or more variable frequency distributions were analysed using a chi-square statistic (X2) to discover whether variables are statistically independent or whether they are associated (P ≤ .05). Only statistically significant findings are used in this paper. Whilst the database is unique in its size it is also only able to give limited accounts of those willing to report their experiences to a third party reporting system; and the research is clear that most of those victimised by hate crime/incidents do not report either to the police or third party reporting agencies (e.g. Chakraborti et al. 2014; Williams and Tregidga 2013). Consequently the data underestimates the prevalence of hate crime/incidents being experienced in Newcastle and Sunderland during the periods of data collection. This is another reason why the key findings discussed in this article can only be suggestive and warrant more research to explore their validity. Before discussing those findings it is important to also provide an account of some of the contours of the database and address ethical concerns. It was designed as a live tool that could be changed and amended over time. That this happened is evidenced by the different data collected by Sunderland (2009-2012) and Newcastle (2005-2015). In the latter’s dataset there are important missing data about the gender of the person reporting but in both datasets there were other missing demographic variables such as sexuality and faith. However, as we argue elsewhere, ‘this context did not just allow us to think through the value of the data itself but also what we might learn about the contexts through which this data (and our analysis) was being produced’ (Authors 2016: 67). The database is large and as such presents unique opportunities to consider patterns and trends that can be read and interpreted in ways that are informed not just by our reading of the relevant literature but also by the professionals involved with Arch and the broader political funding context. Our final analysis is thus the consequence of a ‘dialogue between the statistical, the experiential and the political’ (Ibid: 73). The data used by the research team was anonymised and no qualitative data was available. This provided ethical assurance that no individual could be identified in the analysis; and the nature of Arch meant that those who reported understood that the database was used to identify and report on patterns, hotspots and areas of concern. Key Findings Page 9 of 20 https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/sro Sociological Research Online 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 For Peer Review 10 The data presented reflects what was collected in relation to four core features of the database: the kinds of hate crime/incident reported; the geographical area in which the reported hate crime/incident took place; the time at which the hate crime/incident took place; and who reported repeat victimisation for what kinds of hate crime/incidents. Insert here Figure 1 Figure 1: Types of hate crime/incidents reported across protected strands The Arch data shows (Figure 1) that those reporting hate crime/incidents because of sexuality and gender identity were significantly more likely (P≤0.00) to report offensive and/or abusive language (43%) than those reporting ‘race’ and faith or disability hate crime/incidents (both at 28%). Conversely, they were least likely to report hate crime/incidents that involved material and criminal damage (8% compared with 9.6% of those reporting disability hate and 18.8% reporting race/faith hate). Keeping this in mind, Figure 2 shows, in a map of electoral wards, where in Newcastle or Sunderland hate was reported. Here, for those reporting hate crime/incidents based on sexuality and gender identity, the electoral wards most often the location for the hate crime/incident being reported are the city centres – the area which in Newcastle houses the gay scene, known locally as the Gay Triangle (36.3%); and in the city centre of Sunderland (14.5%) where the main transport link by metro to Newcastle is located. We speculate that it is not just coincidence that these areas might also be the places that LGB and/or T people might be travelling within, to and from whilst engaging with the night-time economy. Figure 2 here Figure 2: Map Showing Reported Incidents Of Hate Across Electoral Wards Of Newcastle And Sunderland Finally, the data from Sunderland alone, which provides the time of day or night the reported hate crime/incident took place (Figure 3) indicates that those reporting sexuality and transgender identity hate crime/incidents were the group most likely to be reporting hate crimes/incidents taking place in the very early hours of the morning. Sunderland does not have as visible a gay scene as Newcastle and it is very common for LGB and/or T people to travel to participate in the Gay Triangle (Authors 2008). Chakraborti et al. (2014) also found that those reporting hate crime/incidents on the grounds of sexuality were most likely than other groups to report their experiences occurring in public spaces, in/around pubs and clubs. The data thus suggests that coming home from nights out whether in Sunderland or Newcastle might be a time when hate crime/incidents might be reported. The other peak, during the time period 3-6pm, might be explained by being that time when schools, colleges and employment end. This may be a potentially risky time for those who might be victimised for their sexuality and/or transgender identity as they make their way home. Figure Three here Page 10 of 20 https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/sro Sociological Research Online 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 For Peer Review 11 Figure 3: Figure Showing Times of Day and Night Reported Incidents Of Hate Took Place in Sunderland In contrast, reporting of ‘race’/faith and disability hate crimes/incidents appears to occur somewhat consistently across wards (with peaks in those neighbourhoods that are among the most socio-economically deprived (see Authors 2016 for a discussion about this) and at all times of the day and night. They are also more likely to report physical violence and material damage. Taken together this suggests that those reporting hate crimes/incidents on the basis of race/faith and disability are more likely to be experiencing this nearer to, or at, home. Turning to the 22% of the reports of hate crime/incidents across the strands that constitute repeat victimisation, there are two findings of note. First is that most of those reporting repeat victimisation are those reporting hate crime/incidents on the grounds of sexuality and transgender identities (32% as opposed to 21% for those reporting race/faith hate and 17% for those reporting disability hate). Second, those who are reporting repeat victimisations of hate crime/incidents motivated by sexuality and transgender identities are most likely to be reporting to the police as well as Arch about verbal abuse. Fifty-seven percent of those reporting hate crimes/incidents motivated by sexuality and transgender identity to the police reported verbal abuse compared with 29% of those reporting ‘race’ and faith hate crimes/incidents and 24% of hate crimes/incidents motivated by disability. This pattern suggests that there is a group of people victimised by hate motivated by sexuality and trans identity who are determined to report to the police, even hate crimes/incidents typically regarded as low level. Discussion Heterogeneity, Agency and Relationality We would suggest that this analysis supports the findings of others (e.g. Browne et al. 2011; Meyer 2010) that those victimised by hate crime are heterogeneous both within and across the protected strands. Secondly, there is evidence that some, especially those victimised by hate based on sexuality and/or transgender identity, are enacting transformative identities: that of being an authentic and legitimate victim of a hate crime/ incident. Simultaneously, through their use of formal reporting systems, they are challenging the identity of the normal(s) who perpetrate hate crime/incidents as potential criminals. This is supported by the analysis showing evidence that there are those targeted by hate who are insisting on (repeat) reporting their experiences, even of apparently lower level expressions of hate (verbal abuse), and suggests, (as does, Meyer, 2010; Orne, 2013 and Siegal et al. 1998) that stigmatised identities are not accepted, as Goffman would have it, but rejected and re- directed at the so-called normals who are expressing hate. Perpetrators’ perceptions of whether or not individuals belong to stigmatised groups might rely on contextual cues – partly taken from what somebody looks like, (do they look gay? Trans?), how they behave (are those two women/men holding hands?), what they sound Page 11 of 20 https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/sro Sociological Research Online 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 For Peer Review 12 like (if they are men do they sound ‘effeminate’?), where they are and at what time of the day/night (might they have come out of a gay pub or club?). All of this relies on ideas about the potential target for hate being perceived as too different, in both the context and to the potential perpetrator and an ‘easy’ target, i.e. one who will behave as a victim and not do anything, or one for whom there might be doubt about their credibility as a witness. What the data suggests is that there is a group amongst those who are reporting hate crime/incidents based on sexuality and transgender identities, who do not conform to their expected role as (passive, discreditable) victims but instead are willing to report, even if their experience is ‘only’ of verbal abuse; and that they are willing to repeatedly report their experiences, not only to a third party reporting system, but in most of these cases to the police as well. Many of those who report hate crime/incidents on the grounds of sexuality and/or trans gender identity are out in the city centre and /or out accessing the night time economy which suggests that these are individuals with financial and social resources. This supports the findings of Meyer (2010) which points to middle class, white LGBT individuals being the most willing to report to mainstream organisations, even verbal hate, and who are also most likely to be supported by their informal support networks to do so. Whilst the data gives no information about the ‘race’, gender, or social class of those reporting to Arch, the patterns are suggestive of a group who are resourced enough to be out for the night and/or on the scene who are refusing to be positioned as victims and are instead reporting what might be seen as low threshold hate incidents. Relationality The literature points to the ways in which hate crime/incidents are assessed by relying on a hierarchy of seriousness. As with domestic and sexual violence, seriousness tends to reflect a hierarchy of violence and abuse with physical violence at the top, whilst threats, verbal violence and online violence tend to be underplayed both by those victimised and service providers, including the police. Indeed the perceived ‘trivial’ nature of their experiences is often given as a reason not to report to the police (Bells et al. 2006; Guasp et al. 2013; Meyer 2010). Yet, what most people report to Arch, and surveys of hate crime/incidents, is verbal hate/incidents (e.g. Chakraborti et al. 2014) of which a high proportion are repeat incidents (Ibid). This suggests that such behaviours, especially when repeated, can be impactful in ways that need further research to understand. Focussing on the parallels there are between hate crime/incidents and domestic violence, it might be of use to consider the impact of repeat victimisation of hate, regardless of the type of violence, particularly when that is happening in and/or around the home or locations associated with those victimised. It might be that some perpetrators of hate crime/incidents are exerting what those in the domestic violence and abuse field call coercive control in ‘hate relationships’ with an individual, household or family, or establishment or part of town (e.g. the ‘gay scene’, see Richardson and May 1999; Williams and Tregidga, 2013). On their Page 12 of 20 https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/sro Sociological Research Online 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 For Peer Review 13 own the discrete behaviours might not even be perceived as anything more than low level anti-social behaviour, normalised such that individuals are expected to become inured to them. Yet experienced with repetition over time the cumulative impact might parallel the impacts for survivors of coercive control in domestically violent relationships, i.e. increased vigilance, fear, a sense of being trapped, decreased confidence, a diminished sense of self, agency and liberty (see Stark 2007 in relation to these impacts for survivors of domestic violence). Further, all of these impacts might be exacerbated if, after seeking help, the response is to minimise experiences by isolating the behaviours and impacts and failing to see the relationships between the incidents; and between the perpetrators and those they victimise, including where they might go to victimise. Conclusion The evidence that the reporting of hate crime/incidents is increasing both to the police, third party reporting agencies and in crime surveys (of reported and unreported criminal experiences) can be seen as a positive sign of growing confidence amongst targeted groups - that they can report and expect to be taken seriously. The fact that reports of hate crime/incidents saw a sharp increase in the three months following the result of the UK referendum on membership of the European Union, is also suggestive of this trend (BBC 2017). There is also some evidence that reporting is motivated by positive intentions to improve things not just for those victimised but also for others. In the All Wales Hate Crime Research Project (Williamson and Tregidga 2013), the three most often cited reasons for reporting were: because it was the right thing to do; to stop it happening again and in the hope that the offender would be brought to justice. Discussions about the relative merits of adopting terms such as hate or bias to distinguish those behaviours apparently motivated by hate have illustrated the intricacies and challenges of using the law to both penalise such behaviour and send a ‘symbolic message’ (Perry 1981) reinforcing tolerance and inclusion. Moran (2004) queried the apparent growing alliance between LGB and/or T communities and the criminal justice system in criminalising hate on the grounds of sexuality. However, if reporting provides opportunities to experience agency (without necessarily leading to a criminal justice response) and provide socially transformative processes for those victimised, as well as for those considering enacting hate, then this might have impacts that are more wide-ranging than just for the individuals involved. Those victimised by hate crime/incidents tend to be characterised by their lack of agency, as being individuals to whom bad things are done. Whilst our argument does rely on an analysis that structural factors can act to construct stigmatised groups as targets for hate, it does not accept a simple construction of passive victimhood. Instead, we argue that it is both power relationships (influenced by historical structural inequalities), as well as perpetrators’ perceptions of power, as embodied in any particular member of a stigmatised group, that come together in an act of hate. Typically, hate crimes/incidents – as with Page 13 of 20 https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/sro Sociological Research Online 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 For Peer Review 14 domestic violence – take place when the perpetrator(s) believe there will probably be no retaliation (i.e. that they will not come to harm themselves) and when they believe they can act with impunity. For hate relationships to endure impunity must be relatively secure. The latter is evidenced by the research that consistently shows most of those victimised do not report their experiences to the police (Corcoran et al. 2015). However, we can also look again at the patterns of reporting hate for what it might tell us about the heterogeneity amongst those victimised. It might be that the reporting of hate incidents that do not reach the threshold for a criminal justice outcome reflects an increased sense of agency and empowerment amongst some members of stigmatised groups which defies perceptions of them as passive victims who will put up with the misery they are experiencing. Perceptions of power might also be misunderstood by perpetrators of hate crime incidents when they believe that they can tell who the members are of minoritised groups and that all members are the same – passive victims who nobody will listen to and who can be victimised. Like the work of Meyer, (2010) the Arch database suggests that some of those reporting hate based on sexuality and/or trans identity might be those who have other resources resulting from their other identities. We also suggest that considering the existence of hate relationships in some of those reporting repeat hate crimes/incidents might enable a better response to those victimised. Instead of responding to repeat incidents as if they are separate and discrete, understanding the impact of repeated incidents on those victimised as akin to those experienced in coercively controlling intimate relationships might result in a more appropriate response from help providers. Finally, as stated at the outset, the conclusions we reach are suggestive but, we believe enough to support a different kind of research agenda in the field of hate that focuses on heterogeneity, agency and relationality. Research is needed to consider motivations for reporting, the demographic factors of those who report as well as those who do not report to the police, perceptions of and/or relationships with perpetrators, temporal and spatial aspects to hate relationships, and, importantly the impacts of repeated, and apparently low- level experiences of hate. Such research is necessary to further assist the development of policy and practice that is better able to understand and respond to the diversity of hate experiences. Page 14 of 20 https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/sro Sociological Research Online 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 For Peer Review 15 AHMED, S. (2001) ‘The organisation of hate’ Law and Critique, Vol 12, No. 3, p. 345-365. BBC (2017) ‘Record hate crimes' after EU referendum’ http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk- 38976087, February 15, 2017. BELL, M.; Hows, J.; Murphy, T. and Smith, F. (2006) Crime & prejudice. The support needs of victims of hate crime: a research report, London: Victim Support BROWNE, K.; Bakshi, L.; and Lim, J. (2011) ‘It's Something You Just Have to Ignore’: Understanding and Addressing Contemporary Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Trans Safety Beyond Hate Crime Paradigms’ Journal of Social Policy Vol 40, No. 4, p. 739 - 756 DOI: 10.1017/S0047279411000250, Published online: 19 May 2011 CHAKRABORTI, N. and Garland, J. (2015) Hate Crime (2nd Edn). London: Sage CHAKRABORTI, N.; Garland, J. and Harvey, S. (2014) The Leicester Hate Crime Project. Findings and Conclusions: Executive Summary, University of Leicester, www.le.ac.uk/centreforhatestudies CHRISTIE N (1986) ‘The ideal victim’, In E. Fattah E (ed.) From Crime Policy to Victim Policy: Reorienting the Justice System. Basingstoke: Macmillan, pp 17–30. Authors 2008 Authors 2016 Authors 2017 CLEWS, C. (2014) ‘1986. Politics: Manchester’s Chief Constable James Anderton’, http://www.gayinthe80s.com/2014/05/1986-politics-manchesters-chief-constable-james- anderton/ Posted on May 12, 2014. CORCORAN, H.; Lader, D. and Smith, K. (2015) Hate Crime, England and Wales, 2014/15, Home Office: Statistical Bulletin 05/15 Authors 2011 Authors 2014 GIDDENS, A. (1992) The Transformation of Intimacy: Sexuality, Love and Eroticism in Modern Societies, Cambridge: Polity Press. GUASP, A.; Gammon, A. and Ellison, G. (2013) Homophobic Hate Crime. The Gay British Crime Survey, London: YouGov with Stonewall. GOFFMAN, I. (1963) Stigma. Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity, London: Penguin. Page 15 of 20 https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/sro Sociological Research Online 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 For Peer Review 16 HARVEY, A. (2012) ‘Regulating homophobic hate speech: Back to basics about language and politics?’ Sexualities, Vol 15, No. 2, p. 191–206. HOME OFFICE (2013) https://www.gov.uk/government/news/new-definition-of-domestic- violence LINK, B., & Phelan, J. (2001) ‘Conceptualizing Stigma’ Annual Review of Sociology, Vol 27, p. 363-85. Authors 2017 MCDEVITT, J., Levin, J. and Bennett, S. (2002) ‘Hate crime offenders: an expanded typology’, Journal of Social Issues Vol 58, No. 2, p. 303-17. MEYER, D. (2010) ‘Evaluating the Severity of Hate-motivated Violence: Intersectional Differences among LGBT Hate Crime Victims’ Sociology Vol 44, No. 5, p. 980-995. MORAN, L. (2004) ‘Emotional Dimensions of Lesbian and Gay Demands for Hate Crime Reform’, McGill Law Journal, Vol 49, p. 925-949. MORAN, L. & Skeggs, B. (2003) Sexuality and the Politics of Violence and Safety, London: Routledge. NAYAK, A. (2017) ‘Purging the nation: race, conviviality and embodied encounters in the lives of British Bangladeshi Muslim young women’ Transactions of the Institute of the British Geographers, Vol 42, p. 289-302. ORNE, J. (2013) ‘Queers in the Line Of Fire: Goffman’s Stigma Revisited’ The Sociological Quarterly, Vol 54, p. 229–253 PAIN, R. (2003) Social geography: on action-orientated research, Progress in Human Geography, 27(5): 649–657 PERRY, B. (2001) In the Name of Hate: Understanding Hate Crimes London: Routledge RICHARDSON, D. and May, H. (1999) ‘Deserving Victims?: sexual status and the social construction of violence’ in The Sociological Review, Vol 47, No. 2, p. 308-331 ROBERTS, C.; Innes, M.; Williams, M.; Tregidga, J. Gadd, D. (2013) Understanding Who Commits Hate Crime and Why They Do It. Welsh Government Social Research: Crown Copyright SIEGEL, K., Lune, H. and Meyer. I. 1998. “Stigma Management among Gay/ Bisexual Men with HIV/AIDS.” Qualitative Sociology, Vol 21, No. 1, p. 3–24. STANKO, B. (1997) ‘Homophobic Violence and the self “at risk”: Interrogating the Boundaries’ Social and Legal Studies, Vol 6, No. 4, p. 513-532. Page 16 of 20 https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/sro Sociological Research Online 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 For Peer Review 17 STARK, E. (2007) Coercive Control. How Men Entrap Women in Personal Life, Oxford: Oxford University Press THE TELEGRAPH NEWSPAPER (2012) ‘Margaret Thatcher saved career of police chief who made Aids remarks’ http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/law-and- order/8991935/Margaret-Thatcher-saved-career-of-police-chief-who-made-Aids- remarks.html, January 4 2012 THOMAS, P. (2013) Hate Crime and Mate crime: hostility, contempt and ridicule. In A. Roulstone and H. Mason-Bish (Ed). Disability, Hate Crime and Violence, (pp. 135-147) London: Routledge. TYLER, I. and Slater, T. (2018) ‘Rethinking the sociology of stigma’, The Sociological Review Monographs, Vol 66, No. 4, p. 721-743. WALKLATE, S. (2011) ‘Reframing criminal victimization: Finding a place for vulnerability and resilience’, Theoretical Criminology, Vol 15, No., 2, p. 179 –194 WALTERS, M., Paterson, J., Brown, R. and McDonnell, L. (2017) ‘Hate Crimes Against Trans People: Assessing Emotions, Behaviours, and Attitudes Toward Criminal Justice Agencies’ Journal of Interpersonal Violence, ISSN 0886-2605. Authors 2001 WILLIAMS, M. and Tregidga, J. (2013) All Wales Hate Crime Research Project Research Overview & Executive Summary, All Wales Hate Crime Research Project, i The authors acknowledge that this acronym is becoming less and less accurate vis-a-vis a shorthand for the multiple identities about sexuality and gender identity that are emerging in many Western countries. However, for the sake of brevity this acronym will be used as it is still the one most recognised by mainstream academic, policy and practice audiences to whom this article is aimed. Page 17 of 20 https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/sro Sociological Research Online 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 For Peer Review Figure 1: Types of hate crime/incidents reported across protected strands 221x177mm (72 x 72 DPI) Page 18 of 20 https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/sro Sociological Research Online 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 For Peer Review Figure 2: Map Showing Reported Incidents Of Hate Across Electoral Wards Of Newcastle And Sunderland 184x155mm (72 x 72 DPI) Page 19 of 20 https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/sro Sociological Research Online 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 For Peer Review Figure 3: Figure Showing Times of Day and Night Reported Incidents Of Hate Took Place in Sunderland 221x177mm (72 x 72 DPI) Page 20 of 20 https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/sro Sociological Research Online 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 
work_jkdkxmgboneipembi2xd36qhqm	----	The Decreasing Role of the USA in Promoting Human Rights The Decreasing Role of the USA in Promoting Human Rights Susan Mapp1 & Shirley Gatenio Gabel2 Published online: 16 May 2019 # Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019 In the years following the end of the Second World War, the USA used its status as a world power to promote the idea of universal human rights. A committee led by Eleanor Roosevelt, the widow of the US president and a formidable proponent of human rights, developed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the most translat- ed document in the world. This document established the bold idea that there was a minimum level of human rights to which all people everywhere were entitled, regardless of what country in which they lived, what identity they held, or any other category of difference. However, since that time, the USA has been a reluctant partner in the idea of global human rights and holding itself to those standards; it has ratified only one of the Covenants that established the UDHR in international law, and only two of the Conventions—the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination and the Convention against Torture. It is the only country in the world not to have ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child. Despite this reticence to apply these global human rights norms to itself, each year, the USA releases an assessment of how well other countries perform in this area. This stance has become substantially worse since the Trump Administration came to power in 2017. The USA withdrew from the Human Rights Council at the UN in 2018, just days before the Council released its report from the Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights, which was extremely critical of the United States’ track record on poverty and particularly noted how the policies of the Trump Administration worsened an already bad situation by seeking to slash the social safety net and provide more to the wealthy. In recent months, the Trump Administration has denied visas to human rights investiga- tors seeking to assess the situation of migrants, especially intended asylum seekers, on the southern border, as well as to members of the International Criminal Court seeking to investigate possible war crimes committed by the United States in Afghanistan. In the Spring of 2019, the USA forced a re-wording of a United Nations resolution on the use of rape as a weapon of war to eliminate language on reproductive and sexual health. It is also not supporting the Conventions it has ratified. It is currently more than a year and a half late on submitting its periodic review to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination and recently declined to appoint a member to that body, despite an increasing number of hate crimes occurring since the 2016 election. While this journal has an international focus and prides itself on publishing authors from around the world, it is based in the USA, and it is essential that social workers in this country work to help all peoples achieve their hu- man rights. However, this is limited by the decision of the US National Association of Social Workers not to include a specific reference to human rights when updating its Code of Ethics, despite the fact that many other countries do and that the International Federation of Social Workers in- cludes human rights in its definition of social work (Mapp et al. in press). US social work education still pri- oritizes the concept of social justice over that of human rights, and students are limited in their understanding of international documents and norms (Gatenio Gabel and Mapp in press). The articles in this issue add much-needed information to this discussion of how to further human rights, in the USA and beyond. Howell examines the issue of the remov- al of the right to vote in the USA from substance users convicted of related crimes, while Rossiter and McPherson explore what a rights-based approach to social work in the jails might look like. Bokek-Cohen as well as Gerlach offer opportunities to learn from cultural traditions in other countries. Borek-Cohen analyzes the conse- quences of matchmaking practices in certain communities * Susan Mapp mapps@etown.edu Shirley Gatenio Gabel gateniogabe@fordham.edu 1 Elizabethtown College, Elizabethtown, PA, USA 2 Fordham University, New York, NY, USA Journal of Human Rights and Social Work (2019) 4:101–102 https://doi.org/10.1007/s41134-019-00100-5 http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1007/s41134-019-00100-5&domain=pdf mailto:mapps@etown.edu in Israel while Gerlach provides us with insight into the concept of buen vivir from indigenous communities in Latin American countries. Rotabi et al. discuss how to apply the rights-based approach in developing effective child protection systems in India, while Fronek et al. dis- cuss how to further children’s rights through alternative care policies in Cambodia. All of these authors offer im- portant information to help chart a path to the future based on human rights. Social workers should be at the forefront of bringing about the realization of rights. References Gatenio Gabel, S., & Mapp, S. C. (in press). Teaching human rights and social justice in social work education. Journal of Social Work Education. Mapp, S. C., McPherson, J., Androff, D., & Gatenio Gabel, S. (in press). Social work is a human rights profession. Social Work. Publisher’s Note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdic- tional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. 102 J. Hum. Rights Soc. Work (2019) 4:101–102 The Decreasing Role of the USA in Promoting Human Rights References 
work_jmlbewuonvggxgiowh5l4rprf4	----	Mental health in the post-COVID-19 era: challenges and the way forward 1Vadivel R, et al. General Psychiatry 2021;34:e100424. doi:10.1136/gpsych-2020-100424 Open access Mental health in the post- COVID-19 era: challenges and the way forward Ramyadarshni Vadivel,1 Sheikh Shoib ,2 Sarah El Halabi,3 Samer El Hayek,4 Lamiaà Essam,5 Drita Gashi Bytyçi,6 Ruta Karaliuniene,7,8 Andre Luiz Schuh Teixeira,9 Sachin Nagendrappa,10 Rodrigo Ramalho,11 Ramdas Ransing ,12 Victor Pereira- Sanchez,13 Chonnakarn Jatchavala ,14 Frances Nkechi Adiukwu ,15 Ganesh Kudva Kundadak16 To cite: Vadivel R, Shoib S, El Halabi S, et al. Mental health in the post- COVID-19 era: challenges and the way forward. General Psychiatry 2021;34:e100424. doi:10.1136/ gpsych-2020-100424 Received 10 October 2020 Revised 23 November 2020 Accepted 23 December 2020 For numbered affiliations see end of article. Correspondence to Dr Ramdas Ransing; ramdas_ ransing123@ yahoo. co. in Correspondence © Author(s) (or their employer(s)) 2021. Re- use permitted under CC BY- NC. No commercial re- use. See rights and permissions. Published by BMJ. INTRODUCTION The COVID-19 pandemic has posed a serious threat to global mental health. Multiple lines of evidence suggest that there is a varying yet considerable increase in mental health issues among the general population and vulnerable groups.1 2 The aftermath is obscure and speculative from a social, economic, individual and public mental health perspective. Recently published studies support the existence of an emotional epidemic curve, describing a high probability of an increase in the burden of mental health issues in the post- pandemic era.3 4 Furthermore, previous major public health emergencies showed that more than half of the population devel- oped mental health problems and required mental health intervention.4 5 There is, therefore, an urgent need to reorganise existing mental health services to address the current unmet needs for mental health and to prepare for future challenges in the postpandemic era in terms of prevention and management. THE BURDEN OF MENTAL HEALTH ISSUES IN THE POST-COVID-19 PANDEMIC ERA The current evidence and published litera- ture related to previous epidemics suggest that mental health issues may arise after the peak of the pandemic, with increased prevalence among the vulnerable popula- tion and people with risk factors (box 1).4 The surge in mental health issues may remain untreated or undiagnosed due to interrupted mental health services and other challenges for mental health services in the post- COVID-19 pandemic era. CHALLENGES FOR MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES IN POST-COVID-19 PANDEMIC ERA The paucity of human resources, infrastructure and burn-out of mental health professionals (MHPs) In many countries, MHPs have been rede- ployed for the provision of medical services in COVID-19 care centres.6 MHPs and physi- cians working in COVID-19 services are experiencing an increased level of mental health issues owing to work stress and the death of patients and loved ones.7 8 If the mental health of MHPs remains unaddressed, then these professionals may not be able to provide efficient mental health services in the postpandemic era. In low and middle- income countries (LMICs) where MHPs are scarce, this could further widen the treatment gap for mental disorders.9 10 Assessing mental health issues In the postpandemic era, it may be difficult to identify mental disorders aetiologically related to COVID-19 (eg, anxiety due to cyto- kine storm) owing to a lack of specific diag- nostic or screening tools.11 The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition or International Classification of Diseases 10th Revision/Eleventh Revision- based diagnostic interviews may under- report or over- report the underlying conditions. The impact of misinformation (‘the infodemic’) In some countries, particularly LMICs, waves of misinformation about COVID-19 are going to persist owing to multiple reasons (eg, reli- gious and/or political beliefs). Surprisingly, most countries are not well prepared for managing this infodemic.3 The inability to access accurate information will strain the individual’s mental health and may lead to an increase in polarisation and the occurrence of hate crimes.12 o n A p ril 5 , 2 0 2 1 b y g u e st. P ro te cte d b y co p yrig h t. h ttp ://g p sych .b m j.co m / G e n P sych : first p u b lish e d a s 1 0 .1 1 3 6 /g p sych -2 0 2 0 -1 0 0 4 2 4 o n 9 F e b ru a ry 2 0 2 1 . D o w n lo a d e d fro m http://bmjopen.bmj.com/ http://orcid.org/0000-0002-3739-706X http://orcid.org/0000-0002-5040-5570 http://orcid.org/0000-0001-9765-2184 http://orcid.org/0000-0001-5543-1746 http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1136/gpsych-2020-100424&domain=pdf&date_stamp=2021-02-09 http://gpsych.bmj.com/ 2 Vadivel R, et al. General Psychiatry 2021;34:e100424. doi:10.1136/gpsych-2020-100424 General Psychiatry Access to mental healthcare services Lack of preparedness, overburdened mental health services, increased prevalence of mental health issues and interrupted mental health services will limit access to mental healthcare facilities in the postpandemic era, particularly in LMICs. Many psychiatric facilities and outpatient departments are currently converted to manage COVID-19.13 14 Therefore, people with mental illness may not seek help from these services owing to a fear of infection. Many pharmaceutical industries have changed their focus to the preparation of COVID-19- related drugs, vaccines and preventive kits (sanitisers), which may hamper the production of psychopharmaco- logical drugs. Perceived job insecurity, financial problems and unemployment contribute to significant risks for psychiatric disorders and pose an important barrier in accessing mental healthcare. Psychotherapy The complex and ever- changing dynamics of the COVID-19 pandemic will be a challenge for psychother- apeutic services owing to a lack of physical and social connection.15 In LMICs, the dearth of telepsychiatric services will limit accessibility to psychotherapy.10 Support systems Adults, children, adolescents and families are affected by the loss of the structured support found in schools, childcare facilities or physical workplaces.4 Rebuilding this extrafamilial system will be challenging. Public health paradox and injustice A substantial body of evidence suggests that people with the highest level of mental health needs often have the least access to services.16 In a post- COVID-19 pandemic era, it will get exaggerated owing to economic recession, strain on resources and unemployment. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR POSTPANDEMIC MENTAL HEALTH SERVICE PREPAREDNESS Because of the limited scientific understanding of the COVID-19 pandemic and mental health thus far, post- pandemic preparedness is difficult. The pandemic is an unpredictable, irregular occurrence and its impact could be difficult to measure and explore. Considering this, we recommend using the components of the mental health preparedness and action framework (MHPAF) for postpandemic preparedness. MHPAF consists of five interlinked components, including preparation and coordination, monitoring and assessment, sustainability of mental healthcare services, infodemic management and communications.3 This framework has been used to evaluate pandemic preparedness in some countries like Kenya and the USA.17 However, postpandemic mental health preparedness could be more challenging in coun- tries that are inadequately prepared for pandemics. In addition to preparing for the components of MHPAF, we suggest a few additional interventions for effective and efficient management of postpandemic psychiatric services. Mental healthcare delivery COVID-19 has affected mental healthcare delivery because of the redeployment of MHPs. We need to recon- sider a few practical approaches or models of care for effective delivery in the postpandemic era. Telepsychiatry Telepsychiatry needs to be developed through a government- supported service platform centred on community health service centres to enable easier access to psychiatric care, especially among vulnerable popu- lations (eg, the elderly). However, the digital divide, access to marginalised populations and poverty are major barriers to telepsychiatry services in LMICs. This could affect the feasibility and acceptability of telepsychiatry in many countries. Considering this challenge, it is impera- tive that healthcare workers reach out to patients and aim at equitable access of telepsychiatric facilities. Infodemic management More robust regulation of social media companies by non- partisan, non- corporate, global regulators is needed to clamp down on the spreading of fake news, anti- vaccine movement and polarising content. All countries should take stringent steps towards infodemic management Box 1 Mental health issues, vulnerable population and risk factors 1. Mental health issues: including grief reactions, substance use disor- ders, anxiety, sleep disorders, depression, suicides, post- traumatic stress disorders, panic disorders.4,25,26 – New- onset mental health issues: due to COVID-19- related stress, fear and loneliness; enduring neuropsychiatric symptoms or dis- orders (eg, acute ischaemic stroke, headache, dizziness, atax- ia, delirium and seizures) of COVID-19 infection due to cytokine storms.27 – Relapse of pre- existing mental illness: due to reduced access to therapeutic resources, disruption of therapies, service provision and social support.4 10 – Suicides: due to neuropsychiatric manifestations and the socio- economic impact of COVID-19.4 – Other issues: COVID-19- related stigma, discrimination and hate crimes.21,28 2. Vulnerable population: children and adolescents; elderly; unem- ployed and homeless persons; COVID-19 survivors; healthcare workers (HCWs); those with pre- existing psychiatric disorders; grass- roots workers; pregnant women; people with disabilities and chronic diseases; migrants; refugees; lesbian, gay, bisexu- al, transgender and queer (LGBTQ) community; racial and ethnic minorities.7,21,29 3. Risk factors: the death of either parent, caregivers or loved ones, misinformation, loss of peer support because of closure of school or workplace, academic loss, medical comorbidities, uncertainties, stigma, prolonged isolation, social rejection, work stress, burn- out, being in direct contact with active cases and facing economic burdens.4,25 o n A p ril 5 , 2 0 2 1 b y g u e st. P ro te cte d b y co p yrig h t. h ttp ://g p sych .b m j.co m / G e n P sych : first p u b lish e d a s 1 0 .1 1 3 6 /g p sych -2 0 2 0 -1 0 0 4 2 4 o n 9 F e b ru a ry 2 0 2 1 . D o w n lo a d e d fro m http://gpsych.bmj.com/ 3Vadivel R, et al. General Psychiatry 2021;34:e100424. doi:10.1136/gpsych-2020-100424 General Psychiatry by the formulation of guidelines for responsible media reporting. Additionally, infoveillance (information moni- toring), building eHealth literacy and capacity, knowl- edge refinement and accurate and timely knowledge translation should be encouraged.18 Integrative care National public health policies should be designed to provide integrated care for mental health in different settings such as hospitals, primary care services, commu- nities, schools, universities, colleges and workplaces.19 Formalising liaison between these settings with mental health services would help to promptly identify and holis- tically address emerging mental health needs. Developing support groups, screening of at- risk groups, peer coun- selling services, establishing dedicated crisis helplines, preparation for long- term plans and expanding support services can facilitate early access to mental health needs. Community mental health services Community mental health services should be well prepared to screen, identify people at risk, provide psycho- logical first aid and facilitate onward referral services.20 Primary healthcare workers and organisational gate- keepers (eg, pharmacists, geriatric caregivers and school teachers) should be trained to identify individuals at risk and direct them to proper evaluation and treatment. Human resources, education and training Current redeployment of, and potential burn- out among, MHPs in the COVID-19 setting is affecting preparations for the delivery of mental health services for the post- pandemic era. Policymakers and stakeholders should consider this as a priority. In many countries (like India), grass- roots medical staff (Accredited Social Health Activist- ASHA, teacher) are playing an important role in prescreening and triage, door- to- door visits, follow- up and on- site screening of COVID-19. Therefore, grass- roots workers should be trained in identifying and managing pandemic- associated psychiatric and psychosocial issues. Formulate guidelines and protocols Many people have been exposed to similar health risks, isolation, grief and economic uncertainty, individually and with their families. Therefore, certain common themes should be used to formulate guidelines to improve access to care. Assessment and intervention The use of a toolkit or stepped care or matched care model through primary care physicians can improve the coverage of mental health services in the postpandemic era by allowing them to manage common mental disor- ders of mild severity.20 Suicide prevention In anticipation of an increase in suicide rates, efforts should be made to reduce access to means (eg, more stringent gun control) and for better resourcing with suicide prevention agencies along with global decriminal- isation of suicide/attempt(s). In addition, early screening for mental illness and treatment should be encouraged. Research Prospective cohort studies should be carried out to iden- tify risk factors and exposure levels, track outcomes and compare outcomes among subgroups. These studies are important to monitor the effect of various interventions and strategies. Stigma and discrimination Interventions are needed to reduce stigmatisation and discrimination towards minority or vulnerable groups and to inform policy changes.21 22 General and specific interventions should be directed towards identification of drivers (eg, misinformation), facilitators (eg, lack of regulations) and intersecting factors (eg, occupation such as healthcare workers) towards reducing stigma and discrimination.21 Networks and services A multinational network of MHPs in collaboration with World Health Organisation (WHO) should be set up to enable the sharing of research and clinical practice para- digms in the post- COVID-19 era. This network should focus on building resilience both in the community and on an individual level. Approach for addressing postpandemic mental health and services Addressing emergent challenges with appropriate inter- ventions could be challenging in many countries partic- ularly in low- resource settings. Therefore, efforts should be taken for the prevention of mental health issues on a large scale and organisation of services for early iden- tification of mental health issues. These approaches to mental healthcare prevention and treatment after the COVID-19 crisis can be classified as universal, selective or indicated.23 24 Universal approach This is a population- wide intervention that will help reduce the overall burden of mental health issues (stress, anxiety and fear) through prevention; therefore, it is imperative to have a universal approach for each country (box 2). Selective approach It should be used for an individual having the risk factors for developing mental health issues. For example, a vulnerable population and individuals with risk factors mentioned above. A screening toolkit or guidelines should be developed to identify these groups of people.20 Indicated approach It should be designed for individuals having signs and symptoms of the mental issues as mentioned above. This approach ought to be guided by well- defined guidelines o n A p ril 5 , 2 0 2 1 b y g u e st. P ro te cte d b y co p yrig h t. h ttp ://g p sych .b m j.co m / G e n P sych : first p u b lish e d a s 1 0 .1 1 3 6 /g p sych -2 0 2 0 -1 0 0 4 2 4 o n 9 F e b ru a ry 2 0 2 1 . D o w n lo a d e d fro m http://gpsych.bmj.com/ 4 Vadivel R, et al. General Psychiatry 2021;34:e100424. doi:10.1136/gpsych-2020-100424 General Psychiatry before the intervention. Some people with mental health issues might not seek help because of fear of COVID-19 infection, stigma and poor motivation. It is therefore important to identify these individuals through a network of hospitals and community health workers. Active outreach It can be helpful for people with a history of psychiatric disorders, COVID-19 survivors and older adults. CONCLUSION To conclude, there is an immediate need to identify the long- term mental health consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic. Clinicians, researchers and policymakers are expected to be prepared for these mental health issues in terms of assessment, interventions and the model of care in the postpandemic era. Author affiliations 1Department of Mental Health and Addictions, Waikato District Health Board, Hamilton, New Zealand 2Department of Psychiatry, Jawahar Lal Nehru Memorial Hospital, Rainawari, Srinagar, Jammu and Kashmir, India 3Department of Narrative Medicine, Columbia University, New York, New York, USA 4Department of Psychiatry, American University of Beirut, Beirut, Lebanon 5El Demerdash Teaching Hospital, Ain Shams University, Cairo, Egypt 6Hospital and University Clinical Service of Kosovo, Community- Based Mental Health Center and House for Integration, Prizren, Kosovo 7Medical Faculty Carl Gustav Carus, Technical University Dresden, Dresden, Germany 8Clinic for Psychiatry and Psychotherapy, Elblandklinikum Radebeul, Academic Hospital Technical University, Dresden, Germany 9Department of Psychiatry and Legal Medicine, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul, Porto Alegre, Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil 10National Institute of Mental Health and Neuro Sciences, Bangalore, Karnataka, India 11Department of Social and Community Health, School of Population Health, University of Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand 12Department of Psychiatry, BKL Walawalkar Rural Medical College, Ratnagiri, Maharashtra, India 13Department of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, NYU Grossman School of Medicine, New York University, New York, New York, USA 14Department of Psychiatry, Faculty of Medicine, Prince of Songkla University, Songkhla, Thailand 15Department of Neuropsychiatry, University of Port Harcourt Teaching Hospital, Port Harcourt, Rivers State, Nigeria 16Early Psychosis Intervention Programme, Institute of Mental Health, Singapore Twitter Sheikh Shoib @sk_shoaib22, Sarah El Halabi @selhalabi1, Samer El Hayek @samerelhayek, Lamiaà Essam @lamiaessam14, Ramdas Ransing @ ram_ransing, Victor Pereira- Sanchez @victorpsanchez and Frances Nkechi Adiukwu @franadiukwu Acknowledgements The authors wish to thank the Early Career Psychiatrists Section of the World Psychiatric Association (WPA) for being a supportive network that allowed early career psychiatrists from different countries to work together on this initiative. Contributors RV, GKK and RAR developed the concept of this article. SS, RAR, RV, GKK, SHB, SHK, LE, RK, ALST, SN, RDR, VPS, CJ and FNA contributed to writing the first draft of the manuscript. All the authors reviewed the final version of the manuscript before submission. RAR is responsible for the overall content of this paper. Funding The authors have not declared a specific grant for this research from any funding agency in the public, commercial or not- for- profit sectors. Competing interests None declared. Patient consent for publication Not required. Provenance and peer review Not commissioned; externally peer reviewed. Open access This is an open access article distributed in accordance with the Creative Commons Attribution Non Commercial (CC BY- NC 4.0) license, which permits others to distribute, remix, adapt, build upon this work non- commercially, and license their derivative works on different terms, provided the original work is properly cited, appropriate credit is given, any changes made indicated, and the use is non- commercial. See: http:// creativecommons. org/ licenses/ by- nc/ 4. 0/. ORCID iDs Sheikh Shoib http:// orcid. org/ 0000- 0002- 3739- 706X Ramdas Ransing http:// orcid. org/ 0000- 0002- 5040- 5570 Chonnakarn Jatchavala http:// orcid. org/ 0000- 0001- 9765- 2184 Frances Nkechi Adiukwu http:// orcid. org/ 0000- 0001- 5543- 1746 REFERENCES 1 Qiu J, Shen B, Zhao M, et al. A nationwide survey of psychological distress among Chinese people in the COVID-19 epidemic: implications and policy recommendations. Gen Psychiatr 2020;33:e100213. 2 Wu M, Xu W, Yao Y. 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Mental health of health- care workers in the COVID-19 era. Nat Rev Nephrol 2020;16:425–6. 9 Ransing RS, Agrawal G, Bagul K, et al. Inequity in distribution of psychiatry trainee seats and Institutes across Indian states: a critical analysis. J Neurosci Rural Pract 2020;11:299–308. Box 2 Focus of universal approach in the postpandemic era ► Promoting mental health wellness and reducing distress through adequate sleep, healthy diet and exercise, mindfulness‐based pro- grammes (eg, yoga) and awareness about mental health issues.30,31 ► Using traditional and social media for mental health awareness campaigns and to encourage individuals to seek help with responsi- ble, transparent and timely media reporting.3 ► Establishing community support for those at risk and encouraging to stay connected and maintain relationships. ► Establishing primary screening services for common mental health issues such as anxiety, depression and suicidal thoughts. ► Establishing the national suicide prevention helplines or other helplines.32 ► Integrating basic mental health services into primary care for early identification of COVID-19- related mental health issues. ► Developing self- help resources and promoting healthy coping strategies. ► Ensuring financial support for people through governmental and non- governmental organisations (eg, loans and credit). o n A p ril 5 , 2 0 2 1 b y g u e st. 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Infectious disease outbreak related stigma and discrimination during the COVID-19 pandemic: drivers, facilitators, manifestations, and outcomes across the world. Brain Behav Immun 2020;89:555–8. 22 Prasad SK, Karahda A, Singh P, et al. Role of mental health professionals in dealing with the stigma attached to COVID-19. Gen Psychiatr 2020;33:e100298. 23 Sher L. The impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on suicide rates. QJM: An International Journal of Medicine, 2020: hcaa202. 24 Sher L. Preventing suicide. QJM 2004;97:677–80. 25 Das N. Psychiatrist in post- COVID-19 era - Are we prepared? Asian J Psychiatr 2020;51:102082. 26 Vindegaard N, Benros ME. COVID-19 pandemic and mental health consequences: Systematic review of the current evidence. Brain Behav Immun;89:531–42. 27 Raony Ícaro, de Figueiredo CS, Pandolfo P, et al. Psycho- Neuroendocrine- Immune interactions in COVID-19: potential impacts on mental health. Front Immunol 2020;11:1170. 28 Varatharaj A, Thomas N, Ellul MA, et al. Neurological and neuropsychiatric complications of COVID-19 in 153 patients: a UK- wide surveillance study. Lancet Psychiatry 2020;7:875–82. 29 Cabarkapa S, Nadjidai SE, Murgier J, et al. The psychological impact of COVID-19 and other viral epidemics on frontline healthcare workers and ways to address it: a rapid systematic review. Brain Behav Immun Health 2020;8:100144. 30 Ransing R, Pinto da Costa M, Adiukwu F, et al. Yoga for COVID-19 and natural disaster related mental health issues: challenges and perspectives. Asian J Psychiatr 2020;53:102386. 31 Nagendrappa S, Shoib S, Rehman S, et al. Recognizing the role of animal- assisted therapies in addressing mental health needs during the COVID-19 pandemic. Asian J Psychiatr 2020;53:102390. 32 Ransing R, Kar SK, Menon V. National helpline for mental health during COVID-19 pandemic in India: new opportunity and challenges ahead. Asian J Psychiatr 2020;54:102447. Dr. Ramyadarshni Vadivel obtained her MBBS degree from the Jawaharlal Institute of Postgraduate Medical Education and Research (JIPMER), Pondicherry, India, in 2008. Now, she is an advanced trainee in mental health and addictions of the Royal Australian and New Zealand College of Psychiatrists (RANZCP). She is also working as a senior registrar in the addictions services of Waikato District Health Board (DHB) in Hamilton, New Zealand. She has been working in Waikato DHB since December 2017 and training in RANZCP since June 2016. She is a member of the Early Career Psychiatrist (ECP) Section of the World Psychiatric Association (WPA) and Network of Early Career Professionals working in the area of Addiction Medicine (NECPAM). In addition, she is a recipient of the World Congress of Social Psychiatry Young Fellow (WCSPYF) (2013), Japan Young Psychiatrists Organisation (JYPO) Fellowship (2013), and WPA ECP fellowship (2018), among other academic awards. Her main research interests include neurostimulation in the treatment of psychiatric disorders, with a special interest in addictions, smartphones and the use of technology in psychiatry and psychiatry in special populations (migration and refugees). She is currently a member of the worldwide network of ECP researchers working on the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on different areas of mental health and addictions. o n A p ril 5 , 2 0 2 1 b y g u e st. P ro te cte d b y co p yrig h t. h ttp ://g p sych .b m j.co m / G e n P sych : first p u b lish e d a s 1 0 .1 1 3 6 /g p sych -2 0 2 0 -1 0 0 4 2 4 o n 9 F e b ru a ry 2 0 2 1 . D o w n lo a d e d fro m http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fpsyt.2020.552450 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.bbi.2020.05.049 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.psychres.2020.113069 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.psychres.2020.113265 http://dx.doi.org/10.1097/PRA.0000000000000476 http://dx.doi.org/10.1097/PRA.0000000000000476 http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10900-011-9527-7 http://dx.doi.org/10.1186/s13033-020-00400-8 http://dx.doi.org/10.2196/21820 http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/gpsych-2020-100275 http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/gpsych-2020-100270 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.bbi.2020.07.033 http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/gpsych-2020-100298 http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/gpsych-2020-100298 http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/qjmed/hch106 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ajp.2020.102082 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ajp.2020.102082 http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fimmu.2020.01170 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S2215-0366(20)30287-X http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.bbih.2020.100144 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.bbih.2020.100144 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ajp.2020.102386 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ajp.2020.102390 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ajp.2020.102447 http://gpsych.bmj.com/ Mental health in the post-­COVID-19 era: challenges and the way forward Introduction The burden of mental health issues in the post-COVID-19 pandemic era Challenges for mental health services in post-COVID-19 pandemic era The paucity of human resources, infrastructure and burn-out of mental health professionals (MHPs) Assessing mental health issues The impact of misinformation (‘the infodemic’) Access to mental healthcare services Psychotherapy Support systems Public health paradox and injustice Recommendations for postpandemic mental health service preparedness Mental healthcare delivery Telepsychiatry Infodemic management Integrative care Community mental health services Human resources, education and training Formulate guidelines and protocols Assessment and intervention Suicide prevention Research Stigma and discrimination Networks and services Approach for addressing postpandemic mental health and services Universal approach Selective approach Indicated approach Active outreach Conclusion References 
work_jngind4mf5dkhgccavsfgxt4ci	----	Perception and Misperception in Urban Criminal Justice Policy: The Case of Hate Crime Donald P. Haider-Markel Department of Political Science 1541 Lilac Lane, 504 Blake Hall University of Kansas Lawrence, KS 66044 Email: prex@ku.edu Phone: (785) 864-9034 Fax: (785) 864-5700 An earlier version of this manuscript was presented at the annual meeting of the Southwest Political Science Association, March 2002. This research was funded by a 1998 Wayne F. Placek Award from the American Psychological Foundation. 1 Keywords: hate crime; perception; organizational context; law enforcement; public policy; interest groups Perception and Misperception in Urban Criminal Justice Policy: The Case of Hate Crime Abstract: Perceptions of an issue, problem, or policy might differ depending on the organizational context in which one is located--the basic notion that “where one sits is where one stands.” The importance of perception has been a concern for students of international relations, political institutions, organizational theory, and public policy, but less so for scholars of urban politics. My study contributes to our understanding of how organizational and community context influence perceptions by examining the perceptions of interest group leaders and police related to law enforcement activity on hate crime with survey data from each group in a sample of the 250 largest American cities. I present a basic theoretical framework for understanding how perceptions may differ depending on organizational and community context. I then test for differences in perceptions using both simple and more advanced statistical methods, controlling for community context. My results do indeed suggest organizational and community context influence perceptions of law enforcement activity. I conclude with a discussion of the implications of my findings for urban politics and democratic political systems more generally. 2 In the political arena human perceptions clearly shape how decisions are made, what decisions are made, and how those decisions come to be understood-- even when perceptions are wrong (Jervis 1976; Jones 1994). Given the importance of perception, one can ask how perceptions of an issue, problem, or policy differ depending on the organizational context in which one is located- -the notion that “where one sits is where one stands” (see Allison 1971, 169- 171). The importance organizational and community context in influencing perceptions has been a concern for students of international relations, political institutions, organizational theory, and policy implementation (Allison 1971; Bell 2002; Brown 1981; Crank 1994; Gerstenfeld 1992; Jervis 1976; Jones 1994; Kelly 2003; Klein and Sorra 1996; Morgan 1986; Pressman and Wildavsky 1973). Perceptions also have real consequences for government legitimacy, especially in a democracy. If citizens perceive that government is engaged in action x, and government officials are not, citizens may come to distrust the government. Such citizen distrust may be difficult to change and may lead to government officials being voted out of office, or at worst, face significant social unrest (Skolnick 1966; Skolnick and Fyfe 1993).1 In this study I contribute to our understanding of the role of organizational and community context by exploring differences in perceptions of law enforcement activity on hate crime in American cities. Making use of original survey data, I examine the perceptions of interest group leaders and 1 One can generate many examples of this problem. Most recently it has become clear that many African Americans perceive that law enforcement disproportionately targets them as a group for traffic stops and harassment. Meanwhile, some law enforcement agencies insist that they are not engaged in so-called “racial profiling,” and empirical evidence has been inconclusive. Nevertheless, the perceptions of African Americans have real consequences, greatly inhibiting the community’s relations with law enforcement (Bell 2002; Jacobs and Potter 1998). 3 police regarding law enforcement activity on hate crime in urban areas.2 I present a framework for understanding how perceptions may differ depending on organizational and community context. I then test for differences in perceptions using both simple and more advanced statistical methods, controlling for broader community contextual influences on perception. My results do indeed suggest perceptions of law enforcement activity are influenced by organization context, even when community characteristics are accounted for. For example, although activists are far less likely than police officials to perceive that law enforcement is doing much to address hate crime, the perceptions of activists and police are also influenced by community context. I suggest these findings have significant implications for democratic government and may be especially relevant for democratic politics in urban areas. CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND ORGANIZATIONAL CONTEXT The politics and process of policy adoption is often the focus of both academics and activists. However, a considerable body of research demonstrates that the success or failure of policy goals occurs during policy implementation. But it is during the implementation process that our attention tends to wane, as interest groups and elected officials often have little incentive to pursue victories outside of the legislative process (DiMaggio 1988; McCubbins and Schwartz 1984; Pressman and Wildavsky 1973). However, some might argue that this apparent lack of attention is simply due to differences in the perceptions of the actors involved. Although interest groups may believe that the bureaucracy is doing little in a given issue area, the bureaucracy itself may believe that it is doing a considerable amount, given limited resources and the like (Bell 2002; Franklin 2002; Jenness and Grattet 2001; Klein and Sorra 1996; Morgan 1986). 2 By interest groups I mean formal organizations created for the purpose of influencing the activity of government (Johnson 1998). 4 In criminal justice policy specifically a wide array of scholars have uncovered the nuances of how organizational structure, cultures, and community context can and often does shape the perceptions and behavior of law enforcement officials, their political overseers, and citizens (for example see Brown 1981; Crank 1994; Crank and Langworthy 1992; DiMaggio 1988; Meyer and Rowan 1977; Nolan and Akiyama 1999). But much of this literature tends to focus on policing methods and traditional crime categories. How well would these research findings fit with newer areas of criminal justice policy, especially those where law enforcement is called upon to address an issue, even when no specific law or ordinance may require them to do so? A network of scholars has suggested that one relevant area for examining the role of organizational and community context in criminal justice policy is hate crime (Balboni and McDevitt 2001; Bell 2002; Boyd et al. 1996; Franklin 2002; Jenness and Grattet 2001; Nolan and Akiyama 1999).3 Hate crime provides a fascinating view on the role of perceptions in criminal justice for several reasons. First, crimes motivated by bias do exist and can be addressed by law enforcement even if no state or local policies have been enacted relating to hate crimes. For example, the New York City police department aggressively tracks and pursues crimes motivated by bias even though no hate crime policy exists in the city or the state (Jacobs 1992; Jenness and Grattet 2001; Lawrence 1999). As such, law enforcement can take action on the issue even without guidance from criminal law (Haider-Markel and O’Brien 1999; Jacobs 1992; Jenness and Grattet 2001; Nolan and Akiyama 1999). Second, where hate crime policies do exist, they are often considered to be symbolic efforts to appease interest group demands and often little effort is made in this area by government officials beyond the adoption of a policy 3 Hate crimes are often defined as crimes that are committed, wholly or in part, because of the victim’s group identification. Group identification might include race, ethnicity, religion, sexual orientation, gender, veteran’s status, and disability, among others (Bell 2002). 5 (Balboni and McDevitt 2001; Haider-Markel 1998; Jacobs and Potter 1998; Jenness and Grattet 2001; Nolan and Akiyama 1999; Walker and Katz 1995). Thus, political forces, such as interest groups and citizen preferences, could play a relatively large role in this area, shaping the perceptions of all actors involved (Bell 2002; Jacobs and Potter 1998; Jenness and Broad 1997; Jenness and Grattet 2001). Third, hate crimes are difficult to track and identify--victims often fail to report the crimes and police may wish to avoid the controversy that often surrounds hate crime issues (Balboni and McDevitt 2001; Bell 2002; Jacobs and Potter 1998; Jenness and Grattet 2001; Levin and McDevitt 2002; Martin 1995, 1996; Nolan and Akiyama 1999). But occasionally hate crimes do occur that attract significant public attention, activating interest groups and prodding bureaucratic action (Boyd et al. 1996; Haider- Markel 1998; Jacobs 1992; Jacobs and Potter 1998; Jenness and Grattet 2001; Levin and McDevitt 2002; Nolan and Akiyama 1999). As such, both bureaucrats and interest groups may have a strong incentive to address these crimes, again depending on local political conditions (Bell 2002; Jacobs and Potter 1998; Jenness and Grattet 2001; Levin and McDevitt 2002). The extent to which hate crime is perceived as a problem by law enforcement, citizens, and elected officials, may be shaped by a variety of forces. Likewise, subsequent perceptions of law enforcement activity on hate crime should also be shaped by the organizational context in which individuals reside and the broader community in which they live and work (Bell 2002; Balboni and McDevitt 2001; Bell 2002; Jacobs and Potter 1998; Jenness and Grattet 2001). To start, citizens may believe that crimes motivated by racial or ethnic bias are more severe and significant to society than other types of crime. But community opinion on hate crime is likely to vary significantly across the country, especially when the crimes involve more controversial groups, such as homosexuals (Bell 2002; Haider-Markel and O’Brien 1999; Jacobs and Potter 1998). As such, the variability of citizen preferences should influence the 6 perceptions and behavior of political actors, including elected officials, interest group leaders, and law enforcement officials (Balboni and McDevitt 2001; Bell 2002; Franklin 2002; Jacobs and Potter 1998; Jenness and Grattet 2001). If citizens in a community believe the problem is of significant concern, politicians may cater to these concerns (to ensure reelection), and pass laws that provide harsh penalties. But the adoption of such policies will be dependent on citizen demands (Haider-Markel 1998; Jacobs and Potter 1998). Even in communities where demand is high, elected officials may not pursue effective implementation because they are unable to take credit for effective policy implementation in the same way they can for policy adoption (Franklin 2002; Jenness and Grattet 2001; McCubbins and Schwartz 1984). Meanwhile, law enforcement bureaucrats may be conflicted on aggressive pursuit of hate crime, perceiving few hate crimes relative to other types of crime, but in some cases, being pressured by local political conditions, including citizen preferences and interest groups, to take action on the issue, especially in highly publicized cases (Balboni and McDevitt 2001; Boyd et al. 1996; Jacobs 1992; Jenness and Grattet 2001; McDevitt and Levin 2002). Law enforcement could take aggressive action by collecting statistics or creating special task forces to demonstrate activity and mollify the demands of interest groups, but interest group demands might conflict with community preferences (Bell 2002; Walker and Katz 1995). Although, bureaucracies often welcome opportunities to expand their operations because such actions may increase the authority and resources of the bureaucracy (Meier 1993), bureaucratic leaders may believe that resources can be more effectively used in other areas and their organizational culture or structure may make adapting to new procedures difficult (Balboni and McDevitt 2001; Bell 2002; Finn 1988; Franklin 2002; Gerstenfeld 1992; Haider-Markel 2002; Jacobs and Potter 1998; Klein and Sorra 1996; Nolan and Akiyama 1999; Walker and Katz 1995). 7 And unlike other types of crime, interest groups play a larger role in hate crime (Haider-Markel 1998; Jenness and Grattet 2001). Various minority groups are concerned about hate crimes because they disproportionately impact their members (Bell 2002; Jenness and Grattet 2001; Martin 1995). For many racial, ethnic, and sexual minorities, interest groups that are concerned about broader issues, such as discrimination, have also focused on hate crime. Further, in some areas specific groups have formed to address hate crimes, establishing their own tracking systems, hotlines, and counseling services (Jenness 1995; Jenness and Grattet 2001). These groups view the problem as more serious than the general population, politicians, or bureaucrats, in part, because their incentive is to act on the concerns of their members (Johnson 1998). As such, they are more likely than any other actor to believe that law enforcement is only weakly pursuing hate crimes or are simply not doing as much as it could be doing (Bell 2002; Jenness and Grattet 2001). This discussion leads us to two key propositions. First, based on the organizational context in which law enforcement officials and interest group leaders exist, each should have differing views of the extent of the problem as well as the extent to which law enforcement is pursuing the problem--with interest groups seeing a larger problem and weaker law enforcement efforts. Second, although the first point should be generally true, the perceptions of law enforcement and interest groups will vary by community context, with both organizational actors perceiving hate crime as a greater problem in communities where citizen preferences are sympathetic to this perspective. Below I systematically test these propositions. DATA AND MEASUREMENT Unless otherwise noted the data for this analysis was collected through a national survey of police departments and interest groups in 1999. Copies of the police survey were mailed to the office of the police chief in the 250 largest (by population) American cities. The police chief was asked to 8 complete the survey. If s/he was unavailable, the chief’s staff was asked to complete the survey. Over 61 percent (152) of police departments agreed to participate in the survey and over 85 percent of persons completing the survey were either the police chief, or a staff member from the chief’s office. For police survey respondents, the mean annual departmental budget was $60 million and the mean number of sworn officers was 607. Survey respondents were representative of the population of large cities. In the original sample cities in the West and South are over represented (because they have more large cities), but the distribution of participants in the survey is similar and does not reveal a bias in response rate. As with the original sample, cities in the Northeast were under represented, as were cities on the lower end of the population scale. Based on the median population, police departments in larger cities were only marginally more likely to complete the survey. However, these differences are small and did not create any systematic bias. Additionally, local interest groups that might be concerned with the issue of hate crimes were located in the 250 largest cities. Groups in each city were identified through contacts with national gay, African-American, Latino, and Asian American groups. Furthermore, local chapters of state and national groups were identified through group mailing lists and websites. All potential groups were either known as anti-violence/hate crime groups or had shown an interest in the issue of hate crime through their website, flyers, connections with other local groups, or connections with national groups.4 4 Because the full universe of groups in each city was unknown, the sample of groups included in this study was not fully random. However, the technique used here is well established in social science research and has been used in previous research on local groups concerned with hate crime (see Jenness 1995; Jenness and Broad 1997). Because survey respondents were informed that their participation and responses would be kept confidential the groups cannot be identified. 9 Once a list was compiled for each city, one group was randomly selected from each of the 250 cities and a survey was mailed to the group leader at the last known address. If a group failed to respond to the survey after three mailings, a new group was randomly selected from the list for that city and mailed a copy of the survey. In all 112 group leaders completed the survey, for a response rate of almost 45 percent. As with the police survey, original sample cities in the West and South are over represented, but the distribution of participants in the survey is similar and does not reveal a bias in response rate. Based on the median city population, there was no systematic bias in the response rate of interest groups in larger versus smaller cities. RESULTS: A FIRST LOOK Because the first proposition suggests there will be a difference in the perceptions of law enforcement versus interest groups, I matched police respondents with interest group respondents for each city where a survey was completed for each group (the relevant survey questions and measurement scales for each group are displayed in the Appendix). This process dropped the total number of cases to 49, but it allows me to directly compare responses over a series of questions asked in each survey using simple T-tests. Respondents were asked a series of questions related to hate crime and police/community relations. The results of the T-test analysis on responses to these questions are displayed in Table 1. [Insert Table 1 About Here] Police departments and interest groups responded differently to nearly all the survey questions, including questions relating to departmental activities and obstacles to pursuing hate crimes. In most cases police departments were more positive about their efforts relating to hate crimes than were interest groups. This finding is consistent with the proposition 10 that bureaucrats have an incentive to suggest they are doing a good job, while interest groups have an incentive to suggest that more needs to be done. There are several additional findings of note. First, when responding to the statement: “Hate motivated crimes are more serious than other, similar but non-bias motivated crimes,” interest groups were slightly more likely to say that hate crimes are more serious than were police, but the difference was not statistically significant. Thus, even though interest groups generally rate police poorly in their efforts related to hate crime, they are not significantly more likely to suggest that police should take hate crimes more seriously than other types of crime. Second, when respondents were asked “How concerned have local politicians in your city been about the issue of hate crime in the past three years,” police were slightly more likely to indicate higher levels of concern than interest groups, but the difference was not statistically significant. Thus, both groups perceived that local politicians have not been very concerned with hate crimes. For law enforcement officials this fact should offer less incentive to aggressively pursue hate crime, and for interest groups this fact suggests that the groups need to engage in activities that raise the salience of the issue for the public and elected officials. Third, when asked about interest group attempts to influence police activity on hate crime, police were more likely to indicate that interest groups were engaged in less activity than was suggested by the interest groups themselves. Although the police have no clear incentive to answer this question one way or the other, interest groups do have a vested interest in suggesting they are doing something. Finally, respondents were asked about a series of obstacles to pursuing hate crime, including funding, training, and resistance from officers. In each case police were significantly more likely to suggest that these obstacles were not problems, while interest groups suggested that they were. For each of these questions the police do not necessarily have an incentive to 11 indicate these obstacles are not problems. Indeed, if a central focus of the bureaucracy is to expand its resources and authority (Meier 1993), one might think police respondents would have suggested these obstacles exist. However, if local political conditions signal that pursuing hate crimes is not valued, police may be less likely to indicate that obstacles exist. ADDITIONAL ANALYSES The above analysis, although interesting, clearly suggests the need for multivariate analysis of police and interest group responses. Each set of respondents clearly perceive the world in a different manner based on their organizational context, but some sets of responses also suggest their perceptions may vary by local political context. To explore this question I pooled the responses for police and interest groups so that the effect of organization context on response could be examined when controlling for characteristics of the community. Each of the questions shown in Table 1 is therefore treated as a dependent variable. The key independent variable is a dummy variable coded one if the respondent was representing an interest group, and zero if the respondent was representing a police department. To capture variations in community context I included a number of additional variables. The city’s crime per capita rate was included with the expectation that in cities with higher crime rates, respondents would be more likely to suggest the police are doing less in the area of hate crimes simply because all actors would perceive a general crime problem.5 Dummy variables are included for the presence of a state or local policies addressing hate crimes, and are simply coded one if the city is covered by a policy, and zero otherwise.6 Here the 5 Data on crime rates are 1997 statistics from the Federal Bureau of Investigation. 6 Data on state policies are from the Anti-Defamation League (1999) and data on local policies are from Haider-Markel and O’Brien (1999). All policies are 12 expectation is that all actors will perceive greater police efforts if public policies have specified hate crime as an issue to take action on (Bell 2002; Haider-Markel 2002). To capture citizen preferences on hate crimes two surrogate measures were used. First, because hate crime policies are often opposed by religious conservatives, cities that have more religiously orthodox populations should shape perceptions of law enforcement activity on hate crime, especially crimes of bias toward sexual orientation (Haider-Markel and O’Brien 1999; Jenness and Grattet 2001; Levin and McDevitt 2002). Religious values are measured as the percent of the county population that is affiliated with a Protestant Fundamentalist denomination.7 Second, Button, Rienzo, and Wald (1997) suggest that non-family households are associated with greater tolerance, especially towards gays and lesbians, and may subsequently influence perceptions of law enforcement activity on hate crime. As such, I included the percent of a city’s population that are living in non-family households.8 In preliminary analysis I also included controls for a city’s minority population, police officers per capita, overall population, median income, college education of the population, type of government (i.e. council/mayor), region of country, percentage Democratic presidential vote, and measures of the youth population. None of these measures was statistically significant nor did they significantly improve the models. Further, most of these included here as dichotomous variables coded 1 if the state or city has any type of policy for collecting statistics on hate crime, creating penalties for hate crime, or enhancing penalties for hate crime. Cities in Texas are counted as being covered by a hate crime law even though the Texas law did not specifically mention particular groups or classes of persons in the year of the surveys (1999). 7 The data are from Bradley et al. (1992) and the classification of Protestant Fundamentalist denominations follows Haider-Markel and Meier (1996). 8 Data are from the U.S. Bureau of the Census (1990). 13 measures were highly collinear with the other community characteristics measures. Thus, none of the models reported here include this additional set of community characteristics.9 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION The results of each analysis treating each question in Table 1 as a dependent variable are displayed in Tables 2a through 2c. Even controlling for community characteristics, the results of multivariate analysis are consistent with the T-tests. In all cases where there was a significant difference between police and interest group perceptions, those differences were confirmed in the multivariate analysis. Conversely, on those questions where the perceptions of police and interest groups were not found to be significantly different in the T-tests, the multivariate analysis found no significant difference. There were no significant differences between interest group and police perceptions of whether or not hate crime laws have an influence on hate crimes, whether hate crimes are more serious than other types of crime, and whether local politicians have been concerned with the issue of hate crimes. For each of these questions we expected that differences between police and interest groups would be small, largely because all respondents have an incentive to provide the most politically correct response. [Insert Table 2a, 2b, and 2c About Here] But overall interest groups were more likely to perceive that police were taking less action on hate crimes, less likely to believe that police and prosecutors would follow through on hate crime cases, and more likely than the police respondents to perceive problems with police funding, training, and 9 I also computed interaction variables from the interest group/police variable and each of the independent variables. None of the interactions was statistically significant and, thus, are not reported in the results here. 14 resistance from officers on the issue of hate crimes. Interestingly, police departments were more likely to say that hate crime victims do report the crime and less likely to perceive that interest groups in the community try to influence their activity related to hate crime. As such, the central proposition that respondents’ perceptions will vary according to their organizational context is confirmed. Additionally, community characteristics play a role in shaping respondent perceptions, but the influence of community characteristics is less consistent and they have less influence on perceptions than organizational context. In several cases, higher levels of crime led to a perception that police efforts on hate crime were not strong, and the presence of formal state and local policies increased perceptions that police were engaged in a fair amount of activity on hate crime. However, in only a few models did community preferences, measured by conservative religious affiliations and non-family households, appear to significantly influence respondents’ perceptions. Thus, the results reaffirm the importance of organizational context in shaping perceptions, but do not consistently demonstrate that community characteristics play a strong role in shaping perceptions. In fact, only the overall crime rate and the presence of a local or state policy on hate crime tend to shape perceptions. In cities with higher crime rates respondents were more likely to suggest police efforts on hate crime were weak, regardless of the institutional context of the respondent. Meanwhile, in cities covered by hate crime policies, respondents were more likely to perceive hate crime as a serious problem and perceive greater law enforcement efforts on hate crime, regardless of the institutional context of the respondent. CONCLUSIONS Across multiple sub-fields in social science researchers have argued that human perceptions shape decisionmaking and behavior, even when those perceptions are wrong. Theory and research suggest that perceptions are 15 shaped by the organizational and community context in which an individual is located. In this study I contribute to our understanding of organizational and community context by making use of original survey data to explore the perceptions of interest group leaders and police regarding law enforcement activity on hate crime. I present a framework for understanding how perceptions may differ depending on organizational context and community characteristics. I then tested for differences in perceptions using both simple and more advanced statistical methods, controlling for community characteristics that may influence perception. My results suggest several important conclusions. First, the simple and advanced statistical tests demonstrate that organizational context influences the perceptions of individuals. Perceptions of law enforcement activity on hate crime vary depending on whether a respondent was representing an interest group or a police department, and these variations persisted even when community characteristics were controlled for. Generally, interest group leaders are far less likely than police officials to perceive that law enforcement is doing much to address hate crime. Further, interest groups are more likely to perceive there are problems with funding, training, and officer resistance when it comes to hate crime. These findings are consistent with other studies of hate crime in urban areas (Balboni and McDevitt 2001; Boyd et al. 1996; Jenness and Grattet 2001; Levin and McDevitt 2002; Martin 1995, 1996). Second, the perceptions of interest groups and police are also influenced by community context, but the influence of community context on perceptions is less consistent. If state or local policies related to hate crime cover the jurisdiction in question, respondents from law enforcement and interest groups are more likely to perceive greater law enforcement action on hate crime. Further, higher overall crime rates in a city led respondents to perceive that police are doing less about hate crime, regardless of whether 16 the respondent was representing law enforcement or an interest group. This result may occur because interest groups, seeing high crime rates, perceive that police are generally doing a poor job regardless of the type of crime. Meanwhile, police in higher crime cities may feel constrained from making statements that suggest they are doing a good job. Third, although the above political conditions influenced respondent perceptions, community preferences, here measured by surrogates for community tolerance, only influenced perceptions of interest groups and police on a few questions. For example, higher levels of community tolerance were associated with respondent perceptions that law enforcement is making a strong effort on hate crimes. Finally, although my results clearly establish that perceptions are influenced by organizational context and community characteristics, organizational context appears to play the greatest role in shaping perceptions of law enforcement and interest groups. And it seems intuitive that differences in the perceptions of political actors are of key importance for citizens in a democracy. If citizens and other political actors, such as interest groups, perceive that government action is weak and government officials perceive that government action is strong, citizens and interest groups may come to distrust the government, and even question its legitimacy. Such citizen distrust may be difficult to change and may lead to government officials being ousted from office, or at worst, lead to high levels of social unrest. Thus, government officials must be conscious of public perceptions exist, even when those perceptions might be wrong. These conclusions seem especially important for criminal justice issues in urban settings. Differing perceptions between police, the public, and elected officials have frequently contributed to distrust, and provided motivation for urban unrest (Skolnick 1966; Brown 1981; Skolnick and Fyfe 1993). Scholars of urban politics and policies should therefore be encouraged 17 to engage in more systematic investigations of the role perceptions play in the urban governmental process. 18 Appendix: Survey Questions for Police Chiefs and Interest Group Leaders 8. On a scale from 0 to 10, with 0 being poor and 10 being excellent, please rate your department’s relations with the following communities: Please circle --Lesbians and gays 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 10. On a scale from 0 to 10, with 0 meaning poor and 10 being excellent, please rate your perception of your department’s efforts at enforcing laws for the following categories of crime: Please circle Hate or bias crimes 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 10a. On a scale from 0 to 10, with 0 meaning poor and 10 being excellent, please rate your perception of the District Attorney’s efforts at enforcing laws for the following categories of crime: Please circle Hate or bias crimes 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 12. On a scale from 0 to 10, with 0 meaning not serious at all and 10 meaning very serious, please rate your perception of how seriously regular uniformed officers take hate crimes and the enforcement of hate crime laws Please circle 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 15. Please read the following hypothetical scenario and respond below. A white male is beaten and robbed near a gay bar in your city. Officers arrive on the scene along with medical personnel. The injured man tells the officers he believes he was attacked and robbed because he is a homosexual. In fact, he heard both of his two assailants call him a "fag" as he was beaten. Although evidence suggests the man was clearly robbed, the initial evidence related to the potential that the crime was motivated by bias towards homosexuals is limited to the statement of the victim. The victim is able to give a description of both assailants. Now based on your department's policies and the attitudes of your officers, please rate the following on a scale from 0 to 10, with 0 indicating very unlikely and 10 indicating very likely. 15a. How likely is it that the police officers on the scene will classify the crime as a hate crime? Please circle 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 15b. How likely is it that a hate crime arrest will be made in the case? 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 15c. How likely is it that the district attorney will pursue the case as a hate crime? 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 15d. How likely is it that a hate crime conviction will be made in the case? 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 19. On a scale from 0 to 10, with 0 meaning poor and 10 being excellent, please rate your perception of your department's effort to track, classify, and report hate crime incidents 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 21. Based on your knowledge of the behavior of hate crime victims would you say that hate crime victims (please circle): 0 never report hate crimes 1 often do not report hate crimes 2 sometimes do not sometimes do report hate crimes 3 often do report hate crimes 4 always report hate crimes 21a. Please rate the degree to which local groups concerned about hate crimes attempt to influence your department's activities related to hate crimes: 0 Never try to influence our activities related to hate crimes 1 Almost never try to influence our activities 2 Sometimes do not sometimes do try to influence our activities 3 Often try to influence our activities 4 Always try to influence our activities 21b. Based on your experience, how much impact do you think hate crime laws have on reducing the number of hate crimes in your city? 0 No impact 1 Very little impact 2 Some impact 3 Quite a bit of impact 19 4 A very large impact 21c. How strongly do you agree with the following statement "Hate motivated crimes are more serious than other, similar but non-bias motivated crimes." 1 Strongly disagree 2 Disagree 3 Neither disagree or agree 4 Agree 5 Strongly agree 22. How much of a problem is lack of funding in your department's efforts to enforce hate crime laws and collect statistics on hate crime (please circle)? 1 Not a problem 2 Slight problem 3 Problem 4 Severe problem 5 Severe and continuing problem 23. How much of a problem is lack of training in your department's efforts to enforce hate crime laws and collect statistics on hate crime? 1 Not a problem 2 Slight problem 3 Problem 4 Severe problem 5 Severe and continuing problem 24. How much of a problem is resistance from regular officers in your department's efforts to enforce hate crime laws and collect statistics on hate crime? 1 Not a problem 2 Slight problem 3 Problem 4 Severe problem 5 Severe and continuing problem 27. How concerned have local politicians in your city been about the issue of hate crime in the past three years? 1 Not at all concerned 2 Somewhat concerned 3 Concerned 4 Very concerned 20 References Allison, Graham T. 1971. The essence of decision. Boston: Little Brown. Anti-Defamation League of B’nai B’rith. 1999. 1999 hate crime laws. New York: Anti-Defamation League of B’nai B’rith. Balboni, Jennifer M., and Jack McDevitt. 2001. Hate crime reporting: Understanding police officer perceptions, departmental protocol, and the role of the victim. Justice Research and Policy 3 (1):1-28. Bell, Jeannie. 2002. Policing hatred: Law enforcement, civil rights, and hate crime. New York: New York University Press. Boyd, Elizabeth A., Richard A. Berk, and Karl M. Hamner. 1996. Motivated by hatred or prejudice: Categorization of hate- motivated crimes in two police divisions. Law & Society Review 30 (4):819-850. Bradley, Martin B., Norman M. Green, Dale E. Johnson, Mac Lynn, and Lou McNeil. 1992. 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Criminology 33 (2):303-26. McCubbins, Mathew D., and Thomas Schwartz. 1984. Congressional oversight overlooked: Police patrols versus fire alarms. 23 American Journal of Political Science 28 (1):165-179. Meier, Kenneth J. 1993. Politics and the bureaucracy. 3rd ed. Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole Publishing. Meyer, John W., and Brian Rowan. 1977. Institutionalized organizations: Formal structure as myth and ceremony. American Journal of Sociology 83 (2):340-363. Morgan, Gareth. 1986. Images of organization. Newbury Park, NJ: Sage Publications. Nolan, James J. III, and Yoshio Akiyama 1999. An analysis of factors that affect law enforcement participation in hate crime reporting. Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice 15 (1):111-127. Pressman, Jeffrey L., and Aaron B. Wildavsky. 1973. Implementation: How great expectations in washington are dashed in oakland; or why it’s amazing that federal programs work at all. Berkeley: University of California Press. Skolnick, Jerome H. 1966. Justice without trial: Law enforcement in democratic society. New York: John Wiley and Sons. Skolnick, Jerome H., and James J. Fyfe. 1993. Above the law: Police and the excessive use of force. New York: The Free Press. U. S. Bureau of the Census. 1990. 1990 census of population social and economic characteristics: United states. Vol. 1. Washington, DC: U.S. Bureau of the Census. Walker, Samuel, and Charles M. Katz. 1995. Less than meets the eye: Police department bias crime units. American Journal of Police 14 (1):29-41. 24 Table 1: T-Tests Comparing Survey Responses of Police Chiefs and Interest Group Leaders ________________________________________________________________________________________ Question Mean SD T Significance (police listed first, activists (2-tailed) second) ________________________________________________________________________________________ 8. On a scale from 0 to 10, with 7.60 1.853 4.937 .000 0 being poor and 10 being excellent, 4.81 3.088 please rate your department’s relations with the following communities: Lesbians and gays 10. On a scale from 0 to 10, with 0 8.70 2.127 6.919 .000 meaning poor and 10 being excellent, 4.80 2.954 please rate your perception of your department’s efforts at enforcing laws for the following categories of crime: Hate or bias crimes 12. On a scale from 0 to 10, with 0 7.84 1.940 8.264 .000 meaning not serious at all and 10 4.36 2.534 meaning very serious, please rate your perception of how seriously regular uniformed officers take hate crimes and the enforcement of hate crime laws Hypothetical scenario responses 15a. How likely is it that the police 7.25 3.019 4.699 .000 officers on the scene will classify the 4.65 2.983 crime as a hate crime? (0-10 scale) 15b. How likely is it that a hate 4.97 3.247 2.045 .048 crime arrest will be made in the case? 3.61 2.969 (0-10 scale) 15c. How likely is it that the district 5.57 3.567 2.311 .027 attorney will pursue the case as a hate 3.91 2.944 crime? (0-10 scale) 15d. How likely is it that a hate 4.94 3.395 2.155 .038 crime conviction will be made in the 3.54 3.003 case? (0-10 scale) 19. On a scale from 0 to 10, with 0 7.51 2.910 5.781 .000 meaning poor and 10 being excellent, 4.08 3.081 please rate your perception of your department's effort to track, classify, and report hate crime incidents 21. Based on your knowledge of the 2.09 .733 4.690 .000 behavior of hate crime victims would you 1.42 .657 say that hate crime victims: 0 never report hate crimes, to, 4 always report hate crimes 21a. Please rate the degree to which 1.79 .833 -2.385 .022 local groups concerned about hate crimes 2.26 .978 attempt to influence your department's activities related to hate crimes: 0 Never try to influence our activities related to hate crimes, to 4 Always try to influence our activities 21b. Based on your experience, how much 1.31 .867 -2.215 .034 impact do you think hate crime laws have 1.77 .942 on reducing the number of hate crimes in your city? 0 No impact, to, 4 A very large impact 21c. How strongly do you agree with the 3.93 1.149 -.850 .400 following statement "Hate motivated 4.12 .900 crimes are more serious than other, similar but non-bias motivated crimes." 25 1 Strongly disagree, to, 5 Strongly agree 22. How much of a problem is lack of 1.58 .792 -3.761 .001 funding in your department's efforts to 2.52 1.176 enforce hate crime laws and collect statistics on hate crime? 1 Not a problem, to, 5 Severe and continuing problem 23. How much of a problem is lack of 1.72 .849 -5.596 .000 training in your department's efforts 3.14 1.246 to enforce hate crime laws and collect statistics on hate crime? 1 Not a problem, to, 5 Severe and continuing problem 24. How much of a problem is resistance 1.47 .825 -5.176 .000 from regular officers in your 2.85 1.306 department's efforts to enforce hate crime laws and collect statistics on hate crime? 1 Not a problem, to, 5 Severe and continuing problem 27. How concerned have local 2.30 .939 .393 .696 politicians in your city been about the 2.23 .832 issue of hate crime in the past three years? 1 Not at all concerned, to, 4 Very concerned ________________________________________________________________________________________ Notes: Results from 49 cities, one police chief respondent and one interest group respondent. Original sample was 250 largest American cities. 26 Table 2a: Determinants of Perceptions of Law Enforcement Activity on Hate Crimes _____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ Independent Relations Dept. HC Officers Scenario: Scenario: Scenario: Variables with gays Effort Serious Classify Arrest DA pursuit About HC as HC _____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ Interest group -2.796** -4.240** -3.776** -2.937** -1.846** -1.896** (.522) (.533) (.464) (.585) (.588) (.617) State policy .729 1.281** .933* 1.689** 2.773** 3.039** (.574) (.594) (.517) (.659) (.651) (.681) Local policy .253 .214 .567 1.915* 2.100* 1.661 (.951) (.963) (.862) (1.072) (1.065) (1.172) Non-Family Households .121 .081 .046 .012 .023 .009 (.081) (.080) (.069) (.086) (.085) (.090) Protestant Fundamentalist -.006 .032 .0006 -.019 -.030 -.037 (.028) (.028) (.025) (.032) (.031) (.034) Crime per capita -.016 -.021* -.027** -.029** -.024* -.026* (.012) (.012) (.011) (.014) (.013) (.014) Constant -6.702** 8.100** 8.642** 8.524** 5.122** 5.945** (1.469) (1.522) (1.339) (1.650) (1.638) (1.751) R Square .29 .47 .48 .35 .34 .36 Adjusted R .24 .43 .45 .30 .29 .31 Standard Error 2.480 2.511 2.233 2.749 2.665 2.782 F 5.757** 12.076** 13.301** 7.205** 6.722** 7.107** Number of cases 90 88 92 88 83 82 _____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ Notes: Coefficients are OLS regression coefficients. Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels in two- tailed test: ** < .05; * < .10. Full questions for dependent variables and coding are in the Appendix. 27 Table 2b: Determinants of Perceptions of Law Enforcement Activity on Hate Crimes _____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ Independent Scenario: Dept. Victim Interest Impact of Agree HC are Variables Conviction Overall HC HC Reporting Group Attempts HC laws More Serious Effort at Influence _____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ Interest group -1.830** -3.707** -.699** .507** .313 .260 (.617) (.581) (.143) (.185) (.197) (.218) State policy 2.955** 1.363** .168 .098 .435** .069 (.678) (.639) (.160) (.206) (.218) (.244) Local policy 1.284 2.369** .361 .159 -.005 .049 (1.171) (1.079) (.265) (.355) (.363) (.414) Non-Family Households .031 .166* .023 .060** .018 .017 (.090) (.086) (.022) (.029) (.030) (.034) Protestant Fundamentalist -.025 -.003 -.009 -.008 -.000 -.010 (.034) (.031) (.008) (.010) (.011) (.012) Crime per capita -.017 -.036** -.004 .002 -.002 -.012** (.014) (.014) (.003) (.004) (.005) (.005) Constant 4.278** 6.969** 2.473** .792 1.003* 4.820** (1.729) (1.639) (.409) (.526) (.559) (.630) R Square .32 .42 .24 .16 .11 .09 Adjusted R .27 .38 .19 .10 .04 .02 Standard Error 2.782 2.706 .694 .887 .894 1.032 F 5.977** 9.936** 4.673** 2.728** 1.545 1.354 Number of cases 82 87 93 91 83 89 _____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ Notes: Coefficients are OLS regression coefficients. Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels in two- tailed test: ** < .05; * < .10. Full questions for dependent variables and coding are in the Appendix. 28 29 Table 2c: Determinants of Perceptions of Law Enforcement Activity on Hate Crimes _____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ Independent Problem: Lack Problem: Lack Problem: Level of Concern Variables of Funding of Training Resistance of Local Politicians From Officers _____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ Interest group .925** 1.456** 1.343** -.062 (.225) (.219) (.227) (.180) State policy -.087 -.159 -.086 .390* (.250) (.240) (.247) (.198) Local policy .471 .274 -.099 -.092 (.424) (.423) (.432) (.352) Non-Family Households -.051 -.039 -.047 .046 (.035) (.034) (.035) (.029) Protestant Fundamentalist -.002 .036** .014 -.009 (.012) (.012) (.012) (.010) Crime per capita .004 -.005 .012** -.003 (.005) (.005) (.005) (.004) Constant 2.095** 2.247** 1.129* 1.727** (.660) (.621) (.644) (.513) R Square .23 .43 .39 .13 Adjusted R .17 .38 .34 .07 Standard Error 1.002 1.002 1.022 .842 F 3.730** 9.627** 8.001** 2.106* Number of cases 81 84 82 88 _____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ Notes: Coefficients are OLS regression coefficients. Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels in two- tailed test: ** < .05; * < .10. Full questions for dependent variables and coding are in the Appendix. 
work_jpluhl3vfrffxelobl4nxtjkeu	----	A Critical History of Child Protection: Lessons from the UK Edinburgh Research Explorer Standing up to complexity Citation for published version: Cree, V, Clapton, G & Smith, M 2016, 'Standing up to complexity: Researching moral panics in social work', European Journal of Social Work, vol. 19, no. 3-4, pp. 354-367. https://doi.org/10.1080/13691457.2015.1084271 Digital Object Identifier (DOI): 10.1080/13691457.2015.1084271 Link: Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer Document Version: Peer reviewed version Published In: European Journal of Social Work Publisher Rights Statement: This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in the European Journal of Social Work on 16/09/2015, available online: http://wwww.tandfonline.com/10.1080/13691457.2015.1084271 General rights Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s) and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights. Take down policy The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim. Download date: 06. Apr. 2021 https://doi.org/10.1080/13691457.2015.1084271 https://doi.org/10.1080/13691457.2015.1084271 https://www.research.ed.ac.uk/portal/en/publications/standing-up-to-complexity(4a931478-1c2f-45cf-b1f4-b0f455913c17).html 1 For European Journal of Social Work Special Issue: Private troubles or public issues? Challenges for social work research Standing up to Complexity: Researching Moral Panics in Social Work Viviene E. Cree, Gary Clapton and Mark Smith The University of Edinburgh Corresponding author: Professor Viviene Cree viv.cree@ed.ac.uk Abstract Moral panics are central to social work policy and practice. Voluntary agencies and statutory bodies (including governments) create and sustain moral panics in order to raise awareness of, and win support for, their own understandings of social issues and problems. This is not a neutral enterprise; on the contrary, moral panics often have consequences that are negative, whether intended or unintended. Far from leading to greater social justice and a more equal society, they may reinforce stereotypes and lead to fearful, risk-averse practice. This paper discusses one such moral panic in 2013 that centred on the story of ‘Maria’, a Bulgarian Roma child living in Greece. The paper explores the meaning and use of the concept of moral panic before unpacking this case-study example in more detail. We argue that the moral panic over ‘Maria’ has much to tell us about ideas of welfare and protection, institutional racism and children and childhood, as well as the connections between ‘private troubles’ and ‘public issues’. We conclude that social work as a profession must stand up to complexity, and in doing so, be aware of its own role in relation to moral panics. (191 words) Introduction 2 Raising the subject of moral panics and social work is neither an easy nor a neutral undertaking. The term ‘moral panic’ has been so widely used in recent years, that there is a widespread public perception that if something is a moral panic, it is somehow not real. Because of this, anyone suggesting that social work is influenced by moral panics risks being accused of dismissing legitimate social concerns and in doing so, minimising the genuine grievances of individuals and groups. They may even be accused of overplaying some harms; of creating moral panics about moral panics! We therefore begin this paper with full awareness that we must ask readers to set aside their everyday perception of ‘moral panic’ and instead consider that moral panics may be an indication of the, at-times uncomfortable, intersection between ‘private troubles’ and ‘public issues’ (Mills, 1959). More than this, we will argue that it is the failure to recognise the way in which genuine concerns become full-blown panics that is itself dangerous; greater harm may result from responses to panics than from the events that precipitate them, and a social work policy and practice that is not sufficiently critical may find itself complicit in these responses. The paper begins by considering definitions of the concept of moral panic, from its beginnings in 1970s sociology in the UK. We then go on to look in detail at a European moral panic that emerged in Greece in 2013, which centred on a Bulgarian Roma child named ‘Maria’, who was taken by police from her home in a Roma settlement amidst fears of child trafficking and abduction. (We describe the child as ‘Maria’ throughout this article, to draw attention to the fact that although this is the name she was given, it is not her real name.) We conclude by arguing that social work practitioners, policy-makers and educators should be encouraged to stand up to complexity and confront the private troubles and public issues that concern us all, asking – What is going on here? Whose interests are being served? What are the implications of this likely to be, and for whom? ‘Maria’’s story illustrates many of the dilemmas at the heart of child protection social work across Europe today, and, arguably, across the world. It is, fundamentally, a story about welfare and protection, about institutional racism, and about meanings of children and childhood. It is 3 also, as we will see, a story that demonstrates that the personal must be placed in the context of the wider social structure in order to understand the true impact of good intentions, intended and unintended. Background The term ‘moral panic’ is one that has passed from sociological theory into everyday usage with barely a pause for breath. It emerged in the sociology of deviance in the 1970s, as firstly, Jock Young and then Stan Cohen (himself a qualified social worker), sought to explain the impact of social reaction on those who engaged in what was considered ‘deviant’ behaviour. Young (1971) explored the social reaction against drug taking, observing that we condemn those who use drugs not because drugs are implicitly harmful (lots of things that are harmful are not outlawed in the same way), but because of ‘moral indignation’ that those who use drugs are somehow less productive and more hedonistic than those who do not. He further notes that moral indignation is often ‘fronted by an air of benign humanitarianism’ (p. 102). Looking back, Young argues that the 20th century had witnessed ‘the emergence of a vast array of experts in deviancy’ (ib.id), so much so that competition had emerged between disciplinary interests. As groups fought for their turf, so the media was drawn into a ‘moral crusade’ (p. 104); more than this, they fanned the flames of what Young called a ‘moral panic’ through a process of ‘deviancy amplification’ (p. 182). The idea of moral panic as social reaction and deviancy amplification was picked up by Stan Cohen (1972), who had trained and practised as a psychiatric social worker before embarking on doctoral research in which he examined the confrontations between Mods and Rockers on the beaches of seaside towns in the South of England in the 1960s. Cohen set out what has become the classic definition of moral panics. It is repeated in full because of its importance to our overall discussion: ‘Societies appear to be subject, every now and then, to periods of moral panic. A condition, episode, person or group of persons emerges to become defined as a 4 threat to societal values and interests; its nature is presented in a stylised and stereotypical fashion by the mass media; the moral barricades are manned by editors, bishops, politicians and other right-thinking people; socially accredited experts pronounce their diagnoses and solutions; ways of coping are evolved or (more often) resorted to; the condition then disappears, submerges or deteriorates and becomes more visible. Sometimes the object of the panic is quite novel and at other times it is something which has been in existence long enough, but suddenly appears in the limelight. Sometimes the panic passes over and is forgotten, except in folk-lore and collective memory; at other times it has more serious and long-lasting repercussions and might produce such changes as those in legal and social policy or even in the way society conceives itself.’ (1972, p. 9) Some important points should be made at the outset. As Cohen emphasises, ‘The argument is not that there is ‘“nothing there” ... but that the reaction to what is observed or inferred is fundamentally inappropriate’ (2002, p. 172). It was disproportionality that Hall et al explored further in Policing the Crisis (1978), where they argued that the moral panic that had erupted around the ‘discovery’ of the phenomenon of ‘mugging’ (otherwise known as petty street crime) in 1972 was successful because of its ability to create a consensus about the nature of the problem and the solutions to it. Goode and Ben Yehuda (1994) outline the main features of a moral panic as follows: (i) concern (some reported conduct or event sparks anxiety); (ii) hostility (the perpetrators are portrayed as ‘folk devils’); (iii) consensus (there is a broad and unified social reaction); (iv) disproportionality (the extent of the conduct and the threat it poses are exaggerated); (v) volatility (panics emerge suddenly, but can dissipate just as quickly too). Garland suggests that this is a useful summary, but contends that it omits two important features of Cohen’s conceptualisation: firstly, that there is a moral dimension to the social reaction that needs to be considered, ‘particularly the introspective soul-searching that accompanies these 5 episodes’; and secondly, that the deviant conduct in question is ‘often seen as symptomatic, for example, of a wider malaise’ (2008, p. 11). Moral panics are not, in this sense, accidental. Jock Young, in some of his later work (2007, 2009), develops this point further. He argues that the social conditions that give rise to moral panic have intensified with the ever-greater pace of societal shifts and the sense of social insecurity which result. For Young, the propensity for moral panic is located within wider structural changes in society and psychological responses to these. Moral panics are, then, moral disturbances ‘centring on claims that direct interests have been violated’. They are ‘not simply panics, media generated or otherwise that provide false information’ (2009, p. 13). Moral disturbance is characterised by a feeling of anxiety; in that sense, it is real, and cannot be readily dismissed as irrational. Moral panics take personal anxiety to a societal level; they do not occur when political and social structures are solid and successful, but rather, when they are in crisis, when society’s ‘tectonic plates’ are shifting (2009, p. 14). Scapegoated groups are not chosen by accident, but are closely related to the source of anxiety. The Roma, as we will demonstrate, are one such scapegoated group. For the last two years, we have been involved in a cross-disciplinary study that has explored the relevance of ‘moral panic’ theory to current social issues and anxieties. Our work began with a research seminar series on moral panics sponsored by the UK’s Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC). This led us into empirical research and academic writing on topics that have been identified within this ‘moral panic’ discourse, including historical abuse in residential childcare (Smith, Cree & Clapton, 2012), child trafficking (Cree, Clapton & Smith, 2014), pornography (Smith & Cree, 2014), social work and the media (Beddoe and Cree, forthcoming) and child protection (Clapton, Cree & Smith, 2013a and 2013b). We have also blogged and tweeted on all aspects of contemporary social concerns that might be perceived to be moral panics, including child sexual abuse, young people and sexuality, and 6 the 2012 UK riots, to name just a few (see http://moralpanicseminarseries.wordpress.com). One of our blogs drew attention to the story of five-year old ‘Maria’ in Greece. We now unpack this story in more detail, using Cohen’s model of a moral panic as our starting-point for analysis. The story of ‘Maria’ On 16th October 2013, a blonde, fair-skinned and green-eyed girl was discovered in a police raid on a Roma settlement on the outskirts of the town of Farsala in central Greece. Police officers were looking for illegal drugs and unregistered firearms, and they came across a little girl aged, they thought, about five years, who looked different: not only was she white in appearance, but she seemed distressed. The police officers were immediately concerned that she had been trafficked; the Roma couple with whom she was found to be living were suspected of either abducting or buying her. Neither adult was able to produce papers to prove that she was their child; they were arrested and the little girl was taken into care, while investigations into her background were carried out. A week later, another blonde girl (aged seven years) was taken from her carers, this time from a housing estate on the West of Dublin in Ireland, after an anonymous tip-off to the Gardai (police) via Facebook. On this second occasion, DNA tests later that day proved conclusively that she was the biological child of the adults with whom she was living, and she was returned home. (see news-story from The Telegraph, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/ireland/10400876/Irish-court-orders- blonde-haired-girl-taken-from-Roma-family-to-be-returned.html) We have deliberately pared back these stories to the factual details; what now needs to be added is the explosion of media and public attention that emerged at this time – this was, without doubt, a classic illustration of a moral panic, as we will now set out, using Cohen’s model as outlined above. http://moralpanicseminarseries.wordpress.com/ 7 Stage One ‘A condition, episode, person or group of persons emerges to become defined as a threat to societal values and interests’ (1972, p. 1). In this case, it was child trafficking that was at the heart of the issue. Trafficking has been a subject of world-wide concern in recent years, with governments and voluntary agencies both campaigning to draw attention to the trafficking of adults and children, who are reported to have been abducted, stolen or sold into domestic service, dangerous work, or, worse still, prostitution and the sex industry. Child trafficking raises additional anxieties, because of children’s vulnerability to child sexual abuse and exploitation. We have already suggested that heightened anxieties over child trafficking might be indicative of moral panic (Cree, Clapton & Smith, 2014). This is not to suggest that people (including children) are not on the move; global poverty, climate change and civil unrest across the world mean that ever- greater numbers of people are fleeing disaster and persecution, just as the response to this has been the introduction of ever-more stringent immigration policies in the countries of destination. Nor is this to suggest that child trafficking never happens: each year, a number of cases across Europe emerge where babies and children are sold to adoption agencies by their poverty-stricken parents. For example, a news-story in The Economist, 22nd October 2013, entitled ‘Maria’s Fate’, reported that one Bulgarian child-trafficking ring uncovered by police in 2011 had asked its Greek clients to pay €25,000 for a boy and €20,000 for a girl. The child’s mother would receive a payment of €2,000 (http://www.economist.com/blogs/charlemagne/2013/10/roma-greece). This is, of course, a matter of concern, for social work as well as for European society as a whole. But we would argue that although child trafficking is an important social issue, we need to separate out evidence from assertion. Just as importantly, we need to think carefully about what a measured response and helpful reaction to it might look like; removing such children from their carers and taking them into public care might not, in reality, be seen to be either measured or helpful. 8 This episode was not simply about child trafficking, however. It was, more specifically, about child-stealing by Roma people, already judged for centuries to be ‘folk devils’, to be treated with suspicion and fear (see Clark, forthcoming; Tyler, 2013). It is estimated that there are between 10 and 12 million Roma across Europe, with 250,000 in Greece alone; the European Court of Human Rights has found that Greece, alongside countries such as Bulgaria, Czech Republic and Hungary, has segregated its Roma communities, with thousands of people living together in squalid housing (shacks and containers from ships), with little opportunities for legitimate, paid work (see www.equaltimes.org/little-maria-and- anti-roma, 28th January 2014). In some Roma settlements, illegal activities such as drug dealing and the trading of stolen goods are known to take place, but in a news-story, from 2013, Roma leaders protest that ‘criminal elements represent only a small fragment of the community’ (‘Old attitudes resurface in Greece’, The Independent, 23rd October 2013, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/old-attitudes-resurface-in-greece-inside- the-roma-camp-where-maria-the-blonde-angel-lived-8897530.html). A report by Amnesty International from 2014 highlights the widespread stigma and discrimination experienced by Roma people in Greece, often at the hands of the authorities. This report states: ‘At a time when Greece has seen a steep increase in racially motivated attacks and xenophobia, Amnesty International has serious concerns about the inadequate response of the law enforcement authorities towards hate crime. This includes failing to intervene to stop racially motivated attacks when they were present on the scene; arresting victims with irregular status rather than the perpetrators of hate crimes; failing to protect people from attacks by far-right groups; discouraging victims from filing complaints; and failing to investigate or to investigate effectively those complaints that are lodged including by unearthing the possible hate motive. In many cases police officers themselves are perpetrators of hate crime’ (2014: 21). http://www.equaltimes.org/little-maria-and-anti-roma http://www.equaltimes.org/little-maria-and-anti-roma 9 It is undoubtedly the case that at the time ‘Maria’’s story emerged (and now), the Roma in Greece were perceived as on the margins of society, a threat and threatened in equal measure. Not only this, their marginal status was reinforced by their poverty. It is known that many Greek Roma people do not register the births of their children because of the prohibitive cost of obtaining a birth certificate. This, then, means that they are not known by the authorities; their entitlement to welfare services, education etc. is removed, at the same time as their protection and avenues of support. This was, in many ways, a moral panic waiting to happen; if it hadn’t been ‘Maria’, it would have been another story that highlighted the Roma as society’s scapegoats or ‘folk devils’. Stage two: ‘Its nature is presented in a stylized and stereotypical fashion by the mass media’ (ib.id.) The stories in both Greece and Ireland were presented by the media in very particular ways. In both cases, the blonde-ness of the girls was emphasised, in contrast to the dark-ness of their carers, as well as the fact that they were young and pretty. The girl in Greece was called ‘the blonde angel’ and given the name ‘Maria’ (as reported by Louise Doughty in ‘An angel kidnapped by gypsies?’ in The Guardian, 22nd October 2013 http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/oct/22/angel-kidnapped-by-gypsies-libel- replayed). Photographs of ‘Maria’ looking sad with her hair in plats dominated the newspapers and television screens across Europe for days on end. The language used to describe her situation was highly emotive: the camp that she was living was described in the UK tabloid press as ‘squalid’. A news-story by Ryan Parry entitled ‘Faked. Gypsies staged pics to cover up girl’s neglect’ was illustrative of much of this. He wrote: ‘unkempt children played in the street waving sticks at strangers. Old motorbikes and car parts littered the neighbourhood, while stray dogs rummaged through piles of rubbish’ (The Sun, 24th October 2013, http://www.thesun.co.uk/sol/homepage/news/5219850/pictures-of-missing-girl-maria- room-staged-to-protect-gypsy-community.html). A home video of ‘Maria’ dancing at a party http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/oct/22/angel-kidnapped-by-gypsies-libel-replayed http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/oct/22/angel-kidnapped-by-gypsies-libel-replayed 10 that was shown repeatedly on television news was described in another newspaper story as ‘disturbing’ evidence of Maria ‘dancing for her captors’ (Daily Mail, 23rd October 2013, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2474417/Maria-groomed-child-bride-Roma-Gypsy- couple.html). Underpinning almost all the reporting of the case was a racist characterisation of the situation, the ‘dark-skinned’ adults contrasted with the ‘fair-skinned’ child. Stage three ‘The moral barricades are manned by editors, bishops, politicians and other right-thinking people’; ‘socially accredited experts pronounce their diagnoses and solutions’ (ib.id.) Interestingly, the telling of this story was left largely to the media. Children’s charities and others seemed wary of getting involved and expressing their opinions about the case. But the case was said on various occasions to ‘offer hope’ to the parents of Ben Needham (who had disappeared in Greece in 1991) and Madeleine McCann (who had disappeared in Portugal in 2007) that their children might still be alive, again affirming the idea that Roma people steal children. The Guardian newspaper bravely went against the tide of mainstream public opinion on 22nd October 2013, reporting that historically, it is Roma children who have experienced being ‘stolen’; for example, between 1926 and 1972, hundreds of Yenish Roma boys and girls were removed from their families by the authorities in Switzerland on the pretext of child welfare concerns. The New York Times also reported that the Roma live in fear of their children being removed, ‘for no reason other than their cultural identity or skin colour’ (story by Dan Bilefsky, ‘Roma, feared as kidnappers, see their own children at risk’, 25th October 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/26/world/europe/for-the-roma-fears-of- kidnapping-in-europe-only-mirror-their-own.html). One of the important elements that could not have been imagined by Cohen in his discussion of moral panics was the part played by social media in the unfolding moral panic. Many of those who engaged in fuelling the moral panic – the ‘right-thinking people’ - were 11 not ‘experts’ at all, and instead were ordinary members of the public who tweeted and blogged and sent literally tens of thousands of emails and phone-calls to the police and to the children’s charity where ‘Maria’ had been taken. This was, in large part, as a direct result of actions taken by the Greek police, who, at a press conference two days after ‘Maria’ had been found, asked for international help to locate her parents (http://www.astynomia.gr/index.php?option=ozo_content&perform=view&id=33338&Itemid=1 181&lang=EN) Social media thus increased both the number and the influence of ‘moral entrepreneurs’, for good or for ill, as this example demonstrates. The role of social media in moral panics is a topic that is only now beginning to enter the academic arena. Some have argued that social media is a liberalising force, allowing more oppositional voices to be heard and thus creating more opportunities for dissent (e.g. Howard et al, 2011, on the rise of the so-called ‘Arab Spring’). Others have asserted that while social media may contain more voices, this may be more voices saying the same (limited) things as before, talking to their own supporters, not to the wider community as a whole, as discussed in a recent blog on the conflict in Gaza (Lotan, 2014). The story of ‘Maria’ shows that social media can and does speak to a wider public, and has an impact both on public opinion and governmental action. In ‘Maria’’s case, the sheer force of public interest in the story made it impossible for her to be returned to the family with whom she had been living. This is not, we would argue, an influence to be dismissed lightly. Stage four ‘Ways of coping are evolved or (more often) resorted to’ (ib.id.) ‘Maria’ was taken into the care of the charity ‘Smile of the Child’, to a children’s home in Athens, 280 kilometres from her home in Farsala. Eleftheria Dimopoulou and Christos Sali, the couple who were caring for her, were jailed on charges of kidnapping and falsifying birth http://www.astynomia.gr/index.php?option=ozo_content&perform=view&id=33338&Itemid=1181&lang=EN http://www.astynomia.gr/index.php?option=ozo_content&perform=view&id=33338&Itemid=1181&lang=EN 12 records. They claimed that they had adopted ‘Maria’ with the permission of her biological mother, and their story was later confirmed when Maria’s birth mother was located in a village in Bulgaria. In spite of this, the Greek authorities formally removed all guardianship rights from Dimopoulou and Sali shortly afterwards; their other children were placed with foster parents. It seems unlikely that ‘Maria’ will ever again see the family that raised her or the community that she lived in until she was five years of age. Stage five ‘The condition then disappears, submerges or deteriorates and becomes more visible… Sometimes the panic passes over and is forgotten…; at other times it has more serious and long-lasting repercussions and might produce such changes as those in legal and social policy or even in the way society conceives itself’ (ib.id.). There has been almost no media interest in this story since the middle of November 2013. There has been no reporting of what happened to either ‘Maria’’s carers or her birth parents. Meanwhile, the decision taken by a Greek court in early June 2014 that the Smile charity be awarded full custody of ‘Maria’, who will stay in care until she is 18 years of age, was given only passing mention in the press. Yet this was a Bulgarian Roma child who was taken from everything that was familiar to her – her language, culture and people. She will no doubt be ‘scarred’ by her experience, as the children’s home director admitted in an interview reported in the Daily Mail on 3rd June 2014 (‘Court rules that blonde girl taken from Roma family in Greece last year will be raised by children's charity’, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article- 2647029/Court-rules-blonde-girl-taken-Roma-family-Greece-year-raised-childrens- charity.html#ixzz3a2Ate4Tr). It seems likely that she will need substantial counselling and support to recover from her ordeal. Likewise, the removal of the child in Ireland (although with far less serious consequences) seems likely to have caused long-term repercussions for the child, for her family, and for others in the Irish Roma community; nightmares, fear and distrust of police and authorities, confirmation of a long-held realisation that their lives are http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2647029/Court-rules-blonde-girl-taken-Roma-family-Greece-year-raised-childrens-charity.html#ixzz3a2Ate4Tr http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2647029/Court-rules-blonde-girl-taken-Roma-family-Greece-year-raised-childrens-charity.html#ixzz3a2Ate4Tr http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2647029/Court-rules-blonde-girl-taken-Roma-family-Greece-year-raised-childrens-charity.html#ixzz3a2Ate4Tr 13 characterised by racism and oppression would seem to be the only outcomes of this unhappy incident. Discussion The moral panic exemplified by the story of ‘Maria’ draws into sharp relief many of the dilemmas at the heart of child protection social work across Europe today, and, arguably, across the world. It is, at its core, about welfare and protection, institutional racism and children and childhood. It also sheds light on the connection between the individual (‘personal troubles’) and social structure (‘public issues’) (Mills, 1959). We will now consider each in turn. Welfare and protection It seem likely that the motivations of the police officers who took ‘Maria’ into care were ones of welfare and protection. They would have been familiar with child trafficking concerns, and if ‘Maria’ had indeed been stolen, then she was a child at risk and her birth parents might have been searching for her for years. The fact that this was an instance of informal adoption or long-term fostering rather than trafficking could not be proved by her carers at the time of her removal, and the police officers, arguably, did the best they could for the child by taking her into care. At the same time, when the Greek court decided eight months later to leave ‘Maria’ in the care of the children’s home, it did what was judged to be in her ‘best interests’. In fact, it would have been very difficult for the court to have done anything else; faced with world-wide press interest, how could the court have justified a decision to return ‘Maria’ either to her birth parents (who had given her to friends to look after) or to her informal carers (who had been imprisoned)? Furthermore, how could they have explained returning her to a life of poverty and hardship? What she was being offered by the charity (again, for ‘Maria’’s ‘own good’) was a good upbringing and, above all, an education. With this ‘second chance’ in her grasp, how could they not confirm her status as a child in care? 14 Child-saving is, of course, a familiar scenario within social work. Accounts of the removal of Aboriginal children in Australia (Read, 2006) and Maori children in New Zealand (Mikaere, 1994), as well as the deportation of thousands of poor white children from the UK to Australia and Canada in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries (Melville and Bean, 1990), are reminders that social work has often sought to ‘rescue’ children for their own good, to give them a ‘fresh start’ in life. A renewed emphasis on child rescue is also in keeping with recent trends that have championed adoption, as witnessed over the last ten years or so in the UK (PIU, 2000). Faced with the choice between the poor with their troubled lives and uncertain futures and the promise of settled middle-class living, who wouldn’t believe in child rescue? The problem is that dismantling families rarely results in long-term good, for anyone. In this respect, the narrow, individualist standpoint of child protection often fails to acknowledge wider societal (public) issues that can be occluded by moral panics such as this one, as recent writing on child protection (e.g. Featherstone et al, 2014) confirms. But this was not only a story of welfare and protection; it was also a story of ‘race’ and racism. Institutional racism We have already indicated that the police intervention in the Roma settlement in Farsala can be understood as an illustration of institutional racism; Amnesty International’s report documents this well. What happened next, however, also demonstrates further the workings of racism, and most especially, prejudice about ‘dark-skinned’ and ‘fair-skinned’ people. There were many children living in the Roma settlement on 16th October 2013 who were not removed by police: it was ‘Maria’’s colouring that drew her to their attention, and which was stressed in all the media coverage that followed. The fact that there are many blonde Roma was not acknowledged in most of this reporting, although this fact was widely known. The ‘Maria’ story also brings to mind another illustration of our rather confused ideas about ‘race’. There has been surprisingly little comment in the social work literature about the 15 practice of inter-country adoption where prominent white personalities have adopted black children from African countries (Madonna and Nicole Kidman are two such high profile examples). On the contrary, this has been presented by some as praise-worthy, child-saving behaviour, as Smolin writes, as ‘a heart-warming act of goodwill that benefits both a child and adoptive family’ (2005: 403). In contrast, some critics have condemned inter-country adoption as ‘modern-day imperialism, allowing dominant, developed cultures to strip away a developing country’s most precious resources, its children’ (Martin, 2007: 174). Whatever we may think about inter-country adoption, the connection between moral panics and institutional racism is not a new one. It was Stuart Hall and his colleagues who first pointed out that the themes of ‘race’, crime and youth coalesced in the image of the black ‘mugger’ (street thief) in the early 1970s in Britain; the ‘mugging’ scare, they argue, came to serve as the ‘articulator’ or ‘ideological conductor’ (1978: viii) of a crisis in hegemony, that is, a breakdown in the post-war consensus, and in the notion of government by consent. In its place, a new ‘law-and-order’ society was taking root, and a key instrument in facilitating this change was, they assert, the creation of ‘mugging’ as a moral panic, with black youth as enemy number one. Moral panics, Young (2009) argues, are acts of ‘othering’ that provide false information; they displace social anxieties onto particular scapegoats. In the 1970s, it was young black men. In the ‘Maria’ story, it was the Roma, familiar scapegoats for society’s ills, across Europe and across centuries, currently shouldering the blame (along with all the poorer countries in Europe) for the failures of neoliberalism. This takes us to children and childhood. Children and childhood The story of ‘Maria’ is one that ultimately reinforces the idea of the innocent, vulnerable child at risk and in need of protection. Christensen (2000) has argued that vulnerability is a key feature of Western conceptions of childhood; this vulnerability is both socially constructed and biological, and is intimately tied up in ideas of children as innocent and lacking in 16 competence (Best, 1994; Platt, 1969; Wyness, 2012). Child trafficking stories replay this representation of children as powerless and childhood as a special time that must be protected at all costs. Meanwhile, a whole child protection industry of ‘child savers’ has grown up over the last 100 years or so, as has been explored in Clapton, Cree & Smith (2013 a and b). This industry not only sustains public attention regarding children ‘at risk’, but also highlights new ways that children are being threatened and endangered, including through trafficking. The end-result of this activity, we have argued, is that more and more children are coming under the ‘child protection radar’ (2013a: 17). Meyer takes this point further. She argues that childhood has become a moral rhetoric that can legitimise anything without having to explain it. Mere mention of the word ‘child’ becomes a short-hand for sacralisation and moral status; as she writes: ‘any opinion can be justified by simply referring to children, and without having to explain why and how children justify it’ (2007 p. 99). (Italics in original.) Returning to the ‘Maria’ story, because she is a ‘child’, no-one needed to justify the decisions that were taken to ‘protect’ her; no other view was required or sought. This, we would argue, is hugely problematic, not least because it may lead to uncritical practice and the silencing of alternative perspectives. The connection between ‘private troubles’ and ‘public issues’ Studying moral panics has forced us to step outside social work’s familiar comfort zone and ask: what is really going on here? What might this story have to tell us about wider social problems? What are we not seeing when our heart-strings are pulled by images of an unhappy blonde child? As we have stated, moral panics invariably have negative outcomes, some of which might be foreseen, and others that are not. Moral panics stereotype and label ‘folk devils’ as ‘perpetrators’, ‘abusers’, ‘criminals’, and in ‘Maria’’s case, ‘child snatchers’. They lead to disproportionate responses and/or punitive legislation: a childhood spent in care for ‘Maria’ and imprisonment for her carers. Moral panics also feed a wider climate of fear, and may lead to risk-averse social work practice and a more fearful society as a whole. 17 It seems likely that the ‘Maria’ story will have led to more, not less, stigmatisation of Roma communities, as demonstrated in the removal of the second Roma child in Ireland, and as seen in the continuing discrimination experienced by Roma living in the UK (see Clark, forthcoming and Tyler, 2013). The story may also, inadvertently or otherwise, have stoked up fears of the negative impact of Eastern European immigration. As our television screens and newspapers were swamped by photographs of Roma settlements in Bulgaria, what underlying messages were being conveyed? Certainly not the negative impact of neoliberal policies on the poor, or the legacy of racism within Europe. This is why moral panics matter most, because they draw attention away from ‘public issues’ by encouraging us to focus only on ‘private troubles’. Conclusion The story of ‘Maria’ has, along with all the case-studies we have explored throughout the moral panic seminar series, allowed us to think more critically about the role of social work today. Not only has this encouraged us to ask, what is going on here?, but it has led us to stand up to complexity, to ask, what are we not seeing and doing while a moral panic is in full swing? On 27th August 2014, two stories dominated the lunchtime headlines on BBC Radio 4. The first concerned the resignation of a Conservative Member of the UK Parliament, Douglas Carswell MP, who had defected to the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP). His stated reasons for doing so were the government’s failure to tackle immigration and reduce the power of the European Union on UK affairs. The second story focused on an inquiry report into child sexual exploitation between 1997 and 2013 in Rotherham, England, that had been published the previous day (Jay, 2014). A police spokesperson was quoted as saying that one of the issues that had led to the police’s reluctance to take action at an earlier point had been “the involvement of men of Pakistani heritage” in the young women’s abuse. He went on to say that the same situation is happening today within the Roma community, “where the sexual norms for 13 and 14 year old girls are very different”. This statement was allowed to pass without question by the well- 18 respected news journalist conducting the interview. These two stories both tell us a great deal about the ‘Maria’ moral panic. While attention was focused on a blonde, pigtailed five- year old girl in Greece, racism and xenophobia remained submerged; poverty, inequality and discrimination were allowed to remain unchecked and unchallenged. We are currently going through the worst economic crisis in living memory in Europe; the gap between rich and poor is widening; immigrants and asylum seekers are experiencing increased hostility and violence across the world. At the European Social Work Research conference in 2014, Walter Lorenz, in a keynote, argued that social work research must have the capacity to confront uncertainty; to relate research to what matters practically and ethically, in order to improve the social condition. Our investigation of moral panic does not claim to have all the answers, but it does raise some critical questions for social work policy and practice. It suggests that social work research must look beyond its own narrow concerns about ‘what works’ to locate its endeavours within a wider body of sociological/ social scientific thinking. In addressing a social work audience in 1975, Cohen urged social workers to stay unfinished. He wrote: ‘In your practice and in theory stay “unfinished”. Do not be ashamed of working for short-term humanitarian or libertarian goals, but always keep in mind the long-term political prospects. This might mean living with the uncomfortable ambiguity that your most radical work will be outside your day-to-day job. Most important: do not sell out your clients’ interests for the sake of ideological purity or theoretical neatness’ (1998: 112). These are important, and we believe, ultimately encouraging messages for social work. We must stand up to complexity and in doing so, resist the pressure to respond uncritically and disproportionately to moral panics, while, at the same time, we must confront the painful truth that social work has, at times, both engendered and supported moral panics, by exaggerating risks and scapegoating individuals and groups, including those we have 19 labelled as ‘other’ (Ben-Ari and Strier, 2010). The ‘Maria’ story was, in the end, a classic morality tale, and one that we have all chosen to forget. Yet her story, as we have seen, forces us to question the vary basis of child protection as it is currently practised. Such is the power of a moral panic analysis for social work. References Amnesty International (2014) “We ask for justice”. Europe’s failure to protect Roma from racist violence, London: Amnesty International. https://www.amnesty.nl/sites/default/files/public/roma_in_europe_p4312.pdf, Accessed 27th August 2014. Beddoe, E. and Cree, V.E. (forthcoming) ‘The risk paradigm and the media in child protection’, in M. Connolly (ed.) Beyond the Risk Paradigm. Current Debates and New Directions in Child Protection, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Ben-Ari, A. and Strier, R. (2010) ‘Rethinking cultural competence: what can we learn from Levinas?’, British Journal of Social Work, 40(7): 2155-2167. DOI: 10.1093/bjsw/bcp153 Christensen, P.H. (2000) ‘Childhood and the cultural construction of vulnerable bodies’, in A. Prout (ed.) The Body, Childhood and Society, pp 38-59, Basingstoke: Macmillan. Clapton, G., Cree, V.E. and Smith, M. (2013a) ‘Moral panics and social work: Towards a sceptical view of UK child protection’, Critical Social Policy, 33: 197 -217, originally published online 6 September 2012, doi: 0.1177/0261018312457860. Clapton, G., Cree, V.E. and Smith, M. (2013b) ‘Moral Panics, Claims-Making and Child Protection in the UK’, British Journal of Social Work, 43 (4): 803-812, first published online 14 May 2013, doi:10.1093/bjsw/bct061. Clark, C. (2015) ‘Integration, Exclusion and the Moral ‘Othering’ of Roma Migrant Communities in Britain’, in Cree, V.E., Clapton, G. and Smith, M. (eds) Revisiting Moral Panics, Bristol: Policy Press, pp 231-242. Cohen, S. (1972) Folk Devils and Moral Panics, Oxford: Martin Robertson. Cohen, S. (1998) Against Criminology, New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers. https://www.amnesty.nl/sites/default/files/public/roma_in_europe_p4312.pdf 20 Cree, V.E., Clapton, G. and Smith, M. (2014) (2014) ‘The Presentation of Child Trafficking in the UK: An Old and New Moral Panic?’, British Journal of Social Work, 44 (2): 418-433. doi: 10.1093/bjsw/bcs120 First published online: August 16, 2012. Featherstone, B., White, S. and Morris, K. (2014) Re-imagining Child Protection: Towards Humane Social Work with Families, Bristol: Policy Press. Garland, D. (2008) ‘On the concept of a moral panic’, Crime, Media, Culture 4(1): 9-30. Goode, E., and Ben-Yehuda, N. (1994) Moral Panics: The Social Construction of Deviance. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell. Hall, S., Critcher, C., Jefferson T., Clarke, J. and R. Bryan (1978) Policing the Crisis: Mugging, the State and Law and Order. London: Macmillan. Jay, A. (2014) Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Exploitation in Rotherham, 1997-2013, Rotherham: Rotherham Metropolitan Borough Council. http://www.rotherham.gov.uk/downloads/file/1407/independent_inquiry_cse_in_rotherham Martin, J. (2007) ‘The good, the bad, and the ugly? A new way of looking at the intercountry adoption debate’, U.C. Davis Journal of International Law and Policy 13: 173-216. Melville, J. and Bean, P. (1990) Lost Children of the Empire, London: Harper Collins. Meyer, A. (2007) ‘The moral rhetoric of childhood’, Childhood 14: 85-104. Mikaere, A. (1994) ‘Maori women: Caught in the contradictions of a colonised reality’, Waikato Law Review, 2, 125-149. Mills, C.W. (1959) The Sociological Imagination, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Nussbaum, M. (2006) Hiding from Humanity: Disgust, Shame and the Law, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Performance and Innovation Unit (PIU) (2000) Adoption: Prime Minister’s Review, London: Cabinet Office. Read, P. (2006) The Stolen Generations: (bringing them home) The Removal of Aboriginal Children in New South Wales 1883 to 1969. 4th reprint, Department of Aboriginal Affairs (New South Wales government) http://www.rotherham.gov.uk/downloads/file/1407/independent_inquiry_cse_in_rotherham 21 http://dmsweb.daa.asn.au/files/Recognition_of_Overseas/Reading%207_StolenGenerations. pdf Smith, M. (2011) 'Reading Bauman for Social Work', Ethics and Social Welfare, 5: 1, 2 — 17 Smith, M., Cree, V.E., Clapton, G. (2012) ‘Time to be heard: Interrogating the Scottish Government’s response to historical child abuse’, Scottish Affairs, 78, Winter: 1-24. Smith, M. and Cree, V.E. (2014) Social work and pornography. Some ethical considerations, Ethics & Social Welfare, doi:10.1080/17496535.2014.889735 Smolin, D.M. (2005) ‘The two faces of intercountry adoption: the significance of the Indian adoption scandals’, Seton Hall Law Review 35: 403- 93. Tyler, I. (2013) Revolting Subjects: Marginalization and Resistance in Neoliberal Britain. London: Zed Books. Young, J. (1971) The Drugtakers, The Social Meaning of Drug Use, London: Paladin. Young, J. (2007) The Vertigo of Late Modernity London: Sage Young, J. (2009) ‘Moral Panic: Its Origins in Resistance, Ressentiment and the Translation of Fantasy into Reality’, British Journal of Criminology 49: 4-16. http://dmsweb.daa.asn.au/files/Recognition_of_Overseas/Reading%207_StolenGenerations.pdf http://dmsweb.daa.asn.au/files/Recognition_of_Overseas/Reading%207_StolenGenerations.pdf 
work_jptoexci4rh5fgj2a7btiaw7au	----	Howe, C. (2009). The Legible Lesbian: Crimes of Passion in Nicaragua. Ethnos, 74(3), 361–378. http://doi.org/10.1080/00141840903053121 The Legible Lesbian: Crimes of Passion in Nicaragua Cymene Howe Rice University, Houston, USA Abstract: This article considers a precedent-setting murder case in Nicaragua that rendered a conviction based upon the victim’s ‘sexual option’ and status as a ‘lesbian.’ A significant achievement for advocates in Nicaragua, the case was also a victory for sexual and human rights proponents globally. This article queries how the sexualization of culture can be viewed through the spectacle of Aura Rosa’s life, death and symbolic resurrection. Analyzing the discourses and practices of Nicaraguan activists, international rights campaigns, the state, and local media, I argue that the post-mortem process of refiguring the victim as a ‘lesbian’ is imaginable only within a discursive field saturated with human rights paradigms including those of sexual rights. Central to these practices are notions of vulnerable bodies, ascriptions to particular models of modernity and an emerging ‘epistemology of the hate crime.’ Keywords: Sexuality, rights, Latin America, hate crime, lesbian A murder is committed. Why? To get another man's wife or wealth, or to snatch at the necessities of life. Or for fear that someone would deprive the murderer of such things. Or from a sense of wrong burning for redress. Who murders with no motive but the mere murdering? ST. AUGUSTINE Confessions (2006:33) http://doi.org/10.1080/00141840903053121 In February 2000, some time during la madrugada — those few hours before dawn — the murdered body of Aura Rosa Pavón was recovered from a pit latrine where it had been dumped. Aura Rosa was a very poor woman, even in the context of Nicaragua, the second poorest country in the western hemisphere. She was generally well-respected in her small rural town and was known for her hard work and perseverance against diffi cult odds. She was also well-known to be a cochona (a ‘dyke’ and more specifically, a masculine woman). On Christmas day, Aura Rosa was shot twice and killed by the husband of her girlfriend and lover, Karla Muñoz. It was three months later, at the prompting of Aura Rosa’s sister, that her corpse was ultimately found and laid to rest. There is, of course, much more to the story. [End Page 361] Why was Aura Rosa killed? Until recently there have been no recorded incidences of violence against sexual minorities, qua minorities in Nicaragua. However, the country has no dearth of ‘crimes of passion’ that often unfold in the sucesos (happenings) columns of nationally circulated newspapers. Aura Rosa’s story was no less dramatic: it including coerced marriage, poverty, incarceration, jealousy and betrayal. Nicaraguan sexual rights activists charged that the homophobic climate brought about by Nicaragua’s then anti-sodomy law (Article 204) — considered by Amnesty International to be the most repressive in Latin America — created the conditions in which Aura Rosa could be, and would be, killed for her sexual difference. According to sexual rights advocates, Aura Rosa was murdered not because she was having an affair with another man’s wife, but because she was a lesbian. The murder trial that followed was precedent-setting: it was the first time in Nicaragua that a murder conviction was made on the claim that ‘the sexual option of the victim was the motive for the crime’ (La Boletina 2004). The man who murdered Aura Rosa, along with his accomplices, were successfully convicted of something akin to a ‘hate crime.’ This conviction was a significant achievement for sexual rights advocates in Nicaragua, and by extension a victory for lesbian and gay rights and human rights proponents globally. But one might also ask what this victory masks. Multiple meanings surround Aura Rosa’s life, death and semiotic resurrection through activist campaigns, media spectacles and judicial proceedings. Aura Rosa may well have been killed because of her sexual identity, but this does not foreclose how designating ‘sexual option’ as the motive for this crime may overshadow other criminal intents, other categories of gender and sexuality, and other sorts of quotidian violence. In this article I am interested in how ‘sexuality’ served as a key semiotic marker in these juridical and activist practices and how an ‘epistemology of the hate crime’ thus emerged. As human rights and identity politics circulate in transnational terrains, local populations, activists, the state and media outlets work to rearticulate these global discourses and practices into socially and culturally relevant and applicable claims for justice? Unraveling Aura Rosa’s story, and the ways in which such spectacles are played out in the realm of the media and the representations of activists, probes the truncated time of the ‘eternal present’ (Debord 1988). Aura Rosa’s story, for one, was transformed from a narrative of perseverance to one of persecution. Through this process, particular ways of speaking about sexuality, culture, and change resulted in new ways of imagining la cochona as la lesbiana. By first focusing on human rights [End Page 362] as a political commodity within the context of Nicaragua’s particular sexual epistemologies, this discussion then moves on to the ‘rest of the story.’ I argue that Aura Rosa was re-figured, post-mortem, as a ‘lesbian’ through juridical processes, spectacles and advocacy initiatives heavily influenced by human rights paradigms and locally situated iterations of identity politics. Nicaragua is no longer the hot bed of cold war action that it was in the 1980s. It is a small country that, while it once served as a beacon for Marxist aspirations and popular insurrection in the developing world, now largely exists on the margins of global power-broking and influence. Though the Sandinista Party recently re-took the presidency in the 2006 elections, the political and social values which underwrote the country’s revolution in 1979 appear radically changed in the present Sandinista regime, including recent political moves to embrace the Catholic Church and neoliberal economic policies. The revolutionary Sandinista state (1979–1990) achieved some of their egalitarian goals, but the revolution was truncated, foiled and failed, as many have observed. During the 1980s a nascent and transnational gay and lesbian movement was founded (Ferguson 1991; Howe n.d.; Randall 1993; Thayer 1997). But it was not until the early 1990s, when the country’s anti-sodomy law was augmented, that sexual rights advocates gained traction and found a common enemy in the revitalized repressive apparatus of the state. It was then that the subject of homosexuality per se became a part of the quotidian media of Nicaraguan television, print and radio. 1 With the advent of sexual rights in Nicaragua, following the global ‘women’s rights as human rights’ campaigns of the 1990s, local activists along with international advocacy organizations have sought to claim sexuality in public and politicized terms. Under the mantles of sexual opción, sexual orientación, lesbiana, gay, and homosexual, practices are being transformed into identities through advocacy practices such as discussion groups for lesbians and gay men and a week-long set of events celebrating a ‘sexuality free from prejudice’ in late June every year. The emergence of sexual rights in Nicaragua is indicative of a particular remaking of a moral order in the midst of neoliberal economic strangleholds and socialist dreams deferred. But as Weber might have asked, how does one group of legitimating values give way to another? Was Aura Rosa’s murder a hate crime, a crime of passion, or, to put it bluntly, a murder motivated by something akin to a property crime: ‘stealing’ another man’s woman? While activists and attorneys argued that Aura Rosa was murdered because she was a lesbian, one might submit that she was killed because she made cuckold a powerful man; this would be a phenomenon with historical resonance in [End Page 363] Nicaragua. In the past, it has been possible to imagine killing someone who has robbed you of your wife or trespassed on the prerogatives of machismo. It took a stretch of the imagination, however, to envision killing someone for being a lesbian, demanding a particular form of Hegel’s ‘recognition.’ Reading Aura Rosa’s case as a ‘hate crime’ indexes her sexuality as fundamental. But one dimension that is occluded in this boon for sexual rights are more mundane and quotidian harms including routinized violence against women. In Nicaragua nearly one third of women report being physically or sexually abused by their male partners (World Organisation Against Torture 2001). The legibility of ‘sexual identity’ presumes a fluency in the transnational registers of human rights and identity politics. Drawing upon human rights paradigms is a way for Nicaraguan advocates to enlist global norms in order to mitigate the effects of a callous state — an attempt to render justice by invoking transnational values. Prior to the mid 1980s, the category ‘lesbian’ was not widely used in Nicaragua. Even at that time, it was a term largely used by transnational, intellectual elites. More substantively, and perhaps more importantly, Nicaragua has not had a history of violence against marked sexual minorities as such. Aura Rosa’s tale can only be rendered within the context of global sexual rights, transnationally waged ‘culture wars,’ and juridical climates where human rights often trump discourses of development and other liberationist strategies (Žižek 2005). As sexual rights gain further traction around the world, how are moral priorities re- ordered, or are they? Anthropologists concerned with human rights have sought to unravel some of these thorny theoretical and political problems. On the one hand, the liberal etiology and values of human rights (intended to be universally applicable) must be accounted for, but so too must particular cultural distinctions be weighed (Nagengast & Turner 1997). In the case of Aura Rosa a new legitimacy and legibility was constructed around ‘sexuality’ as a point of identification. With human rights as the discursive vehicle, sexuality was made into a political commodity as advocates attempted to open new conceptual spaces and create a new legal and social ‘consciousness’ around sexuality. A Brief History of Sex and Death Any concept of lesbian ‘legibility’ contains many modes of deciphering sexual categories, social configurations and juridical ecologies in their larger cultural gestalt. Historically, Nicaragua’s social lexicon had an ‘other’ category of sexual subject: la cochona. Many cochonas were (and are) quite visible, or [End Page 364] in North American and European parlance ‘out,’ in terms of their refusal of gender conformity and sometimes, their romantic lives with other women. They were (and are) largely the object of pity, mockery, confusion and often, deeply ignored (Bolt González 1996; Montenegro 2000). But they have not been figured as particularly hate-able. Though marginalized, cochonas are a part of very quotidian social and familial spaces. ‘Every neighborhood,’ urban Nicaraguans will say, ‘has its cochón (‘fag’) and cochona.’ While I have never met a Nicaraguan who has been expelled from her family home for being a cochona, neither is lesbian sexuality a topic for typical Nicaraguan dinner conversation. In general, cochona is a derogatory term for masculine-appearing women who have sexual and affective relationships with other women (typically ‘feminine’ women designated as muy mujer or ‘very womanish’). But it is also a term that has been, at times, quite neutral. For instance, in the Nicaraguan family households where I have lived during my field research, my visitors were often nonchalantly announced in this way: ‘there is a cochona here to see you.’ In other words, there is a measured ambivalence about cochonas in public spaces. In terms of how cochonas represent themselves, Nicaragua has not (yet) seen a re- appropriation of historical epithets where monikers such as ‘queer,’ ‘fag’ or ‘dyke’ are self- identifying markers of pride. I have never encountered a Nicaraguan woman who has declared, ‘I am a cochona.’ These women, rather, often describe themselves in terms of their social relations, ‘I am Eva’s partner,’ or ‘I take care of my mother,’ or even, ‘I am someone who loves women.’ They also often describe themselves in terms of location, ‘I am a Masayan’ or ‘I am from the country.’ More recently, with NGOs (largely in urban settings) conducting consciousness-raising groups based on lesbian identity, some women are now adopting the term ‘lesbian’ to identify themselves. This is a shift toward situating one’s self under the sign of sexuality. Katherine Franke, a critical legal theorist, writes that ‘to call something sexual is at once to say too much and not enough about the meaning of a practice so named’ (2002:290–91). Following a longstanding debate in feminist politics and scholarship as to what constitutes ‘sex crimes,’ Franke (2002:320) argues that invariably, if mistakenly, sex crimes are constituted by the ‘parts’ involved: those bodily locations (genitals, mouths, etc.) that are deemed ‘sexual’ by whichever cultural logic, power relations and legal apparatuses are speaking. She is concerned with the ways in which certain sites on the body are always already and exclusively made sexual through signification and asks whether these sites may ever exceed or escape this [End Page 365] designation. Deborah Elliston (1995) offers a similar interrogation of whether the ‘erotic,’ or its nearly coeval cousin in the west, the ‘sexual,’ is as transparent as some would claim. Elliston’s critique hinges on the fallacious importation of western value systems concerning the erotic. Her critique, like Franke’s, never belies the body; she is concerned with the ways in which putatively erotic organs are rather seamlessly or tautologically rendered as sexual. Just as bodily organs are inscribed as sexual or erotic, processes of signification also imbue larger social phenomenon with sexuality, sometimes occluding other meanings. With a grander conception of the ‘body’ — as a social body or the body politic — I am asking how it is that particular historical moments and social conditions lend themselves to becoming sites of ‘sexuality.’ Or, as Foucault plainly put it, how, when and where does sex become ‘an especially dense transfer point for relations of power’ (Foucault 1990:103) for both living, and dead, bodies? Nicaragua has been described as a place where there is ‘homosexuality with-out a gay world’ (Adam 1993). As in many Iberian-influenced postcolonial contexts, Nicaragua reflects a kind of homosexual habitus that social scientists have called ‘the Mediterranean model.’ In this configuration, which is based on accounts of homosexual acts between men, it is only the ‘passive’ (or ‘feminized’) partner in homosexual relations who becomes stigmatized. In Nicaragua he is called a cochón (‘fag’). Because of the thin quotient of social scientific analyses of women’s same-sex affective relationships in Nicaragua and the rest of Latin America, it is not yet possible to conclude how women might configure in these passive/active paradigms. Writing about Nicaragua in the late 1980s and early 1990s Roger Lancaster noted that ‘there is little popular interest in categorizing or regulating female same-sex relations and little exists in the popular lexicon to account for it’ (1992:271). However, in my conversations with both rural and urban Nicaraguans from different class backgrounds, from the early 1990s to the present, I have never encountered a Nicaraguan who was not familiar with the term and the personage, cochona. 2 Cochonas are easily identified because of their hombruna (mannish) ways. But there is also a class of ‘very womanish’ women (muy mujer ) and femeninas — who have either occasional or exclusive sexual and affective relationships with other women, but who would not consider themselves (nor are they considered by their neighbors, friends, boyfriends or husbands) to be homosexual, cochona, lesbian, bisexual or in any signifi cant way, sexually ‘different.’ It is only the cochona who garners stigma; her feminine girlfriend is not considered ‘queer.’ [End Page 366] Nicaragua is by no means a queer utopia, and to interpret the presence of pink triangles and rainbow stickers strategically located in some urban areas as representing gay liberation would be mistaken. However, the presence of activism on behalf of sexual minorities as well as accusations against them— oscillating between marginalization, mockery, social ambivalence and legitimacy— suggest that Nicaragua can neither be simply defined as a machista, homophobic terrain as some stereotypes might have it. Attempts to affix the status of a ‘sexual minority,’ whether by the Nicaraguan state through anti-sodomy laws or by gay and lesbian identity advocates, I would argue, does not arise from a fear of the ‘uncategorizable’ (Butler 2004:34). Rather, the concept of a ‘sexual minority’ is uncovered through a field of multiple, polysemic and overlapping categories. The Rest of the Story Born in Niquinohomo, the birthplace of Sandino — the martyred hero from whom the Sandinistas drew their name — Aura Rosa was 26 years old when she was killed. 3 Recognized in her community as a hard-working woman, Aura Rosa was also well known as a cochona. She was unapologetic about her attraction to other women and unconcerned with subscribing to gender-appropriate dress codes and the expectations of femininity. Aura Rosa was the kind of woman whom Nicaraguans would designate as mangas largas (long sleeves), for the men’s long- sleeve shirts that cochonas are said to favor. Aura Rosa made her living raising pigs and chickens. She was described as muy humilde (‘very humble’) — a term Nicaraguans use to designate extreme poverty by wrapping it in the euphemism of moral humility. Over time, Aura Rosa managed to purchase a piece of land on which she hand-built a small house. The house was literally hand-built: it was not constructed from the cinder blocks that are common construction material among the working classes, but hand-crafted from river mud mixed with straw and other found materials. It was indeed a humble home. Aura Rosa’s intent was to share her home with ‘her love:’ a young woman named Karla Muñoz. Karla, however, had already been promised to a wealthy coffee plantation owner, Daniel Norori Tapia. Karla’s mother, in the hopes of relieving her own family’s poverty, had agreed that Karla would marry the 60-year-old Tapia who had been inquiring after Karla since she was 13. Though Karla had become romantically involved with Aura Rosa at some point during her late teens, she did become Tapia’s wife. After Karla’s mother sent her to live with Tapia, she continued to meet [End Page 367] with Aura Rosa in secret and their love affair continued. Tapia and Karla’s mother soon discovered the two, and both were furious. Collaborating once again, Karla’s mother and Tapia phoned the local police and, invoking Article 204, 4 filed a charge of ‘sodomy’ against Aura Rosa. Karla was also ‘pressured,’ according to Aura Rosa’s account, to fi le a charge against Aura Rosa along with that submitted by Karla’s mother. Under Article 204 the fact that Aura Rosa was older than Karla meant that the prosecutor could argue for an increased sentence based on ‘illegitimate seduction’ (seducción ilegítima). Based on her putative ‘authority’ (influencia de autoridad ) or ‘moral influence’ (dirección moral) in the affair, the law states that Aura Rosa would also be the only one accountable for these sexual improprieties. Aura Rosa was tried under Article 204 and sent to prison. 5 But she was released after several months when an attorney successfully argued that Karla Muñoz had been pressured by her mother to bring charges against Aura Rosa. Under the tutelage of the attorney, Karla then wrote a letter to the court saying that she ‘loved Aura Rosa’ and that she [Aura Rosa] had not hurt her in any way; nor had she been raptada (‘kidnapped’ or ‘abducted’) by her. One condition of her early release was that Aura Rosa cease contact with Karla Muñoz. Karla was now spending all of her time in Tapia’s household, by some accounts she was, ‘imprisoned.’ But, the women’s love affair continued. Through the well-oiled channels of local gossip, Karla’s mother and Tapia soon got word of their reunification and decided to elicit the support of Karla’s cousin in an effort to separate the lovers. Their relationship, after all, both fouled Karla’s mother’s well-laid plans for conjugal support, and made Tapia a cuckolded husband — not at the hands of another man, but a woman who dared to transgress the terrains of masculine prerogative. Karla’s cousin, as the newly recruited accomplice, crafted a romantic note, invoking details that he had gleaned from conversations with Karla while in her confidence. The note, supposedly from Karla, and legitimated because it was hand-delivered to Aura Rosa by the trusted cousin, requested that Aura Rosa meet Karla in the woods on Christmas night. Aura Rosa went to the meeting place and was summarily shot by Tapia. Her body was then tossed into the pit latrine — a way of disposing of bodies that evokes Somoza-era punishments for those opposed to the authoritarian regime. 6 [End Page 368] Post Mortems and Modern Love The public manifestation of Aura Rosa’s murder began soon after she had gone missing. Aura Rosa’s sister, who worked as a maid in the capital, became desperate for information about Aura Rosa once she realized her sister was missing and posted a notice about Aura Rosa’s disappearance. Appearing in the widely read national newspaper, El Nuevo Diario, the notice criticized the local police for ignoring the case. It was likely because of this media exposure that Aura Rosa’s body was eventually found — though reportedly her body was found ‘by coincidence.’ 7 At the same time the media focused attention on Aura Rosa’s murder, other iterations of sex and sexuality were on most everyone’s mind in Nicaragua. Two years prior, Zoilamérica Narvaez, the adopted daughter of Daniel Ortega (Sandinista president during the Revolutionary era — who is now President again) made national and international headlines when she publicly denounced Ortega for allegedly having molested her since the age of 11. The ‘daughter of the revolution,’ as Zoilamérica was affectionately known throughout the 1980s, filed a public denouncement that was picked up by the national newspapers. The media fray ultimately resulted in a serialized 50-page testimony detailing sexual assaults that Ortega had allegedly carried out during his years as Nicaragua’s head of state. With the support of friends and feminist advocates, Zoilamérica filed a case in the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. Zoilamérica’s accusations, re-invigorated by political rivalry and feminist activists during the presidential election campaign of 2000, was a source of much speculation and political positioning on street corners and in Nicaragua’s daily diet of print capital and televised news. Similar forms of sensationalism and tabloid titillation became essential to the media’s representation of Aura Rosa’s murder, trial and sentencing, situated as they were in newly overt discussions about sex, propriety and morality. In the press coverage of Aura Rosa’s murder and ensuing trial she was depicted in sexualized terms, following suit with the scandal that had been wrought through Zoilamérica’s allegation. Headlines proclaiming, ‘Lesbian led tormented life’ (El Nuevo Diario, February 27, 2000) ‘Trial begins for lesbian murder’ (El Nuevo Diario February 23, 2000) and ‘All guilty in lesbian murder’ (La Prensa June 28, 2000) were featured on the front pages of the nationally circulated papers. Articles detailed what many sexuality activists considered ‘morbid details’ about her life and death. All of the headlines placed Aura Rosa squarely under the sign of ‘lesbian.’ [End Page 369] No longer a humble woman or a cochona from Niquinohomo, Aura Rosa had been resurrected as ‘the lesbian.’ While newspaper accounts consistently referred to Aura Rosa as ‘the lesbian,’ her lover, Karla, was simply called the ‘young one’ (la jovencita) or ‘the promised woman’ (la mujer prometida). Both Karla and Aura Rosa were involved in a ‘lesbian,’ or same- sex affective and sexual relationship, but only Aura Rosa emerged with the designation ‘lesbian.’ Importantly, it was only Aura Rosa who had served time in prison for sodomy, not Karla. In the configuration offered by the press Aura Rosa is reconstructed as a ‘lesbian,’ as opposed to a ‘cochona.’ But what is kept rather neatly in place — following Nicaraguan social distinctions about femenina and masculina partners in same-sex women’s couples — is the belief that only one partner in this homoerotic pairing is ‘guilty’ or doomed to stigma: la mujer masculina (the masculine woman). According to Angelica, a lesbian and sexual rights activist with whom I spoke, Aura Rosa’s representation in the press as a ‘lesbian’ was a sign of progress. In the newspapers before, you would always see this, ‘cochón this’ and ‘la cochona that,’ even if it was not even anything about the sexuality of the person. It would be, ‘this cochón robbed a woman at the market’ or ‘so and so, a cochona, got in a fight in a bar’ . . . that was the kind of thing you would see in the papers. Now it is better than it used to be. Now in the papers they use the right kind of words, ‘lesbian’ or ‘homosexual,’ instead of always these atrasado [‘backward,’ ‘behind (the times)] terms like cochón and cochona. Having Aura Rosa depicted as a lesbian rather than a ‘dyke,’ was, then, a small victory from the point of view of sexual rights activism. ‘Lesbian’ identity held hope as a new category of recognition, a new definition and ordering of social norms. It was in response to Aura Rosa’s murder itself, not its discursive iterations on the pages of the national papers, that sexuality activists marshaled their forces of protest. La Comisión Pro Derechos Humanos de Lesbianas y Homosexuales, Nicaragüenses (The Commission for the Human Rights of Nicaraguan Lesbians and Homosexuals), a small group of lesbian-identified women and one homosexual-identified man, leveled an activist critique of both the murder and the trial. Before Aura Rosa was killed, when the Comisión had first heard about Aura Rosa’s initial imprisonment under Article 204, they visited her in her cell and recorded her life history. In the wake of her death, they aimed to provide a foil to the national press coverage and clarify what they considered essential elements of Aura Rosa’s life story and her demise. [End Page 370] Eugenia, a member of the Comisión explained to me her initial reactions to the discovery of Aura Rosa’s corpse. And when they found her body…we had known her. This wasn’t just whatever lesbian. It was someone who had been in prison and had had her human rights violated and here she was, dead. And no one lifted a finger, nobody in this country mobilized to see what happened with her murder. Except for us. We were there for her even in her death, like we had been when she was alive and imprisoned. With a simple one-page-folded flyer, the Comisión highlighted how Aura Rosa ‘openly lived her lesbianism’ and was ‘unafraid of who she was’ (La Comisión 2000). The pamphlet emphasized the mutual love between Karla and Aura Rosa and the duration of their relationship spanning a number of years. This time-tested and committed relationship was used to underscore something of social value in Nicaragua: a relationship that lasts. In a place where there are high rates of male abandonment of women and children 8 with approximately one third of households headed solely by women, durable relationships are particularly prized. The length of Aura Rosa and Karla’s relationship lent their saga a legitimating effect. It worked to emphasize that this relationship was not solely ‘sexual’ (read: lewd and decadent), but one based on solidly ‘modern’ forms of romantic love. In this case, modern love — understood as romantic, individually chosen and not necessarily procreative — could be readily juxtaposed against Karla’s mother’s attempt to ‘sell’ her daughter to the highest bidder. The Comisión’s flyer went on to interrogate the role of the Nicaraguan state in Aura Rosa’s execution. 9 Those who developed the wording for the document reasoned that were it not for ‘prejudices,’ ‘repression,’ and ‘moralizing and destructive’ laws present in Nicaragua under Article 204, Aura Rosa would have continued to ‘live her life,’ and her ‘sexual option’ as she chose. The pamphlet further charged that Aura Rosa’s murderers were ‘full of hate’ and killed her ‘because she was a lesbian.’ It described that Aura Rosa’s murderers felt ‘justified’ in their crime, and buoyed by the anti-sodomy law. Not only had Tapia and his accomplices used Article 204 to initially charge and imprison Aura Rosa, but the juridical climate engendered by the state had created the social atmosphere in which one might both imagine and carry out murder based on the sexuality of the victim. Moreover, the state itself was found to be largely responsible for her death. The Comisión’s document explained, . . . to consider homosexuality or lesbianism as a crime is political thinking of the past century. It goes against the principle of legal equality which maintains that, [End Page 371] ‘all people are born free and equal, independent of their physical, psychological, and social differences’…where is the justice? These criminals may go free despite the blood of their innocent victim: there is no Human Rights organization which defends the right to be a lesbian…we call upon all people, regardless of their sexual option to join us in solidarity and demanding justice (La Comisión 2000). Though its circulation was limited (only a few hundred were printed due to lack of funds), the Comisión created a public denunciation with the contention that Nicaragua’s legal code is retrograde, and ‘of the past century.’ The Comisión explicitly called for ‘all people, regardless of their sexual option to join us in solidarity.’ Following the logic of earlier critiques of Article 204 which claimed that the anti-sodomy law ‘violated the rights of every Nicaraguan,’ this particular call to action employs a strategy of inclusion. In this sense, the Comisión enlists not only a call to universal human rights, but mirrors some of the communitarian ethos of the earlier Sandinista period. The state itself is framed as a hypocritical entity that failed to guarantee the ‘free and equal’ status that the Nicaraguan constitution purports to uphold. After a very brief investigation, Karla’s husband, Tapia and his two accomplices were arrested and brought to trial. The prosecuting attorney for the case, Juanita Jiménez, explained, ‘after each of the technical aspects [of the trial], my argument was intended to sensitize the court about how Aura Rosa’s human rights were violated by these people who did not tolerate her sexual preference, nor her existence.’ Jiménez asked of the court, ‘what harm could Aura Rosa have done, if her only sin was to have loved a woman?’ Jiménez’s argument hinged on the violation of Aura Rosa’s human rights, a mortal assault on her bodily integrity, and in particular, how social intolerance of Aura Rosa’s sexuality prefigured this violation. The case was won and the murderers sentenced. Jiménez concluded, ‘what we’ve gained from this trial is the recognition that to be a lesbian is not a crime, but rather a right we have as humanas.’ 10 Ironically the same state apparatus that had mandated Aura Rosa’s incarceration because of her lesbian behavior two years prior, ultimately found that her murder — supposedly motivated by her being a lesbian — was wrong. Essentially, the court found that while engaging in same-sex sex may be designated as criminal according to current Nicaraguan law, ‘being’ a lesbian should not be a death sentence. Bringing international legal norms to bear upon state processes is the explicit ideological intent of human rights and here they were made to trump the state’s anti-sodomy law. According [End Page 372] to Vilma, a feminist advocate, this was a triumph of the law and a sign of cultural conversion. The society can open in this area, and it is happening. More than anything it is fear. Fear of taking on these issues. But the fact is that if you can argue for your rights in this way you don’t need to be afraid. But there was internalized fear and this is why the groups [other activist groups or NGOs] didn’t go forward, because they weren’t sure why she was killed, for being a lesbian or what. We have prejudices inside. It is in society too. In ourselves. These men in the jury, all of them over 50 years old. And the woman in her forties. In this sense we superseded machismo and patriarchy. In addition to the proposition that ‘machismo and patriarchy’ were overcome through this process, something else came out through this trial: new ways to publicly address and acknowledge sexual rights as human rights in Nicaragua. An epistemology of a hate crime, that had been largely unimaginable in Nicaragua until rather recently, was now fully realized through Aura Rosa’s murder; this constituted a new public manifestation of the category ‘lesbian.’ Sexuality activists challenged the juridical culture of Nicaragua, evoking the well- circulated parlance and persuasions of human rights in order to do so. But justice found a contradictory manifestation here. On the one hand, the state has created and maintained the hostile legal conditions which encourage the condemnation and incarceration of homosexual people. On the other hand, it is the state which must ultimately adjudicate the crime of murder, and in this case it is framed in terms of sexual discrimination. Hannah Arendt (1958), describing the aftermath of the Holocaust, understood that human rights are necessarily riddled with ‘paradox’ as they are dependent upon, defined by, and primarily violated by, the state. Noting a similar paradox, and speaking to the more contemporary moment of lesbian and gay human rights, Judith Butler (2004:33) writes that ‘to be part of a sexual minority means, most emphatically, that we are also dependent on the protection of public and private spaces, on legal sanctions that protect us from violence, on safeguards of various institutional kinds against unwanted aggression imposed upon us, and the violent actions they sometimes instigate’. This same sort of awkward dependency on the state apparatus entreated the Comisión to both appeal to, and to be appalled by, the state and the hostile environment they believe it created. For Eugenia of the Comisión, Aura Rosa’s death, trial and activist interventions on her behalf served as a corrective to the Nicaraguan [End Page 373] penal code and social climate, but it served a more global purpose as well. As she put it, ‘we want at least to tell the world that they are murdering lesbians in Nicaragua.’ Some Lives Matter More than Others On the day that the United States attacked Afghanistan in reprisal for the September 11th attacks, Doña Xilo and I sat together watching television as events unfolded on CNN en Español. She observed out loud, ‘¿Sabes una cosa? Algunas vidas valen más que otras.’ Or, ‘You know something? Some lives matter more than others.’ 11 Does Aura Rosa’s life and death matter more as a ‘lesbian’ than as a cochona or a woman, or a person from Sandino’s birthplace who lived in a mud hut? As she is reconfigured as a semiotic reservoir for human rights and lesbian and gay advocacy on local and global levels, how does Aura Rosa’s body come to embody a cause: an arbiter of moral feeling? In the last decade or so, advocates and others in Nicaragua claim that there has been increased violence against those deemed to be non-heterosexual (whether the epithet is lesbian, homosexual, gay, cochón or cochona). Larger structural changes have certainly impacted the politics of sexuality in Nicaragua including the demise of the Sandinista revolution, a series of socially conservative regimes, the global emergence of sexual rights and increasingly difficult neoliberal economic conditions where the state no longer serves its larger ‘welfare’ purpose. Certainly Aura Rosa’s murder must be understood within a context of structural violence where grinding poverty limited the life possibilities of Aura Rosa and drove Karla Muñoz’s mother to, in effect, sell her daughter to the highest bidder. Lesbian murders, akin to hate crimes familiar in the U.S., indicate new ways of imagining murderous intents. Indeed an epistemology of hate crimes may come to replace ‘the epistemology of the closet’ (Sedgwick 1990). As I have heard many times in Nicaragua, ‘we have always had the cochones and the cochonas, but now we have los gays y lesbianas.’ This suggests a shift from what anthropologists might call a ‘folk’ category, cochona, to a category which is more legible in an international register: lesbian. As Aura Rosa is made a sexual subject in the language of transnational human rights parlance, her life story is also changed: she is transformed from an economically marginalized, ‘poor woman,’ to a sexually marginalized, ‘poor lesbian.’ Rather than an agentive cochona who wooed another man’s woman, Aura Rosa becomes a victim. [End Page 374] Aura Rosa’s personal history of visibility, her status as a ‘well known dyke’ was important in making hers a cause célèbre. As a legal vanguard, the trial provided a framework to make comparable social claims and generate narratives outside of the media and legal fray. The sensationalism of Aura Rosa’s story or what Guy Debord (1977) understood as ‘spectacle,’ demonstrates the many seductions of visibility. The spectacle of her life, death and trial became a platform for new dialogues about sex and gender, publics and privates, martyrdom and culpability in Nicaragua and perhaps by extension, in other national settings. These juridical moves provide a legal scaffolding for others to make comparable social claims, fostering quotidian dialogues about homosexuality, human rights and ‘murderous intent’ in the larger collective imagination in Nicaragua. Ultimately Aura Rosa’s case underscores the power of accusation to create new terrains of cultural dialogue and potentially, transformation. Nicaraguans have a new discursive space to render experiences and opinions about ‘sexuality’ and sexual rights as a category of analysis. Internationally, advocacy organizations are also able to share particular narratives about the conditions and activism in Nicaragua. That Aura Rosa came to be grieved in this particular way, that her life and death was transformed through the mediums of human rights discourses, advocacy priorities, and juridical processes demonstrates the ways that a life that is ‘socially vulnerable’ may become valuable in its vulnerability through a politics of injury (Brown 1995). Sexual ‘identity’ is at one and the same time protected under the aegis of human rights, and made a spectacle as a new ontological category, one that has been ‘proven’ to provoke murder: making the unimaginable, imaginable. Notes 1. For example, Nicaragua’s popular national newspaper, El Nuevo Diario, has a weekly publication entitled Salud y Sexualidad (Health and Sexuality) featuring stories ranging from venereal disease to the ‘origins’ of homosexuality. A popular television show for youth features messages about gender, sexual, and racial equality, domestic violence, dating, pregnancy and homosexuality, among other topics. Radio shows produced in Managua air many of the same topics found in the television show. Non-governmental organizations and activist groups host discussion groups about lesbian and homosexual identity. For a comprehensive discussion of sexual rights advocacy in contemporary Nicaragua, see Howe (n.d.). 2. Nicaraguans of all ages and genders voice curiosity, and wonder out loud, about how two women could ‘do it’ sans penetrative genitals. Tortillera, a term used in reference to female/female sex is instructive. It literally means ‘a female tortilla-maker’ and evokes the image of two flat surfaces, eluding phallogocentrism. 3. Information about Aura Rosa’s life, death and trial was gathered through a series of interviews with activists, newspaper accounts, and published materials. In order to describe the narrative efficiently, these sources have been combined with quotes and materials distinguished where necessary. 4. The text of Article 204, which was finally repealed in 2008, read thus: ‘anyone who induces, promotes, propagandizes or practices in scandalous form sexual intercourse between persons of the same sex commits the crime of sodomy and shall incur 1 to 3 years imprisonment.’ It also stated that if one of the parties engaging in homosexual intercourse held power or authority over the other, even if in private, s/he would be punishable with 2 to 4 years in prison for ‘unlawful seduction.’ International rights organizations have pointed out that Article 204 was particularly nefarious compared to other anti-sodomy laws around the world because its language allowed women to be prosecuted as well as men. Moreover, the phrasing of the legislation, ‘anyone who induces, promotes, propagandizes’ potentially threatens organizations, therapists, social workers and media outlets thought to be ‘promoting’ same-sex sexuality in their work. 5. Aura Rosa’s was one of very few cases where a woman was tried and sentenced under Article 204. Activists report that when Article 204 was used to charge ‘sodomy,’ it was often jealous husbands, wives, or parents concerned about the sexual behavior of their daughters or sons. Among Nicaraguans who were aware of Article 204, it was commonly referred to it as a ruta de venganza; a way of exacting revenge and operationalizing state instruments for personal retribution. 6. Much might be said about the symbolic weight of disposing of Aura Rosa’s body in a latrine. Putting dissidents in pit latrines (full of excrement) was one way that ‘Tacho,’ last of the Somoza dictators, tortured enemies of the regime; it was also a convenient and degrading way to dispose of these enemies. For Tapia to have placed Aura Rosa’s body in the latrine may have evoked a similar kind of paternalist and/or patriarchal reckoning on his part — believing that, like the Somozas before him, he had the authority and ‘right’ to do so. 7. That the police failed to locate Aura Rosa’s body quickly may signal any number of things: the life (and death) of a cochóna was of little importance, or perhaps police investigative skills and resources were tapped. 8. This recent calculation of female-headed households is from the United Nations Population Fund Survey (2004). The number of female-headed households has grown steadily since earlier waves of modernization in Nicaragua in the 1950s, with industrialization and mass migrations to the city making Managua a megalopolis. Contemporaneously, according to Nicaraguan analysts and polling, this was the onset of higher rates of male abandonment of wives (or common law wives) and children. Nicaraguan feminists, from a less materialist vantage point, suggest that this phenomenon was only an exacerbated effect of an already-present and pervasive machista inclination to procreate and then move on. 9. To be more precise about what activists are invoking here vis-a-vis ‘the state:’ the Asemblea Nacional and the sitting president in 1992, Violeta Chamorro (1990–96) originally legislated the increased penalties for Article 204. Currently, the judicial branch adjudicates violations of Article 204 and in their inability (or refusal some might argue) to overturn the legislation, the National Assembly and the sitting President continue to be implicated in not providing the justice that activists demand. 10. Note that the feminine form of ‘humans’ is used here (humanas), rather than the gender- neutral (according to grammatical rules) humanos which includes both males and females in the rubric of humans. 11. 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work_jpxqz2fwvbg3pntcj4e7rp5dfq	----	Sexual Orientation Microaggressions: “Death by a Thousand Cuts” for Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual Youth This article was downloaded by: [Simon Fraser University] On: 13 September 2011, At: 10:44 Publisher: Routledge Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK Journal of LGBT Youth Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/wjly20 Sexual Orientation Microaggressions: ““Death by a Thousand Cuts”” for Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual Youth Kevin L. Nadal a , Marie-Anne Issa a , Jayleen Leon a , Vanessa Meterko a , Michelle Wideman a & Yinglee Wong a a John Jay College of Criminal Justice, City University of New York, New York, New York, USA Available online: 11 Jul 2011 To cite this article: Kevin L. Nadal, Marie-Anne Issa, Jayleen Leon, Vanessa Meterko, Michelle Wideman & Yinglee Wong (2011): Sexual Orientation Microaggressions: ““Death by a Thousand Cuts”” for Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual Youth, Journal of LGBT Youth, 8:3, 234-259 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/19361653.2011.584204 PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE Full terms and conditions of use: http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions This article may be used for research, teaching and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, re-distribution, re-selling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents will be complete or accurate or up to date. The accuracy of any instructions, formulae and drug doses should be independently verified with primary sources. The publisher shall not be liable for any loss, actions, claims, proceedings, demand or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material. http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/wjly20 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/19361653.2011.584204 http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions Journal of LGBT Youth, 8:234–259, 2011 Copyright © Taylor & Francis Group, LLC ISSN: 1936-1653 print / 1936-1661 online DOI: 10.1080/19361653.2011.584204 Sexual Orientation Microaggressions: “Death by a Thousand Cuts” for Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual Youth KEVIN L. NADAL, MARIE-ANNE ISSA, JAYLEEN LEON, VANESSA METERKO, MICHELLE WIDEMAN, and YINGLEE WONG John Jay College of Criminal Justice, City University of New York, New York, New York, USA In recent years, there has been a growth of literature examining the mental health impacts of microaggressions, which are defined as subtle forms of discrimination toward oppressed groups. The cur- rent study utilized a qualitative focus group method and directed content analysis to categorize several types of sexual orientation microaggressions that exist. Eight themes were identified, including “Use of heterosexist terminology” and “Endorsement of heteronor- mative culture/behaviors.” Results suggest that lesbian, gay, and bisexual (LGB) individuals experience both conscious and uncon- scious microaggressions from heterosexuals and support that mi- croaggressions negatively impact LGB individual’s mental health. Implications for youth development are discussed. KEYWORDS Bisexuals, discrimination, gay men, lesbians, mental health, microaggressions, sexual orientation, violence Racism and other forms of discrimination have been embedded as part of American society on social, political, and economic levels (Smedley & Smedley, 2005). The civil rights movement and subsequent equal rights ini- tiatives had a significant impact on changing racial attitudes and overt prej- udicial behaviors. In fact, 40 years later (particularly with the election of an African-American president), many Americans may believe such movements eliminated racism and created true equality between Whites and people of color (Sue, 2010; Sue, Capodilupo, et al., 2007; Thompson & Neville, 1999). Received 20 July 2010; revised 9 November 2010; accepted 23 December 2010. This study was funded by the Professional Staff Congress–City University of New York (PSC–CUNY) Research Award Program. Address correspondence to Kevin L. Nadal, John Jay College of Criminal Justice, City Uni- versity of New York, 445 West 59th Street, New York, NY 10019. E-mail: knadal@jjay.cuny.edu 234 D ow nl oa de d by [S im on F ra se r U ni ve rs ity ] a t 1 0: 44 1 3 Se pt em be r 2 01 1 Sexual Orientation Microaggressions 235 However, some authors have suggested that discrimination continues to exist and has transformed from an overt form to a more covert form; these types of discrimination have been labeled as microaggressions (Sue, 2010). Microaggressions are “brief and commonplace daily verbal, behavioral, or environmental indignities, whether intentional or unintentional, that com- municate hostile, derogatory, or negative slights and insults toward members of oppressed groups” (Nadal, 2008, p. 23). Research has found that microag- gressions can occur in various settings and have detrimental impacts on the individuals who experience them (Pierce, Carew, Pierce-Gonzalez, & Willis, 1978; Solorzano, Ceja, & Yosso, 2000; Sue, Lin, Torino, Capodilupo, & Rivera, 2009). When individuals commit microaggressions, they are often unaware of the impact of their statements or behaviors and may even become defen- sive if confronted by others (Nadal, 2008; Sue, 2010). Based on past literature on racial microaggressions (Pierce et al., 1978; Sue, Capodilupo, et al., 2007; Sue, Bucceri, et al., 2007; Sue et al., 2008), there are three posited forms of microaggressions. Microassaults are defined as the usage of explicit and intended deroga- tions either verbally or nonverbally, as demonstrated through name-calling, avoidant behavior, or discriminatory actions toward the intended victim (Sue, Capodilupo, et al., 2007). For example, maliciously calling a person of Asian descent “Oriental” and telling a Latino person to “go back where you came from” are both forms of microassaults. Microinsults are often unconscious and are described as verbal or non- verbal communications that convey rudeness and insensitivity and demean a person’s heritage or identity (Sue, Capodilupo, et al., 2007). For instance, when persons with disabilities are spoken to in a condescending tone or when women are told they aren’t capable of something, subtle messages are sent that these individuals are inferior to the dominant group (i.e., able- bodied persons or men). Microinvalidations are also often unconscious and include communica- tions that exclude, negate, or nullify the realities of individuals of oppressed groups (Sue, Capodilupo, et al., 2007). An example includes a white student telling a student of color that she or he complains about race too much. While seemingly innocuous, such a message indirectly invalidates the racial realities that the person of color faces on a regular basis. Most empirical studies examining microaggression have focused pri- marily on the impacts of racial microaggressions on people of color (Pierce et al., 1978; Sue et al., 2009; Sue, Bucceri, et al., 2007; Sue et al., 2008). Empirical studies of other groups such as women (Capodilupo et al., 2010; Swim, Ferguson, & Hyers, 1999; Swim & Hyers, 1999) and persons with dis- abilities (Keller & Galgay, 2010) suggest that other oppressed groups might also experience subtle discrimination or microaggressions. Microaggression literature also describes various ways that systems, in- stitutions, and environments are microaggressive in nature (see Sue, 2010, D ow nl oa de d by [S im on F ra se r U ni ve rs ity ] a t 1 0: 44 1 3 Se pt em be r 2 01 1 236 K. L. Nadal et al. for review). For example, when buildings are named only after white men or colleges only displays paintings of white men, a subtle communication is sent to people of color and women that white men are superior and that peo- ple of color have not contributed significantly to society (Sue, Capodilupo, et al., 2007). Similarly, racist, sexist, heterosexist, or other discriminatory leg- islations convey messages that discrimination is still acceptable. For example, Arizona’s Senate Bill 1070 (also known as Arizona SB-1070), a law passed in the US state of Arizona in April 2010, requires all individuals to maintain their legal documents at all times and allows law enforcement officials to demand such documents to be produced when requested. One of the ma- jor critiques of this bill is that it allows racial profiling of Latinos and other immigrant groups. With this law in effect, it is argued that police officers would likely only target people of color to show their legal documents, while whites would not be targeted (because they would be assumed to be American born). Creators, enforcers, and supporters of Arizona SB-1070 may not uphold malicious intentions, and they may not recognize the underlying messages that this legislation communicates to people of color. Supporters of Arizona SB-1070 are likely to not consider themselves to be racist; in- stead, they genuinely believe that they have the best interests of the country in mind. However, the environment that is created when such legislation is enforced and supported may create feelings of discomfort, anger, sadness, and other negative emotions. Thus, such discriminatory laws fit the criteria of environmental microaggressions. Previous research reports lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) persons, especially LGBT youth, experience sexual prejudice and discrimi- nation, suggesting that microaggressions can also be based on sexual ori- entation and transgender identity (see Nadal, Rivera, & Corpus, 2010, for a review). For example, the literature on hate crimes (Herek, 2000, 2009; Herek & Capitanio, 1999; Herek, Cogan, & Gillis, 2002), sexual/antigay harassment and prejudice (Burn, Kadlec, & Rexer, 2005; Herek, 2000; Lewis, Derlega, Brown, Rose, & Henson, 2009), sexual stigma (Herek, 2007), modern homonegativity (Morrison & Morrison, 2002), modern heterosexism (Walls, 2008), and transphobia (Hill & Willoughby, 2005) has all pointed to the detrimental impacts of discrimination on the psychological experiences of LGBT persons. Similar to other forms of discrimination, heterosexism and genderism toward LGBT individuals has also become less direct and more subtle (Hill & Willoughby, 2005; Walls, 2008), marginalizing LGBT individu- als while praising and normalizing heterosexual and nontransgender people. On a societal level, there have been attempts to decrease the patholo- gizing of LGBT experiences. For instance, antidiscriminatory US federal and state laws have been passed that protect LGBT individuals. Furthermore, the removal of “homosexuality” as a psychological disorder from the Amer- ican Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) in 1973 required that lesbian, gay, and bisexual (LGB) D ow nl oa de d by [S im on F ra se r U ni ve rs ity ] a t 1 0: 44 1 3 Se pt em be r 2 01 1 Sexual Orientation Microaggressions 237 identities and experiences not be viewed as abnormal (Chernin & Johnson, 2003). Another example includes the increase in advocacy for LGBT rights, as demonstrated by the American Psychological Association passing a resolu- tion which declared that denying same-sex marriage rights is discriminatory and unfair (Rostosky, Riggle, Horne, & Miller, 2009). However, LGBT persons are still denied many civil rights and continue to experience social discrimination. Despite the efforts to be inclusive of homosexuality, for example, transsexualism was added as a disorder in the DSM in 1980, and gender identity disorder is still endorsed by both the American Psychiatric Association and American Psychological Association. In addition, at the time of this writing, LGBT people are allowed to get mar- ried in only five US states and Washington, DC (Human Rights Campaign, 2010), and some states have denied same-sex couples from adopting chil- dren. In addition, according to a report by the US General Accounting Office in 2004, same-sex couples are denied 1,138 benefits, rights, and protec- tions, which negatively impacts policies concerning Social Security, taxes, employee benefits, and medical care (Levitt et al., 2009). Furthermore, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (1964) prohibits workplace discrimination based on sex, race, color, religion, and national origin, but it does not directly cover sexual orientation or gender identity (Berkley & Watt, 2006). Given this discrimination on societal, institutional, and interpersonal levels, LGBT individuals may feel marginalized in American society and ex- perience excess social stress or “minority stress” (Meyer, 1995, 2003), which in turn makes them more prone to mental health problems than heterosexual people. In a meta-analytic review, Meyer (2003) found that gay and lesbian individuals were 2.5 times more likely to have a mental health problem in their lifetimes compared to their heterosexual counterparts. Also, Cochran (2001) found that LGBT individuals suffer from more mental health problems such as depression, substance abuse disorders, and suicide than their hetero- sexual counterparts. Because of these disparities, it becomes necessary for educational systems, government, and other institutions to recognize and val- idate the stressors experienced by LGBT persons, especially in areas where anti-LGBT policies and legislations are more prominent (Levitt et al., 2009; Nadal, 2008; Sue & Capodilupo, 2008). Nadal and colleagues (2010) proposed a theoretical taxonomy on sexual orientation and transgender microaggressions, citing several categories of microaggressions that may target LGBT persons. 1. Use of heterosexist and transphobic terminology occurs when someone uses derogatory heterosexist language toward LGBT persons (e.g., saying words like “faggot” or “dyke,” an employer refusing to use individuals’ preferred gender pronouns, or people using phrases like “That’s so gay!”). 2. Endorsement of heteronormative or gender normative culture/behaviors transpires when an LGBT person is expected to act or be heterosexual D ow nl oa de d by [S im on F ra se r U ni ve rs ity ] a t 1 0: 44 1 3 Se pt em be r 2 01 1 238 K. L. Nadal et al. or gender conforming. For instance, a heterosexual person telling a gay individual not to “act gay in public” and a parent forcing her or his child to dress according to birth sex would be both examples of endorsing heteronormative or genderist values. 3. Assumption of universal LGBT experience occurs when heterosexual peo- ple assume that all LGBT persons are the same (e.g., stereotyping all gay men to be interested in fashion or interior design or assuming all lesbian women to act or look “butch”). 4. Exoticization microaggressions take place when LGBT people are dehu- manized or treated as objects. This can be exemplified by heterosexual people stereotyping LGBT people as being the “comedic relief” or asking transgender people intrusive questions about their genitalia. 5. Discomfort/disapproval of LGBT experience occurs when LGBT people are treated with disrespect and criticism, such as when a stranger stares at an affectionate lesbian couple with disgust or a heterosexual or nontransgen- der person tells an LGBT individual that she or he is “going to hell,” they are expressing their disapproval or discomfort. 6. Denial of societal heterosexism or transphobia transpires when people deny that heterosexism and homophobia exist (e.g., a coworker telling a gay friend that he’s being paranoid thinking someone is discriminating against him). 7. Assumption of sexual pathology/abnormality microaggressions come about when heterosexual or nontransgender people oversexualize LGBT persons and consider them as sexual deviants. For example, many people may assume that all gay men have HIV/AIDS or are child molesters or that transgender women are sex workers. 8. Finally, denial of individual heterosexism/transphobia occurs when non- LGBT people deny their own heterosexist and transgender biases and prejudice (e.g., someone saying, “I am not homophobic. I have a gay friend!”). One study examined the ways that LGB people react to and cope with sexual orientation microaggressions (Nadal et al., 2011). Using qualitative methods, participants reported the various ways that they perceive microaggressions when they occur. Behavioral reactions included different ways that LGB indi- viduals reacted behaviorally to microaggressions (e.g., being passive, being confrontational). Cognitive reactions involved various cognitive processes that LGB individuals reported during and after experiencing microaggres- sions (e.g., conforming to general society, accepting microaggressions, or feeling empowered or resilient). Emotional reactions consisted of the vari- ous types of emotions LGB people experienced when or after experiencing microaggressions. Finally, participants reported the various types of mental health problems that they experienced as a result of microaggressions, as well as the range of systems or groups that enact microaggressions. D ow nl oa de d by [S im on F ra se r U ni ve rs ity ] a t 1 0: 44 1 3 Se pt em be r 2 01 1 Sexual Orientation Microaggressions 239 The goal of the current study was to explore and understand the specific types of sexual orientation microaggressions that LGB individuals experience in their everyday lives. Because there has been substantial research that has supported the specific types of microaggression that people of color, women, and persons with disabilities experience (Capodilupo et al., 2010; Keller & Galgay, 2010; Sue, Bucceri, et al., 2007; Sue et al., 2008), it was important to examine the various types of microaggressions that LGB persons encounter as well. Thus, several research questions were created to examine the experiences of sexual orientation microaggressions: 1. What types of microaggressions do LGB persons experience? 2. Do lesbian women, gay men, bisexual women, and bisexual men experi- ence different forms of microaggressions? 3. How do LGB individuals react to microaggressions when they occur? When seeking rich data, particularly on unstudied topics, qualitative meth- ods can provide an appropriate approach to answering research questions (Morrow & Smith, 2000). Although there has been considerable research ex- amining various forms of discrimination toward LGB persons, few studies have focused on LGB discrimination through the lens of the microaggres- sions framework. Thus, this current study involved focus group discussions and directed content analysis to systematically classify transcribed data into the themes proposed by Nadal and colleagues (2010). Directed content analysis is a qualitative method that is widely used to validate an existing theory or prior research of a phenomenon that is incom- plete or would benefit from further description (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). Furthermore, the researchers replicated the existing qualitative research ex- amining microaggressions that have focused on race (Sue, Bucceri, et al., 2007; Sue et al., 2008; Sue et al., 2009), gender (Capodilupo et al., 2010), and ability (Keller & Galgay, 2010), by implementing the use of focus groups, similar types of interview questions, and parallel qualitative analyses. Focus groups were used instead of individual interviews or surveys in order for participants to share their experiences with others, while triggering other participants to brainstorm potential microaggressions they may not have ini- tially recalled. The use of focus groups has been found to be a more effective method in studying previously unexamined phenomena (Krueger & Casey, 2008). This study focused solely on sexual orientation microaggressions or microaggressions experienced in everyday lives by LGB people. Although there may be similarities between sexual orientation and transgender mi- croaggressions (i.e., microaggressions experienced by transgender or gender- nonconforming people), there are complex differences between these two groups, warranting separate studies. In addition, because it is important not to conflate sexual orientation and gender identity, the researchers believed D ow nl oa de d by [S im on F ra se r U ni ve rs ity ] a t 1 0: 44 1 3 Se pt em be r 2 01 1 240 K. L. Nadal et al. it was important to examine the experiences of these two groups separately. Finally, while there are also differences between lesbians, gays, and bisexu- als, examining these three groups provides an opportunity to compare and analyze their unique experiences. METHOD Participants Participants were recruited in two ways. Many participants were solicited from a large public college in a northeastern metropolitan area. These stu- dents enrolled in introductory psychology classes and were required to par- ticipate in research studies on campus as part of their grade. Participants were also recruited through the general community; recruitment e-mails were sent to local LGBT college student organizations, and website advertisements were posted on the Craigslist (http://craigslist.org) website. Participants from LGBT community groups received light refreshments, while online partici- pants earned $10 for their participation. A total of 26 individuals (11 men and 15 women) participated, compris- ing five focus groups (mean: 5.2 participants). Five participants identified as lesbian, 11 as gay men, and 10 as bisexual women. None identified as trans- gender or gender-nonconforming. Ethnicities were White (N = 11), Latina/o (N = 10), Black (N = 2), Multiracial (N = 2), and Asian (N = 1). The mean age of participants was 25.7 years, SD = 10.43 years, with a range from ages 18 to 55. Majority of the participants (n = 21) were between the ages of 15 to 24, aligning with the United Nations’ definition of youth (United Nations, 2010). Sixteen participants were students, and 10 were working professionals. Researchers Six individuals comprised the research team: one Asian male professor, two white female graduate students, one Arab female graduate student, one Latina female graduate student, and one Asian female graduate student. The principal investigator (PI) is an assistant professor of psychology who has been trained in and has conducted qualitative research methods (namely, content analysis, consensual qualitative research, and community-based par- ticipatory research) for more than ten years and has studied microaggressions extensively for the past five years. The PI trained the graduate researchers extensively on qualitative research, particularly on directed content anal- ysis (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). Researchers were not required to disclose their sexual orientations to the rest of the research team, but one researcher D ow nl oa de d by [S im on F ra se r U ni ve rs ity ] a t 1 0: 44 1 3 Se pt em be r 2 01 1 Sexual Orientation Microaggressions 241 openly identified as gay, another researcher identified as bisexual, and four researchers identified as heterosexual. Before creating research materials and collecting and analyzing data, the research team discussed their assumptions about sexual orientation mi- croaggressions. This practice of openly identifying personal biases allows the researchers and potential readers to evaluate the extent to which researcher biases influence study design and interpretation of results. Hence, by dis- cussing, pronouncing, and staying aware of one’s biases, researchers should minimize such biases through all stages of the methodology and analysis (Hill et al., 2005). The research team identified several general assumptions that were dis- cussed prior to collecting data. Some of these biases included that discrim- ination does exist toward LGBT people, and general society (e.g., media, public policy, or religion) has an influence in the perpetuation of sexual orientation microaggressions. Other discussions ensued about gender differ- ences within the LGBT community, including that gay men may experience more physical violence than lesbian women and that lesbians may be more sexually exoticized than are gay men. Biases involving bisexuality were dis- closed, ranging from individuals questioning the validity of bisexuality to recognizing the discrimination that bisexuals experience from both hetero- sexuals and from lesbians and gays. Power dynamics were also discussed in which all researchers agreed to be able to share their opinions openly and candidly, regardless of rank, education, status, sexual orientation, race, ethnicity, gender, or other identities. Measures Each participant completed a demographic form including information about her or his sexual orientation, age, race, ethnicity, level of education, occupa- tion, religion, and number of years in the United States. Focus groups were organized with a semistructured interview guide designed by the research team. This guide included open-ended questions and possible follow-up questions that were replicated from previous qualitative microaggression studies (see Capodilupo et al., 2010; Sue, Bucceri, et al., 2007; Sue et al., 2008). For example, one question asked participants to “think about a time when you may have been subtly discriminated against because of your sex- ual orientation. Describe the scenario as best as you can.” This question was followed with additional probing questions, such as, “How did you react in this situation?,” “What do you perceive was the message that was being conveyed to you?,” and “How did you feel after the event?” Interviewers asked participants to think about experiences throughout their lifetimes in order to elicit responses from their adulthood, as well as their childhood and adolescence. D ow nl oa de d by [S im on F ra se r U ni ve rs ity ] a t 1 0: 44 1 3 Se pt em be r 2 01 1 242 K. L. Nadal et al. Procedures Focus groups were conducted in a private room at the researchers’ home institution between January and May 2009. At the beginning of each focus group, a focus group leader greeted participants who then were introduced to two additional researchers observing the group. Each participant read and signed an informed consent form, which also notified participants about the use of audio recording. The group leader explained that participation was completely voluntary. Each participant was also given a list of local counseling resources in the unlikely event that the focus group discussion caused any psychological distress. The focus group leader then explained the nature of the focus group process, and the group agreed to confidential- ity. The leader asked open-ended questions about experiences with sexual orientation microaggressions, allowed participants to respond in their own time, and probed with follow-up questions when appropriate. Focus groups, lasting between 60 and 90 minutes, were audio-recorded to maintain the in- tegrity of the discussion and later transcribed verbatim by the research team. Transcripts were analyzed in accordance with directed content analysis. The goal of directed content analysis is “to validate or extend conceptu- ally a theoretical framework or theory” (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005, p. 1281). In the context of this study, researchers began with the theoretical sexual orientation microaggression classification system proposed by Nadal and col- leagues (2010). Next, all research analysts reviewed each of the five focus group transcripts independently from the group with the task of categoriz- ing statements into one of seven microaggression themes. (For example, all researchers used a red highlighter to connote statements that aligned with the first theme, “Use of heterosexist language.”) Researchers also indepen- dently made note of potential unidentified categories or themes absent from the original taxonomy. They highlighted these themes and examples with a different color of their choice and brought back these potential themes for group discussion and analysis. After this independent coding, the research team met to compare codes and notes. Researchers began the process by stating a category from the taxonomy and then identifying each quote that could accurately be labeled in the category. When there were discrepancies, members of the team dis- cussed the statement(s) in question and reached consensus about the most appropriate microaggression theme code. When a quote could potentially fit under more than one category, researchers discussed the item and con- sensually agreed on one category that it could be labeled. Researchers also discussed potential themes that were not included in the taxonomy and con- sensually agreed whether these new themes warranted additional categories. Next, the researchers provided an external auditor, a self-identified gay male professor of psychology well versed in the microaggressions literature as well as other LGBT-related topics in psychology, with the themes and D ow nl oa de d by [S im on F ra se r U ni ve rs ity ] a t 1 0: 44 1 3 Se pt em be r 2 01 1 Sexual Orientation Microaggressions 243 examples of quotes under each theme. After independently reviewing the group’s coded transcripts and chosen quotations for accuracy, he provided feedback to the team. The team reconvened, discussed the auditor’s feed- back (mostly involving the need to provide clearer examples and rename certain themes), and resubmitted their work to the auditor. After the audi- tor’s approval, the team then collaborated to select the most fitting quotations from the transcripts that best illustrated the identified themes. The auditor reviewed the final analysis and approved the teams’ collaborative work. RESULTS Eight themes emerged from the participants’ responses. Seven of these themes matched those proposed by Nadal and colleagues (2010). These themes include 1. use of heterosexist terminology, 2. endorsement of heteronormative culture/ behaviors, 3. assumption of universal LGBT experience, 4. exoticization, 5. discomfort/ disapproval of LGBT experience, 6. denial of the reality of heterosexism, and 7. assumption of sexual pathology/abnormality. 8. An eighth theme, threatening behaviors, emerged from the data and was independent from the original taxonomy. All eight themes included incidents reported by multiple participants from the different focus groups. Incidents described by participants were examined thoroughly to discover hidden messages and intentions of the enactor of the microaggression. Theme 1: Use Of Heterosexist Terminology This first theme refers to microaggressions that occur when heterosexist language is used to degrade LGB persons. This form of microaggression may not be intended to be hurtful toward LGB individuals and may take the form of heterosexist jokes or comments. Participants described certain words such as “faggot” and “dyke” as denigrating to them, sending the message that it is inferior or undesirable to be LGB. For example, one gay male participant shared: I recently opened up to my friend about [being gay] and he’s a guy . . . and just the other day I was at his house and were talking about other D ow nl oa de d by [S im on F ra se r U ni ve rs ity ] a t 1 0: 44 1 3 Se pt em be r 2 01 1 244 K. L. Nadal et al. people and he would describe them as like, “faggot,” and it would get to me. Hearing such negative words was commonplace and even acceptable in everyday life. For example, one participant shared: “When you’re angry at someone, you can call them a ‘faggot’ and that’s still okay.” Others reported people consciously used pejorative language, particularly out of anger. One participant talked about a group of bullies at school: “They came up to me and they told me . . . they were very, very tough, saying ‘You’re a fucking les- bian, and go to hell and leave my family alone.’“ Participants also described that peers used the word “gay” in negative contexts (i.e., as synonymous to “bad” or “weird”). According to the participants, hearing such remarks was hurtful, distressful, and made them feel uncomfortable or unsafe. Such language could be classified as microassaults, in that the perpetra- tors are consciously using hurtful words to denigrate or poke fun at others; however, because such language may not be viewed as intending to injure or threaten others, perpetrators (and bystanders) may perceive such com- munication as being harmless and acceptable. Theme 2: Endoresement Of Heteronormative Culture/Behaviors This theme occurs when LGB persons are expected to be or act like hetero- sexuals. Participants shared that they are often looked down upon or treated negatively in social situations, such as in family gatherings, public places, and workplace settings. Reactions from others about their sexual orientation often made participants feel forced to change their dress, mannerisms, or communication styles in order to feel accepted. Many reported that it was necessary to “act straight” in certain social situations in order to feel safe or accepted. A female participant talked about how she changed who she was in her parents’ home because her mother is “old-fashioned”: [My mother] knows that I’m a lesbian, but she is in denial. She doesn’t want to see it, so I have to act a certain way. You know, act heterosexual, not mention anything about me having a girlfriend or anything like that to make her feel uncomfortable or make her say anything offensive toward me. So, I have to act completely different at home. Another described a situation in which her father pressured her to change her Facebook profile in order to get a job: He’s assuming that for the purposes of that I should hide my identity online . . . because future employers, who he assumes will be un-gay- friendly, will see that and just say “Okay, don’t even interview her.” And D ow nl oa de d by [S im on F ra se r U ni ve rs ity ] a t 1 0: 44 1 3 Se pt em be r 2 01 1 Sexual Orientation Microaggressions 245 I think, part of this is because he was raised in Texas in the ‘50s, so he thinks everybody else in the country takes a fairly dim view of us. These incidents may be considered microinsults, in that the perpetrators may not be aware of how their words and actions communicate offensive messages to LGB people. In addition, many of the participants described how they had to make others feel comfortable around them. They reported doing so by changing their behaviors and compromising parts of their identities. One participant noted that her relationship with her grandmother changed because of the need to hide her sexual orientation. “Every time I call my grandmother, I have to hear about my cousin . . . and his beauti- ful girlfriend. . . . I don’t think they ever talk about my beautiful girlfriend.” Another female participant described how her mother suggested she not disclose she had a girlfriend or hold hands in public. This participant ex- pressed her frustration with being closeted and wanted her family to take her relationship seriously. A third female participant talked about how lesbians are often encour- aged to dress in more gender-conforming ways: My girlfriend . . . she dresses a little boyish. [And this man] looks at her and . . . he kept telling her, “Why do you dress like that? You’re a girl, what are you doing? You’re supposed to wear, you know, girly clothes. . . . Why do you dress like a guy? Why do you look like a guy?” This experience was especially common for female participants who were taught explicitly by their loved ones and strangers that they should dress more femininely. Again, these types of microaggressions may be considered to be microinsults; the intention of the perpetrators is conscious but not malicious, while the victim feels hurt and offended. Theme 3: Assumptions Of Universal Lgb Experience Here heterosexual individuals assume that all LGB persons and their experi- ences are the same. One participant talked about how his close friends made assumptions about him as a gay individual: One day I had asked my friend, ‘cause he was on the football team, and he was the most popular, and I said, you know, “I want to try out for football.” He just stood there and kind of laughed at me. I felt, you know, “What are you laughing at?” He was like, “Come on, you’re gay! You can’t play football!” D ow nl oa de d by [S im on F ra se r U ni ve rs ity ] a t 1 0: 44 1 3 Se pt em be r 2 01 1 246 K. L. Nadal et al. Another male participant talked about how assumptions about LGB persons are common in society, especially in workplace settings: They’re making it seem like everybody is sexual and smutty-buddy and, you know, every gay man is an interior decorator or sells hair for a living, you know. Even at my job . . . if you work in stocks, then it’s a straight guy, but if you’re on the beauty floor and/or you’re a cashier, you’re gay. One female participant described assumptions about the way she dressed: “Since I dress a little bit more feminine than most other lesbians they might take [my identity as a lesbian] as a joke or make offensive statements.” Be- cause this participant did not fit the stereotype of what lesbians are supposed to look or dress like, others assume she is heterosexual, becoming the vic- tim of microinsults rooted in the fallacious assumption of a universal LGB experience. Theme 4: Exoticization When LGB persons feel they are dehumanized or treated like an object, they experience exoticization. An example of this type of microaggression was illustrated by one gay male participant: This woman came up to me one night and she said . . . I think I made some joke or something and she said, “Do you know who you remind me of?” and I knew what was coming, I just knew what was coming. She’s like, “You’re just like that Jack on Will and Grace. You’re so funny.” And I looked at her, and I said, “Ma’am, no offense, but that’s actually not a compliment.” And she was like, “What do you mean? What do you mean? No, no, I was saying you’re funny, and you’re cute, and you dress nice.” He told the focus group, “I feel like straight people kinda think it’s funny how I behave, you know what I mean, like it’s amusing to them.” Another participant discussed how heterosexual people often glamorize his life and assume that all gay people live a “fantastic and fabulous” life. Relaying people’s assumptions that he is “out every night and at all the clubs,” he responded: No, I’m not. I’m really not. It’s not like I never do that, but it’s not like I am out. I haven’t done that in twenty years. . . . What bothers me are—where I get a little annoyed or where I feel weird about it is when I feel like they’re using me as a fantasy projection for what they wish their life was. Again, although the intention of the perpetrator is to be complimentary, the victim experiences a microinsult. D ow nl oa de d by [S im on F ra se r U ni ve rs ity ] a t 1 0: 44 1 3 Se pt em be r 2 01 1 Sexual Orientation Microaggressions 247 A bisexual female participant described feeling objectified and exoti- cized by heterosexual males: “A lot of guys would think, you know, because I’m into both guys and girls that I’ll be like down with the threesome kinda thing, and it’s like ugh, get over yourself.” Other bisexual female participants agreed with this sexual objectification by heterosexual males. Theme 5: Discomfort/Disapproval Of The Lgb Experience An example of disapproval was relayed by one female participant: I was in college, and I came out to a friend who was very conservative Christian, and she didn’t say “I’m going to stop being your friend,” but she did say she was sorry to hear that because “I believe you are condemned.” This same participant also described situations where strangers showed dis- approval toward her because of her sexual orientation. She revealed, “Well, like if we’re marching in a [LGBT Pride] parade, there will be occasionally, like, counter protesters . . . who tell us we’re going to hell.” In two other cases, individuals were uncomfortable with same-sex pub- lic displays of affection by participants; one reaction was subtle (slight facial expressions of disapproval) and another explicit (laughing) .A female partic- ipant relayed an instance where I was with my girlfriend on the train, and she was holding me and kissing me, and there were people sitting there, and they just made a face. They didn’t—I didn’t see them say anything to us. It’s just the face—you can kind of tell, the manner, their facial expression is kind of like “whoa.” More overt discomfort from heterosexual people was shared by a male: “One time I was kissing my boyfriend on my front porch, and this guy walked by us and started chuckling.” Another male participant described attending a wedding with a male date. Later he shared pictures to a female coworker. One picture showed him kissing his date. The coworker reacted: “Oh, gross, I really don’t want to see that. I really, really don’t want to see that.” This participant believed that the coworker would not have been uncomfortable if the picture had been of two heterosexual people kissing. Many bisexual participants talked about how they were often assumed to be gay and lesbian and how their experiences as bisexuals were not valid. One discussed how others often assume that heterosexuality and homosex- uality are the only two sexual orientations: D ow nl oa de d by [S im on F ra se r U ni ve rs ity ] a t 1 0: 44 1 3 Se pt em be r 2 01 1 248 K. L. Nadal et al. I actually went to a taping of [a talk show] recently, and it was an episode about gay marriage and gay issues and [the host] had everyone in the audience wear T-shirts that they gave us that said either “straight” or “gay” or whatever on them. It was really cheesy, but they didn’t have a shirt that said “bi.” They had a straight shirt, a gay shirt, and then a shirt with a question mark on it. I was like, “What the fuck is this?” I’m like, my sexual orientation is not a question mark. I didn’t like how it could be implied that I’m confused. This microaggression upset her because it conveyed that bisexuality is abnor- mal and that one needs to choose to be either heterosexual or homosexual. Bisexual participants in all focus groups reported similar microaggressions and labeled them as common experiences. There, too, were several environmental microaggressions in which soci- ety (e.g., the media, academic institutions, government, and religious groups) evidenced disapproval or discomfort toward LGB persons. The media mes- sages that these participants relayed were that 1. LGB persons cannot disclose their sexualities; 2. it is unsafe for LGB persons to do so; and 3. if LGB persons are visible or present, they are portrayed in a negative manner. Participants talked about the heterosexist laws that are enacted by the federal or state governments, including California’s Proposition 8 (which eliminated same-sex marriage) or the recently overturned “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell” policy (which prohibited gays and lesbians from being “out of the closet” while serving in the military). “They should just remove that question,” offered one participant, “especially that thing with the military. . . . Like, that blows my . . . that ‘Don’t Ask Don’t Tell.’. . . Like, it shouldn’t even matter. What the hell . . . You’re still defending your country. . . . Like, what difference does it make?” Participants also discussed how religious institutions enact environmen- tal microaggressions that convey disapproval of or discomfort with LGB persons. One person, who shared his negative reactions to religious groups, said: Now I’m just not—I’m not just offended by the whole evolution thing. Now I get to be offended by, you know, “God hates fags” and the Mormon Church . . . Prop 8, and anytime the Vatican opens his mouth . . . This is such a religious country. Many participants shared how Christian groups often campaigned heavily in support of California’s Proposition 8 in order to ban same-sex marriage and discriminate against LGB people. D ow nl oa de d by [S im on F ra se r U ni ve rs ity ] a t 1 0: 44 1 3 Se pt em be r 2 01 1 Sexual Orientation Microaggressions 249 Theme 6: Denial Of Reality Of Heterosexism This sixth theme refers to instances when a heterosexual individual denies that heterosexist or homophobic experiences exist. One female participant described an instance that occurred with a professor: My professor, who is overseeing my dissertation in [chemistry], really wants me to become a professor of [chemistry]. And I tried to explain to him that it wasn’t very easy for me, that there are very few jobs, and they are all like in Ohio or Oklahoma or in places I personally wouldn’t want to live. And also I have a partner, who because of her visa situation is tied to [New York], and I tried to explain to him. I can’t just get married to my partner and take her with me where I go because of federal laws, the Defense of Marriage Act. And so I didn’t appreciate his guilt trip when I decided to leave the academy and his sort of lack of understanding around, Do I give up my personal life and who I am and maybe go to a place where I have to be closeted just because he think I should? And I would say his lack of understand might be a subtle form of discrimination. This experience may be considered a microinvalidation. The professor in this situation exemplified a lack of understanding and compassion, as well as a denial of the reality that LGB people experience in a heterosexist society. Denial of the reality of heterosexism also includes individuals who deny that they themselves are heterosexist. For example, in an aforementioned incident where a woman compared a gay male participant to a flamboyant character from the Will & Grace, he reacted to her negatively and pointed out her microaggressive behavior. In response, she denied that she was being heterosexist and instead claimed she was paying him a compliment. This experience is similar to the previous research on racial microaggressions in which whites often deny that they are racist or enact racist acts. These defensive statements may be degrading and hurtful to the recipient of the microaggression who experiences such microinvalidations regularly. Theme 7: Assumption Of Sexual Pathology/Abnormality LGB individuals have been thought to be oversexualized, sexual deviants, or both. One female participant mentioned that, “Well, in my case, I’ve ac- tually had some friends stop being my friends, because they were like, ‘Oh, since you’re bisexual and you might try come on to me’ so they stopped being my friend.” She felt that heterosexuals assume that they are going to be preyed upon just because of their heterosexual orientation. Another assump- tion based on this theme is that LGB persons are infected with HIV/AIDS. One participant whose heterosexual roommate was attending medical school “found out that I was gay and he had brought the cup that I had drank out D ow nl oa de d by [S im on F ra se r U ni ve rs ity ] a t 1 0: 44 1 3 Se pt em be r 2 01 1 250 K. L. Nadal et al. of . . . and he was, like, freaking out. Like ‘Do [I have to take] an HIV test now?”’ Another participant reported: My mom took me to the church to donate blood because they [sic] had the blood bank . . . the mobile thing, blood bank. . . . So, I was going through it . . . but they had you fill out a questionnaire before . . . and one of the questions was, Have you had sex with a man since 1978? . . . That was one of the questions . . . and I put “Yeah,” thinking nothing of it, ‘cause, you know, whatever. I had sex with a man . . . so . . . they took the questionnaire and five minutes later they told me I couldn’t donate blood because of that fact, because of the whole HIV thing. This discriminatory action and policy sends the indirect message that all gay or bisexual men must have HIV/AIDS since they don’t practice safe sex. Similar to other aforementioned examples, this microinsult perpetuates negative stereotypes. Several gay male participants also discussed assumption by others of being sexual predators or child molesters. One participant, a former schoolteacher, revealed: I remember being very careful about interacting with the kids. Because I was gay, I knew that people made assumptions and kept watch over me . . . like we were all sexual predators or something. While not hearing blatant statements about being a sexual predator, he ob- served that others treated him differently than other heterosexual teachers when interacting with children. Relaying such microinsults, he expressed distress, frustration, and hurt. Theme 8: Threatening Behavior A few participants discussed how they were the victims of assaults, threaten- ing behavior, or both. Some of these experiences could easily be classified as hate crimes. But other experiences may be labeled as microassaults, in that the perpetrators may have been conscious of their behavior yet may not have been physically assaultive. Participants reported being called a range of slurs from “faggot” to a “stupid lesbian.” While these verbal attacks were blatant, they can be classi- fied as microassaults in that the enactor may not have had any intention of physically harming the victim. Yet the lack of physical injury does not pre- clude psychological damage, leaving the victim feeling unsafe, vulnerable, or endangered. One male participant discussed how strangers on the street made him feel physically threatened: D ow nl oa de d by [S im on F ra se r U ni ve rs ity ] a t 1 0: 44 1 3 Se pt em be r 2 01 1 Sexual Orientation Microaggressions 251 I was walking with three friends of mine—all male, all gay. . . . It was pretty late, probably about two in the morning, and two guys were standing near a park, and we just passed by them, and one of them said, “What did you say?” We didn’t respond . . . and then they continued and said, “Did you just call me gay? Did you just call me a faggot?” They followed us for about two blocks and tried to start a fight. He believed these strangers verbally harassed him and his gay friends be- cause of their presumed sexual orientation. There, however, were stories of physical assaults. One participant de- scribed how she was bullied during her adolescence: “When I was in school, like in sixth grade until ninth grade, middle school to the beginning of high school, I was really harassed because of it. I was beaten up and sent to the emergency room.” While this physical assault is clearly an assault (and not “micro” in any way), the unsafe and hostile environment that was created prior to the assault may have had qualities of microassaults (i.e., the perpe- trators consciously may have used hurtful and degrading language that they believed was harmless, while observers who did nothing to prevent such be- haviors sent a denigrating message that anti-LGBT behavior is acceptable). DISCUSSION The current study supports and extends the LGBT microaggression taxon- omy proposed in Nadal and colleagues (2010), indicating that LGB people experience a variety of microaggressions. However, one difference with this study is that participants reported examples of both overt discrimination and covert discrimination. This trend was different than studies with people of color (Sue, Bucceri, et al., 2007; Sue, et al., 2008) and women (Capodilupo et al., 2010), in which reported microaggressions manifested predominantly as subtle and covert interactions. Conversely, participants in this study shared experiences in which het- erosexual individuals were subtly uncomfortable or disapproving (e.g., body language that conveyed uneasiness or condemnation) as well as blatantly uncomfortable or disapproving of LGB persons (e.g., being told that LGB persons are going to hell). Participants in this study also reported that they perceived others to be both conscious and unconscious of their use of het- erosexist language (e.g., some perpetrators consciously used slurs to deni- grate LGB people, while some perpetrators seemed unaware of the negative impacts of using the phrase, “That’s so gay!). This finding is similar to a study with seventh-grade students, which found that some adolescents who use homophobic name-calling may identify it merely as an innocuous insult, while others may attribute such behavior as being an LGB slur or gender- identity putdown (Athanases & Comar, 2008). D ow nl oa de d by [S im on F ra se r U ni ve rs ity ] a t 1 0: 44 1 3 Se pt em be r 2 01 1 252 K. L. Nadal et al. This study provides support that sexual orientation microaggressions manifest in the proposed three forms: microassaults, microinsults, and mi- croinvalidations. Microassaults toward LGB persons are conscious acts by the perpetrator and include everything from being called heterosexist slurs to overhearing people tell homophobic jokes. Microassaults also include be- ing told directly to “not act gay” to being told that one will be “condemned.” Microinsults include statements and behaviors that are often unconscious yet send denigrating messages to the victims. A common example of a microin- sult from this study is a heterosexual individual who displays discomfort or disapproval with LGB public displays of affection; this individual may not recognize that her or his behavior is insulting, demeaning, and hurtful to the LGB recipient. Finally, microinvalidations are instances in which the LGB individual’s experiences are nullified or negated. In this study, this was exemplified by the female participant who described an experience with a professor who implied that heterosexism does not exist by stating that she should feel comfortable getting a job and moving to any area, regardless of her sexual orientation. Findings from this study suggest that LGB people experience various types of microassaults and microinsults, suggesting that LGB persons may still experience overt discrimination on a more regular basis. In addition, it appears that lesbians, gay men, and bisexual women and men expe- rience some microaggressions differently. For example, only lesbian and bisexual women reported feeling objectified when heterosexual people sex- ually propositioned them; only gay men reported being accused of having HIV/AIDS or of being a sexual predator. Thus, future research should explore differences based on gender and sexual orientation. Perhaps interventions and public campaigns that dispel these stereotypes may be helpful in mini- mizing these types of microaggressions. In experiencing these microaggressions, almost all of the participants re- ported feeling distressed immediately after the incident. Participants shared an array of emotions, ranging from anger, frustration, and sadness to be- littlement and hopelessness. Many participants discussed how experiencing these microaggressions may have negatively impacted their ability to be comfortable with their LGB identities or ability to come out of the closet. Several participants revealed that experiencing these microaggressions led to detrimental relationships with their family members, friends, coworkers, and others. Some participants discussed chronic mental health effects from this discrimination, including negative impacts on their self-esteem and post- traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). These findings align with previous litera- ture on LGB discrimination (Burn et al. 2005; Herek, 2000, 2007; Herek & Capitanio, 1999; Herek et al., 2002; Morrison & Morrison, 2002; Walls, 2008), which suggests that LGB persons suffer mental health disparities because of their experiences with heterosexist and homophobic behaviors. Thus, while microaggressions may be more subtle and covert than blatant discrimination D ow nl oa de d by [S im on F ra se r U ni ve rs ity ] a t 1 0: 44 1 3 Se pt em be r 2 01 1 Sexual Orientation Microaggressions 253 and hate crimes, they still have a negative impact on LGB individuals’ mental health. Participants described microaggressions that occurred in their adult lives, but many described instances that occurred during their youth. For example, many talked about instances of being bullied in school or hearing hetero- sexist language from their adolescent peers. Because adolescence is a time where individuals develop their personalities and self-esteem, microaggres- sions may negatively influence an adolescent’s ability to feel self-worth. Experiencing heterosexism during one’s youth can also negatively impact one’s ability to gain a positive self-efficacy or navigate successfully in her or his academic and professional life. For example, many studies discussed how LGB youth who experience school violence, heterosexist threats, or damage to their property may avoid going to school altogether (Garofalo, Wolf, Kessel, Palfrey, & DuRant, 1998; Grossman et al., 2009). Thus, microag- gressions affect school achievement for LGB youth in ways that heterosexual youth are not affected. Previous literature has also found that LGB youth also experience higher rates of emotional distress, higher amounts of suicide attempts, risky sexual behavior, and substance abuse (Garofalo et al., 1998; Remafedi, Frendh, Story, Resnick, & Blum, 1998; Resnick et al., 1997). Two national reports cite that reasons for these disparities may include everything from bullying to feelings of isolation, lack of safety, lack of resources, and lack of family sup- port (Just the Facts, 2008; Kosciw & Diaz, 2006). While it is clear that more overt forms of discrimination (e.g., bullying, physical assaults) may lead to these negative outcomes, some reported microaggressions or subtle forms of discrimination influence LGB adolescents’ emotional distress. Some students, for instance, reported that they regularly overheard homophobic/heterosexist remarks by their teachers and other staff members (Kosciw & Diaz, 2006). Accordingly, it is clear that both intentional and unintentional forms of dis- crimination are negatively impacting LGB youth. Clearly, microaggressions may hinder an individual’s identity develop- ment process. If an adolescent experiences microaggression on a regular basis, the individual may attempt to deny her or his LGB identity and may internalize that LGB people are bad or abnormal. If an adolescent experi- ences microaggressions from loved ones, she or he may feel unable to live one’s life an out and proud LGB individual. This aligns with a study by Hesp and Brooks (2009) who found that male college students in fraternities may feel hindered to accept their gay identities due to the overt and subtle heterosexism they experienced regularly. LIMITATIONS Although this study is very important in understanding sexual orientation microaggressions, the results have to be interpreted with caution since the D ow nl oa de d by [S im on F ra se r U ni ve rs ity ] a t 1 0: 44 1 3 Se pt em be r 2 01 1 254 K. L. Nadal et al. study is not without its limitations. The sample was not balanced in terms of gender and sexual orientation, particularly as there were no bisexual men in the sample. Substantial recruitment advertisements were made to various parts of the LGBT community college student organizations, community cen- ters, and online social networks. One reason for this discrepancy may be due to the notion that many bisexual men may not feel comfortable or accepted in the larger LGBT community and therefore do not participate in LGBT organizations (LeBeau & Jellison, 2009). As a result, recruiting through these means may not be an effective way to attract bisexual male participants. In addition, the focus groups’ dynamics could have influenced the partic- ipants’ responses. Some individuals might have provided answers to conform to group norms, and some responses might have been hindered because of the participants being shy or overwhelmed with speaking openly about this sensitive issue. Perhaps the most pressing limitation is the notion that the questions were developed by the research team and embedded within a specific model (Sue, Bucceri et al., 2007; Sue, 2010) and a specific taxonomy (Nadal et al., 2010). While this may have confined the array of topics covered, the directed content analysis that was used is a qualitative method used has effectively and appropriately been used to examine new and unexamined phenomena (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). IMPLICATIONS FOR LGBT YOUTH DEVELOPMENT There are many implications for theory, research, and practice with LGBT youth. First, the findings support that microaggressions do exist toward les- bians, gays, and bisexuals, and that these microaggressions may negatively impact mental health. Thus, in order to prevent microaggressions, practi- tioners who work directly with youth (e.g., teachers, administrators, after- school program coordinators, coaches) must take care in recognizing how microaggressions may impact lives of LGBT youth, as well as come up with strategies to prevent microaggressions from occurring in youth settings. Sex- ual orientation microaggressions can take many forms in schools—between students, between students and staff members, between administrators and students, etc. Consequently, individuals on all levels in school systems must be aware of their potential microaggressive behaviors and the cumulative impact these have on the campus climate. More specifically, faculty and staff members must be conscious of the language that they use directly toward students as well as heterosexist remarks that may be overheard (Kosciw & Diaz, 2006). Microaggressions can also manifest in families—from parents, children, siblings, and other relatives. Accordingly, it is important for indi- viduals to be aware of their behaviors, even in their personal lives, as they may have an impact on youth who identify as (or are struggling to identify as) lesbian, gay, or bisexual (Just the Facts, 2008). D ow nl oa de d by [S im on F ra se r U ni ve rs ity ] a t 1 0: 44 1 3 Se pt em be r 2 01 1 Sexual Orientation Microaggressions 255 This study also advocates for education about microaggressions to be addressed on systemic and institutional levels. Government leaders must ex- amine how microaggressions manifest in policies and laws, knowing that these negatively impact the mental health of their LGBT constituents. These policies may be blatantly heterosexist in content (e.g., laws that ban same- sex marriage or adoption), as well as subtly heterosexist (e.g., sexual ori- entation not included in many hate crime or sexual harassment policies). Leaders in school systems must recognize how microaggressions may man- ifest on various levels—from elementary school to high school—and how these microaggressions may have damaging effects on LGBT youth’s mental health and identity development. For example, educating students to not use phrases like “That’s so gay” is one step that teachers and educators can take to assist in creating a safe space for students and to allow LGBT students to become more comfortable with their identities at an earlier age. Employers must recognize how microaggressions may exist in workplace settings and how these may negatively impact group dynamics and work ethic. Thus, integrating microaggressions into human resources policies can be essential to maintain a safe, diverse work environment, while complying with equal opportunity policies. Specifically, there are many ways that institutions can prevent microag- gressions from occurring toward LGB youth. On institutional levels, the ab- sence of LGB-affirming spaces, role models, programs, policies, and orga- nizations can be construed as a microaggression in itself. High schools and afterschool programs should provide opportunities to create “safe spaces” on campus (particularly an LGBT center or office), so that LGB individuals feel visible, valued, and celebrated. Administrators, staff, and faculty mem- bers must be trained on diversity issues so that they can recognize when microaggressions occur and be able to deal with them accordingly. Policies must be created to protect individuals from experiencing microaggressions and to implement practices that promote LGB safe spaces. In future studies, it would be beneficial to integrate both quantitative and qualitative measures. Developing a quantitative measure that assesses LGB microaggressions could be useful in order to sample more participants more efficiently, while obtaining a more objective and empirical view of the problem. Future quantitative studies can be used to assess mental health (e.g., depression, PTSD, and anxiety), in order to objectively assess the psy- chological impact of LGB microaggressions. In addition, many participants in this study discussed how microaggressions either prevented their coming- out processes or led to various problems with family members, friends, and coworkers. Because many LGB individuals learn to explore their sexual orientations and accept their identities during their adolescence and early adulthood, it may be necessary for institutions to prevent these microag- gressions in order to promote healthy LGB identities and LGB-affirmative spaces for individuals to explore those identities. Finally, further research D ow nl oa de d by [S im on F ra se r U ni ve rs ity ] a t 1 0: 44 1 3 Se pt em be r 2 01 1 256 K. L. Nadal et al. examining the experiences of transgender microaggressions would be nec- essary in order to understand how microaggressions impact the entire LGBT community. REFERENCES Athanases, S. Z., & Comar, T. A. (2008). The performance of homophobia in early adolescents’ everyday speech. Journal of LGBT Youth, 5(2), 9–32. Berkley, R. A., & Watt, A. H. (2006). Impact of same-sex harassment and gender-role stereotypes on Title VII protection for gay, lesbian, and bisexual employees. 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Cultural Diversity and Ethnic Minority Psychology, 13(1), 72–81. Sue, D. W., & Capodilupo, C. M. (2008). Racial, gender, and sexual orientation microaggressions: Implications for counseling and psychotherapy. In D. W. Sue & D. Sue, Counseling the culturally diverse (5th ed.) (pp 105–130). New York, NY: Wiley. Sue, D. W., Capodilupo, C. M., Torino, G. C., Bucceri, J. M., Holder, A. M. B., Nadal, K. L., & Esquilin, M. (2007). Racial microaggressions in everyday life: Implications for clinical practice. American Psychologist, 62(4), 271–286. Sue, D. W., Lin, A. I., Torino, G. C., Capodilupo, C.M., & Rivera, D. P. (2009). Racial microaggressions in the classroom. Cultural Diversity and Ethnic Minority Psychology, 15, 183–190. Sue, D. W., Nadal, K. L., Capodilupo, C. M., Lin, A. I., Torino, G. C., & Rivera, D. P. (2008). Racial microaggressions against Black Americans: Implications for counseling. Journal of Counseling & Development, 86, 330–338. Swim, J. K., Ferguson, M. J., & Hyers, L. L. (1999). Avoiding stigma by association: Subtle prejudice against lesbians in the form of social distancing. Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 21(1), 61–68. Swim, J. K., & Hyers, L. L. (1999). Excuse me—What did you just say?! Women’s public and private reactions to sexist remarks. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 35, 68–88. Thompson, C. E., & Neville, H. A. (1999). Racism, mental health, and mental health practice. The Counseling Psychologist, 27(2), 155–223. D ow nl oa de d by [S im on F ra se r U ni ve rs ity ] a t 1 0: 44 1 3 Se pt em be r 2 01 1 Sexual Orientation Microaggressions 259 United Nations. (2010). Growing together: Youth and the work of the United Nations. Retrieved from http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unyin/documents/ growing together.pdf Walls, N. E. (2008). Toward a multidimensional understanding of heterosexism: The changing nature of prejudice. Journal of Homosexuality, 55(1), 20–70. CONTRIBUTORS Kevin L. Nadal, PhD, is an Assistant Professor of psychology at John Jay College of Criminal Justice, City University of New York, New York, New York, United States. Marie-Anne Issa, MA, is a doctoral candidate in forensic psychology at John Jay College of Criminal Justice, City University of New York, New York, New York, United States. Jayleen Leon, MA, is a graduate of the forensic mental counseling program at John Jay College of Criminal Justice, City University of New York, New York, New York, United States. Vanessa Meterko, MA, is a graduate of the forensic psychology program at John Jay College of Criminal Justice, City University of New York, New York, New York, United States. Michelle Wideman, MA, is a graduate of the forensic mental counseling program at John Jay College of Criminal Justice, City University of New York, New York, New York, United States. Yinglee Wong, MA, is a graduate of the forensic psychology program at John Jay College of Criminal Justice, City University of New York, New York, New York, United States. D ow nl oa de d by [S im on F ra se r U ni ve rs ity ] a t 1 0: 44 1 3 Se pt em be r 2 01 1 
work_jpza2yqzvjgv7ofvsyg6266byq	----	Microsoft Word - Watson galleysPROOFS2 WATSON GALLEYSPROOFS2 5/1/2014 9:13 AM THE DARK HEART OF EASTERN EUROPE: APPLYING THE BRITISH MODEL TO FOOTBALL-RELATED VIOLENCE AND RACISM Matthew R. Watson* ABSTRACT In the summer of 2012, Poland and Ukraine co-hosted the 2012 UEFA European Football Championship. A week before kickoff, BBC’s investigative journalism program, Panorama, aired a documentary highlighting pervasive violence, racism and anti-Semitism in the football stadiums in both these nations. Violent and racist hooliganism is not a new phenomenon in Europe, but the images and interviews were shocking as hundreds of thousands fans from all over Europe prepared to travel to Eastern Europe for Euro 2012. This Article explores the history of European football hooliganism and its proliferation in Eastern Europe. The rise of media coverage after Euro 2012, heightened by instances of racial abuse and violence during the 2012–2013 season, make the issues presented in this Article all the more applicable. Using Britain’s response to hooliganism as a model, this Article proposes that Poland and Ukraine adopt similar measures to curb the growing problem of violent and racist football fans. Specifically this Article argues for the adoption of: (1) travel bans and banning orders for fans convicted of football-related criminal offenses; (2) strict speech restrictions to criminalize hate speech and speech that incites violence; and (3) modern policing tactics to lessen tensions between law enforcement and football supporters and better control large crowds. By implementing these three measures, the Polish and Ukrainian governments would be better equipped to handle crowd disturbances and punish individuals convicted of football-related violence and racism. Part I presents: (1) A brief history of hooliganism in Britain and Eastern Europe; (2) European football’s current governing structure responsible for * B.S. in Sport Management, Syracuse University, 2010; J.D. Candidate, The University of Mississippi School of Law, 2014. The author would like to thank Professor William Berry for his guidance during the writing process and his classmates in the International Criminal Law class for their invaluable edits and suggestions. The author would also like to thank the Emory International Law Review and its staff for the opportunity to publish this article. WATSON GALLEYSPROOFS2 5/1/2014 9:13 AM 1056 EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27 policing and monitoring football-related violence; (3) the relevant penal code provisions applicable to football-related violence and racism in Poland and Ukraine; and (4) the British legal framework established in response to organized and violent hooligan groups. Part II explains travel bans and banning orders for individuals convicted of football-related violence and argues for implementing bans to prevent offenders from attending and causing disorder at football matches. Part III discusses regulation of hate speech and speech intended to incite violence at football matches and argues for implementation of statutes based on Scottish legislation to fight the increase of racism and anti-Semitism at football grounds. Finally, Part IV argues for developing modern policing tactics concentrated on relieving tensions and conflict between police and supporters. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................ 1057 I. FOOTBALL HOOLIGANISM: THE “ENGLISH DISEASE” ....................... 1062 A. Governing Structure in European Football .............................. 1063 1. Football Governing Bodies ................................................ 1064 2. Governmental Entities ........................................................ 1069 B. The History of British Hooliganism ......................................... 1072 C. Hooliganism in Eastern Europe ............................................... 1076 D. Criminal Codes of Poland and Ukraine ................................... 1080 E. Britain’s Legal Response to Hooliganism ................................ 1084 II. BANNING ORDERS AND TRAVEL BANS ............................................. 1086 A. British Banning Order Legislation ........................................... 1086 B. Applying Bans in Poland and Ukraine ..................................... 1090 III. HATE SPEECH AND THE INCITEMENT OF VIOLENCE ......................... 1093 A. Offensive Behaviour at Football and Threatening Communications (Scotland) Act ............................................... 1093 B. Football-Specific Speech Restrictions in Poland and Ukraine 1097 IV. POLICING TACTICS AT FOOTBALL MATCHES ................................... 1100 A. Crowd Control Methods and Hooliganism .............................. 1100 B. Applying Modern Policing Tactics in Poland and Ukraine ..... 1102 CONCLUSION ................................................................................................ 1104 WATSON GALLEYSPROOFS2 5/1/2014 9:13 AM 2013] THE DARK HEART OF EASTERN EUROPE 1057 INTRODUCTION I lived in Łódź and I was shocked. I remember on the main street there was ah, a sign “Jews to the gas” and the people that wrote weren’t the people that really, it didn’t upset me so [sic] idea that people wrote it, the idea that 1000s of people walked past that every day and let that happen was very disturbing to me. —Jonathan Ornstein 1 In June 2012, sixteen European national football teams met in Poland and Ukraine to contest that year’s UEFA European Football Championships (Euro 2012).2 However, the most-discussed news story in the lead up to Euro 2012 had nothing to do with the on-field performance of teams or players; instead, the attention was on violent and racist fan behavior. A week prior to the opening match of the tournament, the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) aired a special episode of Panorama, Euro 2012: Stadiums of Hate,3 exposing the epidemic problem of racist, anti-Semitic abuse by football hooligans in the two host nations, and the increase in football-related violence from this abuse. Panorama’s correspondent, Chris Rogers, experienced first-hand “the dark heart” of Eastern European football and captured it for the world to see. 4 2007, Poland and Ukraine were selected as co-hosts of Euro 2012. This was a huge coup for Eastern European football and seen as a great opportunity for Ukraine to showcase itself to the rest of Europe as European Union membership spreads east.5 Some within football’s hierarchy viewed Euro 2012 as a test of Eastern Europe’s ability to successfully host a major football 1 Panorama, Euro 2012: Stadiums of Hate (BBC television broadcast June 13, 2012) [hereinafter Euro 2012: Stadiums of Hate]. Ornstein is an American living in Poland and the director of the Jewish Cultural Centre in Kraków. Id. 2 Rep. of the UEFA President and Exec. Comm. 2011/12, (XXXVII) Ordinary Cong., July 1, 2011–June 30, 2012, at 2, 4 (May 24, 2013); see Euro 2012: Stadiums of Hate, supra note 1. 3 Id. Panorama is the BBC’s current affairs and documentary program famous for its investigative journalism. See, e.g., 50 Facts About Panorama, BBC (Oct. 29, 2003, 5:07 PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/ programmes/panorama/50th_birthday/3198149.stm. 4 Euro 2012: Stadiums of Hate, supra note 1. Rogers was told that to see “the dark heart of Polish football,” he had to visit the Łódź derby between ŁKS and Widzew. Id. The term “derby” is an intra-city rivalry match. See 4 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 496 (2d ed. 1989) (“A match between two teams from the same district.”). 5 Poland and Ukraine Host Euro 2012, BBC (Apr. 18, 2007, 9:41 AM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/sport2/hi/ football/europe/6562527.stm. A policy at the time for the new UEFA President, Michel Platini, was to address the balance of power in European football. Id. WATSON GALLEYSPROOFS2 5/1/2014 9:13 AM 1058 EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27 tournament,6 which was especially made important after Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) awarded Russia with the hosting duties for the 2018 World Cup.7 From Roger’s month spent in Poland and Ukraine, the footage reveals the extent of vile abuse directed at both players and fans.8 The derogatory chants and songs are choreographed and sung en masse by whole sections of stadiums, but more detrimental to society are the physical acts of violence shown in the documentary. In Łódź, Poland, a city where the Nazis killed almost its entire 230,000 Jewish residents during World War II,9 football supporters use the word “Jew” and Jewish imagery as an insult to attack opposing teams.10 Supporters of the club ŁKS greeted players from their crosstown rivals, Widzew, with a not-so- subtle anti-Semitic cheer: “Anyone not jumping is a Jew. Death to the Jewish whores!”11 Outside the stadium, ŁKS fans clashed with riot police, forcing the BBC crew to take cover as supporters started to throw explosives in the direction of the cameras.12 In the Ukrainian capital of Kiev, during a Ukrainian Premier League match between Arsenal Kiev and Karpaty Lviv, Arsenal fans made monkey noises every time black players touched the ball and abused a black player’s family as they left the stadium.13 And, at a match in Kharkiv, Ukraine, nearly 2000 Metalist fans gave the Nazi salute while chanting “Seig Heil.”14 That alone is 6 See Euro 2012: Stadium of Hate, supra note 1. BBC News asked UEFA for an official response to the Panorama documentary, and UEFA issued a written response stating: “UEFA Euro 2012 brings the spotlight on the host countries and clearly creates an opportunity to address and confront such societal issues.” Id.; see also Sol Campbell Warns Fans to Stay Away From Euro 2012, BBC (May 28, 2012), http://www.bbc.co.uk/ news/uk-18192375. 7 England Miss Out to Russia in 2018 World Cup Vote, BBC SPORT-FOOTBALL (Dec. 2, 2010), http:// news.bbc.co.uk/sport2/hi/football/9250585.stm. Russia was selected to host in 2018, beating out England, a joint bid from Belgium and the Netherlands, and another joint bid from Portugal and Spain. See Russia and Qatar to Host 2018 and 2022 FIFA World Cups, Respectively, FIFA (Dec. 2, 2010), http://www.fifa.com/ worldcup/russia2018/organisation/media/newsid=1344971/index.html. 8 Euro 2012: Stadium of Hate, supra note 1. 9 Rebecca Weiner, The Virtual Jewish History Tour: Łódź, JEWISH VIRTUAL LIBRARY, http://www. jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/vjw/Lodz.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2013). 10 Euro 2012: Stadiums of Hate, supra note 1. The meaning of the word “Jew” to some Polish football fans now means “someone who deserves to be defeated or even killed.” Id. 11 Id. 12 Id. 13 Id. 14 Id. WATSON GALLEYSPROOFS2 5/1/2014 9:13 AM 2013] THE DARK HEART OF EASTERN EUROPE 1059 shocking, but what really shocked former England defender Sol Campbell was the lack of any response by police or stadium stewards to the behavior of the supporters.15 Rogers interviewed Kharkiv’s police colonel, Volodymyr Kovrygin, who claimed that Kharkiv and Ukraine had not had any incidences of racism at football matches and explained that the BBC cameras merely captured Metalist supporters pointing to their opponents.16 The documentary received criticism by some who thought it was sensationalist journalism and biased,17 but the footage nonetheless captures behavior that paints an ugly picture of some factions within Polish and Ukrainian football. Empirical evidence supports what the documentary showed. For instance, a 2011 study found there were 133 instances of serious hate crimes in Polish stadiums from September 2009 to March 2011.18 In the defining moment of the documentary, Rogers asked Sol Campbell whether he recommends English families travel to Poland and Ukraine for Euro 2012.19 Campbell sent a stern warning to those watching, responding: “No chance. Stay at home[;] watch it on TV. Don’t even risk it, because you could end up and come back in a coffin.”20 The problem of racist and anti-Semitic speech leading to violence is a growing societal problem in Eastern Europe and one not merely confined to football. From September 2009 to March 2011, Ukraine had fifty-one reported incidents of race related attacks.21 Nevertheless, racism leading to instances of 15 Id. 16 Id. (“No, it’s not a Nazi salute, they are sort of pointing at their rivals, other fans, so it looked like they were pointing right arms at other fans, sort of to get their attention. It’s not the Nazi salute.” (quoting Col. Volodymyr Kovrygin, Police Chief)). 17 K.T., An Ugly Spectre: Euro 2012 is Overshadowed by Accusations of Racism and Anti-Semitism, THE ECONOMIST: EASTERN APPROACHES (June 6, 2012, 11:24 PM), http://www.economist.com/blogs/ easternapproaches/2012/06/ugly-spectre. 18 E. EUR. MONITORING CTR., HATEFUL: MONITORING RACISM, DISCRIMINATION AND HATE CRIME IN POLISH AND UKRAINIAN FOOTBALL 2009–2011, at 9 (Rafał Pankowski ed., 2011) (“[D]ocument[ing] incidents of a racist and xenophobic nature, and those characterised by the involvement of far-right and neo-nazi activists, within football environments.”); see also Euro 2012: Stadiums of Hate, supra note 1. 19 Id. 20 Id. During his playing career, Campbell was a victim of racial abuse from fans. Id. 21 E. EUR. MONITORING CTR., supra note 18, at 8; see also HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, COMBATING XENOPHOBIC VIOLENCE: A FRAMEWORK FOR ACTION 24 (2011), http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-content/ uploads/pdf/UNHCR_Blueprint.pdf/. WATSON GALLEYSPROOFS2 5/1/2014 9:13 AM 1060 EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27 violence seems to disproportionately take hold within the fanatical supporter groups of football clubs.22 Historically, there has been a symbiotic relationship between football hooligans and right-wing groups in Europe.23 These groups go to football stadiums to find and enlist aggressive and violent young men because football hooliganism emerged as a means for fans to defend the honor and symbolic meaning of their club’s name.24 Linking up with extremist groups gives football hooligans another outlet for their violent tendencies and a chance to blow off steam.25 Most teams in Eastern Europe already have a hardcore set of supporters, called “ultras,” who create noise and an intimidating atmosphere inside the stadiums.26 Some “ultra” groups adopt radical ideologies, like ultra- nationalism, neo-Nazism, and fascism, which further blurs the lines between football hooligans and extremist groups.27 This Article proposes that the Polish and Ukrainian governments, struggling to control football hooliganism, adopt the methods pioneered in the United Kingdom. Specifically, three measures are necessary to rid football of these issues: (1) instituting banning orders and travel bans for individuals convicted of football-related crimes to prevent them from attending matches and from traveling with their club or national team; (2) further criminalization of hate speech and inciting violence by establishing severe penalties for offenders; and (3) modernizing policing tactics, to no longer rely on deploying paramilitary-style police at matches, and create better coordination among clubs, law enforcement, and the judiciary to monitor and track known or suspected hooligans. Eastern European countries cannot rely on football’s governing structure to clean up fan behavior. In the past, the Union des Associations Européennes de Football (UEFA) talked tough about standing up to racism but did little else.28 22 See RICHARD HAYNES, THE FOOTBALL IMAGINATION: THE RISE OF FOOTBALL FANZINE CULTURE 131– 42 (1995). 23 Ann-Cathrine Jungar, Right Wing Extremism. Conceived Football Hooliganism, BALTIC WORLD.S (June 27, 2012), http://balticworlds.com/conceived-football-hooliganism/. 24 Ronnie Michael Booker, Jr., Orange Alba: The Civil Religion of Loyalism in the Southwestern Lowlands of Scotland Since 1798, at 151 (Aug. 2010) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Tennessee), http://trace.tennessee.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1823&context=utk_graddiss. 25 Id. 26 Euro 2012: Stadium of Hate, supra note 1. 27 See Alberto Testa & Gary Armstrong, World and Actions: Italian Ultras and Neo-Fascism, 14 SOC. IDENTITIES 473, 483 (2008). 28 See Euro 2012: Stadium of Hate, supra note 1; infra Part I.A. WATSON GALLEYSPROOFS2 5/1/2014 9:13 AM 2013] THE DARK HEART OF EASTERN EUROPE 1061 In response to BBC’s request for a comment regarding the Panorama program, UEFA said it was making funds available for set up “inclusivity zones” in the Euro 2012 host cities open to all fans as safe spaces to watch the matches.29 This response does nothing to rid stadiums of racism; instead it appeases individuals engaged in anti-social behavior—telling fans that to be safe from abuse, they should not watch the match from the stadium. Therefore, it falls to national governments to proactively confront these pervasive societal issues: one of the most fundamental roles of government is to protect the safety of its citizens. The United Kingdom’s case law is especially “instructive because the U.K. Courts have created more common law dealing with sport,” especially fan behavior, “[than] other European” countries dealing with this issue.30 The Football Spectator Act of 1989 (1989 Act) exemplified Parliament’s commitment to ridding the national game of “the English disease.”31 The 1989 Act established judicially-imposed travel bans and banning orders for any individual convicted of a football-related crime, and subsequent amendments and statutes have extended and strengthened the 1989 Act.32 Another example of strict regulation of hate speech is the Offensive Behaviour at Football and Threatening Communications (Scotland) Act of 2012 (Threatening Communications Act), which criminalizes hate speech and inciting religious violence with respect to football.33 Further, implementing less-threatening policing tactics and better- organized means of crowd control serves to reduce tensions between groups of supporters and the police, and to keep likely agitators apart.34 Increasingly, European nations are coordinating and sharing information on hooligan 29 Euro 2012: Stadium of Hate, supra note 1. The documentarians asked UEFA president, Michel Platini, for an interview; however, he declined because he was too busy. Id. 30 Alexander Wynn, Red Card Racism: Using the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) to Prevent and Punish Racist Conduct Perpetrated By Fans Attending European Soccer Games, 13 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 313, 334, 341 (2011) (contextualizing UEFA’s governing authority within statutory and case law from the E.U. and the United Kingdom). 31 Football Spectators Act, 1989, c. 37, amended by Football (Offences and Disorder) Act, 1999, c.21, and Football (Disorder) Act, 2000, c. 25 (U.K.); Ian Blackshaw, ‘The English Disease’–Taking Football Hooliganism in England, INT’L SPORTS L.J., 2005, at 90. 32 Football Spectators Act, 1989, §§ 14–15; see also Blackshaw, supra note 31. 33 Offensive Behaviour at Football and Threatening Communications (Scotland) Act, 2012, (A.S.P. 1). 34 Micahel Rosander & Gunilla Guva, Keeping the Peace–Police Behaviour at a Mass Event, 9 J. INVESTIGATIVE PSYCHOL. & OFFENDER PROFILING 52, 53 (2012). WATSON GALLEYSPROOFS2 5/1/2014 9:13 AM 1062 EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27 activity, especially with respect to big international matches and tournaments.35 Developing strong communication links between law enforcement agencies, both within and across national borders, is crucial for enforcing travel bans and banning orders. The three measures proposed in this Article are necessary steps for nations facing serious problems with anti-social behavior at football stadiums. It is incorrect to assert that Poland and Ukraine do not have any laws applicable to football-related disorder.36 Acts of violence, disorder, hooliganism, and hate crimes are already criminalized in Poland and Ukraine,37 but this Article argues that without developing a legal framework to more specifically deal with football-related crime and enforcing these laws to the fullest extent, Poland and Ukraine may never stop the growth of football- related violence, disorder, and racism overtaking their stadiums. Part I examines the history of football-related violence in the United Kingdom and Eastern Europe, the current structure in place to police football in Europe, and the legal frameworks currently in place in the United Kingdom, Poland, and Ukraine. Part II argues for the implementation of travel bans and banning orders, analyzing British parliamentary material with respect to football-related disorder, and applying these statutes to the penal codes in Poland and Ukraine. Part III argues that Poland and Ukraine should enact stricter speech restrictions on football supporters committing acts of hate speech and inciting racial and religious violence at football matches, and sentence offenders with severe penalties. Finally, Part IV details more effective tactics for controlling fans and large crowds and explains why the policing tactics currently used in Eastern Europe only serve to create more violence. I. FOOTBALL HOOLIGANISM: THE “ENGLISH DISEASE” Football policing is a real British success story. Where hooliganism was once described as ‘the English disease,’ we now set an example for others to follow. This year’s record low arrest figures follow on 35 Ramon Spaaij, Football Hooliganism as a Transnational Phenomenon: Past and Present Analysis: A Critique-More Specificity and Less Generality, 24 INT’L J. HIST. SPORT 411 (2007). 36 See infra Part 1.D. 37 Id. at 103. WATSON GALLEYSPROOFS2 5/1/2014 9:13 AM 2013] THE DARK HEART OF EASTERN EUROPE 1063 from last year’s successful World Cup in South Africa, where nobody from this country was arrested. —Lord Henley, U.K. Crime Prevention Minister 38 This Part provides the necessary background for this discussion of football- related violence by analyzing five important topics that will set up the proposals presented later in the article. Subpart A examines the governing structure of European football, breaking it into two main categories of organizations responsible for enforcing the laws, rules, and regulations in football; sports governing bodies and governmental entities. Each category is made up of different levels, from the local up to the transnational level. Subpart B looks at the history of British hooliganism and some of the major events that led to the sweeping reforms initiated by the British government to rid football of the blight of hooliganism. Subpart C focuses on how hooliganism spread to continental Europe and has come to be entrenched in the Polish and Ukrainian football cultures. Subpart D introduces relevant statutory provisions from the Polish and Ukrainian criminal codes and points to aspects where these laws currently lack strength and effectiveness. Finally, Subpart E introduces the methods developed in the United Kingdom to address hooliganism and introduces the three measures this article argues Poland and Ukraine should adopt to combat their football-related crime problems. A. Governing Structure in European Football A major hurdle in the fight against racism and violence in European football is the governing structure in place to create rules and police the sport. The governing bodies for football are organized in a top-down pyramid with each level delegating certain duties to the level below it.39 Additionally, many different entities have the ability to assert their authority to control certain aspects of the sport.40 The two categories responsible for ensuring that fans, players, coaches and officials are safe and punishing offenders are the various football governing bodies and governmental agencies.41 This Subpart examines the roles each group assumes in the fight against racism and violence in football, ultimately 38 Press Release, Home Office, Football Disorder at Record Low (Dec. 23, 2011), https://www.gov.uk/ government/news/football-disorder-at-record-low. 39 JOSÉ LUIS ARNAUT, INDEPENDENT EUROPEAN SPORTS REVIEW 57–58 (2006). 40 Michael Ryan, The European Union and Fan Racism in European Soccer Stadiums: The Time Has Come for Action, 20 FLA. J. INT’L L. 245, 248 (2008). 41 Id. at 249, 251. WATSON GALLEYSPROOFS2 5/1/2014 9:13 AM 1064 EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27 concluding that criminalizing behavior at the national level is the best way to fix the problem.42 1. Football Governing Bodies FIFA serves as the top level of football’s internal governance structure that regulates the sport globally.43 FIFA delegates much of its enforcement authority to regional “confederations.”44 UEFA is the European confederation recognized by FIFA.45 UEFA membership is “open to national football associations situated in the continent of Europe, based in a country which is recognised by the United Nations as an independent state, and which are responsible for the organisation and implementation of football-related matters” in their country.46 UEFA is empowered to “promote football in Europe in a spirit of peace, understanding and fair play, without any discrimination on account of politics, gender, religion, race or any other reason.”47 UEFA’s Disciplinary Regulations hold member associations responsible for the conduct of its “members, players, officials or supporters . . . even if the Member Association concerned can prove the absence of any fault or negligence.”48 Regarding conduct that “insults the human dignity of a person or group of persons by whatever means, including on the grounds of skin colour, race, religion or ethnic origin,” the regulations allow UEFA to impose suspensions, fines, stadium closures, forfeiture of matches, deduction of points, and disqualification from competitions.49 Additionally, UEFA has 42 See id. at 248, 249, 251–52 (providing an overview of the governing structure of European Football and their efforts to combat “spectator racism”); Wynn, supra note 30, at 314–24 (arguing that UEFA should divest its authority and vest jurisdiction over such complaints to the Court of Arbitration for Sport). 43 FÉDÉRATION INTERNATIONALE DE FOOTBALL ASSOCIATION, FIFA STATUTES: REGULATIONS GOVERNING THE APPLICATION OF THE STATUTES, art. 2(d), at 6 (2013); see also Wynn, supra note 30, at 318. Under Article 58 of the FIFA Disciplinary Code, anyone who “offends the dignity of a person or group of persons through contemptuous, discriminatory or denigratory words or actions concerning race, colour, language, religion or origin shall be suspended for at least five matches. . . . [A] stadium ban and a fine of at least CHF 20,000 shall be imposed.” FÉDÉRATION INTERNATIONALE DE FOOTBALL ASSOCIATION, FIFA DISCIPLINARY CODE, art. 58, at 33 (2011). 44 FIFA STATUTES, supra note 43, arts. 17–18, at 15, art. 20, at 17–19. 45 Id. art. 20(1)(c), at 17. 46 UNION DES ASSOCIATIONS EUROPÉENNES DE FOOTBALL, UEFA STATUTES, art. 5(1), at 3 (2012). 47 Id. art. 2(b), at 1; see also Ryan, supra note 40, at 249. 48 UNION DES ASSOCIATIONS EUROPÉENNES DE FOOTBALL, UEFA DISCIPLINARY REGULATIONS, art. 8, at 4 (2013). 49 Id. art. 14, at 7–8. WATSON GALLEYSPROOFS2 5/1/2014 9:13 AM 2013] THE DARK HEART OF EASTERN EUROPE 1065 the “sole jurisdiction to organise or abolish international competitions in Europe.”50 Each individual UEFA member association oversees footballing matters within their own national borders.51 Each national association is responsible for organizing league and cup competitions, registering its clubs, players and referees, establishing national rules, and promoting the sport’s growth by training coaches and young players.52 Each member association also has a structure of professional and amateur leagues where clubs compete and, if they finish atop the standings in the country’s highest division, can qualify to compete in lucrative continental tournaments sponsored by UEFA.53 Qualifying for these European-wide club tournaments is crucial for the financial well-being of clubs, especially as the American appetite for viewing top-level football competitions grows. The Champions League Final in recent years has surpassed the Super Bowl as the most watched annual sporting event: 167 million viewers tuned in for the 2012 final, while 108 million watched that year’s Super Bowl.54 UEFA distributed a total of €904.6 million to clubs 50 UEFA STATUTES, supra note 40, art. 49, at 21–22. Some of these include annual club competitions, like the lucrative Champions League and the slightly less prestigious Europa League. Id. 49(a)–(b), at 22. 51 UEFA STATUTES, supra note 40, art. 5(1), at 3; Trevor Brice, Labor Pains on the Playing Field: Why Taking a Page from Europe’s Playbook Could Help the United States, 20 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 49, 64–65 (2013). Despite the United Kingdom being a single sovereign nation for government purposes, each of the four “home nations” in the United Kingdom maintains its own national football association. THE FOOTBALL ASS’N, RULES AND REGULATIONS OF THE ASSOCIATION: SEASON 2013–2014, at 5 (2013) (“The FA has the privilege and the responsibility of overseeing football in England as a whole.”); THE SCOTTISH FOOTBALL ASS’N LTD., ARTICLES OF ASSOCIATION OF THE SCOTTISH FOOTBALL ASSOCIATION LIMITED arts. 3–5 (2013) (outlining The Scottish FA and its Membership); THE FOOTBALL ASS’N OF WALES, FAW RULES 2012/2013, §§ A(1)–(10) (2012) (outlining the Football Association of Wale’s (“FAW”) composition); IRISH FOOTBALL ASS’N LTD., ARTICLES OF ASSOCIATION art. 3, at 6 (2013) (defining membership in and the rules and regulations of football governance in Northern Ireland). These “four national associations” established the International Football Association Board (“IFAB”) in June 1886, which is the body that determines the Laws of the Game of association football. Int’l Football Assoc. Bd., Rules of the International Football Association Board, London, Eng., (June 2, 1886); see also James A.H. Catton, Football Association, in 2 THE ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA: A DICTIONARY OF ARTS, SCIENCES, LITERATURE & GENERAL INFORMATION 65, 65–67 (13th. ed. 1926). 52 UEFA STATUTES, supra note 40, art. 5(1), at 3. Member associations “are responsible for the organisation and implementation of football-related matters in the territory of their country.” ARNAUT, supra note 39, at 57 53 UEFA STATUTES, supra note 40, art. 7(e), at 4. 54 DeMarco Williams, Inside the UEFA Champions League Final in London, FORBES: TRAVEL GUIDE (May 23, 2013, 9:13 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/forbestravelguide/2013/05/23/inside-the-uefa- champions-league-final-in-london/; accord Brice, supra note 51, 65–69 (analyzing the impact of professional sport on the economy using European football and the American football). WATSON GALLEYSPROOFS2 5/1/2014 9:13 AM 1066 EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27 participating in the 2012–13 Champions League competition.55 Clubs looking to recruit new players and grow to or maintain high levels of play must qualify and advance in these European competitions to fund their ambitions, and there is a growing list of clubs who have attempted to overachieve and have failed, causing financial ruin.56 English clubs Leeds United and Portsmouth are prime examples of clubs failing to reach the ambitious goal to grow its European profile, causing the club to free-fall within its own country’s football hierarchy.57 The lowest rung of football’s governing pyramid is the individual club level.58 UEFA’s Disciplinary Regulations hold the member associations and each club responsible for the actions of fans and players.59 Clubs are the primary entity responsible for ensuring safety at matches.60 However, it is common for zealous supporter groups to exert such an influence on their club that they effectively control club policy. In December 2012, the largest fan group of the Russian club Zenit St. Petersburg issued a public letter demanding that black and gay players not be allowed to play for the club.61 Until the summer of 2012, when Zenit signed Brazilian international striker Hulk and Belgian international midfielder Axel Witsel, Zenit was the only Russian Premier League club to not have a black player on its roster.62 The lack of ability to control powerful supporter groups is a major reason why policing football-related violence and racism must come from above the club level. A critical issue in football’s governing organizations fight against racism is determining which level of the structure is responsible for levying punishment against clubs and their fans, players, coaches or officials who violate anti- 55 Clubs Benefit from Champions League Revenue, UEFA (Jun. 23, 2013, 4:14 PM), http://www.uefa. com/uefa/management/finance/news/newsid=1975196.html (distributing revenue for performance bonuses, television revenue and participation). 56 See David Ornstein, Pompey pays for Chasing the Dream, BBC SPORT (Feb. 11, 2009), http://news. bbc.co.uk/sport2/hi/football/teams/p/portsmouth/7879229.stm. 57 Neil Moxley, FA Cup Winners to League Two in Just Five Years . . . Pompey’s Shocking Fall From Grace, Pompey’s Shocking Fall From Grace, DAILY MAIL ONLINE (Apr. 17, 2013, 8:42 AM), http://www. dailymail.co.uk/sport/football/article-2310464/From-FA-Cup-winners-League-Two-The-decline-Portsmouth. html. 58 See ARNAUT, supra note 39, at 57. 59 UNION DES ASSOCIATIONS EUROPÉENNES DE FOOTBALL, REGULATIONS OF THE UEFA CHAMPIONS LEAGUE 2012–15 CYCLE, arts. 6.02–.03, at 8 (2012). 60 See id. 61 Fan Group Calls on Russian Club Zenit Not to Sign Black Players, CNN (Dec. 17, 2012), http:// edition.cnn.com/2012/12/17/sport/football/football-racism-zenit-russia/index.html.. 62 Zenit St. Petersburg Fans Want Black and Gay Players Excluded, BBC (Dec. 18, 2012), http://www. bbc.co.uk/sport/0/football/20770678. WATSON GALLEYSPROOFS2 5/1/2014 9:13 AM 2013] THE DARK HEART OF EASTERN EUROPE 1067 racism rules. There is a division between the rhetoric of UEFA and FIFA and their actual willingness to hand down meaningful punishments.63 These groups claim to maintain a “zero tolerance” stance on racism64 but are often criticized for merely threatening punishment, as well as the overall weakness of its sanctions, leading to speculation from players that the organization is not serious about ridding the sport of racism.65 UEFA has the power to fine clubs, force team to play matches “behind closed doors,” forfeit matches, disqualify and or dock points from offending teams.66 Despite the broad authority UEFA has to enforce its anti-racism regulations, it rarely acts strongly enough to alter the behavior of offending supporters permanently.67 In the first three months of 2013, the UEFA Control and Disciplinary Body fined the Italian club S.S. Lazio (“Lazio”) €90,000 and ordered the club to play three UEFA competition matches “behind closed doors” for igniting and throwing fireworks, racist behavior, blocked evacuation routes and 63 Ryan, supra note 40, at 253 (“[M]uch like UEFA and national associations, clubs’ efforts to eliminate spectator racism have been largely ineffective.”). 64 UEFA, European Football United Against Racism, UEFA Cong. Res. 2013 (IX), 37th Ord. Cong., Annex (May 24, 2013); FIFA, Resolution on the Fight Against Racism and Discrimination, FIFA Cong. Res. 11.2, 63d Cong., at 2–3 (May 30–31, 2013); see also Press Release, UEFA Exec. Comm., UEFA Executive Committee Declaration Against Racism (Dec. 15, 2005), available at http://www.uefa.org/newsfiles/ 379953.pdf. 65 On Oct. 16, 2012, Danny Rose, a black player on England’s U-21 team, was the main victim of Serbian fans monkey chants, but stones, coins and chairs were also thrown onto the playing surface. Adam Shergold & Dominic King, Ban These Racists! Cameron Joins Rose to Call for Serbian Thugs to be Kicked Out (But UEFA Don’t Even Mention It on Their Website . . . ), DAILY MAIL ONLINE (Oct. 17, 2012, 4:16 AM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sport/football/article-2218953/Serbia-v-England-Under-21s-Danny-Rose-called- Serbia-ban-mass-brawl-racist-abuse-ruins-night.html. Clarke Carlisle, currently playing for York City, noted that the Serbian FA was fined a mere £16,000 when Serbian supporters abused England U-21’s black players in 2007, yet UEFA fined Danish international Nicklas Bendtner £80,000 for exposing an unsanctioned advertisement under his shorts after scoring a goal at Euro 2012. Id. 66 UEFA DISCIPLINARY REGULATIONS, supra note 48, art. 6, at 3. 67 Wynn, supra note 30, at 322. [We] have to wake up. We have to open our eyes. . . . [W]e live in this time . . . It’s 2013 . . . we still have to like live with these things. And I’m sad and angry . . . I have to be the one who walks off the field. There are like so many people, the FIFA or whatever they can do something against it. So they should—they should wake up and do it. Connect the World: Kevin-Prince Boateng, AC Milan Walk Off Field After Racial Abuse (CNN television broadcast Jan. 4, 2013), available at LEXIS, News Transcripts (interviewing Kevin-Prince Boateng on the time he and his AC Milan teammates walked off the field during a friendly with Pro Patria after opposing fans made monkey chants.). WATSON GALLEYSPROOFS2 5/1/2014 9:13 AM 1068 EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27 passageways, and lack of stewarding.68 But UEFA’s punishment for this incident would only affect Lazio in European competition and would have no bearing on any of Lazio’s domestic competitions.69 Because punishment handed down by UEFA has no bearing on matches played within the member associations’ control, and vice versa, punishments do not attain the maximum possible effect on clubs by banning fans from domestic league matches if clubs do not reach European cup competitions. Individual league associations have the ability to punish offending clubs and players, but, not all levy fines and punishment strong enough to correct racist and violent behavior.70 Clubs can ban specific fans who commit anti- social behavior from their stadium, but such punishments only apply to that club or stadium. In response to criticisms and growing media attention to racism in football, UEFA has approved stricter sanctions in the most recent edition of the UEFA Disciplinary Regulation, which is in line with UEFA’s “zero-tolerance” policy against racism.71 Also, at the 2013 UEFA Congress, the member associations unanimously approved an 11-point resolution calling on all members to take strict measures to rid European football of racism.72 In February 2013, FIFA’s Strategic Committee created a FIFA Task Force Against Racism and Discrimination, headed by Jeffrey Webb, Vice President of FIFA and President of CONCACAF.73 In 2013, FIFA member associations approved stricter 68 S.S. Lazio, Dec. of 11 Mar. 2013, 2 Case L. CDB & App. Body. 60, 61, 70 (UEFA App. Body 2013), http://www.uefa.org/MultimediaFiles/Download/uefaorg/UEFACompDisCases/01/99/00/41/1990041_DOWN LOAD.pdf. During the 2012/2013 UEFA Europa League season Lazio: (1) was fined €50,000 on January 24 and ordered to play one match “behind closed doors” by the Control and Disciplinary Body (CDB); and(2) fined €40,000 and ordered to play its next two “UEFA competition matches behind closed doors” on February 27 by the CDB, which was upheld on appeal. Id. at 60–63, 71. 69 See, e.g., Fenerbahce SK, Dec. of 11 Mar. 2013, 2 Case L. CDB & App. Body 72, 77 (UEFA App. Body, 2013), http://www.uefa.org/MultimediaFiles/Download/uefaorg/UEFACompDisCases/01/99/00/41/199 0041_DOWNLOAD.pdf (banning fans from Fenerbahce’s next home game in UEFA competitions but not domestic league competition for actions during both European and Turkish league matches). 70 See, e.g., Jame Coomarasmy & Adrian Goldberg, Racism in Russian Football: Zenit Fans Let Side Down: Japanese Striker Quits Slovakian Club Over Racism, FOXSPORTS.COM (Jan. 30 2013, 10:15 AM), http: //msn.foxsports.com/foxsoccer/world/story/japanese-striker-yuki-nakamura-quits-slovakian-club-over-racism- 013013. But see Liverpool Fan Banned for Racist Abuse of Patrice Evra, GUARDIAN (June 22, 2012, 11:36 PM); Lazio Hit by Terrace Ban for Serie A Opener, CNN (Aug. 19, 2013), http://edition.cnn.com/2013/08/19/ sport/football/football-lazio-fans-banned-racist/index.html. 71 UEFA DISCIPLINARY REGULATIONS, supra note 48. 72 European Football United Against Racism, UEFA Cong. Res. 2013, supra note 64. 73 Media Release, Fédération Internationale de Football Association, Executive Committee Strongly Backs Further Governance Reforms and Strengthens Fight Against Racism and Discrimination (Mar. 21, 2013), available at http://www.fifa.com/aboutfifa/organisation/bodies/news/newsid=2039605/index.html; see WATSON GALLEYSPROOFS2 5/1/2014 9:13 AM 2013] THE DARK HEART OF EASTERN EUROPE 1069 punishments for racism in football, including the possible relegation of a club for serious offences.74 The individual member associations of UEFA also have authority to punish clubs registered in their nation, and each league and club can also punish supporters and players who engage in the prohibited activities.75 But as of the present time, football’s governing bodies have not backed up their “zero- tolerance” talk and taken the necessary action to make a stand against racism in football. 2. Governmental Entities In addition to football’s internal governing structure, three levels of governments possess the requisite authority to govern issues related to discrimination in sports: supranational, national and local.76 The EU and the Council of Europe have legislation and treaties concerning human rights and discrimination with a small subset of football-centric laws.77 The EU is the most influential supranational body in Europe, with the competency to enact binding legislation that can have “direct effect” on all 28 member states and their citizens.78 The EU only recently became involved in footballing matters, but since the 1990s, it has shown a willingness to use its legislative and judicial power to address problems in sports.79 also Strategic Committee Submits Anti-racism Proposals, FIFA (Feb. 15, 2013), http://www.fifa.com/ aboutfifa/organisation/news/newsid=2013288/index.html. CONCACAF is the Confederation of North, Central American and Caribbean Association Football. See FIFA STATUTES, supra note 43, art. 20, at 17. 74 FIFA Resolution on the Fight Against Racism and Discrimination, FIFA Cong. Res. 11.2, supra note 64, 2–3. 75 Wynn, supra note 30, at 322. 76 ARNAUT, supra note 40, at 35–37. 77 European Convention on Spectator Violence and Misbehaviour at Sports Events and in Particular at Football Matches, Aug. 19, 1985, E.T.S. No. 120, 1496 U.N.T.S. 125; Ryan, supra note 39, at 255. 78 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 1 [hereinafter TEU]; Case 26/62, N.V. Algemene Transport–en Expedite Onderneming van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen, 1963 E.C.R. 1, 12 (noting that the EU is a “new legal order” and establishing the principle of direct effect). 79 See Ryan, supra note 39, at 253–59 (providing an overview of the EU’s increasing involvement in sports issues, and noting that EU legislation related to racism in sports has become more formal over the last decade); see, e.g., Case C-415/93, Union Royale Belge des Societes de Football Ass’n ASBL v. Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. I-5040. Jean-Marc Bosman sued the Belgian football association, UEFA, and RFC Liege for the right to transfer freely after the expiration of his contract with Liege, challenging the transfer fee and quota systems in football at the time. Id. WATSON GALLEYSPROOFS2 5/1/2014 9:13 AM 1070 EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27 The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) gives the EU three types of “competences” in creating legislation applicable to its member states: exclusive, shared, and support competence.80 Article 4 gives the EU shared competence in the areas of social policy and economic, social, and territorial cohesion.81 Article 6 gives the EU “competence to carry out actions to support, coordinate or supplement the actions of the Member States” in “education, vocational training, youth and sport.”82 Furthermore, an argument can be made that the Treaty gives the EU exclusive competence to “combat discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation.”83 These new provisions, established in the Treaty of Lisbon84, came into force in 2009. The European Commission declared: “sport has now become a field in which the EU can contribute . . . and encourage cooperation between the Member States.”85 This gave the EU “‘soft-law’ competence” to encourage cooperation, support, and supplement actions of member states with respect to sport, education, and youth. 86 However, because the EU lacked the authority to pass binding legislation in relation to sports until recently, it was up to each national government to enact legislation necessary to stop football-related disorder. This is at the heart of the issue of racism and violence in Eastern Europe: Many governments either do not have legislation to address the problem or fail to sufficiently enforce the laws in place. Many European nations that previously faced hooliganism responded to violence and disorder by enacting tough legislation with enough teeth to stamp out these acts in stadiums, bars, the Internet, and other public spaces.87 80 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 2, Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) [hereinafter TFEU]. 81 Id. arts. 3–4. 82 Id. art. 6. 83 Id. art. 19. 84 Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European Community art. 6(2), Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 1, 13 [hereinafter Treaty of Lisbon]. 85 Commission Staff Working Document, Sport and Free Movement, Accompanying Document to the Communication From the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Developing the European Dimension in Sport, at 2, SEC (2011) 66 final (Jan. 18, 2011). 86 TFEU, supra note 80, art. 165. 87 Offensive Behaviour at Football and Threatening Communications (Scotland) Act, 2012, (A.S.P. 1); Football Spectators Act, 1989, c. 37, amended by Football (Offences and Disorder) Act, 1999, c.21, and Football (Disorder) Act, 2000, c. 25 (U.K.); BUNDESGESETZ ÜBER MASSNAHMEN ZUR WAHRUNG DER INNEREN WATSON GALLEYSPROOFS2 5/1/2014 9:13 AM 2013] THE DARK HEART OF EASTERN EUROPE 1071 National governments are in the best position to enact tough legislation, initiate criminal prosecutions against offenders, enforce civil penalties on clubs and supporters, police stadiums and other areas where racism and violence takes place, and monitor individuals or groups who commit acts of violence or racism by establishing national databases.88 In this regard, the United Kingdom best exemplifies the positive effects of passing legislation to comprehensively deal with acts of violence and racism committed by football supporters. In England, even star players are not immune from prosecution for engaging in racist behavior.89 During the 2011– 12 English Premier League season, John Terry, the captain of Chelsea FC and the English national team, was charged with racially-aggravated public disorder.90 This criminal charge stemmed from his alleged on-field racial abuse of Queen’s Park Rangers player Anton Ferdinand.91 This incident was a black eye for the sport, especially in England, but it illustrates how far football and public opinion has come in terms of the response to racism if one of the world’s biggest stars can be prosecuted for actions during a match. Legislation passed at the national level is most effectively enforced at the regional and local level by law enforcement, private stadium security, and the individual football clubs.92 The legislation provides a systematic framework applying uniformly to all spectators, whether they support an amateur team or top-division professional team. Local police work closely with private security firms and football clubs to set up procedures for implementing and enforcing the laws and maintaining crowd control and public safety. Proper policing and crowd-control tactics are crucial in maintaining safety at matches. A study of crowd dynamics and psychology conducted at Euro 2004 in Portugal found that the non-paramilitary policing tactics implemented by Portuguese police in host cities contributed to a “relative absence of SICHERHEIT, LOI FÉDÉRALE INSTITUANT DES MESURES VISANT AU MAINTIEN DE LA SÛRETÉ INTÉRIEURE, LEGGE FEDERALE SULLE MISURE PER LA SALVAGUARDIA DELLA SICUREZZA INTERNA [BWIS, LMSI, LMSI] [FEDERAL ACT ON MEASURES TO SAFEGUARD INTERNAL SECURITY] Mar. 21, 1997, AS 1546, RO 1546, RU 1546 (1998) (Switz.). 88 TEU, supra note 78, arts. 4–5. 89 See, e.g., Daniel Taylor, Football: Terry Quits With Broken Heart But He is No Victim: Defender Ends England Career Over FA Case, OBSERVER (LONDON), Sept. 24, 2012, at S1. 90 See R v. Terry, [2012] EWMC 12 (Magis. Ct.) 1 (Eng.). 91 Id. at 2. 92 See generally Rosander, supra note 34. WATSON GALLEYSPROOFS2 5/1/2014 9:13 AM 1072 EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27 ‘hooliganism.’”93 Despite an estimated 150,000 England supporters travelling to Portugal for the tournament, and the prevailing view that when the English travel for football “it is inevitable there will be trouble,” only one England fan was arrested in a host city for a violent offense.94 Managing and policing crowds at matches is supported by developing networks for sharing information on known or suspected hooligans. This is traditionally carried out between local or regional law enforcement within a single nation; however, the EU has developed a continental network of police cooperation with respect to hooliganism.95 Additionally, the Treaty of Lisbon has significantly expanded EU competences, which also expands the ability to facilitate policing of continent-wide events like international football matches.96 The growing involvement of the EU has led to great improvements in the exchange of information and law-enforcement coordination between EU members.97 Member states now have the ability to quickly share information needed to implement policing strategies for large sporting events, which is especially important for events attended by large amounts of people traveling from abroad.98 B. The History of British Hooliganism The term “hooligan” likely originated from the Irish surname “Houlihan” in the 1890s,99 but came into modern vernacular through media portrayals of football-related violence in the 1960s.100 During the 1960s, British stadiums became public battleground for football supporters to prove their club’s 93 Clifford Stott et al, Tackling Football Hooliganism: A Quantitative Study of Public Order, Policing and Crowd Psychology, 14 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 115, 115 (2008) (explaining that Euro 2004 is seen as one of the most successful tournaments held in Europe, in terms of security and safety). 94 Id. at 117–18 (contrasting Euro 2004 with other recent international competitions where England participated, such as the 1998 World Cup in France, Euro 2000 in Belgium and at the 2006 World Cup in Germany). 95 Council Resolution of 3 June 2010 Concerning a Handbook with Recommendations for International Police Cooperation and Measures to Prevent and Control Violence and Disturbances in Connection with Football Matches with an International Dimension, in Which at Least One Member State is Involved, 2010 O.J. (C 165) 1 (amending Council Resolution of 4 December 2006, 2006 O.J. (C 322) 1). 96 Treaty of Lisbon, supra note 84, arts. 2–6. 97 Council Resolution of 3 June 2010, Annex, 2010 O.J. (C 165) 1. 98 Id. 99 WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, UNABRIDGED 1089 (3d ed. 1971). 100 Geoff Pearson, Fig Fact-sheet Four: Hooliganism, U. LIVERPOOL’S FOOTBALL INDUSTRY GROUP, http: //www.liv.ac.uk/footballindustry/hooligan.html (last updated Dec. 2007). WATSON GALLEYSPROOFS2 5/1/2014 9:13 AM 2013] THE DARK HEART OF EASTERN EUROPE 1073 support and earn the respect of rival fans through fighting.101 A wide variety of anti-social behaviors fall within the modern definition of “hooliganism,” ranging from relatively minor offenses, like individual drunkenness, to serious violent attacks.102 Nevertheless, two specific forms of disorder are most commonly associated with football hooliganism: (a) Spontaneous and usually low level disorder caused by fans at or around football matches (the type that typically occurs at England away matches); and (b) Deliberate and intentional violence involving organised gangs (or “firms”) who attach themselves to football clubs and fight firms from other clubs, sometimes a long way in time and space from a match. 103 In the 1970s gangs of hooligans, formed based on the territory they occupied in stadiums and the neighborhoods they lived in, became a noticeable part of football culture.104 These gangs, called “firms,” combined support for their local club with tribal loyalties.105 Uniformity of attitudes and prejudices, and the use of symbols and tradition, helped shape the ideology of these firms.106 The British hooligan firm’s tribal nature, combined with political, cultural, and racial ideologies, attracted attention from the far-right wing of the political spectrum. Right-wing, nationalist organizations, like the National Front and its successor, the British National Party, were successful in recruiting members from within England’s footballing culture.107 Combat 18, a neo-Nazi group originally affiliated with the British National Party as its military branch, was especially adept at influencing hooligan firms.108 101 See Football Hooliganism, POLITICS.CO.UK, http://www.politics.co.uk/reference/football-hooliganism (last visited Nov. 14, 2012). 102 Stott et al., supra note 93, at 117. 103 Pearson, supra note 100. 104 Id. 105 Football Hooliganism, supra note 101. 106 Josef Smolik, Football Hooliganism From the Standpoint of Extremism, CENT. EUR. POL. STUD. REV. (2004), http://www.cepsr.com/clanek.php?ID=212. 107 BRETT BEBBER, VIOLENCE AND RACISM IN FOOTBALL: POLITICS AND CULTURAL CONFLICT IN BRITISH SOCIETY, 1968–1998, at 156–57 (2012); see also Smolik, supra note 106 (noting that the British National Party published a magazine, The Bulldog, which monitored English football hooligans actions, and described racist cheers). 108 Combat 18’s Hardline Racism, BBC NEWS (Apr. 19, 1999, 5:50 PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_ news/323366.stm. WATSON GALLEYSPROOFS2 5/1/2014 9:13 AM 1074 EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27 The British hooligan problem reached a tipping point in the 1980s when teams traveled to continental Europe for matches.109 In 1985, Liverpool progressed to the final of the European Cup in Brussels, Belgium to face the Italian club Juventus.110 The Heysel Stadium, Belgium’s national stadium, hosted the match despite being in a state of disrepair and both clubs calling for a different stadium to host the match.111 In the hours leading up to kick-off, Liverpool and Juventus supporters threw projectiles at each other over the fence separating the two groups.112 When Liverpool fans rushed at the retreating Juventus fans, a human crush occurred against an aging concrete wall, which caused the wall to collapse—killing thirty-nine and injuring over 300.113 The Heysel disaster cemented the bad reputation of English fans and the concept of the “English disease” in the minds of continental Europeans. UEFA responded by banning all English clubs from European competitions for five years.114 Then, in 1989, four years after the Heysel disaster, another catastrophe involving Liverpool fans occurred, causing a push for the reforms and legislation that continues to shape the sport.115 Hillsborough, the home stadium of Sheffield Wednesday, hosted the FA Cup semi-final match between Liverpool and Nottingham Forest.116 A dangerous crush developed outside the turnstiles where the Liverpool fans had to enter.117 This forced the South Yorkshire Police to open a “number of side gates to allow the crowd into the 109 See generally BILL BUFORD, AMONG THE THUGS (1990) (providing an anecdotal account of the destructive, alcohol-fueled behavior of traveling football supporters across Europe). 110 DAVID GOLDBLATT, THE BALL IS ROUND: A GLOBAL HISTORY OF SOCCER 543–45 (2006). 111 Id. at 544. 112 GOLDBLATT, supra note 110, at 544 (noting that unlike other stadium disasters, which could be blamed on poor stadium infrastructure, inadequate policing or crowd control, one of the major causes of the disaster at Heysel was the behavior of the Liverpool fans). 113 Id. at 543–44. Despite the deadly events before kick-off, UEFA officials and the match referee decided not to abandon the match and Juventus went on to win the European Cup 1-0. Id. at 544–45. 114 Stott et al., supra note 102, at 116. Although no official inquest was conducted into the events at Heysel, “it was understood . . . to have been caused by English hooligans.” Id. 115 Goldblatt, supra note 110, at 546 (describing the Hillsborough disaster as the “low point” of English football). See PHIL SCRATON, HILLSBOROUGH: THE TRUTH (1997), for an in-depth look at the disaster and the subsequent (and still ongoing), proceedings for justice for the victims and their families. See generally THE DAY OF THE HILLSBOROUGH DISASTER: A NARRATIVE ACCOUNT (Rogan Taylor et al. eds., 1995) (narrating the personal accounts of people present at Hillsborough on the day of the disaster, rescue workers, and the families of the victims). 116 Goldblatt, supra note 110, at 599. 117 Id. WATSON GALLEYSPROOFS2 5/1/2014 9:13 AM 2013] THE DARK HEART OF EASTERN EUROPE 1075 stadium.”118 The police did this without informing the stadium stewards inside the West Stand (Leppings Lane End).119 Without stewards to evenly disperse people among the terrace’s four standing-room-only pens, an even more severe crush formed inside the middle two pens.120 Liverpool fans tried to climb the fence, but the police, conditioned to respond to hooliganism, fought to keep the supporters off the field.121 The Hillsborough disaster claimed the lives of ninety-six Liverpool supporters and injured 766 others, as the rest of England watched the events unfold live on television.122 The media and police quickly moved to blame hooligans for rioting, with The Sun notoriously proclaiming on its cover the next morning: “THE TRUTH: Some fans picked pockets on victims; Some fans urinated on the brave cops; Some fans beat up PC giving kiss of life.”123 The reputation of the British hooligan held by police, and not actual hooliganism itself, was a direct cause of disaster.124 In the aftermath of the disaster, the British government appointed Lord Peter Taylor, a judge on the Court of Appeals of England and Wales, to head the Hillsborough Stadium Disaster Inquiry Report (“Taylor Report”) to investigate the causes and influencing factors in an attempt to prevent future tragedies.125 The Taylor Report was presented to Parliament in January 1990 118 See Goldblatt, supra note 110, at 599–601. Over 25,000 Liverpool supporters had tickets to enter through the Leppings Lane end—serviced by only 23 turnstiles-while the rest of the stadium had triple the number of turnstiles for a capacity of 29. Id. 119 Id. 120 Id. at 600 (explaining how the design of the Leppings Lane End’s terminals caused most Liverpool fans to go directly down the tunnel into the middle two pens of the terrace.). 121 Id. (“[T]he game . . . kicked-off [as planned] but was abandoned after six minutes . . . .”). 122 Justice For The 96, LIVERPOOL FC, http://www.liverpoolfc.com/history/hillsborough (last visited Nov. 14, 2012). 123 See THE SUN (London), Apr. 19, 1989, at 1. The acronym “PC” stands for police constable and “kiss of life” refers to CPR. This headline, and The Sun’s subsequent coverage of the Hillsborough disaster, led to a boycott of the paper, and many Liverpudlians still refuse to buy The Sun. See Touch Luck, Kelvin: Former Sun Editor Will NOT Receive an Apology Over His Hillsborough ‘Suffering,’ MIRROR NEWS (Sept. 27, 2012, 8:07 PM), http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/uk-news/kelvin-mackenzie-will-not-receive-hillsborough-1347485. 124 Goldblatt, supra note 110, at 600–01 (“It . . . was not the responsibility of the violent and drunken dregs of the working classes but directly stemmed from the grotesque assumptions and beliefs of the police, and from the neglect and disdain of the football and political elites who had come to view football supporters as pack animals and rabid dogs.”). 125 HOME OFFICE, THE HILLSBOROUGH STADIUM DISASTER, 15 APRIL 1989, INQUIRY BY THE RT HON LORD JUSTICE TAYLOR, FINAL REPORT, 1990, Cm. 962, at 1, 15 (U.K.) [hereinafter TAYLOR REPORT] WATSON GALLEYSPROOFS2 5/1/2014 9:13 AM 1076 EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27 and laid the majority of the blame on the South Yorkshire Police and its commanding officers for the failure to manage the crowd and respond properly to the situation.126 The Football Spectators Act of 1989 outlawed standing-room-only areas and required every stadium of a specified size to be an all-seater.127 This is a major contributing factor to the considerable decrease of violence inside British stadiums.128 While there are still hooligan firms associated with football clubs and isolated instances of racism at matches, the widespread disorder of the 1960s through the 1980s seems to be overcome. C. Hooliganism in Eastern Europe The prevalence of football-related disorder may have diminished in the United Kingdom, but the destructive weekend pastime made popular by British hooligans spread to continental Europe. For instance, in Italy and Spain, the problem of football-related violence and racism remains a part of football.129 Paralleling the two specific forms of football hooliganism found during its peak in the United Kingdom,130 Eastern European hooliganism developed in the same manner.131 European football has seen an increasing numbers of black and minority players in the elite European leagues.132 However, many clubs still face problems of racist abuse directed at players and other fans from elements of their supporters.133 Italian “ultras” are one of the most visible examples of British-style hooligan behavior affecting European football today.134 The ultras create an (recommending converting all the stadiums with standing-room-only terraces into all-seater stadiums, and the removal of perimeter fencing and pens from the terraces). 126 See id. para. 243, at 42. 127 see id. para. 84, at 15; see generally Football Spectators Act, 1989, c. 37 (U.K.). 128 Football Hooliganism, supra note 100. 129 Wynn, supra note 30, at 313–14, 318. 130 Pearson, supra note 104. 131 Smolik, supra note 106 (noting that hooliganism in the Czech Republic started with disorganized instances of football-related violence before becoming more organized with the development of hooligan firms). 132 BEBBER, supra note 107, at 205. 133 Phil Minshull, Colour Barrier Finally Broken at Athletic Bilbao, BBC: PHIL MINSHULL’S BLOG (Dec. 16, 2009, 6:30 AM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/philminshull/2009/12/colour_barrier_finally_broken.html. 134 See GOLDBLATT, supra note 110, at 554–57 (noting that by the mid-1980’s every professional and nearly every semi-professional club in Italy had an ultra group). WATSON GALLEYSPROOFS2 5/1/2014 9:13 AM 2013] THE DARK HEART OF EASTERN EUROPE 1077 atmosphere that is visually and audibly amazing, but incidents of serious disorder caused by the ultras force many clubs to play matches “behind closed doors,” and are likely the reason Italy’s bid to host the 2012 European Championships was not accepted.135 In April 2012, Italian Olympic Committee President Giovanni Petrucci described Italy’s football crisis as “beyond the point of no return” after an incident during a Serie A match between Genoa and Siena where fans threw fireworks and small bombs onto the field during play.136 Some of the world’s fiercest sporting rivalries are found in Eastern Europe. In Poland, the Kraków derby, called the “Holy War,” pits Wisła Kraków against Cracovia, two teams whose respective stadiums are 500 meters apart.137 Annually, local authorities “spend around 150,000 złoty, or around €35,000, scrubbing Kraków’s walls clean of the racist or anti-Semitic graffiti.”138 In addition, some consider the 1990 match between Dinamo Zagreb and Red Star Belgrade at Maksimirska Stadium to be the catalyst of the Yugoslav War, when Serbian fans of Red Star Belgrade fought the Croatian Dinamo Zagreb fans, as well as the Serbian-controlled Yugoslav police force.139 As shown in the Panorama program, Polish and Ukrainian ultra groups are given carte blanche to say and do as they please inside the stadiums.140 Similar to what happened in the United Kingdom with the British National Party and the National Front,141 “an aggressive, desperate nationalism, particularly in the 135 Pearson, supra note 100. 136 Genoa Soccer Fans Hold Match Hostage, Demand Players to Take Off Uniforms, NEW YORK DAILY NEWS (Apr. 23, 2012, 10:34 AM), http://articles.nydailynews.com/2012-04-23/news/31388428_1_serbian- fans-siena-ban. The disorder of the Genoa supporters forced the referee to abandon the match after 45 minutes with Siena leading 4-0. Id. Genoa players tried to appease the ultras “by removing their shirts to acknowledge they weren’t worthy of wearing them.” Id. 137 Euro 2012: Stadiums of Hate, supra note 1; The Beautiful Game?, HOPE NOT HATE (June 2, 2012), http://www.hopenothate.org.uk/the-beautiful-game/. 138 Christian Cummins, A More Tolerant Poland: While Racism is Real, Activists Say “That’s not how we see ourselves,” VIENNA REVIEW (July 3, 2012), http://www.viennareview.net/news/front-page/a-more-tolerant- poland. 139 Dan Ripley, Croatia v Serbia... Now This is What You Call a Rivalry! Duo Clash for First Time Since War, with 1,500 Police Ready Despite Ban on Away Fans, DAILY MAIL (Mar. 22, 2013, 3:45 AM), http:// www.dailymail.co.uk/sport/football/article-2297037/Croatia-Serbia-clash-time-Yugoslav-war-1-500-police- deployed-despite-ban-away-fans.html. 140 Euro 2012: Stadiums of Hate, supra note 1; see also Pearson, supra note 104 (explaining that, compared with the U.K., where disorder in and around stadiums is now rare, the countries in Eastern Europe all frequently face problems with hooliganism inside stadiums). 141 See generally BEBBER, supra note 107, at 147–74. WATSON GALLEYSPROOFS2 5/1/2014 9:13 AM 1078 EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27 ‘liberated’ Eastern European states” is growing in size and popularity, and right-wing groups are recruiting members from among the ultra groups of football clubs.142 Another problem related to hooliganism seeming to disproportionately affect Eastern Europe is pre-arranged fights between rival ultra groups, known as “ustawki.”143 These fights take place in secluded areas where police cannot find and prevent the altercations.144 While visiting the Ukrainian city of Kharkiv, BBC correspondent Chris Rogers met with the Patriots of Ukraine, a group of nationalist ultras who support the club Metalist Kharkiv.145 Vadim, a recruiter for the Patriots, told Rogers he recruits from the football terraces because in post-Soviet Ukraine, “right-wing politics and hooliganism have gone hand-in-hand.”146 Rogers accompanied Vadim to Metalist Stadium, where he witnessed the Metalist fans giving the Nazi salute and chanting “Zeig Heil.”147 Vadim also took Rogers into the Ukrainian forest to a secret training camp where the Patriots train recruits in hand-to-hand combat tactics and weapons skills.148 Studies on xenophobic violence conducted by the non-profit group Human Rights First also show an increase in racially-motivated violence, revealing that Ukraine had a dramatic increase in racist violence in the first four months of 2011, a total already greater than the entire 2010 calendar year.149 Despite these statistics, Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych downplayed the amount of hooligans in his country in the lead up to Euro 2012,150 even though 142 See Euro 2012:Stadium of Hate, supra note 1. 143 Football: Euro 2012 Spotlights East European Hooliganism, EUBUSINESS.COM (June 15, 2012, 11:12 AM), http://www.eubusiness.com/news-eu/security-racism-fbl.h63. 144 Donal MacIntyre, Football Firms Tool Up for War, SUNDAY WORLD (June 4, 2012), http://www. sundayworld.com/top-stories/crime-desk/donal-macintyre-s-crime-cafe/football-firms-tool-up-for-war. 145 Euro 2012: Stadiums of Hate, supra note 1. The Patriots of Ukraine do not identify as neo-Nazi or Nazi, but do support “some positive aspects” of Nazism “because Germany would not be Germany right now without Adolf Hitler.” Id. 146 Id.; see also HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, UKRAINE: 2008 HATE CRIME STUDY 1 (2008), http://www. humanrightsfirst.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/fd-080924-ukraine-web.pdf [hereinafter UKRAINE HATE CRIME STUDY]. “A burgeoning movement of skinheads continues to be responsible for the most violent hate crimes.” Id. 147 Euro 2012: Stadiums of Hate, supra note 1. 148 Id. (noting that one Patriot recruit admitted to Rogers that the tactics learned at the training camps have been used in attacks on the streets). 149 COMBATTING XENOPHOBIC VIOLENCE, supra note 21, at 24. 150 Ukraine’s President Downplays Euro 2012 Racism Fears, BBC (May 31, 2012), http://www.bbc.co. uk/news/world-europe-18286941. President Yanukovych said his country’s problem with hooliganism is “smaller” than in other countries, and that his country has a list of people who participate in anti-social behavior at matches, but “[t]heir numbers are tiny.” Id. WATSON GALLEYSPROOFS2 5/1/2014 9:13 AM 2013] THE DARK HEART OF EASTERN EUROPE 1079 immigrants and minorities continue to be vulnerable to racially-motivated attacks.151 Although President Yanukovych condemned racist violence when the study was first published, his statements before Euro 2012 seem to show him backtracking from that stance.152 During Euro 2012, some of the most violent incidents surrounded the Poland-Russia match.153 The Russian fans marched in Warsaw to celebrate Russia Day prior to the match, which the Polish government permitted, despite some Poles considering it “a provocation, given the historic animosity” between the two countries.154 This intense rivalry aside, violence in Poland during Euro 2012 had the potential to be worse. However, since most hardcore Polish hooligans solely affiliate with a club, they do not have a real interest in supporting or causing disorder around Polish national team matches.155 As the global economic crisis continues to ravage European nations, the membership and popularity nationalist and far-right organizations is increasing.156 In Greece, the neo-Nazi political party Golden Dawn recently won eighteen seats in the Greek Parliament and claims to count more than half of the Greek police force as supporters.157 This neo-Nazi and fascist movement has already shown its influence in the world of football. On March 16, 2013, AEK Athens midfielder Giorgos Katidis celebrated scoring the winning goal for his team by removing his shirt and giving the Nazi salute to supporters.158 The Greek Football Federation quickly responded by banning the 20-year old 151 UKRAINE HATE CRIME STUDY, supra note 146, at 1. Collection of hate crime data in Ukraine is hampered because the government does not collect this type of data, meaning figures are likely higher because many violent attacks are not reported to the nongovernmental monitoring groups. Id. 152 Id. at 11. The study is critical of the Ukrainian government officials who deny the problems of race- related violence. Id. at 1. 153 Euro 2012: Russia Blames Poles for Football Clashes, BBC (June 13, 2012, 6:32 PM), http://www. bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-18421824; Football: Euro 2012 Spotlights East European Hooliganism, supra note 147. 154 Id. (noting that 157 Polish and 24 Russians were arrested, and between 11 and 24 injuries were reported, as police used tear gas, rubber bullets and water cannons to disperse the crowds). 155 Football: Euro 2012 Spotlights East European Hooliganism, supra note 147. Warsaw expert, Janusz Czapinski, stated that if club hooligans did mobilize for Euro 2012, “the 6,000 police officers deployed in the capital wouldn’t have been enough and the situation would have been far more serious.” 156 Maria Margaronis, Fear and Loathing in Athens: The Rise of Golden Dawn and the Far Right, GUARDIAN (Oct. 26, 2012), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/oct/26/golden-dawn-greece-far-right? intcmp=239. 157 Id, 158 AEK Athens Suspend Giorgos Katidis for Rest of Season Over Nazi Salute, GUARDIAN (Mar. 20, 2013, 8:02 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/football/2013/mar/20/aek-suspend-giorgos-katidis-nazi-salute. WATSON GALLEYSPROOFS2 5/1/2014 9:13 AM 1080 EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27 Katidis from any Greek national team for life.159 This is a concern for Eastern Europe because the rise of these groups will further entrench the influence and violent tactics of these groups into society. Greek football should be commended for acting quickly in response to this outrageous display, but as this conduct becomes more frequent, a legal framework is required. D. Criminal Codes of Poland and Ukraine This Subpart presents the available punishments and sentencing guidelines in Polish and Ukrainian criminal law applicable to hooliganism and football- related disorder. Both the Polish and Ukrainian codes are broad and allow for prosecutorial and judicial discretion.160 This discretion factors in when discussing the lack of control over hooligans. Broader laws can lead to less guidance for law enforcement, more sentencing discretion, and reluctance from prosecutors in bringing certain charges.161 Creating football-specific offenses with strong penalties would benefit society by increasing minimum sentences for offenders and showing potential offenders the severity of the consequences. On June 6, 1997, the current Polish Criminal Code, in its current form, was approved by the two houses of Parliament and entered into force in September 1998.162 There are five basic punishments under the Code; “[t]hree of them consist of the deprivation of liberty but for different terms . . . . The other two types of punishment are limitation of liberty and a fine.”163 The Criminal Code lists the penalties in ascending order of gravity: (1) fines; (2) limitation of liberty; (3) deprivation of liberty for a fixed term; (4) deprivation of liberty for twenty-five years; and (5) deprivation of liberty for life.164 “A fine is meant as 159 Graham Wood, Midfielder Katidis Penalised Further for Nazi Salute, REUTERS, Apr. 5, 2013, available at http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/04/05/uk-soccer-greece-katidis-nazi-idUKBRE9340F1201304 05 (“AEK Athens footballer Giorgos Katidis is disqualified for five matches, banned from entering sports stadia for three months and is ordered to pay a fine of €1,000 due to the incidents in the Super League match AEK-Veria.”) Giorgos Katidis transferred to “Serie B side Novara” after AEK Athens released him. Ben Gladwell, Katidis to Make Most of Novara Chance, ESPNFC (July 18, 2013), http://espnfc.com/news/story/_/ id/1501577/katidis-make-most-novara-chance?cc=5901. 160 Kodeks Karny [K.K.] [Penal Code of 06 June 1997] art. 53–63, Dz.U. 1997 Nr. 88, Poz. 553, at 2682– 83 (Pol.); KRYMINAL´NYÏ KODEKS UKRAÏNY [KK UA] [Criminal Code] art. 5 (Ukr.). 161 KRYMINAL´NYÏ KODEKS UKRAÏNY [KK UA] [Criminal Code] art. 67, 161 (Ukr.); see also UKRAINE HATE CRIME STUDY, supra note 148, at 14 (implying that they could be prosecuting under different code provisions that are not specifically related to racial discrimination); see also Stanisław Frankowski, Criminal Law, in INTRODUCTION TO POLISH LAW 340, 349–50 (Stanisław Frankowski ed., 2010); cf. Kodeks Karny [K.K.] [Penal Code] art. 53–63, at 2682–83 (Pol.). 162 Kodeks Karny [K.K.] [Penal Code] (Pol.); see also Frankowski, supra note 161, at 350. 163 Frankowski, supra note 161, at 359; Kodeks Karny [K.K.] [Penal Code] art. 32 (Pol.). 164 See Frankowski, supra note 161, at 358–59; Kodeks Karny [K.K.] [Penal Code] art. 60, §§ 1–5 (Pol.). WATSON GALLEYSPROOFS2 5/1/2014 9:13 AM 2013] THE DARK HEART OF EASTERN EUROPE 1081 the penalty of choice except in the case of the commissions of felonies. Thus[,] it is provided for most crimes, almost invariably in conjunction with the penalty of deprivation of liberty.”165 Additionally, courts may impose a fine as a “separate penalty when a court has refrained from imposing the penalty of deprivation of liberty or decided to apply extraordinary mitigation of the penalty.”166 In addition to the five penalties found in Article 32, Article 39 provides penal measures applicable to certain convictions and sentences, such as redressing the damage caused, and compensatory or monetary damages.167 The Polish code does not explicitly mention hooliganism, but does have broad provisions criminalizing organized groups or associations that are against any other person or group based on their nationality, ethnicity, or religion for criminal purposes.168 The Code is specific with respect to discrimination and promotion of criminal acts, containing numerous articles criminalizing discrimination based on religion, race and ethnicity, and inciting crime.169 While the Code contains specific laws related to discriminatory crimes, the sentences for these crimes merely can be a small fine or restriction of liberty.170 The most penal of all sentences in the Polish Code is reserved for offenders convicted of war crimes, crime against peace, or crimes against humanity based on the victim’s national, ethnic, political or religious beliefs, where the offender can be sentenced to deprivation of liberty for a time of twenty-five years to life, but no less than twelve years.171 The Criminal Code of Ukraine, enacted on September 1, 2001, while a longer code than the Polish Penal Code and containing specific articles with 165 Frankowski, supra note 161, at 361. 166 Id. (citing Kodeks Karny [K.K.] [Penal Code] art. 60, § 6 (Pol.). In all of these situations, a fine is clearly meant as an alternative to short- and mid-term imprisonment. In addition, a fine may also be imposed along with deprivation of liberty for a fixed term if an offender committed a crime with the purpose of obtaining a material benefit or had obtained such a benefit. One of the most interesting innovations of the code allows a judge to suspend conditionally the implementation of an adjudged fine. Id. (citing Kodeks Karny [K.K.] [Penal Code] art. 69, § 1, at 2684.) 167 Kodeks Karny [K.K.] [Penal Code] art. 39, §§ (5)–(7) (Pol.); Frankowski, supra note 161, at 361. 168 See generally Kodeks Karny [K.K.] [Penal Code] arts. 252–59 (Pol.). 169 Kodeks Karny [K.K.] [Penal Code] arts. 118–19, 194–96, 256–58 (Pol.) (regarding crimes against freedom of conscience and religion). 170 See generally id. arts. 119, 194–96, 255–57. 171 Id. arts. 118–19. WATSON GALLEYSPROOFS2 5/1/2014 9:13 AM 1082 EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27 respect to hooliganism offenses,172 critically lacks provisions related to discrimination and crime based on religion or race.173 Article 51 sets out the twelve forms of punishment the court can impose for criminal convictions:174 (1) fines;175 (2) revocation of military or special title, rank, grade or qualification class; (3) deprivation of right to occupy certain positions or engage in certain activities;176 (4) community service; (5) correctional labor; (6) service restrictions for military servants; (7) forfeiture of property; (8) arrest;177 (9) restraint of liberty;178 (10) custody of military servants in a penal battalion; (11) imprisonment for determinate term;179 and (12) life imprisonment.180 Additionally, there are four grades of criminal punishment in Ukraine, based on the gravity of the offense: (1) minor offenses are punishable by imprisonment for a term up to two years or a more lenient penalty; (2) medium offenses call for imprisonment up to five years; (3) grave offenses for a prison term up to ten years; and (4) special grave offenses are punishable by ten or more years to life imprisonment.181 The Code also defines thirteen aggravating circumstances that the court can consider for increasing the sentence, but those are the only aggravating factors the court can take into account.182 172 KRYMINAL´NYÏ KODEKS UKRAÏNY [KK UA] [Criminal Code] art. 296 (Ukr.). 173 See KRYMINAL´NYÏ KODEKS UKRAÏNY [KK UA] [Criminal Code] arts. 67, 161 (Ukr.). 174 Id. art. 51 (defining the forms of punishment in arts. 53–64). 175 KRYMINAL´NYÏ KODEKS UKRAÏNY [KK UA] [Criminal Code] art. 53 (Ukr.). Fines are determined by the court depending on the gravity of the crime and property status of the guilty person, ranging from 30 to 1,000 TFMI, “unless a larger amount of a fine is prescribed by articles of the Special Part of this Code.” Id. 176 Id. art. 55. (This punishment can be imposed as the principle penalty for a term of “two to five years” or as additional punishment for a term of “one to three years.”). 177 Id. art. 60. Arrest is defined as “holding a convicted person in custody” for a term of one to six months. Id. 178 Id. art. 61. “[R]estraint of liberty consists [of] holding a person in an open penitentiary institution without isolation from the society but under supervision and with compulsory engagement of the convicted person in work[]” for a term of one to five years. Id. 179 Id. art. 63 (“Imprisonment shall be imposed for a term of one to fifteen years.”). 180 Id. art. 64. Only imposed for special grave offenses and where specifically provided for by this Code, “where a court does not find it possible to impose imprisonment for a determinate term.” Id. 181 Id. art. 12. 182 Id. art. 67. Defining the aggravating circumstances as: (1) [R]epetition of an offense or recidivism; (2) commission of an offense by a group of persons upon prior conspiracy; (3) commission of an offense based on racial, national or religious enmity and hostility; (4) commission of an offense in connection with the discharge of official or public duty by the victim; (5) grave consequences caused by the offense; (6) commission of an offense against a minor, an elderly or helpless person; (7) commission of an offense against a woman who, to the knowledge of the culprit, was pregnant; (8) commission of an offense against a person who was in a financial, official or other dependence on the culprit; (9) commission of an WATSON GALLEYSPROOFS2 5/1/2014 9:13 AM 2013] THE DARK HEART OF EASTERN EUROPE 1083 Ukraine only has two applicable articles specifically relating to racial or religious discrimination crimes, other than the mention of race and religion in the aggravating circumstances found in Article 67.183 Article 161 criminalizes willful actions inciting hatred, restricting rights, or granting privilege based on race, nationality, or religion.184 If that action also includes violence or threats185 or is done by a group or the act causes grave consequences,186 the penalties are enhanced. It is also a criminal act to import, make, or distribute works promoting violence and cruelty, and racial, national, or religious intolerance and discrimination.187 These provisions are hardly sufficient to deal with the rising racial and religious violence in Ukraine. The violent or group-related criminal offenses in Ukraine, in addition to providing more specific and defined statutory language, also have more severe minimum sentences for convicted individuals. Whereas the penalty in Poland would fall within a range of a month to a few years in prison, Ukrainian offenses generally start at a year to an amount greater than ten years.188 Additionally, Ukraine’s Criminal Code covers: (1) creating criminal organizations; (2) gangsterism; (3) unlawful paramilitaries; and (4) group violation of public order.189 offense through the use of a minor, a person of unsound mind or mentally defective person; (10) commission of an especially violent offense; (11) commission of an offense by taking advantage of a martial law or a state of emergency or other extraordinary events; (12) commission of an offense by a generally dangerous method; (13) commission of an offense by a person in a state of intoxication resulting from the use of alcohol, narcotic, or any other intoxicating substances. Id. 183 Id. art. 67, 161. 184 Id. art. 161. The Code states: Willful actions inciting national, racial or religious enmity and hatred, humiliation of national honor and dignity, or the insult of citizens’ feelings in respect to their religious convictions, and also any direct or indirect restriction of rights, or granting direct or indirect privileges to citizens based on race, color of skin, political, religious and other convictions, sex, ethnic and social origin, property status, place of residence, linguistic or other characteristics . . . are punishable by a fine of 50 times the maximum income. Id. 185 Id. This offense is “punishable by correctional labor for a term up to two years, or imprisonment for a term up to five years.” 186 Id. This offense is “punishable by imprisonment for a term of two to five years.” 187 Id. art. 300. 188 Compare id. art. 294 (penalty for rioting is a term of five to eight years imprisonment, and eight to fifteen years if the rioting results in death of a person), with Kodeks Karny [K.K.] [Penal Code of 06 June 1997] art. 254, § 2, Dz.U. 1997 Nr. 88, Poz. 553, at 2705 (Pol.) (penalties for rioting are imprisonment up to three years, or between three months and five years if the rioting results in the death of a person). 189 KRYMINAL´NYÏ KODEKS UKRAÏNY [KK UA] [Criminal Code] arts. 255, 257, 260, 293 (Ukr.). WATSON GALLEYSPROOFS2 5/1/2014 9:13 AM 1084 EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27 Article 296 specifically criminalizes hooliganism, defining it as a “serious disturbance of the public order based on motives of explicit disrespect to community in a most outrageous or exceptionally cynical manner.”190 The aggravating factors of this offense include whether: (1) a group committed this action; (2) the individual resisted authority; (3) the individual has a previous hooliganism conviction; (4) a firearm was used in the commission of this act; and (5) there was a prior intent to cause bodily harm.191 E. Britain’s Legal Response to Hooliganism This article presents three measures the governments of Poland and Ukraine can implement to help battle hooliganism and stop violence and racism related to football. The Panorama documentary brought the existence of the problem to the public but did not provide any possible solutions. This Article intends to answer the question of what needs to happen before minority players and fans can feel safe at football stadiums in Eastern Europe. In the United Kingdom, statutes authorizing severe restrictions on convicted and suspected hooligans are crucial tools for law enforcement in combating racism and violence related to football.192 The stadium disasters at Heysel and Hillsborough forced Parliament to act swiftly, which it did by passing laws restricting the travel of known hooligans, banning them from stadiums and associating with football clubs, and establishing strict criminal sanctions for those charged with hooliganism and related offenses.193 Part II of this Article discusses banning orders and travel bans created by the British Parliament with the passing of the Football Spectators Act of 1989,194 the Football (Offenses and Disorder) Act of 1999,195 and the Football 190 Id. art. 296. Hooliganism is “punishable by a fine in the amount of five-hundred to one-thousand non- taxable minimum incomes . . . or by arrest for a term up to six months, or by restriction of freedom for a term up to five years.” COMMENT: need consistent use of TFMI abbreviation and numbers 191 Id. 192 Stott et al., supra note 97, at 116. 193 Football (Disorder) Act, 2000, c. 25 (amending Football Spectators Act, 1989, c. 37 (U.K.)); Football (Offenses and Disorder) Act, 1999, c. 21 (amending Football Spectators Act, 1989, c. 37 (U.K.)); Football Spectators Act, 1989, c. 37, amended by Football (Offenses and Disorder) Act, 1999, c. 21, and Football (Disorder) Act, 2000, c. 25 (U.K.). 194 Football Spectators Act, 1989, c. 37, amended by Football (Offenses and Disorder) Act, 1999, c. 21, and Football (Disorder) Act, 2000, c. 25 (U.K.). 195 Football (Offenses and Disorder) Act, 1999, c. 21 (U.K.) (amending Football Spectators Act, 1989, c. 37 (U.K.)). WATSON GALLEYSPROOFS2 5/1/2014 9:13 AM 2013] THE DARK HEART OF EASTERN EUROPE 1085 (Disorder) Act of 2000.196 These statutes created banning orders for football- related disorder, giving the government a powerful tool against individuals who engage in or promote violence at football matches.197 Due to football’s importance in European culture and to its society, these banning orders are seen as a major deterrence to all but the most hardened of hooligans.198 This Article argues that if Poland and Ukraine modeled its laws on those passed in the United Kingdom, they could decrease the number of convicted and known hooligans inside football stadiums, consequently removing the disorder hooligans tend to cause. In Scotland, hooliganism is primarily connected to the historical religious affiliation of each club, which leads to a unique form of sectarian violence more akin to Northern Ireland or Israel than the violence of English football hooligans.199 In Glasgow, Scotland’s largest city, sectarianism is so prevalent and heated that most bars, pubs, and restaurants prohibit patrons from wearing “football colors.”200 To combat these sectarian troubles plaguing football, especially in the rivalry between the two Glaswegian clubs, the Scottish Parliament revamped its restrictions on hate speech and chanting related to race and religion.201 Part III argues that Poland and Ukraine should adopt legislation like the Offensive Behaviour at Football and Threatening Communications (Scotland) 196 Football (Disorder) Act, 2000, c. 25 (amending Football Spectators Act, 1989, c. 37 (U.K.)). 197 Ryan, supra note 39, at 273 (arguing that banning orders are “effective tool[s] because it allows [for] the removal of an offending fan from soccer stadiums for an extended period of time, whereby he or she will no longer be capable of inciting spectator racism inside the stadium.”) 198 See Geoff Pearson, Qualifying for Europe? The Legitimacy of Football Banning Orders ‘On Complaint’ under the Principle of Proportionality, 3 EUR. SPORTS L.J., at 1, 1 (2005). 199 See GOLDBLATT, supra note 110, at 69–70, 187; see also Amos Bershad, How Soccer Explains Israel: Jerusalem’s FC Beitar Signed Two Muslim Players from Russia in February and-Intentionally or Not-Stirred a National Controversy, GRANTLAND.COM (Mar. 19, 2013), http://www.grantland.com/story/_/id/9066752/ jerusalem-fc-beitar-signed-two-muslim-players-russia-february-stirred-national-controversy. Before it signed two Chechnyan-born Muslim players, Beitar Jerusalem FC was the last Israeli Premier League club to sign an Arab player. Beitar supporters responded by creating a banner, “in a surreal echo of Nazi terminology: ‘Beitar Will Be Pure Forever,’” and later fans set fire to the office of the building superintendent at Beitar’s team headquarters. Id. 200 See DUNCAN ADAMS, THE ESSENTIAL SCOTTISH FOOTBALL FAN: THE DEFINITIVE GUIDE TO SCOTTISH GROUNDS 5 (2004). 201 Football Ban Orders Take Effect, BBC NEWS (Aug. 29, 2006), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/ scotland/5293288.stm. WATSON GALLEYSPROOFS2 5/1/2014 9:13 AM 1086 EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27 Act of 2012202 to allow the government to prosecute and punish individuals who speak publically with the intent to incite racial or religious violence.203 Beginning with the Taylor Report in 1990, policing and crowd-control tactics used by British police drastically changed.204 A spectator at a British stadium does not see heavily armed, paramilitary-style police with muzzled German Shepherds, like those Chris Rogers encountered in Poland and Ukraine. This heavy-handed, intimidating style of policing is no longer utilized in the United Kingdom and is beginning to be replaced by less intrusive, more efficient crowd-control methods.205 Better communication, cooperation, and the sharing of information on known hooligans also helps law enforcement monitor and enforce anti-hooligan legislation. Part IV of this article argues that Poland and Ukraine should adopt these more modern policing tactics in order to decrease tensions between supporters and police, which will result in less incidents of violence in and around football stadiums. II. BANNING ORDERS AND TRAVEL BANS The U.K. Government-led approach to preventing football violence was highly successful during Euro 2004. The U.K. strategy based on tough legislation, effective co-ordination and supporter empowerment is proving effective and is to be commended. —Lars-Christer Olsson, Chief Executive of UEFA 206 A. British Banning Order Legislation The United Kingdom has an extensive record of enacting legislation to regulate pubic-disorder offenses, but during the 1980s the statutes in place 202 Offensive Behaviour at Football and Threatening Communications (Scotland) Act, 2012, (A.S.P. 1). 203 See id. § 6. The Act was pushed through Scottish Parliament as an “emergency bill,” showing the urgency felt by MP’s, their constituents, and those in football. Scottish Parliament Justice Committee, Offensive Behaviour at Football and Threatening Communications (Scotland) Bill: Justice Committee Scrutiny, http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/parliamentarybusiness/CurrentCommittees/31384.aspx (last visited Nov. 14, 2012). 204 See TAYLOR REPORT, supra note 125. 205 See id. at 48–49. 206 HOME OFFICE, FOOTBALL (DISORDER ACT) 2000, IMPACT OF MEASURES INTRODUCED BY THE 2000 ACT (AND ASSOCIATED FOOTBALL DISORDER STRATEGY), REPORT, 2005-3, 8.10 (U.K.) [hereinafter IMPACT OF MEASURES INTRODUCED BY THE 2000 ACT]. WATSON GALLEYSPROOFS2 5/1/2014 9:13 AM 2013] THE DARK HEART OF EASTERN EUROPE 1087 proved insufficient to control the increase of violent football hooliganism.207 To better react to and combat hooliganism, Parliament passed the Football Spectators Acts of 1989 with the goal of curbing disorderly behavior at football matches.208 The 1989 Act established a national membership scheme for supporters in England and Wales requiring fans to register so the government can track and monitor who went to matches to better identify individuals who commit acts of disorder.209 Under this law, restriction orders can be ordered by the Crown Court for any individual convicted of a relevant offense set out in Section 22 of the Act.210 The court customizes each banning order on a case-by-case basis and sets the length of the ban for a period between three and ten years.211 A breach of the order is punishable by a maximum sentence of 6 months in prison.212 The 1989 Act also called for the national licensing of stadiums that want to hold football matches.213 207 See Public Order Act, 1936, 1 Edw. 8 & 1 Geo. 6, c. 6 (U.K.); Public Order Act, 1986, c. 64 (U.K.); see also Greenfield & Osborn, supra note 24, at 324–25. The Public Order Act of 1936 was enacted to control issues relating to fascist marching in the 1930’s, while the Public Order Act of 1986 was “aimed at minor acts of hooliganism.” Id. 208 Football Spectators Act, 1989, c. 37, amended by Football (Offenses and Disorder) Act, 1999, c. 21, and Football (Disorder) Act, 2000, c. 25 (U.K.); TAYLOR REPORT, supra note 125, at 58 (stating that breaking the link between football and hooliganism was the main objective for passing the 1989 Act); see also IMPACT OF MEASURES INTRODUCED BY THE 2000 ACT, supra note 206, para. 9.8. This report listed eight reasons why this line of legislation continues to be the cornerstone of the U.K.’s multi-agency approach to controlling hooliganism: (1) prevent known problem fans from traveling to matches overseas; (2) provide a tool for preventing repeat disorder; (3) deter football related misbehaviour generally; (4) empower genuine fans and help provide a climate in which they can take responsibility for their behaviour and reputation; (5) reassure host authorities and communities and encourage them to adopt a welcoming approach to England fans; (6) encourage host police to adopt proportionate and appropriate tactics for English as well as other visiting fans; (7) help ensure that tournaments can be a safe, secure and enjoyable experience for host communities and visiting fans alike; and (8) provide a clear and unequivocal demonstration of the U.K.’s determination to take responsibility for preventing the export of its domestic football disorder problems. Id. 209 Football Spectators Act, 1989, c. 37, §§ 2(1) (U.K.). 210 Id. § 22 (establishing that a restriction order may only be made: in addition to a sentence imposed in respect of the offence of which the accused is (or was) convicted of, or in addition to a probation order (U.K.)). 211 Reducing and Preventing Crime: Football Banning Orders, HOME OFF. (March 26, 2013), https:// www.gov.uk/government/policies/reducing-and-preventing-crime--2/supporting-pages/football-banning- orders. 212 Id. 213 Football Spectators Act, 1989, §§ 8–13. Section 10(6) establishes the condition “requiring specified descriptions of spectators to be refused admittance to the premises to watch designated football matches[.]” Id. § 10(6). WATSON GALLEYSPROOFS2 5/1/2014 9:13 AM 1088 EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27 The membership scheme ultimately failed as a consequence of the Hillsborough disaster,214 and the reactive nature of the scheme “proved futile in combatting the increasingly violent activity of football supporters both inside and outside stadiums.”215 Nevertheless, the government’s ability to restrict individuals convicted of football-related offenses from going to matches within England and Wales was a lasting impact of the 1989 Act. A decade after the 1989 Act, Parliament passed the next in the line of football-specific legislative measures, the Football (Offenses and Disorder) Act of 1999 (the 1999 Act).216 By establishing court-ordered international bans, the 1999 Act added considerably to the government’s arsenal for preventing football-related disorder.217 When the English or Welsh national teams, or individuals clubs play abroad, the person subjected to the order must report to a local police station during the relevant “control period.”218 The individual must also surrender their passport for the duration of the “control period,” an effective way to prevent those with violent and racist football-related convictions from traveling to matches abroad to cause trouble.219 It is the duty of the convicting court to issue an international banning order on an offender “if it is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe that making the order would help to prevent violence or disorder at or in connection with designated football matches.”220 Further amendments were made in 2000 by enacting the Football (Disorder) Act of 2000.221 The 2000 Act “established a more proactive scheme 214 TAYLOR REPORT, supra note 128, at 52 (concluding that the supporter licensing scheme was impracticable going forward because making improvements to the nation’s stadiums jumped up the government’s priority list, forcing funds to shift away from the implementation of the scheme). 215 Geoff Beckham, The Price of Passion: The Banishment of English Hooligans from Football Matches in Violation of Fundamental Freedoms, 25 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 41, 44 (2001). 216 Football (Offenses and Disorder) Act, 1999, c. 21 (amending Football Spectators Act, 1989, c. 37 (U.K.)). 217 Id. secs. 1(1)–(5) (amending Football Spectators Act, 1989, c. 37, §§ 15(1)–(5) (U.K.). These amendments set out the procedure for court-ordered international banning orders. Id. The amended act establishes that “[a]n international football banning order shall specify the police station in England or Wales at which the person subject to the order is to report initially.” Id. § 1(5) (internal quotation marks omitted). 218 Id. secs. 1(1)–(5), §§ 15(1)–(5) (U.K.). The “control period” begins five days prior to the match and ends when the match finishes. Id; accord Beckham, supra note 215, at 44. 219 Id. sec. 3(1), § 15(5). 220 Id. sec. 5(3) (amending Football Spectators Act, 1989, c. 37, § 22(5) (U.K.)). Renewals of banning orders can only be obtained “if there is evidence that the subject continues to pose a risk of violence or disorder at football matches.” IMPACT OF MEASURES INTRODUCED BY THE 2000 ACT, supra note 206, para. 9.3. 221 Football (Disorder) Act, 2000, c. 25 (amending Football Spectators Act, 1989, c. 37 (U.K.)) WATSON GALLEYSPROOFS2 5/1/2014 9:13 AM 2013] THE DARK HEART OF EASTERN EUROPE 1089 for combating hooliganism,”222 and strengthened the ability of law enforcement in some crucial areas.223 For example, the Impact Assessment of the 2000 Act stated, “football banning orders played a major part in preventing and deterring English football disorder during Euro 2004. They are and remain the cornerstone of the multi-agency football disorder strategy.”224 The 2000 Act established that any exclusionary order results in a comprehensive ban from traveling to and attending all domestic and international matches.225 Furthermore, the 2000 Act amended the statutory definitions of “violence”226 and “disorder,”227 adding factors the judge can consider when deciding whether to issue a banning order.228 In applying the updated definitions of “violence” and “disorder,” instances of disorder are no longer limited only to those connected with football.229 Now, courts have the ability “to impose banning orders against individuals who have never been convicted of a football-related offence.”230 The 2000 Act also revised some of the earlier limitations from the 1989 and 1999 Acts by allowing broader application of banning orders.231 Section 14B(1)–(2) established a procedure allowing the judiciary to issue a banning order solely on a complaint made by a chief police officer if “the respondent 222 Beckham, supra note 215, at 45. The Act has “real teeth and, [when] rigorously applied, will go a long way to further squeeze the criminal element out of support for our national game.” UK Government New Police Powers Come Into Force, M2 PRESSWIRE, Aug. 29, 2000, available at Proquest, Doc. No. 445968878 (quoting Bryan Drew, the head of Strategic and Specialist Intelligence at the National Criminal Intelligence Service (“NCIS”)). 223 IMPACT OF MEASURES INTRODUCED BY THE 2000 ACT, supra note 206, para. 2.2. Incidents caused by English fans at Euro 2000 in the Netherland and Belgium “demonstrated that the existing powers were not sufficient to prevent English fans from being involved in serious incidents overseas.” Id. 224 IMPACT OF MEASURES INTRODUCED BY THE 2000 ACT, supra note 206, 9.8. 225 Football (Disorder) Act, 2000, c. 25, sec. 1, § 14E(1)–(3), sch. 1 (amending Football Spectators Act, 1989, c. 37 (U.K.)); see also IMPACT OF MEASURES INTRODUCED BY THE 2000 ACT, supra note 206, para. 2.8. 226 Football (Disorder) Act, 2000, c. 25, sec. 1, § 14C(1), sch. 1. The statute defines “violence” as any “violence against persons or property and includes threatening violence and doing anything which endangers the life of any person.” 227 Id. sec. 1, § 14C(2), sch. 1 “[D]isorder” is defined as: (a) stirring up hatred against a group of persons defined by reference to a colour, race, nationality (including citizenship) or ethnic or national origins, or against an individual as a member of such a group; (b) using threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour or disorderly behaviour; or (c) displaying any writing or other thing which is threatening, abusive or insulting). Id. (alteration in original). 228 Id. sec. 1, §§ 14(C)(4)(a)–(d). 229 See Football (Disorder) Act, 2000, c. 25, sch. 1. 230 Beckham, supra note 215, at 46 (alteration in original). 231 Football (Disorder) Act, 2000, c. 25, sec. 1, §§ 14, 15, 17, sch. 1. WATSON GALLEYSPROOFS2 5/1/2014 9:13 AM 1090 EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27 has at any time caused or contributed to any violence or disorder in the United Kingdom or elsewhere.”232 In 2006, Scotland’s Parliament instituted its own banning-order legislation at the urging of Scottish law enforcement, which considered it a necessary tool in their fight against football violence.233 Scottish Justice Minister Cathy Jamieson cited the growing call from Scottish citizens for the government to stop sectarianism, racism, and violence.234 The British Home Office conducted research to assess the impact of the 2000 Act at Euro 2004 and found that 2,370 British nationals had international banning orders preventing them from traveling to Portugal where they could have potentially engaged in football-related disorder.235 When the report was finally presented to Parliament in 2005, the number of banning orders had already increased to 3,139.236 Regarding the legislation’s impact on Euro 2004, the Home Office concluded that “football banning orders played a major part in preventing and deterring English football disorder” at the tournament.237 B. Applying Bans in Poland and Ukraine While there is little consensus within the literature studying football-related violence, the various schools of thought tend to share the assumption that football crowd disorder results from “the convergence of fans who have some form of predisposition toward violent confrontation.”238 Therefore, prohibiting individuals known for or suspected of causing violence and disorder from attending matches is a sensible method to stop hooliganism. Research confirms the success of legislation prescribing stadium-banning orders and international travel bans.239 To stop their growing problems with football-related violence, 232 Id. sec. 1, §§ 14B(1)–(2), sch. 1. 233 Police, Public Order and Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act, 2006, (A.S.P. 10); see also Football Ban Orders Take Effect, BBC NEWS (Aug. 29, 2006, 1:40 PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/scotland/ 5293288.stm. Although banning orders were employed in England and Wales, Scotland did not have national legislation prescribing banning orders before 2006. Id. 234 Football Ban Orders Take Effect, supra note 233. Minister Jamieson called individuals that engage in bigotry, racism, and sectarianism “a disgrace to us all,” and called on the Scottish people “to respect our rivals and unite against the common enemies that would stain our game.” Id. 235 IMPACT OF MEASURES INTRODUCED BY THE 2000 ACT, supra note 206, para 9.1 (comparing the increased number of banning orders from the 105 before Euro 2000, the 1,053 for the 2002 World Cup in Japan and South Korea, to the 2,370 during Euro 2004). 236 Id. para. 9.2. 237 Id. para. 9.8. 238 Stott et al., supra note 93, at 117. 239 See discussion supra Part II.A.. WATSON GALLEYSPROOFS2 5/1/2014 9:13 AM 2013] THE DARK HEART OF EASTERN EUROPE 1091 the Polish and Ukrainian governments should follow the lead of nations who have already implemented statutory banning orders. In its annual report on football banning orders, the British Home Office found that for ninety-two percent of the banning orders that have expired since 2000, police concluded the individual no longer posed a risk of committing further football-related disorder.240 Evidence from Euro 2004 points out that a major reason for the general lack of disorder and violence at the tournament were legislative measures passed by national governments “prevent[ing] ‘known hooligans’ from leaving their home countr[ies] during the tournament.”241 Statistics from England and Wales continue to provide evidence that the bans reduce football-related violence: The number of arrests decreased by 302 (nine percent) from the 2009–2010 to the 2010–2011 seasons, and the total number of new banning orders issued fell as well.242 Genuine supporters want to be able to attend the matches of the club they support, so enforcing banning orders on individuals convicted of football- related disorder will offer two positive outcomes in Poland and Ukraine. First, banning orders exclude individuals who use football solely to have an outlet for their violent and/or racist tendencies.243 Additionally, banning genuine fans serves as a deterrent for other supporters, showing there are real and serious consequences for engaging in disorder at matches. Poland and Ukraine would also benefit from establishing penalties for violent and racist incidents outside football stadiums, as is done in the UK. Making racist chants while watching a match at a pub, engaging in violence while traveling to a match, or committing an attack motivated by the victim wearing a certain color are just as related to football as incidents that occur inside stadiums during a match.244 Thus, these offenses should all result in a judicially-imposed football banning order against the offending individual. 240 HOME OFFICE, STATISTICS ON FOOTBALL-RELATED ARRESTS & BANNING ORDERS: SEASON 2010–11, (2011) [hereinafter STATISTICS 2010–11]. 241 Stott et al., supra note 93, at 118 (citing IMPACT OF MEASURES INTRODUCED BY THE 2000 ACT, supra note 211). Enforcement of the legislation, specifically in the U.K. and Germany, resulted in success “controlling the movement across national borders of those individuals and groups who were seen by the authorities as likely to initiate disorder.” Id. 242 STATISTICS 2010–11, supra note 240. There were no arrests at 71 percent of English and Welsh matches, and 51 percent of all matches were “police free—continuing to free up police resources to deal with local police and community priorities.” Id. 243 Cf. Pearson, supra note 198, at 1. 244 See discussion supra Part I.E. WATSON GALLEYSPROOFS2 5/1/2014 9:13 AM 1092 EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27 The current laws in Poland and Ukraine are insufficient to combat racism and violence related to football. Merely banning all opposing fans from matches—as the Łódź police did when they prohibited Widzew supporters from attending the derby match against ŁKS—does not offer a lasting solution to football-related disorder.245 The consequence of a blanket ban of an entire club’s fan base is that well-behaved fans are not permitted to attend, while dangerous fans from the other club are still allowed to go and cause disorder. ŁKS fans proved this when they attacked the Łódź riot police despite rival supporters not being present.246 Banning individual offenders—those who are actually suspected or convicted of football-related disorder—is the right solution to rid Polish and Ukrainian football of this problem. New laws need to be enforced to be successful. The Ukrainian parliament, the Verkhovna Rada, enacted tougher punishments in 2009 for serious crimes based on race, religion or national origin, but they are weak in comparison to other European nations.247 The scenes filmed by Panorama in Kharkiv at the Metalist-Shakhtar Donetsk match, one of the biggest matches of the Ukrainian Premier League season, proved that the punishments enacted by the Rada are insufficient to stop the disorder and are not enforced in a meaningful way.248 During the match, in addition to the Nazi chanting mentioned earlier, Metalist fans attacked a group of Asian students sitting in the family section.249 The Asian students were beaten, but neither the stewards nor police stepped in until some of the students had suffered injuries.250 What was especially significant about this attack was that the Asian students were supporting 245 Euro 2012: Stadiums of Hate, supra note 1. 246 Id. 247 KRYMINAL´NYÏ KODEKS UKRAÏNY [KK UA] [Criminal Code] amended by ПРО ВНЕСЕННЯ ЗМІН ДО КРИМІНАЛЬНОГО КОДЕКСУ УКРАЇНИ ЩОДО ВІДПОВІДАЛЬНОСТІ ЗА ЗЛОЧИНИ З МОТИВІВ РАСОВОЇ, НАЦІОНАЛЬНОЇ ЧИ РЕЛІГІЙНОЇ нетерпимості, N. 1707-17 [The Act Concerning Amendments to the Criminal Code of Ukraine in regards to Crimes Committed on the grounds of Racial, National or Religious Intolerance] 2009, No. 5, art. 43. The new and tougher punishments for murder committed out of motives of racial, national, or religious intolerance is ten to fifteen years with confiscation of property. Id. art 115(14). Actions intended to “humiliat[e] national honor and dignity for people’s religion, race, nationality, or language” are now punishable by a fine of 200 to 500 times the tax-fee minimum income, or up to five years of restrained liberty. Id. art. 161(1). Restriction of freedom means “deprivation of the right to certain posts or certain activities”). 248 Euro 2012: Stadiums of Hate, supra note 1. 249 Id. 250 Id. WATSON GALLEYSPROOFS2 5/1/2014 9:13 AM 2013] THE DARK HEART OF EASTERN EUROPE 1093 Metalist.251 This means there was no other motive for the attack other than the race of the victims.252 Right now the only available sentences for football-related crimes are fines, certain civic restrictions, probation, and jail time.253 Without adding banning orders and travel restrictions as punishments for those convicted of football- related disorder offenses to the criminal code, incidents of disorder will continue to plague Polish and Ukrainian football. III. HATE SPEECH AND THE INCITEMENT OF VIOLENCE We will not tolerate sectarianism as a parasite in our national game of football or anywhere else in this society. —Alex Salmond, Scottish First Minister 254 A. Offensive Behaviour at Football and Threatening Communications (Scotland) Act Unlike the United States where free speech is sacrosanct to democracy, the European governments do not need to worry about potential constitutional violations when making legislation that limits free speech and expression.255 European countries that have criminal or civil statutes restricting speech usually do so to protect public order or the human dignity of citizens.256 Incidents of racism in British football grew during the 1970’s and 1980’s as more minority players became prominent footballers.257 Former Liverpool and England player, John Barnes, remembered “there wasn’t a game in the ‘80s when you didn’t get racial abuse as a black player.”258 Following three football 251 Id. 252 Id. 253 See discussion supra Part I.D. 254 Law, Order & Public Safety: People and the Law, Sectarianism, SCOT. GOV’T (last updated Dec. 19, 2011), http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Topics/Justice/law/sectarianism-action-1/football-violence/bill. 255 See Elisabeth Zoller, Foreword, Freedom of Expression: “Precious Right” in Europe, “Sacred Right” in the United States?, 84 IND. L.J. 803, 804–05 (2009) (comparing the American view of free speech to that of Europe, and noting international treaties recognize legal limitations can be placed on free speech). 256 Jeannine Bell, Restraining the Heartless: Racist Speech and Minority Rights, 84 IND. L.J. 963, 976 (2009). The United Kingdom’s anti-hate speech laws are aimed at maintaining public order. Id. This category of speech restrictions “are based on the idea that hate speech that vilifies a group poses a more serious threat to the public order than insults directed at a person for his or her personal characteristics.” Id. 257 Roger Bennett, In the Struggle Against Racism, England Finds Hope, ESPN (Nov. 6, 2012, 8:59 PM), http://soccernet.espn.go.com/blog/_/name/espnfcunited/id/1472?cc=5901. 258 Id. WATSON GALLEYSPROOFS2 5/1/2014 9:13 AM 1094 EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27 stadium disasters within weeks of each other in May 1985, the British government commissioned Justice Popplewell to investigate the causes of these incidents.259 One of the key recommendations made in Popplewell’s inquiry was for the creation of new offenses criminalizing “chanting obscene or racialist abuse at a sports ground.”260 In 1991, Parliament recognized the need to create a separate statute for regulation of racist chanting at football matches and enacted the Football Offenses Act of 1991.261 The 1999 Act, discussed earlier, added more teeth to the racial chanting component of the Football Offenses Act of 1991 by substituting “whether alone or in concert with one or more others” for “in concert with one or more others.”262 This slight modification in language is a significant positive change, because it allows police to charge a lone individual for making racist remarks. Recently, English football has seen a troubling increase in incidents of racism. Nevertheless, this may signal a positive cultural change, because the increase in incidents could be due to an increase in reporting them.263 Journalist Roger Bennett remarked, “[t]he ugliness of these incidents may yet conceal a societal truth. While each occurrence has been grating to witness, their collective effect may ultimately prove positive.”264 Problems relating to inciting violence through religious-based chanting are primarily felt in Scotland.265 The Scottish Government, although still governed by the Westminster Parliament in London, had more powers devolved to it in 2001, which led to the creation of a Scottish Parliament in Edinburgh.266 One 259 Greenfield & Osborn, supra note 22, at 323–24 n.34. On May 11, 1985, a fire in a stand at a Bradford City Football Club resulted in 56 Deaths. On the same day a boy of 15 died during serious crowd disorder at Birmingham City Football Club. On May 29, 1985, 38 fans, mainly Italian, were killed during serious disturbances at European Cup Final between Liverpool Football Club and Juventus. Id. 260 Id. at 324. 261 Id. at 326; Football (Offences) Act, 1991, c.19 (U.K.). 262 Football (Offences and Disorder) Act, 1999, c. 21, sec. 9, § 3(2) (amending Football (Offences) Act, 1991, c.19 (U.K.)). 263 See generally Bennett, supra note 257. “[Wh]en a single Chelsea fan, Gavin Kirkham, was accused of abusing Manchester United’s Danny Welbeck, the offender was named and shamed across the back pages [of the tabloids] in howling coverage, replete with photos of the wrongdoer in a ‘Borat mankini.’” Id. 264 See generally Bennett, supra note 257. 265 Offensive Behaviour in Football and Threatening Communications Bill, 2011 SP Bill [1]-PM, 2011, cl. 7, (Scot.). 266 Scotland Act, 1998, c. 46, § 1 (U.K.) (talk about constitution). WATSON GALLEYSPROOFS2 5/1/2014 9:13 AM 2013] THE DARK HEART OF EASTERN EUROPE 1095 of the devolved powers granted to the Scottish Parliament is the authority to enact criminal laws that are solely applicable to Scotland.267 Scotland enacted criminal laws regulating hooliganism. The Football (Offences and Disorder) Act of 1999 never specifically targeted the unique brand of sectarian violence found in Scottish football.268 A poll conducted by the Scottish Parliament found that 91% of the Scottish population felt stronger legislation was needed to deal with the increasing sectarian and offensive behavior relating to football.269 Therefore, Scottish Parliament felt pressured to pass legislation to specifically address these problems that plagued Scottish football and society. In response to the call for stronger legislation, the Offensive Behaviour at Football and Threatening Communications Act was officially enacted in March 2012.270 The Act provides law enforcement with two new criminal offenses for limiting anti-social behavior related to football: “offensive behavior”271 and “threatening communication.”272 The new offenses apply not only to incidents occurring at football stadiums but also apply to non-domestic property where football matches are broadcast and while fans are traveling to and from matches.273 Furthermore, the Threatening Communications Act has extraterritorial reach so acts taking place outside of Scotland fall within its scope if committed by an individual who habitually resides in Scotland.274 The new criminal laws also apply to anything done by a foreign national while in Scotland and to communications made from outside Scotland, if the intention of such communication is “to be read, looked at, watched or listened to primarily in 267 Id. § 29. 268 Football (Offences and Disorder) Act, 1999, c. 21, sec 9(2), § 3(1). 269 Law, Order & Public Safety: People and the Law, Sectarianism, supra note 254. 270 Offensive Behaviour at Football and Threatening Communications (Scotland) Act, 2012, (A.S.P. 1). 271 Id. § 1. The Act defines “offensive behaviour” as “sectarian and other offensive chanting and threatening behaviour related to football which is likely to cause public disorder.” 272 Id. § 6; see also Law, Order & Public Safety: People and the Law, Sectarianism, supra note 254. The addition of “threatening communication” to the bill “strengthen[s] current law covering threats of serious harm and criminalise threats inciting religious hatred.” Id. 273 Offensive Behaviour at Football and Threatening Communications (Scotland) Act, 2012, (A.S.P. 1), § 2. 274 Id. § 10(1). WATSON GALLEYSPROOFS2 5/1/2014 9:13 AM 1096 EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27 Scotland.”275 Scottish Parliament created severe penalties for violation of the statute, including the possibility of a fine and up to five years in prison.276 The first offense criminalized by the Threatening Communications Act is offensive behavior at regulated football matches.277 This prohibits behavior that expresses or stirs up hatred against people based on religion, race, and other identities.278 The statutory language is broad, prohibiting discriminatory behavior that is wholly or partly based on hatred of a mentioned group, any threatening behavior, and any behavior a reasonable person is likely to consider offensive.279 Another part of the Act criminalizes threatening communications that meet one of two established conditions.280 The first condition is met if the material contains or implies a threat or incitement to carry out a violent act against a particular group, causes people to fear, and the communicator intends to or recklessly causes fear.281 The second condition occurs when material is threatening and the communicator intends to stir up hatred based on religion.282 275 Id. § 10(2). 276 Id. § 1(6). 277 Id. § 1. 278 Id. § 1(2)–(4). (a) [E]xpressing hatred of, or stirring up hatred against, a group of persons based on the membership (or presumed membership) of— (i) a religious group, (ii) a social or cultural group with a perceived religious affiliation, (iii) a group defined by reference to a thing mentioned in subsection (4). The groups referred to in subsection (4) include; color, race, nationality (including citizenship), ethnic or national origins, sexual orientation, transgender identity, and disability. Id. § 1(4). 279 Id. § 1(2)(c)–(e). 280 Id. § 6(1). 281 Id. § 6(2). “Condition A is that— (a) the material consists of, contains or implies a threat, or an incitement, to carry out a seriously violent act against a person or against persons of a particular description, (b) the material or the communication of it would be likely to cause a reasonable person to suffer fear or alarm, and (c) the person communicating the material— (i) intends by doing so to cause fear or alarm, or (ii) is reckless as to whether the communication of the material would cause fear or alarm 282 Id. § 6(5). “Condition B is that—(a) the material is threatening, and (b) the person communicating it intends by doing so to stir up hatred on religious grounds.” Id. WATSON GALLEYSPROOFS2 5/1/2014 9:13 AM 2013] THE DARK HEART OF EASTERN EUROPE 1097 The two conditions constituting “threatening communication” give the Scottish government and law enforcement officials wide discretion to charge an individual on the grounds of hate speech while not being a blanket restriction of speech.283 This is a crucial point of the law; people will not come into the purview of the Act if they are engaging in non-threatening discourse on religion, even if that discourse is negative.284 A year after passing this legislation, Scotland’s Justice Secretary, Kenny MacAskill, reports that the law has been a success thus far.285 MacAskill stated “[t]he charge and conviction rates for people arrested show that it is working well,” and that they “have made clear that bigotry and religious hatred have no place in modern Scotland and they will stamp on it wherever and whenever it occurs.”286 In November, Lord Advocate Frank Mullholland QC reported authorities had prosecuted eighty-nine percent of those charged under the Act, with an eighty-three percent conviction rate.287 It is important to note, as MacAskill did, “[t]he overwhelming majority of football fans are law abiding and want to enjoy the friendly rivalry that is part of any game without this being marred by the actions of a mindless minority,” and further stated that the government will spend £9 million in the next three years to try and rid sectarianism in wider society.288 B. Football-Specific Speech Restrictions in Poland and Ukraine Poland and Ukraine both currently have statutory provisions relating to racism and discrimination, but they are not sufficient.289 In 2008, the Ukrainian government attempted to amend its penal code with respect to inciting racial violence, but these amendments failed to fully overcome the problems they attempted to solve.290 283 Id. § 7(1). “[T]hreatening communication” does not include peaceful preaching or proselytizing, criticisms, comment, satire, or jokes about religious or non-religious beliefs. Id. 284 See id. 285 Anti-Sectarian Legislation ‘Working Well,’ BBC NEWS (Mar. 1, 2013, 2:24 AM), http://www.bbc.co. uk/news/uk-scotland-21626656. 286 Id. 287 Id. 288 Id. 289 See supra Part I.D; Kodeks Karny [K.K.] [Penal Code of 06 June 1997] art. 119, §§ 1–2, Dz. U. 1997 Nr 88, Poz. 553, at 2691 (Pol.); KRYMINAL´NYÏ KODEKS UKRAÏNY [KK UA] [Criminal Code] art. 67 (Ukr.); see also Euro 2012: Stadiums of Hate, supra note 1 (discussing the overall lack of enforcement in these countries). 290 UKRAINE HATE CRIME STUDY, supra note 146, at 14–16. WATSON GALLEYSPROOFS2 5/1/2014 9:13 AM 1098 EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27 Article 67 of the Ukrainian Criminal Code establishes sentencing guidelines that identify various aggravating factors that lead to longer sentences, including crimes based on “racial, national, or religious hatred.”291 But these are not mandatory for a judge to consider when sentencing an individual, and there are no recorded cases where a judge has taken the aggravating factors into account when issuing a sentence.292 The example of supporters of Resovia Rzeszów in Panorama is telling of Polish enforcement of anti-hate speech laws.293 By redefining “Jew” as a derogatory term to mean “someone who deserves to be defeated or even killed,” Polish fans attack both Jewish people and the target of their insult.294 At a match in May 2010, Resovia supporters unfurled a large banner proclaiming “Death to Hook-noses,” and another with a stereotypical anti- Semitic depiction of a Jewish person with an “X” through it.295 The Polish Football Association eventually fined Resovia, but not until a year after the original incident.296 When the BBC crew filmed in Rzeszów in April 2012, cameras captured a Resovia fan holding a banner proclaiming, “[t]he Anti-Jew Front.”297 No club officials, stewards, or police took immediate action to remove the banner or confront the individual.298 Another problem in Eastern Europe relating to racism and football is the abundance of firm-related graffiti.299 More so than supporters in other countries, Eastern European hooligans mark their turf and promote their club and firm using graffiti.300 Poland has a law banning the printing or spray painting of fascist signs or statements, like the swastika, but this restriction has little to no effect on hooligans spray painting fascist and anti-Semitic sentiments throughout Polish cities.301 291 KRYMINAL´NYÏ KODEKS UKRAÏNY [KK UA] [Criminal Code] art. 67 (Ukr.); see also UKRAINE HATE CRIME STUDY, supra note 146, at 14. 292 UKRAINE HATE CRIME STUDY, supra note 146, at 14. 293 Euro 2012: Stadiums of Hate, supra note 1. 294 Id. 295 Id. 296 Id. 297 Id. 298 Id. Police later arrested the supporter who brought the banner to the match. Id. The Polish FA fined Resovia £1,000 and banned supporters from the next two home matches. Id. 299 Id. 300 Id. 301 Kodeks Karny [K.K.] [Penal Code of 06 June 1997] art. 53–63, Dz.U. 1997 Nr. 88, Poz. 553, at 2682– 83 (Pol.). WATSON GALLEYSPROOFS2 5/1/2014 9:13 AM 2013] THE DARK HEART OF EASTERN EUROPE 1099 If Poland or Ukraine established statutes allowing its courts to issue meaningful sentences for hate speech, it would be a positive step in removing derogatory and offensive communications from football. Stopping hate speech and racism is a global problem. This is especially true in the less-economically developed region of Eastern Europe, as immigrants from Asia and Africa continue to come in search of jobs or to migrate to Western Europe.302 Poland and Ukraine should follow the model of British legislation and establish speech restrictions aimed at protecting public order in order to curtail the growing problem of racist speech and violence. The EU’s commitment to fighting discrimination and racism should signal to nations interested in joining the EU, like Ukraine, that they should voluntarily enact stronger racism and hate speech legislation.303 Non- governmental organization’s recommendations should also be considered, because many Eastern European nations underestimate the severity of their issues related to racism and currently do not collect data on racially or religiously motivated crimes.304 The restriction on communications intending to incite violence is widely recognized in many international and European treaties and conventions, as well as in the national legal frameworks in many countries.305 Poland and Ukraine must follow the European community and create statutes to protect minorities from abuse and violence. The present situation in Greece is a cautionary tale of how growing unemployment and economic austerity 302 World Conference Against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance, Geneva, Switz., May 21–June 1, 2001, Report of the Central and Eastern European Regional Seminar of Experts on the Protection of Minorities and Other Vulnerable Groups and Strengthening Human Rights Capacity at the National Level, paras. 16–39, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.189/PC.2/2, Annex (Aug. 14, 2000); see FRANK DÜVEL, CENTRE ON MIGRATION-POLICY & SOCIETY, UKRAINE-EUROPE’S MEXICO 4 (2006) (noting that Ukraine and Eastern Europe lie at the crossroads for migration from Asia and Africa to the more prosperous Western European countries). 303 Council Directive 2000/43/EC, Implementing the Principle of Equal treatment Between Persons Irrespective of Racial or Ethnic Origin, 2000 O.J. (L 180) 22; Ryan, supra note 40, at 270–71. 304 See, e.g., UKRAINE HATE CRIME STUDY, supra note 146, at 17–18 (noting the recommendations made by Human Rights First to the Ukrainian government to address Ukraine’s problems with racist violence). 305 See, e.g., Additional Protocol to the Convention on Cybercrime Concerning Criminalization of Acts of a Racist and Xenophobic Nature Committed Through Computer Systems, Jan. 28, 2003, E.T.S. No. 189; Criminal Code, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-46, §§ 318–19 (Can.); Human Rights Act 1993 (N.Z.); Prohibition of Incitement to Hatred Act 1989 (Act No. 19/1989) (Ir.), available at www.irishstatutebook.ie/1989/en/act/pub/0019/print.html. WATSON GALLEYSPROOFS2 5/1/2014 9:13 AM 1100 EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27 measures can create a situation that allows a racist, anti-Semitic political party to gain a foothold in the national government and among law enforcement.306 If Poland and Ukraine are not proactive in establishing hate speech restrictions, a far-right group like the Patriots of Ukraine could seize on the economic problems and gain power within these nations. Both countries contain laws outlawing organizations;307 they must now apply them with enough force to prevent them from continuing to spread their bigoted and hateful message. IV. POLICING TACTICS AT FOOTBALL MATCHES A. Crowd Control Methods and Hooliganism After the peak period of troubles with hooliganism, the U.K. Home Office conducted a series of extensive inquiries into government and law enforcement reactions to incidents of football-related disorder.308 Lord Taylor devoted Part III of his Hillsborough inquiry to reviewing crowd control at football matches.309 Because of the failures of the South Yorkshire Police to effectively control the crowd at the match, Lord Taylor recommended police make better use of Closed-Circuit Television (“CCTV”) technology, computerize ticket records, establish a national football intelligence unit, and create restrictions on alcohol consumption.310 Many of Lord Taylor’s recommendations have been implemented by the British government, law enforcement agencies, and individual football clubs, and they are contributing to vast reductions in the instances of football-related disorder in the United Kingdom.311 Although there are still risks of spontaneous disorder, the effect of the tougher legislation and new policing 306 Antonis A. Ellinas, The Rise of Golden Dawn: The New Face of the Far Right in Greece, S. EUR. SOC’Y & POL., March 25, 2013, at 1–2, 6–7, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/13608746.2013. 782838. 307 Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej [Polish Constitution of 02 Apr. 1997] art. 13, Dz.U. 1997 Nr. 78, Poz. 483, at 2416 (Pol.); KONSTYTUTSIIA UKRAÏNY [KONST. UA] [CONSTITUTION] art. 37 (Ukr.). 308 TAYLOR REPORT, supra note 128, at 1. 309 Id. at 42–58 (the subject headings in Part III of the report are: police planning and control, alcohol, tickets and touts, police strategies against hooligans, and other possible measures against hooligans). 310 Id. at 42. 311 See IMPACT OF MEASURES INTRODUCED BY THE 2000 ACT, supra note 206, para. 3.3. In 1996 levels of hooliganism had decreased in the United Kingdom because of better CCTV coverage, the conversion to all- seater stadia recommended by the Taylor Report, and more stringent ticketing schemes to separate rival fans. Greenfield & Osborn, supra note 22, at 328–29. WATSON GALLEYSPROOFS2 5/1/2014 9:13 AM 2013] THE DARK HEART OF EASTERN EUROPE 1101 tactics has been to push the individuals committing these acts to the margins of society.312 The next major step for European governments and the EU is to increase the exchange of information and inter-agency cooperation. The Council of the European Union adopted a decision in 2007 that requires Member States “to strengthen their cooperation and to put the exchange of information on a professional footing in order to prevent disturbances to law and order . . . .” and to exchange information on “recommendations for international police cooperation and measures to prevent and control violence and disturbances.” 313 The United Kingdom had already established a policing unit dealing specifically with football prior to the 2002 council decision.314 In the system called the United Kingdom Football Policing Unit, each of the ninety-two Football League clubs is assigned a police “spotter” who is responsible for developing information and sharing it with the national agency.315 This advanced system of intelligence gathering and exchange makes it possible for the United Kingdom to implement its national system of banning orders and travel bans, as information can be quickly directed to the specific law enforcement agencies and officials that need it.316 Furthermore, the Home Office funds research aimed directly at developing a model “for policing high- risk crowds of foreign nationals attending football matches.”317 This system was especially successful for enforcing banning orders during Euro 2004.318 In preparation for the tournament in Portugal, the National Crime Intelligence Service gathered intelligence to share with its Portuguese counterparts and coordinated a nationwide port policing operation to prevent those with travel bans from leaving the United Kingdom.319 312 IMPACT OF MEASURES INTRODUCED BY THE 2000 ACT, supra note 206, para 3.4 (stating that most of current trouble in England seems to center around local derbies and other high risk matches, but is no longer a common occurrence at normal matches). 313 Council Decision 2007/412/JHA amending Decisions 2002/348/JHA, concerning Security in Connection with Football Matches with an International Dimension, 2007 O.J. (L 155) 1. 314 Frank Gregory, The European Union and the Promotion of Major Event Security Within the EU Area, in TERRORISM AND THE OLYMPICS: MAJOR EVENT SECURITY AND LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE 212 (Anthony Richards, Pete Fussey & Andrew Silke eds., 2011). 315 Id. 316 See id. 317 Stott et al., supra note 93, at 121. 318 See IMPACT OF MEASURES INTRODUCED BY THE 2000 ACT, supra note 206, para. 9.1. 319 Id. para. 7.5. WATSON GALLEYSPROOFS2 5/1/2014 9:13 AM 1102 EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27 The Council’s effort to improve coordination of law enforcement and intelligence was also furthered by integrating the 2005 Treaty of Prüm 320 into the EU legal framework.321 The Treaty intensifies cross-border law enforcement efforts specifically, with respect to “terrorism, cross-border crime and illegal migration.”322 This has significant implications for policing international football matches because it vastly improves information exchange procedures by automatically allowing contracting nations to access European- wide and national police databases,323 and creates new avenues for operational coordination between law enforcement agencies.324 B. Applying Modern Policing Tactics in Poland and Ukraine In addition to instituting tougher criminal punishments for those convicted of football-related disorder and creating new criminal offenses for hate speech, Poland and Ukraine must modernize their policing tactics and procedures with respect to football-related disorder. These must be implemented locally, within the police forces of cities hosting matches, as well as nationally, by developing a system to exchange information and coordinate inter-agency efforts to monitor known hooligans. Currently, Poland and Ukraine base their policing efforts on an outdated theory that expects football fans to be violent, which in turn leads to increased instances of violence.325 The footage from Panorama clearly shows Polish and Ukrainian police relying on the paramilitary-style of policing football supporters.326 The Taylor Report noted that disrespectful and contemptuous policing tactics “sour[] the attitude of the supporters towards all police.”327 In Łódź, ŁKS fans expecting to do battle with Widzew supporters instead fought with the riot police 320 Convention on the Stepping Up of Cross-Border Cooperation, Particularly in Combating Terrorism, Cross-Border Crime and Illegal Migration, May 27, 2005, 2617 U.N.T.S. 3. 321 Council Decision 2008/615/JHA, of 23 June 2008 on the Stepping Up of Cross-border Cooperation, Particularly in Combating Terrorism and Cross-border Crime, 2008 O.J. (L 210) 1; see also Press Release, Council of the European Union, 2781st Council Meeting, No. 5922/07 (Feb. 15, 2007), available at http:// www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/jha/92800.pdf. 322 Council Decision 2008/615/JHA, 2008 O.J. (L 210) 1. 323 Id. at 2. 324 Id. 325 Stott et al., supra note 93, at 136. This theory leads police to “see their role as simply to react to, control, contain, and disperse the inherent tendencies of the crowd toward disorder and to undermine the actions of violent minorities seeking to hijack the irrational mass.” Id. 326 Euro 2012: Stadiums of Hate, supra note 1. 327 TAYLOR REPORT, supra note 125, para. 246, at 42 (noting that some tactics used by police and the police’s treatment of supporters, especially those traveling to away matches, could create more harm than good). WATSON GALLEYSPROOFS2 5/1/2014 9:13 AM 2013] THE DARK HEART OF EASTERN EUROPE 1103 stationed outside the stadium after Łódź police banned the Widzew supporters from attending the match. An editorial written in the Kraków Post described the Polish police’s toughness: “These lads’ mums and dads rioted under Soviet machine guns—a few chairs thrown by beered-up fans is not going to intimidate them.”328 Research into previous violent incidents involving English fans concluded that “undifferentiated forms of coercive police intervention,”329 like those threatened in the Kraków Post editorial, only serve to unify regular supporters with hooligans, and create a perception of victimization leading to the view that retaliation against the police is legitimate.330 Deployments of paramilitary police forces at large events like football matches is counterproductive and creates the opposite affect the police set out to achieve.331 As an EU Member State, Poland must comply with binding legislative measures of the Council, like the Treaty of Prüm, and work towards implementing cooperative police measures. While EU is not applicable to Ukraine, implementing similar measures should help Ukraine overcome its hooligan problem and put it in better position to join the EU in the future. Establishing a national database and intelligence system modeled on the British NCIS is ideal and makes it easier to implement the other ideas proposed in this article. Following the example of Portugal’s policing tactics at Euro 2004, where paramilitary police forces were on call but kept out of sight, will also help control violence between supporters and police.332 Furthermore, the international cooperation and free exchange of information prior to Euro 2004 between Portuguese and British law enforcement and intelligence agencies should be the model for other European nations to look to.333 By modernizing policing tactics, limiting the use of paramilitary tactics to situations of absolute necessity, and instituting a database and system of information exchange for 328 Jamie Stokes, 10 Tips for Staying Safe and Legal in Poland During the Euros, KRAKOW POST (June 7, 2012), http://www.krakowpost.com/article/5226. 329 Stott et al., supra note 93, at 120. 330 Id. 331 Id. at 136 (noting that riots are often provoked by zero tolerance, deterrence, and “command and control” policing efforts). 332 Id. at 134. 333 IMPACT OF MEASURES INTRODUCED BY THE 2000 ACT, supra note 211, para 7.4 “The aim throughout was to influence host perceptions and expectation and encourage the adoption of interactive, low friction policing strategies in venue cities and towns designed to minimise the risk of minor incidents being transformed into disorder and violence.” Id. WATSON GALLEYSPROOFS2 5/1/2014 9:13 AM 1104 EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27 known hooligans, Poland and Ukraine will better be able to control violent football supporters. CONCLUSION The implications of racism and football-related violence extend far past the boundaries of the sport, spreading fear, conflict, and social unrest in the wider community. If left unchecked, it can create major issues for law enforcement officials charged with protecting citizens and politicians in the government. Society in general is greatly affected by hooliganism left unchecked. Those who want to watch a match in a stadium or bar, or walk down a street wearing their club’s colors, cannot do so without risking physical or verbal abuse. Poland and Ukraine are both currently struggling to cope with violent and racist football supporters, much like the United Kingdom did during the peak of the “English Disease.” The attention brought to Poland and Ukraine as co- hosts of Euro 2012 and highlighted by the Panorama documentary, exposed these issues to the world. Comparing Poland and Ukraine to the United Kingdom provides a case study in how to tackle the difficult problem of hooliganism and fan disorder. Because of the make-up of European football’s governance structure, national governments must strengthen criminal sanctions for football-related disorder because other organizations are not in a position to enact and enforce the necessary laws. Nevertheless, this does not absolve the sport’s governing bodies of responsibility for aiding in finding a solution to racism and violence. This article proposes three measures Poland and Ukraine should implement to solve their problems of football-related violence and racism: (1) enact legislation establishing mandatory travel restrictions and banning orders for individuals convicted of football-related crimes; (2) criminalize hate speech and inciting violence related to football using Scotland’s Offensive Behaviour at Football and Threatening Communications Act of 2012 as a guide; (3) develop less confrontational policing methods for football matches and crowd control, (4) and establish better channels of communication within national borders and with other European nations to track and monitor hooligan activity. Racist and violent behavior has no place in sports or society. By adopting the proposals laid out in this Article, Polish and Ukrainian football can make great strides in keeping individuals who intend on causing trouble out of the game and can take back the football terraces for the law-abiding majority. 
work_jqocc2c6w5allhtmc326o6ipwa	----	Why We Hate UvA-DARE is a service provided by the library of the University of Amsterdam (https://dare.uva.nl) UvA-DARE (Digital Academic Repository) Why We Hate Fischer, A.; Halperin, E.; Canetti, D.; Jasini, A. DOI 10.1177/1754073917751229 Publication date 2018 Document Version Final published version Published in Emotion Review License CC BY Link to publication Citation for published version (APA): Fischer, A., Halperin, E., Canetti, D., & Jasini, A. (2018). Why We Hate. Emotion Review, 10(4), 309-320. https://doi.org/10.1177/1754073917751229 General rights It is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), other than for strictly personal, individual use, unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons). 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Download date:06 Apr 2021 https://doi.org/10.1177/1754073917751229 https://dare.uva.nl/personal/pure/en/publications/why-we-hate(37ab21eb-5a05-4e13-8d5f-5c6825475191).html https://doi.org/10.1177/1754073917751229 https://doi.org/10.1177/1754073917751229 Emotion Review 1 –12 © The Author(s) 2018 ISSN 1754-0739 DOI: 10.1177/1754073917751229 journals.sagepub.com/home/er Introduction In a comprehensive review of classic as well as more contempo- rary conceptualizations of hatred, Royzman, McCauley, and Rozin (2005) described hatred as the most destructive affective phenomenon in the history of human nature. These destructive implications of hatred on human life have been widely docu- mented in several recent contributions (e.g., Halperin, 2011; Levin & Nolan, 2015a, 2015b; Opotow & McClelland, 2007; Sternberg, 2005; Sullivan, Ong, La Macchia, & Louis, 2016). This literature shows that hate has been defined in a variety of ways, a problem characteristic for emotions in general. Hate has been considered an emotional attitude (Ekman, 1992), a syn- drome (Solomon, 1977), a form of generalized anger (Bernier & Dozier, 2002; Frijda, 1986; Power & Dalgleish, 1997), a gener- alized evaluation (Ben-Ze’ev, 2000), a normative judgment (McDevitt & Levin, 1993), a motive to devalue others (Rempel & Burris, 2005), or simply an emotion (Elster, 1999). Despite these different views, it is remarkable that there is little theoriz- ing about hate, although the topic seems to be getting increasing attention in recent years. Even more surprisingly, there is not much in-depth empirical research on hatred, especially not in psychology. Interestingly, other disciplines, such as sociology, political science, communication, and social justice research have provided interesting new empirical data, in particular on hate crime and hate speech. The fact that hate is an underresearched topic in psychology may be due to several factors. First, hate is a phenomenon that is complex to empirically investigate with the standard psycho- logical methods and samples. The standard student population of the majority of psychological studies report that they have never experienced hate (e.g., Aumer, Krebs Bahn, & Harris, 2015; Halperin, 2008). For example, Halperin (2008, Study 1) aimed to examine people’s lay theories of hatred. For that pur- Why We Hate Agneta Fischer Department of Psychology, University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands Eran Halperin Baruch Ivcher School of Psychology, IDC Herzliya, Israel Daphna Canetti School of Political Science, University of Haifa, Israel Alba Jasini Faculty of Psychology and Educational Sciences, University of Leuven, Belgium Abstract We offer a functional perspective on hate, showing that hate has a unique pattern of appraisals and action tendencies. Hate is based on perceptions of a stable, negative disposition of persons or groups. We hate persons and groups more because of who they are, than because of what they do. Hate has the goal to eliminate its target. Hate is especially significant at the intergroup level, where it turns already devalued groups into victims of hate. When shared among group members, hate can spread fast in conflict zones where people are exposed to hate-based violence, which further feeds their hate. Hate can be reassuring and self-protective, because its message is simple and helps confirming people’s belief in a just world. Keywords anger, hate, hate crime, intergroup, interpersonal Corresponding author: Agneta Fischer, Department of Psychology, University of Amsterdam, Roeterstraat 15, Amsterdam, 1018 WB, The Netherlands. Email: a.h.fischer@uva.nl 751229 EMR0010.1177/1754073917751229Emotion ReviewFischer et al. Why We Hate research-article2018 SPECIAL SECTION https://journals.sagepub.com/home/er mailto:a.h.fischer@uva.nl http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1177%2F1754073917751229&domain=pdf&date_stamp=2018-08-02 2 Emotion Review pose, he asked 40 Israelis to think of one event in their lives in which they felt hatred. All 40 interviewees immediately said that they had never experienced hatred. They further stated that they had felt extreme anger, that they knew other people who experienced hatred, and that they were aware of the prevalence of hatred in conflict zones. But to feel hatred towards other peo- ple? Not them. Ironically, some of the participants who said that they had never hated someone throughout their entire lives then described specific situations in the history of the Israeli– Palestinian conflict in which they had wanted to throw a bomb on a large Palestinian city, or situations in which they wanted to do everything to annihilate or destroy the Palestinians. These examples illustrate the social inappropriateness of hate and the unwillingness to acknowledge feeling such a destructive emo- tion. Second, hate has never been conceived as a standard emotion and thus did not gain from the rising popularity of the psycho- logical study of emotions in the last decades. For example, in most empirical investigations based on appraisal theories (e.g., Roseman, 1984; Scherer, 2005), one can find emotions such as dislike, anger, or contempt, but hate is systematically lacking (but see Fitness & Fletcher, 1993; Halperin, 2008). In this review, we will try to make up for this lack of attention, and analyze the literature on hate from different disciplinary per- spectives and at different levels of analysis. We will start with defining the characteristics of hate, and addressing the question whether hate is an emotion or something else, or both. Second, we will move on to the analysis of hate at different social levels (from individual to intergroup). Third, we will analyze how and why hate spreads, including hate crimes and hate speech. Fourth, we will discuss the role of hate in society. Finally, we will end with a reflection on the role and function of hate at dif- ferent levels of analysis and will then offer some future venues of research. What Are the Characteristics of Hate? Most authors who have written on hate agree that it is a power- ful negative emotional phenomenon (Aumer-Ryan & Hatfield, 2007; Royzman et al., 2005; Sternberg, 2003), although not all scholars would define it as an emotion. Hate is assumed to develop when others mistreat or humiliate someone, or whose deliberate actions have become an obstruction to someone’s goals (Aumer-Ryan & Hatfield, 2007; Baumeister & Butz, 2005; Royzman et al., 2005; Sternberg, 2003). Hate obviously shares characteristics with several other negative emotions, especially anger, contempt, or moral disgust (Fitness & Fletcher, 1993; Frijda, 1986; Halperin, 2008; Oatley & Jenkins, 1996). Indeed, hatred is partly characterized by features that are not unique to hatred. To make the demarcation with other emotions even more complex, it is highly likely that hate feel- ings are often accompanied by other negative emotions, maybe especially because hate is such an intense feeling. For example, individuals may report hate if appraising an event as contra- dicting their goals and interests (relevant to all negative emo- tions), perceiving the other’s behavior as unjustified and unfair (characteristic of anger), morally inferior (characteristic of contempt), or morally nauseating (prototypical for disgust). In other words, anger, contempt, disgust, humiliation, revenge feelings, and hate can all be elicited in reaction to a similar event, namely when another’s action is perceived as negative, intentional, immoral, or evil (Haidt, 2003; Rozin, 1999). The question then is whether and how hate is different from these closely related emotions. We argue that we can theoreti- cally distinguish these emotions on the basis of their appraisal patterns, action tendencies, and motivational goals. With respect to appraisals, hate is different from anger, because an anger tar- get is appraised as someone whose behavior can be influenced and changed (Fischer & Roseman, 2007; Halperin, 2008; Halperin, Russell, Dweck, & Gross, 2011). A hate target, on the contrary, implies appraisals of the other’s malevolent nature and malicious intent. In other words, hate is characterized by appraisals that imply a stable perception of a person or group and thus the incapability to change the extremely negative char- acteristics attributed to the target of hate (Allport, 1954; Royzman et al., 2005; Schoenewolf, 1996; Sternberg, 2003). Its appraisals are targeted at the hate target itself, rather than at spe- cific actions carried out by that target (Ortony, Clore, & Collins, 1988). While we feel anger because a certain action by a certain person or group is appraised as immoral, unfair, or unjust, if that very same person changed their behavior, the levels of anger would be reduced and the person would be forgiven. However, the entire configuration of hatred appraisals focuses on the innate nature, motives, and characteristics of the target itself and therefore a momentary change in certain behavioral patterns will not necessarily diminish levels of hatred. One hates one’s father because he is perceived as a bad father in one’s entire youth, not just once. An individual hates his wife because she has betrayed him and humiliated him deeply and repeatedly. In such cases, there is nothing the hate target can do to make up or repair. The other is malicious, not just acts maliciously. This assessment also contributes to feelings of powerlessness, which have often been reported as a characteristic condition in the development of hate (Sternberg, 2005). Indeed, Fitness and Fletcher’s (1993) prototype analysis of hate (vs. anger, jealousy, and love) shows that the concept of hate includes low levels of control, high levels of obstacles, and intense unpleasantness, because one feels badly treated, unsupported, humiliated, ignored, or uncared for. This sense of powerlessness may be fed by the appraisal that hate targets are dangerous and may execute their malicious intentions at any time. In short, on the basis of preliminary evidence we propose that when individuals experience hate, they typically perceive their hate target as having malicious intentions and being immoral, which is accompanied by feelings of lack of control or powerlessness. Such appraisals are not the result of one specific action, but of a belief about the stable disposition of the hated person or group. This stable and dispositional attribution of negative characteristics to the target of one’s emotion can also be found in appraisals of contempt (see also Halperin, 2008; Jasini & Fischer, 2018) and disgust (Russell & Giner-Sorolla, 2011). In the case of contempt, however, the target of one’s Fischer et al. Why We Hate 3 emotion is seen as inferior (Fischer & Giner-Sorolla, 2016), and in the case of disgust, appraisals are more specifically related to violations of a moral code in relation to what happens with one’s own body, such as bodily contamination (Fischer & Giner- Sorolla, 2016). Appraisals of humiliation are more specific than those of hate, entailing the appraisal of a specific act as extremely derogating and a threat to one’s self-worth (see e.g., Mann, Feddes, Doosje, & Fischer, 2016), which is also the case for feelings of revenge (see Seip, 2016). In sum, the core set of appraisals of hate seems to be the attribution of stable and mali- cious intentions to the target, accompanied by appraisals of dan- ger and feelings of powerlessness. However, the main difference that make hate stand out from other negative emotions can be especially found in its action tendencies and emotivational goals. According to Roseman, Wiest, and Swartz (1994), an emotivational goal reflects what the emotion tries to bring about, and thus drives the emotional experience. Action tendencies are very closely associated with emotivational goals as they reflect the emotional impulse to act on a specific goal (see also Rempel & Burris, 2005). The coer- cion goal for example is closely associated with the tendency to attack someone (either verbally or physically), and the exclu- sion goal is associated with the tendency to ignore or look down on someone (Roseman et al., 1994). Emotivational goal can implicitly be found in others’ theorizing as well. White (1996) for example describes hatred as the desire to harm, humiliate, or even kill its object—not always instrumentally, but rather to cause harm as a vengeful objective in itself. Bar-Tal (2007) also suggested that hatred is a hostile feeling directed toward another person or group that consists of malice, repugnance, and will- ingness to harm and even annihilate the object of hatred. Whereas anger implies a coercion goal, that is, the motive to change another person by attacking, confronting, or criticizing, contempt implies an exclusion goal (Fischer & Roseman, 2007), motivating individuals to exclude others from their social envi- ronment (Halperin, 2008; Halperin, Canetti, & Kimhi, 2012; Jasini & Fischer, 2018). Adopting a social functional perspec- tive on emotions (e.g., Fischer & Manstead, 2016; Keltner & Haidt, 1999), we propose that the emotivational goal of hate is not merely to hurt, but to ultimately eliminate or destroy the target, either mentally (humiliating, treasuring feelings of revenge), socially (excluding, ignoring), or physically (killing, torturing), which may be accompanied by the goal to let the wrongdoer suffer (Ben-Ze’ev, 2008). Although actions and expressions related to hate, anger, contempt, disgust, humilia- tion, or revenge can be similar, their emotivational goals are different (see Figure 1). Anger has the emotivational goal to change the target (e.g., by attacking), contempt has the goal to socially exclude (e.g., by avoiding or derogating), and revenge has the goal to restore the equity in suffering and deter (Seip, 2016). Humiliation has shown to have different goals, depend- ing on the specific context: to withdraw and protect oneself (Mann et al., 2016) or to rehumiliate, that is, take revenge. How exactly the emotivational goal of hate is translated into a specific action will differ, depending on why someone has developed hate and what the relation between the victim and perpetrator is. The best way to eliminate the parent one hates, for example, is to completely ignore them and ban them entirely from one’s life, whereas the best way to destroy hated CEOs may be to derogate, ridicule, and scorn them. In extreme occa- sions, violence or actual murder may be a viable option, but if this is not feasible, then one can cherish feelings of revenge. We will come back to the relationship between hater and the hated later in this review. Long Term Sentiment or an Emotion? Scholars of hatred have continually debated the question of whether hatred is an emotion, a motive (Rempel & Burris, 2005), or an (emotional) attitude or syndrome (Royzman et al., 2005). This debate is driven by the fact that one of hate’s core characteristics is that it generally lasts longer than the event that initially evoked it. The enduring nature of hatred is based in the appraisals that are targeted at the fundamental nature of the hated group. Given that hate is often not a reaction to a specific event, and not limited to a short period of time, the question is raised whether hate actually is an emotion, or rather an emo- tional attitude or sentiment (Allport, 1954; Aumer-Ryan & Hatfield, 2007; Frijda, 1986; Frijda, Mesquita, Sonnemans, & van Goozen, 1991; Halperin et al., 2012; Royzman et al., 2005; Shand, 1920, as cited in Royzman et al., 2005; Sternberg, 2005). In the last two decades, scholars (e.g., Fischer & Giner-Sorolla, 2016; Halperin, 2008; Sternberg, 2003) have resolved this con- tradiction between emotions and sentiments by suggesting that some “emotions” can occur in both configurations—immediate and chronic, and thus can be conceived of as a (short-term) emotion as well as a (long-term) sentiment. In-depth interviews by Halperin (2008) with people who were asked to describe their own subjective experience of hatred indeed suggest that more than half of the participants report an ongoing emotional experience (i.e., an enduring sentiment), while the remainder focused on a more acute event of hate (Halperin, 2008). Halperin et al. (2012) describe the sentiment hate, specifically in inter- group contexts, as a stable and familiar “hating” emotional atti- tude (“chronic hatred”), which organizes people’s social world and helps strengthening the connection to the ingroup (“ingroup love”) at the expense of various outgroups (“outgroup hate”). To prevent future painful offenses by the hated group, the goal of the hate sentiment is to eliminate this group from their environ- ment, for example through an absolute separation from mem- bers of the other group. Everyday observations also suggest that hate is so powerful that it does, not just temporarily but permanently, destroy rela- tions between individuals or groups. An illustration comes from a story of a 20-year-old Kosovar Albanian woman who was asked to describe an experience of hatred in the context of a study by Jasini and Fischer (2018): I was 10 years old when Serbian paramilitary men broke into my house with violence. They had guns in their hands and they approached my dad and my brothers and asked them all the money we had in the house. They threatened to kill them all if the family did not leave the house 4 Emotion Review immediately. Few hours after this horror moment, my family and I left the village to seek refuge in the Albanian territory. Even now, ten years after the Kosovo war, I still hate the Serbians and can’t forget their hatred for us, nor their maltreatment of my family, relatives and neighbors [emphasis added]. I often talked about this event with my family members and friends, but never with Serbian people. Hate can thus remain long after an incident, and therefore can take a different form than a short-term emotional reaction to a specific event (like anger or disgust). The emotion hate (also referred to as “immediate hate”; Halperin et al., 2012) is much more urgent and occurs in response to significant events that are appraised as so dramatic that they lead to the kind of appraisals (e.g., “the ougroup is evil by nature”) and motivations (e.g., “I would like it to be destroyed”) that are usually associated with hatred. This intense feeling is often accompanied by unpleasant physical symptoms and a sense of fear and helplessness (Sternberg, 2003, 2005). It provokes a strong desire for revenge, a wish to inflict suffering, and, at times, desired annihilation of the outgroup. Studies by Halperin et al. (2012) unequivocally show that people are capa- ble of short-term hate, following an unusual, mostly destructive, and violent event. In that very short period of time, they attrib- ute the negative behavior of the outgroup to its innate evil char- acter. The two forms of hatred are related, yet distinct, and one fuels the occurrence and magnitude of the other. Frequent inci- dents of the emotion hate may make the development of the sentiment more probable (see also Rempel & Burris, 2005). At the same time, the lingering of hate as a sentiment constitutes fertile ground for the eruption of hate. Chronic haters, who encounter their targets or the consequences of their targets’ actions, most likely react with immediate hatred. These people evaluate almost any behavior of the hate target through the lens of their long-term perspective that the hate target is malevolent. As such, haters are probably more susceptible than others to systematic biases, such as the fundamental attribution error (Ross, 1977). What follows is that the mere presence, mention- ing, or even internal recollection of the hated person or group can fuel hate as a sentiment. At the same time, the causal mech- anism can work the other way as well. Repeated events of immediate hatred can very easily turn the hatred feeling into an enduring sentiment. Indeed, it is only natural that after repeated violent events of that kind, it becomes very difficult for people to forget earlier instances, and such feelings remain present for longer periods of time. In a way, hatred is an emotion that requires more time to evolve, but once it happens it takes much longer to dissolve, and it will always leave scars. Hate at Different Social Levels of Analysis Hate at an Interpersonal Level One important factor in the development of hate, compared to most other negative emotions, is the relationship between the person who hates and the target of this hate. In the previous sec- tion, we have described the goal of hate to eliminate or destroy. Interestingly, at an interpersonal level, the relationship between hater and hated can be intimate. Studies by Aumer et al. (2016) for example show that when individuals were asked to report on a person they currently love but at one time hated in the past, in contrast with a person they loved and never hated, they report in both cases on persons they know very well, such as family Figure 1. The overlap of appraisals and action tendencies, characteristic of anger, contempt, hate, humiliation and revenge. Fischer et al. Why We Hate 5 members, romantic partners, or colleagues. However, not sur- prisingly, the quality of the current relationship with the person whom was once hated, was shown to be characterized by less intimacy and love, and more hate. Indeed, in another study of hate and love in close relationships, hated persons were found to be perceived as less open, less agreeable, less conscientious, and less emotionally stable than loved ones (Aumer et al., 2015). Thus, although at an interpersonal level hated persons are often intimates, suggesting that love and hate are not neces- sarily diametrically opposed (Ben-Ze’ev, 2008), the quality of the relationship with a person one once hated is less satisfactory (Aumer-Ryan & Hatfield, 2007; Rempel & Burris, 2005). This more negative quality of relationships in which hate is involved is not restricted to marital or family contexts, but can also occur in work contexts, where hate has been found to be associated with experiences of humiliating and demeaning treatment (Fitness, 2000; Fitness & Fletcher, 1993). This is especially the case when such treatment comes from others who are considered as more powerful than oneself (Fitness, 2000). It may be expected that recurrent experiences of humiliation, ridi- cule, or public shame by a partner or coworker may contribute to the development of intense hate towards them. In addition, previous hate feelings towards the other may leave traces of hurt feelings and resentment, which may put a strain on the relation- ship. These different lines of research thus suggest that past occurrences of hate seem to linger on in current relationships and are not forgotten, nor completely forgiven. From an emo- tion theoretical perspective this makes sense, because we can only have intense and extreme emotions such as love and hate when the objects of these emotions touch upon our concerns (Frijda, 1986). In other words, we cannot love or hate persons we are indifferent to. Although we maybe would like or pretend not to care, and to easily forgive or forget, we do care about the neglecting, aggressive, or disgusting character of another per- son, especially if we once loved this person. When moving from an interpersonal to an intergroup level, it is interesting to observe that we do not need to know the persons we hate. It is very well possible to hate groups because of what they represent (in terms of power, values, past behaviors, iden- tity). People may hate Germans for what they did during WWII, even though they do not know any German involved in these atrocities. People may hate homosexuals or lesbians because they think that they are deviants from human nature, even though they do not know any such person. The hatred of groups, thus, does not require a personal connection with a member of this group. In such cases, there is only a symbolic relationship with a group member on the basis of one’s perception of this person as part of a negative outgroup. Hate at an Intergroup Level Similar to other intergroup emotions, intergroup hate is an emo- tion experienced on behalf of one’s own group and targeting the outgroup. Intergroup emotions are instigated by events that advance or threaten the ingroup (Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000). For instance, if group members perceive that their ingroup is unjustly treated or humiliated by another group, they may experience negative emotions towards outgroup members as well as form negative attitudes about them. In addition, the strength of identification with the ingroup may contribute to the intensity of intergroup emotions, with high compared to low identifiers generally reporting stronger emotional experiences (Gordijn, Yzerbyt, Wigboldus, & Dumont, 2006; Iyer & Leach, 2009; Yzerbyt, Dumont, Wigboldus, & Gordijn, 2003). Intergroup hatred is directed at a particular outgroup, aiming to eliminate the group (e.g., Halperin, 2008, 2011; Halperin, Canetti-Nisim, & Hirsch-Hoefler, 2009; Halperin et al., 2011). Hate at the intergroup level requires a clear distinction between the ingroup and the outgroup, and is facilitated by the percep- tion that the outgroup is a rather homogeneous entity. The per- ception of outgroup homogeneity is essential for people to be able to generalize from a negative behavior of a single outgroup member to appraisals targeted at the entire outgroup. For exam- ple, a Palestinian who suffered from an abusive behavior of an Israeli soldier in a military checkpoint will develop hate towards all Jews only to the extent that she believes that all Jews are the same, and that the behavior of that one soldier actually repre- sents the innate characteristics of the entire Jewish people (for similar ideas, see Er-rafiy & Brauer, 2013; Simon & Mummendey, 1990). Especially a loathed outgroup that has attacked the interests of the group, makes the ingroup identity salient and is most likely to become the target of one’s hate. Studies on intergroup hate show very similar patterns of appraisals and motives to those that we have reported for inter- personal hate. In a study on the appraisals of hate and two related emotions (anger and fear), Halperin (2008, Study 2) pro- vided Israeli participants with a questionnaire that included a detailed description of four emotionally conflicting scenarios (e.g., a terror attack, intergroup violent event in a nightclub), followed by a manipulation of the cognitive appraisals of the protagonist in the story regarding five dichotomous appraisal dimensions: (a) just/unjust event, (b) outgroup/circumstances were responsible, (c) intentional/unintentional harm, (d) out- group is evil/not evil, and (e) low/high coping potential. After reading the scenario and the protagonist’s appraisals, partici- pants were asked to rank the extent to which the protagonist experienced hatred, fear, and anger (separately) in response to that event. The results support the assumption that hate has two unique appraisals: outgroup harm is intentional and due to their stable, evil character. On the other hand, the attribution of responsibility to the outgroup and the appraisal that the event was unjust were found for both hatred and anger, and the appraisal of low coping potential (powerlessness) was found for both fear and hatred. Jasini and Fischer (2018) found a similar pattern of appraisals for intergroup hate in their study in another specific intergroup context, namely in Kosovo. The study was conducted with Albanian Kosovars who suffered ethnic cleans- ing by Serbian (para)militaries during the Kosovo War (1998– 1999). They asked Albanian participants to imagine an interpersonal assault carried out by Serbian individuals, and then to rate the emotions and appraisals in response to the event. They found that—after controlling for anger—the intensity of hate was positively associated with appraisals of malicious intent and immorality, and marginally with powerlessness. 6 Emotion Review Intergroup hate can also be characterized by specific emoti- vational goals and action tendencies. Jasini and Fischer (2017) found that hate was positively associated with the goal to take revenge and to exclude the other, and with the tendency to attack (and not to forgive or withdraw). This is in line with the findings from Halperin (2008, Study 1). Participants in this study (83.3%) stated that they would have wanted something very bad to happen to the hated group and its members. In another study (Halperin, 2008, Study 3), Jewish-Israelis were asked for their emotivational goals and action tendencies in reaction to certain Palestinian actions. The results showed that group-based hatred is characterized by specific emotivational goals mentioned ear- lier: to do harm to, to remove, and even eliminate the outgroup. Such goals are accompanied with specific action tendencies such as the tendency to attack and not forgive (Jasini & Fischer, 2018) or the tendency to engage in a violent action with the hated people, up to a point where respondents supported the killing of members of the outgroup (Halperin, 2008, Study 1). Still, in the latter study with Israeli participants, only a few par- ticipants (16.6%) reported the actual execution of a violent action. The three most common actions reported by the partici- pants were complete detachment from the object of the hatred (83.3%), delight at the failure of the hated other (36.6%; see also Smith & van Dijk, XXXX; van Dijk & Ouwerkerk, 2014), and political action taken against the other (56.6%). In short, intergroup hate follows the pattern of interpersonal hate and is characterized by appraisals of harm or malicious intent on the part of the outgroup, reflecting their evil nature. This can lead to the goal to take revenge and to eventually eliminate the out- group from one’s environment. The bodily aspect of collective hatred seems less salient than the cognitive and motivational elements, although we assume it may sometimes also include unpleasant physical symptoms (Sternberg, 2003, 2005), particu- larly when the hate is collectively experienced, for example, during a mass demonstration or a sports event. Behaviorally, hate can lead to actual attempts to eradicate the outgroup (White, 1996). Extensive research has demonstrated that, in some situations, there is a connection between hate and its various active political manifestations, such as outgroup exclusionism (Leader, Mullen, & Rice, 2009), terrorism (Sternberg, 2003), the motivation to fight and kill in battle (Ballard & McDowell, 1991), and hate crimes (Berkowitz, 2005). We should note, however, that the (behavioral) expres- sion of hate can differ, depending on the relation between ingroup and outgroup, the (violent) history between the two groups, the specific incidents that have taken place, the domi- nant (negative) narratives about the outgroup, and the possibil- ity to act upon one’s hate. For example, one can be motivated to destroy the outgroup out of perceived self-defense, driven by fear, or one can hate a powerless outgroup, which may be accompanied by contempt and could lead to actions to com- pletely ban the group from one’s environment. Still all these forms of hate seem to share the common goal to eliminate the hate target, either physically or socially. In other words, while fear can sometimes lead to flight rather than fight tendencies and anger can lead to constructive rather than destructive correc- tions (see Fischer & Roseman, 2007; Halperin, 2011; Halperin et al., 2011; Reifen Tagar, Federico, & Halperin, 2011), hatred will always motivate people for destructive action. The belief in stable, extremely negative characteristics implies that there is no merit in trying to correct or improve the outgroup’s behavior, and as such, only more extreme reactions seem applicable. How Hate Spreads There is abundant evidence that many emotions can be experi- enced at both an individual and group level. Yet, not all emo- tions have the same potential to transcend from the individual to the group or collective level. We think that hatred can more eas- ily go through a transformation from individual to group level than other negative emotions; some will even claim that it is the most “group-based” emotion. Aristotle succinctly states that whereas anger is customarily felt toward individuals, hatred is often felt towards groups (see also Ben-Ze’ev, 1992). One rea- son for this can be found in the core characteristics and the nature of hate. We have argued and shown that hate is based on the generalized attribution of an action to the basic traits and features of a person. In other words, the specific antecedent event of one hateful incident may become less important over time, and the character of the person or group becomes the sole reason for the hate. Generalizing these characteristics to mem- bers of a group further enables a parsimonious justification of one’s hate. This facile transition of hatred from the interpersonal level to the group level makes it a pivotal agent in group-based political dynamics in general and in intergroup conflicts in par- ticular. There are three factors that further contribute to the flourish- ing of hate specifically at the intergroup level. First, hate seems often shared among ingroup members (see Jasini & Fischer, 2018). According to Rimé (2009), the extent of sharing one’s emotions is influenced by the intensity of the emotional experi- ence, and the primary targets of sharing generally are close fam- ily members and friends. In contexts where intergroup relations are tense, groups share collective narratives about their own group and other groups. For example, previous studies on social sharing have found that people who are victims of violence and ferocities and thus experience collective trauma, often share their emotional experience with other group members (Rimé, 2009). In intractable conflicts, collective narratives are domi- nated by the memory of past victimization and by ongoing inter- group violence (Bar-Tal, Chernyak-Hai, Schori, & Gundar, 2009; Canetti, Elad-Strenger, Lavi, Guy, & Bar-Tal, 2017; Noor, Shnabel, Halabi, & Nadler, 2012; Vollhardt, 2012). Thus, col- lective victimhood evokes sharing one’s feelings about the tar- get of hate with similar others. Knowing that other ingroup members experience an event in a similar way further reinforces the experience and expression of one’s own emotions (see also Manstead & Fischer, 2001). The sharing of strong negative emotions can in turn strengthen feelings of collective victim- hood that may make the original feeling of hate even more intense and enduring (see also Bar-Tal, Halperin, & De Rivera, 2007; Kuppens, Yzerbyt, Dandache, Fischer, & van der Schalk, 2013). Thus, sharing past negative emotional experiences Fischer et al. Why We Hate 7 caused by an outgroup increases the probability for the develop- ment of intergroup hatred (see also Jasini & Fischer, 2018). Second, while collective victimhood keeps the memory of hate alive across generations, it may also direct the appraisal of future events. Accumulated group knowledge on the immoral and violent behavior of an outgroup affects the evaluation of future behavior, thereby confirming the sentiment that the out- group is a homogeneous malicious entity. In the eyes of those who see themselves as part of a transgenerational victimized group, the outgroup is malicious, even though they did not per- sonally suffer from the outgroup behavior, or only for a rela- tively short time. The fact that the outgroup’s behavior is considered consistent across generations reflects on its innate negative characteristics. Moreover, shared appraisals on similar emotional events reinforce the emotional fit between individu- als and their cultural group (De Leersnyder, Boiger, & Mesquita, 2015), as does identification with the group (Delvaux, Meeussen, & Mesquita, 2015). In turn, the emotions also influence self- categorization, suggesting that similar emotions strengthen feel- ings of belonging to the same group (Livingstone, Spears, Manstead, Bruder, & Shepherd, 2011; Porat, Halperin, Mannheim, & Tamir, 2016). A final and third interesting aspect of hatred that makes it more susceptible to become an intergroup sentiment that spreads fast, is the fact that it can increase in the absence of any personal interaction between the hater and members of the hated group. According to Jasini and Fischer (2018), the lack of personal interactions with the targets of one’s hate further diminishes chances of perspective taking from the side of the victim. Allport (1954) already mentioned the lack of direct interaction as one of the most powerful engines behind hate and prejudice. According to his approach, supported by studies in the frame- work of contact theory (e.g., Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006), lack of direct interaction amplifies hate because the negative appraisal of the malicious character of the group will never be reappraised or contradicted by other information. For example, since Israel completed the construction of the separation wall, Jewish Israelis do not need to suppress their hate towards the Palestinians anymore, because the wall prevents direct encoun- ters with individual Palestinians. Thus, Israelis are not con- fronted anymore with exceptions to the Israeli view of Palestinians and the hateful image of the Palestinians can easily remain intact. This does not necessarily mean that social inter- actions with hated group members automatically reduce hate. However, under the right circumstances, haters may learn more about the motives and circumstances of the hated group’s actions, which could result in some perspective taking. Hate Crimes and Hate Speech One specific way in which intergroup hate spreads in a society is through hate crimes. According to Levin and McDevitt (2008) “hate crimes are criminal offenses motivated either entirely or in part by the fact or perception that a victim is different from the perpetrator.” In most cases, this difference is not based on individual characteristics, but on assigned social identities, such as being Black, woman, lesbian, or Muslim. The word hate crime is fairly recent and was used in the US in the late 1980s to describe a racial incident in New York where a Black man was killed for no apparent reason. Since then, there has been much debate about hate crime, which has recently lead to a new field of research in some countries referred to as “hate studies” (Chakraborti & Garland, 2015). Hate crimes are based on ste- reotypes, prejudice, or extreme negative sentiments about cer- tain groups, and generally also targeted at visible social groups, such as Blacks, Jews, Native Americans, or homeless people. The goal of hate crimes is to communicate a certain message to the group that the haters want to terrify or eliminate. An important feature of hate crimes is that the victims gener- ally have not done anything specific: they are terrorized for who they are, not for what they have done. This makes the victims feel powerless and unable to control the situation because changing their behavior or attitudes would not help. Levin and McDevitt (2008) distinguish between four types of hate crimes that are based on the offender’s motivations: thrill, defense, retaliation, and mission. Whereas the first type is a form of thrill seeking (mostly by groups of teenagers), the second motivation is based on anger and fear, and is considered a strategy to defend a way of living against intruders. This type of crime is mostly committed by single persons who feel threatened, for example, by a Black family who moves into a White neighborhood, or a homosexual teacher hired by a school. The retaliatory third type of hate crime also seems to involve actual hate and is seen as an act of revenge against previous hate crimes or terrorist attacks. For example, after the terrorist attacks in September 2001, there was a 1.6% increase in anti-Muslim hate crimes reported to local police departments in the US. Finally, the last motivation for hate crimes is the mission, which is less frequent and is defined by the fact that the perpetrator is on a moral mission to destroy outgroup members who are not considered human. In another line of research, hate crimes have been associated with a threatened belief in a just world (Lerner, 1980). The just world belief implies that individuals generally believe that the world is a fair place to live in, and that justice is being done such that people get what they deserve. When an individual becomes the victim of a hate crime on the sole basis of his or her group identity, observers may start restoring their belief in a just world by derogating the victim (see also Sullivan et al., 2016). More importantly, the absence of punishment signals that the violence not only against one individual but against a whole group is justified. Whereas hate crimes can occur in many forms, it is obvious that the rise of the Internet and the use of social media have been crucial in spreading hate, because hate messages now have a worldwide audience. The number of organized hate groups and hate-advocating sites has increased, and so has the exposure of potential victims to hate messages. In a recent study on the exposure of young adults to hate messages in four different countries (US, Finland, UK, and Germany), Hawdon, Oksanen, and Räsänen (2016) found that 53% of the Americans, 48% of the Fins, 39% of the British, and 30.5% of the Germans had been exposed to hateful messages in the past 3 months. The authors explain this country difference on the basis of differ- ences in hate speech laws. These are almost nonexistent in the 8 Emotion Review US, whereas there are relatively strict antihate speech laws in Germany. This question has indeed evoked a debate on the most efficient legislation with regard to hate crime. According to some scholars (e.g., Cavadino, 2014), the emphasis on the pun- ishment of hate crime has not reduced it, nor helped the victims, and therefore other ways to prevent hate crimes may be more successful. The problems with hate crime law are obviously also related to the fact that it is unclear whether victims always report hate crime. Most researchers assume underreporting, either because people do not expect to be taken seriously or because they ignore and deny their feelings related to the inci- dent as a way of coping with it, or because of fear, or simply because they expect the perpetrators will not be punished any- way (Perry, 2003). Research relating hate crime to the belief in a just world, however, clearly suggests that the absence of pun- ishment may increase hate and hate crimes because it signals that the victim and even the whole group to which the victim belongs deserves this fate. This consequence is especially pre- sent for hate crimes because, in contrast with other crimes, the absence of punishment emphasizes the justification of the hatred. Hate in Politics and Society Some characteristics of a culture or society form fertile grounds for the development of hate. In his book on the roots of evil— genocide and mass killing—Staub (1989) argues that, first of all, difficult life conditions such as extreme economic problems leading to poverty of large groups of people, but also political, criminal, or institutional violence, facilitate evil intentions. The second set of features refers to culture, especially the rigidity or adaptability of a society. The more rigid the cultural values in a society, the more difficult it is to cope with changes or distur- bances of one’s traditional values and ways of life. According to Staub (1989), this may lead to scapegoating, trying to protect oneself and one’s group to defend one’s way of life, safety, health, and values. Blaming others helps to fulfill these needs in times of chaos and uncertainty, and this forms the basis for the development of hate towards groups in society that are seen as the cause of all problems. Other characteristics, such as strong leaders, strong respect for authority, nationalism, and a slow progression of devaluing outgroups are the further ingredients for the slow but steady development of societal hate (Staub, 1989). Waller (2002) refers to this latter set of characteristics as collective potentiation, the social augmentation of individual actions in a group, whether good or bad. In the case of hate, it may refer to all the characteristics of a society or culture at a specific point in time when the devaluation of an outgroup may turn into real hate, and activate its associated goals to annihilate that group. Under such conditions, the initial development of hate can be a consequence of short-term conflict-related events, but then may automatically result in support for initiating violent actions and for further escalating the conflict. That is also the reason that Staub (2005) and others (e.g., Petersen, 2002; Volkan, 1997) have pointed to hate as the most dominant emotion in past and recent mass murders and genocide (see also Mishra, 2017). If one is convinced of the destructive intentions of the outgroup and feels total despair regarding the likelihood that the outgroup will change its ways, the violent alternative may seem the only reasonable and successful way out. Indeed, research has shown that feelings of hatred may increase the tendency to support extreme military action toward outgroups (e.g., Halperin, 2011). The perception of increased threat is a powerful amplifier of hatred. Ongoing terrorist attacks elicit stress, fear, and uncer- tainty (Canetti, Russ, Luborsky, Hobfoll, & Gerhart, 2014), and become fertile ground for increasing hate for groups perceived as responsible for the turmoil. Additionally, the aftermath of such events demonstrates that perceived security threats prevail over other issues, such as individual rights and freedoms (Canetti-Nisim, Ariely, & Halperin, 2008). Hate has also been described as part of a broader societal sentiment coined “ressentiment” (Betz, 1994; but see Salmela & von Scheve, 2017) in theories on the growing support of right- wing populism. These scholars consider hate as part of a cluster of negative emotions. In particular, feelings of insecurity and shame can easily be transformed into anger, resentment, and hate towards other groups, like immigrants, refugees, or the political elite (Salmela & von Scheve, 2017). However, whereas various negative emotions may play a role in mobilizing people to support outgroup derogation and even violence, and to oppose compromises for peace and forgiveness, we think that inter- group hate is the most powerful one. There are two main rea- sons for this. First, hate is associated with very low expectations for positive change and with high levels of despair, and as a consequence, its associated political action tendencies are by definition destructive rather than constructive. If one does not believe that positive change in the outgroup’s violent and immoral behavior is possible, then constructive political reac- tions—like negotiations, compromises, gestures, or even apolo- gies, which are usually meant to establish more friendly relations—seem just irrelevant (see also Tausch et al., 2011). In addition to that, the emotional goal associated with hate, namely to do destroy or eliminate the outgroup, also leads to one-sided political actions that do not leave any room for positive or con- structive change. This is apparent from the hate speech spread by ISIS, who describes their online propaganda as “the Internet army” (Shaaban, 2015). Hate can even be a destructive force in the midst of peace negotiations. Two studies found that individuals who experi- enced short-term episodes of hatred in times of negotiations in the Middle East expressed an emotional goal of harming and eliminating the opponent (Halperin, 2008). They likewise tended to reject any positive information regarding the oppo- nent (i.e., lack of openness) and opposed the continuation of negotiations, compromise, and reconciliation efforts (Halperin, 2011). Importantly, given that hatred is associated with a funda- mental negation of the outgroup as a whole, and not merely of the group’s concrete actions or behavior, those who feel hatred toward the outgroup oppose even the smallest gestures and sym- bolic compromises, thus refusing to even entertain new ideas that may lead to peace. Two experimental studies conducted in 2011 on the eve of an important peace summit between Israelis Fischer et al. Why We Hate 9 and Palestinians show that inducing anger toward Palestinians increased support for making compromises in upcoming nego- tiations among those with low levels of hatred, but decreased support for compromise among those with high levels of hatred (Halperin et al., 2011). There is also evidence that hate fuels political intolerance. Political intolerance is the support or willingness to denounce basic democratic values and equal rights of individuals who belong to a defined outgroup in a particular society (Gibson, 2006; Stouffer, 1955) and is considered one of the most prob- lematic phenomena in democratic societies. Results of four large-scale nationwide surveys among Jews in Israel showed that intergroup hatred is the most important antecedent of polit- ical intolerance. It has a stronger effect in the face of heightened existential threat and is especially present among politically unsophisticated individuals—that is, those lacking exposure to political information, intellectual capacity, or efforts to obtain and understand political information (Halperin et al., 2009). The question is what makes hate so persistent and prevalent in politics, more so than anger or fear. Hatred seems an effec- tive, simple, political tool that is commonly used by politicians to attain ingroup solidarity and political benefits and/or out- group exclusion. Campaign ads, canvassing, and slogans based on collective hatred are the bread and butter of successful cam- paigns because the message is simple and emotionally appeal- ing (Hutchings, Valentino, Philpot, & White, 2006; Lazarsfeld, Berelson, & Gaudet, 1944). Hatred has been employed in a number of local and national political campaigns in Israel, Europe (Mudde, 2005), and the United States (Kaplan & Weinberg, 1998). The simple and extreme nature of hatred increases its recurrence in the political realm (Leader et al., 2009). The intensity, swiftness, and superficiality of current political communication in many countries enforce cues, sym- bols, and extreme emotions such as hatred (Galtung & Ruge, 1965; Kinder & Sears, 1985). Notwithstanding the context of moral values, hatred may be problematic from a political perspective. From a leadership per- spective, fine-tuning of the exact patterns of hatred is almost impossible; hence, hate rhetoric can backlash. On the one hand, the use of hate rhetoric may attract traditional voters, encourag- ing them to reconsider their typical support as they search for new paths to channel their group-based hate and opt for more extreme political representation. On the other hand, the use of hatred to mobilize new voters may enhance their support for their own traditional parties (Halperin et al., 2012). In Conclusion Hate is elicited in reaction to very negative transgressions by another person or group. It can be an emotional reaction to a spe- cific event (i.e., immediate hate), but it often occurs as a senti- ment (long-term emotion), generalizing from just one event to the nature of a group or person. Especially extreme transgressions may result in a plethora of negative emotions, like contempt, dis- gust, anger, humiliation, or revenge; and thus the question is to what extent and how hate differs from other emotions. We think that there is overlap between these negative emotions, but we can still theoretically distinguish them on the basis of unique patterns of appraisals and emotivational goals. This does not mean that daily lives are neatly carved up according to these theoretical cat- egories, especially because these emotions may often be elicited in reaction to the same events, and thus may occur either simulta- neously or sequentially. On the basis of research on interpersonal and intergroup hate, we suggest that the unique appraisals of hate are a stable, dispositional attribution of malicious intentions, in combination with the appraisal that the target is seen as dangerous and that one feels powerless (see Figure 1). The emotivational goal associated with hate is to destroy the hate target, whether physically, socially, or symbolically. This goal is associated with the aforementioned appraisals and is different from the goals of contempt (social exclusion), disgust (distancing oneself), revenge (getting even), humiliation (withdrawal), or anger (attack). Still all these emotions can occur together with hate and each of them can become associated with the sentiment hate. From a functional perspective, hate is part of a self-defense system by attempting to eliminate the target of one’s hate. In an intergroup context, one’s group identity is threatened by an out- group member, and self-defense implies defense of one’s group membership. Hate seems particularly prone to spreading at this intergroup level because it helps us to defend ourselves by strengthening the ties with our ingroup and putting all the blame for insecurity and violence elsewhere. Because hate is based on the perception of a stable, malevolent disposition of the other person, haters perceive little room for constructive change, and therefore there seem only radical options left to act upon one’s hate. In case of most emotions, the fulfillment of the emotivational goal reduces the emotion. For example, one may seek revenge in order to get even in suffering, and once this has been established, feelings of revenge decrease (see also Seip, Rotteveel, van Dillen, & van Dijk, 2014). In the case of hate, this means elimination of the target. This leaves the question whether hate can be changed or down-regulated. 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work_jseklze72nhopixmxnxwngbf3q	----	‘I will not be thrown out of the country because I’m an immigrant’: Eastern European migrants’ responses to hate crime in a semi-rural context in the wake of Brexit LUMSDEN, Karen, GOODE, Jackie and BLACK, Alex <http://orcid.org/0000- 0002-5910-0108> Available from Sheffield Hallam University Research Archive (SHURA) at: http://shura.shu.ac.uk/23385/ This document is the author deposited version. You are advised to consult the publisher's version if you wish to cite from it. Published version LUMSDEN, Karen, GOODE, Jackie and BLACK, Alex (2018). ‘I will not be thrown out of the country because I’m an immigrant’: Eastern European migrants’ responses to hate crime in a semi-rural context in the wake of Brexit. Sociological Research Online. Copyright and re-use policy See http://shura.shu.ac.uk/information.html Sheffield Hallam University Research Archive http://shura.shu.ac.uk http://shura.shu.ac.uk/ http://shura.shu.ac.uk/information.html 1 ‘I Will Not Be Thrown Out of the Country Because I’m an Immigrant’: Eastern European Migrants’ Responses to Hate Crime in a Semi-Rural Context in the Wake of Brexit Abstract This article examines Eastern European migrants’ experiences of and responses to hate crime. Following the UK European Union Membership Referendum (‘Brexit’ vote) there was an increase in reported hate crimes against immigrants. The study focuses on the experiences of migrants in Lincolnshire, a region of England which has a significant migrant population, and which had one of the highest ‘leave’ votes. The focus on white migrants in this semi-rural setting offers an original perspective in the field of hate crime studies. We draw on semi-structured interviews and observations to identify temporal, spatial and relational factors in responses to hate crime. We uncover the insecure occupation of a ‘third space’ constituted by material, discursive and emotional practices. This positioning was destabilised post-referendum; but there was also evidence of the operation of agency within processes of ‘othering’, suggesting a transition from victim identity to emergent political subject. Keywords: Brexit, hate crime, migrant, othering, political subject, racism, resistance, third space, victim Introduction This article focuses on migrants’ experiences of, and responses to, hate crime in Lincolnshire, a region in the East Midlands of England which has a significant migrant population and which had one of the highest ‘leave’ votes in the EU referendum (‘Brexit’). The focus on white 2 migrants in this setting offers an original perspective in the field of hate crime studies shedding light on experiences of semi-rural racism, hate crime, and victimization which have tended to remain ‘hidden’ (Charaborti, Garland and Spalek, 2004). The article addresses a lack of familiarity with victims’ experiences of hate crime (Chakraborti, 2016) by exploring the impact of these experiences on migrants’ use of (and access to) public spaces. By uncovering the temporal, spatial, relational and emotional factors at work in processes of identification, we reveal both the insecure occupation of a ‘third space’ (Bhabra, 1994) and the operation of agency which suggests that this space may represent a transitional position between victim identity and political subject. Lincolnshire recorded the highest ‘leave’ vote in the UK in the EU referendum at 75.6 percent of the total vote (Tammes, 2017). A large migrant population is employed in factories and the agricultural industry, while Boston, one of the area’s main towns, is home to the highest concentration of EU migrants after London (Chakelian, 2016). According to the Migration Observatory (2013) the East Midlands has a smaller than average proportion of migrants, but has experienced a 77 per cent increase since 2001. Boston has seen a 467 per cent increase in its migrant population in a decade – the largest increase in England and Wales. 2.4 per cent of England’s EU population originates from countries acceded to the UK between 2001-2011. 10.6 per cent of Boston’s population of 65,000 come from one of the ‘new’ EU countries such as Poland, Lithuania, Latvia or Romania (Policy Exchange, 2016). Boston has been identified as one of the most segregated places in the UK and contains neighbourhoods of significant deprivation (Lincolnshire Research Observatory, 2015). 3 The focus on white migrants in this semi-rural setting offers an original perspective in the field of hate crime studies addressing: the scarcity of studies on ‘hidden’ groups such as white ethnic minorities; experiences of racism in a non-urban setting; and the impact of Brexit on experiences of hate crime. Notwithstanding the difficulties in defining hate crime which has been described as a ‘conceptual quagmire’ (Chakraborti, 2016; Wickes et al. 2016), we view hate crime as involving prejudice associated with a victim’s ‘minority status’ (or perceived status) i.e. race, ethnicity, sexuality, colour, religion, gender and disability. Racist hate crime can be explained by a perspective which Perry (2001) calls ‘doing difference’. This involves the institutionalisation of difference via unequal relations in employment where there can be race discrimination, and also in the cultural sphere where for instance the media may depict minority ethnic groups as the ‘criminal other’ (Wolhuter et al., 2008). The article begins with an overview of literature on hate crime including definitional problems in relation to its ‘ordinariness’ and the need for differentiation between victim groups. We then consider studies of race and racism in non-urban contexts, and highlight critiques of the concept of ‘othering’, including how its binary nature sets up a frame of reference which fails to acknowledge a ‘third space’ (Bhabha, 1994), and which denies agency to victims (Bhatt, 2006). We then discuss the (re)production of raciaised subjects in the context of Brexit. After outlining methods, we discuss findings which include: migrants’ experiences of hate crime; the impact of hate crime including victims’ withdrawal from public life; the impact of Brexit on migrant identities; and instances of resistance in the form of ‘talking back to the othering gaze’ (Jensen, 2011). 4 Hate crime The UK hate crime policy framework as set out by the College of Policing (NPCC, 2004) makes reference not only to hate but to ‘prejudice and hostility’. It requires police forces to record all hate incidents, defined or perceived by a victim or bystander as motivated by prejudice or hostility, even if they do not qualify for classification as a ‘notifiable offence’. Although the protected characteristics that give rise to a hate crime are specified as race, sexual orientation, transgender status, faith and disability, agencies can extend their local policy responses to include other forms of targeted hostility (Chakraborti, 2015). However, Wickes et al.’s (2016) ‘conceptual quagmire’ means hate crime ‘remains a contentious term, with its conceptual, moral, and legal basis continuing to be a perennial source of conjecture’ (Chakraborti, 2016: 578). Chakraborti (2016) draws attention to a disconnect between victims’ lack of awareness of available services to support them and service providers’ lack of familiarity with victims and their problems, resulting in low levels of confidence in officialdom and of reporting, and implications for the continuing marginalization of victims. Scholars call for greater differentiation both between and within victim groups. On the one hand, we might wish to include homeless people, overseas students, those with mental health, drug or alcohol issues, and members of subcultures; on the other, communities consisting of migrants could be divided along temporal lines, between political (older diaspora) migrants and newer economic migrants (Garapich, 2007). Chakraborti and Garland (2012) propose a vulnerability approach which focuses on the context-dependent nature of what constitutes hate crime and how various actors come to be defined. Perry (2001) has been influential in shifting the focus from 5 the individual psychopathy of offenders to societal conditions and the operation of power. Here, racially motivated violence is seen as an extreme response to ‘the other who is out of control, who has overstepped his or her social or political boundaries, thereby challenging the entrenched hierarchies’ (Mason, 2009: 86). Studies have highlighted the ‘ordinariness’ of hate crime in terms of its banality, incorporating everyday kinds of incidents. In Kielinger and Paterson’s (2002) study the majority of reported hate incidents were perpetrated by people who victims had come into contact with in their daily lives. Chakraborti and Garland (2012: 503) highlight banal motivations as including: a departure from standard norms of behaviour through an inability to control language or behaviour in moments of stress, anger, or inebriation; or from a sense of weakness or inadequacy that can stem from a range of subconscious emotional and psychological processes. Hate crime and racism in non-urban contexts It is only recently that scholars have turned their attention to experiences of hate crime and racism in non-urban contexts (Chakraborti and Garland, 2004; Cloke, 2004; Hubbard, 2005) and to the study of ‘hidden’ ethnic minority communities such as Muslim groups, white minority ethnic groups and rural ethnic households. Garland and Chakraborti (2006) note that studies of victimization have tended to focus on the urban setting and ignore experiences of rural racism. In their studies of rural racism in various English counties they highlight a lack of familiarity with difference among many white inhabitants. This resulted in the ‘marginalization of newcomers from mainstream village activities, and especially those from minority ethnic backgrounds who are subjected to a process of “othering” from many white villagers’ (p. 51). The racist hostility 6 that results include verbal abuse and physical attacks that constitute a pattern of victimisation. They also caution that ‘it is unwise to make generalistic assumptions about the “minority ethnic experience” in the countryside as this can be multi-faceted and contingent upon social, spatial and temporal elements’ (ibid: 58). In his study of opposition to asylum centres in the English countryside, Hubbard (2004) notes that notions of the English countryside play a key role in the definition and consolidation of national values. He argues that ‘the community opposition expressed towards … asylum centres was underpinned by a (white) rural imaginary that mapped deviance onto asylum seekers…’ (ibid: 4). The dominant representations of the English landscape leave no room for ethnic ‘otherness’ (Hubbard, 2004). In addition, popular constructions of rural England which focus on images of ‘idyllic, problem-free environments’ and ‘romanticised rurality’ have ‘masked the process of “othering” that works to marginalize particular groups in rural society’ (Chakraborti and Garland, 2004: 383). The ‘othering’ of migrants The concept of ‘othering’ attempts to capture the practices and processes through which the ‘outsider’ is produced. As Bauman notes: In dichotomies crucial for the practice and vision of social order the differentiating power hides as a rule behind one of the members of the opposition. The second member is but the other of the first, the opposite (degraded, suppressed, exiled) side of the first and its creation. Thus abnormality is the other of the norm... woman the other of man, stranger 7 the other of the native, enemy the other of friend, ‘them’ the other of ‘us’. (1991: 14) However, the concept has been criticised for denying victim agency (Bhatt, 2006). Its binary nature also sets up a frame of reference which fails to see an in between or ‘third space’ and which, in the context of the differentiation referred to earlier in relation to people, temporalities, geographical locations and social spaces, denies active agency to a supposedly unified ‘voiceless subaltern’ (ibid: 101). In the Location of Cutlure, Bhabha’s (1994; see also Soja, 1996) theory of cultural difference provides us with the conceptual vocabulary of ‘hybridity’ and the ‘third space’. He develops Turner’s concept of liminality to propose the concept of third space as a position from which new identities/potentialities emerge. ‘Third space’ is criticial of essentialist positions of identity and of ‘originary culture’ (Bhabra, 1994). Third space contains new possibilities. It is a space in which cultural meaning and representation have no ‘primordial unity or fixity’ (Bhabha, 1994). Jensen (2011) addresses critiques of ‘othering’ with reference to McLaren’s (1994) situated ‘oppositional agency’. McLaren similarly opposes essentialist categories: ‘difference is always a product of history, culture, power, and ideology. Differences occur between and among groups and must be understood in terms of the specificity of their production.’ (1994: 126). In his study of young ethnic minority men in Denmark, Jensen restores agency to the ‘othered’ through strategies that he terms ‘capitalization’ (appropriating elements of othering discourses in an attempt to imbue the category with symbolic value) and ‘refusal’ (articulating distance from the category by ‘talking back’ to the othering gaze). Jensen’s interviewees attempted to carve out a third space which was ‘not defined by firstness and otherness, but transcends the dichotomy: 8 simply as a normal human being - not Danish, but also not different from the Danish’ (2011: 74). Building on Thomas and Znaniecki’s (1918-20) pioneering work, Temple (2010) shows how immigrants occupy a ‘third space’ as part of ‘social becoming’. In her study, Polish migrants had different orientations towards: the learning and speaking of English; the values they perceived to be characteristic of Polish and ‘English’ culture; readings of class and access to different sections of society; and how integrated what they wanted to become in a context of uncertainty about their length of stay. This differentiation is echoed in Ryan’s (2017) notion of levels of ‘embeddedness’ in four sectors of household, workplace, neighbourhood and wider community. Finally, studies show how migrants actively differentiate themselves through discourses of personal responsibility. In Cederberg’s (2014) study, a responsibility to learn and speak the ‘host’ country’s language and to resist becoming ‘segregated’ by ‘excluding oneself’ is invoked as part of the presentation of a ‘responsible citizen’ identity – a consciously ‘managed’ self that can be distinguished from other less ‘well-behaved’ immigrants. ‘Boundary work’ is engaged in by migrants to draw distinctions between ‘poor subaltern’ immigrants and themselves as ‘mobile professionals’ (Bygnes, 2015). Brexit and the (re)production of racialized subjects McDonald and Erez (2007) suggest that being a person in a foreign land carries with it a special set of vulnerabilities and disadvantages that add to and interact with other social statuses which people occupy. Even individuals who are relatively privileged in terms of education and other resources are ‘forced to the back of the social line when they become foreigners’ (p. 6). Fox et al. 9 (2012) show how immigration policy and tabloid journalism interact to reproduce ‘racialized’ subjects in relation to Eastern European migrants (Hungarians and Romanians) in the UK. They argue that while immigration policy includes subjects on the basis of shared whiteness, tabloid newspapers tend toward a cultural racism that is exclusionary on the basis of putative cultural differences. Racialization occurs when the category of ‘race’ is invoked in discursive and institutional practices to interpret, order and structure social relations. ‘Race’ in this sense is not an essential trait of migrants, but rather the socially constructed outcome of processes and practices of exclusion. Racialization does not require putative phenotypical or biological difference but can make use of (and/or construct) cultural traits as a basis of differentiation. Their case demonstrates that the nominal absence of somatic difference does not get in the way of xenophobic racism. Rather, racialized difference can be invented in situ. Whiteness is not only a subtle determinant of immigration policy but also the contingent outcome of policy, practices, and processes that operate according to other logics. Tabloid media framings using metaphors of floods, deluges, inundations, swamps, streams, hordes and invasions ‘are not openly or crudely racist; rather they hint at and simultaneously validate taken- for-granted assumptions about the relationship between immigration and race accrued from the past’ (ibid: 687). Regardless of their actual race/ethnicity, culturally-established stigma is transferred from one group to another. This cultural racism occurs when ‘essentialized cultural and social characteristics … are indiscriminately imputed to people identified with ethno- national labels’ (ibid: 690). In the policy process, Eastern Europeans are desirable because they conform to racialized understandings of ‘Europeanness’ while in the tabloids it is not shared whiteness operating as a basis of inclusion, but cultural difference operating as a criterion for 10 exclusion. In relation to the EU Brexit vote, Virdee and McGeever (2017) argue that the history of immigration to Britain has been so racialized over time that a reservoir of latent racism was activated in the referendum campaigning through the production of appropriately coded language. Messages ranged from immigrants ‘sponging’ off the welfare state and ‘bleeding’ the National Health Service dry, to being involved in criminality (Berry, 2016). Immigration overtook economic issues towards the end of the referendum campaign (Deacon et al., 2016). More than 6,000 racist hate crimes were reported to the National Police Chiefs Council in the four weeks after the result was declared (NPCC, 2016). Perpetrators made little attempt to distinguish between black and brown citizens and white European migrants: ‘In their eyes, they were all outsiders’ (Virdee and McGeever, 2017: 7). Our study of the experiences of white Eastern European migrants in the post-Brexit climate, with its focus on the semi-rural setting of Lincolnshire and the ‘hidden’ experiences of victimization of this particular white ethnic group, presents an important and timely analysis which adds an original perspective to the field of hate crime studies and studies of migration, ‘othering’ and racism in non-urban contexts. Methods The discussion draws on data collected from semi-structured interviews with Eastern European migrants in Lincolnshire and observations at community meetings. Access was provided by Lincolnshire Police. Purposive sampling, followed by snowball sampling, was initially effective. 11 The sample was extended via contact with additional community groups and organisations (e.g. victim support services). The final sample consisted of 11 interviewees (eight women and three men, ranging in age from 20 to 50). They had come to the UK from Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and the Ukraine and most had been in the UK for 12 years, often working in other parts of the country before settling in Lincoln or Boston for work or to establish a family. The observations (over 2 days) were conducted by the Research Assistant and included informal conversations with migrants at local community group meetings, access to which was initially provided by Lincolnshire Police. The specific details of the events attended are not discussed for reasons of confidentiality. Participants initially claimed not to have experienced what they understood as hate crime, despite refering to experiences that qualified in law. It became clear that his was because in many cases their experiences of hate crime (including most prominently verbal abuse) had become routinized and normalised within everyday life and community interactions. We therefore tailored our interview schedule accordingly to explore community relations and sentiments around immigration and Brexit more broadly. Throughout the study we adopted an inductive approach, being guided by the emergence of key themes in interviews including any we had not initially considered. Analysis followed a thematic approach, a key aspect of which is flexibility (Braun and Clarke, 2006). We followed Braun and Clarke’s six stages of analysis which include: familiarising yourself with the data; generating initial codes; searching for themes; reviewing themes; defining and naming themes; and producing the report. The analysis was first conducted individually by each of the authors, and then identified themes were reviewed, compared and discussed. As researchers we were all active in identifying themes, selecting those of interest, 12 and disemminating them to various audiences. The study received university ethics approval. Participants’ identities were anonymized by assigning participant numbers. We recognise that recruiting through community organisations is likely to result in a degree of self selection of those who feel they have something to say. However, in a project the aim of which is to explore perspectives on and experiences of an under-reported crime, this may be seen as a strength rather than a disadvantage. It requires a broader approach and an awareness of any apparent agenda interviewees may have. Designing our interview schedule to explore community relations and sentiments around immigration and Brexit more broadly, was effecive as a ‘way in’ rather than directly asking about experiences of hate crime to solicit accounts of the kinds of hate-related ‘incidents’ which qualify as ‘crimes’ according to the legislation. This also enabled us, when undertaking thematic analysis of the data, not only to include the kinds of ‘incidents’ described, but to categorise and contextualise them. While our findings rest on a small number of interviewees, the observations we conducted in our meetings with police and community groups in the setting up of the project, during the observations, and in the presentation of findings to stakeholders, mean that we are reflecting a range of experiences and responses to hate crime from (white Eastern European) victims in the period following the ‘Brexit’ vote, which serve to illuminate the parameters of a hidden and under-reported phenomenon. Findings 1. Experiences of hate crime: banal and everyday Given the ‘hidden’ nature of the experiences of groups such as white eastern European migrants, it is important initially to highlight the everyday and banal nature of hate crime in this semi-rural 13 context – to surface experiences such as verbal abuse, physical and symbolic violence, and exploitation from employers. Within the broader definition of hate crime which we adopted, the most common experiences our interviewees related were of verbal abuse. Being sworn at typically consisted of being called ‘Fucking foreigners’ (e.g. when chatting to a friend in a night club queue) and told to ‘Fuck off’ (interviewee 3, Hungarian, female, in UK since 2002). Interviewee 1 (Polish, in UK since 2005) told us that 12 years earlier when she first arrived, people were more interested than antagonistic but that had changed, first with the recession in 2008, when comments like ‘Pack your bags and go home’ or ‘What you still doing here?’ were heard, and then again following the Brexit vote, so that now, ‘You won’t go a week without hearing something’. Others observed that people found it much easier to be hostile and abusive online: ‘I had a few incidents on social media where someone said to me that all of us should be deported, should go back to where we came from’ (interviewee 5, Polish, female, in UK since 2004). Those who had only experienced verbal abuse knew of others who had experienced physical violence: A lot of the guys like to go fishing… one of the gentlemen went to do some fishing and was approached by a family… after they hear his accent they started to say nasty things … and throwed stones at him … one of the stones hit his head so he was bleeding. (Interviewee 1, Polish, female, in UK since 2005) 14 Incidents also occurred in the workplace. A taxi driver, for example, explained how he regularly encountered xenophobia when listening to passengers swearing at ‘foreigners’ before they realised that he was one of them. On the day of the referendum vote someone left a note on his car windscreen which read: ‘Have you packed your bags yet’? After the Brexit vote, he recounted: People were acting like they’ve had unloaded gun in their pockets – they knew they can make us feel unpleasant … it was unloaded but it was shown to us… so it was that unwritten and unsaid situation that was making me … careful if you know what I mean. (Interviewee 4, Polish, in UK since 2004/5) Others experienced exploitation from employers (e.g. having around £80 a week to cover expenses deducted without prior notification, or being hired as an au pair to care for one child when there were three). Such treatment came as a shock since, as one of our interviewees pointed out: Before we even joined the EU we had agencies from the UK coming to Poland recruiting people… we had meetings for up to 200 people who were interested in working in UK … with potential employers… and they were saying… what we will get, they would sort out for everyone accommodation, work, everything needed…many health care companies, factories, agricultural companies… (Interviewee 1, Polish, female, in UK since 2005) Interviewee 3 (Hungarian, in UK since 2002) worked in a clothes shop where she was not only 15 excluded by colleagues but had been assaulted by her supervisor who was ‘against foreign nationals’. He called her a ‘dipshit’ in front of a customer, told her to, ‘Fuck off back to your own country’ and threw a bunch of keys at her, leaving a mark near her eye for days afterwards. The assistant manager who witnessed him verbally abusing her said, ‘Oh boy, you must have pissed him off if he talks to you like that’. 2. The impact of hate crime: withdrawal from public life The ways in which these migrants managed the perceived threat to their safety by withdrawing from public life and spaces had the effect of rendering them both invisible and silenced. Participants spoke of places where they had learned not to ‘open one’s mouth’ – not only in ‘rough’ neighbourhoods where one would feel unsafe as a ‘foreigner’, but in town, at the pub or in a taxi: Some of my friends, they’re engineers, they got PhDs and they don’t go out to town and they don’t speak our language. They speak English because they feel uncomfortable… people will start asking ‘Oh, where you from?’…When you go to the pub now, you don’t tend to speak. (Interviewee 6, Polish, female, in UK since 2007) One participant explained how her friend’s young son refused to speak to her on the phone on his way home: His mum called him and he just texted her saying ‘I can’t speak to you now; I’ll call when I get back home’. When he got home he said to her that the taxi driver made such a 16 horrific comment that he was scared to speak to his mum in Polish. (Interviewee 1, Polish, in UK since 2005) Others known to our participants led an extremely circumscribed life, avoiding certain public or community spaces, and this was amplified in the wake of Brexit: [They] won’t leave the house unless they go shopping to Tesco or Wilkinson or Poundland…never been in coffee shop… been in the UK for eight years but never went to coffee shop…because they don’t feel confident or because they try before and something bad happened. (Interviewee 1, Polish, female, in UK since 2005) There was a parallel process of feeling obliged to be ‘accountable’ for one’s nationality, as illustrated by one interviewee’s experience at a community meeting when a representative of a church organisation asked where she was from. When she said she was from Poland, he said ‘I’m not asking your country, I’m asking the city or the organisation’. She went on: ‘And I’m like, “Sorry, I just got used to so many people asking where I’m from that automatically I’m saying Poland”’ (Interviewee 1, in UK since 2005). A woman from the Czech Republic (interviewee 2, in UK since 2006) recounted how 11 years ago when she came for a finite period to improve her English, she had ended up working with a mixture of Portuguese, Latvians, Lithuanians and Poles, consequently learning more Russian and Polish than English. Returning in 2005 to Lincolnshire, she communicated comfortably with the large Polish community she found but gradually began to acquire what she saw as the British 17 sensibility of politeness. Now she gets annoyed when observing what she sees as rudeness, for example towards shopkeepers and service staff, on the part of the new wave of migrants from Romania and Bulgaria. Furthermore, having moved on from the comfort and security of her early exclusive associations with those (Slavic, Russian and Polish) people who shared cultural traits and festivals, to tending to ‘cling more to the English people’, she thinks that ‘the immigration in this town is too much now’. This is less an issue of ‘mass immigration’ per se, she suggests, but more to do with the strain on public services from increased demand from people who do not speak English, as well as pressure on housing. The ambivalences of the processes of identification are revealed as she relates the last incident she experienced: So that he becomes bilingual, she speaks to her young son in her own language. However, when another child of 12 years of age overheard them talking in a public park, insults followed, with the child calling them both ‘fucking foreigners’. She shouted that she was going to call the police because it was racist and an English woman who observed the incident urged her to do so. However she regarded it as inappropriate since she attributed responsibility to the child’s family. She speaks as a societal ‘insider’ when she adds that it hurt more coming from a child because, ‘it makes you wonder what society is coming to’. She goes on to invoke the trait of politeness: she avoids speaking in Czech is in ‘mixed’ company in order to be ‘considerate’. She knows what it feels like to be in a group of foreign-language speakers and thinks it is ‘rude’ if all those present can speak English but choose not to. 3. The impact of Brexit on migrant identities In a similar vein, a Hungarian whose friends, after 11 years in the UK, are ‘99 percent British’ 18 regards herself as ‘a British person with an eastern European accent’. Comfortable with this until the Brexit vote, she now feels forced to reflect on official citizenship and moving again: We all know about Theresa May’s propositions and it makes my future quite unsteady … I will not be thrown out of the country because I’m an immigrant … if I would have to move out of the UK I would move to Scotland … But I am a bit concerned and that’s why I’m trying to mitigate it. (Interviewee 3, Hungarian, in UK since 2002) A Polish interviewee with a long-term partner, house and job also speaks as a member of British society but her sense of identity has been ‘knocked’ by post-referendum events: It’s really upsetting … looking at the United Kingdom. We supposed to be focused on … society, human rights … freedom of speech, movement, any freedom ... But recently … makes you feel like, is it really worth coming, trying to integrate, learn the language, educating yourself, working hard, if all you get is negative comments and abuse? (Interviewee 1, Polish, in UK since 2005) For others, the impact was in terms of an explicit dis-identification performed through boundary work (Cederberg, 2014). The taxi driver is at pains to differentiate himself from migrants who attract public opprobrium: ‘I would say myself that I’m not happy about some people being here. Because it makes yourself ashamed … I’m passing by all these benches and areas where people are sitting and all what they do, just sitting and drinking’. Nine out of ten of these people ‘would be from exactly the same community back in (their own) country… that’s a different-type level 19 of people’, he adds. However, his experiences of hate crime are compensated for by the messages of support received from other British people (interviewee 4, Polish, in UK since 2004/5). Participants were positioned within the ‘in between’ space described by Temple (2010) – a space which is not static or stable but subject to shifts according to events and influences beyond one’s control. A major influence compounding this insecurity was media discourse (Fox et al., 2012). A Polish interviewee observes the way that both the local city and county newspapers provided ‘a space for people to actually be racist, say racist things without anything happening’. One had published several articles since Brexit, focused on migrant workers and how much pressure migration puts on education and the NHS: ‘And I’m thinking “Why? Why do you do it?” It’s not really true what they say.’ Such reports do not go unnoticed by ‘native’ language media: If you’ve got access to media from your own country, whether it’s Poland or Lithuania or Latvia you get the message that people are not wanted in UK. (Interviewee 1, in UK since 2005) She had to reassure her elderly father in Poland of her safety after he read a report of a racist attack on a man in her locality who later died. A reference she made to family ‘left behind’ highlights another element inherent in occupying a third space – the experience of loss. This was referred to by several interviewees. A Czech woman explained that the recent spike in hate crime had heightened her sense of loss: 20 I don’t feel welcome here after Brexit ... And I see the beauty of my country and every time I just come back from that crying – I want to go home. (Interviewee 2, in UK since 2006) The taxi driver, a self-described ‘romantic’, found Boston unattractive after having lived near ‘lovely little villages like Mevagissey’. But he was no stranger to loss: ‘You just start missing what you had, especially back home’, where he had ‘a few hectares of land and forest and fruit garden and two lakes and dogs and horses’. He believed that some people do not realise how much migrants have sacrificed by moving to the UK: It’s not like we following American dream, going, ‘Yeah, going to be famous, I’m going to live in California, have a swimming pool and 20 bedrooms and 60 dogs … you sacrifice your life, earn so much as you earn and save just to go once a year to see your family. (Interviewee 4, Polish, in UK since 2004/5) 4. Resistance: ‘talking back’ There was evidence of resistance to the negative impacts of victimisation which took the form of ‘talking back to the othering gaze’ (Jensen, 2011). This happened: by refuting banal ‘othering’ discourses; by taking direct action; and by criticising government positions and responses. A number of alternative discourses to those constituting ‘othering’ were offered. In place of accusations about migrants ‘taking our jobs’ from those seen as unwilling to ‘go and work on the fields or in chicken factory for £7.20 per hour, 12-hour shift’, were representations of migrants as 21 tax-payers. Interviewees highlighted the inconsistency and hypocrisy inherent in the fact that British people with businesses in Spain and Italy are rarely enjoined to ‘pack their bags and leave’. In place of blame for demand on educational resources from migrant children with poor English, were claims that they learn the language very quickly, not least because of being bequeathed values about education as the route to a ‘better life’. In place of negative portrayals of all ‘foreigners’ as drunken rough-sleepers, were strategies designed to ‘disaggregate’ the ‘other’ and lay claims to ‘normality’: … there is nothing normal people can do about it. What are you supposed to do? Go on the street and take beer off drunks or drugs from druggies? I shouldn’t be punished for someone else’s behaviour … (Interviewee 5, Polish, female, in UK since 2004) This same participant tackled someone on Facebook who had referred to some ‘foreign idiots’ jumping out in front of a car. She counteracted what she saw as xenophobia by replying, ‘I think they are idiots because they are idiots not because they are foreign’, adding that such comments only serve to make relations in Boston worse than they already are. Her riposte resulted in an ‘avalanche’ of abuse, including criticism of migrants who are not able to speak English. Another context emboldening interviewees to take action was when it involved another. Having encouraged a fellow Polish person to report a crime despite perceptions that the police typically take no action, interviewee 5 became assertive in her demand that someone at the police station take a report from them. When the police were reluctant to do so she threatened to go to the press 22 ‘and create an article about the Boston police not co-operating with foreign nationals and ignoring me because I’m foreign’. ‘And straightaway everything sorted’, she said. Such action was exceptional however and cultural factors associated with styles of policing and perceived issues of national identity were cited as accounting for a reluctance to contact the police. There was a lack of faith that any action would be taken by the police arising on the one hand from a tendency to ‘solve things between ourselves’ rather than be a snitch; and on the other, to the contrast between UK police who liked to look for causes and explanations and police in Poland, who wear guns and ‘get things done’ by being ‘vocal’ or even violent. A lack of faith in the UK police was also compounded by their historical neglect of the issues faced by migrant communities. Pride was identified as a factor prohibiting reporting, especially for men: ‘another thing is the pride… for males… you’re the head of the house so you should be able to cope with things like this’ (interviewee 7, Crimea, female, in UK since 2005). But it also operated for women, one of whom had urged her friend to report an incident but acknowledged that she herself had not reported the abuse she received in shops and online: … I don’t want them to see me suffering. Because then they know that they can hurt me and if they can hurt me, ‘Oh yeah, get in, give more’…And we quite proud nation. (Interviewee 5, Polish, in UK since 2004) 23 There was also ‘talking back’ to the government. It was seen as a failure of the government not only to have created a generation who have never worked, but to have fuelled a discourse of scapegoating migrants: Anything what is going wrong now in UK, whether it’s economy or some sort of politics, the blame goes to migrant workers… we came here, we work, we pay taxes, but it’s our fault. (Interviewee 1, Polish, female, in UK since 2005) This interviewee also sees the EU negotiations as a reprehensible way for a country like the UK to treat its citizens: ‘You just don’t … [say] things like: “You need to wait because we want to get what we want and then we will decide what to do with you”’. Such government-induced insecurity not only represents the breaking of a social contract, but is experienced as a huge betrayal. This led not only to fragmentation between UK and foreign nationals, with increasing hostility accompanying each new wave of immigration, but to intra-group fragmentation arising from a historical mistrust between Polish people and Lithuanians which was amplified post- Brexit vote. The sophisticated analysis employed in these accounts of resistance from a relatively highly-educated sample of migrants and the passion accompanying the examples they gave of ‘speaking back’ highlights the emotional and embodied components of resistance. Discussion and conclusion This paper offers an original addition to the field of hate crime studies by presenting the accounts and experiences of white eastern European migrants in Lincolnshire, England. It addresses the tendency in hate crime studies to ‘overlook’ particular minority groups of ‘hidden’ people such 24 as white eastern European migrants with ‘hidden experiences of vicitmisation’ (Chakraborti, Garland and Spalek, 2004: 34). It focuses on their experences within a semi-rural context thus also shedding light onto experiences of hate crime and racism in non-urban contexts and spaces. These migrants experienced hostility from the community in a routinized and normalized manner highlighting the everyday, ordinary and banal nature of much hate crime (Chakraborti and Garland, 2012). The majority of hate crime incidents experienced by these migrants were verbal (i.e. ‘pack your bags’ and ‘fucking foreigners’) or symbolic (i.e. a note left on the taxi driver’s car windscreen), but there were also accounts of physical abuse. This was exacerbated by Brexit which participants believed had further legitimized pre-existing community sentiments that migrants were ‘a drain on local resources’. The findings mirror those of studies of racism in rural settngs whereby community opposition can be underpinned by a (white) imaginary and the mapping of deviance and outsider status onto migrant groups (Hubbard, 2004). Since our interviewees had been living in the UK for over 10 years, their accounts also uncovered the dynamic nature of the experience of hate crime and some of the ways in which personal experiences of the phenomenon articulate with wider structural, economic and political events. Temporal factors are significant for differentiating the category ‘migrants’ in relation to: when they migrated; how long they have been undergoing processes of identification in a new country; and historical ‘events’ such as recession, the EU Referendum and ‘Brexit’ - events which serve to (re)activate latent hostilities which, when mobilised, disrupt integration both by and within (heterogeneous) migrant ‘communities’. This demonstrates that it is important not to make generalistic assumptions about the ‘minority ethnic experience’ which can be ‘multi- faceted and contingent upon social, spatial and temporal elements’ (Garland and Chakraborti, 25 2006: 58). Their accounts revealed the significance of place and space (‘there’, ‘here’, ‘home’ ‘in between’). Many of our participants had lived and worked elsewhere before settling in Lincoln(shire) and several commented on being struck, on arrival, by the lack of diversity in the area. They shared with many UK graduates a dissonance between educational level and employment opportunities available to them but their experience of hate crime was peculiar to them. They were also ‘out of place’ in the areas in which they resided, at least in relation to their British neighbours there. As a consequence of the hate crime they experienced, they and others they knew found themselves ‘managing’/disciplining the self in a Foucauldian sense by occupying the ‘privatised’ space of taking personal responsibility for their own victimisation (reinforced on occasion by official responses). They also withdrew physically from the community and from public spaces. This included being hypervigilant in certain neighbourhoods, on public transport, and when participating in the night-time economy, and not drawing attention to their ‘foreign language’ or ‘accent’. Some migrants retreated into the private space of their own homes, as the only place they could speak freely without fear of experiencing abuse. Their accounts were also notable for the way they surfaced feelings: ‘You feel like you are the guilty one’, ‘(friends) feel uncomfortable’, ‘he was scared’, ‘they no longer feel confident’. We are (re)inserting (victims’) feelings into the picture (Chakraborti and Garland, 2015). We are also extending the analysis by illuminating the interaction between the two sides’ feelings. If we see 26 perpetrators’ fears as not only projected onto but ‘taken up by’ victims in their individualised/privatised responses, we can identify a dynamic which, once it becomes ‘normalised’ in the way our interviewees described, establishes ‘structures of feeling’. These are structures through which people become ‘inmates’ of their own homes (Funnell, 2015) and through which a politics of fear is perpetuated. As Thompson and Hoggett observe: ‘The patterning of love and hate in conflict situations … provides a glimpse of the way in which feelings contribute to the dynamic ordering of public life’ (2012: 8). There was a suggestion that for those able to do so, a move out of the ‘epicentre’ of the post- Brexit-referendum ‘spike’ in hate crime to a different neighbourhood or to a rural environment, was a move towards closer alignment with their British ‘peers’ – from whom some received much-valued support. There is evidence of Ryan’s (2017) ‘differentiated embedding’ across household, workplace, neighbourhood and wider community. But to reiterate, in each domain, the trajectory and patterning of the embedding process was to a significant degree determined by an individualised response from victims themselves rather than by legal or institutional responses. The public spaces of social and print media and policy discourse was also experienced as hostile and complicit in both the perpetration of hate crime and the necessity for victims to manage it. For instance, this was reflected in instances when they had to reassure elderly family members who were fearful for their migrant sons and daughters after reading media reports of hate crime in UK. ‘Home’ as place also figures powerfully in migrants’ experience of loss: of a former ‘beautiful’ home only now accessible via occasional holiday visits or in memory and 27 imagination. No longer having relational ties with one’s country/culture of origin was identified as significant in the transition to a partial UK national identity, for example as ‘British with a foreign accent’. These movements back and forth in time and space reveal an unsteady foothold in a ‘third space’ (Bhabra, 1994) rendered even more unstable by wider events and influences. It is an ‘unsteadiness’ constituted by an alignment between: the ubiquitous insecurity within the labour market for the neoliberal worker-subject which these migrants largely espoused in their efforts to construct a self-reliant entrepreneurial self (amplified by the exploitation of dishonest and deceptive employers); and being victims of hate crime. It was an unsteadiness further compounded by the ongoing uncertainty, post-Brexit, of their status as UK residents. This ‘in between’ status nevertheless leaves space for (constrained) forms of agency and we saw our interviewees exerting this in a number of ways, collectively portrayed here as resistance and ‘talking back to the othering gaze’ (Jensen, 2011). In addition to performing the kind of boundary work that portrayed them as distinct from those migrants to be found drunk on public benches, we saw them offering alternative narratives to those circulated by hate crime perpetrators and media outlets, in relation to work, education, health and housing. We heard them criticising and challenging state responses. Finally, some were taking direct action - on social media, in face-to-face public interactions and in interactions with officialdom. In the light of their accounts, we characterise these passionate and deeply-felt resistant responses as a rejection of a victim identity and as a staging post en route to the emergence of a political subject – one which evidences the operation of agency within processes of othering of these migrants, 28 graphically illustrated by one interviewee’s assertion that she ‘will not be thrown out of the country because I’m an immigrant’. We acknowledge that this study focuses on the experiences of a small sample of migrants and therefore call for future research in hate crime studies to explore in more depth (and via comparative studies) the experiences of ‘hidden’ migrant groups in semi-rural and rural contexts. Greater discussion of the ‘conceptual quagmire’ (Chakraborti, 2016) around hate crime, experiences of and responses to it in non-urban contexts, and by various overlooked ethnic minority groups such as white eastern European migrants, is vital as we seek to map and evaluate the effects of the EU (Brexit) referendum. References Bauman Z (1991) Modernity and Ambivalence. Cambridge: Polity Press. Berry M (2016) Understanding the role of the mass media in the EU Referendum. In: Jackson D, Thorsen E, Wring D (eds) EU Referendum Analysis 2016. Poole, UK: Bournemouth University. Bhabha HK (1994) The Location of Culture. New York: Routledge. Braun V, Clarke C (2006) Using thematic analysis in psychology. 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work_jshe4ovg3zcvpajbhqkdjlhloa	----	               City, University of London Institutional Repository Citation: Owusu-Bempah, A. (2015). Prosecuting hate crime: procedural issues and the future of the aggravated offences. Legal Studies, 35(3), pp. 443-462. doi: 10.1111/lest.12072 This is the accepted version of the paper. This version of the publication may differ from the final published version. Permanent repository link: http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/12629/ Link to published version: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/lest.12072 Copyright and reuse: City Research Online aims to make research outputs of City, University of London available to a wider audience. Copyright and Moral Rights remain with the author(s) and/or copyright holders. URLs from City Research Online may be freely distributed and linked to. City Research Online: http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/ publications@city.ac.uk City Research Online http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/ mailto:publications@city.ac.uk 1 Prosecuting Hate Crime: Procedural issues and the future of the aggravated offences INTRODUCTION In a report published by the Home Office in 2002, the structure of the racially aggravated offences in the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 was described as ‘the cause of many a procedural headache’. 1 Recent case law, as well as several responses to a Law Commission consultation on hate crime, suggest that this is still the case. The racially and religiously 2 aggravated offences are complex. They are more serious versions of certain pre-existing offences, and this can present prosecutors with difficult charging decisions. At trial, the consequences of a misunderstanding or misapplication of the offences are significant, and include, not only poor outcomes for victims, but also the imposition of improper and unjustified convictions and sentences. An examination of the procedural issues associated with the aggravated offences fell outside of the scope of the Law Commission’s recently completed hate crime project. 3 As part of this project, the Commission examined the case for extending the racially and religiously aggravated offences in the 1998 Act, so that they also cover disability, sexual orientation and transgender identity. In its final report, the Commission recommended that a full-scale review of the operation of the existing aggravated offences be carried out, before a decision is taken as to whether they should be extended. 4 The Commission noted that, ‘If the current offences are flawed in their structure or operation, there will be little benefit for future victims of hate crime for the offences to be extended in their current form.’ 5 A wider review could reveal whether changes to the structure or elements of the existing offences are required, or whether they should be repealed. If the recommendation for a wider review is not supported by Government, the Commission 1 E Burney and G Rose Racist Offences: How is the Law Working? (Home Office Research Study 244, 2002) p 17. 2 As originally enacted, the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 included only racially aggravated offences. Religiously aggravated offences were added by the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, s 39. 3 Law Commission Hate Crime: The Case for Extending the Existing Offences – A Consultation Paper (Consultation No 213, 2013); Law Commission Hate Crime: Should the Current Offences be Extended? (Law Com No 348, 2014). 4 Law Com No 348, para 5.102. 5 Ibid, para 5.83. 2 recommended in the alternative that the offences be extended in order to bring about equality of treatment across the five statutorily recognised hate crime characteristics. 6 There is a growing body of literature concerning the appropriate substantive elements of hate crime offences and the rationale of hate crime legislation, 7 which the Law Commission suggested be addressed as part of the wider review. 8 While these are important matters to be considered in determining the future of the aggravated offences, this article will focus on the equally important procedural issues which arise from the structure of the existing racially and religiously aggravated offences, and the significant problems thereby caused during the prosecution of the offences. The main focus will be alternative charges and alternative verdicts, which were identified as the main areas of procedural concern in 2002. 9 A doctrinal examination of these procedural issues is important in its own right, in order to determine whether there can be effective administration of justice in individual cases. The examination is further necessitated by the fact that a failure to properly prosecute the aggravated offences, due to procedural problems, could undermine the aims of the offences, which include combatting racism and xenophobia, and improving social cohesion. At the same time as creating an impression that hate crime will not, or cannot, be effectively prosecuted, the procedural issues also put defendants at risk of injustice. The article begins with a brief overview of the structure of the offences and the separate enhanced sentencing provisions which operate alongside them. It then goes on to assess the available charging options, including the advantages and disadvantages of laying alternative charges, covering both the 6 Ibid, para 5.105. 7 See, for example, I Hare ‘Legislating Against Hate: The Legal Response to Bias Crime’ (1997) 17 OJLS 415; J Jacobs and K Potter Hate Crime: Criminal Law and Identity Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998); M Malik ‘“Racist Crime”: Racially Aggravated Offences in the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 Part II’ (1999) 62 MLR 409; P Iganski ‘Hate Crimes Hurt More’ (2001) 45 American Behavioral Scientist 626; H Hurd and M Moore ‘Punishing Hatred and Prejudice’ (2004) 56 Stanford Law Review 1081; B Dixon and D Gadd ‘Getting the Message? “New” Labour and the Criminalization of “Hate”’ (2006) 6 Criminology and Criminal Justice 309; P Iganski Hate Crime and the City (Bristol: Policy Press 2008); D Gadd ‘Aggravating Racism and the Elusive Motivation’ (2009) 49 British Journal of Criminology 775; K Goodall ‘Conceptualising “Racism” in Criminal Law’ (2013) 33 LS 215; N Hall Hate Crime (New York: Routledge, 2013); J Stanton-Ife Extending the Aggravated Offences to Include Disability, Sexual Orientation and Transgender Identity: Theoretical Arguments (2013) available at http://lawcommission.justice.gov.uk/docs/Hate_Crime_Theory-Paper_Dr-John-Stanton-Ife.pdf (last accessed on 25 June 2014); M Walters ‘Conceptualizing “Hostility” for Hate Crime Law: Minding “the Minutiae” when Interpreting Section 28(1)(a) of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998’ (2014) 34 OJLS 47. 8 Law Com No 348, para 5.90. 9 Burney and Rose, above n 1, p 17. http://lawcommission.justice.gov.uk/docs/Hate_Crime_Theory-Paper_Dr-John-Stanton-Ife.pdf 3 aggravated offence and the lesser offence encompassed within it. Next, it considers how some of the problems associated with alternative charges can be alleviated by, instead, leaving alternative verdicts. However, alternative verdicts can only be returned in the Crown Court and can also create difficulties. The article then turns to the issue of inconsistent verdicts, which can occur when more than one aggravated offence is charged. It will be argued that juries are not always directed appropriately, resulting in a possible under-conviction or over-conviction of the defendant. By upholding convictions where there is, arguably, an inconsistent verdict, the Court of Appeal has done little to rectify this problem. 10 The procedural issues explored in this article are not confined to the racially and religiously aggravated offences; they can be relevant to other types of offending, where the offence charged includes a separate and less serious offence. 11 Yet, the issues are most pertinent in relation to the aggravated offences. Given that tackling hate crime is currently high on the Government’s agenda, 12 extension of the offences, either before or after a wider review, is not improbable. 13 It is, therefore, important to appreciate and understand the complex nature of the existing offences, in the hope that past experience can minimise a reoccurrence of significant mistakes being made during future prosecution of these offences. However, it becomes apparent from an assessment of the relevant policy, legislation and recent case law, that the most pragmatic solution would be to repeal the existing aggravated offences, and rely on sentencing legislation to deal with offending involving hostility on the basis of, or towards, particular personal characteristics. This solution is endorsed in the final section which summarises the current procedural issues and considers the future of the aggravated offences. THE AGGRAVATED OFFENCES AND THE ENHANCED SENTENCING REGIME 10 See, for example, Mihocic [2012] EWCA Crim 195, discussed below. 11 For example, if an offender is guilty of wounding with intent contrary to s 18 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, they must also have committed the lesser offence of wounding contrary to s 20. Another example is the offence of possession of a controlled drug with intent to supply contrary to s 5(3) of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971, which includes the lesser offence of possession of a controlled drug contrary to s 5(1). 12 See, HM Government Challenge it, Report it, Stop it: the Government’s Plan to Tackle Hate Crime (2012). 13 It should be noted that the next general election will take place in May 2015. It is highly unlikely that a wider review could be completed by this time. However, it is likely that, even with a change in government, tackling hate crime will remain on the political agenda. 4 The procedural problems which can arise during the prosecution of the aggravated offences are primarily caused by the structure of the offences. It is, therefore, helpful to set out the basic structure and substantive elements of the offences before examining the problems. Although it is outside the scope of this article to assess the theoretical underpinnings of the offences, some consideration will also be given to the aims of the offences, and to whether sentencing legislation can meet those aims. This issue is dealt with more fully in the final section of the article. The Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (the 1998 Act) created aggravated versions of 11 pre-existing, or ‘basic’, offences. These offences are set out in ss 29 through 32 of the Act. They cover various forms of assault, 14 criminal damage, 15 various public order offences, 16 and harassment and stalking offences. 17 The racially and religiously aggravated offences carry higher maximum sentences than their basic offence counterparts. In accordance with s 28(1) of the 1998 Act, the basic offence becomes aggravated if: (a) at the time of committing the offence, or immediately before or after doing so, the offender demonstrated towards the victim of the offence hostility based on the victim’s membership (or presumed membership) of a racial or religious group; or (b) the offence is motivated (wholly or partly) by hostility towards members of a racial or religious group based on their membership of that group. Section 28(1)(a) requires only an outward demonstration of hostility, which will often be verbal or written. Liability is not contingent on the subjective state of mind of the defendant; whether or not the basic offence was committed because of animosity towards the victim’s race or religion is has been said to be irrelevant. 18 As such, it can include those who may have been caught up in the ‘heat of the moment’. 19 However, the legislation is not clear on whether it is sufficient to prove that, absent the 14 Crime and Disorder Act 1998, s 29. 15 Crime and Disorder Act 1998, s 30. 16 Crime and Disorder Act 1998, s 31. 17 Crime and Disorder Act 1998, s 32. 18 See, for example, DPP v Woods [2002] EWHC 85 (Admin); DPP v Green [2004] EWHC 1225 (Admin). 19 See Walters, above n 7, at 63-70. 5 defendant’s mental state, the conduct objectively demonstrated hostility. Walters has argued that the defendant should at least be aware that his expression is likely to be perceived by other right-minded individuals as being one of racial or religious hostility. 20 Section 28(1)(b), on the other hand, requires proof that the offending behaviour was motivated by hostility. Sections 28(1)(a) and 28(1)(b) provide two separate means of establishing the commission of an aggravated offence. Yet, the distinction between the two limbs of s 28 has caused a great deal of confusion, particularly in the lower courts. Numerous reported cases indicate that some trial judges mistakenly proceed on the basis that a subjective motivation must be proved for each limb of the offence. 21 Walters notes that, in addition to this confusion, there has been a reluctance on the part of some judges to apply s 28(1)(a) in cases where the demonstration of hostility appears to be incidental, as against casual, to the offence committed. 22 A failure to understand or properly apply the basic requirements of s 28 fuels concern that the procedural complexities discussed below cannot be easily avoided or resolved. The two limbs of s 28 are drafted widely. Section 28(1)(a) also covers situations in which hostility is demonstrated on the basis of an association with members of a racial or religious group, 23 and where the offender mistakenly presumes the victim to belong to a particular racial or religious group. 24 Section 28(1)(b) requires only that the offender was motivated in part by hostility towards members of a racial or religious group. Racial or religious hostility may, therefore, be a minor cause of the offending behaviour. Section 28(3) provides that, for the purposes of both s 28(1)(a) and s 28(1)(b), it is immaterial whether or not the offender's hostility is also based, to any extent, on any other factor not mentioned in the provisions. In addition, the terms ‘racial’ and ‘religious’ have been interpreted broadly and flexibly, 25 in order to reflect the underlying policy aims of the statute. As stated by Baroness Hale, ‘The mischiefs 20 Ibid. 21 See, for example, SH [2010] EWCA 1931 (Admin); Jones v DPP [2010] EWHC 523 (Admin); RG v DPP [2004] EWHC 183 (Admin); DPP v M [2004] EWHC 1453 (Admin); DPP v Woods [2002] EWHC 85 (Admin). 22 Walters, above n 7, at 61-63. 23 Crime and Disorder Act 1998, s 28(2). See DPP v Pal [2000] Crim LR 756. 24 Crime and Disorder Act 1998, s 28(2). 25 Crime and Disorder Act 1998, ss 28(4) and 28(5). See also, DPP v M [2004] EWHC 1453 (Admin); White [2001] EWCA Crim 216. 6 attacked by the aggravated versions of these offences are racism and xenophobia.’ 26 For example, calling someone a ‘bloody foreigner’ can amount to a demonstration of hostility based on membership of a racial group. 27 One way in which the offences might achieve the aim of tackling racism and xenophobia is through their symbolic and communicative function. They send a clear message that hate crimes are considered to be more serious, and different in kind, to basic offences, and will invoke special condemnation and enhanced levels of punishment. 28 Hate crimes have the potential to cause greater harm than the basic offences and, therefore, increase the offender’s culpability. 29 They are a direct attack on the victim’s sense of identity and can result in psychological harm which is suffered not only by the victim, but also by other minority group members and their wider communities. 30 By denouncing racial and religious hostility, the aggravated offences have the potential to contribute to a positive shift in societal attitudes regarding racism and xenophobia and, therefore, to secure social cohesion. In addition to the harsher sentences that follow conviction, the aggravated offences also carry a ‘label’ which reflects the more serious nature of the offending behaviour, and which can reinforce the communicative and denunciatory effect of the offences. The aggravated element of the conviction appears on the offender’s criminal record, and the conviction may be reported in the media as being racially or religiously aggravated. Accurate labelling serves to describe to the public the nature of the wrongdoing and the level of harm caused, as well as providing criminal justice professionals, including sentencing judges and probation staff, with information necessary to enable them to make fair and sensible decisions. 31 However, the specific and general deterrent effects of the aggravated offences are far from certain. In fact, in some cases, leaving court feeling stigmatised could result in rejection of the court’s 26 Rogers [2007] UKHL 8 at [12]. 27 DPP v M [2004] EWHC 1453 (Admin); Rogers [2007] UKHL 8. 28 Consultation No 213, paras 3.29 and 3.72; Law Com No 348, paras 4.65-4.89. 29 See, for example, F Lawrence Punishing Hate: Bias Crimes Under American Law (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999); Iganski 2008, above n 7. 30 Walters, above n 7, at 72-73. 31 See J Chalmers and F Leverick ‘Fair Labelling in Criminal Law’ (2008) 71 MLR 217. 7 ethical position and lead to recidivism. 32 It is possible that other public awareness and educative measures, short of criminal offences, would be better placed to secure more positive societal attitudes towards ethnic and religious diversity. 33 There are two statutory sentencing provisions which operate alongside the aggravated offences, and which will be referred to as the ‘enhanced sentencing regime’. These are ss 145 and 146 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (the 2003 Act). If applied appropriately, the enhanced sentencing regime could provide a viable alternative to having aggravated offences. Section 145 requires the sentencing judge to pass a higher sentence than would ordinarily be imposed if, at the time of committing an offence, or immediately before or after doing so, the offender demonstrated racial or religious hostility, or the offence was motivated by racial or religious hostility, in the same way as required for the aggravated offences. Section 146 does the same in relation to disability, sexual orientation and transgender identity. The sentence imposed cannot exceed the maximum available for the offence charged. The maximum sentence which could be imposed for a ‘basic offence’, applying s 145, would, therefore, be lesser than that available for an aggravated offence under the 1998 Act. However, in practice, the sentences imposed for the aggravated offences tend to fall well below the maximum available for the basic offence. 34 Where ss 145 or 146 is applied, the judge must state in open court that the offence was aggravated, 35 but, unlike the aggravated offences, this fact will not be recorded on the Police National Computer (PNC) and, so, will not show on the offender’s criminal record. Likewise, the offending behaviour itself is not described, or ‘labelled’, as racially or religiously aggravated. As such, one could argue that the sentencing regime lacks the symbolic and communicative function of the aggravated offences. However, this need not be the case. The enhanced sentence itself can represent fairly the ‘nature and magnitude of the law-breaking’, which is a concern of the principle of fair labelling. 36 Moreover, as 32 See E Burney ‘Using the Law on Racially Aggravated Offences’ [2003] Crim LR 28 at 35. 33 See Law Com No 348, paras 4.89-4.101. 34 See Law Commission Hate Crime: The Case for Extending the Existing Offences Appendix C - Impact Assessment (Consultation Paper No 213, 2013) para C.61. 35 Criminal Justice Act 2003, ss 145(2)(b) and 146(3)(b). 36 A Ashworth and J Horder Principles of Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 7 th edn, 2013) p 77. 8 well as stating that the offence was aggravated, the judge, at the public sentencing hearing, must state the reasons for deciding on the sentence passed. 37 Since the judge’s sentencing remarks can be made available to the public, and since local and national media can report the length and type of sentence imposed in individual cases, the enhanced sentencing regime has the potential to convey the desired message at least as effectively as the aggravated offences. 38 In addition, the Law Commission recommended improvements to the enhanced sentencing regime, in order to make it more effective, including recording the application of the sentencing provisions on the PNC in individual cases. 39 These recommendations are considered further in the final section of this article. The operation of the sentencing provisions, and the benefits of using them as a means of dealing with hate crime, was explored at length by the Law Commission. 40 Suffice it to point out here that, unlike the fixed list of offences which can be aggravated under the 1998 Act, the sentencing provisions can be used to increase the sentence for any offence. As such, they can address a whole range of hostility-based offending, including theft and sexual offences. However, the aggravated offences and the enhanced sentencing regime are ‘mutually exclusive’; the enhanced sentencing regime applies in relation to all offences other than the offences under ss 29-32 of the 1998 Act. 41 As discussed below, this mutual exclusivity is relevant to an examination of the procedural complexities of the aggravated offences. ALTERNATIVE CHARGES Many of the procedural issues which can be encountered during the prosecution of the aggravated offences concern alternative charges. Where there is sufficient evidence that an aggravated offence has been committed, the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) can charge both the basic offence and the aggravated offence, or, if the case is tried in the Crown Court, include counts covering both offences in 37 Criminal Justice Act 2003, s 174(2). 38 Stanton-Ife, above n 7, p 55-56; Law Com No 348, paras 4.82-4.86. 39 Law Com No 348, para 3.104. 40 Consultation No 213, ch. 3. See also, A Owusu-Bempah ‘Improving Sentencing of Hate Crimes’ (2013) 177 Criminal Law and Justice Weekly 559. 41 Criminal Justice Act 2003, s 145(1). 9 the indictment. The CPS’s Guidance on Racist and Religious Crime states that consideration should be given in all cases to putting alternative charges covering both the basic and the racially or religiously aggravated offences. 42 There are pragmatic reasons for this guidance. As discussed below, charging only the basic or aggravated offence can lead to undesirable results. However, there can also be significant consequences if the purpose of alternative charges is not properly understood. Charging decisions If there is evidence that an aggravated offence has been committed, but only the basic offence is charged, there may be no opportunity to take account of racial or religious hostility as an aggravating factor at sentencing, applying s 145 of the 2003 Act. This is because, as explained above, the aggravated offences and the enhanced sentencing regime are mutually exclusive. However, the full extent of the mutual exclusivity is not clear, 43 and this may lead to inconsistency in case outcomes. There is some authority, as well as practitioner guidance, which suggests that if an aggravated offence was available, but not charged, s 145 cannot apply. 44 On the other hand, it has been contended that the relevant case law has been misunderstood, and that, while s 145 cannot apply to the aggravated offences themselves (or to the basic offence following an acquittal of the aggravated offence), it is open to the court to apply s 145 where the aggravated offence could have been, but was not, charged. 45 It is submitted here that the former interpretation is preferable; s 145 should not apply to the basic offences which can be charged as aggravated offences under the 1998 Act. This is consistent with the principle that an offender should not be sentenced for a more serious offence than the offence of which he has been convicted. 46 If there is 42 Crown Prosecution Service Racist and Religious Crime – CPS Guidance http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/p_to_r/racist_and_religious_crime/#a15 (last accessed 25 June 2014). 43 Law Com No 348, paras 2.65-2.71. 44 See, for example, McGillivray [2005] EWCA Crim 604; O’Callaghan [2005] EWCA Crim 317; Sentencing Council Magistrates’ Court Sentencing Guidelines (2008) p 178; Anthony and Berryman’s Magistrates’ Court Guide (2013) para B5.2B; Crown Prosecution Service, above n 421. 45 R Taylor ‘The Role of the Aggravated Offences in Combating Hate Crime 15 Years After the Crime and Disorder Act 1998: Time for Change?’ (2014) 13 Contemporary Issues in Law 76. 46 See, for example, Druce (1993) 14 Cr App R (S) 691; Davies [1998] 1 Cr App R (S) 380; Canavan [1998] 1 WLR 604. http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/p_to_r/racist_and_religious_crime/#a15 10 evidence of racial or religious hostility, then the aggravated offence should be charged. If it is not charged, then the more serious nature of the offending behaviour should not be reflected in the sentence. However, if only the aggravated offence is charged, and the prosecution are unsuccessful in proving the aggravated element, the defendant must be acquitted, despite evidence that he committed the basic offence. This is subject to the possibility of an alternative verdict being returned, if the case is tried on indictment, as discussed in the next section. If the offence is tried in the magistrates’ court, where there is no power to return an alternative verdict to a lesser offence, the opportunity for a conviction of the basic offence will be lost. One benefit of alternative charges is that the defendant will not escape liability for the basic offence because the trier of fact was not satisfied that the offence was motivated by racial or religious hostility, or that such hostility was demonstrated towards the victim. If only the aggravated offence is charged and a guilty plea to the basic offence is offered, but rejected, the plea must be treated as of no effect and withdrawn. If the defendant is then tried for the aggravated offence, and the aggravated element is not proven, the earlier plea cannot be used as a basis for a verdict of guilty to the basic offence. This mistake was made by the judge in the recent case of Al- Tamimi, 47 in which the prosecution could offer no evidence of racial aggravation at trial and, so, the judge directed not guilty verdicts, but then directed that a verdict of guilty be entered for basic criminal damage, based upon an earlier rejected plea. The defendant was then given a conditional discharge and ordered to pay costs. The Court of Appeal held that neither the conviction nor sentence could stand. Since the earlier plea had been rejected, there was no residual conviction of the lesser offence for which the defendant could be sentenced. 48 This case highlights one of the most considerable problems which can arise from the structure of the aggravated offences. The fact that the aggravated offences subsume lesser offences can lead to the mistaken imposition of improper and wrongful convictions and sentences when only the aggravated offence is charged, but only the basic offence can be proven. 47 [2011] EWCA Crim 1123. 48 Ibid, at [18]. 11 Charge bargaining Despite the pragmatic reasoning, charging both the basic and the aggravated offence can have undesirable consequences, including ‘charge bargaining’. Some prosecutors may be willing to accept a plea of guilty to the basic offence on the condition that the aggravated charge is dropped. When the racially aggravated offences first came into force, there was concern that this practice was taking place. In a study conducted for the Home Office, Burney and Rose found that some prosecutors were willing to accept pleas to the basic offence, and that racially aggravated charges were frequently withdrawn or downgraded to the basic offence before trial at the Crown Court. 49 Accepting a plea to the basic offence and dropping the charge of the aggravated offence risks creating the impression that hate crime is not taken seriously, particularly as there will be no opportunity to reflect the racial or religious aspect of the offending in the sentence for the basic offence. Both victims and the wider community may be left feeling that hate crime legislation is something of an empty gesture. In some situations, the defendant could also be adversely affected by the possibility of a charge bargain. For example, a defendant who is maintaining innocence of both charges may face pressure from the prosecution or his own lawyer to plead guilty to the basic offence because, not only will he receive a lesser sentence than if convicted of the aggravated offence, but will also receive a reduction in sentence for pleading guilty. 50 For these reasons, charge bargaining should be avoided. Since 2003, it has been CPS policy that where an aggravated offence is charged, a plea to the basic offence alone will not be accepted, unless there are proper reasons for doing so. 51 For example, because the evidence required to prove the aggravated element is no longer available. However, there is some evidence to suggest that the practice of charge bargaining has continued. CPS and Ministry of Justice statistics, presented in the Law Commission’s impact assessment, indicate that there is a significant gap between the number of aggravated offences charged and reaching a first hearing in the 49 Burney and Rose, above n 1, pp 80-83. See also, The Gus John Partnership Race for Justice: A Review of CPS Decision Making for Possible Racial Bias at Each Stage of the Prosecution Process (2003) para 95. 50 Criminal Justice Act 2003, s 144. 51 Crown Prosecution Service Racist and Religious Crime – CPS Prosecution Policy http://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/prosecution/rrpbcrbook.html#a30 (last accessed 25 June 2014). http://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/prosecution/rrpbcrbook.html#a30 12 magistrates’ court and the number of offences sentenced. 52 For example, according to CPS data, 2,415 aggravated common assault offences were charged and reached a first hearing in 2009, whereas, according to Ministry of Justice data, only 881 aggravated common assault offences were sentenced. In 2011, the figures were 2,636 and 203 respectively. There may be legitimate explanations for the significant difference between the number of aggravated offences charged and sentenced, and for the drop in sentencing, including: issues with the way in which offences are recorded; variations in the way in which the CPS and the Ministry of Justice record data; difficulty in proving the aggravated element of the offence; an actual decrease in the number of aggravated offences; or an increase in the use of restorative justice. 53 Nonetheless, it is possible that at least some of the initial charges were downgraded to the basic offence without proper reasons for doing so. A more optimistic picture is presented in a recent report which was recently published by the Home Office, Office for National Statistics and Ministry of Justice. 54 Whilst the 2009 sentencing figure for common assault is consistent with the figure set out above (881), it is reportedthe report shows that, in 2011, 1,618 defendants were proceeded against for aggravated ‘assault without injury’, and 1,086 offenders were sentenced for the offence. 55 According to this report, in 2012, 8,898 defendants were proceeded against at the magistrates’ court for all racially and religiously aggravated offences. During the same year, 6,458 defendants were convicted for aggravated offences. This represents a conviction ratio of 72.6%, which is compared, in the report, can be compared to a conviction ratio of 72.4% for the corresponding basic offences during the same time period. 56 However, close examination of the data in the appendix tables which accompany the report reveals that if one looks at the figures for the individual offences, it becomes apparent that the conviction ratios for the individual aggravated offences tend to be 52 Law Commission Hate Crime: The Case for Extending the Existing Offences Appendix C - Impact Assessment (Consultation Paper No 213, 2013) paras C.58 and C.63. 53 Ibid, paras C.59 and C.63. 54 Home Office, Office for National Statistics and Ministry of Justice An Overview of Hate Crime in England and Wales (2013). 55 Home Office, Office for National Statistics and Ministry of Justice An Overview of Hate Crime in England and Wales: Appendix Tables (2013) Tables 3.04 and 3.13. 56 Home Office, Office for National Statistics and Ministry of Justice, above n 54, p 37. See alsoIbid, Appendix Table 3.12. 13 significantly lower than for the corresponding individual basic offences. For example, in 2012, the conviction ratio for racially or religiously aggravated ‘assault with injury’ was 51% in 2012, compared to 85% for the basic offence. For criminal damage, the figures were 58% and 79% respectively. The only offence which had a higher conviction ratio for the aggravated offence than for the basic offence was ‘assault without injury’ (ie, common assault), though the difference was less than 1%. 57 It is noted in the report that, between the initial hearing at the magistrates’ court and the first hearing at the Crown Court, the CPS can decide to downgrade the aggravated charge to the basic offence, to ‘increase the chances of a conviction’. 58 The most assured method of increasing the chances of a conviction would be to initiate or accept a charge bargain. Ongoing scrutiny is required. The Law Commission has suggested that a wider review of the offences could help to explain the low conviction ratios and the drop in sentencing for the aggravated offences. 59 It would also be helpful if comprehensive records were kept of the charges proceeded with after the initial hearing, and of the reasons for downgrading charges in individual cases. The prevailing attitude of practitioners prior to 2003 was that charge bargaining should not take place, yet it appeared to do so. 60 Several responses to the Law Commission’s consultation indicate that, in practice, this is still the case. 61 The benefits of a charge bargain, in terms of saved time and money, as well as the guarantee of a conviction of the basic offence, may sometimes prove too tempting, particularly if the basic offence is serious and the evidence of hostility is weak. Continuous charge bargaining could result in hate crime legislation losing both its practical and symbolic value. In fact, routine charge bargaining has the potential to reverse the positive communicative effect of the law. Instead of assuring the public that hate crime is taken seriously, that it is wrong to target individuals because of their personal characteristics, and that such conduct will not be tolerated, we could be left with an empty political gesture which is unlikely to influence attitudes or deter potential offenders, and is likely to dishearten, and further marginalise, the 57 Home Office, Office for National Statistics and Ministry of Justice, above n 55, Table 3.12Ibid. 58 Home Office, Office for National Statistics and Ministry of Justice, above n 543, p 37. 59 Law Com No 348, para 5.25. 60 Burney and Rose, above n 1, p 82. 61 Law Com No 348, paras 4.177-4.180. 14 very people which the offences are intended to protect. Thus, a failure to properly prosecute the offences could undermine the justifications for having them in the first place. Double convictions A further consequence of alternative charges is that it creates the possibility of the defendant being convicted of both the basic and the aggravated offence. If it is proved that the defendant committed the aggravated offence, then he must also have committed the basic offence (since the latter is a necessary element of the former). The ‘double conviction’ problem is most pertinent in the magistrates’ court, where alternative verdicts cannot be returned. Fortunately, and with good reason, it has recently been made clear that a defendant should not be convicted of both an aggravated and basic offence, where the two charges arise out of a single set of facts. The case of R (on the application of Dyer) v Watford Magistrates’ Court, 62 concerned a defendant who had been convicted of both causing racially aggravated fear or provocation of violence and the equivalent basic public order offence of causing fear or provocation of violence. The Divisional Court allowed the claim for judicial review and quashed the conviction on the lesser charge, finding that for the defendant to be convicted twice for a single wrong was unfair and disproportionate. As stated by Laws LJ, ‘It must be basic to our system of criminal justice that a person’s criminal record should reflect what he has done, no more and no less.’ 63 Prior to this decision, there had been cases which supported the proposition that it was open to the magistrates’ to convict of both offences. 64 In DPP v Gane, it was held that one appropriate mechanism for dealing with alternative charges would be to record convictions of both offences, but impose a sentence only for the more serious offence. 65 The obvious consequence of this is that the defendant will have two separate convictions on his record. Arguably, this amounts to an additional punishment in itself, as it could have negative implications for future employment prospects and involvement in other civic 62 [2013] EWHC 547 (Admin). 63 Ibid, at [11]. 64 DPP v Gane (1991) 155 JP 846; R (on the application of CPS) v Blaydon Youth Court [2004] EWHC 2296 (Admin). 65 DPP v Gane (1991) 155 JP 846 at 849. 15 activities. 66 It has been suggested that, prior to Dyer, the principle that a person should be punished in a manner proportionate to his offending behaviour had been consistently flouted in summary trials, with defendants falling foul of the double conviction problem. 67 The Court’s finding that to impose a double conviction is wrong in principle is, therefore, to be welcomed. The Divisional Court went on to confirm that in such circumstances, the magistrates should adjourn the lesser charge before conviction under s 10 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980, so that if an appeal succeeded against conviction on the aggravated charge, the lesser charge could subsequently be dealt with. Consequently, what might amount to a relatively minor offence could become the subject of two trials and an appeal, requiring significant resources. However, the Divisional Court felt that any practical difficulty caused by this could not override the principle that a person should be convicted only once for one wrong. 68 Dyer serves to further highlight the complex nature of the aggravated offences, and the type of problems which arise as a result of the sometimes competing interests of, on the one hand, prosecuting hate crimes and, on the other hand, maintaining fairness in procedure and outcome. Both Dyer and Al- Tamimi are recent cases. Given the continuous confusion in the lower courts regarding the correct interpretation of s 28 of the 1998 Act, it will be important to remain alert to the possibility that double convictions will continue to be imposed as a result of alternative charges being treated as if they were cumulative, and that defendants will continue to be sentenced in relation to offences of which they cannot be convicted. ALTERNATIVE VERDICTS Some of the problems associated with alternative charges can be avoided in the Crown Court by specifying only the aggravated offence in the indictment and, at trial, leaving an alternative verdict of the basic offence to the jury. If the jury is not satisfied of the aggravated element of the offence, the defendant 66 R Wheeler ‘The Danger of the Double Conviction’ (2013) 177 Criminal Law and Justice Weekly 191, at 192. 67 Ibid, at 191. 68 R (on the application of Dyer) v Watford Magistrates’ Court [2013] EWHC 547 (Admin) at [12]. 16 can, nevertheless, be found guilty of the basic offence. This can render the prosecution less vulnerable to charge bargaining and can prevent double convictions. However, because alternative verdicts cannot be delivered in the magistrates’ court, summary trials will remain susceptible to these problems. This area of procedural law is now relatively settled, but it is complex, particularly in relation to the aggravated offences. As with alternative charges, a misunderstanding or misapplication of the law can have undesirable consequences. The complexity of the law in relation to the aggravated offences arises, in part, because the basic offences capable of being aggravated under the 1998 Act consist of both summary only offences and either-way offences, whereas, all but one of the aggravated offences are triable either way. The exception is the aggravated version of s 5 of the Public Order Act 1986 (harassment, alarm or distress), 69 which remains triable only in the magistrates’ court, and, so, no alternative verdict is available. Provision has been made by the 1998 Act, 70 the Criminal Law Act 1967 71 and the Criminal Justice Act 1988, 72 allowing juries to find guilt on the alternative basic offences when the aggravated offence is tried in the Crown Court, even if the basic offence is a summary offence and is not specified in the indictment. As a result of this complicated body of legislation, the jury can, therefore, convict of a basic offence which would otherwise fall outside of the jurisdiction of the court of trial. The benefits of alternative verdicts In some situations, leaving an alternative verdict may be disadvantageous to both the prosecution and the defence. From the prosecution perspective, it might create a risk that the jury will be induced to convict of the lesser offence when there is evidence of the more serious offence. Several responses to the Law Commission’s consultation on the aggravated offences indicate that, in practice, juries can be reluctant to 69 Crime and Disorder Act 1998, s 31(1)(c). 70 Crime and Disorder Act 1998, ss 31(6), 32(5) and 32(6). 71 Criminal Law Act 1967, ss 6(3) and 6(3A). 72 Criminal Justice Act 1988, s 40. 17 convict defendants for aggravated offences. 73 As with charge bargaining, an inability to secure appropriate convictions may render the offences counterproductive, as it could create the impression that hate crime will not, or cannot, be effectively prosecuted. From the defence perspective, leaving an alternative verdict might create a risk that the jury will convict of the lesser offence when they otherwise would have acquitted, resulting in potential injustice to the defendant. Yet, leaving alternative verdicts has clear benefits. In addition to alleviating some of the problems associated with alternative charges, leaving an alternative verdict of the basic offence may prevent the jury from acquitting the defendant altogether, despite evidence that he committed the offence. It may also prevent the jury from convicting of the aggravated offence out of reluctance to see the defendant ‘get away with’ the basic offence, despite not accepting the racial or religious element. This issue arose in the recent case of Mihocic, 74 in which the jury had found the defendant guilty of racially aggravated harassment but not of racially aggravated criminal damage. They did, however, find him guilty of the basic offence of criminal damage, which had been put as a separate count in the indictment. It was argued on appeal that the trial judge had been wrong not to leave an alternative verdict in relation to the count of aggravated harassment, and that the jury’s finding of guilt might have been a means of ensuring liability for the basic offence, rather than an acceptance of racial aggravation. The defendant did not deny that he had shouted at the complainant, but did deny using any words that were racially aggravating. The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding that the real gravamen of the count of racially aggravated harassment was whether racial abuse had been used, and, so, it was understandable that only the aggravated count had been left to the jury. This was predicated on the fact that it was a Crown Court trial and the complainant and the defendant lived in the same street. 75 The relevance of this is not obvious; since the defendant admitted verbally abusing the complainant, the fact that they were neighbours does not in itself make the aggravated element any more central to the charge than would otherwise be the case. This point aside, it is difficult to accept the reasoning implicit in the judgment. Racial aggravation as 73 Law Com No 348, para 4.175. 74 [2012] EWCA Crim 195. 75 Ibid, at [17]. 18 the real gravamen of the offence does not necessarily increase the likelihood of an acquittal if the jury is not convinced of the racial element. The Court failed to squarely address the concern that the jury might not have convicted of racially aggravated harassment had they been able to convict of the basic offence. This issue was particularly relevant given the acquittal of racially aggravated criminal damage. The availability of an alternative verdict can prevent the jury from facing a stark choice between conviction of a serious offence and a complete acquittal. For this reason, Lord Bingham, in the House of Lords case of Coutts, was of the opinion that the public interest in the administration of justice would be best served ‘if in any trial on indictment the trial judge leaves to the jury, subject to any appropriate caution or warning, but irrespective of the wishes of trial counsel, any obvious alternative offence which there is evidence to support.’ 76 The objective, according to Lord Bingham, must be that defendants are neither over-convicted nor under-convicted, nor acquitted when they have committed a lesser offence of the type charged. 77 If this logic is not followed in relation to the aggravated offences, the defendant not only faces the risk of a harsher punishment than his conduct deserves, but also of being subjected to the stigma associated with being labelled as a racist. Alternative verdicts and charging decisions Despite the benefits outlined above, there are also procedural problems which emerge as a result of alternative verdicts. The availability of alternative verdicts, along with the limited list of offences which can be aggravated under the 1998 Act, creates difficult charging decisions. 78 For example, if there is evidence that the defendant caused the victim grievous bodily harm with intent, the prosecution could charge under s 18 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 (OAPA). There is no racially or religiously aggravated variant of the s 18 offence. Section 18 was deliberately excluded from the 1998 Act because it already carries a maximum sentence of life imprisonment (which is significantly higher 76 Coutts [2006] UKHL 39 at [23]. See also, Foster [2007] EWCA Crim 2869. 77 Coutts [2006] UKHL 39 at [12]. 78 See R Leng, R Taylor and M Wasik Blackstone’s Guide to the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (London: Blackstone, 1998) pp 48-51; Taylor, above n 454. 19 than the seven year maximum for the aggravated variants of ss 20 and 47 OAPA). 79 So, if the facts suggest the presence of racial aggravation, this cannot be reflected in the s 18 charge. It would, however, be taken into account at sentencing by applying s 145 of the 2003 Act. Since there is no aggravated variant of s 18, it is not excluded from the enhanced sentencing regime. If the jury rejects intent, they can return an alternative verdict of recklessly inflicting grievous bodily harm contrary to s 20 OAPA, but not of the aggravated variant of s 20, because this would mean relying on the facts which have not been part of the case. The only way to include the racial element, where intent is rejected, is to introduce the racially aggravated variant of s 20 as an alternative count in the indictment. If this route is taken, and the jury do not convict of the aggravated s 20 offence, s 145 cannot be used to increase the sentence. 80 Furthermore, if both the s 18 and aggravated s 20 offences are charged, the prosecution may face pressure to accept a plea to the aggravated offence, because it carries a much shorter maximum sentence than the s 18 offence. 81 Consequently, in this scenario, the options are: 1) put counts in the indictment covering s 18, the aggravated variant of s 20 and the basic s 20 offence, lose accountability for either the intent or the racial element (or both), and become susceptible to a charge bargain; or 2) charge only the s 18 offence and, if successful, take account of the racial element at sentencing. The second option is risky. If the jury rejects intent, the prosecution may lose the case completely (unless an alternative verdict of the basic s 20 offence is left to the jury). Furthermore, the prosecution might prefer to include the aggravated variant of the less serious s 20 offence because of the symbolic and communicative value of the aggravated offences. In fact, for this reason, there may be circumstances in which prosecutors would prefer to charge the aggravated s 20 offence, and not the s 18 offence. The maximum sentence available would be much lower, but, if the circumstances of the case are unlikely to warrant a lengthy sentence following conviction of the s 18 offence, then the racial element might be thought to be more important than the 79 Hansard (HL) 12 Feb 1998, vol 585, col 1280. This suggests that higher sentences are the only reason for the aggravated offences, overlooking other considerations, such as their communicative and denunciatory functions. See Taylor, above n 454. 80 McGillivray [2005] EWCA Crim 604. 81 Taylor, above n 45.4. 20 question of intent. Furthermore, the stigma associated with conviction of a racially aggravated offence might be thought to supplement the sentence. For these same reasons, if both the s 18 and aggravated s 20 offences are charged, the jury might choose to convict of the aggravated offence rather than the s 18 offence, despite evidence of intent. 82 In addition to the complicated charging decisions, there are implications for juries. Whenever the indictment includes aggravated and non-aggravated offences, and whenever alternative verdicts are available, the directions given to the jury are likely to be complicated and difficult to decipher. This is particularly true if an offence which requires proof of intent, but not racial or religious aggravation, is tried alongside an offence which requires proof of racial or religious aggravation, but not intent, and alternative verdicts requiring no intent, or no racial or religious aggravation, can also be returned. It seems, therefore, that no matter which route is taken, the prosecution process will not be straightforward. INCONSISTENT VERDICTS A consequence of both putting alternative charges and of leaving alternative verdicts is that inconsistent verdicts might be returned, particularly if the aggravated offences are not properly understood. This can occur where, for example, the defendant is charged with two aggravated offences arising out of one incident, and his conviction of one of the aggravated offences is inconsistent with his acquittal of the other. This can also occur where a guilty verdict is returned in respect of one of the aggravated offences, and an alternative verdict of guilty to the basic offence is returned in respect of the other offence. The case of Mihocic provides an illustration of how this can happen. As explained above, the defendant had been found guilty of racially aggravated harassment but not guilty of racially aggravated criminal damage. Instead, the jury found him guilty of the alternative count of basic criminal damage. The charges arose from an incident involving a dispute between the defendant and his neighbour. During a confrontation, the defendant verbally abused his neighbour and damaged his neighbour’s new car. The Crown’s case was that, either very shortly before or after the damage, the verbal abuse became racist. 82 Ibid. 21 This formed the basis for the charge of racially aggravated harassment, of which the defendant was convicted. On appeal, the defendant argued that the conviction of racially aggravated harassment was unsafe, as it was inconsistent with the acquittal of racially aggravated criminal damage. The Court of Appeal recognised that the jury’s decision was surprising. 83 Nonetheless, the Court found that the verdicts were not logically inconsistent; the jury must have been satisfied that there was a sufficient gap in time between the racist abuse and the criminal damage. This outcome is also somewhat surprising. Section 28(1)(a) of the 1998 Act provides that the demonstration of racial hostility must take place at the time of committing the basic offence, or immediately before or after doing so. In the case of Babbs, 84 the Court of Appeal took the view that the immediacy requirement is fulfilled by showing a sufficient connection between the demonstration of hostility and the basic offence. In that case, a conviction of racially aggravated assault was upheld, despite there being up to 15 minutes between the demonstration of hostility and the assault. It is unclear from the judgment in Mihocic precisely how much time had elapsed between the alleged racist abuse and the criminal damage. The account of the facts presented suggests that it was much less than 15 minutes. The logical conclusion seems to be that the two verdicts were inconsistent; that if racist hostility could be proven to have been demonstrated towards the victim during the harassment, it occurred immediately before or after the criminal damage. There is no mention of Babbs in the judgment of the Court of Appeal. The Court did acknowledge, however, that the 1998 Act ‘is drafted in terms that one would ordinarily expect that if racial abuse was…used at a particular point in time in the short sequence of events…the terms of the statute would mean that the racial element applied to the criminal damage whether it occurred before or after.’ 85 There may well have been weight in the defence’s submission referred to above, that conviction of racially aggravated harassment was a means for the jury to hold the defendant liable for the basic harassment offence, rather than an acceptance of the racial element. 83 Mihocic [2012] EWCA Crim 195 at [15]. 84 [2007] EWCA Crim 2737. 85 Mihocic [2012] EWCA Crim 195 at [14]. 22 However, the Court’s decision that the verdicts were not inconsistent was based on the logic of the verdicts in the light of the directions of the trial judge; the jury ‘were not directed as to the logical outcome of the evidence as put before them’. 86 Nor had they been given a direction on inconsistent verdicts. This case serves to highlight not only the potential for inconsistent verdicts when more than one offence is alleged to have been committed, but also how important it is for trial judges to understand the complexity of the aggravated offences, and to direct juries appropriately. A similar situation formed the basis of an appeal in the earlier case of Dossett. 87 The defendant had been convicted of a racially aggravated public order offence but acquitted of racially aggravated assault. He was convicted of assault as an alternative to the count of racially aggravated assault. As in Mihocic, the argument on appeal was that the conviction of the racially aggravated public order offence was inconsistent with the acquittal of racially aggravated assault. The charges arose from an altercation between the defendant and a parking attendant. The Crown’s case was that, a few minutes after receiving a penalty notice, the defendant confronted the parking attendant, shouted at her, including telling her to ‘go back to your fucking country’, grabbed her jacket to see her identification number, and continued to shout and threaten her. The words ‘go back to your fucking country’ constituted the evidence of racial hostility for the purposes of both counts in the indictment. It was submitted on appeal that the question of racial aggravation in relation to the two counts stood or fell together. 88 As in Mihocic, the Court of Appeal disagreed, finding that the verdicts were not logically inconsistent. The Court accepted the argument put forward on behalf of the Crown, that the jury may have found that the words relied upon were not spoken at the time of, or immediately before or after, the assault (which was the specific act of grabbing the jacket), but that the public order offence was a more prolonged and ongoing act, and the words were encompassed within it. Again, it is not easy to accept this logic. Although immediacy is a question of fact for the jury to decide, the complainant had given evidence to the effect that there had been one or two minutes between 86 Ibid. 87 [2006] EWCA Crim 709. 88 Ibid, at [12]. 23 the relevant words used and the grabbing of her jacket. Even if the jury were unsure of whether the words were spoken immediately in time before the assault, the case as put by the Crown was that the confrontation, assault, shouting and threats constituted one ongoing incident. In future cases of this kind, it would be helpful for juries to be directed that, following Babbs, ‘immediately before or after’ does not require an immediate temporal link. 89 Instead, it requires a connection between the demonstration of hostility and the commission of the basic offence, such that the words used are capable of colouring the behaviour of the defendant during the commission of the basic offence. 90 The important point of s 28(1)(a) is that it is directed not so much to words but to the hostility which is demonstrated towards the victim with the relevant connotation. 91 A direction of this nature could help to prevent outcomes that appear inconsistent, whereby the defendant was either over-convicted of the aggravated offence or under- convicted of the basic offence. THE FUTURE OF THE AGGRAVATED OFFENCES The future of hate crime legislation should not be determined only by the type of conduct which we wish to prohibit or the particular personal characteristics which we wish to protect. Consideration should also be given to how well the legislation can work in practice and the issues which are likely to arise at the prosecution stage of the criminal process. This article has examined a number of procedural difficulties which arise as a result of the structure of the racially and religiously aggravated offences. These difficulties exist alongside a persistent misunderstanding of the substantive elements of the offences and will inevitably be carried forward into any new aggravated offences based on disability, sexual orientation and transgender identity. Attempts have been made to address some of the procedural problems, including the CPS policy against charge bargaining and the Divisional Court’s declaration that it is unfair to convict 89 However, in the earlier case of Parry v DPP [2004] EWHC 3112 (Admin), it was held that the demonstration of hostility must occur in the immediate context of the basic offence. In that case, no aggravated offence had been committed where the racial hostility was demonstrated 20 minutes after commission of the basic offence, away from the scene of the basic offence, and in the absence of the victim. 90 Babbs [2007] EWCA Crim 2737 at [8]. 91 Ibid. 24 the defendant of both the basic and aggravated offence. Yet, in order to determine whether these solutions are operating sufficiently in practice, close scrutiny is required. The gap between the number of cases reaching a first hearing and the number of sentences imposed for the offences is not encouraging. There appears to be little that can be done to adequately remedy the procedural problems within the current legislative structure. In the Crown Court, the problems associated with charging both the basic and aggravated offence, or only the aggravated offence, can be alleviated by leaving an alternative verdict to the jury, without specifying the basic offence in the indictment. There must be some responsibility on the part of the trial judge to ensure that an alternative verdict of the basic offence is available whenever an aggravated offence is tried. In the absence of an alternative verdict of the basic offence, there will continue to be situations in which the jury face a stark choice between, on the one hand, convicting of the aggravated offence so that the defendant does not get away with the basic offence, and, on the other hand, acquitting of the aggravated offence despite clear evidence of the basic offence. Unfortunately, this solution to the charging problem cannot be applied in the magistrates’ court without a change in the law. In 2002, Burney and Rose found that there was a strong body of opinion among stipendiary magistrates and justices’ clerks that magistrates should have the power of finding alternative verdicts on aggravated offences, and went on to recommend that they be given this power. 92 This should be considered in a wider review of the offences, as recommended by the Law Commission. Although leaving alternative verdicts can alleviate problems associated with charging only one, or both offences, this is an imperfect solution which has shortcomings of its own. For example, it may become very difficult for a jury to understand the judge’s summing up. This is also true if the defendant is also being tried for a non-aggravated offence, such as s 18 OAPA. It is likely that the jury will encounter difficulties in comprehending precisely what must be proven in relation to each count in the indictment and each alternative, and deciding the most appropriate offence to convict of. Careful judicial directions are currently the only means of dealing with this. Careful judicial directions are also essential if inconsistent verdicts are to be avoided. The jury should be advised of the potential for inconsistent 92 Burney and Rose, above n 1, pp 80 and 113. 25 verdicts and the logical outcome of the case whenever more than one aggravated offence is tried. The jury should also be directed carefully as to the requirements of s 28 of the 1998 Act, particularly what is meant by ‘immediately before or after’. The higher sentences and increased stigma associated with the aggravated offences make it imperative that the aggravated element is satisfied before a defendant is convicted. Yet, given the complexity of these matters, even the most careful of judicial directions may be insufficient to ensure fair and just outcomes. If a wider review of the offences is undertaken, it may uncover a way to solve the procedural issues by substantially altering the structure of the law. However, the most straightforward and pragmatic solution would be to repeal the offences and to rely on the enhanced sentencing regime as a mechanism for responding to hostility-based offending. Prosecutors would not face difficult charging decisions and there would be no need to direct juries as to alternative verdicts or inconsistent verdicts. In all cases, the basic offence would be charged, and, if convicted, the aggravating feature of hostility would be evaluated and taken into account by the judge at the sentencing stage. As well as resolving the procedural issues associated with the aggravated offences, the sentencing provisions also address some of the concerns about the characteristics protected by hate crime legislation and the type of conduct targeted; sections 145 and 146 of the 2003 Act must be applied in relation to any offence (other than an aggravated offence) where there is evidence of hostility based on race, religion, disability, sexual orientation or transgender identity. This solution would, therefore, provide equality of treatment to the five statutorily recognised hate crime characteristics. 93 It would also resolve the confusion that has resulted from the combined system of aggravated offences to deal with certain types of offending and a ‘mutually exclusive’ enhanced sentencing regime to deal with all other types of offending. In advocating this solution, the practical, procedural and theoretical limitations of the current sentencing regime should not be overlooked. In terms of the practical limitations, there is evidence to 93 It should be noted that there have been calls to extend hate crime legislation to additional characteristics, such as gender. See Law Com No 348, paras 5.60-5.73. 26 suggest that ss 145 and 146 are not applied as consistently as they should be. 94 There is a danger that where the aggravated element does not form part of the substantive offence, the police will not investigate or gather sufficient evidence in relation to it. Moreover, unless an aggravated offence can be charged, establishing the hostility element might not be a priority for the prosecution. If the issue is not raised by the prosecution, then the sentencing judge is unlikely to be aware of it, and, so, cannot take account of any hostility in the sentence. However, this can be rectified. The Law Commission responded to these concerns by recommending that the enhanced sentencing regime also be subject to review, and that it be improved in order to deal adequately with hostility-based offending, whether or not the aggravated offences are extended. 95 In order to improve the operation of the regime, the Commission recommended new guidance from the Sentencing Council on the approach to sentencing hostility-based offending. This would help to improve professional understanding of the sentencing system. It could increase the likelihood of hostility- related issues being raised in appropriate cases and ensure the consistent application of ss 145 and 146. The precise form and content of any guidance would be a matter for the Sentencing Council. 96 Special training for the police and CPS, intended to raise awareness of the enhanced sentencing regime, could also assist in ensuring that hostility-related issues are brought to the attention of the judge, and that ss 145 and 146 become embedded in the criminal justice response to hate crime. The police and CPS must appreciate that, although the question of hostility does not arise until after a conviction, it is no less important to gather and present supporting evidence than it is in relation to the aggravated offences. The procedural problems with the sentencing regime become apparent where the defendant denies that the offence was aggravated. In O’Callaghan, it was held that, before the sentence is increased to reflect the aggravated element, a Newton hearing must be held or, at the very least, the defence must be 94 Criminal Justice Joint Inspection Living in a Different World: Joint Review of Disability Hate Crime (2013) p 4; Consultation No 213, paras 3.34-3.38; Law Com No 348, paras 3.6-3.14. 95 Law Com No 348, para 5.102. 96 Ibid, paras 3.49-3.51. 27 given plain and adequate notice that sentencing on an enhanced basis is being considered. 97 A Newton hearing is a procedure which is used to determine disputed factual issues which were not resolved during a trial and which could have a substantial bearing on the sentence. 98 During the hearing, both the prosecution and the defence can call evidence and cross-examine witnesses, and the onus is on the prosecution to satisfy the judge to the criminal standard of proof that their version of events is correct. 99 However, there has been concern that this process is sometimes less than thorough, resulting in unfairness to victims if the aggravating factor is not taken into account, and unfairness to defendants if they are not afforded a sufficient opportunity to challenge the allegation of hostility. 100 Defendants might also be deterred from contesting the allegation because, if the matter is resolved against them, any ‘sentence discount’ afforded for pleading guilty to the basic offence may be reduced. 101 Again, these problems could be rectified through guidance from the Sentencing Council. This guidance could emphasise the importance of ensuring that there is an opportunity for the defence to challenge the allegations, usually at a Newton hearing. It could also clarify the correct procedure to be followed, including the prosecution’s burden of proof. Finally, one could argue that the enhanced sentencing regime cannot meet all of the aims of the aggravated offences because it lacks the symbolic and communicative function of the offences. It was argued above that this is not necessarily the case. Although the deterrent effects of hate crime legislation cannot be guaranteed, aApplication of the sentencing provisions could be at least as effective as the aggravated offences in sending out a message that hate crime will not be tolerated. However, this does require that judges make this fact explicit in their sentencing remarks, and that those remarks are routinely made available to the public. It is true that the offence of which the defendant is convicted would not have a label which itself reflects the aggravated nature of the offending behaviour, but if the Law Commission’s recommendations are followed, this would not be necessary. The Commission 97 O’Callaghan [2005] EWCA Crim 317 at [18]. 98 See Newton (1983) 77 Cr App R 13. 99 Underwood [2004] EWCA Crim 2256 at [9]. 100 Law Com No 348, para 3.14. 101 Underwood [2004] EWCA Crim 2256 at [11]. 28 recommended that, in individual cases, the application of ss 145 or 146 of the 2003 Act be recorded on the PNC, so that the offender’s record will show the aggravated element of the offending, just as it shows convictions of racially and religiously aggravated offences. 102 In addition to enhancing the communicative function of the sentencing regime, this would provide criminal justice services with a fuller offender history which could assist in selecting rehabilitation and education programmes, as well as sentencing for subsequent offending. It would also assist potential employers in their decision making process for certain posts which require background checks, particularly those which involve contact with members of a protected characteristic. 103 If taken forward, the Law Commission’s recommendations would help to ensure that the element of hostility is taken seriously and that the enhanced sentencing regime would further encompass the desired symbolic and communicative function of the aggravated offences. This could be usefully supplemented with greater education and public awareness initiatives, designed to promote diversity and reduce incidents of hate crime. Moreover, whenever the commission of a hate crime is suspected or reported, a thorough and sympathetic response from the police and CPS could improve confidence in the criminal justice response to hate crime and increase reporting of hate crime incidents. Abolition of the aggravated offences is unlikely to appeal to politicians; it could be perceived as a reversal of the progress which has been made over the past two decades to tackle racism and other prejudices. However, if procedural problems result in offences which cannot be enforced properly, they become little more than an empty gesture, and this may be counterproductive. Furthermore, if procedural problems create the risk of wrongful conviction and harsher sentences than merited in individual cases, the offences also become a source of injustice to those accused of wrongdoing. One would hope that anxiety about repealing the offences could be reduced through reassurance that the sentencing provisions are still hate crime laws and that by eliminating the procedural problems stemming from the aggravated offences, hate crime can be dealt with more fairly and effectively. From a procedural perspective, the 102 Law Com No 348, para 3.104. 103 Ibid, paras 3.90-3.95. 29 preferred way forward would be to improve the operation of the enhanced sentencing regime in place of aggravated offences. 
work_jszgxzp26rft7mlv3adykwxqse	----	WLHR_A_309477.dvi Belief in the “Free Choice” Model of Homosexuality: A Correlate of Homophobia in Registered Nurses Christopher W. Blackwell ABSTRACT. A great amount of social science research has supported the positive correlation between heterosexuals’ belief in the free choice model of homosexuality and homophobia. Heterosexuals who believe gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender (GLBT) persons consciously choose their sexual orien- tation and practice a lifestyle conducive to that choice are much more likely to possess discriminatory, homophobic, homonegative, and heterosexist beliefs. In addition, these individuals are less likely to support gay rights initiatives such as nondiscrimination policies or same-sex partner benefits in the workplace or hate crime enhancement legislation inclusive of GLBT persons. Although researchers have demonstrated this phenomenon in the general population, none have specifically assessed it in the nursing workforce. The purpose of this study was to examine registered nurses’ overall levels of homo- phobia and attitudes toward a workplace policy protective of gays and lesbians. These variables were then correlated with belief in the free choice model of homosexuality. Results indicated that belief in the free choice model of homosexuality was the strongest predictor of homophobia in nurses. Implications for nursing leadership and management, nursing education, and future research are discussed. KEYWORDS. Discrimination, free choice model of homosexuality, gay, homophobia, homosexual, lesbian, nurse, nursing INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW Discrimination Against Gays and Lesbians in the Workplace The purpose of this study was exploration of registered nurses’ beliefs about homosexu- ality in conjunction with examining attitudes to- wards the protection of gays and lesbians in the workplace through a nondiscrimination policy. Research suggests that discrimination against homosexuals is pervasive in America’s work- places; homosexuals experience disparities in wages and earning, continual harassment and homophobic treatment, and lack many essen- tial employment rights (Anastas, 2001; Croteau, 1996; Irwin, 2002; Klawitter, 1998; Morrow, Christopher W. Blackwell, PhD, ARNP-C, is Assistant Professor, UCF College of Nursing, P.O. Box 162210, Orlando, FL 32816-12210 (E-mail: cwblackw@mail.ucf.edu). 2001). Discrimination that gays and lesbians experience in the workplace is considered both indirect and direct. Indirect forms include the ad- ditional disparity of lesbian couples secondary to overall lower pay for women (Cohn, 1992; Frum, 1992; Melymuka, 2001; Quittner, 2003; Van Soest, 1996; Yared, 1997). Examples of direct discrimination are often central features of qualitative studies of participants’ experi- ences with discrimination at work (Croteau, 1996). Croteau (1996) identified both formal (di- rect) and informal (indirect) discrimination practices in the workplace. Formal are insti- tutionalized procedures that restrict officially conferred work rewards, and informal are the loss of credibility, acceptance, or respect by coworkers and supervisors based on a workers’ Journal of LGBT Health Research, Vol. 3(3) 2007 Available online at http://jlhr.haworthpress.com C© 2007 by The Haworth Press. All rights reserved. doi: 10.1080/15574090802093117 31 32 JOURNAL OF LGBT HEALTH RESEARCH sexual orientation. Formal discrimination was typically associated with employer decisions to terminate or not hire an individual due to their sexual orientation (Croteau, 1996). I also noted other formal discriminatory practices including the exclusion of homosexuals from promotions, pay raises, or increased responsibility at their jobs. Fear of having one’s sexual orientation discovered is predictive of how an individual chooses to present his or her sexual orienta- tion identity in the work environment (Croteau, 1996). This finding may be of significance to this in- quiry because supporters of nondiscrimination policies protective of gays and lesbians in the workplace often claim that such guidelines cre- ate equity and fairness (Economist, 1995), which could help alleviate fears of possible discrimi- nation and antigay retaliation for homosexuals who choose not to hide their sexual identity at work. Anticipation of discrimination, especially if an individual’s sexual orientation is disclosed or discovered, is of great concern to gay and les- bian workers (Croteau, 1996). Individuals have reported the belief that discrimination would oc- cur if their sexual orientation was discovered by management; research has indicated that this fear or anticipation of discrimination is the ma- jor factor in workers closeting lesbian, gay, or bisexual identities (Croteau, 1996). Research regarding the socioeconomic status of gays and lesbians as a minority suggests that working gay, lesbian, and bisexual people are no better off, and in some ways are disadvan- taged economically, in relation to comparable heterosexual people (Anastas, 2001; Badgett, 2000; Cahill & Jones, 2002; Klawitter, 1998). Data suggest that gay males appear to earn less than their heterosexual counterparts. A compre- hensive analysis conducted by Black, Makar, Sanders, and Taylor (2003) estimated earnings among gay men to be between 14% and 16% lower than for heterosexual men; the researchers considered differences in career specialization and labor market choices between heterosexual men and homosexual men and hypothesized the etiology for lower earnings in gay men went beyond these forces and were related to deep and pervasive antigay attitudes of employers. Some studies have found specific examples of such disparity in females as well (Badgett, 2000; Klawitter, 1998). Because of the overall wage discrimination that females experience, lesbian couples have an overall lower combined income than heterosexuals (Anastas, 2001; Klawitter, 1998). Belief in the “Free-Choice” Model of Homosexuality as a Correlate with Homophobia Controllability of one’s sexual orientation, be- lief in the free choice model of homosexuality, and support for psychological versus biological explanations of sexual orientation development have been supported as predictors of homo- phobia (Herek, 2000, 2002; Herek & Capi- tanio, 1995; Landen & Innala, 2002; Sakalli, 2002). Individuals who believe that a homo- sexual orientation results from social learning and/or a conscious choice that remains within one’s control statistically have higher levels of homophobia than those who believe that a ho- mosexual orientation results from biological and psychosocial influences (Herek, 2000, 2002; Herek & Capitanio, 1995; Landen & Innala, 2002; Sakalli, 2002). There are also differences in heterosexual opinions regarding choice of homosexuality of either gay men or lesbians; males and females both considered lesbianism to be more of a choice than male homosexuality (Herek, 2002). In addition, heterosexuals who believe that ho- mosexuality is not a choice overwhelmingly en- dorse the idea that it is innate and not determined by environmental factors (Herek, 2002). People who believe in a biological explanation as the eti- ology of homosexuality are much less restrictive towards homosexuals; i.e., these individuals are much more accepting and more willing to sup- port protections and human rights for gays and lesbians than those who believe in a psycholog- ical explanation (Landen & Innala, 2002). Sim- ilarly, the belief that homosexuals can control their homosexuality has also been correlated to high levels of homophobia (Herek & Capitanio, 1995). Some of the data researching the belief in the free choice model of homosexuality is connected to the body of social science that examines the Christopher W. Blackwell 33 belief that obese individuals choose their obesity (Crandall & Martinez, 1996; Sakalli, 2002). Comparable to the finding that individuals who believe that obesity is a controllable behavioral trait are more prejudiced towards overweight in- dividuals, individuals who believe that homo- sexuality is a controllable behavioral trait have more prejudicial attitudes toward gay men and lesbians than those who think that homosexual- ity is uncontrollable (Herek & Capitanio, 1995; Sakalli, 2002). Clinicians’ personal beliefs regarding the cause of clients’ illnesses can have profound ef- fects on care delivery and discrimination in the workplace. For example, Ortloff’s (1995) work found that homosexuals infected with HIV or di- agnosed with AIDS were more likely to receive discriminatory healthcare and be discriminated against in the workplace than nonsexual mi- norities. HIV/AIDS-associated stigma has been supported as a cause of depression in clients with HIV/AIDS (Swendemen, Rotheram-Borus, Comulada, Weiss, & Ramos, 2006). These is- sues highlight the need for critical assessments of homophobia in the healthcare setting. Discrimination Against Gays and Lesbians in Healthcare Although many inquires have supported the existence of discrimination against gays and lesbians in the workplace, there are very little data examining the amount of homophobia and prevalence of discrimination in the healthcare setting. There is even further scant data exam- ining the responsiveness to deal with homopho- bia within the workplace of healthcare workers (Saunders, 2001). Some studies do examine physician attitudes and discriminatory belief patterns. Examples of such studies include those conducted by Tellez, Ramos, Umland, Palley, and Skipper (1999); Lock (1998); O’Hanlan, Cabaj, Schatz, Lock, and Nemrow (1997); Olsen and Mann (1997); and Muller and White (1997). However, none of this research pertains to the homophobia of regis- tered nurses. In addition, all of these researchers explored the negative impacts of homophobia on the gay and lesbian patient population; none specifically assessed the impacts of physician homophobia in the workplace or attitudes re- garding a protective workplace policy for homo- sexuals. Studies assessing the effects of homopho- bia in the workplace of healthcare professionals are also dearth. Review of the current literature found only a very few studies detailing the well- being of homosexual physicians as related to homophobia in the workplace. Those reviewed concentrated on the overall feelings of gay and lesbian medical doctors about the amount of homophobia thatthey perceived in their places of employment and within their profession. The scarcity of empirical research about homopho- bia in the workplaces of the nursing profession was even greater, as evidenced by the finding of only one study, authored by Theresa Stephany (1992) for Sexuality and Disability. Stephany’s (1992) work was a qualitative es- say and explored the author’s own personal work experiences as a lesbian nurse. Although the work of Douglas, Kalman, and Kalman (1985) did investigate some homophobia in nursing and medicine, it had no emphasis on discrimination in the workplace and, instead, made correlations with homophobia and AIDS patients. Burke and White (2001) conducted research examining the wellbeing of gay, lesbian, and bisexual med- ical doctors and discussed many correlations between well-being and workplace-related dis- crimination issues but, again, were void on the topic of protective policies in the workplace. Purpose of Study The paucity of data assessing registered nurses’ homophobia and attitudes towards gays and lesbians in the workplace have led to a lack of contribution from nursing scholars on how to solve discriminatory dilemmas in the work- place. The purpose of this study is to examine registered nurses’ homophobia and overall at- titudes toward the protection of gays and les- bians in the workplace. The dependent variables of this study were the homophobia scores rep- resented by the Attitudes Toward Lesbians and Gay Men (ATLG) scale and support or nonsup- port of a workplace nondiscrimination policy that protects gay men and lesbians. The inde- pendent variable assessed for this discussion was 34 JOURNAL OF LGBT HEALTH RESEARCH belief in the free choice model of homosexuality, operationalized as: “The belief that gay and les- bian individuals consciously choose their ho- mosexuality and practice a lifestyle conducive to that choice rather than the belief of biologi- cal and psychosocial influences in the develop- ment of sexual orientation” (Blackwell, 2005, p. 16). The findings will augment the literature per- taining to social justice and discrimination is- sues encountered by homosexuals and will also provide direction for administrative decisions re- garding the addition of such policies in the work environment of nurses. Research Hypotheses The research hypotheses of this study pre- dicted a positive correlation between belief in the free choice model of homosexuality with homo- phobia and nonsupport for a nondiscrimination policy protecting gays and lesbians in the work- place. METHODOLOGY Sample A randomized stratified sample of registered nurses licensed in the State of Florida was selected. Using the electronic database of reg- istered nurses through the State of Florida De- partment of Health Board of Nursing, potential participants were chosen by selecting every third name in the Stats database under each letter of the alphabet until 20 names were picked per letter, yielding a total of 520 potential partici- pants. Only individuals with mailing addresses within the United States were included. If an individual living outside the United States was selected, the very next name in the database was selected; every third name was then chosen us- ing the newly selected individual as the starting point. In alphabet letters where the sample of 20 could not be arrived at by selecting every third registered nurse, the deficient amount was made- up by sampling every third name from the end of the alphabet forward. Of the 520 study packets mailed to the sample, 40 were returned as unde- liverable, lowering the potential sample to 480. One-hundred sixty-five (34%) of the 480 surveys were returned and included in the analyses. Instruments One instrument was used in this study, the ATLG Scale developed by Gregory Herek (1984, 1987a, 1987b, 1988, 1994). This 20-question psychometric instrument is designed as a 5-point likert scale on which respondents rate their at- titude regarding a specific statement about ho- mosexual men or women. The ATLG consists of two subscales: the Attitudes Toward Lesbian (ATL) Scale and the Attitudes Toward Gay Men (ATG) Scale. Combined as the ATLG, this tool measures heterosexuals’ attitudes toward homo- sexuals. Scoring is evaluated by summing numerical values (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree) across items for each subscale. Reverse scoring is used for select items; reverse scoring is corrected in the statistical analyses. The possible range of scores varies depending on the response of the study sample. With the 5-point response scale used in this inquiry, total scale scores can range from 20 (extremely positive attitudes) to 100 (extremely negative attitudes), with ATL and ATG subscale scores each ranging from 10 to 50. In addition to the ATLG, a demographic data collection sheet to gather information about the participants’ age, gender, race/ethnicity, educa- tion level, belief in the free choice model of ho- mosexuality, exposure to homosexuals through friends and/or family associations, and attitudes towards workplace nondiscrimination policies protective of gays and lesbians was used. Atti- tudes toward the protection of gays and lesbians in the workplace were determined by evaluat- ing responses to two opposing statements about workplace nondiscrimination policies, which were scored employing the same 5-point lik- ert scale used on the ATLG and data collection sheets. Data Collection Research proposals were submitted for ap- proval to the Institutional Review Board at the University of Central Florida. To collect data in a random fashion, a mathematical approach was used to obtain the sample. To stratify, every third Christopher W. Blackwell 35 nurse under each letter of the alphabet was se- lected until each letter had a total of 20 possible participants. Using 20 per letter, a total of 520 registered nurses were mailed a study packet. Forty were returned as undeliverable and 165 of the remaining 480 (34%) were included in the analyses. The study packet included directions for com- pleting the study, a 2-page questionnaire (includ- ing the demographic data collection sheet and the ATLG Scale), and a postage paid envelope for return of the survey. As explained in the di- rections included in the study packet, comple- tion and return of the survey indicated informed consent for participation. The survey instrument was specifically designed to assess attitudes to- ward gays and lesbians only among heterosex- uals (Herek, 1984, 1987a, 1987b, 1988, 1994). Thus, disclosure of a homosexual or bisexual orientation was exclusionary for the study. The respondents’ identities were kept anonymous; no identifiers were used during the data col- lection or analyses. Participants could choose to withdraw from the study at any time with- out consequence. Individual raw data were read only by the researcher. Confidentiality was main- tained by locking the questionnaires in a research office. Treatment of the Data To determine relationships among indepen- dent and dependent variables structural equation modeling (SEM) and linear regression (also re- ferred to as ordinary least squares) were used. Confirmatory factor analysis was used to support the internal consistency of the ATLG Scale. RESULTS Sample Demographics Five-hundred-twenty registered nurses within Florida were selected using a stratified system- atic sampling method and mailed a study packet. Forty of the 520 were returned as undeliver- able, bringing the potential sample to 480. One- hundred-sixty-five (34%) were returned and included in the analyses. The typical respondent was a Caucasian heterosexual women (only 11 of the respondents were men), between the ages of 40–49 years, with an Associate Degree in Nursing. With regard to religiosity, the major- ity were moderate Christians who attend church weekly. Seventy-three percent of participants have at least one friend or family member who is a gay man or lesbian, and 62% indicated that they would support a nondiscrimination policy in their workplace that protects gay men and lesbians. Hypotheses Testing To test the study’s hypotheses, SEM was used. The independent variables of the study, belief in the free-choice model of homosexuality and sup- port or nonsupport of a nondiscrimination policy protective of gay men and lesbians in the work- place, were placed on the left side of the model and were correlated with the latent construct of homophobia, which was then correlated with the 20-item ATLG scale. To measure belief in the free choice model of homosexuality, respondents were asked to gauge the degree to which they agreed or dis- agreed with the statement: “Gay men and les- bians consciously choose their homosexuality and practice a lifestyle conducive to that choice.” To suggest overall correlation between this in- dependent variable, the researcher analyzed the data using a critical ratio (CR) score of >1.96 (Garson, 2005) to indicate statistical signifi- cance. The CR value for this independent vari- able was 5.9, which was the highest CR score of all the variables in the structural equation model. As the strongest correlate of all the indepen- dent variables, belief in the free-choice model of homosexuality, was strongly correlated with homophobia. To assess the correlation between the nurses’ homophobia and support/nonsupport for a work- place nondiscrimination policy protective of gays and lesbians, respondents were asked to gauge the degree to which they agreed or dis- agreed with the statements “I would support a nondiscrimination policy in my workplace that protects gay men and lesbians” and “I would not support a nondiscrimination policy in my work- place that protects gay men and lesbians.” Next, the researcher included the answers to both of 36 JOURNAL OF LGBT HEALTH RESEARCH TABLE 1. Summary of Study Findings and Interpretations Variable Critical Ratio Value Interpretation Belief in the “free choice” model of homosexuality 5.9∗ Strongest predictor: Nurses believing homosexuality was a conscience lifestyle choice had the highest levels of homophobia. Support for a nondiscrimination policy protecting gays and lesbians in the workplace −4.1∗ Strong reverse correlation: Nurses supporting a nondiscrimination policy in the workplace had lower levels of homophobia. Nonsupport for a nondiscrimination policy protecting gays and lesbians in the workplace 3.3∗ Strong correlation: Nurses who would not support a nondiscrimination policy in the workplace had higher levels of homophobia. ∗Statistically significant at p ≤ .05. these as independent variables in the SEM and analyzed the CR value using >1.96 to indicate statistical significance. Support of the nondiscrimination policy was a significant negative correlate with homopho- bia with a CR value of −4.1. Thus, it can be suggested that those nurses who indicated that they would support such a policy were less ho- mophobic than those who indicated that they would not support such a policy. In addition, the second question had a positive correlation CR value of 3.3, suggesting a positive correlation between nonsupport of a nondiscrimination pol- icy and overall homophobia. Findings and their interpretations are provided in Table 1. DISCUSSION Belief in the Free Choice Model of Homosexuality, Homophobia, and Support/Nonsupport of a Workplace Nondiscrimination Policy Data supported a positive correlation between belief in the free choice model of homosex- uality and homophobia. This finding echoes that of the literature, which suggests individuals who believe gay men and lesbians consciously choose to be homosexual are more homopho- bic than those individuals who believe biologi- cal and psychosocial influences are responsible for the development of a person’s sexual orien- tation (Herek, 2000, 2002; Herek & Capitanio, 1995; Landen & Innala, 2002; Sakalli, 2002). Although outside of the scope of this study, research has also demonstrated differences in heterosexual attitudes regarding choice; lesbians are more often thought as choosing their homo- sexuality rather than gay men (Herek, 2000). Similarly, Herek and Capitanio (1995) pos- itively correlated belief in controllability with homophobia. Study participants who believed that homosexuals had control over their homo- sexuality were more homophobic than those in- dividuals who believed that sexual orientation was outside of one’s control. Some of the data researching the belief in the free choice model of homosexuality is connected to the body of so- cial science that examines the belief that obese individuals choose their obesity (Crandall & Martinez, 1996; Sakalli, 2002). Comparable to the finding that individuals who believe that obesity is a controllable be- havioral trait are more prejudiced towards over- weight individuals, individuals who believe that homosexuality is a controllable behavioral trait have more prejudicial attitudes toward gay men and lesbians than those who think that homo- sexuality is uncontrollable (Herek & Capitanio, 1995; Sakalli, 2002). Treated as an independent variable in the structural equation model, support for the nondiscrimination policy was significantly reverse-correlated with homophobia. Thus, those nurses who supported the workplace policy were significantly less homophobic than those who did not support the policy. Nurses are taught a holistic approach to healthcare (Potter & Perry, 2005). Holism emphasizes respect for the person as a whole Christopher W. Blackwell 37 physical and spiritual being. Because of the em- phasis of this in nursing, perhaps nurses believe that workplace protection policies help provide respect for homosexual persons by maintaining their integrity and individuality. However, the study of the precise relationship between workplace policies and overall homo- phobia is nonexistent. Perhaps the relationship between homophobic attitudes and workplace policies is explained by attitude itself. In other words, heterosexuals who believe that homo- sexuals constitute a disadvantaged population in general society might also extrapolate this idea into workplace discrimination issues. The reverse might also be true. If hetero- sexuals believe homosexuals do not comprise an oppressed group in American society, then workplace policies could be deemed unneces- sary and counterproductive. Perhaps homopho- bic thought can lead to the belief that gays and lesbians are not oppressed in American life, and thus, lead to lack of support for a nondiscrimi- nation policy in the workplace. Implication for Future Research This critical inquiry could possibly serve as a basic infrastructure for future research related to registered nurses’ attitudes towards homo- sexuals in the workplace. During the course of this study, no specific studies that explored the attitudinal differences among registered nurses towards workplace discrimination of gay men and lesbians were found. In addition, a re- search method of reverse correlating support of a nondiscrimination policy in the workplace protective of gay men and lesbians with higher levels of homophobia and positively correlating support of such a policy with decreased levels of homophobia in a sample of registered nurses has never been completed before. A more national (and even possibly global) study could explore the overall homophobia and attitudes of nurses towards a nondiscrimination policy in the workplace that protects gay men and lesbians from a much grander scope. This type of research design might also highlight im- portant geographical differences in homophobia among nurses. Gay marriage was recently legal- ized in Massachusettes, and Vermont has civil union laws granting many of the essential rights of marriage to gay couples; California has some extensive equality laws protective of gay men and lesbians in such areas as domestic partner- ship, mandatory benefits for same-sex couples at work, and nondiscrimination in employment (Segal Group, 2004). Florida, on the other hand, has no legislation that protects gay men and lesbians from work- place discrimination, lacks criminal enhance- ment penalties for homosexual victims of hate crimes, and outlaws any form of adoption by gay men or lesbians (Equality Florida, 2004). Differences in these policies from state to state may cause speculation that, overall, homopho- bia levels and attitudes towards gays and les- bians at work vary by location of the country; research with a larger aggregate of nurses from various geographic boundaries could highlight diverse sociopolitical climates for gays and les- bians throughout the United States. In addition to national studies, future research could also cross international borders and explore differ- ences in homophobia and attitudes towards a nondiscrimination policy in the workplace of various countries, and contrast these beliefs with those of western populations similar to Lim’s (2002) research. Future research studies should shift focus from finding differences in populations to expla- nation of the differences and the evolution of ho- mophobic thought processes in a profession and in society as a whole. Perhaps the application of a qualitative research design would yield richer data. Perhaps future research based in qualita- tive designs could begin to more closely explain causality in homophobia, compare and contrast differences in attitudes and beliefs in the nursing population, and bridge the current gap between phenomenon and explanation. Implications for Nursing Education This study has yielded a vast amount of ed- ucational implications for nursing. Because the sample of this study was comprised of regis- tered nurses licensed in the State of Florida, per- haps the educational implications for nursing are most condign. Registered nurses are taught to treat the client as an entire being, encompassing 38 JOURNAL OF LGBT HEALTH RESEARCH not only physical health, but mental, spiritual, and psychosocial health as well (Potter & Perry, 2005). Whether or not a registered nurse can fully commit to this vital component of care is an important consideration based on the analysis of the data that reflects the presence of homopho- bia within the profession. Many psychologically-driven theories of the 1950s, including psychoanalysis, held highly- homophobic views of homosexuality. Coupled with this pathologizing of homosexuality comes the belief that gay men and lesbians con- sciously choose their homosexuality and prac- tice a lifestyle conducive to that choice. A highly debated issue in the sociopolitical arena, the question of homosexuality as a choice is con- verged with religious belief of homosexuality as a sin, labeling of civil rights for gays and lesbians as “special rights” designed to protect sexually- deviant individuals, and nature versus nurture theories of sexual orientation development (Van Wormer, Wells, & Boes, 2000). Although the contest between nature versus nurture as the etiology of a homosexual orienta- tion continues, it is essential to examine the rel- evant biological and psychosocial research that is scrutinizing this subject. Recent research has suggested a strong biological component to the development of sexual orientation; differences in postmortem brain morphology between het- erosexual and homosexual males,genetic pre- disposition and genotyping of heterosexual versus homosexual samples, and early con- siderable differences in associative gender de- velopment have all been supported in the literature as at-least partial causative agents (Bai- ley & Pillard, 1991; Bailey, Pillard, Neale, & Agyei, 1993; Bell, Weinberg, & Hammersmith, 1981; Comperio-Ciani, Corna, & Capiluppi, 2004; LeVay, 1991; Zastrow & Kirst-Ashmon, 1997). Research supporting an element of social- ization in the development of sexual orienta- tion focuses on the scarce data derived from prison samples (Van Wormer et al., 2000). This data suggests that some homosexual sexual be- haviors first learned in the prison environment perpetuate into life outside of prison; males who received anal sex during incarceration were much more likely to continue this sexual activity once returned to the general population than those males who actually penetrated other males (Van Wormer et al., 2000). The current dominant theory of causality in the social science literature is termed interaction theory, which proposes that a homosexual orientation results from both bi- ological and psychosocial input variables (Van Wormer et al., 2000). To overcome the infusion of homophobia in nursing education, topics and lectures regarding sexual orientation development might include information about interaction theory and could also stress the wider scientific belief that homo- sexuality is at least partly determined through biological factors beyond one’s control. If a nursing student holds strong to the belief that homosexuality is a personal lifestyle decision, instructors might reiterate the principle of au- tonomy, which mandates that registered nurses respect the decisions made by clients, regardless of the personal attitudinal beliefs of the nurse (Potter & Perry, 2005). Limitations Perhaps the greatest limitation of this study is generalizability. Study participants were se- lected from a randomized sample of registered nurses licensed in the State of Florida. Thus, the results of this study are generalizable only to reg- istered nurses licensed in the State of Florida. Another threat to the study that must be con- sidered is whether or not respondents honestly reported their sexual orientation. Although par- ticipant anonymity was ensured, the existence of social stigma and fear of repercussions from dis- closing a homosexual orientation (Schoenewolf, 2004) might have resulted in some homosex- ual or bisexual nurses selecting heterosexual as their orientation on the demographic survey instrument. Finally, the overall size of the sample (n = 165) is small. The smaller sample size threat- ens generalizability of the study and also poses a threat to the integrity of the structural equation model. With an increased sample size, the con- struct validity could be strengthened by splitting the total sample into two groups and performing multiple group analysis with equality constraints of the measurement model. Christopher W. Blackwell 39 Summary and Conclusion The purpose of this study was to examine reg- istered nurses’ overall levels of homophobia and attitudes toward a workplace policy protective of gays and lesbians. These variables were then correlated with belief in the free choice model of homosexuality. Results indicated this belief as the strongest predictor of homophobia in nurses. Implications for nursing leadership and man- agement, nursing education, and future research were discussed. Although the generalizability of the study is limited due to the small sample size and limited sampling technique, the inquiry nonetheless provides a foundation for future re- search related to factors influencing homophobia in nurses and support for protective antidiscrim- ination policies in the nursing workplace. REFERENCES Anastas, Je. (2001). Economic rights, economic myths, and economic realities. Journal of Gay & Lesbian Social Services, 13, 99–116. Badgett, L. (2000). The myth of gay and lesbian affluence. Gay & Lesbian Review Worldwide, 7, 22–25. Bailey, M. J., & Pillard, R.C. (1991). A genetic study of male sexual orientation. Archives of General Psychiatry, 48, 1089–1096. Bailey, M. 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Application of the attribution—Value model of prejudice to homosexuality. The Journal of Social Psychology, 142, 264–271. Schoenewolf, G. (2004). A psychoanalysts’ perspective: AIDS and the death wish. Retrieved April 14, 2005 from http://www.narth.com/docs/deathwish.html. Segal Group. (2004). New California law mandates equal insurance coverage for domestic partners. Re- trieved April 14, 2005 from http://www.segalco.com/ publications/bulletins/nov04CA AB 2208.pdf#search =‘California,%20Equality%20Laws’. Stephany, T. M. (1992). Nursing as a lesbian. Sexuality and Disability, 10, 119–124. Swendeman, D., Rotheram-Borus, M. J., Comulada, S., Weiss, R., & Ramos, M. E. (2006). Predictors of HIV- related stigma among young people living with HIV. Health Psychology, 4, 501–509. Tellez, C., Ramos, M., Umland, B., Palley, T., & Skipper, B. (1999). Attitudes of physicians in New Mexico toward gay men and lesbians. Journal of the Gay & Lesbian Medical Association, 3, 83–90. Van Soest, D. 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work_ju46hgcu6ndldpe4tdven5fkbu	----	Title “You’re either with us, or you are with the terrorists” – Juxtaposed Ideologies in the War on Terror Author Maryam Jameela Publication FORUM: University of Edinburgh Postgraduate Journal of Culture & the Arts Issue Number 22 Issue Date Spring 2016 Publication Date 30/05/2016 Editors Emma Sullivan and Matthew Tibble FORUM claims non-exclusive rights to reproduce this article electronically (in full or in part) and to publish this work in any such media current or later developed. The author retains all rights, including the right to be identified as the author wherever and whenever this article is published, and the right to use all or part of the article and abstracts, with or without revision or modification in compilations or other publications. Any latter publication shall recognise FORUM as the original publisher. University of Edinburgh Postgraduate Journal of Culture and the Arts Issue 22 | Spring 2016 FORUM | ISSUE 22 Maryam Jameela 2 “You’re either with us, or you are with the terrorists” - Juxtaposed Ideologies in the War on Terror Maryam Jameela University of Sheffield A recent British government policy document has attempted to tackle the various guises of extremism by outlining definitions and proposed solutions for a structural approach to the threat of terror. In doing so, the command paper characterises the relationship between Britain and Islamic terrorists as one of an ideological conflict playing out between Western powers and Muslim fundamentalists. In exaggerating the apparent polarisation necessary for an ideological conflict, I will demonstrate how the text locks us into certain narratives that filter out historical contexts in favour of a binary rhetoric aimed at furthering conflicts based on ideology as natural conclusions, rather than the constructions and manipulations of policy. 9/11 has come to signify the starting point in a fifteen year conflict, with the so-called “war on terror” carrying extensive consequences for much of the world. It is difficult to communicate the weight and cultural nuance of the various wars, invasions, and attacks and their political and legal ramifications, that characterise this period of suspicion and paranoia against Muslim communities. Much of the political discourse emerging from Western nations has depicted this “war on terror” as a clash of civilisations, as in Samuel Huntington’s influential work of the same name that posits a divide between Eastern principles and Western values (1996). Edward Said’s earlier canonical work Orientalism (1978) interrogates this rhetoric and presents a powerful critique of a binary opposition that extends into contemporary times, particularly with respect to Muslims of colour as the locus of an ongoing ideological conflict. One such manifestation of this conflict is British Prime Minister David Cameron’s spearheading of a counter-extremism strategy in response to his belief in the growing threat of Islamic extremism and his concern at British citizens potentially fighting for Islamic terrorists. Command Paper 9148 outlines the most recent iteration from the British government of their intention to tackle all forms of extremism and the threat they pose to “British values” (5). My close reading of this particular policy document will illuminate the nuances of ideological terror-based conflict and will question the impact that this ideology of juxtaposed identities has had upon the government’s conception of British values and how this apparently all-encompassing value system clashes with religious freedoms, with particular emphasis upon Muslim communities within the United Kingdom. Policy analysis as narrative deconstruction Policy documents operate within a three part structure: firstly, they identify a national issue to be addressed; secondly, they consider actions to be taken for the public good; and finally, they outline actions to be taken by the government, and detail how these actions will be implemented. Such a FORUM | ISSUE 22 Maryam Jameela 3 structure is more of a tradition in politics and sociology than in literature or, at the very least, a more explicit structure which remains only implicit in fiction and literary criticism. A recent debate between policy analysis researchers has seen a move from empirical approaches to constructivism and critical realism. Mark Bevir isolates a moment from his work with R. A. W Rhodes that is particularly useful for practising traditional fiction analysis with a nonfiction methodology. Bevir and Rhodes move away from a tradition of empiricism and outline a framework they name “meaning holism” (Bevir 184) as an alternative approach more attuned to social realities and the formulation of meaning. Bevir states that “no proposition ever confronts the world in splendid isolation. Evidence only ever confronts overarching webs of belief, and even then the evidence is saturated by theories that are part of the relevant webs of belief” (188). For Bevir, the notion of states behaving as social agents cognizant of belief systems and cultural narratives is a concept central to good policy analysis. However, the centrality of context still does not account for the process and relative veracity of how any particular context is deemed to be relevant for analysis. For example, this paper will read post-9/11 culture through the lens of a postcolonial feminism cognizant of Western colonialism and imperialism, a context relevant to anti-extremism legislation due to the historical status of Britain as an imperial and colonial power. This context is a pertinent “web of belief” that will yield an analysis critical of Western epistemologies, a context that provides a historical background often missing from contemporary analyses of Western influence on non-Western regions. As valuable as this context is for my analysis, it still constitutes a construction which in itself demonstrates how necessary it is to interrogate how knowledge is produced and to acknowledge the artificiality of deeming certain contexts to be more relevant than others. Stuart McAnulla extends these concerns by taking issue with the role agency plays in Bevir and Rhodes’ conception of the self-reflexive praxis of policy makers themselves. McAnulla questions the apparent straightforwardness of their articulation of contextualised meaning, instead arguing that there is a distinction between how webs of belief are “in reality” and how individuals come to perceive those webs. For McAnulla, it is important to assert that whilst the agency of individuals (both in policy making and its reception) is fluid and subject to change based on context and history, it is limited by tradition and by the social responsibilities placed upon individuals (116). McAnulla suggests that these constraints can be mitigated through the inclusion of social structures in the model in order to acknowledge that both entities are changed by the “impact of the external world on actors”, itself a recognition of the fluctuating nature of personal belief systems (123). That context cannot be assumed to form the entirety of a “relevant web of belief” but, rather, questions the reception and dissemination of policy documents. In other words, as much as the contexts and influences behind political thought need to be foregrounded, McAnulla demonstrates that a flexible position alive to the developing contexts and impact upon social change on the part of both policy makers and policy readers is also vital. However, in positing a separation between beliefs in reality and how individuals interpret that reality, McAnulla betrays a troubling conceptualisation at the heart of policy analysis. As Patricia Hill Collins states, “no one group has a clear angle of vision. No one group possesses the theory or methodology that allows it to discover the absolute ‘truth’” (234). In developing the relevant methodology or theory for policy analysis the issue is not sifting truthful reality from perceptions of FORUM | ISSUE 22 Maryam Jameela 4 reality. Rather, it is a matter of acknowledging and ascertaining perceptions of culture, society and history and, as Bevir and Rhodes advocate, perceiving a sense of storytelling within policy analysis so as to better formulate a picture of the context of policy analysis, and how it is understood within different time periods and contexts. This revised model impacts government policy analysis in that it acknowledges the importance of specificity and nuance in understanding the centrality of storytelling or narrative to policy analysis. As Command Paper 9148 concerns preventative counter-terrorism measures that involve Muslim extremists, the context and history that I will have to be mindful of is one that many countries are currently experiencing. We might list the following as elements of the dominant contextual narrative in which this paper emerges: 9/11; 7/7; the attacks in Madrid and Paris; the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq; US torture and illegal detainment in Abu Ghraib; and drone operations in Pakistan and Afghanistan. This list is neither comprehensive nor nuanced and paints a very crude picture. It also calls to mind oppositions of good and evil, and cause and effect; and, given that this ideological conflict is still on- going, it is perhaps inevitable that issues of accountability are heatedly debated. However, these binary oppositions are themselves constructed, and are arguably reductive attempts at over-arching narratives. It is, nevertheless, a context that will define how I read this policy document and will affect the constructions of both my aims and conclusions. Juxtaposed Ideologies The Counter Extremism Strategy (2015) policy document defines extremism from a governmental perspective and outlines relevant problems and solutions. David Cameron and Home Secretary, Theresa May introduce the document by mentioning the centrality of “British values”, which Cameron defines as “the liberty we cherish, the rights we enjoy and the democratic institutions that help protect them” (CM 9148, 5). May includes “democracy, free speech, mutual respect, and opportunity for all” in these values (CM 9148, 7). The phrase “British values” is used repeatedly throughout and frequently to justify the necessity of action in defence of these values. Cameron and May establish a binary opposition with “extremism” as “the vocal or active opposition to our fundamental values” (CM 9148, 9). The pronoun “our” cements the binary and defines the conflict as one that is ‘us’ against ‘them’. This notion is further underscored by the infrequent, yet powerful, assertion that British society is “successful” (CM 9148, 5) because it is a “diverse, multi-racial, multi-faith society” (CM 9148, 9). In positioning Britain as a successful pluralistic society invested in racial and religious diversity, the document constructs British society as a utopia open to all, a utopia forced to defend itself from the scourge of extremism. Given that all of the above quotations come from “Chapter 1 - The Threat from Extremism” (CM 9148, 9) the implication is that those individuals characterised as “extremists” would therefore be anti-diversity, anti-free-speech and anti-democracy. The document does clarify that “our values are not exclusive to Britain...they have been shaped by our history...in which we have seen injustice, misery and damage caused by discrimination on the basis of religion, race, gender, disability or sexual orientation” (CM 9148). The use of the passive “we have seen” communicates the sense that any past injustices, whilst they shaped British values, were not perpetrated by Britain. In a parallel with the government’s version of contemporary reality, this FORUM | ISSUE 22 Maryam Jameela 5 particular narrative strand cements Britain’s position as passive victim of various injustices (and implicitly a perpetrator of none) and the upholder of values. The construction of British values holding fast against extremism can be further elucidated by another favoured pattern in the text ― the description of certain Muslim teachings as “ideology” (CM 9148, 10). When discussing “the harm extremism causes”, the text states that “across the country there is evidence of extremists, driven by ideology, promoting or justifying actions which run directly contrary to our shared values” (CM 9148, 10). In this case “ideology” is a rather vague choice of words, implying a cohesive, overarching system whereby extremists are able to function and navigate against the equally vague, yet implausibly cohesive, British values. The phrase is used again with the assertion that “there is a clear distinction between Islam — a religion followed peacefully by millions — and the ideology promoted by Islamist extremists” (CM 9148, 21). This rhetoric creates an opposition, between “values” and “ideology”. “Values” is communicated around phrases like “shared” and “community”, implying togetherness and benefits for all, while “ideology” is altogether more sinister, implying dogmatism and a concerted effort to defeat these less threatening “values”, the latter a more benign word that is left to imply an “extremist” Muslim. This implication is further heightened by a distinction between “religion” as acceptable and “ideology” as a mutation of the former, which paints a narrative of harmless Muslim subjects and harmful Muslim subjects. The harmful Muslim has, then, been established in opposition to foundational British values and is thus marginalised within the text to occupy a linguistically and analytically menacing position. The policy document presents the need for action as one rooted in defending fundamental values threatened by concerted effort from outside Others to destabilise the nation. Given this stark binary opposition it is little wonder that arguments like Huntington’s Clash of Civilisations (1996) are so widespread and popular. When presented as the only option of analysis the conflict of terrorism comes to be viewed as a wildly oversimplified clash of juxtaposed ideologies, where, at least in this policy document, the narrative constitutes an accurate description of reality. The history and context of Britain as a possible perpetrator of state-sanctioned terrorism (for example, its involvement in illegal detainment and torture practices1), or even the history of Britain as a colonial and imperial nation that brought harm to millions, is not a narrative strand conducive to the picture being painted by the policy document of Britain under attack. Evidently, the narrative framing within the policy document of British values being defended against extremist ideologies exacerbates an already symbolically and physically violent conflict. Modes of Extremism The accusation of extremism is not, however, only levelled at Muslims. Cameron claims that the “scourge of extremism” is constituted by “sickening displays of neo-Nazism, Islamophobia, antisemitism and, of course, Islamist extremism” (CM 9148, 5). This tendency to group disparate forms of extremism together, is further demonstrated with the following assertion: “Islamist extremism is not the only threat, as seen by the vicious actions of a number of extreme right-wing and neo-Nazi groups” 1 The Iraq Historic Allegations Team, which tackles allegations of unlawful killing and torture during the Iraq war has been “overwhelmed with cases,” reports Jonathan Owen in The Independent (1 Feb. 2016). FORUM | ISSUE 22 Maryam Jameela 6 (CM 9148, 10). This is followed by various examples of racist, Islamophobic, Islamic extremist or anti- Semitic hate crimes all described as acts of “intolerance” and “extremism” (CM 9148, 11). The decision to group separate facets of extremism together is a peculiar one given that much of the document is at pains to chart the growth of Islamic “ideology” at length. It is an epistemologically questionable decision to place Islamic extremism and racist, Islamophobic hate crimes on the same plane, to say nothing of the decision to include neo-Nazism and antisemitism in an already confused grouping. There is no explanation of any possible links between the presentation of Islamic extremism in the media and the rise of Islamophobic hate crimes, nor any justification of grouping disparate forms of hate crime together, other than for convenience or for its own ideological purposes. Whilst there is an explanation of the development of extreme right-wing groups in the UK (CM 9148, 23) with a discussion of contesting online spaces where said groups mobilise, chapters four, five and six are all concerned with laying out methods for counter-terrorism. The context and history behind terms such as “extremism,” “terrorism” and “radicalisation” have been developed into connoting overwhelmingly Muslim subjects2 indeed, I would argue that in contemporary times the terms “terrorist” and “extremist” have become synonymous with “Muslim.” Absent articulations are thus particularly telling for the narrative construction at work here. In a linguistic sense, at least, Muslims are both the text and implicit text of the policy document — however committed the government is to combating hate crimes. Whilst it is arguable that this concerted attention to other groups is a misguided attempt to avoid accusations of singling out Muslims, it remains the case that the policy document focuses overwhelmingly on Muslims. As a policy document, it is certainly arguable that the text is not positioned to offer up any such explanation, but as Bevir and Rhodes would argue, such an imposition could only serve to allow policy analysts to reflect on the particular choices of policy makers. In this instance, the grouping of different modes of extremism conveys a lack of rigour in tackling antisemitism and Islamophobia, especially given that so little space is given to identifying causes, symptoms and possible solutions. The priority is evidently Islamic extremism, with a sizeable but still much smaller amount of attention paid to right- wing groups. This places the issues to be tackled within British society in an unfortunate hierarchy, to say nothing of the counter-narrative it presents to the notion of a “successful” Britain (CM 9148, p. 5). Whilst acknowledging that there are more forms of extremism than Islamic terrorism, the document is unsuccessful in constructing nuanced accounts of these other forms, thus undermining their legitimacy as conflicts which require attention. National identity/religious identity The question of religious identity clashing with national identity is addressed in Cameron’s foreword when he states that “people should have no difficulty in identifying themselves as a proud Sikh, or Jew, or Muslim, Hindu or Christian as well as being a proud Brit”, (CM 9148, 5) whilst going on to state his aim of stopping “them [extremists] from driving a wedge between British Muslims and the rest of our society” (CM 9148, 6). As discussed earlier, this contradicts the conceit of including other 2 A recent article by Omar Alnatour in The Huffington Post presents a convincing case by analysing the statistics behind terrorism in the US and Europe, particularly with regards to the link between the ethnicity of the criminal and the style of media coverage (12 Sep. 2015). FORUM | ISSUE 22 Maryam Jameela 7 forms of extremism alongside Islamic terrorism and also demarcates “British Muslims” as a group separate from ‘regular’ British people. Granted, Cameron’s words imply unity but the subtle separation of “Muslim” and “British Muslim” is one which marks the latter group out as separate and Other. The government’s intention for the paper is to: “promote a positive alternative showing that it is entirely possible to reconcile your faith identity and national identity, something that the overwhelming majority of people of all faiths do every day.” (CM 9148, 24) In doing so, it extends the clash between national identity and religious identity as one fundamental to solving the ideological conflict and further integrating British Muslims into British society — itself a claim that rests on the assumption that British Muslims are somehow not fully integrated. This is not to say that this particular conflict is one which British Muslims do actually confront on a regular basis, but rather that it has been assumed that being Muslim must clash with any sense of Britishness. It is reasonable to assume that many British Muslims do not experience this clash in any way and, whilst there is a need to discuss this at length elsewhere, in this particular policy document the language used to address conflicts of nationality and religion subtly highlights a separation of British and Muslim, as with the demarcation between ‘good Muslims’ and ‘bad Muslims.’ Muslims are debated and dissected in the public arena in terms of possible allegiances and internal conflicts, all the while characterised as subtly distinct from other British people. This particular example of the perception of British Muslims is an example of a more symbolic conflict that frames Muslims as carrying internal conflicts and in opposition to a “normal” British community. Construction of terrorism The construction of this Muslim subject is further exemplified by the repeated opposition of a marginalised voice gaining a mainstream reception. The text states that “a small number of strident extremists drown out the mainstream majority, both in person and online” and concludes “we’re now going to actively encourage the reforming and moderate Muslim voices” (CM 9148, 31). Once again, such rhetoric embeds the dichotomy of a helpless Muslim, who is therefore open to cooperation, versus a harmful Muslim, who is thus closed to the values of Britain and actively looking to attack those values. The relationship between isolated and marginalised voices gaining traction appears to involve a degree of cognitive dissonance, but the implication is clearly that the internet acts as a great leveller, a platform bringing social reach to a small group. This opposition serves to support the government’s proposed solution of recruiting the voices of “individuals and groups who have credibility and experience fighting extremism within their communities” (CM 9148, 31). This leaves no room for “moderate” Muslims who are not extremists but are still critical of government policy towards Muslims. The proposed solutions of the text are based on the principle that “government cannot do this alone” (CM 9148, 16) and encourages individuals to confront extremists online, in addition to calling for internet companies to restrict and censor platforms for extremism. As demonstrated earlier, the definitions of extremism and terrorism are under the purview of the government, along with the “credibility” (CM 9148, 31) of individuals who may confront online extremism. The dichotomy constructed around the role of British Muslims, then, is one which is centred not so much on the fact that “government cannot do this alone,” but rather on the notorious FORUM | ISSUE 22 Maryam Jameela 8 proviso that “you’re either with us, or you are with the terrorists” (Bush 30/57). This positioning constitutes a stifling dichotomy that capitalises on a narrative of juxtaposition which in turn isolates “moderate’” Muslims further away from that which the government deems acceptable. The narrative of Islamic extremists as a small minority is one that presumes all Muslims have the potential for extremism, especially given the reference to ‘Prevent’, an initiative encouraging schoolteachers to identify early signs of radicalisation in children (CM 9148, 26). Explicitly, the text claims that moderate Muslims are acceptable Muslims that can integrate seamlessly into British culture, but implicitly the text communicates a profound mistrust of Islam. For example, the text constructs an image of terrorist figures able to weaken the “social fabric of our country” because they hail from places where “women’s rights are fundamentally eroded” and where “there is discrimination on the basis of gender, race, religious belief or sexual orientation” (CM 9148, 10). Not only does this erase the existence of native British Muslims, this rhetoric also functions as justification for state-sanctioned violence, especially given that the document recommends a number of strategies which inform the UK government’s decision to bomb Syria.3 The construction of terrorists, and implicitly Muslim terrorists, follows a pattern both familiar from both other government policies and the British media which portray Muslims as inherently malevolent and worthy of suspicion. The link between the representation of Muslims and state-sanctioned violence against Muslims needs only the context of the past 15 or so years of conflict in order to be characterised as a structural system of oppression built on the actions of a minority. Women’s rights The reductive and decontextualized approach to defining both Islam and Islamic extremism is best typified with regards to the Muslim British women4 mentioned in the text. The only instance of singling out a specific sub-group arises when Muslim women are mentioned. When discussing the impact of ignoring both Islamic extremism and other forms of hate crime, Theresa May writes that the end result would be the erosion of “women’s rights” (CM 9148, 7). By drawing this conclusion, May establishes a tentative link between unopposed Islamic extremism and the loss of rights for women. This is repeated later with the same phrasing. Such a suggestion contributes to a pernicious and widespread narrative of backwards, brown men subjugating brown women. As Gayatri Spivak outlines in her 1983 essay “Can the Subaltern Speak?” this stereotype enables a situation where “white men are saving brown women from brown men” (93). Brown men are further demonised in order to elevate the status of white saviours, thereby leaving brown women stranded in the middle as objects of oppression. The text communicates this context through the manner in which it introduces Muslim women. For example, a chapter headed “The Extremist Threat” posits that extremists “reject the very principle upon which democracy is based” (CM 9148, 7). This claim precedes a section under the heading of 3 The BBC News website provides a useful breakdown of the lead-up to the UK government’s decision to engage in air strikes against Islamic State in Syria: “Syria air strikes: − What you need to know.” 4 I have presumed the terrorist subjects cited thus far are gendered as male because an overwhelming majority of Islamic extremists are shown in the news media to be male. The media declares female Muslim terrorists to be particularly noteworthy. For example, The New York Times published an article by Jane Huckerby with the headline “When Women Become Terrorists,” discussing the strategic choice of extremists to deploy female terrorists in a male-dominated sphere. FORUM | ISSUE 22 Maryam Jameela 9 “harmful and illegal cultural practices” (CM 9148, 13) where female genital mutilation, forced marriage and honour-based violence are discussed. Public discourse on these three issues has historically aligned them as issues rife in Muslim communities and it is no coincidence that the section ends with the line, “we must tackle the root causes that mean certain communities continue to propagate such harmful practices” (CM 9148, 13, my italics). Rather than explicitly addressing the harmful stereotype of these conditions as exclusive or widespread within Muslim communities, the text chooses to implicitly align the two, rather than exploring the existence of these highly complex and constantly evolving issues in the social context within which they originate. Once again, the text constructs a narrative of oppositions that posits the superiority of Western culture against a subordinate and backwards Other, the Muslim subject. Whilst concluding with a desire for a cohesive community, the text claims that isolation is a major root cause of radicalisation and that such isolation breeds “values” which can take hold and promote “behaviour which is deeply discriminatory to women and girls, such as limiting equal access to education, justice, and employment, thereby creating an environment where a range of illegal cultural practices including so-called Honour-Based Violence, FGM [female genital mutilation] and Forced Marriage are perpetuated.” (CM 9148, 37) The attitude conveyed within the text, then, is one which positions the historical and social background of Muslim culture as one which is inherently opposed to rights for women, and, if allowed to spiral from a belief into an ideology, will bring its misogyny to Western cultures. Jasbir Puar’s model of US exceptionalism builds on Spivak’s articulation of the position of brown women in relation to larger systems of political policy and rhetoric. Puar describes “US sexual exceptionalism” (2) as a strategy that consolidates the nation’s self-ordained position as a liberated and liberating global power. Puar uses the optics of queer theory to elaborate upon America’s use of the appearance of liberalism to advance the rhetoric of a civilised and liberated West against a sexually- repressed and oppressive Muslim world in the East (39). Puar’s model was applied to sexual torture at Abu Ghraib and media coverage of the events, and it also provides an interesting context to this policy document’s framing of British values under attack from a Muslim threat. This particular document, and indeed British foreign policy more generally, has demonstrated a proclivity for constructing an opposition of explicitly progressive, even utopic, British values against an implicitly regressive and overtly oppressive culture of Islam in the East. As Puar argued in her work, Western formations of identity and self-knowledge are predicated on the construction, and often the denigration, of the Other (41). It is politically, socially and culturally easier to engender a narrative based on conflicting ideology, rather than confronting alternative, more nuanced, historical narratives. It is not a notable innovation that Muslim women are paid particular attention. Indeed, women are frequently positioned as a litmus test for a successful society and have come to symbolise a conflict that often uses the image of Muslim women in various veils as synonymous with oppression. Ultimately, the policy document reveals an uninterrogated conviction of British superiority which revels in the superiority of Britain as a haven of equal rights for women in direct opposition to the apparent barbarism of Islamic culture, or, as the text would name it, Islamic ideology. The text utilises a foundation of historical oppositions based on ‘clashes of culture’ in order to engineer a further FORUM | ISSUE 22 Maryam Jameela 10 ideological conflict where mounting a defence (and, indeed, definition) of “our” values is only conceivable within the arena of ideological conflict. Women, then, become puppets of discourse that are used to signify the space between warring ideologies, both as individuals and as a group. Conclusion Command Paper 9148 carefully constructs a narrative of opposition between Britain as a victim of terrorism defending values such as freedom, democracy and mutual respect, against the cohesive, organised and brute force of Islamic extremism. The question of British people who are also Muslims has become, for British citizens, a symbol of this apparent culture clash; the policy document is at pains to assert the acceptability of ‘harmless’ Muslims who adhere to British values without questioning possible Islamophobia from the government. Muslim women feature prominently throughout, and whilst the government may emphasise the importance of tackling discrimination against Muslim women from Muslim ‘cultures,’ it nevertheless remains the case that this strategy exists to draw attention away from a culture of sexism in Britain and towards the supposed sexism and misogyny within Muslim patriarchal culture. These tactics serve to present a clash of civilisations, and exaggerate the polarisation necessary for an ideological conflict, while disavowing the ideological nature of British culture in order to maintain a presentation of Britain as a dehistoricised victim of terror. David Cameron recently exposed his belief that Muslim women are “traditionally submissive”, (Harker) and drew a link between British Muslim women being unable to speak English, and their inability to deter husbands and sons from terrorism (Press Association). Cameron’s comments typify the worst stereotypes about Muslim women, of an innately submissive group of people who do not integrate and do not engage with local communities or British values. These stereotypes serve to dehumanise and belittle British Muslim women whilst using them as props for a wider debate on terrorism - irrespective of accuracy, empathy or good cognitive practices. I have demonstrated how such techniques lock us into certain narratives that filter out historical contexts in favour of a polarising and reductive rhetoric. FORUM | ISSUE 22 Maryam Jameela 11 Works Cited Anonymous. “Syria air strikes: What you need to know”. BBC News. 3 Dec. 2015. Web. 13 Apr. 2016. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-34931421> Alnatour, Omar. “Muslims Are Not Terrorists: A Factual Look at Terrorism and Islam”. World Post. 12 Sep. 2015. Web. 13 Apr. 2016. <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/omar-alnatour/muslims-are-not- terrorist_b_8718000.html> Association, Press. “Muslim women to be taught English in £20m plan to beat backward attitudes”. Guardian, 18 Jan. 2016. Web. 19 Feb. 2016. <http://www.theguardian.com/uk- news/2016/jan/18/muslim-women-to-be-taught-english-in-20m-plan-to-beat-backward-attitudes> Bevir, Mark. “Public Administration as Storytelling”. Public Administration 89 (2011): 183–95. JSTOR. Web. 19 Feb. 2016. Bevir, Mark, and R.A.W Rhodes, Interpreting British Politics. London: Routledge, 2003. Print. Bush, George. “Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People”. Washington D.C.: The White House Archives, 2001. Web. 4 Jan. 2016. <http://georgewbush- whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html> Collins, Patricia Hill. Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness and the Politics of Empowerment. London: Routledge, 1990. Print. Harker, Joseph. “David Cameron has become the master of trickle-down hate”. Guardian, 27 Jan. 2016. Web. 19 Feb. 2016. <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/jan/27/david- cameron-trickle-down-hate-bunch-of-migrants-calais> Home Department. Counter-Extremism Strategy Command Paper 9148. London: HM Government, 2015. Web. 4 May 2016. <https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/470088/51859_C m9148_Accessible.pdf> Huckerby, Jane. “When Women Become Terrorists”. New York Times. 21 Jan. 2015. Web. 1 May 2016.<http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/22/opinion/when-women-become-terrorists.html> Huntington, Samuel. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996. Print. Marsh, David. “Understanding British Government: Analysing Competing Models”. British Journal of Politics and International Relations. 10 (2008): 251–68. JSTOR. Web. 19 Feb. 2016. McAnulla, Stuart. “Challenging the New Interpretivist Approach: Towards a Critical Realist Alternative”. British Politics. 1 (2006): 113–38. JSTOR. 19 Feb. 2016. Owen, Jonathan. “British soldiers could face prosecution for crimes committed during Iraq conflict, investigators confirm”. Independent. 1 Feb. 2016. Web. 13 Apr. 2016. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/british-soldiers-could-face-prosecution-for- crimes-committed-during-iraq-conflict-investigators-a6793271.html> Puar, Jasbir K. Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer Times. Durham: Duke University Press, 2007. Print. Said, Edward. Orientalism. London: Penguin, 2007. Print. FORUM | ISSUE 22 Maryam Jameela 12 Spivak, Gayatri C. “Can the Subaltern Speak?” Colonial Discourse and Postcolonial Theory: A Reader. Ed. Patrick Williams and Laura Chrisman. Hertfordshire: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1994. Print. FORUM | ISSUE 22 Maryam Jameela 13 Author Biography Maryam Jameela is a WRoCAH-funded PhD Researcher in the School of English at the University of Sheffield. Her work examines intersectional representations of Desi women in cultural products produced post-9/11 through testing avenues of approach in a highly contemporary and saturated field. She is particularly interested in a process of decentring western feminism and epistemology through a culturally aware phenomenological approach. 
work_jv72i3ceyva67fkw6ezlcgd5du	----	Microsoft Word - Culpeper_Final_Accepted.docx This is the author accepted manuscript to appear in the Journal of Language, Aggression and Conflict. As such, it is under copyright; the publisher should be contacted for permission to re-use or reprint its material in any form. 1 Linguistic impoliteness and religiously aggravated hate crime in England and Wales Jonathan Culpeper, Paul Iganski and Abe Sweiry (Lancaster University) Despite its centrality to religiously aggravated hate crime recorded in England and Wales, the nature of the language used has been neglected in research. This paper, based on a unique dataset, aims to rectify this. It takes its approach from the field of linguistic impoliteness, a field that has yet to consider hate crime. Therein lies our second aim: to consider whether impoliteness notions can be usefully extended to the language of hate crime. In our data, we examine, in particular, conventionalized impoliteness formulae, insults, threats, incitement and taboo words. Whilst we reveal some linguistic support for the way religiously aggravated hate crime is framed in the law and discussed in the legal literature, we highlight areas of neglect and potential ambiguity. Regarding impoliteness, we demonstrate its effectiveness as an approach to this data, but we also highlight areas of neglect in that literature too, notably, non-conditional threats and incitement. Keywords: impoliteness, hate crime, insults, threats, incitement, taboo words, identity, religion 1. Introduction Compared with the situation in the United States, access to language data relating to the courtroom in the UK is highly restricted. Studies make do with historical data (e.g. Archer 2005), high-profile cases, such as that of Harold Shipman (convicted of multiple murders in 2000), which are occasionally released in the public interest (e.g. Coulthard and Johnson 2007, Chapter 5), or restricted quantities of data whose near anomalous release seems largely due to the whim of an individual judge or other official (e.g. Harris 1984, pers. com.). Our research is based on unique access gained to the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) records for England and Wales. That permission for this access was given is probably a consequence of the fact that our research constitutes part of a project conducted under the auspices of the ESRC research centre, Corpus Approaches to the Social Sciences (CASS), based at Lancaster University (UK), and supported by a former government home Minister, a senior police officer responsible for hate crime policy, and the Research and Governance Unit of the CPS, amongst others. Our focus in this paper is on the language manifested as religiously aggravated hate crime. Religiously aggravated hate crime in England and Wales constitutes a relatively recent crime. The Crime, Security and Anti-terrorism Act of 2001 established provisions for religiously aggravated offences, in addition to racially aggravated offences, in response to a backlash of incidents against Muslims in Britain, following the 9/11 terror attacks in the United States. Yet, to date, there has been no scholarly assessment of precisely what language uttered under what circumstance has been deemed to be in violation of that act. This leads to the specific research question we will address: what are the linguistic characteristics of speech deemed by legal authorities in England and Wales as having the potential to be an indicator of religiously aggravated hate crime? We will approach our data with work on linguistic impoliteness (e.g. Culpeper 2011) in mind. Work on impoliteness originally developed as a kind of counterpoint to linguistic pragmatic work on politeness, notably, the classic and oft cited Brown and Levinson This is the author accepted manuscript to appear in the Journal of Language, Aggression and Conflict. As such, it is under copyright; the publisher should be contacted for permission to re-use or reprint its material in any form. 2 (1987). Language that causes offence is very much the business of impoliteness scholarship. However, that scholarship has not hitherto accommodated the language of hate crime. Thus, another question this paper addresses is: can impoliteness notions and frameworks be usefully extended to the analysis of the language of hate crime? This paper begins with two brief sections. Section 2 considers hate crime as framed by laws in England and Wales and also relevant notions in the field of impoliteness. Section 3 contains a description of our data. The following and longest section, section 4, examines the kinds of impoliteness that constitute religiously aggravated hate crime. In the final section, we consider the kinds of identity attack evoked. 2. Background: Hate crime, the law and impoliteness 2.1 Hate crime in the legal context of England and Wales Libraries have been written on the problem of hate speech. But there is a paucity of scholarly analysis of the many actual utterances manifesting racist, religious, or some other type of social identity based hostility, utterances which aggravate and escalate criminal acts into so-called "hate crime". Among the few analyses which seem to have some relation to the project reported in this paper is the foundational work in the field of Critical Race Theory (cf. Delgado 1982; Matsuda 1989). This work focused on the personal and societal wounds inflicted by racist speech, and as a consequence advocated that such speech—and also equivalent “wordless speech” (Matsuda 1989, 2332)—should be treated as a sui generis category of speech for proscription under criminal law in the United States. However, such theorising mostly cited racist hate speech generically in the abstract rather than examined the linguistic characteristics of the actual use of hate speech. Such a trend of focusing on hate speech in the abstract as against actual usage has arguably dominated the scholarly literature on hate speech to date. Even Croom (e.g. 2013), who has made an important contribution to the discussion of racial slurs, focuses on the implications for semantic theory and philosophical aspects of pragmatics; his work is not driven by large-scale empirical analysis of use. Somewhat closer to our project is Asquith (2009), who proposes that hate speech, or 'malediction' to use her preferred term, is central to the majority of hate violence—marking out such violence as a unique form of interpersonal violence (2009, 162). Drawing on Austin’s (1962) performative speech act theory and also Langton’s (1993) speech act theory, she postulates the subordinating and silencing impact of performative malediction in the case of hate speech. In contrast, in our paper we use more recently developed impoliteness notions and frameworks, not to make inferences about the impact of hate speech as Asquith theorised, but to analyze the linguistic characteristics of hate speech which brought the use of particular utterances to be prosecuted under the criminal law in England and Wales as religiously aggravated hate crime. The provisions of current law in England and Wales on hate crime are usefully summarized in a Law Commission Report (No. 348; May 2014) dedicated to the topic. There are three distinct sets of legal provisions (Section 2.1): (1) Aggravated offences under the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (“CDA”), which deal with offences involving racial or religious hostility; (2) Offences of stirring up hatred under the Public Order Act 1986 (“POA”), which apply to conduct intended, or likely, to stir up hatred based on race, religion and sexual orientation; and This is the author accepted manuscript to appear in the Journal of Language, Aggression and Conflict. As such, it is under copyright; the publisher should be contacted for permission to re-use or reprint its material in any form. 3 (3) Enhanced sentencing provisions under the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (“CJA”), which apply to hostility on the grounds of race, religion, sexual orientation, disability or transgender identity. Note the keywords "aggravated" and "hostility", notions that are repeatedly used in these laws and indeed the Law Commission Report. Note also the word "intended", which relates to the important issue of "motivation". Finally, it is worth observing that the laws relate to particular social groups. We briefly elaborate on all these aspects below. Hostility, according to the Law Commission Report (Section 2.7), is not defined in the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, and there is in fact "no standard legal definition". The Law Commission Report (Section 2.7) refers to an "ordinary dictionary definition", which "includes being 'unfriendly', 'adverse' or 'antagonistic'" and "may also include spite, contempt or dislike". In fact, dictionaries vary hugely in their capacity to represent current usage, many being rooted in the etymological meanings of the past. However, even if the dictionary did articulate commonly and currently understood meanings of hostility, they may not be optimal in the context of hate crime. Walters (2013, 49) argues that complex, multifaceted acts of hate, including the "more subtle processes of long-term victimization", do not easily fit those common meanings. In addition, ordinary meanings of hostility are likely to encompass a very large set of behaviours, a much larger set than the legal system and enforcement agencies could possibly deal with. The legal solution to this unsatisfactory situation is to put the onus on the court to decide what hostility means and whether it applies: "Ultimately, it will be a matter for the tribunal of fact to decide whether a defendant has demonstrated, or been motivated by, hostility" (Section 2.7).This is not necessarily a perfect solution, of course, as ensuring consistency across cases will be very difficult. According to the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (Section 28.1, quoted in the Law Commission Report, 2014, Section 2.3), an aggravated offence is considered to have taken place if either hostility is demonstrated ((a) below) or motivation is proven ((b) below), or both these factors take place: (a) at the time of committing the offence, or immediately before or after doing so, the offender demonstrates towards the victim of the offence hostility based on the victim’s membership (or presumed membership) of a racial or religious group; or (b) the offence is motivated (wholly or partly) by hostility towards members of a racial or religious group based on their membership of that group. Regarding what offences might be deemed to involve aggravated demonstrations of "hostility", the Law Commission Report (2014, Section 2.4) offers a list of possibilities. Excluding offences involving physical harm, we are left with "threatening, abusive or insulting conduct", "harassment" and "putting people in fear of violence", all of which could be achieved linguistically. No specific linguistic examples are offered here. Elsewhere in the Law Commission Report, and indeed in the wider literature, the few linguistic examples given are almost always insults. However, the Law Commission Report (2014) offers an interpretation of what constitutes a demonstration of hostility, and includes some linguistic observations: 2.10 The demonstration of hostility will tend to involve words or gestures, but may be manifested in other ways, for example, by wearing insignia such as a swastika or singing This is the author accepted manuscript to appear in the Journal of Language, Aggression and Conflict. As such, it is under copyright; the publisher should be contacted for permission to re-use or reprint its material in any form. 4 certain songs. 2.11 Whether hostility was demonstrated is a wholly objective question. The victim’s perception of, or reaction to, the incident is not relevant. Also immaterial is the fact that the defendant’s frame of mind was such that, while committing the offence, he or she would have used abusive terms towards any person by reference to other personal characteristics.[...] 2.12 Whether hostility was demonstrated will be a question of fact for the tribunal to decide in light of all the circumstances. In Pal, Simon Brown LJ stated that the use of racially abusive insults will ordinarily be sufficient to prove demonstration of racial hostility. It should be noted here that the claim that demonstration is a "wholly objective question" seems to be restricted to perceptions of participants at the time of the purported crime, but not the courtroom. Discussing the meaning of "racial group", the Law Commission Report (2014, Section 2.22) comments on the interpretation of words: Words are to be construed as generally used in the jurisdiction of England and Wales [...] The Court of Appeal has said that it is for the jury to decide whether the use of a particular term is a demonstration of hostility. This, then, allows for the fact that words and expressions do not have fixed values but vary according to context, though no guidance is given on the contextual issues at stake. Whilst racial insults such as black bastard or Paki might present clearer cases of hostility demonstrated against a racial group to the courts, insults such as bloody foreigners are likely to be more uncertain (Walters 2013, 60, who also cites relevant court cases). And even apparently clear-cut cases might be challenged; Walters (2013, 61) notes a claim that black bastard is "'everyday language on the streets of London'". Walters (2013, 50) points out that some commentators have been concerned that the demonstration of hostility, as denoted by (a), is considered sufficient in itself to count as an aggravated offence, as it might "unfairly capture offenders who unthinkingly 'demonstrate' hostility in the 'heat of the moment', but who for all intents and purposes are not bigots or haters". Indeed, in some legal cases the defence has argued that although hostility was demonstrated, it was not intended (Walters 2013, 63). This brings us to the alternative factor for conviction, namely, motivation, as denoted by (b). Motivation is not quite the same as intention: an intention involves a plan to direct actions towards particular ends, whereas motivation involves reasons why one might have the intention. The Law Commission Report (2014, Section 2.18) notes that motivation is probably even more difficult to prove than intention. It suggests that proof may come from "evidence relating to previous conduct or associations" (2014, Section 2.17), including evidence of expressions of racist views or membership of a racist group. The idea, then, is to connect the individual to evidence of an ideology of hate from which motivations might arise. However, Iganski (2008) points out that most hate crimes are not the result of conscious intentions flowing from such ideologies, but arise in local contexts in the 'heat of the moment', often to address a perceived grievance. Interestingly, Walters (2013, 70, original emphasis) argues that what matters is not an intention to be racist or anti-religious but that "the offender intends to express the insult and is aware that to do so will likely demean the victim's identity". This is the author accepted manuscript to appear in the Journal of Language, Aggression and Conflict. As such, it is under copyright; the publisher should be contacted for permission to re-use or reprint its material in any form. 5 Regarding the social groups covered by the legislation, the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (amended by the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001) allows for prosecutions for a specific list of offences for racially and religiously aggravated offences. The Criminal Justice Act 2003 provides some protection for other groups but not in the same way. It suggests that during the sentencing phase, a court must give an enhanced sentence if an offence was aggravated by a demonstration of hostility towards the victim based on sexual orientation, transgender identity, or disability (or racial or religious group membership). In other words, the "identities" protected by the enactment of 'aggravated offences' are just racial and religious groups, but the other three protected groups get some coverage at the sentencing stage. It should be noted that the notion of "identity" is not operationalised in the laws we have been discussing here, or in the Law Commission Report (2014). 135 instances of the term "identity" out of the total of 170 in that report are simply part of the fixed expression "transgender identity" (a further 14 occur as part of the expression "gender identity", and the remainder relate to sexual orientation). Instead, as we saw in the quotation from the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (Section 28.1), legal documents simply refer to 'membership' or 'presumed membership' of social group. 2.2 Linguistic impoliteness Our aim in this brief section on linguistic impoliteness is not to offer a complete overview of impoliteness, but to concentrate on aspects of impoliteness relevant to notions raised in the previous section on the language of hate crime in the legal context of the UK. The notion of hostility is not unknown in the world of impoliteness. In fact, it is part of the label "reasonable hostility" that Tracy (2008) uses to refer to impoliteness (or what she calls "face-attack") in situations where it is considered appropriate. However, there are also many other broadly similar labels used in the literature on linguistic offence, including "rudeness", "incivility", "verbal aggression" and "face-aggravation" (see Culpeper 2011, chapter 1, for a discussion of and references relating to some of these labels), and many more are used outside academia. Each has their own semantic characteristics. Culpeper (2011, 72) proposes that the label "impoliteness" is used as a cover term for these related labels, not least because the word "impoliteness" has very little currency and is thus ripe for appropriation as a technical term. This is the policy we adopt in this paper. Let us pick up on one of the labels just mentioned, the one containing the word "aggravation". Locher and Bousfield (2008, 3), reviewing the contributions to their edited collection on impoliteness, comment that, whilst there is "no solid agreement as to what 'impoliteness' actually is", the "lowest common denominator" seems to be: "impoliteness is behaviour that is face-aggravating in a particular context". The notion of 'face' must qualify as one of the most frequently mentioned concepts in work on impoliteness, especially in earlier work (e.g. Lachenicht 1980; Beebe 1995; Culpeper 1996; Bousfield 2008). It is a technical notion that has helped delineate and operationalize both politeness and impoliteness. It could also help with hostility in the context of hate crime. Most (im)politeness works draw on Goffman (1967: 5) for their definition of face, where it is defined as follows: the positive social value a person effectively claims for himself by the line others assume he has taken during a particular contact. Face is an image of self delineated in terms of approved social attributes. This is the author accepted manuscript to appear in the Journal of Language, Aggression and Conflict. As such, it is under copyright; the publisher should be contacted for permission to re-use or reprint its material in any form. 6 Note that face in Goffman's definition is not just the positive values that you yourself want, but what you can claim about yourself from what others assume about your actions. This is a crucial point: Goffman's notion of face involves the public mediation of identity. This idea could deepen Walter's (2013, 70) argument that the key to hostile insults should be the speaker's awareness that they are likely to demean the victim's identity. From the point of view of face, hostile insults are not about the psychological properties of either the victim or the defendant before the event in question, but about assumptions concerning what might conflict with the kind of positive values (including those involving identity) the victim might want to claim during a particular interaction. Given that face involves an "image of self", it seems a short-step from discussions of face to discussions of identity. However, the concepts of face and identity have generally been pursued separately, at least until recently, when we see a particular focus on (im)politeness and identity emerging. One might note work such as Spencer-Oatey 2007, Locher 2008 and especially Garcés-Conejos Blitvich e.g. 2009, 2013, along with the special issue on face, identity and (im)politeness in the Journal of Politeness Research, 2013, volume 9, issue 1 (see especially Garcés-Conejos Blitvich, Lorenzo-Dus, and Bou-Franch, 2013), and also the discussion in Blitvich and Sifianou (forthcoming).What is of particular note for the current paper is the increasingly strong acknowledgement, in the light of identity research in particular, that face is not simply the property of an individual. For example, Spencer-Oatey's (e.g. 2008) model of "rapport management", in which she describes politeness, impoliteness and other interpersonal notions, proposed two major types of face: 'quality face' (which encompasses personal qualities, such as intelligence or competence), and 'social identity face' (which encompasses social identities and roles, such as a Muslim or mother).1 The latter is obviously of particular relevance to our data. To the non-academic, it is perhaps a no-brainer that certain words and expressions demonstrate impoliteness. However, this is a site of some dispute in the impoliteness literature. For example, Fraser and Nolen (1981, 96) state: no sentence is inherently polite or impolite. We often take certain expressions to be impolite, but it is not the expressions themselves but the conditions under which they are used that determines the judgment of politeness. (Fraser and Nolen 1981, 96) And this is echoed by other researchers (e.g. Watts 2003; Locher 2006). To be fair, these researchers were reacting to earlier work which seemed to treat words and expressions as stable vehicles for politeness or impoliteness, and also they do sometimes acknowledge that particular words or expressions lend themselves to particular (im)politeness perceptions. Indeed, people are able to proffer judgements about the degree of politeness of any word or expression even when it is out of context. The explanation for this, as Holtgraves (2005, 89) notes, is that "people possess a schematic knowledge regarding language and its social implications, knowledge that exists independent of any occasion of use". The wording is important here: the claim is that it is "independent of any occasion of use" and not that it is independent of context. Words and expressions become increasingly associated with their contexts of use so that those contexts become part of the meanings of those words and expressions with the result that they can be interpreted with the associations of their contexts even when they are used in atypical contexts. This view, broadly speaking, is in tune with Terkourafi's (e.g. 2001, 2002, 2003) proposals about politeness formulae arising as a result of becoming conventionalized for certain contexts of use; and Culpeper (2010) builds on those proposals for similar claims about impoliteness. Note here that there is absolutely no claim that such items have completely stable (im)polite meanings, that This is the author accepted manuscript to appear in the Journal of Language, Aggression and Conflict. As such, it is under copyright; the publisher should be contacted for permission to re-use or reprint its material in any form. 7 they are (im)polite in all contexts of use, but simply that they have default interpretations. Again, this idea is in tune with Walter's (2013, 70) argument that the key to hostile insults should be the speaker's awareness that they are likely to demean the victim's identity. Motivation is not much discussed in the impoliteness literature, although one can find comments on situational factors such as "trigger events" and provocation. However, there is a fairly prominent thread on intentionality in the context of impoliteness, that is to say, where somebody intended to offend, had the requisite skill to carry out offence, hatched a plan to carry out that offence, and then carried it out with full awareness. One reason for this prominence is that it helps distinguish 'genuine' cases from cases where somebody inadvertently caused offence (through, for example, a faux pas). Recollect the concerns mentioned in the previous section with respect to the framing of hate crime law and the possibility of unintentional demonstration of hostility. Regarding impoliteness, consider Bousfield’s (2008, 72; our emphasis) definition: Impoliteness constitutes the communication of intentionally gratuitous and conflictive verbal face-threatening acts which are purposefully delivered: (1) unmitigated […], and /or (ii) with deliberate aggression […] This definition clearly takes the communicator's perspective (i.e. the intention of the communicator in doing X). From the target’s point of view, we are actually dealing with perceptions of the communicator's intention. In fact, work on (im)politeness over the last ten years has emphasized the relative importance of what others make of a communicator's intentions compared with what the communicator's intentions might actually have been (e.g. Locher and Watts 2008). One practical issue in tune with this line is that we have no direct way of reaching into the heads of the speakers/communicators to discover what they intended (and sometimes even communicators are not sure what they intended or construct the intention post hoc). Moreover, it emerged in Culpeper's (2011) analysis of 100 narrative reports from British undergraduates of impoliteness events, and also in the work of others (e.g. Gabriel 1998), that sometimes people construe an act as both unintentional and offensive, and also describe it as impolite. Interestingly, Culpeper (2001) argued that whilst the offensive consequences of the utterance might not have been considered intentional, the informant may well have considered them foreseeable, and thus consequences that should have been prevented. This is perfectly in tune with Walker's (2013) argument for awareness and likelihood in hostile insults, as noted above. 3. The data and method 3.1 Data We consider CPS case records for all prosecuted cases that were flagged as ‘religiously aggravated’ in the 2012-13 financial year and tried in the Crown Courts.2 In 2012-13, according to records produced for the research by the CPS Management Information Team, 66 cases going before the Crown Courts were flagged as religiously aggravated on the CPS Case Management System, involving 90 defendants in total. Although flagged as 'religiously aggravated', not all of the cases included indictments for religiously aggravated offences. As the aims of our research were to explore the linguistic triggers for the prosecution of religiously aggravated offences, the selection of cases we analyzed was confined to all those with indictments for religiously aggravated offences - representing all prosecutions in the Crown Courts for religiously This is the author accepted manuscript to appear in the Journal of Language, Aggression and Conflict. As such, it is under copyright; the publisher should be contacted for permission to re-use or reprint its material in any form. 8 aggravated offences in 2012-13. Given our interest in the linguistic component of religious aggravation, we also included a small number of cases in which some type of religious aggravation was mentioned in either the indictment or elsewhere in the case records, even though there was not an indictment for a religiously aggravated offence. With these selection criteria, our sample consisted of 17 cases in total. Each case has three sets of documents: (1) The Report to Crown Prosecutor for Charging Decision (referred to as the MG3 form) capturing the details of the case as reported by the victim(s), any witnesses and police officers along with the defendant’s response to the allegations, the rationale for prosecution along with a weighing of the potential strengths and limitations of the prosecution’s case. (2) The Record of Taped Interview (ROTI) providing a transcript of the defendant’s interview(s) by the police. (3) The Indictment detailing the charges faced by the defendant(s) in court. The quantity of documentation for each case varied considerably. In some cases, ‘no comment’ interviews provided only a few hundred words for analysis in a ROTI, whilst in others, lengthy interviews extended as long as 11,824 words. We made no a priori assumptions about whether any particular utterance or behaviour constitutes impoliteness or hate crime, or indeed anything else. It should be noted that we make no claims about the "truth" or "reality" of the crime. Utterances and behaviours appear in the documents because they have been deemed relevant to the crime by a participant, that is, a victim, a witness, a police officer, or sometimes the defendant. It follows, therefore, that we are not getting a full transcript of what was said in the crime scene or a full detailing of the context, but a particular selection. Nevertheless, it is a selection deemed relevant to the law, and, moreover, it is the selection which will be used in the courtroom to decide the verdict. Thus, it is of crucial importance. 3.2 Method This paper is based on the analysis of all the utterances and other communicative behaviours represented in documents identified in section 3.1, and which are (a) alleged to have been produced by the defendant(s) at the scene of the alleged crime, and (b) have at least some claim to being offensive. Identifying and collecting these utterances/behaviours for our dataset was straightforward as they were nearly always marked as direct speech report, as illustrated by example [1] (no attempt is been made to tidy-up, standardize or otherwise adjust the data represented in this paper). [1] The customer alleged that she was unhappy with the quality of oranges she was seeking to buy and complained to the stall-holder. Allegedly, in response, the stall-holder verbally abused the customer, and by her account, told her to “Fuck off” and called her “You fucking foreign lady”. In addition, we admitted three borderline examples which, though a form of indirect speech report, provided a good idea of the orientation of the utterance in the context of the alleged crime, as illustrated by example [2]. This is the author accepted manuscript to appear in the Journal of Language, Aggression and Conflict. As such, it is under copyright; the publisher should be contacted for permission to re-use or reprint its material in any form. 9 [2] The letters reportedly “The letters attacked the VICTIM's religious beliefs, in particular the use of Tarot Cards and that they were preaching the words of the devil.” We do not have available evidence of the actual words used in the letters. We also included any specific negative behaviours (e.g. spitting, a cutting of the throat gesture). Our key, though not only, analytical framework was to apply the categories for conventionalized impoliteness formulae identified in Culpeper (2011, chapter 4). A conventionalized impoliteness formula is a regularly occurring bundle of language or a non-verbal sign in which context-specific offensive effects are encoded to a degree. Culpeper (2011) initially identified the various types of impoliteness formulae by studying discourses in which impoliteness is central (e.g. army training, exploitative TV shows, graffiti), drawing on a varied collection of data accumulated over 15 years. The limitation of these contexts is that they reflect contexts which are either institutional or often at least partly contrived; they do not include those more everyday moments of impoliteness - on the bus, with a shop assistant, with a member of your family, and so on. So, in addition, Culpeper (2011) deployed an impoliteness event report form filled in by 100 British undergraduates. Having thus generated a range of impoliteness types, the next step taken was to establish whether these formulae are regularly associated with impoliteness effects, and thus can be claimed to be conventionalized. Culpeper (2011) checked all items in the two-billion word Oxford English Corpus (see: http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/words/the-oxford-english- corpus), in order to make sure that more than 50% of the instances of each type occurred in contexts which could be interpreted as involving impoliteness. The resulting list of formulae that met this criterion is displayed in Table 1 (further information about the formulae can be found in Culpeper 2011: chapter 4). Table 1. Conventionalized impoliteness formulae (drawn from Culpeper 2011, 135-136) Impoliteness formulae type Example Insult (Personalised negative vocatives) you fucking moron Insult (Personalised negative assertions) you are such a bitch Insult (Personalised negative references) your little arse Insult (Personalised third-person negative references in the hearing of the target) the daft bimbo Pointed criticisms/complaints that is total crap Challenging or unpalatable questions and/or presuppositions why do you make my life impossible Condescensions that's being babyish Message enforcers listen here Dismissals fuck off Silencers shut the fuck up Threats I'm going to bust your fucking head off if you touch my car Curses and ill-wishes fuck you Some items that one might expect to be in Table 1 simply did not occur frequently enough. For example, taboo words can trigger a judgement of impoliteness, but they seem to do this per se rarely – a mere two cases out of 100 in Culpeper's (2011, 136) report data. In most cases, taboo words operate in conjunction with impoliteness formulae such as those in Table 1. Also, we should note that, whilst Culpeper (2011) acknowledges the existence of conventionalized non-verbal impoliteness behaviour (e.g. spitting, a two or one fingered gesture), he does not investigate them. This is the author accepted manuscript to appear in the Journal of Language, Aggression and Conflict. As such, it is under copyright; the publisher should be contacted for permission to re-use or reprint its material in any form. 10 We then coded and segmented our dataset with the categories comprising conventionalized impoliteness formulae. This was a relatively simple process, as most of the data are reported as fragments of direct speech which neatly fit a category. For instance, in example [1], "fuck off" is a Dismissal, and "You fucking foreign lady" is an Insult (specifically, the variant that comprises personalised negative vocatives). If an utterance/behaviour repeated an impoliteness formula (e.g. "fuck off, fuck off"), each received a separate coding. If the utterance/behaviour ran together a mix of impoliteness formulae (e.g. "fuck off you fucking foreign lady"), each received a separate and different coding. As we elaborate in the following section, just a small number of utterances/behaviours did not fit the categories of conventionalized impoliteness, but instead relied on the generation of impolite implications. Our dataset comprises 168 codings in total. The upcoming sections will note the relative proportions the different types of impoliteness consume of that 168, and also examine their nature more closely. 4.The building blocks of the language of hate crime 4.1 Prefabricated or creative? Our first goal was to establish whether the language of our data is comprised of language associated with impoliteness contexts; in other words, whether it is comprised of language more likely to offend, that is, conventionalized or pre-fabricated impoliteness formulae. 89.3% (149) of our dataset were coded conventionalized impoliteness formulae. Our data is indeed regularly associated with impoliteness. Interestingly, our figure of 89.3% is more than double the figure of 41% for impoliteness events reported by British students in Culpeper (2011, 155). Why is there this difference? Relying primarily on pre-fabricated chunks held in memory involves less mental effort. It is less creative. Creativity in impoliteness tends to go hand in hand with entertaining functions of impoliteness and often social solidarity functions, as is frequently the case with banter (Culpeper 2011, 207-215, 233-244). One might reasonably expect less thought-full language production in the typical situations of our data, that is, highly emotional and stressful situations. However, we cannot ignore another factor that may have a bearing: impoliteness that is more explicit – a conventionalized formula – is more likely to get reported than impoliteness that is more implicational in nature. Consider this utterance that was reported in our data: [3] See you next Saturday. Superficially, it is innocuous, but the context allows an offensive interpretation. It was allegedly said by a defendant to the victim(s) as he was taken away by police. Significantly, he is alleged to have regularly turned up on Saturdays to harass the victim(s). Hence, there is an implied threat to do the same next Saturday. Such cases tend not to get reported, because they are usually more complex and do not fit the discussions surrounding the law which focus on "words" and "terms" imbued with hostility (see section 2.1). Whether such implicational cases can cause as much or even more offence than conventionalized formulae has not been the subject of sufficient research. 4.2 The hate crime language mix: Coercive impoliteness Despite the obvious centrality of language to the manifestation of hate crime, the law, as noted in section 2.1, offers little indication as to nature of relevant language. Figure 1 displays the This is the author accepted manuscript to appear in the Journal of Language, Aggression and Conflict. As such, it is under copyright; the publisher should be contacted for permission to re-use or reprint its material in any form. 11 percentages and frequencies with which different types of conventionalized impoliteness formulae appear in our data. Figure 1. Types of impoliteness formulae(the Y axis indicates raw frequency; the percentages on top of each bar indicate the proportion of the category with respect to the total 149 items that are conventionalized impoliteness formulae) Insults and threats are typical of coercive impoliteness (Culpeper 2011, 225-233), that is, "impoliteness that seeks a realignment of values between the producer and the target such that the producer benefits or has their current benefits reinforced or protected" (2011, 252). Culpeper's notion of coercive impoliteness was partly modelled on work on aggression in social psychology, especially Tedeschi and Felson (1994). Consider their definition of a coercive action: A coercive action is an action taken with the intention of imposing harm on another person or forcing compliance. Actors engaged in coercive actions expect that their behaviour will either harm the target or lead to compliance, and they value one of these proximate outcomes. The value they attach to compliance or harm to the target arises from their belief about the causal relationship between compliance or harm and the terminal values. There are many values that might be pursued through coercive means. For example, actors might value harm to the target because they believe it will result in justice, or they might value the target's compliance because they believe it will lead to tangible benefits. There are two aspects of this definition that are particularly relevant to our data. First, coercive action is not merely a matter of forcing behavioural compliance, but includes the notion of social harm, which involves "damage to the social identity of target persons and a lowering of their power or status" and "may be imposed by insults, reproaches, sarcasm, and various types of impolite behaviour" (Tedeschi and Felson 1994,171). It is about using impoliteness to reduce the target's relative symbolic power (Bourdieu 1991), thereby boosting the speaker's symbolic benefits This is the author accepted manuscript to appear in the Journal of Language, Aggression and Conflict. As such, it is under copyright; the publisher should be contacted for permission to re-use or reprint its material in any form. 12 (which in turn may lead in the future to material benefits). Second, the specific example of the motivation for harm, namely, that it will result in justice, fits a strong thread in our data. The realignment of values attempted in our data sometimes seems to be perceived as having moral backing, as being a matter of re-balancing things, of redressing a grievance. As noted in section 2.1, redressing a grievance has been mentioned as a motivation for hate crime. Tedeschi and Felson (1994, 218) refer to the notion of "distributive justice", which concerns "a fair allocation of benefits, a fair distribution of responsibilities, and recognition of performance or effort", and note that violations of this notion "may form the basis of a grievance and lead to coercive interactions". Example [4] illustrates this, and also the fact that the basis of the grievance need not have common-sense logic (all data examples in this paper follow the spellings and typographical style, e.g. the use of capitals, of the original). [4] MY TWO MATES WHERE KILLED IN AFGHANISTAN BY MUSLIMS, SO ILL KILL YOU In fact, the perceived moral backing underpinning the grievance seemed to empower the defendants. In one police interview, the defendant, a member of the English Defence League (EDL), an extremist nationalist right-wing group, defends his actions by alluding to the alleged prior burning of poppies (a symbol to commemorate the death of British and Commonwealth soldiers after the First World War) by Muslim groups (DS = the police officer rank of detective sergeant): [5] DS SURNAME: What’s your feelings about, how do you feel about going to a place of worship and abusing with violence the people in the, in the mosque? FORENAME SURNAME: How do you feel about them burning poppies? The following sub-sections focus on the most frequent types of impoliteness formulae in our data, and then considers how they are intensified. 4.3A focus on insults As mentioned in Section 2.1, if discussions surrounding hate crime mention the language involved, they strongly gravitate towards insults. Given their high frequency of occurrence in Figure 1, constituting 47% of the conventionalized impoliteness formulae and more than double any other category, this is justified. Also, as we will see in section 5, they are a convenient linguistic carriage for connecting something negative with group membership. However, not all insults are the same. Almost all the insults in the data are of two types, as illustrated below: [6] Personalized negative vocative � idiots � you cunt � dirty muslim scum � you fucking protestant pig � YOU FUCKING PIG LOVING, CURRY MUNCHING, SAND MONEY3 CUNT Personalized negative assertion This is the author accepted manuscript to appear in the Journal of Language, Aggression and Conflict. As such, it is under copyright; the publisher should be contacted for permission to re-use or reprint its material in any form. 13 � you are a terrorist � you're a fucking Muslim � You don't answer coz u no u lowest of the low The fact that these were the most frequent types of insult is not at all distinctive of our data; the datasets examined in Culpeper (2011) also had a preponderance of these types. What is distinctive about the data is that five of the reported insults involved alleged behaviours rather than speech, including: spitting and urinating at a mosque, tearing pages out of the Koran and throwing it down in front of the victims, and pulling-off the victim's head scarf and throwing it on the floor. Just as with verbal insults, such behaviours are symbolic violations of identities. The fact that insults are the predominant type of impoliteness in our data by far (more than twice as frequent as threats, for example) is a distinctive feature of our data. For instance, Kleinke and Bös (2015) studied impoliteness in the BBC's forum Have Your Say, using some of the same impoliteness categories as those used in this paper (i.e. from Culpeper 2011). They discovered that 'pointed criticism' was the most dominant category, accounting for 21% of their impoliteness 869 codings (2015, 56), even exceeding insults. In contrast, this category does not appear in our data. Example [7] illustrates pointed criticism. [7] Catholicism is responsible for maliciously keeping half of the worlds population in poverty (Kleinke and Bös 2015, 55) A key difference between insults and pointed criticism is personalization, usually achieved explicitly through the use of second person pronouns. Insults typically target the addressee’s face, or phenomena (e.g. group membership) in which they have face invested; pointed criticism targets a third party. However, there is leakage between these types of impoliteness. Compare examples [8] and [9], both from our data: [8] you’re a terrorist [9] the Islamic religion is bullshit (addressed to Islamic victim) "You're a terrorist" is obviously an insult: the use of the second person pronoun picks out the target; that target is associated with what is widely viewed as a repugnant group, terrorists, and thereby their face is potentially violated. "The Islamic religion is bullshit" denigrates the Islamic religion, and if the target has face invested in it, then their face is potentially violated. Superficially, example [9] looks like the pointed criticism of example [7]: both make a negative claim about a religion. However, the difference in context is crucial. [9], "The Islamic religion is bullshit", although not explicitly marked by a second person pronoun, is alleged to have been addressed to the Muslim victims present in the physical situation in which it was said. In other words, it implicitly targets those addressees. In contrast, [7], "Catholicism is responsible for maliciously, etc", is said in a context where the presence of Catholics is not salient. Of course, there is potential for leakage between these two impoliteness types. For example, if a Catholic happened to be in the communicative context of example [7], it is quite possible that they may have taken that utterance as an insult, rather than pointed criticism. The context then is crucial. Moreover, in a legal context, the difference is significant. A possible defence could be that it was not an insult, just a pointed criticism. A religiously-oriented insult clearly breaks the law: "the offender demonstrates towards the victim of the offence hostility" (see section 2.1; our emphasis). This is the author accepted manuscript to appear in the Journal of Language, Aggression and Conflict. As such, it is under copyright; the publisher should be contacted for permission to re-use or reprint its material in any form. 14 Religiously-oriented pointed criticism does not. Whilst the court records sometimes include indications as to the direction of talk (e.g. "at the victim"), often this is matter of inference based on what is reported of the context. This puts pressure on the adequacy of the record for reporting context. 4.4A focus on threats Threatening conduct is associated with hate crime, and so it is no surprise to see threats as the second most frequent formula. However, the particularly important point is that those in our data are distinctive. Culpeper (2011, 136) identifies three structures for threats in impoliteness contexts, the most frequent being given in example [10] (the example is constructed out of his data to display prototypical components constituting the threat): [10] [I’ll/I’m/we’re] [gonna] [smash your face in/beat the shit out of you/box your ears/bust your fucking head off/straighten you out/etc.] [if you don't] [X] All structures studied in that work are conditional threats. Similarly, Limberg (2009), a paper that deals with impoliteness and threats, especially responses to threats, focuses on conditional threats, confining non-conditional threats to very occasional brief remarks. In contrast with these studies, our data contain no conditional threats. Instead, our data contain: (1) 26 non-conditional threats, (2) one action characterized as a threat (allegedly, somebody making a shooting gun motion at the victims), and (3) 8 implied threats (e.g. "you're all fucking dead"4). Example [11] illustrates a non- conditional threat. [11] I'm gonna kill you and your family Holger (2009, 1382) remarks that the "implication that the addressee draws from a conditional threat utterance allows him/her to correct the behavior and/or comment on the implicit reproach". Non-conditional threats offer no such explicit opportunities for correction. If there is implicitly an issue associated with the non-conditional threats in our data that needs correction, it would likely be a grievance, as mentioned in section 2.2. In fact, conditional threats are more like commands, controlling the addressee’s future action; non-conditional threats, as in our data, express a commitment to harm the addressee in the future (see the discussion in Martínez-Cabeza 2009). It should be noted, however, that the future orientation of threats just described is present in the semantics, rather than the effect of the act. A perlocutionary effect, to use speech act terminology (e.g. Austin 1962), of a threat, whether conditional or non-conditional, is intimidation. This takes place at the point of utterance, not in the future. This clearly fits the framing of the law, notably of "putting people in fear of violence" (Section 2.2). 4.5 A focus on incitement and negative expressives Incitement was not mentioned in section 2.1 because it is not mentioned in the laws outlining offences of religious aggravation, nor in the offences that can be subject to aggravation, as suggested in the Law Commission Report (2014, Section 2.4). It is discussed at some length, however, in the Law Commission Report (2014, 2.33-56) under the heading "The Stirring up offences", the focus being whether incitement to religious hatred being explicitly included in the law relating to religiously aggravated hate crime is desirable and the extent to which it might This is the author accepted manuscript to appear in the Journal of Language, Aggression and Conflict. As such, it is under copyright; the publisher should be contacted for permission to re-use or reprint its material in any form. 15 already be covered in other laws. As far as the impoliteness literature is concerned, incitement appears nowhere. Paradigm examples in our data include: [12] [shouted] let's kill him [13] GET THEM OUT OF OUR COUNTRY As these examples illustrate, such utterances involve hortative or imperative constructions. The notion of incitement raises interesting issues for speech act theory (e.g. Austin 1962), and has been discussed at length in legal studies. Kurzon (1998) usefully discusses incitement in the contexts both of speech act theory and the law. We will not rehearse such discussions in detail, but raise some of the relevant complexities aired, especially as they apply to our data. In the USA, a touchtone for the discussion of incitement is the First Amendment and its provisions for the protection of free speech. A particularly important case is Brandenburg vs Ohio (1969). Here, the Supreme Court overturned the conviction of Brandenburg, a member of the Klu Klux Klan, who had been charged under Ohio state law. They overturned the conviction because the utterances at issue were considered "mere advocacy" rather than "incitement to imminent lawless action" (395 U.S. 444; see: https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/395/444). Not surprisingly, this rather tenuous distinction has stimulated much legal discussion (e.g. how imminent must imminent action be to be considered so?). What interests us here are the actual utterances in the case. They included "Send the Jews back to Israel" and "Bury the niggers" – ostensibly, exactly the same kind of utterances as those of our data. However, there are differences in the contexts in which these were said, and therefore differences in the potential range of effects. Brandenburg reportedly made those utterances at a Ku Klux Klan meeting; in other words, amongst like-minded people. The utterances in our data which we have labelled incitement were made, as far as we can work out, in the hearing of the victims. Moreover, not only is fairly immediate lawless action (e.g. assault) possible, but – and this is the key point – the mere expression of such utterances potentially causes immediate social harm by instilling fear in the victims. Similar to threats, the effect is one of intimidation. Note here that cases such as these require a complex view of speech acts, such as that articulated in the pioneering work of Thomas (1995) (see especially p. 195-207).The inciter, addressing an accomplice, may perform an act of incitement which indirectly is intended as and/or taken to be a threat by a bystander (victim). This is not to say that all of our examples are unambiguously examples of incitement. Consider example [14]: [14] Fuck the Koran This is ambiguous between an incitement to inflict physical harm, as might be more transparently conveyed by "Let's fuck up the Koran" (note here that one of our cases concerned tearing pages out of the Koran), and an expression of negative feelings, as might be more transparently conveyed by "I don't give a fuck about the Koran". Both, of course, are highly offensive, targeting a key symbol of a religion, though not in the same way. Compare [14] with [15], which was allegedly spoken by a Scotsman to English police officers: [15] Fuck the Queen This is the author accepted manuscript to appear in the Journal of Language, Aggression and Conflict. As such, it is under copyright; the publisher should be contacted for permission to re-use or reprint its material in any form. 16 It is of course improbable that in this context this could be anything other than the expression of negative feelings – not only is the idea of causing physical harm to the Queen a rather remote possibility, but the target audience, English police officers, constitute unlikely candidates for incitement to cause physical harm. Instead, it is the expression of negative feelings, targeting the identities of the English police officers by orienting an attack to the symbolic figurehead of their nation state. In order to reinforce the argument in this paragraph, one might reflect on the meaning of [13] had it been said in England a little over 400 years ago during the reign of Elizabeth I. At that time, in the context of national paranoia about plots to overthrow and/or assassinate the Queen, an incitement reading would be more probable. 4.6 Intensification: Taboo words Young's (2004,300) research on 'hurtful communication' reveals that: How the message was stated was pivotal in determining recipients' appraisals of it. Comments that were stated harshly, abrasively or that used extreme language were likely to be viewed more negatively. One of the most striking features of our data is the high density of taboo words. 50.3% of the conventionalized impoliteness formulae(or 75 of the 149) used at least one taboo word. Compare this with Culpeper's (2011,136) finding that only two of his 100 impoliteness events recorded by students as diary reports contained taboo words. The taboo words in our data are not only frequent but dominated by those perceived to be most offensive in Britain. Perhaps the most substantial study of people’s attitudes to taboo words and offensive language, and also the role of context, in Britain is Millward-Hargrave (2000). Involving a questionnaire delivered to 1,033 informants, this study was commissioned jointly by the Advertising Standards Authority, the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), the Broadcasting Standards Commission and the Independent Television Commission. Table 1 displays the offensiveness rankings of taboo words in Millwood-Hargrave (2000) and their frequency in our data: Table 2. Taboo words and their offensiveness in religiously aggravated hate speech Taboo word in our data Millward-Hargrave's (2000) offensiveness ranking Frequency in our data cunt 1 11 fuck-related 2/3 53 nigger 5 2 paki 10 5 mildly taboo words 17+ 13 Culpeper (2011, 136) argues that in most cases taboo words operate in conjunction with impoliteness formulae in order to exacerbate them. This kind of intensification is likely to be represented in our records, but we should not forget that impoliteness is often intensified by features less likely to appear in our records, namely, prosody (e.g. wide pitch range, sharp pitch falls, high amplitude) and non-verbal behaviours (e.g. spitting, two or one fingered gestures, anger displays). However, we should bear in mind that simple intensification is not the only function This is the author accepted manuscript to appear in the Journal of Language, Aggression and Conflict. As such, it is under copyright; the publisher should be contacted for permission to re-use or reprint its material in any form. 17 performed by taboo words. Example [16] illustrates some of the diversity possible with fuck- related taboo words. [16] I’m a fucking DOUGLAS, so don’t you fucking fuck with me Table 3 shows the functions and structures of fuck-related taboo words in our data and their frequencies. Table 3. Fuck-related taboo words in religiously aggravated hate crime language: Forms and functions [NP=noun phrase; VP=verb phrase; ADJ=adjective; ADV=adverb; PP=prepositional phrase] Function Structure Example Freq. Intensifying elements fucking NP you fucking mug 21 fucking VP we fucking hate Muslim scum 5 fucking fucking 2 fucking ADJ you're all fucking dead 1 Negative expressives fuck NP fuck you 10 Threats don't fuck with NP don't fuck with me 3 fuck you [ADV] up fuck you right up 2 fuck up NP ready to fuck up Muslim scum 1 Dismissals fuck off [PP] fuck off back to the desert 5 Idiomatic expressions give a fuck I don't give a fuck 2 fucking hell fucking hell 1 TOTAL 53 As can be seen, the intensifying function is indeed the most frequent for fuck-related elements, and most often plays a role in insults (which are typically of the form "fucking NP"). However, that function only accounts for a little over half of the instances. Amongst the other functions, negative expressives (prototypical instances being curses) constitute the most prominent type. 5. Identity attacks 39.9% (or 67) of the total 168 coded utterances/behaviours in our data explicitly target an aspect of the addressee's group identity, almost always through an insult. 64.2% (43) of these identity attacks explicitly target a religious aspect of the addressee's identity. This is 25.6% of all coded utterances/behaviours. It may seem puzzling that a mere quarter of the utterances/behaviours explicitly involve identity, as our data were selected on the basis that they allegedly violated the law with respect to religious identity (see Section 2.1).What these numbers reveal is that, although every case in our data contains at least one religious identity attack, other kinds of impoliteness dominate. We can infer from this that religiously aggravated hate crime events seldom revolve around the performance of the language of religiously aggravated hate crime alone, but normally This is the author accepted manuscript to appear in the Journal of Language, Aggression and Conflict. As such, it is under copyright; the publisher should be contacted for permission to re-use or reprint its material in any form. 18 are constituted by multiple impoliteness utterances/behaviours, of which religiously aggravated hate is one. Other group membership identities attacked include race, nationality, gender and sexuality. The remaining utterances /behaviours explicitly target personal identity aspects and values (e.g. "you bald cunt") or are types of impoliteness which include no explicit identity element (e.g. threats, dismissals and commands).That all these types of impoliteness are recorded in our records is a consequence not only of their relevance as the context to religiously aggravated offences, but also the fact that they may be violating other laws in their own right (e.g. the Protection from Harassment Act 1997; the Public Order Act 1986). For example, as well as charges for religiously aggravated offences, 3 of the 17 cases also included charges for racially aggravated offences. It is extremely difficult to quantify the actual or perceived religions of key parties. This information does not form part of CPS case documentation, but has to be inferred from comments participants make. For this reason, we cannot give information about general trends regarding participants' religious identities (or indeed any other aspect of identity). However, it is clear that the notionof a non-Muslim attacking a Muslim, which seemed to be the motivation for the development of the relevant legal framework in the first place (see Section 2.1), does not always apply. Other cases involved defendants and victims who were members of: � Different Christian subgroups: Catholic (by implication) and Protestant � Different Islamic subgroups: Shia, Sunni � Occultism There was also one case of a Muslim allegedly attacking a non-Muslim. Clearly, this is an area that could benefit from more comprehensive research. 6. Conclusions This is the first thorough linguistic treatment of speech manifesting as religiously aggravated crime in England and Wales, being, as it is, based on a unique data set. The laws of England and Wales framing and surrounding religiously aggravated hate crime, and also the related legal literature, contain no linguistic detail about what is involved, despite the fact, as noted in our data set, that language is central to the crime. From the perspective of impoliteness, we might add that that literature is not accustomed to dealing with such extreme data, something which adds additional interest to the fact that our approach involved impoliteness concepts and frameworks. We established that such hate crime is dominated by pre-fabricated conventionalized impoliteness formulae. This lends support to both assumptions in the law and arguments in the legal literature (e.g. Walters 2013) that hate crime can be framed in terms of material that is more "likely" to cause offence. In addition, such impoliteness formulae may reflect a more ‘mind-less’ kind of impoliteness characteristic of highly emotionally charged situations, though we cannot discount the fact that it may also reflect a tendency for more implied kinds of impoliteness to be recorded less. Our analysis supports the legal literature's focus on insults. They are by far the most numerous act of impoliteness in relation to hate crime, offering a convenient carriage for connecting group identity membership with negative aspects. Moreover, we revealed that they primarily take the form of personalised negative vocatives (e.g. "you X") or personalized negative assertions (e.g. "you are an X"). A danger with the latter, we argued, is that they can blur into pointed criticism, with its rather different legal status, when the target is not made explicit (e.g. "the Y religion is X" in the presence of people of Y religion). The onus is placed on the legal This is the author accepted manuscript to appear in the Journal of Language, Aggression and Conflict. As such, it is under copyright; the publisher should be contacted for permission to re-use or reprint its material in any form. 19 record to adequately represent the context, i.e. who the likely implicit targets are. However, we also showed that religiously aggravated hate crime events do not just revolve around insults. We revealed that one of the most striking features of our data is that its numerous threats are never conditional threats, as is typical of many other impoliteness datasets, but are non- conditional threats. We argued that despite expressing a future action (e.g. "I'll X you"), the key effect of intimidation is immediate: they put the target in fear of violence. Similarly, we argued that incitement, achieved via imperative or hortative structures, despite expressing a future action, has the immediate effect of intimidation. Interestingly, incitement, though fairly frequent in our data, is not part of the key laws dealing with religiously aggravated hate crime, nor, in fact, is it mentioned anywhere in the impoliteness literature. We also noted the potential for some ambiguities between incitement and negative expressives (e.g. "Fuck X"). Finally, we revealed that a characteristic of almost half of our impoliteness items is that they contain a taboo word, and moreover taboo words that are strongly offensive. They are typically deployed to intensify the impoliteness of insults, to maximise the offensiveness of the message, but they perform some other functions in our data too (e.g. negative expressives such as curses). Although religious identity is targeted in each of the 17 cases of our data, only a quarter of all reported impoliteness utterances/behaviours involve religious identity. This lends support to the argument that religiously aggravated hate crime events are constituted by many types of impoliteness of which just some relate to religion. Other group membership identities attacked in during those events include race, nationality, gender and sexuality. Yet, we might note that the legal provisions for the protection of these groups vary considerably (gender, for example, is not well accommodated). The remaining utterances /behaviours not involving group membership identities explicitly target personal identity aspects and values (e.g. "you bald cunt") or are types of impoliteness which include no explicit identity element (e.g. threats, dismissals and commands).The fact that our data includes the performance of so many impoliteness utterances/behaviours outside the purview of religiously aggravated hate crime is consistent with the idea that it often arises in the 'heat of the moment' rather than as a conscious intention to be anti-religious, racist, etc. (Iganski 2008). This is not to say, of course, that ideology is not at play. This can most clearly be seen in our data in the idea that a key motivation for hate crime is to redress a grievance (Iganski 2008). The way this idea connects with our analysis begins with the observation that our data is dominated by insults and threats, the stuff of coercive impoliteness, and that participants sometimes evoked moral backing for their coercive actions: they consider themselves to be redressing a "wrong". We noted that this fits the notion of distributive justice (Tedeschi and Felson 1994, 218). What counts as a 'fair' distribution of resources and values is shaped by ideologies concerning religion, ethnicity, etc. Turning to impoliteness, we have thoroughly demonstrated that impoliteness notions and frameworks are effective in describing and theorizing religiously aggravated hate crime. In some ways this is not surprising because, although hitherto unconnected, they share many similar issues, as elaborated in section 2.2. Even some specifics are shared, such as the recent movement away from full intention to a concern with the awareness of the likelihood of the offensive effects of a particular usage (Walters 2013) or a concern with its foreseeability (Culpeper 2011). However, on occasion in our data we have encountered phenomena that have been almost completely ignored by the impoliteness literature. The stand-out cases of this are non-conditional threats and incitement. More generally, one uncomfortable feature of bringing impoliteness to bear concerns nomenclature. Although, as we stated in section 2.2, we have been using "impoliteness" as a blanket-term for offensive behaviours, we cannot deny that that term suggests coverage of behaviours causing lesser offence than the ones typical of hate crime. Rudanko (2006) suggested This is the author accepted manuscript to appear in the Journal of Language, Aggression and Conflict. 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Journal of Pragmatics 38(6): 829-841. doi:10.1016/j.pragma.2005.11.006 Spencer-Oatey, Helen D. M. 2007. "Theories of Identity and the Analysis of Face."Journal of Pragmatics 39: 639−656. doi:10.1016/j.pragma.2006.12.004 Spencer-Oatey, Helen D. M. 2008.Culturally Speaking: Managing Rapport through Talk across Cultures (2ndedn). London and New York: Continuum. Tedeschi, James T., and Richard B. Felson. 1994.Violence, Aggression, and Coercive Actions. Washington DC: American Psychological Association. Terkourafi, Marina. 2001. Politeness in Cypriot Greek: A Frame-based Approach. Unpublished PhD dissertation. Cambridge: University of Cambridge. Terkourafi, Marina. 2002. "Politeness and Formulaicity: Evidence from Cypriot Greek." Journal of Greek Linguistics 3: 179-201. doi: 10.1075/jgl.3.08ter Terkourafi, Marina. 2003. "Generalised and Particularised Implicatures of Politeness." 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However there are some difficulties in separating this type from social identity face, and it also proved to be the least relevant type of face (Culpeper et al. 2010). 2 The Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) maintains a central record of prosecution outcomes, including cases flagged as hate crime, through its electronic Case Management System (CMS) and which are extracted through the related Management Information System (MIS) database. CPS This is the author accepted manuscript to appear in the Journal of Language, Aggression and Conflict. As such, it is under copyright; the publisher should be contacted for permission to re-use or reprint its material in any form. 23 data are available through its Case Management System (CMS) and associated Management Information System (MIS). The CPS collects data to assist in the effective management of its prosecution functions. The CPS does not collect data that constitutes official statistics as defined in the Statistics and Registration Service Act 2007. These data have been drawn from the CPS' administrative IT system, which (as with any large scale recording system) is subject to possible errors with data entry and processing. The figures are provisional and subject to change as more information is recorded by the CPS. The CPS is committed to improving the quality of their data and from mid-June 2015 introduced a new data assurance regime which may explain some unexpected variance in some future data sets. The official statistics relating to crime and policing are maintained by the Home Office (HO) and the official statistics relating to sentencing, criminal court proceedings, offenders brought to justice, the courts and the judiciary are maintained by the Ministry of Justice (MOJ). 3According to the Urban Dictionary, 'sand money' means "crazy insane money, like an Arab Sheik". 4This example flouts Grice's (1975) maxim of quality -- there is no evidence that the addressees are dead. This triggers a search for an implied meaning, a strong possibility being that the speaker is threatening that they will be dead. 
work_k2o3j3htyjc35kuifyrg76ivma	----	soc4_387 591..606 Racist Nativism in the 21st Century Cameron D. Lippard* Department of Sociology, Appalachian State University Abstract Since the 1960s, academia and the public have frequently used racism as the catch-all phrase to explain any racial or ethnic injustice identified in America. However, are the disparities domestic minorities face the same as those faced by immigrant minorities? For example, journalists have suggested that the various state immigration policies targeting Hispanic immigrants in the United States recently are as racist as the Jim Crow laws enacted decades ago. In this essay, I contend that while nativism and racism are kissing cousins, distinguishing and using these concepts may lend to more precise explanations of the issues many racial and ethnic minorities face who exist outside of the Black–White dichotomy that has traditionally characterized United States. To untangle these terms, I review recent scholarship to provide up-to-date definitions, as well as reintroduce the concept of ‘racist nativism’ to better explain the variability that characterizes racial or ethnic preju- dice and discrimination in 21st century America. Introduction Nativism and racism are often confused and conflated. After the 1992 Los Angeles riots, commentators were quick to suggest that the riots highlighted the continuing issue of racism in America. However, Sánchez (1997) points out that African-American’s fears of Korean and Hispanic ‘foreigners’ taking over their neighborhoods sparked most of the violent attacks and looting. The same uncertainty is evident when examining the backlash Arabs and Muslims faced after 9 ⁄ 11. Within 9 weeks of the attacks, over 700 violent inci- dents occurred, targeting Arab Americans or at least those perceived to be Arab or Mus- lim (Ibish 2003). Dubbed as ‘islamophobia’ by many reporters and scholars (see Sheridan 2006), this contemptuous fervor against ‘foreigners’ brought the United States govern- ment to enact several laws (i.e. the Patriot Act of 2001) that targeted Arabs, Muslims, and Hispanic immigrants for interrogation and imprisonment as suspects of terrorism and ille- gal drug activities (Barone 2004; Gardner et al. 2008; Sheridan 2006; Stein 2003). While some viewed these acts as racist because they singled out people of color (e.g. Akram and Johnson 2002; Barone 2004; Ibish 2003), others viewed these policies as nativist reactions (Galindo and Vigil 2006; Tumlin 2004). The same confusion is clear in the recent build up of anti-immigrant attitudes and laws passed targeting Mexican immigrants, particularly those that are undocumented. Lovato (2008), a journalist, identified the current mistreatment of Latinos in Georgia as a throw- back to old South Jim Crow racism, which he labeled, ‘Juan Crow’. Within the past 5 years, Georgia has enacted its own immigration legislation in 2006 (Georgia Security and Immigration Compliance Act) and encouraged local law enforcement to partner with Immi- gration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) to help with arresting and detaining undocu- mented immigrants (use this link for more on partnerships http://www.ice.gov/news/ library/factsheets/287g.htm). Lovato (2008) also suggests that many of the crimes against Sociology Compass 5 ⁄ 7 (2011): 591–606, 10.1111/j.1751-9020.2011.00387.x ª 2011 The Author Sociology Compass ª 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd Latino immigrants in Georgia within the last few years have been racially motivated. For instance, six Latino immigrants were killed during a robbery of their homes in Tifton, Georgia by African Americans who suggested they were ‘easy targets’. Controversies over Arizona’s Senate Bill 1070 provide another example of confusion over whether the recent state immigration laws represent a racist or nativist action (to read SB 1070, use the following link, http://www.azleg.gov/legtext/49leg/2r/bills/ sb1070s.pdf). As suggested in the bill, Arizona state legislators wrote and passed this bill on April 23, 2010 to ‘‘discourage and deter the unlawful entry and presence of aliens and economic activity by persons unlawfully present in the United States’’ (The Help Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act, Section 1). Even though by 2007 every state in the union has introduced or passed legislation to address growing concerns about immigration (Anrig and Wang 2006; Navarro 2009; NCSL 2007), Arizona’s law stood out to many concerned immigrants and citizens because of the following clause (italics added for emphasis): For any lawful contact made by a law enforcement official or agency of this state or a county, city, town or other political subdivision of this state where reasonable suspicion exists that the per- son is an alien who is unlawfully present in the United States, a reasonable attempt shall be made, when practicable, to determine the immigration status of the person (The Help Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act, Section 2, B). For several civil rights organizations including the NAACP, ACLU, and the National Council of La Raza, this particular clause encouraged Arizona law enforcement to use racial profiling to determine whether a person was an undocumented immigrant. More- over, it became clear that being ‘Brown’, or being Hispanic or Latino, would be how law enforcement developed ‘reasonable suspicion’ of whether a person was illegally in the United States without actually seeing a suspect crossing the Mexico ⁄ US border. Or, as US House Representative Steve King suggested, law enforcement could target undocu- mented immigrants using a ‘sixth sense’ that hones in on type of dress, accent when speaking, and grooming habits, which are all at least cultural indicators denoting racial or ethnic classification (see the following video clip, http://www.youtube.com/watch? v=wMuuMZH4gWw). As the NAACP suggested in their reasons for filing a lawsuit against Arizona, there are also other clauses in this bill that subtly point the finger at Mexican undocumented immigrants as the ‘problem’ (NAACP 2010). More important, the NAACP and the National Council of La Raza saw these laws as reminiscent of Jim Crow era laws Blacks faced in the South. So, which is it? Are the incidents and actions that target immigrant minorities racist, nativist, or both? Certainly, this confusion is warranted. Americans have always struggled with how to define, identify, or even acknowledge the existence of either phenomenon (Bonilla-Silva 2001; Feagin 2010; Galindo and Vigil 2006; Higham 1955, 1999; Huber et al. 2008; Jacobson 2008; Sánchez 1997). This confusion about terms has only been magnified by the dramatic increases of Asian and Latino immigration to the United States since the 1960s, and the spread of these immigrants to new and unsuspected destinations (see Furuseth and Smith 2006; Lippard and Gallagher 2011; Massey 2008). Or, it may be that, as suggested by Gallagher (2008), Americans cannot fathom the notion that racism continues to exist in the era of Tiger Woods, Oprah, and President Barack Obama. Or, as Huber et al. (2008) suggests, maybe Americans cannot see nativism at work because governments, anti-immigrant groups, and individuals frame any discriminatory actions against immigrants of color as a ‘necessary evil’ to address issues of terrorism or economic downturn. 592 Racist Nativism in the 21st Century ª 2011 The Author Sociology Compass 5 ⁄ 7 (2011): 591–606, 10.1111/j.1751-9020.2011.00387.x Sociology Compass ª 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd In an attempt to better understand the nature of racism and nativism in 21st century America, this article presents recent definitions of racism and nativism in the context of today’s society. The article then points out the glaring similarities between the two con- cepts and calls for a renewed discourse within academia and the public at-large on how these two phenomena interact. I also reintroduce Higham’s (1955) ‘racial nativism’ to help bridge the gap between discussions of racism and nativism to decipher the recent attitudes and actions toward ‘Brown’ immigrants. More important, this essay provides a clear way to explain how today’s racism and nativism have the same objective – to sustain White dominance in the United States. Defining two concepts in the 21st century Most scholars want to define nativism and racism as two distinct phenomena; there- fore, I start by presenting these concepts separately. On one hand, nativism is an ideology based on nationalist sentiment and separates ‘natives’ from ‘foreigners’ (Galindo and Vigil 2006; Knobel 1996; Schrag 2010). Or, as Higham (1955, 4) defines nativism in his seminal work, Strangers in the Land, it is an ‘‘intense opposition to an internal minority on the ground of its foreign (i.e. ‘un-American’) connections.’’ Later, Higham (1999, 384) states that ‘‘nativism always divided insiders, who belonged to the nation, from outsiders, who were in it but not of it.’’ Thus, nativism is unique in that its ideological core rests on notions of nationalism and distinguishing between native and non-native. As Huber et al. (2008, 41) explains, ‘‘The issue of nationalism is important to nativism because it not only illuminates the process of defending national identity from perceived threats, it also engenders a fear of the foreigner.’’ Nativism becomes clearer during times of national crisis through anti-immigrant sentiment that emphasizes fears that foreigners are either threatening or taking over culturally, politically, or economically. These national calamities usually include economic downturns, wars (or even terrorist attacks), or sudden increases in visibility due to the size or concentration of immigrant populations (Galindo and Vigil 2006; Higham 1955; Perea 1997; Portes and Rumbaut 2006; Sánchez 1997). These fears frequently manifest themselves in a public outcry or anti-immigrant atti- tudes that focus on a particular set of immigrants or even naturalized immigrant groups already in the country. Higham (1955) suggests that anti-immigrant sentiment is often shaped by a real or perceived challenge to natives’ sense of group position, either eco- nomically, politically, or culturally. Jaret (1999) identifies four broad accusations against immigrants in the history of the United States. First, native-born groups have identified immigrants as a threat to the political order of America. For instance, some border vigilante and White extremist groups suggest that undocumented Mexican immigrants entering the United States today are here to ‘re-conquer’ western territories part of Mexico (Chavez 2008; Navarro 2009) – (the following link is an example of discussions about a ‘Reconquista Movement’ in United States by Mexican immigrants, http://www. humanevents.com/article.php?id=16245). Second, nativists often suggest that immigrants threaten the social and cultural fabric of America. Recently, much of this fear revolves around language issues in that some do not see Hispanic immigrants doing enough to learn the English language. For example, late Harvard University political science professor, Huntington (2004, 1), suggested the following concerning how Latinos would change the United States: Racist Nativism in the 21st Century 593 ª 2011 The Author Sociology Compass 5 ⁄ 7 (2011): 591–606, 10.1111/j.1751-9020.2011.00387.x Sociology Compass ª 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd The persistent inflow of Hispanic immigrants threatens to divide the United States into two peoples, two cultures, and two languages. Unlike past immigrant groups, Mexicans and other Latinos have not assimilated into the mainstream U.S. culture, forming instead their own politi- cal and linguistic enclaves—from Los Angeles to Miami—and rejecting the Anglo-Protestant values that built the American dream. The United States ignores this challenge at its peril. Third, some groups have suggested that immigrants are a threat to the environment; putt- ing a strain on natural resources such as land and water use. This message comes through when we consider a new think-tank organization called Numbers USA (see http:// www.numbersusa.com/content/). Emphasizing that influx of immigration will tax natural resources, their website states, ‘‘The 1990s saw the biggest population boom in U.S. his- tory. This is truly astounding news coming three decades after widespread agreement among Americans that the country was mature and probably already overpopulated. No wonder Americans became increasingly alarmed at their deteriorating quality of life due to sprawl, congestion, overcrowded schools, lost open spaces and increasing restrictions on their individual liberty caused by the new population explosion’’ (Numbers USA 2010). The final and most prominent accusation made against immigrants is that they are an economic threat to the US economy. Espenshade and Hempstead (1996) suggest that many native-born groups view increased influxes of certain immigrant groups as the key to job loss, higher unemployment, reductions in wages, and poor working conditions in selected industries. Strains on other resources, such as housing, public schools, and welfare programs are also considered as part of the economic burden of immigration and immi- grants (Borjas 1998 [1993], 2003; Espenshade 1995; Rosenfield and Tienda 1999). As suggested in recent polls, 61% of Americans believe that undocumented immigration from Mexico places an unfair burden on US public services and schools (Saad 2010). The same poll found that 53% believe that undocumented immigrants making low wages make US employers less willing to pay American workers a decent wage. Interestingly, Jaret (1999), Marrow (2010), and McClain (2006) point out that Black, White, and His- panic native-born groups believe that immigrants take jobs, regardless of research suggest- ing otherwise (e.g. Adelman et al. 2005). While extremists often overshadow the mainstream public views, Americans do express some anti-immigrant sentiment. After doing a comparative study of recent immigration polls by large media sources such as CBS, ABC, FOX, and Time Magazine, the Pew His- panic Center (2006) found that most polls reported an overall even division on whether immigration is good for the country or not. Based on Gallup polls, many Americans sug- gest that they are okay with current levels of immigration, think that immigration is good for America, and suggest that immigrants take jobs that Americans do not want or will not do (see Jones 2008; Morales 2010; Saad 2010). In addition, Gallup finds that 57% of Americans believe that immigrants provide positive attributes to the US’s cultural climate (i.e. food, music, and art). However, when it comes to crime, immigrants paying their share of taxes, or using the public education system, over 50% of Americans polled believed that immigrants make these situations worse than when they were not here (Jones 2008). Nativism also inspires systematic discriminatory actions including restrictive immigra- tion policies and laws, increases in riots and hate crimes, and the rise of nativist organiza- tions. Historically, there are several examples. For instance, the United States has enacted several immigration laws to address perceived economic threats by immigrant groups including the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 (see Lee et al. 2003), the Mexican 594 Racist Nativism in the 21st Century ª 2011 The Author Sociology Compass 5 ⁄ 7 (2011): 591–606, 10.1111/j.1751-9020.2011.00387.x Sociology Compass ª 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd Repatriation Movement of the 1920s (see Balderrama and Rodriguez 2006), and Opera- tion Wetback of the 1950s (Garcia 1980). In the last two decades, many states and the US federal government have also enacted nativist laws targeting Mexican immigration due to economic downturns and public outcry. For instance, in 1994, California citizens voted for enacting Proposition 187 that banned undocumented immigrants from receiving any social benefits or services such as public health care or schooling (see Jacobson 2008). This also includes the reorganization of the United States. Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS) into the more aggressive United States. Immigration and Custom Enforce- ment Agency (see http://www.ice.gov/). Also, from 1999 to 2005, over 300 new anti-immigrant and civilian border patrol organizations like The Minutemen Project and the Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR) were formed and thousands of citizens joined from across the United States. On the other hand, today’s racism is somewhat different than nativism. As some scholars suggest (Galindo and Vigil 2006; Huber et al. 2008; Sánchez 1997), nativism and racism differ in their targets and goals. First, racism relies on socially constructed racial categories to distribute privileges and resources within a given society (Huber et al. 2008). As Higham (1999, 384) contends, instead of focusing on nativity, culture, or ‘American-ness’ to divide groups, racism relies on ‘indelible differences of status’ based on pseudo-scientific assignments of a group’s biological or genetic characteristics (i.e. skin color) to a society’s favored social behaviors. Thus, as Galindo and Vigil (2006) and Huber et al. (2008) suggest, the goal of nativism is to justify and reward the superiority of the ‘native’ and racism’s goal is to reinforce ‘White’ superiority. Gal- indo and Vigil (2006, 426) also state, ‘‘Unfavourable reactions to personal or cultural traits are not necessarily nativist but may still be racist. It is only when combined with hostile, defensive, and fearful nationalism that they become nativist.’’ Thus, nativists view foreigners as the key to the decline of the American way of life instead of implying, as racists do, that all people of color are the problem (Bonilla-Silva 2001). Higham (1955, 1999) also suggests they differ because nativism ebbs and flows with national prosperity or despair, while racism is constant and unforgiving (Higham 1955, 1999). Since the 1960s, scholars define racism as a persistent and entrenched American ideol- ogy that denies ‘non-Whites’ resources that ‘Whites’ receive (see Bonilla-Silva 2001, 2006; Feagin 2010; Omi and Winant 1994). More specifically, as suggested by Omi and Winant’s (1994, 162) racial formation theory, American racism is a socio-historical and structuralized ideology that encourages social actions that ‘‘create or reproduce structures of domination based on essentialist categories of race.’’ Thus, racism is about perpetuating ‘White’ superiority by using and infusing racial categories into American social institutions and policies to promote, sustain, and protect White dominance. Omi and Winant (1994) also point out the mechanisms of racism today. One mecha- nism is the continued use of ‘racialization’ to assign racial meaning or identity to all social groups, especially those groups that were not racially classified. For instance, in recent years, the US Census created a new ethnic category in America for all Spanish-speaking individuals – ‘Hispanic’ or ‘Latino’ (see Rodriguez 2000; Sánchez 1993). While this may have allowed for more discussion on ethnic origins, Rodriguez (2000) suggests that, in reality, this new ethnic category helped to further racialize Hispanics and provide a clear distinction between European White Americans (non-Hispanic Whites) and everyone else. This process of racializing Hispanics has happened for all racial ethnic groups (see Bonilla-Silva and Embrick 2006), and these racialized categories are constantly rearticulat- ed and made fluid to ensure ‘Whites’ stay on top. Racist Nativism in the 21st Century 595 ª 2011 The Author Sociology Compass 5 ⁄ 7 (2011): 591–606, 10.1111/j.1751-9020.2011.00387.x Sociology Compass ª 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd However, Omi and Winant (1994) suggest that racialization is inert if it is not linked to a racial state of structural agents that encourage dominance based on race. They point to ‘racial projects’ as the necessary devices that any group, organization, or insti- tution uses to ‘‘reorganize and redistribute resources along particular racial lines’’ (Omi and Winant 1994, 56). For example, indigenous American tribes were clumped together as ‘Indians’ or ‘Native Americans’ to rationalize Manifest Destiny policies to procure more territories for the United States that went mainly to White settlers. A current example is when lending agencies use the categories of ‘White’, ‘Black’, and now ‘Hispanic’, as a proxy to determine ‘creditworthiness’ to receive a home loan (see Sills and Blake 2010). However, scholars point that racism has changed somewhat in America since 1960s. Bonilla-Silva (2006, 3) describes the actions of racism today, stating: ‘‘New Racism’’….In contrast to the Jim Crow era, where racial inequality was enforced through overt means (e.g. signs saying ‘‘No Niggers Welcomed Here’’ or shotgun diplomacy at the voting booth), today racial practices operate in ‘‘now you see it, now you don’t’’ fashion. For example, residential segregation, which is almost as high today as it was in the past, is no longer accomplished through overtly discriminatory practices. Instead, covert behaviors such as not showing all the available units, steering minorities and whites into certain neighborhoods, quoting higher rents or prices to minority applicants…are all weapons of choice to maintain separate communities. In short, while racism may not be overt like legalized segregation or lynching, it still con- tinues subtly in many social institutions (see Bonilla-Silva 2006; Feagin 2010; Gallagher 2008). Here are a few examples to consider. For instance, as of 2010 Whites hold about 90% of all management level jobs in the United States (Wise 2008) and Whites make up 98% of all CEOs of Fortune 500 companies (Curry 2005). Whites also make up 83% and 94%, respectively, of all US House and Senate representatives and until recently, all presi- dents of the United States have been White. Also, as alluded to by Bonilla-Silva above, Farley (2008) finds that even when Whites live in diverse metropolitan areas, 75% live, work, and play in communities with little to no interaction with Blacks. Also, as Kovol (2005) finds in his study of public schools across the United States, most public schools have ‘resegregated’ more and more based on measures of the percentage of racial and eth- nic groups in US schools, as well as the exposure of various groups to others within the schools. The racial disparities on most life indicators between Whites and other racial and eth- nic minorities are still high. In 2009, around 25% of Blacks and Latinos lived below the official poverty line in comparison to only 9.4% of Whites (see U.S. Census report on poverty rates http://www.census.gov/prod/2010pubs/p60-238.pdf). As for wealth, Shap- iro (2004, 47) suggests that ‘‘black families possess only 10 cents for every dollar of wealth held by whites.’’ This holds true in almost every comparison between Whites and all other racial and ethnic groups, except for some Asian groups. The same is true for issues of education where over 75% of Whites graduate high school, but Black and Latino grad- uation rates are around 56% and 52% respectively (see the U.S. Census on education rates http://www.census.gov/hhes/socdemo/education/index.html). Wise (2009) points out that Blacks are 48 times more likely than Whites to be incarcerated for a first-time drug offense. Moreover, Blacks’ chances of being in prison are four times more likely than Whites. For Latinos, the chances are two times greater than Whites to serve prison time. Finally, Blacks and Latinos face several health disparities in which they have higher rates of heart disease and cancer than Whites (see the Center for Disease Control’s focus on 596 Racist Nativism in the 21st Century ª 2011 The Author Sociology Compass 5 ⁄ 7 (2011): 591–606, 10.1111/j.1751-9020.2011.00387.x Sociology Compass ª 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd African-American health http://www.cdc.gov/media/subtopic/resources/aaresource.htm), as well as are least likely to be insured in comparison to Whites (U.S. Census 2010). The shift in racist rhetoric, however, has censored many of the disparities suggested above. The racist rhetoric of today is also slight-of-hand. As described by Gallagher (2008, 1), most Americans delete race or racism from discussing what shapes the ‘‘socio- economic life chances of racial minorities.’’ Instead of blatant verbal attacks, many schol- ars suggest that Whites have resorted to a more ‘color-blind’ factors denouncing race as the primary factor but still pointing out the individual and cultural flaws of entire groups (see Bonilla-Silva 2001, 2006; Gallagher 2003, 2004, 2006). As Bonilla-Silva (2006, 3) affirms, Compared to Jim Crow racism, the ideology of color blindness seems like ‘‘racism lite.’’ Instead of relying on name calling (niggers, Spics, Chinks), color-blind racism otherizes softly (‘‘these people are human, too’’); instead of proclaiming God placed minorities in the world in a servile position, it suggests they are behind because they do not work hard enough; instead of viewing interracial marriage as wrong on a straight racial bias, it regards it as ‘‘problematic’’ because of concerns over the children… Arguably, racial attitudes research since the 1950s has demonstrated that Whites’ views of Blacks are not the same as measured before the civil rights movement and their support of total segregation has declined (Schuman et al. 1997). However, this same research con- tinues to find discrepancies in which Whites do not have any harsh feelings toward or brutally stereotype Blacks but will not support any actions to further equality between Whites and other minorities (see Bobo et al. 1997). For instance, 2007 Gallup poll results suggested that 75% of Whites approved of interracial marriages among Blacks and Whites, which is a significant increase in comparison to the 4% approval rate recorded in 1958 (Carroll 2007). However, only about 9% of Whites are in interracial marriages and the percentages are much higher for Blacks, Hispanics, and Asians; thus, the attitudes do not match the actions (Passel et al. 2010). In short, while Americans have concealed their dis- dain for people of color in color-blind language racism and legal apartheid is over, Amer- ica continues to use categories of race to reinforce the White status quo and racial disparities continue to abound, regardless of the institution examined. The glaring similarities through racist nativism While there are differences, much of the separation between the two concepts is because scholarship on race relations and racism has not ‘kept pace’ with the rapid diversification of the US population (Lee et al. 2003, 45). As of 2007, the US foreign-born population had reached 38 million people of which 31% came from Mexico and another 24% were from South and East Asia (Pew Hispanic Center 2009). Also, Passel and Cohn (2009) estimate that there are 12 million undocumented immigrants in the United States. Many of these new immigrants have settled in new places unaccustomed to significant demo- graphic shifts due to immigration (Frey 2006; Furuseth and Smith 2006; Lippard and Gallagher 2011; Massey 2008). This is especially true for many southern states that saw thousands of Latino immigrants rapidly move in within the last twenty years to take advantage of jobs and a lower cost of living (see Furuseth and Smith 2006; Light 2006; Lippard and Gallagher 2011; Massey 2008). Thus, until recently, many scholars and commentators still view, define, and interpret race relations and discrimination with a ‘lens of Black and White racism’ (Galindo and Vigil 2006, 421). While serving as the central organizing principle of race relations in the Racist Nativism in the 21st Century 597 ª 2011 The Author Sociology Compass 5 ⁄ 7 (2011): 591–606, 10.1111/j.1751-9020.2011.00387.x Sociology Compass ª 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd US for hundreds of years (Lee et al. 2003), this limited definition does not recognize the long history of racial discrimination that many Asians and Latinos have faced (Sánchez 1997). For instance, Chinese and Mexican immigrants and citizens have on several occa- sions been forcibly removed from the country due to restrictive laws enacted including the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, the Operation Wetback of the 1950s. More recently, Asians and Latinos have faced more hate crimes (Ibish 2003; Lopez and Livingston 2009), and have become objects of current racist and nativist critiques (Espenshade 1995; Espenshade and Hempstead 1996; Jaret 1999; Passel 2005; Portes and Rumbaut 2006; Sánchez 1997). Or, in a recent study of the American South, researchers have docu- mented Latino immigrants facing serious issues of racial discrimination in employment, housing, and accessing public education (Lippard and Gallagher 2011). Therefore, some scholars have used nativism as a way to give a voice to the issues other people of color face in America. As Galindo and Vigil (2006) suggest, because America only views racism as a Black and White issue, nativist discrimination is habitually ignored or played off as necessary to protect national interests. Sánchez (1997) proposes that most Asians and Latinos are forever labeled as foreign, which means race scholarship often concedes this discussion to immigration scholars. And, because scholars ignore the relationships between racism and nativism, Asians and Latinos in the United States are also never accepted as ‘White’, even though they may view themselves as, or do as well as, Whites (Lee and Bean 2004; Rodriguez 2000; Sánchez 1993; Tafoya 2004). Thus, being a foreigner in the United States today means never possessing the identities of nativity and race that overwhelmingly dictate privilege, and moreover, disallow immi- grant minorities to suggest racialized discrimination or request civil rights. While new scholarship has begun to theorize a new racial order that includes non- White immigrant minorities, it is still lacking. Some continue to force the diversification of the population into a racial dichotomy (i.e. Black ⁄ non-Black bifurcation) and ignore the historical constructions of other minorities by focusing too much on recent trends (Gans 1999; Lee and Bean 2004; Yancey 2003). Bonilla-Silva and Embrick (2006) offer one of the only recent race theories that challenges current thought by suggesting a ‘Lat- inization’ of the racial hierarchy. Skin color remains the dominant determining factor but this revamped hierarchy also allows for economic status, acculturation, and other factors to predict racial value. Again, none of these new theories truly recognize that some of the racialized strife reported is due to the nationalistic anxiety of the times. Nor, do they discuss how these nativist fears may crystallize into racist doctrine. Overall, both sides of this discussion continue to be hesitant to recognize the concoction of ‘racist nativism’ used in the 21st century. Bridging the gap: ‘racist nativism’ Regardless of scholarly differences, nativism and racism are more similar than different, particularly based on recent events. As Higham (1999, 384) laments late in his career, ‘‘Racism and nativism were different things, though often closely allied.’’ Reflecting on recent anti-immigrant sentiment concerning Asians and Latinos, he also stated that, ‘‘We require no theory of a ‘new’ nativism or a ‘new’ racism to account for the trouble that today’s concentrated immigrations from abroad precipitate…’’ (Higham 1999, 388). Or, as Galindo and Vigil (2006, 426) admit, ‘‘racism and nativism intertwine during processes of nation building when immigrants happen to also be people of colour.’’ To redevelop the much needed link between nativism and racism, Higham’s (1955) historical analysis of nativism in America between 1860 and 1925 is the bridge. In 598 Racist Nativism in the 21st Century ª 2011 The Author Sociology Compass 5 ⁄ 7 (2011): 591–606, 10.1111/j.1751-9020.2011.00387.x Sociology Compass ª 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd Strangers in the Land, Higham (1955) identified three types of American nativism. The first two types of nativism he identified focused on the religious and political differences brought by newly arriving immigrants from Europe that supposedly challenged the core ideals of America, including Catholicism and communism. The third and most prolific nationalist sentiment identified by Higham, however, was ‘racial nativism’. Higham (1955, 1999) found that this brand of nativism was the most intense and enduring, and replaced other forms by the 1920s. Already successful in sepa- rating Whites from Blacks in the 19th century, nativism found an ally with the scientific notions of evolution and biology that formed racist ideologies in the 20th century. In fact, the racist principles that sparked eugenics movements in Europe and the United States provided the simplest means to establish friend from foe, native from foreigner; skin color (Higham 1955, 1999, 384). Thus, any foreigner would become ‘racialized’, as Omi and Winant’s (1994) description of racialization suggested 40 years later. For instance, Jaret (1999) and Huber et al. (2008) point out that Italians were certainly racial- ized as less than Black and rejected. Also, to add more nativist flare, a racialized group’s cultural traits would be attacked as ‘un-American’, or a serious threat to the American way of life. Put simply, like the social constructions of race in America that have con- demned African-Americans and their culture, the racialization of immigrants would make them outsiders forever and provide nativists and racists a diverse set of targets. In a recent application of Higham’s argument, Sánchez (1997) defines three different sen- timents expressed through ‘racialized’ nativism. The first sentiment conveys an ‘‘extreme apathy towards non-English languages and a fear that linguistic differences will undermine the American nation’’ (Sánchez 1997, 1020). A second sentiment highlights how new immigrant minorities receive special privileges because they are racialized minorities in a country that provides racial preferences (i.e. affirmative action), encouraging minority groups to keep their racialized identities. Like the recent rhetoric of color-blind racism, we see the same with racist nativism in which Americans camouflage their distaste for immi- grants with slight-of-hand rhetoric. For instance, Saad (2010) reported that 64% of Ameri- cans feel sympathetic toward undocumented immigrants, but over 60% see them as a drain on public resources and 68% want better control of the borders. The final sentiment expressed is that racialized immigrants, both documented and undocumented, drain all pub- lic resources (i.e. welfare, public education, and health care services), as well as take away jobs that citizens need. However, as Sánchez (1997) clarifies, this particular nativist rant is not just about all immigrants but specifically identifies Hispanic immigrants, particularly Mexicans, as the culprit for this national crisis. Moreover, racial nativism becomes the best method to label all people who look, talk, or act like ‘Mexicans’, making the racialized cate- gory the primary designator, and not nativity. Huber et al. (2008) help us to take a step further in understanding how nativism and racism are in cahoots within the 21st century, which they call ‘racist nativism’. They define racist nativism as, The assigning of values to real or imagined differences, in order to justify the superiority of the native, who is to be perceived white, over that of the non-native, who is perceived to be Peo- ple and Immigrants of Color, and thereby defend the rights of whites, or the natives, to domi- nance (Huber et al. 2008, 43). Based on this definition, Huber et al. (2008) point out several ways to see the linkages between racism and nativism. First, agreeing with Omi and Winant’s (1994) racial formation theory, they view nativism as a racial project in which White America has Racist Nativism in the 21st Century 599 ª 2011 The Author Sociology Compass 5 ⁄ 7 (2011): 591–606, 10.1111/j.1751-9020.2011.00387.x Sociology Compass ª 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd rearticulated the meanings of race and racism and have used to create social policies and practices to prop up White superiority. Like Higham (1955), they recognize the social construct of race became the catalyst in identifying who were the ‘foreigners’ and ‘immi- grants’ with the arrival of Italians in the 1920s. More important, Huber et al. (2008, 42) suggests that there is a distinct link between how Americans view what it means to be White and how they view who is ‘native’ or ‘American’: The notion of whiteness was privileged because it became strategically equated to Anglo-Euro- pean heritage, Western religious traditions, and other values and beliefs deemed dominant and supportive of the ‘American spirit’…Being an American, or being perceived as such, and thus enjoying the privileges that come with that identity, had much, if not everything, to do with being white. Whiteness, thus, became the most important requirement for profiting from the privilege of being native to US soil. However, unlike Higham’s racial nativism, Huber et al.’s (2008) conception emphasizes that it is more than just racializing an immigrant group to shape anti-immigrant attitudes. Racist nativism is a combination of racialization, anti-immigrant attitudes, and the impli- cit manifestation of this ideology within institutional practices to protect White privilege and oppress immigrant minorities. Thus, today’s racist and nativist targets and goals have become very similar in that they both look to people of color to oppress and exploit to sustain White dominance in America. In fact, as we see in the examples at the beginning of this paper, much of the legislation and anti-immigrant attitudes have only focused on Latino immigrants, particularly undocumented Mexican immigrants. Interestingly, even though 56% of all undocumented immigration is coming from Mexico, Americans do not seem too concerned with the other 44% of undocumented immigration coming from Europe, Asia, Africa, and other Latin American countries (see Passel and Cohn 2009). Huber et al. (2008) also specifically emphasizes that scholars should not blanket all issues immigrants of color face as simply racism because there are still nativist tinges. For example, Americans continue to focus on how Asians and Latinos are ‘foreign’ or ‘illegal’, even though many have been citizens for generations. As Johnson (1997, 180) states, As the Chinese, Japanese, and Mexican experiences suggest, nativism generally is not limited to aliens of a particular immigration status but ordinarily directed at all persons of a group, what- ever their immigration status, perceived to be different and ‘un-American.’ Latinos and Asian Americans often are treated by society as foreigners, even if they are long-term lawful perma- nent residents or citizens. It would not be extraordinary for an Asian American citizen to be asked which country she is from or for a Latino citizen in the Southwest to be approached by Border Patrol officers. Americans also continually suggest that these groups will never assimilate into American culture even though recent generations have learned English and participate in American culture (see Alba and Nee 2003). However, Higham (1999) and Huber et al. (2008) point out, Americans use race (i.e. skin color and culture) as the instrument for determin- ing whether groups are un-American or foreign. For instance, the profiling, incarceration, and hate crimes committed against ‘Arab- looking’ or ‘Muslim-looking’ people after 9 ⁄ 11 affected more than just Arab immigrants but also Arab Americans and people who are not even Arab or Muslim. These feelings resurfaced in a recent protest against the possible Mosque or Muslim-oriented community center being built near Ground Zero (New York City World Trade Center). As you can see from the following video clip (see the YouTube clip, http://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=EwaNRWMN-F4&feature=player_embedded), a man was attacked because he 600 Racist Nativism in the 21st Century ª 2011 The Author Sociology Compass 5 ⁄ 7 (2011): 591–606, 10.1111/j.1751-9020.2011.00387.x Sociology Compass ª 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd looked like an Arab or Muslim to the opposing White crowd. Another example is how President Barack Hussein Obama has faced racist nativism when his citizenship status is questioned because of his skin color, parentage, and name (see this Southern Poverty Law Center article, http://www.splcenter.org/publications/splc-report-return-of-the-militias/ nativists-to-patriots). In short, all of the above factors push the discussion of prejudice and discrimination many foreign-born and recent immigrant minorities face in the recent era into a discourse of racist nativism and not solely in the camps of racism or nativism. Consequently, scholars and students of past and current events dealing with people of color should consider the following questions to detect whether racist nativism is afoot: (1) Are both conceptions of race ⁄ ethnicity and nativity used to organize fear and suspicion? (2) Do the attitudes and discriminatory actions by Americans and its institutions unfairly persecute a racial or ethnic minority group’s immigrants and citizens? (3) Do any of these attitudes or actions help to prop up White dominance? (4) Do any of the institutional actions against targeted racial or ethnic minority groups have any social, economic, or political impact on the lives of White Americans? As an example, let us apply these questions to determine if Arizona’s immigration law (SB 1070) should be categorized as racist nativism. First, based on many of the clauses in the SB 1070, the law primarily targets undocumented immigration. However, as pointed out by the NAACP and other civil rights organizations, the clauses that suggest that law enforcement officials will have to use profiling to determine whether they should be suspicious of a person as undocumented makes this also about race, or at least ethnicity. Second and, dovetailing the first argument, the issue of profiling individuals who look like ‘illegal immigrants’ will impact both Latino immigrants and citizens, where Mexican Americans and other ‘Brown’ citizens will be asked to provide citizenship documentation. Finally, none of these laws enacted by Arizona (or any other state or federal push against undocumented immigration in the last 10 years) will impact the rights of White Americans. In fact, while there are no statistics to suggest the number of Whites versus non-Whites interrogated based on this law because it was stalled by litigation, it is likely that people, who look White or at least act American enough, will not be asked for proper citizenship identification at any point on the street or during a suspected crime. Thus, White Americans (or those that look White enough) will not be impacted by changes in state immigration laws and will be able to go about life without any fear of the police. Certainly, we can also go back in time and use these questions to interpret any institu- tional actions against any minority who has recently been an immigrant or seen as foreign born. For instance, relate this to what happened with California’s Proposition 187 that targeted undocumented Mexican immigrants but affected Hispanic American citizens and never became a concern for White or Black Californians (see Barkan 2003; Huber et al. 2008; Jacobson 2008; Kilty and de Haymes 2000). Therefore, racist nativism can be a better tool to frame the recent prejudice and discrimination many racial and ethnic minorities face in the United States, especially in the current tide of frustrations surround- ing perceived threats of terrorism, economic recession, and a growing racial and ethnic minority population. Racist Nativism in the 21st Century 601 ª 2011 The Author Sociology Compass 5 ⁄ 7 (2011): 591–606, 10.1111/j.1751-9020.2011.00387.x Sociology Compass ª 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd Conclusions This survey article has attempted to clarify the fine distinctions between nativism and racism, as well as point out the similarities. Scholars often view nativism as attitudes and actions that focus on securing nationalist concerns (i.e. political and economic shifts) and targeting foreign groups and immigrants, regardless of race or ethnicity. As for racism, scholars suggest that this ideology is about supporting White dominance and using the essentialist categories of race to determine life chances for all racialized groups. However, in the recent era of racist and nativist tensions, I have argued, as have other scholars, that nativism and racism have combined forces to ensure the White status quo and to use both race and nativity as dividing factors in an increas- ingly diversifying country. To tie the two ideologies together, I resurrect John Higham’s ‘racial’ nativism to assist scholars and students to argue a special case for and better digest the recent issues particularly facing Asian and Latino immigrants and citizens in the United States. Focusing on the last two decades, racial or racist nativism is an ideology that focuses prejudice on certain groups based on the factors of race, ethnicity, and nativ- ity. This ideology also encourages understanding how systematic discrimination penal- izes racial and ethnic groups for not being White- or American-enough, particularly in times of national economic and political calamity. It also requires spectators to focus in on how laws and policies set out to protect the American public and its nationalist concerns frequently attack racial and ethnic minority with few rights and ways to protect themselves. As a result, I, like others (see Galindo and Vigil 2006; Higham 1999; Huber et al. 2008; Sánchez 1997), have asserted that racist nativism becomes an important analyti- cal tool for examining the goals and outcomes of any prejudice attitudes or discrimi- natory actions targeting particularly immigrants of color, or any group perceived as foreign and a threat to American society. Scholars and students must consider how negative attitudes and rhetoric focused on Mexican undocumented immigration is both nativist and racist because it simultaneously labels being ‘Brown’ and ‘alien’ as the ‘problem’, despite the fact that many of these groups have inhabited the United States for generations, peacefully. This concept also makes us reconsider the past expe- riences of Asians and Latinos and focuses on the fact that it all supports White supremacy to the highest order. More important, America has to view racist nativism as a way to appropriately identify in our past and present what happens when White America feels threatened by immigrant minorities. As Acuña (2010) attests, racist nativism was apparent when over half of the 500,000–600,000 ‘Mexican’ immigrants deported during the 1920s were actually Mexican American citizens who had lived in the United States for generations and could not speak Spanish. We must also apply this concept to deconstruct the purposes of recent institutional actions. While several state and federal immigration laws (e.g. Arizona SB 1070) were drafted to address growing immigration problems, they subtly reinforced the racist agenda of placing Whites at the top because any one who looks White or ‘American’ enough will not be affected by these laws. Also, these new racist nativist attitudes and actions shield European Whites from being bothered by law enforcement in their everyday lives and distant from experiencing the life-shattering events of deportation. Thus, I push American scholarship and the public to use racist nativism to at least highlight how nativism and racism are still alive and well, industriously working to pick its next vic- tim to hold up whiteness as the continued standard. 602 Racist Nativism in the 21st Century ª 2011 The Author Sociology Compass 5 ⁄ 7 (2011): 591–606, 10.1111/j.1751-9020.2011.00387.x Sociology Compass ª 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd Short Biography Dr. Cameron D. Lippard is Assistant Professor of Sociology at Appalachian State Univer- sity. Lippard serves on the executive board of the North Carolina Sociological Associa- tion and the Southern Sociological Society’s committee on racial and ethnic minorities. His research and teaching interests include a broad examination of race and ethnic rela- tions and inequality with a focus on the social problems Latinos face in the American South. 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work_k5twpbps3rg5rmikugs3ymj5gq	----	3 Bezbednost i viktimizacija: Izazovi društvenog reagovanja i zaštite �rtava Victims of Femicide in Latin America: Legal and Criminal Justice Responses Janice Joseph* Despite the progress that women have made in the fight against gender-based violence, it is still prevalent in various countries in the world. For many women in Latin American countries femicide is a constant reality. This paper critically analyzes femicide in Latin American countries and the legal and criminal responses to this crime. The paper defines femicide and discusses the nature and extent of femicide in Latin America. The analysis of this phenomenon in Latin American countries indicates that although some of these countries have made important strides in addressing the problem, they still face challenges in adequately preventing this crime. Keywords: femicide, violence against women, Latin America, gender-based violence. Introduction Violence against women occurs in every country in the world. It also occurs in every sphere of life and it ranges on a continuum from mild to severe. The most serious form of violence against women is femicide, which is an international problem and it takes various forms. During the last decade, countries in Latin America have been experiencing an epidemic of murders of women. The purpose of this paper is to critically examine the legal and crimi- nal justice responses to femicide in Latin America. The paper discusses the TEMIDA 2017, vol. 20, br. 1, str. 3-21 ISSN: 1450-6637 DOI: https://doi.org/10.2298/TEM1701003J Pregledni rad Primljeno: 28.11.2016. Odobreno za štampu: 20.4.2017. * Dr Janice Joseph is distinguished professor of criminal justice at the Stockton University, United States of America. E-mail:josephj@stockton.edu. Janice Joseph Victims of Femicide in Latin America: Legal and Criminal Justice Responses 4 definition of femicide, the extent of femicide in Latin America, factors related to femicide and the legal and criminal responses to femicide. The Latin American countries comprise those countries in which Roman languages are spoken by the majority of the population. The countries include (Central and South America) Argentina, Belize, Plurinational State of Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Falkland Islands, French Guiana, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Latin American countries also include the coun- tries of Cuba, Dominican Republic, and Puerto Rico in the Caribbean. Definition The term femicide was first used by Russell and van de Ven who stated that the word femicide was introduced because “we must realize that a lot of homicide is in fact femicide. We must recognize the sexual politics of murder” (Russell, van de Ven, 1976: 144). Russell (1982) argued that the word femicide focuses on the fact that when women are killed they are killed because of their gender. Caputi and Russell (1998) view femicide as the most extreme form of terrorism against women, and is motivated by hatred, contempt, pleasure, or a sense of ownership. In 1998, Campbell and Runyan refined the term femicide by suggesting that all killings of women, regardless of motive or perpetrator status, should be considered femicide (Campbell, Runyan, 1998). In Latin America, the term femicide along with the term feminicide is used interchangeable. Feminicide is used to describe not only the social and judi- cial context of femicide but also a political context which examines the judi- cial and political structures that normalize the crime. Countries such as Chile, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama use the term ‘femi- cide’, and El Salvador, Mexico, Peru and the Plurinational State of Bolivia use the term ‘feminicide’ (Economic Commission for Latin America and the Carib- bean, 2014). In general, femicide is a form of homicide which is gender based and it is the most serious and lethal form of violence against women. It can also be viewed as a form of sexist terrorism and a hate crime against women (Caputi, Russell, 1998). These murders of females are embedded in the patri- archal culture that favors masculinity over femininity and supports men’s vio- lence against women as a form of social control. Temida, 2017, vol. 20, br. 1, str. 3-21 5 There are different types of femicides based on the contexts in which they occur. These include intimate partner femicide, honor killing, female feti- cide, female infanticide, bride burning, dowry murders, and multicidal femi- cide.1 Intimate partner femicide is the killing of a woman by her partner. It is the most common form of femicide. Intra-familial femicide is committed by family members, such as honor killing, feticide, female infanticide (World Health Organization, 2012). Multicidal femicide is committed by serial murder- ers and mass murderers and systematic femicide is committed during armed conflict when females are systematically slaughtered. Extent of femicide in Latin America There is a lack of reliable statistical data and reliable systems of infor- mation about femicide in Latin America. Official statistics are scarce, and in some countries the information is still not officially compiled. This impedes an adequate assessment of the severity of the problem. The absence of reli- able records of victims also disguises the real nature and extent of the prob- lem. Also “the problem underlying the lack of compiled data is the inability of public institutions to account for the use of technical, financial and human resources, which makes it impossible to measure, monitor and evaluate such services” (Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, 2014: 44). However, the limited data that exist can provide some insight into the magnitude of the problem in Latin America. In 2016 a femicide took place every three days in Brazil (Del Rio, 2016). In 2015 in Argentina a woman was murdered every 30 hours, mainly because of her gender and six women are murdered every day in Mexico (Del Rio, 2016). In 2014, every day, at least 12 Latin American women were murdered just because they were women with a total of over 2.000 femicides. Of these females murdered in 2014, Honduras had the highest number of femicides with 531 femicides, followed by El Salvador with 183 femicides. Additional information indicates that in 2014, 88 women were killed by their partners in Colombia; 83 in Peru; 71 in the Dominican Republic; 46 in El Salvador; 25 in Uruguay; 20 in Paraguay, 17 in Guatemala and 16 in Chile (Economic Commis- sion for Latin America and the Caribbean, 2014). An average of 4.500 women 1 The term ‘multicidal femicide’ include serial and mass femicides. More in: Joseph (2012). Janice Joseph Victims of Femicide in Latin America: Legal and Criminal Justice Responses 6 are killed in Brazil every year, while in Colombia, a Latin American country of 47 million people, an average of one woman is killed every two days by a man because of her gender (Moloney, 2015a). According to a study conducted by the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (2014), in 2013 at least 1.678 women were mur- dered (because of their gender) in 17 countries of the region and three Car- ibbean countries. Furthermore, El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala have some of the highest femicide rates in the world. Another study done in Latin America reported that El Salvador has had the highest rate of femicide in the world, with 2.250 femicides between 2010 and 2013 (La Via Campesina, 2014). Chart 1 indicates that of the 16 countries presented, Honduras, El Salvador and the Dominican Republic had the highest rate of femicides in 2014. Chart 1. Femicide in 16 Countries in Latin America Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (2014) 13.3 5.7 3.6 2.3 0.4 1.2 1.0 1.3 1.4 0.6 3.0 1.4 2 1 14 H o n d u ra s G u at em al a D o m in ic an R ep u b lic El S al va d o r Ec u ad o r Pe ru Pu er to R ic o C h ile N ic ar ag u a Pa ra g u ay Pa n am a U ru g u ay C o st a R ic a D o m in ic a Su ri n am e B ar b ad o s Absolute number Rate (per 100.000 women) 531 2.7 217 188 183 97 1.2 0.5 90 44 40 36 32 26 24 8 LATIN AMERICA (16 COUNTRIES): FEMICIDE OR FEMINICIDE, 2014 (Absolute number and rates) Temida, 2017, vol. 20, br. 1, str. 3-21 7 The Small Arms Survey (2012) indicated that about 66.000 women and girls are victims of homicides annually. This accounts for approximately 17 per cent of all victims of intentional homicides. The study also found that countries with a high rate of male homicide had a high rate of femicide as well. It also showed that firearms played a vital role in homicides and that perpetrators who used firearms to intimidate and threaten another person were more likely to use that firearm to kill that person. In fact, the data from this study showed that one out of five regions, in the study, with the highest femicide rates was Central America. In addition, the study showed that of the 25 countries with the highest femicide rates, more than half are in the Americas. This study, also, found that El Salvador had the highest rate of femicide (12 per 100.000) and the third highest was Guatemala (9.7 per 100.000) (Small Arms Survey, 2012). In 2012, seven out of the ten countries with the highest female murder rate in the world were in Latin America. They were El Salvador with a rate of 8.9 homicides per 100.000 women in 2012, followed by Colombia with 6.3, Guatemala with 6.2, Brazil with 4.8, Mexico and Suriname are also in the top ten (Matlof, 2015; Yagoub, 2016). Between 2010 and 2013, El Salvador has had the highest rate of femicide in the world, with 2.250 femicides, Guatemala had the third and Honduras the seventh highest rate of femicides (La Via Campensia, 2014). Chart 2 also shows the rate of femicides in selected coun- tries in Latin America and it is clear that many of the countries on that chart have rates higher of femicide than the United States (Mujica, Tuesta, 2014). Janice Joseph Victims of Femicide in Latin America: Legal and Criminal Justice Responses 8 Chart 2. Rate of femicide in several Latin American countries per 100.000 (2013) Source: Mujica, Tuesta (2014). Nature of the violence The majority of victims are killed by firearms, steel weapon, knives and strangulation. Their bodies are often dumped in alleys, ravines, on the sides of the road sides, sidewalks or even in the middle of public parks like litter. In some cases, the victim is dismembered, burnt, or if the murderer decides to cover the body, trash bags are often used to do so. The vicious way in which the women are murdered, as trophies of war, may attributed to the legacy of the civil wars in many of the countries, especially Central America, during which victims were tortured, disfigured, dismembered, abandoned in ditches, trash cans, or garbage bags (Stone, 2011). In some cases, the murderer will mutilate the victim’s genitalia, and write degrade words or deface the corpse. There is also evidence of sexual and/or other forms of torture prior to murder- ing the victim (Valladares, 2012). Honduras Guatemala El Salvador Brazil Mexico Columbia Nicaragua Bolivia United States Argentina Ecuador Peru C o u n tr ie s 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 14,4 8,6 6 5,4 4,8 4,1 2,7 2,1 1,9 1,3 0,6 0,3 Temida, 2017, vol. 20, br. 1, str. 3-21 9 Reasons for the high rate of femicide Women are more often killed by male acquaintances such as their former partners, family members, or friends. In countries with high levels of lethal violence, women are frequently attacked by gangs and organized criminal groups, and this is done in a general climate of indifference and impunity (UN Human Rights, Office of the High Commissioner, 2014). The act of femicide in El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala is related to historical patterns of vio- lence and abuse in Central America, where death squads and civil wars have left a legacy of violence, intimidation and ongoing impunity. But it is also linked to the prevailing history of patriarchal norms that have existed for cen- turies in almost every societies across the globe that presume that women are the property of men to be treated and disposed of any time (Yagoub, 2016) and “traditional views of women’s role in society quite often normalize violent behavior and attribute higher levels of blame to the victims themselves” (Evi- dence and Lessons from Latin America, 2013: 2). While femicide is often related to domestic abuse, a major contributor to the high femicide rates is organized crime. This is evident by the fact that 50 percent of the 854 women killed in Guatemala in 2015 were murdered as a direct result of organized crime, primarily human trafficking. It is believed that most of the female victims are tortured, raped, and often murdered. Gang violence is also a contributor to femicide in Latin America. Although the majority of gang-related deaths and victimization are men, during gang dis- putes, women are frequently targeted for revenge killings by rival gang mem- bers. Furthermore, it does appear that femicides in Latin America are linked to the Maras gangs which first emerged in Los Angeles, California (Yagoub, 2016). Femicides are also high among women who become members of crim- inal organizations. These women are often forced to work in menial but dan- gerous tasks. One such task is that of a ‘mula’ or drug ‘mule’ which sometimes lead to the death of the woman (Yagoub, 2016). As a ‘mula’ the woman smug- gles illicit drugs in her body or in immediate belongings. Swallowing or insert- ing drugs, into their bodies, protected by capsules has become very popular for ‘mulas’. However, it is very dangerous because ruptured capsules of drugs inside of a person’s body can be fatal if the drugs enter the woman’s blood stream (Yagoub, 2016). When these women choose to become ‘mulas’, they are, therefore, risking the possibility of death. Janice Joseph Victims of Femicide in Latin America: Legal and Criminal Justice Responses 10 Other reasons for the high femicide rates in Latin America include acts of vengeance. In the past, a loan shark would often resolve the matter between himself and the debtor. However, it has become common for the loan shark to target and often kill the wives and daughters of the debtor. These crimes can also be viewed as a form of misogynist cleansing and demonstrate an extreme level of violence against its victims. They can be seen as an expres- sion of unequal power relations between men and women, a mechanism of control and domination, discrimination against women, and a display of deeply entrenched sexism (Stone, 2011; Valladares, 2012). The murder of women can also be explained by the machista cultural attitudes which are reinforced in newspapers, commercials, songs, and soap operas, and repro- duces myths justifying violence against women (Musalo, Pellegrin, Roberts, 2010). Violence against women is socially acceptable in many cultures and femicide is extreme form on the continuum of violence against women which culminates in their death (Musalo, Pellegrin, Roberts, 2010). Legal and criminal justice responses The first femicide legislation was passed in 2007 and by 2014, 15 coun- tries had criminalized femicide or feminicide in their criminal laws (Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, 2014). In 2014, Venezuela reformed its Law on the Right of Women to a Life Free of Violence by estab- lishing femicide as a criminal offense (The Argentina Independent, 2014). In 2008, Colombia amended its penal code to include the homicide for being a woman and on July 6, 2015 it passed a new law making femicide a legally defined crime, with a prison sentence of 20 to 41 years (Moloney, 2015b). In 2015, Brazil also passed a law against the killing of a woman by a man because of her gender. The law also stipulated longer prison sentences for crimes com- mitted against pregnant women, girls under 14, women over 60 and people with disabilities (Moloney, 2015a). By 2015, there were 16 Latin American coun- tries that had passed femicide legislation and introduced harsher legal penal- ties for murdering women because of their gender. Temida, 2017, vol. 20, br. 1, str. 3-21 11 Different legal approaches a) Criminalizing femicide An examination of the femicide legislation indicates that the Latin Ameri- can countries differ in their approach to the crime of femicide/feminicide. The legal definition of femicide/feminicide varied among the countries. Argentina includes in its criminal code the crime of femicide as an aggravated type of homicide of a relative, spouse or former spouse, or a person with whom he has or has had an intimate relationship, even if they were not living together at the time of the crime. Countries such as Chile and Costa Rica amended their national penal codes to include femicide as an ‘aggravated circumstance of homicide’ in 2010 and 2007 respectively. However, since the Argentina, Chil- ean and Costa Rican laws define femicide within the context of a relation- ship as a relative or an intimate partner, femicides that occur outside of this context (such as stranger femicide), would be difficult to prosecute under these laws. Most of the countries, however, have enacted a new and separate offence under the name of femicide or feminicide. In addition, a few coun- tries, such as Argentina and Colombia, have added a punitive aggravating cir- cumstance to the crime. In this case the aggravating circumstances of homi- cide is when a woman was killed because she was a woman or “when gen- der-based violence was involved” (Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, 2014: 67). Moreover, a few more progressive governments, such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay have classified certain types of violence against women, in their new femicide laws, as hate crimes, thereby emphasizing the severity and the motive behind the violence against women (Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, 2014). In several countries in Latin America, such as Costa Rica, Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, the femicide legislation establish the administrative and legal obligations of the state to prevent femicide and improve access to justice for the victim (Evi- dence and Lessons from Latin America, 2013). The Guatemalan law is the most comprehensive example of a femicide law in Latin America because it consists of a range of measures and actions that it mandates. For example, it stipulates the obligations that the state must meet to address the structural causes of femicide (Evidence and Lessons from Latin America, 2013). In addition, the new laws addressing femicide in Chile, El Janice Joseph Victims of Femicide in Latin America: Legal and Criminal Justice Responses 12 Salvador and Mexico mandate the state to provide comprehensive compen- sation to victims and their families (Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, 2014). In addition to enacting an anti-femicide law, Argen- tina will establish (in 2017) electronic tracking of men who are violent towards women (Pestano, 2016). The enactment of legislation to counter femicide is an important step to prosecute perpetrators. However, there are a few shortcomings in these laws and the enforcement of these laws needs to be improved. These types of legal reforms are important towards a more holistic and comprehensive strat- egy for preventing femicide. b) Penalties for the crime of femicide The penalties for the violation of the femicide legislation vary from coun- try to country. In general, in those Latin America countries where femicide is a crime, it is punishable by a prison sentence ranging from 12 years (Brazil) to life imprisonment (Chile). The penalties for femicide in Costa Rica apply to aggra- vated homicide, which varies between 20 to 50 years of imprisonment. On the other hand, in Chile femicide is punishable with life imprisonment, but in Peru, femicide is only punished with 15 years of imprisonment which is less than the penalty assigned to aggravated homicide, which is 20 to 25 years. In Mexico, femicide is punishable with a term of imprisonment of between 40 and 60 years in prison, a US$2,000 fine, and the loss of inheritance rights years (Eco- nomic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, 2014; Claros 2015). Table 1. Legal responses to femicide Countries Enactment of Law Punishment Argentina 2012 Life imprisonment Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 2013 30 years Brazil 2015 12 to 30 years Chile 2010 Life imprisonment Colombia 2014 20 to 41 years Costa Rica 2007 20-50 years Ecuador 2013 Up to 28 years El Salvador 2010  Up to 40 years Guatemala 2008 20 to 50 years Honduras 2013 30 to 40 years Mexico 2007 40 and 60 years in prison, a US$2,000 fine Nicaragua 2012 Up to 30 years  Temida, 2017, vol. 20, br. 1, str. 3-21 13 Panama 2013 25 to 30 years Peru 2011 15 years Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 2007 28 to 30 years Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (2014), on the basis of Gender Equality Observatory for Latin America and the Caribbean. c) Criminal justice system and impunity In most Latin America countries, there are very few mechanisms to address gender-based violence in general. Law enforcement officials often claim that these femicides are spontaneous or accidental acts and seldom take appropriate actions to investigate them. They sometimes suggest that the women who are murdered are either criminals or prostitutes (Willard, 2012). However, the majority of the victims are ordinary citizens. There seems to be a systematic indifference by the police to the femicide epidemic in Latin America. Furthermore, there is a lack of police training to deal with gender- related crime (Willard, 2012). To address police indifference to the victims of femicides, Guate- mala required the creation of new units to work on cases of femicide. Con- sequently, the national police and the prosecutor’s office have established special units to investigate cases of violence against women. These units are staffed by police officers and other personnel that have received training on gender issues and human rights (Guatemala Human Rights Commission/USA, 2009; Evidence and Lessons from Latin America, 2014). The Mexican law also mandates the establishment of a national system, which would consist of nine government ministries responsible for implementing policies to prevent and address, and eradicate femicide. The Mexican law also encourages judges to implement protection measures for victims of any form of gender violence to prevent future cases of femicide. It also makes special provisions for adequate reparation for victims’ relatives in the case of femicide (Evidence and Lessons from Latin America, 2014). In addition, the passage of femicide legislation in El Salvador stipulated that Special Protection Units focusing on intra-familial violence, gender-based violence, and discrimination against women should be created. To date, the police departments in El Salvador have 11 local gen- der units to provide services to female victims of violence (Albaladejo, 2016) Although several countries have modified their criminal codes to include special provisions for gender-related killing of females, impunity rather than Janice Joseph Victims of Femicide in Latin America: Legal and Criminal Justice Responses 14 accountability still exists in many of the courts in Latin American countries. For many years, there has been a dysfunctional judicial system with insensi- tive prosecutors and judges in many of the countries. Consequently, most of the femicides have not been investigated and when they were investigated, very few perpetrators were tried or convicted. Over ten years, for example, 34.571 cases of femicide were opened in Colombia but only 3.658 convictions have been confirmed (Del Rio, 2016). Between 2008 and 2010, there were 1.110 reported cases of femicide in Honduras, yet only 211 made it to court and only 4.2% of these cases resulted in a conviction (Kelly, 2011). In Mexico, between 2012 and 2013 more than 3.800 women died in circumstances relat- ing to gender violence. However, only 613 cases were investigated, and only 1.6% ended up with a judicial sentence. Also 98% of cases of femicide in Gua- temala between 2000 and 2008 remain unsolved due to a systematic lack of investigation by police of these cases (Guatemala Human Rights Commission/ USA, 2009). The pattern is similar in other Latin American countries (Mujica, Tuesta, 2014; La Via Campesina, 2014; Del Rio, 2016). There are several reasons for the impunity. Judges are threatened, intimidated or corrupted by murderers who bribe politicians and members of the criminal justice system who seem to care very little about the deaths of women (Musalo, Pellegrin, Roberts, 2010; Kelly, 2011). There is also a lack of policy and mechanism to address gender-based violence in many of the countries. There is also a climate of passivity and unwillingness by the authori- ties to investigate these crimes (Musalo, Pellegrin, Roberts, 2010). In addi- tion, many of the relatives of the victims often do not report the murderers because they are afraid or they do not trust the judicial system (Albaladejo, 2016), so many perpetrators go unpunished. Because of the high rate of impu- nity, some people question the effectiveness of the laws against femicide that have been passed in many of the Latin American countries. In response to the impunity that exists in the criminal justice system in Latin America, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR) in collaboration with UN Women has developed a Model Protocol in 2012 in an attempt to assist in the investigations and prosecutions of femi- cide and other forms of gender-based murders of women in Latin America (UN Human Rights, 2014). The Protocol addresses many of the individual, institu- tional and structural factors relevant to understanding and responding to gen- der-related killings. It is a practical tool and incorporates both the theoretical Temida, 2017, vol. 20, br. 1, str. 3-21 15 and practical experiences of a range of experts, including prosecutors, police, coroners, and judges, across Latin America, and elsewhere. Several Latin Amer- ican countries are already working to integrate the Protocol into their legal sys- tems and others have expressed interest in doing so (UN Human Rights, 2014). Also in an attempt to end impunity in the courts, many Latin American countries have decided to implement several reforms of its court system. Guate- mala, for example, has created special courts for prosecuting cases of femicide. These courts are staffed by judges and public officials trained in women’s rights and gender issues, and are open 24 hours a day for women to report violent crimes. It has developed special prosecutor units and tribunals and, to avoid re-victimization (witnesses, survivors of victims, etc.), it began to use screens and videoconferencing in court proceedings (Evidence and Lessons from Latin America, 2014). El Salvador has also approved the creation of new court, called the Jurisdiction and Specialized Courts for a Life Free of Violence and Discrimi- nation, to address violence against women. In 2010, Guatemala created a Crimi- nal Court for Crimes of Femicide and Violence against Women (Kennedy, 2016). d) Other initiatives to address femicide Other measures include the ‘female friendly urban zones’ which were established by Central American policymakers (McAnarney, 2012). These female-friendly urban zones have provided a range of free services related to sexual and reproductive health, child care, and counseling. In addition, women- only passenger cars and buses were available for women and pink public trans- portation networks were established in Mexico, Brazil, El Salvador and Guate- mala to provide women-only forms of public transportation in an effort to stop the sexual harassment and provide safety for women (McAnarney, 2012). Discussion and conclusion While the passage of the laws to prosecute perpetrators of femicide and reforms of the criminal justice system are important steps, they fail to address the underlying cause of the violence: the continuum of macho culture, which stands in direct opposition to gender equality. So many of these measures are viewed as temporary. In addition, one of the shortcomings in the judicial pro- Janice Joseph Victims of Femicide in Latin America: Legal and Criminal Justice Responses 16 cess is the excessive reliance on testimonial evidence and the limited use of forensic evidence in court. Even the best designed laws are worthless if a government does not pro- vide the resources to implement those laws. It appears that the failure to pro- tect women against femicide in Latin America is related to lack of enforcement of the femicide laws. According to Carrigan, “femicide laws in Latin America, in their current capacity, do not appear to significantly reduce female homicide rates in Latin America” (Carrigan, 2016: 122). The enforcement of the legislation across the region is inconsistent because of the different approaches to the problem. As a result of this inconsistency, the application of the femicide laws appears to be very weak. Legislation that focus on aggravating circumstance of homicide is “less progressive than legislation that has characterized femi- cide as a distinct crime because it does not attempt to challenge, or challenges to a lesser degree, existing gender norms” (Carrigan, 2016: 124). The law alone does not bring about overhauls of justice systems that con- tinually failed victims and allowed for impunity for perpetrators. A UN report stated that the inconsistency of femicide laws (the crime still lacks a com- mon definition across countries), has resulted in its weak application. There remains “impunity and lack of due diligence by the State to prevent femicide, protect women, investigate and punish perpetrators, and provide reparations to victims and their families” (Manjoo, 2012: 7). While the ‘only women’ mode of transportation is safe and convenient for women, and the female friendly urban centralized space for women pro- vides easy access to services and increases the physical safety of women, they provide only a temporary solution to the problem. They do not address the ‘machista’ culture which is the source of the violence against women in Latin America. Instead, these initiatives segregate women from men to provide them with temporary relief from the harassment. Within the Latin American region, there is inconsistency in the ways in which femicide has been conceptualized and this has implications for the col- lection of data. While some countries use the term femicide which focuses only on the crime, other countries use the term feminicide which analyzes not only to crime but the response or non-response of the state to the murders of women. Having a common term or definition for the murder of a woman by a man would provide the framework to identify commonalities and potential methodologies for the region. Temida, 2017, vol. 20, br. 1, str. 3-21 17 There are also gaps in the statistics that are used to measure femicide in Latin America. One of the major challenges in these countries regarding femicide is the lack of comprehensive statistics on femicide. Police statistics, which are often used to determine the nature and extent of femicide in Latin America, are incomplete and many countries do not disaggregate the police statistics and homicide by gender. In addition, a great deal of the informa- tion on femicide comes from the media. Although newspaper information can provide contextual details of the incidents, newspapers can be mislead- ing and sensationalized. There are also gaps in the research on the phenom- enon. There are very few comprehensive studies on femicides in the region. Comprehensive research is, therefore, needed on femicides in Latin America to improve our understanding of the social context, characteristics of the vic- tims, and circumstances surrounding femicides. In order for the Latin American countries to address comprehensively and effectively gender-based homicide – femicide/feminicide, investigators, police officer, crime scene investigation officials and forensic experts need to be properly trained. They should receive intensive and ongoing training in inves- tigative techniques, particularly in the collection and preservation of forensic evidence in relation to gender-based violence. Such training should refer to international standards and expertise including how to detect, document and investigate cases of gender-based violence. The Latin American governments should legislate that gender-based violence is unacceptable and will not be tolerated. Officials need standardized guidelines and protocols for identifying, investigating, and documenting cases of femicide in the region. Accurate information about femicide is necessary to the formulation of preventive measures against femicide. It is, therefore, necessary for compre- hensive data to be collected on femicides so that the nature and extent of this phenomenon can be determined. According to the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, “femicide is one of the areas where the information void is most apparent” and “in some countries where it is a crime, information on aggravated homicide or femicide is not processed” (Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, 2014: 45). However, “now that femicide or feminicide is a criminal offence in 14 of the countries of the region, a region-wide comparison using official records can begin” (Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, 2014: 45). Janice Joseph Victims of Femicide in Latin America: Legal and Criminal Justice Responses 18 It is quite clear that many of the Latin American countries still face chal- lenges in addressing the crime of femicide. They have not been successful in the prevention, investigation, legal prosecution of femicide/feminicide. The general devaluing of women in Latin America is inscribed in cultural and legal codes. Lack of accountability for femicides further validates the idea that women deserve the treatment they receive. Within mainstream culture, media, politics and the legal system, femicide continues to be viewed pri- marily as a personal, individualized issue in Latin America. In the long term, only real social and cultural change will end the long and terrible history of discrimination and violence against women and girls just because they are females. Only when the patriarchal ideology of socio-cultural norms that cre- ates a tolerance of the subordination and abuse of women is eliminated will femicide cease to exist. References Campbell, J. C., Runyan, C. W. (1998) Femicide: Guest Editors’ Introduction. Homicide Studies, 4, pp. 347–352. Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (2014) Annual Report 2013-2014. Confronting Violence against Women in Latin America and the Caribbean (LC/G.2626). Chile: Santiago. Mujica, J.,Tuesta, D. (2014) Femicide Penal Response in the Americas: Indicators and the Misuses of Crime Statistics, Evidence from Peru. International Journal of Criminology and Sociological Theory, 1, pp. 1-21. Musalo, K., Pellegrin, E., Roberts, S. S. (2010) Crimes Without Punishment: Violence against Women in Guatemala. Hastings Women‘s Law Journal, 19, pp. 161-221. Russell, D. E. (1982) Rape in Marriage. New York: Macmillan. Russell, D. E. H., Van de Ven, N. (Eds.) (1976) Crimes against Women: The Proceedings of the International Tribunal. East Palo Alto: Frog in the Well. Small Arms Survey (2012) Femicide: A Global Problem. Research Note: Armed Violence, issue 14. Geneva: Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies. Temida, 2017, vol. 20, br. 1, str. 3-21 19 Internet sources Albaladejo, A. (2016) How Violence Affects Women in El Salvador. Available at: http:// www.lawg.org/action-center/lawg-blog/69-general/1590 -how-violence-affects- women-in-el-salvador, page accessed 25.1.2017. Carrigan, M. (2016) Femicide Legislation: Lessons from Latin America. A Thesis presented to The University of Guelph, Guelph, Ontario. Available at: https://atrium. lib.uoguelph.ca/xmlui/bitstream/handle/10214/9911/Carrigan_Michelle_201608_ MA.pdf?sequence=1, page accessed 29.1.2017. Caputi, J., Russell, D. (1998) Femicide. Feminista, 3/4. Available at: http://www. feminista.com/v2n3/russell.html, page accessed 1.11.2016. Claros, L. R. (2015) Femicide in Argentina, issue 2. Available at: http://wafmag. org/2015/11/femicide-in-argentina/, page accessed 23.10.2016. Evidence and Lessons from Latin America (2013) Building Legal Frameworks to Address Femicide in Latin America. Available at: http://www.fundar.org.mx/mexico/pdf/Brief- BuildingLegalFrameworkstoAddressFemicide.pdf, page accessed 16.9.2016. Guatemala Human Rights Commission/USA (2009) Guatemala‘s Femicide Law: Progress Against Impunity? Washington D.C: GHRC/USA, pp. 17. Available at: http:// www.ghrc-usa.org/Publications/Femicide_Law_ProgressAgainstImpunity.pdf, page accessed 25.5.2016. Kelly, A. (2011, May 29) Honduran police Turn a Blind Eye to Soaring Number of ‚Femicides‘. The Guardian. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/ may/29/honduras-blind-eye-femicides, page accessed 23.6.2016. Kennedy, J. (2016, February 25) El Salvador Creates New Court to Address Violence against Women. Latin Correspondent. Available at: http://latincorrespondent. com/2016/02/el-salvador-creates-new-court-to-address-violence-against-women/, page accessed 10.10.2016. La Via Campensia (2014) Femicide and Impunity: A humanitarian Crisis in Central America, and a Growing Problem Worldwide. Available at: https://viacampesina.org/ en/index.php/main-issues-mainmenu-27/women-mainmenu-39/1715-femicide- and-impunity-a-humanitarian-crisis-in-central-america-and-a-growing-problem- worldwide, page accessed 28.1.2017. Manjoo, R. (2012) Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, Its Causes and Consequences. Available at: http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/ HRCouncil/RegularSession/Session20/A-HRC-20-16-Add4_en.pdf, page accessed 28.1.2017. Janice Joseph Victims of Femicide in Latin America: Legal and Criminal Justice Responses 20 Matloff, J. (2015, January 5) Six Women Murdered Each Day as Femicide in Mexico Nears a Pandemic. Aljazeera America. Available at: http://america.aljazeera.com/ multimedia/2015/1/mexico-s-pandemicfemicides.html, page accessed 25.9.2016. McAnarney, A. (2012, November 15) Femicide in Central America: Is Creating Female- Friendly Urban Zones Really the Solution? Open Security, Conflict and Peacebuilding. Available at: https://www.opendemocracy.net/opensecurity/alex-mcanarney/ femicide-in-central-america-is-creating-female-friendly-urban-zones-real, page accessed 21.7.2016. Moloney, A. (2015a, March 10) Brazil Passes Femicide Law to Tackle Rise in Gender Killings. Reuters. Available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/us-brazil-femicide- women-s-rights-idUSKBN0M61WV20150310, page accessed 21.9.2016. Moloney, A. (2015b, June 4) Colombia Approves Femicide Law Tackle Violence against Women. Reuters. Available at: http://nypost.com/2015/08/20/colombias-new- femicide-law-targets-violence-against-women/, page accessed 25.1.2017. Pestano, V. (2016) Argentina Proposes Electronic Tracking for Men Prone to Violence Toward wWomen. Available at: http://www.upi.com/ Top_News/World- News/2016/07/27/Argentina-proposes- elec tronic-tracking-for-men-prone -to - violence-toward-women/1261469638160/, page accessed 27.1.2017. Stone, H. (2011, May 24) Violence against Women Rises in El Salvador. The Christian Science Monitor. Available at: http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Americas/Latin- America-Monitor/2011/0524/ Violence-against-women-rises-in-El-Salvador, page accessed 20.9.2016. The Argentina Independent (2014, November 26) Venezuela: Femicide Established as Criminal Offence. Available at: http://www.argentinaindependent.com/currentaffairs/ latest-news/newsfromlatinamerica/venezuela-femicide-established-as-criminal- offence/, page accessed 25.1.2017. UN Human Rights, Office of the High Commissioner (2014) Ending Impunity for Femicide across Latin America. Available at: http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/ Pages/EndingImpunityLAC.aspx, page accessed 23.9.2016. Valladares, D. (2012, January 7) Guatemala Heeds the Cries of Femicide Victims. Inter Press Service News Agency. Available at: http://www.ipsnews.net/2012/01/guatemala- heeds-the-cries-of-femicide-victims/, page accessed 1.10.2016. Del Rio, A. (2016, November 7) #NiUnaMenos: Against Femicide in Latin America. Democracia Abierta. Available at: https://www.opendemocracy.net/ democraciaabierta/andr-s-del-r-o/niunamenos-against-femicide-in-latin-america, page accessed 2.10.2016. Temida, 2017, vol. 20, br. 1, str. 3-21 21 Willard, E. (2012, January 4) The Perfect Storm: Impunity and Violence against Women in Guatemala. Peace and Conflict Monitor. Available at: http://www.monitor. upeace.org/archive.cfm?id_article=893, page accessed 15.9.2016. World Health Organization (2012) Understanding and Addressing Violence against Women. Available at: http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/77421/1/ WHO_ RHR_12.38_eng.pdf, page accessed 13.9.2016. Yagoub, M. (2016, February 11) Why Does Latin America Have the World‘s Highest Female Murder Rates? InSight Crime: Investigation and Analysis of Organized Crime. Available at: http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/why-does-latin-america- have-the-world-s-highest-female-murder-rates, page accessed 11.10.2016. Janice Joseph* �rtve femicida u Latinskoj Americi: Zakonski i kriviènopravni odgovori Uprkos napretku koji su žene ostvarile u borbi protiv rodno zasnovanog nasilja, ovaj oblik nasilja i dalje preovladava u mnogim zemljama u svetu. Za mnoge žene u zemljama Latinske Amerike femicid je konstanta realnost. Ovaj rad kritički analizira femicid u zemljama Latinske Amerike i zakonske i krivičnopravne odgovore na ovaj oblik kriminaliteta. U radu je definisan pojam femicida i analizirane su karakteristike i obim femicida u Latinskoj Americi. Analiza ovog fenomena u zemljama Latinske Amerike ukazuje da, iako su neke od tih zemalja napravile važne korake u rešavanju problema, i dalje se suočavaju sa izazovima u njegovom sprečavanju. Ključne reči: femicid, nasilje nad ženama, Latinska Amerika, rodno zasnovano nasilje * Dr Janice Joseph je istaknuta profesorka krivičnog prava na Stockton Univerzitetu, Sjedinjene Američke Države. E-mail:josephj@stockton.edu. 
work_k5yuzn6565h4jl4cosapzo5n7i	----	The University of Brighton Skip to main navigation Skip to search Skip to main content Welcome to The University of Brighton Explore profiles, expertise and research at The University of Brighton Search as: concept matching text Advanced search 1210 Profiles 69 Organisational Units 49 Equipment 189 Projects 19260 Research output 3162 Activities 878 Student theses The University of Brighton research portal Welcome to the University of Brighton's database of research and enterprise including researcher profiles, activities, outputs, projects and our groups and centres. Our research and enterprise activities tackle global challenges, solve practical problems and seek to improve people’s lives and environments. We foster a vibrant, agile research community; supporting our established experts and nurturing the next generation of talent from our thriving postgraduate and early career researchers. Collaborations and top research areas from the last five years Click dots and donuts to bring up details or Select a country from the list Dive into details Select a country to view shared publications and projects Close University (1) Centres (15) Groups (36) School (14) Department (2) 1 results Name (ascending) Name(descending) Export search results Search results University of Brighton Organisational unit: University Powered by Pure, Scopus & Elsevier Fingerprint Engine™ © 2021 Elsevier B.V. We use cookies to help provide and enhance our service and tailor content. By continuing you agree to the use of cookies Log in to Pure About web accessibility The University of Brighton contact form 
work_kakpi2xs6ra6xjpgn5qokvupr4	----	Social Problems of LGBT People in Turkey Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences 113 ( 2014 ) 224 – 233 1877-0428 © 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection and peer-review under responsibility of Cognitive-counselling, research and conference services (c-crcs). doi: 10.1016/j.sbspro.2014.01.029 ScienceDirect 2013 International Congress on Clinical and Counselling Psychology (CPSYC) Social Problems Of LGBT People In Turkey Zümrüt Biçmena*, Zafer Bekiroğullarıb a, bToros University, Mersin, 33140, Türkiye Abstract In this study, I examined the social problems LGBT individuals go through in their hometowns and later, in the places they move to. Data were collected using semistructured interviews that included thirty four open - and close-ended questions. The sample is compsosed of 18 male and 12 female participants which makes 30 in total, residing in any city in Turkey. The findings demonstrate that LGBT individuals are exposed to verbal harassment and physical abuse, they are not accepted and are not able to perform social activities in their hometowns or if they migrated, in the places they moved to. © 2013 T he Aut hors. P ublished by Elsevier Lt d. Select ion and peer-review under responsibilit y of Dr. Zafer Bekirogullari. Keywords: LGBT , immigrate, T urkey, perceptions, social problems Introduction All around the world, throughout the history, anthropologist and historians defend that homesexuality and bisexuality exist. In some cultures it is regarded as something natural and a variation of human sexism and in some, sexual relations of same sexes are supported or those people had higher positions. However, in some cultures, homosexuality is still despised and treated in a bad way (Davies ,2012). * Corresponding author. T el.: +90 324 325 33 00; fax: +90 324 325 33 01. E-mail address: zumrut.bicmen@toros.edu.tr Available online at www.sciencedirect.com © 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection and peer-review under responsibility of Cognitive-counselling, research and conference services (c-crcs). Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license. http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ 225 Zümrüt Biçmen and Zafer Bekiroğulları / Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences 113 ( 2014 ) 224 – 233 LGBT ( lesbian, gay,bisexual,transgender) individuals will have to abandon the cities, countries they live in cases that they are not accepted by the society they live in, they are exposed to attacks, and they are limited or deprived regarding job opportunities. LGBT individuals who basically have different sexual orientation, face discrimination, exclusion from th e society, thus quite often, meet with obstacles to satisfy their needs. This exclusion and ostracism could vary from the simplest personal relations to the most general social ignorance, exclusion, ostracism, working simultaneously together, and can even violate the rights of life. Throughout history, LGBT individuals had to pretend as heterosexuals or come out to gain a place in society. They had to pretend what they were not or took great risks by revealing their real identities. This is a procedure of acceptance or revealing her/ himself (Cormier-Otano,Davies,2012). Heterosexualism is an ideological system which refuses and condemns every non -heterosexual attitude, behaviour, identity, relation and group (Herek, 1990:316). Homophobia is described as the hatred or fear to homosexual individuals and homosexuality (Tuzer,2003;9). Homophobic individuals play an effective role in inferring with the lives of LBT individuals. They cannot supress their feelings of hatred and the fact that they cannot accept LGBT individuals. Thus, they harass LGBT individuals verbally or physically and expose them to violence. Such attitudes direct LGBT individuals to stress, dissatisfaction of the place they live in, exposure to physical disturbance, loneliness and ostracis m. In their study, Pilkington and D'Augelli(1995) found out that lesbian, gay and bisexual young people’s psychological and physical wellbeing is endangered, and they develop negative outcomes such as physical injuries, behavioural and somatic reactions, attempt in interpersonal relations, blaming her/himself, coming out. There are many elements direct LGBT individuals to stress and disturbance that emerge as a result of stress. Social oppression is one of the outstanding elements. Many people attempt to live in compliance with traditions, customs and the religious principles of the religion embraced by the vast majority. Negative attitudes towards LGBT individuals stem from the prejudice that they are mentally ill or sinners (Levine ve Leonard, 1984: 706). Islam is the religion embraced by the vast majority in Turkey. Islam, like other monotheistic religions, Christianity and Judism, interprets homosexuality as a sin and it is regarded as something forbidden. In all three monotheist holy scriptures, there are verses about the destruction Luut’s people: “And [We had sent] Lot when he said to his people, "Do you commit such immorality as no one has preceded you with from among the worlds? Indeed, you approach men with desire, instead of women. Rather, you are a transgressing people. But the answer of his people was only that they said, "Evict them from your city! Indeed, they are men who keep themselves pure. So We saved him and his family, except for his wife; she was of those who remained [with the evildoers]. And We rained upon them a rain [of stones]. Then see how was the end of the criminals. (Araf Surah, 80-84) 226 Zümrüt Biçmen and Zafer Bekiroğulları / Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences 113 ( 2014 ) 224 – 233 In 2010, Society for Sexual Education Treatment and Research (CETAD) and the Psychiatric Association in Turkey made a common statement to the press and indicated that homosexuality, likewise heterosexuality and bisexuality, is one of the sexual orientation ( They described three sexual orientation: homosexuality, heterosexuality and bisexuality) and initially, is a different orientation, not a disease. It is stressed that sexual orientation is not a choice therefore homosexuality is not a sexual choice and a phenomena beyond the will of individuals (Türkiye Psikiyatri Derneği Haber Bülteni [TPD], 2010). In this sense, most of LGBT individuals residing in Turkey are exposed to social oppression, physical attack, jokes, swearwords, attitudinizing that psychologically hurt and hatred and mobbing in the workplaces (Demirdizen,Çınar,Kesici,2012). ''Hate crimes represent the most insidious manifestation of intolerance and discrimination, based on race, sex, language, religion or belief, national or social origin, sexual orientation, disability or other similar grounds. The violent expression of these biases may take the form of assault, murder, threats or property damage, such as arson, desecration or vandalism.''(OSCE-ODIHR,2005) The findings of the sample conducted on hate speech and crimes in Turkey demonstrated that hate speech rate is 79% and hate crime rate is 21%. Regarding hate crime stemmed from sexual orientation, this rate is 7% (Sosyal Değişim Derneği, 2010). It is determined that there is still not a positive attitude towards LGBT individuals elicits the tough, stressful and easy to get sick lives of them. In today’s Turkey, internal and external migration have increased on account of the situations LGBT individuals are exposed to. LGBT individuals have to leave their cities and countries in the cases that they ostracised from the social environment, exposed to attack, their job opportunities are limited and they are deprived of having their own enterprise. In this study, it is aimed to find out the perspective of the society, religions and laws towa rds LGBT individuals, the social problems they encounter and their abilities to deal with such problems and when they can not, their inclination to migrate, and whether they experience the same problems in the places they move in. Problem Statement In a study conducted at Yale University to determine violence and discrimination towards lesbian, bisexual and gay individuals, it is found out that many individuals under the influence of various fears, hide their sexual orientation. However, they are still e xposed to discrimination, psychological and/or physical violence. In another study conducted by students in Massachusetts, it is indicated that homosexual students are attacked physically one time more than the others, use alcohol four times and drugs ten times more, and 50% of them tried to commit suicide in the last year. Conducted studies demonstrate that there is a strong bond between homophobic attitudes and violence around the world (Sözen, 2009: 64). In a study conducted with the participation of university students, homosexuality is regarded as a problem, disease, modelling in puberty and a choice (Çırakoğlu, 2006). 227 Zümrüt Biçmen and Zafer Bekiroğulları / Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences 113 ( 2014 ) 224 – 233 Today there are still psychiatrists, psychologists and academic structures emracing therapeutic practice that describe homosexuality as spiritual and behavioural disorder (Mert,2009:84) Bekiroğulları (2012), in his study conducted in psychology department in a Muslim country, aimed to find out the students’ attitudes towards LGBT individuals. It is pointed out that the very religious students stated that they react with hatred, shame, repulsion to LGBT individuals or with emotions to homosexuals. Purpose In this study, it is aimed to find out whether LGBT individuals residing in Turkey, encounter social problems related with the social oppression and if they had left their countries or cities due to this oppression, whether they experience the same social problems in their new places. The main purpose of this study is to investigate how LGBT individuals deal with the problems they encounter and when they are not able to cope with such problems and move to other cities or countries, whether they are faced with the same kind of problems and finally, how such problems affect LGBT individuals. The samples of this study contain 30 individuals of LGBT living in various cities in Turkey. Data are collected by the writer via the interviews. Methods In this study, I used qualitative research methods to assess LGBT individuals’ perceptions of their hometowns and the problems they encountered in the places they moved later. Data were collected using semi-structured interviews that included thirty four open- and close-ended questions. The purposive sample was composed of 12 female and 18 male LGBT (N = 30) living in different cities in Turkey. The age of all participants were less than 38.Out of 30 LGBT individuals, 8(27% of full sample)were bisexual,8(27%) gay,10 (33%) lesbian and 4 (13%) transsexual. In this study all the questions were asked verbally and the answers were recorded and transcribed into written format directly. Those recorded answers were organized with codes and numbers. Additional questions were specified beforehand in order to obtain information or clarify previous questions. Throughout the interviews, after answering the question prepared before, for the reactions and the comments, participants were asked to write a summary limited with 100 words. Grouping was utilized to classify and encode the same reactions and comments and together with data collection, analysis was conducted with the assistance of these methods. In this research, 8 (27%) of the participants were bisexual , 8 (27%)of them were gay, 10 (33%) of them were lesbians and 4 (13%) of them were transsexual. The total number of the participants were 30 (N=30) . Table 1.Percentages of the Participants According to their birth places Birth Place N % İstanbul 12 40% İskenderun 2 7% Uşak 2 7% Samsun 2 7% Bursa 2 7% İzmit 2 7% Mersin 2 7% Konya 2 7% 228 Zümrüt Biçmen and Zafer Bekiroğulları / Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences 113 ( 2014 ) 224 – 233 In this research, the total number of the participants were 30 (N=30) and 12 (40%) of them were born in İstanbul,2 (7%) of them were born in İskenderun, 2 (7%) were born in Uşak,2 (7%) were born in Samsun,2 (7%) of the participants were born in Bursa,2 (7%) of them were born in İzmit,2 (7%)of them were born in Mersin, 2 (7%) of them were born in Konya. Table 2.The percentages of the participants according to their marital status Marital Status N % Married 4 13% Single 26 87% In this research, 4 (13%) of the total participants were married and 26(87%) of them were single. Table 3. The percentages of the Participants Regarding their Occupations Occupation N % Chief at a Textiel Factory 2 7% Rayon Manager 2 7% Student 8 27% Not working 4 13% Computer Repair Technician 2 7% Accountant 2 7% Sex worker 2 7% Proprietor 4 13% Electrical electronics engineers 4 13% In this research, 2 (7%) of the participants were chiefs in the textile factories, 2 (7%) of them were rayon manager, 8 (27%) of them were students, 4 (13%) of them didn’t work, 2 (7%) of them were the computer repair technicians, 2 (7%) of them were accountants, 2 (7%) of them were sex workers, 4 (13%) of them were proprietors and 4 (13%) of the participants were electrical electronics engineers. The number of the total participants were 30 (N=30). In this research, total number of the participants were 30 (N=30) and 20 (67%) of them were Muslim, 6 (20%) of them were ateist and 4 (13%) of them were deist. Table 4. The percentages of the Participants Beliefs Religious belief N % Muslim 20 67% Ateist 6 20% Deist 4 13% 229 Zümrüt Biçmen and Zafer Bekiroğulları / Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences 113 ( 2014 ) 224 – 233 Results Item 1. Are you able tol ive your sexual orientation openly in the country you live in right now? Percentages Yes 7% Sometimes 1% No 80% As it can be seen in Item 1, most participants (80%) , following the ques tion whether they can live and express their sexual orientation claim that they cannot live their sexual identity openly. Item 2. How LGBT is considered from the perspective of Islam ? Percentages Sin 57% Bad 7% They are silent when we are murdered or attacked 7% Regarding sick and cursed 3 % Burning in hell 13% Forbidden 13% As can be seen in Item 2., more than half of the participants (57%) consider LGBT individuals as “sin” according to Islam. Following this statement, the second most common statement (13%) is '' burning in hell'' and the third common statement(13%) is “forbidden.” Item 3. Have your colleagues threated you in a different way as you are LGBT? Percentages Yes 27% They do not know my sexual orientation 67% No 7% As it can be seen in Item 3, more than half of the participants (67%) hided their real identities with the fear of receiving negative reaction from their colleagues. The participants who revealed their sexual orientation to their colleagues(27%) are described as “pervert” and exposed to “Receive treatment” suggestion and homophobic jokes. Item 4.Did you have friends or family members in your hometown who knew that you are LGBT individual? Percentages Yes 73% No 27% 230 Zümrüt Biçmen and Zafer Bekiroğulları / Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences 113 ( 2014 ) 224 – 233 As Item 4. Demonstrates, more than half of the participants (73%) state that they had family members and friends who knew about the individual’s sexual orientation. Item 5. Who helped you in your hometown when you got sick and needed doctor or medicine? ( flu, catching cold, illnesses etc) Percentages Myself 40% My family 60% As stated in Item 5', more than half of the participants (60%) denoted that their families assisted them when they got sick and needed doctor or medicine in there. Less than half of the participants (40%) when they got sick in their hometowns, they provided the doctor or the medicine themselves. Item 6 . In your hometown, socially, who supported you? Percentages Myself 40% My family 27% My friends 20% My partner 13% As Item 6 indicates, most of the participants stated that they did not receive assistant socially in their hometowns. Item 7 . In your hometown, , who supported you psychologically? Percentages Myself 60% My family 13% My friends 13% I don’t have psychological disorders. 13% As can be seen in Item 7, more than half of the participants (60%) claimed that they did not receive psychological assistant in their hometowns. Furthermore, some participants (13%) stated that they do not have psychological disorders. Item 8 . How do you cope with loneliness? Percentages I don’t stay alone 38% I listen to music and read books 15% I got used to being alone 8% I can’t cope with loneliness 8% I watch movies 8% I have friends and my partner 8% 231 Zümrüt Biçmen and Zafer Bekiroğulları / Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences 113 ( 2014 ) 224 – 233 As Item 8 states, most of the participants (38%) denoted that they do not stay alone. Item 9. Do you feel lonely in the city you live in? Percentages Yes 33% No 67% As it can be seen in Item 9, more than half of the participants (67%) claimed that they do not fee lonely in the city they live in. Item 10 . What should change for you to go back to your hometown? Percentages I don’t want to go back 31% I live in my hometown 23% When they accept me as I am 23% If I have a social environment, I may go back to my hometown 15% If I have a job, , I may go back to my hometown 8% As Item10 states, most of the participants(31%) did not desire to go back to their hometowns. The results demonstrate that when they had health problems, 60% of them went to the hospital and the doctor and provided the necessary medicines themselves. 40% of them had support from their families. However, it is found out that 73% of them who were supported by their families were known to be heterosexual by their families and the social environment and their sexual orientations were unknown to those people. ‘’ Just because they like this, I don’ have to be lik e them. I am a woman and I am in love with a woman. I want to marry her. Do I have to go to the Netherlands for this? Why don’t we have that k ind of marriage in our country? Is our country that barbaric?” (Lesbian, living in Istanbul). The major social problem they encounter is to be exposed to pressure by the society. “I am really sick of the fact that we cannot walk around hand in hand. What happens if we are lesbians? It is none of your business! I wish I could say this to everyone.” (Lesbian, living in İstanbul) 57% of the participants claim that, from the religious perspective, LGBT individuals are “sins”. LGBT individuals dramatically feel not only the oppression of society but also the oppression of religion. Regardless of this result, 87% of them described themselves as “believers.” “ What am I doing to people? I can’t go out during the day. I am beaten by many people and have been hospitalized many times. Is any heterosexual beaten because she/ he is heterosexual? I don’t know what is that difficult to understand and what is to judge. I am a human being like them. (Gay, living in Balıkesir). “My family accepted me but it took a long time. When I faced with the problems I can’t cope with, I started using alcohol and drugs. I was a drug user for 6 years. Now I don’t use and try to continue my life ignoring the others. (Lesbian, living in Bursa). 232 Zümrüt Biçmen and Zafer Bekiroğulları / Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences 113 ( 2014 ) 224 – 233 Conclusions In this study, it is aimed to find out whether LGBT individuals’ social problems vary according to their age, birth place, gender, marital status, where they spent most of their lives before moving to their current places, where they live now; their level of education, religious beliefs and occupations. Following the examination of the literature, it is revealed that LGBT individuals living in Turkey are extremely influenced by the problems they encounter in social environments , and the ones who left their cities and moved to another place don’t desire to move back to their hometowns. The reason for this is that LGBT indiv iduals are exposed to psychlogical and physical pressure from their families and the social environments. Due to these problems, LGBT individuals are left alone at the moments they need assistance the most. At the beginning of the research, it was expected that the LGBT individuals’ social problems would decrease since they leave their families and, thus, behave more comfortably in a positive way with such alterations. The influence of changing the city was visible with LGBT individuals who are away from their families. The findings demonstrate that LGBT individuals have been through the same social problems in the places they later mov ed. References Bekiroğulları, Z. (2012)Perceptions Of Nonheterosexuality among future muslim counseling psychologists. SOCIAL BEHAVIOR AND PERSONALITY, 2012, 40(9), 1569-1584 Cormier-Otaño,O.,Davies,D.(2012).Gender and Sexual Diversity Therapy (GSDT) Çırakoğlu, O. Ç. (2006). Perception of homosexuality among Turkish university students: The roles of labels, gender and prior contact. The Journal of Social Psychology, 146 (3), 293-300. Davies, D (2012) Sexual Orientation in C. Feltham & I. Horton (eds) The Sage Handbook of Counselling and Psychotherapy 3rd edition. London: Sage Publications Demirdizen,D.,Çınar S.,Kesici M.R.(2012). İşyerinde Cinsel Yönelim Ayrımcılığı:LGB Bireylere Yönelik Bir Alan Çalışması.IV. Sosyal Haklar Sempozyumu. Herek, G. M. (1990). The context of anti-gay violence: Notes on cultural heterosexism. Journal of Interpersonal Violence, 5(3), 316–325. Levine, Martine ve Leonard, Robin ( 1984) “Discrimination Aganist Lesbians in the Work Force”, Journal of Women in Culture and Society, 9 (4). Kur'an-ı Kerim.Araf Suresi.(80-84 Verses) Mert, Y. (2009). Psikoloji Pratiğinde Eşcinsellik. ( 84-86). IV. Uluslararası Homofobi Karşıtı Buluşma, Ankara. Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (2005).Combating Hate Crimes in the OSCE Regio n. 233 Zümrüt Biçmen and Zafer Bekiroğulları / Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences 113 ( 2014 ) 224 – 233 Pilkington, Neil W. ve D'Augelli, Anthony R. (1995)Victimization of lesbian, gay, and bisexual youth in community settings. Sosyal Değişim Derneği(2010).Ulusal Basında Nefret Suçları:10 Yıl,10 Örnek. Sözen, Ş. (2009). Kişilerin Cinsel Yönelimleri Sebebiyle Yaşadıkları Şiddet ve Adli Tıbbi Süreçte Karşılaştıkları Zorluklar. Nefret söylemi ve suçları içinde (ss. 64-65). IV. Uluslararası Homofobi Karşıtı Buluşma, Ankara. Tuzer, V. (2003). Eşcinsellik, travestilik, transeksüellik. Lezbiyen ve geylerin sorunları içinde (ss. 9). Kaos GL Sempozyumu, Ankara. Yüksel, Ş.(2010).Eşcinseller,Sosyal Dışlama ve Yoksulluk.Türkiye Psikiyatri Derneği Haber Bülteni [TPD]. 
work_kb4gcngm6bafpe4hmzuqynpl6q	----	Viruses do not discriminate — we are all at risk.” master’s and PhD students studying at universities outside China. The majority are in Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States. Many have returned home while their institutions are closed owing to lockdowns, and many might not return. Students are hesitating to come back, in part because of fears of continuing racism, along with uncertainty over the future of their courses and not know- ing when international travel will resume. These young people will experience disruption and the loss of new connections and opportunities. But the loss of students from China and other countries in Asia has wide-ranging -and worrying implications for the scholarly enterprise, too. It means that universities in the affected countries will become less diverse — something that has not happened for generations. A loss for all For decades, campuses have striven to boost diversity, and countries have enacted policies to encourage international academic mobility. Diversity is valuable for its own sake. It encourages understanding and dialogue between cultures, and sharing of points of view and ways of being. And it has always been a fuel for research and innovation. Moreover, a diverse campus body is needed to improve policies and structures so that universities — and research publishing — can become more welcoming. Many barriers to diversity remain: in the April issue of Nature Reviews Physics, for example, researchers and science communi- cators from China, India, Japan and South Korea report examples of discrimination and other factors that prevent them being heard in international journals (S. Hanasoge et al. Nature Rev. Phys. 2, 178–180; 2020). Many leaders want to listen to and act on expert scien- tific advice to deal with this pandemic and save lives. On terminology, the advice is clear: we must all do everything we can to avoid and reduce stigma; not associate COVID-19 with particular groups of people or places; and emphasize that viruses do not discriminate — we are all at risk. It would be tragic if stigma, fuelled by the corona virus, led Asia’s young people to retreat from international cam- puses, curtailing their own education, reducing their own and others’ opportunities and leaving research worse off — just when the world is relying on it to find a way out. Coronavirus stigma must stop — now. End coronavirus stigma now The pandemic is fuelling deplorable racism, especially against Asian people. Education and research will also pay the price. W hen the World Health Organization (WHO) announced in February that the disease caused by the new coronavirus would be called COVID-19, the name was quickly adopted by organizations involved in communicating public-health information. As well as nam- ing the illness, the WHO was implicitly sending a reminder to those who had erroneously been associating the virus with Wuhan and with China in their news coverage— includ- ing Nature. That we did so was an error on our part, for which we take responsibility and apologize. For years, it was common for viral diseases to be associ- ated with the landscapes, places or regions where the first outbreaks occurred — as in Middle East respiratory syn- drome, or Zika virus, named after a forest in Uganda. But in 2015, the WHO introduced guidelines to stop this prac- tice and thereby reduce stigma and negative impacts such as fear or anger directed towards those regions or their people. The guidelines underlined the point that viruses infect all humans: when an outbreak happens, everyone is at risk, regardless of who they are or where they are from. And yet, as countries struggle to control the spread of the new coronavirus, a minority of politicians are stick- ing with the outdated script. US President Donald Trump has repeatedly associated the virus with China. Brazilian lawmaker Eduardo Bolsonaro — the son of President Jair Bolsonaro — has called it “China’s fault”. Politicians else- where, including in the United Kingdom, are also saying that China bears responsibility. Continuing to associate a virus and the disease it causes with a specific place is irresponsible and needs to stop. As infectious-disease epidemiologist Adam Kucharski reminds us in his timely book The Rules of Contagion, pub- lished in February, history tells us that pandemics lead to communities being stigmatized, which is why we all need to exercise more care. If in doubt, seek advice, and always fall back on the consensus of the evidence. Racist attacks Failing to do so has consequences. It’s clear that since the outbreak was first reported, people of Asian descent around the world have been subjected to racist attacks, with untold human costs — for example, on their health and livelihoods. Law-enforcement agencies say they are making investigation of hate crimes a high priority, but such inquiries might come too late for some, including many of the more than 700,000 Chinese undergraduate, Chinatown in San Francisco, California, during COVID-19. Nature | Vol 580 | 9 April 2020 | 165 The international journal of science / 9 April 2020 JE F F C H IU /A P /S H U T T E R S T O C K © 2020 Springer Nature Limited. All rights reserved. 
work_kbqnv42kf5f7rg5kp7gnfxnq5u	----	05.SRSP.05.01_53-71.qxd 53 March 2008 Vol. 5, No. 1 Sexuality Research & Social Policy http://nsrc.sfsu.edu The Nonprofit Industrial Complex and Trans Resistance Rickke Mananzala, Dean Spade Abstract: Trans politics are gaining visibility and momentum and, increasingly, trans activists are form- ing projects and organizations focused on promoting political change. Given this context, this article examines how critiques of the nonprofit industrial complex might be incorporated into trans political analysis and how they could inform this moment of trans political institutionalization. Taking tools and lessons from antiracist and feminist scholars and activists and recognizing widespread critique of the co-optation of the lesbian and gay rights movement by neoliberalism, this article highlights alternatives to traditional nonprofit structures. The authors provide an in-depth look at 1 trans organization that employs a collective governance model and encourages the leadership of trans people of color, offer- ing it as a potential model for emerging trans organizations. Key words: transgender; racism; organizational development; neoliberalism; co-optation; gay; lesbian “The person who says it cannot be done should not interrupt the person doing it” (Feinberg, 1998, p. 61, quot- ing a Chinese proverb). Since the 1990s, trans politics have decidedly emerged on the national scene in the United States, with the visibility of trans issues reaching new heights. This change is apparent in many sectors: Nine states and almost 100 cities and counties have passed gender identity and expression-inclusive antidiscrimination laws, trans char- acters and stories have appeared in popular media, key institutions have begun considering and adopting policies addressing fair treatment of trans people, and trans activists have fought to be heard in a wide variety of social movements. These events have precipitated important controversies about who should represent trans politics and who should be included under a trans political umbrella; what the priorities of trans political change work should be; and what relationship trans liberation has to feminism, gay and lesbian rights, antiracism, disabil- ity politics, and other key areas of anti-oppression work. Emerging trans struggles are often closely associ- ated with struggles against discrimination based on sex- ual orientation, in part because U.S. culture often conflates sexual orientation and gender expression and in part because of a long history of sexual and gender outsiders finding community together, resisting oppression together, and often understanding their identities through or against each other (Valentine, 2007). Since the 1980s or earlier, this connection between lesbian and gay rights and trans rights has been fraught with controversies about the inclusion or exclusion of trans people from lesbian and gay rights movements that were increasingly institution- alizing and striving for legitimacy. Exclusions of trans people and trans issues from lesbian and gay rights orga- nizations and political struggles have caused significant community rifts, most recently evident in the controversy over trans inclusion in the national Employment Non- Discrimination Act (2007) legislation. Nonetheless, trans politics remain closely aligned with lesbian and gay poli- tics overall and trans activism, now increasingly visible, is often seen as an offshoot of lesbian and gay politics. Because of the relationship of these identities and his- tories of struggle, many people assume that trans work should occur within lesbian and gay organizations and mir- ror the strategies of those organizations. For that reason, the majority of people doing paid work on trans rights or trans Address correspondence concerning this article to Rickke Mananzala, FIERCE!, 147 West 24th Street, 6th Floor, New York, NY 10011. E-mail: rickke@fiercenyc.org; Dean Spade, Williams Institute, UCLA Law School, Box 951476, Los Angeles, CA 90095. E-mail: deanspade@gmail.com Sexuality Research & Social Policy, Vol. 5, Issue 1, pp. 53–71, electronic ISSN 1553-6610. © 2008 by the National Sexuality Research Center. All rights reserved. Please direct all requests for permissions to photocopy or reproduce article content through the University of California Press’s Rights and Permissions website, http://www.ucpressjournals.com/reprintInfo.asp http://nsrc.sfsu.edu http://www.ucpressjournals.com/reprintInfo.asp SEXUALITY RESEARCH & SOCIAL POLICY March 2008 Vol. 5, No. 1 54 politics in the United States work in organizations whose missions focus on gay and lesbian rights—although trans people also have a role in some cities as outreach workers at HIV/AIDS organizations due to increased awareness of the significant rates of HIV in trans populations. At this writ- ing, very few trans-specific organizations exist in the United States; of the ones that are trans-specific, most are small and have low or nonexistent budgets. Trans individuals work- ing on trans-specific projects within lesbian and gay or HIV/AIDS organizations often are the only trans employee (at most, they are one of two) and are working on lower rungs within hierarchically structured organizations. Many lesbian and gay organizations have no trans staff at all, instead assigning a nontrans person to work on trans issues as some part of her or his duties. However, this state of affairs is undergoing significant change as we write this article. Many lesbian and gay orga- nizations that devoted no or few resources to trans concerns a few years ago now have trans-focused work and some- times even a trans staff member. A few trans-focused orga- nizations have sprung up in the last few years—namely, the National Center for Transgender Equality, the Sylvia Rivera Law Project, the TGI Justice Project, and the Transgender Law Center—all of which have had a significant impact on the national conversation about trans politics and have increased pressure on lesbian and gay organizations to include trans concerns in their work. As these organizations and others work to educate funders, donors, and commu- nities about trans issues, we anticipate growing support for work focused on trans liberation, as well as growing insti- tutionalization of this work, including increased funding for nonprofit programs engaging in it. In the context of this emergence of trans political work, we have become interested in considering how trans politics and emerging trans organizations can benefit from critical analyses of the nonprofit industrial complex and of neolib- eralism’s co-optation of activism that has been developed by feminist and antiracist scholars and activists. We want to ask key questions about how, in many ways, the most well- resourced organizations in the gay and lesbian rights arena have fallen into the worst traps of the nonprofit industrial complex and have used structures and tactics that have resulted in neoliberalism’s co-optation of lesbian and gay political aims. We are interested in starting a conversation now, while trans organizations are forming and institution- alization is at an early stage, about what it might look like to build trans resistance that meaningfully engages anti- racist and anticapitalist politics in its structures, strategies, and visions. We are interested in using a critical analysis of how movement organizations’ missions, ideology, governance structures, financial resources, and impacts are interconnected to examine the terrain upon which emerg- ing trans organizations are being and will be developed. This conversation is particularly meaningful because of the futility for trans communities in building organi- zations modeled on lesbian and gay rights frameworks that centrally benefit and concentrate power in the hands of people with race, educational, and class privilege. From our viewpoints working in nonprofits that organize and provide services to trans people, we see trans communi- ties suffering severe economic marginalization and per- vasive state violence, particularly at the hands of criminal justice, immigration, and so-called poverty alleviation systems (Agathangelou, Bassichis, & Spira, 2008; Arkles, 2005; Daley, 2005; Gehi & Arkles, 2007; Marksamer, 2005a, 2005b; Minter & Daley, 2003; Spade, 2005; Xavier, 2000). Given the strong trends of poverty, homelessness, incarceration, and downward mobility in trans commu- nities, we are deeply unsatisfied by the idea of a movement that centralizes leadership in the hands of the few trans people who maintain economic and educational privilege and builds strategies for change that primarily affect those people. Instead, we think that trans politics should use a model based on the concept social justice trickles up, not down, prioritizing the needs and concerns of those facing the worst manifestations of gender-based marginaliza- tion and exclusion, as well as using a model for social change that centralizes the leadership of trans people of color, trans low-income people, trans immigrants, and others facing intersectional oppression. This article describes critiques of the nonprofit indus- trial complex and of neoliberalism’s co-optation of social justice work and looks at those critiques in relation to lesbian and gay politics. It then offers tools for thinking about alternative strategies for structuring social justice work and examines a specific model, the Sylvia Rivera Law Project—a trans political organization striving to resist co- optation and trying to build democratic, sustainable, accountable infrastructure. We offer this model with the belief that building a trans movement based on broad anti-oppression values and mirroring those values in the structures, strategies, and visions of our organizations not only is possible but also represents a more politically viable, winning strategy than traditional models of hier- archical governance and professionalization. Neoliberalism and the Nonprofit Industrial Complex Although the history and impact of neoliberalism are rarely discussed in the context of the most well- resourced strategies of the gay and lesbian rights SEXUALITY RESEARCH & SOCIAL POLICY March 2008 Vol. 5, No. 1 55 movement, examining the rise of neoliberalism is essen- tial to understanding the context of equality struggles in the United States. Angela Harris (2006) explored the lim- itations of recent legal victories for gay rights in her arti- cle “From Stonewall to the Suburbs?: Toward a Political Economy of Sexuality.” Harris contextualized Goodridge v. Dept. of Public Health (2003; granting marriage rights to same-sex couples in Massachusetts) and Lawrence v. Texas (2003; abolishing sodomy statutes) in an under- standing of the law’s role in preserving the status quo of power relations. Harris argued that when faced with social movements opposing oppression, the law will adapt to allow limited changes that reduce the urgency of social jus- tice movements but retain the underlying oppressive power differential. For this reason, Harris says the law engages in preservation through transformation. Harris looked at comparisons of Lawrence and Goodridge with Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka (1954), tracing the history of the implementation of Brown and the sub- sequent suburbanization that undermined its potential for integrating public schools. She noted that public schools are currently as racially segregated as ever, although not through the overt race-based policies that existed prior to Brown. Harris (2006) argued that the history of Brown’s (1954) failure to eliminate racial segregation in schools demonstrates the law’s tendency toward preservation through transformation whereby, when social movements obtain enough political power to successfully push for change, any granted legal change maintains the status quo to the greatest extent possible. She described the rise of neoliberalism and examined how racialized economic policies leading to White flight and suburbanization replaced prior overtly race-based segregation policies to maintain the status quo of segregation and to co-opt the concept of race neutrality as further legitimization for that status quo. Harris cautioned queer activists to look at recent litigation victories with this history in mind in order to recognize the limits of the social change such victories may promise. Harris explained the context of the rise of neoliberalism to examine how the policies and practices of neoliberalism can, and do, make room for limited claims for equal rights that can be co-opted as part of maintaining the status quo of maldistribution. Harris (2006) provided this apt characterization of neoliberalism: Beginning in the late 1960s, and reaching a consol- idation of sorts in the 1980 election of Ronald Reagan, political conservatives took advantage of racial resentment, growing economic suffering and vulnerability, and suburban politics to mount a formidable campaign against the New Deal, the American welfare state, and to some extent gov- ernment itself. Neoliberalism entails a commitment to the dismantling of the economic arrangements sometimes called “Fordism,” and their replacement with an economy driven by substantially deregu- lated markets (themselves driven by the interests of corporate and finance capital), an economy in which capital’s upper hand over labor has led to dramat- ically increasing inequalities of income and wealth. Neoliberalism also entails the dismantling of state institutions meant to cushion citizens against eco- nomic risk, and an approach to governance that favors “privatization,” “deregulation,” and other policies that transfer political power from govern- ments to markets. (p. 1542) The rise of neoliberalism from “state project” to “state strategy” (Tickell & Peck, 2003, ¶ 20) in the last 30 years has presented social movements and progressive non- profits with two interconnected challenges—challenges leading to more pressing questions on the political direc- tion of queer and trans political resistance. First, social movements have had to absorb the impact of neoliberalism. If the impact is a two-sided coin, the first side includes rollbacks on economic safety nets, such as welfare and public housing, that have dev- astated low-income communities, which dispropor- tionately comprise people of color. As Ruth Gilmore (2007) described, the rise of neoliberalism from the 1970s to the present has pushed nonprofit organizations to morph into what she called a shadow state, filling the gaps the government left in meeting people’s social ser- vice needs. The political, economic, and social condi- tions resulting from neoliberalism—including throwing low-income communities into increased crisis due to cuts in survival services — have presented significant challenges to social movements trying to build leader- ship and power among oppressed communities. The other side of the coin is that social welfare has increas- ingly become dependent on business: Business charity essentially has replaced government funding in pro- viding resources for social welfare and has become the so-called answer to social problems. The outcome is the privatization, or the United Wayzation, of social welfare.1 With communities having much deeper eco- nomic and social crises and thus needing more service- based help from movement organizations, social movements are simultaneously less capable of provid- ing resources to support their own work. This situation 1 Gihan Perera, personal communication, October 4, 2007. SEXUALITY RESEARCH & SOCIAL POLICY March 2008 Vol. 5, No. 1 56 translates into organizations’ overreliance on income from corporations and accumulated wealth stored in foundations and often leads to a disconnect from the driving forces behind the organizations’ work: the com- munities themselves. Second, social movements are forced to grapple with questions of co-optation and how to challenge the neolib- eral order in the context of increasing upward distribution of wealth and a growing number of communities in crisis. As seen throughout the height of social movements in the 1960s and 1970s, neoliberalism not only had economic, political, and social impacts on oppressed communities but also significantly curbed the efforts of social move- ments—especially labor movements—that challenged the fundamental profit logic of capitalism and neoliberalism. As we will argue more fully, this second question has been underaddressed in gay and lesbian rights work, demon- strating a departure from the movement’s radical roots. As is evidenced by the priorities of the organizations with the most resources, the focus of this work has shifted to issues primarily based on narrow individual rights often relating to property and responsibilities rather than on col- lective and community well-being. This article explores these two challenges, particularly in light of their relationship to the growth of the non- profit industrial complex and the potential of queer and trans organizations to challenge power relations based in wealth and property, race, gender, and sexuality. First, we define the nonprofit industrial complex and review cri- tiques of its impact; then, we examine how those critiques apply to the gay and lesbian rights movement and ques- tion how emerging trans organizations might depart from that model. Finally, we provide a case study of a trans orga- nization working to do so. Defining the Nonprofit Industrial Complex In his presentation at The Revolution Will Not Be Funded: Beyond the Non-Profit Industrial Complex Conference, Dylan Rodriguez (2004) defined the non- profit industrial complex as a “set of symbiotic relation- ships that link together political and financial technologies of state and owning-class proctorship and surveillance over public political intercourse, including and especially emergent progressive and leftist social movements, since about the mid-1970s.” He called for a critique of the state- corporate alliance and its efforts to keep the lid on “what is left of the alleged U.S. Left.” He asserted that “a popu- lar and institutionalized law-and-order state has reached symbiosis with its liberal foundation allies,” a symbiosis that helps prevent sites of potential radicalism or collapses them into nonantagonistic social service and pro-state reformist initiatives, thereby facilitating functioning of the state and helping to reproduce it. Rodriguez suggested that philanthropic vision “explicitly marginalizes radical forms of dissent that articulate irreconcilable antagonism to civil society’s and the state’s multiple structures of domination or co-optation.” Philanthropic control of resources for social justice organizations, Rodriguez (2007) argued, makes growth impossible for emerging radical political work that refuses to participate in the shared values of U.S. society and instead sees the United States itself as an entirely violent and racist project. In this context, unless a project seeks to reform its institutions in ways that preserve those insti- tutions, it cannot be supported. Rodriguez (2004) sug- gested that philanthropic support is so limiting and controlling of the growth of social justice movements that more radical projects can never get funding from the pro- gressive liberal foundations; furthermore, demands for what he calls radical freedom, as opposed to White bour- geois freedom, cannot occur in the context of the nonprofit industrial complex. Therefore, he argued, the nonprofit industrial complex ultimately maintains politics and insti- tutions of oppression, keeping a lid on radical political work while pushing organizations to provide basic services that quell unrest. Many scholars and activists join Rodriguez in raising concerns about the growth and functions of the nonprofit industrial complex (INCITE!, 2007). Explicating the key concerns raised by critics of the nonprofit industrial com- plex is useful for examining the role of nonprofits in exist- ing lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT)2 activism and emerging trans liberation work. Key Concerns With the Emerging Model of Nonprofits The Emergence of the Nonprofit Sector as the Location for Social Justice Work Has Separated Survival Services From Organizing One critique that has emerged about the effect of the nonprofit model on current social justice movements is that it has separated the provision of direct, survival- based services from organizing (Kivel, 2007). In part because funding streams usually focus on either overtly political organizing work or direct service work, these two kinds of work have been segregated into different 2 The most well-funded organizations in this realm gener- ally use the term LGBT to identify this work now, yet bisex- ual and transgender activists remain critical of the work of these organizations, pointing out the continued marginal- ization of their issues. SEXUALITY RESEARCH & SOCIAL POLICY March 2008 Vol. 5, No. 1 57 types of nonprofits that often operate with little con- nection or communication among them. Consequently, services are depoliticized, offering little opportunity for communities experiencing the effects of systemic oppres- sion (e.g., poverty, homelessness, unemployment, health issues) to build networking relationships for analysis and resistance of this oppression when seeking services to meet their immediate needs. Instead of survival ser- vices being a point of politicization, a locus from which people can connect their immediate needs to a commu- nity-wide issue of injustice or maldistribution, services are provided through a charity or social-work model that individualizes the issues to the particular client and too often includes an element of moralizing that casts clients as blameworthy for their need. This dynamic reflects our previous argument about how the nonprofit sector emerged, in part, to fill the gap in government ser- vices that occurred under Reaganomics. By ameliorating some of the worst effects of capitalist maldistribution, then, these services became part of maintaining the social order, in part because they primarily operate through a depoliticizing charity framework rather than a social change model. The Nonprofit Structure Undermines and Contains the Radical Potential of Social Justice Work, Leading to More Policy and Service-Based Work and Less Organizing Critics (Ahn, 2007; Pharr, 2004) have also pointed out that the increase in nonprofits has been accompanied by a greater prevalence of service-based and policy reform work, rather than base-building organizing, in social jus- tice movements. Some have argued that because social justice nonprofits are funded through philanthropy — frequently directly by wealthy individuals and corpora- tions — the strategies of this work have become more conservative to better fit those funders’ capitalism- maintenance and reformist goals than the base-building, visionary organizing goals that might emerge more directly from communities facing oppression. Funders favor policy work and services over base-building, result- ing in lost opportunities for building political power among those directly affected by oppression. Instead, service and policy reform organizations typically engage in change where those directly affected are clients but educated elites (e.g., lawyers, administrators, social work- ers, public health experts) create and implement reform agendas. Overall, the aims of these organizations, and the breadth of their political demands, are far narrower and less radical due to the incentives provided by philan- thropy to pursue service and policy reform goals. Racism, Educational Privilege, and Classism Within Nonprofits Mirrors Colonialism Because the Direction of the Work and Decisions About Its Implementation Are Made by Elites Rather Than by People Directly Affected by the Issues at Hand The governance of nonprofits has been subject to critique as well. Critics (Kivel, 2007) have argued that the governance structure of most nonprofits, characterized by boards consisting of donors and elite professionals (sometimes with tokenistic membership for the commu- nity members who are directly affected by the organiza- tion’s mission), perpetuates dynamics of dominance. Nonprofits serving primarily low-income and dispropor- tionately non-White populations are frequently governed almost entirely by White people with college and gradu- ate degrees. Staffing follows this pattern as well, with most nonprofits requiring formal education as a prereq- uisite to working in administrative or management-level positions. Thus, the nature of the infrastructure in many social justice nonprofits often leads to concentrating deci- sion making power in the hands of people with race, education, and class privilege rather than in the hands of those bearing the brunt of the oppression. Consequently, the priorities and implementation methods of such orga- nizations frequently do not reflect the perspective or approach that would be taken by the people most directly affected by oppression. For people who hold self- determination as a goal of liberation struggles or who believe that people struggling under oppression possess unique understandings of the operations of that oppres- sion that are not shared by others, this concern is especially significant. The Philanthropic Funding of Nonprofits Takes Direction of the Work Out of the Hands of the People Affected and Concentrates It on the Agendas and Time Lines of Funders, Preventing Long-Term, Self-Sustaining Movements From Emerging Part of the reason that decision-making power in nonprofits becomes concentrated in the hands of elites is because of how the organizations secure funding. The process of successfully applying for funding, includ- ing having 501(c)(3) status or a fiscal sponsor, research- ing applicable grants, writing formal funding requests using specific jargon, having an awareness of current trends in funding, and having personal relationships with philanthropic professionals requires skills and relationships that are concentrated in people with SEXUALITY RESEARCH & SOCIAL POLICY March 2008 Vol. 5, No. 1 58 educational, class, and race privilege. Being able to direct work and spin it to a funder’s vision is, more often than not, the key to success. Furthermore, as Suzanne Pharr (2004) has pointed out, the use of short- term funding cycles (often 1 – 5 years) and the focus on producing deliverables has meant that nonprofits have been encouraged to operate on short-term vision rather than build long-term sustainable structures. Under this model, similar to investment in the private sector, fun- ders seek to see concrete returns (e.g., statistics about numbers of clients served or clear evidence of policy change) on their investment within a limited grant period. Base-building work that involves less tangible returns like the growth of shared political analysis within a community or relationship building is under- valued. This model encourages organizations to iden- tify goals that can be achieved quickly, not to envision the long-term strategies necessary for more radical changes to politics and culture. The Emergence of the Nonprofit Sector Has Created a Cultural Shift in Social Justice Activism, Including Professionalization, Corporatization, and Competition Between Groups for Scarce Resources This funder-driven elitism has also included a pro- fessionalization of social justice organizations such that corporate business models are increasingly used to man- age these organizations. This trend is evidenced by a rise in nonprofits’ use of such terms as CEO (chief executive officer) and CFO (chief financial officer) for top-level staff (Pharr, 2004); a hierarchical pay scale in which people are compensated at very different rates based on valuations of skills and abilities that are similar to those used in the private sector; and other labor practices that reflect business values more than social justice values. Many critics (Hawk, 2007) have lamented that young activists increasingly look at social movement work as a paycheck, with the expectation of professional salaries becoming central to decisions about what kinds of activism and organizing to pursue. Business models of management that focus on top-down decision making, coupled with organizational structures in which educa- tional, race, and class privilege often correspond to high positions in the hierarchy, mean that not only decision making but also compensation and quality of life at work are concentrated in the hands of White people with grad- uate educations (e.g., lawyers, social workers, people with degrees in nonprofit management). Literally, more philanthropic dollars end up in the pockets of those with race, class, gender, and educational privilege. Nonprofits Are a Way That Wealthy People and Corporations Avoid Tax Liability, and Most of That Redirected Money Does Not Go to Social Justice Finally, some critics caution that social justice move- ments should be weary of the centrality of the nonprofit model because of its role in the maldistribution of wealth in the United States. Christine Ahn (2007) has provided an analysis that encourages taxpayers to recognize that money funneled into nonprofits by philanthropists is actu- ally tax money diverted out of the government and into focused causes. The vast majority of that money does not, she points out, end up in social justice organizations fight- ing inequality and oppression. In fact, most tax-exempt giving benefits the nation’s wealthiest people by going to institutions and programs such as conservative think tanks and foundations; upper-class cultural institutions including museums, operas, art galleries, and elite schools; and private hospitals (Kivel, 2007). A large amount also goes back into the pockets of the wealthy through trustee fees, where wealthy people are paid hundreds of thousands of dollars to sit on the boards of foundations (Ahn). Only a tiny portion of the money ends up in social justice orga- nizations and even then, it comes with many strings attached that allow wealthy philanthropists to have a hand in directing the work. Ahn’s analysis instructs social jus- tice activists to remain critical of the nonprofit industrial complex—even while making use of nonprofit structures in their work—because of its broad role in reducing tax lia- bility of the wealthy and putting decisions about wealth redistribution that could be made through governmental use of taxes into the hands of the wealthy. Ahn encourages social justice activists to view redirected tax money as their money—money that has been taken out of govern- ment revenue that can (theoretically) be directed through electoral process by the people and instead directed into handpicked causes by the rich. Case in Point: LGBT Organizations These concerning characteristics of nonprofits are prevalent in organizations that have emerged as part of the gay rights or so-called LGBT movement.3 Looking at these 3 We have reservations about whether movement is an appropriate term for the advocacy, policy, and law reform work that has been engaged over the last 25 years seeking, for the most part, lesbian and gay rights or rights of same- sex couples. The co-optation of the word movement itself, to signify work that does not engage in base-building or bottom-up strategies or promote leadership of those vul- nerable to the most severe manifestations of heterosexism, is a concern of this article. SEXUALITY RESEARCH & SOCIAL POLICY March 2008 Vol. 5, No. 1 59 critiques in the context of this specific area of activism is useful not only because doing so can illustrate the critiques but also because trans work is often seen as a subset of les- bian and gay rights work and thus is expected to follow similar strategies—an assumption that, given these con- cerns, may be worth questioning. Countless scholars and activists have critiqued the direction that gay rights activism has taken since the incendiary moments of June 1969 when criminalized gen- der and sexual outsiders fought back against police harass- ment and brutality at New York City’s Stonewall Inn. What started as street resistance and nonfunded ad hoc organizations, initially taking the form of protests and marches, institutionalized in the 1980s into nonprofit structures that became increasingly professionalized. Critiques of these developments have used a variety of terms and concepts to describe the shift, including charges that the focus became assimilation (Barnard, 1996; Cohen, 1997; Sycamore, 2004); that the work increasingly marginalized low-income people (Blum, DeFillipis, & Perina, 2000 – 2001), people of color (Farrow, 2004; Sycamore, 2004), and transgender people (Minter, 2006; Rivera, 2002; Spade, 2004); and that the resistance became co-opted by neoliberalism (Harris, 2006) and conservative egalitarianism. Critics have argued that as the gay rights movement of the 1970s institutionalized into the gay and lesbian rights movement in the 1980s—forming such institutions as Gay and Lesbian Advocates and Defenders, the Gay and Lesbian Alliance Against Defamation, the Human Rights Campaign (HRC), Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, and the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force — the focus of the most well- funded, well-publicized work on behalf of queers shifted drastically (Harris; Padilla, 2004; Vaid, 1996). From its roots in bottle-throwing resistance to police brutality and radical claiming of queer sexual public space, the focus of gay rights moved toward the more conservative model of equality promoted in U.S. law and culture through the idea of equal opportunity. The thrust of these organi- zations’ work became seeking access and equality through dominant U.S. institutions rather than questioning and challenging the fundamental inequalities promoted by those institutions. The key agenda items became antidiscrimina- tion law focused on employment (e.g., the federal Employment Non-Discrimination Act [2007], as well as equivalent state statutes), military inclusion, decriminal- ization of sodomy, hate crimes laws, and a range of reforms focused on relationship recognition that increasingly nar- rowed in the last decade to focus on marriage. Critics have charged that the social justice focus was erased from the movement and replaced by a focus on formal legal equality that could produce gains only for peo- ple already served by existing social and economic arrange- ments (Spade & Willse, 2005). For example, choosing to frame equal access to health care through a demand for same-sex marriage rights meant fighting for health care access that would affect only people with jobs that include health benefits they could share with a partner, an increas- ingly uncommon privilege (Ettelbrick, 1989; Spade & Willse, 2005). Similarly, addressing the marginalization of queer people in the economy solely through the lens of antidiscrimination laws barring discrimination in employ- ment on the basis of sexual orientation—despite the fact that these laws have been ineffective at eradicating dis- crimination against other oppressed groups and ignoring the reality that most people do not have access to the legal resource needed to enforce these kinds of rights—has been criticized as marking an investment in formal legal equality while ignoring the plight of the most economically marginalized queers. These questions came to the fore during the welfare reform debates and subsequent policy changes of the mid-1990s, when social justice activists criticized gay rights organizations for not resisting the elimination of social welfare programs despite the fact that these policy changes had devastating effects for low-income queers (Blum et al., 2000–2001). Similar critiques have been made of the quest for hate crimes laws, arguing that their aims of enhancing penalties for assaults committed based on antigay animus and directing resources to criminal jus- tice agencies are misguided. Queer activists focused on opposing police brutality and mass incarceration of low- income people and people of color in the United States have argued that hate crimes laws do nothing to prevent violence against queer and trans people, much of which happens at the hands of employees of the criminal justice system to which hate crimes laws lend more resources (Spade & Willse, 2000). These critics have pointed out that the shift in focus from police accountability to part- nering with the criminal justice system and aiming for increased penalties represents a significant move away from the concerns of low-income queers and queers of color, who are the most frequent targets of police and pris- ons, toward the perspective of White and economically privileged queers who may feel protected by the police and the criminal justice system and more interested in retribution than in finding alternatives to a crime-and- punishment model. Overall, the gay rights agenda has shifted toward White gay and lesbian experience while marginalizing or overtly excluding the needs and experiences of people of color, transgender people, and low-income people. Blatant SEXUALITY RESEARCH & SOCIAL POLICY March 2008 Vol. 5, No. 1 60 examples such as the battle over whether the most well- funded gay rights organization, HRC, would include trans- gender people in its national legislation or cover only sexual orientation, as well as examples of value shifting, such as the move from police accountability to hate crimes laws, represent this trend. Professionalization in emerg- ing gay rights nonprofits may be one of the causes of this shift. As these organizations emerged, often funded by wealthy White gay people and the foundations they have created, their staffs were and remain primarily White gay men and lesbians with professional degrees. These orga- nizations operate on typical hierarchal models of gover- nance, with decision making coming from the top down, including board members and senior staff who are even more likely to be White, wealthy, and have graduate-level educations. The gay rights agenda, then, has come to reflect the needs and experiences of those leaders more than the experiences of community members not present in these elite spaces. These paid leaders could imagine themselves fired from a job for being gay or lesbian, beaten up on the street, or kept out of military service. They did not imag- ine themselves as potentially incarcerated, on welfare, homeless, in danger of deportation, or targets of contin- uous police harassment, so those issues did not receive resources in their work. Furthermore, these leaders came out of graduate schools more than from radical move- ments of people facing centuries of state oppression, so their critiques of such notions as formal legal equality, assimilation, and equal rights were less developed. Even White feminist critiques of the institution of marriage could not trump the new call for marriage equality — meaning access for same-sex couples to the fundamentally unequal institution designed to privilege certain family for- mations for the purpose of state control (Colker, 2006; Franke, 2006). The decision-making structures and priorities are not the only aspects of these nonprofits that have gener- ated critique. Money has also been a serious concern— both where it comes from and where it goes. The largest, White-founded and -led organizations doing gay rights work have generated much revenue through both foun- dation grants and sponsorship by such corporations as American Airlines, Budweiser, IBM, and Coors. These partnerships, which include free advertising for the cor- porations, have been criticized by queers concerned about the narrow social justice framework of organizations will- ing to promote corporations whose labor and environ- mental practices have been widely critiqued. These partnerships have furthered the ongoing criticism that gay and lesbian rights have become single-issue politics, ignoring other social justice issues to promote only a nar- row political agenda that concerns gays and lesbians expe- riencing oppression through a single vector — sexual orientation — and thus excluding from concern all the queer and trans people who simultaneously experience sexual orientation–based oppression and other oppres- sions related to their identities as people of color, work- ers, immigrants, gender nonconformers, people with disabilities, and so forth. Lesbian and gay organizations have also, generally, followed labor practices that do not line up with progres- sive social justice values. The most well-funded organiza- tions have pay scales similar to those of the private sector, with executive directors often making three to four times the salaries of the lowest-paid employees. Pay often cor- relates to educational privilege, which again means that the most resources go to White employees from privi- leged backgrounds and the least go to employees of color and people without the benefit of educational privilege. Furthermore, these organizations for the most part do not provide health benefits that include trans health care, despite the fact that this social justice issue is an essential one for trans people. The organizations also have a record of not prioritizing the development of antiracism within their work, with continued failure, despite requests by some employees, for meaningful anti-oppression training and development work within the organizations.4 The refusal to devote resources toward the development of internal antiracist practice reflects the broader marginal- ization of issues important to people of color in these agendas. Overall, the well-funded gay and lesbian rights orga- nizations are stark examples of the critiques made by activists from across a wide range of social justice move- ments about the problems with the nonprofit structure as a tool for social justice. Lack of community accountabil- ity, elitism, concentration of wealth and resources in the usual places, and exploitative labor practices are norms within these organizations, and so create and maintain a disappointing political agenda that fails to support mean- ingful, widespread resistance to oppressive institutions in the United States—and sometimes even bolsters them. Conceptual Tools for Examining Organizational and Movement Approaches to Change During a flood, the raft is a life-saving device, but it is only a means of getting to higher ground. So, too, with survival programs, which are emergency services. In 4 This information comes from the authors’ own work within these organizations and their relationships with other activists working inside these organizations. SEXUALITY RESEARCH & SOCIAL POLICY March 2008 Vol. 5, No. 1 61 themselves they do not change social conditions, but they are life-saving vehicles until conditions change. (Abron, 1998, p. 25) In assessing the disturbing failures of well-resourced organizations focused on lesbian and gay rights to articulate meaningful resistance to maldistribution of wealth and power, and to begin imagining what it would mean to struc- ture organizations focused on trans liberation that also aim to resist neoliberal co-optation, we found some useful con- ceptual tools generated by radical organizations. These tools provide a framework for imagining how organizations can engage in an intentional dialogue about how their tactics and structures fit into their vision of building social movements and engendering social change and, as such, are helpful for our discussion about alternatives to traditional nonprofit structures for emerging trans organizations. These tools are especially helpful in developing an analysis that emphasizes the interconnectedness of struc- ture, ideology, and strategy. As Joo-Hyun Kang (2004) pointed out, focusing solely on structure may be just as dangerous as ignoring it. Kang elaborated on this topic in her plenary speech at The Revolution Will Not Be Funded: Beyond the Non-Profit Industrial Complex Conference. After a productive conference identifying concerns about the limitations of the nonprofit 501(c)(3) structure, Kang challenged attendees to go beyond structure, to address the ideologies that drive the work we as activists do and make sure that the structures employed to carry out that work are consistent with our ideologies and values. Kang argued that as long as nonliberatory ideologies are firmly in place, challenging organizations to change their structures will do no good. We have found these tools useful in under- standing the link between organizational ideology, values, and structure. Theory of Social Change Strategic Concepts in Organizing and Policy Education (SCOPE), a Los Angeles organization, offers a tool called the Theory of Social Change Framework. SCOPE’s assumption is that all social change organizations have some analysis of problems in society, some goals for creating positive change, and some strategies for making their vision into a reality (Strategic Concepts in Organizing and Policy Education, 2004). Broken down into analysis, goals, and strategies, the Theory of Social Change Framework provides organiza- tions with a means to understand and address the root causes of the problems in their communities and with a way to discern what form of organization is needed to achieve their goals for how society should work. With this tool, SCOPE makes an important point about the interconnectedness of analysis, practical work, and form of organization. SCOPE notes that an organiza- tion’s perception of which are the most important prob- lems will determine who needs to be involved in the work. Furthermore, an organization’s primary strategies will dictate what form of organization is most effective. SCOPE’s framework helps organizations make conscious, strategic choices based on an articulated theory of change. Methods of Change: Four Pillars of Social Justice Infrastructure Drawing on previous social movements that used a variety of strategies to build community power, the Miami Workers Center developed a useful tool for understand- ing the role of various strategies in social justice work. Miami Workers Center (2004) has described what it calls the Four Pillars of Social Justice Infrastructure: the Pillar of Policy, the Pillar of Consciousness, the Pillar of Service, and the Pillar of Power. The Pillar of Policy is about work that changes policies and institutions using legislative and institutional strategies, with concrete gains and bench- marks for progress. The Pillar of Consciousness includes work that aims at shifting political paradigms and alter- ing public opinion and consciousness, such as media advo- cacy work, the creation of independent media, and public education work. The Pillar of Service encompasses work that directly serves oppressed people and helps stabilize their lives and promote their survival, including work that provides critical services. Finally, the Pillar of Power is about achieving autonomous community power through building a base and developing leadership: building mem- bership organizations with a large scale and influence (quantity) and developing the depth and capacity of grass- roots leadership (quality). The Four Pillars model is aimed at helping social justice movements understand how these very different kinds of work—which often are located in disparate orga- nizations that do not collaborate extensively and that define themselves as single strategy—are in fact inter- twined, complementary, and essential. The Four Pillars model focuses on helping movements and organizations understand that the Pillar of Power—perhaps the most neglected area in the current nonprofit industrial com- plex–dominated social justice context—is the most essen- tial for change and that the other pillars should ideally be engaged to support the Pillar of Power. This model is useful for evaluating an organization’s overall role in movement building, identifying areas of needed collaboration, and formulating a theory of change. If, for example, we acknowledge that depoliticized direct service work disconnected from the Pillar of Power is the norm as part of the shadow state, we can form ideas about SEXUALITY RESEARCH & SOCIAL POLICY March 2008 Vol. 5, No. 1 62 what direct services that support base-building and lead- ership development might look like. The Four Pillars model allows for recognition of the vital need for all four pillars: Direct services are not simply a Band-Aid, as is sometimes argued, but instead can be understood as an essential aspect to building mass power. Direct services not only allow the base of people affected to survive and polit- ically participate but also can be a road to participation if those services are provided in a politicized context where people come to understand their need for services as linked to broader political structures that affect many others like them. Similarly, media justice work aimed at changing hearts and minds is not the single key strategy for change, as is sometimes presumed by those who invest deeply in the idea that current political conditions are primarily a result of ignorance or misunderstanding on the part of vot- ers or the public. However, media work and public edu- cation are important components of increasing political awareness, changing paradigms, and building power for oppressed people. Seeing the interconnectedness of these strategies for change, as well as their role in building mass movements, allows organizations to resist the pressure of the nonprofit industrial complex to operate competitively and separately from others engaging in different strategies. This viewpoint also reminds those committed to change that the elite strategies mired in expertise, such as policy reform and work with the mainstream media, need to be engaged in service to the fundamental struggle to build power among oppressed people. Looking at social move- ment infrastructure through the Four Pillars model allows for integrating disparate, often competing strategies and offers a chance to reframe the emphasis on elite media work, policy reform, and services created by the nonprofit industrial complex. Contrasting two LGBT organizations with differ- ent theories of change and different methods for achiev- ing change may be useful here for understanding how SCOPE and the Miami Workers Center’s tools can help identify underlying assumptions in social justice work and imagine organizational structures and strategies that mirror radical redistributionist values. We chose HRC and FIERCE! (Fabulous Independent Educated Radicals for Community Empowerment) as our sample organizations because these organizations employ quite different theories and strategies for change and struc- tures of governance. HRC is the largest LGBT organization in the United States. Its best-known work focuses on federal legisla- tion — most notably the federal hate crimes law and the Employment Non-Discrimination Act (2007), which would bar employment discrimination based on sexual orientation. HRC is also known for producing public opinion polls relevant to lesbian and gay concerns; for promoting candidates who take political positions sym- pathetic to lesbian and gay rights (as HRC construes them); and for its Corporate Equality Index, which mea- sures corporations’ commitment to equal treatment for lesbian and gay employees. HRC is structured as a tra- ditional nonprofit with an elite board that rarely includes a significant proportion of people of color or low-income people and has failed to retain transgender board members. HRC’s primary work suggests that the organiza- tion’s theory of change posits that providing incentives for corporations to treat lesbian and gay employees equally, promoting candidates based on their votes on gay issues, and promoting federal legislation prohibit- ing discrimination and enhancing punishment for hate crimes targeting gays and lesbians will yield positive social change for its constituency. HRC’s traditional uses of mainstream media operate within a liberal social change framework aimed at changing the hearts and minds of Americans, hoping that increased goodwill toward lesbians and gays will result in increased support for measures focused on formal legal equality (e.g., marriage rights, rights to nondiscrimination in employ- ment). HRC’s funding comes from wealthy philan- thropists and foundations, reflecting its top-down approach to social change. FIERCE! is a community organizing group in New York City comprising trans and queer youth of color. The scope of the organization’s work is primarily local, although FIERCE! also participates in national coali- tional work. Its campaign focuses on dealing with attacks on public spaces that have served as meeting places for trans and queer youth of color in New York City’s West Village, highlighting the connections between police brutality, discrimination against youth of color in schools, and foster care, gentrification, and political marginalization. FIERCE! uses a by-and-for governance model in which the membership, composed entirely of those directly affected by the organization’s work, cogoverns the organization along with staff and board members. Building political analysis and unity within membership is a primary goal of the organization, with a central focus on the process of membership base-building and leadership development as key to long-term movement building and the struggle for power and self-determi- nation. The question of organizational structure for FIERCE! is about the maximization of the leadership SEXUALITY RESEARCH & SOCIAL POLICY March 2008 Vol. 5, No. 1 63 and power potential of the membership base. The underpinning to the organization’s structure is con- nected to the question of power. When evaluating the effectiveness of the organizational structure, FIERCE! asks the following questions: Do the structure and pro- gram maximize the leadership and power potential or more than just a handful of people? and Does the orga- nization’s structure have integrity with the community it is charged with serving?5 The organization’s theory of change centers on base- building: FIERCE! approaches social change by working to build an organization with the scale and depth to affect public policy, transform institutions, and shift cultural norms. FIERCE! focuses on building skills, political con- sciousness, and leadership among people most directly affected by oppressive systems. This bottom-up approach is reflected in its membership system, its prioritization of relationship building, and its long-term strategies for move- ment building by collaborating with other social movement sectors. The organization’s resistance to top-down strate- gies focused on elite decision-making bodies, as well as its centralization of the experiences of people facing multiple vectors of oppression, contrast sharply to HRC’s highly professionalized workforce, which remains primarily White. In contrast to the collaborative model FIERCE uses, HRC’s strategy for exercising power is primarily through narrow policy advocacy that has frequently been charged with gain- ing victories at the expense of other communities. In com- paring these two organizations, even this brief sketch can offer insight into how an organization’s understanding of power and social change influences its analysis, strategies, and structures—and, ultimately, its impact. Nonprofits differ in strategy (e.g., service provi- sion, community organizing, legal and policy advocacy, public education) and represent a wide spectrum of political ideologies (e.g., radical, liberal, conservative). Whether stated or not, all organizations have a theory of how social change happens that determines what work they deem politically viable, whom they involve in their work, and which strategies and structures they employ to carry out this work. As explained previously, an orga- nization’s ideology will drive the strategies it uses to address a problem. For example, the Black Panther Party survival programs, although technically services, were used as a way to expose the embedded racism in the U.S. government and the systemic neglect of and violence against the Black community. The services the Black Panther Party provided—such as free breakfast programs and freedom schools6—were based in a broader under- standing of the role service provision played in organized struggle for Black liberation and self-determination. Black Panther Party services, then, were aimed at build- ing the Pillar of Power, politicizing its constituency and building shared analysis. Similarly, the Young Lords Party’s hijacking of lead paint testing trucks in the 1960s and 1970s to bring them into Puerto Rican communi- ties combined survival services with political educa- tion, lodging a critique of state health programs and their neglect of Puerto Rican communities. These two organizations’ ability to provide politicized survival services outside of a nonprofit context offer a lens through which to critique the shift toward depoliticized social service provision and the reduction of direct orga- nizing work in the context of the nonprofit industrial complex. The Sylvia Rivera Law Project: A Model for Collective Resistance Despite the fact that the development of the nonprofit industrial complex has led to reduced radical potential and adoption of many conservative practices within social move- ments, the need for movement organizations to create infrastructure for long-term sustainable change remains. Social justice organizations provide key places for leader- ship development, provision of survival services, political development, network building, and sustained campaigns for change. Can the nonprofit model be engaged critically and used to pursue radical social change? Luckily for the emerging institutionalization of transgender justice work, there are excellent models for building social justice orga- nizations that resist many of the aforementioned problem- atic trends. The Sylvia Rivera Law Project (SRLP) is a trans organization that has researched and used existing models of collective governance and antiracist organizational devel- opment that may be useful to people who are working to build accountable, radical social justice organizations focused on trans liberation. We offer SRLP’s model as an entry point for imagining the institutionalization of trans resistance outside of the limited frameworks provided by gay and lesbian nonprofits. SRLP’s Origins Part of what is interesting about SRLP is the story of its founding and transition from a traditionally 6 These schools featured a progressive, experiential cur- riculum that emphasized student-centered teaching and learning by doing with the goal of empowering Blacks to become active citizens and agents of social change. 5 This information is based on Rickke Mananzala’s direct knowledge of the workings of FIERCE!, for which he serves as codirector. SEXUALITY RESEARCH & SOCIAL POLICY March 2008 Vol. 5, No. 1 64 structured nonprofit endeavor to a radical multiracial collective. SRLP was founded by the second author, a White trans 24-year-old a year out of law school in 2002. Dean started SRLP with legal fellowship funding, a type of 1-to 2-year grant available to law graduates starting innovative projects at existing organizations. Dean’s project was hosted within a large, traditionally structured poverty law organization, the Urban Justice Center, where Dean paid overhead expenses in exchange for office space and fiscal sponsorship. The project was based on the recognition that no organizations were providing free legal help to transgender, intersex, and gender-nonconforming communities, who were facing extreme discrimination in gaining access to identifica- tion and basic services, such as welfare, shelters, foster care, and health care. Dean’s idea was to build a project that would pro- vide free legal help, train others who should be provid- ing services but did not have the basic competency on trans issues to do a good job, work to change policies, and engage in litigation. The underlying philosophy, which remains a key element in SRLP’s mission and vision, was that trans communities cannot build political power and take up leadership in the variety of movements that con- cern us if we are not surviving. Providing survival ser- vices in a by-and-for environment based on social justice rather than on charity and focused on building political change can be transformational to a highly marginalized population. As soon as SRLP opened, it was flooded with calls for help, as well as with community members eager to support the work. The outpouring of energy toward the project was significant and overwhelming. Dean began working with other community members, as well as people who knew about organizational development, to think about a model for building an independent orga- nization that could expand its capacity to use volunteer energy and serve more people with few financial resources. He wanted to break away from the Urban Justice Center — an organization with a typical hierar- chical structure and pay scale, in which White people occupied most positions of leadership, and that had unaddressed internal dynamics of oppression—and cre- ate a fully trans organization governed in some way that would resist the typical race, gender, and class dynamics of poverty-law organizations. The initial SRLP steering committee researched col- lectively run organizations—primarily women of color organizations, such as Sista II Sista in New York, Manavi in New Jersey, and the Asian Women’s Shelter in San Francisco, as well as the May First Technology Collective in New York. Steering committee members read the inter- nal structure documents of these organizations, inter- viewed their members, and supplemented this information with various labor best practices guides to draft SRLP’s Collective Handbook and Employee Handbook. The Collective Handbook outlines SRLP’s structure, criteria for collective membership, grievance policies, decision- making structures and other key features. The Employee Handbook focuses on issues of compensation, benefits, administrative procedures, and other areas specific to employees. SRLP’s Mission and Goals Because of our focus on this model, it is worth quoting SRLP’s articulated mission and goals from the organization’s literature. SRLP’s mission statement reads: The Sylvia Rivera Law Project (SRLP) works to guarantee that all people are free to self-determine their gender identity and expression, regardless of income or race, and without facing harassment, discrimination, or violence. SRLP is a collective organization founded on the understanding that gender self-determination is inextricably inter- twined with racial, social, and economic justice. Therefore, we seek to increase the political voice and visibility of low-income people of color who are transgender, intersex, or gender non-conforming. SRLP works to improve access to respectful and affirming social, health, and legal services for our communities. We believe that in order to create meaningful political participation and leadership, we must have access to basic means of survival and safety from violence. (Sylvia Rivera Law Project [SRLP], n.d.a) SRLP’s written organizational goals are as follows: 1. To provide access to free, quality, respectful, affirming legal services for low-income trans- gender, intersex, and gender non-conforming people. 2. To use training, public education, policy reform, and precedent-setting lawsuits to end state sanc- tioned and institutional discrimination, violence, and coercion on the basis of gender identity and expression, which we understand as inextricably related to race and class. 3. To build a non-hierarchical collective organization that internally practices what we’re struggling for by developing the leadership of low-income trans- gender, intersex, and gender non-conforming people of color. SEXUALITY RESEARCH & SOCIAL POLICY March 2008 Vol. 5, No. 1 65 4. To participate in the larger movement for racial, social, and economic justice that includes gender liberation and prioritizes the issues of those most affected by the systems of oppression under which we live. (SRLP, n.d.b) SRLP’s Structure SRLP operates on a collective governance model designed to maximize the use of community volunteer support, build skills and analysis among community mem- bers, centralize leadership of trans people of color and low- income people, and prioritize the needs of those most vulnerable to state violence. SRLP’s structure comprises six equally important teams: The Direct Services Team runs the legal clinic, makes determinations about how to take and handle cases, and advocates for policy reform within institutions that affect the community; the Public Education Team deals with trainings, web resources, media, and publications; the Fundraising and Finance Team raises money and administers financial systems; the Collective Development Team recruits staff and collective members and is responsible for SRLP’s internal anti- oppression work; the Organizing Support Team links SRLP’s work to other community-based organizations and connects clients to opportunities for organizing on issues that affect them; and the SRLP Board is charged with oversight of the legal, ethical, and moral responsi- bilities of the organization and its financial health. Many people imagine that working collectively means making every decision in a big meeting with everyone present and assume that it is less efficient than doing work in hierarchal structures. SRLP’s structure maximizes efficiency by using teams and committees to delegate decision-making and implementation powers to small groups and individuals while employing annual work plans and other accountability measures to make sure that the broad strokes of programming are approved by the entire organization. Once a year, all of SRLP’s teams come together at a retreat to present their work plans for the coming year, including time lines and detailed information about specific projects and priori- ties. Organization members then discuss these plans and approve them, with changes. Then, 6 months later, at SRLP’s second annual retreat, members check in on project progress, changes, and any unexpected events. With this method, everyone always knows what is going on and has opportunities to raise concerns, generate discussion about priorities, and build collaborations. Because the teams are authorized to do the work and implement these decisions as they see fit, this collective process is also efficient. The cause of efficiency is served, too, by the consen- sus basis of the decision-making structure. All of SRLP’s meetings use consensus decision making, a process that works as follows: Once someone makes a proposal, the proposal is discussed and clarified, then concerns are raised and changes made to address them; approval occurs when all concerns have been alleviated (Butler & Rothstein, 2005). Any member can block a decision or stand aside, so no one is assigned a task that she or he did not have a role in discussing and approving. Unlike tra- ditional nonprofits, in which decision making occurs from the top down and the direction of the organization or its specific programming is rarely decided by the workers carrying it out, in SRLP everyone doing the work helps shape that work. This practice maximizes efficiency because workers are invested in their projects, empowered to spot problems and concerns and bring them to the group to be addressed, and never forced to implement pro- grams or strategies with which they disagree. The invest- ment in a collective decision-making process pays off both in the increased leadership abilities of all participating individuals and in their increased drive to implement the organization’s mission and programs. Each SRLP team comprises at least one staff mem- ber (all staff members are also collective members) in addition to other collective members. Community mem- bers become collective members through a nomination process in which they commit at least 15 hours of work per month for a year. The Collective Development Team deter- mines their appropriateness for the collective and their placement on a team. The Collective Development Team is charged with recruiting members in a way that main- tains SRLP’s goals of being governed by 50%-plus-1 peo- p l e o f c o l o r a n d 5 0 % - p l u s - 1 t r a n s , i n t e r s e x , a n d gender-nonconforming individuals. Besides the staff in general, the makeup of each team also reflects these goals, so that every decision-making body in the organization is majority people of color and majority trans, intersex, or gender nonconforming. These goals were put into place with the initiation of the collective structure in July 2003— although it took until 2006 for the staff makeup to reflect these goals. In 2007, at this writing, the staff is 86% peo- ple of color and 86% trans, intersex, or gender noncon- forming (i.e., the organization currently has one White person on staff, as well as one nontrans, intersex, or gender-nonconforming person on staff). At the 2007 win- ter retreat, the organization discussed changing the goal of having 50%-plus-1 people of color on staff to, perhaps, 80% to reflect the fact that the current makeup of the collective and its constitutive bodies feels ideal to many members. SEXUALITY RESEARCH & SOCIAL POLICY March 2008 Vol. 5, No. 1 66 The processes SRLP uses, from its team structure to its retreats and consensus-based decision making, are designed to prevent the concentration of power in a small group of individuals. So far, in the organization’s first 5 years, this method has been successful, with a steady low level of staff and collective member turnover that allows both continuity in the work and shifting perspectives and leadership opportunities. SRLP’s Racial Justice Initiative In 2004, a proposal emerged in the collective to cre- ate a racial justice initiative that would bring more resources to SRLP’s internal anti-oppression work. The proposal suggested hiring long-term (1 – 2 years) consultants to work with SRLP to build its capacity for organizational development in terms of racial justice. The process entailed doing shared political analysis about sys- temic and individual racism among members, as well as developing a White caucus and a people of color caucus that would meet on an ongoing basis. This work was vitally necessary to SRLP’s development as a multiracial organization. Although at that time the organization already had a majority of people of color in the collective, it was nonetheless an organization founded by a White lawyer with White cultural norms operating in many areas and precipitating racist dynamics between members. SRLP recognized that without developing the capacity of the organization and the individuals in it to recognize White cultural norms, to address racism between mem- bers, and to assess racist dynamics in the institutions the organization targeted for change, the organization could not take the next steps toward making its anti-oppression goals meaningful. As a result of this initiative, SRLP devoted its spring 2005 retreat to working with its new consultants, Dismantling Racism. That weekend, and at retreats that followed, collective members engaged in exercises that focused on building understanding of the nature of racism, assessing SRLP’s antiracist organizational development so far, identifying areas for improvement, developing a shared language and skills for discussing racism in the organization, and building White and people of color cau- cuses in which to do specific antiracism work. The process not only was transformational for the organization and its individual members but also became a key support in the organizational developments that followed. One element that this work supported was the founder transition process that SRLP began in 2004. From the beginning, Dean had identified that he did not want to be the kind of nonprofit founder who stays in an organization forever. Founders often end up possessing a great deal of power in an organization because of their his- tory and role and relationships with funders, and their con- tinued presence can often restrict the leadership of others. Dean recognized that most poverty-law organizations he knew of had White male founders who retained power, prevented meaningful community governance, slowed progress of antiracist organizational development, and contributed to the cult of personality dynamic in social jus- tice arenas in which individuals, rather than groups, are credited with the work of community organizations. For these reasons and others, Dean continued to discuss his eventual departure from a staff role at SRLP. For 2 years, the organization worked on this transition, bringing in new staff and transferring skills and duties so that the people taking on Dean’s work would be adequately prepared and allow Dean to move to a new, unpaid support role in the organization. This process was difficult, in part because of entrenched racist dynamics within and outside SRLP that centralized the leadership of a White lawyer in the orga- nization. The processes and skills provided by SRLP’s Racial Justice Initiative supported the transition and provided language for creating priorities and strategies that would benefit the leadership of people of color in SRLP. In August 2006, Dean left the SRLP staff, which had grown to seven, and took up a supportive role on the Fundraising and Finance Team. SRLP’s Funding SRLP’s approach to fund-raising reflects its political commitment to challenging the ways in which traditional nonprofit structures can lead social justice organizations to reflect conservative values in their practices. SRLP is deeply committed to grassroots fund-raising, believing that a large donor base of community members and allies is a more sustainable approach to movement building than receiving support primarily or exclusively from a few foundations and wealthy individuals. Raising money from the organization’s constituency and its allies makes the work more accountable to that constituency and helps ensure that the mission and program will not shift in response to wealthy philanthropists’ visions. SRLP puts significant staff and collective time into creating sliding- scale or free community events that raise money and using mass mailings that simultaneously solicit donations and share information about issues facing SRLP’s con- stituency. The push toward using sustainable grassroots fund-raising is a gradual one for SRLP, which depends on a combination of law fellowships, foundation grants, major donors, and small donations. The highest percentage of the annual budget that SRLP has ever garnered through grassroots fund-raising is 30%. SRLP is committed to a SEXUALITY RESEARCH & SOCIAL POLICY March 2008 Vol. 5, No. 1 67 long-term process of developing sustainable fund-raising strategies while continuing its program work. SRLP is also committed to intervening in the dynam- ics that occur within foundation fund-raising, which has been a challenge for SRLP for several reasons. First, many foundations that focus on LGBT issues have responded to SRLP’s requests for support by questioning the necessity of trans-specific groups when LGBT organizations exist. These same funders have also questioned SRLP’s priori- tization of direct services work and reform of institutions centrally affecting low-income people. SRLP has had to develop relationships with these funders—who are used to viewing social change on queer and trans issues through the lens of the strategies of the most well-funded (so- called successful) gay rights organizations—to demon- strate the need for work focusing on trans survival and the gaps in this work that exist in gay rights. SRLP has also worked to form mutually supportive, rather than competitive, relationships with allied groups focused on LGBT people of color, sharing ideas about grants to apply for and being careful not to compete for grants that are more appropriate for other groups that are even less recognized by funders who do not value base- building organizing and would rather see lawsuits and hate crimes legislation. Approaching foundation fund- raising with a critical eye, recognizing its necessity but also its shortcomings, has been key to strategizing about engag- ing with this source of funding. Overall, SRLP’s reliance on volunteer labor, its avoidance of inflated wages for people with professional degrees (everyone at SRLP makes the same wage, regardless of education), and its focus on grassroots fund-raising are aimed at creating an organi- zation that is sustainable even if foundation funding becomes unavailable or the number of staff positions has to be reduced. Being Visionary: Long-Term and Short-Term Strategies As SRLP has grown and demand for its services and work has continued to expand with its reputation, the teams and the collective as a whole have continually had to face questions about priorities and determinations of which kinds of work, particularly institutional reform work, fit within the organization’s vision and should be pursued. These questions are complex, especially when using legal strategies (which are traditionally reformist) but attempting to manifest radical politics. SRLP explic- itly aims to build power in its constituency to achieve major transformations, not to shore up existing relations of power through meaningless formal legitimizing reforms. Recently, several teams of the collective have been working together to create a goals and strategies document that will help articulate the politics of short-term and long-term strategies for change. The process of producing, amending, and editing this document serves several pur- poses: (a) strengthening political unity and building shared political analysis in the collective through disagreement and conflict, (b) creating clarifying guidance for the work so that each team can implement the mission more fully, (c) building a vision that can be shared with political allies and channeled into public education strategies, and (d) deepening relationships between teams and among col- lective members. The Direct Services Team, especially, has articulated that having a document that provides an over- arching vision and a range of potential strategies will help people with legal intervention skills recognize when other approaches are more appropriate and ask for help from other teams. Since many of the issues and problems SRLP works on come in through clients who first interact directly with the Direct Services Team, and that team has the most experience dealing with issues through legal help, it is important to create guidance for them in assessing when other strategies can be used so that they can alert other teams. This approach is an important part of implement- ing SRLP’s commitment to employ multiple strategies, using all the Pillars rather than just the Pillar of Service to address community members’ concerns. The focus of the goals and strategies document is to look at SRLP’s areas of intervention, such as foster care, prisons, homelessness, or health care access, enumerat- ing within each issue the true end goal, the alternative vision for how that issue or system could work, the short- term goals for change, the interventions SRLP has already undertaken, potential strategies, potential targets, and potential allies. An example may be useful here. The Homeless Shelter System section of SRLP’s current draft of the goals and strategies document identifies the true end goal of SRLP’s work on homeless shelters as “[a]ccess to free or affordable permanent housing for all people.”7 The document states SRLP’s alternative vision for this issue as follows: Housing is a fundamental basic necessity, and should be a basic right of all people, not mediated by the quest for profit. There is enough housing and resources for everyone to be safely housed, and it should be redistributed so that we all are. Subsequently, the document lays out short-term goals, such as increasing legal help for trans, intersex, and gender-nonconforming people in housing court to 7 Document on file with the authors. SEXUALITY RESEARCH & SOCIAL POLICY March 2008 Vol. 5, No. 1 68 prevent evictions and thus reduce homelessness. Another short-term goal the document sets forth is the creation and enforcement of policies that prevent trans women from being placed in men’s homeless shelters. Underneath each short-term goal is a list of strategies that could be or have been used to achieve that goal. Central to SRLP’s mission are the organization’s ongoing efforts to resist relying solely on short-term strategies of social change and to recognize the limits of legal reform while balancing the necessity for law and policy changes that can help trans, intersex, and gender- nonconforming people survive. SRLP recognizes that this process must continually unfold, that its work will be imperfect, that its members will have blind spots, and that each area of its program, like all aspects of anti- oppression, is not about arriving but instead about engaging in a process with integrity, reflection, and openness to change. The desire to explicitly state long- term visions is aimed at preventing the common nonprofit trend toward choosing short-term strategies in the name of political viability without regard to long- term vision. Ongoing Challenges Several areas within SRLP’s structure present con- tinuing challenges that the collective consistently discusses and revisits. One such area is leadership devel- opment. Developing the members’ capacity to become leaders (i.e., helping people deepen their political anal- ysis and gain new skills, such as public speaking, writ- ing, time management, and follow-through, as well as helping collective members move into staff roles) is an ongoing process. As an organization with an enormous workload that takes on significant issues with very few resources, ensuring that members have the time neces- sary to train others, shadow one another, and develop needed skills before being pushed into a new experi- ence is difficult. The collective has continuously improved in this area, but conflicting pressures make it difficult to meet all the demands. SRLP has also struggled with addressing issues of ableism and gender balance. Because its last few years have centralized a focus on antiracist organizational develop- ment, some collective members have felt that addressing the underrepresentation of people with disabilities in the collective, and the underrepresentation of transwomen in the collective, has not been given the attention it deserves. The collective has had several focused conversations specifically about gender balance and recruitment, and transwomen have become a larger part of the membership over time, but ongoing work is required to address the many effects that sexism and divisions between trans masculine and trans feminine communities have on cre- ating a multiracial, multigender organization. Ongoing discussion about recruitment, accessibility of collective events, cultural norms within collective space, and the role of allies in social change work is moving these issues forward in the collective. Overall, SRLP works to remain a space for chal- lenging oppression both within the organization and outside, as well as to engage in a process of collectiviz- ing governance and building accountability to the com- munities it serves. SRLP recognizes these as long-term processes rather than points of arrival and aims to cre- ate an environment that welcomes those challenges and adjusts to meet those goals despite a conservative cli- mate that erases radical social justice values. Aware of the incentives the nonprofit industrial complex pro- vides for centralizing power in the hands of elites and choosing short-term gains over radical social change, SRLP aims to create structures that counter those ten- dencies. Recognizing the important connection between a social movement organization’s mission, vision, ide- ology, and structure, SRLP strives to put its money where its mouth is. Conclusion SRLP’s model may be useful for existing and emerg- ing trans organizations not only because of its organiza- tional structure but also due to what it suggests about the possibility of trans political organization. Despite the fact that SRLP is a new organization with only 5 years of expe- rience to recommend its approach, we believe that its innovative use of older existing models of antiracist and feminist governance, communication, and prioritization have much to contribute to trans politics. In the politically trying times in which we live, radical departures from conservative norms are the most difficult and the most necessary. To build trans liberation organizations or a trans movement that does not meaningfully resist capi- talism and racism or, worse yet, is co-opted to become an arm of racist and capitalist state building, is unsustainable, unjust, and inexcusable. In all social justice work, we cannot know the out- comes of all of our actions and we must assume that we have blind spots that will be pointed out by people who are still being excluded, or by dynamics that have not yet emerged. However, feminist and antiracist movements have produced enough critical analyses of the nonprofit industrial complex and neoliberal co-optation to provide a good sense that modeling trans organizations, strategies, and visions on the existing well-resourced lesbian and SEXUALITY RESEARCH & SOCIAL POLICY March 2008 Vol. 5, No. 1 69 gay rights organizations, although potentially rewarding some trans activists in the short term, is not a just or politically savvy approach to saving the lives of trans people, building trans leadership in social justice, and creating a radically different world without gender coer- cion, racism, patriarchy, or exploitation. Calls for coalition and collaboration to build bridges to people of color and immigrant movements are essential for existing trans organizations, but we must also examine the structures of our organizations and recognize the deeply rooted racism and hierarchy that are produced within traditional non- profit structures. Luckily, we can benefit from well- developed alternative models. Nonprofits remain the site of much social justice work and they can be places of opportunity to provide key survival services, develop critical leadership, reform insti- tutions that are killing our communities, and cultivate a mass movement base. At the same time, we must remain critically aware of the contradictions inherent in using the nonprofit structure to build power for oppressed peo- ple. We must remember that our services operate as a shadow state, quelling resistance, and that foundations operate as stored, stolen wealth, often keeping the lid on social justice and rewarding reformist projects, while the state criminalizes radical redistributionist political orga- nizations (Rodriguez, 2007). Nonprofits alone cannot address the maldistribu- tion of resources under neoliberalism. We need a broader social movement with forms of autonomous community organization outside the nonprofit struc- ture. We need a progressive infrastructure that includes, but is not limited to, nonprofits that see their interests tied up in the dismantling of the ever-changing neolib- eral project by developing democratic organizations. As Ruth Gilmore stated in her 2004 speech at The Revolution Will Not Be Funded Conference in Santa Barbara, California, we need to “not just fight the power, get the power” meaning that we need to be both vision- ary and rigorous, willing to hear critiques and engage an ongoing, ever-unfolding process of movement devel- opment that refuses to compromise portions of our vision or sectors of our community in exchange for a reduced vision of freedom. These are high demands, but if we did not think they were possible, none of this work would be worth trying. 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Yeung (Eds.), Remaking the global economy: Economic-geographical perspectives (pp. 163–181). London: Sage. Retrieved March 29, 2007, from http://www.lboro.ac.uk/gawc/rb/rb102.html Vaid, U. (1996). Virtual equality: The mainstreaming of gay and lesbian liberation. New York: Random House. Valentine, D. (2007). Imagining transgender: An ethnog- raphy of a category. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Xavier, J. (2000). The Washington Transgender Needs Assessment Survey. Retrieved October 25, 2007, from http://www.glaa.org/archive/2000/ tgneedsassessment1112.shtml http://www.srlp.org/documents/NPREC_testimony_Spade.pdf http://www.srlp.org/index.php?sec=01A&page=about http://www.srlp.org/index.php?sec=01A&page=goals http://www.lboro.ac.uk/gawc/rb/rb102.html http://www.glaa.org/archive/2000/tgneedsassessment1112.shtml 
work_kd6orkqilbc2tdubtgag3ueamm	----	1 Hate Crimes and Stigma-Related Experiences Among Sexual Minority Adults in the United States: Prevalence Estimates from a National Probability Sample Gregory M. Herek Department of Psychology, University of California, Davis This is a preprint of a paper that has been accepted for publication in the Journal of Interpersonal Violence. Minor changes to the paper may be made in the course of copy editing. Abstract* Using survey responses collected via the Internet from a U.S. national probability sample of gay, lesbian, and bisexual adults (N = 662), this article reports prevalence estimates of criminal victimization and related experiences based on the target’s sexual orientation. Approximately 20% of respondents reported having experienced a person crime or property crime based on their sexual orientation, about half had experienced verbal harassment, and more than one in ten reported having experienced employment or housing discrimination. Gay men were significantly more likely than lesbians or bisexuals to experience violence or property crimes, as well as harassment and verbal abuse. Employment and housing discrimination were significantly more likely among gay men and lesbians than among bisexual men and women. Implications for future research and policy are discussed. In 1989, the National Institute of Mental Health convened an expert panel on antigay violence to review existing knowledge and identify research needs. The panel named collection of prevalence data as a top research priority and urged that such data be obtained from probability samples AUTHOR NOTE. Data collection for this project was supported by a grant from the Gill Foundation. The author thanks Aaron Norton, Thomas Allen, and Charles Sims for their assistance. Address correspondence to Gregory Herek, Psychology Department, University of California, Davis, CA 95616. when possible (Herek & Berrill, 1990). Since then, data collected by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (e.g., Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2005), the National Crime Victimization Survey (Harlow, 2005), and the National Coalition of Anti-Violence Programs (e.g., National Coalition of Anti-Violence Programs, 2005) have shown that criminal enactments of sexual stigma are widespread (Herek & Sims, 2007). However, prevalence data on criminal victimization among lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals are still fragmentary and derived almost entirely from convenience samples. Berrill (1992) compiled data from 24 published and unpublished studies conducted between 1977 and 1991 by academic researchers and community-based organizations, all but one of them using convenience samples of gay men, lesbians, and bisexuals. Across studies, a median of 9% of respondents reported having been the target of an aggravated assault (i.e., assault with a weapon) because of their sexual orientation; 17% reported simple physical assault (i.e., without a weapon); 19% reported vandalism of their personal property; 44% had been threatened with violence; 33% had been chased or followed; 25% reported having objects thrown at them; 13% had been spat upon; and 80% had been verbally harassed (Berrill, 1992). Most of the studies did not report data separately by respondents’ gender or sexual orientation. More recently, in a study of 2,259 lesbian, gay, and bisexual adults in the greater Sacramento (CA) area, 28% of gay men, 19% of lesbians, 27% of bisexual men, and 15% of bisexual women reported having experienced some type 2 of criminal victimization since age 16 because of their sexual orientation (ns = 898, 980, 191, and 190, respectively; Herek, Gillis, & Cogan, 1999). This includes respondents who reported experiencing a simple or aggravated assault (13% of gay men, 7% of lesbians, 11% of bisexual men, and 5% of bisexual women) or a sexual assault based on their sexual orientation (4% of gay men, 3% of lesbians, 7% of bisexual men, and 4% of bisexual women). Other research has focused on particular age groups in sexual minority communities. In a sample of 1,248 young gay and bisexual men (M = 23 years, range = 18-27 years) recruited in three southwestern U.S. cities, 5% reported they had experienced physical violence because of their sexual orientation during the previous 6 months (Huebner, Rebchook, & Kegeles, 2004). In a sample of 194 lesbian, gay, and bisexual youths (age range = 15-21 yrs) recruited from service agencies across the United States, 9% reported at least one aggravated assault based on their sexual orientation, 18% had experienced a simple assault, 22% had been sexually assaulted, and 44% had been threatened with attack (Pilkington & D’Augelli, 1995). In a study of sexual minority youths recruited through community-based organizations in New York City and its suburbs, D’Augelli and his colleagues found that 11% reported physical violence based on their sexual orientation, 9% reported sexual violence, and 78% reported verbal threats or harassment (D’Augelli, Grossman, & Starks, 2006). At the other end of the age continuum, D’Augelli and Grossman (2001) documented the lifetime occurrence of hate crime victimization among older (> 59 years) lesbian, gay, and bisexual adults recruited from across the United States (n = 416). In that sample, 16% had been physically attacked at some time in their life, 7% had been sexually assaulted, 11% reported having had objects thrown at them, and 29% had been threatened with violence. It is difficult to use these studies to derive an estimate of the population prevalence of hate crime victimization against US sexual minorities because of variations in how they categorized crimes, the time frames within which they assessed victimization, and how they reported their data (e.g., some studies reported findings separately for men and women, or homosexuals and bisexuals, whereas others did not). Moreover, because nearly all of the surveys used convenience samples, the extent to which their results describe the entire U.S. gay, lesbian, and bisexual population cannot be determined. Prevalence data collected in three studies with probability samples further confirm that hate crime victimization is widespread. In a 1989 San Francisco Examiner national telephone survey, 5% of gay men (n = 287) and 10% of lesbians (n = 113) reported having been physically abused or assaulted in the previous year because they were gay (Results of Poll, 1989).* In a 2000 Kaiser Family Foundation (KFF) survey of 405 lesbian, gay, and bisexual adults residing in major US population centers, 32% of respondents said they had been targeted for violence against their person or property because of their sexual orientation (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2001). In a probability sample of 912 Latino men who have sex with men, recruited from social venues in New York, Miami, and Los Angeles, 10% reported they had experienced violence as an adult because of their sexual orientation or femininity (Díaz, Ayala, Bein, Henne, & Marín, 2001). These pioneering surveys yielded valuable data but are nevertheless limited in the generalizability of their findings. Neither the San Francisco Examiner poll nor the KFF poll were published in a peer-reviewed journal. Few published details are available about the methodology of the Examiner survey, making it particularly difficult to evaluate. The KFF poll sampled respondents only in 15 US cities, which may limit its generalizability, and the survey of Latino men focused on specific venues in only 3 cities. The present paper addresses a gap in current knowledge by reporting data on the prevalence of antigay violence and related experiences in a national probability sample of sexual minority * This is the one study cited by Berrill (1992) that was based on a probability sample. 3 adults. Violence against individuals because of their presumed sexual orientation is conceptualized here as a manifestation of sexual stigma, that is, society’s negative regard for any nonheterosexual behavior, identity, relationship, or community (Herek, 2004, 2008). Sexual stigma is a cultural belief system through which homosexuality is denigrated, discredited, and socially constructed as invalid relative to heterosexuality (Herek, 2008; Herek, Chopp, & Strohl, 2007). As with other forms of stigma, sexual stigma is expressed through society’s institutions (e.g., through discriminatory laws and policies) and by its individual members. Individual enactments of stigma can range from personal ostracism to criminal attacks against people perceived to be homosexual or bisexual. Sexual stigma has important consequences for sexual minority individuals. Whereas being the target of any violent crime can have negative psychological effects, victims of antigay violence are at heightened risk for psychological distress (Herek et al., 1999; Mills et al., 2004; see also McDevitt, Balboni, Garcia, & Gu, 2001). Hate crimes may have especially negative psychological sequelae because they attack a core aspect of the victim’s personal identity and community membership, components of the self that are particularly important to sexual minority individuals because of the stresses created by sexual stigma (Garnets, Herek, & Levy, 1990; Herek et al., 1999, 2007). In addition to stigma’s direct effects, sexual minority individuals’ awareness of its extent and their expectancies about when it will be enacted create a subjective sense of threat. This felt stigma (e.g., Scambler & Hopkins, 1986) can motivate them to engage in a variety of proactive behaviors aimed at shielding themselves from enacted stigma. Such strategies (e.g., concealing their sexual orientation) can protect them from directly experiencing enacted stigma but also restrict their opportunities for having normal social interaction and receiving social support (Herek, 2008). The present study assessed the prevalence of eight forms of enacted stigma and three aspects of felt stigma in a national probability sample of sexual minority individuals. The sample consisted of self-identified lesbian, gay, and bisexual adults randomly selected from an existing panel of more than 40,000 US households. Panel members were recruited by Knowledge Networks (KN) using random-digit dialing (RDD) methods. Upon joining the panel, respondents agreed to participate regularly in on-line surveys, and were provided with free Internet access and equipment if they did not already have it. Thus, in contrast to Internet studies with volunteer samples recruited via the Web, the KN panel includes individuals who would not otherwise have Internet access because of their financial or social situation. Reflecting this fact, KN samples are demographically similar to other RDD samples and more closely match the US population than do other Internet samples (Krosnick & Chang, 2001). Samples drawn from the KN panel have been used extensively in academic and government research (Knowledge Networks, 2007). Method Sample and Procedure Members of the KN panel routinely answer a battery of background questions, including an item about their sexual orientation. Using these data, a sample was drawn of 902 English- speaking adults (> 18 years) who had previously responded affirmatively to the question, “Are you yourself gay, lesbian, or bisexual?” Following standard KN procedures, they each received an e-mail invitation to complete the questionnaire at their convenience. A follow-up e-mail was sent to nonresponders after approximately one week. Neither invitation mentioned sexual orientation. As with all KN surveys, panel members were free to decline to participate. A total of 775 individuals (86%) accessed the questionnaire between September 13 and October 7, 2005. In response to a screening question at the beginning of the survey, 56 indicated they were heterosexual. They were thanked for their assistance and their survey was terminated. This left 719 self-identified lesbian, gay, and bisexual respondents who completed the questionnaire. Within that group, 56 4 households were represented by multiple respondents. In these cases, one respondent was randomly selected from the household for inclusion in the data set, yielding a final sample of 662. Taking into account all attrition that has occurred in the KN panel since the earliest stage of RDD recruitment, the response rate for the present study was 30% (American Association for Public Opinion Research, 2006 [Formula 3]). This is a relatively high rate for contemporary commercial surveys (Holbrook, Krosnick, & Pfent, 2008). Measures The present data are based on a subset of questions from a larger questionnaire. Only the relevant variables are discussed here. Enacted Stigma Eight questions were posed about how often respondents had experienced different forms of enacted stigma since age 18 because someone perceived them to be lesbian or bisexual (female respondents) or gay or bisexual (male respondents). The response options were never, once, twice, and three or more times. The questions assessed experiences of enacted stigma within three general categories: criminal victimization, harassment and threats, and discrimination. To assess criminal victimization, respondents were asked how often they had experienced a crime against their person (“You were hit, beaten, physically attacked, or sexually assaulted”) or property (“You were robbed, or your property was stolen, vandalized, or purposely damaged”) or an attempted crime (“Someone tried to attack you, rob you, or damage your property, but they didn’t succeed”) based on their sexual orientation. To assess harassment and threats, respondents were asked about their experiences with antigay threats (“Someone threatened you with violence”) and harassment (“Someone verbally insulted or abused you” and “Someone threw an object at you”). To assess discrimination, respondents were asked about their experiences with sexual orientation discrimination in employment (“You were fired from your job or denied a job or promotion”) and housing (“You were prevented from moving into a house or apartment by a landlord or realtor”). Felt Stigma Felt stigma was assessed with three statements, each accompanied by a 5-point Likert-type response scale ranging from strongly agree to strongly disagree. Utilizing Web software capabilities, the item wording was customized by inserting respondents’ preferred term for characterizing their own sexual orientation (gay, lesbian, bisexual, queer, etc.); each respondent had selected this term earlier in the questionnaire. The three statements (as worded for respondents who indicated gay was their preferred self-identifying term) were (1) “Most people where I live think less of a person who is gay.” (2) “Most employers where I live will hire openly gay people if they are qualified for the job.” (3) “Most people where I live would not want someone who is openly gay to take care of their children.” Demographic Data The survey included a question about the respondent’s specific sexual orientation (bisexual or homosexual). Other demographic data – including respondents’ gender, age, race and ethnicity, and highest educational level completed – had been collected previously by Knowledge Networks. Weighting Because the KN panel was recruited using RDD methods, the initial sample design yielded a simple random sample with equal probability of selection for all US households with a telephone. However, the actual probability of selection for individual respondents was affected by multiple factors (e.g., differences in household size and the number of telephone lines in a single household). Following standard procedures for RDD samples (e.g., Kish, 1965), design weights were calculated and assigned to each case to adjust for unequal probability of selection.* * Design weights were computed to account for the following: (a) variations among respondents in the number of adults in the household; (b) variations in 5 Because the use of weighted data necessitates special analytic procedures to correct standard errors (Lee & Forthofer, 2006), analyses were conducted using statistical software packages that permit such correction (STATA and SPSS Complex Samples). Results Sample Characteristics The final sample consisted of 311 women (152 lesbians, 159 bisexuals) and 351 men (241 gay men, 110 bisexuals). When design weights were applied, the weighted sample was 14.6% lesbian (95% Confidence Interval [CI] = 11.6% - 18.2%), 34.8% gay male (CI = 28.9% - 41.2%), 23.7% bisexual female (CI = 18.8% - 29.3%), and 26.9% bisexual male (CI = 19.1% - 36.4%). Unless otherwise indicated, the weighted data are used hereafter. The respondents’ mean age was 39 years (CI = 37.2 - 40.8). Gay men were significantly older (M = 45.3) than lesbians (M = 40.1), bisexual men (M = 36.6), and bisexual women (M = 31.8 years). In addition, lesbians were significantly older than bisexual women (for all statistically significant differences reported here, p < .05). The sample was 65.4% non-Hispanic White, 15.6% non-Hispanic Black, and 12.5% Hispanic, with the remaining 6.5% from other races or of mixed race or ethnicity. Compared to lesbians and bisexual women, significantly fewer bisexual men were non-Hispanic White (43.0%, compared to 74.4% of lesbians and 77.5% of bisexual women). Bisexual men were also substantially less likely than gay men (70.5%) to be non-Hispanic White but the the number of telephone lines in the household; (c) undersampling of telephone numbers for which matching addresses could not be obtained; (d) oversampling of Black and Hispanic populations; (e) oversampling of households with personal computers and Internet access; (f) undersampling of households in areas not covered by MSN Web TV; (g) slight overrepresentation of Chicago and Los Angeles, cities where early pilot testing for the panel was conducted; (h) oversampling of the 4 most populous states (CA, NY, FL, TX) and Central regional states early in the life of the panel. difference was not statistically significant. Bisexual men were more likely than other respondents to be Hispanic (20.6%) or non- Hispanic Black (28.6%), but the differences were not statistically significant. Most respondents had earned a bachelor’s degree (32.9%) or attended some college (31.4%). Only 7.3% did not have a high school diploma or equivalent. Compared to gay men and lesbians, bisexual men were significantly less likely to have a bachelor’s degree: 15.9% of bisexual men had a degree, compared to 46.4% of gay men and 40.9% of lesbians. A more detailed demographic description of the sample will be reported elsewhere. Experiences With Enacted Stigma Table 1 reports response frequencies and 95% confidence intervals (CIs) for each question about enacted stigma for the four sexual orientation groups. The response options are collapsed into three categories: once, twice or more, and never. Table 2 translates the Table 1 data into more easily interpretable categories. It details the proportions of respondents in each sexual orientation group who reported ever experiencing enacted stigma (combining the response options of once, twice, and three or more times), with specific forms of enacted stigma combined into larger categories when appropriate. ______________________________ Insert Tables 1 and 2 about here ______________________________ As shown in the last column of Table 2, 13.1% of the sample reported having experienced violence against their person based on their sexual orientation at least once during their adult life, and 14.9% had experienced a property crime. Approximately 1 in 5 reported experiencing one or both types of crime, and this proportion increased to about 25% when attempted crimes were included. Overall, 12.5% of respondents reported having objects thrown at them because of their sexual orientation, 23.4% had been threatened with violence, and 49.2% had experienced verbal abuse. More than one respondent in ten (11.2%) reported having experienced housing or employment 6 discrimination because of her or his sexual orientation. Across the sexual orientation groups, gay men reported the highest levels of enacted stigma. They were significantly more likely than others to report experiences of antigay violence (24.9%) and antigay property crimes (28.1%). More than one third of gay men (37.6%) reported experiencing one or both types of crimes, compared to 12.5% of lesbians, 10.7% of bisexual men, and 12.7% of bisexual women. As indicated by the overlapping CIs in Table 1, differences among the latter groups were too small to be considered reliable. Gay men were significantly more likely than bisexual men to report having had objects thrown at them (21.1% vs. 5.6%). They were significantly more likely than lesbians and bisexual women to have been threatened with violence (35.4% of gay men vs. 17.3% of lesbians and 14.1% of bisexual women), and significantly more likely than bisexual women to report verbal abuse because of their sexual orientation (63.0% vs. 34.3%). Employment and housing discrimination were significantly more likely among gay men and lesbians (reported by 17.7% and 16.3%, respectively) than among bisexual men and women (3.7% and 6.8%, respectively). As noted above, the groups differed significantly in age, race and ethnicity, and educational level, which might account for the observed differences on enacted stigma. To test this hypothesis, separate logistic regression equations were computed for each type of enacted stigma (violence, objects thrown, etc.) as well as for the combined categories of criminal victimization (comprising violence, property crime, and attempted crime) and harassment (comprising threats, objects thrown, and verbal abuse). In each equation, the dependent variable was dichotomized (ever experiencing that form of enacted stigma vs. never experiencing it). The independent variables were age, education, race and ethnicity (coded as non-Hispanic White vs. Hispanic or non-White), and sexual orientation (coded as gay male vs. other groups). In the equations for the combined categories of criminal victimization and harassment, the odds ratios (ORs) for sexual orientation were statistically significant, indicating gay men were significantly more likely to report experiencing both categories of enacted stigma, even when demographic differences are controlled. (For criminal victimization, OR = 2.45, 95% CI = 1.36 – 4.41; for harassment, OR = 2.10, CI = 1.23 – 3.60.) The same pattern was observed for all of the individual forms of enacted stigma except attempted crimes (for which none of the variables yielded a statistically significant OR). A similar procedure was followed to assess whether lesbians and gay men’s greater likelihood of experiencing employment or housing discrimination was explained by group differences in age, education, and race. In this equation, sexual orientation was coded as homosexual versus bisexual. The OR for sexual orientation (3.29, CI = 1.58 – 6.85) was significant, indicating that the differences in discrimination were not due to demographic differences. Felt Stigma As shown in Table 3, substantial minorities of respondents expressed some degree of felt stigma. More than one third (34.6%) agreed (strongly or somewhat) that most people where they live think less of a sexual minority individual, 25.5% disagreed that most employers will hire qualified sexual minority individuals, and 40.6% agreed that most people would not want a sexual minority individual to care for their children. Overall, a majority of respondents (54.7%, CI = 47.1 – 62.1%) gave at least one response indicative of felt stigma. As indicated by the overlapping CIs in Table 3, there were few significant differences among the sexual orientation groups in their responses to the individual felt stigma items. The only exception is that gay men were significantly less likely than lesbians to perceive sexual stigma in hiring: 54.8% agreed that most employers in their area will hire a qualified sexual minority person, compared to 32.3% of lesbians who agreed with this statement. Responses to the three statements were summed (with hiring question responses reversed) and divided by the number of items to create a felt 7 stigma scale (α = .71, using unweighted data). Scores could range from 1 (low felt stigma) to 5 (high felt stigma). As shown in the first row of Table 3, gay men scored the lowest on the scale and lesbians the highest (Ms = 2.79 and 3.11, respectively), but differences among the sexual orientation groups were not statistically significant. Association of Felt Stigma with Enacted Stigma Felt stigma scores were higher among respondents who reported having experienced person or property crimes or attempted crimes based on their sexual orientation compared to those who had not (Ms = 3.2 vs. 2.8, respectively), those who had experienced verbal threats or harassment compared to those who had not (Ms = 3.0 vs. 2.7, respectively), and those who had experienced employment or housing discrimination compared to those who had not (Ms = 3.2 and 2.8, respectively). None of these differences were statistically significant. However, significant differences were observed on these variables within some sexual orientation groups. Lesbians who said they had experienced crimes or attempted crimes scored significantly higher on felt stigma compared to those who had not (Ms = 3.6 vs. 3.0, respectively). The difference was also significant among bisexual men (Ms = 3.6 vs. 2.6, respectively), but not gay men (Ms = 2.9 vs. 2.8) or bisexual women (Ms = 3.7 vs. 2.9). Felt stigma was significantly higher among lesbians who reported having experienced employment or housing discrimination (M = 3.7 vs. 3.0 among those who had not). The difference was also significant for bisexual men (3.9 vs. 2.8), but not for gay men (2.9 vs. 2.8) or bisexual women (3.2 vs. 2.9). Discussion The present study yields the most reliable estimates to date of the prevalence of antigay victimization in the United States. The data indicate that approximately 20% of the US sexual minority population has experienced a crime against their person or property since age 18 that was based on their sexual orientation. With attempted crimes included, the proportion increases to roughly 25%. Harassment is considerably more widespread, with about half of sexual minority adults reporting verbal abuse at some time in their adult life as a consequence of their sexual orientation. More than one sexual minority adult in ten has experienced housing or employment discrimination because of her or his sexual orientation. The likelihood of experiencing victimization clearly is not uniform among sexual minorities. Gay men are at the greatest risk for person and property crimes. Approximately 38% of gay men in the present sample reported they had experienced one or both types of criminal victimization. Gay men also were more likely than lesbians and bisexuals to be harassed because of their sexual orientation. This pattern is consistent with previous findings that sexual minority men are at greater risk for antigay victimization than are sexual minority women (D’Augelli & Grossman, 2001; Herek et al., 1999). Several factors may account for it. Men are more likely than women to be victims of violent crime in general, especially crimes committed by strangers (Catalano & Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2005). Most such crimes are perpetrated by heterosexually-identified men, who tend to hold more hostile attitudes toward sexual minority males than toward sexual minority females (Herek, 2002a, 2002b). In addition, gay men may be more visible targets than sexual minority women and bisexual men because, for example, they may be more likely to frequent gay-oriented venues and the public spaces around them. Lesbians and gay men were significantly more likely than bisexuals to report discrimination based on their sexual orientation. This pattern probably cannot be attributed to attitudinal differences among the agents of discrimination because heterosexuals’ attitudes toward bisexuals tend to be somewhat more negative than their attitudes toward gay men and lesbians (Herek, 2002b). Instead, homosexual adults’ greater visibility probably makes them more vulnerable to discrimination in workplace and housing settings, compared to bisexuals. Additional data collected in the present study 8 suggest that bisexual men and women are less likely than gay men and lesbians to disclose their sexual orientation to others in a variety of social contexts, including the workplace. In addition, to the extent that homosexual adults are more likely than bisexuals to cohabit with a same-sex partner (because many coupled bisexuals have a different-sex partner), the former are probably more readily labeled as gay by landlords and realtors and thus are more subject to discrimination. As noted above, comparisons of prevalence estimates across previous studies are problematic because of differences in sampling strategies, question wording, time frames, and data reporting conventions. Estimates of lifetime victimization from the present data are higher than those reported in some published studies (e.g., D’Augelli & Grossman, 2001; Herek et al., 1999) but lower than in others (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2001). The difference between the current study and the KFF survey may be due to the fact that the latter was conducted only with urban residents, who are more likely than non- urban residents to experience crime of all sorts (Herek & Sims, 2007). Differences between the present study and those conducted by D’Augelli and Grossman (2001) and Herek et al. (1999) may result from the latter’s use of convenience samples whose representativeness cannot be determined; the current data probably provide a more accurate estimate of the extent of victimization experiences within the sexual minority population. The current study’s estimates of the extent of felt stigma in the sexual minority population are another unique contribution. About 55% of respondents manifested some degree of felt stigma. It tended to be higher among respondents who had experienced enactments of stigma. For criminal victimization and employment discrimination, this pattern was due mainly to significant differences among lesbians and bisexual men who had experienced enacted stigma versus those who had not. Because the data reported here are retrospective and cross- sectional, the causal and temporal direction of these relationships, if any, cannot be determined. Experiencing enacted stigma is likely to increase an individual’s subjective sense of vulnerability related to her or his sexual orientation (Herek et al., 1999), which could result in a positive correlation between enacted and felt stigma. However, other explanations for the pattern are also plausible. For example, persons with high levels of felt stigma may have a heightened sensitivity to the occurrence of stigma enactments and consequently may be more likely than others to attribute ambiguous incidents to stigma. Previous research on the cognitive strategies used by sexual minority crime victims for assessing their attackers’ motives, however, suggests that relatively unambiguous cues (e.g., antigay verbal abuse) often accompany hate crimes based on sexual orientation (Herek, Cogan, & Gillis, 2002). Despite the methodological advance represented by its use of a national probability sample, the present study has limitations. The data reported here may not accurately describe the experiences of sexual minority members of the KN panel who did not disclose their sexual orientation in response to the initial screening question. Moreover, the questions about victimization were brief and presented in a quasi-checklist format. This approach, which was necessitated by the limited resources available for the present study, did not permit detailed assessment of specific incidents nor did it provide respondents with extensive memory cues (e.g., questions about the date and types of victimization in each incident) to assist them in accurately recalling their experiences with stigma. Whereas experiences with dramatic enactments of stigma, such as serious assaults, are not likely to be forgotten, relatively mundane episodes may be more difficult to recall (Herek, Gillis, Cogan, & Glunt, 1997). In future research, therefore, it will be important to replicate the present findings using more detailed queries about the events surrounding each experience of enacted stigma, and to provide respondents with a variety of memory aids to maximize the accuracy of their self-reports. In addition, as with any probability sample, some error due to sampling can be assumed to be associated with the present data. The great advantage of the use of a probability sample is 9 that, in contrast to convenience samples, sampling error can be quantified and expressed in the form of confidence intervals. Nevertheless, other sources of error may also affect the data. As with most modern surveys, for example, the initial sampling frame excluded US households without a telephone as well as group living quarters (e.g., barracks and dormitories). These limitations to the sample coverage should be kept in mind when interpreting the data. In addition, measurement error may have resulted from the specific wording of the survey questions or from other factors such as the order in which questions were presented. As with all surveys, the data represent a snapshot of the population at the time the study was fielded (autumn of 2005). For these reasons, more studies with national probability samples are needed. Even in the absence of additional surveys with probability samples, however, the present data have important policy implications. They demonstrate that the experience of violence and property crime is disturbingly widespread among sexual minority adults, especially gay men. Thus, they highlight the ongoing need for criminal justice programs to prevent and deter such crimes, as well as the need for victim services that will help to alleviate the physical, economic, social, and psychological consequences of such crimes (e.g., Herek et al., 1999; Herek & Sims, 2007). In addition, the psychological toll of antigay hate crimes and harassment should be considered by mental health professionals and by researchers conducting studies of psychological distress and well being in this population. Some research, for example, suggests that individuals who have engaged in homosexual behavior may be at greater risk than exclusively heterosexual adults for some forms of psychological distress (Herek & Garnets, 2007). Most studies, however, have not assessed how experiences of victimization and harassment might explain this pattern (for an exception, see Mays & Cochran, 2001). Given the association between antigay victimization and heightened psychological distress (Herek et al., 1999) and the present study’s finding that such victimization has been experienced by roughly 1 in 8 lesbians and bisexuals, and nearly 4 gay men in 10, it seems likely that the associations observed in past research between sexual orientation and psychological problems are attributable, at least in part, to such victimization. Moreover, the fact that more than half of the respondents in the present study experienced some degree of felt stigma related to their sexual orientation further highlights the extent to which sexual minorities are subjected to stressors that heterosexuals do not experience (e.g., Meyer, 2003). Ever since the Hate Crimes Statistics Act became law in 1990, marking the federal government’s first official recognition of the problem of violence and crime against people because of their sexual orientation, researchers have attempted to document the extent and prevalence of antigay victimization. The present study makes an important contribution to this effort. Such data can assist law enforcement agencies, service providers, and sexual minority communities in alleviating and preventing the problems created by sexual stigma. References American Association for Public Opinion Research. (2006). Standard definitions: Final dispositions of case codes and outcome rates for surveys. Lenexa, KS: Author. Berrill, K. (1992). Antigay violence and victimization in the United States: An overview. In G. Herek & K. Berrill (Eds.), Hate crimes: Confronting violence against lesbians and gay men (pp. 19-45). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. Catalano, S., & Bureau of Justice Statistics. (2005). Criminal victimization, 2004. Retrieved February 19, 2006, from http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/abstract/ cv04.htm D’Augelli, A., & Grossman, A. (2001). Disclosure of sexual orientation, victimization and mental health among lesbian, gay, and bisexual older adults. Journal of Interpersonal Violence, 16, 1008-1027. D’Augelli, A., Grossman, A., & Starks, M. (2006). Childhood gender atypicality, victimization, and PTSD among lesbian, gay, and bisexual youth. Journal of Interpersonal Violence, 21, 1462-1482. 10 Díaz, R., Ayala, G., Bein, E., Henne, J., & Marín, B. (2001). The impact of homophobia, poverty, and racism on the mental health of gay and bisexual Latino men: Findings from 3 US cities. American Journal of Public Health, 91, 927-932. Federal Bureau of Investigation. (2005). Hate crime statistics 2004. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice. Garnets, L., Herek, G., & Levy, B. (1990). Violence and victimization of lesbians and gay men: Mental health consequences. Journal of Interpersonal Violence, 5, 366-383. Harlow, C. (2005). Hate crime reported by victims and police. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice Retrieved July 4, 2006, from http://www .ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/hcrvp.pdf Herek, G. (2002a). Gender gaps in public opinion about lesbians and gay men. Public Opinion Quarterly, 66, 40-66. Herek, G. (2002b). Heterosexuals’ attitudes toward bisexual men and women in the United States. Journal of Sex Research, 39, 264-274. Herek, G. (2004). Beyond “homophobia”: Thinking about sexual stigma and prejudice in the twenty-first century. Sexuality Research and Social Policy, 1(2), 6-24. Herek, G. M. (2008). Understanding sexual stigma and sexual prejudice in the United States: A conceptual framework. In D. Hope (Ed.), Contemporary perspectives on lesbian, gay and bisexual identities: The 54th Nebraska Symposium on Motivation. New York: Springer. Herek, G., & Berrill, K. (1990). Anti-gay violence and mental health: Setting an agenda for research. Journal of Interpersonal Violence, 5, 414-423. Herek, G., Chopp, R., & Strohl, D. (2007). Sexual stigma: Putting sexual minority health issues in context. In I. Meyer & M. Northridge (Eds.), The health of sexual minorities: Public health perspectives on lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender populations (pp. 171-208). New York: Springer. Herek, G., Cogan, J., & Gillis, J. (2002). Victim experiences in hate crimes based on sexual orientation. Journal of Social Issues, 58, 319-339. Herek, G., & Garnets, L. (2007). Sexual orientation and mental health. Annual Review of Clinical Psychology, 3, in press. Herek, G., Gillis, J., & Cogan, J. (1999). Psychological sequelae of hate crime victimization among lesbian, gay, and bisexual adults. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 67, 945-951. Herek, G., Gillis, J., Cogan, J., & Glunt, E. (1997). Hate crime victimization among lesbian, gay, and bisexual adults: Prevalence, psychological correlates, and methodological issues. Journal of Interpersonal Violence, 12, 195-215. Herek, G., & Sims, C. (2007). Sexual orientation and violent victimization: Hate crimes and intimate partner violence among gay and bisexual males in the United States. In R.J. Wolitski, R. Stall, & R.O. Valdiserri (Eds.), Unequal opportunity: Health disparities among gay and bisexual men in the United States. New York: Oxford University Press. Holbrook, A. L., Krosnick, J. A., & Pfent, A. (2008). The causes and consequences of response rates in surveys by the news media and government contractor survey research firms. In J. Lepkowski, C. Tucker, J.M. Brick, E. D. de Leeuw, L. Japec, P.J. Lavrakas, M.W. Link, & R.L. Sangster (Eds.), Advances in telephone survey methodology (pp. 499- 528). New York: Wiley. Huebner, D., Rebchook, G., & Kegeles, S. (2004). Experiences of harassment, discrimination, and physical violence among young gay and bisexual men. American Journal of Public Health, 94, 1200- 1203. Kaiser Family Foundation. (2001). Inside-out: A report on the experiences of lesbians, gays, and bisexuals in America and the public’s view on issues and politics related to sexual orientation. Menlo Park, CA: Author. Retrieved November 14, 2001, from http://www.kff.org . Kish, L. (1965). Survey sampling. New York: Wiley. Knowledge Networks. (2007). Knowledge Networks bibliography: Articles and presentations based on KN collected data, analysis, methodology. Retrieved April 30, 2007, from http://www.knowledgenetworks .com/ganp/docs/ Krosnick, J.A. & Chang, L. (2001). A comparison of the random digit dialing telephone survey methodology with Internet survey methodology as implemented by Knowledge Networks and Harris Interactive. Columbus, OH: Department of Psychology, Ohio State University Retrieved November 1, 2002, from http://www .knowledgenetworks.com/ganp/docs/OSU Mode Effects 2001.pdf 11 Lee, E., & Forthofer, R. (2006). Analyzing complex survey data (2nd ed.). Thousand Oaks: Sage. Mays, V. M., & Cochran, S. D. (2001). Mental health correlates of perceived discrimination among lesbian, gay, and bisexual adults in the United States. American Journal of Public Health, 91, 1869-1876. McDevitt, J., Balboni, J., Garcia, L., & Gu, J. (2001). Consequences for victims: A comparison of bias- and non-bias-motivated assaults. American Behavioral Scientist, 45, 697-713. Meyer, I. (2003). Prejudice, social stress, and mental health in lesbian, gay, and bisexual populations: Conceptual issues and research evidence. Psychological Bulletin, 129, 674-697. Mills, T., Paul, J., Stall, R., Pollack, L., Canchola, J., Chang, Y., Moskowitz, J., & Catania, J. (2004). Distress and depression in men who have sex with men: The Urban Men’s Health Study. American Journal of Psychiatry, 161, 278-285. National Coalition of Anti-Violence Programs. (2005). Anti-lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender violence in 2004. New York: Author. Retrieved May 1, 2006, from http://www.ncavp.org/ Pilkington, N. W., & D’Augelli, A. R. (1995). Victimization of lesbian, gay, and bisexual youth in community settings. Journal of Community Psychology, 23, 34-56. Results of poll. (1989, June 6). San Francisco Examiner, p. A-19. Scambler, G., & Hopkins, A. (1986). Being epileptic: Coming to terms with stigma. Sociology of Health and Illness, 8, 26-43. 12 Table 1 Self-Reported Experiences With Enacted Stigma: Population Estimates for Individual Items Group (Unweighted N) Type of Enacted Stigma Frequency Experienced Gay Men (n = 241) Lesbians (n = 152) Bisexual Men (n = 110) Bisexual Women (n = 159) Total (n = 662) Violence Once 13.3% 2.1% 5.2% 5.7% 7.7% 7.7 – 22.1 0.8 - 5.4 2.0 – 12.5 2.6 – 12.1 5.1 -11.4 11.6% 5.0% 1.7% 1.0% 5.5% Twice or More 6.6 - 19.6 2.2 - 10.9 0.5 - 5.4 0.3 - 3.4 3.4 - 8.6 Never 75.1% 92.9% 93.1% 93.3% 86.9% 65.5 - 82.7 86.9 - 96.3 85.5 - 96.9 87.0 – 96.7 82.4 - 90.3 Once 13.1% 3.8% 4.1% 5.3% 7.5% 8.1 – 20.5 1.7 – 8.4 1.6 – 10.2 1.5 – 17.7 5.0 - 11.1 15.0% 6.4% 3.6% 1.0% 7.4% Twice or More 10.0 - 21.8 3.2 - 12.4 1.5 - 8.6 0.2 – 4.8 5.3 – 10.3 Never 71.9% 89.8% 92.3% 93.7% 85.1% Property Crime 63.4 - 79.1 83.2 - 94.0 84.9 – 96.2 82.2 - 98.0 80.7 - 88.6 Once 12.3% 3.1% 6.2% 3.8% 7.3% 7.5 - 19.5 1.2 - 7.7 2.7 – 13.7 1.4 - 9.9 5.0 - 10.5 9.2% 5.2% 10.0% 1.8% 7.1% Twice or More 4.7 - 17.2 1.7 - 14.5 2.4 – 34.1 0.5 - 6.6 3.8 - 13.1 Never 78.5% 91.7% 83.7% 94.4% 85.6% Attempted Crime 69.7 - 85.3 83.2 - 96.1 64.0 – 93.7 88.0 – 97.5 79.8 - 89.9 Once 11.4% 6.6% 3.5% 3.4% 6.7% 7.3 - 17.6 2.8 - 14.7 1.1 – 10.1 1.4 - 8.0 4.6 - 9.5 9.6% 8.0% 2.1% 3.4% 5.9% Twice or More 4.8 - 18.4 4.4 -14.2 0.7 - 6.0 1.3 - 8.2 3.7 - 9.2 Never 78.9% 85.4% 94.4% 93.2% 87.5% Objects Thrown 70.2 -85.6 77.0 – 91.1 87.6 – 97.6 87.5 – 96.4 83.4 – 90.6 Table continues 13 Table 1 (continued) Group (Unweighted N) Type of Enacted Stigma Frequency Experienced Gay Men (n = 241) Lesbians (n = 152) Bisexual Men (n = 110) Bisexual Women (n = 159) Total (n = 662) Once 14.0% 3.5% 5.7% 9.0% 9.1% 9.0 - 21.2 1.8 - 6.7 2.4 - 12.8 3.8 - 19.8 6.4 - 12.8 21.4% 13.8% 13.3% 5.2% 14.3% Twice or More 14.7 - 30.1 8.0 - 22.8 4.3 - 34.5 2.6 - 10.0 10.0 - 20.0 Never 64.6% 82.7% 81.0% 85.9% 76.6% Threatened With Violence 55.4 - 72.8 73.8 - 89.0 61.9 - 91.8 75.8 - 92.2 70.5 - 81.8 Once 16.7% 10.8% 7.8% 10.3% 11.9% 10.7 - 25.0 6.4 - 17.7 3.8 - 15.6 5.9 - 17.5 8.9 – 15.8 46.4% 43.7% 33.6% 23.9% 37.3% Twice or More 37.5 - 55.5 33.9 - 54.1 16.4 - 56.6 16.0 - 34.1 30.5 - 44.6 Never 37.0% 45.5% 58.6% 65.7% 50.8% Verbal Abuse 28.6 - 46.2 35.7 - 55.6 37.3 - 77.1 54.9 - 75.2 43.6 - 58.0 Once 9.4% 13.3% 3.1% 4.1% 7.0% 6.0 – 14.3 7.8 - 21.6 1.0 - 9.2 2.0 - 8.1 5.1 - 9.5 6.3% 2.7% 0.3% 2.3% 3.2% Twice or More 2.7 - 13.7 1.1 - 6.7 0 - 2.0 0.9 - 5.7 1.7 - 5.8 Never 84.4% 84.0% 96.6% 93.6% 89.8% Job Discrimination 77.1 - 89.6 75.6 - 89.9 90.7 - 98.8 89.0 - 96.4 86.5 - 92.4 Once 4.6% 3.8% 1.5% 0.9% 2.8% 1.8 - 11.4 1.4 - 9.8 0.2 - 10.0 0.2 - 3.6 1.4 - 5.4 1.9% 1.3% 0.3% 0.4% 1.0% Twice or More 0.8 - 4.7 0.5 - 3.6 0 - 2.3 0.1 - 2.6 0.5 - 2.0 Never 93.5% 94.9% 98.2% 98.8% 96.2% Housing Discrimination 87.1 - 96.8 89.2 - 97.7 90.8 - 99.7 96.1 - 99.6 93.6 - 97.7 Table reports parameter estimates and 95% confidence intervals for each response category for individual questions about enacted stigma, using weighted data. 14 Table 2 Proportion of Respondents Who Reported Ever Experiencing Each Category of Enacted Stigma Group (Unweighted N) Type of Enacted Stigma Gay Men (n = 241) Lesbians (n = 152) Bisexual Men (n = 110) Bisexual Women (n = 159) Total (n = 662) Violence 24.9% 7.1% 6.9% 6.7% 13.1% 17.3 - 34.5 3.7 - 13.1 3.1 - 14.5 3.3 - 13.0 9.7 - 17.6 Property Crime 28.1% 10.2% 7.7% 6.3% 14.9% 20.9 - 36.6 6.0 - 16.8 3.8 - 15.1 2.0 - 17.8 11.4 - 19.3 Violence or Property Crime 37.6% 12.5% 10.7% 12.7% 20.9% 29.1 - 46.9 7.9 - 19.3 5.6 - 19.5 6.6 - 23.1 16.5 - 26.1 Attempted Crime 21.5% 8.3% 16.3% 5.6% 14.4% 14.7 - 30.3 3.9 - 16.9 6.3 - 36.0 2.5 - 12.0 10.1 - 20.2 39.0% 15.4% 20.1% 14.6% 24.8% Violence, Property Crime, or Attempted Crime 30.4 - 48.3 9.5 - 24.0 9.0 - 38.9 8.0 - 25.1 19.4 - 31.0 Objects Thrown 21.1% 14.6% 5.6% 6.8% 12.5% 14.4 - 29.8 8.9 - 23.0 2.4 - 12.5 3.6 - 12.5 9.4 – 16.6 Threatened With Violence 35.4% 17.3% 19.0% 14.1% 23.4% 27.2 - 44.6 11.0 - 26.2 8.2 - 38.1 7.8 - 24.2 18.2 - 29.5 Verbal Abuse 63.0% 54.5% 41.4% 34.3% 49.2% 53.8 - 71.4 44.4 - 64.3 22.9 - 62.7 24.8 - 45.1 42.0 - 56.4 17.7% 16.3% 3.7% 6.8% 11.2% Job or Housing Discrimination 12.1 - 25.0 10.3 - 24.7 1.4 - 9.6 3.9 - 11.7 8.5 - 14.6 Table reports parameter estimates and 95% confidence intervals for proportion of respondents experiencing each form of enacted stigma at least once, using weighted data. 15 Table 3 Felt Stigma Scale Scores and Responses to Individual Items Group (Unweighted N) Item Gay Men (n = 241) Lesbians (n = 152) Bisexual Men (n = 110) Bisexual Women (n = 159) Total (n = 662) Scale Score (Mean) 2.79 3.11 2.83 2.96 2.89 2.65 - 2.94 2.92 – 3.29 2.31 - 3.34 2.64 - 3.27 2.72 - 3.06 Agree 33.2% 44.0% 28.6% 37.7% 34.6% 25.3 - 42.1 34.3 - 54.1 16.5 - 44.9 27.7 - 48.9 28.9 - 40.9 In Middle 23.0% 24.6% 24.8% 19.1% 22.8% 15.6 - 32.6 16.4 - 35.2 10.2 - 48.8 12.1 - 28.8 16.9 - 30.0 Disagree 43.8% 31.4% 46.6% 43.2% 42.6% “Most people where I live think less of a person who is [L/G/B]” 35.1 - 52.9 23.0 - 41.1 26.6 - 67.7 31.8 - 55.3 35.3 - 50.2 Agree 54.8% 32.3% 49.1% 35.4% 45.4% 45.5 - 63.7 24.3 - 41.5 29.0 - 69.6 24.6 - 48.0 38.1 - 52.9 In Middle 27.5% 40.6% 19.6% 35.2% 29.1% 19.3 - 37.6 30.8 - 51.2 10.4 - 33.8 25.7 - 46.1 23.7 - 35.2 Disagree 17.7% 27.1% 31.3% 29.4% 25.5% 12.7 - 24.1 19.0 - 37.1 16.9 - 50.6 20.1 - 40.9 20.2 - 31.6 “Most employers where I live will hire openly [L/G/B] people if they are qualified for the job” Agree 41.2% 44.1% 39.1% 39.1% 40.6% 32.5 - 50.6 34.5 - 54.2 22.5 - 58.6 28.9 - 50.4 34.0 - 47.5 In Middle 32.1% 30.3% 20.8% 30.6% 28.4% 24.0 - 41.5 21.3 - 40.9 10.9 - 35.9 21.5 - 41.5 23.1 - 34.4 Disagree 26.7% 25.6% 40.1% 30.3% 31.0% “Most people where I live would not want someone who is openly [L/G/B] to take care of their children” 20.0 - 34.6 17.9 - 35.2 20.1 - 64.2 19.6 - 43.6 23.5 - 39.7 Table reports weighted percentage of respondents (with 95% confidence intervals) in each response category, and weighted mean scores (with 95% confidence intervals) for combined felt stigma scale. “Strongly agree” and “somewhat agree” responses are combined into “Agree” category; “strongly disagree and disagree somewhat” responses are combined into “Disagree” category. In each item, the respondent’s preferred label for her or his own sexual orientation (e.g., “gay”) was substituted for “[L/G/B].” 
work_kdqrvpgyhzgoxni7we35swisqu	----	Introduction to the special issue on the politics of hate: community, societal and global responses Introduction to the special issue on the politics of hate: community, societal and global responses Hannah Mason-Bish1 & Loretta Trickett2 Published online: 30 January 2019 # Springer Nature B.V. 2019 This special issue is brought to you at a time of increasingly uncertain global politics whereby concerns about hate crime and prejudice are a pressing social and political issue. Across the world there continues to be unprecedented levels of refugees displaced from their homes through conflict or persecution including those from Syria, Afghanistan, African, South Sudan, Myanmar and Somalia amongst others.1 We are now witnessing the highest levels of displacement on record. Around the world, 68.5 million people have been forcibly displaced. That’s the most since World War II, according to the U.N. Refugee Agency (UNHCR). Most people remain displaced within their home countries, but about 25.4 million people worldwide have fled to other countries as refugees, over half of whom are under the age of 18. There are also an estimated 10 million stateless people who have been denied a nationality and access to basic rights such as education, healthcare, employment and freedom of movement.2 This comes at a time when the terms refugee, asylum seeker and migrants have become merged and political and media rhetoric has depicted those affected as ‘other’ and unwanted (Banks 2012).3,4 As a result we have seen a growth in human rights abuses5 as in Russia6 whilst elsewhere supposedly liberal countries disengaging with human rights laws7 and international treaties as agreements as shown in Brexit and Crime, Law and Social Change (2019) 71:241–243 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10611-019-09816-x 1https://www.unhcr.org/uk/news/briefing/2018/1/5a6701184/car-displacement-reaches-unprecedented-levels- 2017.html 2https://www.unhcr.org/uk/figures-at-a-glance.html 3https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/editorials/italy-election-results-populsim-resurgence-europe-anti-eu- silvio-berlusconi-5-star-movement-luigi-di-a8240861.html 4Unmasking deviance: The visual construction of asylum seekers and refugees in English national newspapers. Critical Criminology, 20(3), pp.293–310. 5https://investigaterussia.org/human-rights-abuses 6https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/russia-ukraine-crimea-putin-human-rights-abuses-un- accusations-claims-a7421406.html 7https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2015/may/10/conservatives-to-push-forward-on-manifesto-and-scrap- human-rights-act * Hannah Mason-Bish H.Mason-Bish@sussex.ac.uk 1 University of Sussex, Falmer, Brighton BN1 9RH, UK 2 Nottingham Trent University, Shakespeare Street, Nottingham NG1 4FQ, UK http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1007/s10611-019-09816-x&domain=pdf https://www.unhcr.org/uk/news/briefing/2018/1/5a6701184/car-displacement-reaches-unprecedented-levels-2017.html https://www.unhcr.org/uk/news/briefing/2018/1/5a6701184/car-displacement-reaches-unprecedented-levels-2017.html https://www.unhcr.org/uk/figures-at-a-glance.html https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/editorials/italy-election-results-populsim-resurgence-europe-anti-eu-silvio-berlusconi-5-star-movement-luigi-di-a8240861.html https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/editorials/italy-election-results-populsim-resurgence-europe-anti-eu-silvio-berlusconi-5-star-movement-luigi-di-a8240861.html https://investigaterussia.org/human-rights-abuses https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/russia-ukraine-crimea-putin-human-rights-abuses-un-accusations-claims-a7421406.html https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/russia-ukraine-crimea-putin-human-rights-abuses-un-accusations-claims-a7421406.html https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2015/may/10/conservatives-to-push-forward-on-manifesto-and-scrap-human-rights-act https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2015/may/10/conservatives-to-push-forward-on-manifesto-and-scrap-human-rights-act mailto:H.Mason-ish@sussex.ac.uk debate around scrapping the Human Rights Act in the UK leading to substantial hate crime rises.8 This is part of a global rise in populist politics and right wing politics including an increase in the far right movement feeding xenophobia through a distrust of migrant and refugees.9 Alongside this there have been steep rises in Islamophobia fuelled in large part by ideology and political developments including Trump’s Muslim Ban. Hate manifests itself in individual incidents of street violence; verbal abuse and desecration of religious sites on a local level. Nationally and internationally we have seen media demonization, bans on veiling, religious profiling, restrictions on religious buildings, employment discrimination, criminalization, and programmes against Muslims in the USA, Australia, the Central African Republic, India, Myanmar, Russia, Sri Lanka, and elsewhere, often with state complicity. These are the practical manifestations of the political and cultural functions of Islamophobia over the last two decades. In addition to this there have been hate crime rises against disabled people fuelled in part by policies and media coverage10 which serves to ‘scapegoat’ them as benefits scroungers11 within the few countries that includes disability as a hate crime category. It follows therefore that the efforts of those working in the field of hate crime as scholars and in public policy roles become ever more important. Good examples of combined efforts in Europe include the work of the EU and its Member States in making these crimes more visible and holding perpetrators to account by unmasking the bias motivation behind criminal offences and to improve recording practices which includes FRA’s work12 in documenting the extent of prejudice against groups such as Roma, LGBT, Muslims, and migrant communities and the High Level Group on combating racism and xenophobia including that on-line by working with civic society organisations and communities. Other examples include the EUs work on developing a Code of Conduct for social media sites including Facebook, Microsoft, Twitter for regulating hate speech on-line.13 Grassroots politics to combat prejudice are also increasingly important14; an example of which can be seen in the Metoo movement15 and the introduction of Misogyny Hate Crime Policy by Nottinghamshire Police in the UK16 following research by a civic organisation in the county.17 This special issue consists of a selection of papers presented at the International Network of Hate Studies conference in 2016. They focus on responses to hate crime and offer an excellent collection of papers which provide much needed perspectives on how states can and should respond to hate crime. In his paper on combating 8 Hate crime rises after EU Referendum https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-38976087, https://www.theguardian. com/society/2016/sep/07/hate-surged-after-eu-referendum-police-figures-show 9 https://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/europe/fear-of-migrants-feeds-growth-of-italy-s-far-right- 1.3393398 10 Rise in disability hate crimes UK scrounger rhetoric https://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/entry/disability-hate- crime-reports-increase-53-home-office_uk_59e60f9ee4b0a2324d1df159 11 https://www.theguardian.com/society/2015/jul/22/combat-disability-hate-crime-understand-people-commit 12 https://www.fra.europa.eu/en/theme/hate-crime 13 “Code of conduct on countering illegal hate speech online 14 https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/comment/2017/8/22/international-islamophobia-calls-for-a-global- grassroots-resistance 15 https://www.marieclaire.co.uk/opinion/me-too-hashtag-544974 16 https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/av/uk-england-nottinghamshire-36788697/misogyny-is-now-a-hate-crime 17 https://www.nottinghampost.com/news/local-news/huge-survey-hate-crime-nottingham-1549570 242 Mason-Bish H., Trickett L. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-38976087 https://www.theguardian.com/society/2016/sep/07/hate-surged-after-eu-referendum-police-figures-show https://www.theguardian.com/society/2016/sep/07/hate-surged-after-eu-referendum-police-figures-show https://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/europe/fear-of-migrants-feeds-growth-of-italy-s-far-right-1.3393398 https://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/europe/fear-of-migrants-feeds-growth-of-italy-s-far-right-1.3393398 https://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/entry/disability-hate-crime-reports-increase-53-home-office_uk_59e60f9ee4b0a2324d1df159 https://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/entry/disability-hate-crime-reports-increase-53-home-office_uk_59e60f9ee4b0a2324d1df159 https://www.theguardian.com/society/2015/jul/22/combat-disability-hate-crime-understand-people-commit https://www.fra.europa.eu/en/theme/hate-crime https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/comment/2017/8/22/international-islamophobia-calls-for-a-global-grassroots-resistance https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/comment/2017/8/22/international-islamophobia-calls-for-a-global-grassroots-resistance https://www.marieclaire.co.uk/opinion/me-too-hashtag-544974 https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/av/uk-england-nottinghamshire-36788697/misogyny-is-now-a-hate-crime https://www.nottinghampost.com/news/local-news/huge-survey-hate-crime-nottingham-1549570 xenophobia towards migrants, William Arrocha discusses the timely concern of vio- lence and hate directed towards refugees in the global north. He argues that the humanitarian crisis which has caused millions to flee their homes is often met with a lack of sympathy and in fact political and popular discourse which frames them as problematic. As such, Arrocha argues for compassionate migration in order to foster empathy and to better understand the crisis facing migrants rather than making them subjects of hatred and hostility. His is a timely and important paper. Azra Junuzovic similarly addresses the importance of understanding the political will for change in the context of government action. The paper focuses more specifically on the role of international organisations in addressing hate crime, including the relevance of internal factors such as pressure from civil society groups. In recent years we have seen increasing international efforts to combat hate crime and Junuzovic provides a much needed examination of how these might really influence change. Fundamentally this means international organisations exercise greater evaluation of their won effectiveness by sharing good practice and work more closely with civil society organisations. It is the issue of co-operation that Mike Whine then addresses in his paper. Taking the requirements on European states to combat hate crime as his starting point, he then critically examines the need for criminal justice agencies and civil society to work together. Whine offers his analysis from the perspective of someone who has worked within NGO’s for many years and as such is grounded in experience. By using specific case studies for illustration he demonstrates how the expertise and knowledge the civil society can offer is central in responding to hate crime. Paper four by Piotr Godzisz also looks at government responses but from the perspective of LGBT policy specifically. He shifts our gaze away from the west to look at Balkan countries and asks why hate crime laws are passed but then rarely used. Godzisz observes that often legislation is changed as part of the democratization process but without resources and favourable sentiments at the more local level, provisions are not successfully utilised. The paper continues the themes of the previous papers in the special issue by drawing on themes of co-operation and the multiple layers needed for hate crime to be combated successful. Just as Godzisz examines countries where laws are passed as part of a wider international picture, the final paper by Schweppe and Haynes looks at a country without hate crime legislation. By drawing on an analysis of Parliamentary debates they demonstrate the importance of under- standing the Irish “anomaly” which needs to be understood in the context of the current political landscape. Furthermore, they note the ways in which civil society organisa- tions can have an influence by shaping debates around which victim groups to include. In the end these discussions limited the passage of hate crime legislation. Publisher’s note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Introduction to the special issue on the politics of hate:... 243 Introduction to the special issue on the politics of hate: community, societal and global responses 
work_kdzyhbeccjdd5bpp2snoj24in4	----	Hate Fuel: On the Relationship Between Local Government Policy and Hate Group Activity | SpringerLink Advertisement Search Log in Search SpringerLink Search Hate Fuel: On the Relationship Between Local Government Policy and Hate Group Activity Download PDF Download PDF Article Published: 22 September 2010 Hate Fuel: On the Relationship Between Local Government Policy and Hate Group Activity Sean E Mulholland1  Eastern Economic Journal volume 36, pages480–499(2010)Cite this article 869 Accesses 4 Citations 1 Altmetric Metrics details Abstract Although often joined for ideological reasons, hate groups provide services for their members that may substitute for government services. Therefore, increases in the quality or quantity of government-provided substitutes may lower the marginal benefit of participating in an active hate group. Conversely, government supplied services may sustain active hate groups by offsetting the reduced labor market opportunities associated with signaling membership. Fixed effect logistic panel estimation results suggest that lowering the poverty rate reduces hate group activity. However, using welfare as a means to ease the plight of those less fortunate is associated with an increase in hate group activity. INTRODUCTION The Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC), an authority on hate group activity, declared that the number of active hate group chapters in the United States increased from 474 in 1997 to 888 in 2007.Footnote 1 Some types of hate groups have experienced a decline in the number of active chapters, while others have experienced an increase. Figure 1 depicts the slow and steady increase in the total number of active Ku Klux Klan (KKK), neo-Nazi, and Racist Skinhead chapters and Christian Identity Churches across the United States. Although previous studies have focused on economic conditions, demographics, and history as reasons for hate group activity, few have addressed the possible link between government provided services and the choice to form or join a hate group.Footnote 2 Figure 1 Number of Ku Klux Klan, neo-Nazi, Skinhead, and Christian identity chapters in the US: 1997–2007. Full size image Hate groups share many characteristics with social clubs. Members must sacrifice private consumption to be eligible for goods and services produced by the club. While it is clear that those seeking to join such groups often do so for ideological reasons, hate group membership provides services that may substitute for various government services. Therefore, increases in the quality or quantity of government-provided services may lower the marginal benefit of participating in an active hate group. However, government supplied goods and services may also serve to sustain and encourage hate group activity by reducing the negative wage effect of signaling membership. This paper seeks to determine if changes in local government policy are associated with changes in the presence of hate group activity. Using county-level panel data from the United States for 2002 and 2007 and controlling for unobserved county-level time-invariant heterogeneity, I show that active hate groups are more likely to be present when the percent of households below the poverty line increases. Attempting to reduce the impact of poverty through welfare payments does not, however, appear to reduce the likelihood that a hate group is present. In fact, it appears to increases it. The following section discusses past research on the general dynamics of group formation and on hate groups and hate crime. The next section discusses possible reasons why individuals join hate groups. The subsequent section presents general facts about the number of hate groups across the counties of the United States. The section after that discusses the fixed effects logistic estimation methodology in more detail. The estimation results are introduced and discussed in the penultimate section. Conclusions and possible extensions are presented in the final section. PAST RESEARCH In the 1940s, psychologists and sociologists sought and found links between macroeconomic conditions, such as the price of cotton and the unemployment rate, and the number of lynchings in the south [Hovland and Sears 1940].Footnote 3 Recently, sociologists have reexamined these data using robust statistical techniques and extending the time frame to find no relationship between economic conditions and the number of racially motivated lynchings [Green et al. 1998]. Searching for the sources of racial and ethic prejudices, sociologists have found a link between demographics and demographic change and racial harassment [Green et al. 1998]. Economists initially entered this arena by analyzing why certain goods are provided through clubs instead of private markets [Buchanan 1965; Cornes and Sandler 1986]. The results of these inquiries generated rational choice models of group formation. As research evolved, economists began to incorporate the impact that social setting or interactions can have on individual decisions. Iannaccone [1992] and Berman [2000; 2003] demonstrate why rational, utility-maximizing individuals voluntarily sacrifice to join religious organizations, fraternities and sororities, communes, and political parties. Religious prohibitions discussed in Iannaccone [1992] come in many forms: Christian Scientists refuse medical care; Jehovah Witnesses do not celebrate birthdays or vote; and Orthodox Jewish males do not shake women's hands. Membership prohibitions also occur in various non-religious groups, including hate groups: skinheads, by definition, have shaved heads; during sorority rush members are not allowed to talk with incoming freshmen; and in the gang world the rival Crips and Bloods gangs do not use the first letter in the other group's name, so Crips will not speak the letter “B”; Bloods will not use the letter “C” and will replace it with a “B.”Footnote 4 The participation in such prohibitions reveals to other members that the individual is committed to the organization, and as such, grants an active member certain privileges and benefits. Joining reveals that these benefits of membership are greater than the cost associated with signaling commitment to the group. Looking at hate groups directly, Jefferson and Pryor [1999] use SPLC data for 1997 to analyze whether economic or sociological conditions can explain the existence of a hate group in a county. Because these data measure the number of groups, and not the number of members, they consider factors that might influence the level of intolerance in a county. Relying on cross-sectional variation, they proxy the influence of history and geography, government interference, frustration, status, anxiety, and social disintegration on whether a hate group is present in a county. Using a dichotomous dependent variable, they classify counties as either having or not having a hate group present as a sign of intolerance. Their results suggest that counties that are part of an MSA and within a state that was once a member of the Confederate States of America (CSA) are more likely to be home to an active hate group. They conclude that economic and sociological explanations “are far less important than adventitious circumstances due to history and particular condition.” This final conclusion gives communities little in the way of suggestions on how local governments might alter policy to reduce hate group activity. Jefferson and Pryor's logistic estimates report “coefficients [that] are statistically significant, but with the ‘wrong’ sign.” For instance, they find that a one standard deviation increase in the local property tax per capita in 1987 lowers the probability a hate group is present in 1997 by 3.5 percent. Thus their results suggest that, in the cross-section, a county with higher property taxes per capita is associated with fewer hate groups. This “wrong” property tax result suggests three possibilities (a) that the relationship is spurious, or (b) that local communities with greater tolerance also have higher property taxes, or (c) that local communities with higher property taxes also fund programs that improve the level of tolerance or at least reduce the benefit of hate group activity. More importantly this raises the possibility that local communities may not be hamstrung by historical condition. Policymakers may be able to alter the level of hate group activity within their local communities by altering their local fiscal policy. POSSIBLE REASONS FOR HATE GROUP FORMATION Often cited reasons for hate group formation include peer validation, frustration, scapegoating, and boredom. Groups form when a small number of like-minded individuals believe they have been wronged in a similar manner and are searching for ways to right perceived wrongs. Group formation provides its members with a sense of belonging, security, and empowerment. One hypothesis put forth by McDevitt and J. Levin [1993] is that the impetus for organizing is often based on turf issues. Much like Green et al. [1998], McDevitt uses Boston data and observes that many hate crimes involved violence directed at dissimilar others moving into a previously segregated area. Changes in demographics may be an important component of hate group formation, however, this conclusion again leaves local governments little guidance on how they might craft policy to reduce such conflicts. Individuals commonly cite the thrill associated with the victimization [Levin 1993]. By forming a group, these individuals validate themselves by “committing an act that enhances one's image internally, with a peer group, and with society at large” [Levin 1993]. In this sense, hate groups are much like gangs. In his work on gangs, Klein [1995] summarizes the psychological factors in his statement that “the gang is seen as an aggregate of individuals held together more by their own shared incapacities than by mutual goals. Primarily, group identification is important as it serves individual needs; it leads to delinquent group activity only secondarily and only in the absence of pro-social alternatives.” Although often established for ideological reasons, membership may also serve as a social safety net. The benefit of this security network is threefold: protection from violence imposed by other groups; transfers of resources in time of need; and a source of employment for those with limited skills. A hate group that is able to insure its member's safety and financial security, or at least provide financial support through unemployment spells, will have more active members willing to sacrifice in order to stay on good terms with their fellow members. If a member faces financial difficulty, he or she may first turn to their fellow members for assistance before seeking local government assistance. However, if the benefits provided by the local government agencies are large enough, or if law enforcement is able to maintain a high level of safety, or the local government's development efforts increase the number of job opportunities, then even those individuals who may consider joining a hate group in response to a feeling of being wronged, may find alternative ways to overcome their challenges. For example, schooling is both a function of quality and content. Parents who disagree with much of the public school content may not remove their child if they believe the overall quality is sufficiently high. However, as public school quality declines, the net benefit of removing their child increases.Footnote 5 This is especially true for parents who believe the content is inappropriate. Thus, these families do not interact with those who hold differing views and these biased views of the parents are more likely to be maintained and passed on. Disagreeing with many public school teachings, most neo-Nazis and many Christian Identity members choose to home school their children or send their children to private schools.Footnote 6 Therefore, ceteris paribus, as the quality of public schools increases, the likelihood that these biased views are maintained declines. Government programs, such as welfare, may enhance the net benefit of joining an active hate group. Hate group membership often requires certain prohibitions and costly signals, such as tattoos, piercings, and the like, that reduce labor market opportunities. Fewer labor market options manifest themselves through lower wages and possibly through reduced access to non-government assistance. Government supplied goods and services may serve to sustain active hate groups by reducing the net negative impact membership may have on labor market opportunities. For instance, government medical assistance may serve to offset the negative effect a costly signal may have on a member's access to employers that provide health insurance. GENERAL FACTS ABOUT HATE GROUPS The SPLC tracks hate groups by “using hate group publications and websites, citizen and law enforcement reports, field sources and news reports” Southern Poverty Law Center [SPLC]. Initiated in 1981, 1997 marks the first year the SPLC attempted to gather data for all known active hate group chapters by city.Footnote 7 Although the SPLC now tracks many types of organizations only the KKK, neo-Nazi, Racist Skinhead, and Christian Identity groups are available for every year from 1997 to 2007.Footnote 8 Hate groups are by no means identical. Each organization, as shown in Table 1, has different levels of prohibitions and goals. Racist Skinhead and neo-Nazi members, unlike KKK and Christian Identity members, often display tattoos or wear distinctive clothing to signal membership. Table 1 Hate group characteristicsFull size table Between 1997 and 2007, 793 US counties, or approximately 25 percent, were home to at least one active hate group.Footnote 9 Figure 2 shows the maximum number of KKK, neo-Nazi, Racist Skinheads, and Christian Identity chapters by county reported during any calendar year from 1997 to 2007. Between 1997 and 2007, Harris County, Texas, with seven chapters in 2006, and Cook County, Illinois, with seven chapters in 1997, 2005, and 2006, were home to the largest number of active hate group chapters during a single calendar year. Counties located in states that were part of the CSA are well represented and make up 43.4 percent of those reporting an active hate group throughout the period. However, over half of the counties reporting an active hate group were located outside the former CSA. In fact, of the 12 counties that report five or more active hate group chapters during a calendar year, only three: Harris, Texas in 2006 and 2007, Tarrant, Texas in 1998, and Spartanburg, South Carolina in 2005 and 2006 are located in states that were part of the CSA. Figure 2 Maximum annual number of active hate group chapters present in between 1997 and 2007. Full size image Figure 3 depicts the change in the number of active KKK, neo-Nazi, Racist Skinheads, and Christian Identity chapters present in 2007 compared to those active in 1997. Forty-one states are home to counties that experienced either an increase or decrease in the number of active hate group chapters. This suggests that, while history may be important, other more recent factors may also play a role in hate group activity. Ocean, New Jersey and Harris, Texas experienced the largest increase in the number of active hate groups with an increase of five. Four other counties: Dallas, Texas; Maricopa, Arizona; Davidson, Tennessee; and Forrest, Mississippi each witnessed an increase of three hate group chapters. According to the SPLC data, the two counties that had the greatest reduction in the number of active hate groups, San Diego County, California and Los Angeles County, California were home to four fewer hate groups in 2007 relative to the initial year of collection in 1997. Figure 3 Change in the number of active hate group chapters present between 1997 and 2007. Full size image Over the 10 years observed, 8.3 percent of the county-year observations report the presence of at least one active KKK, neo-Nazi, Racist Skinhead, or Christian Identity chapter, while 99 percent of counties reported no active hate group for at least one year. Counties reporting no active hate group for at least one year did so about 92 percent of the time. Counties reporting an active hate group for at least one year, were home to an active hate group about 33 percent of the time. Looking at the individual hate group types, 3.8 percent of the county-year observations report the presence of at least one active KKK chapter. Counties reporting an active KKK chapter for at least one year, were home to an active KKK chapter about 26 percent of the time. Neo-Nazi chapters look similar to KKK chapters with 4.1 percent of county-year observations reporting the presence of a neo-Nazi chapter. Only about 2 percent of counties were home to a neo-Nazi organization over the 10-year period. Because Racist Skinheads are much more transient than most other type of hate groups, counties that were home to a Racist Skinhead chapter reported an active chapter only 15 percent of the time. Christian Identity Churches were present in 3.5 percent of the counties. Christian Identity Churches were the least likely to disband. Counties that were home to a Christian Identity Church for at least one year, were home to an active church 34 percent of time. ESTIMATION METHOD While anecdotal evidence suggests that the number of chapters is positively correlated with the number of members, the SPLC does not report the number of members per chapter.Footnote 10 Therefore, changes in the number of chapters may be a poor measure of the level of activity. The formation of additional active hate group chapters from one year to the next may simply be a result of the splintering of one large group; the reduction in the number of groups may be the result of a merger. Following Jefferson and Pryor [1999], this analysis will focus on whether a county is home to any active hate group chapter and not the total number of active hate group chapters. In addition, because the SPLC uses “group publications and websites, citizen and law enforcement reports, field sources and news reports,” it is possible that a county is home to a hate group even though it is not reported as present for that calendar year. Therefore, using year-to-year variation may result in false negatives.Footnote 11 Furthermore, changes in government policy take time to affect individual's choices and behavior so that annual estimations using one-year lags may not capture the medium run effects of changes in government policy on hate group activity. To address these issues, I first construct a dichotomous variable: where yi,t equals one if an active hate group chapter is present in county i at time t and zero if no active hate group chapter is reported. I then estimate the effects of economic and social stability, demographics, and county government taxation and expenditures on the probability any hate group chapter is active in a county using the following equation: where yi,t is the presence of an active hate group, x i,t−lag is the vector of explanatory variables for county i in time period t−lag and β is the vector of parameters to be estimated. The time-invariant, county-specific effects represented by α i control for omitted variables that differ between counties but are constant over time and ɛi,t is assumed to be logistically distributed and independent of (xi,t−lag, α i ).Footnote 12 The year dummies, η t , control for omitted changes over time that affect all counties similarly. This fixed effects, or conditional, logistic estimation methodology relies on within county variation to estimate if a change in local government policy is associated with a changes in hate group activity within that county. Although this method reduces the variation in the measured magnitude of hate group activity, it focuses on whether any hate group was active and minimizes any errors associated with measuring the level of activity. To reduce the possibility of false negatives, the logistic estimation only looks at the presence of hate groups every 5 years. If a county is still home to an active hate group after 5 years, the likelihood of a false positive is unlikely. Conversely, if a county does not report an active hate group at either end of the 5-year interval, the probability that this results from a false negative is also quite small.Footnote 13 In addition, using 5-year intervals removes the possibility of first-order autocorrelation. Local government agencies may have little control over long-term economic stability, demographic changes, and those “circumstances due to history and particular condition.” However, local government officials may be able to alter policies so as to reduce the net benefit of starting or joining such an organization. Behavioral responses to government policy often take time to filter through the economy. Individuals must first realize and understand the policy change. Then, they must respond to the new government policies. I lag government policy variables by 10 years so that the estimation is more likely to capture any medium run effects these policies may have on hate group activity.Footnote 14 Following Honoré [2002], with T=2 and in the case for d2000 and d2007 equal to zero if no active hate group is present or one if an active hate group is present, the estimator used in this analysis is: Reducing this equation reveals that a fixed effect estimator does not rely on α i , Because the estimator considers counties where yi, 2002+yi, 2007=1, this method only considers counties that switch from being home to an active hate group to not or vice versa.Footnote 15 As stated by Honoré [2002], “[i]t is intuitively appealing that the individuals who do not switch, are not used to estimate β, those [counties] can be rationalized either by extremely large or by extremely small values of α i .” Counties that are always home to an active hate group, and thus report all ones, or are never home to an active hate group, and thus report all zeros for 2002 and 2007 are unused by this estimator. Fixed effects estimation relies on within county variation, or stated less generally, counties that realize a change in hate group activity. Figure 4 maps the location of these counties that realized a change in presence of hate group activity from 2002 to 2007. In 2002, 286 counties were home to at least one active KKK, neo-Nazi, Racist Skinhead, or Christian Identity chapter. Shown in blue, 168 counties, or about 58.7 percent of those reporting an active hate group in 2002, were no longer home to any active hate groups by 2007. One hundred and eighteen counties were home to active hate groups in both 2002 and 2007. By 2007, 263 counties reported an active KKK, neo-Nazi, Skinhead, or Christian Identity chapter and included 145 “red” counties that had reported no active hate groups in 2002. For both 2002 and 2007, 2,712 counties were never home to an active hate group. Figure 4 Change in hate group activity from 2002 to 2007. Full size image Table 2 displays the county-level summary statistics for each explanatory variable. To account for local levels of economic and social stability, the xi,t−lag vector includes the crime index, real median household income, the unemployment rate, and the poverty rate at the county level. Because levels and changes in demographic heterogeneity are often associated with increases in social tensions, I include sex and age measures, the percentage of blacks and Hispanics, and the population density. Each of these stability and demographic measures are lagged 2 years. Finally to determine the effects of local government policies, I include the real per capita property taxes and expenditures on education, library, welfare, hospital services, health care, highway, transportation, police, fire, corrections, housing and development, and utilities.Footnote 16 Because state and local government policy changes often take time to filter throughout the locality, each measure of local property taxes and expenditures is lagged 10 years. Table 2 Summary statisticsFull size table ESTIMATION RESULTS The results of the Hausman test supporting the use of fixed effects is reported in Table 3. The Hausman test reveals that the random effects estimator, although more efficient, violates one or more assumptions, and returns estimators significantly different from the fixed effects estimation. Therefore the results of the fixed effects logistic estimation are reported in Table 4. The results report standard errors clustered by county in order to account for non-random errors within each panel [Rogers 1993; Williams 2000; and Wooldridge 2002]. Table 3 Hausman testFull size table Table 4 Fixed effects logit estimationFull size table Controlling for unobserved heterogeneity across counties results in an imprecisely estimated effect of a change in per capita property taxes. This result differs from the negative cross-sectional relationship found by Jefferson and Pryor [1999]. Although higher property taxes are associated with less hate group activity in the cross-section, an increase in property taxes is not associated with any change in hate group activity within a county. Reinforcing Green et al. [1998], the results show no relationship between the unemployment rate and median income and the presence of an active hate group. However, economic welfare, as measured by the poverty rate, suggests a slightly different story. A one percentage point increase in the poverty rate, or an increase of about one-fifth of a standard deviation, is associated with a 17.5 percent increase in the probability that an active hate group is present.Footnote 17 Those households falling below the poverty line are likely to seek out reasons for their welfare loss. Looking for a scapegoat, individuals may be attracted to organizations that are more extreme, including hate groups. These results differ from the individual level analysis of Hezbollah and Israeli Jews by Krueger and Maleckova [2003]. They find a positive relationship between living above the poverty line or exposure to secondary education and participation in Hezbollah. In addition, they show that Israeli Jews who attack Palestinians are “overwhelmingly from high-paying occupations.” The difference may lie in the level of estimation. It may also point to a difference between domestic hate groups and international organizations such as Hezbollah. Hate groups in the United States may have fewer resources with which to carry out their plans. More research is needed to determine differences between these domestic and international organizations. Attempting to reduce the impact of poverty through welfare payments does not, however, appear to be associated with a reduction in hate group activity. In fact, the reverse is true. A one standard deviation increase in per capita welfare spending, just over $126, is associated with a 50.5 percent increase in the likelihood that an active hate group is present. By granting a greater amount of welfare payments, policymakers may reduce the net costs of signaling membership. Moreover, for groups that are more mobile, like Racist Skinheads and neo-Nazis, these higher welfare benefits may actually attract these individuals to local communities that provide greater welfare benefits. Unfortunately, policymakers searching for ways to help those in need, while at the same time seeking ways to reduce hate group activity, may need to look for other ways to improve the lives of those at or below the poverty line. Transportation expenditures also appear correlated with reductions in hate group activity. A $1 per capita increase in transportation expenditures is associated with a 0.7 percent reduction in the probability that a hate group is present. Although further research is needed, one possibility is that funding public transportation may provide a public good that lowers the cost of daily commutes from areas with few job opportunities to areas with greater job opportunity. Greater provision of public transportation may reduce the costs of searching for a job and switching jobs. Other measures of government policy included do not appear to be associated with hate group activity. Although race is not associated with hate group activity, the percent of a county that is female between the ages of 5 and 14 is positively correlated with the likelihood that a hate group is present. A county experiencing a one percentage point increase in the portion of its female population between 5 and 14 years of age is almost four times more likely to be home to an active hate group. While an increase in males between the ages of 5–14 years reduces the probability that an active hate group is present. CONCLUSION Although economic and sociological explanations may be less important than history or particular condition, government officials may be able to craft policies that reduce hate group activity. Local and state policymakers looking for a fiscal tool to reduce the presence of active hate groups may wish to look toward polices that target poverty and transportation. Unfortunately, the results suggest that enhanced welfare payments that lower the burden of those below the poverty line may exacerbate the problem of hate group activity. Welfare payments may serve to reduce the net loss in labor income associated with hate group membership. However, it may also be the case that poverty and welfare payments capture some other omitted factor not controlled for in the logistic estimation. These results differ from those found by Krueger and Maleckova [2003] and may speak to subtle differences between domestic hate groups and international organizations. There may be other avenues for policymakers seeking to reduce the incentives to create and join hate groups. Various policies, such as hate crime legislation and enforcement, that focus directly on hate group activities may further reduce their presence. Further research is needed in this area if we are to reduce or eliminate the desire of individuals to express their frustrations through organizations that are built on extreme ideological grounds. Notes 1.The number of groups and the number of affiliations have changed over time. The analysis below includes the KKK, neo-Nazis, Skinheads, and Christian Identity Churches from 2002 to 2007. 2.For a discussion of historical literature and a fresh look at old analyses, see Green et al. [1998]. 3.For a detailed survey on the sociology of social interactions see Weber [1978]. 4.So instead of using the word cigar they will say “bigar.” 5.Hoxby [1998] shows that as per pupil school spending decreases, drop-out rates increase. Accounting for both the possible endogeneity of private enrollment and public expenditures — switching endogeneity — as well as possible Tiebout sorting, Goldhaber [1999] finds that increases in public school expenditure per pupil significantly reduces private school enrollment. 6.In 1999, before the Aryan Nations lost their Idaho compound, Salon writer and associate editor, Amy Benfer, discussed her daughter's public schooling experience with one of the Neo-Nazi women: “They taught her that the Indians saved the Pilgrims’ lives,” Christian [a neo-Nazi mother] says. Then came Black History Month, when the children learned about Martin Luther King Jr. Says Christian: “My daughter is not black. My daughter has no need to know about a black activist.” 7.Although the SPLC reports hate group location by city or town, the analysis is performed at the county level for both theoretical and empirical reasons: First, many hate groups chapters hold rallies and recruitment meetings outside their home towns in locations nearby and thus have members from the surrounding towns and townships. Second, because many of these towns are not in Metropolitan Statistical Areas, county level data represent the least aggregated measures of crime, schooling, unemployment, and the like that are available. 8.In 2000, the SPLC began monitoring Neo-Confederate organizations. This study does not include those organizations because of their initial omission by the SPLC, nor does it include Black Separatists. 9.Not all active hate groups can be assigned to a single county. For instance the SPLC reports an active chapter of the Knights of the White Kamellia (KKK) present in NC, but does not list a city. When no city is reported, the hate group is not included in the analysis. The portion of active groups not included ranges from 1.2 percent in 1998 to 12.8 percent in 2007. 10.For two discussions on the correlation between number of active chapters and membership see Intelligence Report [2000] and The Stephen Roth Institute [2004]. 11.An anonymous referee is responsible for this helpful point. 12.Assuming that hate groups did not alter their voting behavior over this time period, using fixed effects partially addresses any worry that hate groups “may vote for policies that reduce the local government provision of services” [Glaeser 2005]. 13.Given the SPLC's data collection method, a county reporting no active hate groups may still be home to a hate group. It is possible that the hate group chapters simply did not draw attention to themselves for that calendar year. In order to determine the effects of this possibility, I construct alternative measures that assumed a county was hate group free only if that county witnessed no hate group activity over multiple years. If an active hate group is present during any one of these years, I assume that the hate group was simply silent during the others and continued to be present over the entire time period.Using this methodology, I construct three alternative dependent variables: one that assumes a hate group must be silent for 2 years before I consider it disbanded; one for 3 years; and one for 4 years. Repeating the estimation in Table 4 using these three alternative dependent variable measures reveals qualitatively and quantitatively similar results. Results are available from the author upon request. 14.Lagging the taxes and expenditures by 10 years follows Jefferson and Pryor's [1999] methodology. 15.Because 1997 was the first year the SPLC attempted to collect data on all known hate groups, the SPLC's methodology may still have been in its infancy. The SPLC may have found fewer groups in 1997 simply because they were learning how to locate these various types of organizations. Therefore, comparing the growth from 1997 to any following year may simply be due to improved methodology and not an actual increase in the number of existing groups. To avoid this possibility, I chose to analyze hate group activity (a) a few years after their initial collection of 1997 so that much of the initial learning process had occurred and (b) for years when the Census of Governments, reported every 5 years on the 2s and 7s, is available. 16.Though measured at the county level, the expenditures reported include those by sub-county, county, sub-state, and some state-wide agencies. “Most local governments [or sub-state agencies] in the United States operate entirely within a single county area, but there are some units whose territory extends into two or more county areas. Each of these inter-county governments is counted only once in this report and has been assigned for the purposes of enumeration to the county area where its headquarters is located, or in the case of municipal governments, to the county area having the largest share of its population” [Compendium of Government Finances 1997].Local expenditures measured at the county level are also a function of intergovernmental transfers of revenue both to and from federal and state governments. Those programs that are directly administered by the state are not included in the county-level data. Programs that are funded by the state and federal government but are administered by sub-state agencies are included in the measure of county-level expenditures. 17.Though the marginal effects would reveal additional information, they are not available for the fixed effect model because individual effects, which are needed to calculate the marginal effect, are not consistently estimated with fixed effects logit [Wooldridge 2002]. References Anti Defamation League Website. 2005. http://www.adl.org/, (accessed February 4, 2005). Berman, Eli. 2000. Sect, Subsidy, and Sacrifice: An Economist's View of Ultra-Orthodox Jews. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115 (3): 905–953. Article  Google Scholar  Berman, Eli. 2003. Hamas, Taliban, and the Jewish Underground: An Economist's View of Radical Religious Militias, National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper. No. 10004. Buchanan, James. 1965. An Economic Theory of Clubs. Economica, 32: 1–14. 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Google Scholar  Download references Acknowledgements Beneficial suggestions were received from seminar participants at the 2005 Eastern Economic Association Meetings, the 2005 Mid-west Economic Association Meetings, the 2005 Southern Economic Association Meetings, College of the Holy Cross, Lebanon Valley College, Macon State College, Mercer Univerisity, and Stonehill College. I extend my gratitude to Scott L. Baier, Scott A. Beaulier, Barry R. Chiswick, Angela K. Dills, Rey Hernandez-Julian, Robert Tollison, the editor, and anonymous referees for their valuable comments. Errors or deficiencies that have to this point survived this counsel are most assuredly mine alone. Author information Affiliations Department of Economics, Stonehill College, 320 Washington Street, Easton, 02357, MA, USA Sean E Mulholland Authors Sean E MulhollandView author publications You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar DATA APPENDIX DATA APPENDIX crime comes from the Uniform Crime Reports County Data. 1997–2005. (Retrieved June 20, 2006), from the University of Virginia, Geospatial and Statistical Data Center: http://fisher.lib.virginia.edu/collections/stats/crime/. income is the median household income in thousands ($1000s) of 2006 dollars by county as reported by the US Census Bureau, State and County Income and Poverty Estimates (SAIPE) from 1997 through 2005. http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/saipe/county.html (viewed July 10, 2008). unemployment rate is the annual average percent of county residents who are unemployed and looking for a job as reported by the United States Department of Labor: Bureau of Labor Statistics. Labor Force Data by County, Annual Averages (viewed July 10, 2008): ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests/la/laucnty97.txt ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests/la/laucnty98.txt ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests/la/laucnty99.txt ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests/la/laucnty00.txt ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests/la/laucnty01.txt ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests/la/laucnty02.txt ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests/la/laucnty03.txt ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests/la/laucnty04.txt ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests/la/laucnty05.txt poverty is the portion of a county's residents that are below a household income threshold as reported by the US Census Bureau, State and County Income and Poverty Estimates (SAIPE) from 1997 through 2005. http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/saipe/county.html (viewed July 10, 2008). adult male is the percentage of the county population that is male and between the ages of 15 and 44. US Census Bureau, Population Division: County estimates by demographic characteristics — age, sex, race, and Hispanic Origin. http://www.census.gov/popest/datasets.html (viewed July 15, 2008) US Census Bureau, Population Division. adult female is the percentage of the county population that is female and between the ages of 15 and 44. US Census Bureau, Population Division: County estimates by demographic characteristics — age, sex, race, and Hispanic Origin. http://www.census.gov/popest/datasets.html (viewed July 15, 2008). male youth is the percentage of the county population that is male and between the ages of 5–14 (1997–1999) or 5–13 (2000–2005). US Census Bureau, Population Division: County estimates by demographic characteristics age, sex, race, and Hispanic Origin. http://www.census.gov/popest/datasets.html (viewed July 15, 2008). female youth is the percentage of the county population that is female and between the ages of 5–14 (1997–1999) or 5–13 (2000–2005). US Census Bureau, Population Division: County estimates by demographic characteristics — age, sex, race, and Hispanic Origin. http://www.census.gov/popest/datasets.html (viewed July 15, 2008). black is the percentage of county population that is black. US Census Bureau, Population Division: County estimates by demographic characteristics — age, sex, race, and Hispanic Origin. http://www.census.gov/popest/datasets.html (viewed July 15, 2008). hispanic is the percentage of the county population that is Hispanic. US Census Bureau, Population Division: County estimates by demographic characteristics — age, sex, race, and Hispanic Origin. http://www.census.gov/popest/datasets.html (viewed July 15, 2008). msa is the Metropolitan Statistical Area reported by the Population Division, US Census Bureau in 1999 and updated in 2003: http://www.census.gov/population/estimatecity/99m.ps.txt (viewed January 29, 2007). population density is calculated from the county population in US Census Bureau, Population Division: County estimates by demographic characteristics — age, sex, race, and Hispanic Origin (viewed July 15, 2008) divided by the land area in square miles from the US Census Bureau (viewed January 29, 2007). hate group total is the total number of hate group chapters active in a county. This variable is the sum of all Ku Klux Klan (KKK), neo-Nazi, Racist Skinheads, and Christian Identity chapters active at the county level. These data are reported annually at the city level by the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC) in their quarterly publication the Intelligence Report. Each annual report reports activity for the previous year. The Southern Poverty Law Center [1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008]. kkk is the total number of KKK chapters active in a county. These data are reported annually at the city level by the SPLC in their quarterly publication of the Intelligence Report, Issues 85, 89, 93, 97, 101, 105, 109, 114, 117, 121, 125, 129. nazi is the number of neo-Nazi chapters active in county. These data are reported annually at the city level by the SPLC in their quarterly publication of the Intelligence Report, Issues 85, 89, 93, 97, 101, 105, 109, 114, 117, 121, 125, 129. skinheads is the number of Racists Skinhead chapters active in a county. These data are reported annually at the city level by the SPLC in their quarterly publication of the Intelligence Report, Issues 85, 89, 93, 97, 101, 105, 109, 114, 117, 121, 125, 129. identity is the number of Christian Identity Churches active in a county. These data are reported annually at the city level by the SPLC in their quarterly publication of the Intelligence Report, Issues 85, 89, 93, 97, 101, 105, 109, 114, 117, 121, 125, 129. consumer price index is from the United States Department of Labor: Bureau of Labor Statistics: Consumer Price Index. Washington, D.C. ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests/cpi/cpiai.txt (viewed July 10, 2008). property tax are “taxes conditioned on ownership of property and measured by its value. Includes general property taxes related to property as a whole, real and personal, tangible or intangible, whether taxed at a single rate or at classified rates, and taxes on selected types of property, such as motor vehicles, or on certain or all intangibles.” These measures come from the United States Census. Census of Government. Volume 4. Government Finances. Number 5, Compendium of Government Finances. education expenditures includes “schools, colleges, and other educational institutions (e.g., for blind, deaf, and other handicapped individuals), and educational programs for adults, veterans, and other special classes.” These measures come from the United States Census. Census of Government. Volume 4. Government Finances. Number 5, Compendium of Government Finances. library expenditures are “provision and support of public library facilities and services.” These measures come from the United States Census. Census of Government. Volume 4. Government Finances. Number 5, Compendium of Government Finances. welfare expenditures “includes institutional and noninstitutional assistance to the needy, plus the administration of such assistance.” These measures come from the United States Census. Census of Government. Volume 4. Government Finances. Number 5, Compendium of Government Finances. hospital expenditures consists of “financing, construction acquisition, maintenance or operation of hospital facilities, provision of hospital care, and support of public or private hospitals.” These measures come from the United States Census. Census of Government. Volume 4. Government Finances. Number 5, Compendium of Government Finances. health expenditures includes “outpatient health services, other than hospital care, including public health administration; research and education; categorical health programs; treatment and immunization clinics; nursing; environmental health activities such as air and water pollution control; ambulance service if provided separately from fire protection services, and other general public health activities such as mosquito abatement. School health services provided by health agencies (rather than school agencies) and included here.” These measures come from the United States Census. Census of Government. Volume 4. Government Finances. Number 5, Compendium of Government Finances. highway expenditures include “construction, maintenance, and operation of highways, streets, and related structures, including toll highways, bridges, tunnels, ferries, street lighting and snow and ice removal. However, highway policing and traffic control are classed under Police Protection.” These measures come from the United States Census. Census of Government. Volume 4. Government Finances. Number 5, Compendium of Government Finances. transportation expenditures “comprises the functions of Highways, Air Transportation, Parking Facilities, Water Transport and Terminals, and Transit Subsidies.” These measures come from the United States Census. Census of Government. Volume 4. Government Finances. Number 5, Compendium of Government Finances. police expenditures consists of “[l]ocal government payments for police and traffic safety activities amount to the most significant part of police protection.” These measures come from the United States Census. Census of Government. Volume 4. Government Finances. Number 5, Compendium of Government Finances. fire expenditures includes “fire fighting organization and auxiliary services; fire inspection and investigation; support of volunteer fire forces; and other fire prevention activities. Includes cost of fire fighting facilities, such as fire hydrants and water, furnished by other agencies of the government.” These measures come from the United States Census. Census of Government. Volume 4. Government Finances. Number 5, Compendium of Government Finances. corrections expenditures consists of “state prisons, reformatories, houses of correction, and other state institutions for the confinement and correction of convicted persons and juveniles. Includes only state-operated facilities; excludes cost of maintaining prisoners in institutions of other governments.” These measures come from the United States Census. Census of Government. Volume 4. Government Finances. Number 5, Compendium of Government Finances. housing and development expenditures “comprises the functions Natural Resources, Parks and Recreation, Housing and Community Development, Sewerage, and Sanitation Other Than Sewerage.” These measures come from the United States Census. Census of Government. Volume 4. Government Finances. Number 5, Compendium of Government Finances. utilities expenditures includes “government owned and operated water supply, electric light and power, gas supply, or transit system.” These measures come from the United States Census. Census of Government. Volume 4. Government Finances. Number 5, Compendium of Government Finances. Rights and permissions Reprints and Permissions About this article Cite this article Mulholland, S. Hate Fuel: On the Relationship Between Local Government Policy and Hate Group Activity. Eastern Econ J 36, 480–499 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1057/eej.2009.38 Download citation Published: 22 September 2010 Issue Date: 01 September 2010 DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/eej.2009.38 Keywords clubs hate groups poverty welfare JEL Classifications I3 R5 Download PDF Advertisement Over 10 million scientific documents at your fingertips Switch Edition Academic Edition Corporate Edition Home Impressum Legal information Privacy statement California Privacy Statement How we use cookies Manage cookies/Do not sell my data Accessibility Contact us Not logged in - 128.182.81.34 North East Research Libraries (8200828607) - LYRASIS (3000176756) - Carnegie Mellon University (3000133174) - Carnegie Mellon University Hunt Library (1600047252) Springer Nature © 2021 Springer Nature Switzerland AG. Part of Springer Nature. \ 
work_ke2goxb72bfwleafqe3j63v7bm	----	Indian Journal of Psychiatry 56(1), Jan-Mar 2014 1 same-sex conduct.[1] National and International Human rights groups condemned the Supreme Court decision. The Naz Foundation and the Government of India have since filed a petition seeking review of the judgment.[6,7] They argue that there are a number of grave errors of law that need to be corrected. The judgment goes against the grain of the Supreme Court’s own jurisprudence on advancement of fundamental rights and freedoms of all people, especially those who face marginalization in society. The Court’s reliance on the principle of judicial restraint and Parliament’s prerogative to change laws is misplaced, particularly when the law has been challenged for violation of fundamental rights of citizens.[3] The judgment raises significant constitutional issues with far reaching public importance. There is a need to seek an interim stay on the operation of the judgment, as the judgment has caused immense prejudice to all adult persons who engage in consensual sex. This is particularly true for those from the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender (LGBT) community who had become open about their sexual identity since the High Court judgment and are now at risk of prosecution under criminal law.[7] Historical records document the presence of homosexuality from time immemorial, even in our culture. The universality of same-sex expression coexists with variations in its meaning and practice across culture. Medicine and psychiatry, since the 1970’s, abandoned pathologizing same- sex orientation, behavior and LGBT life-style choices.[8] The new understanding was based on studies that documented a high prevalence of same-sex feelings and behavior in men and women, its prevalence across cultures and among almost all non-human primate species.[9] Investigations using psychological tests could not differentiate heterosexual from homosexual orientation. Research also demonstrated India’s Supreme Court recently issued a ruling against human rights by reinstating a law that bans gay sex.[1] The Court restored Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code, a 19th century law, barring “carnal intercourse against the order of nature”. The judgment has caused great dismay among liberal and progressive people and amongst activists and advocacy groups, which use judicial intervention to redress grievances against minorities of all shades in India. It has also been criticized from legal and human rights perspectives.[2-4] The police use the law in question to threaten and blackmail gays, lesbians and transgender people. Violation of the law is punishable by a fine and imprisonment. Following the recent ruling, India’s crimes bureau has stated that it will compile crime statistics under Section 377. The British colonial Government enacted Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code, based on Victorian morality, to criminalize non-procreative sex. The Naz Foundation, a non-Governmental Organization working in the field of human immunodeficiency virus/acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (HIV/AIDS) and sexual health, challenged the constitutional validity of Section 377 because it violated the rights to privacy, to dignity and health, to equality and non- discrimination and to freedom of expression. It also argued that the law prevented public health efforts at reducing the risk of transmission of HIV/AIDS as the fear of prosecution prevented people from discussing their sexuality and life style. The Delhi High Court on 2nd July 2009, in a landmark judgment, held Section 377 to be violative of Articles 21, 14 and 15 of the Constitution, as it criminalized consensual sexual acts of adults in private.[5] Individuals and faith-based group appealed the High Court verdict. The Supreme Court of India, on 11th December 2013, upheld Section 377 and overturned the judgment of the Delhi High Court that had decriminalized adult consensual edItorIal The reversal on Gay Rights in India T. S. Sathyanarayana Rao, K. S. Jacob1 Departments of Psychiatry, JSS Medical College, Mysore, Karnataka, 1Christian Medical College, Vellore, Tamil Nadu, India Access this article online Website: www.indianjpsychiatry.org Quick Response Code DOI: 10.4103/0019-5545.124706 How to cite this article: Sathyanarayana Rao TS, Jacob KS. The reversal on Gay Rights in India. Indian J Psychiatry 2014;56:1-2. Address for correspondence: Dr. T. S. Sathyanarayana Rao, Department of Psychiatry, JSS Medical College, Mysore, Karnataka, India. E-mail: tssrao19@yahoo.com >'RZQORDGHG�IUHH�IURP�KWWS���ZZZ�LQGLDQMSV\FKLDWU\�RUJ�RQ�7KXUVGD\��-DQXDU\�����������,3�����������������@��__��&OLFN�KHUH�WR�GRZQORDG�IUHH�$QGURLG�DSSOLFDWLRQ�IRU�WKLV MRXUQDO https://market.android.com/details?id=comm.app.medknow https://market.android.com/details?id=comm.app.medknow Rao and Jacob: Reversal on Gay Rights Indian Journal of Psychiatry 56(1), Jan-Mar 20142 that people with homosexual orientation did not have any objective psychological dysfunction or impairments in judgment, stability and vocational capabilities. Psychiatric, psychoanalytic, medical and mental health professionals now consider homosexuality as a normal variation of human sexuality. It suggested that much of the distress faced by people with same-sex orientation is due to difficulties they face living in our predominantly heterosexual world.[8] Many countries have decriminalized same-sex orientation and behavior. Several liberal and progressive nations recognize LGBT rights to include human, civil and political rights. Many countries have also legally recognized same- sex civil partnerships, whereas some have even legalized same-sex marriages (e.g., Brazil, Canada, England, France, South Africa, Spain, Sweden and in some states in USA). LGBT rights laws include government recognition of same- sex relationships, civil unions and marriage, adoption and parenting. They also include anti-bullying legislation, anti-discrimination student, employment and housing laws, immigration equality, equal age of consent law and hate crime laws providing enhanced criminal penalties for prejudice-motivated violence against LGBT people. The United Nations Human Rights Council recognizes LGBT rights.[10] The Supreme Court judgment dismissed jurisprudence from around the globe related to LGBT rights, which have struck down such discriminatory laws on grounds of violation of privacy, dignity and autonomy of individuals. It also rejected international human rights law on sexual orientation and gender identity. The distinction between justice and law is crucial,[11] particularly when a 19th century law is interpreted in the 21st century context. The demand for justice brings a case before the law; this demand puts the law at issue. The law requires an extension or a reinterpretation when the demand for justice exceeds the law or brings new issues before it. Justice, then, renews the law – makes it new; extends its hold. The law can never escape from this demand for justice since it is a demand that can never be finally met. The law-justice couple gives us a sense of how the demands of a context, the call of justice, demands a creative citing of the law in relation to the questions that present before it. Judges may opt to close off the call of justice and renew the rule of the law in relation to the new question that is presented. Alternatively, they may take up the challenge and rethink/remake/cite the law as best as they can in ways that measure up to the call of justice. The Supreme Court judgment, which upheld Section 377, is value-laden and seemingly allowed personal ideological views to determine the interpretation of statutory law. The ruling has disregarded the constitutional vision of an equal and inclusive society and has violated the fundamental tenets of India’s Constitution. The suggestion that that Parliament is “free to consider the desirability and propriety of deleting Section 377 I.P.C. from the statute book or amend the same” is disingenuous, given the fractious nature of India’s current Parliament, the conservative views of many of its members and the political stakes in the run- up to 2014 general elections.[3] Humanity in general needs to become more tolerant of diversity. Majorities within democracies need to view minority groups and those who differ from them with respect. We need to focus on other people’s humanity rather than on their sexuality. We should voice our concerns against the Supreme Court verdict. It is also time for social groups and professional associations to clearly state their positions and demand a review of the flawed verdict. The Indian government and its Parliament now have an opportunity to leave a lasting legacy of progress and should act immediately to seek a repeal of Section 377. The 19th century law has no place in a 21st century democracy. 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work_kecso2bwn5dyti5ci7ejoeioga	----	Microsoft Word - Hate and Punishment - June 4 rev.doc Hate and Punishment Antti Kauppinen Trinity College Dublin Final draft, June 4, 2014 For The Journal of Interpersonal Violence Special issue on hate crime, edited by Christian Munthe and David Brax. According to the view I will call Legal Expressivism (LE), neither crime nor punishment consists merely in intentionally imposing some kind of harm on another. Both also have an expressive aspect. In terms I will be using, they are what they are in part because they enact attitudes towards others – in the case of crime, some kind of disrespect, at least, and in the case of punishment, society’s condemnation or reprobation. Indeed, punishment is justified, at least in part, because (and when) it uniquely expresses fitting condemnation or other retributive attitude. Hate or bias crimes dramatize the expressive aspect of crime, since they typically, and sometimes by design, send a message of inferiority to the victim’s group and society at large. Treating the enactment of contempt and denigration towards a historically underprivileged group as an aggravating factor in sentencing may be an appropriate way to counter this message, since it reaffirms and indeed realizes the fundamental equality of all members of a democratic community. Elements of Legal Expressivism can be found in the work of many legal thinkers.1 Yet virtually every aspect of the story has been called into question by critics. In this paper, I will refine the LE account and respond to some of the criticisms. I will begin with the notion of an attitude and its relation to emotion, and argue that the two should not be assimilated.                                                                                                                 1 See in particular Joel Feinberg (1965), Jeffrie Murphy & Jean Hampton (1988), Jean Hampton (1992), Martha Nussbaum & Dan Kahan (1996), Dan Kahan (1996, 2001), Elizabeth Anderson & Richard Pildes (2000), Antony Duff (2001), and Christopher Bennett (2006).   2 I’ll also distinguish between two ways of expressing attitudes: enactment and symbolic expression. Hate crimes, in these terms, are crimes that enact hate, contempt, or disgust towards someone on account of identity-defining group membership. How can expressing such attitudes justify enhanced punishment? I begin by discussing appeal to a special kind of harm caused by hate crime and expressing attitudes in general, and argue that no kind of additional harm suffices to provide a rationale for enhanced punishment for hate crime. Instead, we need to turn to the LE framework. On this picture, wrongdoing is not merely about causing harm, but is rather a function of attitudes towards others (or, equivalently, the valuations) that our actions embody. Punishment manifests reactive attitudes, and is justified in terms of countering the evaluation implicit in the criminal’s behaviour. I take up various criticisms of LE, and argue that they fail to damage the most plausible version, which appeals to the conceptual link between punishment and protecting the status of inviolability that all citizens have in a democratic community in justifying legal condemnation. This is a kind of mixed theory of punishment, since it has both backward-looking elements (punishment expresses reactive attitudes) and forward-looking ones (reactive attitudes are fitting because of their role in protecting the inviolable status of the victim). Given this understanding of crime and punishment in general, we can see the proper place of hate crime legislation. Hate crime is a greater wrong than the parallel crime, because it enacts attitudes that pose a graver threat to the inviolability of all members of the target group. In response, the right kind of hate crime legislation reaffirms the equality of all citizens as a fundamental democratic value. It expresses the determination on the part of members of the democratic community not to allow anyone to be treated as an object of disgust, contempt, or disdain, as a lower kind of being merely in virtue of belonging to a   3 group that is for some reason disvalued. In so doing, it preserves the equal status of all citizens, since such status supervenes on enacting reactive attitudes towards violations. 1. Attitudes and Their Manifestations I will begin with the notion of an attitude or sentiment, since it is crucial to any LE account. Though the term is sometimes used loosely, an attitude is distinct from an emotion or passion or affect. Rather, an attitude is a way of relating to someone or something that disposes one to have different emotions in different situations, to want certain things, to focus attention on certain things, to deliberate in certain ways, and possibly to make use of evidence in certain ways (cf. Anderson & Pildes 2000, 1509). My attitudes show how much I value someone or something. Thus, if I love someone, I will feel joy when she thrives and sadness if she suffers, I want her to do well for her own sake and am committed to doing things that further her good, I notice things that are opportunities or threats for her, I take those opportunities and threats into account in practical deliberation as reasons for action, and may be more likely to believe that she is excellent at her job than the evidence warrants. Perhaps there is a distinct feeling of love that goes with the attitude, but love itself is more than that feeling. Moreover, in the case of an attitude like love, I welcome or endorse the reactions associated with the sentiment, rather than being in their grip. In one sense of the word, I can identify with the pattern of passive responses. Only once I do so, the attitude will be genuinely mine. This doesn’t mean that the attitude is under direct voluntary control, but neither is it purely passive, as it is sometimes portrayed. In fact, there is plausibly an asymmetry between our control over loving someone and not loving them. We can’t will love into existence, but we may be able to will it out of existence. That is, if thoughts about   4 someone give rise to no positive feeling or spontaneously focus our attention, there’s nothing we can directly do to change that. That’s the problem with some arranged marriages. In contrast, if I’m already in a relationship and find myself spontaneously attracted to a co- worker, say, I may well be able to deliberately set aside the feelings and refocus my attention on something else, and catch myself before falling in love. Hate, as I understand it, is in many ways the mirror image of love. If I hate someone, I want her to do badly, whether or not it is of instrumental benefit for me. I feel bad if she does well, get easily angry with her, and may be delighted if misfortune befalls her. I tend to notice things that are opportunities or threats, and take those as reasons for action – though obviously in the opposite way to the case of love. In full-blown hate, I don’t regard these dispositions as something I want to get rid of, but embrace them, perhaps even take pride in them. Again, I may not be able to will hate into existence, but still able to will it out of existence. Perhaps I realize that I’m responding to Jewish people in the same negative way, regardless of their individual qualities. Insofar as I refuse the allow these feelings and thoughts to influence my deliberation and action, I am not a full-blown anti-semite – though of course, I’m not quite innocent either, until and unless the passive responses cease. I don’t want to exaggerate the similarities between hate and love, however. One important difference between them is that hate may be entirely impersonal, as Thomas Brudholm (2010, 295) emphasizes – the individual characteristics of the hated person need not matter, if she is hated on account of belonging to a group. Relatedly, unlike resentment or indignation, hate does not essentially seek punishment of its target for what she’s done. There doesn’t have to be a wrong that should or could be repaid or forgiven, although hate may of course be triggered by wrongdoing as well. As Brudholm observes, even when it is a   5 kind of personal reactive attitude, hate targets the character of the person rather than particular actions (ibid., 306–307). One important consequence of the general picture of attitudes I have introduced is that unlike occurrent emotions, attitudes are not transparent. It may be that you can’t be mistaken about whether you feel joy or sadness or rage right now, but you can be mistaken about whether you love someone – or whether you hate someone. When having an attitude goes against social norms, false belief about it may even be the normal condition. In many circles, anti-semitism, for example, is very disreputable, so people who are prejudiced towards Jews may sincerely but falsely believe that they are not. Other people can be better judges of our attitudes than we are ourselves. We can manifest or express our attitudes in two different ways. We can do so by way of using language or some other convention-based system of signs that is designed to convey our stance to others. I can express my love to my wife by telling her that I love her or by making her something she likes. As I use the term, the expression relation is non-causal, non-factive, and not necessarily intentional. Speech and symbols can express psychological states we don’t actually have, as happens when we’re insincere. They can also express attitudes we’re not aware of having or don’t mean to express. Otherwise psychoanalysts would go out of business. The other way of expressing attitudes is acting in a way that is best made sense of by attributing the attitude to the agent. I’ll talk about enacting the attitude in this case to contrast it with symbolic expression. For example, I enact my love for someone by going out of my way to comfort her when she is in need, whether or not I say anything about my feelings. I just express the love by performing the actions that it motivates me to do. Now, as I’ve defined enacting, it is also potentially non-factive. It may be that what makes best sense of   6 my behaviour is an attitude I don’t actually have. It may be that what I do and the way I do it is such that any reasonable person, well-versed in my cultural context would conclude that I love someone, were they the examine my behaviour, when in fact I am entirely indifferent. Still, on my view, I have enacted love, and people who attributed the attitude to me would be justified in doing so, though mistaken about my mental states. Or, to put it differently, they would be mistaken about my actual attitudes, but not about the attitude embodied by my behaviour. It is a common mistake in this context to liken or assimilate this kind of expression to linguistic meaning (see e.g. Hampton 1992, Adler 2000). In enactment, convention plays at best an indirect role, and its pragmatic effects are very different. My view belongs to what we may call the externalist family, since according to it the meaning of an action isn’t determined by what goes on inside the agent’s (or any particular interpreter’s) mind. Instead, “to grasp the expressive meaning of an act, we try to make sense of it by fitting it into an interpretive context ... [A] proposed interpretation must make sense in light of the community's other practices, its history, and shared meanings.” (Anderson & Pildes 2000, 1525). Think about a case of everyday jealousy. A friend of mine is a very good singer and musician. Recently, he went to a wedding party with his wife, who urged him to grab an acoustic guitar lying around. When he reluctantly did so, some twenty-something girls gathered around him, showering him with requests and adulation. He complied with the requests and welcomed the adulation, with the result that his wife subsequently accused him of flirting with the girls. My friend felt unfairly judged, since he wasn’t in fact interested in the young women (or so he says). However, his wife had a point, too: his behaviour did reasonably express an interest. Without going too deep into what makes for a reasonable interpretation, a good starting point is asking oneself about the goals that an informed and rational agent in the relevant cultural context would pursue by engaging in the observed kind   7 of behaviour. There will inevitably be indeterminacy here, but that is the kind of fact of life that must often be acknowledged in the context of law. One relevant issue in this area will be whether groups of people, such as legislatures or courts, can have or express attitudes above and beyond the attitudes of the individuals that comprise them. The philosophical pendulum has swung in the direction of the legitimacy of attributing group attitudes (see e.g. Tuomela 2007; List & Pettit 2011). Following this tradition, I will take it as given that the attitudes of a collective (such as a state) are determined by the goals, assumptions, and inferences that enough of its relevant members jointly accept as the basis of collective action. As members of a group, people can take as given premises that they wouldn’t make use of in their personal practical or theoretical reasoning, which means that we can attribute to a group goals or beliefs that a minority of members, or no one, has. For example, military planners might agree to design an armament program starting from the assumption that the Chinese will have a new fighter plane in 2016, even if few of them personally think they will be ready yet. Which attitudes should be ascribe to a group, then? I will take Blackburn’s Credibility principle as a starting point: A group may be said to have been committed to a belief (goal, principle) if there is no way – no credible way – that the group could rationally sustain their open affirmations were they not also prepared to stand by the belief (goal, principle). (2010, 81) The most straightforward way a group can commit to a goal is announcing, after going through the procedures its members consider as authoritative, that it has decided to do such- and-such. Thus, the European Central Bank may make it known that it will lend money to Greece. But Credibility also leaves room for groups having beliefs and goals (and indeed attitudes) that are not directly affirmed by any of the relevant spokespeople. The ECB might be committed to preferring a rise in unemployment to a rise in inflation, if it couldn’t   8 credibly deny such a preference, given the pattern of past and present decisions, even if it is never openly affirmed by anyone. 2. Hate Crime and the Varieties of Harm No one, I think, would deny that some of the attitudes we have, such as hate or bias, are morally inappropriate. But should having or manifesting such attitudes be the business of the law, as advocates of hate crime and hate speech legislation want? Isn’t law concerned with our external behaviour rather than motives, as Kant, among others, argued? Is it right to punish one offender more strictly than another, if the only difference between them is in the quality of their motives? The commonly accepted starting point for answering these questions is the principle of proportionality: deserved punishment for a crime is a function of both the degree of wrongdoing and the degree of culpability or responsibility (see e.g. Al-Hakim and Dimmock 2012, 579ff). If hate crimes deserve a stricter punishment, they must either amount to a greater wrong or involve greater culpability. The latter, plausibly, is primarily determined by factors such as intentionality, presence of coercion or invincible ignorance, negligence, and so on. With respect to them, there is unlikely to be a systematic difference between hate crimes and parallel crimes. Much of the discussion about hate crime, including this paper, thus focuses on the difference in wrongdoing. What determines the degree of wrongdoing? One simple answer is that wrongdoing is at least in part a function of the degree of harm to others that an action causes. Perhaps rape is worse than sexual harassment, because it is more harmful to the victim. Along this line, some have defended stricter punishment for hate crimes on the grounds that they cause greater harm to the victim (Lawrence 1999; Iganski 2001; Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S.   9 476 (1993)). For example, there is some evidence that the psychological and physical harms of hate crime are likely to be more serious or more widespread than those of parallel crimes. However, Heidi Hurd and Michael Moore (2004) argue convincingly that enhanced punishment for hate crime cannot in fact be defended on the grounds that such crimes cause greater physical, psychological, collateral, or social harm than otherwise motivated crimes. This, they rightly point out, is a contingent matter. If a greed-motivated crime, say, causes the same harm, why should it be punished more lightly? Motivation here is only a poor proxy for what really makes for the degree of seriousness of crime, namely harm (Hurd & Moore 2004, 1086).2 Similarly, if it is morally worse to harm someone who is in a vulnerable position than someone who isn’t, this doesn’t justify differential treatment of a perpetrator who targets someone vulnerable because of her race, for example – it’s the vulnerability rather than the sort of characteristics that hate crime legislation involves that justifies the difference (ibid., 1097). Conversely, as Anderson and Pildes (2000) point out, thick-skinned victims of hate crime may be psychologically unaffected by the hate aspect. This leads to the ridiculous consequence that “only the thin-skinned and psychologically fragile are entitled to be treated with dignity” (Anderson & Pildes 2000, 1543). So it’s no good to appeal to greater conventional harm to justify enhanced punishment for hate crime. Many defenders of hate crime legislation recognize the difficulties with appealing to ordinary kinds of harm, and consequently introduce a new concept of distinctive expressive harm. This, then, provides a rationale for enhanced punishment. As Dan Kahan puts it, “By imposing greater punishment on [hate] offenders, hate crime laws say that society regards                                                                                                                 2 A reviewer for this journal pointed out that one could nevertheless defend hate crime legislation on grounds of posing a risk of greater harm, parallel to drunk driving, for example. I think there is something to this suggestion. But I believe that the reason why merely imposing a risk on others (even when no harm actually results) can be legally punishable wrongdoing is ultimately that doing so expresses an inappropriate attitude towards them. Thus the wrongdoing involved in imposing risks is not to be understood in terms of harm but rather the Expressive Wrongdoing view sketched in Section 3 below.   10 the harms they impose as different from and worse than the harms inflicted by those who assault or kill for other reasons.” (Kahan 2001, 182) Kahan does not do much to explicate the different kind of harm – indeed, his considered view is better construed as a version of the Wrong Valuation account I discuss below. For a full discussion of what makes for expressive harm, we need to turn to Elizabeth Anderson and Richard Pildes (2000). Anderson and Pildes’ argument proceeds as follows. They begin with the claim that “A person suffers expressive harm when she is treated according to principles that express negative or inappropriate attitudes toward her.” (Anderson & Pildes 2000, 1527) This definition does not by itself say what makes expression of inappropriate attitudes a non- psychological harm for a person. Their answer draws on a link between expression of attitudes and social relationships: “The communication of attitudes creates social relationships by establishing shared understandings of the attitudes that will govern the interactions of the parties.” (1528) Given this, “Communications can expressively harm people by creating or changing the social relationships in which the addressees stand to the communicator” (1529), where these social relationships include “friendship and enmity, collegiality and rivalry, and superior and inferior caste status” (1530). So the argument seems to have three premises: 1) Social relationships supervene on a shared understanding of the attitudes that govern mutual interactions. 2) Shared understandings of interaction-governing attitudes result from actions that express attitudes. 3) Standing in certain social relationships is bad for a person, regardless of how they feel about it. 4) Hence, actions that express attitudes can harm a person via changing the relationships in which they stand to others. The first premise concerns the nature of social relationships. It says that what makes us colleagues, for example, is that we mutually understand that we are to relate to each other in   11 certain ways, and, perhaps, not in other ways – for example, we share an understanding that we won’t hate or love each other. (If we do, we don’t do so qua colleagues.) The second premise says that the shared understandings are created by expressing attitudes. To be sure, the understanding that governs our relations may not be the result of anything you and I specifically did. In most cases, we inherit the conception of what goes with what role from our cultural and historical background. But our expressive actions reaffirm and possibly shape the understanding we have, and perhaps the way we acquire the tradition is by way of expressive action. At least, this is not wholly implausible. The last bit, then, is that some social relationships are as such bad for us to stand in. Which relationships? Anderson and Pildes don’t say, but their example, not of hate crime but of expressive harm of state action, illustrates what they mean: Racial segregation sends the message that blacks are untouchable, a kind of social pollutant from which "pure" whites must be protected. For the communicative goal to be realized, its meaning must be acknowledged. This does not mean that the addressees must believe, approve of, or accept the message. They simply have to understand it. Once people share an understanding that segregation laws express contempt for blacks, these laws constitute blacks as an "untouchable," stigmatized caste. (Anderson & Pildes 2000, 1528) So on this view, the expressive harm of hate crime, independently of its psychological effect on people, consists in its manifesting attitudes toward the victim that place the offender and the victim in an undesirable and harmful relationship in which one dominates the other. If that is the case, enhanced punishment is justified on the basis of greater wrongdoing than in the parallel crime. As Section 4 will show, I find much that is congenial about this picture. However, I don’t believe it will quite suffice. Some social relationships may be all about how we feel about each other: what makes us lovers is that we love each other. But other relationships involve more than a shared understanding of interaction-governing attitudes, and some of those are highly relevant in the context of hate crime. Relationships of domination and   12 subordination and oppression, in particular, may exist in the absence of such understanding. I may think that I am the social or legal equal of someone above me in a hierarchy – and in some cases, they may think the same way – but sadly, that isn’t sufficient to make us equals. Relationships of relative power do not reduce to how we understand. The problem for Anderson and Pildes is that to claim that simply understanding that the behaviour of others expresses contempt towards me as a disabled person, for example, while nevertheless not accepting that it is in any way merited, suffices to make me stigmatized or disadvantaged makes little sense. Instead, being dominated or subordinated is a status that one may have. As I will argue in the next section, status does not supervise just on attitudes that others express towards me, but on how society, and the law in particular, responds to those attitudes. What matters for status is not just symbolic communication but concrete enactment through punishment. 3. Punishment, Expression, and Inviolability If the arguments of the previous section are correct, it is not greater or different kind of harm that makes hate crime deserve enhanced punishment. A different understanding of both crime and punishment is called for. This is what Legal Expressivism promises. Proponents of this type of view emphasize that both crime and punishment have an attitudinal or communicative dimension. It is common for proponents to begin with the observation that merely causing harm or loss to another, even if done intentionally, does not suffice for punishable crime. Instead, we need to look at the attitudes expressed by the perpetrator. Many emphasize that these attitudes embody a mistaken evaluation of the victim’s worth. As Dan Kahan puts it, what moves us to condemn an actor for harming another isn’t the simple perception that her actions have diminished another person’s welfare, but rather the judgment   13 that her actions express too low a valuation of the other person’s worth relative to the actor’s own ends. (Kahan 2001, 181; cf. Kahan and Nussbaum 1996, 351–2) Kahan draws on the work of Jean Hampton, who argues that treating someone in a way that is precluded by her value or represents her as less valuable than it is “diminishes” her value, and simultaneously represents the agent as elevated with respect to the victim (Hampton 1992, 1672–7; cf. Murphy & Hampton 1988, 44-5, 124). Note that this is not the same as the victim feeling demeaned or insulted, or losing self-respect. Nor does it require that the perpetrator intends to diminish the value of the victim – that’s not what a pickpocket has in mind. The wrongdoing involved in crime is a function of the valuation it expresses rather than harm alone. Call this the Wrong Valuation account of wrongdoing. Let me be explicit that on this view, wrongdoing is a matter of the attitude enacted by the action, or what some call its social meaning. Since I’ve endorsed an externalist construal of social meaning, this view is a target of the following objection raised by Hurd and Moore: [Externalist] construals of social meaning … would make a defendant more blameworthy (and thus deserving of greater punishment) not because of any fact about him or his deed; rather, he would be subjected to increased punishment because of the appearance of there being a fact about him, namely, the appearance that he possessed a hateful or bigoted motivation for his crime (regardless of whether he in fact possessed such a motivation). (Hurd & Moore 2004, 1107) Hurd and Moore argue that such appearance could not possibly justify punishment, especially when false. However, their reading misconstrues the externalist view. There is a fact about the deed – for example, that it is disrespectful of someone. This fact is nothing other than the fact that it would be reasonably taken to be so by someone aware of the features of the action and context. Blameworthiness is a separate issue. For Legal Expressivism, what makes the action as potential reason for blame in the first place is that it (objectively) expresses bad attitude or wrong valuation.3 Someone who performs a hateful                                                                                                                 3 Hampton holds a similar view: “[T]he message of the action and the actuality of what it accomplishes is not only something that we understand apart from the victim's reaction to it, but also   14 act, for example, without realizing it is such (and thus not acting out of hate) may be excused on ordinary grounds – the act wasn’t intentional under the description, the agent was invincibly ignorant of the social meaning of the act, and so on. The next step is that punishment expresses what Peter Strawson (1962) labeled reactive attitudes – attitudes towards the attitudes or quality of the will that the agent has expressed by his action. Such attitudes can meaningfully be attributed to groups on the basis of goals and assumptions that their representatives could not credibly disavow, given their behaviour. In the case of punishment, the reactive attitudes are those of the community through authoritative representatives. A classic formulation is given by Joel Feinberg’s definition of punishment, though Feinberg gives it a more conventionalist twist than necessary: Punishment is a conventional device for the expression of attitudes of resentment and indignation, and of judgments of disapproval and reprobation, either on the part of the punishing authority himself or of those “in whose name” the punishment is inflicted. (Feinberg 1965, 400) For Legal Expressivists, expressing reactive attitudes is what makes something a punishment. In Antony Duff’s words, punishment is “a mode of moral communication with offenders that seeks to persuade them to repent their crimes, to reform themselves, and to reconcile themselves with those they have wronged.” (2001, 116) Some critics argue that expressing public condemnation is not a sufficient account of punishment, since punishment necessarily involves hard treatment, and resentment can be expressed without it. Nathan Hanna, for example, argues that we might express our condemnation by requiring payment of court costs or compensation (Hanna 2008, 137) or by confining people in a way comparable to involuntary psychiatric treatment, and thus without intending to cause                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       something that we "read off of" the action regardless of the psychological peculiarities of a wrongdoer's psychology that led him to commit the wrong.” (Hampton 1992, 1684)   15 suffering (Hanna 2009, 242).4 Call this the Enactment Problem: Why does the condemnation have to be enacted by hard treatment rather than merely symbolically expressed? Putting the Enactment Problem aside for now, the expressive account of punishment, as such, leaves open the question of whether and how punishment is justified. The traditional justifications for punishment appeal either to the intrinsic value of the perpetrator’s suffering and the perpetrator’s deserving pain (retributivism) or to the benefits of hard treatment, such as the good social consequences of deterrence or incapacitation (consequentialism). An expressivist understanding of crime and punishment need not appeal to a new kind of justification altogether, but may instead provide a different insight into existing models (Kahan 1996, 601). Jean Hampton’s take on retributivism is a good example of this. For her, crime sends a message, and punishment counters or contradicts it with its own message. Hampton’s case for this draws on the Wrong Valuation account of wrongdoing. The criminal’s action makes a false moral claim and denies moral reality. Retributive punishment is “the defeat of the wrongdoer at the hands of the victim … that symbolizes the correct relative value of wrongdoer and victim” (Murphy & Hampton 1988, 125). It need not involve the infliction of pain (though that’s often part of it), but rather mastering the would-be master himself in order to “deny the wrongdoer's false claim to superiority and to assert the victim's equal value” (ibid., 126). Thus, punishment can “annul the message” (ibid., 131) sent by the crime. Similarly, Kahan says, “The proper retributive punishment is the one that appropriately expresses condemnation and reaffirms the values that the wrongdoer denies.” (1996, 602)                                                                                                                 4 One argument, put forward by Christopher Bennett, is that reactive attitudes as such involve “commitment to retribution, to the thought that it is non-contingently a good thing that those who have done wrong should undergo certain forms of suffering” (Bennett 2002, 147). For Bennett, this suffering that reactive attitudes seek is of two main varieties: the pain of social isolation, and the pain of guilt. Hanna denies this analysis of reactive attitudes. My sympathies are on Bennett’s side, but I lack the space for proper discussion here.   16 I believe Hampton’s view is on the right track. But it places too much weight on communicating a message about the relative value of the criminal and the victim, and the “evidence” that such a message supposedly provides (Hampton 1992, 1676). There is more than mere communication at stake, or so I will argue. Further, instead of Hampton’s Wrong Valuation account of wrongdoing, I adopt the more general Expressive Wrongdoing view: wronging others is a matter of enacting inappropriate or unfitting attitudes towards them (where inappropriateness need not be understood in terms of value). Punishment and Inviolability To find an expressive rationale for punishment, we need not just look at what punishment says about the perpetrator, but also what it says about the victim. After all, punishment also sends a message to the victim: we, the community, will not let others enact disrespect towards you with impunity; we’ll stand up for you. This is also suggested, but not fully developed, by Hampton, who notes that “whatever one's theory of human worth is, I am suggesting that societal punishment practices should be seen as created and designed to protect it” (Murphy & Hampton 1988, 141). What is at issue is a special kind of value, which I’ll call inviolability. Inviolability is a deontic status that something may have. To be inviolable is to be such that there are certain things others are not permitted to do to you. I will take it for granted that human beings are by default de jure inviolable: it is morally wrong to do certain things to them. For example, other things being equal, it is wrong to hurt someone against her will. If someone is treated in an impermissible way, then, other things being equal, it is de jure fitting to impose some kind of negative sanction on the agent. This is a conceptual truth: what it is to have a certain status is for sanctions for certain violations to be appropriate (and conversely, for sanctions for certain behaviours to be inappropriate – part of what it is to have the status of being the   17 owner of something is for it to be inappropriate for others to interfere with your using it). Normative status and fittingness (or unfittingness) of sanctions are simply two sides of the same coin. Calling something impermissible and then saying that no sanction is fitting amounts to contradicting oneself, unless there is an excuse or exemption for the agent. Our inviolability confers us a kind of dignity or worth that is good for us independently of our actually being harmed. This is something that Thomas Nagel emphasizes when he says that “not only is it an evil for a person to be harmed in certain ways, but for it to be permissible to harm the person in those ways is an additional and independent evil.” (Nagel 2002, 38) In a similar spirit, Frances Kamm (2005) talks about the importance of our inviolability over and above the importance of not being actually violated. Moral inviolability is something that we can’t lose as a result of the action of others, but we can meaningfully speak of a kind of de facto inviolability that we may or may not possess. What strips us of our de facto inviolability is not merely that someone harms us or wrongs or disrespects us. But if others can disrespect me with impunity or with a mere slap on the wrist, I will have little dignity left. Our de facto inviolability is thus constituted not by the fact that others treat us as rational and autonomous agents or fail to do so, but by the fact that others must, on pain of external sanction, treat us as such. This is the sense in which law can confer on us a social standing that befits an equal member of a democratic community. It can’t stop others from engaging in a disrespectful behaviour such as stealing or assault, but it can penalize such behaviour and thereby manifest respect for everyone. If, conversely, the law didn’t penalize such behaviour against a particular group, leaving them open to attack with impunity, that would amount to denying them equal respect and thereby constituting them as having a lower standing than others, even if no one ever actually attacked them.   18 So victim-focused LE says that enacting retributive attitudes is justified, because it is the only way to maintain or establish the victim’s de facto status as inviolable – to guarantee that the victim de facto has the inviolability she already has de jure. Merely symbolically expressing censure of the perpetrator or respect for the victim does not suffice to establish the status. I emphasize that this is not a psychological but, as it were, a logical matter: to have a certain status is for it to be the case that behaviours inconsistent with it are sanctioned. To be inviolable is to be someone towards whom no one can violate without punishment – if someone enacts disrespect toward you, the state will enact condemnation of the perpetrator. Inviolability is a matter of degree, and as Hampton points out in her parallel discussion (1988, 141), historically certain groups of people – rich, white, male – have enjoyed higher de facto inviolability, since punishment for disrespecting them has been surer and harder. From this perspective, the Enactment Problem turns on a normative question: whether hard treatment is a proper expression of societal reactive attitudes depends on how inviolable the victims should be treated as, since inflicting suffering on a perpetrator is a way of expressing respect for the victim. Let us turn to potential challenges to this account. First, Matthew Adler considers something like victim-focused LE in his discussion of Hampton. On his reading, Hampton says that wrongdoing “has led the community to believe that the victim has lesser moral worth” (2000, 1424), and punishment is necessary to reverse this status harm. He then has an easy time showing that punishment may not be the best or only way to change community norms and beliefs. But this misses the point altogether. The problem isn’t that wrongdoing results in false beliefs about the victim’s status, but that enacting disrespectful attitudes, if not countered, actually changes the (de facto) status itself.   19 Second, victim-focused justification of expressive punishment also avoids what I’ll call the Illiberality Challenge. This challenge is that if punishment condemns the moral quality of the perpetrator’s attitudes-expressed-in-action, it oversteps the boundaries of political liberalism, which requires moral neutrality. Bennett, for example, justifies state denunciation by appeal to “a model of the responsible or virtuous citizen, a model that represents an individual with concerns and attitudes consonant with the defining authoritative values of the polity”, and says that “criminal law therefore enjoins people to live up to this model” (2006, 301). Though Bennett believes this is consistent with Kantian liberalism, the perfectionist worries of critics like Hurd (2001) are understandable. The victim-focused view, in contrast, does not need to appeal to moral improvement of the perpetrator as justification. The state must condemn crime in order to enact respect for the victim as an inviolable member of the community. There could hardly be a more liberal rationale for punishment. 4. Responding to Hate In the previous section, I defended an Expressive Wrongdoing account of crime and a victim-focused Legal Expressivist account of the nature and justification of punishment in general. I will now argue that it provides the most promising framework for thinking about hate crime legislation. On the Expressive Wrongdoing view, what makes something a crime is that it enacts attitudes that are incompatible with the legal status the victim enjoys as a citizen or occupant of a particular role. Unless society in turn expresses its rejection of such attitudes, the victim’s status really is lowered: she is someone to whom it is (legally) acceptable to do such things. On victim-focused LE, this is what justifies punishment, in proportion to the victim’s   20 status and the seriousness of the violation. Ordinary crime, motivated typically by perception of self-interest or a personal grudge, poses a threat to the victim’s inviolability only as a side effect, however. The victim’s status is no part of the criminal’s concern.5 Hate crime is different. The attitudes it enacts – contempt, hate, disgust – contain an evaluation of the victim, by virtue of who she is (and hence everyone else who shares the relevant characteristic), as inferior. Contempt, for example, presents its object as ranking low in worth as a person, by the lights of some ideal the contemner (perhaps wrongly) endorses, in Michelle Mason’s apt formulation (Mason 2003, 241).6 In that sense, at least, these attitudes aim at lowering the status of the victim and those like her. And if those who are in positions of authority in the society do not respond to this appropriately, they do succeed. It does not suffice to reject the disrespect towards the victim that all crimes manifest to cancel out the hate and contempt. Indeed, failing to respond to this aspect of the crime leaves other members of the society complicit with it. So my main argument for hate crime legislation goes as follows: 1. Committing a base crime against someone as an interchangeable member of a group regardless of personal profit or pre-existing personal relationship manifests an attitude of disgust, contempt, hostility, or hate, for short rejection as an equal member of a democratic community, toward all members of the victim’s group. 2. A criminal justice system that fails to impose an additional sanction for a crime that manifests rejection as an equal itself manifests indifference on the part of the public toward the rejection. 3. Social or legal status is in part constituted by dispositions to sanction manifestations of attitudes. 4. So, manifesting public indifference to rejection as an equal constitutes the status of all members of the victim’s group as inferior, making the public complicit in the hate aspect of the crime.                                                                                                                 5 As a reviewer for this journal pointed out, this is not true of all non-hate crimes. I accept that my argument generalizes to some non-hate crimes, but lack the space to explore the implications here. 6 Mason believes that contempt can be morally justified, if the ideal of the person is justified, and if the object really does fall short of it. I take it as a given that these conditions are not met in the case of hate crime.   21 5. Having an inferior status is in itself bad for a person, regardless of other physical or psychological harm. 6. So, equal respect for persons requires an additional sanction for the hate element of a crime. The first premise delineates some of the grounds for concluding that a crime expresses a demeaning or degrading attitude toward a group in addition to whatever disrespect or disregard the base crime already manifests. If you burn my house because it’s in the way of a new development you want to build, you disrespect me; if you burn my house because you don’t want my kind to live in the neighbourhood, you also show contempt and disgust toward me and my people. The second premise points to the link between imposing sanctions and the attitudes of the public this manifests. The third one links sanctions to status, as discussed above. The fourth premise draws the preliminary conclusion that the public’s attitudes manifested by the failure to sanction the hate aspect constitute the victim’s group as inferior to others. This is a strong claim, of course. But it seems to parallel the case with disrespect: again, if we do nothing (or react only verbally) while someone is being assaulted, for example, or adopt norms that fail to direct us to do anything, we are thereby making the victim into someone de facto insignificant. If we do nothing to react to the hate or contempt aspect manifested by the hate crime, we acquiesce with the treatment of the victim as less significant than others, thereby lowering her de facto status. The fifth premise says that an inferior status is bad in itself. In the real world, having such a status and being aware of it is of course also psychologically harmful. If you realize that no one is going to do anything if you are raped or beaten, this will have effects beyond the rape and beating itself. But as Nagel and Kamm pointed out, lacking inviolability is bad in itself. To put the point differently, it amounts to being dominated by another. As Philip Pettit (1997) has famously argued, even a slave who is never actually interfered with is   22 worse off than a free person, since the owner is always in a position to interfere with the slave’s life on arbitrary grounds. The conclusion, then, is that equal respect for persons, the kind of attitude that any legitimate liberal state is required to manifest toward all citizens, requires that crimes that embody hate or prejudice are punished more seriously than parallel crimes that do not embody the same attitudes. Contrary to a claim popular with critics, this is not punishment for having an attitude, but for enacting it, and furthermore enacting it in a way that is independently disrespectful of others in a way that merits state intervention (and thus should be criminalized in any case). Again, wrongdoing doesn’t consist merely in harming others, but doing so in a way that embodies a devaluing attitude. Laws such as the Wisconsin Hate Crime Statute (Wis. Stat. § 939.645) that prescribe increased penalties for intentional selection of the victim on the basis of perception of protected characteristics seem to target the right thing. 5. Conclusion In this paper, I have argued in defence of the view that both crime and punishment should be understood in expressive terms in general. Part of this defence was distinguishing the different ways in which attitudes can be expressed, symbolic expression and enactment. I have argued that although attitudes of hate or bias are in themselves beyond the rightful scope of legislation, those who manifest them by way of performing actions that are independently wrong and are reasonably interpreted as aiming to lower the status of their victims are morally liable to suffer enhanced punishment in order to protect the equal status   23 of the victim’s group.7 In order for us all to live in a society of equals, we must express our rejection of the rejection of equality that hate crime enacts by more than just words. References Adler, M. (2000). Expressive theories of law: A sceptical overview. University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 148, 1363–1502. Al-Hakim, M. & Dimock, S. (2012). Hate as an aggravating factor in sentencing. New Criminal Law Review, 15 (4), 572–611. Anderson, E. (1993). Value in ethics and economics. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Anderson, E. & Pildes, R. (2000). Expressive theories of law: A general restatement. University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 148 (5), 1503–1575. Bennett, C. (2002). The varieties of retributive experience. Philosophical Quarterly, 52, 145–163. Bennett, C. (2006). State denunciation of crime. Journal of Moral Philosophy, 3 (3), 288– 304. Blackburn, S. (2010). Group minds and expressive harm. In Practical tortoise raising. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 64-89. Brudholm, T. (2010). Hatred as an attitude. Philosophical Papers, 39 (3), 289–313. Duff, A. (2001). Punishment, communication, and community. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Feinberg, J. (1965). The expressive function of punishment. The Monist, 49 (3), 397–423. Hampton, J. (1992). Correcting harms versus righting wrongs: The goal of retribution. UCLA Law Review, 39, 1659–1702. Hanna, N. (2008). Say what? A critique of expressive retributivism. Law and Philosophy, 27 (2), 123–150. Hanna, N. (2009). The passions of punishment. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 90 (2), 232–250.                                                                                                                 7 I have not said anything about symbolic expression of hate. I do not believe that the argument I have made can be extended to support hate speech legislation. It seems to me that the fact that others are free to say unpleasant things about my group does not undermine my status as inviolable in the way that selectively targeting me without punishment does, as long as I am similarly free to talk back or turn my back to it.   24 Hurd, H. M. (2001). Why liberals should hate “hate crime legislation”. Law and Philosophy, 20, 215–232. Hurd, H. M. & Moore, M. (2004). Punishing hatred and prejudice. Stanford Law Review, 56 (5), 1081–1146. Iganski, P. (2001). Hate crimes hurt more. American Behavioral Scientist, 45 (4), 626–638. Kahan, D.M. (1996). What do alternative sanctions mean? University of Chicago Law Review, 63 (2), 591–653. Kahan, D. M. (2001). Two liberal fallacies in the hate crime debate. Law and Philosophy 20, 175–193. Kahan, D. M. & Nussbaum, M. (1996). Two conceptions of emotion in criminal law. Columbia Law Review, 96 (2), 269–374. Kamm, F. (2005). Intricate ethics. New York: Oxford University Press. Lawrence, F. (1999). Punishing hate. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. List, C. & Pettit, P. (2011), Group agency. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Mason, M. (2003). Contempt as a moral attitude. Ethics, 113 (2), 234–272. Nagel, T. (2002). Concealment and exposure and other essays. New York: Oxford University Press. Pettit, P. (1997). Republicanism: A theory of freedom and government. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Strawson, P. (1962). Freedom and resentment. Proceedings of the British Academy, 48, 1– 25. Tuomela, R. (2007). The philosophy of sociality. New York: Oxford University Press. 
work_khaed5chrraodf4mvgd35mzafa	----	MARCKSlevelswouldbeincreasedinBALcelllysatesfromhorseswith EAS,andthatinhibitionofMARCKSinzymosan-stimulatedBALcells (ex vivo) would diminish respiratory burst. METHODS/STUDY POPULATION: Lysates were prepared from BAL cells isolated from horseswithno,mild/moderateandsevereEAS.RelativeMARCKSpro- tein levels were determined using equine specific MARCKS ELISA (MyBioSource). Cultured BAL cells were pretreated with a MARCKS inhibitor peptide (MANS), control peptide (RNS) or vehicle control and stimulated with zymosan for 5 hours. Reactive oxygenspe- cies levels were determined by luminescence to evaluate respiratory burst. Data were analyzed by One-way ANOVA (p<0.05). RESULTS/ANTICIPATED RESULTS: We determined that normal- ized MARCKS protein expression is significantly increased in BAL cell lysates from horses with mild/moderate or severe EAS, compared to horses with normal BAL cytology. Preliminary findings also suggest that MANS treatment of zymosan-stimulated equine BAL cells ex vivo attenuateslevelsrespiratoryburst.DISCUSSION/SIGNIFICANCEOF IMPACT: These findings point to a possible role for MARCKS protein in the pathophysiology of EAS and support MARCKS inhibition as a potential therapeutic strategy. 4377 Missed Opportunities to Prevent Homicide: An Analysis of the National Violent Death Reporting System Justin Cirone1, Jennifer Cone1, Brian Williams1, David Hampton1, Priya Prakash1, and Tanya Zakrison1 1University of Chicago OBJECTIVES/GOALS: The goal of this study is to better understand the homicide victim population who were institutionalized within 30 days prior to their death. Improved knowledge of this population can potentially prevent these future homicides. METHODS/STUDY POPULATION: A retrospective analysis of the 36 states included in the 2003-2017 National Violent Death Reporting System was per- formed. Demographics of recently institutionalized homicide vic- tims (RIHV) in the last 30 days were compared to homicide victims who were not recently institutionalized. Circumstances of the homicide, such as suspected gang involvement, were also com- pared. Parametric and non-parametric statistical analyses were per- formed. Significance was set at p<0.05. RESULTS/ANTICIPATED RESULTS: There were 81,229 homicides with 992 (1.2%) RIHV. The majority of RIHV were Black (49.6%) and older than victims who were not recently institutionalized (37.2 vs. 34.8, p<0.001). RIHV had a high school degree or higher in 54.8% of cases and the primary homicide weapon was a firearm in 67% of the deaths. They were more likely to be homeless (3.1% vs. 1.5%), have a mental health diagnosis (9.2% vs. 2.3%), abuse alcohol (6.1% vs. 2.2%), or abuse other substances (15.2% vs. 5.8%) [all p <0.001]. These victims were most commonly institutionalized in a correctional facility or a hospital compared to other facilities such as nursing homes. Homicide circumstances for RIHV were more likely to involve abuse/neglect (4.3% vs. 2.2%, p<0.001), gang violence (7.6% vs. 5.6%, p = 0.002), or a hate crime (1.0% vs. 0.1%. p<0.001). DISCUSSION/SIGNIFICANCE OF IMPACT: Contact with an institution such as a hospital or prison provides high-risk patients the opportunity to potentially participate in violence intervention programs. These institutions should seek to identify and intervene on this population to reduce the risk of violent homicides. 4141 Molecular Signatures of Cocaine Toxicity in Postmortem Human Brain and Neurons Emily Frances Mendez1, Laura Stertz1, Gabriel Fries1, Ruifeng Hu1, Thomas Meyer1, Zhongming Zhao1, and Consuelo Walss-Bass1 1The University of Texas Health Science Center at Houston OBJECTIVES/GOALS: The goal of this project is to identify new therapeutic targets and biomarkers to treat or prevent cocaine tox- icity by investigating proteomic, transcriptomic and epigenetic sig- natures of cocaine exposure in human subjects. METHODS/ STUDY POPULATION: Cocaine is a highly addictive neurotoxic substance, and it is estimated that 1.9 million Americans are current users of cocaine. To study the molecular effects of cocaine, we gen- erated preliminary proteomics and next-generation RNA sequencing (RNAseq) data from human postmortem dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (Broadmann area 9 or BA9) of 12 cocaine-exposed subjects and 17 controls. Future directions for this project include RNAseq and DNA methylation analysis of neuronal nuclei sorted from human postmortem BA9 and a human induced pluripotent stem cell-derived neuron (hiPSN) model of cocaine exposure from the same postmortem subjects from whom we have brain samples. RESULTS/ANTICIPATED RESULTS: We found alterations in neu- ronal synaptic protein levels and gene expression, including the sero- tonin transporter SLC6A4, and synaptic proteins SNAP25, SYN2, SYNGR3. Pathway analysis of our results revealed alterations in spe- cific pathways involved with neuronal function including voltage- gated calcium channels, and GABA receptor signaling. In the future, we expect to see an enhancement in neuron-specific gene expression signatures in our sorted neuronal nuclei and our hiPSN model of cocaine exposure. The hiPSN model will help elucidate which effects are due to acute versus chronic exposure of cocaine. DISCUSSION/ SIGNIFICANCE OF IMPACT: Neuronal signatures found with this analysis can help us understand mechanisms of cognitive decline in long-term cocaine users as well as the acute effects on the brain of cocaine taken in overdose. With this work and future proposed stud- ies, we can discover novel clinical biomarkers for cocaine neurotox- icity in patients with cocaine use disorder and determine readouts for future therapeutic development on cocaine addiction and overdose. 4488 Neural Network of the Cognitive Model of Reading† Joseph Posner1, Vivian Dickens, Andrew DeMarco, Sarah Snider, Peter Turkeltaub, and Rhonda Friedman 1Georgetown - Howard Universities OBJECTIVES/GOALS: A particularly debilitating consequence of stroke is alexia, an acquired impairment in reading. Cognitive mod- els aim to characterize how information is processed based on behav- ioral data. If we can concurrently characterize how neural networks process that information, we can enhance the models to reflect the neuronal interactions that drive them. METHODS/STUDY POPULATION: There will be 10 unimpaired adult readers. Two functional localizer tasks, deigned to consistently activate robust lan- guage areas, identify the regions of interest that process the cognitive reading functions (orthography, phonology, semantics). Another task, designed for this experiment, analyses the reading-related 140 JCTS 2020 Abstract Supplement https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/cts.2020.414 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:31, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/cts.2020.414 https://www.cambridge.org/core 
work_kjiwdpkakjcbhmc5pos5xwlhay	----	S1537592719001397 1..16 The Cost of Doing Politics? Analyzing Violence and Harassment against Female Politicians Mona Lena Krook and Juliana Restrepo Sanı́n Violence against women in politics is increasingly recognized around the world as a significant barrier to women’s political participation, following a troubling rise in reports of assault, intimidation, and abuse directed at female politicians. Yet conceptual ambiguities remain as to the exact contours of this phenomenon. In this article, we seek to strengthen its theoretical, empirical, and methodological foundations. We propose that the presence of bias against women in political roles—originating in structural violence, employing cultural violence, and resulting in symbolic violence—distinguishes this phenomenon from other forms of political violence. We identify five types of violence against women in politics—physical, psychological, sexual, economic, and semiotic—and three methodological challenges related to underreporting, comparing men’s and women’s experiences, and intersectionality. Inspired by the literature on hate crimes, we develop an empirical approach for identifying cases of violence against women in politics, offering six criteria to ascertain whether an attack was potentially motivated by gender bias. We apply this framework to analyze three cases: the assassination of Benazir Bhutto, the impeachment of Dilma Rousseff, and the murder of Jo Cox. We conclude with the negative implications of violence against women in politics and point to emerging solutions around the globe. R ecent years have seen a troubling rise in reports of assault, intimidation, and abuse directed at female politicians (Krook 2018a). Bolivia was the first state to respond with legal reforms, passing a law crimi- nalizing political violence and harassment against women in 2012. In 2016 and 2017, global and regional organ- izations began to raise awareness and take action: the National Democratic Institute (NDI) launched the Mona Lena Krook is Professor of Political Science at Rutgers University (m.l.krook@rutgers.edu). She has written widely on the diffusion and implementation of electoral quotas for women, including several award-winning books and articles. Her current research explores mechanisms of resistance and backlash against women’s greater inclusion in the political sphere. In 2017, she was named an Andrew Carnegie Fellow to research and write a book on violence and harassment against politically active women. Since 2015, she has collaborated with the National Democratic Institute on its #NotTheCost campaign to stop violence against women in politics. Juliana Restrepo Sanín is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Florida (julireposan@gmail.com). She completed her PhD in Political Science at Rutgers University in 2018 with a dissertation titled “Violence against Women in Politics in Latin America.” In 2018–19, she was a Postdoctoral Fellow at the Sié Chéou-Kang Center for International Security and Diplomacy, Josef Korbel School of International Studies, University of Denver, and One Earth Future Foundation. She has published articles in Politics & Gender and Política y Gobierno and is author of Mujeres y Participación Política: El Fenómeno de la Violencia Contra las Mujeres en Política. The authors would like to thank Sandra Pepera, Caroline Hubbard, Julie Ballington, Brigitte Filion, Rebecca Kuperberg, Mary Nugent, Gabrielle Bardall, Elin Bjarnegård, and Jennifer Piscopo for their sustained engagement with our work. An early version of this article won the APSA Women and Politics Section Best Paper Award in 2015. Subsequent versions have benefited from feedback during presentations at Columbia University, Rutgers University, Brigham Young University, Johns Hopkins University, the College of New Jersey, Emory University, Sewanee: The University of the South, Oklahoma State University, the University of Bucharest, the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, and Princeton University. Fieldwork for this project was supported by a National Science Foundation CAREER Award (SES-0955668), a Chancellor’s Scholarship at Rutgers University, and an Andrew Carnegie Fellowship. Article © American Political Science Association 2019740 Perspectives on Politics doi:10.1017/S1537592719001397 https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592719001397 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:26, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8347-6095 mailto:m.l.krook@rutgers.edu mailto:julireposan@gmail.com https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592719001397 https://www.cambridge.org/core #NotTheCost campaign to stop violence against women in politics; the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) under- took a global study of sexism, violence, and harassment against female members of parliament (MPs); and the Inter-American Commission of Women published a model law to combat violence against women in political life. In 2018, the #MeToo movement led to the suspen- sion or resignation of male MPs and cabinet ministers in North America, Western Europe, and beyond. Available statistics indicate that violence against women in politics is not uncommon. The IPU finds that, globally, nearly all female MPs have experienced psychological violence in the course of their parliamen- tary work. Approximately one-third have suffered eco- nomic violence, one-quarter some type of physical violence, and one-fifth some form of sexual violence (Inter-Parliamentary Union 2016, 3). These patterns are confirmed at country and local levels. Of 425 women who ran for office in Malawi in 2009, 225 quit before the elections were over because of harassment and intimida- tion (Semu-Banda 2008). In Afghanistan, nearly all female candidates interviewed in the 2010 elections had received threatening phone calls (National Democratic Institute 2010). In Peru, 41% of female mayors and local councilors had been subjected to violence (Quintanilla 2012). In Bolivia, 70% of women had been victims of violence more than once (Rojas Valverde 2012). Despite emerging global attention, several conceptual ambiguities remain regarding the contours of this phe- nomenon. First, definitions used by NDI and the IPU focus on women, suggesting that these acts target women because of their gender—but without comparing their experiences to those of men (Krook 2017). Second, terminology varies. UN Women and the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) highlight vio- lence against women in elections, rather than in political life, whereas debates in Latin America distinguish between political violence and harassment. Finally, sources diverge in recognizing different forms of violence: the Bolivian law names two, IFES identifies three, and the IPU lists four. This article seeks to resolve these ambiguities to lay the foundations for improved global research and program- ming. To make the concept of “violence against women in politics” more theoretically, empirically, and method- ologically robust, we draw on literatures in multiple disciplines, a large collection of new stories and practi- tioner reports, and interviews we conducted in Asia, Latin America, North Africa, Western Europe, and sub-Saharan Africa between 2014 and 2018. In the first section, we propose that the presence of bias against women in political roles distinguishes this phenomenon from polit- ical violence and violence against politicians. We argue that violence against women in politics originates in structural violence, is carried out through cultural vio- lence, and results in symbolic violence against women. The second section maps empirical manifestations, emphasizing continuities across a broad range of behav- iors falling under the umbrella of violence against women in politics. Recognizing that definitions of violence are contested, however, we introduce a distinction between violence, the use or threat of use of force, and harassment, the creation of a hostile work environment. We combine research and practitioner work on political violence and violence against women to identify four types: physical, psychological, sexual, and economic. Based on trends in women’s experiences emerging in our news and interview data, we theorize one additional form: semiotic. The third section addresses methodological challenges in studying this phenomenon: the problem of underreporting, the value of comparing men’s and women’s experiences, and the need to take intersectionality into account. Seeking to resolve these issues, the fourth section considers how to identify cases of violence against women in politics. Inspired by the literature on hate crimes, we present six criteria to help ascertain whether an attack was potentially motivated by bias. To illustrate how these elements might inform empir- ical analysis, the fifth section applies our framework to three cases: the assassination of Benazir Bhutto, the impeachment of Dilma Rousseff, and the murder of Jo Cox. These acts targeted female politicians performing their political roles and as such ultimately violated their political rights. Based on our framework, we determine that the Rousseff and Cox cases constitute examples of violence against women in politics, but the Bhutto case does not. Ambiguities in the Cox data, in particular, show why a bias event approach is crucial for judging the broader significance of a given case. The final section outlines the negative implications of violence against women in politics and discusses emerging solutions around the globe. Theorizing the Phenomenon Political scientists have long been troubled by political violence, defining it as the use of force— or threatened use of force—to achieve political ends (Della Porta 1995). It poses a challenge to democracy when one side gets “its way through fear of injury or death,” rather than “through a process in which individuals or groups recognize each other. . . as rational interlocutors” (Schwarzmantel 2010, 222). Recent studies on violence against politicians and on violence against women in politics extend this agenda to consider threats and intimidation toward those who run for and hold political office. Similar to existing work on political violence, these literatures show how violent tactics seek to distort the collective will, with added impact when they specifically target members of particular groups. Violence against Politicians Violence against politicians has captured the attention of both practitioners and scholars working across disciplines. 741September 2020 Vol. 18/No. 3| https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592719001397 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:26, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592719001397 https://www.cambridge.org/core The IPU Committee on the Human Rights of Parlia- mentarians recently renewed its efforts to pressure governments to investigate murders and disappearances and achieve redress for MPs unduly excluded from their mandates (Inter-Parliamentary Union 2018). Govern- ments have also taken a keener interest in this issue. In 2015, the Italian parliament commissioned a survey of murdered politicians. In 2017, British prime minister Theresa May called for a review of abuse and intimidation of candidates, and the Swedish government launched a plan to tackle threats and hate directed at officeholders. Most academic research on this topic has been con- ducted by forensic psychiatrists studying “aggressive/ intrusive” behaviors toward public figures, including physical attacks, threats, stalking, property damage, and inappropriate communications. Between 80% and 90% of MPs in New Zealand and the UK report experiencing at least one of these forms of harassment (Every-Palmer, Barry-Walsh, and Pathé 2015; James et al. 2016). More than one-quarter of Canadian politicians described these intrusions as “frightening” or “terrifying” (Adams et al. 2009, 807), and more than 40% of British MPs increased their security measures at home and work as a result (James et al. 2016, 186). For these scholars, intrusive behaviors “stand apart from what might be seen as the MP’s working role” when they “interfere with his or her function, or cross the border into what is perceived as threatening” (178). Political scientists and economists have taken a different approach, seeking to explain when, why, and how groups use violence against politicians—and with what effects. Evidence from Italy indicates that violence is most likely to occur after elections to influence policy, rather than being committed before elections to affect electoral outcomes. It is usually directed at local politicians and most often takes the form of arson and threatening letters (Daniele and Dipoppa 2017). Its aim is generally to provoke their removal or render them less effective in pursuing agendas that the group dislikes (Dal Bó, Dal Bó, and Di Tella 2003). Country factors may facilitate such violence; for example, in Mexico the number of narco-assassinations has increased since 2005 as a result of growing criminal fragmentation and political pluralization (Blume 2017). Gender features in only a marginal way in these literatures, despite observations in passing that the majority of perpetrators are male (James et al. 2016) and that murdered politicians also tend to be male (Daniele 2017). Yet incorporating a gender lens into the study of violence against politicians does more than just highlight the gendered identities of victims and perpetra- tors. It also points to a related but distinct phenomenon, whereby the origins, means, and effects of violent acts specifically aim to exclude women from the political sphere, disrupting the political process as a means of reinforcing gendered hierarchies. Violence against Women in Politics In September 2017, British MPs held a debate on the abuse and intimidation of political candidates, agreeing that the problem affected all parties and posed a serious problem for democracy. Yet, numerous interventions in the debate by both male and female MPs noted that women were often specifically targeted. Work on online abuse makes a similar observation: whereas “generic trolls” aim to annoy, upset, or anger people, “gender trolls” engage in harassing and threatening behaviors— often using graphic sexualized and gender-based insults— to inspire fear and drive women to withdraw from online discourse (Mantilla 2015). Although the technology is new, maligning a woman’s character, often by reference to her sexuality, has been a recurring strategy historically to discredit women’s ideas and inhibit their participation in traditionally male-dominated spaces (Spender 1982). Violence against women in politics thus entails viola- tions of both electoral and personal integrity (Bjarnegård 2018). It stems from misogyny, a system that polices and enforces patriarchal norms and expectations. Misogyny distinguishes between “good” and “bad” women, punish- ing the latter for perceived violations of appropriate gender roles (Manne 2018). Political scientists have largely over- looked this phenomenon because they tend to define violence in a minimalistic way, as an act of force. Sociologists and many feminist theorists, in contrast, tend to define violence more comprehensively as an act of violation (Bufacchi 2005), thereby uncovering behaviors that otherwise remain hidden or “naturalized.” Inspired by this work, we propose that violence against women in politics originates in structural violence, is perpetrated through cultural violence, and results in symbolic violence against women (Figure 1). Violence against women in politics begins with struc- tural violence, involving the stratification of access to basic human needs based on ascriptive group member- ship. Built into the social structure, this stratification enacts harm in the form of unequal life chances (Galtung 1969), “leav[ing] marks not only on the human body but also on the mind and the spirit” (Galtung 1990, 294). The structural origins of women’s political exclusion stem from ancient and modern political theories associating men with the public sphere and women with the private (Okin 1979). This divide limits women’s mobility even in Figure 1 Violence against women in politics Article | Violence and Harassment of Female Politicians 742 Perspectives on Politics https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592719001397 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:26, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592719001397 https://www.cambridge.org/core countries where women’s movement in public spaces is not legally restricted. Structural violence inspires and rationalizes hostility against women leaders stemming from their perceived status violations (Eagly and Karau 2002). Cultural violence provides the means for perpetrating violence against women in politics. It refers to cultural norms used to justify mistreatment, thereby “changing the moral color of an act from red/wrong to green/right or at least to yellow/acceptable” (Galtung 1990, 291). Rooted in dynamics of structural violence, cultural vio- lence creates a double standard by tolerating violence when perpetrated against members of particular groups. Rape myths are one form: blaming survivors, they suggest that rapes are provoked by women’s personal choices in clothing and behavior (Suarez and Gadalla 2010). Sexist jokes are another form of cultural violence, expressing antagonistic attitudes toward women under the guise of “benign amusement” (Ford 2000). Sexual objectification is a third common vehicle, reducing women to physical attributes and thereby denying their competence and full emotional and moral capacity (Heflick and Goldenberg 2011). Symbolic violence is the intended outcome of violence against women in politics. According to Bourdieu (2001), masculine domination is the quintessential form of symbolic violence, seeking to put women who deviate from prescribed norms back “in their place.” What makes symbolic violence so powerful is “misrecognition,” whereby the “dominated apply categories constructed from the point of view of the dominant to the relations of domination” (35). These dynamics can be seen in cases of sex-based harassment: men and women alike may punish individuals who deviate from gender norms to defend their own status in the existing system of gender hierarchy (Berdahl 2007). Backlash against agentic women maintains stereotypes and rewards perpetrators psycholog- ically, increasing their self-esteem (Rudman and Fairchild 2004). Mapping Empirical Manifestations A minimalist conception of violence as force focuses on the deliberate infliction of physical injury, highlighting the intentions of agents who commit acts of violence at single moments in time. In contrast, a more comprehen- sive view of violence as violation recognizes a wider range of transgressions, privileging the experiences of victims and the temporally indeterminate “ripples of violence” affecting survivors, their families, and society (Bufacchi 2005; Bufacchi and Gilson 2016). Reflecting the latter approach, research and activism on violence against women go beyond physical violence to emphasize a con- tinuum of violent behaviors (Kelly 1988). International and national frameworks thus enumerate various forms of violence against women. Article 2 of the 1993 UN Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women names physical, sexual, and psychological violence, to which Article 3 of the 2011 Council of Europe’s Istanbul Convention adds economic violence. World Bank data from 189 countries indicate that all four forms appear in national laws, with varying degrees of recognition: physical violence is criminalized in 137 states, psychological violence in 134, sexual violence in 106, and economic violence in 86 (World Bank 2016). We propose two modifications to these prevailing frameworks. First, recognizing that political scientists without a foundation in gender studies may hesitate to adopt a broad concept of violence, we propose retaining the umbrella concept of violence against women in politics, under which we can distinguish between acts of violence, involving the use of force, and harassment, actions creating a hostile work environment. Second, we theorize a fifth form of violence against women in politics, semiotic violence, which captures dynamics not reducible to the four other types. Figure 2 illustrates how the five types of violence form part of the same field of behaviors, but may nonetheless be distinguished from one another. Physical Violence and Harassment Physical violence involves efforts to inflict bodily harm and injury. In 2004, a Mexican mayoral candidate, Guadalupe Ávila Salinas, was shot dead in broad daylight by the sitting mayor while holding a meet- ing with women from the community (Jarquín Edgar Figure 2 Types of violence against women in politics 743September 2020 Vol. 18/No. 3| https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592719001397 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:26, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592719001397 https://www.cambridge.org/core 2004). Other women have been kidnapped, such as Afghan MP Fariba Ahmadi Kakar, who was abducted by Taliban rebels in 2013 (Graham-Harrison 2013), or severely beaten, as was Kenyan parliamentary candidate Flora Terah in 2007 (Terah 2008). Physical harassment entails touching, jostling, or other forms of unwelcome physical proximity, as experienced by an activist in Uganda who was stripped naked by police at a party rally in 2015. It might also involve involuntary confinement; for example, a candidate in Tunisia was locked in her home by her husband to prevent her from attending a campaign event.1 The tangible nature of physical acts makes them the most widely recognized and least contested forms of violence against women. They tend to be relatively rare, however, with perpetrators opting for “less costly” means of violence and harassment before escalating to physical attacks. Psychological Violence and Harassment Psychological violence inflicts trauma on individuals’ mental state or emotional well-being. Examples include death and rape threats, carried out in person or online. Laura Boldrini, speaker of the Italian parliament, received bullets in the mail, saw “Death to Boldrini” scrawled on city walls, and was burned in effigy (Feder, Nardelli, and De Luca 2018). Rape threats against British MP Jess Phillips on Twitter became so common that she was forced to block her Twitter accounts and report the abuse to police.2 Psychological harassment occurs inside and outside of official political settings. Malalai Joya, an Afghan MP, was called a prostitute and had water bottles thrown at her in parliament; in 2007 she was ejected by a show of hands, in violation of official procedures for suspending an MP (EqualityNow 2007). Ayaka Shiomura, a Japanese local councilor, was taunted by male colleagues, who yelled “Go and get married” and “Can’t you give birth?” at her while she was making a speech on increasing the number of women in the workforce (Lies 2014). In Sierra Leone, men in secret societies have sought to scare off female candidates (Kellow 2010). Sexual Violence and Harassment Sexual violence comprises sexual acts and attempts at sexual acts by coercion. Stigma prevents many women from coming forward to report their experience of sexual violence. For example, it was only in 2014, during debates on sexual violence in Canadian politics, that former deputy prime minister Sheila Copps disclosed she had been sexually assaulted by a male provincial parlia- ment colleague in 1980 (CBS News 2014). In 2016, Monique Pelletier revealed she was assaulted by a male senator in 1979 while serving as the French minister of women’s rights.3 Sexual harassment entails unwelcome sexual comments or advances. In recent years, elected men who have lost their positions because of such allegations include Mbu- lelo Goniwe, chief whip for the African National Con- gress party in South Africa in 2006; Massimo Pacetti and Scott Andrews, Liberal MPs in Canada in 2014; Silvan Shalom, interior minister of Israel in 2015; and Denis Baupin, vice president of the French National Assembly in 2016 (Krook 2018b). The rise of the #MeToo movement in 2017 has accelerated similar disclosures in countries as diverse as Britain, Canada, Korea, Russia, and the United States. Economic Violence and Harassment Feminists theorize economic violence as abuse seeking to deny or control women’s access to financial resources (UN Women/UNDP 2017, 17), whereas definitions of elec- toral violence include injuries inflicted on “person or property at any stage of the long electoral cycle” (Norris, Frank, and Martínez i Coma 2014, 9). We define economic violence as property damage, ranging from petty vandalism to attempts to undermine a woman’s economic livelihood. Extremists defaced and tore down women’s campaign posters in Iraq (Abdul-Hassan and Salaheddin 2018), and British MP Angela Eagle had a brick thrown through the window of her constituency office (Perraudin 2016). In India, the land and crops of a local councilor were destroyed (Asian Human Rights Commission 2006). Economic harassment involves withholding economic resources to reduce women’s capacity to perform their political responsibilities. In Bolivia, local officials refused to pay the salaries of elected women (Corz 2012), and in Peru, the husband of a local councilor prevented her from having access to the family’s money after she was elected (Quintanilla 2012). In Costa Rica, El Salvador, Mexico, and Peru, locally elected women, but not their male colleagues, were denied offices, telephones, and even travel expenses (Krook and Restrepo Sanín 2016). Semiotic Violence and Harassment Semiotic violence is perpetrated through degrading images and sexist language (Krook 2019). Sexual objec- tification is one strategy of semiotic violence. After the election of Croatian president Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović in 2015, national news outlets published stills from an alleged sex tape of her; in 2016, photos supposedly of her wearing a bikini went viral (“OK Ladies” 2016). Symbolic annihilation is another strategy. This con- cept, which was developed in media studies, proposes that excluding or trivializing particular groups transmits a message about the societal value of the members of those groups (Klein and Shiffman 2009). Symbolic annihilation occurs in politics in at least two ways. First, opponents seek to erase women as actors in the political imagination. In 2009, ultra-Orthodox newspapers in Article | Violence and Harassment of Female Politicians 744 Perspectives on Politics https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592719001397 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:26, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592719001397 https://www.cambridge.org/core Israel altered photos of the cabinet to exclude its female members (Huffington Post 2009). Second, rules of language and grammar are deployed to resist gendered transformations. In 2014, a conservative male MP in France repeatedly addressed the president of the National Assembly as Madame le Président (using the masculine form of “president”), despite her telling him multiple times to use Madame la Présidente, the feminine form (Cotteret 2014). A third strategy is to employ highly negative gendered language to characterize female politicians and their behaviors. Misogynistic merchandise featuring slogans like “Trump That Bitch!” was widely sold at Donald Trump rallies during the 2016 U.S. presidential elections (Bellstrom 2016), and Trump famously called Hillary Clinton “a nasty woman” during the final presidential debate. In the Philippines, President Rodrigo Duterte described Senator Leila de Lima as “immoral” and an “adulterer” when she challenged his leadership, actions that female colleagues condemned as “slut-shaming” (Sherwell 2016). Interrelated Violence Analytically distinguishing between these five types does not mean that they are clearly distinct in practice. Sexual assault, for example, may have both physical and psy- chological components. Similarly, when distributed to a larger public, photoshopped images constitute semiotic violence; when sent to the woman in question, they entail psychological and sexual harassment. These overlaps do not undermine our classification, we argue, but rather bolster the case for thinking about these acts as part of a shared field of practices. Interrelations are perhaps best illustrated, however, by cases where different forms of violence appear in an escalating pattern over time. For Juana Quispe, a local councilor in Bolivia, psychological and economic harassment culminated in physical violence. Even though Quispe and her male party colleagues were critical of the mayor, she was singled out for mistreatment. The mayor, his supporters, and various local councilors first pressured her to resign. When she did not do so, they changed the council’s meeting times and refused her entrance to the sessions. They then falsely accused her of corruption, suspending her from her position. She waged a seven-month legal battle that resulted in her being reinstated, but the council then denied her a salary for those seven months, arguing that she had not attended its sessions. One month later, she was murdered (Corz 2012).4 Tackling Methodological Challenges Documenting violence against women is notoriously difficult. Many women are reluctant to report violence because of feelings of shame and stigma, fear of re- taliation, and perceived impunity for perpetrators (Palermo, Bleck, and Peterman 2014). Normalized in many societies, violence against women is rarely seen as a problem in need of intervention. In the case of violence against women in politics, political dynamics further disincentivize speaking out. Additionally, calls to in- corporate gender and intersectionality raise questions about the robustness of research if men are not included as subjects and how diversity among women should be recognized and taken into account. Reporting Instances of Violence Perhaps the number one barrier to studying this phe- nomenon is the tendency to dismiss violence as “the cost of doing politics.” While some of this resistance appears to stem from a hesitance to be viewed as “victims,” many elected women acknowledge that female colleagues have been targeted for gender-based violence (Cerva Cerna 2014).5 A best practice strategy for collecting statistics on violence against women is to avoid the word “violence,” giving rise to varied subjective interpretations, in favor of asking a list of questions about specific acts (United Nations 2014). Using this approach, the IPU (2016) finds that violence and harassment against women parliamen- tarians is widespread. Silence on these issues is not merely a cognitive question, however. It may also be a strategic decision. In interviews, women admit frankly that speaking out would be a form of “political suicide.”6 One reason is that most perpetrators are members of the woman’s own political party (National Democratic Institute 2018; UN Women 2014). Insiders may justify suppressing women’s accounts out of concerns about negative publicity that could be exploited at election time. Another concern is that women may believe that it will reflect badly on themselves, as in Tanzania where demanding sexual favors for political positions is widespread.7 Silence may also be the result of staff decisions to read and delete abusive correspondence, so that MPs are not fully aware of the extent of harassment (Committee on Standards in Public Life 2017). In cases where women are willing to speak out, moreover, it is rarely clear to whom they should report. In 2014, sexual harassment allegations against Canadian MPs from different parties led to the discovery that there were no procedures in place to handle such claims.8 In the wake of the #MeToo movement, women in several countries have created anonymous reporting mechanisms to fill this gap.9 In Mexico, where the problem is well recognized but no legal framework yet exists, women have lodged complaints with diverse state institutions.10 Open- ing up about sexual violence or harassment may backfire, however, causing female politicians to be portrayed as overly emotional, as occurred after Australian prime minister Julia Gillard’s misogyny speech in parliament in 2012 (Wright and Holland 2014). Women may also 745September 2020 Vol. 18/No. 3| https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592719001397 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:26, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592719001397 https://www.cambridge.org/core simply not be believed: when Kim Weaver stood down as a candidate in an Iowa congressional race against in- cumbent Steve King, citing “very alarming acts of in- timidation, including death threats,” he tweeted in response, “Death threats likely didn’t happen but a fabri- cation” (Fang 2017). Comparing Men’s and Women’s Experiences A second challenge in studying this topic stems from calls to take “gender” seriously in political research. Some scholars argue that it is vital to study men and women together, recognizing that men are gendered beings and that comparison is essential for ascertaining whether or not gender plays a role (Bjarnegård 2018). Bolstering the case for this approach, a review by IFES of its electoral violence data finds that men are more often victims of physical violence, whereas women are more likely to face psycho- logical violence (Bardall 2011). Some male politicians have also been targeted for gender-based attacks: Harvey Milk, the first openly gay man to hold public office in the United States, was assassinated in 1978 by an antigay colleague. Emphasizing that men also experience gender-based political violence, however, risks theorizing a false sym- metry between men’s and women’s experiences. Within the broader field of violence against women, emphasis on the fact that most victims of gender-based violence are women gave rise to a counternarrative—based not on facts but driven by broader political agendas—claiming that men and women were equally victims and perpetrators of domestic violence. This equivalence perspective, however, is easily disproved when types and severity of violence are taken into account (Berns 2001). In the political world, some male politicians do claim to be equally or more abused than their female counter- parts.11 Yet many male MPs reject the notion of equiva- lence; for example, British MP Martin Whitfield stated, “I fully accept that my experience. . . is but a mere toe in the water compared with the vile abuse received by other. . . Members, especially women.”12 Focusing on mere num- bers also can distort perceptions of gender and political violence. A study of mafia assassinations of Italian mayors observes that all victims were male, without noting that women are severely underrepresented in these positions. Taking Intersectionality into Account The emphasis on violence against women in politics, finally, seems to suggest that gender is the only source of abuse. However, the concept of intersectionality theorizes that different facets of identity interact to shape life opportunities and experiences (McCall 2005). Although intersectionality has not yet been incorporated widely into theorizing about violence against women in politics (Kuperberg 2018), it is present in news coverage and emerging data on this phenomenon. An analysis of Twitter abuse against female MPs in the United Kingdom finds that nearly half of the abusive tweets were directed at Diane Abbott, the first black woman to be elected to the British parliament; when Abbott was taken out of the sample, black and Asian women still received 30% more abuse than their white counterparts (Amnesty Interna- tional UK 2017). These interactions are not limited to gender and race. In the United Kingdom, sexism combined with anti- Semitism against Luciana Berger, a Jewish MP, and homophobic slurs were made against Angela Eagle, the first openly lesbian MP.13 Poor and lower-caste women are more vulnerable than other groups in India, Nepal, and Pakistan (UN Women 2014, 64-65), whereas younger women are more prone to violence and harassment according to global data from the IPU (2016). Women who challenge gender roles in multiple ways—being outspoken feminists14 or ascending to prominent leader- ship positions (Davies 2014)—also seem to experience more numerous and more vitriolic attacks. The in- tersectional nature of this violence, however, does not undermine bias against women as a key driver. Rather, it substantiates the intuition that structural, cultural, and symbolic violence against women and members of other marginalized groups lie at the heart of this phenomenon. Identifying Bias Events Due to dynamics of structural, cultural, and symbolic violence, bias against particular groups is often highly naturalized. As a result, perpetrators may not be aware of their prejudice, and targets may accept mistreatment as simply the normal course of affairs. This creates serious challenges to identifying acts of violence against women in politics. To move beyond this impasse, we draw on the hate crimes literature to conceptualize violence against women in politics as “bias events.” Translating this into a strategy for empirical research, we pull from existing legal guidance to create six indicators for identifying cases of violence against women in politics. Consistent with legal applications, this holistic approach does not require that all six criteria be met. Rather, it calls for pieces of evidence to be weighed in relation to one another to determine whether, on balance, they would support a finding of bias against women in political roles. The Concept of Hate Crimes Hate crime laws impose a higher class of penalties when a violent crime targets victims because of their perceived social group membership. These crimes are deemed to be more severe because they also involve group-based discrimination. Used to reassert privilege on the part of dominant groups, their impact “goes far beyond physical or financial damages. It reaches into the community to create fear, hostility, and suspicion” (Perry 2001, 10). These “message crimes” thus aim to deny equal rights to Article | Violence and Harassment of Female Politicians 746 Perspectives on Politics https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592719001397 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:26, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592719001397 https://www.cambridge.org/core group members and heighten a sense of vulnerability among other members of the community (Iganski 2001). One critique of hate crime legislation is that it punishes “improper thinking,” violating the right to free speech (Jacobs and Potter 1997). Yet the aim of these laws is to ensure that all members of society are free to exercise their civil rights without public or private interference (Weisburd and Levin 1994). Perpetrators’ actions seek to diminish free speech on the part of the harassed and other members of their group (Mantilla 2015). Women have not fully benefited from existing hate crime laws because of the frequent exclusion of gender as a category (McPhail 2002). This stems not only from structural and cultural violence naturalizing the mistreat- ment of women but also from the existence of other laws on violence against women (Walters and Tumath 2014). A further challenge relates to the word “hate,” given that perpetrators rarely, in fact, hate all women. Manne critiques this “naïve conception” of misogyny in favor of thinking about it as a property of social systems, in which women face hostility “because they are women in a man’s world” (2018, 33; emphasis in original). Weisburd and Levin advocate using the term “bias crime,” arguing that it more accurately captures this discriminatory, group-based hierarchical component. As civil rights violations, the hateful intent of the perpetrator is less important than the discriminatory use of violence against those who are seen as “transgressors” against their “proper role” in society (1994, 36). Focusing only on “crimes,” we argue, is also too limited. We expand our focus, therefore, to include what police in England and Wales label “hate incidents” or “any non-crime perceived by the victim or any other person, as being motivated by prejudice or hate” (Ask the Police 2018). With these modifications, we propose the umbrella concept of “bias events” as the broader category drawing lines around what does and does not constitute an act of violence against women in politics. A bias event approach has numerous advantages over a hate crime framework for analyzing violence against women in politics. First, it avoids unduly restricting the focus to criminal behaviors, recognizing that legal stand- ards vary across countries, as does state capacity to enforce laws. Second, this approach decenters the state and the police as the only actors relevant to tackling violence against women in politics, opening up opportunities for other actors, such as international organizations, political parties, and civil society, to be active on this issue. Third, it displaces a focus on perpetrator intentions, which can be misunderstood or denied, in favor of the perspectives and experiences of victims and society at large. Criteria for Ascertaining Bias To develop criteria for identifying bias events, we start with the guidelines in the FBI’s Hate Crime Data Collection Guidelines and Training Manual. The FBI notes that because it is difficult to ascertain an offender’s subjective motivation, a crime should be deemed to be motivated by bias “only if investigation reveals sufficient objective facts to lead a reasonable and prudent person to conclude that the offender’s actions were motivated, in whole or in part, by bias” (2015, 4). These guidelines list various types of evidence that— particularly when combined—might support a finding of bias. We focus on five of these, fleshing out how they might be used to analyze potential acts of violence against women in politics and establish the presence of bias against women in political roles (see Table 1). First, the offender made oral comments, written statements, or gestures in- dicating bias. This might include using sexist or sexualized language—in-person, in print, or online—objectifying or otherwise denigrating women. Second, the offender left bias-related drawings, symbols, or graffiti at the scene. Perpetrators, in this case, might post degrading images of female politicians, or paint sexist insults on campaign posters, homes, or constituency offices. Third, the victim was engaged in activities related to his or her identity group. Political women in this scenario might be outspoken feminists, but they may also simply have sought to speak up for women. Fourth, the offender was previously involved in a similar incident or is a hate group member. The perpetrator might have harassed other female politicians, or might participate in men’s rights networks or other groups seeking to defend patriarchy. Fifth, a substantial portion of the community where the event occurred perceived that the incident was motivated by bias.15 Table 1 Six criteria for detecting bias 1. The offender made oral comments, written statements, or gestures indicating bias. 2. The offender left bias-related drawings, symbols, or graffiti at the scene. 3. The victim was engaged in activities related to his or her identity group. 4. The offender was previously involved in a similar incident or is a hate group member. 5. A substantial portion of the community where the event occurred perceived that the incident was motivated by bias. 6. The victim was evaluated negatively according a double standard. Note: All six criteria need not be met to reach a conclusion of bias. 747September 2020 Vol. 18/No. 3| https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592719001397 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:26, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592719001397 https://www.cambridge.org/core Evidence for this might include speeches, opinion pieces, or demonstrations —especially by other women—which explicitly attribute the attack to a woman’s gender. Not all acts of bias are so transparent, however. In cases of unconscious bias, people believe that they are not prejudiced, but nonetheless think or act in biased ways. Unconscious bias may appear in the form of micro- aggressions: everyday indignities that communicate hos- tile, derogatory, or negative views toward members of certain groups (Sue 2010). A more purposive approach masks prejudiced views by claiming other forms of wrongdoing, for example through “judicial harassment,” whereby individuals are targeted with baseless legal charges that divert time, energy, and resources away from their work (Frontline Defenders 2018). To detect these forms of bias, we propose a final criterion: the victim was evaluated negatively according a double standard. This might include attacking female politicians in ways and for reasons not used for male politicians. This hate-crimes-inspired approach goes far in re- solving the three methodological challenges described earlier. First, the analysis does not require that the perpetrator or victim recognize the act as an instance of violence against women in politics. Second, this approach is case based and thus does not require comparisons with other populations to establish that sexism and misogyny played a role. Third, attention to bias as a larger category enables intersectional experiences to be taken into ac- count, while also presenting a framework for ascertaining bias against members of other marginalized groups. By emphasizing the need for analysis, finally, this approach opens up the possibility that some incidents against female politicians may not be attributable to bias. Applying the Framework According to a bias event approach, ascertaining the meaning of particular acts requires placing them in their broader context, using information about their content, targets, perpetrators, and impact. Consistent with the FBI handbook, this approach does not require that all six criteria be met in full. Recognizing that many cases will be ambiguous, with potentially conflicting or competing sources of information, our framework uses these criteria as guidance to explore whether, on balance, the available data would support a finding of bias. Illustrating how to gather and weigh evidence through this lens, we analyze three cases from different parts of the world to determine whether – or not – they constitute violence against women in politics. Benazir Bhutto Benazir Bhutto served as prime minister of Pakistan from 1988 to 1990 and 1993 to 1996. After years living abroad, she returned in October 2007 to contest parlia- mentary elections. Upon her homecoming, she survived an assassination attempt when her motorcade was bombed on its way to a campaign rally in Karachi, killing hundreds of bystanders. On December 27, after months of a tense political and security situation, she was killed as she stood up in her car, waving from the open sunroof, while leaving a rally at Liaquat Bagh park in Rawalpindi. The next day, the Ministry of the Interior announced the cause of death and identified who was responsible for the attack. This quick resolution raised more questions than it answered. In 2008, her widower, Asif Ali Zardari, the new Pakistani president, requested support from the UN for a fact-finding mission to establish the circumstances surrounding her assassination. Conducting more than 250 interviews over the course of nine months, the UN team noted the lack of data available for evaluation: the crime scene was hosed down within an hour of the attack, only 23 pieces of evidence were collected, and an autopsy on the body was not permitted. The team ultimately concluded that these failures were deliberate (United Nations Committee of Inquiry 2010). After the initial arrests, police abandoned their efforts to identify the suicide bomber, leaving his motives unclear. As a result, there is no evidence regarding (1) comments, statements, or gestures and (2) drawings, symbols, and graffiti that might support a finding of gender bias. Evidence that is available, however, strongly points to political motivations for the attack: Bhutto was placed under house arrest before the assassination, there were curious security lapses on the day of her assassination, and government officials behaved suspiciously in the wake of the attacks (Farwell 2011; Hussain 2008; United Nations Commission of Inquiry 2010). The longer trajectory of Bhutto’s career, nonetheless, provides ample testimony of hostility to her leadership due to the fact that she was a woman. When she returned to Pakistan in the late 1980s, she was constantly asked in media interviews why she was not married, leading her to consent to an arranged marriage so she could continue her political activities. In 1988, her party won the elections, but religious leaders opposed her leadership, arguing that a woman could not serve as head of an Islamic state (Zakaria 1990). Empowerment of women formed a key part of her party’s manifesto, and one of her first actions as prime minister was to free many female prisoners, sym- bolically releasing women from the “social prisons” they had suffered during the military dictatorship (Weiss 1990). While this suggests she (3) was engaged in activities related to her identity group, her government subse- quently failed to overturn some of the most discriminatory laws against women (Suvorova 2015). By 2007, her focus on women’s issues was much reduced, appearing in the second half of her party manifesto in a mere half-page of a 22-page document (Pakistan Peoples Party 2008). Because of the botched police investigation, many theories flourished regarding her assassins and their Article | Violence and Harassment of Female Politicians 748 Perspectives on Politics https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592719001397 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:26, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592719001397 https://www.cambridge.org/core potential motivations. Government officials attributed the attack to Al-Qaeda. The UN team noted that Bhutto did worry that Al-Qaeda and the Pakistani Taliban might seek to harm her because of her strong stance against religious extremism. During her last few months in Pakistan, however, she came to believe that then- president Pervez Musharraf was the main threat to her safety (United Nations Commission of Inquiry 2010). She was also deeply suspicious of the military and in- telligence communities, calling out by name three senior Musharraf allies whom she believed were planning to murder her (Farwell 2011). While she believed that the dangers were real, Bhutto was convinced that threat warnings passed to her by the government were intended to intimidate her to stop campaigning (Muñoz 2014). Although Al-Qaeda and the Taliban were (4) previously involved in similar violent incidents, these additional considerations indicate that all potential suspects were driven overwhelmingly by questions of policy and political power. In terms of (5) reactions of the community to the question of gender bias, commentary to this effect was relatively minimal. The Al-Qaeda leader accused of plan- ning the assassination strongly denied assassinating Bhutto, explaining: “Tribal people have their own customs. We certainly don’t strike women” (Lamb 2010). Similarly, in an otherwise extremely detailed, single-spaced, 65-page report, the UN team devoted only one line to gendered motivations, stating that “Ms. Bhutto’s gender was also an issue with the religious extremists who believed that a woman should not lead an Islamic country” (United Nations Commission of Inquiry 2010, 49). Among the three Musharraf allies identified by Bhutto, only one was explicitly said to “not like women meddling in politics” (Farwell 2011, 217). Finally, the response of international leaders largely focused on violence as a threat to democracy, with gendered content restricted to noting she was a woman or calling her Ms. Bhutto (Hussain 2008). Regarding whether Bhutto (6) was punished according to a negative double standard, evidence again points to a lack of gender bias. She was not the first political figure in Pakistan to die in an untimely fashion. Her father, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, who served as president and as prime minister, was executed in 1979. Even more tellingly, Pakistan’s first prime minister, Liaquat Ali Khan, was assassinated in 1951, in the same park Bhutto was leaving as she was killed. When she arrived at the hospital after the October suicide bombing, the staff was busy treating victims of a shooting at a rival candidate’s rally earlier that day. The only discriminatory treatment uncovered by the UN team was a letter in which the Interior Ministry instructed provincial governments to provide stringent and specific security measures for two male ex-prime ministers; no similar directive was issued for Bhutto, also an ex-prime minister. The reason, however, appears to be political: both men were members of the ruling party and close allies of Musharraf (United Nations Commission of Inquiry 2010). Based on this analysis, we conclude that Bhutto’s assassi- nation entailed political violence and violence against politicians, not violence against women in politics. Dilma Rousseff Dilma Rousseff was elected as the first female president of Brazil in 2011 and reelected in 2014. Her reelection was challenged by the main opposition party, and in May 2015, opposition groups presented the party with a peti- tion to impeach Rousseff. Senior leaders did not accept this petition, although they made clear their intention to search for grounds of alleged wrongdoing (Chalhoub et al. 2017). In December 2015, the president of the Chamber of Deputies, Eduardo Cunha, accepted a formal denunciation claiming that Rousseff had committed administrative infractions in the presentation of govern- ment accounts and budgeting practices. The Chamber voted in April 2016 to move ahead with impeachment proceedings. Four weeks later, the Senate voted to suspend Rousseff’s powers during the trial, and her vice president, Michel Temer, became the acting president. In August 2016, the Senate removed Rousseff from office, finding her guilty of breaking the budget law. On their face, impeachment proceedings do not appear to constitute a form of “violence,” nor do they seem like a particularly gendered form of attack. A deeper probe into this case, however, reveals patterns consistent with a bias event seeking to violate women’s political rights. Those who promoted the process and voted in favor of impeach- ment made numerous (1) comments, statements, or gestures indicating bias. Soon after being elected in 2010, Rousseff indicated her preference to be referred to as presidenta (the feminine form). Latin American news outlets overwhelmingly called her presidenta, as did female politicians and members of her own party. In contrast, those voting for impeachment, as well as conservative media outlets, persisted in calling her presidente, the masculine form (Dos Santos 2017). This semiotic violence was accompanied by less gendered but clearly violent language. Deputy Jair Bolsonaro notably dedicated his vote for impeachment to Colonel Carlos Brilhante Ustra, who tortured political prisoners, including Rousseff, during the military dictatorship (Chalhoub et al. 2017). From the time that she first entered the political scene, Rousseff’s appearance—her age, short hair, and profes- sional attire— were seen as an affront to traditional Brazilian standards of femininity (Encarnación 2017). Emphasizing these differences, the magazine Veja pub- lished an article a day after the Chamber vote, praising Marcela Temer, the 33-year-old wife of the vice president, as “beautiful, maidenlike, and ‘of the home.’” A cover story in Isto É! magazine portrayed Rousseff as hysterical, drawing parallels with Queen Mary I of Portugal and Brazil, known as Maria a Louca (Mary the Crazy; Cardoso 749September 2020 Vol. 18/No. 3| https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592719001397 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:26, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592719001397 https://www.cambridge.org/core and de Souza 2016). In July 2015, members of the general public began to place stickers showing Rousseff with her legs spread apart around their gas tank openings, sexually violating her image every time they filled up (Saliba and Santiago 2016). A final set of (2) bias-related drawings and symbols include signs reading Tchau, Querida! (Bye-Bye, Sweetheart!) held up on the Chamber floor by mainly male legislators, taunting Rousseff as they voted for her im- peachment. On the day she was inaugurated, Rousseff (2011) proclaimed, “My greatest commitment, I repeat, is to honoring our women, protecting our most vulnerable people, and governing for everyone.” Actions during her presidency confirm that she (3) was engaged in activities related to her identity group. She continued to advance policies for women implemented under her predecessor and expanded the government’s work to end violence against women and support women’s financial autonomy. She appointed far more women to cabinet positions than previous presidents and elevated the Secretariat on Policies for Women to the status of a full-fledged ministry (Jalalzai and Dos Santos 2015). After her removal, the interim government moved immediately to reverse these gains. Temer appointed the first all-white, all-male cabinet since the military dictatorship. He collapsed the work of the women’s ministry into the Ministry of Justice, and between 2016 and 2017, he discontinued the majority of policies for women initiated under Rousseff and her predecessor (Rubim and Argolo 2018). The two other main protagonists of impeachment, Cunha and Bolsonaro, are well known for (4) their sexism and misogyny. Cunha sponsored a bill in 2013 to restrict access to abortion in cases of rape and to increase penalties for abortion. In 2015, he criticized the inclusion of “gender ideology” in the national plan of education, seeking to prohibit the use of terms like “gender” and “sexual orientation” in the classroom in favor of emphasizing “natural sexual roles” and the “natural family” (Biroli 2016). Bolsonaro was described by journalists in 2014 as “the most misogynistic, hateful, elected official in the democratic world” (Greenwald and Fishman 2014). In response to Congresswoman Maria do Rosário, who denounced the military dictatorship for using sexual violence against dissidents, he took the floor and stated, “I would not rape you. You don’t merit that.” The Supreme Court ruled in her favor when she filed a complaint for libel and slander, which she argued was tantamount to promoting rape culture (Carta Capital 2016). The reaction of women suggests that (5) a substantial portion believed the impeachment was motivated by bias. In an article published in the Guardian in July 2016, one activist wrote, “Almost all feminists agree that her im- peachment was sexist and discriminatory,” observing that thousands of women had come together to express solidarity with Rousseff in a “confrontation with the patriarchy, with male chauvinists” (Hao 2016). Female politicians echoed this message. Senator Gleisi Hoffman stated that it was undeniable that misogyny played a role in the impeachment process (Chalhoub et al. 2017), whereas Senator Regina Sousa remarked during the trial, “The message they are sending in this process is also directed at all women. With their blocking actions they are telling us: women cannot” (Amorim 2016). Rousseff acknowledged this support during her speech in the Senate: “Brazilian women have been, during this time, a fundamental pillar for my resistance.. . . Tireless companions in a battle in which misogyny and prejudice showed their claws” (Rousseff 2016). Finally, ample evidence indicates that Rousseff (6) was punished according to a negative double standard. Her stated offense was using funds from the central bank to conceal a budget deficit before the 2014 elections, which she later reimbursed. This budgetary practice, known in pedaladas fiscais, was made illegal in 2000, but had been employed by two previous presidents without penalty. Moreover, many legal experts agreed that it did not amount to a “crime of responsibility,” the only type of crime that justifies removing an elected president (Encar- nación 2017). In addition, most governors and many mayors engage in pedaladas, including a former governor who served as the rapporteur for the Senate’s special commission on impeachment. Further, more than 100 of the 513 deputies themselves were under formal in- vestigation for some kind of criminal activity at the time of the impeachment vote, including Cunha (Chalhoub et al. 2017). Corruption probes were eventually ordered against more than one-third of the members of Temer’s cabinet (Democracy Now 2017). Rousseff, in contrast, stands out as one of the cleanest politicians in Brazil (Chalhoub et al. 2017). Together with the other evidence, this leads us to classify her impeachment as an instance of violence against women in politics, with psychological, sexual, and semi- otic components. Jo Cox Jo Cox became a member of the British House of Commons in 2015, representing the Labour Party. On June 16, 2016, she was fatally shot and stabbed while arriving at a routine constituency surgery (a weekly walk-in session for constituents to meet with their MPs) in Birstall, West Yorkshire. The last sitting British MP to be killed was Conservative MP Ian Gow, who was assassinated by the Provisional Irish Republican Army in 1990; the last politician to die in an attack was county councilor Andrew Pennington in 2000. Cox’s murder occurred one week before the contested Brexit referendum, in which she was a vocal advocate for Britain to remain in the European Union. She also spoke positively about immigration and campaigned on behalf of refugees from Syria. Article | Violence and Harassment of Female Politicians 750 Perspectives on Politics https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592719001397 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:26, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592719001397 https://www.cambridge.org/core Witnesses reported that the assailant, Thomas Mair, yelled during the attack, “Britain first, keep Britain independent, Britain will always come first. This is for Britain” (Cobain, Parveen, and Taylor 2016). The UK Independence Party leader, Nigel Farage, among other politicians, had made immigration one of the central issues of the Brexit campaign. Adding to these tensions, in May 2016 the extremist Britain First political party pledged that it would target Muslims holding elected office in the United Kingdom, not stopping until all the “Islamist occupiers” were driven out of politics (York 2016). This context indicates that Mair (1) made comments, state- ments, or gestures indicating bias. However, the bias in this case appears to be driven by race rather than gender. Mair’s “death to traitors” outburst during his first court appearance further shows that he viewed Cox as betraying her own race through her policy stances. A search of Mair’s house and computer records following the attack uncovered (2) bias-related drawings and symbols. He had books on the Nazis, German military history, and white supremacy. He also kept newspaper clippings about Anders Breivik, who murdered 77 mem- bers of the Norwegian Labour Party in 2011. Mair’s internet searches included information on the British National Party, apartheid, the Ku Klux Klan, white supremacy, and Nazism (Cobain, Parveen, and Taylor 2016). These clues, again, point to racial prejudice, rather than gender bias, as a motivating factor. In his sentencing, however, the judge did make brief mention of a potential gender element when addressing Mair: “You even researched matricide, knowing that Jo Cox was the mother of young children” (Wilkie 2016, 2). Cox herself was (3) was clearly engaged in activities related to her identity group. On Twitter, she had shared a picture of herself and a group of Labour MPs holding up signs saying #Imafeminist. She disclosed to friends that she was concerned about the “increasing nature of hostility and aggression” toward female MPs (Hughes, Riley- Smith, and Swinford 2016). She had personally contacted police after receiving a stream of malicious messages over the course of three months, which led to the arrest of a man who was given a warning in connection with his conduct in March 2016. Because of this online harassment, at the time of her death police were considering implementing additional security both at her constituency surgery in Birstall and at her houseboat in London. They found no links between this harasser and Mair, however. Based on the first three criteria of the bias event approach, it thus appears that Cox’s murder is best understood as a case of violence against politicians. Considering the next two criteria shifts the picture somewhat. Mair was (4) a supporter of hate groups who attended gatherings of far-right political groups like the National Front and the English Defence League and purchased publications written by extremist groups in the United States and South Africa. Ideas about white supremacy and male supremacy are inextricably linked, according to prominent antihate organizations (ADL 2018). Within the white male supremacist worldview of “naturalized and hierarchized differences” (Ferber 1998), elements of misogyny are as integral as racist beliefs, with intense rage being generated by the prospect of a white woman challenging racism (Shaw 2016). Following the attack, (5) a substantial portion of the community perceived that the incident was motivated by gender bias. Female MPs in particular viewed the murder through a gender lens. Diane Abbott stated, “It is hard to escape the conclusion that the vitriolic misogyny that so many women politicians endure framed the murderous attack on Jo” (Hughes, Riley-Smith, and Swinford 2016). Cox’s friend, Jess Phillips, published numerous editorials in the ensuing months, writing at the time of Mair’s sentencing that “for me and for many of my colleagues— particularly female MPs—fear has also become real and present” (Phillips 2016). These perceptions were echoed by male politicians. Labour MP Chris Bryant, vocal in calling for these threats to be taken more seriously, remarked, “I think women MPs, gay MPs, ethnic minority MPs get the brunt of it” (Mason 2016). These perceptions are borne out by data: while women make up 32% of MPs, the Parliamentary Liaison and Investigation Team, established after Cox’s murder, estimates that approximately 60% of the cases it received concerned female MPs.16 Viewing her murder in terms of challenges to women’s political presence, the Labour Party launched the Jo Cox Women in Leadership Programme. Drawing parallels with suffragettes who “had to contend with open hostility and abuse to win their right to vote,” Prime Minister Theresa May, a Conservative, opted to make her first public statement on a review of abuse and intimidation of candidates on February 6, 2018, the centenary of women’s suffrage (May 2018). Evidence that (6) the victim was evaluated negatively according a double standard is less clear. The police review of Mair’s internet search history revealed that he had looked at the Wikipedia page of William Hague (Cobain, Parveen, and Taylor 2016), a Conservative politician also from Yorkshire who had served as an MP, party leader, and leader of the opposition before being appointed to the House of Lords in 2015. Like Cox, Hague was a supporter of the Remain campaign. The work of the Fixated Threat Assessment Centre (FTAC), which assesses and manages risks from mentally ill individuals who harass, stalk, or threaten public figures, suggests that Mair most likely targeted Cox because she was his local MP. According to FTAC staff, every MP has a group of resentful constituents who channel their frustrations to- ward their local MP.17 It thus may have been a mere coincidence that Mair’s local MP was a young woman with pro-immigration views. 751September 2020 Vol. 18/No. 3| https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592719001397 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:26, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592719001397 https://www.cambridge.org/core Given this mixed evidence, we find classification of this case to be the most challenging of the three. A bias event approach does not require that all six criteria be met, however: each simply provides potential clues as to the presence and significance of the bias that informs the commission of the event. Weighing each piece of in- formation and how they fit together as a whole, we determine that the discussion in relation to criteria (4) gives new meaning to the evidence considered under criteria (1) and (2), indicating that the racist language and symbols also have an underlying misogynistic compo- nent. The reactions mapped under criteria (5) also lend greater substance to the evidence presented under criteria (3), and vice versa, by explaining why female politicians, particularly feminist ones, may experience a heightened sense of vulnerability to violence and harassment. On this basis, we argue that the murder of Jo Cox is a case of violence against women in politics, with physical and psychological elements. Conclusions Violence against women in politics is increasingly recog- nized around the world as a significant barrier to women’s political participation. This article seeks to strengthen its theoretical, empirical, and methodological foundations, recognizing that shared concepts and language are vital for building a cumulative research agenda. Conceptualizing this phenomenon in terms of structural, cultural, and symbolic violence, moreover, lays bare what is at stake by allowing violence against women in politics to continue. First, accepting abuse as “the cost of doing politics” raises questions about the robustness of democracy. Even without equality concerns, interfering with election cam- paigns or preventing officials from fulfilling their mandates violates the political rights of candidates as well as voters. Second, tolerating mistreatment due to individuals’ as- criptive characteristics infringes on their human rights, undermining their personal integrity and sense of social value. Third, normalizing women’s exclusion from polit- ical participation relegates them to second-class citizen- ship, threatening principles of gender equality. Acknowledging the varied manifestations of violence against women in politics, in turn, points to the importance of developing multifaceted solutions. Adopt- ing new legislation or revising existing laws is one approach that has been used extensively in Latin America to combat physical, psychological, and economic vio- lence. Providing guidance for electoral observers in detecting and reporting violence against women during elections, especially physical, psychological, and sexual, has been piloted in Africa and Latin America. In North America and Western Europe, parliaments are developing stronger codes of conduct and procedures for reporting sexual harassment. To track and respond to the online abuse of politically active women, social media companies are partnering with civil society organizations to address psychological, sexual, and semiotic violence. The effec- tiveness of these strategies is not yet known, highlighting the need for further research and the continued de- velopment of countermeasures. A crucial first step for academics and practitioners, however, is to begin raising awareness that violence and harassment should not be the cost of women’s engagement in the political sphere. Notes 1 Interview in Tunisia, September 2015. 2 Interviews in UK, January 2016 and 2018. 3 Tweet in French at https://twitter.com/pelletiermoniqu/ status/729950025795645440?lang5en. 4 Interviews in Bolivia, August 2015. 5 Interviews in Zambia, March 2016, and India, June 2018. 6 Interview in Bolivia, July 2015. 7 Interviews in Tanzania, August 2015. 8 Interviews in Canada, February 2018. 9 Platforms include https://labourtoo.org.uk/, https:// www.wesaidenough.com/, and https://metooep.com/. 10 Interviews in Mexico, May 2018. 11 Interview in UK, January 2016. 12 Hansard, 14 September 2017. 13 Interviews in UK, January 2018. 14 Interviews in UK, January 2016, and Sweden, Sep- tember 2017. 15 Although actors may have incentives to play up or play down the presence of bias, this criterion seeks to capture community-based understandings of the in- cident, recognizing that hate crimes seek to send a “message” about inequality and exclusion. 16 Interview in UK, January 2018. 17 Interview in UK, January 2018. 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work_kofnsfsrvvaw5kbsqejnshqzy4	----	Mulder, J. (2016). The Personal Implications of the Referendum Results for (German) EU Citizens Living in the UK. German Law Journal, 17 , 83-86. http://www.germanlawjournal.com/s/15- PDF_Vol_17_Brexit-_Mulder.pdf Peer reviewed version Link to publication record in Explore Bristol Research PDF-document This is the author accepted manuscript (AAM). The final published version (version of record) is available online via German Law Journal, Inc. at http://www.germanlawjournal.com/brexit-supplement. Please refer to any applicable terms of use of the publisher. University of Bristol - Explore Bristol Research General rights This document is made available in accordance with publisher policies. Please cite only the published version using the reference above. Full terms of use are available: http://www.bristol.ac.uk/red/research-policy/pure/user-guides/ebr-terms/ http://www.germanlawjournal.com/s/15-PDF_Vol_17_Brexit-_Mulder.pdf http://www.germanlawjournal.com/s/15-PDF_Vol_17_Brexit-_Mulder.pdf https://research-information.bris.ac.uk/en/publications/0769c2b1-72fb-4fe0-92d9-f8d648634f3a https://research-information.bris.ac.uk/en/publications/0769c2b1-72fb-4fe0-92d9-f8d648634f3a The Personal Implications of the Referendum Results for (German) EU Citizens Living in the UK Jule Mulde r Unive rsity of Brist ol L aw School [ jule.mulder@bristol.ac.uk ] According the Office for National Statistics’ 2014 estimate, 300,000 UK residents were born in Germany and 131,000 are German nationals.1 This makes them the fifth biggest group of immigrants in the UK by country of birth—preceded only by people born in India, Poland, Pakistan and the Republic of Ireland— and the twelfth largest group of immigrants in terms of nationality.2 Thus, although Brexit’s rhetoric against immigration has not directly targeted Germans, a large number will be affected by the UK’s changing relationship with the EU. Just as for other EU citizens, their future status in the UK is all but certain. What are the possible personal implications for German, and other European citizens, who exercised their EU right to free movement and immigrated to the UK? Of course the short (legal) answer is that nothing will happen in the short term even though protection under the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties is far from clear. European law is still applicable in the UK and the “new deal” negotiated in February 2016, will not be implemented. Changes can only come about once and if Article 50 TEU is triggered, and then, only if the withdrawal agreement changes the status of EU citizens in the UK, or free movement rights in general. While the reduction of (European) immigration was one of the top priorities for the Leave campaign, it is less than certain that EU immigration will actually be limited under the agreement that will have to be negotiated. In my view it is inconceivable that the EU will allow the UK access to the internal market without the right to free movement of persons or workers. This is the case not only because the EU has no interest in offering the UK a favourable deal (thereby encouraging other Member States to leave the Union) but also because the four freedoms are tightly and logically connected. Why should the EU allow the UK to benefit from the internal market (by exporting services/goods) while preventing other Member States and its citizens from doing the same (by providing human capital and a workforce)? Leaving the EU does thus not necessarily mean a reduction of EU migration, a fact which was also conceded by the Leave campaign, although conveniently only after the referendum.3 Even if the withdrawal agreement includes provisions to limit European immigration, it does not necessarily follow that this will directly affect the citizens who are already here. After all, the UK as well as the EU has an interest in accepting a sort of grandfathering of rights for citizens who already exercised their right to free movement. Otherwise the approximately 1.3 million Britons who currently live somewhere else in the EU might be obliged to return to the UK,4 which could put increasing pressure on the social services and the NHS. Finally, even if the UK introduces a (retroactive) “Australian style point system” as suggested by Nigel Farage,5 many European citizens being would probably be able to stay in the UK because they are university educated. Immediate change seems unlikely, but the detachment from the European Union and the possible rejection of direct effect always bears the risk that protection under the treaties, or the eventual withdrawal agreement, will less effective than the current regime and that rights will be watered down over the years. 1 See Population by Country of Birth and Nationality Report: August 2015, OFFICE FOR NATIONAL STATISTICS (27 August 2015) available at http://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/internationalmigration/articles/populationbycountryof birthandnationalityreport/2015-09-27. 2 In 2010 Germans were the fifth largest group in terms of both, nationality and country of birth. See DataBlog, THE GUARDIAN (9 September 2010) available at http://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2011/may/26/foreign-born-uk-population. 3 Ben Quinn, Leave campaign rows back on key immigration and NHS pledges, THE GUARDIAN (25 June 2016) http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jun/25/leave-campaign-rows-back-key-pledges-immigration-nhs-spending. 4 Alberto Nardelli, Ian Traynor and Leila Haddou, Revealed: thousands of Britons on benefits across EU, THE GUARDIAN (19 January 2015) https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/jan/19/-sp-thousands-britons-claim-benefits-eu. 5 Adam Donald, Immigration points-based systems compared, BBC NEWS (1 June 2016) http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-29594642. mailto:jule.mulder@bristol.ac.uk http://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/internationalmigration/articles/populationbycountryofbirthandnationalityreport/2015-09-27 http://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/internationalmigration/articles/populationbycountryofbirthandnationalityreport/2015-09-27 http://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2011/may/26/foreign-born-uk-population http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jun/25/leave-campaign-rows-back-key-pledges-immigration-nhs-spending https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/jan/19/-sp-thousands-britons-claim-benefits-eu http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-29594642 Moreover, the lack of immediate legal consequences does not mean that there are no personal implications for Germans, or other EU citizens, who live in the UK. Beyond the obvious concerns about the economic well- being of the UK, Brexit has a real effect on many jobs and what they entail, including new concerns about job security and career prospects, and the unseemly and uncomfortable anti-immigration rhetoric that is poisoning the political discourse and life.6 Take, for example, the academic staff at UK universities of whom more than 15% are non-British EU nationals.7 Brexit will affect funding of research projects and student/staff exchanges within the Erasmus program, the recruitment of talented students and staff from other European countries, as well as the research focus and activities that might no longer be recognised as relevant within the UK academic community. What are European lawyers, like myself, supposed to do during the time of withdrawal negotiations and post-Brexit? While constitutional European lawyers may be on high demand to comment on the negotiations and changing relationships in the near future, others whose research focuses on substantive EU law, such as EU employment law, EU procurement law, or EU environmental law, may find themselves in a position where they have to retrain to become national lawyers in their respective fields. Alternatively, academics may choose to leave the UK as its turns its back on Europe. This, of course, would have profound effects on the UK as a research power house. It will also affect academics’ career paths. Here, German citizens, whether academic or not, may have the advantage that the strong German economy should be able to accommodate these Brexit exiles’ home-coming. Young EU migrants from, for example, Greece, Spain or Portugal, may not find themselves in such a comfortable position. They may have to try their luck in other European countries, which will often include the need to learn yet another language. But even for Germans, a return to their home-country after years in the UK undoubtedly will have effects on their career prospects. Many German academic and non-academic workers in the UK, including myself, have been attracted by the openness and flexibility of the British (academic) labour market, which often values talent more than titles and degrees.8 German academia, with its much stricter degree and career path requirements, will not necessarily be able to recognise the work experience gained in the UK’s very different academic and educational system. Moreover, a choice to return is, of course, much more than an economic cost/benefit calculation. Many European citizens arrived in the UK as students or young professionals and now have made a home in their host country. They are often very well-integrated,9 have friends and family in the UK, and will not easily be able to leave their host country without significant personal costs, including the potential loss of personal relationships and private networks and support. After years in the UK, the home country can often look much more foreign, strange, and unfamiliar than the country of choice. Nevertheless, Germans, just like other EU citizens, will have to ask themselves whether there is a future for them in a country whose majority just rejected the post-war European consensus and where xenophobic, anti-immigration rhetoric and anti- intellectualism have become acceptable within the mainstream political discourse.10 6 Harriet Agerholm, Brexit: Wave of hate crime and racial abuse reported following EU referendum, THE INDEPENDENT (27 June 2016) http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/brexit-eu-referendum-racial-racism-abuse-hate-crime-reported-latest-leave- immigration-a7104191.html. 7 See Free Online Statistics, HIGHER EDUCATION STATISTICS AGENCY, available at https://hesa.ac.uk/stats-staff. 8 See, e.g., Oliver Imhof, Why I’ll leave the UK if Britain votes no to Europe (Opinion), THE GUARDIAN (24 February 2016) https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/feb/24/leave-uk-brexit-german-london-human-rights. 9 See, e.g., Helen Pidd, Britain's German-born population prefers life under the radar, THE GUARDIAN (14 December 2012) https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2012/dec/14/german-born-population-uk-census and Natalie Tenberg, Krauts in Limey Land: Germans Go Eurotrash in London, SPIEGEL ONLINE INTERNATIONAL (13 June 2005) http://www.spiegel.de/international/krauts-in-limey-land- germans-go-eurotrash-in-london-a-357978.html. 10 See, e.g., Oliver Imhof, Why I will be leaving Brexit Britain (Opinion), THE GUARDIAN (25 June 2016) https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/jun/25/why-leaving-brexit-britain and Julia Ebner and Janet Anderson, I’m an Austrian in the UK – I don’t want to live in this increasingly racist country (Opinion), THE GUARDIAN (24 June 2016) https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/jun/24/country-increasingly-racist-austrian-uk-briton-netherlands-eu-referendum- result. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/brexit-eu-referendum-racial-racism-abuse-hate-crime-reported-latest-leave-immigration-a7104191.html http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/brexit-eu-referendum-racial-racism-abuse-hate-crime-reported-latest-leave-immigration-a7104191.html https://hesa.ac.uk/stats-staff https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/feb/24/leave-uk-brexit-german-london-human-rights https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2012/dec/14/german-born-population-uk-census http://www.spiegel.de/international/krauts-in-limey-land-germans-go-eurotrash-in-london-a-357978.html http://www.spiegel.de/international/krauts-in-limey-land-germans-go-eurotrash-in-london-a-357978.html https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/jun/25/why-leaving-brexit-britain https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/jun/24/country-increasingly-racist-austrian-uk-briton-netherlands-eu-referendum-result https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/jun/24/country-increasingly-racist-austrian-uk-briton-netherlands-eu-referendum-result 
work_komfq5ffcjfa7ny5wte45kzn6a	----	asap_012.tex BL066/JOSI asap˙012 May 21, 2004 0:48 Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy, Vol. 4, No. 1, 2004, pp. 91--113 Opposition to the Legitimacy of Hate Crime Laws: The Role of Argument Acceptance, Knowledge, Individual Differences, and Peer Influence Edward Dunbar∗ and Andres Molina Pacific Psychological Associates, and University of California, Los Angeles Hate Crime laws are a highly controversial legal approach in society’s response to intergroup violence. Argument acceptance, knowledge, and individual differenceswere examined in relationship to attitudes about these laws. These variables were also considered in terms of efforts to influence a peer’s beliefs about hate crime laws. One- hundred and sixty-seven participants completed a measure of knowledge of human rights laws, Gough’s Pr scale, the Selznick and Steinberg anti-Semitism scale, and Cuellar’s Machismo scale.Hate crime attitudes were measured on an affect rating scale and six statements reflecting arguments favoring and opposing hate crime laws. Pee influence was examined on Interpersonal Power Inventory (IPI). Results showed that while most participants endorsed positive attitudes about hate crime laws, men—and both women and men who endorsed machismo attitudes —were more likely to agree with media distortion and identity politics arguments opposing hate crime laws. The Pr and machismo scales predicted greater effort on the IPI to influence peer attitudes about hate crime laws, afte controlling for demographic differences of the participants. These findings indicate that more explicitly biased individuals were more effortful in trying to change the attitudes of peers concerning the legitimacy of hate crime laws . Q1 Hate crimes, and polices meant to enforce them, are a controversial legal remedy to a chronic American dilemma. Since the passage of the 1990 federal hate crimes statistics reporting act and passage in 1994 of a federal sentencing act for hate crime offenders, critics of hate crime legislation have argued the laws are divisive (Jacobs & Potter, 1998) and that the laws “don’t work” as a deterrent to --------------------------------------------------------- ∗Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Edward Dunbar [email: edunbar@ucla.edu]. Q2 91 C_ 2004 The Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues BL066/JOSI asap˙012 May 21, 2004 0:48 92 Dunbar and Molina intergroup violence. At the same time, many young adults express concern about hate crimes. National survey research conducted in 1999 found that 95% of young people support the expansion of hate crime laws. Seventeen percent of the 12- to 24-year-old survey respondents reported knowing someone who had been the vic- tim of a hate crime (http://edworkforce.house.gov/democrats/hr1900views.html). The study of social attitudes has employed a number of methodological and conceptual strategies. It has increasingly been recognized that research examining social issues needs to consider the independent role of cognitive, affective, and situational variables (Zanna, 1994). In their research on attitudes about capital punishment Haddock and Zanna (1999) emphasize the importance of examining the unique role that cognitions, affects, and judgments play in attitude formation. They observe how greater predictive power and construct clarity is possible when research incorporates a multidimensional strategy. The recent study of attitudes about civil rights has revealed the importance of both beliefs relevant to the issue—such as fairness of employment laws—and indi- vidual differences such as political orientation (Kravitz et al., 2000). Aberson and Haag (2003) observed that both attitudes and individual differences predicted the favorableness in how affirmative action laws were viewed. The limited information concerning attitudes about hate crime laws has suggested that negative feelings about gays and lesbians may increase opposition to these laws (Johnson & Byers, 2003). Consistent with the guidance of Haddock and Zanna (1999) the current study employed a multidimensional strategy to examine attitudes and behavioral intentions concerning hate crime laws. The current study examined how cogni- tive, demographic, and individual difference variables shape attitudes about hate crime laws. This was done by examining the relationships between cognitions— that is, acceptance of arguments concerning the legitimacy of hate crimes laws and knowledge about human rights laws, participant social category differences: gen- der, age, and political orientation—and individual difference variables related to outgroup bias. Additionally, this study considered how these same sets of variables were predictive of efforts to influence a peer’s attitudes concerning hate crimes laws. Arguments Concerning the Legitimacy of Hate Crime Laws Arguments in opposition to hate crime laws in the United States suggest that the legal standard is both arbitrary and unenforceable under state of federal guide- lines. Critics of hate crimes question whether these offenses are in any objective sense distinguishable from other crimes (Jacobs & Potter, 1998). Gellman (1991) has argued that hate crime laws penalize not only free speech, but freedom of thought as well. It has additionally been suggested that these laws are the result of special interest group efforts to influence law makers to craft legislation that BL066/JOSI asap˙012 May 21, 2004 0:48 Opposition to Hate Crime Laws 93 meets the identity politics needs of their constituencies (Sykes, 1992). Libertarian political theory would also argue against the federal government mandate regard- ing hate crimes (http://www.LP.org/Libertarian Party - Release - 20000221 - hate crimes.html; http://www.cincypost.com/2003/01/25/edita012503.html). States rights proponents would rather leave the question of prosecution of bias-motivated crimes at a community or state level. Many political conservatives additionally feel that hate crimes are sensationalized by the media (http://dm.olemiss.edu/archives/ 98/9807/980716/980716ED3renick.HTML). This argument proposes that “all crimes are motivated by hate” (http://www.ccv.org/Cincy Hate Crimes.htm) and that discussion of a high-profile case such as the Matthew Sheppard torture and homicide—which was subsequently depicted in a television movie—obscure the everyday realities of violence in the United States. The arguments that support hate crime laws and policies recognize that these laws are part of an effort to promote the maintenance of a civil society. Hate crime laws are particularly important, so goes this line of argument, given the significant ethnic change and in-migration experienced by the United States during the past 50 years. These laws are a recent example of social engineering (Myrdal, 1944), one which serves to create safeguards against intergroup violence for all members of society and not special interests (Taslitz, 1999; Sullaway, in press). Researchers have additionally focused upon the specific vulnerabilities faced by many victims of hate crimes (Garnets, Herek, & Levy, 1992; Herek, Gillis, Cogan, & Glunt, 1996; Garnets, 1997). Hate crime laws therefore protect members of outgroups traditionally under-served and marginalized by law enforcement and the legal sys- tem (Waldrep, 2001). Finally, in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States, human relations advocates have expressed particular concern about the need to guard against the escalation of retaliatory intergroup violence. In this regard, hate crime laws have been described by researchers such as Hamm (1993, 2001) as constituting acts of domestic terrorism. Attitudes concerning hate crime laws may also signify other beliefs concern- ing intergroup issues. Opposition to these laws may be related to the endorse- ment of explicit forms of outgroup bias. As has been suggested previously in the study of symbolic racism (Kinder & Sears, 1981; Jacobsen, 1985), bias against racial outgroups may be referenced via opposition to policies that seek to establish workplace equity, such as affirmative action, or housing rights. Opposition to hate crime laws may simply represent a symbolic form of ethnic or gender bias, for example. Knowledge of the Law and Hate Crime Attitudes Human rights constitute an international concern. Creating legal protections for voting rights, fair employment, the rights of women, and freedom of speech BL066/JOSI asap˙012 May 21, 2004 0:48 94 Dunbar and Molina are important elements of a civil society (Weisbrodt, 1988). The issue of inter- group violence is part of the human rights agenda. Domestically, the U.S. gov- ernment and internationally the United Nations (United Nations Website, 2003) have both endorsed numerous initiatives to promote intercultural involvement and understanding. These initiatives have included school violence prevention, neigh- borhood dispute resolution, and educational programs about tolerance, the legal system, and human rights. As part of this effort, political psychologists have studied citizen compre- hension of civil rights laws (Davies, 2000). Price (1993) has proposed that legal knowledge, ideological sophistication, and opinion change are three significant areas in the formation of attitudes about the law. There is some evidence that pos- session of accurate knowledge about human rights in general may be related to attitudes about laws protecting minority groups. Research in the European Union has found a relationship between knowledge of human rights laws and positive feelings about these laws (Dunbar, Blanco, Sullaway, & Horcajo, 2004). In an ear- lier study, knowledge about policies pertaining to human rights enforcement was predictive of more positive feelings about human rights laws in general (Dunbar, Sullaway, Blanco, Horcajo, & Cortes, 2003). Q3 Individual Differences, Bias, and Attitudes about Hate Crimes Social category differences such as gender (Campbell, 1971; Carter, 1990) and age (Pope-Davis & Ottavi, 1994) have been found to be associated with racism as well as social attitudes concerning employment rights (Kravitz et al., 2000). In their survey research on hate crime attitudes, Johnson and Byers (2003) had proposed that men would be more opposed to hate crime laws than women and that socially liberal individuals would be more supportive of hate crime laws than socially conservative persons. Political orientation and feelings about the political system may play a role in attitudes concerning civil rights (Reef & Knoke, 1993). There is an abundant literature on the endorsement of a male-dominant world- view as a factor in outgroup bias. As Sidanius has proposed in his study of social dominance, a male-dominant worldview constitutes an important element in the support for inequity between groups (Sidanius, Pratto, & Bobo, 1994). Payne (1995) has likewise linked a male-centric worldview to many of the fascistic po- litical movements of the first half of the twentieth century. Machismo (Cuellar, Harris, & Jassco, 1980), similarly, may constitute a stable belief system. As Casas, Wagenheim, Banchero, and Mendoza-Romero (1994) have noted, machismo rep- resents the strong adherence to a male gender identity, one that is not per se exclusively a characteristic of Latino culture. Such a belief system may include a tough-minded approach to civil rights issues—that is, hate crime laws are an “excuse abuse” and it is up to the individual to “get over it” on their own. As BL066/JOSI asap˙012 May 21, 2004 0:48 Opposition to Hate Crime Laws 95 Cuellar, Arnold, and Gonzalez note, “Machismo involves learned gender role be- haviors which are known to be most resistive to change” (1995, p. 241). Estrada’s (1998) meta-analysis of bias reduction initiatives noted that gender differences played a significant role in the failure of tolerance education initiatives to reduce anti-gay and lesbian bias. It may therefore be expected that both gender and gender attitudes independently influence opinions concerning hate crime laws. Less explicit forms of an orientation toward bias may additionally shape atti- tudes about hate crime laws. Gough’s measure of intergroup bias, the Prejudice (Pr) scale, has demonstrated relationships to anti-Semitism (Gough, 1951) and racism Q4 (Dunbar, 1995). The scale, which measures subjective experiences of guarded- ness, cynicism, and negative affect, is also called the Tolerance (To) Scale on the California Psychological Inventory (Gough & Bradley, 1993). Research with Pr has demonstrated cross-cultural validity in predicting endorsement of anti-Semitic and Roma (Gitano) bias in the Czech Republic (Dunbar & Simonova, 2003). Pr has also been found to predict hostility toward indigenous persons (Mapuche Indians) in Chile (Dunbar, Saiz, Stela, & Saiz, 1999). In this study, Pr was found to predict outgroup bias after ingroup-outgroup value dissimilarity had been accounted for. Individual difference variables pertaining to bias, which are both explicit, such as a measure of anti-Semitic stereotypes, or implicit, as reflected in the significantly more ambiguous Pr scale, may both influence attitudes concerning laws designed to protect social outgroups. Peer Influence and Attitudes about Hate Crimes An important aspect of intergroup attitude formation is found in peer relation- ships (Fishbein, 2002). Informal peer relationships may influence attitudes about outgroups and laws to protect them. Understanding how peers, in equal status sit- uations, would try and influence each other about hate crime laws could provide useful information about strategies to foster intergroup relations. One means to examine peer influence about hate crimes is found in the research on social power of French and Raven (1959). Their model identifies the varying forms of interpersonal influence, which are employed in situations of attitude change, task compliance, and conformity (Kipnis, Castell, Gergen, & Mauch, 1976; Gold, 2001). Raven has subsequently distinguished between “hard” and “soft” influence strategies. Hard strategies include actions that seek to control the individual through threat, coercion, explicit reward, and use of formal position of authority. Soft social power strategies employ relationship-enhancing behaviors, logic-based arguments, and interdependent or “referent” forms of establishing compliance (Raven, 1992). The French and Raven model provides a construct-rich approach to the inves- tigation of peer influence concerning hate crime laws. Additionally, considering BL066/JOSI asap˙012 May 21, 2004 0:48 96 Dunbar and Molina how specific attitudes about hate crime laws—for example, ascribing to an identity politics argument—are related to these social power strategies can help to clarify the ideological and motivational factors in the public debate about these laws. This is important given the wide array of media and educational efforts which seek to create positive attitudes about the role of hate crime enforcement. The issue of peer influence has also been found to be a function of both gender and bias orientation. Gender differences have also been found to influence endorsement of social power strategies (Carli, 2001). Dunbar et al. (2004) found that men and women differed in their effort to influence a peer’s beliefs concerning the civil rights of ethnic minorities, with men using more hard influence strategies. In this study it was also found that efforts to influence a peer’s beliefs about human rights was predicted by the endorsement of explicit ethnic and gender bias, as well as an orientation toward bias as measured on the Gough Pr measure. That is, individuals who expressed an overt bias toward outgroups were consistently more forceful in seeking the agreement of a peer concerning human rights than were persons who expressed a less explicit bias against outgroups. As such, a bias orientation that is at once explicit in terms of self-report, and implicit, as reflected in the Gough measure, can be expected to produce more effort to have peers ascribe to attitudes about hate crimes. Research Questions This study examined two interrelated questions about hate crime laws. One of the goals of this study is to examine the relationships between how argument acceptance, legal knowledge, and individual differences influenced feelings about hate crime laws. In addition, this study examined how these variables were related to efforts to have a peer agree with the participant’s beliefs about hate crime laws. Four hypotheses based upon prior research were proposed. In addition, two exploratory research questions were investigated. H1: Positive feelings about hate crime laws would be predicted by possession of accurate knowledge of human rights laws, when controlling for participant age, gender, and political orientation. This would cross-culturally replicate the Dunbar et al. (2004) findings. H2: Negative feelings about hate crime laws would be correlated with the Gough Pr scale, the Machismo scale, and the Selznick and Steinberg anti-Semitism scale, when controlling for demographic differences of the participant. H3: Both hard and soft strategies to influence a peer’s attitudes about hate crimes would be predicted by participant age, gender, and political orientation, the Pr scale, the Machismo scale, and the Selznick and Steinberg anti-Semitism scale. It was anticipated that women and (self-referenced) politically liberal participants would demonstrate more effort to use soft influence strategies. The measures of intergroup hostility, Pr, Machismo, and ant-Semitism were expected to predict to both hard and soft peer influence strategies, again replicating the Dunbar et al. findings. BL066/JOSI asap˙012 May 21, 2004 0:48 Opposition to Hate Crime Laws 97 H4: It was anticipated that men and women would differ in their endorsement of strategies to influence a peer’s attitudes about hate crime laws; it was hypothesized that men would endorse a greater effort to influence a peer’s beliefs. R1: An exploratory research question examined whether the measures of bias orientation and negative feelings about hate crimes would be related to argument acceptance both favoring (i.e., negatively correlated) and rejecting (i.e., positively correlated) the legitimacy of hate crime laws. R2: A second exploratory research question sought to determine whether agreement with arguments for and against hate crimes was related to efforts to gain agreement of a peer concerning the legitimacy of these laws. Method Sample One-hundred and sixty-seven students enrolled at a community college in the metropolitan Sacramento area in Northern California participated in the study. Materials Social Category Variables. Participant variables were coded for participant age, race/ethnicity, religion, and gender. Political orientation was measured on a five-point Likert scale, ranging from left/liberal to right/conservative. These variables were recorded on a demographic face sheet. Human Rights Knowledge Scale. The 23-item measure of human rights laws and policies in California and the United States was developed by the first author. Scale items consisted of factual statements about human rights laws that were evaluated on a 7-point Likert scale, with statements rated from “very certain this is true” to “very certain this is not true.” The current scale is a revision of the measure employed in the Dunbar et al. (2004) study. The statements examined knowledge concerning human rights policies (“California does not have an agency responsible for monitoring the civil rights of minority groups”) and civil laws (“There are laws in the United States against the advocacy of violence against minority groups”), as well as knowledge of federal human rights practices (“The U.S. does not have a policy concerning the human rights of social groups such as Jews”). The human rights knowledge scale consists of four subscales. The first subscale measures knowledge about hate crime laws and consists of six items. The second subscale measures knowledge about laws concerning protection against discrimination (nine items), the third knowledge of laws concerning hate speech (two items), and the fourth knowledge of government policies regarding human rights enforcement; this scale consists of six items. BL066/JOSI asap˙012 May 21, 2004 0:48 98 Dunbar and Molina Hate Crime Affect. Participants were asked to describe how they felt about hate crime laws on three 7-point semantic differential measures, developed by Haddock and Zanna (1999) in their study of attitudes about capital punishment. The three affect pairs (“Positive-Negative, Good-Bad, Like-Dislike”) were aggregated to form a global rating of feelings concerning human rights laws. Higher scores indicate more negative affect. Prejudice (Pr) Scale. The 32 items of Gough’s original Pr scale from the original version of the MMPI. This scale includes items that reflect a cynical, rigid, bitter perspective. Pr has shown cross-cultural reliability in its prediction of outgroup bias. Machismo Scale (Cuellar et al., 1995). This 17-item measure is a subscale of the Acculturation Rating Scale for Mexican Americans-II (ARSMA-II). In prior research the measure has been used with community samples and shown to be related to both acculturative status and the acceptance of traditional familial values. The measure has evidenced satisfactory construct validity and internal reliability (α = .75). Selznick and Steinberg Anti-Semitism Scale. This is an 11-item Likert-scaled measure consisting of statements reflecting negative stereotypes of Jews and Jewish culture (1969). Scale items reflect both negative images (“Jews have a lot of irritating faults”) and distrust (“Jews are shrewd and tricky in business”) of Jews. The scale has been used in community studies in North America during the past thirty years (Matrie & Clark, 1982). Arguments about Hate Crime Laws. Six position statements, reflecting dif- fering arguments for and against hate crime laws were rated on a 5-point Lik- ert scale. Participants were asked “What do you think about Hate Crime laws?” Each statement was then rated from “Strongly Disagree” to “Strongly Agree” with higher scores reflecting greater endorsement of each argument. The state- ments were coded to reflect positions of Identity Politics (opposition to the laws), Vulnerable Groups (supportive of the laws), Libertarianism (opposition), Civil Society (supportive), Social Engineering (supportive), and Media Distortion (opposition). The items are included in Table 3 below. Interpersonal Power Inventory (IPI). This 33-item Likert-scaled measure asks respondents to describe forms of social power they would employ to gain the agreement or compliance of another (Raven, Schwarzwald, & Koslowsky, 1998). The IPI measures the forms of social power described by French and Raven (1959). The power strategies include both hard (e.g., personal coercion) and soft (e.g., information) forms of influence strategies. In the current version of the Raven BL066/JOSI asap˙012 May 21, 2004 0:48 Opposition to Hate Crime Laws 99 Inventory, all items were worded to reflect interaction with a peer, that is, a person of equal status. Participants were asked to respond to a situation in which they were attempting to convince a peer who held an opposite opinion about hate crime laws to agree with their opinion. Participants were asked to describe the actions they would employ to gain their peer’s agreement about the legitimacy of hate crime laws. An example of a statement reflecting personal expertise (one of the “soft” influence strategies) on the IPI is “I would probably have had more knowledge about the issue than they would have,” whereas a statement such as “I could have made it more difficult for them to get some special benefits if they disagreed with me” would reflect the use of material reward (a “hard” social influence strategy). Each Raven Inventory item is scored on a 7-point Likert scale. Low values reflect a disinclination to use a certain form of social power (1 = almost certainly not a strategy) and high scores a preference to use a strategy (7 = almost certainly a strategy). Each IPI scale consisted of 3 items, allowing for a scale range from 3 to 21. For the 11 individual scales, the mean reliability coefficient (α) was .79 (range of .90–.68). Procedure Participants were solicited at their community college and received academic credit for participating in the study. All subjects were enrolled in introductory an- thropology classes at their college. To reduce response bias (Sundberg & Bachelis, 1956) no reference was made in participant solicitation that topics of inter-group attitudes would be sampled. All questionnaire materials were administered dur- ing regular class sessions. The administration of the materials was as follows: the Prejudice Scale was administered first, followed by the Machismo Scale, the Human Rights Knowledge Scale, the Hate Crime Affect scale, and then the Selznick and Steinberg Anti-Semitism Scale. Finally, the Arguments about Hate Crime Laws scales and the IPI was administered; the demographic fact sheet was Q5 administered after the other measures were completed. On the IPI it was em- phasized that participants were to think of a situation in which they would try to change the opinion of a peer who held opposite attitudes from those of the participant concerning hate crime laws. The completed materials were entered into a database by a research team su- pervised by the first author. The dataset was then analyzed in SPSS 10.5. Analysis of variance and zero-order correlations were computed to test the relationships between the independent variables. To test the predictive relationship of sets of variables for feelings about hate crime laws and to examine the question of peer influence concerning hate crime laws, hierarchical multiple regression (HMR) analysis was computed. The HMR equation allowed for the determination of the (proposed) contribution of individual difference variables—that is, machismo BL066/JOSI asap˙012 May 21, 2004 0:48 100 Dunbar and Molina attitudes, anti-Semitism, and bias orientation—after social category and cognitive variables had been accounted for in the model. This evaluative strategy was similar to that employed in the Dunbar et al. study (2004). Results The sample consisted of 69 men and 85 women; 9 participants did not report their gender. The average age was 20.78 years (SD = 5.97). The sample was primarily Euro-White (82.2%); 9.3% of the subjects were Latino, 5.3% were Asian- Pacific, 2% were African–American, and the remaining 1.4% were of various ethnic backgrounds. For political orientation 17.8% of the participants described themselves as liberal/left, 37% as liberal-to-moderate, 32.2% as moderate/middle, 18.5% as moderate-to-conservative, and 12.3% as conservative/right. Feelings and Attitudes about Hate Crime Laws. The mean score for the Hate Crime Affect scale was 11.09 (SD = 7.02, Cronbach alpha = .99). Computed One- way ANOVAs for the Hate Crime Affect scale by political orientation (?2 = .04) Q6 and gender (?2 = .08) was not significant. The computed zero-order correlation Q7 for participant age with the Hate Crime Affect scale was also not significant. Acceptance of Arguments about Hate Crimes. Analysis of the agreement with arguments for and against hate crime laws indicated that the greatest agreement was found for the Civil Society argument (M = 3.72, SD = .92) followed by the other two pro-hate crime statements for Vulnerable Groups (M = 3.36, SD = 1.01) and Social Engineering (M = 3.33, SD = 1.30). The greatest agreement for anti-hate crime statements was found for the Identity Politics (M = 2.84, SD = .96) argument, followed by the Media Distortion statement (M = 2.15, SD = 1.04) with least agreement for the Libertarian argument (M = 1.93, SD = .95). Significance tests indicated that men were more likely to agree with both the Media Distortion (t = 2.38, p < .01) argument (M = 2.37, SD = 1.13) than women (M = 1.98, SD = .93, Cohen’s d = 38) and the Libertarian (t = 1.67, p < .05) argument (M = 2.03, SD = 1.10 and M = 1.79, SD = .74, respectively, Cohen’s d = 26). Computed One-way ANOVAs for each of the arguments by political orientation (M = 2.88, SD = 1.26) indicated that the Identity Politics (F4, 163 = 4.25, p < .01, ?2 = .32) argument varied by political self-reference, Q8 Scheffe contrasts indicated that self-referenced liberal participants (M = 2.23, SD = 1.03) reported less agreement with this argument than did moderate- conservative (M = 2.78, SD = .04) or conservative (M = 3.11, SD = .97) partici- pants. The other five hate crime arguments did not significantly vary by political orientation. BL066/JOSI asap˙012 May 21, 2004 0:48 Opposition to Hate Crime Laws 101 Relationships between anti-Semitism, Machismo, and Pr. The relationship of the measures of anti-Semitism (M = 27.34, SD = 14.92; alpha coefficient of .94), Machismo (M = 2.9, SD = 2.78 alpha = .80), and Pr (M = 10.49, SD = 4.19, alpha = .77) were examined via zero-order correlations. All mea- sures were intercorrelated; Pr was correlated with Machismo (r = .35, p < .01) and anti-Semitism (r = .38, p < .01). The Machismo scale revealed a more ro- bust relationship to anti-Semitism (r = .55, p < .01). Significance tests indicated that these three variables all varied by participant gender. Pr (men M = 11.66, SD = 3.91; women, M = 9.43, SD = 4.09; t = 3.48, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 56), anti-Semitism, (men M = 31.11, SD = 15.50; women, M = 24.00, SD = 13.71; t = 3.01, p < .01, Cohen’s d = 49), and Machismo (men M = 3.80, SD = 3.23; women, M = 2.08, SD = 2.09; t = 3.85, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 66) all produced a higher score for men than women. Predicting Feelings about Hate Crime Laws. The contribution of knowl- edge of laws and policies concerning human rights to feelings about hate crime laws was examined. A hierarchical multiple regression model was computed to test hypothesis one. On step 1 participant demographics—gender, age, and po- litical orientation—were entered, with the Hate Crime Affect scale serving as the dependent variable. Results on step 1 were not significant (R2 = .02; Adj. R2 = −.001), F = .94, p = n.s.). On step 2 the four subscales for knowledge of hate crime laws (M = 25.11, SD = 5.34), anti-discrimination laws (M = 23.01, SD = 2.24), hate speech (M = 7.83, SD = 3.54) and government policies re- garding human rights enforcement (M = 36.19, SD = 3.13) were simultaneously entered. Results yielded a modest if statistically significant relationship (R2 = .06; Adj. R2 = .04), F = 2.44, p = .05), with the subscale measuring accurate knowl- edge of anti-discrimination laws (B = −.27, t = −2.77, p < .01) significantly reducing negative affect concerning hate crime laws. Relationships between Feelings about Human Rights and Individual Differ- ence Variables. The relationship between the Hate Crime Affect scale and individ- ual difference variables (hypothesis 2) was examined via zero-order correlations. The individual differences measures for Pr, Machismo, anti-Semitism, and polit- ical orientation were not significantly correlated with participant’s feelings about hate crime laws. Predicating Peer Influence about Hate Crime Laws. Hierarchical multiple regression models were computed to examine the endorsement of aggregated IPI scores for hard (M = 9.95, SD = 5.01) and soft (M = 24.94, SD = 6.93) peer in- fluence strategies concerning hate crime laws. Participant demographics—gender, age, and political orientation—were initially entered (step 1) into the model; this BL066/JOSI asap˙012 May 21, 2004 0:48 102 Dunbar and Molina was followed by the four Human Rights Knowledge subscales (step 2). On step 3 the Hate Crime Affect scale was entered; on step 4 the Pr scale, the Machismo scale, and the anti-Semitism scale were entered into the model. Hard social influence was predicted by participant demographic differences (R2 = .09, Adj. R2 = .08, F Change = 5.60, p < .001) and the Pr (B = .29, t = 2.26, p < .05) and Machismo (B = .21, t = 2.22, p < .05) scales (R2 = .27, Adj. R2 = .19, F Change = 7.65, p < .001). The variables in step 1 collectively predicted to social power use though none of the individual variables yielded significant beta weights. This is due to the interaction of the predictors, implying an intercorrelation of the demographic vari- ables. The human rights knowledge, hate crime affect, and anti-Semitism measures were not significant predictors of hard peer influence strategies. The use of soft peer influence strategies was predicted by participant de- mographic differences (R2 = .08, Adj. R2 = .06, F Change = 4.57, p < .01), with younger participants less likely to use these strategies (B = −.14, t = 1.96, p < .05). As with the hard peer influence strategies, the human rights knowledge, hate crime affect, and anti-Semitism measures did not yield a significant relation- ship to the criterion measure. After the other variables had been entered in the model Pr (B = .22, t = 2.68, p < .05) and Machismo (B = .27, t = 2.79, p < .05) again were found to predict the use of influence tactics with peers. (R2 = .26, Adj. R2 = .21, F Change = 10.12, p < .01). These findings are presented in Table 1. Gender differences in the endorsement of peer influence strategies were ex- amined in a series of independent samples significance tests. Results indicated significant gender differences on the IPI for reward-material (t = 2.15, p < .05, Cohen’s d = 35) and coercive-material (t = 2.35, p < .05, Cohen’s d = 41) -based influence strategies. Men had higher scores for these influence strategies. Men also had higher scores than women on the aggregated score for the use of hard influence tactics (t = 2.32, p < .05, Cohen’s d = 43). These findings are presented in Table 2. The most frequently endorsed forms of peer influence for both men and women were information, referent, and expert influence strategies. The least-endorsed forms of peer influence were found for coercive (material and personal) strategies. As such the type of social power used to debate hate crime laws is the same for men and women even though the intensity with which (the less desirable) forms of social influence of power varies for men and women. Research question 1 sought to determine what relationship if any existed between the arguments for and against hate crimes and the measures for Pr, Machismo, anti-Semitism, and negative Hate Crime Affect. Zero-order corre- lations were computed for these variables. Zero-order correlations for the three anti-hate crime arguments were modestly correlated with Pr (the mean coeffi- cient value with the three anti-hate crime arguments was .17), Machismo (mean BL066/JOSI asap˙012 May 21, 2004 0:48 Opposition to Hate Crime Laws 103 T ab le 1. R eg re ss io n R es ul ts in P re di ct in g H ar d an d S of t P ee r In fl ue nc e S tr at eg ie s C on ce rn in g P ee r H at e C ri m e A tt it ud es H ar d S tr at eg ie s S of t S tr at eg ie s S te p P re di ct or R 2 A dj .R 2 F C ha ng e B t R 2 A dj .R 2 F C ha ng e B t 1. S oc ia l ca te go ry .0 9 .0 8 5. 60 ∗∗ .0 8 .0 6 4. 57 G en de r .0 1 .2 1 −. 05 −. 06 A ge −. 12 −1 .5 8 −. 14 −1 .9 6∗ P ol it ic al or ie nt at io n .0 8 1. 03 .0 5 .0 6 2. H um an ri gh ts kn ow le dg e .1 3 .0 9 1. 43 .1 1 .0 7 1. 28 B ia s cr im e la w s .1 1 1. 24 .1 1 1. 12 N on -d is cr im in at io n la w s .0 5 .6 3 .0 3. .0 3 B ia s sp ee ch la w s .1 1 1. 46 .1 0 1. 42 G ov er nm en t po li ci es .0 4 .6 3 −. 05 −. 69 3. H at e cr im e ne ga ti ve af fe ct .1 3 .0 9 .2 5 .0 3 .4 4 .1 1 .0 7 .8 6 .0 6 .8 2 4. G ou gh P r sc al e .2 7 .1 9 7. 65 ∗∗ .2 9 2. 26 ∗ .2 6 .2 1 10 .1 2∗ ∗ .2 2 2. 68 ∗∗ M ac hi sm o S ca le .2 1 2. 22 ∗ .2 7 2. 79 ∗∗ A nt i- S em it is m .1 5 1. 78 .0 6 .7 7 ∗ p < .0 1, ∗∗ p < .0 01 . BL066/JOSI asap˙012 May 21, 2004 0:48 104 Dunbar and Molina Table 2. Gender Difference in Peer Influence Strategies Concerning Attitudes about Hate Crime Laws Men Women (n = 69) (n = 85) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) t Reward-personal 3.17 (1.37) 2.77 (1.46) 1.76 Reward-material 2.82 (1.34) 2.32 (1.18) 2.15∗ Coercive-personal 2.57 (1.08) 2.26 (1.43) 1.59 Coercive-material 2.34 (1.42) 1.88 (1.04) 2.35∗ Legitimate-position 3.25 (1.11) 3.13 (1.01) .63 Legitimate-equity 2.59 (1.39) 2.33 (1.19) 1.22 Legitimate-dependent 3.19 (1.36) 2.79 (1.21) .11 Expert 3.73 (1.17) 3.57 (1.21) .78 Information 4.91 (1.05) 4.93 (1.17) .18 Referent 4.27 (1.29) 4.10 (1.16) .94 Hard strategies 11.24 (5.76) 9.09 (4.25) 2.32∗ Soft strategies 25.69 (6.74) 23.56 (6.23) 1.75 ∗p < .05. coefficient = .29), anti-Semitism (mean coefficient = .29), and Hate Crime Affect (mean coefficient = .11). These same variables demonstrated few significant rela- tionships with arguments in support of hate crime laws. These results are presented in Table 3. Table 3. Zero-Order Correlations of Pr Scale, Machismo, anti-Semitism, and Negative Hate Crime Affect with Hate Crime Arguments Gough anti- Hate Crime Pr Scale Machismo Semitism Negative Affect Identity Politics: Hate crime laws unfairly cater to special interest political groups. .18∗ .27∗∗ .37∗∗ .22∗ Vulnerable Groups: Hate crime laws help to protect groups of people who are not adequately protected by the police and the legal system. −.01 −.07 −.08 −.16 Libertarianism: The government should not be involved in the enforcement of hate crime laws. .17∗ .30∗∗ .23∗∗ .09 Civil Society: Hate crime laws help to solve the problems our society faces. −.09 −.03 −.09 −.20∗ Social Engineering: Our society needs hate crime laws to discourage the escalation of intergroup violence. −.12 −.19∗ −.14 −.11 Media Distortion: The media is at fault for making hate crime issues seem like a serious problem, when it is really not that significant an issue. .16∗ .30∗∗ .28∗∗ .01 ∗p < .01. ∗∗p < .01. Q9 BL066/JOSI asap˙012 May 21, 2004 0:48 Opposition to Hate Crime Laws 105 Table 4. Hate Crime Arguments by Peer Influence Strategies Concerning Legitimacy of Hate Crime Laws Identity Vulnerable Civil Social Media Politics Groups Libertarianism Society Engineering Distortion Reward-personal .25∗∗ .02 .19∗ −.03 −.11 .33∗∗ Reward-material .19∗ −.03 .15 −.05 −.10 .30∗∗ Coercive-personal .17∗ −.03 .21∗∗ −.04 −.05 .30∗∗ Coercive-material .16∗ −.12 .16∗ −.01 −.10 .33∗∗ Legitimate-position .05 .07 .13 −.02 −.17∗ .28∗∗ Legitimate-equity .23∗∗ −.05 .32∗∗ −.02 −.17∗ .28∗∗ Legitimate-dependent −.10 .01 −.01 −.04 −.02 .29∗∗ Legitimate-reciprocity .21∗∗ .03 .16∗ −.03 −.16∗ .30∗∗ Expert .21∗∗ .04 .22∗∗ −.01 −.16 .26∗∗ Information .02 .01 −.01 −.04 −.02 .02 Referent .15 .02 .09 .01 .04 .17∗ Hard Strategies .18∗ −.08 .28∗∗ −.05 −.19∗ .33∗∗ Soft Strategies .19∗ −.07 .17 −.03 −.08 .38∗∗ ∗p < .05. ∗∗p < .01. Research question 2 wanted to determine if the arguments for and against hate crime laws were related to specific peer influence strategies. As with re- search question 1, a clearer relationship for arguments opposing hate crimes and greater endorsement of peer influence was found for arguments supporting hate crime laws. The aggregated hard peer influence strategies were correlated with the Identity Politics (r = .18, p < .05), Libertarianism (r = .28, p < .01), Social Engineering (r = −.19, p < .05), and Media Distortion (r = .33, p < .01) ar- guments. Soft peer influence strategies were correlated with the Identity Politics (r = .19, p < .05) and the Media Distortion (r = .38, p < .01) arguments. These results are presented in Table 4. Discussion This study investigated young adults’ attitudes about hate crime laws in terms of their emotional appraisal and acceptance of arguments for and against these laws. Knowledge concerning human rights laws and policies, demographic differ- ences, and personal beliefs were examined in relationship to expressed attitudes and efforts to influence a peer’s beliefs about these laws. Rather than simply mea- suring support or opposition to these laws, the study sought to identify factors that were associated with attitudes about hate crime laws. As had been suggested by Haddock and Zanna (1999), understanding attitudes about important social issues is influenced by multiple predictors that include cognitions, affects, and judgments. These findings largely (cross-culturally) support the Dunbar et al., research with a Spanish sample (2004) concerning the independent role of demographic & BL066/JOSI asap˙012 May 21, 2004 0:48 106 Dunbar and Molina individual difference variables in shaping attitudes about human rights issues. As was found in the prior study, the current findings underscore the role of both belief and personality variables as influencing feelings and expressed behavioral inten- tions concerning hate crime laws after both demographic and cognitive predictors have been accounted for. The current study found that argument acceptance of statements supportive of hate crime laws was unrelated to how individuals felt about these laws. Feelings concerning hate crime laws were also unrelated to demographic differences, bias orientation as measured on the Pr scale, or explicit bias (e.g., anti-Semitism). Possession of knowledge about human rights laws played only a modest role in understanding how individuals felt about hate crime laws. It is interesting that the measure that specifically examined knowledge of the scope and intent of the hate crime laws was unrelated to how individuals felt about these laws. Characteristics of Argument Acceptance Concerning Hate Crime Laws The current findings indicated that the majority of young adults favored state- ments supportive of hate crime laws. This is consistent with the Johnson and Byers (2003) study, where the majority of a community sample similarly expressed sup- port for these laws. The current study, as well as the Johnson and Byers study both are limited by issues of social desirability and respondent acquiescence. As such, perhaps more can be understood in terms of the patterns of responses in the current study, which represent explicit opposition to these laws. The issues of gender and gender attitudes were both found to contribute to greater opposition to hate crime laws. The gender effect for greater bias-orientation among men has been discussed previously (Carter, 1990) as has the importance of a male-dominant worldview. Endorsement of machismo beliefs was related to ar- gument acceptance of statements that opposed hate crime laws. Higher machismo beliefs were also related to rejection of the argument that hate crime laws reduced intergroup violence. Greater negative affect about hate crime laws was also mod- estly related with acceptance of identity politics arguments and rejection of the civil society argument. For these individuals, hate crime laws are seen as being socially divisive. The current findings underscore the symbolic nature of opposition to hate crime laws. Consistent with the proposition of symbolic racism theory, partici- pants who opposed hate crimes laws as being a function of identity politics, who endorsed a libertarian “hands-off” argument, or who blamed the media for sensa- tionalizing hate crimes were also more expressedly anti-Semitic. As noted, individ- uals who agreed with arguments against hate crimes also endorsed more stringent machismo beliefs, supporting the idea of gender inequity. Prior research supports the notion that many individuals who hold negative attitudes toward minorities are motivated to appear nonprejudiced to others by attenuating their biased beliefs BL066/JOSI asap˙012 May 21, 2004 0:48 Opposition to Hate Crime Laws 107 (Dunton & Fazio, 1997); this would suggest that the relationship in the current study between opposition to hate crime laws and outgroup bias is, if anything, an underestimate. Endorsement of arguments opposing hate crime policies may be symbolic of a generalized xenophobia. In this condition opposition to these laws constitutes a form of “code,” one which references a bias against the outgroups that these laws were developed to protect. Not all opinion in opposition to hate crime laws ought to be thought to reflect a symbolic form of bias. The current findings also raise the question as to whether or not there are two distinctive types of individuals who oppose hate crime laws. On the one hand, legal theorists may oppose these laws based upon legitimate concerns about the validity of these laws. On the other, as found in our findings, many individuals may oppose these laws as an extension of their opposition to intergroup equity and social justice in general. Predictors of Peer Influence Concerning Hate Crime Laws The present study was interested in how knowledge, feelings, and argument acceptance would contribute to young adults’ efforts to influence a peer’s attitudes about hate crime laws. It was found that greater effort to influence a peer’s be- liefs about these laws was predicted by demographic differences—notably gender differences—and personal beliefs that were in turn correlated with anti-Semitic attitudes. Individuals in their early twenties—the median age of these participants— typically spend a great deal of their daily lives around same-aged peers. They frequently interact with one another in not only entry-level jobs but also in edu- cational settings and in recreational activities. By comparison, intergroup educa- tional programs—as found in public institutions of higher education and through community-based organizations, are relatively brief educational initiatives. Fre- quently, these programs constitute less than 20 hours of a young adult’s time in a given calendar year. As such, it can be argued, naturally occurring social rela- tionships constitute an important arena in which attitudes about social issues—and bias crime laws—are continuously reinforced. The role of peer influence in shap- Q10 ing attitudes about hate crime laws may constitute an important and somewhat neglected issue in human relations practice. In the current study, participants’ feelings concerning hate crime laws were assessed in terms of the affect dimensions used by Haddock and Zanna (1999) to study attitudes about capital punishment. The semantic pairs (i.e., good-bad, positive-negative, like-dislike) reflect appraisal of at least one component of atti- tudes concerning hate crime laws. However, it may be that other more poignant emotional content may have yielded a more meaningful—that is, significant— difference within the participant sample. The emergent literature on affect and intergroup relations suggests that a range of more complex emotional content BL066/JOSI asap˙012 May 21, 2004 0:48 108 Dunbar and Molina (e.g., threat, guilt, warmth) may shape attitudes concerning ethnic outgroups and by extension attitudes about hate crime laws (Mackie & Smith, 2002). Collectively, these findings indicate that participants who were men and who endorsed a worldview that was both traditionally male-dominant and suspicious of the intentions of others (as measured on the Gough Pr scale), were likely to blame the media for distorting the issue of hate crimes and to feel that these laws were promulgated as a consequence of special interest groups. These individuals constituted the minority of our sample. When these characteristics were present, however, the individual endorsed more forceful and varied efforts to shape a peer’s beliefs about hate crime laws. Persons who expressed more favorable attitudes about hate crime laws felt that these policies helped protect vulnerable victim groups and helped to promote societal norms. Additionally, individuals who felt more favorably about hate crime laws possessed greater knowledge of anti-discrimination laws. These individuals constituted the majority of respondents. Their positive opinions and feelings con- cerning hate crime laws were not, however, related to their expressed effort to influence others to share their favorable opinions about these laws. It is hardly unimportant that explicitly biased individuals would be more ef- fortful in trying to change another’s attitudes about hate crime laws. This does not mean that highly biased persons are, per se, more socially persuasive or dominant, though they may seek to be so. Rather, individuals who agree with arguments that support hate crime laws may be more tolerant. This might include tolerance of individuals with differing views about civil rights and anti-discrimination laws. As Walzer (1997) observes, greater commitment to intergroup tolerance is char- acterized by an equity valuation of those beliefs, which the individual personally disavows. In this perspective, then, accepting differences concerning beliefs about the merits of hate crime laws is consistent with a worldview that eschews control of another’s beliefs or actions. It is not a deficit of the person but rather an exemplar of the principle of equity. What this study does not reveal is how persuasive individuals actually are in influencing others about hate crime laws. Explicitly biased individuals—who are more effortful in debating the legitimacy of hate crime laws—may actually alienate others via use of coercive social power. This may be particularly true in peer relationships, where formal power differentials cannot be used to gain the compliance of another. There is no reason to believe that less forceful efforts to change another’s beliefs—at least about hate crime laws—are less persuasive than more aggressive and controlling attempts. It must of course be kept in mind that our study provides information on what individuals say they will do, rather than sampling actual behavior concerning interpersonal influence. Our version of the IPI is referred to by Raven as the “likelihood form of the IPI.” This version is often, though not always, correlated with expected effectiveness (Raven, personal communication, January 8, 2004). BL066/JOSI asap˙012 May 21, 2004 0:48 Opposition to Hate Crime Laws 109 Future study of the role of peer influence upon human rights attitudes would benefit from experimental study factors that mediate the use of social power. Effort to influence a peer may also vary based upon the question of inclusion of gender or sexual orientation in these laws, which are included in only 19 and 23 of the states presently (http://www.adl.org/adl.asp). The Johnson and Byers (2003) study found that inclusion of sexual orientation in hate crime laws reduced the overall support for these laws. Similarly, it may be that greater influence between peers (particularly between men) may result when sexual orientation is proposed as a category of these laws. Implications for Educational about Hate Crime Laws Educational initiatives that address hate crime laws need to be considered with regard to what research tells us about creating positive intergroup attitudes, on the one hand, and the realties of how young people are presently learning about these issues, on the other. Recent survey research suggests that adolescents and young adults infrequently learn about hate crime laws through educational experiences. A national survey of school-aged youth (USA Weekend’s “Eighth Annual Back-to- School Survey,” August 18, 1995) found that nearly one-half of youth associated in their ethnic ingroups, that a third of the respondents felt their teachers expressed some form of racial prejudice, and that more than 40% felt that their schools did not promote intergroup cooperation. Another national survey conducted by Penn, Shoen & Berland Associates (http://edworkforce.house.gov/democrats/ hr1900views.html) found that the majority of young people were unaware of community-based initiatives that addressed the problems of hate crimes. The present study found that argument acceptance and feelings about hate crime laws were largely unrelated to one another. It may therefore be that differing educational strategies may be required to enhance both the judgments and feelings of young adults about hate crime laws. Creating positive feelings about the role of these laws needs to address social psychological processes that moderate these attitudes. Such interventions would need to target factors that will promote positive judgments of hate crime policies. These findings implicitly call into question how relevant hate crime laws are to young adults, a group that arguably possesses little knowledge about hate crimes or public policies that address intergroup violence. The personal salience of hate crime laws may be contingent upon a variety of factors, such as intergroup contact or relationships with persons who have been the targets of intergroup violence. Psycho-educational interventions that address the issue of saliency to the individual or that emphasize how these laws and policies are seen as an issue of public safety—that is, the valuing of a civil society—may engender greater commitment to these issues. BL066/JOSI asap˙012 May 21, 2004 0:48 110 Dunbar and Molina Situational Characteristics of the Study The current findings reflect the attitudes of young adults in a community that has frequently been a site of violence against gay men and lesbians (Herek et al., 1996) and anti-Semitic activity (http://www.jewishsf.com/bk020419/1c.shtml). The community had also recently witnessed the highly publicized hate-motivated violence of the Williams brothers, two young men who identified themselves as followers of hate groups such as World Church of the Creator and Aryan Nation. The brothers committed a series of fire bombings against three synagogues and an abortion clinic; they also brutally murdered a gay couple, all during calendar year 1999. The study participants certainly would have been exposed to these events via both the local and national media, through their school experiences, and their interactions with friends and family members. What the interested reader ought to consider is that the issue of bias-motivated violence was not some distant issue for this community. Rather, these findings reflect the range of opinions that may be found in an American city where both frequent acts of violence against gay men and lesbians and more sensational forms of violence are found. Implications for Future Research This study sought to examine how persons felt not about the occurrence of hate crimes, but rather the legal standards and practices used to address intergroup violence. Given the relative recency of hate crime laws, as well as the support of diversity education initiatives to make these laws more acceptable to the general population, future study of this issue is needed. Determining how young adults view the legitimacy, on the one hand, and the effectiveness of these laws on the other, can contribute to the design of interventions that foster more positive feelings about social justice in general, and hate crime laws specifically. Other factors that might be expected to shape both opinions and feelings about hate crime laws include intergroup contact and salience. As Herek and Capitanio (1996) have noted, positive contact with gay and lesbian persons increases positive affect among heterosexuals. It is worth examining how positive contact with gay men and lesbians influences support for hate crime legislation, as well. The exam- ination of attitude change concerning hate crime laws—an issue not considered in this study—may similarly be a function of mortality salience and terrorist threat theory (Greenberg et al., 1990). The elicitation of mortality-salient beliefs may moderate feelings about laws that serve to control intergroup threat, for example. Examination of the salience of these laws to the individual, and by extension their ingroup, is worth future study. Salience may reflect a “vested ingroup interest” in supporting (or opposing) the legitimacy of hate crime laws for the ingroup, on the one hand, and the endorsement of these laws as a function of commitment to a civil society, on the other. BL066/JOSI asap˙012 May 21, 2004 0:48 Opposition to Hate Crime Laws 111 Investigation of the relationship between participation in educational pro- grams concerning intergroup relations and how individuals debate the issue of hate crime laws should be examined. Optimally, this would involve experimental methods to unpack the factors that influence peer influence about human rights and hate crime laws. It would be of great practical value if research were to consider the contribution of formal educational experiences, salience, and naturalistic forms of contact in shaping pro-social attitudes concerning laws to address intergroup violence. References Aberson, C. L. (in press). Support for race-based affirmative action: Self-interest and procedural justice. Journal of Applied Social Psychology. Q11 Aberson, C. L., & Haag, S. C. (2003). Beliefs about affirmative action and diversity and their relation- ship to support for hiring policies. Analyses of Social and Public Policy, 3(1), 121–139. Allport, G. (1954). The nature of prejudice. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. Campbell, A. (1971). White attitudes towards black people. Ann Arbor, MI: Institute of Social Research, University of Michigan. Q12 Carli, L. L. (2001). Gender and social influence. Journal of Social Issues, 57(4), 725–742. Carter, R. T. (1990). The relationship between racism and racial identity among white Americans: An exploratory investigation. Journal of Counseling and Development, 69, 46–50. Casas, J. M., Wagenheim, B. R., Banchero, R., & Mendoza-Romero, J. (1994). Hispanic masculinity: Myth or psychological schema meriting clinical consideration. Hispanic Journal of Behavioral Sciences, 16(3), 315–331. Cuellar, I., Arnold, B., & Gonzalez, G. (1995). Cognitive referents of acculturation: Assessment of cultural constructs in Mexican Americans. Journal of Community Psychology, 23, 339– 356. Cuellar, I., Harris, L. C., & Jassco, R. (1980). 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BL066/JOSI asap˙012 May 21, 2004 0:48 112 Dunbar and Molina French, J. R., & Raven, B. H. (1959). The bases of social power. In D. Cartwright & A.F. Zander (Eds.) Studies in social power (pp. 159–167). Ann Arbor, MI: Michigan Institute for Social Research. Q14 Garnets, L. (1997). Antigay violence and multiple minority status: Psychological consequences and interventions. Paper presented at the 105th Annual Convention of the American Psychological Association, Chicago, IL. Garnets, L., Herek, G. M., & Levy, B. (1992). Violence and victimization of lesbians and gay men: Mental health consequences. In G. Herek, & K. T. Berrill (Eds.). Hate crimes: Confronting violence against lesbians and gay men. Newbury Park: Sage Publications. Gellman, S. (1991). Sticks and Stones can put you in jail, but can words increase your sentence? Constitutional and policy dilemmas of ethnic intimidation laws. UCLA Law Review 39, 333– 396. Gold, G. J. (2001). How status affects the actual and expected use of social power. Paper presented at the 109th Annual Convention of the American Psychological Association, San Francisco, CA. Gough, H. G. (1951). Studies of social intolerance II: A personality scale of anti-Semitism. Journal of Social Psychology, 33, 247–255. Gough, H. G., & Bradley, P. (1993). Personal attributes of people described by others as intolerant. In P. M. Sniderman, P. E. Tetlock, & E. G. Carmines, (Eds.), Prejudice, politics, and the American dilemma. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Greenberg, J., Pyszczynski, T., Solomon, S., Rosenblatt, A., Veeder, M., Kirkland, S., & Lyon, D. (1990). Evidence for Terror Management Theory II: The effects of mortality salience on reac- tions to those who threaten or bolster the cultural worldview. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 67, 627–637. Haddock, G., & Zanna, M. P. (1999). Assessing the impact of affective and cognitive information in predicting attitudes toward capital punishment. Law and Human Behavior, 22(3), 325–339. Hamm, M. S. (1993). American skinheads: The criminology & control of hate crime. Westport, CT: Praeger. Hamm, M. S. (2001). In bad company. America’s terrorist underground. Boston: Northeastern Uni- versity Press. Herek, G. M., & Berrill, K. (1992). Hate crimes: Confronting violence against lesbians and gay men. Newbury Park: Sage Publications. Q15 Herek, G. M., & Capitanio, J. P. (1996). “Some of my best friends”: Intergroup contact, conceal- able stigma, and heterosexual’s attitudes toward gay men and lesbians. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 22(4), 412–424. Herek, G. M., Gillis, R., Cogan, J., & Glunt, E. (1996). Hate crime victimization among lesbian, gay, and bisexual adults. Journal of Interpersonal Violence, 12(2), 195–215. Jacobs, J. B., & Potter, K. (1998). Hate crimes: Criminal law and identity politics. New York: Oxford University Press. Jacobsen, C. K. (1985). Resistance to affirmative action: Self-interest or racism? Journal of Conflict Resolution, 29(2), 306–329. Johnson, S.-D., & Byers, D. D. (2003). Attitudes towards hate crime laws. Journal of Criminal Justice, 31, 227–235. Jones, J. M. (1997). Prejudice and discrimination (2nd ed.). Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. Q16 Kimmel, P. R. (1998). Cultural and ethnic issues in conflict and peacekeeping. In H. J. Langholtz (Ed.), The psychology of peacekeeping (pp. 57–71). Westport, CT: Praeger Press. Q17 Kinder, D. R., & Sears, D. O. (1981). Symbolic racism versus racial threats to the good life. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 40, 414–431. Kipnis, D., Castell, P., Gergen, M., & Mauch, D. (1976). Metamorphic effects of power. Journal of Applied Psychology, 61, 127–135. Kravitz, D. A., Klineberg, S. L., Avery, D. R., Nguyen, A. K., Lund, C., & Fu, E. J. (2000). Attitudes towards affirmative action: Correlates of demographic variables and with beliefs about targets, actions, and economic effects. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 30, 1109–1136. Mackie, D. M., & Smith, R. S. (2002). From prejudice to intergroup relations: Differentiated reactions to social groups. London: Psychology Press. Matrie, G., & Clark, R. (1982). Anti-Semitism in the United States: A study of prejudice in the 1980’s. New York: Praeger. BL066/JOSI asap˙012 May 21, 2004 0:48 Opposition to Hate Crime Laws 113 Myrdal, G. (1944). An American dilemma: The Negro problem and modern democracy. New York: Houghton Mifflin. Payne, S. G. (1995). A history of fascism, 1914-1945. Madison, WI: The University of Wisconsin Press. Pope-Davis, D. B., & Ottavi, T. M. (1994). The relationship between racism and racial identity among White Americans: A replication and extension. Journal of Counseling and Development, 72, 293–297. Price, V. (1993). Political information. In J. P Robinson, P. R. Shaver, & L. S. Wrightsman (Eds.), Measures of political attitudes (pp. 591–639). San Diego, CA: Academic Press. Raven, B. H. (1992). A power/interaction model of social influence: French and Raven 30 years later. Journal of Social Behavior and Personality, 7, 217–244. Raven, B. H., Schwarzwald, J., & Koslowsky, M. (1998). Conceptualizing and measuring a power/ interaction model of interpersonal influence. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 28, 307– 332. Reef, M. J., & Knoke, D. (1993). Political alienation and efficacy. In J. P. Robinson, P. R. Shaver, &, L. S. Wrightsman (Eds.), Measures of political attitudes, Volume 2 (pp. 456–459). San Diego, CA: Academic Press. Selznick, G., & Steinberg, S. (1969). The tenacity of prejudice: Anti-Semitism in contemporary America. New York: Harper and Row. Sidanius, J., Pratto, F., & Bobo, L. (1994). Social dominance orientation and the political psychology of gender: A case of invariance? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 67, 998–1011. Sullaway, M. E., (in press). Psychological perspectives on hate crime laws. Psychology, Public Policy and Law. Q18 Sundberg, N. D., & Bachelis, W. D. (1956). The fakability of two measures of prejudice: The California F scale and Gough’s Pr scale. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 2, 140–142. Sykes, C. (1992). A nation of victims. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Tajfel, H. (1982). Social psychology of intergroup relations. Annual Review of Psychology, 33, 1–39. Q19 Taslitz, A. E. (1999). Condemning the racist personality: Why the critics of hate crimes legislation are wrong. Boston College Law Review, 40, 739–785. United Nations. (2003). Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948. Retrieved November 29, 2003, from http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html. Waldrep, C. (2001). Racial violence on trial. Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO Press. Walzer, M. (1997). On toleration. New Haven: Yale University Press. Weisbrodt, D. (1988). Human rights: A historical perspective. In P. Davies (Ed.). Human Rights. London: Routledge. Wilson, R. A. (1997). Human rights, culture and context. London: Pluto Press. Q20 Zanna, M. P. (1994). On the nature of prejudice. Canadian Psychology, 35(1), 11–23. BL066/JOSI asap˙012 May 21, 2004 0:48 Queries Q1 Author: Please check the use of this phrase “polices meant to enforce them.” Q2 Author: Please provide complete mailing address. Q3 Author: Please check that the change retains the intended meaning. Q4 Author: The reference listing has Gough (1951). The citation has been changed. Please check. Q5 Author: Please check whether the appropriate use is ‘face’ or ‘fact’ sheet. Q6 Author: Please check what this value is. Q7 Author: Please check what this value is. Q8 Author: Please check what this value is. Q9 Author: Please check these values. Q10 Author: Please check the usage ‘bias crime laws’. Q11 Author: Please update this reference. This reference is not cited in the text. Q12 Author: This reference is not cited. Please check. Q13 Author: This reference is not cited. Please check. Q14 Author: Please confirm the names of the editors. Q15 Author: This reference is not cited. Please check. Q16 Author: This reference is not cited. Please check. Q17 Author: This reference is not cited. Please check. Q18 Author: This reference is not cited. Please check. Q19 Author: This reference is not cited. Please check. Q20 Author: This reference is not cited. Please check. 114 
work_kq57yytt7rh4dlaxfw662vced4	----	Spectacular Manhood and Girlhood 53 0026-3079/2016/5502-053$2.50/0 American Studies, 55:2 (2016): 53–64 53 Review Essay Spectacular Manhood and Girlhood: Celebrity Studies and Girlhood Studies Come of Age Kathleen A. Feeley DECONSTRUCTING BRAD PITT. Edited by Christo- pher Schaberg and Robert Bennett. New York: Blooms- bury. 2014. SPECTACULAR GIRLS: Media Fascination and Celeb- rity Culture. By Sarah Projansky. New York: New York University Press. 2014. Celebrity studies as interdisciplinary scholarship has come of age, as the books under review here indi- cate. Over the last half century, a vast study of celebrity, fame, stars, and entertainment industries has emerged to investigate how “the star intervenes and functions on every level of life, the imaginary level, the practical level, and especially on the level of the dialectic between the imaginary and the practical.”1 Yet scholars of celebrity culture can still find themselves on the defensive, facing charges of “zany doings” and “trendy jargon,” as did the editors of Deconstructing Brad Pitt when they tried to organize a 2005 conference panel on the “cultural logic of Brad Pitt” to explore masculinity, sexuality, white- 54 Kathleen A. Feeley ness, celebrity, philanthropy, the American West, and national identity.2 As Su Holmes and Sean Redmond reported in the 2010 inaugural issue of Celebrity Studies, the first academic journal devoted exclusively and explicitly to this work, “in the media’s bludgeoning of the idea for the journal, we knew that the critical worth of Celebrity Studies was being proven. . . . s]tudying the impact of celebrity culture on everyday life was touching a raw nerve at the symbolic centre of celebrity production.”3 Yet the tide has turned as scholars, literature, organizations, and conferences devoted to this work proliferate: the two books under review here—Deconstructing Brad Pitt and Spectacular Girls—are part of this shift and exemplify the complex politics of gender, race, class, age, and sexuality laid bare by such work. While the classical Hollywood studio system provided the original impetus for the study of celebrity culture, the subfield now encompasses a more nuanced and wide-ranging understanding of who is a celebrity, what it means to be cel- ebrated, and the kinds of new and old media platforms and industries that create and sustain celebrity studies, including print culture, television, the music and recording industries, sports, and social media. As the technologies and platforms proliferate, the study of media and its celebrities grows, playing a decisive role in newer interdisciplinary areas of study—including media studies and cultural studies—as well as reshaping older disciplines like history and literature. When literature scholars Christopher Schaberg and Robert Bennett issued a call for conference papers in 2005, using Brad Pitt as the lens through which to examine “race, class, gender, and regional or national identity” in postmodern American society, it provoked vitriolic reactions inside and outside academia (xvii). Bloggers took aim; so did the Chronicle of Higher Education. Nearly a decade later, we have Deconstructing Brad Pitt, which underscores how dramati- cally the scholarly terrain has shifted. This volume uses Pitt’s work—primarily his acting as well as philanthropy—and his public persona to understand celeb- rity culture, modern U.S. popular and political culture, American selfhood and upward mobility, and shifting constructions of American masculinity. Here is a very interesting and provocative—if uneven—collection of fourteen essays, including Nancy Bernardo’s visual essay as well as engaging front and back matter. The collection’s front matter—including a prelude, foreword, preface, and introduction—details the collection’s origins and its intended audience and goals. In their introduction, editors Schaberg and Bennett reveal their goal to keep the collection “outside an academic series”: while the volume takes “an academic and critical approach,” it is also “free of . . . jargon” (2, 3). Their goal is an admirable one: to try to reach a popular, nonacademic audience without sacrificing intellectual rigor and theoretical significance. And in many ways, it works: the essays are not overly long; the endnotes are very much abbreviated; the cover, typefaces, images, and general layout are appealing and not the norm in an academic volume—nor is the visual essay. Some of the essays, however, might be too theoretical and engaged with academic concerns for a popular reader. Alternately, for an academic audience, the paucity of endnotes and relative brevity Spectacular Manhood and Girlhood 55 of the essays sometimes leaves the scholarly reader wanting more. The result is a collection that is provocative and engaging, if uneven and sometimes vexing: arguably exactly the hybrid kind of publication the editors sought to produce. Perhaps most vexing is the editors’ decision to forgo the “standard academic strategy” of chapter summaries as well as—more importantly—an overview and analysis of the essays as a whole. While the desire to make reading the volume “an open-ended process” has merit, providing an interpretive frame—which readers can choose to ignore—is especially important to shed insight and provide coher- ence for an edited collection. Indeed, Brian Sullivan’s brief Coda to the volume provides a partial and welcome interpretive overview of its persistent theme of failure, given the many flawed, marginalized characters in the Pitt filmography. From arrested adolescent stoner Floyd in True Romance (1993) to dim-witted personal trainer Chad in Burn After Reading (2008), Pitt has consistently sought roles inflected with pathos to undermine and complicate his “spectacular body.” In a more traditional male leading role like Seven’s police detective David Mills, Pitt’s protagonist solves the case and “gets” the serial killer villain. But, in do- ing so, Mills’s family, career, and life are left in ruins—not a triumphant finish. In a similar vein, Christopher Schaberg’s essay traces the motif of crashing in Pitt films, as in, for example, the “crash pads” and downward mobility of loner characters like Floyd in True Romance and the eponymous lead in Johnny Suede (1991). The volume’s first two essays foreground Pitt’s reoccurring characterizations of flawed American manhood through heroes who demonstrate “a more complex masculinity that includes self-awareness, personal integrity, and non-conformity” as well as failure (33). Ben Luebner analyzes Pitt in his two Montana-based films—Paul in A River Runs Through It (1992) and Tristan in Legends of the Fall (1994)—where he plays “perfectly wild and perfectly debonair gentlemen” of the new American West (14). In these postmodern Westerns, Pitt’s protagonists are outsiders who champion Native American life and culture, primarily via relationships with Native women. Yet, as Elizabeth Abele argues, these Native female love objects remain largely inscrutable, silent “noble savages” (like so many of Hollywood’s Indians): characters that serve primarily as narrative tools to underscore the white protagonists’ progressivism. Abele also deftly interrogates Pitt’s star persona, identifying the literary concept of the Romantic hero as inspiration for many early roles and his endur- ing appeal. After his breakout, a supporting role as a self-serving conman in Thelma and Louise (1991), Pitt’s early starring performances—including in the aforementioned Montana films and as Louis in 1994’s Interview with a Vam- pire—hew closely to the Romantic archetype. Such a character chooses individual passions, demons, and goals over duty, convention, and family, making him not “an ideal romantic partner” (23). Flawed and unconventional outsiders, like Rusty Ryan in Ocean’s Eleven (2001), have persisted in Pitt’s repertoire even as he began to play male protagonists who would not sacrifice their personal lives for their work, quest, or demons. In 2011’s Moneyball, for example, Billy 56 Kathleen A. Feeley Beane rejects conventional markers of public success in favor of his domestic life and personal values. Robert Bennett uses a welcome wide-angle analytical lens and situates Pitt’s films and characters within the broader context of American history and film: namely, in the post–World War II suburban revolution and the resulting cultural critique thereof. He uses 1967’s germinal The Graduate, which turns on Benjamin Braddock’s “acute sense of suburban alienation” and Michelangelo Antonioni’s Zabriskie Point (1970) to offer a scathing, radical rejection of suburbia (55). Both films have influenced decades of American movies, including Fight Club and Mr. and Mrs. Smith. In Mr. and Mrs. Smith, Pitt and his now-wife Angelina Jolie star as an estranged suburban couple. By the end of the film, as Bennett argues, they have rejected the “paranoid cold war nation-state” and military-industrial complex that employed them as assassins for hire and that also funded the post– World War II suburban revolution (68). Bennett does not address the unplanned but unmistakable ways in which the film’s critique of the white, middle-class status quo was mirrored in its stars’ personal lives. By the time the film was released in 2005, Pitt was famously in the midst of divorce proceedings with his first wife Jennifer Aniston and in an as-yet-unacknowledged relationship with Jolie. This romantic triangle has fueled tabloid headlines for over a decade and once represented a challenge to heterosexual matrimony as the cornerstone of a white, middle-class sensibility.4 Certainly, Pitt’s personal life has always been a defining feature of the Pitt persona: from dating ingénues; to marrying Aniston, an American Sweetheart; to his partnership with Jolie and their formation of an unconventional family. Michele White examines Pitt’s personal life in her fine essay “Brangelina Blend.” White emphasizes how the celebrity portmanteau in general, and for this couple and their sometimes-unconventional choices in particular, can undermine the male partner’s masculinity. The uber-coupledom represented by Brangelina has been used to feminize Pitt: his partnership with Jolie, an independent, unorthodox female figure, sometimes compromises his personification of “ideal white mas- culinity” (95). White misses an opportunity to deepen her compelling analysis by placing Brangelina within a long Hollywood tradition of superstar couples and portmanteaus: Pickfair became home to one of Hollywood’s first celebrity couples—Mary Pickford and Douglas Fairbanks—in 1920. So there is a long history of celebrated duos using their partnership to fuel mass appeal, profes- sional opportunities, and acclaim—and to avoid or circumvent negative publicity. Several essays offer close sociocultural and political analyses of a single Pitt film and/or role to explore these films’ cultural work in shaping, reflecting, confirming, and/or challenging cultural norms and ideals. Film and media studies scholar Andrew Horton is also a screenwriter who rewrote the screenplay for The Dark Side of the Sun, Pitt’s first leading role, and he reflects upon a pre- fame Pitt. Fran Pheasant-Kelly argues that the significance of Seven (1995) lies in is its nihilistic vision of American masculinity via the “failed oedipal trajec- tory of Pitt’s character” David Mills (139). Throughout the film, Mills is being Spectacular Manhood and Girlhood 57 groomed to replace Morgan Freeman’s retiring Detective William Somerset. Yet just as Mills seems poised to assume Somerset’s role as patriarch at film’s end, his family is killed and he loses control over his life, exemplifying “an on- going crisis in masculinity, initiated after Vietnam, inflamed by feminism and gay rights, and perpetuated in more recent times by 9/11” (149). This so-called crisis of masculinity, however, needs more development here and elsewhere: is it real, imagined, fueled by the media? Lacking an extended analysis, readers are left to presume that the social, economic, and political gains of women and nonwhite men have, in fact, come at the expense of white men. In Troy (2004), Rick Hudson argues that Pitt’s arrogant, selfish, and brutal Achilles made this film a “successful critique of conventional heroic narratives” (153). The heroes in Troy do not win: they perish and “heroism is not rewarded but it is valued” (161). Thus, Achilles represents an uneasy blend of ancient and modern heroic attributes for a modern audience. Robert Bennett argues that Pitt’s casting and his acting ability make Fight Club and its pointed critique of modern consumer culture and its suburban aes- thetic successful. Pitt’s skilled “performance of madness” and his considerable popular appeal brought in a mass audience, which might otherwise have rejected this disturbing and resolutely downbeat project. Understanding the enduring ap- peal and cult status of the film Fight Club is at the heart of Randy Laist’s essay. Laist contends that Pitt is first and foremost a celebrity and tabloid fixture, which is precisely why director David Fincher cast him. Fincher’s “subversive casting choice” transformed the novel’s critique of mass culture, deepened it, and turned it nihilistic by having “the voice denouncing mass media culture . . . coming out of the very idealized face of that culture” (84). Laist places the focus on Fincher choosing Pitt while Bennett emphasizes Pitt’s choosing and performing of the role. A central question in celebrity studies is always some version of: “how much credit does Brad Pitt deserve for developing Brand Pitt?” (172). Bob Batchelor most directly takes on this thorny and important issue. Pitt’s “spectacular body” and a sometimes-turbulent personal life have periodically threatened to desta- bilize his star persona and undermine his work life. Batchelor argues that Pitt’s membership in “Hollywood’s power elite” is a result of his own hard work, the entertainment publicity machine, and “timing, looks, affect, and luck” (165, 168). Other essays look beyond Hollywood and Pitt’s films to examine: how vi- sual artists interpret his persona and cultural influence, his philanthropic work in post-Katrina New Orleans, and how Pitt’s persona operates in contemporary digital culture. In “Art Muse,” Sarah Juliet Lauro explores how contemporary visual, media, and fine artists have been inspired by Pitt and the machinery of stardom—not just as muse but as collaborator with artists like Chuck Close and Robert Wilson. These projects—like others in which Pitt played no part—meditate on the real versus reel, and “the celebrity’s nightmare . . . the ever searching, insatiable gaze of the viewer” (123). This essay also reproduces images of the artwork under discussion, which complements and deepens the analysis and serves as a reminder that the visual is absolutely central to understanding Pitt as 58 Kathleen A. Feeley artist and symbol. Indeed, Nancy Bernardo’s cover image and her visual essay provide welcome, important visual components and analyses to the collection, despite its puzzling exclusion from the volume’s table of contents. Those who work in media studies often struggle with being bound to the written word when our subjects operate so much in the visual (and aural) realms. Thus Bernardo’s juxtaposition of the many faces and characters of Brad Pitt in conjunction with words of Jacques Derrida’s theory offers another kind of meditation upon Pitt’s cultural significance. Thomas Bayer takes on Pitt’s philanthropy in post-Katrina New Orleans, which resulted in a 2009 unofficial “campaign” for Pitt as mayor. The campaign highlighted discontent in post-Katrina New Orleans, the power of celebrity in politicking, as well as the enormous goodwill generated by Pitt’s on- going philanthropic efforts in New Orleans. Edmond Chang takes on the gender and sexual politics of the digital Pitt persona. The “Brad Pitt Theory”—Google it—suggests that whatever their sexual orientation and identity, all men can safely desire Pitt. Chang identifies “an attainable masculinity and a contained feminin- ity” embodied by Pitt that makes it possible for straight men to challenge gender and sexual binaries, “disavow homophobia and heterosexism,” and “imagine the potential for queerness” (205, 211). Deconstructing Brad Pitt examines Pitt’s function as a symbol of American masculinity, the new American West, modern parenting and partnership, green architecture and sustainability, philanthropy, and same-sex desire. While most of the essayists are careful to distinguish between Pitt as symbol and persona versus Pitt as an active agent in the world, an opportunity to reflect upon Pitt as both symbol and agent is missed. As his celebrity grew, Pitt’s economic, institutional, promotional, and cultural power increased. But actors—even iconic ones—are not the most powerful personnel on a film set: directors and especially producers have the real power. Since 2006, Pitt has served as a producer on over thirty film and television projects through his production company Plan B Entertainment. Indeed, he won his first Academy Award as a producer of Best Picture winner 12 Years a Slave (2013) and most his recent films roles have been in Plan B produc- tions, so an essay on Plan B would be most desirable. Overall Deconstructing Brad Pitt is a compelling read, most suitable for a scholarly audience though accessible to well-read mass audience that seeks thoughtful commentary on American popular culture. Pitt as actor, celebrity, philanthropist, father, partner, environmentalist, liberal activist, man, tabloid fodder, artist sheds light on many aspects of American popular culture and society. The “spectacular body” of Brad Pitt and the many questions it raises about modern, white, middle-class, American masculinity shares a mediascape with spectacularized representations of girls—“can-do,” “at-risk,” and “crash and burn” alike. In Spectacular Girls: Media Fascination and Celebrity Culture, feminist media scholar Sarah Projansky explores a century of mediated American girlhoods and then focuses upon turn-of-the-twenty-first-century representa- tions of girlhood and reception of normative and non-normative girls who are celebrated variously as performers, victims, and cautionary tales. A now con- Spectacular Manhood and Girlhood 59 siderable literature on the history, culture, and meaning of girlhood, including newer work like Projansky’s fine work, exists on the intersection of childhood and star studies. This interdisciplinary scholarship has produced, by her count, at least ten major literature review essays, a new journal (Journal of Girlhood Studies [2008]), and special conferences and symposia. Projansky uses public and social policy research and ethnographic studies about girlhood that are seldom incorporated in the current girlhood literature to uncover both a normative girl “as an idealized citizen for the neoliberal global economy . . . [and] postfemi- nist discourse” and alternative girls who challenge the gender, racial and sexual status quo in late-twentieth and early twenty-first-century American popular and political culture and society (11–12). While white, middle-class, athletic, heterosexual, well-behaved, and suc- cessful girls predominate in U.S. media culture, Projansky seeks to destabilize this “narrow definition of conventional girlhood” and broaden the literature by focusing on alternative, nonwhite, nonnormative girls and their bodies and stories, including Selena Gomez, Sasha and Malia Obama, Serena and Venus Williams, Tamara Brooks, Jacqueline Marris, Jessica Dubroff, and Sakia Gunn (1). Pro- jansky’s sample is not limited to media celebrities like performers, athletes, and “First Daughters”; she also incorporates girls who have entered the public eye as kidnapees, hate crime victims, and murder victims. Objectified and commodified, public American girlhood is generally presented in two seemingly dichotomous modes: as outstanding and upstanding or as (potentially) scandalous. Projansky makes a compelling case that the key archetypes—the “can-do,” “at-risk,” and “crash-and-burn” girls—are, in fact, part of a simplistic, false continuum in which a declension narrative predominates. The path to success is tied to hew- ing to a white, heteronormative status quo and “through consumer choices” (5). Young, female celebrity girls are powerful and compelling vehicles to market all manner of goods, but the fallen girl narrative bumps ratings, guarantees Internet traffic, and is thus particularly lucrative and desirable in the marketplace. Indeed, both public and private girlhood are the targets of countless moral panics (for example: eating disorders, teen pregnancy, hyper-sexualization, and bullying) used to justify “surveillance and discipline” of all girls (4). Celebrated girls in the media are not a new phenomenon. Projansky de- votes her first chapter to the history of celebrated girlhood in twentieth-century American film and culture. She argues that the “girl star played a central role in establishing, perpetuating, and protecting the structure of the star system and Hollywood as a whole” (30). Indeed Spectacular Girls is a key contribution to a small but growing literature on the importance of the early Hollywood “girl” and “girlishness” in shaping the film industry, celebrity culture, and the perfor- mance (and invisibility and pervasiveness) of whiteness.5 Both young girls like Shirley Temple and adult women “playing young” like Mary Pickford inspired wildly ambivalent responses that could both challenge and/or uphold the status quo: erotic longing, sentimental protectionism, and gender and sexual ambigu- ity. Projansky traces changes and continuities in representations and personas 60 Kathleen A. Feeley of female child stars across the twentieth century and then focuses upon the under-studied 1970s child star Tatum O’Neal. O’Neal serves as an excellent example of girl celebrity as a “hyper-white, highly sexualized, and highly scandalous individual in conflict” (56). Prior to the 1980s, Projansky identifies only five nonwhite girl performers in lead film roles—as opposed to their typi- cal casting as the sidekick. O’Neal’s stardom, like those before her, was built upon African-American supporting characters, demonstrating how “girl star as a cinematic category produces, maintains, and requires, whiteness” (43). And O’Neal’s early career illustrates the “anxiety and ambivalence” long embedded in the concept of the child star: the problem of child labor, the problem of young female performer as both sexual object and ambiguously gendered figure, and the problem of looming adulthood (43). Projansky then examines the late 1990s and early 2000s media prolifera- tion of girl culture. She defines girls as those who entered the public spotlight “under the age of eighteen” and whose girlishness remains central to their public persona even as they mature (19). Her prodigious research tracks public fascination with and media exposure of celebrated girls via Time, Newsweek, and People cover stories from 1990 to 2012, finding 242 relevant covers. Her goal is twofold: establishing the dominant narrative about white, heterosexual girlhood and “identifying alternative girls” who defy racial, national, and sexual norms (60). About 80 percent of these cover girls are plotted along the “can-do/ at risk” continuum and pass as white. They are celebrated for some combination of: 1. their precocious, professional accomplishments; 2. their vulnerability in a dangerous, difficult world; and 3. who/what they symbolize in their success/ failure. But what of the other 20 percent “who are spectacular in part because of their difference” (65)? These atypical cover girls include presidential daughters, performers, athletes, and victims of violent crime. Some of these feature stories racialize the can-do girl, offering a nonwhite, mixed race vision of success as embodied by Malia and Sasha Obama, Vanessa Hudgens, or Selena Gomez, but do not otherwise challenge the can-do/at-risk paradigm. Tennis champions Venus and Serena Williams not only offer a nonwhite version of girlhood, they also some- times challenge the typical success narrative. For example, they acknowledge that they are treated like outsiders and denounce racism on the tennis tour. Even as they faced charges of being too confrontational, “‘arrogant,’” and “‘aloof.’” they remained wildly successful and stymied the usual can-do/at-risk narrative, creating spaces for a different kind of girlhood (81). Of the young female victims of violent crime or accidents who gained media notoriety during this period, a majority were white, blonde, and blue-eyed—those for whom it was easiest to make a case that they were deserving of protection and justice. Notably, a few such girls did not fall into these categories and thus offer alternative readings on what it means to be a “girl in peril”: structural, racial, gender, and economic inequities were invoked as contributing factors in these cases, and such girls were presented as resourceful and resilient, thereby destabilizing the can-do/at Spectacular Manhood and Girlhood 61 risk paradigm. For example, media coverage of Jessica Dubroff as “a miniature and queer Amelia Earhart” bestowed upon her an unusual degree of “agency and complexity” and offers a more complex and dynamic vision of American girlhood (90, 92). Projansky then focuses upon four feature films drawn from her extensive database of 450 girl culture films produced between 2000 and 2009. The films Projansky highlights inspired the most significant feminist debate over the lead actors, their roles, and star personas as well as the films’ content in both main- stream and alternative media: Mean Girls (2004), Little Miss Sunshine (2006), Juno (2007), Precious (2009). All of these films provide alternative girlhoods of agency, choice, and/or fortitude, though rooting for these “special” female protagonists often requires “a disciplining and derogatory denigration of girls in general” (106). These films’ young, female leads provoked ambivalent, fluc- tuating commentary that sometimes upheld and sometimes challenged gender, sexual, and/or racial conventions. In particular, Projansky seeks to understand how, when, and why these films also create space for and a provide voice for alternative girlhoods. Mean Girls critiques heteronormativity and whiteness, particularly through its supporting characters. In Little Miss Sunshine, Olive’s desire to participate in a child beauty pageant drives the film’s narrative and makes her a particularly active girl character by choosing her path and claiming a performative, public space on her own terms. Precious centers on a poor, black girl and details the protagonist’s problems and possibilities on a specific and individual level and thus “challenge[s] the denial of black girlhood” (124). Juno makes many important feminist choices: most importantly to have sex and then make her own reproductive decisions and to choose a single adoptive mother for her baby. All of these films inspired media conversations around feminist topics like domestic and sexual violence, reproductive politics, female empowerment and sexual pleasure. Next Projansky expands upon an earlier analysis of media coverage of Venus Williams. As she emerged as a superstar athlete in the late 1990s, Projan- sky skillfully argues, commentators mostly avoided explicit discussion of race except when offering an inspirational, upwardly mobile narrative of Williams as “an exceptional black girl” (137). Williams’s “difference” was most commonly depicted without reference to race, racism, or the enduring whiteness of the professional tennis tour. Instead her outsider status was framed as her choice and/or her fault and was reinforced through racially coded fetishizing of her hair, clothing, stature, and musculature. Yet periodically the problematic behavior and responses of sportscasters, other players, and tennis officials erupted into explicit debates about race and racism in sports and in American society. Three broadcasting incidents are the focus here: an ongoing debate over the Williams family’s career management strategies; an opponent’s aggressive, unapologetic shoulder bump; and an umpire’s controversial ruling of a match penalty be- cause of Williams’s loose hair beads. Projansky makes a compelling case that Williams’s extraordinary success has commanded respect, sometimes inspired 62 Kathleen A. Feeley forthright racial commentary, and has helped to forge a new narrative around black girlhood as dynamic, specific, and powerful. The author then turns to the life, death, and varied memorializations of the poor, queer, African-American teenager Sakia Gunn, the victim of a 2003 hate crime in Newark, New Jersey. Here Projansky moves beyond mainstream media to find diverse representations of girlhood. Gunn’s life and death garnered little attention in the national, mainstream media, but was consistently featured in New York and New Jersey local mainstream media outlets as well as national alternative press. Across all of the coverage, however, is little discussion about Gunn’s age and her girlhood: indeed, Projansky seeks to “reclaim her girlhood” (166). National coverage of the case was very limited and generally focused upon Gunn as the innocent victim of violent crime. However, the media’s usage of class and racial signifiers like “Newark” and “public transportation” imply that Gunn was poor and black. Local and alternative news outlets generally covered Gunn as a much more well-rounded and complex individual—as opposed to “a generic symbol of pathos” (158)—who was attacked and killed because of her race, class, sexuality, gender, and age. Here she emerged as a queer and/or black victim whose death became symbolic of violence directed at LGBTQ and/or black citizens, the problems of the urban underclass, and the need for advocacy work. Yet some alternative media outlets also championed Gunn as a “heroic queer girl” (169). Here Projansky recovers and restores an active, multifaceted girlhood to this poor, gay, African American, gender-nonconforming teenager whose life and death defied the status quo and who demonstrates that alternative kinds of girlhood operate in the real world and in the media. In the final chapter Projansky applies the book’s theory and analysis of spec- tacular and alternative girlhoods to actual girls (and boys) through an analysis and assessment of elementary school students’ media literacy. Projansky spent several weeks in her daughter’s third grade Midwestern public school classroom. Her purpose was twofold: 1. to challenge the so-called Ophelia Thesis that young “girls are cultural dupes” who must be protected from dangerous and damaging media content; and 2. to understand the varied ways in which they understand and use media (182). Their work together revealed that these twenty-one students (nine girls and twelve boys) “are media critics who use their specific analytical abilities to articulate persuasive insights about both media structure and gender representation” (215). Perhaps most illuminating in this chapter was how the students resisted, challenged, and transformed the project and exposed its limi- tations, as Projansky carefully details, thereby proving that they were “already media critics who can set the terms of the conversation” (215). Her project plan, created with the classroom teacher, had to evolve particularly when students re- jected writing a final media analysis essay in favor of watching and commenting upon television ads and shows in large and small groups. Projansky found that the students engaged in sophisticated, close textual analysis; questioned media industry structure; and challenged commonplace, simplistic, and negative as- sumptions about media, including notions that it “rots our brains” (197). Students Spectacular Manhood and Girlhood 63 also identified, often questioned, and sometimes rejected the gender binaries inscribed in media production and promotion. Simultaneously, they were aware of the dangers of transgressing gender norms and sometimes policed themselves accordingly. Projansky addresses some of the study’s limitations, including insuf- ficient engagement with the intersectional complications of race and class with the students. A more complete sense of the students’ own socioeconomic profiles would have helped further contextualize her findings. Projansky used data from both the male and female students, arguing that this prepubescent group was “not gender specific” and responded very similarly—though she did rely more heavily on her nine female subjects, further shrinking the already small sample size of twenty-one subjects (194). Ultimately Projansky builds a convincing case that most of these students—in their complex responses to and understandings of media—exemplify an active, not passive, “‘girl as media critic’” and, as such, serve as an important example of an alternative kind of girlhood in which their “thinking belongs to them” (182, 213). Spectacular Girl sets out to redefine media girlhood by establishing the normative girl and her history, but then also seeks alternative girlhoods in the national mainstream media and beyond—such as in the alternative press and finally in a third-grade classroom. The author very successfully uses “an an- tiracist, queer, feminist perspective” to illuminate alternative girlhoods (221). Economic status is also central here, but receives less attention. A more sustained discussion of the media representations of poor and working-class girls—their invisibility, inscrutability, passivity, pathos—would have been welcome. Also worth addressing is whether the norm is truly a middle-class girl or an upper- class girl? So many of the spectacular girls under discussion here are already affluent and/or are greatly enriched by their spectacular girlhood: from Mary Pickford to Tatum O’Neal to Vanessa Hutchens to Venus and Serena Williams. Selena Gomez rose to fame portraying middle-class Alex Russo on Wizards of Waverly Place; as a result, Gomez became wealthy: so is the ideal the middle- class Russo or the upper-class Gomez? An American ethos of upward mobility and the politics of star personas obscures the contradiction at the heart of “an everyday girl . . . dealing with mega stardom” (77). A more explicit analysis of the perils of economic privilege (or the lack thereof) would further enrich Projansky’s already germinal dismantling of the can-do/at-risk dichotomy. The book’s first three chapters are organized thematically and chronologically and cover much ground: most of the last century in mainstream media representations of American girlhood. The final three chapters are case studies of alternative vi- sions of girlhood from 1997 to 1999, 2003, and 2009. Organizing the book into two parts would have more clearly signaled to the reader the distinctiveness of the two halves of the book and more closely integrated the case study chapters into the fabric of the book. For example, the outstanding standalone chapter on Venus Williams lacks explicit reference to Projansky’s earlier analysis of Venus and Serena Williams as mass-market magazine cover girls. 64 Kathleen A. Feeley Spectacular Girls is an ambitious, deeply researched, and compellingly argued work of feminist girls’ media studies that both provides an important contextual and historical overview of the last century of girlhood in the media and advances important new arguments about and insight into the media repro- duction of American girlhood. In correcting a myopic scholarly focus on a white, heteronormative girlhood and exposing and challenging the can-do/at-risk binary, Projansky opens up important new areas of research in a book that works to help readers imagine “more expansive and liberatory futures for all girls” (226). She exposes the “neoliberal protectionist stance that writes out of existence . . . girls who are not white, not heterosexual, not vulnerable, and/or not passive” (223). And, most importantly, Projansky demonstrates that alternative visions, perfor- mances, and examples of nonwhite, queer, active girlhoods are widespread, if only we are willing to look for and know how to spot them, and are willing to acknowledge them. Like the contributors to Deconstructing Brad Pitt, Projansky helps readers to understand the power and politics of American popular culture and sheds important new light on the myriad ways that audiences consume and understand media and celebrity culture. Notes 1. Edgar Morin, The Stars, trans. Richard Howard (1957; repr. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005), 147. The literature on celebrity studies is vast: some important early examples are Richard deCordova, Picture Personalities: The Emergence of the Star System in America (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1990); Richard Dyer, Heavenly Bodies (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1986) and Stars, 2nd ed. (London: BFI, 1998); Richard Schickel, Intimate Strangers: The Culture of Celebrity (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1985). 2. Charlotte Allen, “Yes, But Will Angelina Jolie Be Delivering a Paper?” Independent Women’s Forum, June 9, 2005. Accessed on August 21, 2015 at: http://www.iwf.org/blog/2427255/ Yes-But-Will-Angelina-Jolie-Be-Delivering-a-Paper 3. Su Holmes and Sean Redmond, “A journal in Celebrity Studies,” Celebrity Studies 1:1 (March 2010): 1. 4. In 2014, Pitt and Jolie married; Aniston married Justin Theroux in 2015, thus reasserting the supremacy of heterosexual marriage. 5. On the early Hollywood girl, see, for example, Hilary A. Hallett, Go West, Young Women! The Rise of Early Hollywood (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2013); Kristen Hatch, Shir- ley Temple and the Performance of Girlhood (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2015); Christel Schmidt, ed. Mary Pickford: Queen of the Movies (Library of Congress/University Press of Kentucky, 2012); Gaylyn Studlar, Precocious Charms: Stars Performing Girlhood in Classical Hollywood Cinema (Berkeley: UC Press, 2013). 
work_krbel5wswzc3jf2lwl7ka74qyy	----	Sexual and gender minorities rights in Latin America and the Caribbean: a multi-country evaluation RESEARCH ARTICLE Open Access Sexual and gender minorities rights in Latin America and the Caribbean: a multi-country evaluation Monica Malta1,2,3*, Reynaldo Cardoso4, Luiz Montenegro5, Jaqueline Gomes de Jesus6, Michele Seixas7,8, Bruna Benevides9, Maria das Dores Silva10, Sara LeGrand11 and Kathryn Whetten11 Abstract Background: Although the extent of legal inequities experienced by sexual and gender minorities (SGM) has declined during recent decades, this population still enjoys fewer legal protections and benefits than the non- gender-variant, heterosexual population. Herein we analyze the current scenario of SGM rights in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC). Methods: Policy documents and governmental strategies addressing SGM rights were analyzed within a timeline framework by three major LAC sub-regions: the Caribbean, Mesoamerica and South America. Results: Our search identified 88 eligible documents addressing the following categories: (1) legal protections towards same-sex couples (decriminalization of same-sex acts among consenting adults, legal recognition of same- sex unions, same-sex marriage, adoption by same-sex couples), and (2) anti-discrimination laws (SGM allowed to serve openly in the military and anti-discrimination laws related to sexual orientation, gender identity and/or expression). The majority of Caribbean countries prohibit same-sex acts between consenting adults, while in Mesoamerica same-sex couples do not have equal marriage rights and are not allowed to adopt as a couple. In the Caribbean and Mesoamerica transgender people lack proper legal protection. Legislation to protect SGM rights in South America is the most inclusive and progressive in LAC. Several countries recognize same-sex marriage and the right of transgender people to legally change their name and gender. The majority of South American countries have some kind of anti-discrimination law, but no effective mechanisms to enforce these laws. In spite of those progresses, the LAC region registers the highest rate of violence and hate crimes against SGM in the world. Conclusion: In the Caribbean and Mesoamerica the overall discriminatory legislation exacerbates violence against SGM within a social and cultural context of strong sexist, gender stereotypes and widespread violence. This scenario is driving hundreds of SGM to leave their home countries. In spite of progressive legislations, several South American countries are currently controlled either by highly conservative leaders (e.g. Brazil and Chile) or by repressive dictators (Venezuela). The near future of the LAC region is unknown, but if such trends continue, severe human rights problems, including setbacks in SGM legal protections, are likely. © The Author(s). 2019 Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made. The Creative Commons Public Domain Dedication waiver (http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/) applies to the data made available in this article, unless otherwise stated. * Correspondence: Monica.Malta@camh.ca 1Faculty of Medicine, Department of Psychiatry, University of Toronto, Toronto, 33 Russell Street / Room RS 2035, Toronto, Ontario M5S 2S1, Canada 2Institute for Mental Health Policy Research, Centre for Addiction and Mental Health, Toronto, ON, Canada Full list of author information is available at the end of the article Malta et al. BMC International Health and Human Rights (2019) 19:31 https://doi.org/10.1186/s12914-019-0217-3 http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1186/s12914-019-0217-3&domain=pdf http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/ mailto:Monica.Malta@camh.ca Background According to the Commission on Social Determinants of Health, from the World Health Organization, “social justice is a matter of life and death. It affects the way people live, their consequent chance of illness, and their risk of premature death” [1–3]. The lack of social justice and frequent social stressors (e.g. victimization and discrimination) affect health in- equities frequently identified among sexual and gender minorities – SGM [4]. Sexual minority women seem to have greater risk for breast cancer and cardiovascular disease relative to heterosexual women [5, 6], while sex- ual minority men have increased risk for sexually trans- mitted infections compared to heterosexual men [7]. SGM have higher rates of smoking and heavy drinking than the general population [6, 8]. Depression and anx- iety disorders are more prevalent among transgender people [9–11] and sexual minorities [6] when compared to the general population. In spite of those increased health risks, SGM are less likely to access the care they need [11–14], when com- pared to non-SGM groups. Those inequities in health- care provision are mostly influenced by stigma and discrimination [15, 16], lack of sufficient health insur- ance [17], inadequate knowledge or prejudice by health- care providers [18]. One of the most prominent framework to study SGM health inequities is the minority stress model [19]. This theoretical model addresses the relationship between mi- nority and dominant values in society and resultant con- flicts with the social environment that are experienced by minority group members [19–21]. The impact of in- creased and frequent exposure of SGM to stress, when compared to heterosexual cisgender individuals, highly influences SGM health inequities [22]. Although the ex- tent of legal inequities experienced by SGM has declined in many countries during recent decades, this population still enjoys fewer overall legal rights, protections, and benefits than the non-gender-variant, heterosexual population. Inequities in the law can affect fundamental aspects of SGM lives and might influence their health and ability to access quality health care [23, 24]. For instance, in countries that do not authorize same- sex civil unions or marriage, same-sex couples are de- nied a variety of benefits. In many cases, employer- sponsored health insurance is not extended to same-sex partners, affecting their access to affordable health care. In addition, SGM are often unable to request medical leave from work to care for an unmarried same-sex part- ner to the same extent as married couples [25]. The lack of recognition of same-sex civil unions or marriage has other health implications as well. Some studies have identified positive health outcomes associ- ated with same-sex marriage [26, 27]. Riggle et al. [28] conducted a study with 2677 lesbian, gay, and bisexual adults, and identified that same-sex couples in legally recognized relationships experienced fewer depressive symptoms, lower levels of stress and reported less inter- nalized homophobia, when compared with long-term same-sex partners without legal recognition. Discriminatory polices deeply affect transgender people lives, their health status and healthcare access in numerous ways [29]. For example, legal recognition of one’s gender identity is not only essential for a person’s dignity, but also necessary to ensure access to the most basic services, including legal identification, formal edu- cation, employment, social security, health services, pub- lic safety and legal protection [16, 30, 31]. A lack of documents that match an individual’s gender identity can result in denial of health and social support services, travel restrictions, bullying, humiliation, and gender- based violence [30, 32, 33]. Transgender individuals encounter unique barriers to access healthcare, when compared to sexual minority men and women, a disparity closely related to legal in- equities [33]. Inadequate legislations could jeopardize transgender individuals’ access to hormone treatment and gender-affirming surgical procedures, frequently af- fecting their quality of life and mental health [34]. SGM rights are more likely to advance in democracies where social movements are strong, organized, suffi- ciently networked, and where religion is less influential in daily life and policy development [35]. However, even strong democracies with well-organized social move- ments can experience setbacks under highly conservative governmental administrations. For instance, the Trump administration recently removed sexual orientation and gender identity questions from national surveys [36], has banned transgender recruits from joining the military and is revising anti-discrimination regulations – a deci- sion that could decrease SGM access to healthcare, government-funded shelters, economic and social bene- fits [12, 13, 37]. In Latin America and Caribbean (LAC) countries, SGM rights have developed in close synchrony with growing so- cial movements [38]. Fights for democratization, after years of dictatorship, presented an important juncture for social movements in several LAC countries [39]. Transi- tion to democratization dramatically changed the political opportunities in LAC countries, which allowed for a dif- ferent type of interaction between the state and social movements [40]. However, even after the return to democracy, SGM did not have any civil, political or social rights. The re- emergence of activism was related, in part, to continued rights-based oppression of SGM under democratically elected governments. For example, in terms of civil rights, three months after Raul Alfonsin was sworn in Malta et al. BMC International Health and Human Rights (2019) 19:31 Page 2 of 16 as President of Argentina, “approximately 50 activists were detained in a gay club” [39]. As for political rights, “up until 1990, a law (albeit) unenforced was on the books in Buenos Aires” that essentially banned SGM from voting [40]. In Brazil, the role of social movements during the democratic transition was crucial for ousting the military dictatorship that ruled the country from 1964 to 1985 [41]. During the 1980’s the SGM community mainly or- ganized itself to fight the AIDS epidemic, while actively participating in broader discussions and manifestations towards democracy, human rights and health sector re- form [42]. However, only in 2013 the country adopted a National Comprehensive Health Plan addressing SGM needs and specificities [43]. Evaluations of major gaps in SGM-related legislation and discriminatory laws can inform policy reforms and guide changes on licensing boards, ethics committees, and other regulatory bodies. The collaborative effort of activists, researchers, health professionals and policy an- alysts have been pivotal to identify the harmful outcomes of “conversion therapies”, informing legislations that ban these “therapies” [44]. However, assessing changes in the legal environment and how it might affect SGM’s quality of life is challenging. The causal pathway is frequently long and complex, large-scale changes in legislation do not occur quickly, and there is no gold standard methodology. Outside of high-income countries, no region has expe- rienced more progress in expanding SGM rights than Latin America [38–40]. While many SGM rights in the United States still involve some degree of legal dispute, in several countries in Latin America laws about same- sex marriage and adoption, changing gender on national ID cards, and anti-discrimination laws started in the past decade - many before the US Supreme Court legalized same-sex marriage [45–47]. Nevertheless, worldwide, the highest rate of violence against SGM is found in the LAC region [38]. This art- icle explores this paradigm by analyzing the current sce- nario of SGM rights in LAC, key successes, major gaps and future challenges. Methods We documented and compared policies addressing SGM rights in LAC countries, following James Mahoney’s sociological framework of ‘policy path dependency’ [48]. This framework allows for the identification of policies based on chronological order, enabling the visualization of changes across countries over time. We hypothesized that previous decisions and policy frameworks could in- fluence changes in future SGM-related legislations. We also assumed the path dependency to follow a ‘reactive sequence’, instead of a ‘self-reinforcing’ sequence. According to Mahoney [48], ‘self-reinforcing’ sequences are characterized by successive events that reinforce early events, while ‘reactive sequences’ are marked by backlash processes that transform and sometimes re- verse previous events – therefore stimulating policy changes over time through a chain or path of events linked by reactions and counter-reactions. According to Paul Pierson, “initial disturbances are crucial not because they generate positive feedback, but because they trigger a powerful response ( …) where action and reaction shift the system in a new direction, but not one that rein- forces the first move” [49]. This methodology is suited to explore policy pathways based on precedent legislations and is particularly ad- equate to understand how (and if) laws are changed in response to human rights violations. We considered three structural documents in our analysis: the landmark Universal Declaration of Human Rights – UDHR [50], adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1948, as well as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), both adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1966 [51, 52]. These three documents — the UDHR, ICCPR, and ICESCR — are referred collectively as the “International Bill of Human Rights”. The documents form the normative basis from which SGM rights were evaluated here, as an intercon- nected process across LAC countries. This methodo- logical framework allowed us to conceptualize SGM policy as a social process, following a sociological dy- namic of “increasing returns”, or positive feedback [53]. Furthermore, it integrated competing ideas, values and legislations from the different countries and sub-regions under analysis. Theoretical framework: path dependency in reactive sequences The use of a path dependence methodology enables pol- icy processes to be analyzed taking into account the sig- nificance of sequencing in policy development and policy changes. This framework was utilized to: (1) iden- tify what aspects might define, review or change policies towards SGM from LAC countries; (2) create a reference framework to better understand the policy-making pro- cesses related to SGM rights; and (3) trace a possible interface between political changes, internal and external pressures and the (possible) adoption of new policies. Our study considered the UDHR [50] as a critical juncture policy that influenced SGM rights protections internationally and within the LAC region, followed by ICCPR and ICESCR [51, 52]. Policy and time were key variables in our analysis, herein presented in diagrams that facilitate the visualization of their supposed inter- dependency in SGM rights [48]. We evaluated each Malta et al. BMC International Health and Human Rights (2019) 19:31 Page 3 of 16 selected policy to identify putative inputs, advantages, disadvantages and possible effects on other policies re- lated to SGM rights in each country, sub-region and LAC. Data collection and search strategy The first step, the identification stage of our search, was to extract relevant data from governmental policies and legis- lation that address SGM from all 33 LAC countries. Data was extracted from original legal documents published by each country. The search was not limited by language or publication year, as one major goal was to create a time- line of policies. The scope of SGM polices was narrowed to include two broad categories: legal protections address- ing same-sex couples, and anti-discrimination laws. Legal and policy documents retrieved from govern- mental websites or provided by governments were in- cluded if deemed eligible, whereas programs and strategies developed by non-governmental organizations were excluded. Identified laws were eligible regardless of publication date, and constitutions were included because of their fundamental role in each country’s leg- islations. Policy documents and governmental strategies were compared to and aligned in a timeline framework, organized by three sub-regions: the Caribbean (Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Cuba, Dominica, Do- minican Republic, Grenada, Haiti, Jamaica, St. Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Trinidad and Tobago), Mesoamerica (Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Panama) and South America (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay, Venezuela). Our study did not include overseas territories of the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, France or the USA. Data analysis Our analysis included the following steps: (1) data ex- traction (date and description of legislation) for each country, (2) organization of legislation by sub-region (the Caribbean, Mesoamerica or South America), (3) aggrupation of legislations according to key domains under analysis, and (4) data analysis. The domains analyzed addressed two broad categories: (1) legal protections addressing same-sex couples (decriminalization of same-sex acts among consenting adults, legal recognition of same-sex unions, same-sex marriage, adoption by same-sex couples), and (2) anti- discrimination laws (SGM allowed to serve openly in the military and anti-discrimination laws related to sexual orientation, gender identity and/or expression). We conducted an analysis of policy path dependency in reactive sequences within each LAC sub-region. The strategy enables the identification of temporal patterns of policy-making, inter-relations between policies from the same country and possible temporal and political in- fluences between countries and across a selected region. The strategy also allows for a better visualization of complex policy processes, such as those related to SGM rights. Policies that addresses highly vulnerable and stig- matized sub-groups tend to be deeply influenced by so- cial, cultural and political changes, as well as national, regional and international scenarios [54]. This strategy was also adopted to (1) create a reference analysis frame- work, (2) identify changes in local legislations, following other countries new/updated laws, and (3) analyze the impact of different political scenarios (e.g. progressive vs. conservative) in SGM legislation in the region, fol- lowing the reactive sequence theory. The initial and seminal policy considered within our analysis was the UDHR [50], followed by ICCPR and ICESCR [51, 52] given that these documents were mile- stones that influenced international, regional and national policies addressing fundamental human rights. Time and policy are two variables presented on a timeline to show their putative overlap, therefore facili- tating the visualization and analysis of trends. This strat- egy allowed us to identify core policies as historical sequences and patterns, sometimes linear, sometimes not – therefore in synchronicity with the chosen theor- etical framework. Current SGM-related policies were considered as a result of previous events, tracked using this framework. Results We identified 105 documents through governmental sources and 42 additional reports from selected entities (Organization of American States, United Nations, Am- nesty International, and Human Rights Watch). No du- plicates were identified; therefore, we included 147 documents in the screening stage. During the screening, we excluded 61 records that did not mention our study population (SGM), did not describe any SGM-related le- gislation or were unrelated to the LAC region. The final number of policies initially included in our analysis was 86. After the manuscript initial peer-review, two new legislations were approved in 2019 (same-sex marriage in Ecuador and SGM-hate crime in Brazil). Therefore, we included 88 policies and international reports in our analysis. A full list of the policy documents analyzed in this paper is available (Additional file 1). Please see our PRISMA flow chart (Fig. 1) for the detailed search strat- egy stages and results. The countries were organized by sub-regions (Caribbean, Mesoamerica and South- America), to account for heterogeneity across LAC countries and to compare countries with more similar social and cultural characteristics. With these inputs, we created a timeline of policies related to SGM population Malta et al. BMC International Health and Human Rights (2019) 19:31 Page 4 of 16 for each country, organized by the three sub-regions under analysis (Fig. 2). Table 1 summarizes the existing laws addressing SGM in each LAC country by sub-regions. All selected docu- ments and reports are available at an Open Science Framework page (https://osf.io/4zq7j/files/?view_only= e139c918d77c4f14a120658edfd25804). The Caribbean region Discriminatory laws against SGM people are particularly common in the Caribbean region. The majority of Carib- bean countries have versions of “buggery” and gross in- decency laws, relics of British colonialism, that prohibit same-sex conduct between consenting adults. Among the countries evaluated (n = 13), the majority has laws that, when violated, include 10 years to life imprisonment, fines and/or hard work: Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, Jamaica, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines (Table 1). Although these laws are vaguely worded and rarely enforced in criminal prosecutions, the legislation contributes to wide- spread discrimination, violence, stigma and prejudice against SGM in the region [55]. Section 9 of the Sexual Offences Act of Barbados criminalizes the act of “buggery”, defined by the Barba- dian courts as “anal sex between men or between a man and a woman”. Section 12 criminalizes “serious in- decency,” which is defined as any act by anyone “involv- ing the use of the genital organs for the purpose of arousing or gratifying sexual desire.” These acts are criminalized notwithstanding the consent of the partici- pants. The maximum penalty for buggery is life impris- onment; the maximum penalty for an act of serious indecency (involving a partner above the age of 16) is 10 years in prison (Table 1). In Haiti, there is no law criminalizing consensual same-sex sexual acts, but Article 227 of its criminal code prohibits vagrancy, with a specific mention in the code to transgender people. In 2017, the Haitian Senate passed a Bill listing homosexuality, alongside child porn- ography and incest, as reasons to deny a citizen its ‘Cer- tificat de Bonne Vie et Moeurs’, a document required by employers and universities. In the same year, another Bill was passed to ban gay marriage and any public advo- cacy of SGM rights [48]. Only Cuba and Bahamas allow SGM to serve openly in the military. Cuba is the single country in the Caribbean with anti-discrimination laws Fig. 1 Overview of the search strategy according to the PRISMA flowchart Malta et al. BMC International Health and Human Rights (2019) 19:31 Page 5 of 16 https://osf.io/4zq7j/files/?view_only=e139c918d77c4f14a120658edfd25804 https://osf.io/4zq7j/files/?view_only=e139c918d77c4f14a120658edfd25804 related to sexual orientation (2014) and gender identity/ expression (2008). Since 2008, Cuba’s government pro- vides integral medical care (including gender-affirming surgeries and hormonal treatment) through the National Health System. Transgender people can change their name and gender in legal documents, but need to sub- mit the petition to a local tribunal, including a medical certification that the petitioner has undergone gender- affirming surgery (Table 1). The key international documents that guided our ana- lysis (UDHR [1948], ICCPR [1966] and ICESCR [1966]) do not seem to have influenced policies targeting SGM in most countries in the Caribbean. After the publication of the ‘International Bill of Human Rights’, only Cuba implemented a broad range of new policies allowing consensual same-sex acts (1979), transgender individuals to change their legal name and gender (2008), work- related SGM anti-discrimination laws (2014), and overall SGM anti-discrimination laws (2019). Besides Cuba, the Bahamas also implemented a new legislation allowing consensual same-sex acts (1991) and reinforced the right of SGM to serve openly in the military (1998). In Fig. 2 a Selected SGM rights in the Caribbean, 1998-2018. b Selected SGM rights in Mesoamerica, 1998-2018. c Selected SGM rights in South America, 1998-2018 Malta et al. BMC International Health and Human Rights (2019) 19:31 Page 6 of 16 T a b le 1 Se le ct ed SG M rig h ts in La ti n A m er ic a an d th e C ar ib b ea n ,1 99 8– 20 18 Su b -r eg io n an d C o u n tr y Le g al p ro te ct io n s ad d re ss in g sa m e- se x co u p le s SG M an ti -d is cr im in at io n la w s C o n se n su al Sa m e- Se x Se xu al A ct s Re co g n it io n o f sa m e- se x le g al u n io n Sa m e- se x M ar ria g e A d o p ti o n b y sa m e- se x co u p le s SG M al lo w ed to se rv e o p en ly in m ili ta ry A n ti -D is cr im in at io n la w s re la te d to se xu al o rie n ta ti o n La w s re la te d to g en d er id en ti ty /e xp re ss io n C ar ib b ea n A n ti g u a & Ba rb u d a Ill eg al (o n ly m al e, m ax p en al ty 15 ye ar s p ris o n ) N o N o N o N o N o N o Ba h am as Le g al si n ce 19 91 N o N o N o Ye s (r ei n fo rc ed si n ce 19 98 ) N o N o Ba rb ad o s Ill eg al (o n ly m al e, m ax p en al ty fo r b u g g er y lif e im p ris o n m en t) N o N o N o N o N o N o C u b a Le g al si n ce 19 79 N o N o N o Si n ce 19 93 Ye s W o rk -r el at ed an ti -d is cr im in at io n la w (2 01 3) N ew C o n st it u ti o n b an s al l an ti SG M d is cr im in at io n (2 01 9) Ye s Si n ce 20 08 in te g ra l m ed ic al ca re (in cl u d in g g en d er -a ff irm in g su rg er y an d h o rm o n e th er - ap y) is p ro vi d ed b y th e g o ve rn m en t. Ri g h t to ch an g e le g al g en d er an d n am e si n ce 20 08 ,r eq u iri n g g en d er -a ff irm in g su r- g er y, m ed ic al ce rt ifi ca ti o n an d ju d ic ia l p ro ce d u re s. D o m in ic a Ill eg al (o n ly m al e, m ax p en al ty 10 ye ar s in p ris o n + p sy ch ia tr ic tr ea tm en t N o N o N o N o N o N o D o m in ic an Re p u b lic Le g al si n ce 18 22 N o N o (C o n st it u ti o n al b an si n ce 20 10 ) N o N o N o N o G re n ad a Ill eg al (o n ly m al e, m ax p en al ty 10 ye ar s p ris o n ) N o N o N o Th e co u n tr y h as n o m ili ta ry N o N o H ai ti Le g al si n ce 17 91 N o N o N o Th e co u n tr y h as n o m ili ta ry N o N o Ja m ai ca Ill eg al (a ll g en d er sa , m ax p en al ty 10 ye ar s p ris o n + h ar d la b o r) N o N o (C o n st it u ti o n al b an si n ce 19 62 ) N o N o N o N o St .K it ts an d N ev is Ill eg al (o n ly m al e, m ax p en al ty 10 ye ar s p ris o n + h ar d la b o r) N o N o N o N o N o N o Malta et al. BMC International Health and Human Rights (2019) 19:31 Page 7 of 16 T a b le 1 Se le ct ed SG M rig h ts in La ti n A m er ic a an d th e C ar ib b ea n ,1 99 8– 20 18 (C o n tin u ed ) Su b -r eg io n an d C o u n tr y Le g al p ro te ct io n s ad d re ss in g sa m e- se x co u p le s SG M an ti -d is cr im in at io n la w s C o n se n su al Sa m e- Se x Se xu al A ct s Re co g n it io n o f sa m e- se x le g al u n io n Sa m e- se x M ar ria g e A d o p ti o n b y sa m e- se x co u p le s SG M al lo w ed to se rv e o p en ly in m ili ta ry A n ti -D is cr im in at io n la w s re la te d to se xu al o rie n ta ti o n La w s re la te d to g en d er id en ti ty /e xp re ss io n Sa in t Lu ci a Ill eg al (o n ly m al e, m ax p en al ty 10 ye ar s in p ris o n ) N o N o N o Th e co u n tr y h as n o m ili ta ry N o N o St .V in ce n t an d th e G re n ad in es Ill eg al (a ll g en d er s, m ax p en al ty 10 ye ar s p ris o n ) N o N o N o Th e co u n tr y h as n o m ili ta ry N o N o Tr in id ad an d To b ag o Le g al si n ce 20 18 N o N o N o N o N o N o M es o am er ic a Be liz e Le g al si n ce 20 16 N o N o N o N o Si n ce 20 16 b an s al l an ti SG M d is cr im in at io n N o C o st a Ri ca Le g al si n ce 19 71 Si n ce 20 14 N o N o Th e co u n tr y h as n o m ili ta ry Si n ce 20 15 b an s al l an ti SG M d is cr im in at io n Si n ce 20 18 tr an sg en d er p er so n s ca n ch an g e th ei r n am e an d g en d er w it h o u t co n d it io n sb El Sa lv ad o r Le g al si n ce 18 22 N o N o N o Si n ce 19 74 Si n ce 20 10 a d ec re e b an s an ti SG M d is cr im in at io n in p u b lic se rv ic e N o G u at em al a Le g al si n ce 18 71 N o N o N o N A In 19 97 C o d e o n C h ild h o o d & Yo u th b an s d is cr im in at io n b as ed o n se xu al o rie n ta ti o n ag ai n st m in o rs Si n ce 20 16 TG ca n ch an g e le g al n am e af te r ju d ic ia l p ro ce d u re s, b u t n o t th ei r le g al g en d er H o n d u ra s Le g al si n ce 18 99 N o N o (C o n st it u ti o n al b an si n ce 20 05 ) N o N o Si n ce 20 08 b an s al l an ti SG M d is cr im in at io n N o M ex ic o Le g al si n ce 18 72 Si n ce 20 10 in al l st at es an d M ex ic o ci ty Si n ce 20 09 in M ex ic o ci ty . C u rr en tl y le g al in M ex ic o ci ty an d 18 /3 1 st at es Si n ce 20 10 in M ex ic o ci ty .C u rr en tl y le g al in 16 /3 1 st at es an d M ex ic o C it y N A Si n ce 20 03 b an s al l an ti SG M d is cr im in at io n (F ed er al La w to Pr ev en t & El im in at e D is cr im in at io n ) In 20 13 Su p re m e C o u rt ru le d ag ai n st h at e sp ee ch to w ar d s SG M TG ca n ch an g e le g al n am e an d g en d er in 6/ 31 st at es an d M ex ic o C it y (2 01 4) w it h o u t co n d it io n sb M ex ic an Su p re m e C o u rt o f Ju st ic e ru le d th at th e rig h t to se lf- d et er m in at io n o f g en d er id en ti ty is a fu n d am en ta l h u m an rig h t in 20 19 N ic ar ag u a Le g al si n ce 20 08 N o (C o n st it u ti o n al b an si n ce 20 15 ) N o (C o n st it u ti o n al b an si n ce 20 15 ) N o (C o n st it u ti o n al b an si n ce 20 15 ) N A 20 08 – La b o r rig h ts & an ti - d is cr im in at io n N o Pa n am a Le g al si n ce 20 08 N o N o N o Th e co u n tr y h as n o m ili ta ry 20 02 – A n ti -d is cr im in at io n in p u b - lic b u ild in g s/ se rv ic es Si n ce 20 06 TG ca n ch an g e le g al n am e an d g en d er ,b u t o n ly af te r g en d er -a ff irm in g su rg er y. Malta et al. BMC International Health and Human Rights (2019) 19:31 Page 8 of 16 T a b le 1 Se le ct ed SG M rig h ts in La ti n A m er ic a an d th e C ar ib b ea n ,1 99 8– 20 18 (C o n tin u ed ) Su b -r eg io n an d C o u n tr y Le g al p ro te ct io n s ad d re ss in g sa m e- se x co u p le s SG M an ti -d is cr im in at io n la w s C o n se n su al Sa m e- Se x Se xu al A ct s Re co g n it io n o f sa m e- se x le g al u n io n Sa m e- se x M ar ria g e A d o p ti o n b y sa m e- se x co u p le s SG M al lo w ed to se rv e o p en ly in m ili ta ry A n ti -D is cr im in at io n la w s re la te d to se xu al o rie n ta ti o n La w s re la te d to g en d er id en ti ty /e xp re ss io n Si n ce 20 16 TG ca n ch an g e n am e w it h o u t g en d er af fir m in g su rg er y, b u t n o t g en d er . So u th A m er ic a A rg en ti n a Le g al si n ce 18 87 Si n ce 20 08 Si n ce 20 10 Si n ce 20 10 Si n ce 20 09 Si n ce 19 88 o ve ra ll an ti - d is cr im in at io n la w . N o sp ec ifi c an d n at io n al an ti SG M d is cr im in at io n Si n ce 20 12 TG p er so n s ca n ch an g e th ei r n am e an d g en d er w it h o u t co n d it io n sb Bo liv ia Le g al si n ce 18 32 N o (C o n st it u ti o n al b an si n ce 20 09 ) N o (C o n st it u ti o n al b an si n ce 20 09 ) N o (C o n st it u ti o n al b an si n ce 20 09 ) Si n ce 20 15 Si n ce 20 10 b an s an ti SG M d is cr im in at io n (≈ La w A n ti -R ac is m ) Si n ce 20 16 TG p er so n s ca n ch an g e th ei r n am e an d g en d er w it h o u t co n d it io n sb Br az il Le g al si n ce 18 31 Si n ce 20 11 Si n ce 20 13 Si n ce 20 10 Si n ce 20 15 Si n ce 19 99 - Ba n ‘c o n ve rs io n th er ap y’ Si n ce 20 13 SG M H ea lt h Po lic y Si n ce 20 19 b an s an ti SG M d is cr im in at io n (≈ La w A n ti -R ac is m ) Si n ce 20 18 TG p er so n s ca n ch an g e th ei r n am e an d g en d er w it h o u t co n d it io n sb C h ile Le g al si n ce 19 99 Si n ce 20 15 N o N o Si n ce 20 12 Si n ce 20 12 b an s al l an ti SG M d is cr im in at io n Si n ce 19 74 TG ca n ch an g e le g al n am e/ g en d er . Si n ce 20 19 TG p er so n s ca n ch an g e th ei r n am e an d g en d er w it h o u t co n d it io n sb C o lo m b ia Le g al si n ce 19 81 Si n ce 20 07 Si n ce 20 16 Si n ce 20 15 Si n ce 19 99 Si n ce 20 11 Si n ce 20 15 TG p er so n s ca n ch an g e th ei r n am e an d g en d er w it h o u t co n d it io n sb Ec u ad o r Le g al si n ce 19 97 Si n ce 20 09 Si n ce 20 19 N o (C o n st it u ti o n al b an si n ce 20 09 ) N A Si n ce 19 98 C o n st it u ti o n al b an o f d is cr im in at io n b as ed o n se xu al o rie n ta ti o n Si n ce 20 08 b an s al l an ti SG M d is cr im in at io n Si n ce 20 14 - b an ‘c o n ve rs io n th er ap y’ Si n ce 20 16 TG p er so n s ca n ch an g e th ei r n am e an d g en d er w it h o u t co n d it io n sb Th e g o ve rn m en t in cl u d es a p er m an en t m ar ke r o n d o cu m en ts to id en ti fy g en d er ch an g es G u ya n a Ill eg al (m al e o n ly ,m ax p en al ty lif e p ris o n ) N o N o N o Si n ce 20 12 N o N o Pa ra g u ay Le g al si n ce 18 80 N o (C o n st it u ti o n al b an si n ce 19 92 ) N o (C o n st it u ti o n al b an si n ce 19 92 ) N o Si n ce 20 10 N o N o Pe ru Le g al si n ce 18 36 – 18 37 N o N o N o Si n ce 20 09 Si n ce 20 17 a d ec re e b an s al l an ti SG M d is cr im in at io n Si n ce 20 16 tr an sg en d er p er so n s ca n ch an g e th ei r n am e an d g en d er w it h o u t g en d er - af fir m in g su rg er ie s. Ju d ic ia l p ro ce d u re s re q u ire d Su rin am e Le g al si n ce 18 69 N o N o N o N o Si n ce 20 15 N o Malta et al. BMC International Health and Human Rights (2019) 19:31 Page 9 of 16 T a b le 1 Se le ct ed SG M rig h ts in La ti n A m er ic a an d th e C ar ib b ea n ,1 99 8– 20 18 (C o n tin u ed ) Su b -r eg io n an d C o u n tr y Le g al p ro te ct io n s ad d re ss in g sa m e- se x co u p le s SG M an ti -d is cr im in at io n la w s C o n se n su al Sa m e- Se x Se xu al A ct s Re co g n it io n o f sa m e- se x le g al u n io n Sa m e- se x M ar ria g e A d o p ti o n b y sa m e- se x co u p le s SG M al lo w ed to se rv e o p en ly in m ili ta ry A n ti -D is cr im in at io n la w s re la te d to se xu al o rie n ta ti o n La w s re la te d to g en d er id en ti ty /e xp re ss io n U ru g u ay Le g al si n ce 19 34 Si n ce 20 07 Si n ce 20 13 Si n ce 20 09 Si n ce 20 09 Si n ce 20 04 b an s al l an ti SG M d is cr im in at io n Si n ce 20 17 - b an ‘c o n ve rs io n th er ap y’ Si n ce 20 09 tr an sg en d er p er so n s ca n ch an g e th ei r n am e an d g en d er w it h o u t g en d er - af fir m in g su rg er ie s. Si n ce 20 18 w ith o u t ju d ic ia l p ro ce d u re s. Ve n ez u el a Le g al si n ce 18 00 s N o N o N o N o 20 08 - Su p re m e C o u rt re in fo rc es n o n -d is cr im in at io n re la te d to se x- u al o rie n ta ti o n N o a In Ja m ai ca fe m al e sa m e- se x en co u n te rs ar e n o t ex p lic it ly o u tl aw ed b W it h o u t co n d it io n s: N am e an d g en d er ch an g e in o ff ic ia l d o cu m en ts ar e al lo w ed w it h o u t th e re q u ir em en t o f to ta l o r p ar ti al g en d er -a ff ir m in g su rg er y, h o rm o n e th er ap ie s, m ed ic al /p sy ch o lo g ic al tr ea tm en t o r ev al u at io n s. N o le g al o r ju d ic ia l p ro ce d u re s ar e re q u ir ed Malta et al. BMC International Health and Human Rights (2019) 19:31 Page 10 of 16 contrast, after the publication of the ‘International Bill of Human Rights’, two countries adopted a constitutional ban against same-sex marriage: Jamaica (1962) and the Dominican Republic (2010). SGM prosecutions are not common in the region, but the overall lack of legal protection contributes to an en- vironment that condones discrimination, stigmatization, and violence towards SGM. These laws (or the lack of legislation against discrimination) have frequently been utilized to justify arbitrary detention, police abuse, extor- tion and torture. SGM who are incarcerated or other- wise implicated in the justice system are particular targets for sexualized violence and administrative pun- ishment while in custody. Our analysis identified that discriminatory legislations (Table 1) negatively influence SGM rights the Caribbean, making them ready victims of discrimination, violence, and other human rights violations. The majority of Caribbean countries do not seem to be influenced by the ‘International Bill of Human Rights’ and its core princi- ples to promote and protect human rights of individuals and more vulnerable groups, such as SGM (Fig. 2a). To some extent, Cuba remains a single exception in this scenario. As of August 2019, the country signed in 2008 the ICCPR and ICESCR, but did not ratify these treaties. In spite of the identified progress in the field of SGM-rights, the Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have reported several human rights viola- tions in Cuba. The state tight controls freedom of ex- pression, and frequently employ arbitrary detention to harass and intimidate critics, independent activists, polit- ical opponents and human rights defenders who attempt to document abuses – including SGM citzens. In 2019, the government canceled the annual LGBT Pride Parade and arrested SGM activists who organized an unauthorized march. Mesoamerica region We included in this sub-region seven countries from Central America (Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama) and Mexico. Same-sex sexual acts among consenting adults has been legal in four countries since the 1800’s (El Sal- vador, Guatemala, Honduras and Mexico). A few years after the publication of the ‘International Bill of Human Rights’, same-sex sexual acts among consenting adults became legal in Costa Rica (1971). However, the same legislation was only adopted in Nicaragua and Panama in 2008, followed by Belize in 2016 (Fig. 2b). In the vast majority of countries in Mesoamerica, same-sex couples do not have equal marriage rights and are not allowed to adopt as a couple. In January 2015, the Supreme Court of Mexico handed down a landmark decision in which the legal definition of marriage was changed to encompass same-sex couples. After this deci- sion, the law restricting marriage to a man and a woman was considered unconstitutional. However, in several states of Mexico, same-sex couples still have to request an injunction (“Amparo”) from a judge to marry, a process not required for opposite-sex couples. In Costa Rica, same-sex legal unions are recognized (2014). On the opposite end of the spectrum, although same-sex sexual activity among consenting adults is legal in Honduras and Nicaragua, both countries have constitu- tional bans against same-sex marriage. In Honduras, same-sex marriages, de facto unions and adoption by same-sex couples were constitutionally banned in 2005. In Nicaragua, after the adoption of a new Family Code (2015), marriage, civil union or adoption by same sex couples was prohibited. In Mexico, only 16 states (of 31) and Mexico City allow adoption by same-sex couples, and until the end of this review (August 2019) there was no national legislation addressing marriage equality (Table 1). In contrast, in April 2017, lawmakers from Guatemala presented a legislative proposal to explicitly prohibit same-sex marriage and restrain public schools from teaching about sexual diversity and gender identity – the proposal was supported by over 30,000 signatures. Four countries implemented some degree of anti-SGM discrimination laws, including labor rights legislations in Nicaragua (2008), anti-discrimination laws in public buildings in Panama (2002) and El Salvador (2010), and legislation protecting SGM youth in Guatemala (1997). Four countries ban all discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity: Mexico (2003), Honduras (2008), Costa Rica (2015) and Belize (2016). Only Costa Rica allows transgender people to change their name and gender on documents without surgeries, medical/psychological evaluations or judicial permission. Since 2006, Panama allows transgender persons to change their legal name and gender, but only after gen- der affirming surgery. Since 2016, transgender people can change their name without needing any surgery in Panama, but not their gender. In Guatemala, trans- gender persons can change their legal name after judicial permission, but not their legal gender (2016). In Mexico, there is no national legislation addressing the needs and specificities of transgender people. Since 2015, trans- gender people can change their legal name and gender in Mexico City without the need of psychological/med- ical evaluations or gender-affirming surgery. Six states (of 31) adopted similar legislations until the end of this review (August 2019). In May 2019, the Mexican Su- preme Court of Justice decided that the right to self- determination of gender identity is a fundamental hu- man right; therefore, a new scenario might be imple- mented towards transgender rights in the entire country. (Table 1). Malta et al. BMC International Health and Human Rights (2019) 19:31 Page 11 of 16 In May 2016, the government of Costa Rica ques- tioned the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, of the Organization of American States (IACHR/OAS) about their obligations related to transgender citizens who requested to change their names and gender in offi- cial documents. They also inquired if the country should develop a specific legislation to recognize the economic rights of same-sex couples [56]. In 2018, the IACHR/ OAS affirmed, through Advisory Opinion 24/17, that all State Members should assure that same-sex couples have access to civil marriage and all related rights. The document also requires State Members to offer a fast, easy and cost-free process to allow transgender people legally change their name and gender in accordance with their self-perceived gender identity [56]. Following IACHR/OAS Advisory Opinion 24/17, in 2018 Costa Rica implemented a new legislation that allows trans- gender person to change their legal name and gender without the need of medical/psychological evaluation, judicial permission or gender-affirming surgery. However, in Mesoamerica systemic discriminatory leg- islations seems to exacerbate the discrimination towards SGM, within a social and cultural context of strong sex- ism, gender stereotypes and high rates of violence. This scenario is driving hundreds of SGM from Mesoamerica to leave their home countries, usually looking for refuge in Mexico or in the United States [57]. According to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), nearly 90% of SGM asylum seekers and refugees from Central America report experiences of sexual and gender-based violence in their home coun- tries [58]. South America region Same-sex sexual acts among consenting adults has been legal in six countries of South America since 1800’s (Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Paraguay, Peru, and Suriname). Four countries legalized same-sex consensual acts during the 1990’s: Chile, Colombia, Ecuador and Uruguay. In Venezuela same-sex sexual acts was never illegal, but a law related to ‘Vagrants and Thugs’ (‘Ley de vagos y maleantes’) was occasionally applied to SGM en- gaged in sex work. The Supreme Court of Justice de- clared this law unconstitutional in 1997. Same sex acts between two men is illegal in Guyana and could lead to imprisonment for life (Fig. 2c). Six countries recognize same sex legal unions: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador and Uruguay. Argentina, Colombia, Brazil and Uruguay also recognize same-sex marriage nationally and allow same-sex couples to adopt. Following IACHR/OAS Advisory Opinion 24/17 [56], in July 2019 same-sex marriage became legal in Ecuador, but the country does not allow same-sex couples to adopt. As of August 2019, only two countries in the region have a constitutional ban against same-sex mar- riage: Paraguay (1992) and Bolivia (2009). Guyana is the only country in South America, and the only country in the Americas outside the Caribbean, where homosexual acts (as well as heterosexual anal and oral sex) are illegal. Guyana does not recognize same-sex legal unions; neither allow same-sex couples to adopt. In the country, transgender people cannot change their legal name and gender, and there is no SGM anti- discrimination legislation. In November 2018, Guyana’s final court of appeal ruled that a law against cross- dressing violates the constitution of Guyana, voiding it. Guyana, Paraguay, Suriname and Venezuela are the countries where SGM people have fewer rights in the re- gion (Table 1). Transgender individuals can change their legal name and gender in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador and Uruguay without the require- ment of surgeries, medical/psychological evaluations or legal procedures. In Peru, transgender people can change their name and gender, but they need to apply before a judge - no medical/psychological evaluations or surgeries are required. Those legislations were implemented after the ‘International Bill of Human Rights’, mostly during the last two decades (Fig. 2c). Overall, legislation to protect SGM rights in South America have undergone fundamental and positive transformations during the last decade. The majority of countries in South America have legal protections against discrimination towards SGM people and con- sider hate crimes based on sexual orientation and/or gender identity as an aggravating circumstance. Eight countries (of 12) allow transgender people to change their name and gender on legal documents without sur- geries or medical/psychological evaluations, just one re- quiring judicial permission (Table 1). Despite the expanding federal laws to protect SGM, the region registers one of the highest rate of violence and hate crimes against SGM people. Whichever the legal framework, and regardless of whether it includes specific hate crime or hate speech laws addressing SGM people, each country need to ensure that criminal legis- lation relating to SGM discrimination and violence is diligently applied. The existence of laws addressing SGM rights violation is important, but if available legislation is not effectively enforced a mutually reinforcing cycle of lack of reporting and low conviction rates continues. The region countries need to created effective mecha- nisms to enforce these laws. In addition, the majority of countries do not classify crimes based on sexual orienta- tion and/or gender identity as hate crimes, with more se- vere penalties. The lack of proper law implementation might be a key factor influencing high rates of violence against SGM in the region. Brazil, for instance, has the Malta et al. BMC International Health and Human Rights (2019) 19:31 Page 12 of 16 highest rate of hate crimes against SGM in the world – crimes frequently unprosecuted and unpunished. Only in June 2019, the Brazilian Supreme Court decided to consider discrimination on the grounds of sexual orien- tation or gender identity equivalent to racism, making those crimes punishable under the country’s more severe anti-racism law. In recent years, highly conservative groups have also increased their political influence in the South America region. In January 2019, Brazil’s far-right president, Jair Bolsonaro, was sworn into office. Under Mr. Bolsonaro administration, an ultra-conservative agenda is being im- plemented, deeply decreasing the country progressive support towards diversity and human rights [59, 60]. The government authorized severe cuts in federal fund- ing for education, health, research and social support strategies, directly affecting SGM people and other vul- nerable minorities [42]. In Venezuela, Nicolás Maduro was first elected presi- dent in 2013, and re-elected in a controversial election in 2018. Until mid-2019, over 4 million people have left Venezuela to escape violence, insecurity, life threats, lack of food, medicine and essential services – the percent of those who self-identify as SGM is unknown [61]. After a decade of leftist government, around mid-2010 a right- wing political phenomenon emerged in South America. Currently the majority of countries in the region are controlled either by center-right (e.G. Argentina), right wing leaders (e.g. Brazil) or by repressive dictators (Venezuela). The near future of the region is unknown, but if this highly conservative political agenda influence human rights legislation currently available, setbacks in SGM legal protections are likely. Discussion Recently the IACHR/OAS Advisory Opinion 24/17 stated that all signatory member States of the of the American Convention on Human Rights (‘Pact of San Jose’, signed in 1969) should assure that same-sex cou- ples have access to civil marriage and all related rights. The Advisory Opinion also requested State Members to assure that adequate and efficient gender identity legisla- tions are available to their transgender citizens [56]. In terms of marriage equality, this IACHR Advisory Opinion 24/17 could be an important step forward to pro- mote SGM rights in the LAC region. However, among 20 states from LAC that recognize the IACHR and the Court mandatory jurisdiction, 14 have not yet legalized same-sex marriage: Barbados, Bolivia, Chile, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, and Suriname [56]. Trinidad and Tobago and Venezuela had both ratified the Court’s jurisdiction, but withdrew its ratification when they denounced the American Convention in 1998 and 2012, respectively – both countries do not recognize same-sex marriage. Grenada, Dominica and Jamaica rati- fied the ‘Pact of San Jose’, but do not recognize the IACHR mandatory jurisdiction – those countries likewise do not recognize same-sex marriage. IACHR’s Advisory Opinion 24/17 also addressed legal gender recognition, recommending all signatory coun- tries to adopt a simplified process allowing anyone to change their name and affirm their self-perceived gender identity in public records and documents. According to IACHR, the process should be confidential, free, and not require surgery or hormone treatment [56]. However, until August 2019, transgender people are unable to change their gender in public records and legal docu- ments in several LAC countries – mostly in the Carib- bean and Mesoamerica. Other countries allow those changes only through a complex, costly and time- consuming process involving judicial permission and court appearances (as in Guatemala), or only after gender-affirming surgery (as in Panama and Cuba). Other countries, like Ecuador, allow transgender citizens to change their name and gender, but include a perman- ent marker on the person’s documents – a stigmatizing policy. On the opposite side of the spectrum, the majority of countries from South America allow their transgender citizens to change name and gender in legal documents with a fast, easy and inexpensive manner. On February 3rd, 2018, the Brazilian Supreme Court authorized gen- der modification on civil documents without the need of any medical evaluation or gender-affirming surgery. The Brazilian Superior Electoral Court allowed transgender candidates to use their preferred name and pronouns during the 2018 elections. In June 2019, the Brazilian Supreme Court made homophobia and transphobia crimes similar to racism, a hate crime [62]. In most countries where transgender people are refused legal recognition of their gender identity, this might lead to further human rights violations, impacting their access to education, employment, healthcare, social security, and legal protection [29, 30]. Many countries that do permit the modification of gender markers on identity documents impose abusive requirements, such as forced or otherwise involuntary surgery, medical diagnosis, long, costly and complicated judicial procedures [31, 32]. The translation of IACHR Advisory Opinion 24/17 into reality will require multidisciplinary work and strong political will in the LAC region. However, in the past few years conservative move- ments have resulted in a strong backlash against SGM rights across the Americas. In 2016, a conservative move- ment contributed to blockage of a constitutional Bill on marriage equality in Mexico. In 2017, the conservative parties from Peru derailed a proposed SGM-inclusive edu- cation curriculum. Recently, people have rallied in Malta et al. BMC International Health and Human Rights (2019) 19:31 Page 13 of 16 Paraguay and Ecuador, claiming a need to defend the “traditional family” from so-called “gender ideology” [57, 63, 64]. Right wing and ultra conservative presi- dents have been elected in Argentina (2015), Chile (2017), and Brazil (2018). While studying the uneven evolution of SGM rights in the LAC region, it is possible to state that the existence of pro-SGM movements and progressive legislations have been important but not sufficient to advance SGM rights. The expansion of SGM rights and efforts to ad- vance those rights have produced a persistent confronta- tion between right-based social movements, the State and conservative/religious organizations. In the region, religiosity and faith-based groups continue to be strong veto players and frequently influence the implementa- tion of more inclusive SGM-rights legislations [65]. Our analysis demonstrated that countries located in the Central America and the Caribbean provide less con- stitutional rights to their SGM citizens. SGM related so- cial movements are recent within this region and started in the 1990’s to fight the AIDS epidemic. Until nowadays SGM-rights efforts in the region face strong opposition from governments, religious organizations and the soci- ety at large [38–40]. Policy challenges, opportunities and the way forward This review discussed the transformation of SGM rights in Latin America and the Caribbean. The different sce- narios provide important examples of how social move- ments, institutions and governments can (and should) work together to improve SGM rights. Social move- ments within the LAC region have made impressive ad- vances in the legal environment of many countries, despite the prevalence of adverse cultural attitudes, con- servative norms and prejudice. While there has been an undeniable progress in many countries, stagnation on the legal status of SGM people is also visible in the LAC region. In some countries (e.g., Argentina, Uruguay, Brazil) and in some cities (e.g., Mexico City), the legal status of SGM rights is ahead of some of the most advanced and democratic nations of the world – with same-sex marriage or civil unions, anti-discrimination and hate crime laws, and progressive legislations addressing transgender rights. In other coun- tries (mostly in the Caribbean and Central America), the legal status of SGM rights remains underdeveloped. Sometimes this unevenness is perceived in the same country. Brazil, for instance, provides extensive legal protections to SGM, but has also one of the highest rates of SGM violence and murders worldwide [59, 60]. Reasons for this disparity are complex and represent a clear indication that progressive legislation is not sufficient to advance SGM quality of life. In a social, cultural and political scenario of entrenched prejudice, discrimination and rampant violence, SGM-related legislation is fre- quently not enforced or even observed. Few Latin American employers have proactive policies towards SGM employees. Marriage continues to be defined, constitutionally in some cases, as the union between a man and a woman. Transgender people are fre- quently victims of harassment, discrimination, sexual and physical violence (committed by police officers, other State officials and non-State actors). Although the legislation exists (in some countries), the cultural and social environment is unwelcoming and con- stantly dangerous for SGM in the LAC region. Conclusion International courts are not be able to protect the rights of SGM people due to region and country-specific legis- lations. Political, cultural and societal pressures con- stantly influence how (and if) legislation and national policies underpin a rights based approach or not. Unfor- tunately, just a few national and subnational courts in the LAC region respect all signed international laws and decrees, as clearly presented here. However, in countries with an independent and impartial judiciary, where gov- ernments understand and respect human rights stan- dards, those international laws should contribute and inform a necessary pathway to change. Recent advances show good prospects, but the pro- cesses of constructing non-discriminatory public policies towards SGM face several barriers in each country. Cul- tural norms and the overall political environment highly influence SGM rights in the region and worldwide. We conclude that SGM rights in the LAC region need to be improved. Governments and the civil society should work together, in order to tackle the unacceptable levels of violence and human rights violations towards SGM in the region. It is also pivotal to increase this population access to health, education, social support, legal protec- tion and justice. The policy synthesis provided here could guide LAC policymakers, political and government leaders, advo- cates, lawyers, policy makers and activists to identify local and regional gaps in SGM-related rights. Our study can also underscore the need to advocate for better leg- islations that respect the rights and dignity of all. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights [50] states in Article 2: “Everyone is entitled to all the rights and free- doms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind.” According to the United Nations [66], failure by State authorities to investigate and punish SGM- related discrimination and violence “is a breach of the State’s obligation to protect everyone’s right to life, lib- erty and security of person, as guaranteed by article 3 of the UDHR and articles 6 and 9 of the ICCPR”. Malta et al. BMC International Health and Human Rights (2019) 19:31 Page 14 of 16 Regardless, in 2019 a substantial percentage of signa- tory Member States fail to protect the human rights of their SGM citizens. LAC countries have achieved several successes in this field, and have the potential to foster SGM rights in the next years. The question is whether local governments and lawmakers will actually commit their efforts to protect human rights and decrease the unacceptable abuses towards SGM identified in the Latin America and the Caribbean. Supplementary information Supplementary information accompanies this paper at https://doi.org/10. 1186/s12914-019-0217-3. Additional file 1. List of Selected documents. Abbreviations IACHR: Inter-American Court of Human Rights; LAC: Latin America and the Caribbean; LGBTI: Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender; OAS: Organization of American States; UNHCR: Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Acknowledgements Dr. Cardoso acknowledges the support of the Department of International Law of the Secretariat for Legal Affairs at OAS, during the XLIV Course on International Law in 2017. Dr. Malta acknowledges the support of the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies, provided during the second mandate of Federal Deputy Jean Wyllys to the Oswaldo Cruz Foundation (FIOCRUZ). Authors’ contributions MM and RC conducted the literature review and the analysis. MM, RC, SL and KW drafted the manuscript. MDDS developed the Open Science Framework and revised the manuscript methods description. LM, JGJ, MS, and BB extracted the data, organized the results and provided feedback on the final draft of the manuscript. All authors read and approved the final manuscript. Funding Not applicable. Availability of data and materials All selected documents are available at an Open Science Framework: https:// osf.io/4zq7j/?view_only=e139c918d77c4f14a120658edfd25804 Ethics approval and consent to participate Not applicable. Consent for publication Not applicable. Competing interests Monica Malta is Associate Editor for BMC Public Health and BMC International Health and Human Rights. The other authors declare that they have no conflict of interest. Author details 1Faculty of Medicine, Department of Psychiatry, University of Toronto, Toronto, 33 Russell Street / Room RS 2035, Toronto, Ontario M5S 2S1, Canada. 2Institute for Mental Health Policy Research, Centre for Addiction and Mental Health, Toronto, ON, Canada. 3Department of Social Science, National School of Public Health, Oswaldo Cruz Foundation (ENSP/FIOCRUZ), Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. 4Department of International Law, Organization of American States (OAS), Washington, DC, USA. 5Department of Epidemiology and Quantitative Methods in Health, Sergio Arouca National School of Public Health (DEMQS-ENSP), FIOCRUZ, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. 6Rio de Janeiro Federal Institute of Education, Science and Technology, Belford Roxo, RJ, Brazil. 7UN Women Brazil, Civil Society Advisory Group, Brasilia, DF, Brazil. 8Felipa de Sousa Women’s Group, Rio de Janeiro, RJ, Brazil. 9Brazilian National Association of Transgender and Travesties (ANTRA), Salvador, BA, Brazil. 10Department of Social Science, Sergio Arouca National School of Public Health (DCS-ENSP), FIOCRUZ, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. 11Center for Health Policy and Inequalities Research, Duke Global Health Institute, Duke University, Durham, NC, USA. 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BMC International Health and Human Rights (2019) 19:31 Page 16 of 16 http://scholarlyrepository.miami.edu/oa_theses/690 http://scholarlyrepository.miami.edu/oa_theses/690 https://www.ohchr.org/EN/UDHR/Documents/UDHR_Translations/eng.pdf%20Accessed%20in%20May%2014 https://www.ohchr.org/EN/UDHR/Documents/UDHR_Translations/eng.pdf%20Accessed%20in%20May%2014 https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx%20Accessed%20May%2014 https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx%20Accessed%20May%2014 https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/cescr.aspx%20Accessed%20May%2014 https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/cescr.aspx%20Accessed%20May%2014 https://www.hrw.org/report/2018/03/21/i-have-leave-be-me/discriminatory-laws-against-lgbt-people-eastern-caribbean/ https://www.hrw.org/report/2018/03/21/i-have-leave-be-me/discriminatory-laws-against-lgbt-people-eastern-caribbean/ https://www.hrw.org/report/2018/03/21/i-have-leave-be-me/discriminatory-laws-against-lgbt-people-eastern-caribbean/ http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/opiniones/seriea_24_esp.pdf http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/opiniones/seriea_24_esp.pdf https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/AMR0172582017ENGLISH.PDF https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/AMR0172582017ENGLISH.PDF http://www2.ohchr.org/english/OHCHRreport2017/allegati/Downloads/1_Whole_Report_2017.pdf http://www2.ohchr.org/english/OHCHRreport2017/allegati/Downloads/1_Whole_Report_2017.pdf http://www2.ohchr.org/english/OHCHRreport2017/allegati/Downloads/1_Whole_Report_2017.pdf https://www.unhcr.org/venezuela-emergency.html https://www.hrw.org/video-photos/interactive/2019/02/28/sexual-orientation-gender-identity-country-profiles https://www.hrw.org/video-photos/interactive/2019/02/28/sexual-orientation-gender-identity-country-profiles http://sxpolitics.org/sexual-politics-in-ecuador-in-the-2000s-a-birds-eye-view/17140%23_ftn27 http://sxpolitics.org/sexual-politics-in-ecuador-in-the-2000s-a-birds-eye-view/17140%23_ftn27 https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/LivingFreeAndEqual.pdf Abstract Background Methods Results Conclusion Background Methods Theoretical framework: path dependency in reactive sequences Data collection and search strategy Data analysis Results The Caribbean region Mesoamerica region South America region Discussion Policy challenges, opportunities and the way forward Conclusion Supplementary information Abbreviations Acknowledgements Authors’ contributions Funding Availability of data and materials Ethics approval and consent to participate Consent for publication Competing interests Author details References Publisher’s Note 
work_kv6ieyoeazglriqeahza2zzw5m	----	Changing Landscapes of Heteronormativity: The Regulation and Normalization of Same-Sex Sexualities in Europe Sasha Roseneil1, Isabel Crowhurst2, Tone Hellesund3, Ana Cristina Santos4 and Mariya Stoilova1 This paper explores transformations in institutional norms about same-sex sexual- ities across four European countries: Bulgaria, Norway, Portugal and the UK. Focusing on the period from the late 1960s to the present day, it examines both endogenous, path-dependent nationally specific factors at work in the changing regulation of same-sex sexualities, particularly the campaigns of lesbian and gay movements, and exogenous influences exerted by processes of Europeanization and transnationalization. Three processes of normative change are discussed: the legitimation of same-sex sexual practice; the protection of lesbian, gay and bisexual (LGB) people; and the recognition of intimate relationships. We argue that there has been a radical shift in the landscape of heteronormativity in Europe, with the emergence of a new European norm of “homotolerance” and the progressive nor- malization of same-sex sexualities: a process of “homonormalization”. Introduction Over a decade ago Anglo-American and Nordic sociologists began to identify significant contemporary transformations in the organization and reg- ulation of same-sex sexualities. For instance, Seidman (2002) argued that many people in the USA are living “beyond the closet”, their homosexuality subjectively “normalized” and “routinized” in their everyday lives and social interactions. In Denmark, ten years after the introduction of the first law allowing same-sex partnership registration, Bech (1999) took a stronger 1 Birbeck, University of London, UK, s.roseneil@bbk.ac.uk 2Kingston University, UK 3University of Bergen, Norway 4 Centre for Social Studies, University of Coimbra, Portugal Socpol: Social Politics, Summer 2013 pp. 165–199 doi: 10.1093/sp/jxt006 # The Author 2013. Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com Advance Access publication May 12, 2013 Social Politics 2013 Volume 20 Number 2 a t U n iv e rsity o f G e o rg ia L ib ra rie s o n M a y 2 6 , 2 0 1 5 h ttp ://sp .o x fo rd jo u rn a ls.o rg / D o w n lo a d e d fro m http://sp.oxfordjournals.org/ position, suggesting that the distinctive figure of the modern homosexual is disappearing in parts of continental north-western Europe. Drawing on British data, Weeks, Heaphy and Donovan (1999) pointed to a growing con- vergence in the ways of life of homosexuals and heterosexuals, with Weeks more recently arguing that there has been “a long, unfinished but profound revolution that has transformed the possibilities of living sexual diversity and creating intimate lives” (Weeks 2007: x). And Roseneil (2000; 2002) proposed an understanding of the postmodernization of the western regime of sexuality, characterized by a number of “queer tendencies” in social relations, popular culture, political activism and critique that question the normativity and natu- ralness of heterosexuality, and re-configure the hierarchical inside/ outside, binary relationship between heterosexuality and homosexuality. Alongside these arguments, there is a body of work that has focused on “sexual citizen- ship” (Weeks 1998; Richardson 1998; Bell and Binnie 2000; Cossman 2007), “intimate citizenship” (Plummer 2003; Roseneil et al. 2012) and the legal reg- ulation of same-sex sexualities (e.g. Wilson 1994; Stychin 1995, 2003, 2004, 2006a, b; Herman and Stychin 1995; Stychin and Herman 2000; Phelan 2001; Cretney 2006; Andersen 2009), which offers a detailed and politically engaged critique of the ways in which non-normative practices of sexuality and inti- macy are regulated by law and policy. Sitting at the intersection of these two approaches, this paper argues that the period since the late 1960s has seen a radical restructuring of institutional norms about same-sex sexualities in Europe. Central to the paper is the concept of heteronormativity, which draws attention to the multitudinous (social, legal, political, cultural) ways in which heterosexuality is normalized, naturalized and privileged as an institution, and to the ways in which homosex- ual practices and relationships are excluded, stigmatized, marginalized and minoritized. 1 In analyzing the changing landscape of law and policy as it relates to same-sex sexualities, we focus on macro-level processes of normative change, and the “crucial moments of normative decision” (Therborn 2004), that constitute the legal displacement and partial dis-establishment of hetero- normativity and the parallel emergence of a new European legal norm of “homotolerance”, which is part of a wider process of normalization of same- sex sexualities. Extending beyond the national contexts that are the primary focus of Anglophone scholars of sexuality, our analysis encompasses Bulgaria, Norway, Portugal and the UK. 2 A European comparative perspective is important because of the growing significance of the European Union, both in terms of its expansion across Europe, and the extension of its formal com- petence, and because European institutions have played a particular role in relation to the regulation of same-sex sexualities in recent years. The article attends both to endogenous, path-dependent, national, and culturally specific factors at work in the regulation of same-sex sexualities, and to exog- enous influences, exerted by processes of European transnationalization and globalization. 166 Roseneil et al. a t U n iv e rsity o f G e o rg ia L ib ra rie s o n M a y 2 6 , 2 0 1 5 h ttp ://sp .o x fo rd jo u rn a ls.o rg / D o w n lo a d e d fro m http://sp.oxfordjournals.org/ National Contexts: Welfare, Sexuality and Social Movements The countries discussed are a “social democratic” Nordic welfare state (Norway), a “liberal”, or, perhaps more recently, a “social investment” or “neo-liberal”, welfare state (the UK), a “post-communist” state (Bulgaria) and a “Southern European”, post-dictatorship state (Portugal). Neither Esping- Andersen’s (1990) work on welfare regimes, nor his feminist critics (e.g. Lewis 1992; Orloff 1993; 1996; O’Connor 1993; Sainsbury 1996; Pascall 1997; Daly 2000) pay any significant attention to issues of sexuality or same-sex relationships, being largely, and unquestioningly, concerned with the hetero- sexual family, and the relationships between men, women, the state and the market, in the work of heterosexual social reproduction. Despite this, and in the absence of any parallel comparative analysis of what might be called “sex- uality regimes” or “intimate citizenship regimes”, a brief overview of the welfare regimes and of the patterning of gender and intimate life in each of the four countries provides important context for understanding the path dependence of the changing regulation of same-sex sexualities within nation states. The importance of the idea of “welfare regime” is that it proposes that the normative arrangement of welfare in any given country, the historical compromises, political ideologies and institutional relationships between state, market and “family” - or intimate life more broadly-play a dynamic role in the construction of relationships of gender, “race” and ethnicity (Esping- Andersen 1990; Schierup, Hansen and Castles 2006), and we suggest, also of sexuality. Particularly salient to our concerns here is the extent to which welfare regimes facilitate “a socially acceptable standard of living, independ- ently of family relationships, either through paid work or social security provi- sions” (Lister 1997: 173; also Orloff 1993; O’Connor 1993). As a “social democratic” 3 (Esping-Andersen 1990), “woman-friendly” (Hernes 1997) welfare state, Norway has a legacy of low “conceptual polariza- tion of genders” (Löfström 1998) and an extensive history of feminist activism, which gave rise to a “progressive maternalism” (Hagemann 2007) and exten- sive state commitment to gender equality. Norway is a country with a high degree of universalism in welfare policy, with a de-familialized (Lister 1997), individualized family policy, in which most benefits are defined without refer- ence to family status. Part of the Nordic “vanguard of the dismantling of explicitly patriarchal marriage” (Therborn 2004: 80), there is a long tradition of legal individualism and “egalitarian marriage” (Melby et al. 2000; Therborn 2004), no fault divorce having been introduced in 1909. We suggest that there is a connection between this historical organization of welfare and Norway’s early moves toward homotolerance. The UK is historically a “liberal” (Esping-Andersen 1990), or “liberal collec- tive” (Ginsburg 1992) welfare state, 4 orientated strongly toward the market and means tested benefits, which has transformed more recently under New Labour into a “social investment state”. Having been a male-breadwinner Changing Landscapes of Heteronormativity 167 a t U n iv e rsity o f G e o rg ia L ib ra rie s o n M a y 2 6 , 2 0 1 5 h ttp ://sp .o x fo rd jo u rn a ls.o rg / D o w n lo a d e d fro m http://sp.oxfordjournals.org/ welfare regime, the UK now expects both men and women to be economically active individuals, and conceptualizes children as future productive citizens (Williams and Roseneil 2004). British social policy combines individual and family-based benefits, but is becoming increasingly individualized (Millar 2003). The UK has a long history of feminist activism, but one which has been more ambivalent about, and less successful at, entering the state, and hence which has a less well-established state gender policy machine than Norway. Bulgaria is part of the distinct cluster of post-communist European welfare regimes (Fenger 2005), 5 which combine characteristics of Esping-Andersen’s “social democratic” and “conservative”, traditional-family orientated welfare regimes. With a history of state familialism and strong pro-natalist policies under communism that financially penalized those who did not have children (Roseneil and Stoilova 2011) and favored married couples (Therborn 2004), Bulgaria also had a constitutional commitment to gender equality, high levels of female employment (Koeva and Bould 2007) and was the first communist country to declare marriage constitutionally equal and secular (Therborn 2004). The post-Communist era has seen a diminution in welfare services and benefits (Heinen 2009), increasing poverty and inequality (Sotiropoulou and Sotiropoulos 2007), particularly affecting women and minorities, and signifi- cant declines in marriage and fertility rates, alongside increases in divorce and births outside marriage (European Commission (EC) 2009). Portugal transitioned to democracy after the overthrew of the Estado Novo (1926–1974) dictatorship, which had “promoted values and laws related to the rural world, marianic Catholicism, the patriarchal family, submission of women, and a brand of nationalism that worshiped the past and praised colo- nialism” (Vale de Almeida 2008: 6). Portugal is one of the group of Catholic “Southern European” welfare regimes characterized by the prevalence of the informal economy and the lack of resources for welfare expenditure, meaning that much welfare provision is familial (Ferrera 1996; Trifiletti 1999; Flaquer 2000; Ferreira 2005), and suggesting that they might be seen as “welfare soci- eties” (Wall et al. 2001) rather than welfare states. 6 With significant involvement of the Catholic church in welfare provision and policy making (Ferreira 2005; Portugal 2008), at the same time as there is a socialist focus on workers’ rights as part of the legacy of the Carnation Revolution of 1974, there has been a strong symbolic and rhetorical investment in “the family”. As in other “Southern European” welfare regimes, divorce rates, fertility rates and the political representation of women are low, and young people leave the parental home late. But Portugal stands out from other “Southern European” countries in having a female employment rate closer to Nordic, former Communist Europe and liberal welfare regimes (Walby 2001) than to other Southern European countries, and in having a higher proportion of births outside mar- riage (Coelho 2005). In both Norway and the UK, active campaigning for the rights of homosex- uals (UK)/homophiles (Norway) began in the 1950s. An early exemplification of the processes of transnational diffusion that characterize contemporary 168 Roseneil et al. a t U n iv e rsity o f G e o rg ia L ib ra rie s o n M a y 2 6 , 2 0 1 5 h ttp ://sp .o x fo rd jo u rn a ls.o rg / D o w n lo a d e d fro m http://sp.oxfordjournals.org/ lesbian and gay movements (Adam et al. 1999), a branch of the Danish homo- phile organization, The League of 1948 was set up in Norway in 1950. Explicitly referencing the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Heli 2006), it was probably one of the earliest attempts to harness the discourse of human rights to campaign for homosexual rights. The Norwegian Association (DNF-48) worked discretely for the decriminalization of male homosexuality for many years (Kristiansen 2008), but during the 1970s this political agenda became increasingly visible and new organizations and groups were formed. In the UK, the Homosexual Law Reform Society, established in 1958, addressed decriminalization in a similarly moderate and assimilationist way to DNF-48 (Weeks 1977), and in the early 1970s, in the context of the New Left and the development of feminism, more radical grassroots gay liberationist groups emerged. In both countries increasingly open lesbian and gay sub-cultures developed during the 1970s, although lively urban “gay scenes” have been much stronger in the UK than in Norway. In the UK, the major lesbian and gay pressure group, Stonewall, was formed in 1989 to campaign against the anti-gay Section 28 of the Local Government Act, later broadening its remit to encompass all aspects of lesbian and gay equality. A radical queer politics of direct action and highly visible protest developed at the same time, instantiated during the 1990s in the groups Outrage and Lesbian Avengers. In both coun- tries, the AIDS crisis from the mid-1980s brought gay activists into closer contact with the state and health and welfare institutions. In Norway, this was productive of a trustful relationship between the gay movement and the state (Rydström 2011), and served to forge valuable personal contacts and released funding for gay/lesbian organizations. State-movement relations were much more fraught in the UK, where the Thatcher government engaged in openly homophobic politics (Weeks 2007). From the 1980s onwards, the Norwegian lesbian and gay movement, like its women’s movement, was much closer to the machinery of state and political power than was the UK movement, with important consequences for the pace and timing of legal change in the two countries that we discuss later. In contrast to the more dynamic civil societies of Norway and the UK, the right and left wing authoritarian regimes in Portugal and Bulgaria meant that there was little social movement activism (Sousa Santos 1992; Daskalova 1999; Estanque 1999; Brunnbauer 2008), a relatively small urban middle class of the type that was the backbone of the new social movements in the 1970s and 1980s in western Europe (Scott 1990; Rodrigues 1995), and hence a lack of possibility for the development of lesbian and gay collective identities and mobilizations (Cascais 2006; Carneiro and Menezes 2007; Pisankaneva 2009; Roseneil and Stoilova 2011). However, in the years following the transition to democracy in Portugal, and especially after the country’s accession to the EU, there was a growth in citizen and student initiatives around issues such as abor- tion, the environment and lesbian and gay politics (Sousa Santos and Nunes 2004; Santos 2013). The first LGBT movement organizations were the lesbian group Organa, founded in 1990, and the left-wing party group GTH, in 1991, Changing Landscapes of Heteronormativity 169 a t U n iv e rsity o f G e o rg ia L ib ra rie s o n M a y 2 6 , 2 0 1 5 h ttp ://sp .o x fo rd jo u rn a ls.o rg / D o w n lo a d e d fro m http://sp.oxfordjournals.org/ with activism really taking off in the late 1990s. The movement mobilized EU policy to demand lesbian and gay rights; in 2004, for instance, the Annual Manifesto listed a series of demands, each followed by the statement: “Because we are Europe too!” In Bulgaria, the Bulgarian Gay Organization “Gemini”, established in 1992, was the first sign of lesbian and gay activism, focusing on HIV prevention, community building and campaigns for protection against discrimination and equal rights (BGO Gemini 2007). Since 2004, a growing number of NGOs, campaigning and social groups have emerged, making lesbian and gay identities more visible, but whether this constitutes a “lesbian and gay movement” is debatable. The first Gay Pride in 2008 was met with violent attacks, more recent Pride celebrations have been larger, and have passed off peacefully (Sofia Pride 2011). Transnational Contexts: Human Rights and the Emergence of the “European Social Model” With the increasing importance of supranational institutions of governance in post World War II Europe, and the emergence of human rights discourse as “the meta-law of national legal systems” (Pylkkanen 2007), the sovereignty of nation states over law and policy has been diminishing. In this context, trans- national bodies have played a significant role in the changing landscape of het- eronormativity in Europe. At the global level, lesbian and gay rights have met considerable resistance within the United Nations (Swiebel 2009), but in 1994 the UN Human Rights Committee ruled that laws outlawing same-sex sexual practices are human rights violations, and that human rights law forbids dis- crimination on the grounds of sexual orientation. 7 In 2008, the UN General Assembly passed its first non-binding resolution, recognizing that “violence, harassment, discrimination, exclusion, stigmatization and prejudice are directed against persons in all countries in the world because of sexual orienta- tion or gender identity” and condemning “violations of human rights and fun- damental freedoms based on sexual orientation or gender identity”. 8 In 2011, the UN Human Rights Council adopted resolution 17/19 which expressed “grave concern” about violence and discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity, and the UN Office for the High Commissioner for Human Rights published its first report on the human rights of LGBT people outlining “a pattern of human rights violations that demands a response” in every region of the world (UNHCHR 2011, 24). 9 Both the Council of Europe (CoE) and the European Union (EU) have, since the early 1980s, taken normative positions in relation to same-sex sexual- ities, which promote, within the limits of their (changing) legal competences, a human rights based equality agenda that has been expanding in scope. As members of the CoE, all four countries are bound by the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (hereafter, ECHR). 10 While there is no explicit mention of homosexuality in the Convention, from 1980 onwards a number of landmark cases and judgments by the European 170 Roseneil et al. a t U n iv e rsity o f G e o rg ia L ib ra rie s o n M a y 2 6 , 2 0 1 5 h ttp ://sp .o x fo rd jo u rn a ls.o rg / D o w n lo a d e d fro m http://sp.oxfordjournals.org/ Court of Human Rights have contributed to the reshaping of the regulation of same-sex sexuality (Kollman 2007). Although not legally binding in other member states, ECHR rulings contribute to the transnational normative order of sexuality, and have been significant, as we indicate later, in three of our countries. In addition, since recognizing in 1981 that homosexuals “continue to suffer from discrimination and even, at times, from oppression”, 11 the CoE has passed numerous non-binding recommendations and resolutions concern- ing a range of forms of discrimination against lesbians and gay men, in rela- tion, for instance, to residence and immigration, freedom of expression and parenting rights, and has recommended “a broad interpretation of the concept of family” to include “nonmarried partners, including same-sex partners” (Recommendation 1686, 2004). In 1993 it adopted a Written Declaration (No. 227) on “homosexual rights in the new democracies” which stated that the rights of homosexual people not to be discriminated against needed to be addressed in the former Communist countries. 12 A strong statement of the new normative regime of “tolerance and non-discrimination” in relation to same-sex sexualities was issued in 2008: “The Committee of Ministers recalls that it is strongly attached to the principle of equal rights and dignity of all human beings, including lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender persons. The Council of Europe’s message of tolerance and non-discrimination applies to all European societies, and discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation or gender identity is not compatible with this message. It notes that instances of discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation or gender identity as well as homophobia and intolerance towards transgender persons are regrettably still widespread in Europe” (Committee of Ministers, 2008, 1031st Meeting, item 4.3c). As a supra-nationalizing institution, with powers that have expanded consider- ably in recent years and an agenda that is often ahead of its member states (Walby 2004), the EU is also an essential element of the context of law and policy relating to same-sex sexualities in the UK, Portugal and Bulgaria. 13 Although Norway is outside the EU, as a member of the European Economic Area and part of the Schengen framework, much Norwegian law and policy has been brought into line with EU policy (Archer 2005), and hence, Norway is also affected by ongoing, and intensifying, processes of Europeanization. Social policy was largely outside the original remit of the EU, but the “social dimension” has been increasing in importance since the mid-1980s, with the birth of the idea of the “European Social Model”. The 1992 Treaty of Maastricht brought “justice and home affairs” into the concerns of the EU, and promotion of “social cohesion” and the combating of social exclusion, as part of the political project of creating European citizenship and constructing a shared set of European values, has become more central (Shore 2004). The 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam marked a step change in EU engagement in social policy, introducing a new anti-discrimination agenda and a new “soft law” Changing Landscapes of Heteronormativity 171 a t U n iv e rsity o f G e o rg ia L ib ra rie s o n M a y 2 6 , 2 0 1 5 h ttp ://sp .o x fo rd jo u rn a ls.o rg / D o w n lo a d e d fro m http://sp.oxfordjournals.org/ mode of governance—the “open method of coordination”—which seeks to bring about convergence between the EU and member states’ policy through the use of benchmarking, guidelines and the sharing of best practice, to com- plement “hard law” regulation which is binding on member states. Article 13 of the Treaty of Amsterdam created an explicit legal competence for the EU to combat discrimination based on “sexual orientation”. The groundwork for this had been laid by the Squarcialupi Report of 1984, which addressed sexual orientation discrimination in the workplace, leading to a non-binding resolu- tion of the European Parliament condemning “all forms of discrimination based on an individual’s sexual tendencies” (OJ 1984 C 104/46-48) (Bell 1998), and the Roth Report in 1994, which proposed action on discrimination against lesbians and gay men, and raised the issue of same-sex marriage and parenting rights (Swiebel 2007). 14 In 2000, the anti-discrimination policy agenda legitimized by the Treaty of Amsterdam was turned into a legally binding directive (the Employment Equality Directive), prohibiting discrimination in employment on the grounds of religion, belief, age and sexual orientation. This was the first EU legislation to address same-sex sexuality. 15 Referring in its Preamble to the founding prin- ciples of the EU-“liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamen- tal freedoms” (Council Directive 2000/78/EC: para. 1)-the Directive suggests that the principle of equal treatment between women and men is “well estab- lished” within Community law, and that the Community should aim “to elimi- nate equalities, especially since women are often the victims of multiple discrimination”. The next move is to claim “the right of all persons to equality before the law and protection against discrimination” as a universal right, rec- ognized by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and various UN Conventions and Covenants. It is only then that reference is made to the EC objectives relating to the development of a European strategy to promote “a skilled, trained and adaptable workforce” (Council Directive 2000/78/EC: para. 7). Discrimination is opposed because it “may undermine the achieve- ment of the objectives of the EC Treaty, in particular the attainment of a high level of employment and social protection, raising the standard of living and the quality of life, economic and social cohesion and solidarity, and the free movement of persons” (Council Directive 2000/78/EC: para. 11). Also in 2000, the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights was adopted, a non- binding but rhetorically and politically significant statement about the meaning and reach of human rights within the Union. Article 21 of the Equality chapter states that “Any discrimination based on any ground such as sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic features, language, religion or belief, political or any other opinion, membership of a national minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual orientation shall be prohibited”. 16 This was followed by a five-year £100m euro “Community Action Programme to Combat Discrimination” (2001–6) that included sexual orientation. The Lisbon Treaty 2007 made the Charter legally binding on member states, 17 and the European Agency for Fundamental Rights was established, with 172 Roseneil et al. a t U n iv e rsity o f G e o rg ia L ib ra rie s o n M a y 2 6 , 2 0 1 5 h ttp ://sp .o x fo rd jo u rn a ls.o rg / D o w n lo a d e d fro m http://sp.oxfordjournals.org/ homophobia and sexual orientation as a key aspect of its agenda. The “renewed social agenda” adopted by the European Commission in 2008 includes tackling discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation beyond the sphere of employment, so ending the “equality hierarchy”, which offers protection against sex/gender and racial discrimination in a wider range of areas (Swiebel 2009). 18 Alongside, and influencing, these changes in European law and policy, has been the political activism of the transnational LGBT movement, and the moral pressure exerted by human rights NGOs, such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and the International Gay and Lesbian Human Rights Commission. 19 From the early 1990s, the European branch of the International Lesbian and Gay Association (ILGA-Europe) began to secure funding from the European Commission, and it seized the political opportunity opened up by the establishment of the Social Platform in 1995 to become a key player within the EU’s civil dialogue, and also obtained consultative status in the CoE. The LGBT movement lobbied effectively for the sexual orientation provisions of the Charter for Fundamental Rights, and gay activists working as assistants within parliamentary groups, and sympathetic bureaucrats within the Commission have also been crucial (Swiebel 2009). Processes of Normative Change Turning now to the question of how the legal and policy landscape relating to same-sex sexuality has shifted historically, we identify three processes of normative change: the legitimation of same-sex sexual practice, the protection of lesbian, gay and bisexual (LGB) people and the recognition of intimate rela- tionships. These processes have proceeded at a different pace in each of the four countries in recent decades, and have reached different points. A full account of the twists and turns of legal and policy change, and of the role of the many actors involved in enacting these changes, is beyond the scope of this paper; rather we identify key moments of normative decision and key actors, teasing out the particular role played by nationally specific and transnational political processes. TheLegitimationofSame-SexSexualPractice In all four countries, a legal distinction has long been drawn between “legiti- mate” sex—between husband and wife—and “illegitimate” sex—outside mar- riage, and sexual acts between men, which were specifically outlawed for many centuries. Sexual acts between women were criminalized only in Bulgaria, although there were attempts to do so in the early twentieth century in Norway and England. 20 In Bulgaria, the criminalization of sexual acts between men dates back to the reign of Simeon (893–927), with the death penalty for those found guilty, except for the “passive” party, if he was under the age of 20 (Bulgarian Helsinki Committee 2001). In 1896, the punishment was reduced to “confinement to a Changing Landscapes of Heteronormativity 173 a t U n iv e rsity o f G e o rg ia L ib ra rie s o n M a y 2 6 , 2 0 1 5 h ttp ://sp .o x fo rd jo u rn a ls.o rg / D o w n lo a d e d fro m http://sp.oxfordjournals.org/ dark cell for 6 months.” Under communism, the Penal Code of 1951 criminal- ized both acts of “sexual intercourse” and acts of “sexual pleasure” between people of the same sex, the latter encompassing, for the first time, sexual acts between women (Bulgarian Helsinki Committee 2001) and increasing punish- ment to three years imprisonment. This might perhaps be understood in the context of the strong social and legal pressure placed on women to procreate. Only reproductive sexual acts between spouses were considered legitimate sexual practices (Popova 2004), and there were fiscal penalties for not having children, public reprobation and imprisonment for infidelity (Penal Code 1956), and restrictions on abortion (Popova 2004; Brunnbauer 2008). However, while there was a state campaign against “intellectual homosexuals”, who were sent to corrective labour camps by the communist regime, no women were sentenced for same-sex sexual acts (Pisankaneva 2002). According to the Norwegian law of 1687, “fornication against nature” could be punished by “stake and fire”, which was revised by the Penal Code of 1842 to a punishment of hard labour. In the mid-nineteenth century, three cases of fornication against nature were taken to the Supreme Court, two of which were cases of woman–woman sex, despite the legal definition referring to ejacula- tion and anal intercourse. While conviction took place in one, the latter case was acquitted, and this set legal precedent (Aarset 2000). The progressive liber- alism that came to characterize twentienth century Norway was evident in Section 213 of the 1902 revised Penal Code, which explicitly criminalized sexual relations between men but also stated that they were only to be prose- cuted if they caused public damage (Halsos 1999; Jordåen 2003). As a result relatively few cases of homosexuality were taken to court, with the “problem” of homosexuality shifting location to the realm of psychiatry. 21 Suggestions that sex between women should be included in the new law were rejected. In England and Wales, the 1533 Buggery Act made sodomy (along with bes- tiality) punishable by hanging. Having fallen into disuse (Weeks 2000), the death penalty for “buggery” was abolished in 1861, but the 1885 Labouchère amendment to the Criminal Law Amendment Act extended the range of sexual behaviour that was criminalized, and created the offence of “gross inde- cency” between men, a term that was understood to encompass most or all male homosexual acts, with punishment for gross indecency of up to two years imprisonment, with or without hard labour (Cretney 2006). In 1921, an attempt was made to criminalize same-sex sexual acts between women, but the proposal in Parliament was defeated on the grounds that such a law would publicize the possibility of such behaviour (Weeks 1989). The number of offences of gross indecency “known to the police” rose dramatically between 1931, when there were 622, to 6644 in 1955 (Cretney 2005). Portuguese law has historically been unspecific about same-sex sexual acts, with the first Penal Code of 1852 addressing “threats to decency”(Aguiar 1926) and its revision of 1886 “addictions against nature”(Moita 2001). The first law used to specifically target those engaging in same-sex sexual acts was the 1912 Law on Begging and Mendacity, which referred to vagrancy, “false” beggars, 174 Roseneil et al. a t U n iv e rsity o f G e o rg ia L ib ra rie s o n M a y 2 6 , 2 0 1 5 h ttp ://sp .o x fo rd jo u rn a ls.o rg / D o w n lo a d e d fro m http://sp.oxfordjournals.org/ such as prostitutes and others who practiced “addictions against nature” (Bastos 1997). 22 Male homosexuals, vagrants and prostitutes were then incar- cerated and tortured under the Salazar regime, and there were regular police raids on places used for same-sex encounters (Bastos 1997). Later in the dicta- torship, the Penal Code of 1966 introduced a new offence, with a maximum two-year sentence, targeting “whomsoever frequently makes an indecent assault on someone of the same sex” (Article 253). The first moves toward decriminalization in our four countries were made in the UK, 23 where the Wolfenden Committee was set up in 1954 by the Conservative government to investigate the working of the criminal law in rela- tion to “homosexual offences and prostitution”, because both seemed to be increasingly visible and widespread (Cretney 2006). The Committee recom- mended that homosexual behaviour between consenting adults in private no longer be a criminal offence, marking the beginning of an emerging public dis- course of tolerance of homosexuality and of non-intervention in “the private lives of citizens”. It took a decade of lobbying by the Homosexual Law Reform Society and the Albany Trust before the Sexual Offences Act of 1967 was passed by a Labour government, decriminalizing, in England and Wales, homosexual acts that took place between two men over twenty-one years of age “in private”. In Scotland, male homosexuality was decriminalized in 1980, two years later in Northern Ireland, and in 1992 in the Isle of Man. The change in the law in Northern Ireland, where religious authorities held much greater sway, followed the first European Court of Human Rights case (Dudgeon v. UK 1981) to find that the criminalization of consenting sexual relations between adults in private was contrary to article 8 of the ECHR. In the 1990s, the struggle for the equalization of the age of consent for gay men became a key plank in lesbian and gay activism (Waites 2005). The age of consent was reduced from 21 to 18 in 1994, and following an application to the European Commission for Human Rights, in the case of Sutherland versus UK, 24 which found that an unequal age of consent contravened the ECHR, eventually led to equalization with the heterosexual age of consent (at 16 in England, Wales and Scotland, and 17 in Northern Ireland) in the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act in 2000 (Waites 2005). In Norway, DNF-48 began campaigning to decriminalize sexual relations between men in 1950. In 1953 the Committee on the Penal Code suggested removing the relevant paragraph, but proposed an age of consent of 18 (as opposed to 16 for heterosexual sex), and sought to introduce a prohibition on “homosexual propaganda”, in order to counter public fears that decriminaliza- tion would lead to the spread of homosexuality. In contrast to the Homosexual Law Reform Society in the UK, which adopted a conciliatory and gradualist approach to securing legal change, DNF-48 took the position that the proposed changes were worse than the existing (mostly sleeping) paragraph, and pressure for decriminalization was put on hold. It was only in the late 1960s that the issue was taken up again by the movement, and in 1972 the removal of Section Changing Landscapes of Heteronormativity 175 a t U n iv e rsity o f G e o rg ia L ib ra rie s o n M a y 2 6 , 2 0 1 5 h ttp ://sp .o x fo rd jo u rn a ls.o rg / D o w n lo a d e d fro m http://sp.oxfordjournals.org/ 213 was supported by an overwhelming majority in the Norwegian Parliament (Jordåen 2003). Decriminalization occurred in Bulgaria in the Penal Code of 1968, several years before Norway and only a year after the UK. A number of other Soviet bloc countries had already decriminalized sexual acts between men, 25 with pressure for change coming from the medical profession, particularly “the flourishing field of sexology” (Long 1999:247), and Bulgaria seems to have followed this liberalization process. 26 However, the law continued to explicitly discriminate between homosexual and heterosexual behaviour, criminalizing homosexual prostitution, as well as homosexual acts performed in public places or in a manner that was “scandalous” or that might incite others to follow a path of perversion (Penal Code 1968). No one was prose- cuted under either article (Bulgarian Helsinki Committee 2001: 7), but they became a target both of lesbian and gay and human rights from the early 2000s and, most significantly, of European Commissioners as part of the accession negotiations. 27 As part of the acquis communitaire, in order to be able to accede to the EU, Bulgaria revoked the discriminatory paragraphs in two stages in 2002 and 2006. 28 Meanwhile, the age of consent for same-sex sex in Bulgaria has been changed several times in recent history. In 1968, when homosexual acts were legalized, the age of consent was set at 18 years, four years older than for het- erosexual acts. In 1986, the age of consent was equalized, but in 1997 it was raised to 16, as part of Penal Code amendments aimed at reducing criminality during the economic and political transition (Kostov 1999). The age of consent was a target of equality campaigns by gay activists, but it was ulti- mately removed in 2002 because it fell foul of the acquis and threatened accession to the EU (Draft Law on Alteration and Supplementation of the Penal Code 2002). Similarly to Bulgaria, the decriminalization of same-sex sexual acts in Portugal was enacted in the revised 1982 Penal Code, as part of the process of democratization and during Portugal’s process of preparation for accession to the EC. The European legal and policy climate in this area was clearly changing in the early 1980s, in the wake of Dudgeon v. the UK (1981), and the CoE’s Recommendation 924 which “urged” member state to decriminalize homosex- ual acts between consenting adults, and to equalize the age of consent. As in the UK and Bulgaria, decriminalization was accompanied by the introduction of an unequal age of consent (of 16, as opposed to 14 for heterosexual sex), and the new crime of “homosexuality with minors”. Revisions to the Penal Code in 1995 redefined crimes relating to sexuality as “crimes against sexual freedom and self-determination”, instead of as crimes “against the values and interests of social life”, suggesting that a new sexual norm of the “individual right to sexual freedom and self-determination” now “outweighed the collec- tive moral values of society in the eyes of the lawmakers”. The crime of “homo- sexuality with minors” was thereby abolished, and a new crime of “induced misconduct of minors by adults of the same sex” introduced. Given that the 176 Roseneil et al. a t U n iv e rsity o f G e o rg ia L ib ra rie s o n M a y 2 6 , 2 0 1 5 h ttp ://sp .o x fo rd jo u rn a ls.o rg / D o w n lo a d e d fro m http://sp.oxfordjournals.org/ sexual abuse of children, “teenagers and subordinates” was already illegal, this new crime continued with the punishment of the sexual orientation of the abuser, rather than just the act of abuse. Both the 1982 and 1995 changes to the Penal Code, therefore, contained provisions which countered progress toward full equality, which might be understood in the context of the absence of social movement or pressure group campaigning around the issue in Bulgaria. The unequal age of consent came to forefront of the agenda of the new LGBT movement only when a scandal about the sexual abuse of boys in a state institution for young people erupted in 2002, with media reports often using the words “homosexual” and “paedophile” interchangeably. The move- ment responded with demands that the differential ages of consent be revoked, using in its lobbying both the anti-discrimination provisions in the 2004 Constitution, for which it had campaigned (see next section), and EU reports and European Parliament resolutions on the age of consent. 29 Finally, in 2007, after two judgments by the Constitutional Court in which the unequal age of consent was found to be unconstitutional, the revised Penal Code equalized the age of consent for same-sex and heterosexual sex. So, the process of legitimation of same-sex sexual practice took place over the space of forty years across the four countries, beginning in 1967 in England and Wales, and ending in Portugal in 2007. Norway completed the process in one move, whereas the other three countries required both exter- nal pressure from European legislation and human rights provisions and internal social movement lobbying and campaigning, with the former most significant in Bulgaria. TheProtectionofLesbian,GayandBisexualPeople Historically moves to protect LGB people from discrimination and homo- phobic speech and violence in the public sphere began after the process of legitimation of same-sex sexual practices in the private sphere. Protection against discrimination. The argument that LGBT people suffer discrimination and disadvantage has been the core, unifying claim of contem- porary LGBT movements internationally. Establishing the existence of discrim- ination and making it normatively unacceptable has been a major focus of activist intervention since the early 1970s in Norway and the UK, and from the mid-1990s in Bulgaria and Portugal. The recognition by national and transna- tional state actors of “sexual orientation discrimination”, and the move to enact legislation to protect LGB individuals from such discrimination consti- tute a significant victory for LGBT movements. Norway was the first country in the world to legislate against discrimination on the grounds of “sexual orientation” (Löfström 1998). In 1974, DNF-48 pro- posed to the Minister of Justice that people with “homosexual inclinations” be added to the list of those protected from discriminatory refusal to supply goods or services (Penal Code, section 349a) and from threatening and hateful utterances (section 135a). This proposal resulted in a report by the Committee Changing Landscapes of Heteronormativity 177 a t U n iv e rsity o f G e o rg ia L ib ra rie s o n M a y 2 6 , 2 0 1 5 h ttp ://sp .o x fo rd jo u rn a ls.o rg / D o w n lo a d e d fro m http://sp.oxfordjournals.org/ on the Penal Code (NOU 1979: 46), which was split on the issue, but in 1981 the Penal Code was revised to include protection on the basis of “homosexual inclination, lifestyle or orientation” with a maximum penalty of six months imprisonment (Hennum 2001). 30 Although these changes may seem radical and early in a comparative context, they have not been seen as particularly sig- nificant in Norway, possibly because section 135 tends to be interpreted quite restrictively by the courts, with the argument for free speech (section 100) tending to overrule section 135 (Hennum 2001). This Norwegian reframing of anti-discrimination legislation was passed in the same year that the CoE first recognized the discrimination and oppression facing homosexuals, and three years before the EU first addressed sexual orientation discrimination, and it was another two decades before the other three countries in our study intro- duced similar laws. The first tranche of sexual orientation discrimination legislation in the UK, Portugal and Bulgaria was the direct result of the EU Employment Equality Directive of 2000. 31 This Directive banned discrimination based on religion and belief, age, disability and sexual orientation, in employment and occupa- tion, vocational training, and membership of employer and employee organi- zations. In accordance with the directive, Bulgaria and Portugal revised their Labour Codes, and the Employment Equality (Sexual Orientation) Regulations were introduced in the UK. 32 Since then all three countries have gone beyond the requirements of the Directive, and appear to be working within the wider normative framework of Article 13 of the Treaty of Amsterdam and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights in their approach to protection against discrimination. Bulgaria and the UK have introduced legislation that extends beyond work, employment and training, bringing them closer to Norway’s long-existent and extensive protec- tion. Bulgaria has gone further than the UK, banning sexual orientation dis- crimination “in principle in every part of the social sphere” (Kukova 2008). LGBT activist and other human rights NGOs were involved in the drafting of the Protection against Discrimination Act (PADA) in Bulgaria. Adopted in 2004, it includes all aspects of discrimination, direct and indirect, that are rec- ognized in international and Bulgarian law, thereby following the ECHR (Kukova 2008), and explicitly includes sexual orientation. In addition, there are several other pieces of legislation, explicitly prohibiting discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation in the assessment of the patient’s health con- dition (Health Law), refusal of social insurance (Social Security Act), provision of judicial services (the Judicial Ethics Code) and the selection of civil servants (Regulation of the Procedures for Selection of State Servants). While there is inconsistency in the incorporation of protection against sexual orientation dis- crimination into Bulgarian law, the direction of legal and policy change is clear: the Bulgarian state is taking on board the new European norms about sexual orientation discrimination. The UK extended protection against sexual orientation discrimination to the provision of goods, facilities and services, in the exercise of public functions, in education, and in the rental or sale of 178 Roseneil et al. a t U n iv e rsity o f G e o rg ia L ib ra rie s o n M a y 2 6 , 2 0 1 5 h ttp ://sp .o x fo rd jo u rn a ls.o rg / D o w n lo a d e d fro m http://sp.oxfordjournals.org/ properties under the Equality Act (Sexual Orientation) Regulations 2007 (and 2006, in Northern Ireland). 33 However, an exemption was made for religious organizations for whom complying with the law could conflict with either their doctrine and/or the views of followers, except when a religious organiza- tion provides a public service (such as adoption and fostering), in which case, the regulations do apply. Moreover, both Bulgaria and the UK have established statutory equality bodies with a remit to deal with multiple forms of discrimi- nation, including sexual orientation, although this was not required by the Employment Equality Directive. 34 Although its legislation against sexual orientation discrimination long pre- dates that in Bulgaria and the UK, Norway has recently enacted a number of similar changes to its national law, including the establishment of an equality and anti-discrimination body in 2006, and addressing sexual orientation in several pieces of legislation including the Tenancy Act (1999); the Housing Association Act (2003); the Residential Building Association Act (2003); and the Working Environment Act (2005). This points to the power of the emerging European norms about sexual orientation discrimination, and the transnational diffusion of equality and diversity policy beyond the boundaries of the EU. Portugal has followed a different path in respect of sexual orientation dis- crimination, occupying a somewhat contradictory position in which it offers both more extensive but less specific protection against discrimination. On the one hand, it has gone no further than the Employment Equality Directive, pro- hibiting sexual orientation discrimination only in employment, not extending it to goods and services, and it has not established a new public body to deal with sexual orientation discrimination. 35 On the other hand, Portugal is the only country in our study, the fourth country in the world, and the first in Europe, to include protection against sexual orientation discrimination in its Constitution. 36 In 2004, revisions to the Principle of Equality (Article 13) of the Constitution, which states “Every citizen shall possess the same social dignity and shall be equal before the law”, place sexual orientation among the grounds on which “No one shall be privileged, favoured, prejudiced, deprived of any right or exempted from any duty” (Article 13, Section 2). The LGBT movement made extensive use of EU law and rhetoric in arguing that the Constitution should be changed to comply with article 13 of the Amsterdam Treaty. The movement’s success with this campaign has provided it with a resource, in the form of Constitutional equality and protection from discrimi- nation that has subsequently been mobilized in the struggle for the recognition of same-sex relationships. Protection from homophobic speech and violence. While there is a strong emerging European norm that LGB people should be protected against discrimination, which has impacted upon law and policy in all four countries, specific criminal law protection from homophobic speech and violence is less consistently normative, although pressure is growing to strengthen criminal law in this area, particularly from transnational human rights and LGBT Changing Landscapes of Heteronormativity 179 a t U n iv e rsity o f G e o rg ia L ib ra rie s o n M a y 2 6 , 2 0 1 5 h ttp ://sp .o x fo rd jo u rn a ls.o rg / D o w n lo a d e d fro m http://sp.oxfordjournals.org/ organizations, such as Human Rights First and ILGA-Europe, and through the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The concept of “hate crimes” was developed in the USA in the mid-1980s by activists and scholars concerned with crimes of violence, and provocation to violence, against ethnic and racialized minorities and lesbians and gay men (Jacobs and Potter 1998) and by 2003 it had been adopted by the OSCE to refer to crimes that are “committed with discriminatory selection”; however, its members have not yet reached agreement as to whether homophobic crimes should be recognized as “hate crimes” (ODIHR 2008: 10). 37 The OSCE, nonetheless, includes homophobic crime and violence in its annual reports on hate crimes, and notes that they are under-reported and under-recorded (ODIHR 2008: 8). This exemplifies how actors within transnational institutions at times actively pursue an agenda that is at variance with some member states. In 2006, the European Parliament passed a resolution noting an increase in racist and homo- phobic violence in Europe, and that “strongly condemns all racist and hate attacks, urges all national authorities to do everything in their power to punish those responsible and to fight the climate of impunity with respect to those attacks”. 38 The Fundamental Rights Agency has also put the question of criminal sanctions against homophobia on its agenda, but in the absence of any binding legal action on the issue the situation across member states is variable. Norway was, again, the first country in the world to address homophobic “utterances”, although statistics on hate crimes only began to be collected in 2007. The 1981 revised Penal Code that outlawed discrimination in the provi- sion of goods and services also made it illegal to “threaten or deride, or to incite to hatred, persecution or contempt” against anyone on account of his or her “homosexual inclination, lifestyle, or orientation” (Section 135a). Later revisions have strengthened these provisions, increasing the maximum penalty to three years imprisonment, and expanding the interpretation of the “public dissemination” of such utterances. The 2010 Penal Code states that it is an aggravating circumstance if the crime is motivated by the victim’s religion, skin color, national or ethnic background, homophile orientation, functional ability or other circumstances that collide with the need for groups with a par- ticular need for protection (Bruknapp 2009:106). The UK and Portugal also offer criminal law protection against homopho- bia, introduced later than in Norway but currently stronger, with the UK the strongest. In Northern Ireland, the Criminal Justice No. 2 (Northern Ireland) Order 2004 criminalized acts intended, or likely, to stir up hatred or arouse fear on the grounds of sexual orientation. In England and Wales, in 2008, after extensive lobbying from the pressure group Stonewall, the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act introduced a new offence of inciting hatred on the grounds of sexual orientation. The Criminal Justice Act 2003 extended statutory aggrava- tions to include sexual orientation in England and Wales. 39 The UK is the only one of our countries to monitor and publish information about the incidence of sexual orientation hate crimes (Human Rights First 2008), 40 and extensive policy guidelines have been issued about the prosecution of homophobic 180 Roseneil et al. a t U n iv e rsity o f G e o rg ia L ib ra rie s o n M a y 2 6 , 2 0 1 5 h ttp ://sp .o x fo rd jo u rn a ls.o rg / D o w n lo a d e d fro m http://sp.oxfordjournals.org/ crimes. In Portugal, the Penal Code was revised in 2007 to criminalize any pro- motion, encouragement or incitement of hatred on the grounds of sexual ori- entation (Article 240) and sexual orientation was made an aggravating factor in offences of murder, serious assault and assault (Article 132). Bulgaria offers no specific criminal law protection against homophobic speech or violence, although homophobic speech is banned as harassment on the grounds of sexual orientation by the PADA (Kukova 2008), and one case has been brought, unsuccessfully, to court, and another to the PADC. Homophobic intent is not an aggravating factor and there is very little public discussion of anti-gay violence and no policy initiatives to combat it. The Bulgarian Helsinki Committee (2001) points to police violence against homo- sexuals, the collection of personal information from homosexual victims of violence that does not relate to the case, and refusal to register acts of homo- phobic violence. BGO Gemini has stated that LGBT people “very often” say that they “prefer” “becoming reconciled [to violence] to defending their rights and seeking legal protection” (BGO Gemini 2004). TheRecognitionofIntimateRelationships The legal recognition of same-sex unions and of same-sex parenting rights has been the most recent, and is the most incomplete, of the three processes of normative change in the four countries. Traditionally, family law has been seen as having a particularly close relationship with a nation’s “character” (Tsoukala 2008), and family law remains relatively untouched by EU directives. 41 There is, for instance, no directive requiring the recognition of same-sex marriage, and a debate on mutual recognition of same-sex registered partnerships across EU borders failed to reach agreement as part of discussions of the Stockholm Program, the EU’s legislative agenda for 2009–2014. However, Kollman (2009) argues that there is an emerging soft law norm about same-sex relationship recognition in Europe. For instance, directives on free movement, family reunification and qualifications address the rights of same-sex partners, and in 2009 the principle of freedom of movement for married couples and those in same-sex partnerships was reiterated, 42 and the European Parliament adopted a resolution on the situation of fundamental rights in the EU which called for Member States “to take legislative action to overcome the discrimination experienced by some couples on the grounds of their sexual orientation.” 43 In 2010, a report was adopted by the European Parliament supporting moves to ensure the mutual recognition of both same-sex and different-sex partnerships and marriages across national borders. 44 Also in 2010, the Parliamentary Assembly of the CoE adopted Resolution 1728 which states that its 47 members should not discriminate against same-sex couples, and that the “denial of rights to de facto ‘LGBT families’ in many member states must also be addressed, including through the legal recognition and protection of these families”. 45 ILGA-Europe describes this resolution as an “historic” document: “the world’s first Changing Landscapes of Heteronormativity 181 a t U n iv e rsity o f G e o rg ia L ib ra rie s o n M a y 2 6 , 2 0 1 5 h ttp ://sp .o x fo rd jo u rn a ls.o rg / D o w n lo a d e d fro m http://sp.oxfordjournals.org/ intergovernmental agreement codifying the application of human rights standards to LGBT people”. 46 Norway was the first of the four countries to introduce recognition of same-sex unions in 1993, and moved to full equality with the gender neutral Marriage Act of 2008. The 1993 Act on Registered Partnership provided equiv- alent rights and responsibilities to marriage for “homophile persons of the same sex/gender”, in relation to tax, social security and unemployment bene- fits, pensions and survivor benefits, carers’ allowances, and inheritance rights, except that registered partners could not adopt, access assisted conception or register their partnership in the Church of Norway. The introduction of gender neutral marriage, which allows “two persons of opposite or same-sex” to marry, removed all references to sexual orientation, and equalized parenting rights for same-sex married couples, allowing adoption, second parent adop- tion (i.e. same-sex step parents’ acquisition of parental responsibility), and, for lesbians, access to assisted conception, with parental rights for the non- biological “co-mother” (medmor). The struggle for relationship rights had been the major focus of the Norwegian lesbian and gay movement since the late 1980s, when it abandoned its 1970s critique of couplehood and focus on discrimination against single people (Andersen 2009). There was heated public debate about the 1993 legislation, but much less heated debate about the 2008 Act, with issues concerning parenting and children being the most controver- sial, and both being only opposed en bloc by the most conservative political groupings. Portugal was the second of the four countries to recognize same-sex part- nerships, with the introduction of legal recognition of the same-sex “de facto unions” in 2001. The lesbian and gay movement mobilized on an unprece- dented scale after the approval in 1999 of a law recognizing de facto unions of heterosexual couples only, and was offered by the government legislation to recognize “shared economies” within households of individuals. The move- ment rejected the idea that same-sex unions were merely “shared economies” (Santos 2013), and, after a well-organized campaign, an inclusive de facto union law and the shared economy law were introduced simultaneously. 47 After the introduction of same-sex marriage in Spain in 2005, the Portuguese movement began to campaign for the right to marry (Vale de Almeida 2009). Mobilizing the Constitutional anti-discrimination legislation, a lesbian couple took the argument to the Constitutional court, which found that the Constitution neither demanded nor opposed same-sex marriage. Following this, and despite opposition from the Catholic Church and centre right and right wing parties, the Socialist government legalized same-sex marriage in 2010. Although adoption by same-sex couples and second parent adoption are still not lawful 48 and access to assisted conception remains restricted to hetero- sexual de facto and married couples, 49 the achievement of same-sex marriage within a decade is a remarkable feat for lesbian and gay activism in Portugal. In the UK, where there had been a fierce contestation about the outlawing of the “promotion of pretended family relationships” by local authorities in 182 Roseneil et al. a t U n iv e rsity o f G e o rg ia L ib ra rie s o n M a y 2 6 , 2 0 1 5 h ttp ://sp .o x fo rd jo u rn a ls.o rg / D o w n lo a d e d fro m http://sp.oxfordjournals.org/ the Thatcher government’s 1988 Local Government Act (Section 28), the lesbian and gay movement had been less focused on same-sex partnership rec- ognition than in Norway and Portugal, and more concerned with revoking Section 28 and equalizing the age of consent, after New Labour came to power in 1997. With these battles won, attention turned to the question of relationship recognition, and in 2004, the Labour government passed the Civil Partnership Act, which introduced a distinctive legal entity for same-sex unions, granting equality with marriage in all but name. 50 This political com- promise, which was supported by Stonewall, but opposed by more radical groups such as Outrage and Queeryouth, who argued for an inclusive defini- tion of marriage, averted a backlash against this aspect of the government’s equality agenda, and the legislation was passed with little political or public opposition. Interestingly, same-sex parenting rights have been more robustly recognized, and for longer, under the more liberal, market-oriented UK assisted conception regime than in Norway or Portugal. 51 Lesbians (single and coupled) have long been able to access assisted conception in private clinics, as long as clinics “take account” of the “the welfare of any child who may be born as a result of the treatment (including the need of that child for a father)” 51 (Human Fertilization and Embryology Act (HFEA) 1990). 52 Amendments introduced to the HFEA in 2008 de-gendered this requirement, so that account must be taken only of the need for “supportive parenting”. In addition, the 2008 Act allows for the recognition of both partners in a same-sex relationship as legal parents of children conceived through assisted conception, and the Adoption and Children Act (2002) allows same-sex couples to apply for joint adoption, and second parent adoption. Opposition to these changes was muted, with leading Conservative MPs arguing not against lesbians’ access to assisted conception, but merely for “some father figure somewhere” (Watt 2008). Bulgaria contrasts with the other three countries in having a constitutional definition of marriage as a union of a man and woman, with the revised Family Code of 2010 confirming this, and recommitting state and society to the protection of family and heterosexual marriage. Same-sex marriage, part- nership and adoption were widely debated in 2008–9, while the Family Code was being revised, and the first Gay Pride was organized around the theme “Me and My Family” with demands for legal recognition. The Protection against Discrimination Commission intervened to suggest that the right to rec- ognition of cohabitation should be extended to same-sex couples, but ulti- mately no recognition of cohabitation (heterosexual or same-sex) was achieved. Former Head of Parliament Gerjokov exemplified the tenor of the debate, with reference to the traditions of the Bulgarian nation: With all my respect for the different, I cannot accept that gay marriages should be made legal in Bulgaria. We are a patriarchal society and this would detonate public opinion. So those who find it necessary to be in a Changing Landscapes of Heteronormativity 183 a t U n iv e rsity o f G e o rg ia L ib ra rie s o n M a y 2 6 , 2 0 1 5 h ttp ://sp .o x fo rd jo u rn a ls.o rg / D o w n lo a d e d fro m http://sp.oxfordjournals.org/ same-sex [relationship] should not want the official recognition of the state for this’. 53 However, a recent European Court of Human Rights ruling in respect of Poland that a Constitutional definition of marriage as a union of a man and a woman cannot be used to justify the denial of certain family rights to same-sex partners, points to the difficulty that Bulgaria is likely to face in holding out against the new European norm on partnership recognition. 54 National Specificities/Transnational Commonalities Across the four countries that we have discussed there has been a radical transformation in the normative landscape that structures and gives meaning to same-sex sexualities over the past four decades. These countries have very different political histories and represent different welfare regimes, yet all have been party to a broadly similar set of changes in law and policy. Alongside this there have been significant shifts in public opinion around same-sex sexuality in all four countries, which parallel a global trend towards greater approval of same-sex sexual behaviour (Smith 2011). Smith’s (2011) analysis of International Social Survey Program data finds that there has been an average net change per annum in the approval of same-sex sexual behaviour of þ 4.66% in Portugal (the greatest change of any of the 31 countries studied), þ 2.88% in Bulgaria, þ 2.87% in Norway and þ 2.13% in Great Britain. 55 Norway has had the strongest public support for both same-sex marriage and same-sex adoption, followed by the UK, then Portugal and, a long way behind, Bulgaria. 56 The process of normative change in each country has its own dynamic which has to be understood in the context of the broader landscape of the particular national relationships between the claim-making practices of social movements and the law-making practices of states, and the relationships between nation states and European institutions. Sitting outside the EU, Norway led the way in the process of legal normal- ization, its long tradition of legal individualism and its social democratic welfare state having instituted equality as a firm principle of governance. The Norwegian lesbian and gay movement, like its women’s movement, worked closely with state bodies, and the close connections that have long existed between activists and government in this small country are central to under- standing the Norwegian state’s “extensive will to reform” ( Mühleisen et al. 2012) in the realm of intimate citizenship. The lesbian and gay movement was able to attach itself to hallowed Norwegian values of equality, gender equality [likestilling], and inclusion with greater ease than in any of the other countries, to the extent that gender equality and support for gay rights have come to be seen as characteristically “Norwegian” – with implications for migrants to Norway from non-western backgrounds whose adherence to these sexual norms is increasingly regarded with suspicion (Mühleisen et al. 2012). 184 Roseneil et al. a t U n iv e rsity o f G e o rg ia L ib ra rie s o n M a y 2 6 , 2 0 1 5 h ttp ://sp .o x fo rd jo u rn a ls.o rg / D o w n lo a d e d fro m http://sp.oxfordjournals.org/ The English liberal tradition meant that decriminalization was earlier than in the other countries discussed here, and there was less legal intervention against same-sex parenting than in “family-welfare” orientated Norway. But the less entrenched commitment to the core social democratic value of equal- ity, and the long period of Conservative government (1979–1997) at the time when Norway was enacting partnership recognition, meant that the UK has lagged behind Norway in moving toward full equality. The UK movement was necessarily politically more oppositional and radical than the Norwegian movement, in the context of the homophobic “family values” that dominated political debate during the 1980s and the early 90s, and the movement has never unequivocally embraced the demand for same-sex marriage. Meanwhile, Portugal came late to the process of change, but enacted the most rapid and radical transformation in the regulation of same-sex sexuality of the four coun- tries. Despite the historic strength of the Catholic Church, the Portuguese lesbian and gay movement’s agile “syncretric” strategy (Santos 2013) of direct action, public debate, legal challenge and political lobbying mobilized emerg- ing European norms about lesbian and gay equality alongside the democratic socialist politics that have been important in the post-dictatorship era, to achieve Constitutional protection and same-sex marriage in just over a decade. In Bulgaria, where a much weaker LGBT movement/NGO sector has been contesting the legacy of Communist familialism and Orthodox patriarchalism, accession to the EU has been the major driver of change, and has seen the equalization of laws relating to same-sex sexuality and the enactment of exten- sive protection against discrimination on the grounds of sexuality. But the changes enacted by the CoE and the EU have been significant, at different times and in different ways, in all three of the member states in our study, each of which has been pushed to act by ECHR rulings and EU directives. The changes in law and policy that we have discussed must be understood as a victory for lesbian and gay movements and their allies. Without the crea- tivity and energy of national and transnational social movement activists, and the translations of the demands of lesbian and gay movements by left and centre-left political parties, same-sex sexualities would not have entered the equalities and human rights agendas of nation states and transnational bodies. It is important to note that almost every change in national law in Norway, Portugal and the UK discussed in this article has been enacted by a party or coalition of the left or centre left, as have initiatives on lesbian and gay rights with the European Parliament, starting with the work of German Green MEPs in the 1980s. However, it is indicative of the normalization of opposition to sexual orientation discrimination and of same-sex relationships that took place during the first decade of the twentieth-first century that in 2012 the Conservative-led coalition in the UK declared its intention to legislate for same-sex marriage. Changing Landscapes of Heteronormativity 185 a t U n iv e rsity o f G e o rg ia L ib ra rie s o n M a y 2 6 , 2 0 1 5 h ttp ://sp .o x fo rd jo u rn a ls.o rg / D o w n lo a d e d fro m http://sp.oxfordjournals.org/ The New European Homotolerance and Processes of Homonormalization Looking broadly across the sweep of legal and policy changes regarding same-sex sexualities over recent decades, the decriminalization and equaliza- tion of the law around same-sex sexual behaviour might be seen as the first step in the emergence of a new European norm of “homotolerance” (Røthing 2008) which is now more or less institutionalized within the four countries we have discussed. The establishment of legal tolerance of homosexual sexual activity set in train a process of radical transformation in heteronormativity. This has involved the struggle for, and achievement of, formal legal protection against discrimination and violence for lesbians and gay men, and, less com- pletely, the opening up of the possibility of recognition for their couple and parenting relationships, the full achievement of which might be understood as legal “homonormalization”, that is, the formal legal inclusion of lesbian and gay men as full and equal citizens. We use the notion of homonormalization, rather than the more widely used notion of homonormativity (Duggan 2002; Puar 2007), which was coined to describe “the sexual politics of neoliberalism” (Duggan 2002) in the USA, in order to emphasize both the incompleteness of this process, and the historical and ongoing incommensurability of heteronor- mativity and homonormativity as regulatory and normative regimes. 57 This transformation in the heteronormative legal and policy order has to be understood in relation to a complex set of macro-level processes of moderniza- tion, democratization, and transnationalization that can be traced back through the twentieth century, and that have a distinctively European hue. The legacies of two World Wars, of dictatorships, fascism and racism in Europe, are the backdrop to the project of European identity and citizenship building that discursively foregrounds equality and human rights, and that now firmly includes sexual orientation within its agenda. However, there are important issues to be raised about the politics of this new norm of homotolerance and processes of homonormalization, as they enact their own modes of regulation, discipline, exclusion and hierarchization. First, the European identity project, and its various national instantiations that have begun to claim homotolerance as a key element seem also to be increasingly mobilizing this equalities agenda as a marker of the distinction between “progressive”, “civilized” Europe and “others”—within Europe itself, on its borders and beyond. 58 At nation state level, distinctions are drawn, and differences measured, in numerous trans-European reports and surveys, between the member states and candidate countries of the EU, to evaluate “progress” in respect of the new sexuality-equality norm. It is generally the “post-socialist” states that find themselves at the bottom of the league tables of homotolerance, and are thereby cast as “lagging” and deficient. 59 Within some European nations, in the decade following of 11 September, and in the context of the “war on terror” and the public dominance of discourses about the “clash of civilizations” (Huntingdon 1993), new forms of “sexual nationalism”, 186 Roseneil et al. a t U n iv e rsity o f G e o rg ia L ib ra rie s o n M a y 2 6 , 2 0 1 5 h ttp ://sp .o x fo rd jo u rn a ls.o rg / D o w n lo a d e d fro m http://sp.oxfordjournals.org/ or what Puar (2007) has labelled “homonationalism”, have developed that con- struct the tolerance of lesbians and gay men (alongside gender equality/ women’s rights), as national values that certain racialized/religious minorities within Europe, particularly Muslims, are seen as failing to embrace (Butler 2008; Haritaworn 2008; Mühleisen et al. 2012). The new tendency to instru- mentalize same-sex equality (Fassin 2011) as part of a racist, Islamophobic pol- itics in Europe needs to be named and confronted, but, as Fassin (2011) and Zanghellini (2012) argue, this does not mean that the struggle for lesbian and gay rights should be relinquished or that it is inherently related to such a poli- tics. Moves toward homotolerance and homonormalization have their own historicity and pre-date the changed political landscape that has followed the rise in Islamic fundamentalism and the “war on terror”. Moreover, a concern with the equality of lesbians and gay men is not essentially or exclusively “European”. It was South Africa that was the first nation to expressly protect against sexual orientation discrimination in its Constitution, and throughout history there have been many ways to deal with and/or accept same-sex sexual- ity and love in different societies. Second, while we have adduced strong evidence of the emergence of a new European legal and policy norm of homotolerance, we wish to emphasize the difference between the institution of laws and policies promoting equality for lesbians and gay men and the eradication of heteronormativity. We are not suggesting that the legislation that has been enacted is actually being fully implemented and its provisions utilized, or that discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation no longer takes place. We are not claiming that homo- phobic speech and violence have been eradicated, and certainly not that same-sex relationships, in all their variety, are fully recognized and allowed to flourish. We are certainly not asserting that same-sex sexuality is fully cultur- ally legitimate. Indeed, our research on the lived experiences of intimate life and intimate citizenship of LGB people in the four countries suggests that this is far from the case (Roseneil et al. 2012). People living outside normative het- erosexuality in each of the four countries continue to experience often severe impingements of their intimate citizenship rights, as well as routine, every day moments of misrecognition and social exclusion. The relationship between changes in law and policy, public opinion and homotolerance, and cultural and social transformation in everyday life is complex, varying not just between the countries we have studied, but within nations, between regions, and among different social and age groups. Lives are lived in complex psychosocial tempo- ralities, rooted in intergenerational and communal relations; they do not map straightforwardly onto the temporalities of legal and policy change, and subjec- tivities do not necessarily shift in time and in tune with social change. Third, we are not saying that the move toward the normalization of same-sex sexualities necessarily constitutes “lesbian and gay liberation”. As LGBT and queer theorists (e.g. Bell and Binnie 2000; Warner 2000; Seidman 2002; Richardson 2004) have pointed out, the embrace of the state enacted by processes of legal normalization is a form of incorporation and assimilation Changing Landscapes of Heteronormativity 187 a t U n iv e rsity o f G e o rg ia L ib ra rie s o n M a y 2 6 , 2 0 1 5 h ttp ://sp .o x fo rd jo u rn a ls.o rg / D o w n lo a d e d fro m http://sp.oxfordjournals.org/ within citizenship which leaves many elements of unequal societies unchanged. Many hundreds of thousands of lesbians and gay men have actively fought, and silently hoped, for this embrace; but many have not, and many remain excluded because they do not conform to the newly recognizable, “respectabl- ized” forms of intimacy and sexuality. Recognition of same-sex relationships is the recognition of long-term dyadic relationships that are expected to be monogamous (see Roseneil et al., forthcoming); recognition of same-sex parenting expects such parenting to be carried out by a couple, not by groups of three, four or more co-parents. Lesbians and gay men who are living outside the couple form, and whose parenting practices do not conform to the two parent model, remain outside the sphere of recognition. And citizenship itself remains an inherently exclusionary status, marking insiders from non-citizens and denizens, the politics of which are increasingly critiqued (Robson and Kessler 2008; Roseneil 2013). Concluding Comments These qualifications notwithstanding, to conclude we suggest that it is both sociologically and politically important to register the extent, scope and speed of the normative change that has taken place, which means that same-sex sex- ualities are no longer outlawed, and are significantly less stigmatized than once they were. The past four decades have seen a reconstruction of the European intimate citizenship regime, involving the decriminalization of homosexuality and the eventual equalization of laws relating same-sex sex, the establishment of laws and institutions seeking to protect lesbians and gay men from discrimi- nation and violence, and, more recently, the move toward the recognition of same-sex intimate relationships and parenting. Same-sex sexuality has been, more or less, fully legally normalized in Norway, Portugal and the UK, trans- forming in the process the inside/outside (Fuss 1990) relationship that has his- torically existed between heterosexuality and homosexuality. And across all four countries, and a range of welfare regimes, as across the wider terrain of Europe, the normativity, protected status and naturalness of heterosexuality have been thrown into question by the legal recognition and protection of same-sex sexualities. This is a truly radical transformation that deserves the continued attention of scholars of social politics. Notes 1. First used by Warner (1991), the concept of heteronormativity has since been widely taken up in queer theory, but can be traced back to feminist theorizing of the institution of “compulsory heterosexuality” (Rich, 1980). 2. The research on which this paper is based was carried out as part of the Intimate Citizenship Work Package of the FEMCIT project (Gendered Citizenship in Multicultural Europe: the Impact of Contemporary Women’s Movements), which was funded by the European Union Framework 6 program from 2007 to 188 Roseneil et al. a t U n iv e rsity o f G e o rg ia L ib ra rie s o n M a y 2 6 , 2 0 1 5 h ttp ://sp .o x fo rd jo u rn a ls.o rg / D o w n lo a d e d fro m http://sp.oxfordjournals.org/ 2011 (project: 028746). See www.femcit.org and Halsaa, Roseneil and Sümer (2012). 3. This group is comprised of the Nordic countries. 4. According to Esping-Andersen (1990), this group also comprises the United States, Canada and Australia. 5. Esping-Andersen (1990) did not address the post-communist states in his original typology, and later rejected the existence of a separate Eastern European welfare model. However, we find more convincing Fenger’s (2005) argument that there remains a distinctive welfare regime amongst former communist states, in which he included Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. 6. Esping-Andersen (2002) does not accept the existence of a distinctive Southern European welfare regime. 7. Stychin (2004) argues that there has been a “double movement of global- ization” in relation to same-sex sexualities: the globalization of human rights, and the globalization of an “Anglo-American, “Stonewall” model of sexuality, identity and liberation” (2004:954). See also Cruz-Malave and Manalansan (2002). 8. http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2008/12/18/un-general-assembly-statement- affirms-rights-all. Accessed 27 June 2012. 9. http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/19session/A.HRC. 19.41_English.pdf. Accessed 27 June 2012. It should be noted, however, that there remains considerable opposition from some members of the UN to the recognition of lesbian and gay rights as human rights. 10. Norway and the UK were founding members (1949), with Portugal and Bulgaria joining shortly after their transition to democracy, in 1976 and 1992. 11. Recommendation 924 (1981) http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/ Documents/AdoptedText/ta81/EREC924.htm.. Accessed 27 June 2012. 12. http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/WorkingDocs/ Doc93/EDOC6779.htm. Accessed 27 June 2012. 13. Accession dates were: UK 1973, Portugal 1986 and Bulgaria 2007. 14. Resolution on equal rights for homosexuals and lesbians in the European Community, OJ 1994 C 61/40, Res. No. A3-0028/94, 8 Feb. 1994. 15. Council Directive 2000/78/EC, OJ L3030/16. 16. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/charter/pdf/text_en.pdf. Accessed 27 June 2012. 17. The UK has an opt-out from this, on the grounds of its common law legal system, but the 1998 Human Rights Act gives “further legal effect” in the UK to the fundamental rights and freedoms contained in the ECHR. 18. The Racial Equality Directive 2000/43/EC offers protection against dis- crimination on the grounds of race or ethnicity in employment and training, education, social security and healthcare, membership of, and involvement in, organizations of workers and employers, and access to goods and services, including housing. 19. Stychin (2003) and Binnie and Klesse (2011) point to the complex power relations involved in “transnational activism” and the politics of “solidarity”, exploring the flow of ideas and the transfer of resources between LGBT activists in western and eastern Europe, and pointing to the ways in which western donors have the power to set agendas. Changing Landscapes of Heteronormativity 189 a t U n iv e rsity o f G e o rg ia L ib ra rie s o n M a y 2 6 , 2 0 1 5 h ttp ://sp .o x fo rd jo u rn a ls.o rg / D o w n lo a d e d fro m http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2008/12/18/un-general-assembly-statement-affirms-rights-all http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2008/12/18/un-general-assembly-statement-affirms-rights-all http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2008/12/18/un-general-assembly-statement-affirms-rights-all http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2008/12/18/un-general-assembly-statement-affirms-rights-all http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2008/12/18/un-general-assembly-statement-affirms-rights-all http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2008/12/18/un-general-assembly-statement-affirms-rights-all http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2008/12/18/un-general-assembly-statement-affirms-rights-all http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/19session/A.HRC.19.41_English.pdf http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/19session/A.HRC.19.41_English.pdf http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/19session/A.HRC.19.41_English.pdf http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/19session/A.HRC.19.41_English.pdf http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/19session/A.HRC.19.41_English.pdf http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/19session/A.HRC.19.41_English.pdf http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/19session/A.HRC.19.41_English.pdf http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/19session/A.HRC.19.41_English.pdf http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/19session/A.HRC.19.41_English.pdf http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/19session/A.HRC.19.41_English.pdf http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/AdoptedText/ta81/EREC924.htm http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/AdoptedText/ta81/EREC924.htm http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/AdoptedText/ta81/EREC924.htm http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/AdoptedText/ta81/EREC924.htm http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/AdoptedText/ta81/EREC924.htm http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/AdoptedText/ta81/EREC924.htm http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/AdoptedText/ta81/EREC924.htm http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/AdoptedText/ta81/EREC924.htm http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/WorkingDocs/Doc93/EDOC6779.htm http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/WorkingDocs/Doc93/EDOC6779.htm http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/WorkingDocs/Doc93/EDOC6779.htm http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/WorkingDocs/Doc93/EDOC6779.htm http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/WorkingDocs/Doc93/EDOC6779.htm http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/WorkingDocs/Doc93/EDOC6779.htm http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/WorkingDocs/Doc93/EDOC6779.htm http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/WorkingDocs/Doc93/EDOC6779.htm http://www.europarl.europa.eu/charter/pdf/text_en.pdf http://www.europarl.europa.eu/charter/pdf/text_en.pdf http://www.europarl.europa.eu/charter/pdf/text_en.pdf http://www.europarl.europa.eu/charter/pdf/text_en.pdf http://www.europarl.europa.eu/charter/pdf/text_en.pdf http://www.europarl.europa.eu/charter/pdf/text_en.pdf http://www.europarl.europa.eu/charter/pdf/text_en.pdf http://sp.oxfordjournals.org/ 20. The criminalization of female same-sex sexuality is historically much less common than male, but a number of countries, including Austria, Sweden and Finland criminalized both male and female same-sex sexual acts in the late nine- teenth century (Crompton, 1980/81; Löfstrom, 1998). 21. In the period 1905–1950, 119 men were sentenced (Hennum, 2001) for homosexual acts. 22. There is little research on the history of same-sex sexuality in Portugal, but see Bastos (1997), Cascais, (2004). 23. Same-sex sexual acts were, however, decriminalized in 1930 in Denmark and 1944 in Sweden. 24. http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?action=html&documentId= 697231&portal=hbkm&source=externalbydocnumber&table=F69A27FD8FB8614 2BF01C1166DEA398649. Accessed 27 June 2012. 25. Poland in 1945, Hungary and Czechoslovakia in 1961. 26. There were a number of sexology clinics and a research institute under communism (Okoliyski and Velichkov, 2004). 27. COM (2002) 624 final “Road Map for Bulgaria and Romania”. http://ec. europa.eu/bulgaria/documents/abc/roadmap-br-ro-2002_en.pdf. Accessed 27 June 2012. 28. The Copenhagen criteria set out in 1993 require candidate countries to adopt the acquis communitaire, the total body of EU laws and regulations. 29. E.g. resolution A5-281/2003 –2002/2013(INI) Available at http://www. europarl.europa.eu/. Accessed 27 June 2012. 30. http://www.iglhrc.org/binary-data/ATTACHMENT/file/000/000/53-1. pdf. Accessed 27 June 2012. 31. Directive n. 2000/78/EC, 20 November, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/ LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32000L0078:en:HTML. Accessed 27 June 2012. 32. All three countries are broadly considered to have implemented the Directive, although there are some deviations and differences in the details of implementation. 33. This has since been replaced by the Equality Act 2010. 34. In Bulgaria, the PADA established the Protection against Discrimination Commission, and in the UK the Equality Act (2006) established the Equality and Human Rights Commission in England, Wales and Scotland, and the Equality Commission in Northern Ireland, replacing specialist bodies dealing with race, sex and disability, and introducing the requirement for the new body to promote equality, monitor the effectiveness of legislation and investigate discrimination on seven “protected grounds”: age, disability, gender, race, religion and belief, sexual orientation and gender reassignment. 35. The Commission on Citizenship and Gender Equality’s remit has been extended to include sexual orientation discrimination. 36. The first three to do so were South Africa (1996), Fiji (1997) and Ecuador (1998). 37. OSCE Ministerial Council Decision No. 4/03, “Tolerance and Non-discrimination”, Maastricht, 2 December 2003, http://www.osce.org/mc/ 19382. Accessed 27 June 2012. 38. European Parliament resolution P6_TA(2006)0273 http://www.europarl. europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do;jsessionid=D6A53BF668317C341F07A1FCAC3AE922. 190 Roseneil et al. a t U n iv e rsity o f G e o rg ia L ib ra rie s o n M a y 2 6 , 2 0 1 5 h ttp ://sp .o x fo rd jo u rn a ls.o rg / D o w n lo a d e d fro m http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?action=html&amp;documentId=697231&amp;portal=hbkm&amp;source=externalbydocnumber&amp;table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF01C1166DEA398649 http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?action=html&amp;documentId=697231&amp;portal=hbkm&amp;source=externalbydocnumber&amp;table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF01C1166DEA398649 http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?action=html&amp;documentId=697231&amp;portal=hbkm&amp;source=externalbydocnumber&amp;table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF01C1166DEA398649 http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?action=html&amp;documentId=697231&amp;portal=hbkm&amp;source=externalbydocnumber&amp;table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF01C1166DEA398649 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Accessed 27 June 2012. 39. Similar provisions were introduced in Northern Ireland in 2004 (Criminal Justice No.2 (Northern Ireland) Order), and in 2009 in Scotland (Aggravation by Prejudice (Scotland) Act). 40. http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/FD-081103- hate-crime-survey-2008.pdf. Accessed 27 June 2012. 41. However, it has been suggested that European harmonization of family law is happening “through the back door” (McGlynn 2006) through coordination rules on the free movement of labour and the European Convention on Human Rights. 42. http://www.euractiv.com/en/socialeurope/parliament-approves-stockholm- programme-prison-add-ons/article-187730. Accessed 27 June 2012. 43. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/file.jsp?id=5498372. Accessed 27 June 2012. This resolution drew on the Fundamental Rights Agency’s first thematic report, which was about homophobia and sexual orientation discrimination in member states. http://fra.europa.eu/fraWebsite/research/publications/publications_per_ year/2008/pub_cr_homophobia_0608_en.htm Accessed 27 June 2012. 44. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONS GML+REPORT+A7-2010-0252+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN. Accessed 27 June 2012. 45. More specifically, the Assembly reiterated its recommendations of 2000 that same-sex partners be entitled to the same pecuniary rights and obligations as different-sex couples, “next of kin” status, equality in residence rights for a foreign same-sex partner and joint parental responsibility for children. http://assembly. coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/WorkingDocs/Doc10/EDOC12185.htm. Accessed 27 June 2012. 46. http://www.ilga-europe.org/home/news/for_media/media_releases/47_ european_countries_unanimously_agree_on_historic_human_rights_ recommendations_for_lesbian_gay_bisexual_and_transgender_people. Accessed 27 June 2012. 47. The new legal form of shared economy might be seen to be more radically queer than the recognition of same-sex couple relationships in its potential to rec- ognize non-dyadic, non-conjugal relationship of interdependence, care and support. 48. Law n.31/2003. 49. Law n. 32/2006. 50. The two differences between marriage and civil partnership are that the latter cannot be registered by means of a religious ceremony or in a religious build- ing, and the latter does not require “consummation” in order to be valid (see Stychin, 2006a). 51. This is not to say that lesbians have found it easy to access assisted concep- tion; the cost is high in private clinics, and studies suggest lesbians have encoun- tered discrimination when seeking NHS treatment (Langdridge and Blyth, 2001). 52. http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1990/37/contents. Accessed 27 June 2012. 53. Broadcast on Nova Television (2009) Csjylp ia naklata [Everything about the Mother], Temata na Nova, 27 March 2009. 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Accessed 27 June 2012. 55. Smith (2011) draws on ISSP data from 1991–2008. Norway has consis- tently had the highest level of approval of same-sex sexual behaviour, followed by the UK, then Portugal and then Bulgaria. The percentage of those surveyed think- ing that same-sex sexual behaviour was “not wrong at all” only passed the 50 percent mark in Norway in 2008 (56.7 percent), with Great Britain recording 36.1 percent and Portugal 28.9 percent (no data on Bulgaria for 2008). 56. European Omnibus Survey, EOS Gallup Europe 2003 data: percentage sup- porting same-sex marriage and same-sex adoption: Norway—66; 37 percent; UK— 47; 35 percent; Portugal—43; 25 percent; Bulgaria—20; 14 percent. http://www. rklambda.at/dokumente/news_2003/News-PA-031015-Gallup-Umfrage-Text.pdf. Accessed 27 June 2012. More recent (2006) Eurobarometer research excludes Norway and offers lower figures in response to the question “Homosexual marriages should be allowed throughout Europe”, and “adoption of children should be authorized for homosexual couples throughout Europe”: UK—46; 33percent agree; Portugal—29; 19 percent agree; Bulgaria—15; 12 percent agree. http://ec.europa .eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb66/eb66_highlights_en.pdf. Accessed 27 June 2012. 57. Berlant and Warner argue that it is not possible to speak of homonormativity in the same sense as heteronormativity “[b]ecause homosexuality can never have the invisible, tacit, society-founding rightness that heterosexuality has” (1998:548). 58. For a wider critique of the recent politics of tolerance, see Brown (2006). 59. See Kulpa and Mizielinska (2011) for critiques of the positioning and repre- sentation of central and eastern Europe in European discourses around same-sex sexuality. References Aarset, A. H. 2000. 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work_kw2aslydszc73oxwwnfi62hb3a	----	Revista inteRnacional de Pensamiento Político - i ÉPoca - vol. 12 - 2017 - [189-200] - issn 1885-589X 189 UNA PERSPECTIVA TRANSATLÁNTICA SOBRE POPULISMO/S: ¿QUÉ ESTÁ PASANDO? A TRANSATLANTIC PERSPECTIVE ON POPULISM(S): WHAT’S GOING ON? Ariane Chebel d’Appollonia Rutgers University (SPAA, DGA) Sciences Po Paris (CEVIPOF) arianecd@rutgers.edu Recibido: Noviembre de 2017 Aceptado: Diciembre de 2017 Palabras clave: populismo, causas, Europa y Estados Unidos. Keywords: populism, causes, Europe and USA. Resumen: Este artículo trata sobre las diferencias y coincidencias entre los populismos en Europa y el Trumpismo. Evalúa, asimismo, tres elementos que son percibidos generalmente como explicación de acontecimientos re- cientes, como el Brexit y la elección de Donald Trump: un desencanto con la democracia, la desigualdad económica y una reacción cultural. Mientras el trumpismo incluye peculiaridades típicamente americanas, refleja una profunda crisis social que afecta a todas las democracias occidentales. Esta crisis está alimentada por una cultura del miedo, un síndrome revanchista y una creciente banalización de la violencia. Abstract: This paper addresses the similarities and differences between forms of populism in Europe and Trumpism. It evaluates three factors that are commonly perceived as explaining recent events, such as Brexit and the election of election of Donald Trump: a democratic disenchantment; economic inequality; and a cultural backlash. While Trumpism includes typically American peculiarities, it reflects a deep societal crisis that affects all Western democracies. This crisis is fueled by a culture of fear, a revanchist syndrome, and an increasing banality of violence. What’s going on? This is definitely the first and foremost question raised by either supporters of, or opponents to, the changes Western democracies now face. For advocates of Brexit or Trump supporters, we are entering into a new era. It is one characterized by the collapse of a corrupted establishment; the decline of mainstream parties disconnected from popular concerns; and increasing push towards equity for the “left-behinds” of neoliberal globalization. They believe that some restitution is Revista inteRnacional de Pensamiento Político - i ÉPoca - vol. 12 - 2017 - [189-200] - issn 1885-589X 190 part of the overdue recognition of their legitimate grievances as the insecure strata of society. Opponents frame the critical issues in a differing way. For them it is to understand “how did we get into this mess?”1 . That “mess” includes the improved electoral fortune of populist leaders; the development of savage partisan divisions; common and increasingly aggressive affronts to minimal decency; the growth of ethno-religious prejudice; and the normalization of racial conservatism. For European commentators, there were “echoes of Trumpism in the nationalist parties of Britain, Denmark, the Netherlands, Greece as well as France.” Common to all of them is “a dissatisfaction with the status quo, the sense that middle-class and working class have been neglected by the existing political establishment, a feeling that politicians aren’t honest with voters”2. Trump himself was often compared to authoritarian leaders (such as Putin and Erdogan), and populist activists like Geert Wilder in the Netherlands, Marine Le Pen in France, and Frauke Petry in Germany. “Now that Trump is coming,” Brian O’Connor wrote in Time, “we must look at this election in the broader context of Western populism – a trend that shows no sign in true direction but also shows no signs of weakening anytime soon”3. Marine Le 1. McAdam, D. and Kloos, K. (2014) Deeply Di- vided. Racial Politics and Social Movements in Postwar America, Oxford, N.Y., Oxford Univer- sity Press, p. 3. 2. Ketty, K. (2016) “Europe Hates Trump. Does it Matter?”, BBC, March 4. Available at http:// www.bbc.com/news/magazine-35702584. Access May 8, 2017. 3. O’Connor, B. (2016) “President Trump and Brexit Are Only the Start”, Time, November 11. Available at http://time.com/4566638/trump- brexit-france-germany/. Access May 8, 2017. Pen, the self-proclaimed “Madame Frexit”, tweeted her congratulations to President Trump who characterized himself “Mr Brexit plus, plus” and tweeted that she was the “strongest candidate” in the run up to the French presidential election. Nigel Farage, the UK Independence Party (UKIP) leader who strongly supported the exit from the EU, celebrated Trump’s victory as a “win double”. President Trump, reciprocally, made Farage “a close but unofficial adviser” in the immediate aftermath of his inauguration. One American observer noted that both the Brexit campaign and the Trump cam- paign were “boiled with populist anger, fear-mongering by politicians, hostility towards distant political elites and resur- gent nationalism”4. In The Washington Post, Chris Cillizza emphasized the “re- markable parallels between the Brexit vote and the rise of Donald Trump”5. He listed major similarities between the two campaigns, such as the vehemence of anti-immigrant feelings, distrust for ins- titutions, and a disdain for the presiding political elites. USA Today reported that Trump himself stressed a “big parallel… People want their country back. Britons took their country back, just like we will take America back”6. 4. Collinson, S. (2016) “Trump on Brexit: Amer- ica Is Next”, CNN, June 25. Available at http:// www.cnn.com/2016/06/24/politics/us-election- brexit-donald-trump-hillary-clinton/. Access May 8, 2017. 5. Cillizza, C. (2016) “The Remarkable Parallels Between the Brexit Vote and the Rise of Donald Trump”, The Washington Post, June 24. Avail- able at https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/ the-fix/wp/2016/06/24/the-remarkable-parallels- between-the-brexit-vote-and-the-rise-of-donald- trump/?utm_term=.69f4949116f4. Access May 8, 2017. 6. Onyango-Omara, J. (2016) “Parallels Run Strong With Shocking Trump U.S. victory Revista inteRnacional de Pensamiento Político - i ÉPoca - vol. 12 - 2017 - [189-200] - issn 1885-589X 191 1. What’s supposedly going on? From a macro-perspective, three interrelated series of factors are key. The first focuses on political factors and relates to a democratic disenchantment, of which there are several elements. A substantial body of research has documented the strong decline in institutional trust, a decrease in political participation, the rejection of mainstream political establishment, and the toxic impact of ideological polarization7. David Van Reybrouck, a Belgium intellectual, suggested that the loss of confidence in politicians was a manifestation of the “Democratic Fatigue Syndrome”8. Surveys substantiate this perspective. The share of the vote for populist, authorita- rian parliamentary parties in Europe has increased by an average of 50 percent over the past two decades. In contrast, the number of people who consider it “es- sential” to live in a democracy has sharply declined, today constituting 32 per cent of those born after 1980 according to the and Brexit”, USA Today, November 9. Avail- able at https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/ world/2016/11/09/donald-trump-president-brex- it-united-kingdom/93540450/. Access May 8, 2017. See also Zakaria, F. (1997) “The Rise of Il- liberal Democracy,” Foreign Affairs, November/ December. Available at https://www.foreignaf- fairs.com/articles/1997-11-01/rise-illiberal-de- mocracy. Access May 8, 2017. 7. Stoker, G. (2016) “Explaining Political Disen- chantment: Finding Pathways to Democratic Re- newal”, The Political Quarterly 77 (2): 184-194; Parker, C. and Barreto, M. (2013) Change They Can’t Believe in: The Tea Party and Reactionary Politics in Contemporary America, Princeton, N.J, Princeton University Press. 8. Van Reybrouk, D. (2016) Against Election: The Case for Democracy, London, Random House. World Values Survey9. In its 2017 report, fittingly entitled “Trust In Crisis,” the Edel- man Trust Barometer found that only 41 percent of respondents in 28 countries said they trusted their government10. And according to a 2014 Eurobarometer sur- vey, 72 percent of Europeans distrusted their government, while 82 percent dis- trusted their national political parties11. This trend extends to the United States where faith in institutions has reached his- toric lows. According to a Gallup opinion poll survey, only 32 percent of respon- dents expressed confidence in 14 major U.S. institutions in 2016 – down from 38 percent in 2007. The data on confidence in Congress is even more stunning: de- clining from 19 percent to nine percent during the same period12. By 2017, more than 20 percent of U.S. adults cited dis- satisfaction with the government and po- litical leadership as the most important problem facing the country13. The second set of factors relate to economic inequality. This perspective 9. Foa, R. S. and Mounk, Y. (2016) “The Demo- cratic Disconnect”, Journal of Democracy, 27 (3), pp. 6-18. 10. Available at http://www.edelman.com/execu- tive-summary/. Access May 9, 2017. 11. Standard Eurobarometer (2014), Public Opin- ion in the European Union, 81, Spring. Available at http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publico- pinion/archives/eb/eb81/eb81_publ_en.pdf. Ac- cess May 9, 2017. 12. Available at http://www.gallup.com/ poll/192581/americans-confidence-institutions- stays-low.aspx. Access May 9, 2017. 13. Swift, A. (2017) “Americans Name Dissat- isfaction With Government as Top Problem”, Gallup, April 5. Available at http://www.gallup. com/poll/208526/adults-name-government- dissatisfaction-important-problem.aspx?g_ source=Politics&g_medium=newsfeed&g_ campaign=tiles. Access May 9, 2017. Revista inteRnacional de Pensamiento Político - i ÉPoca - vol. 12 - 2017 - [189-200] - issn 1885-589X 192 emphasizes the consequences of globalization on post-industrial econo- mies. They include four elements: the decline of manufacturing industry, the erosion of organized labor, an increasing competition over scarce social resources (such as welfare benefits and educational opportunities), and the dramatic socio- economic inequalities enhanced by neo- liberal austerity policies14. These trends collectively fuel resentment among the so-called “losers of globalization.” They become susceptible to exploitative anti- establishment, nativist, and xenophobic scare-mongering by populists who blame ‘Them’ for stripping prosperity, job opportunities, and public services from ‘Us’15. This narrative has taken two forms in the United States. On the Left, the economic inequality argument has been foundational to the anti-Wall Street narrative embedded in the campaign of the democratic presidential candidate Bernie Sanders. On the Right, in its nativist formulation, it has driven Trump’s supporters who praise the restoration of a past golden age through restrictions to NAFTA, the rejection of the Paris Climate Agreement, American withdrawal from the proposed Trans Pacific Partnership, and the avid endorsement of anti-migrant measures. In Europe, concerns about the “dark sides” of globalization have catalyzed support for Eurosceptic parties (such as UKIP in Great Britain, the Freedom Party in Austria and Golden Dawn in 14. Piketty, T. (2014) Capital, Cambridge, MA, Bellnap Press; Hacker, J. (2006) The Great Risk Shift: The New Economic Insecurity and the De- cline of the American Dream, NY, Oxford Uni- versity Press. 15. Inglehart, R. and Norris, P. (2016) “Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Populism: Economic Have-Nots and Cultural Backlash”, Faculty Re- search Working Paper, Harvard Kennedy School. Greece) and left-wing populist groups (such as PODEMOS in Spain, and Syriza in Greece). Charles Hankla, professor at Georgia University State, argued that the Brexit vote and Trump’s election reflected a global rejection of liberal ideals. These two events, he wrote, indicated that “a significant number of Britons and Americans, especially among the native- born working class, have negative feelings about immigration, free markets and social change more generally”16. The third approach to explaining the crisis of liberal democracies focuses on a cultural backlash. Ronald Ingelhart and Pippa Norris maintain that this perspective builds on the “silent revolution” theory “which holds that the shift toward post-materialist values, such as cosmopolitanism and multiculturalism” triggers a “counter- revolutionary retro backlash, especially among the older generation, white men, and less educated sectors, who sense decline and actively reject the rising tide of progressive values”17. Active participants in this cultural backlash include the Tea Party Movement in the United States, as well as other political and religious groups combating key components of “identity liberalism” – such as gender and racial equality, and equal rights for the LGBT community. Populist movements in Europe exploit a sense of cultural insecurity by raising the specter of the Islamization of the continent, denouncing the decline of national identity, and rejecting progressive 16. Hankla, C. (2016) “Intolerance on the March: Do Brexit and Trump Point to Global Rejection of Liberal Ideals?”, The Conversation, June 28. Available at https://theconversation.com/intoler- ance-on-the-march-do-brexit-and-trump-point- to-global-rejection-of-liberal-ideals-61632. Access May 8, 2017. 17. Ibid, p. 3. Revista inteRnacional de Pensamiento Político - i ÉPoca - vol. 12 - 2017 - [189-200] - issn 1885-589X 193 changes (such as the legalization of same-sex marriage). 2. Is Trumpism exceptional? Notable comparable trends on both sides of the Atlantic inevitably leads to the suggestion that they are caused by similar factors – whether they are political, economic cultural or a combination of two or more. But does it follow that the same effects are produced by the same causes? In the wake of Brexit and the rise of Trump, many observers expressed concerns about a populist spillover effect in Europe from these two events. Yet, not all populist European leaders nor their parties benefitted from a “Trump effect.” Far-right candidate Geert Wilders’ campaign fell short of expectations in the Dutch elections in March 2017. His Freedom Party (PVV) lost by a significant margin, being overtaken by the ruling center- right Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD). In France, Marine Le Pen lost the second round of the presidential election in May 2017 despite her intense anti- immigrant campaign, longstanding double- digit unemployment, and a series of terrorist attacks (which killed more than 230 people in 2015-16). Furthermore, the GERB, a pro- European center-right party won the election in Bulgaria over anti-EU/anti-migrant candidates while UKIP’s share of the vote dramatically declined at both the local and national levels in Britain. During the general election if June 2017, the Conservative Party did not benefit from a positive “Brexit effect”; instead, the Conservatives won by a very small margin and lost 13 seats. These examples lend credence to the claim that Trumpism may indeed be “exceptional.” If so, a problem remains in defining the most relevant components of this exceptionalism. Scholars and political analysts have focused on four possible factors. The first –and most individualized– relates to peculiarities of the current leadership. American populist nativism is as old as the United States itself – from Benjamin Franklin complaining about the “Palatine Boors” who were trying to Germanize Pennsylvania to the Know Nothing movement and the Order of the Star-Spangled Banner whose motto in the mid-19th century was “America for Americans”18. Indeed, key components of “Trumpism” have been exploited by previous political leaders who did not reach the Oval Office over the last five decades – such as Pat Buchanan and George Wallace. Other presidential contenders had a business background but also failed – such as William Randolph Hearst, Henry Ford, and Ross Perot. Trump, by contrast, successfully combines different US traditions: anti-intellectualism, nativist populism, and racial conservatism, combined with a long-standing distrust of government and grassroots contempt for the political correctness of the liberal establishment. He can thus be characterized as a “non-identified political” Janus figure who combines an insurgent mystic appeal in his fight against the corrupt establishment with the iconic American myth of the “self-made billionaire.” As Peter Beinart wrote in The Atlantic, Trump wants to “make America exceptional again” by promoting his own “exceptionalist story” – a narrative emphasizing on US sovereignty, nationhood, and the protection of US cultural values”19. 18. Chebel d’Appollonia, A. (2012) Frontiers of Fear: Immigration and Insecurity in the United States and Europe, Ithaca, Cornell University Press. 19. Beinart, P. (2017) “How Trump Wants to Make America Exceptional Again”, The Atlantic, February. Available at https://www.theatlantic. Revista inteRnacional de Pensamiento Político - i ÉPoca - vol. 12 - 2017 - [189-200] - issn 1885-589X 194 A second approach to explaining Trump exceptionalism relates to the idiosyncrasies of party strategies and the US electoral system. Trump’s electoral victory may have surprised scholars and political pundits. But it can be understood as the culmination of a long-term, partisan evolution. The GOP began its strategic rightward shift under Nixon’s ‘Southern strategy” in order to capture George Wallace’s electoral support. It was later reinforced by Ronald Reagan who also energized racial conservatives, and firmly embedded the Christian right in the GOP with a focus on abortion, cultural wars and the use of drugs as electoral issues. Conversely, the Democratic Party meanwhile rebranded its platform under pressure from the civil rights movement of the 1960s, and the New Left of the 1970s. “Playing to the base” was seen as strategically more important, according to Doug McAdam and Karina Kloos, than courting the “median voter” on both sides20. This trend towards partisan polarization increased during the Clinton administration, and peaked during the Obama administration. The Tea Party movement accelerated the GOP’s rightward shift. Its major agenda consisted of ousting Obama, repealing the Affordable Care Act, reducing taxes, downsizing the federal government, and vehemently opposing progressive regulations21. Conversely, Democrats moved leftward, increasingly invoking the strategy and rhetoric of diversity by appealing to minorities of all stripes to vote for them. com/politics/archive/2017/02/how-trump-wants- to-make-america-exceptional-again/515406/. Access May 12, 2017. 20. McAdam, D. and Kloos, K. (2014) Deeply Divided. Racial Politics and Social Movements in Postwar America, op. cit, p. 9. 21. Skocpol, T. and Williamson, V. (2012) The Tea Party and the Remaking of Republican Con- servatism, New York, Oxford University Press. Cumulatively, the 2016 presidential campaign resembled a wrestling match organized by peculiar electoral rules (such as the super-PACs, and the electoral college) in a contest characterized by intense political animosity. About 58 percent of Republicans had a very unfavorable impression of the Democratic Party in 2016, up from just 32 percent in 2008 and 46 percent in 2014. Highly negative views of the GOP among Democrats have similarly escalated: from 37 percent in 2008 to 43 percent in 2014 and 55 percent in 201622. Such an intense political polarization helped Trump to take control of the GOP, and to secure the support of his voters. Although only 38 percent of Americans had a favorable opinion of Trump in November 2017, 82 percent of Republicans still supported him23. A third recent approach has focused on public opinion, notably the grievances of some white Americans - and their hostility to minority groups. Trump’s rhetoric during the presidential campaign combined nativist arguments (such the priority given to native workers over immigrants for employment and social benefits) and xenophobic fear tactics – conflating the notions of “terrorist” (against Muslims) and “criminal” (against Hispanics). Trump voters strongly subscribed to this rhetoric. A public opinion poll conducted by the Pew Research Center in November 2016 found that 79 percent of Trump voters believed that illegal 22. Pew Research Center (2016) “Partisanship and Political animosity in 2016”, US Politics & Policy. Available at http://www.people-press. org/2016/06/22/partisanship-and-political-ani- mosity-in-2016/. Access May 23, 2017. 23. Gallup Opinion Poll Survey. Available at http://news.gallup.com/poll/203198/presidenti- al-approval-ratings-donald-trump.aspx. Access November 14, 2014. Revista inteRnacional de Pensamiento Político - i ÉPoca - vol. 12 - 2017 - [189-200] - issn 1885-589X 195 immigration was a “very big” problem in the country while only 20 percent of Clinton voters expressed such a belief. Since then, studies measuring the respective impact of intolerant attitudes towards immigrants and economic insecurity have illustrated that xenophobia –combined with conservative values– was the main predictor of those who for Trump. Trump performed best among Republicans who score highest in white ethnocentrism, anti-immigrant attitudes, racial resentment, fear of Muslims, and ethno-racial intolerance. The fourth approach focuses on America’s unique and core relationship to racism. The disparity in the views of Clinton and Trump supporters about the prevalence of racism and its foundational role in defining American social and economic relations is remarkable. Various exit polls confirmed that white non-Hispanic voters preferred Trump over Clinton by 21 points. In that context, racism was viewed as a major problem by 53 percent of Clinton voters but by only 21 percent of Trump voters24. Much has been made about the fact that Trump won an overwhelming share (67 percent compared with just 28 percent who supported Clinton) among whites without a college degree. But, reinforcing the significance of race, Trump also got more support from whites with a college degree graduates than Clinton (49 and 45 percent respectively)25. 24. Pew Research Center (2016) A Divided and Pessimistic Electorate, November 10. Available at http://www.people-press.org/2016/11/10/a- divided-and-pessimistic-electorate/. Access De- cember 12, 2016. 25. Pew Research Center (2016) Behind Trump’s Victory: Divisions by Race, Gender, Education, November 9. Available at http://www.pewre- search.org/fact-tank/2016/11/09/behind-trumps- victory-divisions-by-race-gender-education/. Access November 12, 2016. Michael Tesler, in his book Post-Racial or Most-Racial? Race and Politics in the Obama Era, provided evidence that racial attitudes have increasingly structured public opinion about immigration, as well as perceptions of economic conditions. Notably, data from the Cooperative Campaign Analysis Project (from 2008 and 2012) showed that economic anxiety was not causing racism; rather, racial resentment was driving economic anxiety26. And in their analysis of the American National Election Study’ 2016 Pilot Study, Michael Tesler and John Sides argue that both white racial identity and beliefs that whites suffer from discrimination were powerful predictors of support for Trump27. In this context, it is reasonable to assume that the core support for Trump comes from white, blue-collar manufacturing (or ex-manufacturing) voters who subscribe to a politicized nativism and ethno-racial nationalism. Trump was indeed portrayed as the candidate of the poor white working-class. Among his supporters, 63 percent said that job opportunities 26. Tesler, M. (2016) Post-Racial or Most-Ra- cial? Race and Politics in the Obama Era, Chi- cago, Chicago University Press. See also (2016) “Economic Anxiety isn’t Driving Racial Resent- ment. Racial Resentment Is Driving Economic Anxiety”, The Washington Post, August 22. Available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/ news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/08/22/economic- anxiety-isnt-driving-racial-resentment-racial- resentment-is-driving-economic-anxiety/?utm_ term=.df9955bda622. Access August 25, 2016. 27. Tesler, M. and Sides, J. (2016) “How Politi- cal Science Helps Explain the Rise of Trump: The Role of White Identity and Grievances”, The Washington Post, March 3. Available at https:// www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/ wp/2016/03/03/how-political-science-helps- explain-the-rise-of-trump-the-role-of-white- i d e n t i t y - a n d - g r i e v a n c e s / ? t i d = a _ i n l & u t m _ term=.6eab9db6f24b. Access April 2, 2016. Revista inteRnacional de Pensamiento Político - i ÉPoca - vol. 12 - 2017 - [189-200] - issn 1885-589X 196 for working-class Americans were a “very big” problem in the country. There is evidence that supporters of Trump are indeed white, more likely to work in blue-collar occupations, and less likely to have a college degree than voters who supported Clinton. Nevertheless, when compared to the general population, they have higher-than-average income, are 60 percent more likely to be self-employed, and live in communities with little manufacturing activities and high levels of racial homogeneity. Trump was therefore elected by voters having relatively high incomes –sharing nothing in common with the working class– except a strong sense of economic insecurity28. Trump exceptionalism admittedly relates to white ethnocentrism and racism. A survey conducted by PRRI among white working-class Trump voters, for example, showed that fears about immigrants and cultural displacement (such as the feeling of “being stranger in their own land”) were among the more powerful factors motivating Trump supporters. About 68 percent of respondents said “the U.S. is in danger of losing its culture and identity;” 62 percent believed that immigrants threaten American culture; and 52 percent agreed that discrimination against whites has become a “big problem” in recent years29. 28. Silver, N. (2016) “The Mythology of Trump’s Working Class’ Support”, Politics. Available at https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/the-mytholo- gy-of-trumps-working-class-support/. Access May 23, 2017. 29. Cox, D. et al. (2017) “Beyond Economics: Fears of Cultural Displacement Pushed the White Working Class to Trump”, PPRI/The Atlantic. Available at https://www.prri.org/research/white- working-class-attitudes-economy-trade-immigra- tion-election-donald-trump/. Access May 12, 2017. There are, however, puzzling trends that suggest that racial prejudice is only one subcomponent of a broader phenomenon. It is worth noticing, for example, that Obama won a significant number of votes among racially prejudiced whites in 2008 and 2012. About one quarter of whites, for example, who did not even think that blacks and whites should date each other supported Obama for president30. In aggregate, whites preferred Trump over Clinton (58 percent to 37 percent). Trump, however, fared little better among blacks and Hispanics than Mitt Romney had in 2012. No pre-election polls suggested that Trump would get as high as the 8 percent of black voting support –mostly conservative evangelicals– he received. Clinton, in contrast, lost one million black voters. So the assumption that political polarization involves only white voters against minority voters is misleading. Data on perceptions of racism provide significant evidence of anti-black prejudice among whites, and a widespread feeling among African Americans that they are discriminated against by whites on a racial. But, interestingly, about 37 percent of Americans believe that most black Americans are more racist than whites and Hispanics. And even among 30. Tesler, M. (2016) “Obama Won Lots of Votes From Racially Prejudiced Whites (And Some of Them Supported Trump)”, The Washington Post, December 7. Available at https://www.washing- tonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/12/07/ obama-won-lots-of-votes-from-racially-prej- udiced-whites-and-some-of-them-supported- trump/?utm_term=.f1e988212db5. Access De- cember 8, 2016. See also Popkin, S. and Rivers, D. (2016) “The Unmaking of President McCain,” The Economist/YouGov/Polimetrix. Available at http://www.pollster.com/blogs/Popkin%20Riv- ers%20Campaign%20Analysis%2011-04%20 w%20graphs.pdf. Access December 9, 2016. Revista inteRnacional de Pensamiento Político - i ÉPoca - vol. 12 - 2017 - [189-200] - issn 1885-589X 197 African Americans, 31 percent think that most blacks are racists31. Party affiliation actually divided within racial groups: for example, 53 percent of Hispanic Republicans believe that Trump will be a good or great president. By comparison, 58 percent of Hispanic Democrats believe that Trump will be a poor or terrible president32. Furthermore, the relationship between “being a member of a migrant minority” and “having a positive view of immigrants” is more complex than might be expected. Hispanics, for example, are more likely than whites or blacks to believe that immigrants are make a positive contribution to American society (61 percent, 41 percent, and 44 percent respectively). Twenty percent of Hispanics, however, have negative views of the impact of immigrants on the United States. Only 39 percent of Hispanics have a positive view of Latin American immigrants, and 48 percent believe that the U.S. government should give priority to highly educated immigrants – despite the fact that Hispanic immigrants are less educated than other groups. Among third generation Latinos, one-third (32 percent) believe that the impact of unauthorized immigration on Hispanics living in the U.S. is negative33. These and many other 31. Rasmussen Reports (2013) “More Americans View Blacks As Racist than Whites and Hispan- ics”. Available at http://www.rasmussenreports. com/public_content/lifestyle/general_lifestyle/ july_2013/more_americans_view_blacks_as_rac- ist_than_whites_hispanics. Access May 29, 2017. 32. Pew Research Center (2017) “Latinos and the New trump Administration”, Hispanic Trends. Available at http://www.pewhispanic. org/2017/02/23/latinos-and-the-new-trump-ad- ministration/. Access May 23, 2017. 33. Pew Research Center (2015) “US Public Has Mixed Views of Immigrants and Immigration”, Hispanic Trends. Available at http://www.pe- examples of complexity, suggests that the relationship between racism and other forms of prejudice need to be clarified. 3. What’s actually going on? These countervailing views confirm that, although the “whitebacklash” is significant, it is crucial to incorporate other explanatory factors into a broader perspective. These factors are actually symptoms of a deeper societal crisis on both sides of the Atlantic. Three inter- related aspects of this crisis deserve particular attention: First, a widespread culture of fear which fuels and is fueled by conflicting group relations; second, a revanchist syndrome affecting politics, policies and social relations; and third, a subsequent banality of violence involving both actual and symbolic forms of adversity. These trends take place in a context characterized by a transition to diversity, a process that is deeply confrontational to, and rapidly transformative of the social fabric of Western democracies. The Culture of Fear. The novelty of the present situation is only partially explained by the persistence of prejudice among all groups – as defined largely by their political affiliation, socio-economic status, and ethno-racial identity. It is also the product of a combination of an expanding repertoire of perceived threats and an extremely negative stereotypical process. These trends have two effects on the diffusion of a culture of fear: First, the category of the threatening “others” has been broadened. It today includes not only foreigners and ethno-racial minorities whispanic.org/2015/09/28/chapter-4-u-s-public- has-mixed-views-of-immigrants-and-immigra- tion/. Access November 3, 2016. Revista inteRnacional de Pensamiento Político - i ÉPoca - vol. 12 - 2017 - [189-200] - issn 1885-589X 198 but also various in-groups who compete in the defense of their actual and symbolic position in Western societies. The “depiction of entire categories of people as innately dangerous” constitutes these groups’ raison d’être34. Muslims, for example, are negatively perceived by 43 percent of Europeans. Many Europeans (59 percent) also believe that refugees will increase the likelihood of terrorism in their country. It is worth noticing that these negative perceptions are not a linear function of the actual size of migrant groups, nor they are sustained by evidence about the relationship between influxes of refugees and terrorism. In Hungary, for example, where non-nationals represent 1.3 percent of the total population, 72 percent have a negative opinion of Muslims, and 76 percent believe that refugees pose a terrorist threat35. Second, perceptions of threats have been expanded into many facets of economic, political, and social life in the United States. Economic resentment, for example, has less to do with objective economic conditions than with negative perceptions of the economy. The unemployment rate declined from 9.9 percent in January 2010 to 4.7 percent in December 2016; yet, during the presidential election, 44 percent of Americans believed that the job situation has worsened and 21 percent that it stayed about the same36. Among Brexit’s 34. Glassner, B. (2010) The Culture of Fear: Why Americans Are Afraid of the Wrong Things, NY, Basic Books, p. 8. See also Furedi, F. (1997) The Culture of Fear: Risk-taking and the Morality of Low Expectation, London, Washington, Cassell. 35. Pew Research Center (2016) Global Atti- tudes, July 11. Available at http://www.pewglobal. org/2016/07/11/negative-views-of-minorities-refu- gees-common-in-eu/. Access November 11, 2017. 36. Pew Research Center (2016) A Divided and Pessimistic Electorate, op. cit., p. 4. supporters, a growing gap emerged between the actual state of national economy and people’s evaluation of their own financial position. This trend provided a fertile ground for the “Leave” campaign – notably using deliberate falsehoods about the UK’s contribution to the EU. In turn, the “Remain” campaign multiplied predictions of economic disaster arising from leaving the EU as part of a “Project Fear”37. This culture of fear subsequently transcends the traditional divides (the poor and wealthy, whites and non-whites, as well as native and foreign born people) by fueling “post-truth politics.” On both sides of the Atlantic, the traditional dichotomy between progressivism and orthodoxy has been fragmented in recent years into a multitude of sectarian attitudes based on alternative perceptions of existential threats. As Norris and Inglehart argued, “populism has a chameleon-like quality which can be and has been coopted by politicians of many different stripes and ideological persuasions”38. Yet, the most successful populist parties are those that combine in their rhetoric both material and cultural insecurities, as well as authoritarian values, resentment, social intolerance, and mobilizing anxieties. A revanchist syndrome. Fear constitutes a fertile ground for revanchism. It denotes a revengeful sentiment, one that drives intolerant attitudes and policies aimed against those seen as posing a threat39. 37. Perkins, A. (2016) “Osborne’s Punishment Budget is Restoking ProjectFear”, The Guard- ian, June 15. 38. Norris, P. and Inglehart, R. (2017) “Cultural Backlash: Values and Voting for Populist Author- itarian Parties in Europe”, Paper presented at the APSA Conference. 39. Smith, N. (1996) The New Urban Frontier. Gentrification and the Revanchist City, NY, Revista inteRnacional de Pensamiento Político - i ÉPoca - vol. 12 - 2017 - [189-200] - issn 1885-589X 199 There are left and right wing versions of revanchism, as well as complementary ethno-racial variations. All, however, include similar ingredients – a claim of as injustice, discrimination, deceit, suffering, resentment, and actual or perceived alienation. Defensive in-groups launch battles employing a strategy designed to delegitimize threatening out-groups. Revanchism often involves exclusivist urban policies (such as gentrification, school re- segregation, and fight against “deviants”), and entails political maneuvering against minority groups (such as gerrymandering) and vulnerable populations (such as restrictive measures targeting food stamps users). Intolerant policies also involve various forms of “reverse discrimination,” as illustrated by legal battles in several states waged by whites claiming they are unfairly treated by affirmative action programs40. Intersectionality - originally conceived as a source of social empowerment through strength, community and tolerance - has been used by some movements as a rallying cry for exclusionary measures reinforcing harmful structures of race, class, and gender41. The banality of violence. Both revanchism and the culture of fear induce the banality of symbolic and physical violence. As Pierre Ostiguy and Kenneth Roberts argued, “for all populisms, paraphrasing their discourse, power should be brought back to the authentic or ‘true’ people who Routledge. 40. Pincus, F. (2003) Reverse Discrimination: Dismantling the Myth, Boulder, London, Lynne Rienner Publishers. 41. For the original purpose of intersectionality, see Crenshaw, K. (1991) “Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color”, Stanford Law Review, vol. 43, pp. 1241-1291. are deemed to be ‘from here’”42. Most of them thus define “the people” in ethno- nationalist terms – leading to violent verbal abuse against the “others”. According to the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC), American hate groups –and particularly anti-Muslim groups– are on the rise (from 34 in 2015 to 101 in 2016) fueled in part by the recent presidential election. Trump had “electrified the radical right,” during his campaign rallies that were “filled with just as much anti-establishment vitriol as any extremist rally”43. Hate crimes are also on the rise. More than 6,100 incidents of hate crimes were reported in 2016, up from more than 5,800 in 2015. According to FBI data, hate crimes motivated by hatred of a religion increased last year, with a rise in the number of crimes targeting Jews and Muslims. Of the incidents spurred by hatred of a particular religion, anti-Semitism was again the leading cause, motivating about 55 percent of those episodes, followed by anti-Muslim sentiment, which spurred about 25 percent44. Similar trends are noticeable in Europe. Germany, for example, reported a 77 percent increase in hate crimes between 2014 and 2015. In Great Britain, hate crimes increased by 40 percent in 2016 compared to 2015. The UN Committee on Eliminating Racial Discrimination attributed this increase to the “divisive, 42. Ostiguy, P. and Roberts, K. (2016) “Putting Trump in Comparative Perspective: Populism and the Politicization of the Sociocultural Low”, Brown Journal of World Affairs, vol. XXIII (1), p. 39. 43. Southern Poverty Law Center, Annual report 2017. Available at https://www.splcenter.org/. Access September 24, 2017. 44. FBI, 2016 Hate Crime Statistics. Available at https://ucr.fbi.gov/hate-crime/2016/topic-pages/ incidentsandoffenses. Access November 22, 2017. Revista inteRnacional de Pensamiento Político - i ÉPoca - vol. 12 - 2017 - [189-200] - issn 1885-589X 200 anti-immigrant and xenophobic rhetoric” surrounding the Brexit referendum. Police data showed that about 82 percent of hate crimes were racially or religiously motivated, including ones related to anti- Semitism and Islamophobia45. 4. What’s next? Fortunes of populist parties vary. In some countries, they remain “niche players” but in others they either threaten to topple rivals in mainstream parties or rule the country. The most influential ones are those that combine an aggressive populist rhetoric with xenophobic sentiments. They flourish in the current context of “democracy of suspicion”46 whereby the norms of liberal democracy are subject to hostility on behalf of identity-based movements that express bitter grievances fueled by deep-rooted anger and insecurity. The root causes of the societal crisis that Western democracies are facing today are long term. They include growing socio- economic inequalities – fuelling actual and perceived risks of social deprivation; prejudicial policies enhancing a sense of alienation; counter-reactions to liberal values – leading to social intolerance and resentment directed towards various scapegoats (from the elites to migrants and refugees). None of these issues will soon disappear. No one can foresee the end of the populist era, especially when considering the effects 45. CERD, Concluding Observations. Available at http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CERD/Sha- red%20Documents/GBR/CERD_C_GBR_CO_21- 23_24985_E.pdf. Access November 12, 2017. 46. Osborn, T. (2017) “What Thucydides Can Teach Us About Populism”, Working Paper n° 01-17, University of Bristol. of the transition to diversity, a process affecting both the United States and Europe. Indeed, multiethnic grievances and post-racial conflicts are exacerbated by this great transformation of the American societal fabric. Evidence about America’s demography vividly demonstrates that transition. The United States is becoming more racially and ethnically diverse, as the result of four factors: immigration flows, the growing propensity for intermarriage, the subsequent multiracial baby-boom, and thus the sharp increase in the number of people who identify themselves as “multiracial” (as measured by the U.S. Census since 2000). As a consequence, no single ethno-racial group will comprise a majority of the population in the decades ahead. This trend is already evident, as illustrated by the multiplication of inter- and intra-group conflicts based on “reactive identification” as various groups attempt to secure their respective position into mainstream society. In Europe, those who fear that their country is already “swamped” by immigrants are even more militant when they envisage the future. They express concerns that low fertility rates combined with high immigration streams will lead to a significant increase in the culturally – if not ethno-racially – distinct population. The specter of the “great replacement”, raised by populists in most European countries, is gaining currency among policy leaders and public opinion. This suggests that European democracies will face further political disruptions and societal challenges. 
work_ke3nv77mfjdabc4pfgkq4j6a4e	----	= TESTING CRIMINOLOGICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL EXPLANATIONS FOR THE FORMATION OF HATE GROUPS ______________________________________________________________________________ A Dissertation Submitted to the Temple University Graduate Board ______________________________________________________________________________ in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY ______________________________________________________________________________ by Clairissa D. Breen January, 2012 Examining Committee Members: Matthew Hiller, Advisory Chair, Criminal Justice Elizabeth Groff, Criminal Justice Steven Belenko, Criminal Justice Mark Hamm, External Member, Indiana State University ii ABSTRACT Title: Testing Criminological and Sociological Explanations for the Formation of Hate Groups Using Simulations Modeling. Candidate: Clairissa D. Breen Degree: Doctor of Philosophy Temple University, 2012 Doctoral Advisory Committee Chair: Matthew Hiller The purpose of this dissertation is to employ simulation modeling to test theories of group formation as they pertain to hate groups: groups whose hate ideology may or may not condone violent criminal behavior. As of 2010, there were 1002 hate groups known to be active in the United States. Previous examinations of hate groups have assumed formation. This dissertation uses simulation modeling to test Hamm‟s (2004) criminological theory of collective hate and Weber‟s (1947) socio-political theory of charismatic leadership. Simulation modeling is designed to create a computer simulation that simplifies people and their interactions to mimic a real world event or phenomena. Three different experiments were tested using five models of hate group formation. These experiments test the importance of personal and societal levels of hate in group formation and the influence of charismatic leadership. These experiments also tested hypotheses regarding the number of groups that form, the speed of formation and group size. Data to test these hypotheses was collected from fifteen thousand model iterations. All three models successfully generated hate groups. Hate groups were generated at all levels of societal hate. An in-depth understanding of how hate groups form may assist in slowing the proliferation of these groups and decreasing their appeal. iii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS In 1952, Adlai Stevenson, Jr., stated that “if we value the pursuit of knowledge, we must be free to follow wherever that search may lead us.” My search for knowledge has been a long and winding road full of pitfalls and pleasures. On this journey, I have had a great number of supporters, guides, and comrades. I am deeply grateful to Dr. Matt Hiller, my dissertation chair, for his belief in me when I approached him with a rather unconventional topic for my dissertation. His support and advice have been of greatest value to me through this process. I thank Dr. Steven Belenko and Dr. Liz Groff for serving on my dissertation committee; I know it has been a long a complicated process. Dr. Groff especially assisted on the methodology side of the project, introducing me to the science and art of simulation modeling. Gratitude is also due, Dr. Mark Hamm for his advice and service as my outside reader on this dissertation. Further, I thank Dr. Steve Frezza for his assistance in the programming and validation of my simulation models and Dan Nungesser for his assistance in data management for this very data rich project. I am grateful as well to Dr. Jerry Ratcliffe, with whom I have worked on several projects and for whom I have great respect. Thanks also to Dr. Ralph Taylor and Dr. Kate Auerhahn, both of whom have served me well as advisors and mentors over the course of my time at Temple. I am immeasurably grateful to my mentor, Dr. Jim Gilham, Buffalo State College, for his faith in my ability to pursue a PhD and his guidance throughout this process. However, the most important I leave for last; I am indebted and thankful to my parents, Norman and Phyllis Breen for more than I can put into words and dedicate this dissertation to them, with love. iv Page TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT ................................................................................................................................... ii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ........................................................................................................... iii APPENDICES ............................................................................................................................. vii LIST OF TABLES ...................................................................................................................... viii LIST OF FIGURES ........................................................................................................................x CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION ...........................................................................................................................1  Structure of the Dissertation .........................................................................................................4  Summary...................................................................................................................................5 CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW ................................................................................................................7  Group Formation ..........................................................................................................................7  Collective Identity ....................................................................................................................9 What is Hate? .........................................................................................................................11  What is a Hate Group .............................................................................................................14  Summary.................................................................................................................................15 CHAPTER 3 HATE GROUPS IN THE UNITED STATES AS PHENOMENA .............................................16  Hate Groups Currently Active in the United States ..............................................................16 The Ku Klux Klan: a Case Study of the Oldest and Most Prevalent Hate Group in America. ................................................................................................................................................23  Summary.................................................................................................................................37 CHAPTER 4 THEORIES ...................................................................................................................................38 White Supremacists, Skinheads, Neo-Nazis, and Collective Hate. ..........................................38  Charismatic Leadership as the Driving Cause of Group Formation. ........................................44  Hypotheses. ...............................................................................................................................46 Summary ....................................................................................................................................50 v Page CHAPTER 5 AGENT-BASED MODELING AS METHOD ............................................................................51 Lexicon of Modeling Terms. .....................................................................................................51  Simulation Modeling Basics. ....................................................................................................54  8 Key Components for an Agent-Based Model. .......................................................................54 Summary ....................................................................................................................................60 CHAPTER 6 METHODOLOGY ....................................................................................................................61 ABM Modeling platform ..........................................................................................................61  Programming ..............................................................................................................................62  Random numbers. ......................................................................................................................64  Model ........................................................................................................................................69  Agents ........................................................................................................................................73  Environment. .............................................................................................................................75  Data. ..........................................................................................................................................75  Dependent Variables. ................................................................................................................78  Group Formation. ......................................................................................................................80  Independent Variables ...............................................................................................................81  Control Condition ......................................................................................................................98 Experiments: Manipulating Collective Hate, Charismatic Leader Presence, and Societal Hate ......................................................................................................................................................100  Analytic Plan ...........................................................................................................................103 Summary ......................................................................................................................................105 vi Page CHAPTER 7 RESULTS ...................................................................................................................................106 Hypotheses 1a – 1c. .................................................................................................................106  Hypotheses 1d - 1f. ..................................................................................................................110  Hypotheses 2a – 2c ........................................................................................................................ ..................................................................................................................................................113  Hypotheses 2d – 2f ...................................................................................................................115 Summary ..................................................................................................................................123 CHAPTER 8 DISCUSSION ..............................................................................................................................124 Implications for Methodology. ................................................................................................125  Limitations of Simulation Modeling ........................................................................................125  Limitations of Models Used in this Dissertation .....................................................................126 Implications for Criminological Theory. ................................................................................129  Collective Hate ........................................................................................................................130  Charismatic Leadership ...........................................................................................................131 Societal Hate. ..........................................................................................................................133  Implications for Public Policy ..................................................................................................135  Future Research .......................................................................................................................139 Summary ..................................................................................................................................140 REFERENCES ...........................................................................................................................141 vii APPENDICES Page APPENDIX A .............................................................................................................................155 APPENDIX B .............................................................................................................................159 APPENDIX C .............................................................................................................................163 APPENDIX D .............................................................................................................................164 APPENDIX E ..............................................................................................................................170 APPENDIX F ..............................................................................................................................186 APPENDIX G ............................................................................................................................195 viii LIST OF TABLES Page TABLE 1 Lexicon of Modeling Terms .........................................................................................................51 TABLE 2 Eight Elements Table Real World Analogs and Simulation Model Representations ...................59 TABLE 3 Procedures and Programming .......................................................................................................67 TABLE 4 Random Numbers in the Model Experiments ...............................................................................68 TABLE 5 Individual Characteristics .............................................................................................................74 TABLE 6 Group Agent Characteristics .........................................................................................................75 TABLE 7 Log File Example .........................................................................................................................77 TABLE 8 Dependent Variables .....................................................................................................................79 TABLE 9 Independent Variables ..................................................................................................................83 TABLE 10 Conditions for Changing Perceived and Intrinsic Hate ................................................................88 TABLE 11 Societal Hate .................................................................................................................................93 TABLE 12 Covariates of Interest ....................................................................................................................94 TABLE 13 Levels of Motivation .....................................................................................................................95 TABLE 14 Levels of Charisma .......................................................................................................................96 TABLE 15 Levels of Susceptibility .................................................................................................................97 TABLE 16 Control Model and Conditions ......................................................................................................99 TABLE 17 Hypotheses and Experiments ......................................................................................................101 ix LIST OF TABLES Page TABLE 18 Analytic Plan ..............................................................................................................................104 TABLE 19 Effects and their Representations in for ANCOVAs for H1a-H1f Results Tables .....................107 TABLE 20 ANCOVA Analysis for Control vs Collective Hate H1a-H1c ...................................................109 TABLE 21 ANCOVA Analysis Control vs Collective Hate for H1d-H1f, Societal Hate Effects ......112 TABLE 22 Effects and their Representations in for ANCOVAs for H2a-H2f Results Tables .....................113 TABLE 23 ANCOVA Analysis for Control vs Charismatic Leadership H2a-H2c ......................................114 TABLE 24 ANCOVA Analysis Control vs Charismatic Leadership for H2d-H2f, Societal Hate Effects ...118 TABLE 25 Dependent Variables for Validation ...........................................................................................196 x LIST OF FIGURES Page FIGURE 1 Hate Groups Active in the US in 2010 ..........................................................................................18 FIGURE 2 Percent Change for Hate Groups Active in the United States 2006-2010 .....................................21 FIGURE 3 Jack Gibbs Model as adopted and modified by Hamm (Adapted) ...............................................38 FIGURE 4 Key elements of collective hate model .........................................................................................42 FIGURE 5 Intrinsic and Extrinsic Hate Levels in the Model .........................................................................84 FIGURE 6 Agent communication and agreement and disagreement decisions .............................................87 FIGURE 7 Agent Decisions Regarding Changing their Levels of Intrinsic Hate ...........................................90 1 CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION The purpose of this dissertation is to empirically examine the formation of hate groups: organized groups that profess racist, bigoted or prejudiced ideology; and to answer the question: “what causes hate groups to form?” Specifically, it expands upon the use of simulation modeling in the discipline of criminal justice by using this methodology to test Hamm‟s criminological theory of collective hate and Weber‟s socio-political theory of charismatic leadership. Because hate groups exist in all fifty United States, it is important to understand how these groups form. Understanding what elements of the aforementioned theories are vital to hate group development may enable the creation of programs aimed at addressing these factors to prevent further proliferation of these groups. It may also allow for the creation of intervention programs, perhaps focused through community and educational models with members of defunct groups. This research is needed because hate groups and their rhetoric may inspire their members and/or sympathizers to engage in hate-motivated crimes. In 2008, hate-motivated crime was the highest it had been in seven years, with 7,783 hate crime incidents reported, encompassing 9,168 offenses and directly involving 9,691 victims. Of these reported hate crime incidents, 58% were crimes against persons and 46% were crimes against property (FBI, 2009). In previous examinations of hate groups, the fact that the hate group existed was taken for granted. How the group formed was only addressed through conjecture of theory, if it was addressed at all. Therefore, this dissertation argues for the need to develop an understanding of how hate groups form and gain membership. It uses simulation modeling to isolate and test 2 theory-based explanations for hate group formation and proliferation. An increased understanding of how these groups form will better inform research on how membership or desire for membership influences individual and/or group behavior. There are several challenges to studying hate group formation. It is almost impossible and quite dangerous to seek out and monitor potential hate group members and those who could possibly start their own hate group. It is also unethical to manipulate the parameters that may influence hate group formation in the “real world.” Agent-based modeling is a computer-based simulation technique growing in popularity in criminal justice studies because it allows for the controlled study of phenomena not amenable to experimental manipulation (Groff, 2007), allowing one to observe the “growth” of a hate group without endangering anyone. The other problem with simply studying individuals who might form or join a hate group is that there are no guarantees they will do so, and such studies would be prohibitively long and expensive. Thus, hate group formation remains the stronghold of theory, and there is almost no empirical work on this topic. Although there are no guarantees that groups will form as a result of a particular parameter or set of parameters in a simulation model, this technique does allow for cost and time efficient studies of variables associated with hate group development throughout history. There is great variation in the types of hate groups that exist; this dissertation focuses specifically on white supremacy groups, which are the most prevalent type of hate group in the United States and the type with the longest history. Simulation models were built around Mark Hamm‟s theory of collective hate, which is used to explain the formation of white supremacy groups, and Max Weber‟s theoretical assertions regarding charismatic leaders, in accordance with a pattern evident throughout history in the development of hate groups in the United States. 3 Specifically, Mark Hamm (2004) theorized that bonds can be created between individuals through a shared hatred. He asserts that hate groups and hate organizations in the United States, including Neo-Nazis, right wing extremists and militia groups, “arose from an intense collective hatred for the federal government” (Hamm, 2004: 334). Hate, or a belief in a hate group‟s rhetoric or philosophy, is a defining characteristic of hate group members or potential members in the real world. Therefore, this study uses three types of hate as primary parameters for manipulation: intrinsic, extrinsic, and societal. Intrinsic hate is the individuals‟ privately held feelings toward a target group, which may or may not be totally revealed through extrinsic hate, or overt expressions of hatred. Extrinsic hate is how the individual expresses him or herself in regards to his or her hate, the language they use, the tattoos they have, and/or the slogans printed on the clothing they wear. The coming together of individuals based on their levels of intrinsic and extrinsic hate is the basis for collective hate. These individual representations of hate are needed to draw the individuals together into a collective hate, where individuals share the same hate beliefs and rhetoric. Societal hate refers to a “background” level of hate held by general society toward a particular target group. Other factors undoubtedly influence an individual‟s decision to join a hate group. One of those factors is the presence of a charismatic leader. Weber (1947) theorized that marginalized groups with limited access to power, status or wealth become susceptible to charismatic leaders seeking to challenge the established government or system and that the position of the charismatic leader is one of a symbiotic relationship. The presence and loyalty of the followers and their belief in the charismatic leader, assists the charismatic leader in his or her maintenance of his/her position and power (Weber, 1947). In this vein, hate groups may represent anyone who believes that the target of their hate has some influence on their personal life, their real or 4 perceived failures, or missed opportunities. Weber‟s (1947) theory of charismatic leadership provides the basis for examining whether the presence of a charismatic leader in the agent-based models influences groups to form. Relative to hate groups, individuals adhering to a hate ideology often believe that the target of their hate is or has the support of the dominant social, media, and political networks. They believe that the target of their hate is “taking over”; a belief epitomized in the hate mantra popular with skinheads and white supremacist groups known as “The 14 Words.” Developed by The Order member David Lane as justification for the beliefs and actions of white supremacists, “The 14 Words” are: “we must secure the existence of our people and a future for white children” (Lane, 1999:1). Although “The 14 Words” alone do not advocate violence or hate crime, they have been a unifying factor among a wide variety of white supremacist hate groups, many of whom advocate violence when necessary to uphold the underlying tenets of this mantra. Structure of the Dissertation This dissertation focuses predominately on agent-based simulation modeling as a technique for criminal justice research. Hence, after this introductory chapter, this dissertation is structured as follows:  Chapter Two provides a review of scholarly literature on group formation and on hate. Additionally, this chapter defines what a hate group is and highlights the importance of hate as a defining characteristic in the simulation models.  Chapter Three provides a current and historical discussion of hate groups as the phenomena this technique will be used to replicate.  Chapter Four presents the theories that will be tested in the experiments and provides the hypotheses. 5  Chapter Five explains the agent-based simulation modeling technique.  Chapter Six details the simulation model experiments that were used in this dissertation.  Chapter Seven provides the analysis and results of those experiments.  Chapter Eight discusses the conclusions and the impact of this dissertation on agent- based simulation as a methodology for criminal justice research, as well as theory, public policy, and future research. Summary Hate groups are prevalent in the United States. The study of hate groups has historically either assumed group formation or paid little attention to what brought a group into being. To this end, there are theories regarding group formation that should be empirically examined, including Mark Hamm‟s theory of collective hate, which was specifically developed to explain white supremacy hate group formation, and Max Weber‟s proposition that charismatic leadership can influence the development of marginal group types, like hate groups. The ethical concerns about and the dangers associated with hate group research, as well as the inaccessibility of hate groups at the moment of their inception, make the case for empirically examining these theories is to use agent-based simulation modeling. Simulation modeling allows for the re-creation of hate group phenomena in a more controlled environment, allowing for the manipulation of theoretically-important parameters that would be impossible to address in the real world. In order to better understand how hate groups form, one must have clear understanding of hate. The next chapter, therefore, defines hate and illustrates how it may be the most influential factor in hate group formation. 6 CHAPTER TWO LITERATURE REVIEW This chapter provides a review of the scholarly literature on group formation and on hate. Scholarly literature on group formation has focused on mainstream, accessible groups. Hate groups have been researched in historical context and will be discussed in Chapter Four. As a link between this discussion of group formation and the hate groups that are the focus of this dissertation this chapter also includes a review of the literature regarding hate. Group Formation Scholarly literature examining group formation has focused on: situational responses (Glick and Jackson, 1970: Breton and Pinard, 1960), homogeneity, heterogeneity, homophily (Merton and Lazerfeld, 1954), benefit, technology, framing, rhetoric, ideology, charismatic leadership (McGuire, 1972: Aghion and Gollier, 2000: Weber, 1947: Popper, 2000: Howell, 1988: Volkan, 1980) and collective identity (Hamm, 2004: Polletta and Jasper, 2001: Olson, 1965: Carroll and Ratner, 1996: Jasper, 1997: Friedman and McAdam, 1992: Klandermans, 1992: and Castells, 1997). Glick and Jackson, (1970) hypothesized that groups form around a shared situation, such as going to college. Merton and Lazerfeld, (1954) suggest groups form out of the individuals‟ desire for similarity. Groups form as individuals seek out others who are similar to themselves (Merton and Lazerfeld, 1954). This may be partly due to homogenous groups forming as a response to the differences in a community (Merton and Lazerfeld, 1954). Group formation has been analyzed based on economic models, providing that membership in the group results from the individuals finding a financial benefit from membership in the group (McGuire, 1972: Aghion and Gollier, 2000). Since the advent of the internet, technology has been identified as a catalyst for group formation, especially since the internet gives people the ability to come 7 together in a virtual place rather than a physical one to exchange ideas (Langman, 2005: Adams and Roscigno, 2005). Some groups form in a very overt fashion. Sussman (1956) qualitatively examined the creation, disintegration and resurrection of a group interested in weight loss. This group formed in response to a call for members who considered themselves overweight (Sussman, 1956). Potential members were invited to meet at the city hall through a series of newspaper articles announcing the group‟s formation (Sussman, 1956). If no one had responded to the articles, this group would not have formed. These articles called for specific people to come together based on a shared characteristic at a particular time and place. This is an example of situational response. Further literature regarding situational response and homogeneity deals with immigration and assimilation (Breton and Pinard, 1960: Blau, 1956: Eisenstadt, 1951). Specifically, Breton and Pinard (1960) found that immigrants were more likely to form groups based on ethnicity when their education and language skills were found to be inadequate for assimilation and when they found employment with individuals who had emigrated from the same country of origin. Inadequate education and unfamiliarity with the local language prevented most immigrants in the study from making contacts outside of their ethnic group and limited the number of employment opportunities (Breton and Pinard, 1960). This study supported other earlier works examining the necessity of homophily 1 in the establishment of groups (Breton and Pinard, 1960). Despite identifying why immigrants developed groups based on their ethnicity apart from the society into which they had immigrated, the study does not shed light on how groups form. It focused on how associations were made between individuals. A better explanation for group formation can be found in studies examining collective identity. 1 Homophily from R.K. Merton and P.F. Lazarfeld (1954) is a tendency to seek out individuals who possess similar qualities to which the group conforms such as status, ethnicity, norms and values. 8 Collective identity One key factor in human group formation is an overt or developed collective identity that draws the individuals together and maintains the group‟s cohesiveness (Jasper and Poulsen, 1995: Polletta and Jasper, 2001: Jacobs and Potter, 1998; Hamm, 2004: McVeigh, 2006: Berbrier, 1998). Part of the formation of such groups is the call for membership based on this identity or identifying characteristics (Useem, 1972: Jasper and Poulsen, 1995: Langman, 2005: Jasper and Polletta, 2001: Berbrier, 1998). Polletta and Jasper (2001) argue that it is a collective identity 2 that draws individuals together when examining protest and social movements. Once this common identity is established, individuals mobilize strategically and out of a sense of obligation to support their fellow group members (Polletta and Jasper, 2001). Some draw pleasure from being involved in the cause that they view as part of their identity or as possessing strong roots in their culture (Polletta and Jasper, 2001). These individuals require, for the most part, little or no financial or material compensation for their time and involvement (Polletta and Jasper, 2001). In order to draw individuals into a collective identity, activists may frame a particular cause, such as AIDS or human rights, as a cornerstone of another cultural identity, such as homosexuality or an ethnic minority (Polletta and Jasper, 2001). They then can draw individuals into the movement‟s identity by appealing to the individual through groups that he or she already claims membership 2 Polletta and Jasper (2001) define collective identity as “an individual‟s cognitive, moral, and emotional connection with a broader community, category, practice or institution. It is a perception of a shared status or relation, which may be imagined rather than experienced directly, and is distinct from personal identities, although it may form part of a personal identity.” (Polletta and Jasper, 2001: 285) Further, they identify that such collective identities may be developed first by outsiders and then adopted by individuals within the group. Some may use cultural symbols, rituals, and/or clothing to express the collective identity (Polletta and Jasper, 2001). Unlike Hamm‟s (2004) collective hate, collective identity is viewed as a positive thing, an element of behavior or group cohesion that is beneficial to those involved and the greater community. Polletta and Jasper (2001) take great pains to separate collective identity from any form of ideology; even though, their studies examine political protest and social movements. For more on collective identity see: Olson, 1965: Carroll and Ratner, 1996: Jasper, 1997: Friedman and McAdam, 1992: Klandermans, 1992: and Castells, 1997 . 9 in as a means of personal identity (Polletta and Jasper, 2001). In some social movements, the successful outcome may be nothing more than the creation of a collective identity from which activists and lobbyists can draw support or present as a sign of political solidarity or social capital (Polletta and Jasper, 2001). An earlier examination of radical protest movements by Useem (1972) examined not collective identity, but collective response. If a problem is not readily apparent to the larger population, it is difficult to create a social movement to counteract the problem (Useem, 1972). Likewise, social movements need solidarity, cohesion and a shared sense of purpose that can be considered missing in situations where the movement is sparked by leadership, distant either ideologically or in social standing, from the group‟s recruitment base (Useem, 1972). Similar to theories presented by Coser 3 (1964), Useem (1972) highlights external hostility and internal ritual as binding functions within groups to enhance commitment and develop bonds within the group, similar to that discussed by Hirschi 4 (1969). It is only after these commitments are solidified and an individual distances him or herself from outside attachments that they develop a political or collective identity within the group (Useem, 1972). Useem (1972) further argued that the group identity distances the individual member from larger society, and his or her previous attachments. 3 Lewis Coser‟s (1964) analysis of Georg Simmel‟s functions of conflict identifies a number of these processes, including the solidarity-producing or binding function of conflict; a group that perceives itself to be oppressed by the dominant order will coalesce around a cause or/identity. Coser (1964) also explains how external conflict decreases the tolerance within the group of dissent. Conflict reaffirms group values and helps to distinguish the group and its membership from the enemy or target of its hostility (Coser, 1964). Coser (1964) also highlights the ways in which conflict preserves and strengthens hate organizations through the creation and maintenance of ideologies and the establishment of associations and alliances. 4 Travis Hirschi‟s (1969) theory of social bonds, characterized by attachment to one‟s peers and family, commitment to conventional behavior, involvement in conventional activities and belief in the moral validity of such conventions, is important to the hate discourse in that it can identify how an individual becomes ensconced in a hate group and lifestyle. 10 These collective identity studies are similar to Hamm‟s (2004) theory of collective hate, which is described in Chapter Four as a specific collective identity model for hate groups. In order to understand how hate can be a unifying factor for a collective identity, it is necessary to understand hate. What is Hate? To understand hate, it is necessary to understand prejudice. Prejudice is a negative response or appraisal of an individual based solely on a defining characteristic (Falk, 2001: Jacobs and Potter, 1998). Hate centers upon extreme prejudice (including both negative affective and cognitive appraisals) towards a stigmatized group (Falk, 2001). This can include hatred directed at one due to one‟s gender (Klein, 2005: Hood and Rollins, 1995: McPhail, 2002: McPhail and DiNitto, 2005: Rayburn, Earlerywine and Davison, 2003: Levin, 1999), race (Craig, 1999: Torres, 1999: Saucier, Brown, Mitchell and Cawman, 2006: Martin, 1999: Dixon and Gadd, 2006: Saucier, Hockett and Wallenberg, 2008: Hewitt, 2000: Petrosino, 1999: Rayburn, Mendoza and Davison, 2003: Rayburn, Earlerywine and Davison, 2003: Levin, 1999: Young, 1990), religion (Byers, Crider and Biggers, 1999: Baysinger, 2006: Rayburn, Mendoza and Davison, 2003: Rayburn, Earlerywine and Davison, 2003: Levin, 1999), sexuality (Hood and Rollins, 1995: Parrott and Zeichner, 2006: Rayburn, Mendoza and Davison, 2003: Rayburn, Earlerywine and Davison, 2003: Levin, 1999: Berrill, 1990), culture, national origin or ethnicity (Byers, Crider and Biggers, 1999: Rayburn, Earlerywine and Davison, 2003: Levin, 1999), or disability status (Rayburn, Earlerywine and Davison, 2003: Levin, 1999). Hate is a stronger sentiment than prejudice as it can serve as a catalyst for action against a stigmatized group (Medoff, 1999: Allport, 1955: Staub, 1989: Fromm, 1947). Hate can be situational, influenced, guided or sanctioned by the dominant views of society or an authority 11 figure. These can be reflected in changes in accepted social norms, such as the Anti-Semitic policies of the Third Reich or the laws governing the treatment of slaves in the Antebellum American South and the Jim Crow Laws of the post-Reconstruction American South (Pettigrew, 1959: Goldhagen, 1996: Milgram, 1974: Olzak and Nagel, 1986: Medoff, 1999). Hatred can include impulse and aggression and may be a key factor in decisions to commit violent or property crimes directed at the hated group (Medoff, 1999: Allport, 1955). Although not everyone who hates someone will engage in violence, hate can be destructive and a brutal tool in the hands of the powerful (Medoff, 1999). Hate is an essential part of decisions to engage in genocidal programs against a social or political out group (Medoff, 1999). Hate also has a hidden psychological component (Allport, 1955; Staub, 1989; Fromm, 1947). It can be a response related to the low self-image of the hater (Staub, 1989). Engaging in violence against or belittling members of the target group boosts the ego and self-assurance of the hater (Staub, 1989). Hatred possesses a projective-punitive factor (Allport, 1955). The one who hates believes that fault always rests upon the target of his or her animosity (Allport, 1955). The hater can fault the target for his personal misfortune or lack of opportunity as well as greater social problems such as economic turmoil or crime. Blaming the victims lessens the guilt felt by those engaging in violence against the target (Allport, 1955). 5 Fromm (1947) argues that there are two types of hatred: rational and character- conditioned. Rational hatred is a response to a personal violation, an attack or threat (Fromm, 5 This is similar to Sykes and Matza‟s (1957) theory of neutralization that deals with the existence of a series of subterranean values within conventional society and argues that within this subterranean value system, legal codes are seen as inconsistent and vulnerable. Subterranean values can include prejudicial treatment or informal rules of conduct between authority figures and the general population (Sykes and Matza, 1957). Legal codes that are applied in an inconsistent or prejudicial fashion become vulnerable and lose their influence (Sykes and Matza, 1957). If excuses for illegal behavior are accepted; and therefore, an individual is not punished for the behavior, the law becomes neutralized, decreasing an individual‟s belief that he should adhere to any established laws (Sykes and Matza, 1957). Neutralization can occur at any time, before, during or after a criminal event and includes the denial of responsibility, of injury and/or of the victim, as well as condemnation of the condemner and/or an appeal to higher loyalties (Sykes and Matza, 1957). 12 1947). Character-conditioned hatred, by contrast, has little basis in reality (Fromm, 1947).The target of an individual‟s hate may be chosen at random, and the hater then develops a reason to justify his or her hatred (Fromm, 1947). Character-conditioned hate focuses on target groups and avoids personalizing the animosity. The out-group is belittled in the hater‟s mental and social dialogue until the group and its membership are entirely dehumanized (Fromm, 1947). As a result, the individual then believes his or her hatred and hostility is justified (Fromm, 1947). Dehumanization or deindividuation, in turn, has been shown to be a factor in particularly heinous race-based violent crimes, specifically the lynching of African-Americans throughout the post- Reconstruction South (Mullen, 1986). Hatred can be situational or culturally specific (Pettigrew, 1959; Milgram, 1974). Individuals learn to hate as they are socialized into their in-groups (Pettigrew, 1959; Milgram, 1974). These in-groups need not be actual hate groups. They can be one‟s peer groups, family or co-workers (Pettigrew, 1959). In an effort to fit in with these groups and conform to their social norms, individuals learn to hate the groups that their peers and family or co-workers hate (Pettigrew, 1959). Hate can be especially virulent in these situations if these individuals are influenced by an authority figure (Milgram, 1974), possibly more so in the presence or under the influence of a charismatic leader (Weber, 1947). The influence of charismatic leaders will be discussed further in Chapter Four. What is a Hate Group? Taking the above literature review into consideration for this dissertation, a hate group is defined as any group of like-minded individuals, united by a common hatred of one or more 13 target groups, who often support, but may or may not plan, and/or perpetrate hate crimes 6 . It is important to note that an individual need not be a member of a hate group to support, plan, or commit a hate crime. In the past, the perpetrators of many hate crimes were unattached to any well-defined hate group (Torres, 1999). Increasingly, hate crimes are being committed by, if not members of organized hate groups, those who attribute their actions to a particular hate group‟s philosophy, rhetoric or propaganda (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2008; 2009). Further, some who engage in hate crimes may claim membership to a group that they have not formally joined or were refused membership. This may be done to prove themselves to the group, or to show their own beliefs are in-line with the group‟s agenda (SPLC, 2008; 2009). Once imprisoned for these crimes, these individuals are provided with a smorgasbord of potential groups to join. Many hate groups have chapters in or have formed within the prison system, such as the United Society of Aryan Skinheads (SPLC, 2009). Hate groups, whether or not they engage in hate crime, hate specific targets. Summary Groups form for a wide variety of reasons. One of the most compelling arguments for group formation is collective identity. Collective identity research argues that there is a defining characteristic or belief system that brings individuals together into groups. For hate groups, this defining characteristic is their hatred of a stigmatized or social out group. While hate is difficult to identify and define, the history of hate and hate groups in the United States is without pause. Anyone can find him or herself the target of hate simply due to their outward appearance or perceived membership in a minority or stigmatized group. 6 Hate crimes are defined as any “criminal act perpetrated against an individual due to his or her actual or perceived race, ethnicity, religion, national origin, disability status, sexual orientation, or gender 6 ” (Rayburn, Mendoza and Davison, 2003: 1055). 14 CHAPTER THREE: HATE GROUPS IN THE UNITED STATES AS THE PHENOMENA OF INTEREST This chapter establishes a 3-part justification for the examination of hate groups using agent-based modeling. First, there are hundreds of hate groups (particularly white supremacy groups) operating in the United States. Secondly, these groups possess a long history including periods of violence and crime. Third, even when the history of a group is known, the actual formation and its precursors remain rather inaccessible phenomena. Hate Groups Currently Active in the United States In 2010, the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC) 7 documented 1,002 8 hate groups operating in the United States. Hate groups have chapters in all fifty states and the District of Columbia (see Table 4 in Appendix A). For example, in the 69 square miles that encompass Washington, DC there are twelve active hate groups – four black separatist, two anti-gay, one anti-immigrant, three white nationalist, one general hate and one sect of the Ku Klux Klan (SPLC, 2011). These twelve organizations operate as legitimate businesses, lobbying organizations, and political movements (SPLC, 2011). 7 The Southern Poverty Law Center has collected information on and kept a count of hate groups since its formation in 1971 (SPLC, 2009). Although there are arguments against using the SPLC counts, the SPLC has the longest running history of tracking hate groups and their activity. SPLC counts of hate groups have been used extensively by scholars including, but not limited to, Krueger, & Malečková, 2003, Blazak, 2001, Adams, & Roscigno, 2005, Ezekiel, 2002, Yousman, 2003, Futrell & Simi, 2004, McVeigh, 2004, McVeigh, Welch, & Bjarnason, 2003, Varsanyi, 2010, and Hughey, 2009. The Southern Poverty Law Center‟s expertise on hate groups was recognized when its president was called to testify before the U.S. House of Representative judiciary committees in support of the Emmett Till Unsolved Civil Rights Crime Act (HR 923). 8 The Southern Poverty Law Center does not provide a specific definition for hate groups, however it counts groups that “have beliefs or practices that attack of malign an entire class of people, typically for their immutable characteristics” (SPLC, 2009: 1). The list is derived from “hate group publications and websites, citizen and law enforcement reports, field sources and news reports” (SPLC, 2009:1). The SPLC avoids adding groups based on websites that appear to be the work of one person, but does not provide for a minimum size for defining a hate group (SPLC, 2009). The Southern Poverty Law Center notes that simply being on the list does not mean the group in question is involved in or advocates criminal activity (SPLC, 2009:1). 15 There are fourteen different categories of hate groups studied by the SPLC, including Ku Klux Klan groups, White nationalists, Neo-Nazi groups, Skinhead groups, Neo-Confederate groups, Christian Identity groups, Radical Traditionalist Catholic groups, Racist music, Holocaust denial groups, Anti-gay hate groups, Black separatist groups, Anti-immigrant groups, Anti-Muslim groups and General hate. The majority of these groups, (75%) may be categorized as white supremacist groups (see Figure 1 below). Data: Southern Poverty Law Center, 2011 Figure 1: Hate Groups Active in the U.S. in 2010 Ku Klux Klan groups are white supremacist groups targeting an ever-changing list of minority, religious, homosexual, and political groups. The first formed in the post-Civil War era and will be discussed in depth later in this chapter (Wade, 1987: Chalmers, 1981). White nationalists are primarily white supremacist or separatist groups (SPLC, 2008). They are typically supporters of eugenic programs and segregation based on race. This category includes groups like the European-American Unity and Rights Organization and Council of Conservative Citizens (SPLC, 2008). Neo-Nazi groups are white supremacist groups that espouse many of the same racial and eugenic beliefs as Hitler‟s Nazi party (SPLC, 2008). Neo-Confederate groups, such as League of the South, are a type of white supremacist group that espouse a celebration of 221 137 171 136 42 26 17 252 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 White Suppremacist Groups 16 the pre-Civil War American South and the racist ideology prevalent at that time in American history (SPLC, 2008). Started in the 1960s in Britain as a fascist revolutionary organization, skinhead groups developed in the United States in the 1980s and have both racist and non-racist factions (SPLC, 2008: Jacobs and Potter, 1998: George and Wilcox, 1996: Hamm, 1994). Skinheads usually form into small groups or “shock troops” and are typically violent, prone to criminal activity, and highly mobile (SPLC, 2008: Jacobs and Potter, 1998: George and Wilcox, 1996: Hamm, 1994). Examples include Volksfront, Blood and Honour, Berdoo Skinhead Family and many groups that use a city or place name in front of Skins or Skinheads (e.g. AC Skins in New Jersey, Californian Skinheads in California, Old Glory Skinheads in North Carolina, Maryland State Skinheads in Maryland; SPLC, 2010) (SPLC, 2008). Mostly white supremacist, anti-Semitic, and anti-minority, Christian Identity groups maintain that their racist views have a Christian theological base (SPLC, 2008). Examples include Covenant People‟s Ministry, Kingdom Identity Ministries and By Yahweh‟s Design (SPLC, 2008). Radical Traditionalist Catholic groups are an anti-Semitic faction of Catholicism rejected by most mainstream Catholics and not recognized by the Vatican; they include Tradition in Action and Slaves of the Immaculate Heart of Mary (SPLC, 2008). While the other category is the largest of the categories presented in Figure 1, the wide variety of groups that are included in this category, on their own, do not out number any of the types of white supremacist groups listed in the figure. By comparison the wide range of other types of hate groups account for about 25% of all hate groups in the United States and the various white supremacist groups, approximately 75%. The other category in Figure 1 above is composed of the following types of hate groups: racist music, Holocaust denial, and anti-gay, 17 black separatist, anti-immigrant, anti-Muslim and general hate. Racist music groups specifically refer to bands and organizations related to the music industry that create or distribute racist music, mostly for white supremacist groups (SPLC, 2008). Holocaust denial groups are those that deny the persecution of Jews by the Nazis during World War II, such as the International Conspiratological (sic) Association and Campaign for Radical Truth in History (SPLC, 2008). Anti-gay hate groups are those that specifically espouse an ideological or theological doctrine against homosexuals, including mostly extremist groups from the Christian far-right, such as Abiding Truth Ministries, Watchmen on the Walls, and Heterosexuals Organized for a Moral Environment (H.O.M.E.) (SPLC, 2009). The Black Panther Party, the Nation of Islam and United Nuwaubian (sic) Nation of Moors are a few of the black separatist groups operating in the United States and are predominately anti-white and anti-Semitic (SPLC, 2008). They often speak of seeking segregation in favor of blacks (SPLC, 2008). Anti-immigrant groups, such as American Immigration Control Foundation, Save our State, and United for a Sovereign America, are nativist groups formed mostly as a response to waves of illegal immigration (SPLC, 2009). Anti- Muslim groups were added as a new category in 2010. These groups hold all Muslims responsible for the September 11 th , 2001 terrorist attacks on New York City and Washington D.C. and seek to defame the religion of Islam and its practitioners as a danger to the United States (SPLC, 2010). The category of general hate encompasses groups that do not easily fit under the other categories (SPLC, 2008). Examples include the Jewish Defense League, a mostly anti-Arab organization of radical Jews, a variety of anti-Catholic Christian Groups, and other organizations whose ideology is not easily categorized (SPLC, 2008). As new types of hate groups are 18 identified or unique ideologies are presented by hate groups, the SPLC shifts its classifications of groups into new categories, therefore the groups that are in the category of general hate at this moment may be part of a new category within the next few years and depending on the SPLC‟s classification, other groups from previously established categories may be moved into those new categories as well (SPLC 2009, SPLC 2010). Table 5 in Appendix A shows the frequencies and percentages for all of these categories of hate groups operating in the United States from 2006 through 2010 and how they have increased and decreased in frequency. The most common types of hate groups are Neo-Nazis and the Ku Klux Klan. Both types of groups have fluctuated in recent years, Neo-Nazis being the most prevalent for three years (2006-2008) only to be surpassed by the Ku Klux Klan in 2009. As shown in Figure 2 below, the percentage of increase and decrease for the number of hate groups has fluctuated over time. 19 Data: Southern Poverty Law Center, 2011 Figure 2 Percent Change for Hate Groups Active in the United States 2006-2010 -65.0% -45.0% -25.0% -5.0% 15.0% 35.0% 55.0% %change 2006-2007 %change 2007-2008 %change 2008-2009 %change 2009-2010 Ku Klux Klan White Nationalist Neo-Nazi Racist Skinhead Neo-Confederate Christian Identity 20 In 2010, Ku Klux Klan groups became the most prevalent type of group in the United States. All white supremacist groups increased between 2009 and 2010, with the exception of Christian Identity and Neo-Confederate groups. Both of these types of groups may have affiliated or consolidated with either Ku Klux Klan or Neo-Nazi groups due to similarities in beliefs, targets and rhetoric. It is also possible that Christian Identity groups may have been shifted into the Radical Traditionalist Catholic category, Anti-gay category or the newly created Anti-Muslim category based on their ideology and/or rhetoric. Racist skinhead groups increased in number from 78 in 2006 to 122 in 2009, an increase of 56.4%. The number of skinhead groups in the United States tripled between 2002 and 2006 and, as shown in Tables 5 and 6 (see Appendix A), this number continues to rise (SPLC, 2008, 2009, 2010). This may be due to new groups forming after splintering from larger groups. This is problematic because when they were part of the larger group, violence and criminal activities were kept to a minimum because the larger group may have kept strict control over their membership (SPLC, 2008). The new groups have been seen to engage in more violent crimes, possibly vying for power or attempting to prove their strength to current and future membership, as well as the parent group, or because their members represent a more extremist position that advocates violence (SPLC, 2008). For the current study, white supremacy groups, because they are the most common, have the longest history in the United States and because they represent the groups that are increasing in number over the past few years, will be the focus of the agent-based simulation models aimed at determining how these groups form. Limiting the analysis to this subset of hate groups has the added effect of sharpening the focus on a specific, more homogenous portion of hate groups who have similar ideologies and target similar minority groups. Plus, the 3 parameters examined in this research, collective hatred, societal hate, and charismatic leadership have a well-documented 21 history for these groups. However, findings may not be generalizable to the other types of hate groups. The other concern with white supremacy groups in the United States is that their history is perpetual. The history of hate in the United States is virtually without pause (Petrosino, 1999). In early America, simply being white/Caucasian was considered enough by proponents of prejudiced agendas to identify someone as supportive of anti-Native American or anti-African American sentiments or activities (Petrosino, 1999). Native and African Americans have been the targets of hate and/or victims of hate motivated crime since the colonization of America. Every wave of immigration has introduced another population that has been met with stigma, distrust, prejudice and often violence (Petrosino, 1999). The Ku Klux Klan: a Case Study of the Oldest and Most Prevalent Hate Group in America The Ku Klux Klan is the oldest organized hate group in America with a well-documented history. This section will describe the history of the Ku Klux Klan. Corresponding elements of the group formation theories (e.g., collective hate and charismatic leadership) discussed in Chapter Four will be highlighted throughout the narrative. The roots of the Ku Klux Klan (Klan) can be traced to the year following the end of the American Civil War. In June of 1866, after returning to their home town of Pulaski, Tennessee and finding little to occupy their time, six confederate veterans: Calvin Jones, Frank McCord, James Crowe, John Kennedy, John Lester, and Richard Reed; formed a social fraternity (Wade, 1987: Chalmers, 1981). All were college-educated men, and they chose the Greek term kuklos or circle as the name for their group. However, as an exercise in obfuscation, they altered the spelling to Ku Klux (Wade, 1987: Chalmers, 1981). The addition of the term Klan was partly due to alliteration and partly due to the Scottish/Irish descent of the original members (Wade, 22 1987: Chalmers, 1981). The sounds of the name brought to mind the macabre smack of bone against bone, and from here, the idea of dressing in costume and elements of the occult and the supernatural were added as elements to the society (Wade, 1987: Chalmers, 1981: Elliott, 1998). In fact, at one time the original members of the group competed with one another to see who could devise the most outlandish costume, each applying more and more nonsensical mystic symbols than the other and hats that increased the wearer‟s height by as much as two feet (Chalmers, 1981). The Klan originally avoided social and political issues, encouraging its members to “have fun, make mischief and play pranks on the public.” (Wade, 1987: 34) The founding of the Klan is an example of homophily, (discussed further in Chapter Four) a tendency to seek out individuals who possess similar qualities to which the group conforms such as status, ethnicity, norms and values (Merton and Lazarfeld 1954). That is, all members of the original Klan were confederate veterans, all were college educated, all claimed the same heritage, and all wanted a social connection to help occupy their time. It is difficult to reconcile the mundane origins of the Klan with the subsequent crime and violence perpetrated by its membership. Though the early Klan engaged in mischief, perhaps a precursor of the criminal behavior to come, the original Klan probably would not have drawn the interest of a criminologist. The first acts of criminal mischief engaged in by the Klan were nighttime rides through the communities of recently freed slaves. These rides, before the reactionary activities of the Klan in response to Reconstruction, were meant to scare the superstitious residents of these communities and may be viewed as harassment and intimidation, though sophomoric in nature. 23 When the Klan shifted from pranks and mischief to violence and crime, it was a reaction to the installation of a Reconstruction government, viewed by many in the South as the occupation by the victorious North. The conflict between the Klan and the Reconstructionist government, its supporters, and local black communities was instrumental in the Klan‟s evolution from a social club to a violent organization. As members of the Klan saw the Reconstruction government and its supporters as infringing upon their way of life, they engaged them in violent conflict, attempting to gain or regain power and control through violence and fear. This change is illustrated by how Klan pranks began to take on an aura of later Klan behavior when the members began night rides through the countryside with torches (Wade, 1987: Chalmers, 1981). The strange costumes and bizarre behavior were then directed at the recently liberated blacks in the area, with Klan members pretending to be ghosts of confederate soldiers or plantation owners back to haunt their prior property (Wade, 1987: Chalmers, 1981). These “hauntings” became increasingly sinister as Congress passed the 1867 Reconstruction Act which divided the South into militarily-controlled zones under congressionally-appointed governments. This Act was in response to the Black Codes passed in most Southern States as an attempt to re-subjugate the black population (Wade, 1987: Chalmers, 1981). At this time, Nathan Bedford Forrest became head of the Klan and, despite his claiming no interest in and a horror of the crime and violence perpetrated by the Klan, for the next 2 years beatings, lynching, murder, rape and other crimes against both African American and white supporters of the Republican party and reconstruction governments were the norm for the Klan (Wade, 1987: Chalmers, 1981). The Klan had members in all Southern states by 1868. However, within a year Forrest 24 demanded that the Klans disband and destroy their costumes and written records, some complied, and others did not (Wade, 1987). This call to disband was partly in response to increasing use of State militias to fight Klan activity. By 1871 the Ku Klux Klan Act was passed by congress. This act, specifically designed to dismantle the KKK and end its violent criminal activities throughout the Reconstruction South 9 , provided that it was unlawful: “if two or more persons conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any person… in free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States… or if two or more persons go in disguise on the highway [i.e., the Ku Klux Klan], or on the premises of another, with intent to prevent or hinder [the] free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege so secured.” (18 U.S.C.A. § 241, as cited in Jacobs and Potter, 1998: 37) This resulted in extensive arrests and prosecution of Klan members. In 1876, when reconstruction ended, the Klan disappeared. The Klan‟s disappearance is strange, as the Klan could have simply returned to its non-violent origin. For most historians, the Klan‟s dissolution is explained by the end of the Reconstruction Era and the enactment of Jim Crow Laws. In a sense, the Klan had won the fight and served its purpose (Wade, 1987: Chalmers, 1981). The Klan saw resurgence in popular culture before it returned to action. In 1905, a historical romance was published as part of a trilogy of Klan related novels, The Clansman was the second book of the trilogy written by Thomas F. Dixon, Jr., and it glorified the Klan. Ten years later it was adapted by D.W. Griffith, for his silent movie Birth of a Nation (Wade, 1987: 9 After the end of the Civil War, the Federal Government and the victorious Union endeavored to establish order in the defeated South. After allowing the South to establish its own post-war governments, the Federal government found these new governments and their policies, especially those directed at the emancipated black population to be inadequate for the task (McPherson, 2003). The Federal government appointed and dispatched a series of governors and other overseeing politicians into the South to aid in the creation of acceptable policies within the post-war South and to assist in the rebuilding of the towns destroyed by the ravages of war and the reestablishment of order (McPherson, 2003). 25 Chalmers, 1981; Dixon, 1905). This movie played in sold-out theaters throughout the south and was even screened by Woodrow Wilson in the White House. In April of the same year, a young girl, Mary Phagan, was brutally murdered and the accused, a Jewish businessman named Leo Franks was lynched by a mob when his death sentence was commuted 10 (Frey and Thompson, 2002). This event, combined with the popularity of the Griffith movie, resulted in the Klan‟s rebirth in Georgia under the guidance of a new leader, William Joseph Simmons; first as the Knights of Mary Phagan and then as the Klan (Wade, 1987: Chalmers, 1981; Frey and Thompson, 2002). Stone Mountain Georgia became the revival meeting place for the Klan, and it was here that the tradition of the cross burning ceremony for the Klan began (Wade, 1987: Chalmers, 1981). 11 Much like the original founders of the Klan, Simmons devised a series of oaths, rituals and nonsensical names for gatherings, members, officers and activities that he compiled in a volume known as the Kloran (Wade, 1987: Chalmers, 1981). The Klan became integral in the patriotic movement surrounding the American entrance into World War I. Klansmen would parade through the streets shouting for spies to leave town and patriots to buy war bonds (Wade, 1987: Chalmers, 1981). Further, they worked with legitimate wartime organizations as “hired muscle” to scare workers into increased productivity and to chase prostitutes away from military bases (Wade, 1987: Chalmers, 1981). After the war, the Klan gained Northern membership as wartime industries became obsolete and jobs scarce (Wade, 1987: Chalmers, 1981). 10 The case of Leo Franks is unique in American legal history. It is the first in which the testimony of a black man was used to convict a white man. It also is considered the catalyst for the formation of the Anti-defamation league and it signaled a change in Klan policy from being anti-Black and anti-republican to being Anti-Semitic as well. Leo Franks was found guilty of the rape and murder of Mary Phagan, and sentenced to death, but his sentence was commuted to life in prison by the governor. A mob removed Franks from the local jail and lynched him in the street. Later evidence revealed him to be innocent and that the man who had testified against Franks, Joe Conley was the guilty one. The state of Georgia pardoned Franks in 1986, though the Phagan family still contends he was guilty. 11 Klan members claim that the lighting of the cross is symbolic of the return of Christ to light the world out of darkness and that Klan members gain strength for their cause by absorbing the light of the flaming crosses into their souls. The use of burning a cross in the yard of a Klan target for intimidation was not employed until the 1950s. 26 In the early 1920s, the Klan billed itself as a patriotic, American organization, a champion of temperance and a protector of the purity of white womanhood (Wade, 1987). In 1921, the New York World ran an exposé on the Klan, which prompted a series of congressional hearings. However, Simmons charmed the congressmen and the committee adjourned without action (Wade, 1987: Chalmers, 1981). The publicity helped increase Klan membership to over 500,000 and every state had a branch of the Klan, known as a Klavern (Wade, 1987: Chalmers, 1981). Despite an initiation fee of $10 in 1922, the Klan boasted three million members and held extensive influence over local and state elections, both due to their numbers and active voter intimidation (Wade, 1987: Chalmers, 1981). Circa 1928, the Klan reversed its post-Civil War political affiliation with the Southern Democratic Party, due to dislike for recent Democratic nominees who were Catholic, and began to use its influence to support more Republican candidates (Wade, 1987: Chalmers, 1981). Klan members held many high ranking political positions, including Edward Jackson, Governor of Indiana, Clifford Walker, Governor of Georgia, and Roger Mills and Earle Mayfield; U.S. Senators representing Texas (Wade, 1987). As the women‟s rights movement gained momentum, women requested membership in the Klan and women‟s auxiliaries were founded with as many as 500,000 members at the height of the Klan (Wade, 1987: Chalmers, 1981). Cities and towns, especially in the south were completely under Klan control and embattled mayors and governors who did not support the Klan appealed to the Federal government for help to bring the Klan under control. State legislatures begin to pass laws in attempts to curtail the Klan, by making it illegal to wear masks in public (Wade, 1987: Chalmers, 1981). For example, in 1924 the Klan in Indiana was controlled by David Curtis Stephenson, who maintained his power through a series of quid pro quo relationships with powerful politicos 27 throughout the state (Wade, 1987: Chalmers, 1981). He required signed statements from all politicians seeking Klan support. When he was convicted of 2 nd degree murder in November of 1925 12 , Stephenson released all of these documents to the press as revenge for his political cronies‟ inaction in his court case (Wade, 1987: Chalmers, 1981). Stephenson‟s murder case would become the hallmark of the fading Klan. The Klan fell from grace in the aftermath of the Madge Overholtzer murder, where the Klan was seen as betraying its membership and their beliefs by engaging in rape and brutalization. Members left the Klan in droves. By 1925, the Klan‟s internal problems began to signal a new downfall (Wade, 1987: Chalmers, 1981). Simmons was ousted from leadership by Hiram Evans. On August 8 th of 1925, Evans led a Klan parade down Pennsylvania Avenue in Washington D.C. with 40,000 representatives of the Klan from around the country. But by 1928, Klan membership had dropped from four million to about 100,000 (Wade, 1987: Chalmers, 1981). During the Great Depression, the Klan tried to reimage itself as a benevolent organization. It organized a series of free suppers, but it was vehemently against handouts from the government (Wade, 1987: Chalmers, 1981). During this time, the Klan shifted its target list to include communists and unions in an effort to regain membership, and its stronghold returned to the South. The Klan united with the German American Bund associations, the Nazi party in the United States, until the onset of World War II showed this to be an unwise alliance (Wade, 1987). This was further highlighted when the House Un-American Activities Committee investigated the relationship between the Klan and the Bund in 1940, though congress was far 12 Stephenson was known for an insatiable sexual appetite. In March 1925, he raped and brutalized a young woman named Madge Overholtzer. Ms. Overholtzer had been plied with extensive amounts of alcohol and repeatedly raped and brutally bitten. She attempted suicide, but failed. Stephenson kept her prisoner, and once she was released to her home, there was little doctors could do for her. She wrote a dying declaration vividly describing her ordeal that resulted in Stephenson‟s conviction. Stephenson had not expected to be convicted and had likewise expected to be pardoned by the governor he had helped elect. When he was convicted and his requests for clemency ignored, he released all his private papers. This court case and the related press was the downfall for the 1920s Klan as it revealed the hypocrisy of the Klan‟s stance on temperance and women. 28 more vehement in their questioning of Bund members than Klan members (Wade, 1987: Chalmers, 1981). The Klan expanded its anti-Semitic stance during World War II, by publishing a series of anti-Jew essays written by Henry Ford under the title The International Jew (Chalmers, 1981). Congress repeatedly investigated the Klan during World War II, and in 1944, the Klan, as revived by Simmons, was disbanded. To do this, the Internal Revenue Service placed a $650,000 lien against the Klan for back taxes, so income tax evasion destroyed the national Klan (Wade, 1987: Chalmers, 1981). The Klan disappeared for a few years until it was reconvened by Dr. Sam Green in 1946, who proposed a new plan for the Klan (Wade, 1987: Chalmers, 1981). The Klan would no longer have a national overseer. Each Klavern was now autonomous and various Klan organizations cropped up throughout the South, especially as the Civil rights movement began to gain ground (Wade, 1987: Chalmers, 1981). Another change was that the women‟s auxiliary Klan organizations were absorbed into the male dominated Klaverns (Wade, 1987). Women now joined the same group as their husbands, as a family unit by the mid- 1940s (Wade, 1987: Chalmers, 1981). After Green‟s death in 1949, he was replaced by Sam Roper, who eventually left and became head of the Georgia Bureau of Investigations, where he spent most of his time investigating Klan activity and violence (Wade, 1987: Chalmers, 1981). Eldon Lee Edwards attempted to reunite the Klan under a blanket organization, U. S. Klans, in 1953 (Wade, 1987: Chalmers, 1981). Edwards revised the Simmons Kloran and gained notoriety as he began to use television broadcasts to make his case for the Klan as a law-abiding organization interested in maintaining the Southern lifestyle (Wade, 1987: Chalmers, 1981). Klan activity and membership increased after the 1954 Supreme Court decision in Brown v. Board of Education. The Klan held public demonstrations protesting school integration. The 1950s and 1960s brought the Klan new internal strength as the targets of its animosity, mostly 29 minorities, made gains in the Civil Rights movement. During this time, new leaders gained strongholds in different factions of the Klan, such as Samuel Bowers, a man still revered by the modern Klan. As civil rights protests and demonstrations increased, so did Klan activity and retaliation. Edwards increased his attempts to gain membership into the Klan and to open new chapters of the U.S. Klans in thirty states (Wade, 1987: Chalmers, 1981). Demonstrations and protests were met with violence; civil rights workers, both white and black were murdered. This activity was supported by blatant racism and bigotry in the governments of most towns throughout the South where politicians and law enforcement were often known supporters or even members of the Klan (Wade, 1987: Chalmers, 1981). Edwards died in 1960 and leadership of the U.S. Klans was shifted to R. L. „Wild Bill” 13 Davidson. Davidson started his brief career as Imperial Wizard of the U.S. Klan with a November 1960 Klan rally where he is quoted as saying "we will use buckshot if necessary" to stop integration. However, Edwards‟ widow did not like him and prevented Davidson from using the U.S. Klans‟ name or materials (Wade, 1987: Chalmers, 1981). Davidson split from the U.S. Klan and created a few other Klan organizations, most of which still have chapters in operation today. His downfall came when he opposed the Klan's anti-integration activities at the University of Georgia. Davidson resigned in 1961 after serving barely a year (Wade, 1987: Chalmers, 1981). Davidson was succeeded by Robert Shelton, who would become infamous in 1965 by granting an interview to Playboy magazine, despite his public stance against pornography (Wade, 1987: Chalmers, 1981). The Klan shifted its tactics during the 1960s, especially in 13 Davidson‟s “Wild Bill‟ nickname came from his choice of attire (a buckskin jacket) first donned during his days as an insurance salesman. Davidson was considered too high strung and too nervous to actually run the Klan as his predecessors had. The infighting and disparate nature of the various Klan chapters across the South was not something he was equipped to handle. His son, Dr. Robert Davidson believed “Dad was full of shit and probably just used the Klan as a crutch to improve his business and political aspirations.” 30 Alabama, where Birmingham became a key battleground for the Civil Rights movement and the Klan‟s attempt to maintain the status quo of segregation and racism (Wade, 1987: Chalmers, 1981). The Klan began using bombs made mostly with dynamite to attack civil rights workers and demonstration staging grounds, such as the 16 th Street Baptist Church 14 (Wade, 1987: Chalmers, 1981). Because the Klan at this time operated as disjointed units with little communication between them, each Southern state had its own unique problems with the Klan as the civil rights movement progressed and demonstrators attempted to uphold the successes won in court and congress (Wade, 1987: Chalmers, 1981). In Mississippi, the White Knights of the Ku Klux Klan came under the command of Samuel Bowers. Under Bowers‟ leadership, the White Knights became known as the most violent faction of the Klan in American history (Wade, 1987: Chalmers, 1981). The most famous of their crimes was the destruction of the Mount Zion Church outside of Philadelphia, Mississippi, and the subsequent murder of three civil rights workers by Klan members in concert with local law enforcement (Wade, 1987: Chalmers, 1981). 15 The Klan responded violently to Lyndon Johnson‟s signing of the Civil Rights Act (Pub. L. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241) on July 2, 1964, murdering a car full of black soldiers in Georgia 16 (Wade, 1987: Chalmers, 1981). Johnson 14 The September 1963 bombing of the 16 th Street Baptist Church resulted in the deaths of four young girls: Addie Mae Collins, Carole Robertson, Cynthia Wesley and Denise McNair. The bomber, Robert E. “Dynamite Bill” Chambliss, was originally convicted on the charge of possession of dynamite, but this charge was overturned. In 1970, Georgia Attorney General Baxley reopened the 16 th Street case and in 1977, Chambliss was found guilty of murder for his involvement in the bombing. 15 The White Knights murdered three young men, Michael Schwerner, a leader in the council of federated organizations (COFO), Andrew Goodman and James Chaney. In response to Federal pressure about the murders, Bowers responded vehemently that the boys had not disappeared and the Klan had nothing to do with it, that Mississippi was being crucified by outsiders. Lyndon Johnson sent J. Edgar Hoover to investigate. The state of Mississippi, despite overwhelming evidence, refused to indict the Klan for the murders. Members of the Klan would later be charged and convicted under the Klan Act of 1871, and Samuel Bowers served ten years for his involvement. 16 The murder of Lamuel Penn occurred the same evening as Johnson signed the civil rights act. He was shot at close range inside his vehicle along with two others. His murderers were tried and acquitted in Georgia, but were tried in Federal court in 1966 under the 1871 Klan act and all involved were found guilty of violating his civil rights. This trend of local acquittal and Federal indictment under the 1871 Klan Act would continue throughout the 1960s. 31 further antagonized the Klan with the passage of 18 U.S.C.A. § 245 in 1968. This civil rights statute was designed to prevent prejudice and/or hate from interfering with an individual‟s participation in state and local activities, such as serving on a jury, government employment, and use of public amenities or services (18 U.S.C.A. § 245: Jacobs and Potter, 1998). The Federal Bureau of Investigation and its predecessors used the Ku Klux Klan Act to claim jurisdiction over Klan-related criminal cases, such as arson and murder, which otherwise would not have been handled in Federal Court (Wade, 1987: Chalmers, 1987). The Ku Klux Klan Act was invoked especially when local courts refused to indict Klan members for murder and other offenses, during the Civil Rights movement (Wade, 1987). FBI involvement in investigating the Klan further incited Klan antagonism against the Federal government. Klan members would collect poisonous snakes that they would place in the distinctive cars of the FBI agents, however, the FBI made inroads into the Klan using paid informants, something that would pay off in the investigation of a series of Klan murders during the early 1960s (Wade, 1987: Chalmers, 1981). In 1965, the House Committee on Un-American Activities convened investigations into the Klan and its affiliate chapters, Robert Shelton as Imperial Wizard was called to testify during which, he responded to 158 questions with the following refusal: Sir, I respectfully decline to answer that question for the reason that I honestly feel my answer might tend to incriminate me in violation of my rights as guaranteed under the amendments five, one, four and fourteen of the Constitution of the United States. (Wade, 1987: 357) Despite popular amusement that a member of the Klan would invoke the fourteenth amendment, the report released by the committee 2 years later was not one of amusement, but one that highlighted the Klan‟s violent and illegal activities (Wade, 1987: Chalmers, 1981). High 32 ranking Klan members served prison sentences for contempt of Congress and one committed suicide. The Klan suffered from internal power struggles and legal fees, as well as extensive FBI investigations throughout the rest of the decade, with about 6% of Klan members working as informants for the FBI 17 (Wade, 1987: Chalmers, 1981). By 1974, Klan membership had dropped to approximately 1,500, but it would see resurgence three years later when charismatic leader David Duke arose to leadership of the United Klans of America. Despite David Duke‟s clean cut image and media popularity, the Klan itself was not entirely behind him (Wade, 1987: Chalmers, 1981). Part of how David Duke drew a great deal of media attention to the Klan and its‟ revised message, was the work of David Lane, who served as one of his organizers (Hamm, 2007). Lane later left the Klan to serve as minister of propaganda for The Order under a different charismatic leader, Robert Jay Matthews (Hamm, 2007). Matthews first began recruiting followers in 1972 for a group he called the Sons of Liberty, which swelled to over thirty members and drew media attention (Hamm, 2007). Matthews inspired a great deal of loyalty among members of this first organization, who followed him even after FBI attention forced him to flee (Hamm, 2007). By 1983, Matthews had drawn the first individuals who would serve with him in his new organization, the Order, which would soon gain nearly 50 members and national attention through a series of bank heists designed to fund Matthews‟ vision of an Aryan revolution (Hamm, 2007). Matthews‟ eventual death at the hands of the FBI resulted in his elevation as a martyr of the white supremacist movement, the date, December 8 th is 17 FBI investigation of the Klan in the late 1960s was considered elemental in acts of violence; FBI agents raised money from communities targeted by the Klan to pay informants to entrap Klan members, such as the disputed attempted bombing of the home of Meyer Davidson in Meridian, Mississippi. The Klan members involved discouraged the blaming of the FBI for the attempt, stating that “Davidson was „a high priority target,‟…‟so the FBI did not lure us into doing something that we had no intention of doing.‟” (Wade, 1987; 363) 33 commemorated by other white supremacist groups, and Matthews‟ Order is considered a prime example of what white supremacist groups should attempt to emulate (Hamm, 2007). Klan rallies were being met increasingly with violence and Klan members were being forced away from their rallies and public demonstrations by a vehemently uninterested public (Wade, 1987: Chalmers, 1981). Dissension among Klan members resulted in further splintering of the Klan into militia and patriot-movement groups, many of whom abandoned the robes and trappings of the Klan of the past in favor of fatigues. At this time, the Klan also made alliances with the rising Neo-Nazi movement and attempted to gain membership through protests against affirmative action, reverse discrimination and forced busing (Wade, 1987: Chalmers, 1981). The Klan maintained its anti-Communist and anti-Union stance established during the Great Depression, a stance that resulted in a massacre of union organizers and members of the Communist party in Greensboro, North Carolina in 1979 18 (Wade, 1987). Duke‟s leadership of the Klan in the late 1970s gave way to that of Bill Wilkinson in the 1980s, signaling a less media oriented, more violent Klan (Wade, 1987: Chalmers, 1981). By the early 1980s, the Klan and affiliates had opened paramilitary training camps throughout Texas. Organized by Klan member and Louis Beam, these camps were designed to prepare members for a future race war (Wade, 1987). Those trained at these camps were implicated with increases in Klan violence throughout the 1980s with random shootings, and attempted and successful bombings of homes and offices (Wade, 1987). 18 The Communist party and related groups had previously demonstrated at a Klan event at which Griffith‟s Birth of a Nation was to be shown and Klan members would be on hand to discuss the Klan, answer questions and seek new members. After the success of disrupting the Klan event, the communists opted to hold a “death to the Klan” rally. The Klan arrived at the rally with Neo-Nazi allies and after a brief scuffle with the rally participants, opened fire on the crowd, killing five. The police were not present at the rally and after the shooting, arrested both the Klan members who remained at the site, as well as the protestors. At trial, members of the communist party and witnesses to the Klan attack, refused to testify as they believed the trial was “rigged” from the beginning. A jury found that the Klan members had shot the demonstrators in self-defense, despite media coverage of the shooting. 34 The Klan remained a reactionary force throughout the 1980s, adding homosexuals and Asian immigrants to its list of non-desirables and targets (Wade, 1987: Chalmers, 1981). In 1981, after an African American man was acquitted in the death of a white police officer, the Klan called upon its membership to take revenge. This call to arms resulted in the murder of Michael Donald by two young Klan members in Alabama 19 (Wade, 1987). Throughout the 1990s, Klan membership fluctuated at around five thousand members (George and Wilcox, 1996). As of 2007 there were 155 different Klan affiliated organizations across the United States (SPLC, 2008). Klan organizations maintain loose affiliations with neo-Nazi and skinhead groups across the country; maintain websites and limited liability companies (SPLC, 2008). The Klan currently maintains a strong presence in the United States and is likely to endure (SPLC, 2010). Individuals are drawn to the Klan because they have an intense hate for one or all of the minority or other out groups targeted by the Klan (Elliott, 1998). The Klan added each minority group to its list of targets for a reason. These reasons were diverse, but always based in hate and prejudice directed at that group. These groups became scapegoats in Klan rhetoric and literature used to draw in members. These efforts were also designed to garner the explicit or implicit support of the population, either through membership or apathy to Klan activity against those groups. This collective hatred supports Hamm‟s (2004) theory that will be discussed in depth in Chapter Four. 19 Michael Donald was strangled and had his throat slit by two young Klan members. The court case resulted in the first capital conviction for a Klan member. A subsequent civil suit filed by the Southern Poverty Law Center against the United Klans of America brought a seven million dollar verdict and ended the reign of the United Klans of America. 35 Summary Without the ability to go back in time, truly examining the factors that sparked the formation and reformation of the Ku Klux Klan is difficult. This does not discount the importance of or exclude historical research, it simply highlights that at the point of formation, and most organizations do not provide a thought out and detailed explanation of why and how they formed their group. That being said, the Klan‟s history and perseverance provides a fertile background against which to test models of hate group formation. The Klan‟s history of violence and destruction provide ample warning about just how dangerous a hate group can be when left unchecked. This group alone highlights the importance of understanding how hate groups form, how they gain support and what influence they possess both directly and indirectly over the commission of hate and bias motivated crime. The next chapter presents the two theories that have been tested by this dissertation as possible explanations for hate group formation. 36 CHAPTER FOUR THEORY This chapter discusses the two theories of group formation: Hamm‟s (2004) theory of collective hate and Weber‟s (1947) theory of charismatic leadership which are the theoretical focus of this research. These theories were tested using the agent-based simulation modeling experiments laid out in Chapter Six. White Supremacists, Skinheads, Neo-Nazis, and Collective Hate Mark Hamm (2004) theorized that bonds can be created between individuals through a “common hatred of social out-groups” (Hamm, 2004: 327). He applies these ideas to the hate groups he identifies as domestic terrorists in the United States, including Neo-Nazis and Right wing extremist and militia groups. This theory has been adapted herein to examine hate groups, the linkage between these domestic terrorist groups and hate groups being easily made, as Neo- Nazi and other Right wing extremist groups adhere to a white supremacist ideology. These groups also “arose from an intense collective hatred for the federal government” (Hamm, 2004: 334). In some of his most definitive work, Hamm has closely examined the American skinhead movement (Hamm, 1994a; Hamm, 1994b). In this research, he has presented a model originated by Jack Gibbs, reproduced in Figure 3 below 20 . The steps in this Gibbs model show the combination of belief, membership, and action that influences a prospective white supremacist‟s “buy-in” to the collective white supremacist identity. In step 1, the prospective white supremacist begins to identify himself as being the victim of social injustice (Hamm, 1994). 20 Figure 3 presents the hate group adaptation with a modification that replaces the words terrorist from the original model with white supremacist and terrorism with crime. 37 Figure 3 Jack Gibbs Model as adopted and modified by Hamm (Adapted) He feels that the targets of his hatred and the government are conspiring against him, preventing him from achieving his goals (Hamm, 1994). An example of such a goal could be acquiring employment in a blue-collar field that increasingly hires minorities and immigrants or has begun to shift more blue-collar jobs overseas. The minorities become a target because the prospective white supremacist sees them as having stolen his job. The government becomes a target because they have created trade deals and policies that make it cheaper for manufacturing jobs to be performed overseas. In step 2, the future white supremacist develops a belief in the ideology of the group. This ideology fuels aggression and supports the view that violence is the best solution to dealing with the target group (Hamm, 1994). The white supremacist dismisses alternative viewpoints and focuses solely on the information that fits his new ideology. As part of this, he may start engaging in vocal disputes with minorities, but physical violence is uncommon during this stage. Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 Step 5 Messages of perceived victimization: Transnational - Transgenerational Belief in White Supremacist Ideology Affiliation with a white supremacist collective (First Party membership), e.g. style, education Crime (Punishment of a third Party) Attempted Social Control Policy (Reaction of Second Party) 38 A single individual, especially one that is new to the ideology, may not be ready for violence until he or she has become assimilated into the group. 21 Step 3 is where the white supremacist joins an existing group or attempts to form a new group to spread the message that the hated group is responsible for the victimization of the new white supremacist and any who are like him (Hamm, 1994). This step is essential to the idea of collective hate. This is the step where hate becomes the unifying force among the white supremacists, a foundation around which to form a group. Once formed, the group will begin to act as a cohesive unit rather than a set of individuals. This does not mean that they function coherently in concert with other groups, as groups do not always cooperate and rivalries between skinhead groups are common. In step 4, the group acts against the hated group, engaging in violence or other forms of hate crime (Hamm, 1994). Much white supremacist rhetoric advocates violence against target groups, both minorities and the government. Similar to strain theory 22 , this element of white supremacist involvement echoes back to the first step where a prospective white supremacist identifies minorities and the government as being responsible for his failures or inability to achieve goals. Becoming a white supremacist and engaging in violence and hate crime allows the new white supremacist to “do something” about these feelings of inadequacy and failure. In step 5, the government attempts to suppress the white supremacist group (Hamm, 1994). As illustrated by the arrows, this attempt by the government or other authority to exert control over the white supremacists can inspire increased feelings of victimization and thereby reaffirm the skinhead‟s views and strengthen his or her cause. The arrow that connects step one 21 Among hate groups, skinheads are considered especially violent (Langer, 2003; SPLC, 2008). Certain skinhead factions, such as the Volksfront, have been the focus of investigations by the FBI and Department of Homeland Security, especially due to their propensity towards murder, violent assault, and arson (DHS, 2008). 22 Agnew (1985) theorized that individuals experience strain and can turn to deviance and crime when their goals and aspirations for their life are blocked or unattainable. This is an expansion of the Anomie theories of Merton (1938) and Durkheim (1893). 39 with step five, illustrates that an individual may seek to punish the target group and engage in violence without actually going through the process of joining a group. Figure 4 below, presents a simplification of the process whereby an individual may join or form a hate group consistent with the theory of collective hate. Figure 4 Key elements of collective hate model Step 1 is belief or indoctrination. Belief is part of the idea behind why individuals who hate one or more particular groups come together. That belief, as a function of their hate, is the unifying factor. Step 2 is this belief leading to affiliation with or creating a hate group of likeminded individuals. Because group formation is the main drive of this research, it is important to understand the different ways that the belief in a hate ideology is established in the individuals who join a group. One way in which an individual becomes indoctrinated in the ideology of a hate group is through the presence of charismatic leadership. Charismatic leadership as the driving cause of group formation As noted in the previous chapter, hate groups, such as the Ku Klux Klan and the Order, have had numerous charismatic leaders rise to the forefront of the movement. Much of the scholarly literature regarding how charismatic leadership influences group formation is focused on theoretical explanation and description of these phenomena. Research in criminology has 40 touched upon the role of charismatic leadership as relevant to studies of ethnic and youth gangs (Brown and Wilson, 2007: Hughes and Short, 2006), Asian organized crime groups (Lindberg, et. al., 1998), and some drug gangs (Paoli, 2004). The origins of theoretical explanations of charismatic leadership are found in Max Weber‟s (1947) identification of the charismatic leader as one whose authority rested on the population‟s “devotion to the specific sanctity, heroism, or exemplary character of an individual person and of the normative pattern or order revealed by him (Weber, 1947: 328).” Charisma is a characteristic based on the leader‟s beliefs about his position as leader, his power and his destiny, as well as the faith his followers have in him and his message (Ulman and Abse, 1983). This is a symbiotic relationship, the presence and loyalty of the followers and their belief in the charismatic leader, assists the charismatic leader in his or her maintenance of his/her position and power (Weber, 1947). It can be possessed by either positive or negative leaders, megalomaniacs, or saints (Popper, 2000: Howell, 1988: Volkan, 1980). The charisma itself is neutral. It is the power wielded by the individual and the resulting behavior of his followers that makes charismatic leadership dangerous or desirable (Popper, 2000: Howell, 1988; Volkan, 1980). When a group has a charismatic leader, the group is an extension of its leader and his ideas (Tucker, 1968). Part of the success of a charismatic leader is the historical and socioeconomic factors surrounding their rise to power or acquisition of followers (Tucker, 1968; Wilner and Wilner, 1965). One thing that has made the charismatic leaders of white supremacist hate groups so successful has been their attention to their social and political environment and being aware of their supporters and detractors (Tucker, 1968; Wilner and Wilner, 1965). This social and political environment is the basis for running variants of the proposed models at 41 different levels of societal hate, simulating varying levels of popular support. Oftentimes the charismatic leader offers hope or deliverance as the draw for followers (Tucker, 1968). If potential followers do not feel hopeless or in need of rescue, they will not follow (Tucker, 1968). Charismatic leaders are often placed in two categories, those who are seeking personal gain and those who use their power to serve or assist others (Howell, 1988; Howell and Avolio, 1992). Another major aspect of a charismatic leader‟s sphere of influence is comprised of those who identify with his message. This message may continue long after he is dead. Examples include the rhetoric and ideology espoused by Adolf Hitler which still strongly influences Neo- Nazis and racist skinheads. His message and his views have been accepted by these groups as part of their collective identity. A charismatic leader expands upon collective identity and often highlights the situations facing his followers and elevates them through rhetoric focusing on their homogeneity. Hypotheses Hamm‟s collective hate and Weber‟s charismatic leadership theories, as discussed earlier in this chapter, were used to create the following hypotheses, each of which was tested using agent-based simulation experiments that are discussed in Chapter Six. Research Question: Does collective hate influence variations in the attributes of hate group formation? H1a: The greater the level of hate possessed by the individual agents; the greater the number of groups that are formed by the individual agents. H1b: The greater the level of hate possessed by the individual agents; the greater the speed at which groups form. H1c: The greater the level of hate possessed by the individual agents; the greater the size of the groups that form. 42 Building upon the collective hate thesis as described by Hamm (2007), these hypotheses test whether individuals are drawn together by an intense collective hatred. It is this shared belief that causes groups to form. Because Hamm‟s theory highlights the idea of a shared intense hatred as the deciding factor for joining a group, the more hate an individual has; the more likely he will agree with other haters and the more likely a group will form. Illustrative of these hypotheses (and as discussed in Chapter Three), in 1913, a large number of people formed the Knights of Mary Phagan in response to the murder of Mary Phagan. This group formed to lynch the primary suspect, Leo Franks, and perpetuated itself as a hate group targeting outsiders from the North, Jews and other minorities (Frey and Thompson, 1988). It was absorbed into the Ku Klux Klan a year later (Frey and Thompson, 1988: Wade, 1987: Chalmers, 1981). H1d: The greater the level of societal hate; the greater the number of groups that form. H1e: The greater the level of societal hate; the greater the speed at which groups form. H1f: The greater the level of societal hate; the greater the size of the groups that form. At points in history when a hate ideology was widely accepted by society (e.g., the Antebellum South, the Post-WWI United States, Nazi Germany, and to a certain extent, the American South during the Civil Rights Era), hate groups witnessed rapid growth in membership and in popular support. Hate groups do not form in a void: they form within the larger fabric of society. Although hate groups may form in the absence of societal support, history shows that groups like the Ku Klux Klan and skinheads are more likely to form in areas where and at times when there is some level of social acceptance of their views. The higher the levels of societal 43 hate, the more social support the hate groups are afforded. Also a larger pool of potential members is available for recruitment into existing or formation of new groups. Illustrative of these hypotheses are the American South after the Civil War and during the Civil Rights Era which saw a proliferation of Ku Klux Klan groups during times when it was socially acceptable to hate minorities and governmental actions designed to increase the rights and freedoms of minorities, especially African Americans. Research Question: Does the presence of a charismatic leader influence variations in the attributes of hate group formation? H2a: The presence of a charismatic leader will increase the number of groups that form. H2b: The presence of a charismatic leader will increase the speed at which hate groups form. H2c: The presence of a charismatic leader will increase the size of the hate groups that form. These hypotheses are based on the first tenet of Weber‟s (1947) theory of charismatic leadership. Weber (1947) asserts that groups need, or are formed due to their members‟ susceptibility to charismatic leadership. The presence of a charismatic leader in the environment gives a group someone to coalesce around. Because the group has a specific focal point, the speed at which the group forms should increase. The draw or influence of a charismatic leader, as a focal point for group formation also should increase the number of individuals who join that leader‟s group. Illustrative of these hypotheses is Adolf Hitler who inspired Nazi hate groups to form within Germany where he had some direct influence (Goldhagen, 1996; Gellately, 2001; Kershaw, 2008). Even after his death he still inspires groups both in the United States and abroad (Fritzsche, 2008; Kershaw, 2008; Hamm, 1994; Ezekiel, 2002). For example, California White Aryan Resistance formed around Tom Metzger who was inspired by Hitler. His supporters in 44 skinhead and neo-Nazi groups actively recruit new members across the country, distributing pamphlets and recordings of white power rock to potential recruits (Langer, 2003). H2d: The greater the level of societal hate; the greater the number of groups that form around the charismatic leader. H2e: The greater the level of societal hate; the greater the speed at which hate groups that form around the charismatic leader. H2f: The greater the level of societal hate; the greater the size of the hate groups that form around the charismatic leader. Charismatic leaders are nested within a larger society. A leader cannot lead if there is no one to follow him; his charisma is partly maintained due to the existence of his loyal followers. A charismatic leader cannot rise to power or gain followers if his message is not favorably received. The charismatic leader‟s presence has historically been seen as a catalyst to group formation, and given the right social and political climates, a charismatic leader‟s rise to power can be very rapid. Even in situations where a charismatic leader is not seeking political power, this catalytic element of their presence does appear to result in the quick acquisition of supporters and followers. The charismatic leader‟s presence and rhetoric often has some influence or sway over the beliefs of those around him. This is not to say that everyone in the presence of a charismatic leader is immediately under that person‟s thrall. Some individuals react negatively to the message of a charismatic leader. Because of this, the level of societal hate is important to consider. In a society with low average hate, there would be fewer individuals who are likely to be influenced by the charismatic leader‟s message. However, the higher the level of societal hate, the more receptive the members of that society would likely be and the more supporters that leader is likely to acquire. Although a charismatic leader may draw together a small group of supporters when societal hate is low, he 45 is more likely to draw a large group of followers when societal hate is higher. This mimics the societal and environmental factors present when Adolf Hitler drew his followers together after World War I and the leaders of the Ku Klux Klan drew record numbers of supporters during the 1920s and the Civil Rights Movement. These hypotheses are best illustrated by Adolph Hitler‟s rise to power. Hitler held a great deal of influence over the beliefs of his direct followers and the rest of his country regarding their racial superiority and how their supposed inferiors should be treated (Kershaw, 2008). Rallies, public appearances, and radio addresses expanded his sphere of influence until he became a pervasive force in Germany (Kershaw, 2008). However not all Germans followed Hitler. German dissidents attempted to assassinate and sabotage Adolf Hitler, even at the height of his power (Kershaw, 2008). Summary This chapter laid the theoretical foundation for the experiments that will be discussed in the next chapter. Although a number of theories have been proposed to explain group formation, this dissertation is focused on two of them: collective hate and charismatic leadership. Collective hate relates to how this strong emotion can act as a catalyst for the decision to become part of a skinhead organization and was illustrated by Hamm (1994:2004). Weber (1947) argued that groups form because they are led by a charismatic leader who draws followers into the group. 46 CHAPTER FIVE AGENT-BASED MODELING AS METHOD This chapter provides an explanation of the terminology and methodology of agent-based simulation modeling. Agent-based models allow for the examination of phenomena, such as hate group formation and the manipulation of theoretical parameters that are thought to be important to the phenomena in the real world (Miller and Page, 2007). In order to better understand how agent-based models can be used to test the hypotheses presented in Chapter Four, it is important to examine how these models work and relate to the “real” world. Lexicon of Modeling Terms Table 1 below provides definitions for common terms used in simulation and agent-based modeling. These terms will be employed throughout the dissertation as simulation modeling is explained. The experiments as described in Chapter Six were designed to test the theories of hate group formation, (discussed in Chapter Four), using this method. Table 1: Lexicon of Modeling Terms Term Definition Agent Any representation of a real world entity that is the focus of what the simulation is being designed to study. In simulations of human behavior or phenomena, the agents are representations of human beings (Epstein, 2007; Miller and Page, 2007: Gilbert and Troitzsch, 2005). Autonomy The amount of control an agent has over their decisions, interactions, communication, and/or behavior (Epstein, 2007). Characteristic Any attribute, quality or feature of interest belonging to an agent in the simulation. These characteristics may be representations of demographics, such as hate and commitment, as well as any other “human” characteristic (Epstein, 2007; Miller and Page, 2007: Gilbert and Troitzsch, 2005). 47 Table 1: Continued Term Definition Communication The simulation of discussion between agents. Agents can relay information to one another. It is not the same as an actual verbal conversation between real people, but agents can be programmed to ask questions and give responses to those questions (Epstein, 2007). Interaction The relations and contacts between agents. It includes not only communication but also proximity, cooperation, conflict and any behavior of interest that relies on more than one agent (Epstein, 2007; Miller and Page, 2007). Agent-based model A type of model that is focused on the behavior and activity of agents, or a model that is simulating human behavior (Epstein, 2007; Miller and Page, 2007: Gilbert and Troitzsch, 2005). Behavior rule A user programmed command that informs an agent what it can, should or must do. A behavior rule may tell an agent that it must be inactive for the model equivalent of eight hours in order to simulate sleep or a work day. Another behavior rule tells an agent that it can converse with any agent within a set distance; the agent decides which agents within that distance it will converse with (Epstein, 2007; Miller and Page, 2007: Gilbert and Troitzsch, 2005). Decision How an agent uses or responds to the behavior rules it is given and the situations in which the agent finds itself (Epstein, 2007; Miller and Page, 2007: Gilbert and Troitzsch, 2005). Emergence or emergent behavior Any agent behavior of interest that is not a direct result of programmed behavior rules or agent characteristics (Epstein, 2007; Gilbert and Troitzsch, 2005). Experiment A series of model runs (see below) that examine the effect of particular agent characteristics on the outcome or phenomena of interest (Epstein, 2007; Miller and Page, 2007: Gilbert and Troitzsch, 2005). Landscape or location The representation of the physical surroundings of the agents within the model, it can be as specific or general as fits the situation of interest (Epstein, 2007; Miller and Page, 2007: Gilbert and Troitzsch, 2005). Log file The file generated by the simulation that populates with the data created by the simulation model regarding the variables of interest to the user. A log file can be exported to any statistical program for analysis (Epstein, 2007). 48 Table 1: Continued Term Definition Model A representation or example of the phenomena being studied (Epstein, 2007; Miller and Page, 2007: Gilbert and Troitzsch, 2005). Random number generator A computer program or logarithm designed to provide a random number typically used for seeding the model agents with particular characteristics or seeding the agents on to random squares within the landscape. These numbers may also be used to assign random responses to situations, such as agreements between agents or the decision to engage in particular behavior (Miller and Page, 2007: Gilbert and Troitzsch, 2005). Randomization The random assignment of characteristics to agents similar to random assignment in a real world experiment (Epstein, 2007; Miller and Page, 2007: Gilbert and Troitzsch, 2005). Reliability Whether or not the model is working according to how it was programmed over the course of subsequent model runs (Epstein, 2007; Gilbert and Troitzsch, 2005). Run (AKA Model Run) A single sequence or cycle of the simulation model from beginning to end, encompassing all the ticks the modeler sets for the time period of the model (Epstein, 2007; Miller and Page, 2007). Sensitivity analysis The systematic or random varying of the model conditions and parameters to determine the impact of those parameters on the outcome of the model run (Gilbert and Troitzsch, 2005). Simulation model A simplified representation of a real world scenario or phenomena, encompassing the fewest possible explanatory variables that would replicate the behaviors or phenomena of interest (Epstein, 2007; Miller and Page, 2007: Gilbert and Troitzsch, 2005). The user specifically programs this in agent-based modeling to include agents, characteristics and behavior rules designed to correspond to a specific theory or set of theories. Tick A measure of time within a simulation model. The modeler sets how many ticks constitute any particular period of time, from a matter of minutes, to hours or even days (Epstein, 2007; Miller and Page, 2007). In these experiments 1 tick equals 6 hours of elapsed time. Verification Verification is concerned with how the software and programming work, and whether or not there are errors or problems with how the model has been programmed (Manson, 2001). Validation Validation concerns how closely the model represented or recreates the situation or phenomena of interest (Gilbert and Troitzsch, 2005: Manson, 2001). 49 Simulation Modeling Basics A simulation model (as defined in Table 1 above) distills a social or natural phenomena down to its most basic working parts (Epstein, 2007; Miller and Page, 2007: Gilbert and Troitzsch, 2005). It is a “bare bones” representation of the real world (Epstein, 2007; Miller and Page, 2007: Gilbert and Troitzsch, 2005). When modeling social phenomena, the model is a representation of a combination of location and people interacting within that location (Epstein, 2007; Miller and Page, 2007: Gilbert and Troitzsch, 2005). The location is the environment; it stands for the general milieu in which the model is situated. It can be specified to mirror a city or a rural area or it can be programmed to be very generic, simulating simply an open space in which people interact. The people interacting in the model are referred to as agents. Agents are the representation of the “who” or “what‟ the modeler is investigating. In models of social events or behaviors, agents are computerized representations of human beings (Epstein, 2007; Miller and Page, 2007: Gilbert and Troitzsch, 2005). They are given characteristics and behavior rules. In the same model, a variety of agents are included that have randomly assigned start values for characteristics and a specified set of behavior rules to govern the actions and decisions emitted by the agents. Characteristics are traits that differentiate one agent from another. Starting values for these characteristics usually are randomly assigned at the beginning of a model run. Characteristics can encompass a wide variety of traits and demographics found in the real world. For example, an agent can be assigned a specific profile to mirror a type of person in the real world, such as a college student (Epstein, 2007; Miller and Page, 2007: Gilbert and Troitzsch, 2005). However, similar to empirical observations, the more variables or traits added to the mix, the more complex the model and the more likely that the specific interactions that result in the event or behavior of interest will be obscured (Epstein, 2007; Miller and Page, 2007: Gilbert and 50 Troitzsch, 2005). Thus it is considered in simulation modeling, that less is more. Characteristics can be altered or even removed from the model in successive runs to determine whether or not there is a relationship between the characteristics and the behavior, or whether something else is involved (Epstein, 2007; Miller and Page, 2007: Gilbert and Troitzsch, 2005). Behavior rules guide the agents‟ activity (Miller and Page, 2007: Gilbert and Troitzsch, 2005). Behavior rules can be complex or simple (Epstein, 2007). A simple rule can be used to move an agent a fixed distance in a random direction. A complex rule would build on that action, asking the agent to take into account it‟s perception of traffic density and personal energy level before adding in a random factor. Both rules require the agent to do something, but one is far more complex than the other. Behavior rules are not designed to be predictive but rather to represent basic components of decisions (Epstein, 2007; Miller and Page, 2007: Gilbert and Troitzsch, 2005). The decisions agents make stem from their consideration of the behavior rule but add a randomly generated number which represents information not included in the model that can change the decision to a different one. The goal of a simulation model is to identify the smallest number of characteristics and simple rules that result in the computerized agents mimicking the “real-world” behavior being studied (Epstein, 2007; Miller and Page, 2007: Gilbert and Troitzsch, 2005). Because some social phenomena take longer to occur than others, time becomes a factor. Behavior rules can be designed to inform agents that they should “sleep” for a certain period of time during each representation of a day. In a simulation model, time also is controlled by the programmer. The modeler makes the decisions about how time will be used in a model (Epstein, 2007; Miller and Page, 2007: Gilbert and Troitzsch, 2005). A model is designed to run through a set number of steps. When the model finishes its run, the “clock is up” for the agents in the 51 model. A model can be run to simulate what the agents do in a brief period of time, such as a few minutes or a longer period of time, like years (Epstein, 2007; Miller and Page, 2007: Gilbert and Troitzsch, 2005). Each run of a simulation model produces data. Data is captured in a separate log file for each run (Epstein, 2007; Miller and Page, 2007: Gilbert and Troitzsch, 2005). Data can be collected continuously through the model run or only at specific points, such as the beginning, middle, and end of the model run. Data are exported into any statistical program and analyzed (Epstein, 2007). In terms of model validation, a model is typically considered successful if it creates the behavior of interest (Epstein, 2007; Miller and Page, 2007: Gilbert and Troitzsch, 2005). Multiple model runs using the same programming are used to ensure that the model run that resulted in the behavior of interest was the result of chance alone. Multiple model runs using the same programming are used to see whether these replicate the previous model. In order to make certain there is variability between model runs, random number generators are used to assign different levels to variables of interest, as well as the starting location and movement of the individual agents. If the model repeatedly results in the same outcome even across a range of sensitivity testing, it is robust to changes in the tested value. In terms of model verification, the accuracy of the programming code and the logic of behavior rules are typically checked by other modelers in order to identify and correct mistakes in the programming (Manson, 2001). Further, sensitivity testing is used; varying different parameters slightly over initial model runs and the changes in outcome are noted in order to determine the limits of the model‟s application (Manson, 2001). In order to verify the models used in this dissertation, each individual process was programmed separately and print 52 statements were used to verify that the processes were running. Further, in watching the model update over the course of the initial individual process runs, key elements of processes were given visual cues, agents and background patches changed color, allowing for a visual assessment of how the model was running, what agent behaviors were in place, whether or not time was being divided properly, and whether agent characteristics were remaining static or changing. As the processes were created individually, they were verified by Dr. Stephen Frezza (see Appendix F for CV) who checked the programming language against the visual cues designed to highlight the processes and the print statements. The individual processes were then combined, allowing them to cascade into the full model for theory testing. The model at this point was checked again by Dr. Frezza, and all errors in programming language were documented and corrected. The full models in the three experimental conditions (control, collective hate, and charismatic leadership) were run 100 times, each separate from the model runs for data collection. This output was used to verify that the log files were populating correctly and that the data generated by the models was within the ranges set for the different agent characteristics and behaviors of interest. For further discussion of the validation and verification steps used in the creation of the models used in this dissertation see Appendix G. Each model is an alternative representation of how hate groups might form under different conditions. The variations maintain the simplistic representation of the world inherent in simulation modeling. Each model variation builds on the previous variations in order to make it possible to clearly identify which parameters are being manipulated. 53 Eight Key Components for an Agent-Based Model Simulation modeling is an excellent method for theory exploration, especially in situations where data are incomplete, difficult to obtain, or simply nonexistent. This method assists by “providing a research platform for translating theory into models that can be discussed, shared, tested and enhanced with the goal of building scientific knowledge” (Groff, 2007:75). Agent-based models allow for the agent to be viewed as either an individual or a group (Groff, 2007; Gilbert and Terna, 1999; Gilbert, and Troitzsch, 2005). However, simulation modeling can only determine whether a theory or model is a possible representation of real life occurrences and interactions, not whether it is the only explanation (Groff, 2007). Simulation modeling can be conceptualized as a complex adaptive system in which agents are interactive and “thoughtful,” but not omniscient or even highly intelligent (Miller and Page, 2007). A simulation includes eight key elements; 1) information and connections, 2) goals, 3) communication among agents, 4) interaction, 5) payoffs, 6) strategies and actions, 7) cognition, and 8) model focus and heterogeneity (Miller and Page, 2007). Table 2 (below) details the eight elements of a simulation model. Each element is listed in the first column. To illustrate the interplay of these eight elements, the second column uses real world examples from the Ku Klux Klan. The third column shows how each of these elements was specifically expressed in the programming of the simulation models created for this dissertation. Please note that underlined constructs within the table represent either parameters that were manipulated in the simulation or dependent variables examined within the context of the experiments discussed in Chapter Six. 54 Table 2: Eight Elements Table: Real World Analogs and Simulation Model Representations Element Real World (The Ku Klux Klan) Simulation Model Representation 1) Information and connections Individuals at Klan rallies or Klan functions dress and speak in a specific way; they wear t- shirts that profess their ideology or Klan uniforms that highlight their position in the organization. They carry signs and shout slogans associated with their ideology and condemning their targets (e.g. African Americans, Jews, and Homosexuals). Other hate groups that attend these events may or may not be Klans, such as skin head groups or Neo- Nazis, but their shared ideology, professed through conversations and outward appearance, allows them to know they are welcome. People rely on their interaction with others to make connections. Agents know the hate they possess and the level of hate possessed by other agents. Agents are randomly assigned a base level of intrinsic hate, which is their true level of hate before any interactions allowing for the tracking of how agents change their level of intrinsic hate based on the levels of extrinsic hate of other nearby agents, the presence of fully formed groups, and so forth. The model relies on the interactions between agents and the connections they make in order to simulate hate group formation. 2) Goals Throughout history the Klan has had a variety of goals – large goals like preventing desegregation of schools to smaller goals of gaining members in their groups. Highlighted by David Duke‟s attempts to repackage the Klan to make its message of hate more palatable to a larger population. Agents have one goal. They are seeking others that possess similar levels of hate and avoiding those who possess a level of hate they see as too dissimilar from their own level. 55 Table 2: Continued Element Real World (The Ku Klux Klan) Simulation Model Representation 3) Communication among the agents Klan members overtly communicate, asking each other about their likes and dislikes, they agree and disagree. Klansmen also look at visual cues, t-shirt slogans, bumper stickers, tattoos. Agents overtly communicate, asking each other about their level of hate and their agreements and disagreements with other agents. 4) Interactions As Klan members find others they enjoy talking to at a Klan event, they hang out with each other and talk. They may exchange contact information and business cards – gaining opportunities for future interactions. As agents agree about levels of hate, they form groups and gain support and status within the model. Support refers to the number of agents that agree with a particular agent, thus increasing the likelihood that a group will form that agrees with the agent in question. Status refers to the agent‟s position in a newly formed group, as a founding member of the group. 5) Payoffs In the real world it depends on what the person is interested in. Wild Bill Davidson considered membership in the Klan a bonus as his fellow Klansmen supported his business ventures. David Curtis Stephenson used his power to make political connections, which he thought, erroneously would protect him from conviction and imprisonment. When groups form, agents are assigned two new characteristics. They gain the beneficial characteristic of commitment to the group and the detrimental characteristic of fear. Commitment maintains the agent‟s membership in the group and fear influences whether or not the agent leaves the group. Fear is representative of a group becoming more violent or extreme in its beliefs than the agent is comfortable with. 56 Table 2: Continued Element Real World (The Ku Klux Klan) Simulation Model Representation 6) Strategies and actions People at a Klan gathering can stretch the truth to make themselves more interesting or feign interest in the conversation of an important contact, in order to manipulate their current and future experiences and interactions. The agents have free rein to change their level of extrinsic hate at any time and are given control over whether or not they agree or disagree with their fellow agents no matter how similar their level of hate may be. 7) Cognition People in the real world are not omniscient, but have varying levels of intelligence – they are for the most part, more intelligent than the agents in a simulation model. Agents are aware of their surrounding agents and can remember previous interactions throughout the model run. Agents are not omniscient and are designed to be rather simple with few underlying mental characteristics. 8) Model focus and heterogeneity The real world is far more complex and heterogeneous than a model that has simplified the world to examine one particular phenomenon. Hate agents are given a variable level of extrinsic hate from 0 to +10. The model is simplified to remove all other background characteristics and focuses solely on collective hate with experiments relating to charismatic leadership. The models are run at different levels of societal hate mimicking the amount of general social support a hate group might find for its views. In regards to element 1, information and connections, agents in the simulation are analogs to individuals in the “real world.” No one exists independent of the world. Agents react to what they “know” about the simulated environment around them and to the input they receive 57 from the other agents with whom they are in contact (Miller and Page, 2007). Agents, like their real-world counterparts, can form networks of relationships and information and are influenced by their experiences and the experiences of their peers. Just like people in the real world, agents may alter their “behavior” to influence each other‟s actions (Miller and Page, 2007). Element 2 refers to the goals the agents have in the model (Miller and Page, 2007). Because a simulation model is a simplified representation of the real world, this goal is an echo of the motivations people have in the real world. The goals of an agent are reflected in the specific behaviors and interactions that are included in the design of the experiment (Miller and Page, 2007). Importantly, the rules programmed into the model reflect the theoretical assumptions that the models are designed to test, without being deterministic. While rules govern agent behavior, random error terms are used in order to add an element of chance as to whether those behaviors result in the behavior of interest. In the models for this dissertation, an agent is told it wants to meet other agents who have similar levels of hate, the agent is not told to create a hate group. Even when an agent makes enough connections with other agents who have similar levels of hate, there is a random chance assigned to that group of agents that a hate group will form. Element 3, communication among agents, is a further representation of how a model mimics the real world. Very few people can exist in a void without some form of contact or communication with others. Agents communicate with one another, either by action or by providing the other agent with some form of information (Miller and Page, 2007). Element 4, interaction, refers to what an agent does with the information received (Miller and Page, 2007). Agents make decisions about the information they receive and act accordingly, just like people in the real world respond to what they hear, see and believe (Miller and Page, 58 2007). These decisions translate into action and these actions influence the other agents around them and their simulated environment (Miller and Page, 2007). Element 5 is payoff. Agents engage in behaviors, communicate and interact with a purpose. They want something, just like people in the real world (Miller and Page, 2007). This payoff can be linked to their goals, but this is not necessary. The goal of meeting someone may be easily achieved; however, that person providing further benefit is not guaranteed. Together, agents can change the simulated world in which they live. These changes can positively or negatively impact the agents, causing them to derive benefit from some behaviors and detriment from others (Miller and Page, 2007). Element 6 focuses on the strategies and actions that the agents undertake, similar to the manipulations people in the real world become involved in when they are vying for a resource or playing a game (Miller and Page, 2007). Agents analyze their fellow agents in each situation and may make decisions about their responses based on these perceptions (Miller and Page, 2007). These decisions also may be influenced by previous interactions between the same agents or in events and changes within the model that occurred since the agent‟s last interaction (Miller and Page, 2007). Cognition, or thought, is element 7 (Miller and Page, 2007). This element of a simulation model is based on the programmer‟s decision about how complex to make the agents. Most models have very simple agents with mental processes far more simplified than their real world counterparts (Miller and Page, 2007). Although the agents in the model are a representation of people in real world situations, they need not be identical to the real world (Miller and Page, 2007). 59 Element 8, focus and heterogeneity, refers to the model itself and not the agents within the model (Miller and Page, 2007). The key question here is: Does the model actually encompass everything necessary to recreate the process of interest? Even though simulation models are seeking to explain or recreate complex interactions and phenomena, the model itself should be simply designed to encompass the underlying processes that produce the desired result (Miller and Page, 2007). Summary This section examined agent-based modeling as a technique for criminal justice research. Simulation models distill social or natural phenomena down to its most basic working parts. Agent-based models allow for the safe and ethical examination of social phenomena. The next chapter explains how this methodology was used in this dissertation to create models simulating hate group formation based on the theories of collective hate and charismatic leadership. 60 CHAPTER SIX METHODOLOGY This chapter describes in detail the dependent and independent variables used in the models. It lays out the experiments run to test the hypotheses outlined in Chapter Four. The chapter ends with a discussion of the statistical methods used to compare the control and experimental models. ABM Modeling Platform There are many different ABM modeling platforms available. Each platform was designed for different purposes and this makes it important to be aware of the specialization of the modeling platform. Because of the wide range of program available, it is necessary to check the various surveys of programs that have been conducted (Castle and Crooks, 2006; Leszczyna, 2004; Tobias and Hoffman, 2004; Nikolai and Madey, 2009). Some of these surveys examine only a few modeling platforms (i.e. Tobias and Hoffman (2004) examined four Java-based platforms). The most extensive is the Niklolai and Madey (2009) survey. Nikolai and Madey (2009) surveyed and compared 53 different ABM modeling platforms. These modeling platforms were rated on five separate characteristics “language required to program a model and to run a simulation, operating system required to run the toolkit, type of license that governs the toolkit, primary domain for which the toolkit is intended, and types of support available to the user” (Nikolai and Madey, 2009, 12). The program chosen for this dissertation was NetLogo. NetLogo is a simulation modeling program that was designed for examining social and natural events and activities and is well- suited to the simulation of “complex systems that develop over time.” (Wilensky, 1999:1) Nikolai and Madey (2009) highlight NetLogo‟s accessibility, ease of operation and its primary 61 specialization as one geared towards the general social sciences. Because of this specialization, NetLogo has seen extensive use in the social sciences. Notably, NetLogo has been used to examine political behaviors and situations (Lustick, Miodownik, & Eidelson, 2004; Kuznar, & Sedlmeyer, 2005), as well as for developing an understanding on how communities form, collective identities develop and cooperation between individual and groups (Berman, Nicolson, Kofinas, Tetlichi, & Martin, 2004; Flache, & Macy, 2002; Lansing, 2000; Lansing, & Miller, 2005, Burnett, 2000; Lustik, 2000). NetLogo has also been used to model how stereotypes and norms develop among and between groups (Adams, & Markus, 2004; Agar, 2005; Aoki, Wakano, & Feldman, 2005; Brauer, Judd, & Jacquelin, 2001; Doreian, 2001; Gotts, Polhill, & Law, 2003; Sun, 2001; Gumerman, Swedlund, Dean, & Epstein, 2003; Hastie & Stasser, 2000; Kenrick, Li, & Butner, 2003; Kohler, 2000; Lyons, & Kashima, 2003; Sallach, 2003 ). Programming NetLogo is programmed using the computer programming language Java but modelers use simplified language propriety to NetLogo to program their models (Wilensky, 1999).As presented in Table 3 below, programming is kept rather simple. Programming is divided into procedures; the number of procedures varies depending on model complexity. To give the reader a feel for what a NetLogo program looks like, Table 3 contains four of the procedures used in the models written for this dissertation. The full program can be found in Appendix E. Table 3: Procedures and Programming Procedure Agent programming Explanation Procedure1 – Agent characteristics This section assigns the variables of interest to the agents. turtles-own extrinsichate ;; random 0-10 intrinsichate ;; random 0-10 Turtle is the generic term for an agent in the program. Turtles have extrinsic and intrinsic hate that can vary from 0 to 10. 62 Table 3: Continued Procedure Agent programming Explanation Procedure 2 – Set-up for the model This section prepares the model to run the experiment. to setup clear-all create-turtles 500 set-default-shape turtles "person" ask turtles [ setxy random-xcor random-ycor ] ask turtles [ set color red ] ask turtles [ set extrinsichate random 10 ] ask turtles [ set intrinsichate random 10 ] End In order to run the model: Clear all previous model information Create 500 turtles Make them look like people Spread them out over the screen at random Make them red Assign a random level of extrinsic hate max 10 Assign a random level of intrinsic hate max 10 This ends the set up Procedure 3 – Agent behavior This section tells the agents what to do. to communicate ;; turtle procedure if any? other turtles-here with [extrinsichate = [intrinsichate] of myself] [ if random-float 100 < agree-chance [ set agree? true set color white ]] The turtles are going to communicate Does the turtle detect another turtle Is that turtle‟s extrinsic hate = its intrinsic hate? If yes, give a random chance that they will agree If they agree, change their color to white 63 Table 3: Continued Procedure Agent programming Explanation Section 4 – Log File This section creates a log of the information from the model. to log-agentset-header set-current-directory base-path file-open word base-filename "-agenthate.csv" file-type "tick-no ," to log-agentset-variables [tick- no] set-current-directory base-path file-open word base-filename "-agenthate.csv" foreach sort agents ask? [ file-type tick-no file-type " ," This sets up the header for the variables. This tells the model where to save the file. This tells the model what to call the file. This tells the model what the first variable is. This starts filling in the information in the file. Tells the model where to look for the file. Tells the model to open the file. Tells the model to collect information from each agent by requesting their information and storing it under the appropriate variable. Random Numbers Because it is impossible to know or account for the interactions that make up every situation, a degree of randomness is necessary so that some other factor could come into play. Thus, an agent could evaluate an invitation based on the relative difference in hate levels and find it attractive, but once the error term is added, they could decide not to join. The distribution of the random number generator reflects the modeler‟s best estimate about the probabilities involved. If there is no basis for preferring one over the other, a uniform distribution is often 64 used because there is an equal chance that any number in the range will be selected. If most of the time a low value is expected (i.e., that random factors are not very important), a Poisson distribution is utilized so that more often, the number generated will be closer to zero. The random term is generated from a normal random number distribution and ranges from X to X. The reason for the random generation of a response is to simulate the interaction between people whose ideology or level of hate is the same, but have different opinions on what should be done or how their beliefs are expressed. In NetLogo there are eight different ways in which random numbers are used. These are: random-xcor/ycor or pxcor/pycor, random-seed number, random, random-float, random- exponential mean, random-gamma alpha lambda, random-normal mean standard-deviation, and random-poisson mean. Table 4 below shows the different ways random numbers were used in the experiments. The first, random-xcor/ycor or pxcor/pycor is used to place agents within the environment. Random-xcor/ycor is used to place the agents at random x and y coordinates anywhere in the model landscape. Random pxcor/pycor places agents randomly to the center of patches within the model landscape. The second, random-seed number is used to provide an integer for a pseudo-random number generator. This use of random numbers was not used in this model. Random and random-float are used to report a number of zero or greater to a point pre-set by the programmer. In this dissertation, random-float was used for agreements and disagreements and for error terms in group formation. Random was used to assign numbers within a range for extrinsic hate, motivation, susceptibility, and in the charismatic leader experiment, the charismatic leader‟s level of charisma. Random was also used after agreements or disagreements were made between agents to separate the agents and cause them to seek out other agents. In this second case, agents 65 were given the command random 360, causing both agents to turn away from each other and move away at the random angle assigned by the program in order to seek out another agent. When the distribution of numbers is more important, NetLogo provides a series of options random-exponential mean, random-gamma alpha lambda, random-normal mean standard- deviation, and random-Poisson mean. This dissertation used random-Poisson mean, where mean was replaced with 2, 4, 6, or 8, depending on the level of societal hate for the model run. This means that intrinsic hate was randomly distributed according to a Poisson distribution centered on the level of societal hate in the model. When societal hate was allowed to change based on agent behavior, this does mean that, when compared to the real world, dramatic changes in levels of societal hate could happen in a short time frame, if on day 100 half the agents had not made an agreement, they could all change their intrinsic hate at the same time and cause significant changes in the societal hate of the model. Because of this, the fluctuation of societal hate in models where it has been allowed to vary due to agent behavior is noted in the log file and the data are collected for future analysis and research. In model runs that were absent of societal hate, where societal hate was not included, intrinsic hate was treated like extrinsic hate and declared as random for the intrinsic hate range. Table 4: Random Numbers in the Model Experiments Random Number Generator Experiment Use in Model Random-xcor/ycor Control Collective Hate Charismatic Leadership Is used in the set-up of all models to place the agents within the model landscape. 66 Table 4: Continued Random Number Generator Experiment Use in Model Random-float Control Collective Hate Charismatic Leadership When agents are determining whether or not they agree when all other factors are accounted for (+/- 1 intrinsic to extrinsic hate) and when groups are about to form (random-float, klan-chance). Random Control Collective Hate Charismatic Leadership Extrinsic hate, susceptibility, motivation. In the charismatic leadership experiment this is also how the Charismatic Leader‟s charisma is assigned. Random-poisson mean Control Collective Hate Charismatic Leadership When societal hate is systematically set (2, 4, 6, or 8) at the beginning of a model, this random number generator is used to assign levels of intrinsic hate around that societal average. Model The purpose of the model designed for this dissertation was to test theories of hate group formation. Hate group formation has been examined through theory and retrospective. Although some histories exist for well-known hate groups, such as the origins of the Ku Klux Klan, the proliferation of hate groups in the United States and elsewhere over the past ten years increases the need to understand how hate groups form. The structure of the model is simplistic. Individual agents in the model are designed to represent ordinary people. There is nothing extraordinary about the people who form or join hate groups, they are every day, ordinary human beings. 67 Therefore, the agents in the model are the same. The agents are stripped down versions of these ordinary human beings; they have an internal belief system (intrinsic hate), an external representation of their views (extrinsic hate), motivation, and susceptibility to charismatic leadership (in models where a charismatic leader was included). They do not have social status, education, or economic status, as these characteristics distract from the core problem. Hate group members have, historically, been drawn from all social and economic strata and from a variety of educational backgrounds. The environment was also minimalist and will be discussed in the next section. The temporal scale of the model was a one year period, a very brief period of time for hate group formation, or any type of group formation, but a manageable period of time, as the SPLC measures the number of active hate groups in the United States on a yearly schedule. For the agents in the model, this scale was subdivided into 6-hour blocks, measured by one tick of the model‟s run time. The agents‟ motivation process was directly tied to these ticks. Motivation is one of the key processes in the model. When the model is programmed to motivate the agents, it is the start of all other processes. Motivation is divided into three categories. The most motivated agents are active 18 hours a day, the second category of agents are active 12 hours a day and the least motivated agents are active only 6 hours a day. When the motivation process begins, the agents who are motivated to be active during that time period begin the communication process. Those who are not motivated to be active during that time period do not initiate the communication process. The communication process governs the interaction between agents. The agents are programmed to look for other agents within their current patch who present themselves (extrinsic hate) as having similar beliefs (intrinsic hate). When an agent finds another agent who fits this qualification, the agent approaches that agent and they discuss their beliefs. This process is 68 within the communication process, where the agents compare their views (intrinsic hate to extrinsic hate). The agents are not mind readers, so they are comparing the external representation of each other‟s beliefs (extrinsic hate) to their own internal beliefs (intrinsic hate). The next step of this process is the agreement/disagreement process. The agreement/disagreement process takes place when the agents have made this comparison of beliefs and are determining whether or not they agree with each other. In some cases, the two agents will appear to agree on the surface (extrinsic hate of Agent 1 = extrinsic hate of Agent 2), but this façade does not reveal their internal beliefs and they immediately disagree and seek other connections. In other cases, the agents will agree on the surface and internally (extrinsic hate of Agent 1 = intrinsic hate of Agent 2). These agents are most likely to form a connection. However, everyone knows there is more to making a connection with another person than shared beliefs. Because of this, the process for agreements has a random chance associated with it. The program essentially “tosses a coin” to determine whether or not this connection has been made. If the connection is made, both agents keep track of who it was they agreed with and seek out other connections. If the connection was not made, the same process as the immediate disagreement comes into play. If an agent does not manage to make any connections over the course of 100 days, a new process comes into play. The agent is given the opportunity to change its mind (intrinsic hate). There are no core rules that govern how the agent changes its mind (intrinsic hate), but if the agent chooses to change, all internal characteristics of the agent change (intrinsic hate, motivation, susceptibility). Although most people change their mind more than three times a year, the idea here is that intrinsic hate is a long-held core belief, not a transient dislike that may change with time and experience. 69 Whether or not an agent is making connections after each agreement or disagreement, the agents are given the option of changing their outward appearance (extrinsic hate). This process allows the agent to reset their extrinsic hate to any amount. This allows an agent to change their outward representation of their beliefs up or down, in turn giving themselves an increased likelihood of forming connections. The agents want to make connections, because they are representations of human beings, which are social animals. When an agent has tallied a total of five or more connections (agreements), the group formation 23 process comes into play. The group formation process does not require that the agents be in close proximity to each other when the tally reaches five, just like a group of friends deciding to form a club may contact each other by phone, text message or via social media (e.g., Twitter, Facebook). The agents are alerted to their possibility of group formation. This does not mean a group forms instantly, just as with the agreement process, the group formation process also has a random component. The model once again “flips a coin” to determine whether or not the group forms. If the group does not form, the agents keep their agreements, but continue seeking further connections. If the group does form, the agents populate a group agent and are given new characteristics as group members, commitment and fear. These new characteristics in combination with the agent‟s intrinsic hate give the agents the option of staying with the group or leaving the group. A group can gain members from this point as its members make new 23 Though the group was developed based on a series of connections, it is not a social network model. A social network model establishes pre-existing links between agents and then uses the agents‟ pre-existing connections to form new connections (Carroll & Ratner, 1996: Dorien, 2001: Friedman & McAdam, 1992). These pre-existing connections run contrary to the basic tenets of Hamm‟s (2004) collective hate, that people are drawn together by an intense collective hatred. This collective hatred is not theorized as being based in a pre-existing network of friends or acquaintances, but more in the synchronistic coming together of people with similar views and beliefs. Therefore, in these models, while agents bring in their connections, these connections are established in a more free-flowing fashion than a structured social network model. 70 connections. No behavior rule governs how many groups the agents can join, as their real world counterparts can certainly have more than one group affiliation. The processes in place when the group is populated are the option of changing intrinsic hate and dropping out of the group. The option for changing intrinsic hate comes after the agents have been populated in a group and the group has stayed together for ten days. The agents are then given the option to increase or decrease their intrinsic hate, to radicalize or become disenchanted. When the agents choose to increase or decrease their intrinsic hate, they also reset their internal characteristics (motivation and susceptibility). The second process in place when a group has formed is the agents dropping out of the group. When these agents joined groups they were given two new characteristics, fear and commitment. Commitment is randomly assigned. Each agent determines how much fear it has based on the difference between the level of hate possessed by the most extreme member of the group and their level of commitment. So, if Agent 1 has a level of commitment of 4 and the most extreme member of the group has a hate level of 7, Agent 1‟s level of fear is 3. The decision to leave the hate group is based on the following: if the mean level of hate for the group becomes twice a particular agent‟s level of fear, that agent will make the decision to leave the group. Therefore, if an agent has a fear level of 3 and the mean level of hate for the group is 6, the agent will leave the group. No matter how much an individual buys into a group‟s belief system or viewpoint, there is a point at which the group may advocate a position beyond an individual member‟s comfort zone. For some agents this can be instantaneous: the minute their levels of fear and commitment are assigned, they may assess the group and leave. Dropping out of the group is governed by a calculation of the agent‟s characteristics and the group‟s characteristics. 71 µH=2f Where µH is mean intrinsic hate or the group level of hate and f is the individual agent‟s level of fear. No matter how much an individual buys into a group‟s belief system or viewpoint, there is a point at which the group may advocate a position beyond an individual member‟s comfort zone. For example, a person may absolutely hate a certain segment of the population with a blinding passion, but may not want to engage in acts of violence against those individuals. When an agent leaves a group, their levels of commitment and fear are documented in the log file for analysis, but they do not retain the commitment or fear characteristics. They are no longer a member of the group, so they are no longer committed to the group. They also have left the situation that was causing or influencing their fear, so they are no longer afraid. They can join another group or even the same group at a later time, at which time they would be assigned a new commitment level and have a new level of fear calculated. If a group‟s membership falls below three members, the group dissolves. The only other processes present in the model are those that come into play when there is a charismatic leader in the model. All previously discussed processes are still active in the model. The leader process is based first on the leader agent being assigned a level of charisma above zero. The charismatic leader agent then begins the same agreement/disagreement process as all other agents. The difference here is that the agents‟ susceptibility comes into the decision as to whether or not to agree with the charismatic leader. An agent makes the same intrinsic hate vs. extrinsic hate assessment, but if their intrinsic hate matches up to the leader‟s extrinsic hate (+/- 1) it is their level of susceptibility that first determines their agreement rather than a random coin toss. If they possess the highest level of susceptibility they immediately agree, if they possess no susceptibility they immediately disagree. The middle levels of susceptibility are then 72 governed by the same random coin toss as the agreements and disagreements between regular agents. When an agent disagrees with the charismatic leader, the leader tallies those disagreements and they become a measure of the charismatic leader‟s lack of support in the society. When an agent agrees with the charismatic leader, they identify themselves as followers of the leader and the leader tallies their agreements and keeps a list of their identification numbers. The agreement tally is then used by the charismatic leader as a measure of his popularity in the society. When a leader is active in society, his followers are given an extra benefit of changing their internal belief system more often. Those agents can reset their internal characteristics (intrinsic hate, susceptibility, motivation), any amount at ten-day intervals after declaring themselves followers of the charismatic leader. If the agents decide to change their intrinsic hate to a value below the charismatic leader‟s extrinsic hate, the agent is also given the opportunity to leave the charismatic leader‟s fold. If they choose to do so, they are removed from the charismatic leader‟s list of followers and are no longer self-identified as a follower. All group formation processes remain the same. The model is programmed to keep track of all agent characteristics at every tick of the model. A log file is created at the start of the model run and all information for all individual and group agents is collected from that point until the end of the model run. Group agents that do not populate report zeroes in all columns throughout the model run. Agents Within these experiments there were two kinds of agents; individual people and groups. Each model contained 500 individual agents. These agents were given the characteristics listed in Table 5 below. The models that contained a charismatic leader included a charismatic leader 73 agent. This agent was given all the same characteristics as the individual agents with the only difference being that individual agents were assigned a charisma of zero and the charismatic leader‟s charisma could vary from one to five. Table 5: Individual Characteristics Individual Characteristics After Individual becomes a group member After Individual leaves a group ID** Intrinsic hate RP(0-10) Extrinsic hate R(0-10) Motivation R(1-3) Charisma (0) R(1-4)* Susceptibility R(0-4)* Group ID** Commitment** Fear ** Dropout ID** * In the charismatic leader experiments ** Included in the model but not used as an independent variable When an agent leaves a group, their levels of commitment and fear are documented in the log file, but they do not retain these characteristics. They are no longer a member of the group; therefore, they are no longer committed to the group. They also have left the situation that was causing or influencing their fear; therefore, they are no longer afraid. The agent is then given a drop-out ID that tracks which groups they have left. These agents can join another group or even the same group at a later time. If they do so, they would be assigned a new commitment level and have a new level of fear calculated. Group agents serve as place-holders for the groups that will be formed by the individual agents. Each model contained 100 of these group agents. The group agents were given the characteristics listed in Table 6 below. 74 Table 6: Group Agent Characteristics Group Characteristics ID*** Group mean Hate**(≥5) Number of members*(≥5) Group mean Commitment*** Group mean Fear*** Number of drop-outs*** * Used to determine dependent variables: number of groups that formed and size ** Used to determine dependent variables: number of groups that formed, level of hate *** Included in the model but not used as an independent or dependent variable Group agent‟s characteristics are populated when a group is formed. Environment As previously stated, the environment in a simulation model is developed by the programmer. It can be very complex, simulating a bustling metropolis with streets and hubs or simply an open field. The environment design for this simulation model was kept simplistic. The open field landscape was determined to be the best option to prevent interference from environmental factors that could change agent behavior. Therefore, the landscape for the model was composed of patches. Each agent was randomly assigned to a section of a patch at the start of the model run and from that point the agents were able to move to any patch they wanted as they interacted with other agents. This prevented situations where the location at which the agents interacted had more influence over group formation than the individual agent characteristics. Further, hate groups have historically existed in all 50 states, in both rural and urban areas, as well as internationally and in the nebulous environment of the internet. In this environment, the agents are randomly distributed across the landscape. This does affect their earliest conversations with other agents, but as the model run progresses, they are free to move 75 throughout the landscape and speak with whomever they encounter who “looks” like a good prospect based on their extrinsic hate. Data Simulation modeling by its very nature is extremely data rich. Based on what information the modeler decides to collect, each model run can produce thousands of data points. In the programming for a simulation model, the programmer sets up a log file with the variables of interest and the number of times the data should be recorded. Data are usually of three varieties, the value of a characteristic (i.e., intrinsic hate 5), a count of some action or behavior (i.e., agreements 12) or a list (i.e., the agent ids of a series of agents in a group). The majority of the data collected for this dissertation was of the first two varieties. In this dissertation, data were recorded for all variables at each tick of the model run. Each model run in these experiments produced a log file for individual agent data and a second for group data. The 5,000 experiment iterations testing the charismatic leadership hypotheses also produced a log file for leader data. The 15,000 iterations used to create distributions of results produced a total of 15,000 individual agent log files, 15,000 group log files and 5,000 leader log files for a total of 35,000 individual log files 24 . 24 All total there were 500 agents in each model and 730,000 data points per model, yielding a total of 10,950,000,000 individual data points of agent data. These data points included information regarding each agent‟s level of intrinsic and extrinsic hate at any given time, the group or groups they joined and the group or groups they had left if they dropped out of a group. There were 100 possible hate groups that could be populated per model and 146,000 data points per model, yielding a total of 2,190,000,000 data points of group data. These data points included the number of members, the mean intrinsic and extrinsic hate of each group, as well as a list of agents who had joined and a list of agents who had left the group at any given time. There was only one leader present in 5,000 model runs and for those model runs 1,460 data points per model, yielded a total of 7,300,000 data points of leader data. These data points included the charismatic leader‟s levels of intrinsic and extrinsic hate at any given time, as well as the number of followers and detractors the leader had come in contact with over the course of the model run. Because these data sets together were large enough to be unwieldy, the data within the log files was used to create cases in the analysis dataset. The log file for agent data, group data, and where applicable, leader data were matched up for each model iteration and then the data from each of these files was used to create a single data set where each model iteration became a single case within the data set. Each case included the pertinent individual, group, and where applicable, leader information that related to that model run as needed for the analysis outlined in the analytic 76 The log files were designed such that the variables of interest and the unique identifier for each individual agent in the agent log files and the group identifier in the group log files were listed across the top of the spreadsheet and the tick number at which the data were collected was listed down the left hand side of the spreadsheet. Therefore, at each tick in the model, the agent log file recorded the individual agent‟s value on all characteristics, as well as the number of agreements and disagreements the agent had made up to that point and whether or not they had joined a group, left a group or stayed in a group. The group log file recorded the group characteristics at each tick of the model, listing the identifiers of agents who had joined a group, left the group, as well as their averages on the individual agent characteristics. The leader log file recorded all of the leader characteristics at each tick, including the agent identifiers for all individual agents who decided to follow the leader as well as the number of agreements and disagreements the leader accrued. An example of a hypothetical agent log is provided in Table 7 below. Log files can become very large depending on the length of time the model iteration is running, the number of characteristics or actions that the file is programmed to keep track of, and the number of agents included in the model. That was the case with the log files used to collect data from the model runs documented here. Table 7: Log File Example Tick AgentID Intrinsic Hate Extrinsic Hate Agreements Disagreements 12 23 8 5 4 6 12 24 6 6 5 7 plan at the end of this chapter. The full data sets for individual agents, groups, and the charismatic leader have all been preserved in order to provide the data necessary for the future research agenda outlined in the final chapter. 77 In Table 7, Tick refers to the time in the model, in this case, the last six-hour block of the third day. AgentID is the unique identifier for the agent in the model. Intrinsic Hate is their assigned level of intrinsic hate, as this is only the third day this value is stagnant at this point and will not have changed. Extrinsic Hate is that agent‟s assigned level of extrinsic hate, also stagnant at this point. Agreements is a count of how many agents that agent has agreed with over the past three days. Agent 23 has agreed with four other agents. These agreements are counted at each tick: three ticks earlier, Agent 23 may have only had two agreements. Disagreements is a count of how many agents that agent has disagreed with in the past three days. Agent 26 has not disagreed with anyone in the past three days, while Agent 25 has disagreed with nine other agents over the past three days. Outside of the dependent and independent variables, the log file also tracks data on agent characteristics or behaviors that are not intended for later analysis. In the models programmed for this dissertation, this includes the characteristics that are given to agents when they join a group. The first characteristic is the Group ID, this is a number that which group the agent joined the group in question and designates the order in which they joined. The agent is then randomly assigned a level of Commitment that determines how likely they are to stay in the group. Third, the agent is given the characteristic of Fear; fear is calculated by the difference between the agent‟s level of commitment and the highest level of intrinsic hate in the group. Commitment and Fear are characteristics that give the agent an option for leaving a group they have joined. These characteristics and these options are in place to maintain the model‟s similarity between the simulation and the real world, where people choose to stay with or leave groups for a variety of reasons. This prevents the groups themselves from becoming static and does influence the dependent variables of number of groups and size, as detailed below. 78 Dependent Variables The dependent variables of interest for all models were number of groups that form, the speed at which groups form, and the size of the groups that formed. The dependent variables with their conceptual and operational definitions are listed in Table 8 below. Table 8: Dependent Variables Dependent variable Conceptual Definition Operational Definition Number of groups The number of groups that formed A group with a minimum of 5 members with an average intrinsic hate of 5 or higher Speed The amount of time it took for groups to start forming The first day that a group formed The average number of days for all groups that formed Size The number of members in a group The largest group formed in the model The number of groups that formed above the minimum number of members Number of groups is conceptualized as the number of groups that form over the course of a model run. Number of groups is operationalized as the number of groups of five or more agents that come together and form a group with an average intrinsic hate of 5 or higher. Operationalizing these groups as needing an intrinsic hate of 5 or higher is based on the lowest level of societal hate used as an experimental condition in the models. The lowest level of societal hate used as an experimental condition in the models is 2; therefore, a group with an average intrinsic hate of 5 has a level of hate within their group of 2.5 times the level of societal hate. When societal hate is 4, these groups are those whose hate is 1.25 times the level of societal hate. The concern occurs when societal hate is 6 or 8, where these groups have less intrinsic hate 79 on average than the society; however, increasing the average hate required for a hate group to be counted in these situations would mean that the number of groups could not be compared across levels of societal hate. For this reason, the requirement of an average intrinsic hate of 5 or higher remains constant. Speed is conceptualized as the amount of time it took for groups to start forming. This variable is operationalized in two different ways. The first is the first day the first group formed. This gives a snap shot of when groups started to form. The second is the average number of days, under the experiment conditions; it took for the groups to form. These two measures of speed give a good idea of what is happening in regard to time in the model. Groups can start forming within the first day, this may be due to a series of agents whose levels of hate are compatible being randomly assigned to the same patch within the model environment, giving them an advantage towards group formation, similar to a group of potential skinheads all frequenting the same bar at the same time. To offset this type of accident of circumstance, the average amount of time it took for all the groups to form gives a picture of all the activity in the model. Size is conceptualized as the number of members in a group. Just like speed, size is operationalized in two ways, the largest group that formed in the model and the number of groups larger than the minimum group size. The first measure gives an idea of how big the biggest group became over the course of the model run. The second measure looks at comparing how many of all the groups that formed were larger than the minimum set by the program at the end of the model run. This second measure was preferred to a measure of the average number of members in all groups as the number of groups with only the requisite five founding members typically outnumbered the larger groups and would have skewed the mean. This second measure was taken at the end of the model run to account for changes in group membership over the 80 course of the model run, where groups may have had more than the requisite five members at one point during the model and lost members to drop-outs by the end of the model run. This also assured that no group was counted more than once. Group Formation A group is defined as having a minimum of five members. The decision to make groups this size is to differentiate between the idea of a few friends who share a belief and an organized group. The number five was chosen to represent a hypothetical group with some internal structure, similar to a club with positions for a president, vice president, secretary, treasurer, and general membership. In order for the group to be counted as a hate group, the average intrinsic hate of the group must be five or higher. While groups may form at lower levels of average intrinsic hate, these groups are not counted in the analysis of hate group formation unless the average level of intrinsic hate in the group increases to the 5 or higher point during the model run. As agents interact within the model, they make connections based on which agents share their views. Each agreement between agents begins a tally toward group formation. Once five agents are connected, the model randomly generates whether or not the group will form. If the chance generated a no response, the group did not form, though the connections remained intact. This represented those groups that may have had enough people in agreement, but for unknown reasons did not form. If the chance generated a yes response, everyone who is connected through agreements was then populated into that group. An agent does not need to agree with every agent in the group. Once formed, groups are seeking new members and attempting to retain the members they already have. Within the group, as agents change their views based on interactions 81 with one another and group membership, the relationships become more pronounced. However, should a group‟s membership fall below 3 members, the group is dissolved. Independent Variables The independent variables of interest are the characteristics of the individual agents. These variables are listed in Table 9 below. The independent variables of interest for all models were intrinsic hate, extrinsic hate, the societal level of hate, and motivation. When a charismatic leader was present in experiments for testing the second set of hypotheses, the presence of the charismatic leader, as well as, his level of charisma and the susceptibility of other agents to his message become independent variables of interest as well. Each independent variable is examined for its individual effects. Combined effects are not examined in the analysis. Random assignment for independent variables changed depending on which experiment was being used. In experiments where societal hate was part of the model, a Poisson distribution was used. When societal hate was not part of the model, random assignment was normally distributed. Due to the varying levels of societal hate, the Poisson distributions were skewed positively when societal hate was higher and negatively when societal hate was lower. Societal hate is both an experimental condition and an independent variable. The experiments were run at set levels of societal hate that were systematically changed between model runs, 1,000 each at societal hate 2, 4, 6, and 8, as well as 1,000 runs without societal hate included in the model for all three experiments, control, collective hate, and charismatic leadership. Table 9: Independent Variables Independent Variable Conceptual Definition Operational Definition Type of Agent Hypothesis Intrinsic hate The core personal belief in a hate ideology Randomly assigned levels from 0-10 All All 82 Table 9: Continued Independent Variable Conceptual Definition Operational Definition Type of Agent Hypothesis Extrinsic hate How the agent displays their beliefs Randomly assigned levels from 0-10 All All Societal hate The societal level of hate Set at levels 2,4,6,and 8 n/a – model parameter H1d-f, H2 d-f As you will recall, collective hate is a reflection of two levels of individual hate, intrinsic and extrinsic. Intrinsic hate was conceptualized as the core personal belief of an agent, reflective of the extent to which agents had levels of hate commonly espoused by those adhering to a white supremacist ideology. Agents with lower levels of intrinsic hate have little-to-no core personal buy-in to the white supremacist ideology. Those with higher levels of intrinsic hate have an increasingly more substantial buy-in to the white supremacist ideology. They are “true believers,” individuals with an unshakeable belief in the tenets of the white supremacist ideology. Operationally, intrinsic hate was an interval level variable with values ranging from 0 to 10. A zero reflects an absence of intrinsic hate; whereas a 10 reflects the greatest amount of intrinsic hate possible. Figure 5 below shows the relationship between intrinsic and extrinsic hate and a person‟s beliefs and behavior. Intrinsic hate is the level of hate that an agent has developed, presumably based on life experience or social or familial norms (or by prior exposure to others with similar levels of hate and/or a charismatic leader). This is the type of hate that influences agents to either agree or disagree with others when contrasted with the other agent‟s extrinsic hate. Agents are comparing the outward representation of other agents‟ hate level (i.e., the other agents‟ extrinsic hate level) to their own personal, core beliefs (i.e., their own intrinsic hate level) 83 Figure 5 Intrinsic and Extrinsic Hate Levels in the Model If the agent asking about the individual agent‟s agreement has an extrinsic hate that is more than ±1 of the individual agent‟s intrinsic hate, the agent immediately disagrees. The ±1 range was chosen in order to adhere closest to the ideas of the theory of collective hate, any range larger than ±1 would have created groups with members with widely disparate opinions and beliefs. If the membership has such widely varying opinions and beliefs, they would not be representative of the intense collective hatred theorized by Hamm (2004). If the asking agent‟s extrinsic hate falls within that range, the agent being asked “considers” what the asking agent is “saying.” The final decision is based on an equation that weighs the relative difference between the two agents and incorporates a random term representing unknown factors. In other words, as per Figure 6 below, two agents may come into contact, perceive each other to have similar views (+/- 1 extrinsic hate) and begin a conversation. Over the course of that conversation, the agents weigh what is being said against their internal views and beliefs (± 1 intrinsic hate). This conversation is based on geographic proximity; that is, the agents have to come in contact with 84 one another. This contact is established by the two agents standing next to each other in the same unit of the model environment. For example, two potential Klan members meet on the street. They are both wearing t- shirts with a logo from a popular white power rock group and have similar tattoos. They strike up a conversation, based on this perceived common ground. Over the course of their conversation, one of the potential Klan members decides that the person he is conversing with is a little more extreme than fits his internal belief system, perhaps he hates minorities and has done a little vandalism, but the person he is talking with is discussing his desire to attack minority children at a local YMCA and kill as many as possible. This discussion has extended beyond the one potential Klan member‟s internal views, his core beliefs, his intrinsic hate. If this violent Klan member approached him about a new group that was forming, the nonviolent Klan member would be disinclined to join it. In the model, the programmer tells the agents to look at the other agents nearby and seek out those agents whose extrinsic hate (their outward appearance or profession of hate) is within +/-1 of their own intrinsic hate (their internal core beliefs). When the agent spots another agent that fits this criterion, the agent is instructed to communicate with that agent. The agents communicate by exchanging information about their extrinsic hate, in other words they size each other up as to whether or not they agree on their hate ideology on the surface. If they agree on the surface, the agent who has been approached considers the other agents views internally. That is, they compare what this agent is presenting to them through their extrinsic hate with their internal views, their intrinsic hate. If the extrinsic hate falls within +/-1 of the agent‟s intrinsic hate the agent decides whether or not they agree. This agreement is contingent on a random chance, an error term that is presented by the model. This allows for two agents who have the 85 right values on their characteristics, intrinsic vs. extrinsic hate to disagree, based on some non- programmed factor, such as bad hygiene or a repulsive habit. Intrinsic hate is not something that an agent can vary at random, but it can change based on situation or experience, specifically when the conditions listed in Table 10 are met. There is not a set limit on how much an agent can change their levels of hate when they comply with the time limits set by the behavior rules. Each model runs for 1 year, 365 days, the decision to allow intrinsic hate to change (when not in the control model) after 100 days without an agreement was made based on the idea that this is someone‟s core internal belief system feeding their intrinsic hate, it would take a long time for them to change this internal system, so nearly 1/3 of the model run. The change in intrinsic hate is left up to the agent; they are given the option of resetting their internal variables (intrinsic hate, motivation, and susceptibility) at these time points. After 100 days without making any agreements, an agent may increase their intrinsic hate to replicate someone who finds this lack of agreement bolstering to their beliefs – as though they are saying, no one agrees with me because they are all delusional or supporters of the thing I hate. An agent may decrease their hate, replicating someone who finds this lack of agreement as a sign that there might be something amiss with their beliefs – similar to the experience of someone who developed an intense hatred for a racial or ethnic group that they had never encountered and changed their mind after learning more about that group. The time periods for group members or those under the charismatic leader‟s thrall are far shorter. 86 Figure 6 Agent communication and agreement and disagreement decisions 87 Groups are prone to radicalization from within and strengthening of belief systems (Simmel, 1955). Therefore, for group members this decision to change intrinsic hate is 1/10 of the time as compared to when they do not have any agreements. For those who increase their intrinsic hate, these are those members who become increasingly radical, those who decrease their intrinsic hate are those who are made uncomfortable by the group‟s viewpoint and distance themselves from the group. In the case of the agents following the charismatic leader, the increase in intrinsic hate are those who are riled up by the leader‟s message, those who decrease their intrinsic hate are those who are being put-off by the leader‟s message. Table 10: Conditions for Changing Perceived and Intrinsic Hate Conditions for changing extrinsic hate Conditions for changing intrinsic hate Unless otherwise noted in an experiment, agents have full autonomy over their extrinsic hate and can change their level of extrinsic hate up or down, any amount without fulfilling any conditions After 100 days without an agreement, an agent can raise or lower their level of intrinsic hate. See Figure 7. After 10 days of membership in a hate group, an agent can raise or lower their level of intrinsic hate. See Figure 7. After 10 days in the presence of a charismatic leader, an agent can raise or lower their level of intrinsic hate. See Figure 7. If an agent changes its level of intrinsic hate, the new level of intrinsic hate is maintained until the agent enters into a situation where one of the conditions in Table 10 is satisfied. This change is triggered by the number of days that an agent does not register an agreement with another agent or the number of days it has been a member of a hate group. The agent is given the option to reset its intrinsic hate; therefore, the level of intrinsic hate can increase or decrease any amount. The agent decisions based on these conditions are laid out in the decision tree of Figure 88 7, below. Figure 7 below simplifies the decisions in the model; it does not lay out every possible decision or situation that takes place in the model. This figure is designed to show steps that are of the most importance in the decisions that relate to changes in intrinsic hate as laid out in Table 10. It does not provide a full list of any theorized motivations behind agent behavior or reasoning that the agents may have in increasing or decreasing intrinsic hate. It should be noted that nothing in the programming code for the models biases an agent towards group membership. Group membership is based on agreements. The only influence that may affect an agent‟s potential for group membership is the agent‟s motivation. How motivated an agent is will affect how many opportunities that agent has to make agreements. However, Figure 7 does not include the motivations or susceptibility of the agents; it looks only at one of the characteristics of the agents, intrinsic hate. Extrinsic hate was conceptualized as the way in which the individual agents present themselves to others. This represents the extent to which they outwardly show support for a white supremacist ideology. Agents with lower levels of extrinsic hate would be perceived by other agents as having little or no interest in a white supremacist ideology. Those with higher levels of extrinsic hate would be perceived by other agents as having increasingly more interest and support for a white supremacist ideology. Operationally, extrinsic hate is an interval level variable with values ranging from 0 to 10, where zero reflects no extrinsic hate and 10 reflects the greatest level of extrinsic hate possible. Extrinsic hate is randomly distributed; this is not a uniform of normal distribution. 89 Figure 7 Agent Decisions Regarding Changing their Levels of Intrinsic Hate 90 As per Table 10 above, extrinsic hate can be varied at any time in all experiments except the control experiments. The reasoning behind this is that extrinsic hate is how the agent presents itself to its surroundings. This is similar to changing clothes or carrying a sign. It is the same as choosing different vocabulary or a different story when talking to another person. Because of this, the agents are given the opportunity to change their extrinsic hate after each evaluation of the agents that are in closest proximity. The agents are asked if they see any other agents in their surroundings that have extrinsic hate that is +/- 1 of their intrinsic hate and are asked to pick one and communicate with that agent. If an agent finds someone or more than one person, that agent may not choose to change its extrinsic hate, if they do not find someone the agent may change its‟ extrinsic hate. This choice is completely under the agents‟ control in both the collective hate and charismatic leadership experiments. In the control experiments, extrinsic hate, just like all other characteristics, remains static. Societal hate was conceptualized as the degree to which the society in which the agents are interacting accepts the presence of white supremacists and their ideology. Lower values of societal hate are representative of less support for white supremacists and their ideology. Higher levels of societal hate are representative of a society that is more accepting of white supremacists and their ideology. Operationally, societal hate is an interval variable with values ranging from 0 to 10. It was calculated as the mean of the intrinsic hate possessed by all 500 agents present in that specific model. Societal hate during the control experiments was held at fixed values of exactly 2, 4, 6, and 8 for the entire experiment. Any societal hate lower than 2 would be indicative of nearly Utopian societies, at level 0, the average hate for the society would be 0, at level 1, the average hate would be 1, this would result in hate being too rare a phenomena in the society to really 91 measure. Likewise, societal hate higher than 8 results in societies so saturated with hate that it becomes increasingly difficult to separate out the formation of hate groups, the society itself would be an informal hate group. Utopian societies and societies completely saturated with a hate ideology are nonexistent in the real world and as simulation models attempt to recreate real world phenomena, these extremes would be outside the model scope. In all other experiments, the level of societal hate was allowed to increase and decrease, reflecting aggregate changes in the individual agents‟ levels of intrinsic hate. In all models when societal hate was allowed to vary and reflect aggregate changes in the individual agents‟ levels of intrinsic hate, no matter what the starting point was, societal hate increased and decreased over the course of the model run. These changes in societal hate were recorded in the log file. Societal hate did not always increase, and it did not always decrease over time. When societal hate started lower, it tended to increase over the course of the model run rather than decrease, when it started higher, it tended to decrease rather than increase. Variation in societal hate was recorded in the log files for all experimental models. In the analysis, societal hate at the starting point, the set societal hate at the beginning of the model, is used to differentiate between the model runs. While the changes in societal hate and the ending societal hate are recorded, for comparison purposes, the models are analyzed based on the level of societal hate with which they started. Beginning societal hate was used in the analysis because it was the common starting point, this allowed for the direct comparison of the control condition and the two experimental conditions. Because societal hate could vary substantially within the same model run under the experimental conditions, this choice was made to maintain uniformity in the data set. Time series analysis can be used in future examination of the data to make a more nuanced examination of the effect of changing 92 societal hate on hate group formation in individual model runs. The levels of societal hate used in the control models are loosely defined and presented in Table 11 below. The literature on societal hate is limited to explanations of Nazi Germany and levels of societal hate have not been presented in previous research. These levels are not concrete representations but are provided in order to give the reader a point of comparison between the real world and the simulations. Table 11: Societal Hate Level of Societal Hate Definition Societal Hate 2 When the mean level of hate in the society is 2, the society is rather accepting of differences, very little social unrest. Individuals with higher levels of hate are a minority in society, similar to most large urban areas in the United States currently. Societal Hate 4 When the mean level of hate in the society is 4, the society is accepting of differences, but there may be pockets of social unrest. Individuals with higher levels of hate are still a minority in society, similar to the current anti-immigration movement in Arizona. Societal Hate 6 When the mean level of hate in the society is 6; the society is rather intolerant of differences, increasing amounts of social unrest. Individuals with higher levels of hate are a small majority in society, similar to the United States during the Civil Rights Era. Societal Hate 8 When the mean level of hate in the society is 8, the society is intolerant of differences, and there is a high likelihood of social unrest. Individuals with higher levels of hate are a majority in society, similar to Nazi Germany at the height of World War II. 25 25 While to most individuals Nazi Germany has all the trademarks of a society completely saturated with hate, however due to the presence of individuals who willingly risked and sacrificed their lives in opposition to the Nazi 93 Based on the analytic plan outlined later in this chapter, some agent characteristics and behaviors are of interest as covariates, as presented in Table 12 below. Table 12: Covariates of Interest Covariate Conceptual Definition Operational Definition Type of Agent Hypothesis Motivation How active the agent is over the course of a day Randomly assigned levels from 1-3 All All Popularity How much support does the charismatic leader have Count of the number of supporters N/A H2 a-f Charisma How charismatic the leader is Randomly assigned levels from 1-4 Leader, all other agents have charisma 0 H2 a-f Susceptibility How susceptible to the charismatic leader an agent is Randomly assigned levels from 0-5 All H2 a-f Motivation was conceptualized as the level to which an agent actively sought out relationships with other agents, how motivated the agent was to seek out individuals who might agree with his hate beliefs. Operationally, motivation is an interval level variable with values of 1(equivalent to 6 hours of inactivity), 2 (equivalent to 12 hours of inactivity) and 3 (equivalent to 18 hours of inactivity). Each agent was inactive for at least 6 hours and as many as 18 hours. The decision to provide agents with at least 6 hours of inactivity was that this would account for at least a minimum amount of time that a person in the real world would spend asleep. An agent that is inactive only 6 hours is highly motivated because they are active for 18 hours. This is equivalent to someone who interacts with others for most of the time they are awake. This is not regime and those whose accounts of life under the Nazis express the prevalence of coercion and fear that influenced the behavior of everyday citizens, it is not possible to rank Nazi Germany as the epitome of societal hate (Goldhagen, 1996; Gellately, 2001; Kershaw, 2008). 94 static over the course of the model run. If an agent chooses to change its level of intrinsic hate, as per Table 10 above, the model also randomly reassigns a level of motivation. The motivation may be the same as before, or it may increase or decrease. An agent may increase their level of intrinsic hate, but the model may decrease their motivation. The model randomly assigned a third of the agents to each level of motivation. See Table 13 below for explanations of the different levels of motivation. These explanations are provided solely for the purpose of a reference that explains individual agent behavior in real world terms. Table 13: Levels of Motivation Levels of Motivation Equivalence in the Real World Motivation 1 Actively seeking others 18 hours out of every day. This is someone who is very extroverted and interacts often with others, a real “people person.” Motivation 2 Actively seeking others 12 hours out of every day. This is someone who is friendly but not immediately classified as an extrovert and interacts often with others, but also likes to be left alone from time to time. Motivation 3 Actively seeking others 6 hours out of every day. This is someone who is friendly, but not very active. They interact occasionally with others, but prefer to be left alone most of the time. Popularity was conceptualized as how much support the charismatic leader found among the population. Operationally, popularity is an interval variable without a preset range of values. It is a count of the number of supporters the charismatic leader acquired over the course of the model run. This count is taken at the end of the model run in order to allow for agents who 95 changed their position from supporter to non-supporter over the course of a model run to be removed from the count. Charisma was conceptualized as the amount of sway or influence possessed by the charismatic leader. The symbiotic relationship between charismatic leader and his followers is addressed in the behavior rule, allowing agents to change their intrinsic hate due to their status as followers. Operationally, charisma is an interval variable with values ranging from 0 to 4. Only the charismatic leader can possess a level of charisma greater than 0. A value of 0 represented no charisma, and a value of 4 represented the highest possible charisma. The different levels of charisma are presented in Table 14 below with real world equivalents. These explanations are provided solely for the purpose of a reference that explains an individual agent characteristic in real world terms. Weber (1947) says nothing regarding levels of charisma; therefore, these levels of charisma are designed to be a parameter that will be manipulated in the charismatic leader model. The model was given the range of 1-4 for the charismatic leader‟s level of charisma and assigned a stagnant level of charisma to the leader at the start of the model run. Table 14: Levels of Charisma Level of Charisma Equivalence in the Real World Charisma 0 This is not someone repulsive, but just a regular person, not a leader. Charisma 1 Someone with a little charisma, fun or interesting to be around, some good ideas. Charisma 2 Someone who can draw anyone into conversation, but does not have a set group of followers, can influence some decisions. Charisma 3 Someone who has a small group of followers around them at all times and has some control over the activity of the group. Charisma 4 Someone with a large group of followers and the ability to sway others to their way of thinking and the activities they wish to be involved in. 96 Susceptibility was conceptualized as how likely an agent is to be influenced by the charismatic leader. Operationally, susceptibility is a Likert scale; an ordinal level variable with values ranging from 0 to 4. A value of 0 represented someone who was put off by a charismatic leader, and a value of 4 represented the highest possible susceptibility to the charismatic leader. The different levels of susceptibility and an explanation of what this means in the models is presented in Table 15 below. Because Weber (1947) hypothesized that some people are more susceptible to charismatic leaders than others, agents were given varying levels of susceptibility. Susceptibility was presented to the program as a range from 0-4 and the program randomly assigned each agent one of the numbers in the range at the start of the model run. If an agent decided to change its intrinsic hate, according to the behavior rules in Table 10, the model generated a new level of susceptibility within that range. Table 15: Levels of Susceptibility Level of Susceptibility Explanation Susceptibility 0 Not susceptible: the charismatic leader has no direct influence over the agent. Susceptibility 1 Not very susceptible: the charismatic leader has little direct influence over the agent. There is something about the charismatic leader that the agent does not like. Susceptibility 2 Neutral: the agent could go either way; the charismatic leader does not immediately sway the agent in either direction. Susceptibility 3 Somewhat susceptible: the agent is interested in what the charismatic leader has to say and is likely to follow. There is something that the agent likes about the charismatic leader. Susceptibility 4 Very susceptible: the agent is a true believer in what the charismatic leader has to say, is inclined to join any group that professes the charismatic leader‟s ideology and is easily influenced to do anything the charismatic leader wants. 97 The next section details the control and experimental conditions used to generate data to test the hypotheses more fully described at the end of Chapter Four. Control Condition In the control condition, the agents were unable to alter their extrinsic or intrinsic levels of hate. Also, unlike subsequent experiments, agents in this condition were randomly assigned values for their levels of extrinsic and intrinsic hate that they were not able to alter. Societal hate was systematically assigned, and because intrinsic and extrinsic hate were not allowed to vary over the year modeled, this means that societal hate remained constant during each model. Intrinsic hate, which is the basis for societal hate was randomly assigned using a Poisson distribution centered on the level of societal hate as the mean. See Table 16 below for the conditions present in the control model concerning societal hate and agent characteristics. When societal hate was low; the intrinsic hate of all agents was skewed to the low end. When societal hate was high; the intrinsic hate of all agents is skewed to the high end. The dependent variables measured included number of groups that form, speed of group formation, and group size. The control condition (which represented what would happen in the absence of the ability to vary hate and form a collective identity (i.e., collective hate) and in the absence of a charismatic leader) across different levels of societal hate provided data for comparison to the experiments described next. 98 Table 16: Control Model and Conditions Control Model Conditions Use in Analysis No Societal Hate Societal hate was not included in the model. All agents were randomly assigned levels of extrinsic and intrinsic hate that could not vary over the course of the model run. Analysis for hypotheses 1a-1c and 2a-2c Societal Hate 2 Societal Hate 4 Societal Hate 6 Societal Hate 8 Societal hate was set at level 2 and did not vary over the course of the model run. Societal hate was set at level 4 and did not vary over the course of the model run. Societal hate was set at level 6 and did not vary over the course of the model run. Societal hate was set at level 8 and did not vary over the course of the model run. . Analysis for hypotheses 1d-1f and 2d-2f For all societal hate conditions, all agents were randomly assigned levels of extrinsic and intrinsic hate that could not vary over the course of the model run. Intrinsic hate was randomly assigned using a Poisson distribution that used the level of societal hate as its mean. Experiments: Manipulating Collective Hate, Charismatic Leader Presence, and Societal Hate Using the behavioral rules shown in Table 10 and Figures 6 and 7, the experiments described in this section were used to generate data to systematically manipulate variables central to Hamm‟s and Weber‟s theories of group formation. This included models for four theory-based experiments (2 manipulating collective hate and 2 manipulating the presence of a charismatic leader) with each having a total of 1,000 model runs. The first model set for 99 collective hate provided data for determining whether a simple relationship existed between collective hate and the 3 dependent variables (e.g., number of groups, speed of group formation, size of group; H1a, H1b, H1c, respectively, see Table 17). The second model set for collective hate added societal hate as a potential moderating variable. For these, the collective hate model was run at each level of societal hate (i.e., 2, 4, 6, and 8) for each of the 3 dependent variables. This provided data to test whether higher levels of societal hate intensified the relationship between collective hate and the 3 dependent variables (H1d, H1e, H1f, respectively, see Table 17). The model sets for charismatic leadership followed the same logic as those described above for collective hate. In the first set of models, collective hate was allowed to vary and whether a charismatic leader was present as well as the leader‟s level of charisma varied. This provided data to test whether there was a simple relationship between presence of a charismatic leader while continuing the “real world” equivalency of allowing hate to vary (See Table 17, H2a, H2b, and H2c, respectively). In the second set of charismatic leader models, societal hate was added as a moderating variable providing data for testing the hypotheses that higher levels of societal hate would increase the relationship between the charismatic leader and the dependent variables (H2d, H2e, and H2f, respectively). Each model was allowed to run to simulate activity within 1 year (i.e., 1,460 ticks). Images that show examples of what these experiment models looked like when they were running and explanations of what was going on at that time in the model can be found in Appendix D. Conceptually, each experiment represented the same set of agents situated in different virtual worlds free to change their levels of intrinsic and extrinsic hate. Some virtual worlds contained charismatic leaders and some didn‟t. Some virtual worlds placed the agent within a societal context that ranged from low to high hatred. 100 Table 17: Hypotheses and Experiments Hypothesis (dependent variable) Experiment Parameters Control Condition Comparison for H1a-H1c Control Random assignment of fixed intrinsic and fixed extrinsic hate. Societal hate not included. Collective Hate Model Set 1 H1a: Number of Groups Collective Hate Random assignment of intrinsic and extrinsic hate. Societal hate not included. H1b: Speed of Formation Collective Hate Random assignment of intrinsic and extrinsic hate. Societal hate not included. H1c: Size of Groups Collective Hate Random assignment of intrinsic and extrinsic hate. Societal hate not included. Control Condition Comparison for H1d-H1f Control Random assignment of fixed intrinsic and fixed extrinsic hate. Societal hate included at levels 2, 4, 6, and 8. Collective Hate Model Set 2 H1d: Number of Groups with Societal Hate Collective Hate Random assignment of intrinsic and extrinsic hate. Societal hate included at levels 2, 4, 6, and 8. H1e: Speed of Formation with Societal Hate Collective Hate Random assignment of intrinsic and extrinsic hate. Societal hate included at levels 2, 4, 6, and 8. H1f: Size of Groups with Societal Hate Collective Hate Random assignment of intrinsic and extrinsic hate. Societal hate included at levels 2, 4, 6, and 8. Control Condition Comparison for H2a-H2c Control Random assignment of fixed intrinsic and fixed extrinsic hate. Societal hate not included. Charismatic Leader Model Set 1 H2a: Number of Groups with Charismatic Leader Charismatic Leadership Charismatic leader in model. Random assignment of intrinsic and extrinsic hate. Societal hate not included. 101 Table 17: Continued Hypothesis (dependent variable) Experiment Parameters H2b: Speed of Formation with Charismatic Leader Charismatic Leadership Charismatic leader in model. Random assignment of intrinsic and extrinsic hate. Societal hate not included. H2c: Size of Groups with Charismatic Leader Charismatic Leadership Charismatic leader in model. Random assignment of intrinsic and extrinsic hate. Societal hate not included. Control Condition Comparison for H2d-H2f Control Random assignment of fixed intrinsic and fixed extrinsic hate. Societal hate included at levels 2, 4, 6, and 8. Charismatic Leader Model Set 2 H2d: Number of Groups with Charismatic Leader and Societal Hate Charismatic Leadership Charismatic leader in model. Random assignment of intrinsic and extrinsic hate. Societal hate included at levels 2, 4, 6, and 8. H2e: Speed of Formation with Charismatic Leader and Societal Hate Charismatic Leadership Charismatic leader in model. Random assignment of intrinsic and extrinsic hate. Societal hate included at levels 2, 4, 6, and 8. H2f: Size of Groups with Charismatic Leader and Societal Hate Charismatic Leadership Charismatic leader in model. Random assignment of intrinsic and extrinsic hate. Societal hate included at levels 2, 4, 6, and 8. 102 It is akin to being able to see how different people would react in different conditions and situations that were selected for analysis based on the review of the literature on hate group formation and the theories of collective hate (Hamm, 2004) and charismatic leadership (Weber, 1947). Although the models encompassed increasingly complex representations of the conditions for hate group formation, they still were far simpler than the real world. Each experiment was built on the previous experiments to make it possible to clearly identify which parameters were being manipulated, how many groups formed, how quickly these groups formed and how large they became. The analytic strategies used to examine each of these hypotheses are described next. Analytic Plan All data generated by the log files of the experiments was analyzed using the statistical analysis program SPSS. The data were analyzed using a series of one way, 2x4 and 3x4 ANCOVAs as detailed in Table 18 below. ANCOVA or analysis of covariance was designed to expand upon the ideas of the ANOVA, which compares means of multiple groups as well as the interaction effects within those groups through the analysis of their variance (Harlow, 2005). ANCOVA expands on this type of analysis by allowing for the inclusion of covariates, factors that may influence or predict the outcome, but are not considered part of the main experiment. In the analysis of the data produced by the collective hate experiments, the covariate of interest is motivation, how much time did the agents spend seeking connections. In the charismatic leader experiment analyses, the covariates of interest include not only motivation, but the charismatic leader‟s level of charisma and the susceptibility of the agents to that charismatic leader. 103 Table 18: Analytic Plan Experiment Hypotheses Method Included Factors and Covariates Dependent Variable Collective Hate H1a-H1c One-way ANCOVA Experiment as between groups factor (Control v Collective Hate) Motivation as Covariate H1a: Formation H1b:Speed H1c:Size Collective Hate H1d-H1f 2x4 ANCOVA Experiment (Control v Collective Hate) and societal hate as between groups factor Motivation as Covariate H1d: Formation H1e:Speed H1f:Size Charismatic Leaders H2a-H2c One-way ANCOVA Experiment as between groups factor (Control v Collective Hate v Leader) Motivation, charisma, popularity, and susceptibility as Covariates H2a: Formation H2b:Speed H2c:Size Charismatic Leaders H2d-H2f 2x4 ANCOVA Experiment as one factor (Control v Leader) Societal hate as the second factor Motivation, charisma, popularity, and susceptibility as Covariates H2d: Formation H2e:Speed H2f:Size 104 Summary This chapter laid out the agent-based simulation modeling experiments designed to test Hamm‟s (2004) theory of collective hate and Weber‟s (1947) theory of charismatic leadership. The dependent variables of interest are the number of groups that form, the size of those groups, both the largest group and the number of larger groups, and the speed of formation, both the starting point of formation and the average number of days in which groups formed. The covariate of interest for the collective hate hypotheses (H1a-H1f) is motivation. For the charismatic leader hypotheses (H2a-H2f) motivation is a covariate of interest, but also susceptibility, the charismatic leader‟s level of charisma, and the leader‟s popularity. These covariates are parameters that were manipulated in the simulation models associated with their respective hypotheses. Each model was run 1,000 times absent of societal hate and 1,000 times each at varying levels of societal hate for a total of 5,000 model runs per experiment. The next chapter details the results of the experiments and the ANCOVA statistical analyses. 105 CHAPTER SEVEN RESULTS This chapter details the results of the statistical analysis. It is divided into four sections. Each section provides the ANCOVA analysis for one of the four sets of hypotheses tested in this dissertation and detailed in Table 18 in the previous chapter. The ANCOVA allows for the analysis of the main effects and interactions for the primary independent variables (i.e., collective hate, charismatic leadership and societal hate) net the influence covariates on the outcomes of interest, including group formation, group size, and speed of formation. The order in which the results are presented below follows the same order as the hypotheses. Hypotheses 1a-1c This section provides the results of the ANCOVA analyses comparing the control condition to the experimental collective hate condition. These ANCOVAs test the first set of hypotheses, those dealing with collective hate only. Societal hate is not considered in these analyses. For this section and the rest of this chapter, the effects of interest when present are represented by the symbols provided in Table 19 below. For example, in the results tables that follow, a statistically significant effect of the model condition on an outcome will be marked as A “significant main effect for model condition”. 106 Table 19: Effects and their Representations in for ANCOVAs for H1a-H1f Results Tables Effect of Interest (H1a-H1f) Representation in Effects Significant main effect for Model condition Significant main effect for Societal hate Significant Model condition X Societal hate interaction Motivation as a significant covariate Significance level p<.1 Significance level p<.05 Significance level p<.001 A B AxB C † ** *** Findings for the first hypothesis, H1a, as presented in Table 20, show the number of hate groups formed was significantly associated with model condition (control versus experimental) [F(1, 1,997) = 55.0, p<.001], as well as motivation [F(1, 1,997) = 4.1, p<.05]. In this analysis, the experimental model was consistent with expectations. That is, the experimental models produced significantly more hate groups than the control models. For the second hypothesis, H1b, which examined group size as the dependent variable (first based on the largest group formed), there was a significant effect for the experimental condition [F (1, 1,997) = 260.8, p<.001], and a marginally significant effect for motivation, [F (1, 1,997) = 2.3, p<.1]. Because of the exploratory nature of this research, the marginal effects become important for guiding future examination of model parameters. In this situation, the idea that motivation is marginally significant, means that this is a parameter that in future research should be kept in the model and further manipulated, perhaps with smaller time increments, 4 hours rather than 6 or as larger increments, agents active for a week and then inactive for 2 or 3 days. The control model produced the largest group when compared to the experimental condition. This finding is contrary to theory, because it was expected that the largest groups would have been seen in the experimental models rather than in the control models. The 107 individual log files showed that agents did not leave groups in the control models but they did frequently leave groups in the collective hate models. The net effect of this was that groups became larger than those in the experimental models because the group never experienced member attrition. That is to say, the control groups kept growing because no agents left the group or groups that they joined and more agents were added to those groups throughout the model run. When group size was operationally defined as the number of larger groups formed (i.e., groups that were larger than the requisite 5 members needed to define a group), a marginally significant effect for the experimental condition was observed [F (1, 1,997) = 2.4, p<.1]; however, motivation was not a statistically significant covariate. The control models produced slightly more larger groups than the experimental condition. This does not meet expectations, as the experimental condition was expected to produce larger groups and more of them. The individual log files showed that agents frequently left established groups in the experimental condition, making these groups slightly smaller than their control model counterparts. In the last analysis for Hypotheses 1a to 1c, the ANCOVA examined the relationship between experiment type and how quickly the groups formed (i.e., H1c). The first of these analyses examined at how quickly groups began to form operationalized as the number of days that elapsed before the first group formed. In this analysis, there was a significant effect for the experimental condition, [F (1, 1,997) = 3.8, p<.05]. The first group that formed in both the control model and the collective hate model formed, on average, on the 12 th day of the model run. The experimental condition produced its first hate group slightly earlier than the control model. When looking at how quickly groups formed using the average amount of time it took for each group to form aggregated across the entire model run, there was a significant effect for 108 collective hate, [F (1, 1,997) = 11.5, p<.001]. The control models created groups faster, on average, than the experimental collective hate models. It was expected that the experimental models would produce their hate groups faster than the control model, making this finding contrary to expectations. The log files did not show any particular reason for this pattern of findings. Groups in the experimental model took longer to form, perhaps because of the frequency with which the agents changed their extrinsic hate, something that the agents controlled in the experimental models but were unable to do so in the control models. Table 20: ANCOVA Analysis for Control vs. Collective Hate H1a-H1c Variables Control Collective Hate Significant Effects # of Hate Groups 18.7(94.0) 20.1 (4.4) A***, C** Size Largest Group 17.1(3.2) 15.0(2.6) A***, C† # of Larger Groups 27.0(3.2) 26.8(3.3) A† Speed Formation of First Group 11.9(4.1) 11.5(3.8) A** Average Formation Time 211.3(3.8) 211.9(4.6) A*** Note: Standard deviations appear in parentheses. Hypotheses 1d- 1f This section provides the results of the ANCOVA analysis comparing the control condition to the experimental condition in the models, taking into account the effect of societal hate as outlined in the second set of hypotheses, H1d-H1f. The results of the analyses are presented in Table 21 below. The means and standard deviation are presented in order, societal hate levels of 2, 4, 6, and 8 respectively. 109 The first analysis examined the effect of societal hate on the number of hate groups that form in the experimental condition (H1d). The analysis showed that there was a significant main effect for model condition [F (1, 7,991) = 618.9, p<.001]. In the control model, societal hate is stagnant; in the experimental condition, societal hate varies across the model run, as a function of changes in agent‟s intrinsic hate level. Examination of the log files showed that in the experimental models the agents with lower levels of hate were “hesitant” to increase their intrinsic hate past the set societal hate average. This is to say that an agent with intrinsic hate 2 when societal hate was 4 would not increase his hate past 4, no matter what his situation. This was an emergent property of the model. Agents in the experimental models were given full control over increasing or decreasing their intrinsic hate and nothing was programmed into their behavior rules that explicitly capped how much these levels could be increased. For the next hypothesis, H1e, which examined group size as the dependent variable (first based on the largest group formed), the analysis showed that there was a significant effect for the experimental condition [F (1, 7,991) = 21373.7, p<.001] and motivation as a significant covariate, [F (4, 7,991) = 5.1, p<.05]. The control model always produced the largest group when compared to the experimental condition, regardless of the level of societal hate. This mirrors the same findings as the previous analysis of the largest groups in H1b. The log files showed that when agents were given more control over their intrinsic and extrinsic hate; group membership fluctuated with agents commonly joining and then leaving a group in the experimental models, thus preventing groups from growing to the size seen in the control models. Examining the number of larger groups, the analysis showed that there was a significant effect for the experimental condition [F (1, 7,991) = 915.2, p<.001], and a marginally significant interaction between societal hate and the experimental condition [F (4, 7,991) = 19.3, p<.1]. 110 Motivation was not statistically significant as a covariate in either analysis for group size. Here the findings followed theoretical expectations, no matter what the level of societal hate; increasingly larger groups were observed in the experimental model as societal hate increased. The last hypothesis in this series dealt with the speed of group formation. The first analysis examined how quickly groups began forming. In this analysis, there was a marginally significant main effect of the experimental condition [F (4, 7,991) = 2.5, p<.1], as well as a marginally significant interaction between societal hate and the experimental condition [F (4, 7,991) = 1.9, p<.1]. The addition of societal hate resulted in the control models outperforming the experimental models. This results in a counterintuitive finding, as the experimental models were expected to form groups before the control model and did so, when societal hate was not included. The log files showed that this trend may have been due to the agents‟ constant shifting of their extrinsic hate early in the model runs, as extrinsic hate shifted, the ability to make connections that would lead to potential hate group formation were constantly in flux. The analysis conducted using the average amount of time it took for each group to form aggregated across the entire model run showed that there was a significant effect for the experimental condition [F (1, 7,991) = 567.5, p<.001]. The control models created groups faster, on average, than the experimental collective hate models. It was expected that the experimental models would produce their hate groups faster than the control model, making this finding contrary to expectations. Because the changing levels of intrinsic hate in the experimental condition are interconnected with societal hate (i.e., societal hate was the average collective intrinsic hate of the agents in the model); the changing levels of intrinsic hate inherent in the experimental condition model had a corresponding impact on societal hate, which in turn 111 impacted how quickly the groups came together. Motivation was not a statistically significant covariate in either analysis for speed of formation. Table 21: ANCOVA Analysis Control vs. Collective Hate for H1d-H1f, Societal Hate Effects Variables Societal Hate Level Control Collective Hate Significant Effects # of Groups 2 4 6 8 19.0(3.6) 19.2(3.6) 19.0(3.4) 19.0(3.6) 17.2(3.5) 17.2(3.6) 16.9(3.5) 17.2(3.6) A*** Size Largest Group 2 4 6 8 17.9(3.7) 18.1(3.9) 18.1(3.7) 17.9(3.7) 14.8(2.6) 14.8(2.5) 14.7(2.6) 14.7(2.7) A***, C** # of Larger Groups 2 4 6 8 24.8(3.3) 24.9(3.0) 24.9(3.0) 24.9(3.1) 27.1(3.3) 27.1(3.3) 26.9(3.3) 27.3(3.4) A***, AxB† Speed Formation of First Group 2 4 6 8 12.5(4.8) 12.9(4.6) 12.6(4.6) 12.6(4.6) 12.8(4.3) 12.6(4.2) 12.9(4.3) 12.9(4.1) A†, AxB† Average Formation Time 2 4 6 8 132.5(11.5) 133.0(11.5) 132.8(11.4) 132.5(11.8) 138.6(10.3) 138.7(10.6) 132.3(10.5) 138.6(10.0) A*** Hypotheses 2a- 2c These sections provide the results of the ANCOVA analyses examining the role that societal hate and charismatic leadership played in the variations observed in each of the 3 dependent variables: number of groups, group size, and speed of group formations. These 112 ANCOVAs test the third and fourth sets of hypotheses and the manner in which the effects of interest are represented is presented in Table 22 below. Table 22: Effects and their Representations in for ANCOVAs for H2a-H2f Results Tables Effect of Interest (H2a-H2f) Representation in Effects Column Significant main effect for Experimental condition A Significant main effect for Societal hate B Significant interaction term (Experimental condition x Societal hate) AxB Motivation as a significant covariate C Charisma as a significant covariate D Susceptibility as a significant covariate E Popularity as a significant covariate F Significant p<.1 † Significant p<.05 ** Significant p<.001 *** The results of the analyses related specifically to hypotheses H2a-H2c are presented in Table 23 below. For the first hypothesis, H2a, that examined the number of hate groups formed when a charismatic leader was included in the model, there was a significant effect for the experimental condition, [F (1, 1,994) = 13.3, p<.001], and a marginally significant effect for motivation as a covariate, [F (1, 1,994) = 2.8, p<.1]. The charismatic leader model produced more groups than the control model. For the second hypothesis, H2b, examining group size (first based on the largest group formed), there was a significant effect for the experimental condition [F (1, 1,994) = 20.7, p<.001]. None of the covariates were statistically significant. The control model produced the largest groups. An examination of the log files showed that agents who agreed with the charismatic leader avoided agreements with agents who disagreed with the charismatic leader. This decreased the number of agents with whom the charismatic leader‟s followers could form groups. This was an emergent property of the model because the agents were not given any 113 specific behavior rules to influence their interaction with other agents based on the extent to which the agents supported or disapproved of the charismatic leader. When examining group size based on the number of larger groups formed, nothing was significant. The control model produced more larger groups, but the difference was not statistically significant. In the last analysis in this series, the ANCOVA tested the third hypothesis, H2c, regarding how quickly the groups formed. The first of these analyses examined how long it took for the first hate group to form. In this analysis, there was a marginally significant effect for the experimental condition, [F (1, 1,994) = 3.1, p<.1]. On average, the first group that formed in the control model and in the experimental condition was formed on the 12 th day, with the groups forming in the charismatic leader models slightly earlier. When looking at the mean formation time for all groups in days, there was a marginally significant effect for the experimental condition, [F (1, 1,994) = 2.7, p<.1]. On average, when looking at all the groups that formed, the average time for group formation was faster in the charismatic leader model, but only slightly. Table 23: ANCOVA Analysis for Control vs. Charismatic Leadership H2a-H2c Variables Control Charismatic Leadership Significant Effects # of Groups 18.7(4.0) 19.9(4.3) A***, C† Size Largest Group 17.0(3.1) 15.1(2.5) A*** # of Larger Groups 27.2(3.3) 26.8(3.4) ns Speed Formation of First Group 11.7(3.9) 11.3(3.8) A† Average Formation Time 211.3(4.2) 211.0(4.1) A† 114 Hypotheses 2d – 2f This final section provides the results of the ANCOVA analysis comparing the control conditions to the experimental charismatic leadership condition in the models while taking into account the effect of societal hate, as outlined in the second set of hypotheses, H2d-H2f. The results of the analyses are presented in Table 24 below. The means and standard deviation are listed in sequence, beginning with the condition where societal hate was equal to 2, 4, 6, and 8 respectively. The first hypothesis in this set, H2d, examined the effect of societal hate on the number of hate groups formed. There was a significant effect for the experimental condition, [F (1, 7,989) = 25.0, p<.001]. The changing levels of intrinsic hate in the experimental condition had an impact on societal hate, which in turn impacts how the groups form in that model. Among the covariates, nothing was significant. In this situation, the control model produced more hate groups when societal hate was included, as compared to the scenario where societal hate was not included. This finding was unexpected, and examination of the log files showed that in some of the model runs where the charismatic leader was included, the charismatic leader started out acquiring detractors before supporters, in these situations the number of supporters eventually acquired by the charismatic leader were outnumbered by the detractors. This decreased the number of hate groups that formed in those model runs, as the detractors often decreased their intrinsic hate at the first opportunity after meeting the charismatic leader. This was an emergent property of the model because agents were not given a behavior rule that would have caused them to decrease their intrinsic hate if they disagreed with the charismatic leader. 115 For the second hypothesis, H2e, examining group size (first based on the largest group that formed), there was a significant effect for the experimental condition [F (1, 7,989) = 47.2, p<.001]. Of the covariates, there was a significant effect for motivation, [F (1, 7,989) = 11.1, p<.001]. The other covariates were not statistically significant. The control model produced the largest group in all situations. The log files showed a tendency by the charismatic leader‟s supporters to avoid agents who did not agree with the charismatic leader and to drop their intrinsic hate and leave a group if detractors of the charismatic leader joined that group. This resulted in groups having too much flux in membership to develop into the largest possible groups. The agents were not given any particular behavior rules regarding interaction based on support of the charismatic leader; therefore these behaviors are emergent properties. When examining group size based on the number of larger groups formed, there was a significant effect for the experimental condition [F (1, 7,989) = 227.9, p<.001]. None of the covariates were statistically significant. In this situation, the charismatic leader model did produce a larger number of large groups, regardless of the level of societal hate. Another explanation from the log files shows there was a trend for groups that formed with more than one supporter of the charismatic leader in the initial 5 members to draw more of the charismatic leader‟s supporters into the group throughout the model run. There is no programming that explains this behavior; it is an emergent property that helps explain why larger groups formed in the charismatic leader model scenarios. In the last set of analyses, the ANCOVA tested the third hypothesis, H2f, regarding how quickly groups formed. The first of these analyses examined how quickly groups began to form based on when the first group formed. In this analysis the only significant main effect was the experimental condition and this was only marginally significant, [F (4, 7,989) = 2.2, p<.1], 116 motivation was also marginally significant as a covariate [F (4, 7,989) = 2.1, p<.1]. The presence of the charismatic leader was expected to speed up group formation, no matter what level of societal hate was evident in the model. This was not the case. When societal hate was added to the models, the experimental condition resulted in the first group forming slightly after the control model‟s groups. The log files showed that the agent behavior first identified in the explanation for H2e held true at all levels of societal hate. That is, agents who followed the charismatic leader were “disinclined” to agree with agents who disagreed with the charismatic leader. No matter what the level of societal hate, this not only effected group size when societal hate was included in the models, but also increased the amount of time it took for some groups to form because this increased the amount of time between agreements for the charismatic leader‟s followers. When looking at the mean formation time for all groups, there was a significant effect for the experimental charismatic leadership condition [F (1, 7,989) = 155.6, p<.001]. None of the covariates were significant. In all instances, the control model produced a faster average time of formation than the charismatic leader model. This is counterintuitive as the charismatic leader‟s presence was expected to increase the speed of group formation. The log files showed that the agent behavior first identified in the explanation for H2e and identified as a factor in the formation of the first group, held true at all levels of societal hate. That is, agents who followed the charismatic leader were “disinclined” to agree with agents who disagreed with the charismatic leader. No matter what the level of societal hate, this increased the amount of time it took for some groups to form because this increased the amount of time between agreements for the charismatic leader‟s followers. 117 Table 24: ANCOVA Analysis for Control vs. Charismatic Leadership H2d-H2f, effects of Societal Hate Variables Societal Hate Level Control Charismatic Leadership Significant Effects # of Groups 2 4 6 8 18.1(3.7) 18.2(3.7) 17.9(3.6) 18.1(3.7) 16.7(3.5) 16.9(3.5) 16.8(3.6) 16.8(3.5) A*** Size Largest Group 2 4 6 8 16.4(3.6) 16.4(3.7) 16.4(3.6) 16.3(3.6) 14.5(2.6) 14.6(2.7) 14.5(2.5) 14.6(2.5) A***, C*** # of Larger Groups 2 4 6 8 25.9(3.5) 25.9(3.3) 25.9(3.3) 26.1(3.5) 26.9(3.4) 26.9(3.4) 27.1(3.4) 27.1(3.4) A*** Speed Formation of First Group 2 4 6 8 12.7(4.5) 12.8(4.4) 12.7(4.4) 12.7(4.3) 12.8(4.3) 12.8(4.3) 12.8(4.2) 12.9(4.3) A†, C† Average Formation Time 2 4 6 8 132.5(11.3) 133.0(11.4) 132.8(11.3) 132.5(11.4) 138.9(10.4) 138.6(10.6) 138.8(10.2) 138.5(10.9) A*** Summary This chapter presented the results of the analyses testing the hypotheses set forth by this dissertation. The ANCOVAs found significant effects supporting both collective hate and charismatic leadership in terms of the formation of hate groups, their size and the speed of formation. Support also was found in all analyses for motivation as a covariate. The next chapter discusses these results and their implications. 118 CHAPTER EIGHT DISCUSSION Does collective hate influence variations in the attributes of hate group formation? Does the presence of a charismatic leader influence variations in the attributes of hate group formation? As discussed below, this dissertation has begun to answer these questions. These findings have important implications for agent-based simulation models as methodology, criminological theory, public policy and future research. The research has identified the following findings:  The theoretically-informed models of human behavior generated hate groups.  The experimental models, both collective hate and charismatic leadership produced more hate groups when societal hate was not added to the models.  For the experimental models, larger groups were more prevalent than in the control model, at all levels of societal hate.  When societal hate was included in the models, the control model, which gave the agents the least amount of freedom over their levels of intrinsic and extrinsic hate, produced the most hate groups and the largest hate groups.  Because all models produced hate groups, there was support for Hamm‟s (2004) theory of collective hate.  Because the charismatic leader model replicated the charismatic leader‟s acquisition of supporters, there was support for Weber‟s (1947) theory of charismatic leadership. Hate groups formed at all levels of societal hate. There was a significant difference between the control and experimental models, especially when societal hate was included in the models. In cases where larger groups formed, these groups in the real world can have more 119 moderate views and behaviors than their smaller counterparts; these groups essentially police the behavior of their membership through the overall numbers within the group (SPLC, 2009). Small groups can radicalize faster than larger groups and can also be more inclined to engage in criminal activity (Hamm, 2007). Groups that formed quickly may not have the staying power of groups that formed more slowly, in the case of Robert Matthews nearly a decade passed between when he formed the Sons of Liberty and the formation of the Order, of the two, the Order was far more involved in criminal behavior and acting upon Matthews‟ supremacist ideology (Hamm, 2007). When societal hate was included, the control models produced more groups and in all cases produced the largest group. Although this seems somewhat counterintuitive, comparison of the control and experimental model log files revealed two factors relating to this difference: 1) When societal hate was included in the models, the societal level of hate established a starting point for the intrinsic hate of the agents in all models. The control model did not allow for the variation of this hate. This hate could vary within the collective hate model, and the agents with lower levels of hate in this model were “hesitant” to change their intrinsic hate when given the option, and rarely did so to a level above the societal average. This means that an agent starting with hate equal to 2 in a model where the societal average started at 4 very rarely increased their level of hate beyond 4. This is an emergent property 26 that held throughout the models. It cannot be explained by the model programming. This opens up new questions to explore within these models and the resultant data. Situations like this one highlight a key difference between simulated and other forms of research: where this result would inspire further interviews in qualitative research or the creation of a revised survey in quantitative research, the changing numbers present in the model log files cannot be asked to elaborate. 26 An expanded discussion of emergent properties and their relation to ABM can be found in Railsback, S. and Grimm, V. (in press) Agent-Based and Individual-Based Modeling A Practical Introduction, Princeton, Princeton University Press. 120 When societal hate was allowed to change, there was an increased likelihood of groups to form when societal hate was decreasing in the models where societal hate began at higher levels. This is consistent with the real world phenomena where hate groups, particularly Klan groups or groups that form due to a particular political issue, believe that society is becoming too accepting of that which they hate – Klan groups drew increased membership when schools desegregated, in the past two years the SPLC has had to increase the number of categories of hate groups to account for new anti-gay and anti-immigrant groups, forming in reaction to changes in political and public policy. When societal hate started low and was able to change, groups formed as societal hate increased, where more agents started raising their level of hate, this is also similar to the real world phenomena where hate groups form as more people establish a hate of a particular target, case in point anti-Muslim groups after the 9/11 terrorist attacks or anti-German groups in the wake of the American entry into World War II. 2) A second explanation for why the control model produced more hate groups when societal hate was included in the models is that while in the collective hate model agents left groups and joined new groups, agents formed multiple groups in the control model. In these situations, the agents in one group also formed satellite groups. This was not something that happened in the experimental conditions, so in the experimental conditions, the agents likely left the group and joined another rather than maintaining membership in multiple groups. In the charismatic leader models, the leader‟s supporters avoided agreements with anyone who did not agree with the charismatic leader. In some cases, this greatly decreased their potential pool of agreements towards group formation. As with the collective hate model, the charismatic leadership model increases the number of opportunities for the agents to change their internal characteristics, this ability increases the likelihood that groups dissolved. Another 121 potential explanation from examining the log files is that the agents that agreed with the leader would not agree with agents who disagreed with the leader, despite having similar levels of intrinsic and extrinsic hate; this is an emergent property that was not programmed into the charismatic leader model. While this behavior decreased the number of agreements between certain agents, thereby decreasing the likelihood that they would gain enough agreements to form a group it does illustrate balance theory. Balance theory, identified by Heider (1958), argues that individuals make decisions regarding interpersonal relationships in an attempt to achieve a balance state. In this balance state, individuals seek relationships that will maintain a positive agreement on a personal belief or viewpoint, as it relates to a third person or mutual interest (Heider, 1958). Individuals are uncomfortable or experience tension in situations where the views of the members of a group regarding the mutual interest are not in balance, which can result in the dissolution of partnerships or relationships (Heider, 1958). Similar to the collective hate model, in the charismatic leader model, agents that left a group usually sought out a group that had already formed that was more in-line with their characteristics, making these groups larger. In both the collective hate and the charismatic leader models, this seemed to indicate that once an agent decided to be a member of a group, even if they left that group, they appeared to seek out group membership in an already formed group than begin the process to make new connections to form new groups. This is an emergent property, not programmed into the models. This means that the behavior is not programmed, but that agents who have previously been members of a group appear to be drawn to established groups. Because some agents were more “picky” about which agreements they sought out, particularly those agents who agreed with the charismatic leader to avoid agents who disagreed 122 with the leader, this resulted in a longer period of time before those agents made enough agreements to form a group. Implications for Methodology This dissertation used an innovative methodology, simulation modeling, to study hate group formation. As noted previously, simulation models are usually considered viable if they recreate real world phenomena in ways that “match up” to history and experience. The models in the dissertation, thus, were successful in that they recreated hate groups using a small number of theoretical parameters. They have recreated situations that have been seen, historically, in the real world. For example, hate groups formed around a charismatic leader, something that has been seen throughout American history with White Supremacist groups like the Ku Klux Klan, the Order, and neo-Nazis. Hate groups formed at all levels of societal hate, just like they have in the United States throughout history. Regardless of how accepting society has become of ethnic, cultural and social diversity, hate groups have formed if enough people accept a hate ideology. Hate groups became rather large with a single group encompassing nearly 5 to 6% of the population of the model, similar to membership seen in the 1920‟s by the Klan in the US and in the 1930s and 1940s by the Nazi party in Germany. Furthermore, these models can provide a basis for additional examination of hate group phenomena. Regardless, much research into hate groups using this methodology remains and the data collected in this dissertation can continue to be analyzed. Collectively, results of these models provide support for the continued and expanded use of this methodology in the field of criminal justice, especially when the phenomena of interest are inaccessible. The fact that hate groups formed under these simplified conditions cannot be discounted. The purpose of these models was 123 to see whether hate groups could be formed based solely on hate, following Hamm‟s (2004) theory of collective hate. Using hate as the primary characteristic, extrinsic and intrinsic, formed hate groups. With respect to the second theory Weber‟s (1947) theory of charismatic leadership, the influence of a single individual as a catalyst for group formation encouraged those with the same level of hate to form hate groups. Although, in both of these situations the number of hate groups, how large they were and how quickly they formed did not surpass the control model, they still formed. The unexamined data produced by this dissertation‟s models may provide a wealth of further information that can be matched to historically known scenarios and situations. All in all, the models are a viable starting point for examining hate groups, as well as other extremist or criminal groups, such as terrorist organizations, violent Mexican drug cartels, and street or prison gangs. Limitations of Simulation Modeling As a methodology, simulation modeling cannot replace other forms of research, either qualitative or quantitative. This is because models lack the detail that can be accomplished through qualitative and quantitative research that can get at the purely human element of social phenomena. However, simulation modeling can take these more traditional forms of research in new directions, like when examining something that cannot be measured with a survey, or objectively identified through qualitative means, like hate group formation. Although the goal of simulation modeling is to use the simplest combination of characteristics and behavior rules to duplicate social phenomena in a computerized environment, it is always possible that the model oversimplifies the situation (Miller and Page, 2007; Gilbert and Troitzsch, 2005). Simulation models should be seen as a springboard for “real world” 124 qualitative and quantitative research (Gilbert and Troitzsch, 2005). Simulation cannot replace real world observation, ethnographic, historical or archival research, but in situations where real world observation is dangerous or ethically inadvisable, it provides a viable resource for theoretical examination (Miller and Page, 2007; Gilbert and Troitzsch, 2005; Groff, 2007). Limitations of the Models used in this Dissertation The models used in this dissertation have identified hate as a primary characteristic of interest and tested two theories; collective hate and charismatic leadership, in an attempt to recreate the dynamics of hate group formation in simulation. The rigid structure of the control models, specifically the inflexible nature of the model (not letting agents change) had the effect of agents not dropping out of a group once they had joined. This is very different from real world groups and this complicated the comparison with the experimental models. Human beings are incredibly complex in their thoughts, interactions and responses to the situations in which they find themselves. Though hate groups formed under these conditions, it is still probable that something has been overlooked. Although many human characteristics that are typically considered important were not included (i.e. education level, socio-economic status), this limitation was partially offset by the fact that hate groups form at every level of these characteristics in the real world. Nevertheless, these models did not include one characteristic that is considered very important to hate groups and that is race. Race was not included as it is an assumed characteristic in Hamm‟s (2004) and Weber‟s (1947) theories. Both of theories were designed to explain behaviors and phenomena seen in racially or ethnically homogenous settings. Therefore, all agents were the same race and racial pride was not a characteristic given to the agents. In future 125 research examining hate group behavior and hate crime, this is a characteristic that will likely need to be included. Also, these models were not designed to examine even simulated responses to a specific “trigger” event that could increase hate group formation, such as a heinous crime, as in the case of the Knights of Mary Phagan. Further, different types of hate groups, even within the broader category of white supremacist groups form along generational lines. Ku Klux Klan or Neo-Nazi group members may join as teens or as adults up into their 50s and 60s, while Skinhead groups usually are formed by and recruit individuals below the age of 25. The exclusion of age, while maintaining the simplicity of the models, does prevent more careful examination of how subgroups differing in age within white supremacy groups may emerge differently in both simulation and the real world. Finally, societal hate was operationalized as the mean of the intrinsic hate of all agents in the models; societal hate is a relatively new concept and may not relate at all to a mean level of hate in a society. While historians, archivists and ethnographers examining Nazi Germany and the Ku Klux Klan have discussed the role of society and social views on the rise of these groups, no one has sought to measure a society‟s psychological or emotional level regarding hate. Although, opinion polls on various subjects that are “hot button” issues to hate groups (gay marriage, desegregation, immigration, to name a few) exist, they are fraught with methodological and validity concerns and at best are only a proxy measure of societal hate. Public opinion is fickle. Although many hate groups have been able to increase their membership and support by playing off public opinion, this does not mean that societal hate is the best proxy. It can be argued that these models could be used to form groups for a variety of purposes by switching intrinsic and extrinsic hate with other characteristics, such as “love of chess.” Due to the lack of a means for externally validating the hate group formation models, this can be seen 126 as a limitation. The same argument can be made for any simulation model, that any characteristic is only a label provided by the modeler and embodies only as much meaning as that label. While this is a limitation of these and other simulation models, the models generated groups that are listed as hate groups, under the conditions provided in the model programming. The distribution of both intrinsic and extrinsic hate and whether or not they are correlated with one another may be another limitation to this study. There simply have been no real world surveys of hate to enable a determination of how close real world estimations would match those of the simulation. Eleven levels of intrinsic and extrinsic hate may be too many or too few to show the varying degrees of hate that are present in society. Furthermore, the agents may have been given too much freedom over their characteristics, especially evident because this was a driving force in the experimental models that differentiated how many groups formed when agents were given more freedom versus the absence of freedom in the control model. Implications for Criminological Theory Results from the models indicate that there was support for Hamm‟s (2004) theory of collective hate. The support for Hamm‟s (2004) theory of collective hate, evidenced in both the control and collective hate models supports the idea that collective hate is, at the very least, if not absolutely necessary, is a sufficient condition for hate groups to form. Furthermore, the charismatic leader models produced enough hate groups to warrant further examination of Weber‟s (1947) theory of charismatic leadership as an influence on hate group formation. Hate groups did form at each level of societal hate and societal hate effects were supported by the analysis. It might be useful to further explore each theory individually and relate the findings to the historical events that influenced the creation of these theories and the foundation of these models. 127 Collective Hate These models produced groups at varying levels of hate; and therefore, not only did they successfully model group formation but also hate group formation in a way that appears to support Hamm‟s (2004) theory of collective hate. The models included three types of hate, intrinsic, extrinsic, and societal. Hate was programmed as the driving force for interactions between individuals and the agents did interact and form groups based on this characteristic. The control model, which was a version of the collective hate model without “free will” to change the values of their internal and external characteristics, was consistent with the theory of collective hate. Perhaps more compelling was that when agents were given “free will” like their real world counterparts in the experimental models, they still produced hate groups. Although allowing agents to have autonomy over intrinsic/extrinsic hate levels is more representative of how people behave in the “real world”, the fact that collective hate led to group formation in the control condition as well as the experimental condition provides strong support for this idea. Conceptually it is accurate to say that the exchange between individuals with differing levels of both intrinsic and extrinsic hate represents a “shared belief” in the sense that only those who have similar levels of hate form a group. Further examination of the data will shine more light on which types of hate and at which level they influenced hate group formation. Research conducted by Ramakrishna (2006), with Islamic militant youth has shown that a collective prejudice or bigotry is instrumental in influencing individuals to seek out and join terrorist groups. If hate is the driving force behind hate group formation and hate is being identified as part of the connection between members of terrorist and other extreme groups, the current research is valuable for examining the spread of such groups. Expansion of the models used in this dissertation, to other, more extreme groups, 128 can examine the dissemination of ideology via media as well as how the internet or other non- person-to-person communication can spread a belief and expand a group‟s support base. From a different perspective, other emotional connections, such as desire, loyalty or revenge can be modeled to use variations of these experiments to model gang formation or the establishment of criminal or subversive networks, such as child pornography rings, cults or counter-government movements. Charismatic Leadership The most striking results were those found in relation to the charismatic leader hypotheses. When societal hate was included, the charismatic leader model produced the fewest hate groups, especially since charismatic leaders were theorized to be a product of the society in which they come to power. This may be due in part to an over-simplified representation of charismatic leadership in the model or this result may actually be echoing history. Historically, charismatic leaders have not risen to power from the ether, and their group dominates the landscape, limiting the proliferation of other groups. Historians and archivists who focus on Nazi Germany highlight a series of events that came into alignment that allowed for the rise of Hitler (Kershaw, 2008). Among these events were Germany‟s loss of World War I, the shame and degradation of the German people due to heavy reparations and massive unemployment (Kershaw, 2008); increases in crime and immorality, especially in Berlin, the rise of the mysticism movement, the Great Depression in the United States, rising popularity of the Communist Party, civil unrest, weak centralized government and the Reichstag Fire; all contributed to Hitler‟s rise (Kershaw, 2008). Weber‟s (1947) original examination of charismatic leadership was designed to explain the rise and influence of charismatic leaders. The small number of hate groups formed in the 129 charismatic leader models likely highlights the importance of these other factors when studying charismatic leadership and separate modeling that would allow for thresholds of unrest, unemployment and catastrophic incidents likely is needed. Another explanation from history is that charismatic leaders have sometimes been associated with several different groups, but too many competing groups are detrimental to the leader‟s sway over his followers, as too many opportunities for in-fighting distract from the leader‟s message. Other reasons for why the presence of a charismatic leader resulted in a smaller number of groups can be seen in the early supporters of the Nazi party. While Hitler was a great orator and passionate in his message, his personal habits and mannerisms made him someone that most people would not be comfortable with should they meet him on the street (Kershaw, 2008; Gellately, 2001; Fritzsche, 2008). Weber himself expanded on his original views of charismatic leadership throughout his writings and these variations of charisma idea developed later than the original theory can guide future variations of the charismatic leader model. Charismatic leaders come to the forefront in a wide variety of organizations, not just hate groups. Charismatic leaders have a place in legitimate society and organizations; however, their sway is also seen among more dangerous groups or can be employed in subversive ways. The groups that formed in this model included the followers of the leader. The leader‟s followers were given an extra option for changing their intrinsic hate and other internal characteristics. If these agents increased their intrinsic hate, radicalizing in support of the leader‟s views, they would surpass the intrinsic hate of their fellow agents within a group, resulting in more frequent model calculations of the group‟s mean intrinsic hate and more opportunities for drop-outs to choose to leave the group. If enough members left, the group dissolved. More experimentation with charisma and susceptibility may help model a group 130 members‟ acquiescence in instances of genocide, war crimes, and less violent crimes, such as voluntary participation in Ponzi schemes or fraud. Societal Hate Societal hate produced significant effects in the models used in this dissertation. However, the number of hate groups did not increase as societal hate increased. Hate groups formed at all levels of societal hate, but did their best, especially in the experimental models, when societal hate was not included in the model. Unlike in the past, hate groups are not always at their most prevalent when society supports their views. Hate groups can be very reactionary. If society is not supporting the hate group‟s views it can almost be seen by the hate group that there is a greater need to form additional groups to gather the “believers” together to fight a society that is delusional, in their opinion, for not sharing their views and beliefs. Hate groups that have formed throughout history have seen increased support and membership when society as a whole appeared to be evolving, such as when Supreme Court cases found in favor of equality and desegregation during the Civil Rights Era (Wade, 1987: Chalmers, 1981). This is part of the conjecture of Hamm‟s (1994) examination of skinheads that led to his collective hate theory, that potential skinheads perceived society or government as supporting the target of their hatred rather than those blue-collar, white, Anglo-Saxon, Protestants who were the skinhead‟s family, friends, and neighbors. Although the collective hate and charismatic leader models allowed for the levels of societal hate to vary over time, the level of variance was not examined in the present analysis. Hate groups formed at each level of societal hate; therefore, this change in societal hate likely merits further evaluation. Further examination of the data may show support for changing levels of societal hate to better match the politically and socially reactionary history of hate groups. Societal hate may be different from 131 societal acceptance of a hate group‟s presence or activities. Altering societal hate to not be related to the hate possessed by the agents themselves may present a better way to examine the phenomena. Societal hate is a relatively new concept, while it has been linked to the everyday German in the years preceding and throughout the Nazi regime (Kershaw, 2008: Goldhagen, 1996). This merits future examination, especially if one or the other can be used to explain genocide or other atrocities in more recent history. Implications for Public Policy While support has been found in this dissertation for the theories of collective hate and charismatic leadership, many more models need to be built and tested before concrete policy recommendations can be made from the findings. This is not to say that hate groups are not a public policy issue. This section examines some of the legislation and policies in place. The existing legislation is supported by this dissertation‟s preliminary findings. Currently, little has been done to legislate against hate groups beyond the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871. Instead, a variety of legislation has passed in order to track and punish hate crime. Not specifically designed as a hate crime statute, 18 U.S.C.A. § 245, similar to 18 U.S.C.A. § 241, was passed to provide a basis for the Federal government to respond to bias, prejudice, and the denial of civil rights not addressed specifically by state or local law enforcement or officials (Jacobs and Potter, 1998). The most well-known of these Federal statutes is the Hate Crime Statistics Act of 1990 (Jacobs and Potter, 1998). Although, this law does not provide any form of compensation for victims of hate crime or any special definitions, prosecutorial powers or specific punishments, it is designed to track how many hate crimes occur annually in the United States. 132 Other examples of Federal statutes are those designed to prevent hate group members from serving in the military and provide for the recording of hate crimes occurring in relation to the military. Specifically the recording of hate crimes perpetrated by or against military personnel on the basis of race, religion or gender (P.L. 11-84). In 2009, the Matthew Shepard and James Byrd Jr. Hates Crimes Prevention Act was enacted as part of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (P.L. 11-84). This act expanded the original Hate Crime Statistics Act of 1990 and allows for the investigation and prosecution of hate crime on a federal level (P.L. 11-84 § 4701). However, the punishment of hate crimes, usually through the use of sentence enhancement, has been mostly left to the states. (For a review of state legislation, see Jacobs and Potter, 1998 and Jenness and Grattet, 1996). At times, state hate crime legislation has been challenged in the Supreme Court 27 over concerns about the constitutionality of sentencing enhancement for hate crimes. Further research into hate group formation and then subsequent research into hate group behavior can be used to support sentencing enhancement, especially in situations where the accused claims affiliation with a known hate group. Recent legislation excluded, the limitations of Federal hate crime legislation has not prevented the Federal prosecution of hate group members. Often, as the result of the arbitrary decisions made by prosecutors, hate group members have been labeled as terrorists, especially in cases involving sedition, treason and overt political actions, or situations that were explicitly political, such as the Oklahoma City Bombing (Turk, 1982: Hewitt, 2000: Smith, 1994: Smith, et. al, 2002) 28 . 27 R.A.V. v. St. Paul ruled a Minnesota ordinance unconstitutional on 1 st amendment grounds as it prohibited biased or prejudiced speech. Wisconsin v. Mitchell upheld Wisconsin‟s sentencing enhancement, as it dealt with criminal conduct rather than speech. For an examination of both cases, see Jacobs, James B. and Kimberly Potter (1998) Hate Crime: Criminal Law and Identity Politics. New York: Oxford University Press. 28 Beyond any sort of Federal or state prosecution of hate group members, any sort of legal or social institution, such as the Southern Poverty Law Center can attempt to regulate or counter hate groups and hate crime. The SPLC regularly attempts to counter skinhead and other hate group behavior through law suits. 133 The current count of 1002 active hate groups in the United States as of 2010 is an embarrassment to the image of a nation that prides itself for its position on fairness, equality and impartiality, the underlying tenets of justice and freedom. It is impossible to legislate against hate. Denying the rights of speech and assembly to groups whose beliefs and messages are not popular with the greater population is unconstitutional and provides the framework for a slippery slope of lost rights. Although FBI Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) data for hate crime provides detailed information about both the victims and the incident, little information is included about the offenders who committed these crimes. This makes it impossible to provide statistics related to whether a perpetrator was or was not affiliated with a hate group. Membership or interest in a particular hate group or ideology is only available in statements made by offenders at arrest or trial, but are not a part of the UCR record. Therefore, the percentage of hate crimes perpetrated by hate group members, hate group supporters, or individuals with no interest in or involvement with a hate group is unknown. Given that hate groups are well entrenched in American society and history and protected by the Bill of Rights, the presence of a hate group and the proliferation of its rhetoric are influential on the behaviors of anyone susceptible to their message, sometimes to the point of violence. More precise information regarding bias crime would lead to a far better understanding of bias motivated crime. This means that keeping some form of record of hate group affiliation in the UCR data for hate crime could be considered vitally important. Being aware of the dynamics of hate group formation may allow for preemptive action on the part of politicians and law enforcement to discourage hate group formation before it becomes a constitutional issue. 134 Some populations are more susceptible to the ideology and rhetoric of hate groups than others. Among those susceptible populations are those who are currently incarcerated. An understanding of how hate groups form and gain membership is imperative to the Corrections system. Policy and procedure within the prison system is different from the greater population. It is possible to intercept, evaluate, and censor communication. It is also possible to separate dangerous inmates from the rest of the prison population, either through sanction or isolation. Limiting the access of a charismatic leader to a potential group of followers is not impossible within the prison system. Therefore, if future research shows charismatic leadership as the parameter with the strongest correlation to hate group formation, it would be imperative for maintaining order and safety within the prison system to educate staff and administrators on the dangers of charismatic leadership and the identification of charismatic leaders adhering to hate ideologies, so that such individuals could be isolated from General Population prisoners before they gain enough support to cause problems. In the community, it is not impossible to educate against hate and to combat the rhetoric of existing groups with fact. The foremost benefit in policy as a response to hate group formation is in the education of the potential hate group member to decrease the likelihood that hate group membership would be seen as beneficial or desirable. Programs currently in place to encourage students to identify and embrace diversity are beneficial in combating a desire for hate group membership as it decreases the likelihood of an individual believing rhetoric that belittles demographic groups of individuals based on those characteristics. While the impact of mentoring or education as having the ability to counteract the effects of charismatic leadership has not been determined, from a collective hate focus, these educational programs certainly have merit. 135 Future Research Although these models have examined at hate groups as a whole, the data sets include information regarding hate groups at the most extreme levels. The formation of hate groups in these models based on varying levels of hate provides support for Hamm‟s (2004) theory of collective hate and a basis for future research. Because of the rich amount of data produced by these simulation models, there are several relationships and elements that can be examined beyond what was analyzed for this dissertation. Future research can examine just the individual agents and their interactions and characteristics to determine what elements of the models really influenced their behaviors and decisions and then new and expanded models can be developed to examine other hate group phenomena. The first step in the research agenda is to examine the individual characteristics and interaction for an expanded understanding of how the individual decisions made by the agents impacted the results. Secondly, the most extreme groups that formed, groups whose mean hate reached 7 or higher, will be analyzed separate from their less extreme counterparts. After this current data is examined, new expanded models will be constructed. At a glance, this likely provides some interesting effects to examine as far as comparing the most extreme groups formed with other groups formed by these models. The most extreme groups are considered, in the real world, to be those most likely to engage in crime and violence. The first expansion of the collective hate model will examine the effect of hate group membership on hate crime, adding a race characteristic to the agents and a secondary motivation characteristic, this one based on routine activities theory, as a motivation towards crime. As previously discussed, if these models were able to generate hate groups, it is likely that other hate group or hate behaviors can also be modeled. A future examination using a combination of 136 simulation models and crime statistics should examine the necessity of a hate ideology or hate group membership in the perpetration of hate crime. This would be relatively easy to accomplish through the addition of a second group of agents as potential targets of hate to the existing models. Although the entire picture regarding hate crime is relatively unknown, hate crimes are a logical step in the continuing research on this subject. (See appendix B for a discussion of hate crime in the United States and trends in hate crime statistics over the past 14 years.) The second expansion of the collective hate model will be used to mimic the concept of “symbolic threat.” In cases where the hater commits a criminal act against a person or a number of people who belong to a particular group, the hate crime also may have a pervasive nature that expands the tally of victims beyond the original target or targets to the larger community. This is the element of hate and hate crime known as “symbolic threat.” Those who commit hate crimes may seek not only to affect the immediate target, but also anyone who is a member of or sympathizes with the target group (Symonds, 1980: Berk, 1990: Rayburn, Mendoza and Davidson, 2003: Rayburn, Earlerywine and Davison: 2003: Herek, Gillis and Cogan: 1999: Garnets, Herek and Levy, 1992: Crenshaw, 1998). They may also hope to attract the attention of the media, others who hate the target group and public officials as well as the wider population of an area (Symonds, 1980: Berk, 1990: Rayburn, Mendoza and Davidson, 2003: Rayburn, Earlerywine and Davison: 2003: Herek, Gillis and Cogan: 1999: Garnets, Herek and Levy, 1992: Crenshaw, 1998). In many cases, the specific target does not matter as long as he or she belongs or appears to belong to the hated group (Herek, 1989: Levin and McDevitt, 2002: Crenshaw, 1998: Berks, 1990: Price, 1977: Medoff, 1999). As such, a criminal act directed at that one person is an act symbolically directed at the group as a whole (Herek, 1989: Levin 137 and McDevitt, 2002: Medoff, 1999). This behavior should be easy to simplify enough for future simulation models, both as individual and group behaviors. The second half of the research agenda is further examination of the charismatic leader model, especially in light of the marginally number of groups formed by this model. The individual agreements and disagreements within the models and the time constraints of the model will be systematically altered to determine the effect of varying levels of support and detraction in the population, as well as what would happen if the charismatic leader was given a longer period of time to gain followers. Further experimentation with this model will also examine the effect of non-direct contact with the charismatic leader, where the model would be expanded to include a new characteristic giving the agents varying levels of knowledge of the charismatic leader‟s message. The model will also be expanded upon to include the target variation proposed for expansion of the collective hate model, as well as an event driven model that will seek to mimic the rise of Hitler based on a series of external events that assisted in his acquisition of support. Summary Though simulation models are limited by their simplification of the real world, the uses of simulation modeling in the discipline of criminal justice and other social sciences is limited only by curiosity and imagination. The models in this dissertation recreated the formation of hate groups in a manner consistent with the historical accounts of what has happened as hate groups have changed over time. 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The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 358, 77-88. Young T.J. (1990) Violent hate groups in rural America. International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology, 34(1), 15-20. http://jasss.soc.surrey.ac.uk/7/1/6.html 153 Yousman, B. (2003) Blackophilia and Blackophobia: White Youth, the Consumption of Rap Music, and White Supremacy, Communication Theory, 13 (4), 366-391 154 APPENDICES 155 APPENDIX A Hate groups in the United States, by State 2006-2009 29 State Land Area in Sq. miles 30 number of cities w/ pop > 100,000 31 number of Groups 2006 number of Groups 2007 number of Groups 2008 number of Groups 2009 number of Groups 2010 Alabama 50,744.00 4 22 24 36 32 33 Alaska 571,951.26 1 1 0 0 1 0 Arizona 113,634.57 9 10 17 19 16 22 Arkansas 52,068.17 1 19 18 20 24 29 California 155,959.34 62 64 80 84 60 68 Colorado 103,717.53 9 13 12 15 17 19 Connecticut 4,844.80 5 7 6 5 6 6 Delaware 1,953.56 0 2 2 4 4 5 Dist. Of Columbia 61.4 N/A 7 8 8 9 12 Florida 53,926.82 18 49 49 56 51 49 Georgia 57,906.14 5 49 42 40 37 39 Hawaii 6,422.62 1 0 0 0 1 0 Idaho 82,747.21 1 7 8 7 9 13 Illinois 55,583.58 8 23 23 23 28 29 Indiana 35,866.90 4 16 18 7 17 24 Iowa 55,869.36 2 4 4 8 17 6 Kansas 81,814.88 5 6 7 8 6 6 Kentucky 39,728.18 2 12 13 11 10 15 Louisiana 43,561.85 4 24 22 22 28 25 Maine 30,861.55 0 3 1 1 2 3 Maryland 9,773.82 1 11 7 13 13 17 Massachusetts 7,840.02 5 8 9 13 16 10 Michigan 56,803.82 7 25 26 23 26 35 Minnesota 79,610.08 2 9 7 8 9 7 Mississippi 46,906.96 1 28 28 22 25 40 Missouri 68,885.93 4 23 29 30 31 26 Montana 145,552.43 1 5 6 6 12 13 Nebraska 76,872.41 2 4 3 4 4 8 Nevada 109,825.99 4 12 11 13 15 15 New Hampshire 8,968.10 1 5 4 3 5 5 29 Counts of hate groups from Southern Poverty Law Center 30 Department of Commerce, Census Bureau – does not include any area covered by water such as lakes, rivers, etc 31 Census Bureau, 2007 156 New Jersey 7,417.34 4 34 34 40 44 47 New Mexico 121,355.53 1 2 2 1 2 3 State Land Area in Sq. miles 32 number of cities w/ pop > 100,000 33 number of Groups 2006 number of Groups 2007 number of Groups 2008 number of Groups 2009 number of Groups 2010 New York 47,213.79 5 27 26 24 31 31 North Carolina 48,710.88 8 33 28 30 29 28 North Dakota 68,975.93 0 0 1 1 1 4 Ohio 40,948.38 6 31 28 23 27 32 Oklahoma 68,667.06 3 16 13 19 15 23 Oregon 95,996.79 3 9 11 7 10 15 Pennsylvania 44,816.61 4 27 33 37 28 36 Rhode Island 1,044.93 1 0 0 2 3 2 South Carolina 30,109.47 2 45 45 45 36 30 South Dakota 75,884.64 1 0 0 4 3 2 Tennessee 41,217.12 5 35 38 38 37 35 Texas 261,797.12 28 55 67 66 66 59 Utah 82,143.65 4 1 2 5 6 6 Vermont 9,249.56 0 2 1 2 1 2 Virginia 39,594.07 9 35 34 26 22 29 Washington 66,544.06 5 16 20 12 15 13 West Virginia 24,077.73 0 9 7 14 13 13 Wisconsin 54,310.10 3 12 12 10 8 8 Wyoming 97,100.40 0 2 2 2 4 5 Type of group Freq. 2006 % of groups 2006 34 Freq. 2007 % of groups 2007 35 Freq. 2008 % of groups 2008 Freq. 2009 % of groups 2009 Freq. 2010 % of groups 2010 Neo-Nazi 190 22% 207 23% 196 21% 162 17% 171 17% Ku Klux Klan 165 19% 155 17% 186 20% 186 20% 221 22% White Nationalist 114 13% 125 14% 111 12% 134 14% 137 14% Neo- Confederate 102 12% 104 12% 93 10% 68 7% 42 4% 32 Department of Commerce, Census Bureau – does not include any area covered by water such as lakes, rivers, etc 33 Census Bureau, 2007 34 Rounded to nearest full percent. 35 Rounded to nearest full percent. 157 Black Separatist 94 11% 81 9% 113 12% 121 13% 149 15% General hate 79 9% 32 4% 33 4% 41 4% 46 5% Type of group Freq. 2006 % of groups 2006 36 Freq. 2007 % of groups 2007 37 Freq. 2008 % of groups 2008 Freq. 2009 % of groups 2009 Freq. 2010 % of groups 2010 Racist Skinhead 78 9% 90 10% 98 11% 122 13% 136 14% Christian Identity 37 4% 36 4% 39 4% 37 4% 26 3% Racist Music 0 0 14 2% 13 1% 13 1% 15 1% Radical Traditionalist Catholic 0 0 14 2% 14 2% 16 2% 17 2% Anti-Gay 0 0 9 1% 12 1% 14 2% 17 2% Anti- Immigrant 0 0 14 2% 11 1% 12 1% 13 1% Holocaust Denial 0 0 7 <1% 7 <1% 6 <1% 7 <1% Anti-Muslim 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 <1% Total 859 99% 38 888 39 98% 40 926 99% 932 98% 41 1002 99% Type of group %change 2006-2007 %change 2007-2008 %change 2008-2009 %change 2009-2010 Neo-Nazi 8.9% -5.3% -17.3% 5.5% Ku Klux Klan -6% 20% 0% 18.8% White Nationalist 9.6% -11.2% 20.7% 2.2% Neo-Confederate 1.9% -10.6% -26.9% -38.2% 36 Rounded to nearest full percent. 37 Rounded to nearest full percent. 38 Does not add up to 100% due to rounding 39 New categories were added in 2007 and may account for the drop in the general hate – Anti-Gay (9, 1%), Anti- Immigrant (14, 2%), Racist Music (14, 2%), Radical Traditionalist Catholic (14, 2%), Holocaust Denial (7, <1%). 40 See above for explanation of missing % - with the new categories added = 100% 41 Does not add up due to rounding to nearest full percent 158 Black Separatist -13.8% 39.5% 7.1% 23.1% General hate -59.5% 3.1% 24.2% 12.2% Racist Skinhead 15.4% 8.8% 24.5% 11.5% Type of group %change 2006-2007 %change 2007-2008 %change 2008-2009 %change 2009-2010 Christian Identity -2.7% 8.3% -5.1% -29.7% Racist Music n/a -7% 0% 15.4% Radical Traditionalist Catholic n/a 0% 14.2% 6.3% Anti-Gay n/a 33.3% 16.6% 21.4% Anti-Immigrant n/a -21.4% 9.1% 8.3% Holocaust Denial n/a 0% -14.2% 16.6% Anti-Muslim n/a n/a n/a n/a All Groups Together 3.4% 4.3% 0.65% 7.5% 159 APPENDIX B THE CURRENT STATE OF HATE CRIME The “dark figure of crime,” that is, those crimes not reported to the police and not included in official statistics, is of great concern to criminologists and criminal justice practitioners alike (Skogan, 1977: Biderman and Reiss, 1967). All varieties of crime are subject to some underreporting (Skogan, 1977: Biderman and Reiss, 1967). Estimates of the “dark figure of crime” suggest that approximately 50% of violent crimes and 60% of property crimes are not reported to law enforcement (Skogan, 1977: Biderman and Reiss, 1967). Consistent with this, comparisons of official and self-reported incidents of hate crime show substantial underreporting of these crimes. Using data from the National Crime Victimization Survey, the Bureau of Justice Statistics estimated that from 2000 to 2003, an average of 191,000 incidents of hate crime have occurred each year, encompassing 210,000 hate crime victimizations (Harlow, 2005). The respondents of the National Crime Victimization Survey reported that of these, 92,000 incidents of the 191,000 incidents were reported to the police (Harlow, 2005). This means that 99,000 hate crime incidents, or approximately 48% of hate crimes were not reported to the police. Hate crimes can be difficult to identify and categorize, resulting in part from a lack of interaction between hate crime victims and law enforcement. Also, in some hate crimes the direct victim is not a person (e.g. a building) and therefore not subject to sympathy (Hood & Rollins, 1995). These cases are predominately vandalism. For example, in the case of the Zimmerman library incident 42 , the targets of the crime were books and scholarly journals on 42 In examining a specific, anti-gay and gender-hate event, the Zimmerman Library Incident, Hood and Rollins, address how hate crimes causing limited damage can have an extensive effect on their target community, but are not always identified as hate crimes by those outside of the target community (Hood and Rollins, 1995). In mid - 160 gender and sexuality that were defaced, hidden or damaged (Hood & Rollins, 1995). A variety of tables showing hate crime in the United States broken down to detail the offenses encompassed by the UCR reports are presented below. HATE CRIME STATISTICS Hate Crimes in the United States 1995-2009 43 Year Number of Incidents Number of Offenses Number of Victims 1995 7,947 9,895 10,469 1996 8,759 10,706 11,039 1997 8,049 9,861 10,255 1998 7,755 9,235 9,722 1999 7,876 9,301 9,802 2000 8,063 9,430 9,924 2001 9,730 11,451 12,020 2002 7,462 8,832 9,222 2003 7,489 8,715 9,100 2004 7,649 9,035 9,528 2005 7,163 8,380 8,804 2006 7,722 9,080 9,652 2007 7,624 9,006 9,535 2008 7,783 9,168 9,691 2009 6,604 7,789 8,336 Type of Offenses 44 1995-2009 45 Year Crimes against persons 46 Crimes against property 47 Crimes against society 48 1995 7,144 2,725 - 1996 7,359 3,330 17 1997 6,873 2,973 15 November, 1994 volumes of gender and gay studies journals were removed from their shelves and hidden, they were replaced with library copies of Nazi publications and those left behind were vandalized with Nazi symbols and anti- gender Statements (Hood and Rollins, 1995). Nazi symbols, other graffiti and vandalism were reported across campus (Hood and Rollins, 1995). The Zimmerman Library incident faded into obscurity when the journals in question were located and replaced and the graffiti removed, no charges were filed and campus officials and local media reclassified the incident as a prank (Hood and Rollins, 1995). 43 All information taken from FBI UCR reports for Hate Crimes from 1995 - 2008 44 These numbers are from the number of offenses column, not the number of incidents column 45 All information taken from FBI UCR reports for Hate Crimes from 1995 - 2008 46 Includes murder, non-negligent manslaughter, forcible rape, aggravated assault, simple assault and intimidation 47 Includes larceny, burglary, robbery, destruction, damage, vandalism, arson and motor-vehicle theft 48 Crimes against society were not reported in 1995 161 1998 6,305 2,905 25 1999 6,189 3,082 30 2000 6,130 3,241 59 2001 7,768 3,607 76 2002 5,960 2,823 49 Year Crimes against persons 49 Crimes against property 50 Crimes against society 51 2003 5,517 3,139 59 2004 5,642 3,333 60 2005 5,190 3,109 81 2006 5,449 3,593 38 2007 5,408 3,579 19 2008 5,542 3,608 18 2009 4,793 2,079 26 Breakdown of offenses – Crimes against persons 1995-2009 52 Year Murder 53 Rape Aggravated Assault Simple Assault Intimidation Other 54 1995 20 12 1,268 1,796 4,048 - 1996 12 10 1,444 1,762 4,130 1 1997 8 9 1,237 1,800 3,814 5 1998 13 11 1,084 1,706 3,488 3 1999 17 6 1,120 1,766 3,268 12 2000 19 4 1,184 1,615 3,292 16 2001 10 4 1,241 2,154 4,339 20 2002 11 8 1,035 1,791 3,105 10 2003 14 5 920 1,809 2,744 25 2004 5 4 1,040 1,750 2,827 16 2005 6 3 1,062 1,566 2,539 14 2006 3 6 1,178 1,737 2,508 17 2007 9 2 1,116 1,684 2,565 32 2008 7 11 1,025 1,778 2,704 17 2009 8 9 914 1,691 2,158 13 Break down of offenses – Property 1995-2009 55 Year Robbery Burglary Larceny Vehicle Theft Arson Vandalism, etc Other 1995 194 96 53 5 62 2,315 26 49 Includes murder, non-negligent manslaughter, forcible rape, aggravated assault, simple assault and intimidation 50 Includes larceny, burglary, robbery, destruction, damage, vandalism, arson and motor-vehicle theft 51 Crimes against society were not reported in 1995 52 All information taken from FBI UCR reports for Hate Crimes from 1995 - 2008 53 Murder and non negligent manslaughter combined 54 The other category was not used in the 1995 report for crimes against persons 55 All information taken from FBI UCR reports for Hate Crimes from 1995 - 2010 162 1996 155 140 75 7 74 2,874 4 1997 144 111 95 7 60 2,549 7 1998 118 99 81 3 50 2,549 5 1999 129 112 103 14 48 2,654 22 2000 139 138 114 11 52 2,765 22 Year Robbery Burglary Larceny Vehicle Theft Arson Vandalism, etc Other 2001 158 149 150 15 90 3,018 27 2002 131 131 151 9 38 2,347 16 2003 107 164 173 15 34 2,618 28 2004 112 146 169 15 44 2,812 35 2005 127 136 221 18 39 2,528 40 2006 142 155 261 25 41 2,911 58 2007 178 159 221 40 22 2,915 44 2008 145 158 224 26 53 2,970 32 2009 124 137 163 11 41 2,465 29 Number of Offenses by bias-motivation 1995-2009 56 Year Race Religion Sexuality Ethnicity Disability 57 Multiple-bias 1995 6,170 1,414 1,266 1,022 - 23 1996 6,767 1,500 1,256 1,163 - 20 1997 5,898 1,483 1,375 1,083 12 10 1998 5,360 1,475 1,439 919 27 15 1999 5,240 1,532 1,487 1,011 21 10 2000 5,171 1,566 1,486 1,164 36 17 2001 5,290 2,004 1,592 2,507 37 21 2002 4,393 1,576 1,464 1,345 47 7 2003 4,574 1,426 1,430 1,236 40 9 2004 4,863 1,480 1,406 1,201 71 14 2005 4,691 1,314 1,171 1,144 53 7 2006 4,737 1,597 1,415 1,233 94 4 2007 4,724 1,477 1,460 1,256 82 7 2008 4,704 1,606 1,612 1,148 85 8 2009 3,816 1,376 1,436 1,109 99 14 56 All information taken from FBI UCR reports for Hate Crimes from 1995 - 2010 57 Anti-mental or physical disability hate crimes were not reports in 1995 and 1996 163 APPENDIX C AGENT DECISIONS Agents who are seeking fellow hate agents Agent looks for closest agent Finds agent – evaluates agent Does the agent possess similar hate (agent‟s extrinsic hate +/-1)? If no – seek another agent. If yes – ask if they agree. If agree – agreeing agent gains tally toward group formation – seek another agent If disagree – seek another agent Agents that are being sought Agent is approached by seeking agent – evaluate agent Does asking agent possess similar hate (agent‟s extrinsic hate +/-1)? If no – immediately disagree. If yes – randomized decision If agree – gain tally towards group formation If disagree – leave interaction All Agents Agent evaluates the level of hate of the three agents closest to itself and within its group if it has joined a group. Agent can decide to increase or decrease its extrinsic hate at random (may see an emergent tendency to increase or decrease hate in attempts to gain membership) Agents who are members of a group evaluate the group versus their level of commitment and fear – recalculating fear at each evaluation. Agent can decide to increase or decrease its commitment at random. 164 Appendix D In this screen capture a charismatic leader model has just been set up. The hate agents are at their default setting, represented by the red figures and the charismatic leader is represented by the star in the upper left hand quadrant. Motivation has not yet been applied to the model, so all 500 agents are in attendance. When the model is set to go, by pressing the go button in the tool bar to the left, the agents will change and begin to interact. Over the course of the model run, the agents will change color and move to denote motivation, agreements, disagreements and changes in their extrinsic hate. 165 This screen capture shows a collective hate model in the early stage of “go.” The different shades of purple seen as the majority of agents show agents that are at different levels of motivation, the more motivated, the darker the purple. Interaction between agents also changes their color, though it does not affect their motivation. Agents who are green possess an extrinsic hate greater than 5. Agents who are white have just made an agreement. Agents who are pink have just disagreed with another agent. Agents who are blue have enough agreements to start thinking about forming a hate group. Agents who are orange have just left a group. In this screen capture, the agents who are thinking about creating a group and those who have left are probably in the same group of agreements. The fact that some are appearing orange without a group appearing on the screen shows that the group probably dissolved before it hit a viable formation point. 166 This screen capture shows a similar situation as the previous screen capture. This one however, does not include individuals whose extrinsic hate is five or higher, showing a time where agents have very likely decided to lower their extrinsic hate. White agents are still those who are agreeing with one another, pink agents have just disagreed. Blue agents are contemplating forming a group and orange ones have just left a hate group. The cluster of pink and orange agents towards the center bottom of the screen is very likely a group of agents who came very close to forming a group, possibly the two orange agents agreed with the white agent in the middle, but as the other potential members assembled the disagreements between them resulted in the dissolution of the group rather than its formation. 167 In this screen capture, hate groups have just formed, identified as the two green “monsters” at the right hand side of the screen. These are new groups, as they are relatively small. The colors of the agents remain the same, white is still recent agreements, pink is still recent disagreements. The shades of purple denote levels of motivation. No blue agents are currently seen in this screen capture as they have gone beyond contemplating forming a hate group to the actual formation point. Because the green “monsters” have appeared, groups have formed. Because no orange colored agents are visible, no one has left these groups. If levels of fear, commitment and hate within the group cause the group to dissolve, these green “monsters” would disappear from the screen and a series of orange agents would be visible denoting the drop outs from the groups. The tick count at the top left hand corner of the model screen shows that this is tick 87, or the afternoon of day 22 (87/4 = 21.75, thus the third six hour block of time, 168 12pm-6pm, afternoon on the 22 nd day.) Therefore, the first groups for this model have formed within the first 22 days of the model run. This screen capture shows a variety of groups that have formed. The smaller the “monster,” the smaller the group, the larger sized “monsters” represent larger groups. Groups can form at any size, so some of these are groups that formed with larger membership and others may have grown to larger membership after formation. The colors of the agents on the screen maintain the same meanings. The lack of blue and orange agents at this point in time shows that at this tick, no one is thinking of creating a new group, nor has anyone left the existing groups. In the upper left hand corner of the model screen the tick number states that this is tick 207. Therefore, by the afternoon of the 52 day (divide 207 by 4, 51.75, thus afternoon (12 pm to 6 pm) or the third 6 hour period of the day), 19 visible groups have formed. Whether these are hate 169 groups, having an average intrinsic hate within the group of 5 or higher or interest groups, having an average intrinsic hate of 4.99 or lower, cannot be determined simply by looking at the screen. The log file collecting data as the models run will provide that information. 170 Appendix E breed [agents agent] breed [leaders leader] breed [Klans Klan] globals [ agree-chance Klan-chance societalhate ;; average intrinsic hate of all agents in model (presets at 2, 4, 6, 8) time-of-day min-Klan-size Klan-limit leader-limit no-agreement-count ;; 100 days days-with-Klan ;; 10 days days-with-leader intrinsic-hate-range ;; changes for each run base-filename base-path ] agents-own [ id ;; 1-500 identification of the agent morning ;; used for time-of-day markers, e.g., active in morning noon evening night extrinsichate ;; random 1-10 intrinsichate ;; random 1-10 in-Klan? ;; true if an agent belongs to a Klan Klan-count ;; count of how many Klans this agent belongs to Klan-list ;; array of the Klan id's that this agent belongs to agree? ;; true if agent intrinsichate +/- 1 of asking agent disagree? ;; true if agent intrinsichate +/- 2 of asking agent commitment ;; random 1-10 if agent belongs to a Klan fear ;; agreements ;; count agent agreements with other agents disagreements ;; count agent disagreements with other agents motivation ;; random 1-3 amount of 6 hour blocks of time agent is active versus inactive 171 leader-list ;; list of the leader agents that I followed at least once... charisma ;; 0 for all agents except charismatic leader random 1-5 susceptibility ;; 0 for all models without a charismatic leader, if charismatic leader is present random 1-5 similar-nearby move-count tod-count ticks-in-Klan ticks-following-leader ] leaders-own [ l-id ;; any identification of leader extrinsichate ;; random 1-10 intrinsichate ;; random 1-10 agreements ;; count agent agreements with other agents disagreements ;; count agent disagreements with other agents motivation ;; random 1-3 amount of 6 hour blocks of time agent is active versus inactive charisma ;; 0 for all agents except charismatic leader random 1-5 follower-list ;; list of agents who followed ME at least once. agree? disagree? move-count tod-count similar-nearby ] Klans-own [ k-id ;; group identifier member-count ;; count of members in the Klan members ;; turtle ids of members in the Klan meanhate ;; mean of Klan members intrinsic hate meancommitment ;; mean of Klan members commitment meanfear ;; mean of Klan members fear dropouts ;; turtle ids of the members who left the Klan ] to setup 172 clear-all setup-globals create-agents 500 [ set id who set in-Klan? false set agree? false set disagree? false set agreements 0 set disagreements 0 set charisma 0 setxy random-xcor random-ycor set color red set extrinsichate random 10 set intrinsichate random-poisson intrinsic-hate-range ;; set intrinsichate random 10 set motivation (random 3) + 1 ;; Want number from [1..4] set susceptibility (random 4) + 1 ;; Want number from [1..5] set move-count 0 set tod-count 0 set ticks-in-Klan 0 set ticks-following-leader 0 set fear 0 set commitment 0 set Klan-count 0 set agreements 0 set disagreements 0 set Klan-list n-values Klan-limit [0] set leader-list n-values leader-limit [0] ] create-leaders leader-limit [ set l-id who set agreements 0 set disagreements 0 set agree? false set disagree? false set charisma (random 4) + 1 ;; Want number from [1..5] setxy random-xcor random-ycor set color blue set size 3 set extrinsichate random 10 set intrinsichate random-poisson 10 ;; set intrinsichate random 10 set motivation (random 3) + 1 ;; Want number from [1..4] set move-count 0 set tod-count 0 set follower-list [] 173 ] create-Klans Klan-limit [ hide-turtle set k-id who set dropouts [] set meanfear 0 set meancommitment 0 set meanhate 0 set members [] set member-count 0 ] ask patches [ set pcolor white ] set-default-shape agents "person" set-default-shape Klans "monster" set-default-shape leaders "star" set societalhate (sum [intrinsichate] of agents / count agents) end to setup-globals reset-ticks set min-Klan-size 5 set Klan-limit 100 set leader-limit 0 set time-of-day 0 set agree-chance 50 set Klan-chance 25 set no-agreement-count 400 ;; 100 days of no agreements = change to hate set days-with-Klan 40 ;; 10 days set days-with-leader 40 set intrinsic-hate-range 6 set base-filename (word "run-" behaviorspace-run-number "-intrinsic-" intrinsic-hate-range) set base-path "F:\\Leaders" log-agentset-header log-Klanset-header log-leaderset-header end 174 to go if ticks >= 1460 [ stop ] set time-of-day (ticks mod 4) if (time-of-day) = 0 [ reset-motivations ask patches [ set pcolor grey ]] motivate-agents time-of-day ticks motivate-leaders ask agents [ communicate ] ask agents [group] update-agents log-agentset-variables ticks log-Klanset-variables ticks log-leaderset-variables ticks tick end to reset-motivations ask agents [ ;; clear the time-of-day markers set morning 0 set noon 0 set evening 0 set night 0 ifelse (motivation = 1) [ set-TOD-markers (random 1 - 4) set color 118] [ ifelse (motivation = 2)[ set-TOD-markers (random 1 - 4) set-TOD-markers (random 1 - 4) set color 115] [ if (motivation = 3) [ set-TOD-markers (random 1 - 4) set-TOD-markers (random 1 - 4) set-TOD-markers (random 1 - 4) set color 112] ] ] ] end to set-TOD-markers[n] ifelse (n = 1) [set morning 1] [ ifelse (n = 2) [ set noon 1] [ ifelse (n = 3) [ set evening 1] [ set night 1] ] 175 ] set tod-count n end to motivate-agents [TOD Current-Tick] ask agents [ if ((TOD = 0 and morning = 1) or (TOD = 1 and noon = 1) or (TOD = 2 and evening = 1) or (TOD = 3 and night = 1)) [ ;; Move the agent... right random 360 if extrinsichate > 5 [ forward 5 set color green ] forward 1 set move-count (move-count + 1) set extrinsichate random 10 ;; reset, as this is random... if ((Current-Tick != 0) and (Current-Tick mod no-agreement-count) = 0) and (agreements = 0) every 100 days [ reset-agent-internal-variables ] if ((ticks-in-Klan mod days-with-Klan) = 0 and (in-Klan? = true)) ;; every 10 days [ reset-agent-internal-variables ] if (ticks-following-leader mod days-with-leader) = 0 and ((length remove-duplicates leader-list) > 1) [ reset-agent-internal-variables ] ] ] end to reset-agent-internal-variables set intrinsichate random 10 set motivation (random 3) + 1 ;; Want number from [1..4] set susceptibility (random 4) + 1 ;; Want number from [1..5] end to motivate-leaders 176 ask leaders [ set motivation (random extrinsichate) Move the leader... right random 360 ifelse motivation > 5 [ forward 5 set size 3 ] [ forward 1 set size 1 ] set move-count (move-count + 1) ] end to update-agents ask agents [ set similar-nearby count (agents-on neighbors) with [extrinsichate = [extrinsichate] of myself] ] end to communicate ;; turtle procedure if (length remove-duplicates Klan-list > 1) [set ticks-in-Klan (ticks-in-Klan + 1)] if (length remove-duplicates leader-list > 1) [set ticks-following-leader (ticks-following-leader + 1)] let communicating-agent self if any? other agents-here with [extrinsichate = [intrinsichate] of myself] [ if random-float 100 < agree-chance [ set agree? true set color white set agreements agreements + 1] ] if any? other agents-here with [extrinsichate = [intrinsichate] of myself - 1] [ if random-float 100 < agree-chance [ set agree? true set color white set agreements agreements + 1 ] ] if any? other agents-here with [extrinsichate = [intrinsichate] of myself + 1] [ if random-float 100 < agree-chance [ set agree? true set color white set agreements agreements + 1 ] ] if any? other agents-here with [extrinsichate = [intrinsichate] of myself - 2] [ set disagree? true set color pink set disagreements disagreements + 1 ] if any? other agents-here with [extrinsichate = [intrinsichate] of myself + 2] [ set disagree? true set color pink set disagreements disagreements + 1] 177 leader effects ask leaders-here with [extrinsichate = [intrinsichate] of myself] [ ;; <myself> is the asking agent... ifelse ([susceptibility] of myself > 2) [ set color [green + 5] of myself set color blue set agreements agreements + 1 ;; leader's agreement count... set intrinsichate [[intrinsichate] of myself + 1] of myself set follower-list remove-duplicates (lput ([id] of myself) follower-list) let my-leaders remove-duplicates (lput l-id [leader-list] of myself ) ask communicating-agent [ set leader-list my-leaders ] ] [ set disagree? true set color pink set disagreements disagreements + 1 set intrinsichate [[intrinsichate] of myself - 1] of myself let my-leaders remove l-id ([leader-list] of myself) ask communicating-agent [ set leader-list my-leaders ] ask communicating-agent [ set ticks-following-leader 0] ] ] ask leaders-here with [extrinsichate = [intrinsichate] of myself + 1] [ ifelse ([susceptibility] of myself > 2) [ set color [green + 5] of myself set color blue set agreements agreements + 1 ;; leader's agreement count... set intrinsichate [[intrinsichate] of myself + 1] of myself set follower-list remove-duplicates (lput ([id] of myself) follower-list) let my-leaders remove-duplicates (lput l-id [leader-list] of myself ) ask communicating-agent [ set leader-list my-leaders ] ] [ set disagree? true set color pink set disagreements disagreements + 1 set intrinsichate [[intrinsichate] of myself - 1] of myself 178 let my-leaders remove l-id [leader-list] of myself ask communicating-agent [ set leader-list my-leaders ] ask communicating-agent [ set ticks-following-leader 0] ] ] ask leaders-here with [extrinsichate = [intrinsichate] of myself - 1] [ ifelse ([susceptibility] of myself > 2) [ set color [green + 5] of myself set color blue set agreements agreements + 1 ;; leader's agreement count... set intrinsichate [[intrinsichate] of myself + 1] of myself set follower-list remove-duplicates (lput ([id] of myself) follower-list) let my-leaders remove-duplicates (lput l-id [leader-list] of myself ) ask communicating-agent [ set leader-list my-leaders ] ] [ set disagree? true set color pink set disagreements disagreements + 1 set intrinsichate [[intrinsichate] of myself - 1] of myself let my-leaders remove l-id [leader-list] of myself ask communicating-agent [ set leader-list my-leaders ] ask communicating-agent [ set ticks-following-leader 0] ] ] end to group ;; turtle procedure let my-Klan-count Klan-count let agreeing-agent self if any? other agents-here with [(extrinsichate = ([intrinsichate] of myself)) or (extrinsichate = ([intrinsichate] of myself) + 1) or (extrinsichate = ([intrinsichate] of myself) - 1) ] [ if random-float 100 < Klan-chance ;; there will be action to try to form/join Klans [ ifelse (my-Klan-count = 0) [ ;; 'myself' is not in a Klan yet let agents-that-agree-list (turtle-set self agents-here with 179 [(extrinsichate = ([intrinsichate] of myself)) or (extrinsichate = ([intrinsichate] of myself) + 1) or (extrinsichate = ([intrinsichate] of myself) - 1) ]) let Klan-count-of-agents-that-agree 0 ask agents-that-agree-list ;; see if any of the agreeing parties are already in a Klan [ foreach Klan-list [ if (? != 0) ;; add the Klan corresponding to this id to the <Klan-set-of-agents-that-agree' list [ ask Klans with [ ? = k-id ] [ join-this-Klan agents-that-agree-list ] set Klan-count-of-agents-that-agree Klan-count-of-agents-that-agree + 1 ] ] ] if (Klan-count-of-agents-that-agree = 0) [ ;; make a new Klan populate-new-Klan agents-that-agree-list ] ] ] end to update-existing-Klan [ KlanID ] ask Klans with [k-id = KlanID] [ ;; check to see if anyone should drop out let maxhate (max [intrinsichate] of members) ;; Determine who should leave the group, now that the group has changed. let someone_left false ;; ask members [ ask max-one-of members [fear] [ if (maxhate >= (2 * fear)) ; see if anyone wants to leave [ leave-Klan KlanID self 180 set someone_left true ] ;; end if ] ;; end foreach ] end to leave-Klan [ KlanID someTurtle ] ask someTurtle [ ;; this turtle is leaving this Klan set color orange set Klan-list remove KlanID Klan-list set Klan-list lput 0 Klan-list set Klan-count Klan-count - 1 if (Klan-count = 0) [ set fear 0 set commitment 0 set ticks-in-Klan 0 set in-Klan? false ] ] ask Klans with [k-id = KlanID] [ ;; add someTurtle to the dropout list ifelse (member? someTurtle members) [ set members agents with [ member? KlanID Klan-list ] set dropouts remove-duplicates (lput someTurtle dropouts) set member-count count members if (member-count > 0) [ set meanhate (sum [intrinsichate] of members / count members) set meanfear (sum [fear] of members / count members) set meancommitment (sum [commitment] of members / count members) ] ] ;; Pull from this group [] ;; not in Klan - nothing to do ] end to populate-new-Klan [ agentList ] 181 ask min-one-of Klans [ member-count ] [ join-this-Klan agentList ;; should have one clan with nothing in it ] end to join-this-Klan [ agentList ] ask self [ let this-Klan-id k-id ask agentList [ set fear random 5 set commitment random 10 set in-Klan? true ] ifelse (member-count = 0) [ ;; Add to an empty clan set members agentList ask agentList [ set Klan-count Klan-count + 1 set Klan-list replace-item Klan-count Klan-list this-Klan-id set color blue ] set color blue ;; Klan color ] [ ;; Add these agents to a non-empty Klan set members agents with [ member? this-Klan-id Klan-list ] ask agentList [ if not (member? this-Klan-id Klan-list) [ set Klan-count Klan-count + 1 set Klan-list replace-item Klan-count Klan-list this-Klan-id ] ] set color green ;; Klan color ;; beep ] set meanhate (sum [intrinsichate] of members / count members) set meanfear (sum [fear] of members / count members) set meancommitment (sum [commitment] of members / count members) update-existing-Klan k-id set member-count count members set size member-count 182 move-to max-one-of agentList [intrinsichate] ifelse (member-count >= 5 ) ;; min-Klan-size) [ set size member-count ;;(member-count - min-Klan-size + 1 ) show-turtle ] [ hide-turtle ] ] end to log-Klanset-header set-current-directory base-path file-open word base-filename "-Klanhate.csv" ;;header line file-type "tick-no , " file-type "k-id , " file-type "member-count , " file-type "members , " file-type "meanhate , " file-type "meancommitment , " file-type "meanfear , " file-type "dropouts " file-print "" file-close end to log-Klanset-variables [tick-no] set-current-directory base-path file-open word base-filename "-Klanhate.csv" foreach sort Klans [ ask ? [ file-type tick-no file-type " , " file-type k-id file-type " , " file-type member-count file-type " , " file-type word (sort members) "" file-type" , " 183 file-type meanhate file-type " , " file-type meancommitment file-type " , " file-type meanfear file-type " , " file-type word dropouts "" file-print "";; need to force an end-of-line as recognized by MS Excell ] ] file-close end to log-agentset-header set-current-directory base-path file-open word base-filename "-agenthate.csv" file-type "tick-no ," file-type "id ," file-type " intrinsichate ," file-type " extrinsichate ," file-type "agreements ," file-type "disagreements ," file-type " in-Klan? ," file-type " fear ," file-type "commitment ," file-type " motivation ," file-type " Klan-count ," file-type " Klan-list ," file-type " susceptibility ," file-type " leader-list ," file-type " ticks-in-Klan ," file-type " ticks-following-leader ," file-print "move-count" file-close end to log-agentset-variables [tick-no] set-current-directory base-path file-open word base-filename "-agenthate.csv" foreach sort agents [ ask ? [ file-type tick-no file-type " ," file-type id 184 file-type " ," file-type intrinsichate file-type " ," file-type extrinsichate file-type " ," file-type agreements file-type "," file-type disagreements file-type " ," file-type in-Klan? file-type " ," file-type fear file-type " ," file-type commitment file-type " ," file-type motivation file-type " ," file-type Klan-count file-type " ," file-type sort Klan-list file-type " ," file-type susceptibility file-type " ," file-type sort leader-list file-type " ," file-type ticks-in-Klan file-type " ," file-type ticks-following-leader file-type " ," file-print move-count ] ] file-close end to log-leaderset-header set-current-directory base-path file-open word base-filename "-leaderhate.csv" file-type "tick-no ," file-type "l-id ," file-type "charisma ," 185 file-type "intrinsichate ," file-type "extrinsichate ," file-type "agreements ," file-type "disagreements ," file-type "motivation ," file-type "follower-list ," file-print "move-count" file-close end to log-leaderset-variables [tick-no] set-current-directory base-path file-open word base-filename "-leaderhate.csv" foreach sort leaders [ ask ? [ file-type tick-no file-type " ," file-type l-id file-type " ," file-type charisma file-type " ," file-type intrinsichate file-type " ," file-type extrinsichate file-type " ," file-type agreements file-type "," file-type disagreements file-type " ," file-type motivation file-type " ," file-type sort follower-list file-type " ," file-print move-count ] ] file-close end 186 Appendix F 187 188 189 190 191 192 193 194 195 Appendix G Validation and Verification Model Verification As previously stated in Chapter Five, model verification ensures that there are no problems with the software and the programming of the model (Manson, 2001). In order to determine whether or not the models were viable and the programming correct, Dr. Stephen Frezza of the Computer Science Department of Gannon University examined the model programming language for mistakes. Dr. Frezza also provided assistance and suggestions regarding programming language based on his expertise in the areas of JAVA and computer programming. Dr. Frezza ran a series of model runs separate from the model runs designed to test the hypotheses to check the mechanics of the models. He ran partial segments of the programming code varying discernable outcomes, such as having agents change color to show particular characteristics or adherence to behavior rules. Dr. Frezza actively discussed the results from these test runs with the modeler and assisted in rewrites of the model programming when errors were detected. Dr. Frezza asserts that the models were accurate in accordance with the characteristics and behavior rules of interest. Dr. Frezza‟s letter of support and CV can be found in Appendix F. Model Validation Model validation is related to how close the model comes to replicating the behaviors or phenomena of interest (Manson, 2001: Gilbert and Troitzsch, 2005). This process is considered easier when the model is tied to a theory (Manson, 2001). The models used in this dissertation are linked to two theories; Hamm‟s (2004) collective hate and Weber‟s (1947) charismatic 196 leadership. The concepts inherent in these theories are detailed earlier in this chapter and were manipulated as parameters in the model testing phase with Dr. Frezza. The validation of how well the models recreated the theoretical and real world phenomena of interest, hate group formation will be determined through two validation analyses using the dependent variables listed in Table 25 below. Table 25: Dependent Variables for Validation Dependent variable Conceptual Definition Operational Definition Most extreme group The group with the highest collective intrinsic hate A group with a minimum of 5 members with the highest average intrinsic hate Number of supporters The number of supporters personally connected to the charismatic leader The number of supporters personally connected to the charismatic leader Conceptually and operationally, the most extreme group is the group with the highest average intrinsic hate formed over the course of a model run. This is the core test of collective hate, whether or not a group of individuals was brought together due to an intense collective hatred. This is the dependent variable for the overarching research question regarding collective hate and serves as part of the validation of the collective hate experiment model. Conceptually and operationally, the number of supporters, is the number of supporters personally connected to the charismatic leader. These are individuals who have agreed with the charismatic leader when they have come in contact with him. This is the core test of charismatic leadership, whether or not the charismatic leader can draw in direct supporters. This is the dependent variable for the overarching research question regarding charismatic leadership and serves as part of the validation of the charismatic leadership experiment model. 197 Validation of Collective Hate A two-way ANOVA was conducted that examine the effect of societal hate and type of experiment on the most extreme hate group formed. The dependent variable, most extreme hate group did not have any homogeneity in variance as assessed by the Levene‟s test for equality of error variances. There was not a significant interaction between the effects of type of experiment and societal hate on the most extreme group formed. Individually, the level of societal hate F (4, 2) 246.4, p<.001 and the type of experiment F(2, 4) 7.9, p<.001 did have a significant effect on the most extreme group formed. Figure 8 below shows the profile plots for the most extreme group formed during each experiment at the varying levels of hate. Figure 8: Most Extreme Hate Group Profile Plot 198 Hamm‟s (2004) theory of collective hate states that individuals are drawn together due to an intense collective hatred. This analysis shows that groups with an intense collective hatred were formed at the absence of and at all levels of societal hate, in the control, collective hate and charismatic leader experiments. The control model significantly produced the most hate groups and the largest hate groups. These groups were also the most extreme at every level of societal hate. This follows the basic logic that the control model had the absolute fewest moving parts. Agents in the control model were locked into their respective levels of intrinsic and extrinsic hate. They could not change these values. As such, societal hate also remained constant. The control model produced hate groups at each level of societal hate at a rate that is lower than the number of hate groups added to the SPLC list this past year. However, these hate groups were being developed in a simulated society that did not have already existing hate groups. Further, the SPLC looks at hate groups forming on a national scale, while the population of these models was 500 agents. For 500 agents to form as many hate groups as they did over the course of these model runs could show that these models produced more hate groups than a comparable society in the real world would have formed. As a foundation, all the models produced a reasonable amount of hate groups. The collective hate model produced fewer hate groups and groups that were significantly smaller than the control model, but agents were able to change their intrinsic and extrinsic hate, further resulting in changes in societal hate. These changes are more likely to be similar to real world behavior of potential hate group members than the stagnant levels of intrinsic, extrinsic, and societal hate in the control model. These models produced less extreme groups, but those groups followed a similar distribution of level of extremism to that of the control models. 199 The charismatic leader model produced the fewest hate groups and also significantly smaller groups. This merits further investigation of the data to determine if the behavior of the charismatic leader truly mimicked a real world charismatic leader. While this model presented the greatest number of options for changing intrinsic, extrinsic, and societal levels of hate, the model itself may have been too simplistic to recreate a charismatic leader scenario. One point to note however, in examining the level of extremism among groups formed in the charismatic leader model, when societal hate was at level 6, the charismatic leader model produced more than the collective hate model. The next section examines the validation of the charismatic leadership experiment. Validation of Charismatic Leadership A two-way ANOVA was conducted that examine the effect of societal hate and level of charisma on the number of supporters following the charismatic leader. The dependent variable, number of supporters did not have any homogeneity in variance as assessed by the Levene‟s test for equality of error variances. There was a significant interaction between the effects of level of charisma and societal hate on the number of supporters F(16, 4) 165.8, p<.001. Individually, the effect of level of charisma F(4, 4) 64980.5 , p<.001 and level of societal hate F(4, 4) 948.3, p<.001 were also significant. Figure 9 below shows the profile plots for the number of supporters the charismatic leader acquired at the varying levels of hate, based on different levels of charisma. Weber‟s (1947) theory of charismatic leadership postulates that a charismatic leader draws individuals to him. This analysis shows that individuals were drawn to the charismatic leader as supporters at the absence of and at all levels of societal hate and at each level of charisma assigned to the charismatic leader. 200 Figure 9: Number of Supporters Profile Plot The charismatic leadership models dealt with personal connections and face-to-face meetings between the agents in the model and the leader over the course of the model run. They did not look at the leader‟s influence as a more nebulous presence. On average over the course of a model run, the leader agent met with approximately 20% of the population of the model. Of that 20%, his supporters or detractors continuously shifted, so that one group outnumbered the other on a regular basis. His supporters, as illustrated by Figure 9 above, averaged out between 40 and 60, with more supporters, on average, at higher levels of societal hate. This means that between 8 and 12% of the population supported the charismatic leader. When Hitler came to the forefront of the Nazi party, he garnered varying levels of public support (Goldhagen, 1996; 201 Gellately, 2001; Kershaw, 2008). Looking at election records, in 1928 his party received 2.6% of the votes for the Reichstag, 18.3% in 1930, 37.3% in 1932, and 43.9% in 1933 (O'Lessker, 1968). A recent study in Germany, conducted by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation found that about 13% of Germans would welcome the election of a new „Fuhrer‟ in Germany to restrict immigration, limit the practice of Islam, and decrease the influence of Jews in Germany (Marquand, 2010). So, while representative of past instances where support for a charismatic leader, the small percentage of support for the charismatic leader in the model is likely indicative of increased support that would have developed if the models have run for longer than one simulated year. The smallest following occurred when societal hate was not included in the model; this makes sense due to the fact that charismatic leaders are very situational. The concern is that the levels of charisma do not seem to engender much difference in how much support the charismatic leader gained. As long as the leader possessed even the minimal level of charisma, a following developed. This does match up with historical accounts of Hitler, while he was a great orator and passionate in his message, his personal habits and mannerisms made him someone that most people would not be comfortable with should they meet him on the street (Kershaw, 2008; Gellately, 2001; Fritzsche, 2008). 
work_l2tvpz6fvfdsra6y3ik7wlo6sq	----	King’s Research Portal DOI: 10.1108/JAP-09-2016-0021 Document Version Peer reviewed version Link to publication record in King's Research Portal Citation for published version (APA): Kidd, J., & Manthorpe, J. (2017). Modern Slavery: the adult safeguarding interface. Journal of Adult Protection, 19(3), 158-166. https://doi.org/10.1108/JAP-09-2016-0021 Citing this paper Please note that where the full-text provided on King's Research Portal is the Author Accepted Manuscript or Post-Print version this may differ from the final Published version. If citing, it is advised that you check and use the publisher's definitive version for pagination, volume/issue, and date of publication details. And where the final published version is provided on the Research Portal, if citing you are again advised to check the publisher's website for any subsequent corrections. 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Apr. 2021 https://doi.org/10.1108/JAP-09-2016-0021 https://kclpure.kcl.ac.uk/portal/en/publications/modern-slavery(40bdbc14-bd84-465d-93d0-1f27e9df2572).html https://kclpure.kcl.ac.uk/portal/en/persons/joanna-kidd(4908f269-8d5a-484e-a3df-c24c8cdea393).html /portal/jill.manthorpe.html https://kclpure.kcl.ac.uk/portal/en/publications/modern-slavery(40bdbc14-bd84-465d-93d0-1f27e9df2572).html https://kclpure.kcl.ac.uk/portal/en/journals/journal-of-adult-protection(1e6468bb-d3da-4156-be46-0c17a70a0969).html https://doi.org/10.1108/JAP-09-2016-0021 Journal of Adult Protection, accepted 13 March 2017 Modern Slavery – the adult safeguarding interface Joanna Kidd and Jill Manthorpe King’s College London Abstract Purpose: The inclusion of modern slavery in the Care Act 2014 in England as a form of abuse means that the subject of modern slavery is now included in the remit of adult safeguarding. This article discusses the background to the Modern Slavery Act 2015 and its provisions. Methodology A policy analysis was undertaken in 2016 drawing on research and commentary related to the interface between modern slavery and adult safeguarding. Findings There is little material as yet focussing on adult safeguarding and modern slavery but the inclusion of modern slavery in this area of practice will require practitioner responses, organisational collaboration, and revised data collection and analysis. Newspaper accounts of criminal charges under the Modern Slavery Act 2015 may be important first evidence of the interface potentially between modern slavery and adults at risk of abuse and neglect that are the focus of adult safeguarding concern. Practical Implications: Information about modern slavery may provide relevant background and contextual detail for adult safeguarding communities; furnishing links and resources for this new area of their work. Originality/value This article is likely to be of interest to policy makers, researchers, and practitioners in examining their new duties under the Care Act 2014 and the Modern Slavery Act 2015; and to wider public and private bodies considering their responsibilities in responses to modern slavery more broadly. Policy Paper Key words: modern slavery, adult safeguarding, adults at risk, human trafficking. Modern Slavery – the adult safeguarding interface Introduction In March 2015 the Modern Slavery Act (H.M. Government, 2015) was passed. Most of its provisions apply to England and Wales. In the same year The Human Trafficking and Exploitation (Scotland) Act 2015 was passed by the Scottish Parliament and the Human Trafficking and Exploitation (Criminal Justice and Support for Victims) Act (Northern Ireland) 2015 was passed by the Northern Ireland Assembly (see Brown 2016 for specific details). Notwithstanding this, victim support measures and law enforcement powers are very similar across the United Kingdom (UK) (see Malloch and Rigby, 2016). Under these laws modern slavery encapsulates all offences related to slavery, servitude and forced or compulsory labour, and human trafficking (as set out in the Modern Slavery Act 2015, Part 1 - Offences). Commenting on the Parliamentary processes related to England and Wales, Craig (2015) observed: One important victory was won with the government finally agreeing to include a clause requiring companies to take some responsibility for exploring whether slavery might be found in their supply chains. The Act in its final form indicates a series of issues which companies with an annual turnover above a threshold (which has yet to be determined) would be required to include in their anti-slavery statements on a website. Contrarily, the government failed to respond to very strong and prolonged demands from inside and outside Parliament to protect overseas domestic workers from the abuse they suffer at the hands of wealthy employers. It is in this context that this policy article is set; since adult safeguarding practitioners and leaders in national and local arenas in England, amongst others, have new responsibilities to consider modern slavery, to respond and co-operate in stopping the traffic and help people who are affected by it. As Clements (2016) noted, in England the initial Care Act 2014 Statutory Guidance (Chapter 14) (Department of Health 2014; see also revised Guidance from the Department of Health 2017) provided a much more expansive explanation of what is considered to be ‘abuse’ than was evident previously. Authorities were cautioned against limiting ‘their view of what constitutes abuse or neglect’ and this enlargement potentially includes the exploitations of modern slavery. Similar provisions followed with the implementation of the Social Services and Well-being (Wales) Act 2014, although under this Act a relevant partner of a local authority has a duty, if it has reasonable cause, to suspect and adult (or child) to be at risk of abuse or neglect, to inform the local authority. Moreover local authorities in Wales are able to apply for an Adult Protection and Support Order to enable a local authority authorised officer to secure entry to premises in order to speak in private with an adult suspected of being at risk to determine whether they are making decisions freely, whether they are at risk, and what care and support needs they may have (see Welsh Assembly 2015). Adult safeguarding across the UK has been largely ‘victim’ focused with high levels of interest in risk factors, assessment, interventions and access to justice. (The term adult protection is more commonly employed in Scotland.) It has considered and addresses prevention but these aspects are largely relationship focused or related to health and social care provider systems. Furthermore most responses are nationally focused. Modern slavery, by contrast, both challenges adult safeguarding to think globally but also suggests new ways of conceptualising and addressing prevention, risk factors and responses. A recent systematic review focusing on healthcare responses to human trafficking, but not mentioning adult safeguarding, highlighted: … the importance of interviewing possible victims in private, using professional interpreters, and building trust. For provision of care, key themes included the importance of comprehensive needs assessments, adhering to principles of trauma-informed care, and cultural sensitivity. Further prominent themes were the necessity of multi-agency working strategies and well-defined referral pathways (Hemmings et al 2016). The aim of this article is consider modern slavery in the context of adult safeguarding in England and to set out some of the broader features of modern slavery that are encapsulated in the new legislations. As Androff (2010, p213) suggested, some forms of contemporary slavery have received more attention than others; particularly sexual slavery and child slavery. This means adult safeguarding communities of interest may benefit from consulting widely and listening carefully about the subject when developing their responses to the Acts at local and national levels. The article is structured into four sections. The first outlines the background to the Modern Slavery Act 2015. We next focus on one facet of modern slavery, the notion of supply chains, and the ways in which responses to these are being developed. Following this we discuss the ways in which human trafficking – fundamental to supply chains – is emerging in as a policy concern with its overlaps and connections with adult safeguarding. We conclude with some early examples of adult safeguarding activity as it interfaces with modern slavery; such examples are likely to become more commonplace and more diverse as practice, systems and responses develop and as the numbers of cases detected continue to rise (Salvation Army 2016). Background The Care Act 2014’s initial Care and Support Statutory Guidance included under its sections on abuse and neglect the following types; physical abuse, domestic abuse, sexual abuse, psychological abuse, financial abuse, modern slavery, discriminatory abuse, neglect and acts of omission, and self-neglect and/or domestic violence (Department of Health 2014 para 14.17). Such a broad definition was new since slavery and human trafficking had hitherto been deemed mainly criminal justice and police matters and to be rare in the contemporary UK. However, prior to Care Act 2014, Sharapov (2014a) had found that: On rare occasions where councils did recognise trafficking as relevant to their operations, it was interpreted as an issue of safeguarding vulnerable children and adults. Modern slavery is a global trade, reaping huge profits for traffickers and organised crime networks, generating massive human rights violations, and causing serious problems for governments and law enforcement. Almost 150 years following the general abolition and criminalisation of slavery (all countries, with the exception of North Korea, have domestic legislation which criminalises some forms of modern slavery) millions of men, women and children are either enslaved or trafficked for labour and exploitation against their will. Moreover, as refugee and migrant crises develop from drivers such as civil war, famine, internal strife and the breakdown of order, the numbers potentially vulnerable to exploitation increase. As a result, a criminal market has been created which exploits the vulnerabilities of people desperate to relocate in search of better circumstances or tricked into exploitative relationships, who may be traded for cash, sometimes accompanied by a promise of a better life. The Home Office (2016, p44) reported that ‘Vulnerable people are often targeted as being easier to coerce into a situation where they can be manipulated’. The criminality driving this market has grown to be a large source of activity and income for many forms of transnational organised crime and is changing the nature and activity of criminals themselves. This was first highlighted, and has since been echoed by others, in 2000 during the opening statement of Pino Arlacchi, Under-Secretary-General to the United Nations, at an International Seminar on Trafficking in Human Beings, who stated that reports indicated the transition of some trafficking groups from their traditional cargo of drugs to human beings, in a search for high profits at lower risk (Arlacchi 2000). Furthermore, modern slavery as a crime and transnational security risk does not exist in isolation and significant security threats hide in the chaos created by illegal movements of people on a large scale, not least terrorism. By its nature, modern slavery and its associated criminal networks are hidden from sight and victims rarely identify themselves or volunteer their stories. This leads to an environment in which there is scant information, few resources and insufficient data available for the development of effective strategies and limited understandings derived from research about the prevention, mitigation, disruption and interdiction of trafficking crimes for policymakers, academics and law enforcement bodies alike. While we lack reliable quantitative data to produce accurate statistics, it is estimated by the International Labour Office (ILO) that there are currently 21 million people in forced labour in the world today (ILO, 2016) with figures from the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) indicating that human trafficking generates over US$ 150 billion in criminal revenue annually, with more than 1.1 million new victims each year. In addition, this crime has significant intended and unintended effects on the economy, sustainable development, safety, cohesion, culture and well-being of populations around the world. It is these reasons and the increasing statistics that have driven the need globally to better define, understand and address the crime as it evolves dynamically and affects all societies. A report from the Institute for the Study of International Migration at Georgetown University, United States of America, highlighted the many powerful barriers which exist regarding access to primary data which hinder the scope and utility of current research (Goździak and Bump 2008). Specifically, this report stated that the main obstacle to conducting empirical qualitative research on human trafficking is related to problems in gaining access to trafficked individuals (ibid, p. 10). The scarcity of quantitative studies stems from both the unavailability of datasets on trafficking of people and/or difficulty in gaining access to the existing databases (ibid, p. 29). One exception is the quantitative research conducted by the Walk Free Foundation for its Global Slavery Indices (Walk Free, 2016). In 2016, the Global Slavery Index estimated the number of people in modern slavery in 167 countries to be 45.8 million people and provided a ranking of slavery conditions in a country based on key variables. However, this research has been widely criticised for failures in applied methodologies, unverified assumptions, logic errors and the global extrapolation of an exceptionally small dataset (sample survey in 19 countries and limited secondary data) which rendered the data controversial, and possibly invalid (ibid, p. 12; p. 112). A further initiative was launched in 2016 by the campaigning charity Stop the Traffik with its STOP APP (http://www.stopthetraffik.org/uk/page/the-stop-app, accessed 8 March 2017), which aims to coordinate the gathering and sharing of data on trafficking; it remains to be seen how accurate this initiative will be. The importance of supply chains Specifically, the Modern Slavery Act 2015 introduced penalties and sentencing rules, ensured that offences are subject to the asset recovery regime under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, introduced http://www.stopthetraffik.org/uk/page/the-stop-app bespoke slavery and trafficking compensation orders, and provided for the confiscation of vehicles, ships and aircraft used for the purposes of trafficking. Moreover, in what was the first legislation of its kind globally, Section 54 (Part 6) of the Modern Slavery Act, the Transparency in Supply Chains provision, addressed the role businesses should play in preventing slavery in their supply chains and organisations. The inclusion of this rests on the argument that addressing supply chain compliance, especially in global companies with multinational supply chains often rooted in small local businesses in developing countries, may be an effective tool to combat modern slavery. This is because businesses may be able to leverage economic power to influence existing markets and create new ones, where workers enjoy decent work, human dignity and are free from coercion and the exploitation associated with modern slavery (U.S. Department of State, 2015). The Transparency in Supply Chains provision required, from 31st March 2016, that all commercial organisations and franchises with a minimum turnover of £36 million which supply goods or services and conduct business or part of a business in the UK, must produce a slavery and human trafficking annual statement setting out the steps they have taken to ensure there is no taint of slavery in their own business and supply chains in the financial year. If an organisation has not taken steps to do this, its statement should explicitly say so and if a business fails to produce a statement, the Secretary of State may seek an injunction through the High Court requiring it to comply. While the Act does not require businesses to provide a guarantee that their supply chains are slavery free, it created an impetus for them to avoid the poor publicity and reputational damage that would ensue from apparent insouciance over such a strongly rebarbative practice. It is therefore seen as a spur for businesses to act responsibly and change their policies and practices if necessary. Nevertheless, exposing and identifying vulnerable or exploitive practises continue to prove exceptionally difficult and thus businesses are now joining the data sparse environment. Non-governmental organisations, such as Stop the Traffik (STT), have particular expertise in working with industries to understand better and identify the threat from modern slavery in supply chains. STT has produced reports focusing on plantation based industries, such as tea and cocoa, where there is often a continued high risk of trafficked labour, and has worked with industry partners in these areas. In conjunction with its subsidiary Finance Against Trafficking, STT highlighted the risks in supply chains of the major FTSE 100 companies in a report Forced Labour, Human Trafficking & the FTSE 100 (Barry and Palmer 2015). This identified significant difficulties in supply chain analysis, even with compliant companies, with the greatest being the identification of the upper branches of supply chains where trafficked labour may be embedded (ibid). The involvement of traditional criminal intermediaries and ‘middlepersons' in the labour supply (labour brokers, employment agencies or recruiters), who cover the tracks of criminal procurement of labour by using tactics of fear, intimidation, deception and forced confiscation of identity documents, makes the task exceptionally difficult. Trafficking and professional practice in the UK A training programme on responses to modern slavery across professionals was recently evaluated by Cordis Bright (2106) for the Welsh Government. This was seen to be effective partly as a result of the investment in systems in Wales to identify and respond to possible cases. However, Ross et al (2015) recently conducted a survey of NHS professionals; mainly in the London area. The healthcare professionals surveyed said they would welcome information and training on human trafficking. Ross et al (2015) recommended that the content of training programmes should include how to identify and respond to human trafficking, what questions to ask, risk assessment, and referrals to support providers and criminal justice systems. Interestingly this study found that such training was seen as particularly relevant to practitioners in maternity services, mental health, paediatrics and emergency medicine, as well as professionals working in areas where victims of human trafficking are encountered, or where shelter and support are on offer. For those working in adult safeguarding Ross et al’s (2015) conclusions that more needs to be known about the experiences of NHS primary care practitioners, and which training programmes are effective in improving the identification and referral of potential human trafficked individuals, have resonance in light of adult safeguarding experiences that adult safeguarding related training in the NHS is less often taken up than in local authorities. Mollach et al (2012) warned: Provision of care and assistance may be excellent as provided by dedicated services, but problems continue with lack of awareness of this issue by professionals and court systems surrounding victims of domestic servitude and forced labour. (p35) Moreover modern slavery and human trafficking requires a different scope and understanding from areas that are familiar to adult safeguarding communities. They span the evolution of transnational organised crime and its impact on communities. This suggests a need for approaches and methodologies which can be used to identify, prevent and mitigate impacts at local and global levels. While practitioners will face questions when working with individuals, at more strategic levels managers, data collectors and analysts will need to think what quantitative and qualitative data are relevant and required to research and respond to modern slavery and the role, modus operandi, and network structures of transnational organised crime in facilitating its incidence in key multinational industry supply chains. It is possible that the largely individual focus of adult safeguarding may benefit from such approaches, particularly around financial abuse and the ways in which organised crime may be engaged in targeting adults at risk (Mills et al 2013). Modern slavery often represents a spectrum of abuse and it is not always clear at what point, for example, poor working practices and lack of health and safety awareness seep into instances of human trafficking, slavery or forced labour in a work environment. As noted above, it exists in formal and informal labour markets of both lawful and illicit industries, affecting skilled and unskilled workers from all educational backgrounds. These dimensions will need to be raised on an inter- agency basis. Early responses relating to adult safeguarding The Ann Craft Trust (2014) recently commented on the criminal prosecution of members of the Rooke family in respect of Craig Kinsella: The imprisonment and torture of Craig Kinsella highlights a shocking trend of serious and violent hate crime against people with learning disabilities and vulnerable adults. The imprisonment and sentences handed out to David Rooke and his son should be applauded, however this shocking crime brings into sharp focus a clear need for greater education around protecting those most at risk in our society. Terms such as abuse, violence, torture, hate crime and slavery as used by the Ann Craft Trust indicate the many interpretations of such behaviour but also the overlap between modern slavery and adult safeguarding. Likewise a recent criminal case in Nottingham was reported as ‘Woman with learning difficulties, 24, kept as a slave and forced to sleep in a duck pen by couple who beat and threatened to soak her in water’ (Mail Online 2015). A later case was reported of trafficking by gang-masters from Lithuania that involved vulnerable people: The Subatkis twins were used as forced labour and their experience is typical of a growing pattern of exploitation in the UK made possible by a supply chain that relies of layers of sub- contracting in which traffickers can thrive. The pair were employed at the 2 Sisters factory via the Staffline recruitment agency, as signed up by Ratautas. They were vulnerable young men, brought up partly in care in Lithuania. Edvinas has learning disabilities and Edgarus is of limited education. (Guardian 2016) While such vulnerable situations may be anticipated by adult safeguarding practitioners, Lemos & Crane (2014) have also highlighted the risk of homeless people being targeted by those engaged in forced labour and other abuses. The Modern Slavery Act (2015) guidance provides social workers and other professionals with details of how to identify and support victims and their obligations under the processes of reporting as part of the duties of public bodies (for information on the reporting requirements see Home Office 2016). It consolidated and updated criminal legislation on human trafficking, slavery, forced labour, cannabis farming, organ harvesting, forced begging and domestic servitude. The maximum custodial sentences for the most serious offences were increased from 14 years to life imprisonment. One particular point of interest is that understanding of modern slavery seems to be becoming better known among the general public in the UK; Sharapov (2014b, p.7) has suggested that this may be the result of greater public recognition of domestic violence: The increasing public awareness of domestic violence, for example, has contributed towards its re-definition from a private matter into a social and criminal problem in need of formal social and legal control. The general public can be one of the most powerful interest groups if motivated towards positive actions but a real so, to greater and lesser degrees, participants in the supply and demand contexts of humans trafficking. Those responsible for safeguarding adults in England must be alert to the exploitation inherent to modern slavery. In local or regional adult safeguarding policies and procedures or other materials, this responsibility has been highlighted. Buckinghamshire Adult Safeguarding Board (2014), for example, recently stated: For people who have particular vulnerabilities, especially learning disabilities or mental health needs they can be additionally able to be manipulated and are sometimes easily drawn into these situations, and find it even more difficult to get out even if they realise the way they are being treated is unacceptable. Similarly the Crown Prosecution Service (2015) has reminded its staff that victims of crimes such as modern slavery need to be kept engaged throughout the entire criminal process. It observed: Often, victims are targeted for these crimes because of their extreme vulnerabilities (e.g. learning or physical disabilities), so prosecutors are encouraged to use special measures, and be inventive in doing so, wherever they can. This could include live link evidence or identification, and it is particularly important that we strengthen our relationships with prosecutors and police from different countries to ensure that this can take place, whatever the circumstances of the case. Lastly, awareness of modern slavery needs translation into systems and organisational relationships. One recommendation made by the Human Trafficking Foundation (2015) was that: … a multi - agency specialist working group, including Local Authority Adult Safeguarding Leads and NGOs (non-governmental organisations), develop a ‘Case Transfer Protocol’ which can be adopted into existing guidance so that moving on from the Government-funded scheme becomes a safer and more streamlined process. To complement this we recommend a telephone based advice service be developed for front- line professionals to access knowledge and resources. (p6) Such a recommendation was made following case examples of the ways in which people (in Care Act 2014 terms ‘adults at risk’) who had been subjected to trafficking and to abuse are not always well supported by agencies even if they are in contact with services (see, for example, the case illustration of ‘Maria’ reported by the Human Trafficking Foundation (2015) p30). We will also need to collect evidence of the effectiveness of such developments if they occur and of other responses, including the ways in which local safeguarding authorities work with the National Referral Mechanism (NRM) - the process by which an individual is formally identified as a victim of modern slavery and support is offered (see National Crime Agency, no date). Safeguarding authorities may also be able to inform data collection about people who are not identified as victims officially or whose official support has come to an end. Conclusion The inclusion of modern slavery in the lexicon of adult abuse presents challenges to adult safeguarding leaders, managers and practitioners. Much stress is being laid on the need for local agency collaboration but there is a fresh emphasis on prevention internationally. There is also a new focus on interrupting supply chains in respect of trafficking and ensuring that all businesses (some of which will be care providers) consider their own responsibilities to prevent modern slavery. This latter point may be a new departure for adult safeguarding communities of interest since it chimes with notions of care quality and the responsibilities placed on care providers. For practitioners there is a need to be familiar with the new legislation and its requirements; for Safeguarding Adult Boards, a similar need to take on the new requirements and to ensure agency collaboration including support for victims, and for researchers and educationalists a need to move on from definitional debates to assess the effectiveness of interventions and responses. Acknowledgements and disclaimer References Arlacchi, P. (2000), Opening Statement of Pino Arlacchi Under-Secretary-General Director-General to the International Seminar on Trafficking in Human Beings, Brasilia, 28-29 November 2000, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/about- unodc/speeches/speech_2000-11-28_1.html (accessed 8 March 2017) Androff, D.K. (2010), The problem of contemporary slavery: An international human rights challenge for social work, International Social Work, 54(2) 209-222. 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Budapest: Center for Policy Studies, Central European University, http://pdc.ceu.hu/archive/00007217/01/cps-public-knowledge-and-attitudes-towards- thb-2014.pdf (accessed 8 March 2017) U.S. Department of State (2015), Trafficking in Persons Report, Washington DC, https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/245365.pdf (accessed 8 March 2017) Walk Free (2016) The Global Slavery Index, http://www.globalslaveryindex.org/findings/ (accessed 8 March 2017) Welsh Assembly (2015), Explanatory Memorandum to the Adult Protection and Support Orders (Authorised Officer) (Wales) Regulations 2015, Cardiff, Welsh Assembly, 4 June, http://www.assembly.wales/laid%20documents/sub-ld10228-em/sub-ld10228-em-e.pdf (accessed March 2017) http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3356635/Woman-learning-difficulties-24-kept-slave-forced-sleep-duck-pen-couple-beat-threatened-soak-water.html#ixzz47LbOTpOe http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3356635/Woman-learning-difficulties-24-kept-slave-forced-sleep-duck-pen-couple-beat-threatened-soak-water.html#ixzz47LbOTpOe http://www.gov.scot/Resource/0040/00404917.pdf https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/246390/horr73.pdf https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/246390/horr73.pdf http://www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/about-us/what-we-do/specialist-capabilities/uk-human-trafficking-centre/national-referral-mechanism http://www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/about-us/what-we-do/specialist-capabilities/uk-human-trafficking-centre/national-referral-mechanism http://C:/Users/stra9316/Downloads/160614-new_contract_first_year_report_styled%20(2).pdf http://antitraffickingreview.org/index.php/atrjournal/article/view/63 http://pdc.ceu.hu/archive/00007217/01/cps-public-knowledge-and-attitudes-towards-thb-2014.pdf http://pdc.ceu.hu/archive/00007217/01/cps-public-knowledge-and-attitudes-towards-thb-2014.pdf https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/245365.pdf http://www.globalslaveryindex.org/findings/ http://www.assembly.wales/laid%20documents/sub-ld10228-em/sub-ld10228-em-e.pdf 
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work_l74g4azijfbdfpi5ybho6xesaq	----	Women, War, and Peace in Jewish and Middle East Contexts Women, War, and Peace in Jewish and Middle East Contexts Marla Brettschneider Nashim: A Journal of Jewish Women's Studies & Gender Issues, Number 6, Fall 5764/2003, pp. 56-59 (Article) Published by Indiana University Press DOI: For additional information about this article [ This content has been declared free to read by the pubisher during the COVID-19 pandemic. ] https://doi.org/10.1353/nsh.2004.0034 https://muse.jhu.edu/article/53339 https://doi.org/10.1353/nsh.2004.0034 https://muse.jhu.edu/article/53339 56 Symposium WOMEN, WAR, AND PEACE IN JEWISH AND MIDDLE EAST CONTEXTS Marla Brettschneider, University of New Hampshire I was delighted to be invited to participate in Nashim’s virtual symposium for its special issue on “Women, War, and Peace in Jewish and Middle East Contexts.” After much thought, I dutifully sat down to write a short piece in which I offered a particular frame for understanding the Israel–Palestine conflict. My subject was primarily Israel, relying on a feminist approach that was large, philosophical. Using broad brush strokes, I painted a portrait of a complicated and shifting ontological clash between the United States, Israel, and Palestine. As is common in patriarchal forms of international relations that eschew difference, if the U.S. is to work publicly with another nation and claim it as a long-term and secure ally, it must portray that country as similar to the dominant understanding of itself: a western-style, at least somewhat free-market democracy of interest to Christians. Yet Israel is not simply “like” the U.S. I described some differences between the political cultures of Israel and the U.S. that may help explain the strains between the two during these tough times of war and failed negotiations. Adding to the limitations of a U.S.-designed strategy to end the fighting are the similarities between Israel and Palestine, together in their difference from U.S. assumptions. But for all the many similarities between Israel and Palestine, I looked through a feminist lens at how their needs and modes of analysis begin to part ways, so that the tensions between them have only been exacerbated. I speak in the past tense, because that essay is not the one you are about to read. I still think that these macro-international issues require feminist analysis. However, in the months since I drafted that first attempt, I have felt increasingly concerned about the insanity in the U.S. as well, as the governing administration rushes into a new war in the Middle East. I feel compelled to explore the dynamics over here and to expose some of the micro aspects of the larger topic. Building on efforts underway within the elite for many years, the U.S. govern- ment has turned the tragedy(ies) of September 11th, 2001, into an opportu- nity for pushing a fundamental shift toward a Republican agenda crafted by the party’s right wing. The nation has entered a historical cycle of dangerous either/or patriotism and xenophobic violence. Using the specter of terrorism chf 57 Women, War, and Peace to knock ordinary folk into a narrow realm of interpretation and response, the federal government is recasting domestic and international policy without regard for basic principles of either decency or debate. Basic civil liberties, due process, separation of powers, and checks and balances—cornerstones of a U.S.-fashioned notion of democracy—are consistently and publicly disregarded. The federal government is undertaking the most significant reorganization in this nation’s history with the aim to centralize surveillance, the information gathered therefrom, and its directed response. Stepping up anti-immigrant laws passed in the mid-1990s but hitherto only sporadically enforced, these policies, such as the forced registrations, arrests, and detention of immigrants, target the very vulnerable populations of Moslems, Arabs, Middle Easterners, and South Asians in the U.S. While this new effort appears to be directed at men from these communities, it is also designed to disempower already rather disenfranchised groups of women. Snatching away the men fitting these profiles is tearing apart families and communities—economically, socially, religiously, and otherwise. Not merely relegating women from these communities to the sidelines, the situ- ation has left them with the multiple hardships of supporting the men in or under threat of detention while somehow holding families and communal structures together. All this, in a historical context for which there has been little preparation and a national climate in which these same women face verbal and physical harassment and abuse every day, at every level. Anti-welfare and anti-drug laws enacted since 1996 have also mostly tar- geted young people of color, while bringing women into the prison-industrial complex at faster rates than before. Splitting up families and communities through the surveillance and incarceration of women threatens to bring to fruition the self-fulfilling fantasy of some whites that women of color are producing generations of humans unfit for an “American way of life” and are thus a threat to the nation’s well being. Where is the Jewish community in all of this? Its role has been mapped out quite clearly. Notwithstanding the rise in anti-Semitism and anti-Jewish hate crimes in the U.S., the Jewish community has not generally been the target of these recent legislative developments and efforts at “law” enforcement. Long defenders of immigrants’ rights and proponents of civil equality, major Jewish organizations in the U.S. have recently retreated from these commit- ments. Not willing to risk their anxious status as honorary members of the elite, many large Jewish institutions are generally putting out the message 58 Symposium that they are patriotic supporters of the government’s sweeping re-orienta- tion. We are seeing a trend wherein many Jews in these organizations are publicly “pledging allegiance” to the Administration and also securing their alliances with right-wing Christian groups. Internally, Jews with power have clamped down on dissent on issues ranging from Israel and the conflict there to other U.S. interventions around the globe, and to the anti-democratic poli- cies here. Average Jewish individuals tend to toe the communal party line, whether or not they recognize that line as part of a concerted Jewish effort at public opinion-making. Jewish women, following a long tradition of speaking out in a pro-peace voice, are finding their jobs and status yet again threatened. Despite the squeeze on dissent in the Jewish community, and Jewish women’s still precarious position in Jewish life and among our leadership, many Jewish feminists have mustered the strength and courage to stay active. Many smaller, more domestically-focused groups with feminists in leadership positions—such as Jews for Racial and Economic Justice here in New York City and the range of organizations across the nation linked through the Jewish Social Justice Network—have continued to work for immigrant rights and other justice issues, risking attack in the press, threats of violence from other Jewish organizations, and de-funding. As a domestic-international crossover example, Jewish Women Watching, a national Jewish version of the Guerilla Girls, has targeted the increasingly bolstered alliances between parts of the mainstream, organized Jewish com- munity and the radical Christian right. Their most recent campaign involves distributing condoms with a wrapping that reads “practice safe politics.” An attached postcard urging “abstinence from strange bedfellows” offers facts about these alliances and their potential impact on civil liberties issues and women’s, gay, and reproductive rights. It also reminds us that the Zionist Organization of America awarded “The State of Israel Friendship Award” this year to the Christian right’s Pat Robertson. Other groups have also formed in response to the call for peace and sanity at this historic moment. The organization Brit Tzedek v’Shalom: Jewish Alli- ance for Justice and Peace has emerged as the foundation of a new center- left peace effort declaring its concern for Israel at the core of its mission. Feminists have been central in this group’s design and development in ways rarely found in U.S. Jewish organizational life. Feminists have also been central to the reinvigoration of an array of as-yet small further-left Jewish 59 Women, War, and Peace groups working on Israel and Middle East peace. Some examples are the coalition of groups involved in the now defunct JUNITY (Jews United for a Just Peace, which formed at the start of the current Intifada in order to help spur organizing and coalitions around the U.S.), the web of Women in Black solidarity groups, Jewish Voice for Peace, JATO (Jews Against the Occupation), and the Refuser Solidarity Network. Radically inclined Jewish groups, particularly when it comes to Israeli politics and peace, have histori- cally faced marginalization in the community. That there are many active feminists in these groups seems to make it easier for the largely male-run U.S. Jewish establishment to alternately threaten and ignore them. The costs of macro modes of maintaining global U.S. dominance, and of the domestic components of U.S. foreign policy, are Jewish, feminist, and decidedly Jewish feminist issues. Feminists have long argued that an inability to address the complex of cultural difference within and among nations will ensure that efforts at peace are ineffective. We are also seeing up close how demonizing difference is essential to the strategy of using peacemaking as a guise for war-making. Globally, it is weaker nations that suffer most in these circumstances; domestically, it is those comprising the imbricating groups of women, the poor, and already disempowered minorities. The combination of intense state activity and propaganda aimed at joining xenophobia, patriotism, and the creation of “evil others” is clearly dangerous. Historically a primary target in such campaigns, Jews know the importance of rejecting either/or politics and propagandistic messages of hate. Jewish contributions to a politics of decency and equality have historically yielded significant benefits for Jews and for many. I’ve been asked what my own Jewish feminist agenda is for now. As a Jewish feminist, I feel called upon to remain steadfast and public in my commitment to diversity and peace work, linking macro developments on the international level to the most micro effects manifest among women, the poor, and the variety of minority communities that may be directly affected at any given moment. New historical moments require new analyses and strategies of engagement. This moment also reveals ever more deeply the wisdom of hard-learned Jewish feminist insights into the need for open, steady, and sustainable justice work. 
work_l7ulursxojgulj67cd4mupf2cm	----	‘Normalized’ Pride? Pride parade participants in six European countries http://www.diva-portal.org This is the published version of a paper published in Sexualities. Citation for the original published paper (version of record): Peterson, A., Wahlström, M., Wennerhag, M. (2018) ‘Normalized’ Pride?: Pride parade participants in six European countries Sexualities, 21(7): 1146-1169 https://doi.org/10.1177/1363460717715032 Access to the published version may require subscription. N.B. When citing this work, cite the original published paper. CC BY-NC Permanent link to this version: http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:sh:diva-34968 Article ‘Normalized’ Pride? Pride parade participants in six European countries Abby Peterson University of Gothenburg, Sweden Mattias Wahlström University of Gothenburg, Sweden Magnus Wennerhag Södertörn University, Sweden Abstract Based on quantitative survey data collected during Pride parades in six European coun- tries – the Czech Republic, Great Britain, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzerland – we analyse who participates in Pride parades. Engaging with the so- called protest normalization thesis we ask: are Pride parade participants, aside from sexual orientation, representative of the wider populace? In none of the countries could we find indications that Pride participants mirror the general populations. The parades remain dominated by well-educated, middle strata youth, rich in political resources. However, we find variation between countries, which we link to differences in elite and public support for LGBT rights. Keywords LGBT movements, normalization of demonstrations, Pride parades, protest participa- tion, protest survey Pride parades are today staged in numerous countries and localities, providing the most visible manifestation of lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) move- ments and politics. Pride parades, we argue, are foundational rituals for LGBT movements across the globe; as such they act as collective responses to oppression, encourage redefinition of self, and express collective identity (Engel, 2001: 140; Taylor and Whittier, 1995). But are LGBT individuals from all ages and all Sexualities 0(0) 1–24 ! The Author(s) 2017 Reprints and permissions: sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav DOI: 10.1177/1363460717715032 journals.sagepub.com/home/sex Corresponding author: Mattias Wahlström, University of Gothenburg Box 720, 405 30 Gothenburg, Sweden. Email: mattias.wahlstrom@gu.se https://uk.sagepub.com/en-gb/journals-permissions https://doi.org/10.1177/1363460717715032 journals.sagepub.com/home/sex http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1177%2F1363460717715032&domain=pdf&date_stamp=2017-08-03 walks of life included in Pride parades? Or are Pride parades the privileged public spaces of young, highly educated, middle-class, white males? Can we speak about a genuine democratization of the LGBT movement expressed by the diversity of its Pride parade participants? In this article we examine what in the social movement literature is designated as the ‘protest normalization thesis’. The protest normalization thesis can be broken down in two parts. Firstly, it is argued that demonstrations have become an increasingly normal and acceptable means of political participation. Secondly, the composition of people engaging in demonstrations is becoming increasingly ‘normal’ in a statistical sense, that is, representing more or less a cross-section of the population. Linking these two dimensions together, Verhulst and Walgrave claim that ‘the normalization of protest has brought on a normalization of protesters’ (2009: 457). Subsequently, if the protest normalization thesis holds true, then we should expect to find that Pride parades are no longer solely the domain of what Verhulst and Walgrave call the ‘usual suspects’. Instead, Pride participants would more or less mirror the general population in terms of socio- demographics, thereby conforming to the general, albeit weak, normalization trend in demonstrations. Hence our first question: Are Pride parade participants, aside from sexual orientation, reflecting the social diversity found in the wider population? Commemorating the 1969 Stonewall Riots in New York City, the first Pride demonstrations were held in New York, Los Angeles and Chicago in 1970 to publicly demonstrate and assert lesbian and gay identity and pride. The tradition has since travelled globally (Herdt, 1997; Lundberg, 2007: 173). Despite its origins in the USA, the tradition has become ‘translated’ into new contexts to suit different national and local settings (Adam et al., 1999; Browne, 2007; Calvo and Trujillo, 2011; Duggan, 2010; Enguix, 2009; Nardi, 1998; Robinson, 2012; Ross, 2008). 1 Subsequently, we argue that the mobilizing and political contexts should also impact on the participant profiles in Pride parades (Holzhacker 2012; see later in this article). Hence, our second research question: How do these different mobilizing and political contexts influence participation in Pride parades, either encouraging a mobilization of a broad range of people or recruiting only a more limited segment of the LGBT population? Hitherto there has been little systematic knowledge about the participants in Pride parades, with only a few studies based on relatively small samples of partici- pants (Browne, 2007; McFarland, 2012). In this study we use quantitative survey data collected within the European Science Foundation Euroscores program ‘Caught in the Act of Protest: Contextualizing Contestation’ (CCC), to analyse who participates in Pride parades in six European countries: the Czech Republic, Great Britain, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzerland. This choice of countries is primarily based on available data from the CCC program, nonetheless the sample includes a range of different societal contexts that provide a basis for fruitful international comparisons. In the next section, we describe the normaliza- tion thesis of demonstration participation, and discuss its relevance for Pride 2 Sexualities 0(0) parades. After a section outlining the data and research methods we will turn to an analysis of the socio-demographic and political composition of the Pride parades included in our study. The ‘protest normalization thesis’ and Pride parades Demonstration participation has become a normalized form of political activity in Western European societies. Since the 1960s more and more issues have been raised in demonstrations and a steadily increasing number of demonstrations and dem- onstrators have taken to the streets across Western Europe (see e.g. Barnes and Kaase, 1979; Meyer and Tarrow, 1998; Norris, 2002; Norris et al., 2005; Tilly, 1983; Van Aelst and Walgrave, 2001). According to Topf (1995), both the number and above all the legitimacy of all kinds of peaceful protest acts have risen to such an extent in Western Europe that any reference to ‘unconventional’ forms of partici- pation is more or less outmoded. Demonstrations have become normalized result- ing in what Etzioni (1970) very early proclaimed as ‘demonstration democracies’ and what Meyer and Tarrow (1998) call ‘social movement societies’. The so-called new social movements that emerged in the 1960s, in addition to introducing new issues to the street, also produced a new kind of protester. The demographic profile of environmental, feminist or peace demonstrations differ radically from that of disgruntled workers: they are both younger and more educated. Demonstrations are no longer solely the means for the organized working class to air their demands, but (perhaps primarily) the domain of the politically active, well-educated middle class (Van Aelst and Walgrave, 2001; see also Norris, 2002). But the question remains, has the normalization of demonstra- tions developed to produce a normalization of the demonstrator? Van Aelst and Walgrave (2001:466) posed the following question: ‘Are the profiles of demonstra- tors different to those of the average man or woman in the street?’ Their answer was ambivalent. As protest issues have become more diversified, the diversity in social groups that today stage demonstrations has increased (what Van Aelst and Walgrave see as an increasing ‘external heterogeneity’). However, the internal diversity of demonstration populations has but slowly increased. While gender is less a factor today, there remains what they called ‘female’ and ‘male’ demonstra- tions. Furthermore, younger and better-educated demonstrators continue to dom- inate. However, they found that in specific types of demonstrations, linked to what they call ‘new emotional movements’, the heterogeneity, and therefore representa- tiveness, of the demonstration’s rank and file is quite remarkable (Van Aelst and Walgrave, 2001: 477–78). These mobilizations are typically emotional reactions to criminal victimization and participants are predominantly mobilized directly through mass media rather than through associations or organizations. Nevertheless, they concluded, in regards to the normalization of the protester that the ‘underrepresentation of those with less education and the less affluent prevents us from speaking about genuine democratization of street protest’ (2001: 482). Peterson et al. 3 In conclusion, while there appears to be a degree of normalization among dem- onstrators, the trend is still relatively weak. Nonetheless, there has been a social diffusion of protest. Van Aelst and Walgrave (2001: 481) maintain that the lower forecasting potential of socio-demographic variables has made way for situational variables. Individuals’ likelihood to take part in protests depends less on their age, gender and, to a lesser extent, their education, than on the context of the mobiliza- tion, as well as the issue of the demonstration. It can also be added that compared to other forms of political participation (e.g. contacting governmental officials, or work- ing in a political party), the level of participation in protests is today more similar between different social strata (Schlozman et al., 2012: 122–124). Prima facie, many Pride parades could be expected to be a good example of this normalization trend, since they explicitly seek to mobilize the breadth of the LGBT community. They are often organized as ‘open’ demonstrations encouraging everyone with a LGBT identity (or heterosexuals who sympathize with LGBT politics) to par- ticipate. In this sense Pride parades encourage social diversity and are a celebration of the social diversity of the LGBT community. By extension, as noted by Ross (2008), there is an increasing tendency to embrace diversity in society as a whole. LGBT identities are transversal. Although not always in equal proportions across all social demographic categories, they are found in all parts of society and cut across perceived social barriers such as class, ethnicity/race, age and sex (cf. Gates, 2015). This suggests a potential for the ‘normalization’ of Pride parade participants. However, the notion of ‘normalization’ is hotly debated within the LGBT movement and among LGBTQ scholars and does not carry the same connotation as within the wider social movement literature discussed earlier. Queer critics contend that ‘nor- malization’ – in terms of LGBT people ceasing to challenge broader relationship norms and sexual norms in society – leads to a politics of assimilation into hetero- normativity, which thereby undermines the LGBT movement’s emancipatory force and fundamental cultural challenge (e.g. Chasin 2000; Epstein 1998; Gamson 1995; Seidman 1997; Valocchi 1999; Walters 2003; Warner 2000). Richardson (2004: 394) argues that, paradoxically, by drawing on respect for diversity LGBT movements ‘may further their efforts in seeking social conformity as ‘‘normal gays’’, who espouse the norms and values of the ‘‘ordinary’’ citizen’. Despite the problematics associated with trumpeting out ‘we are just like the rest of you’, an underlying aim of the organizers of the Pride parades we studied is just that, to manifest the LGBT community as more or less reflective of the social diversity found within the wider population (Wahlström and Peterson, 2016) – ‘We are everywhere’ (Davis, 1995: 293) – the socio-demographic normalization of the Pride participants. We explore whether the normalizing tendencies in terms of socio-demographics outlined in the social movement literature, and the aims of some Pride organizers to maximize diversity, in fact holds for Pride par- ades. Hence the following hypothesis: H1 The participants in Pride parades are not statistically different from their respect- ive national populations in terms of age, gender, class and education. 4 Sexualities 0(0) Furthermore, the LGBT community is not a political monolith. Sexual orientation alone does not result in political consensus, especially not in states where parties across the left–right spectrum increasingly take liberal stances on LGBT issues. Consequently, LGBT individuals, like the wider population, could be expected to crisscross ideological and party political barriers – the political normalization of the Pride participants. However, in practice, LGBT people can be expected to less frequently vote for parties with illiberal stances on LGBT rights. For example, in the USA, LGBT voters show disproportionately weak support for the Republican Party (e.g. Gates, 2012). In line with this research we propose the following hypothesis: H2 Among Pride participants, conservative political sympathies are underrepresented while liberal (centre) and left-wing sympathies are overrepresented, compared to national populations. Aside from these hypothesized common patterns across countries, the varying macro-contexts of Pride mobilizations in the six countries in our sample can be expected to influence the socio-demographic profiles, as well as political sympathies, of Pride parade participants. Walgrave and Verhulst (2009) maintain that the internal diversity of anti-war protests was profoundly shaped by the gov- ernment’s and the opposition’s position on the Iraq war. In those countries where both the government and the opposition were against the war in Iraq, staging what they called emotional ‘aimless’ demonstrations, proved to be the most internally diverse. In those countries whose governments and/or opposition supported the war, where the demonstrations had clear domestic targets for their demands, the demonstration populations were much less diverse. Rowing against mainstream politics results in participants from socio-demographically stronger groups, espe- cially in terms of education. Walgrave and Verhulst hypothesize that demonstra- tors in these contexts also would come from the left of the political (left–right) spectrum, be strongly committed and well organized, although the empirical sup- port for this is weak. Rowing with mainstream politics can attract a more ‘normal’ sample of the population and a more internally diverse protest crowd (2009: 1363). Walgrave and Verhulst make no distinction between the effect of elite opinions and public opinions, arguing that public opinions are ultimately a consequence of elite opinions. Be that as it may, it is clear that elite and public opinions on LGBT issues are not always concordant. Consequently, Ron Holzhacker (2007, 2012) explains differences between the character of LGBT movement organizations’ stra- tegies with reference to the combination of elite and public opinions on LGBT issues. He identifies three modes of interaction of LGBT movement organizations and their political environment. First, in countries where the public and elite atti- tudes regarding LGBT people remain internally polarized (as in, typically, coun- tries or regions showing strong religious influence), LGBT organizations are embroiled in morality politics. In these cases, Holzhacker argues, the organizations will most often pursue highly visible confrontational strategies, to be able to push Peterson et al. 5 their causes onto the political agenda. Where both the elite and public attitudes are supportive or even highly supportive, LGBT organizations will practice a high- profile politics mode of interaction vis-à-vis their political environment, staging large-scale celebratory public events, engaging in close cooperation with govern- ment authorities and exporting their ideas and resources. Whereas Walgrave and Verhulst (2009) treat public opinion on the war merely as an intermediary variable between elite orientation and who is mobilized, Holzhacker (2012) also discusses situations where elite and public opinions differ. In places where the elite opinion is relatively supportive, while public opinion is divided or negative, the organizations will seek incremental change, favouring small-scale events and working discreetly behind the scenes through lobbying, and cooperating with, government authorities. In cases where elite and popular opinion are more or less in accordance, Walgrave and Verhulst’s (2009) assumptions about anti-war demonstrators should be applicable also for the social composition of Pride parades. Consequently, where both elite attitudes and public opinion are polarized or hostile towards LGBT rights, the threshold for participation is higher and Pride mobil- izations should be likely to be composed of participants from more resourceful social groups, possibly also more politically radical and likely to already be part of the formally organized core of the movement (i.e. those categories which in most contexts are typically more prone to participate in political demonstrations). Conversely, when both elites and the public are predominantly supportive towards LGBT issues, participants in Pride should be more diverse and more closely cor- respond to the general population. The consequences of intermediary types of situations for the socio-demographic composition of Pride parades are less obvi- ous. If a situation where there is relatively strong support from elites but little support from the population typically leads to backstage lobbying rather than mass mobilization, then Pride parades are not likely to be prioritized by the (orga- nized) LGBT movement. A tentative hypothesis is that the degree of internal diver- sity in Pride parades is somewhere between those under the other two context types, while the degree of formal organization is comparatively low (since the formal organizations do not prioritize mass mobilization). In conclusion, we expect that: the composition of the Pride parades in the six countries is influenced by public opinion and the support/nonsupport of political elites vis-á-vis LGBT demands. That is, in contrast to Walgrave and Verhulst (2009) who focus on the internal diversity of demonstrations per se, we focus on the degree of similarity with national populations as a whole. We further argue that Holzhacker’s analysis can be used to break down our broad assumption into hypotheses regarding the impact of the political and cultural context on the com- position of Pride parades: H3 (a) In mobilizing contexts where there is broad support in society for LGBT rights, Pride participants will reflect the socio-demographics of the country to a higher degree than in other contexts. (b) In these contexts Pride participants will also reflect the party political sympathies of the general national population. 6 Sexualities 0(0) H4 (a) In mobilizing contexts, which are strongly polarized or hostile, Pride partici- pants will more often be well educated, middle class and significantly younger than those participating in highly supportive contexts. (b) In addition, in these contexts Pride participants will more often identify with left-wing politics, will be more active in unconventional forms of participation, and more organized in the social movement sector compared to those participating in the former context. H5 Participants within a mobilizing context where the movement finds relative sup- port among elites but polarized attitudes among the population we expect to find in the middle of our normalization dimension, and to be less organized than those pro- testing under more strongly adverse conditions. Methodology The collection of data on Pride demonstrations mainly took place in 2012, cover- ing six European countries: the Czech Republic (in both 2012 and 2013), Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden (2012 in Gothenburg and 2014 in Stockholm), Switzerland (one demonstration in Geneva in 2011, one in Zurich in 2012) and the UK (see Table 1). Two sampling procedures developed and tested by Stefaan Walgrave and colleagues were employed in order to produce reliable, valid and comparable data (van Aelst and Walgrave, 2001; Walgrave and Verhulst, 2011). First, to ensure that all participants had equal probabilities of becoming sampled, inter- viewers were directed by ‘pointers’. The pointers made sure that postal surveys were meticulously distributed according to a predetermined rule to one demon- strator in every nth row. Second, every 5th demonstrator who was handed a postal survey was also asked to participate in a short face-to-face interview. The purpose of these interviews was to assess possible bias resulting from non- response to the postal survey. In each parade, typically between 100 and 200 face- to-face interviews were conducted with participants who also received postal survey questionnaires. Only postal questionnaires were handed out to an add- itional 500–800 participants. Unlike traditional postal surveys with address-coded questionnaires we were unable to send out reminders, hence our return rates varied between a low of 16% in Prague and a high of 36% in Gothenburg, Sweden. Contextual data were collected on the countries included, the mobilizing contexts, the demonstrations and the protestors, using specifically designed fact sheets and questionnaires. Our country sample is analytically categorized following Holzhacker’s (2007, 2012) model of the expected modes of interaction of LGBT movements based on the movement organizations’ layered interactions with their political environment. We can roughly group the countries in our sample within Holzhacker’s model based on public opinion towards gays and lesbians measured by how European Social Survey respondents responded in 2012 to the statement: ‘Gay men and lesbians should be free to live their own life as they wish’ (alternatives: ‘agree Peterson et al. 7 T a b le 1 . P ri d e p a ra d e s su rv e y e d . C ze c h R e p u b li c It a ly N e th e rl a n d s S w e d e n S w it ze rl a n d U K P ra g u e P ra g u e B o lo g n a H a a rl e m G o th e n b u rg S to c k h o lm G e n e v a Z u ri c h L o n d o n D a te 1 8 A u g u st 2 0 1 2 1 7 A u g u st 2 0 1 3 9 Ju n e 2 0 1 2 7 Ju ly 2 0 1 2 3 Ju n e 2 0 1 2 2 A u g u st 2 0 1 4 2 Ju ly 2 0 1 1 1 6 Ju n e 2 0 1 2 7 Ju ly 2 0 1 2 T o ta l N o . o f p a rt ic ip a n ts in p a ra d e (a c c o rd in g to C C C re se a rc h te a m s) 9 0 0 0 1 0 ,0 0 0 1 5 ,0 0 0 1 0 0 0 3 3 0 0 6 0 ,0 0 0 3 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 2 0 ,0 0 0 6 4 ,3 0 0 N o . o f fa c e -t o -f a c e su rv e y s m a d e 1 2 6 1 2 8 1 8 8 7 4 8 0 1 5 8 1 5 9 9 4 1 4 0 1 1 4 7 N o . o f d is tr ib u te d p o st a l su rv e y s 6 4 6 8 3 5 1 0 0 0 3 6 8 4 4 5 � 8 1 0 7 9 2 4 7 8 1 0 0 0 6 3 7 4 N o . o f re tu rn e d p o st a l su rv e y s 1 3 5 1 3 1 2 1 6 1 0 0 1 6 2 2 3 8 1 9 7 1 5 0 1 9 4 1 5 2 3 R e sp o n se ra te (% ) 2 1 1 6 2 2 2 7 3 6 2 9 2 5 3 1 1 9 2 4 8 Sexualities 0(0) strongly/agree/neither agree nor disagree/disagree/disagree strongly’), 2 together with existing LGBT-relevant legislation (ILGA-Europe, 2012). In Table 2 we can observe among the countries in our sample, public opinions that are either relatively stable or (most notable in the UK) progressively becoming more positive to LGBT persons’ freedom to live life as they wish. While the countries in our sample do not fit unequivocally into clear-cut categories, we never- theless find some patterns that can be used as a basis for an analysis. At one end of the spectrum in category one, which encompasses contexts where LGBT move- ments are expected to be engaged in high-profile politics, we have placed Sweden, the Netherlands and Great Britain. Public opinion in both the Netherlands and Sweden was highly supportive of gay and lesbians’ right to live their lives as they wish: 93% and 88%, respectively. In both countries only 4% disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement given in the last paragraph. In the UK, the support was almost as high. 84% of the British respondents replied positively and 5% negatively. Both Sweden and the Netherlands recognized same- sex marriage, same-sex couple adoption, and robust anti-discrimination legislation and legal protection against hate crime and hate speech were in place. At the time of the London Pride parade in our study, Britain had a partnership law and since 2010 it recognizes partnerships that take place in religious premises (however, the legislation includes an opt-out clause in which Christian churches are not obligated to conduct same-sex marriages on their premises). Since 2014, same-sex marriage is Table 2. ‘Gays and lesbians should be free to live life as they wish’. Source: European Social Survey round 1–6 (2002–2012, see Note 2). 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 Percentage that answered ‘Agree strongly’ and ‘Agree’: Switzerland 80 75 77 82 83 78 Czech Republic 60 59 66 67 61 UK 76 76 79 81 84 84 Italy 72 64 73 Netherlands 88 89 88 91 93 93 Sweden 82 84 86 87 90 88 Percentage that answered ‘Disagree strongly’ and ‘Disagree’: Switzerland 10 12 12 9 8 10 Czech Republic 17 20 14 13 18 UK 12 9 9 8 6 5 Italy 12 18 12 Netherlands 5 5 6 5 3 4 Sweden 7 6 5 5 3 4 Peterson et al. 9 allowed in all parts of the UK aside from Northern Ireland. Britain had robust anti-discrimination legislation, but Engel (2001: 78) argues that this had been enacted piecemeal and in a government-directed top-down manner, without the LGBT movement’s active grassroots involvement. In ILGA-Europe’s review of the national legal human rights situation for LGBT persons in 2012 (the year of most mobilizations in our data), UK is assigned higher overall scores than both Sweden and the Netherlands in regards to LGBT rights (ILGA-Europe, 2012). In contrast to Italy and the Czech Republic, elites in Great Britain, Sweden and the Netherlands were quite likely (32–40%) to acknowledge sexual minorities as rele- vant for a diverse society (Klicperová-Baker and Košťál 2012). In category two at the other end of the spectrum we have Italy and the Czech Republic. In these countries we find the highest percentages of LGBT-unfriendly attitudes amongst the public. In Italy 12% disagreed/disagreed strongly with the statement ‘Gay men and lesbians should be free to live their own life as they wish’ and 73% agreed/agreed strongly; in the Czech Republic 18% responded negatively to that statement and 61% positively. According to Klicperová-Baker and Košťál (2012), elites in these countries rarely recognized the importance of taking sexual minorities into account. Both countries also scored relatively low in ILGA-Europe’s 2012 human rights review. Italy lacked a same-sex partnership law, 3 while the Czech Republic had a same-sex partnership law granting inferior rights compared to het- erosexual partnerships (Fojtová, 2011). Both countries lacked legal protection against hate crime and hate speech. However, despite these ostensibly similar con- texts, the categorization is complicated by the fact that the dominant strategy of the Czech LGBT movement seems to have been backstage lobbying rather than mass mobilization (O’Dwyer, 2013). We will return to this in the interpretation of the data. In category three in the middle of our spectrum we placed Switzerland. Public opinion was far less polarized among Swiss respondents: 78% responded positively and 10% negatively. In the ILGA review of LGBT rights, Switzerland actually scored lower than the Czech Republic. However, Switzerland had a same-sex part- nership law, which is almost equal to the heterosexual law, but lacked a hate crime law and a hate speech law. The participant profiles in Pride parades taking place in these diverse contexts is compared to the national populations, as measured by the European Social Survey (ESS). One possible weakness of this approach is that the national populations from which the samples in the ESS are drawn are not necessarily equivalent to the populations that form the mobilizing potential of the demonstrations. First, the primary mobilizing potential of a demonstration in a particular city is the popu- lation of that particular city and its vicinity, and characteristics such as level of education and political opinion may differ in that city from the country as a whole. Second, the Pride parades in our sample also mobilized small proportions of par- ticipants from other countries, so in another sense the mobilizing potential extends beyond the borders of the nation state. 4 Nevertheless, we chose to regard the national populations as a reasonable approximation of the mobilizing potential, and therefore use the national ESS data. 10 Sexualities 0(0) Socio-demographic normalization We find that in none of the countries in our sample do participants in Pride parades represent a cross-section of the population in terms of age, level of education, or class position (see Tables 3 and 4). Hence we can reject H1 – that the profiles of Pride participants mirror the rest of the population. Neither is there unqualified support for H3 (a), which predicted a higher degree of socio-demographic con- formity in countries with a broad support for LGBT rights. Nonetheless, there are significant country differences. The youngest demonstrators are in the Czech Republic and Italy, which corroborates our hypothesis H4 (a) that Pride parades in these countries will gather younger demonstrators than in the remaining four countries. Younger demonstrators (up to 29 years old) dominate also in Sweden, and are well represented in the Swiss demonstrations and to a somewhat lesser degree in the UK. The demonstration in the Netherlands is the exception in our sample, where the age group 50–64 years dominates. Only 11% of the Dutch Pride participants were under the age of 30 and only 1% were students (not working). 5 The latter is also in stark contrast with the other countries. Students are particu- larly well represented in Pride parades in Italy and the Czech Republic. In all of the countries a majority of Pride participants have university education or are currently studying at the university level. The level of education is most dramatic in the UK and Italy, where 76% and 75% respectively are university educated. The demonstrators in the remaining four countries in our sample are also far from representative of the general population in their respective countries in regards to level of education. Corroborating research on participants in the so-called new social movements in general, Pride parades are also overwhelmingly dominated by the middle strata, in contrast to, for instance, May Day marches and other trade union demonstrations (Wennerhag, 2016). The parades in our sample attracted few participants with working-class occupations (see Table 4). 6 In comparison to the general population, it is in particular individuals with middle-class occupations that are overrepre- sented amongst the Pride participants. In earlier research on class voting, it has been shown that especially the highly educated ‘socio-cultural professionals and semi-professionals’ (e.g. teachers, social workers, medical doctors) support left- libertarian political parties (Oesch, 2008), that is, parties that often have been at the forefront in supporting LGBT rights. Another occupational class that is over- represented in the Pride parades in relation to the general population are self- employed professionals, another resourceful occupational class that generally tends to support, or participate in, ‘new social movements’ (cf. Kriesi, 1989). Ideological and party political normalization Pride participants in five of our countries in general position themselves on the left of the left–right political dimension, far more than the general population in their respective countries (see Table 5). This provides relative support for H2, which Peterson et al. 11 T a b le 3 . S o c io -d e m o g ra p h ic p ro fi le s o f P ri d e p a rt ic ip a n ts . F ig u re s a re p e rc e n ta g e s a n d th o se in b ra c k e ts d e n o te th e c o rr e sp o n d in g fi g u re s fo r th e c o u n tr y p o p u la ti o n , a c c o rd in g to E u ro p e a n S o c ia l S u rv e y 2 0 1 2 . C ze c h R e p u b li c It a ly N e th e rl a n d s S w e d e n S w it ze rl a n d U K P ra g u e P ra g u e B o lo g n a H a a rl e m G o th e n b u rg S to c k h o lm G e n e v a Z u ri c h L o n d o n 1 8 A u g u st 2 0 1 2 1 7 A u g u st 2 0 1 3 9 Ju n e 2 0 1 2 7 Ju ly 2 0 1 2 3 Ju n e 2 0 1 2 2 A u g u st 2 0 1 4 2 Ju ly 2 0 1 1 1 6 Ju n e 2 0 1 2 7 Ju ly 2 0 1 2 C ra m e r’ s V A g e u p to 2 9 y e a rs 5 3 (2 1 ) 5 2 (2 1 ) 4 6 (2 1 ) 1 1 (1 8 ) 4 2 (2 2 ) 3 5 (2 2 ) 3 5 (2 2 ) 2 3 (2 2 ) 2 1 (1 9 ) 0 .2 6 0 ** * 3 0 – 4 9 y e a rs 3 9 (3 8 ) 4 2 (3 8 ) 4 2 (3 4 ) 3 7 (3 3 ) 3 7 (3 0 ) 4 2 (3 0 ) 5 3 (3 3 ) 5 4 (3 3 ) 5 1 (3 1 ) 0 .1 2 7 ** 5 0 – 6 4 y e a rs 7 (2 5 ) 3 (2 5 ) 1 0 (2 5 ) 4 2 (2 8 ) 1 5 (2 4 ) 1 7 (2 4 ) 1 0 (2 5 ) 1 7 (2 5 ) 2 1 (2 6 ) 0 .2 4 7 ** * 6 5 + y e a rs 1 (1 6 ) 2 (1 6 ) 0 (2 0 ) 6 (2 1 ) 4 (2 4 ) 6 (2 4 ) 2 (2 3 ) 5 (2 3 ) 5 (2 4 ) 0 .1 1 0 * G e n d e r id e n ti ty W o m a n 3 9 4 0 4 5 6 1 6 3 5 9 5 5 4 6 3 8 0 .1 8 6 ** * M a n 6 0 6 0 5 2 3 8 3 2 3 4 4 2 5 1 5 8 0 .2 1 3 ** * O th e r g e n d e r id e n ti ty 1 n .a . 3 1 5 7 3 3 5 0 .1 0 7 * U n iv e rs it y e d u c a ti o n (c o m p le te d o r o n g o in g ) 5 6 (1 4 ) 6 0 (1 4 ) 7 5 (2 0 ) 6 5 (3 1 ) 7 0 (3 2 ) 7 4 (3 2 ) 5 4 (3 1 ) 5 9 (3 1 ) 7 6 (3 2 ) 0 .1 8 2 ** * C a se s (N ) 1 3 5 1 3 0 – 1 3 1 1 6 7 – 2 1 6 9 9 – 1 0 0 1 5 4 – 1 6 2 2 3 4 – 2 3 6 1 9 5 – 1 9 7 1 4 4 – 1 4 9 1 8 7 – 1 9 4 N o te : * p < 5 % , ** p < 1 % , ** *p < 0 .1 % . 12 Sexualities 0(0) T a b le 4 . O c c u p a ti o n a l p ro fi le s o f P ri d e p a rt ic ip a n ts (O e sc h ’s c la ss sc h e m e ). F ig u re s a re p e rc e n ta g e s a n d th o se in b ra c k e ts d e n o te th e c o rr e s- p o n d in g fi g u re s fo r th e c o u n tr y p o p u la ti o n , a c c o rd in g to E u ro p e a n S o c ia l S u rv e y 2 0 1 0 (o f w h ic h It a ly w a s n o t p a rt ). C ze c h R e p u b li c It a ly N e th e rl a n d s S w e d e n S w it ze rl a n d U K P ra g u e P ra g u e B o lo g n a H a a rl e m G o th e n b u rg S to c k h o lm G e n e v a Z u ri c h L o n d o n 1 8 A u g u st 2 0 1 2 1 7 A u g u st 2 0 1 3 9 Ju n e 2 0 1 2 7 Ju ly 2 0 1 2 3 Ju n e 2 0 1 2 2 A u g u st 2 0 1 4 2 Ju ly 2 0 1 1 1 6 Ju n e 2 0 1 2 7 Ju ly 2 0 1 2 C ra m e r’ s V S e lf -e m p lo y e d L a rg e e m p lo ye rs (1 0 o r m o re e m p lo y e e s) 4 (1 ) 4 (1 ) 2 2 (1 ) 0 (1 ) 4 (1 ) 1 (1 ) 2 (1 ) 2 (1 ) n .s . S e lf -e m p lo ye d p ro fe ss io n a ls 7 (1 ) 9 (1 ) 7 5 (2 ) 5 (2 ) 2 (2 ) 2 (3 ) 5 (3 ) 8 (1 ) n .s . S m a ll b u si n e ss o w n e rs 6 (8 ) 6 (8 ) 2 4 (8 ) 3 (9 ) 3 (9 ) 3 (8 ) 7 (8 ) 7 (9 ) n .s . E m p lo y e d : P ro fe ss io n a ls a n d e m p lo y e e s A ss o c ia te m a n a g e rs a n d a d m in is tr a to rs 2 3 (7 ) 2 6 (7 ) 1 0 3 2 (2 3 ) 1 3 (1 6 ) 1 9 (1 6 ) 2 7 (1 7 ) 2 8 (1 7 ) 4 1 (1 6 ) 0 .2 1 6 ** * T e c h n ic a l p ro fe ss io n a ls a n d te c h n ic ia n s 5 (5 ) 6 (5 ) 8 7 (5 ) 3 (8 ) 7 (8 ) 8 (8 ) 8 (8 ) 7 (4 ) n .s . S o c io -c u lt u ra l p ro fe ss io n a ls / se m i- p ro fe ss io n a ls 1 2 (8 ) 1 5 (8 ) 2 2 3 5 (1 7 ) 4 0 (1 3 ) 3 4 (1 3 ) 2 8 (1 4 ) 2 8 (1 4 ) 2 1 (1 0 ) 0 .1 9 0 ** * E m p lo y e d : W o rk e rs O ff ic e c le rk s 5 (1 2 ) 3 (1 2 ) 4 5 (1 2 ) 3 (7 ) 3 (7 ) 7 (9 ) 5 (9 ) 4 (1 2 ) n .s . P ro d u c ti o n w o rk e rs 3 (3 1 ) 3 (3 1 ) 1 1 (1 4 ) 1 (1 8 ) 3 (1 8 ) 4 (2 0 ) 2 (2 0 ) 1 (2 0 ) n .s . S e rv ic e w o rk e rs 3 (1 4 ) 5 (1 4 ) 1 0 7 (1 2 ) 9 (1 6 ) 7 (1 6 ) 4 (1 3 ) 8 (1 3 ) 3 (2 0 ) n .s . S tu d e n ts n o t w o rk in g 4 0 (1 3 ) 2 5 (1 3 ) 3 3 1 (6 ) 2 2 (1 1 ) 1 9 (1 1 ) 1 5 (8 ) 8 (8 ) 7 (8 ) 0 .2 5 2 ** * C a se s (N ) 1 1 5 1 0 8 1 6 2 8 2 1 4 3 2 1 4 1 7 6 1 3 0 1 6 4 N o te : ** *p < 0 .1 % . Peterson et al. 13 T a b le 5 . L e ft – R ig h t p o li ti c a l o ri e n ta ti o n o f P ri d e p a rt ic ip a n ts . F ig u re s a re p e rc e n ta g e s a n d th o se in b ra c k e ts d e n o te th e c o rr e sp o n d in g fi g u re s fo r th e c o u n tr y p o p u la ti o n , a c c o rd in g to E u ro p e a n S o c ia l S u rv e y 2 0 1 2 . C ze c h R e p u b li c It a ly N e th e rl a n d s S w e d e n S w it ze rl a n d U K P ra g u e P ra g u e B o lo g n a H a a rl e m G o th e n b u rg S to c k h o lm G e n e v a Z u ri c h L o n d o n 1 8 A u g u st 2 0 1 2 1 7 A u g u st 2 0 1 3 9 Ju n e 2 0 1 2 7 Ju ly 2 0 1 2 3 Ju n e 2 0 1 2 2 A u g u st 2 0 1 4 2 Ju ly 2 0 1 1 1 6 Ju n e 2 0 1 2 7 Ju ly 2 0 1 2 C ra m e r’ s V L e ft -R ig h t p la c e m e n t L e ft (0 – 3 ) 2 0 (2 0 ) 2 1 (2 0 ) 8 3 (2 9 ) 5 2 (1 8 ) 7 0 (2 0 ) 6 3 (2 0 ) 5 3 (1 8 ) 5 8 (1 8 ) 5 5 (1 4 ) 0 .3 7 5 ** * C e n tr e (4 – 6 ) 2 5 (4 1 ) 3 1 (4 1 ) 1 1 (4 2 ) 2 9 (4 6 ) 1 6 (4 3 ) 1 8 (4 3 ) 2 9 (5 1 ) 2 7 (5 1 ) 2 3 (5 3 ) 0 .1 6 4 ** * R ig h t (7 – 1 0 ) 3 8 (2 7 ) 3 7 (2 7 ) 2 (2 0 ) 1 5 (3 2 ) 1 1 (3 2 ) 1 4 (3 2 ) 1 1 (2 5 ) 1 2 (2 5 ) 1 1 (1 6 ) 0 .3 0 3 ** * D o n ’t k n o w 1 7 (1 2 ) 1 0 (1 2 ) 4 (9 ) 4 (3 ) 4 (5 ) 5 (5 ) 7 (6 ) 3 (6 ) 1 0 (1 7 ) 0 .1 5 2 ** * C a se s (N ) 1 3 1 1 3 1 2 0 7 9 6 1 6 1 2 3 8 1 9 7 1 4 7 1 9 2 N o te : ** *p < 0 .1 % . 14 Sexualities 0(0) predicted a general overrepresentation of centre and left-wing political views among Pride participants. However, we found no support for hypothesis H3 (b), that participants in highly supportive contexts (Sweden, Netherlands and the UK) would be politically very similar to the general population. The exception to this ‘rule’, that Pride demonstrators lean decidedly to the left, are demonstrators in the Czech Republic. While Czech Pride participants are more representative of the general population with regards to left–right political orien- tation than demonstrators in the other five countries, they are nevertheless more orientated to the right and less centre orientated than the Czech electorate. Scholars have reminded us that the left–right political orientation scale carries different meanings in different contexts (e.g. Huber and Inglehart, 1995). What has historically proved so valuable a tool for understanding political conflicts in estab- lished western democracies does not necessarily bare the same explanatory weight or meaning for post-communist societies (Deegan-Krause, 2006). Piurko et al. (2011) found in their study of the saliency of the left–right scale measured by personally held core values within the electorates in 20 countries that the Czech Republic exhibited a unique pattern. ‘A right orientation was associated with the openness to change values and a left orientation with security and conformity values’ (2011: 551–552). According to these authors, people who give high priority to openness to change values should prefer policies perceived as likely to promote and protect individual freedoms and civil rights. Given the meanings that left and right have for Czechs, it is not unanticipated that Pride participants who are challenging conformity to sexual norms and demanding change in the civil rights of LGBT persons position themselves on the right of the left–right political orien- tation scale. 7 In general, the participants in the Pride parades tend to support left-libertarian parties such as Green, Left Socialist, and Social Democratic parties. But in compari- son to the general population it is in particular the Green and Left Socialist parties that are overrepresented, while Conservative, Christian Democrat and Radical Populist Right parties are underrepresented. However, the Czech Republic is again the exception in this case, at least regarding support for conservative parties (33% in both demonstrations). Czech Pride participants lend their support to conservative parties almost to the same degree as the Czech electorate. On the other hand, the one moral conservative Christian democrat party (Christian and Democratic Union – Czechoslovak People’s Party, KDU-ČSL), received only marginal support among the demonstrators. Czech participants also deviate from the electorate in their sup- port (33–39%) for the marginal Green Party, a typical ‘new social movement party’ that champions LGBT communities having the same rights as everyone else. In all Pride parades apart from the British, the support for Liberal and Left Liberal parties tends to mirror the general population. The Swedish demonstrators’ support for a feminist party (12–28%) reflects the newly formed party Feminist Initiative, which has LGBT rights as one of its primary foci. The degree of organization among the participants again only partly validates our hypothesis H4 (b), that participants in hostile contexts will be more organized Peterson et al. 15 T a b le 6 . O rg a n iz a ti o n a l m e m b e rs h ip a n d p o li ti c a l p a rt ic ip a ti o n o f P ri d e p a rt ic ip a n ts . F ig u re s a re p e rc e n ta g e s a n d th o se in b ra c k e ts d e n o te th e c o rr e sp o n d in g fi g u re s fo r th e c o u n tr y p o p u la ti o n , a c c o rd in g to E u ro p e a n S o c ia l S u rv e y 2 0 1 2 . C ze c h R e p u b li c It a ly N e th e rl a n d s S w e d e n S w it ze rl a n d U K P ra g u e P ra g u e B o lo g n a H a a rl e m G o th e n b u rg S to c k h o lm G e n e v a Z u ri c h L o n d o n 1 8 A u g u st 2 0 1 2 1 7 A u g u st 2 0 1 3 9 Ju n e 2 0 1 2 7 Ju ly 2 0 1 2 3 Ju n e 2 0 1 2 2 A u g u st 2 0 1 4 2 Ju ly 2 0 1 1 1 6 Ju n e 2 0 1 2 7 Ju ly 2 0 1 2 C ra m e r’ s V M e m b e r in L G B T o rg a n iz a ti o n 1 3 2 1 4 5 2 4 2 2 3 0 4 5 4 2 4 0 0 .2 3 4 ** * H av e d u ri n g th e la st 1 2 m o n th s ta k e n p a rt in . . . D e m o n st ra ti o n s 4 5 (7 ) 4 1 (7 ) 8 7 (1 7 ) 3 3 (3 ) 7 9 (7 ) 6 8 (7 ) 8 1 (4 ) 7 8 (4 ) 7 5 (3 ) 0 .3 6 9 ** * D ir e c t a c ti o n (e .g . b lo c k a d e s, o c c u p a ti o n s, c iv il d is o b e d ie n c e ) 7 9 2 4 4 1 0 8 1 0 6 8 0 .1 8 8 ** * C a se s (N ) 1 2 9 – 1 3 5 1 2 3 – 1 3 1 2 0 5 – 2 1 6 9 1 – 1 0 0 1 5 5 – 1 6 2 2 2 8 – 2 3 8 1 8 2 – 1 9 7 1 3 8 – 1 5 0 1 7 9 – 1 9 4 N o te : ** *p < 0 .1 % . 16 Sexualities 0(0) in the social movement sector and are more often involved in unconventional forms of political participation. As expected, Swedish and Dutch marchers have a rela- tively low degree of membership of LGBT organizations, compared to those in Italy and Switzerland (see Table 6). However, participants in the UK deviate in terms of a relatively high proportion of organized participants. Conversely, the Czech participants deviate from our expectations with a comparatively low degree of organization. However, this corresponds to the generally low density of social movement organizations in the Czech Republic, and in particular dedicated LGBT organizations (O’Dwyer, 2013). The Czechs’ comparatively low degree of involve- ment in demonstrations and direct action, must also be interpreted in the light of earlier studies’ emphasis that activists in Central Eastern European countries seldom use disruptive forms of protests, and that the level of participation in volun- tary associations and contentious forms of political actions in this region is rela- tively low in comparison to Western Europe (Cı́sar, 2013; Cı́sar and Vráblı́ková, 2010; Jacobsson and Saxonberg, 2013: 257; Petrova and Tarrow, 2007). Hypothesis H5, which predicted that Switzerland would be in the middle of the spectrum in regards to level of organizational ties, does not find support; the Swiss participants were often members of LGBT organizations, as often as the Italian participants. As regards experiences of extra-parliamentary activism, such as demonstrating or taking part in direct action during the last year, the Italian demonstrators clearly conform to our expectations with a high degree of participation, while the Dutch demonstrators have a low degree of participation. The Swedish participants score unexpectedly high while the Czech participants score relatively low. However, compared to the national averages, Italy, Sweden, Switzerland, and UK turn out to be very similar. Conclusions In this article we have engaged with the so-called ‘protest normalization thesis’ and tested whether Pride demonstrators more or less reflect the social diversity within the general population in regards to ideological and party political orientations, and in regards to socio-demographic and socio-economic profiles. We argued that the phenomenon of Pride parades should be a critical case to test the ‘protest normalization thesis’. In contrast to what researchers have found regarding the participant profiles in other ‘new social movements’, we had no reason to assume that LGBT individuals are only found in certain age groups, social classes or ethnic categories. Nor did we have any reason to assume that LGBT individuals are per definition left wing, even if in more hostile LGBT environments left-wing political parties have often been the main champions of their cause. In countries such as the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK, where all major political parties support most demands of the LGBT movement, we expected Pride participants to span the party political spectrum. However, in none of the countries could we find indications that Pride participants mirror the general populations regarding party political Peterson et al. 17 affiliation. An overview of variables where national averages were available for all countries highlights our most important findings (see Table 7). Even in countries where we expected that Pride parades would mobilize a broader cross-section of potential LGBT individuals and LGBT political sup- porters, namely the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK, the participants did not reflect the diversity within the general population. In short, we found no evidence for a normalization of Pride demonstrators. 8 Much like new social movement demonstrators more generally, Pride participants are overwhelmingly from the middle strata, highly educated, young, and are politically left oriented (aside from Czech participants, see next paragraph). In short, they are rich in potential political resources. Nonetheless, we did find country-level differences in the mobilizing patterns of the surveyed Pride parades, which underline the impact of general political opportunities on the national level, as well as the mobilizing structures of LGBT movements. The different national patterns only to a degree corroborate the hypotheses that we derived from Walgrave and Verhulst’s (2009) study of anti- war demonstrators and Holzhacker’s (2012) ideal-typical model of different polit- ical environments for LGBT organizations in Europe. In countries where LGBT movements are ‘rowing against mainstream politics’, as well as being counter to public opinion, our hypothesis is at least partially confirmed. In both Italy and the Czech Republic, demonstrators were younger and significantly more highly edu- cated than the general populations. They were also younger than Pride participants in the remaining four countries, although the same age pattern is also evident in Sweden. Pride demonstrators in Italy typically inclined far more towards the left than the Italian electorate, being what social movement scholars recognize as ‘left- wing radical’ in the context of Western European social movements, in other words, identifying significantly towards the left on the left–right political orienta- tion scale, highly organized, frequent demonstrators, and familiar with disruptive protest tactics. The Czech demonstrators did not conform to this pattern. Pride demonstrators in the Czech Republic positioned themselves significantly more towards the political right than the Czech electorate, which can be interpreted as politically ‘radical’ in the Czech context where ‘right’ generally signifies change values, respect for individual freedoms and civil rights. That few Czech Pride par- ticipants were formally organized did not conform to what we expected from the political context. However, given the incremental change strategy of the Czech LGBT movement, this result becomes less surprising. In contrast to Walgrave and Verhulst’s (2009) study we find more ambiguous patterns. A possible explanation is that the political positions regarding LGBT issues are more complex and less clear-cut compared to the support for or oppos- ition to the Iraq war. Compared to anti-war mobilizations, there may be different mechanisms at work when a large share of the participants in the demonstrations comes from the aggrieved population, as in Pride parades. While there is good reason to believe that LGBT individuals represent more or less a cross-section of the general population, Pride participants do not. Pride 18 Sexualities 0(0) T a b le 7 . O ve rv ie w : re la ti v e d iv e rs it y o f p ro te st e rs . T h e fi g u re s in th e ta b le a re th e d if fe re n c e s in p e rc e n ta g e p o in ts b e tw e e n th e av e ra g e a m o n g th e p ro te st e rs a n d th e n a ti o n a l av e ra g e a c c o rd in g to th e E u ro p e a n S o c ia l S u rv e y 2 0 1 2 . C ze c h R e p u b li c It a ly N e th e rl a n d s S w e d e n S w it ze rl a n d U K P ra g u e P ra g u e B o lo g n a H a a rl e m G o th e n b u rg S to c k h o lm G e n e v a Z u ri c h L o n d o n 1 8 A u g u st 2 0 1 2 1 7 A u g u st 2 0 1 3 9 Ju n e 2 0 1 2 7 Ju ly 2 0 1 2 3 Ju n e 2 0 1 2 2 A u g u st 2 0 1 4 2 Ju ly 2 0 1 1 1 6 Ju n e 2 0 1 2 7 Ju ly 2 0 1 2 A g e u p to 2 9 y e a rs + 3 2 + 3 1 + 2 5 � 7 + 2 0 + 1 3 + 1 3 + 1 + 2 3 0 – 4 9 ye a rs + 1 + 4 + 8 + 4 + 7 + 1 2 + 2 0 + 2 1 + 2 0 5 0 – 6 4 ye a rs � 1 8 � 2 2 � 1 5 + 1 4 � 9 � 7 � 1 5 � 8 � 5 U n iv e rs it y e d u c a ti o n (c o m p le te d o r o n g o in g ) + 5 2 + 4 6 + 5 5 + 3 4 + 3 8 + 4 2 + 2 3 + 2 8 + 4 4 L e ft -R ig h t p la c e m e n t L e ft (0 – 3 ) + /� 0 + 1 + 5 4 + 3 4 + 5 0 + 4 3 + 3 5 + 4 0 + 4 1 C e n tr e (4 – 6 ) � 1 6 � 1 0 � 3 1 � 1 7 � 2 7 � 2 5 � 2 2 � 2 4 � 3 0 R ig h t (7 – 1 0 ) + 1 1 + 1 0 � 1 8 � 1 7 � 2 1 � 1 8 � 1 4 � 1 3 � 5 D o n ’t k n o w + 5 � 2 � 5 + 1 � 1 0 + 1 � 3 � 7 D e m o n st ra ti o n p a rt ic ip a ti o n la st 1 2 m o n th s + 3 8 + 3 5 + 7 0 + 3 0 + 7 2 + 6 1 + 7 7 + 7 4 + 7 2 Peterson et al. 19 parades are not mobilizing the potential diversity of LGBT people. More or less like in other so-called new social movements, demonstrating on the streets remains the privileged arena of well-educated, middle-strata youth, rich in political resources and confident in their political capabilities. Our study is based on the actual participants in Pride parades. Future studies, either based on the mobilizing strategies of the organizers of Pride parades or on quantitative data on Pride parade bystanders, might be better equipped to provide answers as to why Pride parades are not mobilizing the full potential diversity of LGBT people leading to a genuine democratization of LGBT movements. Acknowledgements We would like to thank the editors of Sexualities and the anonymous reviewers for valuable comments on previous versions of this manuscript. Funding The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, author- ship, and/or publication of this article: This study was made possible by support from the Bank of Sweden Tercentenary Foundation (P2013-0861:1), the Swedish Council for Working Life and Social Research (FAS 2008-1799), and the European Science Foundation (ESF-08-ECRP-001). Notes 1. Yearly ritual lesbian and gay demonstrations had not taken place in the countries in our sample prior to 1970. However, calling post-1970 LGBT demonstrations ’Pride parades’ appeared in most Western European countries first in the 1990s, prompted by the European Pride Organizers Association staging EuroPrides (the Netherlands, London and Sweden) and InterPride, designating Rome as the venue for the first World Pride in 2000. Geneva has called its LGBT yearly event Pride, while Zurich initially called its events Christopher Street Day, connecting to the German tradition. Since 2009 when Zurich hosted EuroPride, the event is now called Zurich Pride. The relatively recent Prague parades have always been named Prague Pride. 2. The European Social Survey (ESS) has been conducted bi-annually since 2002 in most European countries. In this article, we have downloaded and analysed the survey dataset available for researchers on the ESS website http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org (accessed July 2017). 3. The Italian Parliament passed legislation recognizing same-sex civil unions (albeit with- out adoption rights), which came into effect on 5 June 2016 despite mass rallies against the law sponsored by the Vatican. 4. The largest proportion of survey respondents resident in other countries – 15% – was found in the Geneva Pride parade (which is not surprising considering the proximity to the French border). In Prague Pride 2013 the corresponding figure was 7% and in the other events it was even smaller. Since the absolute numbers of foreign respondents are small, these figures should be interpreted with care, but they are nevertheless lower than expected considering the strong transnational dimension of LGBT mobilizations, noted by e.g. Ayoub (2013). 20 Sexualities 0(0) http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org 5. The absence of students can probably be explained by the fact that Haarlem is not a university city. 6. As a measure of occupational class in this article we use the class scheme developed by Oesch (2008). This class scheme is a modified version of the EGP (Erikson-Goldthorpe- Portocarero) scheme that introduces a horizontal distinction between three work logics: the organizational, the technical and the interpersonal. The self-employed and employers are included in a fourth, independent, work logic. The wage earners are furthermore divided vertically into middle-class (professionals, employees) and working-class occupa- tions. The resulting class scheme consists of 17 classes, which can be collapsed into the 9- class version we use in this article. 7. A comparison with data from the European Social Survey (2012) confirms that whereas there is a general tendency in European countries that people are less positive to the statement ‘Gays and lesbians should be free to live as they wish’, the more right-leaning they are politically, the Czech Republic belongs to the few countries where there is an opposite tendency. A closer look shows that the tendency to agree with that statement among Czech people is indeed highest from the middle to the right end of the political scale. 8. Unfortunately, the only demonstrations in the sample with a question regarding sexual orientation were the Pride parades in London 2012, Haarlem 2012, and Stockholm 2014. 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Abby Peterson is professor of sociology at the Department of Sociology and Work Science, University of Gothenburg. She has researched and published widely in the fields of social movement theory, cultural sociology and policing. Mattias Wahlström, PhD, is associate professor at the Department of Sociology and Work Science, University of Gothenburg. His main areas of research are social movements, protest, repression and political violence. Magnus Wennerhag, PhD, is associate professor at the Department of Social Science, Södertörn University, and researcher at the Department of Sociology and Work Science, University of Gothenburg. His main areas of research are social movements, protest and political participation. 24 Sexualities 0(0) 
work_lauar7xv2jfstemad5uqfttsq4	----	Neil Chakraborti, Jon Garland, Hate Crime – Impact, Causes & Responses, Second Edition (Sage Publications: 2015), Pages: 208, Price: $24.99. —Jasmine J. Pereira BA, Psychology, School of Liberal Studies Pandit Deendayal Petroleum University Gandhinagar, Gujarat Hate crime refers to those crimes in society that have been stimulated by prejudice for a certain social group, ethnicity, religion, language or gender identity, etc. Hate crime is now prevalent across the world and has a remarkable impact not only on the victim but on the entire community. The book, Hate Crime – Impact, Causes & Responses, brings to the notice of readers not only the nature and extent but also the impact and disputes with the policy making.This book also covers the new realm of hate crimes like cyber bullying and online hate. Neil Chakraborti is Professor of Criminology at the University of Leicester and an Adjunct Professor at the University of Ontario Institute of Technology. He has conducted research in various fields including victimisation, crime and policing. Jon Garland has been a Reader at the University of Surrey’s Department of Sociology since January 2013; his main areas of research are in the fields of hate crime, rural racism, community and identity, policing and victimisation. The book explores various dimensions of hate crimes. The author begins by looking at the various features of hate crime like marginalisation, victimissation and difference in the light of conceptual understanding. It also talks about the laws ratified by the UK to protect its citizens. The authors have observed that the most common form of hate crimes that people face are racist hate crimes. This crime is aroused by an individual’s ethnic identity. “Low levels” of racist’s harassment like blocking the driveways, throwing eggs, etc, have become part and parcel of the targetted ethnic communities. The book sheds light upon the emergence of racist hate crime in UK by examining the scope of and legal framework that has been used to deal with the victims of such hate crimes. Over the years we have seen how a particular religion has been blamed and scrutinised for terrorism happening across the globe. Such scruntinisations have led to target communities on the basis of their religious beliefs which then are manifested into secular constructions of cultural and national identity. The book Liberal Studies, Vol. 1, No. 1, January-June 2016140 also primarily focusses upon Islamophobia (prejudice against Islam or Muslims) & Antisemitism (prejudice against Jews). Thus, the laws that have been formed put religious communities on the same level as minority ethnic communities in terms of guiding their identities and rights in the eyes of the law. Homophobia, a very serious and contemporary issue, is the fear or hatred of homosexuals and homosexuality. The book article encompasses the nature, extent and effects of the homophobic hate crime. A major reason behind the rise of this crime is the relationship between the police and gay community which has damaged the trust and the confidence between the two parties. Low level of harassment is common for these communities and the assaults targetted towards such groups have been of extreme nature than those of other crimes. Gender is not something that is biological but is rather a socially raised phenomenon that is subjected to an individual. Transphobic hate crimes are more frequent and have a significant impact on the victims as compared to other hate crimes. Transphobic hate crimes have come up due to fear/hatred against the transgenders or trans-sexuals. The book also tries to understand the grounds of the perpetuator’s action. Disabilist hate crimes have recently caught attention from the academics as well as the criminal justice system. This hate crime occurs because the perpetuator believes that the disabled people are inferior to others. The issue of ‘cuckooing’ is also discussed in the chapter. The book explores the nature and extent of crimes against domestic violence, elder abuse attacks upon sex workers and the homeless. The book also investigates the various types of hate crime offenders along with their motivation and relationship with the victim. It has been frequently seen that hate crimes are being enacted for the excitement and delight involved rather than the hatred towards a particular group or individual. Generally, males belonging to deprived backgrounds have been major perpetuators of hate crimes. A reason behind the growing number of cases for hate crimes is the troubled relationship between the police and the minority communities. This relationship affects the response of the police towards a hate crime. The chapter examines few theoretical, cultural and operational complexities that have distorted the policing of hate crimes. Towards the end, the book reassesses the various concepts of hate crimes that have been discussed in the previous chapters along with future directions for future research, policy and practice. Hate crimes are a relevant issue across the globe, especially so in India, where there is a lot of diversity in terms of culture, religion and socio-economic status. This book helps us understand the concept of hate crimes and their impact on the victims as well as the communities. Contents Binder1.pdf 38 Contents Is it the Right Time? Binod C Agarwal Further Contemplation Required S.D. Muni Promoting Socio-Economic Equity in South Asia: Challenges and Prospects Uddipan Mukherjee Pradeep Mallik Gurmeet Kanwal Rise of the Islamic State: Dangerous New Threat to Stability in Strife-torn West Asia Sanjay Kumar Pradhan South Sudan: Peace and Security Challenges Narottam Gaan Digital Age Security Threats: Challenges to IR Theories Arun Vishwanathan Understanding Nuclear Proliferation: A Theoretical Analysis Shalendra D. Sharma Bringing Politics Back In: Piketty and Economic Inequality in the United States Binder1.pdf 111 Contents Is it the Right Time? Binod C Agarwal Further Contemplation Required S.D. Muni Promoting Socio-Economic Equity in South Asia: Challenges and Prospects Uddipan Mukherjee Pradeep Mallik Gurmeet Kanwal Rise of the Islamic State: Dangerous New Threat to Stability in Strife-torn West Asia Sanjay Kumar Pradhan South Sudan: Peace and Security Challenges Narottam Gaan Digital Age Security Threats: Challenges to IR Theories Arun Vishwanathan Understanding Nuclear Proliferation: A Theoretical Analysis Shalendra D. Sharma Bringing Politics Back In: Piketty and Economic Inequality in the United States 
work_lfq3pzuz3jatznbhmhpaxgyihy	----	Automatic Hate Speech Detection using Machine Learning: A Comparative Study (IJACSA) International Journal of Advanced Computer Science and Applications, Vol. 11, No. 8, 2020 Automatic Hate Speech Detection using Machine Learning: A Comparative Study Sindhu Abro1, Sarang Shaikh2, Zafar Ali4 Sajid Khan5, Ghulam Mujtaba6 Center for Excellence for Robotics, Artificial Intelligence and Blockchain, Department of Computer Science Sukkur IBA University, Sukkur, Pakistan Zahid Hussain Khand3 Department of Computer Science Sukkur IBA University Sukkur, Pakistan Abstract—The increasing use of social media and information sharing has given major benefits to humanity. However, this has also given rise to a variety of challenges including the spreading and sharing of hate speech messages. Thus, to solve this emerging issue in social media sites, recent studies employed a variety of feature engineering techniques and machine learning algorithms to automatically detect the hate speech messages on different datasets. However, to the best of our knowledge, there is no study to compare the variety of feature engineering techniques and machine learning algorithms to evaluate which feature engineering technique and machine learning algorithm outperform on a standard publicly available dataset. Hence, the aim of this paper is to compare the performance of three feature engineering techniques and eight machine learning algorithms to evaluate their performance on a publicly available dataset having three distinct classes. The experimental results showed that the bigram features when used with the support vector machine algorithm best performed with 79% off overall accuracy. Our study holds practical implication and can be used as a baseline study in the area of detecting automatic hate speech messages. Moreover, the output of different comparisons will be used as state-of-art techniques to compare future researches for existing automated text classification techniques. Keywords—Hate speech; online social networks; natural language processing; text classification; machine learning I. INTRODUCTION In recent years, hate speech has been increasing in-person and online communication. The social media as well as other online platforms are playing an extensive role in the breeding and spread of hateful content – eventually which leads to hate crime. For example, according to recent surveys, the rise in online hate speech content has resulted in hate crimes including Trump's election in the US [2], the Manchester and London attacks in the UK [3], and terror attacks in New Zealand [4]. To tackle these harmful consequences of hate speech, different steps including legislation have been taken by the European Union Commission. Recently, the European Union Commission also enforced social media networks to sign an EU hate speech code to remove hate speech content within 24 hours [1]. However, the manual process to identify and remove hate speech content is labor-intensive and time- consuming. Due to these concerns and widespread hate speech content on the internet, there is a strong motivation for automatic hate speech detection. The automatic detection of hate speech is a challenging task due to disagreements on different hate speech definitions. Therefore, some content might be hateful to some individuals and not to others, based on their concerned definitions. According to [5], hate speech is: “the content that promotes violence against individuals or groups based on race or ethnic origin, religion, disability, gender, age, veteran status, and sexual orientation/gender identity”. Despite these different definitions, some recent studies claimed favorable results to detect automatic hate speech in the text [21-32]. The proposed solutions employed the different feature engineering techniques and ML algorithms to classify content as hate speech. Regardless of this extensive amount of work, it remains difficult to compare the performance of these approaches to classify hate speech content. To the best of our knowledge, the existing studies lack the comparative analysis of different feature engineering techniques and ML algorithms. Therefore, this study contributes to solving this problem by comparing three feature engineering and eight ML classifiers on standard hate speech datasets. Table I shows major concepts related to automatic text classification along with their explanations and references. This study holds practical importance and served as a reference for new researchers in the domain of automatic hate speech detection. This rest of the paper is organized as: Section II highlights the related works. Section III discusses the methodology. Sections IV, V, and VI explain the experimental settings, results, and discussion. Finally, Section VII discusses the limitation, future work, and conclusion as well. 484 | P a g e www.ijacsa.thesai.org (IJACSA) International Journal of Advanced Computer Science and Applications, Vol. 11, No. 8, 2020 TABLE I. TEXT CLASSIFICATION (KEY CONCEPTS) S. No. Concept Acronym Definition References 1 Feature Extraction FE It is mapping from text data to real-valued vectors. [6] 2 Bigram - It’s a feature engineering technique which represents two adjacent words in a single numeric feature while creating master feature vectors for words. [7] 3 Term Frequency - Inverse Document Frequency TFIDF It’s a feature representation technique that represents “word importance” is to a document in the document set. It works in a combination of the frequency of word appearance in a document with no. of documents containing that word. [8] 4 Word2vec - It is a technique used to learn vector representation of words, which can further be used to train machine learning models. [9] 5 Doc2vec - It is an unsupervised technique to learn document representations in fixed-length vectors. It is the same as word2vec, but the only difference is that it is unique among all documents. [10] 6 Machine Learning Classifiers ML Classifiers These are applied to numeric features vector to build the predictive model which can be used for prediction class labels. [11] 7 Naïve Bayes NB It’s a probabilistic based classification algorithm, which uses the “Bayes theorem” to predict the class. It works on conditional independence among features. [12] 8 Random Forest RF It’s a type of ensemble classifier consisting of many decision trees. It classifies an instance based on voting decision of each decision trees class predictions. [13] 9 Support Vector Machines SVM It’s a supervised classification algorithm which constructs an optimal hyperplane by learning from training data which separates the categories while classifying new data. [14] 10 K Nearest Neighbor KNN It’s a simple text classification algorithm, which categorize the new data using some similarity measure by comparing it with all available data. [15] 11 Decision Tree DT It is a supervised algorithm. It generates the classification rules in the tree-shaped form, where each internal node denotes attribute conditions, each branch denotes conditions for outcome and leaf node represents the class label. [16] 12 Adaptive Boosting AdaBoost It is one of the best-boosting algorithms, which strengthens the weak learning algorithms. [17] 13 Multilayer Perceptron MLP It is a feedforward artificial neural network. It produces a set of outputs using a set of inputs [18] 14 Logistic Regression LR It is a predictive analysis. It uses a sigmoid function to explain the relationship between one independent variable and one or more independent variables [19] II. RELATED WORKS These days, hate speech is very common on social media. Therefore, in previous years, some of the researchers have applied a supervised ML-based text classification approach to classify hate speech content. Different researchers have employed different variety of feature representation techniques namely, dictionary-based [21-23], Bag-of-words- based [24-26], N-grams-based [27-29], TFIDF-based [30, 31] and Deep-Learning-based [31]. Peter Burnap et al. [20] employed a dictionary-based approach to identify cyber hate on Twitter. In this research, they employed an N-gram feature engineering technique to generate the numeric vectors from the predefined dictionary of hateful words. The authors fed the generated numeric vector to ML classifier namely, SVM and obtained a maximum of 67% F-score. Stéphan Tulkens et al. [22] also used a dictionary- based approach for the automatic detection of racism in Dutch Social Media. In this study, the authors used the distribution of words over three dictionaries as features. They fed the generated features to the SVM classifier. Their experimental results obtained 0.46 F-Score. Njagi Dennis et al. [21] used ML-based classifier to classify hate speech in web forums and blogs. The authors employed a dictionary-based approach to generate a master feature vector. The features were based on sentiment expressions using semantic and subjectivity features with an orientation to hate speech. Afterward, the authors fed the masters feature vector to a rule-based classifier. In the experimental settings, the authors evaluated their classifier by using a precision performance metric and obtained 73% precision. Nonetheless, the combination of dictionary-based and ML approaches showed a good result. However, the major disadvantage of such type of approach is that it requires a dictionary, based on the large corpus to look for domain words. To overcome this drawback, many of the researchers have used a BOW-based approach which is similar to a dictionary-based approach but the word features are obtained from training data and not from the predefined dictionaries. Edel Greevy et al. [23] used the supervised ML approach to classify the racist text. To convert the raw text into numeric vectors, the authors employed a bigram feature extraction technique. The authors used bigram features, with the BOW feature representation technique. They used the SVM 485 | P a g e www.ijacsa.thesai.org (IJACSA) International Journal of Advanced Computer Science and Applications, Vol. 11, No. 8, 2020 classifier to perform experimental results. In their results, they achieved 87% accuracy. Irene Kwok et al. [24] employed an ML-based approach to the automatic detection of racism against black in the twitter community. In their research, they employed unigram with the BOW-based technique to generate the numeric vectors. The authors fed the generated numeric vector to the Naïve Bayes classifier. Their experimental results obtained a maximum of 76% accuracy. Sanjana Sharma et al. [25] classified hate speech on twitter. In their research, they employed BOW features. The authors fed the generated numeric vector to the Naïve Bayes classifier. Their experimental results showed a maximum of 73% accuracy. Nevertheless, BOW showed better accuracy in social network text classification. However, the major disadvantage of this technique is, the word-order is ignored and causes misclassification as different words are used in different contexts. To overcome this limitation, researchers have proposed an N-grams-based approach [7]. Zeerak Waseem et al. [28] classify the hate speech on twitter. In their research, they employed character Ngrams feature engineering techniques to generate the numeric vectors. The authors fed the generated numeric vector to the LR classifier and obtained overall 73% F-score. Chikashi Nobata et al. [27] used the ML-based approach to detect the abusive language in online user content. In their research authors employed character Ngrams feature representation technique to represent the features. The authors fed the features to the SVM classifier. The results showed that the classifier obtained overall 77% F-score. Shervin Malmasi et al [26] used an ML-based approach to classify hate speech in social media. In their research, the authors employed 4grams with character grams feature engineering techniques to generate numeric features. The authors fed the generated numeric features to the SVM classifier. The authors reported maximum of 78% accuracy. In recent years, few researchers employed ML approaches to detect automatic hate speech. For example, Karthik Dinakar et al. [29] classified sensitive topics from social media comments or posts. In their research, they employed unigram with the TFIDF feature representation technique to generate the numeric feature vectors. The authors fed the generated features to four ML classifiers namely Naïve Bayes, rule- based, J48, and SVM. Their experimental results showed that the rule-based classifier outperformed NB, J48 and SVM classifiers by obtaining 73% accuracy. Shuhua Liu et al. [30] performed classification on web content pages into hatred or violence categories. In their study, they used trigram features, represented using TFIDF. The authors used the Naïve Bayes classifier. In their experimental settings, the Naïve Bayes classifier obtained highest accuracy of 68%. The N-gram-based approach gives better results than the BOW-based approach but it has two major limitations. First, the related words may be at a high distance in sentence and finally increasing the N value, results in slow processing speed [32]. In recent years, authors employed deep learning-based NLP techniques to classify hate speech messages. Sebastian Köffer et al. [31] employed word2vec features and SVM classifiers to classify German texts hate speech messages and obtained 67% F-score. The word2Vec showed the lowest results because such approaches need enormous data to learn complex word semantics. Recently, there has been a good attempt to construction and detection of hate speech as well as offensive language in other languages (i-e: Danish). An important research study [45] in 2019 worked on the construction of Danish dataset for hate speech and offensive language detection. The dataset contained comments from Reddit and Facebook. It also contained the various types and targets of the offensive language. The authors achieved the highest F1 score of 0.74 by using deep learning models with different features sets. Schmidt et al. [46] conducted a survey on hate speech detection using natural language processing in 2017. The authors discussed in detail studies regarding various feature engineering techniques to be used for supervised classification of hate speech messages. The major drawback of this survey is that there were no experimental results for those mentioned techniques. Previous studies showed that a variety of researchers from across the globe are working on hate speech recognition written in different languages such as German, Dutch and English. However, according to our information, no study provides a comparative study of various features and ML algorithms on the standard dataset that can serve as a baseline study for future researchers in the field of hate speech recognition. Hence, in this study, we compared three feature engineering and eight ML classifiers to evaluate which one best works on hate speech datasets (discussed in Section III). III. METHODOLOGY This section explains the proposed system which we have employed to classify tweets into three different classes namely, “hate speech, offensive but not hate speech, and neither hate speech nor offensive speech”. Fig. 1 shows the complete research methodology. As shown in this figure, the research methodology is contained of six key steps namely, data collection, data preprocessing, feature engineering, data splitting, classification model construction, and classification model evaluation. Each of the step is discussed in detail in the subsequent sections. Fig. 1. System Overview. 486 | P a g e www.ijacsa.thesai.org (IJACSA) International Journal of Advanced Computer Science and Applications, Vol. 11, No. 8, 2020 A. Data Collection In this research study, we collected publicly available hate speech tweets dataset. This dataset is compiled and labeled by CrowdFlower. In this dataset, the tweets are labeled into three distinct classes, namely, hate speech, not offensive, and offensive but not hate speech. This dataset has 14509 number of tweets. Of these, 16% of tweets belong to class hate speech. In addition, 50% of tweets belong to not offensive class and the remaining 33% tweets are offensive but not hate speech class. The details of this distribution are also shown in Fig. 2. B. Text Preprocessing Several research studies have explained that using text preprocessing makes better classification results [33]. So, in our dataset, we applied different preprocessing-techniques to filter noisy and non-informative features from the tweets. In preprocessing, we changed the tweets into lower case. Also, we removed all the URLs, usernames, white spaces, hashtags, punctuations and stop-words using pattern matching techniques from the collected tweets. Besides this, we have also performed tokenization and stemming from preprocessed tweets. The tokenization, converts each single tweet into tokens or words, then the porter stemmer converts words to their root forms, such as offended to offend using porter stemmer. C. Feature Engineering The ML algorithms cannot understand the classification rules from the raw text. These algorithms need numerical features to understand classification rules. Hence, in text- classification one of the key steps is feature engineering. This step is used for extracting the key features from raw text and representing the extracted features in numerical form. In this study, we have performed three different features engineering techniques, namely, n-gram with TFIDF [8], Word2vec [9] and Doc2vec [10]. D. Data Splitting Table II shows the class-wise distribution of the overall dataset as well as data set after splitting (i.e. Training set and Test set). We have used the 80-20 ratio to split the preprocessed data (i.e. 80% for Training Data and 20% for Test Data). The training data is used to train the classification model to learn classification rules. Moreover, the test data is further used to evaluate the classification model. Fig. 2. Class wise Data Distribution. TABLE II. DETAILS OF DATA SPLIT Class Total Instances Training instances Testing instances 0 Hate Speech 2399 1909 490 1 Not offensive 7274 5815 1459 2 Offensive but not Hate Speech 4836 3883 953 Total 14509 1607 2902 E. Machine Learning Models According to “no free lunch theorem” [34], there is no any single classifier which best performs on all kinds of datasets. Therefore, it is recommended to apply several different classifiers on a master feature vector to observe which one reaches to the better results. Hence, we selected eight different classifiers NB [12], SVM [14], KNN [15], DT [16], RF [13], AdaBoost [17], MLP [18] and LR [19]. F. Classifier Evaluation In this step, the constructed classifier predicts the class of unlabeled text (i.e. “hate speech, offensive but not hate speech, neither hate speech nor offensive speech”) using test set. The classifier performance is evaluated by calculating true negatives (TN), false positives (FP), false negatives (FN) and true positives (TP). These four numbers constitute a confusion matrix as in Fig. 3. Different performance metrics are used to assess the performance of the constructed classifier. Some common performance measures in text categorization are discussed briefly below. The more details of performance metrics can be found in [35]. 1) Precision: Precision is also known as the positive predicted value. It is the proportion of predictive positives which are actually positive. Refer to “(1)”. 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 𝑇𝑃 (𝑇𝑃+𝐹𝑃) (1) 2) Recall: It is the proportion of actual positives which are predicted positive. Refer to “(2)”. 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙 = 𝑇𝑃 (𝑇𝑃+𝐹𝑁) (2) 3) F-Measure: It is the harmonic mean of precision and recall (as shown in Equation 3). The standard F-measure (F1) gives equal importance to precision and recall. Refer to “(3)”. 𝐹 − 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 = 2 × (𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 ×𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙 ) (𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛+𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙 ) (3) 4) Accuracy: It is the number of correctly classified instances (true positives and true negatives). Refer to “(4)”. 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 = (𝑇𝑃+𝑇𝑁) 𝑇𝑃+𝐹𝑃+𝑇𝑁+𝐹𝑁 (4) Fig. 3. Confusion Matrix. 487 | P a g e www.ijacsa.thesai.org (IJACSA) International Journal of Advanced Computer Science and Applications, Vol. 11, No. 8, 2020 IV. EXPERIMENTAL SETTINGS As mentioned in section C, we used three types of features namely n-gram (bigram) with TFIDF, Word2vec and Doc2vec. Hence, we have a total of three different master feature representations. In addition, eight different ML algorithms were applied to the created three master feature vectors. Hence, overall 24 analyses (3 master feature vectors x 8 ML algorithms) were evaluated to check the effectiveness of classification models. V. RESULTS This section explains the overall results of 24 analyses. Tables III to Table VI shows the precision, recall, F-measure and accuracy of all 24 analyses, respectively. The bold values represented are the maximum and minimum result values. All the tables are showing performance for different features representation and classification techniques applied in experimental settings. In all 24 analyses, the lowest precision (0.58), recall (0.57), accuracy (57%) and F-measure (0.47) found in MLP and KNN classifier using TFIDF features representation with bigram features. Moreover, the highest recall (0.79), precision (0.77), accuracy (79%) and F-measure (0.77) were obtained by SVM using TFIDF features representation with bigram features. In feature representation, bigram features with TFIDF obtained the best performance as compared to Word2vec and Doc2vec. However, there was a fringe difference between the result observed in bigram, and Doc2vec. In text-classification models, the SVM classifier best performed among all the eight classifiers. However, the AdaBoost and RF classifiers results were lesser than SVM results and were better than LR, DT, NB, KNN, and MLP results. Furthermore, Fig. 4 and Fig. 5 show the confusion matrix of best-performing analyses. Fig. 4 shows the SVM classifiers’ confusion matrix using bigram with TFIDF features. As shown here, out of 490 tweets belonging to hate speech class, only 155 were correctly classified. However, the 335 instances were incorrectly classified. Of these 335 instances, 54 were falsely classified as not offensive and 281 were falsely classified as Offensive but not Hate Speech. The 1459 instances belong to the second class, the 1427 tweets were correctly classified as not offensive speech. The remaining 32 instances were misclassified, 5 were incorrectly classified as hate speech and 27 were falsely classified as an offensive language but not hate speech. The remaining 953 instances out of 2902 test set belonging to offensive language but not hate speech class. Here, the SVM classifier correctly classified the 698 tweets as an offensive language but not hate speech. The 122 and 133 instances were misclassified into hate speech and not offensive speech, respectively. However, Fig. 5 shows the confusion matrix of the Adaboost classifier using bigram with TFIDF features. As shown here, the overall performance of the Adaboost classifier is lower than the SVM classifier while using bigram with TFIDF features. The Adaboost only performed well in offensive language but not hate speech class. Fig. 4. Confusion Matrix (Features: Bigram (TFIDF), Classifier: SVM). Fig. 5. Confusion Matrix (Features: Bigram (TFIDF), Classifier: ADABOOST). TABLE III. PRECISION OF ALL 24 ANALYSIS Features LR NB RF SVM KNN DT AdaBoost MLP Bigram 0.72 0.71 0.73 0.77 0.61 0.71 0.75 0.58 Word2vec 0.69 0.66 0.66 0.70 0.64 0.62 0.65 0.69 Doc2vec 0.70 0.65 0.65 0.70 0.69 0.61 0.66 0.71 The bold marked values represented are the higher and lower result values. TABLE IV. RECALL OF ALL 24 ANALYSIS Features LR NB RF SVM KNN DT AdaBoost MLP Bigram 0.75 0.73 0.75 0.79 0.57 0.73 0.78 0.70 Word2vec 0.72 0.67 0.68 0.73 0.61 0.63 0.68 0.71 Doc2vec 0.72 0.62 0.67 0.72 0.65 0.63 0.67 0.71 The bold marked values represented are the higher and lower result values. 488 | P a g e www.ijacsa.thesai.org (IJACSA) International Journal of Advanced Computer Science and Applications, Vol. 11, No. 8, 2020 TABLE V. F-MEASURE OF ALL 24 ANALYSIS Features LR NB RF SVM KNN DT AdaBoost MLP Bigram 0.72 0.68 0.74 0.77 0.47 0.71 0.73 0.63 Word2vec 0.69 0.66 0.66 0.70 0.61 0.60 0.65 0.65 Doc2vec 0.70 0.63 0.66 0.72 0.65 0.61 0.66 0.66 The bold marked values represented are the higher and lower result values. TABLE VI. ACCURACY OF ALL 24 ANALYSIS Features LR NB RF SVM KNN DT AdaBoost MLP Bigram 0.75 0.73 0.75 0.79 0.57 0.73 0.78 0.70 Word2vec 0.72 0.67 0.68 0.73 0.61 0.63 0.68 0.71 Doc2vec 0.72 0.62 0.67 0.72 0.65 0.63 0.67 0.71 The bold marked values represented are the higher and lower result values. VI. DISCUSSION In the experimental work, we have evaluated eight classifiers over three different feature engineering techniques, giving 24 different analyses over hate speech dataset containing three classes. Our experimental results showed that the SVM algorithm with the combination of bigram with TFIDF FE techniques showed the best results. The theoretical analysis is discussed in subsequent sections. A. Feature Engineering The selection of feature engineering is important in text classification. In this study, we compared three distinct feature extraction techniques namely, Bigram with TFIDF, word2vec and doc2vec. The experimental results exhibited that from these three techniques, bigram with TFIDF outperformed. Conversely, the Word2vec and Doc2vec showed lower results. The possible reason for the outperformance of bigram and TFIDF is that bigram maintains the sequence of words compared to word2Vec and doc2vec [36]. Moreover, several studies showed that the TFIDF representation technique is better than the binary and term frequency representation [6]. The possible reason for the lower performance of Word2vec is because it is unable to handle OOV (out-of- vocabulary) words specially in the domain of Twitter data. Moreover, Word2Vec requires a huge amount of training set to learn the complex relationship between the words [37]. However, as shown in Table I (data collection table), our dataset has approximately 15000 tweets, which might be not enough to train effectively to word2vec for eliciting the complex word relationship. In our experimental results, Doc2Vec also showed lower performance. This might be because it performs low in case of very short length documents [38] and the tweets which we used in our dataset often having 280 character length. B. Machine Learning Classifier Several studies proved that no single ML algorithm performed better on all kinds of data. Therefore, the comparison of various ML algorithms is required to discover which one is best performing on the given dataset. Hence, on our dataset, we used eight different ML algorithms as discussed in Section 3.E i.e. ML Models. The experimental results proved that SVM and AdaBoost classifiers achieved the best performance possibly because SVM uses threshold functions to separate the data, not the number of features based on margin. This shows that SVM is independent upon the presence of the number of features in the data [7, 15]. In addition, SVM has the capability to best perform on non-linear data apart from the linear data because of its kernel functions. The possible reasons behind the outperformance of AdaBoost are that it uses adaptive algorithms to learn the classification rules iteratively [39] and it focuses on the reduction of the training error. The results obtained with RF and LR classifiers are a little lower than SVM and AdaBoost results but are somewhat higher than the results of NB, DT, KNN, and MLP. The low performance of RF might be due to the unavailability of informative features which leads to incorrect predictions [40]. It is possible that the performance of LR might be lower because its decision surface is linear in nature and cannot handle nonlinear data adequately [41]. The lowest performance was obtained amongst the NB, DT, MLP and KNN classifiers. The NB classifier works on conditional independence among features. Thus, the performance of the NB classifier is negatively affected as the conditional dependence becomes more complicated due to the increase in the number of features [12]. The DT showed lower performance in predicting hate speech because the features inside the master features vector are represented as continuous data points that make it difficult to find the ideal threshold values that are required to build a decision tree [42]. The reason behind the poor performance of the MLP classifier is due to not having enough training data that’s why it is considered as complex “black box” [43]. The KNN had the worst performance due to laziness of the learning algorithm and it does not work adequately for noisy data [44]. Hence the KNN is not suitable for detecting hate speech tweets. C. Classwise Performance As discussed in Section 3.A we have three classes name “hate speech”, “offensive but not hate speech” and “neither hate speech nor offensive speech”. The results show that all 489 | P a g e www.ijacsa.thesai.org (IJACSA) International Journal of Advanced Computer Science and Applications, Vol. 11, No. 8, 2020 features and classifiers performed well for two classes (i.e. offensive but not hate speech, and neither hate speech nor offensive speech). Our experimental results showed that the 24 combinations performed lowest for class hate speech. According to Table I, the class “Hate Speech” has the lowest training instances as compared to other classes, but the major reason for misclassification of class “Hate Speech” (as shown in Fig. 3 and Fig. 4) might be overlapping of different bigram words with higher frequency in other classes than hate speech class. For example, bigrams like “lame nigga, white trash, bitch made” are more frequently appearing in class “Offensive but not Hate Speech” as compared to class “Hate Speech”. Hence, it might be possible that the classifier learned weak learning rules. VII. CONCLUSION This study employed automated text classification techniques to detect hate speech messages. Moreover, this study compared three feature engineering techniques and eight ML algorithms to classify hate speech messages. The experimental results exhibited that the bigram features, when represented through TFIDF, showed better performance as compared to word2Vec and Doc2Vec features engineering techniques. Moreover, SVM and RF algorithms showed better results compared to LR, NB, KNN, DT, AdaBoost, and MLP. The lowest performance was observed in KNN. The outcomes from this research study hold practical importance because this will be used as a baseline study to compare upcoming researches within different automatic text classification methods for automatic hate speech detection. Furthermore, this study also holds a scientific value because this study presents experimental results in form of more than one scientific measures used for automatic text classification. Our work has two important limitations. First, the proposed ML model is inefficient in terms of real-time predictions accuracy for the data. Finally, it only classifies the hate speech message in three different classes and is not capable enough to identify the severity of the message. Hence, in the future, the objective is to improve the proposed ML model which can be used to predict the severity of the hate speech message as well. Moreover, to improve the proposed model’s classification performance two approaches will be used. First, the lexicon- based techniques will be explored and assessed by comparing with other current state-of-the-art results. Secondly, more data instances will be collected, to be used for learning the classification rules efficiently. REFERENCES [1] Hern, A., Facebook, YouTube, Twitter, and Microsoft sign the EU hate speech code. The Guardian, 2016. 31. [2] Rosa, J., and Y. Bonilla, Deprovincializing Trump, decolonizing diversity, and unsettling anthropology. 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Journal of biomedical informatics, 2001. 34(1): p. 28-36. [43] Singh, P.K. and M.S. Husain, Methodological study of opinion mining and sentiment analysis techniques. International Journal on Soft Computing, 2014. 5(1): p. 11. [44] Bhatia, N., Survey of nearest neighbor techniques. arXiv preprint arXiv:1007.0085, 2010. [45] Sigurbergsson, G. I., & Derczynski, L. (2019). Offensive language and hate speech detection for Danish. arXiv preprint arXiv:1908.04531. [46] Schmidt, A., & Wiegand, M. (2017, April). A survey on hate speech detection using natural language processing. In Proceedings of the Fifth International workshop on natural language processing for social media (pp. 1-10). 491 | P a g e www.ijacsa.thesai.org I. Introduction II. Related Works III. Methodology A. Data Collection B. Text Preprocessing C. Feature Engineering D. Data Splitting E. Machine Learning Models F. Classifier Evaluation 1) Precision: Precision is also known as the positive predicted value. It is the proportion of predictive positives which are actually positive. Refer to “(1)”. 2) Recall: It is the proportion of actual positives which are predicted positive. Refer to “(2)”. 3) F-Measure: It is the harmonic mean of precision and recall (as shown in Equation 3). The standard F-measure (F1) gives equal importance to precision and recall. Refer to “(3)”. 4) Accuracy: It is the number of correctly classified instances (true positives and true negatives). Refer to “(4)”. IV. Experimental Settings V. Results VI. Discussion A. Feature Engineering B. Machine Learning Classifier C. Classwise Performance VII. Conclusion 
work_lg2ltm4jzjbudo3aqahrt76tzy	----	Intellectual disability, hate crime and other social constructions : A view from South Yorkshire MCCLIMENS, Alex <http://orcid.org/0000-0003-2859-910X> and BREWSTER, Jacqui Available from Sheffield Hallam University Research Archive (SHURA) at: http://shura.shu.ac.uk/16498/ This document is the author deposited version. You are advised to consult the publisher's version if you wish to cite from it. Published version MCCLIMENS, Alex and BREWSTER, Jacqui (2017). Intellectual disability, hate crime and other social constructions : A view from South Yorkshire. Journal of Intellectual Disabilities. Copyright and re-use policy See http://shura.shu.ac.uk/information.html Sheffield Hallam University Research Archive http://shura.shu.ac.uk http://shura.shu.ac.uk/ http://shura.shu.ac.uk/information.html 1 Introduction The idea of care in the community is premised on the equitable distribution, allocation of and access to public space. Meininger (2014) states that 'The public space to which - in line with common definitions of inclusion - persons with intellectual disability are designated often turns out to be a space of discrimination' (2014:24). This has been noted elsewhere. The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (2008) (article 16 - Freedom from exploitation, violence and abuse) is as follows: 'State parties shall take all appropriate legislative, administrative, social, educational and other measures to protect persons with disabilities, both within and outside the home, from all forms of exploitation, violence and abuse, including their gender- based aspects'. The reality, however, is far removed from the rhetoric. In the UK so-called hate crime against disabled people has, since 2003, received official recognition in Section 146 of the Criminal Justice Act (HM Government 2003) and became law in 2005. The phenomenon is not uniquely British. Beadle-Brown et al (2007) note that similar movements are apparent in much if the Western world. Writing from a Dutch perspective a similar line is taken by Overmars-Marx et al (2014) who look to neighbourhoods and their inhabitants who work together to accommodate people with intellectual disability. They cite Wolfensberger (1972, 1983) and his work on Normalisation when they say 'The idea that people with disabilities can be a part of society and can also contribute to different life-domains was inspired by the normalization movement during the 1980s and 1990s' (2014: 256). 2 The fact that hate crime is becoming a global phenomenon means that it is coming under greater scrutiny as a concept. This, however, brings its own difficulties. Schweppe and Walters (2016) note that 'most of the knowledge accretion about hate crime is based on country-specific analyses that have used jurisdiction-specific definitions' (2016:1). But this internationalisation of the phenomenon has also led to internationally shared understanding of how to combat it (Perry, 2015). It appears then that legislative and policy changes both here in the UK and elsewhere have helped to reposition the individual with intellectual disability on the streets of our towns and cities where they are in a better position to access the goods and services available to the majority of citizens. To paraphrase O'Brien and Tyne (1981) these people now not only have presence within communities they can also participate meaningfully in community living. The Local Situation Historically the citizen in distress in a public place would contact the emergency services, mostly the police, for assistance. More recently there has been a recognition that while the police remain a resource there is an argument for liaison with other services whose expertise may be more appropriate to the situation, particularly when criminality is not the overriding factor. Hence Dean (2013) describes a street-based scheme that aims to reduce the number of people detained by the police under section 136 of the Mental Health Act (1983). Community psychiatric nurses patrol with police officers and perform street triage to direct individuals with mental health problems to appropriate services. Those individuals would formerly have been detained in police custody. 3 Such arrangements between the police and other agencies to act to together to make the streets safer came about under the auspices of the Crime and Disorder Act (1998). This legislation gave local authorities more responsibility for reducing crime in their purlieu. To achieve this they were required to cooperate with the police and other agencies by formulating Crime and Reduction Disorder Partnerships. Here then are the roots of the fit between the joint responsibilities of the police and the local authority to keep the citizen safe on the streets. It is within this framework that hate crime presents itself as a distinct social problem within communities and so potentially amenable to a coordinated response. Corcoran and Smith (2016) calculate hate crime in the disability strand for the year 2015/16 at 3629 recorded incidents or 6% of the total for all hate crimes across the five monitored strands1 (2016:2). This shows a rise from 2013/14 when there were 23 reported incidents. The authors point out that this may be due to increased awareness, more diligence by police and an increased willingness of individuals to report crime. But when looking at the figures since records began in 2011 disability hate crime has shown a 44% increase - the largest across all strands (2016:4). However, the figures quoted do not discriminate between intellectual disability and other forms of impairment. And as MacDonald (2015) points out, '…the police are far less likely to gather intelligence or investigate a hate crime if the person has a learning difficulty than if they have another impairment' (2015:353). And it was against this sort of background that many local authorities have devised schemes to help keep their intellectual disable citizens safer on the streets. The local 1 the 5 monitored strands are race or ethnicity; religion or beliefs; sexual orientation; disability; and transgender identity. 4 initiative we report on here was managed by the Adult Safeguarding Team within the city council through a contract with a local charity who ran the scheme on a day-to- day basis. The arrangement was subject to a service level agreement and was funded to cover staff costs and some additional volunteer and sundry expenditure. Oversight came via bi-monthly meetings attended by representatives from the Adult Safeguarding team, other relevant council officials, the police, the charity and any other interested parties by request. The scheme was founded on the premise that people with intellectual disability are sometimes subject to harassment as they engage in routine city centre activity and that this situation can be remedied to some extent by the provision of places of refuge where a distressed individual can get help and support. It was also thought that while the police will always respond to a call for assistance from the public the situation in which an individual with intellectual disability was being subject to 'low- level harassment' was not always conducive to police intervention. Instead it was envisaged that appropriate help and support could be offered by staff in various commercial and business premises across the city. The advantages are that this precludes the involvement of the police and by being located on the 'High St' should be readily accessible to an individual in distress. Our remit was to undertake an evaluation of the scheme as it was then operated. This was considered timely because the apparent success of the scheme meant that there was a move to expand it to cover other vulnerable sections of the population. After meetings with the council officials and their advisory user group we secured ethical approval from the Faculty Research Ethics committee and began the evaluation. 5 Methods At the time of our evaluation 71 business/commercial premises were signatory to the scheme and there were 156 individuals with intellectual disability signed up as users/members. The staff in the business premises received initial training in how to respond to an individual in distress. This was supplied by the charity which oversees the scheme on a day-to-day basis. The individual members, for their part, carry an ID card that has details of who should be contacted in a localised emergency. In the absence of any records of contact between individuals and the potential places of refuge we set about to generate primary data that would give us some insight into the working of the scheme. Survey The membership was a disparate group who had no single point of contact or regular meeting place. We sent out a plain language flier to all of the members listed on the database inviting them to make contact with us to discuss their involvement with the scheme. Northway et al (2013) used a similar tactic in their work where they reported 'The survey has demonstrated that an acceptable response rate can be achieved when using a postal questionnaire to gather data from groups of people with intellectual disabilities' (2013: 243). In our case, of the 156 invitations sent out, we received 9 replies. They were as follows: We received three phone calls. Two were from members of the scheme. One was from a relative of the member informing us the member was deceased. Five invitations were returned by Royal Mail. Of these three were listed as 'no such address' and two others stated 'addressee gone away'. One individual spoke to us in person when they were in the university on other business. 6 The two individuals who made phone calls were both able to tell us about their experiences. One claimed they had a membership card and once thought they were being followed when out shopping in town. They went to a local shop and showed the card to the shopkeeper who was standing outside by the door and he told them to go inside as there was cctv. The alleged follower disappeared and our respondent carried on with their day. The caller related nothing further occurred. The other caller wasn't sure when asked if they were a member of the scheme. They then said they had misplaced their card. They said they found some shops unhelpful but they conceded that this might be because of their speech (very rapid and hard to follow). They hadn't ever used the card or been involved in what might be called an 'incident'. The respondent who visited told us that they were a member of the scheme but when asked to show their card said they had left the card at home. They did relate one incident which took place outside a large department store. A Big Issue seller apparently picked on this individual who then went into the shop and approached a security man. The security man 'had a word' with the Big Issue seller. The few people we spoke to were not convincing advocates for the scheme. The person who visited us on campus, for example, had clearly been primed to talk up their experiences. They attempted this in borrowed language that did nothing for the authenticity of the incident they related. The two telephone callers may or may not have been members of the scheme but in any event the shop identified in the 'incident' was not signatory to the scheme. It was apparent from these exchanges that carrying the membership card is not an established routine. 7 Fieldwork and Findings We also made unannounced and opportunistic visits to 26 of the premises to check on their awareness and knowledge of the scheme and the implications of their membership. These visits took place on six separate occasions during November and December 2015. They were conducted by the two authors. A summary table of the visits appears in appendix A. Three of the premises listed were no longer in business or had relocated. One was closed on the day of our visit (see below for more detail). We adopted a quasi-ethnographic approach here that might fit with a participant/observer style of data generation, making field notes immediately after the visits to capture the conversations we had with staff. We did not use any recording equipment as the visits had to approximate to the template of the casual consumer/shopper making a naïve enquiry. In our planning for the visits we had one simple objective - to find out if the people we approached on the day had knowledge of the scheme their business was signed up to. We did this by asking, 'What's that sticker about'? For those premises where no sticker was displayed we had to feign some prior knowledge of the scheme and enquire about its operation. Here we phrased our enquiry along these lines - 'I heard you were part of a Safe Places scheme - how does that work'? On our visits we found that staff working in six of the premises had no knowledge about the scheme at all. At another six premises the first person we spoke to hadn’t heard of the scheme but did manage to find a colleague who had some knowledge of the scheme. At one very large, national department store it took four attempts to 8 locate a member of staff who had heard of the scheme but their account described 'domestic abuse' and made no mention of intellectual disability. Of the remainder knowledge of the scheme as related by the staff was varied. In one case (a small independent cafe) the member of staff only became aware of the scheme because of our questions. At the transport hubs we received fairly detailed responses. In one of the branch libraries the staff member thought the scheme was aimed at children, which probably explains why the sticker was on the door of the children's section of the library. From our field notes we made the following observations - • at GP surgery in suburbs - no sticker/sign displayed - when I asked if they were part of the safe places scheme the receptionist knew nothing about it but went to ask a senior colleague who said that yes they were. When I asked about the sticker they said that they would look into why they didn't have one on the door and contact the person who told them about the scheme to get one put up. • charity shop in city centre - sticker displayed - the shop assistant told me it was a scheme the manager had signed up to in order to get more volunteers into the shop. • transport interchange - sticker displayed - the staff at the desk knew about the scheme and talked about assisting people who were lost or confused and need some help • national bookstore chain - city centre shopping mall - sticker displayed on the shop window - I asked an assistant about the sticker. The assistant had 9 never heard of the scheme and wanted to see the sticker. We went out to see it. He said he'd look into it. • council premises - city centre - sticker displayed - I asked two uniformed floor walkers about the scheme. 'No idea, mate. Best ask at reception'. (the reception area was very busy with clearly distressed individuals arguing about housing benefit). When the fieldwork was over we compared notes to calculate the numbers with and without a sticker displayed and to make some assessment of the knowledge displayed by staff. Given the small sample size we can't make any generalisable claims but we found no correlation between having a sticker displayed and staff being knowledgeable. Indeed one of the most comprehensive descriptions we got was from staff on a public reception area with no sticker displayed. Out of the twenty six areas visited we got twelve positive responses, ten negative with the rest either closed at the time of the visit or the business had relocated. And of all the premises visited thirteen (50%) had a sticker somewhere on the exterior of the building. But even then of these not all were easily visible. We highlight some of the salient points in the discussion below. Discussion There are two strands to this. Firstly we consider the more practical issue arising directly from our findings. Then we move on to a short discussion on more 'philosophical' aspects associated with the topic. The scheme is founded on the premise that people with intellectual disability are sometimes subject to low-level harassment and occasionally more serious threats as they engage in routine city centre activity and that this situation can be remedied to 10 some extent by the provision of places of refuge where a distressed individual can get help and support. This help and support is offered by staff in various commercial and business premises across the city. The advantages are that this precludes the immediate involvement of the police and by being located on the 'High St' should be readily accessible. The commercial premises and businesses (n=71) which are signed up to the scheme are distributed widely across the city. The way that premises advertise themselves as being part of the scheme is by having a sticker placed in the door/window. This acts as a visual cue to alert individual members that they are potentially in a 'safe place'. In our experience the visibility of the sticker (when any sticker was actually present) was poor. There are two considerations here. One appears to be the local rules permitting the display of 'external' materials on the entrance to the premises. We were told by staff at the local university, for example, that this was why the sticker couldn't be displayed on the main door. The other consideration is the unexplained absence of any sticker on some premises. If the premises are to be identified as a 'safe place' then the physical presence of a sticker seems like a minimum requirement. [insert photo about here] In one of the branch libraries, for example, the sticker was on an interior door of the building. The sticker at another branch library was clearly visible but the premises had been closed the month previously. The stickers for the Art Gallery and the central library were both well into the interior of the building and so not visible to anyone passing by. 11 Given that individuals in distress can locate premises that are signatory to the scheme they then have to secure the cooperation of the staff inside. The way the scheme is supposed to work is that the individual will show their membership card to a member of staff who will offer some reassurance and make a phone call to the contact number/person displayed on the card. From our experience this was not guaranteed to happen. In the case of the two uniformed council employees on council owned premises their attitude was some way short of reassuring. But we must recognise that such schemes can, by their presence, offer some assurance and protection to distressed individuals. That said, the provision of places of refuge relies on a buildings-based approach when we are all aware that it is attitudes that need to change (Wilson and Scior, 2014). Implications Several areas present themselves here. We have taken each in turn to offer some suggestions about how the scheme might be improved to cater for concerns over location, opening times, the nature of the premises and the operational definitions of a 'hate crime'. Location, location, location….. It seems axiomatic that for the premises to act as a place of refuge for individuals then those premises should ideally be in locations which are well populated, reasonably accessible and likely to be on people's social radar. This was simply not the case with some localities (branch libraries and GP surgeries) being in out-of-the- way settings, far from the civic hub. 12 This brings us to issues around individual knowledge of the scheme and access to information. We already know from the literature that individuals will literally go out of their way to avoid some people and places. As Smith (2015) notes 'Disabled people restructure their lives to minimise real and perceived risk to themselves even if they have not experienced targeted violence personally' (2015: 37/38). In the local situation, unless individuals have a good working knowledge of where exactly the premises are which are signed up to the scheme, they will need to consult some source of information. This information will either be in hard copy or accessible digitally. In either case there are questions over literacy skills even before we have to consider ownership of and access to digital devices. And we have to remember here that not all premises display the sticker to advertise their membership of the scheme. Open All Hours? The premises listed as being signed up to the scheme tended to operate chiefly during office hours and on a Monday to Saturday basis. Some also had (shorter) Sunday opening. A few (transport links) have much longer opening hours. Libraries have reduced opening times currently and are often closed for whole days to accommodate budgetary constraints. Of the two libraries we visited, for instance, one was permanently closed for business and the other was closed on the day of our visit. Neither would have provided solace to an individual in distress. Two of the organisations listed had relocated. Another was closed for business. 13 Buildings v Services All the commercial members of the scheme operated out of static premises. Even where these are accessible, open and welcoming with knowledgeable staff they were not always well located to meet the needs of the target population (see above). It is, after all, people who create social distress rather than premises. The kinds of anti-social behaviour quoted by Hall (2004) and related anecdotally by some individuals locally, do not necessarily occur within hailing distance of a place of refuge. The best responses we got when cold calling commercial premises were from staff working in transport hubs. This suggests that by incorporating transport companies their buses, trams and trains could all be designated as potentially safe places. Paid Staff v Volunteers In some of the smaller premises we visited it was apparent that charity shops, for example, rely on volunteers to run the business. At the other end of the spectrum we also spoke to officers of the Transport Police. Our data only allows us to suggest a possible correlation between being knowledgeable about the scheme and employment status. But on the little evidence we have it seems as if bigger organisations have more robust in-house training and are also less likely to have issues a round staff turnover. These factors may explain some of the variation in response we got when talking to individuals. Definitions There remains a problem in deciding what is and what isn't a 'hate crime' and who makes that judgment. If we consider the case of people with intellectual disability it may not be so obvious, to them at least, whether 'hate' per se has been a 14 motivational factor. Williams and Tregidga (2014) note 'In particular, our data revealed that, in some cases, respondents felt that the term ‘hate’ did not resonate with their experiences. Many felt the term was too extreme and narrow and failed to fit with their rationalizations of offender motives….. Furthermore, the use of the term ‘crime’ emerged as confusing for respondents as they were unsure whether their experiences constituted acts serious enough to be classified as crimes that warranted reporting to the police' (2014:948). Hence we have to pay attention to the subtleties of language and its interpretation. Limitations The study was hampered by a lack of access to the individuals who use the scheme. But in the absence of a 'live register' or a physical meeting place where ordinary users could be canvassed for their views it seemed that the mailed survey was the only viable option. We also have to concede that the 'snapshot' nature of the fieldwork might have yielded a different result on a different day. Finally we must be aware of the limitations associated with research. As Olzowski and Boaden (2010) put it, 'Research, while giving the appearance of activity, may actually delay action in the real world, leaving people with intellectual disabilities wondering how it will make their lives safer now' (2010:29). Conclusions and Next Steps Following on from our note on limitations it is vital that hard data is first recorded and then shared between the various agencies involved - the police, the local authority, 15 community learning disability teams, housing providers and any third sector organisations that contribute to the overall care of the target population. By collating statistics on the individuals concerned, the location, timing and category of incident as well as gathering information, where available, on the perpetrator(s), some sport of pattern might be established to assist in focusing assistance at times and places where it is most likely to be required. And the focus on location has already been highlighted by Roberts et al (2013) who note ‘Place’ is an important yet neglected consideration in relation to hate crime offending. Emerging evidence suggests that there may be identifiable hate crime ‘hotspots’ (2013:30). The report by Gravell (2012) confirms that in the study 56% of all incidents reported took place either in or around the home (2012:18) while the breakdown of perpetrators highlights that a quarter of the total were neighbours or people living locally (2012:22). So while a 'High St' presence might offer some reassurance to individuals, and this ought to be recognised, we need to remain aware of the range of potential threats. People with intellectual disability are part of our society and we have evidence from many sources that their participation remains contested, marginalised and insecure with detrimental effects on quality of life (Verdugo et al, 2012). The scheme in place locally is at least an attempt to recognise and ameliorate that situation. We believe that it is flawed in its current configuration. Some of this is to do with the internal systems and the lack of contact with the membership. There is also an urgent need to more pro-actively engage with the staff employed within the signatory premises to ensure that they are equipped to deal with whatever situations arise. 16 And other similar schemes do exist nationally. Therefore a useful next step would be for communication and contact between the various organisations operating under this banner. We are currently engaged with a charitable organisation in preparing a funding proposal which we hope can extend the work we began here to other parts of the country. Notes Acknowledgments We need to thank Mick Conboy of the Crown Prosecution Service for his helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article. Can You See the Sticker? The sticker is on the right of the window as you look at it, slightly above halfway on the vertical. But by being on a window there's a lot of glare and reflection, not to mention the row of (legitimately) parked bicycles to negotiate. So if you can't see the sticker…… 17 References Beadle-Brown, J. Mansell, J Kozma, A. (2007) “Deinstitutionalization in Intellectual Disabilities Mental Retardation and Development Disorders 20: 437–442 Burch, L. (2016) Comment from the Field: Challenging ‘Hate Crime’: Research, Policy, and Practice, International Criminological Research Unit. Journal of Literary & Cultural Disability Studies, 10(1), 113-116. Corcoran, H. Smith, K. (2016) Hate Crime, England and Wales, 2015/16 Statistical Bulletin 11/16 London: Home Office https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/55931 9/hate-crime-1516-hosb1116.pdf [accessed May 2017] Dean, E. (2013). More nurses to help police manage people with mental health problems: Street Triage project extended to reduce number of visits by vulnerable people to emergency departments. Emergency Nurse, 21(6), 9-9. Garland, J. (2012). Difficulties in defining hate crime victimization. International Review of Victimology, 18(1), 25-37 Gravell, C. (2012) Loneliness & Cruelty: people with learning people with disabilities and their experience of harassment, abuse and related crime in the community https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/559319/hate-crime-1516-hosb1116.pdf https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/559319/hate-crime-1516-hosb1116.pdf 18 London: Lemos & Crane Hall, E. (2004) Social geographies of learning disability: narratives of exclusion and inclusion. Area, 36(3), 298-306 HM Government (2003) Statute: Criminal Justice Act 2003, London: TSO HMSO (2006) Safeguarding vulnerable groups act. London: HMSO. Home Office (2015) Statistical Bulletin 05/15 https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/hate-crime-england-and-wales-2014-to- 2015 accessed May 2016 Macdonald, S. J. (2015). ‘Community fear and harassment’: learning difficulties and hate crime incidents in the north-east of England. Disability & Society, 30(3), 353- 367. Meininger, H. (2013) Inclusion as heterotopia: Spaces of encounter between people with and without intellectual disability. Journal of Social Inclusion, 4(1), 24-44 Northway, R. Bennett, D. Melsome, M. Flood, S. Howarth, J. Jones, R. (2013). Keeping safe and providing support: a participatory survey about abuse and people with intellectual disabilities. Journal of Policy and Practice in Intellectual Disabilities, 10(3), 236-244 https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/hate-crime-england-and-wales-2014-to-2015 https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/hate-crime-england-and-wales-2014-to-2015 19 O’Brien J. Tyne A. (1981) The Principle of Normalisation: A Foundation for Effective Services. CMH: London Olszowski, P. Boaden, A. (2010) "Targeted violence, harassment and abuse against people with learning disabilities in Great Britain" Tizard Learning Disability Review Vol. 15 no 1 28 - 30 Overmars-Marx, T. Thomése, F. Verdonschot, M. Meininger, H. (2014). Advancing social inclusion in the neighbourhood for people with an intellectual disability: An exploration of the literature. Disability & Society 29(2), 255-274 Perry, B. (2015) Intervening Globally: confronting hate across the world Criminal Justice Policy Review doi 10.1177/0887403415599643 Roberts, C. Innes, M. Williams, M. Tregidga, J. Gadd, D. (2013) Understanding who commits hate crime and why they do it http://orca.cf.ac.uk/58880/1/understanding-who-commits-hate-crime-and-why-they- do-it-en.pdf accessed June 2016 Schweppe, J. Walters, M.A. (2016) Introduction: the globalization of hate crime in Schweppe, J.Walters, M. A. (Eds.). (2016). The Globalization of Hate: Internationalizing Hate Crime?. Oxford University Press. Shirlow, P. Taylor, L.K.. Merrilees, C. Goeke- Morey, C.E.M. Cummings, M. (2013) Hate Crime: Record or Perception? Space and Polity 17:2, 237-252 http://orca.cf.ac.uk/58880/1/understanding-who-commits-hate-crime-and-why-they-do-it-en.pdf http://orca.cf.ac.uk/58880/1/understanding-who-commits-hate-crime-and-why-they-do-it-en.pdf 20 Smith, M. (2015) Disability Hate Crime - a call for action in P.Giannasi R. Shah (eds) Tackling Disability Discrimination and Disability Hate Crime: A Multidisciplinary Guide London: Jessica Kingsley Publishers e United Nations (2008) Convention on the rights of persons with disabilities. Retrieved from http://www.un.org/disabilities/convention/conventionfull.shtml Verdugo, M. A. Navas, P. Gómez, L. E. Schalock, R. L. (2012) The concept of quality of life and its role in enhancing human rights in the field of intellectual disability. Journal of Intellectual Disability Research, 56(11) 1036-1045 Williams, M. L. Tregidga, J. (2014) Hate Crime Victimization in Wales Psychological and Physical Impacts Across Seven Hate Crime Victim Types. British Journal of Criminology azu043 Wilson, M. C. Scior, K. (2014) Attitudes towards individuals with disabilities as measured by the Implicit Association Test: A literature review. Research in Developmental Disabilities 35(2) 294-321 Wolfensberger, W. P. Nirje, B. Olshansky, S. Perske, R. Roos, P. (1972). The principle of normalization in human services. Wolfensberger, W. (1983). Social role valorization: A proposed new term for the principle of normalization. Mental Retardation, 21(6), 234. http://www.un.org/disabilities/convention/conventionfull.shtml 21 22 Smith, M. (2015) Disability Hate Crime - a call for action in P.Giannasi R. Shah (eds) Tackling Disability Discrimination and Disability Hate Crime: A Multidisciplinary Guide London: Jessica Kingsley Publishers 
work_lggg4riddvcuznzay5pylnzy4y	----	• • J 11!1 The •unsocial' facets of social x ( + c Apps i lnternatlonalhatestudtes.com/the-unsoclal-facets-of-social-medla-platforms/ ti .. • 6 'JI c t':i Cl a Ill\\ - • 0 ~~~~~~~~~ Home Blog The 'unsociar facets of social media platforms The 'unsocial' facets of social media platforms On 8th May 2020 by INHS Blog Editor In hate crime, Hate Speech, Media By Luiz Va/trio P. Trlndodt, PhO The current ubiquitous presence of social media in people's lives on a global scale and the Increasing trend of dtvlslonlsm and polanzat1on fostered in this environment raises an Important reOect1on: How 'soclarhas this d.srupllve technology really become? The sociologist James M Henslin advocates that 'society makes us humans', and that this process Is achieved through social Interaction. or IMng In society and developing ones· self It Is also true that IMng In society Is not without conflicts, misundernandings, and d1ffKultles, and none of their ongins are due to the emergence of social media since they have been established only from the m1d-2000s onwards. Nevertheless, while this disruptive technology has expenenced an lmpresSIYI! exponenual growth rate In the number of monthly actJve users and revenue, there Is also evidence revealtng that social media has become a breeding ground for the d1ssem1natJon of a myriad of unsocial behaV10ur Concurrent With this growth. a surge In bigotry. racism, hate speech. xenophobia. cyberbullymg. and suicKle of young people has also been observed • where soda! media has not only conmbuted to their emergence but has also amplified and exacerbated them In alarming proporuons. This overall picture has been identified In many countnes, such as Brazi~ Chile, Italy. Myanmar. Portugal, Spain. the UK. and the us. Taking into conslderauon the worrying phenomenon of suicide amongst young people, data reveals that In most cases, dlsrurblng content circulating on social media has played a relevant role In such cases. In other words, distressing onllne content can potentially amplify young people's lived experiences of depression, emotional instability, low self·esteem, and even encourage them to engage In self.harm practices. Conversely to what some people may think, the onllne and offllne environments are not detached from each other but rather part of the same complex Intertwined reality. The Impact of attitudes or behaviour performed onllne Is not restricted to that environment but can rather affect people in the offilne context. Putting It In another way, words can wound and cause real harm in people's lives, and recent cases of suicide amongst young people 1nnuenced by disturbing social media content contribute to corroborate this argument In the case of second-generation Immigrants, a recent report released by the Europtan Union ...,tncy for Fundomtnral Righrs reveals that this social group tends to experience more hate- motovated harassment than first.generations do (32'!6 vs 21'!6). Moreover, according to the EurofmJn Comm1uion ogoinsc Rodsm ond lnco/rraoce, people exposed to discrlmlnauon and Intolerance have neither the capaoty nor the resources to enforce their rights. And within the social group of second-generation Immigrants, it is possible to nouce that women comprise a partKularly vulnerable sooal group And within this soda! group or secorKl-generation immigrants, It is possible to notice that women are particularly more vulnerable. In other words, the paradoxical scenario IS that even being bom and raised In me countries where xenophobic discourses are fostered both onhne llnd offllne, secorKl-generauon 1mm1grant women might be perceived as 'llleginmate' otizens. This distorted negative perception 1s oh:enumes fuelled by extreme nationalist pohncal discourses and amplified by several lntersectlonahty dimensions such as gender, race, dass, ethnlC origin, affiliation to non-hegemonic religions, hairstyle, and dress code. As these biased vtews are disseminated and shared on social media, they reach a wide audience of like-minded people and reverberate both online and offilne and, In some circumstances even leading towards violent hate crimes. In Germany, for example, a study conduaed in 2018 has discovered a strong correlacion between anti-refugee speech on social media and physical attacks. Within this context. leading political figures should be more cautious and aware of the Infl uential aspects of their public statements and their possible impacts and consequences on people's lives. Their leadership position adds a strong symbolic weight to t heir w ords and expressed beliefs, In such a way that In the case of hateful, bigotry, xenophobic or divisive discourses. they can potentlaliy validate, legltlmate. and endorse negative perceptions, attitudes, and behaviours towards ethnic minority groups. Supporting evidence is found, for example, In the surge of hate crimes against American Muslims, hate crimes against immigrants In the UK ah:er the EU referendum campaign, and extremist political discourses in Italy that have raised concerns regarding Increasing assaults on Immigrants. This is to say !hat when a prominent political figure uses social media to post messages conveying Ideas such as ·go back to where you came from' directed towards second-generation immigrants, thts can instil in the collecuve mindset the distorted belier that. 1n fact. that partic\Jlar social group does not belong there. In general terms, the dominant logic behind most of the maior social media platforms Is that users Increase their netw0rk of 'fnerl<ls' as much as possible and keep postmg engaging content regularly (e g textS, Videos. Images, etc.) that can trigger as many posiuve rearuons as possible. The Increasing number of 11kes', 'comments', 'followers', etc. imply endorsement to the content posted and prOVldes a sort of psychological reward for the indMduals, whkh can encourage them to keep posung more content 1n a quest for more rewards and thus for external approval. As a consequence of this process (which has been coined as ·soaal-vahdauon feedback loop'). the large corporations and owners of the social media platforms. make fortunes with advenlsements. However, within the social media industry itself, this process has also been subjected to strong criticism and considered a way to exploit people's psychological vulnerablllues. Categories alternative justice measures Antisemitism Attitudes B1phob1a Call It Hate Context Effect Coronawus Equal mamage Extremism Football Gendered violence hate crime Hate Crime and Health Hate Crime Balkans hate crime Canada Hate Cnme Concept Hate aime leg1slauon Hate Cnme Poland Hate Crime Polley Hate Speech homophobia Human Rights International law lslamophobla lslamophOblc hate crime LEICESTER HATE CRIME PROJECT LGBT hate cnme Media Monitoring Moral Philosophy Polc1ng PolitKS Racism Research Terrorism Transphobla transphoblc hate crime Nonetheless, while a large number of'frlends' on social media platforms might provide some people with a perception of belonging, social acceptance and performing dynamic social Interaction, this might not exactly be the case. A recent poll conducted In the UK revealed that the average British social media u ser has around 554 'friends' online, but In real lire, the po ll's respondents have said that they can count on no more than five people, which Is less than one ~~~~-'-l!~n~r4at~e~quour1~1e~dl-~~~~~- I I https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/dec/11/facebook-former-executive-ripping-society-apart https://books.google.it/books?id=bKOmngEACAAJ&source=gbs_book_other_versions https://theconversation.com/brazils-supposed-racial-democracy-has-a-dire-problem-with-online-racism-99343 https://santiagotimes.cl/2017/09/04/chilean-minorities-celebrate-bachelets-move-to-criminalize-hate-speech/ https://www.famigliacristiana.it/articolo/haters-ecco-l-italia-che-odia-via-internet.aspx https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/apr/03/revealed-facebook-hate-speech-exploded-in-myanmar-during-rohingya-crisis https://ec.europa.eu/migrantintegration/?%20action=media.download&uuid=8ADFC4D4-A8C8-CC19-FDB301AC88E92077 https://elpais.com/elpais/2015/05/20/inenglish/1432123786_668593.html?rel=mas https://www.theguardian.com/media/2017/dec/19/mps-press-social-media-firms-over-failure-to-take-down-hate-speech?CMP=Share_iOSApp_Other http://newsfeed.time.com/2013/05/20/the-geography-of-u-s-hate-mapped-using-twitter/ https://time.com/5550803/depression-suicide-rates-youth/ https://www.bbc.com/news/av/uk-46966009/instagram-helped-kill-my-daughter https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2018-frr-chapter-4-racism_en.pdf http://hudoc.ecri.coe.int/eng?i=REC-02rev-PR-2018-266-ENG https://books.openedition.org/iheid/6256 https://books.openedition.org/iheid/6256 https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2018/01/12/in-germany-online-hate-speech-has-real-world-consequences http://monitoracism.eu/the-rise-of-bolsorano/ https://news.un.org/en/story/2019/08/1043911 https://www.upf.edu/documents/3329791/3455370/gritimps2.pdf/f0833b51-b7aa-4708-8be1-b2335afdf874 https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/aug/09/how-matteo-salvini-pulled-italy-to-the-far-right https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/18/us/politics/hate-crimes-american-muslims-rise.html https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/aug/26/politicians-rise-hate-crimes-brexit-vote-un-committee https://www.theguardian.com/global/2018/aug/03/warning-of-dangerous-acceleration-in-attacks-on-immigrants-in-italy https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/14/us/politics/trump-twitter-squad-congress.html https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/dec/11/facebook-former-executive-ripping-society-apart https://www.theverge.com/2017/11/9/16627724/sean-parker-facebook-childrens-brains-feedback-loop https://home.barclays/news/press-releases/2018/10/i-ll-be-there-for-you---why-friends-are-the-new-family-for-two-t/ https://internationalhatestudies.com/the-unsocial-facets-of-social-media-platforms/ • • r 11!1 The 'unsocial' factlS of socio! )( I + c Ii lnternatlonalhatestudles.com/the-unsoclal-facets-of-social-medla-platlorms/ Apps ~ Library Ge nesis Eltclronlc library.... 8 Amazon.com: Luiz_ CJ lmportado d o IE 13 From ToXI To Spt... CJ Luiz Va1'rio de Pa... CJ l1aly CJ Swilze~and --- --- --------, __ .... _. - percent or their cohort or onhne friends. So, while this big number of so-called friends might well be beneficial for the corporations under a business-oriented perspecuve, for the lnd1vlduals It might not necessarily provide a truly social experience. Thus, rather than respect, trust. soUdamy, and effective sooal interacuon, the aforementioned array of sooal phenomena (bigotry. raosm, xenophobia. hate speech, etc.) contribute to rewallng the worrying unsocial facets of social media platforms. Certainly, these aspects alone do not define social media as a whole and 1t would not be fair to reduce them to these aspects Newnheless, they raise serious concerns ind1catmg that the social d1srupuon, dMslon1sm and polanzauon created In this envuonment should not simply be accepted as the new norm In our socleues. Arstly, because there have been so many young people severely affeaed by content that Is freely dlsumlnated and shared on these platforms. Secondly, because 1t can be observed that In several societies second-generaoon immigrant women have been having their citizenship delegltlmlzed and challenged as If they did not belong there. Finally, because there has been an Immense amount of bigotry w1dely disseminated and shared online creating an almost endless echo-chamber erfea. Therefore, It ls Important not only to question but also to challenge and deconstrua this 'new society' shaped by unsocial social media behaviour before Its dominance reaches an Irreversible point where this scenario becomes completely normalized and acceptable. About the Author Luiz Val~rlo P. Trlndade holds a PhD In Sociology by the University of Southampton (UK). His areas of scholarship and research Interests encompass the construction and dissemination or hate speech on social media, critical race studies, and social representation of ethnic minorities on means of mass communication. https:J/soton.academla.edu/Lu1zValerioTrlndade Comment Uncategonzed V1roms Violence Recent Posts The ·unsooar facets of sooal media platforms May8, 2020 Hating the corona111rus is pointless. But no good will come from turning anxieties and anger against Chinese people Aprll 29, 2020 Minimising the collateral damage of hate crime: Some tips from Belaruslan journalists and editors for sensitive media reporting Morch 2, 2020 After a Decade of R1slng lslamophob1a, It's Time to Reconfigure and Rethink Understanding January 14. 2020 Recent Co mments Marie Walters: You will need to contaa the orgarusers of this event to book a place. 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BylulzValenoP.Tmdade, P i'MtO"abOnal\atesWches.com View on Twtttef Protea1ng commonly targeted groups In the context of ·new pohuc.s': the case of Ireland I Special Need of Vletlms of Hate Crime Regarding Cnmmal Proceedings and Victim Support (Spttlale Bchoefte van Slachtoffers van Hate Cnme TenAanzfen Vlln Het Str1fproces en de Slaehtofferhulp] Limits of UK Counterterrorlsm Pol cy and its 1mpl cauons for tslamophobla and Far Right extremism 'Lebanese Mushm' A Bourd1eu1an ·cap1car offense in an Austrahan coastal town lslamophobla and everyday muluculturallsm In Australia https://www.childrenssociety.org.uk/cyberbullying-inquiry https://discoversociety.org/2018/09/04/on-the-frontline-the-rise-of-hate-speech-and-racism-on-social-media/ https://theconversation.com/explainer-how-facebook-has-become-the-worlds-largest-echo-chamber-91024 https://soton.academia.edu/LuizValerioTrindade https://internationalhatestudies.com/the-unsocial-facets-of-social-media-platforms/ 
work_lgtaf7ayync2lfemanhl724ql4	----	cjmh_12_03.pdf Stigma and disclosure: Implications for coming out of the closet PATRICK W. CORRIGAN 1 & ALICIA K. MATTHEWS 2 1 Center for Psychiatric Rehabilitation & 2 Department of Psychiatry, University of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois, USA Abstract Background: There are costs and benefits for people with psychiatric disorders to decide to disclose publicly these disorders. Aims: The gay and lesbian community has struggled with the same tension and their discoveries about coming out may prove useful for the disclosure concerns of persons with mental illness. Methods: Lessons learned about coming out by the gay and lesbian community include a variety of models that map the stages for successfully coming out; e.g., identity confusion, comparison, identify acceptance, immersion, and identity synthesis. Navigating these stages requires consideration of the costs and benefits of disclosure; we review some of these including social avoidance and disapproval as key costs and improved psychological well- being and interpersonal relations as benefits. Conclusions: The paper ends with a review of levels of disclosure for people who opt to come out. Declaration of interest: This paper was made possible in part by MH62198-01 from the National Institute of Mental Health. Keywords: mental illness, stigma, coming out, gays Dealing with the stigma of mental illness by coming out of the closet Harvey Milk, the first openly gay supervisor of San Francisco, once said, ‘I would like to see every gay lawyer, every gay architect come out, stand up and let the world know. That would do more to end prejudice overnight than anybody could imagine.’ (cited in Herek, 1996, p. 213). Advocates and researchers agree that one way to challenge the stigma of mental illness is through contact. Mem- bers of the general public are more likely to diminish prejudicial attitudes and discriminating behaviors when they have contact with people with mental illness. This parallels a basic finding about change in racial prejudice; namely, the white majority decreased prejudice and discrimination when they had contact Address for Correspondence: Patrick Corrigan, 7230 Arbor Drive, Tinley Park, IL 60477, USA; Tel: 708 614- 4770; Fax 708 614-4780; E-mail: p-corrigan@uchicago.edu; www.stimgaresearch.org Journal of Mental Health (June 2003) 12, 3, 235 – 248 ISSN 0963-8237print/ISSN 1360-0567online/2003/030235-14 # Shadowfax Publishing and Taylor & Francis Ltd DOI: 10.1080/0963823031000118221 with people of color (Johnson & John- son, 2000; Jones et al., 2000). The experience of mental illness stigma differs from racism in that the stigma of mental illness may be hidden while the signs that yield racial discrimination are largely manifest. Hence, the experience of men- tal illness is like many other groups in which members may hide their associa- tion, groups including minority subsets of sexual orientation, educational attain- ment, and social status (Corrigan & Lundin, 2001). Despite the ability of many individuals to conceal their sexual orientation, the gay and lesbian community has discov- ered that their community benefits when individuals choose to disclose their sexual orientation. In this article, we argue that the community of people with mental illness may similarly benefit from disclos- ing their illness to the public at large. We assert that what is known about ‘coming out’ in terms of sexual orientation may provide hypotheses and methods that might guide future research in this area as it relates to mental illness. However, it should be noted that in comparing the experiences of sexual minorities to those with mental illness, we are in no way implying that any aspects of gay, lesbian, bisexual, or transgender orientations represent a psychiatric disorder. A sec- ond, equally important point also needs to be made. In stating that homosexu- ality is not a psychiatric disorder, we have reinforced the notion that being mentally ill is in someway morally wrong. Assertions like these are equally unjust and need to be corrected. How contact changes stigma Before we juxtapose the experiences of sexual minorities to those with mental illness, we will briefly review the litera- ture on the relationship between social contact and stigma. Here we review the three ways of changing public stigma – protest, education, and contact – and the body of evidence on the strengths and weaknesses of each. Briefly, protest strategies highlight the injustice of spe- cific stigmas and lead to a moral appeal for people to stop thinking that way. Education strategies have largely focused on replacing the emotionally charged myths of mental illness (e.g., people with mental illness are dangerous!) with facts that counter the myths (e.g., on average, people with mental illness are no more dangerous than the rest of the popula- tion). Although research suggests that these interventions might lead to mild change in attitudes (Holmes et al., 1999; Keane, 1991; Morrison, 1980; Penn et al., 1994) and limited change in behavior (Corrigan et al., in press), research has shown contact to yield the best changes in stereotypes, prejudice, and discrimina- tion. Contact effects are understood in terms of familiarity. Research shows that members of the general public who are more familiar with individuals labeled mentally ill are less likely to endorse prejudicial attitudes (Holmes et al., 1999; Link & Cullen, 1986; Penn et al., 1994, 1999). Moreover, members of the general public who interact with a person with mental illness as part of an anti-stigma program show significant changes in their attitudes (Corrigan et al., 2001). A subsequent study has shown that attitude change that results from contact main- tains over time and is related to a change in behavior (Corrigan et al., 2003). In a similar vein, Herek (1986) and Herek & Capitanio (1996) observed that contact between homosexuals and heterosexuals 236 Patrick W. Corrigan & Alicia K. Matthews diminished stigmatizing attitudes among heterosexuals. Hence, he concluded that coming out (one way to facilitate con- tact) has significant value for diminishing the stigma experienced by gay men and lesbians. Given that many gays and lesbians have benefited from decisions regarding coming out, it is not unreason- able, given the similarities, that people with mental illness can benefit from these lessons. Some of these lessons, and their relevance for people with mental illness, are reviewed here. Parallel societal experiences In this paper, we seek to better under- stand ways which people might manage the stigma of mental illness by comparing their experiences to gays, lesbians, and bisexuals. For this enterprise to be fruitful, we must first demonstrate that the comparison is valid. First, the mark that signals the stigma of homosexuality and of mental illness is not readily transparent. Goffman (1963) distin- guished stigmatized groups like these from groups whose stigmatizing mark is readily observed (e.g., skin color). This notion may seem contrary to naı̈ve psychological notions that gays and people with mental illness are easily recognizable. Members of the general public may list several cues that are thought to be characteristic of each group but in fact lead to mistaken identification. For example, labeling ef- feminate men as gay will lead to false positives (Brookey, 2000). Similarly, tag- ging eccentric or unkempt people as mentally ill leads to erroneous identifica- tions (Corrigan, 2000). Yet another commonality lies in the vagaries of categorical distinctiveness between the stigmatized group and the majority. On one hand, naı̈ve psycho- logical notions might suggest that homosexuality (and mental illness) distinguishes a unique category from the rest of the population (straights or non-mentally ill). They are frequently described as binary groups (Cover, 2000): a person is either straight or gay, mentally ill or sane. This kind of duality is false and accentuates the ‘we versus they’ qualities that augment stigma (Link & Phelan, 2001). Similarly, the boundary between mental illness and ‘normal’ is gray. First, epidemiological research sug- gests that the prevalence rate of major mental illnesses is as high as 20% thereby debunking the idea that mental illness is a rare occurrence (Narrow et al., 2002). Second, and more germane to the point here, many of the characteristic symp- toms of mental illness are quite common at subclinical levels. Hence, like gay versus straight, a clear distinction be- tween the sane and mentally ill is not borne out by the data. Another commonality is the way in which experiences with stigma emerge in the two communities. This similarity can be understood by contrasting it to the experiences of those whose stigma is readily manifest from birth. For example, members of stigmatized ethnic minority groups are born into families and com- munities who typically bear the same marks, are aware of potential prejudice that results from the stigma, and provide guidance for how to respond to preju- dice. Conversely, the life experiences that result in someone calling themselves gay or mentally ill typically occur in adoles- cence and young adulthood rather than at birth (Fisher & Akman, 2002; Weiser et al., 2001). Consequently, sexual mino- rities and individuals with mental illness often undergo a developmental process Coming out of the closet 237 that is different from their primary care providers and larger support systems. At the worst, family members and others ostracize the person who is struggling with either their gay or mentally ill identity (Savin-Williams, 2001). More commonly, parents and other mentors are unable to provide any clarity to their experiences. Finally, both groups have been stig- matized because of similar, society-wide misperceptions. In earlier times, homo- sexuality and mental illness were both viewed in moral terms. Homosexuality represented a volitional decision to opt for a sinful lifestyle (Zachary, 2001). Mental illness embodied the demon- possessed individual who did not have sufficient moral backbone to hold off Lucifer (Kinzie, 2000). The nineteenth and twentieth centuries replaced the religious models with views that medica- lized the conditions (Duberman, 1993; Foucault, 1980). The DSM-I defined homosexuality as a sexual deviation involving pathological behavior (Amer- ican Psychiatric Association, 1952). DSM-II cut the category of sociopathic personality disturbances from the defini- tion but continued to list homosexuality among deviant sexual practices (Amer- ican Psychiatric Association, 1968). At the same time, most of what has been considered to be major mental illnesses (e.g., schizophrenia) have been defined as medical conditions (American Psychia- tric Association, 1952, 1968, 1980). Note that homosexuality per se was removed as a psychiatric disorder from DSM-III (American Psychiatric Association, 1980) while mental illnesses obviously are the only focus of the diagnostic manual. Implicit in the medicalizing of a phenomenon is the idea that it can be corrected through treatment. During much of the twentieth century, some mental health professionals believed homosexuality could be cured through intensive psychotherapy. Most social scientists and health care professional now recognize gays and lesbians as an alternative sexual orientation that is not an appropriate target of psychotherapy (Davies & Neal, 2000). In some ways, parallels between the experiences of sexual minorities and the mentally ill diminish here. As noted above, mental illnesses have appropriately continued to be construed by the psychiatric commu- nity as medical conditions (American Psychiatric Association, 1987, 1994, 2000) while sexual orientation has not. The parallel between homosexuality and mental illness also diminishes when con- sidering issues related to treatment. Although there are several mental health survivor groups that question the legiti- macy of psychiatric treatment (Crossley, 1998), empirical research generally sug- gests that most people with mental illness are better able to accomplish life goals when receiving evidence-based pharma- cotherapy and psychosocial services (Drake et al., 2001). Hence, unlike gays and lesbians, treatment may play an important role in the lives of many people with major mental disorders. One other difference seems to emerge between sexual minorities and people with mental illness; embracing their identity. Most advocates and researchers agree that essential to the psychological well-being of gays, lesbians, and bisex- uals is embracing their sexual orientation (Besner & Spungin, 1995). At first appearances, the parallel does not seem to hold for people with mental illness. Rare would be the suggestion that a person needs to embrace their illness. Instead, it seems from the perspective of 238 Patrick W. Corrigan & Alicia K. Matthews patient and doctor that the number one goal of membership in the mental illness group is to get out of it. Some clinicians and advocates assert, however, that a necessary part of recovery is identifying the role that one’s experience with mental illness plays in defining the self (Fisher, 1994; Mosher & Burti, 1992). Despite the reasonableness of this perspective, a re- view of the literature yielded no empirical studies on identity development among people with mental illness. Despite the paucity of information about identity development among peo- ple with mental illness, there is an important literature on disease insight that may be relevant here (Amador & Kronengold, 1998; McEvoy, 1998). However, the professional literature mostly views mental illness as a pathogen that interferes with identity development. This difference in viewpoints is ripe for conceptual development and empirical testing in two ways. First, does mental illness as an experience have significance for identity development in ways other than disruption? If yes, then second, what models might explain identity and identity development in people with mental illness? Some models of identity development relevant to gays and les- bians are reviewed in the next section as possible candidates. Lessons learned on coming out Researchers studying sexual minorities have developed a series of models that represent identity development in this population (McCarn & Fassinger, 1996; Rosario et al., 2001; Vincke, 1999). One model with a fair amount of empirical support has described the process of integrating a lesbian and gay identity into the self-concept by dividing it into five stages (Brady & Busse, 1994; Cass, 1979, 1984; Sophie, 1985). We extrapo- late these stages here to issues related to identity development for people with mental illness. During the first two stages – identity confusion and comparison – people begin to question their sanity. They are aware of their psychiatric symptoms and feel alienated from the seemingly ‘normal’ population. Slowly, people in this situa- tion learn to tolerate this new identity and seek out others with mental illness. At the identity acceptance stage of identity development, people decide to disclose to trusted others. Concern and fear about one’s mental illness may be replaced by acceptance or pride. Some people become immersed in the culture of consumer, survivor, and ex-patient groups (Frese & Davis, 1997; Trainor et al., 1997). Moreover, there is a rejection of values in the dominant culture; one way this shows is the anti-psychiatry movement (Crossley, 1998). Finally, the relative extremism of identity pride ob- served during the immersion stage is replaced by identity synthesis such that the person’s identity as mentally ill becomes only one aspect of their identity. Cass’ (1979) model of identity integra- tion assumes statements like ‘I am gay and proud of it!’ are an essential element of developing a healthy self-concept. It is still unclear whether a parallel exists in mental illness: ‘I am mentally ill and proud of it.’ Is this a necessary part of the self that needs to be recognized and included into an integrated view of one’s self? An alternative way to view state- ments like ‘I am mentally ill and proud of it!’ may be as a necessary political assertion. Namely, because people with mental illness are discriminated by the majority, they may need to identify their Coming out of the closet 239 similarities as a stigmatized group to obtain greater social power. In this case, an identity model like Cross’ (1971) may be illustrative of the development pro- cess. Several studies have empirically validated aspects of his paradigm (Hall et al., 1972; Mio & Iwamasa, 1993; Parham, 1989; Ponteretto & Sabnani, 1989; Ridley et al., 1994). Cross’ model seeks to map identity development in African Americans as they move from a ‘Negro’ identity, which included some of the majority groups stereotypes, to a ‘Black’ identity which represents views that emerge from the African American community. Once again, we explain the model in terms of how it might apply to people with mental illness. During the pre-encounter stage, people with mental illness are unaware of their political plight and of the way that assumptions by the seemingly ‘normal’ majority influence attitudes about them. The subsequent encounter stage brings into awareness these subtle assumptions in two ways. First, people experiencing early signs of significant psychiatric symptoms are challenged by their view of normalcy. Second, people struggling with psychiatric symptoms encounter advocates who are out of the closet and seemingly dealing with the prejudice that mental illness entails. These challenges lead to immersion where some people steep themselves in the consumer-ex- patient-survivor movement. This immer- sion leads to hostility towards the ‘nor- mal’ majority and rejection of psychiatric services. During the internalization phase, ideas that are learned as the result of interacting with the consumer-ex- patient-survivor community become part of the person’s self-identity. People tran- sition from statements about them (‘The consumer community is supportive be- cause of its common bond with mental illness’) to about me (‘I am supportive because of my mental illness’). In the last stage of Cross’ model – internalization- commitment – the identity statements yield affective products including right- eous anger and self-love. Benefits and costs to disclosing What are the advantages and disad- vantages to coming out of the closet? Once again, we would argue that many of the consequences to coming out of the gay closet are similarly applicable to the experiences of people with mental illness. Costs and benefits are listed in Table 1. Perhaps most sobering among the risks of coming out for sexual minorities is bodily harm. The news media regularly reports on hate crimes based on sexual orientation. The case of Matthew She- pard is perhaps best known. This 21- year-old gay male was beaten to death outside of Laramie, Wyoming in 1998. Unfortunately, this is not a rare occur- rence. Results of one study showed 41% of a sample of lesbians and gay men reported being victims of a bias-related crime and another 9.5% reported an attempted bias crime against them (Herek et al., 1997). Data provided by Human Rights Watch (2001) has shown that more than 80% of gay and lesbian students report incidents of name-calling and other forms of verbal harassment in a single year. On one hand, there does not seem to be a facile comparison between these kinds of hate crimes and the experiences of people with mental illness. There is no body of evidence clearly suggesting that people with mental illness who come out are victims of crime in retaliation for their ‘mentally ill’ life 240 Patrick W. Corrigan & Alicia K. Matthews style. Alternatively, some advocates be- lieve violence against people with mental illness comes in a more subtle form (Chamberlin, 1998; Fisher & Ahern, 2000). Namely, the prescription of coer- cive and/or mandated treatments, such as involuntary commitments and man- dated medication, has been perceived as a violent measure by some people with mental illness. Research has shown that some people with mental illness experi- ence mandated or coercive treatment as harmful and abusive (Svensson & Hans- son, 1994). There are other examples of less violent, but still punitive, consequences to disclosing. Many members of the general public may choose to avoid people who have come out as gay. Experiences of social disapproval may negatively impact the self-esteem of people who are out. Of even greater concern, disclosing one’s sexual orienta- tion may translate into job and housing discrimination (Ragins & Cornwell, 2001). Although specific statistics have been difficult to gather, mounting evi- dence suggest that gays and lesbians suffer employment discrimination (Jen- nings, 1994; Olson, 1987; Weaver v Nebo School District, 1998). A similar pattern has been found for people with mental illness. Individuals who are disclose their psychiatric conditions are less likely to obtain or maintain jobs because of stigma (Corrigan & Watson, 2002). Despite the disadvantages, benefits to disclosing a stigmatized status exist. Perhaps key among these is the removal of the stress that results from having to no longer keep a secret on such an important part of one’s identity (Rosario et al., 2001). Research by Daniel Wegner and colleagues (Wegner & Lane, 1995) has examined the deleterious effects of secrets for people with concealable stig- mas. Labeling it the secrecy cycle, Wegner and colleagues found that at- tempts at secrecy activate a set of cognitive processes that lead to an obsessive preoccupation with the secret. Coming out negates the need for con- cealment and therefore helps the person avoid the secrecy cycle. Among sexual minorities, diminished stress that results from coming out leads to better relationships with one’s partner (Beals & Peplau, 2001) and improved job satisfaction (Day & Schoenrade, 1997, 2000). Moreover, people who come out report greater support from their families (Kadushin, 2000). Further, as a group, sexual minorities have embraced coming out as beneficial for the political and socio-economic needs of their commu- nities. As such, advocacy groups repeat- Table 1: Summary of costs and benefits of coming out of the gay closet Benefits Costs Psychological well being Physical harm . Increased self-esteem . Decreased distress Diminished risky behavior Social avoidance by others Facilitate interpersonal relations Social disapproval Enhance relatedness to key institutions like work Self-consciousness and self-fulfilling prophecies Coming out of the closet 241 edly urge individual gays and lesbians to come out at all levels. Although the benefit for the stigma- tized community seems clear, the impact on individuals within that community is less transparent. There are no algorithms that suggest how the costs and benefits of coming out will add up to affect an individual. Hence, the individual must consider these advantages and disadvan- tages for themselves in deciding whether or when to disclose. In the next section, several levels of disclosure, and its impact on people making the disclosure decision, are reviewed. Different levels of disclosure Cain (1991) interviewed 38 gay men to determine decision rules for coming out. The author asserts that people choose to disclose their gay orientation because it meets at least one of six needs. (1) Research has shown that maintaining a secret about an important aspect of one’s identity is inversely related to psycholo- gical well-being (Rosario et al., 2001). Hence, disclosing the secret serves the therapeutic purpose of enhancing one’s self-esteem. (2) Disclosing may enhance closeness in relationships that were dis- tant because of the closeted secret. (3) Sometimes people disclosed as a way to resolve interpersonal problems. One spe- cific example with relevance to mental illness was coming out to avoid constant questions about one’s whereabouts when covertly involved in the gay world (or mental health community). (4) Preventive disclosures attempt to avoid worse out- comes that might occur by accidentally discovering that a person is gay. (5) Some people opt to publicly announce their sexual orientation because they believe the more people that are out, the more the homophobic majority will diminish their prejudice. (6) Finally, Cain noticed that disclosure sometimes serves a spon- taneous function. Examples include on- the-spot decisions or slips of the tongue. Cain (1991) noted that just as there are reasons why people opt to disclose, so there are functions that keep people in the closet. Called concealment, four examples are described below. (1) Often times, people believed that disclosure was neither appropriate nor relevant to the situation. For example, several people reported it would be improper to share their sexual orientation with parents who have discouraged any discussion whatso- ever on sexual matters. (2) Some people opt to conceal their homosexuality out of deference to a significant other. Age was often cited as reason to defer and not tell someone (e.g., aging grandparents). (3) Some people stay in the closet because they lack the necessary emotional re- sources to face the challenge of disclo- sure. For example, they do not have the stress management skills or support to handle the disapproval and anger they may experience from others when they come out. (4) Finally, some people opt not to disclose because of concerns that people in positions of power (e.g., employer) might use the information against them. In an ethnographic study of 146 people with mental illness, Herman (1993) iden- tified several specific ways in which people might disclose. Based on our work with mental health advocates (Cor- rigan & Lundin, 2001), we summarized her observations into five specific levels of disclosure. According to Herman (1993), at the most extreme level, people may stay in the closet through social avoidance. This means keeping away from situations where people may find 242 Patrick W. Corrigan & Alicia K. Matthews out about one’s mental illness. Instead, they only associate with other persons who have mental illness. Others may choose not to avoid social situations but instead to keep their experiences a secret. An alternative version of this is selective disclosure. Selective disclosure means there is a group of people with whom private information is disclosed and a group from whom this information is kept secret. While there may be benefits of selective disclosure such as an increase in supportive peers, there is still a secret that could represent a source of shame. People who choose indiscriminant disclo- sure abandon the secrecy. They choose to disregard any of the negative conse- quences of people finding out about their mental illness. Hence, they make no active efforts to try to conceal their mental health history and experiences. Broadcasting one’s experience means educating people about mental illness. The goal here is to seek out people to share past history and current experi- ences with mental illness. Broadcasting has additional benefits compared to indiscriminant disclosure. Namely, it fosters their sense of power over the experience of mental illness and stigma. Ways in which coming out has been supported Although the decision to come out is a personal one, disclosure has been facili- tated by a variety of institutions and social movements. Three of these are summarized below: The reappropriation of stigmatizing labels Several examples to diminish the effect of a bad label are apparent from the commercial world where businesses have sought to escape prejudice by changing their names (e.g., Valujet morphed into Air Tran after a major accident). Learn- ing from these lessons, perhaps one way to deal with prejudice and discrimination is to find words that are less pejorative to describe a stigmatized group. An alter- native approach is to reappropriate stigmatizing labels. In the latter instance, a stigmatized group revalues what was a negative label by referring to itself in terms of that label (Galinsky et al., 2003). Queer is an example of this phenomenon in the gay community. In 1990 four members of ACT-UP dubbed itself Queer Nation with the slogan ‘We’re here. We’re Queer. Get used to it.’ What used to be a disrespectful way of referring to sexual minorities has been embraced by the community. There is some evi- dence of label reappropriation in the consumer survivor community too. Per- haps the best example is MadNation. Established in 1997, MadNation now comprises more than 800 members ‘working for social justice and human rights in mental health’ (www.networks- plus.net/fhp/madnation/announce.htm). Galinsky et al. (2003) identified several benefits to label reappropriation. Perhaps most obvious, the public can no longer use the term against the group. Secondly, reappropriation implies that deviance or abnormality is not a bad thing. Lastly, the reappropriation of a term like queer or mad actually becomes a source of pride. In turn, this kind of pride enhances the self-esteem of individuals who will- ingly wear it. Advocacy and support groups A second social phenomenon that facilitates disclosure is the advocacy and support groups made up of people who are out. Among sexual minorities, these groups sometimes adopt a reappro- priated name and become a resource in the community. Groups like these pro- vide a range of services including support Coming out of the closet 243 for those who are just coming out, recreation and shared experiences which foster a sense of community within a larger hostile culture, and advocacy/ political efforts to further promote gay pride (Kates & Belk, 2001). Several forces have converged over the past century to foster consumer-operated services for persons with psychiatric disabilities. Some reflect dissatisfaction with mental health services that disem- power persons by providing services in restrictive settings. Others represent a natural tendency of persons to seek support from others with similar pro- blems. Recently, a variety of consumer- operated service programs have devel- oped including: drop in centers, housing programs, homeless services, case man- agement, crisis response, benefit acquisi- tion, anti-stigma services, advocacy, research, technical assistance, and em- ployment programs (Van Tosh & del Vecchio, 2000). Results of a qualitative evaluation of consumer operated pro- grams showed that participants in these programs reported improvements in self- reliance and independence; coping skills and knowledge; and feelings of empow- erment (Van Tosh & del Vecchio, 2000). Future research needs to isolate the active ingredients of consumer-operated services that lead to positive change. Outing A third phenomenon related to disclo- sure is outing. In the past decade, some gay and lesbian advocates have called for outing people in the closet as a way to advance an anti-prejudice agenda. Outing means publicizing the fact that a specific person is gay or lesbian when that person has actively tried to stay in the closet. Outing generates strong ethical debate (Chekola, 1994; Mayo & Gunderson, 1994; McCarthy, 1994) and may vary from what is frequently considered the most justified position (e.g., publicly out- ing a conservative politician who takes an anti-gay stand on important public is- sues) to the least (e.g., outing a private citizen who keep all facets of his or her life private). In a parallel fashion, people active in the mental illness community might opt to out individuals in the closet about their psychiatric problems. There have been examples of the psychiatric problems of famous people being dis- closed for political agenda. Perhaps best known of these was Thomas Eagleton’s experiences with depression which were leaked to the press. Senator Eagleton, a democrat from Missouri, was George McGovern’s running mate in the 1972 general presidential election. In this in- stance, however, outing Eagleton was not to serve mental health pride but to increase prejudice. Similarly, there is not yet any empirical evidence that outing has somehow diminished either prejudicial attitudes or discriminatory behaviors toward gays. This needs to be the focus of future research. Conclusion For the gay and lesbian community coming out has significant advantages at the individual and community level. We argued in this paper that the experiences of stigma are similar for gays/lesbians and people with mental illness. Hence, what the gay community has learned about coming out may inform a similar move- ment in the community of people who identify themselves as mentally ill. In the process, the research that has examined some of the questions related to identity development and disclosure in the gay community may inform similar experi- ences in people with mental illness. This 244 Patrick W. Corrigan & Alicia K. 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work_ilhavmsmnbcbjdebgyfua7qu3e	----	HP 2010 Companion Document-Title Page Coordinated and co-written by the Gay and Lesbian Medical Association (GLMA) w w w. g l m a . o r g With experts from across the field and the National Coalition for LGBT Health www.lgbthealth.net. Technical assistance and editing provided by IQ Solutions, Inc. April, 2001 For further information, or to order additional copies of the Healthy People 2010 Companion Document for LGBT Health, contact: The Gay and Lesbian Medical Association 459 Fulton Street, Suite 107 San Francisco, CA 94102 Phone: 415-255-4547 Email: HP2010_LGBT@glma.org Web: Http://www.glma.org The HP2010 Companion Document for LGBT Health is available for downloading or printing at the GLMA and National Coalition for LGBT Health Web sites. An order form for hard copies is available at the GLMA web site. Suggested Citation: Gay and Lesbian Medical Association and LGBT health experts. Healthy People 2010 Companion Document for Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender (LGBT) Health. San Francisco, CA: Gay and Lesbian Medical Association, 2001. The development of this document received partial funding support from the Health Resources and Services Administration of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services under purchase orders 00-0048 (P) and 01- 0145 (P). The opinions expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official positions of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. C o n t e n t s A c k n o w l e d g m e n t s. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i I n t r o d u c t i o n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Access to Quality Health Services. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 7 C a n c e r. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 7 Educational and Community-Based Programs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 2 Health Communication. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 5 1 H I V / A I D S . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 7 2 nization and Infectious Diseases. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 9 7 al Health and Mental Disorders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 0 5 Immu Ment Nutrition and We i g h t . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 4 0 Public Health Infrastructure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 5 8 Sexually Transmitted Diseases (Infections) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 9 8 Substance A b u s e. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3 0 Tobacco Use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 5 2 Violence Prevention. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 7 6 A p p e n d i c e s Appendix A: Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 417 Appendix B: Acronyms. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 435 Appendix C: LGBT Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 443 Appendix D: Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 451 Appendix E: Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 477 A c k n o w l e d g m e n t s The Healthy People 2010 Companion Document for LGBT Health is the product of a national collaborative effort that involved nearly 200 individuals, organizations, and agencies. The full list of contributors may be found in Appendix E: Contributors. In addition, several individuals and organizations provided strategic leadership and contributed significant time and resources. IQ Solutions, Inc. drafted the document and provided editorial, design, and production services throughout the document development process. Nancy Kennedy of the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA), DHHS, contributed immeasurably in editing and writing the document. The collaborative process was organized, planned, and coordinated by the Gay and Lesbian Medical Association. An outgrowth of this process was the formation of the National Coalition for LGBT Health by many of the contributing organizations. The National Coalition will continue to be a partner in the dissemination and implementation of the document. Other organizations that provided staff and logistical support for the process include: Boston Public Health Commission; Columbia University Center for LGBT Health and the Lesbian Health Research Institute; Fenway Community Health; LLEGO, The National Latina/o Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Organization; National Association for Lesbian and Gay Addiction Professionals; National Coalition for LGBT Health; National Gay and Lesbian Task Force; University of Pittsburgh Center for Research on Health and Sexual Orientation; and Virginia Commonwealth University Survey and Evaluation Research Laboratory. The document could not have been written without the notable contributions of the following individuals: Deborah J. Aaron, Clinton Anderson, Sandi J. Armstrong, John Auerbach, Cornelius Baker, Valerie Bassett, Rodger L. Beatty, Deborah J. Bowen, Judy Bradford, Sean Camargo, Darren Carter, Bianca Cody Murphy, Blake Cornish, Patricia Dunn, L. Michael Gipson, Henia Handler, Irene Anne Jillson, Nancy Kennedy, Stewart Landers, Anne Lawrence, Jean Flatley McGuire, Alejandro Marcel, Nina Markovic, Kenneth H. Mayer, Marshall Miller, Craig Packer, Gerard Passannante, Fred D. Rachman, Marty Rouse, Lauretta A. Safford, Scout, Randall Sell, Anthony J. Silvestre, Jessica M. Xavier, and Frank Y. Wong. i I n t ro d u c t i o n Healthy People 2010 is the prevention agenda for the Nation. It is designed to serve as a roadmap for improving the health of all people in the United States during the first decade of the 21st century. (More information is available online at www.health.gov/healthypeople.) Like the preceding Healthy People 2000 initiative—which was driven by an ambitious, yet achievable, 10-year strategy for improving the Nation’s health by the end of the 20th century—Healthy People 2010 is committed to a single, overarching purpose: promoting health and preventing illness, disability, and premature death. Federal program planners and health care policymakers recognize that all population groups neither share the same health status, nor have equal access to quality health care and related services. Vulnerable or underserved populations—people who, for a variety of reasons, do not have access to needed health care—face many barriers to health care. These barriers include having no health insurance, having inadequate health insurance coverage, having low income, living in isolated areas or in crowded inner cities where there may be a shortage of needed health care providers, facing discrimination, experiencing stigma, and encountering cultural barriers such as a lack of literacy and few culturally competent providers or culturally accessible health promotional or educational materials. The ability of health professionals and health plans to provide necessary and appropriate services in areas with the greatest need depends, to a large extent, on good information about the health needs of people served within communities as well as overall health status. Lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) populations have been among those for whom little or no national-level health data exist.1, 2, 3, 4, 5 Some State-level data from CDC’s Youth Risk Behavioral Surveillance System, a few household-based studies, many studies using convenience samples, and anecdotal information have indicated that LGBT populations, in addition to having the same basic health needs as the general population, have health disparities related to sexual orientation or gender identity. This Healthy People 2010 Companion Document contains most of the existing quantitative and qualitative research and information specific to LGBT health in the areas defined and Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 1 A Healthy People 2010 Companion Document for Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health Healthy People 2010 is grounded in science, built through public consensus, and designed to measure progress. Introduction discusses the overall health status of LGBT people. Making the best use of available data, this document describes the barriers and recommends changes that will facilitate success in overcoming them. Healthy People 2010 Companion Documents Although Healthy People 2010 outlines the health goals for the Nation over the next 10 years and serves as a benchmark and guide for community-based program planning, such a document cannot meet the diverse needs of all people, especially of minority populations for whom adequate data are lacking. Healthy People 2010 Companion Documents, therefore, are intended to highlight or identify the objectives most relevant to selected populations or groups and to focus on practical strategic steps to improve the health of the population or to better manage chronic disease conditions. Companion Documents also are designed to make Healthy People 2010 and the information pertaining to targeted populations more useful to consumers, community health planners, health educators, people in health professions training, academics, and practicing health professionals at all levels of health care delivery. Over the next decade, a series of Healthy People 2010 Companion Documents on a broad range of health issues or focused on the health needs of selected populations are expected to be available. The History Behind the Healthy People 2010 Initiative Healthy People 2010 builds on other national health promotion and disease prevention initiatives pursued for more than two decades. Of the most recent, in 1979, Healthy People: The Surgeon General’s Report on Health Promotion and Disease Prevention provided national goals for reducing premature deaths and preserving independence for older adults. In 1980, another report, Promoting Health/Preventing Disease: Objectives for the Nation, set forth 226 targeted health objectives for the Nation to achieve over the next 10 years. Healthy People 2000: National Health Promotion and Disease Prevention Objectives, released in 1990, identified health improvement goals and objectives to be reached by the year 2000. The Healthy People 2010 initiative continues in the tradition and looks ahead to improve the overall health of the Nation for the first decade of the 21st century. Healthy People 2010 represents the ideas and expertise of a diverse range of individuals, health professionals, and organizations concerned about the Nation’s health. The Healthy People Consortium—an alliance of more than 350 national organizations and 250 State public health, mental health, substance abuse, and environmental agencies—conducted three national meetings. In addition, many individuals and organizations gave testimony about health priorities at five Healthy People 2010 regional meetings held across the country in late 1998. On two occasions—in 1997 and in 1998—the American public was given the opportunity to share thoughts and ideas and to comment specifically on the draft objectives. More than 11,000 comments on the draft materials were received by mail or via the Internet from individuals in every State, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico. These comments were all considered in the development and refinement of the objectives and the content of the chapters. 2 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health Introduction The Relationship Between Individual and Community Health Over the years, it has become clear that individual health is closely linked to community health—the health of the community and the environment in which individuals live, work, and play. Likewise, community health is profoundly affected by the actions, collective beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors of everyone who lives in the community. Community partnerships, particularly when they reach out to nontraditional partners, can be among the most effective tools for improving health in communities. For the past two decades, Healthy People has been used as a strategic management tool for the Federal Government, States, communities, and many other public- and private-sector partners. Virtually all States, the District of Columbia, and Guam have developed their own Healthy People plans modeled after the national plan. Most States have adapted the national objectives to meet their State- specific needs. Many communities have adapted Healthy People objectives and strategies in order to target their prioritized health needs. Therefore, the underlying premise of Healthy People 2010 is that the health of the individual is almost inseparable from the health of the larger community, and that the health of every community in every State and territory determines the overall health status of the Nation. That is why the vision for Healthy People 2010 is “Healthy People in Healthy Communities.” Systematic Approach to Health Impro v e m e n t Healthy People 2010, then, is about improving health—the health of each individual, the health of communities, and the health of the Nation. However, the Healthy People goals and objectives themselves cannot improve the health status of the Nation. Instead, they need to be recognized and utilized as part of a larger, systematic approach to health improvement composed of four key elements: Goals Objectives Determinants of health Health status Whether this systematic approach is used to improve health on a national level, as in Healthy People 2010, or to organize community action around a particular health issue, such as promoting smoking cessation, the components remain the same. The goals provide a general focus and direction. The goals, in turn, serve as a guide for developing a set of objectives that will measure actual progress within a specified amount of time. The objectives focus on the determinants of health, which encompass the combined effects of factors influencing individual health or Healthy People 2010:Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health 3 Community health is profoundly affected by the collective beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors of everyone who lives in the community. Successful community partnerships use a systematic approach to health improvement. Introduction well-being, community physical and social environments, and policies and interventions used to promote health, prevent disease, and ensure access to quality health care. Finally, health status also is a description of the health of the total population. The Goals and Objectives of Healthy People 2010 Healthy People 2010 is designed to achieve two overarching goals: Increase quality and years of healthy life Eliminate health disparities These two goals are supported by 467 specific objectives in 28 focus areas, or chapters. Each objective was developed with a target to be achieved by the year 2010. Three of the focus areas are cross-cutting: Access to Quality Health Services, Educational and Community-Based Programs, and Public Health Infrastructure. These three focus areas are overarching and, by their nature, overlap. They also link with all other focus areas. Each focus area is written as a stand-alone document within the larger document, with an introduction, background information, objectives with supporting text, and data templates for objectives for which data currently are available. Each objective and its supporting text are written so the objective or an identified group of objectives stands alone within the focus area. Types of Objectives There are two types of objectives in Healthy People 2010: measurable and developmental. Measurable objectives provide direction for action. For measurable objectives, the current status of the objective is expressed with baseline data. The baseline represents the starting point for moving the Nation toward a desired end. The baselines are obtained from valid and reliable data from currently established, representative data systems at the national level and State level. National data are not a prerequisite to developing an objective, and where appropriate, State, private-sector, or organizational data systems may be used. The data source for each measurable objective is clearly identified and described extensively in the Tracking Healthy People 2010 document. Developmental objectives provide a vision for a desired outcome or health status. Current national surveillance systems do not always provide data on these subjects, although new questions are being added to national surveys yearly. The purpose of developmental objectives is to identify areas of emerging importance and to drive the development of data systems to measure them. Most developmental objectives have a potential data source with reasonable expectation of data points by the year 2004. Not all data sets for all measurable objectives are complete with needed data. For example, those data areas for some subpopulations are labeled developmental, meaning the data are currently unavailable or not collected. 4 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health Introduction For persons defined by sexual orientation or gender identity, Healthy People 2010 includes 29 specific objectives for which sexual orientation is included in the data templates. These objectives occur within 9 of the 28 focus areas. (See table 1.) However, for most of the 29 objectives, “DNC” appears in the data templates: DNC means that data specific to sexual orientation are not currently collected by the data system used to track the objective. 6 With the exception of HIV/AIDS Surveillance System of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), which includes reporting new AIDS cases among adolescent and adult men who have sex with men, no other national survey or data collection system specifically identifies people by sexual orientation or gender identity. Factors Influencing Health or Well-Being There are major factors that influence, in a positive or negative manner, health or well- being. One of these factors, genetics, encompasses, in a varying or unique mixture, the biological inheritance of the individual and possible predisposition to specific diseases or disorders (e.g., sickle cell anemia or Tay-Sachs disease).7 Heredity is considered the internal or host variable of health status. Genetic inheritance also may determine such aspects of individuals as metabolism and patterns of behavior. Some scholars, researchers, and others postulate that the causes of homosexuality are genetic.8, 9, 10, 11 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 5 Introduction Another major factor influencing health is the environment; this is characterized as external, in contrast to genetics as internal. The environment encompasses both the physical—including air and water quality, pollution, and quality of housing—and other factors that enhance or divest individual dignity in the ability to maintain self-respect.12 Also included are such factors as the social environment—the ways in which we work, the people with whom we interact, and the environmental factors that enhance or deter the gratifications received from this socialization or lack thereof.13 The social environment is the major determinant of an individual’s psychological constitution.14 In contrast to the genetic research mentioned, there are researchers and organizations who purport that the causes of homosexuality are probably environmental.15, 16, 17 Another external cause or factor affecting health or well-being is the availability, quantity, and utilization of health services. Some individuals have equated this factor with that of the medical care system, a system undergoing rapid and dramatic changes as the processes of managed care saturate the private system and move rapidly into the public arena.18 The health care system is, however, much broader than the medical system. (See Access to Quality Health Services focus area). Even with a narrow conceptualization of services, individual health is affected. Inappropriate utilization of the health care system occurs when either an individual or provider “medicalizes” an individual’s life, reducing all problems to medical terms.19 One purpose of the Healthy People 2010 Companion Document for LGBT Health is to examine health care disparities and a lack of access to needed services related to sexual orientation or gender identity. The emphasis is on research and science, not anecdotes. Nevertheless, there are those who believe that LGBT people rarely face discrimination, 20 and some organizations continue to exist to prevent homosexuality21 or, if homosexuality does occur, assist in its treatment. 22, 23 This Healthy People 2010 Companion Document illustrates that most health care providers need additional education and training to offer culturally appropriate and linguistically accessible services. In 1987, Coleman published a relatively simple assessment tool to help map out or identify the sexual orientation of health care consumers that could be a mechanism for discussion of an uncomfortable topic for most individuals, LGBT or heterosexual.24 The questionnaire considers the combination of sexual behavior, fantasies, feelings, and self-identification that contributes to sexual orientation or gender identity. Another factor influencing health is habits or lifestyle, including such behavioral factors as the amount and quality of diet, exercise, sexual activity, work, reaction to stress, and use of alcohol, tobacco, and other drugs. An individual can be made ill by the way he or she lives; and both behavioral excesses and deficiencies are factors determining health, wellness, disorder, or disease.25 6 Healthy People 2010:Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health Factors Influencing Health or W e l l - B e i n g Genetics Environment Health services Habits or lifestyle Introduction With repetition, behaviors become habitual. Those behaviors can become a categorical lifestyle when they dominate as normative behaviors. However, as the body cannot be separated from the mind, so behavior is intrinsically linked to the psyche. Thus, attitudes and values are even more influential than knowledge in determining behavior. The evidence for learning, which is also an internal process, is behavioral change that can be observed or measured.26 This seemingly simplistic explanation is not meant to give an inaccurate appearance to the complexities of human behavior. Instead, the purpose is to establish the premise that behavior, especially harmful behavior, can be changed. Sexual activity does not equal sexual orientation. However, the starting place of homophobia for many people is sexual activity equated with sexual orientation.27 Several opinion surveys in the United States have shown that people who consider homosexuality a chosen behavior or lifestyle (as many as 40 percent of the U.S. population) have more negative opinions toward gays and lesbians and are less likely to favor nondiscrimination statutes, as compared to people who think that a person’s sexual behavior is inborn or not a choice.28 “Homosexual” was a term created by Karl Maria Kertbeny in 1869 in preference to “pederast,” the derogatory term for men who had sex with men that was in common use at that time in Germany.29 “Sodomy” was a term that St. Peter Damian coined around 1050.30 There is, then, a long history associated with homosexuality and gender identity, as well as specific terminology that has varied across time and place. Moreover, sexual orientation, as well as gender identity, is multidimensional with a great deal of variability. For example, many women who have sex with other women do not identify as lesbians,31 and some self- identified gay men and lesbians are married to opposite-sex partners.32, 33 Sexual orientation is commonly considered to have three dimensions: desire/attraction, behavior, and identity.34, 35 Health Status The health status of the United States is a description of the health of the total population, using information representative of most people living in this country. The ultimate measure of success in any health improvement effort is the health status of any defined population. For relatively small population groups, however, it may not be possible to draw accurate conclusions about their health using current data collection methods. The goal of eliminating health disparities will necessitate improved collection and use of standardized data to identify correctly disparities among select population groups. General health status can be measured by birth and death rates, life expectancy, quality of life, morbidity from specific diseases, risk factors, use of ambulatory care and inpatient care, accessibility of health personnel and facilities, financing of health care, health insurance coverage, and many other factors. The information used to report health status comes from a variety of sources, including birth and death records, hospital discharge data, and health information collected from health care records, personal interviews, physical examinations, and telephone surveys. How a population is defined often determines the data collected. Healthy People 2010:Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 7 Introduction Epidemiology is the study of the distribution and factors of health-related stress and events in a defined population.36 Epidemiology is the major vehicle for evaluating health status, describing the natural history of diseases or disorders, identifying risk and protective factors, aiding in the process of clinical analysis and decisionmaking, and developing and evaluating the continuum of care.37 The basic paradigm of epidemiology was developed in response to a need to measure the extent and characterize the occurrence of infectious diseases such as cholera and smallpox. That paradigm consists of agent, host, and environment.38 In infectious diseases, the focus of attention is the agent, without which the disease would not occur. Infectious diseases seem to result from a relatively straightforward cause-and- effect relationship, making epidemiological methods for describing the occurrence of disease apparently simple. In many cases, however, the mere presence of the agent in a host does not necessarily initiate the disease process. Thus, host susceptibility and environment are determinants of whether or not disease will occur. A natural result of decreasing infectious diseases was an increase in longevity of life. As a result of living longer, chronic diseases are more prevalent. And, although the rates of chronic disorders are highest among the elderly, one in four children younger than 18 years also has a chronic condition.39, 40 Etiological research, focusing on the causes and origins of diseases, reveals that chronic illnesses have multiple causes leading to a single effect. The metaphor of a “web of causation”41 explains the complexity of chronic diseases. As for the classic paradigm of agent, host, and environment, Morris, in postulating a paradigm for chronic diseases, replaced the term agent with behavioral factors.42 Etiologic research involving chronic diseases reveals the importance of behavioral risk factors. This perspective allows chronic diseases to be classified as diseases of lifestyle.43 Research by Pentz suggests that host susceptibility is the most important factor in the paradigm, thereby lending credence to preventive interventions that support and increase resiliency.44 In a recent survey, 90 percent of participants agreed with this statement: My physical well- being is in my hands. In spite of this affirmation, 57 percent of respondents described themselves as overweight, 52 percent did not exercise, and 26 percent smoked cigarettes.45 These paradoxical statements are further evidence of the need for a new model applicable to the complexity of the new millenium. Epidemiology also has been seen as an important research method for identifying factors associated with a variety of social and health problems, such as violence, accidents, mental disorders, and addiction, and has assumed an important role in understanding these conditions and behaviors.46 Although each of these conditions has unique characteristics, they all share a common trait involving the inability to cease a behavior, which has or could 8 Healthy People 2010:Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health Paradigm of E p i d e m i o l o g y H o s t A g e n tE n v i r o n m e n t Introduction have a deleterious effect on health or well-being. Similar to chronic disease, the focus of attention in the epidemiology of behavioral disorders is on environment and host susceptibility. Although basic research has demonstrated clear biochemical and neurophysiological changes that occur with some disorders, such as alcoholism and schizophrenia, a common element among the diseases appears to be a significant psychosocial dimension.47 The conditions or precursors that lead to these disorders are generally more voluntary, and, to some extent, there is more knowledge of the consequences than with either infectious or chronic disease. The sensitive nature of the data associated with almost all of these disorders presents unique measurement problems. Traditional data sources fail to capture most of the afflicted population. Veracity of self-report also presents a challenging methodological problem. People with these problems or disorders generally avoid contact with facilities or systems through which their behavior can be identified, including health care systems. 48 Often, primary care providers are not cognizant of these problems or disorders as a potential cause of trauma and/or disease, and thus, important data may not be recorded. Finally, the emergence of human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) and acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS) as a major international health problem highlights the interrelationship among infectious, chronic, and behavioral diseases and the epidemiology used in their study. HIV, which causes the disease, is transmitted principally through behavioral factors, such as sexual activity or sharing of syringes among injection drug users. The AIDS issue (see HIV/AIDS focus area) is the most recent example of the importance of epidemiology in public health and chronicles the need for continually adapting effective methods of investigation to accommodate both changes in human behavior and changing conditions of life.49 The leading causes of death frequently are used to describe the health status of the Nation. Data for most Healthy People 2010 mortality objectives are based on the underlying cause of death.50 The underlying cause of death is defined by the World Health Organization as the disease or injury that initiated the sequence of events leading directly to death or as the circumstances of the violence or accident that produced the fatal injury.51 Tobacco and diet/activity patterns are the two most influential factors, outpacing all other causes by a tremendous magnitude.52 A very different picture emerges when the leading causes of death are viewed for various population groups. Unintentional injuries, mainly motor vehicle crashes, are the fifth leading cause of death for the total population, but they are the leading cause of death for people aged 1 to 44.53 Similarly, HIV/AIDS is the 14th leading cause of death for the total population but the leading cause of death for African American men aged 25 to 44.54 Understanding and monitoring behaviors, environmental factors, and community health systems may prove more useful in monitoring the Nation’s true health, and in driving health improvement activities, than the death rates that reflect the cumulative impact of these factors. This more complex approach has served as the basis for developing the Leading Health Indicators. Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 9 Introduction Leading Health Indicators The Leading Health Indicators reflect the major public health concerns in the United States and were chosen based on their ability to motivate action, the availability of data to measure their progress, and their relevance as broad public health issues. The Leading Health Indicators illuminate individual behaviors, physical and social environmental factors, and important health system issues that greatly affect the health of individuals and communities. Underlying each of these indicators is the significant influence of income and education. The process of selecting the Leading Health Indicators mirrored the collaborative and extensive efforts undertaken to develop Healthy People 2010. The process was led by an interagency work group within the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. Individuals and organizations provided comments at national and regional meetings or via mail and the Internet. Additional developmental work was undertaken by the Institute of Medicine, National Academy of Sciences. The result—this small set of measures—will provide a snapshot of the health of the Nation. Tracking and communicating progress on the Leading Health Indicators through national- and State- level report cards will spotlight achievements and challenges in the next decade. The Leading Health Indicators serve as a link to the 467 objectives in Healthy People 2010 and can become the basic building blocks for community health initiatives. The Leading Health Indicators are intended to help everyone more easily understand the importance of health promotion and disease prevention and to encourage wide participation in improving health in the next decade. Developing strategies and action plans to address one or more of these indicators can have a profound effect on increasing the quality of life and the years of healthy life and on eliminating health disparities—creating healthy people in healthy communities. For each of the Leading Health Indicators, specific objectives derived from Healthy People 2010 will be used to track progress. Table 2 identifies the specific objectives and whether sexual orientation is in the data template. “DNC” in the template means that the data currently are not collected by the data system being used to track the objective. At the time this Companion Document went to press, none of the 29 objectives with sexual orientation in the data template had data on sexual orientation. Until the surveys identified to track progress on the Leading Health Indicators collect data on sexual orientation, progress specifically for LGBT populations cannot be monitored. The addition of sexual orientation and gender identity measures to Federal surveys in general, and to those surveys that measure the Healthy People 2010 objectives and the Leading Health Indicators specifically is a recommendation that has been made consistently. Some States have supplemented the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System and the Youth Risk Behavior Surveillance System surveys to include questions of sexual 10 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health A major challenge throughout the history of Healthy People has been to balance a comprehensive set of health objectives with a smaller set of health priorities. Introduction orientation. Perhaps more importantly, this Companion Document contains numerous examples of innovative programs and strategies that LGBT people have used to address the nature and magnitude of specific problems such as tobacco, AIDS, and cancer. Similarly, community-based organizations have built programs to promote the health of LGBT people from children to elders, based on local needs assessments and community consensus. Although relatively few probability studies have been conducted with LGBT populations, these methods are increasingly feasible and can provide reliable data on which to develop programs, interventions, and educational strategies. Until sexual orientation and gender identity are measured by Federal health surveys, probability and, when appropriate, strong Healthy People 2010:Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 11 Moderate physical activity in adults 22-2 Vigorous physical activity in adolescents 22-7 Obesity in adults 19-2 Overweight and obesity in children and adolescents 19-3c Cigarette smoking by adults 27-1a Cigarette smoking by adolescents 27-2b Alcohol and illicit drug use by adolescents 26-10a Illicit drug use by adults 26-10c Binge drinking by adults 26-11c Responsible adolescent sexual behavior 25-11 Condom use by adults 13-6 Treatment for adults with recognized depression 18-9b Deaths from motor vehicle crashes 15-15a Homicides 15-32 Ozone pollution exposure 8-1a Exposure to environmental tobacco smoke 27-10 Fully immunized children aged 19 to 35 months 14-24 Flu and pneumococcal vaccination in high-risk adults 14-29a,b Persons with health insurance 1-1 Source of ongoing care 1-4a Early prenatal care 16-6a Table 2 Leading Health Indicators Healty People 2010 Objectives Short Text Objective Number General Population Sexual Orientation in Data Tables? Introduction nonprobability sampling techniques can strengthen the quality of surveys, prevention research, and program evaluation studies. Healthy People 2010 Companion Document for LGBT Health In 2000, the Gay and Lesbian Medical Association (GLMA) joined with Columbia University’s Center for LGBT Health to coauthor the white paper, Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health: Findings and Concerns, a comprehensive overview of the state of LGBT health in the first federally funded paper on LGBT health concerns. This report discusses the health of LGBT individuals. The LGBT designation includes diverse and varied populations that often share little more than society’s stigma and prejudice. Stigma, however, as well as a range of other social and cultural factors, are forces that impact both the health of LGBT people and the ability of health care providers to care for them in myriad ways. (The white paper can be downloaded from www.glma.org.) The white paper helped Federal and other health professionals see LGBT people as distinct communities with a wide range of health issues and concerns. In addition to enlightening academics, health professionals, health care planners, community health planners, and consumers about the need for culturally competent health care for LGBT communities, the white paper: Identifies key health concerns for LGBT communities, including cancer, HIV/AIDS, mental health, suicide among youths, substance abuse, and access to quality care Presents the case for a national research agenda to determine the health needs of LGBT communities Identifies barriers that have thwarted prior research, including homophobia, ignorance, and fear Points out that these same barriers among many medical professionals have limited gay and lesbian access to health care or denied LGBT people culturally appropriate care The imperative for building a more responsive health care system in the 21st century is clear in the pages of the white paper. The white paper and Healthy People 2010 are the two key documents upon which the Healthy People 2010 Companion Document for LGBT Health was built. Federal funding was provided by the Health Resources and Services Administration to the Gay and Lesbian Medical Association (GLMA) to continue coordinating the process. As in the development of Healthy People 2010, an inclusive process has been used for writing the Companion Document, providing a catalyst for LGBT health care consumers, providers, researchers, educators, and advocates to join together in voicing the specific needs and concerns of this multicultural community. Eleven work groups included representatives from: 12 Healthy People 2010:Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health Introduction Academic and research institutions National LGBT and health organizations LGBT health clinics LGBT community centers Other community-based organizations Professional associations Federal, State, regional, and local governmental health agencies A full list of participants in the Companion Document process may be found in Appendix E: Contributors. From July to November 2000, the work groups met by conference call and shared documents through e-mail to develop the chapters. In October 2000, many of the participants met in Washington, D.C., for a working meeting. Existing work group members were joined by new participants to further expand and diversify the collaboration. In December 2000, a small editorial committee representing the work groups and the diversity of the LGBT communities spent two full days discussing a draft of the document, identifying gaps or inconsistencies, and suggesting improvements. The Healthy People 2010 Companion Document addresses 110 objectives in 12 topic areas. Where national data were lacking, local sources, program evaluations, small studies, and other research efforts have been used. This Companion Document has been written for all possible audiences—Federal agencies administering publicly funded health and related services programs, State health departments, local health departments, health centers, health planners at all levels, policymakers, managed care plans developing benefits packages or options for purchasers of health care, other insurance companies, the business community, employers, health professionals in all settings, health professions students, the school system, and especially those who know little or nothing about LGBT people and their health needs. With the exception of Public Health Infrastructure, which is broken into sections, each focus area or chapter is arranged with the same format: Healthy People 2010 goal Overview Issues and trends Disparities Opportunities Healthy People 2010:Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 13 Introduction Summary of LGBT research Discussion of Healthy People 2010 Objectives Recommendations Terminology References The focus areas or chapters can be viewed in different ways. For example, each chapter can be an entity describing a particular subject, such as immunization or violence. Or chapters can be combined for a larger discourse, such as joining substance abuse, tobacco, and mental health to describe behavioral health. LGBT People In addition to the previously mentioned factors influencing health or well-being, culture is a significant factor in the context of personal and public health. Culture is not restricted to racial or ethnic identification or heritage; instead, culture is the customs, beliefs, values, knowledge, and skills that guide a people’s behavior along shared paths.55 In fact, culture even differently defines or broadens the concepts of health/wellness and disease/disorder. Culture is pervasively intertwined among the four factor influencing health: genetics, environment, health services, and habits. However, these factors need to be congruent with cultural and linguistic norms and morés.56 This statement cannot be undervalued for LGBT culture, a construct that is not without debate,57 because LGBT individuals are present in every community and subpopulation group within the United States. Thus, “gay” culture as it refers to the collective LGBT population is as diverse as all its members. How many LGBT people are there? The actual number of people who identify themselves as LGBT is not known. Because of a lack of research focusing on the size of the population and the fear that many LGBT people, especially youth, have concerning revealing their sexual identity, reliable data are difficult to obtain.58 Moreover, in the few surveys that do provide data, respondents are usually asked about sexual behavior, not orientation or identity. The popular estimate that 10 percent of the male population and 5 to 6 percent of the female population are exclusively or predominately gay and lesbian is based on the Kinsey Institute data.59, 60 Laumann and associates (1994), using the national probability Health and Social Life Survey combined with data collected in the General Social Survey, found that 2.8 percent of men and 1.4 percent of women identified as gay or lesbian, while 7.7 percent of men and 7.5 percent of women reported homosexual desire.61 Michaels (1996) analyzed the limited available data and estimated that in the United States 9.8 percent of men and 5 percent of women report same-gender sexual behavior since puberty; 7.7 percent of men and 7.5 percent of women report same-gender desire; and 2.8 percent of men and 1.4 percent of women report homosexual or bisexual identity.62 An analysis of U.S. census data has provided the most solid evidence of the presence and certain social characteristics of 14 Healthy People 2010:Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health Introduction lesbians and gays among the general population. In the 1990 census, gay and lesbian respondents could identify themselves as unmarried partners. Estimates from the 1990 census indicate that 1.63 percent of people aged 15 and older nationwide reported themselves as unmarried partners of the householder.63 Bisexual individuals are perhaps the most misunderstood population within the spectrum of LGBT populations. For some bisexual people, their bisexual identity is continuous and fixed across their life span. For others, sexual orientation may be more fluid and marked by changes from heterosexual to either lesbian or gay or vice versa.64 It is not uncommon for gay men and lesbians in recalling their “coming out” process to remember self-identifying as bisexual. Although the stages of homosexual identity formation65 denote that this is a very common experience, that does not negate the fact that bisexuality is a distinct sexual orientation. Nevertheless, mistaken beliefs about bisexuality are prevalent among lesbians and gays as well as the heterosexual population, and, unfortunately, may also be internalized by bisexual people. The following are some of the most persistent myths: Bisexuals are confused about their identity. Bisexuals are afraid to be lesbian or gay because of social stigma and oppression by the majority. Bisexuals have become “stuck” in the coming-out process. Bisexuals have knuckled under to the social pressure to “pass” as straight. Bisexuals are hypersexual and will have sex with anyone.66 As health care providers may also embrace some of those myths and be inclined to view bisexual individuals as being psychologically or emotionally damaged, being developmentally immature, or having a personality disorder, Fox (1996), in reviewing the literature, asserts that “research has found no evidence of psychopathology or psychological maladjustment in bisexual men and women.”67 Gender identity is even less understood. “ Transgender ” is an umbrella term that encompasses a variety of people including transsexuals, cross-dressers, drag kings and queens, as well as bigender and androgynous individuals.68 “ Transgender ” came into common usage during the 1980s. Previously, people with mixed gender and sexual characteristics were described as transsexuals or transvestites, terms emanating from the psychiatric vocabulary. “ Transgender ” comes from the transgender community and is, therefore, the preferred term in working with transgender people.69 There are no probability studies of transgender people reported in the literature and no effort underway to develop measures for inclusion in Federal surveys. Some psychiatric literature estimates that 1 percent of the population may have had a transgender experience, but this Healthy People 2010:Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 15 Introduction estimate is based only on transgender people who might have sought mental health services.70 Approximately 25,000 U.S. citizens have undergone sex reassignment surgery. An estimated 60,000 consider themselves candidates for such surgery, and the doctors who perform such surgeries report long waiting lists.71, 72 Transgender people exhibit the full range of sexual orientations, from homosexual to bisexual and heterosexual.73 LGBT people face many of the same issues all people face as they progress through life. As people, our commonality is linked by our experiences with the “problems of living”—those events, occurring during life, either expected or unexpected, which, in the absence of sufficient ability to cope, may lead to deleterious behaviors.74 However, LGBT youth may have the most difficult life cycle issues. Most youth feel awkward and embarrassed by sexual conflicts. But, LGBT youth have an even more difficult time as such youth are not recognized as even existing within U.S. society, for sexual orientation is assumed heterosexual unless adults choose differently. Although “coming out” or sexual identity formation can occur in adulthood, the awareness of being different (i.e., not heterosexual) usually occurs during childhood. However, children who disclose to their family that they are LGBT risk rejection, ostracism, and possibly harm from the one societal unit always expected to give unconditional care, love, and support. The other traditional adolescent support systems—such as schools, faith organizations, and peer groups—may have similar negative reactions. Homophobia is also viewed as a “family value” prejudice.75 As adolescents struggle to reconcile societal myths and misconceptions about LGBT people, with a growing sense of dread that they, too, might be LGBT, these internalized feelings of stigma and self-hatred increase existing vulnerabilities, affect self-esteem, and, for many such youth, restrict life choices.76 Some youth use alcohol, drugs, food, sex, or work as vehicles for dissociating from the painful realities of living in a homophobic society. Dissociation, by whatever manner it is manifested, enables survival. Negotiating the “coming-out” process may be particularly challenging for racial and ethnic LGBT people, who must integrate their sexual orientation or gender identity with their racial or ethnic self when confronted with societal homophobia and racism.77 Given that few surveys document or describe LGBT populations in the United States, there is little evidence as to the racial, ethnic, socioeconomic, and educational composite variables. The Voter News Service’s lesbian, gay, and bisexual samples provide evidence that racial diversity is comparable to the Voter News Service’s heterosexual samples.78 Little research has been done on the interactions among racial/ethnic diversity and sexual orientation or gender identity. Some researchers, health care providers, advocates, and writers have discussed specific cultural variables within the context of being LGBT.79, 80, 81, 82, 83 The multiple dimensions of culture can come into play as an LGBT individual may have a stronger connection to his or her racial or ethnic group than to the LGBT community, or the dominant allegiance may be to the LGBT community (sometimes referred to as “gay culture”), or there may be multiple permutations if the LGBT individual is partnered with someone of a different racial or ethnic group. 16 Healthy People 2010:Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health Introduction Gay culture is different in the degree to which it is submerged within other cultures as well as in the way that these cultures intersect. LGBT people’s behavior is still stigmatized, and because there is usually no way to identify LGBT people apart from their own disclosure or identification with gay culture, gay culture is essentially hidden in the larger culture. The LGBT culture is one that is not developed, taught, or transmitted by people’s legally defined families. Although history indicates homosexuality has existed throughout the ages and in many different cultures, gay culture as it is known today started in 1969, when the New York City police raided a popular gay bar, the Stonewall Inn. Although raiding gay bars was a common practice, that night in New York, the raid erupted into a violent protest as the crowd fought back. The protests that followed, known as the Stonewall Riots, gave birth to the gay rights movement and the celebration of being gay.84 Like all cultures, the gay culture or the world in which LGBT people live has its specific values, beliefs, traditions, language, nonverbal behavior, and learning styles.85, 86, 87 In addition, these norms or morés are affected by race/ethnicity, age, geography, socioeconomic status, religion, and education. Neither the Introduction nor this Healthy People 2010 Companion Document can discuss in detail all nuances or facets of LGBT people. There are organizations and groups within the LGBT community that represent every conceivable segment of the community. (See Appendix D: Resources for a list of many of these organizations.) Many of the developmental issues that LGBT adults face are the same as those faced by heterosexual adults: entering the workforce, finding a partner and developing a satisfying relationship, deciding where to live and buying a home, deciding whether to have children, becoming a parent, and negotiating the aging process. Many LGBT people consider becoming part of a couple an important part of life. Although there are no legal sanctions for such relationships, except the civil commitment available in Vermont, the majority of LGBT people are in relationships, and many are as committed as traditional heterosexual couples.88 Deciding where to live is dependent upon many variables, such as job availability, cost of living, and quality of life. Using the 1990 census, Black and associates (2000) provide the first systematic evidence of the distribution of same-sex partners in large U.S. urban areas.89 From their research, 50 cities with a population of at least 700,000 people were ranked. The top five cities for gay couples were San Francisco, District of Columbia, Austin, San Diego, and Seattle. The top five cities for lesbian couples were San Francisco, Austin, Sacramento, Seattle, and Minneapolis-St. Paul. Despite the perception, not all LGBT people live in urban areas. In fact, for some LGBT people, living in rural areas is their preference. (For more information, see www.ruralgay.com.) Despite the fondness that some LGBT people have for rustic, bucolic locales, safety is a ubiquitous concern.90 Deciding whether or not to have children is an important and sometimes difficult decision for all women, whether lesbian, bisexual, or heterosexual. However, LGBT parents must cope with the very real fear that they will lose their children in custody battles or other legal situations.91 Lesbians and gay men are often denied custody of and visitation with their biological children and denied the opportunity to adopt or become foster parents.92, 93 Healthy People 2010:Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 17 Introduction Lesbians and other unmarried women are still sometimes refused donor insemination services.94 An important LGBT subgroup to consider within the developmental life span is LGBT elders. For all the same reasons as the previous groups, the exact number of LGBT elders is unavailable.95 According to Herdt and associates (1997), there are several generational cohorts identified for gay elders:96 Pre- and post-World War II McCarthy witch-hunt era, arrests, and blackmail Pre- and post-Stonewall generations Pre- and post-advent of AIDS Sexual and lifestyle development and sexual orientation-related identity formation in older LGBT individuals are the two major issues of importance. As Kimmel (1993) points out in his research, there is a large continuum of behaviors with many people falling somewhere within the gradient.97 Six social-sexual patterns that many gay people experience during their lifetime are identified. These social-sexual patterns, through which many gay people migrate at varying lengths of time, include the following: Heterosexual marriage with or without periodic homosexual relations, following or followed by a gay lifestyle Celibacy with a homosexual affectionate orientation Raising children, including adopted children Long-term gay friend/lover relationship(s) Gay lifestyle with no long-term sexual relationships Bisexual lifestyle without marriage Friend (1989) developed a model of lesbian and gay identity formation, which is used in many research studies in an attempt to explain the intense diversity in the lives of many older LGBT individuals.98 Heterosexism is defined as the belief that every individual should be heterosexual and that homosexuality is negative and threatening to society. Older LGBT people are divided into three groups. Stereotypic older LGBT people are identified as people who conform to many of the heterosexist assumptions of what it means to be older and gay (e.g., loneliness, depression, and isolation). Many of the people who fit into this category experience extreme internalized homophobia. 18 Healthy People 2010:Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health Introduction Passing older LGBT individuals fall within the midrange of this model’s continuum. These individuals typically suffer some internalized homophobia and do not challenge the heterosexist belief system. They place intense effort and energy into passing as heterosexual. Passing individuals accept some “aspects of homosexuality while still believing that heterosexuality is inherently better or superior to homosexuality.” Affirmative older LGBT people are the individuals who are most likely to participate in research studies. They tend to be psychologically well adjusted, aging well, and active in many social settings. Many affirming individuals attempt to destruct heterosexual assumptions and views and have a great acceptance of their homosexuality. They exhibit positive values and beliefs that affirm homosexuality. The elder LGBT community, similar to the general elderly U.S. population, depends heavily upon Government programs such as Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid. Currently, many persons living with HIV/AIDS receive health care benefits via Medicaid. This program will certainly experience an unbearable strain as new, effective AIDS medications increase a person’s life span, thereby increasing the number of elderly.99 Conclusion of the Companion Document for LGBT Health The limited nature of research about LGBT populations makes it difficult to document and prioritize their health needs. Although numerous studies have been conducted with certain health conditions, notably for HIV in gay men and breast cancer in lesbians, in most other areas data are seriously lacking and, as noted previously for transgender individuals, very few studies have been attempted. Although LGBT people in general have the same basic health needs as do all other people, they also have health needs associated with being LGBT. For example, all individuals should receive recommended early childhood immunizations, but young adult and adult LGBT individuals, due to an identified higher risk, also should be routinely immunized for hepatitis A, hepatitis B, and influenza. Older LGBT persons at high risk should be immunized for pneumonia. Each focus area highlights the health needs associated with LGBT people or infers from the literature, especially literature applicable to racial and ethnic minorities, that being both LGBT and non-White increases the probability of health disparities. The Healthy People 2010 Companion Document for LGBT Health is designed to provide a context for educating all possible readers and for addressing the personal and systemic challenges that must be overcome if persons defined by sexual orientation or gender identity are to be fully understood and their needs met within the health care system. People in health care represent different disciplines, different occupations, and different institutional affiliations. All are interested in people and health, but unless there is an understanding of who people are, then the collective interest can easily be dissipated by individual differences. An operational context must be developed for that which encompasses our differences, integrates them, and permits us to realize that the power of a group or a Healthy People 2010:Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health 19 Introduction community to impact health is greater than the sum of its parts. This Companion Document can serve as the operational context. Healthy People 2010 has provided a framework for national, State, and local health agencies and nongovernmental organizations to assess health status, health behaviors, and services and to plan and evaluate health promotion programs.100, 101 The national Healthy People initiatives have served as a “menu” for identifying State and local priorities as well as selecting objectives that are most relevant to specific States, communities, specific settings (e.g., schools, the worksite), and health care delivery systems.102, 103 By using the national Healthy People initiative as a common point of departure, agencies and organizations have tailored programs targeted toward their customers, yet retained a common basis for evaluating performance in relation to the Nation, other States, or populations.104 This focus on performance has prompted State and local health agencies to shift from their emphasis of primarily providing services to one that conducts needs assessment and quality assurance.105, 106 This shift has required increased collection and analysis of data. Health care delivery organizations also have experienced this shift and have increased efforts to collect standardized data on patients, services, and outcomes.107 The increased emphasis on data collection and analysis for purposes of assessment and evaluation has increased the need to address the associated issues of data availability, validity/reliability, comparability, and utilization. The Healthy People “menu” provides a useful way for States and localities to focus on serious health issues, but many agencies, organizations, and communities have tailored the objectives to better focus on specific concerns of their constituents. To leverage resources, LGBT organizations are encouraged to seek out partnering or collaborative efforts with other health-focused organizations. Community coalitions or partnerships, particularly when they reach out to nontraditional partners, can be among the most effective tools for improving health in communities. They may be even more effective for populations in disparity in the receipt of needed services. LGBT people also can use a community-driven process to develop benchmarks and monitor the progress of this Companion Document. A three-tiered health surveillance system —local, State, and national—can be established for LGBT health. The purpose of this surveillance system at the community, State, and Federal levels would be to ascertain whether the disparities of LGBT people are being reduced and the health of LGBT people is improving. One model for such a surveillance system has been in continuous operation since 1976 under the auspices of the National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA). Although this particular surveillance system focuses only on substance abuse, the model may be replicable for all focus areas covered in this document. The NIDA surveillance system, known as the Community Epidemiology Work Group, meets semiannually throughout the country to review current and emerging substance abuse patterns, as well as HIV/AIDS data, that are collected by community and State representatives. This information is distributed to prevention, treatment, public health officials, researchers, and policymakers. There are comparable meetings in some States. 20 Healthy People 2010:Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health Introduction For example, the Texas Epidemiology Work Group has also met on a semiannual basis for almost two decades, sharing its information to all interested parties in that State. The prototype for the third tier, the community level, is Miami, where representatives from diverse different community agencies meet on the same semiannual basis. For Additional Information About the Companion Document To obtain more information about this Companion Document, visit the Web sites of the Gay and Lesbian Medical Association (www.glma.org) and the National Coalition for LGBT Health (www.lgbthealth.net). The document is available in an Adobe® Portable Document Format (PDF) for electronic distribution worldwide. R e f e re n c e s 1 Solarz, A.L., ed., Institute of Medicine. Lesbian Health: Current Assessment and Directions for the Future. Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1999. 2 Dean, L., et al. Lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender health: Findings and concerns. Journal of the Gay and Lesbian Medical Association 4(3):101-151, 2000. 3 Ryan, C., and Futterman, D. Lesbian and Gay Youth: Care and Counseling. New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1998. 4 Los Angeles Gay and Lesbian Center. Advancing Gay and Lesbian Health: A Report from the Gay and Lesbian Health Roundtable, January 2000. 5 Sell, R.L. Defining and measuring sexual orientation: A review. Archives of Sexual Behavior 26(6):643-658, 1997. 6 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS). Tracking Healthy People 2010. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office (GPO), November 2000. 7 Kennedy, N.J. Behavioral medicine: The cost-effectiveness of primary prevention. In: Gullotta, T.P.; Hampton, R.L.; Adams, G.R.; Ryan, B.A.; and Weissberg, R.P., eds. Children’s Health Care: Issues for the Year 2000 and Beyond. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1999, 229-282. 8 Pillard, R. The causes of homosexuality are probably genetic. In: Williams, M.E., ed. Homosexuality: Opposing Viewpoints. San Diego, CA: Greenhaven Press, 1999, 27-34. 9 Williams, T.J.; Pepitone, M.E.; Christensen, S.C.; et al. Finger-length ratios and sexual orientation. Nature 404:455-456, March 30, 2000. 10 Bailey, J.M.; Nothnagel, J.; and Wolfe, M. Retrospectively measured individual differences in childhood sex-typed behavior among gay men: Correspondence between self- and maternal reports. Archives of Sexual Behavior 24:613-622, 1995. 11 Miller, E.M. Homosexuality, birth order, and evolution: Toward an equilibrium reproductive economics of homosexuality. Archives of Sexual Behavior 29(1):1-34, Feb 2000. 12 Kennedy, 1999. 13 Ibid. 14 Denham, J. The Role of Medicine in Health Promotion . Chapel Hill, NC: Health Sciences Consortium, 1978. Healthy People 2010:Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 21 Introduction 15 Illinois Family Institute and C. Thomas. The causes of homosexuality are probably environmental. In: Williams, M.E., ed. Homosexuality: Opposing Viewpoints. San Diego, CA: Greenhaven Press, 1999, 35-41. 16 Friedman, R., and Downey, J. Neurobiology and sexual orientation: Current relationships. Journal of Neuropsychiatry (5):2, Spring l993. 17 Brelis, M. 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Saunders, 1953. 61 Laumann, E.O.; Gagnon, J.H.; Michael, R.T.; and Michaels, S. The Social Organization of Sexuality: Sexual Practices in the United States . Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1994. Healthy People 2010:Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 23 Introduction 62 Michaels, S. The prevalence of homosexuality in the United States. In: Cabaj, R.P., and Stein, T.S., eds. Textbook of Homosexuality and Mental Health. Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Press, 1996, 43-63. 63 Cook, C., and Fields, J. Evaluation of Relationship, Marital Status, and Grandparents Items in the Census 2000 Dress Rehearsal. Population Division Working Paper No. 33. Washington, DC: U.S. Census Bureau, April 1999. 64 McVinney, D. Clinical issues with bisexuals. In: SAMHSA, CSAT. A Provider’s Introduction to Substance Abuse Treatment for Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Individuals. DHHS Pub. No. (SMA) 01-3498. Rockville, MD: DHHS, SAMHSA, CSAT, 2001, 87-90. 65 Cass, V. Sexual orientation identity formation: A Western phenomenon. In: Cabaj, R.P., and Stein, T.S., eds. Textbook of Homosexuality and Mental Health. Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Press, 1996, 227-251. 66 McVinney, 2001. 67 Fox, R.C. Bisexuality: An examination of theory and research. In: Cabaj, R.P., and Stein, T.S., eds. Textbook of Homosexuality and Mental Health. Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Press, 1996, 154. 68 Tewksbury, R., and Gagne, P. Transgenderists: Products of non-normative intersection of sex, gender, and sexuality. Journal of Men’s Studies 5:105-129, 1996. 69 Leslie, D.R.; Perina, B.A.; and Maqueda, M.C. Clinical issues with transgender individuals. In: SAMHSA, CSAT. A Provider’s Introduction to Substance Abuse Treatment for Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Individuals. DHHS Pub. No. (SMA) 01-3498. Rockville, MD: DHHS, SAMHSA, CSAT, 91-98, 2001. 70 Seil, D. Transsexuals: The boundaries of sexual identity and gender, 1996. In: Cabaj, R.P., and Stein, T.S., eds. Textbook of Homosexuality and Mental Health. Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Press, 1996, 743- 762. 71 Goldberg, C. Shunning “he” and “she,” they fight for respect. New York Times September 8, 1996, 10. 72 Cloud, J. Trans across America: Watch out, Pat Buchanan. Ridiculed for years, ‘transgenders’ are emerging as the newest group to demand equality. Time Magazine July 20, 1998, 48. 73 Green, J. Introduction to transgender issues. In: Currah, P., and Minter, S. Transgender Equality: A Handbook for Activists and Policymakers. New York, NY: Policy Institute of the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force and National Center for Lesbian Rights, 2000, 7. 74 Leopold, J.; Igou, V.; and Kennedy, N.J. A Volunteer Educator for Mental Health, Workbook. Baltimore, MD: Mental Health Association of Maryland, 1975. 75 The Public Forum. Homophobia: Analysis of a “Permissible” Prejudice. 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In: Garnets, L.F., and Kimmell, D.C., eds. Psychological Perspectives on Lesbian and Gay Male Experiences. New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1993, 517-534. 98 Friend, R.A. Older lesbian and gay people: Responding to homophobia. Marriage and Family Review 14(3- 4):241-263, 1989. 99 Maxwell, C. Unpublished document on aging issues, November 19, 2000. 100 Kuzma, J.W. Basic Statistics for the Health Sciences. Loma Linda University, CA: Mayfield Publishing Co., 1984. 101 NCHS. Vital Statistics of the United States. Vol. I, Natality and Vol. II, Mortality . Washington, DC: U.S. Public Health Service, annual. 102 DHHS. Healthy People 2010, 2nd Ed. Understanding and Improving Health and Objectives for Improving Health (2 vols.). Washington, DC: GPO, November 2000. Healthy People 2010:Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 25 Introduction 103 Maurer, K.R. Plan and operation of the Hispanic Health and Nutrition Examination Survey, 1982-1984. Vital and Health Statistics 1(19), 1985. 104 NCHS. Plan and operation of the Hispanic Health and Nutrition Examination Survey, 1988-1994. Vital and Health Statistics 1(32), 1994. 105 Ezzati, T.M. Sample design: Third National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey. Vital and Health Statistics 2(113), 1992. 106 Wakesburg, J.; Sperry, S.; Judkins, D.; and Smith, V. National Survey of Family Growth, cycle IV, evaluation of linked design. Vital and Health Statistics 2(117), 1993. 107 Judkins, D.R.; Mosher, W.D.; and Botman, S. National Survey of Family Growth, Cycle IV, Evaluation of linked design. Vital and Health Statistics 2(109), 1993. 26 Healthy People 2010:Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health Access to Quality Health Serv i c e s Healthy People 2010 Goal Improve access to comprehensive, high-quality health care services. O v e rv i e w Access to quality health care and related services is important in order to eliminate health disparities and increase the quality and years of healthy life for all persons in the United States. This chapter focuses on eliminating barriers and increasing access to appropriate, needed health care for lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) populations. For example, a significant barrier to LGBT people accessing needed care is the lack of provider LGBT competency and the discrimination toward people of other sexual orientation or gender identity that frequently is encountered in the health care system. These and other adverse barriers may lead to delays in seeking care or an avoidance of preventive and treatment services. As LGBT people also represent diversity relative to race, ethnicity, socioeconomic status, disability, and other characteristics, their barriers may be compounded by the barriers experienced by people who are members of those other underserved populations with health disparities. To better understand access to services and the factors that impact access, four care components of the American health care system—clinical preventive care, primary care, emergency services, and long-term and rehabilitative care are highlighted. In addition, the structural, personal, and provider barriers that LGBT populations experience in different health care settings are discussed along with current studies and research. Issues and Tre n d s Major changes taking place in the U.S. health care system, including the increasing influence of market forces, changes in payment and delivery systems, and welfare reform, have significant implications for vulnerable and at-risk populations. As system changes negatively affect the numbers of the health work force and the availability of needed services, Federal, State, and local public health agencies must increase their efforts to identify and eliminate barriers to care, encourage more individuals of minority populations to enter health professions careers, strengthen the existing infrastructure of services at the Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health 27 Access to Quality Health Services community level, and actively target reducing disparities for vulnerable, unserved and underserved populations. It is increasingly important that unbiased health care communication and the appropriate, needed primary care and preventive services be provided to all people in a culturally sensitive and linguistically accessible manner. Managed care has recharged consumerism and is making the health care delivery system increasingly aware that it must provide access to quality health and related services to a multicultural enrollee population. Access to high-quality health care in each of the health care settings in the continuum of care must be improved in order to realize the full potential of preventive health care. Managed care, the prevailing approach to managing costs and the delivery of services in the American health care system, is influenced by many variables, including social and cultural factors. However, with few exceptions, the culture of LGBT individuals is unknown to the majority of health professionals who work in managed care settings. Few LGBT health care consumers or organizations have openly voiced the specific needs and concerns of this multicultural group. Much of this silence is a reaction to prevailing or residual homophobic behavior. For example, how is an African American lesbian, who is quadriplegic and in a monogamous long-term relationship of over 25 years, categorized in the health care arena? Frequently, race and ethnic categorization is made by the provider through visual assessment, and assumed responses are filed on intake forms: African American and quadriplegic. The dangers of assumption are well documented and, in this case, would eliminate two critical facets of this woman’s identity—her sexual orientation and her commitment or relational status. LGBT individuals, especially non-white, are “hidden.” They lose the critical potential for empowerment and an ability to participate in the design of services and policies that may improve their access to appropriate health care. There exists no national survey that provides accurate figures documenting the size of the sexually diverse population. With sanctions against same-sex activity in 20 States and widespread discrimination directed at people who have revealed their identity, many sexually diverse individuals feel that “coming out” is dangerous—even coming out to health care providers. LGBT consumers, clients or patients, as well as health care advocates, are breaking their silence. The prevalence of behavioral problems within the gay community is too devastating to maintain silence. The gay community needs to avoid adversarial relationships with managed care plans and providers working in managed care settings, and build bridges so that the continuum of care is available within the private as well as the public sector. It is almost impossible for LGBT and questioning youth not to experience feelings of self- hatred, depression, and anxiety as a result of being raised in a society with a significant number of people who continue to condemn and reject homosexuality. Children who admit their homosexuality to their family risk ostracism and non-existence from the one, basic societal unit expected to give unconditional care, love, and support. Many gay youth use alcohol, drugs, food, sex, and/or work as vehicles for dissociating from the painful realities 28 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health Access to Quality Health Services of living in a society with a strong homophobic element. The unfortunate consequences of homophobic attitudes and actions can result in devastating outcomes, including human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) and acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS), addictive disease, stress-related disorders, depression, and suicide. Thus, being served by a continuum of care ranging from preventive services to identification of risk conditions or disease, treatment, referral or rehabilitation or maintenance is essential for a group that has an increased probability of risk for developing chronic and costly conditions. In addition to the possibility of reducing costs associated with many preventable conditions, managed care organizations derive another benefit. Professional guidelines, consumer report cards, and accrediting organizations are mechanisms in place to ensure access to culturally competent health care services. Attention or inattention to cultural issues impact both service delivery and service utilization which, in turn, affect not just access but also quality, utilization, and costs. Clinical preventive care. Clinical preventive services have a substantial impact on many of the leading causes of disease and death. People must have access to clinical preventive services that are effective in preventing disease or in detecting asymptomatic disease or risk factors at early, treatable stages. The National Health Interview Survey (NHIS) reports that 69 percent of children aged 5 to 16 years had a physical examination once at ages 5 and 6 and once every 2 years from ages 7 to 16. The percentage was lower for children with family incomes below the poverty level (62 percent) but higher for children with Medicaid (83 percent).1 Improving access to appropriate preventive care requires addressing many barriers, including those that involve the patient, the provider, and the system of care.2, 3 Use of preventive health services is a critical problem among school-aged children in families living below the poverty level.4 In Medicaid’s Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnostic, and Treatment (EPSDT) program, States are required to provide or arrange for “comprehensive, periodic assessments of the physical and mental health and followup services for Medicaid-eligible children under age 21 and to diagnose and treat any problems discovered as part of the screening process.” Pediatricians and primary care providers (PCPs) are often the first health care professionals to be consulted or present when physical, behavioral and/or emotional problems are manifested. Understanding the semantics of service delivery models is critical in overcoming barriers to accessing preventive health services. As frequently as the public health model is expounded (See Public Health Infrastructure focus area), misunderstanding of the model continues. A model that would be applicable for both the business orientation of the health care system and also the altruism of providers working to improve health and empower people is needed. The model that may enable such a system is the framework proposed by the Institute of Medicines (IOM). 5 It is referred to as either “ the IOM model” or the “continuum of care model.” (See Figure 1.) Prevention, treatment, and maintenance activities are clearly delineated as a continuum, with all parts interconnected. The relationship among prevention, treatment, and maintenance is displayed visually to better define and understand the semantics. With the continuum of care model, prevention, Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 29 Access to Quality Health Services 30 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health Access to Quality Health Services including clinical preventive services, has three components that more finitely describe the interventions appropriate for designated populations, such as LGBT people, and/or individuals. Universal prevention. Not dissimilar to what is called primary prevention in the public health model, targets either the entire population or a designated segment of the population, such as adolescents, women, or LGBT people. In terms of probability (not as a negative label), everyone in the designated population shares the same general risks of disease occurrence, although the magnitude of risk may vary among individual members of the population. Universal prevention is not new, it provides a means by which to increase health and wellness by providing basic health promotion information and the skills necessary to avoid behaviors that may be deleterious. For example, all LGBT people can benefit from learning about the dangers of tobacco. Selective preventive interventions. Used for specific subgroups of the general population whose risk or probability of a disorder, disease, or behavioral occurrence is significantly higher than average, either approaching (because of an expected life event) or over a lifetime (because of some biological or environmental factor). In keeping with the public health orientation, and in contrast to the medical model, the entire subgroup of individuals receives the selective preventive intervention. As the entire subgroup receives the intervention, it is not necessary to assess or identify a specific individual’s magnitude of risk. Belonging to the subgroup presumes each person in that subgroup has the same risk of particular diseases, disorders, or problematic behaviors. The purpose of selective preventive interventions is to deter the onset of a diagnosable disorder either by reducing those risk factors amenable to change and/or strengthening those protective or resiliency factors to cope with risk factors not amenable to change. Tapping resiliency can “ignite innate potential for full and healthy development.” 6 An example of a selective preventive intervention is having adolescents, whose parents are substance abusers, attend a Family Strengthening program.7 Indicated preventive strategies. Services that involve high-risk individuals who have minimal or detectable signs or symptoms foreshadowing a diagnosable disease or disorder. Although indicated preventive interventions are appropriate for all high-risk individuals regardless of age, gender, or other variables, infancy, childhood, and adolescence are critical periods for intervention. 8 Adolescence is the time when the inevitable trajectory of socioeconomic status, probability the most consistent predictor of morbidity and mortality, can be most modified because of school attendance and other intervening factors.9 Youth questioning their sexual orientation or gender identity may require an indicated preventive strategy so as to avoid deleterious manifestations that might result in serious consequences. Primary care. The provision of integrated, accessible health care services by clinicians who are accountable for addressing a large majority of personal health care needs, developing a sustained partnership with patients, and practicing in the context of family and community.10 According to an IOM report on access, the definition used for access is “ the Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health 31 Access to Quality Health Services timely receipt of appropriate care.” 11 Access to primary care across the Nation depends in part on ensuring that people have a usual source of appropriate care. Having a primary care provider as the usual source of care is especially important because of the known benefits of primary care.12, 13, 14 These benefits include the provision of most of the prevention and treatment services within the continuum of care selected for the Access to Quality Health Services focus area of Healthy People 2010. Primary care providers commonly are the gatekeepers in the managed care system; that is to say, primary care services should meet the health needs of most people and the primary care provider is the entry point into the medical care system through referral for other or specialized care. PCPs include physicians, nurse practitioners, physician assistants, and several other professional groups recognized by accrediting organizations.15 Secondary medical care services require a certain degree of sophistication, additional, or focused training, and are considered specialized resources. As this is a three-tiered model, the degree of sophistication is greater than primary but less than tertiary. Secondary care usually takes place after a diagnosis is made and the patient’s illness or disorder requires the services of a specialist or other specialized care. Tertiary medical care services are services that, due to the degree of sophistication of the resources to provide them and because of the low frequency with which they are needed, should be centralized and grouped within units emphasizing efficiency, effectiveness, and continuity. One of the best examples of tertiary medical care services is a shock trauma unit. Consumers and their families are the primary caregivers in chronic illness.16, 17, 18 Because of the nature of chronic disorders or illnesses that predominate within the United States, traditional medical interventions are not sufficient. Managed care may be an opportunity yet to be realized. Health care providers can be effective change agents because of the importance of behavioral factors in the development of chronic disorders and/or the building of collaborative community relationships to maintain or improve health or well- being. This is especially important for LGBT people, many of whom identify with an LGBT community. Behavioral problems commonly have their roots in the community; likewise, the community is the repository of solutions.19 A vital function of health care providers, especially physicians, is to teach individuals when and how to use self-care. The Latin word for doctor translates as “ teacher.” 20 However, few physicians demonstrate the ability to teach disease prevention and health promotion.21 This limitation of physicians (or imposed on physicians) diminishes hope that consumers can control their environments.22 Considering that 25 percent of physician office visits are for problems that consumers could treat themselves,23 managed care organizations need to urge their physicians and professional staff to teach self-care. In addition to reducing inappropriate utilization of the medical care system, the result of appropriate health education is an increase in the individual’s self-confidence and self-empowerment. Emergency services. Prehospital emergency medical services (EMS), poison control centers (PCCs), and hospital-based emergency departments (EDs) are the most commonly sought sources of emergency care. Each year, they provide prompt first-contact care for millions of 32 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health Access to Quality Health Services people regardless of their socioeconomic status, age, or special needs. For many severely ill and injured persons, these settings are a crucial link in the chain of survival between the onset of symptoms and treatment in a hospital. For persons whose health problems are less pressing, but who believe they need urgent medical attention, emergency services are a gateway to additional health care. Some patients identify the emergency department as their regular source of care, 24 but this cannot be considered primary care, and as a regular source of care it may not be appropriate to their needs.25 Emergency medical personnel and other health care professionals in the emergency room also are an important contact point for addressing other medical, mental health, behavioral problems, and needed social interventions. For example, in dealing with victims of domestic violence, and timely identification and intervention on the part of the emergency medical personnel can save lives. Overall, upwards of 35 percent of all emergency room visits by women are the result of domestic violence, whether due to acute injury, problems during pregnancy, or stress-related complaints.26 Unfortunately, domestic abuse frequently is not disclosed voluntarily by the patient, and may go overlooked by the attending provider. A recent 1999 study examined the health problems and utilization patterns of homeless individuals seeking medical services in a small, southern community.27 Results showed that the medical problems for which the homeless sought treatment were often (73 percent) a reoccurring problem for which treatment had been previously received. The most prevalent medical problem was upper respiratory infection (47 percent), likely exacerbated by the high rate (73 percent) of cigarette smoking found among the sample. More than half (51 percent) of the participants had used other medical services in the past month. Despite these high rates of utilization, the homeless may be underutilizing appropriate preventive medical services, waiting until the medical problem becomes serious before seeking treatment, and, thereby, overutilizing emergency rooms for non-emergency care. In addition to emergency room services, there are other components of emergency services. Since 1953, poison centers have been making a positive contribution to public health in the United States. The goal of poison centers is to reduce morbidity and mortality due to poisoning. Poison center personnel include medical toxicologists, clinical toxicologists, and specialists in poison information. Services include: Emergency telephone treatment recommendations for all types of poisonings, chemical exposures, and drug overdoses Telephone followup for hospitalized and nonhospitalized patients to assess progress and recommend additional treatment as necessary Research and surveillance of human poison exposures Community education in poison prevention Education in the recognition and management of poisonings for health care providers Training of future toxicologists Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health 33 Access to Quality Health Services In 1998, the American Association of Poison Control Centers (AAPCC) reported more than 2.3 million human poison exposures. The AAPCC Web site (www.aapcc.org) lists the certified poison control centers in each State. The primary goal of the voluntary certification process is to ensure that all residents of a given geographic area have access to the highest quality of certified poison center services. It has been shown that poison centers reduce health care expenditures. Despite the fact that poison centers save lives and decrease health care costs, poison center services throughout the United States appear to be eroding due to inadequate funding. Funding cutbacks have resulted in reduction or elimination of community poison prevention education, reduced areas of service, reduced areas of service, reduced toll-free access, delayed acquisition of current references, and reduced training programs for future toxicologists. In some areas of the country, poison control center funding has been totally eliminated. Data show that, by the end of 1993, only 54 percent of the U.S. population had access to a certified regional poison control center. The National Association of Emergency Medical Technicians (NAEMT), founded in 1975 with support from the National Registry of EMTs and numerous leaders in emergency medicine, serves as the national voice for prehospital emergency health care professionals. The NAEMT’s prime mission is to promote the professional status of the EMT, paramedic, EMS educator, and EMS administrator. NAEMT also encourages the development of national standards and accreditation of EMS education, develops continuing education programs for members and non-members, supports legislative initiatives, and produces career information for the public and EMS community. NAEMT has developed ongoing liaison relationships with close to 30 federal agencies and professional organizations serving the emergency/trauma medicine and public safety community, including the American College of Emergency Physicians, National Registry of EMTs, Commission on Accreditation of ambulance Services, Emergency Nurse’s Association, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency. More information on NAEMT can be found online at www.naemt.org. The National Association of State Emergency Medical Services Directors (NASEMSD) was formed in 1980 as the lead national organization for EMS. The goals of NASEMSD are: To promote the orderly development of coordinated EMS systems across the nation To promote uniformly high quality care of acutely ill and injured patients To provide a forum for the exchange of information and the discussion of common concerns among State EMS directors To facilitate interstate cooperation in such areas as patient transfer, communications and reciprocity of EMS personnel To disseminate pertinent information to our membership and others To maintain ongoing and effective liaison with State and national governments, professional organizations, and other appropriate public and private entities 34 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health Access to Quality Health Services To improve the quality and efficiency of State EMS program administration To enhance the professional knowledge, skill and abilities of State EMS directors and staff To encourage research and evaluation in all areas of EMS To serve as a permanent national advocacy group for EMS The NASEMSD has posted an October 14, 2000 draft of a National EMS Information System on its Web site (www.nasemsd.org). The document states that “ There is no central database, at a national level for example, that relates to the current practice of EMS. The data required to completely describe an EMS event exists in separate disparate locations. These include EMS agencies, emergency departments, hospital medical records, other public safety agencies and vital statistics offices. In most cases, meaningful linkages between such sites are non-existent.” The plans for establishing a National database are well articulated within the document posted. Long-term care and rehabilitative services. People with physical or mental conditions that limit their capacity for self-care need long-term care and rehabilitative services. (See Figure 1 for the maintenance components of the continuum of care.) This population includes people of all ages, from those who were born with physical or mental limitations or who developed such limitations later on in life, including those injured at any age, to those with diminishing functioning at older ages.28 About 40 percent of the people in this population are under age 65 years.29 The long-term care population includes individuals who need help or supervision to perform activities of daily living or instrumental activities of daily living. The goals of long-term care services are to improve functioning, maintain existing functioning, or slow the deterioration in functioning while delivering care in the least restrictive environment. Rehabilitative services, a critical component of long-term care, strive to return individuals to their optimal level of functioning. The importance of long-term care is growing as the number of elderly, especially the very old, increases. Providing the long-term care services needed, now and in the future, presents difficult issues and challenges for coordinating care, for long term care extends well beyond the provision of personal health services to encompass issues of housing, nutrition, assistance in the activities of daily living, social services, transportation, and the roles of voluntary caregivers.30 As with many preventive screening services and interventions, rehabilitation and long-term care are encumbered by a lack of policies ensuring reimbursement for such services. The role of primary care in the provision of long-term services is similarly impacted by the same issues. Nearly all persons who receive long-term care services are high utilizers of medical services, including primary care. Thus, access to appropriate caregivers is a critical issue. Family, friends, and community-based organizations work to fill the gap and provide many long-term care services. Some avenues for improvement and some care models show a promise of better integration of services. Demonstration programs such as the Social Health Maintenance Organizations Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 35 Access to Quality Health Services (S/HMO), the program for the All-Inclusive Care of the Elderly (PACE program), and others, pool Medicare, Medicaid, and private funding sources to provide a coordinated approach to care that includes medical services.31 Opportunities for coordination seem more likely in integrated health care systems that encompass community-oriented primary care. 36 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health Access to Quality Health Services Health insurance. Another significant measure of access is the proportion of people who have health insurance. Although most people assume that health insurance is an automatic benefit associated with employment, the beginning of financing health care costs originated in 1929 with the establishment of the forerunner of the Blue Cross Insurance Company.32 In 1943, approximately 19 percent of the civilian population had protection for hospitalization.33 In 1999, for the first time since at least 1987, the percentage of U.S. citizens with health insurance increased, and 82.5 percent of persons under age 65 were covered by some form of health insurance.34 Significant numbers of privately insured persons, however, lack a usual source of care or report delays or difficulties in accessing needed care due to affordability or insurance problems.35 These individuals are considered to be “underinsured ” and frequently qualify for publicly-funded programs providing health care and related services. Managed care, in multiple forms, has replaced fee-for-service (FFS) as the dominant form of health insurance for the privately insured, largely as a cost management tool. The following table demonstrates the saturation of managed within the private sector. While those who were employed or could afford the out-of-pocket expense have fared well with the rise in medical coverage, the poor continued to fall mostly outside the insurance safety net. After lengthy national debate, Congress passed legislation in 1965 establishing the Medicare and Medicaid programs as Title XVIII and Title XIX, respectively, of the Social Security Act. Medicare was established as a health insurance program in response to the specific medical care needs of the elderly, while Medicaid was established in response to the widely perceived inadequacy of welfare medical care under public assistance. Together, Medicare and Medicaid financed $387 billion in health care services in 1998— about one-third of the country’s total health care bill and almost three-fourths of all public spending on health care. 36 Responsibility for administering Medicare and Medicare rests with the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) within the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS). The Medicare program provides reimbursement for health care services for 95 percent of the aged population in the United States. As Medicare costs have risen, federal policymakers have turned to managed care techniques as a means of controlling and managing those cost increases. Until implementation of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, health maintenance organizations continued to be the only managed care option available to Medicare beneficiaries. By the end of 1997, 13.5 percent of Medicare beneficiaries were enrolled in risk HMOs. 37 Medicaid is the source of reimbursement for health care services provided for more than 1 in 7 U.S. citizens, accounts for 15 percent of our Nation’s spending on health care, and is the major source of financial assistance to the States, accounting for 40 percent of all Federal grant-in-aid payments to States.38 From its roots as a program to help States cover their welfare populations, Medicaid has developed into a program that addresses the needs of uninsured low income families, the elderly (who meet the eligibility requirements), and those with chronic, disabling health conditions.39 Currently, Medicaid is the source of Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 37 Access to Quality Health Services coverage for one in five non-elderly persons with a specific, chronic disability who live in the community, and is the single largest source of public financing for HIV/AIDS-related care.40, 41 Faced with increases in the number of recipients and the costs of their care, State and federal Medicaid officials have increasingly turned to managed care (over the past decade largely through State Medicaid waivers), to control costs, estimating a 2 to 10 percent savings over FFS.42 Figure 3 illustrates the increase in Medicaid managed care. Medicaid also is part of the publicly funded financing system for the Nation’s safety net of clinics and hospitals that serve low income and uninsured populations. In addition to its rules that guarantee payment of clinic providers, Medicaid, through its disproportionate share hospital program, makes supplemental payments available to institutions that serve a large portion of low income and uninsured patients.43 Medicaid’s financing is crucial to ensuring the solvency of many of these providers, making up 41 percent of revenues for safety-net hospitals and 34 percent of revenues for community health centers.44, 45 Medicaid also is a key third-party resource to supplement funding for State public health efforts, such as tuberculosis control and family planning programs, as well as such Federal programs as the Ryan White Care Act.46 In 1997, Congress enacted the State Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) legislation of Title XXI of the Social Security Act. This legislation further expanded Medicaid to serve as a health insurance program distinct from welfare, providing funds for States to expand coverage to children in families whose income is up to at least 200 percent of the Federal poverty level.47 As of December 1999, nearly 2 million previously uninsured children were covered under SCHIP in addition to the 21 million children with Medicaid coverage.48 In providing States with the option of covering all children in families with incomes up to 200 percent of the poverty level (in many States, this limit is even higher), Medicaid in combination with SCHIP could extend health insurance to all low income children—an expansion that would cover 19 percent of the total uninsured population in the United States today.49 Although Medicaid and SCHIP have been instrumental in providing health insurance coverage, especially to low income children, and hold the promise of extending coverage in the future, the ability of the programs to reach their full potential is undermined by barriers in outreach and enrollment. 50 Nearly one-half of uninsured children are eligible for Medicaid or SCHIP, but are not enrolled.51 The implementation of welfare reform has created another set of issues in regard to States’ ability to broaden their Medicaid eligibility guidelines to cover more of the unserved, low income population. The welfare reform legislation of 1996 severed the automatic link between Medicaid and welfare eligibility, and has contributed to the apparent loss of Medicaid coverage for many low income adults and some of their children.52 Low income families moving from welfare to the workplace are still eligible for Medicaid, but many appear to lose their Medicaid benefits in the transition. Studies show that one year after 38 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health Access to Quality Health Services Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health 39 Access to Quality Health Services leaving welfare, 49 percent of females and 29 percent of children formerly covered by Medicaid were uninsured, largely as a result of confusion over eligibility rules and systems errors.53 This confusion has contributed to the recent declines in Medicaid enrollment and helped increase the number of uninsured U.S. citizens, despite what appears to be a robust economy. Among the 44 million uninsured people (18 percent of the population under age 65), more than one-half have incomes below 200 percent of the Federal poverty level, and nearly two- thirds of the low income uninsured are children and their parents.54 Eight in 10 of the uninsured are workers or their dependents.55 Predictably, the uninsured are more likely than the insured to lack a regular primary care provider and to postpone or forego needed care. They are less likely to receive preventive services—screens such as Pap tests, or counseling interventions such as smoking cessation. According to the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, the top uninsured principal diagnoses in U.S. hospitals are infants born in the hospital, pneumonia, alcohol-related mental disorders, depression, and substance-related mental disorders.56 Medicaid’s ability to reach and cover the uninsured is one of its persistent challenges. If Medicaid is to meet the challenge for which it was created, to provide needed health care services for an increasingly diverse population, there must be assurance that the health needs of the population it serves are met.57 Even in the public sector, Medicaid coverage for mental health and substance abuse treatment tends to be limited, thereby affecting access.58, 59 Measuring access to care is an extremely important area of concern for health care consumers, providers, planners, policymakers, and purchasers, both in the private and public sectors. No one technology exists to measure access as it is a multi-faceted or compound construct. It may be assessed in a variety of ways: access to providers, to initial and followup appointments, to providers of choice, at time of day of choice, satisfaction with services, and other circumstances. 60 The Healthy People 2010 Access to Quality Health Services focus area objectives measure access from several sentinel perspectives, but there are subtle areas which are, as yet, not well defined. Different population groups have different health problem profiles, may be differentially represented, and have different health care needs and issues related to access. Thus, access issues for LGBT people, as well as other underserved populations, may be different than those for heterosexual people. Quality improvement. Since the 1990s, increased attention has been paid at all levels of government and by the private sector to improving and measuring health care quality. Measurement of the quality of health care services is driven by different forces in the private and public sectors. In the private sector, quality measurement is a reflection of the requirements of the accreditation process and, increasingly, is also a response to the demands of employers and other purchasers through contracting, report cards, and other means.61 In the public sector, performance measure is the primary tool of accountability for spending public funds on health care.62, 63 40 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health Access to Quality Health Services The Foundation for Accountability (FACCT), representing a broad coalition of public and private purchasers and others, has begun to develop and test tools that will allow documentation of population-specific functioning, quality of life, satisfaction with services, and risk reduction for several medical conditions commonly seen in health plans, such as diabetes, asthma, coronary artery disease, breast cancer, low back pain, and depression.64 FACCT and its partners is currently identifying a “ master set” of quality measures for children’s health care.65 This effort by FACCT follows the continuum of care—staying healthy, getting better, and living with illness. There has been a proliferation and growth of accreditation organizations to match the changing organization and financing of the health care system. The following are the major accreditation organizations: The National Committee for Quality Assurance (NCQA). NCQA was formed in 1979 by two managed care associations, the Group Health Association of America and the American Managed Care and Review Association [now merged and renamed the American Association of Health Care Plans (AAHP)]. NCQA developed a set of health performance measures known as the Health Plan Employer Data and Information Set (HEDIS), a widely used tool for evaluating health plan performance.66 In 1996, NCQA released the Medicaid HEDIS, and today has multiple Medicare and Medicaid-focused projects such as the National HEDIS Medicaid database, Accreditation 1999 Medicaid Benchmarks (More information may be found online at www.ncqa.org). Although HEDIS data collection is not required for NCQA accreditation, managed care organizations (MCOs) regularly institute HEDIS measures. The Joint Commission for the Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO) is the oldest and largest of the accreditation organizations. Having started in 1951 as the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals, the named was changed in 1987 to JCAHO to reflect accrediting non-hospital health care organizations including managed care organizations.67 JCAHO’s performance system is known as ORYX™.68 Currently, the hospital, long-term care, network, laboratory, home care, and behavioral health care accreditation programs have performance measurement requirements under the ORYX™ initiative with requirements yet to be developed for ambulatory care organizations and long-term care pharmacies. The Council on Accreditation of Services for Families and Children (COA) was founded in 1977 as a joint effort of the Family Service America and the Child Welfare League of America (CWLA). (More information can be found online at www.coanet.org.) COA accredits or is in the process of accrediting more than 1,400 public and private organizations in the United States and Canada that provide child and family services, behavioral health care services, and financial management/debt counseling services. In contrast to the other accreditation organizations, the programs accredited by COA are largely community-based programs more closely related to a social services model than to a medical model of treatment.69 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health 41 Access to Quality Health Services The Utilization Review Accreditation Commission (URAC), also known as the American Accreditation Healthcare/Commission, was founded in 1990 to establish standards for the managed care industry. (More information can be found online at www.urac.org.) URAC’s broad-based membership includes representation from all the constituencies affected by managed care—employers, consumers, regulators, health care providers, and the workers’ compensation and managed care industries. In contrast to some of the other accreditation organizations, URAC offers ten different accreditation programs for managed care organizations such as case management organization standards, health call center standards, and network practitioner credentialing standards. Since 1991, URAC has issued over 1,600 accreditation certificates to over 300 organizations doing business in all 50 States. The Rehabilitation Accreditation Commission, formerly the Commission on Accreditation of Rehabilitation Facilities (CARF), was developed in 1966 through efforts of the American Rehabilitation Association and the Association of Sheltered Workshops. Each year, CARF produces separate Standards Manuals for Behavioral Health, Medical Rehabilitation and Employment and Community Services. A Standards 42 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health Access to Quality Health Services Manual for Adult Day Services was developed in 1999 and the Assisted Living Standards Manual was revised in 2001. (More information can be found online at www.carf.org.) The CARF standards emphasize communicating with consumers in a way that is understandable and making each consumer a key member on their own service team.70 CARF currently accredits more than 11,000 programs in the United States and Canada, including alcohol and drug programs, mental health programs, and community-based rehabilitation programs.71 CARF also requires that programs have a plan to reduce barriers to care, including cultural, architectural, attitudinal, and other barriers.72 New accreditation organizations and/or standards change in response to the fluidity of the current health care system. For example, URAC, NCQA and the Consumer Coalition for Quality Health Care are currently collaborating on performance assessment tools for preferred provider organizations, the largest and fastest growing sector of the health care industry.73 Some organizations are unique, whereas others overlap in their accreditation domains, but have a slightly different focus.74 Historically, the public sector’s involvement in quality assurance has been indirect. For example, the Federal government makes use of the information collected by JCAHO and relies on JCAHO’s judgments regarding the quality of hospitals in setting eligilibity rules for reimbursement by Medicare. 75 In addition, 22 states recognize the COA accreditation process in lieu of Medicaid certification, state monitoring, or licensing.76 Finally, TRICARE, formerly the Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS), uses both existing tools, such as the Consumer Assessment of Health Plans (CHAPS) as well as its own mechanisms including the Appointment Standardization Integrated Program Team (ASIPT). Another Federal initiative is OASIS (Outcome and Assessment Information Set), a data set developed for HCFA to certify Medicare home health agencies. (More information about OASIS is available online at www.hcfa.gov/medicaid/oasis/oasishmp.htm.) In 1997, the Federal Advisory Commission on Consumer Protection and Quality in the Health Care Industry was established to study changes occurring in the health care system and recommend ways to ensure consumer protection and quality health care. The Commission’s report77 includes a “Consumer Bill of Rights and Responsibilities,” which is designed to strengthen consumer confidence in the health care system while holding participants in the system accountable for improving quality. D i s p a r i t i e s Limitations in access to care extend beyond such basic causes as a shortage of health care providers, the distribution of the existing health work force, or a lack of facilities. Individuals also may lack a usual source of care (See Figure 4) or face other barriers, such as financial barriers (having no health insurance or being underinsured), or personal barriers (sexual orientation, cultural differences, language differences, not knowing what to do, or environmental challenges for people with disabilities). Discrimination in a health care Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 43 Access to Quality Health Services setting can cross-cut these categories of barriers. People belonging to groups who experience the highest levels of discrimination (e.g., transgender people of color) face increased barriers. Patients with disabilities may face additional barriers arising from facilities that are not physically accessible or from clinician attitudes. Hispanics, young adults, and uninsured persons are least likely to have a usual source of care.78 Hispanic persons or those with less than 12 years of education are least likely to have a usual primary care provider.79 Certain people, such as those who are disabled, transgender, elderly, chronically ill, or HIV-positive, require access to health care providers who have the knowledge and skills to address their special needs.80 Substantial disparities in health insurance coverage remain for certain populations. Among adults under age 65, approximately 33 percent of Hispanic persons lacked coverage in 1998, a rate that is more than double the national average. Mexican Americans had one of the highest uninsured rates at 40 percent. For adults under age 65 years, 34 percent of those below the poverty level were uninsured. Similar disparities exist in access to a specific source of ongoing care. An average of 85 percent of adults identified a specific source of ongoing care in 1998, but the proportions dropped to 76 percent for Hispanics and 77 percent for those below the poverty level.81 Lesbians and gay men may be more likely to face barriers in access to care and preventive services.82 The data do not exist that will allow for similar assessments for bisexual and transgender people although there is speculation that those groups also experience disparities in access to needed health care. Undoubtedly, the degree to which any LGBT individual feels comfortable disclosing his/her sexual orientation and/or gender identity appears to be related to health care access. There also is reason to expect that disparities in access to care for ethnic and minority populations also are experienced by LGBT people within those populations. Therefore, one would expect to find an increase in the lack of access to health care for LGBT people who are of minority racial or ethnic groups, or who lack health insurance, or whose income is below the poverty level, or who have a disabling condition/disorder. O p p o rt u n i t i e s Throughout the next decade, Healthy People 2010 and its partners will continue to promote community-wide efforts to provide clinical preventive services, using local leadership, insight, and experience to tailor and increase the accessibility of these services. Efforts will continue to promote the development of local prevention coalitions that include health departments, businesses, community institutions, and individuals in leadership roles from each community. Healthy People also will work to strengthen the capacity of States and localities to collect health data and conduct community health assessments for small geographic areas. During the past several decades, the concept of “community” has become increasingly compelling in the design and implementation of health and social services programs. Many federally funded grants require that the grantee develop a community consortium that brings 44 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health Access to Quality Health Services Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 45 LGBT Health Access Project Community Standards of Practice Standard 1: The agency shall establish, promote, and effectively communicate an inclusive, nondiscriminatory work place environment for LGBT e m p l o y e e s . Standard 2: The agency shall support and encourage visibility of LGBT e m p l o y e e s . Standard 3: The agency shall work toward ensuring that LGBT employees of all ages are subject to the same terms of employment as all other employees. Standard 4: The agency shall ensure that comprehensive policies are implemented to prohibit discrimination in the delivery of services to LGBT and their families. The agency shall ensure that the staff will use inclusive language and forms with LGBT a n d their families. For the purposes of these standards, family shall be broadly construed, and shall include but not be limited to relatives by blood, adoption, marriage, or declaration of domestic partnership. Standard 5: The agency shall ensure that it has comprehensive and easily accessible procedures in place for clients to file and resolve complaints alleging violations of these policies. Standard 6: The agency shall develop and implement or revise existing intake and assessment procedures to ensure that they meet the needs of LGBT clients of all ages and their families. Standard 7: All agency staff shall have a basic familiarity with LGBT issues as they pertain to the services provided by the agency. Standard 8: All direct care staff shall routinely provide general care to LGBT clients. They shall be competent to identify and address, within the scope of their expertise, specific health problems and treatment issues for LGBT clients and their families and to provide treatment accordingly, including necessary referrals. Standard 9: All case managers and treatment plans shall include and address sexual orientation and gender identity where it is a necessary and appropriate issue in client care. Standard 10: The agency shall ensure the confidentiality of client data, including information about sexual orientation and gender identity issues. LGBT clients shall be informed about data collection that includes reference to sexual orientation and/or gender identity, including in what circumstances such information may be disclosed, whether it may be disclosed as aggregate or individual information, whether personal identifiers may be disclosed, and how and by whom such information may be used. Standard 11: The agency shall provide appropriate, safe and confidential treatment to LGBT minors, unless the agency’s services are inappropriate for all minors. All clients who are minors shall be informed of their legal rights, and advised of the possibility and possible consequences of any statutory or otherwise mandated r e p o r t i n g . Standard 12: The agency shall include LGBT and their families in outreach and health promotion eff o r t s . Standard 13: The composition of the agency Board of Directors and other institutional bodies shall encourage representation from LGBT c o m m u n i t i e s . Standard 14: Agency community benefits programs shall include LGBT in the community the agency serves. Access to Quality Health Services all local stakeholders, concerned citizens, and consumers to the planning table. Ambitious strategies that have incorporated community strengths and engaged community members create significant opportunities.83, 84 The Metro Denver AIDS Consortium has been identified as one initiative whose changes in the health care system were attributed (at least in part) to the efforts of a community consortium or coalition.85 The Metro Denver AIDS Services Consortium was formed in response to concern about rising treatment costs and lack of alternatives in the community for home-based and hospice care. The consortium’s goal was to establish a continuum of medical and psychosocial services for people with HIV/AIDS by planning and coordinating services, ensuring access to needed services, and marshalling public and private sector support. The initial membership included the health department, a State-wide AIDS services organization providing social work, and the Visiting Nurses Association. After an unsuccessful initial attempt to secure Ryan White CARE Act funding, the consortium made an effort to include more community-based organizations and expand the heavily medical model to that resembling the continuum of care model. Between 1986 and 1989, the average length of stay for inpatient care dropped from 11.3 days to 8.2 days, and the average inpatient and outpatient charges per patient dropped 55.9 percent.86 46 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health Removing the Barriers Cultural Competency Training Components Overview of LGBT barriers to care Exercises demonstrating the adverse impact of these barriers (a ‘heterosumption’ exersize is used, where a straight person in a homosexual environment tries to get their healthcare needs met without disclosure of their sexual orientation). Defining LGBT cultural competence in terms of health care Take heterosexual-based questions off the intake forms (i.e., Married? Yes or No?) Do not presume heterosexuality Use nonbiased behavior towards patient Do not assess using labels/identity, use behavior Conduct a competent sexual-risk screening Demonstrate knowledge of LGBT-specific health risks Review of language used in LGBT communities Review of research on LGBT health risks Personal contract for change Removing the Barriers Mautner Project for Lesbians with Cancer a n d The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (Excerpted with permission) Access to Quality Health Services The Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) within DHHS has a new Community Access Program to assist communities in building partnerships among health care providers, to deliver more and better care to their neediest residents. Grantees in 23 States were awarded monies in Fiscal Year 2000 to build integrated health care systems among local partner organizations, all of which are committed to expanding health services to the uninsured. HRSA is dedicated as the “Access Agency” to helping communities find their own ways to improve access to health care and to eliminate health disparities. State health departments play a key role in mobilizing necessary partnerships to improve access and reduce disparities.87 The Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual and Transgender Health Access Project is a collaborative community-based program funded by the Massachusetts Department of Public Health (MDPH). The project’s mission is to foster the development and implementation of comprehensive, culturally appropriate, quality health promotion policies and health care services for LGBT people and their families (see Figure 5).88 The standards are designed to assist providers in the development and delivery of comprehensive, culturally competent services. Consumers can use these standards to guide them to quality providers in their community. Sanlo (2000) took the Community Standards of Practice for Provision of Quality Health Care Services for Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual and Transgender Clients and adapted them for college and university health care settings.89 Several examples of standards of care or practice also exist for transgender people. Resources include the Harry Benjamin Standards of Care for transgender people90 and the Tom Waddell Health Center’s “ Protocols for Hormonal Reassignment of Gender.” 91 Even when knowledgeable providers are available, the existing Standards of Care (SOC) for gender identity disorders, announced by the Harry Benjamin International Gender Dysphoria Association (HBIGDA), can create additional barriers to care for persons seeking cross-gender hormone therapy. The SOC, to which most well informed providers usually adhere, require an extensive psychological evaluation before hormones can be prescribed.92 Many transgender persons are unable to afford such an evaluation, and many also are unable to afford the services of a prescribing physician. Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that use of unsupervised “ black market” hormones is widespread among urban transgender persons. The prevalence of black market hormone use has been reported to range from 29 percent to 63 percent within urban groups of male to female (MTF) transgenders.93, 94, 95, 96 Recently some progressive clinics, such as the Tom Waddell Health Center in San Francisco, have begun offering supervised hormone therapy to persons who would otherwise use black market hormones, without requiring a preliminary psychological evaluation.97 This “ harm reduction ” model of transgender hormone prescription is expected to receive at least a qualified endorsement in Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 47 “. . . Unrecognized homosexuality by the physician or the patients’ reluctance to report his or her sexual orientation can lead to failure to screen, diagnose, or treat important medical problems. . .” —American Medical Association147 Access to Quality Health Services the forthcoming revision of the HBIGDA Standards of Care (Version Six), due to be released in early 2001. In addition to standards of care, providers must be culturally sensitive so as to build a therapeutic alliance and maintain an ongoing relationship with a primary care provider. LGBT people have barriers to accessing health care.98 Certainly, one of the most critical barriers involves the relationship, or lack thereof, between providers and consumers.99 The LGBT consumer’s avoidance of existing but inappropriate or non-LGBT-competent health care services will diminish as provider cultural competency training brings about attitudinal changes, and the health care system demonstrates increased access to equal quality of care for all. In a review of comprehensive care for LGBT patients and families, Harrison and Silenzio (1996) summarize four steps physicians (and other health care professionals) can take to offer appropriate care. 100 Step 1: Maintain a nonhomophobic attitude. Step 2: Distinguish sexual behavior from identity. Step 3: Communicate clearly and sensitively using gender-neutral terms. Step 4: Be aware of how their own attitudes affect clinical judgments. Throughout their careers, health care providers should be expected to participate in continuing education opportunities that offer cultural competency training. Allied health professions educational institutions should incorporate LGBT cultural competency training in their curriculum with the other core competencies. (See discussion under Objective 1-7 in this chapter. Also see Educational and Community-Based Programs focus area and Public Health Infrastructure focus area for a more comprehensive discussion of this issue.) Continuing medical education (CME) credit must be available to reinforce initial training and for the health care work force in the field. CDC has developed cultural competency- based training focusing on women who partner with women (WPW). Its basic approach, shown in Figure 6 can be modified for use in a number of contexts. The Mautner Project for Lesbians with Cancer successfully uses this training approach. Bisexual people may have the least amount of information relative to standards of conduct and to training curricula. After a groundbreaking conference on bisexuality and HIV prevention was held in June 1999, Miller and Solot (2000) wrote Tips for Health Care Providers when Working with Bisexually-Identified and Behaviorally-Bisexual Clients.101 BiHealth is the first and only program of its kind in Massachusetts, and one of the only of its kind in the country. BiHealth provides prevention and education about HIV and sexually transmitted diseases (STDs), and addresses health concerns in a holistic way, whether one identifies as bisexual, bi-curious, bi-questioning, pansexual, heterosexual, gay, lesbian, transgender, or no label at all. BiHealth is located at the Fenway Health Center in Boston. A core function of public health agencies is to promote a statewide assessment of current health status and access barriers to help prioritize interventions and set baselines upon which to measure progress. The Association of State and Territorial Health Officers 48 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health Access to Quality Health Services (ASTHO) in partnership with HRSA has started a resource compendium that supports a State or community in assessing where they are on the range towards 100-percent access and 0 health disparities. The online version at www.astho.org/access/documents.html will include links to many of the innovative, online State and local data sources. All of the accreditation organizations have provider and consumer occasions that solicit input to ensure that the needs of all enrollees are being met. For example, JCAHO requires organizations requesting the accreditation process to notify the community, patients, their families, patient advocates and others of the opportunity of a public information interview (PII) with the survey team.102 LGBT consumers and providers should contact both the accreditation organizations as well as the local health care programs that have received accreditation and inquire as to the opportunities that exist. Perhaps the next version of NCQA’s HEDIS instrument or JCAHO’s ORYX TM could include information specific to the health care needs and concerns of LGBT consumers. S u m m a ry of Researc h LGBT persons face documented structural, financial, personal, and cultural barriers when attempting to access health care services.103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110 These barriers tend to alter the individual’s behavior and attitudes toward health care services, if available, and probably adversely affect health outcomes. Personal and cultural barriers to health have been well researched for LGBT populations. The results from multiple studies document provider bias as to LGBT people or patients.111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126 Findings also show that, perhaps in an effort to avoid this bias or because of internalized homophobia, LGBT patients frequently withhold personal information about their sexual orientation, gender identity, practices, and behavioral risks from their health care providers.127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132 In addition, many health care providers may be uncomfortable, reluctant, and under-trained to take sexual histories.133 , 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144 These barriers are of concern for LGBT individuals and providers of health care, as barriers could result in LGBT people not seeking needed preventive screening tests and preventive interventions, or delaying seeking treatment for acute health conditions or exacerbation of chronic conditions.145, 146 Despite known biases against LGBT populations, little training is provided to medical professionals on how to overcome biases or gain cultural competency-based skills in treating LGBT populations.148 Provider bias against LGBT populations or the non- prioritization of these populations also may lead the provider to de-prioritize the need for training to overcome these biases.149 LGBT populations face several financial barriers to health care. Some community surveys show that LGBT individuals often experience lower socioeconomic status than the general population, as well as being uninsured or underinsured.150, 151, 152 Gay men and lesbians in committed relationships are at a disadvantage in obtaining insurance compared to married Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 49 Access to Quality Health Services heterosexual couples since many insurance companies and employers do not provide domestic partner benefits.153, 154 The full impact of financial barriers is difficult to measure because of a lack of scientific data. The best available data on population disparities in insurance is an analysis of approximately 96,000 older women enrolled in the Women’s Health Initiative.155 In this study, despite the fact that lesbian and bisexual women were most likely to have attended graduate school and work in managerial professions, they were significantly more likely to be uninsured (6.8 percent for heterosexuals, 9.7 to 10.4 percent for lesbians, and 12 percent for bisexuals). Other surveys yielded similar findings. The National Lesbian Health Care Survey (NLHCS) highlighted groups of lesbians particularly likely to lack insurance, such as those who were younger, unemployed, in school, poor, and/or African American. Sixteen percent of respondents reported that they did not obtain health care because they could not afford it.156 Those who were uninsured had a greater preponderance of certain illnesses— such as anxiety, suicide ideation, physical or sexual abuse, ulcers, substance use, and eating disorders.157 A 1997 Los Angeles County survey of almost 5,000 women found that lesbians and bisexual women were less likely than heterosexual women to have health insurance. Seventy percent of the heterosexual women were insured compared to 63 percent of lesbians and 42 percent of bisexual women.158 The Michigan Lesbian Health Survey yielded similar findings whereby 12.3 percent of lesbians sampled indicated that they did not have health insurance compared to 9.7 percent of Michigan women in general.159 And while middle-aged lesbians report that they are in good to excellent health, 27 percent stated that they did not have health insurance.160 Little is known about the percentages of insured or uninsured status for gay males. The Urban Men’s Health Study provides some insight as it is based on a random household sample of men in census tracks with high proportions of gay men in San Francisco, New York, Los Angeles, and Chicago.161 Key findings from the study suggest that about 16 percent of men who have sex with men in America’s largest cities do not have any form of health insurance, and about 13 percent do not have a health care provider. In addition, economic privilege seems to predict having health insurance or a health care provider. Uninsured levels are highest among transgender people. A 1997 survey in San Francisco found that 52 percent of the almost 400 transgender individuals surveyed lacked health insurance,162 while the Washington Transgender Needs Assessment Survey, conducted between 1998 and 2000, found that 47 percent of respondents lacked health insurance.163 A December 1999 survey by the New York City Department of Health found that 21 percent of transgender respondents reported having no health insurance of any kind.164 Within these transgender communities, people of color are likely to be disproportionately uninsured—a finding that mirrors statistics on people of color throughout the Nation.165, 166 Unlike married heterosexual couples, partnered LGBT couples are unlikely to be eligible for the benefits of family health insurance coverage. LGBT families, therefore, pay more for 50 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health Access to Quality Health Services the same level of coverage for all family members, and are less likely to enjoy the benefits of family-focused care under the same set of doctors. Structural barriers that have been linked to LGBT health include the health care system’s unfamiliarity with LGBT populations167 and the lack of legal recognition of partners.168 As our predominant form of health care organization and financing is managed care or managing care in some form, LGBT persons within most types of managed care arrangements such as HMOs or PPOs may not be aware of LGBT-friendly providers or health professionals who have demonstrated their cultural competence with these population groups. Or, the LGBT person may be more concerned about breach of confidentiality in managed care settings because of the level of detail often required to approve benefits.169 The lack of structure for recognizing an LGBT family goes beyond the insurance concerns expressed to an additional set of structural barriers that may affect the individual’s health care options. There is a “systemic bias in favor of heterosexuals” in a number of Federally administered social benefit programs, particularly around survivor benefits and joint assets.170 Many Federal health care programs for women are focused on reproductive care. Since this is not as relevant to most lesbians, they have less access to the concomitant care bundled in with the reproductive services. Without legal acknowledgement of the LGBT family unit, LGBT persons whose partners become medically incapacitated can be left out of medical decisionmaking, denied information on their partner’s condition, or even barred from seeing their partner. Since social and family support has been shown to have a positive effect on health outcomes, denying that support is not in the best interests of the patient and creates a hardship for the partner.171 Access to culturally competent health care is a particular issue for intersex individuals— those born with characteristics of both male and female anatomy. Around the late 1950s, it became widespread practice to perform surgery and start hormone treatments on intersex children so that the child would be viewed as clearly male or clearly female. Many people believe most of these interventions were and are not medically necessary. Beginning in the mid-1990s, a growing number of adults who had been subjected to these treatments as children began to speak out, criticizing the interventions as causing emotional trauma and physical damage to sexual function. Psychologists and ethicists soon joined these critics. 172, 173, 174 By 2000, many clinicians had acknowledged that the model of treatment introduced in the 1950s, which was based on secrecy and early genital plastic surgery, was scientifically unsound.175, 176 Some even called for a moratorium on early surgeries.177, 178, 179, 180 Access to care is especially limited for adolescents. They are the most uninsured and underinsured of all age groups. Access is especially complicated for LGBT youth who may fear loss of confidentiality, ridicule, or discrimination in seeking care, and who are at risk for a range of health and mental health concerns associated with stigma, a lack of accurate health prevention and promotion information, and a lack of adequately trained providers. At the same time that this population is experiencing extraordinary barriers to care, they are also at increased risk for suicide, violence, and substance abuse.181 A report from the Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 51 Access to Quality Health Services DHHS’s Task Force on Youth Suicide found that gay men are up to six times more likely to attempt suicide than their heterosexual counterparts, and lesbians are up to twice as likely to attempt suicide than heterosexual women.182 Later research on suicide shows the rates of suicide attempts among LGBT youth are consistently between 20 and 42 percent.183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192 In a 1993 study across 13 cities, 80 percent of LGBT youth had experienced verbal abuse, 44 percent had been threatened with attack, and 17 percent had experienced a physical assault.193 The particularly vulnerable position of LGBT youth may intensify the deleterious effect of anti-LGBT bias on their health care. In a 1998 survey, “ two-thirds of youth had never discussed their sexual orientation with their provider but reported a desire to do so. Fewer than one-half of subjects remembered being informed about their right to medical confidentiality.” 194 Another study found that less than half of doctors were screening adolescents for sexual health risks.195 What limited information there is about transgender youth demonstrates the increased risks of being members of multiple underserved populations, and its negative impact on health status and health risk behavior.196 The issues of stigma and discrimination that affect health care for LGBT youth pervade the range of social services this at-risk population might need. Not only will LGBT youth be challenged to find appropriate medical care, but they also will be challenged to find an accepting homeless shelter, or nondiscriminatory treatment if they are in the foster care system. The combination of provider aversion to conducting a sexual risk screening, provider lack of training to do so for LGBT populations, the understandable fear LGBT youth have of disclosure, and the research showing higher risk behaviors for this group may be a deadly combination. The cross-cutting issue of discrimination in health care affects LGBT people through their full lifespan. As LGBT people age, the cumulative impact of years of health care delay, avoidance, or mismanagement can be expected to have a greater impact on their health status. In addition, not all lesbian and gay people “come out” or declare their gender identity during adolescence. Among age cohorts, many lesbian and gay people have been married to someone of the opposite sex.197 For example, in Adams and Kimmel’s study (1997) of older Black gay men in New York, six out of 20 had been married to a woman.198 At least four, and as many as six of the 20, reported having fathered children, and 16 of 20 reported at least one heterosexual experience.199 Herdt et al.’s study (1997) of 160 older gay men, lesbians and bisexuals in Chicago found over 40 percent of the sample had been married to a person of the opposite sex, for an average of 14 years. Some 40 percent of the women had children, as did 24 percent of the men.200 Little is known about the health care needs of older LGBT people, especially transgender people.201 However, LGBT elderly share many common health care challenges with all other elderly persons. For example, one of the shortcomings of Medicare is that, unless enrolled in a Medicare HMO, prescriptions medications are not reimbursed or the reimbursement is minimal.202 52 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health Access to Quality Health Services There is some evidence from the limited research that LGBT seniors are more likely to live alone. A 1999 study conducted for Senior Action in a Gay Environment (SAGE) found that 65 percent of 253 gay and lesbian seniors surveyed in New York City reported living alone. This was nearly twice the rate of all people 65 years or older in New York City, where 36 percent lived alone.203 Another more representative study found that 75 percent of gay and lesbian seniors in Los Angeles lived alone.204 Few agencies exist to specifically meet the social service needs of LGBT seniors.205 A 1994 study of 24 Area Agencies on Aging (AAA) and 121 lesbian and gay elders (aged 60 and older) who lived in those regions found that 96 percent of the AAAs did not offer any services specifically for them and did not have outreach efforts to lesbian and gay seniors.206 While this lack of social support can have a deleterious effect on health itself, when it is combined with the discrimination within the health care system, LGBT seniors are at serious, increased risk. This discrimination can be particularly malicious when a person is wholly dependent upon their health care providers for basic life needs and the staff refuses to touch “ the lesbian,” as documented in one study.207 Very little of the information cited here looks at the differences among LGBT populations that are also members of other underserved populations (such as racial and ethnic groups, rural populations, people whose primary language is not English, immigrants, people with disabilities, and children of LGBT people). For example, minor children of LGBT couples or parents are also negatively affected by Social Security’s failure to recognize LGBT families. In States that do not recognize second-parent adoptions, in the death of the primary parent, children are deprived of minors’ survivor benefits.208 In recognition of the earlier mentioned health barriers to access, LGBT communities, especially in urban areas, have expended a significant level of energy and resources in building service delivery systems designed to be more responsive to their unique health care needs. (See Appendix D: Resources for a national listing of the Gay and Lesbian Centers throughout the United States, most of whom also offer services for bisexual and transgender people.) The top 10 largest clinics serve a combined 45,000 LGBT clients.209 However, not all LGBT individuals have access to such systems; in addition, many LGBT individuals in Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 53 San Francisco: Setting an Example In 1997, the city of San Francisco implemented a law requiring every company that does business with the city to provide the same benefits to its e m p l o y e e s ’ domestic partners as it does to its e m p l o y e e s ’ spouses. Within 3 years, over 2,700 companies changed their benefits policies to include domestic partners. Given that no other single law has ever made such a profound impact on domestic partner benefits, this form of government action clearly has the potential to make a dramatic difference in the availability of health insurance to LGBT people. Since passage of the San Francisco law, Broward County, Florida, and Seattle, Washington, have adopted similar ordinances, and several other cities have considered them. Access to Quality Health Services these larger cities choose, for many different reasons, to pursue their health care through different routes. Regardless of where or when LGBT people present for care, they should be assured of equal access to culturally competent systems of care that are devoid of bias and responsive to the health concerns of LGBT people. Discussion of Healthy People 2010 Objectives Clinical Preventive Care Healthy People 2010 Objective 1-1: Increase the proportion of persons with health insurance. Access to health services often depends on whether a person has health insurance.210, 211, 212 Even without the optimal level of research on this issue, exploratory studies suggest that LGBT people may be more likely than heterosexual people to be uninsured or underinsured. In addition, some insured LGBT people with private insurance or who are self-insured may be reluctant to have claims for health services submitted to the plan out of fear that their employer will have access to their medical record and personal information about their sexual orientation.213 Within the diversity grouping of LGBT people, transgender individuals are likely to have the highest rates of being uninsured. Virtually all of the services related to hormone and endocrinology therapy and surgical procedures are not covered by standard health insurance policies on the grounds that the treatments are either cosmetic or experimental.214 Transgender people also may have the most difficult task in overcoming some of the obstacles and barriers to needed services as relevant procedures and/or treatments specifically may be excluded in health care plans or insurance policies. For example, one insurance policy excludes any “ procedure or treatment designed to alter the physical characteristics of a member’s biological sex to those of the opposite sex, regardless of any diagnosis of gender role or psychosexual orientation.215 This is not the only health plan stipulating such an exclusion, 216 and most private insurance specifies that medical services related to sex-reassignment are excluded from coverage.217 There have been cases in which insurance coverage denials were overturned. For example, in May 2000, a Massachusetts court ordered the Massachusetts Division of Medical Assistance (DMA) to pay for breast reconstruction surgery for a transsexual woman. The woman, Germaine Beger, a 50-year-old Medicaid recipient whose sex-assignment surgery in 1975 included breast implants, sought treatment in 1999 for a possible cyst in her right breast. The Massachusetts DMA approval the removal but denied the followup breast reconstruction surgery citing a State regulation that excludes Medicaid coverage for sex- assignment surgery. The Court decision directed DMA to authorize payment for the procedure stating that the decision was arbitrary and based on an incorrect interpretation of the agency’s regulations.218 A similar Medicaid case was successfully won in Iowa in 54 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health Access to Quality Health Services 1980.219 Another successful case was won in 1979 against Aetna Life and Casualty Insurance Company.220 An additional reason for the lack of adequate insurance coverage relates to the lack of family health insurance for domestic partners and their children. Unlike heterosexual families, such coverage frequently is not available when one member of a LGBT couple is unable to work, due to illness, caring for a child or an elderly relative, or for any number of other reasons.221, 222 To increase the level of LGBT people covered by health insurance, the inability of LGBT people to have access to family insurance plans routinely offered to married employees should be addressed. A report on domestic partner insurance benefits by the Institute for Gay and Lesbian Strategic Studies (IGLSS) showed a distinct increase in the number of private companies to extend this benefit to their LGBT employees.223 In 1990, no Fortune 500 companies offered domestic partnership insurance. By 2000, more than 20 percent offered this benefit. The trend is not limited to large companies. About 18 percent of all employers—numbering more than 3,500 —offer domestic partner benefits. Most make the benefits available to both same-sex and different-sex unmarried couples.224 This inclusive definition of domestic partners recognizes that some bisexual and transgender people have different-sex partners, and acknowledges the increasing family diversity of the workplace. The IGLSS report also assessed the financial impact of this benefit on companies and found it to be much smaller than previously assumed, usually a cost increase of 1 to 2 percent. Even when employers offer domestic partner or family recognition benefits, other barriers may prevent some LGBT employees from taking advantage of them. Some employees are afraid that enrolling an eligible same-sex partner will “out ” them or make their other sexual orientation known in a homophobic workplace, exposing them to harassment or possibly loss of their job. Others are deterred when domestic partner health benefits are taxed as part of the employee’s salary, when spousal benefits are not taxable. Across the United States, 13 communities form the building blocks of a national effort to improve the health care system. The national effort is called Community Voices: Health Care for the Underserved, and is a 5-year W. K. Kellogg Initiative. 225 The following are the cities in which the 13 communities are located: Oakland, CA; Sacramento, CA; Denver, CO; Washington, DC: Miaimi, FL; Baltimore, MD; Detroit, MI; Lansing, MI; Albuquerque, NM; New York, NY: Pinehurst, NC; El Paso, TX; and Charleston, WV. Each community is investigating a model of addressing the problem of access, inclusive of, but not restricted to health insurance. One strategy that a number of States are using is “community benefit” legislation which can assist vulnerable populations to gain access to health care by imposing certain requirements on nonprofit providers if they want to retain their tax-exempt status.226 Some States, such as California, have required health plans converting from nonprofit to for-profit status to set aside a certain amount of conversion funds to be used to promote better access to care for vulnerable populations. Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 55 Access to Quality Health Services 1-2: (Developmental) Increase the proportion of insured persons with coverage for clinical preventive services. Insurance coverage for clinical preventive services improved substantially during the 1990s, but significant variations remain in the services covered, depending on the plan and type of insurance. A 1997 national survey of over 3000 employers found that 88 percent of employer-sponsored plans covered well-baby care, 89 percent covered adult physical examinations, 92 percent covered gynecologic examinations, 89 percent covered Pap tests, and 91 percent covered mammograms. Coverage was highest in health maintenance organizations (HMOs) and lowest in indemnity or fee-for-service (FFS) insurance plans.227 Including effective clinical preventive services among those routinely covered by insurance is an effective way to emphasize the importance of clinical preventive services as an integral part of health care.228 The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 (Public Law 105-33) added colorectal cancer screening among other new preventive benefits covered by Medicare, and expanded Medicare coverage of mammography and cervical cancer screening. The proposed data source for Access objective 1-2 is the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS), which is administered by the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ). The 1996 MEPS data are currently being analyzed and are expected to provide baseline data on the percentage of persons with coverage for selected preventive services (well-child visits, immunizations, cervical cancer screening, and adult physicals). The current demographic data for the MEPS includes age, race, ethnicity, region, occupation, employment status, and household composition. The numerator will be the number of people who have coverage for clinical preventive services as part of their health insurance. The denominator will be the number of insured persons. These data are based on an abstract of the respondents’ insurance policies, rather than household reports. Data will be collected periodically, with as much as a 3-year lag time in reporting these data. Data that are collected periodically from policy booklets obtained from MEPS household respondents could be modified to collect information on a broader set of preventive interventions such as recommended cancer screening and smoking cessation. 1-3: Increase the proportion of persons appropriately counseled about health behaviors. 1-3a. (Developmental) Counseling about physical activity or exerc i s e f o r a d u l t s 1-3b. (Developmental) Counseling about diet and nutrition for adults 1-3c. (Developmental) Counseling about smoking cessation for adults 56 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health Access to Quality Health Services 1-3d. (Developmental) Counseling about reducing excessive alcohol consumption by adults 1-3e. (Developmental) Counseling about childhood injury prevention: vehicle restraints and bicycle helmets 1-3f. Counseling about unintended pregnancy (females aged 15 to 44 years) 1-3g. (Developmental) Counseling about sexually transmitted diseases (males aged 15 to 49 years; females aged 15 to 44 years) 1-3h. (Developmental) Counseling about management of menopause (females aged 46 to 56 years) The notation “d e v e l o p m e nt” indicates subobjectives for which data are missing. T h i s objective, however, is one of the HP2010 objectives in which sexual orientation is in the data table as DNC (Data are Not Collected). DNC indicates that the data source or sources listed for the objective do not collect data on the specific subpopulation or demographic characteristic at this time. A d i fferent or new data source may be needed or added in order to measure progress on this objective for persons of other sexual orientation or gender identity.2 2 9 Selective clinical preventive services have a positive influence on personal health, and many are cost-effective in comparison with the treatment of disease.230, 231, 232 Insurance coverage, especially, is problematic for counseling services, in part, because of the difficulty in demonstrating the efficacy or proving the benefits of the interventions. For example, only 22 percent of employer-sponsored plans cover medications or counseling for smoking cessation.233 The effectiveness of smoking cessation counseling, however, is supported by strong evidence, with more intensive interventions having the greatest impact and most favorable cost-effectiveness ratios.234 Unhealthy diets, smoking, physical inactivity, and alcohol use account for a majority of preventable deaths in the United States.2 3 5 Data indicate that risk assessment and counseling interventions are delivered less frequently than other interventions (for example, cancer s c r e e n i n g s ) .2 3 6 That is understandable, given that nearly all of a physician’s training is devoted to acquiring technical skills associated with medicine. Such technical intervention may reverse or palliate biologic illnesses, but have little effect on the factors influencing health/wellness or d i s e a s e / d i s o r d e r.2 3 7 The type and number of preventive counseling interventions offered also may be affected by whether the provider will be reimbursed for certain preventive counseling or screening services, i.e., whether the counseling or screening service is covered by the p a t i e n t’s health insurance. In many care settings, other health staff (physician’s assistants, nurses, nurse practitioners) provide preliminary counseling screens. Thus, the appropriate or necessary counselor may not always be the physician. Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 57 Access to Quality Health Services Time is an important constraint in the primary care setting. However, brief clinician counseling is effective in having consumers stop smoking and reduce problem drinking.238, 239 In addition, brief counseling interventions aimed at high-risk individuals can increase condom use and prevent the spread of sexually transmitted diseases. 240 (See Sexually Transmitted Diseases (Infections) and HIV/AIDS focus areas.) Provider counseling should be tailored to the individual risk factors, needs, preferences, and abilities of each health care consumer.241 Rather than medical interventions or verbal admonitions to change lifestyles by adopting behaviors that either never existed or are culturally disharmonius, what is necessary are preventive interventions delivered by appropriate messengers. The subsequent measures of success may become quality of life in lieu of “cures.” 242 The likelihood of LGBT people having appropriate messengers and/or messages is rare within traditional settings, given societal assumptions and the fact that most health professionals are poorly informed about the health care risks of LGBT patients.243, 244, 245, 246, 247 A 1998 survey of all U.S. medical schools found an average of only 2.5 hours devoted to this topic in the 4-year program.248 The amount of time that other providers, such as physician assistants, nurse practitioners, nurses, social workers, employee assistant professionals and health educators who may engage in counseling with LGBT consumers is not known. While it is known that more research is needed to better quantify some risks for the LGBT community, preliminary research does show some disparities.249 The Women’s Health Initiative is a longitudinal research project that collects health risk information for older women. It is also one of the first large-scale health studies to include a measure of sexual orientation, so the data can be analyzed for lesbian and bisexual (although not transgender) subpopulations. Of a sample of 96,000 of the participants, lesbians and bisexuals were significantly more likely than heterosexuals to be heavy drinkers, current or previous smokers, obese, and nulliparous (never having born children). They were also significantly less likely than heterosexuals to have never had a mammogram, have waited longer since their last PAP test, and to eat fewer fruits and vegetables daily.250 Another study shows similar results. A total of 1,362 women were surveyed in California, and it was found that lesbians and bisexuals were significantly more likely than heterosexuals to have recently used illicit drugs and to have been tested for HIV; they also were less likely to have had an appropriate cholesterol screening or mammography.251, 252 58 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health Cultural Competency. . . “The framework which allows us to design research and provide services uniquely tailored to each community or individual by integrating and being responsive to factors that influence attitudes, behavior and experience.” —E. J. Rankow Applying principles of cultural competency to lesbian health, Journal of the Gay and Lesbian Medical Association, 2(3), 1998 Access to Quality Health Services Both gay men and lesbians show a higher rate of smoking than the general population.253 (See Tobacco focus area.) A number of community-based studies on transgender populations report them to be at high risk for HIV or STDs, suicide, becoming victims of violence, and having substance abuse issues.254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259 Gay and lesbian youth are at disproportionate risk for suicide, victimization, sexual risk behaviors, and multiple substance use than their heterosexual counterparts.260 [See all other relevant focus areas, especially Mental Health, HIV/AIDS, and Sexually Transmitted Diseases (Infections).] Increasing preventive screening and counseling for LGBT health risks is dependent upon better scientific identification of the factors found to accompany elevated risk—including sexual orientation and gender identification. Studies have clearly identified the reluctance of many LGBT individuals to self-identify for such reasons as a lack of provider cultural competency, and fear of discrimination and breach of confidentiality.261, 262 Therefore, to increase the proportion of LGBT persons appropriately counseled, cultural competency training should be a standard component of the health professions training curriculum and made available to the public health workforce in the field, additional research and data collection on health status and disparities must take place, and the LGBT community must become informed about what clinical preventive services they should be receiving from their health care providers. Health promotion and disease prevention marketing campaigns are designed to build prevention awareness, promote healthy behaviors, and better enable individuals to access available health care services. The most successful campaigns target populations with culturally appropriate messages. To increase the number of LGBT persons who are appropriately counseled about health behaviors, health educators and planners developing health promotion/disease prevention campaigns should include representation from the LGBT community to create community-specific messages. With the exception of subobjectives 1-3f and 1-3g, the sources of data for the other subobjectives are the National Health Interview Survey (NHIS), CDC, NCHS, each State’s Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS), CDC, and NCCDPHP. Subobjective 1-3f is the only subobjective that has baseline data and is not developmental. The baseline data for unintended pregnancy is the 1995 National Survey on Family Growth (NSFG), which is administered periodically by CDC’s National Center for Health Statistics. This survey is to be the source for 1-3g. NSFG is being conducted this year (2001) and also scheduled for 2004 and 2007. The primary survey content contains data on factors affecting birth and pregnancy rates, adoption, and maternal and infant health. The current demographic data associated with NSFG are age, race, Hispanic ethnicity, family income, and educational attainment. 263 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 59 Access to Quality Health Services P r i m a ry Care 1-4: Increase the proportion of persons who have a specific source of ongoing care. Access to care depends in part on access to an ongoing source of health care services. People with a usual source of health care are more likely than those without a usual source of care to receive preventive health care services.264, 265 An estimated 15 percent of adults in the United States lack a usual source of care.266 The National Health Interview Survey does not count emergency departments as a usual source of care. Thus, more than 40 million persons have no particular doctor’s office, clinic, or health center. An estimated 93 percent of children aged 17 years and under have a specific source of ongoing care. The Children Health Insurance Program, implemented in 1999, provides a mechanism for increasing the proportion of children with an ongoing source of care and generates new opportunities through school-based health centers and other types of facilities.267, 268 For example, the Adolescent Health Network affiliated with the St. Paul- Ramsey County Department of Public Health, in St. Paul, Minnesota, and other collaborators is planning an educational forum on the health care needs of LGBT youth.269 To increase the proportion of LGBT people who have a specific source of ongoing health care, a number of barriers need to be addressed, including those for LGBT people living in rural areas or where there are no LGBT-competent providers, as well as a general lack of LGBT-friendly or LGBT-informed health professionals. The Gay and Lesbian Medical Association (www.glma.org), the Association of Gay and Lesbian Psychiatrists (www.aglp.org), the Renaissance Transgender Association (www.ren.org), Whitman Walker Clinic (www.wwc.org) and GayHealth.com (www.gayhealth.com) have online services that identify LGBT providers. The Lesbian and Gay Community Services Center of New York offers a guide to community centers serving the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender communities across the country (www.gaycenter.org). (Appendix D: Resources contains a listing of each center by State.) Although not currently inclusive of LGBT populations, a new Web site with expanded coverage of health care and healthy policy issues, especially access, has been launched at www.comumunityvoices.org. A project of the W. K. Kellogg’s Community Voices Initiative, the site contains the latest information about national health policy as well as the efforts of local communities to improve health care access and quality. The Web site will be updated weekly and will cover health care issues related to the millions of people in the United States who are uninsured or underinsured. 1-5: Increase the proportion of persons with a usual primary care provider. Primary care providers (PCPs) are the gatekeepers of our current health care system, most commonly characterized as some form of managed care, managed costs, or coordinated care. As the entry people, PCPs are to meet the medical, and if well trained and educated, 60 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health Access to Quality Health Services the health care needs of most people.270 PCPs can include physicians, nurse practitioners (NPs), physician assistants (PAs), and several other professional groups, usually with certification and/or licensure, who are recognized by accrediting organizations. A usual source of primary care helps people clarify the nature of their health problems and usually directs them to the appropriate health services, including specialty care.271 Primary care also emphasizes continuity, which implies that individuals use their source of primary care over time. More afterhours care, shorter travel time to the site of care, and shorter waiting times for care have been associated with health care consumers’ initiation with a usual PCP. Greater continuity has been observed for individuals with shorter appointment waits, insurance, and access to more afterhours care.272 Evidence suggests that first contact care provided by an individual’s PCP leads to less costly medical care.273 Members of the LGBT community often share information regarding which providers are LGBT-friendly, culturally competent, and accepting. Transgender people are more likely to go to doctors who have been recommended by other transgender people because of their need for expertise related to any issues of hormones or surgery.274 No study or organized body of literature exists discussing the relationship between PCPs and LGBT people. A few examples of the availability of primary care do exist. More than 14 MCOs have formed contractual relationships for primary physical health care services with the new Lambda Medical group in Los Angeles. The Los Angeles Lambda Medical group is a medical center connected to the L.A. Gay and Lesbian Community Center that provides primary health care by physicians and other health care providers who specialize in the health care needs of lesbians and gay men.275 The Lesbian Health Wellness Network, based in Washington, D.C., is a 150-member provider network with many PCPs who are affiliated with different PPOs. In addition to a provider manual and a referral system, the network is also actively involved in providing LGBT-competency training for mainstream providers.276 Since 1971, the Fenway Community Health Center in Boston, Massachusetts has provided comprehensive, high-quality health and medical care to LGBT people. Every medical client at Fenway works with a primary care team, which includes a PCP and a registered nurse. Fenway accepts all major insurance plans, private and public. (More information can be obtained online at www.fenwayhealth.org.) Howard Brown Health Center in Chicago, Illinois, offers every client a continuum of care that is broad in scope. Founded in 1974 by a small group of medical students and other concerned volunteers, Howard Brown’s original focus was on the provision of low cost, confidential testing and treatment of sexually transmitted diseases. Over the course of two decades, the Center has dramatically expanded its role in the community, responding to the most pressing needs of the LGBT community. The Center accepts private insurance and public aid claims as well as sliding fee scales. (More information can be obtained online at www.howardbrown.org.) Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 61 Access to Quality Health Services Michael Callen-Audre Lorde Community Health Center is New York’s only health facility devoted primarily to the LGBT communities. Throughout its 15-year history, more than 27,000 people have been served by Callen-Lorde. The center delivers a comprehensive health service model which provides on-going health maintenance and preventive care, as well as screening and treatment for STDs, hepatitis B prevention and immunization, walk-in services for acute and episodic medical care, dermatological care, and other medical and specialty services. Primary care is provided by paid practitioners, and episodic (walk-in) care is provided by a combination of paid and volunteer staff. (More information can be obtained online at www.callen-lorde.org.) In November 1973, the Gay Men’s VD Clinic, part of the Washington Free Clinic, began operating in the basement of the Georgetown Lutheran Church in Washington, D.C. As the forerunner of Whitman-Walker Clinic (WWC), the renamed STD Clinic is the longest running program. The professional staff and 270 medical and clinical volunteers provide the effective delivery of HIV/AIDS-related, culturally sensitive health care. The HIV Clinic provides comprehensive medical evaluations, ongoing primary medical care, and treatments for HIV disease and related illnesses. In order to become a client and receive HIV/AIDS services at WWC, you must schedule a meeting with an access counselor. The counselors, not unlike PCP gatekeepers, provide information about services available through WWC and other organizations. WWC also provides many programs to lesbians, bisexual, and transgender members of the community. (More information can be obtained online at www.wwc.org.) 1-6: Reduce the proportion of families that experience difficulties or delays in obtaining health care or do not receive needed care for one or more family members. In 1996, according to the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS), 12.8 million families (11.6 percent) for a variety of reasons experienced difficulty or delay in obtaining care or did not receive health care services they thought they needed.277 In addition to a lack of insurance or being underinsured, barriers include a lack of appropriate referrals, travel distance to the provider, lack of transportation, and unavailability of specialists. Families experience barriers to care for a variety of reasons: inability to afford health care (60 percent); insurance-related causes (20 percent) including the insurance company not approving, covering, or paying for care, preexisting conditions for which insurance coverage often is restricted, lack of access to required referrals, and clinicians refusing to accept the family’s insurance plan; and other problems (21 percent), such as transportation, physical barriers, communication problems, child care limitations, lack of time or information, or refusal of services.278 An additional source of information on obtaining services is the Robert Wood Johnson (RWJ) National Access to Care Survey. Results of the 1994 RWJ survey suggest that some studies have missed substantial components of unmet needs by failing to include specific questions about supplementary health care services, such as prescription drugs, eyeglasses, dental care, and mental health care or counseling.279 When specific questions were added 62 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health Access to Quality Health Services about these services, the findings showed that 16.1 percent of respondents (approximately 41 million) were unable to obtain at least one service they believed they needed with dental care being the highest reported. This problem can be attributed partly to insufficient provider reimbursement, which discourages participation in plans even when the service is covered.280 The MEPS queries the head of household and does not include questions as to sexual orientation and gender identity. There may be opportunities to explore for LGBT data, however. While it is not possible to disaggregate the MEPS data, undoubtedly LGBT people were included in the MEPS survey and, if head of household, were asked questions regarding family members. Obviously, some men and women have had children in the context of heterosexual relationships that split up after one or both partners assumed lesbian or gay identities. (See Summary of LGBT Research.) A growing number of men and women have also had children after assuming lesbian or gay identities.281 Many organizations have developed or have changed to reflect the changing family structure. For example, the mission of the Family Pride Coalition is to advance the well- being of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender parents and their families through mutual support, community collaboration, and public understanding. (More information about the Coalition and links to similar organizations is found online at www.familypride.org.) The alternative insemination program at Fenway Health Center has helped more than 200 families.282 The diversity of different family systems is rapidly changing and should influence the design of survey instruments. 1-7: (Developmental) Increase the proportion of schools of medicine, schools of nursing, and other health professional training schools whose basic curriculum for health care providers includes the core competencies in health promotion and disease prevention. Significant changes in the health care system and in the expectations of consumers are influencing the education of health care providers in the United States. For example, many medical schools are assessing the content of their predoctoral and postgraduate curricula.283 Medical educators and medical schools are recognizing that physicians will need to be prepared to provide population-based preventive health care as well as high-quality medical care to their patients.284 This challenge exists for other health professionals, including nurses, nurse practitioners, physician assistants, health educators, social workers, mental health and substance abuse providers, and other allied health personnel. The most disturbing barriers that LGBT consumers and providers face in health care are the biases and discrimination in the health care system. In a 1999 study of second year medical students, 25 percent of them believed homosexuality to be “immoral and dangerous to the institution of the family.”285 Another survey of medical students found that 52 percent agreed that an openly homosexual candidate for residency programs was discriminated against.286 A survey of physicians and medical students showed that 59 percent of respondents had suffered discrimination, harassment, or ostracism within the medical Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health 63 Access to Quality Health Services profession because of their sexual orientation.287 Another survey found that 32 percent of lesbian physicians experienced harassment on the job.288 Multicultural training is a common component in medical school curricula. One survey of family practice residencies found 86 percent of programs had some form of multi-cultural t r a i n i n g .2 8 9 Yet, multicultural training may not include sexual orientation or gender identity issues, even though there is evidence that health care students are much more uncomfortable with LGBT populations versus people of different races or ethnicities.2 9 0 This discomfort or bias is likely to be further exacerbated when confronting a bisexual or transgender patient.2 9 1 In a 1998 study of family medicine departments at medical schools, 50.6 percent offered no training on LGBT cultural competency or health issues in the full 4-year curriculum. Of those that did offer training, it averaged only 2.5 hours. Medical students themselves express a preference that cultural competency in this area be woven throughout the curricula.2 9 2 A survey of LGBT medical students found that they are significantly more likely to “come out” or identify their sexual orientation when they have LGBT f a c u l t y, but people of color were less likely to know of supportive faculty, to “come out,” or to know of support services.2 9 3 O f all the students, 62 percent had been exposed to anti-LGBT comments. National-level health professions societies have taken tentative steps to stand against discrimination in health care. Several have added organizational nondiscrimination statements in recent years, or encouraged providers to provide equal care to LGBT p o p u l a t i o n s .2 9 4 , 2 9 5 I n 1999, the American Medical Association adopted a resolution asking for one of the major medical school accreditation agencies to require nondiscrimination policies that include sexual orientation for all accredited schools. These national-level health professions societies need to be made aware that an antidiscrimination policy that does not include gender identity as well as sexual orientation will not protect the full LGBT population, and will likely leave unserved the group that experiences the highest level of discrimination. While inroads are being made, the widespread tolerance of discrimination against LGBT people in general, and in the health care area in particular, serves to suppress opportunities for LGBT providers to “come out”—another major factor in the barriers to LGBT- competent care experienced by LGBT people. Because the demand is high for nondiscriminatory and culturally competent health care, increasing the proportion of LGBT persons with a usual primary care provider can be accomplished by providing people with a cadre of health care providers trained in LGBT health needs. This can be accomplished through a multipronged approach: Supporting current and developing LGBT health centers Placing emphasis on educating and urging LGBT people to enter the health professions Developing an advanced training program for health professionals interested in developing a specialty in LGBT health Certifying current providers as competent in LGBT care (especially telemedicine health care providers) 64 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health Access to Quality Health Services A core set of competencies for medical students in health promotion and disease prevention was developed by a task force established by the Association of Teachers of Preventive Medicine (ATPM) and HRSA. The competencies, derived from the ATPM Inventory of Knowledge and Skills Relating to Health Promotion and Disease Prevention,296 cover four categories—clinical prevention, quantitative skills, health services organization and delivery, and community dimensions of medical practice. This set of competencies will provide medical educators with measurable education outcomes in prevention education. The core competencies will be evaluated for potential adaptability to health provider education curricula in schools of nursing and other health professions schools. The core competencies also will be reviewed for potential expansion to cover emerging issues such as LGBT health concerns. Because health care providers will have to address new health issues, policies, technologies, and practice guidelines over their careers, continuing education programs also need to be updated periodically. 1-8: In the health professions, allied and associated health profession fields, and the nursing field, increase the proportion of all degrees awarded to members of underrepresented racial and ethnic groups. Certain racial and ethnic groups and low income communities lag behind the overall U.S. population on virtually all health status indicators, including life expectancy and infant death. Furthermore, access to health care is a problem, and these groups often lack a specific source of care. Increasing the number of health professionals from certain racial and ethnic groups is viewed as an integral part of the solution to improving access to care.297 This same strategy can apply to LGBT populations, as they, too, are minority populations, and, particularly, underrepresented racial and ethnic groups who are LGBT. Members of underrepresented racial or ethnic groups make up about 25 percent of the U.S. population. Their representation among health professionals, however, is in the range of 10 percent. Several studies have shown that minority health professionals are more likely to serve areas with high proportions of underrepresented racial and ethnic groups and to practice in or near designated health care shortage areas.298, 299 Despite considerable efforts to increase the number of representatives of racial or ethnic groups in health profession schools (medicine, dentistry, nursing, pharmacy, and allied and associated health professions), the percentage of such entrants, enrollees, and graduates has not advanced significantly, and in some cases has not advanced at all since 1990. The targets set for the Healthy People 2000 objective for enrollment and graduation were not achieved across all population groups, and achieving the revised targets by 2010 presents a significant challenge. In addition to the federally-funded programs in place, additional attention is needed to such efforts as providing financial assistance for students from underrepresented racial and ethnic groups to pursue health care degrees, encouraging mentor relationships, promoting the early recruiting of students from racial and ethnic groups before they graduate from high school, and increasing the number of racial and ethnic group faculty and administrative staff members in schools that train health care professionals. Other suggested approaches to improving culturally appropriate care for Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 65 Access to Quality Health Services ethnic and minority populations include increasing cultural competency among all health workers and increasing the number of lay health workers from underrepresented racial and ethnic groups.300 Data sources for this objective as written in Healthy People 2010 are: Survey of Predoctoral Dental Educational Institutions, American Dental Association Profile of Pharmacy Students, American Association of Colleges of Pharmacy AAMC Data Book: Statistical Information Related to Medical Schools and Teaching Hospitals, Association of American Medical Colleges Annual Data Report, American Association of Schools of Public Health Annual Survey of RN (Registered Nurse) Programs, National League for Nursing, Center for Research in Nursing Education and Community Health301 1-9: Reduce hospitalization rates for three ambulatory care sensitive conditions—pediatric asthma, uncontrolled diabetes, and immunization-preventable pneumonia and influenza in older adults. The three indicators selected here represent common problems encountered in primary care and allow monitoring of hospitalization rates for children (asthma), working-age adults (diabetes), and elderly persons (pneumonia and influenza). If data on sexual orientation and gender identity were collected as part of the Healthcare and Utilization Project (HCUP) of AHRQ, then these indicators would serve as a measure of the utilization of primary care throughout the lifespan of LGBT people as well. For each of these conditions, interventions can reduce hospitalization rates. Advances in the management of asthma have reduced its adverse health effects. Primary care can prevent both acute problems and long-term consequences of diabetes. Illness and death from preventable pneumonia and influenza among elderly persons can be avoided through the use of pneumococcal and influenza vaccines. These three conditions have been chosen because coordination of community preventive services, public health interventions, clinical preventive services, and primary care can reduce levels of these illnesses. To be effective, these services must be culturally competent and linguistically appropriate.302 This objective can be achieved by targeting high- risk populations. Because multiple factors besides access and quality contribute to the admission rates for ambulatory-care-sensitive conditions, each State will need to examine its rates and 66 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health In 1995, Tyra Hunter was injured in an automobile accident. When first- responding EMT p e r s o n n e l discovered she had male genitalia, they stopped treating her and stood back, making derogatory comments. She died later that night. Her mother later won a $1.75 million lawsuit against the District of Columbia Fire Department with provisions that they institute a diversity and sensitivity training program for all personnel. Access to Quality Health Services interpret them in the context of its population, health system, and community characteristics and will need to implement corresponding strategies. The objective is to improve primary care and preventive services and thereby reduce the need for hospital admission and the extended illness and costs associated with hospitalization.303, 304, 305, 306 It should be noted that persons who are privately insured have admission rates that are half those of the national average, indicating what is potentially achievable. Because of data limitations and potential access barriers to hospital admission among the uninsured, the Medicaid rate is artificially high and the uninsured rate is artificially low. (See Tracking Healthy People 2010 for more information.) Data by race are not included because these data are reported at the State level. State-level hospital discharge databases can provide accurate estimates of racial and ethnic disparities in hospital admission rates at the State level. There are substantial disparities in hospital admission rates for pediatric asthma and uncontrolled diabetes by race and ethnicity. The magnitude of this disparity also fluctuates by State, suggesting that access to care and quality of services may play a role. Specifically, among seven States for which rates were determined, the age- and gender-adjusted relative risk of hospitalization for pediatric asthma ranged from 2.3 to 5.8 for African Americans and 1.3 to 2.6 for Hispanics compared to non-Hispanic Whites. For uncontrolled diabetes, the relative risk of hospitalization ranged from 3.0 to 4.4 for African Americans and 1.2 to 2.0 for Latinos compared to non-Hispanic Whites.307 AHRQ is developing a “minority national inpatient sample” as part of HCUP that will provide national estimates of disparities in avoidable hospitalization rates by race and ethnicity. HCUP is based on data collected by individual States and provided to AHRQ by the States. HCUP would not exist without State data collection projects. HCUP databases contain patient-level information compiled in a uniform format with privacy protections in place. The Nationwide Inpatient Sample (NIS) includes inpatient data from a national sample of over 1,000 hospitals. The State Inpatient Databases (SID) cover inpatient care in community hospitals in 22 States that represent more than half of all U.S. hospital discharges. The State Ambulatory Surgery Databases (SASD), the project’s newest restricted access public release, contain data from ambulatory care encounters in nine States. HCUP’s objectives are to: (1) obtain data from statewide information sources; (2) design and develop multi-State health care databases for health services research and health policy analysis; and (3) make these data available to a broad set of public and private users. The uniform data in HCUP make possible comparative studies of health care services and the use and cost of these services, including: The effects of market forces on hospitals and ambulatory care Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 67 Access to Quality Health Services The care provided Variations in medical practice The effectiveness of medical technology and treatments More information on HCUP can be found online at www.ahrq.gov/data/hcup. E m e rgency Serv i c e s 1-10: (Developmental) Reduce the proportion of persons who delay or have difficulty in getting emergency medical care. Emergency services are a vital part of access to health care in the United States. All population groups, regardless of their socioeconomic, health, or insurance status, want to know that emergency services will be available and will function quickly and effectively when needed.308 This broadly shared social expectation was reinforced by landmark Federal legislation, the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA) of 1986. EMTALA stipulates that anyone seeking care at a hospital ED must receive a medical screening examination for an emergency medical condition and appropriate stabilizing measures.309 For many people, however, a variety of barriers continue to block access to emergency departments when the need for emergency medical care arises.310 Among these barriers are psychological and cultural factors that may keep some people, even if insured, from seeking care promptly; financial constraints that may inhibit some people, even if insured, from seeking care promptly; and shortcomings in the number, location, or capability of EDs in a specified geographic area. A significant component of this objective is to reduce the proportion of people whose access to emergency services is blocked by their health insurance coverage or payment policies. These policies affect access to hospital emergency departments and, in some instances, use of prehospital emergency services.311 Typically, these policies stipulate that unless an enrollee’s condition is life threatening, the enrollee or the ED must obtain authorization before an ED visit, or risk that a claim for services will be denied if it is deemed by the insurance company that the services were medically unnecessary. The rationale for these coverage and payment policies is clear: to manage care and contain costs. These policies, however, discourage some enrollees from receiving emergency treatment when it is warranted.312 Concerns about access barriers have prompted Federal, State, and organizational groups to seek assurances that health coverage or payment policies will provide payment when people go to an ED with acute symptoms of sufficient severity—including severe pain—such that a prudent layperson could reasonably expect that the lack of medical attention could result in serious jeopardy, serious impairment to bodily functions, or serious dysfunction of any bodily organ or part. 68 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health Access to Quality Health Services This objective includes emergency medical care received in the emergency department of a hospital as well as emergency medical care in the field. When people are severely injured or believe they are in need of emergency care, they become physically and psychologically vulnerable. LGBT people may delay or have difficulty in getting needed emergency medical care due to previous negative experiences with emergency medical personnel who may be biased against gays, lesbians, or transgender individuals. Reports of other LGBT people who have had negative experiences with emergency medical personnel affect the attitudes of the entire LGBT community. These negative experiences greatly diminish the probability that LGBT individuals, particularly transgender people, will seek out emergency medical care and risk putting themselves in the hands of one or more health professionals with biases. Emergency medical personnel routinely should receive training in cultural competency and LGBT health needs, and their training enhanced by updates providing the most current clinical information. 1-11: (Developmental) Increase the proportion of persons who have access to rapidly responding prehospital emergency medical services. The outcome of many medical emergencies depends on the prompt availability of appropriately trained and properly equipped prehospital emergency medical care providers. In urban areas, this capability is defined by an interval of less than 5 minutes from the time an emergency call is placed to arrival on the scene for at least 90 percent of first-responder emergency medical services and less than 8 minutes for at least 90 percent of transporting EMS. In rural areas, this capability is defined as an interval of less than 10 minutes from the time an emergency call is placed to arrival on the scene for at least 80 percent of EMS responses. Assuring a prompt response requires a well-coordinated system of care involving a variety of o rganizations and agencies, some of which are outside the traditional health care arena. T h e components include public awareness of how and whom to call for emergency assistance and public education concerning initial lifesaving emergency care procedures to be followed until the arrival of EMS providers. They also include access via a 911 or enhanced 911 system or, in rural areas, a uniform addressing system that allows emergency responders to locate the person requesting emergency assistance quickly; the availability of well-trained and appropriately certified response personnel, who are frequently from law enforcement or fire services; transportation (ground, air, or water ambulance); medical direction and oversight; and destination hospitals that are well-equipped and appropriately staffed. Emergency medical services, as a profession, is now barely a generation old.313 Effective components of quality EMS education have emerged during the last 30 years, including national standard EMS curricula, accreditation standards, and a national registration system. However, these parts developed independently, and currently there is no formal EMS education system in which the components are clearly defined, the interrelationships articulated, and the decisionmaking prcoess for changes and improvement established.314 The National Highway Traffic and Safety Administration (NHTSA) of the Department of Transportation (DOT), in concert with HRSA and other Federal agencies, will continue to Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 69 Access to Quality Health Services be the Federal departments and agencies responsible for coordinating the EMS education system. The hope is that by 2010 the following components will exist: National EMS Core Content National EMS Scope of Practice Model National EMS Education Standards National EMS Education Program Accreditation National EMS Certification As this is an evolutionary process, it is hoped that the needs and concerns of LGBT people related to receiving appropriate care by EMS personnel can be addressed and LGBT EMS providers can be part of the work force. 1-12: Establish a single toll-free telephone number for access to poison control centers on a 24-hour basis throughout the United States. Poison control centers (PCCs) are staffed on a 24-hour basis by toxicologists and specialists in poison information who respond to requests from the general public and to health care professionals for immediate information and treatment advice about poisonings and toxic exposures. Local or toll-free telephone calls to PCC hotline numbers provide primary access to these services. Each year more than 2 million callers seek telephone assistance from PCCs throughout the United States.315 When a caller reports a poisoning or toxic exposure, a PCC toxicologist or specialist in poison information assesses the severity of the incident, advises the caller about treatment, and makes referrals for further medical attention when necessary. PCCs respond to inquiries in languages other than English by using language translation services, interpreters, or bilingual staff members. PCCs manage most incidents by providing telephone advice to a caregiver at home, avoiding the need for more costly care at a hospital emergency department or another health care facility. Previously, there were hundreds of PCCs in the United States; currently, there are 70, accessed by 115 different emergency numbers, and 16 different TTY/TTD numbers.316 In the past few years, at least three PCCS have closed due to a lack of funding, and in 2000, seven States received a total of $1.2 million in emergency funding to stabilize centers at risk of closing or severely disrupt services. This crisis in PCCs prompted the 106th Congress to pass the Poison Control Center Enhancement and Awareness Act (P. L. 106-174, February 25, 2000). A total of $20 million was appropriated for Fiscal Year 2001 to support this legislation. The Act is intended to provide assistance for PCCs and establish a nationwide toll-free phone 70 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health In 1983, Sharon Kowalski was hit by a drunk driver. Her injuries left her a quadriplegic. A f t e r caring for Sharon as a quadriplegic for years, her lover, Karen Thompson, lost custody to S h a r o n ’s biological family and was barred from seeing Sharon for six years. Many LGBT couples still do not have the legal protections that would guard against this possibility. Access to Quality Health Services number to access poison control centers. In addition, the law states that the Secretary of Health and Human Services shall: Establish a national media campaign to educate the public and health care providers about poision prevention and the availability of poison control resources in local communities, and conduct a media campaign promoting the nationwide toll-free number Establish a grant program to award grants to certified PCCs for the purposes of achieving financial stability of such centers, and for preventing and providing treatment recommendations for poisonings Expand education programs, develop standard patient management protocols for commonly encountered toxic exposures, improve the data collection systems, improve national toxic exposure surveillance, and expand physician/medical toxicologist supervision of PCCs. Federal responsibility for the implementation of this legislation rests within the Injury/Emergency Medical Services Branch, Division of Child, Adolescent and Family Health, Maternal and Child Health Bureau (MCHB), HRSA. Linking all PCCs in the United States through a single toll-free telephone number and consolidating several key PCC functions can make contacting PCCs easier and more cost- effective.317, 318 When PCCs are linked through a common telephone number, callers can be routed automatically to the nearest PCC based on their area code, telephone exchange number, and ZIP Code. Educational efforts could focus on a single easy-to-remember emergency number that permits callers to access PCCs quickly. Incorporating all PCCs under the umbrella of a toll-free nationwide telephone number will help ensure access to poison control services when and where they are needed. CDC’s National Center for Injury Prevention and Control and HRSA have provided funding through a collaborative agreement with the American Association of Poison Control Centers (AAPCC) to establish a national toll-free poison control number. The new number, which will provide universal access to poison control services will link callers with their state and local poison control centers. The supporting telecommunications system will include contingency plans for disasters and network failures, and will expand call capacity and functionality over time. The AAPCC will develop, implement, and evaluate a national public-education campaign to raise awareness about the toll-free number and services provided by PCCs. The primary target audience for this campaign will be caregivers of children, including parents, grandparents, and childcare providers. Materials will also be developed to address the educational needs of potential teen and adult poisoning victims. LGBT people are as vulnerable as non-LGBT individuals relative to poisonings. More than 90 percent of poisonings, as reported to PCCs, occur in the home with 53 percent of the poisoning victims being children younger than 6 years of age.319 The expectation for this objective, as with most objectives, is that PCCs never be discriminatory in responding to Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 71 Access to Quality Health Services request for information and treatment advice from LGBT people and the targeted media campaigns be inclusive of LGBT populations and their diversity. The data source for this objective is the AAPCC Survey, U.S. Poison Control Centers. 1-13: Increase the number of tribes, States, and the District of Columbia with trauma care systems that maximize survival and functional outcomes of trauma patients and help prevent injuries from occurring. A trauma care system is an organized and coordinated effort in a defined geographic area to deliver the full spectrum of care to injured patients. The main goals of the system are to match the available trauma care resources in a community, region, or State with the needs of individual patients, and to ensure that patients have rapid access to the acute care facility and rehabilitation services they need. In a trauma care system, Prehospital, acute care, and rehabilitation services are integrated and administered by a public agency that provides leadership, coordinates service delivery, establishes minimum standards of care, designates trauma centers (which offer 24-hour specialized treatment for the most severely injured patients), and fosters ongoing system evaluation and quality improvement. Trauma care systems traditionally have focused on preventing adverse outcomes in the event of injury. Many trauma care professionals and people in the public health field believe that trauma care systems also should contribute to the prevention of injuries.320, 321 Trauma care professionals are in a good position to provide leadership in injury surveillance, clinical preventive services, and community-wide injury prevention programs. Recent Federal initiatives in trauma care have resulted in the design of a model system that incorporates public information, education, and prevention of injuries as key features.322 The Charles McC. Mathias, Jr., National Study Center for Trauma and Emergency Medical Systems was designated by the United States Congress in 1986 to serve as a focal point for research related to trauma, emergency medicine, and emergency medical systems. Based at the University of Maryland School of Medicine, Study Center faculty and staff collaborate with clinicians and policymakers who share the goal of reducing preventable deaths and disabilities caused by injury and illness. Research on the following facets of trauma and emergency care is currently under way at the National Study Center: Biomechanics of car crashes Substance use/abuse and injury Prehospital emergency care Trauma care systems and disaster management Trauma/EMS informatics, including telemedicine Injury prevention 72 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health Access to Quality Health Services Rehabilitation The National Study Center’s expertise includes study design, epidemiology, systems analysis, statistical analysis, and professional publication. The Study Center also sponsors educational forums for clinicians and other investigators. Faculty from the Program in Trauma and Emergency Medicine collaborate on many Study Center initiatives. (More information on the National Study Center can be found online at www.umm.edu/shocktrauma/trauma_nsc.html.) CDC (65 FR 31001-31003) announced the availability of funds in Fiscal Year 2000 for a grant to develop a National Trauma Information and Exchange Program (TIEP). The purpose of TIEP is to make data and information on trauma care in the United States more accessible to a broad spectrum of individuals and organizations, including trauma care professionals and professional associations, trauma centers and other acute care hospitals, trauma care systems, emergency medical services systems, injury researchers and research organizations, public health agencies, health care payers, and the general public. In an ongoing funding initiative to support injury prevention goals supported by the Coalition for American Trauma Care and a broad cross section of acute care and public health groups in Healthy People 2010, CDC announced a series of grants for Fiscal Year 2001 in injury prevention and control which include evaluating the availability and effectiveness of trauma systems of care in the United States. Results of a national survey conducted in 1993 indicated that only 5 States had complete trauma systems, but 19 other States and the District of Columbia had at least some trauma system components in place.323 A survey of all 50 States and the District of Columbia in 1998 again indicated that only 5 States satisfied all trauma care system criteria.324 However, results from this survey also showed that 37 other States and the District of Columbia had at least some trauma system components in place. Being transported to a trauma care system is an ordeal not only for the victim but also for family and friends. Sometimes, the experience is much more disturbing for the family and friends as the victim is often unconscious or in shock. The thought of this experience is obviously of particular concern for many LGBT people because it is a time when they know they may have little control over the situation and be subjugated to the rules and policies of the trauma center and the staff. Time is of the essence and life or death decisions must be made without delay. Some institutional policies restrict decisionmaking to the biological or legally defined family, often to the detriment of an LGBT partner or parent. Some of these unfortunate situations might be rectified by couples having already prepared medical durable Powers of Attorney or Health Proxies. In addition, trauma care center staff need information about LGBT relationships and families. Trauma staff recognize that the physical presence of a significant other improves health outcomes; however, as for many mainstream providers, “significant other” needs to be identified. Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 73 Access to Quality Health Services The data sources for this objective are the State EMS Directors Survey, National Association of State EMS Directors and the Indian Health Service. (Tribal data are developmental.) Long Te rm Care and Rehabilitative Serv i c e s 1-15. (Developmental) Increase the proportion of persons with long- term care needs who have access to the continuum of long-term care services. The long-term care population needs access to a range of services, including nursing home care, home health care, adult day care, assisted living, and hospice care.325 Persons with long-term care needs require the help of other persons to perform activities of daily living (personal care activities) and instrumental activities of daily living (routine needs). Access problems are viewed as a need for specified long-term care services that were not received in the past 12 months. In the context of objective 1-15, the continuum of care includes nursing home care, home health care, adult day care, assisted living, and hospice care. Long-term care needs are defined as needing the help of another person with personal care such as eating, bathing, dressing, and getting around in the home or needing the help of other persons with routine needs such as everyday chores, doing necessary business, shopping, or getting around for other purposes. Persons without access to the continuum of long-term care services are those with long-term care needs who report needing long-term care services but not receiving them in the past 12 months. Long-term care also crosses the boundaries of different types of care—from health to social—and intensity of services—from periodic home health and homemaker visits to round-the-clock subacute care. Access to the full range of long-term care services continues to be a problem because of financial barriers and the limited availability of specific services.326, 327 Although people in the long-term care population and their caregivers prefer long-term care to be delivered in the least restrictive environment, limited access and limited knowledge about care options can result in a long-term care population that is more dependent than necessary. The long-term care services selected cover key services in institutions, in the home, and in the community. Obtaining access to this range of services in rural areas is often difficult. The Policy Institute of the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force Foundation (NGLTF) estimate that 1 to 3 million people in the United States over 65 are LGBT, based on a range of 3 to 8 percent of the population.328 This is most probably an undercount as there are no national data available on transgender people who can exhibit the full range of sexual orientations, from homosexual to bisexual and heterosexual.329 LGBT people are distributed along the income scale in the same proportions to heterosexuals.330 Little is known about the racial and class diversity of the LGBT community but the Voter’s News Service’s gay, lesbian, and bisexual sample is racially representative of the larger population.331 Like the 74 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health Access to Quality Health Services rest of the overall elder population, so, too, the LGBT elders will increase significantly in the next two decades. 332 Most seniors turn to members of their families of origin for assistance and support in coping with the aging process. However, according to the limited data existing on gay and lesbian seniors, gay elders are more likely to live alone—75 percent in one study and 65 percent in another.333, 334 Aging LGBT people appear to lack access to a personal caregiver should they urgently need one. This was indicated in a 1999 survey conducted at a gay and lesbian health fair in New York City by Pride Senior Network. Some 64 percent of respondents aged 50 years and younger indicated that, if they needed a caregiver immediately, they would have someone upon whom to rely. By contrast, 68 percent of those aged 51 or older could not identify such a person.335 Nursing homes, assisted living centers, congregate housing, and home health care services need to take proactive steps to minimize the potential abuse and neglect of LGBT elders.336 All providers of caregiving services and housing to elders and their staff need culturally competency training in issues of sexuality and gender identity. Nursing homes in particular should include detailed sexuality policies as part of residents’ rights policies. Such policies validate the natural and healthy sexual needs of all seniors and remove devastating judgments regarding sexuality from individual staff.337 Transgender individuals face particular concerns of sensitivity and safety in such living environments. Transgender people with gender-congruent bodies may be closeted, while transgender people with noncongruent bodies are at risk for psychological and physical abuse at the hands of caregivers or other residents. 338 As long as homophobia and transphobia persist in health and aging services, providing more choices, particularly LGBT-competent choices, for elders is critical. Like their heterosexual counterparts, most LGBT elders would probably prefer to live in familiar surroundings. Thus, the passage of the Medicaid Community Attendant Services and Supports Act (MCASSA) would enable elders to either remain at home and receive home care services or move from institutional care to a home setting. It is essential that home care workers also must be culturally sensitive to the health care needs of LGBT elders.339 Proposed national data sources for objectives 1-15 are the National Long-Term Care Survey, Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey, HCFA; National Health Interview Survey (NHIS), CDC, NCHS; or the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS), AHRQ (formerly AHCPR). S e rv i c e s — R E C O M M E N D ATIONS Private and public sector health care systems should create receptive environments for LGBT health care consumers. For example, health care forms should be inclusive rather than exclusive. Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health 75 Access to Quality Health Services The 1,200 school-based health care centers located in 45 States and the District of Columbia should offer targeted preventive interventions for LGBT and questioning youth. The National Coalition of LGBT Health and other interested organizations can create a “Health Care Report Card for LGBT Consumers.” A national resource list of health plans, agencies, and professionals that are LGBT competent should be made available through the Internet. DHHS, in partnership with the health sector should collaborate on a web site that addresses LGBT health issues, including such information as LGBT health consumer rights and responsibilities, self-care, promotion of culturally appropriate standards of care for LGBT people, and a compendium of LGBT health information for professionals. DHHS, in partnership with professional organizations and other health care agencies already concerned with cultural competency in health care, should fund the expansion and evaluation of existing programs to promote sensitivity among health care providers to serve LGBT populations. The Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual and Transgender Health Access Training Project is ongoing in Massachusetts and the Removing the Barriers to Accessing Health Care for Lesbians was developed through funding from CDC’s Division of Cancer Prevention and Control to the Mautner Project for Lesbians with Cancer in Washington, D.C. Appropriate social service agencies should include LGBT-sensitive support for informal family caregivers, including same-sex partners and close friends. Education and Tr a i n i n g — R E C O M M E N D ATIONS Cultural competency training, specific to LGBT populations, should be a standard component of all health professional training curricula and made available to the health care workforce through continuing education institutes or other appropriate mechanisms. Models for training health care providers in LGBT-sensitive care should be collected in a database applicable to key stakeholders. Medical Boards and other groups that license or certify health care professionals should ensure that their examinations include questions on LGBT health care. Academic departments of health should encourage, if not require, an internship or a rotation at a community center or health center that serves LGBT people. Home care agencies should be trained to be culturally sensitive and respectful of the cultural differences among all elders, including LGBT. 76 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health Access to Quality Health Services P o l i c y — R E C O M M E N D ATIONS All health care accreditation organizations should specifically include language within their policies regarding access to health care services for LGBT populations. All Federal and other publicly funded health programs, including Medicare, should specifically have nondiscriminatory language related to sexual orientation and gender identity. DHHS, in partnership with organizations such as the American Association of Health Care Plans, the American Medical Association, the National Assembly of School-based Health Care, the American Public Health Association, National Association of State Medicaid Directors, and the National Association of Community Health Centers, should convene a task force of experts to discuss health care access for LGBT populations and issue recommended standards of care for adoption by appropriate health care programs. Confidentiality for LGBT people is critical and confidentiality guidelines and assurances must not only be communicated but also incorporated into all health care record keeping. Hospitals, nursing homes, assisted living facilities and any other health care facility should adopt policies that ensure that the families of LGBT people are treated as are the family members of heterosexual patients and residents. Medicaid spend-down protections, which provide income and asset protections to the husband or wife of a nursing home resident, should be expanded to cover the life partners of LGBT people who enter nursing homes. R e s e a rc h — R E C O M M E N D ATIONS Government and/or private funding should be directed to determining the barriers to access for LGBT populations as a whole as well as its component parts, including crosscutting variables such as race, age, ethnicity, and disability. Health care economists should be encouraged to develop an algorithm for determining the costs-benefits associated with sexual reassignment surgery and/or hormones so that health care insurers can make informed decisions. Health care researchers should be encouraged by public and private funders to identify LGBT individuals, if appropriate, within all studies relating to health care access. Government and/or private funding should be used to investigate the impact of domestic partnership policies on insurance coverage for LGBT populations. Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health 77 Access to Quality Health Services Research is critical in determining not only the causes of but also the resolutions to homophobia within the health care system. Data are needed to compare hospitalization rates for three ambulatory-care-sensitive conditions—pediatric asthma, uncontrolled diabetes and immunization-preventable pneumonia and influenza for LGBT adolescents, adults, and elders, respectively, with the total population. Te rminology Access: According to the Institute of Medicine, “The timely use of personal health services to achieve the best possible health outcomes.”340 This definition includes both the use and effectiveness of health services. The concept of access also encompasses physical accessibility of facilities. Activities of daily living (ADL): Personal care activities, such as bathing, dressing, eating, and getting around (with special equipment, if needed) inside the home. A m b u l a t o ry care: Health care that does not require the patient to stay in a hospital or other facility, such as care provided on an outpatient basis. Asymptomatic: Without symptoms. This term may apply either to healthy persons or to persons with preclinical (prior to clinical diagnosis) disease in whom symptoms are not yet apparent. Clinical care: The provision of health care services to individual patients by trained health care professionals. Clinical preventive services (CPS): Common screening tests, immunizations, risk assessment, counseling about health risk behaviors, and other preventive services routinely delivered in the clinical setting for the primary prevention of disease or for the early detection of disease in persons with no symptoms of illness. Consumerism: The movement seeking to protect the rights of consumers by requiring such practices as honest packaging, labeling, and advertising, fair pricing, and improved safety standards. Continuum of care: The array of health services and care settings that address health promotion, disease prevention, and the diagnosis, treatment, management, and rehabilitation of disease, injury, and disability. Included are primary care and specialized clinical services provided in community and primary care settings, hospitals, trauma centers, and rehabilitation and long-term care facilities. C o re competencies: A defined set of skills and knowledge considered necessary in the educational curricula for training health care providers. Examples of core competencies include skills in prevention education; skills in using sources of health data to identify what clinical preventive services should be delivered to the individual patient based on that 78 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health Access to Quality Health Services person’s age, gender, and risk factor status; an understanding of the U.S. public health system (local and State health departments) and its role in monitoring and maintaining the health of the community; and skills to evaluate and translate medical and scientific research reports into clinical practice. Emergency services: Health care services that are or appear to be needed immediately because of injury or sudden illness that threatens serious impairment of any bodily function or serious dysfunction of any bodily part or organ.341 Health insurance: Any type of third party payment, reimbursement, or financial coverage for an agreed-upon set of health care services. Includes private insurance obtained through employment or purchased directly by the consumer, or health insurance provided through publicly funded programs, including Medicare, Medicaid, CHAMPUS/CHAMPVA, or other public hospital or physician programs. Health outcomes: The results or consequences of a process of care. Health outcomes may include satisfaction with care as well as the use of health care resources. Included are clinical outcomes, such as changes in health status and changes in the length and quality of life as a result of detecting or treating disease. Instrumental activities for daily living: Routine activities, such as everyday household chores, shopping, or getting around for other purposes, that enable a person to live independently in the community. Intervention: Any measure taken to improve or promote health or to prevent, diagnose, treat, or manage disease, injury, or disability. Long-term care (LTC): A broad range of health and social services delivered in institutions, in the community, and at home. Long-term care services include institutional services, such as those delivered in nursing homes, rehabilitation hospitals, subacute care facilities, hospice facilities, and assisted living facilities; services delivered in the home, such as home health and personal care, hospice, homemaker, and meals; and community- based services, such as adult day care, social services, congregate meals, transportation and escort services, legal protective services, and counseling for clients as well as their caregivers.342 Managed care: According to the Institute of Medicine, “a set of techniques used by or on behalf of purchasers of health care benefits to manage health care costs by influencing patient care decisionmaking through case-by-case assessments of the appropriateness of care prior to its provision.” 343 Patient barriers: Any mental, physical, or psychosocial condition that prevents an individual from accessing needed health care. Examples include attitudes or biases, mental disorders or illnesses, behavioral disorders, physical limitations, cultural or linguistic factors, sexual orientation, and financial constraints. Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 79 Access to Quality Health Services Persons with long-term care needs: Persons who need the help of other persons to perform activities of daily living (personal care activities) and instrumental activities of daily living (routine needs). P r i m a ry care: According to the Institute of Medicine, “ The provision of integrated, accessible health care services by clinicians who are accountable for addressing a large majority of personal health care needs, developing a sustained partnership with patients, and practicing in the context of family and community.” 344 P r i m a ry care provider: A physician who specializes in general and family practice, general internal medicine, or general pediatrics, or a nonphysician health care provider, such as a nurse practitioner, physician assistant, or certified nurse midwife. P r i m a ry prevention: Health care services, medical tests, counseling, and health education and other actions designed to prevent the onset of a targeted condition. Routine immunization of healthy individuals is an example of primary prevention.345 P ro v i d e r barriers: Any mental, physical, psychosocial, or environmental condition that prevents or discourages health care providers from offering preventive services. Examples of provider barriers include a poor practice environment, lack of knowledge, and lack of efficacy studies. Quality: According to the Institute of Medicine, “ The degree to which health services for individuals and populations increase the likelihood of desired health outcomes and are consistent with current professional knowledge.” 346 Simply stated, it is doing the right thing, for the right patient, at the right time, with the right outcome. Rehabilitative services: Services to restore specific skills, including overall physical mobility and functional abilities. S e c o n d a ry prevention: Measures such as health care services designed to identify or treat individuals who have a disease or risk factors for a disease but who are not yet experiencing symptoms of the disease. Pap tests and high blood pressure screening are examples of secondary prevention.347 System barriers: Conditions within a health care system that prevent people from accessing needed services or prevent health care providers from delivering those services. System barriers include physical, cultural, linguistic, and financial barriers as well as the availability of health care facilities or providers with special skills, such as eye, ear, nose, and throat specialists. Te rt i a ry prevention: Preventive health care measures or services that are part of the treatment and management of persons with clinical illnesses. Examples of tertiary prevention include cholesterol reduction in patients with coronary heart disease and insulin therapy to prevent complications of diabetes.348 80 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health Access to Quality Health Services Usual source of care: A particular doctor’s office, clinic, health center, or other health care facility to which an individual usually would go to obtain health care services. Having a usual source of care is associated with improved access to preventive services and followup care. Vulnerable and at-risk populations: High-risk groups of people who have multiple health and social needs. Examples include pregnant women, people with human immunodeficiency virus infection, substance abusers, migrant farm workers, homeless people, poor people, infants and children, elderly people, people with disabilities, people with mental illness or mental health problems or disorders, and people from certain ethnic or racial groups who do not have the same access to quality health care services as other populations. R e f e re n c e s 1 Newacheck, P.W., and Stoddard, J.J. Prevalence and impact of multiple childhood chronic illnesses. Journal of Pediatrics 124:40-48, 1994. 2 Thompson, R.S.; Taplin, S.H.; McAfee, T.A.; et al. Primary and secondary prevention services in clinical practice. Twenty years’ experience in development, implementation, and evaluation. Journal of the American Medical Association 273:1130-1135, 1995. 3 Solberg, L.I.; Kottke, T.E.; Brake, M.L.; et al. The case of the missing clinical preventive services systems. 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Point of Service Plan, Exclusions and Limitations, October 1998. 217 Minter, S. Representing Transsexual Clients: An Overview of Selected Legal Issues, 2000. Available online at www.nclrights.org. 218 Massachusetts State Health Insurance Ordered to Cover Costs of Transsexual Woman. World News, May 4, 2000. Available online at www.gayottawanow.com/archives/news/2000054MassTransHealth.html. 219 Pinneke v. Preisser, Commissioner of Social Services, No. 79-1551, U.S. Court of Appeals for the 8th Circuit, 623 F.2nd 546, June 27, 1980. 220 Davidson v. Aetna Life and Casualty Insurance Company, 420 N.Y.S. 2d 450 (New York Supreme Court), 1979. 221 Deneberg, 1995. 222 Stevens, 1995. 223 Badgett L. Calculating costs with credibility: Health care benefits for domestic partners. Angles: The Policy Journal of the Institute for Gay and Lesbian Strategic Studies 5(1):1-8, 2000. 224 Human Rights Campaign. The State of the Workplace for Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgendered Americans 2000. Washington: DC: Human Rights Campaign, 2000. 225 Meyer, J.A., and Silow-Carroll, S. Increasing Access: Building Solutions. Washington, DC: Economic and Social Research Institute, June 2000. 226 Ibid. 227 Partnership for Prevention. Results from the William M. Mercer Survey of Employer Sponsored Health Plans. Washington, DC: Partnership for Prevention, 1999. 228 Davis, Bialek, Parkinson, et al., 1990. 229 DHHS. Healthy People 2010. 2 nd ed. With Understanding and Improving Health and Objectives for Improving Health. 2 vols. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, November 2000. 230 U.S. Preventive Services Task Force, 1995. 231 Tengs, T.O.; Adams, M.E.; Pliskin J.S.; et al. Five-hundred life saving interventions and their cost effectiveness. Risk Analysis 15:369-390, 1995. 232 Dorfman, S. Preventive Interventions Under Managed Care: Mental Health and Substance Abuse Services. DHHS Publication No. SMA00-3437. Rockville, MD: DHHS, SAMHSA, Center for Mental Health Services (CMHS), 2000. 233 Partnership for Prevention, 1999. Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health 91 Access to Quality Health Services 234 Cromwell, J.; Bartosch, W.J.; Fiore, M.C.; et al. Cost-effectiveness of the clinician practice recommendations in the AHCPR guideline for smoking cessation. Journal of the American Medical Association 278:1759-1766, 1997. 235 McGinnis and Foege, 1993. 236 NCHS, unpublished data. 237 Kennedy, 1999. 238 U.S. Preventive Services Task Force, 1995. 239 Fiore, M.C.; Bailey, W.C.; Cohen, S.J.; et al. Smoking Cessation. Clinical Practice Guideline No. 18. AHCPR Pub. No. 96-0692. Rockville, MD: DHHS, AHCPR, 1996. 240 Kamb, Fishbein, Douglas, et al., 1998. 241 U.S. Preventive Services Task Force, 1995. 242 Kennedy, 1999. 243 Wiener, Illston and Hanley, 1994. 244 NCHS, unpublished data. 245 NCQA, 1997. 246 National Health Service, Center for Reviews and Dissemination. Getting evidence into practice. Effective Health Care 5(1):1-15, 1999. 247 Forrest, C.B., and Starfield, B. Entry into primary care and continuity: The effects of access. American Journal of Public Health 88:1334, 1998. 248 Ibid. 249 IOM, 1996. 250 Valanis, Bowen, Bassford, et al., 2000. 251 Koh, A.S. Use of preventive health behaviors by lesbian, bisexual, and heterosexual women: Questionnaire survey. Western Journal of Medicine 172(6):379-384, 2000. 252 Fethers, K.; Marks, C.; Mindel, A.; and Estcourt, C. Sexually transmitted infections and risk behaviors in women who have sex with women. Sexually Transmitted Infections 76:345-349 2000. 253 Skinner, W.F. The prevalence and demographic predictors of illicit and licit drug use among lesbians and gay men. American Journal of Public Health 84:1307-1310, 1994. 254 Xavier, 2000. 255 ActionAIDS, Inc.; Unity, Inc.; University of Pennsylvania, School of Social Work. Needs Assessment of Transgender People in Philadelphia for HIV/AIDS and other Health and Social Services. Philadelphia, PA: The HIV Commission of the Philadelphia EMA, Philadelphia Department of Public Health, 1997. 256 JSI Research and Training Institute, Inc., and the GLBT Health Access Project, 2000. 257 Mason, T.H.; Connons, M.M.; and Kammerer, C.A. Transgenders and HIV Risks: Needs Assessment. Boston, MA: Massachusetts Department of Public Health, HIV/AIDS Bureau, 1995. 258 McGowan, 1999. 92 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health Access to Quality Health Services 259 San Francisco Department of Public Health. The Transgender Community Health Project. San Francisco, CA: San Francisco Department of Public Health, 1999. 260 Garofalo, M.D.; Wolf, R.C.; Kessel, S.; et al. The association between health risk behaviors and sexual orientation among a school-based sample of adolescents. Pediatrics 101:185-902, 1998. 261 Diamant, A.L.; Schuster, M.A.; and Lever, J. Receipt of preventive health care services by lesbians. American Journal of Preventive Medicine 19(3):141-148, 2000. 262 Allen, Glicken, Beach and Naylor, 1998. 263 DHHS. Tracking Healthy People 2010. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, November 2000. 264 Moy, E.; Bartman, B.A.; and Weir, M.R. Access to hypertensive care: Effects of income, insurance, and source of care. Archives of Internal Medicine 155(14):1497-1502, 1995. 265 Ettner, 1996. 266 NCHS, unpublished data. 267 Fitzgerald, M., and Rostermundt, J. Lessons Learned 1998: Profiles of Leading Urban Health Department Initiatives in Maternal and Child Health, From the 1998 CityMatCH Urban MCH Leadership Conference. Omaha, NE: CityMatCH at the University of Nebraska Medical Center, 1998. 268 Lear, J.G.; Eichner, N.; and Koppelman, J. The growth of school-based health centers and the role of state policies: Results of a national survey. Archives of Pediatrics and Adolescent Medicine 153:1177-1180, November 1999. 269 Fitzgerald and Rostermundt, 1998. 270 Kennedy, 1999. 271 Starfield, B. Primary Care: Balancing Health Needs, Services and Technology. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1998. 272 Forrest and Starfield, 1998. 273 Forrest, C.B., and Starfield, B. The effect of first-contact care with primary care clinicians on ambulatory health care expenditures. Journal of Family Practice 43:40-48, 1996. 274 JSI Research and Training Institute, Inc., and the GLBT Health Access Project, 2000. 275 Jean, L.L. A ward of our own. The Advocate 7, 1998. 276 Lohman, Kennedy, Levin, et al., 2001. 277 DHHS, Healthy People 2010, 2000. 278 Weinick, Zuvekas, and Drilea, 1997. 279 Berk, M.L.; Schur, C.L.; and Cantor, J.C. Ability to obtain health care: Recent estimates from the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation National Access to Care Survey. Health Affairs 14(3):139-146, 1995. 280 Ibid. 281 Patterson, C. Lesbian mothers, gay fathers and their children. In: D’Augelli, A.R., and Patterson, C. (Eds.) Lesbian, gay, and bisexual identities across the lifespan: psychological perspectives. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1995. 282 Coolidge, L. Family ties: Fenway ’s alternative insemination program turns 15. Outlook Spring 1999. Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 93 Access to Quality Health Services 283 Wallace, Weise, Lawrence, et al., 1990. 284 Report on the population health perspective panel. Academic Medicine 74:138-141, 1999. 285 Klamen, D.L.; Grossman, L.S.; and Kopacz, D.R. Medical student homophobia. Journal of Homosexuality 37(1):53-63, 1999. 286 Oriel, K.A.; Madlon-Kay, K.F.; Govaker, D.; and Mersy, D.J. Gay and lesbian physicians in training: family practice program directors’ attitudes and students’ perception of bias. Family Medicine 28(10):720-725, 1996. 287 Gay and Lesbian Medical Association (GLMA). Anti-gay discrimination in medicine: Results of a national survey of lesbian, gay, and bisexual physicians. San Francisco, CA: GLMA, May 1994. 288 Brogan, D.J.; Frank, E.; Elon, L.; et al. Harassment of lesbians as medical students and physicians. Journal of the American Medical Association 282(13):1290-1292, 1999. 289 Culhane-Pera, K.A.; Like, R.C.; Lebensohn-Chialvo, P.; and Loewe, R. Multicultural curricula in family practice residencies. Family Medicine 32(3):167-173, 2000. 290 Eliason and Raheim, 2000. 291 Eliason, M.J. The prevalence and nature of bi-phobia in heterosexual undergraduate students. Archives of Sexual Behavior 26(3):317-326, 1997. 292 Harrison, 1996. 293 Townsend, M.J.; Wakick, M.M.; and Cambre, K.M. Follow-up survey of support services for lesbian, gay, and bisexual medical students. Academic Medicine 71(9):1012-1014, 1996. 294 Schneider, J.S., and Levin, S. Uneasy partners: the lesbian and gay healthcare community and the AMA. Journal of the American Medical Association 282(13):1287-1288, 1999. 295 U.S. Preventive Services Task Force, 1995. 296 Wallace, Wiese, Lawrence, et al., 1990. 297 DHHS, Healthy People 2010, 2000. 298 Komaromy, Grumbach, Drake, et al., 1996. 299 Cooper-Patrick, L.; Gallo, J.; Gonzales, J.; et. al. Race, gender, and partnership in the patient-physician relationship. Journal of the American Medical Association 282:583-589, 1999. 300 DHHS, Healthy People 2010, 2000. 301 Ibid. 302 Carillo, J.E.; Green, A.R.; and Betancourt, J.R. Crosscultural primary care: A patient-based approach. Annals of Internal Medicine 130(1):829-834, 1999. 303 Billings, J.; Anderson, G.M.; and Newman, L.S. Recent findings on preventable hospitalizations. Health Affairs 15(3):239-249, 1996. 304 Billings, J.; Zeitel, L.; Lukomnik, J.; et al. Impact of socioeconomic status on hospital use in New York City. Health Affairs 12(1):162-173, 1993. 305 Bindman, A.B.; Grumbach, K.; Osmond, D.; et al. Preventable hospitalizations and access to health care. Journal of the American Medical Association 274(4):305-311, 1995. 306 Weissman, J.S.; Gatsonis, C.; and Epstein, A.M. Rates of avoidable hospitalization by insurance status in Massachusetts and Maryland. Journal of the American Medical Association 268(17):2388-2394, 1992. 94 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health Access to Quality Health Services 307 AHRQ. Hospital Cost and Utilization Project (HCUP), State Inpatient Database (SID). Unpublished data, 1996. 308 IOM, 1993. 309 Dane, L.A. Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act: The anomalous right to health care. Health Matrix 8:3-28, 1998. 310 Josiah Macy, Jr. Foundation. The role of emergency medicine in the future of American medical care: summary of the conference. Annals of Emergency Medicine 25:230-233, 1995. 311 Young, C.J. Emergency! Says who?: Analysis of the legal issues concerning managed care and emergency medical services. Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy 13:553-579, 1997. 312 Young, G.P., and Lowe, R.A. Adverse outcomes of managed care gatekeeping. Academic Emergency Medicine 4:1129-1136, 1997. 313 National Highway Transportation and Safety Administration (NHTSA). Education Agenda for the Future: A Systems Approach (Final Version). Washington, DC: NHTSA, Department of Transportation, June 2000. 314 Ibid. 315 Litovitz, T.L.; Klein-Schwartz, W.; Caravati, E.M.; et al. Annual report of the American Association of Poison Control Centers: Toxic Exposure Surveillance System. American Journal of Emergency Medicine 17:435-487, 1999. 316 ASTHO. New Resources for Poison Control Centers: Issues and State Roles. ASTHO Brief January 18, 2001. 317 Zuvekas, A.; Nolan, L.S.; Azzouzi, A.; et al. An Analysis of Potential Economies of Scale of Poison Control Centers: Final Report. Washington, DC: Center for Health Policy Research, Georgetown University Medical Center, 1997. 318 Poison Control Center Advisory Work Group. Final Report. Atlanta, GAand Rockville, MD: National Center for Injury Prevention and Control, CDC, and Maternal and Child Health Bureau, HRSA, 1997. 319 Litovitz, Klein-Schwartz, Caravati, et al., 1999. 320 IOM, Committee on Injury Prevention and Control. In: Bonnie, R.J.; Fulco, C.E.; and Liverman, C.T. (Eds.) Reducing the Burden of Injury: Advancing Treatment and Prevention. Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1999. 321 Gentilello, L.M.; Rivera, F.P.; Donovan, D.M.; et al. Alcohol interventions in a trauma center as a means of reducing the risk of injury recurrence. Annals of Surgery 230:473-483, 1999. 322 HRSA. Model Trauma Care System Plan. Rockville, MD: HRSA, Division of Trauma and Emergency Medical Systems, 1992. 323 Bazzoli, G.J.; Madura, K.J.; Cooper, G.F.; et al. Progress in the development of trauma systems in the United States: Results of a national survey. Journal of the American Medical Association 273:395-401, 1995. 324 Bass, R.R.; Gainer, P.S.; and Carlini, A.R. Update on trauma system development in the United States. Journal of Trauma 47(Suppl. 3):515-521, 1999. 325 Havens, B., and Beland, F. (Eds.) Long-term care in five countries. Canadian Journal on Aging 15(Suppl. 1):1-102, 1996. 326 Wiener, Illston, and Hanley, 1994. 327 Estes, C.L., and Swann, J.H. The Long Term Care Crisis. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, 1993. Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 95 Access to Quality Health Services 328 Cahill, South, and Spade, 2000. 329 Jamison, G. Introduction to Transgender Issues in Transgender Equality: A Handbook for Activists and Policymakers. New York, NY: The Policy Institute of the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force Foundation, 2000. 330 Cahill, South, and Spade, 2000. 331 Bailey, R.W. Out and Voting II: The Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Vote in Congressional Elections, 1900- 1998. New York, NY: The Policy Institute of the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force Foundation, 2000. 332 Administration on Aging (AoA). Profile of Older Americans. Washington, DC: AoA, 1999. Available online at www.aoa.dhhs.gov/aoa/stats/profile/. 333 Rosenfeld, 1999. 334 Brookdale Center on Aging of Hunter College and Senior Action in a Gay Environment, 1999. 335 Pride Senior Network. LGBT seniors may be unable to access needed caregivers. Networker. New York: Pride Senior Network, 1-4, Summer/Fall 1999. 336 Cahill, South, and Spade, 2000. 337 Fairchild, S.K.; Carrino, G.E.; and Ramirez, M. Social workers’ perceptions of staff attitudes toward resident sexuality in a random sample of New York state nursing homes: A pilot study. Journal of Gerontological Social Work 26(1/2), 1996. 338 Cahill, South, and Spade, 2000. 339 Ibid. 340 IOM. Medicare: A Strategy for Quality Assurance. Vol. 1. Lohr, K.N., ed. Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1998. 341 President’s Advisory Commission on Consumer Protection and Quality in the Health Care Industry. Consumer Bill of Rights and Responsibilities—Report to the President. Washington, DC: the Commission, 1997. 342 Kane and Kane, 1987. 343 Halverson, P.K.; Kaluzny, A.D.; McLaughln, C.P.; et al., eds. Managed Care and Public Health. Gaithersburg, MD: Aspen Publishers, Inc., 1998. 344 IOM, 1996. 345 U.S. Preventive Services Task Force, 1995. 346 IOM, 1998. 347 U.S. Preventive Services Task Force, 1995. 348 Ibid. 96 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health C a n c e r Healthy People 2010 Goal Reduce the number of new cancer cases as well as the illness, disability, and death caused by cancer. O v e rv i e w Cancer is a serious health issue for many people, including lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) persons. Research suggests that LGBT people may be disproportionately affected by some types of cancers, including breast cancer, cancers related to acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS), lung cancer, and cancers caused by human papillomavirus (HPV). Data are needed on rates of these cancers in LGBT populations, with participants identified by sexual orientation and gender identity in population-based research efforts and data surveillance systems. Risk factors for these cancers are likely to vary by sexual orientation and gender identity status, and they need research attention. Heterosexism and homophobia in the health care system may make LGBT people less likely to receive needed prevention information and treatment. Therefore, research is needed to determine culturally appropriate methods of prevention- and treatment-oriented interventions for LGBT populations, so that targeted health education, care services, and planning policies can be implemented. Issues and Tre n d s Cancer is the second leading cause of death in the United States. During the year 2000, an estimated 1,220,100 persons in the United States were expected to be diagnosed with cancer, and 552,200 persons were expected to die from cancer.1 These estimates did not include most skin cancers, and new cases of skin cancer are estimated to exceed 1 million per year. One-half of new cases of cancer occur in people aged 65 and older.2 About 491,400 persons who get cancer in a given year, or 4 in 10 patients, are expected to be alive 5 years after diagnosis. When adjusted for normal life expectancy (accounting for factors such as dying of heart disease, injuries, and diseases of old age), a relative 5-year survival rate of 60 percent is seen for all cancers.3 This rate means that the chance of a Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health 97 Cancer person recently diagnosed with cancer being alive in 5 years is 60 percent of the chance of someone not diagnosed with cancer. Five-year relative survival rates commonly are used to monitor progress in the early detection and treatment of cancer and include persons who are living 5 years after diagnosis, whether in remission, disease-free, or under treatment. In addition to the human toll of cancer, the financial costs of cancer are substantial.4 Cancer prevention activities could reduce the burden of cancer if applied to the whole population and if health education and culturally competent prevention efforts are targeted toward subpopulations with an increased risk for certain types of cancers. Increasing evidence for screening and primary prevention efforts indicates several possibilities for prevention of breast, cervical, lung, and colorectal cancers. D i s p a r i t i e s Cancer death rates vary by gender, race, and ethnicity.5 The most relevant changes have been in lung cancer rates. Among males, lung cancer death rates have declined since 1990. In contrast, lung cancer death rates have continued to increase among females. Since 1987, more females have died from lung cancer than breast cancer. African Americans are about 34 percent more likely to die of cancer than are whites and more than two times more likely to die of cancer than are Asians and Pacific Islanders, American Indians, and Hispanics. 6 African American women are more likely to die of breast and colon cancers than are women of any other racial and ethnic group. The recent decrease in deaths from breast cancer in White females is attributed to greater use of breast cancer screening in regular medical care. However, deaths due to breast cancer in African American females continue to increase, in part, because breast cancer is diagnosed at later stages in African American females. African American men have the highest death rates of colon and rectal, lung, and prostate cancers. Age-adjusted lung cancer death rates are approximately 40 percent higher among African American males than White males. Little difference in age-adjusted lung cancer death rates has been observed between African American females and White females. Hispanics have higher rates of cervical, esophageal, gallbladder, and stomach cancers. New cases of female breast and lung cancers are increasing among Hispanics, who are diagnosed at later stages and have lower survival rates than Whites. Similarly, some specific forms of cancer affect other ethnic groups at rates higher than the national average (e.g., stomach and liver cancers among Asian American populations, colorectal cancer among Alaska Natives). Certain racial and ethnic groups have lower survival rates than Whites for most cancers.7 These differences in cancers and risks among racial and ethnic groups represent both a challenge to understand the reasons and an opportunity to reduce illness and death so to improve survival rates. Data on colorectal cancer show a decline in new cases and death rates in White males and females, stable new case rates in African Americans, and a continued rise in death rates in African American males. Five-year survival rates for the 1989–94 period are 64 percent in 98 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health Cancer Whites and 52 percent in African Americans.8 Early detection and treatment play a key role in these survival rates. Less is known about potential disparities in cancer rates among individuals of diverse sexual orientations, due primarily to the lack of collection of appropriate data in national registries and databases. Little is known about differential rates of cancer among women of diverse sexual orientations. Possible disparities regarding the health status of lesbians and possible barriers to access to health services by lesbians have been identified by the Institute of Medicine as a research priority.9 The January 2001 newsletter of the Mary-Helen Mautner Project for Lesbians with Cancer points out that “each year 23,000 women are diagnosed with ovarian cancer, and 14,000 die from the disease, making it the deadliest of the gynecologic cancers and the fifth leading cause of cancer death among women.”10 Although there are common risk factors for ovarian cancer among all women (e.g., personal or family history of ovarian, breast, and colon cancer; increasing age), additional factors are suspected to increase the risk of ovarian cancer for lesbians. Among these are not bearing children, not using oral contraceptives, barriers to access of health care or lower utilization of the health care system, and, possibly, use of fertility drugs.11 Because of the research on human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) and AIDS, much is known about rates of certain cancers (i.e., Kaposi’s sarcoma, anal cancer, lymphoma) in gay men. Relevant data are summarized later. O p p o rt u n i t i e s Evidence suggests that several types of cancer can be prevented and that the prospects for surviving cancer continue to improve. The ability to reduce cancer death rates depends, in part, on the existence and application of various types of resources. First, the means to Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health 99 Cancer provide culturally and linguistically appropriate information to the public and to health care providers on prevention, preventive clinical screens, early detection, and referral for treatment is essential. Second, mechanisms or systems must exist for providing people with access to state-of-the-art risk assessment, preventive services, and treatment. Where suitable, application for participation in clinical trials also should be encouraged. Third, a mechanism for maintaining continued research programs and for fostering new research is essential. Emerging information on genetic markers or environmental linkages that can be used to improve disease prevention strategies and healthy behavior counseling is emerging for many cancers and may provide the foundation for improved effectiveness in clinical care and preventive counseling services. There is a continuing and vital need to foster new partnerships and innovative research on both the causes of cancer (including genetic and environmental causes) and on methods to translate biologic and epidemiologic findings into effective prevention and control programs for use by publicly funded programs and community organizations. This will provide new opportunities for cancer prevention and control in the future and further reduce many burdens associated with cancer. This need can be met, in part, with the network of cancer control resources now in place. This network has the organizational and personnel capacity for various cancer interventions. Despite the extent of these resources, they alone are insufficient to reduce deaths from cancer. Gaps exist in information dissemination, information on optimal practice patterns and clinical guidelines, research capabilities, and research underway in other countries. These gaps must be recognized and filled to meet cancer prevention and control needs. It is estimated that 50 percent or more of cancer can be prevented through smoking cessation and improved dietary habits, such as reducing fat consumption and increasing fruit and vegetable consumption.12, 13 Physical activity and weight control also can contribute to cancer prevention.14, 15 These are all relevant to the LGBT community, due to potential differences in risk factor rates in this population as well as some behavioral characteristics of populations within the community (e.g., lesbians who tend to have a higher body mass than the general population of women, groups of men who have sex with men who glorify higher body weight and are known as “bears”). Scientific data from randomized trials of cancer screening together with expert opinions indicate that adherence to screening recommendations for cancers of the breast, cervix, and colon/rectum reduces deaths from these cancers. To reduce breast cancer deaths in the United States, a high percentage of females aged 40 and older need to comply with screening recommendations. A reduction in breast cancer deaths could be expected to occur after a delay of roughly 7 years.16 To reduce cervical cancer deaths, a high percentage of females in the United States aged 18 and older need to comply with screening recommendations. Evidence from randomized preventive trials is unavailable, but expert opinion suggests that a beneficial impact on cervical cancer death rates would be expected to occur after a delay of a few years. 100 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health Cancer Evidence shows that a reduction in colorectal cancer deaths can be achieved through detection and removal of precancerous polyps and treatment in the earliest stages of the disease. The findings from randomized, controlled trials indicate that biennial screening with fecal occult blood tests can reduce deaths from colorectal cancer by 15 to 21 percent in people aged 45 to 80.17, 18, 19, 20, 21 The efficacy of sigmoidoscopy has been supported by three case-control studies that showed reductions of 59 to 79 percent in colorectal cancer deaths from cancers within reach of the sigmoidoscope in persons aged 45 and older.22, 23, 24 In the past year, however, a preference appears to be emerging among some gastroenterologists for colonoscopy screening over sigmoidoscopy for screening individuals at higher risk for colorectal cancer and for preventive, baseline purposes among the unscreened total population over aged 50. Prostate cancer prevention strategies are not available at this time. Race and age are the only clearly identified risk factors for prostate cancer. African Americans and older men are at higher risk. There is no scientific agreement on the benefits of screening for prostate cancer, and screening is not recommended in the general population or in high-risk groups because it is unclear, in certain cases, if screening and treatment do more harm than good.25 Clinical trials currently are underway to assess the benefits and risks of screening and treatments, and additional research is needed to identify modifiable risk factors for prostate cancer. Melanoma and other skin cancers were expected to claim the lives of nearly 9,600 persons in the year 2000. 26 Evidence is still being weighed on whether routine skin examinations (by self or physician) decrease deaths from melanoma or other skin cancers. However, many of the skin cancers diagnosed each year could be prevented by limiting exposure to the sun, wearing protective clothing, and using sunscreen. For all cancers, treatments proven to increase survival are needed along with improved access to state-of-the-art screening and post-detection care. In addition to measurements of survival, indices of quality of life for both the short term and long term are important considerations. S u m m a ry of LGBT Researc h Preliminary data lend credence to the suggestion that gay men and lesbians are at increased risk for certain cancers, and that more research is needed to understand the natural history of the disease in lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and transsexual (through gender surgical reassignment) populations. Innovative studies in psychoneuroimmunology further suggest a direct association between psychological phenomena, reduced immunity, and tumor growth. Thus, gay men and lesbians who do not disclose their sexual orientation may be at increased risk for melanoma or other cancers due to psychogenic suppression of the immune response.27 Several investigators have hypothesized that lesbians are at higher risk for breast cancer than heterosexual women due to higher rates of risk factors, such as obesity, alcohol Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health 101 Cancer consumption, nulliparity, and lower rates of breast cancer screening.28, 29 Although definitive studies in this area have yet to be completed, data on prevalence of each of the risk factors confirm the plausibility of this hypothesis.30, 31 Lesbians also receive less frequent gynecologic care than heterosexual women 32 and therefore might be at greater risk for mortality and morbidity from gynecological cancers, especially ovarian cancer. Both of these risks are likely compounded by the difficulties many lesbians experience in communicating with or receiving standard clinical care from physicians and health care systems. Little is known about prevalence and incidence of other cancers among lesbians, but more research is needed. Even less is known about cancer in transsexual persons, and research is needed to determine rates, risk factors, and screening needs.33, 34 Among gay men, high rates of Kaposi’s sarcoma (KS) were some of the first described indicators of AIDS.35 Estimated risk for KS among gay and bisexual men was thousands of times higher than in the general population prior to approval of highly active antiretroviral therapies.36 This was a byproduct both of HIV’s weakening of the immune system and of the sexually transmitted nature of the herpes virus now thought to cause the cancer.37 The risk for AIDS-related non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma is also elevated among gay men, although at lower magnitudes. 38 Between 1973 and 1987, non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma incidence increased tenfold, and KS incidence increased more than five-thousandfold in single men aged 20 to 49 in San Francisco.39 Although highly active antiretroviral therapies have significantly reduced KS rates, 40 non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma remains among the AIDS- related malignancies that continue to occur at sharply higher rates among HIV-positive individuals. An increase in the incidence of Hodgkin’s disease has also been observed, but its association with HIV/AIDS is equivocal, and the disease is not included in the AIDS case definition.41 A cohort design, using studies of records in New York and California cancer registries and the National Death Index, found gay and bisexual men to be at excess risk for anal cancer, non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma, and Hodgkin’s disease. These accounted for an increased risk for all cancers in this population. The authors found no difference in the incidence of cancers in any other site, including lip, oral cavity, and pharynx; digestive system and peritoneum; respiratory system; bone and connective tissues; skin; genital and urinary organs; bone marrow (multiple myeloma); blood and tissues (leukemia); or other and unspecified sites. Although the authors determined that the increase in risk for both non- Hodgkin’s lymphoma and Hodgkin’s disease was related to increased incidence of HIV/AIDS among gay men, they found the increased risk for anal cancer to be unrelated to HIV/AIDS.42 Research suggests that risk factors for the excess incidence of anal cancer among men who have sex with men includes an increase in human papillomavirus (HPV) and anal squamous intraepithelial lesions—both of which are putative anal cancer precursors.43, 44, 45, 46 HPV has been found in both HIV-positive and HIV-negative men, but prevalence of infection is higher among HIV-positive men, with highest prevalence associated with the latest stages of HIV disease.47, 48 In a study of HIV-positive and HIV-negative gay and bisexual men, a high prevalence of HPV was observed (93 percent and 61 percent, respectively)—most of the 102 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health Cancer HPV-16 subtype. Infection with multiple HPV types was found in 73 percent of HIV- positive and 23 percent of HIV-negative men.49 Higher risk for HPV has been related to a history of receptive anal intercourse, rectal administration of recreational drugs,50 and a higher number of lifetime sexual partners.51 In addition to sexual behavior, smoking prevalence—which is sharply higher among gay men—increases the risk of anal cancer.52 Survival time among gay men with cancer may also be lower than the general population. One study found 5-year survival rates for non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma (9.8 percent) and Hodgkin’s disease (32.8 percent) was much shorter than the expected national rates (50.2 percent and 75.7 percent, respectively).53 The shorter-than-expected survival rate is probably related to HIV/AIDS comorbidity. Additional reasons for the lower survival rate may include delay in detection and treatment, possibly related to barriers in accessing care or communication with health care providers. The disparity in survival rate “highlights the need for rapid identification of such patients, and more effective approaches to detection and treatment of malignancies.”54 The use of rectal Pap tests for detection of HPV infections has been suggested as one such intervention,55 although further research needs to assess the association of HPV subtypes and anal cancer, and the efficacy of Pap tests in detection. Difficulty in assessing sexual orientation in the general population may lead to bias in studies of any existing studies on LGBT participants and their risk for various cancers. Available studies typically use study respondents who live in urban areas and are highly sexually active—usually of midlife age. It is not known to what extent the results are applicable to less sexually active, older, or younger LGBT populations. There are other negative impacts of homophobia and heterosexism. Because of the many barriers to health access outlined in this document, LGBT people may not receive adequate or optimally useful prevention information about cancer. For example, a health care provider may not be comfortable discussing sexuality with a patient, or the patient may fear disclosing information about sexual practices. In this situation, a gay man may not receive prevention education from his health care provider about the risk of anal cancer from HPV. Discussion of Healthy People 2010 Objectives Although the Cancer focus area objectives of Healthy People 2010 are for all people, the following section of this chapter identifies those Healthy People 2010 objectives seen as being of direct relevance to LGBT populations. The discussion of objectives 3-1, 3-2, 3-3, 3-4, 3-5, 3-7, and 3-8 has been collapsed into a single section. 3-1: Reduce the overall cancer death rate. 3-2: Reduce the lung cancer death rate. 3-3: Reduce the breast cancer death rate. 3-4: Reduce the death rate from cancer of the uterine cervix. Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 103 Cancer 3-5: Reduce the colorectal cancer death rate. 3-7: Reduce the prostate cancer death rate. 3-8: Reduce the rate of melanoma cancer deaths. Currently, no national-level, Federal health surveys incorporate sexual orientation or gender identity as a demographic or population variable in relevant data collection. It is commonly accepted that data collection on the health characteristics and health status of all smaller populations within the total population, particularly those with identified higher risk factors, could generate a wealth of new knowledge about additional health risks and health behaviors of racial, ethnic, and other populations. At this time, no national cancer registries collect data based on sexual orientation or gender identity, even though there is a need for data on the incidence and prevalence of various forms of cancer among LGBT individuals in the United States. Inclusion of sexual orientation measures in registries and large national surveys could answer many of the basic questions about potential disparities and point toward new research opportunities in addressing disparities in access to or the receipt of care or efficacy of preventive services. Likewise, to date, there has been no reporting or monitoring of non-AIDS cancer deaths among sexual minorities via national registries or large-scale epidemiological studies. As has been discussed, there is sufficient evidence to suggest that gay, lesbian, and bisexual individuals may be at increased risk for various forms of cancer. AIDS-related cancer deaths appear to be higher in gay men, although recent reports indicate a reduction in such deaths due to current AIDS therapy.5 6, 5 7 Rates of anal cancer are higher among gay men.5 8 One study has found higher rates of breast cancer among lesbians,but because the cohort was small and the research methodology was not population-based, the reliability of these findings have been q u e s t i o n e d . 5 9 Several recent studies have found higher risk of breast cancer among lesbians, using reasonable samples, but none have been truly population-based.6 0 Some data exist on possible higher risk factors among lesbians for other cancers (e.g., tobacco use, weight status, low screening rates), but there are only limited population-based data. There is discussion that lesbians may be at increased risk for ovarian cancer as well.6 1 There has been very little research concerning cancer among transgender persons. One population-based study from the Netherlands suggests that overall cancer morbidity and mortality rates among transsexuals are comparable to those of the general population.6 2 Nevertheless, transsexuals’ exposure to hormone therapy over an extended period of time might be expected to increase the risk of certain hormone-related cancers. For example, estrogen is a risk factor for cancer of the breast, and there have been four case reports of breast cancer in male-to-female transsexuals treated with estrogens.6 3, 6 4, 6 5 There have also been two case reports of ovarian cancer in female-to-male (FTM) transsexuals, and it has been suggested that testosterone therapy may be a risk factor for such cancers in FTM transsexuals.6 6 104 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health Cancer 3-10: Increase the proportion of physicians and dentists who counsel their at-risk patients about tobacco use cessation, physical activity, and cancer screening. There are no national data on the degree to which physicians and dentists recommend preventive measures or deliver clinical preventive screens for cancer among LGBT patients. However, there is a significant amount of data, cited in this document, to suggest that LGBT individuals have limited access to appropriate care, including culturally appropriate health education materials, cancer screening, and prevention counseling. There is also evidence that health care providers from a variety of disciplines are uncomfortable providing care to LGBT persons and therefore may not address LGBT-specific needs as well as general prevention strategies. 3-11: Increase the proportion of women who receive a Pap test. There are no national data on Pap test rates among women of other sexual orientation or gender i d e n t i t y. Recent survey data suggest lower Pap test rates among sexual minority women.6 7 H o w e v e r, little or no population-based data on lesbians, bisexual women, or male-to-female (MTF) transgender people are obtained through national-level surveys or studies. Data indicate that sexual behaviors between women can result in HPV transmission.68, 69 And there is some indication that lesbians and their providers may not perceive women who have sex with women as an at-risk group, contributing to a lack of Pap tests among sexual minority women. Cancer has been related to HPV infection. However, gay men, who are at higher risk for anal cancer, often do not receive preventive care, including Pap tests. For MTF transgender individuals, the belief among many providers that they are still biologically male may interfere with preventive gynecological care. Also, tissue remaining after sex reassignment may still produce cancer cells. FTM transgender people who have cervixes remain at risk for cervical cancer and require regular Pap tests. However, there are no existing data on actual risk. Specific guidelines for recommended prevention efforts have not been developed, but the Harry Benjamin International Gender Dysphoria Association recommends that transgender persons be screened for malignancies “as are all other persons.”70 MTF transsexuals who have undergone vaginoplasty also may not be perceived as being at risk. However, persons who have undergone penile-inversion vaginoplasty with the penile gland retained as a neocervix should be offered neocervical Pap tests because of the risk of penile cancer in this group.71 3-12: Increase the proportion of adults who receive a colorectal cancer screening examination. There are no national data on colorectal cancer screening rates among LGBT persons. Additional studies are needed to identify specific barriers that may inhibit early and appropriate screening among these groups. Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health 105 Cancer 3-13: Increase the proportion of women aged 40 and older who have received a mammogram within the preceding 2 years. Although there are no national data on rates of mammography among lesbian and bisexual women and transgender populations, existing data indicate that a possible disparity by sexual minority status may exist. Access barriers may inhibit appropriate mammography screening, and specific interventions should be designed for both providers and patients. Breast and cervical health programs funded by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention may serve as a potential model for replication in sexual minority communities, but no evaluation data on these programs have been published. 3-14: Increase the number of States that have a statewide population-based cancer registry that captures case information on at least 95 percent of the expected number of reportable cancers. No statewide registries currently collect data using sexual orientation or gender identity as demographic variables. Such variables would generate a wealth of new knowledge on LGBT populations, and would lay the foundation for future LGBT-specific prevention subobjectives. 3-15: Increase the proportion of cancer survivors who are living 5 years or longer after diagnosis. Although there are no data on long-term followup of sexual minority cancer survivors, it is reasonable to suggest that several barriers may affect the survivorship of LGBT populations. For example, a lack of community support, health care access barriers, and barriers in provider-patient communication may jeopardize the long-term survival of LGBT individuals diagnosed with cancer. Additional research is needed to verify that these are barriers for LGBT individuals and to design appropriate solutions that may increase longevity. There are currently a wide variety of demonstration projects that provide services to lesbians in large urban areas living with cancer. These cancer projects provide services for survivors of cancer and other chronic diseases. There is no available research on the efficacy of these projects, but their continued wide use and availability speaks to the role that they fill in communities. S e rv i c e s — R E C O M M E N D AT I O N S ■ All public health clinics and providers should participate in cultural competence training about sexual minority status and its effect on health and the provision of health care and related services. Federal funding for other types of provider situations should be contingent on the completion of cultural competency training. ■ LGBT-friendly and, where necessary, LGBT-specific services should be provided in all areas of cancer care, including prevention and health behavior change. 106 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health Cancer ■ Existing lesbian cancer projects should be reviewed for their appropriateness as models for care for all sexual minority people. Education and Tr a i n i n g — R E C O M M E N D ATIONS ■ Health professions organizations should address sexual orientation and gender identity concerns in continuing medical education courses, clinical guidelines, risk assessment, and screening policies. ■ Culturally appropriate interventions specific to LGBT health needs should be developed and made available to LGBT health centers, to other providers, and within the community itself. ■ Preventive services screening programs, both current and future, should explicitly promote access for people of other sexual orientation or gender identity. R e s e a rc h — R E C O M M E N D ATIONS ■ Additional research is needed to better understand disparities in cancer rates among LGBT populations and the degree to which potential disparities are associated with the lack of culturally appropriate prevention information and barriers to effective provider- patient communication. ■ Population-based studies are needed to increase knowledge of breast and other forms of cancer among lesbians and to confirm hypotheses that obesity, alcohol consumption, nulliparity, and lower rates of breast cancer screening are risk factors for lesbians. ■ Research is needed on how to target and market health education and health promotion programs successfully to diverse segments of the LGBT community. Te rminology C a n c e r : A term for diseases in which abnormal cells divide without control. Cancer cells can invade nearby tissue and can spread through the bloodstream and lymphatic system to other parts of the body. C a n c e r s c re e n i n g : Checking for changes in tissue, cells, or fluids that may indicate the possibility of cancer when there are no symptoms. Clinical trials: Research studies that evaluate the effectiveness of new treatment or disease prevention methods on patients. Fecal occult blood test: A test to check for small amounts of hidden blood in stool. Invasive cervical cancer: Cancer that has spread from the surface of the cervix to tissue deeper in the cervix or to other parts of the body. Malignant (malignancies): Cancerous. Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health 107 Cancer M a m m o g r a m : An x ray of the breast. M e l a n o m a : Cancer of the cells that produce pigment in the skin. Pap (Papanicolaou) test: Microscopic examination of cells collected from the cervix. The Pap test is used to detect cancer, changes in the cervix that may lead to cancer, and noncancerous conditions, such as infection or inflammation. Risk factor: Something that increases a person’s chance of developing a disease. S i g m o i d o s c o p y : A procedure in which the physician or health care provider looks inside the rectum and the lower part of the colon (sigmoid colon) through a flexible lighted tube. During the procedure, the physician or health care provider may collect samples of tissues or cells for closer examination. S t a g e : The size and extent of a cancer, including whether the disease has spread from the original site into surrounding tissue and other parts of the body. R e f e re n c e s 1 Landis, S.H.; Murray, T.; Bolden, S.; et al. Cancer statistics, 2000. CA: A Cancer Journal for Clinicians 50(1):2398-2424, 2000. 2 Ries, L.A.G.; Kosary, C.L.; Hankey, B.F.; et al. SEER Cancer Statistics Review, 1973–1996. Bethesda, MD: National Cancer Institute, 1999. 3 Landis, Murray, Bolden, et al., 2000. 4 Brown, M.L.; Hodgson, T.A.; and Rice, D.P. Economic impact of cancer in the United States. In: Schottenfeld, D., and Fraumeni, Jr., J.F.; eds. Cancer Epidemiology and Prevention. 2nd ed. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1996. 5 Wingo, P.A.; Ries, L.A.G.; Giovino, G.A.; et al. Annual report to the Nation on the status of cancer, 1973–1996, with a special section on lung cancer and tobacco smoking. Journal of the National Cancer Institute 91(8):675-690, 1999. 6 Landis, Murray, Bolden, et al., 1996. 7 Ibid. 8 Wingo, Ries, Giovino, et al., 1999. 9 Solarz, A., ed. Lesbian Health: Current Assessment and Directions for the Future 1999. Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1999. 10 Boyd, N.C. Lesbians and Ovarian Cancer: Ending the Epidemic of Silence. Washington, DC: Mary-Helen Mautner Project for Lesbians with Cancer, January 2001. 11 Ibid. 12 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS). The Health Benefits of Smoking Cessation. DHHS Publication No. CDC 90-8416. Atlanta, GA: Public Health Service, Centers for Disease Control, Center for Chronic Disease Prevention and Health Promotion, Office on Smoking and Health, 1990. 13 Willet, W. Diet and nutrition. In: Schottenfeld, D., and Fraumeni, Jr., J.F.; eds. Cancer Epidemiology and Prevention. 2nd ed. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1996, 438-461. 108 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health Cancer 14 Greenwald, P.; Kramer, B.; and Weed, D.L.; eds. Cancer Prevention and Control. New York, NY: Marcel Dekker, 303-327, 1995. 15 DHHS. Physical Activity and Health: A Report of the Surgeon General. Atlanta, GA: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), 1996. 16 Fletcher, S.W.; Black, W.; Harris, R.; et al. Report of the International Workshop on Screening for Breast Cancer. Journal of the National Cancer Institute 85(20):1644-1656, 1993. 17 Kronborg, O.; Fenger, C.; Olsen, J.; et al. Randomized study of screening for colorectal cancer with faecal- occult-blood test. Lancet 348(9640):1467-1471, 1996. 18 Hardcastle, J.D.; Chamberlain, J.O.; Robinson, M.H.E.; et al. Randomized controlled trial of faecal-occult- blood screening for colorectal cancer. Lancet 348(9040):1472-1477, 1996. 19 Mandel, J.S. Reducing mortality from colorectal cancer by screening for fecal occult blood. Journal of the National Cancer Institute 91(5):434-437, 1999. 20 Mandel, J.S.; Bond, J.H.; Church, T.R.; et al. Reducing mortality from colorectal cancer by screening for fecal occult blood. New England Journal of Medicine 328(19):1365-1371, 1993. 21 Winawer, S.; Fletcher, R.; Miller, L.; et al. Colorectal cancer screening: Clinical guidelines and rationale. Gerontology 112:594-642, 1997. 22 Selby, J.V.; Freidman, G.D.; Quesenberry, Jr., C.P.; et al. A case-control study of screening sigmoidoscopy and mortality from colorectal cancer. New England Journal of Medicine 326(10):653-657, 1992. 23 Muller, A.D., and Sonnenberg, A. Protection by endoscopy against death from colorectal cancer—A case- control study among veterans. Archives of Internal Medicine 155:1741-1748, 1995. 24 Newcomb, P.A.; Norfleet, R.G.; Storer, B.E.; et al. Screening sigmoidoscopy and colorectal cancer mortality. Journal of the National Cancer Institute 84(20):1572-1575, 1992. 25 Alexander, F.E.; Edinburgh, G.L.; Andriole, G.L.; et al. Rationale for randomized trials of prostate cancer screening. European Journal of Cancer 35(2):262-271, 1999. 26 Landis, Murray, Bolden, et al., 1996. 27 Cole, S.W.; Kemeny, M.E.; Talyor, S.E.; and Visscher, B.R. Elevated physical risk among gay men who conceal their homosexual identity. Health Psychology 15:243-251, 1996. 28 Haynes, S. Breast cancer risk: Comparisons of lesbians and heterosexual women. In: Bowen, D.J., ed. Cancer and Cancer Risks Among Lesbians. Seattle, WA: Fred Hutchinson Cancer Research Center Community Liaison Program, 1995. 29 Denenburg, R. Report on lesbian health. Women’s Health Issues 5(2):181-191, 1995. 30 Dibble, S.L.; Vanoni, J.M.; and Miaskowski, C. Women’s attitudes toward breast cancer screening procedures: Differences by ethnicity. Women’s Health Issues 7(1):47-54, 1997. 31 Valanis, B.; Bowen, D.J.; Bassford, T.; et al. Sexual orientation and health: Comparison in the Women’s Health Initiative samples. Archives of Family Medicine, in press. 32 Robertson, P., and Schacter, J. Failure to identify venereal disease in a lesbian population. Sexually Transmitted Diseases 8(20):75-76, 1981. 33 Balen, A.H.; Schachter, M.E.; Montgomery, D.; et al. Polycystic ovaries are a common finding in untreated female to male transsexuals. Clinical Endocrinology 38(3):325-329, 1993. 34 Lawrence, A.A. Vaginal neoplasia in a male-to-female transsexual: Case report, review of the literature, and recommendations for cytological screening. Submitted for publication. Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health 109 Cancer 35 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Kaposi’s sarcoma and Pneumocystis among homosexual men—New York City and California. Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report 30:305-308, 1981. 36 Koblin, B.A.; Hessol, N.A.; Zauber, A.G.; et al. Increased incidence of cancer among homosexual men, New York City and San Francisco, 1978-1990. American Journal of Epidemiology 144:916-923, 1996. 37 Martin, J.N.; Ganem, D.E.; Osmond, D.H.; et al. Sexual transmission and the natural history of human herpesvirus 8 infection. New England Journal of Medicine 338:948-954, 1998. 38 Koblin, Hessol, Zauber, et al., 1996. 39 Rabkin, C.S.; Biggar, R.J.; and Horn, J.W. Increasing incidence of cancers associated with the human immunodeficiency virus epidemic. International Journal of Cancer 47:692-696, 1991. 40 Buchbinder, S.P.; Holmberg, S.D.; Scheer, S.; et al. Combination antiretroviral therapy and incidence of AIDS related malignancies. Journal of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndromes 21(suppl 1):S23-S26, August 1, 1999. 41 Koblin, Hessol, Zauber, et al., 1996. 42 Ibid. 43 Beckman, A.M.; Daling, J.R.; Sherman, K.J.; et al. Human papillomavirus infection and anal cancer. International Journal of Cancer 43:1042-1049, 1989. 44 Breese, P.L.; Judson, F.N.; Penley, K.A.; and Douglas, J.M. Anal human papillomavirus infection among homosexual and bisexual men: Prevalence of type specific infection and association with human immunodeficiency virus. Sexually Transmitted Diseases 22:7-14, 1995. 45 Daling, J.R.; Weiss, N.S.; Hislop, G.; et al. Sexual practices, sexually transmitted diseases and the incidence of anal cancer. New England Journal of Medicine 17(3):317-321, 1987. 46 Melbye, M.; Rabkin, C.; Frisch, M.; and Biggar, R.J. Changing patterns of anal cancer incidence in the United States, 1940-1989. American Journal of Epidemiology 139(8):772-780, 1994. 47 Breese, Judson, Penley, and Douglas, 1995. 48 Melbye, Rabkin, Frisch, and Biggar, 1994. 49 Palefsky, J.M.; Holly, E.A.; Ralston, M.L.; and Jay, N. Prevalence and risk factors for human papillomavirus infection of the anal canal in human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) positive and HIV negative homosexual men. Journal of Infectious Diseases 177:361-367, 1998. 50 Ibid. 51 Breese, Judson, Penley, and Douglas, 1995. 52 Daling, Weiss, Hislop, et al., 1987. 53 Koblin, Hessol, Zauber, et al., 1996. 54 Ibid. 55 Palefsky, Holly, Ralston, and Jay, 1998. 56 Koblin, B.A.; Hessol, N.A.; Zauber, A.G.; et al. Increased incidence of cancer among homosexual men, New York City and San Francisco, 1978-1990. American Journal of Epidemiology 144:916-923, 1996. 57 CDC, 1981. 58 Koblin, Hessol, Zauber, et al., 1996. 110 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health Cancer 59 Dibble, Vanoni, and Miaskowski, 1997. 60 Valanis, Bowen, Bassford, et al., in press. 61 Mary-Helen Mautner Project for Lesbians with Cancer, 2001. 62 van Kesteren, P.J.; Asscheman, H.; Megans, J.A.J.; and Gooren, L.J.G. Mortality and morbidity in transsexual subjects treated with cross-sex hormones. Clinical Endocrinology (Oxford) 47(3):337-342, 1997. 63 Symmers, W.S. Carcinoma of breast in trans-sexual individuals after surgical and hormonal interference with the primary and secondary sex characteristics. British Medical Journal 2(597):82-85, 1968. 64 Pritchard, T.J.; Pankowsky, D.A.; Crowe, J.P.; and Abdul-Karim, F.W. Breast cancer in a male-to-female transsexual. A case report. Journal of the American Medical Association 259(15):2278-2280, 1988. 65 Ganly, I., and Taylor, E.W. Breast cancer in a trans-sexual man receiving hormone replacement therapy. British Journal of Surgery 82(3):341, 1995. 66 Hage, J.J.; Dekker, J.J.; Karim, R.B.; et al. Ovarian cancer in female-to-male transsexuals: Report of two cases. Gynecologic Oncology 76(3):413-415, 2000. 67 Valanis, Bowen, Bassford, et al., in press. 68 Marrazzo, J. STDs and cervical neoplasia among lesbians: Research review and update. Presentation at the 19th Annual National Lesbian and Gay Health Association Conference, Seattle, WA, July 1996. 69 O’Hanlan, K.A., and Crum, C.P. Human papillomavirus-associated cervical intraepithelial neoplasia following lesbian sex. Obstetric Gynecology 88(4,2):702-703, 1996. 70 Harry Benjamin International Gender Dysphoria Association. The Standards of Care for Gender Identity Disorders. Dusseldorf, Germany: Symposion Publishing, 1998. 71 Lawrence, submitted for publication. Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 111 112 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health Educational and Community-Based P ro g r a m s Healthy People 2010 Goal Increase the quality, availability, and effectiveness of educational and community-based programs designed to prevent disease and improve health and quality of life. O v e rv i e w Educational and community-based programs have an important role in improving the health of the community and, particularly, in reaching people outside traditional health settings. Educational and community-based programs present exemplary opportunities for health promotion, health education, fostering health behaviors, and improving quality of life. Healthy People 2010 focuses on health promotion and health education programs in four basic settings: the school, the worksite, the health services setting, and the community overall. The Healthy People 2010 Educational and Community-Based Programs objectives focus on creating and seizing opportunities within the different settings to improve the health of the community and the quality of life for all residents. Within all living, learning, and working environments, people experience conflict and stress throughout their lives. A certain amount of conflict and stress is viewed as normal and is a natural part of the learning, growth, and maturation processes. There are types of conflict and stress, however, that are highly unpleasant experiences with lasting, negative effects. Conflict may arise between people for many different reasons, but often is due to different beliefs, values, and needs. So, too, people have different responses to negative conflict and stress, such as avoidance, internalization, and confrontation. Unfortunately, our schools and communities have become potential sites for confrontational violence. Lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) students, children of LGBT individuals, and students who are perceived as not being heterosexual often are targets of verbal harassment and, sometimes, physical confrontation. One thing on which all community leadership, students, parents, guardians, and school personnel agree is that schools and other educational facilities must be safe. To this end, communities and school settings have an important role in educating people, Educational and Community-Based Programs especially children, about conflict and stress and about similarities and differences between people. And that understanding the nature of conflict can be a positive learning experience. The health and quality of life for LGBT people, like other people, is enriched by educational and community-based programs—not simply a well-functioning health and medical care system. Positive attitudinal and health status changes most often occur within all communities when partnerships are formed between a variety of organizations with shared interests. Whereas schools are natural settings for reaching children and youth, worksites reach most adults. Unfortunately, although the workplace is a convenient setting for health promotion activities, it also can be a source of stress and conflict, especially for LGBT people. Antigay bias can affect the entire workforce and harm both individual and corporate productivity.1 Representatives and expertise from across communities need to be involved with the organizations conducting health-related research, to ensure that the content of the health promotion and health education efforts developed is tailored to meet the needs of their communities and the populations served. Communities also need to be involved to enhance the appropriateness and sustainability of science-based interventions and prevention programs and to ensure that the lessons of research are transferred back to the community. Issues and Tre n d s Communities experiencing the most success in addressing health and quality of life issues have involved many, if not most, components of their community: public health, health care, business, local government, schools, civic organizations, voluntary health organizations, faith organizations, park and recreation departments, and other interested groups and private citizens. Communities eager to improve the health of specific at-risk groups have found that they are more likely to be successful if they work collaboratively within their communities and if the social and physical environments are conducive to supporting healthy changes. Because many health problems relate to more than one behavioral risk factor as well as to social and environmental factors, communities with effective programs also work to improve health by addressing the multiple determinants of a health problem. Among the more effective community health promotion programs are those that implement comprehensive intervention plans with multiple intervention strategies (e.g., educational, policy, environmental) within various settings (e.g., the community overall, health care facilities, schools [including colleges and universities], worksites).2, 3, 4, 5 Four basic settings—schools, worksites, health care facilities, and the community—serve as locations in which to reach desired audiences and to apply strategies or intervention across populations. Each of the settings has multiple components, increasing the venues for interventions. These settings also provide major social structures for intervening at the policy level to facilitate healthful choices.6 For example, the school library is an integral part of education that permeates the continuum of education from the elementary level to the doctoral level. Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 113 Educational and Community-Based Programs The school setting. The school setting, ranging from preschool to university, is an important avenue to reach the entire population and specifically to educate children and youth. Schools have more influence on the lives of young people than any other social institution, except the family, and provide a setting in which friendship networks develop, socialization occurs, and norms that govern behavior are developed and reinforced. In 1997, the Institute of Medicine advised that students should receive the health-related education and services necessary for them to derive maximum benefit from their education and enable them to become healthy, productive adults.7 To ensure that all students receive the maximum benefits from federally conducted educational programs, on June 23, 2000, President William Clinton issued Executive Order 13160, which prohibits sexual orientation-based discrimination in federally conducted education and training programs.8 Executive Order 13160 also prevents discrimination based on status as a parent. The order, however, applies only to programs run by the Federal Government. It does not apply to State and locally operated educational systems that only receive Federal funding. However, some States (such as California, Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Wisconsin) and local school districts have enacted their own antidiscrimination laws. The Commonwealth of Massachusetts provides funding and legislation for a safe- schools teacher-training program.9 Massachusetts also contracts with several organizations, including the Gay, Lesbian, and Straight Education Network (GLSEN), to teach adult training on violence prevention, suicide prevention, and LGBT issues. Educating teachers contributes to a safer, more informed environment for all students, but especially for students perceived or known to be LGBT or for children of LGBT parents. GLSEN also offers training and education to students. Through its chapters in 40 States, GLSEN tailors the training according to the needs of schools and communities. Information on this program can be found online at www.glsen.org. Each school day, about 48 million youth in the United States attend almost 110,000 elementary and secondary schools for about 6 hours of classroom time. More than 95 percent of all youth aged 5 to 17 are enrolled in school. Schools are second only to homes among the primary places that children spend their time and thus are one of the significant places where children may be exposed to potentially harmful environmental conditions. Violence has motivated some schools to address the issue of school safety, especially the 114 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health The Gay and Lesbian Parent Te a c h e r Student Association (GLPTSA) of Greater Puget Sound in Wa s h i n g t o n State was founded by a parent who acted because of the treatment she observed her gay son experiencing within the Seattle school district. GLPTSA, numbering 251 parent and s t a ff members, is involved in such standard PTA activities as playground cleanups and school carnivals. GLPTSA is an organizational member of the Safe Schools Coalition of Washington State. This is a public-private partnership of agencies and individuals. Its mission is to help make Washington State schools safe places in which every family can belong, every educator can teach, and every child can learn, regardless of gender identity or sexual orientation. More information is available online at w w w. s a f e s c h o o l s - w a . o r g / s a f e . h t m l. Educational and Community-Based Programs overt and covert acts of violence directed at LGBT students, children of LGBT individuals, and students who are perceived as not being heterosexual—all of whom are often targets of verbal harassment or physical confrontation. During high school, national dropout rates average 12 percent. Prior to high school, dropouts are nearly nonexistent. 10, 11, 12 Because healthy children learn better than children with health problems, schools also have an interest in addressing the health needs of students. Although schools alone cannot be expected to address the health and social problems of youth, they can provide, through their climate and curriculum, a focal point for efforts to reduce health-risk behaviors and improve the health status of youth.13 More than 12 million students currently are enrolled in the Nation’s 3,600 colleges and universities.14 Thus, colleges and universities are important settings for reducing health-risk behaviors among many young adults. Health clinics at the postsecondary level can help empower students to take responsibility for their own health through education, prevention, early detection, and treatment. The worksite setting. The growing cost of health care, combined with the increase of preventable acute and chronic illnesses, drives the continuing need for comprehensive worksite health promotion programs. The worksite setting provides an opportunity to implement educational programs, policies, and environmental actions that support health, which benefits managers, employees, and the community as a whole. These programs have become an integral part of corporate plans to reduce health care costs, improve worker morale, decrease absenteeism, and improve behaviors associated with increased worker productivity.15 Although reductions in health risks have been achieved through many worksite health promotion programs, risk reduction for hourly and part-time workers and companies with fewer than 50 employees has lagged.16 Much of the debate about LGBT people in the workplace centers around discrimination, stigma, and concomitant health problems. Nondiscrimination bills have been considered in recent years in more than 18 States and in the U.S. Congress.17 The need for systematic research is tantamount. But even without such research, companies need harmonious workplaces to maintain productivity and profit. When diversity is valued, the workplace is a site of health, wellness, and vitality. Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 115 The Commonwealth of Massachusetts provides funding and legislation for a safe-schools teacher-training program. Massachusetts also contracts with several organizations, including the G a y, Lesbian, and Straight Education Network (GLSEN), to teach adult training on violence prevention, suicide prevention, and LGBT issues. Educating teachers contributes to a safer, more informed environment for all students, but especially for students perceived or known to be LGBT or for children of L G B T parents. GLSEN also off e r s training and education to students. Through its chapters in 40 States, GLSEN tailors the training according to the needs of schools and communities. Information on this program can be found online at w w w. g l s e n . o r g. Educational and Community-Based Programs The health care setting. In health care facilities—such as hospitals, medical and dental clinics, and offices—health care providers often see their patients at a teachable moment. Individualized education and counseling by health care providers at such moments in these settings have been shown to have positive and clinically significant effects on behavior in persons with chronic and acute conditions.18 (See Access to Quality Health Services.) Providers must be cognizant of these opportunities and prepared to provide appropriate patient education. Institutions that employ providers also must allow sufficient time and training for patient education and counseling to occur. The health care setting is critical to the delivery of health education and health promotion because of the dramatic change it has undergone since 1990. In 1989, 18 percent of the population reported they were covered by some form of managed care; 19 in 1996, that number had risen to 29 percent, an increase of 57 percent. As of June 1999, the number had jumped to 70 percent. As of January 1, 1997, more than 4.9 million Medicare beneficiaries were enrolled in managed care plans, accounting for 13 percent of the total Medicare program and representing a 108-percent increase in managed care enrollment since 1993. As of June 30, 1998, more than 16 million—or 54 percent—of Medicaid beneficiaries were enrolled in managed care programs. The community setting. Whereas health promotion in schools, health care centers, and worksites provides targeted interventions for specific population groups, community-based programs can reach the entire population. Broad public concern and support are vital to the functioning of a healthy community and to ensure the conditions in which people can be healthy.20 Included in the community setting are public facilities, local government and agencies, and social service, faith, and civic organizations that provide channels to reach people where they live, work, and play. These venues can be strong advocates for educational, policy, and environmental changes throughout the community. Places of worship may be a particularly important setting for health promotion initiatives, and they may effectively reach some underserved populations. Approaches to prevention must account for the character of the community and ensure community participation in the process.21 Valuable and effective health benefits of community-based approaches have been demonstrated by community interventions that have served a variety of ethnic, racial, and socioeconomic population groups.22, 23, 24 Community-based approaches in conjunction with targeted approaches in schools, health care settings, and worksites increase the likelihood for success to improve personal and community health. D i s p a r i t i e s The U.S. population is composed of many diverse groups. Evidence indicates a persistent disparity in the health status of racially and culturally diverse populations, as well as other unserved or underserved groups, as compared with the overall health status of the Nation. Over the next decade, the demographic composition of the United States will become more racially and ethnically diverse, thereby increasing the need for effective prevention programs tailored to specific community needs. Poverty, inadequate access to quality health services, and the lack of culturally competent and linguistically accessible health and 116 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health Educational and Community-Based Programs preventive services also are underlying factors that must be addressed. (See Access to Quality Health Services.) Given these disparities, the need for appropriate interventions is clear. Effective prevention programs in diverse communities must be tailored to community needs and take into consideration individual factors, such as disability status, sexual orientation and gender identification, and gender appropriateness. These attributes play a significant role in determining health outcomes, behaviors, patterns of health services use, and attitudes across age, racial, and ethnic groups. Despite some strong rhetoric by a number of organizations and a few influential people, recent data challenge the notion that the United States is totally antigay.25 This 3-decade move toward opportunity is tempered by several findings. First, although most people who were polled believe that gay and lesbian people should have equal civil rights, they also continue to rank gay people among the most disliked groups of people in the country. And secondly, no public opinion data have been collected nationally on bisexual and transgender persons. Thus, anti-LGBT societal attitudes, coupled with overt and covert acts of discrimination against LGBT people, perpetuate disparities and limit opportunities. O p p o rt u n i t i e s Health promotion programs need to be sensitive to the diverse cultural norms and beliefs of the people for whom the program has been developed. Achieving such sensitivity is a continuing challenge as the Nation’s population becomes increasingly diverse. To ensure that interventions are culturally appropriate, linguistically accessible, and appropriate for the needs of racial, ethnic, gender, sexual orientation and gender identity, disability status, and age groups within the community, members of the populations served and their gatekeepers must be involved in the community assessment and planning process. Community assessment helps to identify the cultural traditions and beliefs of the community as well as the education, literacy level, and language preferences necessary for the development of appropriate materials and programs. In addition, a community assessment can help identify levels of social capital and community capacity. Such assessments help identify the skills, resources, and abilities needed to manage health improvement programs in communities.26, 27 Educational and community-based programs must be supported by accurate, appropriate, and accessible information that is firmly grounded in the latest scientific knowledge. Increasing evidence supports the efficacy and effectiveness of health education and health promotion in schools, worksites, health care facilities, and community-based programming.28 Gaps in research include the dissemination and diffusion of effective programs, new technologies, policies, relationships between settings, and approaches to disadvantaged and special populations. 29 Beginning in 1990, the Bureau of the Census30 allowed respondents to identify as unmarried partners. Of the roughly 14.2 million households who completed the long-form census Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 117 Educational and Community-Based Programs questionnaire, there are 17,043 same-sex couples identified as unmarried partners, of whom 9,241 are male and 7,802 are female. Some of the demographic characteristics are evidence that same-sex couples identified from the census are quite distinct from the general population—the most notable characteristic being more highly educated than the rest of the population.31 Techniques to evaluate community processes and community health improvement methods and models need to be refined and disseminated so that other communities can learn from and duplicate successful strategies. Issues of partnering and the role of collaborative efforts to increase the capacity of individuals and communities to achieve long-term outcomes and improvements in health status are not fully understood32 and should be evaluated. Mechanisms need to be developed to share what is learned in an appropriate and timely manner with communities. S u m m a ry of LGBT Researc h Due to the lack of information about LGBT health issues in traditional education, health care organizations, government agencies, and private-sector systems, LGBT communities and their supporters began promoting awareness of sexual orientation and gender identity health issues in the 1950s. Early efforts focused on declassifying homosexuality as a medical illness,33 and eventually homosexuality was removed from the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders of the American Psychiatric Association.34 LGBT communities also created a myriad of professional and volunteer health care initiatives designed to offer nonjudgmental education and services about sexually transmitted diseases (STDs) and mental health concerns related to coming out and social stigma. “Lesbian health nights” were established at several women’s health clinics, 35 while gay counseling sessions, peer education groups, and STD screenings were created at mainstream, nongay community health facilities. With the advent of the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) and acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS) epidemic, efforts were undertaken to expand mainstream health organizations and to establish organizations focusing specifically on lesbian and gay health education, treatment, and advocacy.36, 37 LGBT health encompasses a multiplicity of health care needs, including HIV/AIDS, mental health, cancer, violence, and other serious public health challenges. Many of these LGBT- focused, community-based programs are working to address these needs in a comprehensive, coordinated, and culturally competent way.38 Some government agencies, professional associations, and mainstream health care organizations also have begun to respond to the unique health care needs of LGBT persons and families. However, studies indicate that many LGBT individuals rely on LGBT-focused community resources and professional organizations to address LGBT-related health needs.39 The reliance by LGBT persons and families on LGBT community-based resources, however, is not unlike non- LGBT individuals who recognize that health-related solutions fundamentally are at the community level and grounded in prevention and public health. 118 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health Educational and Community-Based Programs LGBT persons and their families share health promotion and medical needs in common with their non-LGBT counterparts, but they also have some LGBT-specific health care needs. For LGBT individuals, what is often an issue is not as much the LGBT-related needs as the prevailing attitudes and assumptions carried into the provider encounter, the perceived environment in which health care services are delivered, and the anticipation of negative experiences with providers. Such perceptions and negative anticipations may cause individuals to fail to seek out and act upon health promotion knowledge that could be lifesaving, such as mammography, Pap tests, prostate examinations, and other routine clinical screenings. Discussion of Healthy People 2010 Objectives 7-1: Increase high school completion. Many LGBT students are at risk for dropping out of school because of harassment and violence.40, 41 There is increasing evidence that young people who leave their neighborhoods and homes may be at higher risk for STDs and HIV infection.42 Data from the 1999 Massachusetts Youth Risk Behavior Survey43 show that youth who self- identified as lesbian, gay, or bisexual, or who had a history of same-sex sexual behavior reported significantly higher rates of school-related violence than their peers. The study also revealed that sexual minority youth were more than two times as likely as heterosexual youth to have been in a physical fight at school and three times more likely to have been threatened or injured with a weapon at school in the past year. Sexual minority youth also were more than three times as likely as their peers to have carried a weapon to school in the past month, or to have skipped school in the past month because they did not feel safe.44 Additional analysis of these data showed that gay and bisexual boys in particular reported higher levels of skipping school because they did not feel safe in the school setting.45 Schools need to provide a safe space for LGBT youth to socialize and create social ties. In October 2000, Parents, Families, and Friends of Lesbians and Gays (PFLAG) launched a new safe schools campaign, “From Our House to the School House: A Recipe for Safe Schools.” The campaign unites PFLAG chapters, representatives, and State councils in creating a wave of safe schools activities. In addition, PFLAG is forming coalitions with other local groups committed to creating safe school environments. The first step in this campaign is to conduct school and community assessments to determine the climate in Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 119 To help LGBT youth stay in school, the Massachusetts Department of Education and the Governor’s Commission on Gay and Lesbian Youth developed in 1993 the Safe Schools Program for gay and lesbian students. The program supports school e fforts to implement Board of Education recommendations to develop and maintain antiharrassment policies to protect sexual minorities; to provide training for school personnel; to develop school-based groups for gay, lesbian, and heterosexual students; and to provide support for family members of lesbian and gay students. More information on this program can be found online at w w w. d o e . m a s s . e d u / l s s / p r o g r a m / s s c h . h t m l. Educational and Community-Based Programs schools and school districts toward the safety of LGBT students. More information on PFLAG is available online at www.pflag.org. Antidiscrimination legislation draws attention to the need to improve the school environment for both LGBT students and children of LGBT families. The California Student Safety and Violence Prevention Act of 200046 adds real or perceived sexual orientation and real or perceived gender identity to the State education antidiscrimination code. California was the fourth State to include sexual orientation in such a code, following Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Wisconsin. California was the first State to include gender- related harassment by specifying that all schools receiving Federal funding, with the exception of religious schools that choose to abstain, are required to comply.47 Recreational programs can play an important role in decreasing the isolation that LGBT young people experience.48 In addition to addressing the effect of isolation by increased physical or recreational activities, schools should provide diversity training on sexuality development to school professionals and paraprofessionals. The training should include strategies for confronting homophobia, assisting parent(s) or guardians in creating safe environments, counseling victims of bias-related violence, and demystifying homosexuality.49 Suicide among LGBT youth is well documented. 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57 A summary of homophobia-related suicide from the 1995 Seattle Teen Health Risk Survey is available online at www.safeschools-wa.org/quant_mh.html. Administrators, teachers, social workers, counselors, and nurses must be trained to identify issues that put LGBT youth at high risk for suicide. Quality counseling should be provided for LGBT youth who need and want it. LGBT youth experience unique stressors that the school system must address in an affirmative manner.58, 59, 60 Refusal to attend school is a common problem in visibly transgender adolescents. According to the Harry Benjamin International Gender Dysphoria Association, collaboration between school officials and treating professionals may be necessary if transgender adolescents are to continue their education. 61 Early hormonal interventions in profoundly transgender adolescents may contribute to school completion because treatment delays commonly result in educational and social delays.62 7-2: I n c rease the pro p o rtion of middle, junior high, and senior high schools that provide comprehensive school health education to pre v e n t health problems in the following areas: unintentional injury; violence; suicide; tobacco use and addiction; alcohol or other drug use; unintended pre g n a n c y, HIV/AIDS, and STD infection; unhealthy dietary p a t t e rns; inadequate physical activity; and environmental health. Schools provide an ideal setting for comprehensive sex education, including issues on sexual orientation and gender identity, to reduce the risk for HIV/AIDS, drug use, and teen pregnancies. Adolescence has shown to be a time of heightened increase in risk-taking behaviors. Adolescence also is a time of sexual development and maturation. LGBT youth 120 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health Educational and Community-Based Programs are at risk for STDs and HIV/AIDS.63 (See HIV/AIDS focus area and Sexually Transmitted Diseases focus area.) Although schools may provide an opportunity for comprehensive HIV education and prevention, one study found that only 53.5 percent of gay, lesbian, and bisexual youth who skipped school reported receiving AIDS education in school, compared to 86.5 percent of their heterosexual peers.64 Transgender youth appear to be at increased risk in many of the six priority health risk behavior areas, notably violence, suicide, drug and alcohol use, and HIV/AIDS and other STDs.65, 66, 67, 68 However, transgender persons frequently report that traditional educational programs concerning health risk behaviors do not address their needs and often do not seem relevant to their social contexts.69 7-3: Increase the proportion of college and university students who receive information from their institution on each of the six priority health-risk behavior areas. To meet the health needs of LGBT students, colleges and universities should develop LGBT-competent health programs that promote healthy behaviors. Student services should provide training for their professional staff members to enable them to be effective in program development.70 Because LGBT students undergo the process of sexual identity formation in largely hostile environments, as documented at several community college campuses, they may fail to achieve graduation or they may exhibit other problems, necessitating intervention by the institution.71 Transgender college and university students appear to be at increased risk in many of the six priority health-risk behavior areas, notably violence, suicide, drug and alcohol use, and HIV/AIDS and other STDs.72, 73, 74 However, transgender persons frequently report that traditional educational programs concerning health-risk behaviors do not address their unique needs and often do not seem relevant to them.75 No data are available on the number of LGBT students in American higher education. One reason for the lack of data is the fear that faculty, staff, and administrators who wish to better understand and address the needs of LGBT students may themselves be perceived as gay.76 For these educators, the fear of being perceived as LGBT may relate to a fear of losing tenure, losing their jobs, and being unable to teach elsewhere. College campuses are not thought of as bastions of antigay or antitransgender violence and harassment. However, findings from the only study to examine antigay violence at six community colleges in the San Francisco Bay area indicate that the problem is more widespread than previously thought. In the study, more than one in three community college students had engaged in hate speech or hate crimes on their campus.77 A number of college and universities have implemented educational interventions with such names as Safe Zone, Safe Space, Safe Harbor, and Safe on Campus.78 Although there is no consensus on the origin of the first campus program, most people acknowledge that the distinction belongs to Ball State University in Muncie, Indiana. The Ball State program, implemented during the 1992-93 academic year, was called Staff, Administration, and Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health 121 Educational and Community-Based Programs Faculty for Equality (SAFE) on Campus.79 A hallmark of these “Safe” programs is the public identification of allies by placing a “Safe” symbol, usually a pink triangle or rainbow, on office doors or within dormitories. Student affairs professionals, administrators, and faculty only recently have begun to recognize the potential that heterosexual allies have for increasing tolerance toward LGBT students on college and university campuses. Program interventions such as Safe Zone80 and Safe on Campus 81 are attempting to develop heterosexual allies while providing support to LGBT students. The tradition of the sticker or sign continues. In addition, there are now training sessions, technical support, Web-based resources including a listserv, campus and community assessments, and questionnaires. For many college students, belonging to fraternities and sororities is a positive experience that assists in socialization on campus and leads to the creation of lifelong friendships. However, like other school experiences, the Greek community overall has not been supportive of LGBT persons. A national survey of 340 students found that members of the Greek community were more likely to have an antigay bias than members of the non-Greek community.82 However, like other parts of society, Greek life also is changing, if slowly. The story of Ryan Grigsby, an openly gay fraternity member at the University of Nebraska, was chronicled in a recent article appearing in Rolling Stone magazine.83 Some fraternities, such as Sigma Phi Epilon and Zeta Beta Tau, have added sexual orientation to the nondiscrimination clauses in their bylaws.84, 85 In lieu of existing fraternities and sororities changing their bylaws, new “gay fraternities” have been formed, such as Delta Lambda Phi.86 In addition, groups such as Lambda 10 have been organized to raise awareness of gays in the Greek community. The Lambda 10 project is an associate member of the Association of Fraternity Advisors and is housed in the Office of Student Ethics and Anti-Harassment Programs at Indiana University. Efforts are underway to improve campus life for LGBT students, teachers, and administrators. The American College Health Association (ACHA) has launched several programs to help make campuses safer, more welcoming, and more responsive to LGBT students.87, 88 ACHA has developed an instrument containing 12 assessment areas, including health centers and health fairs, through which leaders of higher education institutions can assess whether the needs of students, including LGBT students, are being met. 122 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health A directory of campuses with LGBT services is available online at w w w. u i c . e d u / o r g s / l g b t. Other campuses with LGBT- a ffirming programs a r e : ■ Western Michigan University’s Safe on Campus www.salp.wmich.edu/lbg/GLB/default.html ■ Texas A& M Allies Program www.allies.tamu.edu ■ Iowa State University Safe Zone www.public.iastate.edu/~clund/safezones ■ Northern Illinois University Safe Zone www.niu.edu/lgbt Educational and Community-Based Programs 7-4: Increase the proportion of the Nation’s elementary, middle, junior high, and senior high schools that have a nurse-to-student ratio of at least 1:750. Increasing the nurse-to-student ratio in elementary, middle, junior, and senior high schools with nurses who are culturally competent and LGBT-sensitive is important in the health and developmental process of all youth and young adults. It is critical that nurses and other health care providers who interact with school-age students provide culturally competent prevention, treatment, and referral services to LGBT youth. School health personnel— including nurses, health educators, guidance counselors, and school psychologists—also must be adequately trained to meet the psychosocial and health care needs of LGBT youth with whom they interact. If these nurses and other health care professionals are affiliated with school-based health clinics, their roles are enhanced as they become service providers and work jointly with primary care providers. The National Assembly for School-Based Health Care (NASBHC) is an excellent resource for offering an integrated service delivery system to students who may be uninsured, underserved, or vulnerable. More information on NASBHC can be found online at www.nasbhc.org. School nurses are student advocates who have the organizational ability to implement and evaluate safe schools programs, educate students and staff, connect with resources for information, access medical and counseling referrals, and facilitate support groups for the school population. Other health personnel also can serve as student allies for both LGBT students and children of LGBT parents. School nurses can exercise their responsibility with a nonjudgmental unanimity of commitment to support and advocate for all groups of students in the school setting.89 Adolescents may feel they are “different” or alone in dealing with sexual orientation issues, and they may avoid or suppress associated anxiety. As a result, they may develop physical or mental symptoms and be at risk for self- destructive behaviors that often come to the attention of the school nurse.90 Tolerance of verbal harassment and violence toward any group of people is unacceptable, particularly among school professionals. Gay and lesbian students in schools need help from nurses, administrators, and staff to assure that the school is a physically and emotionally safe place for students.91 Ultimately, the school health system must be driven by the needs of the students—and the hiring of adequate numbers of school nurses, who are entrusted with the complex physical and emotional health needs of all students. To foster a safe environment for LGBT students and ensure that they are open, nonjudgmental communicators among all students, school nurses and other health personnel initially must self-assess if they possess and exhibit fears, presumptions, and biases toward LGBT students. School nurse training programs generally provide limited knowledge and information on sexual orientation and gender identity issues. Therefore, school nurses need to educate themselves about LGBT issues in the school setting, just as they educate themselves about other professional health issues. School nurses and their health colleagues can build a base of support toward sexual orientation and gender identity issues within the Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 123 Educational and Community-Based Programs school and community. These health professionals can network and collaborate with community agencies and resources that address LGBT adolescent issues.92 Nurses and other health professionals should display “inclusive” posters, provide accessible information, and utilize neutral language that indicates their openness to the topic of sexual minorities.93 LGBT youth need these health professionals to support them by validating them as individuals and educating others in homophobia awareness.94 Lastly, school nurses must take a leadership role in promoting safe school and antigay harassment prevention programs, as well as promoting a nonhomophobic atmosphere within schools.95, 96 The National Association of School Nurses contends that school nurses “should be involved in fostering a safe environment, demonstrating an acceptance of diversity” to help all students, regardless of sexual orientation, to have equal opportunities in the educational system.97 The school nurse who reaches out to meet the needs of this underserved group of people will also better serve the needs of all youth and school administrators and staff. The American School Health Association (ASHA) unites the many professionals working in schools who are committed to safeguarding the health of school-aged children. The association, a multidisciplinary organization of administrators, counselors, dentists, health educators, physical educators, school nurses, and school physicians, promotes high-quality school health instruction, health services, and a health-positive school environment. ASHA has more than 2,000 members in 56 countries with more than half of the members working in elementary and secondary schools. To improve school health education, school health services, and school health environments, ASHA promotes interdisciplinary collaboration among all those who work to promote and improve the health, safety, and well-being of children, youth, families, and communities. ASHA offers professional development opportunities for all those associated with school health programs, advocates building and strengthening effective school health programs, and encourages research on school health programs. Given its history, mission, goals, and member composition, ASHA emerges as a key player in ensuring that school health programs prevent, detect, address, and resolve health problems, increase educational achievement, and enhance the quality of life of LGBT youth and their families. Resolutions issued by the American School Health Association influence not only schools but also communities. In 1990, the ASHA Council on Sexuality issued its “Gay and Lesbian Youth in School” resolution, which was reviewed in 1995 and 1997.98 The resolution acknowledges the existence and estimated size of the population, the biological and chronological development of sexual orientation, examples of several risk factors, and the lack of support of family and peers unlike that experienced by other oppressed minorities. In declaring the resolution, ASHA encouraged that: ■ All young persons should have an equal opportunity for quality education regardless of their sexual orientation. ■ Curriculum materials, teaching strategies, and school policies that do not discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation should be implemented in schools. 124 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health Educational and Community-Based Programs ■ Sexual orientation should be addressed in the sexuality component of a comprehensive health instruction curriculum. ■ School personnel should discourage any sexually oriented deprecating, harassing, and prejudicial statements injurious to students’ self-esteem. ■ Every school district should provide access to professional counseling by specially trained personnel for students who may be concerned about sexual orientation. 7-5: Increase the proportion of worksites that offer a comprehensive employee health promotion program to their employees. Increasing the proportion of worksites that sponsor comprehensive health promotion programs for their employees is relevant to the health concerns of all populations and to promoting prevention-oriented, healthy behaviors. Employers can play an important role in ensuring that worksite health promotion activities and programs are culturally relevant to LGBT populations, increasing access to prevention, treatment, and support services and engaging LGBT employees in culturally and linguistically competent health promotion and improvement programs. Health promotion has been defined as “the science and art of helping people change their lifestyle to move toward a state of optimal health.”99 Change can be facilitated through a combination of efforts to enhance awareness, alter behavior, and create environments that are supportive of wellness. Companies of all sizes increasingly have implemented health promotion initiatives because these strategies are effective ways to reach people at high risk. Health promotion programs, like other preventive interventions, need to be targeted, not broad, as known characteristics of target populations correspond with established health risks.100 In addition, more than 90 percent of well-designed studies indicate that worksite health promotion efforts are cost-beneficial. 101 In addition to the Association for Worksite Health Promotion, the Wellness Councils of America (WELCOA) have embraced through their “Well Workplace” program the responsibility for maximizing the health and well-being of their employees. In “Well Workplace,” the vision of protecting and enhancing the health and well-being of all employees becomes part of the very fabric of the organization and not something tangential to core business functions. More than 2,000 organizations have joined WELCOA, providing them the evidence-based materials to put theory into practice. Companies belonging to Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health 125 The following are examples of the return on investment experienced by a few companies as a result of their health promotion activities. The figures are expressed as the dollar value returned for each dollar invested. C o o r s : $ 6 . 1 5 Bank of America: $ 6 . 0 0 Citibank: $ 4 . 5 8 Travelers: $ 3 . 4 0 D u p o n t : $ 2 . 0 5 Source: Association for Worksite Health Promotion and William M. Mercer, Inc. 1999 National Worksite Health Promotion Survey Educational and Community-Based Programs WELCOA compete for recognition as some of North America’s healthiest companies. More information on WELCOA can be found online at www.welcoa.org. 7-6: Increase the proportion of employees who participate in employer-sponsored health promotion activities. Some LGBT workers may be disinclined to participate in employer-sponsored health promotion activities because they believe that either such programs are not relevant to them, or that participation may focus attention on their sexual minority or gender minority status, and possibly lead to harassment or discrimination. Transgender persons, in particular, frequently report that traditional educational programs concerning health risk behaviors do not address their needs and often do not seem relevant to them.102 Despite the reluctance of some LGBT employees to participate in employer-sponsored activities, many other LGBT people feel connected to their worksites because of an increasing sense of community created during health promotion and social activities. The Internet has given LGBT people the means to disseminate information related not only to social events but also to the worksite. LGBT workplace issues are discussed at www.lavendercollar.com. This Web site lists public and private agencies that have LGBT employee groups as well as legal protections. The Employee Assistance Professional Association (EAPA) has published two directories listing nearly 500 companies that have internal LGBT employee groups. The EAPA directories are an important resource for models enabling LGBT people to network within the worksite as well as for EAPA professionals to use as a resource for LGBT employees seeking cultural ties. Employee assistance professionals are trained to address chemical dependency addictions and emotional disorders. According to the EAPA Code of Ethics, “. . . members shall not discriminate because of a client’s race, religion, national origin, political affiliation, disability, gender, or sexual orientation.”103 Currently, 10 States have laws prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation.104 One State and the District of Columbia prohibit employment discrimination based on gender identity.105 There are other organizations, among them unions, that have supported LGBT people. For example, the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees (AFSCME) has been one of the leaders among union organizations in demanding equal rights for LGBT persons. In 2000, AFSCME passed another resolution acknowledging its continued support for passage of the Employment Non-Discrimination Act.106 7-7: (Developmental) Increase the proportion of health care organizations that provide patient and family education. Health care organizations have multiple opportunities to offer patient and family education to consumers, including LGBT individuals. Given that the predominant financing structure of the American health care system today is some form of managed care (e.g., managed care plans, managed fee for service, health maintenance organizations), most LGBT persons and children of LGBT persons with either private or public health care coverage are most likely 126 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health Educational and Community-Based Programs enrolled in some type of managed care program. Most managed care entities proactively promote healthy behaviors and prevention as means to reduce health care costs. Other health care organizations often play a leading role in responding to consumer needs. For example, in the early days of the HIV epidemic, LGBT-focused community health organizations were influential in educating gay and bisexual men and transgender individuals who have sex with men about HIV, modes of transmission, and effective prevention strategies. In the same manner, community-based organizations arose to focus on such critical issues as breast cancer among lesbians. The National Association of Lesbian and Gay Community Centers hosts an online directory at www.gaycenter.org. The centers vary in fiscal and staff resources and available activities. A few Centers have the infrastructure to offer disease management and family education. There are additional Internet sites that provide patient and family education, including www.gayhealth.com, the Gay and Lesbian Medical Association at www.glma.org, www.FamiliesLikeOurs.com, and www.Homebirthmidwife,com, which offers preconception counseling. Mainstream health care providers frequently have difficulty discussing more intimate aspects of a patient’s behavior. And often, patients who do not necessarily self-identify as lesbian, gay, or bisexual are reluctant to discuss specific behaviors that may put them at increased risk for an array of health problems. Mainstream health care organizations need to create an environment in which LGBT individuals can openly and honestly discuss their health care concerns with providers. Many LGBT individuals lack access to a reliable and routine source of basic health care because they are uninsured, underinsured, unaware of or too far from an LGBT-friendly source of care, or disenfranchised from traditional or mainstream sources of health care. For-profit health care organizations, nonprofit health care organizations, and other public- sector and community agencies can work in partnership to provide a culturally competent, comprehensive system of care that meets the health education, prevention, and treatment needs of LGBT individuals who may otherwise lack access to care. 7-8: (Developmental) Increase the proportion of patients who report that they are satisfied with the patient education they receive from their health care organization. Personal and institutional barriers. In addition to difficulties in accessing health care, LGBT individuals often face significant barriers that inhibit open and honest communication with health care providers. Many practitioners—sometimes openly, sometimes secretly—harbor negative attitudes toward LGBT persons. In one study published in 1986, 40 percent of physicians reported they were sometimes or often uncomfortable providing care to lesbian or gay patients.107 In a nonrandom survey of members of the Gay and Lesbian Medical Association (GLMA) conducted in February 1994, 67 percent of respondents indicated that they had seen gay or lesbian patients receiving “substandard” care because of their sexual orientation.108 Many lesbians and gay men have reported that their doctors are not sensitive to or knowledgeable about their Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 127 Educational and Community-Based Programs particular health risks and needs and do not disclose pertinent information about treatments or prevention.109, 110, 111 Disclosure of sexual orientation and sexual behaviors to providers is a highly personal decision, influenced by many issues, including the source of one’s medical care, familiarity with the provider, financial independence, basic health knowledge, and where the patient might be in the coming-out process. For example, gay and lesbian adolescents, who often lack financial independence and social networks that can sustain older gay men and lesbians,112, 113, 114 are likely to delay disclosure of sexuality to clinicians. Homosexually active men and women who identify as heterosexual, or those who are at the early stages of the distinct developmental processes theorists have associated with coming out,115 also may choose not to disclose their sexual histories to health care providers. Many gay men and lesbians do not disclose their sexual orientation to health care providers because they do not feel comfortable doing so or they fear receiving substandard care as a result of disclosure. Similarly, transgender persons report several barriers to accessing quality care, including the lack of provider education and knowledge about the health concerns of transgender people. 116 Intake forms covering sexual history rarely include the option for providing information on same-gender sexual partners. Physicians and researchers routinely ask heterosexually biased questions, such as: “Are you married, single, widowed, or divorced?” or “What kind of birth control do you use?” Consequently, disclosure of sexual orientation in a health care setting remains infrequent for the majority of gay men and lesbians.117, 118, 119, 120, 121 In a 1989 survey of lesbians in Michigan, 61 percent felt unable to disclose their sexual orientation to their providers.122 Some 9 percent of respondents reported that their health providers had not allowed their female partners to stay with them during treatment or see them in a treatment facility; 9 percent also said that providers had not included their partners in discussions about treatment.123 The medical educational system has failed to educate providers and researchers about different aspects of lesbian and gay health,124 including communication skills, examination techniques, and preventive recommendations. Although homosexuality has been removed from the list of mental disorders in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders of the American Psychiatric Association,125, 126 the relationship between homosexuality and sickness has proved more enduring in the minds of many providers. A variety of studies describe provider hostility127, 128 or instances of gay men or lesbians being described as “deserving” of illness or unworthy of treatment.129 Tellingly, stigma may be most pronounced in those instances where sensitive treatment is needed. A number of respondents to the GLMA survey, for example, said they had seen doctors performing “rough” or “violent” digital rectal exams on patients after discovering that they were gay.130 Similarly, patients and parents of children treated according to the traditional model of care for congenital sexual ambiguity have reported a feeling of betrayal because physicians did not disclose the uncertain state of knowledge regarding gender identity development or the long-term consequences of genital plastic surgery on infants and because accurate information about diagnosis and treatment history was concealed or misrepresented. A “paradigm shift” from a model of treatment based on secrecy and early genital plastic 128 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health Educational and Community-Based Programs surgery to one based on full disclosure, counseling rather than risky and irreversible surgery, and patient autonomy is underway. Widespread promulgation of this change in the standard of practice will likely increase the proportion of patients (and families) treated for sexual ambiguity who report that they are satisfied with the patient education they receive from their health care organization. 131 Many clinicians sympathetic to gay men or lesbians may lack a repertoire of questions about social and sexual history appropriate to homosexuals, or they may be unaware that culturally appropriate questions might be necessary. Among physicians interviewed in 1998 by the Mary-Helen Mautner Project for Lesbians with Cancer, half stated that they assumed lesbians were in their practices but did not see any reason to address this in a direct way.132 These providers expressed an eagerness to learn more about the needs of lesbians and stated emphatically that they would make changes if they had information about what steps would be appropriate. Physicians are not alone among health providers in facing difficulties in communication with gay and lesbian patients. In a random sample survey of Virginia mental health providers conducted in 1994, respondents acknowledged having lesbians in their practices, yet had little or no training about the special needs of these clients.133 Some mental health practitioners continue to practice “reparative” therapy for homosexuality,134 to use inadequate or inappropriate definitions for lesbians and gay men, or to state that they do not think the concerns of gay or lesbian clients are different from those of heterosexuals.135, 136 Findings were similar in a California study published in 1986 of physicians dealing with lesbians and gay men.137 Barriers to communication about the needs and realities of gay and lesbian life are manifested at both systemic and individual levels. In hospitals, emergency rooms, and intensive care units, visitation and medical decisionmaking policies frequently exclude partners of lesbian or gay patients. Public ambivalence toward homosexuality continues. As late as 1998, a poll found the majority of the public considered homosexuality a moral wrong in the same category as adultery.138 This situation may create censorship or self- censorship of information critical to vulnerable populations. Health consequences of poor communication. Disclosure of sexual orientation in the health care setting is crucial to the provision of appropriate, sensitive, and individualized care. Failure to establish rapport and communication between physicians and patients is associated with decreased levels of adherence to physician advice and treatment plans, and decreased rates of satisfaction. 139 Additionally, clinicians unaware of their patients’ sexual orientation may fail to accurately diagnose, treat, or recommend appropriate preventive measures for a range of conditions. Although more research is needed on the effects of communication related to sexual orientation and medical care, small surveys suggest that successful communication and ease of sexual orientation disclosure may positively affect health risks and screenings. In a study of lesbians in Oregon published in 1997,140 90 percent disclosed their sexual orientation to providers, and of these, 92 percent raised the issue themselves.141 Communication style of the provider was rated by respondents as the Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 129 Educational and Community-Based Programs most important characteristic in determining ease of discussion about difficult issues. Lesbians who disclosed their sexual orientation were more likely to seek health and preventive care, to have a Pap test, to be nonsmokers, and to report comfort in communication with providers. By contrast, difficulty communicating with the primary care provider was associated with delay in seeking health care.142 One of the most significant barriers to adequate patient education for transgender persons is that most health professionals lack knowledge about transgender identity, sexuality, and health care issues necessary for them to respond adequately to their patients. As a result, patients are usually required to educate their health care providers about transgender issues.143, 144 Transgender persons are also subject to discrimination from health care professionals based on their gender-variant physical and social presentations.145 Predictably, this interferes with adequate patient education. 7-9: (Developmental) Increase the proportion of hospitals and managed care organizations that provide community disease prevention and health promotion activities that address the priority health needs identified by their community. Community health promotion services provided by hospitals and managed care organizations (MCOs) are growing, as illustrated by the expansion of Federal and State managed care reform legislation directed at the creation of a core set of prevention activities across MCOs.146 The changing demographics of the Nation, broader recognition of the necessity for culturally accessible services for minority populations, and a focus on community-based, integrated systems of care are some of the compelling reasons for consumer and community involvement in fostering a prevention-oriented health care system that evolves around the primary care provider. Primary care providers (PCPs) and other health professionals are increasingly trained across disciplines and to work with community-based outreach. Primary care is an array of “integrated, accessible health care services by clinicians who are accountable for addressing a large majority of personal health care needs, developing a sustained partnership with patients, and practicing in the context of family and community.”147 The 1995 Sixth Report of the Council on Graduate Medical Education (COGME) acknowledged that “educational programs will have to produce a physician with a new set of skills and new areas of knowledge than previously.” The Group Health Association of America, now known as the American Association of Health Plans, delineated the necessary competencies, such as fostering health promotion and delivering disease prevention services; communicating effectively with patients; and detecting, diagnosing, and effectively managing common symptoms and physical signs.148 PCPs and the settings in which they practice are not disinterested in prevention. Nonetheless, many are knowledgeable about neither the strategies for stopping the onset or altering the duration of unhealthy behaviors nor the research-based evidence supporting those strategies. In addition, there has been little financial incentive for providers to focus 130 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health Educational and Community-Based Programs on preventive medicine, and many believe that they have neither the time nor the energy to engage in the activities. One article appearing in the series published by the Journal of the American Medical Association in 1996 addressed physicians ’ “inability to teach disease prevention and health promotion.”149 Both private and public payers increasingly are insisting that providers and organizations be held accountable for the outcomes of the interventions provided. The Health Plan Employer Data and Information Set (HEDIS 3.0) developed by the National Committee on Quality Assurance (information online at www.ncqa.org) includes performance measures regarding the effectiveness and use of preventive interventions, similar to those required for treatment interventions. The relevant preventive HEDIS measures have been grouped in five categories: ■ Effectiveness of Care Measures with Health Education (e.g., percent of smokers in the plan who received advice to quit from health professionals) ■ Effectiveness of Care Measures with Population Screening Implications (e.g., screening for chemical dependency) ■ Uses of Services Measures with Health Screening/Aftercare Implications (e.g., percent of 3- to 6-year-olds with well-child visit in past year) ■ Access/Availability Measures with Prevention Implications (e.g., availability of language interpretation services) ■ Plan Descriptors with Prevention Partnership Implications (e.g., arrangements with public health, education, and social services entities)150 Nearly 40 of the community coalitions funded by the Center for Substance Abuse Prevention within the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration forged linkages with managed care entities. These coalitions offered the full continuum of prevention services as well as treatment and rehabilitation for individuals in the community, especially youth. The established collaboration between coalitions and the managed care system is almost always a mutually beneficial effort. Historically, two fields have focused on the community as an arena for preventive interventions: public health and mental health. “Communitywide prevention” is the term used in this discussion. (The Healthy People 2010 document, on page 7-27, defines a community-based program as “a planned, coordinated, ongoing effort operated by a community that characteristically includes multiple interventions intended to improve the health status of members of the community.”) Communitywide prevention in this context refers to the systematic application of prevention strategies throughout the community in a sustained, highly integrated approach that simultaneously targets and involves diverse social systems, such as families, schools, media, health care centers, workplaces, and other entities composing the defined community entity. Behavioral problems have their roots in the community. Likewise, the community is the repository of solutions. The responsibility for the health or well-being of the community has often been relegated to the caregivers of the Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 131 Educational and Community-Based Programs community. However, seldom have PCPs been given the leadership or felt that they should assume the leadership for community-oriented primary care. As managed care systems grow and assume responsibility for larger segments of the population, especially those financed wholly or in part with public funds such as reimbursement by Medicaid and Medicare, community-based approaches will be a critical complement to individual clinical interventions. The development of community-based prevention linked to community-level risk factor rating analyses is a more targeted approach for MCOs not only to reduce the likelihood of high health care costs but to achieve the final evolutionary step in maintaining community health or well-being. Desktop mapping using computer software is called a geographic information system (GIS). The vast majority of all databases contain geographic information, which can permit community coalitions and MCOs to answer such questions as: Where are the populations at greatest risk for developing health care problems? Where should services be located? How does service intervention change risks or demands? This computer-based tool combines maps and data to show patterns and relationships. When used collaboratively by both the community and managed care entities, a higher level of consensus can be reached and achieved in policy decisions and funding service needs, such as wraparound services. (Wraparound or enabling services are loosely defined as ancillary services that make it easier for consumers to access and stay in treatment or to obtain better outcomes upon discharge.151 Examples may include housing, child care, transportation, and employment counseling.) In addition to software such as GIS packages, the Internet provides a promising and rapidly growing avenue for distant learning. As Internet technology becomes more sophisticated and users more proficient, a myriad of interactive instructional multimedia will become available. For example, “Virtual Patient,” available through the Marshall University School of Medicine, allows a primary care provider to interview the patient by typing questions and receiving feasible responses, simulating the diagnostic process. In addition, the program enables the provider to conduct a clinical physical examination that yields lab results and x rays. PCPs should be involved in the development of community-based behavioral health promotion and disease prevention strategies. The effectiveness of disease prevention and health promotion initiatives is enhanced as consumers are informed and empowered to take responsibility for their behavior. Consumers need to be prepared to request that their primary care clinician provide clinical preventive services (e.g., mammograms, Pap tests, fecal occult blood screening, immunizations) appropriate for their age and personal health risk. Increasing the individual’s knowledge about and responsibility for preventive self-care should reduce overutilization of health services. Vigorous, well-designed programs of health promotion and disease prevention that involve proactive consumers should help the American health care system evolve from a reactive, medical model to a prevention- oriented system. Despite the promotion of competition, partnerships, services integration, and other strategies, consumers, providers, purchasers, and managed care organizations must have 132 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health Educational and Community-Based Programs financial incentives to promote mental well-being and to prevent negative behaviors. Whether private or public, the ultimate goal of a comprehensive, integrated health care system is improved quality of life for individuals, communities, and society. 7-10: (Developmental) Increase the proportion of tribal and local health service areas or jurisdictions that have established a community health promotion program that addresses multiple Healthy People 2010 focus areas. Comprehensive and multifaceted health promotion and community health improvement activities should be promoted at the State and local levels. The objective includes activities conducted through local health departments as well as those conducted by other community-based organizations, particularly in those communities not served by a local health department. Assessment activities recognize the need for community involvement and mobilization as basic methods for planning, implementing, and evaluating educational and community-based programs. Public health departments, community health centers, faith communities, civic organizations, voluntary health organizations, businesses, worksites, schools, universities, Area Health Education Centers, and healthy city or community groups are a few of the organizations that plan and deliver such programs in the United States. In the tribal jurisdictions, the Federal agency, the Indian Health Service, oversees with the tribal leadership the tribal health system. For those American Indians and Alaska Natives receiving services in nontribal service settings, special emphasis needs to be accorded to culturally competent and linguistically accessible services. The Federal Government is obligated by various treaties, laws, and other agreements—dating back as far as 1787—to provide health care to the 547 federally recognized tribes.152 A study released in June 2000 by the Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation found that a majority of American Indians—80 percent—do not have access to the limited care provided by the Indian Health Service.153 HIV/AIDS is rapidly becoming the number one health problem of American Indians and Alaska Natives.154 Yet, there is virtually no research on Indian perceptions and their responses to the AIDS epidemic.155 Health care and related services are provided to American Indians and Alaska Natives through fee-for-service, tribal programs, and other publicly funded programs legislated to serve the uninsured, the underinsured, and high-risk populations. The status of culturally competent health promotion and health education programs and materials for LGBT populations within American Indian and Alaska Native populations is a subject for additional study. 7-11: Increase the proportion of local health departments that have established culturally appropriate and linguistically competent community health promotion and disease prevention programs for racial and ethnic minority populations. Culture is a significant factor in the context of personal and public health and in how health and related services are delivered, received, and perceived. Few people define themselves in Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 133 Educational and Community-Based Programs a monocultural way, although many people acknowledge a dominant culture. Thus, the multicultural model exists because ascription to a single culture is literally impossible.156 Nonetheless, some people, especially those associated with racial or ethnic groups, are made uncomfortable when LGBT people self-identify themselves within a cultural context. Almost a half-century ago, Linton defined culture as the “customs, beliefs, values, knowledge, and skills that guide a people’s behavior along shared paths.”157 There are now more than 200 definitions of culture, and although there is no overarching definition, there is consensus on defining culture as factors that somehow bind an aggregate of individuals together, resulting in an identifiable group of people. Consumers who are members of a specific cultural group may be much more comfortable receiving services from health providers who share their cultural context. Sexual orientation and gender identity are cultural issues because they are constructs based on society’s stereotypes and prejudices. 158 LGBT people, especially those who are people of color, may be “hidden,” thereby losing the critical potential for empowerment and the ability to participate in the design of services and policies that are inclusive of their specific needs. LGBT communities often have differing health needs than those of members of the majority community. Some members of the LGBT communities—such as people of color, people with disabilities, and people of low socioeconomic status—also may require culturally appropriate and linguistically competent health promotion and disease prevention programs. An excellent example of a culturally appropriate and linguistically competent LGBT health promotion and disease prevention program is the GLBT Health Web page project, sponsored by the public health departments of Seattle and King counties in Washington State. More information can be found online at www.metrokc.gov/health. Additionally, the Network for Battered Lesbians and Bisexual Women in Massachusetts offers support groups, legal advocacy, legal referrals, mental health services, and free English/Spanish translation. More information about the network is available online at www.nblbw.org. 7-12: Increase the proportion of older adults who have participated during the preceding year in at least one organized health promotion activity. Only a handful of studies consist of samples comprised solely of older lesbians,159, 160, 161, 162, 163 of older gay men, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171 or of both. 172, 173, 174 Limited research and anecdotal reports suggest that older gay and lesbian adults face a range of challenges in accessing health promotion activities. A primary obstacle to participation in health promotion activities is discrimination against older gay men and lesbians in the settings in which such activities are commonly held, including nursing homes, assisted living residences, retirement communities, and senior centers. Anecdotal reports indicate various forms of discrimination against older gay and lesbian adults, including forced separation of long-term partners in nursing homes, discriminatory comments made by staff or other residents of retirement communities, and 134 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health Educational and Community-Based Programs failure of community or senior centers to provide information or support on gay- or lesbian- specific issues.175, 176 Older gay and lesbian adults face other impediments to effective health promotion. Older lesbians and gay men—many of whom have had adverse experiences, such as electroshock treatment or forced institutionalization to “repair” their sexual orientation early in life—may be less comfortable disclosing their sexual orientation in health care settings. Gerontology training rarely includes education about sexual concerns or the health needs of older adults, particularly gay men and lesbians.177 Gay and lesbian older adults may also be less likely to have children or other family members advocating for their care, a factor that may affect their health-seeking activities as families play an increasingly large role in the provision of care in the United States.178 Specific health promotion priorities/impediments for older gay men. From 1991 to 1996, AIDS diagnoses grew fastest among those aged 50 and older,179 with the greatest number of cases among homosexually active men. Yet, physicians and other health care providers have not routinely recommended either HIV testing or safer sex education to older patients.180, 181, 182 Physicians may feel less comfortable performing digital rectal exams, which is recommended for men over aged 50, on patients known to be gay. A national survey of members of the Gay and Lesbian Medical Association reported that gay male patients coming in for rectal exams were the objects of jokes and “rough” or “violent” rectal exams.183 Although significant research has sought to evaluate or reduce risk of erectile dysfunction following treatment for benign prostatic hyperlasia or prostate cancer, no research exists on the effects of such procedures on anal pleasure or exploring less invasive or destructive alternatives.184 Specific health promotion priorities/impediments for older lesbians. Potentially important sources of health disparity documented among lesbians—including nulliparity, increased rates of obesity and body mass, increased rates of smoking, and decreased likelihood of obstetric, gynecological, or other health screenings—are all linked to health problems most commonly associated with older adults. Risk of breast cancer, lung cancer, and cardiopulmonary disease increase the importance of health promotion and disease management strategies available for older lesbians. Specific health promotion priorities/impediments for older transgender individuals. Little research exists on health promotion or special health concerns for older transgender individuals. Research questions in need of exploration include implications and appropriate dosages for long-term hormone use, interactions of testosterone with other medications for chronic conditions, education of aging services providers on appropriate care, and attitudes toward transgender individuals. Finally, older gay men and lesbians face a number of structural barriers to accessing care. State laws allow one member of a married heterosexual couple to retain a jointly owned house without jeopardizing the other’s right to Medicaid, the primary source of payment for long-term care for the elderly. For long-term, same-sex cohabitators, there are no legal Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health 135 Educational and Community-Based Programs protections regarding inheritance laws, save those that partners institute themselves (e.g., trusts, long-term care insurance, durable powers of attorney, wills, and legal evidence of co- ownership). Legally licensed opposite-sex cohabitators may be eligible to receive a portion of the partner’s Social Security payments following his or her death and are granted the ability to transfer wealth or property tax-free in the event of the death of one partner.185 All of these privileges—in many cases essential for the maintenance of housing and health care—are denied to same-sex cohabitators. S e rv i c e s — R E C O M M E N D ATIONS ■ Community clinics, health maintenance organizations, and other primary care providers should become more knowledgeable about the different needs of LGBT patients and seek ways to make them more welcome in a clinical environment. ■ Continuing education for physicians, nurses, technicians, and others who come in contact with LGBT patients in clinical settings should be available through professional organizations, continuing medical education programs, nursing education programs, and other venues to increase understanding and sensitivity. ■ Primary care venues that welcome LGBT clients should post symbols or posters that indicate they are nondiscriminatory and patient-sensitive clinics. ■ All forms used in school settings, worksites, health care venues, and other community organizations should be culturally sensitive and linguistically appropriate for LGBT individuals or parents. ■ All types of managed care organizations, including health maintenance organizations, preferred provider organizations, point-of-service plans, and the hybrid of other financial and organizational structures, should devise a system for providing knowledge about providers who are LGBT or LGBT-friendly. This system must ensure the confidentiality of providers and consumers. Education and Tr a i n i n g — R E C O M M E N D ATIONS ■ Continuing education for other community-based services should be available for emerging service providers (e.g., fire, police, 911 teams) and community-service program staff (e.g., food banks, social security offices, emergency housing placement services). ■ Health department staff should receive cultural competency and sensitivity training that includes information on LGBT populations and their health needs. ■ Training provided to supervisors in both public and private sectors should include information on the health concerns of LGBT individuals along with sexual orientation and gender identity in cultural competency training. 136 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health Educational and Community-Based Programs P o l i c y — R E C O M M E N D ATIONS ■ Schools must protect LGBT youth from harassment and violence. ■ All health care accrediting organizations—such as the National Committee on Quality Assurance, the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Health Care Organizations, and the Council on Accreditation must include sexual orientation and gender identity as components of cultural competency. ■ All Medicaid and Medicare regulations should reflect the inclusion of sexual orientation and gender identity within their beneficiary guidelines to ensure provision of care and appropriate reimbursement for medical and related services. ■ Community-based organizations that receive Federal funding should be prohibited from discriminating against LGBT persons. R e s e a rc h — R E C O M M E N D ATIONS ■ The National Profile of Local Health Departments survey instrument, administered at intervals by the National Association of City and County Health Officials, where appropriate should include questions related to sexual orientation and gender identity. ■ Research is needed on culturally competent health promotion and education programs and materials for LGBT populations within the American Indian and Alaska Native populations. ■ Analyses of the 2000 census data should yield more information about unmarried same- sex couples, thereby illuminating the demography of the gay and lesbian population. ■ Specific research about LGBT persons is critical for generating baseline data for Healthy People 2010 population-based objectives. ■ Longitudinal studies should be conducted to determine how sexual orientation and gender identity is manifested throughout the life cycle. Te rminology Community: A specific group of people, often living in a defined geographical area, who share a common culture, values, and norms and who are arranged in a social structure according to relationships the community has developed over a period of time.186 Community-based program: A planned, coordinated, ongoing effort operated by a community that characteristically includes multiple interventions intended to improve the health status of members of the community. Community capacity: The characteristics of communities that affect their ability to identify, mobilize, and address social and public health problems.187, 188 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 137 Educational and Community-Based Programs Community health promotion program: Includes all of the following: (1) community participation with representation from at least three of the following community sectors— government, education, business, faith organizations, health care, media, voluntary agencies, and the public; (2) community assessment, guided by a community assessment and planning model, to determine community health problems, resources, perceptions, and priorities for action; (3) targeted and measurable objectives to address at least one of the following— health outcomes, risk factors, public awareness, services, and protection; (4) comprehensive, multifaceted, culturally relevant interventions that have multiple targets for change; and (5) monitoring and evaluation processes to determine whether the objectives are reached. C o m p rehensive worksite health promotion programs: Programs that contain the following elements: (1) health education that focuses on skill development and lifestyle behavior change in addition to information dissemination and awareness building, preferably tailored to employees’ interests and needs; (2) supportive social and physical work environments, including established norms for healthy behavior and policies that promote health and reduce the risk of disease, such as worksite smoking policies, healthy nutrition alternatives in the cafeteria and vending services, and opportunities for obtaining regular physical activity; (3) integration of the worksite program into the organization’s administrative structure; (4) related programs, such as employee assistance programs; and (5) screening programs, preferably linked to medical care service delivery to ensure followup and appropriate treatment as necessary and to encourage adherence. Optimally, these efforts should be part of a comprehensive occupational health and safety program.189 Culturally appropriate: An unbiased attitude and organizational policy that values cultural diversity in the population served. Reflects an understanding of diverse attitudes, beliefs, behaviors, practices, and communication patterns that could be attributed to race, ethnicity, religion, socioeconomic status, historical and social context, physical or mental ability, age, gender, sexual orientation, or generational and acculturation status. Includes an awareness that cultural differences may affect health and the effectiveness of health care delivery. Knowledge of disease prevalence in specific cultural populations, whether defined by race, ethnicity, socioeconomic status, physical or mental ability, gender, sexual orientation, age, disability, or habits. Excess deaths: The statistically significant difference between the number of deaths expected and the number that actually occurred. Health: A state of physical, mental, and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease and infirmity. Health care organizations: Included are hospitals, managed care organizations, home health organizations, long-term care facilities, and community-based health care providers. Health education: Any planned combination of learning experiences designed to predispose, enable, and reinforce voluntary behavior conducive to health in individuals, groups, or communities.190 138 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health Educational and Community-Based Programs Health literacy: The degree to which individuals have the capacity to obtain, process, and understand basic health information and services needed to make appropriate health decisions.191 Health promotion: Any planned combination of educational, political, regulatory, and organizational supports for actions and conditions of living conducive to the health of individuals, groups, or communities. 192 Health promotion activity: Broadly defined to include any activity that is part of a planned health promotion program, such as implementing a policy to create a smoke-free workplace, developing walking trails in communities, or teaching the skills needed to prepare healthy meals and snacks. Healthy community: A community that is continuously creating and improving those physical and social environments and expanding those community resources that enable people to mutually support each other in performing all the functions of life and in developing to their maximum potential.193 Healthy public policy: Characterized by an explicit concern for health and equity in all areas of policy and by an accountability for health impact. The main aim of healthy public policy is to create a supportive environment to enable people to lead healthy lives by making healthy choices possible and easier for citizens. It makes social and physical environments health enhancing.194 High school completion rate: The percentage of persons aged 18 to 24 who are not currently enrolled in high school and who report that they have received a high school diploma or the equivalent, such as a General Education Development certificate. Linguistically competent: Skills for communicating effectively in the native language or dialect of the targeted population, taking into account general educational levels, literacy, and language preferences. Local health service areas: Local health jurisdictions and local health unit catchment areas. Managed care organizations (MCOs): Systems that integrate the financing and delivery of health care services to covered individuals by means of arrangements with selected providers to furnish health care services to members. Managed care includes health maintenance organizations, preferred provider organizations, and point-of-service plans. Patient and family education: A planned learning experience using a combination of methods, such as teaching, counseling, skill building, and behavior modification, to promote patient self-management and patient and family empowerment regarding their health. P o s t s e c o n d a ry institutions: Includes 2- and 4-year community colleges, private colleges, and universities. Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 139 Educational and Community-Based Programs Quality of life: An expression that, in general, connotes an overall sense of well-being when applied to an individual and a pleasant and supportive environment when applied to a community. On the individual level, health-related quality of life (HRQOL) has a strong relationship to a person ’s health perceptions and ability to function. On the community level, HRQOL can be viewed as including all aspects of community life that have a direct and quantifiable influence on the physical and mental health of its members.195 School health education: Any combination of learning experiences organized in the school setting to predispose, enable, and reinforce behavior conducive to health or to prepare school-aged children to be able to cope with the challenges to their health in the years ahead.196 Settings (worksites, schools, health care sites, and the community): Major social structures that provide channels and mechanisms of influence for reaching defined populations and for intervening at the policy level to facilitate healthful choices and address quality-of-life issues. Conceptually, the overall community, worksites, schools, and health care sites are contained under the broad umbrella of “community.” Health promotion and health education may occur within these individual settings or across settings in a comprehensive, communitywide approach.197 Social capital: The process and conditions among people and organizations that lead to accomplishing a goal of mutual social benefit, usually characterized by four interrelated constructs: trust, cooperation, civic engagement, and reciprocity.198 Social ecology: The complex interactions among people and their physical and social environments and the effects of these interactions on the emotional, physical, and social well-being of individuals and groups.199 R e f e re n c e s 1 McNaught, B. Gay Issues in the Workplace. New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press, 1993. 2 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Planned Approach to Community Health: Guide for the Local Coordinator. 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Digest of Education Statistics, 1993. Washington, DC: NCES, 1993. 11 NCES. Dropout Rates in the United States: 1993 . Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Education, Office of Educational Research and Improvement, 1994. 12 National Health Education Consortium. The relationship to learning: Healthy brain development. Principles and practices of student health. School Health 2:262-272, 1992. 13 Kann, L.; Collins, J.L.; Pateman, B.C.; et al. The School Health Policies and Programs Study (SHPPS): Rationale for a nationwide status report on school health programs. Journal of School Health 65(8):291-294, 1995. 14 Kominski, R., and Adams, A. Educational Attainment in the United States: March 1993 and 1992. Washington, DC: U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1994. 15 Gebhardt, D.L., and Crump, C.E. Employee fitness and wellness programs in the workplace. American Psychologist 45:262-271, 1990. 16 Association for Worksite Health Promotion, William M. Mercer, Inc., and U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. The 1999 National Worksite Health Promotion Survey. New York, NY: Association for Worksite Health Promotion, 2000. Available online at www.awhp.org. 17 Badgett, M.V.L. Vulnerability in the workplace: Evidence of anti-gay discrimination. Angles 2 (1):1-4, 1997. 18 Mullen, P.D.; Evans, D.; Forster, J.; et al. Settings as an important dimension in health education/promotion policy, programs, and research. Health Education Quarterly 22:329-345, 1995. 19 National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS). Health, United States, 1999. With health and aging chartbook. Hyattsville, MD: NCHS, 1999. 20 Institute of Health Promotion Research, University of British Columbia, and British Columbia Consortium for Health Promotion Research. Study of Participatory Research in Health Promotion. Review and Recommendations for the Development of Participatory Research in Health Promotion in Canada. Vancouver, British Columbia: Royal Society of Canada, 1995. 21 Katz, M.F., and Kreuter, M.W. Community assessment and empowerment. In: Scutchfield, F.D., and Keck, C.W., eds. Principles of Public Health Practice. Albany, NY: Delmar Publishers, 1997, 147-156. 22 Ibid. 23 Glanz, K.; Lankenau, B.; Foerster, S.; et al. Environmental and policy approaches to cardiovascular disease prevention through nutrition: Opportunities for State and local action. Health Education Quarterly 22:512-527, 1995. 24 Lacey, L.P.; Phillips, C.W.; Ansell, D.; et al. An urban community-based cancer prevention screen and health education intervention in Chicago. Public Health Reports 104(6):536-541, 1989. 25 Yang, A. From wrongs to rights, 1973 to 1999: Public opinion on gay and lesbian Americans moves toward equality. Washington, DC: National Gay and Lesbian Task Force, 1999. Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 141 Educational and Community-Based Programs 26 Steckler, Allegrante, Altman, et al., 1995. 27 Kreuter, M.W.; Lezin, N.A.; and Young, L.A. Community-based collaborative mechanisms: Implications for practitioners. Health Promotion Practice 1(1):2000. 28 King, A.C.; Jeffrey, R.W.; Fridinger, F.; et al. Environmental and policy approaches to cardiovascular disease prevention through physical activity: Issues and opportunities. Health Education Quarterly 22:499- 511, 1995. 29 Mullen, Evans, Forster, et al., 1995. 30 U.S. Bureau of the Census. Census 1990. Washington, DC: Bureau of the Census, 1991. 31 Black, D.; Gates, G.; Sanders, S.; and Taylor, L. Demographics of the gay and lesbian population in the United States: Evidence from available systematic data sources. Demography 37(2):139-154, May 2000. 32 Kreuter, Lezin, and Young, 2000. 33 Dean, L., et al. Lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender health: Findings and concerns. Journal of the Gay and Lesbian Medical Association 4(3):101-151, 2000. 34 Bayer, R. Homosexuality and American Psychiatry: The Politics of Diagnosis. New York, NY: Basic Books, 1981. 35 Plumb, M. A call for a progressive research agenda. Paper presented at the Lesbian and Bisexual Women’s Health Research Forum. Fenway Community Health Center, Boston, MA. 1998. 36 Deyton, B., and Lear, W. A brief history of the gay/lesbian health movement in the U.S.A. In: Shernoff, M., and Scott, W.A., eds. The Sourcebook on Lesbian/Gay Health Care. Washington, DC: National Lesbian/Gay Health Foundation, 1988. 37 Andriote, J.M. Victory Deferred. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1999. 38 Dean, et al., 2000. 39 Ibid. 40 Faulkner, A.H., and Cranston, K. Correlates of same-sex sexual behavior in a random sample of Massachusetts high school students. American Journal of Public Health 88(2): 262-266, 1998. 41 Hunter, J., and Schaecher, R. Stresses on lesbian and gay adolescents in schools. Social Work in Education 9:180-190, 1987. 42 Hunter, J., and Haymes, R. It ’s beginning to rain: Gay/lesbian/bisexual adolescents and AIDS. In: Schneider, M., ed. Pride and Prejudice: Working with Lesbian/Gay/Bisexual Youth. Toronto, Canada: Central Toronto Youth Service, 1998. 43 Goodenow, C., Massachusetts Department of Education HIV/AIDS Program and Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. 1999 Youth Risk Behavior Survey, 2000. Available online at www.doe.mass.edu/lss/yrbs99/letter.html. 44 Massachusetts Department of Education, HIV/AIDS Program. Massachusetts Youth Risk Behavior Survey. Boston, MA. Unpublished data. 45 Goodenow, C. Massachusetts Youth Risk Behavior Survey. Massachusetts Department of Education. Unpublished data. 46 Safety: California Student Safety and Violence Prevention Act of 2000. AB 537. 1999 Legislative Summary. Retrieved December 10, 2000, at www.kern.org/legal/1999legs_3.html. 142 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health Educational and Community-Based Programs 47 Jiminez, A. Back to School. Alternative Family Magazine, 3(5), 2000. Available online at www.altfammag.com/magazine/volume3_issue5/backtoschool.html. 48 Grossman, A.H. Inclusion, not exclusion: Recreation services delivery to lesbian, gay, and bisexual youth. Journal of Physical Education, Recreation, and Dance 63:45-47, 1992. 49 Cooley, J.J. Gay and lesbian adolescents: Presenting problems and the counselor’s role. Professional Schools Counseling, February 1998, 30-34. 50 Garofalo, R.; Wolf, R.C.; Wissow, L.S.; Woods, E.; and Goodman, E. Sexual orientation and risk of suicide attempts among a representative sample of youth. Archives of Pediatric Adolescent Medicine 153:(5)487-493, 1999. 51 Asher, I.J. What are the perceptions of five gay and lesbian youth as to the factors that caused them to attempt to commit suicide? Ed.D. Thesis. DAI, Vol. 58-03A, 1997. 52 Ginsberg, R.W. In the triangle/out of the circle: Gay/lesbian students’ school experience. Ed.D. Thesis, DAI, Vol 58-01A, 1996. 53 Hecht, J.B. Suicidality and psychological adjustment in a community sample of lesbian, gay, and bisexual youth. Ph.D., Thesis, Boston University, DAI, Vol. 58-07B, 1998. 54 Marrero, J.A. Interpersonal cognitive problem-solving skills among adolescents at high risk of suicidal behavior. New York City. Ph.D. Thesis, New York University, DAI, 1994. 55 Nicholas, J., and Howard, J. Better to be dead than gay? Depression, suicide ideation and attempt among a sample of gay and straight males aged 18 to 24. Youth Studies Australia 17(4):28-33, 1998. 56 Rutter, P.A. Adolescent suicidal behavior across sexual orientation: An assessment of suicidal ideation, risk, and history of attempts. Ph.D. Thesis, Temple University, DAI, Vol. 59:10B, 1998. 57 Safren, S.A. Depression, substance and suicidality in sexual minority adolescents. Ph.D. Thesis, State university of New York at Albany, DAI, Vol. 58-08B, 1998. 58 McFarland, W.P. Gay, lesbian and bisexual student suicide. Professional School Counseling (3):26-29, 1998. 59 Hunter and Schaecher, 1987. 60 Radowsky, M., and Siegel, L.J. The gay adolescent: Stressors, adaptations and psychosocial interventions. Clinical Psychology Reviews 17(2):191-216, 1997. 61 Harry Benjamin International Gender Dysphoria Association. The Standards of Care for Gender Identity Disorders. Dusseldorf, Germany; Symposion Publishing, 1998. 62 Cohen-Kettenis, P.; van Goozen, S.; and Cohen, L. Transsexualism during adolescence. In: de Ceglie, D., and Freedman, D., eds. A Stranger in My Own Body . London, England: Karnac, 1998. 63 Hunter, J., and Mallon, G. Adolescents. In: Smith, R., ed. Encyclopedia of AIDS: A Social, Political, Cultural, and Scientific Record of the HIV Epidemic. Chicago, IL, and London, England: Fitzroy Dearborn Publishers, 1998. 64 Goodenow, unpublished data. 65 Peterson, J.; Zevin, G.; and Bordy, B. Characteristics of transgender persons attending a public clinic. In: Abstracts of the Annual Conference of the American Public Health Association, 1996. 66 Israel, G.E., and Tarver, D.E. Transgender Care: Recommended Guidelines, Practical Information, and Personal Accounts. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1997. Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 143 Educational and Community-Based Programs 67 Kral, A.H.; Molnar, B.E.; Booth, R.E.; and Watters, J.K. Prevalence of sexual risk behavior and substance use among runaway and homeless adolescents in San Francisco, Denver and New York City. International Journal of STDs and AIDS 8:109-117, 1997. 68 Xavier, J. Final Report of the Washington Transgender Needs Assessment Survey. Administration for HIV and AIDS, Government of the District of Columbia. 2000. 69 Bockting, W.O.; Robinson, B.E.; and Rosser, B.R.S. Transgender HIV prevention: A qualitative needs assessment. AIDS Care 10(4):505-526, 1998. 70 Telljohann, S.K.; Price, J.H.; and Poureslami, M. Teaching about sexual orientation by secondary health teachers. Journal of School Health 65:18-22, 1995. 71 Sanlo, R.L., ed. Working with Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender College Students: A Handbook for Faculty and Administrators. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1998. 72 Peterson, Zevin, and Bordy, 1996. 73 Israel and Tarver, 1997. 74 Kral, Molnar, Booth, and Watters, 1997. 75 Bockting, Robinson, and Rosser, 1998. 76 Leider, S. Sexual minorities on community college campuses. EDO-JC-00-03, Clearinghouse for Community Colleges Los Angeles, CA: UCLA, 2000. Available online at www.gseis.ucla.edu/ERIC/digests/dig0003.html. 77 Franklin, K. Psychosocial motivations of hate crime perpetrators: Implications for education intervention. Paper presented at the 106th Annual Convention of the American Psychological Association, San Francisco, CA, August 16, 1998. 78 Poynter, K. What is the safe zone? How do I find information to start a heterosexual ally program on my campus? From the National Consortium of Directors of LGBT Resources in Higher Education Fact Sheet, Updated Nov. 27, 2000, Available online at www.lgbtcampus.org/faq/safe_zone.html. 79 Lesbian, Bisexual, and Gay Student Association. Safe on Campus Informational Manual. Muncie, IN: Ball State University, 1992. 80 Hothem, K.B., and Keene, C.D. Creating a safe work zone project at a small private college: How hate galvanized a community. In: Sanlo, R., ed. Working with Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender College Students: A Handbook for Faculty and Administrators. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1998. 81 Poynter, K., and Schroer, S. Safe on campus: A program for allies of lesbian, gay, and bisexual students. Michigan Journal of College Student Development 3(1):6-8, 1999. 82 Gladstone, N. Brotherly love and hate. New York Times, Education Section, January 3, 1999. 83 Marsha, K. College 2000: Coming out on fraternity row. Rolling Stone, October 26, 2000. 84 Sigma Phi Epsilon. By-laws. Richmond, VA: Grand Chapter Sigma Phi Epsilon Fraternity, Zollinger House, 1999. 85 Zeta Beta Tau. Enchiridon, Zeta Beta Tau Fraternity, 7th Edition. Indianapolis, IN: Zeta Beta Tau, 1998. 86 Delta Lambda Phi. Organizational Information. Washington, DC: Delta Lambda Phi. Retrieved December 10, 2000, at www.dlp.org/aboutus.shtml#Organizational Info. 87 Chollar, R. Personal communication, November 21, 2000. 144 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health Educational and Community-Based Programs 88 Ottenritter, N. The Courage to Care: Addressing Sexual Minority Issues on Campus, American Association of Community Colleges, April 1998, 13-20. 89 Adams, R. Preventing verbal harassment and violence toward gay and lesbian students. Journal of School Nursing 13(3):24-28, 1997. 90 Taylor, B., and Remafedi, G. Youth coping with sexual orientation issues. Journal of School Nursing 2(9):26-27, 30-37, 1993. 91 Adams, 1997. 92 Ibid. 93 Taylor and Remafedi, 1993. 94 Adams, 1997. 95 Ibid. 96 Taylor and Remafedi, 1993. 97 National Association of School Nurses. Position statement on sexual orientation. Scarborough, ME, 1995. 98 American School Health Association, Council on Sexuality Education. Gay and Lesbian Youth in School. Adopted in 1990. Revised in 1995 and 1997. 99 O’Donnell, M.P. Definition of health promotion: Part III: Expanding the definition. American Journal of Health Promotion 3(3):5, 1989. 100 Huddy, D.C.; Johnson, R.L.; and Hyner, G.C. Risk indicators and health perceptions among university faculty and staff. American Journal of Health Behavior 20(3), 1996. Available online at http://131.230.221.136/ajhb/1996/volume20-3.htm. 101 Association for Worksite Health Promotion, William M. Mercer, Inc., and U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. 2000. 102 Bockting, Robinson, and Rosser, 1998. 103 Employees Assistance Professional Association. Code of Ethics. Arlington, VA: Employees Assistance Professional Association, June 10, 1997. 104 Human Rights Campaign. The State of the Workplace of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgendered Americans. Washington, DC: Human Rights Campaign Foundation, 2000. Available at www.hrc.org/pubs/state_workplace/sow2000.pdf. 105 Mills, K., and Herrschaft, D. The state of the workplace for lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgendered Americans. 1999. Available online at www.hrc.org/pubs/stwork.pdf. 106 American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees. Resolution No. 7, Support for Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual and Transgender Issues. 34th International Convention, Philadelphia, PA, June 26-30, 2000. 107 Matthews, W.C.; Booth, M.W.; Turner, J.D.; et al. Physicians’ attitudes toward homosexuality: Survey of a California county medical society. Western Journal of Medicine 144:106, 1986. 108 Schatz, B., and O’Hanlan, K. Anti-gay discrimination in medicine: Results of a national survey of lesbian, gay and bisexual physicians. San Francisco, CA: American Association of Physicians for Human Rights/Gay and Lesbian Medical Association, May 1994. 109 Smith, E.M.; Johnson, S.R.; and Guenther, S.M. Health care attitudes and experiences during gynecologic care among lesbians and bisexuals. American Journal of Public Health 75:1085, 1985. Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 145 Educational and Community-Based Programs 110 Trippet, S.E., and Bain, J. Reasons American lesbians fail to seek traditional health care. Health Care Women International 13:145, 1992. 111 Schatz and O’Hanlan, 1994. 112 Allen, L.B.; Glicken, A.D.; Beach, R.K.; and Naylor, K.E. Adolescent health care experiences of gay, lesbian, and bisexual young adults. Journal of Adolescent Health 23(4):212-220, 1998. 113 D’Augelli, A.R., and Hershberger, S. Lesbian, gay, and bisexual youth in community settings: Personal challenges and mental health problems. American Journal of Community Psychology 21(4):421-448, 1993. 114 Newman, G., and Muzzonigro, P. The effects of traditional family values on the coming out process of gay male adolescents. Adolescence 28(109):213-226, 1993. 115 Brady, S, and Busse, W. The gay identity questionnaire: A brief measure of homosexual identity formation. Journal of Homosexuality 26(4):1-22, 1994. 116 John Snow, Inc. Access and use of health services by lesbians and gay men in the Great Boston Area: An exploratory study. Boston, MA, June 1997. 117 Robertson, A.E. The mental health experiences of gay men: A research study exploring gay men ’s health needs. Journal of Psychiatric Mental Health Nurses 5(1):33-40, 1998. 118 White, J.C., and Dull, V.T. Health risk factors and health seeking behavior in lesbians. Journal of Women’s Health 6(1):103-112, 1997. 119 Allen, Glicken, Beach, and Naylor, 1998. 120 Cochran, S.D., and Mays, V.M. Disclosure of sexual preference to physicians by black lesbian and bisexual women. Western Journal of Medicine 149:616-619, 1988. 121 Siegel, K.; Krauss, B.; and Karus, D. Reporting recent sexual practices: Gay men’s disclosure of HIV risk by questionnaire and interview. Archives of Sexual Behavior 23(2):217-230, 1994. 122 Bybee, D., and Roeder, V. Michigan Lesbian Health Survey: Results relevant to AIDS. A report to the Michigan Organization for Human Rights and the Michigan Department of Public Health. Lansing, MI: Michigan Department of Health and Human Services, 1990. 123 Ibid. 124 Wallik, M.N., et al. Homosexuality as taught in U.S. medical schools. Academic Medicine 67:601-603, 1992. 125 Bayer, 1981. 126 American Psychiatric Association. Position statement on homosexuality and civil rights. American Journal of Psychiatry 131:497, 1974. 127 Hayward, R., and Weissfeld, J. Coming to terms with the era of AIDS: Attitudes of physicians in U.S. residency programs. Journal of General Internal Medicine 8:10-18, 1993. 128 Gerbert, B.; Maquire, B.; Bleeker, T; et al. Primary care physicians and AIDS. Journal of the American Medical Association 266:2837-2842, 1991. 129 Schatz and O’Hanlan, 1994. 130 Ibid. 131 Dreger, A. Intersex in the Age of Ethics . Hagerstown, MD: University Publishing Group, 1999. 146 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health Educational and Community-Based Programs 132 Bradford, J., and Dye, L. Physicians’ readiness for providing cancer screening to lesbians. Unpublished manuscript. 133 Ryan, C.C.; Bradford, J.B.; and Honhold, J.A. Social workers’ and counselors’ understanding of lesbians. Journal of Gay and Lesbian Social Services 9(4):1-26, 1999. 134 Berger, J. The psychotherapeutic treatment of male homosexuality. American Journal of Psychotherapy 48(2):251-261, 1994. 135 Robertson, 1998. 136 Ryan, Bradford, and Honhold, 1999. 137 Matthews, Booth, Turner, et al., 1986. 138 Ungarski, P.J., and Grossman, A.H. Health problems of gay and bisexual men. Nursing Clinics of North America 34(2):313-331, 1999. 139 Inui, T.S., and Carter, W.B. Design issues in research on doctor-patient communication. In: Stewart, M., and Roter, D., eds. Communicating with Medical Patients. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, 1989, 197- 210. 140 White and Dull, 1997. 141 White, J.C., and Dull, V.T. Room for improvement: Communication between lesbians and primary care providers. Journal of Lesbian Studies 2(1):95-110, 1998. 142 Ibid. 143 Bockting, Robinson, and Rosser, 1998. 144 Xavier, 2000. 145 Lawrence, A.; Shaffer, J.; Snow, W.; Chase, C.; and Headlam, B. Health care needs of transgender patients. Journal of the American Medical Association 276:874, 1996. 146 Chapman, L.S. Worksite health promotion in the managed care era. The Art of Health Promotion 1:1-7, 1998. 147 Donaldson, M.; Yordy, K.; and Vanselow, N., eds. Defining Primary Care: An Interim Report. Committee of the Future of Primary Care, Division of Health Care Services, Institute of Medicine. Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1994. 148 Group Health Association of America. Primary Care Physicians: Recommendations to Reform Medical Education. Competencies Needed to Practice in HMOs, 1994. 149 Blumenthal, D., and Their, S.O. Managed care and medical education: The new fundamentals. Journal of the American Medical Association 276(9):725-727, 1996. 150 Stoil, M.J., and Hill, G. Interaction Between Managed Care and Prevention Resources: A Preliminary Analysis of 8 Models. McLean, VA: Conwal Incorporated, 1996. 151 Edmunds, M., et al., eds. Managing Managed Care: Quality Improvement in Behavioral Health. Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1997. 152 Peters, K.M. The long wait. Government Executive, 2000, 20-30. 153 Brown, E.R.; Ojeda, V.D.; Wyn, R.; and Levan, R. Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Access to Health Insurance and Health Care. UCLA Center for Health Policy Research and Kaiser Family Foundation, April 2000. Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 147 Educational and Community-Based Programs 154 National Indian Health Board (NIHB). A silent killer in Indian country. NIHB Health Reporter 15, May 1994. 155 Mail, P. Personal correspondence, November 30, 2000. 156 Kennedy, N.J. Lesbians’ access to health care: Bringing visibility to managed care. Presentation to Women’s Caucus, American Public Health Association Annual Meeting, Indianapolis, IN, November 12, 1997. 157 Linton, R. The study of man. New York, NY: Appleton Press, 1947. 158 Tusler, A. Disability as a Cultural Issue. Alcohol, Drugs, and Disability: Summary Report. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, Center for Substance Abuse Prevention, 1993. 159 Almvig, C. The Invisible Minority: Aging and Lesbianism . Syracuse, NY: Utica College of Syracuse, 1982. 160 Deevey, S. Older lesbian women: An invisible minority. Journal of Gerontological Nursing 16(5):35-39, 1990. 161 Kehoe, M. Lesbians Over 60 Speak for Themselves. New York, NY: Harrington Park Press, 1989. 162 Raphael, S.M., and Robinson, M.K. The older lesbian: Love relationships and friendship patterns. Alternative Lifestyles 3(2):207-229, 1980. 163 Ryan, C., and Bradford, J. The national lesbian health care survey: An overview. In: Shernoff, M., and Scott, W.A. eds. The Sourcebook on Lesbian/Gay Health Care, 2nd ed. Washington, DC: National Lesbian/Gay Health Foundation, 1988. 164 Berger, R.M. Psychological adaptation of the older homosexual male. Journal of Homosexuality 5(3):161- 175, 1980. 165 Berger, R.M. The unseen minority: Older gays and lesbians. Social Work 27(3):236-242, 1982. 166 Friend, R.A. The individual and social psychology of aging: Clinical implications for lesbians and gay men. Journal of Homosexuality 4(1/2):307-331, 1987. 167 Gray, H., and Dressel, P. Alternative interpretations of aging among gay males. The Gerontologist 25(l):83- 87, 1985. 168 Kelly, L. The aging male homosexual: Myth and reality. The Gerontologist 77(4):328-332, 1977. 169 Kimmel, D.C. Life-history interviews of aging gay men. International Journal of Aging and Human Development 10(3):239-248, 1979. 170 Lee, L.A. What can homosexual aging studies contribute to theories of aging? Journal of Homosexuality 13(4):43-71, 1987. 171 Weinberg, M.S., and Williams, C.J. Male Homosexuals: Their Problems and Adaptations. New York, NY: Penguin Books, 1974. 172 Quam, J.K., and Whitford, G. Adaptation and age-related expectations of older gay and lesbian adults. The Gerontologist 32(2):367-374, 1992. 173 Berger, R.M. Realities of gay and lesbian aging. Social Work 29(l):57-62, 1984. 174 Minnigerode, F. Age status labeling iii homosexual men. Journal of Homosexuality 1(3):273-275, 1976. 175 Gewirtzman, D , and Kaelber, T. Long Term Care Issues for the LGBT Communities. Presentation given at the Senior Action in a Gay Environment “Out of the Closet—Into the Future: Midlife and Aging in Gay America” Conference, New York, NY, May 5-6, 2000. 148 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health Educational and Community-Based Programs 176 Wolfe, D. Men Like Us: The GMHC Complete Guide to Gay Men’s Sexual, Physical, and Emotional Well- Being. New York: Ballentine Books, 2000. 177 Quam, J.K. Gay and lesbian aging. SIECUS Report. June-July 1993. 178 National Alliance for Caregiving and the American Association of Retired Persons. Family Caregiving in the U.S.: Findings from a National Survey. Washington, D.C. 1997. 179 CDC. AIDS among persons age 50 years and older in the United States, 1991-1996. Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report 47(2):21-27, January 23, 1998. 180 Skiest, D.J., and Keiser, P. Human immunodeficiency virus infection in patients older than 50 years. A survey of primary care physicians’ beliefs, practices, and knowledge. Archives of Family Medicine 6:289-294, 1997. 181 Grossman, A.H. At risk, infected, and invisible: older gay men and HIV/AIDS. Journal of the Association of Nurses in AIDS Care 6:13-19, 1995. 182 Wolfe, 2000. 183 Schatz, B., and O’Hanlan, K. Anti-gay discrimination in medicine: Results of a national survey of lesbian, gay and bisexual physicians. American Association of Physicians for Human Rights/Gay and Lesbian Medical Association. San Francisco, CA, May 1994. 184 Wolfe, 2000. 185 Kimmel, D.C. Coming of Age. Presentation at the 1st national Gay Men’s Health Summit. Boulder, CO. July 1999. 186 World Health Organization (WHO), Division of Health Promotion, Education and Communication. Health Promotion Glossary. Geneva, Switzerland: WHO, 1998. 187 McLeroy, K. Community capacity: What is it? How do we measure it? What is the role of the prevention centers and CDC? Paper presented at Sixth Annual Prevention Centers Conference, CDC, NCCDPHP in Atlanta, GA. 188 Green, L.W., and Ottoson, J.M. Community and Population Health. 8th ed. New York, NY: McGraw Hill, 1999. 189 Heaney, C.A., and Goetzel, R.Z. A review of health-related outcomes of multi-component worksite health promotion programs. American Journal of Health Promotion 11:290-307, 1997. 190 Green, L.W., and Kreuter, M.W. Health Promotion Planning: An Educational and Ecological Approach. 3rd ed. Mountain View, CA: Mayfield Publishing Company, 1999. 191 Selden, C.R.; Zorn, M.; Ratzan, S.; et al., eds. Health Literacy, January 1990 through October 1999. NLM Pub. No. CBM 2000-1. Bethesda, MD: DHHS, NIH, National Library of Medicine, 2000, vi. 192 Green, L.W., and Kreuter, M.W. Health Promotion Planning: An Educational and Ecological Approach. 3rd ed. Mountain View, CA: Mayfield Publishing Company, 1999. 193 Duhl, L., and Hancock, T. Assessing Healthy Cities. In: World Health Organization Healthy Cities Papers. Copenhagen, Denmark: WHO, 1988. 194 World Health Organization (WHO), Division of Health Promotion, Education, and Communication. Health Promotion Glossary. Geneva, Switzerland: WHO, 1998. 195 Moriarty, D. CDC studies community quality of life. NACCHO NEWS 12(3):10,13, 19 196 Green and Kreuter, 1999. Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health 149 Educational and Community-Based Programs 197 Mullen, Evans, Forster, et al., 1995. 198 Green and Kreuter, 1999. 199 Stokols, D. Establishing and maintaining healthy environments: Toward a social ecology of health promotion. American Psychologist 47(1):6-22, 1992. 150 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health Health Communication Healthy People 2010 Goal Use communication strategically to improve health. O v e rview This chapter describes the principles of health communication and highlights the vehicles through which health information is shared. Multidimensional approaches to health communication are needed from the macro level of entire populations to the micro level of communication between health care provider and consumer. Health communication activities rarely acknowledge the diversity of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) people or develop health promotion campaigns targeted to LGBT people. Numerous barriers often prevent effective communication of LGBT-specific health promotion and disease prevention messages, and inadequate communication between health care providers and LGBT consumers can increase LGBT health disparities. Future health communication efforts should focus on increasing LGBT access to health information resources, including LGBT professionals in the development of appropriate health communication campaigns and materials, enhancing media literacy among LGBT individuals, supporting LGBT-focused research and evaluation of health communication activities, and ensuring that health care providers possess the knowledge, skills, and competency to communicate effectively with LGBT consumers. Issues and Tre n d s Health communication is a critical component of efforts to improve personal and public health.1, 2, 3 For individuals, effective health communication can help raise awareness of health risks and solutions, provide the motivation and skills needed to reduce these risks, help them find support from other people in similar situations, and affect or reinforce attitudes.4 Health communication also can increase demand for appropriate health services and play an important role in helping consumers make complex choices, such as selecting health plans, care providers, and treatments.5 For the community, health communication can be used to influence the public agenda, advocate for policies and programs, promote positive changes in the socioeconomic and physical environments, improve the delivery of Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health 151 Health Communication public health and health care services, and encourage social norms that benefit health and quality of life.6 Health communication alone, however, cannot change systemic problems related to health, such as lack of access to health care; poverty, discrimination, and prejudice; and lack of needed mental health services. Comprehensive health communication programs should include a systematic exploration of all the factors that contribute to health and the strategies that could be used to influence these factors. Well-designed health communication activities help individuals better understand their needs and their communities’ needs, so appropriate actions can be taken to maximize health. Public education campaigns seek to change the social climate to encourage healthy behaviors, create awareness, change attitudes, and motivate individuals to adopt recommended behaviors.7, 8, 9 The Division of Neuroscience and Behavior Health, Institute of Medicine, National Academy of Sciences, is currently engaged in a project entitled Communication for Behavior Change in the 21st Century: Improving the Health of Diverse Populations.10 The purpose of this report is to: ■ Review existing theory and research applications in health communications and health behavior change, especially as they relate to culturally and demographically diverse populations ■ Consider examples of public health interventions to evaluate characteristics that influence the effectiveness of public health campaigns ■ Identify promising strategies for public health interventions to achieve a sustained change in the behaviors in diverse populations Health messages are communicated from the macro level of population to the micro level of individuals. Population-based campaigns rely traditionally on mass communication such as print, radio, and television to deliver health messages. Some campaigns have integrated mass media with community-based programs, whereas others have used social marketing techniques. An emerging area is health communication to support community-centered prevention.11 Community-centered prevention shifts attention from the individual to group- level change and emphasizes the empowerment of individuals and communities to effect change on multiple levels. Increasingly, health improvement activities use digital technologies, such as CD-ROM and the World Wide Web (Web), that can target audiences, tailor messages, and engage people in interactive, ongoing exchanges about health.12, 13, 14 Today’s health care professionals are developing and applying new concepts for telecommunications-based health care systems, or telehealth. The Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) cochairs the Departmental Joint Working Group on Telemedicine, a Federal interagency group working to coordinate telehealth activity. Examples of health telecommunication projects funded by the Federal Government include: 152 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health Health Communication ■ Systems that improve the care and treatment of patients in the home environment, especially with American Indian populations ■ Telemedicine systems that offer new approaches to extending medical expertise to rural or underserved urban areas or nontraditional settings, such as schools ■ Projects designed to improve communication between health care providers and patients and to enable consumers to participate more actively in their health care ■ Projects to extend trauma care services beyond the emergency room ■ Networks or information services aimed at disease prevention and health promotion Despite the great importance and obvious success of electronic communication and social marketing, interpersonal communication remains indispensable. Personal communication reinforces every other health communication channel and can be most effective if there is attenuation to personal situations that necessitate recognition of particular situations or uncommon circumstances. Communication occurs in all contexts (e.g., school, home, work); through multiple channels (e.g., interpersonal, electronic, mass media) with a variety of messages; and for innumerable purposes. People do not attend to all communications they receive but selectively attend to and purposefully seek out specific messages.15 LGBT people are exposed to traditional and emerging health communication sources; however, few sources acknowledge LGBT communities as a group or target health concerns of LGBT people. There are specific LGBT community-based newspapers, magazines, journals, directories of services and accommodations in States and cities, Internet sites, television, cable, satellite broadcasts, and radio media. (For specific information about each source, more information is available online at www.gaydata.com.) In addition, there is a National Lesbian and Gay Journalists Association (NLGJA) that was founded in 1990. The purpose of NLGJA is to work within the news industry to foster fair and accurate coverage of lesbian and gay issues and oppose newsroom bias against lesbians, gay men, and all other minorities. (More information is available online at www.nlgja.org.) The Annenberg School of Communication recently released its second report of Lesbians and Gays in the Newsroom: 10 Years Later.16 The following is part of Dean Geoffrey Cowan’s Message concerning the report: “While treatment in the newsroom has apparently improved for gays and lesbians, the respondents felt that serious treatment in print and broadcast media had failed to keep pace, particularly with regard to local and regional issues. Their findings deserve widespread attention, for it would be a shame if the media have shown less initiative in covering local and regional issues involving gays and lesbians when bias based on sexual orientation remains a central societal issue.” Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 153 Health Communication The report gives accolades to the widespread coverage of dramatic and event-based stories, such as comic Ellen DeGeneres’ “coming out” and the murder of Matthew Shepherd. However, the most negative judgments point out the void in covering local events in the daily lives of LGBT people, especially people of color. The importance of multidimensional, audience-centered efforts. A one-dimensional approach to health communications, such as reliance on mass media campaigns or other single-component communication activities, has been shown to be insufficient to achieve program goals. Research indicates that effective health promotion and communication initiatives adopt an audience-centered perspective, which means that promotion and communication activities reflect audiences’ preferred formats, channels, and contexts.17 These considerations are particularly relevant for LGBT communities as health communicators must understand that the LGBT community mirrors the general population, from young to old, rural and urban, disadvantaged and not disadvantaged, and across all other minority and ethnic population groups. LGBT health communication materials must be culturally competent and linguistically accessible to the local community for which the materials are developed. A diverse range of customized messages should be developed so that the health needs of LGBT people can be adequately addressed. Public-private partnerships and collaborations need to be created involving LGBT organizations and consumers as coparticipants in designing, implementing, and disseminating health communication activities. Advances in medical and consumer health informatics are changing the delivery of health information and services and are likely to have a growing effect on individual and community health.18, 19, 20, 21 The convergence of media (computers, telephones, television, radio, video, print, and audio) and the emergence of the Internet create a nearly ubiquitous networked communication infrastructure. This infrastructure facilitates access to an ever- increasing, and sometimes confusing, array of health information and health-related support services and extends the reach of health communication efforts. Use of the Internet is changing how health professionals and health organizations inform consumers and reach potential patients and how consumers with shared interests or similar diseases or conditions interact with each other, such as in online support groups. As with the general population, the lack of culturally appropriate, LGBT-specific health communication information may have LGBT individuals receiving guidance from health information sources that may be misleading, inaccurate, or inappropriate, thereby putting LGBT consumers at risk. For example, although many health professionals agree that the Internet is a boon for consumers because of easier access to more information, health care professionals also are concerned that the potential lack of credible information may jeopardize health rather than enhance wellness. In addition, concerns continue regarding privacy and confidentiality of personal health information. These are major issues for consumers when personal information is collected, stored, and made available online.22 Given that some States may have laws prohibiting certain sexual behaviors, personal information is of particular concern to some LGBT individuals. 154 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health Health Communication The trend in rapidly expanding opportunities in health communication intersects with recent demands for more rigorous evaluation of all aspects of the health care and public health delivery systems and for evidence-based practices.23 Numerous studies of provider-patient communication support the connection among the quality of the provider-patient interaction, patient behavior, and health outcomes.24 As the knowledge base about provider-patient interaction increases, a need becomes apparent for the development of practice guidelines to promote better provider-patient communication, including communication that occurs between health care providers of all disciplines and LGBT consumers. National data systems will not yield the data needed to track many of the Healthy People 2010 population-based objectives in the first half of the decade. One area that currently has no tracking data is in evaluating health communication. Although it is not addressed in the Health Communication focus area, it is found in the Educational and Community-Based Programs focus area: consumer satisfaction with the health education and health information they received during their most recent search for such information. Health- conscious consumers increasingly are proactive in seeking out health information. Both the public health and medical communities share an interest in promoting and sustaining informed decisions for better health. Surveys suggest that people want to get health information from a professional and that counseling by health professionals can be effective both in reducing lifestyle risks and supporting self-management of chronic diseases like diabetes. (See Access to Quality Health Services focus area and Educational and Community-Based Programs focus area.) However, reduced time between provider and patient in clinical visits, along with some clinicians’ discomfort with open communication, negatively impact an optimal information exchange. Health information should be not only easily accessible but also of good quality and relevant for the needs of the person. For LGBT communities, these challenges are of utmost concern because of numerous barriers that tend to inhibit open and honest communication with health professionals, such as fear of disclosing one’s sexual orientation or gender identity, provider biases against or misunderstanding of sexual minorities, and limited access to culturally appropriate health care services. D i s p a r i t i e s Individuals with the greatest health burdens often have the least access to information, communication technologies, health care, and social services. Even the most carefully designed health communication programs will have limited impact if underserved communities lack access to the appropriate health professionals, needed services, and communication channels that are components of a health improvement project. For LGBT individuals, the cultural relevance of health communication activities—whether they are implemented in provider offices, community-based programs, the mass media, or another venue—plays an important role in determining whether health promotion and disease prevention messages are heard, understood, accepted, and practiced. Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 155 Health Communication O p p o rtunities For health communication to contribute to improvements in the health status of LGBT individuals and communities during the first decade of the 21st century, stakeholders— including LGBT consumers and organizations, health professionals, researchers, public officials, and the lay public —must collaborate on a range of activities. These activities include: ■ Initiatives to build a robust health information system that provides equitable access for LGBT individuals ■ Development of high- quality, LGBT-competent information and support services for specific health problems and health-related decisions for all segments of the LGBT population, especially underserved LGBT persons ■ Training of health professionals in the science of communication, the use of communication technologies, and how to apply this knowledge appropriately and sensitively to the provision of health care services for LGBT communities ■ Evaluation of LGBT- specific interventions and the testing of interventions that have demonstrated success in the general population to determine if they are likely to yield similar success in LGBT communities ■ Promotion of a critical understanding and practice of effective health communication Effective health communication—regardless of the method or context through which it occurs—has the potential to be a powerful force in improving LGBT health. For example, 156 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health The Stepping Stone is a San Diego provider of services related to human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) and acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS) and substance abuse. Headquartered in the heavily LGBT Hillcrest neighborhood, the Stepping Stone was the recipient of county contract funds to conduct alcohol prevention activities for the city’s large LGBT population. Its initial Community Needs Assessment survey reported that members of San D i e g o ’s LGBT community were largely uninformed about substance abuse-related health topics. Reviewing LGBT-targeted publications available in the city, the survey noted a near-total absence of articles relating to alcohol, tobacco, and other drugs. Although it gave local media high marks for their extensive coverage of HIV/AIDS, the survey found a lack of discussion in this coverage of the known association of substance abuse and HIV/AIDS. Concluding that the apparent dependence of the L G B T press on alcohol and tobacco advertising had e ffectively silenced this important voice for health communication, the survey then looked at 25 LGBT- serving organizations in San Diego County. Here, the Stepping Stone writers also identified a conflict between funding sources and organizational policies, a d v o c a c y, and public health education and communication. Similarly, it was noted in the report that the four major annual gay pride and HIV/AIDS awareness events held in San Diego had substantial alcohol sponsorship funding, resulting in public events where alcohol abuse was commonplace. Health Communication health communication between a lesbian and her health care provider may be evaluated according to its responsiveness to her personal cultural context and her individual desire for specific information, possibly with reference to her relationship status, domestic issues, reproductive health, or relevant cancer risk. Similarly, health information directed to subsets of the LGBT community in a given geographic region should address emerging health issues (such as the rebound of syphilis among men who have sex with men [MSM] in a number of urban centers in the United States) in a meaningful and timely manner. However, advocates for LGBT-competent health communication should not reduce community norms, values, information needs, and literacy levels to a single archetype. For example, the socially connected, urban adult gay men may be assumed to have a level of HIV risk information above that of the average person in the United States. However, MSM who live in rural areas, are young, do not self-identify as gay or bisexual, or are members of communities of color may be expected to have specialized health information needs that differ greatly from any assumed norm. The same is true for lesbians and bisexual women, transgender individuals, and other LGBT populations that could be accurately characterized by socioeconomic, racial/ethnic, geographic, and cultural diversity. Social marketing and empowerment approaches to health communication have been developed and evaluated extensively in the gay male community, specifically around HIV prevention,25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31 and in hard-to-reach LGBT populations, such as MSM who do not identify as gay, women who engage in sex for drugs, injection drug users, female sex partners of injection drug users, and high-risk youth.32 These approaches, however, have yet to be broadly applied to the multiple health issues facing LGBT individuals (such as breast cancer, domestic and other interpersonal violence, sexually transmitted diseases (STDs), substance use or abuse, and health problems associated with aging). S u m m a ry of LGBT Researc h Accessing the appropriate health care services is not the only barrier that LGBT individuals face when seeking health care services. Communication with health care providers also presents a serious challenge. Many practitioners openly or secretly harbor negative attitudes toward LGBT individuals. Some physicians have even reported that they are uncomfortable providing care to lesbian and gay patients.33 Where a person is in the “coming-out” process also plays an important role in an individual’s disclosure of his or her sexuality and sexual behaviors to providers. For example, gay and lesbian adolescents are likely to delay disclosure of their sexuality to clinicians, as are many homosexually active men and women who identify as heterosexual. Many gay men, lesbians, and bisexual men and women, moreover, do not disclose their sexual orientation to health care providers because they do not feel comfortable doing so or they fear receiving substandard care as a result of disclosure. Similarly, transgender persons report several barriers to accessing quality care, including the lack of provider education and knowledge on the unique health concerns of transgender individuals.34 Consequently, disclosure of sexual orientation in a health care setting remains infrequent for the majority Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health 157 Health Communication of gay men and lesbians.35, 36, 37, 38, 39 In addition, some LGBT people do not understand that they have specific health care needs related to their sexual orientation or gender, and so feel no need to disclose their status and thus risk discrimination.40 Physicians are not alone among health providers in facing difficulties in communicating with gay and lesbian patients. In a random sample survey of Virginia mental health providers, respondents acknowledged having lesbians in their practices, yet had little or no training about the special needs of these clients.41 Some mental health practitioners continue to practice “reparative” therapy for homosexuality,42 to use inadequate or inappropriate definitions for lesbians and gay men, or to state that they do not think the concerns of gay or lesbian clients are different from those of heterosexuals.43, 44 Findings were similar in a California study of physicians dealing with lesbians and gay men.45 When faced with an uncomfortable interaction with a clinician, LGBT persons may lack the skills or self-efficacy to defend themselves. They may feel unable to change the provider’s conduct, to resolve an uncomfortable situation, or to speak openly with a clinician about their discomfort. This may stem from a history of discrimination and the power imbalance often experienced between clinician and patient or from past negative experiences. For example, in a study reported in 1997, LGBT youth in Washington State were asked to assess their access to health care and the quality of care they received. The study found that 66 percent of youth stated that their health provider had never brought up issues of sexual orientation. Many received inappropriate treatment and health education based on their provider’s heterosexual assumptions and ignorance of the patient’s true sexual orientation. 46 In focus groups conducted in seven cities with LGBT youth in preparation for HRSA’s 1994 conference on the primary care needs of lesbian and gay youth, only one-third of youth reported that they could talk openly with providers about their sexual orientation. Four-fifths were sexually active. Yet, only half of their providers had discussed STDs and sexual activity with them, and only 55 percent of providers had discussed HIV risks. Although 61 percent of the youth had been tested for HIV, testing had been suggested by only 16 percent of primary care providers, and a majority of providers assumed their adolescent patients were heterosexual.47 Health consequences of poor communication. Disclosing one’s sexual orientation to a health care provider is crucial to the provision of appropriate and sensitive care that is tailored and responsive to each individual’s unique needs. Failure to establish rapport and communication between physicians and patients is associated with decreased levels of adherence to physician advice and treatment plans, and decreased rates of satisfaction.48 Additionally, clinicians unaware of their patients’ sexual orientation may fail to accurately diagnose, treat, or recommend appropriate preventive measures for a range of conditions. Although more research is needed on the effects of communication related to sexual orientation and medical care, small surveys suggest that successful communication and ease of sexual orientation disclosure may positively affect health risks and screenings. In another study, reported in 1997, of lesbians in Oregon,49 90 percent disclosed their sexual orientation to providers, and of these, 92 percent raised the issue themselves.50 158 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health Health Communication Communication style of the provider was rated by respondents as the most important characteristic in determining ease of discussion about difficult issues. The lesbians who disclosed their sexual orientation were more likely to seek health and preventive care, to have a Pap test, to be nonsmokers, and to report comfort in communication with providers. By contrast, difficulty communicating with the primary care provider was associated with a delay in seeking health care.51 One of the most significant barriers to adequate patient education for transgender persons is that most health professionals lack the knowledge of transgender identity, sexuality, and health care issues necessary for them to respond adequately to their patients. As a result, responsibility for educating health care providers about transgender issues far too often falls on the patient.52,53 This presents a formidable challenge for transgender persons who are also subject to discrimination from health care professionals based on their gender-variant physical and social presentations.54 Discussion of Healthy People 2010 Objectives 11-1: Increase the proportion of households with access to the Internet at home. Healthy People 2010 notes that Internet access at home is necessary to supplement Internet access at work and in public facilities, such as libraries and schools, because “several limitations affect the use of online health information and support in these [latter] settings.” These limitations include “privacy and confidentiality concerns” and “the potentially sensitive nature of health-related uses of the Internet.” However, for youth, as well as other dependent persons, seeking information about LGBT-related health issues, simply having access at home may not resolve these concerns. LGBT youth may not be “out” to their parents and thus not able to access needed information openly. In addition, they may not have privacy for accessing the Internet at home, or their access to LGBT-related health information may be blocked, accidentally or deliberately, by commercial filtering software that fails to distinguish between health information and erotica. To fulfill the underlying purpose of objective 11-1, it must be recognized that, for LGBT youth in particular, home access alone is not sufficient to overcome privacy and confidentiality concerns and to guarantee access to sensitive information. Access to LGBT- related health information must also be available in public settings, such as schools and libraries. Moreover, it is critical that commercial Internet filtering software, whether it is used in public facilities or in private homes, does not filter out legitimate LGBT health- Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 159 Planet Information, located in Boston, is a free computer drop-in center open to the HIV/AIDS community in Boston. It o ffers Internet access, training in computer and wordprocessing programs, and assistance in finding online AIDS information. It was originally created to help people living with HIV infection learn more about their health. Over time, the program has expanded its scope to include housing and employment support. Health Communication related information. For example, grants to local school districts for library services might be contingent upon allowing access to such health-related information without filtering, and software vendors should be given economic incentives not to produce software for either home or institutional use that filters LGBT-related health information. Families and patients dealing with intersexuality (congenital sexual ambiguity) have expressed strong wishes to meet others dealing with similar conditions. Because intersexuality is relatively uncommon (about 1 in every 2,000 births), and because parents, patients, and clinicians have been reluctant to discuss sexual issues openly, this desire has often been met with frustration. The Internet provides an excellent opportunity to meet these types of communication needs. The ability to access information on health care and prevention and to discuss specific diseases or medical conditions in the privacy of one’s own home is a revolutionary change. Support groups for intersexuality are flourishing on the Internet, and referrals to these important sources of information and peer support fulfill a compelling need. 11-2. (Developmental) Improve the health literacy of persons with inadequate or marginal literacy skills. The existence of grassroots agencies and LGBT community media presents an important opportunity to reach and educate LGBT individuals with critical health promotion and disease prevention messages. For example, many public health advocates are concerned about the impact of accepting alcohol and tobacco industry funding on the policies and practices of public benefit organizations. They also fear that accepting tobacco and alcohol funding may effect policy and programmatic choices. Mosher and Frank surveyed 62 national nonprofit organizations to assess their support for nine alcohol policy measures and to identify whether or not they had an organizational policy related to accepting or rejecting alcohol funding.55 The study found strong overall support for alcohol policy measures, particularly among medical associations, alcohol and drug agencies, and faith communities. Two-thirds of the sample reported the existence of a policy or practice opposing the acceptance of alcohol industry funding. The presence of organizational policies and practices related to acceptance or rejection of alcohol funding was correlated with support for broader alcohol policy measures. Organizations accepting alcohol funding were less likely to endorse policy measures. Indeed, three of the organizations demonstrating strong advocacy for alcohol policy initiatives (Mothers Against Drunk Driving, Students Against Drunk Driving, and the National Council on Alcohol and Drug Dependencies) took these positions only after electing to refuse alcohol industry funding. Although alcohol problems are a significant health concern for organizations representing diverse populations, the rate of support for alcohol policy measures was low in this category apparently (based on comments during interviews) because these organizations are engaged in addressing issues of greater immediate concern to their constituents and have not yet considered alcohol policy issues. Lesbian and gay communities may have low rates of support for alcohol policy initiatives for similar reasons as other organizations representing diverse populations, but surveys specific to lesbian and gay organizations have yet to be conducted. 160 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health Health Communication Advertising in gay publications is increasing, with the top categories of advertisers including pharmaceutical companies, travel, fashion, and alcohol.56 Advertising may influence content of gay and lesbian publications, like other mainstream publications. A San Diego community assessment found high rates of alcohol ads and substantial coverage of general HIV/AIDS issues in local lesbian and gay publications. However, the assessment also revealed little coverage of alcohol and other drug problems and no mention of the link between HIV and substance use.57 A number of articles in alcohol industry publications document the increase in target marketing to LGBT communities. An article on the evolution of advertising of mainstream products, particularly advertising campaigns by Philip Morris (a tobacco manufacturer) and three alcohol importers, quotes a business manager who specializes in markets: “If you are in a business that has declining volume and share, you have to identify franchises . . . For a liquor company not to be targeting someone like that is ludicrous.”58 Clearly, companies target LGBT communities, and the strategies they employ include running mainstream ads in the gay media, creating gay-themed ads for the gay media, and, in some instances, running gay-themed ads in mainstream media.59 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 161 LGBT Health Web Sites Advocates for Yo u t h w w w. a d v o c a t e s f o r y o u t h . o r g Asian and Pacific Islander Wellness Center w w w. a p i w e l l n e s s . o r g BiNet, U.S.A. w w w. b i n e t u s a . o r g Gay and Lesbian Association of Retiring Persons w w w. g a y l e s b i a n r e t i r i n g . o r g Gay and Lesbian Medical A s s o c i a t i o n w w w. g l m a . o r g Gay and Lesbian National Hotline w w w. g l n h . o r g G a y, Lesbian, and Straight Education Network w w w. g l s e n . o r g Gay Men of African Descent w w w. g m a d . o r g Gay Men’s Health Crisis w w w. g m h c . o r g Human Rights Campaign Resource to Coming Out w w w. h r c . o r g / n c o p / g u i d e . h t m l Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Caucus w w w. s t o p h i v. c o m / ~ l g b c Lesbian Health Foundation w w w. l e s b i a n h e a l t h f o u n d a t i o n . o r g Mautner Project for Lesbians with Cancer w w w. m a u t n e r p r o j e c t . o r g National Clearinghouse for Alcohol and Drug Information LGBT Web site w w w. h e a l t h . o r g : 8 0 / f e a t u r e s / l g b t / i n d e x . h t m National Latina/o Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Organization w w w. l l e g o . o r g National Youth Advocacy Coalition w w w. n y a c y o u t h . o r g Parents, Families, and Friends of Lesbians and Gays w w w. p f l a g . o r g Senior Action in a Gay Environment w w w. s a g e u s a . o r g Health Communication 11-3: (Developmental) Increase the proportion of health communication activities that include research and evaluation. The multiple negative health risks faced by LGBT individuals demand the highest levels of health communication, risk communication, and health promotion. However, evidence of effective health communication interventions for LGBT communities is largely limited to the HIV prevention and treatment adherence literature. In terms of health communication initiatives, innovations in the creation of helping relationships with gay male community members,60 assessments of the communication quality of gay men in clinical settings,61, 62 application of opinion leader models, and other community-level prevention interventions63, 64, 65 have all established best practices and an extensive literature base in the realm of HIV-related health communication. However, no such depth of research and evaluation exists for other LGBT health areas. Limited literature is beginning to develop around the effectiveness of clinical care66, 67 and broader health promotion68 programs for lesbian and bisexual women. Yet, there is ample room for the examination and rigorous evaluation of historic and emergent approaches to targeted health communication across sexual minorities and their cultural subsets. In addition to examining and assessing singular health communication methodologies and venues that show promise, additional success documented among gay and bisexual men around HIV prevention goals point toward more comprehensive and integrated health promotion approaches. These pose significant research challenges. Yet the relative success of mainstream campaigns around tobacco control, cardiovascular health, and childhood immunization—all of which rely on the combination of clinical preventive care, individual education, social marketing, media campaigns, and peer influence to effect behavioral change—challenges LGBT health professionals to develop equivalent, comprehensive health promotion efforts that are monitored for effectiveness. There continues to be a lack of LGBT-specific research and evaluation on health communication activities. Funding for the development and evaluation of such messages should be provided by government, foundations, and private sources. A small but growing body of work integrates consideration of environmental factors in lesbian and gay alcohol, tobacco, and drug-related problems. 69, 70, 71, 72 There is also a growing literature related to policy considerations and advancing public health strategies to address the intersecting concerns of substance use and HIV/AIDS.73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80 For example, recommended action steps from a meeting convened to discuss HIV prevention and alcohol and other drug use prevention among MSM included the development of tools to evaluate programs using social and environmental change to promote individual change among MSM, closer collaboration between researchers and community-based prevention programs, and further research on cultural and societal factors in addressing HIV and substance abuse prevention among MSM of color.81 Other experts in HIV/AIDS and substance abuse prevention call for public health initiatives that address environmental issues and build on community assets. Such ideas include use of social interventions and community building for HIV prevention82 and adopting a marketing approach that integrates prevention activities into arenas that 162 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health Health Communication people are already willing to engage in (e.g., health clubs, social services).83 Increasing availability of population- specific alcohol and drug treatment programs and prevention services may also serve to reduce HIV/AIDS and other health problems.84 11-4: (Developmental) Increase the proportion of health-related World Wide Web sites that disclose information that can be used to assess the quality of the site. Disclosure of privacy and confidentiality policies by health-related Web sites is of special importance to LGBT users because many such users may not be out to their families, schools, or employers, and might not want information on themselves and the health topics they have researched to be shared with others. An example of a Web site that provides LGBT-related health information and that conforms to the essential information disclosure guidelines of Healthy People 2010 is the GLBT Health Web page (www.metrokc.gov/health) sponsored by the Seattle and King counties departments of public health in Washington State. 11-5: (Developmental) Increase the number of centers for excellence that seek to advance the research and practice of health communication. Several centers have been developed or are under development at universities around the country. These include the Center for Research on Health and Sexual Orientation at the University of Pittsburgh; the Center for Lesbian Health Research at the University of California at San Francisco; Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health 163 Day treatment programs have demonstrated success in providing patients in mental health systems with community-based support services and preventing rehospitalization for patients with persistent mental illness. Outpatient nonmethadone treatment programs or day treatment programs have been found to be comparable to residential treatment programs in terms of outcomes, such as drug use, criminal activities, and p r o d u c t i v i t y. The benefit/cost ratio of an outpatient program was found to be higher than those of residential programs. In spite of the application of day treatment programs in the mental health and drug treatment systems, the efficacy of retreat (camp-out) and day treatment (camp-in) programs on the reduction of HIV risk behaviors has not been systematically evaluated. The Asian and Pacific Islander We l l n e s s Center (APIWC), a San Francisco-based AIDS service organization targeting people of Asian and Pacific Islander descent, has an 8-week HIV prevention retreat program that is being tested for Asian and Pacific Islander MSM, youth, and HIV-positive MSM. The comparison group receives standard, prevention- oriented case management. Participants have informally expressed their satisfaction with the camp-out program, noting increased bonding with other participants and increased access to nonfamily social networks. In particular, the camp-out program appears to provide a safe place for youth to talk openly about their sexuality and to receive personal support from both family and nonfamily members. Staff at APIWC noted that the camp-out program culturally fits Asian and Pacific Islander MSM and that participants seem to sustain protective behaviors after participating in the program. Health Communication the Center for Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health at the Joseph L. Mailman School of Public Health at Columbia University and its affiliated Lesbian Health Research Institute; and the Institute on Sexuality, Inequality, and Health at San Francisco State University. Such centers for excellence on LGBT health should be supported, enhanced, and expanded. Information on best practices and successful models that come out of these LGBT-focused centers for excellent should be broadly disseminated to public- and private- sector health professionals and health plans. 11-6: (Developmental) Increase the proportion of persons who report that their health care providers have satisfactory communication skills. Many of the specific barriers that inhibit effective communication between health care providers and LGBT health care consumers are discussed earlier in this chapter in the Summary of LGBT Research and in the Access to Quality Health Services focus area and in the Educational and Community-Based Programs focus area in objective 7-8. S e rv i c e s — R E C O M M E N D AT I O N S ■ Clinical care providers for LGBT individuals should create opportunities to examine risk patterns as well as behaviors and options for risk reduction and to promote the adoption of health promotion practices through the establishment of safe and culturally responsive environments. ■ Targeted health information should be delivered to high-risk and hard-to-reach LGBT individuals directly in their social contexts, including neighborhoods, socializing spaces, sexual environments, and workplaces. ■ LGBT individuals identified as at risk should have access to individual and small group interventions founded on intervention research published in peer-reviewed health journals. These interventions should focus on relevant behavior patterns and should work to build motivation and skills to reduce harm associated with these behaviors. ■ Community-level interventions targeted to various LGBT communities should be further developed to address large-scale patterns of risk and to influence health-supporting practices. These should include social marketing and electronically based forms of health communication. Education and Tr a i n i n g — R E C O M M E N D AT I O N S ■ Health care providers of all disciplines should be provided with education and training on how to communicate with LGBT consumers and families in a culturally competent way and how to reduce barriers to effective communication. 164 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health Health Communication Policy and Advocacy—RECOMMENDATIONS ■ Health communication directed toward LGBT people should build upon the considerable health promotion literature and be founded on established principles predictive of successful outcomes. R e s e a rc h — R E C O M M E N D ATIONS ■ Research is needed to determine if access to LGBT-specific health information improves health-seeking behaviors, increases access to care, enhances knowledge, and yields better health outcomes for LGBT consumers and families. ■ At each level of intervention, a rigorous assessment, process monitoring, and outcome/impact measurement should be performed to assess the application of interventions previously tested with non-LGBT populations and subsets of the LGBT community not previously studied. ■ Research is needed to determine the most appropriate health communication strategies for hard-to-reach LGBT populations such as those in rural areas, Native Americans, and persons with disabilities. Te rminology Advocacy: Communication directed at policymakers and decisionmakers to promote policies, regulations, and programs to bring about change. Availability: Content (whether a targeted message or other information) that is delivered or placed where the audience can access it. Placement varies according to audience, message complexity, and purpose—from interpersonal and social networks to billboards, mass transit signs, prime-time TV, and radio and from public kiosks (print or electronic) to the Internet. C o n s u m e r health informatics: Interactive health communication focusing on consumers. (See also Interactive health communication.) Cultural competence: The design, implementation, and evaluation process that accounts for special issues of select population groups (ethnic and racial, linguistic) as well as differing educational levels and physical abilities. Health communication: The art and technique of informing, influencing, and motivating individual, institutional, and public audiences about important health issues. The scope of health communication includes disease prevention, health promotion, health care policy, and the business of health care as well as enhancement of the quality of life and health of individuals within the community.85 Health education: Any planned combination of learning experiences designed to predispose, enable, and reinforce voluntary behavior conducive to health in individuals, groups, or communities.86 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 165 Health Communication Health literacy: The degree to which individuals have the capacity to obtain, process, and understand basic health information and services needed to make appropriate health decisions.87 (See also Literacy.) Health promotion: Any planned combination of educational, political, regulatory, and organizational supports for actions and conditions of living conducive to the health of individuals, groups, or communities. Interactive health communication: The interaction of an individual with an electronic device or communication technology to access or transmit health information or to receive guidance on a health-related issue.88 Internet: A worldwide interconnection of computer networks operated by government, commercial, and academic organizations and private citizens. Literacy: The ability to read, write, and speak in English and to compute and solve problems at levels of proficiency necessary to function on the job and in society, to achieve one’s goals, and to develop one’s knowledge and potential.89 Outcome evaluation (sometimes called impact evaluation): Examines the results of a communication intervention, including changes in awareness, attitudes, beliefs, actions, professional practices, policies, costs, and institutional or social systems. Patient communication: Information for individuals with health conditions to help them maximize recovery, maintain therapeutic regimens, and understand alternative approaches. Patient communication includes educational resources, provider-patient communication, and, increasingly, peer-to-peer communication. Reach: Information that gets to or is available to the largest possible number of people in the target population. Risk communication: Engaging communities in discussions about environmental and other health risks and about approaches to deal with them. Risk communication also includes individual counseling about genetic risks and consequent choices. Social marketing: The application of marketing principles and techniques to program development, implementation, and evaluation to promote healthy behaviors or reduce risky ones.90, 91 Targeting: Creating messages and materials intended to reach a specific segment of a population, usually based on one or more demographic or other characteristics shared by its members.92 Telehealth: The application of telecommunication and computer technologies to the broad spectrum of public health, medicine, and health. Telemedicine: The use of electronic information and communication technologies to provide clinical care across distance.93 166 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health Health Communication Underserved: Individuals or groups who lack access to health services or information relative to the national average. The underserved population may include residents of rural, remote, or inner-city areas; members of certain racial and ethnic groups; socioeconomically disadvantaged persons; or people with disabilities. World Wide Web (Web): An international virtual network composed of Internet host computers that can be accessed by graphical browsers. R e f e re n c e s 1 National Cancer Institute (NCI). Making Health Communications Work. Pub. No. NIH 89-1493. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), 1989. 2 Piotrow, P.T.; Kincaid, D.L.; Rimon, II, J.G.; et al. Health Communication. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1997. 3 Jackson, L.D., and Duffy, B.K., eds. Health Communication Research. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1998. 4 NCI, 1989. 5 Ibid. 6 Piotrow, Kincaid, Rimon, et al., 1997. 7 Maibach, E., and Parrott, R.L. Designing Health Messages. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1995. 8 Atkin, C., and Wallack, L., eds. Mass Communication and Public Health . Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, 1990. 9 Backer, T.E.; Rogers, E.M.; and Sopory, P. Designing Health Communication Campaigns: What Works? Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, 1992. 10 Institute of Medicine. Communication for Behavior Change in the 21st Century: Improving the Health of Diverse Populations. PIN BNBH-H-99-04-A, in press. 11 Finnegan, Jr., J.R., and Viswanath, K. Health and communication: Medical and public health influences on the research agenda. In: Ray, E.B., and Donohew, L., eds. Communication and Health: Systems and Applications. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1990. 12 Science Panel on Interactive Communication and Health. Eng, T.R., and Gustafson, D.H., eds. Wired for Health and Well-Being: The Emergence of Interactive Health Communication. Washington, DC: DHHS, 1999. 13 Harris, L.M., ed. Health and the new media. Technologies Transforming Personal and Public Health. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1995. 14 Street, R.L.; Gold, W.R.; and Manning, T., eds. Health Promotion and Interactive Technology: Theoretical Applications and Future Directions. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1997. 15 Freimuth, V.S.; Stein, J.A.; and Kean, T.J. Searching for Health Information: The Cancer Information Service Model. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1989. 16 Aarons, L., and Murphy, S. Lesbians and Gays in the Newsroom: 10 Years Later. University of Southern California, Annenberg School of Communication, 1999. 17 Maibach and Parrott, 1995. 18 Jackson and Duffy, 1998. 19 Science Panel on Interactive Communication and Health, 1999. Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 167 Health Communication 20 Harris, 1995. 21 Robinson, T.N.; Patrick, K.; Eng, T.R.; et al., for the Science Panel on Interactive Communication and Health. An evidence-based approach to interactive health communication: A challenge to medicine in the Information Age. Journal of the American Medical Association 280:1264-1269, 1998. 22 Science Panel on Interactive Communication and Health, 1999. 23 Agency for Health Care Policy and Research. Evidence-based Practice Centers. RFP No. AHCPR-97-0001. Washington, DC: DHHS, 1997. 24 Roter, D.L., and Hall, J.A. Doctors Talking with Patients/Patients Talking with Doctors: Improving Communication in Medical Visits. Westport, CT: Auburn House, 1992. 25 Silvestre, A.J. Brokering: A process for establishing long-term and stable links with gay male communities for research and public health education. AIDS Education and Prevention 6(1):65-73, February 1994. 26 Elford, J.; Bolding, G.; Maguire, M.; et al. Do gay men discuss HIV risk reduction with their GP? AIDS Care (England) 12(3):287-290, June 2000. 27 Edwards, A.; Hood, K.; Matthews, E.; et al. The effectiveness of one-to-one risk communication interventions in health care: A systematic review. Medical Decision Making 20(3):290-297, July 2000. 28 CDC AIDS Community Demonstration Projects Research Group. Community-level HIV intervention in five cities: Final outcome data from the CDC AIDS Community Demonstration Projects. American Journal of Public Health 89(3):336-345, 1999. 29 Kegeles, S.M.; Hays, R.B.; and Coates, T.J. The Mpowerment Project: A community-level HIV prevention intervention for young gay men. American Journal of Public Health 86(8):1129-1136, 1996. 30 Kelly, J.A.; St. Lawrence, J.S.; Stevenson, T.; et al. Community AIDS/HIV risk reduction: The effects of endorsements by popular people in three cities. American Journal of Public Health 82(11):1483-1489, 1992. 31 Myrick, R. In the life: Culture-specific HIV communication programs designed for African American men who have sex with men. Journal of Sex Research 36(2):159-170, May 1999. 32 Pulley, L.; McAlister, A.L.; Kay, L.S.; and O’Reilly, K. Prevention campaigns for hard-to-reach populations at risk for HIV infection: Theory and implementation. Health Education Quarterly 23(4):488-496, Nov 1996. 33 Matthews, W.C.; Booth, M.W.; Turner, J.D.; et al. Physicians’ attitudes toward homosexuality: Survey of a California county medical society. Western Journal of Medicine.1986;144:106. 34 John Snow, Inc. Access and use of health services by lesbians and gay men in the Great Boston Area: An exploratory study. Boston, MA. June 1997. 35 Robertson, A.E. The mental health experiences of gay men: A research study exploring gay men ’s health needs. Journal of Psychiatric Mental Health Nurses 5(1):33-40, 1998. 36 White, J.C., and Dull, V.T. Health risk factors and health seeking behavior in lesbians. Journal of Women’s Health 6(1):103-112, 1997. 37 Allen, L.B.; Glicken, A.D.; Beach, R.K.; and Naylor, K.E. Adolescent health care experiences of gay, lesbian, and bisexual young adults. Journal of Adolescent Health 23(4):212-220, 1998. 38 Cochran, S.D., and Mays, V.M. Disclosure of sexual preference to physicians by black lesbian and bisexual women. Western Journal of Medicine 149:616-619, 1988. 39 Siegel, K.; Krauss, B.; and Karus, D. Reporting recent sexual practices: Gay men’s disclosure of HIV risk by questionnaire and interview. Archives of Sexual Behavior 23(2):217-230, 1994. 168 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health Health Communication 40 Silvestre, A.J., and Friedman, M.S. Health care of gay men and lesbians in southwestern Pennsylvania— Results of a health care survey. Pennsylvania Public Health Association, 1997. 41 Ryan, C.C.; Bradford, J.B.; and Honhold, J.A. Social workers’ and counselors’ understanding of lesbians. Journal of Gay and Lesbian Social Services 9(4):1-26, 1999. 42 Berger, J. The psychotherapeutic treatment of male homosexuality. American Journal of Psychotherapy 48(2):251-261, 1994. 43 Robertson, A.E. The mental health experiences of gay men: A research study exploring gay men ’s health needs. Journal of Psychiatric Mental Health Nurses 5(1):33-40, 1998. 44 Ryan, et al., 1999. 45 Matthews, et al., 1986. 46 Kreiss, J.L., and Patterson, D.L. Psychosocial issues in primary care of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender youth. Journal of Pediatric Health Care 1:266-274, 1997. 47 Ryan, C., and Futterman, D. Lesbian and Gay Youth: Care and Counseling. New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1998. 48 Inui, T.S., and Carter, W.B. Design issues is research on doctor-patient communication. In: Stewart, M., and Roter, D., eds. Communicating with Medical Patients. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, 1989, 197-210. 49 White, J.C., and Dull, V.T. Health risk factors and health seeking behavior in lesbians. Journal of Women’s Health 6(1):103-112, 1997. 50 White, J.C., and Dull, V.T. Room for improvement: Communication between lesbians and primary care providers. Journal of Lesbian Studies 2(1):95-110, 1998. 51 Ibid. 52 Bockting, W.O.; Robinson, B.E.; and Rosser, B.R.S. Transgender HIV prevention: A qualitative needs assessment. AIDS Care 10(4):505-526, 1998. 53 Xavier, J.M. The Washington Transgender Needs Assessment Survey. Administration for HIV and AIDS of the District of Columbia, 2000. 54 Lawrence, A.; Shaffer, J.; Snow, W.; Chase, C.; and Headlam, B. Health care needs of transgender patients. Journal of the American Medical Association 276:874, 1996. 55 Mosher, J.F. Alcohol advertising and public health: An urgent call for action. American Journal of Public Health, 84:180-181, 1994. 56 Wilke, M. Gay press sets pace with 19.6% ad increase. Advertising Age 67:57, September 9, 1996. 57 Kelly, J. Preventing Alcohol and Other Drug Problems in the Lesbian and Gay Community. Sacramento, CA: EMT Group, Inc., 1995. 58 Levin, G. Mainstream’s domino effect: Liquor, fragrance, clothing advertisers ease into gay magazines. Advertising Age 64(3):30-32, 1993. 59 Wilke, M. Big advertisers join move to embrace gay market. Advertising Age 1, August 4, 1997. 60 Silvestre, 1994. 61 Elford et al., 2000. 62 Edwards et al., 2000. 63 CDC AIDS Community Demonstration Projects Research Group, 1999. Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 169 Health Communication 64 Kegeles et al., 1996. 65 Kelly, J.A., et al., 1992. 66 Roberts, S.J., and Sorensen, L. Lesbian health care: A review and recommendations for health promotion in primary care settings. Nurse Practitioner 20(6):42-47, 1995. 67 Rankow, E.J., and Tessaro, I. Cervical cancer risk and Papanicolaou screening in a sample of lesbian and bisexual women. Journal of Family Practice 47(2):139-143, August 1998. 68 Koh, A.S. Use of preventive health behaviors by lesbian, bisexual, and heterosexual women: Questionnaire survey. Western Journal of Medicine 172(6):379-384, 2000. 69 Kelly, 1995. 70 Mongeon, J.E., and Ziebold, T.O. Preventing alcohol abuse in the gay community: Toward a theory and model. Journal of Homosexuality 7(4):89-99, 1982. 71 National Association of Lesbian and Gay Addiction Professionals (NALGAP). Prevention Guidelines. Oakland, CA: NALGAP, 1994. 72 Stall, R., and Wiley, J. A comparison of drug and alcohol use habits of heterosexual and homosexual men. Drug and Alcohol Dependence 22:63-74, 1988. 73 Bux, D. The epidemiology of problem drinking in gay men and lesbians: A critical review. Clinical Psychology Review 16(4):227-298, 1996. 74 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). The Northwest Regional Workshop: HIV Prevention Approaches for Alcohol and Drug Use among Men Who Have Sex With Men. Seattle, WA: DHHS, U.S. Public Health Service, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 1997. 75 Gorman, M.E.; Morgan, P.; and Lambert, E.Y. Qualitative research considerations and other issues in the study of methamphetamine use among men who have sex with men. In: Lambert, E.Y.; Ashery, R.S.; Needle, R.H., eds. Qualitative Methods in Drug Abuse and HIV Research. NIDA Research Monograph 157, NIH Pub. No. 95-4025, 156-181. Rockville, MD: National Institute on Drug Abuse, 1995. 76 McKirnan, D.J.; Ostrow, D.G.; and Hope, B. Sex drugs and escape: A psychological model of HIV-risk sexual behaviors. AIDS Care 8(6):655-669, 1996. 77 Paul, J.P.; Barrett, D.C.; Crosby, G.M.; and Stall, R.D. Longitudinal changes in alcohol and drug use among men seen at a gay-specific substance abuse treatment agency. Journal of Studies on Alcohol 57:475-485, 1996. 78 Paul, J.P.; Stall, R.; and Bloomfield, K.A. Gay and alcoholic: Epidemiological and clinical issues. Alcohol Health and Research World 15(2):151-160, 1991. 79 Perry, M.J.; Solomon, L.J.; Winette, R.A.; and Kelly, J.A. High risk sexual behavior and alcohol consumption among bar-going gay men. AIDS 8(9):1321-1324, 1994. 80 Sullivan, P.S.; Nakashima, A.K.; Purcell, D.W.; and Ward, J.W. Geographic differences in noninjection and injection substance use among HIV-seropositive men who have sex with men: Western United States vs. other regions. Journal of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndromes and Human Retrovirology 19:266-273, 1998. 81 DHHS, 1997. 82 Rofes, E. Context is everything: Thoughts on effective HIV prevention and gay men in the United States. Journal of Psychology and Human Sexuality 10(3/4):133-142, 1998. 83 McKirnan, et al., 1996. 84 Paul, et al., 1996. 170 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health Health Communication 85 Ratzan, S.C., ed. Health communication, challenges for the 21st century. Special issue. American Behavioral Scientist 38(2), 1994. 86 Green, L.W., and Kreuter, M.W. Health Promotion Planning: An Educational and Ecological Approach. 3rd ed. Mountain View, CA: Mayfield Publishing Company, 1999. 87 DHHS, National Institutes of Health, National Library of Medicine (NLM). In: Seiden, C.R.; Zorn, M.; Ratzan, S.; et al.; eds. Health Literacy, January 1990 Through 1999. NLM Pub. No. CBM 2000-1. Bethesda, MD: NLM, February 2000, vi. 88 Robinson, T.N.; Patrick, K.; Eng, T.R.; et al., for the Science Panel on Interactive Communication and Health. An evidence-based approach to interactive health communication: A challenge to medicine in the Information Age. Journal of the American Medical Association 280:1264-1269, 1998. 89 U.S. Congress. National Literacy Act of 1991. Public Law 102-73, 1991. 90 Lefebvre, R.C., and Rochlin, L. Social marketing. In: Glanz, K.; Lewis, F.M.; and Rimer, B.K.; eds. Health Behavior and Health Education: Theor y, Research, and Practice. 2nd ed. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1997, 384 -401. 91 Ling, J.C.; Franklin, B.A.; Lindsteadt, J.F.; et al. Social marketing, its place in public health. Annual Reviews of Public Health 13:341-362, 1992. 92 Kreuter, M.W.; Strecher, V.J.; and Glassman, B. One size does not fit all: The case for tailoring print materials. Society of Behavioral Medicine 21:276-283, 1999. 93 Committee on Evaluating Clinical Applications of Telemedicine. Field, M.J., ed. Telemedicine: A Guide to Assessing Telecommunications for Health Care. Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1996. Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health 171 172 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health H I V / A I D S Healthy People 2010 Goal Prevent human immunodeficiency virus infection and its related illness and death. O v e rv i e w Healthy People 2010 provides an extensive discussion of HIV/AIDS trends among heterosexual populations. It also places strong emphasis on reducing new HIV/AIDS cases among adolescents and adults. However, Healthy People 2010 does not adequately address recent trends among men who have sex with men, even though this population makes up both the majority of those in the United States currently living with HIV infection (including those who since 1981 have been diagnosed with AIDS). The Companion Document for LGBT Health has been written to present a relevant discussion of HIV/AIDS among other sexual minorities including bisexual individuals, lesbians, and transgender persons. This chapter also provides a brief, critical review of the impact of HIV/AIDS on lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) populations and presents issues and trends affecting the general population as well as LGBT communities. The chapter outlines existing disparities, opportunities to help achieve Healthy People 2010 goals, and LGBT-specific HIV/AIDS research. After the discussion of the Healthy People 2010 objectives as they relate to LGBT communities, the chapter offers recommendations for future action. Issues and Tre n d s In 1981, a new infectious disease, acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS), was identified in the United States.1 Several years later, the causative agent of AIDS—human immunodeficiency virus (HIV)—was discovered. This discovery coincided with the growing recognition of AIDS in the United States as part of a global infectious disease pandemic. Currently, HIV/AIDS has been reported in virtually every racial and ethnic population, every age group, and every socioeconomic group in every State and most large cities in the HIV/AIDS United States.2 Initially identified among men who have sex with men (MSM)* primarily in major urban areas on the east and west coasts of the United States,3 the AIDS epidemic is now characterized by its diversity. The proportion of AIDS cases among MSM has decreased from nearly 65 percent of cases diagnosed in 1985 to approximately 40 percent of cases diagnosed since 1998. 4 The estimated number of persons living with AIDS has increased for each region between 1993 and 1998. The proportional distribution by region has changed slightly with an increase in the South from 34 to 37 percent and a decrease in the West from 23 to 20 percent.5 Epidemiologic research demonstrates that there are increasing numbers of people living with HIV and AIDS in rural America.6, 7 Since 1981, 733,374 cases of AIDS have been reported to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC).8 The total number of cases reported each year is decreasing, after a large increase in 1993 when the case definition was expanded to include persons at an earlier stage of HIV disease.9 Fifty-nine percent of adults and 58 percent of children with diagnosed AIDS have died.10 The annual number of deaths among persons with AIDS has decreased although AIDS remains one of the leading causes of death among persons 25 to 44 years of age. 11 The decrease in deaths partly reflects the leveling of AIDS-opportunistic illness incidence and improved survival among persons with AIDS due to improvements in medical therapeutics.12 Providers must correctly use the rapidly accumulating new drugs for the treatment of HIV disease in order to treat persons with HIV most effectively.13, 14 AIDS surveillance has been the cornerstone of national efforts to monitor the spread of HIV infection in the United States and to target HIV prevention programs and health care services.15 The advances in treatment diminished the ability of AIDS surveillance data to represent trends in the incidence of HIV infection or the impact of the epidemic on the health care system due to the significant lengthening of the time between acquisition of HIV infections and development of AIDS.16 In response, CDC and the Council of State and Territorial Epidemiologists recommended that all States and territories include surveillance for HIV infection as an extension of their AIDS surveillance activities.17 In 1999, 34 States conducted HIV surveillance and reported 21,048 new cases of HIV infection in adults and adolescents and a cumulative total of 127,648 people with HIV infection.18 Since the early 1980s, surveillance studies have identified five distinct populations and issues that have affected the epidemic in these populations (racial and ethnic minorities are disproportionately represented in these risk groups): ■ MSM who frequently change sex partners and engage in high-risk sexual behaviors ■ Injection drug users who share needles and syringes, especially those contaminated with HIV-infected blood Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health 173 * The term “MSM” is used here to refer to men who engage in same-sex sexual behaviors with other men. No assumption is made about their sexual identity. A man who has sex with another man may self-identify as gay, bisexual, heterosexual, or reject all such categorizations. Therefore, the term “MSM” is used because it specifically denotes behavior that is the targeted by HIV prevention and intervention efforts. The terms bisexual, lesbian, and transgender are used to connote some sort of sexual identity. HIV/AIDS ■ Heterosexual people who engage in high-risk sexual behaviors and/or injection drug use ■ Incarcerated individuals who may be exposed to high-risk sexual behaviors ■ Perinatal transmission among infants, caused by undetected or untreated HIV infection in pregnant females The proportion of different population groups affected by HIV/AIDS has also changed over time. By 1998, 83 percent of the cumulative AIDS cases had occurred in males, 16 percent in females, and 1 percent in children under 13 years of age.19 Forty-five percent of men and 43 percent of women were 30 to 39 years of age at diagnosis. Sixteen percent of men and 21 percent of women were in their twenties, and 27 percent of men and 22 percent of women were in their forties.20 The true extent of the epidemic remains difficult to assess for several reasons, including the following: ■ Because of the long period of time from initial HIV infection to AIDS and because highly active antiretroviral therapy has slowed the progression to AIDS, new cases of AIDS no longer provide accurate information about the current HIV epidemic in the United States.21 ■ Because of a lack of awareness of HIV serostatus—as well as delays in accessing counseling, testing, and care services by individuals who may be infected or at risk of infection—some populations do not perceive themselves to be at risk. As a result, some HIV-infected persons are not identified and provided care until late in the course of their infection.22 HIV infection rates appear to have stabilized since the early 1990s at about 40,000 new infections per year, which represents a slowing from growth rates experienced in the mid- 1980s.23 At least 800,000 persons are infected with HIV, with more than 200,000 to 250,000 persons who are not aware of their infection.24 About 335,000 persons are estimated to be in treatment with new antiretroviral treatment therapies, but some 215,000 are not currently in treatment.25, 26, 27 HIV prevention efforts save human suffering. Estimates of care and services costs per case of HIV/AIDS vary widely but are recognized as significant, hence the strong focus on prevention of HIV transmission. Prevention efforts include availability of culturally and linguistically appropriate HIV counseling and testing, partner counseling, and referral systems for individuals at high risk for HIV infection; needle and syringe exchange programs; and information, education, treatment, and counseling for injection drug users.2 8 , 2 9 In late 1982, cases of AIDS attributed to blood transfusions were first reported in the United States.30, 31 The publication, dissemination, and implementation of specific guidelines and recommendations to prevent HIV infection among health care workers and to test donated 174 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health HIV/AIDS blood for HIV32, 33, 34, 35 have resulted in a reduction in transfusion-related AIDS and increased safety among health workers. Another prevention success has been the 66-percent decline in perinatal transmission from 1992 to 1997.36 With the finding that perinatal HIV transmission rates could be reduced substantially with zidovudine therapy during pregnancy, the U.S. Public Health Service issued guidelines recommending that HIV counseling and voluntary testing become a part of routine prenatal care for all pregnant women.37 This policy ensures that HIV-infected pregnant women have access to important health care for themselves and have the opportunity to reduce the risk of HIV transmission to their infants. Subsequent declines in new AIDS cases among children demonstrate that these strategies are showing success in reducing mother-to-infant HIV transmission.38, 39 Deaths from AIDS continued to decline throughout 1997 and 1998 (down 42 percent and 20 percent, respectively, compared to 1996). The number of persons living with AIDS (AIDS prevalence) in 1997 and 1998 increased by 12 percent and 10 percent, respectively.40,41 Declines in newly diagnosed AIDS cases and in AIDS deaths mean that an increasing number of persons are living with HIV infection. There is a need for improved HIV surveillance and increased early diagnosis to better direct prevention and treatment services to people with asymptomatic infection or mild illness. Principal health determinants. Behaviors (sexual practices, substance abuse, and accessing prenatal care) and biomedical status (having other sexually transmitted diseases [STDs]) are major determinants of HIV transmission.42 Unprotected sexual contact, whether homosexual or heterosexual, with a person infected with HIV and sharing drug-injection equipment with an HIV-infected individual account for most HIV transmission in the United States.43, 44, 45 Increasing the number of people who know their HIV serostatus is an important component of a national program to slow or halt the transmission of HIV in the United States as it is estimated that up to one-third of infected persons do not know their HIV status.46 For persons infected with HIV, behavioral determinants also play an important role in health maintenance. Although drugs are available specifically to prevent and treat many opportunistic infections, individuals living with HIV infection also need to make lifestyle- related behavioral changes to increase the quality and quantity of life. The new HIV antiretroviral drug therapies for HIV pose certain difficulties. These therapeutics are expensive and the medication schedules can be more complex than other medications, thereby raising both access and adherence issues.47 As HIV infection weakens the immune system, people with tuberculosis (TB) infection and HIV infection are at very high risk of developing active TB disease. 48 Interventions. Interventions for combating HIV are behavioral as well as biomedical. There are over 200 guidelines on the Web site (www.guideline.gov) related to HIV/AIDS. Recent advances in antiretroviral therapy have been credited with dramatic declines in deaths associated with HIV/AIDS. However, declines in overall AIDS cases, particularly in the early epicenters of the epidemic such as San Francisco and New York City, predate the Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health 175 HIV/AIDS advent of antiretroviral therapies and support the belief that behavior-based prevention programs are effective. In San Francisco, for example, new cases of AIDS among MSM began dropping in 1992, suggesting that sustained, comprehensive prevention activities begun in the 1980s succeeded in reducing HIV transmission in this group. 49 Behavioral interventions to prevent HIV vary, depending on the target, the designers, and available funding. Effective community-level prevention strategies in the United States have included social marketing interventions to increase condom use and messages about safer sex and needle sharing that rely on popular opinion leaders and role model stories.50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55 Effective small and large group interventions have aimed at increasing safer sex practices for high-risk HIV-infected men and women and have tended to employ cognitive behavioral and skill-building methods.56 Several effective individual counseling or education interventions have focused on increasing condom use and other safer sex practices for persons with HIV infection.57 For example, at the individual level, client-centered HIV counseling and testing appear to be effective in preventing high-risk uninfected persons from becoming infected and in helping HIV-infected persons prevent transmission to uninfected partners.58 Venues vary for interventions and include STD clinic waiting rooms, drug treatment centers, schools, community agencies, street settings, churches, mobile vans, and other community settings.59 Although HIV testing in STD clinics is an important intervention, detection and treatment of other STDs also are an important biomedical component of an HIV prevention program that should include both behavioral and biomedical interventions. STD prevention programs must address STD concerns and their cofactor role in HIV transmission. Early STD detection and treatment is a biomedical tool for lowering the risk for sexual transmission of HIV infection. Behavioral interventions emphasize reducing the number of sex partners, knowing the serostatus of one’s partner, using condoms consistently and correctly, and avoiding risky sexual behaviors. 60, 61, 62 D i s p a r i t i e s In the United States, compared to other racial and ethnic groups, African Americans and Hispanics are disproportionately affected by HIV/AIDS. Through December 1998, 688,200 cases of AIDS had been reported among persons of all ages and racial and ethnic groups, including 304,094 cases among Whites, 251,408 cases among African Americans, and 124,841 cases among Hispanics. Although 55 percent of the reported AIDS cases occurred among African Americans and Hispanics, these two population groups represent an estimated 13 percent and 12 percent, respectively, of the total U.S. population.63 176 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health The National Guideline Clearinghouse (NGC) is a public resource for evidence-based clinical practice guidelines. NGC is sponsored by the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (formerly the Agency for Health Care Policy and Research) in partnership with the A m e r i c a n Medical Association and the American Association of Health P l a n s . HIV/AIDS In 1997, AIDS remained the leading cause of death for all African Americans aged 25 to 44—the second leading cause among African American females and the leading cause among African American males.64 In 1996, for the first time, African Americans accounted for a larger proportion of AIDS cases than Whites, and this trend has continued. The AIDS case rate among African Americans in 1998 was 66.4 per 100,000 persons, or eight times the rate for Whites (8.2 per 100,000) and more than twice the rate for Hispanics (28.1 per 100,000).65 Among women with AIDS, African Americans and Hispanics have been especially affected, accounting for nearly 77 percent of cumulative cases reported among women by 1998. Of the 109,311 AIDS cases in women reported through December 1998, 61,874 cases occurred in African American women, and 21,937 occurred in Hispanic women.66 For young adults aged 20 to 24 years, 24,437 cumulative AIDS cases were reported through December 1998. Of this total, 10,107 (41 percent) occurred among African Americans, 8,804 (36 percent) among Whites, and 5,203 (21 percent) among Hispanics. Overall, 73 percent (17,797) of the AIDS cases in this age group occurred among males and 27 percent (6,640) among females. Among African Americans in this age group, 63 percent were male, and 37 percent were female. Among Hispanics, 74 percent were male, and 26 percent were female. Because the time from initial infection with HIV to the development of AIDS is long and variable (often 8 to 10 years or more), many of these young adults likely acquired their infections while in their teens.67 Among teenagers aged 13 to 19 years, 3,423 cumulative AIDS cases had been reported through December 1998. In this age group, 1,047 cases (31 percent) occurred among Whites, 1,654 (48 percent) among African Americans, and 668 (20 percent) among Hispanics. Overall, males accounted for 61 percent and females accounted for 39 percent of the AIDS cases in this age group. Among African American teenagers with AIDS, 46 percent were male, and 54 percent were female. Among Hispanic teens with AIDS, 67 percent were male, and 33 percent were female. Among White teenagers with AIDS, 79 percent were male, and 21 percent were female.68 The disproportionate impact of HIV/AIDS on non-White individuals underscores the importance of implementing and sustaining effective health education and prevention efforts for other racial and ethnic populations as well as populations at increased risk. For example, although Asian and Pacific Islanders account for 0.7 percent of adult male-reported HIV/AIDS cases, the service needs of gay and bisexual men from Asian and Pacific Islander communities are very important because 81 percent of these men with AIDS have sex with men, compared to 61 percent for all races and ethnic groups combined.69 Gay and bisexual men with HIV/AIDS from American Indian and Alaska Native communities also are disproportionately represented.70 HIV prevention efforts must take into account not only the multiracial and multicultural nature of society, but also other social and economic factors—such as poverty, underemployment, and poor access to health care. Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health 177 HIV/AIDS Healthy People 2010 recommends an increase in the percentage of Americans who know their HIV status. Major health system barriers are limiting progress in this area. Cultural insensitivity by health care workers and organizations creates an environment in which potential HIV risks are not identified and may prevent individuals from seeking care and HIV testing, particularly because individuals do not feel comfortable in disclosing their sexual minority status or risk behaviors.71, 72 Living in rural areas also is a risk factor for late diagnosis and entry into care. Heckman et al. (1996) noted that “several barriers to life- care services impacting rural persons with HIV/AIDS include the lack of adequately trained medical specialists, geographical distances and isolation from social support, insufficient or unreliable sources of transportation, and the lack of a cohesive support community for infected gay men and woman.”73 Finally, assumptions cannot be made that the positive and attitudinal changes seen among older MSM also apply to younger men. Research among gay and bisexual men suggests that some individuals are now less concerned about being infected than in the past and may take more risks.74 O p p o rt u n i t i e s New, highly active antiretroviral therapy (HAART) has played a substantial role in reducing AIDS deaths and reducing opportunistic infections.75 Although the long-term effects of combination treatment regimens are largely unknown, a growing body of evidence suggests that there is an association with hyperlypidemia, diabetes, and lipodystrophy.76 Some of these conditions contribute to premature cardiovascular disease and mortality. Although effective HAART will reduce the HIV load in plasma, individuals on HAART may still be infectious. Drug-resistant strains of HIV have emerged and have been detected in as many as 16 percent of those who recently contracted HIV, 77 which raises serious concerns regarding treatment, safer sexual practices, and reinfection—especially as more and more people with HIV live longer and remain sexually active. A retrospective case-control study of HIV-exposed health workers conducted by CDC, and extrapolation from the use of antiretrovirals to halt perinatal transmission, has led many experts to consider the possible use of postexposure prophylaxis to help contain viral replication in individuals who may recently have been exposed to HIV—either sexually or through injection drug use. 78 Studies are underway to evaluate this preventive approach, but these programs are expensive, are logistically difficult, and have experienced low utilization. This is not likely to be a practical prevention strategy. Before the advent of HAART, a diagnosis of HIV/AIDS meant leaving the workplace, often permanently. HIV-infected individuals who were symptomatic frequently went on permanent disability, and most of them went home to die. Now, because of treatment, many people can continue to work, with few or no absences related to their illness. Those who have left the workplace temporarily are able to return to their old jobs or seek new ones. Managing HIV at work presents unique problems and issues, with implications in the legal, medical, and psychosocial arenas as well as real challenges to time-management skills. The question of whether the health of people living with HIV/AIDS can be properly managed 178 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health HIV/AIDS along with full- or part-time work is first and foremost a situation to discuss with health care providers.79 For some people who return to work, the benefits can be psychological as well as financial. However, for others, the stress of work may speed the progression from HIV infection to AIDS.80 The employment provision of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)81 makes it unlawful to discriminate against people who have or are perceived to have disabilities. The ADA, which applies to public- and private- sector employers with 15 or more employees, covers HIV-infected individuals even when they are asymptomatic. At no time during the hiring process may an employee be required to disclose details of a disability. Disabled persons have the right to request and be granted “reasonable accommodations” that will enable them to participate in the application process and/or to perform functions essential to the job. The ADA also prohibits employers from discriminating on the basis of disability in the provision of health insurance to their employees and/or entering into contracts with health insurance companies that discriminate on the basis of disability. Thus, for example, blanket preexisting condition clauses do not violate the ADA unless a preexisting condition clause excluded only the treatment of HIV- related conditions.82 People with HIV/AIDS may qualify for disability benefits from the Social Security Administration (SSA) under two programs: Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI). 83 The medical eligibility rules for receiving SSDI and SSI are the same, but there are differences between the two programs. The amount of the monthly benefits of SSDI depends upon earnings while employed. Individuals qualify for Medicare if SSDI benefits have been received for 24 months. Medicare helps pay for hospital and hospice care, laboratory tests, home health care, and other medical services. People who have not worked long enough to qualify for Social Security, or whose Social Security benefits are low, may qualify for SSI payments if they have low income and limited resources. Children with disabilities who live in low-income households also may qualify for SSI. If people receive SSI, they also may be eligible for food stamps and Medicaid, a State-funded medical assistance program. Medicaid reimburses for medical bills including hospitalization and outpatient care. In some States, Medicaid pays for hospice care, a private nurse, and prescription drugs for HIV disease. If people return to work, benefits may still continue.84 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health 179 Given the tremendous expense of antiretroviral therapy and other HIV/AIDS medications, some pharmaceutical companies off e r indigent patient assistant programs. For example: ■ Zidovudine (AZT, ZDV or Retrovir) Glaxo Wellcome Company 1-800-722-9294 ■ Didanosine (ddl, Videx) Bristol-Myers Squibb 1-800-426-7644 ■ Zalcitabine (ddc, Hivid) Hoffman-LaRoche 1-800-526-6367 ■ Lopinavir (Kaletra) Abbott Laboratories 1-800-222-6885 HIV/AIDS Employer-provided health insurance programs allow workers and their families to take care of essential medical needs. These programs can be one of the most important benefits provided by an employer. Prior to 1985, group health insurance was available only to full- time workers and their families, but the condition of full-time employment changed in 1985 with the passage of certain health benefit provisions in the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA).85 The COBRA contained health care provisions giving former employees, retirees, spouses, and dependent children the right to temporary continuation of health coverage group rates. COBRA coverage, however, had some gaps, most of which were closed with the passage of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA).86 Health insurance policies tended to differ widely relative to preexisting conditions and pharmaceuticals, and the HIPAA was designed to provide some consistency in coverage issues. Managed care, the dominant organization and financing of health care services, is changing its policies and benefit packages for people who have HIV/AIDS. Although managed care o rganizations (MCOs) have little experience treating nontraditional populations such as people living with HIV/AIDS, States now offer Medicaid managed care for persons with H I V / A I D S .8 7 One of the first Medicaid managed care programs in the United States was the Moore Clinic, a grantee program established by the Johns Hopkins University as a Ry a n White CARE (Comprehensive AIDS Resources Emergency) A c t’s Special Project of National Significance funded by the Health Resources and Services A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ( H R S A ) .8 8 Treating people with HIV/AIDS is not restricted to public-sector managed care. Kaiser Permanente Mid-Atlantic has a strong case management cooperative system.8 9 I n addition to MCOs, some other types of health insurers have changed their policies. For example, after fighting all the way to the U.S. Supreme Court, Mutual of Omaha Insurance announced plans to lift special restrictions on medical coverage for HIV/AIDS-related care.9 0 Health care providers and/or community counselors can assist people who have HIV/AIDS to live their lives with quality. Although Healthy People 2010 recommends an increase in the percentage of people who know their HIV status, major barriers are limiting progress in this area. Cultural insensitivity by health care workers and organizations creates an environment in which potential HIV risks are not identified and may prevent individuals from seeking care and HIV testing, particularly because individuals do not feel comfortable in disclosing their sexual minority status or risk behaviors.91 H I V prevention works. There are a wide range of proven strategies to reduce behaviors that increase the risk of transmitting or acquiring HIV.9 2 With better treatment, more Americans are living with HIV/AIDS than ever before. However, this increase in the HIV-infected population creates more opportunities for transmitting the virus and thus a greater need for prevention. There also is compelling evidence that testing and treatment of STDs can be an effective tool in preventing the spread of HIV.93 Comprehensive HIV prevention programs may develop linkages with STD programs to incorporate: 180 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health HIV/AIDS ■ Community-based efforts to improve STD care-seeking behavior ■ Quality onsite STD detection and treatment services at a variety of settings for HIV- infected persons and other persons at risk for HIV or other STDs and their partners ■ Improved STD treatment for sex partners of infected persons ■ Expanded STD surveillance systems Because many adolescents across the country remain at risk for HIV, STDs, and unintended pregnancy, expanded efforts are required of families, schools, youth-serving organizations, and other social institutions that can influence adolescents to modify risky behaviors. The following actions are necessary: ■ Encourage all young people to be involved in reducing their risk and spread of HIV/AIDS, to educate peers, and to develop responsible, healthy lifestyles ■ Develop policies that protect the rights of youth to be informed and educated about HIV/AIDS and other STDs ■ Establish or expand programs that increase access to quality, culturally competent health care services, and support groups for young adults with HIV ■ Ensure that young people are protected from discrimination or exploitation resulting from their sexual orientation, gender identity, or HIV status. LGBT persons living with HIV/AIDS who are members of population groups that lack access to preventive services—such as African Americans, Latino or Hispanic Americans, those with serious mental illness, substance users, and individuals who are homeless or incarcerated—require culturally competent, linguistically accessible services that meet their complex needs. LGBT persons living with HIV/AIDS and other medical or mental health problems also require a comprehensive array of health and related services, interventions, and supports, including housing, financial, and social support systems. The outcomes of 11 Federal demonstration projects serving persons living with or affected by HIV/AIDS consistently show that “Efforts to reach this alienated and heavily stigmatized population require specialized and Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 181 The HIV/AIDS Tr e a t m e n t Information Service (ATIS) is a central resource for Federally approved treatment guidelines for HIV and AIDS. ATIS is staff e d by multilingual health information specialists who answer questions on HIV treatment options, using a broad network of Federal, national, and community-based information resources. Callers can reach this confidential, personalized service at 1-800- H I V-0440 (1-800-448-0440). More information is available online at w w w. h i v a t i s . o r g. HIV/AIDS targeted approaches that involve close collaboration among a broad range of disciplines and service providers.” 94 In October 1998, the Clinton administration declared HIV/AIDS in racial and ethnic minority communities a “severe and ongoing health crisis.” 95 In 1998, the administration and the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services in collaboration with the Congressional Black Caucus announced a new $156 million initiative to address this crisis through increased funding and outreach to these communities. In fiscal year 1999 (October 1, 1998, through September 30, 1999), the Initiative targeted African Americans and Hispanic communities. In fiscal year 2000, the Minority AIDS Initiative was created to include all communities of color, and the funding to support the expanded programs was increased to more than $245 million. (For a breakdown of the Federal agencies and specific programs, more information can be found online at www.sfaf.org/policy/mhai_funding.html.) S u m m a ry of LGBT Researc h HIV prevention and treatment. HIV prevention and treatment presents a serious public health dilemma that is complicated by a myriad of social, environmental, and health system factors. Research and prevention materials typically target men who identify as gay, whereas others group gay and bisexual men as a single group.96 Consequently, men of color, who may not identify as gay and may be at highest sexual risk for HIV, are often ignored in research and prevention, as are transgender individuals, lesbians, and women who have sex with women. For example, studies of bisexual behavior among men have found an association with reduced intentions to use condoms, knowing fewer HIV-positive people, insufficient knowledge and understanding of safer sexual practices,97 and elevated rates of high-risk sexual activity.98 The LGBT community recognizes that “survival sex”—including convenience sex, sex for drugs, or sex for food—are key behaviors in HIV transmission. Additional research and education materials are sorely needed, especially for men who have sex with both sexes and transgender persons. In addition, HIV-positive men who have sex with both sexes but do not identify with the gay and bisexual communities may not have access to the prevention, treatment, support, and health improvement systems readily available in many gay and bisexual communities.99 The lack of identification with gay and bisexual communities and the range of support and health services they offer may raise similar barriers for transgender persons living with, or at risk for, HIV infection. Behavioral interventions intended to reduce the risk of HIV transmission are the only means that have demonstrated effectiveness in slowing the spread of HIV.100 Prevention and education efforts often are stymied by the reality that the LGBT population includes individuals from all walks of life, including those who identify themselves as gay, bisexual, and heterosexual and those who reject any such categorization. These challenges are further complicated by the fact that assessing one’s sexuality, variations in levels of actual or perceived homophobia within various cultural and ethnic groups, and conflicts between ethnicity and sexuality may make it difficult for men to identify themselves as gay and contribute to denial regarding HIV risks.101, 102 The fact that men who have sex with both 182 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health HIV/AIDS sexes often do not disclose their bisexuality to their female partners is also well documented.103, 104 Likewise, LGBT partners may not disclose or be aware of their own serostatus or risk factors. 105 LGBT communities of color in the United States have faced additional challenges associated with the management and prevention of HIV infection. In spite of recent Federal initiatives designed to bolster HIV prevention efforts, the feelings of inevitability and fatalism within these communities may hamper the effectiveness of the community’s response. Even in the light of significant improvements in access to HIV treatment, communities of color, especially African Americans, continue to be underrepresented among individuals living with HIV who are in treatment. 106 The efficacy of HAART therapies has created yet another unforeseen negative outcome for some LGBT people living with HIV. Treatment advances have contributed to a perception that AIDS has become a manageable, chronic illness in some communities. One study revealed that 18 percent of HIV-positive gay men practice safe sex less often than they previously did because of advances in treatment.107 Although longevity has dramatically increased, HIV prevention efforts among MSM have not adapted to changes in the epidemic, and prevention efforts need to be reinvigorated and expanded with a particular focus on those MSM at greater risk for infection—youth, African Americans, Latinos, and substance users. HIV/AIDS among MSM. HIV prevalence continues to be high among MSM (especially young MSM). In a recent study of young MSM aged 18 to 22 in seven urban areas from 1994 to 1998, a 7 percent infection rate was noted,108 a rate significantly higher than the general U.S. population. Although HIV/AIDS is still widely considered by many as a public health concern that primarily affects gay White men, African American and Latino men in recent years have constituted the majority of AIDS cases among MSM.109 In 1999, the AIDS incidence rate in African American MSM (55.5 cases per 100,000 men) was more than five times that for White MSM (10.9), and the rate for Latino MSM (26.8) was almost two and a half times greater than that for Whites. In contrast, the AIDS rate for American Indian MSM (10.9) was the same as that for White MSM, and the rate for Asian and Pacific Islander MSM (5.5 percent) was half. Meanwhile, within Asian and Pacific Islander communities, a majority of the AIDS cases (close to 70 percent) are MSM. However, statistics pertaining to Asians and Pacific Islanders and American Indians are complicated by the fact that the data statistically group both under the population category of “other.” Also, many States still group these populations under “other.” As a result, an “accurate base rate” of the two groups is not known. HIV reporting data are inadequate for MSM. The data do not reflect the HIV/AIDS epidemic among MSM. States that account for most of the infections in MSM do not have HIV reporting, and the data do not represent the affected populations. African Americans are overrepresented, and Latinos and Asians and Pacific Islanders are underrepresented. HIV/AIDS among lesbians. The impact of HIV/AIDS on lesbian populations is not discussed in Healthy People 2010. The prevalence of HIV among lesbians and the risks Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 183 HIV/AIDS associated with female-to-female transmission (some women who have sex with women may not identify themselves as lesbians) have gone largely unstudied.110 However, several reports have documented concomitant HIV risks, including injection drug use and bisexual male partners, among some subgroups of lesbians, in spite of known high rates of new infections among women and other marginalized communities. One San Francisco study of HIV-positive women reporting female sexual partners found that the HIV-positive women were twice as likely to have used drugs and significantly more likely to have had anal intercourse with a man than those who did not report having a female sexual partner.111 HIV/AIDS among transgender individuals. There are now sufficient recent studies to document high HIV seroprevalence rates among some groups of male-to-female (MTF) transgender persons in the United States. Seroprevalence rates ranging from 22 to 47 percent have been documented within urban subpopulations of MTF transgender individuals across the United States.112, 113, 114, 115, 116 HIV seroprevalence rates appear to be especially high among African American MTF transgender persons.117, 118 Despite numerous studies showing high levels of HIV infection and high-risk sexual behavior among MTF transgender individuals, the prevention needs of transgender persons continue to go largely unaddressed at the national level. Moreover, even less is known about men who have sex with MTF transgender persons, especially those who have sex with MTF sex workers. These men may also have male and female sex partners, representing a significant, yet unmeasured means of HIV transmission.119 In addition, very little is known about the HIV risks for female-to-male (FTM) transgender individuals, who constitute a largely invisible population with regard to sexual risk behaviors.120, 121 In a recent policy statement, the American Public Health Association urged that both MTF and FTM transgender individuals should be recognized by research and health care communities as populations whose needs are unique and distinct from those of gay men and lesbians.122 HIV/AIDS and adolescents. Gay youth are a subgroup of MSM that are more likely to engage in high-risk behavior and are at increased risk for HIV infection. The same may be true for young transgender individuals. HIV infection rates among adolescents and young adult MSM remain very high. One sample of young, urban MSM aged 15 to 22 found that 7 percent were infected with HIV, with the highest rates among African American (14 percent) and Latino youth (7 percent) being disproportionately represented. (The rate among Whites was 3 p e r c e n t ) .1 2 3 , 1 2 4 Another study of inner-city youth participating in a gay community center program reported consistent condom use in only 13 percent of adolescent MSM, whereas one- quarter were engaged in prostitution and all subjects reported at least some sexual activity.1 2 5 Rates of new infections tend to be high among people of color. School health education on H I V and STD prevention is another opportunity for progress that has gone largely untapped. (See Educational and Community-Based Programs focus area.) HIV/AIDS, stigma, comorbidity, and culture. HIV/AIDS disproportionally affects ethnic minority populations where rates of poverty, homelessness, mental health disorders, and substance abuse are higher. Presumably, the numbers of LGBT persons in these populations is proportionate to the numbers in the population as a whole—5 to 10 percent.126 184 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health HIV/AIDS Discussion of Healthy People 2010 Objectives 13-2: Reduce the number of new AIDS cases among adolescent and adult men who have sex with men. Community-based education has long been a mainstay in efforts to reduce the risk of HIV exposure.127 However, persistently high rates of HIV infection among MSM indicate that HIV/AIDS prevention messages are no longer adequate, especially in light of recent advances in HIV therapy—most notably, the introduction of potent antiretroviral therapy.128 Current prevention efforts may be less effective than before because the nature and the magnitude of the epidemic has changed. Social marketing techniques and strategies that are responsive to new sexual attitudes and practices (e.g., the Internet) are seldom used. In addition, many messages have presumed that MSM are gay and therefore engage only in homosexual behavior. However, MSM may also have sex with other partners including women and transgender people. There is a strong behavioral bias in messages such as “consistent condom use” with all sexual partners. Although condoms have demonstrated success in helping to prevent the spread of HIV, the process by which different individuals determine whether or not they are going to use condoms is often complex. In anecdotal conversations, gay men who sometimes “slip,” argue that condom use takes away their romance and intimacy. As for women, it is often an issue of power and negotiation between them and their sexual partners.129 Assumptions have been made that the epidemic is less severe because of health-positive images in commercial advertising targeting gay and bisexual men (and perhaps transgender individuals) that promote images of physical vigor and vitality associated with HIV.130 Another major concern is the transmission of HIV strains that are resistant to antiretroviral therapies. Such strains have been reported in 5 to 16 percent of those infected.131 This raises new challenges for promoting safer sexual practices and educating infected persons about ways to prevent reinfection. It also underscores the need for additional research and effective, culturally competent health promotion. This could result in the possible sexual transmission of resistant strains from one HIV-infected person to another, which could in turn jeopardize the efficacy of antiretroviral therapy. 13-3: Reduce the number of new AIDS cases among females and males who inject drugs. After nearly two decades of research on the HIV/AIDS epidemic, much is known about different populations impacted by the disease, including those affected directly or indirectly by drug use. Men who have sex with other men who use drugs have not received the same research attention as other drug users, despite the fact that they represent nearly one-fifth of AIDS cases.132, 133, 134 Additional research is needed to better understand the degree to which LGBT populations, especially youth, are at increased risk for HIV infection because of recreational drug use or hormonal injection among transgender individuals. Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 185 HIV/AIDS 13-6: Increase the proportion of sexually active persons who use condoms. As stated earlier, there is increasing evidence that high-risk sexual behavior may be on the rise. The advances in HAART may create a sense of false security among MSM that HIV is a manageable chronic infection. 135 Research has found that, although most gay men have protected sex most or all of the time, as many as one in three MSM report having unprotected anal sex.136, 137 Possible reasons for such high rates of unprotected sex and perceived lower risks include selected risk-reduction strategies (e.g., having unprotected sex primarily or exclusively with partners they believe to share the same serostatus),138, 139 low self-esteem, lack of social supports, “mood” prior to the sexual encounter, optimism, fatalism, age, education, and alcohol or drug use.140 No data on rates of unprotected sex among transgender individuals are available. New strategies need to be developed to reach young MSM who do not identify as gay or bisexual and may be “underground.” This will most likely involve researching, testing, and communicating alternative prevention messages, through nontraditional communications vehicles, to reach young MSM. Schools are the ideal setting for teaching LGBT youth before they become sexually active. Older LGBT individuals receive less HIV-related information and are typically ignored by HIV education and prevention programs. 141 Additional efforts are needed to ensure that older LGBT populations are included in HIV prevention and education activities. There is also a need to increase the availability of condoms to incarcerated individuals. T h e categorization of “M S M” captures a diverse array of subpopulations that may identify as gay, bisexual, or heterosexual. However, “M S M” does not typically include transgender individuals because they often do not identify themselves as such or are excluded either by org a n i z a t i o n s conducting prevention activities or by the community being targeted for prevention. As a result, the preventive health needs of transgender persons largely go unaddressed. 13-7: (Developmental) Increase the number of HIV-positive persons who know their serostatus. Men who do not identify as gay are less likely to perceive themselves at risk for HIV and thus may avoid HIV screening.142 Among other LGBT populations (e.g., Asians and Pacific Islanders), testing for HIV may be a function of health beliefs and choice of medical procedures (e.g., standard blood test vs. OraSure‚). That is, help-seeking behaviors (e.g., see a doctor or health care provider for HIV versus diet) is a function of a complex social arrangement. Without taking these health beliefs or norms into consideration, achieving this objective will be a challenge. And as indicated earlier, the lack of anonymous testing is a barrier to increasing the number of persons with HIV who know their serostatus. 186 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health HIV/AIDS 13-9: (Developmental) Increase the number of State prison systems that provide comprehensive HIV/AIDS, sexually transmitted diseases, and tuberculosis (TB) education. Homosexual activity among males occurs in prisons. However, many prison systems do not officially acknowledge this activity and therefore do not provide condoms. Several recent court cases indicated that incarcerated transgender individuals may be more likely to be sexually assaulted while in prison.143, 144 Thus, comprehensive HIV education should be made available in all correctional facilities and systems. 13-10: (Developmental) Increase the proportion of inmates in State prison systems who receive voluntary HIV counseling and testing during incarceration. Health-related services (e.g., access to condoms, counseling, testing) should be made available in all correctional facilities and systems. 13-14: Reduce deaths from HIV infection. There is a growing perception that LGBT individuals, particularly those from disenfranchised communities (e.g., younger, poorer, from communities of color) are not tested for HIV as often as necessary. Delays in seeking testing services ultimately results in delays in accessing treatment for those who test positive. Transgender individuals may not be tested as frequently as appropriate.145, 146 Culturally sensitive testing and counseling is necessary to reach out to LGBT communities that have been traditionally marginalized and have avoided seeking testing and counseling. In spite of recent advances in HIV treatment, available medications are not necessarily effective for all patients due to patient nonadherence to the treatment regimen, toxicity, or the ability of HIV to become resistant. These factors can lead to increased morbidity and mortality. Proper adherence to the medical treatment regimen is essential and can dramatically improve the quality of life for individuals living with HIV. It is also critical for adherence education to be culturally specific. Renewed efforts are needed to promote early and appropriate treatment as soon as possible after HIV diagnosis. S e rv i c e s — R E C O M M E N D ATIONS ■ Public and private-sector systems of care should implement comprehensive strategies to promote culturally competent, appropriate, and linguistically accessible HIV prevention messages to high-risk youth, particularly LGBT adolescents. ■ Efforts are needed to better integrate prevention and treatment strategies for HIV/AIDS and primary care. ■ There is a need for a national HIV prevention strategy for gay and bisexual men, the population at greatest risk for infection. Such a strategy should reflect the racial, ethnic, geographic, cultural, and age diversity of the gay and bisexual community and should be Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 187 HIV/AIDS easily adaptable for population-specific marketing, including men of color, older gay and bisexual men, youth, gay and bisexual men in rural areas, and other diverse groups. ■ There is a need to increase, through multiple measures, the percentage of individuals who know their HIV status. Education and Tr a i n i n g — R E C O M M E N D AT I O N S ■ Health education materials need to be culturally specific to address the needs of transgender people and other sexual minority communities.147, 148, 149 ■ Cross-training is needed among all health care workers, especially those working with youth, acknowledging the interrelatedness of risky behaviors. P o l i c y — R E C O M M E N D ATIONS ■ Health departments need to form alliances with community-based organizations to address the epidemic at the local level by conducting needs assessments and funding community-based prevention and treatment strategies. ■ Health insurance companies and managed care organizations should create incentives for health plans, providers, and provider organizations to develop targeted preventive interventions and accompanying early intervention services. R e s e a rc h — R E C O M M E N D ATIONS ■ More data are needed on the incidence and prevalence of HIV infection in specific communities, the means by which individuals become infected, and how they identify themselves (LGBT, heterosexual, or otherwise). ■ Additional studies are needed to better understand the potential risks associated with using recreational drugs, hormonal therapy (including transgender-related hormone therapy and anabolic steroid use among men), and other medications while on antiretroviral therapy. ■ Research is needed to assess the long-term effects of combination anti-HIV drug regimens. ■ Studies are needed to identify effective HIV prevention interventions for MSM (only 11 of 98 rigorous intervention studies in the United States have included MSM). Te rm i n o l o g y AIDS: Acquired immunodeficiency syndrome, the most severe phase of infection with human immunodeficiency virus (HIV). Persons infected with HIV are said to have AIDS when they get certain opportunistic infections or when their CD4+ cell count drops below 200. 188 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health HIV/AIDS CD4+ cell count: A measure of the number of CD4+ cells present in the blood. Because HIV infection kills CD4+ cells, the CD4+ cell count is used to track the progress of HIV infection. C o s t - e ffective: Indicates that the cost of a particular intervention compares favorably to lifesaving interventions associated with other diseases. Cost-saving: Indicates that a particular intervention averts health care costs in excess of the cost of the intervention. H A A RT (highly active antire t roviral therapy): Aggressive anti-HIV treatment usually including a combination of drugs called protease inhibitors and reverse transcriptase inhibitors whose purpose is to reduce viral load infection to undetectable levels. H I V (human immunodeficiency virus): A virus that infects and takes over certain cells of the immune system that are important in fighting disease. H I V a n t i re t rovirals: Drugs, such as zidovudine (AZT) and saquinavir, designed to attack HIV and prevent it from multiplying. O p p o rtunistic infections: Infections that take advantage of the opportunity offered when a person’s immune system has been weakened by HIV infection. At least 25 medical conditions, including bacterial, fungal, and viral infections and certain types of cancer, are associated with HIV infection. Pandemic: An epidemic over a large area or country. P revalence: A proportion of persons in a population who are infected, at a specified point in time or over a specified period of time, with HIV. P rophylaxis: Measures designed to prevent the spread of disease and preserve health; protective or preventive treatment. P rotease inhibitor: A drug that binds to and blocks HIV protease from working, thus preventing the production of new functional viral particles. S e rostatus: The result of a blood test for the antibodies that the immune system creates to fight specific diseases. R e f e re n c e s 1 Centers for Disease Control. Kaposi ’s sarcoma and pneumocystis pneumonia among homosexual men—New York City and California. Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report 30(25):305-308, 1981. 2 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). HIV/AIDS Surveillance Report 10(2), 1998. 3 CDC. Update on acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS)—United States. Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report 31(37):507-514, 1982. 4 CDC. HIV/AIDS Surveillance Report 12(1), 2000. 5 Ibid. Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 189 HIV/AIDS 6 Gardner, L.; Brundage, J.; Burke, D.; et al. Evidence for spread of the human immunodeficiency virus epidemic into low prevalence areas of the United States. Journal of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndromes 2, 521-532, 1989. 7 Lam, N.S., and Liu, K. Spread of AIDS in rural America, 1982-1990. Journal of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndromes 7:485-490, 1994. 8 CDC, HIV/AIDS Surveillance Report 12(1), 2000. 9 CDC. 1993 revised classification system for HIV infection and expanded surveillance case definition for AIDS among adolescents and adults . Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report 41(RR-17):2, 1992. 10 Ibid. 11 Martin, J.A.; Smith, B.L.; Mathews, T.J.; and Ventura, S.J. Births and deaths: Preliminary data for 1998. National Vital Statistics Reports 47(25), 1999. 12 Barber, T.W. Management of advanced HIV disease. In: Libman, H., and Wirzburg, R.A., eds. HIV Infection: A Primary Care Manual. Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Co., 1996. 13 Kessler, H.A. Recent Advances in HIV Therapy: A Treatment Team Approach. New York, NY: World Health Communications, 1999. 14 El-Sadr, W.; Oleske, J.M.; Agins, B.D.; et al. Evaluation and management of early HIV infection. Clinical Practice Guideline No. 7, AHCPR Pub. No. 94-0572. Public Health Service, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 1994. 15 CDC. HIV/AIDS Surveillance Report 9(2), 1997. 16 Fleming, P.L.; Ward, J.W.; Janssen, R.S.; et al. Guidelines for National Human Immunodeficiency Virus case surveillance, including monitoring for human immunodeficiency virus infection and acquired immunodeficiency syndrome. Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report 48(RR13):1-28, December 10, 1999. 17 Council of State and Territorial Epidemiologists (CSTE). CSTE Position Statement ID-4; National HIV Surveillance—Addition to the National Public Health Surveillance System. Atlanta, GA: CSTE, 1997. 18 CDC, HIV AIDS Surveillance Report 12(1), 2000. 19 Ibid. 20 Ibid. 21 Fleming, P.L.; Ward, J.W.; Janssen, R.S.; et al. Guidelines for National Human Immunodeficiency Virus case surveillance, including monitoring for human immunodeficiency virus infection and acquired immunodeficiency syndrome. Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report 48(RR13):1-28, December 10, 1999. 22 Sweeney, P.A.; Fleming, P.L.; Karon, J.M.; et al. A minimum estimate of the number of living HIV-infected persons confidentially tested in the United States [Abstract 1-16]. Paper presented at the Interscience Conference on Antimicrobial Agents and Chemotherapy in Toronto, Canada, September 1997. 23 Karon, J.M.; Rosenberg, P.S.; McQuillan, G.; et al. Prevalence of HIV infection in the United States, 1984–1992. Journal of the American Medical Association 276(2):126-131, 1996. 24 CDC. HIV/AIDS Surveillance Branch, unpublished data, 1999. 25 CDC. Update: Trends in AIDS incidence, deaths, and prevalence —United States, 1996. Morbidity and mortality Weekly Report. 46(8):165-173, 1997. 26 Sweeney, Fleming, Karon, et al., 1997. 190 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health HIV/AIDS 27 Bozzette, S.A.; Berry, S.H.; Duan, N.; et al. The care of HIV-infected adults in the United States, 1984–1992. New England Journal of Medicine 339(26):1897-1904, 1998. 28 Ruiz, M.D.; Gable, A.R.; Kaplan, E.H.; et al. eds., Institute of Medicine. No Time to Lose: Getting More from HIV Prevention. Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 2000. 29 NIH Consensus Statement. Interventions to prevent HIV risk behaviors. 15(2):1-41, 1997. 30 CDC. Update on acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) among patients with hemophilia A. Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report 31(48):644-652, 1982. 31 CDC. Possible transfusion-associated acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS)—California. Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report 31(48):652-654, 1982. 32 CDC. Prevention of acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS): Report of inter-agency recommendations. Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report 32(8):101-104, 1983. 33 CDC. Acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS): Precautions for health-care workers and allied professionals. Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report 32(30):450-452, 1983. 34 CDC. Provisional public health service inter-agency recommendations for screening donated blood and plasma for antibody to the virus causing acquired immunodeficiency syndrome. Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report 34(1):1-5, 1985. 35 CDC. Recommendations for preventing transmission of infection with human T-lymphotropic virus III/lymphadenopathy-associated virus in the workplace. Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report 34(45):681- 686, 691-696, 1985. 36 CDC, Public Health Service Task Force. Recommendations for the use of antiretroviral drugs in pregnant women infected with HIV-1 for maternal health and for reducing perinatal HIV-1 transmission in the United States. Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report 47(RR-2), 1998. 37 Ibid. 38 Sperling, R.S.; Shapiro, D.E.; Coombs, R.W.; et al. Maternal viral load, zidovudine treatment and the risk of transmission of HIV-1 from mother-to-infant. New England Journal of Medicine 335:1621-1629, 1996. 39 CDC. Update: Perinatally acquired HIV/AIDS —United States, 1997. Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report 46(46):1086-1092, 1997. 40 CDC. HIV/AIDS Surveillance Report 10(2), 1998 . 41 CDC. HIV/AIDS Surveillance Report 10(2), 1999 . 42 Ruiz, Gable, Kaplan, et al., 2000. 43 CDC. Update: Barrier protection against HIV infection and other sexually transmitted diseases. Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report 42(30):589-591, 1993. 44 Institute of Medicine. The effects of needle exchange programs. In: Norman, J.; Vlahov, D.; and Moses, L., eds. Preventing HIV Transmission: The Role of Sterile Needles and Bleach. Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1995. 45 Gorman, E.M.; Barr, B.D.; Hansen, A.; et al. Speed, sex, gay men, and HIV: Ecological and community perspectives. Medical Anthropology Quarterly 11(4):505-515, 1997. 46 CDC. Statistical Projections. Available online at: www.cdc.gov/hiv/hivinfo/vfax/260210.htm, 1999. 47 Hartshorn, K.L., and Cooley, T.P. Antiretroviral Therapy. In: Libman, H., and Wirzburg, R.A., eds. HIV Infection: A Primary Care Manual. Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Co., 1996, 461-480. Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health 191 HIV/AIDS 48 CDC. Prevention and treatment of tuberculosis among persons with human immunodeficiency virus: Principles of therapy and revised recommendations. Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report 47(RR-20), 1998. 49 Kamb, M.L.; Fishbein, M.; Douglas, Jr., J.M.; et al. Efficacy of risk-reduction counseling to prevent human immunodeficiency virus and sexually transmitted diseases: A randomized controlled trial. Project RESPECT Study Group. Journal of the American Medical Association 280(13):1161-1167, 1998. 50 NIH Consensus Statement, 1997. 51 Choi, K.H., and Catania, J.A. Changes in multiple partnerships, HIV testing, and condom use among U.S. heterosexuals 18 to 49 years of age, 1990 and 1992 American Journal of Public Health 86:554-556, 1996. 52 Kelly, J.A.; St. Lawrence, J.S.; Stevenson, L.; et al. Community AIDS/HIV risk reduction: the effects of endorsements by popular people in three cities. American Journal of Public Health 82:1483-1489, 1992. 53 Normand, J.; Vlahov, D.; and Moses, L.E. Preventing HIV Transmission: The Role of Sterile Needles and Bleach. Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1995. 54 Rosenstock, I.M.; Strecher, V.J.; and Becker, M.H. The health belief model and HIV risk behavior change. In: DiClemente, R.J., Peterson, J.L., eds. Preventing AIDS: Theories and Methods of Behavioral Interventions. New York, NY: Plenum Press, 1994. 55 Watters, J.K.; Estilio, M.J.; Clark, G.L.; and Lorvick, J. Syringe and needle exchange as HIV/AIDS prevention for injection drug users . Journal of the American Medical Association 271(2):115-120, 1994. 56 Ibid. 57 Goodrich, J.; Wellings, K.; and McVey, D. Using condom data to assess the impact of HIV/AIDS preventive interventions. Health Education Research 13(2):267-274, 1998. 58 El-Sadr, W.; Oleske, J.M.; Agins, B.D.; et al., 1994. 59 Ibid. 60 CDC. Update: Barrier protection against HIV infection and other sexually transmitted diseases. Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report 42(30):589-591, 1993. 61 CDC. HIV prevention through early detection and treatment of other sexually transmitted diseases. United States: Recommendations of the Advisory Committee for HIV and STD Prevention. Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report 47(RR-12):175-219, 181, 1998. 62 Wasserheit, J. Epidemiological synergy. Interrelationships between human immunodeficiency virus infection and other sexually transmitted diseases. Sexually Transmitted Diseases 19(2):61-77, 1992. 63 CDC. HIV/AIDS Surveillance Report 10(2), 1998. 64 Hoyert, D.L.; Kochanek, K.D.; and Murphy, S.L. Births and deaths: Final data for 1997. National Vital Statistics Report. Hyattsville, MD: National Center for Health Statistics, 47(19), 1999. 65 CDC. HIV/AIDS Surveillance Report 10(2), 1998. 66 Ibid. 67 Ibid. 68 Ibid. 69 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS). HIV/AIDS Workgroup on Health Care Access Issues for Gay and Bisexual Men of Color. Pub. No. HRSA-95-4. Rockville, MD: DHHS, Health Resources and Services Administration, Bureau of Health Resources Development, 1995. 192 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health HIV/AIDS 70 CDC, HIV/AIDS Surveillance Report 6(1), 1994. 71 Xavier, J.M. The Washington Transgender Needs Assessment Survey. Administration for HIV and AIDS of the District of Columbia, 2000. 72 Fuller, J.D. The homosexual or bisexual partner. In: Libman, H., and Wirzburg, R.A., eds. HIV Infection: A Primary Care Manual. Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Co., 1996. 73 Heckman, T.; Somlai, A.; Kelly, J.; et al. Reducing barriers to care and improving quality of life for rural persons with HIV. AIDS Patient Care and STDs 11:37-43, 1996. 74 CDC, National Center for HIV, STD and TB Prevention, Division of HIV/AIDS Prevention. Need for Sustained HIV Prevention Among Men Who Have Sex With Men. www.cdc.gov/hiv/pubs/facts/msm.htm, 2000. 75 CDC. 1999 USPHS/IDSA guidelines for prevention of opportunistic infections in persons infected with human immunodeficiency virus. Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report 48(35), 1999. 76 Kaul D.; Cinti, S.K.; Carver, P.L.; and Kaznjian, P.H. HIV protease inhibitors: Advances in therapy and adverse reactions, including metabolic complications. Pharmacotherapy 19(3):281-299, 1999. 77 Boden, D.; Hurley, A.; Zhang L.; et al. HIV-1 drug resistance in newly infected individuals. Journal of the American Medical Association 282(12):1135-1141, 1999. 78 Kwong, J.; Mayer, K.; LaSalvia, T.; Church, D.; Peterson, N.; Pares-Avila, J.; Forstein, M.; and Appelbaum, J. Non-occupational HIV post exposure prophylaxis at a Boston community health center. Abstract. National HIV Prevention Conference, Altanta, GA, 1999. 79 Managing Work and HIV: Helping clients achieve a productive and rewarding working life. HIV Frontline, September/October 1999, 1-5. 80 Lesserman, J.; Petitto, J.M.; Golden, R.N.; et al. Impact of stressful life events, depression, social support, coping, and cortisol on progression to AIDS. American Journal of Psychiatr y 157:1221-1228, 2000. 81 Public Law 101-336, Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990. 82 U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, Disability Rights Section. Questions and Answers: The Americans with Disabilities Act and Persons with HIV/AIDS, www.usdoj.gov:80/crt/ada/pubs/hivqanda.txt. 83 Social Security Administration. Social Security Benefits for People Living with HIV/AIDS. SSA Publication No. 05-10019, May 1995. 84 Social Security Administration. Working While Disabled . . .How Social Security Can Help. SSAPub. No. 05-10095, 1995. 85 Public Law 99-272, Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, 1986. 86 Public Law 104-191, Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, July 1, 1997. 87 Bartlett, L., and Hitz, P.R. Delivering HIV Care in a Managed Care Environment: Issues and Strategies . Menlo Park, CA: Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, 1996. 88 Kessler, 1999. 89 Ibid. 90 U.S. Insurer to Lift Discriminatory Caps on AIDS Coverage. Online: April 12, 2000, www.gatottawanow.com/archives/news/20000412MutualOmaho.html. 91 Karon, Rosenberg, McQuillan, et al., 1996. 92 Ruiz, Gable, Kaplan, et al., 2000. Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health 193 HIV/AIDS 93 Wasserheit, J. The role of STD testing and treatment in HIV prevention, The Active Voice. Spring 1998. 94 Acuff, C.; Archambeault, J.; Greenberg, B.; et al. Mental Health Care for People Living With or Affected by HIV/AIDS: A Practical Guide. Rockville, MD: Center for Mental Health Services. 1999. 95 President Bill Clinton. Protecting America’s Health, Increasing Funding for HIV/AIDS. October 28, 1998. 96 Heckman, T.G.; Kelly, J.A.; Sikkema, K.J.; et al. Differences in HIV risk characteristics between bisexual and exclusively gay men. AIDS Education and Prevention 7(6):504-512, 1995. 97 Ibid. 98 Doll, L.S., and Beeker, C. Male bisexual behavior and HIV risk in the United States: Synthesis of research with implications for behavioral interventions. AIDS Education and Prevention 8(3):205-225, 1996. 99 Chapple, M.J.; Kippax, S.; and Smith, G. “Semi-straight sort of sex”: Class and gay community attachment explored within a framework of older homosexually active men. Journal of Homosexuality 35(2):65-83, 1998. 100 NIH Consensus Statement, 1997. 101 Diaz R.M.; Stall R.D.; Hoff C.; et al. HIV risk among Latino gay men in the Southwestern United States. AIDS Education and Prevention 8(5):415-429, 1996. 102 Stokes, J.P., and Peterson, J.L. Homophobia, self-esteem, and risk for HIV among African American men who have sex with men. AIDS Education and Prevention 10(3):278-292, 1998. 103 Kalichman, S.C.; Roffman, R.A.; Picciano, J.F.; and Bolan, M. Risk for HIV infection among bisexual men seeking HIV-prevention services and risks posed to their female partners. Health Psychology 17(4):320-327, 1998. 104 Weatherburn, P; Hickson, F.; Reid, D.S.; et al. Sexual HIV risk behaviour among men who have sex with both men and women. AIDS Care 10(4):463-471, 1998. 105 Stein, M.D.; Freedberg, K.A.; Sullivan, L.M.; et al. Archives of Internal Medicine 158:253-257, 1998. 106 Levi, J., and Kates, J. HIV: Challenging the health care delivery system. American Journal of Public Health 90:1033-1036, 2000. 107 Kelly, J.A.; Hoffman, R.G.; Rompa, D.; and Gray, M. Protease inhibitor combination therapies and perceptions of gay men regarding AIDS severity and the need to maintain safer sex. AIDS. 12(10):F91-95, July 9, 1998. 108 Valleroy, L.A.; MacKellar, D.A.; Karon, J.M.; et al. HIV prevalence and associated risks in young men who have sex with men. Journal of the American Medical Association 284:198-204, 2000. 109 CDC. HIV/AIDS Among racial/ethnic minority men who have sex with men—United States, 1989-1998. Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report 49(1), 2000. 110 Dean, L., et al. Lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender health: Findings and concerns. Journal of the Gay and Lesbian Medical Association 4(3):101-151, 2000. 111 Young, R.M.; Weissman, G.; and Cohen, J. Assessing risk in the absence of information: HIV risk among injection drug users who have sex with women. AIDS and Public Policy Journal 7(3):175-183, 1992. 112 Nemoto, T.; Luke, D.; Mamo, L.; et al. HIV risk behaviors among male-to-female transgenders in comparison with homosexual or bisexual males and heterosexual females. AIDS Care 1(3):297-312, 1999. 113 Clements, K., et al. The Transgender Community Health Project: Descriptive Results. San Francisco Department of Public Health, 1999. 114 Xavier, 2000. 194 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health HIV/AIDS 115 McGowan, C.K. Transgender Needs Assessment. New York, NY: New York City Department of Health, HIV Prevention Planning Unit, 1999. 116 Reback, C.J.; Simon, P.; Gatson, B.; and Bemis, C. The Los Angeles Transgender Health Study: Baseline findings. 1999. 117 Clements et al., 1999. 118 Xavier, 2000. 119 Asian Pacific Islander Intervention Team. Men who have sex with transgenders. Poster presented at the U.S. Conference on AIDS, 2000. 120 Namaste, V.K. HIV/AIDS and female to male transsexuals and transvestites: Results from a needs assessment in Quebec. International Journal of Transgenderism 3:1-2, 1993. Available online at www.symposium.com/itj/hiv_risk/namaste.htm. 121 Clements et al., 1999. 122 American Public Health Association. Policy Statements Adopted by the Governing Council of the American Public Health Association. November 10, 1999. 123 Valleroy, MacKellar, Karon, et al., 2000. 124 CDC. HIV/AIDS Among African Americans. Downloaded December 12, 1999. Available at www.cdc.gov/hiv/pubs/facts/afam.pdf. 125 Rotheram-Borus, M.J.; Meyer-Bahlburg, H.F.; Rosario, M.; et al. Lifetime sexual behaviors among predominantly minority male runaways and gay/bisexual adolescents in New York City. AIDS Education and Prevention, Suppl:34-42, 1992. 126 Laumann, E.O.; Gagnon, J.H.; Michael, R.T.; and Michaels, S. The Social Organization of Sexuality: Sexual Practices in the United States. Chicago, IL, and London: University of Chicago Press, 1994. 127 Coates, T.J., and Collins, C. Preventing HIV infection. Scientific American, July 1998, 96-97. 128 Kelly, Hoffman, Rompa, and Gray, 1998. 129 Amaro, H. Love, sex, and power: Considering women’s realities in HIV prevention. American Psychologist 50:437-447, 1995. 130 Ramspacher, K., and White, C. Safer-Sex Among MSM. Callen-Lorde Community Health Center. June 23, 1998. 131 Little, S.J.; Daar, E.S.; D’Aquila, R.T.; et al. Reduced antiretroviral drug susceptibility among patients with primary HIV infection. Journal of the American Medical Association 282:1142-1149, 1999. 132 Gorman, Barr, Hansen, et al., 1997. 133 Deren, S.; Estrada, A.; Stark, M.; et al. A multisite study of sexual orientation and injection drug use as predictors of HIV serostatus in out-of-treatment male drug users. Journal of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndromes and Human Retrovirology 15(4):289-295, 1997. 134 Frosch D.; Shoptaw, S.; Huber, A.; et al. Sexual HIV risk among gay and bisexual male methamphetamine abusers. Journal of Substance Abuse Treatment 13(6):483-486, 1996. 135 Ramspacher and White, 1998. 136 Hickson, F.C.; Reid, D.S.; Davies, P.M.; et al. No aggregate change in homosexual HIV risk behaviour among gay men attending the Gay Pride festivals, United Kingdom, 1993-1995. AIDS 10(7):771-774, 1996. Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 195 HIV/AIDS 137 Meyer, I.H., and Dean, L. Patterns of sexual behavior and risk-taking among young New York City gay men. AIDS Education and Prevention 7(5, suppl):13-23, 1995. 138 Kippax, S.; Noble, J.; Prestage, G.; et al. Sexual negotiation in the AIDS area: Negotiated safety revisited. AIDS 11(2):191-197, 1997. 139 Elford, J.; Bolding, G.; Maguire, M.; and Sherr, L. Sexual risk behaviour among gay men in a relationship. AIDS 13(11):1407-1411, 1999. 140 Hospers, H.J., and Kok, G. Determinants of safe and risk-taking sexual behavior among gay men: A review. AIDS Education and Prevention 7(1):74-96, 1995. 141 Linsk, N.L. Experience of older gay and bisexual men living with HIV/AIDS. Journal of Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Identity 2(3-4):285-308, 1997. 142 Stall, R.D.; Hays, R.B.; Waldo, C.R.; Ekstrand, M.; and McFarland, W. The gay 90s: A review of research in the 1990s on sexual behavior and HIV risk among men who have sex with men. AIDS 14(suppl 3), 2000. 143 Farmer, V., et al. U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, 1994. 144 Schwenk v. Hartford. U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 2000. 145 Xavier, 2000. 146 Rodríquez-Madera, S., and Toro-Alfonso, J. Transgenders, HIV and Puerto Rico. Abstract presented at the U.S. Conference on AIDS, 2000. 147 Clements et al., 1999. 148 McGowan, 1999. 149 Xavier, 2000. 196 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health Immunization and Infectious Diseases Healthy People 2010 Goal Prevent disease, disability, and death from infectious diseases, including vaccine-preventable diseases. O v e rv i e w This chapter focuses on the vaccine-preventable diseases of primary concern to lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) populations: hepatitis A and hepatitis B. It highlights both the financial and preventive benefits of making vaccinations for hepatitis A and hepatitis B more readily available to LGBT populations—especially men who have sex with men (MSM) and transgender persons who have sex with men. The chapter also has a discussion of hepatitis C and tuberculosis transmission among MSM. Issues and Tre n d s Between 1980 and 1992, the number of deaths from infectious diseases rose 58 percent in the United States.1 Even when diagnoses associated with human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) and acquired immunodefiency syndrome (AIDS) are removed, deaths from infectious diseases still increased 22 percent during this period. (See HIV/AIDS focus area.) Considered as a group, three infectious diseases—pneumonia, influenza, and HIV infection—constituted the fifth leading cause of death in the United States in 1997.2 Infectious diseases also must be considered in a global context. Increases in international travel, importation of foods, inappropriate use of antibiotics on humans and animals, and environmental changes multiply the potential for worldwide epidemics of all types of infectious diseases. International cooperation and collaboration on disease surveillance, response, research, and training are essential to prevent or control these epidemics. Actions taken to improve health in one country affect the health of people worldwide. Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health 197 Immunization and Infectious Deseases Vaccines. Vaccines are biological substances that interact with a person’s immune system to produce an immune response identical to that produced by the natural infection. Vaccines can prevent the debilitating and, in some cases, fatal effects of infectious diseases. Vaccines help to eliminate the illness and disability of polio,3 measles, and rubella.4 However, the organisms that cause these diseases have not disappeared. Rather, they have receded and will reemerge if the vaccination coverage drops or if people are not reimmunized if their vaccine protection is outdated and no longer effective. Vaccines can protect more than the vaccinated individual. They also can protect society. When vaccination levels in a community are high, the few who cannot be vaccinated—such as young children and persons with contraindications to vaccination—often are indirectly protected because of group immunity (in other words, they live among vaccinated persons who may offer protection from exposure to disease). Significant progress has been made in reducing indigenous (not imported) cases of vaccine- preventable diseases (VPDs). The occurrence of many VPDs is at or near record-low levels. Most diseases have been reduced by more than 95 percent from peak prevaccine levels.5 Although this is true for diseases routinely immunized in infancy (e.g., polio, diptheria, smallpox), it is not yet true for such diseases as varicella, hepatitis A, influenza, pneumonococcus, and nonneonatally transmitted hepatitis B. In 1996, a vaccine against hepatitis A virus (HAV) was licensed that has the potential to reduce the health burden of this disease. The vaccine is now recommended primarily for high-risk groups. To decrease HAV transmission, universal vaccination was recommended in 1999 for children who lived in States where the rate of new cases was greater than two times the national average. 6 D i s p a r i t i e s Among LGBT communities, men who have sex with men have been consistently identified for having elevated risks for viral hepatitis.7 Since the 1980s, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) has recommended that all homosexually active men be immunized to prevent hepatitis B (HBV). In 1996, CDC extended this recommendation to include vaccination against HAV in gay and bisexual men as well as other high-risk groups.8 Healthy People 2010 notes the significance of CDC’s recommendations targeting MSM. Healthy People 2010 also points out the necessity for identifying missed opportunities for vaccinations and patient counseling by physicians, which also holds true for health providers serving MSM and transgender persons who have sex with men (TSM). 198 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health Immunization and Infectious Deseases O p p o rtunities A coordinated strategy is necessary to understand, detect, control, and prevent infectious diseases, including those that disproportionately affect LGBT populations. The major strategies to protect people from vaccine-preventable diseases are:9 ■ Improving the quality of vaccines and the number of opportunities for immunization services ■ Minimizing financial burdens for low income persons ■ Increasing community participation, education, and partnership in immunization health education campaigns ■ Improving surveillance and monitoring of diseases and immunization rates ■ Continuing to develop new and improved vaccines, and improving the use of those new vaccines Patients who are immunosuppressed, such as individuals living with HIV infection or people with certain chronic diseases, should be vaccinated against pneumococcal pneumonia and influenza. HIV-infected patients are at increased risk of invasive and noninvasive pneumonococcal disease (e.g., bacteremia, meningitis, pneumonia) and suffer more complications from influenza, such as secondary bacterial pneumonia. Culturally sensitive health prevention education programs are needed to enhance utilization of these highly effective vaccines. Although the exact number of LGBT individuals who need either vaccine is unknown, the assumption can be made that a proportion of LGBT people need these immunizations because of their high-risk status and the severity of the secondary conditions. All individuals, but particularly those with disabilities or suppressed immune systems and the elderly, should follow the recommended immunization schedules set forth by the U.S. Preventive Services Task Force in its Guidelines for Clinical Preventive Services.10 Additional information on recommended clinical preventive services, including immunization schedules, is available online at the Agency for Healthcare Quality and Research’s Web site at: www.ahrq.gov/clinic/prevenix.htm. S u m m a ry of LGBT Researc h For LGBT populations, and for MSM in particular, HAV and HBV education and prevention efforts must be designed in a way that is consistent with the social context of MSM and other high-risk LGBT populations. Nonetheless, young MSM and TSM, in particular, often are not engaged in health care or do not seek out health care on a timely basis, which severely limits opportunities for health promotion and disease prevention efforts as they relate to prevention of HAV and HBV. There is a dire need to help young MSM and TSM obtain information about vaccines and to increase access to affordable vaccination services. Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health 199 Immunization and Infectious Deseases Hepatitis C is the most common cause of chronic infectious liver disease in the United States, a ffecting more than 4 million A m e r i c a n s .11 The virus establishes a persistent infection in the majority of infected persons, most of whom develop evidence of chronic inflammatory liver d i s e a s e .1 2 The morbidity and mortality of hepatitis C stems from its propensity for causing chronic inflammation, which can progress to cirrhosis and liver cancer.1 3 Data regarding the sexual transmission of hepatitis C virus (HCV) among MSM are limited and contradictory.14 Hepatitis C has been most highly associated with blood-borne exposures. One study found that 4.6 percent of a cohort of 735 MSM had hepatitis C antibodies.15 When percutaneous injection exposures were controlled for, the risk of HCV was marginally greater in men who had more than 50 sex partners per year, or more than 25 receptive anal or oral partners. In a Pittsburgh cohort of 1,058 MSM, the prevalence of HCV was 2.9 percent.16 Multivariate analysis indicated that prior parenteral (intravenously or otherwise administered by injection) drug use was most highly associated with being infected with hepatitis C. However, in the Pittsburgh study, hepatitis C seropositivity was found to be associated with prior sexually transmitted diseases (STDs) and unprotected anal intercourse, but not with the number of sexual partners. In a San Francisco STD clinic study, 5 percent of non-injection-drug-using MSM and 25 percent of MSM who injected drugs had hepatitis C antibodies, but there was no association between hepatitis C and specific sexual behaviors.17 In a study from Sydney, 7.6 percent of MSM were found to have evidence of hepatitis C infection. Multivariate analysis indicated that injection drug use (IDU) history and coinfection with HIV were associated with hepatitis C but did not reveal specific sexual practices associated with this infection.18 The aggregate data suggest that hepatitis C may be sexually transmitted, but further studies are needed to better define the epidemiology and specific practices that may increase the potential for its transmission (e.g., the role of traumatic sex). There are no prospective studies that identify the prevalence or incidence of hepatitis C infection among lesbians, transgender, and bisexual people. HIV-infected people are more susceptible to becoming infected with tuberculosis (TB) and developing related conditions. Because almost half of the people living with HIV in the United States are MSM, culturally specific programs may be needed to enhance access to appropriate TB screening services, such as subcutaneous tests and chest x rays, particularly if they may have been exposed to TB. Transmission of TB is facilitated by malnutrition and crowding, and epidemics have been described in prisons and homeless shelters. Research is needed to determine if LGBT community members are at risk for acquiring TB apart from the previously mentioned situations. For example, research has shown that LGBT youth who are rejected by their parents are at increased risk for homelessness,19 prostitution,20 HIV infection,21 and stress.22, 23 Youth who identify as lesbian, gay, or bisexual at an early age are also at increased risk of becoming victims of violence,24 even within their families,25 and of abusing substances. 26 Many of these factors increase their risk for acquiring TB and other diseases. 200 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health Immunization and Infectious Deseases Discussion of Healthy People 2010 Objectives 14-3. Reduce hepatitis B. Unsafe sexual practices and drug use (especially sharing needles) promote the spread of HBV.27 28 Based on a 1996 study of 385 MSM aged 17 to 22 in San Francisco and Berkeley, California, CDC in 1996 reported that 20 percent of the men had previously been exposed to HBV (lifetime), whereas 3 percent had an active infection at the time of the study. In addition, 80 percent of the participants reported having had anal sex or injecting drugs in the 6 months preceding the study,29 supporting earlier findings. Data from the Netherlands suggest that male-to-female transsexuals, many of whom have sex with men, were significantly more likely to be HBV-infected than controls.30 14-6. Reduce hepatitis A. Healthy People 2010 recognizes that MSM are at high risk for HAV infection. This is likely true for TSM as well. However, additional data are needed to document the incidence and prevalence of HAV and vaccination rates among LGBT groups other than MSM, such as TSM. Vaccination for HAV is available, and in 1996 the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices31 began recommending HAV vaccinations for gay and bisexual men and other high-risk groups. Yet, numerous barriers often inhibit vaccination rates, including lack of awareness among patients and providers, limited or no access to a reliable source of health care, provider discomfort with talking about intimate issues related to sexuality or sexual practices, restricted access to counseling and services, and the ability of MSM and TSM (especially younger persons) to afford the cost of vaccination. 14-28. Increase hepatitis B vaccine coverage among high-risk groups. Healthy People 2010 specifically identifies MSM as a high-risk group for HBV infection. TSM are plausibly at high risk as well. There is a significant chasm between the scientific community’s understanding of the benefits of HBV vaccination and the use of the vaccine, especially among high-risk groups. Although vaccination for HBV was first recommended in the 1980s, there are several barriers that often prevent LGBT populations from being vaccinated, including the lack of awareness of LGBT health needs among health care providers, limited access to counseling and services, and affordability. Therefore, increasing vaccination rates for hepatitis B, particularly among the MSM and TSM populations, should be a public health priority. The same CDC study referenced above found that only 3 percent of its sample of young MSM were vaccinated against HBV.32 Additional data are needed to increase the Nation’s understanding of HBV prevalence and incidence as well as vaccination rates among MSM populations. Without standard prevalence rates for HBV vaccinations, education and prevention programs have not been able to develop and implement targeted, evidence-based vaccination campaigns that could play a powerful role in preventing HBV transmission among MSM and other high-risk LGBT populations. Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health 201 Immunization and Infectious Deseases S e rv i c e s — R E C O M M E N D ATIONS ■ Public health, private health care providers, and STD clinics must all participate in programs to identify at-risk persons for HAV and HBV infection, including MSM and TSM, and to encourage vaccination. ■ Providers should be expected to ask nonthreatening questions that identify individuals at risk, not just MSM and TSM, and they should offer the vaccine when they determine the individual is at risk. ■ Individuals who are aware that they are at risk should be educated to understand that they share responsibility for requesting HAV and HBV vaccines. ■ Providers and health plans should ensure that high-risk populations (e.g., persons over aged 65, persons with compromised immune systems due to chronic disease or disability or medications) receive the appropriate immunizations for pneumonia and influenza. Education and Tr a i n i n g — R E C O M M E N D ATIONS ■ New efforts are needed to reach physicians and other health care practitioners in all health care settings who provide health care to MSM and transgender persons so they can play an active role in educating patients about the risks of HAV and HBV infection as well as the availability of vaccinations. ■ Curricula should be developed for physicians and other health care providers, as well as in health education and health promotion programs, on how to prevent, recognize, and treat HAV and HBV infection in high school and college students. P o l i c y — R E C O M M E N D AT I O N S ■ Managed care organizations, insurance companies, and other health plans should provide insurance coverage or reimbursement for needed vaccines for high-risk populations, without cancellation penalties. ■ Efforts must be made to ensure that LGBT individuals—including elders, children, and youth—who cannot afford to pay for needed vaccines have access to publicly funded services or affordable HAV and HBV vaccinations. R e s e a rc h — R E C O M M E N D ATIONS ■ Additional research is needed to gain a better understanding of the risk and prevalence of HAV and HBV—not only among MSM and TSM but also among other LGBT populations. ■ New studies are needed to explain why HAV and HBV vaccination rates among MSM and TSM are low. 202 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health Immunization and Infectious Deseases Te rminology A d v i s o ry Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP): Federally chartered advisory committee with the goals of providing advice to the CDC Director on decreasing disease through the use of vaccines and other biological products and on improving the safety of their use. G roup immunity: The immunity of a group or community; immunity based on the resistance to infection among a high proportion of individual members of the group. H o s p i t a l - a c q u i red infection: Any infection that a patient acquires as a result of medical treatment while in the hospital. Va c c i n e s : Biological substances used to stimulate the development of antibodies and thus confer active immunity against a specific disease or number of diseases. R e f e re n c e s 1 Hoyert, D.L.; Kochanek, K.D.; and Murphy, S.L. Deaths: Final data for 1997. National Vital Statistics Reports 19(47), 1999. 2 Ibid. 3 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Summary of notifiable diseases—United States, 1994. Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report 43(53), 1995. 4 National Communicable Disease Center (NCDC). Rubella Surveillance No. 1. Atlanta, GA: NCDC, 1969. 5 CDC. Achievements in public health, 190 0–1999: Impact of vaccines universally recommended for children—United States, 1990–1998. Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report 48(12):243-248, 1999. 6 CDC. Prevention of hepatitis A through active or passive immunization: Recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP). Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report 48(RR-12):1-37, 1999. 7 McDonnell, W.M., and Askari, F.K. Immunization. Journal of the American Medical Association 278(22):2000-2007, 1997. 8 CDC [1]. Prevention of hepatitis A through active or passive immunization: Recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP) [published erratum appears in Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report 46(25):588, June 27, 1997]. Morbidity and Morality Weekly Report 45(RR-15):1-30, 1996. 9 CDC. Reported vaccine-preventable disease—United States, 1993, and the Childhood Immunization Initiative. Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report 43(4):57-60, 1994. 10 U.S. Preventive Services Task Force. Guide to Clinical Preventive Services, 2nd Edition. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Disease Prevention and Health Promotion, 1996. 11 Alter, M.J., et al. The natural history of hepatitis C infection in the United States. New England Journal of Medicine 327:1899, 1992. 12 Jeffers, L.J., et al. Prevalence of antibodies to hepatitis C among patients with cryptogenic chronic hepatitis and cirrhosis. Hepatology 15:187, 1992. 13 Saito, I., et al. Hepatitis C is associated with the development of hepatocellular carcinoma. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 87:6547, 1991. Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 203 Immunization and Infectious Deseases 14 Osmond, D.H., et al. Comparison of risk factors for hepatitis C with hepatitis B in homosexual men. Journal of Infectious Diseases 167:66, 1993. 15 Ibid. 16 Bodsworth, N.J., et al. Hepatitis C infection in a large cohort of homosexually active men: Independent association with HIV-1 infection and injecting drug use but not sexual behavior. Genitourinary Medicine 72:118, 1996. 17 Buchbinder, S.P., et al. Hepatitis C in sexually active homosexual men. Journal of Infection 29:263, 1994. 18 Weinstock, H.S., et al. Hepatitis C infection among patients attending a clinic for sexually transmitted diseases. Journal of the American Medical Association 269:392, 1993. 19 Kruks, G. Gay and lesbian homeless/street youth: Special issues and concerns. Journal of Adolescent Health 12:515-518, 1991. 20 Coleman, E. The development of male prostitution activity among gay and bisexual adolescents. In: Herdt, G., ed. Gay and Lesbian Youth. New York, NY: Haworth Press, 1989. 21 Gold, R., and Skinner, M. Situational factors and thought processes associated with unprotected intercourse in young gay men. AIDS 6(9):1021-1030, 1992. 22 Hershberger, S., and D’Augelli, A. The impact of victimization on the mental health and suicidality of lesbian, gay and bisexual youths. Developmental Psychology 31:65-74, 1995. 23 Savin-Williams, R.C. Verbal and physical abuse as stressors in the lives of lesbian, gay males and bisexual male and bisexual youths: Associations with school problems, running away, substance abuse, prostitution and suicide. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology 62:261-269, 1994. 24 Hunter, J. Violence against lesbian and gay male youths. Journal of Interpersonal Violence 5:295-300, 1990. 25 Harry, J. Parental physical abuse and sexual orientation in males. Archives of Sexual Behavior 18(3):251- 261, 1989. 26 Garofalo, R.; Wolf, R.; Kessel, S.; Palfrey, S.; and DuRant, R.H. The association between health risk behaviors and sexual orientation among a school-based sample of adolescents. Pediatrics 101(5):895-902, 1998. 27 Schreeder, M.T.; Thompson, S.E.; Hadler, S.C.; et al. Hepatitis B in homosexual men: Prevalence of infection and factors related to transmission. Journal of Infectious Diseases 146:7-14, 1982. 28 Reiner, N.E.; Judson, F.N.; Bond, W.W.; et al. Asymptomatic rectal mucosal lesions and hepatitis B surface antigen at sites of sexual contact in homosexual men with persistent hepatitis B infection: Evidence for de facto parenteral transmission. Annals of Internal Medicine 96:170-173, 1982. 29 CDC [2]. Undervaccination for Hepatitis B among young men who have sex with men—San Francisco and Berkeley, California, 1992-1993. Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report 45(10):215-217, 1996. 30 van Kesteren, P.J.; Asscheman, H.; Megens, J.A.; and Gooren, L.J. Mortality and morbidity in transsexual subjects treated with cross-sex hormones. Clinical Endocrinology 47(3):337-342, 1997. 31 CDC [1], 1996. 32 CDC [2], 1996. 204 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health Mental Health and Mental Disord e r s Healthy People 2010 Goal Improve mental health and ensure access to appropriate, quality mental health services. O v e rv i e w Evidence suggests that lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) people may disproportionately utilize mental health services.1 However, there are serious concerns about the quality of mental health care that LGBT people receive. The well-documented history of having “homosexuality” classified as a mental disorder 2 may lead to iatrogenic problems— disorders induced in a patient by a physician’s actions or words. In addition, there are four specific diagnoses within the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition,3 that are potentially applicable to transgender persons. Children and adolescents may be most vulnerable. Within the developmental life cycle, most children and youth feel awkward and embarrassed by sexual conflicts. Sexually diverse youth may have an even more difficult time in that their sexuality is not adequately acknowledged. The societal assumption is that sexual orientation and gender identity is something identified or chosen in adulthood. Although the coming-out process can occur in adulthood, most LGBT youth have an awareness of being different. Many LGBT youth experience feelings of self- hatred, depression, and anxiety as a result of being raised in a society that is condemning and rejecting of morés different from the majority. Children who admit their sexual orientation or gender identity to their family risk ostracism from the one societal unit always expected to unconditional care, love, and support.4 For many such youth, coming out to their families has led to physical and verbal abuse or their running away from home.5 Some families have sought mental health professionals to use “reparative therapy,” also known as conversion therapy, to change their child’s sexual orientation from homosexual to heterosexual. According to the American Psychiatric Association (APA), there is “no published scientific evidence supporting the efficacy of reparative therapy as treatment to change one’s sexual orientation.”6 In addition, reparative therapy is not included in the APA’s Treatments of Mental Disorders.7 Nonetheless, nearly 10 percent of respondents in one study reported that their therapist suggested or attempted to change their sexual orientation from homosexual to Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health 205 Mental Health and Mental Disorders heterosexual, although no consumers had expressed this desire.8 Some psychiatrists have urged that gender identity disorder in children be removed from the next edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), which implicitly labels homosexual boys as mentally disordered 9 and may perpetuate the demand for conversion therapy. LGBT people who also have a mental disorder must cope with more than one stigma. The belief persists among some segments of society that LGBT people are “mentally ill” because they self-identify as LGBT. Evidence that mental disorders are of a different nature in origin and highly responsive to appropriate treatment promises to be a potent antidote to the stigma related to mental disorders, which should encourage more individuals to seek needed mental health care. However, LGBT people may still be reluctant to seek needed mental health services because of the negative attitudes associated with their sexual orientation and gender identity. No Federal surveys of mental health and mental disorders currently ask sexual orientation and gender identity questions, so discussing differences in the rates of mental disorders among LGBT people must be approached with sensitivity and caution. Issues and Tre n d s Mental health is a state of successful performance of mental function, resulting in productive activities, fulfilling relationships with other people, and the ability to adapt to change and cope with adversity. Mental health is indispensable to personal well-being, family and interpersonal relationships, and contribution to community or society. Mental disorders are health conditions that are characterized by alterations in thinking, mood, or behavior (or some combination thereof). Mental disorders also are associated with distress or impaired functioning, and they spawn a host of human problems that may include disability, pain, or death. Mental disorders generate an immense public health burden of disability, varying in their severity and in their impact on people’s lives. More severe disorders—such as schizophrenia, major depression, manic depressive or bipolar illness, obsessive-compulsive disorder, and panic disorder—can be enormously disabling. The World Health Organization, in collaboration with the World Bank and Harvard University, has determined the “ burden of disability” associated with the whole range of diseases and health conditions suffered by people throughout the world. A striking finding of the landmark Global Burden of Disease Study is that the impact of mental illness on overall health and productivity in the United States and throughout the world often is profoundly underrecognized. In established market economies such as the United States, mental illness is on a par with heart disease and cancer as a cause of disability.10 Suicide—a major public health problem in the United States—occurs most frequently as a consequence of a mental disorder. Mental disorders occur across the lifespan, affecting persons of all racial and ethnic groups, both genders, all educational and socioeconomic groups, and others, including lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender people. Approximately 40 million people in the United States aged 18 to 64, or 22 percent of the population, had a diagnosis of mental disorder alone 206 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health Mental Health and Mental Disorders (19 percent) or of a co-occurring mental and addictive disorder in the past year.11, 12, 13 At least one in five children and adolescents between the ages of 9 and 17 has a diagnosable mental disorder in a given year.14 Mental and behavioral disorders and serious emotional disturbances (SEDs) in children and adolescents can lead to school failure, alcohol or illicit drug use, violence, or suicide.15, 16, 17 About 5 percent of children and adolescents are extremely impaired by mental, behavioral, and emotional disorders.18 In later life, the majority of people aged 65 and older cope constructively with the changes associated with aging and maintain mental health. Yet an estimated 25 percent of older people (8.6 million) experience specific mental disorders—such as depression, anxiety, substance abuse, and dementia—that are not part of normal aging. Alzheimer’s disease strikes 8 to 15 percent of people aged 65 and older,19 with the number of cases in the population doubling every 5 years of age after age 60. Alzheimer’s disease is thought to be responsible for 60 to 70 percent of all cases of dementia and is one of the leading causes of nursing home placements.20 Modern treatments for mental disorders are highly effective, with a variety of treatment options available for most disorders. There is no “one size fits all” in treatment. Similarly, there exists today a diverse array of treatment settings, and a person may have the option of selecting a setting based on health care coverage, the clinical needs associated with a particular type or stage of illness, and personal preference. Despite the effectiveness of treatment and the many paths to obtaining treatment, only 25 percent of persons with a mental disorder obtain help for their disorder in the health care system. In comparison, 60 to 80 percent of persons with heart disease seek and receive care.21 More critically, 40 percent of all people who have a severe mental disorder do not seek treatment from either general medical services providers or specialty mental health providers. Indeed, the majority of persons with mental disorders do not receive mental health services. Of those aged 18 and older who seek help, about 15 percent turn to mental health specialists.22 Of young people aged 9 to 17 who have a mental disorder, 27 percent receive treatment in the health sector.23 However, an additional 20 percent of children and adolescents with mental disorders use only school-based mental health services.24 The direct costs of diagnosing and treating mental disorders totaled approximately $69 billion in 1996. Lost productivity and disability insurance payments due to illness or premature death accounted for an additional $74.9 billion.25 Crime, criminal justice costs, and property loss contributed another $6 billion to the total cost of mental illness. People with mental disorders are overrepresented in jail populations, where many do not receive treatment.26 Of the $69 billion spent for diagnosing and treating mental disorders, nearly 70 percent was spent on the services of mental health specialty providers, with most of the remainder for general medical services providers. The majority—53 percent—of treatment for mental disorders was paid for by public-sector sources, including the States and local governments as well as Medicaid, Medicare, and other Federal programs. Some 47 percent of expenditures were from private sources, and of these, almost 60 percent were from Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 207 Mental Health and Mental Disorders private insurance.27 The remainder came from out-of-pocket payments, including insurance copayments, with a small amount from other sources, such as foundations. Programs and services that prevent mental disorders and mental health problems have the potential to lessen an enormous burden of suffering and to reduce the cost of future treatment and lost productivity at home, at school, and at work. When applied faithfully, preventive interventions can decrease the risk of onset or delay onset of a disorder.28 The availability and accessibility of these interventions to the millions of people whose health care is provided by managed care organizations (MCOs) depend upon whether or not mental health services are covered among the benefits offered. Only gradually are health plans adding coverage for preventive interventions for mental health problems to their benefit packages. Public Law 102-321, also known as the Alcohol, Drug Abuse, and Mental Health Administration Reorganization Action of 1992, requires States to include estimates of serious mental illness in their applications for State Block Grant Funds. The State-level estimates developed are based on a synthetic estimation method.29 This method begins with direct national estimates of serious mental illness based on survey data within a series of subsamples, defined on the basis of census variables (e.g., age, sex, race), and then weights the class means by the proportion of people in each State in each class to arrive at State- level estimates. There are also two surveys to obtain direct estimates. The Epidemiologic Catchment Area Study was carried out in the 1980s,30 and the National Comorbidity Study was carried out in the early 1990s.31 The National Household Survey on Drug Abuse contains a series of questionnaire items that can be used to determine diagnoses of substance dependence and screening questions indicating a high probability that respondents have one of more mental syndromes—that is, major depressive episode, general anxiety disorder, agoraphobia, and panic attacks. 32 Research on the brain and behavior in mental health and mental disorders is moving at a rapid pace. An increasingly strong consumers’ movement in the mental health field is adding urgency to the tasks of translating new knowledge into clinical practices and refining service delivery systems to maximize the use of new and emerging information for consumer needs. Consumer and family organizations, which formed out of concern over the frequent fragmentation of mental health services and the inaccessibility of such services, have assumed a substantial role in supporting development of mental health services. Diverse groups share overlapping goals, including overcoming stigma and preventing discrimination toward persons with mental disorders, supporting self-help groups, and promoting recovery from mental disorders.33 The co-occurrence of addictive disorders among persons with mental disorders is gaining increasing attention from health care professionals, especially professionals working in the mental health and substance abuse fields. Among adults aged 18 and older with a lifetime history of any mental disorder, 29 percent have a history of an addictive disease. Of those with a diagnosis of alcohol disorder, 37 percent have had a mental disorder. Among those with other drug disorders, 53 percent have had a mental disorder.34 When looking at specific 208 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health Mental Health and Mental Disorders populations, the prevalence can be even much greater. For example, co-occurring mental and addictive disorders are estimated to affect 50 to 60 percent of homeless persons.35 Children and adolescents also experience co-occurring disorders.36 Especially at risk for alcohol use problems are boys diagnosed with so-called externalizing disorders, such as conduct problems, oppositional-defiant disorder, and attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder.37 From public health promotion and disease prevention perspectives, children and adolescents with mental disorders often do not become substance abusers until after the mental disorder is apparent. 38 This time lag creates a “window of opportunity” when prevention of substance abuse may be possible.39 As the life expectancy of individuals continues to increase, the sheer number—although not necessarily the proportion—of persons experiencing mental disorders in later life also will increase. This trend presents society with unprecedented challenges in organizing, financing, and delivering effective preventive and treatment services in the aging population. As recognition continues to grow that depression and certain cognitive losses are treatable disorders and not inevitable concomitants of aging, diagnostic precision in later life and provision of targeted treatment are increasingly urgent. Health care in the United States continues to undergo fundamental structural changes that require creative and flexible responses from service providers, administrators, researchers, and policymakers alike. Two prominent forces of change are Federal and State efforts to improve access to health care, including treatment of mental disorders, and the rapid growth and impact of managed care organizations. In 1998, the Mental Health Parity Act (P.L. 104- 204) was implemented to help increase access to care. (The term “parity” or “mental health parity” refers generally to insurance coverage for mental health services that includes the same benefits and restrictions as coverage for other physical health services.) Although the Federal Mental Health Parity Act is quite limited in reducing insurance coverage discrepancies between physical and mental disorders, 53 percent of the U.S. population is now covered by State mental health parity laws.40 Consumers, providers, insurers, and purchasers are all stakeholders in decisions about which services will be included in MCO contracts and how those services will be delivered. Other stakeholders include constituency groups, accrediting organizations, and business groups on health.41 Several compelling reasons motivate these stakeholders to support the incorporation of proven, effective preventive behavioral health programs and services into MCO systems of care. It is in the public interest to prevent mental disorders rather than to wait until disease and disability impose their burdens. A substantial and growing body of research provides evidence that certain preventive behavioral health interventions are effective and efficacious. A small, but developing, body of multidisciplinary research demonstrates that certain preventive behavioral health interventions can produce cost savings or a cost offset. And MCO accreditation standards include requirements for some preventive behavioral health interventions. 42 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 209 Mental Health and Mental Disorders D i s p a r i t i e s Although mental disorders, for the most part, are equal opportunity disorders, there are some marked differences in how they present themselves and how they are prevented, diagnosed, and treated by gender, racial and ethnic group, sexual orientation, gender identity, and age.43, 44, 45, 46 Mental disorders are not only the cause of limitations of various life activities but also can be a secondary problem among people with other disabilities. Depression and anxiety, for example, are seen more frequently among people with disabilities than among those without disabilities.47 Studies of the number of cases of mental health problems among different populations, although increasing in number, remain limited and often inconclusive. Discussion of the rates of existing cases must consider variations in how persons of different cultures and racial and ethnic groups perceive mental health and mental disorders. Behavioral problems that Western medicine views as signs of mental illness may be assessed differently by non- Western individuals. With this in mind, along with the recognition that sample sizes for racial and ethnic groups and the elderly may be limited, examination of studies for mental health trends among all people, including LGBT people, remains important. O p p o rt u n i t i e s Social and behavioral research is beginning to explore the concept of resilience to identify strengths that may promote health and healing. Resilience involves the interaction of biological, psychological, and environmental processes. LGBT people are enmeshed in stressful situations throughout their lives. Yet, most LGBT people survive and might be viewed as prototypes for resiliency. In the discussion of the Boston Lesbian Health Project, Sorensen and Roberts noted that attempts of suicide decreased considerably after adolescence and “coming out.”48 Increased understanding of how to identify and promote resilience will assist all health planners in designing effective programs that foster and draw on innate internal capacity. Consumers are the ultimate end users of the health care system, including the mental health system. Mental health consumers, their families, and advocates have had an important impact on the organization, financing, and delivery of managed care services. Mental health consumers are working as active partners with practitioners to ensure that their causes are addressed at State and national levels.49 In 1996, the Center for Mental Health Services, Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, released a consumer-oriented report card for mental health services in a collaborative effort with many consumers and consumer groups.50 Managed care is challenging the interrelationship between behavioral health and physical health that has existed for quite some time. Evidence has been presented that the provision of behavioral interventions, especially preventive interventions, can be effective and reduce medical costs. Preventive behavioral interventions can shift much responsibility for health care from providers to consumers. Placing the onus for health and well-being back into the hands of individuals should increase more direct responsibility of health care status, and 210 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health Mental Health and Mental Disorders ultimately, reduce the demand for service utilization. These actions are not meant to obviate the responsibilities of providers, especially physicians. However, at the present time, many individuals view behavioral disorders as something beyond their control. Thus, the role of patients with behavioral disorders is characterized as a passive, sometimes negative role that, when accompanied by stigma, strips individuals of their dignity and results in resentment against the providers and systems whose true aim is to help. Vigorous, well- designed programs of health promotion and prevention of behavioral disorders require a therapeutic alliance and active participation by all parties. If the objective of an integrated delivery system is to both increase the quality of life and reduce the financial burden, then behavioral medicine is the vanguard. The measurement of ultimate success is the transformation of the current health care system from a focus on sickness to wellness.51 S u m m a ry of LGBT Researc h Mental health, mental disorders, and the LGBT population. The relationship between sexual orientation and gender identity and mental health or mental disorders has evolved through four phases.52, 53 First, “ homosexuality” was classified as a mental disorder.54 Then, beginning in the late 1950s, with psychologist Evelyn Hooker’s groundbreaking research funded by the National Institute of Mental Health55 and continuing with a number of studies in the 1960s and early 1970s,56 the validity of the mental disorder classification of homosexuality was directly assessed and found invalid. In the context of wider social changes that increased lesbian, gay, and bisexual people’s power and visibility in society, such studies led the American Psychiatric Association to declassify homosexuality as a mental disorder in 1973. 57, 58 Specific attention to mental health issues in transgender- identified individuals developed late in this second phase, in part because such individuals were encountered more rarely and because homosexuality and gender identity were often conflated. Once homosexuality was declassified as a mental disorder, subsequent research focused on understanding the mental health needs of the LGBT population. At the same time, LGBT- focused community-based organizations began to develop basic mental health services outside the mainstream health and mental health service delivery systems. The prevalence of social prejudice, however, severely limited the scope of both research and services. In this phase, the results of studies on convenience samples of LGBT people, coupled with the professional judgment of clinicians in the community, generated widespread concern that mental health problems arising in reaction to social stigmatization might be elevated in the LGBT population. However, sample limitations made it difficult to know whether such elevated risks could be generalized to the population.59 The widespread prejudice, discrimination, and violence to which LGBT people are often subjected is a major mental health concern. Sexual prejudice, sexual orientation discrimination, and antigay violence are stressors.60, 61, 62 Furthermore, resilience in the face of such stress and coping skills for adapting to it are complicated by the internalization of negative social attitudes. 63, 64 Because of sociocultural attitudes and discrimination, Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 211 Mental Health and Mental Disorders finding appropriate and affirming social support may be a crucial and difficult process for LGBT people. As society has begun to acknowledge that the health needs of LGBT people are legitimate and merit additional study, a fourth phase is beginning. Population-level information on mental health and mental disorders is beginning to be published.65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73 However, additional research is needed. The issue of whether and how to include sexual orientation questions in general population research and surveillance is being addressed more widely,74 although this has not yet occurred for gender identity issues. Large-scale studies targeting LGBT samples are beginning to receive funding and to produce information about the moderating and mediating factors related to mental health and mental disorders—not just rates of mental illness.75 LGBT patients may not disclose their sexual orientation out of fear that their care may be adversely affected.76 Why have gay and lesbian health care consumers been relatively silent as our health care system is rapidly changing and becoming very consumer-oriented? Social and legal sanctions, as well as hate crimes, against individuals whose sexual orientation is either primarily or partly homosexual are enough to precipitate silence. Any disclosure connected with sexual behavior that is incongruent with the societal norm is risky because of possible harmful consequences to the individual. Homosexually active men have reported higher rates of major depression and panic attack syndromes than males who reported no same-sex sexual partners in the past year. Likewise, homosexually active women have reported higher rates of alcohol and drug dependence than their female counterparts who reported no same-sex sexual partners in the past year.77 Another study found that LGBT young people in New Zealand were at higher risk for major depression, generalized anxiety disorder, and conduct disorders than were non-LGBT youth.78 Young homosexually active men may be at greater risk for depression than exclusively heterosexually active young men. 79 Pillard found elevated rates of bipolar disorders among gay men,80 and Atkinson and colleagues found elevated rates for most mental disorders among gay men.81 In samples of gay men, compared with estimates of U.S. rates of disorders reported by the Epidemiologic Catchment Area Study,82 Williams and colleagues found a high lifetime prevalence of affective disorders, but no elevated prevalence of current disorders.83 Tross and colleagues found a slightly elevated prevalence for current major depressive disorder.84 The National Lesbian Health Care Survey85 found that symptoms of depression among lesbians were roughly equivalent to those in studies among heterosexual women.86 Oetjen and Rothblum used a standardized measure to examine the effect among lesbians of factors consistently cited in the women and depression literature (relationship status, relationship satisfaction, social support from friends, and social support from family) and two unique factors (outness and relationship status satisfaction) to determine their ability to predict depression among lesbians. Perceived social support from friends, relationship status 212 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health Mental Health and Mental Disorders satisfaction, and perceived social support from family were found to be significant predictors.87 A similarly designed study among Canadian lesbians found lower depression rates among women in relationships, lesbians who had more social support from friends and family, and those who were more open about their sexual orientation.88 Another study reported higher levels of depressive symptoms among homosexually active African American men and women than those found in studies of the general population of African Americans.89 Although research is inadequate, some studies have suggested that there may be an increased incidence of severe personality disorders, psychoses, and other severe mental illnesses in clinical samples of transgender persons,90, 91, 92, 93 but more recent studies have found no relationship between gender dysphoria and other psychiatric diagnoses.94, 95 More rigorous research will be required to determine the actual incidence of mental disorders in transgender persons.96 Two studies have found that psychological function, as measured by the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory and by clinical measures, improves after sex-reassignment surgery.97, 98 Mental health and older LGBT persons. Although there is some evidence that older gay men usually have a higher measure of psychological well-being than younger gay men,99 there are still numerous, profound mental health issues that affect older LGBT populations. Older LGBT individuals who seek social support services do so usually because of a crisis in their lives, such as failing health, death of a partner or lover, personal care needs, isolation, difficulty in applying for benefits and other financial concerns, couples counseling, or lack of an existing support system.100, 101 Other potential concerns that may affect older LGBT individuals include hostility they have experienced, social emphasis on youthful attractiveness, loneliness during holidays, a tendency to withdraw into a relatively closed circle of friends that may not provide adequate social support,102 and regrets that they did not have children. 103 Mental health issues for intersex individuals. The traditional model for medical management of intersexuality (congenital sexual ambiguity) has been in place since the 1950s but lacks long-term outcome studies or scientific justification.104 The traditional model is based upon the notion that “reconstructive” genital surgeries can make parents forget that their child was born with a sexual difference and eliminate parental confusion, shame, guilt, and fear. Numerous reports of negative outcomes indicate that this model is flawed.105, 106, 107 The emerging model of care —which centers on open disclosure, counseling, and patient autonomy—may reduce long-term negative consequences, including reduced psychosocial function, sexual dysfunction, and damage to fertility. Use of mental health services. Understanding patterns of and risk factors for mental disorders in LGBT individuals is important for tailoring proper mental health treatment and for designing effective public health intervention and prevention programs.108 Like members of other minority groups, LGBT populations are not passive recipients of stigma and discrimination but engage in active coping to counter the ill effects of negative social Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 213 Mental Health and Mental Disorders stressors. Such positive coping has been shown to be beneficial to members of minority groups.109 Prejudice against transgender individuals is pervasive within American medicine.110 Most U.S. medical providers and researchers, as well as the public at large, believe that transgender behavior is pathological. A survey of transgender men and women in San Francisco found that many are chronically underserved with regard to basic medical and psychological support services.111 There is evidence that transgender people often avoid seeking treatment for depression out of concern that their gender issues will be assumed to be the cause of their symptoms and that they will be judged negatively.112 Because of these and other factors, depression associated with gender transition may be underdiagnosed. Transgenderism as a mental disorder. The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition (DSM-IV) 113 offers four specific diagnoses that are potentially applicable to transgendered persons: ■ Gender identity disorder (GID) in adolescents and adults (302.85) ■ Gender identity disorder in children (302.6) ■ Gender identity disorder not otherwise specified (GIDNOS; 302.6) ■ Transvestic fetishism (302.3) (Note: The numbers in parentheses represent the numerical nomenclature of the International Classification of Diseases, which is the basis for classifying mental disorders within DSM-IV and used by clinicians, medical record librarians, administrators, benefit claims representatives, researchers, epidemiologists, and program planners.) Under DSM-IV, any of these diagnoses requires evidence of distress or impairment in functioning. Functional impairment that is solely due to societal prejudice based on perceived social deviance does not meet this criterion.114 Under DSM-IV, being transgender does not in itself constitute a mental disorder. The diagnosis of GID is generally reserved for the most severely gender dysphoric adults and adolescents, persons who usually meet the criteria for transsexualism.115 Transvestic fetishism, a paraphilia, could be the diagnosis given some cross-dressers. GIDNOS is the most general of the DSM-IV diagnoses and is potentially applicable to a wide variety of transgender persons.116 The diagnoses of GID and transvestic fetishism are considered pejorative by many in the transgender community. GID is often viewed as stigmatizing of nonnormative gender behavior, in much the same way that homosexuality was pathologized prior to its removal from the list of mental illnesses by the American Psychiatric Association in 1973. 214 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health Mental Health and Mental Disorders Additional issues related to the relationship between mental health and Healthy People 2010 objectives not addressed in this chapter: HIV/AIDS and substance abuse. Stress and mental health raise important and practical public health issues related to HIV risk-taking behavior, particularly as prevention research has begun to move from purely cognitive explanatory models of risk-taking behavior to the consideration of affective and nonrational processes among gay men. 117, 118, 119 Mental health problems, including substance use and personality and psychological constructs (e.g., low self-esteem, sensation seeking), have been associated with HIV-related risk-taking behavior.120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130 Research has also described high-risk behavior as an emotion-focused coping strategy to reduce stress.131 The convergence of internalized homophobia, drug problems, and AIDS-related traumatic stresses are related to increased risk-taking.132 In addition, in the context of reports of increased risk for suicide among gay and bisexual men, the relationship of mental health and HIV risk-taking is of particular concern. Some researchers have suggested that high-risk sexual behavior among young gay and bisexual men may be related to a sense of hopelessness and suicidal tendencies. 133, 134 Discussion of Healthy People 2010 Objectives 18-1: Reduce the suicide rate. Research has not demonstrated any higher risk of completed suicide associated with same-gender sexual orientation for either adults or adolescents.135, 136 An association between same- gender sexual orientation and elevated lifetime prevalence of suicide ideation and attempts has been reported in several studies of general population probability samples of adolescents and adults.137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143 In addition, research studies on convenience samples of LGBT people have commonly found higher rates of reported suicide attempts and ideation than general population research would lead one to expect.144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151 For example, the results of the National Lesbian Health Care Study found that more than half the sample had experienced thoughts of suicide at some time, and 18 percent had attempted suicide.152 This compares to 33 percent and 4 percent, respectively, for women in the United States as reported in the Epidemiologic Catchment Area Study.153 Van Kesteren and colleagues reported a disproportionately high number of deaths due to suicide in male-to-female (MTF) transsexuals compared to the general population.154 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 215 The biggest challenge in studies of completed suicide is obtaining an accurate post mortem classification of sexual orientation. It is reasonable to assume that post mortem estimates are underestimated. Furthermore, judging whether rates of completed suicide are elevated in such studies requires making assumptions about the base rate of same-gender sexual orientation—estimates of which vary from population to population and across different definitions of same-gender sexual orientation. Mental Health and Mental Disorders However, after reviewing more than 2,000 cases, Pfafflin and Junge found reports of only 16 possible suicide deaths following surgical sex reassignment.155 Dixen and colleagues found that, among 479 MTF and 285 female-to-male (FTM) transsexuals seen in the Palo Alto program, about 25 percent and 19 percent, respectively, had attempted suicide prior to transition.156 Most other studies report a pretransition suicide attempt rate of 20 percent or more, with MTFs relatively more suicide-prone than FTMs.157 In the Washington Transgender Needs Assessment Survey, the suicidal ideation rate was 35 percent, and the attempt rate was 16 percent.158 Another form of self-harm in transgender persons is attempted or completed autocastration, or genital mutilation. A study of a cohort of transgender individuals who applied for services at gender identity clinics reported that genital mutilation was attempted by 9 percent of males and breast mutilation was attempted by 2 percent of females.159 18-2: Reduce the rate of suicide attempts by adolescents. Several recent population studies have reported alarmingly high rates of suicide ideation and attempts among young people who identify themselves as homosexual or report same- sex sexual partners. For example, six studies found that rates of various measures of suicide ideation and attempts were three to seven times higher among gay and lesbian youth than heterosexual youth.160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165 Mediating factors for suicidal ideation among LGBT youth include depression, substance abuse, and victimization.166, 167, 168, 169, 170 The suicidal ideation rate in one needs assessment of young transgender people was 28 percent, with 17 percent reporting actual suicide attempts.171 18-5: (Developmental) Reduce the relapse rates of persons with eating disorders including anorexia nervosa and bulimia nervosa. Some studies of clinical samples have found sexual orientation to be a significant predictor of eating disorders among men, though not among women.172, 173, 174, 175, 176 Other studies have found no such association.177, 178, 179 Community studies—which have typically sampled college students or participants in gay and lesbian organizations—have often found a significant association between sexual orientation and negative body image among gay men.180, 181, 182 Among women, while being female was related to concerns about dieting and being fat, lesbians were less likely to be preoccupied with weight and body image than heterosexual women.183, 184 In the Minnesota Adolescent Health Survey,185 homosexual boys were more likely than heterosexual boys to report a poor body image (28 percent vs. 12 percent), frequent dieting (9 percent vs. 6 percent), binge eating (25 percent vs. 11 percent), and purging behaviors (12 percent vs. 4 percent).186 In contrast, homosexual girls were more likely than heterosexual girls to report a positive body image (42 percent vs. 21 percent). However, they were no less likely to report disordered eating behaviors, such as binge eating or purging.187 216 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health Mental Health and Mental Disorders Significant gender differences that relate to eating problems hold true for gay and lesbian populations. In the Minnesota sample, young boys (15 percent) were less likely than young girls (27 percent) to rate themselves low on body image. A greater proportion of older females (38 percent) than males (22 percent) considered themselves to be overweight. In each group, more girls than boys reported dieting in the last year, at all levels of frequency. Despite increased risk among homosexual men compared with heterosexual men, women (both lesbian and heterosexual) are at greater risk for body dissatisfaction and disordered eating.188 18-6: Increase the number of persons seen in primary health care who receive mental health screening and assessment. The Institute of Medicine (IOM) defines primary care as “the provision of integrated, accessible health care services by clinicians who are accountable for addressing a large majority of perceived health care needs, developing a sustained partnership with patients, and practicing in the context of family and community health.”189 Primary care providers (PCPs) are now the gatekeepers of the managed care system. These services should meet the health needs of most people and be the entry point into the medical care system. In a primary care medical practice, approximately 10 to 20 percent of presenting patients have a diagnosable psychiatric disorder. Many of the remaining presenting patients also have significant psychological distress.190, 191 More than a dozen studies have looked at the rate of recognition of mental health and substance abuse problems in a primary care setting.192 Most often, a person will present with a physical complaint, and about half the time the PCP will recognize the underlying behavioral health issues.193, 194 In the small number of cases in which the presenting problem is emotional or psychological, the mental health or substance abuse diagnosis is correctly determined about 90 percent of the time.195 The IOM report on the future of primary care has called for the development of models of coordinated, integrated care, including better integration among mental health and primary health care professionals.196 Studies of existing, working models would help to identify best practices in the coordination of all care, particularly primary care and behavioral health care. Carved-out behavioral health services do not necessarily lead to poor coordination of care or to coordination poorer than that in a fee-for-service system. However, the separation of primary care and behavioral health care systems brings risks to coordination and integration that may not be in the best interest of consumers.197 The challenge for health care providers—regardless of discipline—is to ensure access. The IOM committee defines access as “ the extent to which those in need of mental health and substance abuse care receive services that are appropriate to the severity of their illness and the complexity of their needs.”198 Too often, indicators of access reflect merely the availability of services or the delivery of any service rather than the delivery of services that respond effectively to consumer needs. Considering the fit between service need and access also means taking into account variations in need among special populations, such as LGBT persons. Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 217 Mental Health and Mental Disorders Some PCPs have reported an unwillingness to treat lesbian and gay consumers, as well as a negative bias against other providers who themselves are lesbian and gay.199 Although the target population for this objective is PCPs, another study showed that mental health providers are not invulnerable to having their perceptions of consumers affect the therapeutic alliance. This study examined the hypothesis that clinicians’ perception of psychological maladjustment is related to the deviations of symptoms from prevailing role stereotypes. In a study by Waisberg and Page, practicing psychologists viewed female patients with masculine symptoms (e.g., alcoholism, antisocial behavior) as more psychologically disturbed than males with the same symptoms. Similarly, psychologists also perceived male patients with feminine symptoms (e.g., depression, anxiety) as more psychologically disturbed than their female counterparts.200 Almost 20 years after APA’s removal of homosexuality from DSM, one-fourth of psychiatric faculty admit their homophobia. In a 1991 survey of 4-year U.S. medical schools, the mean amount of course time devoted to the topic of homosexuality was 3 hours, 26 minutes.201 More than half of nurses teaching in nursing schools think being a lesbian is unnatural. In a 1986 study of more than 1,000 physicians in San Diego, 40 percent were uncomfortable treating lesbians and gay men, 30 percent opposed admitting lesbians and gay men into medical school, and 40 percent would not refer patients to a lesbian or gay colleague. 202 According to a study of gay men, almost half did not reveal their sexual orientation to their PCPs. That same percentage applied to gay men with HIV. A 1988 study of 529 African American lesbians and bisexual women found that only 33 percent had disclosed their sexual orientation to their health care providers.203 In a 1989 health care study of 1,681 lesbians in Michigan, 6 percent had a health care provider who was lesbian or gay, 61 percent felt that they were unable to come out to their provider, and 6 percent of their providers tried to “cure” their patients’ lesbianism.204 18-7: Increase the proportion of children with mental health problems who receive treatment. LGBT adolescents face unique difficulties and risks.205 LGBT youth may experience estrangement from their parents when they reveal their sexual orientation.206, 207 When parents reject their LGBT children, these young people are at increased risk for homelessness,208 prostitution,209 HIV infection,210 and stress.211, 212 Youth who identify as lesbian, gay, or bisexual at an early age are also at increased risk of becoming victims of violence,213 even within their families; 214 of abusing substances;215 and of attempting suicide.216 The social stigma associated with LGBT identity also may complicate career choice and development.217 Perceived parental and peer acceptance has an important impact on the social adjustment of LGBT youth.218 Although peers and educators may be helpful in improving the psychosocial environment for these youth,219, 220, 221, 222 they may lack the information and experience necessary to be effective. When these potential sources of support are heterosexist, they may cause additional conflict and distress.223, 224 218 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health Mental Health and Mental Disorders In recent years, there has been an upsurge in publicity for the idea that homosexuality is a mental disorder and that adolescents should be encouraged to seek psychotherapeutic treatment to change their sexual orientation. The concept of “reparative therapy” is based on an understanding of homosexuality that has been rejected by most major health and mental health professions. These professions have all taken the position that homosexuality is not a mental disorder and thus there is no need for a cure.225 Almost all research on transgender youth combines them with gay and lesbian youth in the catchall “LGBT” category. Moreover, many youth who appear transgender, and who may later identify as transgender, initially identify as gay or lesbian. Consequently, little is known about the prevalence of mental disorders among transgender youth. One study of psychological functioning in 29 adolescent transsexuals in the Netherlands found little evidence of more frequent mental disorders than in nontranssexual youth.226 For the most severely gender-dysphoric youth, early intervention with puberty-delaying hormones has been used to allow the adolescent time to explore gender issues in therapy, while preventing the irreversible hormone-induced physical changes that make passing in the desired gender so difficult for most adult transsexuals.227, 228, 229 Transsexuals who have been treated early at the Amsterdam Gender Clinic pass very easily as members of the opposite gender.230 As a result, these individuals may suffer less stress as adults. 18-9: Increase the proportion of adults with mental disorders who receive treatment. Prejudice, discrimination, and violence pose risks to the mental health and well-being of LGBT people.231 Membership in a stigmatized group increases the risk for stress related to chronic daily hassles (e.g., hearing antigay jokes, always being on guard) to more serious negative life events (e.g., loss of employment, home, or custody of children; antigay violence; discrimination due to sexual orientation).232, 233 Research has shown that gay men are at risk for mental health problems234 and emotional distress 235 as a direct result of discrimination and negative experiences in society. Social stressors affecting LGBT older adults—such as a lack of legal rights and protection in medical emergencies and a lack of acknowledgment of couples’ relationships, particularly following the loss of a partner— have been associated with feelings of helplessness, depression, and disruption of normative grief processes.236, 237, 238 LGBT people who live in rural communities may experience stress related to the risk of disclosure because anonymity about their sexual orientation or gender identity may be more difficult to maintain. Fears about the loss of employment and housing may be more significant because of the limited opportunities within a small community. Less visibility and fewer LGBT support organizations may intensify feelings of social isolation. Furthermore, LGBT people may feel more vulnerable to acts of violence and harassment because rural communities may provide fewer legal protections.239, 240 Given the real and perceived social and physical dangers many LGBT consumers face, developing a sense of safety is of primary importance. Societal stigmatization, prejudice, Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health 219 Mental Health and Mental Disorders and discrimination (e.g., antigay ballot initiatives, murders of LGBT individuals) can be sources of stress and create concerns about workplace and personal security.241, 242, 243 Physical safety and social and emotional support have been identified as central to reducing stress among LGBT people. 244, 245, 246 In addition to external stressors, negative societal attitudes may result in self-image problems ranging from a lack of self-confidence to overt self-hatred,247 depression,248, 249 or alcoholism and other substance abuse.250 Meyer and Dean showed that gay men scoring high on a measure of internalized homophobia were significantly more likely than less homophobic gay men to experience sexual dysfunction and relationship instability, and to blame themselves for antigay victimization.251 Because of the stigmatization of homosexuality and bisexuality, it is to be expected that many lesbian, gay, and bisexual people feel conflicted or have significant questions about aspects or consequences of their sexual orientation. 252 Fear of multiple personal losses— including family, friends, career, and spiritual community—and vulnerability to harassment, discrimination, and violence may contribute to an individual’s fear of self-identifying as lesbian, gay, or bisexual. Many consumers who are conflicted about or are questioning the implications of their sexual orientation seek psychotherapy to resolve their concerns. Some LGBT adults may seek reparative therapy in an attempt to change their sexual orientation, even though all major health and mental health professions have rejected it. In addition, mental health service providers who harbor prejudice or are misinformed about sexual orientation may offer responses to the questioning or conflicted client that may exacerbate the client’s distress.253 Transgender people are likely to experience some form of victimization as a direct result of his or her transgender identity or gender expression. A link between these experiences and mental health disorders such as posttraumatic stress disorder is widely suspected, but has not been adequately documented. Victimization includes subtle forms of harassment and discrimination, as well as blatant verbal, physical, and sexual assault. The last may include physical and sexual assault—and even homicide. The majority of assaults against transgender persons are never reported to the police. This situation exists because transgender individuals have little social support and limited or no access to legal recourse. Sexual violence against MTF transsexuals is common, but such incidents are rarely prosecuted in the criminal justice system.254 Of the transgender individuals sampled in the Washington Transgender Needs Assessment Survey, 13.5 percent reported having been the victims of sexual assault.255 There is evidence that changes related to gender identity significantly affect partners and could unsettle relationships, causing significant emotional stress to both individuals.256 When initially introduced to their partner’s transgender status, spouses, partners, and significant others often question their own and their partners’ sexual orientation. Partners’ symptoms can be severe and sometimes resemble those of posttraumatic stress disorder.257 220 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health Mental Health and Mental Disorders 18-10: Increase the proportion of persons with co-occurring substance abuse and mental disorders who receive treatment for both. Although no research on co-occurring disorders has focused on LGBT populations, some evidence suggests that LGBT persons may be at heightened risk for some substance abuse or mental disorders.258, 259 Furthermore, limited data suggest that the prevalence and patterns of some substance abuse and mental disorders may differ for LGBT persons and those in the general population. For example, studies that have compared lesbians and gay men have found much smaller gender differences in problems related to substance use or substance abuse than is typically reported in studies of women and men in the general population.260, 261 In addition, in a recent study comparing 1-year prevalence of several psychiatric syndromes using data from the HIV/AIDS questions appearing in the 1996 National Household Survey of Drug Abuse, patterns of gender differences in disorders were found that are opposite of those typically reported in the general population.262 In this study, homosexually active men reported higher rates of major depression and panic attack syndromes, whereas homosexually active women reported higher rates of alcohol and drug dependence than did their male and female counterparts who reported no same-sex partners in the past year. 18-12: Increase the number of States and the District of Columbia that track consumers’ satisfaction with the mental health services they receive. Gay, lesbian, and bisexual consumers form a significant percentage of consumers in mental health treatment, perhaps greater than their percentage in the U.S. population.263 Nevertheless, no large, cross-national studies have been sponsored to determine LGBT consumer satisfaction with existing services. Existing research has suggested that many LGBT consumers are dissatisfied with current treatment practices.264, 265 18-13: Increase the number of States, Territories, and the District of Columbia with an operational mental health plan that addresses cultural competence. When a client presents with discomfort about his or her sexual orientation or gender identity, it is important for providers to assess the psychological and social context in which this discomfort occurs. Such an assessment might include an examination of internal and external pressures on consumers to change their sexual orientation or gender expression; the presence or absence of social support and models of positive LGBT life; and the extent to which consumers associate homosexuality, bisexuality, or gender variance with negative stereotypes and experiences. The role of providers, regardless of therapeutic orientation, is not to impose their beliefs on consumers, but to examine thoughtfully the consumers’ experiences and motives. They may also serve as a resource for accurate information about sexual orientation (e.g., by providing consumers with access to empirical data on such Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health 221 Mental Health and Mental Disorders questions as the development of sexual orientation or gender identity or the relationship between mental health and sexual orientation or gender identity).266 Racial/ethnic minority LGBT people must negotiate the norms, values, and beliefs regarding homosexuality, bisexuality, and gender expression of both mainstream and minority cultures.267, 268, 269, 270, 271 Cultural variation in these norms, values, and beliefs can be a major source of psychological stress. There may be no one group or community to whom a racial/ethnic minority LGBT person can anchor his or her identity and receive full acceptance. This problem may be an even greater challenge for racial/ethnic minority youth that are exploring their sexual identity and orientation.272 Bisexual adults and youth may experience a variety of stressors in addition to the social prejudice resulting from same-sex attractions. One such stressor is that the polarization of sexual orientation into heterosexual and homosexual categories invalidates bisexuality.273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279 This view has influenced psychological theory and practice as well as social attitudes and institutions. Consequently, bisexuality may be inaccurately represented as a transitional state. Although no evidence of psychological maladjustment or psychopathology has been found, bisexual individuals who do not adopt an exclusively heterosexual or homosexual identity may nevertheless be viewed as developmentally arrested or in other ways psychologically impaired.280 Negative individual and societal attitudes toward bisexuality in both heterosexual and homosexual communities adversely affect bisexual individuals.281, 282 Such attitudes may be associated with the lack of information about, or limited access to, a visible and supportive community of other bisexuals.283 Providing information on community resources can help facilitate the development and maintenance of positive bisexual identities.284, 285 S e rv i c e s — R E C O M M E N D AT I O N S ■ Mental health and substance abuse services for LGBT consumers should be culturally competent and consumer-based to reflect the diversity of LGBT people. ■ Effective services should be available for LGBT people who are in the process of acknowledging sexual orientation and gender identity. If age- appropriate, services are also needed for families and other significant individuals. ■ Social, mental health, and substance abuse service providers should be sensitive to issues such as homophobia and internalized homophobia. ■ A culturally appropriate and linguistically suitable hotline should be available, 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, to assist LGBT people and families who need assistance with mental health problems. 222 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health In addition to involving traditional child- and adolescent-serving agencies (e.g., mental health, substance abuse, education, child welfare, juvenile justice), an L G B T-competent system of care should involve community organizations, advocacy groups, and other programs that specialize in providing access to LGBT- f o c u s e d community supports. Mental Health and Mental Disorders ■ Public-sector systems serving LGBT youth, including schools, should implement a comprehensive, wraparound approach to providing services. ■ Given that mental health problems in children and adolescents generally precede the onset of substance abuse problems by approximately 6 to 8 years, policymakers and community leaders should support and establish substance abuse prevention activities that specifically target LGBT youth. Education and Tr a i n i n g — R E C O M M E N D ATIONS ■ Providers need to acquire basic knowledge of LGBT people (through curricula, inservice programs, or other educational opportunities) and their mental health needs. This understanding should reflect the diversity of different populations and the availability of community resources and referrals. ■ Mental health care providers of all disciplines who serve children and adolescents and their families should be adequately trained to address sexual orientation and gender identity in clinical practice. ■ Training programs for mental health, substance abuse, social service, and health care providers on LGBT issues should be developed and evaluated for effectiveness. P o l i c y — R E C O M M E N D ATIONS ■ Sexual orientation and gender identity information should be included as components of cultural competency training for managed care, Medicaid, Medicare, and Children’s Health Insurance Program providers. ■ Sexual orientation and gender identity should be included, whenever appropriate, in national surveys, evaluation studies, and surveillance systems. ■ Licensing bodies for medicine, nursing, psychology, social work, and other health and mental health professions should include guidelines that prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity. ■ Specific regulations should be developed to cease involuntary hospitalization of LGBT youth by parents and removal of LGBT youth from parent or guardian custody by child welfare agencies. ■ The existing mental health consumer groups—such as On Our Own, the National Empowerment Center, the Consumer Managed Care Network, the Mental Health Consumers Association, United Seniors Health Cooperative, and the Information Exchange—should include sexual orientation and gender identity within their special populations of concern. ■ Existing accreditation organizations—such as the National Committee for Quality Assurance, the Council on Accreditation of Services for Families and Children, the Joint Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health 223 Mental Health and Mental Disorders Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations, the Rehabilitation Accreditation Committee, and the Utilization Review Accreditation Commission— should include sexual orientation and gender identity as one of the cultural competence- related areas for accreditation. ■ As most businesses and industries purchase health care benefits for their employees, groups such as the Washington Business Group on Health, the Pacific Business Group on Health, and the Employee Assistance Professionals’ Association should sponsor regional meetings to discuss the mental health concerns of their LGBT employees. R e s e a rc h — R E C O M M E N D ATIONS ■ New studies are needed to assess whether an elevated risk of suicide exists for LGBT populations. ■ Research is needed to develop better screening tools to assess patients’ sexual orientation, gender identity, and mental health needs. ■ Additional research is necessary to generate new knowledge about LGBT youth and mental health services, including access to mental health services in comparison to non- LGBT youth and mental health services, specific mental health disparities, service utilization patterns, and outcomes. ■ Research is needed to understand the healthy development of LGBT persons at all stages of life, including studies of how sexual orientation and gender identity develop. Such research should reflect the diversity of the LGBT community. ■ Clinical and intervention research is needed to identify mental disorders that may be more prevalent among LGBT persons and to identify the most appropriate prevention and treatment strategies. ■ Studies are needed that focus on comparisons within LGBT samples, such as similarities and differences based on sexual orientation, gender, gender identity, age, race/ethnicity, socioeconomic status, and geographic location. ■ More clinical research focusing on the transgender population is needed, including followup psychosocial assessments for long-term outcomes for treatment of gender dysphoria, for gender reassignment, and for the relationship between the age at which an individual receives sex reassignment and long-term outcomes. Te rm i n o l o g y Anxiety disorders: Anxiety disorders have multiple physical and psychological symptoms, but all have in common feelings of apprehension, tension, or uneasiness. Among the anxiety disorders are panic disorder, agoraphobia, obsessive-compulsive disorder, posttraumatic stress disorder, and generalized anxiety disorder. 224 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health Mental Health and Mental Disorders Case management: Practice in which the service recipient is a partner in his or her recovery and self-management of mental illness and life. Co-occurring/comorbidity: In general, the existence of two or more illnesses—whether physical or mental—at the same time in a single individual. In this chapter, comorbidity specifically means the existence of a mental illness and a substance abuse disorder or a mental illness and a physical illness in the same person at the same time. Consumer: In this chapter, any person using mental health services. Cultural competence: In this chapter, a group of skills, attitudes, and knowledge that allows persons, organizations, and systems to work effectively with diverse racial, ethnic, and social groups. Depression: A state of low mood that is described differently by people who experience it. Commonly described are feelings of sadness, despair, emptiness, or loss of interest or pleasure in nearly all things. Depression also can be experienced in other disorders such as bipolar disorder (manic-depressive disorder). Diagnosable mental il lness: Includes all people with a mental illness in a specified population group, whether or not they have received a formal diagnosis from a medical or mental health professional. Homeless person: A person who lacks housing. The definition also includes a person living in transitional housing or a person who spends most nights in a supervised public or private facility providing temporary living quarters. Juvenile justice facility: Includes detention centers, shelters, reception or diagnostic centers, training schools, ranches, forestry camps or farms, halfway houses and group homes, and residential treatment centers for young offenders. Mental health services: Diagnostic, treatment, and preventive care that helps improve how persons with mental illness feel both physically and emotionally as well as how they interact with other persons. These services also help persons who have a strong risk of developing a mental illness. Mental il lness: The term that refers collectively to all diagnosable mental disorders. Mental disorders are health conditions characterized by alterations in thinking, mood, or behavior (or some combination thereof) that are all mediated by the brain and associated with distress or impaired functioning or both. Mental disorders spawn a host of human problems that may include personal distress, impaired functioning and disability, pain, or death. These disorders can occur in men and women of any age and in all racial and ethnic groups. They can be the result of family history, genetics, or other biological, environmental, social, or behavioral factors that occur alone or in combination. Parity, mental health parity: Equivalent benefits and restrictions in insurance coverage for mental health services and for other health services. Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 225 Mental Health and Mental Disorders Resilience: Manifested competence in the context of significant challenges to adaptation or development. Schizophrenia: A mental disorder lasting for at least 6 months, including at least 1 month with two or more active-phase symptoms. Active-phase symptoms include delusions, hallucinations, disorganized speech, and grossly disorganized or catatonic behavior. Schizophrenia is accompanied by marked impairment in social or occupational functioning. Screening for mental health problems: A brief formal or informal assessment to identify persons who have mental health problems or are likely to develop such problems. The screening process helps determine whether a person has a problem and, if so, the most appropriate mental health services for that person. Serious emotional disturbance (SED): A diagnosable mental disorder found in persons from birth to aged 18 that is so severe and long-lasting that it seriously interferes with functioning in family, school, community, or other major life activities. Serious mental il lness (SMI): A diagnosable mental disorder found in persons aged 18 and older that is so long lasting and severe that it seriously interferes with a person’s ability to take part in major life activities. R e f e re n c e s 1 Cochran, S.D., and Mays, V.M. Relation between psychiatric syndromes and behaviorally defined sexual orientation in a sample of the US population. 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How the topic of homosexuality is taught at US medical schools. Academic Medicine 67(9):601-603, 1992. 202 Stevens, P. Lesbian health care research: A review of the literature from 1970 to 1990. Health Care for Women International 13:91-120, 1992. 203 Ibid. 204 Bybee, D. Michigan Lesbian Health Survey: A Report to the Michigan Organization for Human Rights and the Michigan Department of Public Health. Lansing, MI: Michigan Organization for Human Rights, 1990. 205 D’Augelli, A. Developmental implications of victimization of lesbian, gay, and bisexual youth. In: Herek, G., ed. Psychological Perspectives on Lesbian and Gay Issues: Vol. 4. Stigma and Sexual Orientation. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. 1998. 206 Cramer, D., and Roach, A. Coming out to mom and dad: A study of gay males and their relationships with their parents. Journal of Homosexuality 15:79-91, 1988. 207 Bell, A.; Weinberg, M.; and Hammersmith, S. Sexual Preference: Its Development in Men and Women. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1981. 208 Kruks, 1991. 209 Coleman, E. The development of male prostitution activity among gay and bisexual adolescents. In: Herdt, G., ed. Gay and Lesbian Youth. New York, NY: Haworth Press, 1989. 210 Gold, R., and Skinner, M. Situational factors and thought processes associated with unprotected intercourse in young gay men. AIDS 6(9):1021-1030, 1992. 211 Hershberger, S., and D’Augelli, A. The impact of victimization on the mental health and suicidality of lesbian, gay and bisexual youths. Developmental Psychology 31:65-74, 1995. 212 Savin-Williams, 1994. 213 Hunter, J. Violence against lesbian and gay male youths. Journal of Interpersonal Violence 5:295- 300, 1990. 214 Harry, J. Parental physical abuse and sexual orientation in males. Archives of Sexual Behavior 18(3):251- 261, 1989. 215 Garofalo, Wolf, Kessel, et al., 1998. 216 Remafedi, French, Story, et al., 1998. 217 Prince, J. Influences on the career development of gay men. Career Development Quarterly 44:168- 177, 1995. 218 Savin-Williams, R. Parental influences on the self-esteem of gay and lesbian youths: A reflected appraisals model. In: Gerdt, G., ed. Gay and Lesbian Youth. New York, NY: Haworth Press, 1989. 219 Anderson, J. School climate for gay and lesbian students and staff members. Phi Delta Kappan 76(2):151- 154, 1994. 220 Caywood, C. Reaching out to gay teens. School Library Journal 39(4):50, 1993. 221 Lipkin, A. Project 10: Gay and lesbian students find acceptance in their school community. Teaching Tolerance 1(2):25-27, 1992. 222 Woog, D. School is Out: The Impact of Gay and Lesbian Issues on America’s Schools. Boston, MA: Alyson Publications, 1995. 236 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health Mental Health and Mental Disorders 223 Martin, A.D., and Hetrick, E.S. The stigmatization of gay and lesbian adolescents. Journal of Homosexuality 15(1-2):170-175, 1988. 224 Telljohann, S., and Price, J. A qualitative examination of adolescent homosexuals ’ life experiences: Ramifications for secondary school personnel. Journal of Homosexuality 26(1):41-56, 1993. 225 The organizations are the American Academy of Pediatrics, the American Counseling Association, the American Psychiatric Association, the American Psychological Association, and the National Association of Social Workers. 226 Cohen, L.; de Ruiter, C.; Ringelberg, H.; and Cohen-Kettenis, P.T. Psychological functioning of adolescent transsexuals: Personality and psychopathology. Journal of Clinical Psychology 53(2):187-196, 1997. 227 Gooren, L., and Delemarre-van de Wall, H. The feasibility of endocrine interventions in juvenile transsexuals. Journal of Psychology and Human Sexuality 8(4):69-74, 1996. 228 Cohen-Kettenis, P.T., and van Goozen, S.H.M. Puberty delay as an aid in diagnosis and treatment of a transsexual adolescent. European Child and Adolescent Psychiatry 7(4):246-248, 1998. 229 Harry Benjamin International Gender Dysphoria Association, 1998. 230 Cohen-Kettenis, P.T., and van Goozen, S.H.M. Sex reassignment of adolescent transsexuals: A follow-up study. Journal of the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry 36:263-271, 1997. 231 Herek, Gillis, and Cogan, 1999. 232 DiPlacido, J. Minority stress among lesbians, gay men and bisexuals: A consequence of heterosexism, homophobia, and stigmatization. In: Herek, G., ed. Psychological Perspectives on Lesbian and Gay Issues: Vol. 4. Stigma and Sexual Orientation: Understanding Prejudice Against Lesbians, Gay Men, and Bisexuals. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1998. 233 American Psychological Association. Guidelines for psychotherapy with lesbian, gay, and bisexual consumers. American Psychologist, in press. 234 Meyer, 1995. 235 Ross, M. The relationships between life events and mental health in homosexual men. Journal of Clinical Psychology 46:402-411, 1990. 236 American Psychological Association, in press. 237 Berger, R., and Kelly, J. Gay men and lesbians grown older. In: Cabaj, R., and Stein, T., eds. Textbook of Homosexuality and Mental Health. Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Press, 1996. 238 Slater, S. The Lesbian Family Life Cycle . New York, NY: Free Press, 1995. 239 American Psychological Association, in press. 240 D’Augelli, A., and Garnets, L. Lesbian, gay, and bisexual communities. In: D’Augelli, A., and Patterson, C., eds. Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual Identities over the Lifespan: Psychological perspectives. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1995. 241 Rothblum, E., and Bond, L., eds. Preventing Heterosexism and Homophobia. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. 1996. 242 Fassinger, R. From invisibility to integration: Lesbian identity in the workplace. Career Development Quarterly, 1995, 148-167. 243 Prince, 1995. 244 Hershberger and D’Augelli, 1995. Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health 237 Mental Health and Mental Disorders 245 Levy, E. Strengthening the coping resources of lesbian families. Families in Society 73:23-31, 1992. 246 American Psychological Association, in press. 247 Gonsiorek, J. Mental health issues of gay and lesbian adolescents. In: Garnets, L., and Kimmel, D., eds. Psychological Perspectives on Lesbian and Gay Male Experiences. New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1993. 248 Meyer, 1995. 249 Shidlo, A. Internalized homophobia: Conceptual and empirical issues in measurement. In: Greene, B., and Herek, G., eds. Psychological Perspectives on Lesbian and Gay Issues: Vol. 1. Lesbian and Gay Psychology: Theory, Research, and Clinical Applications. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1994. 250 Glaus, O. Alcoholism, chemical dependency, and the lesbian client. Women and Therapy 8:131-144, 1988. 251 Meyer and Dean, 1998. 252 American Psychological Association, in press. 253 Ibid. 254 Feinberg, L. Transgender Warriors: Making History from Joan of Arc to Dennis Rodman . Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1996. 255 Xavier, 2000. 256 Doctor, R.F., and Prince, V. Transvestism: A survey of 1032 cross-dressers. Archives of Sexual Behavior 26(6):589-605, 1997. 257 Cole, S. A transgender dilemma: The forgotten journeys of the partners and families. Paper presented at the 16th Biennial Symposium of the Harry Benjamin International Gender Dysphoria Association, August 1999. 258 Cochran and Mays, American Journal of Epidemiology, 2000. 259 Hughes, T.L.; Haas, A.P.; Razzano, L.; Cassidy, R.; and Matthews, A. Comparing lesbians’ and heterosexual women’s mental health: A multi-site survey. Journal of Gay and Lesbian Social Services 11(1):57-76, 2000. 260 McKirnan, D.J., and Peterson, P.L. Alcohol and drug use among homosexual men and women: Epidemiology and population characteristics. Addictive Behaviors 14:545-553, 1989. 261 Skinner, W.F. The prevalence and demographic predictors of illicit and licit drug use among lesbians and gay men. American Journal of Public Health 84(8):1307-1310, 1994. 262 Cochran and Mays, American Journal of Epidemiology, 2000. 263 Ibid. 264 Garnets, L.; Hancock, K.A.; Cochran, S.D.; et al. Issues in psychotherapy with lesbians and gay men: A survey of psychologists. American Psychologist 46(9):964-972, 1991. 265 Liddle, B. Therapist sexual orientation, gender, and counseling practices as they relate to ratings of helpfulness by gay and lesbian consumers. Journal of Counseling Psychology 43(4):394-401, 1996. 266 American Psychological Association, in press. 267 Chan, C. Asian-American lesbians and gay men. In: Dworkin, S., and Gutierrez, F., eds. Counseling Gay Men and Lesbians: Journey to the End of the Rainbow. Alexandria, VA: American Association for Counseling and Development, 1992. 238 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health Mental Health and Mental Disorders 268 Chan, C. Issues of sexual identity in an ethnic minority: The case of Chinese American lesbians, gay men, and bisexual people. In: D ’Augelli, A., and Patterson, C., eds. Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual Identities over the Life Span. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1995. 269 Greene, B. Ethnic minority lesbians and gay men: Mental health and treatment issues. Journal of Consulting and Psychology 62(2):243-251, 1994. 270 Manalansan, M. Double minorities: Latino, Black, and Asian men who have sex with men. In: Savin- Williams, R., and Cohen, K., eds. The Lives of Lesbians, Gays, and Bisexuals: Children to Adults. Fort Worth, TX: Harcourt Brace, 1996. 271 Rust, P. Managing multiple identities: Diversity among bisexual women and men. In: Firestein, B., ed. Bisexuality: The Psychology and Politics of an Invisible Minority. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1996. 272 American Psychological Association, in press. 273 Eliason, M. The prevalence and nature of biphobia in heterosexual undergraduate students. Archives of Sexual Behavior 26(3):317-325, 1997. 274 Fox, R. Bisexuality in perspective: A review of theory and research. In: Firestein, B., ed. Bisexuality: The Psychology and Politics of an Invisible Minority. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, 1996. 275 Markowitz, L. Bisexuality: Challenging our either/or thinking. In the Family 1:6-11, 23, 1995. 276 Matteson, D. Counseling and psychotherapy with bisexual and exploring consumers. In: Firestein, B., ed. Bisexuality: The Psychology and Politics of an Invisible Minority. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, 1996. 277 Ochs, R. Biphobia: It goes more than two ways. In: Firestein, B., ed. Bisexuality: The Psychology and Politics of an Invisible Minority . Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, 1996. 278 Paul, J. Bisexuality: Exploring/exploding the boundaries. In: Savin-Williams, R., and Cohen, K., eds. The Lives of Lesbians, Gays, and Bisexuals: Children to Adults. Fort Worth, TX: Harcourt Brace, 1996. 279 Shuster, R. Sexuality as a continuum: The bisexual identity. In: Boston Lesbian Psychologies Collective, eds. Lesbian Psychologies: Explorations and Challenges . Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1987. 280 Fox, 1996. 281 Ibid. 282 Ochs, 1996. 283 Hutchins, L. Bisexuality: Politics and community. In: Firestein, B., ed. Bisexuality: The Psychology and Politics of an Invisible Minority . Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, 1996. 284 Ibid. 285 Matteson, 1996. Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 239 240 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health Nutrition and We i g h t Healthy People 2010 Goal Promote health and reduce chronic disease associated with diet and weight. O v e rv i e w Nutrition is essential for physical growth, development, health, and well-being. Many dietary components are involved in the relationship between nutrition and health. This chapter explores what little is known about the nutritional, dietary, and related physical activity habits of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) populations. There is a growing body of evidence to suggest that some portions of the LGBT population may be at increased risk for a range of negative health outcomes associated with poor nutrition, weight, and disordered eating behaviors. Special consideration must be given to lesbians with a high body mass index, certain groups of gay and bisexual men, persons living with human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) infection, and LGBT or questioning adolescents. Finally, recommendations for action in the areas of nutrition services, education and training, policy, and research are discussed. Issues and Trends Nutritional or dietary factors contribute substantially to the burden of preventable illnesses and premature deaths in the United States.1 Indeed, dietary factors are associated with 4 of the 10 leading causes of death: coronary heart disease, some types of cancer, stroke, and type 2 diabetes.2 These health conditions are estimated to cost society more than $200 billion each year in medical expenses and lost productivity.3 Dietary factors also are associated with osteoporosis, which affects more than 25 million persons in the United States and is the major underlying cause of bone fractures in postmenopausal women and elderly persons.4 The 2000 Dietary Guidelines for Americans recommend that, to stay healthy, persons aged 2 and older should follow these ABCs for good health: Aim for fitness, Build a healthy base, and Choose sensibly. [Note: In text that follows in this chapter, Dietary Guidelines for Americans will refer to the 2000 Dietary Guidelines for Americans unless otherwise noted.] Nutrition and Weight The Food Guide Pyramid, introduced in 1992, is an educational tool that conveys recommendations about the number of servings from different food groups each day and other principles of the Dietary Guidelines for Americans.5 The degree to which LGBT populations understand these recommendations and incorporate them into their day-to-day lifestyles remains unknown. In addition to including whole grains, fruits, and vegetables and limiting saturated fat, cholesterol, total fat, sugar, salt, prepared food, and alcoholic beverages, the Dietary Guidelines for Americans also emphasize the need for adequate consumption of iron-rich and calcium-rich foods.6 Although some progress has been made since the 1970s in reducing the prevalence of iron deficiency among low-income children,7 much more is needed to improve the health of children of all ages and of women who are pregnant or of childbearing age, including lesbian and bisexual women who are pregnant or contemplating pregnancy. Since the start of this decade, consumption of calcium-rich foods, such as milk products, has generally decreased and is especially low among teenage girls and young women.8 In general, however, excesses and imbalances of some food components in the diet have replaced once commonplace nutrient deficiencies. Yet there has been a marked increase in the number of overweight and obese persons.9, 10 Overweight results when a person eats more calories from food (energy) than he or she expends, for example, through physical activity. This balance between energy intake and output is influenced by metabolic and genetic factors as well as behaviors affecting dietary intake and physical activity. Environmental, cultural, and socioeconomic components also play a role. When a body mass index (BMI) cut-point of 25 is used, nearly 55 percent of the U.S. adult population was defined as overweight or obese in 1988–94, compared to 46 percent in 1 9 7 6–8 0 .11, 12 In particular, the proportion of adults defined as obese by a BMI of 30 or greater has increased from 14.5 to 22.5 percent.1 3 A similar increase in overweight and obesity also has been observed in children over aged 6 in both genders and in all population groups.1 4 Many diseases are associated with overweight and obesity, even though weight is hard to alter and much of the research has not controlled for income or dieting history. Persons who are overweight or obese are at increased risk for high blood pressure, type 2 diabetes, coronary heart disease, stroke, gallbladder disease, osteoarthritis, sleep apnea, respiratory problems, and some types of cancer. Total costs (medical costs and lost productivity) attributable to obesity alone amounted to an estimated $99 billion in 1995.15 Disparities Disparities in health status indicators and risk factors for diet-related disease are evident in many segments of the population based on gender, age, race and ethnicity, and income. For example, overweight and obesity are observed in all population groups, but obesity is particularly common among Hispanic, African American, Native American, and Pacific Islander women. Portions of LGBT communities also appear to be at risk for overweight or obesity. Several nonrandom studies suggest that lesbians are more likely to be overweight or Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 241 Nutrition and Weight obese than heterosexual women, 16, 17, 18 including their heterosexual sisters.19 Although undetermined, it is possible that lesbians who are Hispanic, African American, Native American, or Pacific Islander may be at higher risk for obesity. Although sexual orientation has not been identified as a risk factor for the general population of gay men, there is some evidence that a certain segment of gay men that celebrate their larger girth—commonly referred to as “bears”—report high levels of compulsive eating.20 Furthermore, despite concerns about the increase in overweight and certain excesses in U.S. diets, segments of the population suffer from undernutrition, including persons who are socially isolated and poor. Many LGBT adolescents, particularly males, may experience high levels of undernutrition associated with body dissatisfaction and eating disorders, 21 and there is some evidence to suggest that this problem may extend into adulthood.22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29 Moreover, malnutrition, protein depletion, weight loss —and more recently body fat distribution and metabolic alternations in the United States—have been common complications of HIV infection for gay and bisexual men and others30, 31, 32 Initial research with respect to nutritional therapy to address these issues have shown that although weight gain does occur through such methods as appetite stimulants, the new weight is composed primarily of fat.33 Physical activity and exercise also have been examined as a means for increasing muscle strength for even critically ill patients, with some success.34, 35 There are also concerns about the nutritional status of persons in hospitals, nursing homes, convalescent centers, and institutions; persons with disabilities, including physically, mentally, and developmentally disabled persons in community settings; children in childcare facilities; persons living on reservations; persons in correctional facilities; and persons who are homeless. National data about these population groups are currently unavailable or limited, especially for LGBT individuals. Data also are insufficient to target the fastest- growing segment of the population, old and very old persons who live independently, including older LGBT persons. O p p o rtunities Healthy People 2010 places strong emphasis on establishing healthy dietary and physical activity behaviors in childhood—largely through education, curricula development, and parental influence. However, additional efforts may be necessary to ensure that LGBT communities understand the importance of sound nutritional and dietary habits as part of preventive healthy behavior and disease prevention. For example, LGBT youth are at risk for dropping out of school because of harassment and violence,36, 37 and they may miss out on education-based efforts to promote healthier nutritional, dietary, and physical activity behaviors. Curricula for students will need to provide an LGBT-competent response to the concerns of LGBT adolescents who may be at risk for eating disorders because of negative body image. Teachers may need training in how to identify LGBT and questioning youth 242 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health Nutrition and Weight who may be exhibiting signs of eating disorders and how to respond in a way that is culturally appropriate and respects the individual’s right to confidentiality and privacy. Healthy People 2010 also recognizes that although nutrition promotion efforts should begin in childhood, they need to continue throughout the lifespan. In particular, public education about the long-term health consequences and risks associated with yo-yo dieting and lack of exercise are necessary. Although many persons attempt to lose weight, studies show that within 5 years the majority regain the weight.38 Policymakers and program planners at the national, State, and community levels can and should provide important leadership in fostering healthful diets and physical activity patterns among all people in the United States, including LGBT youth and adults. The family and others, such as health care practitioners, schools, worksites, institutional food services, and the media, can play a key role in this process. For example, registered dietitians and other qualified health care practitioners can improve health outcomes among LGBT populations by increasing health professionals’ knowledge of LGBT health, seeking training in LGBT competency, and applying what they learn to nutrition screening, assessment, and primary and secondary prevention. Many of the Healthy People 2010 objectives that address nutrition and overweight in the United States measure in some way the Nation’s progress toward implementing the recommendations of the Dietary Guidelines for Americans. However, none of these tracking measures use sexual orientation or gender identity as demographic variables. Although the data for the Healthy People 2010 dietary intake objectives measure the consumption of specified levels of certain foods or nutrients by populations, it is important to track and report on the levels consumed by currently unmeasured population groups, including LGBT people, to broaden the scope of progress on these objectives. In summary, several actions are recognized as fundamental in achieving this focus area’s objectives: ■ Improving accessibility of nutrition information, nutrition education, nutrition counseling and related services, and healthful foods in a variety of settings and for all population groups, including LGBT communities ■ Focusing on preventing chronic disease associated with diet and weight, beginning in youth, but continuing into adulthood ■ Strengthening the link between nutrition and physical activity in health promotion ■ Maintaining a strong national program for basic and applied nutrition research, including population-based nutrition research on LGBT populations, to provide a sound science base for dietary recommendations and effective interventions ■ Maintaining a strong national nutrition monitoring program to provide accurate, reliable, timely, and comparable data to assess status and progress and to be responsive to unmet Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health 243 Nutrition and Weight data needs and emerging issues, including tracking of sexual orientation and gender identity as they relate to nutrition ■ Strengthening State and community data systems to provide new information about the nutritional habits of LGBT populations and to be responsive to the data users at these levels ■ Working in close partnership with LGBT organizations at the national, State, and local levels to build and sustain broad-based nutrition education initiatives targeting LGBT youth and adults S u m m a ry of LGBT Research Very little research has been done on the nutritional habits of LGBT individuals. Healthy People 2010 recognizes that there are disparities in health status indicators and risk factors for diet-related disease in certain segments of the U.S. population, based on gender, age, race and ethnicity, and income. Sexual orientation and gender identity are not identified in Healthy People 2010 as potential risk factors for poor nutrition and obesity, even though there is a growing body of evidence to suggest that sexual minorities in the United States may be at increased risk for negative health outcomes associated with poor nutrition and obesity. Lesbians. Several nonrandom studies suggest that lesbians are more likely to be overweight or obese than heterosexual women,39, 40, 41 including their heterosexual sisters. 42 Other nonrandom studies suggest that lesbians may have a higher BMI and smoke more than heterosexual women, which may increase their risk for cardiovascular disease and cancer.43, 44, 45 However, although being female has been related to concerns about dieting and being fat, lesbians tend to be less preoccupied with weight and body image than heterosexual women.46, 47 Although a higher body mass may be associated with genetic factors, it may also be attributed to poor nutrition or behaviors linked to eating disorders. Lesbians have been found to consume fewer vegetables and fruits than heterosexual women.48 Additional studies are needed, however, to determine to what degree having a higher BMI can be attributed to poor nutrition or eating disorders among lesbians. Research also is needed to determine at what point in the lifespan lesbians gain weight compared to nonlesbians who have been found to gain weight in adolescence or during pregnancy. More information is needed on the prevalence of obesity among bisexual women compared to lesbians and heterosexual women. Gay and bisexual men. Very little is known about the nutritional habits of gay and bisexual men, and there appears to be significant variation within gay and bisexual male populations in their nutritional and weight management practices. Some studies of clinical samples have found sexual orientation to be a significant predictor of eating disorders among men, though not among women.49, 50, 51, 52, 53 Other studies have found no such association.54, 55, 56 Community studies—which have typically sampled college students or participants in gay 244 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health Nutrition and Weight and lesbian organizations—have often found a significant association between sexual orientation and negative body image among gay men.57, 58, 59 There is a theory that “gay male gym culture” is a current phenomenon that prescribes a sort of gay beauty requirement and narrow norm for gay male attractiveness to which some men desperately try to conform. More information is needed about this theory and its potential impact on eating disorders among gay men. 60 Gay and bisexual men, and others infected with HIV, often experience nutritional and weight problems. Despite a decreased incidence in malnutrition in the United States with persons taking active antiretroviral therapy, individuals infected with HIV have developed problems in the areas of body fat distribution and metabolic alterations including hyperlipidimia and insulin resistance.61 Additional research is needed as well as provider education and standards that will ensure individuals with HIV receive LGBT-competent, HIV-sensitive, and individualized information with respect to nutritional therapy and physical activity. One population of gay and bisexual men, known as “bears,” may be at significant risk for adverse health outcomes associated with poor nutrition and being overweight. “Bears” typically celebrate large bodies as more masculine and generally identify a sexual attraction to other large men. A newsletter-based survey of members of New York City’s Metrobear Club asked, “What are your five greatest health concerns?” Compulsive overeating was identified as the top health concern of “bears,” especially those aged 35 to 49, followed by depression, HIV/AIDS, lack of health insurance, and stress.62 Although the sample was small and represented only 18 percent of the Metrobear Club’s membership, its findings clearly indicate an important public health concern and a need for additional research. Additional research is needed to examine for both “bears” and lesbians the unique cultural ways in which weight and body image are viewed, including the rejection of heterosexual norms. Such research could lead to improved LGBT competency by providers and educators in the areas of nutrition, eating disorders, body image, and sexuality.63, 64 Lesbian, gay, and bisexual adolescents. In the Minnesota Adolescent Health Survey,65 homosexual boys were more likely than heterosexual boys to report a poor body image (28 percent compared to 12 percent), frequent dieting (9 percent compared to 6 percent), binge eating (25 percent compared to 11 percent), and purging behaviors (12 percent compared to 4 percent).66 In contrast, homosexual girls were more likely than heterosexual girls to report a positive body image (42 percent compared to 21 percent). However, they were no less likely to report negative eating behaviors, such as binge eating or purging.67 It is important to note that significant gender differences related to eating problems and body image appear to hold true for gay and lesbian populations. Young boys (15 percent) in the Minnesota sample were less likely than young girls (27 percent) to rate themselves low on body image. A greater proportion of older females (38 percent) than males (22 percent) considered themselves to be overweight. In each group, more girls than boys reported dieting in the last year, at all levels of frequency. Despite increased risk among homosexual Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 245 Nutrition and Weight men compared with heterosexual men, women (both lesbian and heterosexual) are at greater risk for body dissatisfaction and eating disorders.68 Transgender persons. No empirical studies on the nutritional and weight management practices of transgender persons have been conducted. However, it is reasonable to expect individuals who are transitioning to the opposite gender may modify their diet, eating behaviors, or perception of weight to appear more like the desired gender. For example, female-to-male (FTM) transgender persons may be more likely to accept or attempt to achieve a higher BMI because it may seem more masculine in appearance. Likewise, male- to-female transgender persons may be more likely to diet or have higher rates of eating disorders to attain a more feminine appearance. These behaviors to modify body image merit further study. Additionally, cross-gender hormone therapy with either androgens or estrogens may predispose to weight gain; 69 and androgen therapy in FTM transgender persons causes a shift in lipid profiles to male patterns, which increases the risk of cardiovascular diseases.70 Additional studies are needed to better understand the long-term health risks associated with cross-gender hormone therapy and how modifying one’s diet might help reduce these risks. LGBT populations and issues related to physical activity, heart disease, and stroke. The fact that lesbians may have a higher BMI than women in the general population is interesting in that lesbians also report more frequent episodes of regular, vigorous physical activity71 and weight-bearing exercise.72 Together, these findings may justify concerns that some lesbians may be experiencing an imbalance between energy intake and output, although there also may be a correlation between increased muscle mass due to physical activity and a higher BMI. Additional research is needed to give health providers better information on nutrition, diet, and physical activity among lesbians. Both the National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey (NHANES) and the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS) collect national data on physical activity. Adding sexual orientation as a demographic variable or additional population group in these national data sets would yield information on the physical activity, nutritional, and dietary habits of LGBT populations and allow for comparisons across multiple populations and with the general population. Such data may be critical in defining risk profiles for cardiovascular disease, breast cancer, and other diseases related to inactivity or poor nutrition as well as in developing culturally competent interventions. Although there is a lack of data specific to lesbians, coronary heart disease is the leading cause of death among women,73 and there is no evidence that lesbians are at less risk among women. Lesbian-specific interventions are needed to combat additional risk factors, such as smoking, hypertension, abnormal lipid profiles, diabetes, obesity, and inactivity.74 Another study which compared lesbians, bisexual women, heterosexual women, and asexual women found that two groups of lesbians—lifetime lesbians and adult lesbians—had the highest rates of myocardial infarction and slightly lower prevalences of stroke and hypertension.75 246 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health Nutrition and Weight It is also known that psychosocial factors—particularly low socioeconomic status, gender- specific stress, racial/ethnic differences, and discrimination can contribute to elevated blood pressure. A few studies have investigated whether or not stress or discrimination due to sexual orientation is elevated in LGBT individuals and the degree to which this may elevate blood pressure in the population.76, 77, 78 By inference, if stress due to sexual orientation- based discrimination is high, then LGBT persons who also have low income or are members of racial or ethnic minority groups may have even greater levels of stress and elevated blood pressure. Discussion of Healthy People 2010 Objectives 19-1: Increase the proportion of adults who are at a healthy weight. See discussion under objective 19-2. 19-2: Reduce the proportion of adults who are obese. As noted earlier in this chapter, several studies suggest that lesbians are more likely to be overweight or obese than heterosexual women.79, 80, 81 Additional studies are needed to determine the specific causes of increased rates of obesity among lesbians and to determine if the long-term, potential health consequences of obesity in lesbians differ from women in the general population. Few data are available on obesity among gay and bisexual men, bisexual women, and transgender persons. National data sets, such as NHANES, and other data surveys conducted by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS/CDC) could provide vehicles through which to collect data on LGBT populations using both sexual orientation and gender identity as demographic variables. Health care providers can play an important role in counseling LGBT patients on how to modify eating patterns and improve nutrition. However, there is evidence that many health care providers fail to establish rapport and communicate effectively with patients, which can lead to decreased levels of adherence to physician advice and treatment plans and decreased rates of satisfaction.82 Many clinicians are unaware of their patients’ sexual orientation, and as a result, they may fail to accurately diagnose, treat, or recommend appropriate preventive measures, including recommendations for achieving and maintaining a healthy weight and eating a balanced diet. However, when patients have difficulty communicating with a primary care provider, they may be more likely to delay seeking health care.83 (See Health Communication focus area.) One of the barriers to patient education for transgender persons is that most health professionals lack knowledge about transgender identity, sexuality, and health care issues and are unable to respond appropriately to their transgender patients. As a consequence, responsibility for educating health care providers about transgender issues far too often falls on the patient.84, 85 Providing the needed information presents a formidable challenge for Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 247 Nutrition and Weight transgender persons who also are subject to discrimination from health care professionals based on their gender-variant physical and social presentations.86 19-5: Increase the proportion of persons aged 2 and older who consume at least two daily servings of fruit. See discussion under objective 19-10. 19-6: Increase the proportion of persons aged 2 and older who consume at least three daily servings of vegetables, with at least one-third being dark green or deep yellow vegetables. See discussion under objective 19-10. 19-7: Increase the proportion of persons aged 2 and older who consume at least six daily servings of grain products, with at least three being whole grains. See discussion under objective 19-10. 19-8: Increase the proportion of persons aged 2 and older who consume less than 10 percent of calories from saturated fat. See discussion under objective 19-10. 19-9: Increase the proportion of persons aged 2 and older who consume no more than 30 percent of calories from total fat. See discussion under objective 19-10. 19-10: Increase the proportion of persons aged 2 and older who consume 2,400 mg or less of sodium daily. Healthy People 2010 states that consuming a healthy diet of fruits, vegetables, and grains that is low in calories, saturated fat, and sodium is essential to good nutrition. Good nutritional habits should be developed in childhood and adolescence. However, there is evidence that LGBT youth may be at risk for developing poor nutritional habits at an early age. In 1986-87, more than 30,000 adolescents completed the Minnesota Adolescent Health Survey, a comprehensive assessment of adolescent health status, health behaviors, and psychosocial factors. Although the survey included relatively few items on nutrition-related issues, it found that homosexual orientation among adolescent males was a risk factor for inadequate food intake patterns or unhealthy weight-control practices. Other risk factors included low socioeconomic status, chronic illness, poor school achievement, low family connectedness, weight dissatisfaction, being overweight, and other health-compromising behaviors87—many of which may be experienced by gay or bisexual adolescent males. Ethnicity was also found to be a risk factor, further increasing the likelihood of poor food intake or weight control practices by ethnic gay or bisexual adolescent males.88 248 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health Nutrition and Weight Good nutrition is important for all populations within the LGBT community. For example, LGBT individuals with a high BMI, such as lesbians or “bears,” need to work in close partnership with health care providers to develop a healthy nutritional routine. Similarly, LGBT persons living with HIV infection also need sound nutritional assistance tailored to their needs. Due to a combination of factors—such as body image disorders, related and unrelated chronic dieting, eating disorders, single lifestyle causing a likely increase in eating outside of the home or eating prepared foods, and high prevalence of certain illnesses in LGBT communities (e.g., H I V i n f e c t i o n )8 9 , 9 0 , 9 1 , 9 2—many LGBT individuals may be more likely to fail to meet the nutritional goals outlined in Healthy People 2010. Additional efforts are needed to ensure that L G B T populations understand the basic components of good nutrition. Although efforts have been made to educate school-aged children, parents, elderly persons, racial/ethnic minorities, and other segments of the U.S. population about good nutrition habits, LGBT people have not been targeted for LGBT-specific and basic nutritional education. 19-16: Increase the proportion of worksites that offer nutrition or weight management classes or counseling. See discussion under objective 19-17. 19-17: Increase the proportion of physician office visits made by patients with a diagnosis of cardiovascular disease, diabetes, or hyperlipidemia that include counseling or education related to diet and nutrition. Worksites have demonstrated their value in reaching large numbers of employees with information, activities, and services that promote healthy dietary and physical activity behaviors.93 They have also demonstrated success in helping employees make healthier dietary decisions.94 Examples of such programs include weight management classes, physical activity programs, lunchtime seminars, self-help programs, cooking demonstrations and classes, healthy food service and vending machine selections, nutrition information, and offering flexible benefits that include nutrition-related education and services. It is critical that employer-sponsored programs be available and accessible to LGBT employees. LGBT persons may be less likely to access employee-sponsored nutrition and weight management programs because of high levels of uninsurance and underinsurance.95, 96 They are also unlikely to have access to LGBT-competent educators and providers97 and may be less likely to participate in such programs because of perceived or actual discrimination or heterosexism.98 Additional research is needed to shed new light on the incidence and prevalence of hyperlipidemia, type 2 diabetes mellitus, and cardiovascular disease in LGBT populations. Healthy People 2010 states that primary care providers are well positioned to provide a range of preventive services, including nutrition screening and assessment, referral, and counseling. However, there is evidence that numerous barriers experienced by LGBT Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 249 Nutrition and Weight persons within the health care system often result in LGBT persons avoiding prevention services.99 (See Access to Quality Health Services focus area.) Although referring LGBT clients who need nutritional assessment, education, counseling on behavior change, diet modification, and specialized nutrition therapies to a qualified nutrition professional may constitute appropriate clinical practice, it is critical that nutrition professionals provide their services in an LGBT-competent manner. S e rv i c e s — R E C O M M E N D ATIONS ■ New efforts are needed to address body dissatisfaction and eating disorders among LGBT populations, with a strong emphasis on gay male and transgender adolescents. Specifically, school-based nutrition education programs must be LGBT-competent and relevant to LGBT youth who may be experiencing body dissatisfaction and eating disorders. ■ LGBT-competent health care and support services must be made available to address nutrition, physical activity, and weight for lesbians with a high BMI, gay and bisexual men with weight or body image concerns, transgender individuals, persons living with HIV infection, and LGBT or questioning adolescents. Education and Tr a i n i n g — R E C O M M E N D AT I O N S ■ Health care providers of all disciplines—but especially primary health care providers, dietitians, and nutritionists—need training on the specific nutritional needs of LGBT populations, such as lesbians with a high BMI, certain groups of gay and bisexual men, persons living with HIV infection, and LGBT or questioning adolescents. Such training should include a strong emphasis on delivering culturally competent and sensitive care. P o l i c y — R E C O M M E N D ATIONS ■ The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services and the U.S. Department of Agriculture should collaborate in designing, supporting, and evaluating a public health education campaign designed to increase awareness among LGBT populations about the Food Guide Pyramid and the recommendations of the Dietary Guidelines for Americans. R e s e a rc h — R E C O M M E N D ATIONS ■ Sexual orientation and gender identity should be included as demographic variables in all relevant Federal and national data sets, including NHANES, BRFSS, the Continuing Survey of Food Intakes by Individuals, and the National Worksite Health Promotion Survey, as well as data sets administered by CDC and NCHS. ■ Research is needed to examine the impact of self-esteem and body image, and their relationship to eating disorders within LGBT populations, especially among gay and bisexual males and MTF transgender individuals. Research also should look at the 250 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health Nutrition and Weight extent to which alienation, discrimination, and resultant stress may increase any propensity to eating disorders among all LGBT populations. ■ Additional studies are needed to determine the specific causes of increased rates of obesity among lesbians and to determine if the long-term, potential health consequences of obesity in lesbians differ from women in the general population. ■ Once sexual orientation and gender identity are added as demographic variables in national data sets, additional analyses will be needed to estimate the prevalence of poor nutrition and diet, obesity, physical inactivity, smoking, alcohol and drug use, and other risk factors commonly observed in LGBT populations as well as their association with heart disease, stroke, diabetes, and other negative health outcomes. ■ Additional research is needed on the nutritional status of LGBT persons in hospitals, nursing homes, convalescent centers, and institutions; LGBT persons with physical, mental, and developmental disabilities in community settings; LGBT persons living on reservations and in correctional facilities; and LGBT youth and adults who are homeless. Data also are insufficient to develop targeted interventions for older LGBT persons who live independently. ■ Research on the nutritional and dietary habits of transgender populations are needed to better understand the appropriate role of nutrition and diet in gender expression and reassignment. Te rm i n o l o g y Body mass index (BMI): Weight (in kilograms) divided by the square of height (in meters), or weight (in pounds) divided by the square of height (in inches) times 704.5. Because it is readily calculated, BMI is the measurement of choice as an indicator of healthy weight, overweight, and obesity. Calorie: Unit used for measuring the energy produced by food when metabolized in the body. Cholesterol: A waxy substance that circulates in the bloodstream. When the level of cholesterol in the blood is too high, some of the cholesterol is deposited in the walls of the blood vessels. Over time, these deposits can build up until they narrow the blood vessels, causing arteriosclerosis, which reduces the blood flow. The higher the blood cholesterol level, the greater is the risk of getting heart disease. Blood cholesterol levels of below 200 mg/dL are considered desirable. Levels of 240 mg/dL or greater are considered high and require further testing and possible intervention. Levels of 200-239 mg/dL are considered borderline. Lowering blood cholesterol reduces the risk of heart disease. Coronary heart disease: The type of heart disease due to narrowing of the coronary arteries. Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 251 Nutrition and Weight Dietary Guidelines for Americans: A report published by the U.S. Department of Agriculture and U.S. Department of Health and Human Services that explains how to eat to maintain health. The guidelines form the basis of national nutrition policy and are revised every 5 years. This chapter refers mostly to the 2000 guidelines. Fats and fatty acids: Hydrocarbon chains ending in a carboxyl group at one end that bond to glycerol to form fat. Fatty acids are characterized as saturated, monounsaturated, or polyunsaturated depending on how many double bonds are between the carbon atoms. Fatty acids supply energy and promote absorption of fat-soluble vitamins. Some fatty acids are “essential” because the body cannot make them. Food Guide Pyramid: A graphic depiction of the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s current food guide that includes five major food groups in its “base” (grains, vegetables, fruits, milk products, and meats and meat substitutes) and a “tip” depicting the relatively small contribution that discretionary fat and added sugars should make in U.S. diets. The Food Guide Pyramid provides information on the choices within each group and the recommended number of servings. Hypertension: High blood pressure. Hypertriglyceridemia: Elevated levels of triglycerides in the blood. Iron deficiency: Lack of adequate iron in the body to support and maintain functioning. It can lead to iron deficiency anemia, a reduction in the concentration of hemoglobin in the red blood cells due to a lack of iron supply to the bone marrow. Nutrition: The set of processes by which nutrients and other food components are taken in by the body and used. Obesity: A condition characterized by excessive body fat. Osteoporosis: A bone disease characterized by a reduction in bone mass and a deterioration of the bone structure leading to bone fragility. Overweight: Excess body weight. Physical activity: Bodily movement that substantially increases energy expenditure. Registered dietitian: A food and nutrition expert who has met the minimum academic and professional requirements to receive the credential “R.D.” Many States and Commonwealths also have licensing laws for dietitians and nutrition practitioners. Type 2 diabetes: The most common form of diabetes, which results from insulin resistance and abnormal insulin action. Type 2 diabetes was previously referred to as noninsulin- dependent diabetes mellitus or adult-onset diabetes. 252 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health Nutrition and Weight R e f e re n c e s 1 Frazao, E. The high costs of poor eating patterns in the United States. In: Frazao, E., ed. America’s Eating Habits: Changes and Consequences. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), Economic Research Service (ERS), AIB-750, 1999. 2 National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS). Report of final mortality statistics, 1995. Monthly Vital Statistics Report 45(11):Suppl. 2, June 12, 1997. 3 Frazao, E. The American diet: A costly problem. Food Review 19:2-6, 1996. 4 National Institutes of Health (NIH). NIH Consensus Statement: Optimal Calcium Intake 12(4), 1994. 5 USDA. The Food Guide Pyramid. USDA Home and Garden Bulletin No. 252. 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Obesity: Preventing and Managing the Global Epidemic. Report of a WHO Consultation on Obesity, Geneva, 3-5 June 1997. Geneva, Switzerland: WHO, 1998. 12 NIH. Clinical guideline on the identification, evaluation and treatment of overweight and obesity in adults— The evidence report. Obesity Research 6(Suppl. 2):51S-209S, 1998. 13 Ibid. 14 Troiano, R.P., and Flegal, K.M. Overweight children and adolescents: Description, epidemiology, and demographics. Pediatrics 101:497-504, 1998. 15 Wolf, A.M., and Colditz, G.A. Current estimates of the economic cost of obesity in the United States. Obesity Research 6(2):97-106, 1998. 16 Roberts, S.A.; Dibble, S.L.; Scanlon, J.L.; Paul, S.M.; David, H. Differences in risk factors for breast cancer: Lesbian and heterosexual women. Journal of the Gay and Lesbian Medical Association 2(3):93-101, 1998. 17 Siever, M.D. Sexual orientation and gender as factors in socioculturally acquired vulnerability to body dissatisfaction and eating disorders. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology 62:252-260, 1994. 18 Aaron, D.J.; Markovic, N.; Danielson, M.E., et al. Behavioral risk factors for disease and preventive health practices in a community sample of self-identified lesbian women. American Journal of Public Health, submitted for publication. 19 Factor, R., and Rothblum, E.D. Lesbians and their sisters as a control group: Demographic and mental health factors. Psychological Science, in press. 20 Albert, S. Organizing a bear health collective. Presentation at the Gay Men’s Health Summit 2000: Denver, CO, 2000. Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 253 Nutrition and Weight 21 Neumark-Sztainer, D.; Story, M.; Resnick, M.D.; and Blum, R.W. Lessons learned about adolescent nutrition from the Minnesota Adolescent Health Survey. Journal of the American Dietetic Association 98:1449-1456, 1998. 22 Carlat, D.J.; Camargo, C.A.; and Herzog, D.B. Eating disorders in males: A report on 135 patients. 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International Journal of Eating Disorders 20:135-141, 1996. 29 Herzog, D.B.; Newman, K.L.; and Warshaw, M. Body image dissatisfaction in homosexual and heterosexual males. Journal of Nervous and Mental Disorders 170:356-359, 1991. 30 Hogg, R.S.; Zadra, J.N.; Chan-Yan, C.; et al. Analysis of nutritional intake in a cohort of homosexual men. Journal of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndromes and Human Retrovirology 9(2):162-167, 1995. 31 Palenick, J.G.; He, D.; Graham, N.M.; et al. Weight loss as a predictor of survival after AIDS among HIV- infected gay men enrolled in the MACS. Abstract WS B34-1. International Conference on AIDS 9:77, 1993. 32 Kotler, D.P. Nutritional alterations associated with HIV infection. Journal of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndromes 25:581-587, 2000. 33 Engelson, E.S.; Tierney, A.R.; Pi-Sunyer, F.X.; et al. Effects of megastrol acetate upon body composition and circulating testosterone in patients with AIDS . Journal of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndromes and Human Retrovirology 9(1):1107-1108, 1995. 34 Spence, D.W.; Gulantino, M.L.A.; Mossberg, K.A.; et al. Progressive resistance exercise: Effect on muscle function and anthropometry of a select AIDS population. Archives of Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation 71:644-648, 1990. 35 Roubenoff, R.; McDermott, A.; Weiss, L.; et al. Short-term progressive resistance training increases strength and lean body mass in adults infected with the human immunodeficiency virus. AIDS 13:231-239, 1999. 36 Faulkner, A.H., and Cranston, K. Correlates of same-sex sexual behaviors in a random sample of Massachusetts high school students. American Journal of Public Health 88(2):262-266, 1998. 37 Hunter, J., and Schaecher, R. Stresses on lesbian and gay adolescents in schools. Social Work in Education 9:180-190, 1987. 38 NIH Technology Assessment Conference Panel. Methods for voluntary weight loss and control. Consensus development conference, March 30 to April 1, 1992. Annals of Internal Medicine 119(7.2):764-770, 1993. 39 Roberts, Dibble, Scanlon, et al., 1998. 40 Siever, 1994. 254 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health Nutrition and Weight 41 Aaron, Markovic, Danielson, M.E., et al., submitted for publication. 42 Factor and Rothblum, in press. 43 Bradford, J.; Plumb, M.; White, J.; and Ryan, C. Information transfer strategies to support lesbian research. Psychological and Behavioral Factors in Women’s Health: Creating an Agenda for the 21 st Century— American Psychological Association Conference Proceedings, Washington, DC, May 1994. 44 White, J.C., and Dull, V.T. Health risk factors and health seeking behaviors in lesbians. Journal of Women’s Health 6(1):103-112, 1997. 45 Moran, N. Lesbian health care needs. Canadian Family Physician 42:879-884, May 1996. 46 Siever, 1994. 47 Brand, P.A.; Rothblum, E.D.; and Solomon, L.J. A comparison of lesbians, gay men, and heterosexuals on weight and restrained eating. International Journal of Eating Disorders 11:253-259, 1992. 48 Valanis, B.G.; Bowen, D.J.; Bassford, T.; et al. Sexual orientation and health: Comparisons in the Women’s Health Initiative sample. Archives of Family Medicine 9:843-853, 2000. 49 Carlat, Camargo, and Herzog, 1997. 50 Herzog, Norman, Gordon, and Pepose, 1984. 51 Schneider and Agras, 1987. 52 Robinson and Holden, 1986. 53 Fichter and Daser, 1987. 54 Turnbull, J.D.; Freeman, C.P.L.; Barry, F.; et al. Physical and psychological characteristics of five male bulimics. British Journal of Psychiatr y 150:25-29, 1987. 55 Pope, H.G.; Hudson, J.I.; and Jonas, J.M. Bulimia in men: A series of fifteen cases. Journal of Nervous and Mental Disorders 174:117-119, 1986. 56 Herzog, Newman, and Warshaw, 1991. 57 Silberstein, Mishkind, Streigel-Moore, et al., 1989. 58 Beren, Hayden, Wilfley, and Grilo, 1996. 59 Herzog, Newman, and Warshaw, 1991. 60 Barnard, I. No “fats or fems,” gym culture as patriarchic oppression. South Africa. A daily online journal, Nov. 25, 1998. Retrieved January 5, 2001 www.q.co.za/news/1998/9811/981125-barnard.htm. 61 Kotler, 2000. 62 Albert, 2000. 63 Wright, L. ed. Bear Book: Readings in the history and evolution of a Gay Male Subculture. Old Saybrook, CT: Harrington Park Press, 2000. 64 Atkins, D, ed. Looking Queer: Body Image and Identity in Lesbian, Bisexual, Gay and Transgender Communities. Binghamton, NY: Haworth Press, 2000. 65 Neumark-Sztainer, Story, Resnick, and Blum, 1998. Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 255 Nutrition and Weight 66 French, S.A.; Story, M.; Remafedi, G.; et al. Sexual orientation and prevalence of body dissatisfaction and eating disordered behaviors: A population-based study of adolescents. International Journal of Eating Disorders 19:119-126, 1996. 67 Rogers, L.; Resnick, M.; Mitchell, J.; and Blum, R. The relationship between socioeconomic status and eating-disordered behaviors in a community sample of adolescent girls. International Journal of Eating Disorders 22:15-27, 1997. 68 Saewyc, E.M.; Bearinger, L.H.; Heinz, P.A.; et al. Gender differences in health and risk behaviors among bisexual and homosexual adolescents. Journal of Adolescent Health 23:181-188, 1998. 69 Futterweit, W. Endocrine therapy of transsexualism and potential complications of long-term treatment. Archives of Sexual Behavior 27(2):209-226, 1998. 70 Harry Benjamin International Gender Dysphoria Association. The Standards of Care for Gender Identity Disorders. Dusseldorf, Germany: Symposion Publishing, 1998. 71 Aaron, Markovic, Danielson, et al., submitted for publication. 72 Patton, C.L.; Millard, P.S.; Kessenich, C.R.; Storm, D.; Kinnicutt, E.; and Rosen, C.J. Screening calcaneal ultrasound and risk factors for osteoporosis among lesbians and heterosexual women. Journal of Women’s Health 7:909-915, 1998. 73 American Heart Association. Taking Wellness to Heart. Dallas, TX: American Heart Association, 1998. Retrieved January 5, 2001, online at http://women.americanheart.org/wellness/index.html. 74 Ulstad, V.K. Coronary health issues for lesbians. Journal of the Gay and Lesbian Medical Association 3(2):59-65, 1999. 75 Valanis, Bowen, Bassford, et al., 2000. 76 Krieger, N.; Sidney, S. Prevalence and health implications of anti-gay discrimination: A study of black and white women and men in the CARDIAcohort. International Journal of Health Services 27(1):157-176, 1997. 77 Bernhard, L.A., and Applegate, J.M. Comparison of stress and stress management strategies between lesbian and heterosexual women. Health Care for Women International 20:335-357, 1999. 78 LaCroix, A.Z. Psychosocial factors and risk of coronary heart disease in women: An epidemiologic perspective. Fertility and Sterility 62(Suppl 2, 6):133S-139S, 1994. 79 Roberts, Dibble, Scanlon, et al., 1998. 80 Siever, 1994. 81 Aaron, Markovic, Danielson, et al., submitted for publication. 82 Inui, T.S., and Carter, W.B. Design issues in research on doctor-patient communication. In: Stewart, M., and Roter, D., eds. Communicating with Medical Patients. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, 1989. 83 White, J.C., and Dull, V.T. Room for improvement: Communication between lesbians and primary care providers. Journal of Lesbian Studies 2(1):95-110, 1998. 84 Bockting, W.O.; Robinson, B.E.; and Rosser, B.R.S. Transgender HIV prevention: A qualitative needs assessment. AIDS Care 10(4):505-526, 1998. 85 Xavier, J. Final Report of the Washington Transgender Needs Assessment Survey. Administration for HIV and AIDS, Government of the District of Columbia. 2000. 86 Lawrence, A.A.; Shaffer, J.D.; Snow, W.R.; et al. Health care needs of transgendered patients. Journal of the American Medical Association 276:874, 1996. 256 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health Nutrition and Weight 87 Neumark-Sztainer, Story, Resnick, and Blum, 1998. 88 Ibid. 89 Ibid. 90 Valanis, Bowen, Bassford, et al., 2000. 91 Hogg, Zadra, Chan-Yan, et al., 1995. 92 Palenick, He, Graham, et al., 1993. 93 Public Health Service. Worksite Nutrition: A Guide to Planning, Implementation, and Evaluation, 2nd edition. Washington, DC: American Dietetic Association and Office of Disease Prevention and Health Promotion, Public Health Service, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 1993. 94 Sorensen, G.; Stoddard, A.; Hunt, M.K.; et al. The effects of a health promotion-health protection intervention on behavior change: The WellWorks Study. American Journal of Public Health 88(11):1685- 1690, 1998. 95 Badgett, M.V.L. Income Inflation: The Myth of Affluence Among Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Americans. National Gay and Lesbian Task Force Policy Institute and Institute for Gay and Lesbian Strategic Studies, 1998. 96 Bradford, J., and Ryan C. The National Lesbian Health Care Survey . Washington, DC: National Lesbian and Gay Health Foundation, 1988. 97 Solarz, L.A., ed. Lesbian Health: Current Assessment and Directions for the Future. Washington, DC: Institute of Medicine, National Academy Press, 2000. 98 Schatz, B., and O’Hanlan, K. Anti-Gay Discrimination in Medicine: Results of a National Survey of Lesbian, Gay and Bisexual Physicians. San Francisco: Gay and Lesbian Medical Association, 1994. 99 Dean, L., et al. Lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender health: Findings and concerns. Journal of the Gay and Lesbian Medical Association 4(3):101-151, 2000. Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 257 258 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health Public Health Infrastructure Healthy People 2010 Goal Ensure that Federal, tribal, State, and local health agencies have the infrastructure to provide essential public health services effectively. O v e rv i e w The mission of public health is to fulfill “society’s interest in assuring conditions in which persons can be healthy.” 1 Public health engages both private and public organizations as well as individuals in accomplishing this mission. Responsibilities encompass preventing epidemics and the spread of disease, protecting against environmental hazards, preventing injuries, encouraging healthy behavior, helping communities to recover from disasters, and ensuring the quality and accessibility of health services to individuals who otherwise cannot access or afford needed health care and related services. The Nation’s public health infrastructure consists of the resources needed to deliver the essential public health services to every community—people and health professionals who work in the field of public health; information and communication systems used to collect and disseminate accurate data; and public health organizations at the Federal, State, and local levels in the front lines of public health. The public health infrastructure is a complex web of practices and organizations that has been characterized as in “disarray.” 2, 3 Public health encompasses three core functions: assessment of information on the health of the community, comprehensive public health policy development, and assurance that public health services are provided to the community.4 These functions have been defined further and expanded into 10 essential public health services.5 (See Figure 1 for a full list of functions.) The totality of the public health infrastructure includes all governmental and nongovernmental entities or organizations that provide any of these services. Environmental health, occupational health and safety, mental health, and substance abuse are integral parts of public health. Service providers, such as managed care organizations, hospitals, nonprofit corporations, schools, faith organizations, businesses, and consumer organizations also are an integral part of the public health infrastructure in many communities. They are among the stakeholders who should be at the public health planning table at the State level and in the community. Public Health Infrastructure Issues and Tre n d s Various reports and evaluations have described the continuing deterioration of the national public health system. Health departments are closing, technology and information systems evaluated have been found to be outmoded, newly emerging and drug-resistant diseases threaten to overwhelm resources, and serious inadequacies in health professions training weaken the capacity of the public health workforce to address new threats and adapt to changes in the health care market. 6, 7 Conversely, interest in public health has led to the development of public health improvement plans in many States, such as Illinois and Washington. In addition, private foundations have funded major national programs to improve health. All public health services depend on the presence of basic infrastructure. Every categorical public health program— childhood immunizations, infectious disease monitoring, cancer and asthma prevention, drinking water quality, injury prevention, and many others—requires health professionals who are competent in cross-cutting and technical skills, public health agencies with the capacity to assess and respond to community health needs, and up- to-date information systems. Federal public health agencies rely on the presence of adequate infrastructure systems at the local and State levels to support the implementation of their programs. Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 259 Figure 1. Essential Public Health Services ■ Monitor health status to identify community health problems ■ Diagnose and investigate health problems and health hazards in the community ■ Inform, educate, and empower people about health issues ■ Mobilize community partnerships to identify and solve health problems ■ Develop policies and plans that support individual and community health efforts ■ Enforce laws and regulations that protect health and ensure safety ■ Link people to needed personal health services and assure the provision of health care when otherwise unavailable ■ Assure a competent public health and personal health care workforce ■ Evaluate effectiveness, accessibility, and quality of personal and population-based health services ■ Research for new insights and innovative solutions to health problems Source: Public Health Functions Steering Committee. Public Health in America, Fall 1994. Available online at w w w. h e a l t h . g o v / p h f u n c t i o n s / p u b l i c . h t m. Turning Point: Collaborating for a New Century of Public Health Initiatives, supported by the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation and the W.K. Kellogg Foundation, helps develop more effective public health infrastructure by providing technical assistance to health departments at State and local levels. S o u r c e : w w w. t u r n i n g p o i n t p r o g r a m . o r g . Public Health Infrastructure In public health, a strong infrastructure provides the capacity to prepare for and respond to both acute and chronic threats to the Nation’s health, whether they are bioterrorism or weapons of mass destruction attacks, emerging infections, disparities in health status, or increases in chronic disease and injury rates. Such an infrastructure serves as the foundation for planning, delivering, and evaluating public health. The public health infrastructure comprises the workforce, data and information systems, and public health organizations. Research also is a key activity of public health infrastructure in identifying opportunities to improve health, strengthen information systems and organizations, and make more effective and efficient use of resources. Health data and surveillance systems provide information on illness, disability, and death from acute and chronic conditions; injuries; personal, environmental, and occupational risk factors; preventive and treatment services; and costs. To be most useful, public health data must be accessible, accurate, timely, clearly stated, and adherent to strict confidentiality standards. The system must be linked with other data systems and linked with and integrated at the Federal, tribal, State, and local levels. The systematic collection, analysis, interpretation, dissemination, and use of health data drive efforts to determine the health status of a population, plan prevention programs, and evaluate program effectiveness. Healthy People activities during the 1980s and 1990s have demonstrated the central role of data, focused attention on what is important to measure, and stimulated the expansion and improvement of existing national-level surveys and the development of new data systems. Although Federal agencies take the lead in collecting national public health data, these agencies are only some of the many necessary partners that collect, analyze, and use public health data. Surveillance often involves active cooperation among Federal, tribal, State, and local agencies. For example, the Vital Statistics Cooperative Program obtains information on births, deaths, marriages, and divorces from all 50 States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and Guam. Programs in each area collect vital information from many sources in local communities, including funeral directors, medical examiners, coroners, hospitals, religious authorities, and justices of the peace. Other data collection systems, based on sample surveys rather than reports, depend on the participation of thousands of private citizens nationwide. And still other systems rely on the administrative records of public and private health care organizations. If data are unavailable or missing, problems can arise, especially for State and local health agencies. In p a r t i c u l a r, health problems may not be identified in high-risk populations, such as lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) populations, or the public intervention may not be timely enough. Information enables public health to direct preventive services and health promotion activities toward select populations. 260 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health Caitlin Ryan and Donna Futterman wrote their book, Lesbian and Gay Youth: Care and Counseling as a followup document to a national working conference sponsored by the Health Resources and Services Administration to address the full range of primary health care and preventive needs for these underserved adolescents.8 Public Health Infrastructure The public health workforce must have up-to-date knowledge, skills, and abilities to deliver services effectively and carry out the core functions of assessment, policy development, and assurance of services to all populations. The importance of organizations in making a system effective may be overlooked. Yet, tribal, State, and local public health agencies, in partnership with other community organizations, are essential to creating an effective public health system. Today’s fiscal restraints and increasing social problems increase the challenge to maintain a proactive, effective, and culturally responsive public health infrastructure. In addition, this difficult task is made more complicated by an increasingly diverse, multicultural society. People in the public health work force now must provide services for people whose cultural orientation, view of life, and living circumstances may differ significantly from the providers. LGBT people, for example, often have different social systems and social interactions than those of health planners and other individuals responsible for strengthening the public health infrastructure. D i s p a r i t i e s One of the overarching goals of Healthy People 2010 is to eliminate health disparities. These disparities exist at all State and local levels but are not well delineated because of differences in public health systems between States. A better trained public health workforce, improved data and information systems, and more effective public health organizations will strengthen the public health infrastructure at all levels and help identify where disparities exist so that targeted, more effective interventions and programs to eliminate the disparities can be developed. Disparities among public health organizations and between the public and private health sectors also are of concern. For example, a diverse, highly skilled workforce must be recruited and trained to meet the challenges expected to emerge during the 21st century. These challenges include the changing racial and ethnic demographics of the country; immigration trends and the overall health of new immigrants; an increase in the older population; the identification of other sicker and higher-risk populations as well as populations in disparity in access to needed health care and related services; the emergence of epidemic or pandemic diseases; changes in cost-containment strategies by health plans and health insurance companies; and gaps in the types of health care providers needed to serve the changing population of health care consumers. Salary structures and the differences in staffing patterns across public health jurisdictions, as well as disparities between workers in the public and private sectors, will affect the ability of public health agencies to recruit and retain a high-quality workforce. Among the populations more recently recognized as in disparity in access to needed services are LGBT people who often remain invisible and “in the closet ” or who never identified as LGBT even though they may seek public health services or are entitled to receive such services.9, 10 The invisibility of LGBT people also means that heterosexuals may assume that LGBT people seeking services are heterosexual. The heterosexual Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health 261 Public Health Infrastructure provider, who also may be homophobic, then may fail to modify or alter the services so they are appropriate to the sexual orientation of the person being served.11 Over the last 25 years, researchers have found evidence of homophobia among a variety of health care professionals, including psychologists, nurses, social workers, counselors, and physicians.12 O p p o rt u n i t i e s Several developments suggest opportunities to improve public health capacity nationwide. The Public Health Workforce: An Agenda for the 21st Century, published by the Public Health Service in 1997, recognized the need for the public health system to assure a stronger public health workforce. 13 The report identified five areas to be strengthened: national leadership, State and local leadership, workforce composition, health professions curriculum development, and distance learning. Data systems are needed to track the extent to which the workforce has the knowledge, skills, and abilities to carry out its evolving functions. With wide input from the public health community, the Standard Occupational Classification system was updated in 1997 and 1998 to include an array of public health professions.14 This classification system will continue to be used in a number of national population- and employer-based surveys by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (U.S. Department of Labor), the Bureau of the Census (U.S. Department of Commerce), and the Bureau of Health Professions (Health Resources and Services Administration, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services). A standard classification may be useful in determining minimum levels of competency for each classification. Part of the effort to better understand the effectiveness of public health interventions and to make Healthy People 2000 more understandable and useful to the States and localities was release of a set of 18 Health Status Indicators and Priority Data Needs in July 1991 by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). The indicators were developed in response to one of the Healthy People 2000 objectives that focused on obtaining data for racial and ethnic groups, and their use by Federal, State, and local health agencies was encouraged. Data on the Health Status Indicators and Priority Data Needs are reported on in the Healthy People 2000 Reviews published at regular intervals, the most recently published being Healthy People 2000, 1998-99.15 State data are available for both the Health Status Indicators and Priority Data Needs at www.cdc.gov/nchswww/datawh/datawh.htm. Data on the health indicators have been an important step in monitoring progress toward the second goal of Healthy People 2010: to eliminate health disparities among population groups, particularly at the State and local levels. Additional steps need to be taken to produce relevant health status data for all populations at the national, State, tribal, and local levels. The greatest opportunity for obtaining health-related data for LGBT people has been a greater acceptance of LGBT people over the past 40 years.16 A cursory review of key health care stakeholders was conducted to identify professional associations, provider groups, private and public purchasers, accrediting groups, and other major policies that specifically addressed sexual orientation or sexual identity relative to clients and providers. The following groups have such policies. The date reflects when the policies were written. 262 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health Public Health Infrastructure ■ Academy of Managed Care Pharmacy (1998) ■ Addiction Prevention and Recovery Administration (1997) ■ American Academy of Pediatrics (1996) ■ American Counseling Association (1992) ■ American Medical Association Council on Scientific Affairs (1996) ■ Council for Accreditation of Counseling and Related Educational Programs (1998) ■ Employee Assistance Professional Association (1996) The American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees (AFSCME) continues to work to promote the rights of their lesbian and gay union members via the promotion of legislation that affects domestic partner benefits and discrimination based on human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) status. AFSCME also issued a 1994 report resulting from their Presidential Advisory Commission that clearly states consumer rights issues within health care.17 More than 100 LGBT-community based programs are located throughout the United States, offering not only medical care but also public health services to many recipients. (More information about the LGBT community health centers can be found online at www.gaycenter.org.) Finally, in several communities, such as Seattle, networks of youth service agencies, public health departments, schools, and religious-affiliated groups have been developed to conduct needs assessments and coordinate communitywide program development for both “visible” and “invisible” gay and lesbian youth. 18 S u m m a ry of LGBT Researc h This chapter addresses the need to ensure that the public health system infrastructure has the capacity to carry for LGBT people the three core functions of public health as set forth in the Public Health Infrastructure focus area of Healthy People 2010: ■ Assessing the health status of LGBT populations (including ensuring adequate data and information, monitoring trends, and informing and educating decisionmakers and the general population) ■ Developing comprehensive public health policies (including programs, plans, laws, and regulations) that are based on adequate health status and health services data and are supportive of individual and community health efforts ■ Assuring the availability of quality personal and public health services. These core functions exist in the context of the broad-based public health infrastructure. and relate to all aspects of health care, including primary health care, mental health, and substance abuse. Although there are increasing efforts among some Federal, State, and local agencies to address LGBT health concerns in the context of these core functions, outside of Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 263 Public Health Infrastructure HIV and acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS), the health of LGBT people is largely invisible to the public health system. The White House Office of National AIDS Policy, created by President Clinton and Vice President Gore, is the only Federal organization that provides broad policy guidance and works closely with community-based and national organizations. There is, however, no single office or agency within the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services charged with the coordination of public health infrastructure issues for LGBT people. Similarly, no one Federal agency has the responsibility for maintaining linkages among the various Federal agencies that address some aspect of LGBT public health (e.g., breast cancer, substance abuse treatment services, access to health services). There is a lack of data about health status and access to and utilization of health services among LGBT populations. Resolving that lack of data would be a significant contribution toward ensuring a public health infrastructure that meets the needs of all people. One of the challenges is that national-level health data for the LGBT population are limited because of the methodological challenges in researching LGBT health issues, due to limitations in the infrastructure and a lack of funding to support such research.19, 20 In Healthy People 2010, the availability of consistent and uniformly reliable data for the U.S. population is recognized as a cornerstone of a sound public health infrastructure. The document also recognizes that the current collection of health data and surveillance systems do not meet all current data needs. However, for the total population the existing data systems provide a level of reliable and valid data, based, for example, on periodic national surveys, sample surveys, and public and private administrative health records of individual practitioners and provider institutions. Reliable data about LGBT health, then, serve as an essential starting point for building the capacity of the public health system to maintain and improve the health of LGBT people. A number of researchers, health planners, and providers are either not culturally competent or uninterested in addressing LGBT health concerns. This, in combination with the lack of data, affects the ability of the public health system to eliminate disparities against one group that also is diverse with respect to age, race/ethnicity, socioeconomic status, and educational level. For example, a rural public health agency may be challenged to plan substance abuse services for LGBT people. However, the agency or the State may not collect information about the local LGBT youth, adults, and families and may find that few, if any, of the local substance abuse staff have expertise in this area. A first step for this hypothetical agency might be to build its own capacity to identify and respond to the needs of local LGBT residents, with the support and leadership of State, Federal and local community-based agencies. To assist in this effort, this chapter is organized into three categories that relate to public health infrastructure: data and information systems, core workforce and organizational competency, and the law and public health. 264 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health Public Health Infrastructure Data and Information Systems The lack of data on smaller populations, usually those people who are vulnerable or at higher risk, presents a conundrum for the American public health system. Healthy People 2010, a statement of national health and prevention priorities, is based on the goal of eliminating health disparities. However, without methodologically sound data on the health status and health needs of LGBT populations, public health agencies cannot accurately document the health status of this population, identify disparities, and address emerging health conditions and issues. For example, because HIV/AIDS surveillance includes men who have sex with men, data indicate that the highest number of new AIDS cases in 1996- 98 was among African American men in the Southern United States who have sex with men. Nearly one-quarter of those men live in the rural South—outside of major metropolitan areas.21 This is critical information for HIV prevention and AIDS treatment planning. However, current public health documents are only slowly addressing other health issues for LGBT populations that are beginning to reveal comparable critical epidemiologic information that identifies disparities or disease trends and informs public health policy. The collection of accurate data is especially important for LGBT people of color and all transgender individuals, who suffer a disproportionate burden of discrimination and associated health risks.22, 23, 24 Without accurate data, health planners at the Federal and local levels are limited in their ability to organize, finance, and deliver meaningful health promotion, health education, disease prevention, and treatment services. Knowledge and understanding of health-related information (e.g., health status, services access and utilization) on any population can inform public health policy in general as well as policies and plans related to targeted prevention and treatment efforts. This, in turn, lays the foundation for the more effective allocation of limited Federal, State, and local public health resources, including financial, health workforce, and physical infrastructure. In addition to methodological and other challenges that relate generically to public health data and information, three that relate specifically to LGBT people are increasingly recognized within broad public health policy forums as urgently in need of resolution. These are: ■ Methodological issues related to collection of data by sexual orientation and gender identity. This challenge underscores the need for expert discussions on the appropriate way to collect information on sexual orientation and gender identity as demographic variables in national data collection efforts. Specifically, how should questions about sexual orientation or gender identity be framed in the public health and other service delivery settings? Can specific terminology be agreed upon? How will issues related to data reliability and validity be addressed? When sexual orientation or gender identity are assessed, what precisely will be measured? How does asking questions affect response rates? Information about each of these issues currently is limited at best. ■ Ethical issues related to data collection. This issue relates to both the general population (e.g., protection of confidentiality in national data collection projects) and sensitivity on the part of subpopulations within the LGBT community. For example, closeted lesbians Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 265 Public Health Infrastructure and gay men will be reluctant to declare their sexual orientation if they are not assured of anonymity. How will national surveys capture accurate data from individuals living in a heterosexual marriage or relationship, given that these individuals may be reluctant to divulge same-sex sexual behavior? How will the findings be reported without compromising confidentiality? ■ Consistency and accuracy in terminology. Ensuring accurate and culturally neutral terminology that is used across national and other data sets will be critical, as it is for all data and information systems on which the public health infrastructure depends. In the case of the LGBT populations, policymakers and researchers must address cultural differences within different constructs of sexuality and gender. The terms “gay,” “lesbian,” “homosexual,” “bisexual,” and “transgender” are relatively new and often are considered to be referring to people among the “mainstream” or “Northern European American” populations. Communities of color, rural communities, and immigrant populations may not understand the terms, or may not associate their sexual behavior, sexual orientation, or gender variance with the terms. The full understanding of these definitions culturally or the impact of that understanding on attempts to measure sexual orientation or gender identity is unknown. In spite of these challenges, there is an urgent need to collect, analyze, and disseminate data on LGBT communities—even as the methodological questions concerning the best way to do so are being discussed. It is common practice for the U.S. census to change how questions about race, ethnicity, or occupation are asked from one census to the next— apparently without a broad understanding of or consensus on the best way for such questions to be asked. Like race, ethnicity, or occupation, survey questions about self- identification of sexual orientation and gender identity may evolve over time as communities change the way they define and identify themselves or as research identifies more reliable and valid ways to obtain desired information. The collection and dissemination of data are essential building blocks in the effort to address health disparities among LGBT communities. Many chapters in this companion document present known data regarding health disparities—and address specific needs for data and information related to the health issues addressed in those chapters. This section addresses the overall need for improved data and information systems related to LGBT people and issues related to the following six objectives: 23-2: (Developmental) Increase the proportion of Federal, tribal, State, and local health agencies that have made information available to the public in the past year on the Leading Health Indicators, Health Status Indicators, and Priority Data Needs. 23-3: Increase the proportion of all major national, State, and local health data systems that use geocoding to promote nationwide use of geographic information systems at all levels. 266 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health Public Health Infrastructure 23-4: Increase the proportion of population-based Healthy People 2010 objectives for which national data are available for all population groups identified for the objective. 23-5: (Developmental) Increase the proportion of Leading Health Indicators, Health Status Indicators, and Priority Data Needs for which data—especially for select populations—are available at the tribal, State, and local levels. 23-6: Increase the proportion of Healthy People 2010 objectives that are tracked regularly at the national level. 23-7: Increase the proportion of Healthy People 2010 objectives for which national data are released within 1 year of the end of data collection. Including sexual orientation and gender identity measures in population-based studies is essential to accurately identify health disparities in LGBT communities as well as the nature and extent of those disparities. Such studies should include Federal population and health- related data collection surveys; State, tribal, and local government data collection activities; studies and research undertaken by private foundations (e.g., Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, Kaiser Family Foundation); and publicly funded research studies (e.g., those performed by the National Academy of Sciences). The issues concerning data systems are primarily issues of data collection and the escalating cost of collecting data, particularly for smaller populations. Objective 23-6 speaks to the need to maintain data collection efforts on an ongoing basis, and objectives 23-2 and 23-7 speak to the importance of disseminating research findings. However, it is the lack of data on the health status of LGBT communities that is the focus of this discussion. The lack of needed data is not surprising, given the overall lack of population-based surveys of sexual behavior25 and the lack of resources for research on lesbian and gay health.26 E m e rging communities. In the past three decades, LGBT communities have become less of a “h i d d e n” population. The ability of these communities, or of public health planners, to evaluate or know the health status of LGBT communities is hindered by a lack of questions about sexual orientation or gender identity in health-related surveys. At the same time, there is growing evidence that it is not difficult or problematic to ask these questions in surveys that ask respondents to self-identify gender, race, ethnicity, age, or other personal characteristics. For example, in 1997, it was found that 488 of 520 (94 percent) of women responded to a question about sexual orientation in a random-digit-dial telephone survey.27 Those who refused to answer the question about sexual orientation differed from those who did answer the question in that they were less willing to answer other personal questions, such as their race, age, and income. In general, willingness to disclose was greater among younger, highly educated, and higher income women. Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health 267 Public Health Infrastructure In Massachusetts, questions have been added to the Federal Youth Risk Behavior Study, which asks students in grades 9 through 12 to answer questions about sexual identity and same-sex sexual behavior. Data from this random sample of school-based youth have provided valuable information about disparities in risk behavior and response rates. In the 1997 survey, 3,982 Massachusetts public high school students in grades 9 through 12 were surveyed on a total of 94 items. The sexual identity question was included in the upfront demographics section, which may account, in part, for the low non-response rate. Sexual behavior items were grouped later in the survey. Of the 3,982 respondents, only 36 individuals (0.9 percent) did not respond to the sexual identity item. Only 13 other items had a better response rate, putting this item in the top 20 percent of all items on the survey in this regard.28 The non-response rate for “sex of sexual partner(s)” was 1.6 percent. In comparison, other items and their non-response rates included “ever had intercourse,” 8.0 percent; “ever drank alcohol,” 6.9 percent; “trying to lose weight,” 1.8 percent; and “rode a bicycle in the past year,” 3.1 percent. Questions about sexual identity and same-sex sexual behavior have been asked biannually from 1993 through 1999. These comparisons regarding response rates generally hold true for the 1993, 1995, 1997, and 1999 surveys. With the HIV/AIDS epidemic, the Federal Government, for the first time, realized that a lack of information on the gay and bisexual male community made it difficult to understand the path and extent of the epidemic. Information about male-to-male sexual activity was included in AIDS surveillance forms completed across the country. However, even this information did not fully provide information about the impact of HIV/AIDS on the LGBT communities, as lesbians and transgender persons were still excluded from the surveys. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention has recognized that information about same-sex sexual behavior is an important part of data collection in following certain diseases. For example, new surveillance forms drafted by CDC for hepatitis C include questions about sexual activity with both male and female partners that will be asked of all respondents, regardless of gender. Geographic-based data. There is a need to understand more about the relationship between sexual orientation, gender identity, and the geographical distributions of populations. Currently, there are very limited data that are population-based or based on a large enough sample to convincingly demonstrate whether LGBT communities are geographically homogenous or, as often suspected, concentrated in urban areas. Some urban centers have been considered to be “gay ghettos,” but sufficient information has not been collected through research or population-based studies to confirm those patterns or to allow comparisons between and among lesbians, gay men, bisexuals, and transgender persons. Because neither sexual orientation nor gender identity have been included in the largest Federal databases, such as the census, there is not information that could be used for geocoding (coding by ZIP Code) and mapping information about health status indicators based on the geographical distribution of populations identified by selected characteristics. Some Federal databases include measures of sexual orientation (see below), but HIV/AIDS 268 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health Public Health Infrastructure is the only area in which information about sexual orientation has been collected sufficiently to analyze some data geographically. AIDS incidence trends vary greatly among geographic areas in the United States. Areas in which AIDS incidence trends are similar are defined as clusters. Areas within a cluster may have similar HIV epidemic patterns and thus may lead to similar prevention and intervention strategies.29 Geographic and racial/ethnic variations in the AIDS incidence among homosexual and bisexual men in the United States not using injection drugs has been measured over time. Incidence increased much less rapidly after 1986 in the three metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) with the most AIDS cases—New York City, Los Angeles, and San Francisco—and may have reached a plateau in these areas. This change in incidence occurred in non-Hispanic Black and Hispanic gay and bisexual men, as well as in non-Hispanic Whites in these MSAs, but earlier in Whites. There have been similar changes in incidence (but later in time) in all other MSAs with a population of at least 1 million combined, with more of a tendency toward a plateau in Whites than in non-Whites. In contrast, incidence increased linearly through 1989 in MSAs with a population of fewer than 1 million and in rural areas, with no change in trend after 1986.30 H o w e v e r, rates of HIV/AIDS incidence among gay and bisexual men may reflect diff e r e n c e s in risk behavior as much as the actual location of gay men. It could be misleading to assume that incidence or prevalence rates of HIV/AIDS among gay or bisexual men are identical in urban, suburban, and rural areas. However, work within the LGBT communities in urban, small town, and rural areas may provide some health-related information about the presence or absence of LGBT persons in various geographic locations. In urban areas, one of the few population-based studies of gay and bisexual men, the Urban Men’s Study, used random-digit dialing within selected zip code areas in Chicago, Los Angeles, New York, and San Francisco. The study provides information on the percent of households in which the person answering the telephone identified as either a gay or bisexual male. ZIP Codes were selected based on information indicating that many gay or bisexual men lived in this area. Given limited resources, it was cost-effective to derive a population-based sample by specifically targeting certain neighborhoods perceived as having a higher density of gay or bisexual men.31, 32 Studies of transgender populations, although not population-based, have focused exclusively on urban areas. Studies in San Francisco33 and Washington, D.C.,34 used convenience sampling to identify significant numbers of transgender individuals (515 in San Francisco and 252 in Washington D.C.). The American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition, (1987) estimates the prevalence of transsexual persons to be 1 in 30,000 for male-to-female transsexuals and 1 in 100,000 for female-to-male transsexuals. As with cities with fewer than 1 million people, either there is substantial, disproportionate representation of transgender individuals in urban centers, or estimates on the prevalence of the transgender population need to be revisited. Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 269 Public Health Infrastructure Not all studies of LGBT communities have occurred in major metropolitan areas. The Trilogy Project is a longitudinal study of lesbian and gay people living in and around two smaller metropolitan areas in a southern State. The study was specifically designed to provide epidemiological data on the lifetime, past-year, and past-month prevalence rates for the use of six illicit, four psychotherapeutic, and two licit drugs, as well as comparative data to the National Household Survey on Drug Abuse (NHSDA).35 Although not population-based, exit polling data collected by the Voter News Service between 1990 and 1998 asked whether voters identified with any of several minority groups, including “g a y, lesbian, or bisexual.” (Bisexual was added in 1992.) In 1996, 5 percent of polled voters identified as gay, lesbian, or bisexual. When examined by type of location, data averaged for 1996 and 1998 found approximately 8 percent of voters in large and medium-sized cities, 4 percent of voters in suburban or small towns, and 2 percent of rural voters identified as gay, lesbian, or bisexual.3 6 The question remains whether these differences are due to residential preferences, differences in voting patterns, or differences in willingness to disclose this information. Yet another study estimated gay and bisexual men to constitute 9.2 percent of the population in the centers of the 12 largest SMAs; 3.4 percent of their suburbs; 4.2 percent of the centers of the 13t h to 100t h l a rgest SMAs; 1.3 percent of their suburbs; 1.9 percent of smaller cities and towns; and 1.2 percent of rural areas.3 7 To some extent, the door has been opened for Federal data systems to monitor health disparities based on sexual orientation. A review of the Healthy People 2010 objectives identified 18 objectives that could be tracked using four data systems: the National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey, the National Survey of Family Growth, NHSDA, and the Youth Risk Behavior Survey. An additional 21 objectives could be tracked if sexual orientation were added to the National Health Information Survey, the National Vital Statistics System, the STD Case Surveillance System, the National Notifiable Disease Surveillance System, the National Crime Victimization Survey, the HIV/AIDS Case Surveillance System, and the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System.38 Attachment 1 reproduces and adds to Table 2 from that report indicating the readiness of these systems to address questions of sexual orientation. Gender identity questions are not currently addressed through these systems, but a column has been added to the table to promote discussion of this issue. A model program for collection of a population-based sample of women is the 1997 Los Angeles County Health Survey. Participants reported their sexual orientation; the respondents included 4,697 women of which 4,610 were heterosexual, 51 were lesbians, and 36 were bisexual. With this sample, analysts adjusted relative risks to assess the effect of sexual orientation on important health issues.39 Defining LGBT communities. A substantial amount of work by LGBT community researchers has focused on clarifying definitional issues. Specifically, research has attempted to define what constitutes a same-sex or homosexual orientation. Although a variety of hypotheses have been proposed and studied, a general consensus has emerged 270 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health Public Health Infrastructure that same-sex sexuality may be measured in terms of three concepts: identity, behavior, and attraction/desire.40, 41 Researchers have expressed the challenge of definition as follows: “How to define and identify sexual orientations for the purpose of constructing representative samples of homosexuals, bisexuals, and heterosexuals is unclear and confusing to researchers. Different definitions and measures have been proposed and used to develop samples since the 1860s when sexual orientations first gained widespread research interest. Unfortunately, the definitions and measurement tools used since then result in the selection of divergent and incomparable samples. If advances in the understanding of sexual orientations are to be made, it is critical that definitions and measures of sexual orientation be standardized.” 42 Thus, it is important that standardization take place—particularly at the national level—to create comparable survey questions on sexual orientation and gender identity. However, it is equally important that research move forward at all levels and not wait for universal consensus, which most agree is unlikely to be achieved. Some of the more recent discussions on issues of identity for bisexual men have occurred in the context of HIV/AIDS. One researcher addresses the issue of bisexual identity versus bisexual behavior among men. Cultural differences around gender roles and norms in the A f r i c a n American and Hispanic communities may influence identity versus behaviors.4 3 I n d e e d , cultural differences in the definition of homosexuality, bisexuality, and transgender identity are likely to have an effect on the response rate and validity of questions in these areas.4 4 , 4 5 Questions about behavior are more frequently being included in surveys specifically looking at risk behavior around HIV/AIDS and other sexually transmitted diseases (STDs). The 2000 Massachusetts Adult Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System asks about same-sex activity as it attempts to measure condom use in a population-based survey of the State. Attachment 2 highlights the specific way in which respondents are asked to identify the gender of their most recent sexual partner. Researchers have conducted meta-analyses of research methods. One paper looked at the representativeness of samples of homosexuals, bisexuals, gays, and lesbians obtained for public health research. It identified journal articles cited in Medline, that were published between 1990 and 1992, that sampled individuals and classified them as homosexual, bisexual, gay, or lesbian. Information was abstracted from these articles to evaluate four components of sample selection affecting the representativeness of samples: (1) how the population is conceptually defined, (2) how the sampled population is operationally identified, (3) the setting from which samples are selected, and (4) the use of probability sampling to select subjects. 46 Race and ethnicity will affect the ability of surveys to reflect the LGBT communities accurately. In one case, members of a minority community disproportionately and Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 271 Public Health Infrastructure inaccurately selected “lesbian” when given the choice of “heterosexual,” “homosexual,” “bisexual,” and “lesbian” because it was the only choice without “sex” in it and, therefore, was assumed to be the least threatening. Many gay or bisexual Hispanic males who only engage in insertive homosexual sex do not consider themselves homosexual or bisexual; only the recipient is perceived to be homosexual. Similarly, lesbians from ethnic minority groups may not identify in the same way as lesbians generally.47 Some of this may be related to immigration and the degree of acculturation.48 With respect to the transgender community, a Native American researcher describes use of the term “two-spirit” by Native populations, which refers to a person who may exhibit some characteristics of a trangender or gay person but does not overlap precisely with either identity.49 R e c o m m e n d a t i o n s ■ Establish guidelines within the Federal Government that recommend the collection of sexual orientation and gender identity data in all Federal, State, tribal, and local surveys that routinely collect population-based information regarding health, violence, or social issues. ■ Support should be fostered for research to study how different ways of asking questions about sexual orientation, same-sex sexual behavior, attraction, and gender identity affect response rates and the validity of responses. Questions about methodology will continue to be discussed and should not be seen as a barrier to the immediate collection of data on sexual orientation and gender identity in population-based surveys. ■ Methodological studies should ensure that racial, ethnic, and geographic differences in terminology and the definitions of sexual orientation and gender identity are accounted for when measuring health status indicators in LGBT communities. ■ Demographic questions about sexual orientation and gender identity should be framed in national studies and surveys so as to provide widespread geographic and population- based information about prevalence of LGBT communities and their health status. Findings should be widely disseminated through all appropriate distribution methods, including through State, tribal, and local public health agencies. 23-17: (Developmental) Increase the proportion of Federal, tribal, State, and local public health agencies that conduct or collaborate on population-based prevention research. The purpose of this objective is to increase collaboration between Federal, tribal, State, and local public health agencies and the communities they serve. LGBT communities are stakeholders in the health of the community, and representatives should be included in all broad public health planning. Ways to increase inclusiveness include supporting LGBT research projects and ensuring that LGBT communities are active and visible participants in research studies. LGBT experts also should be involved in study sections, grant review 272 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health Public Health Infrastructure committees, advisory boards, and other groups that help determine public health data collection priorities, research, needs assessment, and information dissemination. To date, this high level of involvement has occurred only in a handful of cases. In 2000, the Office of the U.S. Surgeon General in the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) convened a cross-agency Steering Committee on Health Disparities Related to Sexual Orientation. Within DHHS, the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA) has created an advisory board on LGBT issues. The Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) routinely includes representatives from the LGBT community in planning to increase access to health care and related services for LGBT and other unserved or vulnerable populations served by its grantees. (More information is available at www.hrsa.gov and in HRSA’s strategic plan, Eliminating Health Disparities in the United States, released in December 2000 and available online at www.hrsa.gov/OMH/OMH/OMH.HTM). A handful of local health departments also have created an office or appointed an individual to coordinate gay and lesbian health issues. LGBT communities need ongoing Federal, State, and local support in organizing and mobilizing their resources to address health issues of mutual concern, including setting research agendas, identifying high-priority local health concerns, and advocating for additional health services resources. In October 2000, the National Coalition for LGBT Health was formed to serve this function at the national level. However, organizations at the State and local level need to partner both with each other and with organizations at the national level to support ongoing health improvement efforts. R e c o m m e n d a t i o n s ■ Federal, tribal, State, and local public health agencies must involve representatives from LGBT communities at all levels of decisionmaking, including soliciting input and participation of LGBT academics and other expertise in study sections, grant review committees, and advisory boards. The curriculum vitae of LGBT persons with specific areas of expertise should be provided to the organizations reviewing grant proposals and involved in other health planning and research activities. ■ LGBT researchers should be encouraged to participate in extramural research programs. C o re Wo r k f o rce and Organizational Competency To reduce and eliminate health disparities experienced by LGBT persons in the United States, public health agencies need the capacity to provide culturally competent and nondiscriminatory public health services to these populations. “Homophobia in Health Care is Unhealthy” is the central message of a campaign supported by the Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual, and Transgender Health Access Project of JRI [Justice Research Institute] Health and the Massachusetts Department of Public Health. Homophobia and heterosexism—both of which continue to exist among many individuals and institutions within the health care system—must be addressed to ensure that LGBT people have an equal opportunity to Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health 273 Public Health Infrastructure achieve optimal health status. 50, 51, 52, 53 Therefore, both individual and organizational cultural competency is required at all levels of the public health system to provide appropriate services to LGBT people. Cultural competency training, which includes competencies for health providers serving LGBT communities, should be provided in the health professions schools, as a component of continuing education and graduate medical education, and in advanced training courses and workshops. Resources for cultural competency materials, training modules, and best practices for addressing the health care needs of LGBT populations should be made available online as well as in printed materials that are widely disseminated through the national health professions organizations. The next section of this chapter focuses on three Healthy People 2010 objectives that address issues related to core workforce and organizational competency: 23-8: (Developmental) Increase the proportion of Federal, tribal, State, and local agencies that incorporate specific competencies in the essential public health services into personnel systems. 23-11: (Developmental) Increase the proportion of State and local public health agencies that meet national performance standards for essential public health services. 23-12: Increase the proportion of tribes, States, and the District of Columbia that have a health improvement plan and increase the proportion of local jurisdictions that have a health improvement plan linked with their State plan. All three of these objectives relate to the elements of true LGBT competency, which encompasses both personnel and organizational cultural competency. “Public health agency LGBT competency” means that an organization is a nondiscriminatory workplace that includes LGBT health needs in its program-specific and agency-level planning. “LGBT- competent personnel” includes direct service providers, policy and program developers, and researchers, whose ranks should include LGBT people as well as people sensitive to and skilled in understanding the needs, demographic characteristics, and behaviors of these populations. “LGBT-competent human resource policies,” such as domestic partner benefits, domestic partner and transgender options on forms, sensitivity to the needs of different kinds of families, and nondiscrimination policies help to foster a nondiscriminatory workplace. An “LGBT-competent public health plan” should assess need, ensure access, promote policies designed to address disparities, and incorporate LGBT health into existing programs and services. LGBT competency in data collection, service delivery, research, needs assessment, and program planning. Data collection can and should be a process that emphasizes sensitivity to LGBT health concerns. To collect and analyze meaningful data on this population, researchers and analysts need an understanding of the methodology of researching LGBT health and the need to ask specific questions regarding sexual orientation, behavior, and gender identity. Researchers also should recognize the importance of asking questions in a sensitive and skillful way that will elicit the most accurate response. 274 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health Public Health Infrastructure Research has shown that when studies are crafted and administered appropriately, people will disclose their sexual orientation. Inappropriately crafted and administered studies miss this information and provide invalid data. In addition, researchers need skills and understanding about racial and ethnic differences to gain a better understanding of LGBT subpopulations. Because diverse racial and cultural groups define sexuality and gender in different ways (and some of the definitions concerning sexuality and gender identity are themselves evolving and different across locales), questions about same-sex behavior and sexual orientation should be culturally specific to obtain complete and accurate information.54, 55 Positions for health care workers who will be providing direct services or working at the point of service (e.g., health centers, mental health centers, clinics) should have specific competencies incorporated into their job descriptions, especially in service areas in high demand by LGBT people. Experience with HIV counseling and testing has demonstrated that expertise in research, and understanding LGBT communities is needed to provide adequate services. Understanding and skill are needed for providers and public health workers to create a safe space for disclosure of sexual orientation and gender identity and to communicate effectively with LGBT clients. In another example, a health care worker unaware that domestic violence occurs nearly as frequently among LGBT communities as in the general population is unlikely to ask important questions, provide outreach, or recommend appropriate referrals to LGBT clients. Nursing home staff that either refuse or fail to recognize clients’ same-sex relationships cause great suffering by limiting their clients’ access to their life partners, thus eliminating an important source of support. The issue of disclosure is a critical one for providers to understand, and LGBT people are not likely to reveal their sexual orientation or gender identity to, or even seek services from, providers who are not LGBT-friendly or do not demonstrate an adequate understanding of LGBT issues. Specific skills and strategies are required to make LGBT clients comfortable enough to “come out.” Such strategies may include displaying welcoming materials, making LGBT-affirmative statements, and asking appropriate interview questions. One small study found that disclosure of sexual orientation is correlated with more frequent use of health care services.56 However, according to a 1995 study, 60 percent of young LGBT people do not disclose their sexual orientation to providers, and more than half of these young respondents explained that the reason they do not “come out” to providers is fear or embarrassment.57 Similarly, studies of gay, lesbian, and bisexual adults show that a significant percentage—and in some cases, a majority—does not disclose sexual orientation to providers.58, 59, 60 Transgender persons in particular face ignorance, hostility, and discrimination from providers unskilled in serving this population.61 Such experiences, Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health 275 A positive example of LGBT- competent program planning is evident in the Seattle-King County Department of Public H e a l t h ’s “Hep Squad,” which targets bus signs and outreach materials to diverse gay and bisexual men. It also off e r s provider training and free vaccinations for uninsured or low-income gay and bisexual m e n . Public Health Infrastructure coupled with a fear of provider hostility, lead to a low use of health services for transgender individuals.62 Planners and program developers need a comprehensive understanding of LGBT health issues to ensure that agencies carry out their missions effectively and do not unwittingly contribute to health outcome disparities. For example, in the face of widespread misunderstanding and ignorance regarding transgender individuals, residential detoxification programs that segregate clients by gender usually assign transgender people by their biological birth gender, not their gender identity. As a result, many transgender people do not seek services, while others quit detoxification programs. Healthy People 2010 recognizes the importance of conducting State and local needs assessments and developing health improvement plans that are responsive to those needs. It is critical that the health priorities of LGBT populations are reflected in needs assessments and that those needs are reflected in State and local health planning. The participation of the LGBT community in such needs assessment and research planning will help ensure that the needs assessment and research agenda are appropriate to all members of the community. Public health planning and organizational competency. An informal survey of major urban health departments across the Nation revealed that fewer than 10 had or were in the process of creating a plan, position, programs, or services to address LGBT health concerns other than HIV/AIDS. Several cities, such as Chicago and New York City, have offices of lesbian and gay health charged with ensuring that their city health departments address lesbian and gay health issues. The Boston Public Health Commission, which serves as the city’s board of health, has created a new position of LGBT health coordinator to implement a series of commission-wide policy recommendations approved by the board. (The commission’s recommendations can be found in Attachment 3). Similarly, the public health departments of San Francisco and Seattle-King County integrate LGBT health concerns into the programming and services throughout the departments. When agencies make plans to address LGBT health, such as designating a liaison or creating an office to coordinate LGBT health efforts, it is important that competency training be provided to all relevant staff within the agency so that the burden of organizational competency does not fall upon the liaison or the designated office. 276 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health An example of the successful inclusion of LGBT health needs in health improvement planning is the health and social service needs assessment conducted by John Snow, Inc., on behalf of the Board of Supervisors in C a l i f o r n i a ’s Santa Clara County. T h e recommendations from the needs assessment were presented to the Board of Supervisors, and a plan for their implementation has begun. Several city health departments—such as the District of Columbia, New Yo r k C i t y, and San Francisco—have undertaken similar needs assessments of the transgender community to ensure that the unique needs of transgender people in those localities are addressed and to generate much- needed data on the health needs of transgender individuals. Public Health Infrastructure The Massachusetts Department of Public Health funds the Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual, and Transgender (GLBT) Health Access Project, which operates out of JRI Health in Boston. Working with community partners, such as John Snow, Inc., and Fenway Community Health Center, the project trains providers on LGBT health and cultural competency issues, disseminates reports and information on LGBT health, supports research, maintains a Web site at www.glbthealth.org, and sponsors an annual meeting focusing on LGBT health and best practices. Federal agencies like HRSA have focused their efforts on capacity-building by establishing lesbian and gay health advisory committees that make recommendations regarding LGBT health, access, and research issues. Most recently, HRSA created a new position within the Office of the Administrator to serve as a liaison to the LGBT community and other DHHS agencies. Other agencies in DHHS also have designated an LGBT liaison to coordinate information within each agency. S t a n d a rds of practice. A 1997 report by the GLBT Health Access Project identified the need for community standards of care because of the proven lack of LGBT awareness and understanding on the part of providers as well as the poor communication, discrimination, and barriers to care often reported by LGBT individuals. Working from the premise that LGBT people seek health care and prevention services in every community throughout Massachusetts, the project worked with consumers and advocates to develop Community Standards of Practice for the Provision of Quality Health Care Service for Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual, and Transgendered Clients. The standards (see figure 5, page 45) address a wide range of concerns, including personnel, clients’ rights, intake and assessment, service planning and delivery, confidentiality, community outreach, and health promotion. The Harry Benjamin International Gender Dysphoria Association, an international body of professionals who care for transsexual patients, developed standards of care for providers working in this field. Only 9 out of 19 European and North American clinics responding to a recent survey reported that they completely follow these standards.63 Although there is some disagreement about certain aspects of these standards, the fact that fewer than half of surveyed clinics reported following these standards points to possible gaps in care for transsexual patients. It is also important to note that some practices commonly used in various health disciplines may be culturally incompetent—or even harmful—for LGBT individuals. For example, it has been argued that reparative therapy to alter a young person’s sexual orientation and gender expression may constitute child abuse,6 4 which raises serious questions about the appropriateness of reparative therapy under standards of mental health care for LGBT p e o p l e . Promising approaches to LGBT-competent service delivery. The San Francisco Public Health Department developed a gay health specialist waiver process for positions determined as requiring this cultural competency. Similar waivers used by the department include an African American health specialist and various bilingual waiver requirements. The waiver program is administered by the department’s Equal Employment/Affirmative Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 277 Public Health Infrastructure Action and Cultural Competency Office and must be approved by the lesbian/gay health services coordinator. The waiver requires 500 hours or more of service to lesbian and gay clients and an accredited course in human sexuality that focuses on lesbian and gay life. The department also offers periodic training to assist employees in meeting the waiver requirements. In addition, San Francisco requires all contractors that provide direct services to clients to “demonstrate their ability to provide culturally competent and nondiscriminatory services,” including competency in serving the sexual population to be served under the contract. The department is currently incorporating new standards of care for services to LGBT clients into existing cultural competency and nondiscrimination contract requirements. (See Attachment 4.) The Mary-Helen Mautner Project for Lesbians with Cancer, a nonprofit organization based in the District of Columbia, offers an array of services and programs aimed at both cancer prevention and the specific issues faced by lesbians with cancer. Services offered include education, smoking cessation, support groups, referrals to lesbian-competent caregivers, and assignment of volunteers to assist lesbians and their families. The Mautner Project strengthens provider and organizational competency and removes access barriers to care through a special project designed to enhance the skills of health care providers and to promote organizational change through training and technical assistance. The Mautner Project also participates in research on lesbians and cancer and advocates for legislation that affects women’s health. R e c o m m e n d a t i o n s ■ DHHS should develop an office of LGBT health to provide overarching guidance and planning on LGBT health policy. ■ DHHS should support further study of effective models of building institutional and specific personnel LGBT competency, including support for agencies working together across local and regional boundaries to develop effective models and to share knowledge and best practices. For example, the Massachusetts Department of Public Health supported the May 2000 Boston meeting of urban health officials addressing LGBT health. ■ DHHS should encourage State, tribal, and local health agencies to implement standards of care for LGBT health consumers. The standards should be developed by a panel of experts that also includes appropriate stakeholders representing the diversity within LGBT populations. ■ The Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) should support research designed to improve the outcomes and quality of health care and broaden access to effective services for LGBT health care consumers. ■ Public health agencies should develop appropriate policies, procedures, and requirements for contractors to ensure that services and products purchased are organized and delivered in a nondiscriminatory manner. 278 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health Public Health Infrastructure ■ Accrediting organizations such as the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations and the National Committee for Quality Assurance, along with such entities as Federal agencies involved in the delivery of publicly funded health care and related services (HRSA, SAMHSA, the Health Care Financing Administration, the Administration for Children and Families, and the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development), the American Public Health Association, and the National Association of County and City Health Officials should collaborate to develop cultural competency standards for organizational and personnel competencies that may be adopted by State, local, and tribal health agencies nationwide. ■ The National Institute of Mental Health (part of the National Institutes of Health), the Center for Mental Health Services (part of SAMHSA), and AHRQ should fund research into standards and best practices of mental health care for LGBT people, including research on the impact of reparative therapy. SAMHSA with HRSA should review the need for developing a collaborative mental wellness initiative that includes all populations in disparity. ■ Technical assistance in grant writing should be made available to all interested applicants. Such assistance could be made available through the Internet, the use of tutorials on CD-ROM, and other workshops organized at the regional level. ■ All legally prohibited discrimination should include discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity. ■ State agencies charged with the regulation and oversight of nursing homes and long- term care facilities should develop and enforce compliance with standards of care for LGBT clients, including policies that recognize and affirm same-sex partners. ■ Federal agencies providing publicly funded services to unserved populations and conducting data surveillance activities should communicate regularly with the field and Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 279 As part of a Macy Foundation initiative on physician communication, the University of Massachusetts Worcester Medical School is training physicians in how to communicate more eff e c t i v e l y about sexuality and sexual orientation. The school is developing a curriculum to incorporate the teaching of appropriate care for L G B T people and their families into the education of physicians, pediatricians, psychiatrists, family practitioners, and obstetricians/gynecologists. T h e Massachusetts Medical Society—in conjunction with the Massachusetts Department of Public Health, the G L B T Health Access Project, Beth- Israel Deaconess Medical Center, and the Fenway Community Health Center—is engaged in an initiative to raise awareness of LGBT h e a l t h issues among practicing clinicians in Massachusetts, including working with the deans of local schools of medicine and developing a curriculum for the State to use in ongoing provider training. In addition, Kaiser Permanente’s National Diversity Council has recently published a handbook on culturally competent care for LGBT Public Health Infrastructure regional offices regarding cultural competencies for all populations in disparity in access to needed services. For example, the agencies could disseminate an article on the importance and availability of LGBT competencies and guidelines, along with resources for additional information, technical assistance, and implementation strategies. 23-9: (Developmental) Increase the proportion of schools for public health workers that integrate into their curricula specific content to develop competency in the essential public health services. Training and education for health workers of all kinds—including nurses, physicians, dentists, paramedics, emergency medical technicians, and other allied health workers— should incorporate cultural competency training as part of the curricula. Few health professions programs currently devote a significant amount of attention to cultural competency. The provision of culturally competent care can make the difference in whether people in need seek out services; whether individuals receive the appropriate screening, preventive, and primary care services; and for many, such as transgender individuals in particular, whether services are received at all. In one study of gay and bisexual young men, their ability to “discuss same-sex feelings or experiences with a physician or counselor” was a significant predictor of whether they had undergone HIV testing.65 A study of lesbians demonstrated that women who reported that their health care providers were more knowledgeable and sensitive to lesbian issues were significantly more likely to have had a Pap test in the last year.66 Another study reported that transgender people avoid mental health care for depression because they expect that mental health providers will assume that gender identity is the primary cause of their depression.67 For reasons such as these, the American Medical Association’s Council on Scientific Affairs recommended that the “physician’s nonjudgmental recognition of sexual orientation and behavior enhances his or her ability to render optimal patient care in health as well as illness.”68 Without specific training, health providers of all disciplines often fail to provide needed services, whether deliberately because of discomfort with their patient’s sexual orientation or unintentionally because of a lack of knowledge. One survey found that 40 percent of physicians “sometimes” or “often” are uncomfortable caring for lesbian and gay patients.69 As a result of widespread provider ignorance and discrimination against transgender individuals,70 many transgender men and women are medically and psychologically “chronically underserved.”71 In a Gay and Lesbian Medical Association study, 67 percent of the respondents reported witnessing gay and lesbian patients receiving substandard care because of their sexuality.72 Mental health providers in a random-sample Virginia survey were aware that they served lesbians in their practices, but reported little or no training in what special needs lesbians might have.73 LGBT individuals also report experiencing discrimination in paramedical and auxiliary care settings, such as nursing homes, domestic violence centers, and senior centers.74 280 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health Public Health Infrastructure Half of the respondents in one survey of medical school departments of family medicine said that they did not include LGBT health at all in their curricula. For those departments that covered the topic, they spent an average of only 2.5 hours of the entire 4-year education focused on lesbian, gay, and bisexual issues. Several studies show that when cultural sensitivity training is included in provider curricula, it can help reduce negative bias toward other groups, including lesbians. 75 Other research suggests that additional studies on effective models of incorporating LGBT competency into the medical curriculum are needed.76 Education and training about LGBT health and homophobia are needed in graduate programs in mental health.77 Research on the services impact of LGBT competency in public health graduate education programs is needed. R e c o m m e n d a t i o n s ■ The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention should fund the Association of Schools of Public Health to develop model curricula for public health students. CDC also should fund demonstrations and evaluations of LGBT-competent curricula. ■ Accreditation bodies such as the Liaison Committee on Medical Education, the National Library of Medicine, and the Council on Education of Public Health should issue recommendations that address LGBT competency. They also should conduct surveys of schools of public health, nursing, and medicine, as well as emergency medical technician training programs, to determine which include LGBT competency in their curricula and to highlight case studies for dissemination throughout the medical field. Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health 281 Centers for research on sexuality, gender i d e n t i t y, and health have opened at several universities. They are working to address critical research needs and to offer opportunities for graduate students and faculty to increase their knowledge of LGBT health issues and develop L G B T-competent research skills. The Center for Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Tr a n s g e n d e r Health and the Lesbian Health Research Institute at Columbia University’s Joseph L. Mailman School of Public Health were created to “assure equal access to comprehensive, culturally competent, quality health care for all regardless of sexual orientation or gender identity/expression.” In addition to supporting research and evaluation activities focusing on L G B T health, the center offers education and training opportunities and health care services. It also provides vital policy and advocacy work, including playing a critical role in the formation of the National Coalition for Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health. Public Health Infrastructure 23-10: (Developmental) Increase the proportion of Federal, tribal, State, and local public health agencies that provide continuing education to develop competency in essential public health services for their employees. In a study of physicians participating in the Mary-Helen Mautner Project for Lesbians With Cancer to train providers serving lesbians with cancer, half of respondents assumed they served lesbians, but did not see a need to address this fact directly in their care. These same providers expressed an interest in learning more about the needs of lesbians and asserted that they would make changes if they knew what to do.78 The Gay and Lesbian Youth Support Project ( G LYS), funded by the Massachusetts Department of Public Health, is a program based in Brockton, Massachusetts, to educate providers that serve G L B T youth. An evaluation of this program, conducted by JSI, Inc., revealed that individual respondents to pretests and posttests improved their scores significantly for knowledge, attitudes, and beliefs regarding LGBT people. To a lesser degree, posttests also revealed positive behavior c h a n g e .7 9 This evidence suggests that training providers can make a difference in provider attitudes and behaviors. However, the one knowledge item on the evaluation that did not show significant improvement in its score was knowledge about transgender individuals. At least one study suggests that there may be additional barriers for individuals to learn about transgender issues than about lesbian, gay, and bisexual issues.80 Because the need for competent transgender care is so acute, developing effective means of developing transgender competency and standards of care should be a top priority. Assuring that the current public health workforce possesses the competencies necessary to provide appropriate services to all populations in need, including LGBT people, is part of having an effective national public health infrastructure. It is also a critical step toward meeting the Healthy People 2010 overarching goal of eliminating health disparities, also an overarching goal of the Health Resources and Services Administration. Continuing education is an important method of increasing competency in the public and private health care workforce. Evidence suggests that LGBT competency training can be effective in changing the knowledge and behavior of individual providers in different health settings.81 Further research is needed to determine the effect of such training on institutional change. Competency training should always incorporate an understanding of the diversity within LGBT communities. For example, provider training on health issues for lesbians and bisexual women may help caregivers create an environment in which clients feel safe to 282 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health The Seattle-King County Department of Public Health developed a special campaign to promote Pap testing for lesbians called “Lesbian Health Matters.” The initiative is based on data that show that human papillomavirus can be sexually transmitted between women. It also supports a major public information campaign and offers training for health care providers on how to serve lesbians eff e c t i v e l y. Public Health Infrastructure disclose sexual orientation. Research suggests that African American lesbians are more likely to have more extensive heterosexual experience than White lesbians.82 If cultural competency training does not help providers understand this difference, a gynecologist might not ask an African American lesbian about heterosexual intercourse, thus missing critical health information. R e c o m m e n d a t i o n s ■ DHHS should ensure that cultural sensitivity training is provided to all health care providers receiving Federal funds. Special attention should be given to identifying and evaluating studies that examine the effectiveness of training programs designed to promote transgender competencies, eliminate discrimination, and improve organizational competencies. Efforts to partner with the private sector and managed care plans should be an important part of this initiative. ■ Existing cultural competency training modules should be reviewed by the Federal agencies, and a menu of appropriate technical assistance resources and training models should be made available to all publicly funded services programs, health departments, and health professionals to ensure that culturally competent care is provided for LGBT clients. ■ Additional efforts are needed to increase the number of public health agencies that integrate LGBT-focused core competencies into orientation and inservice training. ■ DHHS should provide incentives to increase the number of Federal, State, and local health departments that support community-based agencies providing LGBT competency training to the public health workforce. The Law and Public Health The law and its ability to safeguard and improve the health of LGBT people is a fundamental aspect of the public health infrastructure. However, this area is seldom addressed in public health discussions. This is relevant when the health disparities experienced by LGBT people are the result of a lack of action or due to the attitudes and behaviors of people charged with serving high-risk populations in need of services through publicly funded programs. In most cases, discrimination or actions that negatively affect an individual’s access to needed publicly funded services are prohibited by law. In most contexts, racial and ethnic populations, as well as people with disabilities, are protected by Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 283 The Massachusetts Department of Public Health funds several programs that provide ongoing training in reducing heterosexism and homophobia and appropriately serving LGBT clients. The GLBT Health A c c e s s Project of JRI Health worked with other agencies to develop and distribute standards of care for L G B T clients. (See A t t a c h m e n t 3.) Working with the Fenway Community Health Center, the Health Access Project also provides training for staff of the Massachusetts Department of Public Health as well as for health and human service agencies Statewide. Public Health Infrastructure law from discriminatory treatment, but people whose sexual orientation or gender identity is not heterosexual are not. This section of the Companion Document focuses on the one Healthy People 2010 objective that broadly addresses laws and regulations. The objective is viewed as a building block for achieving a public health infrastructure that serves all eligible recipients and works to achieve the Healthy People 2010 goal to eliminate disparities in access to care. 23-15: (Developmental) Increase the proportion of Federal, tribal, State, and local jurisdictions that review and evaluate the extent to which their statutes, ordinances, and bylaws assure the delivery of essential public health services. For LGBT populations, the legislative mechanisms mentioned in the objective have less to do with statutes that govern the agency’s actions and more to do with having the agencies look at any lack of antidiscrimination laws that negatively affects their ability to provide needed, appropriate services to eligible populations. Given that LGBT people are not, in most cases, among the populations defined in antidiscrimination laws, the effect of that omission on the health status of LGBT communities is an important concern that requires attention and further discussion. Public and private health agencies and organizations should assume a supportive role in calling for statutes and local regulations that will positively affect the health and social welfare of all persons receiving health care and related services. In short, public health agencies should work with the private sector to eliminate the adverse health effects of discrimination. Many examples of a lack of legislation, statutes, or local ordinances that negatively affect the health and welfare of people exist. In 39 States it is still legal to fire a person because of his or her sexual orientation or gender identity.83 Likewise, anti-LGBT discrimination in housing, public accommodations, or credit is still within the bounds of the law in 39 States. The absence of civil rights legislation means that LGBT people have no protection in more than three-quarters of the States. Sodomy laws are enforceable in 18 States.84 In many instances, the Supreme Court’s 1986 decision in Bowers v. Hardwick, which upheld the Georgia statute criminalizing sodomy, has been used to withhold civil rights from gay men and lesbians.85 The lack of consistent legal recognition for same-sex partners results in reduced access to insurance and other health-related benefits as well as negative treatment in health care settings, such as when providers fail to treat same-sex relationships in the same manner as marriages or long-term heterosexual relationships.86 Discrimination against transgender people is widespread. Although “homosexuality” was removed from the catalog of mental disorders by the American Psychiatric Association in 1973, “Gender Identity Disorder” remains. Although the association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition, asserts that transgender identity itself is not a disorder, the listing may be stigmatizing and has been used to justify discriminatory treatment. 284 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health Public Health Infrastructure Laws that do not prohibit stigmatizing people but allow discrimination against groups of people perpetuate a stressful and negative health care environment for LGBT persons. The experience of another form of discrimination, specifically racial discrimination, has been correlated with high blood pressure related to the stress response to discrimination. The same result would be expected to be true for other stigmatized groups experiencing discrimination, such as LGBT people. In addition, this research suggests that LGBT people who also are people of color face racism in addition to homophobia and are at greater risk for adverse health effects associated with discrimination.87 In another study, African American lesbians and bisexual women reported higher levels of depressive distress than African American gay and bisexual men, except for those with HIV infection.88 The authors of the study also inferred that carrying multiple lower social statuses increases the risk for depression caused by stress. Psychoneuroimmunologic research suggests that the psychological stress of not “coming out” suppresses the immune system and may lead to an increased risk for melanoma or other cancers among gay men and lesbians who do not disclose their sexual orientation. 89 By sending the message that LGBT people are not treated as full and equal citizens, laws that do not prohibit discrimination also foster a climate in which homophobia and anti- LGBT hate can flourish—potentially leading to violent hate crimes. Lesbians and gay men are among the most frequent victims of hate crimes.90 Transgender people, however, are particularly at risk for hate crime violence. The Washington Transgender Needs Assessment Survey showed that 13.5 percent of respondents had been victims of sexual assault.91 In Seattle, 85 percent of high school respondents to the Youth Risk Behavior Survey reported that they had been a target of offensive comments or attacks because of their actual or perceived sexual orientation. 92 Arguably, the most important piece of legislation—whether Federal, State, local, or tribal— is the funding received for programs. The funding received is based on a budget request, and not all budget requests are fully funded. The funding or financing received is allocated to programs or initiatives described in the budget proposal, and so the funding amount largely determines what programs or services are implemented or funded. Public health agencies can strengthen their capacity to deliver services or create initiatives to improve the health of LGBT people in their jurisdictions by becoming more actively involved in the process to develop the next budget proposal. In addition to funding legislation, supporting both antidiscriminatory and civil rights legislation can affect the ability of public health agencies to carry out the delivery of needed services to eligible population—an essential public health service. Discrimination also creates barriers to gathering health data, as LGBT persons may fear adverse consequences if they answer questions honestly, a similar fear of immigrants in the United States who lack legal status. For example, the U.S. military’s “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy institutionalizes nondisclosure of sexual orientation, which then can lead to inadequate health care and negative health outcomes for LGBT people. For these reasons, legislation that prohibits LGBT-affirming health education or restricts services to LGBT Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health 285 Public Health Infrastructure people—such as the 1987 Helms Amendment, which barred funding any public health or educational materials that “promote or encourage, directly or indirectly, homosexual sexual activities”—should be opposed.93 Barriers to disclosure affect access to needed health and related services as well as the quality of care received. For example, LGBT parents may be afraid to disclose their sexual orientation or gender identity for fear of losing custody of their children. As a result, both parents and children may receive inadequate and inappropriate care. They also may endure added stress as a result of fear of the family unit being fragmented. This stress and family instability is not in the best interests of any family member. Laws barring LGBT people from serving as foster and adoptive parents mean that, in many cases, LGBT youth are placed in inappropriate foster care, possibly putting them at greater risk for adverse health conditions. State laws and court rulings allowing LGBT people to become adoptive or foster parents have a protective function for LGBT families and also for foster and adoptive LGBT youth who need appropriate parenting. In addition, laws and insurance regulations that require parental consent or notification for minors to access care have a chilling effect on LGBT youth seeking LGBT-focused services. Such regulations effectively limit access to needed and culturally appropriate care for LGBT youth. R e c o m m e n d a t i o n s ■ DHHS with other Federal departments and agencies (e.g., U.S. Department of Education, U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, U.S. Department of Labor) should collaborate to determine how best to eliminate the effects of discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity. ■ DHHS should direct its operating divisions and staff offices to review their policies, procedures, and practices to ensure that publicly funded services are being provided in a nondiscriminatory and culturally competent manner. ■ Public health agencies at the State and local levels should review policies, procedures, and practices to ensure that publicly funded services for which they are accountable are being provided in a nondiscriminatory and culturally competent manner. ■ The DHHS Office of Civil Rights should increase its efforts to enforce nondiscrimination protections, including meeting the requirements of the Americans with Disabilities Act. ■ DHHS should review existing research and support new studies on the effect of legislation failing to prohibit discrimination on public health outcomes. 286 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health The City and County of San Francisco adopted a law prohibiting discrimination based on gender identity. The San Francisco Human Rights Commission created Compliance Guidelines to Prohibit Gender Identity Discrimination. Public Health Infrastructure ■ Federal, State, tribal, and local health departments should adopt domestic partner benefits policies for employees and promote such policies on a wider basis as an access- to-care issue. ■ Health agencies should incorporate guidelines to ensure equal consideration of same-sex partners of clients receiving treatment in all health care settings as part of their standards of care for LGBT people. R e f e re n c e s 1 Institute of Medicine (IOM), Committee for the Study of the Future of Public Health. The Future of Public Health. Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1988. 2 IOM Committee for the Study of the Future of Public Health, 1988. 3 Harrell, J.A., and Baker, E.L. The essential services of public health. Leadership in Public Health 3(3):27-31, 1994. 4 IOM Committee for the Study of the Future of Public Health, 1988. 5 Harrell and Baker, 1994. 6 IOM Committee for the Study of the Future of Public Health, 1988. 7 Baker, E.L.; Melton, R.J.; Stange, P.V.; et al. Health reform and the health of the public: Forging community health partnerships. Journal of the American Medical Association 272(16):1276-1282, 1994. 8 Ryan, C., and Futterman, D. Lesbian and Gay Youth: Care and Counseling. New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1998. 9 Elliott, P. Sheltering illusions: Same sex domestic violence. Journal of Gay and Lesbian Social Services 4(1):1-8, 1996. 10 Hamberger, L.K. Interventions in gay male intimate violence requires coordinated efforts on multiple levels. Journal of Gay and Lesbian Social Services 4(1):83-91, 1996. 11 Stowers, G.N.L. A different model: Alternative service delivery for today’s diverse communities. Journal of Health and Human Services Administration 22(2):174-195, 1999. 12 Harris, M.B.; Nightengale, J.; and Owen, N. Health care professionals’ experience, knowledge, and attitudes concerning homosexuality. Journal of Gay and Lesbian Social Services 2(2):91-107, 1995. 13 Public Health Service (PHS). The Public Health Workforce: An Agenda for the 21st Century. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 1997. 14 Office of Management and Budget. 1998 Standard Occupational Classification. Federal Register 64(101):53136-53163, September 30, 1999. 15 National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS). Healthy People 2000 Review, 1998–99. Hyattsville, MD: NCHS, 1999. 16 Gochros, H.L., and Bidwell, R. Lesbian and gay youth in a straight world: Implications for health care workers. Journal of Gay and Lesbian Social Services 5(1):1-17, 1996. 17 American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees (AFSCME). Managed Care, Community- Based Strategies for Improving Quality. Washington, DC: AFSCME, 1994. 18 Gochros and Bidwell, 1996. Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 287 Public Health Infrastructure 19 Solarz, A.L., Institute of Medicine, ed. Lesbian Health: Current Assessment and Directions for the Future. Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1999. 20 Dean, L., et al. Lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender health: findings and concerns. Journal of the Gay and Lesbian Medical Association 4(3):101-151, 2000. 21 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. HIV/AIDS among racial/ethnic minority men who have sex with men—United States, 1989-1998. Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report 49(1):4-11, 2000. 22 Cochran, S., and Mays, V. Disclosure of sexual preference to physicians by black lesbian and bisexual women. Western Journal of Medicine 149:616-619, 1988. 23 Dean et al., 2000. 24 Clements, K.; Wilkinson, W.; Kitano, K.; and Marx, R. HIV prevention and health service needs of the transgender community in San Francisco. International Journal of Transgenderism 3(1,2), 1999. 25 Turner, C.F.; Danella, R.D.; and Rogers, S.M. Sexual behavior in the United States, 1930-1990: Trends and methodological problems. Sexually Transmitted Diseases, May-Jun 1995, 173-190. 26 Silvestre, A. Gay male, lesbian, and bisexual health-related research funded by the National Institutes of Health between 1974 and 1992. Journal of Homosexuality 37(1):81-94, 1999. 27 Bradford, J.; Honhold, J.A.; and Ryan, C. Disclosure of sexual orientation in survey research on women. Journal of the Gay and Lesbian Medical Association 1(3):169-177, 1997. 28 Goodenow, C. Massachusetts Department of Education. Private communication. 29 Kafadar, K., and Karon, J.M. An analysis of AIDS incidence data by clustering trends. Statistics in Medicine 12:311-326, 1993. 30 Karon, J.M., and Berkelman, R.L. The geographic and ethnic diversity of AIDS incidence trends in homosexual/bisexual men in the United States. Journal of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndromes 4:1179- 1189, 1991. 31 Mills, T.; Paul, J.; Binson, D.; et al. A method for taking a household-based probability sample of men who have sex with men (MSMs) in major American cities. Presented at the 12th International AIDS Conference, Geneva, Switzerland. June 30, 1998. Poster Number 24172. 32 Stall, R.; Greenwood, G.L.; Acree, P.J.; and Coate, T.J. Cigarette smoking among gay and bisexual men. American Journal of Public Health 89(12):1875-1878, 1999. 33 Clements, K. The Transgender Community Health Project: Descriptive Results. San Francisco Department of Public Health. Unpublished report. 1999. 34 Xavier, J.M. Final Report of the Washington Transgender Needs Assessment Survey. Administration for HIV and AIDS of the District of Columbia, 2000. 35 Skinner, W.F., and Otis, M.D. Drug and alcohol use among lesbian and gay people in a southern U.S. sample: Epidemiologic, comparative, and methodological findings from the Trilogy Project. Journal of Homosexuality 30:59-92, 1996. 36 New voting bloc on the block, part 2. The Gay and Lesbian Review. Fall 2000, 17-20. 37 Michael, R.; Gagnon, J.; Laumann, E.; and Kolata, G. Sex in America: A Definitive Study. New York, NY: Little, Brown and Company. 1994. 38 Sell, R.L., and Bradford, J. Elimination of health disparities based upon sexual orientation: Inclusion of sexual orientation as a demographic variable in Healthy People 2010 objectives. Unpublished paper, 2000. 288 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health Public Health Infrastructure 39 Diamant, A.L.; Wold, C.; Spritzer, K.; and Gelberg, L. Health behaviors, health status, and access to and use of health care: A population-based study of lesbian, bisexual and heterosexual women. Submitted for publication. 40 Laumann, E.O., et al. The social organization of sexuality. Sexual Practices in the United States. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1994. 41 Rankow, E.G. Sexual identity vs. sexual behavior. American Journal of Public Health 86(12):1822-1823, 1996. 42 Sell, R.L. Defining and measuring sexual orientation: A review. Archives of Sexual Behavior 26:643-658, 1997. 43 Doll, L.S., and Baker, C. Male bisexual behavior and HIV risk in the United States: Synthesis of research with implications for behavioral interventions. AIDS Education and Prevention 8:205-225, 1996. 44 Gonsiorek, J.C., and Weinrich, J.D. The definition and scope of sexual orientation. In: Gonsiorek, J.C., and Weinrich, J.D., eds. Homosexuality: Research Implications for Public Policy . Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, 1991. 45 Gonsiorek, J.D.; Sell, R.L.; and Weinrich, J.D. Definition and measurement of sexual orientation. Suicide and Life-Threatening Behavior 25(Suppl):40-51, 1995. 46 Sell, R.L., and Petrulio, C. Sampling homosexuals, bisexuals, gays, and lesbians for public health research: A review of the literature from 1990 to 1992. Journal of Homosexuality 30:31-47, 1996. 47 Liu, P, and Chan, C.S. Lesbian, gay and bisexual Asian people and their families. In: Laird, J., and Green, R.J., eds. Lesbians and Gays in Couples and Families: A Handbook for Therapists. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 1996. 48 Green, B. African American lesbians: Triple jeopardy. In: Brown-Collins, A. ed. The Psychology of African American Women. New York, NY: Guilford Press, 1996. 49 Tafoya, T. Presentation at the 5 th Annual New England Transgender Health Conference. Boston, MA, 2000. 50 Schatz, B., and O’Hanlan, K. Anti-Gay Discrimination in Medicine: Results of a National Survey of Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual Physicians. San Francisco, CA: American Assocation of Physicians for Human Rights/Gay and Lesbian Medical Assocation, 1994. 51 Wolfe, D. Men Like Us: The GMHC Complete Guide to Gay Men’s Sexual, Physical, and Emotional Well- Being. New York, NY: Ballantine Books, 2000. 52 Mathews, W.C.; Booth, M.W.; Turner, J.D.; et al. Physicians’ attitudes toward homosexuality: Survey of a California county medical society. Western Journal of Medicine 144:106, 1986. 53 Dean et al., 2000. 54 Mays, V.M., and Jackson, J.S. AIDS survey methodology with Black Americans. Social Science and Medicine 33(1):47-54, 1991. 55 Solarz, 1999. 56 White, J.C., and Dull, V.T. Health risk factors and health seeking behavior in lesbians. Journal of Women’s Health 6(1):103-112, 1997. 57 The Medical Foundation. Health Concerns of the Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual, and Transgender Community. Second Edition. 1997. 58 Robertson, A.E. The mental health experiences of gay men: A research study exploring gay men ’s health needs. Journal of Psychiatric and Mental Health Nursing 5:33-40, 1998. Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 289 Public Health Infrastructure 59 White and Dull, 1997. 60 Cochran and Mays, 1988. 61 Dean et al., 2000. 62 Clements, 1999. 63 Dean et al., 2000. 64 Hicks, K. Reparative therapy: Whether parental attempts to change a child’s sexual orientation can legally constitute child abuse. American University Law Review 49(2):505-547, 1999. 65 Povinelli, M.; Ramafedi, G.; and Tao, G. Trends and predictors of human immunodeficiency virus antibody testing by homosexual and bisexual adolescent males, 1989-1994. Archives of Pediatric and Adolescent Medicine 50:33-38, 1996. 66 Rankow, E., and Tessaro, I. Cervical cancer risk and Papanicolaou screening in a sample of lesbian and bisexual women. Journal of Family Practice 47(2):139-143, 1998. 67 Israel, G.E., and Tarver, D.E. Transgender Care: Recommended Guidelines, Practical Information, and Personal Accounts. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1997. 68 Council on Scientific Affairs, American Medical Association. Health care needs of gay men and lesbians in the United States. Journal of the American Medical Association 275(17):1354-1359, 1996. 69 Mathews, Booth, Turner, et al., 1986. 70 Dean et al., 2000. 71 Clements, 1999. 72 Schatz and O’Hanlan, 1994. 73 Ryan, C.C.; Bradford, J.B.; and Honhold, J.A. Social workers’ and counselors’ understanding of lesbians. Journal of Gay and Lesbian Social Services 9(4):1-26, 1999. 74 Wolfe, 2000. 75 Solarz, 1999. 76 Muller, M.J., and White, M.D. Medical student attitudes toward homosexuality: Evaluation of a second-year curriculum. Journal of the Gay and Lesbian Medical Association 1(3):155-159, 1997. 77 Murphy, B.C. Educating mental health professionals about gay and lesbian issues. Journal of Homosexuality 22(3-4):229-246, 1992. 78 Bradford, J., and Dye, L. Physicians readiness for providing cancer screening to lesbians. Unpublished manuscript. 79 John Snow, Inc. Evaluation of the Gay and Lesbian Youth Support Project. Unpublished report. 1999. 80 John Snow, Inc., and the GLBT Health Access Project. Access to health care for transgendered persons in Greater Boston. July 2000. 81 John Snow, Inc., 1999. 82 Cochran and Mays, 1988. 83 National Gay and Lesbian Task Force. 1999 Capital Gains and Losses. 1999. 84 Ibid. 290 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health Public Health Infrastructure 85 Hicks, 1999. 86 Dean et al., 2000. 87 Solarz, 1999. 88 Cochran, S.D., and Mays, V.M. Depressive distress among homosexually active African American men and women. American Journal of Psychiatry 151:524-529, 1994. 89 Cole, S.W.; Kemeny, M.E.; Taylor, S.E.; Wisscher, B.R. Elevated physical health risk among gay men who conceal their homosexual identity. Health Psychology 15:243-251, 1996. 90 Finn, P., and McNeil, T. The Response of the Criminal Justice System to Bias Crime. Cambridge, MA: Abt Associates, 1987. 91 Xavier, 2000. 92 Safe Schools Coalition of Washington. Eighty-three thousand youth: selected findings of eight population- based studies. 1999. 93 Andriote, J.M. Victory Deferred. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1999. Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 291 Public Health Infrastructure 292 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health Attachment 1 Public Health Infrastructure Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 293 The following questions were included in the 2000 Massachusetts Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance Survey: SEXUAL BEHAVIOR SERIES (to be asked of all 18-64 year olds) The next questions are about your sexual behavior. By sex we mean oral, vaginal, or anal sex, but NOT masturbation. When we talk about condoms, we mean both male as well as female condoms. 1. During the past 12 months, have you had sex? Yes [1] No [2]SKIP to END Refused [9]SKIP to END 2. During the past 12 months, with how many people have you had sex? Number [...] Don’t know / Not sure [enter 777] Refused [enter 999] 3. During the past 12 months, have you had sex with only males, only females, or with both males and females? Only males [1] Only females [2] Both males and females [3] Refused [9] SKIP to END 4. Now, thinking back about the last time you had sex, did you or your partner use a condom? Yes [1] SKIP to END No [2] SKIP to 5 Refused [9] SKIP to END 5. The last time you had sex, was your partner male or female? Male [1] If male respondent SKIP to 6, if female respondent SKIP to 7 Female [2] If female respondent SKIP to END, if male respondent SKIP to 7 Refused [9] SKIP to END Attachment 2 Public Health Infrastructure 294 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health Attachment 3 RECOMMENDATIONS APPROVED BY THE BOARD OF THE BOSTON PUBLIC HEALTH COMMISSION Health of Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual and Transgender (GLBT) Residents Presented by the Public Health Advisory Committee as part of its ongoing efforts to improve service to underserved populations. 1. Increase the health data collection and analysis of GLBT residents - In reviewing the available reports and hearing from the community, we observed that there is relatively little information collected on the health of GLBT residents. GLBT status is rarely collected and when it exists it is often not included in reports (with AIDS as the notable exception). The Commission should review existing studies and literature on GLBT health, explore ways to collect health data information on GLBT residents, include such information in regular, standard reports and publish a GLBT special report once sufficient information is collected. 2. Investigate possible organizational responses to GLBT health and begin an alliance with other large city health departments that are also addressing this issue - The Commission should convene a national meeting with other large urban health departments regarding the approaches they have taken to address GLBT health. The experiences of these other departments should be summarized and shared with the Advisory Committee and the Commission Board, for possible replication in Boston. 3. Designate a person/s to represent the Commission internally and externally - The Commission should have at least one staff person whose job includes overseeing the degree to which GLBT issues are adequately addressed throughout the organization. This person will oversee the implementation of these recommendations. In addition, a person should be assigned to pay particular ongoing attention/serve as a liaison with the GLBT community. 4. Conduct an internal assessment and create a strategic plan for how the Commission can better serve GLBT people in its own programs and services. Write a policy statement articulating the Commission’s commitment to the health needs of diverse GLBT residents. Among other efforts, the Commission can support internal training to ensure that all program staff is aware of and sensitive to the needs of GLBT clients. 5. Include awareness of GLBT health issues in promotion of cultural competency. Support outreach to and external training of providers in hospitals, community health centers, mental health, and other settings. 6. Speak out on GLBT health issues on an ongoing basis - The Commission should become more vocal in addressing health issues as they affect the GLBT communities, in partnership with the Mayor’s Office, and the Mayor’s advocacy. This would include condemning GLBT violence, advocating for appropriate care in medical settings, and supporting specific services where the community is underserved. 7. Highlight and promote the importance of Mayor Menino’s domestic partner health insurance benefits policy as it affects the health of LGBT Bostonians and their families. 8. Seek funding for GLBT prevention and services activities - The Commission should make an effort to seek funding to support prevention and services activities from a variety of sources, both public and private. Whenever possible, these should be sought in collaboration with community partners. Public Health Infrastructure Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 295 Attachment 4 City and County of San Francisco Department of Public Health Public Health Infrastructure 296 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health Attachment 4 City and County of San Francisco Department of Public Health Public Health Infrastructure Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health 297 Attachment 4 City and County of San Francisco Department of Public Health 298 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health Sexually Tr a n s m i t t e d Diseases (Infections) Healthy People 2010 Goal Promote responsible sexual behaviors, strengthen community capacity, and increase access to quality services to prevent sexually transmitted diseases and their complications. O v e rv i e w This chapter discusses the issues and trends surrounding sexually transmitted diseases (STDs) on a national level and specific to lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) populations. STDs are common, costly, and preventable. More than 65 million people are currently living with an incurable STD. An additional 15 million people become infected with one or more STDs each year, roughly half of whom contract lifelong infections. Healthy People 2010 cites a 1997 Institute of Medicine report on STDs to prioritize preventing the disproportionate effect that STDs have on some population groups, including youth, some racial groups, and those who are economically or socially disenfranchised. Without question, LGBT communities have historically experienced social marginalization and are disproportionately at risk for STDs. Additional disparities as well as challenges and opportunities for prevention and treatment for LGBT populations are explored with respect to the Healthy People 2010 objectives for STDs. Finally, recommendations for action in the areas of services, education and training, policy, and research are discussed. Issues and Tre n d s Sexually transmitted diseases refer to the more than 25 infectious organisms transmitted primarily through sexual activity. Despite the burdens, costs, complications, and preventable nature of STDs, they remain a significant public health problem, largely unrecognized by the public, policymakers, and public health and health care professionals in the United States.1 Despite the fact that STDs are extremely widespread, have severe and sometimes deadly consequences, and add billions of dollars to the Nation’s health care costs each year, most people remain unaware of the risks and consequences of almost every STD but one— Sexually Transmitted Diseases (Infections) human immunodefiency virus (HIV). Studies of the worldwide HIV pandemic link other STDs to a causal chain of events in the sexual transmission of HIV infection.2 (See HIV/AIDS focus area.) Although extremely common, STDs are difficult to track. Many people with STDs do not have or recognize symptoms and remain undiagnosed. STDs that are diagnosed frequently are not reported and counted. Thus, a part of the overall epidemic remains hidden, the scope and extent may go unrecognized, and other people exposed to STDs do not receive treatment. A 1997 Institute of Medicine (IOM) report characterized STDs as “hidden epidemics of tremendous health and economic consequence in the United States” and stated, “STDs represent a growing threat to the Nation’s health and that national action is urgently needed.”3 The principal conclusions in the IOM report are that the United States needs to: Establish a much more effective national system for STD prevention, taking into account the complex interaction among biological and social factors that sustain STD transmission in populations Identify and address the disproportionate effect that STDs have on some population groups Apply proven, cost-effective behavioral and biomedical interventions Foster change in personal behaviors and in health care services through education, mass media, and organization and financing of health care services and health care infrastructure policies4 LGBT communities, without question, have historically experienced social and economic marginalization and are disproportionately at risk for STDs.5, 6, 7 Particular segments of the LGBT community may be at even higher risk due to factors related to age and economic and racial status. 8, 9 Furthermore, sexual orientation and gender identity are not included as demographic variables in several data sources that could generate a wealth of new knowledge on STD research, prevention, education, and treatment.10, 11 STDs are common, costly, and preventable.12, 13, 14 Worldwide, an estimated 333 million cases of curable STDs occur annually.15 In 1995, STDs were the most common reportable diseases in the United States, accounting for 87 percent of the top 10 infections most frequently reported to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) from State health departments.16 Of the top 10 infections, five were STDs—chlamydia, gonorrhea, acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS), syphilis, and hepatitis B. Each year an estimated 15 million new STD infections occur in the United States, and nearly 4 million teenagers are infected with a STD.17 The direct and indirect costs of the major STDs and their complications, including sexually transmitted HIV infection, are conservatively estimated at $17 billion annually.18 The 1997 IOM report concluded that, despite recent progress toward controlling some STDs, the United States has failed to go far enough or fast enough in its national attempt to contain acute STDs and STD-related complications.19 Whether STDs are increasing or decreasing depends on the specific disease being reviewed. The latest scientific data suggest that chlamydia, the most commonly reported infectious Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 299 Sexually Transmitted Diseases (Infections) disease in the United States, may be one of the most dangerous STDs among women. Although it has declined in areas with screening and treatment programs, the infection rate remains at very high levels.20 For the first time in nearly two decades, gonorrhea is on the rise, increasing more than 9 percent from 1997 to 1999, after a 72-percent decline from 1975 to 1997.21 Syphilis, in both adults and infants, has declined overall and is now at an all-time low, presenting CDC with an opportunity to attempt to eradicate the disease. In October 1999, CDC launched the National Plan to Eliminate Syphilis in the United States.22 Chancroid also has declined steadily since 1987.23 Genital herpes has continued to increase, spreading across all social, economic, racial, and ethnic boundaries, but most dramatically affecting adolescents and young adults. 24 With an estimated 20 million people in the United States currently infected with human papillovirus (HPV), this viral STD also continues to spread with an estimated 5.5 million people becoming newly infected each year.25 A summary of key issues surrounding STDs in the United States follows. Biological factors. STDs are behavior-linked diseases that result from unprotected sex.26 Several biological factors contribute to their rapid spread.27, 28, 29 Asymptomatic nature of STDs. The majority of STDs do not produce any symptoms or signs, or they produce symptoms so mild that they often are disregarded, resulting in a significant number of infected persons who should, but often do not, seek medical care. For example, as many as 85 percent of women and up to 50 percent of men with chlamydia have no symptoms.30, 31, 32, 33 In the case of gonorrhea, women are more likely to be asymptomatic than men.34 Most HPV infections appear to be temporary and are probably cleared up by the body’s immune system. The study of college students conducted by Ho and colleagues showed that, in 91 percent of women with new HPV infections, those infections were undetectable 2 years later.35 Most people with genital herpes have no symptoms and are unaware of their infection. In a national household survey, less than 10 percent of people who tested positive with herpes knew they were infected.36 Lag time between infection and complications. Often, a long interval—sometimes years— occurs between acquiring a sexually transmitted infection and recognizing a clinically significant symptom or health problem. Examples are cervical cancer caused by HPV, liver cancer caused by hepatitis B virus infection,37 and infertility and ectopic pregnancy resulting from unrecognized or undiagnosed chlamydia or gonorrhea.38 Gender and age. Women are at higher risk than men for most STDs, and young women usually are more susceptible than older women to certain STDs.39, 40 The higher risk is partly because the cervix of adolescent females is covered with cells that are especially susceptible to certain STDs, such as chlamydia.41 In nonmenstruating women, the protective effects of estrogen in thickening mucosal layers is missing. Social and behavioral factors. The spread of STDs, especially in certain vulnerable population groups, is directly affected by social and behavioral factors. For example, military populations are thought to have high rates of STDs. In 1999, nearly 10 percent of 17- to 37-year-old women screened for STDs during their induction tested positive for 300 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health Sexually Transmitted Diseases (Infections) chlamydia.42 The results from a Fort Bragg, North Carolina, study revealed that chlamydia rates for male and female active-duty soldiers were threefold to sixfold higher than rates for males and females in North Carolina and in the United States as a whole.43 Social and cultural factors may cause serious obstacles to STD prevention by adversely influencing social norms regarding sex and sexuality. The use of the Internet has created another environment for meeting people, and the resulting exposure increases the potential risk for acquiring or transmitting STDs. 44 Behavioral factors that can increase STD transmission in a community include increases in the exchange of sex for drugs, increases in the number of anonymous sex partners, decreases in motivation to use barrier protection, and decreases in attempts to seek medical treatment.45, 46, 47 Poverty and marginalization. STDs disproportionately affect disenfranchised persons and persons who are in social networks in which high-risk sexual behavior is common and either access to care or health-seeking behavior is compromised. Some disproportionately affected groups include sex workers (people who exchange sex for money, drugs, or other goods), adolescents, persons in detention, and migrant workers.48, 49, 50 The historical social marginalization of the LGBT community also places many segments of this population disproportionately at risk for STDs.51 Without publicly supported STD services, many people in these categories would lack access to STD health care services. Access to health care. Access to quality health care is essential for early detection, treatment, and behavior-change counseling for STDs.52 Often, groups with the highest rates of STDs are the same groups in which access to health services is most limited, such as substance abusers, sex workers, adolescents, incarcerated people, and LGBT individuals.53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59 Only half of local public health departments in the United States provide STD preventive services, compared with 96 percent that provide vaccinations.60 Even when STD services are provided, access to care is often restricted by limited hours of operation and the lack of timely services.61 Nearly 40 percent of local health departments that provide STD services cannot see potentially infected new patients the same day they seek care, and 15 percent cannot see such patients for 3 days or more.62 As a result of the organization and financing of health care services, most patients with STDs, especially women, are not examined in public STD clinics. In managed care organizations, where primary care providers are the gatekeepers, most providers do not routinely obtain a sexual history or ask about or screen for STDs.63 However, managed care organizations do acknowledge the importance of both preventing and treating STDs.64 Both adolescents and adults frequently perceive that primary care providers are uncomfortable discussing sexuality and often lack adequate communication skills on this topic.65 Although the majority of North American medical schools offer medical students curriculum material in sexuality, nearly one-third of the curricula does not address important topics such as taking a sexual history.66 Innovative approaches to delivering STD clinical care outside of both clinics that specialize in STD treatment and individual primary care provider offices are occurring. For example, integration of STD and family planning services within a broader reproductive health model Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health 301 Sexually Transmitted Diseases (Infections) provides efficient health care for women and has been highly successful as a primary strategy for reducing chlamydia infections in the United States.6 7 S i m i l a r l y, prenatal and obstetrical care settings provide another setting for STD/HIV screening and prevention, while enhancing the potential for preventing the STD-related adverse outcomes of pregnancy.6 8 Community outreach for STD prevention is limited in many jurisdictions, particularly where populations may be at increased risk.69 However, school-based health clinics are an excellent venue for receiving STD-related services.70 Unfortunately, although U.S. prisons have expanded screening programs for HIV infection in recent years, other STD screening and prevention remain less common.71 Substance abuse. Many studies document the association of substance abuse, especially the abuse of alcohol and drugs, with STDs.72, 73 At the population level, the introduction of new illicit substances into communities often can drastically alter sexual behavior in high-risk sexual networks, leading to an epidemic of STDs.74 Other substances, including alcohol and club drugs, may affect an individual’s cognitive and negotiating skills before and during sex, lowering the likelihood that protection against STD transmission and pregnancy will be used.75, 76 Sexuality and secrecy. Perhaps the most important social factor contributing to the spread of STDs in the United States and the factor that most significantly separates the United States from those industrialized countries with low rates of STDs is the stigma associated with STDs and the general discomfort of people in the United States with discussing intimate aspects of life, especially those related to sex.77 Sixty-two percent of parents of 10- to 12- year-olds have not discussed how to prevent pregnancy and STDs.78 Changing sexual behaviors and sexual norms will be an important part of any long-term strategy to develop a more effective national system of STD prevention in the United States. For example, the adult film industry now has a nonprofit organization dedicated to STD testing, tracking, and education. Because of the Adult Industry Medical Health Care Foundation, regulations are in place that require adult performers to be tested monthly for STDs.79 A new sexual openness needs to become the norm to ensure that all sexual relationships are consensual, nonexploitive, and honest and to protect against disease and unintended pregnancy. This openness would allow: Opinion leaders and the media to promote safe sexual behavior, to acknowledge that sex and sexuality are part of our culture and should be responsibly but explicitly discussed, including that diverse sexual cultures are present throughout our society Parents to talk frankly, comfortably, and sensitively with their children, as well as teachers and counselors with their students, about responsible behavior and avoiding risks (e.g., abstaining from intercourse, delaying initiation of intercourse, reducing the number of sex partners, increasing the use of effective barrier contraception) Sex partners to talk openly with each other about their sexual histories, any risks, and safe sexual behaviors 302 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health Sexually Transmitted Diseases (Infections) Health care providers to talk comfortably and knowledgeably, with sensitivity and acceptance, with patients about sexuality and sexual risk, to counsel them about risk avoidance, and to screen them regularly for STDs when indicated HIV and STDs. Compelling worldwide evidence indicates that the presence of other STDs increases the likelihood of both transmitting and acquiring HIV infection.80, 81 (See HIV/AIDS focus area.) Prospective epidemiological studies from four continents, including North America, have repeatedly demonstrated that when other STDs are present, HIV transmission is at least two to five times higher than when other STDs are not present. Biological studies demonstrate that when other STDs are present, an individual’s susceptibility to HIV infection is increased, and the likelihood of a dually infected person (someone with HIV infection and another STD) infecting other people with HIV is increased. Conversely, effective STD treatment can slow the spread of HIV at the individual and community levels.82 Disparities STDs affect all racial, cultural, geographic, economic, and religious groups.83 Nevertheless, some population groups are disproportionately affected by STDs and their complications. Gender disparities. Women suffer more frequent and more serious STD complications than men do.84 Among the most serious STD complications are pelvic inflammatory disease, ectopic pregnancy, infertility, and chronic pelvic pain.85 Women are biologically more susceptible to infection when exposed to a sexually transmitted agent.86 Acute STDs (and even some complications) often are very mild or are completely asymptomatic in women.87 STDs are more difficult to diagnose in women due to the physiology and anatomy of the female reproductive tract. This combination of increased susceptibility and “silent” infection frequently can result in women being unaware of an STD, which may result in delayed diagnosis and treatment. STDs in pregnant women can cause serious health problems or death to the fetus or newborn.88, 89 Age disparities. For a variety of behavioral, social, and biological reasons, STDs also disproportionately affect adolescents and young adults.90 In 1997, females aged 15 to 19 had the highest reported rates of both chlamydia and gonorrhea among women; males aged 20 to 24 years had the highest reported rates of both chlamydia and gonorrhea among men.91 The herpes infection rate of white youth aged 12 to 19 years increased nearly fivefold from the period 1976-80 to the period 1988-94.92 Because not all teenagers are sexually active, the actual rate of STDs in teens is probably higher than the observed rates suggest.93 There are several contributing factors: Data indicate teenagers are increasingly likely to have more sex partners at earlier ages. In 1971, 39 percent of sexually active adolescent females aged 15 to 19 had more than one sex partner. By 1988, the percentage had increased to 62 percent.94 Sexually active teenagers often are reluctant to obtain STD services, or they may face serious obstacles when trying to obtain them. In addition, health care providers often are Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 303 Sexually Transmitted Diseases (Infections) uncomfortable discussing sexuality and risk reduction with their patients, thus missing opportunities to counsel and screen young people for STDs.95 These factors are exacerbated for sexually active LGBT youth. Racial and ethnic disparities. Certain racial and ethnic groups (mainly African American and Hispanic populations) have high rates of STDs, compared with rates for Whites.96 Race and ethnicity in the United States are risk markers that correlate with other fundamental determinants of health status, such as poverty, limited or no access to quality health care, and fewer attempts to obtain medical treatment. Thus, some of the noted disparity may be a statistical artifact as national surveillance data may overrepresent STDs in racial and ethnic groups that are more likely to receive STD services from publicly funded STD clinics that report the occurrence of such diseases. O p p o rt u n i t i e s Prevention opportunities increase with the understanding of STD transmission dynamics. The rate of STD infection in a population is determined by the interaction of three principal factors:97, 98 The rate at which uninfected individuals have sex with infected persons (rate of sex partner exchange or exposure) The probability that a susceptible exposed person actually will acquire the infection (transmission) The time period during which an infected person remains infectious and able to spread disease to others (duration) Effective STD prevention requires effective population-level and individual-level interventions that can alter the natural course of these factors. IOM advised in its report: “Use of available information and interventions could have a rapid and dramatic impact on the incidence and prevalence of STDs in the United States. Many effective and efficient behavioral and biomedical interventions are available.” 99 Biomedical interventions can affect aspects of transmission and duration factors. Vaccines minimize the probability of infection, disease, or both after exposure (transmission). Although vaccines for some STDs are in various stages of development, the only effective and widely available STD vaccine is for hepatitis B.100, 101 Unfortunately, hepatitis B vaccine coverage remains minimal, especially in high-risk groups, mainly due to a lack of awareness of all high-risk groups on the part of health care providers, limited opportunities to reach high-risk youth in traditional health care settings, and limited financial support for wide-scale implementation of this effective intervention. Correct and consistent condom use decreases STD transmission.102 However, the message that condom usage equals safe sex may lead to a false sense of security, as condom usage 304 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health Sexually Transmitted Diseases (Infections) does not prevent the spread of hepatitis A and HPV, nor does it provide protection from diseases spread by anal-oral contact, such as HPV. Screening and treatment of STDs affect both transmission and duration factors. For curable STDs, screening and treatment can be cost-effective by decreasing the period during which infected persons can transmit diseases to others. Screening for STDs clearly meets the criteria for an effective preventive intervention.103 For STDs that frequently are asymptomatic, screening and treatment benefit those who are likely to suffer severe complications (especially women) if infections are not detected and treated early.104 When combined with a new generation of sensitive and rapid diagnostic tests, some of which can be performed on a urine specimen, STD screening of specific high-risk populations in nontraditional settings appears to be a promising control strategy that expands access to underserved groups.105 The success of screening programs will depend on the availability of funds, the willingness communities and institutions to support them, their cultural competence for serving LGBT individuals, and the availability of well-trained health care providers and well-equipped and accessible laboratories. Identifying and treating partners of persons with curable STDs to break the chain of transmission in a sexual network always have been integral aspects of organized control programs.106 Early antimicrobial prophylaxis of the exposed partner reduces the likelihood of transmission and infection. With partner treatment, the initially infected person benefits from a reduced risk of reinfection from an untreated partner, and the partner avoids acute infection and its potential complications. Future sex partners are protected by treating infected individuals; thus, this treatment strategy also benefits the community. Active partner notification and partner treatment generally have been the responsibility of personnel in publicly funded STD clinics. New approaches for having more partners treated are being assessed both in traditional and nontraditional STD treatment settings. One approach actively involves initially infected patients in the process of referring their partners for evaluation and treatment.107 Another approach uses new techniques to assess sexual networks in outbreak situations in order to identify infected patients and their partners more quickly.108 Because most STD care in the United States is delivered in the private sector, private health care providers, managed care organizations, and health departments need to work together to overcome barriers to rapid and effective treatment of the nonplan sex partners of health plan members, including those in same-sex relationships. In no area does the potential for managed care to diminish, rather than strengthen, public health carry more significance than in the prevention, treatment, and control of STDs.109 In many communities, STD rates are highly elevated, and new forms of old diseases are an emerging cause of public health concern.110 In the context, treatment, and prevention of STDs, several basic and separate issues relate to the intersection of managed care, especially Medicaid managed care, and public health.111 Those issues are: The consequences of managed care on the delivery of STD prevention, testing, and treatment services by local public health agencies Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 305 Sexually Transmitted Diseases (Infections) The effect of managed care on the ability of public health agencies to exercise their historic police powers to control the spread of STDs through the use of practice guidelines and treatment interventions The impact of managed care on the communitywide surveillance activities of public health agencies as well as other health activities, such as partner notifications, that depend on access to data All three issues are embodied in the contextual relationships between managed care organizations (MCOs) and public health agencies, as exemplified by the written agreements—i.e., memoranda of understanding (MOU)—that codify the roles and responsibilities of each entity. In 2000, Rosenbaum and associates did a content analysis of MOUs as well as interviews of MCOs, State and local public health agencies, and Medicaid officials in 10 communities. The findings varied greatly. An earlier study for the Kaiser Family Foundation by the same investigators found that Medicaid agencies classify STD testing as a family planning service; however, the MOUs were silent on how people who tested positive would be referred back to health care plans for treatment. This finding is puzzling as the MOUs were drafted not by the MCOs but rather by public health and Medicaid agencies. According to the report, “Public health and MCO interviewees in several sites acknowledged that STDs are not even ‘blips on the radar screen’ in discussions concerning priorities for developing the public health/managed care relationship.”112 Obviously, more communication and collaborative efforts are needed in the relationship between managed care and public health to increase access to quality services to prevent and treat STDs. Strong leadership in STD prevention by health agencies and health plans that is backed by appropriate rules and standards is critical.113 Public health officials can demonstrate leadership by promoting and supporting consensus development around national standards, collaborating on priority setting, and simplifying interventions for clinicians. MCOs and other health plans now need to take responsibility for STD prevention because an effective system for such prevention cannot occur without MCOs.114 In addition, MCOs have a social and normative responsibility to improve the health of the public.115 Population-based behavioral interventions can be brought to bear on exposure, transmission, and duration factors. Further attention must be given to helping parents become better at providing STD information. Currently, a small percentage of adolescents receive STD prevention information from parents.116 Schools are the main source of STD information for most teenagers,117 indicating that school-based interventions can play a significant role in informing young people about STD exposure and transmission issues and in motivating them to modify their behaviors.118 (See Educational and Community-Based Programs focus area.) Both school-based health information and school-based health service programs are potentially beneficial to young persons; however, all programs need to be linguistically accessible and culturally competent, including those for LGBT populations.119 306 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health Sexually Transmitted Diseases (Infections) Mass media campaigns have been effective in bringing about significant changes in awareness, attitudes, knowledge, and behaviors concerning other health problems, such as smoking.120 When asked to name specific STDs, very few people can name the most common STD—HPV.121 A third of people (36 percent) are not aware that having an STD increases a person’s risk of becoming infected with HIV.122 National communication efforts, inclusive of messages for LGBT audiences, are needed to help overcome widespread misinformation and lack of awareness about STDs. S u m m a ry of LGBT Researc h STDs among men who have sex with men. HIV continues to be the most serious of all STDs, and a disproportionate number of cases are still borne by men who have sex with men (MSM), including bisexual men.123 In addition, other STDs may increase the efficiency of HIV transmission. However, insufficient data exist regarding the prevalence of HIV infection among lesbians, bisexual women, and transgender persons. In comparison to heterosexual men, MSM are at increased risk not only for HIV, but also certain STDs.124, 125, 126 Getting accurate estimates of the prevalence rates of STDs among MSM is virtually impossible because of the dual stigma associated with STDs and homosexuality. MSM are generally believed to be at increased risk for a range of STDs, including urethritis, proctitis, pharyngitis, prostatitis (due to gonorrhea or chlamydia), hepatitis A virus (HAV), hepatitis B virus (HBV), syphilis, herpes, genital warts caused by HPV, molluscum contagiosum, and HIV. However, additional data on infection patterns and prevalence are needed.127 STDs can hold dire consequences for MSM living with HIV, including chronic or life- threatening complications such as cytomegalovirus, herpes, and anal cancer associated with certain strains of HPV.128 In recent years, HIV prevention programs have played an important role in the steady decline of STD transmission among gay and bisexual men.129 However, recent U.S. and international studies provide evidence that rates of unprotected anal intercourse and STDs may be on the rise.130, 131 Increases in rectal gonorrhea were reported among MSM in San Francisco,132 whereas increases in syphilis have been reported among MSM in Seattle. In 1998 and 1999, community-based clinics in New York, Boston, and Atlanta, and public health departments in Los Angeles, Chicago, Miami, Washington, D.C., and other U.S. cities, as well as several cities abroad, reported epidemic rates of HAV.133 These increases in STDs among MSM coincide with a decrease in the number of MSM who reported that they “always used condoms” 134 and an increase in the proportion of MSM reporting that they have unprotected anal sex.135, 136 These trends underscore a clear need for “renewed efforts to reduce the rates of STD and HIV transmission among MSM, and for the development of new surveillance techniques to assess the efficacy of these efforts.”137 Additionally, MSM who are engaging in sex with men outside of a primary relationship with a woman put their female sex partners at increased risk. HAV and HBV infection and immunization among MSM. HAV and HBV are vaccine- preventable diseases that are highly prevalent among MSM. Even though vaccines to Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 307 Sexually Transmitted Diseases (Infections) prevent HAV and HBV are available, and even though CDC recommends vaccination for sexually active MSM, vaccination rates among MSM are low.138 (See Immunization and Infectious Diseases focus area.) Healthy People 2010 underscores the importance of the hepatitis B vaccine and reports that HBV coverage is minimal, especially among high-risk groups. Healthy People 2010 points to a lack of awareness among providers, difficulty in reaching high-risk youth via traditional service delivery settings, and limited financial support for wide-scale implementation as barriers to vaccination. (See Immunization and Infectious Diseases focus area.) Increasing the rates of HBV vaccination among MSM is vitally important. HAV is an STD among MSM that can be prevented by vaccination. STDs among women who have sex with women. The prevalence of STDs among women who have sex with women (WSW) and the risk of STD transmission between WSW have received little study. Furthermore, because the majority of WSW have had sex with men at some point during their lives, they may be at risk for a range of STDs, including herpes, HPV, HIV, and HBV as a result of these exposures. Data strongly support that HPV and trichomonas are transmitted between female sex partners,139, 140 and cases of HIV, HBV, and HAV transmission have been reported. 141, 142 Bacterial vaginosis (BV) is a condition in which overgrowth of commensal anaerobic flora dominates the hydrogen peroxide-producing lactobacilli that predominate in the healthy vagina.143 BV confers an increased risk of preterm delivery, low birthweight, and postpartum/postabortal endometritis. For reasons that are not yet understood, BV may be markedly more prevalent among WSW than among women who have sex with men. Despite clear evidence of HPV and cervical neoplasia among WSW, including those who have never had sex with men, WSW may not seek or receive Pap tests as frequently as standard guidelines recommend. Untreated STDs in women can cause infertility, which could cause problems for increasing numbers of lesbians who wish to have families through pregnancy. Several large studies have shown that WSW attending STD clinics who report also having sex with men have substantially higher risk profiles for acquiring HIV than do women who do not have sex with women.144 STDs among LGBT adolescents. STDs are among the most commonly diagnosed infectious diseases in adolescents; nearly two-thirds of cases occur in young people under age 25.145 Younger adolescents, especially females, are least likely to be considered at risk or to be screened if they are asymptomatic.146 LGBT youth who are sexually active are at risk for STDs, and young MSM are particularly vulnerable. Lesbian and bisexual female youth who have sex with gay male peers are at increased risk. Risk is heightened by a lack of accurate health promotion and prevention information as well as by the lack of supportive environments for socialization that promotes anonymous sexual encounters and other high- risk behaviors.147 STDs among transgender persons. No prospective studies have been done on the risk of STDs for transgender persons. Given the fact that MSM are at increased risk for specific 308 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health Sexually Transmitted Diseases (Infections) STDs, additional research is needed to ascertain the degree to which transgender persons who have sex with MSM or WSW are at risk. Moreover, many transgender individuals take hormones via injection, and needle-sharing is a practice that may increase the risk for HIV and other STD transmission. Cultural concerns for LGBT populations. Some subpopulations of MSM have been shown to have more sexual partners than heterosexual men, thereby increasing their risk for STDs.148 For a certain segment of the MSM population, sex partners may be anonymous, with little or no chance to discuss a partner’s sexual history. In addition, young MSM, especially racial/ethnic youth, remain difficult to reach, in part because they typically do not have a regular source of care149 and have not yet benefited from increased access to education and information that often comes with being actively involved in the gay community. In addition, MSM may not be reached effectively by health promotion campaigns unless they are specifically targeted with culturally sensitive messages.150, 151 Because drug use is associated with an increased risk for STDs, gay men and other LGBT people who use drugs and alcohol are also at increased risk for STDs. People who exchange sex for money to buy drugs further enhance their risk.152 This public health issue can be further complicated by increases in the number of anonymous sex partners. This is an issue of particular importance to those gay men who use stimulants and libido-enhancing recreational drugs.153 The extent to which these drugs are used in conjunction with unsafe sex among lesbians, bisexuals, and transgender people is unclear, but some cross-sectional data suggests that use may be widespread in some LGBT communities.154 The social stigma associated with STDs continues to present a serious challenge for STD prevention, education, screening, detection, and treatment. As noted in Healthy People 2010, STD-related stigma may be the most important social factor contributing to the transmission of STDs in the United States. Most Americans are not comfortable discussing such intimate aspects of personal life, especially as they relate to sexual activity. This stigma may be compounded for the LGBT community as studies indicate that only between 18 and 49 percent of LGBT patients disclose their sexual orientation to their physician.155, 156, 157 Furthermore, given the increases in data showing suboptimal Pap testing among WSW, and the well-documented occurrence of HPV-associated cervical neoplasia in these women, WSW may not be aware of their screening needs or of the risk of HPV-associated cervical neoplasia in WSW who have not had sex with men.158 Discussion of Healthy People 2010 Objectives 25-5. (Developmental) Reduce the proportion of persons with human papillomavirus (HPV) infection. Rates of rectal precancer and cancer among MSM appear to be on the rise.159 The etiology of precancers and cancers of the anus, penis, cervix, vagina, and vulva is oncogenic HPV (specific subtypes are associated with this risk). Host factors can contribute to its acquisition and include the presence of chronic illness, immune deficiency (especially HIV disease), Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 309 Sexually Transmitted Diseases (Infections) cigarette smoking, and frequency of exposure. Recent research shows a strong correlation between cervical and anal neoplasia,160 thus permitting parallels in our understanding of the natural history of both diseases. HPV is also transmitted between female sex partners, and associated cervical neoplasm in WSW who report no prior sex with men has been well documented.161, 162, 163, 164 The anatomical, virological, and pathological analogies between cervical and anal neoplasia suggest that interventions to enhance screening, diagnosis, and treatment in the precancerous phase would avert and possibly arrest the otherwise expected progression to anal cancer, especially in HIV-infected persons. The use of anal Pap tests has been demonstrated to be a cost-effective approach.165 High-resolution anoscopy is used to evaluate abnormal Pap tests and permit directed histologic sampling of the anus.166 Because WSW, especially those who are no longer sexually active with men, have been documented to have less frequent Pap tests and fewer visits for gynecologic care, they may be more at risk for cervical dysplasia and progression to invasive carcinoma.167, 168, 169, 170, 171 The incidence of anal intraepithelial neoplasia and invasive anal cancer is higher in HIV- infected persons than noninfected individuals.172, 173 It is estimated that there are 70 cases per 100,000 persons with HIV infection,174 which is twice the rate of cervical cancer prior to routine cervical sampling with the Pap test.175 The life expectancy of HIV-infected people enhanced by highly active antiretroviral therapy has resulted in prolonged immunosuppression, which increases the risk for the development of malignancies, including anal cancer. Homosexual men have a high rate of progression from low- to high- grade squamous intraepithelial lesions (correlating with anal neoplasia 3, or carcinoma in situ) when followed by anal cytology and histology.176 25-11. Increase the proportion of adolescents who abstain from sexual intercourse or use condoms if currently sexually active. A majority (86 percent) of U.S. individuals favor sexuality education in the public schools, and 86 percent also believe that birth control information should be available to adolescents.177 School-based sexuality education programs are generally of two types: (1) abstinence-only programs that emphasize sexual abstinence as the most appropriate choice for young people, and (2) sexuality and STD/HIV education programs that cover abstinence as well as condoms and other methods of contraception to provide protection against STDs or pregnancy. To date, the few published evaluations of abstinence-only programs have found little or no effect on initiation of sexual activity.178, 179, 180 However, due to this limited number of studies, definitive conclusions cannot be drawn about this approach. Programs that typically emphasize abstinence, but also cover condoms and other methods of contraception, have a larger body of evaluation evidence that indicates either no effect on initiation of sexual activity or, in some cases, a delay in the initiation of sexual activity.181 This evidence gives strong support to the conclusion that providing information about contraception does not increase adolescent sexual activity by hastening the onset of sexual 310 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health intercourse, increasing the frequency of sexual intercourse, or increasing the number of sexual partners. In addition, some of these evaluated programs increased condom use or contraceptive use among adolescents who were sexually active.182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189 Abstinence promotion and STD prevention messages typically assume heterosexual orientation, thereby negating the thoughts or experiences of LGBT adolescents or adolescents questioning their sexual orientation or gender identity. Studies of adolescent sexual orientation show that the age of “coming out” or self-identification as lesbian or gay has been dropping steadily.190 Average Age (Years) Event Occurs Adults* Adolescents** (Retrospective Studies) (Prospective Studies) Behavior/Identity Males Females Males Females First awareness of homosexual attraction 13 14-16 9 10 First homosexual experience 15 20 13 15 Self-identification as lesbian or gay 19-21 21-23 16 16 * Troiden, R.R. Homosexual identity development. 9:105, 1988. ** Herdt, G., and Boxer, A. , 2n d ed. Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1996. LGBT and questioning youth need targeted, culturally competent messages with which they can identify. Obviously, female adolescents, whether heterosexual, bisexual or lesbian, can become pregnant for a variety of reasons (e.g., choosing to have children, hiding sexual orientation, failure to use contraceptives).191 A 1999 study by Saewyc and associates examined the prevalence of heterosexual behavior and related risk factors and pregnancy histories among lesbian and bisexual teenagers. Overall, bisexual or lesbian respondents were about as likely as heterosexual women ever to have had intercourse (33 and 29 percent, respectively). However, the bisexual or lesbian respondents had a significantly higher prevalence of pregnancy (12 percent) and physical or sexual abuse (19 to 22 percent) than heterosexual adolescents.192 These same researchers also found that American Indian adolescents reported higher prevalence of gay, lesbian, and bisexual orientations than Euro-Americans. Gay and bisexual males were more likely than other males to report early heterosexual intercourse, more consistent contraception, and a higher prevalence of abuse and running away. Likewise, lesbian and bisexual females were more likely to report early onset of heterosexual intercourse, more frequent intercourse, and running away, but not sexual or physical abuse.193 Culturally competent messages should be sensitive and appropriate to LGBT adolescents and should include instructions on condom usage in all relevant contexts and information on hepatitis vaccination. Estimates of lesbian and gay homeless youth vary, but youth service providers agree that rates are very high, ranging from 20 to 40 percent in various studies.1 9 4 , 1 9 5 , 1 9 6 This population may be at extremely high risk for STDs due to multiple behavioral and social factors, including Sexually Transmitted Diseases (Infections) Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 311 Sexually Transmitted Diseases (Infections) 312 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health limited access to services, stigma and discrimination, having sex for money, having multiple and anonymous partners, and using drugs and alcohol. Brief risk-reduction messages have been shown, in some studies, to lead to substantial increases in condom use.1 9 7 , 1 9 8 , 1 9 9 O t h e r studies have shown little eff e c t .2 0 0 , 2 0 1 More extensive counseling, either individual or small group, can produce additional increases in consistent condom use.2 0 2 25-13: Increase the proportion of tribal, State, and local sexually transmitted disease programs that routinely offer hepatitis B vaccines to all STD clients. Among MSM, Hepatitus B virus is spread through sexual contact. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention recommends routine vaccination against Hepatitis B for sexually active MSM. Hepatitus A virus is spread through oral-fecal routes of transmission, which includes oral-anal contact, or other sexual contact that can spread infected feces. The CDC has also recommended rountine vaccination against Hepatitus A for sexually active MSM 203 In spite of nearly 5 years of promotion, the vaccination rate among MSM seems to be below 20 percent.204, 205, 206 In addition, only 5 percent of State and local STD programs offered hepatitis B vaccines in accordance with CDC’s 1998 guidelines. These data highlight missed opportunities for vaccinating MSM for both hepatitis A and B. Providers need to be educated to ask appropriate and sensitive sexual history questions and to vaccinate all sexually active LGBT people against HAV and HBV. Providers also should be aware that other modes for hepatitis B transmission include parental exposure by needles used for recreational drugs or hormonal injections.207 Another mode of HAV and HBV transmission may be through the sharing of sexual paraphernalia. 25-14: (Developmental) Increase the proportion of youth detention facilities and adult city or county jails that screen for common bacterial sexually transmitted diseases within 24 hours of admission and treat STDs (when necessary) before persons are released. Public health and corrections officials should be aware that many youth in juvenile detention facilities and adults in jails and prisons engage in same-sex behavior, even though they may be, or may identify themselves as, heterosexual. Incarcerated individuals may be more likely to exchange sex for money or drugs or have acquired STDs prior to their entering custodial facilities. CDC Hotlines for STDs CDC National STD Hotline: 1 - 8 0 0 - 2 2 7 - 8 9 2 2 1 - 8 0 0 - 3 4 2 - 2 4 3 7 En español: 1-800-344-7432 American Social Health Association Hotlines National Herpes Hotline: 1 - 9 1 9 - 3 6 1 - 8 4 8 8 National HPV and Cervical Cancer: 1 - 9 1 9 - 3 6 1 - 4 8 4 8 Sexually Transmitted Diseases (Infections) 25-15. (Developmental) Increase the proportion of all local health departments that have contracts with managed care providers for the treatment of nonplan partners of patients with bacterial sexually transmitted diseases (gonorrhea, syphilis, and chlamydia). As this is a developmental objective, there were no national baseline data at the time the document went to print. The proposed national data source is the Survey of STD Programs, National Coalition of STD Directors (NCSD).208 Syphilis, gonorrhea, and AIDS are reportable diseases in every State, and chlamydia is reportable in most States.209 However, NCSD is a national partnership of State, county, city, and territorial STD prevention and control directors whose mission is to promote policies, programs, and strategies that reduce the prevalence of STDs.210 Perhaps a nongovernment data organization might be better positioned to survey the organizations required to track progress on the objective. For example, the Center for Health Services Research and Policy (CHSRP), formerly the Center for Health Policy Research, is the major health services research center for the George Washington University Medical Center and has already conducted research in this area.211 CHSRP often works in concert with various entities and could form an alliance with, for example, the Gay and Lesbian Medical Association or the National Coalition for LGBT Health. Unfortunately, STDs have tended to be low priorities, not only for most managed care organizations but also for some health agencies.212 Within these organizations, persons with responsibility for STDs typically have not been involved in the strategic decisionmaking process and therefore not represented in contract negotiations among managed care organizations, States, or counties. Given the “partnership” structure of NCSD, as explained by Charles Rabins at a meeting of Healthy People 2010, the likelihood is low that many members of NCSD were involved in establishing State Medicaid managed care contracts or the State Children’s Health Insurance Program. 213 Stereotypes and misperceptions are pervasive among staff of MCOs, health agencies, and LGBT health centers. Traditionally, public health agencies and community-based organizations serving populations such as LGBT individuals provided clinical services for diseases that potentially endanger the public health (e.g., STDs) that private-sector Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 313 Goals of the National STD Action Plan: Educate the public about STDs through National STD Awareness Month and Web sites (www.ashastd.org and www.iwannaknow.org for teens). Educate consumers and health care providers about state-of-the-art diagnostics, treatments, and emerging vaccines. Help consumers and health care providers communicate more effectively about STDs. Promote positive health behaviors among individuals who are infected with STDs. Educate policymakers about STD prevalence, the costs and benefits of prevention, and early diagnosis and treatment. Improve communication on issues of race and ethnicity and STDs. Sexually Transmitted Diseases (Infections) physicians were unwilling or reluctant to treat.214 Because of the stigma surrounding STDs, many people value confidential services and do not access STD-related services from their health plan for fear that their employer, family, or insurer will find out.215 California prepared a model document for use by local public health agencies with MCOs.216 The San Francisco Department of Health and contracting Medicaid MCOs agreed to use identification numbers that do not reveal the nature of the service when billing the health plan for services provided to plan enrollees. The health department also requires that contractors inform members of the right to access out-of-plan services for STDs without prior authorization.217 With the exception of New York and California, the memoranda of understanding between public health agencies and MCOs did not obligate the MCOs to provide public health agencies the necessary information either to carry out their epidemiological surveillance activities or to conduct other activities essential to the control of STDs.218 The most notable activity potentially affected by the absence of such data is partner notification, and testing and treatment for possibly infected partners. Because many partners may not be members of the MCO to which the infected partner belongs, the ability to follow up with notification and support for the cost of treatment is pivotal. Interestingly, the laboratories, not physicians, are the prime source of information about notifiable diseases, including STDs.219 New York is the only State that classifies any laboratory that tests specimens drawn in the State as doing business in-State and requires a laboratory to report test results, regardless of location.220 Because many MCOs use centralized laboratory services that are furnished by out-of-State suppliers, State public health laws in fact may not reach this critical source of data.221 No MOUs in the Rosenbaum et al., study conducted in 2000 required adherence to public health standards with respect to STDs, and none addressed the issue of payment for treatment of potentially infected partners. Interviews with public health officials suggested that alternative sources of funding (e.g., Federal grants from CDC and other Federal agencies) may have diminished their interest in addressing in contractual language the treatment of nonplan partners. 222 However, these alternative sources of funding, although important, are not necessarily needed if managed care contracts are written to be inclusive of all medical services necessary to prevent and treat STDs. The current absence of this specific language is an opportunity for all groups interested in prevention of STDs, especially LGBT health care organizations, to craft model language that can modernize public health policy and alter current managed care policy by establishing reimbursement relationships with out-of-plan individuals or providers. 25-16. (Developmental) Increase the proportion of sexually active females aged 25 years and under who are screened annually for genital chlamydia infections. The proposed national data sources are the Office on Population Affairs data reported in Family Planning Annual Report and the STD Surveillance System (STDSS), CDC, National 314 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health Sexually Transmitted Diseases (Infections) Center for HIV, STD, and TB Prevention. Response rates to STDSS vary by disease and patient population. Estimates of completeness for case reporting of chlamydia are only 20 percent in contrast to syphilis at 65 percent and gonorrhea at 50 percent. Data on sexual orientation or gender identity are not collected. The STD Surveillance Report is published annually and is supplemented by the Chlamydia Prevalence Monitoring Annual Report. More information can be found on the Internet at www.cdc.gov/wonders/STD/contents.html.223 The magnitude of the risk of sexually transmitting infections between WSW and how this compares to that of heterosexual women is unknown.224 Attempts to use national or local surveillance to estimate the risk of STD transmission between women are limited by the fact that many risk classification schemes have either excluded same-gender sex among women or subsumed it under a hierarchy of other behaviors viewed as higher risk.225 Classical STDs, including chlamydia, are rare in women who have sex with women only, in part because of sexual behavior and in part because of issues related to transmission efficiency.226 However, many, if not most, lesbians and bisexual women have had sex with men, and an estimated 21 to 30 percent of lesbians report continued sex with men.227, 228, 229 25-18. Increase the proportion of primary care providers who treat patients with sexually transmitted diseases and who manage cases according to recognized standards. Many health care providers are not adequately trained to provide culturally competent STD prevention and treatment services in a way that is appropriate and relevant to LGBT populations.230 Furthermore, many providers are not comfortable with talking about the intimate aspects of sexual behavior, and other providers lack education on the relationship between STDs and increased risk for HIV infection. These factors may be operative in providers’ decisions to provide elemental STD-related counseling, screening and management, and to perform routine Pap testing among WSW. At the same time, LGBT individuals who are not “out” to their health care providers may not receive appropriate STD prevention counseling, accurate diagnoses, or culturally appropriate treatment.231, 232, 233 Given that many LGBT individuals may be reluctant to seek care from mainstream providers because of previous negative experiences with the health care system, health care providers need to make a concerted effort to create a health care delivery environment that is not only open to serving LGBT populations but also conducts active outreach to engage LGBT clients. At the same time, LGBT people do not understand that they have specific health needs and, therefore, see no reason to inform their health care providers about their sexual orientation or gender identity.234 (See Health Communication focus area.) Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 315 The National Guideline Clearinghouse (NGC) is a public resource for evidence-based clinical practice guidelines. NGC is sponsored by the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (formerly the Agency for Health Care Policy and Research) in partnership with the A m e r i c a n Medical Association and the American Association of Health P l a n s . Sexually Transmitted Diseases (Infections) S e rv i c e s — R E C O M M E N D ATIONS “Sexual history” risk assessment tools that are culturally and linguistically appropriate need to be developed and widely disseminated. Additional efforts are needed to increase, at all potential sites for screening, the proportion of LGBT people screened for STDs and, if found positive, provided treatment services. There is a need for culturally appropriate STD prevention outreach for LGBT youth and youth questioning their sexual orientation. All STD media campaigns should be inclusive of all population sectors including LGBT youth and adults. Education and Tr a i n i n g — R E C O M M E N D AT I O N S Professional organizations of health care providers should address sexual orientation and gender identity concerns in continuing medical education courses, clinical guidelines, risk assessment, and screening policies. Health professions schools, including schools of medicine, nursing, physician assistants, public health, health educators, and others, should partner with all existing LGBT health centers for purposes of STD clinic staffing as well as management and professional training. All health care professionals should counsel their LGBT patients (or refer them to community-based organizations) regarding the risk of STDs and methods for reducing or preventing high-risk behaviors. Counseling for STDs should be reimbursed without copayments or other financial disincentives by Medicaid programs, managed care organizations, or other health plans. Education is needed for LGBT individuals—especially youth—that condom usage provides no protection against hepatitis A and STDs transmitted by genital-oral contact. Health care providers and consumers must be made aware of the risks of HPV and how it is transmitted and prevented, including the need for routine Pap testing for WSW. P o l i c y — R E C O M M E N D ATIONS STD-related performance measures specific to LGBT populations should be included in the Health Plan Employer Data Information Set (HEDIS) developed by the National Committee for Quality Assurance as well as in other health 316 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center in Boston has an Intraepithelial Neoplasia Clinic that implements a multidisciplinary approach to STD treatment and prevention. The team includes an HIV oncologist, an infectious disease specialist, a colorectal surgeon, a gynecologist, and a virologist. To g e t h e r, the team contributes to clinical care and plans research activities related to anal neoplasia. Sexually Transmitted Diseases (Infections) services performance measures of public and private health plans. Local health departments, with the assistance of the State health department, should consult with the LGBT community in determining how to provide high-quality, comprehensive STD-related clinical services. Health plans should provide for and cover comprehensive STD-related services, including screening, diagnosis, treatment, and counseling for plan members and their sex partners, regardless of the partners’ insurance status. LGBT organizations should work with an independent group to serve as a catalyst for social change toward a new norm of healthy sexual behavior in the United States that would include a long-term national initiative to increase knowledge and awareness of preventing and treating STDs. R e s e a rc h — R E C O M M E N D ATIONS Research is needed to identify the incidence and prevalence of STDs within LGBT populations and to identify which sexual practices increase the risk of specific STDs. Sexual orientation and gender identity measures should be included within the CDC STD Surveillance System, the National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey, and CDC’s National Center for HIV, STD, and TB Prevention. Specific data on the prevalence of anal neoplasia in men with a history of receptive anal sex should be collected, with special emphasis on individuals with anogenital HPV and HIV infection. Te rm i n o l o g y STD complications: Serious health problems that occur following an acute bacterial or viral STD. Among the most serious of these complications: Cancer: Includes cervical cancer and its precursors (due to some strains of human papillomavirus) and liver cancer that can result from chronic infection with hepatitis B virus. Infection of a fetus or newborn: Includes conditions such as congenital syphilis, neonatal herpes, HIV infection, eye infections, and pneumonia. Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 317 The homeless may be at greater risk for STDs as a result of abusing substances and engaging in high- risk sexual behaviors (e.g., exchanging sex for drugs or money). CDC is funding a special STD screening program for the homeless in three sites in Chicago. The target population is primarily homeless youth and screening for gonorrhea and chlamydia. In partnership with The Night Ministry, an organization providing health care services to the homeless and sex workers, the Chicago Department of Health is using a mobile health unit staffed by a nurse to access three high prevalence sites per night. T h i s program is scheduled to be completed in December 2001. Sexually Transmitted Diseases (Infections) Pelvic inflammatory disease (PID): Can cause permanent damage to the female reproductive tract and lead to ectopic pregnancy, infertility, or chronic pelvic pain. Preterm birth: Can result from maternal infection. Sexually transmitted HIV infection: Can be facilitated by the presence of an inflammatory or ulcerative STD in one or both sex partners. R e f e re n c e s 1 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)[1]. Tracking the Hidden Epidemics: Trends in STDs in the United States. Atlanta, GA: CDC, 2000. 2 St. Louis, M.E.; Wasserheit, J.N.; and Gayle, H.D. 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Lesbian Health: Current Assessment and Directions for the Future. Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1999. Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 325 Sexually Transmitted Diseases (Infections) 159 Palefsky, J.; Holly, E.; and Ralston, M. High incidence of anal high grade squamous intra-epithelial lesions among HIV-positive and HIV-negative homosexual and bisexual men. AIDS 12:495-503, 1998. 160 Zaki, S.R.; Judd, R.; Coffield, L.M., et al. Human papillomavirus infection and anal carcinoma. Retrospective analysis by in situ hybridization and the polymerase chain reaction. American Journal of Pathology 140:1345-1355, 1992. 161 Marrazzo, J. STDs and cervical neoplasia among lesbians: Research review and update. Presentation at the 19th Annual National Lesbian and Gay Health Association Conference, Seattle, WA, July 1996. 162 O’Hanlan, K.A., and Crum, C.P. Human papillomavirus-associated cervical intraepithelial neoplasia following lesbian sex. Obstetric Gynecology 88(4,2):702-703, 1996. 163 Ferris, D.; Batish, S.; Wright, T.; et al. A neglected lesbian health concern: Cervical neoplasia. Journal of Family Practice 43:581-584, 1996. 164 Carroll, Goldstein, Lo, and Mayer, 1997. 165 Goldie, S.J.; Kuntz K.M.; Weinstein M.C.; et al. The clinical effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of screening for anal squamous intraepithelial lesions in homosexual and bisexual HIV-positive men. Journal of the American Medical Association 281:1822-1829, 1999. 166 Jay, N.; Berry, J.M.; Hogeboom, C.J.; et al. Colposcopic appearance of anal squamous intraepithelial lesions: Relationship to histopathology. Diseases of the Colon and Rectum 40:919, 1997. 167 Marrazzo, J.M.; Koutsky, L.A.; Kiviat, N.B.; et al. Pap smear screening and prevalence of genital human papillomavirus infection in women who have sex with women, unpublished data, 2000. 168 Marrazzo, J.M.; Stine, K.; Kuypers, J.; et al. Genital human papillomavirus in women who have sex with women. Journal of Infectious Diseases 178:1604-1609, 1998. 169 Robertson, P., and Schachter, J. Failure to identify venereal disease in a lesbian population. Sexually Transmitted Diseases 83:75-76, 1981. 170 Rankow, E.J., and Tessaro, I. Cervical cancer risk and Papanicolaou screening in a sample of lesbian and bisexual women. Journal of Family Practice 46:139-143, 1998. 171 Koh, A.S. Use of preventive health behaviors by lesbian, bisexual, and heterosexual women: Questionnaire survey. Western Journal of Medicine 172:379-384, 2000. 172 Palefsky, J., et al. Virologic, immunologic, and clinical parameters in the incidence and progression of anal squamous intraepithelial lesions in HIV-positive and HIV-negative homosexual Men. Journal of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndromes and Human Retrovirology 17(4):314-319, 1998. 173 Frisch, M.; et al. Sexually transmitted infection as a cause of anal cancer. New England Journal of Medicine 337:1350-1358, 1997. 174 Palefsky, Holly, and Ralston, 1998. 175 Bosch, F.X.; Manos, M.M.; Munoz, N.; et al. Prevalence of human papillomavirus in cervical cancer: A worldwide perspective. International Biology Study on Cervical Cancer (BSCC) study group. Journal of the National Cancer Institute 87(11):796-802, 1995. 176 Palefsky, Holly, and Ralston, 1998. 177 Smith, T. Data from the General Social Survey . Chicago, IL: National Opinion Research Center, University of Chicago, 2000. 178 Christopher, F.S., and Roosa, M.W. An evaluation of an adolescent pregnancy prevention program: Is “just say no” enough? Family Relations 39:68-72, 1990. 326 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health Sexually Transmitted Diseases (Infections) 179 Kirby, D., et al. Evaluation of Education Now and Babies Later (ENABL): Final Report. Berkeley, CA: University of California, School of Social Welfare, Family Welfare Research Group, 1995. 180 St. Pierre, T.L., et al. A 27-month evaluation of a sexual activity prevention program in Boys and Girls Clubs across the Nation. Family Relations 44:69-77, 1995. 181 Kirby, D. Reducing adolescent pregnancy: Approaches that work. Contemporary Pediatrics 16:83-94, 1999. 182 Coyle, K.K., et al. Short-term impact of Safer Choices: A multi-component school-based HIV, other STD and pregnancy prevention program. Journal of School Health 69(5):181-188, 1999. 183 Hubbard, B.M., et al. A replication of Reducing the Risk, a theory-based sexuality curriculum for adolescents. Journal of School Health 68(6):243-247, 1998. 184 Jemmott, J.B., et al. Reductions in HIV risk-associated sexual behaviors among black male adolescents: Effects of an AIDS prevention intervention. American Journal of Public Health 82(3):372-377, 1992. 185 Magura, S., et al. Outcomes of intensive AIDS education for male adolescent drug users in jail. Journal of Adolescent Health 15:457-463, 1994. 186 Main, D.S., et al. Preventing HIV infection among adolescents: Evaluation of a school-based program. Preventive Medicine 23:409-417, 1994. 187 Rotheram-Borus, M.J.; et al. Reducing HIV sexual risk behaviors among runaway adolescents. Journal of the American Medical Association 266(9):1237-1241, 1991. 188 St. Lawrence, J.S., et al. Cognitive-behavioral intervention to reduce African American adolescents’ risk for HIV infection. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology 63(2):221-237, 1995. 189 Walter, H.J., and Vaughn, R.D. AIDS risk reduction among a multi-ethnic sample of urban high school students. Journal of the American Medical Association 270(6):725-730, 1993. 190 Ryan and Futterman, 1998. 191 Ibid. 192 Saewyc, E.M.; Bearinger, L.H.; Blum, R.W.; and Resnick, M.D. Sexual intercourse, abuse and pregnancy among adolescent women: Does sexual orientation make a difference? Family Planning Perspectives 31(3):127-131, 1999. 193 Saewyc, E.M.; Skay, C.L.; Bearinger, L.H.; et al. Sexual orientation, sexual behaviors, and pregnancy among American Indian adolescents. Journal of Adolescent Health 23(4):238-247, 1998. 194 Los Angeles County Task Force on Runaway and Homeless Youth. Report and Recommendations of the Task Force on Runaway and Homeless Youth. Los Angeles, CA, 1988. 195 Seattle Commission on Children and Youth. Report on Gay and Lesbian Youth in Seattle. Seattle, WA: Department of Human Resources, 1988. 196 Stricof, R.L.; Kennedy, J.T.; Natell, T.C.; et al. HIV seroprevalence in a facility for runaway and homeless adolescents. American Journal of Public Health 81:50, 1988. 197 Kamb, M.L.; et al. Efficacy of risk-reduction counseling to prevent human immunodeficiency virus and sexually transmitted diseases: A randomized controlled trial. Journal of the American Medical Association 280:1161-1167, 1998. 198 Cohen, D.A.; et al. Condoms for men, not women: Results of brief promotion programs. Sexually Transmitted Diseases 19:245-151, 1992. Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health 327 Sexually Transmitted Diseases (Infections) 199 Mansfield, C.J.; et al. A pilot study of AIDS education and counseling of high-risk adolescents in an office setting. Journal of Adolescent Health 14:115-119, 1993. 200 Clark, L.R.; et al. Effect of HIV counseling and testing on sexually transmitted diseases and condom use in an urban adolescent population. Archives of Pediatric and Adolescent Medicine 152:269-273, 1998. 201 Wenger, N.S.; et al. Effect of HIV antibody testing and AIDS education on communication about HIV risk and sexual behavior: A randomized, controlled trial in college students. Annals of Internal Medicine 117:905- 911, 1992. 202 Shain, R.N.; et al. A randomized, controlled trial of a behavioral intervention to prevent sexually transmitted diseases among minority women. New England Journal of Medicine 340:93-110, 1999. 203 CDC. Prevention of hepatitis A through active or passive immunization: Recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP) [published erratum appears in Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report, 46(25):588, June 27, 1997]. Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report 45(RR-15):1-30, 1996. 204 Remis, R.; Ducour, A.; et al. Association of hepatitis B virus infection with other sexually transmitted infections in homosexual men. American Journal of Public Health 90(10):1570-1574, 2000. 205 Seage, G.; Mayer, K.; et al. HIV and hepatitis B infection and risk behavior in young gay and bisexual men. Public Health Reports 12(112):158-167, 1997. 206 Dufour, A.; Remis, R.; et al. Factors associated with hepatitis B vaccination among men having sexual relations with men in Montreal, Quebec, Canada. Sexually Transmitted Diseases 26(6):317-324, 1999. 207 CDC[1], 2000. 208 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS). Tracking Healthy People 2010. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, November 2000. 209 CDC. Guidelines for treatment of sexually transmitted diseases. Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report 47(RR-1);1-118, January 23, 1998. 210 Rabins, C. Public Testimony, Session III: Preventing Diseases and Disorders. Transcript of the Healthy People 2010 Regional Meeting, Chicago, Illinois, November 5-6, 1998. Washington, DC: DHHS, Office of Disease Prevention and Health Promotion. 211 Rosenbaum, Mauery, Blake, and Wehr, 2000. 212 IOM, 1997. 213 Rabins, 1998. 214 Eng and discussion leaders of the IOM Workshop on the Role of Health Plans in STD Prevention, 1999. 215 Celum, C.L.; Bolan, G.; Krone, M.; et al. Patients attending STD clinics in an evolving health care environment. Demographics, insurance coverage, preferences for STD services and STD morbidity. Sexually Transmitted Diseases 24:599-605, 1997. 216 Rosenbaum, Mauery, Blake, and Wehr, 2000. 217 Eng and discussion leaders of the IOM Workshop on the Role of Health Plans in STD Prevention, 1999. 218 Rosenbaum, Mauery, Blake, and Wehr, 2000. 219 Lewin Group. The Impact of Managed Care and Health System Changes on Clinical Microbiology: A Survey Analysis. Prepared by the Lewin Group for the American Society for Micorbiology, September 1998. 220 Rosenbaum, Mauery, Blake, and Wehr, 2000. 328 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health Sexually Transmitted Diseases (Infections) 221 Dalton, R. Lab chiefs warn of HMO cost pinch. The San Diego Tribune September 29, 1998, B-3:1,7,8; B- 4:3,5. 222 Rosenbaum, Mauery, Blake, and Wehr, 2000. 223 DHHS, 2000. 224 IOM, 1999. 225 Chu, S.Y.; Hammett, T.A.; and Buehler, J.W. Update: Epidemiology of reported cases of AIDS in women who report sex only with other women, United States, 1980-1991 [letter]. AIDS 6:518-519, 1992. 226 IOM, 1999. 227 Einhorn, L., and Polgar, M. HIV-risk behavior among lesbians and bisexual women. AIDS Education and Prevention 6(6):514-523, 1994. 228 Ferris, Batish, Wright, et al., 1996. 229 O’Hanlan and Crum, 1996. 230 Marr, L. Sexually Transmitted Diseases. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Press, 1998. 231 Johnson, Guenther, Laube, et al., 1981. 232 Smith, Johnson, and Guenther, 1985. 233 Dardick and Grady, 1980. 234 Silvestre, A.J., and Friedman, F.S. Health care of gay men and lesbians in southwestern Pennsylvania— Results of a health care survey. Pennsylvania Public Health Association, 1997. Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 329 330 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health Substance Abuse Healthy People 2010 Goal Reduce substance abuse to protect the health, safety, and quality of life for all, especially children. O v e rv i e w Substance abuse is pervasive and affects all populations, youth to elderly, in the United States. It takes an enormous toll on the Nation—in both human and economic terms—and remains a significant concern to the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) community. Although no national data are available, a recent review of the literature based on smaller population studies suggests that lesbians and gay men may still be at heightened risk for substance abuse.1 Much less is known about bisexual or transgender women and men, but these groups also may be at increased risk for substance abuse. In addition to being discriminated against by many heterosexuals, they are frequently further marginalized by the gay and lesbian community.2, 3 Like the general population in the United States, substance abuse in the LGBT community is associated with a myriad of public health challenges, including human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) and acquired immonudeficiency syndrome (AIDS), sexually transmitted diseases (STDs), violence (of particular concern, acts committed by and against the LGBT community), and chronic disease conditions such as cirrhosis of the liver. This chapter addresses substance abuse as it affects all populations, but particularly the disparities and issues affecting LGBT populations. LGBT youth use alcohol and other drugs for many of the same reasons as their heterosexual peers: to experiment and assert independence, to relieve tension, to increase feelings of self- esteem and adequacy, and to self-medicate for underlying depression or other mental health problems.4 Adolescents grow up in an environment that assumes heterosexuality of everyone. There is scant acceptance available to LGBT youth within most sectors of their world (e.g., families, peers, schools, churches). Youth of color face additional stresses and challenges in integrating their sexual, gender, racial, and ethnic identities.5 To become visible as LGBT, youth risk painful repercussions with few or no avenues of support. Subsequently, homelessness is a serious consequence for gay youth for a variety of reasons. For many, simply being LGBT is the reason why they may be banished from their Substance Abuse families of origin. Homeless youth are at high risk for exploitation. Without an education or job skills, they may engage in illicit behaviors, such as exchanging sex for food, drugs, or shelter.6 Abusing substances can occur at any age although the focus of most substance abuse prevention programs is on the adolescent. Ironically, substance abuse often is undetected or neglected among older adults, particularly older LGBT people. LGBT elders may feel vulnerable and under pressure to appear heterosexual. Efforts to self-medicate simply increase the invisibility of this segment of the senior community and their particular health needs— including treatment of their substance abuse. Issues and Tre n d s Epidemiological data and information related to substance abuse among the LGBT population are, for the most part, limited to regional or local studies of specific populations (e.g., lesbians, men living with or at risk for HIV). The two most commonly cited substance abuse data sets—the National Household Survey on Drug Abuse and the Monitoring the Future Study—at present do not include sexual orientation or gender identity as demographic variables in their data sets, nor do they ask questions that would yield data for the different populations within the LGBT community. Moreover, the same challenges that confront substance abuse research in general also pertain to studies designed to result in a reliable, accurate picture of the incidence and prevalence of substance abuse among LGBT populations. These include: ■ Clear and consensus-based terms and definitions for “lesbian,” “gay,” “bisexual,” and “transgender.” Although widely recognized and accepted, these terms are often clouded by ambiguity when used for research purposes. Similarly, in most existing studies, definitions of sexual orientation are based on self-report, or no mention is made of how this variable was assessed 7 ■ The impact of stigma and, in some jurisdictions, the fear of legal impact on those individuals participating in and accurately reporting for studies of substance abuse ■ Ethical issues, particularly related to assurances of confidentiality for those participating in prevention and treatment programs, which are important sources of information on use patterns and factors that influence recovery ■ A lack of standard diagnostic criteria to assess substance abuse or substance dependence Studies of alcohol and other drug use in the LGBT community have focused primarily on lesbians and gay men. Few have been designed specifically to include bisexual or transgender persons. The relative lack of national data—and of data for the bisexual and transgender population in particular—is due largely to the cost of oversampling smaller populations in general and concerns regarding the statistical significance of the data obtained. This renders comparison of substance abuse indicators and risk factors among these populations difficult. However, a synthesis of available research indicates that Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 331 Substance Abuse substance abuse is at least as serious a public health problem for the LGBT community as it is for the general population in the United States.8 Data on substance use, together with information regarding barriers to care and factors that contribute to recovery, inform culturally relevant and effective prevention and treatment strategies. Early research on substance abuse among lesbians and gay men reported alarmingly high rates of drinking and other drug use.9, 10 These qualitative research studies were carried out in the absence of disaggregated data for this population from national data sets. However, because of the nature of the research (relatively small, nonrepresentative samples and lack of comparison groups), the results could not—nor were they intended to —be generalized to the LGBT population. Studies conducted in the 1980s reported lower rates of heavy drinking among lesbians than earlier studies. However, these studies suggested that, compared with heterosexual women, lesbians were more likely to drink and more likely to experience alcohol-related problems.11, 12, 13 Overall, recent data suggest that substance use among lesbians and gay men—particularly alcohol use—has declined over the past two decades. However, both heavy drinking and use of drugs other than alcohol appear to be prevalent among young lesbians and gay males, and among some older groups of lesbians and gay men.14, 15 Reasons for this may include greater awareness and concern about health and more moderate drinking among women and men in the general population, some lessening of the social stigma and oppression of lesbians and gay men, and changing norms associated with drinking in some lesbian and gay communities. “Club” drugs such as amyl nitrite, ketamine, and ecstasy, or 3,4- methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA), are receiving national attention. Many of these drugs have been in use for several decades, but the prevalence seems to have increased sharply, especially at late-night dance clubs and at dance parties known as “raves.”16 Although no national studies can verify the prevalence of ecstasy, among LGBT people, Cohen, who has written one of the most definitive books on ecstasy, alluded to its popularity among gay and lesbian populations.17 Klitzman and colleagues explored the association between abuse of ecstasy and high-risk sexual behaviors among gay men. Although the study had many methodological limitations, the results suggested there was a strong association with high-risk sexual behaviors and MDMA.18 The National Institute on Drug Abuse is funding a study to investigate methamphetamine and other drug abuse patterns of men who have sex with men in relation to HIV risk behaviors.19 Few substance abuse studies have included sufficient numbers of bisexual persons to permit separate analyses, and no studies to date have focused exclusively on this subset of the population. Data from bisexual men and bisexual women are usually combined with that of gay men and lesbians, respectively. This most likely reflects an unexplored assumption that bisexual men and bisexual women share more in common with gay men and lesbians, respectively, than with heterosexual men or women. Therefore, many of the studies of presumed gay men or lesbians are likely to include some proportions of bisexual men or bisexual women. Notably, bisexual men are included in studies of gay men in much greater numbers than bisexual women in studies of lesbians. One reason for this is the 332 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health Substance Abuse disproportionately high number of studies that have as a major aim greater understanding of risk factors associated with STDs, including HIV/AIDS, among men who have sex with men. Thus, it is behavior, rather than identity, that is of primary concern in most of the research on substance use among gay and bisexual men. Scant research has been carried out concerning substance abuse among transgender persons,20 and the few studies that do exist have been conducted as part of HIV-related research. These studies have typically employed convenience samples from large urban areas, and their conclusions cannot be generalized to transgender persons as a whole. Nevertheless, they do provide evidence of the extent of substance abuse problems in some urban transgender groups. One 1999 study done in San Francisco by the Department of Public Health found that, in the preceding 6 months, the drugs most commonly used by male-to-female (MTF) transgender persons were: marijuana (64 percent), speed (30 percent), and crack cocaine (21 percent); female-to-male (FTM) transgender persons reported using only marijuana frequently (43 percent).21 Another study, the results of which were publicized in 1999, reported that alcohol, cocaine/crack, and methamphetamines were the drugs most commonly used by MTF transgender persons in Los Angeles.22 Another study, published in 1997 by the San Francisco Department of Public Health, of transgender individuals participating in focus group discussions in San Francisco found that lack of educational and job opportunities and low self-esteem were important factors contributing to drug and alcohol abuse.23 D i s p a r i t i e s There is evidence to suggest that gay men and lesbians perceive themselves to be at increased risk for alcoholism and substance abuse, that they have an increased need for treatment, and that they face barriers to treatment. Gay men and lesbians report alcohol problems nearly twice as often as heterosexuals, even though heavy drinking patterns do not seem to diff e r significantly by sexual orientation.2 4 Alcohol consumption rates among gay men and lesbians do not seem to decrease with age as quickly as they do among heterosexuals.2 5 , 2 6 , 2 7 , 2 8 Too few studies of substance use or abuse in LGBT populations have included sufficient numbers of racial/ethnic minority persons to permit separate analyses. However, the interaction of gender and race/ethnicity also is apparent in LGBT populations, though not always in the same form as in the general population. There is some evidence to suggest that African American men are more likely than White men to trade sex for drugs.29 Because heavy drinking is prevalent in the Latino heterosexual culture and gay male culture, Latino gay men may have higher rates of drinking than either group alone.30 Some studies done in the early 1990s indicated that treatment facility staff members often are not trained in providing gay- and lesbian-specific treatment and that facilities often have few or no gay staff members. 31 Meanwhile, other studies done during the same period and in 1997 suggest that gay, lesbian, and bisexual clients are more willing to participate in treatment programs that address gay issues and are less likely to adhere to treatment Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 333 Substance Abuse recommended by homophobic mental health care providers.32, 33 Additional research is needed to better understand the unique treatment needs of LGBT populations and the role of cultural factors in shaping and influencing patterns of substance use and sexual behavior. Such factors—such as reliance solely on bars and clubs as a means of socialization, stress caused by discrimination and prejudice, and advertising by liquor companies in magazines and publications that target gay men and lesbians—have been documented but continue to be insufficiently understood.34, 35 Notwithstanding the urgent need to address substance abuse among the LGBT adolescent population, there continues to be a serious lack of alcohol-free and drug-free alternative activities for both coming-out or questioning youth and the LGBT adult population. In part because of this lack of opportunities, coming-out youth may have few other options than to enter LGBT society via clubs and bars, where they are susceptible to exposure to the use of tobacco, alcohol, and illicit drugs. Without question, LGBT communities share the responsibility for establishing safer and healthier opportunities for LGBT individuals to gather and socialize. At the same time, there are indications that LGBT communities are to be among those populations apparently targeted by the alcohol industry.36 Environmental as well as individually oriented prevention is useful for reducing consumption among youth and reducing alcohol-related problems among adults. Many environmental prevention strategies that have demonstrated effectiveness in the general population may also be appropriate for LGBT communities. These strategies might include responsible beverage services, promotion of alcohol-safe community events, and development of policies related to alcohol and other drugs in LGBT service and social org a n i z a t i o n s .3 7 L G B T communities may also consider developing guidelines for organizations and community events on limiting alcohol and tobacco sponsorship and promotions.3 8 Accessible substance abuse treatment may be most problematic for transgender individuals. Many substance use programs are not sensitive to the needs of transgender individuals, and few have the capacity to address the realities faced by the transgender population.39, 40 For example, the Transgender Substance Abuse Treatment Policy Group of the San Francisco Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender Substance Abuse Task Force reported that transgender clients in substance abuse treatment programs experienced verbal and physical abuse by other clients and staff; requirements that they wear only clothes judged to be appropriate for their biological gender; and requirements that they shower and sleep in areas judged to be appropriate for their biological gender.41 The reality is that transgender individuals tend to be “invisible” in program evaluation, intake, assessment, and other points in substance abuse prevention and treatment. Culturally sensitive instruments need to be designed and tested to evaluate the effectiveness of substance use programs at all levels (e.g., prevention, treatment, outpatient, inpatient, detoxification). This is especially important for programs serving youth. 334 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health Substance Abuse O p p o rt u n i t i e s Healthy People 2010 states that the direct application of prevention and treatment research knowledge is particularly important in solving substance abuse problems. Developing adaptations of research-proven programs for diverse racial and ethnic populations, field- testing them with high-quality process and outcome evaluations, and providing them where they are most needed are critical. Interventions appropriate to the population to be served, including interventions to address gaps in substance abuse treatment capacity, must be identified and implemented by Federal, tribal, regional, State, and community-based providers in a variety of settings. For LGBT populations, however, it is unclear if prevention and treatment strategies that have demonstrated success in heterosexual populations will yield the same benefits for LGBT individuals. For example, studies indicate that school-based programs focused on altering perceived peer-group norms about alcohol use42, 43 and developing skills in resisting peer pressures to drink44, 45, 46 do reduce alcohol use among participating students. Communitywide programs involving school curricula, peer leadership, parental involvement and education, and community task forces also have reduced alcohol use among adolescents.47 It is not known, however, if these strategies are equally successful in preventing alcohol and other drug use among LGBT students. Many opportunities to prevent drug-related problems have been identified. Core strategies for preventing drug abuse among youth include raising awareness, educating and training parents and others, strengthening families, providing alternative activities, building skills and confidence, mobilizing and empowering communities, and employing environmental approaches. All of these strategies hold promise for preventing alcohol and other drug use among LGBT and questioning youth. In particular, creating and sustaining safer, alternative venues for LGBT and questioning youth to “come out” would represent a major step forward. For substance abuse prevention to be effective, people need access to culturally, linguistically, and age-appropriate services; job training and employment; parenting training; general education; more behavioral research; and programs for women, dually diagnosed patients, and persons with learning disabilities. Particular attention must be given to young persons under age 18 who have an addicted parent because these youth are at increased risk for substance abuse. Because alcoholism and drug abuse continue to affect lesbians, gay men, and transgender persons at two to three times the rate of the general population,48 culturally competent programs that address the special risks and requirements of LGBT individuals are needed. Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 335 Substance Abuse Discussion of Healthy People 2010 Objectives 26-9: Increase the age and proportion of adolescents who remain alcohol- and drug-free. Available data related to youth who identify as lesbian, gay, or bisexual; who have had same-sex experiences; or who are perceived by their peers as being lesbian, gay, or bisexual and are subsequently harassed show a significantly higher prevalence use of alcohol and other drugs than their peers who identify as heterosexual or who have had no sexual experience. In a 1997 Massachusetts Youth Risk Behavior Survey of lesbian and gay youth and those who reported having same-gender sex, 46 percent reported ever having used hallucinogens, 77 percent reported ever having used marijuana, and 33 percent reported having ever used cocaine. 49 Illicit drug use among LGBT youth. One school-based study, which used CDC’s Youth Risk Behavior Survey and was the first to examine the association between sexual orientation and health-risk behaviors, found that self-identified lesbian, gay, and bisexual youth, who made up 2.5 percent of the cohort, were more likely than heterosexual youth in the sample to have used multiple substances. The study also found that lesbian, gay, and bisexual youth were more likely to have been victimized, threatened, and engaged in a variety of risk behaviors, including suicidal ideation and attempts as well as high-risk sexual behavior.50 A longitudinal study of African American and Hispanic gay and bisexual adolescent males found that protective factors and reduced sexual risk-taking were associated with reduced substance use, anxiety, and depression as well as increased self-esteem.51 The 1997 Vermont Youth Risk Behavior Survey found that youth with same-gender sexual experience used drugs and alcohol significantly more than other youth. Some 64 percent smoked cigarettes in the past 30 days; 16 percent drank alcohol daily for the past 30 days; 22 percent reported smoking marijuana 10 or more times in the past 30 days; 29 percent reported using cocaine in the past 30 days; and 19 percent injected illegal drugs two or more times in their life. 52 The 1997 Wisconsin Youth Risk Behavior Study compared 9th through 12th graders who reported having been threatened or hurt because someone thought they were lesbian, bisexual, or gay with those who reported no such harassment. Of those who reported harassment based on the perception of being lesbian, bisexual, or gay, 53.3 percent had smoked cigarettes in the last 30 days; 51.7 percent had used marijuana in the past 30 days; 38.3 percent had sniffed inhalants (glue, aerosol cans, paints) ever; 25.0 percent had used LSD (“acid”) ever; and, 23.3 percent had used cocaine (powder, freebase, or crack) ever.53 CDC’s Youth Risk Behavioral Survey and its Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System questionnaire would serve as an ideal future data collection survey for past-month use among LGBT individuals. The Center for Substance Abuse Treatment (CSAT) has invited the National Association of Alcoholism and Drug Abuse Counselors and five other professional associations (the American Association of Marriage and Family Therapists, the American Counseling Association, the American Psychological Association, the American 336 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health Substance Abuse Psychiatric Association, and the National Association of Social Workers) to gather the information needed to develop a national plan on addictions. Each association will collect information specific to CSAT’s needs through a practitioner research network—a group of professionals from a variety of settings/services who provide information on clinical and service delivery issues. The questionnaire asked gender identity and sexual orientation questions of both providers and the clients they treat. (More information is available online at www.lewin.com/naadac.) 26-10: Reduce past-month use of illicit substances. Past-month use of illicit substances is a measure used in nearly all standardized national, State, and local surveys. However, these surveys do not measure past-month use using sexual orientation or gender identity as demographic variables. In 1996, the National Household Survey on Drug Abuse (NHSDA), administered by the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA), asked one question that focused on sexual behavior and the relationship between substance use and the risk of HIV transmission. Because the question was asked during only one survey year, longitudinal analyses are not available. Even if NHSDA had continued to ask the question, only longitudinal analyses regarding sexual behavior—not sexual orientation—would have been possible. CDC, which administers the Youth Risk Behavior Survey and the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System survey, permits States to add additional questions, including questions related to sexual orientation or gender identity. Several States, such as Massachusetts and Vermont, have subsequently revised their surveys to include questions specific to sexual orientation. To date, no States measure gender identity as a demographic variable in data collection. There is a need to develop a simple, standardized way to obtain valid, LGBT-specific data from a variety of venues across the United States, including the use of quantitative and qualitative research methods to elicit information on use patterns, effective prevention programs, and treatment-seeking and recovery behaviors. Qualitative research can yield critical information for prevention and treatment programs targeting the LGBT community. For example, such research can be used to gather information regarding the role of alcohol and other drugs in the LGBT socialization process, including bars and “circuit parties”—large, international dance events organized and attended by gay and bisexual men. Held at primarily urban venues across the United States, circuit parties have become an increasingly popular alternative to the more traditional local club and bar scene, with participants often flying thousands of miles to attend any one of a number of weekend-long annual events held across the country. Illicit substance use among gay and bisexual men. An analysis of NHSDA data found that people with same-sex partners were more likely to use illicit substances than people with opposite-sex partners.54 About one-third of nearly 170 gay and bisexual men who Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 337 Substance Abuse participated in a survey on MDMA (ecstasy) reported using the drug at least once a month.55 A survey conducted at the April 2000 Millennium March in Washington, D.C., asked 730 men who self-identified as gay males, “How often are party drugs used in your close circle of friends?” Some 26.3 percent reported that party drugs are used once a month, 13.4 percent reported party drugs are used one or more times a week, 21.9 percent reported one or two times a year, and 38.4 percent reported that party drugs are never used in their circle of friends.56 There is also evidence that, even though drug use and heavy alcohol use may decline as gay and bisexual men get older, levels of substance use still remain high and may continue to jeopardize the health of gay and bisexual men.58 Most gay and bisexual men living with HIV infection and substance use disorders either discontinue or reduce substance use before or subsequent to finding out they are HIV-positive, most likely in an attempt to adopt a healthier lifestyle; however, persistent substance abuse or dependence among some HIV-positive men is accompanied by higher levels of distress and diminished quality of life, which underscores their need for treatment.59 Meanwhile, of 3,220 HIV- negative men who have sex with men who participated in an HIV vaccine preparedness study, 49 percent reported using marijuana, 29 percent reported using nitrate inhalants, 21 percent reported using amphetamines or similar stimulants, 14 percent reported using cocaine, and 14 percent reported using hallucinogens. Nearly 90 percent of all participants reported alcohol use.60 Illicit drug use among lesbians and women who have sex with women. Comparisons of data on lesbians and women from the general population show that lesbians tend to drink more than other women. It is important to note that lesbians and gay men are less likely to abstain from alcohol use. Lower rates of abstention show up more consistently in studies than higher rates of “heavy” drinking and may contribute to higher rates of reported problems.61 Lesbians also report greater difficulties related to alcohol consumption.62 The 1988 National Household Survey on Drug Abuse data on the prevalence of 12 illicit and licit drugs by sex and age group and the demographic predictors of past-year frequency of marijuana, alcohol, and cigarette use in a southern State found differences between gay men and lesbians in the use of specific substances and the demographic predictors of drug use.63 A Seattle-based study comparing risk factors for HIV and other STDs in women who reported having had sex with both men and women to women who reported having had sex with men found only that women with a history of bisexual behavior were more likely to 338 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health The 1992 Research Symposium on Alcohol and Other Drug Problem Prevention A m o n g Lesbians and Gay Men Proceedings (California Department of Alcohol and Drug Programs) included consensus among participating researchers that there was more heavy drinking among lesbians and gay men than in the general population and that it persisted later into life than is typical in general population samples. In fact, lesbians were shown to drink more heavily than either nonlesbian women or straight men and more like gay men.5 7 Substance Abuse report past-month drug use than exclusively heterosexual women.64 Meanwhile, a self- report survey of 263 lesbians found that levels of stress, social support, and coping styles were not predictive of problematic substance use.65 The K-Y Community Health Survey asked 307 self-identified lesbians, “How often are party drugs used in your close circle of friends?” Although 61.9 percent reported that party drugs are never used in their group of friends, 11.4 percent reported once a month, 5.9 percent reported one or more times a week, and 20.8 percent reported one or two times a year.66 These findings add to the growing, yet preliminary, body of knowledge that party drug use among lesbians is on the rise. Illicit substance use among transgender people. Except for studies that specifically examined transgender people, there is little information about illicit substance use among transgender individuals. One study examining the past month substance use of 209 transgender women found that 37 percent used alcohol, 13 percent used marijuana, 11 percent used methamphetamine, 11 percent used crack, 7 percent used powdered cocaine, and 2 percent used heroin.67 Generally, other studies of substance use are not designed to identify transgender persons within the study sample. It should be noted that asking about sexual orientation or the number of lesbian and gay clients served does not identify transgender men and women. 26-12: Reduce average annual alcohol consumption. Long-range trends on apparent per capita ethanol consumption by beverage type provide a historical perspective on national patterns of alcoholic beverage consumption. The National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism (NIAAA) uses a drinking population aged 14 and older to calculate per capita consumption rates. NIAAA, with the National Institute of Child Health and Human Development, announced in May 2000 the results of their first study to determine whether future drinking may be predicted by response to stress during infancy. According to NIAAA Director Enoch Gordis, M.D., “If borne out in humans, these findings elucidate the alcohol-stress relationship in two ways: They confirm that early life stress can influence later alcohol consumption, and they offer a promising biological marker of risk for excessive drinking.”68 The K-Y Community Health Survey conducted in the year 2000 asked more than 1,030 respondents about their weekly alcohol use. Among 730 self-identified gay male respondents, 45.1 percent reported that they consume alcohol once a week or less, 28.4 percent reported using alcohol two or three times a week, and 14.6 percent reported using alcohol four times a week. Among 307 self-identified lesbian respondents, 57.4 percent reported using alcohol once a week or less, 20.5 percent reported consuming alcohol two or three times a week, and 14.6 percent reported using alcohol four times a week. Nearly 12 percent of gay males and nearly 6 percent of lesbians who participated in the survey reported that they never use alcohol. Lesbians ranked alcohol abuse as the second highest health concern for the c o m m u n i t y, and more than 30 percent of gay men reported the same concern.6 9 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 339 Substance Abuse 26-13: Reduce the proportion of adults who exceed guidelines for low-risk drinking. Most States in the United States and the District of Columbia collect data on alcoholic beverage sales data. For States with no such data, shipment data are obtained from the Beer Institute (which also includes data from the Distilled Spirits Council of the United States). State population estimates for persons aged 14 and older were obtained from the U.S. census. (To calculate State-level estimates of per drinker ethanol consumption, estimates of abstainers are taken from CDC’s Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System.) Future potential data sources for collecting LGBT-specific data relevant to this objective include the following: ■ Alcohol Epidemiologic Data System, from NIAAA. Specific instruments include the National Alcohol Survey, a multistage-area probability sample of adult respondents, aged 18 and older whose ninth issuance was in 1995-96. (One variable was quantity/frequency measures of total alcohol consumption.) ■ NIAAA and CDC’s National Center for Health Statistics, National Health Interview Survey, Alcohol Sections, 1983 and 1988. Variables included detailed information on quantity and frequency of alcohol consumption. ■ SAMHSA’s National Household Survey on Drug Abuse. Variables include detailed information on consumption. ■ National Institute of Child Health and Human Development and 17 other Federal agencies’ National Longitudinal Study on Adolescent Health, Wave I (1994) and Wave II (1995), which includes a variable on alcohol consumption. ■ U.S. Department of Labor, National Opinion Research Center and Center for Human Resource Research’s National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (1979-97), a multistage, stratified area probability sample of youth aged 14 to 21. Variables include consumption of various alcoholic beverages. ■ CDC’s Youth Risk Behavior Survey. Many of these surveys will be repeated in the future depending upon funding and interest. The dates given should be used only as reference points for previous iterations of the surveys. 26-17: Increase the proportion of adolescents who perceive great risk associated with substance abuse. The perception of risk in using illegal drugs is an important factor in decreasing drug use. As perception of harm decreases, use tends to increase.70 Therefore, youth, including LGBT and questioning youth, need to be informed of the many risks, such as HIV infection, associated with substance use. People who use or abuse drugs or alcohol sometimes reported being so high or intoxicated that they forgot to use a condom.71 Therefore, 340 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health Substance Abuse informing youth about the connection between substance use and other problem behaviors, such as unsafe sex, dating violence, and suicide, is critically important. The 1998 National Household Survey on Drug Abuse found the percentage of adolescents aged 12 to 17 who perceive great risk associated with substance abuse is on the decline.72 The percentage perceiving great risk in using marijuana once a month decreased from 40 percent in 1990 to 30.8 percent in 1998. The percentage of youth perceiving great risk in using cocaine once a month decreased from 63 percent in 1994 to 54.3 percent in 1998. Perception of risk in having five or more drinks once or twice a week decreased from 58 percent in 1992 to 47 percent in 1998.73 Because NHSDA does not include sexual orientation or gender identity as a demographic variable in its data set, data on LGBT and questioning youth are not available. The attitude of influential adults about alcohol and other drugs is another critical predictor of attitudes in youth. It is important that surveys measure both identity and behaviors because questions about identity, behavior, and attraction often yield different response rates. Identity questions generally have the lowest response rate because many people involved in same-sex relationships do not identify with terms commonly used in surveys. Questions about behavior and attraction may be less intimidating or invasive for the respondent, and as a result, may produce more accurate information.74 Many adults who have regular contact with youth communicate ambivalent messages about alcohol and drug use. 75 This may be particularly true for LGBT and questioning youth whose primary venues for “coming out” are bars and clubs. LGBT adults who consume alcohol, drugs, and tobacco products may have a powerful role in influencing young LGBT people’s perception of risk. As a result, the messages about harm and risk that they receive are sometimes impacted by LGBT community dynamics and denial. Risk and harm messages targeted to youth, including LGBT youth, therefore, must take this into account. 26-18: (Developmental) Reduce the treatment gap for illicit drugs in the general population. Healthy People 2010 defines treatment gap as “the difference between the number of persons who need treatment for the use of illicit drugs and the number of persons who are receiving treatment in a given year.” The document estimates that, given this definition— which includes illicit drugs only—5.3 million Americans are in need of treatment services that are not available. Healthy People 2010 also addresses the critical gap in treatment services for alcohol problems, but does not estimate the number of individuals for whom services are not available, suggesting only that “. . . availability of resources and access to clinically appropriate and effective treatment for alcohol problems are limited.” However, an estimated 5.6 million individuals meet the diagnostic criteria for alcohol abuse, and it can be assumed that a significant proportion of them do not have access to treatment. There have been no specific studies of treatment gaps for the LGBT population; there are therefore no precise numerical estimates of treatment gaps. Although there have been rough estimates of needs for treatment for specific populations based on proportions in the general population, these are not considered to be of adequate validity. Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health 341 Substance Abuse There is evidence that “gay men and lesbians . . . have increased need for drug and alcohol treatment, and that they face particular barriers in accessing it.”76 The barriers to treatment for both illicit drugs and alcohol, several of which are cited in Healthy People 2010 for the general U.S. population, are essentially the same for the LGBT communities: ■ Financial barriers that result from public funding mechanisms (e.g., Substance Abuse Prevention and Treatment Block Grant Program, Medicaid, Medicare, demonstration programs) and from private-sector funding sources (which may allocate only a limited number of treatment slots) ■ Financial barriers related to inadequate health and disability insurance coverage ■ Lack of culturally appropriate treatment methods ■ Lack of trained personnel ■ Lack of knowledge and information regarding treatment effectiveness 26-21: (Developmental) Reduce the treatment gap for alcohol problems. Little attention has been paid to the lack of treatment programs designed to reach LGBT populations. There are presently no requirements that block grant programs, or other Federal grant programs, include LGBT populations in the classification of “vulnerable” populations that could be targeted through these funding mechanisms. Through demonstration research programs (e.g., CSAT-sponsored targeted capacity grants), several treatment programs that target LGBT populations have been funded and are participating in cross-site studies of treatment effectiveness. Some treatment programs funded through other federally funded initiatives (e.g., Residential Programs for Women and Their Children) and other State- funded programs have services that meet the specific needs of LGBT populations. However, most of these are outpatient programs. Self-help groups are another source of treatment. According to Beatty and colleagues, as of 1999, the Fellowship of Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) reported that, in addition to the more than 500 AA gay groups in the United States, many AA groups are “gay-friendly,” and Women for Sobriety, although not as widespread as AA, is increasingly used by lesbians, who find the support more culturally appropriate. However, the authors note, “gay-specific inpatient treatment centers are scarce, considering the number of gay individuals with alcohol and drug abuse problems.”77 Education and training of treatment program staff in cultural issues related to and appropriate services for the LGBT population are critical if the availability of effective services is to be enhanced. Whether or not the number of treatment slots is increased, treatment staff must be adequately prepared to provide culturally appropriate and LGBT- competent treatment services for alcohol and other drug use as well as for the physical, mental health, and other service needs associated with substance abuse. Citing a 1991 report, Dean suggests that “Assessments of alcohol and drug treatment facilities have 342 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health Substance Abuse documented lack of staff training in treatment issues for gay and lesbian alcoholics, and few or no gay staff.”78 There also is a need for LGBT-specific standards of care and protocols that are generally acceptable or sanctioned by national accreditation bodies (e.g., American Society of Addiction Medicine, Health Care Quality Assurance). Such standards could be used as the basis for certification of clinical staff or licensing of treatment programs as well as the basis for staff training programs. Adequate data are needed to estimate the need for, demand for, access to, and availability of treatment facilities for LGBT populations. As with Healthy People 2010, this Companion Document recommends that the National Household Survey on Drug Abuse be reviewed as a potential data source. In order to use this periodic survey to obtain useful data on various aspects of treating LGBT populations for substance abuse, specific questions regarding gender identity, gender presentation, sexual orientation, and sexual practices would have to be added to the current survey instrument. In addition to this survey, three additional federally supported surveys are potential sources of data: (1) Treatment Episodes Data System (SAMHSA), (2) National Hospital Ambulatory Medical Care Survey (CDC), and (3) National Health Interview Survey (CDC). As with NHSDA, questions regarding gender identity/presentation and sexual orientation/practices would have to be added to these surveys. For the latter two, specific questions regarding access to and use of alcohol and other drug treatment would be added. In addition to these national data sets, both public (Federal and State) and private (foundation, corporation, and third-party payer) funding should be significantly expanded to support research related to treatment-seeking behavior by the LGBT population. Additional research is also needed on the availability of culturally appropriate alcohol and other drug treatment services and effectiveness of treatment in the LGBT population. These studies could be supported through existing Federal initiatives (e.g., CSAT Expanding Capacity program) or through new initiatives directed toward the LGBT population. The studies could include both quantitative and qualitative research methods. There are no available research studies that have identified best practices among alcohol and other drug treatment programs. LGBT-specific standards for existing treatment services are severely lacking, and LGBT-identified and LGBT-appropriate programs for those who need and could benefit from them are not widely available. Anecdotal evidence suggests that alcohol and other drug treatment programs frequently fail to consider the identities and needs of transgender persons, thereby compromising effectiveness. Treatment personnel may inappropriately require transgender persons to conform to the gender of their birth sex. In the case of inpatient treatment programs, this may result in persons who live full-time as women being housed with men or being required to use male rest rooms. Such policies predictably interfere with the treatment relationship and are not conducive to recovery. Programs may also inappropriately require transgender persons to stop using cross-gender hormones as part of a treatment or detoxification protocol. This can cause significant mental distress and can reduce treatment adherence and effectiveness. Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health 343 Substance Abuse 26-23: (Developmental) Increase the number of communities using partnerships or coalition models to conduct comprehensive substance abuse prevention efforts. According to Healthy People 2010, “a comprehensive program of interventions at the community level is crucial to effective substance abuse prevention.” Citing a study of 48- community partnerships funded by SAMHSA’s Center for Substance Abuse Prevention (CSAP), Healthy People 2010 describes seven characteristics that are shared among partnerships in communities showing statistically significant reductions in substance abuse. These characteristics have been adapted to include treatment and prevention foci as well as findings of other studies of integrated (comprehensive) health and social service delivery programs and systems. Therefore, apparently successful partnerships or coalitions in communities showing statistically significant reductions in substance abuse treatment have: ■ A communitywide vision that reflects the consensus of diverse groups and citizens throughout the community ■ A strong core of community partners ■ An inclusive, broad membership of organizations from all parts of the community ■ Specific mechanisms for avoidance or resolution of conflict ■ Decentralized groups that implement a large number of locally tailored prevention and treatment programs that effectively target local causes of drug use and empower residents to take action and made decisions ■ Services that are culturally appropriate for the population(s) served ■ Low staff turnover ■ Clearly defined and implemented agreements among programs for referrals and shared resources ■ Extensive prevention and treatment activities and support for improvements in local prevention and treatment policies Neither this CSAP-funded research nor any readily available studies regarding community partnerships and coalitions related to substance abuse disaggregate information to indicate the level of involvement of LGBT organizations and individuals in such community partnerships and coalitions. There are examples of involving LGBT organizations (primarily gay organizations) in community coalitions formed to address HIV/AIDS. However, there is no evidence that LGBT representatives or organizations have been involved on a routine basis in the planning and implementation of programs funded by federally supported initiatives related to integrated services (e.g., Starting Early Starting Smart, HIV Outreach). Research on the impact of partnerships and coalitions on the incidence and prevalence of alcohol and other drug use and on treatment effectiveness is minimal. The only available 344 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health Substance Abuse study of impact of prevention-focused programs is the CSAP-funded study cited above. That study, however, does not provide data regarding the involvement of LGBT organizations or individuals in the partnerships. Because of the increasing attention to community-based partnerships and integrated services, it is important that research related to the impact of these efforts on substance abuse treatment outcomes among the LGBT population be supported. S e rv i c e s — R E C O M M E N D ATIONS ■ Health education and prevention-oriented materials on health risks related to substance abuse should be developed for and directed to LGBT youth. ■ On college campuses, where binge drinking often occurs, LGBT students or local LGBT-friendly health clinics need to be included in health education and prevention programs aimed at reducing binge drinking. ■ Providers should review how consumer data are collected for statistical purposes, program reporting requirements, and funding or reimbursement sources and should discuss with the data collection entities how best to collect baseline data on health needs and services usage by LGBT consumers. Education and Tr a i n i n g — R E C O M M E N D ATIONS ■ Mental health and substance abuse counselors should receive cultural competency training that includes addressing the health and other needs of LGBT youth and adults. ■ Substance abuse and mental health providers, as well as LGBT persons, need to be made aware that people who meet the “disability” eligibility criteria in Medicare may be eligible for Medicare-covered alcohol and other drug treatment services. ■ Culturally competent health education materials on low-risk drinking, or responsible alcohol use, and high-risk drinking need to be developed for and directed to the LGBT community. P o l i c y — R E C O M M E N D ATIONS ■ Federal and State funding for health services programs need to be linked to community- based prevention and treatment efforts; LGBT persons need to be included in the community-based planning process along with representatives from other underserved or unserved populations; and cultural competency guidelines need to be established so that individuals are not denied access to care based on their sexual orientation or gender identity. ■ Community partnerships and coalitions should seek cultural competency training and technical assistance from LGBT organizations and service agencies so community planners may better understand and incorporate the health care needs of LGBT populations into planning efforts. Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 345 Substance Abuse ■ Federal and State governments should develop demonstration projects that support community partnerships and coalitions that are convened to address the substance abuse prevention and treatment needs of LGBT communities. R e s e a rc h — R E C O M M E N D ATIONS ■ Sexual orientation and gender identity should be included as demographic variables in national substance abuse surveys, such as NHSDA and the Monitoring the Future Study. ■ Model programs for school youth education programs that address homophobia and drug abuse should be developed. ■ Additional studies are needed to assess the drinking habits of midlife and older LGBT individuals. Te rminology Alcohol abuse: A maladaptive pattern of alcohol use that leads to clinically significant impairment or distress, as manifested by one or more of the following occurring within a 12-month period: recurrent alcohol use resulting in a failure to fulfill major role obligations at work, school, or home; recurrent alcohol use in physically hazardous situations; recurrent alcohol-related legal problems; or continued alcohol use despite having persistent or recurrent social or interpersonal problems caused or exacerbated by the effects of alcohol. In the literature on economic costs, alcohol abuse means any cost-generating aspect of alcohol consumption; this definition differs from the clinical use of the term, which involves specific diagnostic outcomes. Alcohol dependence: A maladaptive pattern of alcohol use that leads to clinically significant impairment or distress, as manifested by three or more of the following occurring at any time in the same 12-month period: tolerance; withdrawal; often taking alcohol in larger amounts or over a longer period than was intended; persistent desire or unsuccessful efforts to cut down or control alcohol use; spending a great deal of time in activities necessary to obtain alcohol or recover from its effects; giving up or reducing important social, occupational, or recreational activities because of alcohol use; or continued alcohol use despite knowledge of having a persistent or recurrent physical or psychological problem that is likely to have been caused or exacerbated by alcohol. Binge drinking: Defined by the National Household Survey on Drug Abuse as drinking five or more drinks on the same occasion on at least 1 day in the past 30 days; defined by the Monitoring the Future Study as drinking five or more drinks on the same occasion during the past 2 weeks. Co-occurring disorders: The simultaneous presence of two or more disorders, such as the coexistence of a mental health disorder and substance abuse problem. Drug dependence: A pattern of drug use leading to clinically significant impairment or distress, as manifested by three or more of the following occurring at any time in the same 12-month period: tolerance; withdrawal; use in larger amounts or over a longer period of 346 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health Substance Abuse time than intended; persistent desire or unsuccessful efforts to cut down; spending a great deal of time in activities necessary to obtain drug(s); giving up or reducing important social, occupational, or recreational activities; or continued use despite knowledge of having a persistent or recurrent physical or psychological problem. I n h a l a n t s : Fumes or gases from common household substances, such as glues, aerosols, butane, and solvents, that are inhaled to produce a high. Injection drug use: The use of a needle and syringe to inject illicit drugs (e.g., heroin, cocaine, steroids) into the vein, muscle, skin, or below the skin. Injection drug use places the user at great risk for transmitting or contracting a number of blood-borne infectious diseases, including HIV, hepatitis B, and hepatitis C. Substance abuse: The problematic consumption or illicit use of alcoholic beverages, tobacco products, and drugs, including misuse of prescription drugs. R e f e re n c e s 1 Hughes, T.L., and Eliason, M. Substance use and abuse in lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender populations. Prepared for the Center for Substance Abuse Prevention. Under Review. 2 Firestein, B.A. Bisexuality: The Psychology and Politics of an Invisible Minority Group. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1996. 3 Israel, G.E., and Tarver, D.E. Transgender Care. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1997. 4 Ryan, C., and Hunter, J. Clinical Issues With Youth. A Provider’s Introduction to Substance Abuse Treatment for Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Individuals. Rockville, MD: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, Center for Substance Abuse Treatment, in press. 5 Hunter, J., and Schaecher, R. Gay and lesbian adolescents. In: R.L. Edwards, ed. Encyclopedia of Social Work. Washington, DC: National Association of Social Workers, 1995, 1055-1063. 6 Clatts, M.C., and Davis, W.R. A demographic and behavioral profile of homeless youth in New York City: Implications for AIDS outreach and prevention. Medical Anthropology Quarterly 13(3):365-374, 1999. 7 Sell, R.L., and Petrulio, C. Sampling homosexuals, bisexuals, gays, and lesbians for public health research: A review of the literature. Journal of Homosexuality 39(4):31-47, 1996. 8 Dean, L., et al. Lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender health: Findings and concerns. 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Journal of the American Medical Association 273(14):1106-1112, 1995. 47 Perry, C.L.; Williams, C.L.; Veblen-Mortenson, S.; et al. Project Northland: Outcomes of a community wide alcohol use prevention program during early adolescence. American Journal of Public Health 86(7):956-965, 1996. 48 McKirnan and Peterson, 1989. 49 Garofalo, R.; Wolf, R.C.; Kessel, S.; et al. The association between health risk behaviors and sexual orientation among a school-based sample of adolescents. Pediatrics 101(5):895-902, 1998. 50 Garofalo, Wolf, Kesell, et al., 1998. 51 Rotheram-Borus, M.J.; Rosario, M.; Reid, H.; and Koopman, C. Predicting patterns of sexual acts among homosexual and bisexual youths. American Journal of Psychiatry 152(4):588-595, 1995. 52 Vermont Department of Health. The 1997 Vermont Youth Risk Behavior Survey. Retrieved December 14, 2000. Available online at www.state.vt.us/adap/yrbs97a.htm. Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 349 Substance Abuse 53 Wisconsin Survey Research Laboratory. Wisconsin Youth Risk Behavior Survey. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin—Extension for Wisconsin Department of Public Instruction. Retrieved December 14, 2000, at www.dpi.state.wi.us/dpi/dlsea/sspw/yrbsindx97.html. 54 Cochran, S., and Mays, V.M. Relation between psychiatric syndromes and behaviorally defined sexual orientation in a sample of the U.S. population. American Journal of Epidemiology 151(5):516-523, 2000. 55 Klitzman, Pope, and Hudson, 2000. 56 K-Y Liquid Community Health Survey. Conducted at the Millennium March, Washington, DC. April 29-30, 2000. 57 Research Symposium on Alcohol and Other Drug Problem Prevention Among Lesbians and Gay Men. Proceedings. Sacramento, CA: California Department of Alcohol and Drug Programs, October 1992. 58 Crosby, G.M.; Stall, R.D.; Paul, J.P.; and Barrett, D.C. Alcohol and drug use patterns have declined between generations of younger gay-bisexual men in San Francisco. Drug and Alcohol Dependence 52(3):177-182, 1998. 59 Ferrando, S.; Goggin, K.; Sewell, M.; Evans, S.; Fishman, B.; and Rabkin, J. Substance use disorders in gay-bisexual men with HIV and AIDS. American Journal on Addictions 7(1):51-60, 1998. 60 Woody, G.E.; Donnell, D.; Seage, G.R.; Metzger, D.; Marmor, M.; and Koblin, B.A. Non-injection substance use correlates with risky sex among men having sex with men: Data from HIVNET. Drug and Alcohol Dependence 53(3):197-205, 1999. 61 Evaluation, Management, and Training. Drug and alcohol use among lesbian and gay people: Findings, research design, insights, and policy issues from the Trinity Project. Research Symposium on Alcohol and other Drug Problems: Prevention among Lesbians and Gay Men, Los Angeles, CA., Folsom, CA, August 1992. 62 Abbott, L.J. The use of alcohol by lesbians: A review and research agenda. Substance Use and Misuse 33(13):2647-2663, 1998. 63 Skinner, 1994. 64 Gonzales, V.; Washienko, K.M.; Krone, M.R.; et al. Sexual and drug-use risk factors for HIV and STDs: A comparison of women with and without bisexual experiences. American Journal of Public Health 89(12):1841-1846, 1999. 65 Heffernan, K. The nature and predictors of substance use among lesbians. Addictive Behaviors 23(4):517- 528, 1998. 66 K-Y Liquid Community Health Survey, 2000. 67 Reback and Lombardi, 1999. 68 National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism. Stress hormone linked to increased alcohol consumption in animal model. NIH News Advisory, May 22, 2000. Results of study also published in Alcoholism: Clinical and Experimental Research 24(5), 2000. 69 K-Y Liquid Community Health Survey, 2000. 70 U.S. Department of Health and Human Sevices, Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA). 1998 National Household Survey on Drug Abuse . Rockville, MD: SAMHSA, 2000. 71 Ibid. 350 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health Substance Abuse 72 Ibid. 73 Ibid. 74 Laumann, E.O.; Gagnon, J.H.; Michael, R.T.; and Michaels, S. The Social Organization of Sexuality: Sexual Practices in the United States. Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press, 1994. 75 Ellis, D.; Zucker, R.; and Fitzgerald, H. The role of family influences in development and risk. Alcohol Health and Research World 21(3):218-226, 1997. 76 Dean et al., 2000. 77 Beatty, R.L.; Geckle, M.O.; Huggins, J.; et al. Gay men, lesbians, and bisexuals. In: McCrady, B.S., and Epstein, E.E., eds. Addictions: A Comprehensive Guidebook. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1999. 78 Dean et al., 2000. Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 351 352 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health Tobacco Use Healthy People 2010 Goal Reduce illness, disability, and death related to tobacco use and exposure to secondhand smoke. O v e rv i e w This chapter on tobacco use among lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) populations provides a literature review of tobacco use and its health implications for the LGBT community. It details tobacco initiation and use trends, and the potential health issues affecting LGBT populations because of smoking and exposure to secondhand smoke. Health disparities by age, race, ethnicity, socioeconomic status, education, biological sex, gender expression, and sexual orientation are summarized. The needs and opportunities to expand research and data collection on LGBT populations and their use of tobacco products are explored. Included in this review are strategies to incorporate LGBT populations in the population data to track the health promotion objectives of Healthy People 2010 concerning tobacco control and smoking cessation; recommendations for the inclusion of LGBT populations, particularly LGBT youth, in tobacco control efforts; and information on ways cultural competency measures may be effectively employed to better reach and serve LGBT populations. This chapter can be used as an educational tool for people interested in promoting healthy behaviors and preventing tobacco-related diseases among LGBT communities. Issues and Trends Tobacco use is one of today’s most challenging health and social problems. Early use of tobacco as well as alcohol has been linked clearly to later substance abuse and behavioral problems.1, 2 Scientific knowledge about the health effects of tobacco use has increased greatly since the first Surgeon General’s report on smoking was released in 1964.3, 4 The current Surgeon General’s Report acknowledges that smoking rates among teens and adults could be cut in half within the next 10 years if the United States would fully implement antismoking programs using effective approaches that are already available.5 Tobacco Use Rigorous surveillance, prevention, and treatment research are needed to change the cultural, psychosocial, and environmental factors that influence tobacco use, and to improve our understanding of smoking patterns and identify strategic tobacco control opportunities. Community-based programs can address risk factors that are identified for specific population groups. However, little is known about tobacco use among lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender populations and the effectiveness of prevention and treatment strategies within LGBT populations. The single most important high-risk behavior associated with the leading chronic diseases is cigarette smoking.6 Although cigarettes have multiple components, most attention is accorded to nicotine. This drug—nicotine—is not only highly addictive but also has been proven to contribute to cardiovascular disease.7 The “safe cigarette,” long sought after, has not been found. 8, 9 Other popular forms of tobacco, such as cigars and bidis (small, imported, brown cigarettes that are hand-rolled in Tendu or Tamburni) are not safe alternatives to smoking commercial cigarettes. Cigar use causes cancer of the larynx, mouth, esophagus, and lung.10 Research shows that bidis are a significant health hazard to users, increasing the risk of coronary heart disease and cancer.11 Reports have shown an increase in the popularity of bidis, particularly among youth, despite their potential negative health implications. 12 The rate of smoking among adults in 1997 was 25 percent.13 Studies have found higher levels of cigarette use among gay men and lesbians than among heterosexuals. 14,15,16,17 Recent representative studies of tobacco use seem to confirm that the prevalence rate of tobacco use among gay men is dramatically higher than among men in the general population. For Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 353 The American Legacy Foundation (ALF) is a philanthropic organization formed as a result of the historic 1999 tobacco settlement agreement. Its purpose is to promote national, State, and local smoking cessation and tobacco control programs. In November 2000, ALF convened more than 50 health researchers and professionals serving the LGBT population for a national health forum focused on tobacco use in the LGBT c o m m u n i t y. Forum participants discussed the various ways tobacco use impacts the LGBT community and made recommendations to ALF for the promotion of LGBT-specific tobacco control and smoking cessation programs. Forum participants reported a high prevalence of smoking in the L G B T community—particularly among youth, LGBT persons with low socioeconomic status, and LGBT people with mental illness. In addition, forum participants identified secondhand smoke as a potential health risk for LGBT people, since L G B T people are disproportionately represented as employees and consumers in venues (i.e., bars, clubs, and restaurants) with a more tolerant attitude toward smoking. Furthermore, participants reported an increase in smoking as a cultural norm among L G B T youth, particularly rural youth, runaway/homeless youth, and youth who accessed LGBT youth centers. Given the clear health needs of this c o m m u n i t y, ALF has prioritized LGBT populations for targeted interventions, research, and a range of health promotion activities designed to reduce smoking and other tobacco use. (More information can be found online at w w w. a m e r i c a n l e g a c y. o r g. ) Tobacco Use example, a study reporting in 1999 found that 41.5 percent of gay adults in a household- based sample identified as smokers18—a rate that far exceeds the rate reported in other studies of men in the general population.19, 20 Tobacco initiation and addiction usually begin in adolescence. Among adults in the United States who have ever smoked daily, 82 percent tried their first cigarette before age 18, and 53 percent became daily smokers before age 18.21 Specific risk factors affecting youth initiating tobacco use include personal/individual, family, school, peer group, community, and society.22 Many of the most important risk factors affecting tobacco use can be categorized as uncontrollable variables, such as genetic predisposition, age, and gender. More amenable to change are personal risk factors, including a lower self-image and lower self-esteem than peers, the belief that tobacco use provides a benefit, and the lack of ability to refuse offers to use tobacco.23 From the prenatal stage through adolescence, the family—parents, caregivers, or parent surrogates— is the main influence in the development of youth and children, and the crucible in which problem behaviors and their antecedents are shaped.24 For youth, failure in school is one of the strongest predictors of tobacco use.25 The negative influence of peers is well established as one of the most important factors for youth, and the influence of peers continues to be important through adulthood.26 There are many community risk factors that have been culled from the research. 27 One community risk factor that is relevant for LGBT youth is cultural disenfranchisement—i.e., a perception among youth that the dominant/mainstream culture is not relevant to them. Societal-level risk factors relate to national economic and employment conditions, discrimination, and marginalization of groups.28 The relevance of these societal factors to LGBT people, especially youth, cannot be overstated. The combination of influencing factors increases the risk of LGBT youth initiating tobacco use. In spite of the potential for increased risk, the short- and long-term effects of known risk factors, especially internalized and externalized homophobia, on smoking behaviors among LGBT youth is unstudied. And although youth have emerged as a major focus for tobacco use control efforts, LGBT youth with their specific risk circumstances have not been identified for preventive interventions. Tobacco use among adolescents increased in the 1990s. Data from the 1999 Monitoring the Future Study indicated that past-month smoking among 8th-, 10th-, and 12th-graders was 18, 26, and 35 percent, respectively. These rates represented increases of 20 to 33 percent since 1991.29 Data from the Youth Risk Behavior Survey revealed that past-month smoking among 9th- to 12th-graders rose from 28 percent in 1991 to 36 percent in 1997.30 In 1997, past-month cigar use among 9th- to 12th-graders was 22 percent (11 percent of females and 31 percent of males). 31 The data necessary to determine tobacco use among LGBT youth were not collected in these studies as respondents were not questioned regarding sexual orientation or gender identity. Tobacco use is responsible for more than 430,000 deaths per year among adults in the United States, representing more than 5 million years of potential life lost.32 If current 354 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health Tobacco Use tobacco use patterns in this Nation persist, an estimated 5 million persons under aged 18 will die prematurely from a smoking-related disease.33 In addition to smoking tobacco, exposure to secondhand smoke has serious health effects.34, 35,36 Researchers have identified more than 4,000 chemicals in tobacco smoke. Of these, at least 43 cause cancer in humans and animals.37 Each year, because of exposure to secondhand smoke, an estimated 3,000 nonsmokers die of lung cancer.38, 39 Studies also have found that secondhand smoke exposure causes heart disease among adults.40,41 Data reported from a study of the U.S. population aged 4 and older indicated that, among non- tobacco users, 88 percent had detectable blood levels of serum cotinine, a biological marker for exposure to secondhand smoke.42 Asthma and other respiratory conditions often are triggered or made more severe by tobacco smoke. Smoking seems to be the cultural norm for many social settings frequented by LGBT people (e.g., bars, circuit parties, dance clubs, youth centers), thereby giving weight to the notion that LGBT persons may be at disproportionately high risk for exposure to secondhand smoke and its associated negative health effects. However, additional research is needed to support or invalidate this thinking. Disparities Disparities in tobacco use exist among certain racial and ethnic populations. The 1998 Report of the Surgeon General43 responded to the need to analyze thoroughly the smoking- related health status of racial and ethnic groups and to determine if there was a differential risk for tobacco addiction. 44 High risk might derive not only from personal characteristics, but also from social factors, such as changes in location, acculturation, and targeted advertising. Tobacco use varies within and among racial and ethnic groups. In general, the data suggest that “acculturation influences smoking patterns in that individuals tend to adopt the smoking behavior of the current broader community. . . .”45 American Indians and Alaska Natives (34 percent) are more likely to smoke than other racial and ethnic groups, with considerable variations in percentages by tribe.46 Hispanics (20 percent) and Asians and Pacific Islanders (17 percent) are less likely to smoke than other groups. Regional and local data, however, reveal much higher smoking levels among specific subpopulation groups of Hispanics and Asians and Pacific Islanders.47 Smoking levels among Vietnamese and Korean Asian Americans are higher than previously reported, according to a 1997 multilingual survey.48 Additional research is needed to determine if sexual orientation or gender identity among people of color increases their risk for tobacco use. Among adolescents, smoking rates differ between Whites and African Americans. 49, 50 By the late 1980s, smoking rates among White teens were more than triple those of African American teens. In recent years, smoking has started to increase among African American male teens, but African American female teens continue to have lower smoking rates. Education and socioeconomic status are significant factors in determining the likelihood of tobacco use, including that among gay men and lesbians. Gay men and lesbians with higher Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health 355 Tobacco Use education levels are less likely to use cigarettes as frequently as those with lower levels of education.51 Persons with 9 to 11 years of education (35 percent) have significantly higher levels of smoking than individuals with 8 years or less of education or 12 years or more. Individuals with 16 or more years of education have the lowest smoking rates (12 percent). Individuals below the poverty level are significantly more likely to smoke than individuals at or above the poverty level (33 percent compared to 25 percent)52—a fact that has important implications for the prevalence of smoking among LGBT individuals and families living in poverty. O p p o rt u n i t i e s Efforts to reduce tobacco use in the United States range from individually based interventions, primarily smoking cessation strategies, to more population-based interventions. Population-based interventions emphasize prevention of initiation, reduction of exposure to environmental tobacco smoke, and systems changes to promote smoking cessation.53,54,55,56,57,58,59 Federal, State, and local government agencies and numerous health organizations have joined together to develop and implement these population-based approaches. Smoking cessation research has generated the most advanced and effective brief and intensive behavioral intervention protocols. 60 Generally, these programs help patients to: ■ Set a target date and specific plan for quitting ■ Identify and cope with temptations likely to provoke relapse ■ Effectively utilize nicotine replacement or other medications ■ Solicit support from family or friends ■ Secure continued followup and support services ■ Prevent relapse The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services’ Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, in partnership with the American Association of Health Plans and the American Medical Association, has developed a comprehensive Internet-based source for clinical practice guidelines. The National Guidelines ClearinghouseTM makes available a full range of current guidance on treatments for specific medical conditions or behaviors such as tobacco. (More information can be obtained online at www.guideline.gov.) More than 50 guidelines are relevant to tobacco, cigarette smoking, cessation programs, physician counseling, and nicotine replacement therapy. Population-based community research studies and evidence from California, Florida, Massachusetts, and Oregon have shown that comprehensive programs can be effective in reducing average cigarette consumption per person. Both California and Massachusetts increased cigarette excise taxes and designated a portion of the revenues for comprehensive 356 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health Tobacco Use tobacco control programs. Data from these States indicate that (1) increasing excise taxes on cigarettes is one of the most cost-effective short-term strategies to reduce tobacco consumption among adults and to prevent initiation among youth, and (2) the ability to sustain lower consumption increases when the tax increase is combined with an antismoking campaign.61 In addition, recent data from Florida indicate that past-month smoking decreased significantly among public middle school students (from 19 to 15 percent) and high school students (from 27 to 25 percent) from 1998 to 1999 following implementation of a comprehensive program to prevent and reduce tobacco use among youth in the State. 62 Unfortunately, because sexual orientation and gender identity were not variables within these studies, it cannot be determined whether these strategies will yield similar success in LGBT communities. The goals of comprehensive tobacco prevention and reduction efforts include preventing people from starting to use tobacco, helping people quit using tobacco, reducing exposure to secondhand smoke, and identifying and eliminating disparities in tobacco use among population groups. These principles hold true for LGBT populations as well. To address these goals, several approaches are being implemented: community programs, media interventions, policy and regulation, and surveillance and evaluation. Specifically, the following elements are used to build capacity to implement and support tobacco use prevention and control interventions: a focus on change in social norms and environments that support tobacco use, policy and regulatory strategies, community participation, establishment of public and private partnerships, strategic use of media, development of local programs, coordination of statewide and local activities, linkage of school-based activities to community activities, and use of data collection and evaluation techniques to monitor program impact. The importance of these various strategic elements has been demonstrated in a number of States, such as Arizona, California, Florida, Massachusetts, and Oregon.63 In these and other States, tobacco control programs are supported through funding from the Federal Government, private foundations, State tobacco taxes, State lawsuit settlements, and other sources. These programs address issues such as reducing exposure to secondhand smoke, restricting minors’ access to tobacco, treating nicotine addiction, limiting the impact of tobacco advertising, increasing the price of tobacco products, and directly regulating the product (e.g., requiring product ingredient reporting). Tobacco control programs and materials should be culturally and linguistically appropriate. Given the racial, ethnic, age, and gender diversity within the LGBT c o m m u n i t y, this concept is especially applicable to LGBT populations. It is essential that tobacco control programs, the agencies and organizations that sponsor these programs, and the staff and personnel who administer such initiatives are LGBT-competent, sensitive to the needs of LGBT persons, and respectful of the rights of LGBT individuals to confidentiality and privacy. Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 357 Tobacco Use S u m m a ry of LGBT Researc h Smoking among lesbians and gay men. Studies of tobacco use in gay and lesbian populations, like surveys of alcohol use, tend to use nonrandom samples. In most cases, subjects typically include bar patrons who report tobacco use rates that are substantially higher than their heterosexual counterparts.64 However, unlike studies of alcohol use, more recent representative studies of tobacco use seem to confirm the earlier suspicion that the prevalence rate of tobacco use among gay men is dramatically higher than among men in the general population. For example, 41.5 percent of gay men in a household-based sample identified as smokers65—a rate that far exceeds the 28.6 percent rate reported among men in the general population. 66 Lesbian adults have been found to smoke more than heterosexual women. Data reported by the Institute of Medicine (IOM) point to significant differences in cigarette smoking status by sexual orientation. Two times as many lesbians reported heavy smoking than heterosexual women. The IOM report also suggests that, even though this issue is understudied, lesbians may experience high levels of psychosocial stress, which may be complicated by low socioeconomic status.67 Smoking has also been found to be more prevalent among poor women than women of higher socioeconomic status,68, 69 and among women who experience high levels of stress.70, 71 Smoking rates may be especially high among lesbians of low socioeconomic status who also experience stress. Some studies have found no indication that cessation interventions differ by gender. However, they acknowledge that the issue is understudied. Women may face different stressors and barriers to quitting, such as greater likelihood of depression, weight-control concerns, and issues surrounding childcare. Thus, cessation programs should be studied for differences by gender as well as sexual orientation to ensure that these suggested differences are identified and addressed. 72 Representative studies of tobacco use among lesbians have not been completed. Nonrandom studies suggest that lesbians may smoke more and have a higher body mass index than heterosexual women, and that they may be at increased risk for cardiovascular disease and cancer.73, 74, 75 Comparisons between young gay men and lesbians found that lesbians may actually smoke more than young gay men, which raises serious concerns about their risk of tobacco-related morbidity and mortality and underscores the need for additional research.76 Lesbians and gay men have consistently reported higher levels of cigarette smoking (current, in the past year, and lifetime use) across all age levels than their heterosexual counterparts.77, 78 More than 37 percent of LGBT respondents in one survey were current smokers,79 whereas 36 percent of gay male and lesbian respondents (versus 30 percent of heterosexuals) in another national marketing survey identified as current smokers.80 In an Australian study, more than half (54 percent) of the gay men in the Brisbane sample currently smoked,81 compared to nearly 40 percent in the Melbourne sample.82 The most scientifically rigorous study to date on tobacco use among gay and bisexual men revealed that they were more likely to smoke cigarettes than men in the general population. Some 47.8 percent of the sample reported current cigarette smoking—significantly higher 358 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health Tobacco Use than rates found in a general sample of adult men (28.6 percent). Smoking rates for gay men were also significantly higher than for men in general using both national prevalence estimates and State prevalence estimates for Arizona and Oregon separately. This held true even when prevalence estimates were stratified by age and education. Half of the youngest cohort of gay men aged 18 to 24 were current smokers, suggesting that smoking among gay men will continue to represent an enormous public health challenge in the years to come.83 Smoking among transgender persons. To date, no empirical data on tobacco use among transgender populations exist. However, smoking may be highly prevalent among transgender persons given identified risk factors: poverty, low educational attainment, a high prevalence of injection and noninjection substance use and abuse, stressful living and work environments (e.g., unstable housing, violence), incarceration, human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) seropositivity, and sexual risk patterns.84 These risk factors suggest that tobacco use may be high among transgender populations. Additional research is needed to shed new light on the prevalence of tobacco use in this population and to design culturally competent interventions. Smoking among HIV-positive persons. The medical literature contains conflicting reports on the effect of cigarette smoking on medical conditions related to the course of HIV infection.85, 86, 87, 88, 89 Researchers have consistently found, however, an association between cigarette smoking and bacterial pneumonia, hairy leukoplakia, oral candidiasis, and dementia related to acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS) among people with HIV.90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97 The effect of cigarette smoking on the development of Pneumocystis carinii pneumonia (PCP) and Karposi’s sarcoma (KS) is unclear. However, some research has indicated that cigarette smoking is related to the development of PCP, that smoking predicts a shorter time of progression to a diagnosis of AIDS, and that smoking is associated with a higher risk of death.98, 99, 100 Other researchers have found no relationship between smoking and incidence of PCP or KS, progression to AIDS diagnosis, or death.101, 102, 103, 104 One study found that 57 percent of HIV-positive men and women were current smokers. 105 In comparison to HIV-negative individuals, HIV-positive persons were significantly more likely to smoke.106, 107 Smoking and tobacco use among LGBT youth. Another study revealed that adolescent males who engage in same-sex sexual behavior also reported increased rates of tobacco use in comparison to their heterosexual peers, and that a higher number of male sexual partners was associated with higher rates of tobacco use, substance use, victimization, and use of violence.108 However, there is no way to know where gay adolescents fit into initiation of smoking trends, to what degree LGBT youth are initiating smoking, or if LGBT youth are more likely than their heterosexual peers to start smoking or quit at an earlier age. Tobacco-related illness in LGBT populations. As a result of high smoking rates, the burden of tobacco-related health problems is great among LGBT populations, including an increased risk of lung cancer and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, and an increased risk for such cancers as esophageal cancer due to the co-occurrence of cigarette smoking and heavy alcohol use among LGBT individuals.109, 110 Several investigators have Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 359 Tobacco Use hypothesized that lesbians are at higher risk for breast cancer than heterosexual women due to higher rates of risk factors (e.g., obesity, alcohol consumption, nulliparity) and lower rates of breast cancer screening.111, 112 Given the high prevalence of smoking among lesbians, tobacco-related health problems—such as lung, breast, and cervical cancer—may be elevated compared to women in general. Tobacco marketing in LGBT communities. There is evidence that the tobacco industry aggressively targets the LGBT community.113 A survey of more than 300 gay men and lesbians in Los Angeles revealed that 59 percent of respondents either “disagree” that tobacco companies target the LGBT community or were “not aware” that they were being targeted. Some 44 percent of those same respondents, however, reported that they recalled seeing tobacco companies sponsor bar and night club events to promote their products, and 50 percent reported using cigarettes during the 7 days prior to completing the survey. Some 53 percent also “agreed” that tobacco use is an “acceptable” norm among their peers.114 Tobacco companies have been enormously successful in adopting the strategies of alcohol businesses—positioning the tobacco industry as a valuable “friend” to LGBT communities. This is particularly true for community LGBT youth organizations that are dependent on the tobacco industry and funding for prevention of HIV and sexually transmitted diseases (STDs) to provide services to their underserved populations. A spokesperson for Philip Morris Companies, Inc., noted that in 1990 the company contributed more than $800,000 to AIDS-related charities and the following year donated $10,000 to the Gay and Lesbian Alliance.115 At the same time, LGBT community leaders, organizers, health professionals, advocates, and HIV/AIDS service organizations seem to remain oblivious to the impact of tobacco money on their own work and are often resistant to discussions of these issues. In some instances, this resistance may stem from their own use of tobacco. Developing partnerships with key individuals within large advertising and marketing firms could help facilitate the development of appropriate media messages that both serve the advertisers’ function (e.g., selling a product) and the LGBT community (e.g., increasing positive LGBT images, reducing health-negative behaviors, reducing homophobia, and addressing other issues of concern to the LGBT community). Assisting LGBT youth and adult service organizations dependent on tobacco industry funding to identify and cultivate alternative funding to meet their financial needs would loosen the tobacco industry’s grip on the LGBT community. The need for new, LGBT-specific knowledge. There is a lack of concrete data on tobacco use among LGBT persons. In addition, there is a lack of formative or market research on youth who are either coming out or questioning their sexuality and for whom preventive strategies could be effective in stopping the onset of tobacco use. Within the LGBT network of health and social services, attempts to address tobacco use have been few and far between—and easily overshadowed or abandoned in the face of other more immediate crises, such as HIV/AIDS or breast cancer. Finally, there are no evaluated model programs for preventing tobacco use in LGBT populations, no rigorous evaluations of the very few LGBT-specific smoking cessation programs offered in a handful of localities, and no tracking treatment programs for LGBT people enrolled in managed care organizations. 360 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health Tobacco Use Discussion of Healthy People 2010 Objectives 27-1: Reduce tobacco use by adults. Existing research indicates that a broad range of health care providers can effectively deliver cessation interventions, yet only a minority of smokers reports being advised to quit.116 There are well-documented problems with access to appropriate and culturally competent health care and health insurance for LGBT individuals.117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124 If those who want to quit smoking do not have access to a culturally competent health care provider who is educated and prepared to screen for tobacco use and able to administer the appropriate intervention, they may miss out on important counseling and nicotine replacement therapies that also might be covered by insurance. Commonly, over-the-counter nicotine replacement therapies are not covered by health insurance plans and may be cost-prohibitive for individuals to purchase out-of-pocket. Whenever possible, smoking cessation programs should be tailored to the different needs of the diverse populations being served. The Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality guidelines recommend that, when there is a lack of studies on smoking treatment in minority communities, more research should be conducted to better understand the treatment needs of the population and to develop culturally appropriate interventions.125 This recommendation is directly applicable to LGBT communities and should be considered a top public health priority. To track the success of targeted interventions for LGBT populations and to document improved outcomes, researchers, policymakers, program planners, and others concerned with reducing LGBT tobacco use must work to obtain a more accurate measurement of how many LGBT persons use tobacco products. Better surveillance data on LGBT tobacco use are urgently needed. Existing research seems to indicate that LGBT populations smoke at significantly higher rates than the general population. However, obtaining accurate estimates of smoking prevalence in the LGBT community is difficult because: ■ Large-scale household-based surveys do not ask the sexual orientation or gender identity of respondents. ■ Large-scale household-based health studies that have samples of LGBT people do not ask about tobacco use. ■ Most studies to date have relied on convenience samples (e.g., people in bars or clinics), where smokers were more likely to be present. Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health 361 The Urban Men’s Health Study is a household-based instrument with a probability sample of men who have sex with men (MSM) in San Francisco, Los Angeles, New Yo r k , and Chicago. A followup tobacco study conducted by Dr. Ron Stall and Dr. Greg Greenwood is expected to yield new data on smoking among MSM, including current and lifetime tobacco use, attempts to quit smoking, and attitudes about smoking. The study is funded by the California To b a c c o - Related Disease Research Program, Urban Men’s Health Study, and National Institute of Mental Health. Tobacco Use 362 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health ■ Due to small sample sizes, studies have been unable to examine effectively whether groups of LGBT populations are disproportionately affected by tobacco use. It is crucial that ethnicity/race, age, gender, education, geography, and socioeconomic status be included as demographic variables in studies of LGBT tobacco use as well as the effectiveness of tobacco use interventions. 27-2: Reduce tobacco use by adolescents. Little is known about tobacco use among LGBT youth, in part because many young people do not self-identify as LGBT until early adulthood, and because of the distrust LGBT youth frequently have of adults, institutions, authority figures, and the health system. However, Stall and colleagues found that smoking rates were highest among younger gay and bisexual men,126 theorizing that smoking initiation among this group occurred during adolescence. LGBT youth may be at particularly high risk to initiate tobacco use given risk factors: lack of support from family and peers, depression, low self-esteem, and stressful life events related to “coming out.”127 27-3: (Developmental) Reduce initiation of tobacco use among children and adolescents. Psychological and behavioral factors significantly influence the onset of smoking behavior in youth. These include poor self-esteem, peer pressure, misperceptions about the number of youth who actually smoke, and exposure to opinion leaders who influence behavior.128, 129 The younger the person is when he or she begins to smoke, the more likely the person is to be a smoker as an adult. Nearly all smoking begins in adolescence. However, if initiation is delayed until adulthood, rates of new smoking decline significantly.130 Adolescents with fewer coping skills to resist peer influences are more likely to smoke.131, 132 Youth who smoke are also more likely to attempt suicide and engage in high-risk activities. Although the act of smoking is not causal in nature, these behaviors are found in greater numbers of LGBT youth when compared with the general population and should be considered as a constellation of related behaviors. The exact nature of this relationship or interrelationship is unknown but should be considered an opportunity for a targeted, comprehensive health promotion program. LGBT youth are more likely to have lower self-esteem because of external and internalized homophobia.133 LGBT youth often experience low perceived levels of adaptive social support due to internalized or externalized homophobia. Because lower self-esteem is associated with smoking, this places LGBT youth at greater risk for smoking. Smoking behavior is usually the first substance used prior to the initiation of alcohol and other drug use.134 There is a high rate of substance abuse among LGBT teens, generally associated with difficulty in adaptive coping. 135 If smoking behaviors among LGBT teens can be prevented or delayed, other substance use may be prevented or delayed as well. Tobacco Use 27-5: Increase smoking cessation attempts by adult smokers. Culturally competent smoking intervention services for the LGBT community have not been developed, and research on the topic is lacking. The absence of research on tobacco use cessation treatment or interventions that are specific to the LGBT community pales in comparison to treatment development and research of LGBT- specific interventions for other health risks (e.g., alcohol and drug use, STD/HIV treatment and prevention) as well as ethnic- specific tobacco treatment research and intervention. Existing research indicates that although a broad range of health care providers can effectively deliver cessation interventions, only a small number of smokers report being advised to quit.136 Additional future data may become available through the Queer Tobacco Intervention Project (QueerTIP), which is a 1-year (2000-2001), State-funded Pilot Community-Academic Research Award to build partnerships to reduce smoking in the LGBT community. The program is conducting a community-based pilot research project to design and evaluate tobacco cessation services specifically designed for LGBT populations. Although the long-term goal is to reach every segment of the LGBT community, the current scope of the pilot project is limited due to funding constraints. Over the course of the next year, the project will establish and evaluate a comprehensive tobacco intervention program designed specifically to reach young lesbians, bisexual women, transgender persons, and all LGBT persons. The project is built on four primary goals: ■ To strengthen collaborations among researchers, health advocates, and community providers and organizations serving the LGBT community in San Francisco ■ To review tobacco services and research to date with the LGBT community to identify best treatment and intervention approaches Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 363 The Last Drag Program in San Francisco, an L G B T- a ffirming, community-based smoking cessation group, serves as a promising smoking cessation model for LGBT populations. Created in the early 1990s, the intervention is based upon the volunteer models of smoking cessation supported by the American Cancer Society and the American Lung Association. Outcome data are minimal, and the model has not been empirically tested. However, 42 to 47 percent of participants reported successfully becoming nonsmokers by the end of an 8-week class. Two-thirds of the clients are men, one-third are people of color, and one-tenth do not identify as gay. Another potential model is the King County (Seattle, Washington) Sexual Minorities To b a c c o Coalition. Launched in 1995, the coalition joined forces with Emily Brucker to develop Out and Free, a smoking cessation guide that applies the skills learned during coming out to quitting smoking. The goal of the coalition is to increase awareness of the risks of smoking, conducting a d v o c a c y, encouraging appropriate public policy, and promoting cessation. Tobacco Use ■ To develop comprehensive tobacco intervention services specifically designed for the LGBT community, including a CORE [Commitment, Opportunity, Responsibility, and Education] smoking cessation model and a multicomponent network system for referrals to LGBT-positive treatment providers ■ To submit a proposal for a 3-year, community-based, randomized clinical trial of LGBT- positive tobacco intervention services 27-6: Increase smoking cessation during pregnancy. No data are available on smoking rates during pregnancy among lesbians and bisexual women. Although a significant degree of planning may occur prior to pregnancy among lesbians, a number of issues still merit attention. For lesbians who smoke and are pregnant, many health care providers may be unable to provide culturally competent care and counseling. Some lesbian mothers-to-be may not reveal their sexual orientation to their health care provider and remain closeted throughout the prenatal care process. Specific issues facing adolescent girls and young adult women who are questioning their sexuality and are pregnant need to be addressed. In addition, as in all households, male partners and other individuals living in the household must stop smoking so that the mother and fetus are not exposed to secondhand smoke. Many individuals in the LGBT community are parents or planning to be parents. As a result, the same tobacco prevention and smoking cessation principles recommended to heterosexual individuals who are parents or planning to be parents should be used in counseling LGBT individuals who are parents or contemplating parenthood. However, such strategies need to be accessible to LGBT individuals and delivered in an LGBT-competent way. In addition, some L G B T youth who live with their families of origin have the same opportunity as their non- L G B T counterparts to assist their mothers in trying to stop smoking if the mothers are pregnant. This educational opportunity is mutually beneficial to all parties. 27-7: Increase tobacco use cessation attempts by adolescent smokers. Several challenges are associated with introducing tobacco cessation attempts among LGBT youth. Access to adequate health insurance that covers the cost of smoking cessation products presents the most formidable challenge. Some youth who live in metropolitan areas can participate in smoking cessation courses that may be offered by LGBT community centers. QuitNet is an Internet Web site that brings proven scientific methods online to deliver support to smokers whenever they need it. (More information is available online at www.quitnet.org.) In addition, youth smoking cessation is complicated by the fact that developmental and psychosocial issues can influence the effectiveness of smoking cessation efforts and that few youth report the onset of smoking. In many cases, smoking serves a social function for youth attempting to improve self-image and exhibit what they believe to be normative behavior. LGBT youth often experience a greater sense of being different (cognitive 364 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health Tobacco Use dissonance) that they may try to decrease though using behaviors that allow them to feel part of the mainstream group of youth. Given the complexity of these factors, smoking cessation efforts aimed at LGBT youth must address the psychological function that smoking serves, or cessation efforts are unlikely to be effective. 27-8: Increase insurance coverage of evidence-based treatment for nicotine dependency. The American Association of Health Plans (AAHP) was awarded a 4-year, $1.4 million grant from the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation to assist AAHP in developing and managing a broad technical assistance program to support the foundation’s recently announced Addressing Tobacco in Managed Care Program. Specific activities of AAHP’s National Technical Assistance Office (NTAO) are cofunded by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality. AAHP is coordinating the NTAO efforts with its member plan, the Health Alliance Plan in Detroit, Michigan, to develop a multifaceted tobacco resource center. Information will be available to health plans, the medical and academic communities, public health, and health care consumers through numerous ongoing programs and activities. During the 4-year project, NTAO will direct an ongoing process to: ■ Develop a comprehensive network of key contacts in health plans responsible for smoking cessation and health promotion ■ Establish a clearinghouse of tobacco prevention information gathered from academic and professional journals, conferences, newsletters, and white papers The goal of NTAO is to provide health plans with all the resources necessary to implement and support comprehensive tobacco prevention and cessation programs within the health plan’s membership or the larger community, using proven and available methods as a tool to design interventions most appropriate to the plan’s target populations. NTAO expects to compile diverse examples of best practices that will be easily adaptable in a variety of managed care settings. (More information can be obtained online at www.aahp.org.) Although there appear to be no data on insurance coverage for evidence-based treatment of nicotine dependence for LGBT populations, some LGBT persons lack insurance coverage for nicotine dependency treatment. In addition, treatment interventions were not designed with the needs of LGBT smokers in mind, and providers may not have the skills or knowledge to deliver those interventions in a culturally competent manner. Diseases related to tobacco use exact an enormous financial toll on the public-sector health care system. Private-sector health care organizations should assume at least partial responsibility for reducing future tobacco-related morbidity and mortality by increasing LGBT access to nicotine treatments and ensuring that LGBT individuals have equal access to early diagnosis and treatment services for tobacco-related illnesses. Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 365 Tobacco Use 366 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health 27-9: Reduce the proportion of children who are regularly exposed to tobacco smoke at home. Many children and adolescents living in LGBT families are exposed to secondhand (or environmental) tobacco smoke. LGBT parents who smoke may be reluctant to disclose their smoking habit to health care providers. This presents a barrier to parents receiving smoking cessation counseling and continues to expose their children to risk. LGBT parents and other LGBT adults who smoke tobacco at home need to be educated about the risks to others living in the home and encouraged to seek treatment. In addition, the treatments available to LGBT individuals who want to quit should be LGBT-competent and delivered in a nonstigmatizing, nonjudgmental way. 27-10: Reduce the proportion of nonsmokers exposed to environmental tobacco smoke. Bars and clubs serve as an important gathering place for many LGBT individuals. However, exposure to secondhand smoke has presented a serious concern for nonsmokers seeking a physically safe, LGBT-affirming place to socialize and congregate. Several LGBT advocacy groups—such as Community Focus, the Coalition of Lavender Americans on Smoking and Health, and the California Lavender Smoke-Free Network— played a role when California bars and restaurants were required to become smoke-free. One group used the anticipated implementation of smoke-free bar rules to conduct intercept surveys at LGBT pride events in Los Angeles, in part designed to begin preparing the LGBT community for the prospect of nonsmoking gay bar life. The Los Angeles planning group also did some outreach to gay bar and tavern owners in advance of the new regulation’s taking effect. A very popular bar in West Hollywood, California, hosted a smoke-free night once a week. The increased patronage on the smoke-free nights was significant in encouraging other such businesses to plan to comply with the new laws rather than ignore or actively resist. 27-12: Establish laws on smoke-free indoor air that prohibit smoking or limit it to separately ventilated areas in public places and worksites. Healthy People 2010 recognizes that legislative change is required to ensure that all workers in the United States, including LGBT people, should be protected from secondhand smoke. Such policies not only safeguard the health of nonsmokers but can also provide the impetus for a smoker to quit. In the LGBT community, gay businesses are often the most common places where LGBT persons gather to socialize. The store or business owners and staff have the right to perform their jobs in a safe environment, and the patrons and customers have the right to shop or safely congregate, without being exposed to secondhand tobacco smoke. Federal, State, and Tobacco Use local governments should work in partnership with LGBT business owners and managers to implement and enforce smoke-free environments that safeguard the health of employees and customers. 27-16: (Developmental) Eliminate tobacco advertising and promotions that influence adolescents and young adults. Media portrayals directly and indirectly influence how youth and young adults, including LGBT young people, perceive smoking. Advertising affects how youth perceive smoking by influencing their perception of smokers. If the media or advertising is used to promote the onset of smoking, then media can be effective in discouraging smoking or preventing tobacco use. Media messages that overtly include LGBT youth in general are rare, yet media messages represent an untapped resource in conveying positive messages about self- esteem and in discouraging smoking. Federal, State, and local agencies should join forces with LGBT national and community organizations to sponsor counteradvertising that promotes health-positive messages and discourages tobacco use. 27-17: Increase adolescents’ disapproval of smoking. Attitudes and beliefs are an important part of influencing behavior. LGBT youth are likely to differ in key ways from heterosexual youth on general attitudes and beliefs about the desirability of smoking. Exactly how they differ is unknown. However, effective programs need to be specifically tailored to the targeted group. Hence, smoking cessation programs should take into account how attitudes that support smoking may function as barriers to tobacco cessation and prevention strategies and should include modification of these attitudes as part of the program activities directed to LGBT youth or the community. 27-18: (Developmental) Increase the number of tribes, Territories, and States and the District of Columbia with comprehensive, evidence- based tobacco control programs. Although the LGBT community may not be directly connected to the tobacco control programs in States, Territories, and tribal jurisdictions, LGBT populations should be reflected in local strategies as they are among the general population. It is crucial that LGBT individuals be actively involved in the planning, implementation, and evaluation of tobacco control programs to ensure that they are LGBT-competent, nondiscriminatory, and reflective of the LGBT community’s needs. S e rv i c e s — R E C O M M E N D ATIONS ■ Smoking prevention and cessation programs must be LGBT-competent, affordable, and accessible to LGBT individuals. ■ LGBT-oriented community centers and other LGBT-affirming community-based organizations should be recognized as resources and included in developing, implementing, and evaluating culturally competent smoking cessation and prevention programs. Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health 367 Tobacco Use Education and Tr a i n i n g — R E C O M M E N D ATIONS ■ Because clinical cessation guidelines may be used as a training tool for educating health care providers, LGBT-specific concerns regarding tobacco use and LGBT-competent prevention and treatment services should be reflected and addressed in such guidelines. ■ Health care providers need training on how to provide culturally competent care to LGBT smokers and to adhere to guidelines on tobacco screening and treatment. ■ Counter-advertising campaigns that promote health-positive messages should be conducted and targeted to LGBT populations. Such campaigns could be modeled after the “Truth” campaign and California Department of Health Services antismoking campaigns. Policy and Advocacy—RECOMMENDATIONS ■ LGBT individuals must have access to comprehensive, nondiscriminatory health insurance that covers smoking cessation products and services. ■ LGBT communities must be educated about tobacco advertising and its role in promoting tobacco use. ■ Health-positive environments for LGBT and questioning youth must be funded, supported, and sustained so that LGBT youth have healthier venues in which to socialize and “come out.” R e s e a rc h — R E C O M M E N D ATIONS ■ Sexual orientation and gender identity must be included in national and local data sets to study differences in smoking rates and treatment success. ■ Data are needed on a variety of LGBT-specific tobacco-related issues so that culturally competent social marketing and public education campaigns, prevention activities, and cessation programs can be established and implemented. Te rm i n o l o g y C o n s u m p t i o n : The amount of tobacco products consumed or used by the population. Consumption usually is measured in units, such as the number of cigarettes smoked or pounds of spit tobacco used over a given period of time. C o u n t e r a d v e rt i s i n g : The placement of pro-health advertisements on TV, on radio, in print, on billboards, on movie trailers, on the Internet, and in other media. Nicotine dependency: Highly controlled or compulsive use, use despite harmful effects, withdrawal upon cessation of use, and recurrent drug craving. Secondhand smoke: A mixture of the smoke exhaled by smokers and the smoke that comes from the burning end of the tobacco product. 368 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health Tobacco Use Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health 369 Serum cotinine: A biological marker for tobacco use and exposure to environmental tobacco smoke measured in the blood. Cotinine is a breakdown product of nicotine. Spit tobacco: Chewing tobacco, snuff, or smokeless tobacco. 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Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 373 Tobacco Use 100 Page-Shafer, K.; Delorenze, G.N.; Satariano, W.A.; and Winkelstein, W., Jr. Comorbidity and survival in HIV-infected men in the San Francisco Men’s Health Survey. Annals of Epidemiology 6(5):420-430, September, 1996. 101 Craib, K.J.; Schechter, M.T.; Montaner, J.S.; et al. The effect of cigarette smoking on lymphocyte subsets and progression to AIDS in a cohort of homosexual men. Clinical and Investigative Medicine 15(4):301-308, August, 1992. 102 Burns, Hillman, Neaton, et al., 1996. 103 Conley, Bush, Buchbinder, et al., 1996. 104 Begtrup, K.; Melbye, M.; Biggar, R.J.; et al. Progression to acquired immunodeficiency syndrome is influenced by CD4 T-lymphocyte count and time since seroconversion. American Journal of Epidemiology 145(7):629-635, April 1, 1997. 105 Burns, Hillman, Neaton, F.; et al., 1996. 106 Craib, Schechter, Montaner, et al., 1992. 107 Burns, D.N.; Kramer, A.; Yellin F., et al. Cigarette smoking: A modifier of human immunodeficiency virus type-1 infection. Journal of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndromes 4(1):76-83, 1991. 108 DuRant, R.H.; Krowchuk, D.P.; and Sinal, S.H. Victimization, use of violence, and drug use at school among male adolescents who engage in same-sex sexual behavior. Journal of Pediatrics 133(1):113-118, 1998. 109 Launoy, G.; Milan, C.H.; Faivre, J.; et al. Alcohol, tobacco and esophageal: Effects of the duration of consumption, mean intake and current and former consumption. British Journal of Cancer 75:1389-1396, 1997. 110 Thomas, D.B. Alcohol as a cause of cancer. Environmental Health Perspectives 103:S153-S160, 1995. 111 Haynes, S. Breast cancer risk: Comparisons of lesbians and heterosexual women. In: Bowen, D.J., ed. Cancer and Cancer Risks Among Lesbians . Seattle, WA: Fred Hutchinson Cancer Research Center Community Liaison Program, 1995. 112 Deneberg, R. Report on lesbian health. Women’s Health Issues 5(2):181-191, 1995. 113 Engardio, J.P. Outgoing Marlboro man: Document reveals new details on how tobacco companies target gays. San Francisco Weekly, February 16-22, 2000. 114 Los Angeles County Department of Health Services, Tobacco Control Program. Needs Assessment Report: Gay/Lesbian/Bisexual/Transgender Tobacco Coalition. 1999. 115 Brucker, E.L. Out and Free: Sexual Minorities and Tobacco Addiction. Seattle, WA: King County Health Department, 1997. 116 Fiore, Bailey, Cohen, et al., 2000. 117 Millman, M. Access to Health Care in America . Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1993. 118 Dean, L., et al. Lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender health: Findings and concerns. Journal of the Gay and Lesbian Medical Association 4(3):101-151, 2000. 119 Badgett, M.V.L. Income Inflation: The Myth of Affluence Among Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Americans. Washington, DC: National Gay and Lesbian Task Force Policy Institute and Institute for Gay and Lesbian Strategic Studies, 1998. 120 Bradford, J., and Ryan C. The National Lesbian Health Care Survey. Washington, DC: National Lesbian and Gay Health Foundation, 1988, 76-85. 374 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health Tobacco Use 121 Deneberg, 1995. 122 Stevens, P.E. Structural and interpersonal impact of heterosexual assumptions on lesbian health care clients. Nursing Research 44(1):25-30, 1995. 123 Bradford, J.B.; Honhold, J.A.; Rothblum, E.D.; and Ryan, C.C. Compromised access to health care: Health insurance status of lesbians. Journal of the Gay and Lesbian Medical Association, in press. 124 Bybee, D., and Roeder, V. Michigan Lesbian Health Survey: Results Relevant to AIDS. A report to the Michigan Organization for Human Rights and the Michigan Department of Public Health. Lansing, MI: Michigan Department of Health and Human Services, 1990. 125 Fiore, Bailey, Cohen, et al., 2000. 126 Stall, Greenwood, Acree, et al., 1999. 127 Brucker, 1995. 128 DHHS, 1994. 129 Well, S. The health beliefs, values and practices of gay adolescents. Clinical Nurse Specialist 13(2):69-73, 1999. 130 DHHS, 1994. 131 American Academy of Pediatrics, Committee on Adolescents. Homosexuality and adolescence. Pediatrics 92(4):631-634, October 1993. 132 McMahon, S.; Jason, L.; and Salina, D. Stress, coping and appraisal in a smoking cessation intervention. Anxiety, Stress, and Coping: An International Journal 7:161-171, 1994. 133 American Academy of Pediatrics, Committee on Adolescents, 1993. 134 DHHS, 1994. 135 Teague, J.B. Issues related to the treatment of adolescent lesbians and homosexuals. Journal of Mental Health Counseling 14(4):422-439, 1992. 136 Fiore, Bailey, Cohen, et al., 2000. Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 375 376 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health Violence Pre v e n t i o n Healthy People 2010 Goal Reduce injuries, disabilities, and deaths due to violence.* O v e rv i e w Violence is one of the Nation’s most preventable public health problems. It contributes significantly to mortality and physical health morbidity, and it has serious mental health and social consequences—not only for the survivor but also for the victim’s family, the lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) community, and society at large. Violence resulting from hate crimes, domestic violence, suicide, and other forms of physical, sexual, emotional, and environmental violence takes a heavy toll on the LGBT population. Between one-quarter and one-third of all LGBT individuals experience domestic violence. LGBT individuals are more than four times as likely as the general population to have attempted suicide. Despite the prevalence of violent acts against the LGBT population and other populations suffering from high rates of violence, as well as the far-reaching individual and societal consequences, the public health, educational, social service, and criminal justice systems generally do not have adequate policies, procedures, and programs in place to address this significant and costly public health challenge. Issues and Tre n d s Violence in the United States is pervasive and changes not only quantity of life but also quality of life. On an average day in the United States, 53 persons die from homicide, and a minimum of 18,000 persons survive interpersonal assaults; 84 persons complete suicide; and as many as 3,000 persons attempt suicide.1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 (See Mental Health and Mental Disorders focus area.) Domestic violence alone affects a significant proportion of the U.S. population either as direct victims or as witnesses of abuse directed toward spouses or intimate partners, children, and elders.8 The past two decades have seen dramatic changes * In Healthy People 2010, this focus area or chapter is entitled Injury and Violence Prevention. However, only the first two objectives that are discussed in the Companion Document correspond to “injury” prevention in Healthy People 2010. As the discussion focuses mainly on Violence, the Chapter title is appropriately Violence Prevention. Violence Prevention in the response to domestic violence in States and communities throughout the country. To date, a great deal of the change has occurred within the criminal and civil justice systems.9 There is an awareness that the problem of violence, especially violence against women, is complex and requires coordinated service responses involving health care and social services agencies as well as justice systems. Identifying violence as a public health issue is a concept that has emerged in the past decade. In 1991, former U.S. Surgeon General C. Everett Koop wrote that: “Traditionally, when confronted by the circumstances of violence, [we] . . . have deferred to the criminal justice system. Over the years we have tacitly and, I believe, mistakenly agreed that violence was the exclusive province of the police, the courts, and the penal system. To be sure, those agents of public safety and justice have served us well. But when we ask them to concentrate more on the prevention of violence and to provide additional services for victims, we may begin to burden the criminal justice system beyond reason. At that point, the professions of medicine, nursing and the health-related social services must come forward and recognize violence as their issue and one that profoundly affects the public health.”10 Violence is a learned behavior and, therefore, preventable.11 In addition to immediate physical, emotional, or psychological injury, the sequelae of violence is often serious and lifelong. Long-term effects may include permanent mental and physical disabilities resulting from physical damage; sexually transmitted diseases, including HIV; pregnancy and its complications; depression, anxiety, post traumatic and stress disorders; substance abuse; and other conditions that might be prevented if the violence had not occurred. General issues that impede the public health response to progress in this area include the lack of comparable data sources, lack of standardized definitions and definitional issues, lack of resources to establish adequately consistent tracking systems, and lack of resources to fund promising prevention programs. In addition, violence prevention is not a priority for most policymakers.12 As it is with most other public health problems, cultural competence is needed in dealing with violence as a health care problem.13 Standardized terminology pertaining to violence and abuse is still evolving and changing. Not only are various definitions being developed for standardization for health and social service delivery and research, but also within the legal system, especially as established by court decisions. The lack of standardized terminology stems largely from the fact that the American system is a federal system of 50 semi-sovereign states.14 In addition, experts in the area of violence and abuse prevention employ different definitions and a variety of terminology. The following are some key terms and/or constructs. ■ Violence is the intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or actual, against another person or against oneself or against a group of people, that results in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, maldevelopment, or deprivation.15 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 377 Violence Prevention ■ Maltreatment is a generic term for many types of abuse and neglect of people of all ages. There are for major types of maltreatment: physical abuse, neglect, sexual abuse, and psychological or emotional abuse.16, 17, 18 ■ Assault is the unlawful attack or attempt to attack through force or violence to do physical injury to another; may involve the use of firearms, knives, or other weapons, or aggravated use of hands, fist, or feet.19 ■ Neglect is the refusal or failure to fulfill any part of a person’s obligations or duties by a person who has fiduciary responsibilities. Neglect can be physical or emotional, or educational when applied to children, such as allowance of chronic truancy.20, 21 ■ Physical violence and/or abuse is the intentional use of physical force with the potential for causing death, injury, or harm. Physical violence or abuse includes, but is not limited to scratching, pushing, shoving, throwing, grabbing, biting, choking, shaking, poking, hair pulling, slapping, punching, hitting, burning, and use of restraints or one’s body, size, or strength against another person. The unwarranted administration of drugs and physical restraints, force-feeding, and physical punishment of any kind are additional examples of physical abuse. Physical violence includes use of a weapon (gun, knife, or other object) against a person.22, 23 ■ Sexual violence and/or abuse is divided into three categories: (a) the use of physical force to compel a person to engage in a sexual act against his or her will, whether or not the act is completed; (b) an attempted or completed sex act involving a person who is unable to understand the nature or condition of the act, to decline participation, or to communicate unwillingness to engage in the sexual act due to age, illness, disability, influence of alcohol or other drugs, intimidation or pressure; and/or (c) abusive sexual contact. Sexual contact includes, but is not limited to, unwanted touching, and sexually explicit photographing.24, 25, 26 ■ Psychological/emotional abuse is trauma to the victim caused by acts, or threats of acts, such as verbal assaults, insults, intimidation, humiliation, and harassment, controlling what the victim can and cannot do, withholding information from the victim, becoming annoyed if the victim disagrees, isolating the victim from others.27, 28, 29, 30 ■ Psychological/emotional abuse as a type of violence acknowledges the aforementioned definition; yet, to be considered a type of violence, there must also have been prior physical or sexual violence (or the threat of such violence).31 ■ Victim is the person who is the target of violence or abuse.32 ■ Perpetrator is the person who inflicts violence or abuse, or causes these to be inflicted, on the victim.33 ■ Violent intimate partner includes current and former spouses (legal and common law) and non-marital partners (boyfriend, girlfriend, same-sex partner, dating partner) who has perpetrated violence on his/her partner. Partners may or may not be cohabitating.34 378 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health Violence Prevention ■ Violence against women (VAW) is composed of three components: physical violence; sexual violence; and threats of physical and/or sexual violence.35 ■ Violence and abuse against women (VAAW) is composed of five components: the three aforementioned (physical violence; sexual violence; and threats of physical and/or sexual violence), as well as stalking and psychological/emotional abuse.36 These definitions, intended for the general population, also apply to the LGBT community. In addition to these categories, this chapter addresses suicide, a public health concern recognized in Healthy People 2010, and hate crimes. Hate crime, as defined in Section 280003(a) of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement act of 1994 (28 U.S.C. 984 note) is a term used to describe crimes against individuals where the victim was selected because of race, skin color, ethnicity/national origin, sexual orientation, gender, religion or disability. A hate crime under this provision is not, in fact, a specific crime.37 The provision refers to penalty enhancements for crimes motivated by biases against a victim. As of July 2000, only seven States (Arkansas, Hawaii, Indiana, Kansas, New Mexico, South Carolina, and Wyoming) do not have any hate crimes laws. As a result of mounting national concern over crimes motivated by bias, Congress enacted the Hate Crime Statistics Act of 1990. In 1999, there were 7,876 hate crime incidents reported to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The incidents involved 9,301 separate offenses, 9,802 victims, and 7,271 known offenders. Of the total reported incidents, 4,295 were motivated by racial bias, 1,411 by religious bias, 1,317 by sexual orientation bias, 829 by ethnicity/national origin bias, 19 by disability bias, and 3 by multiple biases. Intimidation was the single most frequently reported offense, accounting for 35 percent of the total. Following intimidation were damage, destruction, or vandalism of property, 29 percent; simple assault, 19 percent; and aggravated assault, 12 percent.38 Among students nationwide, 13 percent reported that they had been called a hate-related word or name. Overall, 36 percent of students reported seeing hate-related graffiti at school.39 The likelihood that today’s children are exposed to some form of violence—in the streets, at school, at home, or in the media—is enormous. Despite the tragedy at Columbine High School in Littleton, Colorado on April 20, 1999, far more children are victims of serious physical violence within their homes than are severely injured in acts of violence on school grounds or elsewhere. 40 Addressing the needs of children who have been abused or neglected is one of the most important goals of the Administration on Children, Youth and Families (ACYF). To achieve this goal, ACYF collects data on child maltreatment through the National Child Abuse and Neglect Data System (NCANDS) and provides a summary of these data to policymakers, child welfare practitioners, researchers, and concerned citizens. The following statistics are from the latest ACYF Report on Child Maltreatment:41 ■ Approximately 903,000 children were victims of maltreatment nationwide. ■ More than half (53.5 percent) of victims suffered neglect, while almost a quarter (22.7 percent) suffered physical abuse, and 11.5 percent were sexually abused. Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 379 Violence Prevention 380 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health ■ Three-fifths (60.4 percent) of perpetrators were female. Female perpetrators’ median age was 31 and male perpetrators’ median age was 34. ■ In cases of sexual abuse, more than half (55.9 percent) of victims were abused by male parents, male relatives, or other males. ■ An estimated 1,100 children died as a result of child abuse or neglect . ■ Children not yet a year old accounted for 37.9 percent of the fatalities, and 77.5 percent were not yet aged 5 years. ■ Perpetrators of fatalities were considerably younger than perpetrators in general. Nearly two-thirds (62.3 percent) were younger than 30 years of age, compared to the percentage of all perpetrators who were younger than 30 (38.7 percent). Child abuse and neglect are defined in both Federal and State legislation. Each State is responsible for providing its own definitions within the civil and criminal context. Children are also exposed to violence through the media. Children and adolescents in the United States spend an average of 3-5 hours per day with a variety of media, including television, radio, videos, videogames, and the Internet.42 A content analysis of music videos revealed that rap videos and rock videos had the highest portrayal of violence and weapon carrying.43 Considerable research exists to document concerns about the relationship between children who are abused and/or exposed to violence and the increased risk of them becoming offenders.44, 45, 46 The maltreatment of children and violence against women often go hand-in-hand.47 In 1998, there was an estimated 876,340 violent victimizations against women by intimate partners and an estimated 160,000 violent victimizations against men by intimate partners.48 Although most women in the U.S. fear attack by strangers, 1996 FBI data indicate that 51 percent of all murdered women were killed by someone they knew and that 30 percent were killed by their husbands, ex-husbands, or boyfriends.49 Approximately 34 percent of rapes are estimated to occur in the victim’s home, where children may be present to see or hear the sexual assault of their mothers or caregivers.50 The needs of battered women, possibly their children, and their batterers span several social service systems, and may require interventions by one or more of the criminal and civil justice systems, social services, health care or mental health care agencies, and support systems for battered women and their families. Research indicates that more than one-fifth, and perhaps as many as one-third, of women receiving care in hospital emergency rooms have symptoms related to domestic violence.51 Most commonly, women seeking such health services do not identify themselves as battered women and health care providers do not identify them as such. Some jurisdictions require health care providers to report domestic violence to law enforcement agencies.52 While this requirement was undoubtedly appropriately constructed, the unintended impact may result in having fewer battered women seek care. The avoidance of services may occur most frequently when the batterer is an intimate partner. Violence Prevention Over the past 25 years, States have become increasingly concerned with the problem of elder abuse, both domestic and institutional, and have enacted legislation in an attempt to prevent and treat the problem. The National Center on Elder Abuse documented 71 laws in the 50 States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Virgin Islands that address neglect and violence toward the elderly.53 Congress, under the Family Violence Prevention and Services Act of 1992 (P.L. 102-295), required that a study of the national incidence of abuse, neglect, and exploitation of elderly persons be conducted. The Administration of Children and Families (ACF) was responsible for administering those provisions of the legislation. In concert with resources and experts from the Administration on Aging (AoA), ACF conducted the study between October 1994 and December 1997.54 (Given the parameters of the legislation, the target population was non-institutionalized elderly, thereby excluding elders living in hospitals, nursing homes, assisted living facilities, or other institutional or group facilities.) The best national estimate is that a total of 449,924 elderly persons, aged 60 and over, experienced abuse and/or neglect in non-institutionalized settings. Approximately 90 percent of the perpetrators were related to the victims. Only 16 percent of these cases of abuse and/or neglect were reported to State Adult Protective Services agencies.55 Abuse of the elderly in institutional care first came to public awareness in the late 1970s and early 1980s through research findings and Congressional hearings.56, 57, 58 While there exists the national incidence study for domestic elder abuse, statistics concerning elder abuse in the institutional setting remain relatively unknown.59 Therefore, no national statistics are available. In 1995, more than 300 confirmed cases of abuse or neglect were reported by Virginia, Maryland, and the District of Columbia nursing homes.60 D i s p a r i t i e s The decade between 1983 and 1993 was marked by an unprecedented surge of lethal and nonlethal violence among young people in the United States.61 For millions of youth and their families, a period of life that should have been distinguished by good health and great promise was instead marred by injuries, disability, and death.62 The highest victimization rates for child maltreatment victims were for the 0-3 age group (14.8 victims per 1,000 children of this age in the population), and rates declined as age increased. Victimization rates by race and ethnicity ranged from a low of 3.8 among Asian/Pacific Islander victims per 1,000 children of the same race to 20.7 among African Americans. The victimization rate for American Indians/Alaska Natives was 19.8, for Hispanics 10.6, and for Whites 8.5.63 Although overall school crime has decreased since 1992, the rate of serious violent crime— including rape, sexual assault, robbery, and aggravated assault—against students at school stayed fairly consistent from 1992 to 1998.64 Students of all ethnic groups reported fearing attack or harm at school less often in 1999 than they did in 1995. However, in both years, larger percentages of Black and Hispanic students than White students feared such attacks.65 Younger students, ages 12 through 14, were more likely than older students, ages 15 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 381 Violence Prevention through 18, to be victims of crime at school.66 School-associated violent deaths remain rare events.67 For the complete school year, July 1, 1998 through June 30, 1999, 34 incidents resulted in 50 school-associated violent deaths (students and non-students). Thirty-eight of these deaths were homicides, nine were suicides, two adults were killed by a law enforcement officer in the course of duty, and one death was an unintentional shooting.68 Certain racial and ethnic groups experience more deaths than Whites. Rates for the Black population compared with the White population were at least 1.5 times greater for seven of the leading causes of death, with the largest ratio being for homicide.69 Problems of race and Hispanic-origin classification affect the level of Hispanic death rates and the relative levels compared with the non-Hispanic population. Hispanic origin on the death certificate may be underreported by an estimated 7 percent.70 Age-adjusted rates were higher for the White population than the Black and Hispanic population for suicide.7 1 (Note: The age-adjusted death rate, which eliminates the distorting e ffects of the aging of the population, was at a record low of 471.7 per 100,000 U.S. standard population.) For White males between the ages of 15-24, the three leading causes of death with rates are accidents (54.1), suicide (39.4), and homicide (14.7). For Black males between the same ages, the three leading causes of death with rates are homicide (96.5), accidents (30.3), and suicide (15.0). For Hispanic males at comparable ages, the three leading causes of death and rates are accidents (52.3), homicide (41.1), and suicide (13.4). The mortality figures for females aged 15 to 24 years, according to race, are slightly different than for males. For White females, the three leading causes of death with rates are accidents (20.4), malignant neoplasms (growths or tumors) (3.7), and suicide (3.5). For Black females of comparable age, the causes of deaths with rates are accidents (13.0), homicide (12.6), and malignant neoplasms (4.0). And for Hispanic females aged 15 to 24 years, the three leading causes of death with rates are accidents (13.7), homicides (4.2), and malignant neoplasms (3.4).72 Research has not demonstrated any higher risk of completed suicide associated with same-gender sexual orientation for either adults or adolescents.73, 74 Given the aforementioned suicide statistics, especially for males, post-mortem classifications of same-gender sexual orientation probably are underestimated. Kipke and colleagues (1997) explored 432 homeless youths’ histories of exposure to violence, perpetration of violence, and fear of violent victimization.75 The youths, between the ages of 13 and 23, reported a high rate of violence with no difference between females and males. However, females were more likely to report having been sexually assaulted and fearing victimization, and less likely to report perpetrating violence. With a few exceptions, ethnic identity was not a significant predictor of exposure to violence. As to elder maltreatment, women are disproportionately represented as victims.76 The oldest elders (age 80 and over, also known as “the frail elderly”) are abused and neglected at two to three times their proportion of the elderly population.77 Racial/ethnic statistics depended upon the methodology of data collection. From data submitted by the 1,100 trained “sentinels” from public and private agencies that had frequent contact with elderly 382 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health Violence Prevention community residents, fewer than 10 percent of abused or neglected elderly were minorities. On the other hand, higher proportions of victims of most forms of abuse and neglect reported to Adult Protective Service (APS) were Black.78 Other racial/ethnic categories, especially Hispanic elderly, were low to both APS and to sentinels. Further research is needed to ascertain whether low rates for Hispanics, in particular, are due to lower rates of reporting and detection of abuse and neglect, perhaps because of language barriers, or due to lower rates of actual abuse. A National Coalition of Anti-Violence Programs (NCAVP) report on domestic violence in the LGBT population indicates that the age and race/ethnicity disaggregations are generally comparable to reports of domestic violence in the general population. For example, under 1 percent of reported domestic violence incidents is among the population under 18 years of age, while more than half (52 percent) is among those aged 30 to 44. This likely reflects the fact that the younger LGBT population is much less likely to feel safe in reporting their sexual orientation and to be aware of LGBT centers to which they can report such incidences. In terms of race and ethnicity, as with the general population, people of color are over-represented in reported incidents, in part because, as the NCAVP report indicates, the three largest reporting sites are in cities with significant proportions of populations of color.79 Hate crimes are message crimes, according to Dr. Jack McDevitt, a criminologist at Northeastern University in Boston. 80 They are different from other crimes in that the offender is sending a message to members of a certain group that they are unwelcome in a particular place, whether a neighborhood, street, school, workplace, church, restaurant, park, or any other place. By far the largest determinant of hate crimes is racial bias, with African Americans at greatest risk.81 Ethnic minorities in the United States often become targets of hate crimes because they are perceived to be new to the country even if their families have been here for generations, or simply because they are seen as different from the mainstream population. Most religiously motivated hate crimes are acts of vandalism with the overwhelming majority directed against Jewish people.82 Gender-based violence is a significant social and historical problem, with women the predominant victims. Hate crimes against people with disabilities are motivated by the perception that such people are not equal, deserving, contributing members of society, and therefore, attacking them is an acceptable moré .83 The most socially acceptable, and probably the most widespread, form of hate crime, especially among adolescents and young adults, is targeting LGBT people.84, 85, 86, 87 Franklin (1997) has identified the following group of perpetrators involved in hate crimes against LGBT people:88 ■ Ideology perpetrators who report that their crimes stem from the negative beliefs and attitudes that people in the community have about LGBT people. Thus, these people are enforcing social morals. ■ Thrill seekers, typically adolescents, who commit assaults to alleviate boredom, to have fun and excitement, and to feel strong. Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 383 Violence Prevention ■ Peer-dynamics perpetrators who also tend to be adolescents who commit hate crimes to prove their toughness and heterosexuality to friends. ■ Self-defense perpetrators who believe that LGBT people are sexual predators and the assaults are responses to aggressive sexual propositions. Transgender people may experience greater disparities than any other group in being the victims of violence. Although this statement may be debatable, transgender people have been excluded from almost every hate crime bill, whether at theFederal, State or local level.89 Four States have included transgender people in their hate crimes laws—Minnesota (1993), California (1998), Vermont (2000), and Missouri (2000).90 The first major study on violence and discrimination against transgender people in the United States91 found that 60 percent experienced some form of harassment and/or violence sometime during their lives, and 37 percent experienced some form of economic discrimination. While more documented research is needed, almost all transgender people, whether female- to-male (FTM) or male-to-female (MTF), admit that preventing the experience of violence within their lives is a ubiquitous aspiration.92 O p p o rt u n i t i e s There is a growing awareness of the need to enact appropriate laws and more vigorous enforcement with education and training initiatives designed to reduce different types of violence. The Federal Government has a central role to play in the legislative arena as well as in funding program development and promoting awareness of initiatives that work. Poverty, discrimination, lack of education, and lack of employment opportunities are important risk factors for violence and must be addressed as part of any comprehensive solution to the epidemic of violence. Strategies for reducing violence should begin early in life, before violent beliefs and behavioral patterns can be adopted. In 1992, Congress approved several new hate crime and prejudice reduction initiatives as part of the 4-year Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act reauthorization.93 The Act included a requirement that each State’s juvenile delinquency prevention program include a component designed to combat hate crimes and a requirement that the Justice Department’s Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) conduct a national assessment of youths who commit hate crimes, their motives, their victims, and the penalties received for the crimes. OJJDP provided funds for the development of a wide- ranging curriculum, “Healing the Hate”—appropriate for educational, institutional, and other settings—to address prevention and treatment of hate crimes committed by juveniles.94 In 1992, Congress also acted to incorporate antiprejudice initiatives into The Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA), the principal Federal funding mechanism for the public schools.95 Title IV of the Act, Safe and Drug-Free Schools and Communities, also included a specific hate crimes prevention initiative—promoting curriculum development and “professional training and development for teachers and administrators on the cause, 384 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health Violence Prevention effects, and resolutions of hate crimes or hate-based conflicts.”96 In July 1996, the Department of Education provided almost $2 million in new grants to fund the development and implementation of “innovative, effective strategies for preventing and reducing the incidence of crimes and conflicts motivated by hate in localities directly affected by hate crimes.” 97 Over the past year, the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) has provided essential funding for the development of a four-part law enforcement training curriculum, piloted in three train-the-trainer conferences in the fall of 1998.98 BJA also provided funding for the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) for its national Hate Crime Summit held in June 1998. In addition, BJA is funding an important new initiative to develop and provide training for prosecutors in responding to hate crimes. The National District Attorneys Association, through its research arm, the American Prosecutors Research Institute, is developing these training materials, best practices, and model protocols for effective response to hate crimes. Hate violence can be addressed effectively through a combination of presence, prevention, and outreach to the community that is the hallmark of community policing. During 1999, the Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) provided essential funding for the IACP Hate Crime Summit and for the production and distribution of the Justice Department’s law enforcement hate crime training initiative. In addition, the COPS Office funded several bias crime-related initiatives under the $40 million Problem-Solving Partnership grant program. Determining the prevalence of hate crimes is difficult for many reasons. Federal law enforcement officials have only been compiling nationwide hate crime statistics since 1991, the year after the Hate Crime Statistics Act (HCSA) (28 U.S.C. 534) was enacted. The HCSA requires the Justice Department to acquire data on crimes which “manifest prejudice based on race, religion, sexual orientation, or ethnicity” from law enforcement agencies across the country and to publish an annual summary. In 1992, at the direction of Congress, the Department of Justice’s Office for Victims of Crime (OVC) provided funds to improve the response of law enforcement and victim assistance professionals to victims of hate crimes.99 In the Violent Crime and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 (Public L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796), Congress expanded coverage of the HCSA to require FBI reporting on crimes based on “disability.” In September of 1994, the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) of 1994 (42 U.S.C. 13981), which is comprehensive legislation dealing with the increasing problem of violent crime against women, was passed by Congress. One provision of VAWA is a new Federal civil remedy for victims of gender-based violent crimes which provides them with the right to compensatory and punitive damage awards as well as injunctive relief. Under a grant funded by the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS), scholars and researchers from the Center for Criminal Justice Policy Research at Northeastern University in Boston are studying differences in reporting rates among law enforcement agencies—and identifying strategies for increasing and sustaining reporting participation by these State and local officials. In addition, BJS is currently integrating questions about hate crime into its National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS).100 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 385 Violence Prevention As with most other offenses, reporting hate crimes is voluntary on the part of local jurisdictions. Some States started submitting data only recently, and not all jurisdictions within States are represented in their reports.101 Another obstacle to obtaining an accurate count of hate crimes is the reluctance of many victims to report such attacks. In a study of gay men and lesbians by Herek and associates (1997), about one-third of the hate crime victims reported the incident to law enforcement authorities, compared with two-thirds of gay and lesbian victims of nonhate crimes.102 Dunbar (1997), who studies hate crime in Los Angeles County, has found that victims of severe hate acts are the least likely of all hate crime victims to notify law enforcement agencies, often out of fear of future contact with the perpetrators.103 It also appears that some people do not report hate crimes because of fear that the criminal justice system is biased against the group to which the victim belongs and, consequently, law enforcement authorities will not be responsive. The National Council of La Raza holds that Hispanics often do not report hate crimes because of mistrust of the police.104 Many potentially effective culturally and linguistically competent intervention strategies for violence prevention exist, such as parent training, mentoring of youth, and home visitation.105 The Center for Mental Health Services (CMHS), a component of the Federal government’s Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA), is developing a matrix of evidence-based prevention interventions from the CMHS School Violence Prevention Initiative. (More information is available online at www.samhsa.gov/cmhs.) Other integrated, multidisciplinary public health and social services approaches—including cross-training of service delivery staff, coordination of referral mechanisms, and counseling of both survivors and perpetrators—are seen as effective. In addition to strategies and approaches, many resources exist devoted to preventing different types of violence and making society safer for all of us throughout the lifespan. In response to an alarming increase in hate crime among youth, the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC) founded the Teaching Tolerance Organization in 1991. This organization is a national education project dedicated to helping teachers foster equity, respect, and understanding in the classroom and beyond (www.splcenter.org). The Teaching Tolerance handbook, Responding to Hate at School, is a step-by-step, easy-to-use guide designed to help administrators, counselors, and teachers react promptly and effectively whenever hate, bias, and prejudice occur.106 Legal measures are also a possible remedy against violence. A number of Federal and State laws prohibit acts or threats of violence, as well as harassment and discrimination, based on race, color, religion, national origin, sexual orientation, gender and/or disability. Section 245, 18 U.S.C., is the principal Federal hate crime statute, although neither sexual orientation nor gender identity is included. In the first Federal appellate case on antigay 386 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health Massachusetts is a model State for the ongoing efforts to address antigay bigotry in public schools The report, “Making Schools Safe for Gay and Lesbian Youth,” is available from the G o v e r n o r’s Commission on Gay and Lesbian Youth, State House, Room 111, Boston, MA, 02133, 6 1 7 - 8 2 8 - 3 0 3 9 . Violence Prevention violence in schools, Lambda, the nation’s oldest and largest lesbian and gay legal organization founded in 1973, successfully represented Jamie Nabozny, who suffered severe antigay abuse for 4 years in his Wisconsin middle and high schools.107 In its landmark ruling, the court said, “…The Equal Protection clause does, however, require the State to treat each person with equal regard, as having equal worth, regardless of his or her status…We are unable to garner any rational basis for permitting one student to assault another based on the victim’s sexual orientation.” The court remanded the case for trial, and in November 1996, a jury found three school administrators liable for discriminating against Jamie Nabozny. The school settled the case for just under $1 million.108 The Human Rights Campaign (HRC) has established FamilyNet (www.hrc.org/familynet) for all LGBT people as a place where practical information, community support and expert advice on a menagerie of topics, including violence, can be obtained. Finally, sources of funding violence prevention exist in the public and private sector. For example, the Violence Against Women Office, of the Office of Justice Programs, United States Department of Justice was created in 1995 to implement the 1994 Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) and to lead the national effort to stop domestic violence, sexual assault, and stalking of women. The Violence Against Women Office works with U.S. Attorneys to ensure enforcement of the Federal criminal statutes contained in the 1994 Act, assists the Attorney General in formulating policy related to civil and criminal justice for women, and administers more than $270 million a year in grants to help States, tribes, and local communities transform the way in which criminal justice systems respond to violent crimes against women. The National Funding Initiative on Violence Prevention (NFCVP) is a partnership among public and private funders, experts in violence prevention, and other disciplines and community collaborations. Since its establishment in 1994, the NFCVP has raised over $10.4 million from both Federal and philanthropic sources to support strategies that emphasize citizen engagement, promote community empowerment, and comprehensively address the range of factors undermining community safety. Additional information is available online at www.peacebeyondviolence.org. S u m m a ry of LGBT Researc h This section focuses on a range of issues associated with violence prevention related to LGBT populations. Specifically, this chapter addresses reported hate-motivated crimes, domestic violence, other physical and sexual violence, and suicide. These categories generally follow those reported by the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) and the Department of Justice (DOJ). However, it should be noted that the categories are not necessarily mutually exclusive. For example, “other physical violence” may include hate-motivated violence or domestic violence that has not been reported or documented as such. Hate-motivated violence: Most hate crime perpetrators are not crazed, hate-filled neo-Nazis or “skinheads.” 109 Dunbar’s research (1997) reveals that fewer than 5 percent of the perpetrators of the 1,500 hate crimes committed in the Los Angeles area between 1994 and 1995 were members of organized hate groups.110 Most hate crimes are carried out by otherwise law-abiding people who see little wrong in their actions. However, extreme hate Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 387 Violence Prevention crimes tend to be committed by people with a history of antisocial behavior.111 Examples of horrific crimes include the dragging death of James Byrd on June 7, 1998 in Jasper, Texas,112 the torturous death of Matthew Shephard on October 12, 1998 in Laramie, Wyoming (www.mattshepard.org), and the mass shooting with one fatality (Danny Overstreet) on September 22, 2000 in a gay bar in Roanoke, Virginia.113 Although alcohol and drugs sometimes help fuel the commission of both hate crimes and extreme hate crimes, the main determinant appears to be personal prejudice, a situation that impairs people’s judgment, blinding the perpetrators to the immorality of their behaviors.114 Aggressive behavior, denigration, and other forms of violence against LGBT people have been documented in a myriad of settings, including schools and colleges, the armed services, jails and prisons, homes, workplaces, and other public places.115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121 122, 123 It is widely hypothesized that hate crimes or hate-motivated violence can inflict psychological damage far greater than other types of violence as a result of assaulting the victim’s identity as well as his or her person or property.124, 125 Twenty-two (22) gay- or lesbian-related homicides were reported by national tracking programs in 1995. Including States without tracking programs, 70 is the statistical estimate of nationwide gay- or lesbian-related homicides occurring in 1995. Of those 70 homicides, only two victims were women, and both were killed by family members.126 A 1999 report by the NCAVP points to a 12 percent rise in homicides resulting from hate-motivated violence against LGBT individuals over the previous year (26 murders in 1998; 29 in 1999).127 These numbers underrepresent a national total of anti-LGBT murders because they include only those murders reported to a mere 13 reporting sites across the country. Furthermore, this 12 percent rise is in stark contrast to the nation’s murder rate generally, which has declined to its lowest level in decades.128 Antihomosexual violence may be different from more usual forms of violence in several ways. Homicides committed against LGBT persons often are more violent than homicides committed in the general population.129, 130 Similarly, it is more likely that the assailant and victim are strangers and that there will be a higher ratio of assailants to victims.131, 132 While hate-based violence occurs against LGBT persons of all ages, younger LGBT persons appear to be particularly vulnerable.133 In those circumstances, family members and community authorities are often the perpetrators of homophobic hate crimes,134 and many gay and lesbian adolescents have been forced out of their homes or schools because of abuse related to their sexual orientation.135, 136, 137 Violence is most often learned at home,138 a fact that has powerful implications on how LGBT persons who experience violence in the home perceive violence and how perpetrators of violence perceive their own behavior. Many surveys of hate crime, specifically, or of personal violence, in general, are unable to estimate on a State, regional, or national level, the incidence and prevalence of hate crimes against the LGBT population139, 140 Only one published study focuses exclusively on antilesbian hate crimes.141 However, a larger lesbian health survey that included questions on violence and hate crimes revealed that more than half of respondents had experienced a verbal hate crime, and about 1 in 20 had been physically assaulted due to her sexual orientation.142 Other research has found that about 75 percent of lesbians have experienced 388 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health Violence Prevention at least one verbal hate crime, and 1 in 10 reported experiencing a hate-motivated physical assault in the past. 143, 144, 145 The California Penal Code Section 13023 (1989) requires the State Attorney General to submit an annual report to the Legislature regarding crimes motivated by the victim’s race, ethnicity, religion, gender, sexual orientation or physical or mental disability as reported by law enforcement agencies. In 1999, of 1,962 reported hate crime events 59.8 percent were motivated by the race/ethnicity of the victim; 22.2 percent were motivated by the sexual orientation of the victim; 17.2 percent were motivated by the religion of the victim; 0.1 percent were motivated by the physical/mental disability of the victim; and 0.7 percent were motivated by the gender of the victim. Of the sexual orientation hate crimes, 77.8 percent were antimale homosexual; 15.4 percent were antifemale homosexual; and the remaining 7.8 percent were antihomosexual. There were 13 gender hate crimes. All 13 were antitransgender.146 An estimated 20 to 26 percent of 746 gay and bisexual men in New York City who participated in a longitudinal study reported being the victims of antigay violence or discrimination at least once a year from 1985 to 1991. Half of the participants experienced at least one such event in one of the years, while 26 percent of the sample reported experiencing violence in two or more years of the study.147 The study by Herek and associates (1997) revealed that antigay victimization is a common experience for gay men, lesbians, and bisexuals in the Sacramento area.148 In this study, roughly one fifth of the respondents had experienced an antigay property crime. Verbal harassment and threats were even more prevalent, with approximately one-half of the respondents experiencing at least one incident in the previous year, and most of the sample reporting at least one incident since age 16. Further, individuals who experienced physical assault because of their sexual orientation appeared to have higher levels of psychological distress. Bias crime assault survivors were more anxious and angry than others and experienced more symptoms of depression and Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). They also displayed less willingness to believe in the general benevolence of people and rated their own risk for future victimization somewhat higher than did others.149 A Youth Risk Behavior Survey (YRBS) conducted in Seattle in 1995 showed that, when compared with heterosexual youth, LGBT youth were almost six times more likely to be targets of offensive comments or attacks, three times more likely to be injured in a fight to the point of requiring medical attention, and more than twice as likely to have missed at least one day of school in the last month because of fearing for their safety. A Massachusetts YRBS conducted in 1997 showed that, compared to their heterosexual classmates, LGBT youth were more than 4 times as likely to have been threatened with or Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health 389 The Safe Schools Coalition of Washington publishes the results of its documentation of antigay abuse of youth in Safe Schools A n t i - Violence Document Project T h i r d Annual Report (1997). To order copies of the report, call or write the Northwest Coalition A g a i n s t Malicious Harassment, P.O. Box 16776, Seattle, WA, 98116, 206- 233-9136, or download at w w w. s a f e s c h o o l s - w a . o r g. Violence Prevention injured by a weapon at school in the past 12 months, twice as likely to have been in a physical fight, and 4.5 times as likely to have missed at least one day of school in the last month because of fearing for their safety.150 One study showed that up to half of LGBT students had experienced physical harassment,151 while another study revealed that more than 90 percent of LGBT youth had been verbally abused at school.152 LGBT youth are not the only victims of antigay violence. In fact, four out of five victims of antigay violence are actually heterosexual. When compared with the general heterosexual student population, straight victims of antigay violence exhibit lower academic performance, were 1.5 times as likely to use drugs, more than twice as likely to consider or plan suicide, more than 3 times as likely to have attempted suicide, and 5 times as likely to have attempted suicide to a degree of requiring medical treatment. Straight victims of antigay violence report levels of risk behavior similar to LGBT victims of violence. 153 A Wisconsin YRBS reported that, regardless of sexual orientation, youth who experienced antigay harassment were more likely to have used cigarettes (1.5 times), inhalants (2.5 times), LSD (2.6 times), and cocaine (3.3 times); considered suicide (2.2 times), attempted suicide (4 times), been pregnant or gotten someone pregnant (3 times), and vomited or taken laxatives to lose weight in the past 30 days (4.7 times).154 Victims and observers of antigay harassment are often hesitant to report such incidents because they fear further or increased violence from offenders.155 The psychological toll of violence based on sexual orientation is significant. In fact, recovery from bias-based violence takes much longer than recovery from random violence.156 Trauma associated with hate crime victimization probably lasts longer than one year, perhaps as long as five years.157, 158 Environments that deny youth the opportunity to learn and participate, or subject youth to ongoing humiliation, lead to diminished self- esteem, undermine self-confidence, and create a “pervasive sense of insecurity and self- doubt.”159 Environments where violence is tolerated, combined with lowered self-esteem, exacerbate psychological distress.160 LGBT students who are victims of antigay violence have higher risk-taking and self-endangerment behaviors compared with LGBT or heterosexual students who have not been victimized. In addition, studies show that “youth who feel vulnerable to physical attack are more likely to commit acts of violence.” 161 Other behaviors include increased drug use, lower academic performance, and considering, planning, and attempting suicide. 162 Perhaps the most frightening consequence of victimization is its relationship with suicidality, which becomes more and more direct as the severity of the violence increases.163 Hate Crimes Reporting. The summary of data regarding LGBT-related hate crimes must be considered in light of existing reporting systems. The FBI definition of hate crimes, described earlier in this chapter, acknowledges a specific motivation for a criminal event. The Hate Crimes Statistics Act of 1990 (P.L.101-275) was developed to shed new light on the scope of the problem in the United States. However, in 1999, 85 percent of the 12,122 participating agencies (representing two-thirds of all local departments that could participate) reported zero hate crimes in their jurisdictions during the year.164 Such underreporting is likely related to two factors. First, many States do not currently recognize 390 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health Violence Prevention crimes committed with a bias against sexual orientation as hate crimes. And second, sexual orientation is not included in the 30-year-old Federal hate crime statute. If crimes are not recognized accurately as bias crimes, they cannot be reported. Thus, LGBT statistics are considered vastly underestimated in national statistics. Also, similar to previous years, the number of antigay hate crimes recorded for the FBI report is significantly lower than the number of crimes logged for the same year by the National Coalition of Anti-Violence Programs, a gay organization which monitors antigay violence.165 Underreporting of hate-motivated violence against the LGBT population has been documented in a number of studies. For example, one longitudinal study found that only 13 to 14 percent of violent incidents against gay men each year were reported to the police.166 Victims are often reluctant to disclose their sexuality to authorities for fear that such disclosure may subject them to additional punishment. According to a summary of antigay violence and victimization surveys conducted between 1988 and 1991, this fear may be well founded since 16 to 30 percent of LGBT victims had reported being victimized by police.167 Other physical violence. Studies of child sexual abuse and adult sexual assault among the LGBT population reveal divergent results, as might be expected given generic reporting problems related to sexual abuse and assault, and given the stigma experienced by LGBT populations. For example, some studies report that lesbians aged 25 and younger168 experience rates of abuse and assault that are similar to the general female population.169 Another study of male-male rape of adolescent and adult gay males in New York found that gay males are more likely to have been sexually assaulted than heterosexual men.170 Tjaden and associates (1999) used data from a nationally representative telephone survey conducted from November 1995 to May 1996 to compare lifetime experiences with violent victimization among men and women with a history of same-sex cohabitation and their counterparts with a history of marriage and/or opposite-sex cohabitation only.171 The study found that respondents who had lived with same-sex intimate partners where significantly more likely than respondents who had married or lived only with an opposite-sex partner to have been: (1) raped as minors and adults; (2) physically assaulted as children by adult caregivers; and (3) physically assaulted as adults by all types of perpetrators, including intimate partners. The study also confirms previous reports that intimate partner violence is more prevalent among gay male couples than heterosexual couples. On the other hand, intimate partner violence is not more prevalent among lesbians than heterosexual couples, thereby suggesting that intimate partner violence is perpetrated primarily by men, whether against same-sex or opposite-sex partners.172 The long-term consequences of sexual abuse are severe and well documented. Among the general population, such crime has been associated with substance abuse, depression, suicidal ideation, and a need for mental health services.173 There may be particular consequences for the LGBT population. For example, one study that compared sexually abused gay men to gay men who reported no such abuse found that those who had been sexually abused demonstrated higher levels of internalized homophobia and an earlier onset of sexual activity than nonabused gay males.174 Another study found that gay and bisexual men who reported a history of childhood sexual abuse demonstrated higher HIV risk-taking Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 391 Violence Prevention behaviors,175 a finding that has also been documented in studies of Latino and African American men.176, 177 In a study of 228 gay male perpetrators, Farley (1996) found the following contributing to gay interpersonal violence—40 percent abused drugs, 87 percent had previous mental health problems, 93 percent reported physical abuse as a child, 67 percent reported sexual abuse as a child, 40 percent reported alcohol abuse in their family of origin, and 80 percent had a previous history of being an abuser in an adult relationship.178 Finally, male-male adult and adolescent sexual assaults almost always involve unprotected anal intercourse, which magnifies the trauma of sexual assault and potential consequences because of risk of HIV infection.179 Notwithstanding the prevalence of all types of physical assaults against the LGBT population, health personnel (in particular, emergency medical personnel), staff at rape crisis centers, social service providers, and criminal justice personnel are generally unfamiliar with the psychological or physical examination needs of LGBT survivors.180, 181 Domestic violence. A myth only recently being identified and addressed is that women do not batter other women in their relationships.182 This myth has been one of the biggest obstacles to dealing with the problem of lesbian and bisexual women battering in this country.183 Kerry Lobel and the National Coalition Against Domestic Violence Lesbian Task Force’s publication, Naming the Violence: Speaking Out Against Lesbian Domestic Violence (1986), was a milestone for the battered women’s movement as it first acknowledged the problem.184 A positive correlation between substance abuse and domestic violence is generally accepted, and high rates of substance abuse in the lesbian and gay community may exacerbate the level of domestic violence.185 The NCAVP collects data from 14 LGBT antiviolence programs and nine “mainstream” domestic violence programs in 13 cities. According to their report on 1998 data, the NCAVP found that “attempts to gauge the actual prevalence of violence in LGBT relationships have generally found rates roughly equal to rates estimated in heterosexual couples (i.e., between 25 and 33 percent of LGBT couples experience battering behavior).” 186 In cases in which the gender identity of the survivor was known, 49 percent were male, 48 percent were female, 3 percent were MTF transgender, and less than 1 percent were FTM transgender. With regard to sexual orientation, the majority of reporting survivors was either gay (47 percent) or lesbian (36 percent). Nine percent were bisexual. 187, 188 A few studies of intimate partner violence or sexual assault in lesbian relationships, though limited by small samples, 189, 190, 191 revealed intimate partner violence rates slightly lower (11.4 percent)192 than rates reported by heterosexual women.193 Bisexual women may have these problems as well; however, the data is almost nonexistent. Bisexual women have felt that they exist between two worlds, unaccepted in either.194 Intimate partner violence among gay men also is documented,195 196 197 with prevalence rates comparable to or somewhat higher than those observed among heterosexual couples.198 Lesbians and gay males who are the victims of domestic violence often find that police, health practitioners, and social service providers lack training and resources on the nature 392 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health Violence Prevention and dynamics of homosexual intimate partner violence. For example, the laws of a number of States exclude battered lesbians and gay men by defining domestic violence only as violence between members of the opposite sex or as violence occurring between spouses, former spouses, or family members who are related by blood or consanguinity.199 Thus, many law enforcement officials have no legal basis on which to intervene. Shelters for battered persons are rarely equipped to accommodate men, and groups for batterers, which are themselves uncommon, are generally not open to women. However, Johnson (1999) discusses his experience with groups at Fenway Community Health Center in Boston, MA as well as with groups in San Francisco, New York City, and Los Angeles.200 Also, in Massachusetts, there is a battering group for lesbians and bisexual women.201 Receiving support for domestic violence is critical for lesbians as many of them may lose their entire support system.202 Another issue faced by service providers which distinguishes the lesbian domestic violence issue from others is the inability to determine which of a lesbian or bisexual client is the actual batterer. Women are more likely to fight back against a lesbian batterer and could move from being the victim to being the perpetrator.203 204 Not only have all the domestic services (and the movement itself) been developed assuming a female survivor of battering, but society has deeply ingrained biases against men who fit into society’s picture of the victim.205 Men who have been battered are often so reluctant to admit they have been abused that they have to experience extreme violence before they will seek assistance. Many men find it difficult to leave a battering relationship since they feel they must stay and “stand their ground” or “take it like a man.”206 Suicide and Suicidal Ideation in LGBT Populations. (See Mental Health focus area.) An association between same-gender sexual orientation and elevated lifetime prevalence of suicide ideation and attempts has been reported in several studies of general population probability samples of adolescents and adults.207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213 In addition, research studies on convenience samples of LGBT people have commonly found higher rates of reported suicide attempts and ideation than general population research would lead one to expect.214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221 As one example, the results of the National Lesbian Health Care Survey (NLHCS) found that more than half of the sample had experienced thoughts of suicide at some time, and 18 percent had attempted suicide.222 This compares to 33 percent and 4 percent, respectively, for women in the United States as reported in the Epidemiologic Catchment Area studies.223 Van Kesteren and colleagues reported a disproportionately high number of suicide deaths in MTF transsexuals compared to the general population.224 However, after reviewing more than 2,000 cases, Pfafflin and Junge found reports of only 16 possible suicide deaths following surgical sex reassignment.225 Dixen and colleagues found that, among 479 MTF and 285 FTM transsexuals seen in the Palo Alto program, about 25 percent and 19 percent respectively had attempted suicide prior to transition.226 Most other studies report a pre- transition suicide attempt rate of 20 percent or more, with MTFs relatively more suicide- prone than FTMs.227 In the Washington Transgender Needs Assessment Survey, the suicidal ideation rate was 35 percent, and the attempt rate was 16 percent.228 Another form of self- Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health 393 Violence Prevention harm in transgender persons is attempted or completed autocastration or genital mutilation. A study of a cohort of transgender individuals who applied for services at gender identity clinics reported that genital mutilation was attempted by 9 percent of the males, while breast mutilation was attempted by 2 percent of the females.229 Several recent population studies have reported alarmingly high rates of suicide ideation and attempts among young people who identify themselves as homosexual or report same- sex sexual partners. For example, six studies found that rates of various measures of suicide ideation and attempts were three to seven times higher among gay and lesbian youth than heterosexual youth.230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235 Mediating factors for suicidal ideation among LGBT youth include depression, substance abuse, and victimization.236, 237, 238, 239, 240 The suicidal ideation rate in one needs assessment of young transgender people was 28 percent, with 17 percent reporting actual suicide attempts.241 Discussion of Healthy People 2010 Objectives 15-10: Increase the number of States and the District of Columbia with statewide emergency department surveillance systems that collect data on external causes of injury. Statewide emergency surveillance systems could provide an urgently needed mechanism for collecting data on external injuries caused by domestic violence, bias crimes, and other sources of injury to LGBT individuals. Data instruments for the collection of such data should be developed and implemented to generate new knowledge on causes of injury against LGBT individuals that may be bias-based in nature. The current data source for this objective is the External Cause of Injury Survey, American Public Health Association (APHA). Twelve States had statewide emergency department surveillance systems that collected data on external causes of injury in 1998. The following is how the current question appears on the survey: ■ Are International Classification of Disease, 10th Revision, Clinical Modification (ICD- 10-CM) data routinely collected in the statewide emergency date system? APHA could be approached to determine the feasibility of collecting LGBT data on this survey. However, the likelihood of adding LGBT data to the database is low because most emergency departments do not collect such data and LGBT people might be uncomfortable with supplying such information, given the possible ramifications. A more likely scenario would be for a researcher to do a probability study of LGBT people and external causes of injury. 15-11: Increase the number of States and the District of Columbia that collect data on external causes of injury through hospital discharge data systems. As with the previous objective, the current data source is the External Cause of Injury Survey, APHA. Twenty-three States collected data on external causes of injury through 394 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health Violence Prevention hospital discharge data systems in 1998. The following is how the current question appears in the survey: ■ Is the collection of ICD-10-CM data in the statewide hospital discharge data system mandated by State law or a ruling by another body? The term “mandate” refers to a State law or a ruling by another body (e.g., the State Hospital Association) that requires hospitals to collect ICD-10-CM data. Currently, there are no established procedures for collecting data on external causes of injury that may be bias- related upon discharged from a hospital. Data systems for collecting such information should be developed and implemented upon discharge from a hospital; however, issues of confidentiality need to be carefully considered in establishing such a system. 15-32: Reduce homicides. This objective is one of the measures of Leading Health Indicators. (See Introduction for description of Leading Health Indicators.) Homicide was the 13 th leading cause of death for 18,272 persons in the United States (6.8 per 100,000 population) in 1998.242 The homicide rate among males aged 15 to 24 years in the United States is 10 times higher than in Canada, 15 times higher than in Australia, and 28 times higher than in France or Germany.243 The data source for this objective is the National Vital Statistics System (NVSS), the Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS); FBI Uniform Crime Reports, U.S. Department of Justice.244 The NVSS for mortality began in 1900 but not all States participated before 1933. Geographic estimates are available on a national, regional, State, and county basis. Beginning with 1989 data, some changes were initiated to increase confidentiality protection. Identifying information, including date of death and geographic indicators for counties of less than 100,000 persons, are not available for public use.245 The mode of administration of the NVSS is as follows: Administrative records (death certificates) completed by physicians, coroners, medical examiners, and funeral directors are filed with State vital statistics offices; selected statistical information is forwarded to NCHS to be merged into a national statistical file. Beginning with 1989, revised standard certificates replaced the 1978 versions; the next scheduled revision is 2003. Demographic information on the death certificate is provided by the funeral director and is based on information supplied by an informant. Medical certification of cause of death is provided by the physician, medical examiner, or coroner. The primary survey content includes: year of death, place of decedent’s residence, place death occurred, age at death, day of week and month of death, Hispanic origin, race, marital status (beginning in 1979), place of birth, gender, underlying and multiple causes of death for all States, injury at work (beginning in 1993), hospital and patient status, educational attainment (beginning in 1989) for selected States, and occupation and industry (beginning in 1984) for selected States. Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 395 Violence Prevention Demographic data include: gender, race, Hispanic origin (beginning in 1984), age at death, place of decedent’s residence, educational attainment (beginning in 1989) for selected States, marital status, and industry and occupation for selected States. Race and ethnic origin are separate items on the death certificate. Beginning with 1992 data, California, Hawaii, Illinois, New Jersey, New York, Texas, and Washington reported expanded Asian and Pacific Islander categories of Asian Indian, Korean, Vietnamese, Samoan, and Guamanian. The rest of the States reported a combined Other Asian and Pacific Islander category in addition to the categories of White, Black, American Indian, Chinese, Hawaiian, Japanese, and Filipino that all States report. As of 1997, all States began reporting Hispanic origin. The categories reported include Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, Central and South American, and Other Hispanic. A 1999 report by the NCAV P points to a 12 percent rise in homicides resulting from hate- motivated violence against LGBT individuals over the previous year (26 murders in 1998; 29 in 1999).2 4 6 These numbers underrepresent a national total of anti-LGBT murders because they include only those murders reported to a mere 13 reporting sites across the country. 15-33: Reduce maltreatment and maltreatment fatalities of children. The 1997 Child Maltreatment Report from the States to the National Child Abuse and Neglect Data System found there were approximately 984,000 victims of maltreatment, a decrease from more than 1 million victims in 1996 in the 50 States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, and Guam. The rate of child victims was 13.9 per 1,000 children in the general population in 1997, which is slightly higher than the rate of 13.4 victims per 1,000 children in 1990. There were an estimated 1,196 fatalities due to child maltreatment in the 50 States and the District of Columbia. The findings regarding the types of maltreatment were as follows: 55.9 percent neglect, 24.6 percent physical abuse, 12.5 percent sexual abuse, and 6.1 percent emotional abuse. It is also important to note that 58.8 percent of the substantiated or indicated reports of maltreatment were from professional sources: legal, medical, social service, or education professionals. Based on data from 39 States, 75.4 percent of the perpetrators were the victims’ parents, 10.2 percent were relatives, and 1.9 percent were individuals in other caretaking relationships.247 Information needs to be collected about new cases and causes of maltreatment. National surveys of new cases are needed to describe the magnitude of the problem. In addition, existing interventions and their impact need to be evaluated. Some long-term studies on home-visitation programs for young mothers have shown potential for preventing child abuse and neglect. There are two subobjectives: reduce maltreatment of children and reduce child maltreatment fatalities. The data source is the National Child Abuse and Neglect Data System (NCANDS), Administration on Children, Youth and Families, Administration for Children and Families (ACF), Children ’s Bureau. The National Center on Child Abuse and Neglect (NCCAN) established NCANDS in response to the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act (Public Law 93-247), as amended, which called for the creation of a coordinated universal and case-specific national data collection and analysis program. In 1988, NCCAN embarked on a collaborative effort with the States to collect and analyze annual child abuse 396 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health Violence Prevention and neglect data, on a voluntary basis, from Child Protective Services (CPS) agencies in the 50 States, the District of Columbia, the territories, and the Armed Services. Findings from NCANDS are based on aggregate data from 49 States and case-level data from 16 States.248 Maltreatment is defined as an act or failure to act by a parent, caretaker, other person, as defined under State law, which results in death, serious physical or emotional harm, sexual abuse or exploitation, or an act or failure to act that presents an imminent risk of serious harm. State definitions may include additional criteria.249 The national information is prepared from State data reports of maltreatment from State child welfare agencies. The numerator for the first subobjective is the number of persons aged 18 years and under found to be victims of maltreatment by State child welfare agencies. The actual question appearing on the survey is: ■ Enter the number of children by disposition who were the subject of a CPS investigation or assessment ______ The national rate of children who were the subjects of reports was estimated to be 42.0 children per 1,000 children in the general population. Based on the number of child victims in the 41 reporting States (798,358), more than half of child victims (54.7 percent) were victims of neglect, while a quarter (24.5 percent) suffered physical abuse. Twelve percent were sexually abused. Child victims of psychological abuse or neglect or medical neglect accounted for 6.2 and 2.4 percent of all victims, respectively, while 11.0 percent were subjected to other types of maltreatment, such as “abandonment,” “congenital drug addiction,” and “threats to harm the child.” (Percentages add up to more than 100 because children could have been victims of more than one type of abuse.)250 The numerator for the second subobjective is the number of reported child fatalities due to maltreatment among children aged 18 years and under. Child fatality due to maltreatment is defined as the death of a child as a result of abuse or neglect, because either (a) an injury resulting from the abuse or neglect of a child was the cause of the death, or (b) abuse or neglect were contributing factors to the cause of death. Data on child fatalities are collected from all States. Some State offices of CPS work closely with Health Departments or the coroner’s office, whereas others rely more on their own records, including deaths reported to them by law enforcement.251 The actual question appearing on the survey is: ■ Enter the number of child victims who died as a result of child abuse or neglect _____ Forty-one States reported that there were 967 child maltreatment fatalities in 1997. Based on these numbers, it was estimated that there were 1,196 fatalities in the 50 States and the District of Columbia, a rate of 1.7 children per 100,000 children in the general population or 123 child fatalities per 100,000 victims of maltreatment.252 Violence or potential violence in the home is a primary, precipitating factor in some LGBT youth running away from home. These LGBT youth report histories of sexual abuse, physical abuse, and emotional abuse from parents, family members, guardians, and others in positions of power and responsibility.253, 254, 255, 256 In addition, some LGBT youth are Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health 397 Violence Prevention probably more likely than the general population to refrain from reporting family violence for fear of disclosure and further harm to themselves and their families. Improving the cultural appropriateness of service agencies to which youth may report violence and enhancing the sense of safety these programs offer victims could improve the data and information available, hold perpetrators accountable, and increase understanding of this public health challenge. 15-34: Reduce the rate of physical assault by current or former intimate partners. The data source for this objective is the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS), U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics. Sexual orientation data currently are not collected (DNC in the data template). The numerator is the number of persons aged 12 years or older who report being threatened or assaulted by a current or former spouse, boyfriend, or girlfriend. NCVS uses a stratified, multistage cluster sample. Primary sampling units (PSUs) consist of counties, groups of counties, or large metropolitan areas. The 1994 survey sample households were drawn from the 1980-based sample design. Data are collected every year from a sample of approximately 50,000 households that include about 100,000 people aged 12 years and older. PSUs remain in the sample for a total of 3 years. A total of seven interviews are conducted at 6-month intervals during the 3-year process. NCVS counts incidents not reported to police and is one of two U.S. Department of Justice measures of crime in the United States. The survey contains a screening section with detailed questions and cues on victimizations and situations within which crimes may take place. Interviewers follow up positive responses and collect details about victimizations in incident reports. Demographic variables include age, gender, race, ethnicity, and income. Property crimes include data on age, race, ethnicity, and household size.257 Available data from 13 reporting centers throughout the United States indicate that intimate partner abuse occurs in 25 to 33 percent of same-sex relationships, generally equivalent to rates reported for opposite-sex relationships.2 5 8 N C AV P r e p o r t e d 2,574 cases of domestic violence in LGBT relationships in 1998. However, there is evidence that violence in same-sex relationships maybe the “most overlooked” form of intimate violence2 5 9 and that violence between same-sex partners may be as severe as that found between opposite-sex partners.2 6 0 15-35: Reduce the annual rate of rape or attempted rape. The data source for this objective is the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS), U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics. Sexual orientation data currently are not collected (DNC in the data template). This area is one for which there seems to be neither data nor research on LGBT populations. Obviously, this objective requires discussion as to the context, definitions, and mechanisms for proceeding. Given some of the alleged rates of alcohol abuse and use of other drugs, there are probably few LGBT individuals who would deny that rape or 398 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health Violence Prevention attempted rape occurs within the LGBT populations. Stigma and myths surround this area of investigation, and prompt the need for solid research-based findings. 15-36: Reduce sexual assault other than rape. Both females and males experience family and intimate violence and sexual assault. Perpetrators can be the same or of the opposite sex. Male victimization of females is more common in intimate partner violence and sexual assault. In 1995, almost 5,000 females in the United States were murdered. In those cases for which the FBI had data on the relationship between the offender and the victim, 85 percent were killed by someone they knew. Nearly half of the females who knew the perpetrators were murdered by a husband, ex-husband, or boyfriend.261 In 1994, more than 500,000 females were seen in hospital Emergency Departments (ED) for violence-related injuries, and 37 percent of those females were there for injuries inflicted by spouses, ex-spouses, or nonmarital partners.262 Although most assault victims survive, they suffer physically and emotionally. Violence against women is primarily partner violence. A national survey conducted from November 1995 to May 1996 estimates that approximately 1.5 million females and 834,700 males are raped and/or physically assaulted by an intimate partner annually in the United States. Seventy-six percent of the females who were raped and/or physically assaulted since age 18 were assaulted by a current or former husband, cohabiting partner, or date, compared with 18 percent of the males. Females are significantly more likely than males to be injured during an assault: 32 percent of the females and 16 percent of the males who were raped since age 18 were injured during their most recent rape; 39 percent of the females and 25 percent of the males who were physically assaulted since age 18 were injured during their most recent assault. About one in three females who were injured during a rape or physical assault required medical care. 263 Estimates of abuse rates during pregnancy also are a concern. A 1996 literature review indicated that estimated proportions of women experiencing Intimate Partner Violence (IPV) during pregnancy ranged between 0.9 percent and 20.1 percent. The majority were between 4 and 8 percent. The proportion of pregnant women who had experienced IPV at any time in the past ranged between 9.7 percent and 29.7 percent.264 Males who are physically violent toward their partners are more likely to be sexually violent toward them, and are more likely to use violence toward children.265 The perpetration of IPV is most common in adults who, as children or adolescents, witnessed IPV or became the targets of violence from their caregivers.266 Survey data from 1994 indicate that 407,190 females aged 12 years and older were victims of rape, attempted rape, or sexual assault.267 Other surveys indicate that the problem is underestimated.268 For example, the National Women’s Study, in conjunction with estimates based on the U.S. Census, suggests that 12.1 million females in the United States have been Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 399 Violence Prevention victims of forcible rape sometime in their lives. According to this study, 0.7 percent or approximately 683,000 of adult females experienced a forcible rape in the past year.269 Teen dating violence is a concern that may stem from childhood abuse or other experiences with violence. Battering in teen relationships is very different from IPV that occurs between adults. The issue of teen dating violence requires national attention and prevention efforts that need to continue focusing on adolescent violence within the larger context of family violence. The nature of IPV and sexual violence makes such problems difficult to study. Consequently, much remains unknown about the factors that increase or decrease the likelihood that males will behave violently toward females, the factors that endanger or protect females from violence, and the physical and emotional consequences of such violence for females and their children. The current data source for this objective is the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS), U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics. Sexual orientation data currently are not collected. 15-37: Reduce physical assaults. In 1999, NCAVP reported 735 incidents of assault (without a weapon, with a weapon, and attempted assault with a weapon), abduction/kidnapping, bomb threats/bombings, and arson against individuals in the LGBT population. These include both hate-motivated and other acts of violence. In particular, it is important to ensure that DHHS and DOJ address bias- driven incidents committed by hate groups (25 in 1998; 17 in 1999 against LGBT individuals) or the police (72 in 1998; 30 in 1999).270 The current data source for this objective is the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS), U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice. 15-38: Reduce physical fighting among adolescents. Sexual minorities are the most socially acceptable and widespread targets of violence by teenagers and young adults. 271 Several studies of violence against LGBT youth have found that they are much more likely than heterosexual youth to report having been targets of physical attacks and to have required medical attention as a result of such attacks.272 In one study, up to half of LGBT students has been physically harassed.273 The current data source for this objective is the Youth Risk Behavior Surveillance System (YRBSS), CDC, National Center for Chronic Disease Prevention and Health Promotion (NCCDPHP). S e rv i c e s — R E C O M M E N D ATIONS ■ Federal, State, and community programs should strengthen and expand prevention and education programs and services related to violence—including, for example, bias and hate-related violence, anger management, conflict resolution training, domestic violence, 400 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health Violence Prevention suicide, and substance abuse—through the public health and public school systems, social service agencies, criminal justice institutions, and the workplace by ensuring the inclusion of LGBT people. ■ If self-identified LGBT people present with signs of physical violence, health care providers should assess, as with heterosexual clients, using a standardized instrument (e.g., Campbell’s Danger Assessment) for forced sex, mental health status, previous undiagnosed head injuries, risk of suicide and/or homicide.274 ■ Health care providers should be aware of local, State, and national domestic violence referral sources for LGBT people, and where appropriate and available, link victims of violence to culturally appropriate social and mental health services for followup and aftercare. Education and Tr a i n i n g — R E C O M M E N D ATIONS ■ Schools should incorporate conflict resolution training and tolerance education into health and other antiviolence curricula beginning at the grade school level. DHHS, the U.S. Department of Education, and DOJ should collaborate on evaluating and improving existing curricula, supporting the dissemination of recommended curricula, and training teachers and other school personnel in the use of recommended curricula. ■ DHHS, DOJ, State and local agencies, and private sector organizations should support the development and implementation of strategies to increase community awareness of bias crimes against LGBT individuals and families and to reduce such crimes at the community level. ■ Federal, State and local agencies, and the private sector should support and strengthen training of health care, mental health, behavioral health, social services, and criminal justice personnel in the identification of LGBT-related violence, including hate- motivated crime and domestic violence, determination of factors related to the crime, and provision of prevention and intervention services, including but not limited to referral for culturally-appropriate post-trauma physical and mental health services. ■ Federal, State and local agencies, and the private sector need to create services to address domestic violence within LGBT populations. ■ An LGBT Intimate Partner Violence and Sexual Assault: A Guide to Training Materials and Programs for Health Care Providers should be written for distribution to all key stakeholders in health, law enforcement, and public safety. Included in the distribution should be the 36 model programs showcased in the already existing guide written in 1998 by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.275 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 401 Violence Prevention P o l i c y — R E C O M M E N D ATIONS ■ School systems should strengthen their antiviolence programs to include disciplinary procedures designed to reduce anti-LGBT violence; reduce or eliminate discrimination and violence against LGBT teachers, coaches, and other staff; and create “safe” environments that encourage involvement of LGBT parents and families with LGBT children in school boards and Parent/Teacher Associations. ■ Key stakeholders in public policy should acknowledge that violence may disproportionately affect LGBT people, identify societal attitudes and barriers that may contribute to violent acts against LGBT people, and discuss efforts to prevent such violence. ■ LGBT people should be involved in all subsequent national discussions of “defining” violence and ways to measure violent acts that include LGBT populations. ■ Businesses should establish and enforce appropriate LGBT tolerance and antidiscrimination standards for the workplace. ■ Faith-based initiatives at national, regional, State, and local levels should explicitly state that any violent act against LGBT people is not only unacceptable, but also illegal. ■ The media should report anti-LGBT violence in its proper context—as a broader pattern of behavior that harms everyone. ■ DHHS should work collaboratively with DOJ, State health offices, and State attorneys general to improve documentation of hate-motivated behavior against LGBT individuals and to strengthen Federal, State, and local law enforcement efforts. R e s e a rc h — R E C O M M E N D ATIONS ■ DHHS with DOJ should increase support for data collection and analysis related to LGBT violence, including domestic violence and hate-motivated violence, with ample epidemiologic data to allow for design and implementation of effective prevention programs (e.g., demographic data on both survivors and perpetrators, changes in trends in the communities). ■ DHHS with DOJ and other relative agencies should develop uniformity of definitions and measurement tools for violence perpetrated against and within LGBT populations. DHHS and DOJ jointly could explore conducting methodologic research. ■ Given the possible small number of cases, a sentinel research system should be established so as to estimate statistically the incidence of violence and abuse of LGBT people across the lifespan. ■ DHHS, other Federal agencies, and private foundations should support research to identify the patterns of hate crimes, criminal justice findings and outcomes (arrests, prosecutions and sentencing of hate crime offenders) by State and local jurisdiction. 402 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health Violence Prevention Te rm i n o l o g y Attempted rape: Includes males and females, heterosexual and homosexual rape, and verbal threats of rape. Homicide: Fatal injury intentionally caused to one human being by another. I n j u ry: Unintentional or intentional damage to the body resulting from acute exposure to thermal, mechanical, electrical, or chemical energy or from the absence of such essentials as heat or oxygen. Intimate partner(s): Spouses, ex-spouses, boyfriends, girlfriends, and former boyfriends and girlfriends (includes same-sex partners). Intimate partners may or may not be cohabitating and need not be engaging in sexual activities. Intimate part n e r violence: Actual or threatened physical or sexual violence or psychological and emotional abuse by an intimate partner. Rape: Forced sexual intercourse, including both psychological coercion and physical force. Forced sexual intercourse means vaginal, anal, or oral penetration by the offender(s) and includes incidents of penetration by a foreign object. Also included are attempted rapes, male and female victims, and heterosexual and homosexual rape. Sexual assault: A wide range of victimizations separate from rape and attempted rape. Included are attacks or attempted attacks of unwanted sexual contact between the victim and the offender that may or may not involve force; includes grabbing or fondling. Verbal threats also are included. Unintentional injury: Injury that occurs without purposeful intent. Violence: The intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or actual, against another person or against oneself or against a group of people, that results in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, maldevelopment, or deprivation. R e f e re n c e s 1 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS). Deaths: Final data for 1997. National Vital Statistics Reports 47(10), June 1999. 2 U.S. Public Health Service (PHS). The Surgeon General’s Call to Action to Prevent Suicide . Washington, DC: PHS, 1999. 3 PHS. Mental Health: A Report of the Surgeon General. Washington, DC: PHS, 1999. 4 NCHS. Health, United States, 2000 with Adolescent Health Chartbook. Hyattsville, MD: NCHS, 2000. 5 PHS. Youth Violence: A Report of the Surgeon General. Washington, DC: PHS, 2000. 6 Fox, J.A., and Zawitz, M.W. Homicide Trends in the United States. Washington, DC: Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS), U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), 2001. www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/homicide/homtrnd.htm; 7 DOJ, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Crime in the United States, 1999. Washington, DC: DOJ, FBI, October 15, 2000. Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 403 Violence Prevention 8 American Association of the College of Nursing. Violence as a Public Health Problem, Position Statement, Approved by AACN Membership, March 15, 1999. 9 Clark, S.J.; Burt, M.R.; Schulte, M.M.; and Maguire, K. Coordinated Community Responses to Domestic Violence in Six Communities: Beyond the Justice System. Report by the Urban Institute for the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Planning and Evaluation, October 1996. 10 Koop, C.E. Foreword. In: Rosenberg, M.L., and Fenley, M.A. (Eds.) Violence in America: A Public Health Approach. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1991, iv. 11 Contra Costa County Health Services Prevention Program. Preventing Violence in Contra Costa County: A Countywide Action Plan and A Framework for Action. Pleasant Hill, CA: Contra Costa County Health Services Prevention Program, 1995. 12 Ibid. 13 American Association of the College of Nursing, 1999. 14 National Center on Elder Abuse at the American Public Human Services Association. The National Elder Abuse Incidence Study, Final Report. Prepared for the Administration for Children and Families (ACF) and the Administration on Aging, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), September 1998. 15 DHHS. Healthy People 2010. 2 nd ed. Understanding and Improving Health and Objectives for Improving Health. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office (GPO), November 2000. 16 Addressing Violence in Oklahoma: Child Maltreatment. Available online at www.health.state.ok.us/program/injury/violence/childmal.html, no date. 17 National Clearinghouse on Child Abuse and Neglect Information. What is Child Maltreatment? Washington, DC: National Clearinghouse on Child Abuse and Neglect Information, no date. 18 Jones, J.S.; Veenstra, T.R.; Seamon, J.P.; Krohmer, J. Elder mistreatment: national survey of emergency physicians. Annals of Emergency Medicine 30(4):473-479, 1997. 19 Uniform Crime Reporting, National Incident-Based Reporting System. Volume I, Data Collection Guidelines. Washington, DC: DOJ, FBI, 24, February 1998. 20 National Clearinghouse on Child Abuse and Neglect Information, no date. 21 National Center on Elder Abuse at the American Public Human Services Association, 1998. 22 CDC Committee on Violence Definitions. Atlanta, GA: CDC, 1997. 23 National Center on Elder Abuse at the American Public Human Services Association, 1998. 24 CDC Committee on Violence Definitions, 1997. 25 Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act. As amended and authorized (P.L. 104-235, Section 111; 42 U.S.C. 5106g, October 1996. 26 National Center on Elder Abuse at the American Public Human Services Association, 1998. 27 CDC Committee on Violence Definitions, 1997. 28 Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, 1996. 29 Garabarino, J., and Garbarino, A.C. Emotional Maltreatment of Children (revised edition). Chicago, IL: National Committee to Prevent Child Abuse, 1994. 30 National Center on Elder Abuse at the American Public Human Services Association, 1998. 31 CDC Committee on Violence Definitions, 1997. 404 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health Violence Prevention 32 Ibid. 33 Ibid. 34 Ibid. 35 CDC. Building data systems for monitoring and responding to violence against women: Recommendations from a workshop. Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report 49(No. RR-11), 2000. 36 Ibid. 37 U.S. Department of Education (DOE) and DOJ. School Safety, 2000: Annual Report on School Safety. Washington, DC: DOE and DOJ, 2000. 38 DOJ, FBI, 1999. 39 DOJ, BJS. School Crime Supplement to the National Crime Victimization Survey. Washington, DC: DOJ, BJS, 1999. 40 DHHS, Administration on Children, Youth, and Families. Child Maltreatment 1997: Reports from the States to the National Child Abuse and Neglect Data System. Washington, DC: GPO, 1997. 41 Ibid. 42 Strasburger, V.C., and Donnerstein, E. Children, adolescents, and media in the 21st Century. Adolescent Medicine 11(1):51-68, Feb 2000. 43 DuRant, R.H.; Rich, M.; Emans, S.J.; et al. Violence and weapon carrying in music videos: A content analysis. Archives of Pediatric and Adolescent Medicine 151(5):443-448, 1997. 44 Singer, M.I.; Slovak, K.; Frierson, T.; and York, P. Viewing preferences, symptoms of psychological trauma, and violent behaviors among children who watch television. Journal of the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry 37(10):1041-1048, 1998. 45 Strasburger and Donnerstein, 2000. 46 Widom, C.S. The Cycle of Violence, Research in Brief. Washington, DC: DOJ, Office of Justice Programs, National Institute of Justice, 1992. 47 Jacobson, W.B. Safe from the Start: Taking Action on Children Exposed to Violence. Washington, DC: DOJ, Office of Justice Programs, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, November 2000. 48 BJS. Intimate partner violence against women declined from 1993 through 1998. News Release, May 17, 2000. 49 FBI. Crime in the United States: Uniform Crime Reports. Washington, DC: DOJ, FBI, 1997. 50 Pynoos, R.S., and Nader, K. Children who witness the sexual assaults of their mothers. Journal of the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry 27(5):567-572, 1988. 51 Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, American Medical Association. Physicians and domestic violence: Ethical considerations. Journal of the American Medical Association 267(23):3190-3193, 1992. 52 Clark, Burt, Schulte, and Maguire, 1996. 53 Tatara, T. An Analysis of State Laws Addressing Elder Abuse, Neglect, and Exploitation. Washington, DC: National Center on Elder Abuse, 1995. 54 National Center on Elder Abuse at the American Public Human Services Association, 1998. 55 Ibid. Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health 405 Violence Prevention 56 Tatara, T., and Broughton, D. Institutional Elder Abuse: A Summary of Data Gathered from State Limits on Aging, State APS Agencies, and State Long-term Ombudsman. Washington, DC: National Aging Resource Center on Elder Abuse, 1992. 57 Senate Special Committee on Aging. Resident Assessment: The Springboard to Quality of Care and Quality of Life for Nursing Home Residents. Comm. Pub. No. 101-30. Washington, DC: GPO, 1990. 58 House Select Committee on Aging, Subcommittee on Health and Long-term Care. Board and Care Homes in America: A National Tragedy. Comm. Pub. No. 101-711, Chairman’s Report. Washington, DC: GPO, 1989. 59 DHHS Office of the Inspector General (OIG). Resident Abuse in Nursing Homes: Respondent Perceptions of Issues. Washington, DC: HHS, OIG, 1990. 60 Tousignant, M., and Davis, P. Nursing homes in area, nationwide plagued by reports of abuse. Washington Post, B1, October 13, 1996. 61 PHS, 2000. 62 Cook, P.J., and Laub, J.H. The unprecedented epidemic in youth violence. In: Tonry, M., and Moore, M.H. (Eds.) Youth Violence, Crime and Justice: A Review of Research. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1998, 27-64. 63 ACF, Children’s Bureau. Child maltreatment 1998: Reports from the States to the National Child Abuse and Neglect Data System. Washington, DC: DHHS, ACF, Children’s Bureau, 2001. 64 DOJ, BJS, National Crime Victimization Survey, 1992-1998. As cited in DOE and DOJ, 2000. 65 DOJ, BJS, School Crime: Supplement to the National Crime Victimization Survey, 1989, 1996 and 1999. As cited in DOE and DOJ, 2000. 66 DOE. Violence and Discipline Problems in U.S. Public Schools: 1996-1997. Washington, DC: DOE, National Center for Education Statistics, 1998. 67 DOE and DOJ, 2000. 68 CDC, DOE, and DOJ. The School Associated Violent Death Study. Atlanta, GA: CDC, 2000. 69 Murphy, S.L. Deaths: Final Data for 1998. National Vital Statistics Reports 48(11):26-50, 2000. 70 Rosenberg, H.M.; Mauer, J.D.; Sorlie, P.D.; et al. Quality of death rates by race and Hispanic origin: A summary of current research, 1999. Vital Health Statistics 2(128): 1-20, 1999. 71 Murphy, 2000. 72 Ibid. 73 Rich, G.L.; Fowler, R.C.; Young, D.; and Blenkush, M. San Diego suicide study: Comparison of gay to straight males. Suicide and Life-Threatening Behavior 16(4):448-457, 1986. 74 Shaffer, D.; Fisher, P.; Hicks, R.H.; et al. Sexual orientation in adolescents who commit suicide. Suicide and Life-threatening Behavior 25:64-71, 1995. 75 Kipke, M.D.; Simon, T.R.; Montgomery, S.B.; et al. Homeless youth and their exposure to and involvement in violence while living on the streets. Journal of Adolescent Health 20(5):360-367, 1997. 76 National Center on Elder Abuse at the American Public Human Services Association, 1998. 77 Ibid. 78 Ibid. 406 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health Violence Prevention 79 National Coalition of Anti-Violence Programs (NCAVP). Anti-Lesbian, Gay, Transgender and Bisexual Violence in 1998: A Report of the National Coalition of Anti-Violence Programs. New York, NY: NCAVP, April 1999. 80 McDevitt, J. The Hate Crimes Prevention Act. Testimony before the House Judiciary Committee, Washington, DC, 1998. 81 American Psychological Association. Hate Crimes Today: An Age-old Foe in Modern Dress. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, 1998. 82 Leadership Conference Education Fund/Leadership Conference on Civil Rights. Cause for Concern: Hate Crimes in America. Washington, DC: Leadership Conference Education Fund/Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, 1997. 83 American Psychological Association, 1998. 84 Ibid. 85 Finn, P., and McNeil, T. The Response of the Criminal Justice System to Bias Crime. Cambridge, MA: Abt Associates, 1987. 86 Garnets, L.; Herek, G.M.; and Levy, B. Violence and victimization of lesbians and gay men: Mental health consequences. Journal of Interpersonal Violence 5(3):366-383, 1990. 87 Franklin, K. Psychosocial motivations of hate crime perpetrators: Implications for prevention and policy. Paper presented at a congressional briefing cosponsored by the American Psychological Association and the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues, Washington, D.C., November 1997. 88 Ibid. 89 Mintor, S. Representing Transsexual Clients: An Overview of Selected Legal Issues. San Francisco, CA: National Center for Lesbian Rights 2000. 90 Ibid. 91 Lombardi, E., and van Servellen, G. Building culturally sensitive substance use prevention and treatment programs for transgendered populations. Journal of Substance Abuse Treatment 19:291-296, 2000. 92 Leslie, D.R.; Perina, B.A.; and Maqueda, M.C. Clinical issues with transgender individuals. In: DHHS, Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA), Center for Substance Abuse Treatment (CSAT). A Provider’s Introduction to Substance Abuse Treatment for Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Individuals. DHHS Pub. No. (SMA) 01-3498. Rockville, MD: DHHS, SAMHSA, CSAT, 2001. 93 Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974, as amended in 1992 (PL 93-415; 42 U.S.C. 5601 et seq., 1992. 94 Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP). Report to Congress on Juvenile Hate Crime. Washington, DC: DOJ, OJJDP, July 1996. 95 Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA), as amended in 1992. 20 U.S.C. 6302.13, 1992. 96 Improving America’s Schools Act of 1994, Sec. 4123. Hate Crime Prevention, 1994. 97 Federal Register. Vol. 61, No. 128, July 2, 1996. 98 Anti-Defamation League. Hate Crimes Laws. Available online at www.adl.org/99hatecrime/intro.html, 1999. 99 Education Development Center, Inc., Massachusetts Criminal Justice Training Council, and the Office for Victims of Crime. Bias Crimes: National Bias Crime Training for Law Enforcement and Victim Assistance Professionals, 1994. Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health 407 Violence Prevention 100 Anti-Defamation League, 1999. 101 American Psychological Association, 1998. 102 Herek, G.M.; Cogan, J.; and Gillis, R.J. The impact of hate crime victimization. Paper presented at a congressional briefing cosponsored by the American Psychological Association and the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues, Washington, DC, November 1997. 103 Dunbar, E. Hate crime patterns in Los Angeles County: Demographic and behavioral factors of victim impact and reporting of crime. Paper presented at a congressional briefing cosponsored by the American Psychological Association and the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues, Washington, DC, November 1997. 104 National Council of La Raza. Fact sheet: Latinos and hate violence. Washington, DC: National Council of La Raza, 1997. 105 National Center for Injury Prevention and Control. Best Practices for Preventing Violence by Children and Adolescents: A Source Book. Atlanta, GA: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 1999. 106 Carnes, J. (Ed.) Responding to Hate at School. Montgomery, AL: Southern Poverty Law Center, 1999. 107 Nabozny v. Podlesny. 92F.3d 446, 7th Circuit Court, 1996. 108 Buckel, D. Stopping antigay Abuse of Students in Public Schools. New York, NY: Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, 1998. 109 American Psychological Association, 1998. 110 Dunbar, 1997. 111 American Psychological Association, 1998. 112 Hall, H.P. Big Thicket Requiem: An Elegy in Six Parts for James Byrd, Jr. San Antonio, TX: Pecan Grove Press, July 1999. 113 Mundy, L. In and out in Roanoke. The Washington Post Magazine, 10-17;22-25, February 19, 2001. 114 American Psychological Association, 1998. 115 American Psychiatric Association. Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Third Edition. Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association Press, 1991. 116 Bradford, J.; Ryan, C.; and Rothblum, E.D. National Lesbian Health Care Survey: Implications for mental health care. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology 52(2):228-242, 1994. 117 D’Augelli, A.R. Lesbians’ and gay men’s experiences of discrimination and harassment in a university community. American Journal of Community Psychology 17(3):317-321, 1989. 118 Garnets, L.; Herek, G.M.; and Levy, B. Violence and victimization of lesbians and gay men: Mental health consequences. Journal of Interpersonal Violence 5(3):366-383, 1990. 119 Herek, G.M. Hate crimes against lesbians and gay men. American Psychologist 44:948-955, 1989. 120 Levine, M.P., and Leonard, R. Discrimination against lesbians in the work force. Signs 9:700-710, 1984. 121 Rothblum, E.D. “I only read about myself on bathroom walls:” The need for research on the mental health of lesbians and gay men. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology 62(2):213-220, 1994. 122 Wolfe, A. One Nation After All: What Americans Really Think About God, Country, Family, Racism, Welfare, Immigration, Homosexuality, Work, the Right, the Left and Each Other. New York, NY: Viking Press, 1998. 408 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health Violence Prevention 123 Wooden, W.S., and Parker, J. Men Behind Bars: Sexual Exploitation in Prison. New York, NY: Da Capo, 1982. 124 Garnet, Herek, and Levy, 1990. 125 Herek, G.M.; Gillis, J.R.; Cogan, J.C.; and Glunt, E.K. Hate Crime Victimization among Lesbian, Gay and Bisexual Adults. Journal of Interpersonal Violence 12,2(4):195-215, 1997. 126 Fenway Community Health Center/Victory Recovery Program. antigay/Lesbian Violence in 1995: Massachusetts and the United States; Local and National Trends, Analysis and Incident Summaries. Boston, MA: Fenway Community Health Center/Victory Recovery Program, 1995. 127 NCAVP. 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Psychosocial Stressors in a Panel of New York City Gay Men During the AIDS Epidemic, 1985 to 1991. In: Herek, G.M., Berrill, K.T. (Eds). Psychological Perspectives on Lesbian and Gay Issues (Volume 2). AIDS, Identity, and Community: The HIV Epidemic and Lesbians and Gay Men. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1995. 148 Herek, Gillis, Cogan, and Glunt, 1997. 149 Herek, Cogan, and Gillis, 1997. 150 Safe Schools Coalition of Washington. Eighty-three Thousand Youth, Selected Findings of Eight Population-based Studies as They Pertain to Antigay Harassment and the Safety and Well-Being of Sexual Minority Students. May 1999. < www.safeschools-wa.org>. 151 Gustavsson, N.S., and MacEachron, A.E. Violence and Lesbian and Gay Youth. In: Sloan, L.M., Gustavsson, N.S. (Eds). Violence and Social Injustice Against Lesbian, Gay and Bisexual People. Binghamton, NY: Haworth Press, 1998. 152 Gay, Lesbian, and Straight Education Network. National School Climate Survey: Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender Students and their Experiences in School. 1999. <www.glsen.org>. 153 Safe Schools Coalition of Washington, 1999. 154 Ibid. 155 National Association of Attorneys General, 2000. 156 American Psychological Association. Hate Crimes Today: An Age-old Foe in Modern Dress. 1998. 157 Herek, Gillis, Cogan, and Glunt, 1997. 158 Herek, Cogan, and Gillis, 1997. 159 Gustavsson and MacEachron, 1998. 160 Waldo, C.R.; Hesson-McInnis, M.S.; and D’Augelli, A.R. Antecedents and consequences of victimization of lesbian, gay, and bisexual young people: A structural model comparing rural university and urban samples. American Journal of Community Psychology 26(2):307-334, 1998. 161 National Association of Attorneys General, 2000. 162 Safe Schools Coalition of Washington, 1999. 163 Waldo, Hesson-McInnis, and D ’Augelli, 1998. 164 FBI, 2001. 165 NCAVP, 2000. 166 Dean, Martin, and Wu, 1992. 167 Berrill, K.T. Antigay Violence and Victimization in the United States: An Overview. In: Herek, G.M., Berrill, K.T. (Eds). Hate Crimes: Confronting Violence Against Lesbians and Gay Men. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, 1992. 410 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health Violence Prevention 168 Bradford and Ryan, 1988. 169 Russell, D.E.H. Sexual Exploitation: Rape, Child Sexual Abuse, and Sexual Harassment. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1984. 170 Scarce, M. Male on Male Rape. New York, NY: Plenum Press, 1997. 171 Tjaden P.; Thoennes, N.; Allison, C.J. Comparing violence over the life span in samples of same-sex and opposite-sex cohabitants. Violence and Victims 14(4):413-425, Winter 1999. 172 Ibid. 173 Remafedi, G.; Farrow, J.A.; and Deischer, R.W. Risk factors for attempted suicide in gay and bisexual youth. Pediatrics 87:869-875, 1991. 174 Knisley, E.R. Psychosocial factors relevant to homosexual men who were sexually abused as children and homosexual men who were not sexually abused as children: An exploratory-descriptive study. Dissertation Abstracts International 53(6-B):3157, 1992. 175 Bartholow, B.N.; Doll, L.S.; Joy, D.; et al. Emotional, behavioral, and HIV risks associated with sexual abuse among adult homosexual and bisexual men. Child Abuse and Neglect 18(9):747, 1994. 176 Carballo-Dieguez, A., and Dolezal, C. Association between history of childhood sexual abuse and adult HIV-risk sexual behavior in Puerto Rican men who have sex with men. Child Abuse and Neglect 19(5):595- 605, 1995. 177 Doll, L.S.; Joy, D.; Bartholow, B.N.; Harrison, J.; et al. Self-reported childhood and adolescent sexual abuse among adult homosexual and bisexual men. Child Abuse and Neglect 16(6):855-864, 1992. 178 Farley, N. Survey of factors contributing to gay and lesbian domestic violence. Journal of Gay and Lesbian Social Services 4(1):35-42, 1996. 179 Kalichman, S.C., and Rompa, D. Sexually coerced and noncoerced gay and bisexual men: Factors relevant to risk for human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) infection. Journal of Sex Research 32(1):45-50, 1995. 180 Scarce, 1997. 181 King, M. Male rape: Victims need sensitive management. British Medical Journal 201:1345-1346, 1990. 182 Elliott, P. Sheltering illusions: Same sex domestic violence. Journal of Gay and Lesbian Social Services 4(1):1-8, 1996. 183 Stowers, G.N.L. A different model: Alternative service delivery for today’s diverse communities. Journal of Health and Human Services Administration 22(2):174-195, 1999. 184 Lobel, K. Naming the Violence: Speaking Out Against Lesbian Domestic Violence. Seal Press, 1986. 185 The Medical Foundation. Health Concerns of the Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual, and Transgender Community, 2nd edition. Funded by the Massachusetts Department of Public Health, Boston, MA, June 1997. 186 NCAVP, 2000 187 Ibid. 188 Ibid. 189 Brand, P.A., and Kidd, A.H. Frequency of physical aggression in heterosexual and female homosexual dyads. Psychological Report 59:1307-1313, 1986. 190 Renzetti, C.M. Violent Betrayal: Partner Abuse in Lesbian Relationships. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, 1992. Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 411 Violence Prevention 191 Schilit, R.; Lie, G.; and Montagne, M. Substance use as a correlate of violence in intimate lesbian relationships. Journal of Homosexuality 19:51-65, 1990. 192 Bradford and Ryan, 1988. 193 Russell, D.E.H. The prevalence and incidence of forcible rape and attempted rape of females. Victimology: An International Journal 7:81-93, 1982. 194 Stowers, 1999. 195 Letellier P. Gay and bisexual male domestic violence victimization: challenges to feminist theory and responses to violence, Violence Vict 9(2): 95-106, 1994. 196 Cruz J.M., and Firestone, J.M. Exploring violence and abuse in gay male relationships. Violence and Victims 13(2):159-173, 1998. 197 Burke, L.K., and Follingstad, D.R. Violence in lesbian and gay relationships: theory, prevalence, and correlational factors. Clinical Psychology Review 19(5):487-512, 1999. 198 Tjaden, P.; Thoennes, N.; and Allison, C.J. Comparing violence over the life span in samples of same-sex and opposite-sex cohabitants. Violence and Victims 14(4):413-425, 1999. 199 Fray-Witzer, E. Twice abuse: Same-sex domestic violence and the law. In: Leventhal, B., and Lundy, S.E. (Eds.) Same-Sex Domestic Violence: Strategies for Change. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 19-31, 1999. 200 Johnson R. Groups for gay and bisexual male survivors of domestic violence. In Leventhal, B., and Lundy, S.E. (Eds.) Same-Sex Domestic Violence: Strategies for Change. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 215- 231, 1999. 201 Cayouette, S. Running battered groups for lesbians In In Leventhal, B., and Lundy, S.E. (Eds.) Same-Sex Domestic Violence: Strategies for Change. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 233-242, 1999. 202 Morrow, J. Director, Lesbian Domestic Violence Services. Interview with WOMAN, Inc., January 13, 1994. 203 Ibid. 204 Elliott, 1996. 205 Stowers, 1999. 206 Letellier, 1994. 207 Cochran, S.D., and Mays, V.M. Lifetime prevalence of suicidal symptoms and affective disorders among men reporting same-sex sexual partners: Results from the NHANES III. American Journal of Public Health 90(4):573-578, 2000. 208 DuRant, R.H.; Krowchuk, D.P.; and Sinal, S.H. Victimization, use of violence, and drug use at school among male adolescents who engage in same-sex sexual behavior. Journal of Pediatrics 133(1):113-118, 1998. 209 Faulkner, A.H., and Cranston, K. Correlates of same-sex sexual behavior in a random sample of Massachusetts high school students. American Journal of Public Health 88(2):262-266, 1998. 210 Fergusson, D.M.; Horwood, L.J.; and Beautrais, A.L. Is sexual orientation related to mental health problems and suicidality in young people? Archives of General Psychiatry 56:876-880, 1999. 211 Garofalo, R.; Wolf, R.; Kessel, S.; et al. The association between health risk behaviors and sexual orientation among a school-based sample of adolescents. Pediatrics 101(5):895-902, 1998. 212 Remafedi, Farrow, and Deischer, 1991. 412 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health Violence Prevention 213 Russell, S.T., and Joyner, K. Adolescent sexual orientation and suicide risk: Evidence from a national study. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Association, Chicago, IL. August 1998. 214 Bradford, Ryan, and Rothblum, 1994. 215 D’Augelli, A.R., and Hershberger, S. Lesbian, gay, and bisexual youth in community settings: Personal challenges and mental health problems. American Journal of Community Psychology 21(4):421-448, 1993. 216 Kruks, G. Gay and lesbian homeless/street youth: Special issues and concerns. Journal of Adolescent Health 12:515-518, 1991. 217 Remafedi, Farrow, and Deischer, 1991. 218 Schneider, S.G.; Farberow, N.L.; and Kruks, G.N. Suicidal behavior in adolescent and young adult gay men. Suicide and Life-Threatening Behavior 19(4):381-394, 1989. 219 Pillard, R.C. Sexual orientation and mental disorder. Psychiatric Annals 18(1):52-56, 1998. 220 Bell, A.P., and Weinberg, M.S. Homosexualities: A Study of Diversity Among Men and Women. New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 1978. 221 Saghir, M.T., and Robins, E. Male and Female Homosexuality: A Comprehensive Investigation. Baltimore, MD: Williams and Wilkins Company, 1973. 222 Bradford, Ryan, and Rothblum, 1994. 223 Robins, L.E., and Regier, D.A. Psychiatric Disorders in America: The Epidemiologic Catchment Area Study. New York, NY: The Free Press, 1991. 224 van Kesteren, P.J.M.; Asscheman, H.; Megens, J.A.J.; and Gooren, L.J.G. Mortality and morbidity in transsexual subjects treated with cross-hormones. Clinical Endocrinology 47:337-342, 1997. 225 Pfafflin, F., and Junge, A. Sex reassignment: Thirty years of international follow-up studies after SRS—A comprehensive review, 1961-1991. 1992. English translation available at http://www.symposion.com/ijt/pfaefflin/1000.htm. 1998. 226 Dixen, J.M.; Maddever, H.; Van Maasden, J., et al. Psychosocial characteristics of applicants evaluated for surgical gender reassignment. Archives of Sexual Behavior 13:269-277, 1984. 227 Pfafflin and Junge, 1998. 228 Xavier J. Final Report of the Washington Transgender Needs Assessment Survey. Administration for HIV and AIDS, Government of the District of Columbia. 2000. 229 Dixen, Maddever, Van Maasden, et al., 1984. 230 DuRant, Krowchuk, and Sinal, 1998. 231 Faulkner and Cranston, 1998. 232 Fergusson, Horwood, and Beautrais, 1999. 233 Garofalo, Wolf, Kessel, et al., 1998. 234 Remafedi, G.; French, S.; Story, M.; et al. The relationship between suicide risk and sexual orientation: Results of a population-based study. American Journal of Public Health 88(1):57-60, 1998. 235 Russell and Joyner, 1998. 236 D’Augelli and Hershberger, 1993. 237 Bartholow, Doll, Joy, et al., 1994. Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 413 Violence Prevention 238 Remafedi, Farrow, and Deischer, 1991. 239 Rotheram-Borus, M.; Hunter, J.; and Rosario, M. Suicidal behavior and gay-related stress among gay and bisexual male adolescents. Journal of Adolescent Research 9:498-508, 1994. 240 Russell and Joyner, 1998. 241 Xavier. 2000. 242 Murphy, 2000. 243 World Health Organization (WHO). World Health Statistics Annual, 1994. Geneva, Switzerland: WHO, 1995. 244 DHHS. Tracking Healthy People 2010. Washington, DC: GPO, November 2000. 245 Tolson, G.C.; Barnes, J.M.; Gay, G.A.; and Kowaleski, J.L. The 1989 revision of the U.S. standard certificates and reports. Vital Health Statistics 4(28), 1991. 246 NCAVP, 2000. 247 Administration on Children, Youth and Families (ACYF). Child Maltreatment 1997: Reports from the States to the National Child Abuse and Neglect Data System. Washington, DC: GPO, 1999. 248 ACYF, 1999. 249 DHHS. Tracking Healthy People 2010, November 2000. 250 ACYF, 1999. 251 DHHS. Tracking Healthy People 2010, November 2000. 252 ACYF, 1999. 253 Garofalo, Wolf, Kessel, et al., 1998. 254 Remafedi, French, Story, et al., 1998. 255 Russell and Joyner, 1998. 256 D’Augelli and Hershberger, 1993. 257 DHHS. Tracking Healthy People 2010, November 2000. 258 Bartholow, Doll, Joy, et al., 1994. 259 Remafedi, Farrow, and Deischer, 1991. 260 Rotheram-Borus, Hunter, and Rosario, 1994. 261 FBI. Crime in the United States: 1996. Washington, DC: GPO, 1997. 262 BJS. Violence-Related Injuries Treated in Hospital Emergency Departments. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, 1997. 263 Tjaden, P., and Thoennes, N. Prevalence, Incidence, and Consequences of Violence against Violence: Findings from the National Violence against Violence Survey. Pub. No. NCJ 172837. Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice and CDC, 1998. 264 Gazmararian, J.A.; Lazorick, S.; Spitz, A.M.; et al. Prevalence of violence against pregnant women. Journal of the American Medical Association 275:1915-1920, 1996. 414 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health Violence Prevention 265 Hotaling, G.T., and Sugarman, D.B. An analysis of risk markers in husband to wife violence: The current state of knowledge. Violence and Victims 1:101-124, 1986. 266 Ibid. 267 DOJ, BLS. Crime Victimization in the United States, 1994. Washington, DC: BJS, 1997. 268 Bachman, R., and Taylor, B. The measurement of family violence and rape by the re-designed national crime victimization survey. Justice Quarterly 11:701-704, 1994. 269 Kilpatrick, D.G.; Edmunds, C.N.; and Seymour, A.L. Rape in America: A Report to the Nation. Arlington, VA: National Victim Center, 1992, 2. 270 NCAVP, 2000. 271 American Psychological Association, 1998. 272 Safe Schools Coalition of Washington, 1999. 273 Gustavsson and MacEachron, 1998. 274 Campbell, J.C. Nursing assessment for risk of homicide with battered women. Advances in Nursing Science 8(4):36-51, 1986. 275 Osattin, A., and Short, L.M. Intimate Partner Violence and Sexual Assault: A Guide to Training Materials and Programs for Health Care Providers. Atlanta, GA: CDC, 1998. Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health 415 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health 417 Appendix A: Recommendations Access to Quality Health Serv i c e s S e rv i c e s — R E C O M M E N D ATIONS ■ Private and public sector health care systems should create receptive environments for LGBT health care consumers. For example, health care forms should be inclusive rather than exclusive. ■ The 1,200 school-based health care centers located in 45 States and the District of Columbia should offer targeted preventive interventions for LGBT and questioning youth. ■ The National Coalition of LGBT Health and other interested organizations can create a “Health Care Report Card for LGBT Consumers.” ■ A national resource list of health plans, agencies, and professionals that are LGBT competent should be made available through the Internet. ■ DHHS, in partnership with the health sector should collaborate on a web site that addresses LGBT health issues, including such information as LGBT health consumer rights and responsibilities, self-care, promotion of culturally appropriate standards of care for LGBT people, and a compendium of LGBT health information for professionals. ■ DHHS, in partnership with professional organizations and other health care agencies already concerned with cultural competency in health care, should fund the expansion and evaluation of existing programs to promote sensitivity among health care providers to serve LGBT populations. The Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual and Transgender Health Access Training Project is ongoing in Massachusetts and the Removing the Barriers to Accessing Health Care for Lesbians was developed through funding from CDC’s Division of Cancer Prevention and Control to the Mautner Project for Lesbians with Cancer in Washington, D.C. ■ Appropriate social service agencies should include LGBT-sensitive support for informal family caregivers, including same-sex partners and close friends. Education and Tr a i n i n g — R E C O M M E N D ATIONS ■ Cultural competency training, specific to LGBT populations, should be a standard component of all health professional training curricula and made available to the health care workforce through continuing education institutes or other appropriate mechanisms. ■ Models for training health care providers in LGBT-sensitive care should be collected in a database applicable to key stakeholders. ■ Medical Boards and other groups that license or certify health care professionals should ensure that their examinations include questions on LGBT health care. ■ Academic departments of health should encourage, if not require, an internship or a rotation at a community center or health center that serves LGBT people. ■ Home care agencies should be trained to be culturally sensitive and respectful of the cultural differences among all elders, including LGBT. P o l i c y — R E C O M M E N D ATIONS ■ All health care accreditation organizations should specifically include language within their policies regarding access to health care services for LGBT populations. ■ All Federal and other publicly funded health programs, including Medicare, should specifically have nondiscriminatory language related to sexual orientation and gender identity. ■ DHHS, in partnership with organizations such as the American Association of Health Care Plans, the American Medical Association, the National Assembly of School-based Health Care, the American Public Health Association, National Association of State Medicaid Directors, and the National Association of Community Health Centers, should convene a task force of experts to discuss health care access for LGBT populations and issue recommended standards of care for adoption by appropriate health care programs. ■ Confidentiality for LGBT people is critical and confidentiality guidelines and assurances must not only be communicated but also incorporated into all health care record keeping. ■ Hospitals, nursing homes, assisted living facilities and any other health care facility should adopt policies that ensure that the families of LGBT people are treated as are the family members of heterosexual patients and residents. ■ Medicaid spend-down protections, which provide income and asset protections to the husband or wife of a nursing home resident, should be expanded to cover the life partners of LGBT people who enter nursing homes. R e s e a rc h — R E C O M M E N D ATIONS ■ Government and/or private funding should be directed to determining the barriers to access for LGBT populations as a whole as well as its component parts, including crosscutting variables such as race, age, ethnicity, and disability. ■ Health care economists should be encouraged to develop an algorithm for determining the costs-benefits associated with sexual reassignment surgery and/or hormones so that health care insurers can make informed decisions. ■ Health care researchers should be encouraged by public and private funders to identify LGBT individuals, if appropriate, within all studies relating to health care access. ■ Government and/or private funding should be used to investigate the impact of domestic partnership policies on insurance coverage for LGBT populations. ■ Research is critical in determining not only the causes of but also the resolutions to homophobia within the health care system. ■ Data are needed to compare hospitalization rates for three ambulatory-care-sensitive conditions—pediatric asthma, uncontrolled diabetes and immunization-preventable pneumonia and influenza for LGBT adolescents, adults, and elders, respectively, with the total population. 418 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health C a n c e r S e rv i c e s — R E C O M M E N D AT I O N S All public health clinics and providers should participate in cultural competence training about sexual minority status and its effect on health and the provision of health care and related services. Federal funding for other types of provider situations should be contingent on the completion of cultural competency training. ■ LGBT-friendly and, where necessary, LGBT-specific services should be provided in all areas of cancer care, including prevention and health behavior change. ■ Existing lesbian cancer projects should be reviewed for their appropriateness as models for care for all sexual minority people. Education and Tr a i n i n g — R E C O M M E N D ATIONS ■ Health professions organizations should address sexual orientation and gender identity concerns in continuing medical education courses, clinical guidelines, risk assessment, and screening policies. ■ Culturally appropriate interventions specific to LGBT health needs should be developed and made available to LGBT health centers, to other providers, and within the community itself. ■ Preventive services screening programs, both current and future, should explicitly promote access for people of other sexual orientation or gender identity. R e s e a rc h — R E C O M M E N D ATIONS ■ Additional research is needed to better understand disparities in cancer rates among LGBT populations and the degree to which potential disparities are associated with the lack of culturally appropriate prevention information and barriers to effective provider-patient communication. ■ Population-based studies are needed to increase knowledge of breast and other forms of cancer among lesbians and to confirm hypotheses that obesity, alcohol consumption, nulliparity, and lower rates of breast cancer screening are risk factors for lesbians. ■ Research is needed on how to target and market health education and health promotion programs successfully to diverse segments of the LGBT community. Educational and Community-Based Pro g r a m s S e rv i c e s — R E C O M M E N D ATIONS ■ Community clinics, health maintenance organizations, and other primary care providers should become more knowledgeable about the different needs of LGBT patients and seek ways to make them more welcome in a clinical environment. ■ Continuing education for physicians, nurses, technicians, and others who come in contact with LGBT patients in clinical settings should be available through professional organizations, continuing medical education programs, nursing education programs, and other venues to increase understanding and sensitivity. Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 419 ■ Primary care venues that welcome LGBT clients should post symbols or posters that indicate they are nondiscriminatory and patient-sensitive clinics. ■ All forms used in school settings, worksites, health care venues, and other community organizations should be culturally sensitive and linguistically appropriate for LGBT individuals or parents. ■ All types of managed care organizations, including health maintenance organizations, preferred provider organizations, point-of-service plans, and the hybrid of other financial and organizational structures, should devise a system for providing knowledge about providers who are LGBT or LGBT-friendly. This system must ensure the confidentiality of providers and consumers. Education and Tr a i n i n g — R E C O M M E N D ATIONS ■ Continuing education for other community-based services should be available for emerging service providers (e.g., fire, police, 911 teams) and community-service program staff (e.g., food banks, social security offices, emergency housing placement services). ■ Health department staff should receive cultural competency and sensitivity training that includes information on LGBT populations and their health needs. ■ Training provided to supervisors in both public and private sectors should include information on the health concerns of LGBT individuals along with sexual orientation and gender identity in cultural competency training. P o l i c y — R E C O M M E N D ATIONS ■ Schools must protect LGBT youth from harassment and violence. ■ All health care accrediting organizations—such as the National Committee on Quality Assurance, the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Health Care Organizations, and the Council on Accreditation must include sexual orientation and gender identity as components of cultural competency. ■ All Medicaid and Medicare regulations should reflect the inclusion of sexual orientation and gender identity within their beneficiary guidelines to ensure provision of care and appropriate reimbursement for medical and related services. ■ Community-based organizations that receive Federal funding should be prohibited from discriminating against LGBT persons. R e s e a rc h — R E C O M M E N D ATIONS ■ The National Profile of Local Health Departments survey instrument, administered at intervals by the National Association of City and County Health Officials, where appropriate should include questions related to sexual orientation and gender identity. ■ Research is needed on culturally competent health promotion and education programs and materials for LGBT populations within the American Indian and Alaska Native populations. ■ Analyses of the 2000 census data should yield more information about unmarried same-sex couples, thereby illuminating the demography of the gay and lesbian population. 420 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health ■ Specific research about LGBT persons is critical for generating baseline data for Healthy People 2010 population-based objectives. ■ Longitudinal studies should be conducted to determine how sexual orientation and gender identity is manifested throughout the life cycle. Health Communication S e rv i c e s — R E C O M M E N D AT I O N S ■ Clinical care providers for LGBT individuals should create opportunities to examine risk patterns as well as behaviors and options for risk reduction and to promote the adoption of health promotion practices through the establishment of safe and culturally responsive environments. ■ Targeted health information should be delivered to high-risk and hard-to-reach LGBT individuals directly in their social contexts, including neighborhoods, socializing spaces, sexual environments, and workplaces. ■ LGBT individuals identified as at risk should have access to individual and small group interventions founded on intervention research published in peer-reviewed health journals. These interventions should focus on relevant behavior patterns and should work to build motivation and skills to reduce harm associated with these behaviors. ■ Community-level interventions targeted to various LGBT communities should be further developed to address large-scale patterns of risk and to influence health-supporting practices. These should include social marketing and electronically based forms of health communication. Education and Tr a i n i n g — R E C O M M E N D AT I O N S ■ Health care providers of all disciplines should be provided with education and training on how to communicate with LGBT consumers and families in a culturally competent way and how to reduce barriers to effective communication. Policy and Advocacy—RECOMMENDATIONS ■ Health communication directed toward LGBT people should build upon the considerable health promotion literature and be founded on established principles predictive of successful outcomes. R e s e a rc h — R E C O M M E N D ATIONS ■ Research is needed to determine if access to LGBT-specific health information improves health-seeking behaviors, increases access to care, enhances knowledge, and yields better health outcomes for LGBT consumers and families. ■ At each level of intervention, a rigorous assessment, process monitoring, and outcome/impact measurement should be performed to assess the application of interventions previously tested with non- LGBT populations and subsets of the LGBT community not previously studied. ■ Research is needed to determine the most appropriate health communication strategies for hard-to-reach LGBT populations such as those in rural areas, Native Americans, and persons with disabilities. Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 421 H I V / A I D S S e rv i c e s — R E C O M M E N D ATIONS ■ Public and private-sector systems of care should implement comprehensive strategies to promote culturally competent, appropriate, and linguistically accessible HIV prevention messages to high-risk youth, particularly LGBT adolescents. ■ Efforts are needed to better integrate prevention and treatment strategies for HIV/AIDS and primary care. ■ There is a need for a national HIV prevention strategy for gay and bisexual men, the population at greatest risk for infection. Such a strategy should reflect the racial, ethnic, geographic, cultural, and age diversity of the gay and bisexual community and should be easily adaptable for population-specific marketing, including men of color, older gay and bisexual men, youth, gay and bisexual men in rural areas, and other diverse groups. ■ There is a need to increase, through multiple measures, the percentage of individuals who know their HIV status. Education and Tr a i n i n g — R E C O M M E N D AT I O N S ■ Health education materials need to be culturally specific to address the needs of transgender people and other sexual minority communities. 148, 149, 150 ■ Cross-training is needed among all health care workers, especially those working with youth, acknowledging the interrelatedness of risky behaviors. P o l i c y — R E C O M M E N D ATIONS ■ Health departments need to form alliances with community-based organizations to address the epidemic at the local level by conducting needs assessments and funding community-based prevention and treatment strategies. ■ Health insurance companies and managed care organizations should create incentives for health plans, providers, and provider organizations to develop targeted preventive interventions and accompanying early intervention services. R e s e a rc h — R E C O M M E N D ATIONS ■ More data are needed on the incidence and prevalence of HIV infection in specific communities, the means by which individuals become infected, and how they identify themselves (LGBT, heterosexual, or otherwise). ■ Additional studies are needed to better understand the potential risks associated with using recreational drugs, hormonal therapy (including transgender-related hormone therapy and anabolic steroid use among men), and other medications while on antiretroviral therapy. ■ Research is needed to assess the long-term effects of combination anti-HIV drug regimens. ■ Studies are needed to identify effective HIV prevention interventions for MSM (only 11 of 98 rigorous intervention studies in the United States have included MSM). 422 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health Immunization and Infectious Diseases S e rv i c e s — R E C O M M E N D ATIONS ■ Public health, private health care providers, and STD clinics must all participate in programs to identify at-risk persons for HAV and HBV infection, including MSM and TSM, and to encourage vaccination. ■ Providers should be expected to ask nonthreatening questions that identify individuals at risk, not just MSM and TSM, and they should offer the vaccine when they determine the individual is at risk. ■ Individuals who are aware that they are at risk should be educated to understand that they share responsibility for requesting HAV and HBV vaccines. ■ Providers and health plans should ensure that high-risk populations (e.g., persons over aged 65, persons with compromised immune systems due to chronic disease or disability or medications) receive the appropriate immunizations for pneumonia and influenza. Education and Tr a i n i n g — R E C O M M E N D ATIONS ■ New efforts are needed to reach physicians and other health care practitioners in all health care settings who provide health care to MSM and transgender persons so they can play an active role in educating patients about the risks of HAV and HBV infection as well as the availability of vaccinations. ■ Curricula should be developed for physicians and other health care providers, as well as in health education and health promotion programs, on how to prevent, recognize, and treat HAV and HBV infection in high school and college students. P o l i c y — R E C O M M E N D AT I O N S ■ Managed care organizations, insurance companies, and other health plans should provide insurance coverage or reimbursement for needed vaccines for high-risk populations, without cancellation penalties. ■ Efforts must be made to ensure that LGBT individuals—including elders, children, and youth —who cannot afford to pay for needed vaccines have access to publicly funded services or affordable HAV and HBV vaccinations. R e s e a rc h — R E C O M M E N D ATIONS ■ Additional research is needed to gain a better understanding of the risk and prevalence of HAV and HBV—not only among MSM and TSM but also among other LGBT populations. ■ New studies are needed to explain why HAV and HBV vaccination rates among MSM and TSM are low. Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 423 Mental Health and Mental Disord e r s S e rv i c e s — R E C O M M E N D AT I O N S ■ Mental health and substance abuse services for LGBT consumers should be culturally competent and consumer-based to reflect the diversity of LGBT people. ■ Effective services should be available for LGBT people who are in the process of acknowledging sexual orientation and gender identity. If age-appropriate, services are also needed for families and other significant individuals. ■ Social, mental health, and substance abuse service providers should be sensitive to issues such as homophobia and internalized homophobia. ■ A culturally appropriate and linguistically suitable hotline should be available, 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, to assist LGBT people and families who need assistance with mental health problems. ■ Public-sector systems serving LGBT youth, including schools, should implement a comprehensive, wraparound approach to providing services. ■ Given that mental health problems in children and adolescents generally precede the onset of substance abuse problems by approximately 6 to 8 years, policymakers and community leaders should support and establish substance abuse prevention activities that specifically target LGBT youth. Education and Tr a i n i n g — R E C O M M E N D ATIONS ■ Providers need to acquire basic knowledge of LGBT people (through curricula, inservice programs, or other educational opportunities) and their mental health needs. This understanding should reflect the diversity of different populations and the availability of community resources and referrals. ■ Mental health care providers of all disciplines who serve children and adolescents and their families should be adequately trained to address sexual orientation and gender identity in clinical practice. ■ Training programs for mental health, substance abuse, social service, and health care providers on LGBT issues should be developed and evaluated for effectiveness. P o l i c y — R E C O M M E N D ATIONS ■ Sexual orientation and gender identity information should be included as components of cultural competency training for managed care, Medicaid, Medicare, and Children’s Health Insurance Program providers. ■ Sexual orientation and gender identity should be included, whenever appropriate, in national surveys, evaluation studies, and surveillance systems. ■ Licensing bodies for medicine, nursing, psychology, social work, and other health and mental health professions should include guidelines that prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity. ■ Specific regulations should be developed to cease involuntary hospitalization of LGBT youth by parents and removal of LGBT youth from parent or guardian custody by child welfare agencies. ■ The existing mental health consumer groups—such as On Our Own, the National Empowerment Center, the Consumer Managed Care Network, the Mental Health Consumers Association, United Seniors Health 424 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health Cooperative, and the Information Exchange —should include sexual orientation and gender identity within their special populations of concern. ■ Existing accreditation organizations—such as the National Committee for Quality Assurance, the Council on Accreditation of Services for Families and Children, the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations, the Rehabilitation Accreditation Committee, and the Utilization Review Accreditation Commission—should include sexual orientation and gender identity as one of the cultural competence-related areas for accreditation. ■ As most businesses and industries purchase health care benefits for their employees, groups such as the Washington Business Group on Health, the Pacific Business Group on Health, and the Employee Assistance Professionals’ Association should sponsor regional meetings to discuss the mental health concerns of their LGBT employees. R e s e a rc h — R E C O M M E N D ATIONS ■ New studies are needed to assess whether an elevated risk of suicide exists for LGBT populations. ■ Research is needed to develop better screening tools to assess patients’ sexual orientation, gender identity, and mental health needs. ■ Additional research is necessary to generate new knowledge about LGBT youth and mental health services, including access to mental health services in comparison to non-LGBT youth and mental health services, specific mental health disparities, service utilization patterns, and outcomes. ■ Research is needed to understand the healthy development of LGBT persons at all stages of life, including studies of how sexual orientation and gender identity develop. Such research should reflect the diversity of the LGBT community. ■ Clinical and intervention research is needed to identify mental disorders that may be more prevalent among LGBT persons and to identify the most appropriate prevention and treatment strategies. ■ Studies are needed that focus on comparisons within LGBT samples, such as similarities and differences based on sexual orientation, gender, gender identity, age, race/ethnicity, socioeconomic status, and geographic location. ■ More clinical research focusing on the transgender population is needed, including followup psychosocial assessments for long-term outcomes for treatment of gender dysphoria, for gender reassignment, and for the relationship between the age at which an individual receives sex reassignment and long-term outcomes. Nutrition and We i g h t S e rv i c e s — R E C O M M E N D ATIONS ■ New efforts are needed to address body dissatisfaction and eating disorders among LGBT populations, with a strong emphasis on gay male and transgender adolescents. Specifically, school-based nutrition education programs must be LGBT-competent and relevant to LGBT youth who may be experiencing body dissatisfaction and eating disorders. ■ LGBT-competent health care and support services must be made available to address nutrition, physical activity, and weight for lesbians with a high BMI, gay and bisexual men with weight or body image concerns, transgender individuals, persons living with HIV infection, and LGBT or questioning adolescents. Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health 425 Education and Tr a i n i n g — R E C O M M E N D AT I O N S ■ Health care providers of all disciplines—but especially primary health care providers, dietitians, and nutritionists—need training on the specific nutritional needs of LGBT populations, such as lesbians with a high BMI, certain groups of gay and bisexual men, persons living with HIV infection, and LGBT or questioning adolescents. Such training should include a strong emphasis on delivering culturally competent and sensitive care. P o l i c y — R E C O M M E N D ATIONS ■ The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services and the U.S. Department of Agriculture should collaborate in designing, supporting, and evaluating a public health education campaign designed to increase awareness among LGBT populations about the Food Guide Pyramid and the recommendations of the Dietary Guidelines for Americans. R e s e a rc h — R E C O M M E N D ATIONS ■ Sexual orientation and gender identity should be included as demographic variables in all relevant Federal and national data sets, including NHANES, BRFSS, the Continuing Survey of Food Intakes by Individuals, and the National Worksite Health Promotion Survey, as well as data sets administered by CDC and NCHS. ■ Research is needed to examine the impact of self-esteem and body image, and their relationship to eating disorders within LGBT populations, especially among gay and bisexual males and MTF transgender individuals. Research also should look at the extent to which alienation, discrimination, and resultant stress may increase any propensity to eating disorders among all LGBT populations. ■ Additional studies are needed to determine the specific causes of increased rates of obesity among lesbians and to determine if the long-term, potential health consequences of obesity in lesbians differ from women in the general population. ■ Once sexual orientation and gender identity are added as demographic variables in national data sets, additional analyses will be needed to estimate the prevalence of poor nutrition and diet, obesity, physical inactivity, smoking, alcohol and drug use, and other risk factors commonly observed in LGBT populations as well as their association with heart disease, stroke, diabetes, and other negative health outcomes. ■ Additional research is needed on the nutritional status of LGBT persons in hospitals, nursing homes, convalescent centers, and institutions; LGBT persons with physical, mental, and developmental disabilities in community settings; LGBT persons living on reservations and in correctional facilities; and LGBT youth and adults who are homeless. Data also are insufficient to develop targeted interventions for older LGBT persons who live independently. ■ Research on the nutritional and dietary habits of transgender populations are needed to better understand the appropriate role of nutrition and diet in gender expression and reassignment. Public Health Infrastructure Data and Information Systems—R E C O M M E N D AT I O N S ■ Establish guidelines within the Federal Government that recommend the collection of sexual orientation and gender identity data in all Federal, State, tribal, and local surveys that routinely collect population- based information regarding health, violence, or social issues. 426 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health ■ Support should be fostered for research to study how different ways of asking questions about sexual orientation, same-sex sexual behavior, attraction, and gender identity affect response rates and the validity of responses. Questions about methodology will continue to be discussed and should not be seen as a barrier to the immediate collection of data on sexual orientation and gender identity in population-based surveys. ■ Methodological studies should ensure that racial, ethnic, and geographic differences in terminology and the definitions of sexual orientation and gender identity are accounted for when measuring health status indicators in LGBT communities. ■ Demographic questions about sexual orientation and gender identity should be framed in national studies and surveys so as to provide widespread geographic and population-based information about prevalence of LGBT communities and their health status. Findings should be widely disseminated through all appropriate distribution methods, including through State, tribal, and local public health agencies. ■ Federal, tribal, State, and local public health agencies must involve representatives from LGBT communities at all levels of decisionmaking, including soliciting input and participation of LGBT academics and other expertise in study sections, grant review committees, and advisory boards. The curriculum vitae of LGBT persons with specific areas of expertise should be provided to the organizations reviewing grant proposals and involved in other health planning and research activities. ■ LGBT researchers should be encouraged to participate in extramural research programs. C o re Wo r k f o rce and Organizational Competency—R E C O M M E N D AT I O N S ■ DHHS should develop an office of LGBT health to provide overarching guidance and planning on LGBT health policy. ■ DHHS should support further study of effective models of building institutional and specific personnel LGBT competency, including support for agencies working together across local and regional boundaries to develop effective models and to share knowledge and best practices. For example, the Massachusetts Department of Public Health supported the May 2000 Boston meeting of urban health officials addressing LGBT health. ■ DHHS should encourage State, tribal, and local health agencies to implement standards of care for LGBT health consumers. The standards should be developed by a panel of experts that also includes appropriate stakeholders representing the diversity within LGBT populations. ■ The Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) should support research designed to improve the outcomes and quality of health care and broaden access to effective services for LGBT health care consumers. ■ Public health agencies should develop appropriate policies, procedures, and requirements for contractors to ensure that services and products purchased are organized and delivered in a nondiscriminatory manner. ■ Accrediting organizations such as the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations and the National Committee for Quality Assurance, along with such entities as Federal agencies involved in the delivery of publicly funded health care and related services (HRSA, SAMHSA, the Health Care Financing Administration, the Administration for Children and Families, and the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development), the American Public Health Association, and the National Association of County and City Health Officials should collaborate to develop cultural competency standards for organizational and personnel competencies that may be adopted by State, local, and tribal health agencies nationwide. Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 427 ■ The National Institute of Mental Health (part of the National Institutes of Health), the Center for Mental Health Services (part of SAMHSA), and ARHQ should fund research into standards and best practices of mental health care for LGBT people, including research on the impact of reparative therapy. SAMHSA with HRSA should review the need for developing a collaborative mental wellness initiative that includes all populations in disparity. ■ Technical assistance in grant writing should be made available to all interested applicants. Such assistance could be made available through the Internet, the use of tutorials on CD-ROM, and other workshops organized at the regional level. ■ All legally prohibited discrimination should include discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity. ■ State agencies charged with the regulation and oversight of nursing homes and long-term care facilities should develop and enforce compliance with standards of care for LGBT clients, including policies that recognize and affirm same-sex partners. ■ Federal agencies providing publicly funded services to unserved populations and conducting data surveillance activities should communicate regularly with the field and regional offices regarding cultural competencies for all populations in disparity in access to needed services. For example, the agencies could disseminate an article on the importance and availability of LGBT competencies and guidelines, along with resources for additional information, technical assistance, and implementation strategies. ■ The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention should fund the Association of Schools of Public Health to develop model curricula for public health students. CDC also should fund demonstrations and evaluations of LGBT-competent curricula. ■ Accreditation bodies such as the Liaison Committee on Medical Education, the National Library of Medicine, and the Council on Education of Public Health should issue recommendations that address LGBT competency. They also should conduct surveys of schools of public health, nursing, and medicine, as well as emergency medical technician training programs, to determine which include LGBT competency in their curricula and to highlight case studies for dissemination throughout the medical field. ■ DHHS should ensure that cultural sensitivity training is provided to all health care providers receiving Federal funds. Special attention should be given to identifying and evaluating studies that examine the effectiveness of training programs designed to promote transgender competencies, eliminate discrimination, and improve organizational competencies. Efforts to partner with the private sector and managed care plans should be an important part of this initiative. ■ Existing cultural competency training modules should be reviewed by the Federal agencies, and a menu of appropriate technical assistance resources and training models should be made available to all publicly funded services programs, health departments, and health professionals to ensure that culturally competent care is provided for LGBT clients. ■ Additional efforts are needed to increase the number of public health agencies that integrate LGBT- focused core competencies into orientation and inservice training. ■ DHHS should provide incentives to increase the number of Federal, State, and local health departments that support community-based agencies providing LGBT competency training to the public health workforce. 428 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health The Law and Public Health—R E C O M M E N D AT I O N S ■ DHHS with other Federal departments and agencies (e.g., U.S. Department of Education, U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, U.S. Department of Labor) should collaborate to determine how best to eliminate the effects of discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity. ■ DHHS should direct its operating divisions and staff offices to review their policies, procedures, and practices to ensure that publicly funded services are being provided in a nondiscriminatory and culturally competent manner. ■ Public health agencies at the State and local levels should review policies, procedures, and practices to ensure that publicly funded services for which they are accountable are being provided in a nondiscriminatory and culturally competent manner. ■ The DHHS Office of Civil Rights should increase its efforts to enforce nondiscrimination protections, including meeting the requirements of the Americans with Disabilities Act. ■ DHHS should review existing research and support new studies on the effect of legislation failing to prohibit discrimination on public health outcomes. ■ Federal, State, tribal, and local health departments should adopt domestic partner benefits policies for employees and promote such policies on a wider basis as an access-to-care issue. ■ Health agencies should incorporate guidelines to ensure equal consideration of same-sex partners of clients receiving treatment in all health care settings as part of their standards of care for LGBT people. Sexually Transmitted Diseases (Infections) S e rv i c e s — R E C O M M E N D ATIONS ■ “Sexual history” risk assessment tools that are culturally and linguistically appropriate need to be developed and widely disseminated. ■ Additional efforts are needed to increase, at all potential sites for screening, the proportion of LGBT people screened for STDs and, if found positive, provided treatment services. ■ There is a need for culturally appropriate STD prevention outreach for LGBT youth and youth questioning their sexual orientation. ■ All STD media campaigns should be inclusive of all population sectors including LGBT youth and adults. Education and Tr a i n i n g — R E C O M M E N D AT I O N S ■ Professional organizations of health care providers should address sexual orientation and gender identity concerns in continuing medical education courses, clinical guidelines, risk assessment, and screening policies. ■ Health professions schools, including schools of medicine, nursing, physician assistants, public health, health educators, and others, should partner with all existing LGBT health centers for purposes of STD clinic staffing as well as management and professional training. ■ All health care professionals should counsel their LGBT patients (or refer them to community-based organizations) regarding the risk of STDs and methods for reducing or preventing high-risk behaviors. Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 429 Counseling for STDs should be reimbursed without copayments or other financial disincentives by Medicaid programs, managed care organizations, or other health plans. ■ Education is needed for LGBT individuals—especially youth—that condom usage provides no protection against hepatitis A and STDs transmitted by genital-oral contact. ■ Health care providers and consumers must be made aware of the risks of HPV and how it is transmitted and prevented, including the need for routine Pap testing for WSW. P o l i c y — R E C O M M E N D ATIONS ■ STD-related performance measures specific to LGBT populations should be included in the Health Plan Employer Data Information Set (HEDIS) developed by the National Committee for Quality Assurance as well as in other health services performance measures of public and private health plans. ■ Local health departments, with the assistance of the State health department, should consult with the LGBT community in determining how to provide high-quality, comprehensive STD-related clinical services. ■ Health plans should provide for and cover comprehensive STD-related services, including screening, diagnosis, treatment, and counseling for plan members and their sex partners, regardless of the partners’ insurance status. ■ LGBT organizations should work with an independent group to serve as a catalyst for social change toward a new norm of healthy sexual behavior in the United States that would include a long-term national initiative to increase knowledge and awareness of preventing and treating STDs. R e s e a rc h — R E C O M M E N D ATIONS ■ Research is needed to identify the incidence and prevalence of STDs within LGBT populations and to identify which sexual practices increase the risk of specific STDs. ■ Sexual orientation and gender identity measures should be included within the CDC STD Surveillance System, the National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey, and CDC’s National Center for HIV, STD, and TB Prevention. ■ Specific data on the prevalence of anal neoplasia in men with a history of receptive anal sex should be collected, with special emphasis on individuals with anogenital HPV and HIV infection. Substance Abuse S e rv i c e s — R E C O M M E N D ATIONS ■ Health education and prevention-oriented materials on health risks related to substance abuse should be developed for and directed to LGBT youth. ■ On college campuses, where binge drinking often occurs, LGBT students or local LGBT-friendly health clinics need to be included in health education and prevention programs aimed at reducing binge drinking. ■ Providers should review how consumer data are collected for statistical purposes, program reporting requirements, and funding or reimbursement sources and should discuss with the data collection entities how best to collect baseline data on health needs and services usage by LGBT consumers. 430 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health Education and Tr a i n i n g — R E C O M M E N D ATIONS ■ Mental health and substance abuse counselors should receive cultural competency training that includes addressing the health and other needs of LGBT youth and adults. ■ Substance abuse and mental health providers, as well as LGBT persons, need to be made aware that people who meet the “disability” eligibility criteria in Medicare may be eligible for Medicare-covered alcohol and other drug treatment services. ■ Culturally competent health education materials on low-risk drinking, or responsible alcohol use, and high-risk drinking need to be developed for and directed to the LGBT community. P o l i c y — R E C O M M E N D ATIONS ■ Federal and State funding for health services programs need to be linked to community-based prevention and treatment efforts; LGBT persons need to be included in the community-based planning process along with representatives from other underserved or unserved populations; and cultural competency guidelines need to be established so that individuals are not denied access to care based on their sexual orientation or gender identity. ■ Community partnerships and coalitions should seek cultural competency training and technical assistance from LGBT organizations and service agencies so community planners may better understand and incorporate the health care needs of LGBT populations into planning efforts. ■ Federal and State governments should develop demonstration projects that support community partnerships and coalitions that are convened to address the substance abuse prevention and treatment needs of LGBT communities. R e s e a rc h — R E C O M M E N D ATIONS ■ Sexual orientation and gender identity should be included as demographic variables in national substance abuse surveys, such as NHSDA and the Monitoring the Future Study. ■ Model programs for school youth education programs that address homophobia and drug abuse should be developed. ■ Additional studies are needed to assess the drinking habits of midlife and older LGBT individuals. Tobacco Use S e rv i c e s — R E C O M M E N D ATIONS ■ Smoking prevention and cessation programs must be LGBT-competent, affordable, and accessible to LGBT individuals. ■ LGBT-oriented community centers and other LGBT-affirming community-based organizations should be recognized as resources and included in developing, implementing, and evaluating culturally competent smoking cessation and prevention programs. Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health 431 Education and Tr a i n i n g — R E C O M M E N D ATIONS ■ Because clinical cessation guidelines may be used as a training tool for educating health care providers, LGBT-specific concerns regarding tobacco use and LGBT-competent prevention and treatment services should be reflected and addressed in such guidelines. ■ Health care providers need training on how to provide culturally competent care to LGBT smokers and to adhere to guidelines on tobacco screening and treatment. ■ Counter-advertising campaigns that promote health-positive messages should be conducted and targeted to LGBT populations. Such campaigns could be modeled after the “Truth” campaign and California Department of Health Services antismoking campaigns. Policy and Advocacy—RECOMMENDATIONS ■ LGBT individuals must have access to comprehensive, nondiscriminatory health insurance that covers smoking cessation products and services. ■ LGBT communities must be educated about tobacco advertising and its role in promoting tobacco use. ■ Health-positive environments for LGBT and questioning youth must be funded, supported, and sustained so that LGBT youth have healthier venues in which to socialize and “come out.” R e s e a rc h — R E C O M M E N D ATIONS ■ Sexual orientation and gender identity must be included in national and local data sets to study differences in smoking rates and treatment success. ■ Data are needed on a variety of LGBT-specific tobacco-related issues so that culturally competent social marketing and public education campaigns, prevention activities, and cessation programs can be established and implemented. Violence Pre v e n t i o n S e rv i c e s — R E C O M M E N D ATIONS ■ Federal, State, and community programs should strengthen and expand prevention and education programs and services related to violence—including, for example, bias and hate-related violence, anger management, conflict resolution training, domestic violence, suicide, and substance abuse—through the public health and public school systems, social service agencies, criminal justice institutions, and the workplace by ensuring the inclusion of LGBT people. ■ If self-identified LGBT people present with signs of physical violence, health care providers should assess, as with heterosexual clients, using a standardized instrument (e.g., Campbell’s Danger Assessment) for forced sex, mental health status, previous undiagnosed head injuries, risk of suicide and/or homicide.274 ■ Health care providers should be aware of local, State, and national domestic violence referral sources for LGBT people, and where appropriate and available, link victims of violence to culturally appropriate social and mental health services for followup and aftercare. 432 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health Education and Tr a i n i n g — R E C O M M E N D ATIONS ■ Schools should incorporate conflict resolution training and tolerance education into health and other antiviolence curricula beginning at the grade school level. DHHS, the U.S. Department of Education, and DOJ should collaborate on evaluating and improving existing curricula, supporting the dissemination of recommended curricula, and training teachers and other school personnel in the use of recommended curricula. ■ DHHS, DOJ, State and local agencies, and private sector organizations should support the development and implementation of strategies to increase community awareness of bias crimes against LGBT individuals and families and to reduce such crimes at the community level. ■ Federal, State and local agencies, and the private sector should support and strengthen training of health care, mental health, behavioral health, social services, and criminal justice personnel in the identification of LGBT-related violence, including hate-motivated crime and domestic violence, determination of factors related to the crime, and provision of prevention and intervention services, including but not limited to referral for culturally-appropriate post-trauma physical and mental health services. ■ Federal, State and local agencies, and the private sector need to create services to address domestic violence within LGBT populations. ■ An LGBT Intimate Partner Violence and Sexual Assault: A Guide to Training Materials and Programs for Health Care Providers should be written for distribution to all key stakeholders in health, law enforcement, and public safety. Included in the distribution should be the 36 model programs showcased in the already existing guide written in 1998 by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.275 P o l i c y — R E C O M M E N D ATIONS ■ School systems should strengthen their antiviolence programs to include disciplinary procedures designed to reduce anti-LGBT violence; reduce or eliminate discrimination and violence against LGBT teachers, coaches, and other staff; and create “safe” environments that encourage involvement of LGBT parents and families with LGBT children in school boards and Parent/Teacher Associations. ■ Key stakeholders in public policy should acknowledge that violence may disproportionately affect LGBT people, identify societal attitudes and barriers that may contribute to violent acts against LGBT people, and discuss efforts to prevent such violence. ■ LGBT people should be involved in all subsequent national discussions of “defining” violence and ways to measure violent acts that include LGBT populations. ■ Businesses should establish and enforce appropriate LGBT tolerance and antidiscrimination standards for the workplace. ■ Faith-based initiatives at national, regional, State, and local levels should explicitly state that any violent act against LGBT people is not only unacceptable, but also illegal. ■ The media should report anti-LGBT violence in its proper context —as a broader pattern of behavior that harms everyone. ■ DHHS should work collaboratively with DOJ, State health offices, and State attorneys general to improve documentation of hate-motivated behavior against LGBT individuals and to strengthen Federal, State, and local law enforcement efforts. Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 433 R e s e a rc h — R E C O M M E N D ATIONS ■ DHHS with DOJ should increase support for data collection and analysis related to LGBT violence, including domestic violence and hate-motivated violence, with ample epidemiologic data to allow for design and implementation of effective prevention programs (e.g., demographic data on both survivors and perpetrators, changes in trends in the communities). ■ DHHS and DOJ and other relative agencies should develop uniformity of definitions and measurement tools for violence perpetrated against and within LGBT populations. DHHS and DOJ jointly could explore conducting methodologic research. ■ Given the possible small number of cases, a sentinel research system should be established so as to estimate statistically the incidence of violence and abuse of LGBT people across the lifespan. ■ DHHS, other Federal agencies, and private foundations should support research to identify the patterns of hate crimes, criminal justice findings and outcomes (arrests, prosecutions and sentencing of hate crime offenders) by State and local jurisdiction. 434 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health 435 Appendix B: Acro n y m s FEDERAL AGENCIES AND THEIR COMPONENTS AHCPR Agency for Health Care Policy and Research (now AHRQ) AHRQ Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (formerly AHCPR) BHPr Bureau of Health Professions (part of HRSA) BLS Bureau of Labor Statistics (part of DOL) CDC Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (part of DHHS) CMHS Center for Mental Health Services (part of SAMHSA) CSAP Center for Substance Abuse Prevention (part of SAMHSA) CSAT Center for Substance Abuse Treatment (part of SAMHSA) DHHS Department of Health and Human Services DOEd Department of Education DOJ Department of Justice DOL Department of Labor DOT Department of Transportation GAO General Accounting Office (investigative arm of Congress) HCFA Health Care Financing Administration (part of DHHS) HHS Health and Human Services (see DHHS) HRSA Health Resources and Services Administration (part of DHHS) IHS Indian Health Service (part of DHHS) MCHB Maternal and Child Health Bureau (part of HRSA) NCCDPHP National Center for Chronic Disease Prevention and Health Promotion (part of CDC) NCES National Center for Education Statistics (part of DOEd) NCHS National Center for Health Statistics (part of CDC) NCHSTP National Center for HIV, STD, and TB Prevention (part of CDC) NCI National Cancer Institute (part of NIH) NHTSA National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (part of DOT) NIAAA National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism (part of NIH) NIDA National Institute on Drug Abuse (part of NIH) NIH National Institutes of Health (part of DHHS) NIMH National Institute of Mental Health (part of NIH) PHS Public Health Service (see USPHS) SAMHSA Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (part of DHHS) SSA Social Security Administration USPHS U.S. Public Health Service (see also PHS) O R G A N I Z ATIONS AND OTHER TERMINOLOGY AA Alcoholics Anonymous AAA Area Agencies on Aging AAHP American Association of Health Plans (formerly GHAA) AAPCC American Association of Poison Control Centers ACHA American College Health Association ACS American College of Surgeons ACU-I Association of College Unions, International ADA Americans with Disabilities Act ADHD attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder AEDS Alcohol Epidemiologic Data System AFSCME American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees AHECs Area Health Education Centers AIDS acquired immunodeficiency syndrome AIN anal intraepithelial neoplasia AJCP American Journal of Community Psychology ALF American Legacy Foundation AMA American Medical Association 436 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health AMC American Medical Center Cancer Research Center AOD alcohol and other drugs APA American Psychiatric Association APEX/PH Assessment Protocol for Excellence in Public Health APHA American Public Health Association API Asian and Pacific Islander APIWC Asian and Pacific Islander Wellness Center ASAM American Society of Addiction Medicine ASHA American School Health Association ASIL anal squamous intraepithelial lesions ASIPT Appointment Standardization Integrated Program Team ASTDHPPHE Association of State and Territorial Directors of Health Promotion and Public Health Education ASTHO Association of State and Territorial Health Officers ATPM Association of Teachers of Preventive Medicine BBA Balanced Budget Act (of 1997) BMI body mass index BRFS Behavioral Risk Factor Survey BRFSS Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System BV bacterial vaginosis CAHPS Consumer Assessment of Health Plans Study CARF Commission for Accreditation of Rehabilitation Facilities CBO community-based organization CHAMPUS Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services CHD coronary heart disease CHIP Children's Health Insurance Program CME continuing medical education COA Council on Accreditation of Services for Families and Children COBRA Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act COGME Council on Graduate Medical Education CPS clinical preventive services Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 437 CRC colorectal cancer CSFII Continuing Survey of Food Intakes by Individuals CWLA Child Welfare League of America DMA Division of Medical Assistance DSH disproportionate share hospital DSM Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders EAPA Employee Assistance Professional Association ECA Epidemiologic Catchment Area ED (hospital-based) emergency department EMS emergency medical services EMT emergency medical technician EMTALA Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (of 1986) EPSDT Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnostic, and Treatment FACCT Foundation for Accountability FERRET Federal Electronic Research and Review Extraction Tool FFS fee-for-service FOBT fecal occult blood test FTM female-to-male FTMs female-to-male transsexuals GHAA Group Health Association of America (now AAHP) GID gender identity disorder GIDNOS gender identity disorder not otherwise specified GIS geographic information system GLAAD Gay and Lesbian Alliance Against Defamation GLBT gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender GLMA Gay and Lesbian Medical Association GLPTSA Gay and Lesbian Parent Teacher Student Association GLSEN Gay, Lesbian, and Straight Education Network GLYS Gay and Lesbian Youth Support Project GME graduate medical education 438 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health GMHC Gay Men's Health Crisis HAART highly active antiretroviral therapy HAV hepatitis A virus HBIGDA Harry Benjamin International Gender Dysphoria Association HBV hepatitis B virus HCQA Health Care Quality Alliance HCSA Hate Crimes Statistics Act HCUP Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project HCV hepatitis C virus HEDIS Health Plan Employer Data and Information Set HIPAA Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act HIV human immunodeficiency virus HMO health maintenance organization HPV human papillomavirus HRA high resolution anoscopy IDU injection drug use IDUs injection drug users IGLSS Institute for Gay and Lesbian Strategic Studies IOM Institute of Medicine (part of National Academy of Sciences) JAH Journal of Adolescent Health JAMA Journal of the American Medical Association JCAHO Joint Commission for the Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations JOH Journal of Homosexuality KS Kaposi's sarcoma LGBT Lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender LGBTQ lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and questioning LLEGO National Latina/o Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Organization LSD lysergic acid diethylamide MCO managed care organization MDMA 3,4-methylenedioxymethamphetamine (also known as “ecstasy”) Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health 439 MDPH Massachusetts Department of Public Health MEPS Medical Expenditure Panel Survey MHPA Mental Health Parity Act MMPI Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Index MMWR Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report MSA metropolitan statistical area MSM men who have sex with men MTF male-to-female MTFs male-to-female transsexuals NAADAC National Association of Alcoholism and Drug Abuse Counselors NACCHO National Association of City and County Health Officials NAEMT National Association of Emergency Medical Technicians NASBHC National Assembly for School-Based Health Care NASEMSD National Association of State EMS Directors NCAVP National Coalition of Anti-Violence Programs NCQA National Committee for Quality Assurance NCVS National Crime Victimization Survey NGC National Guideline Clearinghouse NHANES National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey NHIS National Health Interview Survey NHSDA National Household Survey on Drug Abuse NIHB National Indian Health Board NIS Nationwide Inpatient Sample NLGJA National Lesbian and Gay Journalists Association NLHCS National Lesbian Health Care Survey NMAC National Minority AIDS Council NMES National Medical Expenditures Survey NNDSS National Notifiable Disease Surveillance System NP nurse practitioner NPLHD National Profile of Local Health Departments 440 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health NSFG National Survey of Family Growth NTAO National Technical Assistance Office (part of AAHP) NVSS National Vital Statistics System OASIS Outcome and Assessment Information Set PA physician assistant PATCH Planned Approach to Community Health PCCs Poison Control Centers PCP Pneumocystis carinii pneumonia PCP primary care provider PDN priority data needs PFLAG Parents, Families, and Friends of Lesbians and Gays PFP Partnership for Prevention PID pelvic inflammatory disease POS point of service PPO Preferred Provider Organization PRN Practitioner Research Network QueerTIP Queer Tobacco Intervention Project RWJF Robert Wood Johnson Foundation SAFE Staff, Administration, and Faculty for Equality SAGE Senior Action in a Gay Environment SASD State Ambulatory Surgery Databases SCHIP State Children's Health Insurance Program (see CHIP) SED serious emotional disturbance S/HMO social health maintenance organizations SID State Inpatient Database SMI severe mental illness SOC Standard Occupational Classification SOCs standards of care SPMI serious and persistent mental illness SSDI Social Security Disability Insurance Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 441 SSI Supplemental Security Income STD sexually transmitted disease STDs sexually transmitted diseases STD-CSRS STD Case Surveillance Reporting System TB tuberculosis TRDRP Tobacco-Related Disease Research Program TSM transgender persons who have sex with men UCR Uniform Crime Reporting URAC Utilization Review Accreditation Commission VNA Visiting Nurses Association VPDs vaccine-preventable diseases WELCOA Wellness Councils of America WHI Women's Health Initiative WHO World Health Organization WPW women who partner with women WSW women who have sex with women YRBS Youth Risk Behavior Survey 442 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health 443 Appendix C: LGBT Definitions A ffectional orientation: Emotional attraction to another person. A n d ro g y n e : Person who deliberately adopts characteristics of both genders or strives to attain a gender-neutral or nongender status.1 (See also H e r m a p h ro d i t e.) Asexual: Having no evident sex or sex organs (Webster ’s). In usage, may refer to a person who is not sexually active, or not sexually attracted to other persons. B e a r : Slang for a gay man whose disposition is rooted in a subculture that emphasizes male secondary sexual characteristics such as beards and body hair growth,2 and who is usually somewhat stouter than the average man. B i a s : Prejudice; an inclination or preference, especially one that interferes with impartial judgment.3 B i s e x u a l : Man or woman with a sexual and affectional or emotional orientation toward people of both sexes.4 C l o s e t e d : Not being open about oneself being gay or lesbian.5 Coming out: Refers to the experiences of some, but not all, gay men and lesbians as they explore their sexual identity. There is no correct process or single way to come out, and some LGBT persons do not come out. The process is unique for each individual, and it is the choice of the individual. Several stages have been identified in the process: identity confusion, comparison, tolerance, acceptance, pride, and identity synthesis.6 Compulsive sexual behavior: Sexual activity that is driven by stress, anxiety, or depression, rather than by sexual desire. Compulsive sexual behaviors often cause problems for persons who engage in them; problems include the potential for injury or illness, sexually transmitted diseases, and social or legal sanctions.7 C ro s s - d re s s e r : Person who dresses in clothing of the opposite sex for personal expression, emotional satisfaction, or erotic pleasure.8 C ross-gender hormone therapy: Hormone medication used by transsexuals and other transgender persons to induce the physical characteristics of the sex with which they identify. Female-to-male hormone therapy utilizes testosterone; male-to-female hormone therapy utilizes estrogen, testosterone blockers, and progesterone. Cultural competence: Broadly based and diverse understanding of, and ability to respond and relate to, culturally specific nuances, communication styles, traditions, icons, experiences, and spiritual traditions of a given culture or cultures.9 Cultural practice: Customs, habits, thinking patterns, and actions based on a set of beliefs, values, and traditions held by a specific group of people. D i s c r i m i n a t i o n : The act of showing partiality or prejudice; a prejudicial act.10 Domestic partner insurance: Health insurance benefits package (which may include medical, mental, dental, or long-term care insurance coverage) provided to an employee ’s unmarried partner as that insurance coverage would be made available to the employee’s spouse. Dominant culture : The cultural values, beliefs, and practices that are most common, or that are most powerful and influential, within a given society. F a m i l y : Legally defined family is prescribed by legal statute or common law, specifically on the basis of blood relationship, legal marriage, or legal adoption. 444 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health Family of choice: Persons or group of people an individual sees as significant in his or her life. It may include none, all, or some members of his or her family of origin. In addition, it may include individuals such as significant others or partners, friends, and coworkers. 11 Family recognition benefit: Benefit a person is eligible to receive as a result of being recognized as belonging to the family of another person. Ability to be included in a health insurance plan of a family member is one example of a family recognition benefit. Female-to-male (FTM) transsexuals: Individuals who have started, are in the process, or have partially or fully transitioned from female to male.12 The FTM process does not necessarily include sex reassignment surgery. G a y : Term sometimes used to refer to a homosexual person of either sex. For example, some lesbians identify as “gay.” However, “gay” most commonly refers to men who primarily have emotional and sexual attraction to men. Self-identified gay men do not necessarily have sex only with men, but occasionally may engage in sex with women. Gender identity: Person’s sense of self as being either male or female. Gender identity does not always match biological sex; for example, a person may be born biologically male yet have a female gender identity.13 G e n d e r- n e u t r a l : Nondiscriminatory language to describe relationships—e.g. “spouse” and “partner” are gender-neutral alternatives to the gender-specific words “husband” and “wife.” G e n d e r- v a r i a n t : Displaying gender traits that are normatively more typical of the opposite biological sex, within a given. “Feminine” behavior or appearance in men is gender-variant as is “masculine” behavior or appearance in women. Gender-variant behavior is culturally specific. Gender ro l e : How “masculine” or “feminine” an individual acts. Society commonly has norms regarding how men and women should behave,14 although the argument is made that dominant normative behavior is a dynamic, often evolving, process. (See also G e n d e r- v a r i a n t.) Hate crime: Hate crime legislation “defines a hate crime as an act committed on the basis of the actual or perceived race, color, religion, national origin, ethnicity, gender, disability, or sexual orientation of any person.”15 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 445 H e rm a p h rodite (also may be re f e r red to as intersex person): Older, medical term for a person born with both male and female genitalia or reproductive organs. Today, “intersex” appears to be emerging as the preferred term in common usage, but some intersexed persons continue to refer to themselves as hermaphrodites.16 The Intersex Society of North America believes that “hermaphrodite”is a stigmatizing and misleading term. The Society reports a growing momentum to eliminate the word “hermaphrodite” from medical literature and use only the word “intersex” in its place.17 (See also A n d ro g y n e.) H e t e ro s e x i s m : Belief that heterosexuality is the only “natural” sexuality and that it is inherently healthier or superior to other types of sexuality.18 H e t e ro s e x u a l : Individual with a primary sexual and affectional orientation or emotional attraction toward persons of the opposite sex. Heterosexuals are sometimes referred to as “straight.”19 H o m o p h o b i a : Irrational fear or hatred of lesbian, gay, bisexual, or transgender people. H o m o s e x u a l : Individual with a primary sexual and affectional orientation or emotional attraction toward persons of the same sex. Male homosexuals are often referred to as “gay,” whereas female homosexuals are referred to as “lesbians.”20 I n t e rnalized homophobia: Internalized self-hatred that gays and lesbians struggle with as a result of heterosexual prejudice. Persons who experience internalized homophobia accept and believe the negative messages of the dominant group as they relate to gay men, lesbians, 21 bisexuals, and transgender people. I n t e r s e x e d : Person having the characteristics of both male and female biological organs or genitalia. (See also H e r m a p h ro d i t e .) L e s b i a n : A woman who has primary emotional and sexual attraction to other women. Sometimes lesbian women engage in sexual behaviors with men, even though the women self-identify as lesbian.22 L G B T: Acronym for lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender. 446 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health L G B T Q : Acronym for lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and questioning. Questioning is commonly used to refer to adolescents. (See also Questioning youth.) Male-to-female (MTF) transsexuals: Individuals who have started, are in the process, or have partially or fully transitioned from male to female.23 The MTF process does not necessarily include sex reassignment surgery. M a rg i n a l i z e d : Excluded, ignored, or relegated to the outer edge of a group,24 or society. Men who have sex with men (MSM): Men who engage in same-sex behavior, but who may not necessarily self-identify as gay. Nonoperative transsexual: A transsexual individual who has decided not to undergo sex reassignment surgery.25 Out or out of the closet: Refers to varying degrees of being open about one’s sexual orientation or gender identity.26 (See also C o m i n g o u t .) Penile-inversion vaginoplasty: In sex reassignment surgery, the creation of a vaginal cavity in a male-to-female transsexual using the skin of the penis turned inside out to line the vaginal cavity. Questioning youth: Young individual who may be experiencing lesbian, gay, bisexual, or transgender feelings or urges, but has not yet identified his or her sexual orientation or gender identity. LGBTQ is included in this population. Reparative therapy (also called conversion therapy): Attempt to change a person ’s sexual orientation from lesbian, gay, bisexual, or transgender to heterosexual. Same-sex sexual orientation: Having an erotic, physical, and emotional attraction to persons of one’s own sex. S e l f - i d e n t i f y : To perceive and express one ’s internal reality or identity (as in sexual orientation or gender identity), as opposed to external factors and others’ interpretations of them.27 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 447 Sex reassignment surg e ry : Surgery performed on transsexuals to create genitalia resembling those of the sex with which the person identifies. In male-to-female transsexuals, this means removal of the penis and testes and creation of a vulva and vagina. In female-to-male transsexuals, this means removal of the uterus, tubes and ovaries, and often creation of a penis, testes, and scrotum. Sex workers: Individuals (either male or female) who work as prostitutes, hustlers, or escorts and are in the business of providing sex for money, drugs, or housing. 28 Sexual identity: What people call themselves with regard to their sexuality. Labels include “lesbian,” “gay,” “bisexual,” “bi,” “queer,” “questioning,” “undecided” or “undetermined,” “heterosexual,” “straight,” and “asexual.” Sexual identity evolves through a multistage developmental process, which varies in intensity and duration depending on the individual. Our sexual behavior and how we define ourselves (our identity) is usually a choice.29 Sexual identity also refers to a person’s erotic and affectional response to another with respect to gender: heterosexual, lesbian, gay, or transgender. Sexual identity form a t i o n : The process of coming to recognize one’s attraction to members of one or both sexes and to define or label oneself on the basis of that attraction. Sexual minority: Refers to lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and questioning people as a minority in a predominantly heterosexual total population. Significant other: Life partner, domestic partner, lover, boyfriend, or girlfriend. Because gays and lesbians are not allowed to marry legally in the United States (although gay and lesbian marriages are allowed in some European countries), “significant other” is often equivalent to the term “spouse” for lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender people.30 Sodomy laws: State statutes (which vary by State) that prohibit contact between the mouth or anus of one person and the sexual organs of another person, consensual or otherwise.31 Transgender person: Person whose gender identity or gender expression is not congruent with his or her biological sex. Transgender persons usually live full or part time in the gender role opposite to the one in which they were born. “Transgender” sometimes may be used as an umbrella term encompassing transsexuals, transvestites, and cross-dressers. 448 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health Transgenders who have sex with men (TSM): Transgender people who engage in sex with men. Tr a n s p h o b i a : Irrational fear or hatred of transgender or transsexual individuals.32 Tr a n s s e x u a l : Individual whose gender identity is that of the opposite sex. There are female-to-male and male-to-female transsexuals. A transsexual may or may not have had sex reassignment surgery. Va g i n o p l a s t y : In sex reassignment surgery, the creation of a vaginal cavity in a male-to-female transsexual. (See also P e n i l e - inversion vaginoplasty.) Women who have sex with men (WSM): Women who engage in sex with men, but may not necessarily identify as heterosexual. Women who have sex with women (WSW): Women who engage in same-sex behavior, but may not necessarily identify as lesbian. Women who partner with women (WPW): Women who form long-term or committed relationships with other women, often involving cohabitation. May or may not involve same-sex behavior. Additional definitions and links: Wizard’s Gay Slang Dictionary: http://www.hurricane.net/~wizard GayProud: http://www.gayproud.org 1 Sember, R.; Lawrence, A.; and Xavier, J. Lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender health: Findings and concerns. Journal of the Gay and Lesbian Medical Association 4(3):37, 2000. 2 Richard Bulger, Original Publisher, Bear Magazine. Retrieved January 14, 2001. 3 Neufeldt, V., ed. Webster’s New World Dictionary of American English, Third College Edition . 1991, 135. 4 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA). A Provider’s Introduction to Substance Abuse Treatment for Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Individuals. Rockville, MD: SAMHSA, 2000, A-1. 5 Scott, R. A Brief Dictionary of Queer Slang and Culture. 1997. Retrieved January 14, 2001. www.geocities.com/WestHollywood/Stonewall/4219/. 6 DHHS, SAMHSA. A Provider’s Introduction to Substance Abuse Treatment for Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Individuals. Rockville: SAMHSA, MD, 2001, xvii. 7 Coleman, E. Is your patient suffering from compulsive sexual behavior. Psychiatric Annals 22:320-325, 1992. Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 449 8 Sember, R.; Lawrence, A.; and Xavier, J. Lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender health: Findings and concerns. Journal of the Gay and Lesbian Medical Association 4(3):37, 2000. 9 DHHS, SAMHSA. A Provider’s Introduction to Substance Abuse Treatment for Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Individuals. Rockville, MD: SAMHSA, 2000, A-1. 10 Neufeldt, V., ed. Webster’s New World Dictionary of American English, Third College Edition . 1991, 393. 11 DHHS, SAMHSA. A Provider’s Introduction to Substance Abuse Treatment for Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Individuals. Rockville, MD: SAMHSA, 2000, A-2. 12 Transgender Nation. 13 DHHS, SAMHSA. A Provider’s Introduction to Substance Abuse Treatment for Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Individuals. Rockville, MD: SAMHSA, 2000, A-2. 14 JRI Health. 15 DHHS, SAMHSA, Center for Substance Abuse Prevention . Substance Abuse Resource Guide: Hate Crimes . Rockville, MD: SAMHSA, National Clearinghouse for Alcohol and Drug Information, DHHS Publication No. (SMA) 00-3445, 2000, 11. 16 DHHS, SAMHSA. A Provider’s Introduction to Substance Abuse Treatment for Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Individuals. Rockville, MD: SAMHSA, Page A-2. 2000. 17 Intersex Society of North America. http://www.isna.org. 18 DHHS, SAMHSA. A Provider’s Introduction to Substance Abuse Treatment for Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Individuals. Rockville, MD: SAMHSA, 2000, A-2. 19 Ibid. 20 Ibid. 21 Ibid. 22 Ibid. 23 Transgender Nation. 24 Neufeldt, V., ed. Webster’s New World Dictionary of American English, Third College Edition . 1991, 827. 25 DHHS, SAMHSA. A Provider’s Introduction to Substance Abuse Treatment for Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Individuals. Rockville, MD: SAMHSA, 2000, A-2. 26 Ibid. 27 Gender Web Project. Transgender, Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Glossary and Acronym List. 1994. Retrieved January 14, 2001. http://www.genderweb.org/general/tlbgglos.html. 28 DHHS, SAMHSA. A Provider’s Introduction to Substance Abuse Treatment for Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Individuals. Rockville, MD: SAMHSA, 2000, A-3. 29 Blumenfled, W.J. Adolescence, Sexual Orientation and Identity: An Overview. OutProud, Be Yourself. Available online at http://www.outproud.org/article_sexual_identity.html. 30 DHHS, SAMHSA. A Provider’s Introduction to Substance Abuse Treatment for Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Individuals. Rockville, MD: SAMHSA, 2000, A-3. 31 Ibid. 32 Ibid. 450 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health 451 FEDERAL RESOURCES F I R S T G O V Internet gateway to the entire Federal Government, with search engine and hot links sorted by interest areas: www.firstgov.gov U.S. Department of Health and Human S e rvices (DHHS) Internet gateway to DHHS, with search engine, links to agencies, news, opportunities, and related sites: www.dhhs.gov. This Web site provides access to the individual DHHS agencies. The DHHS Agencies: The Secre t a ry of Health and Human S e rvices (OS) Advises the President on health, welfare, and income security plans, policies, and programs of the Federal government. The Secretary administers these functions through the Office of the Secretary and the Department’s 12 operating divisions, including a budget of $376 billion and a workforce of 59,000 employees. Administration for Children and Families (ACF) Responsible for some 60 programs which provide services and assistance to needy children and families, administers the new State-Federal welfare program, Temporary Assistance to Needy Families, administers the national child support enforcement system, and the Head Start program, provides funds to assist low income families in paying for child care, and supports state programs to provide for foster care and adoption assistance. Administration on Aging (AOA) Supports a nationwide aging network, providing services to the elderly, especially to enable them to remain independent. AoA supports some 240 million meals for the elderly each year, including home- delivered “Meals on Wheels,” helps provide transportation and at-home services, supports ombudsman services for elderly, and provides policy leadership on aging issues. Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) Supports crosscutting research on health care systems, health care quality and cost issues, and effectiveness of medical treatments. Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR) Works with states and other federal agencies to prevent exposure to hazardous substances from waste sites. The agency conducts public health assessments, health studies, surveillance activities, and health education training in communities around waste sites on the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s National Priorities List. Centers for Disease Control and P revention (CDC) Provides a system of health surveillance to monitor and prevent outbreak of diseases. With the assistance of states and other partners, CDC guards against international disease transmission, maintains national health statistics and provides for immunization services and supports research into disease and injury prevention. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) Assures the safety of foods and cosmetics, and the safety and efficacy of pharmaceuticals, biological products and medical devices. Appendix D: Resourc e s Health Care Financing Administration ( H C FA) Administers the Medicare and Medicaid programs, which provide health care to America’s aged and indigent populations, about 1 in every 4 Americans, including nearly 18 million children and nursing home coverage for low income elderly. HCFA also administers the new Children’s Health Insurance Program through approved state plans that cover more than 2.2 million children. Health Resources and Serv i c e s Administration (HRSA) The Access agency: helps provide health resources for medically underserved populations. HRSAsupports a nationwide network of 643 community and migrant health centers, and 144 primary care programs for the homeless and residents of public housing, serving 8.1 million Americans each year. HRSA also works to build the health care workforce and maintains the National Health Service Corps, oversees the Nation’s organ transplantation system, works to decrease infant mortality and improve child health and provides services to people with AIDS through the Ryan White CARE Act programs. Indian Health Service (IHS) Supports a network of 37 hospitals, 60 health centers, 3 school health centers, 46 health stations and 34 urban Indian health centers to provide services to nearly 1.5 million American Indians and Alaskan Natives of 557 federally recognized tribes. National Institutes of Health (NIH) With 17 separate institutes, is the world’s premier medical research organization, supporting some 35,000 research projects nationwide in diseases like cancer, Alzheimer’s, diabetes, arthritis, heart ailments and AIDS. Substance Abuse and Mental Health S e rvices Administration (SAMHSA) Works to improve the quality and availability of substance abuse prevention, addiction treatment, and mental health services. Social Security Administration (SSA) Became an independent agency on March 31, 1995. F O U N D ATIONS AND FUNDING R E S O U R C E S American Legacy Foundation 1001 G Street, NW, #800, Washington, DC 20001 202-454-5555 E-mail: info@americanlegacy.org www.americanlegacy.org Established in November 1998 as a result of the Master Settlement Agreement (MSA) between a coalition of Attorneys General in 46 states and 5 U.S. territories and the tobacco industry. Funds cutting edge research, marketing and education programs that tell the truth about tobacco use. LGBT populations are a priority for funding. Astraea National Lesbian Action F o u n d a t i o n 116 East 16th Street, 7th Floor, New York, NY 10003 212-529-8021 E-mail: info@astraea.org http://www.astraea.org National nonprofit public charity whose purpose is to advance the economic, political, educational and cultural well-being of lesbians. Educates individuals about money, power and giving. Dedicated to expanding the community of donors supporting lesbian issues and to raise and distribute funds to organizations, individuals and projects. Programs benefit lesbians, gay men and all women and girls both in the United States and internationally and work to eliminate racism, ageism, sexism, heterosexism, economic exploitation and anti-Semitism. Gill Foundation 2215 Market Street, Suite 205, Denver, CO 80205 303-292-4455 E-mail: info@gillfoundation.org www.gillfoundation.org Serves as a catalyst and provides resources for communities in pursuit of justice and equality, while building awareness of the contributions gay men and lesbians make to American society. Through grantmaking activities, technical assistance and other special programs, the Foundation invests in organizations serving the needs of LGBT people, and in community programs designed to improve the quality of life for everyone. Lesbian Health Fund A program of the Gay and Lesbian Medical Association 459 Fulton St., Suite 107, San Francisco, CA 94102 452 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 415-255-4547 E-mail: info@glma.org www.glma.org/programs/lhf/index.html Dedicated to improving the health of lesbians and their families through research grants. National Health Foundation 515 S. Figueroa St., #1300, Los Angeles, CA90071 213-538-0700 www.nationalhealthfdt.org Independent, charitable, tax-exempt, 501(c)(3) corporation dedicated to improving and enhancing the health of the underserved by developing and supporting innovative programs that can become independently viable, systemic solutions to gaps in healthcare access and delivery, and that have the potential to be replicated nationally. R o b e rt Wood Johnson Foundation PO Box 2316, Princeton, NJ 08543 www.rwjf.org Largest U.S. foundation devoted to improving the health and health care of all Americans. Concentrates grantmaking in three areas: to assure that all Americans have access to basic health care at a reasonable cost; to improve care and support for people with chronic health conditions; and to promote health and prevent disease by reducing the harm caused by substance abuse — tobacco, alcohol, and illicit drugs. Gives preference to applicants that are public agencies or are tax-exempt under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. COMMUNITY HEALTH CENTERS S E RVING THE LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL, AND TRANSGENDER C O M M U N I T Y C a l l e n - L o rde Community Health Center 356 West 18th Street, New York, NY 10011 212-271-7200 www.callen-lorde.org Offers primary health care, including medical services, case management, health promotion, support groups, lesbian health services, HIV/AIDS primary care and special programs reaching at-risk teens and transgendered individuals. Chase Brexton Health Services 1001 Cathedral Street, Baltimore, MD 21201 410-837-2050 www.chasebrexton.org Offers comprehensive primary care services, including but not limited to medical services, mental health, addictions counseling, pediatrics, health promotion, case management, preventative health care, STD clinics and HIV/AIDS primary care. Fenway Community Health 7 Haviland Street, Boston, MA 02115 617-267-0900 888-242-0900 (toll free) 617-927-6460 (Spanish) 617-859-1256 (TTY) 888-340-4528 (Helpline); www.fenwayhealth.org Offers comprehensive primary medical care, mental health, and addiction services, including acupuncture detoxification, to the LGBT communities of greater Boston and New England. A full spectrum of HIV/AIDS clinical services is offered. Additional programs include health promotion and wellness, lesbian cancer support groups, violence recovery services, lesbian and gay family and parenting programs, research and training. Clinical departments have bilingual/bicultural Spanish capacity, and ASL interpretation is offered. H a rt f o rd Gay and Lesbian Health Collective 1841 Broad Street, Hartford, CT 06114 860-278-4163 www.hglhc.org Provides comprehensive education, support, advocacy and specific medical services to meet the health care needs of lesbians, gay men and bisexuals in the greater Hartford, Connecticut area, with a strong focus on wellness and prevention work. H o w a rd Brown Health Center 4025 N. Sheridan Road, Chicago, Illinois 60613 773-388-1600 www.howardbrown.org Howard Brown Health Center, located in downtown Chicago, offers a continuum of primary care services, with a focus on addressing the needs of the LGBT community. Medical care, comprehensive HIV/AIDS care, STD services and a women’s health program, mental health counseling and support services, prevention and wellness programs are also available. Lambda Medical Group Los Angeles Gay and Lesbian Center Museum Square Building, 5757 Wilshire Blvd, Los Angeles, CA 877-4LAMBDA (877-452-6232) www.laglc.org Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 453 454 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health Lambda offers traditional family practice services, including wellness and prevention programs, Ob-Gyn, and HIV/AIDS treatment. HIV/AIDS services are available at the Jeffrey Goodman Special Care Clinic, while Lesbian health programs are located with the Audre Lorde Lesbian Health Clinic. Adolescent HIV services are provided at the Pedro Zamora Youth HIV Clinic. In addition to primary medical care, the Lambda group also offers mental health and domestic violence services. Ly o n - M a rtin Wo m e n ’s Health Services 1748 Market St., #201, San Francisco, CA 94102 415-565-7667 www.sfccc.org/clinics/lmwhs.htm Lyon-Martin Women’s Health Services provides primary care, gynecology, primary care for HIV positive women, breast cancer early detection screening, support groups, case management, prevention education, nutrition counseling, smoking cessation classes, and substance abuse education not only for lesbians, but bisexual and transgendered women and girls. Parenting services for lesbian and bisexual parents offer legal, medical and social services information through forums and workshops. Services are available in Spanish as well as English. M o n t rose Clinic 215 Westheimer, Houston, TX 77006 713-830-3000 www.montroseclinic.org Montrose Clinic is located in Houston, Texas, and is the city’s only health clinic serving the lesbian and gay community. As part of the Clinic ’s primary care services, it offers anonymous and confidential HIV testing, women’s health services, dermatology, nutrition consultation, optometry and ophthalmology screening, and STD and Hepatitis C screening services. A community services division provides education, case management and outreach. A research division, Houston Clinical Research Network, provides community based HIV drug research through clinical trials. Outer Cape Health Serv i c e s 49 Harry Kemp Way, Provincetown, MA 02657 508-487-9395 Outer Cape Health is a free standing community health center with clinical sites in Provincetown, Wellfleet, and Orleans, Massachusetts, with a long history of serving the area’s gay and lesbian population. Primary care services include medical, nutrition, laboratory, and x-ray services. Also offers case management, referrals, and health promotion programs. Whitman Walker Clinic 1407 S Street, NW, Washington, DC 20009 202-797-3500 202-365-5225 (24-Hour Line) 202-939-7814 (TDD) 202-328-0697 (En Español) www.wwc.org Whitman Walker Clinic, a volunteer-based lesbian and gay community health organization serving the Washington, DC metropolitan area, provides health care services to the LGBT community in the greater District of Columbia area, with four service delivery sites, two in the District, and one each in Virginia and Maryland. Services include HIV/AIDS care and treatment, mental health services, lesbian and gay health wellness programs, a lesbian and gay hotline, and AIDS education and prevention programs. A special HIV and STD prevention initiative targets the Latino community through outreach and education services. LGBT COMMUNITY CENTERS The LGBT Community Centers section of the Resource Guide was produced by Richard Burns and Paul Fricken, Lesbian and Gay Community Services Center - New York, for the National Association of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender Community Centers - www.gaycenter.org. A L A S K A Anchorage Organizing Committee 907-278-4784 Their vision is to create a physical community center in Anchorage and a virtual one for the whole state. A R I Z O N A N o rt h e rn Arizona Rainbow Community C e n t e r 1300 South Milton Rd, Suite 221, Flagstaff, AZ 86001 520-526-5419 E-mail: arcc12000@aol.com Information/referral switchboard, resource/referral database, group meeting space, office space for LGBT organizations/allies, community information packets, regional LGBT calendar. Monthly newsletter: Rainbow Reporter. Valley of the Sun Gay and Lesbian Community Center 24 West Camelback Road, Suite C, Phoenix, AZ 85013 602-265-7283 E-mail: lmiller@phxcenter.org www.phxcenter.org Lesbian and Gay Community Switchboard and Arizona AIDS Information Line; youth groups, men’s/women’s/seniors’ suport groups; antiviolence project; recovery community support project; cultural programs. W i n g s p a n 300 E. 6th Street, Tucson, AZ 85705 520-624-1779 E-mail: wingspan@wingspanaz.org www.wingspanaz.org Adult and youth support groups, meeting spaces, information and referral phone line, lending library, free and anonymous HIV testing, Pride Law Center, and Domestic Violence Project. Bimonthly newsletter: Wingspan. C A L I F O R N I A Inland Empire Gay and Lesbian Center 909-882-4488 Hotline, peer support and a speakers bureau. L. A. Gay and Lesbian Center 1625 N. Schrader Blvd., Los Angeles, CA 90028 323-993-7600 E-mail: info@laglc.org www.laglc.org Counseling, addiction recovery, policy and public affairs, youth services, homeless youth shelter, legal services, antiviolence project, AIDS/HIV medical clinic, pharmacy, Audre Lorde Lesbian Health Clinic, anonymous HIV testing site, HIV prevention education, Pedro Zamora Youth HIV Clinic. Additional facilities of the Los Angeles Gay and Lesbian Center: California AIDS Clearinghouse: 323-845-4180 Jeff Griffith Gay and Lesbian Youth Center: 323-461-8163 Youth talk line: 800-773-5540 Lambda Medical Group: 877-4-LAMBDA The Village at Ed Gould Plaza: 323-860-7302 Lambda Community Center 920 20th Street, Suite 117, Sacramento, CA 95814 916-442-0185 E-mail: LAMBDACENTER98@hotmail.com AIDS education and prevention, youth program, health education for lesbians, Lambda Players Theatre Group, AIDS/HIV support groups, Triangle Cafe, library and resource center, case management, Lambda AIDS response. Quarterly newsletter: At The Center. National Deaf Queer Resource Center E-mail: info@deafqueer.org www.deafqueer.org Resources, information and referrals. Weekly newsletter: FLASH. N o rthcoast Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender Alliance 235 4th Street, Suite A, Eureka, CA 95501 707-445-9760 E-mail: darncat@reninet.com www.reninet.com/darncat Drop-in space, community resource listings, assistance with welfare and public health services, support groups, outreach, dances, job bank, lending library, and art gallery. Monthly newsletter: GALA News. Pacific Center for Human Gro w t h 2712 Telegraph Avenue, Berkeley, CA 94705 510-548-8283 510-548-2192 (Counseling Request Line) E-mail: info@pacificcenter.org www.pacificcenter.org LGBTQ community space; individual/family/couples counseling; HIV counseling/support groups/outreach and prevention; educational outreach and speakers bureau; peer support groups; information and referral; volunteer programs; and youth services. Quarterly newsletter: Pacific Currents. Pacific Pride Foundation 126 E. Haley Street, Suite A10, Santa Barbara, CA 93101 805-963-3636 E-mail: Pride@silcom.com Sponsor annual Pride and AIDS Walk events. HIV counseling, youth groups and support groups. Monthly newsletter: The Bulletin. Rainbow Community Center of Contra Costa County 2118 Willow Pass Road, Suite 500, Concord, CA 94520 925-992-0090 E-mail: board@rainbowcc.org www.rainbow.cc.org Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 455 Social activities, peer support groups, and educational programs. Bimonthly newsletter: Prism. San Francisco Community Center P ro j e c t 1800-1810 Market Street, San Francisco, CA94102 415-437-2257 E-mail: sfgaycent@aol.com www.sfgaycenter.org Planning began in 1994. Center is under construction. Solano Pride Center 934 Missouri Street, Suite T, Fairfield, CA 94533 707-246-6660 E-mail: barmayjr42@cs.com Solanopride.org Youth group (ages 13-21), community outreach, adult services, information and referral line. Publish bimonthly newsletter. Spectrum Center for Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Concern s 1000 Sir Frances Drake Blvd, #10, San Anselmo, CA 94960 415-457-1115 E-mail: spectrumLG@aol.com www.SpectrumMarin.org Support groups for all ages, social activities, speakers bureau, Annual Marin Pride Festival. Monthly newsletter: Spectrum Dispatch. Stonewall Alliance Center 341 Broadway, Suite 416, Chico, CA95928 530-893-3336 E-mail: Center@stonewallchico.org www.stonewallchico.org Information and referral, Harlen M. Adams Memorial Lending Library, youth program (ages 13 to 25), Pride Fest “Chico Freedom Fest,” Social Services Rainbow Alliance and Business Alliance, support groups, AIDS Panels of Remembrance, coalition with the Butte Health Dept. for HIV testing, Partner Abuse Prevention Program (PAPP). Monthly newsletter: CenterStone. The Billy DeFrank Lesbian and Gay Community Center 938 The Alameda, San Jose, CA 95126 408-293-3040 E-mail: defrank@defrank.org www.defrank.org Information and referral, voter registration and mobilization, peer counseling, youth services, social/recreational services mental health program, addiction outreach program, volunteer resources, community drop-in, gay bingo, and meeting space. Monthly newsletter: Community Center News. The Diversity Center 1328 Commerce Lane, Santa Cruz, CA95060 831-425-5422 E-mail: info@diversitycenter.org www.diversitycenter.org Annual parade and celebration; diversity outreach committee; Santa Cruz Uniting Trans Men; Santa Cruz Youth Task Force; men’s, women’s, and coming out support groups; social events; and La Gazette Women’s Newspaper. Monthly newsletter: Manifesto. The Edge 39160 State Street, Fremont, CA 94538-1436 510-790-2887 E-mail: theedgefremont@aol.com Meeting space, drop-in space, community announcement bulletin boards, housing referral boards, gay men’s support group, gay men of color support group, women’s support group, men’s social group, lesbian social group, and HIV education and prevention services. The Gay and Lesbian Community Center of Greater Long Beach 2017 E. 4th Street, Long Beach, CA 90814-1001 562-434-4455 www.centerlb.org Support and rap groups, hate crimes hotline, legal, psychological and unemployment counseling, community activities programs, information and referral, twelve step programs, and AIDS/HIV case management and client advocacy. Monthly newsletter: Center Post. The Gay and Lesbian Community S e rvices Center of Orange County 12832 Garden Grove Blvd., Suite A, Garden Grove, CA 92843 714-534-0862 E-mail: administration@centeroc.org www.centeroc.org Mental health services, special interest groups, youth services, information and referral, AIDS education and HIV support services and testing. Bimonthly newsletter: Center Connections. 456 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health The Lesbian and Gay Men’s Community Center 3909 Centre Street, San Diego, CA 92103 619-692-2077 619-692-3282 (TTY) E-mail: iedthecentersd@usa.net www.thecentersd.org HIV prevention, youth services, antiviolence project, lesbian health, disabled services, coming out groups, LGBT counseling, HIV mental health. Bimonthly newsletter: CenterPiece, available online. Satellite center at 150 Valpreda, Suite 201, San Marcos: 760-744-0220. The Wayne McCaughan Community Pride Center 1306A Higuera Street, San Luis Obispo, CA93401 805-541-4252 Education, outreach, referrals and a library. Bimonthly newsletter: GALA News and Reviews. Ventura County Rainbow Alliance 3503 Arundell Circle, Suite A, Ventura, CA 93003 805-339-6340 E-mail: LAConstrux@aol.com www.glccventura.com AIDS Project Ventura County; breast cancer early detection program; alcohol and drug program; HIV/STD prevention, testing and counseling; Youth Empowerment Project; Lesbigay Student Scholarship Fund; annual community service awards; mental health counseling and referral; addiction recovery; social services/outreach/legal/financial clinics. Monthly newsletter: Out and About. C O L O R A D O Aspen Gay and Lesbian Community F u n d 215 North Garmisch, Aspen, CO 81611 970-925-4123 E-mail: aspengay@rof.net www.gayskiweek.com Resources and referrals for Aspen and Roaring Fork Valley, links to AIDS services, HIV prevention and education, youth diversity and tolerance training, speakers bureau, social activities. Monthly newsletter: Community News. G a y, Lesbian and Bisexual Community S e rvices Center of Colorado 234 Broadway, Denver, CO 80203 303-733-7743 E-mail: glbcscc@aol.com www.coloradoglbt.org Youth services, community support programs, Pridefest, Mountain State G/L film festival, Lesbian Cancer support services, Health and Wellness Programs, HIV testing, hepatitis vaccinations, HIV prevention programs, movies and cultural programing. Bimonthly newsletter: Centerlines. Pikes Peak Gay and Lesbian Community Center 125 North Parkside, Colorado Springs, CO 80909 719-471-4GAYS (4429) E-mail: mail@ppglcc.org www.ppglcc.org Resource and information line, office space for other organizations, PrideFest, Business Directory. Monthly newsletter: Community Vision. The Lambda Community Center 149 West Oak, Suite #8, Fort Collins, CO 80524 970-221-3247 970-221-3247 (Information Services and TTY) E-mail: lambda@lambdacenter.org www.lambdacenter.org Lambda Library and Archives; men’s, women’s and youth groups, Lambda University Educational Series; Lambda Business Council; information and referral. Monthly newsletter: Lambda Lines. C O N N E C T I C U T Gay and Lesbian Community Center 1841 Broad Street, Hartford, CT 06114 860-724-5542 AA recovery programs, health services, recreational programs, educational forums, and a theatre company. Monthly newsletter. New Haven Gay and Lesbian Community Center 50 Fitch Street, New Haven, CT 06515 203-387-2252 E-mail: fgdmyo@aol.com www.nhglcc.org Coming out group, gay fathers ’ group, gay men’s rap group, lesbian rap group, movie night, Living Positively, lesbian coparenting group, Course in Miracles, and drop-in hours. Bimonthly newsletter: NHGLCC News. Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 457 Triangle Community Center P.O. Box 4062, East Norwalk, CT 06855 203-853-0600 E-mail: tccenter@aol.com members.aol.com/tccenter Discussion groups, resouce room of books and periodicals, meeting space, and a community directory. Monthly newsletter: News and Views. F L O R I D A C o m p a s s 1700 North Dixie Highway, West Palm Beach, FL 33407 561-833.3638 E-mail: compasswpb@aol.com Support and social programs for youth 14-18 and parents; HIV prevention and education; lending library; HIV/AIDS case management services. Quarterly newsletter: Compass Direction. Cosmopolitan Center of Miami 701 Lincoln Rd Fl 2, Miami, FL 33139-2879 305-759-5210 Bimonthly newsletter: Cosmopolitan Clarion. Gay and Lesbian Community of G reater Fort Lauderd a l e P.O. Box 70518, Fort Lauderdale, FL 33307-0518 954-563-9500 E-mail: GLCCFTL@aol.com www.glccftl.org Information, referral and peer support switchboard and hotline; mainstream outreach program (GLOW); voter registration; meeting space; support groups; free HIV testing; gays and lesbians with children; older men’s talk group; youth group; women ’s group; and generation x group. Monthly newsletter: The Center Voice. G a y, Lesbian and Bisexual Community Center of Central Florida 934 N. Mills Avenue, Orlando, FL 32803-3230 407-228-8272 E-mail: info@glbcc.org www.glbcc.org Community and business support and advocacy, family and youth services including advocacy, crisis intervention, peer counseling and education, bisexual/transgender support services, information and referral, 24-hour gay info line, outreach/education services, speakers bureau. Monthly newspaper: The Triangle. The Center of Ta m p a 4265 Henderson Boulevard, Suite B, Tampa, FL 33629 813-287-2687 E-mail: tampacenter@mindspring.com www.tampacenter.org Support groups for lesbians, gay men, LGBTQ youth, transgender individuals, gay parents, and coming out; Community information and referral; organizations support and assistance with startup. Bimonthly newsletter: The Center Voice. The Family Tre e 423 East Virginia Street, Tallahassee, FL 32301 850-222-8555 E-mail: familytree1999@hotmail.com www.familytreecenter.org Telephone information and referrals, social and recreational events, peer counseling, support groups, community education, publicity outreach, resource library, youth group. Monthly newsletter: Branching Out. The Gay and Lesbian Community C e n t e r 1075 Duval Street, Duval Sq. C-14, Key West, FL 33041-0071 305-292-3223 E-mail: info@glcckeywest.org glcckeywest.org Forty-Niners (Senior gays), AIDS support group, social, sports. Quarterly newsletter: The Center. G E O R G I A The Atlanta Gay and Lesbian Center 159 Ralph McGill Blvd, Suite 600, Atlanta, GA30308 404-523-7500 E-mail: jpetty@aglc.org www.aglc.org Support/discussion groups; clinic testing and immunization; library with 3,000+ volumes; helpline; various social and cultural programs. H AWA I I Gay and Lesbian Community Center 2424 S. Beretania Street, Honolulu, HI 96826 808-951-7000 E-mail: glcc-news@juno.com www.glcc-hawaii.org Meeting space; spirituality support groups; coming out support groups for men, women, and youth; speakers bureau; library. Quarterly newsletter: Outlook. 458 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health I D A H O The Community Center: Resources for Gay and Lesbian People 919A N. 27th, Boise, ID 83702 208-336-3870 E-mail: tcc@micron.net Hotline and Information and Referral 208-336-3870. Publish the gay and lesbian newspaper for Idaho: Diversity. I L L I N O I S C h u rch of the Open Door Community C e n t e r 5954 South Albany Avenue, Chicago, IL 60629 773-778-3030 Employment services; crisis counseling; counseling; prison outreach; antiviolence actions; voter registration; health advocacy; credit and budget counseling; men’s group; community organizing and leadership development; space sharing for nonprofits; multimedia information and education materials focused on the African American LGBT and wider communities. Horizons Community Serv i c e s 961 W. Montana Street, Chicago, IL 60614-2408 773-472-6469 E-mail: Rogerd@horizonsonline.org www.horizonsonline.org Lesbian and Gay Helpline, Anti-Violence Project 24 Hour Crisis Hotline, youth services, ED and support services, psychotherapy, speakers service and legal services. Quarterly newsletter: The Horizon. Quad Citians Aff i rming Diversity 1705 2nd Avenue, #508, Rock Island, IL 61201 309-786-2580 E-mail: qcadmen@aol.com home.revealed.net/qcad Youth and adult drop-in and support; technical assisstance; community education. Monthly newsletter: QCAD News. I N D I A N A The Diversity Center Chris Gonzolez Library and Archive 723 Massachusettes Avenue, Indianapolis, IN 46204 317-639-4297 E-mail: diversity@gayindy.org www.gayindy.org The Marion County Board of Health anonymous and confidential HIV testing, FDA HIV/AIDS Drug Fraud Task Force. Up the Stairs Community Center 3426 Broadway, Fort Wayne, IN 46807 219-744-5430 E-mail: uts2k@hotmail.com Archives and resource library, Community AIDS Action Team, Social Action Committee, bisexual/transgender group, Horizons Youth Group, Promote the Vote, Friday Night Drop-In, Pride Fest Committee. Monthly newspaper: The Rainbow Reader. I O WA Gay and Lesbian Resource Center 1165 25th Street, Des Moines, IA 50311 515-277-7884 www.glrc-dsm.org 3,500+ library and video collection, Web site, speakers bureau, media response, organizational meeting space, phone line, artists gallery, youth space, drop-in center. Newsletter published monthly. Gay and Lesbian Resource Center of Cedar Rapids 1056 5th Avenue, South East, Cedar Rapids, IA 52403 319-366-2055 E-mail: crglrc@crglrc.org www.crglrc.org Lending library, resource and referral, social functions, advocacy, speakers bureau, workshops, phone line, support groups. Monthly newsletter: The Resource Line. The Center - Wichita 316-262-3991 Lesbian, Gay, Bi, AA Meetings; The Kansas Gay and Lesbian Archives; weekly coffee house; weekly lesbian coming out support group; Wichita Gay and Lesbian Alliance; HIV/AIDS Clothes Closet; community information center. Monthly newsletter. L O U I S I A N A Lesbian and Gay Community Center of New Orleans 2114 Decatur Street, New Orleans, LA70116 504-945-1103 E-mail: lgccno@aol.com www.lgccno.homepage.com Hate Crimes Intervention Project; youth group; coming out support group; 20-something group; meeting space; Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 459 information and referral. Monthly newsletter: The Center Line. The Lambda Center 1733 Florida Blvd, Baton Rouge, LA 70802 225-346-0670 E-mail: info@lambdabr.org www.lambdabr.org Teen group; men’s group; monthly community breakfast; PFLAG; GLSEN; socials; referrals; speakers bureau; Annual Fallfest (pride celebration). Bimonthly newsletter: Lambda Letter. M A I N E Gay and Lesbian Community Serv i c e s Center of Nort h e rn Maine 568 Main Street, Caribou, ME 04736 207-498-2088 A hotline – including HIV prevention education and counseling; education; information and peer support for the LGBT communities of Maine, and their families; various other social activities. The Diversity Center 888-216-2034 ext. 7299 E-mail: pinkpride@hotmail.com M A RY L A N D Gay and Lesbian Community Center of B a l t i m o re 241 W. Chase Street, Baltimore, MD 21201 410-837-5445 E-mail: office@glccb.org www.glccb.org Switchboard referral service; youth and young adults program; Womonspace; People Like Us; various social, support, and outreach groups; community outreach; health outreach; and Pride celebration. Semimonthly publication: Baltimore Gay Paper. M A S S A C H U S E T T S Boston Center for Lesbians and Gay M e n 80 Chandler Street, Boston, MA 02116 617-426-1316 LGBT Community Center Project of We s t e rn Massachusetts 413-582-0743 E-mail: valleyctr@hotmail.com www.queerhamp.org Virtual community center Web site, community resource listings, monthly book club. Committees: programming and development, fundraising, and public relations and networking. Bimonthly newsletter: The Community News. Pride Zone 34 Maplewood Shops, Northampton, MA01060 413-584-1116 Youth Alliance, game night, 24-hour advisor, monthly social events, Western Massachusetts Pride Rally, Trans Support Group, Youth of Queer Parents Group. M I C H I G A N A ff i rmations Lesbian and Gay Community Center 195 West Nine Mile Road, Ferndale, MI 48220 248-398-7105 E-mail: affirmationslgbt@juno.com www.comnet.org/affirmations Social services, advocacy and education. Monthly newsletter: Affirmations. Kalamazoo Gay and Lesbian Resourc e Center 629 Pioneer Street, Kalamazoo, MI 49008-1801 616-349-4234 E-mail: KGLRC@aol.com www.kglrc.org Information and referral line and a youth group. Quarterly newsletter: The Resource Center News. Karibu House Detroit, MI 313-863-8803 E-mail: karibuhouseinc@aol.com Lesbian and Gay Community Network of We s t e rn Michigan 909 Cherry Street, SE, Grand Rapids, MI 49506 616-458-3511 616 458-4691 (TTY) Weekly support groups, annual Pride Celebration, lending library, drop-in center and meeting space, resource directory, information and referral services, Stop the Violence Hotline for reporting bias incidents, 460 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health speakers bureau, HIV/AIDS prevention programs, and various social and educational activities throughout the year. Monthly newsletter: The Network News. Washtenaw Rainbow Action Pro j e c t 325 Braun Court, Ann Arbor, MI 48107 734-995-987 E-mail: wrap@wrap-up.org www.wrap- up.com Works on public policy concerns such as nondiscrimination policies; liaisons and cooperates with other groups; offers educational presentations; provides meeting space for local groups; disseminates information; provides social programming; organizes special events, such as National Coming Out Day rally, march and street party. Monthly newsletter: WRAP-Up. M I N N E S O TA AURORA: A Northland Lesbian Center 32 East 1st Street, Duluth, MN 55802 218-722-4903 Resource center, lesbian library, referral, Women Music Fest. Monthly newsletter. N o rthland Gay Men’s Center 8 N. 2nd Ave. East, Suite 309, Duluth, MN 55802 218-722-8585 E-mail: ngmc@cpinternet.com cpinternet.com/~ngmc Discussion groups, lending library, canoeing, camping, day trips, community action, mentoring, dances, education, and speakers bureau. Quarterly newsletter: GAYRIGHTER. O u t F ront Minnesota 310 East 38th Street, Room 204, Minneapolis, MN 55409 612-822-0127 800-800-0350 E-mail: outfront@outfront.org www.outfront.org 24-hour info line, domestic violence intervention, antiviolence advocacy, legal advocacy, education and training, community development, and public policy. M I S S O U R I Gay and Lesbian Community Center of the Ozarks 518 E. Commercial, Springfield, MO 65801 417-869-3978 E-mail: GLODir@aol.com www.ozarksforum.net/GLO Rap groups, HIV+ Affinity Group, youth group, Cafe GLO (Open Mike Night), GLO Film Society. Monthly newsletter: The GLO Newsletter. Lesbian and Gay Community Center The Supreme Bean Coffee Shop, 1615 W. 39th Street, Kansas City, MO E-mail: lgcc@kc-lgcc.org www.kc-lgcc.org Currently meeting upstairs at The Supreme Bean Coffee Shop. M O N TA N A We s t e rn Montana Gay and Lesbian Community Center 615 Oak Street, Missoula, MT 59801 406-543-2224 E-mail: wmglcc@gaymontana.com www.gaymontana.com Healthy Lifestyles Program (HELP), a lending library, support groups, resource center. N E B R A S K A Panhandle Gay and Lesbian Support S e rv i c e s 308-635-8488 Provide services to 11 counties in Nebraska panhandle through social functions, support and education. Rainbow Outreach Resource Center 1719 Leavenworth Street, Omaha, NE 68102 402-341-0330 www.rocc.org 24-hour phone line, library, education, information and referral, social activities, meeting space for eastern NE/western IA. Publish a quarterly newsletter. N E VA D A A Rainbow Place 263 Keystone Avenue, Reno, NV 89503 775-329-3034 E-mail: ARainbowPlace@aol.com Community library, 24-hour information hotline, antiviolence project, meeting space, youth support services, suicide prevention program, leadership building, peer support groups, political engagement; voter registration, education, lobbying, Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 461 health/counseling service referral network, public education. Quarterly Newsletter: Nevada OUTpost. The Gay and Lesbian Community Center of South Nevada 912 East Sahara Avenue, Las Vegas, NV 89104 702-733-9800 Youth mentoring, HIV prevention, community resource services. Bimonthly newsletter: The Center Line. NEW JERSEY Gay and Lesbian Community Center of New Jersey 626 Bangs Avenue, Asbury Park, NJ 07712 732-774-1809 Email newsletter. The Pride Center of New Jersey 211 Livingston Avenue, New Brunswick, NJ 08901 732-846-2232 E-mail: info@pridecenter.org www.pridecenter.org Statewide info line, HIV counseling and testing, roommate/apartment services, monthly coffee house, over 20 programs including coming out support groups, Al-Anon, Latinos Unidos, Long Yang Club, Out There, Under the Rainbow, and others. NEW YORK Capital District Gay and Lesbian Community Center 332 Hudson Avenue, Albany, NY 12210 518-462-6138 E-mail: cdglcc@aol.com www.thedigitalvillage.com/cdglcc Support groups; programming throughout the Capital District; and a 24-hour information line. Monthly newsletter: Community. Community House of Long Island 751 Long Island Avenue, Deer Park, NY 631-242-9727 E-mail: info@choli.org www.choli.org Major programs and services are in the formation stages. Projects include a diversity program, Promote the Vote, Project on Domestic Violence with Gay and Lesbian Couples; groups include HIV+ Group, Latinos and Hispanics, LIFE, GOAL, The Bears, The LGBT Network Committee, Gay Democrats of Suffolk County, SAGE, and more. Gay Alliance of the Genesee Va l l e y 179 Atlantic Avenue, Rochester, NY 14607 716-244-6335 E-mail: rgelder@gayalliance.org www.gayalliance.org Pride Community Center of Central New Yo r k 745 North Salina Street, Syracuse, NY 13208 315-426-1650 Resource and referral center, phone info line, drop-in center, reading/lending library, meeting space for organizations, Friday night movies. Quarterly newsletter: Pride Inside. Queens Lesbian and Gay Community C e n t e r c/o Queens Borough Hall 120-55 Queens Boulevard, Rom 325, Kew Gardens, NY 11424 718-261-7068 Meeting space for Queens groups, library/media resource center, social events, domestic violence counseling with Anti-Violence Project, legal clinic, gender identity series, youth group. The Audre Lorde Pro j e c t 85 South Oxford Street, 3rd Floor, Brooklyn, NY 11217 718-596-0342 E-mail: alpinfo@alp.org www.alp.org Quarterly newsletter: The Missive. The Lesbian and Gay Community S e rvices Center 208 West 13th Street, New York, NY 10011 212-620-7310 E-mail: info@gaycenter.org www.gaycenter.org Meeting space for over 300 groups; alcoholism and substance abuse recovery counseling; AIDS bereavement program; creative arts programming for young people; support services for the transgender/transexual community; mediation services; information and referral; and more. Bimonthly newsletter: Center Voice and monthly calendar: Center Happenings. 462 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health The Loft - The L&GCSC of the Lower Hudson Va l l e y 180 East Post Road, White Plains, NY 10601 914-948-4922 914-948-2932 E-mail: info@loftgaycenter.org www.loftgaycenter.org Weekly rap groups run by loft peer support services, as well as other special discussion groups, Sobriety at The LOFT, Al-Anon, social events and groups, Positively Expressed (HIV+ group), various socials, dances, speakers, authors/book signings, and other events. HIV testing available by appointment. Newsletter 10 times per year: LOFT Community New (Cnews). N O RTH CAROLINA OutCharlotte Organizing Committee 704-563-2699 E-mail: communitycenter@aol.com www.outcharlotte.org Triangle Community Wo r k s ! 814 Dixie Trail, Raleigh, NC 27607 919-821-0055 Gay and Lesbian Helpline, A Safer Place Youth Network, resource library, Medical Provider Resource Project, Bisexual Discussion Group. Bimonthly newsletter: Community Works! O H I O Lesbian/Gay Community Serv i c e Center of Greater Cleveland 6600 Detroit Avenue, Cleveland, OH 44102 216-651-5428 1-888-GAY-8761 E-mail: thecenter@earthlink.net www.lgcsc.org Hotline; The Living Room (A drop-in center for people living with HIV/AIDS); youth program; Presence and Respect for Youth In Sexual Minority (PRYSM), Safe Schools Are For Everyone (SSAFE), a speakers bureau and resource center. Quarterly newsletter: The Center Attraction. Pride Center of Greater Yo u n g s t o w n 330-747-7433 E-mail: youngstownpride@hotmail.com hometown.aol.com/thepridecenter Maintains a Web site and an informational phone line; social events safe for LGBT people; Coffee Klatches; Liason with LGBT groups in the area. Stonewall Columbus Community C e n t e r 1160 N. High Street, Columbus, OH 43201 614-299-7764 E-mail: stonewall@stonewall- columbus.org www.stonewall-columbus.org Support groups, referrals, free meeting space, copies and fax services, mailbox rentals, office space rental (when available), Lavendar Listings - annual business directory. Monthly newsletter: Stonewall Journal. The Dayton Lesbian and Gay Center 200 Delaware Avenue at Faith UCC, Dayton, OH 45405 937-676-2274 Women’s Forum, Men’s Forum, Monthly Community Nite Series, Pride Events, 24-hour automated hotline. Quarterly newlsetter. The Gay and Lesbian Community Center of Greater Cincinnati 4119 Hamilton Avenue, Cincinnati, OH 45223 513-591-0200 513-651-0070 (Information and referral switchboard) E-mail: mail@glbtcentercincinnati.com www.glbtcentercincinnati.com Library and archives, meeting space, community calendar of events, community resource area for copying, faxing and work on personal computer; Cincinnati Youth Group, Coalition, Men’s Support Group, Pride Committee. Quarterly newsletter: Outlooks. The Pride Center 71 North Adams Street, Akron, OH 44302-2254 330-275-5900 E-mail: akpride007@hotmail.com www.rainbow-akron.com/aapc/ Social, educational, support and disussion groups for LGBT communities. Meeting/event space for AA, Stonewall Akron, NEON, Equality Begins at Home, Out In Akron, and various LGBT churches. Lending library; and resource and information distribution. Monthly newsletter: The Pride Center. O K L A H O M A Herland Sister Resourc e s 2312 N.W. 39th Street, Oklahoma City, OK 73112 405-521-9696 E-mail: herland@mailroom.com www.herlandsisters.org Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 463 Cultural programming, semiannual retreat for women, meeting space for various groups. All services oriented for women although men may participate in any program or service not specifically designated as “women only.” Bookstore, library, and coffee house. Monthly newsletter: Herland Voice. The Center 2135 NW 39th Street, Oklahoma City, OK 73112 405-524-6000 Pride merchandise store, meeting space for community organizations, substance abuse groups, coming out groups, annual Pride events. Monthly newsletter: The Pride Center News. The Pride Center -Tulsa Oklahomans for Human Rights 1307 East 38th Street, Tulsa, OK 74105 918-743-4297 E-mail: pride_center@yahoo.com Pride merchandise store, meeting space for community organizations, substance abuse groups, coming out groups, annual Pride events coordination (including HIV prevention programs that are now operated as a separate agency). Monthly newsletter: The Pride Center News. O R E G O N Abdill-Ellis Lambda Community Center The Fourth Street Studio, 281 Fourth Street, Ashland, OR 97520 541-488-6990 E-mail: info@abdellis.org www.abdellis.org Lending library; business directory; info and referral; Southern Oregon outreach to lesbians and gay men; HIV/AIDS prevention education; movie night; social and support groups. Monthly newsletter: Prizm. Lesbian Community Pro j e c t 1001 East Burnside Street, Portland, OR 97214 503-233-3913 E-mail: lcppdx@hotmail.com www.teleport.com/~lcppdx Lesbian Health Project; The Oregon Lesbian Conference; voter registration; For Love and Justice - A Walk Against Hate; safer sex workshops; coming out series; presentations to high school and college classes and business and social service organizations, churches and other groups; and some thirty other programs and services. Monthly newsletter. N o rth Coast Pride Network 10 6th Street, Suite #209, Astoria, OR 97103 503-338-0601 E-mail: ncpn@pacifier.com LGBT social, quarterly newsletter “OUT on the Coast,” information about events and community service activities. Phoenix Rising 424 Burnside, Portland, OR 97214 503-872-9664 E-mail: safetnet@aol.com Youth drop-in center for LGBT and questioning youth, youth support groups, youth leadership training, HIV/STD (Youth Against AIDS) prevention, outreach and education. Seniors Community Resource Guide. Triannual newsletter: Phoenix Flyer. P E N N S Y LVA N I A Gay and Lesbian Community Center of P i t t s b u rg h 5808 Forward Avenue, Pittsburgh, PA 15217-2302 412-422-0114 412-422.1633 (Youthline) E-mail: center@glccpgh.org www.glccpgh.org Youthline hours: 3pm-6pm on Saturdays, youth services, information and referral support through phone line, lending library and meeting space. Quarterly newsletter: Gay and Lesbian Community Center Newsletter. William Way Community Center 1315 Spruce Street, Philadelphia, PA 19107-5601 215-732-2220 E-mail: wwcenter@yahoo.com www.waygay.org Peer counseling, front desk information and referral, library, archives, support groups, coffee houses, seminars, social events, town meetings. Bimonthly newsletter: William Way Community Center News and Notes. T E N N E S S E E Gay and Lesbian Resource Center 1040 Murfeesboro Pike, Suite 105, Nashville, TN 37217 877-499-GLRC (4572) 877-480-TENN (8366) (24 hour crisis intervention) E-mail: info@glrgtn.org www.glrctn.org Case management for disabled and mentally challenged; walkin crisis counseling and assistance with food, prescriptions, and utilities; coming out support for 464 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health men aged 18-25; Transistional Living Program, emergency housing for homeless people and victims of domestic abuse. Newsletter: Freeality. LGBT Center 703 Berry Road, Nashville, TN 37204 615-297-0008 E-mail: info@nashcenter.org www.nashcenter.org Education, community building, strategic development, counseling/care providing, and outreach. Switchboard services include referrals, information and peer counseling. Bimonthly newsletter: Center Intrigue. Memphis Gay and Lesbian Community C e n t e r 901-324-4297 E-mail: mglcccalendar@yahoo.com www.memphisgayweb.org Town Hall meeting, potluck dinner, Gay and Lesbian Film Festival, Pride Weekend Party. Web site provides community calendar and directory. Switchboard provides information about groups, business, and counseling. T E X A S Austin Gay and Lesbian Community S e rvices E-mail: aglcs@email.com www.austincenter.org Access to an Austin area calendar of events, an e-mail subscription list, a Resource Guide and Business Directory. This is a cyber center. Gay and Lesbian Community Center of San Antonio 3126 N. Saint Mary ’s, San Antonio, TX 78212 210-732-4300 HIV/AIDS testing, counseling, information and referrals, HIV Support Plus Club, psychological counseling, monthly calendar, social mixers, youth groups, lending library, meeting space rental, Virtual G and L Chamber of Commerce. Monthly newsletter: The Calendar. Houston Lesbian and Gay Community C e n t e r 803 Hawthorne, Houston, TX 77006 713-524-3818 Meeting space, community information, office space for community organizations. Monthly newsletter. John Thomas Gay and Lesbian Community Center 2701 Reagan Street, Dallas, TX 75219 214-528-9254 E-mail: glccdallas@resourcecenterdallas.org www.resourcecenterdallas.org Speakers bureau; switchboard; special events and fun classes; 10% Youth; meeting space for 60+ groups; Lesbian Health Commandos; Phil Johnson Historic Archives and Research Library; and AIDS Resource Center Division. Community newsletter in development. Monthly AIDS Update published by AIDS Resource Center. LAMBDA LGBT Community Serv i c e s 216 S. Ochoa, El Paso, TX 79901 915-562-4297 E-mail: admin@lambda.org www.lambda.org National Hate Crimes Documentation Network (www.HCDN.org), HIV/AIDS prevention and testing, meeting and office space for community organizations, library/archives, regional calendar and e-mail lists, counseling, community information, weekly movie nights, youth dances, information and referrals, concerts, annual Pride events. Monthly newsletter. U TA H The Lesbian and Gay Community Center of Utah 361 North-300 West, Salt Lake City, UT 84103 801-539-8800 E-mail: pwolfe@glccu.com www.glccu.com Lending library, referrals, group meetings, bulletin boards, art center, youth programs, drop-in center, meeting space, and a coffee shop called The Stonewall Coffee Company. V E R M O N T R.U.1.2. Community Center 802-860-RU12 (7812) E-mail: thecenter@ru12.org www.ru12.org Monthly potluck, bimonthly coffeehouse, cosponsor other events. Quarterly newsletter: From The Center. Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 465 V I R G I N I A Shenandoah Valley Gay and Lesbian A s s o c i a t i o n 540-574-4636 Resource information, a calendar of events, social and educational support services. Monthly newsletter and calendar of events. WA S H I N G T O N Lesbian Resource Center 2214 South Jackson Street, Seattle, WA 09144 206-322-3965 www.lrc.net/ Resources, referrals, library, rap groups, emergency fund. Lesbian Neighborhoods Project—grassroots organizing and training in individual neighborhoods. Antioppression program—regular trainings (antiracism, anticlassism) offered to community and other organizations. Monthly newsletter: Lesbian Resource Center News. Queen City Community Development 1161 11th Avenue, Seattle, WA 98122 206-323-2227 E-mail: info@seattlegayculture.org www.seattlegayculture.org 60 units of mixed income senior housing, 50,000 square feet of nonprofit offices including day care, senior center, adult day health and family center plus conference center and multipurpose spaces. Rainbow Center 1501 Pacific Avenue, Suite 310-D, Tacoma, WA 98402 253-383-2318 Distribution center and bulletin boards, information and referral and voice mail services, partnership program for LGBT groups to use center as a home base for meetings, events, etc. Monthly community events calendar. Rainbow Regional Community Center 206 1/2 East Wellesley, Spokane, WA 99207 509-489-1914 E-mail: info@rainbowcenter.org www.rainbowcenter.org Various support groups; meeting facilitators; fiscal sponsorships; voice mail for other LGBTQ groups; lending library; Pride Store; educational outreach; intimate partner abuse referral system; community contacts and networking assistance. Quarterly newsletter. O u t re a c h 600 Williamson Street, Suite P-1, Madison, WI 53703 608-255-8582 E-mail: outreach@outreachinc.com www.outreachinc.com Peer counseling; support groups; information; referrals; education services; youth services; lending library; advocacy; The Directory: A Guide to Businesses and Organization Serving Madison’s LGBT Communities; The Calender and Guide. Quarterly Newsletter: Equal Time. The Milwaukee LGBT Community C e n t e r 170 South Second Street, Milwaukee, WI 53204 414-271-2656 E-mail: execdirector@mkelgbt.org www.mkelgbt.org Community development – office space, meeting rooms, technical assistance; youth programming – drop- in, mentoring, tutoring, speakers bureau, social activities; community outreach and education – library, speakers bureau, hotline, Web site; advocacy— “Promote the Vote” voter registration and mobilization, neighborhood organizing, statewide efforts. P R O F E S S I O N A L O R G A N I Z ATIONS (see NATIONAL LGBT O R G A N I Z AT I O N S ) American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO 1625 L Street, NW, Washington, DC 20036-5687 202-429-1000 202-659-0446 (TTY) www.afscme.org One of the union leaders in demanding equal rights for all employees. American Libraries Association Gay and Lesbian Roundtable http://calvin.usc.edu/~trimmer/ala_hp2.html A unit of the American Library Association, the GLBTRT was founded in 1970 as the Task Force on Gay Liberation. Considered to be the nation’s first LGBT professional organization. 466 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health American Psychological Association Committee on Lesbian and Gay C o n c e rn s 750 First Street, NE #100, Washington, DC 20002-4242 202-336-5500 202-336-6041 www.apa.org/pi/lgbc Both an advocacy and membership group, the Committee encourages objective and unbiased research in areas relevant to LGBT adults and youths, and the social impact of such research, examines the consequences of inaccurate information and stereotypes about LGBT adults and youths in clinical practice, and develops educational materials for distribution to psychologists and others. Also furthers the cause of civil and legal rights of LGBT psychologists within the profession. American Public Health Association Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender Caucus of Public Health Wo r k e r s 800 I St NW, Washington, DC 20001 www.apha.org www.stophiv.pitt.edu/~lgbtc/ Forum for public health workers and professionals interested in LGBT issues. Committed to combating discriminatory practices in health organizations and systems. Web site includes two papers: The Need for Acknowledging Transgendered Individuals within Research and Clinical Practice and The Need for Public Health Research on Gender Identity and Sexual Orientation. Site also includes links to Web sites related to support and funding information and other LGBT sites. American School Health Association P.O. Box 708, Kent, Ohio 44240 330-678-1601 E-mail: asha@ashaweb.org www.ashaweb.org/ Mission of the Association is to protect and improve the well-being of children and youth by supporting comprehensive school health programs, including school health education, school health services and school health environments. Also works to support and integrate school counseling, psychological and social services, food services, physical education programs and the combined efforts of schools, other agencies and families to improve the health of school-aged youth and school personnel. Association for Worksite Health P ro m o t i o n 60 Revere Drive Suite 500, Northbrook, Illinois 60062 847-480-9574 E-mail: awhp@awhp.organization www.awhp.org Provides a network of worksite health promotion professionals willing to share the methods, processes and technologies necessary to initiate a successful health promotion program. Association of Gay and Lesbian P s y c h i a t r i s t s 4514 Chester Ave., Philadelphia, PA 19143-3707 215-222-2800 www.aglp.org Professional organization of psychiatrists, psychiatry residents, and medical students that serves as a voice for the concerns of lesbians and gay men within the psychiatric community. Committed to fostering a more accurate understanding of homosexuality, opposing discriminatory practices against gay men and lesbians, and promoting supportive, well-informed psychiatric care for lesbian and gay patients. Association of Nurses in AIDS Care 11250 Roger Bacon Drive, Suite 8, Reston, VA 20190- 5202 800-260-6780 703-925-0081 E-mail: AIDSNURSES@aol.com www.anacnet.org Committed to fostering the individual and collective professional development of nurses involved in the delivery of health care to persons infected or affected by the HIV, and to promoting the health, welfare, and rights of all HIV infected persons. Gay and Lesbian Medical Association ( G L M A ) 459 Fulton St. Suite 107, San Francisco, CA 94102 415-255-4547 E-mail: info@glma.org www.glma.org Working to end homophobia in health care. Represents the interests of LGBT physicians and medical students, as well as millions of LGBT patients throughout North America who seek equality in health care access and delivery. Web site contains the full text of this Healthy People 2010 Companion Document, the January 2000 white paper, “LGBT Health: Findings and Concerns,” comprehensive information on LGBT health in the United States, links to other LGBT and health organizations, and the nation’s largest online LGBT heath care provider referral program. Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 467 National Assembly on School-based Health Care 666 11th St., NW, Suite 735, Washington, DC 20001 888-286-8727 202-638-5872 E-mail: info@nasbhc.org www.nasbhc.org Dedicated to promoting accessible, quality school-based primary health and mental health care for children and youth through interdisciplinary and collaborative efforts. Provides community, state, and national advocacy, information and knowledge exchange, networking opportunities, and technical assistance. National Association of School Nurses P.O. Box 1300, Scarborough, ME 04070-1300 207-883-2117 www.nasn.org Improves the health and educational success of children and youth by developing and providing leadership to advance school nursing practice. National Association of Social Wo r k e r s National Committee on Lesbian, Gay and Bisexual Issues 750 First St. NE, Suite 700, Washington, DC 20002- 4241 202-408-8600 www.socialworkers.org Membership organization that promotes, develops, and protects the practice of social work and social workers. Committed to enhancing the effective functioning and well-being of individuals, families, and communities through its work and through its advocacy. P a rtnership for Pre v e n t i o n 1233 20th St. NW, Suite 200, Washington DC 20036 202-833-0009 E-mail: info@prevent.org www.prevent.org Dedicated to increasing the resources for and knowledge about effective disease prevention and health promotion policies. Analyzes information and convenes experts and decision makers from various sectors to identify strategies to improve the science and practice of prevention. Advocates for policies and programs that reduce the nation’s burden of preventable disease, injury, and death. Wellness Councils of America 9802 Nicholas St., Suite 315, Omaha, NE 68114 402-827-3590 E-mail: wellworkplace@welcoa.org www.welcoa.org Dedicated to improving the health and well-being of Americans everywhere—especially through activities at the worksite. N ATIONAL LGBT O R G A N I Z ATIONS (see PROFESSIONAL O R G A N I Z AT I O N S ) A l t e rnatives to Marriage Pro j e c t http://www.unmarried.org/ A national organization for unmarried people, including people who choose not to marry, are prevented from marrying, or are among the majority of people who live together before marriage. Work for greater understanding and acceptance of unmarried people. BiNet, USA www.binetusa.org Also known as the Bisexual Network of the USA, this is a national organization. Dedicated to collecting and distributing information regarding bisexuality; facilitating the development of bisexual community and visibility; working for the equal rights and liberation of bisexuals and all oppressed peoples; eradicating all forms of oppression inside and outside the bisexual community. Bisexual Resource Center P.O. Box 1026 Boston, MA02117-1026 617-424-9595 www.biresource.org Focusing on research and education, the center also serves as a support network and provides a public forum for the discussion of bisexuality. C h i l d ren of Lesbians and Gays E v e ry w h e re (COLAGE) 3543 18th St., #1, San Francisco, CA94110 415-861-KIDS (5437) E-mail: colage@colage.organization www.colage.org Mission is to foster the growth of daughters and sons of lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender parents of all racial, ethnic, and class backgrounds by providing education, support and community on local and international levels, to advocate for our rights and those of our families, and to promote acceptance and awareness in society that love makes a family. 468 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health Families Like Ours, Inc. P.O. Box 3137, Renton, WA 98056-3137 425-793-7911 Washington Office 480-699-2897 Arizona Office www.familieslikeours.org Online virtual community where alternative family parents (adoptive and birth parents) and parents-to-be will find resources, tools, and support. Family Pride Coalition P.O. Box 34337, San Diego, CA92163 619-296-0199 E-mail: pride@familypride.organization www.familypride.org Mission is to advance the well-being of lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgendered parents and their families through mutual support, community collaboration, and public understanding. Gay and Lesbian Alliance Against Defamation (GLAAD) 1825 Connecticut Avenue NW, 5th Floor, Washington, DC 20009 202-986-1360 1-800-GAY-MEDIA (1-800-429-6334) E-mail: glaad@glaad.organization www.glaad.org Dedicated to promoting and ensuring fair, accurate, and inclusive representation of individuals and events in all media as a means of eliminating homophobia and discrimination based on gender identity and sexual orientation. Gay and Lesbian Victims’ Assistance H o t l i n e 800-259-1536 Assists all victims of antigay incidents and provides a centralized source of information and documentation. Gay and Lesbian Association of Retiring Persons (GLARP) 10940 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 1600, Los Angeles, California 90024 310-966-1500 E-mail: glarp@earthlink.net www.gaylesbianretiring.org Dedicated to encouraging gay and lesbian individuals and businesses to give financially and of their time and talent to enhance the aging experience of all retiring gays and lesbians in exchange for tax and other benefits. Gay and Lesbian National Hotline 1-888-843-4564 212-989-0999 415-355-0999 E-mail: glnh@glnh.organization www.glnh.org National nonprofit dedicated to meeting the needs of the gay and lesbian community by offering free and totally anonymous information, referrals and peercounseling. G a y, Lesbian and Straight Education Network (GLSEN) 121 West 27th St. Suite 804, New York, NY 10001 212-727-1035 www.glsen.org Leading national organization fighting to end anti-gay bias in K-12 schools, working for a future in which every child learns to respect and accept all people, regardless of sexual orientation or gender identity. Web site includes resource guides and workshops for safe schools and staff development, statistic reports, curricula for teachers, and law and policy guides. Gay Men of African Descent (GMAD) 214 W. 14th Street, New York, NY 10011 212-414-9344 www.gmad.org Committed to empowering gay men of African descent through education, social support, political advocacy and health and wellness promotion. Gay Men’s Domestic Violence Pro j e c t 800-832 1901 www.gmdvp.org Provides community education, resources and direct services to gay, bisexual, and transgendered male victims and survivors of domestic violence. Gay Men’s Health Crisis Hotline: 1-800-AIDS-NYC (1-800-243-7692) 212- 807-6655 212-645-7470 (TTY) E-mail: hotline@gmhc.org www.gmhc.org Dedicated to providing AIDS care, education and advocacy worldwide. Web site includes resource guide on HIV/AIDS, living with HIV/AIDS, and information on other STDs. Includes an action center. H a r ry Benjamin International Gender Dysphoria Association (HBIGDA) 1300 South Second Street, Suite 180, Minneapolis, MN 55454 612-625-1500 www.hbigda.org Professional organization devoted to the understanding and treatment of gender identity disorders. HBIGDA Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health 469 also develops and publishes internationally accepted Standards of Care for the treatment of gender identity disorders. Human Rights Campaign (HRC) 919 18th Street, NW, Suite 800, Washington, DC 20006 202-628-4160 www.hrc.org Largest national lesbian and gay political organization, the HRC is committed to an America where lesbian and gay people are ensured of their basic equal rights. Institute for Gay and Lesbian Strategic Studies IGLSS, P.O. Box 53036, Washington, D.C. 20009-3036 413-577-0145 www.iglss.org Supports scholarly inquiry and enhances major public policy debates through research, analysis, and education in order to create an equal and integrated society for people of all sexual orientations and gender identities. Intersex Society of North America P.O. Box 3070, Ann Arbor, MI 48106-3070 www.isna.org A public awareness, education, and advocacy organization which works to create a world free of shame, secrecy, and unwanted surgery for intersex people. The National Latina/o Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Tr a n s g e n d e r O rganization (LLEGÓ) 1612 K Street, NW, Suite 500, Washington, DC 20006 202-466-8240 www.llego.org National nonprofit organization devoted to organizing Latina/o Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender communities on a local, regional, national and international level, addressing the need to overcome social, health, and political barriers faced due to sexual orientation and ethnic background. Web site in Spanish and English. National Association of Lesbian and Gay Addiction Professionals (NALGAP) c/o NAADAC, 901 North Washington Street, Suite 600, Alexandria, VA 22314 703-465-0539 www.nalgap.org Membership organization dedicated to the prevention and treatment of alcoholism, substance abuse, and other addictions in LGBT communities. Confronts homophobia and heterosexism in the delivery of services to LGBT people and advocates for LGBT- affirming programs and services. Provides information, training, networking and advocacy, and support for addiction professionals, individuals in recovery, and others concerned about LGBT health. National Association of Lesbian and Gay Community Centers One Little West 12th Street, New York, NY 10014 212-620-7310 www.gaycenter.org Provides a home for the birth, nurture and celebration of our organizations, institutions and culture; cares for our individuals and groups in need; educates the public and our community; and empowers our individuals and groups to achieve their fullest potential. National Center for Lesbian Rights 870 Market St. Suite 570, San Francisco, CA 94102 415-392-6257 www.nclrights.org Nation’s legal center with a primary commitment to advancing the rights and safety of lesbians and their families through a program of litigation, public policy advocacy, free legal advice and counseling, and public education. National Coalition for Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health c/o W h i t m a n - Walker Clinic, Attn: Cornelius Baker 1407 S St. NW, Washington, DC 20009 E-mail: cbaker@wwc.organization w w w. l g b t h e a l t h . n e t Committed to improving the health and well-being of lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender individuals through federal advocacy that is focused on research, policy, education and training. Web site includes resources and links related to LGBThealth and federal advocacy, as well as the full text of this Healthy People 2010 Companion document. National Coalition of Anti-Vi o l e n c e P ro g r a m s Coordinated by the New York City Gay and Lesbian Anti-Violence Project 240 West 35th Street, Suite 200, New York, NY10001 212-714-1184 www.avp.org Association of 26 programs that document and advocate for victims of antilesbian, gay, transgender, bisexual and HIV-related violence/harassment, domestic/intimate partner violence, sexual assault, police abuse/misconduct, and other forms of victimization. 470 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health Annually publishes the only national report on hate crimes toward the LGBT and HIV-positive community. National Coalition of Feminist and Lesbian Cancer Pro j e c t s Coordinated by the Mautner Project 1707 L St., NW, #1060, Washington, DC 20036 202-332-5536 www.mautnerproject.org Committed to building and maintaining a communications and support network among local cancer projects dedicated to lesbian and feminist health concerns, providing technical assistance and support for new and existing projects. National Gay and Lesbian Task Forc e ( N G LT F ) 1700 Kalorama Road NW, Washington, DC 20009- 2624 202-332-6483 202-332-6219 (TTY) www.ngltf.org National progressive organization working for the civil rights of gay, lesbian, bisexual and transgendered people. NGLTF also runs a Policy Institute, offers leadership development, and serves as a national resource center. National Minority AIDS Council 1931 13th St. NW, Washington, DC 20009 202-483-6622 www.nmac.org National organization dedicated to developing leadership within communities of color to address the challenge of HIV/AIDS. National Native American AIDS P revention Center 436 14th Street, Suite 1020, Oakland, CA 94612 510-444-2051 www.nnaapc.org Committed to stopping the spread of HIV and related diseases among American Indians, Alaska Natives, and Native Hawaiians and to improve the quality of life for members of our communities infected and affected by HIV/AIDS. National Youth Advocacy Coalition ( YA C ) 1638 R St. NW, #300, Washington, DC 20009-6451 202-319-7596 www.nyacyouth.org Advocate for and with young people who are lesbian, gay, bisexual, or transgender in an effort to end discrimination against these youth and to ensure their physical and emotional well being. Web site includes bibliography and resource directory of works appropriate for children, adolescents, educators, and family, and on such topics as religion and HIV/AIDS. P a rents, Families and Friends of Lesbian and Gays (P-FLAG) 1726 M Street, NW, Suite 400, Washington, DC 20036 202-467-8180 www.pflag.org Promotes the health and well-being of LGBT persons, their families and friends through support, education, and advocacy, to create a society that is healthy and respectful of human diversity. Senior Action in a Gay Enviro n m e n t ( S A G E ) 305 Seventh Ave., New York, NY 10001 212-741-2247 E-mail: sageusa@aol.com www.sageusa.org Dedicated to meeting the unique needs of senior LGBT persons. Committed to fostering a greater understanding of aging, to promoting positive images of life in the later years, and to supporting and advocating for the rights of senior gay men and lesbians in both the gay and straight communities. OTHER LGBT RESOURCES ACLU Lesbian and Gay Rights 125 Broad St., 18th Floor, New York, NY 10004 212-549-2627 www.aclu.org/issues/gay/hmgl.html Works for fair and equal treatment for LGBT people. This means evenhanded treatment by the government, protection from discrimination in jobs, schools, housing, and public accommodations, and equal rights for gay and lesbian couples and families. The ACLU AIDS Project works to ensure that as society responds to the changing nature of the HIV epidemic, it does not needlessly abrogate fundamental constitutional rights. Advocates for Yo u t h www.advocatesforyouth.org Dedicated to creating programs and promoting policies that help young people make informed and responsible decisions about their sexual health. Provides information, training, and advocacy to youth-serving Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 471 organizations, policy makers, and the media in the United States and internationally. American Medical Students A s s o c i a t i o n Lesbian, Gay and Bisexual People in M e d i c i n e 1902 Association Dr., Reston, VA 20191 703-620-6600 www.amsa.org/sc/lgbpm.html Improving awareness and breaking down the barriers for LGBT health community. A group of LGBT individuals, and our straight allies who support each other and work to educate the medical school community. American Society on Aging Lesbian and Gay Aging Issues N e t w o r k 833 Market St, Suite 511, San Francisco, CA94103- 1824 415-974-9600 E-mail: lgain@asa.asaging.org www.asaging.org/lgain.html Works to raise awareness about the special challenges that LGBT elders face as they age, and about the unique barriers these often invisible populations encounter in gaining access to housing, healthcare, long-term care and social services. Web site includes an extensive annotated directory of Internet resources dealing with LGBT aging. Asian and Pacific Islander We l l n e s s C e n t e r http://www.apiwellness.org/v20/research/research.html Educates, supports, empowers and advocates for Asian and Pacific Islander (A&PI) communities - particularly A&PIs living with or at-risk for HIV/AIDS. Provides HIV care services. Association for Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Issues in Counseling 5999 Stevenson Ave., Alexandria, VA 22304 www.aglbic.org Committed to educating mental health service providers about issues confronting LGBT individuals. B i . o rg http://bi.org/ This site is continually renovated and is a great resource for the international bisexual community. Bi.org now is a very large site with links all over the globe. Especially strong are the links to bi resources throughout the world outside of North America. Bi The Wa y http://www.bisexual.org/g/bitheway/ This site is a resource and reference for bisexuals, as well as the general LesBiGay community. Quite extensive. The Center for Health and Sexual O r i e n t a t i o n University of Pittsburgh 3520 Fifth Avenue, Suite 400, Pittsburgh, PA 15213 412-624-5080 E-mail: tonys@stophiv.pitt.edu With faculty from the University of Pittsburgh, Carnegie Mellon University and The Urban Institute, the Center is dedicated to generating and carrying out health research related to sexual orientation. Current areas of activity include chronic health problems affecting lesbians, HIV, suicide, STDs, nutrition, drug and alcohol use, mental health, aging, health promotion and the Internet, and methodological issues. Center for LGBT Health at Columbia U n i v e r s i t y Joseph L. Mailman School of Public Health Columbia University, 600 West 168th Street, 7th Floor, New York, NY 10032 212-305-3457 E-mail c/o Randy Sell, Ph.D.: rls39@columbia.edu Coordinates and conducts LGBT health research, education, services, and policy. Center for Lesbian Health Researc h University of California, San Francisco Laurel Heights Campus, 3333 California St., Suite 340, San Francisco, CA 92118 415-502-5200 www.lesbianhealthinfo.org Specifically and uniquely concerned with health and wellness issues about lesbians, bisexual women, transgendered individuals, their families, and health care providers. Engages in health research on lesbian, bisexual women, and transgendered individuals. Conducts research, education, training and public service, reflective of a broad vision of health and 472 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health wellness and a strong commitment to community collaborations. Ensures that the results of the Center’s research will be used in a broad range of settings, from clinical care applications to policy implementation. Coalition of Lavender Americans on Smoking and Health Last Drag Smoking Cessation Pro g r a m 1748 Market St., #201, San Francisco, CA 94102 415-565-7672 ext. 351 E-mail: info@lastdrag.organization www.lastdrag.org The Last Drag Program is a free smoking-cessation class for LGBT and HIV-positive smokers held in San Francisco. Confidential and supportive group setting. FTM Intern a t i o n a l www.ftm-intl.org The Internet contact point for the largest, longest- running educational organization serving female-to- male (FTM) transgendered people and transsexual men. Gay Asian Pacific Alliance www.gapa.org E-mail: webmaster@gapa.org An organization dedicated to furthering the interests of gay and bisexual Asian/Pacific Islanders by creating awareness, by developing a positive collective identity and by establishing a supportive community. Formed from the need for an organization to address, through a democratic process, social, cultural, and political issues affecting the gay and bisexual Asian/Pacific Islander Community. The Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual, and Transgender Health Access Pro j e c t Justice Resource Institute Health 100 Boylston St., Suite 815, Boston, MA 02116 617-988-2605 www.glbthealth.org The mission of the LGBT Health Access Project is to strengthen the Massachusetts Department of Public Health’s ability to foster the development of comprehensive, culturally appropriate health care services for LGBT people through a variety of venues including community education, policy development, advocacy, and prevention strategies. Gay and Lesbian Parent Te a c h e r Student Association of Greater Puget Sound, Washington State PMB #1425, 1122 E. Pike, Seattle, WA 98122-3934 425-468-9345 E-mail: glptsa@email.com Addresses the unique challenges and difficulties often faced in schools by students, educators and families who are gay, lesbian, bisexual or transgendered. Everyone is welcome: parents of gay or lesbian students, straight students with gay or lesbian parents, or anyone else who supports the GLPTSA’s mission, regardless of sexual orientation. G a y H e a l t h . c o m www.gayhealth.com An online health resource for the gay, lesbian, transgendered, and bisexual communities with information on sex, drugs, general health, violence, nutrition, and exercise. Site includes a health care provider referral service. Gay Men’s Health Summit Listserv e www.egroups.com/group/GayMensHealthSummit A discussion list discussing emerging issues in the gay men’s health movement. Generated from the Gay Men’s Health Summit in Boulder, Colorado. H e t r i c k - M a rtin Institute 2 Astor Place, New York, NY 10003 212-674-8650 (TTY) 212-674-8695 www.hmi.org E- mail: info@hmi.org The world’s first and largest not-for-profit, multi- service, education, and advocacy organization dedicated to providing services to lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and questioning youth, and all youth who are coming to terms with issues of sexuality. The Institute has over 20 years of experience providing quality youth services. Institute on Sexuality, Inequality and H e a l t h San Francisco State University Human Sexuality Studies Program, Room 336. 1600 Holloway Avenue, San Francisco, CA 94132 415-405-3570 E-mail: hmsxdept@sfsu.edu http://hmsx.sfsu.edu A research, policy and training institute of the Human Sexuality Studies Program funded in part by the Ford Foundation that provides high quality academic Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health 473 research and training in the service of marginalized communities. The Institute is committed to addressing health and social disparities that affect cultural minorities through applied social science research that shapes community-based services and programs and informed public policy. The Institute sponsors an annual Summer Institute on Sexuality, Society and Health for students, researchers and practitioners from the United States and other countries. J o u rneys: Midwifery Care www.homebirthmidwife.com Includes information on alternative insemination and preconception counseling. King County Tobacco Council for Sexual Minorities Seattle, WA 206-296-7613 Addresses the tobacco addiction and targeting of the industry in the LGBT community. For the past four years, this group has been providing the Out and Free Cessation guide to assist in the cessation efforts of the LGBT community. Acts as an advisory group to report to the King County Tobacco Free Council on the disparities with smoking in the gay community. L a v e n d e r C o l l a r. c o m www.lavendercollar.com Resource for LGBT workplace issues. Site includes links to and information about employee groups organized by LavenderCollar; LGBT-friendly employers, including sections on military, government, law enforcement; other relevant organizations; legal links; and transgender resources. Lavender Youth Recreation and I n f o rmation Center (LY R I C ) 3543 18th Street, #31, San Francisco, CA94110 415-703-6150 415-703-6152 Social interaction and activities for LGBT youth aged 23 and under. Offers Transformations, weekly support group for transgendered youth. Lesbian Health Foundation of the Gay and Lesbian Medical Association 510-883-0778 E-mail: info@lesbianhealthfoundation.org www.lesbianhealthfoundation.org The Lesbian Health Foundation, a part of the Gay and Lesbian Medical Association, provides a web-based resource for research, information and services on health issues affecting lesbians, bisexual women, and transgendered individuals; education and training for health care professionals; and a national Speakers Bureau for educating and raising awareness of the special health needs of lesbians, bisexual women, and transgendered individuals. Lesbian Health Listserv e Majordomo@queernet.org To subscribe, send e-mail to above address with lesbian health in the body of the message. Lesbian Health Research Institute ( L H R I ) 212-305-4055 E-mail: Scout@aol.com www.lesbianhealthresearch.org Part of the Center for LGBT Health at Columbia University, the Lesbian Health Research Institute is committed to conducting, facilitating, supporting, and publishing high quality community-based research about lesbian health. LHRI publishes a quarterly newsletter and maintains a Web site for lesbian health research issues. Massachusetts Department of Education Govern o r ’s Commission on Gay and Lesbian Youth - Safe Schools P ro j e c t www.doe.mass.edu/lss/program/ssch.html Site includes two papers: A Student Guide to Gay/Straight Alliances and Recommendations on the Support and Safety of Gay and Lesbian Student. The Mautner Project for Lesbians with C a n c e r 1707 L St. NW, Suite 500, Washington DC, 20036 202-332-5536 (Voice/TTY) E-mail: mautner@mautnerproject.org www.mautnerproject.org Dedicated to lesbians with cancer, their partners and caregivers. In addition to providing direct services to lesbians with cancer, their partners and caregivers, the Project advocates on behalf of lesbian health and provides information to both health and lesbian communities. Web site includes resource list of sister 474 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health sites on cancer, (lesbian-related) health, feminist and lesbian cancer projects, and clinical trials. National Association of Lesbian and Gay Community Centers www.gaycenter.org/natctr/index.htm Site includes a national directory of LGBT Community Centers. National Clearinghouse for Alcohol and Drug Inform a t i o n www.health.org:80/features/lgbt/index.htm Site includes research abstracts on substance abuse in the LGBT population, “how to” on social support and violence prevention, and information on risk factors associated with youth and suicide. National Consortium of Directors of LGBT Resources in Higher Education www.lgbtcampus.org Committed to achieving higher education environments in which LGBT students, faculty, staff, administrators, and alumni have equity in every respect. Supports colleagues and develops curriculum; seeks climate improvement on campuses; advocates for policy change, program development, and establishment of LGBT Office/Centers. Web site includes directory of LGBT resources on college campuses. The National Wo m e n ’s Health I n f o rmation Center 1-800-994-9662 TDD: 1-888-220-5446 www.4woman.gov A service of the Office on Women’s Health in the Department of Health and Human Services. Provides a gateway to the vast array of Federal and other women’s health information resources. Network for Battered Lesbians and Bisexual Wo m e n P.O. Box 6011, Boston, MA 02114 619-695-0877 (Voice/TTY) 619-423-SAFE (7233) (Crisis hotline - English and Spanish) E-mail: nblbw@erols.com www.nblbw.org Addresses battering in LGBT communities, provides support to battered lesbians and bisexual women, and works toward the elimination of violence against women. Web site includes information on same-sex domestic violence, resources, a newsletter, links and a bibliography on battering in LGBT communities. In Spanish and English. New Leaf Services for Our Community 1853 Market Street, San Francisco, CA 94103 415-626-5916 (TTY) 415-252-8376 www.NewLeafServices.org A multi-purpose out-patient counseling center. Community-based and non profit. New Leaf is one of the nation’s largest counseling centers for the lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender communities. Provide substance abuse treatment; individual and group therapy and other general mental health services; HIV/AIDS prevention and counseling; outreach to elders; counseling for children, youth and families; psychiatric assessment and medication services. Notes on Gender Tr a n s i t i o n www.avitale.com/FTM_101.html An overview of the FTM experience, focusing particularly on health issues. P R E V L I N E ’s LGBT We b p a g e s www.health.org/features/lgbt Information on substance abuse, youth suicide, eating disorders, and other health issues compiled by the National Clearinghouse for Alcohol and Drug Information. Pride Institute 14400 Eden Martin Drive, Eden Prairie, MN 55344 614-934-7554 1-800-54-PRIDE www.pride- institute.com E-mail: support@pride-institute.com Specialize in providing addiction and mental health treatment to the LGBT community. Pride Senior Network 356 West 18th Street, New York, NY 10011 212-271-7288 www.pridesenior.org Promotes services which foster maximum health, well- being, and quality of life for aging LGBT people through community advocacy and education. Public Health–Seattle and King C o u n t i e s www.metrokc.gov/health/glbt Online resource established by King County (Seattle, Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 475 476 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health WA) for LGBT health designed to meet the health concerns of the LGBT community and to provide tools to health care providers to ensure that health care environments are welcoming. Road Map for Male-to-Female Tr a n s s e x u a l s www.tsroadmap.com Site discusses making informed purchasing decisions and setting realistic, achievable transition goals. Safe Zone www.indiana.edu/~out/safezone/links.shtml List of SAFE programs on college campuses. Stepping Stone of San Diego HIV/AIDS and Substance Abuse Services 3425 5th Ave., San Diego, CA 92103 619-295-3995 www.steppingstonesd.org Dedicated to creating, sustaining, and extending life enhancing alcohol and other drug recovery and prevention services primarily to the LGBT community in San Diego County. Stonewall Recovery Serv i c e s 430 Broadway Street, East, Seattle, WA 98102 206-461-3749 www.stonewallrecovery.org Seattle’s only drug and alcohol treatment center for sexual minorities and has been involved in HIV prevention since 1993. Tenderloin AIDS Resource Center 187 Golden Gate Avenue, San Francisco, CA94102 415-431-7476 Services for transgender clients include substance abuse support groups and individual counseling, HIV/AIDS counseling, case management, street outreach, and weekly transgender support groups and individual counseling. Transgender Education Network http://www.jri.org/ten.html An HIV prevention and health initiative promotion aimed at Greater Boston’s transgendered population. Transsexual Wo m e n ’s Resourc e s www.annelawrence.com/twr Medical and other resources for transsexual women (Male-to-Female). Tr i k o n e www.trikone.org A registered 501(c)(3) nonprofit organization for lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgendered people of South Asian descent. Founded in 1986 in the San Francisco Bay area, Trikone is the oldest groups of its kind in the world. Through social and political activities, Trikone offers a supportive, empowering, and nonjudgemental environment where queer South Asians can meet, make connections, and proudly promote awareness and acceptance of their sexuality in society. Trikone actively works against all forms of oppression based on race, gender, class, and other identities. If you would like your organization to be included in this resource guide online or elsewhere, or if you have changes and updates to the information included here, send information by e-mail to hp2010_lgbt@glma.org. Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health 477 Deborah J. Aaron Center for Research on Health and Sexual Orientation, University of Pittsburgh Jeffrey S. Akman George Washington University Steve Albert Callen-Lorde Community Health Center Tom Aloisi Bear Health Collective Clinton Anderson American Psychological Association Jonathan S. Appelbaum Fenway Community Health Sandi J. Armstrong National Association of Lesbian and Gay Addiction Professionals John Auerbach Boston Public Health Commission S. Bryn Austin Harvard University Cornelius Baker Whitman-Walker Clinic Tom Barrett Howard Brown Health Center Valerie Bassett Boston Public Health Commission Ignatius Bau Asian and Pacific Islander American Health Forum Kip Beardsley Southwest Washington Health District Rodger L. Beatty Center for Research on Health and Sexual Orientation University of Pittsburgh Ulrike Boehmer Boston University Stephen Boswell Fenway Community Health Deborah J. Bowen Fred Hutchinson Cancer Research Center Judy Bradford Virginia Commonwealth University Sean Camargo The National Latina/o Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Organization Nina Carroll Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center Darren Carter HIV Center for Clinical Behavioral Studies Micah Carvalho Los Angeles Gay and Lesbian Center Cheryl Chase Intersex Society of America Appendix E: Contributors Organizations are listed for identification purposes only. Opinions expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official positions or policies of the listed organizations. Julie A. Chitty Office on Women’s Health, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Peter Chvany Bisexual Resource Center Mary Clark LGBT Health Access Project, JRI Health Ryan Clary Gay and Lesbian Medical Association Bianca Cody Murphy Society for the Psychological Study of Lesbian, Gay and Bisexual Issues Tim Condon National Institute on Drug Abuse, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Blake Cornish National Gay and Lesbian Task Force Edwin Craft SAMHSA, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Kevin Cranston Massachusetts Department of Public Health Joe C. Cronauer Philadelphia Department of Public Health Cathleen Crowley Johnson, Bassin and Shaw, Inc. MK Cullen Gay, Lesbian, and Straight Education Network Gary K. Daffin Multicultural AIDS Coalition Gem P. Daus Asian and Pacific Islander American Health Forum Laura Dean Center for LGBT Health Columbia University Kathleen DeBold Mary Helen Mautner Project for Lesbians with Cancer Dallas Denny Gender Education and Advocacy, Inc. Allison Diamant University of California, Los Angeles Laurie Drabble Laurie Drabble and Associates Patricia Dunn Gay and Lesbian Medical Association Gerard Fergerson New York University Cheryl Fields Mary Helen Mautner Project for Lesbians with Cancer Dana Finnegan National Association of Lesbian and Gay Addiction Professionals Loretta P. Finnegan NIH, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Mark S. Friedman University of Pittsburgh Donna Futterman Montefiore Medical Center Joel E. Gallant Johns Hopkins University L. Michael Gipson National Youth Advocacy Coalition Cynthia Gomez University of California, San Francisco Michael Gorman San Jose State University Greg Greenwood University of California, San Francisco David Haltiwanger Chase Brexton Health Services, Inc. Henia Handler Fenway Community Health David A. Hansell New York City Department of Health Patricia D. Hawkins Whitman-Walker Clinic 478 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health Richard S. Haymes New York City Gay and Lesbian Anti-Violence Project Suzanne Haynes Office on Women’s Health, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Michael Hinson COLOURS Organization, Inc. Ernest C. Hopkins San Francisco AIDS Foundation Tonda Hughes University of Illinois at Chicago Joyce Hunter HIV Center for Clinical and Behavior Studies Eugene Jackson National Association of People With AIDS Irene Anne Jillson Policy Research Incorporated Susan R. Johnson University of Iowa Ric Kasini Kadour Gay City Health Project Ellen Kahn Whitman-Walker Clinic Nancy Kennedy SAMHSA, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Douglas Kimmel City University of New York Amy V. Kindrick San Francisco General Hospital Stewart Landers John Snow, Inc. Jay Laudato Callen-Lorde Community Health Center Anne Lawrence Harry Benjamin International Gender Dysphoria Association A. Charlene Leach National Youth Advocacy Coalition Jeff Levi George Washington University Saul Levin Gay and Lesbian Medical Association Harold S. Levine Levine and Co. Yoseñio V. Lewis National Transgender Advocacy Coalition Emilia Lombardi University of California, Los Angeles Rob Lyerla CDC, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Stefan Lynch Gay and Lesbian Medical Association Reverend John Magisano SpeakOUT! LGBT Voices for Recovery Patricia D. Mail University of Washington Ana Maldonado Lyon Martin Women’s Health Services Kathleen Maloy Mary Helen Mautner Project for Lesbians with Cancer Alejandro Marcel TransHealth and Education Development Program, JRI Health George Marcelle Social and Health Services, Ltd. Nina Markovic Center for Research on Health and Sexual Orientation, University of Pittsburgh Jeanne Marrazzo University of Washington Kenneth H. Mayer Brown University Philip T. McCabe University of Medicine and Dentistry in New Jersey Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 479 Kevin McGruder Gay Men of African Descent Jean Flatley McGuire Massachusetts Department of Public Health Emily McNally National Association of Lesbian and Gay Addiction Professionals Ilan H. Meyer Center for LGBT Health, Columbia University Marshall Miller Fenway Community Health Deborah J. Morton University of California, San Diego Joseph Neisen New Leaf Norm Nickens San Francisco Department of Public Health Kate O’Hanlan Gynecologic Oncology, Surgery and Endoscopy Maureen O’Leary Gay and Lesbian Medical Association Martin Orenelas-Quintero The National Latina/o Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Organization David G. Ostrow Loyola University Craig Packer IQ Solutions, Inc. Gerard Passannante National Gay and Lesbian Task Force Debra Paul Boston Public Health Commission June A. Peters NIH, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Emily Pitt Fenway Community Health Jennifer Pittman University of California, San Francisco Fred D. Rachman Howard Brown Health Center Elizabeth J. Rankow Consultant Reagan Reid Gay and Lesbian Medical Association Josiah Rich Brown University Charles R. Rinaldo, Jr. University of Pittsburgh Leigh Roberts Howard Brown Health Center Patricia A. Robertson Center for Lesbian Health Research, University of California, San Francisco Kevin Robinson Center for LGBT Health, Columbia University Eric Rofes Humboldt State University Andrea Ronhovde Consultant Esther Rothblum University of Vermont Caitlin Ryan Institute on Sexuality, Inequality and Health San Francisco State University Lauretta A. Safford Virginia Commonwealth University Javier Salazar National Minority AIDS Council Doreen Salina Northwestern University Joe Sampson University of California, Santa Cruz Scout Lesbian Health Research Institute/Center for LGBT Health, Columbia University Randall Sell Center for LGBT Health, Columbia University 480 Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health Robert Sember Center for LGBT Health, Columbia University Michael D. Shankle University of Pittsburgh Yael Sherman Gay and Lesbian Medical Association Kevin Shipman District of Columbia Department of Health Larry Siegel District of Columbia Department of Health Vincent Silenzio Center for LGBT Health Columbia University Anthony J. Silvestre Center for Research on Health and Sexual Orientation, University of Pittsburgh Shane Snowden LGBT Resources Center for Gender Equity, University of California, San Francisco Dorian Solot Alternatives to Marriage Project Kathleen Somers The California Endowment William Sowers IQ Solutions, Inc. Jodi Sperber John Snow, Inc. Ron Stall CDC, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Kathleen Stine Northwest Policy Institute Alan L. Storm Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual Issues Committee Arizona Psychological Association Lisa Swanberg IQ Solutions, Inc. Lee Swislow JRI Health Jennifer S. Taylor Gay and Lesbian Medical Association Steve Tierney San Francisco Department of Public Health Ron Tierney Gay and Lesbian Medical Association Evelyn P. Tomaszewski National Association of Social Workers Mark H. Townsend Louisiana State University Lisa Tuttle Augusta, ME Ronald O. Valdiserri CDC, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Basil Vareldzis American Public Health Association Robert Vazquez-Pacheco The Audre Lorde Project J. Carlos Velazquez The National Latina/o Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Organization Steve Wakefield HIV Vaccine Trials Network Barbara E. Warren Lesbian and Gay Community Services Center of New York City Riggin Waugh IQ Solutions, Inc. Lynne Weise Maryland State Department of Education Jocelyn White Lesbian Health Research Institute/Center for LGBT Health, Columbia University Daniel Wolfe Author Frank Y. Wong George Washington University Jessica M. Xavier Gender Education and Advocacy, Inc. Healthy People 2010: Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Transgender Health 481 Table of Contents Acknowledgments Introduction Access to Quality Health Care Services Cancer Educational and Community-Based Programs Health Communication HIV/AIDS Immunization and Infectious Diseases Mental Health and Mental Disorders Nutrition and Weight Public Health Infrastructure Attachment 1 Attachment 2 Attachment 3 Attachment 4 Sexually Transmitted Diseases (Infections) Substance Abuse Tobacco Use Violence Prevention Appendix A: Recommendations Appendix B: Acronyms Appendix C: LGBT Definitions Appendix D: Resources Appendix E: Contributors 
work_lh53a6sinzczbaqzac33j2jpeu	----	Editorial: Hate Crimes Editorial: Hate Crimes Blowing people up in the shopping centre of Warrington or of a provincial Irish town, or in a Jerusalem restaurant, flying planes full of people into heavily populated skyscrapers or centres of govern- ment, massacring defenceless villagers simply because they belong to another tribe. These are certainly hate crimes, that is, crimes fuelled by hate. For most of us the hate and the crime, when we watch such events unfold, are unimaginable. We cannot imagine what it is which can drive people in our time to do such things. Terrorism must be outlawed once and for all, we think, surely rightly. Yet we are unsure how to do it. But there is a vague feeling that some of this terrorism arises from violent differences of belief, and from people being driven by their beliefs to kill those of other beliefs. But again, as liberals, we do not know how to handle this thought. Perhaps things would be better if we could stop people saying and believing these hateful things. Or perhaps what is required is a kind of universal tolerance, a respect for the beliefs of others, so that they and their beliefs can be brought under the umbrella of tol- erance, which will make them more tolerant in their turn. This latter thought has been prominent in the utterances of Western leaders after September 11th; somewhat confusingly they say that what is at issue is not a question of belief, while at the same time falling over backwards to say that all beliefs must be tolerated and respected. In Britain a law was proposed by the Government to protect religious beliefs against ridicule and scorn. Incitement to ‘religious hatred’ was to become a criminal offence, although the attempt was in the end blocked by the House of Lords. Philosophers may be no wiser or more experienced than anyone else when it comes to dealing with terrorism in general. But philoso- phers ought to be alert to any attempt, however well intentioned, to control thought and expression. Gibbon was unsparing in his mockery of Christianity, and so, in their own way, were Hume, Voltaire and Russell. They caused and continue to cause offence. Some religious people might find in their writings ‘incitement to religious hatred’; it is indeed hard not to think that someone swayed by the rhetoric of Why I Am Not a Christian would not come to hate religion, and that surely was Russell’s purpose. (And not just Christianity; unwisely, perhaps, from the Islamic point of view, the book used to be freely on sale in Pakistan, where the censors obvi- ously failed to realize that Russell did not confine his tirade to Philosophy 77 2002 1 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:30, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use. https://www.cambridge.org/core Christianity.) And what of the case of Salman Rushdie, on whom eminent philosophical opinion has been divided? We do not know exactly what the new law will say, but it is hard to think of any remotely effective law against religious hatred which, intentionally or unintentionally, would not convict The Satanic Verses; certainly it could not fail to do so if the feelings of the offended were taken into account in judging ‘hatred’, which is presumably a large part of the point of the new law. No doubt in our liberal sensitivity, we generally want to avoid giving offence or succouring those who are deliberately offensive. There is something deeply offensive to the liberal mind about a cer- tain type of rhetoric, Marx’s, say, or Hitler’s. But should we seek to censor the rhetoric, as opposed the deeds which may follow from it? Part of our dilemma arises from the fact that some of those most vulnerable to the rhetoric of ridicule and scorn will be the very fanatics whose own outpourings fuel militant extremism. So, from a liberal point of view, ridicule and scorn—and so a certain type of incitement to religious hatred—might seem good. At first blush this seems right. Despite what our leaders may say we should not passively tolerate those whose beliefs are intolerant. Rather we should contest those beliefs, vigorously, however offen- sive this might be to the believers. As we learn from Gibbon and the rest scorn and ridicule can be highly effective weapons against that sort of intolerance. In censoring ridicule and scorn we will be depriving ourselves of one of the strongest antidotes we have to the hate which kills, even if those scorned see themselves as thereby targets of hate. This antidote may be stronger and more effective in the war against hatred than censorship; for censorship may stop those of us who are in a broad sense liberals from saying what we really think about certain beliefs, while at the same time driving the most virulent expressions of those beliefs underground. Censorship, in other words, won’t stop the beliefs, but it may well muzzle the most powerful weapon against them. This is certainly not a final conclusion. But a debate there must be. And it is one in which philosophers, as guardians of the life of the mind, need to become involved. Editorial 2 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:30, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use. https://www.cambridge.org/core 
work_lj7hm6sgorcdvhrqn3i4qewzjy	----	Applied Intelligence (2018) 48:1083–1085 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10489-018-1143-0 Editorial for the special issue: Knowledge-based systems and data science Hamido Fujita1 · Ali Selamat2 Published online: 7 February 2018 © Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2018 Intelligence displayed by machines has evolved from the- oretical research to vital process re-improvements this very decade, where more and more industrial progression relied on the capability of machines perceiving and learn- ing from surrounding environments, assisting in succession of given tasks. The advanced progressing of computa- tional intelligence has promoted design and implementation of multifaceted solutions for complex industrial problems that eventually benefits changeling applications in multi- disciplinarily fields. This special issue highlights the pre- sentation of recent theoretical, operational and real-world applications on multiple industries benefitted through the implementation of artificial intelligence techniques in a vast array of domains including network security, hardware and software, data structures, ranking predictions, pattern recog- nition, medical tools, ubiquitous computing, education and else The papers in this special issue have been selected from the extended versions of the 29th International Conference on Industrial, Engineering & Other Applications of Applied Intelligent Systems (IEA/AIE 2016, Morioka, Japan) and the submitted papers through a public call. All papers have been peer-reviewed according to the journal standards. The accepted papers in this special issue are classified into three groups. The first group focuses on the area of security, regres- sive methods and algorithm design. The paper titled “Vector Based Genetic Algorithm (VBGA) to optimize predictive analysis in network security” proposes a new Intrusion Detection System (IDS) for network security, making use of a Vector-Based Genetic Algorithm (VBGA) inspired by � Hamido Fujita HFujita-799@acm.org Ali Selamat aselamat@utm.my 1 Iwate Prefecture University, Takizawa, Iwate, Japan 2 Universiti Teknologi Malaysia, Iskandar Puteri, Johor, Malaysia evolutionary approaches. The novelty in the algorithm is to represent chromosomes as vectors and training data as matrices. This approach allows multiple pathways to cal- culate fitness function out of which one particular method- ology is used and tested. The paper titled “Anomaly Detection using Piecewise Aggregate Approximation in the Amplitude” proposes a representation method called the Piecewise Aggregate Approximation in the Amplitude Domain (AD-PAA). For discovering anomalies, a sequence is partitioned into subsequences by a sliding window firstly. Then in the AD-PAA method, a subsequence is divided into equal-sized subsections according to the amplitude domain. With mean values of subsections computed, the amplitude oscillation of a subsequence is embodied effectively. The paper titled “Supervised Ranking Framework for Rela- tionship Prediction in Heterogeneous Information Net- works” proposes a novel frame work named Supervised Ranking frame- work (S-Rank) is proposed to tackle exist- ing approaches. To avoid the class imbalance problem, the S-Rank framework treated the relationship prediction problem as a ranking task and divide it into three phases: Supervised PageRank strategy (SPR), utilization of Meta Path-based Ranking method (MPR) and integration of two ranking scores combining all the Attr-info, Global-info and Local-info together. Experiments on DBLP data demon- strate that the proposed S-Rank framework can effectively take advantage of all the three kinds of information for rela- tionship prediction over HINs and outperforms other well- known baseline approaches. The paper titled “Challenging State-of-the-Art Move Ordering with Adaptive Data Structures” presents a comparison to two well-known, acclaimed strategies, which operate on a similar philoso- phy to the History-ADS, namely, the History Heuristic, and the Killer Moves technique. In this work, a mechanism by which these established move ordering strategies can be approximated, or directly implemented, in terms of ADSs. In a wide range of two-player and multi-player games, at various points in the game’s progression, the History-ADS performs at least as well as presented strategies (in the arti- cle), and, in fact, outperforms them in the majority of cases. http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1007/s10489-018-1143-0&domain=pdf mailto:HFujita-799@acm.org mailto:aselamat@utm.my 1084 H. Fujita, A. Selamat The paper titled “ETARM: An Efficient Top-K Associa- tion Rule Mining Algorithm” presents a novel algorithm named ETARM (Efficient Top-k Association Rule Miner) to efficiently find the complete set of top-k association rules. The proposed algorithm integrates two novel candi- date pruning properties to more effectively reduce the search space. These properties are applied during the candidate selection process to identify items that should not be used to expand a rule based on its confidence, to reduce the num- ber of candidates. An extensive experimental evaluation on six standard benchmark datasets show that the proposed approach outperforms the state- of-the-art TopKRules algo- rithm both in terms of runtime and memory usage. The paper titled “SpringBoard: game-agnostic tool for sce- nario editing with meta-programming support” presents the development of SpringBoard, an open source scenario editor for games using the SpringRTS engine. Extending it to support game and level requirements is achieved with multi-level meta-programming, while still providing a sys- tem that is integrated with the GUI editor and therefore intuitive to use. The second group of articles in this special issue demon- strates machine learning and analytical solutions. The paper titled “Successes and challenges in developing a hybrid approach to sentiment analysis” covers some success and learning experiences attained during the devel- oping of a hybrid approach to Sentiment Analysis (SA) based on a Sentiment Lexicon, Semantic Rules, Negation Handling, Ambiguity Management and Linguistic Vari- ables. The proposed hybrid method is presented and applied to two selected datasets: Movie Review and Sentiment Twit- ter datasets. The achieved results are compared against those obtained when Naı̈ve Bayes (NB) and Maximum Entropy (ME) supervised machine learning classification methods are used for the same datasets. The proposed hybrid system attained higher accuracy and precision scores than NB and ME, which shows its superiority when applied to the SA problem at the sentence level. The paper titled “Online Sig- nature Verification by Spectrogram Analysis” proposes a novel online signature analysis methodology for touch- screens that starts with signing an interface consisting of a signature silhouette. The frequency spectrum along the signing process is stealthily extracted and spectrograms are created by short-time Fourier transforms. Since the spec- trograms are found as RGB images, providing valuable information about frequency vs time, grid histograms are formed by quantization for the real signature sample. Given the discrimination purposes, a fuzzified surface is designed for computing closeness of grid histograms. The paper titled “A View-invariant Gait Recognition Algorithm based on a Joint-Direct Linear Discriminant Analysis” pro- poses a view-invariant gait recognition algorithm, which builds a unique view invariant model taking advantages of the dimensionality reduction provided by the Direct Linear Discriminant Analysis (DLDA). Proposed scheme is able to reduce the under-sampling problem (USP) that appears usu- ally when the number of training samples is much smaller than the dimension of the feature space. In the paper titled “Hybrid sentiment classification on twitter aspect-based sentiment analysis”, a new hybrid approach for twitter aspect-based sentiment classification is proposed by embed- ding the feature selection method. The comparison of classi- fication accuracy using the feature selection method Princi- pal Component Analysis (PCA), Latent Semantic Analysis (LSA), and Random Projection (RP) have been presented in this paper. Furthermore, the evaluation with different clas- sification algorithms also demonstrates that our new hybrid approach produced meaningful results with our own Hate Crime Twitter Sentiment (HCTS) dataset and also Stanford Twitter Sentiment (STS) and Sanders Twitter Corpus (STC) benchmark dataset which represent different domain. The paper titled “A Fuzzy Classification Model for Myocar- dial Infarction Risk Assessment” presented the develop- ment of a new clinical decision support system (CDSS) to diagnose Coronary Artery Diseases (CAD). In this paper, an automatic approach to design CDSS for CAD assess- ment is proposed. The proposed diagnosis model is based on Random Forest algorithm, C5.0 decision tree algorithm and Fuzzy modeling. The experimental results underscore very promising classification accuracy of 90.50% while optimizing training time using UCI (the University of Cal- ifornia at Irvine) heart diseases datasets compared to the previously reported results. The paper titled “Agent Sys- tems Verification and Validation: Systematic Literature Review” presented a study that surveys existing techniques for checking agent properties and detecting faults during design, development, and runtime phases of agent system life-cycle are presented with the aim to identify implementa- tion gap and to derive research direction. The paper “Some Bibliometric Procedures for Analyzing and Evaluating Research Fields” has presented new results on bibliometric analytics that can provide a good tool to scientific research predictions. The third group in this special issue presented works done in industrial applications. The paper titled “Convolutional Neural Network Acceleration with Hardware/Software Co-Design” presents a design methodology for accelerating CNNs using Hardware/Software Co-design techniques, in order to balance performance and exibility, particularly for resource-constrained systems. The methodology is applied to a gender recognition case study, using an ARM processor and FPGA fabric to create an embedded system that can process facial images in real-time. The paper titled “Design and implementation of a web-based fuzzy expert system for diagnosing depressive disorder” proposes a design a web-based expert system for diagnosing depression using Editorial for the special issue: Knowledge-based systems and data science 1085 the fuzzy Delphi method by estimating the weights and im- portance of depression symptoms. Fuzzy Logic is adopted to calculate the level of depression. The proposed system appears helpful for everyone, from ordinary persons to specialists in medical environments. It can also be useful to train psychology students in the area of diagnostic reasoning. In the paper titled “Overlapping community detection based on discrete biogeography optimization”, an overlapping community detection algorithm based on biogeography optimization is proposed. Experiments on benchmark test data, including two synthetic networks and four real-world networks, show that the proposed algorithm can achieve results with better accuracy and stability than the compared evolutionary algorithms. The paper titled “Mining Constrained Inter-Sequence Patterns: A Novel Approach to Cope with Item Constraints” proposes two novel algorithms for it. First is the ISP- IC (Inter-Sequence Pattern with Item Constraint mining) algorithm based on a theorem that quickly determines whether an inter-sequence pattern satisfies the constraints. Then, we propose a way to improve the strategy of ISP- IC, which is then applied to the iISP-IC algorithm to enhance the performance of the process. Finally, piISP-IC, a parallel version of iISP-IC, will be presented. Experimental results show that piISP-IC algorithm outperforms the post-processing of the-state-of-the-art method for mining inter-sequence patterns (EISP-Miner), ISP-IC, and iISP- IC algorithms in most of the cases. The paper titled “A multi-level approach to ubiquitous modeling and solving constraints in combinatorial optimization problems in production and distribution” presents a multi-level approach to the modeling and solving of combinatorial optimization problems. It is versatile and effective owing to the use of multi-level pre-solving and multiple paradigms, such as constraint programming, logic programming, mathematical programming, and fuzzy logic, for their complementary strengths. The capability of this framework and its advantage over mathematical programming alone or over hybrid frameworks is shown in the illustrative example, in which combinatorial optimization is used as a benchmark to prove the effectiveness of the proposed approach. The paper titled “A novel three-band orthogonal wavelet filter bank method for an automated identification of alcoholic EEG signals” presented an automated system for the classification of alcoholic and normal EEG signals using a recently designed duration-bandwidth product (DBP) optimized three-band orthogonal wavelet filter bank (TBOWFB) and log-energy (LE). The results have achieved the classification accuracy (CA) of 97.08%, with ten-fold cross validation strategy. The proposed model presents a promising performance, and therefore it can be used in a practical setup to assist the medical professional in the diagnosis of alcoholism using EEG signals automatically. The paper titled “Automated detection of retinal health using PHOG and SURF features extracted from fundus images” proposed a novel approach to develop an automated retinal health screening system in this work. This paper discusses a retinal screening system to automatically differentiate normal image from abnormal (AMD, DR, and glaucoma) fundus images. The presented results achieved 96.21% accuracy, 95.00% sensitivity, and 97.42% specificity with ten-fold cross-validation strategy using k- nearest neighbor (kNN) classifier. This novel algorithm has high potential in the diagnosis of normal eye during the mass eye screening session or in polyclinics quickly and reliably. The paper “The Promotion Strategy of Supply Chain Flexibility Based on Deep Belief Network” has provided an intelligent flexible model by considering the supply side and demand side in uncertain environment using belief network. The editors hope that this issue will provide valuable knowledge, ideas, and state-of-the-art research propagation in applied intelligence specifically in reshaping industrial advancement through constant improvements of informative intelligence. With much appreciation to the contributors of this special issue, the editors hope that the hard work and efforts will be made useful for a conclusive betterment of computational industrial solutions. Editorial for the special issue: Knowledge-based systems and data science 
work_lmrjihf72veejgyi5fgy6bl5k4	----	S2056472420000642jra 1..13 Understanding increasing rates of psychiatric hospital detentions in England: development and preliminary testing of an explanatory model Luke Sheridan Rains, Scott Weich, Clementine Maddock, Shubulade Smith, Patrick Keown, David Crepaz-Keay, Swaran P. Singh, Rebecca Jones, James Kirkbride, Lottie Millett, Natasha Lyons, Stella Branthonne-Foster, Sonia Johnson and Brynmor Lloyd-Evans Background The steep rise in the rate of psychiatric hospital detentions in England is poorly understood. Aims To identify explanations for the rise in detentions in England since 1983; to test their plausibility and support from evidence; to develop an explanatory model for the rise in detentions. Method Hypotheses to explain the rise in detentions were identified from previous literature and stakeholder consultation. We explored associations between national indicators for potential explana- tory variables and detention rates in an ecological study. Relevant research was scoped and the plausibility of each hypothesis was rated. Finally, a logic model was developed to illustrate likely contributory factors and pathways to the increase in detentions. Results Seventeen hypotheses related to social, service, legal and data- quality factors. Hypotheses supported by available evidence were: changes in legal approaches to patients without decision- making capacity but not actively objecting to admission; demo- graphic changes; increasing psychiatric morbidity. Reductions in the availability or quality of community mental health services and changes in police practice may have contributed to the rise in detentions. Hypothesised factors not supported by evidence were: changes in community crisis care, compulsory community treatment and prescribing practice. Evidence was ambiguous or lacking for other explanations, including the impact of austerity measures and reductions in National Health Service in-patient bed numbers. Conclusions Better data are needed about the characteristics and service contexts of those detained. Our logic model highlights likely contributory factors to the rise in detentions in England, priorities for future research and potential policy targets for reducing detentions. Keywords In-patient treatment; psychiatry and law; mental health act; detentions; risk assessment. Copyright and usage © The Author(s) 2020. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Royal College of Psychiatrists. This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the same Creative Commons licence is included and the original work is properly cited. The written permission of Cambridge University Press must be obtained for commercial re-use. Rates of detention in psychiatric hospital have more than doubled in England since 1983 and risen faster than almost anywhere else in Europe during the past decade.1 Detention in hospital is inherently coercive: it is experienced by most patients as such,2,3 and 3 months after detention many patients still disagree with the decision to detain them.4 Involuntary hospital admissions are typically longer and more costly than voluntary admissions. Patients experience only limited improvements in health and social circumstances fol- lowing detention.5 Understanding and addressing the rising rate of detentions is therefore a priority for mental healthcare in England, which prompted the recent Independent Review of the Mental Health Act (MHA Review), which reported in December 2018.6 To support the review, an expert topic group was convened, supported by the National Institute for Health Research (NIHR) Mental Health Policy Research Unit (MHPRU). This group was tasked with exploring why rates of detentions in psychiatric hospital in England have risen since the introduction of the Mental Health Act 1983 (MHA), and most rapidly over the past decade. This work is reported here. We sought to identify hypotheses for the rise in detentions in England, test their plausibility in relation to available evidence, and then develop an explanatory logic model for the rise in deten- tions in England between 1983 and 2016. The term ‘detentions’ is used here to include compulsory admissions to psychiatric hospital and detentions of people in psychiatric hospital following a volun- tary admission, including civil and forensic MHA detentions, for people of all ages. We excluded uses of the MHA that direct convey- ance to a place of safety or to permit short-term detention (72 h or less) for the purpose of assessment only. Method The study comprised: (a) generating hypotheses to explain the rising rate of detentions; (b) rapid scoping for evidence relevant to each hypothesis; (c) testing each hypothesis (in so far as data permitted) and rating its plausibility as an explanation for rising rates of deten- tion; and (d) developing an explanatory model of the rising rate of detentions in England. Hypothesis generation A list of potential explanatory factors for the rising rate of detentions was generated from three sources. (a) Reports and literature, chiefly the recent report from the Care Quality Commission7 and the evidence submitted to the MHA Review,6 which included over 50 focus groups with patients and carers, evidence submissions from over 200 mental BJPsych Open (2020) 6, e88, 1–13. doi: 10.1192/bjo.2020.64 1 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. 11 Sep 2020 at 13:31:04, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use. http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/ https://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog?doi=10.1192/bjo.2020.64&domain=pdf https://www.cambridge.org/core health organisations, practitioners, patients and carers, and seven public workshops across England. (b) Consultation with an expert topic group convened for the MHA Review. This comprised eight academics, six of whom were psychiatrists, one a social worker and one a researcher with lived experience. The group included two women and two members of Black, Asian and minority ethnic (BAME) communities, one of whom co-chaired the Mental Health Act Review African and Caribbean Group (MHARAC), which supported the MHA Review. (c) Consultation with 14 members of the Lived Experience Working Group of the Mental Health Policy Research Unit (MHPRU), all with lived experience as a mental health patient or family carer. All members of this group were adults; the group was demographically varied with respect to age, gender and ethnicity. Through discussion in the MHA Review topic group, all pro- posed explanations were considered and clarified into hypotheses where necessary, describing how proposed explanatory factors might contribute to an increase in detentions. Types of information that could support or contradict each hypothesis were agreed. Evidence gathering Relevant data sources were sought for variables relating to each hypothesis, with advice from academics with epidemiology, health economic and health services research expertise. We investigated the relationship of each variable to the rising rate of detentions in England through the following process. First, an ecological study explored the associations over time between national population-level indicators for a range of explana- tory variables and the rate of detentions. Where more than one rele- vant data source was identified for a proposed explanatory variable, the most appropriate variable was selected through discussion in the study team, with priority given to well-established measures used in previous research or national reports, and variables with the most years of data available. Annual data for all explanatory variables were collected from 1983 onwards, where available. Descriptive data from each variable were reviewed to assess whether exposure to the explanatory variable appeared to have changed over time (in the direction compatible with contributing to a rise in deten- tions). The association between each indicator variable and rates of involuntary hospital admission was assessed using regression analyses. Following guidance,8,9 only indicator variables with at least 10 years of annual data were included in the analyses, to avoid reporting imprecise statistical results based on limited data. Breusch–Godfrey tests were used to identify the presence of serial correlation (in which the model residuals are correlated over time). Such correlation can be present in time series data and can result in biased estimates if inappropriate regression methods are used. When there was evidence of serial correlation, Prais– Winsten regression10 was used; otherwise simple linear regression was used. Analyses were performed using Stata version 15 for Windows. The outcome variable in all analyses was annual number of detentions per 100 000 population, derived from publicly available English KP90 detentions data.11 If prevalence of exposure to an explanatory variable was unchanged or was not associated with detention rates in the expected direction, it was considered less plausible as a contributory factor for the rise in compulsory admissions. Second, available research was scoped by MHPRU researchers (L.S.R., N.L., L.M.) for additional evidence relevant to our hypoth- eses, including: studies exploring predictors of detention at individ- ual patient, local area or international level, and qualitative literature regarding perceived changes in explanatory factors over time. Relevant literature was identified through: (a) a programme of sys- tematic reviews and data analysis conducted for the MHA Review by the MHPRU.6 These provided a range of types of evidence from quantitative and qualitative research, and included systematic reviews of social and clinical predictors of detention, interventions to reduce detention, qualitative literature on patients’ and carers’ experience of detention, an international comparison of detention rates and factors associated with detention rates, and an analysis of routine health records data regarding the nature of changes over time in patterns of detention in two London National Health Service (NHS) trusts; (b) keyword searching for relevant terms in electronic databases (MEDLINE and PsycInfo); and (c) asking subject experts in the MHA Review topic group, authors of this paper and others (acknowledged at the end of this paper) to identify other relevant literature. Assessing the plausibility of hypotheses Findings for each hypothesis were synthesised and summarised. The likelihood of any hypothesised or observed ecological relation- ship between explanatory variables and rates of detentions being causal in nature was assessed, where applicable and as far as evi- dence was available, with regard to established criteria for causal- ity,12 including the strength and consistency of associations, their perceived plausibility as causal mechanisms and, where possible, the specificity of relationships to populations at increased risk of detention, and temporality, i.e. evidence that rises in explanatory factors preceded rises in detentions. Hypotheses were then graded by the study team for plausibility as a contributory factor to the rising rate of detentions in England: 0, contradicted by available evi- dence; 1, lack of evidence or available evidence is ambiguous or mixed; 2, supported by the balance of available evidence. Two factors were considered in grading each hypothesis: evidence for change over time in the direction expected; and evidence, or self- evident face validity, that the hypothesised factor was causally related to risk of detention. Ratings were made initially by the lead authors of this paper (L.S.R, B.L.-E.), then reviewed by all authors and revised if necessary following discussion. Logic model development Following guidance,13 we developed a visual logic model to show how plausible proposed contributory factors (i.e. hypotheses rated as 1 or 2 for plausibility) might contribute to the rising rate of deten- tions in England and might interrelate. In developing the model, we worked backwards from the final outcome to be explained (the rising rate of detentions) to identify proximal outcomes, mental health service activities, inputs and contextual factors. We differen- tiated elements of this explanatory model that were supported by available evidence from hypothesised elements with ambiguous or absent evidence. Proposed causal pathways and mechanisms of change in the rate of detentions were illustrated in the model with arrows. An initial draft of the logic model was developed by B.L.-E., informed by a preliminary draft of relevant data tables and evidence reviews (supplementary Appendices 1 and 2, available at https://doi.org/10.1192/bjo.2020.64). This was then discussed with the study co-authors and revised with feedback and reference to additional retrieved evidence in five iterative stages. Results Rates of detention in England Data for the number of detentions in England were not available from NHS Digital before 1988. National detention data collection Sheridan Rains et al 2 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. 11 Sep 2020 at 13:31:04, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use. https://doi.org/10.1192/bjo.2020.64 https://doi.org/10.1192/bjo.2020.64 https://www.cambridge.org/core methods changed from April 2016,11 so data after this point are not comparable with previous data. The annual rates of detentions per 100 000 population in England from 1988 to 2016 are shown in Fig. 1. Detention rates more than doubled during this period, from 52 to 114 per 100 000 population. A 1-day census of the number of people per 100 000 population detained at year-end each year also rose, from 26.0 in 1998 (the first year for which data are available) to 36.5 in 2016. The rise in the rate of detentions was steepest in the periods 1988–1996 and 2011–2016, plateauing in between. Increases in detentions were greatest at the point of admission. Overall detention rates, and detentions for assessment (section 2 of the Mental Health Act 1983, MHA), rose significantly during the study period. Rates of detention for treatment (s.3 MHA) and use of forensic detentions did not change significantly (supplementary Appendix 1). Use of legal powers by the police to bring people to a hospital-based place of safety (s.135 or s.136 MHA) for assessment – which were not included in our overall detention rate variable – also increased significantly during the study period. Individual patients are not dis- tinguished in government KP90 detentions data, which therefore cannot distinguish to what extent the rise in detentions reflects more people being detained, or the same number of people being detained more frequently. The data also cannot identify in which clinical or demographic groups the rise in detentions occurred. Proposed explanations for the rising rate of detentions in England Seventeen hypotheses for the rising rate of detentions in England were generated. These are presented in the Appendix (immediately preceding the References), with a brief description of the proposed mechanisms of effect on detention rates. Consistent with previous work7 we have grouped the hypotheses as: social factors, service pro- vision, legal factors and data recording problems. Available data relevant to each hypothesis are summarised in Table 1, along with results of statistical tests of association with detention rate, where undertaken. Serial correlation was present for all but one indicator variable, so Prais–Winsten regressions were used. Full descriptive data and illustrative graphs showing change over time for each explanatory variable are provided in sup- plementary Appendix 1. Research evidence regarding the nature of the relationship of each of these factors to detention rates is sum- marised below and reported fully in supplementary Appendix 2. Social factors We considered whether the rise in detentions was related to: increased social and economic hardship, reduced social support, demographic change, increasing psychiatric morbidity, and increas- ing drug and alcohol use in the population. Internationally, wealthy countries tend to have higher rates of detention.1 However, at individual level, poverty and economic hardship, and lack of social support, are associated with increased risk of detention.32 The two periods of economic recession in the UK during the study period (1991 and 2008–2009)33 coincide with or immediately precede periods of steepest rise in detentions in England. However, many established markers of economic hard- ship, including unemployment rate, poverty/relative poverty and income inequality, do not show clear evidence of change nationally over the study period (Table 1). Evidence of reduced informal social support or increased social discord during the study period is also limited: median scores for social fragmentation – an established indicator of informal social support,34 collected every 10 years through national census data – have changed little. More specific indicators of social discord and discrimination, such as recorded hate crimes and racist incidents, have available data only for recent years and provide an inconclusive picture. Public attitudes to mental illness also appear to be unchanged or 0.00 19 88 –8 9 19 89 –9 0 19 90 –9 0 19 91 –9 2 19 91 –9 3 19 93 –9 4 19 94 –9 5 19 95 –9 6 19 96 –9 7 19 97 –9 8 19 98 –9 9 19 99 –0 0 20 00 –0 1 20 01 –0 2 20 02 –0 3 20 03 –0 4 20 04 –0 5 20 05 –0 6 20 06 –0 7 20 07 –0 8 20 08 –0 9 20 09 –1 0 20 10 –1 1 20 11 –1 2 20 12 /1 3 20 13 –1 4 20 14 –1 5 20 15 –1 6 20.00 40.00 60.00 80.00 100.00 120.00 Rate of inv hosp per 100 000 population rate of s.2 on admission per 100 000 rate of s.3 on admission per 100 000 rate of s.4 on admission per 100 000 rate of part 3 sections on admission per 100 000 rate of revocation of CTO per 100 000 population rate of all place of safety orders per 100 000 population rate of detentions in non-NHS hospitals per 100 000 Rate of people subject to the MHA on 31 March per 100 000 population Fig. 1 Rates of involuntary detentions per 100 000 population in England 1988–2016. Inv hosp, involuntary hospital admissions; s., section of the Mental Health Act 1983; CTO, community treatment order; MHA, Mental Health Act 1983; NHS, National Health Service. Rates of psychiatric hospital detentions in England 3 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. 11 Sep 2020 at 13:31:04, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use. https://www.cambridge.org/core Table 1 The relationship of potential explanatory factors to detention rates: exploration of available national data Hypothesis number Potential explanatory variable (measure) Data source Data points, years Mean annual increase,variable units Mean annual change, standardised units Relationship to detention rate,coefficient (95% CI), P Significant association corroborates hypothesis? 1 Relative poverty UK (% people earning <50% median national income) OECD14 20 −0.10 −0.12 0.36 (−1.55 to 2.26), 0.695 Not significant 1 Income inequality (Gini coefficient) ONS15 28 −0.05 −0.04 −0.38 (−1.88 to 1.12), 0.605 Not significant 1 Rate of evictions per 100 000 population Mortgage and landlord possession statistics16 18 −3.44 −0.12 0.02 (−0.04 to 0.08), 0.512 Not significant 1 Unemployment rate (over 16 years old and seasonally adjusted) Labour force survey17 29 −0.10 −0.06 −1.56 (−3.74 to 0.62), 0.153 Not significant 1 Number of racial hate crimes recorded by the police per 1000 population GOV.UK hate crime statistics18 6 0.08 0.42 n.a. 1 Number of reported racist incidents per 1000 population (England and Wales) 4 −0.04 −0.53 n.a. 1 Proportion of people in England and Wales reporting experience of racial prejudice British social attitudes survey19 20 −0.24 −0.06 0.13 (−0.07 to 0.33), 0.192 Not significant 1 Fear and exclusion of people with mental illness, 1994–2014 Time to Change Attitudes to Mental Illness Research Report (2014)20 14 −0.23 −0.08 −1.38 (−2.70 to −0.07), 0.04 No 1 Understanding and tolerance of mental illness, 1994–2014 14 −0.01 −0.01 −0.47 (−2.30 to 1.35), 0.58 Not significant 1 Integrating people with mental illness into the community, 1994–2014a 14 0.21 0.08 0.06 (−1.50 to 1.61), 0.94 Not significant 1 Causes of mental illness and the need for special services, 1994– 2014 14 −0.05 −0.028 −0.37 (−1.95 to 1.20), 0.62 Not significant 2 Any drug use (proportion of population) Crime survey for England and Wales21 22 −0.12 −0.08 0.02 (−2.77 to 2.81), 0.99 Not significant 2 Alcohol use in general population (proportion using alcohol in past week) ONS22 13 −0.55 −0.21 −0.81 (−2.56 to 0.96), 0.335 Not significant 2 Rate of cannabis use per 100 000 hospital admissions NHS Digital hospital-admitted patient care activity23 19 0.08 0.13 9.43 (4.29 to 14.56), 0.001 Yes 2 Rate of substance use excluding alcohol (ICD- 10 F11– F19) per 100 000 hospital admissions 19 −0.08 −0.03 0.26 (−0.26 to 0.90), 0.256 Not significant 2 Rate of alcohol use per 100 000 hospital admissions 19 2.41 0.11 −0.02 (−0.11 to 0.07), 0.632 Not significant 3 Proportion of males in population ONS17,24 28 0.02 0.11 54.48 (28.44 to 80.52) <0.01 Yes 3 Proportion of working-age adults in population 28 −0.13 −0.10 −0.66 (−8.31 to 6.99), 0.861 Not significant 3 Urbanicity (UK) World Bank25 29 0.17 0.10 9 (4.60 to 13.39), <0.01 Yes 3 Proportion of population from BAME groups ONS17,24 28 0.30 0.10 4.86 (2.28 to 7.45), <0.01 Yes 3 Proportion of the population not born in the UK 28 0.27 0.11 5.13 (2.60 to 7.65), <0.01 Yes 4 Rate of all consultation episodes involving psychosis diagnoses per 100 000 population NHS Digital hospital admitted patient care activity23 19 −0.73 −0.12 0.02 (−0.12 to 0.17), 0.738 Not significant 4 % of people reporting symptoms of severe common mental disorder in the past week APMS26 4 0.10 0.11 n.a. 4 Number of people per 1000 population assessed as having a psychotic disorder 4 0.14 0.09 n.a. 5 Social support (Congdon social fragmentation index median) National census data27 3 −0.01 −0.09 n.a. S h e rid an R ain s e t al 4Do w n lo ad ed fro m h ttp s://w w w .cam b rid g e.o rg /co re. 11 Sep 2020 at 13:31:04, su b ject to th e C am b rid g e C o re term s o f u se. https://www.cambridge.org/core 6 Number of people in contact with secondary mental health services per 1000 population NHS Digital Mental Health Bulletin28 14 1.80 0.26 1.2 (−0.11 to 2.51), 0.068 Not significant 6 Mental health spend (inflation adjusted) per capita (£)a NHS reference costs29 13 2.21 0.19 −0.07 (−0.16 to 0.03), 0.162 Not significant 6 Mental health spend per person in contact with secondary mental health services (£) 13 −50.90 −0.10 −0.01 (−0.02 to 0.00) Yes 6 Mental health nurses number per 100 000 population NHS Digital Mental Health Bulletin28 9 −1.57 −0.30 n.a. 6 Nurses in community psychiatry number per 100 000 population 9 0.08 0.10 n.a. 6 Nursing support staff total number per 100 000 population 9 −0.37 −0.28 n.a. 6 Nursing support staff in community psychiatry per 100 000 population 9 −0.09 −0.25 n.a. 6 Number of psychiatrists per 100 000 population 9 −0.16 −0.35 n.a. 6 Number of CMHT patient contacts per 1000 population 6 2.55 0.22 n.a. 6 Number of CMHT contacts per person in contact with mental health services 6 −0.09 −0.20 n.a. 7,8 Number of CRT contacts per 1000 population 6 2.24 0.33 n.a. 7,8 Number of CRT contacts per person in contact with secondary mental health services 6 −0.00 −0.01 n.a. 9 NHS psychiatric beds per 100 000 population NHS Digital Mental Health Bulletin: bed availability and occupancy data30 28 −3.24 −0.12 −0.55 (−0.75 to −0.3), <0.01 Yes 9 Detentions in non-NHS hospitals per 100 000 population NHS Digital MHA statistics – annual figures11 28 0.44 0.13 3.6 (2.43 to 4.78), <0.01 Yes 12 Percentage of all detentions in non-NHS hospitals 28 0.37 0.12 3.7 (2.23 to 5.17), <0.01 Yes 12 Antipsychotic depot prescriptions (in 1000s) NHS Digital prescription cost analysis31 16 −4.00 −0.25 0.17 (−0.06 to 0.40), 0.137 Not significant 12 Clozapine prescriptions (in 1000s) 16 0.08 0.06 1.41 (−0.80 to 3.62), 0.188 Not significant 14 Readmissions to hospital following revocations of CTO per 100 000 population NHS Digital MHA statistics – annual figures11 8 0.32 0.35 n.a. 15 All place of safety orders per 100 000 population 28 1.43 0.12 1.01 (0.61 to 1.42), <0.01 Yes 15 Number of conversions from s.135 or s.136 to s.2 28 0.21 0.13 6.74 (4.22 to 9.26), <0.01 Yes 15 Number of conversions from s.135 or s.136 to s.3 28 0.02 0.09 8.2 (−5.68 to 22.09), 0.235 Not significant OECD, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development; ONS, Office for National Statistics; n.a., not applicable; BAME, Black, Asian and minority ethnic; APMS, Adult Psychiatric Morbidity Survey; NHS, National Health Service; CMHT, community mental health team; CRT, crisis resolution team; MHA, Mental Health Act 1983; CTO, community treatment order; s., section (of MHA). a. Linear regression was conducted for this variable, not Prais–Winsten regression, as there was no evidence of auto-correlations. R ate s o f p sych iatric h o sp itald e te n tio n s in E n glan d5 D o w n lo ad ed fro m h ttp s://w w w .cam b rid g e.o rg /co re. 11 Sep 2020 at 13:31:04, su b ject to th e C am b rid g e C o re term s o f u se. https://www.cambridge.org/core to have become more positive, based on available data from 1994 to 2014 (Table 1). Men, younger adults (age 18–35) and people from Black, Asian and minority ethnic (BAME) groups are at increased risk of deten- tion in England.35,36 The proportion of the population in England from all BAME groups has more than doubled between 1988 and 2016, as has the proportion of non-UK-born people in the popula- tion. The proportion of the population who are male has risen mar- ginally. These rises may contribute to a rise in detentions (Table 1). Conversely, the proportion of the English population who are adults aged 18–35, the highest-risk age group for detentions, has fallen as the number of older adults has increased. Available data suggest that psychiatric morbidity in England has increased during the study period, consistent with our fourth hypothesis. Adult Psychiatric Morbidity Survey (APMS) data col- lected every 7 years indicate a consistent rise in prevalence of people with common mental disorders with severe symptoms from 1993 to 2014, and a possible recent rise in prevalence of people with psychosis.26 A clear causal pathway between increased overall psychiatric morbidity and more detentions is lacking, however. The increasing number of people seen in secondary mental health services (Table 1) may reflect increased numbers of people with a severe mental health problem, who are also at risk of detention. Alternatively, however, it could reflect increases in help-seeking or service accessibility, which do not influence rates of detention. Contrary to our hypothesis, rates of drug and alcohol use in the general population in England have fallen over the past 20 years). However, psychiatric hospital admissions for people with substance use disorders have risen since 2010 (supplementary Appendix 1), with a significant association with detention rate across the whole study period for cannabis use (Table 1). Three potential, not mutu- ally exclusive, explanations for this discrepancy are: (a) drug use has increased among people accessing mental health services, in con- trast to the general population; (b) the greater availability of potent drugs, including forms of cannabis such as skunk,37 and novel psychoactive substances with mental health risks38 has increased the risk of detention among drug users with mental health problems; and (c) changing attitudes among mental health practitioners to risk and safety and perceived treatability have led to more detentions of people with mental health problems who use drugs, independent of changes in patterns of drug use. We lack evidence to definitively support or reject any of these explana- tions, and the causal association of drug use and detention rates is uncertain (supplementary Appendix 2, section 2). Service provision Changes in the availability or quality of (a) in-patient care, (b) com- munity crisis care, (c) longer-term community care, (d) reduced continuity of care during assessment for compulsory admission, (e) staff attitudes to risk and safety and (f) changes in prescribing practice were all considered as potential contributors to the rising rate of detentions. In-patient care The rise in detentions has coincided with a dramatic reduction in NHS psychiatric beds in England (Table 1). Plausible mechanisms have been proposed for why reduced bed availability may lead to more detentions.39 Offer of in-patient admission may be delayed until illness becomes more acute. Relapse and re-detention may be more likely if patients are discharged prematurely because of bed pressures. Patients may not accept voluntary admission if the only available beds are far from home or because levels of dis- turbance in in-patient wards have increased, as only the most severely unwell, mainly non-consenting patients are admitted. Some psychiatrists report a perceived need to (unlawfully) detain patients who could have been voluntarily admitted, in order to secure prompt access to a bed.40 P.K. and colleagues39 found that the association between bed reductions and detention rates at local level in England was strongest with a 1-year time lag, i.e. increases in detentions follow bed cuts. This suggests a pos- sible causal relationship. However, the same study found that a moderate correlation remained between NHS bed reductions and rises in detentions, both contemporaneously and with a time lag in the other direction, i.e. bed reductions following rises in detentions,39 which less clearly indicates that bed reductions cause detentions. Increasing use of private beds (Table 1) and increasing access to community crisis alternatives41 may mitigate some pressures caused by NHS bed reductions. A recent systematic review found no studies that had demonstrated a relationship between detention rates and bed occu- pancy rates, another indicator of pressures on available beds.32 An even more recent study has reported no significant association between in-patient bed numbers and detention rates in a multivari- ate model, for the period from 1999 to 2016.42 Internationally, greater in-patient bed availability is associated with higher, not lower, rates of compulsory admissions.1 Community crisis care Specialist community crisis care has proliferated in England fol- lowing the national mandate in 2000 to introduce crisis reso- lution teams in the NHS Plan,43 and the accessibility of community crisis care may have increased further since 2011.41 However, no community crisis service models have been shown to reduce compulsory admissions.44 Improvements in service quality in crisis resolution teams had no impact on rates of compulsory admissions in a recent English trial.45 Hypotheses that reduced availability or quality of community crisis services has contributed to rising detention rates are not supported by available evidence. Longer-term community care We have limited evidence about how the quality of care in com- munity services has changed since 1983. Over the past 15 years, the number of patients seen by mental health services has increased substantially, while overall mental health funding has increased only slightly and community mental health service staffing has remained relatively stable. Similar resources, spread across a larger patient group, have therefore led to a reduction in mental health spend per patient in secondary care, and in the number of contacts provided per patient in recent years in some service settings, for example community mental health teams (Table 1). The extent and quality of community mental health service provision may relate to rates of detentions, although the relation- ship is complex. Interventions delivered in longer-term commu- nity care are best supported by current evidence as promising means to reduce detentions.44 Weich and colleagues35 found that higher spending on community mental health teams in England was associated with lower local detention rates, but that health service areas with community teams assessed as lower quality than others also had lower rates of detention. As their reach increases, community mental health services, especially higher-quality teams, may be getting better at detecting the need for detention, but at the same time becoming less able to provide intensive support to individuals where necessary to prevent deten- tions, as their resources are spread more thinly across a larger patient group. Adult social care spending has fallen since 2010– Sheridan Rains et al 6 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. 11 Sep 2020 at 13:31:04, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use. https://www.cambridge.org/core 2011:46 this could further reduce available support to prevent mental health crises and subsequent detentions. Changes in prescribing practice Regarding prescribing practice, reductions in use of clozapine and depot injections were proposed as factors that might increase patients’ risk of relapse and therefore of detention. However, there has been no clear reduction in the prescription of clozapine since 2007.47 National prescription cost data suggest that the number of items of depot antipsychotic medication prescribed has reduced marginally since 2000. However, although the association between depot prescriptions and (reduced) detentions was in the anticipated direction, this association was not statistically significant (Table 1). Furthermore, given variable dosing schedules, fewer prescriptions do not necessarily reflect a reduction in the number of people for whom depot medications are prescribed. Finally, there is some evi- dence that depot injections may not increase adherence in any case.48 Staff attitudes to risk and safety Risk and safety are important considerations for mental health staff,49 and clinicians’ attitudes and responses to risk are highly vari- able and subjective.50,51 Perceived risk has consistently been identi- fied as the strongest predictor of outcome of assessments for involuntary admission in English studies.52–54 The amendments to the MHA in 2007 extended the reach of coercion in response to perceived risk by broadening legal definitions of mental disorder and treatability, and introducing community coercion through community treatment orders, and has been characterised as reflect- ing a more general societal preoccupation with risk minimisation.55 Szmukler & Rose49 identify an increasing salience for risk assess- ment in mental healthcare internationally. It is plausible that increasing focus by mental health staff on risk and safety may have contributed to the rise in detentions since 1983. The increase in detentions for assessment under section 2 of the MHA, rather than treatment under section 3, may be consistent with an increas- ing willingness by mental health staff to detain people in the context of potential perceived risks, not just established known risks. However, we cannot quantify any such change in attitudes or its impact on detention rates. Continuity of care We found little evidence regarding how changes in the continuity of care at MHA assessments may affect the outcome of assessment and thus detention rates. One small study suggests that presence of a community professional, such as the patient’s care coordinator, may reduce the risk of a formal assessment for compulsory admis- sion resulting in detention.54 However, we lack information about the extent of any changes over time in the involvement in MHA assessments of practitioners, including general practitioners, who know the patient being assessed. Legal factors Three legal factors potentially relevant to detention are: (a) chan- ging legislative approaches to patients who lack decision-making capacity but do not actively object to hospital admission; (b) the introduction of compulsory community treatment; and (c) the police’s use of legal powers to bring people with suspected mental health problems to a place of safety for assessment. Capacity and consent to treatment Since the Human Rights Act 1998 came into force in England in 2000, enshrining the European Convention on Human Rights, it has been unlawful to admit anyone to psychiatric hospital on a vol- untary basis who lacks the capacity to consent to this treatment. This requirement has been reinforced by subsequent English case law, most notably the ‘Bournewood judgment’ in 2004 and the ‘Cheshire West’ case in 2014. Deprivation of liberty safeguards (DoLS) were introduced in 2008 as an addition to the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (MCA): DoLS provide a legal framework for approving in-patient admission and treatment for people who lack decision-making capacity, without using detention under the MHA. It is hypothesised that the rising rate of detentions in England may reflect increasing compliance with human rights law through the application of the MHA rather than DoLS to those who might previously have been admitted voluntarily. Available research suggests that, prior to the introduction of DoLS, as many as 20% of in-patients were non-objecting and volun- tarily admitted, but lacked capacity to consent to admission.56 In 2017–2018, however, fewer than 4000 DoLS applications were com- pleted for patients in psychiatric hospitals,57 i.e. only about 4% of roughly 100 000 admissions per year in total.58 The uncertainty in extrapolating from one small research study’s findings is acknowl- edged, and we do not know whether, in practice, some non-object- ing patients who lack decision-making capacity may still be (unlawfully) admitted to hospital voluntarily. However, if detention under the MHA is always now used to admit the remaining non- objecting patients who lack capacity but are not subject to DOLS, this could explain a substantial proportion of the rise in detentions in the past decade. Compulsory community treatment The introduction of community treatment orders (CTOs) in 2008 has been proposed as a potential contributor to the rising rate of detentions, either by lowering the bar for readmission of patients subject to a CTO (through the use of recall to hospital) or by increas- ing the risk of relapse by facilitating earlier, premature hospital dis- charge following the index admission leading to the CTO. The use of CTOs in England increased year on year from 2008 to 2016, with the numbers of people readmitted to hospital from a CTO rising corres- pondingly (Table 1). However, a recent systematic review59 provides clear evidence that internationally and in England, compulsory community treatment has no effect on raising or reducing readmis- sion rates. This hypothesis is therefore not supported by available evidence. Police use of place of safety powers Police use of legal powers (s.135 or s.136 MHA) to convey someone to a health-based place of safety has risen markedly during the study period. This has led to a corresponding increase in the number of people admitted to psychiatric hospital following use of a police place of safety order (Table 1). It is unknown what proportion of these people might otherwise have been detained via a different pathway, but it is plausible that police are becoming better at iden- tifying people who meet criteria for detention in hospital and bring- ing them to the attention of health services. Some of those who are now detained via a place of safety order may previously have been arrested or left in public spaces or at home. Data recording The Care Quality Commission proposed that more complete reporting of detentions by provider organisations may have led to an artefactual rise in recorded detentions over the study period.7 An analysis of patient records from 2007 to 2016 in six London bor- oughs60 found substantially lower increases in detention rates in these boroughs than those observed nationally. However, the extent of missing data in the routine nationally collected KP90 Rates of psychiatric hospital detentions in England 7 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. 11 Sep 2020 at 13:31:04, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use. https://www.cambridge.org/core data on detentions, and whether this has changed over time, are unknown. ‘Double-counting’ in official statistics may contribute to a rise in the recorded rate of detentions. Detention episodes within one pro- vider organisation are reported in the KP90 data used for this paper as a single detention, even if a person is transferred from one form of detention to another during this episode (e.g. transfers from a MHA section 2 detention for assessment to section 3 detention for treat- ment). However, recorded detentions in the KP90 data are inflated by double-counting of transfers in care, where a patient is moved during detention from one hospital to another run by a different provider organisation.36 This may account for between 12 and 20% of all detentions recorded in the data, and accounts for the big drop in English national detention records in 2017, when a new reporting system was adopted.34 The increase in the use of private hospitals during the study period is associated with the rise in detentions (Table 1) and suggests that transfers of care during detentions might have increased, leading to more double- counting and an artefactual rise in reported detentions. However, the extent of any such rise over time is unknown. Development of an explanatory logic model From the evidence summarised above, and presented more fully in supplementary Appendices 1 and 2, ratings were made regarding the strength of evidence for each proposed hypothesis to explain the rise in detentions (Table 2). An explanatory logic model was then developed (supplemen- tary Appendix 3). Hypotheses contradicted by available evidence were excluded from the model. Bold and dashed text boxes were used to distinguish components of the model supported by available evidence, and those for which available evidence was ambiguous or lacking. Arrows highlighted possible relationships between compo- nents of the model. Following reviewers’ feedback on the full logic model described in supplementary Appendix 3 and the initial paper draft, we decided to develop a second visual explanatory model for the observed rise in rates of detentions from 2010 onwards. The rationale for this second model is that more data are available for potential explana- tory factors in this period. This complementary but simpler and clearer explanatory model distinguishes two overarching pathways to the rise in detentions during this decade: an increase in perceived need for detention; and an increase in actual need. This second model is shown in Fig. 2. Discussion Main findings Our explanatory model shows that societal, service-related and legal factors may all contribute to the rise in detentions in England since 1983. Changes in legal approaches to safeguarding the rights of patients who lack decision-making capacity are a probable major contributor to the rapid increase in detentions in this decade. Rising levels of mental illness and demographic change in the popu- lation may both contribute. Mental health services and the police may be getting better at identifying people who meet criteria for detention, while in some community mental healthcare settings, increasingly stretched resources may reduce the availability and intensity of the preventive support that can be provided to patients to avert relapse or subsequent detention. Other factors may be important, but we lack confirmatory evi- dence. These include: increased exposure of vulnerable groups to economic and social hardship, reduction of available informal social support, changes in drug use among the patient population, changes in public and practitioners’ attitudes to risk and safety, and reduced NHS in-patient bed availability. The reported rise in detentions may have been inflated by the unreliability of available data. Available evidence suggests that reductions in the availability or quality of community crisis care and the introduction of community treatment orders have not contributed to the rise in detentions. We Table 2 Strength of evidence ratings for hypothesised explanations for the rise in detentions Explanatory factor Evidence for temporal relationship with change in detention ratesa Evidence for, or self-evident plausibility of, causal relationship to risk of detentiona Ratingb (1) Social and economic hardship Equivocal Equivocal 1 (2) Increased drug and alcohol use Equivocal Equivocal 1 (3) Demographic change (increased numbers of those at risk of detention) Supported Equivocal 2 (4) Increasing rates of mental illness Supported Equivocal 2 (5) Reduced informal social support Equivocal Supported 1 (6) Reduced availability and quality of community mental health services Equivocal Supported 2 (7) Reduced availability of alternatives to admission Contradicted Equivocal 0 (8) Reduced quality and/or responsiveness of crisis services Equivocal Contradicted 0 (9) Reduced in-patient bed capacity Supported Equivocal 1 (10) Less continuity of care at MHA assessments Equivocal Equivocal 1 (11) Greater aversion to risk among mental health professionals Equivocal Supported 1 (12) Changes in prescribing practice Contradicted Equivocal 0 (13) Changes in legal and clinical practice in respect of capacity Supported Supported 2 (14) Introduction of CTOs (and earlier discharge) Supported Contradicted 0 (15) Police more likely to bring people to a health- based place of safety Supported Equivocal 2 (16) Better data reporting in recent years Equivocal Supported 1 (17) Increase in transfers between hospitals during admission leads to double-counting Equivocal Supported 1 MHA, Mental Health Act 1983; CTO, community treatment order. a. Contradicted, contradicted by current evidence; equivocal, absent or ambiguous evidence; supported, supported by current evidence. b. 0, hypothesis is contradicted by available evidence; 1, lack of evidence or available evidence is ambiguous or mixed; 2, hypothesis is supported by the balance of available evidence. Sheridan Rains et al 8 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. 11 Sep 2020 at 13:31:04, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use. https://www.cambridge.org/core also found evidence that public fear and exclusion of people with mental illness has decreased in England during the study period, in contradiction to a hypothesis that reduced tolerance of people with mental health problems has driven the rise in detentions. Strengths and limitations Our paper collects and appraises the available evidence for and against 17 hypotheses for the rising detention rate, finding evidence to support 4 and reject 3 hypotheses. It thus provides the most com- prehensive and informed exploration to date of the rising rate of detentions in England. We identify ten limitations of this paper. First, reported detention rates are based on routinely collected national data that are not wholly reliable. Second, our list of hypoth- eses to explain the rising rate of detentions may not be exhaustive. For example, the impact on detention rates of changing practices in discharge and transfer of patients with mental health conditions from accident and emergency and general hospitals was raised during the peer review process for this paper. The selection and framing of hypotheses, and ratings of the strength of evidence sup- porting each hypothesis, will inevitably reflect the perspectives and biases of those involved. Both the MHA Review topic group and the paper’s authors comprised a range of mental health stakeholders, but the most represented group in both was academic psychiatrists. Third, because of the breadth of the topic, searches for available evi- dence were not systematic, and relevant data or research may have been overlooked. Fourth, our evaluation has highlighted hypotheses for which corroborating evidence from explanatory variables is available. However, hypotheses for which we lacked any relevant data to explore associations with detentions may be equally important – for example, changes in attitudes to risk and safety and risk assessment practice among mental health professionals. Fifth, for some hypotheses for which potential explanatory variables were identified, we lacked sufficient data points to allow statistical exploration of their relationship to detention rates. For variables with at least ten data points for which we did conduct analyses, these were not informed by power calculations: potentially import- ant relationships may not have achieved statistical significance. Sixth, identified associations between explanatory variables and detention rates do not determine whether relationships are causal. With the exception of in-patient bed numbers, we were rarely able to establish temporality to inform consideration of the direc- tion of causation in associations. For many hypotheses, additional available research was insufficient to confidently infer or reject caus- ality or establish mechanisms. For example, it is unclear why men and people from BAME ethnic groups are detained more often, and many proposed explanations lack empirical support.61 Seventh, for many of the explanatory variables that we examined, data regarding changes over time were only available at whole- population level, not specifically for those people who are detained, or vulnerable to detention, thus creating risks of ecological fallacies. This may have particularly limited our exploration of the impact of social and economic factors on detention rates. For instance, falls in overall poverty levels in England have not been experienced equally among all demographic groups,62 while the measure of income inequality used in our analyses (the Gini coefficient) has been criti- cised as being insufficiently sensitive to change.63 We have been unable to locate evidence specifically for people with mental health problems regarding change over time in levels of unemploy- ment, work precarity, disposable income, benefits sanctions, living alone or similar variables, with which to interrogate our hypotheses in more depth. Eighth, we used a single source of data for each population-level indicator used as potential explanatory variables, to allow comparisons of change over time. However, for some indi- cators, there were changes during the study period in data-reporting methods or acknowledged concerns about data quality, which may limit the validity of comparisons over time. Where identified, these are reported for each variable in supplementary Appendix 1. Ninth, for mental health service provision, staffing and funding, we have relied on available national data for mental health services in Societal context Changes in mental health service practice Mechanism of impact on detentions Outcome “Moral panic” and increased focus on mental health risks and safety 1990s-2000s Legal changesre detention criteria, capacity and treatability MCA 2005, MHA 2007 Changing police response to mental illness Increased use of s.136 “Austerity” and socio- economic pressures Cuts to social care and other support services Changing demographics More men and BAME groups Increased psychiatric morbidity Non-objecting people without decision-making capacity now detained Changing thresholds in clinical practice for meeting detention criteria Better identification in mental health services of people meeting criteria for detention Improved access to community crisis care. More people seen by mental health services Reductions in contacts per patient and preventive support provided in community mental health services Increase in perceived need for detentions by mental health staff Increase in actual acuity and risks of people in mental health crisis, requiring detention Rising rate of detentions Fig. 2 Two proposed pathways to the rising rate of detentions in England 2011-16: a provisional explanatory model. Rates of psychiatric hospital detentions in England 9 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. 11 Sep 2020 at 13:31:04, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use. https://www.cambridge.org/core general. Specific changes or pressures for children’s or older adults’ services may be obscured. Last, we have mainly looked at the rela- tionship between proposed explanatory factors and detention rates individually. We were limited in how far we could explore interrelationships between explanatory factors and cumulative effects of exposure to several factors. For these reasons, our proposed explanatory logic model has limited empirical support. It does not offer certainty, but does illus- trate likely and possible contributory factors to the rising rate of detentions in England between 1983 and 2016. We have looked spe- cifically for evidence to explain the rise in detentions in England during this time period: our explanatory model may have less valid- ity for other countries and time periods. Implications for research This study was limited by the limited information available from routine data about detentions in England. The complete KP90 data held by NHS Digital, which allowed us to compare rates of detention over time, could not yield answers to basic questions regarding in which clinical or demographic groups the rise was occurring. Better routine data are required. The change by NHS Digital in 2016–2017 to collecting complete data about detentions at individual patient level26 may address this need to some extent over time. The development of local NHS systems that allow researchers to access detailed, anonymised records for all patients using local secondary mental health services64 also enables more sophisticated understanding of risk factors for detention and changes over time. Our study highlights numerous areas where further research is needed regarding the relationship of potential explanatory factors to rates of detention, especially for social and economic factors, and attitudes to risk and safety. Public health research indicates that increasing psychiatric mor- bidity in England may be a result of increasing social deprivation,65 and that specific social and administrative measures may also influ- ence mental health outcomes: for instance, increases in ‘fitness for work’ tests being associated with more suicides.66 We need a clearer and more nuanced understanding of the extent of exposure to social and economic stressors among people with mental health problems, how this may change over time and how, if at all, it relates to changes in rates of detention. Practitioners’ attitudes to risk and safety are variable and highly important regarding decisions to detain,48–51 but changes over time in clinical culture and practice are not easily evaluated empirically. More qualitative research to understand the nature and extent of practitioners’ biases and group-level stigma has been called for, to aid understanding of the rise in detentions and the disproportion- ately high rates of detention for people from BAME groups.61 A better understanding of what drives clinicians’ decision-making regarding detention is desirable, as is development and evaluation of interventions to improve the quality of risk assessment and encourage appropriate positive risk-taking. In this context, three elements of the legal processes for deten- tion are priorities for further research. First, there is a need to under- stand the causes and consequences of the specific rise in the use of section 2 of the MHA for assessment, rather than section 3 for treat- ment. Although this may simply be an appropriate response to more new people requiring detention,60 the MHA Review expressed con- cerns that section 2 is being ‘overused’,6 either through a growing perception that it is less restrictive than a detention for treatment, or because it can be easier to complete, as does not require a place of treatment to be identified. Exploration of patient-level data is desirable regarding circumstances and rates of conversion from assessment and treatment sections, and their relationship to subsequent readmission rates. Second, research is required to understand clinicians’ decision-making processes in using MHA or MCA DoLS processes to detain patients who are not objecting to admission but lack decision-making capacity, and how this choice affects patients’ experiences and outcomes. Third, research is needed to understand the circumstances in which patients are dis- charged from detention following appeal to a tribunal. This may help identify uses of detention that were unwarranted or avoidable, and how these may contribute to the rising detention rate. Implications for policy and practice There is considerable uncertainty about many of our proposed explanations for the rise in detentions in England. Furthermore, interventions might help to reduce detentions, even if they are unre- lated to the reasons for the rise: for example, improving community crisis care. For these reasons, implications from our study for policy and practice should be proposed with caution. However, we suggest three areas of priority for reducing detentions. First, an increase in detentions appears to have been an unin- tended consequence of legislation and English case law regarding safeguarding the rights of non-objecting patients who lack deci- sion-making capacity and require hospital admission. Clear guid- ance and training are required for practitioners regarding assessment of capacity and when detention under the MHA is indi- cated rather than use of DoLS provisions under the MCA. Sufficient staff, appropriately trained in both processes, are required to ensure that the most appropriate course of action can be used in each case. Second, the past decade has seen a large increase in the number of people treated by secondary mental health services (in addition to the expansion of psychological services in primary care), and a cor- responding reduction in the amount of care offered to each individ- ual patient in some service settings. This appears to have been a de facto change in mental healthcare over the past decade rather than one explicitly planned in policy. Within any level of total invest- ment, achieving the optimal balance between breadth and depth of care involves weighing many different aims and priorities. Consideration should be given by policy planners and commis- sioners to the share of healthcare funding provided to mental health services, and to the potential effect on detention rates of spreading mental health resources increasingly widely, and thus away from the high-need, low-number group of patients most vul- nerable to detention. Third, our study shows that not all the rise in detentions in England necessarily relates directly to mental health service provi- sion: wider societal factors may be equally important to address. Potential contributory factors such as increasing psychiatric mor- bidity and social deprivation and inequalities require a broader public health and governmental response. More attention to the potential mental health impact of wider social policy is desirable. Lived experience: commentary by Stephen Jeffreys and Stella Branthonne-Foster Collectively, we have personal experience of community and in- patient mental health services. We commented on drafts of this paper but did not contribute to the design and scope of the project. The authors highlight gaps in detentions data: lack of individ- ual-level data and failure to differentiate between frequent individ- ual detentions and detention of more people, plus limited monitoring of Equality Act 2010 protected characteristics. The paper suggests that detaining more patients lacking cap- acity, who were previously admitted informally, is a major factor. However, this hypothesis relates only to the second period of stee- pest rise in detentions. Furthermore, it would be interesting to Sheridan Rains et al 10 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. 11 Sep 2020 at 13:31:04, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use. https://www.cambridge.org/core specifically examine child and adolescent mental health services data for similar trends. The children and young people’s landscape is vastly different from that of their adult counterparts and needs specific consider- ation. We regret that data on children and young people are merged into the overall national data-set; it is important to note the differences in services (both in-patient and community), and the needs and presentations of under-18s. We anticipate that absence of these data obscures factors specific to that age group. The biggest increases in detention rates have coincided with two periods of recession, but the authors were unable to demonstrate the impact of austerity or find data specific to those with mental health problems. We suggest widening this investigation to encompass other and more intangible factors associated with austerity and neo- liberal ideology, such as individualism, cuts in local services and financial uncertainty. As there has also been a substantial increase in demand on community mental health teams, this work should not be limited to rates of detention. The paper reveals that MHA section 2 detentions have increased, with section 3 figures remaining stable. Are hospitals dis- charging patients more quickly and perhaps too quickly owing to pressure on beds, are they finding swifter methods of support and treatment, or are more people being detained under the MHA unnecessarily? Luke Sheridan Rains, MSc, Division of Psychiatry, University College London, UK; Scott Weich, MD, Professor, School of Health and Related Research, University of Sheffield, UK; Clementine Maddock, MRCPsych, Swansea Bay University Health Board, UK; Shubulade Smith , MD, Behavioural and Developmental Disorders Directorate, South London and Maudsley NHS Foundation Trust, Maudsley Hospital, London; and Department of Forensic and Neurodevelopmental Disorders, Institute of Psychiatry, Psychology and Neuroscience, Kings College, London, UK; Patrick Keown , MRCPsych, Northumberland Tyne and Wear NHS Foundation Trust, UK; David Crepaz- Keay , DProf, Mental Health Foundation, London, UK; Swaran P. Singh, DM, Professor, Department of Mental Health and Wellbeing, University of Warwick, UK; Rebecca Jones, PhD, Division of Psychiatry, University College London, UK; James Kirkbride , PhD, Division of Psychiatry, University College London, UK; Lottie Millett, MSc, Division of Psychiatry, University College London, UK; Natasha Lyons , MSc, Division of Psychiatry, University College London, UK; Stella Branthonne-Foster, DM, Division of Psychiatry, University College London, UK; Sonia Johnson, BSc, Professor, Division of Psychiatry, University College London; and Camden and Islington NHS Foundation Trust, London, UK; Brynmor Lloyd-Evans , PhD, Associate Professor, Division of Psychiatry, University College London, UK Correspondence: Brynmor Lloyd-Evans. Email: b.lloyd-evans@ucl.ac.uk First received 28 Jan 2020, final revision 5 Jun 2020, accepted 29 Jun 2020 Supplementary material Supplementary material is available online at http://doi.org/10.1192/bjo.2020.64. Data availability The data supporting the findings of this study are available within the article (and/or its supple- mentary materials). Funding This paper presents independent research commissioned and funded by the National Institute for Health Research (NIHR) Policy Research Programme, conducted through the NIHR Policy Research Unit in Mental Health (PR-PRU-0916-22003). The views expressed are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the NIHR, the Department of Health and Social Care or its arm’s length bodies, or other Government Departments. S.P.S. is part-funded by the NIHR Collaboration for Leadership in Applied Health Research and Care West Midlands (NIHR CLAHRC WM). Acknowledgements Dr Gareth Owen, Professor Paul McCrone and Joe Botham from King’s College London helped to identify relevant data or research papers for some of the evidence summaries in this paper. We thank Stephen Jeffreys and Stella Branthonne-Foster, both members of the Lived Experience Working Group in the National Institute for Health Research (NIHR) Mental Health Policy Research Unit, for their commentary on this paper. Author contributions B.L.-E., C.M., S.S. were members of the Working Group for the Independent Review of the Mental Health Act 1983. B.L.-E., C.M., S.S., D.C.-K., P.K. and S.P.S. were members of the expert topic group on understanding the rising rate of detentions, which supported the Independent Review of the Mental Health Act. The topic group was chaired by S.W., and topic group mem- bers helped generate and refine study hypotheses. B.L.-E., S.W., C.M., S.S., S.J. and L.S.-R. designed the study. J.K. advised on relevant data sources. L.S.-R., L.M., N.L. and B.L.-E. extracted data, scoped relevant research papers and drafted hypothesis summaries for sup- plementary Appendix 2. L.S.-R. conducted data analyses, with advice from R.J.. B.L.-E. and L. S.-R. drafted the manuscript. All authors (L.S.-R., S.W., C.M., S.S., P.K., D.C.-K., S.P.S., R.J., J.K., L.M., S.B.-F., S.J., B.L.-E.) helped interpret findings, revise the manuscript and approved the submitted version. Declaration of interest B.L.-E., C.M., S.S. were members of the Working Group for the Independent Review of the Mental health Act 1983. B.L.-E., C.M., S.S., D.C.-K., P.K. and S.P.S. were members of the expert topic group on understanding the rising rate of detentions, which supported the Independent Review of the Mental Health Act. S.W. chaired the topic group. ICMJE forms are in the supplementary material, available online at https://doi.org/10.1192/ bjo.2020.64. Appendix Proposed hypotheses for the rising rate of detentions in England since 1983 We hypothesised the following 17 potential contributory factors to the rising rate of detentions, listed here with possible mechanisms for the hypotheses (how might exposure to the hypothesised risk factors cause or modify the risk of detention?) Social factors (1) Social and economic hardship: increased exposure to social stressors leads to more frequent relapses in the patient popula- tion and/or increase in rates of people developing a mental illness, leading to more detentions (social stressors could include: poverty, unemployment, social inequality, benefits sanctions, exposure to discrimination or hate crime). (2) Increased drug and alcohol use: increased substance misuse leads to increased risk of relapse in the patient population and/or increased rates of mental illness. (3) Demographic change (increased numbers of those at risk of detention): some demographic groups are at higher risk of detention than others (i.e. men, people from BAME groups and young adults age 18–35): if the proportion of the popula- tion from these groups increases, we would expect higher rates of detention. (4) Increasing rates of mental illness: a proportion of those with mental illness become so unwell that detention is required: higher rates of mental illness lead to more detentions. (5) Reduced informal social support: the absence of informal support (and perhaps the increase in people living alone) leads to higher rates of relapse; it also makes delivery of com- munity-based crisis care difficult, and admission more likely; bed pressures result in the eventual need for detention. Service factors (6) Reduced availability and quality of community mental health services: reductions in the reach (number of patients seen) by community mental health ongoing care services leads to reduced capacity to prevent detentions. Reductions in the quantity and quality of care provided to current patients (pos- sibly due to reduced investment in community mental health services) lead to increased rates of relapse, leading to more detentions. (7) Reduced availability of alternatives to admission: reduced availability of less restrictive community alternatives to Rates of psychiatric hospital detentions in England 11 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. 11 Sep 2020 at 13:31:04, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use. https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3797-6985 https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4727-5880 https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3845-4721 https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3401-0824 https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1635-0681 https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9866-788X mailto:b.lloyd-evans@ucl.ac.uk http://doi.org/10.1192/bjo.2020.64 http://doi.org/10.1192/bjo.2020.64 https://doi.org/10.1192&sol;bjo.2020.64 https://doi.org/10.1192&sol;bjo.2020.64 https://doi.org/10.1192&sol;bjo.2020.64 https://www.cambridge.org/core admission leads to more compulsory admissions for patients not prepared to go into hospital. (8) Reduced quality and/or responsiveness of crisis services: later intervention, or the lack of home treatment services, will result in more patients needing to be admitted. (9) Reduced in-patient bed capacity: lack of availability of beds (evidenced by reduction in bed numbers or increased bed occupancy rates) means that patients have longer to wait for a bed and are therefore more unwell at the time of admission; or are detained when voluntary admission was possible, in order to secure a bed; or are discharged prematurely to free beds, leading to more frequent relapse and re-detention. (10) Less continuity of care at Mental Health Act (MHA) assess- ments: assessment of risk may be more conservative (and overestimated) by professionals who do not know the patient. (11) Increased focus on safety and risk among mental health profes- sionals: section 12 doctors and approved mental health profes- sionals (AMHPs) have become more likely to detain patients with a risk and clinical presentation that would not have led to detention in the past, owing to changes in professional culture and attitudes to patient safety and risk management. (12) Changes in prescribing practice: reduced use of depot medica- tion over time has led to reduced medication adherence, resulting in more relapses and subsequent detentions. Reduced use of clozapine over time has led to more relapses and subsequent detentions. Legal factors (13) Changes in legal and clinical practice in respect of patients who lack decision-making capacity: following the Bournewood judgment (HL v. UK [2004] ECHR 471) in 2004, non-objecting patients who lack decision-making cap- acity, who might previously have been admitted to hospital informally, must now be subject to a ‘lawful process’, i.e. detention under the Mental Health Act 1983 or the Mental Capacity Act 2005 deprivation of liberty safeguards (DoLS). (14) Introduction of community treatment orders (CTOs) (and earlier discharge): (a) there is a lower threshold for CTO recall than for admission following an MHA assessment, so CTO patients are recalled to hospital who would not otherwise have been detained, leading to an increase in compulsory admissions since introduction of CTOs in 2008; (b) CTOs are used as a means of facilitating early (premature) discharge, leading to frequent relapse and recall/readmission. (15) Police more likely to bring people to a place of safety under section 135 or 136: increasing mental health awareness and use of MHA sections 135 and 136 by the police lead to patients being brought to a place of safety and subsequently detained, who would previously have been arrested or left at home/in public places and not have ended up detained through other routes. Data-recording factors (16) Better data reporting in recent years: over time, service provi- ders are submitting more complete data returns regarding detained patients, so underreporting of detentions in official statistics reduces. (17) Increase in transfers between hospitals during admission leads to double-counting: increasing bed pressures lead to an increase in transfers between hospitals for patients during a detention (out- of-area NHS placements and use of private hospitals), leading to increased double-counting of detentions in KP90 data. 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Approved Mental Health Professionals and detention: an exploration of professional differences and similarities. Pract Soc Work Action 2019; 31: 83–96. 52 Singh SP, Burns T, Tyrer P, Islam Z, Parsons H, Crawford MJ. Ethnicity as a pre- dictor of detention under the Mental Health Act. Psychol Med 2014; 44: 997– 1004. 53 Gajwani R, Parsons H, Birchwood M, Singh S. Ethnicity and detention: are Black and minority ethnic (BME) groups disproportionately detained under the Mental Health Act 2007? SPPE 2016; 51: 703–11. 54 Wickersham A, Nairi S, Jones R, Lloyd-Evans B. The Mental Health Act assess- ment process and risk factors for compulsory admission to psychiatric hospital: a mixed methods study. Br J Social Work 2020; 50: 642–63. 55 Pilgrim D. New mental health legislation for England and Wales: some aspects of consensus and conflict. J Soc Policy 2007; 36: 79–95. 56 Owen GS, Richardson G, David AS, Szmukler G, Haywood P, Hotopf M. Mental Capacity to make decisions on treatment in people admitted to psychiatric hos- pitals: cross sectional study. BMJ 2008; 337: 448. 57 NHS Digital. Mental Capacity Act (2005) Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards, England 2017/18. NHS Digital, 2018 (https://digital.nhs.uk/data-and-informa- tion/publications/statistical/mental-capacity-act-2005-deprivation-of-liberty- safeguards-assessments/annual-report-2017-18-england [cited 18 Jul 2019]). 58 Care Quality Commission. Monitoring the Mental Health Act in 2015/16. CQC, 2016. 59 Barnett P, Matthews H, Lloyd-Evans B, Mackay E, Pilling S, Johnson S. Compulsory community treatment to reduce readmission to hospital and increase engagement with community care in people with mental illness: a sys- tematic review and meta-analysis. Lancet Psychiatry 2018; 5: 1013–22. 60 Oram S, Colling C, Pritchard M, Khondonker M, Fonseca de Freitas D, Ter- Minassian L, et al. Patterns of use of the Mental Health Act 1983, from 2007– 08 to 2016–17, in Camden and Islington NHS Foundation Trust, London. BJPsych Open 2019; 5: e102. 61 Barnett P, Mackay E, Matthews H, Gate R, Greenwood H, Ariyo K, et al. Ethnic variations in compulsory detention under the Mental Health Act: a systematic review and meta-analysis of international data. Lancet Psychiatry 2019; 6: 305– 17. 62 JRF Analysis Unit. UK Poverty 2018: A Comprehensive Analysis of Poverty Trends and Figures. Joseph Rowntree Foundation, 2018. 63 Gastwirth J. Is the Gini Index of Inequality overly sensitive to changes in the mid- dle of the income distribution? Stat Public Policy 2017; 4: 1–11. 64 Fernandes A, Cloete D, Broadbent M, Hayes R, Chang C-K, Jackson R, et al. Development and evaluation of a de-identification procedure for a case register sourced from mental health electronic records. BMC Med Inform Decis Mak 2013; 13: 71. 65 Barr B, Kinderman P, Whitehead M. Trends in mental health inequalities in England during a period of recession, austerity and welfare reform 2004 to 2013. Soc Sci Med 2015; 147: 324–31. 66 Barr B, Taylor-Robinson D, Stucker D, et al. ‘First, do no harm’: are disability assessments associated with adverse trends in mental health? A longitudinal ecological study. J Epidemiol Community Health 2015; 70: 339–45. 13 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. 11 Sep 2020 at 13:31:04, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use. https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/populationestimates/datasets/populationestimatesforukenglandandwalesscotlandandnorthernireland https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/populationestimates/datasets/populationestimatesforukenglandandwalesscotlandandnorthernireland https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/populationestimates/datasets/populationestimatesforukenglandandwalesscotlandandnorthernireland https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/populationestimates/datasets/populationestimatesforukenglandandwalesscotlandandnorthernireland https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/populationestimates/datasets/populationestimatesforukenglandandwalesscotlandandnorthernireland https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.URB.TOTL.IN.ZS https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.URB.TOTL.IN.ZS https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.URB.TOTL.IN.ZS https://digital.nhs.uk/data-and-information/publications/statistical/adult-psychiatric-morbidity-survey/adult-psychiatric-morbidity-survey-survey-of-mental-health-and-wellbeing-england-2014 https://digital.nhs.uk/data-and-information/publications/statistical/adult-psychiatric-morbidity-survey/adult-psychiatric-morbidity-survey-survey-of-mental-health-and-wellbeing-england-2014 https://digital.nhs.uk/data-and-information/publications/statistical/adult-psychiatric-morbidity-survey/adult-psychiatric-morbidity-survey-survey-of-mental-health-and-wellbeing-england-2014 https://digital.nhs.uk/data-and-information/publications/statistical/adult-psychiatric-morbidity-survey/adult-psychiatric-morbidity-survey-survey-of-mental-health-and-wellbeing-england-2014 https://digital.nhs.uk/data-and-information/publications/statistical/adult-psychiatric-morbidity-survey/adult-psychiatric-morbidity-survey-survey-of-mental-health-and-wellbeing-england-2014 https://www.ons.gov.uk/census https://www.ons.gov.uk/census https://digital.nhs.uk/data-and-information/publications/statistical/mental-health-bulletin/mental-health-bulletin-2016-17-annual-report https://digital.nhs.uk/data-and-information/publications/statistical/mental-health-bulletin/mental-health-bulletin-2016-17-annual-report https://digital.nhs.uk/data-and-information/publications/statistical/mental-health-bulletin/mental-health-bulletin-2016-17-annual-report https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/nhs-reference-costs-2015-to-2016 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/nhs-reference-costs-2015-to-2016 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/nhs-reference-costs-2015-to-2016 https://www.england.nhs.uk/statistics/statistical-work-areas/bed-availability-and-occupancy/bed-data-overnight/ https://www.england.nhs.uk/statistics/statistical-work-areas/bed-availability-and-occupancy/bed-data-overnight/ https://www.england.nhs.uk/statistics/statistical-work-areas/bed-availability-and-occupancy/bed-data-overnight/ https://digital.nhs.uk/data-and-information/publications/statistical/prescription-cost-analysis/prescription-cost-analysis-england-2017 https://digital.nhs.uk/data-and-information/publications/statistical/prescription-cost-analysis/prescription-cost-analysis-england-2017 https://digital.nhs.uk/data-and-information/publications/statistical/prescription-cost-analysis/prescription-cost-analysis-england-2017 https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/grossdomesticproductgdp/timeseries/ihyq/qna https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/grossdomesticproductgdp/timeseries/ihyq/qna https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/grossdomesticproductgdp/timeseries/ihyq/qna https://files.digital.nhs.uk/36/E95A5F/ment-heal-act-stat-eng-2016-17-back-data-qual-rep1.pdf https://files.digital.nhs.uk/36/E95A5F/ment-heal-act-stat-eng-2016-17-back-data-qual-rep1.pdf https://files.digital.nhs.uk/36/E95A5F/ment-heal-act-stat-eng-2016-17-back-data-qual-rep1.pdf https://www.mentalhealthtoday.co.uk/survey-reveals-extent-of-mental-health-beds-crisis) https://www.mentalhealthtoday.co.uk/survey-reveals-extent-of-mental-health-beds-crisis) https://www.mentalhealthtoday.co.uk/survey-reveals-extent-of-mental-health-beds-crisis) https://digital.nhs.uk/data-and-information/publications/statistical/mental-capacity-act-2005-deprivation-of-liberty-safeguards-assessments/annual-report-2017-18-england https://digital.nhs.uk/data-and-information/publications/statistical/mental-capacity-act-2005-deprivation-of-liberty-safeguards-assessments/annual-report-2017-18-england https://digital.nhs.uk/data-and-information/publications/statistical/mental-capacity-act-2005-deprivation-of-liberty-safeguards-assessments/annual-report-2017-18-england https://digital.nhs.uk/data-and-information/publications/statistical/mental-capacity-act-2005-deprivation-of-liberty-safeguards-assessments/annual-report-2017-18-england https://www.cambridge.org/core Understanding increasing rates of psychiatric hospital detentions in England: development and preliminary testing of an explanatory model Method Hypothesis generation Evidence gathering Assessing the plausibility of hypotheses Logic model development Results Rates of detention in England Proposed explanations for the rising rate of detentions in England Social factors Service provision In-patient care Community crisis care Longer-term community care Changes in prescribing practice Staff attitudes to risk and safety Continuity of care Legal factors Capacity and consent to treatment Compulsory community treatment Police use of place of safety powers Data recording Development of an explanatory logic model Discussion Main findings Strengths and limitations Implications for research Implications for policy and practice Lived experience: commentary by Stephen Jeffreys and Stella Branthonne-Foster Supplementary material Data availability Funding Acknowledgements Author contributions Declaration of interest Proposed hypotheses for the rising rate of detentions in England since 1983 Social factors Service factors Legal factors Data-recording factors References 
work_lorsypblm5fejhkwf6ou25gwvu	----	Be the Change Consulting | Curriculum Worksheets Skip to main content About Staff Solutions Initiatives Character Development Coaching & Case Management Curriculum Design Organizational Development Strategic Planning Staff Learning Communities Training Shop Tools Worksheets How To Videos Articles 20 Zoom Tips SEL Tools for Facilitators: Social Emotional Learning to the Rescue! Featured SEL Activity: Muralistas Featured SEL Activity: My Roots Starter Kits Contact Search form Search Curriculum Finder Grade Levels - Any - Elementary Middle High School Transitional-Aged Youth Staff Teams - Any - Elementary Middle High School Transitional-Aged Youth Staff Teams Type - Any - Advanced Curriculum Implementation Guides Recipe Card Boxes Reflection Ring Staff Development - Any - Advanced Curriculum Implementation Guides Recipe Card Boxes Reflection Ring Staff Development Theme - Any - Case Management Character Coaching Diversity Group Development Icebreakers Identity Leadership Organizational Practices Social Justice Staff Development Youth Development - Any - Case Management Character Coaching Diversity Group Development Icebreakers Identity Leadership Organizational Practices Social Justice Staff Development Youth Development Institution - Any - After School Program Community Based School Day - Any - After School Program Community Based School Day Many of the activities in our curriculum refer to handouts to be downloaded from the web. Here they are! These handouts are not intended for public use - we appreciate your respect of intellectual property. If you like a handout, it's likely you will LOVE the curriculum. Buy it and use it all to your heart's content! Experiential Activities to Introduce Identity, Culture, Class, Gender, and Inclusion Activity Handout Book Club Book Club: Book List (b&w) Identity Filters (b&w) Popcorn and Politics Popcorn and Politics: Movie List (b&w) Food for Thought Five Myths about Immigration (b&w) The Return of the Welfare Queens, Feminism, Secularism and Anti-Racism (b&w) White Priviledge: Unpacking the Invisible Knapsack (b&w) Alden Parker on Homophobia and Hate Crime (b&w) Understanding Privilege Unpacking Power Definitions (b&w) Power Chart Graphic (b&w) Cycle of Oppression Stereotypical Images (color) The Miseducation Cycle (b&w) Triggers Definition of Emotional Triggers (b&w) Strategies for managing emotional triggers (b&w) Ten ways to know we are being triggered (b&w) Try a Different Tactic Try a Different Tactic: Role-Play Scenarios (b&w) Facilitation Tool Box: Ten Reframing Strategies (b&w) Unpack Your Story Five injustices Posters (b&w) The Healing Circle The Education Cycle (b&w) Pieces of Me Sample: Pieces of Me (color) Pieces of Me (b&w) Identity Filters (b&w) Mobile Time Lines Important Events (b&w) My Roots My Roots (b&w) Mini Me I'd Like to Introduce (b&w) Living Monologue My Community Interview (b&w) First Person Monologue (b&w) Double Take Feelings cards (b&w) Ally Scenarios (b&w) Feeling Chart (b&w) Ally Poster (b&w) Message Detective Disney Images (color) Message Detective Research (b&w) Fortune Teller Fortune Teller instructions (b&w) Million Dollar Questions (b&w) Princess Boy Ally Poster (color) Gendernauts How to make a flipbook (b&w) Gender Studies The Gender Studies Posters (b&w) Family Flower Garden Common Questions in a LGBTQ Discussion (b&w) Instructions for a Family Garden (b&w) That's So Gay Homophobic Lingo (b&w) Dial it Down Homophobic Lingo Template (b&w) Ally Endings Storyboard Template (b&w) Ally Swag Scenarios (b&w) Ally Character Development Template (b&w) Community Kite Community Kite Puzzle template (b&w) R(E)AD THIS Read This: Set One (b&w) Read This: Set Two (b&w) Set the Table Table-Setting Outline (b&w) Instructions for School Supplies (b&w) Culture Cocoon Culture Cocoon (b&w) Mosaic Self-Portraits Mosaic Self Portrait Sample (color) Star-Bellied Sneetches Youtube video (color) Money Can't Buy Me Money Can't Buy Me (b&w) Class Category posters (b&w) Share the Wealth Feeling Cards (b&w) Every Great Country My Great Country Worksheet (b&w) Colonizer Statements (b&w) Cause and Effect Our Tragic Cause and Effect Time Line (b&w) Unsung Heroes Unsung Heroes Poster Template (b&w) Strings of Justice Strings of Justice: Script Template (b&w) Experiential Activities to Develop Critical Thinkers Activity Handout Animal Scramble Animal Scramble (b&w) People Bingo people bingo (color) blank bingo grid (color) people bingo (b&w) blank bingo grid (b&w) Girls vs. Boys 1970s Comic Book (color) Modern Storybook Template (color) 1970s Comic Book (b&w) Modern Storybook Template (b&w) Star Bellied Sneetches The Sneetches (color) Sneetches Video (color) The Sneetches (b&w) Sneetches Video (b&w) Communication Maps Master Communicator Maps (color) Master Communicator Maps (b&w) The Trees and the Worms trees and worms (color) yoga story board template (color) trees and worms (b&w) yoga story board template (b&w) World Changers The Dark and the Light (color) The Dark and the Light (b&w) Experiential Activities to Explore Values for Elementary and Middle School Participants Activity Handout Community Values Values Cards (color) Values Cards (b&w) Behavior Bucks Behavior Bucks (color) Behavior Bucks (b&w) Responsibility Roles Job Application Template (b&w) Slam Books Slam Book Template (color) Slam Book Template: Dial it Down (color) Slam Book Template (b&w) Slam Book Template: Dial it Down (b&w) Self Care Medallion Medallion Handout (color) Medallion Handout: Dial it Down (color) Medallion Handout (b&w) Medallion Handout: Dial it Down (b&w) Chef Du Jour Healthy Eating Pyramid (color) Serve Me Up Food Pyramid Servings and Ammounts (color) My Eyes, Your Hands Friendship Qoutes (color) Friendship Quotes (b&w) Big Rocks Big Rocks (color) Big Rocks (b&w) Green Team Statistics for Superheroes (b&w) Who Dunnit Who Dunnit Scenario (b&w) Life Choices Employment Profiles (color) Life Choices Worksheet (color) Employment Profiles (b&w) Life Choices Worksheet (b&w) Dream Catchers How to Make a Dream Catcher (color) Lakota Legend (color) How to Make a Dream Catcher (b&w) Lakota Legend (b&w) Magazine Expo Growth Values Cards (color) Magazine Cover Template (color) Growth Values Cards (b&w) Magazine Cover Template (b&w) Values Extract Growth Values Cards (color) Magazine Cover Template (color) Growth Values Cards (b&w) Magazine Cover Template (b&w) Awareness Ribbons Awareness Ribbons (color) 1000 Paper Cranes How to Make an Origami Crane (color) Experiential Activities to Promote Group Development and Youth Leadership Activity Handout Twisters and Teasers Logic Puzzles (color) Logic Puzzles (b&w) The Sound of Silence *Poetry and Drawing Prompts (color) *Feelings Chart (color) *Feelings Chart (b&w) Partner Up Deck of Memory Cards (color) Animal Concert Animal Concert Nursery Rhyme Collection (b&w) Animal Concert Backyard Collection (b&w) Animal Concert Jungle Collection (b&w) Animal Concert Barnyard Collection (b&w) Famous Pairs and Trios Famous Trios Activity Cards (b&w) Famous Pairs Activity Cards (b&w) The Missing Piece You Complete Me Images (b&w) Quotables Quotable Cards (b&w) Postcard Parcels Postcard Parcels Simplified Sentence Bling (color) Postcard Parcels Sentence Bling (b&w) Postcard Parcels Simplified Sentence Bling (b&w) Writings on the Wall Writings on the Wall Hieroglyphics (color) Writings on the Wall Hieroglyphics (b&w) Survey Says Survey Says Data Sheet (color) Survey Says Data Sheet (b&w) Perspective Pie Perspective Pie Handout (color) Perspective Pie Dial it Down Handout (color) Perspective Pie Handout (b&w) Perspective Pie Dial it Down Handout (b&w) Fist to Five Fist to Five Consensus Spectrum (b&w) Fist to Five Agreement Spectrum (b&w) My 2 Cents My Two Cents Chart Sample (color) Issue Mapping Community Defined Worksheet (color) YouTube It YouTube It Media Release Form (b&w) YouTube It Sample Script (b&w) Certified Friend Certificate template (color) Aloha Candy Lei Instructions (b&w) Golden Globes Golden Globe Awards (b&w) E-mail Clouds E-mail Clouds Template (color) Creative, Resourceful & Whole Experiential Exercises to Build Awareness, Transform Perspectives, and Make Choices Activity Handout Dinner Party Dinner Party Questions (b&w) I'm the One Who… I'm The One Who… (b&w) Make a Date Getting to Know You Questions (b&w) Stepping Stones Stepping Stones (b&w) My Iceberg My Iceberg (b&w) Magazine Expo! Values Cards (b&w) Magazine Cover Template (b&w) Polaroids Polaroids (b&w) Body Maps Body Map (b&w) My Inner Truth Values Cards (color) Values Cards (b&w) Values Extract Values Cards (color) Values Cards (b&w) Graduation Speech Graduation Speech Template (b&w) Perspective Board Perspective Board Posters (b&w) Crystal Ball Crystal Ball Visualizations (b&w) Email Clouds E-mail Clouds Template (b&w) Big Rocks Big Rocks (b&w) Balancing the Wheel Balancing the Wheel (b&w) Balancing the Wheel: Goals (b&w) Catching Dreams Lakota Legend (color) Lakota Legend (b&w) How to Make a Dream Catcher (b&w) Let It Go Slogans to Live By (b&w) Bookends How to Make Bookends (b&w) Love Languages Five Love Languages: Summary (b&w) Inside Team Sticky notes to Characters (b&w) Picture It Picture-it Image Cards (b&w) Shadowboxing Shadowboxing Coaching Cards (b&w) Peer Coaching Come From Cards (b&w) Come From Descriptions (b&w) Double Emotion Feelings Cards (b&w) Icebreakers and Team Builders to Elicit Group Values Activity Handout J.O.Y. Joy Worksheet (b&w) Life Map Life Map Signs (b&w) Speed Dating Speed Dating Questions (b&w) True for Me True For Me Statements (b&w) Human Collectables Human Collectables List (b&w) Head Heart Feet Head Heart Feet (b&w) Lunch to Go Lunch to Go (b&w) Activities to Teach Social Emotional Skills and Restorative Practices Activity Handout Gateway Behaviors Sample WANTED Poster (b&w) Wanted: For Disturbing the Peace The Gateway Gang Story (color) Sample Sheriff Badge (color) The Gateway Gang Story (b&w) Sample WANTED Poster (b&w) Sample Sheriff Badge (b&w) Feelings Create Actions Arrow Template (b&w) Peaceometers Peaceometer stages (color) Peaceometer stages (b&w) Peacometer Arrow Template (b&w) Good News! Newsletter Template (b&w) Emotional Mirrors Newsletter Template (b&w) HALT H.A.L.T. Coloring Sheets (color) H.A.L.T. Coloring Sheets (b&w) I Just Called, to Say I'm Sorry Apology Letter Template (color) A Feeling Chart (color) Apology Letter Template (b&w) A Feeling Chart (b&w) Feeling Coloring Cards (b&w) Illusions of Many Optical Illusions (b&w) Trigger Happy Trigger Shields (color) Trigger Shields (b&w) What's on your Mind? elephant image (color) Blind men and an Elephant story (color) Role Plays (color) elephant image (b&w) Blind men and an Elephant story (b&w) Role Plays (b&w) Does this Band-Aid fit that wound? Restorative Analysis Worksheet Restorative Consequences Cards Restoration in Action Community Healing skits (color) Community Healing skits (b&w) Walk That Community Talk Walk that Community Talk Pledge Card (color) Walk that Community Talk Pledge Card (b&w) Conflicting Approaches Conflict Resolution Self-Assessment (color) Conflict Resolution Self-Assessment (b&w) Win-Win or Bust Super tic-tac toe boards (color) Will you Win or Lose (color) Super tic-tac toe boards (b&w) Will you Win or Lose (b&w) Little Miss Muffet's Needs Little Miss Muffet handout (color) Little Miss Muffet handout (b&w) Little Red Riding Hood Negotiates Little Red Robin Hood Negotiates (color) Little Red Robin Hood Negotiates (b&w) Experiential Activities to Develop Critical Thinkers: Middle and High School Activity Handout Animal Wisdom Animal Wisdom (color) Animal Wisdom (b&w) Mad Lib Mad Libs Handout (color) Mad Libs Handout (b&w) Mosaic Self Portraits mosaic self portrait samples (color) mosaic self portrait samples (b&w) Personal Histories Conocimiento questions (b&w) Power Shuffle Power Shuffle Handout (color) Power Shuffle Handout (b&w) Power Chart Power Chart Graphic The Brown Bag The Brown Bag (color) The Brown Bag (b&w) Life Happens! Family Profiles (color) Family Profiles (b&w) Life Happens Cards (b&w) Take a Stand Taking a Stand Posters (color) Taking a Stand Posters (b&w) Beyond Black and White Beyond Black and White Scenarios (color) Beyond Black and White Scenarios (b&w) 10 Step Implementation Guide to Deepen Organizational Practices Activity Handout Step 3 Values Cards (color) Value Card Sort Activity (color) Values Cards (b&w) Value Card Sort Activity (b&w) Step 6 Youth Development Observation Guide (color) Youth Development Observation Guide (b&w) Step 7 setting benchmarks for success (color) setting benchmarks for success (b&w) Step 9 Calendar Template (color) Sample Calendar (color) Calendar Template (b&w) Sample Calendar (b&w) Step 10 Program Planning Activity (color) Program Planning Activity (b&w) Quarterly quarterly evaluation (color) Quarterly evaluation (b&w) Overview Implementation poster.2 (color) Implementation poster.2 (b&w) A 10-Step Implementation Guide to Purposeful Program Design Activity Handout Planning for Pitfalls Planning for Pitfalls (color) Planning for Pitfalls (b&w) Step 1 Connect Inspirational Metaphors (color) Connect Inspirational Metaphors (b&w) Step 2 Writing Strong Learning Objectives (color) Writing Strong Learning Objectives (b&w) Step 3: Create a Mobile Classroom Mobile Classroom Check List (color) Step 5: Interrupt Gateway Behaviors Interrupt Gateway Behaviors (color) Interrupt Gateway Behaviors (b&w) Step 7 Behavior Motivation System (color) Behavior Motivation System (b&w) Step 9 Trading Post (color) Trading Post (b&w) Step 10 Write Home About it (color) Write Home About it (b&w) SEED: Supervision for Effective Employee Development in a Youth Development Context Activity Handout Step 2: Assess Yourself Supervision Time Log (b&w) Supervision Triggers (b&w) Supervision Staff Development Tasks (b&w) Step 3: Learn Your Staff's Decision-Making Styles Leadership Compass Self Assessment and Facilitation Instructions (color) Leadership Compass Self Assessment and Facilitation Instructions (b&w) Step 4: Assess Your Staff Assess Your Staff (b&w) Step 5: Workplan Observation Matrix Workplan Observation Matrix (b&w) Step 8: Integrate a Systems Coaching Process SEED Systems Coaching Process (b&w) Step 10: Conduct a 360 Degree Survey 360 Degree Survey (b&w) 25 Activities to Develop a Professional Learning Community Activity Handout Values & Agreements Values Cards (color) Values Cards (b&w) Taking a Stand Taking a stand (color) Taking a stand (b&w) Coaching Scenarios Coaching Scenarios (color) Coaching Scenarios (b&w) Principles in Action Principles in Action Questions (color) Principles in Action Questions (b&w) Mad Libs Mad Libs Handout (color) Ann's Poem by Nikki Giovanni (color) Mad Libs Handout (b&w) Ann's Poem by Nikki Giovanni (b&w) Giving Feedback Giving Effective Feedback (color) Giving Effective Feedback (b&w) Leadership Compass Leadership compass self assessment (color) Leadership Compass Profiles and Self assessment (b&w) Conocimientos Conocimientos (color) Conocimientos (b&w) Staff Debates Staff Debate Questions (color) Staff Debate Questions (b&w) Empowering vs. Enabling Empowering vs. Enabling (color) Empowering vs. Enabling (b&w) Brag Bag Brag Bag Personality Checklist (color) Brag Bag - Analyzing Your Skills (color) Brag Bag Personality Checklist (b&w) Brag Bag - Analyzing Your Skills (b&w) Jocks 'n' Geeks Jocks 'n' Geeks (color) Jocks 'n' Geeks (b&w) Life Happens! Life Happens Cards (color) Life Happens Cards (b&w) Food is My Fuel - A Health, Nutrition and Cooking Curriculum Activity Handout Foodie Zines Food Journal Sheets Who Am I? "Who Am I?" food cards Food Category Posters Fill the Tank Food Is My Fuel posters Meal Plan Template Balloon Pop Sugar Food Facts Sugar Food Facts Answer Sheet Fruity Dessert My 'Naturally' Sweet Tooth recipe cards My Portion Plate Plate Template Apples or Onions Mid Year Reflection Questions Apples or Onions Cards Culinary Teams Culinary Champ Cook-Off Poster The Chef's Hats Hats to Inspire Veggie Art Veggie Art Cards Jelly, Butter, and Peanuts Mashup Score Sheet Project-Planning Arrow Project-Planning Arrow worksheet Recipe for a Good Friend A Recipe for a Good Friend Feeling Cards The Learning Map Instructions to Create a Learning Map Fair Game - A Physical Fitness Curriculum Activity Handout Name Challenge Vocabulary Chart Find Me! Most Valuable Player Trading Card Our Values Values Cards Athlete Charts Athlete Pairing Cards Athlete Charts Scoreboard Athletic Code of Conduct scoreboard poster Team Trading Cards Team Trading Cards Tournament of Champions Tournament Score Sheet Project Planning Arrow Project-Planning Arrow Foul or Slam Dunk Foul or Slam Dunk Evaluation Questions End of Season Love of the Game Certificates Love of the Game Awards List The Learning Map Instructions to Create a Learning Map Crossing the River: A Ten-Step Implementation Guide to Design Youth Development Programs Activity Handout Integrate Youth Development into Program Design Youth Development River Guide Cards Initiate Community Engagement Project Planning Arrow Leaders of Today: A Ten-Step Implementation Guide to Design Youth Leadership Programs Activity Handout Create Your Stance Belief Cards Build Leadership Profiles My Leadership Profile Avoid Common Pitfalls Youth-Leadership Programs Challenges cards Understand Youth Leadership Youth Adults Spectrum Integrate a Social Justice Analysis What are they thinking? Begin with the End in Mind Newspaper Article Icebreakers and Team Builders To Build Community Activity Handout Paper-Plate Hat Tricks Paper hat instructions handout a and b Raffle Ticket Raffle Ticket Template Circling Up Talking Bundle Color Chart Sign Up Here Sign Up Here Discussion Questions Dare, Double Dare Dare, Double, Dare Questions Wear Your Attitude Mood Cards Team Résumé Team Résumé Template Personal Qualities Cards Affirmations Writing Strong Affirmations Off the Grid Off the Grid Map New Planet New Planet Worksheet and Log Let the Homies Talk Homie Talk Discussion Questions Letters Home Letters Home Handout When You Are in My Seat My Year in Reflection Handout Innovators, Inventors, and Makers: A Curriculum to Envision and Create a Better World Activity Handout The Learning Map Instructions to Create a Learning Map From Scratch Homemaker's Marshmallow Homemakers Marshmallow Instructions Fun Homemakers Recipes Electricity Potato Power How to make Potato Power Lemon Light BUILD A LEMON LIGHT INSTRUCTIONS Physics Balloon-Propelled Car How to make a Balloon Car Solving Real World Problems Mythological Super-Creature Mini Maker Design Challenge poster It's Youth-Led! 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work_lpuravvhbjcqbdoz27m3aqmpay	----	This Love Saves Lives: Community and Callaloo at Oxford University This Love Saves Lives: Community and Callaloo at Oxford University Stacy Parker Le Melle Callaloo, Volume 40, Number 1, Winter 2017, pp. 4-7 (Article) Published by Johns Hopkins University Press DOI: For additional information about this article [ Access provided at 6 Apr 2021 02:18 GMT from Carnegie Mellon University ] https://doi.org/10.1353/cal.2017.0040 https://muse.jhu.edu/article/705046 https://doi.org/10.1353/cal.2017.0040 https://muse.jhu.edu/article/705046 Callaloo 40.1 (2017) 4–6 THIS LOVE SAVES LIVES Community and Callaloo at Oxford University by Stacy Parker Le Melle On November 22, 2016, two weeks after Election Day, I returned to Oxford, England, for the first time in two decades since my year as a post-grad student. New York City felt like both safety and danger and I wanted a few days outside of everything Donald Trump, even if the escape was to one of the greatest sites of Western European truth-making, an operation that for centuries kept my kind at the bottom of every pyramid—even if we were the ones building them. There is always a behind-fortress-walls feeling when I visit Oxford. A literal one, of course, for so many colleges are small castles, but also the felt sense of having scaled walls created specifically to keep us out. My traveling friend Holly, a 5’2” woman of Italian extraction, kept finding her space invaded by boisterous groups of young English men in sweaters and tweed. This is their natural habitat, I told her, as if that were an excuse for not seeing her on the sidewalk, or for swamping her space at a café. Though I was struck that the only things that still looked the same to me after twenty years were the yellow- stone colleges, and the looks of the landed gentry youth. Yet inside our host castle, I found respite. Pembroke College hosted our assembly of Black writers, poets, and scholars gathered to celebrate Callaloo, the journal of African diaspora arts and letters. We suffered shellshock from the election results but we had each other, and created fellowship through panels, readings, dinners, and drinks. No matter the history of Oxford and its Black intellectuals, no matter the chilliness inside the confer- ence auditorium that pushed some to use coats as blankets, the gathering itself warmed me, reminded me, as Prof. Robert Reid-Pharr said, that we’ve been in bad political straits before, that this is the time for writers to live with our fear and still speak out. But the fear is no joke. Poet Vievee Francis articulated a primal fear during the Creative Writing Workshop panel. Francis, who has co-led the annual Callaloo Creative Writing Workshop with Pulitizer Prize winner Greg Pardlo for several years now, outlined the conventions that distinguished their poetry workshops. At one point she said the teachers would not “discourage individuals if they chose to write about roses on the trellis,” that “the individual is not a threat to the collective.” Threat. Yes. God. Francis wasn’t talking about the outside world, per se, but when aren’t we Black people resisting these constant efforts to categorize our beings as dangerous? There is that question for Black people, always. And the intensity of our pushback since Trayvon Martin’s murder—in the streets, in our arts, ending missives with those three simple words #BlackLivesMatter, three words that threaten those who feel they have something to lose when our full humanity is acknowledged. 5 C A L L A L O O This perception of Black threat to the American collective is always present. But what struck me about Francis’s point was the safety within a writing workshop—and really, safety within a Black gathering. She stated with conviction and power that within their assembly, there is support to write about “the roses on the trellis”—that is, to go where your desire and art takes you, not what you think the collective requires, for fear of being abandoned by the collective. Maybe we can’t get revolution all at once right now. Maybe we get revolution in 90-minute intervals. In spaces of love created by people who say, you, yes you, can bring your whole loving self here, we won’t grieve your rebellion against groupthink, we won’t read your independence as our death. This is my fear. I come to you, as myself, and you reject me. In some circumstances, that is OK, I can keep going, your rejection hurts but won’t stop me. But what if the rejecters are family members? Peers? Employers? Law enforcement? Community at large? Despite our beliefs that we are individuals in charge of our destinies, we rely on the communal, and it is no small thing to be expelled from those other humans that have loved us, protected us, gave us the means of survival in landscapes at turns hostile and indifferent. Which brings me back to Donald Trump. And what is to be our future under a Trump Administration. Already, I’ve seen three ultra-affluent Black celebrities say, “Let’s give Trump a chance.” Mega-mogul Oprah Winfrey did it. So did comedian Dave Chapelle at the end of his Saturday Night Live monologue, the first #SNL after the election. Basketball legend Shaquille O’Neill did, too. These are two Black men and one woman who, of course, have never escaped Blackness, and of course carry the psychic wounds of anti- Black discrimination. But, they must admit to themselves they now belong to a protected class—the rich. And not just the rich. The cool Black rich. The kind of Black people that, if pulled over by police, would more likely be greeted with smiles and requests for selfies. They must admit, even if it’s difficult—or easy, I don’t know their hearts—that they are not of the folk anymore, that they will not face the same gamut of tripwires and harassments. They must not forget those who have not followed them past those fortress gates. They should do this for morality’s sake. But if that’s not enough motivation, they must heed this everlasting truth: no fortress is perfect. If the city burns, your barricades won’t hold. I write this on December 1, 2016. Already, I’ve seen circulated a “Dangerous Profes- sors” list. I’ve seen a Rutgers Professor, after tweeting a “dangerous” tweet, picked up by NYPD and sent to Bellevue Hospital for a psychological evaluation. I’ve seen Trump advisor Kellyanne Conway go on national television and warn popular vote winner Hillary Clinton that Trump had been “gracious” in discontinuing his call to arrest her. I still can’t believe the GOP nominee threatened his opponent with jail, making clear for all dissidents that jail could be in their future, too. I live in New York City. This vertical city is home to so many warrens of detention. Rikers. The Tombs. ICE. Places we know about. Places we don’t. I live my life as bravely as I can, careful with my actions, for I am a mother, a wife, a daughter, and I must act with my family in mind. I always fear those handcuffs and guns who abuse their power. The man, or woman, in charge of the men with weaponry decides that we free people of America are threats to the collective, or, really, to the leader’s power, and I will find myself branded a terrorist. And with that my rights rescinded, my life bound by the dictates of state-drafted definition of sub-humanity, one that justifies their methods to silence and hurt me, kill me if needed. 6 C A L L A L O O I am small potatoes. But I need the big potatoes to be brave, too. I need them to stand up for us and speak out loudly. This becomes harder as the nightmares of Gestapo return. But how to resist despair? So many of us feel like Cassandras yet we see those around us drift into the Formation we fear—if not lockstep service, then huddled acquiescence. This essay is not to provide political strategy; as we make out the fast-shifting landscapes our strategies change and change. But let me offer this one suggestion for coping that I believe will help us persevere: community gathering. And not just any old gatherings. Ones with love, where, as Francis states, the individual is not a threat to the community. The Callaloo ConferenCe at Oxford offered this kind of gathering. But so did a reading I curated in Harlem on November 15th, one week after the election. Called “What Just Happened: Writers Respond to the 2016 Presidential Election,” several local writers shared essays, poems, and sit-down stories about how they’d experienced the last year. Five Black writers, an Afghan writer, a Guyanese writer, four women and three men, two of them Muslim, one from a Muslim-Christian family, two who identified openly as LGBT—all of us at Shrine Bar, surrounded by the album covers that decorated the ceiling and the walls, all of us leaning forward in our seats to hear their words in that packed house. All of the writers delivered that night. Ibrahim Abdul-Matin. Grace Aneiza Ali. Hajar Husseini. Max S. Gordon. Chris Prioleau. Morgan Jerkins. Hafizah Geter. I must make special note, however, of Ibrahim Abdul-Matin’s essay, for in speaking about our natural environment, and helping us see Mannahatta before the Europeans showed up, he pulled me out of the angst of this Manhattan moment, helped me touch the moist black earth that lived beneath the concrete and subway tunnels, connected us to currents that flow through and around us, regardless of us. I must also single out poet Hafizah Geter, who had a pointed reaction to those who thought this election result was white supremacy’s last gasp, that we need only wait for the old guard to die. She told us to look at where so much of the bullying and hate crimes were happening: in schools. Grammar schools and universities. The young learning from the old, as they always have. How she remarked that Trump had given the “green light” to all who didn’t want to “get with the program,” that those days of respect were over. Funny how the new program looks so much like the old program we’d fought like crazy to escape. The writers spoke of pain and anger. Yet, after 90 minutes, I was shocked. Not by what they said. But how I felt. How others there told me they felt. We somehow felt better. No logical reason to feel better. Nothing outside had changed. But inside, somehow, my batteries recharged. That slinking, sinking to the floor inertia had been beat back. Like church. The best of church when you’re welcomed in love and not judgment. I didn’t know what I’d do next. But I knew I’d do something because we came together. Because we got into the same room and churched. Just like we did at Oxford. Just like Dr. Charles Henry Rowell’s Callaloo does with its conferences and creative writing workshops every year. I can’t begin to express my gratitude for being included in these communities. They will save our lives. 
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work_lrkfpzotfzcmjpa4f7zclrbmqa	----	Diaspora without Homeland: A Review September/October 2010 |21 Diaspora without Homeland: A Review Diaspora without Homeland: Being Korean in Japan. Edited by Sonia Ryang and John Lie (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2009), 229 pp., ISBN 9780520098633 , US $29.95. Shota Ogawa∗ Diaspora without Homeland is a cross-disciplinary collection of articles that brings to- gether different, at times conflicting, perspectives on Koreans in Japan under a shared acknowledgment of the necessity to respond to the rapidly changing conditions sur- rounding them. Much has been written on Koreans in Japan since Changsoo Lee and George De Vos’s pioneering work Koreans in Japan: Ethnic Conflict and Accommoda- tion (University of California Press, 1981), partly as a reaction against the proliferation of Nihonjinron (literally ‘theories on the Japanese,’ popular literature that emphasizes the uniqueness of Japanese culture) in the 1980s. The historical presence of the ap- proximately 600,000 Koreans in Japan, particularly that of the so-called 460,000 “old- comers” (colonial subjects brought to Japan before 1945 and their descendents) became a living proof for scholars aiming to counter Nihonjinron theorists and their belief in Japan’s homogeneity. The book’s framing of the Koreans in Japan as a diasporic group marks a departure from the traditional treatment of them as Japan’s minorities. Due to Japan’s jus san- guineous nationality law, even Japan-born descendents of “old comer” Koreans are ex- cluded from national membership which renders the term “Japan’s minority” problem- atic. The turn to “diaspora” stresses the group’s exteriority to Japan, but also offers an escape from the discourse that prescribes assimilation and naturalization as the condi- tion for any improvements of the group’s status. The co-editors Sonia Ryang and John Lie insist on the book’s heterogeneity which purportedly resists an “academic resolu- tion” over political differences. Faithful to this spirit, the book opens with Ryang’s in- troduction and her separate chapter which stress the vulnerability that comes with Kore- ans’ exclusion from Japan’s polity and ends with Lie’s counter-argument that urges the readers to look beyond the clichéd image as “the oppressed and pathetic” colonial vic- tims toward their future that exists in Japan. The book draws its strength from its highly ambiguous definition of diaspora that highlights the discontinuous relation Koreans in Japan have to existing nation-states as well as to the very label of “Koreans in Japan.” Most contributors thus engage the discourses of diaspora critically, which marks the book’s departure from its closest predecessor, the special issues of Korean and Korean American Studies Bulletin (Vol 11,12, 2000, 2001), also featuring Ryang and Lie, which literally mapped out the Korean diaspora – the fourth largest in the world as the issue editor Hesung Chun Koh stresses – in sections that are divided according to four large Korean diasporas in the United States, Japan, China, and Central Asia. Ryang qualifies the book’s turn to diaspora by defining diasporic discourses as het- erogeneous, or “promiscuous” sets of theories that destabilize their own parameters (2). ∗ Shoto Ogawa is a graduate student at the University of Rochester (Email: shota.ogawa@gmail.com). 22 | Journal of Contemporary Eastern Asia, Volume 9, No.2 To discuss Koreans in Japan as diasporic people is thus different from framing them within the discourse of the “Korean diasporas” as Koh’s special issues did. Ryang iden- tifies two models of diaspora studies: the “classical” model of diaspora studies exempli- fied by the Jewish Diaspora founded on “a strong sense of connection to home;” and the newer “cultural studies” model which stresses the “on-going crisis of identity” related to “the loss of an original homeland” (2). While her notion of the “promiscuous” diaspora as well as the use of terms such as “routes” suggest her bias toward the “cultural stud- ies” mode of James Clifford and Paul Gilroy, she aims to carve out a middle ground based on the equal measure of emphasis both models place on the idea of a lost home- land. To this extent, Ryang’s investment in the notion of diaspora should be understood differently from the popular idea of “Korean diasporas” which frames heterogeneous diasporas as satellite communities of Korea proper, and also from an expansive interpre- tation of diaspora formed around various forms of displacement not necessarily away from “homeland.” Ryang’s investment in the idea of “homeland” is peculiar given that much of the contemporary writing on Koreans in Japan attempts to circumvent the problem of the North and South division of Korea which traditionally ran deep in the Korean communi- ties of Japan. This trend has informed the choice of terms used to denote the group. The traditional term zainichi chosenjin, which technically denoted “Koreans” in Japan, gradually came to refer to North Koreans in Japan while a separate term zainichi kanko- kujin was coined for South Koreans. In order to avoid the impression of political bias, scholars and the public prefer to use the shortened version: zainichi, simply meaning “in Japan” without the subject. Among the contributors to Diaspora without Homeland, the trend to shy away from homeland-orientation (sokoku shiko) is evident in Youngmi Lim’s case study on naturalized Koreans (“Korean Roots and Zainichi Routes”). Lim shows her commitment to this by conducting her fieldwork without using “homeland State-based organizational channels” such as Chongryun and Mindan (organizations with affiliations to North and South Korea respectively. We find a hint for understanding Ryang’s seemingly anachronistic turn to “home- land” in her chapter contribution titled “Visible and Vulnerable: The Predicament of Koreans in Japan.” The chapter is evidently a hastily written piece, prompted by an im- pending sense of emergency in the face of the deteriorating environment for Koreans in Japan following Kim Jon-il’s surprise admission of kidnapping a total of thirteen Japa- nese civilians in 2002. This so-called 9/17 crisis caused a sharp increase in hate crimes against Koreans in Japan – most notably against female students of schools run by Chongryun (the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan), whose ethnic school uniforms make them highly visible and vulnerable, while the male students are able to pass for Japanese in their Japanese-style school uniforms. Alarmed by the me- dia’s labeling of Chongryun students as “loyal followers of the Kim regime,” Ryang asserts that the students as well as most Chongryun employees and associated members are “accidental affiliates” of Chongryun, rather than Kim’s sympathizers by choice (64). The deteriorating tolerance toward anyone affiliated with Chongryun compels Ryang to make a contradictory move to question the capacity of a country with such “deep and profound” racism as Japan to host diasporic communities. Diaspora in this context is no longer a descriptive term, but a utopian, unrealized horizon, akin to Ryang’s notion of “homeland” that must always remain an idea (79). The moment the “homeland” be- comes conflated with an actual place such as North Korea – as it was the case in the 1980s when Chongryun association members were at last allowed to travel abroad in- September/October 2010 | 23 cluding to their “glorious socialist fatherland“ – the diaspora loses its appeal. The thou- sands who visited North Korea had to confront the gap between the idealized “father- land,” perpetuated through Chongryun propaganda, and the actual impoverished and hierarchical country. The travel back to the “homeland,” which Chongryun avidly en- couraged, ironically diminished Chongryun’s authority and sped its decline (66-67). The two chapters by Mark E. Caprio and Yu Jia, and Tessa Morris-Suzuki add an- other dimension to diaspora discourses through their research which spans multiple countries. Despite the title, “Occupations of Korea and Japan and the Origins of the Ko- rean Diaspora in Japan,” Caprio and Jia prompt us to look further back to the pre- Occupation history wherein U.S. intelligence agency activities resulted in the “origin” of the Korean diaspora. They cite fascinating testimonies (collected by the U.S. military in preparation for their postwar policies) by Korean prisoners of war who had fought in the Japanese army. The U.S. officials appear to have been successful in eliciting honest comments from the Korean POWs regarding the degrees of hatred Korean people felt toward the Japanese, Koreans working for the Japanese police, and those working for the Japanese in other capacities. While these testimonies offer important insights, it would add another dimension to the study of Korean diasporas if it was stated in what language these interviews were conducted and whether there were any Koreans (or Japanese) in the U.S. involved in the process. Despite these intelligence activities, how- ever, the rest of the chapter makes clear that the Occupation eventually conformed to the Japanese administration’s treatment of Koreans in Japan and Korean nationals as communist elements. Tessa Morris-Suzuki’s chapter, “Freedom and Homecoming: Naratives of Migra- tion in the Repatriation of Zainichi Koreans to North Korea,” complicates the book’s focus on diaspora through her historiographical analysis of the “repatriation” of some 90,000 Koreans and their Japanese family members from Japan to North Korea between 1959 and 1984. The rhetoric of “homecoming,” on which diasporic discourses are founded, has naturalized the “repatriation” even though the great majority of the “repa- triated” were from the southern part of the Korean peninsula (40). Morris-Suzuki raises the “age-old conundrum of freedom versus determinism,” which is central to so many historical narratives of migration. The boundary between voluntary migration and im- posed relocation becomes blurred through Morris-Suzuki’s case studies such as those of a woman who secured parole on the condition of repatriating, a Japanese woman sepa- rated from her Korean spouse who chose to “repatriate” for her son’s well-being, and a psychiatric ward escapee who claimed to have been unjustly hospitalized despite being sane. The individual stories are corroborated by Morris-Suzuki’s “another story” method woven from public documents, including newly declassified records kept by the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC). What emerges is a continuity be- tween Capri and Jia’s study of the postwar Yoshida government’s determination to “rid” Japan of Koreans and the repatriation project which eventually won the support of ICRC and consequently the status of “a praiseworthy act of humanitarianism” (46). The repatriated Koreans did not find “home,” but a further complication of their diasporic condition. The conundrum of free choice versus imposed relocation is also evident in the complexity involved in the visibility/vulnerability of the female students in Ryang’s study. The visibly Korean outfit is imposed on the Female Chongryun students today due to a deep patriarchal bias running through Chongryun. An historical investigation into the origin of the female uniforms, however, complicates the picture, for the uni- 24 | Journal of Contemporary Eastern Asia, Volume 9, No.2 forms were originally designed by a group of female students in order to make their presence visible in the hitherto male-dominated sphere of higher education. Youngmi Lim’s “Korean Roots and Zainichi Routes: the Invisible Diaspora among Naturalized Japanese of Korean Descent” also addresses the tension between individual and collective dimensions, but probes more deeply in order to question the limits of di- aspora discourses. Lim’s contribution is important, first of all, for considering the tradi- tionally overlooked group of Koreans who have naturalized to Japanese and noting the alienation these Koreans experience from both Japanese society and the Korean com- munity in Japan. Lim observes most scholars’ subconscious bias toward “organized” zainichi Koreans who are more visible and accessible than the perspectives of the “in- visible diaspora” exemplified by naturalized ex-Zainichi. This criticism is applicable to discourse on diaspora even in its most expansive form so long as it necessitates some notion of “diasporic consciousness.” Such consciousness is absent in the subjects of Lim’s study who “do not imagine themselves part of the zainichi diaspora” even though they “have not found a secure ‘homeland’ in their country of birth and residence over generations” (103). Ultimately, for Lim, diaspora is a “theoretical tool” which allows her to resist the conventional teleological scenario of immigration that assumes all im- migrants to sooner or later follow the trajectory of assimilation (104). Lim persuasively illustrates the problems in Ryang’s ambiguous notion of diaspora, which mystifies its own exclusive structure behind its supposedly open-ended indeterminacy. From the in- terviews with Koreans with Japanese nationality, however, their position appears so dif- ferent from the Koreans who insist on the notion of homeland that we are left to wonder what we are gaining from considering the two groups under the rubric of diaspora. The chapters by Kashiwazaki (“The Foreigner Category for Koreans in Japan: Op- portunities and Restraints”) and Erin Aeran Chung (“The Politics of Contingent Citizen- ship: Korean Political Engagement in Japan and the United States’) complicate the issue of the exteriority of Koreans in Japan in relation to full membership in Japanese society. Kashiwazaki persuasively demonstrates the uniquely positive value Koreans are able to confer upon their “outsider” status by actively playing on their “foreignness” by identi- fying with people from various foreign countries. Chung, on the other hand, offers a fascinating comparative study between Koreans in Japan and America and juxtaposes the contingent citizenship and vocal foreignness. The two chapters suggest a more posi- tive reassessment of exteriority than Ryang’s dystopian assessment of the post-9/17 po- litical climate surrounding the largely assimilated Koreans in Japan who nonetheless find themselves excluded from Japanese state protection. Kashiwazaki notes the numer- ous “instances in which the word foreigner (gaikokujin) is being used as a positive cate- gorical term” in the present political climate: Foreigners are residents, too, Living to- gether with foreigners, and Local electoral rights for resident foreigners (121) Such identification with foreignness is peculiar since Japan-born Koreans are culturally closer to the Japanese than to other foreigners. Through historical analysis, Kashiwazaki dem- onstrates that Koreans in Japan have always strategically employed a rhetoric of for- eignness. In the immediate postwar years, the U.S. Occupation Command and the Japanese government placed Koreans in a legal gray area with rights between those of Allied citi- zens and Japanese subjects so that they could be treated at once as Japanese nationals in terms of criminal jurisdiction (including war crime trials) and as foreign nationals under the new immigration control devices symbolized by their vulnerability to forced depor- tation. In such circumstances, the identification with “foreignness” was a “resistance September/October 2010 | 25 against the daisangokujin (the third-country national) category” (130). Today, the “for- eign” category is effectively employed in local-level activism that circumvents the North-South or newcomer-oldcomer divides. As Kashiwazaki notes, foreign nationals regardless of birthplace or degree of cultural assimilation share many hurdles including housing discrimination and compulsory finger-printing as part of Alien Registration (138). Her chapter, however, does not elaborate on the limits of the collective identifica- tion with foreignness in relation to the post-9/17 climate of intolerance symbolized by the Abe government’s clampdown on Chongryun through searches and arrests as well as the Tokyo Governor Ishihara Shintaro’s apparent instruction to Japanese schools to cease their interactions with Chongryun schools (75). Even the implication of Abe’s at- tempt to revise the so-called “no-war” clause of the Japanese Constitution rings differ- ently for “foreigners” from countries such as the U.S. and Chongryun-affiliated Koreans. This revision would pave the way for a potential military clash between Japan and North Korea which would place Chongryun Koreans in an even more vulnerable posi- tion as enemy sympathizers. Chung’s reevaluation of zainichi Koreans’ non-Japanese status is based on her analysis of the key events in 1952 that changed the fates of Koreans in Japan and the United States. When the San Francisco Treaty came into effect in 1952, all Koreans in Japan who were unilaterally made Japanese subjects through colonial policy lost that Japanese nationality. In the same year, the McCarran-Walter Act in the U.S. removed racial limitations to naturalization, thereby making all Koreans in the U.S. potential citi- zens. Despite the more privileged legal status of Koreans in the U.S., it was curiously the Koreans in Japan that gained “greater political visibility as foreign residents than Korean Americans have as citizens or potential citizens” (165). To understand this co- nundrum, Chung proposes examining citizenship as always being contingent upon cer- tain categories (race, ethnicity, class, etc.), individual qualifications (language, past conduct, etc.) and particular historical circumstances such as the Cold War (150-151). For Koreans both in Japan and the U.S., “the Cold War made the costs of citizenship especially high,” but while the majority of Koreans in the U.S. gained contingent citi- zenship, the naturalization rate is still low for Koreans in Japan who, despite their non- citizen status, “emerged as leaders of the burgeoning immigrant community and are of- ten at the center of public debates on immigrant incorporation, Japanese citizenship, and Japanese national identity (147, 149). Chung offers a radical yet important perspective that citizenship does not necessarily protect minority groups and conversely, that “legal citizenship status is not always a requirement for citizenship rights and practices” (152). After Chung’s radical reassessment of the exteriority of Koreans in Japan, John Lie’s final chapter, “The End of the Road? The Post-Zainichi Generation,” is a sober depiction of what he describes as the “prosaic world” that zainichi Koreans inhabit to- day, free from the direct racism and severe poverty they used to experience. Lie’s chap- ter sits uncomfortably at the closing of the book since his views are directly opposed to those of the other contributors. While it is important to acknowledge the improved status of Koreans in Japan, Lie’s generalized assessment of the waning legacy of “colo- nial past and colonial racism” does not resolve concerns over the increasingly hostile environment for Chongryun members or the inability of naturalized Koreans to feel “at home” even after gaining Japanese citizenship (168). Lie highlights the differences among zainichi Koreans that are exemplified by the diametrically opposed views of Kang Sang-jung and Tei Taikin, two vocal ethnic Korean intellectuals. Kang seeks to claim a place for zainichi Koreans outside the Japan-Korea binary in favor of the dias- 26 | Journal of Contemporary Eastern Asia, Volume 9, No.2 poric identity, while Tei advocates for naturalization. It is hard not to notice a similar divide running between Ryang and Lie. Kang and Ryang both envision diasporic sub- jectivity outside nation states, but in the discursive and utopian site of the first genera- tion’s memory (Kang) or the idea of “homeland” (Ryang). Lie does not openly identify with Tei, but he shares Tei’s reservation towards identity based on past memory and his preference for an open-ended notion of an unpredictable future self. Lie is right to cau- tion us of the danger of “facile sociological generalizations,” but his turn to individual- ism and open future possibilities appears equally facile. As long as we are writ- ing/reading about, rather than living as, Koreans in Japan, we cannot seek an easy way out of grappling with Morris-Suzuki’s conundrum of individualism versus determin- ism. 
work_lru6xbxmcnbwtmrcf4wx5i4ive	----	Violent and non­violent crimes against sex  workers : the influence of the sex market  on reporting practices in the United  Kingdom Connelly, LJ, Kamerade, D and Sanders, T http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0886260518780782 Title Violent and non­violent crimes against sex workers : the influence of the  sex market on reporting practices in the United Kingdom Authors Connelly, LJ, Kamerade, D and Sanders, T Type Article URL This version is available at: http://usir.salford.ac.uk/id/eprint/46973/ Published Date 2018 USIR is a digital collection of the research output of the University of Salford. Where copyright  permits, full text material held in the repository is made freely available online and can be read,  downloaded and copied for non­commercial private study or research purposes. Please check the  manuscript for any further copyright restrictions. For more information, including our policy and submission procedure, please contact the Repository Team at: usir@salford.ac.uk. mailto:usir@salford.ac.uk 1 Violent and non-violent crimes against sex workers: The influence of the sex market on reporting practices in the United Kingdom Abstract Previous research has shown that sex workers experience extremely high rates of victimization but are often reluctant to report their experiences to the police. This paper explores how the markets in which sex workers operate in the United Kingdom impact upon the violent and non-violent crimes they report to a national support organization and their willingness to report victimization to the police. We use a secondary quantitative data analysis of 2,056 crime reports submitted to the UK National Ugly Mugs (NUM) scheme between 2012 and 2016. The findings indicate that although violence is the most common crime type reported to NUM, sex workers operating in different markets report varying relative proportions of different types of victimization. We also argue that there is some variation in the level of willingness to share reports with the police across the different sex markets, even when the type crime, presence of violence, and other variables are taken into account. Our finding that street sex workers are most likely to report victimization directly to the police challenges previously held assumptions that criminalization is the key factor preventing sex workers from engaging with the police. Key words: sex work; violence; policing; reported victimization Facilitated by processes of globalization, the commercial sex industries have in recent years grown in size, diversified in nature, and emerged as a more visible part of the global economy (Anon & Author C, 2010). These changes to the global sex industries have given rise to a growth in the levels of violence sex workers1 experience. Indeed, it has become almost axiomatic for researchers and practitioners alike to lament the enduring levels of violence against sex workers (Aids Alliances, 2017; Deering et al., 1 In this article, we use the term ‘sex worker’ to describe those engaged in commercial sex work since it is the term commonly used by National Ugly Mugs and its membership, including its self-identifying sex worker members. It is important to recognise, however, that the language one uses to describe the global sex industries and those working within them is not politically neutral. Although the term ‘sex worker’ is contentious – with some feminists preferring instead to use the terms ‘prostituted women’ and/or ‘person engaged in commercial sex work’ – we use it here to acknowledge the global movement for the (labor) rights of sex workers. 2 2014; Lyons et al., 2015). Some feminists assert that prostitution is a form of violence against women (Jeffreys, 1997; Raymond, 1998), and buyers of sex demonstrate more sexually aggressive values and behaviours than men who do not purchase sex (Farley et al., 2015). Other scholars – many of whom view sex work as a legitimate form of labour – reject the view that the sex industry is inherently violent. Instead, they consider high levels of victimization to be the product of state regulation, particularly policies which criminalize clients and/or other aspects of the sex industry (Ellison, 2015; Krüsi et al., 2014; Levy & Jakobsson, 2014). They contend that the majority of sex workers are rational agents who exercise choice and display resilience within the structures exerted upon them (Author A et al., 2016; Shdaimah & Leon, 2015), and only a minority of clients are violent (Kinnell, 2008). While these debates foreground much of the research into the lived experiences of sex workers, there exists agreement that sex workers are often perceived by offenders to represent ‘easy targets’ (Canter, Ioannou & Youngs, 2016; van der Meulen & Valverde, 2013). Many offenders operate with the belief that sex workers will not report their victimization to the police or if they do, the police will not take their report seriously (Hubbard, 2006; Krüsi et al., 2014). The criminalization of the street sex market in the UK is understood to hinder further the reporting and investigation of crimes against sex workers (Kinnell, 2004), whilst its spatial and environmental conditions shape experiences of violence (Maher, Pickering & Gerard, 2013). Research has therefore established that street sex workers experience higher rates of violence than those working in indoor markets (Church et al., 2001; Kinnell, 1993; Stalans & Finn, 2016). In this article, we present findings from secondary quantitative bivariate and multivariate data analyses of 2,056 crime reports submitted between 2012 and 2016 to the UK National Ugly Mugs (NUM) scheme. NUM is a non-profit organisation which collates reports of victimization from sex workers and shares information about dangerous clients across its membership and/or with the police. This paper seeks to answer two key questions: i) How do the different sex markets in the UK effect what crimes are reported to NUM? ii) What effect do the different sex markets in the UK have on sex workers’ willingness to report victimization to the police? This paper makes an important empirical contribution. Whilst previous research has focused largely on localised samples of street sex workers to explore experiences of violent crime, this paper is 3 this first to use a large, national sample to explore reporting practices around both violent and non- violent crime, as well as reported victimization across a range of sex markets. In so doing, we make a theoretical contribution by encouraging academic understandings of sex workers to move beyond generalisations about violent trends and instead, to look at the nuanced differences that arise in the reporting behaviours of sex workers operating across different sex markets. We argue that there is a significant relationship between sex market and the type of crime reported, with sex workers in different markets reporting varying relative proportions of different types of victimization. We also argue that street sex workers are more likely to report their victimization to the police than sex workers operating in other sex markets, regardless of the type or severity of the crime they report, whether the crime is violent or non-violent in nature, the number of perpetrators involved, or the gender of the sex worker. It therefore suggests that the police, and practitioners working to support sex workers, need to review their ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach to addressing violence against sex workers. Instead, their responses must recognise that even sex workers working legally in the UK experience significant barriers to reporting victimization. The paper begins by reviewing existing literature, detailing what is already known about reported crimes against sex workers. Next, it describes the NUM scheme and the methodology used in this study. We then examine the results, before presenting a discussion that focuses on the centrality of the sex market as a key variable which can be related to the type of crimes that sex workers report to NUM and their willingness to engage with the police. Current Perspectives on Sex Worker Victimization Research shows that the extent of physical, sexual and emotional violence against sex workers is extremely high, both in the UK and globally. In a systematic review of research evidence from 41 peer- reviewed articles, Deering et al., (2014) reported that workplace violence is experienced globally by 45-75% of sex workers over their lifetime. In the UK, Kinnell (1993) found that of the 110 women involved in sex work who she interviewed in Birmingham, 68% had experienced violence during the commission of their work. Research carried out in another large city in the UK, Liverpool, found that 80% of sex workers had experienced work-based violence (Campbell & Stoops, 2010). A similar 4 finding emerged from a survey of 240 sex workers, this time across three cities in the UK, which found that 63% had experienced violence in their lifetime (Barnard et al., 2002). Mortality rates are also significantly greater amongst sex workers than in the general population (Goodyear & Cusick, 2007), with one UK-based study indicating that female sex workers are twelve times more likely to be murdered than women from the general population (Ward, Day & Weber, 1999). When compared to homicide rates amongst women working in bars or catering – occupations believed to have high mortality ratios – sex working women are approximately five times more likely to be murdered (Author C et al., 2017). Serial killers are also known to have targeted women on the basis of their involvement in the sex industry, such as the ‘Green River Killer’ in the US in the 1980s and 1990s, and the ‘Ipswich Murderer’ in the UK in 2006. Yet levels of violence are not experienced equally across all sectors of the sex industry. The smallest of the UK sex markets, the outdoor/street market is known to be at very high risk of violence. Comparatively, indoor markets – which include those working in brothels, saunas and parlours, as well as sex workers working independently – are understood to be less ‘risky’ (Kinnell, 2004, 2008; O’Neill et al., 2008; Phipps, 2013). In the aforementioned survey conducted across three UK cities, for example, 50% of street sex workers had experienced violence in the past six months compared to 26% of indoor workers (Church et al., 2001). Surratt et al., (2004) contend that street sex workers are engaged in a social milieu wherein subcultures of violence are commonplace: violence is perpetrated not only by clients but also ‘pimps’, pseudo-clients, vigilantes and other sex workers. They also experience higher levels of stigmatization than their indoor counterparts, even in countries such as New Zealand where sex work is decriminalized (Armstrong, 2016). Although rates of violence are generally lower in the indoor markets, there is a greater risk of robbery (Brooks-Gordon, 2006), which may be due to the greater likelihood of monies kept on the property. Author C (2005) notes, however, that a professionalized occupational culture exists within indoor markets, which operates in part to minimize harm. An additional factor that works to minimize violence for indoor sex workers is that they may form stronger bonds with their clients than street sex workers. Although, as Phipps (2013) points out, this increases their risk of stalking, with a small minority of clients developing problematic fixations on 5 indoor sex workers. Of course, sex workers’ experiences of violence are not only mediated by the sex market in which they operate but also by factors such as class, nationality, race and ethnicity, immigration status, gender and sexuality (Bernstein, 2007; Feis-Bryce et al., 2015; Scott et al., 2005). Accurate estimates of the prevalence of violence against sex workers are no doubt difficult to obtain. Many incidents of violent crimes against sex workers are not reported to the police, meaning an unknown proportion comprises the dark figure of crime (Church et al., 2001). Dodd’s (2002 in Toynbee Hall, 2009) survey of 110 female street sex workers, for example, highlighted that 69% report ‘no or hardly any’ incidents of victimization to the police. Some of the same factors that discourage the public from reporting victimization to the police apply to sex workers (Crime Survey for England and Wales, 2017): they assume the police will not care about or believe their claim to victimization; the police will not take their claim seriously; and/or the criminal justice system will be ineffective in prosecuting offenders (Barnard et al., 2002; Dodd, 2002 in Toynbee Hall, 2009). Rape myth attitudes, which assume that sex workers have given up their right to refuse sex, are common towards sex workers (Monto & Hotaling, 2001; Miller & Schwartz, 1995) and may serve as an additional barrier to reporting victimization. In countries where sex work is (partially) criminalized, sex workers may also be deterred from reporting victimization to the police by their fear of arrest, the arrest of their co-workers or clients, the closure of the premises in which they work, and/or public identification (Boff, 2012; Brooks- Gordon, 2006; Campbell, 2015). Enduring societal attitudes of intolerance and a culture of distaste towards sex workers, particularly those working on the street, may also serve to deter the reporting of victimization (Author C & Anon, 2007; Surrat et al., 2004). Indeed, for Lowman (2000), society constructs sex workers through a ‘discourse of disposability’ as non-citizens. This negative construction of sex workers is promulgated by core institutions such as the police and the media. It appears in official discourses and is expressed by much of the public, and operates to ‘Other’ sex workers by positioning them as immoral, dangerous and dirty. Some studies have employed self-report research methods to circumvent the problems inherent to police recorded crime reports (Barnard et al., 2002; Church et al., 2001; Campbell & Stoops, 2010; Kinnell, 1993). These studies have successfully drawn attention to prevalence of violence against sex 6 workers, differences in levels of violence between sex markets, and the poor relationship between sex workers and the police. Yet they are based on small (convenience) samples and/or have concentrated on particular regional locations. This article is the first to use a large, national data set to explore reported violent and non-violent crimes across different sex markets. While previous research has focused on rates of violence and the nature of the violence sex workers experience, this paper examines reported victimization. Indeed, sex workers’ decisions about whether and what to report – their reporting practices – tell us a great deal about their trust in support organisations and the police. This article makes a theoretical contribution by extending the discussion from its traditional focus on violence in the street sex market to examine reported violence alongside other forms of reported victimization, across a range of sex markets. We therefore contribute to the literature on violence against sex workers (and the broader field of violence against women) by responding to two significant gaps in previous analysis: i) how the sex market may influence violent and non-violent crimes reported to a national support organization; ii) how the sex market may influence sex workers’ willingness to engage with the police. We address these gaps empirically by using national data to highlights nuanced variations in the type of reported victimisation and willingness to engage with the police by sex market. Methods Data: National Ugly Mug Crime Incident Reports This paper uses a secondary quantitative analysis of crime incident reports submitted to the UK National Ugly Mugs (NUM) scheme over a four-year period between 2012 and 2016. With few exceptions (n =10), the crime reports submitted referred to incidents that had taken place within the sampled four- year period. Founded by the UK Network of Sex Work Projects (UKNSWP) in 2012, NUM is a non- profit organization initially funded by the Home Office for a one-year pilot. Members sign up to the scheme to facilitate the sharing of information about dangerous clients across NUM’s membership. They can confidentially report victimization to NUM and this information is collated in one central database, from which members receive legally compliant email or text alerts from NUM about potentially dangerous clients. In December 2016, the membership of NUM was at an all-time high: 3,514 individual members; 539 projects offering frontline support to sex workers around sexual health, 7 wellbeing, housing, the law, and social welfare; and 221 escort sites/forums or indoor sex establishments. One of the key objectives of NUM is to support sex workers to report their victimization to the police, in order to improve historically low rates of engagement in the criminal justice process. If the victim consents, NUM may share anonymous intelligence with the police through their national intelligence systems. The reports members submit to NUM capture information about: where and when an incident occurred, what happened, whether the incident involved violence, the perpetrator(s), and whether the member would like to report it to the police. The data the researchers received from NUM was in the form of a Microsoft Access database, which had been compiled by NUM staff from the crime reports submitted by NUM members. To protect the anonymity of members, any identifying characteristics (including age, race and ethnicity) had been removed from the data by NUM. Informed consent to use the data was obtained by NUM, with all NUM members notified before submitting a crime report that anonymized data may be used for research purposes.2 Sample A total of 2,227 reports were submitted to the NUM database between 16 July 2012 (the date the first report was submitted to NUM) and 21 July 2016. The sample for this research project was 2,056 separate crime reports since 171 reports were excluded: 166 reports (7.5%) in which the sex worker did not specify the sector in which they worked; and five reports (0.2%) about sex workers working across multiple sectors. Because of the lack of other variables describing the sex market, no imputation of missing values for these cases was used. Of these sampled crime reports, the majority were submitted to NUM by sex worker support projects (73.3%). Considerably fewer were submitted by sex workers themselves (21%), the police (4 %) or sex work establishments (0.9%). In a few cases the crime incident was reported jointly by the police and a support project (0.1%), and in some cases (0.6%) the reportee was anonymous or not specified on the crime report. 2 This project received ethical approval from the University of Leeds on 8 July 2016 [Ref: LTSSP-029] 8 Variables3 The ‘sex market’ variable described the type of sex work that the victim identified as engaged in on the crime report submitted to NUM. It was a categorical variable coded as: 0 - street sex market; 1 - traditional indoor sex market (i.e. brothel, sauna or parlour); 2 - escort workers operating through an agency; and 3 - independent or private sex workers. The victim could select more than one category, but only five victims did so. For clarity of analysis, these cases were excluded from the dataset. The ‘type of crime’ variable described the type of reported victimization as identified by the person completing the report. The ‘type of crime’ was recorded as a series of binary variables, each with two categories: 0 - no; 1- yes. The types of crime originally recorded included ‘violence’, ‘rape’, ‘attempted rape’, ‘robbery’, ‘attempted robbery’, ‘fraud’, ‘hate crime’, ‘stalking and harassment’, ‘condom removal’, and ‘refusal to wear a condom’. For the analyses in this paper, ‘rape’ and ‘attempted rape’, ‘robbery’ and ‘attempted robbery’, ‘refusal to use a condom’ and ‘removal of a condom’ were recoded together into three variables: ‘rape/attempted rape’, ‘robbery/attempted robbery’, and ‘condom refusal/removal’ as in the vast majority of cases (97-99%) both types of crime were reported for the same incident. Each crime incident could be reported in more than one of these categories: violent rape, for example, could be categorised by the reportee as both ‘rape’ and ‘violence’ and therefore, a single incident could be classified as more than one type of crime. All reported combinations of the type of crime were explored at the beginning of the analysis (see the results section). As this paper focuses on violence in crimes against sex workers, it also used a variable ‘presence of violence’ which measured whether violence was part of a crime incident reported. This variable had three categories: 0 - no violence involved; 1 - only violence; 2 - violence and another crime. The ‘number of perpetrators’ variable was an ordinal level of measurement, which described the number of perpetrators that were reported as being involved in the crime. Twenty-six cases (1.2% of the sample) were excluded from the analyses as the number of perpetrators was reported either as zero or as ‘unknown’. This was the only control variable with missing values. Pairwise exclusion (available 3 For the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the analyses see Appendix A. 9 case analysis) was used, excluding the cases only if they were missing the data required for the specific analysis. This exclusion method was used instead of imputing missing values because the proportion of missing values was low and our sample was too small for sophisticated imputation methods, such as maximum likelihood and the expectation-maximisation algorithm to produce normal, unbiased and efficient estimates (Jamshidian, 2009). The ‘report to police, anonymous consent’ variable measured whether the sex worker reporting the crime had given their consent for the crime report and their personal details to be shared anonymously by NUM with the police. This was a dichotomous variable: 0 - no anonymous consent given; 1- anonymous consent given. Anonymous consent meant that all identifying details were removed by NUM staff before any information was passed onto the police force local to the area in which the reported crime took place. The ‘report to police, full consent’ variable measured whether the sex worker reporting the crime had given their full consent for the report to be shared with the police. This variable was dichotomous: 0 - no full consent given; 1 - full consent given. Full consent was selected on the crime report if the victim had either already reported or intended to report the crime to the police themselves. Even when full consent was selected, NUM never shared full details about the victim with the police but rather, facilitated engagement between the two parties. ‘Gender of the victim’ measured the self-defined gender of the victim. It had four categories: 0 - female; 1 - male; 2 - transgender (male to female); 3 - not identified. None of the sex workers reporting to NUM identified as transgender (female to male). Method of Data Analysis To examine relationships between two categorical variables – for example, ‘sex market’ and ‘type of crime’, or between ‘sex market’ and ‘report to police, full consent’ – a chi-square test was used. To explore differences in the number of perpetrators a Kruskall-Wallis test was used because the number of perpetrators was an ordinal variable. Finally, logistic regression analysis was used to examine the relationships between the ‘sex market’ and the likelihood of the crime being reported to the police, after 10 taking into account: the type of crime, presence of violence, gender of the sex worker, and number of perpetrators. Results Sex Market: Victim Type and Gender More than half (60.9%, n=1,253) of the sampled crimes reported to NUM were committed against sex workers operating in the street sex market. Independent sex workers were the second most likely group to report a crime incident to NUM (29.7%, n=611), followed by sex workers working in indoor sex establishments such as brothels, saunas and parlours, whom accounted for 5.9% (n=121) of all reports. The numbers reporting victimization to NUM was lowest amongst those escorting through an agency (3.5%, n=71). In terms of gender, the vast majority (93.9%) of the victims defined as ‘female’. Only 4.3% of victims defined as ‘male’ and only 1.3% defined as ‘transgender m-f’, whilst 0.5% did not specify their gender. Types of Crime and the Presence of Violence Violence was present in around half (46.1%) of the all crime incidents reported to NUM. Violence on its own was reported in 15.4% of incidents, while in 30.6% of cases, violence was recorded alongside other crimes. A total of 168 different unique combinations of crime types were recorded in the sample. Table 1 presents the 31 combinations reported in ten or more cases. As can be seen, violence on its own was the most commonly reported type of crime against sex workers. Other frequently reported crimes included stalking and harassment, robbery with or without violence, and crimes categorised to NUM by the reportee as ‘other crime’. Details about these ‘other crimes’ were provided by some reportees as free-text but were removed from the dataset to protect sex workers’ anonymity. Other combinations of crime were less common. This paper did not proceed with the analysis of all possible combinations separately as such analysis would lead to low statistical power and increase the likelihood of Type II error – the likelihood of not detecting differences that actually exist. Sex Market and Type of Crime 11 As can be seen in Table 2, the numbers reporting different types of victimization varied within the overall number of reports. Crimes involving violence were considerably more likely to be reported than other crimes; they constituted 46.1% of all reports in the sample. Other types of crime were reported less frequently; they represented only approximately one-fifth of all reports. Condom removal or refusal was the least reported crime in the sample. Table 2 also shows that the relative proportions of the different types of victimization reported to NUM varied considerably by sex market. Street workers reported the greater number of violent incidents, followed by sex workers working in traditional indoor establishments (brothels, saunas and parlours). Those escorting through an agency and independent workers were considerably less likely to report violence. These differences in reported violence among the different sex markets were statistically significant ((X 2 (3, N= 2,056) =194.7, p<0.001)). Traditional indoor sex workers – those working in brothels, saunas and parlours – reported the greatest number of incidents of robbery or attempted robbery but independent sex workers were least likely to report this type of crime. Again, the differences in reported robbery among the various sex markets were statistically significant ((X 2 (3, N= 2,056) =30.5, p<0.001)). Independent sex workers reported considerably more stalking and harassment than sex workers operating in any other sex market. Approximately a third of all crime reports by independent sex workers were related to stalking and harassment, compared only to 13-15% of the reports from sex workers operating in other sex markets. These differences were statistically significant ((X 2 (3, N= 2,056) =98.3, p<0.001)). Street sex workers and agency escort workers reported the highest number of hate crime incidents; a fifth of all crime reports submitted by these workers were related to hate crime. The fewest reports of hate crime were submitted by sex workers operating in the traditional indoor market. The differences in reported hate crime by sex market were statistically significant ((X 2 (3, N= 2,056) =13.0, p=0.03)). 12 Agency escorts and independent sex workers were significantly more likely to report fraud than sex workers operating in the street sex market or in traditional indoor establishments ((X 2 (3, N= 2,056) =58.5, p<0.01)). Sex workers operating in three sex markets – traditional indoor, agency escort, and independent – were significant more likely to report removal or refusal of a condom than sex workers operating on the street ((X 2 (3, N= 2,056) =19.2, p<0.001)). Escorts and independent sex workers were also significantly more likely than street and traditional indoor sex workers to report other types of crime. There were no significant differences among the different sex markets in reported rape or attempted rape, and sexual assault. Figure 1 shows that sex workers operating in the street sex market were the least likely of all sex workers to report non-violent crimes. In contrast, independent sex workers were most likely to report non-violent crimes. It can also be seen that for crimes involving only violence, reports were considerably more likely to involve sex workers operating in the traditional indoor market and in the street sex market. Finally, street sex workers were most likely to report crimes involving both violence and other types of crime. The relationships between sex market and the presence of violence in reported crime was statistically significant ((X2(6, N= 2,056) =203.01, p<0.001)). Reporting to the Police According to Figure 2, sex workers were considerably more likely to give their consent for the crime report to be shared anonymously with the police than they were to give full consent to report to the police. On average, in nine out of ten cases, the sex worker had given anonymous consent, whilst only in two out of ten cases full consent had been given. Their willingness to give consent also varied significantly by sex market. In general, sex workers operating in the street market were most likely to give both anonymous and full consent for the crime report to be shared with the police. Independent sex workers were the least likely to give both types of consent. The differences between the sex markets 13 in reports to the police were statistically significant: for anonymous consent ((X 2 (3, N= 2,056) =49.9, p<0.001)) and for full consent ((X 2 (3, N= 2,056) =77.9, p<0.001)). In order to examine whether some groups of sex workers are more likely to report their victimization to the police, regardless of the type of the crime they report, or whether the crime is violent in nature, a logistic regression analysis was employed. Four regression models were performed (see Table 3). Models 1 and 3 explored the relationships between type of sex market and reporting a crime to police anonymously and with full consent, taking into account whether violence was present. Models 2 and 4 examined the relationships between type of sex market and reporting a crime to police depending on the crime type reported. All models control for gender and number of perpetrators. As can be seen in Table 3, the type of sex market where the victim works was related to their willingness to report to the police, even after other variables are taken into account. The negative regression (B) coefficients in Table 3, for all sex market categories and in all four models, indicate street sex workers are significantly more likely to give anonymous or full consent than sex workers operating in all other sex markets. Those escorting through an agency are the least likely to give anonymous consent to report to the police, while independent workers are the least likely to give full consent to report to the police. According to the odds ratios Ex(B)(inverted for easier interpretation) in Model 1, street sex workers are on average approximately 2.56, 3.33, and 2.86 times more likely than indoor establishment, escort workers and independent sex workers, respectively, to give anonymous consent to report the crime to police. These effect sizes remain similar in Model 2. In Model 3, before the crime type is controlled for, street sex workers are also 1.79, 1.89 and 2.94 times more likely than indoor establishment, escort workers and independent workers, respectively, to give full consent to report the crime to the police. When the type of crime is taken into account in Model 4, the effect size remains the same for indoor establishment workers: street sex workers are still 1.79 more likely to give their full consent than indoor establishment workers. However, in this model the effect size increased slightly for escort and independent sex workers. After controlling for the crime type, street workers were 2.03 times more likely than escort workers and 3.09 times more likely than independent sex workers to give full consent. 14 The regression results suggest it is not the type of crime reported, the number of perpetrators involved, the gender of the victim, or whether the crime was violent in nature but rather, the sex market in which the sex worker operates that has the greatest influence over willingness to engage with the police. Almost none of the ‘type of crime’ or ‘presence of violence’ variables had a significant relationship to reporting a crime to police. The exception was ‘other crimes’ (B=0.42): sex workers were 1.51 times as likely to give full consent to report a crime to the police if ‘other crime’ was present in the NUM report than if it was not. Another exception was hate crime (B=-0.32): sex workers were 1.38 times as likely to give full consent to report to the police if a hate crime was not present than if a crime was reported to NUM as a hate crime. Discussion This paper aimed to answer two key questions: i) How do the different sex markets in the UK effect what crimes are reported to NUM? ii) What effect do the different sex markets in the UK have on sex workers’ willingness to report victimization to the police? These two important questions have not been explored in previous published work and our findings therefore shed new light on the reporting behaviors of street and indoor sex workers. This study contributes to the understandings of reported victimization, and offers recommendations for improving the criminal justice and practitioner response to violence against sex workers. In relation to the first research question, we found a significant relationship between sex market and the type of crime reported to NUM. Sex workers operating in different sex markets report varying relative proportions of different types of victimization. Although violence is the most frequently reported crime type across all sex markets, street sex workers report the largest number of violent incidents. On the other hand, street sex workers report lower numbers of non-violent crimes, such as stalking and harassment, fraud, and condom refusal or removal than sex workers in other sex markets. Traditional indoor sex market (brothels, saunas and parlours) workers are more likely to report to NUM higher numbers of violent incidents and crimes involving robbery or attempted robbery. They are least likely to report stalking and harassment, hate crime, and fraud. Those escorting through an agency are more likely than other sex workers to report fraud and hate crime. Independent sex workers are the most 15 likely to report non-violent crimes, such as stalking and harassment, fraud, or condom removal and refusal but are least likely to report violent crime and robbery. In relation to the second research question, the findings indicate that the likelihood that the sex worker is willing to give their consent for NUM to share their report with the police is related to the sex market in which they work. This is true for both anonymous and full consent. Street sex workers are significantly more likely to give anonymous or full consent to report to the police than sex workers working in any of the other sex markets. Those escorting through an agency are the least likely to give anonymous consent to share their crime report with the police. Independent sex workers are the least likely to grant full consent. Other variables, such as type of crime, the presence of violence, gender, or the number of perpetrators involved are not significant predictors of whether the sex worker will give their anonymous of full consent to share the crime report with the police. Some of our findings are in keeping with previous research which shows that levels of reported violence are higher in the street market than the indoor sex markets (Church et al., 2001; Kinnell 2008; O’Neill et al., 2008; Surrat et al., 2004). Higher rates of violence against street sex workers may be a consequence of enduring societal stigmatization and marginalization, which enables the violence perpetrated against them to go unchallenged often. Frequently imagined in the public consciousness as immoral and transgressors of feminine norms (O’Neill, 1997), street sex workers have a long history of (state sanctioned) oppression. Indeed, street sex workers may be made vulnerable to violence by laws in the UK and elsewhere that criminalise the street sex market and thus relegate street workers to unsafe spaces (Author C, 2004), encourage risky working practices (Krüssi et al., 2014), and deter the reporting of victimization to the police (Boff, 2012). Lower rates of condom removal/refusal experienced by street sex worker may be explained by their (mis)construction in the public imagination as ‘vectors of disease’ (Day & Ward, 1997), which may deter clients from engaging in this form of victimization. Our findings that sex workers operating in brothels, saunas and parlors report higher numbers of robbery and attempted robbery than those working in the other sex markets may be explained by Brooks-Gordon’s (2006) claim that indoor premises are regarded by perpetrators as ‘soft targets’ for robbery due to the large volumes of cash kept on the premises and the low likelihood that these 16 establishments will report to the police. Levels of engagment with the police by indoor sex establishments may be mediated by their legal status. Indeed, Brents and Hausbeck (2005) report that in legalised brothels in Nevada, the police become the allies of brothel owners in minimizing disorder and keeping sex workers safe. Conversely, when brothels are illegal – such as those criminalised in the UK by the Sexual Offences Act 1957 – perpetrators of robbery may be aware that sex workers are unlikely to engage with the police due to fear of their own arrest or closure of their work places. The analysis we present, however, also makes a threefold contribution that offers new findings that extend empirical and theoretical understandings of reported violent and non-violent crimes in the sex industry. Firstly, we contribute to the literature on the victimization of independent sex workers. To date, little in known about the victimization that independent sex workers experience since research is only beginning to act on the realization that the majority of sex work is now mediated by, or provide through, digital technologies (Author C et al., 2016; Cunningham & Kendall, 2011; Jarvis-King, forthcoming; McClean, 2015;). It is perhaps unsurprising that independent sex workers report higher rates of stalking and harassment than other types of sex workers because they are more likely to have regular clients who may, occasionally, develop unnatural emotional attachments to the sex worker (Phipps, 2013), and strong attachements to their victim are a common charatceristic of stalkers (van de Aa, 2010). Secondly, there has to date been no known research which has explored reported crimes against agency escorts. Yet our research indicates they report more fraud and hate crime incidents to the innovative NUM scheme, suggesting their victimization may manifest in both financial and discriminatory forms. Thirdly, we challenge previous research that has highlighted that sex workers are often reluctant to engage with the police due to fear of arrest, fear of public identification or negative experiences of the police (Boff, 2012; Brooks-Gordon, 2006, Campbell, 2015). Klambauer (2017:13) uses qualitative interview data from both indoor and street workers in the UK to highlight how ‘consciousness of stigmatization’ dominates sex workers’ perceptions of interactions with the police. Our findings, however, suggest some variation in the level of willingness to share reports with the police across the 17 different sex markets, even when the type of crime, presence of violence and other variables are taken into account. That street sex workers are the most likely group to give their full consent for their report to be shared with the police and independent sex workers the least, sits in contrast to previously held assumptions that criminalization is the key factor preventing sex workers from engaging with the police (Dewey & St Germain 2014; Armstrong 2017). Making sense of this in the context of what has been a significant and high profile political attempt to ‘eradicate’ prostution in the past twenty years in the UK (Graham, 2017) requires an understanding of how the heterogenous sex industry works. Although street sex work is illegal in the UK and independent sex working is legal, it is clear from this dataset that it is street sex workers whom are more willing to report victimization to the police. Three key factors may explain this. Firstly, street sex workers are ‘targeted’ by services with a range of remits from providing support to ‘exit’ the sex industry, to welfare, safety and harm reduction. These remits are often steered by government policy and guidance, as well as funding obligations (Carline & Scoular, 2017; Author A, 2016). Therefore, there has been a historically higher level of engagement with support service by street sex workers than their independent counterparts (Anon & Author C, 2017; Penfold et al., 2004). These support agencies may act as an intermediary to facilitate street sex workers to engage with the police directly, and/or practitioners may liaise with NUM and the local police themselves as part of the reporting process. A second explanation for why street sex workers are the most likely group to report victimization to the police may be their closer proximity to the police. There is evidence that within the plurality of policing approaches adopted in the UK (Feis-Bryce, 2018), some progressive local authorities use multi-agency partnership models to ensure key police personnel have protection remits for street sex workers. Anon & Author C’s (2017) analysis of a managed zone in the UK demonstrates that Sex Work Liaison Officers are pivotal in improving reporting practices amongst street sex workers. As a result of the priority given to some street sex workers through these multi-agency partnerships, it may also be the case that this group have more regular contact with the police than those working independently and therefore have greater opportunity to report victimization. The physical availability 18 of street sex workers, in comparison to their more hidden indoor counterparts, may also mean they have far greater levels of contact with the police, as well as other (non-state) organizations. Thirdly, the lower numbers of reports from independent workers may be understood through both their unique working arrangements and their ambivalence to engaging with the police for fear of bringing attention to their income generating activities. Whilst street sex workers often have relationships with local support projects, independent workers typically do not. From a survey of internet-based sex workers, most of whom were independent workers, Author C, Author A and Anon (2016) found that the vast majority of respondents (n = 168/240; 70%) do not access a formalised sex work support projects and instead, find support from other sources, including online professional working forums. It may also be the case that independent sex workers, particularly those taking bookings via digital technologies, may have more information about violent clients that those working in the street sex market. They may have telephone numbers and/or email addresses, which they can then use personally or collectively – by sharing with NUM – to avoid future interactions with dangerous clients. The removed and hidden nature of indoor sex work, particularly independent escorting, also means the police will be seldom aware of these types of sex work taking place, unless where complaints are made from members of the community and/or intelligence suggests visits are required to address concerns around trafficking, undocumented workers, or other forms crime (Author A, 2016). In this regard independent workers usually operate ‘below the radar’ and are less inclined to contact the police about their experiences. They may fear not being believed by the police or judged by officers, and/or they may fear being publicly-identified as a sex worker (Boff, 2012; Campbell, 2015; Toynbee Hall, 2009). Limitations Although this paper makes an important empirical and theoretical contribution, there are, however, some limitations. Whilst our analysis indicates that street sex workers report higher levels of violence than those working in other sex markets, we cannot know from this dataset whether street sex workers actually experience more violence than their indoor counterparts. It may be the case that street sex workers are simply more likely to report violence to NUM and the police than indoor workers. As such, 19 these reporting practices may be, at least in part, the consequence of sex worker support projects – which are frequently targeted at street workers – encouraging street sex workers to engage with NUM. While our research identifies and offers potential explanations for variations in the relative proportions of different types of victimization and sex workers’ willingness to engage with the police between sex markets, new qualitative research could further elucidate these complex relationships. Indeed, future research in the form of semi-structured interviews could ask sex workers operating in different markets how and why the environment in which they work influences their reporting practices. Conclusion and Recommendations Through an analysis of a large national dataset of 2,056 crime incident report, we have demonstated that sex workers working in different sex markets report varying relative proportions of different types of vicitimization. Sex workers operating in the street market are the most likely to report victimization involving violence, whilst rates of non-violent crimes – such as stalking and harassment and fraud – are more likely to be reported to NUM by independent sex workers. The findings presented here also demonstrate that street sex workers are more willing to report their victimization to the police, either anonymously via NUM or directly themselves. The different ways in which the street and indoor markets operate has a significant bearing on the nature by which, and extent to which, different types of sex workers engage with the reporting process when they have experienced harm. As such, sex workers operating within the legal framework in the UK have no greater access to justice through the criminal justice system than those working outside of the law. Based upon these conclusions, we recommend that the police, and practitioners who work with sex workers in a social and health care context, refrain from adopting a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach to supporting sex workers to report victimization. Instead, their responses must recognise variations in reporting behaviors across the different sex markets, and redress indoor sex workers’ reluctance to engage with the police. This will require significant and long-term investments in the cultivation of sex worker-police relationships, which have historically been fractious. Specifically, there is a need for more proactive police work that seeks to accentuate the message the sex workers will be treated with respect and dignity if they come forward as a victim of violent or non-violent crime. Legal reform in 20 the UK is required, to facilitate sex workers to engage with the police, without fear of arrest. For academics, this research represents a call to ensure that in discussions around violence, generalisations and blanket statements are avoided: a great deal of heterogeneity exists in the reporting behaviours of sex workers operating across the different sex markets in the UK. References Aids Alliances (2017) Sex work and institutional violence. Retrieved from ttps://www.aidsalliance.org/news/889-sex-work-and-institutional-violence Armstrong, L. (2016). Who’s the slut, who’s the whore?: Street harassment in the workplace among female sex workers in New Zealand. Feminist Criminology, 11(3), 285-303. Armstrong, L. (2017). 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Types of crime: most common combinations Type of crime N % Violence 317 15.4 Other crime//crime type not specified 294 14.3 Stalking and harassment 166 8.1 Robbery/Attempted robbery and violence 156 7.6 Robbery/attempted robbery 99 4.8 Rape, attempted rape and violence 90 4.4 Hate crime and violence 78 3.8 Fraud 65 3.2 Hate crime 57 2.8 Rape and other unspecified crime 49 2.4 Hate, robbery/attempted robbery and violence 43 2.1 Sexual assault and violence 36 1.8 Rape, stalking and harassment 29 1.4 Hate crime and other crime 27 1.3 Sexual assault 26 1.3 Violence, stalking and harassment 25 1.2 Rape, robbery and violence 25 1.2 Violence, rape, and hate crime 18 .9 Condom removal & refusal to use condom 17 .8 Robbery and rape 16 .8 Violence, stalking and hate crime 14 .7 Hate crime 12 .6 Robbery/attempted robbery and hate crime 10 .5 Stalking, rape and hate crime 10 .5 Other combinations 377 18 Total N 2,227 27 Table 2. Reported crime type by the type of sex market Type of sex market Street sex workers Indoor establishment sex workers Escort workers Independent sex workers Average for all Reported crime type % % % % % Violence *** 57.1 52.9 33.8 23.4 46.1 Robbery/att. Robbery*** 23.7 31.4 19.7 14.2 21.2 Stalking& and harassment*** 12.6 13.2 15.5 31.3 18.3 Hate crime** 20 8.3 19.7 15.5 18 Other crime*** 17.5 16.5 22.5 25.9 20.1 Rape/attempted rape 19.6 14.9 15.5 15.1 17.8 Sexual Assault 7.1 9.9 5.6 7.2 7.2 Fraud*** 2.7 6.6 12.7 11 5.7 Condom (refusal or removal)** 3.9 5.8 7 7.9 5.3 Note: ***p<0.001; **p<0.01, *<0.05 for chi square test 28 Table 3. Logistic regression estimates Anonymous consent to report to the police Full consent to report to the police Model 1: Presence of violence Model 2: types of crime Model 3: Presence of violence Model 4: types of crime B (S.E) Exp(B) B (S.E.) Exp(B) B Exp(B) B (S.E.) Exp(B) Sex market (street sex worker) Indoor establishment sex worker workerworkersworkers -0.94 ** (0.31) 0.39 -0.947** (0.32) .39 - 0.57*(0.24) 0.56 -0.58*(0.24) .561 Escort worker -1.22***(0.36) 0.3 -1.24 ***(0.36) .29 -0.64* (0.32) 0.53 -0.71*(0.32) .493 Independent sex worker -1.05***(0.19) 0.35 -1.06***(0.19) .35 - 1.0***(0.1 5) 0.34 - 1.13***(0.15) .324 Gender of victim (female) Male -0.189(0.33) 0.83 -0.18 (1.07) 1.10 -.400 (0.35) 0.67 -.42 (0.36) .660 Trans (m to f) -0.053 (0.63) 0.95 -0.09 (1.12) .92 -.036 (0.56) 0.96 -.08 (0.57) .919 Not specified -0.124 (1.07) 0.88 -0.09 (1.23) 1.00 1.39* (0.63) 4.00 1.45* (0.63) 4.247 Presence of violence (not present) Only violence 0.004 (0.26) 1 .033 (0.15) 1.03 Violence and other crime 0.217 (0.21) 1.24 .154 (0.12) 1.17 Presence of type of crime (0- no, 1 –yes) Violence -0.03 (0.22) .97 0.06 (0.14) 1.057 Fraud -0.16 (0.37) .85 -.22 (0.25) .800 Other Crime 0.22(0.26) 1.25 0.42*** (0.18) 1.518 Rape/attempted rape 0.03 (0.22) 1.03 -.07 (0.14) .933 Condom refusal/removal -0.15 (0.35) .86 .38 (0.24) 1.465 Robbery/attempted robbery -0.03 (0.24) .97 -.08 (0.13) .927 Sexual assault -0.47 (0.39) .62 .08 (0.21) 1.082 Stalking and/or harassment -0.03 (0.26) .97 .10 (0.17) 1.105 Hate crime -0.20(0.24) .82 -0.32*(0.14) .723 Number of perpetrators 0.058 (0.1) 1.06 0.05 (0.11) 1.05 0.015 (0.05) 1.01 -.01(0.05) .993 Constant 2.00*** (0.36 7.4 2.31 (0.5) 10.04 1.18*** (0.25) 0.31 -1.16**(0.33) .31 N 2030 2030 2030 2030 R squared 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.08 Note: ***p<0.001; **p<0.001, *p<0.05 29 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 No violence Only violence Violence and other crimes Street sex workers Indoor establishment sex workers Escort workers Independent sex workers Average for all 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 Street sex workers Indoor establishment sex workers Escort workers Independent sex workers Average for all Anonymous consent Full consent Figure 1. Sex market type and the presence of violence in crime reporting Figure 2. Reporting to the police by the type of sex workers 30 Appendix A: Descriptive statistics Variable % Sex market (Street) 60.9 Brother/Sauna/Parlour 5.9 Escort through Agency 3.5 Private/independent 29.7 Type of crime (if reported) Violence 46.1 Rape/attempted rape 17.8 Sexual assault 21.2 Robbery/attempted robbery 21.2 Condom (refusal or removal) 5.3 Fraud 5.7 Stalking and harassment 18.3 Hate crime 18.3 Other crime (unspecified) 20.1 Presence of violence (No violence involved) 53.9 Only violence reported 15.4 Violence and another crime 30.6 Report to police, anonymous consent’ (yes) 91.6 Report to police, full consent’ (yes) 24.6 Gender of the victim (Female) 93.9 Male 4.3 Trans male to female 1.3 Not specified 0.5 Number of perpetrators (M=1.31, SD=0.98, min 1, max 15 
work_lsn4gvccivbwtim5u35sepizni	----	Hazards of Stigma: The Sexual and Physical Abuse of Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Adolescents in the United States and Canada Elizabeth M. Saewyc, Carol L. Skay, Sandra L. Pettingell, Elizabeth A. Reis, Linda Bearinger, Michael Resnick, Aileen Murphy, and Leigh Combs Some studies suggest lesbian, gay, and bisexual (LGB) teens are at higher risk than peers for violence at home, in school, and in the community. That can bring them into the child welfare system or services for runaway and homeless teens. This study compared self-reported experiences of sexual and physical abuse based on sexual orientation and gender in seven population- based surveys of youth. The authors used d- and age- adjusted odds of abuse to compare bisexual to hetero- sexual, mostly heterosexual, and gay and lesbian students. They also provide case studies to illustrate the experiences of such youth. Elizabeth M. Saewyc, PhD, RN, PHN, is Research Director, McCreary Centre Soci- ety, and Associate Professor, School of Nursing, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC, Canada; Carol L. Skay, PhD, is a Senior Research Associate, School of Nursing, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MI; Sandra L. Pettingell, PhD, is Research Associate, School of Nursing, University of Minnesota; Elizabeth A. Reis, MS, is Public Health Educator, Public Health Seattle-King County, Seattle, WA; Linda H. Bearinger, PhD, MS, RN, is Professor, School of Nursing, University ofMinne- 0009-4021/2006/030195-19 $3.00 © 2006 Child Welfare League of America 195 NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION 196 CHILD WELFARE • Vol. LXXXV, #2 • March/April Case 1. "Troy" was taken from his mother at age 5 be- cause of neglect and abuse. He has moved so often and been in so many foster care facilities that he has lost count. Until he met an openly gay teen at his latest foster home, he had no idea this was even a possibility. Troy really liked this boy; one thing led to another, and they ended up get- ting caught in the midst of a sexual experience, which was very embarrassing. His social worker thought it best the boys be separated, and placed Troy in a home with deeply religious conservative foster parents. Along with other religious rituals that were supposed to eliminate his de- sire for men, his foster parents' church tried exorcism. Negative messages toward sexual minority groups arecommon across North American society: from the constant antigay pejoratives heard in high school hallways, to the bitter protests at school board meetings against bullying policies that specifically include antigay harassment; in sermons at local places of worship and in major statements by the leaders of some religious denominations; in arguments before the courts, as well as debates in the U.S. Congress and Canadian House of Commons; and recently, in the media's wide coverage of cam- paigns against gay marriage, as well as its gratuitous humor in sitcoms and commercials at gay people's expense. In nearly ev- ery social arena, identifying as lesbian, gay, or bisexual (LGB) carries a burden of stigma and societal disapproval. That disap- proval is not always limited to words; research has identified pervasive discrimination experienced by sexual minority adults in U.S. employment, housing, and social interactions nationwide (Mays & Cochran, 2001), as well as hate crimes ranging from prop- erty damage to murder (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2004). sota; Michael Resnick, PhD, is Professor, Division of Adolescent Health, Department of Pediatrics, University of Minnesota; Aileen Murphy, MA, is Managing Director, McCreary Centre Society; Leigh Combs, AS, CDCP, is Program Coordinator, GLBT Kids: Abuse Intervention, Family and Children's Service, Minneapolis. NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION Saewyc, etal. 197 Health Canada has identified stigma and discrimination based on sexual orientation status as social determinants of health that contribute to health disparities for LGB people (de Bruyn, 2005). Case 2. "Sue," age 15, lives in the suburbs with both par- ents and two younger siblings. She feels that her parents' beliefs are too strict for her, especially since she has a crush on one of her girlfriends. Her parents have no idea about her romantic exploration, but they are concerned her be- havior has changed in the last six months. They also do not know yet that kids at school have found out about Sue and her friend and are harassing the two girls. Sue wants to get away from everyone at this point. Some studies from the U.S. and Canada have documented the anxious, angry, and even violent responses LGB youth expe- rience from their families, at school, and in the community (Reis & Saewyc, 1999). Families can be influenced by the stigmatizing attitudes in their social and cultural environments, and when a son or daughter discloses a gay, lesbian, or bisexual orientation, some families respond with hostility and distress (D'Augelli, Hershberger & Pilkington, 1998; Pilkington & D'Augelli, 1995; Murphy, Sidhu, & Tonkin, 1999; Waldo, Hesson-Mclnnis, & D'Augelli, 1998). One limitation of these studies is they draw on convenience samples of LGB youth and may not represent the general population of sexual minority teens. They do suggest, however, that some of the suspected maltreatment cases child Acknowledgments: These analyses were supported by Grant ROl MH-6258601 from the National Institute of Mental Health, National Institutes of Health (Saewyc, origi- nal PI; Skay, second PI); Grant ROl DA1797901, National Institute of Drug Abuse (Saewyc, original PI; Skay, second PI); and a Michael Smith Foundation for Health Research Career Scholar award (Saewyc, PI). Preliminary results of the study were presented at the 2004 annual meeting of the Society for Adolescent Medicine, St. Louis, Missouri. Thanks to Pamela Hillard, Seattle School District, for access to the Seattle Adolescent Health Surveys of 1995 and 1999, the Minnesota Department of Educa- tion for access to the Minnesota Student Surveys, and Dr Roger Tonkin, McCreary NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION 198 CHILD WELFARE • Vol. LXXXV, #2 • March/April welfare workers encounter will involve LGB youth and unsupportive family members. Social workers also can be influ- enced by community attitudes and respond in ways that are not supportive of LGBTQ youth. Some evidence shows actual disclosure is not the only trigger for family maltreatment toward sexual minority youth. In their study of victimization among LGB college students, Waldo and colleagues (1998) find that those who had disclosed their orien- tation to unsupportive families were not only more likely to ex- perience victimization, but those with higher gender atypicality, which has been correlated with homosexual orientation, also were at risk for victimization, even when they had not disclosed to family. Waldo and colleagues suggest gender-atypical youth of- ten are assumed to be gay, lesbian, or bisexual, and families may not protect such youth from victimization or may even perpe- trate the violence themselves. Case 3. "Joe," age 17, grew up in the rural Midwest. He was sexually abused by his stepbrother, but did not tell anyone. He was harassed throughout his school years, mostly by name calling with derogatory words like "fag." Joe stopped going to school in 10th grade, after being jumped by several boys in the locker room and having his head put in a toilet. He ran away to the city and lived in a squat with other young people he met at a homeless youth program. For money, Joe would stand outside the gay bars at closing time and make a few dollars by giving men oral sex in the parking lot and alleys. A small number of population-based studies also have docu- mented higher prevalence of physical abuse by family members among LGB people compared to heterosexual peers (Horliss, Gochran, & Mays, 2002; Saewyc, Bearinger, Blum, & Resnick, 1999; Saewyc, Skay, Bearinger, Blum, & Resnick, 1998). Like Waldo and colleagues, Horliss and colleagues suggest stigma from gender atypicality or some as-yet unmeasured trait of emerging gay or NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION Saewyc, etal. 199 bisexual orientation may decrease family protection and support for LGB teenagers even before they recognize and self-identify and, thus, may help explain higher risk for maltreatment during childhood and adolescence. Why is it important to identify this disparate risk for violence among stigmatized populations such as LGB teens? Sexual and physical abuse are among the most potent predictors of youth risk behaviors such as substance use and abuse, suicide attempts, running away, and teen pregnancy (Anderson, Teicher, Polcari, & Renshaw, 2002; DeBellis, 2002; Holmes & Slap, 1998; Saewyc, Magee, & Pettingell, 2004). In part, these risk behaviors may be attempts to cope with the stress and trauma from that abuse. In the past decade, several studies have reported a higher preva- lence of these risk behaviors among sexual minority youth, with some of the same surveys also noting a higher risk of harassment and sexual violence for LGB teens (Borowsky, Ireland, & Resnick, 2001; DuRant, Krowchuk, & Sinai, 1998; Hershberger & D'Augelli, 1995; Robin, Brener, Donahue, Hack, & Goodenow, 2002; Rotheram-Borus, Marelich, & Srinivasan, 1999; Russell & Joyner, 2001; Saewyc et al., 1999). While most studies combined LGB teens in a single category, among those surveys that did not, bisexual adolescents or those with both gender attractions appeared to be at higher risk for victimization and reported differing levels of risk behaviors than gay and lesbian peers (Robin et al., 2002; Russell, Franz, & Driscoll, 2001). Case 4. "Colette," age 14, lived with her father and older brother; her mother died when she was 7. She first had sex at age 12, with her best friend from Girl Scouts; eight months later she dated a boy from school and found she liked sex with him, too. Now she's in love with "Jenny," also age 14, and they've been together most of the school year. When she decided to confide in her brother that she's bisexual, she was unprepared for his outrage. He told their father, who kicked her out of the house, and then her NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION 200 CHILD WELFARE • Vol. LXXXV, #2 • March/April brother got a couple of his friends to assault Jenny. Con- vinced Jenny's family would be just as hostile, the two girls ran away. To survive, Jenny panhandles, while Colette works as a stripper and has sex with their land- lord for the basement room they stay in. She has come to the teen clinic four months pregnant. Other population-based studies have documented higher rates of harassment and victimization among LGB youth at school or in the community, rather than family-specific violence (DuRant et al., 1998; Robin, et al., 2002; Russell, Franz & DriscoU, 2001). While two of these studies included sexual abuse in the form of forced intercourse (DuRant et al.; Robin et al.), DuRant's study focused on boys only, and both were limited to the East Coast of the United States. Russell and colleagues used a nationally representative sample to explore both experiencing and witnessing violence among same-gender and both-gender-attracted adolescents, but their study did not include experiences of sexual violence or physi- cal abuse within the family. Thus, a small but growing number of studies, primarily from the eastern United States, and one study from western Canada, have begun to document the increased risk among LBG youth for familial physical abuse, family and other sexual abuse, and harassment and physical violence in the community. If a higher level of stigma and violence directed toward LGB youth is con- sistently documented in surveys across North America, it may help explain higher behavior risks noted among them. The purpose of this study, therefore, is to compare the preva- lence of sexual and physical abuse experienced by bisexual youth with their gay, lesbian, and heterosexual peers in population-based surveys of high school students from the United States and Canada. The authors hypothesized that bisexual boys and girls would re- port greater odds of sexual and physical abuse than heterosexual peers, but not necessarily greater than gay or lesbian peers. NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION Saewyc, et al. 201 Methods As part of a larger study of health and risk behaviors, stigma, and sexual orientation, the authors conducted secondary analyses from seven population-based high school health surveys in the United States and Canada (Table 1). The survey data had been gathered during the 1990s: four were state- or province-wide: the Minnesota Student Surveys of 1992 and 1998 (MSS92 and MSS98) and the Brit- ish Columbia Adolescent Health Surveys of the same years (BC92 and BC98); two from Seattle (SEA95 and SEA99); and the last the first wave of a nationally representative longitudinal study of youth— Add Health. The two surveys each from British Columbia and Min- nesota asked about family physical abuse. All of the surveys assessed sexual abuse experience, although items were worded differently. In the case of the Seattle and Add Health surveys, they were limited to a question about experiencing forced intercourse, which misses youth whose abuse experiences may include only oral sex without genital or anal penetration. This abuse could be just as traumatic but would not be counted with such a question (Saewyc, Pettingell, & Magee, 2003). In addition, while the Add Health survey asked girls if ^ e y had ever been forced to have intercourse, it only asked boys if they had ever forced someone to have intercourse; thus, the authors were limited to sexually experienced girls from that study. BC98 asked about forced intercourse, plus a separate sexual abuse question that was broader and matched the item from BC92. The measures of sexual orientation varied within the different surveys. Add Health asked two questions about the genders of people to whom students were attracted; Seattle and British Co- lumbia had a self-labeling measure that defined the labels on the basis of attraction, with British Columbia including a "mostly het- erosexual" category with heterosexual, bisexual, and gay/lesbian. In contrast, the Minnesota surveys asked two items about genders of sexual partners in the past 12 months. Detailed information about NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION 202 CHILD WELFARE • Vol. LXXXV, #2 • March/April TABLE 1 Datasets and Measures DATASET: Design: BC92 Stratified duster sample (weighted) BC98 Stratified ciuster sampie (weigfited) MSS92 Census of 97% of scfiool districts (subset of ever fiad sex only) MSS98 Census of 92% of scfiooi districts (subset of ever had sex oniy) SEA95 Census of ali students public bigb sciiooi SEA99 Census of aii students pubiic high schooi ADD HEALTH Stratified ciuster sample (nation- wide, giris ever had sex oniy) N: Grade renge: % lemale: Orientation measure; Sexual abuse measure: 237,748 7-12 50.5% Attraction .f iabei Singie abuse item 278,102 7-12 52.7% Attraction * label Singie abuse item.t forced intercourse 24,880 9 & 12 47.7% Gender of sexuai partners past year 2 items: incest and non-famiiy abuse 22,007 9 & 1 2 49.3% Gender of sexuai partners past year 2 items: incest and non-famiiy abuse 7,448 9-12 50.9% Labei Forced intercourse 7,610 9-12 51.4% Labei Forced intercourse 2,228 7-12 100% Attraction Forced intercourse Physical Single item, Singie item. Abused by Abused by None f^one None abuse meastire: physicai abuse by family or anyone physical abuse by famiiy or anyone aduit in househoid or witnessed abuse in family aduit in household or witnessed abuse in famiiy the specific wording of items, percentage of missing and nonresponse, and evaluation of the measures for most of the sur- veys has been reported elsewhere (Saewyc, Bauer, Skay, Bearinger, Resnick, Reis, & Murphy, 2004). Although attraction and behav- ior are not always congruent with orientation self-identity, for brevity throughout this paper the authors will use the conven- tion of bisexual, gay/lesbian, heterosexual, and mostly hetero- sexual for each survey. The authors recognize these labels may not be precise for students who indicate just attraction or recent sexual behavior. NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION Saewyc, et al. 203 All analyses were conducted separately for boys and girls. The authors used cross-tabulations with Pearson's chi square to examine the prevalence of abuse by orientation in each survey, and logistic regression to calculate age-adjusted odds ratios with 95% confidence intervals for risk of abuse for bisexual boys and girls compared to the other groups. Because of the large sample sizes, the authors set alpha to .01 for all analyses, except for the comparisons between bisexual and gay/lesbian groups to avoid detecting statistically significant but not clinically meaningful dif- ferences. For bisexual versus gay/lesbian comparisons, which were smaller samples, alpha was set to .05. Results Sexual Abuse by Orientation The prevalence of sexual abuse based on orientation and related age-adjusted odds ratios for boys and girls in each dataset are re- ported in Table 2. In all surveys except Seattle's, girls were more likely to report abuse than boys, but the differences between ori- entation groups were more marked among boys. Among girls, les- bian and bisexual girls reported the highest prevalence of sexual abuse, with 1 in 4 to nearly half reporting a history of sexual abuse. Heterosexual and mostly heterosexual girls' prevalence of reported sexual abuse ranged from just under 10% to just over 25%. In contrast, the prevalence of sexual abuse or forced inter- course reported by heterosexual and mostly heterosexual boys is well under 10%, but gay and bisexual boys are nearly as likely as bisexual and lesbian girls to report sexual abuse. For most sur- veys, more than 1 in 4 bisexual boys and 1 in 5 gay boys reported sexual abuse. Except for girls in both British Columbia and Minnesota in 1992, bisexual teens of both genders had significantly greater odds of sexual abuse compared to their heterosexual age peers. Among NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION 204 CHILD WELFARE • Vol. LXXXV, #2 • March/April TABLE 2 Prevalence and Age-Act]usted Odds Ratios of Sexual Abuse/Forced Intercourse, by Orientation and Gender Girls, Prevalence ol Sexual Abuse by Orientation (%) BC92 BC98 MSS92 MSS98 SEA95 SEA99 AddHealth Het 21.0 15.4 27.4 20.6 14.2 9.0 19.3 MH 23.1 27.3 - - - - B 23.8 35.9 32.4 39.8 26.3 26.9 32.8 L 43.3 30.2 23.9 39.2 40.7 17.4 27.5 Boys, Prevalence ot Sexual Abuse by Orientation BC92 BC98 MSS92 MSS98 SEA95 SEA99 Het 3.2 3.4 4.8 6.4 5.8 5.4 MH 8.1 8.4 - - - B 14.9 26.9 21.7 27.5 31.3 30.5 G 22.5 26.3 17.7 22.0 17.4 31.6 Girls, Adlusted OR (95% CI) ol Sexual Abuse B vs. Het NS 2.8 (2.6,3.0) t NS 2.3(1.9, 2.9) t 2.1 (1.4, 3.0) t 3.8 (2.7, 5.5) i 2.1 ( 1 . 4 , 3 . 0 ) t B vs. MH NS 1.5(1.4,1.7) t - - • - B v s . L 0.3 (0.2,0.5) * NS NS NS NS NS NS Boys, Adlusted OR (95% Ci) ol Sexual Abuse B vs. Het 5.4 (4.8,6.2) t 10.9(9.7,12.3)* 5.4 (4.6, 6.3) t 5 . 2 ( 4 . 5 , 6 . 1 ) * 7.1(4.5,11.3)* 7.3(4.4,12.0)* B vs. MH 2 . 3 ( 1 . 7 , 2 . 4 ) * 4 . 4 ( 3 . 8 . 5 . 1 ) * - - - - Bvs.G 0.6 (0.5,0.8) t NS NS NS NS NS p<.01; tp<.001; • = not applicable in this survey NS = not significant boys, the age-adjusted odds ratios range from 5 to almost 11, and for girls, most are 2 or higher. That means bisexual boys were up to 10 times as likely and bisexual girls at least twice as likely to report sexual abuse as their heterosexual peers of the same age. Adjusted odds of abuse for mostly heterosexual teens compared to bisexual teens varied between the two years of British Columbia surveys, with higher odds ratios for bisexual boys in both years but only in 1998 for bisexual girls. Differences were generally not sigruficant between gay/lesbian and bisexual teens, but in BC1992, gay or les- bian teens had higher odds of sexual abuse for both boys and girls. NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION Saewyc, et al. 205 Physical Abuse by Family Members In the four surveys that assessed physical abuse, girls in all ori- entation groups report higher prevalence of physical abuse than their male peers (Table 3). Bisexual and lesbian girls also report a higher prevalence of physical abuse than heterosexual girls in the more recent surveys and, in BC98, also higher than mostly heterosexual girls. The age-adjusted odds of physical abuse for bisexual girls was twice as likely when compared to heterosexual peers in the 1998 surveys but not significant for the 1992 surveys. In the British Columbia surveys, bisexual girls had significantly lower odds of abuse than lesbian peers, but the differences were not significant in Minnesota surveys. In each survey, gay and bisexual boys also report a higher preva- lence of physical abuse, with nearly 1 in 5 up to 1 in 3 reporting abuse, compared to 1 in 8 heterosexual boys. The age-adjusted odds of experiencing physical abuse among boys showed bisexual youth have at least twice the odds of abuse compared to their hetero- sexual peers for all datasets, with odds ranging from 2.0 to 2.8. However, comparisons with gay peers were mixed: In the two ear- lier surveys, the differences were not significant, but in BC98, bi- sexual boys had lower odds of physical abuse, while in MSS98, they had nearly twice the odds of abuse as their gay peers. Thus, while most surveys had no significant differences in odds of sexual abuse between bisexual teens and their gay or lesbian peers, differences in physical abuse occurred in half the surveys. In all but one instance that had significant differences between the two sexual minority groups, gay or lesbian teens had higher odds of reporting physical abuse. Discussion Patterns across these seven surveys from various regions of the United States and Canada, in both earlier and later years of the NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION 206 CHILD WELFARE • Vol. LXXXV, #2 • March/April T A B L E 3 Prevalence and Age-Adjusted Odds Ratios of Physical Abuse, by Orientation and Gender Girls, Prevalence of Physical Abuse by Orientation Dataset: BC92 BC98 MSS92 MSS98 Het 24.0 19.6 23.0 19.1 MH 28.4 28.1 - - B 21.0 37.8 29.9 35.1 L 26.6 40.8 28.9 43.1 Boys, Prevalence ol Physical Abuse by Orientation Oataset: BC92 BC98 MSS92 MSS98 Het 14.1 12.2 12.2 12.3 MH 22.1 25.5 - B 39.2 27.3 23.5 28.5 G 25.2 33.5 17.1 16.2 Girls, Adjusted OR (95% CI) of Physical Abuse B vs. Het 0.8 (0.7, 0.9) t 2.3 (2.1, 2.5) t NS 2.0(1.6, 2.5) t B vs. MH 0.6 (0.6, 0.7) i 1.6(1.5,1.7) t - - Bvs. L 0.7 (0.5, 0.9) * 0.8 (0.6, 0.9) * NS NS Boys, Adiusted OR (95% CI) of Physloai Abuse B vs. Het 2.0(1.8, 2.3) t 2.8(2.5, 3.1) t 2.1 (1.8, 2.4) t 2.4(2.1,2.8)1 B vs. MH 1.2(1.0,1.3)® NS - Bvs.G 0.5 (0.4, 0.6) t 0.8 (0.7, 0.9) ® NS 1.8(1.2,2.8)® p<.05: p<.01; t p<.001; - = not applicable in this survey: NS = not significant 1990s, with different sampling methods, different wording of abuse items, and even different measures of sexual orientation, are strikingly similar. Although the actual proportion of teens reporting abuse varies from survey to survey, sexual minority teens in nearly all surveys still are significantly more likely to report sexual and physical abuse than their same-age heterosexual counterparts. In most surveys, bisexual teens of either gender were more than twice as likely to report abuse compared to hetero- sexual teens, with the differences markedly stronger for boys. In contrast, only a few surveys had significant differences in abuse histories between bisexual and gay or lesbian teens, and no con- sistent pattern of differences by gender, type of abuse, or region of survey. Of concern, when two surveys are from the same region but from different years, the prevalence of either type of abuse for NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION Saewyc, et al. 207 bisexual teens appears to be higher in later surveys compared to earlier ones, and their odds of abuse versus heterosexual peers are also greater (except for sexual abuse for bisexual boys in Min- nesota, which is unchanged from 1992 to 1998). Technically, three points in time are required to document a trend, but these data suggest the disparities in abuse between bisexual and hetero- sexual teens was worsening, not improving, as the past decade progressed. Further tracking of abuse and orientation in surveys after 2000 must take place to determine whether this pattern con- tinues to worsen. A number of issues should be considered when putting these findings in context. Beginning at puberty, sexual identity is a de- velopmental task of adolescence, influenced by the societal and cultural contexts in which young people make sense of their physi- cal, emotional, and cognitive changes. Sexual orientation, as one component of sexual identity, unfolds over this period of develop- ment, and the processes begin earlier for some teens than for oth- ers (Rosario, Meyer-Bahlburg, Hunter, & Exner, 1996). But all the surveys reported here are cross-sectional snapshots in time; some of the teens who did not identify as gay, lesbian, or bisexual may have done so at a later point in high school or even in early adult- hood. Thus, the findings primarily pertain to adolescents who be- gan to recognize their orientation and self-identify, even if they have not disclosed it. In addition, some of the measures of sexual orientation in these school-based surveys deal with only one di- mension of orientation—either attraction or behavior rather than self-label—and sometimes, may underestimate the number of LGB adolescents (Saewyc, Bauer, et al., 2004). The similarity of the find- ings across different surveys with different measures, however, lends support to the stability of these results. Another complication in this picture is the timing of physical and sexual abuse: before or after self-identification, during child- hood or during adolescence? For what percentage of teens was the abuse a direct, clear consequence of disclosing their orientation, or NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION 208 CHILD WELFARE • Vol. LXXXV, #2 • March/April a response to a teen's subtle behavioral cues to orientation out any overt disclosure? Because the surveys are cross-sectional, they cannot disentangle the complexity of timing and determine causality, such as a teen being abused because of her lesbian or bisexual status. Physical and sexual abuse can occur across a lifespan, but peak prevalence of maltreatment in the United States appears to be during adolescence (Snyder & Sickmund, 2000)— concurrent with the years of developing sexual orientation—and not limited to either early or later adolescence (Saewyc et al., 2003). That makes it impossible to determine which most likely came first: coming out or being abused. Sexual and physical abuse, however, clearly are not the cause of developing a gay, lesbian, or bisexual orientation, as earlier researchers sometimes considered (Simari & Baskin, 1982). In the seven surveys as in other popula- tion-based ones, the majority of adolescents who identify as gay, lesbian, or bisexual do not report any abuse, and the overwhelm- ing majority of adolescents who report sexual or physical abuse identify as heterosexual, because they outnumber LGB students so greatly. Although the stigma may lead to less protection for LGB teens, or a perception that they are more deserving of abuse, a potential alternate explanation for the higher prevalence of abuse among teens exists. Physical and sexual abuse also carries a burden of shame and stigma (Finkelhor & Browne, 1985). Sexual abuse, even more than physical abuse, carries a potent stigma, what Goffman (1968) describes as "spoiled identity" in his pioneering work on stigma: Society presents clear messages that those who have been sexually violated somehow are tainted or "damaged," no longer innocent and pure. As a result of their lost "innocence," victims of sexual assault or exploitation suffer a further loss of status and worth. For most teens, the likely costs of acknowledging a stigma- tized orientation may be too risky to recognize same-gender at- tractions, so they may suppress that knowledge. In contrast, abused teens, having already suffered loss of status and self-worth NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION Saewyc, et al. 209 owing to abuse, may be more open to recognizing and disclosing their same-gender or both-gender attractions because they have less to lose socially by admitting another stigmatized status. They still may risk further victimization after disclosure, and an addi- tive effect of multiple types of stigma may occur, which further increases their odds of substance abuse and other risky coping behaviors. This additive effect was suggested by a different analy- sis of the four cohorts from the Pacific Northwest, where the au- thors found an interaction between sexual minority status and abuse that predicted higher involvement in HIV risk behaviors such as rv drug use and risky sexual behaviors (Saewyc, Richens, Skay, Reis, Poon, & Murphy, in press). Regardless of the timing or reason for the abuse, the higher prevalence of abuse among LBG youth suggests they will be dis- proportionately found among runaway, homeless, juvenile jus- tice, and foster care populations, which a number of studies have already confirmed (Frankowski & the American Academy of Pe- diatrics Committee on Adolescence, 2004; Murphy, Poon, & Weigel, 2001). Child welfare and other youth services need to be aware of the added vulnerability of LGB youth and be prepared to provide orientation-sensitive and appropriate care among those populations. Education for social workers, foster parents, and others involved in child protection work should include training on the development of sexual orientation and gender identity among children and adolescents, identification and fostering of healthy environments for sexual minority teens, and boundary issues related to personal and religious values. The routine assessment for experiences of physical and sexual violence among all adolescents is necessary, and LGB youth are no exception. Professionals who work with the families of LGB youth in crisis should help them respond to sexual orientation disclosure in helpful, not harmful, ways. The American Psychi- atric Association, the American Psychological Association, the American Academy of Pediatrics, the National Association of NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION 210 CHILD WELFARE • Vol. LXXXV, #2 • March/April Social Workers, and other professional organizations have de- nounced as unethical therapy aimed at trying to change sexual orientation with children and adolescents, because the methods have the potential to cause great harm, and little credible evi- dence for their effectiveness exists (American Psychiatric Asso- ciation, 2000). Families need encouragement and resources that help them support their sexual minority child, rather than mes- sages further stigmatizing them. For families and youth concerned about how their religious community views sexual orientation, it may be useful to provide information about safe, open, and af- firming religious institutions within their local area. Individual and community interventions intended to prevent child abuse and family violence should incorporate messages that emotional pressure or corporal punishment will not change a child's most natural gender expression or sexual orientation. Orgaruzations and caseworkers must raise awareness about the unacceptable level of violence directed at LGB teens, whether in families or in the community, but they must do it in ways that work toward reducing that risk rather than unintentionally rein- forcing the expectation of violence from the people youth should look to for love and support. Schools, as a key institution for posi- tive youth development, have an important role in supporting LGB youth, as well as linking teens to supportive community resources when needed. Effective prevention of the violence and enacted stigma target- ing sexual minority teens will require further societal efforts to re- duce the stigma of LGB orientation. The Canadian Charter of Rights aftirms individuals' right to protection from discrimination based on characteristics such as race, sex, religion, or age; it does not mention orientation, but the courts have since ruled it also prohib- its discrimination based on other characteristics, including sexual orientation (de Bruyn, 2004). In the United States, several cities and states have incorporated similar language in their equal op- portunity and antidiscrimination laws. Legal efforts, however, must NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION Saewyc, et al. 211 be augmented with advocacy and interventions to increase respect for diversity and reduce community acceptance of violence toward those marginalized. When society truly values and nurtures all children, LGB teens will no longer face the added hazards from stigma in their families, foster care, school, and their community. References American Psychiatric Association (2000). Therapies focused on attempts to change sexual orientation (reparative or conversion therapies). Position statement. APA Document Reference No. 20001, May 2000. Accessed on April 21,2006, at www.psych.org/edu/ other_res / lib_archives / archives / 200001 .pdf. Anderson, C. M., Teicher, M. H., Polcari, A., & Renshaw, P. F. (2002). Abnormal T2 relaxation time in the cerebellar vermis of adults sexually abused in childhood: Potential role of the vermis in stress-enhanced risk for drug abuse. Psychoneuroendocrinology 27,231-244. Borowsky, I. W., Ireland, M., & Resnick, M. D, (2001). Adolescent suicide attempts: Risks and protectors. Pediatrics, 107, 485-493. D'Augelli, A. R., Hershberger, S. L., & Pilkington, N. W. (1998). Lesbian, gay, and bi- sexual youth and their families: Disclosure of sexual orientation and its consequences. American Journal of Orthopsychiatry, 68(3), 361-371. De Bellis, M. D. (2002). Developmental traumatology: A contributory mechanism for alcohol and substance use disorders. Psychoneuroendocrinology, 27,155-170. de Bruyn, T. (2004). A plan of action for Canada to reduce HIV/AIDS-related stigma and dis- crimination. Canadian HIV/AIDS Legal Network. Accessed March 2005 at www.aidslaw.ca. DuRant, R. H., Krowchuk, D. P., & Sinai, S. H. (1998). Victimization, use of violence, and drug use at school among male adolescents who engage in same-sex sexual behav- ior. Journal of Pediatrics, 133(1), 113-118. Federal Bureau of Investigations. (2004). Hate crime statistics 2003. Washington, DC: Fed- eral Bureau of Investigations, U.S. Department of Justice. Accessed April 4, 2006, at www.fbi.gov/ucr/ucr.htmffhate. Finkelhor, D., & Browne, A. (1985). The traumatic impact of child sexual abuse: A conceptualization. American Journal of Orthopsychiatry, 55, 530-540. NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION 212 CHILD WELFARE • Vol. LXXXV, #2 • March/April Frankowski, B.L., & the American Academy of Pediatrics Committee on Adolescence. (2004). Sexual orientation and adolescents. Pediatrics, 113,1827-1832. Accessed April 4, 2006, at www.pediatrics.org/cgi/content/full/113/6/1827. Goffman, E. (1968). Management of spoiled identity. In E. Rubington and M.S. Weinberg, (Eds.), Deviance: The interactionist perspective. Text and readings in the sociology of devi- ance (pp. 344-348). New York: The MacMillan Company. Hershberger, S. L., & D'Augelli, A. R. (1995). The impact of victimization on the mental health and suicidality of lesbian, gay, and bisexual youths. Developmental Psychology, 31, 65-74. Holmes, W.C. & Slap, G.B. (1998). Sexual abuse of boys: Definition, prevalence, correlates, sequelae, and management. Journal of the American Medical Association, 280,1855-1862. Horliss, H. L., Cochran, S. D., & Mays, V. M. (2002). Reports of parental maltreatment during childhood in a United States population-based survey of homosexual, bi- sexual, and heterosexual adults. Child Abuse & Neglect, 26,1165-1178. Mays, V. M., & Cochran, S. D. (2001). Mental health correlates of perceived discrimina- tion among lesbian, gay, and bisexual adults in the United States. American Journal of Public Health, 91,1869-1876. Murphy, A., Poon, C , Weigel, M. (2001). No place to call home: A profile of street youth in British Columbia. Burnaby, BC, Canada: The McCreary Centre Society Accessed April 4, 2006, at www.mcs.bc.ca. Murphy, A., Sidhu, A., & Tonkin, R. (1999). Being out: Lesbian, gay, bisexual & transgender youth in BC, an adolescent health survey. Burnaby, BC, Canada: The McCreary Centre Society. Assessed April 4, 2006, at www.mcs.bc.ca. Pilkington, N. W., & D'Augelli, A. R. (1995). Victimization of gay, lesbian, and bisexual youth in community settings. Developmental Psychology, 23, 33-56. Reis E., & Saewyc, E. (1999). 83,000 Youth: Selected findings of eight population-based studies as they pertain to anti-gay harassment and the safety and well-being of sexual minority students. Safe Schools Coalition of Washington, May 1999. Accessed April 4, 2006, www.safeschoolscoalition.org. Robin, L., Brener, N. D., Donahue, S. R, Hack, T., Hale, K., & Goodenow, C. (2002). Asso- ciations between health risk behaviors and opposite-, same-, and both-sex sexual partners in representative samples of Vermont and Massachusetts high school stu- dents. Archives ofPediatric and Adolescent Medicine, 156, 349-355. NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION Saewyc, et al. 213 Rosario, M., Meyer-Bahlburg, H.R, Hunter, J., & Exner, T.M. (1996). The psycho-sexual development of urban lesbian, gay, and bisexual youths. Journal of Sex Research, 33, 113-126. Rotheram-Borus, M. J., Marelich, W. D., & Srinivasan, S. (1999). HIV risk among homo- sexual, bisexual, and heterosexual male and female youths. Archives of Sexual Behav- ior, 28,159-177. Russell, S. X, Franz, B. T, & Driscoll, A. K. (2001) Same-sex romantic attraction and experiences of violence in adolescence. American Journal of Public Health, 91,903-906. Russell, S. T., & Joyner, K. (2001). Adolescent sexual orientation and suicide risk: Evi- dence from a national study. American Journal of Public Health, 91,1276-1281. Saewyc, E. M., Bauer, G. R., Skay, C. L., Bearinger, L. H., Resnick, M. D., Reis, E., Murphy, A. (2004). Measuring sexual orientation in adolescent health surveys: Evaluation of eight school-based surveys. Journal of Adolescent Health, 35, 345e.l-e.l6. Saewyc, E. M., Bearinger, L. H., Blum, R. W., & Resnick, M. D. (1999). Sexual intercourse, abuse, and pregnancy among adolescent women: Does sexual orientation make a difference? Family Planning Perspectives, 31(3), 127-131. Saewyc, E. M., Magee, L. L., & Pettingell, S. (2004). Teenage pregnancy and associated risk behaviors among sexually abused adolescents. Perspective on Sexual and Repro- ductive Health, 36(3), 98-105. Saewyc, E. M., Pettingell, S., & Magee, L. L. (2003). The prevalence of sexual abuse among adolescents in school. Journal of School Nursing, 19, 266-272. Saewyc, E. M., Skay, C. L., Bearinger, L. H., Blum, R. W., & Resnick, M. D. (1998). Sexual orientation, sexual behaviors, and pregnancy among American Indian adolescents. Journal of Adolescent Health, 23(4), 238-247. Snyder, H., & Sickmund, M. (2000). Sexual assault of young children as reported to law en- forcement: Victim, incident, and offender characteristics. July 2000. National Centre for Juvenile Justice. Accessed April 4, 2006, at www.unh.edu/ccrc/factsheet.htmW3. Waldo, C. R., Hesson-Mclnnis, M. S., & D'Augelli, A. R. (1998). Antecedents and conse- quences of victimization of lesbian, gay, and bisexual young people: A structural model comparing rural university and urban samples. American Journal of Commu- nity Psychology, 26, 307-334. NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION 
work_ltmo5b3ckvdwtbvxsjgkxubj2a	----	www.amajournalofethics.org 1086 AMA Journal of Ethics® November 2016, Volume 18, Number 11: 1086-1094 ETHICS CASE Should Psychiatrists Prescribe Gender-Affirming Hormone Therapy to Transgender Adolescents? Commentary by Cary S. Crall, MD, and Rachel K. Jackson Abstract Gender-affirming hormone therapy is a safe and effective way to improve quality of life and mental health outcomes for transgender adolescents. Access to this treatment is limited, with the most vulnerable transgender people experiencing the greatest gaps in care. Because some psychiatrists help transgender patients receive needed medical interventions, we analyze the ethical values they must balance when deciding whether to provide hormone therapy to patients who seek it. Case In the medium-sized city where he practices psychiatry, Dr. Lao has developed expertise in treating and counseling transgender adolescents. This afternoon, Dr. Lao is scheduled to meet with Jessie, a 15-year-old high school student with autism spectrum disorder. Jessie has been Dr. Lao’s patient since elementary school. Within the last two years, Jessie, who was birth-assigned male, began opening up to her family and Dr. Lao about her identity as a transgender female. In the waiting room, Jessie’s parents pulled Dr. Lao aside. “Is it true that you will soon start administering hormone therapy yourself?” Jessie’s father asked Dr. Lao. “Because it would be great if we didn’t have to find another physician when Jessie starts hormone treatment. Jessie said she would much rather have you perform the treatments.” It was true that Dr. Lao was considering becoming trained to administer hormone therapy. Many of Dr. Lao’s transgender patients and families have complained about the lack of physicians in their rural community who are trained in hormone therapy administration. Dr. Lao thought he might play a role in reducing this resource disparity for his patients by becoming trained himself. Their previous session ended just as Jessie began to describe some of her anxieties to Dr. Lao about transitioning from male to female. Jessie worried about what her classmates might think about her transition, and, while her immediate family was very supportive, Jessie worried about the opinions of members of her extended family, who tended to be less progressive on issues of gender and sexuality. AMA Journal of Ethics, November 2016 1087 In their session today, Dr. Lao wanted to follow up with Jessie about these concerns. “Jessie, when we last met, you mentioned concerns regarding how your classmates and family members might react to your transition—would you like to keep discussing that?” With that question, Dr. Lao noticed that Jessie seemed somewhat withdrawn and uncharacteristically uncomfortable in front of him. “No,” she replied, “I thought it over, and I’m not as worried anymore about what they’ll think.” Dr. Lao tried a couple more times in their discussion—with little success—to veer the conversation back to Jessie’s formerly expressed worries about her transition. At the end of their session, Jessie said to Dr. Lao before leaving his office, “I’m feeling very ready to begin hormones—and it would make me so happy if you were the one managing my treatments, Dr. Lao.” As Dr. Lao waved goodbye to Jessie and her family, he couldn’t help but wonder if Jessie’s refusal to discuss her anxieties about her transition were related to her wish to pursue hormone therapy under his care. Could it be that Jessie feared Dr. Lao would be hesitant to treat her or might delay the process if Jessie disclosed her anxieties about transitioning with him? Dr. Lao wondered: If he developed expertise in hormone therapy, would his patients then perceive him as a kind of gatekeeper in the process of their transition? Will his role in offering hormone therapy sacrifice important elements in his therapeutic relationships with his patients like Jessie? Commentary Initiating and managing care for transgender patients can often be daunting, even for a caring, motivated physician like Dr. Lao. Transgender people who seek gender-affirming medical care are a small, geographically diffuse community with specialized medical needs requiring coordinated communication among multiple medical specialists. They experience rampant social discrimination, often leading to unemployment and unequal access to health insurance [1] as well as high rates of mental illness [2], further complicating their ability to obtain adequate care. Additionally, many transgender people are hesitant to engage with clinicians and medical office staff due to a personal history of mistreatment by the medical community. In a 2009 survey, 70 percent of transgender or gender-nonconforming respondents reported experiencing at least one type of discrimination in health care settings, with 26.7 percent of the total reporting that they were refused care due to their gender identity and 7.8 percent of the total reporting that clinicians were physically rough while providing care [3]. Given this precedent, their hesitance is understandable. These challenges have led to a system in which transgender care is centralized in specialized, cross-disciplinary health clinics located in major cities, leaving the most vulnerable transgender patients—those from racial or ethnic minority communities, of low socioeconomic status, or young or elderly people living in rural communities— largely without quality care. What is the nature and scope of an individual psychiatrist’s obligation to provide gender-affirming medical treatment to patients seeking hormone www.amajournalofethics.org 1088 therapy, especially when providing such care can extend beyond his or her normal scope of practice? As is the case with many medical interventions, Dr. Lao’s decision to provide hormone therapy is clinically and ethically complex. Careful analysis guided by the principles of patient autonomy, beneficence, nonmaleficence, and justice provides an overall framework to guide psychiatrists, particularly those in rural communities, on how they should proceed. Ethical Principles Favoring Hormone Therapy Administration The principles of patient autonomy and beneficence support the need for psychiatrists to prescribe hormone therapy for gender-transitioning adolescents. Patient autonomy. The patient autonomy argument for providing HRT is straightforward—physicians should honor transgender patients’ right to express their gender identity by providing desired medical interventions in line with the established standard of care [4, 5]. Historically, clinicians serving as gatekeepers to hormones led to an outcry from members of the transgender community that such a practice violates their basic human right to gender expression [6]. In turn, physician gatekeeping policies and practices limiting access to hormone therapy for those who desire it has led to a robust, unregulated black market for hormones outside the purview of pharmacist or FDA regulatory monitoring of hormone product safety and quality. Gatekeeping can exacerbate disparities in access to safe and reliable hormone treatment, particularly among transgender youth [7]. Thus, honoring patient autonomy by providing access to hormone therapy serves the dual purpose of acknowledging transgender persons’ right to self-determination regarding gender expression and expressing regard for the principle of nonmaleficence by limiting potential negative health consequences of unsafe products from unregulated sources. While ethical issues of consent and autonomy specific to initiating hormone therapy in minors are complex, they have been effectively analyzed elsewhere [8, 9]. Beneficence. The principle of beneficence—the obligation to do good for the patient— additionally supports Dr. Lao’s providing hormone therapy. The best available evidence, along with decades of clinical experience, indicates that effective hormone therapy has a positive effect on psychological and quality of life outcomes in transgender people [10]. Jessie’s anxiety and depression plants her firmly within the mainstream for young transgender people who live with varying degrees of social, legal, and medical affirmation of their gender identity. In a recent study featuring a diverse, multicity cohort of 298 young transgender women, Reisner et al. found that 41.5 percent had at least one mental health or substance dependence diagnosis and 35.4 percent reached criteria for a lifetime major depressive episode [2]. Although only 7.4 percent of participants reported current suicidality in Jessie’s age group (i.e., ages 16-19), that number was 23.7 percent for those just ten years older [2]. This finding suggests that the patient sitting in front of http://journalofethics.ama-assn.org/2016/11/ecas3-1611.html http://journalofethics.ama-assn.org/2013/02/ecas1-1302.html AMA Journal of Ethics, November 2016 1089 Dr. Lao is at a critical period of development, at high risk of developing mental health problems and suicidal ideation if effective interventions are not put in place. The causal pathway to higher rates of mental illness in transgender youth is illuminated by a recent study, which found that socially transitioned transgender children who are supported in their gender identity have developmentally normal levels of depression and only minimal elevations in anxiety compared to other children their age [11]. This finding suggests that psychopathology within this group is a product of poor social acceptance rather than an intrinsic part of transgender identity. Pubertal suppression and hormone therapy are the chief tools physicians have at their disposal for minimizing a transgender patient’s risk of suffering adverse mental health outcomes. Opportunities to provide benefit to the patient extend well beyond psychological care as Jessie, at age 16, is undergoing physical development that requires timely medical intervention to maximize medical affirmation of her gender identity. Depending on Jessie’s current height, timely estrogen administration might aid in closure of the growth plates, possibly allowing for her to remain closer to the median height for girls her age. Additionally, each passing day of androgen-predominant puberty leads to further facial masculinization, deepening vocal range, and male pattern hair growth that will require costly—and variably effective—medical and behavioral interventions if Jessie chooses to pursue them in order to pass as her affirmed gender. Tragically, passing can be a matter of safety and survival for young transgender women. In one large survey of transgender people, 53 percent reported being victims of harassment in public accommodations [12], and, in 2015, 67 percent of victims of hate crime homicides reported by the National Coalition of Anti-Violence Programs were perpetrated against transgender and gender-nonconforming people [13]. Passing can also affect transgender people’s ability to find romantic partners, housing, and employment, with 63 percent of transgender survey respondents reporting acts of serious discrimination in one or more of these domains [12]. Although these are largely social and legislative problems, timely hormone therapy is crucial for transgender patients’ quality of life and physical safety, given the current risks of violence and discrimination they face. In the absence of other physicians willing to provide hormone treatment, Dr. Lao’s obligation to intervene based on the principle of beneficence is imperative to Jessie’s well-being. Ethical Principles that Do Not Support Psychiatric Administration of Hormone Therapy Ethical analysis based on the principles of nonmaleficence and justice suggests that Dr. Lao should think twice before providing hormone therapy for gender-transitioning adolescents. http://journalofethics.ama-assn.org/2010/08/jdsc1-1008.html http://journalofethics.ama-assn.org/2011/10/oped2-1110.html www.amajournalofethics.org 1090 Nonmaleficence. Although there are strong arguments in favor of Dr. Lao being trained to provide gender-affirming medical care, specifically hormone therapy, the ethical principles of nonmaleficence and justice weigh on the other side of the balance. Nonmaleficence—to do no harm—is a complicated standard to uphold in this case. Much has been made of potential iatrogenic harms of estrogen-based hormone therapy in late adolescence—including increased risk of deep vein thrombosis, prolactinomas (brain tumors that cause excess prolactin release by the pituitary gland), and loss of fertility for those who do not undergo cryopreservation prior to hormone initiation [14, 15]. While these medical complications can be severe, recent studies have found the incidence of adverse effects of hormone therapy to be low overall [16], and the potential harms of any treatment must be weighed with the potential gains in mind. Dr. Lao must be prepared to monitor and treat all side effects of the medications he prescribes, whether through his own efforts or expert consultation. Unfortunately, he is unlikely to have been taught basic hormone therapy administration or pubertal suppression while completing his psychiatry residency training. Although current Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education (ACGME) core competencies require psychiatric residency programs to teach “fundamental principles of the epidemiology, etiologies, diagnosis, treatment, and prevention of all major psychiatric disorders in the current standard diagnostic statistical manual” [17], management of gender dysphoria—the conflict between birth-assigned and self-identified gender— including hormone therapy, is seldom taught [18]. While psychiatrists have long prescribed estrogen for indications ranging from postnatal unipolar depression to premenstrual dysphoric disorder, there is little precedent for psychiatric practitioners providing hormones for gender dysphoria [19]. Because Dr. Lao is practicing in a rural setting without access to transgender-affirming medical specialists for consultation, he must consider the potential harm to Jessie of initiating hormone therapy and then being required to stop if complications arise that he does not have the expertise to manage. Additionally, because Dr. Lao is Jessie’s psychiatrist, he must consider the potential harm to his therapeutic alliance with her if he chooses to prescribe hormone therapy. On the one hand, the standard of care for prescribing hormone therapy, especially in adolescents, calls for invasive physical exams, including of breast and genital tissue—a practice that could generate negative transference reactions from Dr. Lao or Jessie and be detrimental to the therapeutic relationship. On the other hand, as Jessie’s mental health clinician, Dr. Lao has an obligation to help Jessie process her gender dysphoria, regardless of whether she chooses to continue medical assistance with her transition. If Dr. Lao is invested in managing Jessie’s hormone therapy, will he be able to integrate the physical dimensions of her care into their therapeutic relationship without causing harm? Justice. Finally, the principle of distributive justice—the fair distribution of scarce resources and the balancing of competing needs—calls into question the ethical and http://journalofethics.ama-assn.org/2008/09/ccas2-0809.html AMA Journal of Ethics, November 2016 1091 clinical wisdom of Dr. Lao taking on the responsibility of prescribing hormone therapy. While providing hormone therapy would serve to bring this resource to a population in which there is a relative scarcity of access, Dr. Lao’s position as a psychiatrist who sees adolescents in a rural area makes his time another scarce resource to consider. A 2010 study in the Journal of Pediatrics reported that primary care pediatricians rated child and adolescent psychiatrists as the least accessible subspecialists for patients requiring a referral, with the worst access reported in rural communities [20]. Long wait times for patients with high-acuity chief complaints, ranging from first-episode psychosis to posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) from chronic abuse, would potentially increase if a clinician unfamiliar with a relatively rare condition took time to learn its management. Is there truly a clinical and ethical imperative for Dr. Lao to take on learning to serve outside his current scope of practice when the need for him to serve within its limits is already so great? Conclusion Physicians who choose to provide quality care for a stigmatized patient population within a system that generally ignores its unique medical needs do so at the fringes of their clinical comfort zone. In the absence of a functional system of consistent and equitable care delivery for all patients, the onus of competent care often falls on conscientious individual clinicians who are passionate about caring for the underserved. As the sole clinician offering Jessie crucial gender affirmation, we argue that it is Dr. Lao’s responsibility to ensure Jessie receives all medically indicated interventions she desires, including hormone therapy. To do this, it is his clinical and ethical responsibility to perform due diligence by helping Jessie receive gender-affirming medical treatment, including hormone therapy, from an experienced clinician. If geographic and cultural factors, such as transphobia, limit the availability of adequate transgender care, it becomes Dr. Lao’s responsibility to become trained in and to initiate hormone therapy with the patient as long as the benefits of providing hormone therapy outweigh the potential risks. Although each psychiatrist must make his or her own decision about whether to help patients receive desired hormone therapy, a few basic principles should serve as a guide: 1. When transgender patients present seeking gender-affirming medical interventions, psychiatrists are responsible for ensuring these patients receive access to all medically indicated care. Due to the clinical complexities of gender-affirming medical treatment for adolescents, due diligence in locating an experienced and skilled clinician must be exercised. 2. ACGME-accredited psychiatry residency training programs should teach management of pubertal suppression and gender-affirming hormone therapy as part of their standard curricula. Some of this training might take the form of grand rounds, case discussions, and simulated patients if residents do not come into contact with transgender people with regularity at their available training sites. http://journalofethics.ama-assn.org/2016/11/ecas1-1611.html http://journalofethics.ama-assn.org/2016/11/ecas1-1611.html http://journalofethics.ama-assn.org/2009/05/pfor1-0905.html www.amajournalofethics.org 1092 3. When assessing the urgency of hormone therapy initiation for adolescents, special attention should be paid to developmental window periods in physiologic puberty. 4. Psychiatrists should give special consideration to the therapeutic alliance when considering initiating hormone therapy. Co-management with other professionals is the preferred method of treatment. In most cases, due to the possibility of negative transference reactions, psychiatrists should not perform sensitive physical exams on patients with whom they have an established therapeutic alliance. With these principles in mind, it is our hope that psychiatrists will work to reverse a legacy of exclusionary gatekeeping policies towards transgender patients seeking gender-affirming medical treatment by becoming champions in the effort to expand access to care. References 1. Movement Advancement Project; Human Rights Campaign; Center for American Progress. A Broken Bargain: Discrimination, Fewer Benefits and More Taxes for LGBT Workers. http://www.lgbtmap.org/file/a-broken-bargain-full-report.pdf. Published June 2013. Accessed September 7, 2016. 2. Reisner SL, Biello KB, White Hughto JM, et al. Psychiatric diagnoses and comorbidities in a diverse, multicity cohort of young transgender women: baseline findings from Project LifeSkills. JAMA Pediatr. 2016;170(5):481-486. 3. Lambda Legal. When health care isn’t caring: transgender and gender- nonconforming people. http://www.lambdalegal.org/sites/default/files/publications/downloads/whcic- insert_transgender-and-gender-nonconforming-people.pdf. Accessed Aug 23, 2015. 4. Coleman E, Bockting W, Botzer M, et al. Standards of care for the health of transsexual, transgender, and gender-nonconforming people, version 7. Int J Transgend. 2012;13(4):165-232. 5. Hembree WC, Cohen-Kettenis P, Delemarre-van de Waal HA, et al; Endocrine Society. Endocrine treatment of transsexual persons: an Endocrine Society clinical practice guideline. J Clin Endocrinol Metab. 2009;94(9):3132-3154. 6. Sanchez NF, Sanchez JP, Danoff A. Health Care Utilization, barriers to care, and hormone usage among male-to-female transgender persons in New York City. Am J Public Health. 2009;99(4):713-719. 7. Gridley SJ, Crouch JM, Evans Y, et al. Youth and caregiver perspectives on barriers to gender-affirming health care for transgender youth. J Adolesc Health. 2016;59(3):254-261. 8. Lambrese J. Suppression of puberty in transgender children. Virtual Mentor. 2010;12(8):645-649. AMA Journal of Ethics, November 2016 1093 9. Giordano S. Lives in a chiaroscuro. Should we suspend the puberty of children with gender identity disorder? J Med Ethics. 2008;34(8):580-584. 10. White Hughto JM, Reisner SL. A systematic review of the effects of hormone therapy on psychological functioning and quality of life in transgender individuals. Transgend Health. 2016;1(1):21-31. 11. Olson KR, Durwood L, DeMeules M, McLaughlin KA. Mental health of transgender children who are supported in their identities. Pediatrics. 2016;137(3):e20153223. http://pediatrics.aappublications.org/content/137/3/e20153223.long. Accessed September 28, 2016. 12. Grant JM, Mottet LA, Tanis J, Harrison J, Herman JL, Keisling M. Injustice at Every Turn: A Report of the National Transgender Discrimination Survey. Washington, DC: National Center for Transgender Equality, National Gay and Lesbian Task Force; 2011. http://www.thetaskforce.org/static_html/downloads/reports/reports/ntds_full .pdf. Accessed August 3, 2016, 2016. 13. Waters E, Jindasurat C, Wolfe C. Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Queer, and HIV-Affected Hate Violence in 2015. New York, NY: National Coalition of Anti- Violence Programs; 2016:18. http://avp.org/storage/documents/ncavp_hvreport_2015_final.pdf. Accessed September 28, 2016. 14. Mueller A, Gooren L. Hormone-related tumors in transsexuals receiving treatment with cross-sex hormones. Eur J Endocrinol. 2008;159(3):197-202. 15. Toorians AW, Thomassen MC, Zweegman S, et al. Venous thrombosis and changes of hemostatic variables during cross-sex hormone treatment in transsexual people. J Clin Endocrinol Metab. 2003;88(12):5723-5729. 16. Weinand JD, Safer JD. Hormone therapy in transgender adults is safe with provider supervision; a review of hormone therapy sequelae for transgender individuals. J Clin Transl Endocrinol. 2015;2(2):55-60. 17. Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education. ACGME program requirements for graduate medical education in psychiatry. https://www.acgme.org/Portals/0/PFAssets/ProgramRequirements/400_psyc hiatry_2016.pdf. Effective July 1, 2016:13. Accessed September 20, 2016. 18. See, for example, UT Southwestern Medical Center. Department of Psychiatry: special education events: LGBT mental health. http://www.utsouthwestern.edu/education/medical- school/departments/psychiatry/education-and-training/residency- program/life/seminars.html. Accessed September 7, 2016. 19. Craig MC. Should psychiatrists be prescribing oestrogen therapy to their female patients? Br J Psychiatry. 2013;202(1):9-13. www.amajournalofethics.org 1094 20. Pletcher BA, Rimsza ME, Cull WL, Shipman SA, Shugerman RP, O’Connor KG. Primary care pediatricians’ satisfaction with subspecialty care, perceived supply, and barriers to care. J Pediatr. 2010;156(6):1011-1015. Cary S. Crall, MD, is a first-year resident in the Massachusetts General Hospital/McLean Adult Psychiatry Residency Program in Boston. He received his MD from Harvard Medical School. His research interests include LGBTQ mental health, child and adolescent psychiatry, and medical education. Rachel K. Jackson is a fourth-year medical student at the University of Washington in Seattle. She received her BS from Portland State University and plans to pursue residency training in family medicine. Rachel’s professional interests include primary care for LGBTQ adults and adolescents, mental health, suicide prevention, addiction, transgender care, sexual health, and wilderness medicine. Related in the AMA Journal of Ethics Affirmative and Responsible Health Care for People with Nonconforming Gender Identities and Expressions, November 2016 Closing the Gap: Finding and Encouraging Physicians Who Will Care for the Underserved, May 2009 Doctors’ Responsibility to Reduce Discrimination against Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual, and Transgender People, October 2011 How Should Physicians Refer When Referral Options Are Limited for Transgender Patients?, November 2016 Is the Standard of Care Always Worth the Cost?, February 2013 Should Mental Health Screening and Psychotherapy Be Required Prior to Body Modification for Gender Expression?, November 2016 Understanding Transgender and Medically Assisted Gender Transition: Feminism as a Critical Resource, November 2016 What’s in a Guideline? Developing Collaborative and Sound Research Designs that Substantiate Best Practice Recommendations for Transgender Health Care, November 2016 The people and events in this case are fictional. Resemblance to real events or to names of people, living or dead, is entirely coincidental. The viewpoints expressed in this article are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views and policies of the AMA. Copyright 2016 American Medical Association. All rights reserved. ISSN 2376-6980 http://journalofethics.ama-assn.org/2016/11/pfor1-1611.html http://journalofethics.ama-assn.org/2016/11/pfor1-1611.html http://journalofethics.ama-assn.org/2009/05/pfor1-0905.html http://journalofethics.ama-assn.org/2011/10/oped2-1110.html http://journalofethics.ama-assn.org/2011/10/oped2-1110.html http://journalofethics.ama-assn.org/2016/11/ecas1-1611.html http://journalofethics.ama-assn.org/2016/11/ecas1-1611.html http://journalofethics.ama-assn.org/2013/02/ecas1-1302.html http://journalofethics.ama-assn.org/2016/11/ecas2-1611.html http://journalofethics.ama-assn.org/2016/11/ecas2-1611.html http://journalofethics.ama-assn.org/2016/11/msoc1-1611.html http://journalofethics.ama-assn.org/2016/11/msoc1-1611.html http://journalofethics.ama-assn.org/2016/11/stas1-1611.html http://journalofethics.ama-assn.org/2016/11/stas1-1611.html ETHICS CASE Should Psychiatrists Prescribe Gender-Affirming Hormone Therapy to Transgender Adolescents? Ethical Principles Favoring Hormone Therapy Administration The principles of patient autonomy and beneficence support the need for psychiatrists to prescribe hormone therapy for 2TUgender-transitioning adolescentsU2T. Patient autonomy. The patient autonomy argument for providing HRT is straightforward—physicians should honor transgender patients’ right to express their gender identity by providing desired medical interventions in line with the established 2TUstanda... Beneficence. The principle of beneficence—the obligation to do good for the patient—additionally supports Dr. Lao’s providing hormone therapy. The best available evidence, along with decades of clinical experience, indicates that effective hormone the... The causal pathway to higher rates of mental illness in transgender youth is illuminated by a recent study, which found that socially transitioned transgender children who are supported in their gender identity have developmentally normal levels of de... Ethical Principles that Do Not Support Psychiatric Administration of Hormone Therapy Ethical analysis based on the principles of nonmaleficence and justice suggests that Dr. Lao should think twice before providing hormone therapy for gender-transitioning adolescents. Nonmaleficence. Although there are strong arguments in favor of Dr. Lao being trained to provide gender-affirming medical care, specifically hormone therapy, the ethical principles of nonmaleficence and justice weigh on the other side of the balance. ... Conclusion 
work_luoqojretzenlm7cl46sx4qzsu	----	Microsoft Word - Richey et al BAAS Submission LGBTQPAN 20191114.docx Gender and sexual minorities in astronomy and planetary science face increased risks of harassment and assault Christina R. Richeya, Katharine M.N. Leeb, Erica Rodgersc, and Kathryn B.H. Clancyb,d aJet Propulsion Laboratory, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA, USA bDepartment of Anthropology, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Urbana, IL, USA cSpace Science Institute, Boulder, CO, USA dBeckman Institute for Advanced Science and Technology, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Urbana, IL, USA A R T I C L E I N F O Peer Reviewed Article history: Received 1 APR 2019 Revisions Received 22 OCT 2019 Accepted 11 NOV 2019 Keywords: gender minorities sexual minorities harassment assault planetary science astronomy Corresponding Author: C.R. Richey, christina.r.richey@jpl.nasa.gov A B S T R A C T Lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer/questioning, pansexual, asexual, and/or nonbinary (LGBTQPAN) people are a vulnerable, yet understudied group in the American STEM workplace. Only recently have efforts been made to assess their workplace experiences and levels of representation in STEM. In this paper, we sought to explore the experiences of LGBTQPAN individuals in the astronomy and planetary science community. We conducted an internet-based survey of the workplace experiences of 474 astronomers and planetary scientists. We hypothesized LGBTQPAN women and gender minority respondents in our sample would observe negative remarks or directly experience verbal or physical harassment in higher proportion compared to cisgender, straight women, a more commonly studied group. We found support for this hypothesis. LGBTQPAN women and gender minorities also observed more homophobic and transphobic remarks from their peers, and were more likely to feel unsafe at work due to their race, sexual orientation, and gender identity, compared to cisgender, straight women. They were more likely to be verbally harassed due to sexual orientation and gender identity, and were fully twice as likely to be physically harassed due to gender or sex. Based on our sample, we suggest that LGBTQPAN women and gender minorities experience a more hostile workplace climate in astronomy and planetary science compared to cisgender, straight women. © 2019. All rights reserved. 1. Introduction Consideration of axes of gender and sexual identity representation has been slow in science workplaces, and thus limited data is available on their lived experiences in the sciences. Yet evidence in American workplaces more broadly demonstrates that lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer/questioning, pansexual, asexual, and/or nonbinary (LGBTQPAN) people are at greater risk for experiencing negative workplace behaviors than many other groups. Members of the LGBTQPAN community (see Table 1 for working definitions of terms) are stigmatized, labeled, verbally and physically harassed, assaulted, and potentially face employment discrimination, workplace discrimination, and termination of employment [Konik & Cortina, 2008; Rabelo & Cortina, 2014]. Many members of the LGBT+ community resort to keeping their sexual identity or gender non-conformity private in response to hostile environments or out of fear of discrimination [Eliason et al., 2011]. The trans community faces especially pervasive problems. In a recent survey of trans people, over 50% of respondents either delayed or hid their gender transitions to avoid discrimination in the workplace, and this discrimination is racialized, with Black, Latinx, and American Indian trans respondents facing significantly more workplace discrimination than white respondents [Grant et al., 2011]. The science workplace experiences of LGBTQPAN populations have been understudied, with the majority of negative workplace behavior studies focusing on cisgender women [NASEM report, 2018], and to a limited extent on racial or ethnic inequalities among cisgender women [Clancy et al., 2017]. The limited research that has been done on sexual harassment and other identity-based harassment on those with minority identities for gender, sexual orientation, or both, suggests that these groups experience even higher frequencies of harassment than the already-vulnerable group of cisgender straight women [Brewster et al. 2012; Brewster 2014; Eliason et al., 2011; Atherton et al., 2016; Yoder and Mattheis, 2016]. For instance, members of the trans community have reported being outed by coworkers [Schilt & Connell, 2007; Dispenza et al., 2012], being called a former or incorrect pronoun intentionally [Budge et al., 2010; Brewster et al., 2014], being asked inappropriate questions about their surgical status [Grant et al., 2011], and dealing with job discrimination, including termination of employment [Badgett et al., 2007; Brewster et al., 2014]. Atherton et al., 2016 noted that 15% of LGBT men, 25% of LGBT women, and 30% of gender-nonconforming individuals characterized the overall climate of their department or division of their campus and/or workplace as “uncomfortable” or “very uncomfortable”. Further, their experience as often isolated, tokenized, or closeted members of their workplace can further limit the abilities of LGBTQPAN people to find allies and resolve conflicts around incivilities, discrimination, or harassment [Ackerman et al., 2018; NASEM report 2018]. It’s hard to know whether LGBTQPAN people are especially underrepresented in the sciences, because they are so marginalized as a class that the National Science Foundation has only just started to pilot a program to begin to assess their prevalence in the scientific 2 BULLETIN OF THE AMERICAN ASTRONOMICAL SOCIETY (BAAS, 2019) workforce [Langin, 2018]. In a recent survey of physicists, transgender and gender-nonconforming physicists reported the highest levels of exclusionary behavior, adverse climate, and unsupportive policies [Atherton et al., 2016]. Thirty percent of LGBTQPAN respondents reported considering leaving their workplace or school [Atherton et al., 2016]. Those who experienced discrimination or behavior that was exclusionary were also more likely to consider leaving their institutions and/or places of employment [Atherton et al., 2016; Ackerman et al., 2018]. Members of the LGBT+ community in STEM also have lower job satisfaction than both non-LGBT+ STEM professionals, and LGBT+ community members in non-STEM professions [Brewster et al., 2012; Suri, 2015]. Table 1. Glossary of terms. This glossary does not represent absolute definitions of these terms, only our working definitions for the purposes of this paper. In astronomy and planetary science, regardless of whether the issue is one of LGBTQPAN scientists being underrepresented, underserved, or both, the dominant lived experience and cultural constructions of the field are white, cisgender male, and straight. In our previous paper on this sample, we found not only that women of color reported the highest levels of sexual harassment and assault but that women of color were the most likely to report feeling unsafe at work in the last five years due to their gender (40% of women of color in our sample compared to 27% of white women) [Clancy et al., 2017]. The majority of scientists holding positions of high power, influence, or rank in astronomy and planetary sciences do not hold minority identities. This means that culture, policy, and the perception of climate is dictated largely by white, cisgender, straight men. LGBTQPAN experiences may be less visible to these groups, and so the extent to which holding these identities puts one at additional risk for sexual or other forms of identity-based harassment is likely to be underestimated. In this paper, we sought to explore the experiences of LGBTQPAN individuals in the astronomy and planetary science community using our previously collected sample [Clancy et al., 2017]. We ask whether LGBTQPAN women and gender minorities experience a more hostile workplace environment than cisgender, straight women. We confine most of our analyses to a comparison between cisgender, straight women and LGBTQPAN women and gender minorities because cisgender men experience such low rates of harassment that their inclusion runs the risk of overstating differences between cisgender straight and LGBTQPAN experiences. We hypothesize that LGBTQPAN women and gender minorities experience a significantly greater hostile workplace environment than cisgender straight women in this sample. 2. Methods This research was conducted under the oversight of the University of Illinois Institutional Review Board (protocol #15354). The survey was administered electronically on the Survey Monkey website from 5 January to 15 March 2015. To obtain informed consent, the front page of the online survey informed research participants about the study and that continuing past the front page to complete the survey signified consent. We recruited participants through multiple outlets in the planetary science and astronomical sciences community, and additional detail can be found in Clancy et al., 2017. Recruitment intentionally oversampled women due to their small numbers in astronomy and planetary sciences. Participants were not compensated for participation. As reported in our previous publication [Clancy et al., 2017] the questions were based on a survey on workplace climate in physics conducted by the American Physical Society’s Forum of Graduate Student Affairs [Long, 2012] and adapted for the astronomical and planetary scientist community. Participants were asked to respond to questions regarding personal experiences in the workplace in the past 5 years relative to the dates the survey was conducted. If the participant changed positions in the past 5 years, they were asked to answer questions regarding their current workplace and then asked the same set of questions about their previous workplace. In this paper, we only analyze answers regarding experiences in the current workplace. Participants were asked to provide demographic information about their gender, gender identity, race and ethnicity, and ability status at the end of the survey. The supporting information provides a complete list of survey questions. The personal experience questions were categorized into three sections: (1) negative language, (2) safety, and (3) responses to harassment. Participants were asked how often they hear negative language from their peers, supervisors, or others (regarding language either directed at themselves or others), regarding sexual orientation, race, sex, gender, femininity/masculinity, physical or mental ability, or religion. Participants were then asked to identify if they feel unsafe due to personal characteristics related to these same factors, and subsequently if they skipped any type of activity (school or work related) because they felt unsafe. The safety section ends by asking respondents if they encountered verbal or physical harassment because of their personal characteristics, and if so, they LGBTQPAN Lesbian, gay, transgender, queer/questioning, pansexual, asexual, and/or nonbinary identities. We use a maximally inclusive term to represent minority identities in gender identity and/or sexual orientation. All of these identities were specifically inquired about in the demographics portion of our survey. LGBT+ Lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, plus represents another common shorthand for those with minority identities of gender identity and/or sexual orientation. We use this term when referring to other published research where it is unclear the inclusivity of the survey items, and/or when it is the preferred acronym identified by the study authors. Cisgender The gender identification of a person when it matches the gender they were assigned, typically at or near birth. Transgender Of, relating to, or being a person whose gender identity and/or gender expression differs from what is typically associated with the sex they were assigned at birth. LGBTQPAN women and gender minorities This term includes cisgender women who have a minority sexual orientation identity as well as transgender and nonbinary people regardless of their sexual orientation identity. BULLETIN OF THE AMERICAN ASTRONOMICAL SOCIETY (BAAS, 2019) 3 were asked to identify if the harasser(s) was a peer, supervisor, or another member of their school or work community. We grouped together all individuals who self-identified in one of the following ways: sexuality as lesbian, gay, bisexual, questioning, queer, pansexual, asexual; gender as transgender; or gender as non- binary, and are labelling this broad category “LGBTQPAN.” We regret the error of not providing an option for intersex individuals. We understand that lived experiences are qualitatively different for people across and between these categories, however we also take seriously the privacy of participants holding these identities given the low numbers of most of these categories among astronomers and planetary scientists. While the barriers to acceptance are different among these identities, the effects of sexist, heteronormative, and/or transphobic work climates, should they exist in this sample, are likely to be experienced by most people in this grouping. If someone identified strictly as cisgender and straight, they are categorized as “Cis, straight.” Fifty-seven participants did not report any identities in these categories, thus they are not included in these analyses. In these analyses, we mostly compare the experiences of cisgender straight women (n = 222) with LGBTQPAN women and gender minorities (n = 52). Because this data was originally collected to examine the experiences of women in astronomy and planetary science and is a common reference group in studies of sexual harassment, this dataset intentionally oversampled women. Some descriptive statistics involved all respondents who reported gender and gender identity; these are clearly noted. Otherwise for this follow-up analysis, we excluded cis men (n = 120 cis straight men, n = 12 LGBQPAN men) in order to more directly compare the experiences of cis straight women with women and gender minorities across the LGBTQPAN spectrum. Therefore, we did not remove trans men from our analyses. We used Fisher’s Exact test to test if the frequency of hearing negative comments in the workplace, experiences feeling unsafe in the workplace, or number of events skipped due to feeling unsafe differed between LGBTQPAN respondents and cis, straight respondents. Significance was set at alpha = 0.05, however this means that for two-tailed tests, significance will be at alpha = 0.025. We report effect size along with p values rather than performing Bonferroni corrections because Bonferonni corrections decrease statistical power and increase the risk of Type II error [Nakagawa 2004]. Cramér’s V was calculated to measure effect size using the LSR package [Navarro 2015] for those analyses where performing a Fisher’s Exact test on the continency tables indicated significant results. We follow convention to categorize effects as small (V = 0.10 to 0.30), medium (V = 0.30 to 0.50), and large (V >= 0.50) [Mangiafico 2016]. All analyses were performed in R version 3.5.1 [R core team, 2018] using ggplot2 and dplyr packages [Wickham, 2016; Wickham et al., 2018]. Figure 1. Timeline of policies and protections for LGBT+ community members (primarily at the federal level) within the United States, as well as efforts within the astronomical and planetary science communities to build community groups, committees, and survey efforts that are referred to within this paper. The goal of this paper is to understand workplace climate issues as they relate to the LGBTQPAN community within our respondents. The survey results for our study were acquired from 5 January to 15 March 2015, during one of the highest points of protections within the United States for LGBT+ community members. 1990: The Hate Crimes Statistics Act become the first federal statute to recognize gay, lesbian, and bisexual people. 1990: George HW Bush signed the Immigration Act of 1990, which no longer allowed for homosexuality to be used as a basis for barring entry to the United States. 1993: “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” is signed into law by President Clinton, prohibiting openly gay and lesbian Americans from serving in the military. 1995: The Hate Crimes Sentencing Enhancement Act goes into effect. 1996: President Clinton signs into law the Defense of Marriage Act. 2003: The US Supreme Court strikes down the “homosexual conduct” law. 2008: Proposition 8 is approved by voters in California, making same-sex marriage illegal. 2009: The Matthew Shepard Act is passed, expanding the definition of hate crimes to include gender, sexual orientation, gender-identity, and disability. 2010 A federal judge rules Proposition 8 unconstitutional. 2011: "Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” is repealed, ending a ban on openly gay men and lesbians from serving in the military. 2016: The US Depts of Education (ED) and Justices (DOJ) issue guidance that schools provide transgender students access to sex-segregated activities and facilities consistent with their gender identity. 2016: The Public Facilities Privacy and Security Act in North Carolina, which limited the use of bathrooms to the sex identified in an individual’s birth certificate, was approved. Portions of the measure were repealed in 2017. 2016: California becomes the first state (after several local and city ordinances) to require all single-toilet bathrooms be designated gender neutral. 2017: The 7th Circuit of Appeals rules that the Civil Rights Act prohibits workplace discrimination against LGBT employees. 2017: The US Depts of Education (ED) and Justice (DOJ) rescinds guidance extending sexual discrimination protections under Title IX to trans students, including for the 2016 facilities based on gender identity. The Office for Civil Rights (OCR) halted several Title IX investigations involving trans students. 1992: The GLB Astronomy (Now the GLBTQastro List) email distribution list is formed. The group begins organizing networking events for members of the LGBT+ community at American Astronomical Society (AAS) Meetings. 2011: The National Transgender Discrimination Survey (NTDS) is released. 2012: The AAS establishes the Working Group on LGBTIQ Equality (WGLE). 2015: The CSWA Survey on Workplace Climate results (which this paper analyzes) are gathered from the community. 2015: WGLE officially become the AAS Committee for Sexual-Orientation and Gender Minorities in Astronomy (SGMA). 2016: The US Transgender Survey, the 2nd report from the NTDS, is released. 2016: The American Physical Society released it’s LGBT Climate in Physics Report. 2016: The Division for Planetary Sciences creates the Professional Culture and Climate Subcommittee. 2018: The LGBT+ Inclusivity in Physics and Astronomy: A Best Practices Guide (2nd Edition) is released jointly by the AAS SGMA and the LGBT+Physicists Group. 2017- 2018 1990 - 1996 1996 -2008 2009 - 2016 National Surveys and Activities in Planetary & Astronomy Greater US Laws, Policies, and Rulings 3. Results Participants across all identity groups reported high rates of both observing and directly experiencing verbal and physical harassment. For example, 62% of all cisgender male respondents (118 cis, straight men and 12 cis men who reported a sexual orientation other than straight) in this sample indicated that they had heard sexist comments from their peers in their work environment in the last five years; for cisgender straight women that number climbed to 78% and for LGBTQPAN women and gender minorities that number was 81% (see Figure 2). 3% percent of cisgender male respondents experienced verbal harassment of a sexist nature; for cisgender straight women that number was 40% and for LGBTQPAN women and gender minorities that number was 47%. Physical harassment due to sex was reported by 0% of cisgender male respondents, 9% of cisgender straight women, and 21% of LGBTQPAN women and gender minority respondents. We next compared the observations and direct experiences of cisgender, straight women (n = 222) with LGBTQPAN women and gender minorities (n = 59) in our sample. We found a significant difference between the frequency of hearing negative remarks from peers when we compare the experiences of women and gender minorities who identify as LGBTQPAN versus cis, straight women. LGBTQPAN women and gender minorities were more likely to observe negative remarks that were homophobic (p=0.002, V = 0.22), were transphobic (p<0.001, V= 0.34), and were about religion or a lack thereof (p=0.001, V=0.23) from their peers. The frequency of hearing negative remarks from supervisors was also greater for LGBTQPAN women and gender minorities for racist remarks (p=0.01, V=0.21) and religion or lack thereof (p=0.014, V=0.20); for negative remarks from others, more LGBTQPAN women and gender minorities observed transphobic remarks (p=0.02, V=0.20). Additional detail is available in Supplemental Table A. Figure 2. Frequency of hearing sexist remarks from peers in the workplace. Only cis, straight women and LGBTQPAN women and gender minorities are included in this graph. When we asked if people have felt unsafe at their current position due to any of the listed personal characteristics, LGBTQPAN women and gender minorities were more likely to feel unsafe due to their race (12% for LGBTQPAN women and gender minorities vs 4% for cis, straight women; p=0.02, V=0.15), sexual orientation (10% for LGBTQPAN women and gender minorities vs 0% for cis, straight women; p<0.001, V=0.24), and gender identity (14% for LGBTQPAN women and gender minorities vs 0% for cis, straight women; p<0.001, V=0.31). There was no significant difference in feeling unsafe due to gender, likely because it was common for both groups (28% for cis, straight women vs. 34% for LGBTQPAN women and gender minorities). For additional details, see Supplemental Table B. There were no significant differences between groups for the number of events skipped due to feeling unsafe (13% cisgender vs 16% LGBTQPAN, p = 0.18, V=0.15). Finally, verbal harassment due to sexual orientation was higher (p=0.005, V could not be calculated due to zeros in table), and physical harassment due to gender or sex was higher (p=0.006, V=0.21), for LGBTQPAN women and gender minorities. Table 2 shows that 21% of LGBTQPAN women and gender minorities report experiencing physical harassment in the workplace within the 5 years prior to the survey administration dates, more than twice the incidence reported in our sample of cisgender, straight women (9%). Supplemental Tables C and D show responses to all questions about verbal and physical harassment. Never Ever cis, straight 91% (198) 9% (19) LGBTQ+ 79% (45) 21% (12) Table 2. Frequency of LTBTQPAN women and gender minorities and cis, straight women experiencing physical harassment due to sex at current workplace, binarized into never experienced/ever experience 4. Discussion LGBTQPAN women and gender minorities in this sample reported a high rate of observing negative remarks, as well as directly experiencing verbal harassment and physical harassment in their astronomy and planetary science workplaces. We remind the reader that the survey responses for this study were acquired during one of the highest points of protection within the United States for the LGBTQPAN community (see Figure 1). Our survey methodology also tightly defined the context of the study as being in respondents’ current position, over just the last five years (2011- 2015) to limit recall bias or inclusion of long past events that may have occurred in a differently inclusive work environment. Not only did LGBTQPAN women and gender minorities observe more homophobic and transphobic remarks than their cisgender, straight female peers, they were more likely to feel unsafe at work due to their race, sexual orientation, and gender identity. They were more likely to be verbally harassed due to sexual orientation and gender identity. Finally, they were more than twice as likely to be physically harassed due to gender or sex. As has been shown previously with this sample, women generally have already been shown to experience a more hostile environment than men [Clancy BULLETIN OF THE AMERICAN ASTRONOMICAL SOCIETY (BAAS, 2019) 5 et al 2017]. We again assert that the negative experiences reported in this sample constitute a hostile workplace environment. The hostile workplace environment experienced by LGBTQPAN women and gender minorities may add to the burden of considering personal well-being and safety when travelling for work (i.e. for conferences, observing runs, geology field trips). Whether employed in higher education, government, or industry, LGBT+ members of academic and professional communities need to consider their travel location’s discriminatory practices and laws, access to bathrooms, as well as the increased likelihood for violence, in ways that cisgender straight folks often do not [Ackerman et al., 2018]. Members of the LGBTQ+ community have heightened levels of stress, anxiety, depression, substance abuse, and suicide attempts, in large part due to the overall negative cultural climate and discriminatory practices they face throughout their lives [Brewster et al., 2012]. Members of the trans community show higher rates of feeling excluded, dealing with intersectional verbal and physical harassment and assault, and dealing with higher rates of prejudice [Lombardi et al., 2002; Grant et al., 2011; Brewster et al., 2014; Atherton et al., 2016]. Our work firmly establishes that LGBTQPAN folk within the astronomy and planetary science community also experience this hostile environment at work. Diversity of thought is paramount to identifying robust STEM research questions, problem identification, and data interpretation [Watson et al., 1993; Wright et al., 1995; McLeod et al., 1996; Burt, 2004; Vedres & Stark, 2010; Neff, 2012]. We must be inclusive and constantly practice being allies, advocates, and accomplices with our colleagues in the LGBTQ+ community to achieve advances in astronomy and planetary science. 5. Recommendations As with our previous paper on this data set [Clancy et al., 2017], the recent APS LGBT+ best practices report [Ackerman et al., 2018], and the National Academies of Science, Engineering, and Medicine (2018) report on sexual harassment, we seek not only to highlight a problem but also to provide a path toward a more inclusive and equitable scientific community. The research strongly indicates that: • Institutional leadership should prioritize the physical, sexual, and psychological safety of all their workers. They need to clearly communicate and provide incentives and rewards to motivate culture change. • Institutions should conduct climate surveys that employ subject matter experts, not just survey method experts. They should swiftly address issues revealed by these assessments but also recognize that there are actions they can take, today, to lessen the impact of a hostile work environment on their LGBTQPAN colleagues and their allies. • Institutions should develop codes of conduct with clear language about what constitutes appropriate professional behavior. There should be swift sanctions for transgressions of behavior graded to the severity of the issue (e.g., a conversation with one’s boss, additional training, probation, demotion, or termination). • Institutions should consider restorative capacity building practices to develop bystander intervention skills in all workers, a sense of responsibility for the culture and climate of the institution at all levels, including at the top, and informal practices to encourage conversation and “calling in” where relevant. Institutions can also educate the astronomy and planetary science workforce through perspective-taking trainings to inform the broader community on the lived experience of being LGBTQPAN. • Institutions should work to identify and support LGBTQPAN networking opportunities, allies, and initiate a discussion of LGBTQPAN workplace concerns. • Institutions should ensure equal access to bathroom facilities for all genders. • Institutions should encourage safe/inclusive practices of sharing gender pronouns and using preferred gender pronouns. • Institutions should require all research partners to have inclusive LGBTQPAN policies. Travel considerations for LGBTQPAN individuals should be explicitly considered by conference organizers, field school program directors, and observatory directors, rather than existing as an extra burden or barrier for LGBTQPAN members of the community. Supportive workplace climates that include non-discrimination policies or other protective practices are related to job satisfaction and affective commitment to the workplace [Bouzianis at al., 2008; Brewster et al., 2012]. LGBT+ people who work in these supportive workplace climates are more likely to be out at work or more likely to disclose transgender identity at work [Brewster, 2014 and references within; Gates & Viggiani, 2014 and references within]. Environments where disclosure worsens the workplace experience, or where the workplace is not deemed safe enough to disclose, carries the consequence of increasing cognitive burden and worsening the home environment for those LGBTQPAN folks who cannot be “out” [Madera, 2010; Ozeren 2014; Botti et al., 2015; Williamson et al., 2017]. In addition to encouraging institutions to take the above actions, individuals in the astronomy and planetary science can all work to set better examples and expectations for professional behavior. Allies and advocates need to practice inclusive workplace behavior, and be willing to hear criticism and improve. Leaders in the field need to model appropriate behavior and define an inclusive and equitable culture in their workplaces, disciplines, and professional societies [Settles et al., 2006; Cortina et al. 2013; Clancy et al., 2014]. Allies should engage in dialog regarding preferred pronouns through respectful discourse and email signature annunciation [Ackerman et al., 2018; Grant et al., 2011]. Many of the above recommendations reflect the kinds of inclusive workplaces that reduce rude and contemptuous behaviors and many types of identity-based harassment broadly, and frankly create a more enjoyable workplace for people of all identities. Inclusive workplaces are ones that are more equitable, friendly, 6 BULLETIN OF THE AMERICAN ASTRONOMICAL SOCIETY (BAAS, 2019) and in the end, more productive and innovative. Astronomy and planetary science are disciplines already starting to be attuned to these issues, with grassroots efforts like the Inclusive Astronomy Conference and the Astronomy Allies. These efforts and their leaders deserve more structural support from their departments and professional societies to see positive change. Acknowledgements Aggregated, de-identified data are provided in the tables and supplemental information. We thank the American Astronomical Society (AAS) and the AAS’s Committee for the Status of Women in Astronomy for funding to support this research, and the anonymous reviewers who strengthened this manuscript considerably. C.R. Richey would like to thank Jet Propulsion Laboratory’s Raise the Bar, under a contract with National Aeronautics and Space Administration, for partial funding for their time and efforts. K.B.H. Clancy would like to thank the Illinois Leadership Center Faculty Fellow Program for funding her time and efforts. 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Supplemental Tables Never Rarely Sometimes Often p value Peers racist cis, straight 52% (114) 36% (79) 11% (24) 2% (4) 0.27 LGBTQ+ 41% (24) 39% (23) 19% (11) 2% (1) sexist cis, straight 22% (48) 40% (88) 32% (70) 6% (14) 0.55 LGBTQ+ 19% (11) 34% (20) 37% (22) 10% (6) homophobic cis, straight 59% (130) 36% (79) 5% (11) 0% (1) 0.003 LGBTQ+ 36% (21) 51% (30) 10% (6) 3% (2) transphobic cis, straight 85% (185) 13% (29) 1% (3) 0% (1) <0.001 LGBTQ+ 61% (36) 20% (12) 19% (11) 0% (0) masc/fem enough cis, straight 53% (114) 28% (61) 17% (36) 3% (6) 0.06 LGBTQ+ 37% (22) 37% (22) 17% (10) 8% (5) physical ability/disability status cis, straight 47% (104) 31% (69) 19% (41) 3% (6) 0.31 LGBTQ+ 38% (22) 36% (21) 19% (11) 7% (4) mental ability/inability status cis, straight 46% (102) 33% (72) 19% (41) 2% (5) 0.05 LGBTQ+ 32% (19) 39% (23) 20% (12) 8% (5) religion or lack thereof cis, straight 41% (91) 30% (65) 25% (54) 5% (10) 0.001 LGBTQ+ 17% (10) 38% (22) 31% (18) 14% (8) Supervisors racist cis, straight 83% (180) 14% (31) 1% (3) 2% (4) 0.01 LGBTQ+ 69% (41) 22% (13) 8% (5) 0% (0) sexist cis, straight 58% (128) 22% (49) 14% (30) 5% (12) 0.16 LGBTQ+ 47% (28) 24% (14) 25% (15) 3% (2) homophobic cis, straight 90% (197) 8% (18) 1% (3) 0% (1) 0.27 LGBTQ+ 85% (50) 10% (6) 3% (2) 2% (1) transphobic cis, straight 94% (202) 6% (13) 0% (1) 0% (0) 0.13 LGBTQ+ 86% (51) 14% (8) 0% (0) 0% (0) masc/fem enough cis, straight 78% (170) 14% (31) 6% (12) 2% (5) 0.18 LGBTQ+ 71% (42) 12% (7) 12% (7) 5% (3) physical ability/disability status cis, straight 79% (172) 16% (35) 4% (9) 1% (2) 0.20 LGBTQ+ 71% (42) 17% (10) 8% (5) 3% (2) mental ability/inability status cis, straight 77% (168) 14% (30) 7% (15) 2% (4) 0.17 BULLETIN OF THE AMERICAN ASTRONOMICAL SOCIETY (BAAS, 2019) 9 LGBTQ+ 64% (38) 20% (12) 12% (7) 3% (2) religion or lack thereof cis, straight 78% (169) 12% (27) 7% (15) 3% (6) 0.013 LGBTQ+ 61% (36) 27% (16) 12% (7) 0% (0) Others racist cis, straight 44% (97) 37% (81) 17% (38) 1% (3) 0.25 LGBTQ+ 35% (20) 37% (21) 25% (14) 4% (2) sexist cis, straight 14% (31) 33% (73) 41% (90) 11% (24) 0.30 LGBTQ+ 18% (10) 23% (13) 42% (24) 18% (10) homophobic cis, straight 50% (110) 39% (86) 10% (21) 1% (2) 0.08 LGBTQ+ 42% (24) 35% (20) 19% (11) 4% (2) transphobic cis, straight 75% (161) 22% (47) 4% (8) 0% (0) 0.02 LGBTQ+ 65% (37) 21% (12) 12% (7) 2% (1) masc/fem enough cis, straight 41% (90) 36% (79) 18% (39) 5% (10) 0.34 LGBTQ+ 35% (20) 32% (18) 25% (14) 9% (5) physical ability/disability status cis, straight 41% (89) 36% (78) 21% (46) 2% (5) 0.74 LGBTQ+ 37% (21) 33% (19) 26% (15) 4% (2) mental ability/inability status cis, straight 35% (74) 42% (92) 22% (48) 2% (4) 0.06 LGBTQ+ 39% (22) 32% (18) 21% (12) 9% (5) religion or lack thereof cis, straight 35% (76) 35% (76) 22% (49) 8% (17) 0.43 LGBTQ+ 33% (19) 26% (15) 28% (16) 12% (7) Supplemental Table A. Comparing frequency of hearing negative remarks in the workplace LGBTQPAN women and gender minorities to cis, straight women. 10 BULLETIN OF THE AMERICAN ASTRONOMICAL SOCIETY (BAAS, 2019) No Yes p value Race cis, straight 96% (214) 4% (8) 0.02 LGBTQ+ 88% (52) 12% (7) physical ability/inability status cis, straight 98% (218) 2% (4) 0.16 LGBTQ+ 95% (56) 5% (3) mental ability/inability status cis, straight 99% (219) 1% (3) 0.037 LGBTQ+ 93% (55) 7% (4) sexual orientation cis, straight 100% (221) 0% (1) <0.001 LGBTQ+ 90% (53) 10% (6) gender identity cis, straight 100% (221) 0% (1) <0.001 LGBTQ+ 86% (51) 14% (8) gender or sex cis, straight 72% (159) 28% (63) 0.42 LGBTQ+ 66% (39) 34% (20) religion or lack thereof cis, straight 96% (213) 4% (9) 0.48 LGBTQ+ 93% (55) 7% (4) Supplemental Table B. Feeling unsafe, comparing LGBTQPAN women and gender minorities to cis, straight women. Never Rarely Sometimes Often p-value Race cis, straight 93% (202) 4% (9) 3% (6) 0% (1) 0.61 LGBTQ+ 91% (53) 5% (3) 2% (1) 2% (1) physical ability/disability cis, straight 99% (214) 1% (2) 0% (0) 0% (1) 0.28 LGBTQ+ 96% (55) 2% (1) 2% (1) 0% (0) mental ability/disability cis, straight 99% (215) 0% (0) 0% (1) 0% (1) 0.04 LGBTQ+ 95% (54) 4% (2) 2% (1) 0% (0) sexual orientation cis, straight 97% (211) 2% (5) 0% (1) 0% (0) 0.005 LGBTQ+ 86% (50) 10% (6) 3% (2) 0% (0) gender ID cis, straight 99% (214) 0% (1) 1% (2) 0% (0) 0.10 LGBTQ+ 95% (53) 4% (2) 2% (1) 0% (0) Gender/Sex cis, straight 60% (130) 26% (56) 12% (26) 3% (6) 0.11 LGBTQ+ 53% (31) 19% (11) 24% (14) 3% (2) Religion cis, straight 90% (195) 6% (12) 4% (8) 0% (1) 0.03 LGBTQ+ 84% (48) 16% (9) 0% (0) 0% (0) Supplemental Table C. Comparing frequency of verbal harassment for LGBTQPAN women and gender minorities to cis, straight women. BULLETIN OF THE AMERICAN ASTRONOMICAL SOCIETY (BAAS, 2019) 11 Never Rarely Sometimes Often p-value Race cis, straight 100% (218) 0% (1) 0% (0) 0% (0) 1 LGBTQ+ 100% (57) 0% (0) 0% (0) 0% (0) physical ability/disability cis, straight 100% (217) 0% (1) 0% (0) 0% (0) 0.37 LGBTQ+ 98% (56) 2% (1) 0% (0) 0% (0) mental ability/disability cis, straight 100% (217) 0% (1) 0% (0) 0% (0) 1 LGBTQ+ 100% (57) 0% (0) 0% (0) 0% (0) sexual orientation cis, straight 100% (215) 0% (1) 0% (0) 0% (0) 1 LGBTQ+ 100% (57) 0% (0) 0% (0) 0% (0) gender ID cis, straight 100% (218) 0% (0) 0% (0) 0% (0) 1 LGBTQ+ 100% (57) 0% (0) 0% (0) 0% (0) Gender/Sex cis, straight 91% (198) 5% (11) 3% (7) 0% (1) 0.006 LGBTQ+ 79% (45) 19% (11) 2% (1) 0% (0) Religion cis, straight 100% (214) 0% (0) 0% (0) 0% (0) 1 LGBTQ+ 100% (56) 0% (0) 0% (0) 0% (0) Supplemental Table D. Comparing frequency of physical harassment for LGBTQPAN women and gender minorities to cis, straight women. 
work_lush2efsmveh3lcdizkfzveluy	----	TF_Template_Word_Windows_2010 Exploring how the social model of disability can be re- invigorated: in response to Jonathan Levitt. WOODS, Richard Available from Sheffield Hallam University Research Archive (SHURA) at: http://shura.shu.ac.uk/24527/ This document is the author deposited version. You are advised to consult the publisher's version if you wish to cite from it. Published version WOODS, Richard (2017). Exploring how the social model of disability can be re- invigorated: in response to Jonathan Levitt. Disability and Society, 32 (7), 1090-1095. Copyright and re-use policy See http://shura.shu.ac.uk/information.html Sheffield Hallam University Research Archive http://shura.shu.ac.uk http://shura.shu.ac.uk/ http://shura.shu.ac.uk/information.html Exploring how the social model of disability can be re-invigorated: in response to Jonathan Levitt. Abstract. Levitt argues the social model of disability needs to be re-invigorated, potentially by adapting the tool for separate countries. The social model has been successfully applied for some disabled groups in the United Kingdom. However, the social model is not implemented for neurodivergent labels such as autism, through negative language of autism, causing severe problems for autistic individuals’ daily lives. The social model can be re-invigorated for autism, removing social barriers by; changing non-autistic people’s attitudes towards autism through ensuring positive language of autism, preventing the categorisation of autism and fully enacting The Autism Act 2009 and The Equality 2010. Keywords: autism, social model of disability, emancipation, impairment labels, neuodiversity. How is the social model implemented in the UK? Levitt (2017) argues that the social model of disability should be re-invigorated by making a bespoke social model of disability for each separate country it is applied to. He proposes the social model has been successful for himself and other disabled people in the UK over the last 22 years. However, I contest that the social model has been fully implemented in the UK for all impairment labels, traditionally being successfully deployed for people with physical and sensory impairments, while neurodivergent labels have been left behind in modern times (Graby 2016). While the social model has numerous flaws (Mallet and Runswick-Cole 2014), it is largely associated with physical and sensory impairments, as shown by how blind people use folding canes, have brail at all entrances and stairs. The practice of Universal Design is enshrined in USA law, however less so in the UK Equality Act 2010, and is not used much in the UK (Milton, Martin and Melham 2016); the principle is meaningfully practised however when designing new buildings for which should be accessible for people with physical and sensory impairments. In the UK Education system inclusion, is practised as a form of integration largely due to the dominance of medical/ deficit based discourse utilised to gain extra support for Special Educational Needs and Disability pupils. For instance the high numbers of autistic pupils with Education Health and Care Plans is a sign of how the education system requires bolt on support for anyone who is different from the mythical norm (Milton, Martin and Melham 2016), helping to perpetuate ableism and internal ableism (Campbell 2008). The commonly reported struggles parents face gaining adequate support for autistic pupils often causes severe psychological distress to autistic pupils due to poorly enacted inclusion policies (Beardon 2017). Social model is not practised for the autism label. The medical model of disability is the dominant model in autism studies (Graby 2016). The UK fulltime employment rate for people with autism is stagnant at around 15% (National Autistic Society 2016). Even with The Autism Act 2009 and The Equality Act 2010 autistic individuals could be discriminated against in the Criminal Justice System (Beardon 2008). Autistic individuals expend prodigious amounts of energy forcing themselves to meet Predominant Neurotype (Beardon 2008) demands and expectations, often causing undue psychological harm to themselves (Beardon 2017). This leads to higher suicide rates for autistic individuals: “7.3% - 15% of people who have been hospitalised for attempted suicide also have an autism diagnosis. This is much higher than the 1% rate of autism diagnosis we would expect in the general UK population” (Cassidy 2015). The above average autistic suicide is is symptomatic of autistic individuals being compared to Predominant Neurotype societal demands and expectations (Beardon 2017). An example of wider prejudice against neurodivergent labels, with the UK government favouring ‘really disabled people’ to the detriment of neurodivergent labels, or unseen disabilities: “Disability benefits should go to "really disabled people" not those "taking pills at home, who suffer from anxiety"” (Anon 2017). Cuts to the welfare in the UK have thus helped to segregate the different impairment types (Graby 2016), driving internal ableism. This article however argues that the social model should be more widely implemented for all neurodivergent labels. Shifting autism research away from causes and biological effects onto services and social issues will also assist autistic individuals by exploring the impact of living in Predominant Neurotype society. Autistic individuals are treated harshly for multiple reasons, primarily due to the language used to describe autism. The language used to describe a topic affects how people treat the topic. This is reflected in the recent rise in hate crime against European Union migrants after the Brexit Referendum in the UK. For neurodivergent labels, Sayal et al (2010) suggest that teachers believing pupils have ADHD predisposes the teachers to have negative opinions of the labelled pupils due to labelling effects. The Autism Strategy (Department of Health 2015) explicitly mentions the problems individuals with Asperger’s Syndrome face in their every-day lives, due to the misconception Asperger’s Syndrome is mild autism or that Asperger’s Syndrome is not autism. Significantly clinicians over identified the number of cases of Asperger’s Syndrome by ignoring the differential marker of delayed speech development between Asperger’s Syndrome and autism, primarily due to the positive connotations of Asperger’s Syndrome. The autism discourse is dominated by concepts of autism being a disorder and a deficit (Graby2016). This allows Predominant Neurotypes to treat autistic people as less than human, as autistic individuals are seen as diminished versions of the perfect Predominant Neurotype person (Campbell 2008). This is a profound type of barrier, something which has to be tackled by using the social model of disability. Secondly, the social model is not implemented for autistic individuals due to the burden of adapting to each other being unreasonably and unevenly placed onto autistic individuals compared to Predominant Neurotype institutions. Predominant Neurotype society forces autistic individuals to adapt to an environment which is not adapted for autistic individuals. For instance, autistic pupils are forced to learn a social skills curriculum in addition to the national curriculum. With increasing academisation it is less likely that autism friendly universal design will be implemented (Milton, Martin and Melham 2016). To compound the imbalance Predominant Neurotype society ignores the challenges autistic individuals often experience, actively creating asocial barrier to their employment (Graby 2016). These factors contribute towards the systematic discrimination and oppression of autistic individuals by Predominant Neurotype society. How do we implement the social model for autistic individuals? Levitt (2017) argues that the social model can be re-invigorated by asking five questions which adapt the social model for individual countries. I contest the limited view of Levitt’s scope and believe that in order to make the social model ubiquitous, these questions need to be applied to specific impairment labels by each country; universal and consistent application of the social model will benefit people of all impairment labels. Here I reply to Levitt’s questions not from a country’s perspective, but from the perspective of the autism neurodivergent label: 1) “Which aspects of the negative influence of society on disability (other than barriers to inclusion) are particularly worth focusing on and how can these be effectively addressed?” (Levitt 2017, 4). The primary social barrier to be removed is the negative language and discourse of the autism label, such as deficit and disorder, along with removing subcategories and sublevels. For instance, having a blanket Autism Spectrum label where a person’s impairment is not measured but described upon diagnosis could help to avoid the negative stereotypes caused by the negative discourse of autism. A blanket Autism Spectrum label could ensure autistic potential is the primary focus when judging autistic individuals (Beardon 2017). Autism emancipation is achieved through not breaking up the autism label, which can help save autistic lives. 2) “What ways of using the model (apart from a practical tool) seem promising and how can these ways be fruitfully implemented?” (Levitt 2017, 4). There is still scope to use the social model in practical ways, particularly the basic income can be liberating for all disabled people. That with every citizen being financially secure, there is less competition and stigma attached to having an impairment label. In particular with the removal of needs based assessment for the levels of “impairment” no longer matter (Mays 2016).A basic income stops discrimination against autistic individuals and people of other neurodivergent individuals, means people with autism and other neurodivergent people could be as seen being equally impaired and worthwhile to society. Overcoming the current social barriers neurodivergent individuals face gaining employment (Graby 2016). 3) “To which groups of people (other than disability professionals in developed countries) is it important to disseminate the model and how can it be conveyed effectively?” (Levitt 2017, 4). Disseminating the social model to all autistic individuals and recognising that each autistic person is the “expert” on their autism will allow for increased autistic self-advocacy and self- regulation. Allowing autistic individuals to control their lives will lead to greater autism emancipation by reducing the mental health damage caused by autistic individuals forcing themselves to adapt to Predominant Neurotype societal demands. 4) Is it a good idea to present the social model in a manner which is contradictory (as opposed to complementary) to other models or that implies it is the only model conducive to emancipating disabled people?” (Levitt 2017, 5). From the point of view of neuro-divergence the social model should be seen as being complementary to other disability models. The Nordic countries use and discuss the UK social model in addition to their relational models. The social model is not the only model of disability and the model does have numerous limitations. The social model does not always explain how disability is experienced, for instance the Nordic relational models can sometimes better explain disabled people’s experiences (Mallett and Runswick-Cole 2014), for instance how, an autistic individual can experience crippling anxiety awaiting an email reply from a Predominant Neurotype person who thinks the autistic individual will be OK while they do not respond to the email (Beardon 2017). 5) “What should be the primary goals of the social model and what steps can we take to achieve these objectives?” (Levitt 2017, 5). The primary goal of the social model has always been to take the focus from the individual impairment, and to shift the gaze towards societal structures. This now needs to happen by Predominantly Neurotype institutions taking responsibility for making adjustments. The social model should be shifting the burden of making adjustments away from autistic people onto Predominant Neurotype institutions. This can be done by changing the law or fully implementing existing legislation, such as Local Authorities’, and NHS Trusts’ obligations to The Autism Act 2009, along with institutions enacting reasonable adjustments under The Equality Act 2010. To also change the autism discourse to take on positive connotations of autism by moving away from toxic words and debates like “disorder” and “deficit”. By doing this Predominant Neurotype society will finally treat autistic individuals as equal to themselves, leading to full autism emancipation. How can the social model achieve full autism emancipation? When implemented the social model is a powerful tool to achieving emancipation of all disabled people. Similar to other neurodivergent labels, the negative discourse about autism helps to ensure that the social model of disability is not applied to it, leading the UK education system to be un-inclusive. Due to most autistic individuals simultaneously experiencing other neurodivergent labels, implementing the social model for autism will spread the social model for more neurodivergent labels. By focusing on stopping the negative discourse of autism, barring the categorisation of the autism label along with proper application of The Autism Act 2009 and The Equality Act 2010. The social model can be used to achieve autism emancipation by creating positive societal attitudes towards autism and shifting the imbalanced burden of adapting away from autistic individuals onto Predominant Neurotypes institutions. This can prevent damage to autistic individuals’ mental health, helping to prevent the undue loss of autistic lives, and leading to the full emancipation of the autistic population. Acknowledgements. I would like to thank Dr Luke Beardon, Dr Mitzi Waltz, Professor Sarah Parsons, Dr Damian Milton, Dr Catriona Stewart and Dr Nick Chown for our separate conversations on autism and the social model of disability. Disclosure statement. No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author. References. Anon., 2017. Disability benefits: PIPs should be for 'really disabled' (Online). London: British Broadcasting Corporation. Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-39097019 (Accessed on 21 March 2017). Beardon, L., 2008. Asperger Syndrome and perceived offending conduct: a qualitative study (Online). Ed.D Thesis. Sheffield Hallam University. Available at: http://shura.shu.ac.uk/7155/1/Beardon_aspergers_-_full.pdf (Accessed 14 January 2017). Beardon, L., 2017. Luke Beardon: Perspectives on Autism (Online Blog). 17 March 2017. Available at: https://blogs.shu.ac.uk/autism/?doing_wp_cron=1490259625.4494929313659667968750 (Accessed on 23 March 2017). Campbell, F., 2008. 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Available at: https://www.academia.edu/28495623/Unworkable_Conditions_work_benefits_and_disab led_peoples_resistance_to_capitalism_2016 (Accessed on 08 April 2017). Levitt, J., 2017. Exploring how the social model of disability can be re-invigorated: in response to Mike Oliver. Disability and Society. Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09687599.2017.1300390 (Accessed on 21 March 2017). https://www.academia.edu/28495623/Unworkable_Conditions_work_benefits_and_disabled_peoples_resistance_to_capitalism_2016 https://www.academia.edu/28495623/Unworkable_Conditions_work_benefits_and_disabled_peoples_resistance_to_capitalism_2016 Mallet, R., and Runswick-Cole, K., 2014. Approaching Disability: Critical issues and perspectives. 1 st ed. London: Routledge. Mays, J., 2016. Countering disablism: an alternative universal income support system based on egalitarianism. Scandinavian Journal of Disability Research, 18 (2), 106-117. Milton, D., Martin, M. and Melham, P. 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work_lv4rjwdtmvcetmzn6xsgmzv2om	----	South African Journal of Psychology 2015, Vol. 45(1) 116 –129 © The Author(s) 2014 Reprints and permissions: sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav DOI: 10.1177/0081246314555595 sap.sagepub.com Educators’ perceptions of homophobic victimisation of learners at private secondary schools Hendrik P Mostert1, Charmaine Gordon1 and Susan Kriegler2 Abstract Heteronormativity is a foundational source of human oppression, resulting in heterosexism and homophobic attitudes, thus creating a hostile climate for non-heterosexual people. Despite a constitution that prohibits discrimination against anyone on the grounds of sexual orientation, homophobic victimisation of learners at secondary schools still occurs. The objective of this research project was to investigate educators’ perceptions of homophobic victimisation against homosexual learners at private secondary schools. We adopted a phenomenological approach. The research design was qualitative and of an exploratory, descriptive, and contextual nature. We gathered data by means of an open-ended, structured questionnaire and, with the assistance of an independent coder, we employed Tesch’s eight-step method of data analysis. We identified six themes: culture of acceptance; the need for policies; understanding of homosexuality; perception of homosexual learners; social difficulties and acts of verbal, physical, and emotional victimisation; and the learners’ feelings. These themes were organised under three categories, namely, school context, educators’ perceptions, and learners’ difficulties. Keywords Discrimination, educators’ perceptions, homophobic victimisation, homosexual, learners, private secondary schools Introduction Homophobia, heterosexism, and heteronormativity form the foundation of many injustices to those learners who are lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgendered, intersexed, and queer (LGBTIQ). For quite 1 Department of Psychology, School of Human and Community Development, University of the Witwatersrand, South Africa 2Department of Educational Psychology, University of Pretoria, South Africa Corresponding author: Hendrik P Mostert, P O Box 79191, Senderwood, Johannesburg, South Africa, 2145. Email: henk@ianopperman.com 555595 SAP0010.1177/0081246314555595South African Journal of PsychologyMostert et al. research-article2014 Article mailto:henk@ianopperman.com Mostert et al. 117 a large percentage of the LGBTIQ learner segment, school can be a difficult place to learn and mature. Among secondary school learners, about 10% identify as gay or lesbian while bisexuality may account for over one-third of adolescents’ sexual disposition (Sears, 2005). This article spe- cifically focuses on homosexual learners at private secondary schools. Homophobia refers to irrational fear, abhorrence, and dislike of homosexuality and an intoler- ance of any sexual difference from the established norm (Ritter & Turndrup, 2002). It may include the fear of one’s own homosexuality (Murray, 2001). Plummer (1999) defines the term ‘homopho- bia’ as a repository of beliefs, values, and behaviour related to concepts like ‘not self’, ‘difference’, and ‘otherness’. To address the problem of the narrow focus on individuals rather than on the context of the social and cultural systems that encourage homophobia, the term ‘heterosexism’ seeks to describe larger, more inclusive, and underlying issues in our social and cultural landscape. In conjunction with homophobia, the term ‘heterosexism’ emphasises the similarities between the oppression of LGBTIQ people and women and a patriarchal social structure (Herek, 1990). The perception that heterosexuality represents normative behaviour is linked to gender-role beliefs, endorsement of male gender norms, religious fundamentalism, and hostile sexism (Nagoshi et al., 2008). According to Clarke, Ellis, Peel, and Riggs (2010), heterosexism is a form of prejudice primarily directed towards all non-heterosexual people, while Athanases and Larrabee (2003) describe heterosexism as a socially embedded paradigm where heterosexuality is perceived as normal and superior to other sexual orientations. Although the term ‘heterosexism’ acknowledges the marginalisation of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgendered (LGBT) people as a social issue rather than an individual one (Clarke et al., 2010), the term ‘heteronormativity’ more emphatically refers to the social and cultural dimensions. Heteronormativity, therefore, normalises heterosexuality and provides the larger context of homo- phobia and heterosexism at the intersections of race, class, and gender (Yep, 2003). Heteronormativity is a foundational source of human oppression, an omnipresent framework for bias and daily acts of violence against individuals and groups who do not conform to the mythical norm of heterosexual- ity. Heteronormative thinking assumes that heterosexual experience is synonymous with human experience. As a result, it regards all other forms of human sexual expression as pathological, devi- ant, invisible, unintelligible, or written out of existence (Cramer, 2002). Such arguments frame the continuing debate over the suitability of the term homophobia in the literature, with various authors suggesting alternative labels. For example, Logan (1996) proposes that the term ‘homoprejudice’ may provide a rationale for the pathologisation of and discrimination against homosexual people, as well as the negative valuing, stereotyping, and discriminatory treatment of individuals whose appearance or sexual preferences do not conform to the prevailing social expectations. Herek (2000), in turn, considers the phrase ‘sexual preju- dice’ as more apt to describe the broader context of social and psychological research about prejudice. Plummer (1999) explores a lengthy list of alternatives, concluding that all terms offer inadequate descriptors for a complex phenomenon. He, however, proposes retaining the term ‘homophobia’ because other terms attempt to denote aspects of homophobia while fragmenting the body of knowledge currently associated with the term. Also, given the short history of the term ‘homophobia’, the body of literature associated with the phenomenon is relatively small and no generally accepted alternative exists. Moreover, since the 1970s, the meaning of homo- phobia has broadened to include a wide range of negative and aggressive emotions, attitudes, and behaviour towards homosexual people (Haaga, 1991), as well as the internalised attitudes of sexually and gender different persons. In conclusion, Bowers, Minichiello, and Plummer (2005) postulate that homophobia still is a useful repository for understanding experiences of prejudice and trauma that LGBT people express. 118 South African Journal of Psychology 45(1) There is no doubt that victims of homophobia are likely to experience major adverse effects concerning their health and general well-being (American Psychological Association [APA], 2008; Hatzenbuehler, 2009). It does not matter how we define the formative – and often traumatic – phenomenon; experiences of homophobia have long-term implications for individuals’ adjustment and functioning in the contexts of their family, school, church, and community (Bowers et al., 2005). Hirschfeld (2001) maintains that most educators and administrators are raised and schooled in a society that considers homosexuality a sickness, and LGBT issues remain largely taboo in school communities. Despite anti-bullying programmes in American classrooms, schools are not safe and affirming places for a significant number of learners. A school environment that fails to embrace its LGBT learners sustains a breeding ground for bias, stigma, discrimination, teasing, harassment, verbal abuse, and even physical violence (Martin-Storey & Crosnoe, 2012). A study of LGBT secondary school learners by Kosciw, Greytak, and Diaz (2009) examines how locational, community-level, and school district-level variables are related to a hostile school climate for these learners. Results demonstrate that LGBT youth in rural communities and communities with lower adult educational attainment may face particularly hostile school climates. Collier, van Beusekom, Bos, and Sandfort (2013) conducted a systematic review of psychosocial and health outcomes associated with sexual orientation and gender identity/expression in relation to peer victimisation during adolescence. They found fairly strong evidence of a diminished sense of school belonging, higher levels of depressive symptoms, suicidality, disruptions in educational trajectories, traumatic stress, as well as alcohol and substance use. Although parental attitudes also play an important role (D’Augelli et al., 2005), the failure of schools to adopt a pro-active approach in order to support LGBT youth is a major cause of psychological problems, including trauma symptoms (Toomey, Ryan, Diaz, Card, & Russell, 2010; Van Wormer & McKinney, 2003). Ferfolja (2007) explores how some schooling cultures in New South Wales, Australia, control and silence non-heterosexuality through a number of institutional processes that cause homopho- bia and heterosexism to flourish. Despite an apparent broader societal tolerance of non- heterosexuality and legislation that condemns anti-homosexual discrimination at educational insti- tutions in Australia, homophobic prejudice – often in the form of silence, omission, and assumption – prevails. In addition, Jones (2012) reports that as Australian LGBTIQ learners have increasingly come out over the past decade, their experience of bullying has significantly increased. In 2010, 61% of young people reported verbal abuse due to homophobia, 18% of young people reported physical abuse as a result of homophobia, and 69% reported other forms of homophobia, including exclusion, cyber-bullying, and rumours. In general, 80% experienced some form of abuse at school. It seems that these learners are bullied more now than ever before, an epidemic reflected in research from around the world (Jones, 2012). In school settings where anti-LGBTIQ bigotry goes unchallenged, an often overlooked reality amidst the tide of homophobic bullying is the significant constraints on all learners. Homophobia and sexism confine learners to rigid gender-role norms and expectations by inhibiting many from exploring and expressing their creative, athletic, and intellectual aptitudes. An environment like this one presents narrow perceptions of humanity, stunting the minds and psychosexual develop- ment of learners. Such an educational atmosphere may be the breeding ground of the fear and ignorance that exacerbate teasing during the early grades and of violent acts by the time learners reach high school (Jones, 2012). Significantly, statistics show that White male teenagers commit the majority of hate crimes related to homophobia (Levin & McDevitt, 1993). In a nationwide study of lesbian and gay hate crimes in the United States, 97% of hate crime offenders were male (National Coalition of Anti-Violence Programs, 2001). A positive school climate and a decline of homophobic victimisation may moderate the differ- ences between sexual orientation and negative outcomes. Schools have the ability to decrease the Mostert et al. 119 negative outcomes for LGBTIQ learners by creating a positive climate and reducing homophobic teasing, harassment, and bullying (Birkett, Espelage, & Koenig, 2009). A study by Chesir-Teran and Hughes (2009) involving a large cohort of LGBTIQ high school learners, however, yielded only moderate correlations between non-discrimination policies, inclusive programmes, and anti- LGBTIQ harassment. Significantly, inclusive programmes are more closely associated with the prevalence and tolerance of harassment at schools than the mere existence of non-harassment poli- cies. This finding indicates that not only should there be a policy, but that policy needs to be accompanied and implemented by programmes. Context and aim of the study Against the tide of homophobia that seems to be sweeping the African continent (Msibi, 2011), post-apartheid South Africa had been the first country in the world that explicitly incorporated lesbian and gay rights in the Bill of Rights of the post-apartheid constitution (Gunkel, 2009). According to Betteridge and van Dijk (2007), Section 9 of the new South African Constitution (entitled ‘Equality’) states, ‘The state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds, including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, lan- guage, and birth’. Sooka (2010) maintains that the transformation of social justice in South Africa should lead to reducing inequalities that are based on sexual orientation. The reality, however, is that entrenched patriarchy and heteronormativity are valid and fixed in many African societies (Msibi, 2011), while South Africa remains widely conservative in its treatment of homosexuals. The relevant context of the South African education system is determined by the South African Schools Act of 1996 that recognises two categories of schools: public (state-controlled) and inde- pendent (private). Historically, however, a third category exists, namely former Model C schools that are public schools which are administrated and partially funded by a governing body of parents and alumni. Public schools are completely dependent on the government for funding and materials. The standards and facilities may vary considerably, depending on the effective management and the general well-being of the area. Most of the former Model C schools are now racially integrated and offer outstanding services. Private education is more expensive than public or former Model C education; therefore, it generally offers a fairly high standard of education. Most private schools also boast smaller class sizes. The question remains whether private education includes a positive school climate for homosexual learners. Against the backdrop of policies in South Africa that guarantee – but in reality fail to deliver – equality on the basis of sexual orientation, Bhana (2014) describes the ways in which school man- agers negotiate and contest the rights of gay and lesbian learners at their schools. That research study draws on an approach that recognises relations of heterosexual domination and subordina- tion, as well as the material and social realities that produce such relations. The political emphasis on rights has positive effects on wrestling with the homosexual agenda at schools. Yet, discrimina- tion, sexual denial, and religious intolerance combined with racialized and cultural practices are still imposing severe restrictions on learners’ sexual rights. Mostert (2008) conducted a study at a private school to explore and describe the perceptions of aggression of 30 Grade 11 learners (19 males and 11 females) towards learners who were perceived to be homosexual. Focus group interviews were used to obtain data. Mostert’s (2008) study reveals three key attitudes: acceptance, ambivalent feelings, and non-acceptance of homosexual learners. This study also indicates a high prevalence of homophobic victimisation among learners. The results indicate that perpetrators experience internal feelings of discomfort, anger, irritation, fear, 120 South African Journal of Psychology 45(1) hatred, and disgust towards victims. The externalised feelings of these perpetrators manifest in both verbal and physical forms of aggression. The former includes rumours, bad jokes, name- calling, teasing, and mockery. The latter includes ganging up against the victims, bullying, and hitting (Mostert, 2008; Mostert, Myburgh, & Poggenpoel, 2012). In the South African context, there is little to no research in relation to educators’ perceptions about homophobic victimisation among learners at private secondary schools. It is, therefore, essential to address this gap in the existing literature by investigating educators’ perceptions about the homophobic victimisation of learners at private secondary schools. In light of this, Mostert’s (2012) study, on which this article is based, investigates the current perceptions of educators in order to gain knowledge about their understanding of homophobic victimisation among learners at private secondary schools. Following the example of D’Augelli, Grossman, and Starks (2006), and more particularly, due to logistical and time constraints that limited the access to the educators, the focus of this study was on same-sex sexuality of learners. Method Design The research design of this study was qualitative and of an exploratory, descriptive, and contextual nature. The study employed a phenomenological approach. Phenomenology is not concerned with the causes of an experience, but rather with the nature of that experience and the respondents’ conscious thoughts about the experience (Brewer, 2007). In qualitative research, it is important to ‘discover and understand how people make sense of what happens in their lives’ (Locke, Spirduso, & Silverman, 2000), and this study aimed at investigating the current perceptions of educators with regard to homophobic victimisation of homosexual learn- ers at their private secondary schools. An open-ended structured questionnaire to gain insight into educators’ perceptions of homopho- bic victimisation satisfied the exploratory nature of the research. The researchers thoroughly described the respondents’ perceptions within the context of two private secondary schools and considered those perceptions in relation to their context, that is, the specific educational setting. The primary research question of this study was: ‘What are educators’ perceptions of homophobic victimisation of homosexual learners at private secondary schools?’ Sample and sampling The sample for this study comprised educators from two English-speaking private secondary schools in an upper middle class urban area of Johannesburg, Gauteng. We used non-probability, purposeful sampling to select respondents for this study (Strauss & Myburgh, 2007). This sam- pling approach was applied, since the respondents were conveniently available and representative of the desired respondents needed for this research study. The target population for this research consisted of 103 educators between the ages of 23 and 75 years at two private, co-educational, secondary schools. At School A, 21 of the 27 invited educators participated. At School B, only 22 of the 76 invited educators volunteered to participate in the research study. Consequently, 43 edu- cators from the target population participated in the research study. Table 1 summarises the demo- graphic information about the respondents. The demographic information indicates that this research study is limited to specific percep- tions and consequently the results cannot be generalised to a diverse South African schooling landscape. Mostert et al. 121 Data collection We obtained data by using an open-ended, structured questionnaire. The questionnaire contained the following questions: 1. What is educators’ personal understanding of homosexuality? 2. What do educators think of homosexual learners at school? 3. Do educators feel that school culture accepts homosexual learners? 4. What do educators think school policies should say about homosexual learners? 5. What difficulties do educators think homosexual learners might face at school? 6. Are educators aware of occasions when homosexual learners have been treated differently because of their sexual orientation? 7. Are educators aware of acts of aggression towards homosexual learners? 8. Which types of aggressive acts towards homosexual learners occur at the school? 9. What do educators think school policies should say about aggressive acts towards homo- sexual learners? 10. Do educators feel that their school is dealing adequately with victimisation of homosexual learners? Table 1. Demographic overview. Demographic categories School A School B Gender Male 9 7 Female 12 15 Race Asian 2 2 Black 1 0 Coloured 0 2 White 18 18 Sexual orientation Asexual 1 0 Heterosexual 19 21 Homosexual 0 1 Not indicated 1 0 Religion Atheist 1 1 Christian 13 11 Eclectic 0 1 Hindu 2 2 Jewish 2 7 Keylontic Science 1 0 Secular Humanist 1 0 Spiritual (no specific denomination) 1 0 Home language Afrikaans 9 3 Bilingual (Afrikaans and English) 2 0 English 9 18 Hebrew 0 1 isiZulu 1 0 Age Range 23–64 years 25–63 years Teaching experience Duration 2–41 years 3–40 years Qualification Level of education Tertiary Tertiary 122 South African Journal of Psychology 45(1) The researchers had a pre-arranged information session with the educators during a staff meet- ing. We spent approximately 30 minutes informing them about the research. Educators were invited to complete an open-ended, structured questionnaire. The questionnaires were distributed to all the educators in the staffroom, and the researcher asked them to complete the questionnaires in their free time during a period of 7 days. The questionnaire was to be completed anonymously, but pro- vided space for demographic data, that is, the letter assigned to the school, information on gender, race, sexual orientation, religion, home language, age, years in teaching, and level of education. The researcher informed the educators of the value of educators’ perceptions about homophobic victimisation of homosexual learners at private secondary schools. At the end of the staff meeting, the educators had an opportunity to ask questions and to raise concerns that they might have had. No questions or concerns arose. After the meeting, we left a private sealed box placed in an allo- cated area of the school premises where respondents could post their questionnaires. The box was collected after 1 week. Data analysis In this study, we used a structured process to conduct a thematic content analysis as described by Tesch in Creswell (2003). An independent coder analysed the data in order to provide greater objectivity with regard to qualitative findings. Ethical considerations We obtained permission for the research from the Ethics Committee of the School of Human and Community Development at the University of the Witwatersrand. The principal of each school received an individual information letter that provided details about the exact nature of the study and how the researcher was to conduct the study, while ensuring confidentiality of the school and the anonymity of the participating educators. We also explained to the respondents that involve- ment in the study was voluntary. Respondents signed informed consent forms. Discussion of results We identified six themes, and the themes were organised under three categories, namely school context, educators’ perceptions, and learners’ difficulties. The six themes and three categories are presented in Table 2. Category 1: school context Although society includes homosexual people, there are schools that perform their educational duties on the premise that all learners are heterosexual (Lucas, 2004). The respondents’ responses in this study confirmed this point of view. The school societies in this study were representative of a general heterosexual society. One of the respondents said, ‘ …unfortunately, the school culture is a microcosm of society and I think gay children are seen as a threat and “different”… ’ The first category refers to the school context and comprises two themes: first, a culture of acceptance of homosexual learners, and second, the possible need for schools to draft policies pertaining to homosexuality. Although school educators who responded to the questionnaire appear to be generally accepting of homosexuality, it would seem that learners were particularly judgmental of their peers’ sexual orientation, as this comment showed: ‘teachers generally do but often learners do not accept those Mostert et al. 123 that are different to them’. Educators do notice discrimination against homosexual learners on the part of heterosexual male learners. This is evident in the words of one educator: ‘Some degree of discrimination exists among male, heterosexual learners towards the idea of homosexuality’. Poteat (2008) suggests that homophobic banter is more likely to occur in aggressive, homophobic peer groups. Most of the respondents argued that all educators and learners should accept homosexuality. According to the responses gathered, policies should include the promotion of equity and tolerance for all learners, the prevention of discrimination, and the protection of learners’ rights in relation to the freedom to accept one’s sexual orientation and not be harmed as a result of that acceptance. There was a strong perception that ‘aggression cannot be tolerated but should not be met with fur- ther aggression. If tolerance is promoted, aggression can be handled through counselling’. Meyer (2008) states that printed policies are an important factor in organisations’ abilities to manage the issue of gendered harassment effectively; policies should thus include psychological and academic support for homosexual learners, education on homosexuality, and the management of homophobic victimisation. Some educators were clear in their views: ‘I think that policies should make provision for these learners and address issues that learners face on a daily basis’, while another stated that the policy should ‘assist in mental, psychological and academic, social and sport development as stable understanding and accepted learners with rights to stable relation- ships with partners of their own choice’. This may illustrate the need for a specific policy on homo- sexuality in order to prevent discrimination relating to learners’ sexual orientation in order for every individual, regardless of his or her sexual orientation, to be treated equally. One educator, however, indicated, ‘I don’t think it should single out anybody. Just like Black, White, Christian, or Muslims should not have specific policies about them. To single out people is never a good thing’. Another stated, ‘I don’t think there should be any special policy for them. They should be treated equally’. It appears that the educators have different views about the need for a policy that explicitly prohibits discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation. Some of them appear to support this idea, yet other educators are opposed to a specific sexual orientation policy or policy clause. This suggests that some educators may be anxious about exceptionalism (making a special case for homophobia). A question arises whether this point of view represents a subtle form of homophobia, or whether it is sensible to simply talk about discrimination in general? Even though bullying may be linked to homophobia, little has been done to establish the relation between these two areas of research (Espelage & Swearer, 2008). In this regard, Jones (2012) argues that while there is no doubt that generalised bullying policies have their place in schools, homophobic bullying differs from other bullying for a number of reasons, and therefore, requires a specific focus in educational policy. The pervasiveness of homophobia makes it more difficult for people who are working with young people to deal with homophobia differently from other forms of bullying. It makes it even more difficult for LGBTIQ young people to access support. Jones Table 2. Categories and themes. Category Themes 1. School context i. Culture of acceptance ii. The need for policies 2. Educators’ perceptions iii. Understanding of homosexuality iv. Perception of homosexual learners 3. Learners’ difficulties v. Social difficulties and acts of verbal, physical, and emotional victimisation vi. The learners’ feelings 124 South African Journal of Psychology 45(1) (2012) adds that heterosexual families care for most of these young people, making feelings of alienation and isolation more absolute. Category 2: educators’ perceptions The second category comprises educators’ perceptions about homosexuality. It has two related themes. The first of these themes relates to educators’ understanding of the term ‘homosexuality’. According to Clarke et al. (2010), homosexuality is a term that is generally used to refer to the phenomenon of same-sex attraction. Educators’ views on this matter include the perception of homosexuality as a physical attraction to, or preference for, the same sex. One educator declared that ‘it is either two males or two females [who] are in a sexual relationship’, while another stated that homosexuality involves ‘same sex physical and emotional interactions and dependence in relationships’, and a third stated that ‘it is an attraction often leading to a sexual relationship between two’. The responses also raise the debate whether sexuality is a genetic/biological predisposition or whether individuals choose their own sexuality. An educator encapsulated the question with the following statement: ‘It is a preference by individuals in the way they want to live and what sexual- ity they want to be. I personally think that most homosexuals are born the way they are. It is in their genes’. The second theme relates to educators’ perceptions of homosexual learners. In this regard, the responses indicate that homosexual learners are often seen as no different to heterosexuals, and that learners’ sexual orientation is irrelevant: ‘I don’t think differently about them than I do about het- erosexual learners – they are all children’. The respondents generally felt that such learners should have the right to express themselves freely and to learn, regardless of their sexual orientation. In the following statement, ‘I believe they have a right towards their sexual orientation just as heterosexual-orientated learners have a right to their sexual orientation’, one of the educators argued that homosexual learners have a right to express their sexual orientation. This stands in contrast to Norman and Galvin’s (2006) research findings that many learners and parents are igno- rant in respect of understanding homosexuality. It was further evident from the respondents’ responses that homosexual learners should be respected and accepted, and accorded exactly the same rights as heterosexual learners: ‘They should be treated no different from other learners or/and offered ongoing support by the school’. Again, the opinion that homosexual learners should not be treated differently from other learners is debatable. On face value, this point of view makes sense, since it treats all learners as equally valuable. On the other hand, when homophobia remains neither acknowledged nor addressed in policy and programmes, it is likely to be very damaging to young people. It is important to emphasise and address an awareness of this impact on learners in the context of the educational environment. Category 3: learners’ difficulties The third category pertains to the learners and the difficulties that homosexual learners experience, as seen from the perspective of the educators who responded to the questionnaire. This category comprises two themes; both themes focus on the treatment of homosexual learners. The first theme emphasises the social difficulties that homosexual learners experience. These difficulties include discrimination, stereotyping, stigmatisation, peer victimisation, humiliation, isolation, and a need to belong. An educator’s remarks included some of these issues: ‘not being accepted, victimised, abused from others’. Homophobic acts were mentioned in terms of its verbal, Mostert et al. 125 physical, or emotional nature. According to Nel and Judge (2008), results from a study conducted in Gauteng show a high rate of homophobic discrimination. One educator confirmed that learners ‘might be bullied, teased, isolated – they might feel “rejected”’, while another educator expressed the challenges learners may experience as including ‘acceptance from other learners, finding part- ners, fitting in, making friends’. Most respondents were unaware of acts of homophobic victimisation among learners at their schools. Those respondents who were aware of such acts had witnessed bullying and intimidation, such as teasing, mocking, ridiculing, and gay bashing. One participant commented, ‘Personally, I’m not aware of anything but I’m sure it happens on a regular basis’, while another stated, ‘Yes, they are ridiculed and marginalised’, and a third noted that ‘Yes, taunts and cyber-bullying is fairly common in schools’. The second and final theme reveals educators’ perspectives about the feelings of homosexual learners. According to Chan (2009), homophobic bullying at schools may result in trauma for the victims, both at present and in the future. In this regard, the responding educators mentioned emo- tional distress, identity struggles, and a poor self-concept, for example, ‘Lack of acceptance, teas- ing if mannerism not socially acceptable, stress due to being different to the “norm”’, and ‘pressure to conform to pre-established stereotypes. Struggles with identity, fears to come out of the closet. General confusion, anxiety, pain, possibly liberation freedom, and confidence if they have accepted who they are and are not ashamed of it’. Limitations of study This research was limited to specific perceptions, those of educators at two private secondary schools in an upper middle class suburban context, and consequently the results cannot be gener- alised to the diversity of South African school settings. Most literature consulted provides an understanding of the research issue from an international perspective due to the limited South African literature that is available. Only 43 of 103 educators volunteered to participate in the research. The participation rate (42%) limits the trustworthiness of the results of the research study, due to participation being less than half of the sample of 103 teachers. Respondents were self- selected in the sense that those educators who chose to respond could have been more favourably disposed in terms of the research topic, whereas the ones who chose not to respond might have had more negative attitudes, but were reluctant to reveal those attitudes. An indication of the number or percentage of respondents who expressed a particular view or attitude might have strengthened the findings, but the limited number of respondents precluded a quantitative analysis. In the main, we did not critically examine the educators’ comments, but rather took them at face value. In addition, it is possible that the educators had time to discuss the research questions with one another. Those possible discussions raise the likelihood that they answered in a ‘politically correct’ manner due to the influence of other respondents. The questionnaire focussed on educators’ perceptions of prejudice against and victimisation of homosexual learners. This limited focus excludes comprehensive and inclusive results about LGBTIQ people and communities. If respondents interpreted the word ‘homosexual’ to mean male homosexuality, the results would also exclude lesbian and bisexual learners. Recommendations An accepting school environment can only be achieved when educators understand the nature of sexual orientation development and provide the necessary support and a safe environment where all learners – regardless of sexual orientation or gender identity – can flourish, grow, and reach 126 South African Journal of Psychology 45(1) their full potential. Such a safe educational environment needs to be created at all schools, including public, private, and religion-based schools. Homophobic attitudes and bullying create a hostile climate for anyone who is different, including – but not limited to – transgender and intersex learners. Schools that fail to address this miss an opportunity to build an inclusive school culture and to challenge discrimination, prejudice, and ‘othering’ in general. Further research in this area can also contribute to debates about national identity, citizenship, and social cohesion. It is imperative that all educators should be trained and supported to work with all youth on ways to provide support to those learners who experience homophobic victimisation. Educators should make it emphatically clear that harassment of and discrimination against homosexual learn- ers are not acceptable in their classrooms. Educators, irrespective of their sexual orientation, should serve as role models who are open to and accepting of differences while supporting the potential of all learners to mature into responsible, happy, and productive adults. Principals, head educators, Life Orientation educators, librarians, school counsellors, and other staff members should receive training and support with regard to disciplinary and curriculum pro- visions related to sexual diversity and gender identity. Training about sexuality and gender should be contextualised with due consideration of a human rights framework and should include the full spectrum of issues pertaining to LGBTIQ learners. Although much South African research has explored prejudice based on race and ethnicity, little attention has been devoted to bias rooted in attitudes towards sexual orientation and gender iden- tity/expression. This lack of attention is indicative of the practices that surround these issues and the tendency of many researchers to view anti-LGBTIQ biases as acceptable forms of prejudice. In particular, we need more research about LGBTIQ youth in rural communities and communities with lower adult educational attainment. As Martin-Storey and Crosnoe (2012) pointed out, these learners may experience particularly hostile school climates. Building ethical schools is a complex and arduous task. It is perhaps most essential to begin by considering schools as moral entities (Hirschfeld, 2001). The attempts to address this issue need to include regional and international perceptions and attitudes. Msibi (2011) provides an account of how homosexual practices have mistakenly been conflated with the Western-originated identity category of the ‘global gay’. He gives an account of the existence of pre-colonial homosexual practices and argues that homosexual behaviour cannot be considered ‘un-African’. He proposes the need for an African-centred approach to challenge the homophobic tendencies that are on the rise in some African countries. This recommendation of including regional perspectives and voices is particularly relevant for the task of creating a global agenda for addressing inequalities and dis- crimination based on gender identity and sexuality. Conclusion Since they challenge mainstream perceptions of normality, the distressing everyday realities that minority learners encounter in respect of their sexuality and gender identity form the back- ground of this article. In the school context, there are varied thoughts on the culture of accept- ing homosexual learners at schools and about the institutions’ handling of homophobic victimisation. Educators feel that aggressive acts towards homosexual learners should not be tolerated and should be dealt with in the same way as other forms of discrimination. Those educators who are not in favour of a specific school policy anticipate that such a policy would only exacerbate the issue. Some educators perceive homosexuality as a genetic predisposition, while others believe it is a physical attraction or preference to the same sex that results from personal choice. Mostert et al. 127 Educators express the opinion that learners have the right and freedom to embrace their sexual orientation. Homosexual learners do experience social difficulties in their educational setting. These learners are victims of discrimination, stereotyping, stigmatisation, and peer victimisation. As a result, these learners experience emotional distress, identity struggles, and poor self-concepts. Most educators, however, are not aware of the occurrence of acts of homophobic victimisation among learners at their schools. Those educators who are aware of such acts indicate that these acts are of a verbal and physical nature. Preventing discrimination and bullying on the basis of sexual and gender identity requires leadership from state, public sector, and school-level educational bod- ies, but also from the educators who are models for our youth and who guide them to develop their full potential. Funding This research project did not receive any specific grant from any funding agency in either the public, com- mercial, or not-for-profit sectors. References American Psychological Association (2008). Answer to your questions for a better understanding of sexual orientation & homosexuality. Retrieved from http://www.apa.org/topics/sexuality/sorientation.pdf Athanases, S. 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Contextual and moderating effects of the peer group climate on use of homophobic epi- thets. School Psychology Review, 37, 188–201. Ritter, K. Y., & Turndrup, A. I. (2002). Handbook of affirmative psychotherapy with lesbians and gay men. New York, NY: Guilford Press. http://www.avp.org/about-avp/national-coalition-of-anti-violence-programs Mostert et al. 129 Sears, J. T. (2005). Gay, lesbian, and transgender issues in education: Programs, policies, and practices. Binghamton, NY: Haworth Press. Sooka, Y. (2010). Transforming our society. In J. Handmaker & R. Berkhout (Eds.), Mobilising social justice in South Africa: Perspective from researchers and practitioners (pp. 193–202). Pretoria, South Africa: Pretoria University Law Press. South African Schools Act (1996). Act No. 84 of 1996. Retrieved from http://www.acts.co.za/south-african- schools-act-1996/index.html?nsc.php Strauss, J., & Myburgh, C. P. H. (2007). Research methodology learning guide. Johannesburg, South Africa: University of Johannesburg. Toomey, R. B., Ryan, C., Diaz, R. M., Card, N. A., & Russell, S. T. (2010). Gender-nonconforming lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender youth: School victimization and psychosocial adjustment. Developmental Psychology, 46, 1580–1589. Van Wormer, K., & McKinney, R. (2003). What schools can do to help gay/lesbian/bisexual youth: A harm. Adolescence, 38, 409–420. Yep, G. A. (2003). The violence of heteronormativity in communication studies: Notes on injury, healing, and queer world-making. Journal of Homosexuality, 45, 11–59. http://www.acts.co.za/south-african-schools-act-1996/index.html?nsc.php http://www.acts.co.za/south-african-schools-act-1996/index.html?nsc.php 
work_lxbbzdwrg5cb7fmqhfwldozohq	----	Criminal Justice Matters Article The role of Crime Mapping in prevention: more than just pretty maps Many tools and techniques can be employed in the pursuit of preventing crime. One in particular, which transcends organisational boundaries and conflicting departmental priorities, is the approach of mapping crime alongside other related variables. In recent years the realisation that crime can be explained and understood in more depth when exploring its geographical components has led to it becoming a central tool within policing and crime reduction agencies. ‘Crime mapping’ can be thought of as the geographical exploration and visualisation of crime. To frame it within its academic milieu, it is the research field of Geographical Information Systems (GIS) synthesised with the practical modern-day issues which affect the Criminal Justice System. GIS is also the term we give to ‘a computer system for capturing, managing, integrating, manipulating, analysing and displaying data which is spatially referenced to the Earth’ (McDonnell and Kemp, 1995:42). Containing powerful functionality, these software packages allow the user to analyse crime data in a myriad of ways. Underpinning the technical attributes of crime mapping (i.e. which buttons to press on the computer application), are several interconnected theories on the geography of crime. These form a practical subset of mainstream criminology, known as ‘environmental criminology’. Such theories play a vital role in understanding some of the drivers of offending behaviour and should be studied by anyone attempting to use crime mapping as an analytical technique. To consider crime in its simplest form Brantingham and Brantingham (1981) have broken it down into the following four dimensions that every crime possesses: 1. A legal dimension (a law must be broken); 2. A victim dimension (someone or something has to be targeted); 3. An offender dimension (someone has to commit the crime); and 4. A spatial dimension (it has to happen somewhere). Environmental criminologists are drawn to focussing their attention on the latter of these, where spatial dimension is defined as a place in space and time. This is due to the fact that one of the most undisputed and reoccurring research findings within criminology in the last century is that the majority of crime types cluster in space and time. This is by virtue of crime having an inherent geographical quality (Chainey and Ratcliffe, 2005). The general agreement within environmental criminology therefore, is that it is far easier to consider where opportunities to commit crimes are clustered (and are therefore rife) and try to design ways to block those opportunities, than to try and change human behaviour en masse. Crime prevention can be considered as a two-pronged approach, firstly averting any persons from starting to commit crime and secondly intervening in persons who have already committed offences before any additional activity results (Brantingham and Faust 1976). Crime mapping offers considerable scope to intercede in both of these situations. For example, one might analyse where the greatest concentrations of offenders released from prison are residing in order to strategically place rehabilitation services. Or perhaps one could start to disentangle the complex relationships between social deprivation, community cohesion and clustering of hate crime to better understand neighbourhood dynamics. The uses are almost infinite, as a GIS is not limited to simply displaying data on a map, but enables many different layers of area based data (e.g. population, schools, deprivation, housing, pedestrian footfall, sites of interest) to be interrogated either in conjunction with, or separately from crime data. Hotspot analysis within policing is the most common application of GIS to crime data, alerting the police to where there are greater concentrations of crime when compared to the wider area under study (which can be as localised to the neighbourhood level or as wide as a police force). There are a number of uses for hotspot maps; they can play a role in briefing police patrols, who can inhibit offending by patrolling (either in vehicles or on foot) in an intelligent manner. They can be used for accountability amongst police leaders. The identification of hotspots can sometimes be enough to coerce crime prevention activity. For example, if a housing estate features within a compact residential burglary hotspot, this alone is enough evidence to send some PCSOs or community wardens to the location to distribute crime prevention advice to residents. Maps can feature in tactical or strategic planning meetings so that decision makers are aware of where resources need to be deployed. Very often a map is merely the starting point; the powerful visual outputs created foster curiosity and provoke thought which enhances debate around prevention strategies. When designing successful crime prevention initiatives it is first essential to comprehend the underlying causes, or what is driving a crime problem to manifest in the way it does. This encompasses an appreciation of where events cluster in space and time, which can help to illuminate any mechanisms which are working to exacerbate the problem. Problem solving techniques have now been widely adopted within Crime and Disorder Reduction partnerships (CDRP), and are heavily endorsed by governmental guidance. Such analyses focus on specific, recurring problems and aim to remove the causes of crime by identifying problems that require attention (Clarke and Eck, 2003). Intrinsic to problem-solving analysis is the diagnosis of a crime problem, and mapping can help to drill down into the data to define what is going on. The more specific our knowledge about crime problems, the better we understand what is going on and, as a corollary, the better equipped we are to implement successful intervention initiatives. Geographical profiling is another technique that seeks to prevent crime. Instead of trying to reduce the opportunities at a particular location, it aims to get a series of crimes detected, thus incapacitating the offender and preventing them from committing further offences. Geographic profiling is an investigative aid, an approach which is used in conjunction with a raft of other investigative strategies to prioritise suspects or resources (Rossmo, 2000). It uses what environmental criminology has taught us about how offenders interact with space, and applies these findings to construct maps which allude to where an offender’s anchor point (i.e. home or work site) is likely to be situated. Geographic profiling was originally used in serious, serial crime patterns in order to maximise the best opportunities for apprehending an offender and bringing them to justice. More recently however, this technique is being refined so that it can be applied to more volume crime types such as burglary and vehicle crime. Crime mapping has increased in sophistication in recent years and many academics and practitioners are now looking at ways in which to look prospectively at crime patterns, instead of the traditional manner of looking back at what has happened in the past. Crime forecasting is thus an extremely exciting research agenda at present; if crime can be predicted, it tangibly follows that it can be prevented. Research being conducted at the Jill Dando Institute of Crime Science is devising and refining new ways of predicting where crime will happen using the evidence base that environmental criminology has provided. For example, research conducted on burglary shows that it exhibits communicative properties, that is the risk to houses surrounding the original burgled premises are at an elevated risk for a short time period after (Bowers, Johnson and Pease, 2004). Other research has shown that by breaking hotspots down into different police personnel shifts, crime patterns differ over the course of the day and can be used tactically to deploy crime prevention measures. Hence prospective mapping, although in its infancy, is a thrilling enterprise and one that is sure to develop further in the coming years. Crime mapping cannot prevent or solve crime independently. It requires a dedicated number of Criminal Justice System staff to generate, interpret, understand and react on the outputs it creates. Crime mapping increases our understanding of crime problems and can begin the process of really getting to grips with what would best prevent those offences from continuing. Crime mapping can therefore play a vital role within criminal justice agencies and consequently the united goal of crime prevention. References Bowers, K.J., Johnson, S.D., & Pease, K. (2004). Prospective Hotspotting: The Future of Crime Mapping? The British Journal of Criminology, 44, pp. 641-658. Brantingham, P.J. and Brantingham, P.L. (1981). Environmental Criminology. Prospect Heights: Waveland Press. Brantingham, P. and Faust, F. (1976). A conceptual model of crime prevention. Crime and Delinquency. 22, pp.284-296. Chainey, S.P. and J.H Ratcliffe (2005). GIS and Crime Mapping. London: Wiley. McDonnell, R. and Kemp, K. (1995). International GIS Dictionary. Cambridge: GeoInformation International. Rossmo, D.K. (2000). Geographic Profiling. Boca Raton: CRC Press. 
work_lxc3rbg5svffhnehorboehyn5a	----	Developing a Virtual Multicultural Intervention for University Students behavioral sciences Article Developing a Virtual Multicultural Intervention for University Students Kristen Black and Manyu Li * Department of Psychology, University of Louisiana at Lafayette, P. O. Box 43644, Lafayette, LA 70504, USA; kmblck22@gmail.com * Correspondence: manyu.li@louisiana.edu Received: 18 September 2020; Accepted: 3 November 2020; Published: 5 November 2020 ����������������� Abstract: The recent surge in acts of violence motivated by intergroup biases in the United States are of great concern. If allowed to progress, these conditions could create an unwelcoming atmosphere and could foster further division within the United States. Based on previous culture-related studies, multiculturalism is a possible solution to reducing intergroup biases, as it positively affects implicit and explicit cultural attitudes, perceptions, as well as behaviors. The current study developed a virtual multiculturalism intervention as a means to improve intergroup relations and combat cultural biases within the undergraduate student population. Specifically, 249 undergraduate students were randomly assigned to the intervention condition and the control condition. Results showed that participants in the intervention condition had a significantly higher improvement in multiculturalism scores, supporting the incorporation of a virtual multiculturalism intervention in higher education. This study calls for the implementation of a better framework of understanding of how changes in multicultural events are perceived and how this can be used to create a more empathetic population who are more comfortable and understanding with one another. This inexpensive and timesaving model holds the possibility of being used in the future to aid in overcoming cultural differences between student populations and varying ethnics groups alike. Keywords: multiculturalism; intergroup relations; intervention; cultural sensitivity; diversity awareness “We all should know that diversity makes for a rich tapestry, and we must understand that all the threads of the tapestry are equal in value no matter what their color.”—Maya Angelou 1. Introduction This study aims at developing a virtual multicultural intervention for college students to reduce intergroup conflicts on race/ethnicity issues and to increase multiculturalism. In 2017, within the United States (US), a total of 7175 hate crimes were reported to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. About 58% of single-bias hate incidents recorded were racially motivated [1]. According to The Sentencing Project [2], African-Americans and Latinos make up 29% of the US population but comprise 57% of the US prison population. Other racial disparities can be found in a study observing police–civilian interactions via body cameras. The results showed that during routine traffic stops, officers were seen to speak significantly less respectfully to Black community members compared to their Caucasian counterparts [3]. Racially motivated acts of prejudice are widespread, making up 33.9% of all discrimination charges [4]. Another form of cultural bias that is not reflected in criminal data is cultural appropriation, which is defined in the literature as the adoption and misuse of symbols, artifacts, genres, rituals, or technologies associated with a particular culture or subculture [5]. As the US continues to grow in population, its racial profile and overall diversity are expected to grow. The US is projected to become a plurality of racial and ethnic groups—with non-Hispanic Caucasians Behav. Sci. 2020, 10, 168; doi:10.3390/bs10110168 www.mdpi.com/journal/behavsci http://www.mdpi.com/journal/behavsci http://www.mdpi.com https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8324-5868 http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/bs10110168 http://www.mdpi.com/journal/behavsci https://www.mdpi.com/2076-328X/10/11/168?type=check_update&version=2 Behav. Sci. 2020, 10, 168 2 of 11 no longer being a majority [6]. In order to prepare individuals for a more global, pluralistic society, multiculturalism should be incorporated into the teaching curriculum. Implementing multiculturalism is pertinent “to reduce the misunderstandings across subcultures” and to foster a sense of respect for those with other identities unlike our own [7] (p. 29). The multicultural intervention developed in this study addressed issues such as hate crime and also implicit biases, such as cultural appropriation. 1.1. Definition of Multiculturalism Multiculturalism can be defined as “a social-intellectual movement that promotes the value of diversity as a core principle and insists that all cultural groups be treated with respect and as equals” [8] (p. 609). In this definition of multiculturalism, cultural groups are not limited to ethnicity and race. According to the North American Psychological Association’s multicultural guidelines, group identities also include disability, age, gender, religion/spirituality, sexual orientation, and social class [9]. In this study, intervention methods were used to expose participants to multiculturalism educational materials. Intervention studies are programs that draw attention to specific behaviors or attitudes and then build up other behaviors or attitudes. Although the intervention developed in this study mostly concerns racial/ethnic groups, the intervention materials will also briefly cover other group identities. 1.2. Multiculturalism Intervention Cultural groups are not limited to ethnicity and race. This study uses a more multicultural approach when employing intervention studies. Multicultural intervention studies are intervention studies that draw primary focus to concerns regarding racial and ethical issues. Previous studies have analyzed the effects of multiculturalism interventions on various populations, ranging from primary education to social work professionals [10]. These studies all displayed the positive effects of teaching multiculturalism. For example, Smith’s [10] two-group intervention study analyzed the impact of “culture school” on registered nurses’ levels of cultural competency. The culture school was based on a transcultural assessment theoretical model that emphasizes cultural awareness, acknowledging personal biases, and recognizing diversity issues. Subjects’ cultural knowledge and cultural self-efficacy were assessed pre-intervention and post-intervention, as well as 3 weeks after the study. The findings of this experiment suggested that educational, multiculturalism-based interventions can significantly increase cultural competency. Warring et al. [11] tested the effectiveness of comprehensive multicultural training on prospective educators and school psychologists. The course objectives included: understanding the customs of different cultural groups, recognizing prejudices and acts of discrimination, respecting diversity, and developing inclusive behaviors. Students enrolled in the course were given a pretest and a posttest to measure possible changes in multiculturalism. Specifically, this study focused on changes in awareness of personal attitudes towards racial and ethnic minorities, knowledge about racial and ethnic minorities, and developing skills to effectively work with racial and ethnic minorities. A significant increase in levels of awareness, knowledge, and skill was observed amongst participants, which support the incorporation of multicultural courses in the school curriculum. Multiculturalism interventions have benefits aside from increased levels of multicultural awareness. A study conducted by Turner and Brown [12] evaluated the effects of an intervention designed to improve elementary students’ attitudes toward refugees. The program, entitled the Friendship Project, aimed to teach students about the culture, lifestyle, and experiences of refugees [12]. Important dimensions of the program were developing knowledge about refugees, encouraging respect and empathy towards refugees, and gaining skills to detect biases and prejudices. Students were required to complete attitude measures before and after the implementation of the program. Participation in the Friendship Project resulted in positive, short-term attitudes towards refugees. The findings of this study demonstrate the beneficial effects of multiculturalism on attitudes and perceptions. Behav. Sci. 2020, 10, 168 3 of 11 An experiment conducted by Hayes et al. [13] demonstrated the impact of multiculturalism on counselor burnout and stigmatizing attitudes towards substance abusers. The subjects were randomly assigned to one of the following conditions: Acceptance and Commitment Training (ACT), Multicultural Training, or Educational Control. Individuals in the multicultural condition were exposed to multiculturalism ideology, emphasizing cultural diversity, cultural competence, and awareness of personal values and biases. Assessments were completed before the training, after the training, and at a 3-month follow-up. The Multicultural Training condition was found to have a positive impact on stigmatizing processes [13]. Carter et al. [14] demonstrated that even a brief multiculturalism intervention could be beneficial in medical care. The program utilized in the study, The Cultural Proficiency Workshop, was a three-hour workshop implemented during a family medicine clerkship. The workshop focused on health disparities, enhancing cross-cultural awareness, and developing cross-cultural communication skills. Participants’ cultural attitudes and beliefs were assessed pre- and post-workshop, revealing an overall positive effect on participants’ cultural attitudes. Results indicated a positive change in self-awareness of cultural bias, as well as a greater awareness of culture’s role in medical care. The effects of an interactive multicultural intervention on international students were examined by Sakurai, McCall-Wolf, and Kashima [15]. After the implementation of the multicultural program, participants developed more friendships and strengthened their orientation toward the local culture [15]; whereas non-participants showed a decrease in both of these factors and developed stronger home cultural orientation. The findings of this study suggest that similar interventions can be used to enhance social engagement among international students and can also be beneficial in building intercultural links between international and local students [15]. Overall, the studies above imply that teaching multiculturalism is an efficient way of addressing and combatting culturally based problems. The current study extended these previous intervention studies to develop an up-to-date, low-cost, and easy-to-administer virtual intervention specifically targeting college students. 1.3. Multiculturalism Components The components of attaining multiculturalism are similar across cultural competency and multiculturalism literature. They emphasize acknowledging biases, inclusive behaviors, and cultural awareness. The common goal is to develop the necessary multicultural awareness, knowledge, and skills to respectfully engage with other cultural groups. This study will specifically utilize Carroll’s [16] multicultural flashpoints for change to develop a brief virtual multicultural training for college students. According to Carroll [16], the necessary skillsets for achieving multiculturalism include awareness, acknowledgment and knowledge, advocacy, and action. Awareness, the first step towards multiculturalism, is pertinent in communication and developing respect for other cultures [16]. This stage involves awareness of personal values and recognizing oneself as a cultural being but is not limited to the awareness of self and personal beliefs. It also includes the awareness of others and their multiple cultural identities, systemic cultural bias issues, and future implications of relational cultural identities. In other words, learners in multicultural training must be aware of the existence of various cultures. Another dimension is the acknowledgment and knowledge dimension. It is a two-stage cognitive process, which is ultimately affected by personal worldviews and one’s cultural self-awareness [16]. Acknowledgment involves the realization and acceptance of important cognitions regarding multiculturalism. It also involves the acquisition and reconsideration of knowledge. Acknowledging where one lacks in multicultural competence and seeking to gain more knowledge on the issue would be an example of applying this component. The next stage towards transformational change in multiculturalism is advocacy. Carroll [16] described advocacy as “a process that takes one’s awareness, beliefs, knowledge, and acknowledgment and transforms them into a plan for effecting change” (p. 10). An example of advocacy relevant to our college intervention study would be promoting individuals’ advocacy actions in daily activities, Behav. Sci. 2020, 10, 168 4 of 11 such as standing up for a minority student who was teased because of their cultural background or promoting policy change in the university. Taking action is the final multicultural flashpoint for change. This is the point where one becomes proactive in practicing multiculturalism. Carroll [16] considered action to be a broader set of events when compared to advocacy. It involves “a conscious, intentional, and deliberate act or activity” (p. 11) with widespread outcomes that benefit the lives of many and not just the individual. Although Carroll’s [16] flashpoints are specific to school professionals and personnel, our study aims at extending their application to university students. As detailed in Section 2.1, these flashpoints will serve as the foundation of the multiculturalism intervention in this study. 1.4. Study Design and Hypotheses This study developed a virtual multiculturalism intervention and assessed how such intervention might improve individuals’ overall multicultural competence. The ultimate goal of this study was to have a positive effect on multiculturalism in university students and provide evidence of the benefits of incorporating multiculturalism in higher education. To achieve this, an intervention was developed and tested to assess if a virtual, multicultural-based task affects university students’ levels of multiculturalism. It was expected that in comparison to the control group, students’ multiculturalism score in the intervention group would increase after the intervention (Hypothesis 1). In addition, the effectiveness of the multiculturalism intervention was also examined across race/ethnicities, genders, and years in college. Levels of multiculturalism have been shown to differ among races/ethnicities. For example, Pope-Davis et al. [17] examined multicultural counseling competence in Psychology students. Results indicated that ethnic minorities demonstrate higher levels of self-perceived multicultural competence in comparison to Caucasians. This study suggested potential racial differences in levels of multiculturalism in the present study. Another experiment conducted by Chao [18] supported the influence of race on multiculturalism. Specifically, a significant interaction between multicultural training and race/ethnicity was found to predict individuals’ levels of multicultural awareness. Therefore, it was expected that race would moderate the intervention’s effect on multiculturalism (Hypothesis 2). Specifically, it was predicted that racial minorities would have higher pre-intervention scores of multiculturalism compared to Caucasians, potentially creating a ceiling effect. Consequently, the intervention effect might be observed in Caucasians, instead of the racial minority sample. In addition to race/ethnicity, gender is important to consider when examining multicultural competence. Nieto and Zoller Booth [19] analyzed the effects of cultural competence on international students. A significant difference in intercultural sensitivity among genders was observed—with females scoring higher on the sensitivity scale than males. This suggests the possibility of gender differences in multiculturalism in the current study. It was predicted that females would have higher multiculturalism levels pre-intervention compared to males. However, due to the possibility of a ceiling effect in females, the intervention may produce a more measurable change in males and not females (Hypothesis 3). Similarly, it was expected that college experiences would moderate the intervention’s effect on levels of multiculturalism (Hypothesis 4). It was expected that the longer a student has been in college, the more exposure they would have to the university’s diversity office and other culture-related information. Therefore, higher pre-intervention multiculturalism scores were expected to be observed in students who have been in college longer. Due to the possibility of a ceiling effect in upper-class students, the intervention effect might be observed in students with less college experience. In summary, the current study attempted to examine the following research questions: 1. Do college students in the virtual multiculturalism intervention condition show greater improvement in multicultural competence, compared to college students in the control group? (Hypothesis 1) Behav. Sci. 2020, 10, 168 5 of 11 2. Do race, gender, and years spent in college moderate the impact of the virtual multiculturalism intervention on college students’ multicultural competence? (Hypothesis 2–4) 2. Materials and Methods The Institutional Review Board (IRB) of the University of Louisiana at Lafayette approved the research under the approval number FA19-16 PSYC, “The effects of multicultural competence in university students”. Both the pilot study and the main study were approved under the same approval number. 2.1. Intervention Materials and Pilot Study The virtual intervention was designed using Carroll’s [16] multicultural flashpoints for change: awareness, acknowledgment and knowledge, advocacy, and taking action. It was administered using Qualtrics. The intervention materials consisted of five major sets of activities, which were as follows: a diversity awareness quiz, “My Multicultural Self”, cultural sensitivity scenarios, educational videos on microaggressions, cultural appropriation, and implicit bias, and scenarios demonstrating advocacy and taking action. A pilot study was conducted to establish validity for the intervention materials. A total of 50 students who were comparable to the target sample of the main study (i.e., college students who are 18–24 years old) were recruited through the Psychology Department SONA participant pool. Using a 5-point Likert scale (strongly disagree to strongly agree), they were asked to rate each intervention material based on the material’s comprehensibility and overall effectiveness at meeting its main objective. To be included in the final intervention, an average rating of 4 or above in every aspect was required. The final intervention materials are as follows. 2.1.1. Diversity Awareness Quiz In this intervention, awareness was taught by utilizing the diversity awareness quiz, which was administered to facilitate awareness of systemic issues. The diversity awareness quiz [20] was intended to make participants aware of their lack of multicultural competence. 2.1.2. My Multicultural Self Awareness was also taught using an activity called “My Multicultural Self” [21]. This activity was administered to facilitate awareness of one’s own culture, of others’ multiple cultural identities, and stereotypes associated with cultural identities. In the pilot study, participants were presented with the “My Multicultural Self” activity. 2.1.3. Cultural Sensitivity Scenarios Awareness was also taught utilizing a cultural sensitivity scenario. This scenario aimed to enhance one’s cultural sensitivity and increase awareness of how individuals and their cultures can be misunderstood [22]. 2.1.4. Multiculturalism Educational Videos The objective of the acknowledgment and knowledge dimension was for participants to acknowledge their lack of cultural competency and increase their knowledge of systemic cultural issues. Three cultural issues were covered in the intervention, including microaggressions, implicit biases, and cultural appropriation. Videos were approximately 3–6 min long. 2.1.5. Advocacy and Taking Actions Advocacy and action are closely related concepts, as taking actions involves putting advocacy into practice [16]. Therefore, they were combined in our intervention and were taught by providing Behav. Sci. 2020, 10, 168 6 of 11 scenarios illustrating microaggressions, implicit biases, and cultural appropriation. Participants were asked to choose the best way to respond to each scenario. Scenarios came from Oswald’s [23] Situational Judgment Inventory (SJI) measures and Carroll’s [16] chapter on multiculturalism. 2.2. Sample A total of 350 undergraduate students were recruited. Only students who were 18 to 24 years old were included in the final sample. After excluding participants who spent less than 900 s (15 min) on the task, 249 participants were included in the final sample. Participants were randomly assigned to two groups (experimental or control). A total of 172 participants was assigned to the experimental condition (69%), and 77 participants were assigned to the control condition (31%). The average age of participants was 19.01 years (SD = 1.41). Out of the final sample, 148 participants (60%) identified as female, 97 participants identified as male (40%), and 1 participant identified as non-binary (0%). Participant race/ethnicity included Caucasian (n = 148, 60.0%), Black (n = 74, 30.0%), Hispanic (n = 10, 4.0%), Asian (n = 7, 28%), Native Americans (n = 2, 0.8%), and Multi-ethnic (n = 6, 2.4%). For analytic purposes, Black, Hispanic, Asian, and Multi-ethnic participants were categorized into one group (i.e., the racial minority group). In addition, 169 subjects were classified as freshmen (68%), 43 were sophomores (17%), 15 were juniors (6%), and 20 were seniors (8%). Most participants were non-immigrants (98%). 2.3. Procedure Prior to the study, students were randomly assigned to either the experimental or control group. Random assignment was executed by participants drawing a slip of paper. The slips of paper were numbered from 1 to 20. Participants who drew a slip of paper with an even number were assigned to the experimental condition. Those who drew an odd number were assigned to the control condition. Then, students were presented with the consent forms. Students’ multicultural competence was assessed before the virtual intervention or the control activity (i.e., pre-test). After the pre-test was completed, students in the experimental condition were directed to complete the virtual multiculturalism intervention. Participants in the control condition instead completed a 30 min survey that was unrelated to multiculturalism. After the intervention or the control activities, students’ multicultural competence was measured again (i.e., post-test). After the study, the participants were debriefed. 2.4. Measurements The students’ level of multiculturalism was assessed pre- and post-intervention with the 18-item Munroe Multicultural Attitude Scale-Questionnaire (MASQUE) [24]. The MASQUE was tested for internal consistency and was found to be reliable (Cronbach’s Alpha = 0.72). Participants were asked to respond to these statements on a 6-point Likert-type scale, ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree). Sample items were “I realize that racism exists” and “I am emotionally concerned about racial inequality”. These responses were averaged to obtain a mean multiculturalism score for each participant. Gender, race/ethnicities, immigrant status, years in college, and age were included in the pre-test (i.e., before the multicultural intervention). The demographic information was used to examine whether there were significant group differences in multiculturalism improvement after the intervention. 2.5. Data Analysis Repeated measures ANOVA was used to test the hypotheses. For testing Hypotheses 1 and 2 (conditions: intervention vs. no intervention) × 2 (time: pre- vs. post-test), a two-way repeated measures ANOVA was used to assess the difference in student multicultural competence before and after a virtual multiculturalism intervention in comparison to a control group. A significant interaction effect would indicate a significant intervention effect, and further pairwise comparisons would be Behav. Sci. 2020, 10, 168 7 of 11 conducted to unfold the pattern of the interaction. For testing Hypotheses 2 to 4, three-way repeated measure ANOVAs were conducted on race, gender, and years in college to determine the effect of each on the impact of the intervention (vs. control) on multicultural competence scores. 3. Results 3.1. Results of Hypothesis 1 A 2 × 2 repeated measures ANOVA was conducted using JMP Pro 14 to assess differences in multicultural competence between the experimental and control conditions across time, as shown in Table 1. The interaction effect of time by condition was found to be significant, F (1, 244) = 0.02, p = 0.048. Specifically, for those in the intervention condition, overall post-test scores (M = 4.80, SD = 0.67) were significantly higher than overall pre-test scores (M = 4.65, SD = 0.61), F (1, 169) = 26.06, p < 0.001. However, for those in the control condition, pre-test (M = 4.78, SD = 0.57) and post-test (M = 4.85, SD = 0.67) scores were not significantly different F (1, 75) = 2.43, p = 0.123. Results of the significant intervention effect are presented in Figure 1, and the means and standard deviations are presented in Table 2. For the main effects, the main effect of time, F (1, 244) = 0.07, p < 0.001, was significant, but the main effect condition was not significant, F (1, 244) = 0.001, p = 0.251. In other words, participants’ average multiculturalism scores in the intervention condition were not different from the scores of participants in the control condition. The results are in support of Hypothesis 1, which expected participants in the experimental condition to have a significant difference in multicultural competence scores pre- and post-intervention. Table 1. The 2 × 2 repeated measure ANOVA results testing the intervention effect. F p Condition 0.01 0.251 Time 0.07 <0.001 Condition × Time 0.02 0.048 Figure 1. Significant intervention effect (pre- and post- overall multiculturalism scores by conditions). Behav. Sci. 2020, 10, 168 8 of 11 Table 2. Means and standard deviations of multiculturalism scores by time (pre- and post-), and F-statistics of the post-hoc analysis. Pre-Score Post-Score M (SD) M (SD) F p Intervention condition 4.65 (0.61) 4.80 (0.67) 0.07 <0.001 Control condition 4.78 (0.57) 4.85 (0.67) 0.01 0.251 3.2. Results of Hypothesis 2 A three-way repeated measures ANOVA was conducted using JMP Pro 14 to assess the moderating effect of race/ethnicity on the intervention effect. The interaction of condition by race, F (1, 241) = 0.00, p = 0.507, and the interaction of all three factors (time, condition, and race), F (1, 241) = 0.04, p = 0.837 was also found to be non-significant. Therefore, race/ethnicity did not moderate the effect of condition or time or condition across time on the overall score of multiculturalism. The results did not support Hypothesis 2 of the current study, which expected racial minorities to have higher pre-intervention scores of multiculturalism compared to Caucasian participants. Results also showed that neither the main effects of condition, F (1, 241) = 0.00, p = 0.301, or the main effects of race, F (1, 241) = 0.02, p = 0.055 were significant. 3.3. Results of Hypothesis 3 A three-way repeated measures ANOVA was conducted to assess the moderating effect of gender (female vs. male) on the intervention effect. The interaction of all three factors (time, condition, and gender) was also found to be non-significant, F (1, 239) = 0.21, p = 0.651. Therefore, contrary to Hypothesis 3, gender did not moderate the effect of condition or time, or condition across time on the overall score of multiculturalism. Results also revealed that the main effect of condition F (1, 239) = 2.22, p = 0.138, and the interaction effect of condition by gender, F (1, 239) = 3.64, p = 0.058 were both non-significant. However, the main effect of gender was found to be significant, F (1, 239) = 16.55, p < 0.001. Specifically, females (Mpre = 4.84, SD = 0.57; Mpost = 4.97, SD = 0.63) scored higher than males (Mpre = 4.46, SD = 0.58; Mpost = 4.58, SD = 0.65). 3.4. Results of Hypothesis 4 A three-way repeated measures ANOVA was conducted using JMP to assess the moderating effect of college experience (upperclassmen vs. lowerclassmen). The interaction of all three factors (time, condition, and college experience) was found to be non-significant, F (1, 241) = 0.18, p = 0.675. Therefore, college experience did not moderate the effect of condition or time, or condition across time on the overall score of multiculturalism. Results also revealed the main effect of condition, F (1, 241) = 1.42, p = 0.235, and the interaction effect of condition by college experience to be non-significant, F (1, 241) = 0.27, p = 0.603. However, the main effect of college experience was found to be significant, F (1, 241) = 11.21, p = 0.001. Specifically, upperclassmen (Mpre = 5.00, SD = 0.56; Mpost = 5.15, SD = 0.68) scored higher than lowerclassmen (Mpre = 4.64, SD = 0.60; Mpost = 4.76, SD = 0.65). 4. Discussion The present study aimed at developing a brief, online multiculturalism intervention for college students. The ultimate goal of this study was to have a positive effect on levels of multiculturalism in university students. It was hypothesized that in comparison to the control group, students’ multiculturalism score in the intervention group would increase after the intervention. The main significant findings of the study support the original hypothesis—with the intervention effect being observed only in participants in the intervention condition. These findings are consistent with previous intervention studies that have demonstrated the effectiveness of multiculturalism (i.e., [12–14]). Behav. Sci. 2020, 10, 168 9 of 11 In addition to the main hypothesis (Hypothesis 1), contradictory to Hypotheses 2–4, no moderating effects were found for race/ethnicity, gender, or college experience. It was hypothesized that the intervention would produce a more measurable change in certain groups of individuals (i.e., lowerclassmen, males, and Caucasians). However, the null findings of the current study suggest that the intervention is generally effective for all college students tested. Although none of the hypothesized moderators were significant, some interesting significant main effects were observed. For example, the main effect of race was found to be marginally significant (p = 0.055). Specifically, racial minority participants scored higher than their Caucasian counterparts. Similar effects were observed with the main effect of gender and college classes. Specifically, females scored significantly higher than males on average multiculturalism scores. Finally, in comparison to those with less college experience (lowerclassmen), those with more college experience (upperclassmen) scored higher in the average scores of multiculturalism. Therefore, it appears that college education, in general, may help college students to gain knowledge in multiculturalism. Although the main significant finding was relatively small, the current intervention is still beneficial to the college population, as it has shown to produce a measurable change in levels of multiculturalism. This intervention is very timely and useful to college students, as the US is in the midst of a global pandemic (i.e., COVID-19). Many occupational and educational tasks are now being implemented virtually. Being that this low-cost multiculturalism intervention is administered online, it can be easily adopted and accessed by individual students and universities alike. Along with the COVID-19 pandemic, more awareness is being brought to the “Black Lives Matter” movement due to the increase in exposure to police brutality against Black American citizens. The mission of the “Black Lives Matter” movement is to bring awareness to anti-Black racism and state-sanctioned violence against Black Americans [25]. This movement exhibits a need for awareness of cultural differences in the US. The current multiculturalism intervention could be beneficial in increasing the awareness and acceptance of cultural differences. This could be a very useful tool for individuals and organizations in search of a cost-efficient tool to increase multiculturalism and raise awareness of systemic injustices without the need to have in-person diverse experiences. Limitations and Future Directions It should be noted that the present study is limited in some respects. The study’s generalizability is limited, as most study participants were Caucasians and African Americans, and over half identified as female. The observed gender identity and ethnicity disparities do not provide an accurate representation of the diverse US population and could have possibly been resolved if more participants were recruited. Future studies should take sample size and its possible effects to external validity into consideration when developing a virtual intervention. The current study could also be expanded longitudinally to gain a better understanding of assessing multiculturalism in college students. Instead of administering the intervention and assessing participants within the same day, the assessment and intervention processes could be carried out across longer periods (i.e., days or weeks). Giving participants more time to complete the intervention and delaying the pre- and post-assessments could result in higher attentiveness to the material presented. It can be expected that this would ultimately provide a more accurate representation of the intervention’s effects on multiculturalism. Another possible limitation of the present study is related to the intervention being administered using an online-only platform. Prior research has demonstrated the effectiveness of in-person interactions on intergroup relations [26]. Specifically, properly structured contact between members of different cultural groups has been shown to improve intergroup attitudes, as well as reduce bias and conflict [26,27]. Therefore, the present intervention may not have been as effective as an intervention involving personal interactions. Future virtual multiculturalism intervention studies could incorporate activities that facilitate imagined intergroup contact, which has also been shown to be an effective strategy for improving intergroup relations [28]. Incorporating imagined contact Behav. Sci. 2020, 10, 168 10 of 11 activities would be pragmatic for a virtual intervention because it is timesaving and is as effective as direct intergroup contact. 5. Conclusions This study attempted to develop a virtual multiculturalism intervention that increased levels of multiculturalism in college students. Ultimately, the intervention had a small significant effect on overall multiculturalism—with an increase in multiculturalism scores in only the experimental condition, yielding results that fall in line with this study’s hypothesis. This shows that there is a possibility of educating about multiculturalism within a university setting. Future interventions should also be conducted across a longer period of time by allowing more time for either the intervention or the assessment. Activities that involve intergroup contact (e.g., imagined intergroup contact) should also be incorporated to facilitate diverse experiences. This study contributes to the very limited literature on online multiculturalism interventions in undergraduate education and supports the incorporation of multiculturalism in higher education. It also demonstrates applicability to the current social and pandemic-related events occurring in the US. Author Contributions: Conceptualization, K.B. and M.L.; methodology, K.B. and M.L.; formal analysis, K.B. and M.L.; investigation, K.B. and M.L.; data curation, K.B. and M.L.; writing—original draft preparation, K.B.; writing—review and editing, K.B. and M.L.; visualization, M.L., supervision, M.L.; project administration, K.B. All authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript. Funding: This research received no external funding. Acknowledgments: The authors would like to thank Mike McDermott and Theresa Wozencraft for their helpful comments on the research study. The authors would also like to thank Nadia Turki for her help in editing the final version of the manuscript. Conflicts of Interest: The authors declare no conflict of interest. References 1. Federal Bureau of Investigation. Hate Crime Statistics. 2017. Available online: https://ucr.fbi.gov/hate-crime/ 2017/tables/table-1.xls (accessed on 4 November 2020). 2. The Sentencing Project. 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Introduction Definition of Multiculturalism Multiculturalism Intervention Multiculturalism Components Study Design and Hypotheses Materials and Methods Intervention Materials and Pilot Study Diversity Awareness Quiz My Multicultural Self Cultural Sensitivity Scenarios Multiculturalism Educational Videos Advocacy and Taking Actions Sample Procedure Measurements Data Analysis Results Results of Hypothesis 1 Results of Hypothesis 2 Results of Hypothesis 3 Results of Hypothesis 4 Discussion Conclusions References 
work_lxfvfdtybrbgtoj7v7xv23juya	----	[PDF] Learning About a Child's Gay or Lesbian Sexual Orientation: Parental Concerns About Societal Rejection, Loss of Loved Ones, and Child Well Being | Semantic Scholar Skip to search formSkip to main content> Semantic Scholar's Logo Search Sign InCreate Free Account You are currently offline. Some features of the site may not work correctly. DOI:10.1080/00918369.2011.598409 Corpus ID: 43008428Learning About a Child's Gay or Lesbian Sexual Orientation: Parental Concerns About Societal Rejection, Loss of Loved Ones, and Child Well Being @article{Conley2011LearningAA, title={Learning About a Child's Gay or Lesbian Sexual Orientation: Parental Concerns About Societal Rejection, Loss of Loved Ones, and Child Well Being}, author={C. Conley}, journal={Journal of Homosexuality}, year={2011}, volume={58}, pages={1022 - 1040} } C. Conley Published 2011 Psychology, Medicine Journal of Homosexuality This article reports the results of a study examining heterosexual parents' concerns upon learning about their children's gay or lesbian sexual orientations. Three areas of parental concern are noted: (a) those about what society thinks of them because they have gay or lesbian children, (b) those about being rejected by loved ones, and (c) concerns for their child's physical and psychological well being. Results indicate that parents' concerns about having gay or lesbian children differ… Expand View on Taylor & Francis static1.squarespace.com Save to Library Create Alert Cite Launch Research Feed Share This Paper 41 CitationsHighly Influential Citations 9 Background Citations 25 Methods Citations 1 Results Citations 4 View All Topics from this paper Physiological Sexual Disorders Deny (action) Child Welfare Love Female Homosexuality hearing impairment 41 Citations Citation Type Citation Type All Types Cites Results Cites Methods Cites Background Has PDF Publication Type Author More Filters More Filters Filters Sort by Relevance Sort by Most Influenced Papers Sort by Citation Count Sort by Recency Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Youths Coming Out to Their Parents: Parental Reactions and Youths’ Outcomes E. D’amico, D. Julien, N. Tremblay, E. Chartrand Psychology 2015 39 Highly Influenced View 4 excerpts, cites background Save Alert Research Feed The Reciprocal Relationship Between Religious Beliefs and Acceptance of One’s Gay or Lesbian Family Member Katherine A. Zeininger, M. Holtzman, Rachel Kraus Psychology 2017 3 View 1 excerpt, cites background Save Alert Research Feed Effects of Family Demographics and the Passage of Time on Parents' Difficulty with Their Lesbian, Gay, or Bisexual Youth's Sexual Orientation. D. Huebner, K. Roche, Kendrick A. Rith Psychology, Medicine Archives of sexual behavior 2019 3 Save Alert Research Feed Hispanic Parental Experiences of Learning a Child Identifies as a Sexual Minority K. Gattamorta, John P Salerno, Narciso Quidley-Rodriguez Psychology, Medicine Journal of GLBT family studies 2019 2 Highly Influenced View 4 excerpts, cites results and background Save Alert Research Feed Parents, Families and Friends of Lesbians and Gays (PFLAG) Amanda E. Fehlbaum Sociology 2016 6 PDF Save Alert Research Feed Our Story: The Parent and LGBTQ Child Relational Process Tee R. Tyler Psychology 2015 16 View 1 excerpt, cites background Save Alert Research Feed FACTORS IMPACTING PARENTAL ACCEPTANCE OF AN LGBT CHILD Dani E Rosenkrantz Psychology 2018 View 3 excerpts, cites results and background Save Alert Research Feed A Tripartite Examination of Heterosexual Canadians' Attitudes Toward Subgroups of Gay Men and Lesbian Women Jessica M. McCutcheon Psychology 2018 Save Alert Research Feed Coming-Out to Family Members and Internalized Sexual Stigma in Bisexual, Lesbian and Gay People Jessica Pistella, M. Salvati, Salvatore Ioverno, F. Laghi, R. Baiocco Psychology 2016 42 Save Alert Research Feed “It’s Almost Like Gay Sex Doesn’t Exist”: Parent-Child Sex Communication According to Gay, Bisexual, and Queer Male Adolescents D. Flores, S. Docherty, M. Relf, Ross E McKinney, J. Barroso Psychology 2019 9 Save Alert Research Feed ... 1 2 3 4 5 ... References SHOWING 1-10 OF 47 REFERENCES SORT BYRelevance Most Influenced Papers Recency Learning that an adolescent child is gay or lesbian: the parent experience. Susan Saltzburg Psychology, Medicine Social work 2004 126 PDF View 1 excerpt, references background Save Alert Research Feed Beyond Acceptance: Parents of Lesbians and Gays Talk About Their Experiences C. W. Griffin, M. Wirth, Arthur G. Wirth Psychology 1986 49 Save Alert Research Feed Heterosexuals' attitudes toward lesbians and gay men: Correlates and gender differences G. Herek Psychology 1988 1,167 View 1 excerpt, references background Save Alert Research Feed The discovery that an offspring is gay: parents', gay men's, and lesbians' perspectives. A. Ben–Ari Psychology, Medicine Journal of homosexuality 1995 187 View 1 excerpt, references background Save Alert Research Feed Response of parents to learning that their child is homosexual and concern over AIDS: a national study. B. Robinson, L. Walters, P. Skeen Psychology, Medicine Journal of homosexuality 1989 125 View 1 excerpt, references background Save Alert Research Feed Normal Queers: Straight Parents Respond to Their Children's “Coming Out” J. Fields Psychology 2001 118 View 1 excerpt, references background Save Alert Research Feed The Development and Initial Validation of the COPLAG Scale: Measuring the Concerns of Parents of Lesbians and Gays C. Conley Psychology 2011 6 View 1 excerpt, references background Save Alert Research Feed Beyond "homophobia": a social psychological perspective on attitudes toward lesbians and gay men. G. Herek Psychology, Medicine Journal of homosexuality 1984 564 View 1 excerpt, references background Save Alert Research Feed Internalized Stigma Among Sexual Minority Adults: Insights From a Social Psychological Perspective G. Herek, J. R. Gillis, J. Cogan Psychology 2009 695 PDF Save Alert Research Feed Recognizing gay, lesbian, and transgender teens in a child and adolescent psychiatry practice. M. Rosenberg Medicine Journal of the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry 2003 18 View 1 excerpt, references background Save Alert Research Feed ... 1 2 3 4 5 ... Related Papers Abstract Topics 41 Citations 47 References Related Papers Stay Connected With Semantic Scholar Sign Up About Semantic Scholar Semantic Scholar is a free, AI-powered research tool for scientific literature, based at the Allen Institute for AI. Learn More → Resources DatasetsSupp.aiAPIOpen Corpus Organization About UsResearchPublishing PartnersData Partners   FAQContact Proudly built by AI2 with the help of our Collaborators Terms of Service•Privacy Policy The Allen Institute for AI By clicking accept or continuing to use the site, you agree to the terms outlined in our Privacy Policy, Terms of Service, and Dataset License ACCEPT & CONTINUE 
work_lxud6ygzd5e5jhl2wexck5dpry	----	NPS_2000051 213..220 SPECIAL ISSUE ARTICLE Conceptualizing and Operationalizing Identity, Race, Ethnicity, and Nationality by Law: An Introduction András L. Pap* Centre for Social Sciences Institute for Legal Studies (formerly Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Budapest, Hungary; Institute of Business Economics, Eötvös University (ELTE), Budapest, Hungary; National University of Public Service, Faculty of Law Enforcement, Budapest, Hungary; Ludovika University of Public Service, Faculty of Law Enforcement, Budapest, Hungary; Central European University, Nationalism Studies Program, Vienna, Austria. *Corresponding author. Email: pap.andras.laszlo@gmail.com Keywords: genocide; ethnic voting; minority rights; national identity; race Analyzing political and legal measures that serve to operationalize race, ethnicity, or nationality is a growing area of nationalism studies that brings together legal, historical, and political scholars (Dobos 2020; Sansum and Dobos 2020; Smith 2020; Stergar and Scheer 2018). In 2018, I convened a research group involving over 50 scholars from various disciplines on “Identity, Race and Ethnicity in Constitutional Law,” under the auspices of the International Association of Constitutional Law.1 The aim was to create a forum for academics working in different fields of law and other areas of social sciences to create novel and illuminating intersections for understanding how the multifac- eted and complex phenomena of race, ethnicity, and identity are conceptualized and operationa- lized. The challenge and goal is to bridge and cross-fertilize discourses and narratives on race (in the US), ethnicity (in various jurisdictions), the continental European framework of collective, claim- based national minority rights, and the conceptual and policy toolkit of aboriginal/indigenous law, in order to assess how substantive or procedural law encapsulates identity. Authors of the special issue are members of the Research Group and this is first of the hopefully many more such collaborative efforts to surface. The broader aim of this project is to map the role and potential of law to conceptualize and operationalize (i) race, ethnicity, and nationality; (ii) the various types and forms of political and legal institutions, as well as policies built on these social constructs; (iii) and the role of identity and modes of identification in the conceptualization and operationalization. As argued earlier (Pap 2017 and Brubaker 2015), the past decades brought transformative changes in how the meaning of the terms of (first of all gender, but also) ethno-racial identity are assigned and conceptualized in social sciences and humanities, and to a certain degree in politics and law. Brubaker (2015) emphasizes the lack of linguistic and conceptual resources, cultural tools, and proper vocabulary for thinking about racial identity. The lack of a solid and current vocabulary is particularly stark in the field of law, especially international law, which habitually operates with the concepts of race, ethnicity, and nationality when setting forth standards for the recognition of collective rights or protection from discrimination, establishing criteria for asylum, labeling actions as genocide, or requiring a “genuine link” in citizenship law, without actually providing definitions for these groups or of membership criteria within these legal constructs. There are a number of focal points for discussion in this broadly defined project. One is to standardize the conceptual toolkit of subjective/choice-focused, objective/standard-based, and fraudulent operationalization of ethno-racial categories. These inquiries tackle the question of © The Author(s), 2020. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of Association for the Study of Nationalities. This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. Nationalities Papers (2021), 49: 2, 213–220 doi:10.1017/nps.2020.51 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:31, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use. https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4546-6632 mailto:pap.andras.laszlo@gmail.com http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://doi.org/10.1017/nps.2020.51 https://www.cambridge.org/core what role public law plays in the political minefield and labyrinth of identity politics. The aim is to map out the landscape of the various ways law conceptualizes ethnicity and race, and to show the diversity, complexity, and often inconsistency of the various operationalizing methods—as well as to point to the lack of a single, overarching model or strategy. Even though the methodology of the analysis centers on law (legislation, case law, and jurisprudence), since law is arguably a tool to operationalize politics and social movements (i.e. theory, ideology, or activism), the potential target audience goes beyond legal academia. It needs to be emphasized that the practical trigger for this project is that ambiguity in terms of the targeted communities and membership boundaries for minority protection mechanisms and social inclusion measures may hinder the achievement of policy goals. In addition, the potential for abuse can open avenues for further discrimination and marginalization. The first set of questions for this broader project concern whether there are even existing legal definitions for the “source” of identity, be it race, ethnicity, nationality, or even religion. The analysis has two dimensions: definitions and classifications pertaining to the groups, and how membership criteria are established in these groups/communities. As for the first subset, besides official recognition requirements for religious institutions and churches, the analysis should include debates on ethno-racial census categories; definitions used for national minorities and indige- nous/aboriginal groups and castes; and enumerated racial or ethnic groups for anti-discrimination and hate crime legislation, affirmative action, or other forms of preferential treatment (see for example the difficulties defining explicitly targeted minority communities and agents of collective minority rights). Here, policies on the political participation of minorities, minority policies in the fields of education and employment, and naturalization policies should be scrutinized, along with the question of how family law introduces and operationalizes racial or ethno-religious identity in creating separate clusters for jurisdiction and substantive law, for example, in Israel, South Africa, and Greece. Several doctrinal and practical issues arise in this cluster of questions. Consider for example census debates. In the US, the multiracial category movement went beyond academic circles into the spheres of political mobilization. Challenging census identity categories is also a recurring theme in post-Yugoslav debates, involving harsh census election campaigns, ethno-national boycotts by ethnic entrepreneurs, and the phenomenon of protest-identifications such as “Jedi,” “Smurf,” or “in love” (Bieber 2015). Loveman (2014) demonstrates the case of Latin-America, which not only has a rich history of “fraud” (racial drift) in census reassignment due to bribes offered to parish priests in colonial times, but which has completely erased race from the census for decades. Classification is also central to refugee procedures, where race, ethnicity, or membership in a “particular social group” are crucial elements in the basis for persecution. The asylum-seeker will make a claim pertaining to her affiliation and recipient authorities will carry out a validation procedure, first establishing whether the group in question is actually in danger of persecution, and second, whether the claimant is a member of the group. The dilemma assessed in the special issue on whether hate crimes should be conceptualized as identity or minority protection instruments also relates to these questions. A second point for analysis pertains to the question of whether the definitions and classifications concern the majority community (or communities), or only minorities, and whether there are illuminative differences depending on the object of legal and political classification. Here, binary societies with a dominant majority and a single ethno-racial or national minority are of particular interest. The Hungarian and Israeli cases evoked in the special issue show how defining the titular (ethno-)national majority is the core of the nation-building and nationalist project, as nationalism is also framed in reference to ethnic kins in Diaspora. Various formations of constitutional nationalism for the Diaspora such as the Israeli law of return, the Basic Law on the “nation state,” status laws, and ethnicized external citizenship policies must serve as a source of further analysis, especially if there is an asymmetry in terms of how the state classifies and operationalizes ethnicity for minorities, “others” to the nation-constituting majority. Consider for example the 214 András Pap Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:31, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use. https://www.cambridge.org/core circle of ethnocorruption performed by the Hungarian legislation in arguably using minority politics as tools for Diaspora politics and kin politics used as tools for vote creation¸ yet having an uncontested, sincere, genuine core commitment for transnational, post-sovereign nation building. A third set of questions concern the ever-recurring issue of whether the dominant legal conceptualization centers on subjective or objective criteria and definitions. There are several ways to categorize: Legal regimes may institute fully subjective, fully objective, or hybrid models. According to Rich (2014), ethno-racial classification has four dimensions: documentary race concerns the decision one makes by checking boxes in response to administrative data collection efforts; social race concerns involuntarily affiliation assigned by third parties, based on perceived appearance or social practice; private race refers to personal views about one’s racial identity; and finally, public race pertains to racial identification where an individual is prepared to be recognized as having by others in social life. Also, in some cases, the authorization for setting standards of “objective membership criteria” are transferred to agents of the communities. Legal regimes will differ whether it concerns a broad set of services available for members of indigenous communities, political rights for national minorities, or affirmative action measures for ethno-racial minorities. When it comes to measures protecting victimization in hate crimes or discrimination, legal regimes mostly rely on the self-assessment of the victims in regards of their (actual or presumed) membership in the protected groups, although in asylum law or war crime cases—where the consequences of such classifications are particularly grave—group membership is often up for rigorous scrutiny. Likewise, for regimes protecting the freedom to exercise religious identity, even though faith is a deeply personal, subjective attribute, judicial bodies often delve into scrutinizing the sincerity of religious claims or the relevance of a religious practice. Thus, operationalization strategies for ethno-national identity can be manifold. Legislative and policy strategies can rely on self-identification; identification by other members or elected, appointed representatives of the group—leaving aside ontological questions regarding the authen- ticity or genuineness of these actors; TPI, “third party identification” (See Farkas 2017), that is classification made by outsiders, relying on the perception of the majority; or by outsiders but using “objective” criteria, such as names, residence, and so forth. For anti-discrimination measures, subjective elements for identification with the protected group are irrelevant, and external percep- tions should serve as the basis for classification. Policies implementing this anti-discrimination principle may rely on a number of markers: skin color, citizenship, place of birth, country of origin, language (mother tongue, language used), name, color, customs (like clothing), religion, parents’ origin, or even diet. Defining membership criteria is completely different when group formation is based on claims for different kinds of preferences and privileges. In this case, subjective identifi- cation with the group is an essential requirement, but the legal frameworks may establish a set of objective criteria that also needs to be met. In the context of drafting affirmative action and ethnicity-based social inclusion policies, external perception, self-declaration, and anonymized data collection may be varied and combined. Contemporary national legal systems usually refrain from providing legal or administrative definitions for membership criteria in ethno-racial communities. An important exception is the unique indigenous/aboriginal legal and policy framework, which habitually sets forth rigid and explicit membership requirements for indigenous communities. Here, the state either provides strict administrative definitions by employing some form of objective criteria or by officially endorsing tribal norms. In these cases, the individual’s freedom to choose her identity only comes up in the context of leaving the group and excluding herself from preferential treatment. The European model for national minorities habitually rejects creating strict administrative definitions for membership. In most cases, a formalized self-declaration suffices for eligibility to receive collective rights, with occasional additional objective requirements such as proven ancestry (by some sort of official documents) or the proven knowledge of the minority language. Curiously, states are more reluctant to define membership criteria for domestic minority groups than for the Nationalities Papers 215 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:31, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use. https://www.cambridge.org/core titular majority population, a practice often followed in legislation implementing ethnicized concepts for external dual citizenship or Diaspora provisions similar to those of status law (Pap 2015; Pap 2017). Besides a general scrutiny of how law recognizes identity, a fourth, separate question of choice pertains to such identities. Special attention should be dedicated to criticism surrounding the “subjectified” approach, as in a world of unfettered subjectivity allowing the right to change one’s race or gender, arguably, risks obscuring power hierarchies, and may highjack traditional political movements that focus on vulnerabilities, and collective and structural social inequalities. It also potentially depoliticizes the feminist, civil rights, or human rights movements and theory. The concept of “harassment” is particularly illuminating, as it is focuses on the existence of an “intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment” (to use the wording of the EU Race Directive2). The flexibility of anti-discrimination law, as well as its unique terminology and conceptualization, enables activist interpretation to broaden its scope to cover novel, subtle, and complex inequalities and grievances, in the case of harassment, allowing entire organizations or subunits to be sanctioned along with individuals (see Pap 2019). Legal standards relying solely on the subjective feeling of the complainant in regards to an intimidating and humiliating environ- ment, however, are not without their risks. While they are powerful and empowering tools for victims and members of marginalized communities, they can lead to lawlessness if there are no constraints to sanctioning based on declarations of feelings. For comparison, in asylum law, standards have been developed to ascertain and operationalize the objective standards for “well founded-ness” in its central concept of “well-founded fear of persecution” (Zagor 2014). A fifth notable point of discussion centers on “fraud.” In connection with preferential treatment policies and affirmative action, as well as the collective rights-focused frameworks for national minorites in Europe, the experience of “ethno-corruption” and “racial fraud” surfaced in political, policy, and academic discussions. The concept of fraud is difficult to ascertain as an analytic category. In fact, it involves value and normative judgments. It is the perception that building on the loopholes of the legal conceptualization and classification, identity-based policies are intentionally used—or rather abused—by persons who are not members of the authentic target group. Inten- tionality could mean that the abusers are presumed to be aware of the discrepancy and the inadequacy of their actions. Ethno-racial fraud roots in cynicism and/or opportunism and can be practiced by individuals and the state. Examples for the former include racial fraud in relation to “elective race” in the US (Rich 2014), or the experience of ethno-corruption in relation to minority rights in continental Europe. Here, several ethical and epistemological questions are to be addressed: for example, is it even fraudulent to apply for ethnically carved external citizenship, absent an “ethnic identity,” if the individual meets the legal criteria in a regime where the state created a “corrupted” ethnic cluster, passportizing external populations for political purposes? More generally, the ethics of whitewashing or passing, that is coping with and reacting to structural injustices and inequalities of an ethno-racially oppressive society need to be expounded. Another detailed analysis could concern cynical, morally or politically corrupted constructions of ethnicity or race by the state. This official or state ethno-corruption includes several practices. Consider for example peculiar constructions of constitutional identity, that surface in two dimensions: the state endorsing certain cultural values and imposing actual obligations on individuals, for example mandatory oaths, pledges of allegiances, and loyalty clauses. Further case studies for state ethno- corruption can include the analysis of the very process by which states create legislative frameworks for national minorities by delineating deserving and non-deserving groups and creating “hierar- chies of ethnicity.” Such policies might include marginalizing ethno-racial minorities by concep- tualizing them as a national minority, or the aforementioned ethnic engineering that applies ethnic selectivity in (re)ethnicized citizenship or status laws for political or strategic identarian purposes. State-driven ethno-corruption can surface in several forms: for example, when race/ethnicity is rendered invisible in failing to prosecute hate crimes or combating systematic discrimination (e.g. in educational or housing segregation). Furthermore, disparate treatment in legislation when 216 András Pap Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:31, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use. https://www.cambridge.org/core robustly different, asymmetrical regimes define and operationalize minority and majority ethnicity could be another example, similarly to when the dignity and the identity of the ethnic majority is provided special legal recognition and protection. Racial profiling and other forms of institutional discrimination are arguably also forms of official ethno-corruption. It is against this backdrop of questions and issues that the collection of case studies within the articles of the special issue should be seen. The snapshots of case studies, although illuminating and instructive in their own, demonstrate the complexities and often inconsistencies in operationalizing race, ethnicity, and nationality. Opening this special issue, Alon Harel explores a recent Israeli legislation, the Basic Law, and in particular its provision on declaring “Israel the nation state of the Jewish people,” which points to long debates on legal and political interpretations of the “Jewish character of the state.” Harel claims that the way this law anchors the Jewish identity of the state in its formal constitutional structure is designed to accentuate the ethnic superiority of Jews in Israel and to limit some of the traditional rights cherished by liberals. As the right to national self-determination in the state of Israel is granted exclusively to the Jewish nation, this he argues is a direct reaction to proposals that recognize some degree of collective self-determination to Palestinians within the State, emphasizing the asymmetry of Jewish and Palestinian citizens, as the former enjoy collective and individual rights, while the latter enjoy only individual rights—or, at most, limited collective rights. The law also addresses the relations between Israel and the Jewish people in the Diaspora. Harel’s essay opens the floor for further discussions, in the illuminating and peculiar case of Israel and the Jewry, which is special for several reasons: Jews are classified and operationalized as a racial, ethnic, and national minority in addition to being a religious group and a cultural community (and of course all sorts of variations, such as ethno-religious, ethno-cultural). Historical and contemporary case studies, ranging from the Nurnbergian laws to judicial and legislative debates in Israel and the Diaspora, all show how legal categories and political constructs can encapsulate the multifaceted and multilayered questions of defining Jewish identity, and whether the definition concerns membership in a racial, ethnic, national, religious, or cultural community. The case of “Jewishness” is of particular interest due to its history and contemporary experience of persecution and discrimination; the myth, and the challenging legal concept of assimilation (and the related phenomenon of covering); and the unique case of Israel—“official national homeland” of the Jewry—offering a non-exclusionary, yet articulate official definition, which not only provides a fertile ground for scholars interested in constitu- tional identity, constitutional nationalism, definitions for the majority, or the question of constitutional loyalty, but also the potential implications of these legal and political commitments and classifications for Jews living in the Diaspora. The following article by Amanda Haynes, Sindy Joyce, and Jennifer Schweppe (in this special issue) delves into the legal, political, and symbolic aspects of (striving for) the recognition of ethno- cultural groups as distinct “ethnic minority” groups. The case study here involves Irish Travellers, a traditionally nomadic ethnic minority indigenous to Ireland, which is recognized as an ethnic minority in adjacent jurisdictions in England and Wales Northern Ireland. Advocates’ claims for similar recognition have consistently been denied in Ireland, although Travellers had been identified and explicitly named as a protected group in equality legislation, as well as by laws addressing incitement to hatred. The authors document how subsequent to sustained campaigning and criticism from Ireland’s independent statutory Equality Authority and various international monitoring bodies (like the International Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance, the European Framework Convention on National Minorities, and the Rights of the Child European Commission), Traveller ethnicity was finally recognized by the Prime Minister of Ireland in 2017. Exploring the wording, reasoning, and legal significance of the statement of recognition the authors conclude that while it does not actually afford the community any additional rights, it may give a firmer basis for arguing for the activation of these pre-existing rights. Nationalities Papers 217 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:31, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use. https://www.cambridge.org/core Besides being a fascinating ethno-political thriller, the Irish case is instructive and although unique, in certain aspects it is also typical: in Ireland, there is no agreed legal definition for “ethnic groups,” and as the authors explain, even the census problematically conflates ethnic, national, and racialized identities, asking respondents to specify their “ethnic or cultural background.” The case of the Travellers’ modest success can provide valuable insights into the global the workings of the identity-politics-driven lobby for recognizing more and more identities, and the dynamics of construing the hierarchy of valued identities. Carola Lingaas (in this special issue), the author of the next article, focuses on how the term “national group” is conceptualized in jurisprudence and the case law of genocide, where the uncertain boundaries between the protected victim groups result in definitional inconsistencies in the application of the law. As she eloquently explains, international criminal law narrowly protects four enumerated groups from the crime of genocide: national, racial, ethnic, and religious. Focusing on the “national group,” the article examines whether the seemingly static legal frame- work can account for fluid identity fault lines. In the area of criminal law, the principle of legality has a particularly narrow interpretation, as the law must indicate the prohibited conduct unambigu- ously and an individual cannot be sentenced if the law does not prescribe punishment. The stage is set by the case of Rwandan génocidaire Jean-Paul Akayesu, the first ever genocide trial before an international criminal court, where, citing the 1955 Nottebohm decision rendered by the Interna- tional Court of Justice, judges of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) held that a national group is defined as a collection of people who are perceived to share a legal bond based on common citizenship, coupled with reciprocity of rights and duties. Hence, objective legal bonds in the politico-legal sense seem to dominate definition, rather than defining membership of a national group in an ethnographical, social psychological, cultural, or sociological sense. Lingaas points out that it should be irrelevant whether or not there are objective differences as long as the perpetrator considers them to be real. Thus, a definition based on the group’s objectively determinative characteristics rather than its presumed identity is problematic, because, in fact, the perpetrator always has the definitional power over the victims. The fault line between groups, especially in conflicts, Lingaas argues, is often symbolic and based on a construction of opposing, and often changing irreconcilable identities. But in a world of fluid group identities, how can law remain the static pole? The author’s thorough analysis of international and domestic case law points to a shift from the initial, objective feature-based and citizenship-focused approach. For example in 2004, in stark contrast with earlier case law, the European Court of Human Rights showed openness to accept the killing of two Lithuanian partisans in 1953 to fall under the definition of the crime of genocide, as they were held to be more than members of a political group, and rather constituting a “significant part of the Lithuanian nation as a national and ethnic group.” Lingaas warns that this may lead to a dilution of the law of genocide. From Yugoslavia to crimes committed by South American military juntas, the author gives several examples of judicial practice being inconsistent in what should be given more weight—the perpetrator’s perception, objective features like the group members’ common language and culture, or the individuals’ understanding that their group was of a distinct ethnicity—and concludes that the interpretation of the law has evolved in better taking into account the multifaceted levels of group identities. At the same time, however, such interpretation does not cohere with the perpetrator’s definitional power over his/her victim group. Moreover, she adds, such broad interpretation begs the question of whether the intentionally excluded political, gender, cultural, ideological, linguistic, or economic groups will (have to) be granted protection under the law of genocide if their group characteristics can be connected, in any conceivable manner, to the larger concept of nationality. The last article by Pap (in this special issue), the guest editor, uses Hungary as a case study, focusing on legislative policies and the practical application of hate crimes: in doing so, it presents yet another example for the various ways that legal policy can be misguided in the labyrinth of identity politics, minority protection, and penal populism. Here too, the research is necessitated by 218 András Pap Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:31, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use. https://www.cambridge.org/core the fact that inappropriate tailoring of criminal measures can both raise rule of law concerns and impede the initial goal of the legislative measure. Hate crime legislation and the very concept of hate crimes raises a number of theoretical questions with practical implications. What is the moral and political basis of this heightened legal protection: are hate crimes essentially minority or identity-protection mechanisms? Is there a requirement for the protected characteristic to be inducing some sort of social vulnerability, or is any form of victimization related to any form and type of characteristic the individual considers relevant to her personality worthy of protection? Even if we single out certain identities, such as race, ethnicity, religion, or sexual orientation, does belonging to the majority exclude victimization? Also, what happens if the group happens to be the majority locally, but a minority in the national setting? Furthermore, can members of right- wing majority extremist hate groups qualify as hate crime victims, if attacked by members of an ethno-racial minority group? How should membership in the predefined protected groups be ascertained? Is it via the declaration of the identity of the victim, or does the (potentially mistaken) perception of the offender or the majority community matter? Furthermore, how are open-ended lists or vaguely defined criteria for protected characteristics, so often and laudably applied in anti-discrimination legislative frameworks, compatible with the principle of legal certainty? The most commonly used protected classes in hate crimes legislation include a wide range of groups such as age, citizenship, disability, ethnicity, family responsibility and status, gender, matriculation, membership to a labor organization, national origin, personal appearance, political orientation, religion, sexual orientation, social status, drug addiction, criminal record, pedophilic tendencies, mental infirmity, pregnancy, being a physician engaging in performing abortions, etc. (see Schweppe 2012). Groups included in hate crime legislation have specific “tools of political and legal persuasion: a well-recognized history of oppression; an established currency in human rights discourse; the backing of an influential social movement; and the capacity to establish empirical credibility for the targeted violence they experience” (Mason 2013). Besides the fierce political and academic debates concerning the “hierarchy of legitimate victims,” as Schweppe (2012) observes, citing Jacobs and Potter (2001), hate crime laws are also appealing to politicians, since “except for the inclusion of sexual orientation, politicians faced a no lose proposition. By supporting hate crime legislation, they could please the advocacy group without antagonizing any lobbyists on the other side … without making hard budgetary choices. The hate crime laws provided an opportunity to denounce two evils—crime and bigotry— without offending any constituencies or spending any money” (179). However, and this is the broader question implied in the article, the overexpansion of hate crime laws emerging from increasing advocacy efforts by special interest groups may lead to a slippery slope of legal favoritism and the proliferation of protected characteristics, arguably actually transforming identity politics into a form of penal populism (Walker 2017, 1422, 1427). On the other hand, developing “moral fault lines” by distinguishing between victim groups and the failure to include demands for recognition can be seen as exclusion by the “rejected” groups who promote social equality through the criminal justice system, who can argue that by creating hierarchies of victims in hate crimes statutes, the criminal justice system actually discriminates arbitrarily between social groups. In sum, this special issue has provided snapshots of the many research avenues to explore how politics and law conceptualizes and operationalizes race, ethnicity, or nationality. The guest editor would like to thank Nationalities Papers, a traditional venue for such discussions, and special issues Editor Myra Waterbury in particular. Disclosure. Author has nothing to disclose Funding Information. The research project was partly financed from the SASPRO Programme. The research leading to these results has received funding from the People Programme (Marie Curie Actions) European Union’s Seventh Framework Nationalities Papers 219 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:31, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use. https://www.cambridge.org/core Programme under REA grant agreement No. 609427. The research has been further co-funded by the Slovak Academy of Sciences and by DEMOS (Democratic Efficacy and the Varieties of Populism in Europe) H2020 RIA project, as well as the 129018, 129245 and 134962 Hungarian National Research and Innovation Grants. Notes 1 https://www.iacl-aidc.org/index.php/en/research/research-groups/identity-race-and-ethnicity- in-constitutional-law 2 Council Directive 2000/43/EC of June 29, 2000 implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin. References Bieber, Florian. 2015. “The Construction of National Identity and its Challenges in Post-Yugoslav Censuses,” Social Science Quarterly, Special Issue: New Frontiers in the Comparative Study of Ethnic Politics and Nationalism 96 (3): 873–903. Brubaker, Rogers. 2015. “The Dolezal Affair: Race, Gender, and the Micropolitics of Identity.” Ethnic and Racial Studies 39 (3): 414–448. Dobos, B. 2019. “The Elections to Nonterritorial Autonomies of Central and South Eastern Europe.” Nationalities Papers 48 (2): 1–18. Farkas, L. 2017. Analysis and Comparative Review of Equality Data Collection Practices in the European Union, Data Collection in the Field of Ethnicity, European Commission Directorate-General for Justice and Consumers. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union. Jacobs, James B., and Kimberly Potter. 2001. Hate Crimes: Criminal Law & Identity Politics. Studies in Crime and Public Policy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Kazuko, S. and Vacano, D., eds. 2018. Reconsidering Race. Social Science Perspectives on Race in the Age of Geonomics. Oxford University Press. Kymlicka, Will. 2001. “Western Political Theory and Ethnic Relations in Eastern Europe.” In Can Liberal Pluralism be Exported?: Western Political Theory and Ethnic Relations in Eastern Europe, edited by Will Kymlicka and Magda Opalski, 13–107. Oxford University Press. Loveman, Mara. 2014. National Colors, Racial Classification, and the State in Latin-America. Oxford University Press. Mason, Gail. 2013. “Victim Attributes in Hate Crime Law: Difference and the Politics of Justice.” British Journal of Criminology 54 (2): 161–79. Pap, A. L. 2015. “Is There a Legal Right to Free Choice of Ethno-Racial Identity? Legal and Political Difficulties in Defining Minority Communities and Membership Boundaries.” Columbia Human Rights Law Review 46 (2): 153–232. Pap, A. L. 2017. “Ethno-Racial Identity (Politics) by Law: ‘Fraud’ and ‘Choice.’” Nationalities Papers 45 (5): 968–987. Pap, A. L. 2019. “Harassment: A Silver Bullet to Tackle Institutional Discrimination, But No Panacea for all Forms of Dignity and Equality Harms.” Intersections. East European Journal of Society and Politics, 5 (2). Rich, Camille Gear. 2014. “Elective Race: Recognizing Race Discrimination in the Era of Racial Self-Identification.” Georgetown Law Journal 102 (5): 150–172. Rosenfeld, M. 2010. The Identity of the Constitutional Subject: Selfhood, Citizenship, Culture, and Community Discourses of Law. London: Routledge. Sansum, J., and B. Dobos. 2020. “Cultural Autonomy in Hungary: Inward or Outward Looking?” Nationalities Papers, 48 (2): 1–16. Schweppe, Jennifer. 2012. “Defining Characteristics and Politicising Victims: A Legal Perspective.” Journal of Hate Studies 10 (1): 173–98. Smith, D. 2020. “Introduction to the Special Issue on National Cultural Autonomy in Diverse Political Communities: Practices, Challenges, and Perspectives.” Nationalities Papers 48 (2): 1–11. Stergar, R. and Scheer, T. 2018. “Ethnic Boxes: The Unintended Consequences of Habsburg Bureaucratic Classification.” Nationalities Papers 46 (4): 575–591 Tajfel, Henri. 1981. Human Groups and Social Categories: Studies in Social Psychology. Cambridge: CUP Archive. Walker, Savannah. 2017. “Policing Hate: The Problematic Expansion of Louisiana’s Hate Crime Statute to Include Police Officers.” La. L. Rev. 78: 1413–46. Zagor, M. 2014. “Recognition and Narrative Identities: Is Refugee Law Redeemable?” In Allegiance and Identity in a Globalised World, edited by Jenkins, F., M. Nolan, and K. Rubenstein, 311–353. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Cite this article: Pap, A. L. 2021. Conceptualizing and Operationalizing Identity, Race, Ethnicity, and Nationality by Law: An Introduction. Nationalities Papers 49: 213–220, doi:10.1017/nps.2020.51 220 András Pap Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:31, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use. https://www.iacl-aidc.org/index.php/en/research/research-groups/identity-race-and-ethnicity-in-constitutional-law https://www.iacl-aidc.org/index.php/en/research/research-groups/identity-race-and-ethnicity-in-constitutional-law https://doi.org/10.1017/nps.2020.51 https://www.cambridge.org/core Conceptualizing and Operationalizing Identity, Race, Ethnicity, and Nationality by Law: An Introduction Disclosure Funding Information Notes References 
work_ly64c3ni5rbxjms32fwxhokuhm	----	[PDF] Severe sociopolitical stressors and preterm births in New York City: 1 September 2015 to 31 August 2017 | Semantic Scholar Skip to search formSkip to main content> Semantic Scholar's Logo Search Sign InCreate Free Account You are currently offline. Some features of the site may not work correctly. DOI:10.1136/jech-2018-211077 Corpus ID: 53242070Severe sociopolitical stressors and preterm births in New York City: 1 September 2015 to 31 August 2017 @article{Krieger2018SevereSS, title={Severe sociopolitical stressors and preterm births in New York City: 1 September 2015 to 31 August 2017}, author={N. Krieger and M. Huynh and Wenhui Li and P. Waterman and G. Van Wye}, journal={Journal of Epidemiology and Community Health}, year={2018}, volume={72}, pages={1147 - 1152} } N. Krieger, M. Huynh, +2 authors G. Van Wye Published 2018 Medicine Journal of Epidemiology and Community Health Background Severe stressors can induce preterm birth (PTB; gestation <37 weeks), with such stressors including social and economic threats, interpersonal violence, hate crimes and severe sociopolitical stressors (ie, arising from political leaders’ threatening rhetoric or from political legislation). We analysed temporal changes in risk of PTB among immigrant, Hispanic and Muslim populations targeted in the US 2016 presidential election and its aftermath. Methods Trend analysis of all singleton… Expand View on Publisher jech.bmj.com Save to Library Create Alert Cite Launch Research Feed Share This Paper 32 CitationsHighly Influential Citations 1 Background Citations 9 Results Citations 1 View All Topics from this paper Birth Premature Obstetric Labor Crime Act CNS disorder Mandibular right second molar tooth Paper Mentions Blog Post Deportation and the Traumatizing of a Generation The Medical Care Blog 18 June 2020 News Article Rise in Premature Births Among Latina Women Possibly Linked to Trump’s Election: Study KTLA 19 July 2019 News Article Aumentan nacimientos prematuros entre mujeres latinas; la elección de Trump sería la causa, según un estudio CNN News 19 July 2019 News Article A rise in premature births among Latina women may be linked to Trump's election, study says azfamily.com 19 July 2019 News Article Trump’s presidency may be making Latinos sick Washington Post 19 July 2019 News Article Our Anti-Immigrant Atmosphere May Be Contributing To Dangerous Birth Complications For Latinas Yahoo! News 23 October 2018 News Article Spike in premature births among Latinas linked to Trump's win | US news The Guardian 17 October 2018 Blog Post Severe sociopolitical stressors and preterm births in New York City: 1 September 2015 to 31 August 2017 information for practice 17 October 2018 32 Citations Citation Type Citation Type All Types Cites Results Cites Methods Cites Background Has PDF Publication Type Author More Filters More Filters Filters Sort by Relevance Sort by Most Influenced Papers Sort by Citation Count Sort by Recency The Muslim Ban and preterm birth: Analysis of U.S. vital statistics data from 2009 to 2018. G. Samari, R. Catalano, Héctor E Alcalá, A. Gemmill Medicine Social science & medicine 2020 Save Alert Research Feed The 2016 presidential election and periviable births among Latina women. A. Gemmill, R. Catalano, Héctor E Alcalá, D. Karasek, J. Casey, T. Bruckner Medicine Early human development 2020 Save Alert Research Feed National Parent Survey 2017: Worries, hopes, and child well-being. K. Bonuck, K. McGrath, Qi Gao Medicine Journal of community psychology 2020 Save Alert Research Feed Immigrant apprehensions and birth outcomes: Evidence from California birth records 2008-2015. Annie Ro, T. Bruckner, Lauren Duquette-Rury Medicine Social science & medicine 2020 1 Save Alert Research Feed Health Care Use Among Latinx Children After 2017 Executive Actions on Immigration R. Cholera, S. Ranapurwala, +5 authors Kori B. Flower Medicine Pediatrics 2021 1 PDF Save Alert Research Feed Restrictive sub-federal immigration policy climates and very preterm birth risk among US-born and foreign-born Hispanic mothers in the United States, 2005-2016. Kaitlyn K. Stanhope, C. Hogue, S. Suglia, J. León, M. Kramer Geography, Medicine Health & place 2019 4 Save Alert Research Feed Association of Preterm Births Among US Latina Women With the 2016 Presidential Election A. Gemmill, R. Catalano, +4 authors J. Torres Medicine JAMA network open 2019 39 PDF Save Alert Research Feed Impact of anti-immigrant rhetoric and policies on frontline health and social service providers in Southeast Michigan, U.S.A. Hannah Mesa, M. Doshi, +4 authors P. Fleming Political Science, Medicine Health & social care in the community 2020 1 Save Alert Research Feed Association of US state policy orientation with adverse birth outcomes: a longitudinal analysis A. Riley, Daniel F. Collin, Jacob M. Grumbach, J. Torres, R. Hamad Medicine Journal of epidemiology and community health 2021 Save Alert Research Feed A Transdisciplinary Conceptual Framework of Contextualized Resilience for Reducing Adverse Birth Outcomes Tijen Sumbul, Solaire Spellen, M. McLemore Medicine, Sociology Qualitative health research 2019 3 PDF Save Alert Research Feed ... 1 2 3 4 ... References SHOWING 1-10 OF 15 REFERENCES SORT BYRelevance Most Influenced Papers Recency Low birthweight in New York City and upstate New York following the events of September 11th. B. Eskenazi, A. Marks, R. Catalano, T. Bruckner, P. Toniolo Medicine Human reproduction 2007 140 PDF Save Alert Research Feed Change in birth outcomes among infants born to Latina mothers after a major immigration raid. N. Novak, A. Geronimus, Aresha Martinez-Cardoso Medicine International journal of epidemiology 2017 109 PDF Save Alert Research Feed Births : provisional data for 2017 B. Hamilton, M. Osterman, A. Driscoll, L. Rossen Medicine 2018 77 PDF Save Alert Research Feed Pregnancy and Birth Outcomes Among Immigrant Women in the US and Europe: A Systematic Review E. Villalonga-Olives, I. Kawachi, N. Steinbuechel Medicine Journal of Immigrant and Minority Health 2016 31 Save Alert Research Feed A review of recent literature on materialist and psychosocial models for racial and ethnic disparities in birth outcomes in the US, 2000–2014 M. Mutambudzi, J. D. Meyer, S. Reisine, N. Warren Psychology, Medicine Ethnicity & health 2017 10 Save Alert Research Feed State-level immigration and immigrant-focused policies as drivers of Latino health disparities in the United States. M. Philbin, M. Flake, M. Hatzenbuehler, J. Hirsch Political Science, Medicine Social science & medicine 2018 98 PDF Save Alert Research Feed Structural racism and health inequities in the USA: evidence and interventions Z. Bailey, N. Krieger, Madina Agénor, Jasmine Graves, M. Bassett Medicine The Lancet 2017 610 PDF Save Alert Research Feed Policing Us Sick: The Health of Latinos in an Era of Heightened Deportations and Racialized Policing V. Nichols, Alana M W LeBrón, Francisco I. Pedraza Political Science 2018 24 Save Alert Research Feed Health Effects of Dramatic Societal Events - Ramifications of the Recent Presidential Election. D. Williams, Morgan M. Medlock Medicine The New England journal of medicine 2017 53 PDF Save Alert Research Feed Crimesider/CBS News. New data shows hate crimes 2018 ... 1 2 ... Related Papers Abstract Topics Paper Mentions 32 Citations 15 References Related Papers Stay Connected With Semantic Scholar Sign Up About Semantic Scholar Semantic Scholar is a free, AI-powered research tool for scientific literature, based at the Allen Institute for AI. 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work_m22pu5v3obf63gypv5sjsig74u	----	S1537592714000012 1..6 Gender and Politics Jeffrey C. Isaac T he gendering of politics, and the politics of gender, are fundamental themes of human life. Back in March 2010 we featured these themes in our journal’s first-ever special theme issue. At over 400 pages, the issue was the longest single issue in the history of Perspectives and, I would be willing to bet, the history of APSA journal publishing more generally. It also launched our journal’s then-new cover design, which featured a photo of an impoverished Nigerian woman holding a machete with which to chop pieces of dying mangrove wood for sale. In preparing for the Introduction you are now reading, I went back and re-read that old issue of our journal. It is amazing how well it holds up, and how much it anticipates the themes discussed in this issue, also centered on the theme of Gender and Politics. We have chosen to revisit the gender theme for a variety of reasons worth noting. One is that gender issues were raised in a very public way at last year’s APSA meeting in Chicago (see Beth McMurtrie’s report on the meeting, “Political Science is Rife With Gender Bias, Scholars Find,” published in the August 30 Chronicle Review). Much of the discussion centered on the findings presented in Daniel Maliniak, Ryan Powers, and Barbara F. Walter’s piece in the October 2013 International Organization, “The Gender Citation Gap in International Relations.” But for many these findings were the launching point for discussing a much larger set of issues related to the gendering of political science. One interesting forum of discussion is the special symposium on “the gender gap” organized by The Monkey Cage (9/30/2013), which led with a piece by 2012-13 APSA President Jane Mansbridge, whose Address is featured in this issue. These issues have indeed been the focus of a number of APSA committees, most notably the Ad Hoc Committee on Workable Solutions to Advancing Women in the Profession chaired by Kristen Renwick Monroe. They are of pressing concern to many APSA members, and so they were a topic of conversation at our journal’s September 2013 board meeting. Our board decided to make the gender citation question a major topic at our Spring 2014 meeting in Chicago. And we also decided to plan an issue of the journal centering on the theme of gender. The second reason we have centered this issue on the theme of gender is more theoretical: the fundamental importance of gender as an ever-present structuring category of social being and thus of social science. I offered some thoughts on the importance of gender to political science in the Introduction to the March 2010 special issue. But here I can do no better than to quote from Karen Beckwith and Lisa Baldez in their editorial statement in the inaugural issue of our sister publication Politics & Gender, which first appeared in March 2005: “We launch Politics & Gender with the conviction that the study of women and politics, and the gendered analysis of politics, benefit and strengthen political science. We hold the reverse conviction as well: the tools of political analysis advance and strengthen our understandings of women and of gender. . . our primary purpose is to publish research on women and politics and on politics and its gendered analysis. Gender cuts through every aspect of politics. In Politics & Gender, we seek to represent the full array of questions, issues, and approaches within the discipline. We envision each issue as a showcase of work across all the major subfields of political science, including (but not limited to) political theory, comparative politics, interna- tional relations, and U.S. politics.” The range of work on gender published in this issue of Perspectives affirms the truth of Beckwith and Baldez’s words. The fact that the work in this issue of Perspectives was largely unsolicited, and simply came to us in the normal course of our editorial business, is a further sign of how central gender themes are to our discipline (something also documented in the just-published Oxford Handbook of Gender and Politics, edited by Georgina Waylen, Karen Celis, Johanna Kantola, and S. Laurel Weldon). Indeed, there are striking and entirely fortuitous overlaps between this issue of Perspectives and Politics & Gender. This issue contains contributions from four members of the editorial board of Politics & Gender—Kimberly Cowell-Meyers, Cynthia Enloe, Heath Fogg Davis and Jane Mansbridge —and one officer of the Women and Politics section that sponsors the journal—Celeste Montoya. Two other officers of this section—Mala Htun, its President, and Dara Strolovitch—also serve on our board, as does Timothy Kaufman-Osborn who serves on the editorial board of Politics & Gender. These overlaps demonstrate inextricable links between gender scholarship and political science as a discipline. doi:10.1017/S1537592714000012 © American Political Science Association 2014 March 2014 | Vol. 12/No. 1 1 From the Editor https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592714000012 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:30, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592714000012 https://www.cambridge.org/core But more important than the centrality of gender to political science is its centrality to politics. Within days of sitting down to write this Introduction the following four news items came across my desk: * The November 6, 2013 release of a UN report, Women and Natural Resources: Unlocking the Peacebuilding Potential, which contends that: “As primary managers and users of natural resources in many conflict-affected con- texts, women have a key role to play in building peace. However, they remain largely excluded from owning land, benefiting from resource wealth or participating in de- cision-making about resource management. Excluding women is clearly a missed opportunity. Indeed, peace and development will only be achieved when both men and women in conflict-affected and fragile societies access and benefit from natural resources in an equitable and sustainable way.” * A November 4, 2013 Newsweek photojournalistic feature, “Grab and Run: Kyrgyzstan’s Bride Kidnappings,” reporting that “In Kyrgyzstan, as many as 40% of ethnic Kyrgyz women are married after being kidnapped by the men who become their husbands, according to a local NGO. Two-thirds of these bride kidnappings are non- consensual—in some cases, a ‘kidnapping’ is part of a planned elopement—and while the practice has been illegal since 1994, authorities largely look the other way.” * A November 25, 2013 Voice of America story, “UN Expresses Concern on International Day to End Violence Against Women,” which reports that according to the Joint United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS, every hour 50 young women become newly infected with HIV, many as a result of sexual violence. The piece quotes Dr. Mariangela Simao, UNAIDS Director of Rights, Gender, Prevention and Mobilization: “Lots of the gender-based violence [is] sexually related. There is a lot of data right now showing that most of the violence against women happens in the context of intimate partner violence – domestic violence. And many times it takes the face of non-consensual sex, which is a polite way to say rape.” * A November 20, 2013 White House press release marking the annual Transgender Day of Remembrance: “Today, November 20th, communities across the country and around the world will mark Transgender Day of Remembrance. This day is an opportunity to remember those who have lost their lives to violence and injustice because of their gender identity or gender expression. . . The Obama Administration remains committed to pre- venting violence against all people, including all members of the LGBT community. Four years ago, President Obama signed the Matthew Shepard and James Byrd Jr. Hate Crime Prevention Act, which greatly expanded the federal government’s ability to prosecute hate crimes. The law marked the first time that the words, ‘sexual orientation’ and ‘gender identity’ appeared in the U.S. Code, and enables the Justice Department to prosecute in certain circumstances hate crimes committed because of a person’s actual or perceived race, color, religion, national origin, gender, sexual orientation, gender identity, or disability.” Such reports underscore the ongoing importance not simply of sex/gender difference but of sex/gender inequality, and the sometimes violent forms that this inequality takes. But they also underscore that these issues can no longer be simply taken for granted, for they have been politicized. As a result, they are recognized by citizens, activists, NGOs, and governments as problems of public importance requiring public solutions. The research and writing contained in this issue of Perspectives demonstrates that political scientists have much to say about these public problems, their public solutions, and the limits of these solutions. Our lead article, Tali Mendelberg, Christopher F. Karpowitz, and J. Baxter Oliphant’s “Gender Inequality in Deliberation: Unpacking the Black Box of Interaction,” centers on the role of widespread and general communi- cative norms in limiting women’s political voices and thus their political representation. As the authors summa- rize their argument: “When and why do women gain from increased descriptive representation in deliberating bodies? Using a large randomized experiment, and linking individual-level speech with assessments of speaker authority, we find that decision rules interact with the number of women in the group to shape the conversation dynamics and deliberative authority, an important form of influence. With majority rule and few women, women experience a negative balance of interruptions when speaking, and these women then lose influence in their own eyes and in others’. But when the group is assigned to unanimous rule, or when women are many, women experience a positive balance of interruptions, mitigating the deleterious effect of small numbers. Men do not experience this pattern.” Mendelberg, Karpowitz, and Oliphant link their experimental results to a broader consideration of the political importance of governmental and non-governmental deliberative forums in a range of settings throughout the world, and “the conditioning effect of institutions” in limiting the effective participation of women, and thus limiting both the symbolic and the substantive representation of women’s political interests. There are some important complementarities between this analysis and Jane Mansbridge’s 2013 APSA Presi- dential Address, “What Is Political Science For?” Mans- bridge delivers a strong message that is relevant to but also exceeds questions of gender. “The fundamental job of political science,” she writes, “is to help us create and properly use legitimate coercion.” Mansbridge catalogues the domains in which present day politics comes up short, and insists that political science can play an important role in helping us to generate better and more legitimate collective decisions by promoting “negotiation to agree- ment” (Mansbridge’s text here is usefully read alongside one of this issue’s “Undisciplined” features, Sanford 2 Perspectives on Politics From the Editor | Gender and Politics https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592714000012 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:30, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592714000012 https://www.cambridge.org/core Levinson’s “Compromise, Contestation, and the U.S. Constitution”). As Mansbridge writes: “Because negotia- tion is such a large part of politics, we need to identify institutions that help negotiators bring in new issues and make good trades. And because one function of institu- tions is to help correct individual mistakes, we need to figure out what institutions help participants combat the cognitive and emotional barriers to successful negotia- tion.” Mansbridge’s primary purpose here is to promote more inclusive practices of public discourse. She notes that there is some tension between this concern and a good deal of her own work on the contestation of gender inequality: “Viscerally and experientially I identify with resistance. Women, for example, have won most of our gains in the last two centuries by resisting the domination of men. My generation grew up with resistance and our political theory was largely about resistance. Nevertheless, I think the western democratic tradition, anchored in resistance to kings, has focused too much on the possibilities and actualities of tyranny and domination and not enough on the equally important problem of how to create legitimate coercion for collective action.” In one sense, her observation here can be linked to her earliest work on Beyond Adversary Democracy. But even if her Address focuses on constructing commonalities rather than on contesting inequalities, both concerns are linked by the theme of inclusion. For it is only by being maximally inclusive that collective decisions can be either effective or legitimate. And a political science that seeks to “help participants combat the cognitive and emotional barriers to successful negotiation” is a political science that necessarily engages precisely the kinds of discursive barriers, distortions, and obstacles to equal participation addressed by Mendelberg, Karpowitz, and Oliphant (who indeed cite Mansbridge’s published work on this topic). At the same time, gender inequality is a complex phenomenon hardly reducible to the discursive realm. Elizabeth Markovits and Susan Bickford’s “Constructing Freedom: Institutional Pathways to Changing the Gender Division of Labor” addresses a broader theme—the gen- dered social division labor. As they write: “individuals make decisions about work and family in an environment marked by a limited set of gendered social scripts, which are then reinforced by particular institutional structures, all of which work to sustain desires and actions in accord with the gender division of labor.” Markovits and Bickford thus link the kinds of communicative practices analyzed by Mendel- berg, Karpowitz, and Oliphant to the more “material” practices of labor, work, child-rearing and family care that fundamentally structure gender inequality (for a comple- mentary discussion of these connections, see Celeste Montoya’s review of Jacqui True’s award-winning The Political Economy of Violence Against Women in this issue). Their piece blends normative and empirical concerns, and in arguing for “participatory parity,” they gesture toward conceptions of “policy feedback” that have been featured often in our journal, from Suzanne Mettler and Joe Soss’s “The Consequences of Public Policy for Democratic Citizenship: Bridging Policy Studies and Mass Politics” (March 2004) to Eileen McDonagh’s “It Takes a State: A Policy Feedback Model of Women’s Political Representa- tion” (March 2010) to Eric Patashnik and Julian Zelizer’s “When Policy Does Not Remake Politics: The Limits of Policy Feedback” (December 2013). As they write: “In addition to fostering ‘counterpublic’ spaces and cross-public conversations, feminists have long been engaged in struggle over public policy. Public policies that structure women’s options affect what women are able to choose, regardless of what they desire; but they also affect what women desire because they work to ideologically support certain options. Public policies thus play a role in conditioning women’s desires, as the options they support ‘feel’ right and are easier or at least imaginable. When these policies sustain unequal divisions of household labor and women’s underrepresen- tation in the public sphere, they also affect women’s power and participation in the terms and processes of social construction.” Markovits and Bickford thus conclude that public policy is both a key determinant of gender inequality and a potential source of greater equality. Heath Fogg Davis’s “Sex-Classification Policies as Transgender Discrimination: An Intersectional Critique” analyzes a more fundamental dimension of gender in- equality—the very determination of the categories of “man” and “woman,” and the ways that these very binary categories marginalize and exclude transgendered individ- uals. Fogg Davis proceeds from a very specific episode: the Philadelphia Bus Authority’s treatment of Charlene Arcila, an African-American transgender woman who was denied bus access because her monthly public transit pass was considered invalid both when marked with an F to signify female gender and when marked with an M to signify male gender. Fogg Davis uses this episode of an individual who did not “fit” and who was thus denied access to public transportation, to tell a rich political story of Arcila’s civil rights litigation with the city; the activism of R.A.G.E. (Riders Against Gender Exclusion), a local grassroots organization which sprouted in 2009 to bring public attention to the invidious impact of the gender sticker policy; and the legal and political argumentation surrounding the case. In telling this story, he underscores a dimension of gender inequality that is often ignored: “Personal identi- fication documents such as driver’s licenses, passports, and birth certificates bear mandatory binary sex markers. We are asked to tick binary sex boxes on many bureaucratic forms ranging from school, job, mortgage and apartment rental applications, to government census forms, and dental and medical in-take questionnaires. And we live in a society in which most public restrooms, change room March 2014 | Vol. 12/No. 1 3 https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592714000012 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:30, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592714000012 https://www.cambridge.org/core facilities, and all prisons, are designed, constructed and designated as sex-segregated. The invidious nature of these sex-classificatory schemes may be hard for many people to fathom because they are so customary, and because most people experience them as mere moments of cursory verification of who they are and where they ought to be. Moreover, these policies do not fit the model of traditional sex discrimination, which has focused on policies that disadvantage women in relationship to men, and vice versa. However, for those of us who appear to some to be stretching conventional binary sex categories ‘too far,’ sex- classification policies cause significant vulnerability to in- vasive questioning, verbal ridicule, exclusion, and even physical violence by administrative agents, and the public at large.” Like Markovits and Bickford, Fogg Davis blends normative, empirical, and jurisprudential analysis, high- lighting the importance of gender classificatory schemes that are often taken for granted, and calling for the consistent deployment of antidiscrimination law to eliminate the vast majority of these schemes in the name of civic equality. If our first three research articles center on the sources of sex/gender inequality, each also indicates ways that such inequality can be politicized and challenged. Such politicization is the focus of Kimberly B. Cowell-Meyers’s “The Social Movement as Political Party: The Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition and the Campaign for In- clusion.” As Cowell-Meyers writes, “This article considers one particular device for enhancing the inclusiveness and responsiveness of the representative system that has largely been overlooked by scholars to date. The subject is a movement-party, an unusual but not entirely rare in- stitution. In particular, it considers the Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition, which, despite being small, marginal and short-lived, left its mark on the political system in Northern Ireland, by promoting women’s descriptive and substantive representation in nearly all the other political parties in the system.” Cowell-Meyers argues that the Coalition’s organizers “formed a political party to black- mail the other parties into granting their own women access as candidates, representatives, and leaders,” and that through this effort “women managed to break through the cultural prejudices against women in politics, and change popular and elite attitudes. . . altering the terms of representation and enhancing the inclusiveness of the political process.” (The themes of gender mobilization and representation are also explored in this issue’s Critical Dialogue between Kristin A. Goss, author of The Paradox of Gender Equality: How American Women’s Groups Gained and Lost Their Public Voice and Holly J. McCammon, author of The U.S. Women’s Jury Movements and Strategic Adaptation: A More Just Verdict.) This issue’s final two research articles also center on broad questions of inclusion and representation, though without a focus on gender. Zoltan L. Hajnal and Jeremy D. Horowitz’s “Racial Winners and Losers in American Party Politics” offers a careful empirical analysis of the relative well being of African-Americans, Latinos, and Asian-Americans under Democratic and Republican administrations in the United States. As they write: “We trace the well-being of racial and ethnic minorities over time using objective, empirical measures, and then com- pare the relative progress of these demographic groups under different partisan regimes. Specifically, we test to see whether blacks and other racial and ethnic minorities fare better on basic indicators of well being like income, poverty, and unemployment when Democrats control the presidency or whether they do better under Republi- can administrations.” And they conclude that “When the nation is governed by Democrats, racial and ethnic minority well-being improves dramatically. By contrast, under Republican administrations, blacks, Latinos, and Asian Americans generally suffer losses.” As Hajnal and Horowitz make clear, these contemporary disparities relate to long-standing racial inequalities in the United States. Their piece can thus be read alongside our issue’s second “Undisciplined” feature, Rick Valelly’s review essay, “Slavery, Emancipation, and the Civil War Transformation of the U.S. State” Valelly’s piece is a tour de force. Reviewing a group of recent books on the history of the U.S. Civil War (most of them written by professional historians, though one is written by a political science scholar of “APD”), Valelly analyzes the ideological and political struggles and dynamics leading to the Civil War; the role of arguments about slavery and its abolition in these struggles; the sometimes intended and sometimes unintended consequences of the actions of politicians like Stephen Douglas and Abraham Lincoln; and the ways in which the politics of War and Reconstruction both dramatically and haltingly contributed to the growth of the power of the American central state. Indeed, both of our “Undisciplined” review essays, by Vallely and Sanford Levinson, underscore the complexity and contingency through which the American state and its Constitution have developed over time. Paul Frymer’s “‘A Rush and a Push and the Land is Ours’: Territorial Expansion, Land Policy, and U.S. State Formation” is a rich descriptive account, based on extensive archival research, of 19th century land policy in the United States. Frymer details the territorial expansion of the United States, treating it as a form of state-building and a means of dispersal and control of immigrant, settler, and native populations. As Frymer writes: “Land policies offered government officials an institutional mechanism for taking territory that manufactured racially-specific outcomes with less public visibility, enabling the govern- ment to maintain at least the appearance of fidelity to national ideals. Indian removal and the violence it entailed cannot be minimized—the actions of the United States during this period would constitute genocide under current-day international law. But the Indian Removal Act was only one piece of a far broader, systematic, 4 Perspectives on Politics From the Editor | Gender and Politics https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592714000012 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:30, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592714000012 https://www.cambridge.org/core efficacious, and yet ‘unexceptional’ taking of land. Legis- lators clearly intended that these land policies could change the racial demographics of a specific geographical terrain; they designed statutes such as the Armed Occu- pation Act, the Land Donation Act, the Preemption Act, and the Homestead Act to move as many settlers as possible on to contested lands to overwhelm and numer- ically dominate the pre-existing populations. Only after this successful rush and push created a majority of whites residing in the territory would Congress vote to formally incorporate the land as a state.” As Frymer’s article makes clear, the “extended republic” envisioned by James Mad- ison and other framers of the Constitution was accom- plished through state policies of infrastructural expansion, population removal, resettlement and settlement, and extensive violence against native populations that were heavily inflected by class and race. Frymer’s account of the territorial expansion that accompanied the growth of the U.S. state is broadly consistent with a wide range of theories in comparative politics and international relations theory that focus on what might be called “the logic of state power” in the world of power politics. Frymer does not discuss gender in this connection, though works such as Amy S. Greenberg’s Manifest Manhood and the Antebellum American Empire (Cambridge University Press, 2005) make clear that conceptions of masculinity and femininity played an important role in justifying American westward expansion. One of the reasons why Laura Sjoberg’s Gendering Global Conflict: Toward a Feminist Theory of War is so important is that it makes clear that every aspect of modern power politics, and especially those dimensions of power politics that relate to war and peace, are heavily inflected by gender (see also Jessica Peet’s review of Valerie M. Hudson’s Sex and World Peace). Sjoberg argues that the fields of in- ternational relations and security studies are impoverished by an insufficient attention to the gendering of conflict, and that a “feminist theory of war” is therefore indispens- able to an adequate understanding of the politics of war. We are thus especially pleased to feature a symposium on her book that features commentaries by Cynthia Enloe, Sara Meger, Elisabeth P. Prügl, Matthew Hoddie, and Dustin Howes. We are also pleased to include a special discussion of Celeste Montoya’s Global to Grassroots: The European Union, Transnational Advocacy, and Combating Violence Against Women, which features perspectives on the book from an Eastern European feminist scholar (Oana Baluta) and a U.S. scholar (Mary Hawkesworth). Our special review section on Gender and Politics contains reviews of a wide range of political science books. These reviews make clear that gender is a central theme of political science that crosses all conventional subfield and methodological divides in our discipline. At the same time, this issue also contains a great number of reviews that fall more or less neatly under the conventional subfield rubrics. The range of articles, essays, reviews, review essays, and dialogues that appear here demonstrates the synergies between genres and perspectives that make political science an intellectually rich and productive discipline. With this issue, Perspectives begins its twelfth year. Over those twelve years a great many people have contributed to the journal as editors, associate editors, and editorial assistants. I am very pleased that during my tenure our entire editorial board has continued to serve, with enthu- siasm. I am also pleased to note that we recently have added a number of terrific colleagues to our board, and I would like to welcome them here: Michael Bernhard, Charli Carpenter, Ange-Marie Hancock, Marc Lynch, Samantha Majic, Andrew Sabl, Joe Soss, and Paul Stani- land. A complete list of our board appears on our masthead. We all owe these colleagues a debt of gratitude for the work they do for our journal. I would also like to thank Michael Brintnall, who recently retired as APSA’s long-standing Executive Director, for his extraordinary service to our discipline and for his support of our journal. Michael was a terrific colleague, and we look forward to working with his successor, Steven R. Smith, who is off to a great start. My editorial team has experienced its share of turnover over the years. This year one of our longest-serving and most invaluable editorial assistants, Emily Hilty, earned her Ph.D. and left our staff for a position as Visiting Assistant Professor of Political Science at University of Cincinnati. Emily was replaced by Rachel Gears, who joins our current team of crackerjack editorial assistants: Laura Bucci, Peter Giordano, Rafael Khachaturian, Brendon Westler, and Adrian Florea (Adrian, a brilliant young scholar of comparative politics and international relations, recently returned to our staff after holding a competitive disserta- tion writing fellowship, and he plays an indispensible role in bridging the front and back ends of the journal). Ever since I first became Book Review Editor in 2005, I have been graced with the dedicated and indefatigable support of two people who I’ve mentioned frequently: James Moskowitz and Margot Morgan. When I became Editor in Chief, James became our journal’s full-time Managing Editor. Shortly thereafter, Margot earned her Ph.D. from Rutgers and became our full-time Book Review Managing Editor. James and Margot have been my indispensible partners, and what our journal has accomplished under my editorial tenure has only been possible because of their extraordinary collaboration. In August of 2013 Margot left our staff for a position as Visiting Assistant Professor of Political Science at Indiana University Southeast in New Albany, Indiana. She is greatly missed. At the same time, I am pleased to note that her book, Politics and Theatre in Twentieth-Century Europe: Imagination and Resistance, was published by March 2014 | Vol. 12/No. 1 5 https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592714000012 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:30, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592714000012 https://www.cambridge.org/core Palgrave Macmillan in December 2013. I am also pleased to note that James Moskowitz, Perspectives on Politics’s own version of NBA great Allen Iverson—nicknamed “The Answer”—has incorporated the Book Review into his already extensive responsibilities, and remains with us for the duration. I could not do this without him. 6 Perspectives on Politics From the Editor | Gender and Politics https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592714000012 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:30, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592714000012 https://www.cambridge.org/core 
work_m2qnetha5vhbph2jo7ipjssxby	----	Contemporary social fuelling the genocide intent: hate speech and hate crimes. Legal remarks for a common definition and related operational preventing mechanisms Cristiana Carletti This contribution intends to analyze the key elements of the hate speech ‘concept’: the content and context of the expression; the profile of targeted people; the publicity and potential impact of the expression. The criminal legal nature of hate speech, i. e. the representation of hate crimes within three different European institutional systems will then be under attention in territory where new massive violent conflicts were located in 20th century. Within the Council of Europe the ECtHR case law will be studied in relation to an accepted legal definition of ‘hate speech’; within the European Union the need to make hate crime visible is at the core of a greater political will to counter pervasive prejudice against certain groups and to compensate damage caused to victims; for the OSCE/ODIHR hate crimes constitute a serious breach of human rights and have a deep impact on victim communities, threatening domestic and international security. I. Key elements of the hate speech ‘concept’ The hate speech ‘concept’ is at the core of a complex and on-going legal debate which deals with its theoretical opponent, i. e. the freedom of thought, expression and of communication of ideas in terms of disseminating and recipient subjects as members of a social community. The right to freely express personal opinions is a fundamental human right as codified in international and regional legal instruments as well as in constitutional frameworks of all the Countries within the International Community as a whole. It guarantees the right to “seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers”, as enshrined in Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR1). As such, it may be considered as a legal feature which is not entirely due to the effects descending thereof in a legal environment: like other universal freedoms, the right to freedom of expression entails exceptions aimed at limiting its implementa- tion in favor of protecting prevailing public and private interest as well as strength- ening equality and public order. Along these lines, the codification of this right has been inspired by an adequate balancing need between a complete exercise of the freedom of expression and 1 See UNGA res. 217A (III), UN Doc. A/810 at 71 (1948). Cfr. P. Weckel, La justice internationale et le soixantième anniversaire de la Déclaration universelle des droits de l'homme, Revue générale de droit international public 2009, p. 5 et seq.; M.B. Baderin/ M. Ssenyonjo, International human rights law: six decades after the UDHR and beyond, 2010; J.-P.. Machelon/P. Chaigneau/F. Nohra (sous la direction de), La Déclaration universelle des droits de l'homme: fondement d'une nouvelle justice mondiale?, 2010. EuCLR Contemporary social fuelling the genocide intent: hate speech and hate crimes 355 https://doi.org/10.5235/219174414809354800 Generiert durch IP '128.182.81.34', am 06.04.2021, 03:18:29. Das Erstellen und Weitergeben von Kopien dieses PDFs ist nicht zulässig. https://doi.org/10.5235/219174414809354800 possible limitations if this exercise goes well beyond the fundamental respect of other rights and liberties and stirs up the use of traditional and new means of communication to compress the human dignity and personal security of each human being. The formulation of this right incorporating a specific reference to an eventual limitation linked to the commission of a hate crime by recurring to hate speech was included since the compilation of the contents of the UN Convention for the elimination of racial discrimination (ICERD), as adopted by UNGA through Resolution 2106A(XX) of 21 December 1965, and entered into force on 4 January 1969. Article 4(a) provides for a comprehensive definition of the main general components of hate speech to be tackled with: the dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority, the dissemination of ideas based on racial hatred, the incitement to racial discrimination and the incitement to commit acts of racially motivated violence. Moreover, Article 4(c) points out that public authorities and institutions have a special obligation to fight against and to abstain from the recourse to any form of promotion or incitement to racial discrimination. A balancing tentative to make reference to both the above mentioned legal features, the right to freedom of expression and its limitations in terms of hate speech was embraced in the codification of the International Covenant on civil and political rights (ICCPR), adopted by UNGA Resolution 2200A(XXI) of 16 De- cember 1966 and entered into force on 3 January 19762. On the one hand, Article 19(2) contains a clear legal definition of the right under examination: “Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art or through any other media of his choice”. On the other side, as established in Article 19(3), possible limited restrictions to freedom of expression are admitted “if provided by law, if they are necessary for the respect of the rights or reputations of others, and for the protection of national security or of public order, or of public health or morals”. Also, an ad hoc formula was introduced in ICCPR in terms of obligation of States Parties to prohibit hate speech: Article 20(2) states that “Any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law”. On a general note, if Article 19 guarantees the right to freedom of expression in positive terms, albeit with occa- sional exceptions and listed limitations, Article 20 imposes an obligation to restrict speech having a hatred ground or motivation. The relationship between these two provisions has been interpreted with the provision that ICCPR State Parties must implement the duty as introduced in Article 20 while not overstepping the permis- sible scope of limitations on freedom of expression as stated in Article 19; from a complementary approach, these limitations have to be put in place in order to fully observe the obligation introduced in Article 20. In effect, a correspondent commit- 2 See UNGA res. 2200A (XXI), 21 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, UN Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 UNTS 171 ; 6 ILM 368 (1967). 356 EuCLR https://doi.org/10.5235/219174414809354800 Generiert durch IP '128.182.81.34', am 06.04.2021, 03:18:29. Das Erstellen und Weitergeben von Kopien dieses PDFs ist nicht zulässig. https://doi.org/10.5235/219174414809354800 ment is required of all States Parties according to both Articles 19 and 20: the first one is general and comprehensive in its scope, the second one is in line with the previous, even if focusing on combating every form of hatred speech. In other words, it could be said that the obligations of Article 20(2) are identical or extremely close to the permissions of Article 19(3). In order to point up in detail the relevant components of the hate speech ‘concept’ as being completely banned we ought to refer to the observations of the ICERD Committee, as contained in its General Recommendation No. 15 of 23 March 1993 on organized violence based on ethnic violence, in relation to Article 4 of ICERD. The Committee, while reiterating that “[…] The proscription of the dissemination of ideas of racial superiority, and of organized activity likely to incite persons to racial violence, was properly regarded as crucial. […] As a result, implementation of Article 4 is now of increased importance”, recalls that the provision under consideration has a mandatory legal nature: this means that States Parties must act both to prevent and to repress any act corresponding to the categories reported therein, i. e.: (i) dissemination of ideas based upon racial super- iority or hatred; (ii) incitement to racial hatred; (iii) acts of violence against any race or group of persons of another colour or ethnic origin; and (iv) incitement to such acts (Article 4(a)). Two other relevant opinions were expressed by the ICERD Committee in its General Recommendation No. 15: the prohibition of financing of racist activities on the grounds of ethnic and racial motivations by national public authorities (Article 4 (a)); and a proper investigation regarding the promotion or the incitement to racial discrimination by organizations and associa- tions in order to declare the illegal nature of and participation in such activities by these entities. Following the UN analytical contribution in debating this issue, in more general terms, the hate speech ‘concept’ may be under analysis by mentioning three key- components: the intent, the incitement, and prohibited results following the adop- tion of such kind of speech3. The intent consists of an advocacy tentative process aimed at inciting hatred, covering also the public statement that has been pronounced. The material compo- nent insists on the purpose to promote an idea motivated by racial or discriminatory intent, well beyond the fact that this behaviour is linked with the proper liability of the author. The incitement is based on the voluntary dissemination of ideas, namely those based on superiority and racial hatred but, in several circumstances, an investigation over the nexus between the statement and the prohibited results is required in order to demonstrate the causation and to adopt a proper punishment 3 Cfr. S. Farrior, Molding the Matrix: The Historical and Theoretical Foundations of International Law Concern- ing Hate Speech, Berkeley Journal of International Law 1996; D. McGoldrick/ T. O’Donnell, Hate speech laws: consistency with national and international human rights law, Legal Studies 1998, p. 453 et seq.; E. Heinze, Viewpoint Absolutism and Hate Speech, The Modern Law Review 2006, p. 543 etseq.; N. Ghanea, The Concept of Racist Hate Speech and its Evolution over time, Paper presented at the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination’s day of thematic discussion on Racist Hate Speech, 81st session, 28 August 2012, Geneva. EuCLR Contemporary social fuelling the genocide intent: hate speech and hate crimes 357 https://doi.org/10.5235/219174414809354800 Generiert durch IP '128.182.81.34', am 06.04.2021, 03:18:29. Das Erstellen und Weitergeben von Kopien dieses PDFs ist nicht zulässig. https://doi.org/10.5235/219174414809354800 according to the specific context where the incitement was revealed. The causality cannot always be proved so that a standard category of acts may be defined in order to reasonably anticipate the incitement or to suppose that, according to its proper nature, it will raise and generate discrimination. As it concerns the context, it is a very relevant factor to assess if a statement is the logical consequence of an environ- ment of racial hatred where the hate speech refers to contextual elements: these could be well-documented historical facts, established by historians or international or national judiciary systems, but in any case they occurred in a determined place and time and contributed to fueling racial hate through the use of hate speech. Finally, as far as the prohibited results from the recourse to hate speech are concerned, in contrast to the consequences arising from discrimination and vio- lence, as illegal acts punishable according to a general rule prohibiting incitement to crime, the hate crime stands not only as an act but also as an opinion of an individual. This double-track component could be viewed as a complex standard that is not easily proved to find the prohibited ‘hatred’. For this reason, according to a theoretical approach, the need to distinguish between expressions targeting ideas, including offensive speech, and abusive expression targeted at human beings, such as hate speech, is needed. II. Legal representation of hate crimes and hate speech within three different European institutional systems Moving away from a comprehensive overview of the international legal frame- work relating to the codification of the right of freedom of expression and the resulting obligation of States to prevent and repress hate crimes whenever com- mitted making use of hate speech, a focus on the legal definition of these two legal features is needed within the European regional area due to the common approach adopted in compiling human rights and fundamental freedoms’ treaties by the Council of Europe (CoE), in reformulating the EU primary legislation, in adopting soft law recommendations by the competent bodies of the Organization for Secur- ity and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). 1. Theory and practice: hate crimes and hate speech within the CoE system The legal definition aimed at balancing the freedom of expression and possible limitation to implement these rights is contained in Article 10 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR): “everyone has the right to freedom of expression [including] the freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without inter- ference by public authority and regardless of frontiers”, further mentioning that some restrictions will be provided for that “are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the preven- 358 EuCLR https://doi.org/10.5235/219174414809354800 Generiert durch IP '128.182.81.34', am 06.04.2021, 03:18:29. Das Erstellen und Weitergeben von Kopien dieses PDFs ist nicht zulässig. https://doi.org/10.5235/219174414809354800 tion of disorder or crime, […] for the protection of the reputation or rights of others”4. Among the above-mentioned circumstances restricting the right under examina- tion, the duty to prevent and to repress acts which go well beyond the presumed limitation, exists the prohibition to make use of hate speech, as a means of expres- sing a proper intent of racially motivated hatred or incitement in regard of the same. Besides this well known legal instrument, other soft law examples have contrib- uted – inter alia – to a more focused definition of hate speech. The Recommendation No. R (97) on hate speech adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 30 October 1997, states that the term “shall be understood as covering all forms of expression which spread, incite, promote or justify racial hatred, xenophobia, anti-Semitism or other forms of hatred based on intolerance, including: intolerance expressed by aggressive nationalism and ethnocentrism, discrimination and hostility against minorities, migrants and people of immigrant origin”. The Recommendation is aimed at providing Member States with some common criteria to elaborate and implement national legislation in conformity with these regional standards. In particular the gravity of hate speech could be strongly encouraged by recurring to media: along these lines, the effects deriving from committing a hate crime through the dissemination of ideas and principles based on racial motivations may be more harmful and for this reason they require an attentive investigation on the authors of the crime and those who have power over media to incriminate ad personam or in solido. In other terms, the Recommendation outlines the need to clearly distinguish between the responsibility of the author of the expression of hate speech and that of the media for having disseminated racial hatred as an ordinary activity of communicating information and ideas on matters of public interest. In addition, the Declaration of the Committee of Ministers on freedom of political debate in the media, adopted on 12 February 2004, points out that freedom of political debate does not embrace freedom to express racist opinions or incite- ment to hatred, xenophobia, anti-Semitism and all forms of intolerance and that in the case of defamation or insult by the media, the descending criminalization of the offence must be necessary and proportional to the gravity of the violation of the rights or reputation of others, in particular whenever other fundamental rights have been seriously violated through defamatory or insulting statements in the media, such as hate speech. The Recommendation No. 1805 on Blasphemy, religious insults and hate speech against persons on grounds of their religion, adopted on 29 June 2007, by the Parliamentary Assembly refers to the need to criminalize all kind of express manifes- tation or statements that incite hate, discrimination or violence against individuals or groups on the grounds of religious reasons. The link between the principle of non discrimination and the religious factor has been at the core of an interesting and on-going debate on the recurrence of hate 4 See European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ETS No. 5), as entered into force on 3 September 1953. EuCLR Contemporary social fuelling the genocide intent: hate speech and hate crimes 359 https://doi.org/10.5235/219174414809354800 Generiert durch IP '128.182.81.34', am 06.04.2021, 03:18:29. Das Erstellen und Weitergeben von Kopien dieses PDFs ist nicht zulässig. https://doi.org/10.5235/219174414809354800 speech to restrict the freedom of religion and belief. In effect, within the CoE system, this issue was at stake among the topics under the competence and study of the European Commission for Democracy through Law (the so-called Venice Commission), which was tasked to prepare a report on national legislations of Member States concerning blasphemy, insults of a religious nature or incitement to religious hatred. The results of this study culminated in the adoption of the report during the 76th Plenary Session of the Commission, on 17-18 October 2008, and may be summarized as follows: in current democracies each individual or group enjoying the freedom of religion is requested to tolerate criticism in public state- ments and debates in relation to their respective activities, teaching and beliefs, as long as these critics do not constitute deliberate and unreasonable insults or hate speech, or an incitement to perturb public order, violence or discrimination towards people who practice a specific belief. The European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) has also recommended Member States to criminalize expressions that can be considered hate speech that is racial hatred, notably when it intentionally and publicly incites to violence, to hatred, or discrimination on grounds of race, colour, language, religion, nationality or national or ethnic origin (see General Policy Recommendation N°6 on the topic ‘Combating the dissemination of racist, xenophobic and antisemitic material via the internet’, adopted on 15 December 2000). The Commission also commended Member States to adapt criminal national legislations to European standards to combat racist expressions, that is public incitement to violence, hatred or discrimination; public insults and defamation or threats against a person or a group of persons on the grounds of their race, colour, language, religion, nationality, or national or ethnic origin; public expression, with a racist aim, of racist ideology or the public denial, with a racist aim, of crimes of genocide, or crimes against humanity or war crimes should also be criminalized by law; public dissemination with a racist aim or material containing racist expression such as the above should also possibly be the object of criminal sanctions (see General Policy Recommenda- tion No. 7 on national legislation to combat racism and racial discrimination, adopted on 13 December 2002). The last non binding instrument adopted by the Commission on 17 March 2005, was the Declaration on the use of racist, antisemitic and xenophobic elements in political discourse, where the ECRI condemns the use of such elements in political discourse and considers such use as “ethically unaccep- table”5. To complete the CoE legal framework, in recent times, the adoption of the Protocol to the Convention on Cyber Crime, concerning the prosecution of acts of racist and xenophobic nature via computer systems, on 28 January 2003 and which entered into force on 1 March 2006, represents another useful instrument to combat all forms of manifestation and incitement on the grounds of racial and xenophobic hatred disseminated through the so-called new media, i. e. the Internet. 5 See ECRI, Declaration on the use of racist, antisemitic and xenophobic elements in political discourse, as adopted on 17 March 2005, available at http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/ecri/activities/themes/racistpolitical_EN.asp. 360 EuCLR https://doi.org/10.5235/219174414809354800 Generiert durch IP '128.182.81.34', am 06.04.2021, 03:18:29. Das Erstellen und Weitergeben von Kopien dieses PDFs ist nicht zulässig. https://doi.org/10.5235/219174414809354800 In effect the fast development of technologies in a globalised world poses a serious challenge for the respect of principles of equality and inclusion while spreading racial and ethnic feelings only by using the website. Along these lines an emergency may be perceived that is the support for racism and xenophobia from those who manage modern and powerful means. There is, therefore, a primary need to amend the domestic legislation in force for each State Party in order to harmonize substantive criminal law in combating racism and xenophobia on the Internet by introducing the following criminal offences: distributing, or otherwise making available, racist and xenophobic material to the public; threatening with the com- mission of a serious criminal offence, as defined under its domestic law, (i) persons for the reason that they belong to a group, distinguished by race, colour, descent or national or ethnic origin, as well as religion, if used as a pretext for any of these factors, or (ii) a group of persons which is distinguished by any of these character- istics; insulting publicly (i) persons for the reason that they belong to a group distinguished by race, colour, descent or national or ethnic origin, as well as religion, if used as a pretext for any of these factors; or (ii) a group of persons which is distinguished by any of these characteristics; distributing or otherwise making available material which denies, grossly minimizes, approves or justifies acts consti- tuting genocide or crimes against humanity, as defined by international law and recognized as such by final and binding decisions of the International Military Tribunal, established by the London Agreement of 8 August 1945, or of any other international court established by relevant international instruments and whose jurisdiction is recognized by that Party. Furthermore, the Protocol also calls for the full enhancement of procedural and international cooperation provisions contained therein in order to prevent and repress offences of racist and xenophobic propagan- da by the exchange of useful best practices and the adoption of common proce- dures. A very recent initiative has been launched by the CoE on this topic, entitled ‘Young People Combating Hate Speech Online”: it is a project promoted by the youth sector of the Organization for the period 2012-2014, aiming at combating racism and discrimination disseminated in the form of hate speech through the website and it consists of supporting a European campaign, articulated in national networks, the so-called ‘The No Hate Speech Movement”, to be joined online by people, starting from the age of 13, to debate this issue and to propose new methodologies to prevent hate speech online6. The above described legal framework cannot be exhaustive if not completed by a reference to the large case law produced by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) on this issue moving from the assumption that: “[…] tolerance and respect for the equal dignity of all human beings constitute the foundations of a democratic, pluralistic society. That being so, as a matter of principle, it may be considered necessary in certain democratic societies to sanction or even prevent all forms of expression which spread, incite, promote or justify hatred based on intolerance (including religious intolerance), provided that any “formalities”, “con- 6 See http://act4hre.coe.int/. EuCLR Contemporary social fuelling the genocide intent: hate speech and hate crimes 361 https://doi.org/10.5235/219174414809354800 Generiert durch IP '128.182.81.34', am 06.04.2021, 03:18:29. Das Erstellen und Weitergeben von Kopien dieses PDFs ist nicht zulässig. https://doi.org/10.5235/219174414809354800 ditions”, “restrictions” or “penalties” imposed are proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued”7. Moving from a vague legal definition of hate speech as far as its criminalization is concerned, the Court has made reference to several forms of expression that spread, incite, promote or justify hatred based on intolerance, also including the religious component. According to a summarizing doctrinal tentative approach in examining the ECtHR case-law, the following different situations may be at stake: “the incitement of racial hatred or in other words, hatred directed against persons or groups of persons on the grounds of belonging to a race; the incitement to hatred on religious grounds, to which incitement to hatred may be equated on the basis of a distinction between believers and non-believers; the incitement to other forms of hatred based on intolerance “expressed by aggressive nationalism and ethnocentr- ism”” (Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers’ Recommendation 97(20) on “hate speech”). The reason of this setting stands for a practical case-by-case approach about the very nature of the expression to be strictly qualified as hate speech: when the formulation entails no doubts about the intent, the incitement and the descending effect and is clearly addressed to an individual or a group, it cannot be protected according to Article 10(2) of the ECHR. Moreover, if the right of freedom of expression is competing with another right laid down in the same Convention and the ultimate aim is the factual violation of this right, the Court may proceed to safeguard the contents of Article 17 of the ECHR, that is preserving the system of democratic values at the core of the Convention while preventing the intent to destroy the right and liberties established therein. As clearly explained by doctrine: “The conflict of rights is therefore resolved either through denial, through the loss of the right to rely on Article 10, under Article 17 of the Convention, or by concilia- tion, in which case the Court proceeds to a balance of the interests involved”8. This approach is founded on the practical interpretation of Articles 10(2) and 17 respectively. On the one hand, the freedom of expression has been precisely defined by the Court in its Handyside judgment, as follows, further stating the obligations of those who exercise this right: “freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of such a society, one of the basic conditions for its progress and for the development of every man” and according to a formulation which has since then often been recalled, that “subject to paragraph 2 of Article 10, it is applicable not only to “information” or “ideas” that are favourably received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also to those that offend, shock or disturb the State or any sector of the population. Such are the demands of that pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness without which there is no “democratic society””9. On the other, Article 17 is worded in this formulation: “Nothing in this 7 See Gündüz v. Turkey, Application No. 35071/97, Judgment 4 December 2003, margin no 40, CEDH 2003-XI, and Erbakan v. Turkey, Application No. 59405/00, Judgment 6 July 2006, margin no. 56. 8 See A. Weber, Manual on Hate Speech, 2009. 9 See Handyside v. the United Kingdom, Judgment 7 December 1976, Series A No. 24. 362 EuCLR https://doi.org/10.5235/219174414809354800 Generiert durch IP '128.182.81.34', am 06.04.2021, 03:18:29. Das Erstellen und Weitergeben von Kopien dieses PDFs ist nicht zulässig. https://doi.org/10.5235/219174414809354800 Convention may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein or at their limitation to a greater extent than is provided for in the Convention”; so the main aim of this provision is to guarantee the system of democratic values underlying the Convention and, as validated in the ECtHR case-law, to prevent the abuse of any other right included in the Conven- tion, as firstly reported in the Lawless judgment in examining the relationship between Article 17 and other provisions and progressively detailed in order to determine which form of expression could be considered evidently against the values underlying the Convention but not covered by Article 1010. In all circumstances, the Court is requested to take into consideration several factors such as: the objective of the individual whose freedom of speech has been restricted; the content of the expression; the context; the individuals to be consid- ered as targets of the expression; the dissemination and the following potential impact of the expression; the nature and the gravity of the limitation in enjoying the right of freedom of expression. Among the above cited factors, the key criterion adopted by the Court to determine whether an expression could be defined as hate speech and, for this reason, could be restricted is a joint combination of two: the original aim of the author of the manifestation and the context in which the statement is made. Not only must the intent of the individual to spread racist or discriminatory ideas by recurring to hate speech be a primary focus of attention but also the very offensive nature to determine whether this behavior goes beyond the traditional expressions as contained in Article 10 and, therefore, should not be tolerated in a democratic society and is also excluded from the protection ascertained in Article 17 of the Convention. Along these lines, the Court emphasized that when the author is a politician or a journalist, it is “crucially important that politicians avoid disseminat- ing comments in their public speeches which are likely to foster intolerance”11, whenever the communication is written press, audiovisual media and broadcasting. Moreover, relevant differences were made by the Court as long as a political discourse or matters of public interest or speeches of religious nature may be restricted, leaving to State Parties a wide margin of appreciation and supervising over motivated reasons to limit the freedom of expression12. When the Court is doubtful about the compliance with Article 17, it may also investigate the limitations to the enjoyment of the right of freedom of expression as codified in the national legislative framework of the State where the case occurred: its aim will be to verify several requirements if eventual restrictions to the freedom of speech have been foreseen by national laws, if these restrictions comply with legitimate purposes set out in Article 10 of the Convention, and, finally, if they are necessary in a democratic society to achieve the objectives contained in Article 10. 10 See Lawless v. Ireland, Judgment 1 July 1961, Series A3. 11 See Erbakan v. Turkey, cit., margin no 64. 12 See Erbakan v. Turkey, cit., margin no 55; Garaudy v. France, Application No. 65831/01, Judgment 7 July 2003. EuCLR Contemporary social fuelling the genocide intent: hate speech and hate crimes 363 https://doi.org/10.5235/219174414809354800 Generiert durch IP '128.182.81.34', am 06.04.2021, 03:18:29. Das Erstellen und Weitergeben von Kopien dieses PDFs ist nicht zulässig. https://doi.org/10.5235/219174414809354800 In other terms, the Court proceeds in evaluating possible limitations to the right of freedom of expression according to a global perspective, only taking into proper account all the factors and rules when a ‘pressing social need’ exists while ensuring that they are proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. When it refers to national legislations in force, a case-by-case approach, including the principle of the margin of appreciation, is required in order to prove whether the expression is perceived as neutral or could offend, shock or disturb individuals as well as groups or the entire population of a State Party. In the past, the Court declared that statements transmit- ting racial messages or considered to contain racial hatred, such as those denying the Holocaust, need to be restricted to avoid dissemination, to be considered as a denial of crimes against humanity and an incitement to spread hate against the Jewish people. The ECtHR case law shows us that the Court mainly ruled on the non violation of Article 10, recalling the competent national authorities to adopt a restrictive or a flexible approach in relation to the need to protect (or not) other rights established in the Convention. If the Court ascertains the violation of Article 10, it proceeds to examine whether it is prescribed by law, if it pursues a legitimate aim i. e. to safeguard the general interest (the national security, the territorial integrity or public safety, the prevention of disorder or crime, the protection of health and morals), to guarantee other individual rights (reputation, private life), to preserve the authority and impartiality of the judiciary, and whether the restriction is necessary in a democratic society, that is if there is a ‘pressing social need’ which calls for a relevant, sufficient, proportionate and consistent limitation by the national authorities under the Court’s supervision13. When, on the contrary, the Court was motivated by the opportunity not to limit the right of freedom of expression because of the evaluation on the shocking or offensive nature of the statement, it acted considering the nature itself and the related descending effects, the fact that the statement did not have specific and clearly targeted individuals nor was it perceived as insulting a precise group on the grounds of a common belief, nationality, ethnicity and so on, and the absence of a proper incitement to hatred and violence addressed to such persons. However, the case-law confirms that the Court, following an attacking and offensive expression aimed at instigating racial hatred in respect of an individual or a group, recognized the opportunity for national authorities to adopt severe limitations to the freedom of expression, in compliance with the requirements provided for in Article 10, also giving priority to the margin of appreciation even if under its constant supervision. Only in several cases the Court adopted a stricter position in regard of politicians and journalists and media in general, in their role of authors of hate speech: on these occasions, the special responsibility in recurring to a language which surely contributes to fueling hatred and intolerance is unacceptable, also including a command responsibility. While the principles of democracy and impartial information on political issues are relevant for public 13 See Handyside v. the United Kingdom, Judgment 7 December 1976, Series A No. 24. 364 EuCLR https://doi.org/10.5235/219174414809354800 Generiert durch IP '128.182.81.34', am 06.04.2021, 03:18:29. Das Erstellen und Weitergeben von Kopien dieses PDFs ist nicht zulässig. https://doi.org/10.5235/219174414809354800 interest, order within a State must be balanced with the right to disseminate and to receive proper communication without overstepping “the protection of the reputation of others”. In other terms, the prohibition of abuse of rights, as stated in Article 17, forbids every statement or comment amounting to hate speech because it violates the fundamental values and principles of the Convention, and asks for an adequate evaluation of the formulation according to Article 10, to determine eventual limitations like the Court stated in Erbakan v. Turkey: “[…] tolerance and respect for the equal dignity of all human beings constitute the foundations of a democratic, pluralistic society. That being so, as a matter of principle it may be considered necessary in certain democratic societies to sanction or even prevent all forms of expression which spread, incite, promote or justify hatred based on intolerance […]”14. Along these lines, the case-law refers to several forms of hate speech to be condemned as they are undoubtedly against the values underlying the Convention according to Article 17: the establishment of “the communist social order by means of a proletarian revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat” in Communist Party (KPD) v. the Federal Republic of Germany15; the promotion of revisionist or negationist statements, as motivated in Honsik v. Austria where “the applicant’s publications in a biased and polemical manner far from any scientific objectivity denied the systematic killing of Jews in National Socialist concentration camps by use of toxic gas”16; the fact that “like any other remark directed against the Convention’s underlying values …, the justification of a pro-Nazi policy could not be allowed to enjoy the protection afforded by Article 10”, as reported in Lehideux and Isorni, further asserting that “it does not appear that the applicants attempted to deny or revise what they themselves referred to in their publication as “Nazi atrocities and persecutions” or “German omnipotence and barbarism”17; the fact that “Denying crimes against humanity is therefore one of the most serious forms of racial defamation of Jews and of incitement to hatred of them. The denial or rewriting of this type of historical fact undermines the values on which the fight against racism and anti-Semitism are based and constitutes a serious threat to public order. Such acts are incompatible with democracy and human rights because they infringe the rights of others. Its proponents indisputably have designs that fall into the category of aims prohibited by Article 17 of the Convention”, as was clearly motivated in the Garaudy case18. Several cases have been dealt with by the Court in connection with statements that amount to a proper racial hate speech, in violation of Article 17: the decision of the European Commission of Human Rights, followed by the European Court, in 14 See Erbakan v. Turkey, cit., margin no 56. 15 See Communist Party (KPD) v. the Federal Republic of Germany, Judgment 20 July 1957, Yearbook 1, p. 222. 16 See Honsik v. Austria, Application No. 25062/94, decision of the Commission 18 October 1995, D. R. 83, pp. 77-85. 17 See Lehideux and Isorni v. France [GC], Judgment 23 September 1998, Reports of Judgments and Decisions, 1998-VII, para. 47. 18 See Garaudy v. France, Application No. 65831/01, Judgment 24 June 2003. EuCLR Contemporary social fuelling the genocide intent: hate speech and hate crimes 365 https://doi.org/10.5235/219174414809354800 Generiert durch IP '128.182.81.34', am 06.04.2021, 03:18:29. Das Erstellen und Weitergeben von Kopien dieses PDFs ist nicht zulässig. https://doi.org/10.5235/219174414809354800 the case Glimmerveen and Hagenbeek v. the Netherlands19, or the conclusions of the Court in Jersild, Norwood v. the United Kingdom20 and Pavel Ivanov v. Russia21, asserting that policy statements including elements of racial discrimination, in contrast with values of tolerance, social peace and non discrimination underlying the Convention, cannot be framed according to Article 10 but to Article 17. 2. The visibility of hate crimes within the EU: data and policies After the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the freedom of thought, con- science and religion as well as the freedom of expression and information have been enshrined in Articles 10 and 11 of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights, as proclaimed and revised in 2007 and now having a binding legal nature within the new EU normative framework, and must be examined in connection with Article 21 which reiterates the substantive contents of the European acquis as far as the principle of non discrimination22. In contrast to the research methodology adopted with reference to the CoE, a first legal exploration on the relationship between Articles 11 and 21 of the EU Charter will be carried out in order to introduce the key pillars in reference to the fundamental rights and freedoms under attention. The following analysis will deal with the need to make hate crimes visible through a proper inquiry recently promoted and reported by the European Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA) and with the on-going political challenge moving from the adoption of the Framework Decision on combating certain forms and expressions of racism and xenophobia by means of criminal law, adopted on November 28, 2008. Article 11 of the EU Charter states that “1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. 2. The freedom and pluralism of the media shall be respected”. The separation of the components of these freedoms in two paragraphs is the outcome deriving from the development of media as a dynamic means to communicate opinions and ideas in society. On the one hand, paragraph 1 of Article 11 entails a comprehensive protection of the process of forming individually and expressing collectively opinions that may be 19 See Glimmerveen and Hagenbeek v. the Netherlands, Applications Nos. 8348/78 and 8406/78, decision of the Commission 11 October 1979, D. R. 18, p. 187. 20 See Jersild v. Denmark [GC], Judgment 23 September 1994, Series A No. 298. 21 See Pavel Ivanov v. Russia, No. 35222/04, decision of 20 February 2007. 22 See inter alia: M. Bell, The principle of equal treatment: widening and deepening, in: P. Craig/ G. De Búrca G. (eds.), The evolution of EU law, 2011, p. 611 et seq.; M. De Mol, The Novel Approach of the CJEU on the Horizontal Direct Effect of the EU Principle of Non-Discrimination: (Unbridled) Expansionism of EU Law?, Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 2011, p. 109 et seq.; S. Fredman, Discrimination law, 2011; E. Ellis/P. Watson, EU anti-discrimination law, 2012; J. Croon, Comparative Institutional Analysis, the European Court of Justice and the General Principle of Non-Discrimination—or—Alternative Tales on Equality Reasoning, European Law Journal 2013, p. 153 et seq.; C. Tobler, The Prohibition of Discrimination in the Union’s Layered System of Equality Law: From Early Staff Cases to the Mangold Approach, in The Court of Justice and the Construction of Europe: Analyses and Perspectives on Sixty Years of Case-law – La Cour de Justice et la Construction de l'Europe: Analyses et Perspectives de Soixante Ans de Jurisprudence, 2013, p. 443 et seq. 366 EuCLR https://doi.org/10.5235/219174414809354800 Generiert durch IP '128.182.81.34', am 06.04.2021, 03:18:29. Das Erstellen und Weitergeben von Kopien dieses PDFs ist nicht zulässig. https://doi.org/10.5235/219174414809354800 considered as the basic condition to exercise the freedom of expression. This also means that opinions could not only be statements but information to be dissemi- nated through all means of communication and that freedom of expression could include free speech, free press, free artistic and literary forms. The adopted formula contains both the passive and active aspect, i. e. the right to receive and impart all kinds of information. The explanation of this provision confirms a correspondence with Article 10 of the ECHR and, pursuant to Article 52(3) of the Charter, because of the same meaning and scope of this right, possible limitations should be in conformity with those provided for in Article 10(2) and without prejudice to any restrictions imposed by the EU law on Member States. Moreover, by recalling Article 53 of the Charter, the interpretation of its provisions depend on interna- tional law, international treaties to which all the EU Member States are contracting parties, the EU law – jointly considered as EU Treaties and secondary law, and finally on national Constitutions and legal statutes in Europe. Along the lines of the above mentioned correspondence between the EU Charter and the ECHR, Article 11(1) does not contain specific categories or forms of freedom of expression but some of them may well replicate those ones judged by the ECtHR: ‘information and ideas concerning matters … of public interest’, ‘information and ideas on political issues’ and artistic expression. On the other hand, the freedom and pluralism of the media, as established in Article 11(2), includes printed press, radio and television as well as the new media, i. e. the Internet. Besides this economic interpretation of the content of paragraph 2 according to ECJ case-law, as reported in the explanation mentioning the need to protect the freedom of media insofar as they provide services in compliance with Article 49 of the EEC Treaty, as reaffirmed in Council Directive 89/552/EEC of 3 October 1989, and the Protocol on the System of Public Broadcasting in the Member States annexed to the EC Treaty, the protection of the principle of pluralism is further reinforced citing ECJ judgment in the Stichting Collectieve Antennevoorziening Gounda case23. This approach can be interpreted in relation to the aim of respecting this freedom by the EU and of guaranteeing it by Member States as well. In effect, both the EU and national institutions and authorities are requested to provide for possible limitations in the exercise of the freedom of media not through Article 52(3) of the EU Charter referring to Article 10 of the ECHR but through Article 52(1): in other terms, any limitation on the exercise of this right must be provided for by law and respect the substantive contents of the freedom of media, must be necessary and must meet the objectives of general interest recognized by the EU or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others. The linkage among Articles 10, 11 and 21 of the EU Charter could lead the way for the evaluation of the opportunity to adopt secondary legislation aimed at reaffirming the principle of non discrimination while combating all discriminatory 23 See European Court of Justice (ECJ) 25. 7. 1991, case 288/89 (Stichting Collectieve Antennevoorziening Gouda and others / Commissariaat voor de Media) [1991]ECR 4007 . EuCLR Contemporary social fuelling the genocide intent: hate speech and hate crimes 367 https://doi.org/10.5235/219174414809354800 Generiert durch IP '128.182.81.34', am 06.04.2021, 03:18:29. Das Erstellen und Weitergeben von Kopien dieses PDFs ist nicht zulässig. https://doi.org/10.5235/219174414809354800 forms listed in Article 21 or to suggest that Member States enact anti-discrimination legislation at domestic level. In effect, a bottom-up approach has been registered resulting in the adoption of EU secondary legislation as a comprehensive tentative approach to harmonizing national laws within each EU Member State to fight against racism, xenophobia and related intolerance, aiming also at criminalizing racist and xenophobic hate speech and at providing for an aggravating circumstance for crimes having a racist or xenophobic motivation. At the same time, the path to penalizing these crimes favoured EU institutions in pursuing their efforts to ensure the conformity of national laws with the EU secondary legislation: to achieve this scope, both an inclusive investigation on the various forms and manifestations of racial hatred and the elaboration of an ad hoc legal instrument to combat racist and xenophobic attitudes within the European area have been considered as relevant and comple- mentary means. The first objective was achieved by the European Fundamental Rights Agency in 2012 by releasing a report entitled ‘Making hate crime visible in the European Union: acknowledging victims’ rights’, that deals with the issue under examination according to a comparative analysis on national laws in force, reporting individual cases when a hate crime was committed and introducing an inclusive official data collection survey involving the 27 EU Member States as a consequence of the high percentage of people as targets of hate speech because of their – perceived or real – origins, nationality, beliefs or cultures24. The key-research approach consists of the reported violation of fundamental rights as enshrined in the EU primary law, insofar as it was represented by verbal abuse, physical attack or murder motivated by prejudice. Along these lines, official data collection mechanisms adopted at the national level have been classified accord- ing to the limited, good, comprehensive nature and transparency of data. The data quality is interpreted as comprehensive where, despite the modalities of reporting and recording crimes, there is not a higher rate of hate crimes within a country and it is ascertained efficiently and transparently in the publishing phase. On the contrary, when data are limited because of a low rate of reporting, recording and prosecuting, hate crimes have been not properly contrasted. Good data entail an appreciable mechanism to report and record hate crimes, even if, at the publishing stage, a partial gap of data collection is registered that could contribute to capture at best the real situation. The findings confirm that both direct victims and indirect witnesses of hate crimes are generally reluctant to report them to competent public authorities or alternative civil society organizations, and this is the main cause for the invisibility of the phenomenon, contributing to lack of reporting and prosecuting those who are responsible for the commission of these crimes. This under-reporting is also, as we mentioned supra, the result of very dissimilar domestic mechanisms to collect data, 24 See http://fra.europa.eu/en/publication/2012/making-hate-crime-visible-european-union-acknowledging- victims-rights. 368 EuCLR https://doi.org/10.5235/219174414809354800 Generiert durch IP '128.182.81.34', am 06.04.2021, 03:18:29. Das Erstellen und Weitergeben von Kopien dieses PDFs ist nicht zulässig. https://doi.org/10.5235/219174414809354800 to record and evaluate them in relation to bias motivations, and of course to publish comprehensive statistical data about hate crimes. The report suggests to national referees to build a coherent and efficient mechan- ism to include data on the number of incidents reported by victims and recorded by competent authorities in order to properly manage the following sanctions relating to the proved offence. This information could be well complemented by also referring to other crime victimization surveys beyond the legal clarification of hate crimes, due to the spreading condition of multiple discrimination offences. On one side it means that, whenever possible, official data should include references to the nature and the extent of non reported crimes, to the individual experience of the victims and to their reasons for non-reporting. This, as explained in the Report, aims to “make hate crime visible in the EU; give victims of hate crime the opportunity to seek redress against perpetrators; ensure that EU Member States respond effectively to hate crimes as an abuse of fundamental rights”. The reception of advice is probably needed to broaden the scope of the official data collection on hate crimes by introducing multiple references to the nature of what is recorded, the time-frame of the recording, the yearly up-dating of collecting mechanisms, new legislative measures to improve data collection while respecting the socio-historical development of the same mechanisms, and the concrete will of EU Member States to acknowledge and combat hate crimes. On the other side, it stands for the fact that law enforcement officials should take into proper account the bias motivation, that legislators should provide for clear-cut definitions of hate crimes and for adequate penalties to severely punish those committing this kind of offences, that the judiciary clearly sentences the bias motivation to raise awareness regarding the phenomenon and to induce deterrence in relation to the possible commission of a hate crime. Only by supporting these multiple actors’ action, victims and witnesses are really encouraged to report crimes, increasing their confidence in the ability of the public system at all, as well as their opportunities to seek redress against offenders decisively and effectively. Besides the need to delineate in a comprehensive manner the phenomenon of hate crimes at national level, the duty to contribute and to implement EU second- ary law at domestic level is the other relevant recommendation included in the above mentioned Report and to be considered as a complementary legislative action to harmonize the issue under focus. In this sense, the Council Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA of 28 November 2008, on combating certain forms and expressions of racism and xenophobia by means of criminal law could be read to support the process aimed at giving more visibility to hate crimes, also in the perspective of its review to be completed within November 201325. The Framework Decision requires EU Member States to take all the necessary measures to ensure a more severe punishment following an offence motivated by racism or xenophobia along an EU approach as far as the harmonization of criminal 25 See Council Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA of 28 November 2008, in OJ 2008 L 328/556. EuCLR Contemporary social fuelling the genocide intent: hate speech and hate crimes 369 https://doi.org/10.5235/219174414809354800 Generiert durch IP '128.182.81.34', am 06.04.2021, 03:18:29. Das Erstellen und Weitergeben von Kopien dieses PDFs ist nicht zulässig. https://doi.org/10.5235/219174414809354800 law and criminal justice mechanisms is concerned. In particular, it provides that: the punishment must concern a public incitement to violence or hatred addressed to an individual or a group on the grounds of race, colour, religion, descent or national or ethnic origin, and must be effective, proportionate and dissuasive in relation to the committed crime. Article 1 in fact states that: “1. Each Member State shall take the measures necessary to ensure that the following intentional conduct is punishable: (a) publicly inciting to violence or hatred directed against a group of persons or a member of such a group defined by reference to race, colour, religion, descent or national or ethnic origin; (b) the commission of an act referred to in point (a) by public dissemination or distribution of tracts, pictures or other material; (c) publicly condoning, denying or grossly trivialising crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes as defined in Articles 6, 7 and 8 of the Statute of the International Criminal Court, directed against a group of persons or a member of such a group defined by reference to race, colour, religion, descent or national or ethnic origin when the conduct is carried out in a manner likely to incite to violence or hatred against such a group or a member of such a group; (d) publicly condoning, denying or grossly trivialising the crimes defined in Article 6 of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal appended to the London Agreement of 8 August 1945, directed against a group of persons or a member of such a group defined by reference to race, colour, religion, descent or national or ethnic origin when the conduct is carried out in a manner likely to incite to violence or hatred against such a group or a member of such a group”. According to Article 1, the relationship between the perpetrator and the victim could be featured both directly, i. e. when the first labels the second in a discrimina- tory manner, and indirectly, that is by intentionally publicly threatening or inciting others to commit hate crimes against an individual or a group (Article 1, (a) and (b)), by publicly but not intentionally (as necessarily) condoning, denying or trivializing crimes including the hatred component (Article 1, (c) and (d)). This entails that EU Member States shall provide for a maximum criminal sanction of no less than one to three years of imprisonment for natural persons, and both criminal or non-criminal fines for legal persons, including also the exclusion from public benefits or aid, the disqualification from performing commercial activities, the judicial supervision or judicial winding-up orders. Moreover Article 1(2) provides for the EU Member States to limit legal protec- tion to conducts “carried out in a manner that likely to disturb public order”: it is an additional and unnecessary component of the public manifestation on the ground of racial hatred and it will not be further perceived as such by the interested individual or group. Article 4 also establishes that EU Member States shall adopt measures to enhance the severity of the punishment for other criminal offences on the grounds of hatred and prejudice, considering the offence as an aggravating circumstance, otherwise requesting the domestic courts to act to assume an adequate sanction. This formula- 370 EuCLR https://doi.org/10.5235/219174414809354800 Generiert durch IP '128.182.81.34', am 06.04.2021, 03:18:29. Das Erstellen und Weitergeben von Kopien dieses PDFs ist nicht zulässig. https://doi.org/10.5235/219174414809354800 tion implies the opportunity to include grounds such as anti-Semitism, sexual orientation or disability, to give a wider and significant meaning to the offence under attention, according to Article 21 of the EU Charter and to Article 14 of the EHRC at the international level and to national laws promulgated at the domestic level. In effect, several EU Countries have created ad hoc qualifications of crimes being severely punished otherwise the racist and xenophobic motivation is pursued as an aggravating circumstance among many others: in this second hypothesis this could lead to a less proper consideration of hate crime during a proceeding and is a fragile deterrent following the lack for an harsher punishment of the perpetrator. To sum up, the Framework Decision does not entail absorbing all the motivations of an offence in a consolidated legal feature, but to suggest determining a compre- hensive legal framework and asking competent national authorities, both the nor- mative power and the judiciary, to take into proper consideration each motivation on racial, xenophobic or discriminatory hatred when judging in a given case. 3. Hate crimes as a potential threat to domestic and international security from the OSCE perspective The OSCE region is a geographic area experienced in problems of hate crime and violence committed against individuals and groups on the grounds of a bias motivation, especially when it is caused by a feeling of superiority hatred constitut- ing a serious breach of human rights and perpetrated on victims with the aim of undermining domestic, regional and international security as well as social stability while fueling community conflicts and wider-scale violence. This widespread condition has called and calls at present for OSCE intervention to contrast hate crimes and incidents motivated by racism, xenophobia and related intolerance, often determined by ethnic and religious hatred by a preventing and repressing approach, pursuing against a progressively broader instability and unrest or in favour of the re-establishment of political and social stability in the post- conflict stage26. Since 1990, when at the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE participating States pledged to adopt protection measures to prevent any act constituting incitement or violence against a group on national, racial, ethnic, religious discrimination or hatred, further concerns were expressed about crimes based on prejudice, discrimination, hostility or hatred also at the CSCE Meeting of Experts on National Minorities; but the term ‘hate crimes’ was 26 See ODIHR, Combating Hate Crimes in the OSCE Region. An Overview of Statistics, Legislation, and National Initiatives, Warsaw 2005; ODIHR, Hate Crimes in the OSCE Region. Incidents and Responses, Annual Report for 2006, Warsaw 2007; ODIHR, Hate Crimes in the OSCE Region. Incidents and Responses, Annual Report for 2007, Warsaw 2008; ODIHR, Hate Crimes in the OSCE Region. Incidents and Responses, Annual Report for 2008, Warsaw 2009; ODIHR, Preventing and Responding to Hate Crimes, a Resource Guide for NGOs in the OSCE Region, Warsaw 2009; ODIHR, Supplementary Human Dimension Meeting on “Hate Crimes – Effective Implementation of Legislation”, 4-5 May 2009, Vienna, Final Report, Vienna 2009, PC.SHDM.GAL/13/ 09; ODIHR, Hate Crimes in the OSCE Region. Incidents and Responses, Annual Report for 2009, Warsaw 2010. See also U. Kinitz, The Duties and Role of the Police in Combating Hate Crimes, OSCE Yearbook 2007, p. 217 et seq. EuCLR Contemporary social fuelling the genocide intent: hate speech and hate crimes 371 https://doi.org/10.5235/219174414809354800 Generiert durch IP '128.182.81.34', am 06.04.2021, 03:18:29. Das Erstellen und Weitergeben von Kopien dieses PDFs ist nicht zulässig. https://doi.org/10.5235/219174414809354800 explicitly quoted in an OSCE Ministerial Council Decision adopted in 2003 (No. 4), recalling States’ commitment to enact domestic legislations covering crimes ‘fuelled by intolerance and discrimination’. In effect, key principles at the core of the definition of the contents of an OSCE agenda on this issue have been precisely introduced within its legal framework in recent times by support of institutional bodies such as the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) as well as those of OSCE Member States. ODIHR was recommended by the Ministerial Council to combat hate crimes through hate crime data collection, completed by making all useful information publicly available through the Tolerance and Non-Discrimination Information System, by promoting the diffusion of its report on Challenges and Responses to Hate-Motivated Incidents in the OSCE Region, by assisting Member States in alerting, identifying and reporting on hate-motivated incidents (MC Decision No. 13/06), also focusing on the use of the Internet intended to fuel bias-motivated violence (MC Decision No. 9/09). The Ministerial Council further recommended to Member States to implement relevant commitments relating to hate crimes such as: the enactment of tailored legislative measures to combat hate crimes (MC Decision No. 9/09), public con- demnation with reference both to political discourse and general propaganda in the media and on the Internet (MC Decision No. 4/03, No. 12/04, No. 9/09), establishment of institutional and operational mechanisms at the domestic level to collect information and statistics on hate crimes and to translate them to ODIHR, or to provide for appropriate training for public officials, in particular law enforce- ment officials (MC Decision No. 10/05, No. 10/07, No. 9/09), strengthening the monitoring role and contribution from the civil society (MC Decision No. 13/06, No. 10/07, No. 9/09), providing victims with access to counselling and proper legal assistance (MC Decision No. 9/09). Besides the need to introduce a clear legal definition of hate crimes and to provide for a comprehensive strategy to prevent and repress them, both OSCE institutional bodies and Member States have gradually contributed to the achieve- ment of this aim also through the establishment of a network composed of National Points of Contact on Combating Hate Crimes, asking for the participation of representatives from civil society and anti-discrimination bodies, as well as the adoption in March 2009 and related dissemination of the ODIHR Legislative Guidelines on hate crimes, developed in consultation with several experts from the judiciary, governmental bodies, academia and civil society27. Along the above mentioned premises, the issue is under the specific attention of the Organization as a whole and its Member States according to four strategic key- pillars: the adoption of legislative measures aiming at contrasting and repressing hate crimes both generally and specifically; the reinforcement of the judiciary and the improvement of prosecution of hate crimes at the domestic level and related training addressed to public officials and law enforcement officials; data collection and related 27 See ODIHR Legislative Guidelines on hate crimes, available at http://www.osce.org/odihr/50732. 372 EuCLR https://doi.org/10.5235/219174414809354800 Generiert durch IP '128.182.81.34', am 06.04.2021, 03:18:29. Das Erstellen und Weitergeben von Kopien dieses PDFs ist nicht zulässig. https://doi.org/10.5235/219174414809354800 awareness raising educational promoted initiatives; a more active participation of the civil society to collect, monitor and analyze data on the topic at stake. As it concerns the promotion of a comprehensive legislation at national level, providing for a proper definition of the offence and related penalties for accountable perpetrators, it essentially depends on the intent or motivation determining the crime and entails an unambiguous distinction among incitement (hate speech), act (hate crime) and discriminatory attitude or behaviour, beyond the victim’s race, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, religion, mental and physical disability. The above cited ODIHR Guidelines suggested answering the following questions to solve possible legal doubts: “1) whether hate crimes are a specific category of crime or, alternatively, whether a hate motive is treated as an aggravating factor in sentencing for “ordinary” crimes; 2) which groups should be legally protected against hate crimes (e.g., are lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender people included); 3) whether the law applies only if motive of hate or hostility can be shown, or if it also applies in any situation in which a victim was selected because of membership in a protected group; 4) whether the law covers crimes against persons associated or perceived to be affiliated with protected groups; and 5) how much evidence of motive is needed for charges to be filed?”. In effect, if all these questions lead to a positive answer, the enactment of a proper legislative framework has to provide for the punishment not only of the offence (incitement or act, as a hate incident) but also of the aggravating circumstance of having a bias motivation (as a hate-motivated incident). This, of course, calls for a harsher penalty. In other terms, if the hate crime is composed of a first element, that is the constitution of a criminal offence under ordinary criminal law, and of a second element, that is the target of the same offence i. e. a characteristic individual or a group, the latter must be considered as determining an aggravating criminal offence under extraordinary or special criminal law, in relation both to the direct victim or victims and to potential victims in the perspective of escalating patterns of violence. In keeping with this standpoint, the OSCE/ODIHR and Member States con- tributed to the legal categorization of several manifestations of hate crimes, engaging for the enactment or the review of existing legislations in favour of tailored legislative measures: the intolerant discourse inflaming social tensions against tar- geted groups by recurring to racist and xenophobic propaganda (Ministerial Council Decision No. 13/06); the discriminatory speech addressed to targeted groups based on an ethnic or religious motivation, as recalled in several statements and commit- ments adopted during subsequent Ministerial Council meetings from Copenhagen in 1990 until the OSCE High-Level Conference on Tolerance and Non-discrimi- nation, held in Astana in 2010. In particular, it has been the case of “anti-Semitic incidents in the OSCE area making full use of all reliable information available” and “incidents motivated by racism, xenophobia, or related intolerance, including against Muslims” or even “fighting prejudice, intolerance and discrimination against Christians and members of other religions”. All these incidents manifestly contributed to increasing political EuCLR Contemporary social fuelling the genocide intent: hate speech and hate crimes 373 https://doi.org/10.5235/219174414809354800 Generiert durch IP '128.182.81.34', am 06.04.2021, 03:18:29. Das Erstellen und Weitergeben von Kopien dieses PDFs ist nicht zulässig. https://doi.org/10.5235/219174414809354800 and social tensions and undermining international and regional stability of the OSCE region. Another relevant fear was reported in OSCE/ODIHR monitoring activities: the hate crimes committed by identity groups and the neo-Nazis phenomenon. Due to the planned and complex serious criminal action made by these actors, a reinforced international co-operation is required for, moving from a harmonization of previous domestic legislations in force and including targeted investigations by specialized units, further prospecting an educational strategy regarding Nazism and post-World War II extremist ideologies. As far as the reinforcement of the judiciary and the improvement of prosecution of hate crimes at the domestic level and related training addressed to public officials and law enforcement officials are concerned, the OSCE/ODIHR reported in recent years the difficulties encountered depending on the type of offence to be properly investigated, the lack of specialist police units to be specifically instructed to identify, inquiry and register bias motivations before the courts, and the complex- ity to adequately prosecute hate crimes by the same courts. For all these reasons, sufficiently funded professional training and capacity build- ing activities within OSCE Member States are required for combating hate crimes, giving public officials, prosecutors and judges very precise instructions about their work in terms of recording and investigating hate crimes. This further means that they are recommended to promptly investigate hate crimes, to publicly condemn the perpetrators, to encourage reporting by direct victims and third parties, to ensure co-operation mechanisms and develop targeted prevention programmes and initiatives (such the ODIHR Programme on Training against Hate Crimes for Law Enforcement), to promote awareness-raising and education towards the commu- nities and the civil society. As already recalled, the issue of data collection about the hate crimes’ phenomen- on is without doubt at the core of the OSCE strategies. It is inextricably connected with practical obstacles experienced both by the official systems of monitoring and public reporting and by the victims of hate crimes. On a general note, a higher ratio of hate crimes committed in a determined country does not mean that the phenomenon is particularly serious in absolute terms: the collected and evaluated data may simply reflect a broader legal definition of hate crimes and this condition has a stronger impact in the national recording data system. To achieve a comprehensive and factual overview of the phenomenon two conditions need to be satisfied. On one hand, official monitoring and reporting systems should include anonymous and disaggregated information on bias motiva- tions and/or victims – as an individual or groups, and should record incidents, offenses and related prosecutions: according to this approach alone the most vulner- able victims emerge and this entails public officials adopting a careful systemic procedure to categorize and not to separate data according to a presumed hierarchy based on the type of offence or victim. On the other, the assumption of under- reporting due to the lack of identification of the crime as a hate crime by the victim 374 EuCLR https://doi.org/10.5235/219174414809354800 Generiert durch IP '128.182.81.34', am 06.04.2021, 03:18:29. Das Erstellen und Weitergeben von Kopien dieses PDFs ist nicht zulässig. https://doi.org/10.5235/219174414809354800 or to the lack of confidence about reporting to a third party or to public officials has to be properly tackled with, including the guarantee to protect the information by the same law enforcement agents as an essential step for a wider investigation or to prevent further hate crimes. To sum up, an appropriate data collection methodology must be adopted at the national level, including precise references to: competent authorities collecting data, bias motivations, types of crimes under recording, public information and public use of data, number of reported disaggregated hate crimes by police forces and/or prosecutors, number of reported hate crimes including hate speech, hate incidents and/or discriminatory acts. Lastly, a more active participation of the civil society to collect, monitor and analyze data on hate crimes is called for. The role of civil society is also highly valuable in assisting victims of hate crimes. These two functions have been auto- matically included in OSCE/ODIHR strategies concerning the cooperation with non institutional actors. In effect, the supplementary aid from civil society has to be facilitated to counter incitement or violence as hate crimes because of its local recognition and early warning vocational competence on issues of social concern and practical follow-up intervention on incidents. Moreover, civil society plays a relevant role in developing initiatives and educational projects aimed at building the community confidence in law-enforcement agencies and at encouraging the reporting of hate crimes. Without any doubt, civil society organizations and associations have a longstand- ing experience in terms of public awareness-raising and of implementing education programmes promoting tolerance, non discrimination and human rights protection addressed not only to victims but to communities at large, completed by the advocacy function aimed at fostering the establishment of national bodies compe- tent for the development and implementation of national plans on this issue. At present, this competence also needs to be widely supported in a proper and effective manner. III. Concluding remarks Key elements of the hate speech ‘concept’ The analysis of each institutional system in this contribution may lead to the following concluding observations: while the CoE adopted a double approach aimed at legally defining and prosecuting hate crimes and hate speech, the EU pursued the need to study the phenomenon to find adequate political strategies to cope with it, and the OSCE tried to assume it as a potential threat to domestic and international security in the European regional area; three diverging but comple- mentary perspectives, that must be jointly investigated to deal with the phenomen- on in a comprehensive manner. EuCLR Contemporary social fuelling the genocide intent: hate speech and hate crimes 375 https://doi.org/10.5235/219174414809354800 Generiert durch IP '128.182.81.34', am 06.04.2021, 03:18:29. Das Erstellen und Weitergeben von Kopien dieses PDFs ist nicht zulässig. https://doi.org/10.5235/219174414809354800 
work_m45zsgmmsrbxxou4wywsnmy3ty	----	Uniform Crime Report Hate Crime Statistics, 2013 Incidents and Offenses The Uniform Crime Reporting Program collects data about both single-bias and multiple-bias hate crimes. For each offense type reported, law enforcement must indicate at least one bias motivation. A single-bias incident is defined as an incident in which one or more offense types are motivated by the same bias. As of 2013, a multiple- bias incident is defined as an incident in which one or more offense types are motivated by two or more biases. Important note about rape In 2013, the FBI UCR Program initiated the collection of rape data under a revised definition and removed the term “forcible” from the offense name. The UCR Program now defines rape as follows: • Rape (revised): Penetration, no matter how slight, of the vagina or anus with any body part or object, or oral penetration by a sex organ of another person, without the consent of the victim. This includes the offenses of Rape, Sodomy, and Sexual Assault with an Object. • Rape (legacy): The carnal knowledge of a female forcibly and against her will. The offenses of fondling, incest, and statutory rape are included in the Crimes Against Persons, Other category. The revised and legacy rape totals are provided in Tables 2, 3, 4, 7, and 11 of Hate Crime Statistics, 2013. (See the Methodology for more information about this program change as well as others.) Overview • In 2013, 1,826 law enforcement agencies reported 5,928 hate crime incidents involving 6,933 offenses. Hate Crime Statistics, 2013 U.S. Department of Justice—Federal Bureau of Investigation Released Fall 2014 • There were 5,922 single-bias incidents that involved 6,921 offenses, 7,230 victims, and 5,808 known offenders. • The 6 multiple-bias incidents reported in 2013 involved 12 offenses, 12 victims, and 6 offenders. (See Tables 1 and 12.) Single-bias incidents Analysis of the 5,922 single-bias incidents reported in 2013 revealed that: • 48.5 percent were racially motivated. • 20.8 percent resulted from sexual-orientation bias. • 17.4 percent were motivated by religious bias. • 11.1 percent stemmed from ethnicity bias. • 1.4 percent were prompted by disability bias. • 0.5 percent (31 incidents) were motivated by gender-identity bias. • 0.3 percent (18 incidents) resulted from gender bias. (Based on Table 1.) Offenses by bias motivation within incidents Of the 6,921 single-bias hate crime offenses reported in the above incidents: • 49.2 percent stemmed from racial bias. • 20.3 percent were motivated by sexual-orientation bias. • 16.8 percent resulted from religious bias. • 11.5 percent were prompted by ethnicity bias. • 1.3 percent resulted from bias against disabilities. • 0.5 percent (33 offenses) stemmed from gender-identity bias. Hate Crime Statistics, 2013 U.S. Department of Justice—Federal Bureau of Investigation Released Fall 2014 2 • 0.4 percent (30 offenses) were prompted by gender bias. (Based on Table 1.) Racial bias In 2013, law enforcement agencies reported that 3,407 single-bias hate crime offenses were racially motivated. Of these offenses: • 66.4 percent were motivated by anti-Black or African American bias. • 21.4 percent stemmed from anti-White bias. • 4.6 percent resulted from anti-Asian bias. • 4.3 percent were motivated by anti-American Indian or Alaska Native bias. • 3.2 percent were a result of bias against groups of individuals consisting of more than one race (anti-multiple races, group). • 0.1 percent (3 offenses) were motivated by bias of anti-Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander. (Based on Table 1.) Sexual-orientation bias In 2013, law enforcement agencies reported 1,402 hate crime offenses based on sexual- orientation bias. Of these offenses: • 60.6 percent were classified as anti-gay (male) bias. • 22.6 percent were prompted by an anti-lesbian, gay, bisexual, or transgender (mixed group) bias. • 13.2 percent were classified as anti-lesbian bias. • 1.9 percent were classified as anti-bisexual bias. • 1.7 percent were the result of an anti-heterosexual bias. (Based on Table 1.) Religious bias Hate crimes motivated by religious bias accounted for 1,163 offenses reported by law enforcement. A breakdown of the bias motivation of religious-biased offenses showed: Hate Crime Statistics, 2013 U.S. Department of Justice—Federal Bureau of Investigation Released Fall 2014 3 • 59.2 percent were anti-Jewish. • 14.2 percent were anti-Islamic (Muslim). • 6.4 percent were anti-Catholic. • 4.4 percent were anti-multiple religions, group. • 3.6 percent were anti-Protestant. • 0.6 percent (7 offenses) were anti-Atheism/Agnosticism/etc. • 11.6 percent were anti-other (unspecified) religion. (Based on Table 1.) Ethnicity bias Of the single-bias incidents, 794 offenses were committed based on the offenders’ bias toward the perceived ethnicity of the victim. Of these offenses: • 52.6 percent were anti-Hispanic or Latino bias. • 47.4 percent were anti-Not Hispanic or Latino bias. (Based on Table 1.) Note, the term anti-not Hispanic or Latino does not imply the victim was targeted because he/she was not of Hispanic origin, but it refers to other or unspecified ethnic biases that are not Hispanic or Latino. Disability bias There were 92 reported hate crime offenses committed based on disability bias. Of these: • 69 offenses were classified as anti-mental disability. • 23 offenses were reported as anti-physical disability. (See Table 1.) Gender-identity bias Of the single-bias incidents, 33 offenses were a result of gender-identity bias. Of these: • 25 were anti-transgender. • 8 were anti-gender non-conforming. (See Table 1.) Hate Crime Statistics, 2013 U.S. Department of Justice—Federal Bureau of Investigation Released Fall 2014 4 Gender bias There were 30 offenses of gender bias reported in 2013. Of these: • 25 were anti-female. • 5 were anti-male. (See Table 1.) By offense types Of the 6,933 reported hate crime offenses in 2013: • 27.8 percent were intimidation. • 25.7 percent were destruction/damage/vandalism. • 24.8 percent were simple assault. • 10.6 percent were aggravated assault. • The remaining offenses included additional crimes against persons and property. (Based on Table 2.) Offenses by crime category Among the 6,933 hate crime offenses reported: • 63.9 percent were crimes against persons. • 35.0 percent were crimes against property. • The remaining offenses were crimes against society. (Based on Table 2.) (See Data Collection in Methodology.) Crimes against persons Law enforcement reported 4,430 hate crime offenses as crimes against persons. By offense type: • 43.5 percent were intimidation. • 38.8 percent were simple assault. Hate Crime Statistics, 2013 U.S. Department of Justice—Federal Bureau of Investigation Released Fall 2014 5 • 16.6 percent were aggravated assault. • 0.6 percent consisted of 5 murders and 21 rapes (15 rapes were submitted under the UCR Program’s revised definition of rape, and 6 were submitted under the legacy definition of rape). (See Methodology for more details about changes in the definition of rape in the UCR Program.) • 0.6 percent involved the offense category other, which is collected only in the National Incident-Based Reporting System. (Based on Table 2.) Crimes against property • The majority of the 2,424 hate crime offenses that were crimes against property (73.6 percent) were acts of destruction/damage/vandalism. • The remaining 26.4 percent of crimes against property consisted of robbery, burglary, larceny-theft, motor vehicle theft, arson, and other crimes. (Based on Table 2.) Crimes against society There were 79 offenses defined as crimes against society (e.g., drug or narcotic offenses or prostitution). (See Table 2.) By victim type When considering the type of victims among the reported 6,933 hate crime offenses: • 82.0 percent were directed at individuals. • 4.4 percent were against businesses or financial institutions. • 2.6 percent were against government. • 2.6 percent were against religious organizations. • 1.1 percent were against society/public. • The remaining 7.3 percent were directed at other/unknown/multiple victim types. (Based on Table 6.) Hate Crime Statistics, 2013 U.S. Department of Justice—Federal Bureau of Investigation Released Fall 2014 6 Incidents and Offenses Important note about rape Overview Single-bias incidents Offenses by bias motivation within incidents Racial bias Sexual-orientation bias Religious bias Ethnicity bias Disability bias Gender-identity bias Gender bias By offense types Offenses by crime category Crimes against persons Crimes against property Crimes against society By victim type 
work_m5mx5qv4mvc3thbk6s26nk2s54	----	Editor’s Introduction Vol.:(0123456789) Critical Criminology (2019) 27:515–520 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10612-019-09481-5 1 3 Editor’s Introduction Avi Brisman1,2,3 Published online: 14 November 2019 © Springer Nature B.V. 2019 “[T]errorism is one of the major and troublesome issues of our times, an evil which affronts and challenges the very spirit of freedom.” By itself, this assertion might be difficult to attribute to its author or, for that matter, to date. By itself, this claim might seem as apropos at the end of 2019 as in the immediate aftermath of September 11, 2001. Here is a bit more from the same speaker and occasion: [A]s the world shrinks still further with the advances of technology and the growth of travel, it follows that the global village becomes more and more a reality. And with the advance of technology our livelihood is ever more at risk…. We can no longer safely enjoy a degree of isolation and ignore global economic, social and political differences and inequities elsewhere, because they provide causes for which a terrorist is willing to die. We can no longer think in terms of boundaries, but rather in terms of contrasting philosophies. It is a daunting thought that even the most ostensibly inconsequential act of commercial or governmental decision-making can unwittingly draw the attention of terrorists. We must accept that anyone can be a victim, accept the wrong executive position, book with the wrong airline, attend an ill-fated reception, be beside the wrong vacant car or be in the wrong street at the wrong time. [emphasis in the original]. While the content of this longer statement might reveal little as to its origins, the lan- guage employed to make this point about the potential targets of terrorism and the impor- tance of preparedness seems somewhat archaic. After all, we seem to be living more in an age of grandiloquence than one of grand eloquence—although even that observation is somewhat dated in that Haberman (2004), more than 15 years ago, lamented the impover- ishment of the English language and the “absence of memorable words” to accompany the unveiling of the memorial in New York City to commemorate the attacks of September 11, 2001. * Avi Brisman avi.brisman@eku.edu; avi.brisman@newcastle.edu.au 1 School of Justice Studies, College of Justice and Safety, Eastern Kentucky University, Richmond, KY, USA 2 School of Justice, Faculty of Law, Queensland University of Technology, Brisbane, QLD, Australia 3 Newcastle Law School, Faculty of Business and Law, University of Newcastle, Callaghan, NSW, Australia http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1007/s10612-019-09481-5&domain=pdf 516 A. Brisman 1 3 To end the suspense: The initial declaration and the ensuing proclamation were made almost 40 years ago, by Sir Colin Woods, an English police officer in the London Metropolitan Police and later the first Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police, in a paper delivered to the 43rd Ple- nary Scientific Session of the Australian Academy of Forensic Sciences, held in Sydney. In what would seem hauntingly prescient, Woods (1979:70) warned that “[p]opulation mobil- ity [would] continue to be an added hazard” that could complicate or frustrate the detection of terrorist infiltration. His solution? “We hope that society will look in the first instance to its principal guardians, policemen and women, for protection from acts of terrorism,” Woods (1979:71) proposed, although he did seem to recognize the “need to be extremely cautious that we are not, in time, unwit- tingly transformed into a paramilitary organization, at least in the eyes of the public.” One wonders how Woods, who died in January of 2001, might have responded to the recent critiques of the militarization of the police (e.g., Linnemann and Medley 2019; Wall 2013). Woods conclusion was that terrorism was “a phenomenon which will not go away,” but he expressed concern that “we… not over-react to terrorism, which would only serve to abet the terrorist by endangering the very democratic conventions that the terrorist wishes to tear down” (1979:74). How prophetic! For terrorism has, indeed, not gone away. How unfortunate! For our reactions and responses to terrorism (those of the United States (US), in particular) have often resulted in more deaths than terrorist acts themselves, and our policies and strategies have continually undermined the very conventions and institutions that serve as a founda- tion for liberal democracy. It would be a mistake, however, to assume that concern about terrorism simply con- tinued, as Woods suggested it should (although “vigilance” and “preparedness” might be better words)—that it transformed into fear and panic after September 11, 2001 (in US), after October 12, 2002 (in Indonesia),1 after March 11, 2004 (in Spain),2 after July 7, 2005 (in England),3 and so on—and that such anxiety and alarm have subsided only by virtue of the passage of time. As Daniel Benjamin, Norman E. McCulloch Jr. Director of the John Sloan Dickey Center for International Understanding at Dartmouth College, mused in an article written on the seventeenth anniversary of the attacks of September 11, 2001 (and updated in April 2019), “[o]f all the unexpected developments of Donald Trump’s presidency, surely one of the more unlikely ones has been the slow but steady ebbing of the nation’s profound, at times almost boundless, fixation on the threat of terrorism.” Benjamin (2018/2019), who served as Ambassador-at-Large and Coordinator for Coun- terterrorism at the US Department of State from 2009 to 2012, expressed surprise at this development because, as he explained, over the 17 years since the attacks of September 11, 2001, jihadist extremism—the subject of one of the articles in this issue (Larsen and Jensen 2019)—“has come to dominate America’s threat landscape like nothing else since Soviet Russia did during the Cold War. What’s more, as poll after poll has shown, terrorism has 1 On this date, more than 200 people were killed and a similar number injured in bombings on the island of Bali. 2 On this date, more than 200 people were killed and over 2000 people were injured in train bombings in Madrid. 3 On this date, more than 50 people and roughly 800 people were injured by suicide bombers that attacked the London Underground and a double-decker bus. 517Editor’s Introduction 1 3 been far and away the only foreign policy issue Americans care deeply about and the prism through which their sense of national security is defined.” Benjamin (2018/2019) explained that Trump’s scandals (re)focused public attention on questions of campaign collusion with Russia, trade wars, the dramatic comings-and-goings of White House personnel, such that “today only a small fraction of terrorism stories make the front page of the dailies com- pared to only a few years ago.” This lull in attention to terrorism, Benjamin suggested, raises two questions. Is dimin- ishing concern regarding terrorism a positive development? And, if so, how long is it likely to last? With respect to the first, Benjamin (2018/2019) submitted, the answer is yes: “U.S. pub- lic opinion had become a runaway train on the issue of terrorism, to the detriment of our broader interests.” With respect to the second, Benjamin (2018/2019) reminded readers, “terrorist groups thrive in conflict zones” and the continuing chaos and horror in Yemen— the subject of another article in this issue (Ruggiero 2019)—“is a perfect setting for al- Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula to grow its forces.” Moreover, Benjamin (2018/2019) continued, jihadism will remain a potent force in the coming years, if not decades, and he offered several reasons in support of this argument: With few exceptions, especially among the oil monarchies, the Middle East and such Muslim majority countries as Pakistan, remain in poor, sometimes disastrous shape. Economic stagnation is endemic, with job creation a shadow of what it should be. Most people in the region lack real political voice or representative institutions. In the West, especially in Europe, integration of Muslim minority communities is une- ven at best, leaving many frustrated at their limited prospects. These big structural facts aren’t going to change quickly. That said, Benjamin (2018/2019) was quick to caution, it is worth recognizing [that] America is well protected by excellent border controls, capable law enforcement and remarkable intelligence and military capabilities— as the targeting of [the al-Qaeda bombmaker, Ibrahim al-Asiri] underscores. With barely more than 100 people killed in the United States by jihadist operatives since 9/11, the record is a strong one that argues for taking this moment to revise our col- lective thinking about the terrorist threat. That is, the time has come to absorb the notion that jihadist terrorism is a fact of the contemporary world, that can be man- aged but not eradicated and that we have developed excellent though not perfect tools for that task. That understanding… is the precondition for avoiding the kind of overreaction that helped lead us into Iraq and crated near hysteria in 2014 when ISIS appeared on the scene. [emphasis added]. So there we have it. Two commentators, 40 years apart, making more or less the same claims and suggestions: (1) terrorism is a fact of life and “it won’t go away” (although the combatants may change and the ideological reasons for undertaking it may differ); and (2) we should attempt to avoid overreacting and instead adopt more composed and measured responses that take into account the realities of terrorist threats in the contemporary world. The articles in this issue all engage with issues of terrorism or responses thereto. While not a special issue—the articles were not commissioned by me (they were submit- ted through regular channels independently of each other)—I have placed them together because they speak to common concerns and, as such will hopefully attract more readers. Although none of the articles suggests that terrorism has become “a fact of the contem- porary world,” the first three of the articles—those by Haner, Benson and Cullen (2019), 518 A. Brisman 1 3 Larsen and Jensen (2019), and McCulloch, Walklate, Maher, Fitz-Gibbon and McGowan (2019)—endeavor to understand the reasons for—as well as parameters and meanings of— jihadism, terrorism and violence. The second group of three articles—those by Mulinari (2019), Norris (2019) and Kaufman and Niner (2019)—consider how states have attempted to prevent terrorism, as well as the ways in which such mechanisms and strategies have impacted the lives of citizens (most of whom are members of minority groups). The final article—by Ruggiero (2019)—contemplates the situation in Yemen which, as noted above, may prove to be the perfect setting for augmentation and bolstering of al-Qaeda forces. The first article, “Code of the Terrorists: The PKK and the Social Construction of Vio- lence, by Murat Haner, Michael L. Benson and Francis T. Cullen (2019), challenges the construction of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) as a terrorist organization that uses violence indiscriminately to target and murder innocent civilians. Drawing on interviews conducted with a former longtime member of the PKK, Haner and his co-authors argue that this perspective of the PKK’s use of violence is misleading. Rather than being indis- criminate, the authors contend, violence by the PKK is purposeful, restrained, employed primarily in response to Turkish oppression, and governed by a code the regulates (1) legit- imate and forbidden targets; (2) rules of engagement; (3) treatment of enemy captives and detainees; and (4) conduct in regard to private property and protected places. Recognizing that the PKK is governed by a code has important policy implications, Haner, Benson and Cullen submit. The authors maintain that the prospects of resolving the conflict between Turkey and the Kurds remain dim so long as the PKK is portrayed as a terrorist organiza- tion, and that viewing the PKK as a political organization might help settle the conflict at the negotiating table rather than through violence. In the second article, “Jihadism from a Cultural Perspective,” Jeppe Fuglsang Larsen and Sune Qvotrup Jensen (2019) undertake to synthesize subcultural theory with recent accounts of intersectionality in order to explore jihadism as a collective and cultural response to shared experiences of marginalization and othering. Arguing for the relevance of a subcultural approach to the study of jihadi subculture and illustrating the potential of that approach through an empirical analysis of jihadi rap, Larsen and Jensen demonstrate how the idea of subcultures as a collective reaction to a shared situation can help us com- prehend the mechanisms behind the emergence of jihadi subculture among Muslim popu- lations in the West, especially among young Muslim men. In the third article, “Lone Wolf Terrorism Through a Gendered Lens: Men Turning Vio- lent or Violent Men Behaving Violently,” Jude McCulloch, Sandra Walklate, JaneMaree Maher, Kate Fitz-Gibbon and Jasmine McGowan (2019) critique the criminological litera- ture on lone wolf terrorism for its lack of gendered analysis and apply a gendered lens in order to illuminate the different ways which masculinity and violence against or hostility toward women are located in relation to the violence of lone wolf terrorists. Presenting an Australian case study of a lone wolf terrorist with a documented history of violence against women, McCulloch and her co-authors consider how authorities assessed this history and the impact this had on the approach employed by the police to respond to the threat he presented. The authors conclude by arguing that the implications of failing to treat violence against women as real violence are significant for national security. The fourth, fifth and sixth articles consider not the etiology and meanings of jihadism, terrorism and violence, but the ways in which states have responded to real and perceived terrorist threats, as well as the consequences for individuals affected by such measures. The fourth article, “The Spectrum of Repression: Swedish Muslims’ Experiences of Anti-terrorism Measures,” by Leandro Schclarek Mulinari (2019), examines Swedish Mus- lims’ experiences of being targeted by authorities in an effort to prevent terrorism. Weaving 519Editor’s Introduction 1 3 together various Marxist and political perspectives in order to comprehend how repression occurs within society, Mulinari makes the case for “repressive consent”—a concept that he develops and employs to make sense of situations in which people are influenced to undertake activities against their will. Mulinari focuses on experiences of disproportion- ate security controls and encounters with the Swedish Security Service (Säpo) to reveal painful and habitual consequences for some, but not all, of those who become targets in the War on Terror. In “Explaining the Emergence of Entrapment in Post-9/11 Terrorism Investigations” (2019), the fifth article in this issue, Jesse J. Norris draws on in-depth interviews and docu- mentary research to identify the key factors shaping the widespread emergence of entrap- ment in post-9/11 terrorism sting operations in the US. Norris argues that an interconnected set of discursive justifications and policy shifts, institutional incentives and processes, and cognitive biases explain the post-9/11 proliferation of terrorism prosecutions accompanied by compelling claims of entrapment. Norris proposes that neo-orientalism—the view of Muslims, and particularly Arabs, as inherently violent, irrational and fanatical—may be the ultimate driver that has set into motion and enabled many of these mechanisms, creating a cultural and political economy of convictions in which racialized police misconduct is normalized and rewarded. “Muslim Victimization in the Contemporary US: Clarifying the Racialization Thesis” (2019), the sixth article in this issue, by Sarah Beth Kaufman and Hanna Niner, draws on in-depth, qualitative interviews with Muslim and non-Muslim Americans in 2016 to specify how Muslim “racialization” is shaped by the racial politics of the US. Anti-Muslim bias is not experienced by religious Muslims as a whole, Kaufman and Niner explain, but by people whose bodies are read to be affiliated with the Islamic religion—often errone- ously—because of their perceived racial characteristics. Thus, while self-identified black, white, and Hispanic Muslims with no visible markers of their religion do not experience anti-Muslim harassment, non-Muslim Christians, Hindus, and Sikhs who embody an imag- ined “Muslim look,” must cope with fear and aggression from strangers on a daily basis. According to Kaufman and Niner, racialized religion is mutable in that Muslims and non- Muslims are active in constructing how Islam is read on their bodies in public. Moreo- ver, Kaufman and Niner find that hate crime categorization in the US obscures the role that racism plays in religious victimization. Accordingly, the authors encourage scholars who study anti-Muslim acts to include non-Muslims in their analyses, and to advocate for the re-conceptualization of identity-based hate crime categories. Excavating the corpore- ality of criminal victimization, Kaufman and Niner propose, can illuminate the ways in which biases are experienced in the contemporary US—a stark reminder of the necessity of heading Benjamin’s plea to revise our collective thinking about what constitutes (terror- ist) threats. This issue concludes with the seventh article, “Yemen: Civil War or Transnational Crime” (2019), by Vincenzo Ruggiero. In this piece, Ruggiero (2019) defines “civil war” as “a conflict which erupts within a national territory where a faction aims to violently replace an established authority or secede from it.” With this backdrop, Ruggiero assesses how the features of the conflict in Yemen lend themselves to this definition, beginning with a summary of recent events in the country and region. Focusing on the arms markets and transfers that accompanied and still foster the conflict, Ruggiero contends that Yemen is not just a theater of internal conflict but also of one transnational criminal activity. This discussion, however, is not merely definitional or academic. Ruggiero submits that concep- tualizing the conflict in Yemen as a form of transnational crime demonstrates that the fight- ing is not just between groups and organizations with different ideologies, but by a variety 520 A. Brisman 1 3 of actors pursuing diverse goals. “Different identities and interests are involved in acts of violence,” Ruggiero (2019) concludes, acts that “straddle the divide between the individual and the collective, political ideology and private gain.” On the surface, Ruggiero’s article might seem like an outlier in this issue. But as Rug- giero explains, the US government undertook arms sales (as far back as the late 1960s and carrying forward to the current administration) that were deemed crucial for the stability of the region, the fight against international terrorism, and as a counterbalance to the power of Iran. The long duration of this conflict, Ruggiero proposes, can be explicated, in part, by the existence of a prosperous arms market in which combatants and civilians alike partici- pate. In other words, sometimes it is the disproportionate and misguided response to terror- ism (real or imagined) that causes greater harm than terrorist acts themselves—a unifying theme running through all seven articles in Volume 27, Issue 3. References Benjamin, D. (2018/2019). 17  years after 9/11, Americans don’t care about terrorism anymore. Politico. September 11, 2018 [updated April 19, 2019]. Available at: https ://www.polit ico.eu/artic le/911-terro rism-17-years -after -nobod y-cares -anymo re/. Retrieved November 1, 2019. Haberman, C. (2004). NYC; Reflections on an absence of eloquence. The New York Times. January 16: B1. Available at: https ://www.nytim es.com/2004/01/16/nyreg ion/nyc-refle ction s-on-an-absen ce-of-eloqu ence.html. Retrieved November 11, 2019. Haner, M., Benson, M. L., & Cullen, F. T. (2019). Code of the terrorists: The PKK and the social construc- tion of violence. Critical Criminology: An International Journal. https ://doi.org/10.1007/s1061 2-019- 09449 -5. Kaufman, S. B., & Niner, H. (2019). Muslim victimization in the contemporary US: Clarifying the raciali- zation thesis. Critical Criminology: An International Journal. https ://doi.org/10.1007/s1061 2-018- 09428 -2. Larsen, J. F., & Jensen, S. Q. (2019). Jihadism from a cultural perspective. Critical Criminology: An Inter- national Journal. https ://doi.org/10.1007/s1061 2-019-09470 -8. Linnemann, T., & Medley, C. (2019). Black sites, “dark sides”: War power, police power, and the violence of the (un)known. Crime Media Culture, 15(2), 341–358. McCulloch, J., Walklate, S., Maher, J., Fitz-Gibbon, K., & McGowan, J. (2019). Lone Wolf terrorism through a gendered lens: Men turning violent or violent men behaving violently? Critical Criminol- ogy: An International Journal. https ://doi.org/10.1007/s1061 2-019-09457 -5. Mulinari, L. S. (2019). The spectrum of repression: Swedish Muslims’ experiences of anti-terrorism meas- ures. Critical Criminology: An International Journal. https ://doi.org/10.1007/s1061 2-019-09462 -8. Norris, J. J. (2019). Explaining the emergence of entrapment in Post-9/11 terrorism investigations. Critical Criminology: An International Journal. https ://doi.org/10.1007/s1061 2-019-09438 -8. Ruggiero, V. (2019). Yemen: Civil war or transnational crime. Critical Criminology: An International Jour- nal. https ://doi.org/10.1007/s1061 2-019-09472 -6. Wall, T. (2013). Unmanning the police manhunt: Vertical security as pacification. Socialist Studies/Études Socialistes, 9(2), 32–56. Woods, C. (1979). Problems of international terrorism. Australian Journal of Forensic Sciences, 12(2–3), 67–74. Publisher’s Note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. https://www.politico.eu/article/911-terrorism-17-years-after-nobody-cares-anymore/ https://www.politico.eu/article/911-terrorism-17-years-after-nobody-cares-anymore/ https://www.nytimes.com/2004/01/16/nyregion/nyc-reflections-on-an-absence-of-eloquence.html https://www.nytimes.com/2004/01/16/nyregion/nyc-reflections-on-an-absence-of-eloquence.html https://doi.org/10.1007/s10612-019-09449-5 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10612-019-09449-5 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10612-018-09428-2 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10612-018-09428-2 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10612-019-09470-8 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10612-019-09457-5 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10612-019-09462-8 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10612-019-09438-8 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10612-019-09472-6 Editor’s Introduction References 
work_m5mxjqzeufcqffsgwdlphzocom	----	HATE CRIMES HURT SOME MORE THAN OTHERS DOI: 10.1177/0886260514548584 1 Hate crimes hurt some more than others: implications for the just sentencing of offenders Paul Iganski Lancaster University, UK Spiridoula Lagou H8hurts, UK Author note Paul Iganski, Lancaster University Law School, UK Spiridoula Lagou, H8hurts, UK Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Paul Iganski, Lancaster University Law School, Bowland North, Bailrigg, Lancaster, LA1 4YN, UK. E-mail: p.iganski@lancaster.ac.uk HATE CRIMES HURT SOME MORE THAN OTHERS DOI: 10.1177/0886260514548584 2 Abstract An accumulation of research evidence indicates that hate crimes as a category of offence are more serious than similar but otherwise motivated crimes in respect of the greater post-victimization distress reported by victims. Such evidence has been used by advocates of hate crime laws to justify the imposition of greater penalties in the sentencing of convicted hate crime offenders. However, in focusing on the commonalities of the greater level of post-victimization impacts experienced by hate crime victims as a group, the research evidence to date has obscured the diversity of reactions between victims. Consequently, this article expands the evidence in new directions by illuminating the variation in reported victim impacts. The analysis presented uses data from the Crime Survey for England and Wales on reported racially motivated crime and reveals that not all victims report being emotionally affected by hate crime, not all victims are affected the same way, and some victims of racially motivated crime report less of an emotional impact than some victims of equivalent but otherwise motivated crimes. The research findings are used to reason that in any individual case of hate crime the motivating sentiments of the offender provide an unreliable indicator of the harms inflicted upon the victim. Therefore a blanket uplift in penalty in every case of hate crime which rests upon the offender’s mental state— their prejudice, bigotry, bias, or ‘hate’ — cannot be justified if the justification for sentence uplift is to give offenders their just deserts for the harms they inflict. Instead, the justification must rest upon the culpability of the offender for the harms they may or may not actually inflict. Just as there is variation in victim impacts, there will be variation in offender culpability: discretion and flexibility in the mode of enhanced sentencing is therefore necessary to ensure justice for offenders as well as victims. HATE CRIMES HURT SOME MORE THAN OTHERS DOI: 10.1177/0886260514548584 3 Introduction: the hate debate In arguments that have been long rehearsed, critics of hate crimes laws in the United States have argued that the additional punishment of hate crime offenders over and above the punishment that can be meted out for a similar, but otherwise motivated crime, amounts to the state criminalizing the expression of certain thoughts, opinions and values (cf. Bruce 2001; Gey 1997; Hurd 2001) as it is such aspects of the offender’s mind that distinguishes a hate crime from a parallel crime. Against this argument, though, supporters of hate crime laws have contended that it is not the bad values or the motivation of the offender (perhaps expressed in things they say while committing the offence) that are being punished. Instead, they propose that the laws impose greater punishment for the greater harms inflicted by hate crimes. The harms most commonly claimed concern the experience of psychological and emotional trauma by victims following a hate crime (cf. Lawrence 1999 & 2006), and also trauma vicariously experienced by those who share the same identity as the primary victim. Accordingly, enhanced sentencing of convicted hate crime offenders simply gives the offenders the just deserts for the harms they inflict. To use the words of Hurd and Moore (2004) on the matter, who cast this argument as the ‘wrongdoing analysis’, the conclusions drawn from the empirical claims about the greater harms inflicted by hate crime are that: “…hate/bias crime offenders deserve more punishment because they are more blameworthy; that they are more blameworthy because they have done greater wrong; and that they have done greater wrong because they have (typically) caused more harm, namely, the psychological traumatization of victims.” (Hurd & Moore 2004, p. 1087) Although Hurd and Moore focussed on the limitations of the empirical claims behind the ‘wrongdoing analysis’, an accumulating body of evidence does now demonstrate that as a group victims of ‘hate crime’ collectively experience a greater degree of negative psychological impacts when compared with victims of parallel crimes. In drawing from a review of some of the evidence, Craig-Henderson and Sloan posited that the range of negative emotions experienced by victims of racist crime are “qualitatively distinct” from the emotions experienced by victims of parallel crimes (2003, p. 482). The consequences for the HATE CRIMES HURT SOME MORE THAN OTHERS DOI: 10.1177/0886260514548584 4 individual victim of this qualitative difference in hate crime are manifest in symptoms of post- victimization distress. Quantitative differences between hate crime victims and victims of parallel crimes in experiencing such symptoms have also been illuminated by a number of research studies — at first in the United States, and more recently in the United Kingdom. Initially, generalizing the findings of this evidence was limited by the use of small samples of victims of hate crimes and comparison crimes (cf. Garofalo 1997) and non-random samples (cf. Herek, Gillis, Cogan & Glunt 1997; McDevitt et al., 2001). Such limitations have now been overcome by the use of large random samples in the secondary analysis of crime victimisation survey data (cf. Iganski 2008; Smith et al., 2012) as is the case with the analysis to be presented in this paper. Overall, the evidence shows that while hate crime victims experience and report the same types of stress and trauma symptoms as victims of parallel crimes, comparisons of samples of hate crime victims and victims of comparison crimes have shown that hate crime victims are more likely to report:  That they were “very much” emotionally affected (Smith et al., 2012, p. 22), that they “rate their crimes as very serious”, and “that the crimes had a ‘great deal’ of effect on their lives in both the short term and long term” (Garofalo 1997, p. 141);  Having a stronger emotional reaction even when controlling for crime type (Botcherby et al., 2011; Iganski 2008);  Having a greater propensity to have unwanted intrusive thoughts about the incident and to “feel like not wanting to live any longer…” (McDevitt et al., 2001, p. 709);  Having a longer period of recovery from the effects of victimisation (Herek, Gillis, Cogan & Glunt 1997) and that overcoming the incident “had been very difficult” (McDevitt et al., 2001, p. 711);  That “being ‘frightened or scared’ was the primary response in the immediate aftermath of the crime”, (while less likely to report “being ‘angry or mad’ as their predominant response”) (Garofalo 1997, p. 141); Furthermore, in terms of specific symptoms of distress, compared with victims of parallel crimes, victims of hate crime are more likely to report experiencing: HATE CRIMES HURT SOME MORE THAN OTHERS DOI: 10.1177/0886260514548584 5  Higher levels depression (McDevitt et al., 2001) and withdrawal (Ehrlich 1992);  Anxiety (Ehrlich 1992) and nervousness (McDevitt et al., 2001);  Loss of confidence (Ehrlich 1992);  Anger (Herek, Gillis, Cogan & Glunt 1997);  Increased sleep difficulties (Ehrlich 1992);  Difficulty concentrating (McDevitt et al., 2001);  Fear and reduced feelings of safety (McDevitt et al., 2001); These characteristics of post-victimization distress have also been illuminated in depth by a number of studies which have focused solely on hate crime victims without comparison samples of victims of parallel crimes (cf. Barnes & Ephross 1994; Dzelme 2008; Hershberger & D’Augelli 1995; Otis & Skinner 1996; Victim Support 2006). In sum, as a body of evidence, these research findings support the hypothesis that hate crimes hurt more than parallel crimes in respect of the experience of post victimization distress. However, in illuminating the commonality of impacts and the greater severity of stress and trauma symptoms experienced by ‘hate crime’ victims as a group, the research literature on the matter to date has in general obscured the diversity of the experience of impacts among hate crime victims. There have been just a few exceptions to this trend. Craig-Henderson and Sloan (2003) have argued for instance, that the unique reaction by hate crime victims is due to their perception of their experience of victimization as an attack upon the core of their identity. Because of this, black minority victims of racist crime will experience the crime more acutely than white majority group victims because the crime serves as a painful reminder of the cultural heritage of past and ongoing discrimination, stereotyping and stigmatization of their identity group: “When an anti-black racist hate crime occurs it brings all of the dormant feelings of anger, fear and pain to the collective psychological forefront of the victim. This is not the case when whites are the target of racist hate crime” (Craig-Henderson & Sloan, 2003, p. 485). More recently, in employing an intersectional approach to examine how a sample of lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender people evaluated the severity of their experiences of HATE CRIMES HURT SOME MORE THAN OTHERS DOI: 10.1177/0886260514548584 6 hate crime, Meyer’s (2010) findings from his study involving semi-structured interviews with a non- random sample of forty-four respondents in New York City suggested that middle-class white respondents were more likely than low-income respondents of color to perceive their experiences as severe. This was chiefly because of differing expectations between the groups of the likelihood of hate crime victimization based on different reference groups victims used to interpret their experience. This article expands the research evidence even further by exploring the differential impacts of racist victimization as moderated and mediated by particular demographic and socio-economic characteristics of respondents (in other words, an ‘intersectional approach’) and also by type and frequency of crime victimization. Research design and sample The research involved a secondary analysis of data collected by the Crime Survey for England and Wales (formerly known as the British Crime Survey, but renamed from April 2012 to better reflect its geographic coverage) and obtained from the UK Data Archive 1 . The Crime Survey for England and Wales interviews approximately 46,000 respondents (aged 16 and over) every year. The survey is generally regarded as providing a more complete measure of crime compared with police records given that not all victims report crimes to the police for a well-known variety of reasons. The aim of the analysis reported here was to explore diversity among victims of racist crime in their experience of post victimization psychological impacts. It is the preferred practice, in the reporting of the survey findings by the U.K. Home Office which initiated and reports on the survey, for two years of data to be combined to give a sufficient sample size for fine-grained analysis without a too prolonged reference period. However, given that the analysis that was undertaken was concerned with within-group differences of the survey sample of 1 Material from Crown copyright records made available through the Home Office and the UK Data Archive has been used by permission of the Controller of Her Majesty's Stationery Office and the Queen's Printer for Scotland. HATE CRIMES HURT SOME MORE THAN OTHERS DOI: 10.1177/0886260514548584 7 victims of racist crime, rather than with generalizing beyond the sample to the wider population about the incidence or prevalence of crime, consideration of the reference period is not as significant. Hence the analysis combined three sweeps of the survey — from the 2009-10, 2010-11 and 2011-12 surveys (the three most recent data sets at the time of writing) — to enable sufficient sample sizes for logistic regression analyses. All respondents in the survey are asked whether they experienced certain types of crimes in the previous twelve months. Usually, just over one-fifth report being a victim of crime at least once. In its estimates of crime based on the Crime Survey for England and Wales the U.K. Home Office usually excludes reported threats captured by the survey because such incidents do not always meet the criteria of a criminal offence despite being assigned valid offence codes in the survey. However, given that public order offences such as threats constitute a substantial proportion of prosecuted racially aggravated offences in England and Wales the exclusion of threats from the analysis skews the reported picture of racist victimization. Threats are therefore included in the analyses presented in this paper. For each crime they report in the survey, respondents are asked an array of questions. One of the questions is: “Do you think the incident was racially motivated?” (In relying upon the victim’s perception about motivation behind the crime this question is susceptible to over-reporting because some crimes perceived by the victim to have been racially motivated could have been motivated by other reasons. By the same token, though, it is also susceptible to under-reporting because in some crimes victims might not be aware that they were targeted because of their ‘race’ or ethnicity). While respondents from each ethnic group reported some racially motivated crimes, minority ethnic group respondents were more likely than whites to report such crimes (Table 1) (survey respondents are asked to identify their ethnic group from a list of ethnic group categories used in the 2001 and 2011 U.K. censuses). Overall, just over one-in-fifty crimes captured by the survey were perceived by victims to have been racially motivated. However, the reported rate of racist crime victimization for minority groups was much higher: one-in-seven crimes experienced by Asian respondents, for HATE CRIMES HURT SOME MORE THAN OTHERS DOI: 10.1177/0886260514548584 8 instance, were believed by them to have been racially motivated, compared with just over one in a hundred for whites. (Table 1 about here) Racist language used by the offender was the most common reported indicator for respondents that an incident was racially motivated, along with the victim suggesting that they had been targeted because of their ‘race’ or country of origin (Table 2). (Table 2 about here) The core of the analysis reported in this paper was applied to the 441 incidents of crime believed by victims to have been racially motivated and reported by 398 respondents across the three sweeps of the survey used for the analysis (a number of respondents reported more than one discrete separate racially motivated crime and therefore completed more than one victim form, hence the difference between the number of incidents of crime and the number of victims. Victims of a series of related racially motivated crimes, the same crime under the same circumstances probably committed by the same people, are asked to complete only one victimization module for the most recent incident in the series). How ‘hate’ hurts in different ways: evidence from the Crime Survey for England and Wales To set the context for the results of the analysis to be reported, it is instructive to briefly review the major characteristics of the sample of victims of racially motivated crime, and the sample of incidents of racially motivated crime used in the analysis, in comparison to otherwise motivated crime reported in the survey. To take victims first, when comparing victims of racially motivated with otherwise motivated crimes (Table 3) victims of racially motivated crime were more likely to be in a younger age group, from a minority ethnic group, in a household with a low household income, and to be unemployed. HATE CRIMES HURT SOME MORE THAN OTHERS DOI: 10.1177/0886260514548584 9 (Table 3 about here) Statistically significant differences are evident for all these categories of respondents when comparing racially motivated crimes with otherwise motivated crimes. The apparent greater likelihood for males to be victims of racially motivated crime than otherwise motivated crime is just below, but on the margins of, statistical significance (Z= 1.89). To turn to the crimes, when comparing incidents of racially motivated and otherwise motivated crime (Table 4), it is evident that racially motivated crimes were more likely to involve interpersonal offences of violence with and without injury, and threats, and be part of a series of repeat victimization. As a group, victims in incidents of racially motivated crime were more likely to report that they had an emotional reaction following the incident and the differential between victims of racially motivated crime as a group and victims of parallel crime as a group widens further when the extent of the reported emotional reaction is considered. Victims of crimes perceived to be racially motivated were twice as likely as victims of otherwise motivated crimes to state that they had been affected “very much”. (Table 4 about here) The data therefore support the assertion that victims of racially motivated crime — as a group — experience greater negative impacts than victims of otherwise motivated crime. However, it is also apparent that not all victims of racially motivated and otherwise motivated crime report being emotionally affected, or report the same post-victimization effects. In the case of the latter, those victims who report having an emotional reaction are asked for every crime they report, “Which of these reactions did you personally have?” and are given a list of ten options (anger, annoyance, anxiety/panic attacks, crying/tears, depression, difficulty sleeping, fear, loss of confidence/feeling vulnerable, shock, and other) from which they can choose as many as apply. For each type of HATE CRIMES HURT SOME MORE THAN OTHERS DOI: 10.1177/0886260514548584 10 emotional reaction higher proportions of victims in crimes they believed to be racially motivated reported the symptoms, apart from the reaction of “annoyance”, when compared with victims of parallel crimes. The pattern of difference that can be observed, however, obscures variations in emotional reaction among victims of racist hate crime. First, in just under one in ten incidents, victims reported experiencing no emotional reaction. On this measure then, they were less affected than those victims of parallel crimes who did report having an emotional reaction. Second, the different emotional reactions comprising the list for multiple selection by respondents might be grouped into three separate categories of reaction: externalized reactions, internalized reactions, and a third group which combines both externalized and internalized reactions. Anger and annoyance can be considered to be externalized reactions. Anger is a natural response, a basic human reaction when a person feels wronged, or when they have been threatened or attacked. It can be manifest in feelings of retaliation, rage, revenge and aggression towards the source of the wrong doing (we include annoyance as a similar type of natural response). One quarter of the victims who perceived incidents of crime to be racially motivated who reported having an emotional reaction reported solely such an externalised reaction of anger, or annoyance, or both. By contrast, anxiety and panic attacks, crying and tears, depression, difficulty sleeping, fear, loss of confidence and feelings of vulnerability, and shock, are arguably all symptoms of hurt turned within the person who has been wronged (or internalized) rather than against the wrong doer. Almost one-in-five victims of crimes perceived to have been racially motivated reported such an internalized reaction, almost twice the proportion for victims of otherwise motivated crimes. Anger and annoyance can sometimes be positive responses when such emotions provide a force for change or activism against the source of the wrong doing. But they can also be destructive emotions when internalized, perhaps due to the person’s inability to redress or overcome the wrong inflicted, and they can become linked to other internalized reactions, especially in the long term. Hence a third category of emotional reactions can be established combining both externalized and internalized HATE CRIMES HURT SOME MORE THAN OTHERS DOI: 10.1177/0886260514548584 11 reactions for those respondents who reported both types of reaction. This was the largest category of emotional reaction with almost half (47.3%) of victims of crimes perceived to have been racially motivated reporting a syndrome of both externalised and internalized reactions compared with under a third (29.4%) of victims of parallel crimes. Although the data indicate that hate crimes hurt more in the respect that as a victim group, victims of racially motivated crime are more likely to report experiencing an emotional reaction to the crime compared with victims of parallel crimes, and they are more likely to experience internalized reactions, or a combination of externalized and internalized reactions, it is clear that not all victims react in the same way. Logistic regression was used to estimate how much the risk of experiencing the different types of post victimization reactions is increased or reduced according to demographic and socio-economic characteristics of victims and type and frequency of crime victimization. The aim of the logistic regression analysis was to explore the association between victim and victimization characteristics and the risk of experiencing the particular emotional reactions while controlling for the characteristics of the variables included in the analysis, rather than producing a model of best fit (as the purpose of the analysis was to expand understanding of the variation in impacts of hate crime upon victims rather than seeking to fully model an account for that diversity). The sub-sample of respondents who reported having no emotional reaction after experiencing a crime they perceived as being racially motivated was too small to undertake further analysis for all the variables of interest therefore the findings reported here are concerned with the three categories of reaction: externalized reactions, internalized reactions, and the syndrome of symptoms of both externalized and internalized reactions. The analysis showed some clear associations between victim and victimization characteristics and the risk of experiencing particular types of emotional reaction. The observations here are confined to those findings that were statistically significant (p ˂ 0.05). A summary of the significant associations is provided in Table 5. (Table 5 about here) HATE CRIMES HURT SOME MORE THAN OTHERS DOI: 10.1177/0886260514548584 12 Externalized reactions alone The odds of reporting the externalised reactions of only anger or annoyance or both (Table 6) were over three times greater for male victims of crime compared with female victims. Young people in the 16-29 age group had higher odds than the older age groups in reporting such externalised reactions alone. The odds of reporting externalized reactions were greater for white victims compared with non- white victims. When considering the type of crime, the odds of reporting externalized reactions were significantly greater for victims in incidents of property crime compared with incidents of personal crime or threats. And the odds of reporting externalized reactions alone were also significantly greater for victims who had experienced single separate incidents of crime compared with victims who had experienced a series of incidents or those who had experienced two or more separate and unrelated incidents. Internalized reactions alone When examining reported reactions of the internalized symptoms alone — anxiety and panic attacks, crying and tears, depression, difficulty sleeping, fear, loss of confidence and feelings of vulnerability, and shock — much of the pattern is the mirror opposite of the pattern for externalized symptoms of anger and annoyance in that female victims of incidents of racially motivated crime had over twice the odds of reporting internalized symptoms alone compared with male victims. The mid-age category of 30-59 had the greatest odds of reporting internalized symptoms. And the odds for victims in incidents of personal crime involving violence or threats for reporting internalized symptoms alone were greater when compared with victims of incidents of property crime. Syndrome of symptoms of both externalized and internalized reactions The odds of reporting both externalized and internalized symptoms combined were greater for female victims compared with males, for non-white victims compared with whites, victims in the youngest age category 16-29 compared with the other age groups, victims in the lowest household income category, and victims of a series of incidents. HATE CRIMES HURT SOME MORE THAN OTHERS DOI: 10.1177/0886260514548584 13 Implications for just outcomes for offenders The analysis presented in this paper demonstrates that as a group, victims of racist crime collectively experience greater emotional and psychological harms compared with victims of parallel crimes. The same appears to be the case for other groups of hate crime victims. Analysis of CSEW data has shown that disabled victims of hate crime as a group also report more damaging post-victimization psychological impacts than victims of parallel crimes (Coleman et al., 2013; Nocon et al., 2011) and the same is the case when victims of different types of identity-based crime are considered as one aggregate group (Botcherby et al., 2011; Iganski & Lagou 2014; Smith et al., 2012). The greater psychological and emotional damage is arguably inflicted by the message sent by the offender, by the sentiments conveyed by their crime: it is the offender’s expressed values that appear to hurt. Frederick Lawrence has argued that victims of ‘race-hate crime’ experience attacks as a form of racial stigmatisation and that an incident “carries with it the clear message that the target and his (sic) group are of marginal value” (Lawrence, 2006: 3). In essence, it is the values of the attacker striking at the core of the victim’s identity, which hurt more. However, advocates of enhanced sentencing in cases of hate crime do not argue that the offender should be punished more severely for their bad character as manifest in the values expressed in their crime. Neither, and consistent with the application of criminal sanction in the liberal polity (Jacobs 2013), do they propose that the enhanced sentence should serve to require virtuous character beyond encouraging critical reflection by the offender about how the expression of their particular values is consistent with participation in civil society. Instead, in applying the principle of retributive desert, they simply propose that the severity of the punishment should be proportionate to the severity of the criminal conduct. From this desert perspective, the imposition of more or less criminal sanction than the severity of the criminal conduct would be unfair (von Hirsch, 1998: 172). If bad values, or bad character, are excluded from the calculation of severity, criminal sanction should be determined by the relative harmful outcomes inflicted. Yet the evidence presented in this paper of the disparate outcomes in the post-victimization impacts experienced by hate crime victims raises a problem for the just sentencing of offenders if an indiscriminate uplift in penalty would be applied in all cases. Fundamentally, in taking the analysis beyond the type of findings about the mental trauma of hate crime that have already been published to date, the evidence HATE CRIMES HURT SOME MORE THAN OTHERS DOI: 10.1177/0886260514548584 14 presented in this paper demonstrates that there is considerable variation among victims of racist crime when it comes to their reported reactions. It is evident that not all victims react the same way, and some victims of racially motivated crime report less post-victimization distress than some victims of parallel crimes. The analysis shows therefore that victims of racially motivated crime are not a homogeneous group in terms of the emotional impact of the crimes (and neither are victims of parallel crimes for that matter). Although the evidence has yet to be established, given the already known similarities between different identity groups of hate crime victims in terms of the post-victimization trauma they experience, it is likely that there will also be considerable variation in the impacts felt among victims who are targeted because of their religion, sexual identity, or a disability they might have, for instance. This lack of uniformity in the impacts of hate crimes upon victims exposes a potential problem of justice in sentencing outcomes for offenders. Arguably, to justify a blanket uplift in penalty, every victim of hate crime must experience greater harms than every victim of parallel crime. The analysis presented in this paper shows that this is certainly not the case. If an indiscriminate penalty uplift would be applied, some hate crime offenders would potentially receive a higher sentence on the basis of the greater harms they are assumed to inflict even in instances where their victims experience less harm than victims in some cases of otherwise motivated but equivalent crimes where the offenders will receive lower penalties. The logical process for fair sentencing then, to avoid potential injustice for the offender, would arguably be for the victim impact to be demonstrated on a case-by-case basis to the satisfaction of the court that the impact of the hate crime on the victim is greater than would be the case in a parallel crime. Without evidence of the gravity of the hurts experienced by the victim to enable a calculation to be made of what proportionate sentence should fairly be imposed upon the offender, injustice will potentially prevail. Injustice will also prevail if in the absence of evidence of the nature and gravity of the impact the motivating sentiments of the offender are simply used as a proxy for the victim impact given that the variation in reported post-victimization distress among victims demonstrated by the analysis in this paper indicates that the motivating impulses of the offender serves as an unreliable proxy for the harmful outcomes inflicted. HATE CRIMES HURT SOME MORE THAN OTHERS DOI: 10.1177/0886260514548584 15 There are two potential solutions to this problem, but neither is satisfactory. First, it might be argued that to avoid injustice for offenders, discretion and flexibility in sentencing is necessary, with penalty enhancement applied only on a case-by-case basis where it is demonstrated that the impact of the hate crime is greater than would be the case in a parallel crime. The problem with this approach, however, is that it could compound the injustice already experienced by victims by further traumatizing them through the requirement to relive and recount their felt consequences of victimisation in the pursuit of justice for the offender. Second, it might be argued that a hate crime not only hurts the individual victim targeted as potentially each hate crime has many victims in respect of the vicarious, or terroristic, impacts they can have upon targeted communities (Iganski 2001), and such impacts could be used to determine sentencing. As is the case for the harmful outcomes experienced by the individual hate crime victim, it could be reasoned that for the just treatment of offenders in respect of determining their sentences, evidence of any such vicarious impacts must be clearly understood and presented to the court. This would conveniently avoid the problem of further victimisation for the primary victim who could be absolved from unfolding their own suffering before the court. However, to date, evidence about the vicarious impacts of hate crime stands little more than assertion as scholars have so far not convincingly demonstrated such impacts, apart from some small scale qualitative (Noelle 2001 & 2009) and non-generalizable research findings (Perry & Alvi 2012). There is little prospect at the moment then for reliable evidence about the vicarious impacts of hate crime to be brought before the courts, or to reliably inform the understanding of the courts to inform sentencing. Furthermore, it is likely that when such evidence might be produced reliably there is likely to be as much variation in the vicarious impacts as there is in the impacts experienced by individual victims. A way forward in adhering to the principle of retributive desert in the sentencing of hate crime offenders in light of the evidence of the disparate impacts of hate crime provided in this paper, is to step beyond the concern with the actual harmful outcomes of offenders’ actions to focus instead on the culpability of offenders for unleashing risks of harms (Alexander 2011) irrespective of the harmful outcomes that actually occur. Given that the evidence that hate crime as a category of crime inflicts greater harm than otherwise motivated crime is now well established, the culpability of the offender HATE CRIMES HURT SOME MORE THAN OTHERS DOI: 10.1177/0886260514548584 16 can be the primary consideration in deciding sentencing outcomes, not the actual harmful outcomes inflicted. To illustrate this, four different offender types might be distinguished with two different sentencing outcomes. The first type, the successful instrumental bigot, is fully cognizant of the risks of their actions and intends to inflict particular hurts which are in actuality suffered by the victim. The second type, the unsuccessful committed bigot, is also fully cognizant of the risks of their actions and also intends to inflict particular hurts. However, in this case the victim has the resilience or some other good fortune not to suffer the intended hurts. The disposal of both of these offenders should be exactly the same as it would be unfair for the second offender to benefit from the good fortune of targeting a resilient victim when they fully intended to inflict hurts upon them. In both cases the same enhanced penalty proportionate to the risks unleashed, but not necessarily inflicted, would be just in terms of the principle of retributive desert. It is likely, however, that such offenders will be in a small minority as most offenders will not be committed bigots or fully aware of the depth of risk of their actions given that most people will not be inclined to consult the scholarly evidence of the type cited in this paper of the particular hurts inflicted by acts of hate crime. There is a third type of offender then, the unfortunate expressive bigot, who intends to inflict some hurt, perhaps in an emotional outburst in the heat of the moment, or perhaps to have a laugh at the other person’s expense, or perhaps to go along and get along with friends, but who is not aware of the full depth of hurt they inflict upon their victim. Rather than an enhanced penalty, and in keeping with the growing repertoire of sentencing practices (Tonry, 2006), a rehabilitative (Iganski et al., 2011) or some other form of therapeutic intervention aimed at helping the offender manage their emotions in situations of heightened stress and to also begin to address the personal and social contexts for their offending will be more appropriate and just. As too will helping the offender to appreciate the full impact of their actions, perhaps involving reparation as well as retribution with a restorative justice component (Shenk, 2001; Walters & Hoyle, 2010; Gavrielides, 2012; Walters, 2014) or some other form of community mediation (Iganski et al., 2014), would be more appropriate, and more just, for the enhanced element of the sentence over and above the sentence for the predicate offense. The same would apply to a fourth type of offender, the fortunate expressive bigot, who also intends to inflict some hurt, but is not aware of the full depth of hurt they could have inflicted upon their victim had HATE CRIMES HURT SOME MORE THAN OTHERS DOI: 10.1177/0886260514548584 17 they been less resilient. An intervention with such an offender which seeks to raise their empathy for the victim, so that they might think twice before acting the same way again, would be more just in light of their lesser culpability than the infliction of added deprivation. Conclusion The evidence is now well established that hate crimes as a category of offence are more serious than similar but otherwise motivated crimes in respect of the greater post-victimization distress experienced by victims. However, the research evidence to date has obscured the diversity of impacts experienced by victims. This paper has taken the evidence in a new direction by presenting data to illuminate the variation in reported victim impacts. Such variation raises potential problems, however, for retributive desert justifications of enhanced penalties for hate crime offenders. If penalties are to be fairly proportionate to the harms inflicted they would need to be decided on a case-by-case basis with the evidence of the harms inflicted brought before the courts. Such an approach would mitigate against any blanket sentence enhancement in the case of hate crime over and above the predicate offense. The culpability of the offender, however, for unleashing the risk of harm irrespective of the actual harm that occurs, can fairly serve to inform sentence enhancement. Irrespective of the outcome of their actions, different offenders will have different awareness of the full depth of harm they might inflict and different intent to inflict such harms. Flexibility in sentencing, with rehabilitative and reparative dimensions for those with lesser culpability is therefore appropriate. References Alexander, L. (2011). ‘Culpability’, in J. Deigh and D. Dolinko (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Criminal Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Barnes, A. and Ephross, P.H. (1994). The impact of hate violence on victims - emotional and behavioural responses to attacks. Social Work, 39(3), 247-251. Botcherby, S. Glen, F. Iganski, P. Jochelson, K. & Lagou, S. (2011). Equality groups’ perceptions and experience of crime. Analysis of the British Crime Survey 2007-08, 2008-09 and 2009-10. Briefing Paper 4, London, UK: Equality and Human Rights Commission. HATE CRIMES HURT SOME MORE THAN OTHERS DOI: 10.1177/0886260514548584 18 Bruce, T. (2001). The New Thought Police. New York, NY: Three Rivers Press. Coleman, N., Sykes, W. & Walker, A. (2013). Crime and Disabled People. 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HATE CRIMES HURT SOME MORE THAN OTHERS DOI: 10.1177/0886260514548584 21 Table 1 Proportions of incidents of crime perceived to be racially motivated, by ethnic group Row percentages England & Wales, adults aged 16 and over % of incidents Unweighted base ALL INCIDENTS 2.3 35521 Ethnic group White 1.2 32450 Mixed *5.8 393 Asian or Asian British *14.3 1445 Black or Black British *6.1 785 Chinese or other *12.7 448 All minority ethnic groups *11.1 3071 Source: Crime Survey of England and Wales, 2009-10, 2010-11, 2011-12 Variables: racemot (recoded to exclude ‘don’t know’/refused), ethgrp2 *p ˂ 0.05 HATE CRIMES HURT SOME MORE THAN OTHERS DOI: 10.1177/0886260514548584 22 Table 2 Indicators of perceived racial motivation of crimes Column percentages England and Wales, adults aged 16 and over % of incidents ALL INCIDENTS BELIEVED TO BE RACIALLY MOTIVATED Because of victim’s race/country of origin 49.4 Racist language used 49.0 Because of offender’s race/country of origin 18.1 Because it has happened before 18.1 Because some people pick on minorities 9.5 Because offence only committed against minorities 8.3 Other 11.1 Don’t Know 0.4 Unweighted base 441 Source: Crime Survey of England and Wales, 2009-10, 2010-11, 2011-12 Variables: yracemoa – yracemoi, racemot (recoded to exclude ‘don’t know’/refused) HATE CRIMES HURT SOME MORE THAN OTHERS DOI: 10.1177/0886260514548584 23 Table 3. Characteristics of victims of racially motivated crimes compared with victims of otherwise motivated crimes Column percentages England & Wales, adults aged 16 and over Victims of otherwise motivated crime Victims of racially motivated crime Sex Male 51.1 *57.9 Female 48.9 *42.1 Unweighted base 27159 398 Age 16-29 32.8 *39.1 30-59 53.1 54.6 60+ 14.2 *6.2 Unweighted base 27159 398 Ethnic group White 88.7 *43.9 Non-white 11.3 *56.1 Unweighted base 27112 396 Total household income Less than £20.000 24.3 *35.9 £20.000-£39.999 24.3 22.8 £40.000 or more 28.8 *16.9 Not stated/not enough info 22.6 24.4 Unweighted base 27125 397 HATE CRIMES HURT SOME MORE THAN OTHERS DOI: 10.1177/0886260514548584 24 Respondent’s employment status Employed 67.4 *61.6 Unemployed 4.8 *9.4 Economically inactive 27.8 29.0 Unweighted base 27069 396 Source: Crime Survey of England and Wales, 2009-10, 2010-11, 2011-12 Variables: sex, agegrp, ethgrp3, tothhin3 (recoded), remploy, racemot (recoded to exclude ‘Don’t know’/refused) *p ˂ 0.05 HATE CRIMES HURT SOME MORE THAN OTHERS DOI: 10.1177/0886260514548584 25 Table 4. Characteristics of incidents of racially motivated crime compared with incidents of otherwise motivated crime Column percentages England & Wales, adults aged 16 and over Otherwise motivated incidents Racially motivated incidents Offence type Burglary/theft 41.7 *7.6 Criminal damage 19.5 15.7 Violence with injury 9.9 11.7 Violence without injury 8.7 *25.1 Other theft/attempted theft from the person 5.2 *0.9 Threats 15.0 *38.9 Unweighted base 35147 441 Summary offence type Property crimes 61.2 *23.3 Personal crimes of violence and theft/attempted theft from the person 23.7 *37.8 Threats 15.0 *38.9 Unweighted base 35147 441 Incident type Series 34.8 *50.2 Single 65.2 *49.8 Unweighted base 35147 441 One incident or two or more separate incidents for the same victim HATE CRIMES HURT SOME MORE THAN OTHERS DOI: 10.1177/0886260514548584 26 1 55.3 *85.7 2 or more 44.7 *14.3 Unweighted base 35147 441 Emotional reactions Yes 85.1 *91.8 No 14.9 *8.2 Unweighted base 35140 441 How much affected Very much 19.4 *39.0 Quite a lot 30.4 33.5 A little 50.2 *27.5 Unweighted base 29871 407 Types of emotional reactions Externalized 44.9 *23.7 Internalized 10.8 *18.5 Syndrome of externalized & internalized 29.3 *49.6 No reaction 15.0 *8.2 Unweighted base 34845 440 Source: Crime Survey of England and Wales, 2009-10, 2010-11, 2011-12 Variables: offence (recoded), pincid, emotreac (recoded to exclude ‘Don’t know’/refused), howaff1 (recoded to exclude ‘Don’t know’/refused), NMatch (Constructed variable that aggregates discrete incidents for each victim for each category of racemot Yes/No), (recoded to exclude ‘Don’t know’/refused), whemota-whemoti (recoded to create the types of emotional reactions groups) *p ˂ 0.05 HATE CRIMES HURT SOME MORE THAN OTHERS DOI: 10.1177/0886260514548584 27 Table 5. Types of emotional reactions Sex Age Ethnic group Total household income Respondent’s employment status Crime type Single or series One incident or two or more separate incidents for the same victim Externalised Male 16-29 White Property crime Single One Internalised Female 30-59 Personal crime, threats 2 or more Both externalised and internalised Female Non- white Less than £20.000 Series HATE CRIMES HURT SOME MORE THAN OTHERS DOI: 10.1177/0886260514548584 28 Table 6. Explanatory factors associated with the reporting of externalised reactions to incidents of crime believed by victims to have been racially motivated Dependent variable: Incidents for which respondents reported experiencing anger or annoyance (or both) following the crime. Variables B-coefficient Standard error p-value Odds ratio Confidence interval Constant -3.79 0.45 0.000 0.02 Sex Female Male 1.13 0.20 0.000 3.10 2.08 - 4.63 Age 16-29 0.80 0.20 0.000 2.23 1.50 - 3.33 30-59 0.000 60+ 0.01 0.38 0.973 1.01 0.48 - 2.12 Ethnic group White 0.55 0.18 0.003 1.73 1.21 - 2.46 Non-White Total household income Less than £20,000 0.591 £20,000 - £39.999 0.28 0.25 0.271 1.32 0.80 - 2.18 £40,000 or more 0.31 0.27 0.239 1.37 0.81 - 2.30 HATE CRIMES HURT SOME MORE THAN OTHERS DOI: 10.1177/0886260514548584 29 Not provided 0.21 0.24 0.388 1.23 0.77 - 1.98 Respondent’s employment status Employed 0.113 Unemployed -0.25 0.31 0.434 0.78 0.42 - 1.45 Economically active 0.38 0.22 0.087 1.47 0.95 - 2.28 Crime type Personal 0.002 Threats 0.12 0.21 0.575 1.13 0.74 - 1.71 Property 0.86 0.26 0.001 2.36 1.41 - 3.94 Single or series Single 0.49 0.18 0.008 1.62 1.14 - 2.32 Series One incident or two or more separate incidents for the same victim 1 0.60 0.29 0.37 1.83 1.04 - 3.21 2 or more Unweighted base 438 Categories in italics were those used as reference categories. Where categories of variables are statistically significant at the 95% level (p ˂ 0.05) values are highlighted in bold. HATE CRIMES HURT SOME MORE THAN OTHERS DOI: 10.1177/0886260514548584 30 Table 7. Explanatory factors associated with the reporting of internalised reactions to incidents of crime believed by victims to have been racially motivated Dependent variable: Incidents for which respondents reported experiencing any emotional reactions of (and any combination of) anxiety/panic attacks, crying/tears, depression, difficulty sleeping, fear, loss of confidence/feeling vulnerable or shock, following the crime. Variables B-coefficient Standard error p-value Odds ratio Confidence interval Constant -3.39 0.44 0.000 0.03 Sex Female 0.80 0.21 0.000 2.22 1.48 - 3.32 Male Age 16-29 0.000 30-59 1.14 0.23 0.000 3.13 1.98 - 4.95 60+ 0.37 0.51 0.472 1.44 0.53 - 3.92 Ethnic group White Non-White 0.12 0.20 0.546 1.13 0.76 - 1.66 Total household income Less than £20,000 0.925 £20,000 - £39.999 -0.16 0.28 0.566 0.85 0.50 - 1.46 HATE CRIMES HURT SOME MORE THAN OTHERS DOI: 10.1177/0886260514548584 31 £40,000 or more -0.15 0.31 0.619 0.86 0.47 - 1.57 Not provided -0.02 0.27 0.945 0.98 0.58 - 1.66 Respondent’s employment status Employed 0.671 Unemployed -0.18 0.42 0.664 0.83 0.37 - 1.89 Economically active 0.16 0.24 0.512 1.17 0.73 - 1.89 Crime type Personal 0.88 0.30 0.003 2.41 1.34 - 4.33 Threats 0.95 0.28 0.001 2.58 1.50 - 4.44 Property 0.002 Single or series Single Series -0.32 0.20 0.114 0.73 0.49 - 1.08 One incident or two or more separate incidents for the same victim 1 2 or more 1.22 0.25 0.000 3.37 2.05 - 5.54 Unweighted base 438 Categories in italics were those used as reference categories. HATE CRIMES HURT SOME MORE THAN OTHERS DOI: 10.1177/0886260514548584 32 Where categories of variables are statistically significant at the 95% level (p ≤ 0.05) values are highlighted in bold. HATE CRIMES HURT SOME MORE THAN OTHERS DOI: 10.1177/0886260514548584 33 Table 8. Explanatory factors associated with the reporting of both externalised and internalised reactions to incidents of crime believed by victims to have been racially motivated Dependent variable: Incidents for which respondents reported experiencing any emotional reactions of (and any combination of) anger, annoyance, anxiety/panic attacks, crying/tears, depression, difficulty sleeping, fear, loss of confidence/feeling vulnerable or shock, following the crime. Variables B-coefficient Standard error p-value Odds ratio Confidence interval Constant -0.19 0.30 0.522 0.82 Sex Female 0.45 0.16 0.006 1.56 1.14 - 2.14 Male Age 16-29 0.315 30-59 -0.03 0.17 0.879 0.97 0.70 - 1.36 60+ -0.53 0.36 0.138 0.59 0.29 - 1.19 Ethnic group White Non-White 0.41 0.15 0.008 1.50 1.11 - 2.02 Total household income Less than £20,000 0.001 HATE CRIMES HURT SOME MORE THAN OTHERS DOI: 10.1177/0886260514548584 34 £20,000 - £39.999 -0.86 0.22 0.000 0.42 0.28 - 0.65 £40,000 or more -0.09 0.22 0.694 0.92 0.59 - 1.42 Not provided -0.19 0.20 0.359 0.83 0.56 - 1.24 Respondent’s employment status Employed 0.032 Unemployed 0.16 0.27 0.566 1.17 0.69 - 1.98 Economically active -0.45 0.19 0.019 0.64 0.44 - 0.93 Crime type Personal 0.03 0.22 0.874 1.04 0.67 - 1.59 Threats -0.16 0.21 0.432 0.85 0.57 - 1.27 Property 0.490 Single or series Single Series 0.50 0.15 0.001 1.65 1.22 - 2.22 One incident or two or more separate incidents for the same victim 1 2 or more -0.23 0.22 0.298 0.79 0.51 - 1.23 Unweighted base 438 Categories in italics were those used as reference categories. HATE CRIMES HURT SOME MORE THAN OTHERS DOI: 10.1177/0886260514548584 35 Where categories of variables are statistically significant at the 95% level (p ˂ 0.05) values are highlighted in bold. 
work_m65y62ucazb77kd34c3btqp4ni	----	5.3ott.pdf The Politics of Negotiating Public Tragedy: Media Framing of the Matthew Shepard Murder Ott, Brian L. Aoki, Eric. Rhetoric & Public Affairs, Volume 5, Number 3, Fall 2002, pp. 483-505 (Article) Published by Michigan State University Press DOI: 10.1353/rap.2002.0060 For additional information about this article Access Provided by University of Kentucky at 12/08/11 6:01PM GMT http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/rap/summary/v005/5.3ott.html http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/rap/summary/v005/5.3ott.html This essay undertakes a detailed frame analysis of print media coverage of the Matthew Shepard murder in three nationally influential newspapers as well as Time magazine and The Advocate. We contend that the media’s tragic framing of the event, with an emphasis on the scapegoat process, functioned rhetorically to alleviate the public’s guilt concerning anti-gay hate crimes and to excuse the public of any social culpability. It also functioned ideologically to reaffirm a dominant set of discourses that socially stig- matizes gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgendered persons and to hamper efforts to cre- ate and enact a social policy that would prevent this type of violence in the future. A concluding section considers Burke’s notion of the “comic frame” as a potential correc- tive for the media’s coverage of public tragedies. Even before Matt died, he underwent a strange, American transubstantiation, seized, filtered, and fixed as an icon by the national news media dedicated to swift and con- sumable tragedy and by a national politics convulsed by gay rights. —Beth Loffreda, Losing Matt Shepard1 I n the blustery evening hours of Tuesday, October 6, 1998, Aaron McKinney andRussell Henderson lured 21-year-old Matthew Shepard from the Fireside Bar in Laramie, Wyoming, to a desolate field on the edge of town. There the two high school dropouts bound the frail, youthful Shepard to a split-rail fence, viciously bludgeoned him 18 times with the butt of a .357 magnum, stole his shoes and wal- let, and left him to die in the darkness and near-freezing temperatures. It was not until the evening of the next day that Aaron Kreifel, a passing mountain biker, dis- covered Shepard—his face so horribly disfigured that Kreifel told police he thought THE POLITICS OF NEGOTIATING PUBLIC TRAGEDY: MEDIA FRAMING OF THE MATTHEW SHEPARD MURDER BRIAN L. OTT AND ERIC AOKI Brian L. Ott and Eric Aoki are Assistant Professors of Speech Communication at Colorado State University in Fort Collins, Colorado. They contributed equally to this essay. The authors wish to thank Matthew Petrunia for his extensive research assistance and Drs. Karrin Anderson, Greg Dickinson, and Kirsten Pullen for their insightful comments on earlier drafts of this manuscript. © Rhetoric & Public Affairs Vol. 5, No. 3, 2002, pp. 483-505 ISSN 1094-8392 at first it was a scarecrow. The only portions of his face not covered in blood were those that had been streaked clean by his tears. Unconscious, hypothermic, and suf- fering from severe brain trauma, Shepard was astonishingly still alive. He was rushed to Poudre Valley Hospital in Fort Collins, Colorado, where he would die five days later without ever having regained consciousness. McKinney and Henderson had been apprehended prior to his death, and as the gruesome details of that night began to unfold, it became clear that Matthew Shepard was brutally murdered for being gay. In the weeks that followed, Shepard became a symbol of the deep preju- dice, hatred, and violence directed at homosexuals. Indeed, news of the event spawned vigils across the country and a nationwide debate about hate-crimes legis- lation. Shortly more than a year later, Henderson pled guilty and McKinney was convicted of murder. Both men are currently serving life sentences in the Wyoming State Penitentiary. The basic contours of this story remain vividly etched in our memories—mem- ories that have permanently altered our personal and public lives. Perhaps this event so profoundly affected both of us because, as educators in Colorado, we were less than five miles from the hospital where Matthew Shepard clung to life for five days in October 1998. Perhaps the memory still burns brightly for us because several stu- dents at our university mocked the event with a scarecrow and anti-gay epithets on a homecoming float even as Shepard lay comatose in the hospital across town. Perhaps the memory serves as a survival instinct, reminding us that being “out” in the community drastically alters the relation of our bodies to the landscape, and that cultural politics, discourse, and violence are intricately intertwined. Or per- haps, just perhaps, we fear the consequences of forgetting. We cling to the memory of Matthew Shepard because we sense that the nation has already forgotten, or worse, reconciled these events.2 How has an event that sparked so much interest, concern, and public discussion seeped from the collective consciousness of a nation and its citizenry? Why is hate-crimes legislation no longer a “hot” political issue? The answers to these questions we believe reside, at least in large part, in the man- ner in which the news media told this story. We also believe that the underlying form of the Matthew Shepard story may have resonance with the news media’s framing of other public traumas, from the shoot- ings at Columbine High School to the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, D.C., on September 11, 2001. Our aim in this essay, then, is to identify the underlying symbolic process and to analyze how it functions to construct and position citizens relative to the political process, and how it assists them in con- fronting and resolving public trauma. With regard to the Matthew Shepard murder, we contend that the news media’s tragic framing of that event works rhetorically and ideologically to relieve the public of its social complicity and culpability; to reaffirm a dominant set of discourses that socially stigmatizes gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgendered (GLBT) persons; and to hamper efforts to create and enact a 484 RHETORIC & PUBLIC AFFAIRS progressive GLBT social policy. To advance this argument, we begin by examining the literature on media framing. SYMBOLIC ACTION, FRAME ANALYSIS, AND THE NEWS MEDIA In The Philosophy of Literary Form, Kenneth Burke argues that art forms function as equipments for living, by which he means that discursive forms such as comedy, tragedy, satire, and epic furnish individuals and collectives with the symbolic resources and strategies for addressing and resolving the given historical and per- sonal problems they face.3 When there is a traumatic event such as the Matthew Shepard murder, then, discourse—and especially the public discourse of the news media—aids people in “coming to terms” with the event. For Burke, different dis- cursive forms equip persons to confront and resolve problems in different ways. “[E]ach of the great poetic forms,” he contends, “stresses its own peculiar way of building the mental equipment (meanings, attitudes, character) by which one han- dles the significant factors of his time.”4 That different discursive forms offer differ- ent mental equipments is significant because it frames what constitutes acceptable political and social action. Identifying prevailing discursive forms is a never-ending critical task, as symbolic forming is linked to the environment in which it occurs and new discursive forms are continually emerging. In Burke’s words, “the conven- tional forms demanded by one age are as resolutely shunned by another.”5 Thus, to understand how the public made sense of and responded to the Shepard murder, one must attend to the underlying symbolic form of the discourse surrounding it. One approach to analyzing discursive forms and the attendant attitudes (incip- ient actions) they foster toward a situation is by examining what Burke has called “terministic screens”6 and media critics—drawing on a sociological perspective— have called “frame analysis.”7 Frame analysis looks to see how a situation or event is named/defined, and how that naming shapes public opinion. It accomplishes this analysis by highlighting the inherent biases in all storytelling, namely selectiv- ity (what is included and excluded in the story?), partiality (what is emphasized and downplayed in the story?), and structure (how does the story formally play out?). One example of framing in the news media is the distinction between “episodic” stories and “thematic” stories. “The episodic frame,” according to Shanto Iyengar and Adam Simon, “depicts public issues in terms of concrete instances or public events . . . [and] makes for ‘good pictures.’ The thematic news frame, by contrast, places public issues in some general or abstract context . . . [and] takes the form of a ‘takeout’ or ‘backgrounder’ report directed at general out- comes.”8 Though few news reports are exclusively episodic or thematic, the domi- nance of episodic frames in the news has been established in multiple studies.9 How a story is framed in the news affects both how the public assigns responsibil- ity for a traumatic event and “how people following the debate think about policy THE MEDIA FRAMING OF THE MATTHEW SHEPARD MURDER 485 options and preferred outcomes.”10 To appreciate fully the political and ideologi- cal implications of framing, however, the critic must do more than simply classify a news story as episodic or thematic. The subtle ebb and flow of symbolic forms is crucial to how they interpellate subjects and do the work of ideology. To get after these subtleties, we undertook a detailed frame analysis of the news coverage of the Matthew Shepard murder in the Washington Post, the New York Times, and the Los Angeles Times—three “large, nationally influential newspapers.”11 Since we were curious about how this story has been framed over time, we examined the news coverage from October 10, 1998 (when the story was first reported nationally), to December 2001 (roughly two years after McKinney was convicted). This approach generated a sample containing 71 news articles. Wanting to see if the coverage varied in publications with notably dif- ferent politics, we also analyzed the news coverage in Time magazine and The Advocate over the same period. These magazines allowed us to compare and con- trast the coverage of the event in a mainstream weekly with the coverage in an alter- native news source specifically committed to issues affecting the GLBT community. Based on an analysis of these five news outlets, we identified four phases in the print media’s framing of the Matthew Shepard story: naming the event, making a politi- cal symbol, expunging the evil within, and restoring the social order. In the follow- ing section, we describe each of these phases and the symbolic processes they entail. THE MATTHEW SHEPARD STORY All stories have form, which is to say they are temporally structured—creating and fulfilling appetites as they unfold.12 As C. Allen Carter notes: When the narrative strategy is working as intended, the culmination of each episode sets the stage for the next . . . The story relieves its audience of the burden of having to ‘choose between’ different phases of its unfolding and, simply by taking them through one phase, prepares them for the next. Each successive step of the plot leads into the next, whether or not it leads its audience astray.13 Naming the Event Given the formal characteristics of narrative, how a story begins is crucial to how a story develops. In this section, we examine how the Matthew Shepard story is framed in initial news reports and analyze how that framing functions rhetorically. To fully appreciate how this story begins, however, we must first look at when it begins. The Washington Post, New York Times, and Los Angeles Times did not run feature articles on Matthew Shepard until October 10, 1998, three days after he was discovered. The reason for the media’s delay in treating the story as a national news 486 RHETORIC & PUBLIC AFFAIRS item likely has to do with how the news is made. An event is selected to become a major news story based on its potential for drama. As W. Lance Bennett notes, “It is no secret that reporters and editors search for events with dramatic properties and then emphasize those properties in their reporting.”14 Prior to October 8, little was known about the details of the attack outside the Albany County sheriff ’s depart- ment. During a local press conference on that day, Sheriff Gary Puls told reporters that, “[Matthew] may have been beaten because he was gay . . . [and that he] was found by a mountain biker, tied to a fence like a scarecrow.”15 Local reporters cov- ering the story immediately seized on the anti-gay aspect of the crime and the cru- cifix symbolism of the scarecrow image—two dramatic elements that quickly drew the attention of the national press.16 Matthew Shepard was officially “good melodrama” and the reports in the main- stream media that followed focused almost exclusively on two elements, the deplorable motives of Henderson and McKinney and the gruesome character of the scene. Indeed, these aspects of the story are evident in the initial headlines from all three papers we analyzed: “Gay Man Beaten and Left For Dead; 2 Are Charged,”17 “Gay Student Brutally Beaten; 4 Arrested,”18 and “Gay Man Near Death After Beating, Burning; Three Held in Wyoming Attack Near Campus; Hate Crimes Suspected.”19 The qualifier “gay” that begins each headline constructs the victim’s sexuality as the focal point of the story, despite Laramie Police Commander O’Dalley’s public claim at the time that “robbery was the chief motive.”20 The news media’s devotion to drama virtually insured that sensationalistic descriptions of Matthew Shepard’s body would lead every story. In its first feature article, the Washington Post emphasized the savage and dehumanizing aspects of the crime, reporting that “Matthew Shepard, slight of stature, gentle of demeanor . . . was tied to a fence like a dead coyote . . . [with] his head badly battered and burn marks on his body.”21 Likewise, the New York Times began, “At first, the passing bicyclist thought the crumpled form lashed to a ranch fence was a scarecrow. But when he stopped, he found the burned, battered and nearly lifeless body of Matthew Shepard, an openly gay college student.”22 The “scarecrow” image was also referenced in the Los Angeles Times, which began, “A gay University of Wyoming student was brutally beaten, burned and left tied to a wooden fence like a scarecrow, with grave injuries including a smashed skull.”23 The graphic and gruesome images of violence visited upon Shepard’s body were shocking and traumatic, and they begged the question, “How could something like this happen?” As unthinkable and unimaginable as the act seemed, the basic outline of the story already portrayed an answer—hatred fueled by homophobia. The naming of the attack as a “vicious . . . anti-gay hate crime”24 would prove pivotal in the heated political discussion to ensue. Key details, terms, and structures were already setting the stage for how the story must unfold. For instance, the near exclusive focus in early press reports on THE MEDIA FRAMING OF THE MATTHEW SHEPARD MURDER 487 the brutality done to Matthew Shepard’s body functioned in two interrelated ways. First, it personalized the event, making Shepard the center of the story. This was not, and never would become, a story about hate crimes in which Matthew Shepard was simply an example. It was a story about Shepard, in which hate was the motive for violence. One consequence of personalized news, according to Bennett, “[is that it] gives preference to the individual actors and human-interest angles in events while downplaying institutional and political considerations that establish the social con- text for those events.”25 In the Matthew Shepard story, hatred and homophobia—as we will demonstrate shortly—would come to be framed primarily as character flaws of the chief antagonists, rather than as wide-scale social prejudices that routinely result in violence toward gays and lesbians. Second, the repeated emphasis on the hideousness of the crime in both its barbarity and motivation profoundly disrupted the moral and social order. The images and descriptions were not only traumatic, they were traumatizing; they functioned to unsettle and even undermine the public’s faith in basic civility and humanity. So great was the disruption to the social order that even at this early stage it fostered a desire for resolution.26 For this story, for Matthew Shepard’s story, to end (as all news stories must), responsibility had to be assigned and order had to be restored. Since this story centered on Shepard, respon- sibility had a face, or rather two faces, Russell Henderson and Aaron McKinney. But before they would come into focus, Shepard would be transformed into a national political symbol. Making a Political Symbol Even before his death, Shepard had become “a national symbol for the campaign against hate crimes and anti-gay violence.”27 A website created by Poudre Valley Hospital to provide updates on his condition “drew over 815,000 hits from around the world.”28 On Saturday, October 10, students, faculty, and community members from Laramie gathered for the University of Wyoming’s homecoming parade, where “amid the usual hoopla . . . hundreds of people donned yellow arm bands and marched in tribute to Shepard and the belief that intolerance has no place in the Equality State.”29 Throughout the weekend, candlelight vigils for Shepard would be held across the country, with a Los Angeles memorial attracting an estimated 5,000 concerned citizens. Then, in the early morning hours of Monday, October 12, 1998, one day after National Coming Out Day, Matthew Shepard passed away with his parents at his beside. With the news of Shepard’s death, a nation already stricken with grief was plunged even deeper into emotional turmoil. As Reverend Anne Kitch asked in her homily at Shepard’s funeral, “How can we not let our hearts be deeply, deeply trou- bled? How can we not be immersed in despair, how can we not cry out against this? This is not the way it is supposed to be. A son has died, a brother has been lost, a 488 RHETORIC & PUBLIC AFFAIRS child has been broken, torn, abandoned.”30 The Matthew Shepard story had struck a chord. It had “electrified gay America,”31 and it had done much more. As Post reporters Justin Gillis and Patrice Gaines noted: For the first time, in cities across the United States and Canada, straight people . . . marched by the thousands to protest anti-gay violence. More than 60 marches and vigils have taken place since his death, and others are scheduled for today. People rallied in New York, Atlanta and Miami—and in West Lafayette, Ind., Fort Collins, Colo., and Corner Brook, Newfoundland. Under an indigo sky, on the steps of the Capitol, a crowd of sev- eral thousand gathered last week to hold candles aloft, celebrate Shepard’s life and demand that Congress pass legislation to battle hate crimes. “Now!” they cried.32 Among the thousands at the candlelight vigil on the Capitol steps in Washington were actresses Ellen DeGeneres and Kristen Johnson, and numerous congressional representatives, who not only condemned the beating death of Shepard but also urged immediate passage of a federal hate crimes bill.33 Earlier in the week, President Clinton had also pushed “Congress to pass the Hate Crimes Prevention Act . . . [which] would broaden the definition of hate crimes to include assaults on gays as well as women and the disabled.”34 As The Advocate would report a year later, there was little doubt that “Matthew Shepard’s murder turned equal rights and protections for gays and lesbians into topics of nationwide debate.”35 But how had Shepard been transformed into a martyr—“the most recognizable symbol of antigay violence in America”36—and what did that transformation mean for the political debate taking place? The previous year had seen “at least 27 gay peo- ple murdered in apparent hate crimes. . . . And the murders are only the extreme end of the spectrum of anti-gay attacks. A coalition that monitors anti-gay violence and harassment documented 2,445 episodes last year in American cities.”37 Though the motive for Shepard’s murder was hardly an isolated incident, two aspects of this story made it unique and especially well suited for seizing the public’s imagination. The first factor, of course, was the figure at its center. As Brian Levin, director of the Center on Hate and Extremism at Richard Stockton College in Pomona, New Jersey, told the Washington Post, “You can’t get a more sympathetic person to face such a brutal attack than Matt Shepard. He looked like an all-American nice kid next door who’d look after your grandmother if you went out of town. He looked like a sweet kid and he was.”38 Shepard was “white and middle-class,” “barely on the threshold of adulthood,” and “frail [in] appearance.”39 Because of his slight stature, a mere 5’2”, and “cherubic face” even those uncomfortable with homosexuality saw him as an innocent (that is, sexually nonthreatening) victim. The public identified with Shepard, viewing him as friend and son. The second factor that contributed to the emerging mythology was the dramatic structure of the narrative. Jack Levin, professor of sociology and criminology at THE MEDIA FRAMING OF THE MATTHEW SHEPARD MURDER 489 Northeastern University, speculates that, “If Matthew had died instantly of a gun- shot wound to the head, his death may not have gotten as much publicity.”40 That Shepard lay comatose in a hospital for several days while people around the coun- try prayed and stood vigil for him functioned to heighten the public’s investment in the story. Moreover, it was during those days of vigil that the “heinous” and “morose” details of the crime were repeated over and over again in the news media. The juxtaposition of Shepard’s ability to evoke identification with the crime’s incomprehensibility shattered society’s “‘veneer of congeniality,’ and prompted a collective self-examination.”41 In other words, the public’s inability to quickly and easily reconcile Matthew Shepard’s innocence (unlike most gay men, he didn’t have this coming to him) with his “lynching” was a significant source of shame for the country and created wide-scale public guilt. As Steve Lopez wrote in Time maga- zine, “Shepard has ignited a national town hall meeting on the enduring hatred that shames this country” (emphasis added).42 But guilt demands redemption, for as Burke reminds, “who would not be cleansed!” and redemption needs a redeemer, “which is to say, a Victim!”43 Though guilt can be resolved symbolically in a variety of ways, ranging from transcendence to mortification, the tragic framing of the Matthew Shepard story foretold that purification would be achieved through vic- timage and the scapegoat process. Expunging the Evil Within In A Grammar of Motives, Burke contends that, “Criminals either actual or imagi- nary may . . . serve as [curative] scapegoats in a society that ‘purifies itself ’ by ‘moral indignation’ in condemning them.”44 This is not to suggest, however, that those seeking to “ritualistically cleanse themselves” of guilt can simply blame a chosen party. The “scapegoat mechanism” is a complex process that entails three distinctive stages: “(1) an original state of merger, in that the iniquities are shared by both the iniquitous and their chosen vessel; (2) a principle of division, in that elements shared in common are being ritualistically alienated; (3) a new principle of merger, this time in the unification of those whose purified identity is defined in dialectical opposition to the sacrificial offering.”45 For a “sacrificial vessel” to perform the role of “vicarious atonement,” it must be, at first, “profoundly consubstantial with . . . those who would be cured by attacking it.”46 It must represent their iniquities, because symbolic forms that manage guilt can only be “successful if the audience is guilty of the sins portrayed in the discourse.”47 Though the very earliest news reports about the hatred and violence directed at Shepard had identified Aaron McKinney and Russell Henderson as the main perpetrators, those same news reports cast the two as representative of both their local and national communities. As McKinney and Henderson were being arraigned, a significant amount of dis- course was being generated about the state of Wyoming and the “cowboy culture” 490 RHETORIC & PUBLIC AFFAIRS that had nurtured them.48 It was widely reported, for instance, that Wyoming was one of only nine U.S. states to “have no hate-crime laws.”49 Another report noted that, “Although Wyoming often bills itself as the ‘equality state,’ the state Legislature has repeatedly voted down hate crime legislation”; the article subsequently quotes Marv Johnson, executive director of the Wyoming chapter of the American Civil Liberties Union, as saying, “Wyoming is not really gay friendly. . . . The best way to characterize that is by a comment a legislator made a few years back, when he likened homosexuals to gay bulls as worthless and should be sent to the packing plant.”50 Similarly, Susanna Goodin, the University of Wyoming’s Ethics Center director, told the Washington Post, “the beating [would] . . . prompt Wyoming resi- dents to ponder the price of intolerance and indifference” (emphasis added).51 In routinely referencing the “homophobia in the Wyoming legislature”52 and noting that, in light of the attack, Laramie, Wyoming, “wrestled with its attitudes toward gay men” (emphasis added),53 the news media initially framed the community’s attitudes as consistent with the perpetrators’ attitudes. In fact, when jury selection began for the trial of Henderson in March 1999, his defense attorney, Wyatt Skaggs, was rather reflective about this association and told potential jurors, “[The media] . . . has literally injected into our community a feeling of guilt. The press wants us to think that we are somehow responsible for what went on October 6. Are any of you here going to judge this case because you feel guilty and want to make a state- ment to the nation?”54 Nor was Wyoming alone in being identified with the perpetrators’ attitudes and motives. As Lopez observed in Time magazine, “The cowboy state has its rednecks and yahoos, for sure, but there are no more bigots per capita in Wyoming than in New York, Florida or California.”55 In the first few days after the attack, the public was forced, if only temporarily, to confess the prevalence of homophobic attitudes around the country. First was the incident involving the scarecrow on a homecom- ing float at Colorado State University, which was reportedly painted with anti-gay epithets.56 “While the papers were reluctant to report the full range of insults,” Loffreda notes, “I heard that the signs read ‘I’m Gay’ and ‘Up My Ass.’”57 This inci- dent prompted a number of reports about the prevalence of homophobic attitudes in schools around the country.58 Additionally, there were widely circulated news stories about the protestors at Shepard’s funeral. Shortly before he was eulogized, Tom Kenworthy writes, “a dozen anti-gay protestors from Texas and Kansas staged a demonstration across from St. Mark’s, carrying signs saying ‘No Fags in Heaven’ and ‘No Tears for Queers.’ . . . [including] a young girl carrying a sign that read ‘Fag=Anal Sex.’”59 In light of these stories, it was hardly surprising that a Time/CNN poll found that “68 percent [of respondents] said attacks like the one against Shepard could happen in their community” (emphasis added).60 For a few weeks following the attack, the message in the media was that McKinney and Henderson shared much in common with the country. But all of that was about to change. THE MEDIA FRAMING OF THE MATTHEW SHEPARD MURDER 491 “At one moment the chosen [party] is a part of the clan, being one of their num- ber,” explains Carter; “a moment later it symbolizes something apart from them, being the curse they wish to lift from themselves.”61 Division or the “casting out” of the vessel of unwanted evils is accomplished through vilification and through a redrawing of boundaries that excludes the scapegoat. Slowly, almost unnoticeably, discourse in the news media was shifting from the country’s homophobia to that of the perpetrators, where it was being recoded as a character flaw rather than a wide- scale institutional prejudice. In a statement demarcating the new communal boundaries, Wyoming governor Jim Geringer told the Washington Post, “Wyoming people are discouraged that all of us could be unfairly stereotyped by the actions of two very sick and twisted people.”62 Accounts were also now suggesting that the two perpetrators were uniquely ignorant. Time magazine noted that the two men were “high school dropouts,” adding that, “In addition to being an unspeakably grue- some crime, it was a profoundly dumb one.”63 After all, McKinney and Henderson had drawn undue attention to themselves by getting into a fistfight with two other men after beating Shepard. Reports such as this one functioned not only to cast the men as especially dull-witted, but also to highlight a pattern of violence and crimi- nality—one that would be further reinforced in subsequent reports about their pre- vious run-ins with the law, including convictions for felony burglary and drunk driving. Additionally, there was the matter of deception, premeditation, and merci- less cruelty. The news media were now reporting that, according to law enforce- ment, the two men had pretended to be gay to lure Shepard out of the bar and into their pickup truck, and that they had continued to beat him as he begged for his life.64 As time passed, Shepard’s attackers became ever more alienated from the public. They were uneducated, drug addicted, career criminals, who had maliciously sought out their victim because he was gay, and they now “found themselves called ‘subhu- man’ and ‘monsters.’”65 In an uncharacteristic moment of reflective journalism, a Los Angeles Times staff writer comments on Henderson and McKinney’s vilification: In the six months since Shepard’s gruesome death, the protagonists have become dehumanized . . . transmuted by the American compulsion for fashioning moral lessons out of tragedy. This morality play staged in a Western prairie town has demanded simplistic roles: Shepard, the earnest college student who was targeted because he was gay and gave his life to advance a social cause. Henderson and McKinney, the high school dropouts accused of beating Shepard to death, have been cast as remorseless killers. 66 The symbolic distance between the public and McKinney and Henderson grew even wider during McKinney’s trial in October 1999, where gruesome new details from the night of the beating were revealed. The news media seized on one detail in 492 RHETORIC & PUBLIC AFFAIRS particular, in which McKinney stopped beating Shepard to ask if he could read the license plate on his truck. When Shepard replied, “yes” and recited the plate’s num- bers, McKinney resumed the attack despite Shepard’s repeated pleas for mercy. The story embodied the view that McKinney was not quite human, and prosecuting attorney Cal Rerucha retold it in his closing arguments, calling McKinney a “savage and a ‘wolf ’ who preyed on the lamb-like Shepard.”67 As if to further distinguish McKinney from the public, following his conviction the news media widely reported that various national, leading gay rights groups had, along with the Shepard family, publicly condemned the death penalty in this case. As Matthew Shepard’s father, Dennis Shepard, would tell the court in a written statement fol- lowing the trial, “this is a time to begin the healing process. To show mercy to some- one who refused to show any mercy.”68 Mr. Shepard’s statement captured the essence of how the media was naming the difference between the public and the perpetrators, one human and the other not quite. Restoring the Social Order With the surrogate of evil driven from the community, all that remains for creating symbolic closure is the punishment of evil and the reaffirmation of the social and moral order. “Tragedy,” explains Barry Brummett, “subjects the erring [figure] to trial, finds him or her to be criminal, and demands condemnation and penance.”69 In March 1999, Russell Henderson pled guilty, leaving only McKinney to stand trial. The significance of the trial to the outcome of the story was evident before it even began. “The trial will,” wrote Kenworthy in the Washington Post, “close the book on an ugly crime that grabbed the nation by the shoulders and forced it to confront the price of hate and intolerance—and then served as a rallying point . . . for gay rights” (emphasis added).70 During the case, McKinney’s lawyers attempted to advance a “gay panic defense,” which claimed the victim’s sexual advances triggered panic and led to the beating. But Judge Barton Voigt ruled it “inadmissible . . . based on Wyoming law,” and on November 3, 1999—shortly more than a year after Matthew Shepard’s death—Aaron McKinney was convicted of murder and sentenced to two consecutive life terms with no chance of parole. “The trial,” observed Phil Curtis in The Advocate, “delivered an emotionally satisfying vindication for Shepard’s death and brought closure to the Shepard family and to the public, who had followed the grim case for the past year” (emphasis added).71 As odd, perhaps even unbelievable, as it seems, the verdict did deliver both symbolic satisfaction and closure for some. Explains Robert Heath, “As a dynamic progression of an idea, each work [that is, story] leads toward some resolution. If it is achieved, reader and author experience a release, the sheer pleasure of having gone through the process.”72 To the extent that the story began with the brutal beating of Matthew Shepard, the conviction and punishment of his assailants signals its close. THE MEDIA FRAMING OF THE MATTHEW SHEPARD MURDER 493 But the conviction of McKinney had an additional and important side effect. In performing a cathartic function for the public (that is, purging them of their guilt through victimage) and bringing closure to the story, it also brought a sense of res- olution to the debate about gay rights and hate-crimes legislation that Shepard’s death had initiated. Since these issues had been framed in relation to the story about Matthew Shepard’s murder, the story’s conclusion functioned to bring closure to them as well. The national public debate over hate crimes and gay politics dissipated almost as quickly as it had emerged. Two weeks following Shepard’s death in October 1998, a Time/CNN poll asked respondents, “Federal law mandates increased penalties for people who commit hate crimes against racial minorities. Do you favor or oppose the same treatment for people who commit hate crimes against homosexuals?”73 At that time, 76 percent of the public favored hate-crimes legisla- tion that protected homosexuals and 19 percent opposed it.74 In the months fol- lowing his death, legislation to increase the penalty for hate crimes against gays and lesbians was introduced in 26 states. By the time these bills came up for vote, how- ever, the Matthew Shepard story was winding toward narrative conclusion, and only one state, Missouri, passed new legislation.75 Perhaps even more telling, The Advocate reports that, “After McKinney’s conviction Judy and Dennis Shepard . . . traveled to Washington, D.C., to lobby for federal hate-crimes legislation. Their effort failed. A hate-crimes measure was removed from a budget bill in congres- sional committee just weeks after the trial.”76 In fostering symbolic resolution through narrative closure, the news media’s coverage of the story re-imposed order and eliminated the self-reflective space that might serve as the basis for social and political change. FRAMING AND REFRAMING Having described the news media’s framing of the Matthew Shepard story and hav- ing analyzed how those frames functioned rhetorically to absolve the public of its guilt associated with the motives of the murder, we will now take a step back and pose the question, “What difference do the frames make for the larger world?”77 That is, how does the news media’s framing of that event also function ideologi- cally? How does it invite the public to view the world, social relations, and GLBT identities? How does it affirm, challenge, and negotiate centers, margins, and rela- tionships of power? To get after these questions, we propose to look at the way in which the story works to naturalize particular sets of social relations at both the level of language (microscopic) and the level of symbolic form (macroscopic).78 With regard to the linguistic level, we are specifically interested in the consequences of the media’s “naming” of the victim’s body and the perpetrators’ motives. Prejudice and discrimination against GLBT persons have historically been con- nected to the stigmatization of the body as different or abnormal.79 In fact, Erving 494 RHETORIC & PUBLIC AFFAIRS Goffman notes that, “The Greeks, who were apparently strong on visual aids, origi- nated the term stigma to refer to bodily signs designed to expose something unusual and bad about the moral status of the signifier.”80 The homosexual body has tradi- tionally been stigmatized or marked as abnormal in a wide variety of ways; it has var- iously been coded as dirty and unclean, effeminate and queer, and threatening and predatory to suit the needs of those in power.81 One way the bodies of gay men have been stigmatized as threatening and predatory, for instance, is “with the allegation that they are disproportionately responsible for child sexual abuse.”82 The obvious ridiculousness of this claim has not stopped the media from perpetuating it, and a 1998 study of Newsweek found that 60 percent of stories about child molestation involved homosexuals.83 This pattern of naming in the media raises an important question about the Matthew Shepard story: “Would Shepard have received the atten- tion he did had his body not so easily been coded as unthreatening?” Though there is no way to answer this question with certainty, one thing that is clear is that Shepard’s body was coded as unthreatening and his story captured national headlines. Writing in The Progressive, JoAnn Wypijewski speculated that one reason people uncomfortable with homosexuality may have sympathized with this case is because for them, “Shepard is the perfect queer: young, pretty, and dead.”84 Indeed, it is difficult not to wonder how this story might have been told dif- ferently, if at all, had the victim been a minority, especially when the murder of Fred Martinez, a 16-year-old transgendered Navajo in Colorado hardly raised an eye- brow,85 as did the murder of Arthur Warren, a gay black man, in rural West Virginia,86 and the murder of five black gay men in Washington “by someone authorities believe to be an antigay serial killer.”87 The media’s double standard here would seem to suggest that an anti-gay murder is tragic so long as the victim is not too gay, which is to say, too different. The issue of Shepard’s small, non-threatening stature raises still more questions about the intersection of stigmatization and the gay male body. In McKinney’s trial, the defense attempted to shift responsibility for the beating back to the victim by claiming that Shepard’s homosexuality had evoked fear and panic. Though Judge Voight ruled this line of argument and testimony “inadmissi- ble,” he cautiously reminded the media that his ruling was “not intended to send a social or political commentary, [and rather] was based on Wyoming law.”88 In other anti-gay hate crimes where the victim was not as outwardly innocent (that is, frail, youthful, white, middle-class) as Matthew Shepard, the “gay panic” defense has been allowed.89 The use of such a defense is not all that surprising, however, when one considers its ideological consistency with the term used to name the motive in such cases, “homophobia.” According to Byrne Fone, “The term ‘homophobia’ is now popularly construed to mean fear and dislike of homosexuality and of those who practice it” or an “extreme rage and fear reaction to homosexuals.”90 Both def- initions “place the onus on the oppressed rather than on the agents of oppression,”91 THE MEDIA FRAMING OF THE MATTHEW SHEPARD MURDER 495 effectively revictimizing the victim by making the oppressed the source, the instiga- tor, of fear and disruption. The popularity of the term “homophobia” to describe anti-gay attitudes is just one example of how public discourse regarding GLBT per- sons continues to construct homosexuality as abnormal (in this case, “fear-produc- ing”). In the Matt Shepard story, homosexuality was further marked as different and hence deviant by the media’s consistent and ubiquitous references to Shepard’s “gay” sexuality. There were no headlines that reported, “Man Killed by Straight Attackers,” and no articles that named Henderson or McKinney’s sexuality. In treat- ing heterosexuality as invisible, the media both privilege it as the norm and as nor- mal. At the level of language, then, the media’s telling of the Matthew Shepard story functions to reproduce a hegemonic set of sociocultural categories in which homo- sexuality is marginal and Other. Until the unspoken assumptions that frame the dominant discourses about GLBT persons are questioned and interrogated, hatred and the violence it begets are likely to remain prominent features of our cultural landscape. Like the linguistic particularities, we believe that the underlying symbolic form of the story matters ideologically, and so we turn now to the “big picture,” to, as Burke explains, the various typical ways that the most basic of attitudes (that is, yes, no, maybe) are “grandly symbolized.”92 Symbolic forms can be, according to Burke, loosely grouped into “frames of acceptance” and “frames of rejection” based on the general orientation they adopt in “the face of anguish, injustice, disease, and death.”93 Literary forms such as epic, tragedy, and comedy are frames of acceptance because they equip persons to “come to terms” with an event and their place in the world. Precisely how they “come to terms” varies according to the symbolic form (that is, epic, tragedy, comedy, and so forth) at work, and influences, in turn, where they and the world can go with those terms. In shaping attitudes, symbolic forms serve as a basis for programmatic action. Our analysis of the Matthew Shepard story suggests that it was framed primarily in tragic terms, in which the public, through the scapegoat mechanism, cleansed itself of the guilt associated with prejudice, hatred, violence, and their intersection. The shortcoming of tragic framing is that it brings about symbolic resolution without turning the event into a lesson for those involved. By projecting its iniquity upon McKinney and Henderson and attacking them, the public achieves resolution in this instance, but does not substantively alter its character as to insure that future instances are less likely. On the contrary, this mode aggressively perpetuates the status quo, cloaking but not erasing the public’s homophobia (and we do mean the politically loaded term “homophobia”) so that it can return another day. So what are the alternatives? The media could adopt frames of rejection such as those found in the literary forms of elegy, satire, burlesque, and the grotesque.94 The difficulty here is that “frames stressing the ingredient of rejection tend to lack the well-rounded quality of a complete here-and-now philosophy. They make for 496 RHETORIC & PUBLIC AFFAIRS fanaticism, the singling-out of one factor above others in the charting of human relationships.”95 By “coming to terms” with an event primarily by saying “no,” frames of rejection are unable to equip individuals and groups to take program- matic action. A discourse that is wholly debunking is, at least in isolation, ill suited for bringing about social change.96 A second and preferable alternative, according to Burke, is adopting a “comic frame,” which is “neither wholly euphemistic [as is tragedy], nor wholly debunk- ing.”97 As numerous scholars have noted, the comic frame is not about seeing humor in everything;98 it is about maximum consciousness—“self-awareness and social responsibility at the same time.”99 The comic frame is one of “ambivalence,” a flexible, adaptive, charitable frame that enables “people to be observers of them- selves, while acting.”100 In shifting the emphasis “from crime to stupidity,” Brummett maintains that the comic frame provides motives that “teach the fool—and vicari- ously the audience—about error so that it may be corrected rather than punished” (emphasis added).101 “The progress of humane enlightenment,” explains Burke, “can go no further than in picturing people not as vicious, but as mistaken.”102 When social injustices such as the anti-gay beating of Matthew Shepard are framed in tragic terms, naming McKinney and Henderson as vicious, the public finds expi- ation externally in the punishment of those identified as responsible. Framed in comic terms, however, one can identify with the mistaken, become a student of her/himself, “‘transcend’ himself by noting his own foibles,” and learn from the experience.103 The comic frame “promotes integrative, socializing knowledge”104 by emphasizing humility (the recognition that we are all sometimes wrong) over humiliation (the desire to victimize others). CRITICAL REFLECTIONS A frame analysis of the print media’s coverage of the Matthew Shepard murder rein- forces a number of previous findings about how the news is made. The manner in which this story, for instance, gained national prominence testifies to the link between the dramatic qualities of an event and its perceived newsworthiness.105 Since drama increases ratings and “[n]ews content is influenced by the fact that . . . media corporations have a profit orientation,”106 news outlets both seek out stories with dramatic properties and emphasize those properties in their reporting. The profit-driven focus on a story’s dramatic elements accounts, at least partially, for the striking consistency among news reports in the Matthew Shepard case. All three of the national newspapers we analyzed named the event as a vicious anti-gay hate crime, constructed Shepard as a political symbol of gay rights, and transferred the public’s guilt onto McKinney and Henderson. Even Time and The Advocate, publi- cations with varied political perspectives, framed the story in comparable ways. Though The Advocate offered more extensive coverage, particularly with regard to THE MEDIA FRAMING OF THE MATTHEW SHEPARD MURDER 497 Matthew Shepard and his family, the basic contours of the story remained the same. Consistency among news reports is also a product of traditional journalistic rou- tines and practices. Both the New York Times and the Washington Post assigned a primary reporter to the story, while the Los Angeles Times pulled the vast majority of its stories from the Associated Press. The homogeneity of the reports, then, reflects fewer voices gathering data from the same experts and highlighting the same dramatic properties.107 In addition to these broad findings, our analysis points to some specific conclu- sions about how the news media report on public traumas and the attendant social consequences of such reporting. The news media’s fascination with personalities and drama over institutional and social problems contributes to the “tragic fram- ing” of public disasters and events. Since tragic frames ultimately alleviate the social guilt associated with a disaster through victimage, they tend to bring both closure and resolution to the larger social issues they raise. As such, tragic frames do not serve the public well as a basis for social and political action. Though media research on agenda setting has clearly established that the news media influence which political issues are on the public’s mind,108 few studies have looked at how changes in the public agenda may be linked to the piggybacking of social issues onto specific dramatic stories. Future research on agenda setting should attend carefully to the connection between symbolic forms such as the tragic frame and shifts in the public agenda. Our analysis of news coverage of the Matthew Shepard murder found that hate-crimes legislation and gay rights were central public concerns until Shepard’s story came to a close. In light of this finding, it would be worth examin- ing how declining coverage of the Columbine shootings may have contributed sim- ilarly to the dissipation of national public discourse on youth violence. The implications of our analysis extend beyond the matter of the media’s role in estab- lishing a public agenda. Since “frames are fundamental aspects of human con- sciousness and shape our attitudes toward the world and each other,”109 media frames function ideologically. In Matthew Shepard’s case, we believe that news media reproduced a discursive system of prejudice that contributed to Shepard’s death. We can, however, learn from this event and the media’s coverage of it. To introduce this essay, we attempted to provide an outline of the Matthew Shepard story that accurately captured the news media’s tragic framing of that event. To con- clude, we return to that story and adopt an alternative, more comic frame. Despite commitments to both diversity and equality, the nation continued its painful struggle with tolerance today, as Laramie, Wyoming, became the most recent in a long list of U.S. towns and cities to witness, experience, and participate in violence motivated by culturally constructed notions of difference. In an all-too- familiar scene, two young men, Aaron McKinney and Russell Henderson, foolishly allowed their actions to be guided by social ignorance. Goaded, like a vast majority of people, by a deep desire to feel accepted and acceptable, Aaron and Russell 498 RHETORIC & PUBLIC AFFAIRS assaulted Matthew Shepard, a University of Wyoming student, for what they per- ceived to be an intolerable difference, homosexuality. The assault, which resulted in Matthew’s death, highlights a pattern of behavior in which individuals seek com- munal identification and the comfort and security that accompanies it through the expulsion of difference. Such an impulse is, of course, profoundly misguided as it reduces community to sameness, while ignoring the fact that difference is always a matter of perspective and depends upon who is naming it. Aaron and Russell’s actions serve as a powerful reminder that if we truly hope to build healthy and humane communities, then we must aim to bridge the very differences we create. When we cast out others, the attitude is one of superiority and humiliation, and the act is one of violence. For us to curb violence like that seen most recently in Wyoming, we must all begin to erase the “battle lines” that are drawn again and again when we exalt ourselves over others. NOTES 1. Beth Loffreda, Losing Matt Shepard: Life and Politics in the Aftermath of Anti-Gay Murder (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), x. 2. We are using “memory” in a somewhat more general sense than rhetorical and media scholars who study “public memory.” Our concern is not with how the news media con- struct invitations to a shared sense of the past or with the politics of commemoration, but with how the “life” of a political issue—its birth, growth, and death—is related to its fram- ing in the news media. For an overview of the literature on public memory in rhetorical studies, see Stephen H. Browne, “Reading, Rhetoric, and the Texture of Public Memory,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 81 (1995): 237–65. For variations on this theme, see also Carole Blair, Marsha S. Jeppeson, and Enrico Pucci, Jr., “Public Memorializing in Postmodernity: The Vietnam Veterans Memorial as Prototype,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 77 (1991): 263–88; John Bodnar, Remaking America: Public Memory, Commemoration, and Patriotism in the Twentieth Century (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992); James E. Young, The Texture of Memory: Holocaust Memorials and Meaning (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993). For an overview of the literature on public memory in media stud- ies, see Barbie Zelizer, “Reading the Past Against the Grain: The Shape of Memory Studies,” Critical Studies in Mass Communication 12 (1995): 214–39. For variations on this theme, see also Martin J. Medhurst, “The Rhetorical Structure of Oliver Stone’s JFK,” Critical Studies in Mass Communication 10 (1993): 128–43; Thomas W. Benson, “Thinking through Film: Hollywood Remembers the Blacklist,” in Rhetoric and Community: Studies in Unity and Fragmentation, ed. J. Michael Hogan (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1988), 217-55. 3. Kenneth Burke, The Philosophy of Literary Form: Studies in Symbolic Action (Louisiana State University Press, 1941), 302–4. 4. Kenneth Burke, Attitudes Toward History, 3d ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 34. 5. Kenneth Burke, Counter-Statement, 2d ed. (Los Altos, Calif.: Hermes Publications, 1953), 139. THE MEDIA FRAMING OF THE MATTHEW SHEPARD MURDER 499 6. Kenneth Burke, Language as Symbolic Action: Essays on Life, Literature, and Method (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968), 44–45. 7. In media studies, “frames analysis” derives from the work of Erving Goffman, Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974). See W. Lance Bennett, News: The Politics of Illusion, 2d ed. (New York: Longman, 1988); W. Lance Bennett, “The News about Foreign Policy,” in Taken by Storm: The Media, Public Opinion, and U.S. Foreign Policy in the Gulf War, ed. W. Lance Bennett and David L. Paletz (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 12–40; Todd Gitlin, “The Whole World is Watching,” in Transmission: Toward a Post-Television Culture, 2d ed., ed. Peter d’Agostine and David Tafler (Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1995), 91–103; Shanto Iyengar, Is Anyone Responsible? How Television Frames Political Issues (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991); and Shanto Iyengar and Adam Simon, “News Coverage of the Gulf Crisis and Public Opinion: A Study of Agenda-Setting, Priming, and Framing,” in Taken by Storm, 167–85. 8. Iyengar and Simon, “News Coverage,” 171. 9. Iyengar, Is Anyone Responsible?, 14. 10. Bennett, “News about Foreign Policy,” 31. 11. Everette Dennis et al., Covering the Presidential Primaries (New York: The Freedom Forum Media Studies Center, 1992), 59. 12. Burke, Counter-Statement, 31, 124. 13. C. Allen Carter, Kenneth Burke and the Scapegoat Process (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1996), 40. 14. Bennett, News, 35. 15. Quoted in Loffreda, Losing Matt Shepard, 5. 16. Though the “scarecrow” image would appear in news reports repeatedly and even in poetry long after the event, “Matt hadn’t actually been tied like a scarecrow; when he was approached first by the mountain biker, Aaron Kreifels, and then by Reggie Fluty, the sher- iff ’s deputy who answered Kreifels’s emergency call, Matt lay on his back, head propped against the fence, legs outstretched. His hands were lashed behind him and tied barely four inches off the ground to a fencepost” (Loffreda, Losing Matt Shepard, 5). 17. James Brooke, “Gay Man Beaten and Left For Dead; 2 Are Charged,” New York Times, October 10, 1998, sec. A09. 18. “Gay Student Brutally Beaten; 4 Arrested,” Los Angeles Times, October 10, 1998, 16. 19. Tom Kenworthy, “Gay Man Near Death after Beating, Burning; Three Held in Wyoming Attack Near Campus; Hate Crimes Suspected,” Washington Post, October 10, 1998, sec. A01. 20. “Gay Student Brutally Beaten,” 16. 21. Kenworthy, “Gay Man Near Death,” sec. A01. 22. Brooke, “Gay Man Beaten,” sec. A09. 23. “Gay Student Brutally Beaten,” 16. 24. Tom Kenworthy, “In Wyoming, Homecoming Infused with Hard Lesson on Intolerance,” Washington Post, October 11, 1998, sec. A02. 25. Bennett, News, 26. 26. As Wyoming governor Jim Geringer told the Washington Post shortly after Shepard’s death, “[we all] feel a sense of tragedy and disbelief that a human life could be taken in such a bru- tal way. We must now find closure.” (Tom Kenworthy, “Gay Wyoming Student Succumbs to Injuries,” Washington Post, October 13, 1998, sec. A07). 500 RHETORIC & PUBLIC AFFAIRS 27. Tom Kenworthy, “Hundreds Gather to Remember Slain Man as ‘Light to the World’; Anti- Gay Forces Incite Shouting Match at Wyoming Funeral,” Washington Post, October 17, 1998, sec. A03. 28. Loffreda, Losing Matt Shepard, 13. 29. Kenworthy, “In Wyoming,” sec. A02. 30. Kenworthy, “Hundreds Gather,” sec. A03. 31. Justin Gillis and Patrice Gaines, “Pattern of Hate Emerges on a Fence in Laramie; Gay Victims’ Killers Say They Saw an Easy Crime Target,” Washington Post, October 18, 1998, sec. A01. 32. Gillis and Gaines, “Pattern of Hate,” sec. A01. 33. Allan Lengel, “Thousands Mourn Student’s Death; Beating in Wyoming Sparks New Push for Hate-Crimes Laws,” Washington Post, October 15, 1998, sec. A07. 34. Richard Lacayo, “The New Gay Struggle,” Time, October 26, 1998, 34. President Clinton con- tinued to use the Matthew Shepard murder as a rallying cry for the passage of a federal hate- crimes bill over the course of the next year. See “Clinton Urges Expanding Federal Hate Crimes Law,” Los Angeles Times, April 7, 1999, home edition, 4; “White House to Host Meeting on Tougher U.S. Hate Crime Law,” Los Angeles Times, July 10, 1999, valley edition, 13B; Charles Babington, “Clinton Urges Congress to Toughen Laws on Hate Crimes, Guns,” Washington Post, October 16, 1999, sec. A11. 35. Lisa Neff, “The Best Defense: Activists Plan Demonstrations in 50 States to Fight for Basic Human Rights,” The Advocate, March 16, 1999, 40. Shepard’s centrality to the national debate surrounding gay rights and hate-crimes legislation is evident in press reports from the time of his death until the conviction of McKinney. “Shepard’s brutal murder put a spot- light on hate crimes” (“Nation in Brief/Wyoming,” Los Angeles Times, May 22, 1999, home edition, 12). “The crime galvanized the gay and lesbian community and became a rallying point in the push for hate crime laws” (John L. Mitchell, “Vigil Marks Anniversary of Slaying of Gay Student,” Los Angeles Times, October 13, 1999, home edition, 3). “The death of Shepard focused public attention on violence against homosexuals and stimulated at-times feverish debate about hate crimes legislation” (Julie Cart, “Defense Says Homosexual Advance Triggered Slaying, Los Angeles Times, October 26, 1999, home edition, 20). “[Matt Shepard’s] death galvanized those seeking to expand the nation’s hate-crime laws” (“Attack on Gay Was Planned, Witness Says,” Los Angeles Times, October 29, 1999, valley edition, 23A). “The death of the college student [Matt Shepard] ignited national debate over hate crimes and violence against homosexuals” (Julie Cart, “Man Guilty in Shepard Slaying, Could Get Death,” Los Angeles Times, November 4, 1999, home edition, 37). “The brutal murder of the wholesome-looking Shepard struck a chord across America. It spurred calls for the enactment of hate crime legislation” (Julie Cart, “Killer of Gay Student Is Spared Death Penalty,” Los Angeles Times, November 5, 1999, home edition, 1). “The murder [of Matt Shepard] last October gained nationwide publicity and spurred calls by gay and lesbian activists for enactment of tough anti-hate crime legislation nationally” (Tom Kenworthy, “2nd Man is Convicted of Killing Gay Student,” Washington Post, November 4, 1999, sec. A1). “The case [of Matt Shepard] became a rallying cry for states and the Federal Government to pass and expand hate-crime measures” (Michael Janofsky, “A Defense to Avoid Execution,” New York Times, October 26, 1999, sec. A18). See also Carl Ingram, “California and the West,” Los Angeles Times, October 3, 1999, home edition, 24; “Families of Hate Crime Victims Unite at Rally,” Los Angeles Times, October 10, 1999, home edition, 12; Tom Kenworthy, “‘Gay Panic’ Defense Stirs Wyo. Trial,” Washington Post, October 26, 1999, THE MEDIA FRAMING OF THE MATTHEW SHEPARD MURDER 501 sec. A2; Tom Kenworthy, “Wyo. Jury to Weigh Motives in Gay Killing,” Washington Post, November 3, 1999, sec. A3; Bill Carter, “Shepard’s Parents,” New York Times, February 3, 1999, sec. E7. 36. Bruce Shenitz, “Laramie’s Legacy,” Out, October 2001, 76, 110. 37. Gillis and Gaines, “Pattern of Hate,” sec. A01; A second article reported that “in 1996, 21 men and women were killed in the United States because of their sexual orientation, according to the Southern Poverty Law Center, an Alabama group that tracks violence against minorities. According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, sexual orientation was a factor in 11.6 per- cent of the 8,759 hate crimes recorded in 1996.” (James Brooke, “Gay Man Dies from Attack, Fanning Outrage and Debate,” New York Times, October 13, 1998, sec. A17). Sexual orienta- tion ranks third behind race and religion as the motive for (reported) hate crimes. See “2000 FBI Hate Crime Statistics,” Human Rights Campaign, retrieved April 20, 2002, from <http://www.hrc.org/issues/hate_crimes/background/stats/stats2000.asp>. 38. Gillis and Gaines, “Pattern of Hate,” sec. A01. 39. Shenitz, “Laramie’s Legacy,” 76, 110. 40. Quoted in Shenitz, “Laramie’s Legacy,” 77. 41. Kenworthy, “In Wyoming,” sec. A02. 42. Steve Lopez, “To Be Young and Gay in Wyoming,” Time, October 26, 1998, 38. 43. Kenneth Burke, The Rhetoric of Religion: Studies in Logology (Boston: Beacon Press, 1961), 5. 44. Kenneth Burke, A Grammar of Motives (New York: Prentice Hall, 1945), 406. 45. Burke, A Grammar of Motives, 406. 46. Burke, A Grammar of Motives, 406. 47. Barry Brummett, “Burkean Comedy and Tragedy, Illustrated in Reactions to the Arrest of John Delorean,” Central States Speech Journal 35 (1984): 218. 48. Lopez, “To Be Young,” 38. 49. Brooke, “Gay Man Dies,” sec. A17. See also “2 Suspects in Gay’s Killing to Face Death,” Los Angeles Times, December 29, 1998, home edition, 14; “Death Penalty Asked in Gay Man’s Murder,” Washington Post, December 29, 1998; sec. A6; “Wyo. Governor Backs Bill on Hate Crimes,” Washington Post, January 19, 1999, sec. A9. 50. Brooke, “Gay Man Beaten,” sec. A09. 51. Kenworthy, “In Wyoming,” sec. A02. 52. Lopez, “To Be Young,” 39. 53. James Brooke, “After Beating of Gay Man, Town Looks at Its Attitudes,” New York Times, October 12, 1998, sec. A12. 54. “Jury Selection Starts in Wyoming Hate-Crime Trial,” Washington Post, March 25, 1999, sec. A15. “Laramie, Wyo.—This small city on the high plains of southeast Wyoming has looked upon itself as a peaceful, law-abiding community ever since 1868. . . . Those images became blurred last fall with the brutal beating death of Matthew Shepard, a gay university student: To the outside world, Laramie suddenly became the place where a vicious hate crime took place, where below the patina of tolerance lurked a deep streak of cowboy intolerance” (Tom Kenworthy, “After Slaying, Community Takes a Punishing Look at Itself,” Washington Post, April 5, 1999, sec. A3). See also James Brooke, “Wyoming City Braces for Gay Murder Trial,” New York Times, April 4, 1999, sec. 14. 55. Lopez, “To Be Young,” 38. 502 RHETORIC & PUBLIC AFFAIRS 56. In one of our classrooms, a year after the murder, a student connected to individuals held accountable for the dehumanizing event in the Colorado State University parade would con- firm, under the promise of anonymity, the use of the anti-gay epithets “I’m Gay” and “Up My Ass.” 57. Loffreda, Losing Matt Shepard, 10. 58. James Brooke, “Homophobia often Found in Schools, Data Show,” New York Times, October 14, 1998, sec. A19. 59. Kenworthy, “Hundreds Gather,” sec. A03. 60. Gillis and Gaines, “Pattern of Hate,” sec. A01. 61. Carter, Kenneth Burke, 18. 62. The Wyoming governor went on to say, “[We] feel a sense of tragedy and disbelief that a human life could be taken in such a way. We must now find closure” (Kenworthy, “Gay Wyoming Student Succumbs,” sec. A07). 63. Lopez, “To Be Young,” 39. 64. “Brutal Beating of Gay Student is Condemned,” Los Angeles Times, October 11, 1998, 16. News reports repeatedly emphasized that Matt Shepard was deceived into going with his attackers—that Henderson and McKinney “posed as homosexuals and lured Shepard from the bar” (Tom Kenworthy, “‘I’m Going to Grant You Life,’” Washington Post, February 5, 1999, sec. A2). See also Julie Cart, “Gay’s Slaying Spawns Morality Play,” Los Angeles Times, March 24, 1999, home edition, 11; Julie Cart, “Plea Averts 1st Trial in Slaying of Gay Student,” Los Angeles Times, April 6, 1999, home edition, 1; “Attack on Gay,” 23A; Tom Kenworthy, “Gay Student’s Attacker Pleads Guilty, Gets Two Life Terms,” Washington Post, April 6, 1999, sec. A2; “Wyoming Judge Bars ‘Gay Panic’ Defense, Washington Post, November 2, 1999, sec. A7; Kenworthy, “2nd Man Is Convicted,” sec. A1; James Brooke, “Gay Murder Trial Ends with Guilty Plea,” New York Times, April 6, 1999, sec. A20. 65. Chris Bull, “A Matter of Life and Death,” The Advocate, March 16, 1999, 38. 66. Cart, “Gay’s Slaying Spawns,” 11. 67. Kenworthy, “‘Gay Panic’ Defense,” sec. A2; Cart, “Man Guilty,” 37. 68. Phil Curtis, “Hate Crimes: More than a Verdict,” The Advocate, January 18, 2000, 36. See also Cart, “Killer of Gay Student,” 1; Michael Janofsky, “Parents of Gay Obtain Mercy for His Killer,” New York Times, November 5, 1999, sec. A1. 69. Brummett, “Burkean Comedy,” 219. 70. Tom Kenworthy, “Slain Gay Man’s Mother Tries to Show Hate’s ‘Real’ Cost,” Washington Post, October 10, 1999, sec. A2. 71. Curtis, “Hate Crimes,” 34–35. The notion that McKinney’s conviction signaled the end for more than just the trial was evident in other news reports as well. “For the citizens of Wyoming, who often felt that their state’s Western philosophies were on trial, the end of the yearlong ordeal was welcome” (Cart, “Killer of Gay Student,” 1). “The verdict, which came after 10 hours of deliberations over two days, brought a swift end to a case that has been watched closely because of the brutality of the crime and the sexual orientation of the vic- tim” (Michael Janofsky, “Man is Convicted of Killing of Gay Student,” New York Times, November 4, 1999, sec. A14). 72. Robert L. Heath, Realism and Relativism: A Perspective on Kenneth Burke (Macon, Ga.: Mercer University Press, 1986), 246. 73. In Lopez, “To Be Young,” 38. THE MEDIA FRAMING OF THE MATTHEW SHEPARD MURDER 503 74. What is significant about this poll is not the distribution, which was likely a product of how the questions were asked, but that the poll was published in a news report at all. The inclu- sion of the poll contributes to the perception that this issue is significant. After McKinney’s conviction, polls like this one disappeared from the public eye. 75. Curtis, “Hate Crimes,” 38. Since January 2000, four states have passed hate-crimes legisla- tion, including Texas, which approved a hate-crimes bill in 2001. A similar bill, however, was suppressed two years earlier in Texas because it specifically included protection for gays. See Ross E. Milloy, “Texas Senate Passes Hate Crimes Bill that Bush’s Allies Killed,” New York Times, May 8, 2001, sec. A16. The five states, as of April 16, 2002, that still have no hate- crimes laws are Arkansas, Indiana, New Mexico, South Carolina, and Wyoming. Of the 45 states with hate-crimes laws, 18 states have laws that do not explicitly include sexual orien- tation. See “Does Your State’s Hate Crimes Law Include Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity?” Human Rights Campaign, retrieved April 16, 2002, from <http://www.hrc.org/ issues/hate_crimes/background/statelaws.asp>. 76. Curtis, “Hate Crimes,” 38. 77. Gitlin, “The Whole World,” 96. 78. We are suggesting that there are multiple layers of framing. A picture frame, for instance, shapes how viewers perceive a picture, but so too does the picture’s presence in a larger struc- ture such as the frame of a building. Indeed, individuals respond very differently to pictures hanging in a private home than to those hanging in a museum. 79. See George Chauncey, Gay New York: Gender, Urban Culture, and the Making of the Gay Male World, 1890–1940 (New York: Basic Books, 1994), 13. 80. Erving Goffman, Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963), 1. 81. Byrne Fone, Homophobia: A History (New York: Picador USA, 2000), 5. 82. Gerhard Falk, Stigma: How We Treat Outsiders (New York: Prometheus Books, 2001), 74. 83. See Falk, Stigma, 73–74. 84. Quoted in Shenitz, “Laramie’s Legacy,” 110. 85. See Shenitz, “Laramie’s Legacy,” 111. 86. Tracey A. Reeves, “A Town Searches its Soul: After Gay Black Man is Slain, W. VA. Residents Ask Why,” Washington Post, July 20, 2000, sec. A01. 87. Fone, Homophobia, 413. 88. Curtis, “Hate Crimes,” 35. 89. One of many cases where the “gay panic defense” was allowed is that of Michael Auker, who was stomped and beaten by Todd Clinger, 18, and Troy Clinger, 20, in Pennsylvania. “After rendering Auker unconscious, the two allegedly transported him to his home where he was found comatose two days later” (Barbara Dozetos, “Brothers Claim ‘Gay Panic’ after Beating that Left Man in Coma,” The Gay.com Network, retrieved December 13, 2001, from <http://content.gay.com/channels/news/heads/010328_penn_gaypanic.html>). We found this example especially intriguing because of how closely the crime mirrored the Matthew Shepard beating. 90. Fone, Homophobia, 5. 91. Warren J. Blumenfeld, introduction to Homophobia: How We All Pay the Price, ed. Warren J. Blumenfeld (Boston: Beacon Press, 1992), 15. 92. Burke, Attitudes, introduction. 504 RHETORIC & PUBLIC AFFAIRS 93. Burke, Attitudes, 3. 94. “‘Rejection’ is a by-product of ‘acceptance’ . . . It is the heretical aspect of an orthodoxy—and as such, it has much in common with the ‘frame of acceptance’ that it rejects” (Burke, Attitudes, 21). Burke also posits, “Could we not say that all symbolic structures are designed to produce such ‘acceptance’ in one form or another?” (emphasis added, Attitudes, 19–20). 95. Burke, Attitudes, 28–29. 96. Burke, Attitudes, 92; see also William H. Rueckert, Encounters with Kenneth Burke (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1994), 118. 97. Burke, Attitudes, 166. 98. Stanley Edgar Hyman, “Kenneth Burke and the Criticism of Symbolic Action,” in Landmark Essays on Kenneth Burke, ed. Barry Brummett (Davis, Calif.: Hermagoras Press, 1993), 29; Timothy N. Thompson and Anthony J. Palmeri, “Attitudes toward Counternature (with Notes on Nurturing a Poetic Psychosis),” in Extensions of the Burkean System, ed. James W. Chesebro (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1993), 276. 99. Rueckert, Encounters, 121. 100. Burke, Attitudes, 171. 101. Brummett, “Burkean Comedy,” 219. 102. Burke, Attitudes, 41. 103. Burke, Attitudes, 171. 104. Rueckert, Encounters, 117–18. 105. For extended discussion, see Bennett, News; Herbert J. Gans, Deciding What’s News: A Study of CBS Evening News, NBC Nightly News, Newsweek and Time (New York: Pantheon, 1979). 106. David Croteau and William Hoynes, Media/Society: Industries, Images, and Audiences, 2d ed. (Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Pine Forge Press, 2000), 241. 107. Gans, Deciding What’s News, 138–42. 108. See Croteau and Hoynes, Media/Society, 239–41. 109. Mark Lawrence McPhail, “Coherence as Representative Anecdote in the Rhetorics of Kenneth Burke and Ernesto Grassi,” in Kenneth Burke and Contemporary European Thought: Rhetoric in Transition, ed. Bernard L. Brock (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press), 85. THE MEDIA FRAMING OF THE MATTHEW SHEPARD MURDER 505 
work_m6rfjli4efhg7o3fgp5452oxji	----	Clinical Manifestations of Prejudice in Psychotherapy: Toward a Strategy of Assessment and Treatment Megan Sullaway and Edward Dunbar Pacific Psychological Associates and University of California at Los Angeles Social bias is an issue of concern t o both practitioners and clinical researchers. This article considers race and ethnic prejudice as a prominent clinical feature in three psychotherapy cases. Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4th ed.) diagnoses, General Adap- tive Functioning ratings, and Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventoy scores are considered in terms of the level of patient disturbance and severity of out- group prejudice. Two cases exemplify chronic adverse outgroup ideation, d e c t i n g a constellation of traits of personality disturbance, disinhibition, and adverse behavioral response (e.g., panic, hostility, and/or ag- gression) to integroup contact, while one case evi- dences prejudicial ideation as a transitory, conditioned response t o traumatic victimization by a member of a racial outgroup. Prejudice is considered as a clinical syndrome, with treatment strategy considered in terms of the severity and chronicity of prejudicial ideation. Key words: prejudice, racism, psychopathology, di- agnosis, psychotherapy. [Clin Psycho1 Sci Prac 3:296- 309, 19961 Psychological researchers have long demonstrated an interest in the topic of prejudice (Allport, 1954). Preju- d c e has been conceptuahzed from a variety of perspec- tives. Duckitt (1992) proposed a framework of four processes that are suggested t o “subsume and summarize Address correspondence to Megan Sullaway, Ph.D., Pacific Psy- chological Associates, 2221 Rosecrans Avenue, Suite 21 1, El Segundo. CA 90245, or Edward Dunbar, Ed.D., Depanment of Psychology, University of California at Los Angeles, California, 90024; e-mail Ossain@AOL.COM. most psychological thinking” (p. 1182) on the causes of prejudice. These four processes include (a) theories that assume an inherently human propensity for prejudice, (b) intergroup interactions that create socially shared patterns of prejudice, (c) individual learning of socially shared pat- terns of prejudice, and (d) indwidual differences that mediate susceptibility to ascribe to prejudicial belieG. In this article the role of individual differences is considered in terms of the clinical manifestations of out- group bias. O f particular interest is whether patients who express particularly virulent outgroup bias can be best understood as experiencing a true clinical syndrome sec- ondary to other recognized diagnostic categories and associated with characteristic symptoms, including rigid cognitive style and impulsivity in affective expression. We conceptualize prejudice as more than h l t y or overgener- alized cognitions (Jones, 1972). Rather, we conceptualize prejudice as consisting of both negative cognitions and an intensely negative affective response (Frosh, 1989). Research of prejudice as an individual difference vari- able has provided ripe ground for psychological study. Racism has been understood “as projection: the expul- sion of disturbing or painful feelings &om inside oneself o n to the socially legitimized target of another” (Frosh, 1989, p. 234). Pinderhughes (1989) has additionally con- sidered outgroup prejudice as “societal projection” in which the majority group members feel dominant, com- petent, and part of a larger social context that is in opposi- tion to persons viewed as “different.” Prejudice as a form of projection is exemplified in the classic study of Dol- lard, Doob, Miller, Mowrer, and Sears (1939), in which the rise of anti-Semitism in Germany is attributed to the displacement of hostility associated with post-World War I political and economic hardship onto the Jewish minor- ity group. In their seminal study on authoritarian- 0 1996 AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION D11 * 0969-5093/96/55.00 1% ism, Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, and Sanford (1 950) characterized anti-Semitism in terms of character- ological rigidity, hyperconventionality, and sadism (Christie, 1991). More recently, Rokeach, Smith, and Evans (1960) studed dogmatism and cognitive inflexi- bility in association with prejudice. The efforts of these and other theorists describe the psychological experience of the prejudiced individual in terms of personality dis- turbance, which increases susceptibility to prejudicial belie6 and affects. P S Y C H O M E T R I C A S S E S S M E N T O F P R E J U D I C E The efforts of researchers in the decades immediately fol- lowing World War I1 hold implications for contemporary psychological assessment. There have been a proliferation of social attitude scales on topics such as anti-Semitism (Selznick & Steinberg, 1969), homosexual bias (Smith, 1971), and anti-Black racism (McConahay, 1986). However, these measures are more typically used in so- cial science research, as opposed to clinical practice. Fur- thermore, as such measures characteristically manifest strong face validity, they are vulnerable to favorable self- presentation bias. By comparison, a more clinically u s e l l and unobtrusive assessment of outgroup prejuhce is available fiom use of the Minnesota Multiphasic Person- ality Inventory (MMPI), thus minimizing face validity and self-presentation bias concerns. This approach is exemplified in the work of Hamson Gough. Gough’s studies of prejudice-or, as he has come to refer to it, “social intolerance”-have resulted in the introduction of two distinct assessment methods based on MMPI data. These include the measurement of outgroup bias via the Prejudice (Pr) scale (Gough, 1951b), and measurement of patient impulsivity, using the F and K scales of the MMPI (Gough, 1 9 5 1 ~ ) . In his development of the Pr scale, Gough employed a criterion reference keying strategy to select scale items, using the Sanford anti-Semitism scale as the criterion measure. This proce- dure resulted in the identification of 32 MMPI items for inclusion on the scale. The Pr scale was subsequently incorporated into the California Psychological Inventory as the Tolerance (To) Scale (Gough, 1987). Gough described the content of Pr scale items as reflecting anti- intellectuality; pessimism; feelings of cynicism, distrust, and suspicion; misanthropy; dscontent with current sta- tus; a rigid, dogmatic thinking style; and feelings of estrangement. As he observed in 1951, “The overall pic- ture which emerges . . . is one of a harassed, tormented, resen&l, peevish, querulous, constricted, disillusioned, embittered, distrustful, rancorous, apprehensive and somewhat bewildered person” (1951 b, p. 253). The por- trait drawn by Gough is of such vividness that one could infer such individuals might suffer from a variety of hag- nosable conditions, such as the personality disorders rep- resented in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual for Mental Disorders (4th ed.; hereinafter DSM-IV). Recent research supports the construct and criterion validity of the Pr scale (Dunbar, 1995). For example, in a community study of marital relationships Gough and Bradley (1993) observed that the To scale was signifi- cantly correlated with spousal ratings of intolerant behav- ior, as measured on an adjective checklist. Parents who ranked “ h g h [on] the intolerance criterion saw their chil- dren as being difficult to manage, as resentful of parental hcipline, and as vociferous in their resistance when wishes were denied” @. 72). Earlier research had sug- gested that child-rearing practices may contribute to the formation of rigid social judgments, prejudice, and authoritarianism (Frenkel-Brunswik, 1948; Hams, Gough, & Martin, 1950). There is evidence that impulsivity and anxiety, as reflected in MMPI F and K scores, may also be associated with social bias. Gough found that the MMPI scores of persons who reported anti-Semitic belie6 were charac- terized by elevated F ( T > 70) and lower K ( T < 50) scale scores on the MMPI (Gough, 1951a). The relationship of these two scales, widely understood to represent the patient’s self-presentation, is suggestive of a disinhibited and impulsive social style. As suggested by Friedman, Webb, and Lewak (1989) this F-K pattern “suggests low self-esteem, low ego strength, emotional discomfort, difficulty coping, and an openness and willingness to admit to the numerous problems he is experiencing” (p. 147). Dunbar (1996a) found this high-F/low-K relation- ship was associated with negative outgroup belie6 and Pr scale score elevations in a clinical population. H e also found a significant relationship between psychotherapy patients’ Pr scale scores and clinician ratings of outgroup bias. P S Y C H 0 PATH 0 L 0 ti Y A N D P R E J U D I C E Contemporary clinical researchers have paid little atten- tion to the associations between psychopathology and prejudice, and the treatment implications for the preju- CLINICAL MANIFESTATIONS O F PREJUDICE * SULLAWAY & DUNBAR 297 diced individual. A review of the contemporary clinical literature underscores the limited attention paid to the role of psychopathology in the endorsement of socially intolerant beliefs. Maciejewski (1994), writing in a Ger- man psychoanalpc journal, examined the xenophobia directed by Germans a t Gypsies. Maciejewski proposes that this phenomenon is comparable to anti-Semitism and that both have their origins in the projection of unac- ceptable aspects of the self onto outgroup members. Heim (1992) conceptualized xenophobia and racism as consequences of narcissistic fantasies of the homogeneity of the body politic, in which the extemalization of instinctual urges and unpleasurable experiences is pro- jected onto foreigners. Bell (1978, 1980) has suggested a relationship between racism and personality disorders, as represented in the DSM-111 system, noting that racism is characteristic of narcissistic personality disorder. Dun- bar (1994) recently reported a significant relationship between White racial identity, narcissistic traits, and neg- ative attitudes toward Afiican Americans in a nonclinical sample. It is unfortunate that race and ethnic prejudice have received little attention in the clinical research literature, whether as phenomena encountered in psychotherapy, regarding the current DSM-IV &agnostic system (Amer- ican Psychatric Association, 1994), or as a focus of treat- ment. T h ~ s is despite conceptual support for the relationship between prejudice and the personahty CLsor- ders. Furthermore, while there are measures available to assess the psychological significance of adverse outgroup beliefs (such as the MMPI Pr scale), it is likely these are not utilized by the majority of practicing clinicians (H. G. Gough, personal communication, October 14, 1995). We propose a reconsideration of the associations between prejudicial beliefs and associated, measurable traits, particularly in light of the current diagnostic sys- tem employed by researchers and practicing clinicians. Toward that end, a series of case histories are presented below to illustrate the utility of clinical and psychometric methods in the assessment of race/ethnic prejudice, and to illustrate the proposal that virulent prejudiced beliefs and behaviors may rightly be considered a clinical s y n - drome. C L I N I C A L CASE M A T E R I A L Procedure Three case histories WIN be presented. These were se- lected to illustrate a range of severity in clinical manifesta- tions of prejudice. All individuals were psychotherapy patients who voluntarily initiated treatment, and were seen in a private psychology group setting in the Greater Los Angeles area. The two treating psychologists were Euro-White: one female and one male. The practice group where these patients were treated services a wide range of clinical problems and includes a heterogeneous sociodemographic client base. In none of the cases was prejudice or outgroup relations an initial focus of treat- ment, or the reason for self-referral. Details about each case are altered to preserve confidentiality and anonymity. While demographic and other identifying details are altered to preserve confidentiality, all subjects are Euro- White. Measures All subjects were initially seen in an individual assessment interview. Demographic information (e.g., patient edu- cational level, race/ethnicity) was recorded and a DSM- IV diagnosis and General Adaptive Functioning (GAF) score were assigned. In addition, as part of the patient assessment, subjects completed the h4MPI (the 566 version in Cases 1 and 3 and or version 399 with Case 2). The computed Pr scale scores are reported below for the cases, along with the main clinical and vahdity scales. In a nonclinical sample, the Pr scale has been found to yield a mean T score of 54 (Dunbar, 1995). With a recent clinical sample the mean Tscore was 58 (Dunbar, 1996a). Method of Analysis As pointed out by Kazdin and Kagan (1994), “The inten- sive study of the individual permits a level of analysis that may be as useful to our understanding as the study of groups of individuals” (p. 46). In this article, subject case descriptions follow, where possible, the recommenda- tions for psychotherapy research as outlined by Kazdin (1 992). Empirical psychometric data, ideographc (e.g., patient-specific) material, and pre- and posttreat- ment case reviews have been integrated, across multiple cases. Cases were selected to illustrate the variations in the strength and manifestation of race/ethnic prejudice, to provide for comparison of the experiences of situation- ally based bias with more long-standing bias, and, most importantly, to suggest testable theoretical and research questions about prejudice. Clinical diagnosis, rating of degree of impairment (GAF ratings), MMPI F and K scores, and MMPI Pr scale CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY: SCIENCE A N D PRACTICE V3 N 4 , WINTER 1996 298 Table 1. Summary of clinical material and diagnostic information concerning outgroup prejudice Clinician Materlal DSM-IV Dab MMPl Data Pr F K Case Outgroup C A P kale Scale k a l e Code no. Target of PmJudice Manifestations Dlagnoris Score r scorn r kore rScom ~ v p r 1 Hispanic men Anxiety PTSD-acute 70 39 62 61 5 ” 4 ‘ 2 Minority groups, Avoidance PTSD-acute 51 59 ao 42 96’ ‘724’ especially African Anxiety Americans Casual use of Borderline ethnic slurs traits 3 African Americans, Panic attacks, a. Bipolar 40 73 80 40 07’241’ ’= Asian Pacifics social disorder avoidance, and dystunction personality occupational b. Narcissistic 68 76 46 a 2 7 w disorder G A F scores at the initiation of treatment Welsh code format employed for MMPl dinical scales ‘Initial MMPl scores. qubsequent (3 year) MMPl scores. scores will be presented. The case information presented includes (a) presenting problem and DSM-IV diagnoses at treatment initiation, (b) outgroup attitudes as they emerged in therapy, (c) reported family of origin racial/ ethnic attitudes, (d) MMPI data, (e) behavioral manifesta- tion (if any) and degree of impairment related to the belie&, and ( f ) course of psychotherapy treatment. Ths is summarized in Table 1. Case Summaries Case 1 : Classically Conditioned Fear. This 28-year-old Caucasian woman was “carjacked” while she was getting into her car afier leaving a convenience store, in broad daylight, in fiont of other store customers. Two young Hispanic men entered her car; one pointed a gun at her abdomen, ordered her to drive, and directed her to a deserted area of the county. She was told to open the trunk; she released the trunk latch from inside the car. As the two men hopped out of the car to examine the con- tents of the trunk, she put the car in gear and sped away. She heard gunshots but she was not hit. She called the police, and sought treatment a few weeks later due to intrusive memories, nightmares, and physiological reac- tivity to and avoidance of cues representing the event. The initial DSM-IV diagnosis was posttraumatic stress reactionacute, and her initial GAF rating was 70. Her premorbid hnctioning was quite good, and even after experiencing the crime described, she s d managed to function at work and in her personal relationships. Her pretrauma GAF was estimated at 85. Early in the course of treatment the patient voluntady disclosed that one of her symptoms was a newly devel- oped fearful reaction to men she didn’t know who were of the same age and ethnic group as the gunmen. Symp- tomatology included increased heart rate, cold sweat, physical tension, and fear. She denied the presence of these symptoms prior to the carjacking. In fact, this patient was extremely uncomfortable with, ashamed of, and embarrassed about these phobic reactions. She was bilingual in English and Spanish and prior to the crime had a high degree of comfort in multicultural settings. She completed the full MMPI. MMPI test data revealed a raw P R score of 6 (T score = 39). Her code type was 5”48’, with T scores for F and K of 62 and 61, respec- tively. Despite her phobic reactions, the patient attempted (successfully) to suppress overt behavioral manifestation of her fear. Treatment was brief (less than 3 months) and focused on amelioration of the posttraumatic stress disor- der (PTSD) symptoms. As the trauma-related symptom resolved, so did the anxiety and fear reaction to men of the same ethnicity as the gunmen. At the end of treat- ment, her GAF score returned to her premorbid score of 85. CLINICAL MANIFESTATIONS O F PREJUDICE SULLAWAY a DUNBAR 299 Case 2: Prejudice Response Exacerbated by Traumatic Crime. This male patient entered therapy after witnessing a shooting that occurred within a few feet of where he stood. The female victim died on the scene; he was spat- tered with her blood. The perpetrator was an African American male. The initial PTSD symptoms resolved with treatment, but he stayed in therapy to address a vari- ety of longer term interpersonal and occupational prob- lems, including some sexual identity concerns. He had had few intimate relationships with women, and had never had a satisfactory romantic or sexual experience with a woman. His initial diagnosis included PTSD- acute, as well as borderline personality traits. Traits included impulsivity, affective instability, panic at per- ceived abandonment, and (quoting from the DSM-IV) “transient, stress related paranoid ideation or severe dis- sociative symptoms” (American Psychatric Association, 1994, p. 424). His initial GAF score at the start of treat- ment was 51; with amelioration of the PTSD symptoms his GAF rose to 60. Prior to the crime this patient had significant prejuh- cial belie6 about and reactions to (most predominantly) Afiican Americans and Hispanics; however, prejudicial beliefs applied as well to Jews and Asians. These belie6 were shared by h s family of origin; the family was also vehemently negative about homosexuals. After the crime, his hostility and prejudice against Afiican Ameri- cans and Hispanics were heightened. Other reactions included panicky feelings and a desire to escape (some- times acted upon) &om any situation in which there was physical proximity to African American or Latino men. He expressed strongly held belie6 concerning the role of minorities and immigrants in violent crime, fantasies of serious danger if driving alongside a car with a member or members of the feared minority groups, various racist and anti-Semitic remarks, and so on. These beliefs pre- dated the crime incident, and were supported and shared by his famdy; he expressed these belie6 and feelings with- out apology. The panicky responses seemed to have developed as a result of the crime. The outgroup attitudes described above were expressed early in treatment. His Pr T score was 59. His MMPI code type was 96“724’, with T scores of F = 80, and K = 42. Initial treatment sessions focused on coping with the stress and anxiety associated with witnessing the shoot- ing, and with managing the anxiety aroused by the pres- ence of outgroup members. A variety of cognitive- behavioral techniques including systematic desensitiza- tion, cognition restructuring, and relaxation training curbed the physiological reactivity and escape behavior, but did not significantly change the belief system that predated the crime. In the course of treatment a new theme emerged. He had concerns and confusion about his sexual orientation and was terrified that his family would discover his homosexual orientation, particularly as it violates his own family of origin’s religious faith. In the course of treat- ment, he gained comfort with his sexual orientation and was able to enter a stable relationship with another man. Concurrently, the expression of racist belie6 and feelings lessened. At the end of treatment, he was able to ratio- nally confiont his own prejudicial belie6 and to discount them. However, under periods of stress, the racially charged, paranoid feelings and beliefs returned, as did impulsive attempts to escape the situation. His GAF at the end of treatment was 65. Treatment duration occurred over a period of 5 years. Case 3: Chronic Prejudicial Ideation, Behavioral Manijktation, and Severe Psychopathology. This college-aged male was referred by his intemist for evaluation and consultation concerning difficulty with concentration, memory, and dissociation. Cognitive testing revealed a thoroughly nor- mal neuropsychological profile. MMPI results yielded a significantly elevated 8-7 profile (87*241”; F scale T score = 80, K scale T score = 40). The computed Pr scale (T score) was 73. Initial GAF was 40, with impair- ment of reality testing and impairment of completion of dady tasks. Within the first 2 months of treatment, serious mood and sleep fluctuations resulted in a provisional diagnosis of bipolar disorder. Based on psychiatric consul- tation the patient was started on lithium; he has main- tained good adherence to the medication and his mood has stabilized. However, during the past 6 years he has experienced two brief but debilitating episodes of distur- bance of reality testing. This patient had an erratic employment history, due to the patient’s reactions to Afiican Americans encountered in his workplace. He reported severe anxiety, problems with concentration, and minimally controlled hosthty while in the presence of African Americans. These reactions were so overt that it caused dismissal &om two jobs because of his panic and agitation in having to interact with f i c a n Ameri- can customers. His hostile ideation concerning Afiican C L I N I C A L PSYCHOLOGI: SCIENCE A N D PRACTICE V3 N 4 . W I N T E R 1996 300 Americans, whom he readdy acknowledged dislikmg, was ego syntonic to him; however, he found the symptoms of panic, fear, and hostility to be highly unde- sirable. Treatment shifted in emphasis from a supportive and cognitive approach to a more structured behavioral regi- men, emphasizing imaginal and in vivo systematic desen- sitization, with an emphasis on symptom management in the presence of African Americans, both in pleasant envi- ronments (e.g., nature settings) and in the workplace. The patient (who was interested in business) was given materials to read concerning marketing to ethnic com- munities, and restructuring interventions focused on the reality that it “made sense” to master his panic response to persons of color. This treatment strategy proceeded over a 9-month period, with subsequent tapering off of psychotherapy sessions to twice a month. The patient reported a significantly reduced level of arousal in the presence of Black coworkers and customers and was able to work effectively. However, his feelings of dislike and his private denigration of Ahcan Americans were unabated. Afier nearly 2 years the patient terminated psycho- therapy treatment, remaining under medical supervision for pharmacotherapy. Afier a period of nearly 3 years, he reinitiated treatment, due to a recurrence of the origi- nal mania symptoms. These were diagnosed as a rapid- cycling bipolar disorder, with psychotic features. The patient resumed regular weekly psychotherapy, to address stressors a t both home and work, which may have con- tributed to the relapse. At this time he was retested on the MMPI, with a clinically elevated (8-2-7) profile found (827*93”41’; F = 76, K = 46, Pr = 68). An additional diagnosis of narcissistic personality disorder was assigned. The patient’s racial attitudes had evolved. H e continued to express a dislike toward Afiican Americans, yet acknowledged that one of his better fiiends was Afiican American, and his panic and anxiety in exposure situa- tions had not reoccurred. H e expressed disapproval of family fears of persons of color. H e now doubted the credibility of concerns about f f i c a n Americans. How- ever, he now expressed an aversion to Asian Pacifics, par- ticularly men, with the old patterns of fear and panic recurring. This interfered with medical treatment; for example, he once lefi a physician’s waiting room because there were employees of Asian descent working at the desk. H e would not allow an Asian American male to move in as a roommate, because he “didn’t like them on the street,” or in his home. While this patient demonstrated significant improve- ment in terms of reduction of severe anxiety and panic in the presence of African Americans, his general social attitudes toward persons of color remained largely intrac- table. Furthermore, expressed prejudlce toward other ethnidrace groups had migrated to a second hstinct social group (persons of Asian descent). In his behavioral response to both of these groups the patient evidenced an impairment to his overall level of functioning, which a t varying times compromised his economic security, job performance, and domestic circumstances. Finally, the 3- year interval between MMPI adrmnistrations revealed a very stable Pr scale score and consistent relationship between the (elevated) F and (relatively lower) K scale scores. Discussion The case material illustrates a range of severity of clinical manifestations of prejudice and dustrates proposed assess- ment methods appropriate for clinical practice. It is hoped that this case material will provide ground for h t u r e systematic clinical research in the diagnosis and treatment of prejudice as a focus in psychotherapy. In Case 1, prejudicial ideation served as one of the prominent symptoms of acute PTSD. Adverse response was reportedly limited to members of the perpetrator’s ethnic group. This acute outgroup response was appar- ently developed through classical conditioning (Mower, 1960), and was experienced by the patient as uncomfort- able and “ego dystonic.” There were no overt behavioral manifestations of prejudice. Prejudicial ideation did not predate the traumatic event, and remitted with treatment of the PTSD. Her Pr score was quite low ( T score = 39), and F and K scores were inconsistent with the high-F/ low-K pattern noted by Gough’s earlier research. Her GAF scores at the beginning and ending of treatment were relatively high. Case 2 is superficially similar to Case 1 insofar as prejudicial ideation initially presented in treatment as part of a PTSD symptom picture. However, for Case 2 the prejudicial beliefs existed prior to the trau- matic event, extended to several outgroups, and were not experienced as ego dystonic. The Pr score was relatively high ( T score = 59), and the GAF score was moderately low (5 1). Additionally, the impulse-disordered profile suggested by the high F ( T score > 70) and low K (T CLINICAL MANIFESTATIONS O F PREJUDICE SULLAWAY & D U N B A R 301 score < 50) was noted. Even after treatment, prejudicial beliefs remained. A somewhat different clinical situation is reflected in Case 3. In this instance, significant psychopathology included the manifestation of hostile and aggressive behaviors toward outgroup persons; global level of func- tioning was low (GAF = 40). Pr scores were high at both MMPI administrations, 3 years apart (73 and 68). as were the elevated F and lowered K score patterns. For Case 3, fluctuations of mood and personality disturbance were related to the patient’s behavioral and affective impair- ment in the presence of Afiican Americans, initially, and subsequently in the presence of persons of Asian heritage. There are undoubtably patient-specific characteristics of the cases presented here that have shaped our findings. T h e interested practitioner and clinical researcher should consider, for example, that these patients all voluntarily sought psychological services. It is therefore difficult to know what diagnostic impressions and treatment courses will be characteristic of those individuals who are man- dated for treatment, as is increasingly being required with convicted hate crime perpetrators. The absence of an a priori treatment model also limits the ability to replicate the efficacy of our interventions. In the absence of a method of treatment thoroughly grounded in clinical research, the practitioner’s response to outgroup hostility is likely to remain in context of other related clinical problems (e.g., trauma symptoms, anger management). Additionally, the societal context of these cases should not be overlooked. The community in which these indi- viduals lived (Los Angeles) has been impacted by the 1992 riots as well as concerns about immigration (as reflected in 1994‘s Proposition 187) and continued growth and presence o f persons of color throughout Los Angeles County. Other community settings may not as such engender the same concerns for persons seeking psychological services. Implications for Clinical Research T h e intent of this article is to propose a h m e w o r k to understand outgroup prejudice in terms of clinical prac- tice. Given the paucity of recent clinical research o n t h s topic, case illustrations have been used to illustrate pos- sible assessment strategies. Inherently there are limitations in this approach. Case studies are nonexperimental inves- tigations of individuals using clinical impressions and archival material (e.g., clinician observations, psychomet- ric test data, and the DSM categorical ratings). In contrast to single-case research designs (Kazdin, 1992), case stud- ies do not utilize an experimental design (such as an ABAB design), are not typically replicable, and are subject to the biases inherent in patient self-report and clinician observation, record keeping, and memory. Nevertheless, we believe there is a role for case studies, particularly regarding seldom-explored topics. In Meehl’s (1 954) words, It is the tremendous interest in the individual case that defines the clinician. . . . A n improbable factor of a given type may occur with extreme rarity, but improbable factors as a c~ass, each of which considered singly will not appear in a statistical analysis as signtjcant, may contribute heavily to the misses l e g . , instances in which statistical prediction miss the mark]. @. 25) There is essentially n o available information on the frequency with w h c h prejudice and outgroup hostility are significant focuses of clinical treatment. Research needs to determine whether outgroup prejudice is more likely to be encountered in multiethnic communities and social settings characterized by significant demo- graphic change. Furthermore, the frequency of inter- group contact is an important factor to be considered in clinical research of prejudice. As illustrated by these cases, the behavioral manifestation of the prejudicial belief sys- tem was due to adverse intergroup/interpersonal experi- ences. We anticipate that this clinical problem will most likely be further explored via more rigorous and system- atic case study methods than provided in the present instances. It is unlikely that many researchers would be able to access a satisfactory number o f participants to allow for an empirically driven analysis of this issue. This is all the more likely given the absence of an agreed upon methodology concerning the clinical study of prejudlce. The establishment of a recognized model of clinical. assessment is therefore needed, to guide future research. T h e proposed subtypes of outgroup prejudice, as sug- gested here, provide a first step toward formulating assess- ment and treatment strategies. It is hoped that this model may serve to guide both psychometric assessment and clinician-based diagnosis. We cannot emphasize too strongly the need to consider this serious social and clini- cal issue in terms of the contemporary diagnostic nomen- clature. Clinical research must resume the study of C L I N I C A L PSYCHOLOCr: SCIENCE A N D PRACTICE V 3 N 4 , WINTER 1996 301 prejudice and outgroup hatred via a theory- and method- driven approach. These case hstories raise a number of implications for research concerning psychological assessment. These include whether psychometric measures (such as the MMPI) may yield a distinctive profile or pattern of symp- tom complaints that are related to outgroup bias or social group phobias. Additionally, our cases raise the question as to whether the Pr scale reflects a unique aspect of social cognition, one that predisposes psychotherapy patients to ascribe t o intractable prejudicial belief. It has been sug- gested that high scores on the Pr scale (e.g., T scores > 65) reflect a rigid cognitive style. In terms of prognosis, we wonder whether patients scoring high on t h s measure are indeed particularly invulnerable to reduction in symp- toms or beliefs related to race/ethnic prejudice, particu- larly when combined with the F-K pattern reflecting disinhibition and impulsivity. Put another way, is the Pr scale of predctive value concerning treatment outcome for outgroup bias? Finally, does the Pr scale reflect the degree to which outgroup prejudice may be an unques- tioned component of the patient’s world view? P R E J U D I C E : C O M O R B I D , S Y N D R O M E , O R D I A G N 0 STIC F E L L 0 W T R A V E L E R ? As has been suggested in the case histories, clinical and psychometric assessment may help t o inform our t h n k - ing about prejudice as a factor in psychotherapy treat- ment. At the same time, even with further clinical research o n the topic, there is reason for extreme caution regarding how to best incorporate such an assessment process into the present diagnostic system. In context of current clinical debate, it seems fair to question whether prejudce should be considered a comorbid disorder, a syndrome, or if neither, then what sort of a diagnostic fellow traveler it might be. While prejudice may share many symptoms with other Axis 2 disorders, it is incorrect to think of it in terms of comorbidity (defined as “the co-occurrence of two supposedly separate conditions at above chance lev- els” [Rutter, 1994, p. 1001, and a “descriptive term that concerns the co-occurrence of two diagnostic entities” [Feinstein, 1970, as cited by Rutter, 19941). Current thinking about the appropriateness of the concept “com- orbidity” for psychopathology reflects a lack of consen- sus. Lilienfeld, WaIdman, and Israel (1994), for example, question the applicability of the notion of comorbidity to various diagnostic conditions such as the personality disorders, particularly if the discrete Axis 2 diagnoses are not true, independent disorders. If in fact an individ- ual with multiple Axis 2 diagnoses is more accurately described as experiencing “a single condition that is man- ifested in multiple domains that cut across several DSM- 111-R [sic] personality disorder categories” (p. 78), can we consider chronic prejudice, which we propose does fiequently imply personality disturbance, to be comor- bid? As recent discussion in this publication has made clear (see Blashfield, McElroy, Pfohl, & Blum, 1994; Lilienfeld et al., 1994; Robins, 1994; Rutter, 1994; Spitzer, 1994; Widiger and Ford-Black, 1994), there are significantly different opinions found among scholars in the field of psychopathology research. In considering the conceptualization of chronic preju- dice as a clinical condition, we tend t o agree with Rutter (1994) that further attention to whether a clinical prob- lem (such as chronic prejudice) is comorbid when it co-occurs with a recognized diagnostic category is war- ranted. However, we also agree with Lilienfield et d. (1994) that there is certainly n o available evidence that a clinical problem such as prejudice is a condition indepen- dent fiom other recognized psychological dlsorders. Equally, our case illustrations support the notion that chronic prejudice is not related to a specific diagnostic category, although it seems to most fiequently co-occur with Axis 2 disorders. We d o not propose that all bias is the product of per- sonality type or psychopathology. To assume that all instances of outgroup bias meet some still-to-be- established criteria for a diagnostic category or co- occurring condition is o n its face simple minded. There is certainly evidence that outgroup bias is a frequently held belief in the general population (Hoffman, 1993). In addition, the wealth of experimental social psychological research has supported the notion that outgroup stereo- typing and bias are frequent by-products of ingroup iden- tity (Tajfel & Forgas, 1981; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Finally, there is evidence that outgroup stereotyping may be a normative cognitive process and is not per se reflec- tive of a disorder (Mackie & Hamilton, 1993). What we hope to make clear from the clinical case material, how- ever, is that outgroup bias and prejudlce may co-occur with other psychological disorders in such a manner as to be both clinically significant and disabling to the patient. To suggest less would err in the direction of treating all CLINICAL MANIFESTATIONS OF PREJUDICE SULLAWAY B DUNBAR 303 adverse responses to race and ethnicity as being norma- tive when in fact they are not. As a final consideration in this regard, psychopathology research clearly needs to determine the base rates of significant and disabling out- group prejudice with patients receiving psychological services. Implicit to this argument is also the very real need to reestablish investigation of race and ethnic bias as an area of concern to clinical researchers. This means that the problem of prejudice needs to be reconsidered in terms of our contemporary diagnostic system, rather than in terms of psychodynamic principles that are not derived fiom community or epidemiological studies. As observed in Cases 2 and 3, the clinical features asso- ciated with chronic prejudice are characterized by a rigid belief system concerning a designated social outgroup; this is accompanied by an intense and ineffectual affective response to contact with outgroup persons, difficulties with impulse management in this arena, and, conse- quently, interpersonal difficulties that may lead to sig- nificant impairment in undertaking daily life tasks. We have attempted to illustrate chronic, rigid prejudice, and to contrast it with transient, situationally mediated preju- dicial reactions. The relevant clinical features are s u m - rized in Table 2. The clinical features of chronic prejudice presented are largely consistent with the general criteria used to diagnose a personality disorder as described in the DSM- IV, in which an enduring pattern of inner experience and behavior results in clinical symptomatology and h n c - tional impairment. However, we d o not imply that preju- dice is a distinct clinical disorder. Rather, clinical features of prejudice seem to be characteristic of Kazdin’s (1983) description of a syndrome, that is, a constellation of dis- tinct signs and symptoms that covary across indwiduals, of unknown etiology. Perhaps prejudice is best thought of as an indicator of the “extensive” or “diverse” personal- ity disorder described by Oldham et al. (1992) and O’Boyle & Holzer (1992). Proposed Subtypes of Prejudtce as a Clinical Phenomena Based o n prior research and the authors’ clinical experi- ences, five clinical subtypes of prejudice are proposed. These are (a) critical incident prejudice response, (b) avoidant outgroup disorder, (c) antisocial prejudice disor- der, (d) narcissisticAabile prejudice disorder, and (e) para- noid/delusional prejudce disorder. A brief summary of each hypothesized subtype is presented below and con- sidered in terms of h t u r e research concerning treatment. Table 2. 1. Common characteristics of prejudicial ideation Proposed dimensions related to outgroup prejudice 0 Patient‘s identification with distinct social ingroup 0 Adverse affective, ideational, and/or behavioral response to mem- bers of defined social outgroups with outgroup members 2 . Characteristics of transitory prejudicial ideation 0 Adverse intergroup contact experience or traumatic event associated 0 Absence of chronic personality disturbance or disorder 0 Severity of psychopathology evidences mild to moderate disturbance 0 Adverse behavioral response to intergroup contact compromises 0 Adverse cognitive ideation or affective arousal is localized to a dis- 0 Presence of significant personality disturbance or disorder 0 impulsivity or disinhibition regarding self-presentation and interper- 0 Psychopathology evidences moderate to severe disturbance (e.g.. as 0 Generalized adverse response associated with outgroup members in 0 Prominent behavioral features of aggressiveness, hostility, and/or 0 Manifested behavioral response t o intergroup contact compromises 0 Adverse cognitive ideation or affective arousal may be generalized to (e.g.. as represented by CAF rating) functioning in few or no basic life domains or tasks tinct social outgroup 3 . Characteristics of chronic prejudicial ideation sonal relationships represented by CAF ratings) the absence of traumatic event panic are noted secondary to intergroup contact functioning in a variety of life domains/tasks more than one distinct social outgroup Critical Incident Prejudice Response. This subtype is char- acteristic of the formation of classically conditioned adverse outgroup belie6 and affects secondary to trauma (e.g., assault). The unique role of aversive association and intrusion Concerning outgroup persons following the traumatic event is the primary signifier of the condition. We propose that in comparison to the other subtypes, this form of outgroup prejudice holds the greatest poten- tial to benefit from psychotherapy. This is because the prejudicial response is stimulus specific and fkequently is of short duration. In instances of social or environmental stressors, the prejudicial ideation may remit with cessa- tion of the critical event or via brief psychotherapy inter- vention. In instances of trauma-induced prejudicial response, however-as reflected in Case 1 -treatment of arousal and intrusions will require the employment of cognitive-behavioral techniques found to work with crime and critical incident victims. Auoidant Outgroup Disorder. This subtype is character- ized by personality traits of introversion and avoidance. Alienation, anomie, and estrangement are typical (Ehr- lich, 1973). Patients characterized by this subtype may be less likely (as with the paranoid subtype) t o voluntarily discuss outgroup prejudicial belie6. As a consequence, attention to this clinical problem is likely to be minimal CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY: SCIENCE AND PRACTICE V 3 N 4 , WINTER 1996 3 0 4 in psychotherapy treatment. It is not unlikely, however, to encounter outgroup denigration with this subtype, which is independent of actual intergroup contact expe- riences. Likewise, the rigidity of the belief system in terms of outgroup intolerance is notable. The finctional impairment related to this subtype is hypothesized to be the same as that found in other instances of avoidant personality disorder and social pho- bia. By the nature of the personality traits associated with this subtype, behavioral manifestation of outgroup preju- dice is more likely to be evidenced in terms of withdrawal and disengagement, rather than aggression or confionta- tion. It is proposed that treatment would typically con- cern alleviation of the patient’s social estrangement and isolation, rather than t o address specific outgroup rela- tions. Proposed treatment models that address clinical problems of anxiety and social phobia are likely effica- cious with this subtype. Narcissistic/L.ubile Prejudice Disorder. This proposed sub- type reflects the DSM-IV Cluster B personality disorders in which there is n o demonstrable sociopathy. This sub- type o f clinical prejudice is marked by affective lability and hostdity, as suggested by Bell (1980). The role of traits of personality disturbance (e.g., narcissism) should also be considered in determining the subjective impact of intergroup conflict. As Dunbar (1 996b) has noted, nonclinical participants with higher Pr scale scores evi- denced greater trauma symptoms of stimulus avoidance and intrusion, as well as greater affective arousal, follow- ing adverse intergroup contact experiences. While this may not be an intractable condition (as suggested by Case 3), it is hypothesized that long-term adjustment and intergroup relationships will likely remain problematic. Paranoid/Delusional Prejudice Disorder. This subtype of outgroup prejudice is characterized by fear reactions, rigid belie6 of the potential for harm &om outgroup per- sons, and utilization of projection as a defense against intergroup contact experiences. The self-perception is one of having been wronged by members of a given (or multiple) social outgroup. Suspiciousness and cognitive inflexibility are prominent clinical features. In more extreme instances, outgroup ideation may manifest as a filly wrought delusional system. These features may or may not serve to meet the criteria for paranoid personal- ity dsorder. O f interest is the relationship that has been drawn in criminal law between the delusional disorders and aggressive racist behavior. Referred to as racial paranoia-induced delusional disorder, this nonclinical formulation has been proposed as a defense with hate crime perpetrators tried o n charges of assault and attempted murder (Third World Law Journal, 1991). It is proposed that the treatment of paranoid outgroup ideation will prove to be prognostically poor. Interven- tions that fail to address the patient’s underlying guarded- ness and inflexibility are unlikely to prove effective. As has been suggested elsewhere, a primary therapeutic goal with guarded and suspicious patients is the development of a level of trust and openness to facilitate modification of the basic belief system (Beck & Freeman, 1990). This is not likely to be accomplished by psychotherapy that initially focuses o n issues of outgroup prejudice. As with other forms of paranoid and delusional disorders, the patient’s voluntary discussion of outgroup prejudice is not easily accomplished and in this sense poses a therapeutic challenge similar to that of the avoidant prejudice subtype discussed previously. Antisocial Prejudice Disorder. This proposed subtype includes the variants of antisocial personality as suggested by Lykken (1995) and is closely aligned with Hare’s (1991) definition o f sociopathy, as exemplified by his sec- ond factor-derived dimension from the Psychopathy Checklist, which reflects low frustration tolerance, impulsivity, and conduct disturbance. We feel that it is important to distinguish between the impulsive antisocial individual, who is apt to demonstrate a variety of criminal and aggressive behaviors, and the ideologically motivated person, who demonstrates a particular preoccupation with opposition to outgroups such as ethnic minorities and gay/lesbian persons. Accordingly, we have defined two categories that are most characteristic of this subtype. In the first of these, outgroup prejudice is secondary to an undersocialized and antisocial personahty type. In the second category outgroup prejudice is based o n an ideo- logically driven antisocial world view. The first category is characterized by outgroup hostil- ity that is manifested by an impulsive and thrill-seeking personality dsorder. These individuals are hequently hate crime perpetrators, as defined by various municipal civil codes. These individuals evidence a low recurrence of criminal activity toward outgroup persons (Levin & McDevitt, 1993). The psychopathology is principally antisocial and is only secondarily characterized by hostil- ity toward specific social outgroups. The second category C L I N I C A L MANIFESTATIONS O F PREJUDICE * SULLAWAY & DUNBAR 305 includes individuals who evidence strongly held beliefs that place them at odds with mainstream cultural conven- tions and practices. Such groups include members of fas- cist and violent antigovernment groups. This includes persons who meet the criteria of ideologically based criminal assault, as found in the FBI crime classification system (Douglas, Burgess, Burgess, & Ressler, 1992). This subtype also includes persons characterized by hyper- authoritarianism, that is, persons who fail to conform to community standards of the democratic and egalitarian social compact, as originally described by Adorno and his colleagues in 1950. We hypothesize that efficacy of treatment with this subtype is poor. This is due to the role of characterologi- cal disturbance in this form of outgroup hostility. Policy experts in the area of remediation and rehabilitation of hate crime perpetrators have noted the failure of psychoe- ducational and group interventions with this population (Persily, 1996). In many instances psychological treat- ment of choice is comparable to that found in other anti- social and criminal offender models (Bourdain, 1994). These clinical subtypes can be of assistance to the practitioner in considering co-occurring diagnostic fea- tures as well as treatment approaches. Likewise, these subtypes imply distinctly different clinical profiles, with respect to psychometric assessment. It is anticipated that, if these subtypes prove of clinical utility, clinical research- ers may be able to identiify differences in symptom cluster and/or scale elevations on psychometric measures such as the MMPI, Millon scales, and the California Personality Inventory. Implications for Clinical Practice As suggested by Case 1, there is some evidence that a conditioned learning model may explain the develop- ment of prejudiced ideation or behavioral response for some psychotherapy patients. If conditioned learning is explanatory for some patients who evidence outgroup bias, particularly secondary to a traumatic event, then it could be expected that cognitive and behavioral condi- tioning techniques might be a treatment of choice. O n e example of the employment of a cognitive-behavioral response to negative outgroup response is provided in two studies of systematic desensitization in the treatment of anxiety related to racism toward Ahcan Americans (Cotharin, 1978; Cotharin & Milkulas, 1975). Cotharin attempted to determine the effectiveness of systematic desensitization to reduce the negative emotional arousal accompanying racial prejudice in Whites toward Afiican Americans. Therapeutic gain is reported this study. How- ever, in Cases 2 and 3 remission of negative affects, arousal, and behavior was not accompanied by reduction of negative outgroup beliefs and attitudes. Furthermore, in one patient (Case 3), reduction in overt hostility toward one racial outgroup migrated over time to a sec- ond ethnic/racial group. It therefore remains to be deter- mined as to whether some individuals are more likely than others to generalize conditioned negative responses &om one raciaVethnic outgroup to other raciallethnic outgroups. Conversely, if outgroup prejudice is clinically prominent in the absence of a specific traumatic event, or if there is evidence of the prejudiced belief system being long-standing, plausible treatment options might include uncovering/insight-type treatment modalities as well as interpersonal process approaches. In either case, how- ever, we feel that the treating practitioner will need to integrate themes concerning interracial/ethnic contact (Tzeng &Jackson, 1994) and patient racial identity (Car- ter, 1995) if there is to be significant therapeutic gain in this regard. It should also be considered that while others have argued for the efficacy of a group therapy model for prej- udice reduction (Penterotto & Pedenen, 1993). the avail- ability of such a treatment option is quite limited in terms of referral for patients who are seen in outpatient settings. Furthermore, the very real question of achieving patient compliance to participate in such a treatment modality (e.g., treatment specifically addressing prejudce reduc- tion) must be questioned. None of the patients described here initiated treatment because of hidher feelings about racially and ethnically different persons. Rather, treat- ment was initially sought to ameliorate adverse symp- tomatology as experienced by the patient. It is therefore important to consider that the readiness of the patient to fieely participate in targeted prejudice-reduction treat- ment should be seriously questioned, particularly for per- sons who may most be in need of psychological services. Therefore, it appears that the focus of treatment related to prejudice wdl in most cases remain with the treating psychologist with whom the patient has initially initiated psychotherapy. We believe that there are several opporm- nities, in context of the therapeutic relationship, to create a corrective therapeutic response to the patient’s negative outgroup belief system. Issues that may be addressed C L I N I C A L PSYCHOLOGY: SCIENCE A N D PRACTICE V3 N4, W I N T E R 1996 306 include the clarification of how the adherence to prejudi- cial beliefs is self-defeating or “costs” the patient. For example, focusing o n how a panic response to contact with Afncan Americans may compromise j o b security or how negative belie6 about culturally different persons may create conflict with coworkers may help to clan@ the need for the patient to develop effective behavioral responses to interrace and ethnic group contact, which is consequent to leading a more adaptive lifestyle. We would like to point out the critical role that race and ethnicity played in the therapeutic dyads discussed in the present study. As Comas-Diaz and Jacobsen (1991) have suggested, same race/ethnic therapy dyads may facilitate mirroring of greater patient self-esteem and self- regard. We feel that this is particularly true in terms of White therapists demonstrating comfort in exploring and clarifying the impact of interraciaVethnic contact for their White patients. Equally, of course, the failure of the White treating psychologists to address their patients’ adverse racial/ethnic belie6 may help to reinforce a prej- udiced and culturally avoidant world view. In the present study the three White patients were working with a same-race practitioner. As Helms (1 990) has made clear, the impact of the practitioners race arid racial identity is a critical factor for psychotherapy outcome. Our impres- sion is that these three patients not only would have avoided issues of outgroup prejudice with a therapist of a different race/ethnic background but would not have remained in treatment. These patients sought psychological services to address problems they experienced as aversive and that compro- mised their life hnctioning. As treatment progressed, it became apparent that issues concerning outgroup preju- dice were a clinically d e n t aspect of the symptomatol- ogy. In terms of the therapeutic alliance, these individuals were not initially seen as persons w h o endorsed social belie6 that were undesirable, if not repugnant. Rather, through treatment the patients’ fears and hostilities toward outgroup persons were encountered as part of the clinical problem. We have sought to illustrate how these cases reflect meaningful clinical information that is related to out- group prejudice. However, the presenting clinical prob- l e m of these patients are not adequately explained in terms of outgroup prejudice solely. Equally, the issues raised are most salient to psychological service delivery in multicultural settings and may be of less immediate rele- vance to persons in more homogeneous settings. I t is unclear whether these aversive outgroup beliefs would have been clinically manifested in a social milieu that would yield infrequent interethnidrace contact ex- periences. At the same time, the clinical appraisal and treatment of prejudice are likely to be of increasing importance nationally, given the continuing racial/ethnic diversification found throughout the United States. As we have noted, prejudice, as suggested by Duckitt (1992), may be understood in terms of individual differ- ences that may pose significant barriers to the successful treatment of persons receiving psychological services. O n e of the most critical points raised in these case histor- ies concerns the need for practicing psychologists to be competent to therapeutically respond to persons who experience disabling prejudicial outgroup beliefs. An informed and effective therapeutic response is required with persons such as those presented in this article, if practitioners are to be in the service of their patients. A C K N O W L E D G M E N T The authors would like to thank Dr. Hamson Gough for his correspondence concerning the development and history of the Pr scale. R E F E R E N C E S Adorno, T., Frenkel-Bmnswik, E., Levinson, D. J., & Sanford, R. N. (1950). The authoritarian personality. New York: Wdey Science. Allport, G. (1954). The nature of prejudice. Reading, MA: Addison- Wesley. American Psychiatric Association. (1 994). Diagnostic and statisti- cal manual of mental disorders (4th ed.). Washington, DC: Author. Beck, A. T., & Freeman, A. (1990). Cogtiitive therapy ofpersonal- ity disorders. 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work_mdihi2fowfbjjknktjvbvtvyii	----	Journal of the Contemporary Study of ISlam | Volume 1 | ISSue 1 | 2020 Amina Inloes • Review: Stereotyping Religion • pages 55–57 • DOI 10.37264/jcsi.v1i1.18 J C S I 55 Review Stereotyping Religion: Comparing Clichés, ed. Brad Stoddard and Craig Martin, 2017. London & New York, Bloomsbury, 183 pp., $29.95. ISBN: 978-1-4742-9219-1 (pbk). Amina INLOeS The Islamic College, London, UK Email: a.inloes@islamic-college.ac.uk Stereotyping Religion is a collection of chapters aimed at dispelling popular clichés about religion in America arising primarily from the legacy of european liberalism, American Protestantism, and New Atheism. The primary intended audience is religious studies stu- dents in America (as well as religious studies professors looking for course readings). The goal of the book is to assist students and professors challenge assumptions about religion that they may have unquestioningly brought to the classroom with them – for instance, “religions are belief systems”, “religions are intrinsically violent”, or “religion makes people moral”. each chapter is named after a cliché, making navigating the book easy. In a typical chapter, the author explains why the cliché is simplistic, how that cliché is used socially or politically, and the historical roots of the cliché. In practice, many of the themes (such as “religion is a private matter”) run through multiple chapters. While some chapters are more convincing than others, each chapter is at least likely to make the reader question their own assumptions and spur meaningful discussion. Overall, the book is written in a conversational, readable tone. Since the book addresses clichés about religion in America, it is natural that it integrates aspects of American pop- ular culture – such as Bill Maher, Star Trek, Santa Claus, and elf on the Shelf – as well as characteristically American notions of and attitudes towards religion, such as a tolerance towards religious conversion. The authors are united in emphasizing the relatively modern definitions of what a religion actually is, and the roots of those notions in colonialist-era biases. They emphasize that it is near-impossible to make a blanket statement about what religion actually is, given the diversity of human practice, and that not all languages have a word for “religion” in the same way that modern english does. They also note that people espouse the clichés which are most suited to their agendas; for instance, an atheist would be most likely to insist that “religion is bullshit”. Now, to the clichés. “Religions are belief systems” (by Sean McCloud) challenges the assumption that the primary defining factor of a religion should be belief, and that belief is what always leads to action, rather than vice versa. The author also presents situations where Americans formally or informally blend spiritual beliefs of varying origins, even if they identify as Christians. Next comes “Religions are intrinsically violent” (Matt Sheedy), in which the author argues that the claim that all religions are intrinsically violent is relatively new. This is followed by “Religion makes people moral” (Jennifer eyl); the conclusion here is somewhat softer, in that, while problematizing the cliché, eyl concedes that religion can mailto:a.inloes@islamic-college.ac.uk Journal of the Contemporary Study of ISlam | Volume 1 | ISSue 1 | 2020 Amina Inloes • Review: Stereotyping Religion • pages 55–57 • DOI 10.37264/jcsi.v1i1.18 J C S I 56 foster moral discourse through providing a framework for moral exploration (examples she cites are the Tao Te Ching, the Gospel of Matthew, and the Buddhist Silas) or through moti- vating people to adhere to a social code by making them feel watched by a non-visible entity. After that comes “Religion concerns the transcendent” (by Leslie Dorrough Smith), in which the author makes a case that religion actually deals with many measurables, particu- larly those related to group identity, and it is precisely because religion has tangible effects on the physical world that it is considered worthy of study. This is followed by “Religion is a private matter” (by Robyn Faith Walsh), which goes into greater detail about the historical roots and political role of this cliché. In “Religions are mutually exclusive” (by Steven W. Ramey), the author argues that the idea that a person is expected to adhere to one religion at a time is a legacy of the Abrahamic religions which has been imposed onto the global context, both theoretically as well as practically; for instance, the author argues that, prior to British rule of India, the lines between religious groups were blurrier. In “I’m spiritual but not religious” (by Andie R. Alexander and Russell T. McCutcheon), the authors instil in the reader the notion that personal declarations – such as “I’m spiritual but not religious” – do not arise ex nihilo but rather as part of pre-learned discourse and in the context of social interaction. “Learning about religion leads to tolerance” (by Tenzan eaghll) problematizes the theoretical underpinnings of the actual endeavour of teaching about religion in hopes of fostering tolerance. In “everyone has a faith” (by James Dennis LoRusso), the author unpacks the idea that everyone has some sort of intrinsic faith, raises the question as to whether it is appropriate to call non-religious ideologies such as atheism “faiths”, and looks at how this cliché shapes the outer world. Lastly, in the final chapter, “Religion is bullshit” (by Rebekka King), the author explores what it might mean for religion to be “bullshit” and one might apply the word to religion. The author comes up with three main implied critiques: falsity, ethical wrongness, and deplorability. The main strengths of the book are its ease of use, particularly in a pedagogical context; its clear focus; and its potential to lead to broader discussion. One has the sense that the editors (Brad Stoddard and Craig Martin) were rather enthusiastic about and dedicated to this project and really wished to generate something useful and new – which, in fact, they have. However, there are some possible points for critique that could be considered. First, while it is reasonable to discuss theory in a book for religious studies students, some of the chapters would have benefitted from more discussion of what actually happens in practice. A priori discussions pale in the face of real-life crises such as a hate crime. Second, the treatment of religious syncretism sometimes seems to be stretched; for instance, given how many ghosts haunt the cathedrals of europe, it is difficult for me to take belief in ghosts as an example of American Christians picking and mixing between religious traditions. Also, given that religious syncretism happens most everywhere, rather than looking for examples of religious syncretism, the authors could have asked instead why it shouldn’t happen – certainly no organized religion has grown up in a vacuum. Third, some pieces might have been more nuanced if there had been a policy not to describe an abstract (a religion) with an adjective suitable for humans (such as “violent”). For instance, before mulling over whether religions are intrinsically violent, it is worth asking whether that is even a meaningful premise; to date, Christianity itself has never picked up a gun. Lastly, while the editors do situate the ideological and methodological roots of their project in the introduction, it Journal of the Contemporary Study of ISlam | Volume 1 | ISSue 1 | 2020 Amina Inloes • Review: Stereotyping Religion • pages 55–57 • DOI 10.37264/jcsi.v1i1.18 J C S I 57 wouldn’t be inappropriate in a book on stereotypes to reflect back on the how ideologies common in today’s contemporary American academic culture are or are not the best lens for understanding religion or the human condition. None of these points is a severe criticism; rather, they could be food for thought when reading and discussing the material. Since that this is an Islamic studies journal, a few words are in order about the book’s pres- entation of Islam. Given the dismal portrayal of Islam in the contemporary US mass media, it is natural that Islam would feature in a book about religious stereotyping in America. The authors themselves are not advocating any stereotypes about Islam and use examples of Islam or Muslims to challenge clichés about religion. However, in practice, the names that they drop about Islam leave the reader with a slanted, stereotypical image of Islam. That is, one reads about ISIS, al-Qaeda, and Boko Haram; terrorism, FGM, and apostasy; and Salman Rushdie, Maajid Nawaz, and (the vociferously ex-Muslim) Ayaan Hirsi. While it is perfectly legitimate to discuss any of these on their own, most Muslims would not consider these names or issues to be representative of most Muslims. (In contrast, in discussions of Christianity, one finds more expected names such as Martin Luther and Augustine.) I don’t think this was intentional on the part of the authors but rather was simply due to integrating today’s popular views in the US about who or what is “Islamic”. In any case, this would be another excellent topic for discussion. 
work_mej5jwvy7bh3vp5xbitcxyz7ma	----	Trans* policy, politics and research: The UK and Portugal This is a repository copy of Trans* policy, politics and research: The UK and Portugal. White Rose Research Online URL for this paper: http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/124350/ Version: Accepted Version Article: Hines, S orcid.org/0000-0003-2472-7602 and Santos, AC (2018) Trans* policy, politics and research: The UK and Portugal. Critical Social Policy, 38 (1). pp. 35-56. ISSN 0261-0183 https://doi.org/10.1177/0261018317732880 © 2017, The Author(s). This is an author produced version of a paper published in Critical Social Policy. Reprinted by permission of SAGE Publications. eprints@whiterose.ac.uk https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/ Reuse Items deposited in White Rose Research Online are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved unless indicated otherwise. They may be downloaded and/or printed for private study, or other acts as permitted by national copyright laws. The publisher or other rights holders may allow further reproduction and re-use of the full text version. This is indicated by the licence information on the White Rose Research Online record for the item. Takedown If you consider content in White Rose Research Online to be in breach of UK law, please notify us by emailing eprints@whiterose.ac.uk including the URL of the record and the reason for the withdrawal request. mailto:eprints@whiterose.ac.uk https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/ 1 Trans Policy, Politics and Research: the UK and Portugal Sally Hines University of Leeds, England Ana Cristina Santos Colegio S. Jeronimo, Portugal Abstract: This article explores law and social policy regarding trans* activism amongst trans* and non binary social movements, and academic research addressing trans* in the UK and Portugal. In considering different possibilities for theorising gender diversity, this article positions a politics of difference and embodied citizenship as fruitful for synergising the issues under discussion. The authors consider recent law and policy shifts around gender recognition in each country and examine the gaps and the connections between policy developments, activism and research around trans*. Though each country has divergence in terms of the history of trans* activism and research, the article identifies significant similarities in the claims of activist groups in the UK and Portugal and the issues and questions under consideration in academic research on trans* and non binary. 2 Introduction The overlaps and gaps between academia, social policy and politics offer a prolific field for inquiry on topics as diverse as academic impact, public sociology and the links between academia and social movements. In this article, we consider trans* as a mobilizing theme in law and social policy, on the one hand, and academia, on the other. Our understanding of trans in this article includes both transgender people who wish to be part of the binary system of male and female and people who do not (non binary). We support the view that trans* policy, politics and research must enable room for a range of gender-based identities, including gender fluidity and non binary. Key issues raised in the article concern the ways in which trans*-related claims became the focus of concern for policy makers in the UK and Portugal; the extent to which trans* has been used as a focus of interest in the academic arena in the UK and Portugal, and the ways in which trans* has reconfigured the social debate and the theoretical imagination around embodiment, agency, intimacy, recognition and citizenship. The article is situated within current discussions around citizenship and gender-based authenticity in the UK and in Portugal. Embodying a particular mode of trans* lived experience, one that fulfils the expectation of gender binarism even in contexts in which gender identity laws would enable gender fluidity, seems to remain a cultural precondition for recognition. These cultural expectations have been identified and denounced in the sphere of activism in the countries under consideration in this article. The article also considers the role of collective action, and most specifically trans* social movements and NGOs, as a trigger platform for both political change and theoretical innovation. In doing so, we focus on the often contrasting contexts of Portugal and the UK. By centring our analysis on these two geographical locations we hope to demonstrate the resilience of certain narratives and practices around which both trans* based policy and research evolve despite the different historical and political legacies that Portugal and the UK embody. On the one hand, the UK is often mentioned in LGBTIQ literature as a leading political actor from which early LGBTIQ activism and lesbian and gay studies emerged. On the other hand, Portugal remains described as a Catholic, conservative country with a familistic welfare regime (Trifiletti, 1999), even if it offers one of the most striking examples of the impact of LGBTIQ activism in law and social policy (Hines, 2013, 2016).1 3 Despite historical differences, both Portugal and the UK have gender recognition laws that move beyond compulsory surgical interventions or other types of bodily modification. Before engaging in a critical revision of the state of the art of trans* based policy and research in Portugal and the UK, however, the article considers how differences and similarities play out in how citizenship is used to claim trans rights and visibility. In the next section we offer a reflection on different theoretical frameworks in accounting for trans* rights and suggest the use of trans embodied citizenship as a way to look beyond the body whilst retaining the centrality of trans* lived experiences. Theorising Citizenship and Difference The notion of citizenship has long been at the core of theoretical contributions and political concerns regarding vulnerable subject positions (Lister, 1997; Young, 1989). The construction of citizens as those who are able to participate publicly in decisions that affect their lives, and to make claims which are heard and recognized, brought to light new layers of exclusion, as well as new opportunities to frame citizenship beyond a narrow understanding of a strictly social and political set of formal rights. From the 1990s onwards, drawing heavily on contributions by feminist and queer academics, and inspired by developments advanced by social movements in Europe and North America, sexuality started to be regarded as a crucial element of citizenship (Plummer 2003; Richardson, 2000; Weeks, 1998). As Roseneil et al point out: the complex entanglements and gendered valencies of ‘public’ and ‘private’, ‘political’ and ‘personal’, ‘rational’ and ‘emotional’, and ‘mind’ and ‘body’ in constructions and practices of citizenship have been almost exclusively the critical terrain of feminist and queer scholars (2013: 901). In relation to formal recognition, issues such as access to partnering and parenting rights, including marriage, civil partnership and adoption, acquired centre stage in struggles around equality policies and sexual freedom. Concepts such as “intimate citizenship” (Plummer, 2003) and “the sexual citizen” (Bell and Binnie, 2000; Weeks, 1998) became increasingly popular, grounded as they already were in the daily experiences of people living and loving beyond the heteronorm (Roseneil, 2005). More recently, topics such as medically assisted conception or surrogacy, and fierce debates around abortion across the globe, have contributed to studies on reproductive 4 citizenship (Roseneil et al, 2016). Intimate, sexual and reproductive citizenship offer productive tools to theorise gender diversity. In both the UK and Portugal, the autonomy in determining one’s identity through self- identification has been a consistent mobilizing topic for claims and action against the power ascribed to the medical field. In the UK such resistance has been framed under the umbrella of human rights, whereas in Portugal demands have clustered more around citizenship, equality and social justice. Common to both contexts is the emphasis on depathologisation as a way to reclaim autonomy over one’s bodies and identities, whilst at the same time rejecting the centrality of psychiatry in trans* related processes, with a particular focus on the psychiatrization of lived experiences (Davy, 2015). In this regard, we advance the notion of trans* embodied citizenship as a way to acknowledge the importance of lived experience and self-determination regarding trans claims and identities. Embodied citizenship is different from bodily citizenship (Outshoornet al, 2015) in the sense that it does not take body integrity or bodily modification as the core for demands around recognition. On the contrary, trans* embodied citizenship invites us to look beyond the body in its strict sense, whilst at the same time retaining the legitimacy of lived experience, of bodily autonomy, of overcoming obstacles to full access of (intimate, sexual or reproductive) citizenship by embracing rights as a non- negotiable common ground. However, the notion of citizenship is frequently inter-linked with a politics of recognition which attempts to re-shape social justice on the basis of reinstating recognition that has been previously denied. In the work of recognition theorists Taylor (1994), Fraser (1995) and Honneth (1995) recognition is placed at the heart of individual identity formation and experience. Theories of politics of recognition emerged in the 1990s and were inter-linked with the politics of social movements centred on the identities of race, class, gender and sexuality. Taylor (1994) was explicit in this linkage, arguing that a theory of recognition was fundamental for understanding the political struggles and demands of identity – based movements. From this perspective, social justice is not possible without recognition. Theories of recognition have, though, been subject to critique. Heyes (2003) and McNay (2008), for example, argue that recognition theory presumes a fixed self: ‘certain features of a person lie dormant, awaiting discovery by the individual who then 5 presents this authentic self to the world and demands positive recognition for it’ (McQueen, 2016). Further critiques suggest that recognition theory assumes a fixed group identity (Appiah, 1994, Hines, 2013). While this may work in favour of those deemed to ‘fit’ the characteristics of a particular identity, those who project alternative identity markers are positioned outside collective identity. Debates around the place of trans women within feminism are a pertinent example The qualitative research by Hines (2013) thus draws out the ways in which a politics of recognition can work to exclude trans people from LGB and feminist movements. A politics of recognition is therefore problematic for theorising gender diversity as it may contribute to the construction and replication of identity-based narratives around authenticity or gendered ‘realness’. This is especially problematically from a queer lens that is attuned to the myriad of non- binary ways through which gender becomes daily enacted and structurally silenced. A framework of recognition, then, not only bears down on everyday life experience through practices of exclusion, but, as this article goes on to suggest, impacts on how trans-related laws and social policy are designed and implemented. Thus, pro-trans laws and social policy often remain focused on binary conceptualisations of the body, disregarding the nuances through which trans* lived experiences and embodiments are managed and negotiated in the everyday. Somewhat paradoxically, then, gender fluidity becomes further silenced through legal and social policies around trans* that reproduce traditional frameworks that foreground authentic binary gender. Moreover, these silences have been at the core of social movement critique against otherwise emancipatory laws which become captured by strict visions of what gender diversity is. In the two geographical contexts under analysis in this paper, gendered authenticity is a much contested terrain. In advancing the notion of trans* embodied citizenship to enable self-recognition of a diversity of gendered identities and bodily states, then, we conceptualise citizenship as distinct from a politics of recognition. A politics of difference (Young, 1990) provides another productive framework through which to theorise gender diversity. This approach hones in on the distinct structural positions, embodied experiences and identity claims amongst members within a minority movement alongside theorising these distinctions in relation to wider society. In contrast to calls for assimilationism, difference from this perspective is celebrated and understood as offering productive potentials through which to form political alliances. We suggest that this offers a more fruitful framework through which to account for 6 gender diversity without slipping back into debates about who is most (or least) authentically gendered. With this theoretical framework in mind, we now move to critical engagement with trans* based policy and research in both geographical locations under consideration: the UK and Portugal. More than a rigid analytical script of symmetrical issues, in this article we recognize that different contexts offer different strategies and outcomes. Therefore, some of the issues discussed were included because of their relevance – political or otherwise – in the specific location to which they refer – for example, intersex issues are considered more so in relation to the Portuguese context than they are in the UK. Trans* Policy within a UK Context Over the last decade and a half, issues concerning the rights afforded to trans* people have appeared on the UK political agenda. In 2002,Goodwin and I v. instigated a case against the UK government (Goodwin& I v. United Kingdom Government) in the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). The plaintiffs argued that in not enabling trans* people to change their birth certificates and to marry, the UK government was in breach of their human rights. Ruling in favour of the claimants, the ECHR held that the UK government’s failure to alter the birth certificates of trans* people and to allow them to marry in their new gender role was a breach of the European Convention on Human Rights. This landmark case was instrumental to the UK 2004 Gender Recognition Act, which, two years later, was enacted to enable legal recognition. The Goodwin case was supported by the trans* lobbying organisation ‘Press for Change’ (PfC), which since the 1990s, had been campaigning for legal recognition. Following legal success, PfC worked with the UK government in shaping the emerging gender recognition legislation, which had a significant impact on the lived experiences of trans people in the UK and beyond (Davy, 2011; Hines, 2007, 2013). The UK Gender Recognition Act (GRA, 2004) enabled trans* people to change their gender and marry in their acquired gender. Of central importance to trans* campaigning organisations and social movements was that the new law did not insist that the applicant had undergone body modification practices such as surgical 7 procedures or hormone therapies. Such a recommendation would, it was argued, greatly discriminate against the citizenship rights of trans* and non binary people who could not or did not wish to alter their bodies through medical means (Davy, 2011). Thus, the GRA was passed without surgical or hormonal intervention criteria. This did not mean, however, that the process of gender recognition was wholly autonomous from medical discourse or practice. Central here is the concept of ‘gender dysphoria’, which remains a key classificatory term within medical discourse and practice (Sharpe, 2007, 2009; Hines, 2007; Davy, 2010). Moreover, ‘gender dysphoria’ is seen as symptomatic of ‘gender identity disorder’, which is written into the GRA as a pre-requisite condition of gender recognition. Thus, the Gender Recognition Panel – made up of medical professionals– who assess applications for gender recognition requires confirmation from a psychiatrist of a diagnosis of ‘gender identity disorder’. Hines’ (2013) research exploring trans people’s experiences of the GRA2 found that the continued role of psychiatrists in the recognition process was viewed negatively by many of those who had, or were in the process of, applying for recognition, with many stating that psychiatric professionals should not be involved in the process of gender recognition. The continued pathologisation of trans*, and its writing into law, has been the focus of activist campaigning in the UK over the last decade and has recently been addressed by the UK Parliament’s ‘Transgender Equality Enquiry’ (2016). Led by the cross – Party ‘Women’s and Equality Committee’, the ‘Transgender Equality Enquiry’ took place between 2015 and 2016 to ‘look at how far, and in what ways, transgender people still have yet to achieve full equality; and how the outstanding issues can most effectively be addressed’ (Transgender Equality Report, 2016: 2). In addition to addressing legal recognition processes as set out in the GRA, the enquiry focused on a broad range of policy issues as they affected marriage and relationship recognition, hate crime, health, the media, education, social care, employment and criminal justice.3In conclusion, the Report stated that ‘Whilst Britain has been among the countries that have gone furthest in recognising lesbian, gay and bisexual rights, our society is still failing this test in respect of transgender people, despite welcome progress in recent years [...] It became apparent during the inquiry that there is a complex and extensive hierarchy of issues that need to be addressed’ (Transgender Equality Report, 2016: 5). 8 The Report positioned the evidence required for gender recognition as set out in the 2004 Gender Recognition Act as a key problematic area: ‘the requirement to provide documentation regarding a diagnosis of gender dysphoria was particularly contentious. [...] “the continued ‘pathologisation’ of transgender identities [i.e. treating them as a disease or disorder] through the 2004 Act causes significant offence and distress”’ (Transgender Equality Report, 2016: 7). The Report quotes evidence given to the Enquiry by James Morton from the campaigning organisation the Scottish Transgender Alliance: A number of trans people who have been really traumatised and humiliated by the process where they have [had to say whether they have] undergone various medical treatments. The Act says you should be able to access your gender recognition without necessarily having those, and yet the gender recognition panel has insisted on really intrusive levels of detail about the surgeries that people have undergone or their intentions for future surgery. (Transgender Equality Report, 2016: 7). Also giving evidence to the Enquiry from a legal perspective was human rights lawyer Peter Dunne. Dunne advocates for a recognition framework based on self-referral rather than medical referral, which is currently followed in a number of countries: In the decade since the 2004 Act was first introduced […] a seismic shift has occurred at the interface between gender identity advocacy and human rights law. Many transgender individuals now view “self-declaration” as the most appropriate vehicle through which the State can recognise preferred gender. (Transgender Equality Report, 2016: 7). The Report concluded in favour of the UK adopting a process of self-referral and urged the Government to make such changes to legal processes. The calls from trans* social movements for depathologisation have thus been heeded by the UK cross-Parliamentary Transgender Equality. An individually-based framework of evidence is seen to offer greater levels of dignity and autonomy for applicants. Yet, whether or not the Report’s recommendations in this respect will be actioned by Government in its review of the GRA remains to be seen. The issue of the medicalisation, and an inter-linked pathologisation, of gender diversity was also apparent in the Report’s findings on health provision. As discussed elsewhere in this Collection (Davy et al), National Health Care Service (NHS) provision for trans people was addressed as an area of concern in the UK Enquiry and, in line with the view of campaigning organisations, was identified as inadequate. Thus, the Report stated “We have found that the NHS is letting down 9 transgender people, with too much evidence of an approach that can be said to be discriminatory and in breach of the Equality Act” (Transgender Equality Report, 2016: 20). Central to this was the continued understanding in treatment protocols of gender diversity as symptomatic of a mental health issue: “We are concerned that Gender Identity Services continue to be provided as part of mental-health services. This is a relic of the days when transgender identity in itself was regarded as a disease or disorder of the mind and contributes to the misleading impression that this continues to be the case” (Transgender Equality Report, 2016:21). Depathologisation of gender diversity as it is interwoven through the law, policy, and medical understandings and practice was, then, identified by the Inquiry as crucial for the protection of trans* people’s human rights. While the issue of the medicalisation of the current gender recognition process and protocols for treatment were highlighted as key in the Enquiry, a broad range of additional policy recommendations were made in respect of the inequalities faced by trans people across of a range of social and public spheres. Despite the Gender Recognition Act of 2004, the Enquiry found discriminatory practices in the fields of education, criminal justice, family life and the media. It was found that young trans* and non binary people faced bullying from peers at school and that staff at all educational levels often dealt unsuccessfully with changes of gender and names. Such experiences, it was found, impacted on young people’s educational performance and on their mental health. Practices towards trans* people in the criminal justice system were found to be extremely poor. The issue of people not being placed in a prison appropriate to their gender was of particular concern, and the bullying of, and self-harm and suicide by, trans* prisoners was un-proportionally high compared with the rest of the prison population. The issue of spousal consent, where the non-transitioning partner must agree to the change of marriage, or the marriage be annulled, before a full GRC is issued was seen by many trans* people as impacting on their human rights. A witness from the organisation ‘Gender Identity, Research and Education Service’ (GIRES) thus told the Enquiry: ‘Trans people are the only group that can have their civil rights delayed by another […] What is clear is that the effect of the veto is that the “feelings” of the non-trans spouse are given more importance than the rights of the trans person to gain full civil participation. This is a clear indication that government considers trans people as less than equal’ (Transgender Equality Report, 2016:15). Notwithstanding the 10 increasing social and cultural visibility of gender diversity in the UK over recent years, it was also found that overall media representation of trans* people was poor and instances of everyday transphobia and hate-crime were frequent. Policy gaps and areas of inequality across each of these spheres constitute issues of current campaign by trans* organisations in the UK. Health inequalities, for example, are central to the campaigning work of a number of organisations who lobby for an individual system of care that is divorced from psychiatric frameworks, the project ‘Bare Bars’ campaigns against carceral injustices, while the importance of media representation fuels the work of ‘Trans Media Watch’ who collaborate with cultural industries to bring about more positive representations of trans* people across the UK media. As the paper will later address, these areas of discrimination have also been highlighted in UK academic research on trans*. Trans* Policy within a Portuguese Context4 One of the earliest pieces of legislation addressing LGBTIQ related issues in Portugal referred specifically to trans*. Indeed, after the decriminalization of homosexuality in 1982, trans* was the first category to enter the realm of social policy through the door of health practice. In 1995, the National Board of Physicians revoked a ban that was part of its Deontological Code up until then and that forbidden sex reassignment surgery which was considered unethical and illicit (Article 55). After 1995, the same Code added an exceptional ground to this ban in cases in which individuals had been adequately diagnosed with transsexuality or gender dysphoria, as long as they were not married (ILGA Portugal, 2008; Marques et al, 2012). Despite the profoundly pathologising language, the blatant discrimination based on marital status and the power granted to medical doctors in determining gender identity, this piece of social policy enabled several types of bodily modification to be performed to trans* people under the National Health Service since 1995. This change in the National Board of Physicians did not come about as a result of claims put forward by LGBTIQ activists. Rather, in 1995 collective action in the field of LGBTIQ issues was still dispersed and at its very early days. When activism became a hub for legal claims and change, mostly throughout the 2000s, lesbian and gay issues 11 gained precedence over issues about bisexuality or trans*, which were included in the acronym from the outset but struggled with the absence of an influential representation. Over the last ten years, the rights of trans* people in Portugal started to be framed and voiced autonomously, even if still covered by the larger umbrella of LGBTIQ activism and struggling with shortage of financial and human resources. The trans* movement in Portugal started to mobilize around formal recognition, particularly in the aftermath of the murder of Gisberta, a trans* woman killed in 2006 in the city of Oporto by a group of male children and teenagers who were living in a Catholic-based institution (Santos, 2013)5. This event triggered media attention to the specificities of trans* people as a population subject to widespread violence, including the absence of protection under the law. As a result of demands expressed by LGBTIQ organizations, especially by a small number of trans* activists who became more visible after Gisberta’s murder, the Penal Code changed in 2007 in order to include sexual orientation – but not gender identity – as an aggravating factor in case of hate crimes, alongside hatred based on race, religion, politics, ethnic or national origin, and gender (article 132). Despite the absence of ‘gender identity’ from the Penal Code, the inclusion of sexual orientation was regarded as an achievement, signalling a positive impact of the LGBTIQ movement and opening the gate to protection against violence to all LGBTIQ citizens. Another field of interest regarding trans* policy is related to the legal process of naming a child or choosing a name when acquiring formal recognition based on gender identity. In the Portuguese context, the pool of available names is informed by gendered and nationalistic criteria, which have not been adequately investigated nor questioned by the women’s movement or other movements for sexual equality so far. More specifically, the rules which apply when planning to name a newly born child or to change one’s name (e.g. as a trans* person) are published in the Civil Registration Code, under the Ministry of Justice. Every name must be recognized under the Onomastic Index and chosen names cannot raise doubts concerning the gender of the person (Civil Registration Code, article 103, No 2a). Such compulsory gender binary in naming practices and norms offers a powerful example of the resilience of the cis/gender and sexual normative system that often find strongest allies amongst legal and policy actors (Santos, 2017). 12 The issues around naming raise significant questions, that overflow the policy realm into the daily experiences of trans* and non binary people. In a recent conference in Lisbon, Stephen Whittle said: When people ask me about my gender, I tell them I don’t know. In other words, it’s just enough to be me. […] I know I am Stephen. The most important thing is being the person we name ourselves. (Whittle, 2016) And, indeed, questions related to gender authenticity have acquired central stage in trans* based politics in recent years in Portugal. The topic has triggered animosity and devoted reactions on both sides of the cis/trans* gender divide. But perhaps even more interestingly, gender authenticity has been discussed with passion within the trans* community, with dissent around depathologisation on the basis of who is more or less authentically trans (Cunha, 2016). The issue of authenticity needs to be interpreted in light of self-perceived identities. In 2014, the Fundamental Rights Agency issued a report based on a survey to self-identified trans* and intersex people. More than half of the participants in this survey did not identify exclusively with the binary categories women/ men. Empirical data such as this pushes for the acknowledgement of gender fluidity as a key element when discussing theories and politics of gender diversity in the Portuguese context. Certainly, activists, politicians and other decision-makers seem increasingly aware of gender diversity as a floating concept that describes a spectrum, more than a fixed location. This is partially mirrored by the Gender Identity Law (Law no. 7/2011, 15th March) approved by the Portuguese Parliament in 2011, celebrated by activists and in the media as amongst the most progressive in the world at the time, enabling sex markers to be changed in official documents regardless of any bodily modification. According to a 2015 report published by API – Action for Identity, an organization which works on trans and intersex related issues, this law was the first worldwide to comply with the Yogyakarta Principles6to its full extent, protecting applicants from the need to go through any sort of previous bodily modification, hormonal treatment or sterilization, as it was previously the case (Pereira and Ferreira, 2015). However, more recently the 2011 Gender Identity Law triggered increasing critique from trans and intersex organisations who denounced aspects in which the law became dated and failed to offer adequate response. Throughout 2015 and 2016, trans* and 13 intersex activists have been invited by political parties, government offices and parliamentary commissions to provide suggestions in order to update the law. One of the central expectations of activists, politicians and other professionals who criticize this law is to overturn the centrality currently ascribed to health professionals in granting mandatory evidence of individual trans* status. Although body modification through the use of hormones or surgery is not required before accessing gender recognition, the law states that people who apply for gender recognition at the Civil Registry Office must provide a “Report that supports a diagnosis claiming gender identity dysphoria which is also known as transsexuality. The diagnosis has to be made by a multidimensional medical team specialising in clinical sexology and operating in public or private health establishments in Portugal or abroad”(Law no. 7/2011, 15th March). This report, which must be submitted together with the application, needs to be signed by at least one physician and one psychologist. For the emerging trans activist movement in Portugal, the involvement of sexologists and psychologists as gate-keepers to recognition represents the continued pathologisation of gender diversity. The removal of psychiatric authority is currently under challenge by most trans* activists, as has been the case in the UK as discussed above. Besides depathologisation, claims put forward by trans and non binary activists regarding formal rights include diminishing the bureaucratic weight of administrative procedures, gender self-determination for people over 16 years old, gender recognition to citizens from other countries living in Portugal, the end of any gender-based categories in official forms or identification cards, the possibility of accessing a larger pool of gender-neutral names and the prohibition of medical intervention on intersex new-born or children without their informed consent. These changes will have a strong impact on the lived experiences of trans* and non binary children and adults who will acquire greater authority over medical doctors in determining self-identity and representation. An immediate spin-off of this discussion was the recent announcement made by Minister Eduardo Cabrita that Portuguese schools will have to address children and teenagers by their chosen name, regardless of the formal name change happening only after turning 16 years old.7In March 2017 the Government has agreed on a final version of the text covering justice, health and education issues. The revised version will erase the former need for a biomedical report confirming a trans* identity and will enable self-determination from 16 years old onwards, and younger children will have 14 the right to be treated in schools according to their chosen name regardless of legal documents. This revised version of the law was thoroughly negotiated with the ministries of Health, Education and Justice with the strong coordinating input of the Secretary of state for Citizenship and Equality, Catarina Marcelino. At the moment of writing, secretary of state Catarina Marcelino, interviewed in June 2017, expected that this revised Gender Identity Law would be discussed and approved in Parliament by the end of 2017, early 2018. Researching Trans* in the UK Empirical research on trans* from UK scholars has, in the main, been produced by social scientists and has connected closely with social, cultural, legal and policy shifts8; in many ways producing a qualitative exploration of the impact of these developments on trans* people themselves. In mapping a diversity of trans practices in contemporary society, the body of work developed by Richard Ekins and Dave King (1996, 1997) has worked to challenge a universal understanding of trans. Surya Monro’s (2001; 2005) notion of ‘gender pluralism similarly counters a undifferentiated model of trans, instead pointing to a spectrum of identities and practices as an alternative to the binaries of male and female. Stephen Whittle’s intervention problematised a wholly deconstructive reading of trans* that had characterised the then dominant perspective of trans studies coming out the humanities in the US: ‘Real life affords trans people constant stigma and oppression based on the apparently unreal concept of gender. This is one of the most significant issues that transgender people have brought to feminism and queer theory’ (Whittle 2006: xii). A focus on ‘lived experience’ is thus evident in UK scholarship over the last decade, much of which has developed out of empirical research projects. Hines’ (2007; 2010; 2013) body of work has explored the impact of social, cultural, policy and legislative changes on the everyday identities and experiences of trans people in the UK. As discussed above, Hines’ work has qualitatively explored the impact of gender recognition law and policy on trans* people’s everyday lives. This work concluded that the legal and policy changes around gender recognition that were enacted in 2004 were largely welcomed by trans* participants and, overall, seen to mark greater moves 15 towards citizenship parity. Yet, as indicated earlier, significant policy gaps remained and, greater levels of education amongst, and training for, professionals in health, education, social care and social justice, and cultural industries about gender diversity was stressed. Hines’ empirical work has also focused on networks of care and practices intimacy, foregrounding the importance of care networks and intimate relationships in filling the gaps left by policy and professional services. The impact of gender transition on intimate relationships and kinship structures is also apparent in Tam Sanger’s (2008) work. Sanger argues for an ‘ethics of intimacy’, which takes account of a diverse range of intimate practices and formations in contemporary UK society. Empirical research again drove Zowie Davy’s (2011) work on embodiment, which explored trans* people’s divergent bodily experiences and aesthetic practices. Davy’s later work (2015 and in this Volume) has carried forward the questions gender and embodiment to a sociology of health, particularly in respect of trans* people’s experiences of primary health care. As discussed above, the health care experiences of trans* people are at the forefront of current policy recommendations; indicating the links between UK work on transgender and the claims of trans social movements. Research by Elizabeth McDermott and Kristina Roen (2016) into mental health service provision for trans people similarly maps on to campaigns for a more sensitive system of mental health care as it relates to gender diversity. Finally, Sarah Lamble’s (2012) research on the experiences of trans* people in prison in the UK raises concerns that echo social movement claims and policy recommendations around injustices faced by trans people in the UK criminal justice system, particularly in relation to the issue of incorrect gender segregation and lack of knowledge about gender diversity amongst criminal justice professionals. Of increasing significance is the issue of non-binary identity and experience, and work by UK scholars such as M.J. Barker (2016) and Ben Vincent (forthcoming, 2018) points to the specific needs of this population for whom a framework of recognition and rights needs to move beyond the binary models of male and female. Central to this body of scholarship is the argument that personal life emerges through, and intertwines with, the political. A ‘sociology of transgender’ (Hines, 2010) thus traces the formations of power within and through gender and sexual categories; exploring how gender shifts feed into wider debates around the meanings of gender, 16 sexuality and embodiment; themes that are also fore-grounded in the emerging field of work on trans* in Portugal. Researching Trans* in Portugal Despite significant changes in law and social policy regarding law and policy in recent years (Santos, 2013), LGBTIQ studies lack the type of recognition ascribed to other fields of knowledge in Portuguese academia. Even within departments of social sciences and humanities in which embodiment, gender and sexuality could find a safe space to flourish, the epistemological status of LGBTIQ studies is still questioned on a daily basis, tacitly framed as too politicised or subjective to aspire to scientific status. As a result, funded research on LGBTIQ issues is scarce in Portugal and there are no doctoral programmes engaging with these as main subject areas. Within this broader context, trans* as a specific research topic can be described as very recent, intermittent and sporadic. However, some contributions have countered the previous conceptual or empirical void, as this section of the article will briefly discuss. Trans* as a concept had been part of the scientific literature for over a decade, though most of the times under the umbrella acronym LGBTIQ and without further consideration regarding trans* issues. The bottom- up initiatives in the political field have coincided with the emergence of dispersed studies addressing trans issues, most of which result from PhD thesis of students with a background in social sciences. The very few existing empirical studies focusing on trans* in Portugal can be seen to be clustered around three major themes. A first cluster of contributions can be framed as a historiography of activism and legal claims, mapping main events and key actors in local trans* politics. An example of this strand of work is the first study to consider trans* as an autonomous field of scientific inquiry within social sciences in Portugal. Conducted by the sociologist Sandra Saleiro in 2013, this study counters the silence around the specificities of trans* activism and politics, ascribing it a place of its own, a focus of analytical attention that is autonomous from the overruling LGBTIQ acronym. Saleiro identified “a social void, related to the lack of information about transsexualism and transgender; and a sociological void, corresponding to the inattention of the discipline to these phenomena” (2013: 4) in the 17 Portuguese context. Her work aimed specifically at countering this void by mapping out gender diversity both in social movements and society at large. Rather than imposing biomedical labels, this study respected the categories provided by trans* people who participated as interviewees. A second theme gathers contributions that address socio-cultural representations of trans* and non binary people, including identity-based characterizations of trans. Recent research by psychologist Liliana Rodrigues (2013, 2016) offers a good example of this strand. Drawing on “a perspective that is critical, feminist, trans, and intersectional” (2016: 7), Rodrigues explained her aim to be double-fold: to contribute to the (de)construction of trans people’s identities; offering a critique to gender binarism and highlighting ways in which people cross gender in multiple ways, whilst also discussing the depathologisation of transsexuality as a way to extend the human rights of trans people. Other examples of this strand are the works produced by Ana Lúcia Santos, who wrote the first MA thesis on intersex in Portugal, drawing on philosophy and gender studies (Santos, 2012), and the recent MA dissertation produced by Joana Brilhante on representations of trans amongst university students (Brilhante, 2016). In 2016, the INTIMATE research project, funded by the European Research Council, based at the Centre for Social Studies (University of Coimbra) and coordinated by one of the authors of this article (Santos), has conducted an exploratory study on naming, mapping out how restrictive laws on naming are interpreted, integrated or subverted by parents of trans or intersex children; in 2017, INTIMATE conducted a comparative study on networks of care amongst trans people in Portugal, Spain and Italy, highlighting the importance of friendship and informal care provision.9 Finally, a third cluster of studies on trans* in Portugal focuses on health care and the role of health professionals. This last cluster of contributions is the most prominent, and is almost exclusively authored by psychologists, despite some contributions from psychiatry and legal medicine (Marques et al, 2012). Two significant names in this field are Carla Moleiro and Nuno Pinto (Pinto and Moleiro, 2012; Moleiro and Pinto, 2015), both of whom are psychologists working in trans-related issues and part of the research team of the research project “Gender Identity Law: Impact and Challenges of Juridical Innovation in the Transgender Field”. This study received public funding and was conducted between 2014 and 2016. The project focused on the administrative procedures of the 2011 Gender Identity Law; assessing its implementation, identifying 18 and seeking to overcome the difficulties to legal recognition and understanding the impact of the law on the social and psychological well-being of trans* people. Headed by psychologist Carla Moleiro, this constituted the first comprehensive study about medical care and gender identity in the Portuguese context.10It included a survey by questionnaire, as well as in-depth interviews to trans* people, activists and medical doctors. The law was described by most trans* participants as very important in facilitating access to the right to one’s identity. Other key findings included the link between discrimination and well-being and mental health, and in this respect the Gender Identity Law was perceived by trans* participants as having been crucial regarding access to employment, access to public services, as well as improvement in family and intimate life. The formal procedures to change name in Civil Registration Offices after the 2011 Gender Identity Law were reported to be smooth and regular. This study also encountered obstacles and difficulties in the implementation of the law, most of which are related to individual absence of knowledge about the formal procedures and the power ascribed to medical doctors and psychologists, namely those – only 33 – who are authorized by the National Board of Physicians to provide a formal statement confirming the existence of a “deviance in gender identity”. The study concluded that many professionals included in that list could not provide a justification for having been included and that they were not all necessarily trained to address trans-related issues. Another comparative research project with a strong concern with health (mostly sexual health) is Trans Rights, funded by the European Research Council, between 2014 and 2019.11One of its analytical strands is Vulnerability, bio-power and health, and it considers welfare regimes, healthcare systems and medical practices in Portugal, France, the UK, the Netherlands and Sweden. Although outputs of this research project are still largely unknown, this is, to date, the largest study to be funded in Portugal on trans* issues. Though trans* studies are in its infancy in Portugal, there no longer exists a conceptual or empirical void, as was the case only five years ago. Despite the still limited research on trans* within a Portuguese context and taking into account the disparate disciplinarity of these studies, it is possible to identify some common features between them. Most are produced within an academic context– especially at the level of doctoral programmes – which emerge within the formal boundaries of a discipline. Psychology is the field that gathers a larger amount of academic experts and inputs. However, the 19 work produced displays a high level of interdisciplinarity, drawing on accounts produced across a range of fields in social sciences and humanities, including sociology, philosophy and anthropology. All research on trans* in Portugal has been conducted by cis gender-identified academics, with no known trans*-identified authors or Principal Investigators in the field. Conclusion This article started by considering different ways of theorising gender diversity in relation to the policy changes and political claims under consideration in the UK and Portugal. We argued that the notion of embodied citizenship productively brought together the key political claims for embodied agency and self-determination emerging from the social movements in both countries. Further, we suggested that a politics of difference was helpful for moving beyond claims for gendered authenticity that the legal frameworks in both countries encourage. The following sections explored the claims of, and policies relating to, trans* people in the UK and Portugal. The two countries under consideration have very distinct economic histories, which have impacted significantly on their particular welfare regimes. Economic insecurity in present times, moreover, impacts more severely on the Portuguese social welfare system than in the UK – despite significant cut backs to the UK’s National Health Service. These structural factors are significant since, as we have explored in this article, laws and policies relating to the rights and recognition of trans* people in both cultures are deeply intertwined with medical practice and thus social welfare provision. Another key difference between the countries that has emerged in this article concerns the history of trans* activism. In Portugal, trans* social movements have quite recently emerged from LGBTIQ activism, while in the UK trans* activist organisations and support groups go back to the 1970s. There are also differences relating to the status of trans* research in the academy, with scholarship on trans emerging very recently and being spread across more disciplines in Portugal, compared to work developing in the 1990s in the UK and being more firmly located in the discipline of Sociology. 20 Yet, despite these key differences, this article has indicated many connections in policies, politics and research regarding trans* across the UK and Portugal. Both countries have recently enacted gender recognition laws, enabling trans* people to change birth certificates to their acquired gender. Moreover, neither legal framework requires surgical intervention. Both frameworks of recognition are, however, locked into medical discourse and practice that continues to pathologies trans* people. De- pathology and routes to self-definition of gender identification are thus high on the campaigning agendas of trans* and non binary activist movements in both the UK and Portugal. Common themes between trans* activist movements are also evident in the campaigns to address gender recognition claims of young people and improve health care provision. Theories of embodied citizenship point to the ways in which the material body is central to practices of governance; bodies are a means through which rights are attributed or withheld. Moreover, embodied discourses, particularly around which bodies are productive (or non-productive), have material consequences for people with non- normative bodies. Such themes are key to the lived experiences of trans* people and feature strongly in our consideration of trans policy and politics in the UK and Portugal. Thus issues of concern to trans* people in both geographical contexts linked to questions of bodily autonomy and the ability to self-define gender identity. Subsequently, as we have explored, issues around bodily experience, discourse and practice are high on the political agendas of trans* social movements in both countries. As we argued, though, debates around the body and citizenship may problematically dovetail into debates around who has the ‘right’ (or the ‘wrong’) body. Here new understandings and practices of embodied normativity may emerge from the margins to become the indicators of, and for, bodily citizenship. Debates around gendered authenticity based on accessing (or not) surgeries within trans communities, for example, may set up new hierarchies based on standards of ‘realness’, which work to structure who is viewed to be trans* ‘enough’ (Vincent, forthcoming). Additionally, laws and policies around gender recognition may serve to give material rights to some trans* people, for example, those who have accessed surgical interventions, while denying recognition and benefits to others, for example, those who experience their gendered body as non binary. A politics of difference, whereby difference is credited rather than subsumed, is important to remain mindful of citizenship’s tendency to 21 favour assimilationism and normalcy. This article has indicated, academic research on trans* in the UK and Portugal links with these themes as they are understood and practiced in policy and activism. Thus, in both countries, research has sought to qualitatively explore the meanings of shifting law and policy (for example, gender recognition law) and has indicated the gaps in current provision (for example, non- recognition for non binary people). Here the links between academic research and social movement organisation emerge and solidify. 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(2016),Viagens Trans(Género) em Portugal e no Brasil: Uma Aproximação Psicológica Feminista Crítica. Tese de Doutoramento em Psicologia, Faculdade de Psicologia e de Ciências da Educação da Universidade do Porto. Rodrigues, L.; Carneiro, N.; Nogueira, C. (2013), Contributos da psicologia social crítica e dos direitos humanos para a abordagem das transexualidades. In S. Magalhãesand T. Alvarez (eds.), Romper fronteiras: a interseccionalidade nas questões de género e feministas. Lisbon: APEM – Associação Portuguesa de Estudos sobre as Mulheres, 49-60. Roseneil, S. (2005), Living and loving beyond the boundaries of the heteronorm: personal relationships in the 21stcentury. In: McKie, L. and Cunningham-Burley, S. (eds.) Families In Society: Boundaries and Relationships. Bristol, UK: Policy Press, 241-258. Roseneil, S.;Crowhurst, I.; Author; Stoilova, M. (2013), Reproduction and citizenship/reproducing citizens: editorial introduction, Citizenship Studies, vol. 17, no. 8, 901-911. Sanger, T. (2008),Trans Peoples Partnerships: Towards an Ethics of Intimacy.Basingstoke:Palgrave Macmillan. 24 Santos, A.L (2012), Um sexo que são vários: a (im)possibilidade do intersexo enquanto categoria humana. MA dissertation in Feminist Studies, Faculty of Humanities,University of Coimbra. Santos, A.C. (2013) Social Movements and Sexual Citizenship in Southern Europe. Palgrave Macmillan. Santos, A. C. ( with Roseneil, S.; Crowhurst, I.; Stoilova, M. (2017), Reproducing Citizens: family, state and civil society (paperback) . New York and London: Routledge Sharpe A.(2007), A Critique of the Gender Recognition Act 2004. J BIOETHIC INQ, vol. 4(1), 33-42. Sharpe A.(2009),Gender Recognition in the UK: A Return to the 'Truth' of the Past,Social Legal Studies, vol. 18(2), 259-263. Transgender Equality Report (2016) available at: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201516/cmselect/cmwomeq/390/39002.ht m(retrieved 12/03/2016). Trifiletti, R. (1999), Southern European Welfare Regimes and the Worsening Position of Women, Journal of European Social Policy, vol. 9, no. 1, 49-64. Weeks, J. (1998),Thesexual citizen,Theory, Culture and Society, vol. 15, no. 3/4, 35-52. Whittle, S. (2006), Introduction, In S. Stryker and S. Whittle, The Transgender Studies Reader. London: Routledge. Whittle, S. (2016), Non-Binary; It’s gender, Jim, but not as we know it, paper presented during the TRANS*Formations Conference, Lisbon, 14-15 June 2016. Young, I.M (1990),Justice and the Politics of Difference. Princeton University Press. Young, I.M. (1989), Polity and group difference: a critique of the ideal of universal citizenship, Ethics, no. 99, 250–74. Sally Hines is an Associate Professor of Sociology and Gender Studies at the University of Leeds, UK. Her work centres on gender, sexuality, intimacy and corresponding social movements. She is particularly interested in how debates around gender and sexual identity feed into broader discourses of citizenship and recognition. Sally is soon to begin work, as PI, on a 3 year ESRC funded international project that considers the experiences and practices of trans male pregnancy. Her most recent book is ‘Gender Diversity, Recognition and Citizenship: Towards a Politics of Difference’ (Palgrave Macmillan). Address: School of Sociology and Social Policy, University of Leeds, Leeds, LS2 9JT, UK Email: s.hines@leeds.ac.uk Ana Cristina Santos is a Sociologist. She is Senior Researcher at the Centre for Social Studies, University of Coimbra, and Honorary Research Fellow at the Birkbeck Institute for Social Research, University of London.Coordinator of the International PhD Program Human Rights in Contemporary Societies, Cristina is also the PI on the international research project INTIMATE - Citizenship, Care and Choice: The micropolitics of intimacy in Southern Europe, funded by the European Research Council between 2014 and 2019 (www.ces.uc.pt/intimate). Her most http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201516/cmselect/cmwomeq/390/39002.htm http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201516/cmselect/cmwomeq/390/39002.htm mailto:s.hines@leeds.ac.uk http://www.ces.uc.pt/intimate 25 recent book is Social Movements and Sexual Citizenship in Southern Europe (Palgrave Macmillan). 1In 2016 one of the last legal barriers to LGBTIQ citizens were removed in law and included adoption and free access to medically assisted conception regardless of sexual orientation and marital status. Same sex marriage was granted in 2010 and civil partnerships have been recognized by law since 2001 (Hines, 2013). 2The project ‘Gender Diversity, Recognition and Citizenship’ was funded by the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) and carried out in the School of Sociology and Social Policy at the University of Leeds between May 2008 and May 2010. Various qualitative methods were employed to collect data including textual/policy analysis; 25 in-depth one-to-interviews; 2 focus group interviews; analysis of virtual materials. 3For the full Transgender Equality Report see http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201516/cmselect/cmwomeq/390/39002.htm. 4The sections on Portugal included in this publication draw on research funded by the European Research Council under the European Union's Seventh Framework Programme (FP/2007-2013) / ERC Grant Agreement ”INTIMATE - Citizenship, Care and Choice: The Micropolitics of Intimacy in Southern Europe” [338452]. 5More information available at http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/country-study-lgbt- legal-update-2014-pt.pdf. 6 In 2006, a group of international human rights experts met in Yogyakarta, Indonesia, and agreed on a set of guidelines regarding sexual orientation, gender identity and expression, called the Yogyakarta Principles. More information available at http://www.yogyakartaprinciples.org/principles-en/. 7 As reported by Diário de Notícias, 24/01/2017, retrieved from http://www.ilga- portugal.pt/noticias/893.php (01/02/2017). 8An exception to this is Jay Prosser’s ‘Second Skins’ (1998), which considers trans embodiment through textual sources. 9 For more information, please refer to www.ces.uc.pt/intimate. 10The final results of this study were presented during a conference in Lisbon in April 2016. For more information, please refer to http://conferencia-identidadedegenero.iscte-iul.pt/index.html. 11More information available at https://transrightseurope.com/. http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201516/cmselect/cmwomeq/390/39002.htm http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/country-study-lgbt-legal-update-2014-pt.pdf http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/country-study-lgbt-legal-update-2014-pt.pdf http://www.yogyakartaprinciples.org/principles-en/ http://www.ilga-portugal.pt/noticias/893.php http://www.ilga-portugal.pt/noticias/893.php http://www.ces.uc.pt/intimate http://conferencia-identidadedegenero.iscte-iul.pt/index.html https://transrightseurope.com/ 
work_mfuf7tphlbhxvi75w6re7gepu4	----	ARETI THEOFILOPOULOU PUNISHMENT AS MORAL FORTIFICATION AND NON-CON- SENSUAL NEUROINTERVENTIONS (Accepted 6 December 2018) ABSTRACT. The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, I defend and expand the Fortificationist Theory of Punishment (FTP). Second, I argue that this theory implies that non-consensual neurointerventions – interventions that act directly on one’s brain – are permissible. According to the FTP, punishment is justified as a way of ensuring that citizens who infringe their duty to demonstrate the reliability of their moral powers will thereafter be able to comply with it. I claim that the FTP ought to be expanded to include citizens’ interest in developing their moral powers. Thus, states must ensure that their citizens develop their moral reliability, not only because they must enforce their citizens’ compliance with certain duties, but also because states have the duty to maintain the conditions for stability and satisfy their citizens’ interest in developing their moral powers. According to this account of the FTP, if neurointerventions are the only or best way of ensuring that offenders can discharge their fortificational duties, states have strong reasons to provide these interventions. Certain criminal offenders are required or given the option to un- dergo neurointerventions – interventions that act directly on one’s brain – either as part of their sentence or as a condition of their parole. Most commonly, this occurs in the form of lowering sex offenders’ testosterone through the administration of hormonal agents, such as triptorelin.1 Due to the increasing possibilities of using such interventions, there is a growing academic debate on the moral questions regarding their potential uses to achieve greater empathy and impulse control in offenders. 1 See, for example, William M. Burdon and Catherine A. Gallagher (2002) ‘Coercion and Sex Offenders: Controlling Sex-Offending Behavior Through Incapacitation and Treatment’, Criminal Justice and Behaviour, 29 (1), 87–109; Focquaert, Farah (2014) ‘Mandatory Neurotechnological Treatment: Ethical Issues’, Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics, 35 (1), 59–72. See Sect. II for a more elaborate discussion of different neurointerventions. Law and Philosophy (2019) 38: 149–167 � The Author(s) 2019 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10982-018-09341-3 http://orcid.org/0000-0001-9838-8119 http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1007/s10982-018-09341-3&amp;domain=pdf http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1007/s10982-018-09341-3&amp;domain=pdf The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, I defend and expand the Fortificationist Theory of Punishment. Second, I argue that, according to the Fortificationist Theory, non-consensual neuroint- erventions are permissible. In developing this argument, I first pre- sent Jeffrey Howard’s case for the Fortificationist Theory of Punishment.2 According to this view, criminal offenders who violate just laws demonstrate that they cannot – or are not willing to – act on the basis of their moral powers. When citizens fail to discharge their duty to demonstrate the reliability of their moral powers, states ought to ensure that they will comply with it in the future. Apart from citizens’ fortificational duties, I argue that there are two further considerations that collectively serve to justify punishment according to the Fortificationist Theory: these are a state’s duty to promote the collective good of stability and the interest that all individuals have in developing their moral powers. Thus, in this interpretation of the rehabilitative approach to punishment, the purpose of a criminal justice system must be to foster offenders’ capacity to both under- stand and be motivated by the requirements of justice. An interesting and so far unexplored implication of the Fortifi- cationist Theory is that non-consensual neurointerventions are mo- rally permissible and perhaps even morally required, under certain conditions. I develop this argument in Sect. II, where I argue that there are at least three strong reasons in favour of neurointerven- tions once we accept the Fortificationist Theory. In the third and final section of the paper I examine three objections to my argument. The first objection raises the possibility that non-consensual neurointerventions are impermissible because they necessarily violate offenders’ basic liberties. If successful, this objection would imply that, even if we accept that the Fortifica- tionist Theory of Punishment produces certain reasons in favour of neurointerventions, these reasons are decisively outweighed by the reasons we have to protect individuals’ mental freedom and bodily rights. According to the second objection, neurointerventions can never be proportionate to the aims that justify punishment according to the Fortificationist Theory. This is because of the potential harmful side-effects of these interventions, because they infringe individuals’ autonomy, and because they might cause a disruption in 2 See Jeffrey Howard (2017) ‘Punishment as Moral Fortification’, Law and Philosophy, 36 (1), 45–75. ARETI THEOFILOPOULOU150 a person’s psychological continuity across time. The third and final objection, which is implicitly raised by Howard, draws on an analogy between indoctrination and neurointerventions and states that, if indoctrination is impermissible and inconsistent with the proper reading of the Fortificationist Theory of Punishment, then so are neurointerventions. By responding to these objections, I conclude that the three reasons in favour of neurointerventions retain their force. Although my argument is by no means sufficient to establish the all-things-considered permissibility of neurointerventions, mainly due to the non-ideal conditions that characterise our world here and now, this discussion shows that this argument must be taken seri- ously by proponents of the Fortificationist Theory of Punishment. I. THE FORTIFICATIONIST THEORY OF PUNISHMENT According to Howard, the Fortificationist Theory of Punishment offers a new interpretation of rehabilitative approaches to criminal justice, which is immune to the standard objection raised against such approaches – that they fail to treat offenders as moral agents rather than blameless victims. This interpretation states that, to- gether with our duty to refrain from violating others’ rights, we – as moral agents – also have a duty of reliability – that is, a duty to ‘maintain the dependability of our moral capacities’.3 This is because, unless we maintain this dependability, we risk succumbing to desires that may lead us to violate others’ rights. In this way, the duty of reliability is inextricably linked with our duty to refrain from vio- lating others’ rights. In Howard’s words, Doing one’s duty is often not experienced as a matter of flicking a switch. There are potential psychological hurdles that agents may well encounter along the way. And we typically judge that it is the agent herself who is primarily responsible for overcoming them. Thus our primary moral duties to perform or refrain from performing certain acts are, in fact, often accompanied by ‘waves’ of fortificational duties whose fulfilment positions the agent to live up to the asso- ciated primary duties successfully.4 Such fortificational duties may include pursuing counselling or changing one’s lifestyle if that is necessary to ensure one’s compliance with one’s primary moral duties. Thus, when moral agents violate just laws, they reveal that they have violated two related duties. First, they have clearly violated 3 Howard, ‘Punishment as Moral Fortification’, p. 45. 4 Howard, ‘Punishment as Moral Fortification’, p. 48. PUNISHMENT AS MORAL FORTIFICATION AND NEUROINTERVENTIONS 151 their duty to refrain from acting unjustly. Second, they show that they have failed to discharge their duty to remain trustworthy by maintaining the dependability of or by fortifying their moral capaci- ties. The violation of these connected duties produces a distinctive answer to the question of the justifying aim of punishment. That is, states may intervene through punishment in order to enforce the duty that ‘offenders have to reduce their own likelihood of recidi- vism’.5 Given that the criminal offenders in question have failed to comply with their own fortificational duties, states ought to take on the task of fortifying those offenders’ moral powers, to ensure that they become capable of maintaining their dependability. Within the Rawlsian context in which Howard sets his argument, the two moral powers that all moral agents have a duty to fortify are what Rawls calls ‘reasonableness’ – the capacity for a sense of justice – and ‘rationality’ – the capacity to form, revise, and pursue a con- ception of the good. The moral power that is relevant in the context of the criminal law is reasonableness – the capacity for a sense of justice, which includes the epistemic aspect of understanding the requirements of justice and the motivational aspect of being willing to comply with those requirements.6 The Fortificationist Theory of Punishment thus implies that, when faced with a criminal offender who has failed to fortify her moral powers, states must enforce that offender’s duty by targeting the epistemic or the motivational aspect of her reasonableness, or both. This must be done in the appropriate way, given that, for example, education may be the appropriate way to fortify one’s lack of moral understanding, but cases of motiva- tional deficiencies may require different interventions, such as counselling. Howard’s formulation of the Fortificationist Theory of Punish- ment effectively rests on the premise that states have a responsibility to ensure that all citizens comply with their moral duties. I argue that there are three distinct reasons for endorsing this claim. Clearly, the claim that states can intervene when individuals fail to comply with their moral duties is too broad, for, in some cases, 5 Howard, ‘Punishment as Moral Fortification’, p. 45. 6 For the distinction between epistemic and motivational reasonableness, see Howard, ‘Punishment as Moral Fortification’, p. 49. For a similar distinction between philosophical and political reasonable- ness, see Erin Kelly and Lionel McPherson (2001) ‘On Tolerating the Unreasonable’, The Journal of Political Philosophy, 9 (1), 38–55, at pp. 39–40. ARETI THEOFILOPOULOU152 such intervention may not be justified. Enforcing honesty in indi- viduals’ private and consensual relationships would be one of these cases. Thus, we ought to understand the fortificationist position to be claiming that the duties that are transferred to the state when individuals fail to comply with them are those that exist to protect the rights and liberties that ought to be legally protected. It is not possible here to develop an account of which rights and liberties ought to be legally protected, but it suffices to note that if an indi- vidual’s right or liberty ought to be legally protected, then states have a duty to intervene when the law protecting that right or liberty is violated. According to this interpretation, the first reason why states have a responsibility to enforce compliance with moral duties, such as the fortificational duties that are linked to primary duties, is that states themselves have their own duty to protect individuals’ rights and liberties. There exists, however, a second reason that supports the view that states bear this responsibility. This reason springs from states’ duty to promote the collective good of maintaining a well-ordered society. For, if citizens have good reasons to doubt their co-citizens’ commitment to justice, the grounds for stable and fair social coop- eration become shaky. Although the appeal to stability is connected to the appeal to individuals’ rights and liberties (because one reason why we desire stability is that it ensures the protection of our rights), the two claims are distinct: the former is a societal good, whereas the latter is an individual good. This distinction then shows that states’ responsibility to enforce individuals’ compliance with their fortifi- cational duties has a second source, which is states’ duty to promote the stability of their society. Finally, I suggest that a third reason favouring the Fortificationist Theory is the interest that all persons have in developing their moral powers, and the correlative duty that states have to provide the conditions that enable their citizens to satisfy this interest. The claim that we have an interest in developing our moral powers is implicitly endorsed by most moral theories that attribute special value to moral agency. Although some philosophers might cast this claim in perfectionist terms, which may open up worries about paternalism, this need not be the case, as we can accept it without defending a specific conception of the good, such as a PUNISHMENT AS MORAL FORTIFICATION AND NEUROINTERVENTIONS 153 specific view of human flourishing.7 This is because our interest in developing our moral powers is grounded in our interest in partic- ipating in social cooperation. Given that cooperating requires a certain kind of reciprocity, those who fail to engage in such rela- tionships by virtue of their failure to fortify their moral powers lack the capacity to participate in social cooperation. This implies that part of the justification that an anti-perfectionist state can give citi- zens when enforcing their duties is that they have an interest in being moral agents who can participate in reciprocal relationships. This justification can be accepted without leading us to the unde- sirable implication that a state can enforce anything that is in its citizens’ interests construed in perfectionist terms. Thus, a third reason why states have a duty to enforce the fortificational duties of citizens when the citizens fail to enforce the duties themselves is that citizens have an interest in possessing the moral powers that enable them to participate in social cooperation. Of course, this does not imply that states ought to constantly fortify their citizens’ moral powers. Rather, moral powers must be understood as ‘range properties’ that are possessed by all those who have them beyond some minimum threshold. A person’s interest in developing her moral powers therefore calls for fortification only when there is clear evidence that her moral powers have not reached the relevant threshold. It follows that states have an interest-based duty to fortify a citizen’s moral powers only when this is the case. Indeed, this seems to be one justification for the duty that states have to provide good, mandatory education for children and appropriate pedagogical policies for individuals with cognitive disabilities.8 II. FORTIFICATIONISM AND NEUROINTERVENTIONS Recall that, according to my expanded version of the Fortificationist Theory of Punishment, there are three distinct reasons that justify 7 For an anti-perfectionist argument of this kind, see John Rawls (2005) Political Liberalism: Expanded Edition. New York: Columbia University Press, p. 77. 8 See, for example, Jonathan Quong (2011) Liberalism without Perfection. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 305: ‘if we assume a central purpose of liberal justice is to provide a fair framework within which citizens can develop and exercise their moral powers’, then an unreasonable kind of education is not consistent with this purpose and so ‘there may be good grounds for intervention’. For the latter claim, see Sophia Isako Wong (2010) ‘Duties of Justice to Citizens with Cognitive Disabilities’, in E. F. Kittay and L. Carlson (eds.), Cognitive Disability and its Challenge to Moral Philosophy. Oxford: Wiley- Blackwell. ARETI THEOFILOPOULOU154 state intervention when citizens fail to comply with their fortifica- tional duties. The first reason is that states have a duty toward individuals to ensure the protection of their basic rights and liberties; when a citizen fails to comply with her enforceable duties to her co- citizens, states ought to step in and enforce compliance. The second reason is that states have a duty to ensure that there are the appropriate social conditions that make stable and fair cooperation possible. Clearly, the prospect of such cooperation is undermined when citizens have good reason not to trust each other. The third and final reason that supports state intervention when citizens fail to fortify their moral powers is that states have a duty to satisfy their citizens’ interest in possessing the moral powers to the degree that enables them to participate in social cooperation. As Howard has claimed, it seems straightforward that since punishment is justified by appeal to the aim of fortifying criminal offenders’ moral powers, the modes of punishment that states ought to use must be expected to have the required fortificational effects. As a result, instead of permitting incarceration as we observe it in current societies, states should turn to policies such as cognitive behavioural therapy assignments, discussion seminars, and prisons that are ‘replicas of the outside world … providing offenders with substantive access to work, education, and treatment for substance abuse’.9 I suggest, however, that a more controversial and so far unex- plored implication of the Fortificationist Theory is that non-con- sensual neurointerventions are also a justifiable mode of punishment. As with therapy and other modes of punishment, the justifiability of neurointerventions would be subject to the condition that they are expected to have the desired effect of fortifying the offender’s moral powers to the requisite degree. The most widely discussed case of neurointerventions in the context of criminal justice is that of anti-libidinal pharmacological agents administered to sex offenders. There is wide evidence that 9 Howard, ‘Punishment as Moral Fortification’, p. 54. PUNISHMENT AS MORAL FORTIFICATION AND NEUROINTERVENTIONS 155 agents such as cyproterone acetate (CPA), medroxyprogesterone acetate (MPA), and gonadotrophin-releasing hormone (GnRH) ago- nists can reduce one’s testosterone levels, thereby inducing chemical castration.10 Similarly, it has been observed that a side-effect of selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs), which are typically used to treat depression and anxiety, is a decrease in patients’ libido, although there is no consensus on the explanation of this side-ef- fect.11 Although there is still disagreement on the effectiveness of these agents, there are studies that indicate that they significantly decrease the probability of reoffending.12 These effects are reversible, as maintaining them requires constant treatment.13 As a second example, consider pharmacological agents that target serotonin levels. Lower levels of serotonin have been associated with aggression and antisocial behaviour; for instance, many individuals with aggressive and antisocial behaviour have mutations in the gene coding for the 5-HT2B serotonin receptor, or variations in the gene coding for MAOA, a brain enzyme that is crucial for breaking down serotonin.14 Although the causal relationship between serotonin and aggressive or antisocial behaviour is not completely clear, several studies indicate that a fall in individuals’ serotonin increases instances of aggression.15 Moreover, those with low serotonin cannot be de- terred from aggression as effectively as others can by, say, the threat 10 See Harvey Gordon and Don Grubin (2004) ‘Psychiatric Aspects of the Assessment and Treatment of Sex Offenders’, Advances in Psychiatric Treatment, 10 (1), 73–80; Christopher Chew, Thomas Douglas, and Nadira Faber (2018) ‘Biological Interventions for Crime Prevention’, in D. Birks and T. Douglas (eds.) Treatment for Crime: Philosophical Essays on Neurointerventions in Criminal Justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 11 Deepak Prabhakar and Richard Balon (2010) ‘How Do SSRIs Cause Sexual Dysfunction?’, Current Psychiatry, 9 (12), 30–34. 12 For example, the Oregon Depo-Provera trial studied the effects of MPA agents on three groups of sexual offenders. The first consisted of offenders who underwent treatment, the second had offenders who were prescribed MPA but did not undergo treatment, and the third contained offenders who were not eligible for prescription. The trial indicated that only 5% of those in the first group re-offended, and none of the offences were sexual, while 26–30% of the other two groups re-offended, and half of the offences were sexual. Barry M. Maletzky and Gary Field (2003) ‘The Biological Treatment of Dangerous Sexual Offenders: A Review and Preliminary Report of the Oregon Pilot Depo-Provera Program’, Aggression and Violent Behavior, 8 (4), 391–412. 13 Chew et al., ‘Biological Interventions for Crime Prevention’. 14 Chew et al., ‘Biological Interventions for Crime Prevention’. 15 Donald M. Dougherty, James M. Bjork, Dawn M. Marsh, and F. Gerard Moeller (1999) ‘Influence of Trait Hostility on Tryptophan Depletion-Induced Laboratory Aggression’, Psychiatry Research, 88 (3), 227–232; F. Gerard Moeller, Donald M. Dougherty, Alan C. Swann, Diana Collins, Chester M. Davis, and Don R. Cherek (1996) ‘Tryptophan Depletion and Aggressive Responding in Healthy Males’, Psychopharmacology, 126 (2), 97–103; A. J. Cleare and A. J. Bond (1995) ‘The Effect of Tryptophan Depletion and Enhancement on Subjective and Behavioural Aggression in Normal Male Subjects’, Psychopharmacology, 118 (1), 72–81. ARETI THEOFILOPOULOU156 of punishment because lower serotonin levels make individuals more likely to value harming others in retaliation more than they value their own well-being.16 More importantly for the purposes of this discussion, there is evidence that increasing serotonin by the use of SSRIs causes a correlative fall in aggression, particularly in individ- uals with such tendencies and backgrounds.17 When prescribed to offenders, pharmacological agents that increase serotonin levels are therefore expected to fortify their moral powers, enabling them to refrain from reoffending. Apart from pharmacological interventions, there are a number of neurointerventions referred to as ‘electromagnetic brain stimulation’ (EBS), which promise to have similar effects on individuals’ moral powers; these include deep brain stimulation (DBS), transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) and transcranial direct-current stimula- tion (tDCS).18 These interventions are typically used to treat essen- tial tremor and Parkinson’s disease, dystonia, obsessive–compulsive disorder, migraine, and treatment-resistant depression. By targeting specific brain regions, these neurointerventions can affect individu- als’ moral cognition, aggression, and impulsivity.19 Thus, EBS neu- rointerventions can alter their capacity to understand the requirements of justice and morality, as well as their motivational and emotional capacity to comply with these requirements. The fortificationist case for neurointerventions is straightforward. Recall that on my account of the Fortificationist Theory there are three reasons that justify any mode of punishment: the state’s duty to ensure the protection of individuals’ rights and liberties, the state’s duty to promote the social conditions for stability, and the state’s duty to satisfy individuals’ interest in developing their moral powers up to the relevant threshold. These reasons clearly provide prima 16 Molly J. Crockett, Annemieke Apergis-Schoute, Benedikt Herrmann, Matthew D. Lieberman, Ulrich Müller, Trevor W. Robbins, and Luke Clark (2013) ‘Serotonin Modulates Striatal Responses to Fairness and Retaliation in Humans’, The Journal of Neuroscience, 33 (8), 3505–3513. 17 Chew et al., ‘Biological Interventions for Crime Prevention’. 18 These techniques involve applying ‘magnetic fields or electrical currents to specific areas of the brain, with the aim of modulating brain activity. DBS involves the invasive neurosurgical placement of metal electrodes within the brain to transmit electrical impulses. TMS and tDCS, on the other hand, non-invasively induce changes in brain activity through the use of superficial magnets and electrodes respectively. These two modes have a shallow depth of effective penetration relative to DBS and are thus only able to affect relatively superficial brain regions Recent developments in TMS technology, though, suggest it may be possible to extend this range’. Chew et al., ‘Biological Interventions for Crime Prevention’. 19 Chew et al., ‘Biological Interventions for Crime Prevention’. PUNISHMENT AS MORAL FORTIFICATION AND NEUROINTERVENTIONS 157 facie support for neurointerventions. If there are cases in which the only or best way for a state to discharge these duties is by admin- istering non-consensual neurointerventions, such as the ones de- scribed above, then it seems that this mode of punishment is justified. For example, there may be cases in which neurointerven- tions that increase one’s empathy offer the only, or most effective, or most cost-effective way of fortifying one’s moral powers.20 Of course, the claim that neurointerventions are sometimes permissible as a form of punishment should not be taken to imply that offending is caused purely by biological traits. Rather, it seems likely that criminogenic circumstances, such as neglect, abuse, and growing up in disadvantaged socioeconomic circumstances can affect the neurological characteristics of some persons. In any case, what- ever the causal relationship between social and biological factors may be, the above discussion indicates that neurointerventions can often have the desired effect, whether that is an improvement in understanding the requirements of justice or overcoming the motivational hurdles that might prevent someone from complying with them. III. OBJECTIONS A. Basic Rights and Liberties However, it may seem that the prima facie justification of neuroin- terventions is not sufficient to establish an all-things-considered permissibility because they violate basic rights and liberties. Thus, the objection goes, even if we have certain reasons in favour of neurointerventions, these reasons are insufficient and in fact out- weighed by our rightly held commitments to protecting key liberties. This is because neurointerventions seem to violate a key liberal commitment, which requires the equal protection of each person’s 20 It should be stressed that, according to this view, variation between different individuals’ moral powers does not matter when it occurs above the threshold that is required for one’s participation in social cooperation. It follows that even if non-consensual neurointerventions are permissible in order to raise the moral powers of someone who has not fortified sufficiently, it is not permissible to use them to fortify the moral powers of someone who has already discharged her fortificational duties. For more on the issue of the problem of variation, see Richard Arneson (1999) ‘What, if Anything, Renders All Human Beings Morally Equal?’, in Dale Jamieson (ed.), Singer and His Critics. Oxford: Blackwell; Ian Carter (2011) ‘Respect and the Basis of Equality’, Ethics, 121 (3), 538–571; Ian Carter (2013) ‘Basic Equality and the Site of Egalitarian Justice’, Economics & Philosophy, 29 (1), 21–41; and Christopher Nathan (2011) ‘Need There Be a Defence of Equality?’, Res Publica, 17, 211–225. ARETI THEOFILOPOULOU158 rights and liberties. If these liberties include freedom of thought and liberty of the person, then it may seem that non-consensual neu- rointerventions can only be imposed at the cost of violating one’s basic rights and liberties.21 However, other modes of punishment, such as incarceration, involve a restriction of offenders’ basic liberties, such as freedom of movement, and yet we do not view this restriction as a violation of offenders’ basic rights. When we refer to liberties, we appeal to the normative sense of freedom, which is, in a sense, conditional. That is, our liberties depend on our having certain rightful claims on them. For instance, although having the freedom to kill others would increase our freedom in a descriptive sense, we do not speak of the liberty to kill others. This is because we have a duty to refrain from killing them, which places limits on our freedom. Consider, for instance, the following example, which I borrow from Victor Tadros: Hit Man: I hire a hit man to kill you, a complete innocent. The only way for you to avert the threat is to pull me in front of you, using me as a shield.22 In this scenario, it is permissible for you to use me as a shield because I have the duty to respond to the wrongful harm that I created. Given that I have a duty that restricts the liberties that I would have in the absence of this duty, I cannot object that discharging this duty violates my liberties.23 This seems to be the argument that explains the widely-held intuition that incarceration does not violate violent offenders’ lib- erties. For if my incarceration is justified on the basis of my duty to be punished in this way, it follows that my incarceration does not violate my liberty.24 Similarly, if I have a duty to undergo neuroin- 21 See Christoph Bublitz (2016) ‘Moral Enhancement and Mental Freedom’, Journal of Applied Phi- losophy, 33 (1), 88–106. 22 Victor Tadros (2011) The Ends of Harm: The Moral Foundations of Criminal Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 267. 23 I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for this point. 24 Tadros justifies this duty in deterrent terms: on his view, if I harm someone wrongfully, I have the duty to bear the cost of punishment in order to prevent others from harming others in similar ways. See Tadros, The Ends of Harm, p. 277. This duty is cast in very different terms in the Fortificationist Theory, as it is linked to an offender’s fortificational duties. Thus, justifying incarceration in the context of punishment as fortification is considerably more difficult, given that the aim is not deterrence but, rather, the fortification of offenders’ moral powers. PUNISHMENT AS MORAL FORTIFICATION AND NEUROINTERVENTIONS 159 terventions, this duty places certain limits to my freedom, which implies that discharging this duty does not violate my liberty.25 For I do not have the liberty to refuse to satisfy my duty to fortify my moral powers. The duty to undergo neurointerventions springs from the offen- der’s duty to fortify her moral powers. This duty is enforceable for the three reasons that were appealed to in the previous section. First, states have a duty to protect their citizens’ rights and liberties; when a citizen violates others’ rights, the state ought to take on that citizen’s fortificational duties to ensure the protection of citizens’ rights. Second, all states and citizens have an interest in promoting their society’s stability, which is often undermined by some citizens’ failure to fortify their moral powers. Third, all citizens have an interest in developing their own moral powers. These three reasons are collectively sufficient to establish that citizens’ fortificational duties are enforceable. And, as I have argued, these duties sometimes give rise to the duty to undergo neurointerventions. B. Proportionality One might object that even if the above argument can justify restricting some liberties by incurring the cost of incarceration, it is not sufficient to justify non-consensual neurointerventions because this type of punishment can never be proportionate to the aims that it serves. For instance, it would not be permissible to impose a life sentence on someone who has the desire to steal chewing gum because this sentence is disproportionate to the aim of fortifying one’s moral powers against stealing chewing gum.26 Similarly, it might be argued that neurointerventions are disproportionate to the aims of punishment as moral fortification. The proportionality objection in this context can take a number of forms. First, one worry might be that, like most medical treat- ments, some neurointerventions tend to have harmful side-effects. For example, CPA and MPA anti-libidinal pharmacological agents can cause ‘osteoporosis, weight gain, male breast enlargement, and 25 Notice that accepting this argument does not require us to accept that we have a duty to be punished by incarceration, as the previous sentence states, precisely because incarceration typically fails to enable offenders to fortify their moral powers. 26 I thank an anonymous reviewer for pressing the proportionality objection and for raising this example. ARETI THEOFILOPOULOU160 hot flushes, deep venous blood clots, and subsequent complica- tions’.27 Of course, any kind of punishment must be proportionate to the aims that justify it. This account of the proportionality worry implies that the bar of proportionality is set higher with regard to neurointerventions that cause significant side-effects than it is with those that have minor or no side-effects. Moreover, when both options are available and equally effective, the latter should be preferred over the former. For instance, whenever anti-libidinal pharmacological agents are appropriate, GnRH antagonists and SSRIs are to be preferred over CPA and MPA agents, given that the former cause significantly fewer and less significant side-effects.28 Thus, the proportionality objection so understood fails to establish that neurointerventions are always disproportionate but it does re- mind us that the side-effects that a punishment might have ought to be taken into consideration when assessing whether it is propor- tionate to fortificationist aims. A different reading of the proportionality objection states that interfering with one’s mental freedom in the way that neurointer- ventions do infringes one’s autonomy to an extent that renders them disproportionate to the aim of fortifying offenders’ moral powers. One reply to this is to dispute that neurointerventions necessarily infringe individuals’ autonomy: because most offenders offend due to violent impulses or desires they cannot control, neurointerven- tions will often increase their autonomy by giving them the capacity to act in accordance with their considered judgments.29 Yet even if we grant that, in some cases, neurointerventions restrict one’s autonomy, this may be proportionate to the aims of punishment. For, in some cases, the prima facie wrongness of infringing autonomy is not sufficient to imply all-things-considered wrongness. Notice, for instance, that even though using me as a shield in Hit Man infringes my autonomy, we think that it is permissible for you to use me in this way because the harm that you impose on me is proportionate 27 Chew et al., ‘Biological Interventions for Crime Prevention’; Frederico D. Garcia and Florence Thibaut (2011) ‘Current Concepts in the Pharmacotherapy of Paraphilias’, Drugs, 71 (6), 771–790; Peer Briken and Martin P. Kafka (2007) ‘Pharmacological Treatments for Paraphilic Patients and Sexual Offenders’, Current Opinion in Psychiatry, 20 (6), 609–613. 28 Chew et al., ‘Biological Interventions for Crime Prevention’. 29 Thomas Søbirk Petersen and Kristian Kragh (2017) ‘Should Violent Offenders Be Forced to Undergo Neurotechnological Treatment? A Critical Discussion of the ‘Freedom of Thought’ Objection’, Journal of Medical Ethics, 43 (1), 30–34. PUNISHMENT AS MORAL FORTIFICATION AND NEUROINTERVENTIONS 161 to the aim of using me (i.e. to avoid the deadly threat that I imposed on you). To see why neurointerventions would be similarly per- missible, consider the following variation of Hit Man: Hit Man injection: I hire a hit man to kill you, a complete innocent. The only way for you to avert the threat is to pull a lever that will inject me with an empathy-inducing drug, which will make me want to stop the hit man. The fact that it would be permissible for you to inject me with a neurointervention implies that there are at least some cases in which infringing someone’s autonomy by interfering with their mental freedom is proportionate to the aims of punishment as moral fortification. Given that we would not think that you are permitted to inject me if I had hired someone to steal your chewing gum, we can conclude that the autonomy infringing aspect of neurointerven- tions should be taken into consideration when assessing their proportionality. Thus, neurointerventions should only be used in cases where very serious crimes have been committed, and only if less autonomy-restricting interventions, such as education and counselling, are not likely to fortify one’s moral powers to the extent that or as quickly as it is required.30 Lastly, a related variation of the proportionality objection is that when neurointerventions change who we are so much that there is no psychological continuity between our past and future selves, they are effectively a type of death sentence. Even if we grant that undergoing a neurointervention is equivalent to dying, it seems to follow that if you are permitted to use me as a shield in Hit Man in virtue of my duties, then you are also permitted to ask me to un- dergo neurointerventions in Hit Man injection, even if the neuroint- ervention will affect my empathy to such an extent that I will no longer be the same person. We can dispute, however, the claim that neurointerventions are equivalent to death. First, all neurointer- ventions described in Sect. II require constant treatment and are, therefore, reversible. Moreover, neurointerventions may add or alter a characteristic, emotion or motivation, yet it is far from clear that they cause a complete disruption in one’s psychological continuity. For instance, when similar additions or changes occur due to edu- cation, therapy, or medication for depression or anxiety disorders we 30 For instance, if you could make me want to stop the hit man by sharing certain thoughts and reasons with me, then you should prefer that option. Similarly, if you could avert the threat without using me as a shield in Hit Man, then you ought to do so. ARETI THEOFILOPOULOU162 find it implausible to say that the person that has changed in these ways has died. Therefore, although the proportionality objection reminds us of the significance of ensuring that punishment is always proportionate to the aims that justify it, it does not show that neurointerventions are always disproportionate to all crimes that might be committed. C. Fortification vs Indoctrination At this point, it might be argued that if the Fortificationist Theory of Punishment implies that it is permissible for a state to impose non- consensual neurointerventions, then it also, implausibly, implies that nonconsensual indoctrination is permissible, since this could also increase one’s moral powers. Howard seeks to resist the permissibility of indoctrination by arguing that we need to distinguish between ‘approaches that em- power offenders as moral agents – that fortify their moral powers – and those that bypass them’ (Howard 2017, 66). Drawing on the example of Alex in Anthony Burgess’s A Clockwork Orange, he sug- gests that the problem with the conditioning Alex receives is not that it deprives him of his freedom of what to think – he retains the reflective capacity to affirm convictions – but that it fails to attend to the actual root of the problem: Alex’s attitudes toward his fellow human beings. He is moved to refrain from violating others’ rights simply because he is averse to feeling ill – not because he has grasped, and effectively been moved by, an appreciation of others’ value.31 It might seem that, to avoid rendering the Fortificationist Theory implausible, we will need to accept Howard’s response here. But it might seem that this commits us also to rejecting non-consensual neurointerventions. However, there are two distinct reasons why this response fails to show that neurointerventions are impermissible. First, when Ho- ward states that indoctrination fails to address ‘Alex’s attitude toward his fellow human beings’ he implies that indoctrination bypasses one’s moral powers in the sense that it seeks to produce certain actions without regard to the motivations that people have for performing those actions. This is not the case with certain neu- rointerventions, however, which only target precisely a person’s attitudes towards others. Second, indoctrination may seek to incul- 31 Howard, ‘Punishment as Moral Fortification, p. 66. PUNISHMENT AS MORAL FORTIFICATION AND NEUROINTERVENTIONS 163 cate a particular motivation in someone in order to achieve the right result. For example, Alex’s conditioning has ensured that his moti- vation for acting in the required way is his aversion to feeling ill. Yet this does not seem to be the case with some neurointerventions, which enable an individual to have access to the set of reasonable motivations. The following example makes these differences clearer: Suppose there is proof of David’s failure to discharge his fortificational duties because we find out that he has assaulted transgender people. David is found guilty of the crimes and sentenced to incarceration. Upon his release from prison, there are good reasons to believe that David’s views have not changed at all but that he would only commit transphobic crimes in the future if he truly thought that he wouldn’t get caught. If David is indoctrinated at this point, he will not commit any hate crimes in the future, but he will not identify with his decision not to act unjustly. If asked whether he believes that hate crimes are wrong, he will not be able to justify his (negative) answer in any way that reasonable persons should accept. By contrast, if David is subjected to deep brain stimulation, his empathy could be increased. As a result, he would be able to place himself in other people’s shoes and consider things from their point of view, without having his judgment clouded by extreme, irrational emotions, such as hatred. In this case, if asked whether he believes that hate crimes are wrong, David would be able to give appropriate reasons in defence of his (negative) answer. Now one might respond that both interventions are impermissible because David should fortify his moral powers on his own, or by being given reasons that he can consider and evaluate. Bublitz and Merkel, for example, seem to be making the second claim when they argue that, by acting directly on the brain, ‘direct interventions seem to violate the demands of dignity’ and that indirect interventions, on the other hand, such as ‘speech or sounds or images, engage with the other’s first-person perspective by recognizing and referring to her beliefs and feelings’.32 The thought here is that dignity requires treating persons as agents by respecting their ‘first-person perspec- tive’, which neurointerventions and any other kind of direct intervention cannot achieve. This claim, however, is quite contro- versial, given that certain forms of brainwashing that may involve forcing someone to watch or listen to something, for instance, are indirect interventions, yet arguably violate the demands of dignity at least as much as direct interventions do. Similarly, there are cases of direct interventions, such as certain kinds of psychological rehabil- itation that may involve psychiatric treatment, which seem permis- sible; this intuition is even stronger when we compare these interventions to indirect kinds of brainwashing. Thus, we may conclude that respecting the ‘first-person perspective’ is neither 32 Jan Christoph Bublitz and Reinhard Merkel (2014) ‘Crimes Against Minds: On Mental Manipu- lations, Harms and a Human Right to Mental Self-Determination’, Criminal Law and Philosophy, 8, 51– 77, at p. 73. ARETI THEOFILOPOULOU164 sufficient nor necessary for the permissibility of an intervention, and that the distinction between direct and indirect interventions only tracks our intuitions regarding the moral and physical boundaries that bodies seem to set, and not the extent to which an intervention shows lack of respect towards human agency. Instead, I have suggested that a more plausible criterion is whether an intervention targets one’s moral powers as a capacity rather than specific beliefs or desires. To be sure, neurointerventions might not be sufficient as a means for increasing one’s moral powers to the requisite degree. For in- stance, many sex offenders do not offend because they have a high sex drive but because they have certain desires that involve harming others and certain views about, for example, women’s worth. In these cases, even if chemical castration prevents further crimes, it might not enhance the offenders’ moral powers, as they are likely to have the same desires and views post-castration. Of course, as I argued in the previous section, this is not the case with all offenders. If offending is due to impulses as contrasted with more stable desires, then giving an individual the capacity to control these impulses can actually increase that person’s autonomy and enable them to act in accordance with their true desires. A good way to distinguish be- tween the two categories of offenders might be by appealing to the difference between an offender’s first-order and second-order de- sires.33 In cases where the first-order desire to offend is different from the offender’s reasonable second-order desire, neurointerventions might be sufficient to bring the two into alignment. By contrast, when both the offender’s first-order and second-order desires are inconsistent with the requirements of justice, it seems likely that extensive therapy and education will be necessary. In any case, the fortificationist argument in favour of neurointerventions is compat- ible with the claim that neurointerventions are not always sufficient means to ensure the required fortification; in fact, it offers reasons in favour of other methods of rehabilitation as well, such as therapy and education. 33 Harry G. Frankfurt (1971) ‘Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person’, Journal of Philos- ophy, 68 (1), 5–20, at p. 7. PUNISHMENT AS MORAL FORTIFICATION AND NEUROINTERVENTIONS 165 IV. CONCLUSION I have argued that the fortification of criminal offenders’ moral powers through non-consensual neurointerventions is justifiable for three reasons. First, when a citizen violates others’ rights due to her failure to discharge her fortificational duties, the state is permitted to enforce those duties on the basis of its duty to protect individuals’ rights and liberties. One way to do this is by requiring that individual to undergo neurointerventions. Second, the state’s enforcement of fortificational duties is required for the assurance of others’ com- pliance with the requirements of justice, which underpins societal stability. In these cases, neurointerventions may be warranted if they are the only or best way of promoting citizens’ stable and fair social cooperation. Third, because all persons have an interest in devel- oping their moral powers to the degree required in order to par- ticipate in social cooperation, the state has a duty to ensure that this moral power can be developed. This interest establishes a third reason in favour of neurointerventions. In certain cases, these reasons may be outweighed by competing considerations, such as considerations of effectiveness, cost, and the dangers associated with increasing the power that unjust states possess in our non-ideal world. However, even though the reasons that we have in favour of neurointerventions are by no means conclusive in a non-ideal framework, they do suggest that such uses of criminal justice interventions are consistent with the Fortifica- tionist Theory of Punishment and that there may be cases in which such interventions are not only morally permissible but required. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS For helpful discussion of an earlier draft of this paper, I am grateful to the audiences at the VIII Braga Meetings on Ethics and Political Philosophy, and the Bucharest – Oxford Workshop in Applied Ethics, as well as to two anonymous reviewers for very helpful comments. I would also like to thank Jeffrey Howard for providing the theory with which my paper en- gages, as well as David Birks, Max Kiener and Tom Parr for helpful dis- cussions. My greatest debt is to Tom Douglas and Tom Sinclair, who provided me with lengthy and insightful comments. Finally, I should note ARETI THEOFILOPOULOU166 that this paper would not exist without the generous support of the Wellcome Trust (grant number 100705/Z/12/Z), the Society for Applied Philosophy, and the Sir Richard Stapley Educational Trust. OPEN ACCESS This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons At- tribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/ by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made. Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics, Faculty of Philosophy University of Oxford, Suite 8, Littlegate House, 16-17 St Ebbes Street, Oxford, OX1 1PT, UK E-mail: areti.theofilopoulou@philosophy.ox.ac.uk PUNISHMENT AS MORAL FORTIFICATION AND NEUROINTERVENTIONS 167 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ Punishment as Moral Fortification and Non-Consensual Neurointerventions Abstract The Fortificationist Theory of Punishment Fortificationism and Neurointerventions Objections Basic Rights and Liberties Proportionality Fortification vs Indoctrination Conclusion Acknowledgements 
work_mh6rw27dcjh7tj2uzjqcczcrsq	----	Microsoft Word - Bullock and Johnson ACCEPTED VERSION.docx FAITH IN POLICING: THE CO-PRODUCTION OF CRIME CONTROL IN BRITAIN Article accepted for publication in the British Journal of Criminology October 2016 Professor Karen Bullock Department of Sociology University of Surrey Guildford Surrey GU2 7XH United Kingdom k.bullock@surrey.ac.uk Professor Paul Johnson Department of Sociology University of York Heslington York YO10 5DD United Kingdom paul.johnson@york.ac.uk 2 FAITH IN POLICING: THE CO-PRODUCTION OF CRIME CONTROL IN BRITAIN ABSTRACT Involving faith-based organizations (FBOs) in the production of crime control has been seen as a way of increasing efficiency, promoting accountability, and improving trust and confidence in policing. In this article, which draws on qualitative research, we consider how police officers understand the role of faith in policing, engage with faith communities, and work with FBOs to mobilise crime prevention activities. We demonstrate that any effective co-production of crime control that involves faith communities and FBOs requires police officers to negotiate a number of complex and multi-faceted issues. We argue that the co- production of crime control has symbolic, moral, and technical qualities which all need to be successfully negotiated to achieve its aims. KEY WORDS Community, Faith, Faith-based organizations, Policing, Religion 3 FAITH IN POLICING: THE CO-PRODUCTION OF CRIME CONTROL IN BRITAIN INTRODUCTION Religious faith has become central to public policing in Britain. Constabularies now routinely consider and address the relationship between faith and crime in a number of different, and sometimes competing, ways. For example, officers must balance their duty to protect the rights and freedoms of individuals to have and express a faith whilst, at the same time, prevent that faith drawing people into extremism and terrorism. One of the ways in which constabularies have sought to deal with such tensions is to encourage greater interaction between police personnel and religious individuals, organizations, and communities. The principal ambition of this interaction is to facilitate the development of reciprocal relationships between constabularies and faith-based organisations (hereinafter ‘FBOs’) through which the co-production of effective crime control may be achieved by way of initiatives aimed at preventing crime, promoting security, and apprehending criminal suspects (Bullock, 2014). In this article we draw on qualitative data produced in a study of three English constabularies to consider how officers approach, understand, and enact the co- production of crime control in relation to religious faith. THE RELEVANCE OF RELIGIOUS FAITH TO POLICING: A BRIEF HISTORY In recent years, scholars have claimed that British society has undergone a process of desecularisation (Berger, 1999) and entered into a period of postsecularity (Beckford, 2012). Various explanations have been provided for this. These include the increased vocality of conservative religious organizations and pressure groups that, in the face of what they perceive as hostile cultural and political transformations, seek to exercise greater influence in law and policy-making (Johnson and Vanderbeck, 2014). The ‘return’ of religious faith to the centre of policy-making is apparent in British policing and can be understood as the result of a number of trends, which we examine below. 4 Diversity and religious faith In the context of periodic crises in policing – characterised by accusations of police racism and mistrust between the police and minority ethnic communities (Scarman, 1981; Macpherson, 1999) – an appeal to religious faith has been one aspect of the wider equality and diversity agenda developed by constabularies in their attempt to re-establish their legitimacy. Although a focus on race and ethnicity has often served to obscure the specific place of faith within police work (McFadyen and Prideaux, 2014), constabularies have long been concerned with considering the relevance of religion to contemporary British policing. This concern can be traced back to the controversy surrounding the publication of Rushdie’s The Satanic Verses in the late 1980s, which highlighted the relevance of religious identities, motivations and feelings to the policing sphere, and to policy-making and public life more broadly (McFadyen and Prideaux, 2014: 610). Rioting in predominantly Pakistani and Bangladeshi areas in Northern English cities in 2001 drew further attention to the place of faith in the construction of British identities – at least amongst Muslims – and raised questions about the role of policing in promoting community integration and addressing marginalisation and exclusion (McFadyen and Prideaux, 2014). Terrorism and neighbourhood policing The most explicit way in which religious faith and policing currently intersect is in respect of counter-terrorism policy and law enforcement and, therefore, police service interest in religious faith needs to be understood within the wider context of ‘securitization’ (see Ericson, 2007). The threat of Islamic inspired terrorism has driven attempts to increase community resilience to violent extremism by promoting integration, democratic participation, and interfaith dialogue (HM Government, 2006; HM Government, 2009; HM Government, 2011). Whilst counter-terrorism policies have traditionally emphasised ‘hard’ policing tactics (such as surveillance, intelligence gathering, and the use of informants), ‘soft’ community policing models (which stress interaction, engagement, and partnership) have become dominant (Briggs et al 2006; Lowe and Innes, 2008; Innes and Roberts, 2008; Bettison, 2009; Spalek and Lambert, 2008; Spalek, 2010; McFadyen and Prideaux, 2011, 2014). Consequently, there is now significant crossover between the work directly undertaken, managed or directed by police personnel charged with preventing terrorism and 5 the work undertaken by neighbourhood officers within the context of community policing (McFadyen and Prideaux, 2014). Police service interest in religious faith goes much wider than counter-terrorism. Following Scarman (1981), constabularies are required to consult with citizens about police strategies and promote accountability (Jones and Newburn, 2001; Bullock, 2014). A key development in this approach is that officers are now required to be sensitive to faith, responsive to the needs of faith communities, and motivate FBOs to deliver interventions aimed at controlling crime (NPIA, n.d.). Ensuring that neighbourhood policing is responsive to faith communities is seen as a key way in which ‘citizen-focused’ services might be oriented and, more broadly, as a mechanism for building trust and confidence in policing through the promotion of dialogue and information exchange (Innes, 2011; Bullock, 2014). However, it is apparent that current counter-terrorism policy (HM Government, 2011) and counter-terrorism policing practices influence the degree to which certain faith communities and FBOs are prepared to engage with British constabularies (Spalek, 2008 and 2010; Choudhury and Fenwick, 2011). This is relevant to understanding the nature of co-production activities between the police service and FBOs and we return to this issue below. Religious faith and civil society A concern with religious faith is also found in wider debates about the role of civil society in the delivery of public services (Putnam, 1995 and 2000; Wuthnow, 2004). In the USA, the role of FBOs in delivering public services emerged as a major policy debate towards the end of the twentieth century and this has since become increasingly animated (Wuthnow, 2004), especially in respect of policing (Gordon, 2003; McGarrell, Brinker and Etindi, 1999). In Britain, there have been calls from successive governments for the structures of civil society – citizens and organizations that are independent of government – to play a more active role in the provision of welfare and social services (Pratchett, 2004; Stoker, 2006; Bullock, 2014) and this has intensified since the 2008 economic crisis and the associated retrenchment of funding for state services (Bullock, 2014; Evans, 2011). FBOs have been seen as a key facet of civil society (Putnam, 1995 and 2000; Wuthnow, 2004) and their participation in policing has been viewed by British governments as a way of more effectively controlling crime as well as promoting police responsiveness and legitimacy (NPIA, n.d.). For example, the role of FBOs in providing certain policing functions has been an aspect of the ‘Big Society’ – a 6 concept that has been utilised to denote an active role for citizens, often through volunteering, in delivering services to communities (Bullock, 2014; Evans, 2011). The former Conservative Prime Minister, David Cameron, described the Community Security Trust (CST) – a volunteer organization that provides security for British Jews – as a model for British communities and an organization that epitomized the Big Society (Standpoint, 2011). Calls to bring FBOs into British policing therefore need to be understood as the result of a political and economic agenda that advocates the positioning of citizens, rather than the state, as central to the creation and delivery of public services (Pratchett, 2004; Stoker, 2006; Innes, 2011; Bullock, 2014). CONTEXT, CONTRIBUTION AND OVERVIEW OF OUR ANALYSIS Academic consideration of the influence of religion on British policing is, with the exception of counter-terrorism, rare (McFadyen and Prideaux, 2011 and 2014; Prideaux and McFadyen, 2013). Consequently, little is known about how officers use religious faith as an axis around which to orient or deliver services at the local level. There are activities carried out by FBOs which demand strategic and co-ordinated interaction with the police – for example, in respect of some forms of street patrolling carried out by FBOs such as the CST, Street Pastors, and Street Angels (Bullock, 2014) – and some constabularies have encouraged FBOs to develop and deliver interventions on their behalf. However, the extent to which officers identify, engage with, and motivate FBOs to deliver interventions aimed at controlling crime is far from clear. Additionally, when FBOs are motivated to work with constabularies, little is known about the implications for quality, consistency, and accountability of public services. It is within this context that we provide an analysis of data derived from qualitative research on the role of religious faith in policing that was carried out in three English constabularies between 2015 and 2016. The research comprised 21 qualitative interviews with a mix of officers and police staff drawn from neighbourhood policing teams, counter-terrorism units, and diversity directorates, who all had some oversight of, responsibility for, and experience of working with faith groups. As ‘key informants’ or organizational ‘proxies’ (Parsons, 2008), the research participants were therefore purposively selected because of their insight into the role of religious faith in their constabularies. 7 Participants were asked to reflect on the nature of their interaction with faith communities and FBOs, the precise mechanisms which exist to facilitate such interaction, the extent to which the wider police family engages with issues relating to faith, and the perceived benefits and challenges of working with faith groups. The participants were not asked explicitly about their own faith and the role that this may play in operational policing, although a minority of them did discuss this. Since personal religiosity has been shown to influence day-to-day police practice (see Prideaux and McFadyen, 2013) we consider this issue, where relevant, when discussing our findings. Moreover, whilst the issue of counter-terrorism was not a specific focus of the interviews – because the primary aim of the research was to consider the relevance of religious faith to policing more broadly – participants did identify counter- terrorism policing as an influence on their engagement with some, predominantly Muslim, FBOs and, accordingly, we consider this in our analysis. All interviews were digitally recorded and professionally transcribed. Interview data were thematically analysed in light of the aims of the study and extant literature in the field. This involved a process of data familiarisation, generating codes, forming initial themes, and reviewing and refining those themes (Braun and Clarke, 2006). Quotations are provided to illustrate the themes generated from the analysis. In the remainder of the article, we draw on participants’ accounts to offer an insight into the role that religious faith plays within contemporary British policing. We begin with an examination of the ways in which constabularies engage with faith communities and FBOs and go on to consider how FBOs do or may carry out functions relevant to policing, either in a formal capacity on behalf of constabularies or informally through volunteer activity at the community level. We make the distinction between ‘policing with faith’ and ‘faith as policing’ in order to show the differences between police activities that are aimed at encouraging police engagement with faith communities and FBOs, for the sake of generating police-relevant information or promoting confidence, and those that involve FBOs themselves mobilising or levering resources in order to alleviate the impact of crime and disorder. The overall aim of our analysis is to show the ways in which constabularies, faith communities and FBOs currently interact, the mechanisms that shape the nature of such interaction, and the implications of this interaction for crime control. 8 POLICING WITH FAITH The relevance of engagement with faith communities and FBOs to contemporary policing Our research participants saw engagement with faith communities and FBOs as important in promoting responsive policing, crime control, and police legitimacy. In this respect, they often invoked the diversity agendas of their constabularies to talk about how faith was recognized as a dimension of communities that police officers should be alert to. Participants also talked about the challenges raised when faith communities and FBOs make specific demands on officers’ time, when people of faith are subject to specific and unique forms of criminal victimisation, and when officers are required to observe specific forms of social etiquette during interaction with people of faith. However, many participants were keen to stress the importance of officers calibrating the needs of faith communities with other priorities relevant to the delivery of police services. As one officer explained: [T]he way faith groups are dealt with by [named constabulary] [is] the same as any other group, any other group [that] will quite often shout and say they’ve got a problem […] It will then be assessed against what the rest of society are saying is a problem, what crime figures are saying is a problem, what incident levels are saying is a problem. (INT4) Therefore, within the context of competing priorities, faith is understood as one of the multiple factors that influence wider macro-level police decision-making. Police engagement with faith communities and FBOs is seen as central to enhancing crime control and promoting police legitimacy. Acknowledging that some citizens lack confidence in the police, do not report crimes or emerging problems, and that this influences crime control, officers emphasised the need to demonstrate to faith communities ‘how open we are, and that we’re not what they believe we are’ in order to ‘keep pushing forward […] to help these people the best we can’ (INT8). In recognizing that some citizens ‘feel isolated’ and that the ‘trust element [in the police] is missing’ (INT17) building trust in policing, so that those citizens ‘could feel sort of much more confident […] in reporting’ (INT21), was seen as important. In practical terms, this was seen to involve ‘finding out what’s concerning 9 different elements of society’ in order that the police can help ‘to problem solve and make communities better’ (INT19). In this respect, the role of community based neighbourhood officers was seen as vital: Whether it’s faith, whether it’s local residents, whether it’s pubs, clubs, they will be that frontline link passing intelligence both ways, certainly what’s going on from policing perspective and also finding out what’s concerning different elements of society. (INT4) Participants argued that this form of interaction should be a continuous and central aspect of police work. As one officer explained: [I]n order for general policing to take place, which we take for granted, […] I would say there’s a great deal of work going on behind the scenes […] to maintain that normality, that basic civil society […] I’ve been described before as the glue. (INT14) This description of the interaction between police officers and faith communities as providing the ‘glue’ exemplifies what many participants told us. Engagement with faith communities and FBOs is seen as essential to maintaining the social relations that make it possible to deliver responsive police services, to generate police relevant information, and to enforce the criminal law. Without such interaction faith communities could become divorced from ‘basic civil society’ and, as a result, be beyond the reach of police services. Structures of engagement Interaction between the police service, faith communities and FBOs does not occur naturally or straightforwardly but needs to be orchestrated. Specifically, it depends upon police gaining access and this, in turn, requires careful negotiation of a number of factors that we consider below. Accessing institutional spaces Police engagement with faith communities tends to occur in institutional spaces, such as churches, mosques or synagogues. An institutional space acts as a ‘proxy’ for faith and is a 10 gateway to populaces who may otherwise be difficult to access by the police. One participant described religious spaces and the people that attend them as a ‘huge resource’ and a ‘ready- made resource’ for policing (INT7). This participant went on to explain that ‘if the Chief Constable […] asks me […], “can you go out and get me 500 people that I want to speak to”, I’ll find it extremely difficult, whereas on a Friday I can just say OK, let’s go to this mosque, open the door and there are six or 700 people’ (INT7). Gaining access to faith communities via their institutional spaces usually requires that relationships between officers and particular key individuals – gatekeepers – be carefully forged. As one participant put it, ‘You don’t build a relationship with the community, you build a relationship with an individual. I think that’s the misconception’ (INT9). Gatekeepers, who may function to disseminate information, raise awareness, and overcome any suspicion or resistance that officers might encounter in a wider population, were seen as vital for facilitating engagement. As one participant stated: [I]f we get the right people on board, they will subsequently speak to maybe the wider community, people that maybe have language barriers, people that in the past haven’t engaged with police. Instead of me going to that person, the stakeholder would intervene. (INT19) Conversely, reliance on gatekeepers can function to narrow the pool of citizens around which engagement is oriented. As one participant noted: ‘You can quite often deal with a church and the vicar and the people that work at the church, so you’re engaging with them but you’re not necessary engaging with the wider community that attend that venue on a regular basis’ (INT10). Nonetheless, officers clearly adopt a pragmatic approach to using gatekeepers to gain access. As one participant told us: ‘it is not always the people you necessarily ideally want, but nevertheless you have to start somewhere’ (INT21). A factor that influences access to institutional spaces is the level of understanding of faith among officers. For instance, the tensions, intricacies, and nuances that currently characterize Islam are unlikely to be well understood by the majority of officers (Innes, 2006; McFadyen and Prideaux, 2011) and this may affect their access to Muslim communities. One participant explained, for example, how he averted problems that would have been created by his colleagues had they attended, as they planned, an Eid Mubarak celebration to give a talk about radicalisation. Likening the plan to ‘going and talking about the IRA on Christmas 11 Day’, this officer stated: ‘If they invite us to it we can go, but we shouldn’t go with our size nines and start handing out leaflets about terrorism on Eid Mubarak’ (INT9). The importance of understanding different faiths is not limited to matters of religious holidays, festivals, and observances. Negotiating access to a faith community can also be influenced by understanding social and cultural issues which affect that community. For instance, in describing how he used his extensive knowledge of political, economic, and cultural affairs in Pakistan to engage with the largely Muslim population of one area of his constabulary, one officer noted that ‘they were really surprised I knew about some of the issues, the political parties and all the other bits and pieces’ (INT12). Participants drew particular attention to the need to understand how the social relations of faith communities are influenced by wider national politics, foreign policy and international events (see also: Briggs et al 2006; Innes, 2006; Spalek et al 2008; Spalek, 2010). As one officer noted: ‘I see global events impacting on a daily basis on the streets in our district, and that’s many and varied’ (INT14). Or, as another officer put it: [S]omething happens at the other end of the world and you feel the impact of [it] here […] [I]t’s not just the local stuff, but really your eyes and ears have got to be open on an international level, just see what sort of things are happening and how that is going to play out. (INT7) However, participants drew attention to how most officers have limited awareness of geo- political factors and how they influence social relations at the local level. One participant acknowledged: ‘I find it interesting, but trying to talk to some of my officers […] that just want to go nicking people, driving cars around and aren’t really interested in world events so to speak, it’s very hard to get them to want to buy into that’ (INT12). Participants were aware that understanding of faith, familiarity with social, economic and political contexts, and cultural sensitivity are all required if access to faith communities and FBOs is to be successfully negotiated. When these requirements are achieved they are generally achieved experientially rather than through training (see also McFadyen and Prideaux, 2011). This may be inevitable because, as one participant explained, ‘if you try to cover everything, it is impossible, when you look at all the different themes out there and all the different communities […] [The] only way you find out about them is asking, asking 12 questions, and generally people will talk to you’ (INT20). One participant emphasised the importance of equipping officers with ‘universal skills’, such as empathy and sympathy, in respect of gaining access to faith communities and FBOs: I don’t think I or anyone can equip an officer to know everything under the sun in terms of culture and religion and those intricacies about that […] [W]hat I try to tell myself when I interact with people is treat people with that respect and dignity as an individual and usually that person will come along with you […] Let’s equip them with that sensitivity, let’s equip them with understanding empathy and sympathy that you are dealing with somebody that is reporting a crime and not everybody is a bad person and needs locking away […] it’s that sort of interaction that we need to have, universal skills. (INT16) Whilst previous research has shown that the personal faith of police officers can facilitate access to faith communities (McFadyen and Prideaux, 2011), this was not a factor stressed by our participants. One Muslim officer did argue that personal faith can be closely linked to cultural knowledge and this, in turn, might provide access to a faith community – because ‘you get that extra bond with them and […] can easily connect with them’ – but emphasized that ‘anybody can do that kind of [engagement] role, because it’s all about engaging with the community’ (INT17). In this respect, participants stated that access to faith communities was determined less by the personal faith of officers and more by the relationships they form in communities. A crucial factor in building relationships capable of facilitating access is, as one officer explained in relation to engaging with a Muslim community through its institutional spaces, that they must be forged through long-term interaction: I didn’t get fully to grips with it in [the] three years I was doing the role, but I did gain a good understanding […] from going into [and] not knowing anything about that community, to actually becoming welcomed into [the] community and having a good understanding of how to hold my own in a conversation with imams and people like that. (INT10) ‘Becoming welcomed’ into a faith community requires consistent and routine engagement that, as one participant stated, facilitates information exchange and intelligence gathering: 13 [T]he only intelligence you get is by [having] that good relationship, and if you’ve got that consistent relationship where you know somebody and you know their first name and you’ve known them for a number of years, months, it’s so much easier to get something out of somebody than if you just see them and that’s the first time you’ve seen them […] So you need that consistency to build those relationships. (INT4) However, as we explore below, the establishment of long-term relationships, and the intelligence that may flow from them, is often compromised by the institutional organization of engagement work. The institutional organization of engagement Formal engagement work with faith communities and FBOs is a peripheral activity conducted by a minority of officers who are usually concentrated in specialist community and diversity teams. This institutional compartmentalisation results in the segregation of engagement work from routine police work. One consequence of this is that engagement officers may be insufficiently championed and supported in their work. For example, one participant described how, although his manager was unusually supportive, limited resources were made available to facilitate his engagement work: He actually seems to get, seems to be one of the bosses that actually is interested. The police is brilliant at paying lip service to things to be honest with you, and he, he’s really supportive of it. But the problem is, so we’ve got it all up and running, the very small budget to do the training, and then you’re kind of thinking OK, right, what do we do now? (INT12) Another consequence of compartmentalizing engagement work is that the majority of officers may not see engagement as relevant to policing. In this respect, one participant recalled the following conversation with a senior officer: ‘it was about a year ago when a senior officer said to me, “I don’t do community, I leave that to you”, which I found quite shocking really’ (INT11). Participants agreed that officers at all levels could be sceptical of the value and purpose of engaging with faith communities. There may be specific instances – such as engagement resulting in the acquisition of intelligence that leads to the apprehension of a criminal suspect – where officers ‘absolutely […] see the value in it’ (INT3). However, for 14 the most part, the organizational benefits of engagement with faith communities and FBOs are seen as ‘woolly’, ‘diverse,’ and ‘ongoing’ (INT15). Because benefits are felt over the long term and are difficult to quantify, many officers find it hard to appreciate exactly how engagement work fits into routine operational policing. Engagement work, which rests on the slow, patient build-up of relations over time, stands in contrast to other, often immediate, aspects of operational policing, such as criminal investigation and emergency response, which rest on the fast-time, action-fuelled pursuit of criminal suspects and enforcement of the criminal law. These latter activities tend to be seen by many officers as ‘real’ policing and, as such, are coveted by officers and rewarded by the organization (Myhill, 2006; Bullock, 2014). By contrast, engagement work can be devalued and marginalised. As one participant put it, ‘there’s perhaps a temptation to think the job that I do is pink and fluffy’ (INT14). Or as another described: I don’t think you could pluck any particular officer to ask them to do our job. One, it’s perhaps not everyone’s cup of tea, because we are not actually always fighting crime and things, but a lot of people don’t see the importance of community relations. (INT11) A final consequence of compartmentalisation described by participants is that it leaves engagement work vulnerable to the turnover of officers. As previously noted, individual understanding and personal relationships characterise engagement work and a turnover of officers can dissipate knowledge and sever connections, undermining long-term engagement. Acknowledging this, one officer stated: ‘I think for policing you can’t have individuals like me that are the only point of contact, it needs to be “the police”, not “[me]”’ (INT12). The (over) reliance on a small number of individuals that are tied into communities to carry out engagement work, and the potential for this to be disrupted by organizational change, draws attention to the fragility of engagement work, as well as to how it can become marginalised and devalued. This is compounded by wider political and economic shifts, to which we now turn. Political and economic contexts The commitment to resourcing police engagement activities shifts over time as policing priorities become recast in the context of wider political transformations. For instance, one 15 officer explained how the organizational focus on hate crime that was generated by Macpherson (1999) – a pivotal moment in the history of ‘race relations’ and policing in Britain (Rowe, 2007) – was displaced over time: When the [Macpherson] report came out, hate crime was a massive thing for the police service […] I set up a hate crime officer role in [named constabulary] and that was really big, and then that sort of died off […], as time went by, then it became domestic violence, that was really really big, and now it’s child sexual exploitation that is really big. (INT12) This officer went on to explain how the police engagement with Muslim communities that was stimulated by ‘9/11’ had similarly ‘died off’. Consequently, by the time he was assigned to a community policing role in a largely Muslim area of one constabulary, the links he assumed he would find had dissipated: I’ve been an officer on [named area] for the majority of my service so far and we had always heard […] how good the engagement and everything was over in [named area] and it was supposed to be our role model of what we should be doing, and when I arrived there [I] was completely clueless to it effectively, kind of expecting to pick up what had been done and build on it. I found that there was nothing. (INT12) Many participants discussed how a politically motivated transformation of engagement work is currently occurring. As previously noted, much engagement work is organizationally entwined with neighbourhood policing but, as a consequence of the retrenchment that has characterised the state’s response to the 2008 economic recession, neighbourhood policing is now vulnerable (see HMIC, 2013). Participants argued that the structures that sustain engagement work – dedicated officers, small beats, a focus on foot patrol, and systematic interaction with community organizations at the local level – are being dismantled. As one participant noted: ‘there’s not many officers out there really who have the time to engage and go to events and represent the force at things’ (INT11). For participants, this may function to leave those in faith communities feeling marginalized, disengaged, and cynical about officer engagement. One participant stated: ‘A lot of people will remember the last time a police officer said “yeah, I’ll help you, no problem”, and then didn’t’ (INT8). This suggests prior 16 experiences of policing shape citizens’ willingness to engage and, as we explore below, such experiences are recognized in the context of the broader historical legacy of policing. Historical legacies Many participants stated that an awareness of the troubled history of policing in respect of particular minority ethnic groups was essential to understanding contemporary engagement with faith communities and FBOs. Whilst not necessarily interlinked with religion, participants drew attention to how the legacies of officer racism, and elements of over and under policing of minority ethnic citizens (Scarman, 1981; Macpherson, 1999), currently influence engagement with people of faith. To illustrate this, one participant described how his attempts to engage with those at a Sikh temple was undermined by the indifference of officers in the past: ‘there might have been issues, they might not have got the service they deserve, that they require, so they will probably think that they need to take care of issues themselves and not contact the police’ (INT8). Another participant stated that ‘there’s a real, from their side, […] perception of the police that we just don’t like them and we are racist and we don’t have any interest in dealing with them, don’t want to know, unless it’s nicking their kids’ (INT12). Despite long-term attempts to eradicate racism from British constabularies (see Rowe, 2007) participants acknowledged that the perception of the police service as institutionally racist endures. The on-going, pernicious effects of ‘stop and search’ were seen as a significant contributor to sustaining this perception. For example, one participant explained how stop and search activities can produce negative consequences that ripple through faith communities: If I’m travelling and I’m stop searched, it may be for a genuine reason, but if [at] the Friday prayer that I’ve mentioned […] all of a sudden I’m telling another 500 people it’s happened to me […] this is where the suspicion and trust can be lost. (INT7) In respect of calls for increased police engagement with Muslim communities to ensure the effectiveness of current anti-terrorism policy, the historical legacy of over and under policing presents an acute problem because police officers continue to encounter suspicion and mistrust (Briggs et al 2006; Spalek and Imtoual, 2007; Spalek et al 2008; Spalek, 2010; Spalek and McDonald, 2010; Choudhury and Fenwick, 2011; Innes et al 2011). 17 FAITH AS POLICING Faith based policing in principle The role of FBOs in the delivery of public services has long been part of a wider debate about how citizens and communities might more actively participate in welfare provision. In this respect, there is evidence that citizens who actively practise a religion are more likely to volunteer to participate in welfare delivery programmes than those who do not practice a faith (Kitchen et al, 2006). It is sometimes inferred, therefore, that FBOs are a resource that can be tapped into in respect of recruiting volunteers for civic activity. Indeed, British policy makers have looked enviously to the USA where religious organizations often deliver a wide range of services to their members and to the wider community (Smidt, 2003). There is, however, little evidence to suggest that British FBOs can organize and provide welfare services in a similar way to those in the USA. The human capital that is generated through congregational life in the USA is distinctive and may not be present elsewhere (Cnaan et al, 2003). Nevertheless, our participants were generally of the view that FBOs were, in principle, well positioned to deliver police relevant services. This is because participants understood FBOs to operate according to ‘moral’ principles similar to those found in the police service: [T]here is that sort of moral level that often goes with a lot of the basics of faith. So people in faith will often want to maintain a certain standard, don’t know quite how to describe it, but, you know, do good, inspire certain morals within their faith communities. (INT15) Participants also saw FBOs as well placed to mobilise community resources. One officer, for example, noted that because ‘faith groups have a huge footprint in our community’ it may be possible to have a ‘closer engagement with faith groups’ in order to ‘expand our reach into communities, for safeguarding purposes and welfare purposes’ (INT2). The delivery of police relevant services by FBOs was regarded by participants as a way of reducing demand on police resources at a time when constabularies are grappling with the budgetary consequences of state retrenchment. As one officer put it: ‘the reality is […] we can’t do everything, and in a time of austerity […] we are having to do more with less’ (INT2). Participants considered that FBOs might be able to reduce demand on constabularies 18 in both informal and formal ways. In respect of informal activities, officers pointed, for example, to particular vulnerable citizens – citizens with mental illness, for example – who make demands on constabularies in the absence of alternative support (HMIC, 2015). As one officer explained, FBOs may be well placed to provide such individuals with support: [W]e talk about reducing demand around the drain on policing services. [T]here’s a lot of safety, welfare calls we get around elderly, around vulnerable, that perhaps, actually, with a bit more thought and a bit more interaction perhaps, we could get that link in with individuals. So you might not even need to call the police actually if you have a system where vulnerable members of your community are visited on a regular basis. (INT3) In respect of formal activities, participants regularly drew on the example of the Christian street patrols – often operating under the Street Angels and Street Pastors franchises (Bullock, 2014) – who care for citizens who find themselves in vulnerable situation late at night in town centres. This kind of formal intervention was seen as helpful in reducing demand on police resources: So there’s things like when people are lying there, not needing medical assistance, but very drunk, street pastors will come and speak to them and sometimes take them to a location, give them a cup of coffee, help them get a taxi home. And I found the street pastors, because obviously faith based, were very good in terms of part of our overall solution to solving that problem. (INT1) However, whilst there was enthusiasm among our participants for FBOs providing police relevant services in principle, there was scepticism about what FBOs could achieve in practice. Acknowledging that FBOs had the right ‘attitude’, one participant conceded ‘it’s just how you […] harness that, and what exactly you harness it for’ (INT15). In their discussions of ‘harnessing’ FBOs, participants drew attention to particular problematic issues, which we discuss below, relating to the capacity and expertise, the motivation, and the regulation of FBOs. 19 Faith based policing in practice Capacity and expertise of FBOs Not all FBOs possess the capacity to deliver police relevant services. Some FBOs are very small and this affects the degree to which they are able to mobilise resources (Wuthnow, 2004; Chaves and Tsitsos, 2001; Coleman, 2003). Since some FBOs are very active in working within and reaching out to communities, whilst others are insular and focused primarily on the delivery of spiritual services to their members, FBOs play diverse roles within communities (Wuthnow 2004). Acknowledging this, one participant noted that, in respect of delivering police relevant services, ‘some groups might not want to. I think you’ve got to […] accept that […] some of the smaller Christian groups […] are very much quite insular […] [Y]ou can’t take it for granted that they’ll all want to do that’ (INT15). As another officer observed: ‘You have to go to each venue to understand their role in the community’ (INT10). Officers further pointed to the high degree of diversity within religious faiths, explaining that this presented difficulties when attempting to mobilise resources. As this officer explained: I just wonder, because of the […] various different parts of the Muslim community, how easy that would be for them to draw together […] And even differences between individual mosques, for example, it becomes harder then to have a […] recognised organization that can represent them all. (INT21) Another participant concurred with this view and stated that it was therefore important to identify the ways in which faith groups are networked and to access such networks in order to encourage FBOs to deliver police relevant services: I think that would be an interesting thing to try and look at, you know, is there a kind of council meeting for the faith group where different people come together where, if there is a certain idea in an area, the police could go in and say ‘would you do this, that and the other’. (INT13) This observation chimes with previous research which has shown that sustainable faith driven welfare initiatives tend to derive from special-purpose parachurch organizations precisely 20 because individual churches are too small, diffuse, and lacking in resources to effectively organize alone (Coleman, 2003). Indeed, research has demonstrated that FBOs are unlikely to proactively generate initiatives and operate them independently but, rather, are more likely to work in conjunction with and be supported by others (Wuthnow, 2004). Our participants were aware of this and, as this officer explained, regarded ‘close partnership’ between the police and FBOs as essential: The thing that I've noticed about the church specifically is if you ask people they will respond. If you don’t ask, then they don’t respond or they respond in a way that’s not, how can I put it, that’s not effective as it could be [...] for the energy spent. So, if you have a specific request and an idea how you want that doing, if you ask, I’m sure people will come forward. If you say, well, we need to do something in [named area] for young people but we don’t know what we are going to do, then actually coming forward is a little bit harder. So it’s a kind of, I won't say instructed, but it really needs to be quite a close partnership as well. (INT13) However, it should not be assumed that FBOs possess the expertise, management, and coordination capacities that are required in order to deliver police relevant services (Brudney, 1985; 2010). For example, one participant described how a drug drop-in project, instigated by churches in one constabulary, failed because of a lack of knowledge and experience of how to deliver a holistic response to the complex problem of drug addiction: There was no support there for those who were ready to come off the drugs and so it was [a] sort of sticking plaster to try and help and it seemed the right thing to do because there was a certain issue in an area that had been identified, but it wasn’t done as good as it could have been done […] I think that’s one example of sort of Christians wanting to do the right thing but maybe not getting it 100% right. (INT13) Lack of knowledge and experience may also bring FBOs into conflict with statutory agencies in respect of which ‘problems’ are deemed suitable for FBOs to be concerned with. For example, one participant described how a church and local council disagreed about the need to increase provision for homeless people. As a consequence, the services provided by the church were almost closed down by the council who believed ‘there’s not a problem, you don’t need to do this’ (INT13). 21 Participants also raised questions about whether FBOs had the skills capacity to manage and coordinate projects effectively. Little is known about how volunteers in religious organizations are managed but there is no reason to assume that FBOs have sufficient capacity to manage projects or volunteers (Wuthnow, 2004). Rather, as participants told us, there are reasons to assume that such capacity is lacking. Indeed, previous research has drawn attention to the considerable challenges of managing the recruitment and induction of volunteers, as well as the difficulty of motivating them and developing their skills over time (Brudney, 2010). A lack of management infrastructure in FBOs can mean that volunteers are not put to good use: [W]e hear that volunteers come wanting to do some good, and then, you know, they’re let down because no one’s meeting them, briefing them, using their skills properly, and they often think, I wanted to help […] but actually it’s pointless, because no one’s really using me properly. (INT11) As well as curtailing what might be achieved, this risks volunteer dissatisfaction and turnover and potentially puts volunteers at risk: ‘You know there are a lot of people who go to church who want to do the best by people and will help people, but through that help could put themselves into a vulnerable position’ (INT13). Motivation of FBOs Although the values of FBOs are often seen to mirror the values of the police service, our participants stated that not all FBOs possess the internal motivation to work in partnership with constabularies in order to translate their faith-based values into police relevant actions (see also: Wuthnow, 2004). In this respect, the CST is a good case in point. The relationship between the CST and constabularies is long established (Whine, 2011) and facilitates the co- production of crime control in a number of ways. For example, information-sharing agreements facilitate the exchange of intelligence about threats, and formalised meetings provide a mechanism through which the police and the CST can work together to support security arrangements for Jewish events. However, whilst participants were positive about the work of the CST, they thought it unlikely that other FBOs could replicate it. The motivation for CST to organize and deliver police relevant services was seen to have emerged from the 22 distinctive historical and cultural landscape of violent anti-Semitism in Britain (see also: Whine 2011). Without a similar motivation, participants considered it would be difficult for FBOs to generate such a systematic and organized collective response. As one officer explained, ‘I don’t think there is any other community that has its version of the CST, and that is just because of history I think [which] is obviously based around a […] threat’ (INT21). Regulation and accountability of FBOs The regulation of FBOs was seen as essential to ensure that their activities are accountable to citizens, constabularies, and the state more generally. Participants pointed to the ‘red tape’ – the regulation, rules, and bureaucratic processes – that can sometimes hinder police relevant activities carried out by FBOs and limit what they might be able to achieve. Whilst this is often regarded as a source of stifling the co-production of crime control (see, for example: Hodgson, 2011), our participants regarded regulatory constraint as necessary and appropriate: Gone are the days when Mrs Goggins from down the road would run a youth club, you know. Actually we want professional people with skills doing that, who are able to safeguard and be aware of safeguarding, and I think that’s a change that the church has had to adapt to, that it’s had to put in place the policy, press and procedures, that by putting them in place, you have got a group of people who actually are aware how to work safely. (INT13) Whilst participants therefore regarded it as important to hold those who deliver police relevant services to account, they also noted that processes of accountability were often missing in respect of FBOs. Participants stressed that regulation must be sufficient to ensure that any service provided by a FBO is delivered in a consistent, reliable way. One participant, for example, drew attention to significant problems in ensuring accountability in respect of FBOs: [W]e could set up a whole host of things that a particular group could do, as volunteers, but all of a sudden they could turn around and say, ‘not doing that anyway’, so you lose it, and what are you left with? Now you’re back to square one really. So you put all your faith in something that anybody at any time can turn round. 23 There’s no legislation to hold people to account for it, whereas actually the police are accountable for everything. (INT3) Another officer described his frustration at what he saw as FBOs being insufficiently held to account for grants they received from constabularies: ‘[I]t would be a case of like £1,000, there you go, no accountability as to where that money got spent, so we don’t know’ (INT20). Participants saw the issue of accountability to be particularly pertinent in light of the potential for vigilantism to arise in the delivery of police relevant services, most notably in respect of FBOs carrying out public street patrol services. Whilst previous research has shown that there is, in practice, a great variety in the extent to which citizen patrols are embedded in frameworks of policing governance (Bullock, 2014), participants tended to argue that these forms of patrol are well organized and communication with constabularies is well established. However, participants viewed the indiscriminate proliferation of street patrols as something to be approached with caution because of the potential for individuals to act, at best, in an uncoordinated way and, at worst, in an uncontrollable way (see also: Sagar, 2005): We’ve got our intel systems, we’ve got all […] the tools that we need to do our jobs, and if you do it from a superficial way, obviously it’s not going to get you anywhere, is it? (INT19) I think it has to be either closely monitored or done in a specific way. I don’t think people should have carte blanche with the way they do their community policing themselves, if that makes sense. Because especially if they’re not used to the way the police do things or the way things should be done legally, you’re looking at people getting hidings that shouldn’t necessarily get hidings or people being targeted who shouldn’t necessarily be targeted. That has happened in the past. (INT8) Therefore, whilst it is clear that our participants had sympathy for this form of co-producing crime control with FBOs, they also had a critical awareness of its parameters. 24 CONCLUSION Religious faith has become increasingly salient within public policing. What we have called ‘policing with faith’ represents the various ways in which constabularies now engage with faith communities and FBOs; and what we have called ‘faith as policing’ represents the ways in which FBOs can and sometimes do deliver police relevant services. Both forms of interaction between faith communities, FBOs and the police service are driven (at least on the part of the police) by the ideals of promoting police responsiveness, increasing police legitimacy, and more effectively controlling crime. We have shown that such interaction does not occur naturally but, instead, needs to be orchestrated by constabularies in conjunction with faith communities and FBOs. Engaging in such orchestration raises a number of significant issues that constabularies must successfully navigate if they are to achieve the ambition of controlling crime. We summarise and interpret these issues below. ‘Policing with faith’ is shaped, and compromised, by a number of factors. First, interaction between the police and faith communities is influenced by officers’ understanding of religious faiths as well as of the broader social and cultural relations relevant to them. The subtleties and dynamics of faith communities, and the ever-evolving intra-community tensions that often characterize them, are usually unknown to officers. Community dynamics are subject to change by national or international events that officers may struggle to keep up- to-date with. This lack of understanding can undermine the ability of officers to gain or sustain access to faith communities and FBOs. Therefore, generating an understanding among police officers of the dynamics of particular faith communities, at least to the extent that they intersect with crime problems, is an ambition of constabularies seeking to engage with those faith communities. Nevertheless, it is not the case that all officers need in-depth knowledge of faith and its connection to wider social relations in order to effectively engage. Instead, a keen interest, the right attitude, and a willingness to learn are more important. Secondly, the development of long-term ties between officers and local communities, which are seen as essential to engagement with faith communities, are often undermined by organizational issues such as officer redeployment or the retrenchment of services. Thirdly, and relatedly, frequent changes in the organizational commitment to engagement work, often driven by changes in national policy, leaves relationships between officers and faith communities subject to disruption. As a consequence, police engagement with faith communities and FBOs is rendered fragile by weak, transient ties. Finally, historical legacies 25 – most notably in respect of the history of police racism – continue to cast a long shadow that can make engagement work problematic. Taken together, these issues mean that engagement is more than simply a ‘technical matter’ that involves finding the means to open up avenues for dialogue between constabularies and faith communities. Rather, engagement is shaped by the meanings that officers and those in faith communities place on each other; meanings that are themselves informed by wider social structures and relations. As such, engagement between constabularies and faith communities has symbolic and moral qualities that need to be understood and negotiated if it is to lead to realizing the ambition of co-producing crime control. As we have also shown, ‘faith as policing’ is seen as desirable by police personnel because FBOs are thought to adhere to values which accord with those of the police service, and are considered to be well positioned to lever community resources and deliver services in ways that alleviate demands on constabularies. Whilst there are certainly examples of British constabularies co-producing crime control with FBOs, the extent to which FBOs possess the capacity, expertise, and motivation to deliver police relevant services in appropriate, consistent, and accountable ways remains unknown. The ambition of policy-makers to encourage greater co-production of crime control therefore rests on a number of assumptions about the capacity and motivation of FBOs that we have critically interrogated. First, although FBOs are often seen as ‘innately’ willing and able to provide police relevant interventions, this assumption does not straightforwardly stand up to empirical scrutiny. As a consequence of internal diversity, varying sizes, different outlooks regarding the role of faith in the community, differing motivations to provide public services, and varying technical ability among individuals, many FBOs may be less able and less willing to co-produce crime control than has been assumed. Second, although the delivery of police relevant services by FBOs is seen to offer a way of reducing demand on constabularies – something viewed as especially important at a time of state retrenchment – in practice it can generate demands on the police service. For the co-production of crime control to be effective, constabularies must fuel the delivery of services by FBOs by, for example, identifying suitable FBOs, motivating them to participate, sharing information, making joint decisions about the delivery of interventions, and managing or coordinating service delivery. This therefore alters, rather than removes, officers’ responsibility for and engagement in aspects of crime control (see: Garland, 1996). Third, whilst motivating FBOs to deliver police relevant services is seen as desirable the successful co-production of this form of crime control depends upon 26 constabularies orienting officers towards new ways of working with the communities they police. The history of attempts to promote citizen participation in police work suggests that this will continue to be difficult, not least because of officer attachment to conventional modes of crime control, the organizational configuration of constabularies, and the considerable investment required to equip officers with the necessary skills (Myhill, 2006; Bullock, 2014). Taken together, these are weighty issues that present significant challenges to those who attempt to intensify and strengthen the ways in which FBOs and constabularies co- produce crime control. Acknowledgements We are grateful to the research participants and their constabularies, and to Robert Vanderbeck for his advice regarding FBOs. 27 REFERENCES Beckford, James A. (2012) ‘SSSR Presidential Address: Public Religions and the Postsecular: Critical Reflections’, Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 51(1): 1-19. Berger, Peter L. (1999) ‘The Desecularization of the World: A Global Overview’, In Berger, Peter L. (ed.) The Desecularization of the World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics, Ethics and Public Policy Centre, Washington D.C. and William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, Michigan, pp. 1-18. Bettison, N. (2009) ‘Preventing violent extremism – a police response’, Policing 3(2): 129- 138. Braun, V. and Clarke, V. (2006) ‘Using thematic analysis in psychology’, Qualitative Research in Psychology, 3(2) 77-101. Briggs, R., Fieschi, C. and Lownsbrough, H. (2006) Bringing it Home: community-based approaches to counter-terrorism, Leicester: Demos. Brudney, J. (1985) ‘Coproduction: Issues in Implementation’, Administration & Society 17(3): 243-256. Brudney, J. (2010) ‘Designing and Managing Volunteer Programs’, in David O. Renz (ed.) and Associates, The Jossey-Bass Handbook of Nonprofit Leadership and Management, San Francisco: John Wiley and Sons, pp. 753-793. Bullock, K. (2014) Citizens, Community and Crime Prevention, Basingstoke: Palgrave. Chaves, M. and Tsitsos, W. (2001) ‘Congregations and social services: What they do, how they do it, and with whom’, Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly 30(4): 660-683. 28 Choudhury, T. and Fenwick, H. (2011) The impact of counter-terrorism measures on Muslim communities (Equality and Human Rights Commission research report 72). London: Equality and Human Rights Commission. http://www.equalityhumanrights.com/publication/research- report-72-impact-counter-terrorism-measures-muslim-community Cnaan, R., Boddie, S. and Yancey, G. (2003) ‘Bowling Alone but Serving Together: The Congregational Norm of Community Involvement’, in C. Smidt (ed.) Religion as social capital: Producing the common good, Waco, TX: Bayler University Press, pp. 33-47. Coleman, J. A. (2003) ‘Religious social capital: Its nature, social location, and limits’, in C. Smidt (ed.) Religion as social capital: Producing the common good, Waco, TX: Bayler University Press, pp. 33-47. Garland, D. (1996) ‘The Limits of the Soverign State’, British Journal of Criminology 36(4): 445-471. Ericson, R. (2007) Crime in an Insecure World. Cambridge: Polity Press. Evans, K. (2011) ‘“Big Society” in the UK: A Policy Review’, Children and Society 25(2): 164–171. Gordon, M.B. (2003) Law Enforcement, the Faith Community and the Value-Based Initiative, U.S. Department of Justice: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services. HM Government (2006) Countering international terrorism: the United Kingdom’s strategy, London: The Stationery Office, Cm 6888. HM Government (2009) Pursue prevent protect prepare: the United Kingdom’s strategy for countering international terrorism, London: HM Government, Cm 7547. HM Government (2011) Prevent Strategy, London: HMSO, Cm 8092. HMIC (2013) Policing in Austerity: Rising to the Challenge, London: HMIC. 29 HMIC (2015) The welfare of vulnerable people in police custody, London: HMIC. Hodgson, R (2011) Unshackling Good Neighbours, London: Cabinet Office, https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/62643/unshack ling-good-neighbours.pdf Innes, M. (2006) ‘Policing Uncertainty: Countering Terror Through Community Intelligence and Democratic Policing’, The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 605(1): 222-241. Innes, M. (2011) ‘Doing less with more: The “new” politics of policing’, Public Policy Research 18(2): 73-80. Lowe, T. and Innes, M. (2008) ‘Countering Terror: Violent Radicalisation and Situational Intelligence’, Prison Service Journal 179: 3-10. Innes, M., Roberts, C., Innes, H., Lowe, T. and Lakhani, S. (2011) Assessing the Effects of Prevent Policing: A Report to the Association of Chief Police Officers, Cardiff: Universities’ Police Studies Institute, http://www.npcc.police.Britain/documents/TAM/2011/PREVENT%20Innes%200311%20Fin al%20send%202.pdf Johnson, P. and Vanderbeck, R.M. (2014) Law, Religion and Homosexuality, Abingdon: Routledge. Jones, T. and Newburn, T. (2001) Widening Access: Improving Police Relations with Hard to Reach Groups (Police Research Series Paper 138), London: Home Office, http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20110220105210/rds.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/prgpd fs/prs138.pdf Kitchen, S., Michaelson, J., Wood, N. and John, P. (2006) 2005 Citizenship Survey, Active communities topic report. London: Department for Communities & Local Government, http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20120919132719/http://www.communities.gov.uk/ documents/communities/pdf/452564.pdf 30 McFadyen, A. and Prideaux, M. (2011) Effective community policing: negotiating changing religious identities, Cambridge: C.I. Programme. McFadyen, A. & Prideaux, M. (2014) ‘The placing of religion in policing and policing studies’, Policing and Society 24:5: 602-619. McGarrell, E., Brinker, G. and Etindi, D. (1999) The Role of Faith-Based Organizations in Crime Prevention and Justice, Welfare Policy Centre of the Hudson Institute. Macpherson, Sir W. (1999) The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry: Report of an Inquiry by Sir William Macpherson Of Cluny, Cm 4262-I. Myhill, A. (2006) Community Engagement in Policing: Lessons from the literature, London: Home Office. NPIA (n.d.) Working with faith communities: A guide for neighbourhood policing teams and partners, London: NPIA. Parsons, J. (2008) ‘Key Informant’, in P. Lavrakas (ed.) Encyclopaedia of Survey Research Methods, Sage: London, p. 1073. Pratchett, L. (2004) ‘Local Autonomy, Local Democracy and the “New Localism”’, Political Studies 52(2): 358–375. Prideaux, M. & McFadyen, A. (2013) ‘Personal (Non-)Religiosity and Policing’, Journal of Contemporary Religion 28(3): 457-472. Putnam, R. (2000) Bowling alone: The collapse and revival of community in America, New York: Simon & Schuster. Putnam, R. (1995) ‘Bowling Alone: America’s Declining Social Capital’, Journal of Democracy 6(1): 65–78. 31 Rowe, M. (2007) Policing Beyond Macpherson: Issues in Policing, Race and Society, Cullompton: Willan. Sagar, T. (2005) ‘Street Watch: Concept and Practice’, British Journal of Criminology 45(1): 98-112. Scarman, Lord (1981) The Brixton Disorders, April 10-12 1981: Report of an Inquiry by the Rt. Hon. The Lord Scarman, O.B.E., London: HMSO, Cmnd. 8427. Smidt, C. (2003) ‘Introduction’, in C. Smidt (ed.) Religion as social capital: Producing the common good, Waco, TX: Bayler University Press, pp. 1-18. Spalek, B. (2008) ‘Muslim communities post-9/11 – citizenship, security and social justice’, International Journal of Law, Crime and Justice 36(4): 211-214. Spalek, B. (2010) ‘Community policing, trust, and Muslim communities in relation to “New Terrorism”’, Politics & Policy 38(4): 789-815. Spalek, B. and Imtoual, A. (2007) ‘“Hard” approaches to community engagement in the UK and Australia: Muslim communities and counter-terror responses’, Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 27(2): 185-202. Spalek, B. and Lambert, R. (2008) ‘Muslim communities, counter-terrorism and counter- radicalisation: a critically reflective approach to engagement’, International Journal of Law, Crime and Justice 36(4): 257-270. Spalek, B., Awa, S.E. and Mcdonald, L.Z. (2008) Police-Muslim engagement and partnerships for the purposes of counter-terrorism: an examination, Birmingham: University of Birmingham. Spalek, B. and McDonald, L. (2010) ‘Terror Crime Prevention: Constructing Muslim Practices and Beliefs as “Anti-Social” and “Extreme” through CONTEST 2’, Social Policy and Society 9(1): 123–132. 32 Standpoint (2011) ‘Tackling the Islamist Threat to UK Jews’, http://www.standpointmag.co.uk/features-march-11-online-only-tackling-the-islamist-threat- to-british-jews-david-cameron-cst-speech Stoker, G. (2006) Why Politics Matters: Making Democracy Work, Basingstoke: Palgrave. Whine, M. (2011) ‘The Community Security Trust – Best Practice in Combating Antisemitic Hate’, Journal of Hate Studies 9: 113-126. Wuthnow, R. (2004) Saving America? Faith-based Services and the Future of Civil Society, Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
work_mhrh7tb2bfchjlqhbhapnxhlmu	----	DRAFT Afterword 45 Afterword: Challenges for Family Practitioners Edith A. Lewis, Guest Editor In the preceding pages, contributors have offered glimpses of families engaged in the growing activity of transracial adoption, strategies for working with family members in a medical setting, the use of diagnostic and intervention tools such as genograms, the changing nature of grandparenting, and recognizing the myriad roles family practitioners may play in influencing the course and content of the family intervention. All of these articles offer valuable information for those working with Michigan’s 1.3 million families (National Center for Children in Poverty, 2004). Throughout this issue, readers have been encouraged to place families within the numerous interacting contexts that give meaning to their lives. Without doing so, we risk designing interventions for families as we wish they were, rather than as they are. How might family practitioners address the changing realities of families whose life situations differ so much from their predecessors in historical and herstorical time? I suggest that the experiences of the families we have met in these pages leave us with three overarching questions that challenge our ongoing scholarship and practice: • Where do we need to focus our energies as family practitioners and researchers who are mindful of the group, community, societal and global influences on family life? • What or whom have we consistently neglected in our overall theory and practice endeavors? • What roles might we play in improving the overall well being of families within their social, political, historical contexts? Michigan Family Review, 9, 1, 45-50, 2004 © Michigan Council on Family Relations Afterword 46 Michigan Family Review, 9, 1, 45-50, 2004 © Michigan Council on Family Relations Challenge 1: Where Do We Need to Focus Our Energies? Even with the range of innovative practice methods available to family practitioners, some families and their members continue to experience major threats to their overall well being. Almost one-third of Michigan’s 2.4 million children live in low- income families. Only 18 percent of those low-income families have unemployed parents. The majority (48%) of low income families has at least one adult who is employed full-time year-round (National Center for Children in Poverty, 2004). The consequences of this poverty were identified in the first example provided in the introduction to this issue. Associated with such poverty is an increased probability of homelessness and serious housing problems (National Low-Income Housing Coalition, 2004). Parents who wish to work may find it extremely difficult to play an active role in their children’s lives and meet the demands of the low-wage, service sector jobs our nation has been generating for the last 10 years (Malveaux, 2004). As our colleagues in family studies have demonstrated, children with supportive parents become healthier adults. We need to know how to increase the probability that parents will be able to provide the support their children need now in order to meet the future needs of the state and nation. Offering some insight into this challenge, Bishof and his colleagues (this issue) identified four situations in which their medical family practice model can yield optimal results: (a) for those families combating chronic childhood illnesses; (b) for those whose spouses have chronic illnesses; (c) for family involvement in promotion/prevention activities; and (d) for the ongoing care of the aging. As the number of the aging increase in Michigan, considered by Tilove (2004) as one of the “Heartland” states, will we be cognizant that diverting major resources to the aging will leave us with fewer resources for children? For the 20 percent of Michigan’s population whose families exist on incomes 9.2 times lower than those who represent the top 20 percent (National Center for Children in Poverty), attention to Bishof and colleagues’ four effective practice entry points could make the difference between continued lives of ill health with lowered lifetime earning potential or a method of ensuring that even those without adequate health insurance could continue to live as contributing members of our society. Challenge 2: What or Whom Have We Neglected? Effective strategies for working with the chronically mentally ill and their families have been with us for decades (Test & Stein, 2003; Jackson, 2001). These intervention strategies require community-based practitioners and services. It is increasingly clear that during the last 15 years we have moved away from treatment for the chronically mentally ill, with the kinds of dire consequences outlined in the introduction (Lewis, this issue). Although the former Michigan Department of Mental Health has become the Department of Community Health, effective community based Afterword 47 Michigan Family Review, 9, 1, 45-50, 2004 © Michigan Council on Family Relations interventions for the chronically mentally ill have never been institutionalized within the Department’s practice priorities. Gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender family members in families who have lost their domestic partner benefits since the November 2004 election also face a number of very problematic decisions. Michigan educators have long been concerned about the increased probability of suicide among gay and lesbian youth. Will mental health services and or programming geared toward suicide prevention for this population now also be eradicated, and with what consequences? Will only those people with heterosexual orientations have access to medical care? Given the level of misinformation in the nation in terms of understanding the range of sexual orientations, will those who have lobbied to have hate crimes on the basis of sexual orientation recognized and subject to criminal prosecution find that their efforts have been in vain? The omission of rural families in our literature has long been of concern to those who work with them. With the exception of the Chavis article (this issue), all of our examples in this issue dealt with populations who were more likely to have access to cities and their resources for families. As noted in the introduction, the rural school shootings by young white males that have so shocked the nation almost became a reality in Michigan this year. Toppo (2004) noted that many school districts are still afraid of acknowledging the prevalence of troubled adolescents, a fear that is accompanied by a lack of effective interventions. At most, violence prevention is a focus. It is ironic that the “whistleblower” for the Michigan case hailed from another state. What will it take to implement some of the innovative interventions aimed at the systems of violence, such as Frank White’s (2004) well-regarded program that has been adopted by the majority of Minnesota’s school districts? Challenge 3: What Roles Do We Play in Promoting Family Well Being? The contributors to this issue have presented a number of roles open to family practitioners, including serving as advocates, educators, brokers, bridges between medical personnel and patients, and collaborators with multiple family self-help organizations. These roles require an understanding of social, political and historical contexts in order to be effective. They often require learning strategies more likely taught in other disciplines as well. As family practitioners, we can increase the extent to which we interact with our colleagues in other disciplines and collectively identify best practices instead of looking only within the “ways of knowing” afforded by our colleagues within our primary field. Family scholars’ contributions to family interventions may also be improved by embracing the conceptual frameworks that provide a comprehensive and contextual view of family life. The ecological model of family life has been utilized in some disciplines for decades, and has resulted in some fruitful multidisciplinary collaborations (Phenice & Griffore, 2000; Barratt, 2000). Afterword 48 Michigan Family Review, 9, 1, 45-50, 2004 © Michigan Council on Family Relations Learning more about how families live within contexts requires sharing the reality of those contexts with others. Our legislators (who are most likely to be found in the top 20 percent of our state’s income range) can only learn about how much their lives differ from the other 80 percent of Michigan’s families if those differences are pointed out to them. For example, if most families do not adhere to the model prevalent in the 1950s in terms of their structures and functioning, why are we still attempting to foist that ancient model on them? Who has benefited from this model in the past? Who benefits from it today? Is it ethical to have one more privileged group (in terms of access to resources) mandate behavior of less privileged groups without funding the mechanisms so that the desired behavior can actually be enacted by all of Michigan’s families? Boss and colleagues (2003) have demonstrated that family strengths can be utilized to enhance overall family well being even in extremely traumatic circumstances, such as the bombing of the World Trade Towers in New York in 2001. They learned that if they listened to what the families of the trade unions wanted, they could help families in communities along in their healing processes. In this case, listening meant that practitioners needed to be aware of their own cultural competence and knowledge of contexts, that they needed to expand their practice skill base to include facilitating multiple family groups, and that they would need to present their interventions in community-based settings. Their listening has paid off for those families in New York City. During this next decade, let us take up their challenge and commit ourselves to listening to the families of Michigan as we design and implement our family practice interventions. Most importantly, family practitioners and scholars must support families in this country in their attempts to understand themselves and their internal and external complexities. Even those interventions designed to provide immediate behavioral or social change for the family can be viewed within the therapeutic alliance as being a part of an overall long-term plan for intervention. Such long-term plans recognize changes within family structures and functioning as normative and help families develop strategies for recognizing when external assistance is needed. To understand this complexity requires those interested in working with families to also incorporate–as a normative act–all of the systems influencing and being influenced by these families, including those that are historical, social, and political. In this way, family practice, family policy, and family research may more closely provide meaningful solutions to the real needs of families in the 21st century, including the ones of which we are members. Acknowledgements I am deeply grateful to all contributors to this thematic issue. Many thanks go to Libby Balter Blume, Editor, and to the Editorial Review Board for affording me the opportunity to edit this issue of Michigan Family Review. Dr. Blume’s immeasurable assistance and wise counsel were critical at many points during the “birth” of this project. Afterword 49 Michigan Family Review, 9, 1, 45-50, 2004 © Michigan Council on Family Relations Along with Dr. Blume, all reviewers who participated in this process and Dr. Tom Blume who worked diligently as an editorial assistant and reviewer have my gratitude. Readers should be aware that the majority of the state affiliates to the National Council on Family Relations do not produce journals for use at the local, state, and national levels. The Michigan affiliate council’s willingness to continue supporting this journal effort is to be commended. This thematic issue would not have been possible with the steadfast organization and thoughtfulness of my research assistant Aliyah Masudi who kept all of the activities related to the issue’s compilation active even when I was out of the country. By the time we go to press, Ms. Masudi will have completed her joint Masters in Social Work and Masters in Public Health degrees at the University of Michigan. With her outstanding skills, she will be an asset to professional practice in both disciplines. References Barratt, M. (2000). Multidisciplinary perspectives on families in the United States at 2000. Michigan Family Review, 5 (1), 1-10. Boss, P., Beaulieu, L., Weiling, E., Turner, W., & LaCruz, S. (2003). Healing loss, ambiguity and trauma: A community based intervention with families of union workers missing after the 9/11 attack in New York City. Journal of Marital and Family Therapy, 29 (4), 455-467. Coontz, S. (2004, November). Changing all the rules: The historical transformation of marriage. Paper presented at the National Council on Family Relations Annual Conference, Orlando, FL. Jackson, R. L. (2001). The clubhouse model: Empowering applications of theory to generalist practice. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth/Thomson Learning. Mahoney, A. R., & Knudson-Martin, C. (2000). Will old gender scripts limit new millennium families’ ability to thrive. Michigan Family Review, 5 (1). 41-52. Malveaux, J. (2004). The state of Black America: Economics. Available from http://www.blackamericaweb.com/site.aspx.lawnews/stateof/sobeconomics. National Center for Children in Poverty (2004). Michigan demographics. New York: Mailman School of Public Health, Columbia University. National Low-Income Housing Coalition (2004). Web site data available from http://www.nlihc.org. Phenice, L. A, & Griffore, R. J. (2000). Social identity of ethnic minority families: An ecological approach for the new millennium. Michigan Family Review, 5 (1), 29-40. Test, M. A., & Stein, L. (2003). Practical guidelines for the community treatment of markedly impaired patients. Journal of Community Mental Health, 36 (1), 47-60. Tilove, J. (2004). One nation divisible. Ann Arbor News, February 9, A1, 8. http://www.blackamericaweb.com/site.aspx.lawnews/stateof/sobeconomics Afterword 50 Michigan Family Review, 9, 1, 45-50, 2004 © Michigan Council on Family Relations Toppo,G. (2004). Schools safe, but danger lurks. USA Today, June 28, 6D. White, F. M. (2004). Richfield Recreation Programs and Athletics, Richfield, MN. Information available from Frank@respectsports.com. Acknowledgements References 
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work_mq6ny6mh4re6hh2oiedd2au76u	----	Correspondence Letter to the Editor A solution to refugee children healthcare in Greece Two key emerging issues relevant to the high numbers of refugee children reaching host countries in Europe are the challenges facing the local healthcare and state systems and the increase in stigmatising behaviours and discrimination (1). This is also the case in Greece. Around 60,000 Syrian, Afghan and Iraqi refugees, with many children among them, are currently stranded in Greece facing considerable inequalities and non systematic access to healthcare (2). Since October 2016, in a first attempt towards integration, the Greek government has been rolling out a plan to offer education to around 10,000 refugee and unaccompanied asylum seeking children (Official Gazette of the Hellenic State, 29 August 2016, No 2687). However, some opposition has been raised by certain school and parental boards, citing hygiene and infection risks. Notwithstanding the underlying discrimination, we are proposing a pragmatic solution to this proposed risk, and the wider healthcare provision problems, which is consistent with plans proposed to address the rapid changes in the epidemiology of multiple conditions seen in countries with high immigration rates (1). This solution is the establishment of a mobile paediatric unit to offer screening, immunisations, recording of health history and general preventative care. Under the principle of using the best available evidence (1), Greece can use the experience of paediatric healthcare provision through a mobile medical van in Dominican Republic for children of impoverished migrant Haitian workers (3). Further, the mobile unit can undertake the registration of refugee children entering schools, and combine it with the routine examination and care (4). Lastly, in the event of reported hate crimes, access to mental health services and social care can be in place via a triage system in the mobile unit, as children are especially vulnerable to emotional trauma (4). From a financial perspective, the most beneficial model for acquiring such units for not for profit purposes seems to be through direct ownership, though adjustments in monthly payments would make leasing competitive (5). Overall, it is the use of the asset that is more important than ownership, hence, an exit strategy should be in place to close the unit once the cost of running it exceeds the cost of referring those children to the hospital via the normal routes (4). In this context, use of such a mobile paediatric unit could be an interim step before attempting integration in the national healthcare system and while the government is attempting to implement this education bill at pace. Ethical statement: The authors declare that: a) there is no potential conflicts of interest b) The research does not involve Human Participants and/or Animals and c) The research was reviewed and approved by will to come under this category. References 1. Friedrich MJ. Growing Numbers of Refugees Worldwide Are Children. JAMA. 2016;316(19):1956. 2. Kousoulis AA, Ioakeim-Ioannidou M, Economopoulos K. Refugee crisis in Greece: not a one-country job. Int J Public Health. 18 Oct 2016 [Epub ahead of print]. 3. Crouse HL, Macias CG, Cruz AT, Wilson KA, Torrey SB. Utilization of a mobile medical van for delivering pediatric care in the bateys of the Dominican Republic. Int J Emerg Med. 2010;3(4):227-232. 4. Sirbaugh PE, Gurwitch KD, Macias CG, Ligon BL, Gavagan T, Feigin RD. Caring for evacuated children housed in the Astrodome: creation and implementation of a mobile pediatric emergency response team: regionalized caring for displaced children after a disaster. Pediatrics. 2006;117(5 Pt 3):S428-438. 5. Arevalo O1, Saman DM, Bonaime A, Skelton J. Mobile dental units: leasing or buying? A dollar-cost analysis. J Public Health Dent. 2010;70(3):253-257. 
work_mvhcmvboojhdzijtwhhuqqfglq	----	Against the organization of misery? The Marmot Review of health inequalities lable at ScienceDirect Social Science & Medicine 71 (2010) 1231e1233 Contents lists avai Social Science & Medicine journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/socscimed Against the organization of misery? The Marmot Review of health inequalities Kate E. Pickett a,*, Danny Dorling b a Department of Health Sciences, University of York, Seebohm Rowntree Building, Area 2, Heslington, N. Yorks YO10 5DD, United Kingdom b University of Sheffield, Norton, Sheffield, United Kingdom a r t i c l e i n f o Article history: Available online 29 July 2010 Keywords Health inequalities Fair Society, Healthy Lives (The Marmot Review) * Corresponding author. Tel.: þ44 1904 321377; fax E-mail address: kp6@york.ac.uk (K.E. Pickett). 0277-9536/$ e see front matter � 2010 Elsevier Ltd. doi:10.1016/j.socscimed.2010.07.013 In February 2010, the UK Government published Fair Society, Healthy Lives: Strategic Review of Health Inequalities in England Post- 2010, better known as “The Marmot Review” after its lead author Professor Sir Michael Marmot. The very first words of the report are a variation on a quotation from Pablo Neruda: “Rise up with me against the organisation of misery” (Marmot et al., 2010, p. 2) Pablo Neruda was a Chilean writer, a left-wing politician, and a confidante of president Salvador Allende; he died within days of August Pinochet’s coup. An official British document that begins with a quotation from a revolutionary communist would seem to promise unusually radical content. The Marmot Review (2010) received extensive coverage and acclaim from London’s Guardian newspaper and was covered, albeit more briefly, in the Times and the Daily Telegraph, but few of the initial commentators seemed to believe that any of its main recommendations would actually be implemented. These included improving prenatal and early years provision, better drug addiction treatment, and raising social security payments. Rather than anticipating real progress in tackling health inequalities in the wake of the financial crash, one journalist suggested that: “This grim situation makes those few Marmot recommendations that need not involve great public expense, such as better work- place procedures to deal with stress at work, all the more impor- tant, and everyone should now get behind these.” (Guardian, 2010, March 15, p. 30 ) : þ44 1904 321388. All rights reserved. If all that can be done to reduce Britain’s grievous and persistent inequalities in health is to try to abate stress in the workplace, what does that say about the commitment of the British (government, academics, public health professionals, and public alike) to truly creating a fairer and healthier society? The Marmot Review (2010) followed an earlier report also led by Sir Michael. Published just over a year earlier, again with a large cast of distinguished colleagues, he authored the acclaimed WHO Commission on Social Determinants of Health treatise: “Closing the Gap in a Generation: Health Equity Through Action on the Social Determinants of Health” (CSDH, 2008). Many reviews of this report have now been published, in both high-impact (Davey Smith & Krieger, 2010) and less well-known journals (Pearce & Dorling, 2009). Most of the responses to this earlier global report were positive, welcoming its well-argued call for a shift in focus for WHO, from disease control to improving the social determinants of health. “The conclusions of the WHO report are a salient reminder to the governments of member states that reducing health inequalities should be a political priority.” (Davey Smith & Krieger, 2010, p. 530). Like most other commentators, we welcomed the publication of the UK Marmot Review, but think it is now apposite to suggest that, in comparison to the earlier WHO report, and also in comparison to its early precursor in Britain, the Black Report (Black et al., 1980, 1992), it has not succeeded in putting health inequalities back into the political agenda, even as we write this review (in the days approaching a UK general election). We suggest that a major (but significant) problem with the UK Marmot Review is that it fails to deal with the need to reduce inequality by focusing on the top end of the social hierarchy, as well as the bottom. Although the Review calls for the establishment of mailto:kp6@york.ac.uk www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/02779536 http://www.elsevier.com/locate/socscimed http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2010.07.013 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2010.07.013 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2010.07.013 K.E. Pickett, D. Dorling / Social Science & Medicine 71 (2010) 1231e12331232 a ‘minimum income for healthy living’, there is no suggestion that a maximum income or a constraint on the ratio of top-to-bottom incomes in institutions would also help reduce inequalities, and so improve the health and well-being of the population as a whole. In a time of severe financial restraint it is far easier to reduce spending by curtailing top incomes than it is to raise incomes at the bottom. However, taxation is only discussed in the Marmot Review with respect to improving low incomes. This is odd e because the Review demonstrates in great detail that inequalities in health exhibit a social gradient; these are not simply problems of the poor, so why direct all policy solutions towards the bottom? It makes sense to target services to those who need them most, but even more sense to reduce the social inequalities that actually produce social disparities in health in the first place. We suspect that more radical policy measures were not proposed because the political climate in Britain across the mainstream party spectrum, whilst accepting the rhetoric of ‘fairness’, is actually diffident in its support for the policies needed to create more equality. If the Marmot Review had suggested curtailing the excesses of the rich it might have been more difficult for those who ideologi- cally oppose it to criticise it on the grounds that its recommenda- tions would support and sustain those who are stereotyped as the feckless poor. Those who actually favour inequality and elitism would have to defend the harmful impact of the extremely affluent on society, rather than turn their attention to the supposed failings of the people who cost society least: the poor. The vast majority of people benefit when incomes are curtailed at the top. If we curtail top incomes, it is easy to model the benefits e there is far more to go round. The taxation of excessive wealth (perhaps through a land-value tax), regulatory restraint of the bonus culture, and other measures aimed at reducing economic inequalities would help the vast majority of us (in the UK and other rich market democracies) enjoy an improved quality of life, even if such policies did not improve things much for the tiny minority of the super-rich (Wilkinson & Pickett, 2010a). Evidence of hostility towards the poor abounds on the Internet. When poor people joined what little public debate took place on the MarmotReviewtheywereimmediatelyabused:OneoftheDailyMails’s on-line readers, responding to a criticism of his extreme views, said: “Why are the poor replying to my thread? GET A JOB and stop scrounging. Who is paying for your Internet? I0d sterilise the lot of you!eAnthony, Esher, Surrey, 11/2/2010 12:56 Another wrote: I would put you up against a wall and put a bullet in your pathetic brain. I doubt this will be published but oh boy do I feel better now.e Alan, Gloucester UK, 13/2/2010 15:57” Obviously the Daily Mail did publish these views; otherwise we would not be able to report them here. The paper published many similarly extreme comments in its on-line edition. Typical reactions included: “Perhaps Prof. Sir Michael might revise his recommendations from hard working taxpayers being bled even more to pay for feckless wastrels, to relocating ‘poor’ people to remote moun- tainous regions and subsistence occupations?ePenny, London, 14/2/2010 19:34” These angry reactions towards the poor in Britain, and to academics who research their suffering and support their rights, have becomemuchmorecommonthantheywerethirtyyearsago(Dorling, 2010, p. 28). They reflect a general trend in many affluent countries, but especially in those that have become increasingly unequal. Poor people are increasingly seen as an ‘out’ group. The laziness and innate incapabilityof the poor,spongingoff therestofus,costsocietydear;at the extreme, in the USA, Americans are told more and more often that it is the poor who make you poor (Tropman, 1998). Britain is not yet as bad as the United States when it comes to public expressions of hatred for those with less money, but it is not that much better, and is certainly a society with less social solidarity than almost anywhere else in Europe. In such an environment of hate, with huge public sector cuts in the offing, with an unregulated media allowing the on-line promulgation of views that border on fascism and hate crimes, whichever political party forms the next government, it is worth asking whether, in hindsight, the Marmot Review could have painted a more positive picture for societal change. We believe it could have. We believe there is still time to change attitudes rather than plead for a little more charity for those with less. Much of the strong evidence lies within the hundreds of tables and appendices of the Marmot report. The full Review includes abundant evidence on the importance of the social determinants of health. What is missing is the political courage to deal with the root causes of those social determinants. Why people smoke, rather than trying to get them to stop.why people eat too much, commit violence, trust each other less, invest more money in their chil- dren’s education, rather than trying to understand the social inequalities that stand in their way. We have to look back more than 30 years to see when academics last showed true political commitment to health inequalities. Thirty years ago “Inequalities in Health: Report of a Research Working Group chaired by Sir Douglas Black” was published (Black et al., 1980, 1992). Among many other recommendations, that Report suggested the following six main aims and measures: d “To give children a better start in life” (Black et al., 1980, 1992, p. 336). d “.child benefit should be increased to 5½ per cent of . male earnings.” (Black et al., 1980, 1992, p. 342). d “.minimally acceptable and desirable conditions of work”. (Black et al., 1980, 1992, p. 343). d “.abolition of child-poverty should be adopted as a national goal.” (Black et al., 1980, 1992, p. 342). d for communities: “Additional funding for ten special areas” (Black et al., 1980, 1992, p. 341). d strengthen “.preventive and educational action” (Black et al., 1980, 1992, p. 337). Although the Marmot Review opens with a revolutionary quotation, the six main recommendations of the Marmot Review are unlikely to scare the horses, indeed they are remarkably similar (if in places a little less ambitious) to those of the Black Report. The main recommendations of the Marmot Review, for comparison with the above, are: d Give every child the best start in life d Enable all children . to maximise their capabilities and have control over their lives d Create fair employment and good work for all d Ensure a healthy standard of living for all d Create and develop healthy and sustainable places and communities d Strengthen the role and impact of ill health prevention Is the Marmot Review really saying, by repeating so much of it e that it is about time we looked back again at the Black report and K.E. Pickett, D. Dorling / Social Science & Medicine 71 (2010) 1231e1233 1233 realise how little progress we have made? The UK has led the world in research and policies designed to reduce health inequalities. Not only did it commission a series of important reviews e when the UK held the Presidency of the European Union (EU) in the second half of 2005, one of the issues it chose to highlight during its Presidency was inequalities in health. As part of this effort, it commissioned two reports, one on the extent of health inequalities in EU countries (Mackenbach, 2005), the other summarising policy initiatives adopted to tackle them (Judge et al., 2006). What was clear from these reports was that Britain was ahead of other countries in implementing health policies to reduce health inequalities, but also that health inequalities in the UK have shown no tendency to decline. The growth in inequalities in health between geographically defined communities in Britain is currently accelerating (Thomas, Dorling, & Davey Smith, 2010). No reviews or policies ‘boldly go’ where all public health researchers know they need to go. And yet our evidence base for the social determinants of health proceeds apace; we learn more and more about the futility of trying to change individual behav- iour, and more and more about the importance of influences in the womb and early years of childhood. Indeed, the Marmot Review could have gone much further, if it had only placed greater reliance on Sir Michael Marmot’s own research and that of his colleagues studying life-course effects on health in the British birth cohorts. In contrast to 1980 when the Black Report was published, we now, thanks especially to his work, know much more about the impor- tance of psychosocial influences on population health. We also know much more about the biology of chronic stress (Sapolsky, 2005), about how rank and status harm health (Marmot, 2004). We know that children get the best start in life by being brought up in more equitable societies, rather than in rich ones (Pickett & Wilkinson, 2007). Why did the Marmot Review not make hard- hitting recommendations to reduce the harm created by great differences in rank and status? Crucial parts of the contemporary tale are missing in this latest review of health inequalities. Instead, there is a focus on maximising the ‘capabilities’ of children and young adults. This is the language of economics, not social epidemiology or progressive public health. It is a language that has seeped into our everyday vocabulary and thinking, and it permeates the Marmot Review. The Marmot Review is indeed welcome e but it tells only part of the story, and provides far less than its authors and most readers know about what needs to be done. Were Pablo Neruda around today he might feel that what the Marmot Review recommends is not to actually “rise up with me against the organisation of misery”. There are ways of rising up against the organisation of misery, but they all require far much more than attempting the slight abatement of suffering. At the start of the Marmot Review, when Neruda’s words are quoted, five lines of text have been left out from the relevant stanza (Davey Smith, 2010). Here are the missing lines: But stand up, you, stand up, but stand up with me and let us go off together to fight face to face against the devil’s webs, against the system that distributes hunger, against organized misery.(Neruda, 1972, p. 99) References Black, D., Morris, J. N., Smith, C., & Townsend, P. (1980). Key conclusions published as chapter 27. In G. Davey Smith, D. Dorling, & M. Shaw (Eds.), Poverty, inequality and health in Britain: 1800e2000: A reader. Bristol: Policy Press. (2001). Black, D., Morris, J. N.., Smith, C., & Townsend, P. (1992). Inequalities in health: The Black report. In P. Townsend, & N. Davidson (Eds.). London: Penguin. Commission on the Social Determinants of Health (CSDH). (2008). Closing the gap in a generation: Health equity through action on the social determinants of health. Geneva: World Health Organization. Davey Smith, G. (2010) (Per. comm. Recital of ‘The Flag’ by Pablo Neruda). Davey Smith, G., & Krieger, N. (2010). Tackling health inequities, BMJ;337:a1526, Dorling, D. (2010). Injustice: Why social inequality persists. Bristol: Policy Press. Guardian. (March 15th, 2010). The editorial: for richer, for poorer e Britons overall are getting steadily healthier, but being poor still carries a vast penalty. http:// www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/mar/15/health-divide-between- rich-poor. Judge, K., Platt, S., Costongs, C., & Jurczak, K. (October 2005). Health inequalities: A challenge for Europe. Accessed 03.03.06. London: Presidency of the EU. http:// www.dh.gov.uk/assetRoot/04/12/15/83/04121583.pdf. Mackenbach, J. P. (2005). Health inequalities: Europe in profile. London, UK: Presi- dency of the EU. Marmot, M. (2004). The status syndrome: How social standing affects our health and longevity. London: Bloomsbury. Marmot, M. (2010). Fair society, healthy lives. The Marmot review Executive Summary. London: The Marmot Review. http://www.ucl.ac.uk/gheg/ marmotreview/FairSocietyHealthyLivesExecSummary. Neruda, P. (1972). The Captain’s Verses (D.D. Walsh, Trans.). New York: New Direc- tions Books. Pearce, J., & Dorling, D. (2009). Tackling global health inequalities: closing the health gap in a generation. Environment and Planning A, 41, 1e6, Commentary. http://www.envplan.com/abstract.cgi?id¼a41319. Sapolsky, R. (2005). Sick of poverty. Scientific American, 293(6), 92e99. Thomas, B., Dorling, D., & Davey Smith, G. An observational study of health inequalities in Britain: geographical divides returning to 1930s maxima by 2007. BMJ 2010;341:c3639, doi:10.1136/bmj.c3639. Tropman, J. E. (1998). Does America hate the poor?: The other American dilemma- lessons for the 21st century from the 1960s and the 1970s. Santa Barbara: Greenwood Press. Pickett, K.E., Wilkinson, R.G. (2007). Child wellbeing and income inequality in rich societies: ecological cross sectional study. Bmj ;335(7629):1080e7. Wilkinson, R., & Pickett, K. (2010). Spirit level (2nd ed.). London: Allen Lane. http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/mar/15/health-divide-between-rich-poor http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/mar/15/health-divide-between-rich-poor http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/mar/15/health-divide-between-rich-poor http://www.dh.gov.uk/assetRoot/04/12/15/83/04121583.pdf http://www.dh.gov.uk/assetRoot/04/12/15/83/04121583.pdf http://www.ucl.ac.uk/gheg/marmotreview/FairSocietyHealthyLivesExecSummary http://www.ucl.ac.uk/gheg/marmotreview/FairSocietyHealthyLivesExecSummary http://www.envplan.com/abstract.cgi%3Fid%3Da41319 http://www.envplan.com/abstract.cgi%3Fid%3Da41319 http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/bmj.c3639 Against the organization of misery? The Marmot Review of health inequalities References 
work_mw4luzn7xvdjtgiahcwbewj22m	----	Now You See Me? The Visibility of Trans and Travesti Experiences in Criminal Procedures Politics and Governance (ISSN: 2183–2463) 2020, Volume 8, Issue 3, Pages 266–277 DOI: 10.17645/pag.v8i3.2804 Article Now You See Me? The Visibility of Trans and Travesti Experiences in Criminal Procedures Lorena Sosa Netherlands Institute of Human Rights, Utrecht University, 3584 BH Utrecht, The Netherlands; E-Mail: l.p.a.sosa@uu.nl Submitted: 15 January 2020 | Accepted: 10 June 2020 | Published: 18 September 2020 Abstract In 2012, after decades of trans and travesti activism in Argentina, the law on gender identity was finally adopted. Travesti activists Diana Sacayán and Lohana Berkins were at the forefront of these efforts. The same year, after the long struggle of the feminist movement, ‘femicide,’ understood as the murder of women by men in the context of gender-based violence, was incorporated into the Criminal Code as aggravated murder. This legal amendment also criminalized hate crime based on the sexual orientation or gender identity of the victim. Mobilized by Sacayán’s murder in 2015, the trans and travesti collective sought to make the experiences of exclusion and marginalization of the travesti collective visible by coining the notion of ‘travesticide,’ and demanded it to be used in the ensuing criminal trial that followed her death. Constrained by the legal notions of femicide, gender-based violence, and hate crimes, the Tribunal introduced ‘travesticide’ in their deci- sion, yet questions on how to properly operationalize this notion in criminal law remain. Each notion offers opportunities and poses difficulties in making the murder of travestis politically visible and accounted for. By a detailed analysis of the final judgment, this article reflects on the implications of the notions used in the trial and the possible lessons for future interactions with the criminal justice system. Keywords Argentina; criminal procedures; femicide; gender identity; hate crime; transgender; travesti; travesticide Issue This article is part of the issue “Trans* Politics: Current Challenges and Contestations” edited by Mieke Verloo (Radboud University, The Netherlands) and Anna van der Vleuten (Radboud University, The Netherlands). © 2020 by the author; licensee Cogitatio (Lisbon, Portugal). This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribu- tion 4.0 International License (CC BY). 1. Introduction Trans persons and travestis in the Americas have articu- lated numerous social collectives to fight against the per- sistent subordination and injustices they face. Likewise, in Argentina, travestis successfully organized and advo- cated for their rights. In doing so, assuming the ‘travesti identity’ was a first step to making their demands visible, triggering a powerful dynamic of self-naming, recogni- tion and mobilization. Yet what does ‘travesti’ entail and how is it different from ‘transgender’? As Santana (2019, p. 212) points out, “travesti does not correspond to the English travesty [transvestite], which is related somewhat to a performance in drag.” Identifying as travesti entails “the refusal to be woman, the refusal to be intelligible,” but also “the refusal to be trans” (Machuca Rose, 2019, p. 243), since the travesti identity goes beyond gender. Unlike the English ‘trans- gender,’ ‘travesti’ articulates aspects of race, class, abil- ity, and other forms of difference (Rizki, 2019, p. 148). Thus, as Santana (2019, p. 213) explains, being travesti “is not a total negation of themselves as women but a negation of an imposed dominant expectation of wom- anhood.” The travesti identity seeks to elude the iden- tity categories constructed by a state system of social oppression (Berkins, 2003, p. 136). In fact, travesti pol- itics evoke the historical marginalization of the collec- tive, one with clear racial, able-bodiedness, and elitist undertones. Diana Sacayán’s self-identification as ‘trava sudaca originaria’ helps underscore the different dimen- sions of her travesti identity. By focusing on Diana’s murder trial, this article pays particular attention to the Politics and Governance, 2020, Volume 8, Issue 3, Pages 266–277 266 travesti identity, yet, in line with Rizki (2019), it also rec- ognizes that trans and travesti identifications are con- stantly shifting and thus, it does not immediately as- sume they are mutually exclusive (Rizki, 2019, p. 149), but separate. The visibilization of travesti realities has triggered a considerable number of reforms across different legal and policy realms. Among them, criminal law constitutes a crucial battlefield for such change given the histori- cal criminalization of trans/travestis under repressive po- lice codes (Berkins, 2007; Fernández Valle, 2018). In fact, the first travesti association, the Association of Argentine Travestis (in Spanish, ATA), was formed in 1991 to fight police brutality and abuse, gradually leading to the abo- lition of the most repressive norms. Nevertheless, the trans/travesti collective continues to be disproportion- ately affected by new forms of persecution, such as the criminalization of the promotion of sex work (Fernández Valle, 2018, p. 50; Sosa & Ferrero, 2018) or drug traffick- ing (Malacalza, 2018). However, (trans) feminisms in Latin America, and also in Argentina, have often been ambivalent regarding the use of the punitive system to address issues that reveal structural inequality and disadvantage, since it cannot solve these issues and in fact, because it is rooted in a patriarchal structure, it often sustains the criminalization of the most affected sectors of society (Zaffaroni, 2000). At the same time, there has been a tendency towards in- creased criminalization, particularly in relation to severe forms of violence against women and feminine subjectiv- ities (Acosta Vargas, 1999; Costa, 2014). Aware of these tensions regarding punitivism, mak- ing trans/travestis’ experiences visible in the criminal fora and translating them into demands could challenge their persistent profiling as suspects of crime and recon- figure them as subjects of protection, transforming both criminal and criminological discourse. The trial for the murder of trans activist Diana Sacayán offered a perfect scenario to do this. This article explores how the main (historical) demands of the trans and travesti community in Argentina, explored in Section 2, were reconfigured and introduced in the criminal proceedings. Section 3 dis- cusses the final judgment in detail by examining the po- sition of each of the parties to the trial in relation to the key aspects described in Section 2, and how these were interpreted by the judges in relation to the elements of the crimes. Section 4 reflects on the findings and high- lights the positive aspects for similar strategic litigations, and draws attention to some problematic areas. 2. Historical Claims of the Trans/Travesti Community and Institutional Responses There have been three main historical claims of the travesti and trans community in Argentina: the legal recognition of their preferred gender; the possibility to decide on their bodies; and the accountability for their murder. 2.1. Legal Gender Identity The campaign for the legal recognition of the self- perceived gender identity in Argentina articulated de- mands about social positioning, participation, and the fight against the violations of rights. Until recent times, Argentinian media regularly portrayed travestis as a dan- gerous threat to ‘moral society.’ Assuming the travesti identity became an act of resistance, followed by mo- bilization and alliance making as a main political strat- egy (Berkins, 2003). This led to the creation of sev- eral associations, such as the already mentioned ATA, the Association for the Fight for Travesti Transsexual Identity (led by Lohana Berkins) and the Organization of Travestis and Transsexuals of Argentina. In this pro- cess, the term ‘travesti’ achieved a new and empowering meaning, cleared from the negative connotation given by the police (Berkins, 2007). Gender identity demands sought to consolidate this process and ensure the enjoyment of human rights. The lack of legal recognition of gender identity signified the starting point of a continuum of violence and system- atic violations of basic rights, such as the expulsion from the home, the education, the health system, and the labour market, leading travestis to sex work and expos- ing them to health risks, criminalization, social stigma, and police abuse (Radi & Pecheny, 2018). The legal recog- nition of gender identity, thus, makes the enjoyment of other rights possible, giving citizenship and demo- cratic participation a new meaning (Berkins & Fernandez, 2005; Cabral Grinspan & Viturro, 2006; Pecheny & De la Dehesa, 2011; Radi & Pecheny, 2018; Rapisardi, 2003). The demands for the legal recognition of gender iden- tity began to take shape in the first decades of 2000, with the formation of the Anti-Discrimination Liberation Movement (MAL, led by Diana Sacayán), the Argentinian LGBT Federation (FALGBT), and the National Front for the Gender Identity Law. The National Front for the Gender Identity Law and FALGBT prepared a draft law on Gender Identity, which was finally adopted in 2012 as Law 26.743. The law entitles a person to change their sex and name in an administrative proceeding, without requiring medical or psychological advice or body intervention, and recog- nizes the person’s right to undergo therapy, treatments or surgeries, provided by the State. The implications of the law on bodies are discussed in Section 2.2. The law was celebrated by trans activists and al- lies, but it was also critiqued by travesti activists be- cause it upholds the binary construction of the sexes as men/women, “cancelling out the travesti or trans iden- tity” (Wayar, 2012). Nevertheless, as de Mauro Rucovsky and Russell (2019, p. 224) point out, the law has be- come “a political toolbox rather than a mere legal instru- ment,” which has impacted the interpretation of other laws, including criminal law as we shall see, and it has also helped to disrupt the binary construction of gen- der identities by, for instance, allowing registries and courts to grant identity documents without gender indi- Politics and Governance, 2020, Volume 8, Issue 3, Pages 266–277 267 cation. These challenges to binary sex were also present in the most recent annual feminist meeting―‘Encuentro Nacional de Mujeres’ (gathering thousands of women ev- ery year)―calling for a new name that explicitly includes trans/travesti subjectivities and realities. They have also been institutionally supported by the creation of the na- tional ministry for ‘Women, Genders and Diversities.’ To some extent, Law 26.743 also contributed to the realization of basic substantial rights, such as the right to education, health, housing, and work. This has been particularly the case for younger generations (Saldivia Menajovsky, 2018), yet the adult trans/travesti commu- nity has not experienced substantial changes and have limited access to basic human rights due to insufficient implementation (Korol, 2018; Viturro, 2014). 2.2. Body Sovereignty According to Fernández (2003), the visibilization gained during the 1990s provided an opportunity to question the sex/gender binary and the social construction of bod- ies and sexes. ‘Travesti bodies’ are seen as cultural, so- cial, and political objects (Fernández, 2003, p. 147) that confront the oppressive western construct ‘man/woman’ (Berkins, 2007). Laws have controlled and disciplined their bodies in different ways. Social rejection and insti- tutional harassment, particularly by the police, are ways of disciplining travesti bodies that do not comply with dominant appearances, either because the lack of re- sources prevents them from accessing the technologies to change their bodies or because they are comfortable with their own embodiment. Restricting the possibility to change one’s gender at- tributed at birth is another way of policing bodies. Before the adoption of Law 26.743, the ‘real’ gender of an adult person was determined by judges with the advice of dif- ferent medical disciplines, regardless of the person’s will. The law stripped judges and doctors from such power and gave it back to the individual. Since then, the per- son is free to determine their gender identity in a simple administrative procedure free of charge. Moreover, the approach of Law 26.743 towards body intervention is one of rights rather than requirements. Article 11 substantiates the right to a “free personal de- velopment” (Ministerio de Justicia y Derechos Humanos, 2012a) ensuring that every person older than 18 can access surgery or hormonal treatments to adapt their bodies to their perceived gender identity, without any judicial or administrative authorization. This approach discourages binary and hegemonic depictions of bodies and, importantly, it entails the legal recognition of the person’s ‘sovereignty’ on their own bodies, a longstand- ing demand of the trans/travesti community. The insti- tutional cultures, however, show difficulties in accom- modating the new law since the medical and judicial practices of requiring physical and psychological exami- nations are deeply rooted, and so are hegemonic and bi- nary views of bodies. 2.3. Murder Accountability Trans/travesti and feminist activists in Argentina have also demanded accountability for gender-based murders for decades. Different conceptualizations have emerged in that process, each carrying different symbolic and le- gal implications. This section discusses the conceptual- izations (femicide, travesticide, and hate crime) that are relevant to fully understand the final judgment on Diana Sacayán’s murder, their theoretical and symbolic mean- ing, and their legal implications. 2.3.1. Femicide and Travesticide The visibilization of femicide relates to a historical and so- cial process of recognition of the human rights of women and their right to a life free from violence. The theoret- ical concept of ‘femicide’ made the systematic murder of women visible. It was defined by Radford and Russell (1994) as the killing of women perpetrated by men and elaborated further by Lagarde (2006) to underline the gendered nature of the killings and the social constructs behind them. The notion was introduced in shadow re- ports, amicus curiae briefs, and individual petitions be- fore the Inter-American Human Rights System (IAHRS). In 2008, the Committee of Experts monitoring the Inter- American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment, and Eradication of Violence against Women adopted the Declaration on Femicide (Mechanism to Follow Up Convention of Belém do Pará Committee of Experts on Violence, 2008), and the Inter-American Court on Human Rights (IACtHR) recognized it in González et al. v. Mexico (‘Cotton Field’). In Argentina, Casa del Encuentro, a fem- inist association, published the first report on femicides the same year. These demands resulted in the adoption of Law 26.485 in 2009 on the integral protection of women from violence and the amendment of the Criminal Code by Law 26.791 in 2012 on gender-based crimes. The amendment to the Criminal Code consisted of introduc- ing new aggravations to murder in Article 80, capturing the gender-based nature of the crimes. It explicitly crim- inalized the murder of “a woman, committed by a man in a situation of gender-based violence” (Ministerio de Justicia y Derechos Humanos, 2012b, Article 80.11), com- monly referred to as ‘femicide’ in all prosecutorial guide- lines, protocols, doctrine, and the media. The introduc- tion of these aggravations follows the regional tendency, encouraged by the IAHRS, to adopt gender specific def- initions of crimes as an attempt to making visible the structural power imbalances that underlie such crimes. Gendered definitions of crimes send a strong message that such violence is unacceptable, challenging gender stereotypes that view violence as natural and belonging to the private sphere. Yet, the question arises whether, beyond such symbolic meaning, gender specific crimes help in preventing impunity and improve access to jus- tice. In principle, they contribute to collect disaggregated Politics and Governance, 2020, Volume 8, Issue 3, Pages 266–277 268 criminal statistics, revealing the prevalence of such vio- lence and adopting more effective policy measures. Adopting a gendered definition of femicide, how- ever, did not per se yield significant changes in prac- tice. In fact, in 2015, the impunity of violence against women and girls in Argentina reached unprecedented levels, triggering social uproar. This year would become a milestone for several reasons. On June 3rd, 2015, a massive nation-wide demonstration against the mur- der of women took place, setting in motion an orga- nized movement that expanded to other countries in the Americas―the #NiUnaMenos movement―actively sup- ported by Diana Sacayán and Lohana Berkins. These demonstrations resulted in two institutional changes. The first was the creation in 2015 of the Prosecution Unit for Violence Against Women (UFEM), which dictates prosecution protocols and publishes an- nual reports on the murders of women in the city of Buenos Aires. The second development was the decision of the Supreme Court of Justice (SCJ) to formally record femicides and issue a nationwide annual report on such cases. These recording initiatives ensure the visibility of the murder of women. Yet, the murder of trans women and travestis seem to call for a conceptual twist of the theoretical notion of femicide and its current criminal ‘translation’ for two rea- sons. Firstly, the official reports on femicide and proto- cols suggest that the inclusion of trans and travesti vic- tims as ‘women’ has not always been consistent, show- ing the limitations of the Gender Identity Law and bring- ing to question whether the current notion of femicide truly increases access to justice and fights impunity. For instance, the UFEM reports interpret ‘women’ in line with the Gender Identity Law and include all female sub- jectivities regardless of their gender assigned at birth, the formal registration of their gender identity, or how they were identified in the criminal process. However, the criminal framing of their murder has shifted through the years, sometimes referring to them as homopho- bic and transphobic femicide, sometimes as hate crimes (UFEM, 2015) and, more recently, as travesticide (UFEM, 2018). The SCJ annual reports on femicide include trans and travesti victims only since 2018 (Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nacion, 2018). The current gender-specific crime of femicide, thus, even if read in line with the Gender Identity Law, does not fully ensure the visibility of trans and travesti. Secondly, despite existing protocols, national ju- risprudence suggests that the requirement that the crime was committed ‘in a situation of gender-based violence’ is often (mis)interpreted as calling for the perpetrator to be the intimate partner (intimate femi- cide) and the victim in a subordinated position in rela- tion to the perpetrator. Such understanding of ‘gender- based violence’ does not meet the demands of Radi and Sardá (2016), who argue that a definition of trans- femicide/travesticide must reflect that murder is the most visible and final expression in a long chain of struc- tural violence encouraged by a cultural, social, political, and economic system, structured around the gender bi- nary. The murder of trans/travestis constitutes, in fact, the end of a continuum of violations they face. To achieve any symbolic impact, the criminal definition must cap- ture the specificity of these experiences. 2.3.2. Hate Crime The 2012 amendment that incorporated femicide to the Argentinian Criminal Code also incorporated sex- ual orientation and gender identity (SOGI) to the list of grounds aggravating murder based on ‘hate’ (Ministerio de Justicia y Derechos Humanos, 2012b, Article 80.4). The recognition of hate crimes, however, shows a very different trajectory at the national level than that of femicide or gender identity. Although such incorpora- tion is in line with the recommendation of the Inter- American Commission of Human Rights (IACHR, 2015, p. 270) to “enact hate crimes legislation to identify, pros- ecute, and punish prejudice-based violence against per- sons due to perceived or actual sexual orientation and gender identity,” debates on hate crimes based on SOGI have not been prominent in Argentina. In fact, although LGBT movements in other countries have promoted hate crime as a political and legal tool for addressing vio- lence against the collective, the trans/travesti movement in Argentina did not follow that line. Nevertheless, the Homosexual Community of Argentina started issuing an- nual reports on hate crimes in 2011, dedicating their 2015 Report to Diana Sacayán. In 2016, the Office of the Public Defence of Buenos Aires, the National Office of Public Defence, and the LGBT Federation formed a National Observatory for LGBTI Hate Crimes. Despite the incorporation of hate crimes based on SOGI to the Code, there have been very few judicial cases, particularly on transphobic hate crimes, and there is consequently scarce national doctrine elaborating on their defining characteristics. An overview of their key as- pects, however, is needed to assess the potential of the hate crimes for making trans murders visible and chal- lenge impunity. Regarding the visibility of the trans/travesti com- munity, a relevant aspect of hate crimes is that per- petrators target the victims’ (perceived) belonging to a given group, not their individual traits (Craig, 2002; Gerstenfeld, 2004; Mcphail, 2012; Perry, 2012). In fact, Perry and Alvi (2011) argue that hate crimes are sym- bolic acts performed for specific audiences, where the perpetrator sends a message to the group that they are unwelcome and that any group member could be the next victim. Most definitions of hate crime, thus, revolve around the group affiliation of the victim, yet only a few of them emphasize the disadvantaged social positioning and marginalization of victims and groups (Copeland & Wolfe, 1991; Perry, 2012; Sheffield, 1995). Nevertheless, group-based definitions often “tend to oversimplify vic- tim groups and do not take into account the diverse Politics and Governance, 2020, Volume 8, Issue 3, Pages 266–277 269 experiences of victims and the nuances of the harms they suffer” and prevent an intersectional understand- ing of their identities (Mason-Bish, 2014, p. 42). In rela- tion to trans persons, in particular, Meyer (2014, p. 122) holds that mainstream hate crime discourse “aligns the victim’s identity with normative conceptions of homo- sexuality,” therefore representing victims in a gendered and racialised manner, implicitly assuming that victims of hate crimes are white middle-class gay men, hiding other aspects and victims. The potential of hate crime for making violence against trans/travestis visible will thus largely depend on how group belonging is framed and how victims are perceived. Aspects connected to the subjective element of the crimes may, in practice, jeopardize the prosecution and punishment of the violence. Firstly, most definitions of hate crime focus on the perpetrator’s bias (‘hate’) against the victim (Zaffaroni, 2007). This means that, in addi- tion to the intent to commit the crime, hate crimes require a specific motivation behind their commission (Figari, 2018; Hall, 2013; Jacobs & Potter, 1998; Juárez, n.d.; Zaffaroni, 2007), which puts an additional burden on prosecutors and the police that need to prove it (Hall, 2013). There is also much dissent among scholars on what the motivation is. Hall (2013, p. 9) argues that it is ‘prejudice’ and not hate that we refer to when we talk about hate crime. The IACHR (2015, p. 44) specifies this further, suggesting that hate crimes consist of “prejudice motivated by the perception towards non-normative sex- ualities and identities.” Jamel (2018), however, suggests that transphobic hate crimes convey the offender’s ‘fear’ of trans people based solely on their physical appear- ance. Argentinian scholars like Buompadre (2013) and Figari (2018) argue that hate crimes are characterized by an ‘extreme aversion’ of the perpetrator against the victim’s group belonging. Each of these understandings of ‘hate’ suggests a different intensity of the bias and have evidence-related implications. For instance, Figari (2018, p. 16) suggests that ‘aversion’ is so strong that it calls for a psychological assessment to rule out any po- tential exclusion of culpability due to mental and emo- tional conditions. Secondly, the way the causal link between prejudice and the commission of the crime is defined by law will also determine the number of cases prosecuted. If norms require hate crimes to be only motivated by prejudice to the exclusion of all other factors, fewer offences will be recorded. According to Figari (2018, p. 9), Argentinian law requires this connection. Conversely, if the causal link is less strict and allows for other additional factors, e.g., economic interest, more offences will fall under the cat- egory (Jacobs & Potter, 1998, p. 33). Some aspects connected to the material elements of hate crimes may prolong the impunity of some forms of violence against trans/travestis. Hate crimes often show high levels of cruelty that exceed the instrumen- tal purpose of submitting the victim, particularly those against LGBT persons (IACHR, 2015). For some authors, this ‘overkill’ constitutes an objective element of the crime (Hall, 2013; Jamel, 2018) that must be backed by evidence, which means that crimes lacking such bru- tality will not be prosecuted as hate crime. Moreover, hate crime is usually associated with severe offences only, excluding minor forms of violence (Meyer, 2014). In Argentina, transphobic hate only aggravates murder or severe bodily injuries, which means that other forms of violence committed against trans/travestis, including sexual violence and property crimes, will receive a ‘regu- lar’ punishment with no indication of the motivation be- hind them. Despite the limitations of the crime of femicide and hate crimes based on gender identity to make travesti experiences visible described in these sections, the new draft Criminal Code submitted to Congress in May 2019 keeps the wording of Article 80 (“murder of a woman by a man” and “hate based on gender identity”; Ministerio de Justicia y Derechos Humanos, 2012b) intact. The next section explores the potential of the current framework to address these three historical trans/travesti claims in the criminal justice context. 3. The Diana Sacayán Case 3.1. Introduction to the Case Diana Sacayán’s body was found gagged and with bound hands and feet in her apartment in Buenos Aires on July 13th, 2015. Her body had multiple cuts and bruises, and knives were found on the scene. The perpetrators forced the front door from the inside to escape. A man with whom she had an intimate relationship was charged with her murder. As mentioned, Diana Sacayán was a prominent ac- tivist, trans human rights defender, representative of the International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association, and founder of the MAL. She also worked at the National Anti-discrimination Institute (INADI). Diana was the first person to change her gender identity after the adoption of the Gender Identity Law and successfully advocated for the adoption of trans quotas in the pub- lic sector and a protocol for trans-specific public health care in Buenos Aires. She had an established media pres- ence. Her death severely affected the LGBT community in Argentina. Diana’s family and civil society organiza- tions mobilized after her death and formed a commis- sion called ‘Justice for Diana Sacayán/End travesticide’ (‘the Justice Commission’). The Commission actively en- gaged with the media, raising awareness and seeking so- cial support. There was regular media reporting on the case, with the collaboration of experts and activists. There were four main acting parties in this case: the defence, the main prosecutor, and two auxiliary prose- cutors, one on behalf of the INADI and another on be- half of Diana’s brother. In addition, the UFEM (supported by the Justice Commission) acted as advisor to the main prosecutor. The unusual number of persons involved in Politics and Governance, 2020, Volume 8, Issue 3, Pages 266–277 270 the trial reflects the public interest it evoked. Prior to the final judgment, the head of the UFEM described in an interview the role of the Justice Commission in relation to the prosecutorial strategy in the case: “The construc- tion was a collective one, with the family and the orga- nizations. They [the Commission] asked for things that forced us [the prosecutors] to reconsider some notions. They voiced their concerns, we responded” (Revista Institucional de la Defensa Pública, 2018, p. 337). 3.2. Main Arguments of the Parties The parties based their arguments on a combination of theoretical conceptualizations and legal notions, some in unison and some diverging. 3.2.1. ‘Travesticide’ as a Theoretical Notion and Means of Visibility and Recognition This trial introduced the term travesticide in a judicial procedure for the first time and brought it to the at- tention of the media. The Commission emphasised two aspects. Firstly, although gender-based violence is com- mon to femicides and the murder of travestis, ‘travesti- cide’ aimed at capturing the specificities of such murders. Second, it attempts to make visible the structural vulner- ability, marginality, and systematic violence affecting the majority of trans/travestis. These two aspects lie at the core of the notion, and in a way, comprises all claims de- scribed in the previous section. All prosecutorial parties agreed that the notion of ‘travesticide’ fleshes out the historical and structural dis- crimination against trans/travestis and their exposure to violence throughout their lives (Poder Judicial de la Nación, 2018, p. 174). Yet, how to frame in criminal law a murder theoretically conceptualized as travesticide? Article 80 of the Criminal Code (Ministerio de Justicia y Derechos Humanos, 2012b) offers the chance to criminal- ize the murder as a hate crime based on the sexual orien- tation or gender identity (Section 4 of Article 80), and/or as ‘femicide,’ the murder of a woman by a man in a con- text of gender-based violence (Section 11 of Article 80). 3.2.2. Travesticide as a Hate Crime All parties considered that travesticide fell under the ag- gravation of hate crime based on gender identity and that this judgment was an opportunity to fill the doctri- nal gap on such crimes in Argentina. In their oral plead- ings, the prosecutorial parties followed the guidelines of the 2015 Report on violence against LGBTI persons by the Inter-American Commission―the IAC Report―to assess the scope and evidentiary requirements for hate crimes. The prosecutorial parties highlighted the struc- tural and discriminatory nature of the violence against trans/travestis (Poder Judicial de la Nación, 2018, pp. 29, 32, 37), in line with Perry’s (2012) socio-structural ap- proach to hate crime and the IAC report. They introduced official reports and experts’ testimonies as evidence, and more importantly, the testimonies of the trans commu- nity regarding their life experiences. They also provided long and detailed accounts of Sacayan’s life, paralleling those of the trans community, a strategy also used by the IACtHR in its judgments on femicide (Celorio, 2010; Sosa, 2017). The UFEM emphasized the relevance of the structural context and its legal implications, particularly in relation to reparations. Regarding the type of motivation that falls under ‘hate,’ the INADI and the main prosecutor considered it refers to the “aversion” against a person or group of persons (Poder Judicial de la Nación, 2018, pp. 32, 54), suggesting a threshold higher than that for “preju- dice.” The prosecutor argued that such aversion was trig- gered by the victim’s characteristics (Poder Judicial de la Nación, 2018, p. 54), while the INADI considered it re- sulted from the “contradiction between desire and re- jection of the travesti body” (Poder Judicial de la Nación, 2018, p. 25). However, they did not explain the connec- tion between the aversion of the abuser and the context of discrimination and exclusion, thus contributing to the idea that such murders are incidental and the product of one individual. The INADI and the defence lawyer agreed that al- though the “aversion” belongs to the internal process of the abusers, it shows in their actions and other explicit or symbolic manifestations (Poder Judicial de la Nación, 2018, p. 33). The derogative comments by the mother or acquaintances of the accused about trans persons could constitute an indication of the aversion, the prosecutor argued. The defence lawyer refused, however, arguing that only the personal manifestations of the accused could prove his aversion against travestis and, thus, addi- tional evidence was needed (Poder Judicial de la Nación, 2018, p. 120). 3.2.3. The Relevance of Bodies in Travesticide The INADI emphasised that the abuser could either “leave a message on the walls or on the victim’s body” (Poder Judicial de la Nación, 2018, p. 33). For all parties, the victims’ bodies can indicate the special aversion of the abuser, the intention to humiliate the victim, and the rejection of her identity, proving the subjective element of hate crimes (Poder Judicial de la Nación, 2018, pp. 22, 35, 44). Diana’s body thus became the main evidence of ‘hate.’ The three prosecutorial parties agreed that the wounds on her breasts, buttocks, and face could prove the aversion of the abuser (Poder Judicial de la Nación, 2018, pp. 22, 52, 55). The connection between the definition of the crimes and the overkill (high levels of brutality) determines the level of violence travesti bodies are expected to have suffered. For instance, the INADI considered that the overkill was an inherent element of hate crimes, man- ifested in victims’ bodies (Poder Judicial de la Nación, Politics and Governance, 2020, Volume 8, Issue 3, Pages 266–277 271 2018, p. 38). This implies that, in his view, these crimes require excessive violence, even if the result is murder. The defence lawyer agreed with him and added that the IACHR illustrated ‘overkill’ with examples of extreme (sexual) violence, such as decapitation, multiple ejacula- tions on bodies, etc. (Poder Judicial de la Nación, 2018, p. 114). He then argued that the level of violence dis- played by Diana’s body did not meet the required level of severity, and that her wounds corresponded to weapons used (knives) and her defensive behaviour (Poder Judicial de la Nación, 2018, p. 115). Conversely, the victim’s representative disagreed with the inherent character of the overkill, arguing that such excessive violence would in fact constitute an addi- tional aggravation of the crime, falling under Article 80.2 (Poder Judicial de la Nación, 2018, p. 22). Under this ap- proach, murders which are not exceedingly brutal could still constitute hate crimes, and the instrumental role of travesti bodies could be circumvented, along with the se- vere scrutiny they are subjected to. 3.2.4. (Trans)femicide Both auxiliary prosecutors understood that the mur- der of Sacayán also fell under the aggravation of femi- cide (Article 80.11; Ministerio de Justicia y Derechos Humanos, 2012b) since according to the Gender Identity Law she was a woman, and the crime was committed in a context of gender-based violence. In fact, all pros- ecutorial parties considered that Diana’s gender iden- tity was enough justification to frame the crime as femi- cide, without elaborating on the objective element―the situation of gender-based violence. The prosecutor sug- gested the subordinate position was evident “between a man and a woman” (Poder Judicial de la Nación, 2018, p. 39). Such a position, however, does not underscore the structural context of violence against trans/travestis. Particularly since the defence lawyer challenged the classification of the crime as femicide because, he ar- gued, Diana was not in a subordinated position. “She appears as a political referent of LGBTI organizations, speaking in International fora, with a large network. [The suspect] is a shy boy, who keeps silent in meetings, lives with his mother, has never been heard uttering a gender-violence type of expression, and has no previ- ous record in that sense” (Poder Judicial de la Nación, 2018, p. 130). Elaborating on how gender-based violence transcends inter-personal relationships, thus ‘intimate femicide,’ and how this can be proved in court helps to capture the structural violence and discrimination that trans/travestis face. In addition, the main prosecutor considered that the aggravation of femicide applied only subsidiarily if hate crime is ruled out (Poder Judicial de la Nación, 2018, pp. 58, 61). This raises the question of whether victims’ identities can be considered from an intersectional per- spective if their deaths can only be framed either as a hate crime or femicide. 3.3. The Final Judgment: Between Travesti Demands and the Letter of Criminal Law The tribunal, comprised of three judges, sentenced the accused to life imprisonment for the murder of Diana Sacayán, aggravated by Article 80.4 (hate based on gen- der identity) and Article 80.11 (femicide; Ministerio de Justicia y Derechos Humanos, 2012b). The 414 page-long decision features the reasoning of Judge Calvete (chair), Judge Baez, and the dissenting opinion of Judge Bloch. Their combined argumentations clarify important legal aspects of the violent murder of trans/travestis raised by the parties, notably, the possibilities to capture the socio- structural nature of such violence in criminal law and evidence-related aspects of transphobic hate crimes. 3.3.1. Criminal Law and Socio-Structural Perspectives on Violence Perhaps the most notable aspect of the judgment is the judges’ recognition of the structural nature of the discrimination and violence against trans/travesti, with clear references to the continuum of violence they suffer (Poder Judicial de la Nación, 2018, p. 381). The statistics, reports, and testimonies helped in shaping this new di- mension. The judges’ depiction of Diana throughout the judgment, informed by the vivid testimonies, went be- yond the typical victim profiling and emphasized the par- allel with the lived realities of travestis. This acknowledg- ment includes the institutional dimension of the violence. Judge Bloch admitted that violence is often committed by public institutions, particularly by the police (Poder Judicial de la Nación, 2018, p. 314). She also underscored that the lack of an investigation and prosecution leads to the invisibility of the violence and explains the lack of ju- risprudence on transphobic hate crime despite the high prevalence of transphobic violence (Poder Judicial de la Nación, 2018, p. 379). All judges recognized that the conceptual use of ‘trav- esticide’ reveals the complex structural dimension of the violence affecting trans women. Bloch suggested that it should be possible to introduce “as many names as there are types of hatred and subjectivities,” if it helps in mak- ing an existing problem more visible (Poder Judicial de la Nación, 2018, p. 387). Calvete saw “no obstacle to its forensic usage” if it helps clarify the case at hand (Poder Judicial de la Nación, 2018, p. 174). That said, Bloch pointed out that there are alternatives for legally framing travesticide―as hate crime (Article 80.4), but also as femicide (Article 80.11) when the victim is a trans woman (‘transfemicide’; Poder Judicial de la Nación, 2018, p. 388). However, Calvete and Báez, like the prose- cutors, seemed to consider that ‘hate crime’ was the only possible framing, which in practice may lead to overlook- ing the socio-structural nature of the violence against travestis (Poder Judicial de la Nación, 2018, pp. 175, 214). Judge Bloch reveals the first challenge that hate crimes pose to structural understandings of violence Politics and Governance, 2020, Volume 8, Issue 3, Pages 266–277 272 by highlighting that the legal definition of hate crimes does not seek to protect groups facing structural dis- crimination, as the prosecutor argued (Poder Judicial de la Nación, 2018, p. 372). The judges agreed that hate crimes are defined by the motivation of the abuser, rather than the characteristics or group belonging of the victim. It constitutes a hate crime when the abuser mur- dered because of his aversion based on the gender iden- tity of the victim, regardless of whether the victim was really trans/travesti (Poder Judicial de la Nación, 2018, pp. 173, 307, 325, 365). Hate crimes, Bloch argued, are more severely sanctioned because they infringe on the autonomy of the victim and other members of the ‘pro- tected’ group in addition to the primary violation (against life, physical integrity, sexual autonomy, property, etc.). That “individual liberty,” she argues, is precious to all democratic systems (Poder Judicial de la Nación, 2018, pp. 316, 317). The second challenge arises precisely from the legal conceptualization of ‘hate’ as ‘aversion.’ In line with Figari (2018), Calvete explains that aversion points to an individual motivation of a psychological nature, in opposition to that in ‘femicide,’ which is “cultural or so- ciological” (Poder Judicial de la Nación, 2018, p. 171). Could hate crime ever capture the socio-structural un- derstanding of travesticide, even when all judges have acknowledged it? The judges’ discussion regarding femicide and the meaning of ‘gender-based violence’ also raises questions regarding its usefulness to capture socio-structural per- spectives. All judges agreed that trans women and trav- estis constitute ‘women’ in the meaning of the law. They agreed to a large extent about the nature of gender- based violence. Judge Baez critiqued the legislative tech- nique that establishes that only a man can be the per- petrator of femicide and a woman the victim (Poder Judicial de la Nación, 2018, pp. 272–274), yet he recog- nised that, in line with the human rights documents rat- ified by Argentina and the parliamentary debates on femicide, gender-based violence is the expression of a system of domination that perpetuates inequality be- tween men and women, based on an unequal power re- lation. Femicide, thus, recognizes a situation of subordi- nation based on an unequal relation of power. For Judge Bloch, however, such power relations cannot be taken for granted in every relationship and must be supported by evidence (Bloch, 2014; Poder Judicial de la Nación, 2018, pp. 396–397). 3.3.2. Proving ‘Hate’ Another challenging aspect of hate crime is the diffi- culty to prove the subjective element, which all parties linked to the body of the victim. In line with travesti claims, Judge Báez elaborated on the social construction of trans/travesti bodies, arguing that bodies are social, cultural, and political entities affected by the norms, ex- pectations, and stereotypes of the patriarchal society to which they must conform (Poder Judicial de la Nación, 2018, p. 200). The asymmetry of power is, in fact, repro- duced on bodies, adopting multiple forms and varying from one culture to another. Yet this type of violence “of- ten becomes invisible and naturalized through socializa- tion, disguised as beliefs, legalized by laws, customs, pub- licity and by stereotypes of masculinity and femininity” (Poder Judicial de la Nación, 2018, p. 201). These dynam- ics led to “the objectification of the feminine or trans- sexual body” and thus “women are denied as subjects, subdued, alienated and manipulated. Women or trans- sexuals lose their individual agency and are subject to men’s desire” (Poder Judicial de la Nación, 2018, p. 202). Unfortunately, the judge did not explain how such social policing on travesti bodies could be proved in practice. Only Judge Bloch focused on the evidence aspect of hate. She provided an inventory of applicable evidentiary means based on the FBI guidelines and the IAC Report, and then analysed the criteria mentioned by the par- ties and judges. Among the elements indicative of hate crime was the brutality of the crime and signs aiming to erase the victim’s identity, (based on the location of the wounds). Judge Bloch confirmed the relevance of the IAC Report as a guiding document and agreed that these criteria should guide the investigation and prose- cution of hate crimes (Poder Judicial de la Nación, 2018, p. 342). However, she disagreed that these criteria were met in the specific case, particularly regarding the level of brutality and the placing of the wounds. She consid- ered that the level of violence was not comparable to the examples used in the IAC Report. She did not consider that the wounds on the victim’s face, breasts, and but- tocks were an attempt to ‘erase’ her travesti identity ei- ther, but were consistent with self-defence signs (Poder Judicial de la Nación, 2018, p. 345). Arguably, the long and detailed discussion on bodies by Judge Baez could have challenged this view if it had focused on the case at hand, making a crucial contribution. 4. Final Reflections Diana Sacayan’s trial constituted a means to seek justice for her murder and a unique opportunity to consolidate the right to gender identity and re-voice longstanding de- mands about the integrity of travesti bodies, access to human rights, and the right to a life without violence. These demands were introduced to the trial through the combination of procedural mechanisms and an overarch- ing conceptual notion. The first procedural measure used was the informal interaction of an ad hoc Commission, composed by family members, trans activists and other allies, and the prosecution office. The second measure was the intervention of Diana’s brother and the INADI as auxiliary prosecutors. The third was the incorporation of testimonies of gender/trans experts, activists, and wit- nesses. Finally, media management during and after the trial, prompted by the Justice Commission, triggered the debate on the murder of travestis, and to a lesser ex- tent, their living conditions. While this article has focused Politics and Governance, 2020, Volume 8, Issue 3, Pages 266–277 273 on the conceptual aspects of the trial, the procedural as- pects would certainly merit further analysis. The overarching conceptual notion of ‘travesticide’ was employed to name the murder of travestis and make visible the continuum of violence they face. The idea of a ‘continuum’ helps to recognize not only the murder but also the violence leading to it, such as the rejection of trans/travesti identities and bodies and the exclusion and denial of their human rights. The structural and in- stitutional nature of such violence becomes clear. The prosecutors introduced the notion and the tribunal unan- imously accepted it. The judges disagreed about the pos- sible criminal framing of travesticide, suggesting that dif- ferent prosecutorial strategies can be devised. The prosecutorial parties and two judges favoured framing travesticide as hate crime based on gender identity (Article 80.4; Ministerio de Justicia y Derechos Humanos, 2012b). However, such framing raises three issues that claimants should carefully consider. Firstly, the structural nature of the violence is not properly cap- tured by the crime because it focuses on the motive of the accused, that is, their ‘aversion’ against travestis. Murders appear as incidental, the result of a mad man, despite the prevalence and structural nature of the vio- lence. Secondly, hate crime establishes a high threshold to prove guilt. While the IAC Report can guide in such an attempt, victims’ bodies will inevitably become the main piece of evidence. Thus, travesti bodies get scrutinized once again in their death, submitted to a normative ex- amination to find indications of the perpetrator’s aver- sion. Finally, it is unclear if hate crime can capture the in- tersectional nature of the discrimination against the vic- tims, since, despite all testimonies about the richness of Diana’s identity (‘trava sudaca originaria’ and activist), all discussions ended up focusing on only one aspect: her gender identity. Judge Bloch argued the notion of ‘travesticide’ can be criminally framed as gender-based violence against women (Article 80.11 ‘femicide’; Ministerio de Justicia y Derechos Humanos, 2012b) when the victim is a trans woman or travesti. The tribunal confirmed that trans/travesti women are protected under Article 80.11 since the adoption of the Gender Identity Law. Article 80.11 seems more in line with the structural element of travesticide because it connects it with ‘gender- based violence.’ That said, their subordinated position requires proof. Moreover, given the legislator’s decision to adopt a gender-specific approach (“male perpetrators and female victims”; Ministerio de Justicia y Derechos Humanos, 2012b) the specificity of travesticide is re- placed by ‘women,’ imposing a binary view of the travesti identity. The question remains whether both the femi- nist and travesti collective would agree to adopt a def- inition of gender-based violence that focuses on ‘gen- ders,’ without naming specific gender subjectivities. In any case, the tribunal held that hate crimes and femicide can concur, allowing a more intersectional view of trav- esti identities. In sum, Diana Sacayán’s trial was a collective achievement that employed effective strategies to un- veil trans/travesti experiences, nearing social and insti- tutional recognition and accountability. The complexity of travesticide, however, cannot be properly captured by the current structure of neither hate crimes nor femi- cide, rendering the criminal response insufficient. These reflections can improve future criminal strategies, and perhaps inform debates prior to the adoption of the new draft of the Criminal Code. Acknowledgments The research for this article was partially carried out at the University of Buenos Aires, with funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation Program under the Marie Sklodowska-Curie Grant Agreement No. 793823. The article was finalized at Utrecht University, funded by an NWO grant. I thank Say Sacayán, Yamila Rodriguez, Judge Ivana Bloch, the anony- mous reviewers, and the editors for their insightful and constructive comments. I am also extremely grateful to Mina Hunt for her invaluable research support. Conflict of Interests The author declares no conflict of interests. References Acosta Vargas, G. (1999). La mujer en los códigos penales de América Latina y el Caribe Hispano [The woman in the criminal codes of Latin America and Hispanic Caribbean]. In A. Facio & L. Fries (Eds.), Género y dere- cho [Gender and law] (pp. 424–472). Santiago: LOM Ediciones. Berkins, L. (2003). 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(2007, August 21). Los delitos de odio [Hate crimes]. La Gaceta. Retrieved from https:// www.lagaceta.com.ar/nota/231632/tribunales/ delitos-odio-segun-zaffaroni.html Politics and Governance, 2020, Volume 8, Issue 3, Pages 266–277 276 https://doi.org/10.1177/0269758011422475 https://doi.org/10.1177/0269758011422475 https://doi.org/10.1177/000486589402700212 https://doi.org/10.1177/000486589402700212 https://doi.org/10.1215/23289252-7348426 https://doi.org/10.1215/23289252-7348496 https://doi.org/doi:10.1017/9781316771525 https://doi.org/doi:10.1017/9781316771525 https://www.pagina12.com.ar/diario/suplementos/soy/1-2436-2012-05-11.html https://www.pagina12.com.ar/diario/suplementos/soy/1-2436-2012-05-11.html https://www.pagina12.com.ar/diario/suplementos/soy/1-2436-2012-05-11.html https://www.lagaceta.com.ar/nota/231632/tribunales/delitos-odio-segun-zaffaroni.html https://www.lagaceta.com.ar/nota/231632/tribunales/delitos-odio-segun-zaffaroni.html https://www.lagaceta.com.ar/nota/231632/tribunales/delitos-odio-segun-zaffaroni.html About the Author Lorena Sosa is Assistant Professor at the Netherlands Institute of Human Rights (SIM) and is part of the Utrecht Centre for European Research into Family Law (UCERF) at Utrecht University. Her research ex- plores the inclusiveness of human rights law in relation to gender and sexuality in two realms: violence, and equality and non-discrimination. She received a Marie Sklodowska-Curie grant by the European Commission and a VENI by the Dutch Scientific Organisation for her research on gender-based violence against trans and intersex persons. Politics and Governance, 2020, Volume 8, Issue 3, Pages 266–277 277 Introduction Historical Claims of the Trans/Travesti Community and Institutional Responses Legal Gender Identity Body Sovereignty Murder Accountability Femicide and Travesticide Hate Crime The Diana Sacayán Case Introduction to the Case Main Arguments of the Parties `Travesticide' as a Theoretical Notion and Means of Visibility and Recognition Travesticide as a Hate Crime The Relevance of Bodies in Travesticide (Trans)femicide The Final Judgment: Between Travesti Demands and the Letter of Criminal Law Criminal Law and Socio-Structural Perspectives on Violence Proving `Hate’ Final Reflections 
work_n2fa2a7v5fahtkw6fhchdx5nqy	----	The Effects of 9/11 on Attitudes Toward Immigration and the Moderating Role of Education econstor Make Your Publications Visible. A Service of zbw Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft Leibniz Information Centre for Economics Schüller, Simone Working Paper The effects of 9/11 on attitudes toward immigration and the moderating role of education SOEPpapers on Multidisciplinary Panel Data Research, No. 534 Provided in Cooperation with: German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin) Suggested Citation: Schüller, Simone (2013) : The effects of 9/11 on attitudes toward immigration and the moderating role of education, SOEPpapers on Multidisciplinary Panel Data Research, No. 534, Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW), Berlin This Version is available at: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/69518 Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your personal and scholarly purposes. You are not to copy documents for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public. If the documents have been made available under an Open Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence. www.econstor.eu SOEPpapers on Multidisciplinary Panel Data Research The Effects of 9/11 on Attitudes Toward Immigration and the Moderating Role of Education Simone Schüller 534 2013 SOEP — The German Socio-Economic Panel Study at DIW Berlin 534-2013 SOEPpapers on Multidisciplinary Panel Data Research at DIW Berlin This series presents research findings based either directly on data from the German Socio- Economic Panel Study (SOEP) or using SOEP data as part of an internationally comparable data set (e.g. CNEF, ECHP, LIS, LWS, CHER/PACO). SOEP is a truly multidisciplinary household panel study covering a wide range of social and behavioral sciences: economics, sociology, psychology, survey methodology, econometrics and applied statistics, educational science, political science, public health, behavioral genetics, demography, geography, and sport science. The decision to publish a submission in SOEPpapers is made by a board of editors chosen by the DIW Berlin to represent the wide range of disciplines covered by SOEP. There is no external referee process and papers are either accepted or rejected without revision. Papers appear in this series as works in progress and may also appear elsewhere. They often represent preliminary studies and are circulated to encourage discussion. Citation of such a paper should account for its provisional character. A revised version may be requested from the author directly. Any opinions expressed in this series are those of the author(s) and not those of DIW Berlin. Research disseminated by DIW Berlin may include views on public policy issues, but the institute itself takes no institutional policy positions. The SOEPpapers are available at http://www.diw.de/soeppapers Editors: Jürgen Schupp (Sociology, Vice Dean DIW Graduate Center) Gert G. Wagner (Social Sciences) Conchita D’Ambrosio (Public Economics) Denis Gerstorf (Psychology, DIW Research Director) Elke Holst (Gender Studies, DIW Research Director) Frauke Kreuter (Survey Methodology, DIW Research Professor) Martin Kroh (Political Science and Survey Methodology) Frieder R. Lang (Psychology, DIW Research Professor) Henning Lohmann (Sociology, DIW Research Professor) Jörg-Peter Schräpler (Survey Methodology, DIW Research Professor) Thomas Siedler (Empirical Economics) C. Katharina Spieß (Empirical Economics and Educational Science) ISSN: 1864-6689 (online) German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP) DIW Berlin Mohrenstrasse 58 10117 Berlin, Germany Contact: Uta Rahmann | soeppapers@diw.de The Effects of 9/11 on Attitudes Toward Immigration and the Moderating Role of Education* Simone Schüller ABSTRACT The major event of the 9/11 terror attacks is likely to have induced an increase in anti- immigrant and anti-foreigner sentiments, not only among US residents but also beyond US borders. Using longitudinal data from the German Socio-Economic Panel and exploiting exogenous variation in interview timing throughout 2001, I find that the terror attacks in the US caused an immediate shift of around 40 percent of one within standard deviation to more negative attitudes toward immigration and resulted in a considerable decrease in concerns over xenophobic hostility among the German population. Furthermore, in exploiting within- individual variation this quasi-experiment provides evidence on the role of education inmoderating the negative terrorism shock. JEL Classification: F22, I21, J61 Keywords: immigration, attitudes, education, September 11, terrorism Corresponding author: Simone Schüller IZA P.O. Box 7240 53072 Bonn Germany E-mail: schueller@iza.org                                                                   *  Financial support from the German Research Foundation (DFG) for the project “Ethnic Diversity and Labor Market Success” in the DFG-Priority Program “Flexibility in Heterogeneous Labor Markets” is gratefully acknowledged. This paper has benefited from insightful comments by participants of the IZA Brownbag Seminar, the GSOEP Brownbag Seminar, and in particular Costanza Biavaschi, Martin Fischer, Andrew J. Oswald, Ulf Rinne, Dan-Olof Rooth and Klaus F. Zimmermann. All remaining errors are my own.  1 Introduction Several recent studies have examined whether the terrorist attacks in the US on September 11, 2001 (9/11) increased labor market discrimination toward certain minorities, not only in the US (e.g. Dávila and Mora, 2005; Orrenius and Zavodny, 2006; Kaushal et al., 2007; Rabby and Rodgers, 2011), but also in other countries such as Canada (Shannon, 2012), Australia (Goel, 2010), the UK (Braakmann, 2010), Sweden (Åslund and Rooth, 2005) and Germany (Braakmann, 2009; Cornelissen and Jirjahn, 2012). These studies are based on two assumptions. First, that the 9/11 attacks had a direct and significant enough impact on individuals’ attitudes, resulting in an increase in discriminatory behavior toward immigrants as a group or certain minorities. Second, the terrorist attacks in the US are assumed to have caused negative international spillover effects to public sentiments toward minority groups in other countries. The existing empirical literature relies on evidence from aggregate time trends that indicate, for example, dramatic increases in hate crimes against Muslims in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, not only in the US but also beyond its borders. Overall, it is unsurprising that a large-scale terror event such as 9/11 fueled acts of anti-immigrant or anti-Muslim aggression and hostility. However, it remains to be seen whether these events caused attitude shifts among the wider society, and whether such an impact was uniform across all types of individuals. To date, no empirical study has attempted to establish a causal connection between the 9/11 incident and attitude shifts in the overall population, either in the US or beyond its borders, and little is also known about heterogeneous effects. This study offers the first empirical analysis to test the causality of the rela- tionship between a major media event such as the 9/11 terror attacks and public immigration-related attitudes, controlling for aggregate time trends. Besides doc- umenting whether the events of 9/11 resulted in attitudinal changes toward immi- gration outside the US in a European country, this analysis also contributes more generally to the literature concerned with the extent to which people’s views about immigration are driven by factors other than economic self-interest. Several recent studies have consistently found a significant and positive relationship between ed- ucation or skill levels among individuals and their views about immigration (e.g. Scheve and Slaughter, 2001; Mayda, 2006). While these findings have been inter- preted as a reflection of labor-market dynamics, where low-skilled workers are most opposed to low-skilled immigration due to realistic fears about labor market com- petition, another line of scholars have questioned this interpretation. For example, Dustmann and Preston (2007) and Hainmueller and Hiscox (2007, 2010) find that a large component of the effect of education on individual attitudes toward immi- 2 gration is associated with differences in cultural values and beliefs rather than with fear of labor market competition. The contribution of this paper to this strand of literature is twofold. First, utilizing the 9/11 events as an exogenous, non-economic shock, I am able to isolate non-economic drivers of immigration-related attitudes, identifying the extent to which education plays a moderating role in attitude forma- tion in the absence of a realistic threat of economic competition. Second, exploiting intra-individual variation in attitudes over time represents an important contribu- tion to a literature that has been exclusively based on cross-sectional comparisons to date. Using longitudinal data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) allows to examine the impact of the 9/11 attacks on the attitudes of German residents in a quasi-experimental setting. I exploit the fact that annual survey interviews are randomly completed throughout the year, in comparing the attitude levels of pre- and post-9/11 respondents in 2001, and relating these attitudes to the respective attitude levels of the same respondents one year prior. This provides approximate estimates of the causal impact of the terror attacks on the attitudes of the German population toward immigration.1 Furthermore, I examine two types of immigration- related attitudes – individuals’ concerns over immigration and people’s concerns over xenophobic hostility – presuming that the former is mainly associated with evaluations of immigration policies and perceived consequences for the host country, while the latter is more likely related to ethnic prejudice or discrimination (Bauer et al., 2000; Ceobanu and Escandell, 2010). Indeed, I find a non-negligible shift to more negative attitudes toward immi- gration among German residents as a result of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. At the same time, the attacks resulted in decreasing concerns over hostility toward for- eigners. Moreover, I find no evidence of the 9/11 events causing similar changes in individuals’ worries about overall economic development or crime in Germany, which confirms the non-economic nature of the 9/11 shock on immigration-related attitudes. Hence, these results confirm the importance of cultural prejudice in driv- ing immigration-related attitudes and emphasize that public attitude shifts can be potentially triggered by major media events such as the 9/11 attacks. Further investigation shows that a significant 9/11 impact on attitudes toward immigration is mainly prevalent among respondents with below-average education levels, while I find no evidence of a significant attitude shift among highly educated individuals. These results are consistent with a moderating role of education in the 1Similar strategies have been used by Metcalfe et al. (2011) to analyze 9/11-effects on subjective well-being in the UK, and by Goel (2010) to investigate changes in immigrants’ perceptions of racial intolerance and labor market outcomes in Australia as a consequence of 9/11. 3 attitudinal response to the 9/11 attacks. Yet, in terms of concerns about xenophobic hostility, both high- and low-educated respondents reacted equally strongly to the attacks with lower worries about hostility. This might be interpreted as evidence for the limited potential of education to fully shield from non-economic attitude shocks. The paper is organized as follows. The next section provides a brief summary of existing evidence on negative attitude shifts in the aftermath of 9/11 in countries outside the US, with a particular focus on Germany. In Section 3, the data and the employed empirical strategy are introduced. Section 4 details the results of the empirical application for Germany, and Section 5 concludes. 2 Background 2.1 9/11 and Anti-Immigrant Attitudes Strong evidence from aggregate time trends suggests that anti-Muslim sentiments and xenophobic aggression increased considerably among the US population in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. The American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee (2003) reports over 700 incidents targeting Arab Americans or perceived as such, including several murders. Human Rights Watch (2002) and Gould and Klor (2012) refer to data from the FBI Uniform Crime Reporting Program (UCR), showing a 16-fold increase in the reported total number of hate crimes against Muslims from 2000 to 2001. There is also descriptive evidence that the events of 9/11 had a negative im- pact on attitudes toward immigration beyond US borders. In Canada, the Toronto Police Service Hate Crime Unit statistics show a 66 percent rise in hostile acts in late 2001 (Helly, 2004, p.26). Åslund and Rooth (2005) cite aggregate statistics from the Forskargruppen för Samhälls- och Informationsstudier (FSI), showing an 18-percentage-points drop in the fraction of Swedish respondents expressing positive attitudes toward immigration from 51 percent in the period June–August 2001 to 33 percent from September 11 – September 30. With respect to the German popu- lation’s reaction in response to the 9/11 attacks, Brosig and Brähler (2002) describe evidence from four representative opinion surveys collected before and after 9/11, in the form of repeated cross-sections. Their findings suggest a negative change in public attitudes toward certain minority groups, particularly Muslims, with the fraction of respondents who would dislike having Muslims as neighbors rising from 12 percent in June 2001 to 19 percent in April 2002. However, there is no indication that this increase in “social distance” toward Muslims translated into more negative attitudes toward the group of immigrants or foreigners as a whole, as the fraction 4 of respondents expressing a distaste for foreign or guestworker neighbors remained constant at 11 percent. Furthermore, the fear of foreigners in Germany appeared to decrease rather than increase, when comparing 2002 survey responses to results from 1999 (Brosig and Brähler, 2002, p.87–88). In summary, there are suggestions of a negative attitude shift following the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the US, as well as some suggestive indication that the attacks might have also had an impact on attitudes in European countries. However, this evidence is mainly based on aggregate time trends. To the best of my knowledge, no attempts have been made within existing literature to provide systematic empirical evidence of this relationship and directly test the causality of the effects on attitudes toward immigration. However, this might be largely due to limited data availability, since most surveys of attitudes toward immigrants are collected as cross-sectional data. 2.2 The Moderating Role of Education Insofar as the 9/11 terrorist attacks have triggered negative attitudes, there is no direct evidence on whether the 9/11 events had a uniform effect across the entire society or whether it varied between heterogeneous subgroups of the population.2 This study offers first exploratory evidence on the types of individuals most affected in terms of immigration-related attitudes, with a focus on individuals’ educational attainment. I draw on previous literature relating to immigration-related attitude formation to differentiate between groups who are likely at high risk of responding to a negative and intense non-economic attitude shock such as the 9/11 attacks, and those who are expected to be at relatively lower risk of changing their minds. Most studies find that education plays a key role in the perception of immigration and immigrants (e.g. Bauer et al., 2000; Scheve and Slaughter, 2001; Mayda, 2006; Dustmann and Preston, 2007; Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2007, 2010). Gang and Rivera-Batiz (1994) and Fertig and Schmidt (2011) confirm the findings of the low-educated holding relatively more negative attitudes in the German context. However, what lies at the heart of the consistently found positive relationship between educational attainment and attitudes toward immigration and immigrants is controversially debated in the economic literature. On the one hand, the fact that the highly educated hold more favorable attitudes may predominantly reflect their labor market position, which is 2The most closely related study is Cornelissen and Jirjahn (2012), who find negative 9/11-effects in terms of wage discrimination only among low-skilled Muslim employees, and not among the higher skilled Muslims. Assuming that low-skilled Muslims have low-skilled German superiors and co-workers, they attribute this finding to a moderating effect of education in xenophobic attitudes. 5 less vulnerable to typically low-skilled immigration. However, on the other hand, it could also reflect the liberizing effect of education per se, resulting in less ethnic prejudice and greater appreciation of cultural diversity among the highly educated. The context of the 9/11 attacks in 2001 provides a quasi-experimental setting inducing an exogenous shock on individuals’ attitudes toward immigrants and im- migration. In the following, I will argue that this shock has been non-economic in nature and thus increased perceived cultural rather than economic threat. As will be shown in Section 4.1.1, it appears likely that the attacks may not have been per- ceived as associated with increased immigration inflows or changes in immigrants’ skill composition or productivity. In view of 9/11 as a non-economic exogenous shock and against the background of the previous literature on attitude formation, I thus hypothesize that the attacks had a stronger impact on the attitudes of relatively lower educated than highly educated Germans. I furthermore expect a moderating role of education with respect to both individual concerns over immigration as well as worries about hostility toward foreigners. Hence, in contrast to the previous literature, the quasi-experimental setting of the 9/11 attacks allows me to go beyond the analysis of cross-sectional associations and examine within-individual variation in attitudinal reactions to the exogenous shock. In this way, I can not only isolate non-economic from economic drivers of immigration-related attitudes, but also overcome omitted variable issues that might potentially bias cross-sectional analysis. 3 Data and Empirical Setup 3.1 Data This study examines the effects of 9/11 on attitudes toward immigration among German residents. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 act as an exogenous shock providing a powerful quasi-experiment. I use a large longitudinal dataset, consisting of around 20,000 individuals, which allows controlling for individual het- erogeneity and underlying time trends. The German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) is a nationally representative, longi- tudinal study of private households in Germany, conducted in annual waves starting in 1984.3 Respondents are interviewed throughout the year with random timing of the interviews. Although the bulk of interviews usually take place during the first half of each year, a considerable number of respondents are interviewed during the later months. Such data thus provides the unique opportunity to exploit the timing 3See Wagner et al. (2007) for a comprehensive description of this dataset. 6 of survey interviews in 2001 to identify 9/11 effects.4 The two main dependent variables employed in this analysis measure individuals’ concerns over immigration to Germany and hostility toward foreigners or minori- ties in Germany, on a three-point scale ranging from “not at all” to “somewhat” to “very concerned”. In 2000, 32.09 percent of native German respondents were very concerned about immigration to Germany, while 21.90 percent where not at all con- cerned. In the same year, 31.26 percent stated a strong concern over hostility toward foreigners or minorities in Germany, with 16.55 percent not at all worried about this issue.5 Measures of concern over general economic development and about crime in Germany are scaled in the same way as the main dependent variables. Two subsamples are considered in the following. The first includes all individuals aged 17 or older without a so-called migration background6 who were interviewed between January 2000 and December 2001, i.e. the 2000 and 2001 SOEP waves. In- dividuals who took no interview in 2001 or were interviewed on the date of September 11 in 2001 are excluded from the analysis. Moreover, observations with missing in- formation on either of the two main dependent variables are also discarded (1.58 percent of the total sample). This first sample is unbalanced and includes a total of 34,653 observations (16,663 in 2000 and 17,990 in 2001). Next, I consider a second subsample, which additionally includes the two-year period before and after the 9/11 terror attacks, i.e. the waves 1999–2004. This second unbalanced sample consists of 70,799 observations. Table 1 about here Descriptive statistics of the two samples are presented in Table 1. Each of the samples is again split into two groups – the pre-9/11 (control) group including in- dividuals who were interviewed in 2001 between January 1 and September 10, and the post-9/11 (treatment) group consisting of individuals surveyed between Septem- ber 11 and December 31 in the year 2001. Individuals in the post-9/11 group are on average younger, report a slightly higher household income, less likely to be on maternal leave or widowed, and more likely to be single than respondents in the control group. Although it is not clear why such differences occur, it is important to control for these characteristics. 4See Berger (2010) for an example of a previous study exploiting random interview timing in the SOEP, examining the impact of the reactor accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant in 1986 on individual life satisfaction and environmental worries. 5Note that the correlation between the two outcome measures is rather low, the correlation coefficient amounts to 0.0981 in 2000, which justifies separate estimation models for each dependent variable instead of joint modeling. 6An individual is defined as having a migration background if the person is an immigrant to Germany or is born in Germany to at least one immigrant parents. 7 3.2 Empirical Strategy I apply a difference-in-difference approach to identify the effects of 9/11 on in- dividual attitudes of German natives toward immigration and xenophobic hostility, comparing attitude levels of pre- and post-9/11 respondents in 2001 and relating them to the same respondents’ attitude levels one year prior. Ait denotes the level of concern over immigration (hostility toward foreigners) of individual i at time t. Post9/11 is a dummy variable equal to one if the survey interview took place after September 11 in 2001, i.e. in the period from September 12 to December 31 in 2001, and zero otherwise. Year=2001 is a dummy representing the 2001 survey year, the year of the terror attacks, ui is an individual fixed effect, and �it is a time-varying random error term. Ait = α+β1Post9/11it +β2(Y ear = 2001)t +β3[Post9/11it×(Y ear = 2001)t]+ui +�it Parameter β3 is the difference-in-difference estimator that will represent the causal impact of 9/11 on those interviewed between September 12 and December 31 in 2001 (i.e. the average treatment effect on the treated), under the assumption that attitudes of the pre- and post-9/11 group would have changed identically in the absence of the terror events (common trend assumption). This parameter is identified through variation in average attitude levels between respondents who were interviewed before and after 9/11 in 2001, and the comparison of this difference with variation in average attitudes between the pre- and post-9/11 group in 2000. β3 is estimated by applying either pooled OLS with clustering at the individual level, random-effects or fixed-effects models to the above equation. In the following, I will additionally provide estimates of this approach including an extended time period of two years before and after the terror attacks, i.e. the years 1999-2003, to carefully control for underlying aggregate time trends. 8 4 Results and Discussion 4.1 Baseline results Table 2 presents first evidence of a 9/11 impact on individual attitudes toward immigration and concerns over xenophobic hostility in Germany, with estimates us- ing OLS as well as GLS random- and fixed-effects models shown for each dependent variable. With respect to attitudes toward immigration, the coefficients on the in- teraction term between Post9/11 and Year=2001 are statistically significant and positive across all three models. The point estimates range between 0.129 and 0.152, which is around 38 to 44 percent of one within-individual standard deviation in worries about immigration. This indicates that the post-9/11 treatment group ex- perienced a substantial increase in concerns over immigration, while at the same time respondents in the pre-9/11 control group were even slightly less worried about immigration in 2001 than these same individuals reported in 2000. Interestingly, a similar pattern is observed with respect to people’s concerns over hostility toward foreigners or minorities in Germany. Across all three models, the estimated coeffi- cient on the interaction term is significant and negative, with magnitudes ranging from around 29 to 36 percent of one within standard deviation in concerns over xeno- phobic hostility. This implies that the 9/11 attacks did not only result in increased worries about immigration, but also a decrease in worries about xenophobic hostility in Germany. The significant and positive coefficient on Year=2001 indicates that the control group of pre-9/11 respondents instead experienced a moderate increase in such concerns from 2000 to 2001. Table 2 about here This first set of results demonstrate the immediate negative effects of the 9/11 terror attacks in the US on public attitudes in a European country. However, an important assumption is that the attitudes of both the treatment and control group would have followed a similar path in the absence of the treatment. One means of checking this is to consider whether both groups’ attitude levels followed a similar trend in the years preceding 2001 and the years after the event. Figure 1 shows that the average levels of individuals’ worries about immigration and concern over xenophobic hostility follow a very similar trend for both pre- and post-9/11 groups in the two-year periods before and after 2001. However, in the year of the attacks the trend diverges for the two groups, with a noticeable increase in worries about immigration and a considerable decrease in concerns over xenophobic hostility for those interviewed post-9/11 from 2000 to 2001. This is consistent with the estimated treatment effects presented in Table 2. 9 Figure 1 about here In a next step, I incorporate the two years before and after the attacks (survey years 1999-2003) in the empirical analysis, to control more carefully for underlying time trends. In this second set of estimations, controls for gender, age, age squared and log household income, as well as dummies for marital status, labor force status, education, federal state and interview month are added. The results of the GLS models with random and fixed effects respectively are presented in Table 3. With this full specification, the estimated coefficients on the interactions of interest (Post9/11× Year=2001) remain positive and statistically significant in the case of worries about immigration and significantly negative with respect to concerns about xenophobic hostility. In contrast, coefficients on the interaction terms between the post-9/11 treatment group and indicators for the years prior to or post-2001 appear not to be significantly different from zero. This supports the view that, controlling for the relevant covariates, the attitudes of the treatment group do not systematically differ from those of the pre-9/11 control group for reasons other than the exogenous and unanticipated 9/11 terror shock. Note that in the years prior to 2001 both groups are untreated, while both are treated in the years after 2001. We thus only expect both groups to differ in the year 2001 due to interview timings pre- or post-9/11, which appears to be confirmed by the estimation results in Table 3. Overall, the findings fit the evidence on international spillovers based on aggregated time trends. Table 3 about here 4.1.1 Robustness Was the shift toward more negative immigration-related attitudes following the 9/11 terror attacks accompanied by shifts in other, more general types of macro attitudes? Of special interest here are people’s concerns over general economic de- velopment and worries about crime in Germany. Accordingly, Table 4 explores the possibility that the 9/11 attacks also had an impact on these attitudes. Rerunning random and fixed effects models in the specification of Table 3 with measures of worries about economic development and crime in Germany as dependent variables suggests no significant impact of 9/11 on these concerns. For all models in Table 4, the coefficient on the interaction of interest (Post9/11 × Year=2001) is statistically insignificantly different from zero. This suggests that the effects shown in Section 4.1 are not a result of an increased public awareness of security issues or changes in other economic concerns related to immigration. Instead, it is consistent with the inter- pretation of 9/11 representing a non-economic shock. 10 Table 4 about here 4.2 Effect Heterogeneity and the Role of Education Having established empirical evidence that the 9/11 terror events had significant negative effects on individual attitudes toward immigration and resulted in a decrease in worries about xenophobic hostility in Germany, I now investigate whether different types of individuals have been more or less responsive to the 9/11 shock. Along with possible differential effects on individuals according to their education levels, I also examine effect heterogeneity with respect to demographic characteristics such as gender and age, as well as regional foreigner concentration. Tables 5 and 6 recalculate the random effects estimations from Table 3 for split samples by gender, age (i.e. below and above the age of 35), below and above average years of education (i.e. below and above 12 years of education) and federal states with below and above average shares of foreigners, respectively, for both main dependent variables. As indicated by the first set of results in Table 5, men may have been slightly, however not statistically significantly, more responsive than women to the 9/11 at- tacks in terms of worries about immigration. Similarly, younger individuals appear to have reacted more strongly than older people, but these differences are also not very substantial. Furthermore, when comparing respondents in federal states with a relatively low share of foreigners with those in states with a relatively higher share of foreigners, there appear to be no significantly different reactions to the 9/11 events in terms of attitudes toward immigration. The latter finding is particularly interest- ing in the light of empirical evidence from previous studies employing cross-sectional analysis in the German context . For example, Fertig and Schmidt (2001) find that a lower regional foreigner concentration is associated with less favorable immigration- related attitudes among natives on average. However, in response to 9/11, individuals do not seem to update their attitudes toward immigration differently according to whether they reside in a region with a low- or high share of foreigners. The previous background discussion suggests that education may moderate 9/11 effects. Indeed, the estimation results by education level show that the attacks had a larger impact on the group of relatively lower educated individuals than the highly educated. Moreover, the difference is substantial and statistically significant.7 Within the subsample of highly educated individuals, the estimated coefficient on 7I additionally estimated specifications introducing interaction effects instead of split samples by education level. Results are presented in Table A1 in the Appendix for both dependent variables. Similar estimations including interactions with respect to age, gender and regional foreigner share yield non-significant coefficients on the respective interaction terms. These results are available upon request. 11 the interaction Post9/11 × Year=2001 is small in size and not significantly different from zero. Hence, the group of highly educated does not appear to have updated their attitudes toward immigration in the light of the 9/11 events. Table 5 about here The second set of results in Table 6 deals with effect heterogeneity with respect to individual concerns over xenophobic hostility. Interestingly, the estimated coefficients on the interaction Post9/11 × Year=2001 are very similar to each other throughout the split samples, and the differences between males and females, young and old, residents in regions with low and high share of foreigners, and also between the low and the high-educated group are not statistically significant. Consequently, the 9/11 attacks appear to have uniformly lowered individuals’ worries about xenophobic hostility across the population subgroups analyzed. In particular, there is no evidence of a moderating role of education, with both the highly and lower educated reacting equally strongly to the attacks by being less concerned about xenophobic tendencies in the German society. This result is especially striking considering the previous finding of a moderating effect with respect to peoples’ attitudes toward immigration. Table 6 about here However, the ambiguous nature of the measure of individuals’ concerns over xeno- phobic hostility does not allow for a straightforward interpretation of the latter re- sults, as the survey question might in fact trigger diverse connotations. For instance, while one person might report weak concerns over xenophobic hostility due to a distaste for foreigners in Germany or a lack of empathy with them, another indi- vidual may report weak concerns due to their belief that there are no xenophobic tendencies immanent in the German society. The former would therefore reflect an opinion toward minorities or immigrants, while the latter would rather represent an opinion toward fellow German residents. Unfortunately, the different associations related to the survey question are not observable to the researcher, and might even differ according to the respondent’s educational level. The result of lower concerns over xenophobic hostility in response to the 9/11 events could thus either be inter- preted as a shift to more negative attitudes toward immigrants and minorities, or alternatively might indicate a shift to more positive attitudes toward fellow German natives. While it is not possible to clearly distinguish between these two interpre- tations within this study, it is certainly not intuitive to think of a large-scale terror attack as to having resulted in expectations of decreasing xenophobic tendencies in Germany, especially given the German history of xenophobic incidents and violent 12 acts against foreigners (see e.g. Krueger and Pischke, 1997). Against this background, the finding of low- and high-educated respondents reacting equally strongly to the 9/11 events with lower worries about xenophobic hostility casts some doubt on the moderating role of education in this context. The results presented here might rather point at distorting effects due to real or perceived social desirability response bias, which is both higher for the better educated and more prevalent in the more obtrusive question on concerns over im- migration. Studying such distorting effects on expressions of immigration attitudes in survey interviews, e.g. Janus (2010) finds that college graduates are more likely than respondents with a lower educational level to conceal anti-immigration views when asked directly . Stocké (2007) shows that better educated respondents of the German General Social Survey (ALLBUS) perceive stronger social desirability incen- tives when answering racial attitude questions than the less educated. If the survey question on xenophobic hostility is perceived as less obtrusive, especially due to its ambiguous connotation, then its responses may be more in line with individuals’ “true” attitudes. In turn, this would suggest that the finding of a moderating role of education with respect to attitudes toward immigration is solely an artifact of self-presentational concerns. However, I cannot observe respondents’ sensitivity to social desirability pressures within this setting, and thus the above interpretation efforts must remain of a speculative nature. 5 Summary and Conclusion This study highlights that the 9/11 terror attacks in the US had a significant and negative impact on individual attitudes toward immigration and immigrants among native German residents. More specifically, it is shown that the attacks increased worries about immigration by around 38 to 44 percent of one within- individual standard deviation, and lowered concerns over xenophobic hostility by approximately 29 to 36 percent of one within standard deviation. These effects are significant and robust. Moreover, this analysis provides evidence for the role of educational attainment in moderating individuals’ attitudinal responses to a major event such as 9/11. In fact, highly educated respondents have not shown any significant change in attitudes toward immigration in the aftermath of the attacks, whereas the lower educated reacted with a considerable and significant shift to more negative immigration atti- tudes. However, evidence with respect to individual concerns over xenophobic hostil- ity show a different pattern, with both low- and high-educated individuals reacting equally strongly to the 9/11 attacks by lowering their concerns over xenophobic 13 hostility in Germany. Despite the ambiguous character of the measure of attitudes toward xenophobic tendencies, this finding may cast some doubt on a universal mod- erating role of education. Overall, this study provides the first causal evidence that the 9/11 terror attacks in the US provoked substantial changes toward more negative immigration-related attitudes within the wider German society. It shows that external non-economic shocks and other major media events may have the potential to trigger voters’ cul- tural prejudices and frame the public debate. Mixed evidence on the moderating role of education points to the important future research agenda of examining the mechanisms behind the potential effect of education on anti-immigration and anti- foreigner sentiments. Another step for further study in this context would be to probe the influence of social desirability pressures among the highly educated. 14 References American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee (2003). Report on Hate Crimes and Discrimination Against Arab Americans: The Post-September 11 Backlash. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee Report, ADC Research Institute, Washington. 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Schmollers Jahrbuch 127 (1), 139–169. 17 Table 1: Descriptive Statistics Sample 2000-2001 Sample 1999-2003 All Pre-9/11 Post-9/11 All Pre-9/11 Post-9/11 N 34,653 34,046 607 70,799 69,730 1,069 Worries immigration 2.050 2.050 2.044 2.072 2.072 2.028* (0.726) (0.727) (0.710) (0.722) (0.722) (0.744) Worries hostility toward foreigners 2.181 2.181 2.163 2.128 2.128 2.112 (0.679) (0.680) (0.641) (0.666) (0.667) (0.655) Male 0.477 0.477 0.499 0.478 0.478 0.511* Age 46.546 46.577 44.817* 47.237 47.270 45.065 Ln(net household income) 8.321 8.320 8.412* 8.057 8.056 8.148* Lower than secondary degree 0.031 0.030 0.040 0.026 0.026 0.039* Secondary degree 0.801 0.801 0.784 0.803 0.804 0.775* Tertiary degree 0.168 0.168 0.176 0.171 0.170 0.186 Full-time employed 0.423 0.423 0.433 0.421 0.420 0.431 Unemployed 0.099 0.100 0.091 0.101 0.101 0.102 Other Employment 0.205 0.204 0.252* 0.202 0.201 0.247* Retired 0.220 0.221 0.191 0.232 0.232 0.186* Maternity leave 0.020 0.020 0.008* 0.018 0.018 0.007* In education 0.032 0.032 0.025 0.028 0.028 0.027 Married 0.636 0.637 0.608 0.639 0.639 0.609* Single 0.230 0.228 0.292* 0.223 0.222 0.280* Divorced 0.070 0.070 0.059 0.072 0.072 0.071 Widowed 0.064 0.065 0.041* 0.066 0.067 0.040* Notes: Attitude measures (worries) take a value of 1 = not concerned at all, 2 = somewhat concerned, and 3 = very concerned. An individual is assigned to the pre-9/11 group if they were interviewed between January 1, 2001 and September 10, 2001 and to the post-9/11 group if the 2001 interview took place between 12 September and 31 December that year. ∗ Statistically different from pre-9/11 mean at the 5 percent confidence level. Table 2: Worries about Immigration (Worries about Hostility toward For- eigners) and the 9/11 Attacks – Unbalanced Panel, SOEP 2000 – 2001 Worries about Immigration Worries about Hostility OLS RE FE OLS RE FE Post-9/11 -0.073∗ -0.082∗ 0.051 0.042 (0.042) (0.043) (0.034) (0.040) Year=2001 -0.099∗∗∗ -0.097∗∗∗ -0.094∗∗∗ 0.069∗∗∗ 0.071∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗∗ (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) Year=2001 × Post-9/11 0.129∗∗∗ 0.141∗∗∗ 0.152∗∗∗ -0.131∗∗∗ -0.119∗∗∗ -0.103∗∗ (0.043) (0.041) (0.042) (0.045) (0.044) (0.045) Constant 2.102∗∗∗ 2.099∗∗∗ 2.098∗∗∗ 2.146∗∗∗ 2.143∗∗∗ 2.144∗∗∗ (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) N 34,653 34,653 34,653 34,653 34,653 34,653 Source: SOEP 2000–2001, own calculations. Notes: Worries about immigration and worries about hostility toward foreigners take a value of 1 = not concerned at all, 2 = somewhat concerned, and 3 = very concerned. Post-9/11 takes a value of 1 for both years (i.e. 2000 and 2001) if the individual was interviewed between January 1, 2001 and September 10, 2001 and 0 between 12 September 2001 and 31 December 2001. Base year = 2000. Standard errors are in parentheses and, in the OLS case, robust to the clustering by individual identification. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 18 Figure 1: Trends in Worries about Immigration (Worries about Hostility toward Foreigners) Before and After the 9/11 Attacks, SOEP 1999 – 2003 Source: SOEP 1999–2003, own calculations. Note: 2001 is the year of the 9/11 attacks. Thin dashed lines represent the 95%-confidence interval. 19 Table 3: Worries about Immigration (Worries about Hostility toward Foreigners) and the 9/11 Attacks – Multiple time peri- ods, SOEP 1999 – 2003 Worries about Immigration Worries about Hostility RE FE RE FE Post-9/11 -0.033 0.044 (0.076) (0.075) Year=2000 -0.087∗∗∗ -0.080∗∗∗ -0.012∗ -0.001 (0.007) (0.012) (0.007) (0.012) Year=2001 -0.190∗∗∗ -0.182∗∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗ 0.098∗∗∗ (0.007) (0.020) (0.007) (0.020) Year=2002 -0.148∗∗∗ -0.112∗∗∗ -0.039∗∗∗ -0.011 (0.008) (0.029) (0.008) (0.030) Year=2003 -0.195∗∗∗ -0.158∗∗∗ -0.115∗∗∗ -0.079∗∗ (0.008) (0.038) (0.008) (0.039) Year=2000 × Post-9/11 -0.034 -0.047 -0.032 0.002 (0.077) (0.080) (0.078) (0.082) Year=2001 × Post-9/11 0.170∗∗ 0.171∗∗ -0.308∗∗∗ -0.259∗∗∗ (0.079) (0.081) (0.080) (0.083) Year=2002 × Post-9/11 -0.002 -0.007 -0.082 -0.056 (0.078) (0.081) (0.079) (0.083) Year=2003 × Post-9/11 -0.002 -0.005 -0.076 -0.061 (0.079) (0.081) (0.080) (0.083) Male 0.029∗∗∗ -0.107∗∗∗ (0.009) (0.008) Age 0.005∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ (0.002) (0.001) Age-squared/100 -0.003∗ -0.011∗∗∗ (0.002) (0.001) Secondary degree 0.027 0.013 -0.025 0.009 (0.020) (0.029) (0.019) (0.030) Tertiary degree -0.298∗∗∗ 0.018 0.038∗ -0.042 (0.023) (0.041) (0.022) (0.042) Unemployed -0.016 -0.004 -0.030∗∗∗ -0.016 (0.010) (0.013) (0.010) (0.013) Other employment -0.038∗∗∗ -0.015 0.010 0.000 (0.009) (0.011) (0.008) (0.011) Retired -0.015 -0.042∗∗ -0.002 0.003 (0.013) (0.019) (0.013) (0.019) Maternity leave -0.015 0.006 0.018 0.002 (0.019) (0.022) (0.019) (0.022) In education -0.119∗∗∗ -0.037∗ -0.013 -0.062∗∗∗ (0.018) (0.021) (0.018) (0.022) Single -0.100∗∗∗ -0.047∗ -0.030∗∗ 0.013 (0.013) (0.025) (0.012) (0.026) Divorced -0.023 0.017 -0.037∗∗∗ -0.027 (0.014) (0.024) (0.013) (0.025) Widowed -0.088∗∗∗ -0.086∗∗ -0.060∗∗∗ -0.004 (0.018) (0.039) (0.016) (0.040) Ln(net household income) -0.047∗∗∗ -0.012 0.006 0.002 (0.007) (0.010) (0.007) (0.010) Constant 2.504∗∗∗ 2.817∗∗∗ 2.156∗∗∗ 2.501∗∗∗ (0.081) (0.353) (0.076) (0.362) N 70,799 70,799 70,799 70,799 Source: SOEP 1999–2003, own calculations. Notes: See Table 2. Control variables additionally include federal state and interview month dummies. Reference groups include female, married, lower than secondary degree, and full-time employment. Fixed effects models include age dummies rather than continuous age variables. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 20 Table 4: Robustness Check: Other Worries and the 9/11 Attacks – Multiple time periods, SOEP 1999 – 2003 Worries about Worries about Economic Development Crime in Germany RE FE RE FE Post-9/11 0.009 -0.025 (0.068) (0.068) Year=2000 -0.070∗∗∗ -0.067∗∗∗ -0.021∗∗∗ -0.015 (0.007) (0.011) (0.006) (0.011) Year=2001 -0.099∗∗∗ -0.099∗∗∗ -0.063∗∗∗ -0.051∗∗∗ (0.006) (0.019) (0.006) (0.018) Year=2002 0.093∗∗∗ 0.120∗∗∗ -0.110∗∗∗ -0.069∗∗ (0.007) (0.028) (0.007) (0.027) Year=2003 0.359∗∗∗ 0.385∗∗∗ -0.170∗∗∗ -0.123∗∗∗ (0.008) (0.036) (0.007) (0.035) Year=2000 × Post-9/11 -0.103 -0.100 0.008 -0.010 (0.072) (0.076) (0.070) (0.073) Year=2001 × Post-9/11 0.092 0.104 0.014 0.010 (0.073) (0.078) (0.071) (0.075) Year=2002 × Post-9/11 -0.009 -0.015 -0.001 -0.025 (0.073) (0.077) (0.071) (0.074) Year=2003 × Post-9/11 0.026 0.027 0.031 0.009 (0.074) (0.078) (0.072) (0.074) Constant 2.132∗∗∗ 2.303∗∗∗ 2.577∗∗∗ 2.298∗∗∗ (0.067) (0.336) (0.070) (0.323) N 70,693 70,693 70,703 70,703 Source: SOEP 1999–2003, own calculations. Notes: See Table 2. Control variables as in Table 3. Fixed effects models include age dummies rather than continuous age variables. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 21 T a b le 5 : W o rr ie s a b o u t Im m ig ra ti o n . E ff ec t H et er o g en ei ty b y G en d er , A g e G ro u p s a n d E d u ca ti o n W o rr ie s a b o u t Im m ig ra ti o n M a le F e m a le A g e < = 3 5 A g e > 3 5 L o w F S h a re H ig h F S h a re L o w E d u H ig h E d u P o st -9 / 1 1 -0 .0 4 1 -0 .0 2 4 -0 .1 2 3 0 .0 3 5 -0 .0 0 7 -0 .0 5 1 -0 .0 6 4 -0 .0 2 0 (0 .1 0 4 ) (0 .1 1 0 ) (0 .1 2 5 ) (0 .0 9 6 ) (0 .1 2 0 ) (0 .0 9 7 ) (0 .1 1 0 ) (0 .1 0 5 ) Y e a r= 2 0 0 0 -0 .0 8 6 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0 .0 8 8 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0 .0 6 2 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0 .0 9 8 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0 .0 9 3 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0 .0 8 5 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0 .0 8 4 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0 .0 8 8 ∗ ∗ ∗ (0 .0 1 0 ) (0 .0 1 0 ) (0 .0 1 3 ) (0 .0 0 8 ) (0 .0 1 0 ) (0 .0 1 0 ) (0 .0 0 9 ) (0 .0 1 2 ) Y e a r= 2 0 0 1 -0 .1 8 5 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0 .1 9 6 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0 .1 6 3 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0 .2 0 1 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0 .1 8 4 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0 .1 9 9 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0 .1 8 3 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0 .1 9 2 ∗ ∗ ∗ (0 .0 0 9 ) (0 .0 1 0 ) (0 .0 1 3 ) (0 .0 0 8 ) (0 .0 1 0 ) (0 .0 1 0 ) (0 .0 0 9 ) (0 .0 1 1 ) Y e a r= 2 0 0 2 -0 .1 4 5 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0 .1 5 2 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0 .1 4 0 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0 .1 6 1 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0 .1 2 9 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0 .1 6 7 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0 .1 2 7 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0 .1 7 0 ∗ ∗ ∗ (0 .0 1 1 ) (0 .0 1 2 ) (0 .0 1 5 ) (0 .0 1 0 ) (0 .0 1 2 ) (0 .0 1 1 ) (0 .0 1 1 ) (0 .0 1 3 ) Y e a r= 2 0 0 3 -0 .2 0 0 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0 .1 9 0 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0 .1 7 9 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0 .2 1 1 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0 .1 9 6 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0 .1 9 7 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0 .1 8 3 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0 .2 0 0 ∗ ∗ ∗ (0 .0 1 1 ) (0 .0 1 2 ) (0 .0 1 6 ) (0 .0 1 0 ) (0 .0 1 2 ) (0 .0 1 1 ) (0 .0 1 1 ) (0 .0 1 3 ) Y e a r= 2 0 0 0 × P o st -9 / 1 1 -0 .0 5 7 -0 .0 1 2 0 .0 3 7 -0 .0 9 5 -0 .0 8 9 0 .0 0 8 0 .0 1 3 -0 .0 6 1 (0 .1 0 6 ) (0 .1 1 2 ) (0 .1 2 9 ) (0 .0 9 8 ) (0 .1 2 3 ) (0 .0 9 9 ) (0 .1 1 4 ) (0 .1 0 5 ) Y e a r= 2 0 0 1 × P o st -9 / 1 1 0 .1 8 9 ∗ 0 .1 4 9 0 .2 3 9 ∗ 0 .1 0 0 0 .1 7 0 0 .1 9 1 ∗ 0 .2 4 3 ∗ ∗ 0 .0 6 2 (0 .1 0 8 ) (0 .1 1 4 ) (0 .1 3 4 ) (0 .1 0 0 ) (0 .1 2 7 ) (0 .1 0 1 ) (0 .1 1 6 ) (0 .1 0 7 ) Y e a r= 2 0 0 2 × P o st -9 / 1 1 0 .0 7 8 -0 .0 8 3 -0 .0 1 1 -0 .0 3 7 -0 .0 2 3 0 .0 1 6 0 .0 1 7 0 .0 0 7 (0 .1 0 8 ) (0 .1 1 3 ) (0 .1 3 6 ) (0 .0 9 9 ) (0 .1 2 4 ) (0 .1 0 1 ) (0 .1 1 5 ) (0 .1 0 7 ) Y e a r= 2 0 0 3 × P o st -9 / 1 1 -0 .0 2 9 0 .0 1 7 -0 .0 4 7 -0 .0 3 6 -0 .0 2 9 0 .0 2 4 0 .0 7 2 -0 .0 8 3 (0 .1 0 9 ) (0 .1 1 4 ) (0 .1 4 1 ) (0 .0 9 9 ) (0 .1 2 3 ) (0 .1 0 3 ) (0 .1 1 6 ) (0 .1 0 7 ) C o n st a n t 2 .5 0 7 ∗ ∗ ∗ 2 .5 6 1 ∗ ∗ ∗ 2 .4 9 7 ∗ ∗ ∗ 2 .3 8 7 ∗ ∗ ∗ 2 .2 0 1 ∗ ∗ ∗ 2 .5 0 2 ∗ ∗ ∗ 2 .6 6 1 ∗ ∗ ∗ 2 .7 6 3 ∗ ∗ ∗ (0 .1 0 9 ) (0 .1 2 1 ) (0 .2 2 1 ) (0 .1 2 4 ) (0 .1 1 6 ) (0 .1 0 5 ) (0 .1 0 2 ) (0 .1 2 3 ) N 3 6 ,9 4 1 3 3 ,8 5 8 1 9 ,5 0 4 5 1 ,2 9 5 3 2 ,7 6 9 3 8 ,0 3 0 4 4 ,5 0 2 2 6 ,2 9 7 S o u rc e : S O E P 1 9 9 9 – 2 0 0 3 , o w n c a lc u la ti o n s. N o te s: S e e T a b le 2 . R a n d o m e ff e c ts m o d e ls . C o n tr o l v a ri a b le s a s in T a b le 3 . H ig h E d u is d e fi n e d a s in d iv id u a l w it h 1 2 o r m o re y e a rs o f e d u c a ti o n / tr a in in g . H ig h F S h a re in d ic a te s a fo re ig n e r sh a re a t fe d e ra l st a te le v e l a b o v e th e n a ti o n a l le v e l sh a re o f fo re ig n n a ti o n a ls in G e rm a n y in 2 0 0 0 . * p < 0 .1 0 , * * p < 0 .0 5 , * * * p < 0 .0 1 . 22 T a b le 6 : W o rr ie s a b o u t H o st il it y. E ff ec t H et er o g en ei ty b y G en d er , A g e G ro u p s a n d E d u ca ti o n W o rr ie s a b o u t H o st il it y M a le F e m a le A g e < = 3 5 A g e > 3 5 L o w F S h a re H ig h F S h a re L o w E d u H ig h E d u P o st -9 / 1 1 0 .0 0 1 0 .0 8 9 0 .0 1 5 0 .0 7 2 0 .1 3 5 -0 .0 3 1 0 .0 6 3 0 .0 6 6 (0 .1 0 2 ) (0 .1 1 0 ) (0 .1 2 1 ) (0 .0 9 7 ) (0 .1 1 9 ) (0 .0 9 7 ) (0 .1 1 1 ) (0 .1 0 1 ) Y e a r= 2 0 0 0 -0 .0 0 9 -0 .0 1 7 0 .0 0 1 -0 .0 1 7 ∗ ∗ -0 .0 1 1 -0 .0 1 8 ∗ -0 .0 2 7 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0 .0 1 5 (0 .0 1 0 ) (0 .0 1 0 ) (0 .0 1 3 ) (0 .0 0 9 ) (0 .0 1 0 ) (0 .0 1 0 ) (0 .0 0 9 ) (0 .0 1 2 ) Y e a r= 2 0 0 1 0 .0 8 7 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0 .0 6 6 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0 .0 9 7 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0 .0 7 1 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0 .0 7 7 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0 .0 7 2 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0 .0 5 8 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0 .1 1 0 ∗ ∗ ∗ (0 .0 0 9 ) (0 .0 1 0 ) (0 .0 1 3 ) (0 .0 0 8 ) (0 .0 1 0 ) (0 .0 1 0 ) (0 .0 0 9 ) (0 .0 1 1 ) Y e a r= 2 0 0 2 -0 .0 3 6 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0 .0 4 2 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0 .0 5 2 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0 .0 3 5 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0 .0 1 7 -0 .0 6 4 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0 .0 3 4 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0 .0 5 1 ∗ ∗ ∗ (0 .0 1 1 ) (0 .0 1 2 ) (0 .0 1 5 ) (0 .0 1 0 ) (0 .0 1 2 ) (0 .0 1 1 ) (0 .0 1 1 ) (0 .0 1 3 ) Y e a r= 2 0 0 3 -0 .1 0 9 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0 .1 2 0 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0 .1 4 4 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0 .1 0 6 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0 .1 0 0 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0 .1 3 4 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0 .1 0 1 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0 .1 4 2 ∗ ∗ ∗ (0 .0 1 1 ) (0 .0 1 2 ) (0 .0 1 6 ) (0 .0 1 0 ) (0 .0 1 2 ) (0 .0 1 2 ) (0 .0 1 1 ) (0 .0 1 3 ) Y e a r= 2 0 0 0 × P o st -9 / 1 1 0 .0 1 4 -0 .0 8 4 -0 .0 4 4 -0 .0 3 7 -0 .1 6 7 0 .0 7 0 -0 .1 0 7 0 .0 0 9 (0 .1 0 7 ) (0 .1 1 5 ) (0 .1 2 8 ) (0 .1 0 0 ) (0 .1 2 3 ) (0 .1 0 1 ) (0 .1 1 6 ) (0 .1 0 5 ) Y e a r= 2 0 0 1 × P o st -9 / 1 1 -0 .2 8 0 ∗ ∗ -0 .3 4 2 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0 .3 4 3 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0 .3 2 0 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0 .3 8 1 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0 .2 3 2 ∗ ∗ -0 .3 0 8 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0 .3 5 2 ∗ ∗ ∗ (0 .1 0 9 ) (0 .1 1 6 ) (0 .1 3 2 ) (0 .1 0 2 ) (0 .1 2 8 ) (0 .1 0 3 ) (0 .1 1 8 ) (0 .1 0 8 ) Y e a r= 2 0 0 2 × P o st -9 / 1 1 -0 .0 0 7 -0 .1 5 8 -0 .0 4 8 -0 .1 1 4 -0 .1 7 2 -0 .0 1 4 -0 .1 4 8 -0 .0 4 6 (0 .1 0 9 ) (0 .1 1 6 ) (0 .1 3 5 ) (0 .1 0 1 ) (0 .1 2 4 ) (0 .1 0 4 ) (0 .1 1 7 ) (0 .1 0 8 ) Y e a r= 2 0 0 3 × P o st -9 / 1 1 -0 .0 0 1 -0 .1 5 2 -0 .1 6 5 -0 .0 7 1 -0 .1 3 5 -0 .0 4 1 -0 .0 7 3 -0 .1 3 6 (0 .1 1 0 ) (0 .1 1 6 ) (0 .1 4 0 ) (0 .1 0 1 ) (0 .1 2 4 ) (0 .1 0 6 ) (0 .1 1 8 ) (0 .1 0 8 ) C o n st a n t 2 .1 6 3 ∗ ∗ ∗ 2 .0 0 9 ∗ ∗ ∗ 1 .9 0 8 ∗ ∗ ∗ 2 .0 7 5 ∗ ∗ ∗ 1 .5 7 7 ∗ ∗ ∗ 2 .3 2 8 ∗ ∗ ∗ 2 .1 0 3 ∗ ∗ ∗ 2 .2 5 0 ∗ ∗ ∗ (0 .1 0 2 ) (0 .1 1 4 ) (0 .2 0 6 ) (0 .1 1 6 ) (0 .1 1 0 ) (0 .0 9 8 ) (0 .0 9 8 ) (0 .1 1 1 ) N 3 6 ,9 4 1 3 3 ,8 5 8 1 9 ,5 0 4 5 1 ,2 9 5 3 2 ,7 6 9 3 8 ,0 3 0 4 4 ,5 0 2 2 6 ,2 9 7 S o u rc e : S O E P 1 9 9 9 – 2 0 0 3 , o w n c a lc u la ti o n s. N o te s: S e e T a b le 2 . R a n d o m e ff e c ts m o d e ls . C o n tr o l v a ri a b le s a s in T a b le 3 . H ig h E d u is d e fi n e d a s in d iv id u a l w it h 1 2 o r m o re y e a rs o f e d u c a ti o n / tr a in in g . H ig h F S h a re in d ic a te s a fo re ig n e r sh a re a t fe d e ra l st a te le v e l w h ic h is a b o v e th e n a ti o n a l le v e l sh a re o f fo re ig n n a ti o n a ls in G e rm a n y in th e y e a r 2 0 0 0 . * p < 0 .1 0 , * * p < 0 .0 5 , * * * p < 0 .0 1 . 23 Appendix Table A1: Three-Way Interaction – 9/11 Effects and the Moderating Role of Education Worries about Worries about Immigration Hostility Year=2000 -0.066∗∗∗ -0.033∗∗∗ (0.009) (0.009) Year=2001 -0.167∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗ (0.009) (0.009) Year=2002 -0.115∗∗∗ -0.043∗∗∗ (0.010) (0.010) Year=2003 -0.173∗∗∗ -0.110∗∗∗ (0.010) (0.010) High-Edu -0.185∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗ (0.013) (0.013) Year=2000 × High-Edu -0.028∗ 0.047∗∗∗ (0.015) (0.015) Year=2001 × High-Edu -0.029∗∗ 0.058∗∗∗ (0.015) (0.015) Year=2002 × High-Edu -0.062∗∗∗ -0.003 (0.015) (0.015) Year=2003 × High-Edu -0.031∗∗ -0.028∗ (0.015) (0.015) Post-9/11 × High-Edu 0.011 0.030 (0.149) (0.148) Post-9/11 -0.056 0.033 (0.106) (0.105) Year=2000 × Post-9/11 0.026 -0.079 (0.110) (0.111) Year=2001 × Post-9/11 0.306∗∗∗ -0.288∗∗∗ (0.110) (0.111) Year=2002 × Post-9/11 0.022 -0.115 (0.110) (0.112) Year=2003 × Post-9/11 0.078 -0.044 (0.111) (0.113) Year=2000 × Post-9/11 × High-Edu -0.094 0.093 (0.156) (0.157) Year=2001 × Post-9/11 × High-Edu -0.278∗ -0.056 (0.154) (0.156) Year=2002 × Post-9/11 × High-Edu -0.010 0.075 (0.158) (0.160) Year=2003 × Post-9/11 × High-Edu -0.148 -0.083 (0.159) (0.161) N 70,799 70,799 Source: SOEP 1999–2003, own calculations. Notes: See Table 2. Random effects models. Control variables as in Table 3. High-Edu is defined as individual with 12 or more years of education/training. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 24 SOEPpapers 534, Jan. 2013 The Effects of 9/11 on Attitudes Toward Immigration and the Moderating Role of Education ABSTRACT Introduction Background 9/11 and Anti-Immigrant Attitudes The Moderating Role of Education Data and Empirical Setup Data Empirical Strategy Results and Discussion Baseline results Robustness Effect Heterogeneity and the Role of Education Summary and Conclusion References Tables and Figures SOEPpapers 
work_n5vyo2hq7rgtfjhifl4m7f2bha	----	[PDF] Gendering Islamophobia, racism and White supremacy | Semantic Scholar Skip to search formSkip to main content> Semantic Scholar's Logo Search Sign InCreate Free Account You are currently offline. Some features of the site may not work correctly. DOI:10.1177/2043820616655018 Corpus ID: 52293083Gendering Islamophobia, racism and White supremacy @article{Hopkins2016GenderingIR, title={Gendering Islamophobia, racism and White supremacy}, author={Peter Hopkins}, journal={Dialogues in Human Geography}, year={2016}, volume={6}, pages={186 - 189} } Peter Hopkins Published 2016 Sociology, Medicine Dialogues in Human Geography Defendants in both racist and religiously motivated hate crimes in the United Kingdom are usually White men, with these incidents tending to take place in public spaces, especially those close to religious and community buildings. Focusing on the experiences of Muslim men and women in the United Kingdom – including others who look Muslim – I explore common forms of religiously and racially motivated violence and argue that these constitute gendered violence. Policies targeted at key groups who… Expand View on SAGE journals.sagepub.com Save to Library Create Alert Cite Launch Research Feed Share This Paper 17 CitationsHighly Influential Citations 1 Background Citations 6 View All Topics from this paper Gender Experience Occur (action) Paper Mentions News Article De Londres à Paris, regards sur l’islamophobie The Conversation 17 April 2018 News Article Islamophobia in Paris and London – how it differs and why The Conversation 13 April 2018 News Article Young Muslims want to participate in politics – but prejudice might be stopping them Business Insider 16 March 2017 News Article Young Muslims want to participate in politics – but prejudice and Islamophobia may be stopping them Yahoo! News 15 March 2017 News Article Young Muslims want to participate in politics – but prejudice and Islamophobia may be stopping them The Conversation 15 March 2017 17 Citations Citation Type Citation Type All Types Cites Results Cites Methods Cites Background Has PDF Publication Type Author More Filters More Filters Filters Sort by Relevance Sort by Most Influenced Papers Sort by Citation Count Sort by Recency Islamophobia as racialised biopolitics in the United Kingdom T. Abbas Political Science 2020 Save Alert Research Feed Encountering Misrecognition: Being Mistaken for Being Muslim Peter Hopkins, K. Botterill, Gurchathen S. Sanghera, R. Arshad Sociology 2017 32 PDF View 1 excerpt, cites background Save Alert Research Feed Far-Right Contestation in Australia: Soldiers of Odin and True Blue Crew P. Nilan Political Science 2019 1 Save Alert Research Feed Young Muslim women's political participation in Scotland: Exploring the intersections of gender, religion, class and place R. Finlay, Peter Hopkins Sociology 2019 1 Save Alert Research Feed Embodied Islamophobia: lived experiences of anti-Muslim discourses and assaults in Milwaukee, Wisconsin Anna Mansson McGinty Sociology 2020 5 PDF Save Alert Research Feed Embodied Islamophobia: lived experiences of anti-Muslim discourses and assaults in Milwaukee, Wisconsin Anna Mansson McGinty 2020 Highly Influenced View 4 excerpts, cites background Save Alert Research Feed Fear, Imagination, and Public Representations of ‘Western Citizenship’ Among Jewish-Israeli Activists in Toronto Tamir Arviv Political Science 2017 View 2 excerpts, cites background Save Alert Research Feed Picturing translocal youth: Self‐portraits of young Syrian refugees and young people of diverse African heritages in South‐East England R. Evans Sociology 2020 1 Save Alert Research Feed Embodying violence: critical geographies of gender, race, and culture J. L. Fluri, Amy Piedalue Sociology 2017 20 Save Alert Research Feed Challenging discourses on BSA Muslim women through an intersectional analysis of everyday experiences across spaces of home, work and public space Rashida Bibi Sociology 2019 View 2 excerpts, cites background Save Alert Research Feed ... 1 2 ... References SHOWING 1-10 OF 14 REFERENCES SORT BYRelevance Most Influenced Papers Recency The impact of counter-terrorism measures on Muslim communities T. Choudhury, H. Fenwick Sociology 2011 133 PDF View 1 excerpt, references background Save Alert Research Feed Terror Crime Prevention: Constructing Muslim Practices and Beliefs as ‘Anti-Social’ and ‘Extreme’ through CONTEST 2 B. Spalek, L. Mcdonald Political Science 2010 37 PDF View 1 excerpt, references background Save Alert Research Feed Faith, ethnicity, place: young people's everyday geopolitics in Scotland Peter Hopkins, K. Botterill, Gurchathen S. Sanghera, Rowena Arshad History 2015 9 PDF View 1 excerpt, references background Save Alert Research Feed MASCULINITY, MARGINALIZATION AND VIOLENCE A Case Study of the English Defence League J. Treadwell, Jon Garland Medicine 2011 98 PDF View 1 excerpt, references background Save Alert Research Feed I know who I am, but who do they think I am? Muslim perspectives on encounters with airport authorities Leda Blackwood, N. Hopkins, S. Reicher Sociology 2013 55 PDF View 1 excerpt, references background Save Alert Research Feed Towards critical geographies of the university campus: understanding the contested experiences of Muslim students Peter Hopkins Sociology 2011 103 View 1 excerpt, references background Save Alert Research Feed Bodies, gender, place and culture: 21 years on R. Longhurst, L. Johnston Sociology 2014 69 View 2 excerpts, references background Save Alert Research Feed Youth transitions, unemployment and underemployment R. Macdonald Sociology 2011 156 PDF View 1 excerpt, references background Save Alert Research Feed Anti-Muslim Hate Crime and the Far Right N. Copsey, J. Dack, M. Littler, M. Feldman Political Science 2013 34 Highly Influential PDF View 8 excerpts, references background Save Alert Research Feed Islamophobia and Anti-muslim Hate Crime: UK Case Studies 2010 ... 1 2 ... Related Papers Abstract Topics Paper Mentions 17 Citations 14 References Related Papers Stay Connected With Semantic Scholar Sign Up About Semantic Scholar Semantic Scholar is a free, AI-powered research tool for scientific literature, based at the Allen Institute for AI. Learn More → Resources DatasetsSupp.aiAPIOpen Corpus Organization About UsResearchPublishing PartnersData Partners   FAQContact Proudly built by AI2 with the help of our Collaborators Terms of Service•Privacy Policy The Allen Institute for AI By clicking accept or continuing to use the site, you agree to the terms outlined in our Privacy Policy, Terms of Service, and Dataset License ACCEPT & CONTINUE 
work_n5xb2o7xhzgmxhukafdxzswraq	----	[PDF] Hate Crimes Against Trans People: Assessing Emotions, Behaviors, and Attitudes Toward Criminal Justice Agencies | Semantic Scholar Skip to search formSkip to main content> Semantic Scholar's Logo Search Sign InCreate Free Account You are currently offline. Some features of the site may not work correctly. DOI:10.1177/0886260517715026 Corpus ID: 27584746Hate Crimes Against Trans People: Assessing Emotions, Behaviors, and Attitudes Toward Criminal Justice Agencies @article{Walters2017HateCA, title={Hate Crimes Against Trans People: Assessing Emotions, Behaviors, and Attitudes Toward Criminal Justice Agencies}, author={M. Walters and Jennifer Paterson and R. Brown and L. Mcdonnell}, journal={Journal of Interpersonal Violence}, year={2017}, volume={35}, pages={4583 - 4613} } M. Walters, Jennifer Paterson, +1 author L. Mcdonnell Published 2017 Psychology, Medicine Journal of Interpersonal Violence Based on a survey of 593 lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) people in the United Kingdom, this study shows that direct anti-LGBT hate crimes (measured by direct experiences of victimization) and indirect anti-LGBT hate crimes (measured by personally knowing other victims of hate crime) are highly prolific and frequent experiences for LGBT people. Our findings show that trans people are particularly susceptible to hate crimes, both in terms of prevalence and frequency. This article… Expand View on SAGE nrl.northumbria.ac.uk Save to Library Create Alert Cite Launch Research Feed Share This Paper 10 CitationsBackground Citations 5 Results Citations 2 View All Figures, Tables, and Topics from this paper table 1 figure 1 table 2 figure 2 figure 3 figure 4 figure 5 figure 6 figure 7 View All 9 Figures & Tables Crime Act Anxiety Disorders Experience Prejudice Accident and Emergency department Behavior 10 Citations Citation Type Citation Type All Types Cites Results Cites Methods Cites Background Has PDF Publication Type Author More Filters More Filters Filters Sort by Relevance Sort by Most Influenced Papers Sort by Citation Count Sort by Recency Understanding victim group responses to hate crime: shared identities, perceived similarity and intergroup emotions Jennifer Paterson, R. Brown, M. Walters Psychology 2018 2 PDF View 9 excerpts, cites background Save Alert Research Feed The Short and Longer Term Impacts of Hate Crimes Experienced Directly, Indirectly, and Through the Media Jennifer Paterson, R. Brown, M. Walters Psychology, Medicine Personality & social psychology bulletin 2019 12 PDF View 8 excerpts, cites background and results Save Alert Research Feed Group identity, empathy and shared suffering: Understanding the ‘community’ impacts of anti-LGBT and Islamophobic hate crimes M. Walters, Jennifer Paterson, L. Mcdonnell, R. Brown Psychology 2020 5 PDF View 1 excerpt Save Alert Research Feed Enhancing punishment or repairing harms? Perceptions of sentencing hate crimes amongst members of a commonly targeted victim group M. Walters, Jennifer Paterson, R. Brown Psychology 2020 Save Alert Research Feed Digital harassment and abuse: Experiences of sexuality and gender minority adults A. Powell, A. Scott, N. Henry Psychology 2020 12 PDF View 1 excerpt, cites background Save Alert Research Feed Hate crimes against the LGBT community in the Commonwealth: a situational analysis E. Gitari, M. Walters Political Science 2020 1 Highly Influenced PDF View 2 excerpts, cites results and background Save Alert Research Feed New Directions in Hate Reporting Research: Agency, Heterogeneity and Relationality C. Donovan, J. Clayton, S. J. Macdonald Sociology 2019 1 PDF Save Alert Research Feed Homophobic Crimes: Epidemiological Characteristics of Homicides against Brazilian Minorities A. L. Cavalcanti, Thaisy Sarmento Batista de Oliveira, Thaliny Batista Sarmento de Oliveira, C. L. Cavalcanti, Alidianne Fábia Cabral Cavalcanti Psychology 2019 PDF Save Alert Research Feed Open Availability of Patient Medical Photographs in Google Images Search Results: Cross-Sectional Study of Transgender Research Z. Marshall, F. Brunger, V. Welch, S. Asghari, Chris Kaposy Psychology, Medicine Journal of medical Internet research 2018 4 PDF View 2 excerpts, cites background Save Alert Research Feed Sexual/gender minority-related individual differences predict likelihood of social action after a hate crime. Brynn E Sheehan, Ralitsa S Maduro, V. Derlega Psychology 2020 Save Alert Research Feed References SHOWING 1-10 OF 81 REFERENCES SORT BYRelevance Most Influenced Papers Recency Hate Crime Victimization Among Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual Adults G. Herek, J. R. Gillis, J. Cogan, E. K. Glunt Psychology 1997 295 View 1 excerpt, references background Save Alert Research Feed Outside Looking In: The Community Impacts of Anti-Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual Hate Crime J. Bell, B. Perry. Psychology, Medicine Journal of homosexuality 2015 42 View 1 excerpt, references background Save Alert Research Feed Victim Experiences in Hate Crimes Based on Sexual Orientation G. Herek, J. Cogan, J. R. Gillis Psychology 2002 306 PDF Save Alert Research Feed Hate Crimes Hurt Some More Than Others Paul Iganski, S. Lagou Psychology, Medicine Journal of interpersonal violence 2015 30 PDF View 1 excerpt, references background Save Alert Research Feed The phenomenon of hate crimes in the United States Wen Cheng, W. Ickes, J. Kenworthy Psychology 2013 41 Save Alert Research Feed Violence against transgender people: A review of United States data R. Stotzer Sociology 2009 398 Highly Influential PDF View 4 excerpts, references background Save Alert Research Feed Heterosexuals’ Attitudes Toward Transgender People: Findings from a National Probability Sample of U.S. Adults Aaron T. Norton, G. Herek Psychology 2013 299 PDF View 3 excerpts, references background and methods Save Alert Research Feed A Needs Assessment of Transgendered People of Color Living in Washington, DC Jessica Xavier, Marilyn P Bobbin, B. Singer, Earline Budd Psychology 2005 205 Save Alert Research Feed Hate Crime: Impact, Causes and Responses N. Chakraborti, Jon Garland Political Science 2009 124 PDF View 3 excerpts, references background Save Alert Research Feed Resisting Hate Crime Discourse: Queer and Intersectional Challenges to Neoliberal Hate Crime Laws D. Meyer Sociology 2014 28 Highly Influential View 5 excerpts, references background Save Alert Research Feed ... 1 2 3 4 5 ... Related Papers Abstract Figures, Tables, and Topics 10 Citations 81 References Related Papers Stay Connected With Semantic Scholar Sign Up About Semantic Scholar Semantic Scholar is a free, AI-powered research tool for scientific literature, based at the Allen Institute for AI. Learn More → Resources DatasetsSupp.aiAPIOpen Corpus Organization About UsResearchPublishing PartnersData Partners   FAQContact Proudly built by AI2 with the help of our Collaborators Terms of Service•Privacy Policy The Allen Institute for AI By clicking accept or continuing to use the site, you agree to the terms outlined in our Privacy Policy, Terms of Service, and Dataset License ACCEPT & CONTINUE 
work_ncdmcvprbffkfgfh75fodzlm5u	----	UCLA Program on International Migration Title Limits of Panethnicity: An Alternative Model of Group Formation Permalink https://escholarship.org/uc/item/4vx0k3x4 Author Borzorgmehr, Mehdi Publication Date 2015-10-19 Peer reviewed eScholarship.org Powered by the California Digital Library University of California https://escholarship.org/uc/item/4vx0k3x4 https://escholarship.org http://www.cdlib.org/ Limits of Panethnicity: An Alternative Model of Group Formation By Mehdi Borzorgmehr (Department of Sociology, City University of New York); Paul Ong (Luskin School of Public Affairs, UCLA); Sarah Tosh (Department of Sociology, City University of New York) Forthcoming, Ethnic and Racial Studies, 2015; http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2015.1081959 Abstract Existing theories of panethnicity in the United States concentrate on Asian Americans and Latinos, two umbrella groups that originally coalesced during the 1960s Civil Rights era. Although the role played by the state is recognized as a central factor in panethnic development, we argue that this pivotal variable is heavily dependent on historical context. Through a case study of newly emerging ethnic minorities (Middle Eastern and South Asian Americans in the post-9/11 era), we reexamine existing theories of panethnicity at a time when the state plays a narrowly-targeted punitive role. Using an innovative methodology which draws on a wide range of novel sources, we document the way in which the ethnic “Arab” and religious “Muslim” labels have been reinforced at the expense of panethnic labels like “Middle Eastern” and “South Asian.” Accordingly, we develop an alternative model of group formation which prioritizes historical context and the role of the state. Keywords: Panethnicity; ethnic boundaries; Middle Eastern; South Asian; Arab; Muslim. Introduction The study of panethnicity, or the grouping of various nationalities and ethnicities under a single label, has made critically important conceptual and empirical contributions to our understanding of the social construction of group boundaries and racial formation (Omi and Winant 1986, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2015.1081959 Espiritu 1992). The existing theories, however, are largely based on empirical studies of Asian Americans and Latinos, panethnic groups which were consolidated in the immediate post-Civil Rights era, and hence may have limitations when applied to other groups in a different historical context. Consequently, the field suffers from sample-selection bias that weakens the ability to determine the relative importance of the purported factors associated with panethnic formation. Moving beyond this methodological bias helps to clarify which factors are necessary and/or sufficient. Post-9/11 research on Middle Easterners and South Asians, potential contemporary panethnic groups in the United States, indicate that we are not merely witnessing a replay of the formation of previous panethnic groups (Bakalian and Bozorgmehr 2009, 2011). Using the existing models of panethnicity, one would anticipate the emergence of a panethnic category among Middle Easterners and a panethnic category among South Asian Americans, or even a large social construction encompassing both groups. Not only does each of these groups share internal commonalities which can foster panethnicity, they have also been frequently marginalized (stereotyped as being outside society’s mainstream religious groups), racialized (turbaned Sikh men mistaken for Muslims), and demonized (perceived as enemies of the state), especially after 9/11. Within this hostile climate, both groups have had incentives to mobilize and act collectively, with the advantage of borrowing successful political strategies and tactics pioneered by Asian Americans and Latinos, and tapping into group-oriented legal opportunities and protection created decades earlier during the Civil-Rights era. Despite these contributing factors and a decade of targeting and profiling, the Middle Eastern and South Asian categories have failed to crystalize across national, ethnic, and religious lines (see also Love 2009). In this paper, we pose the question: Why have these panethnic categories not developed in the 1 traditional sense, either together, or independently, even after 9/11? Through case studies of these groups, we hope to address the broader theoretical questions around panethnic group formation. Background of Groups Under Study Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) immigrants to the United States are diverse, representing many nationalities, ethnicities and religions. MENA consists of the twenty-two nations that make up the Arab League as well as the three non-Arab countries of Iran, Israel, and Turkey. While the turn of the twentieth century Arab and Armenian immigrant pioneers in the United States were predominantly Christian, the post-1965 newcomers are predominantly Muslim. Although Muslim South Asian immigrants from Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Pakistan, and India are officially classified under the Asian American category, they share cultural and religious traditions among themselves, and have more in common culturally (religion, language, food, and music) with Middle Easterners than with East and Southeast Asians (Leonard 1997, Shankar and Srikanth 1998, Kibria 2006). Furthermore, both Middle Eastern and South Asian Americans experienced substantial post-9/11 backlash, and the protracted wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have aggravated the situation, feeding stereotypes, prejudice and discrimination against these groups (Gold and Bozorgmehr 2007; Jamal and Naber 2008; Bakalian and Bozorgmehr 2009; Maira 2009; Abraham, Howell and Shryock 2011). Middle Eastern immigrants are one of the most ethnically and religiously diverse panethnic groups in America, yet they share cultural, linguistic and religious identities that cut across national boundaries. Generally, these immigrants identify themselves along national (e.g., Iranian, Israeli, Turkey), supranational or ethnic (e.g., Arab), or ethno-religious (e.g., Armenian, Jewish) categories. Most of the Arab immigrants who originate from Arab countries accept the supranational ethnic label of “Arab American,” defined as people who share the Arabic language and culture (Bozorgmehr and Bakalian 2013, www.mearo.org). “Arab” is not a panethnic label. 2 http://www.mearo.org/ Rather, it is an ethnic label like “Chinese” within the panethic label of “Asian American.” In the same vein, while Muslims are increasingly treated as a panethnic group, they are in reality a mutli-national religious group, like Christians. South Asians in the United States are a diverse and even more rapidly growing group (Kibria 2006), further contributing to their national-origin diversity. They are religiously, linguistically, and ethnically heterogeneous, but the predominance of Muslim religion among Afghans, Bangladeshis, and Pakistanis is an important additional source of group identification. While Asian Indians comprise the largest segment of the South Asian American population (Kibria 2006), the small Muslim component of this very heterogeneous national-origin group identifies with the other Muslim countries in the region (Leonard 1997). Literature Review and Application to the Case Study Lopez and Espiritu (1990: 200) were the first to formally define the concept of panethnicity, referring to it as "the development of bridging organizations and solidarities among subgroups of ethnic collectivities that are often seen as homogenous by outsiders.” They make a distinction between cultural and structural characteristics that affect panethnicity (Lopez and Espiritu 1990: Table 1). They argue that while Asian Americans are diverse culturally (language and religion), their structural commonalities (class, race, and geographical dispersion) override this in the creation of panethnicity. Furthermore, external factors that were instrumental in developing Asian American panethnicity include violence against the group, outsiders’ perceptions of Asians as “foreigners,” racial lumping as an official legal minority by the government, and eventual eligibility for affirmative action and other set-aside programs (see also Espiritu 1992, Espiritu and Ong 1994, Min 2006). Generation (first, second, third) is the only identified structural characteristic that they do not share (Lopez and Espiritu 1990). Although Lopez and Espiritu assert that both internal cultural factors and structural factors are important, they conclude that 3 the structural factors are more salient in the development and success of panethnic groupings (e.g., race for Asian Americans). Espiritu (1992) extends this argument by isolating the root causes of panethnicity among Asian Americans as (1) racialization by dominant groups, and (2) subsequent ethnic mobilization and social constructions by Asian Americans themselves. According to Omi and Winant (1994: 55) racialization is “the sociohistorical process by which racial categories are created, inhabited, transformed, and destroyed.” It is through this process that racial categories, and the stigma often associated with them, change over time. Hence, some historically non-white groups can become white, and vice versa. For instance, previously-racialized groups in America, like Italians and Jews, are now racially considered a part of the dominant white mainstream, while Middle Eastern and South Asian groups have become increasingly racialized since 9/11. As is the case with most socially constructed categories, panethnicity is inherently unstable and fluid. Therefore, it can be forged or dismantled depending on historical circumstances. However, it is important to note that panethnicity is most contested and fragile in the initial stages of group formation. After panethnicity is established, it can become institutionalized through codified norms, repetitive daily use, and protection by vested interests. Studies of Asian American panethnicity have shown that panethnic groups are continuously in flux, often due to internal conflicts (e.g., the ambiguous status of Pacific Islanders within the Asian American category) (Espiritu 2013). However, these more nuanced formulations still begin with the existing panethnic categories. Omi and Winant (1986) further suggest that panethnic organizations made up of marginalized minorities have successfully mobilized to make claims on the state and combat racial discrimination. For instance, Asian American umbrella organizations have been particularly instrumental in spearheading the group’s panethnic agenda through their 4 involvement in electoral politics, activism, and the establishment of social service organizations (Espiritu 1992). More specifically, Okamoto (2003: 813) defines panethnic mobilization as “the public action of people from two or more national-origin groups to express grievances or claims on behalf of the collective, pan-national group.” This claims-making can be directed at the host society at a variety of different levels (Wei 1993). Okamoto points to the shifting and layered nature of panethnicity, which she attributes to external and structural factors. This reflects new theorizing about groups and boundaries, a cutting-edge topic in sociology (Alba and Nee 2003, Brubaker 2004, Wimmer 2013). The multiplicity of possible affiliations and identities thus allows for the contraction and expansion of the ethnic boundaries in efforts toward mobilization. This approach allows for a more dynamic and nuanced understanding of panethnic group formation. In a recent synthesis of the panethnicity literature, Espiritu (2012) makes a clear distinction between institutional and individual panethnicity. While panethnicity does not necessarily occur on a subjective individual basis (even members of second- and subsequent generations often identify by national-origin), panethnicity is more likely to occur along organizational lines which cut across various ethnic groups within the broader umbrella group. Like earlier studies of panethnicity, Espiritu’s recent publication focuses on the classic cases of panethnicity (Asian Americans and Latinos), though she is attentive to the variation within these groups. The discussion still leaves out groups, such as Middle Easterners and South Asians, who are increasingly visible after 9/11, yet among whom panethnicity has not even emerged on an intragroup level. Like Asian Americans and Latinos, both Middle Easterners and South Asians have some cultural commonalities (language, religion, geographical origin) and structural similarities (immigration history, geographical concentration in the United States, relatively high 5 socioeconomic status, generation, Census classification). More significantly, both groups have been subjected to severe external pressures such as stereotyping, prejudice and discrimination, hate crimes and bias incidents, and a string of post-9/11 government initiatives (see Bakalian and Bozorgmehr 2009: Chapter 5 and Appendix). The hate crimes and bias incidents committed against members of the targeted groups are well-documented (see Jamal and Naber 2008; Maira 2009; Tehranian 2009; Bakalian and Bozorgmehr 2009, 2011; Abraham, Howell and Shryock 2011). These and other studies have also catalogued the devastating state policies and initiatives that have singled out Middle Eastern, South Asian and Muslim men since 9/11. If we disaggregate the post-9/11 backlash into its components (scapegoating, bias incidents and hate crimes, and government initiatives), non- Arabs and non-Muslims (e.g., Sikhs, Iranians, Turks, Armenians), have also suffered the consequences of targeting and profiling. Specifically, two government initiatives targeted non- Arabs: the National Security Entry-Exit Registration System (NSEERS) and the required registration with the former Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). The NSEERS dragnet included non-Arab countries such as Afghanistan, Eritrea, Indonesia, Iran, and Pakistan. Similarly, the INS registration program’s coverage was also extended to include Iranians. While there are no probability surveys of all Middle Eastern and South Asian groups in the United States, many of these populations are covered by 2007 and 2011 Pew nationally representative surveys of Muslim Americans. The results of both surveys indicate that over half of the respondents consistently reported that it has become more difficult for Muslims living in the United States since 9/11. Furthermore, only a negligible percentage (1-2%) reported life getting easier since 9/11. Almost half (40% in 2007 and 43% in 2011) reported personal experiences with discrimination or prejudice within the year before they were surveyed (Pew Research Center 2007, 2011). 6 Like the Asian American example used by Lopez and Espiritu (1990), Middle Easterners in the United States are also culturally heterogeneous in that they speak a variety of languages (e.g., Arabic, Persian, Turkish, Armenian, Hebrew) and practice a wide range of religions and denominations (e.g., Shiite and Sunni Islam, Christianity, Judaism). Similarly, South Asian Americans use a variety of languages (e.g., Hindi, Urdu, Bengali) and practice many religions (e.g., Hinduism, Buddhism, Sikhism, Islam). As noted above, however, cultural similarities and differences figure more prominently in the identificational dimension of panethnicity, rather than the organizational dimension. Thus, this diversity is not necessarily detrimental to the emergence of panethnic solidarities (see also Love 2009). Critics of panethnicity often confuse these two important analytical dimensions, and accuse researchers of lumping diverse groups together. Middle Eastern Americans also have similar structural commonalities to Asians, with the important exception of race (Lopez and Espiritu 1990). In terms of social class or socioeconomic status, Middle Easterners have generally high levels of education, very high self-employment rates, and largely hold professional specialty occupations, partly because many arrived as foreign college students and elite exiles (Gold and Bozorgmehr 2007). Entrepreneurship and managerial/professional occupations are widely considered as the two most successful modes of economic adaptation for immigrants groups (Portes and Rumbaut 2006), and therefore Middle Eastern Americans have high socioeconomic status overall. Middle Easterners are also highly concentrated in a few states (California, New York, Michigan, Washington, Maryland/Virginia, Illinois) and converge in metropolitan areas (Los Angeles, New York, Detroit, Washington, D.C., Chicago). In terms of generation, only Armenians and Arabs have been in the United States long enough to have more than three generations represented. The rest of the Middle Eastern groups (Iranians, Turks, Egyptians, etc.) are relative newcomers whose second generation is coming of age. Concerning racial breakdown, while Middle Eastern groups are officially classified as white 7 by the U.S. government, there is a wide range of phenotypes among this population. However, there are similarities in physical appearance that characterize most Middle Eastern groups (www.mearo.org). Lopez and Espiritu (1990) distinguish Indo-Americans from Asian Americans, and as such, do not subsume South Asians under the Asian American category. However, increasingly, this group has been subsumed under the Asian American category (e.g., the U.S. Census). Yet, just as South Asian Americans have their own cultural commonalities, they have distinct structural commonalities which set them apart from other Asians (e.g., geographical concentration on the east coast, newer generational status, relatively low rates of self- employment) (Kibria 2006). Besides cultural and structural commonalities within panethnic groups, racialization is another key factor identified in the theories of panethnic group formation reviewed above. Interestingly, racialization of Arabs, Muslims, and South Asians is a popular topic among the new generation of scholars (Jamal and Naber 2008, Maira 2009). Drawing on the experiences of other minority groups, Arab and Muslim American activist-scholars have used the concept of racialization to discuss the discrepancy between official categorization and actual treatment of Arabs and Muslims after 9/11 (reviewed in Shryock 2008, Bakalian and Bozorgmehr 2011). However, Arabs and Muslims are not the only Middle Eastern or South Asian groups who have been racialized since 9/11 (groups that are neither Muslim nor Arab have felt the brunt of racialization as well). Furthermore, the new studies have not been couched in the “racial formation perspective” to address how Arabs and especially Muslims, as supranational ethnic and panreligious groups, respectively, differ from other panethnic groups such as Asian Americans (for an exception, see Rana 2011). In sum, despite the presence of many of the causal determinants of panethnicity identified in the literature, we have not yet witnessed the emergence of Middle Eastern or South Asian 8 http://www.mearo.org/ panethnic labels. Moreover, if 9/11, and the extreme backlash which ensued, did not result in this panethnic formation, it is unlikely that normative processes will do so on their own. Further challenging the theoretical expectations, instead of new panethnic group formations, we have witnessed the reinforcement of the ethnic label of Arab American and the religious label of Muslim American, as will be documented in the following section. Through the exploration of the reasons behind this distinctive trajectory, we plan to test the existing theory of panethnicity and offer an alternative model. Methods and Findings In order to document the range of labels and categories applied to this complex population, we utilized four different methods and sources: (1) a list of tax-exempt, non-profit organizations using Urban Institute’s National Center for Charitable Statistics’ database; (2) a ProQuest National Newspapers Premier search of articles published in three major national newspapers (The New York Times, The Los Angeles Times, and The Washington Post) in the decades before and after 9/11; (3) a GoogleBooks search of scholarly books published in the decades before and after 9/11; and (4) a GoogleTrends enumeration of Web search volume over time. By drawing from this broad and novel range of sources, we are able to assess how different labels applied to the groups under study have become accepted and reified by community-based organizations (CBOs), print media, the scholarly community, and the public at large. Omi and Winant (1986), and subsequently, Espiritu (1992) emphasize the emergence of ethnic umbrella organizations as a major indicator of panethnic group formation. Following this approach, we conducted a search of ethnic and religious non-profit organizations that cover the full spectrum of groups under study. The National Center for Charitable Statistics (NCCS), compiled by the renowned Urban Institute, is the most comprehensive database of tax-exempt non-profit organizations in the United States. NCCS works closely with the Internal Revenue 9 Service (IRS) to include all local and national organizations which file for tax-exempt status. The database provides a variety of useful data on these organizations (including year of founding, financial information, geographic location, etc.). The search engine provided by NCCS is widely used by researchers in the academic community (see www.nccs.urban.org). Using the NCCS database, we conducted a search using unhyphenated labels (e.g., Arab, Muslim, Iranian, Pakistani). After extracting only the organizations based in the United States, our results correspond to the categories under study, even if all included organizations do not use the word “American” in their titles. Furthermore, we omitted organizations which were clearly not related to the populations under study. Finally, we divided the resultant list by rule date (i.e., the date each organization received its recognition of exemption from the IRS). There are many more Muslim organizations than any of the other categories (N=394, Figure 1). This is partially due to the fact that many mosques in the United States file as tax- exempt non-profits with the IRS. The next largest number of organizations were Arab (N=118). National-origin categories like Iranian and Turkish also had surprisingly numerous organizations (N=101 and 104, respectively), but many of these are locally-based professional associations given the high socioeconomic characteristics of these groups. There are only 58 South Asian organizations, and even fewer Middle Eastern ones (N=18). The combined Arab and Muslim category is not listed in because there were no organizations in the database with this label in their title (Figure 1). FIGURE 1 HERE By dividing our list of organizations between those with rule dates of 2000 and before and 2001 and after, we see that even a decade after 9/11 there has been little organizational development for the Middle Eastern category, and only slightly more along South Asian lines (Figure 1). On the other hand, Muslim American organizations, which were already quite numerous before 9/11, proliferated afterwards. Surprisingly, the number of Arab American 10 organizations did not grow nearly as much as Muslim ones. The number of national origin organizations (i.e., Iranian, Turkish, Afghan, Pakistani) also grew. After conducting a chi-square ( x 2 ¿ test, we found that the percentage of organizations that were established before or after 9/11 differ significantly by ethnic and religious categories. In sum, when the populations under study form organizations, they do so along more narrow ethnic and religious lines (Arab and Muslim, respectively), much more so than South Asian and especially Middle Eastern panethnic lines (Figure 1). Part of the reason for this is that non-Arab Middle Easterners (i.e. Iranian, Turkish) are still more likely to form nationality-based associations, rather than join others to form panethnic Middle Eastern organizations. The same applies to Afghans, and to a lesser extent, to Pakistanis in relation to the South Asian category. Therefore, groups subsumed under Middle Eastern and South Asian categories are opting for religious, ethnic and national organizations over these panethnic ones to a large degree, even after 9/11. For our newspaper search, we considered two major databases, LexisNexis and ProQuest. While LexisNexis has traditionally been used as the key source for print media analyses, ProQuest has more recently emerged as a leading newspaper database. ProQuest National Newspapers Premier has full searchable text from the 1980s to the present of over twenty-five local, regional and national newspapers. By using ProQuest, we gained full access to archives of the New York Times, Los Angeles Times and Washington Post, for the two periods under investigation. All three are widely considered to be the top national newspapers in the United States, and the inclusion of the New York Times and Los Angeles Times are vital to our research because these two metropolitan areas are home to the largest and most diverse Middle Eastern, South Asian, and Muslim American populations in the country. ProQuest is the exclusive 11 provider of Los Angeles Times archives (this newspaper restricts LexisNexis searches to the last six months only), further accounting for our decision to use this comprehensive database. Choosing specific search terms presented some challenges. When we used general labels like “Middle Eastern,” “Arab,” and “Muslim,” we came up with an inordinate number of articles, many of which dealt with the Middle East and the Muslim world, two geographical areas which dominate international news. In order to avoid this problem, we tried using more specific terms such as “Arab American(s),” “Muslim American(s),” etc. These searches resulted in more manageable numbers and correspond to our topic far more directly and accurately. We divided our search between the time since 9/11 and an equivalent time period before. We used 11 April 2013 as the endpoint for the post-9/11 period, in order to avoid the deluge of articles using the Muslim American label after the Boston Marathon Bombings (15 April 2013). Since this endpoint fell eleven years and seven months after 9/11, we used the same time period for the pre- 9/11 phase. The total numbers of articles using specified ethnic and religious labels in the New York Times (NYT), the Los Angeles Times (LA Times) and the Washington Post (The Post) in each time period are reported in Figure 2. Results and trends indicate substantial increases in the use of Arab, Muslim, and national-origin categories after 9/11. While use of the “South Asian American” and “Middle Eastern American” labels also increased, their growth was small and their numbers remained relatively negligible. Again, a Chi-Square ( x 2 ¿ test showed that the percentage of articles that were published before or after 9/11 differ significantly by ethnic and religious categories. FIGURE 2 HERE Next, we examined the use and reification of these ethnic and religious labels and categories in scholarly book titles published before and after 9/11 (1989-2000 and 2001-2012). Although we would have liked to include numbers of both books and articles on these 12 populations, there is no central database that covers all scholarly journal articles. Furthermore, many journals are not searchable electronically, and even for those that are searchable, not all are identifiable through platforms like GoogleScholar. Therefore, we chose to limit our search to books published by university and scholarly presses. Using GoogleBooks (www.books.google.com), one of the most comprehensive searchable compilations of book titles available on the Internet, we looked for all book titles and subtitles about the groups under study. We charted the number of major scholarly books for selected ethnic, religious, and combined categories from 1989-2000 and 2001-2012 (see Figure 3). It shows that the number of books using the Arab American and Muslim American labels in their titles, was higher than other categories before 9/11, but noticeably increased after. Furthermore, after 9/11, the most book titles fall under the Arab American category and Muslim American category. A negligible number of books use the Middle Eastern American category in their title, both before and after 9/11. The panethnic South Asian American category is also underrepresented, when compared with the religious Muslim label and ethnic Arab label. While the pre- and post- 9/11 numbers did not vary in this category, the books published after 9/11 were more focused on South Asian Muslims than those published before. These data indicate the relative prevalence of the Arab American and Muslim American labels, as well as the coinage of the combined Arab and Muslim American label, in scholarly production since 9/11. The pre- and post-9/11 differences within each category, however, have to be interpreted more cautiously, because the differences were not found to be statistically significant, most likely due to the very small Ns. FIGURE 3 HERE In order to gauge the use of these labels by the general public, we employed the new and innovative tools provided by GoogleTrends (www.google.com/trends/). This platform provides the average Web volume for all terms searched through Google since 2004. Through GoogleTrends, users are able to view graphs showing search trends over time in various cities 13 http://www.google.com/trends/ http://www.books.google.com/ and countries around the world. We narrowed our own search to the United States. The results are reported numerically on a scale of 0-100, with 100 representing the peak search volume. FIGURE 4 HERE From 2004-2012, the “Arab American” and “Muslim American” labels have the highest average Web search volume (Figure 4). These are followed by the “Iranian American” and “Turkish American” national-origin labels. Once again, the “South Asian American” and “Middle Eastern American” labels were used least frequently. This indicator is generally consistent with our other findings, as well as our overarching argument, indicating that the “Arab” and “Muslim” labels and categories have become ingrained in and reified by a variety of segments of American society. An Alternative Model of Group Formation In order to understand the lack of emergence of the Middle Eastern and South Asian panethnic categories, we must revisit the existing model of panethnicity and highlight the role played by the state in different historical contexts. By only looking at panethnic groups that formed during the post-Civil Rights era, the existing models of panethnicity inadvertently treat the role of the state of a constant. While major panethnic categories (e.g., Asian Americans, Latinos) emerged from the post-Civil Rights era, the Middle Eastern and South Asian cases are evolving in a time of international war, terrorism, and crisis. These two different contexts are important in determining the different roles played by the state, and the resulting group formation and mobilization by impacted populations. At a time when the state does not single out groups punitively, but instead compensates disadvantaged minority groups more generally, umbrella groups can more actively determine their own boundaries, and national-origin groups have more incentive to be subsumed under these broad panethnic groupings. When the state targets specific groups along ethnic (Arab) and religious (Muslim) lines, it becomes much more difficult for 14 groups to challenge these imposed categories and boundaries, and national-origin groups have a disincentive to enlist in broad panethnic groupings. In our alternative model of group formation, historical events and their resulting political contexts are the independent variables, the role of the state vis-à-vis minority groups is the intervening variable, and group formation and mobilization are the dependent variables (Figure 5). Different historical contexts (i.e., post-Civil Rights movement vs. Post-9/11 era) result in different state responses toward minority groups. In the Civil Rights case, the state engaged in a compensatory role, by passing Civil Rights laws and creating set-aside programs, affirmative action, and entitlements for disadvantaged minorities. In the post-9/11 era, the state has played a punitive role through the passage of discriminatory policies and initiatives which target scapegoated minorities. In response, in the post-Civil Rights era, minority groups such as Asian Americans and Latinos, engaged in instrumental mobilization and solidarity along broad panethnic group lines, following in the footsteps of African Americans. In the post-9/11 era, the impacted groups have engaged in what we refer to as defensive mobilization based on narrowly defined ethnic and religious categories imposed by the state (i.e., Arabs and Muslims). Ironically, even this defensive mobilization owes its existence to the opportunity structures put in place by the Civil Rights movement, hence the broken arrow between these two outcomes (Figure 5). Our model is dynamic in the sense that both the role of the state and mobilization and group formation have a recursive relationship, hence the two-way solid arrows (Figure 5). FIGURE 5 HERE The panethnicity literature has dealt with the “lumping” role played by the state and society in the creation of group labels (e.g., Asian Americans, Latinos). However, it is important to make a distinction between the role of government and the role of society-at-large. These two are not always the same, especially in times of crisis, when minorities frequently become scapegoats. While governmental targeting usually singles out specific groups for reprisals 15 through legislative initiatives and policies, members of the host society are more likely to engage in indiscriminate stereotyping and scapegoating. For instance, the mistaken association between turban-wearing Sikhs and Osama Bin Laden led to societal scapegoating of this group immediately after 9/11. In fact, Balbir Singh Sodhi, a Sikh man, was the first person murdered in a 9/11-related hate crime. Despite ongoing profiling and discrimination, the Sikhs were not specifically targeted by post-9/11 government initiatives, since they are neither Arab nor Muslim. Through mobilization, Sikhs themselves have worked tirelessly to challenge misguided associations with terrorism by clarifying their distinctive religion and culture. At the same time, they have forged partnerships and coalitions to show support for targeted groups, especially Muslims, another religious minority. Although societal discrimination has failed to make a distinction between Muslims and Sikhs, governmental targeting has been more focused. Thus, while Arabs and Muslims have also mobilized after 9/11, and continue to do so, they have not managed to challenge these two labels so starkly defined by punitive government initiatives. Conversely, in the post-Civil Rights era, some groups mobilized to be included in official categories conferred by the government, because of the advantages entailed. Asian Indians are a case in point. Classified as white in the 1970 Census, this highly-diverse group organized to be counted as a distinct racial category. In response, the Census Bureau placed them under the Asian American category in the 1980 Census. Subsequently, other South Asian groups (Bangladeshis, Pakistanis, Sri Lankans) were also subsumed under the label of Asian American, but as write-in options under the “Other Asian” category on the census. In the post-Civil Rights era, newly available programs designated for official minorities served as an incentive for marginalized groups to proactively and instrumentally mobilize for inclusion in governmentally-designated panethnic minority categories. However, in the current context of crisis, the same groups can be forced to defensively mobilize along lines created by negative government targeting (see 16 Appendix in Bakalian and Bozorgmehr, 2009 for “A Time Line of Government Initiatives and Actions”). Therefore, in the post-9/11 era, when South Asian groups are targeted as Muslims, they have come to protectively mobilize along religious lines, bringing them closer to Middle Eastern Muslims, a group that they culturally and religiously have more in common with (Leonard 1997, Maira 2009). The ethnic and religious positioning of South Asians, according to the demands of different historical epochs, reflects the role of instrumental versus defensive mobilization in determining broad versus narrow group boundaries and formations (see Figure 5). A conducive opportunity structure is a necessary, if not sufficient, condition for ethnic mobilization (Bakalian and Bozorgmehr 2009). The opportunity structure put in place by the Civil Rights era has partially made it possible for groups to mobilize and engage in claims making against the state, a context that was not available to maligned groups prior to the 1960s. Not only did the Civil Rights movement create a basis for making demands for equal rights and entitlements, but it also created a conducive structure for protective mobilization in times of crisis. Despite the devastating effects of internment on Japanese Americans during World War II, large-scale mobilization by this ethnic group was hampered by the risk of being seen as un- American, and did not fully mature until the Redress Movement of the 1970s. However, after 9/11, Arabs and Muslims immediately mobilized. In response to punitive targeting by the state, narrow group formations (i.e., Arabs and Muslims) were used as the bases of defensive ethnic and religious mobilization, which in turn further crystalized these ethnic and religious boundaries. Conclusion and Discussion 17 Given the existing theoretical formulations of the panethnicity literature, we would expect Middle Eastern and/or South Asian panethnic categories to have arisen, especially after severe post-9/11 backlash against these populations. Not only do these groups share similar cultural traits and are subjected to similar structural pressures as other major panethnic groups such as Asian Americans, but given the relatively smaller population size of these groups in the United States, they should have even more of an impetus to organize collectively. In the absence of external lumping by the state and host society prior to 9/11, national (e.g., Iranian, Turkish, Bangladeshi, Pakistani) and supranational (e.g., Arab) categories were the main ethnic labels used to describe major Middle Eastern and South Asian groups in America. Although the Muslim label was often invoked, it did not dominate the earlier discourse about these populations. The post-9/11 backlash has served to reify “Arab and Muslim” as an awkwardly conflated category, combining two groups that are neither mutually exclusive nor exhaustive. These designations can most likely be attributed to the fact that all nineteen of the September 11th hijackers were Muslim Arabs. Although there is overlap between these two groups, all Arabs are not Muslim, especially in America. While the post-1965 immigrants from the Arab world have been predominantly Muslim, the pioneers who came to this country at the turn of the twentieth century were mostly Christian. As a result, the current Arab American population is religiously diverse. The conflation of Arabs and Muslims in the post-9/11 era is further problematic because it implies that all targeted non-Arabs (e.g., Iranians, Turks, and South Asians) are Muslims, which is not necessarily the case. Some Christian Arab groups (e.g., Assyrians, Chaldeans) have even mobilized to disassociate from the Muslim Arab label and its associated liabilities. Muslims in the United States are an even more heterogeneous group than Arabs, yet Muslim American and “American Islam” have come to be treated as a monolithic entity and 18 mistaken for an ethnic category after 9/11. American Muslims hail from countries all over the world, though mainly from the Middle East, Southeast and South Asia, and Africa. Furthermore, African American Muslims and other American converts (i.e., whites and Latinos) to Islam are conspicuously absent from the “Arab and Muslim” terminology. Although these indigenous Muslim groups were spared much of the immediate post-9/11 backlash, they are increasingly impacted with the threat of so-called “homegrown terrorism,” and thereby their exclusion from the putative Muslim category is problematic. Furthermore, the essentialized use of this religious label implies that all American Muslims are devout and observant, and hence privilege this identity over their nationality. In fact, many Muslims in the United States are secular, cultural, or nominal Muslims, and identify more strongly with their national origin than with their religion. There is also the assumption that immigrants from predominantly-Muslim countries are all Muslim. Given their origins as political refugees and exiles, there are many non-Muslim ethno- religious minorities (most prominently Christians and Jews, but also other smaller groups) from predominantly-Muslim countries who have emigrated to the United States. In accordance with the existing literature on panethnicity, this paper takes an institutional approach (e.g., organizational) to the subject, rather than the more subjective identificational one (e.g., ethnic identity-based). When the state, the most powerful institution in the land, defines the boundaries of group formation (in this case Arab and Muslim), it creates a set of potential commonalities and shared opportunities and/or liabilities for emergent minority groups. Panethnic organizations emerge as the result of successful collective action by members of these populations. This does not require that every member buy into the panethnic designation, which certainly is evident in the history of Asian Americans and Latinos, where enduring ethnic solidarities continually contest the broader group identification. The ambiguity inherent in 19 panethnic labels serves as an important reminder that these are externally-imposed legal-political constructs that do not necessarily correspond to individual identification. Our empirical research provides an analytic innovation by broadening the scope of institutional panethnicity with our inclusion of non-profit organizations, media coverage, academia, and general public Web use in an assessment of the emergence of Middle Eastern and South Asian panethnic labels. It incorporates metrics that capture modern informational practices anchored in the Internet, something that did not exist as a mass medium in previous decades. Using cutting-edge data sources such as ProQuest and GoogleTrends, this study documents the post-9/11 escalation in salience of the two most widely-used categories of “Arab American” and “Muslim American,” in lieu of the rarely-used “Middle Eastern American” and “South Asian American” categories. Critics may argue that Middle Easterners and South Asians are relative newcomers to America, as compared to Latinos and Asians, and generational change might foster panethnic formation among these groups. However, we believe that if the onslaught of post-9/11 backlash did not give rise to either Middle Eastern or South Asian panethnicity, it is doubtful that either will emerge in the near future. The existing model of panethnicity draws on extant case studies of groups who went through this process in the Civil Rights era, and continue to take shape today. We propose an alternative model of panethnic group formation which pays close attention to varying roles played by the state in different historical contexts. When the state targets selected minorities during a time of international crisis or war, the impacted groups at best can engage in defensive mobilization based on the categories imposed by punitive state policy. Therefore, groups which emerge in such an era do so on different terms than those which arose in the Civil Rights era, a time when the state engaged in compensation for disadvantaged official minority groups. 20 Although the current opportunity structure continues to be conducive to ethnic mobilization and claims making, this is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for panethnic group formation. There are other factors that preclude the rise and success of panethnicity which are undertheorized in the literature. For example, immigrant groups that originate from a specific world region invariably have vivid memories of historical conflict with other groups from that region, especially if the conflicts are ongoing. Such tensions are generally attenuated over length of residence and generations in the United States. Asian Americans worked to suppress these conflicts for the greater good of panethnic group interests during the post-Civil Rights era. In these cases, intergroup conflicts were in the distant past (e.g., between Koreans and Japanese), so it is easier to overcome these differences, especially among the native-born. However, in the case of Middle Eastern and South Asian Americans, ethnic, religious, and national conflicts are ongoing. In fact, what distinguishes these groups from other panethnic groups is their ubiquitous preoccupation with politics in their regions of origin. This is exemplified in the dual mission of Middle Eastern and South Asian CBOs of dealing with both foreign policy and domestic civil rights issues. The current climate of war, terrorism, and international crisis further exacerbates conflicts among these groups (e.g., Shiite and Sunni Muslims, Arabs and Israelis, Pakistanis and Indians). Intergroup conflicts can also be construed theoretically as an aspect of historical context, in which the home and host states play a decisive role. In this case, conflicts between groups in the Middle East and South Asia are inextricably linked with current U.S. foreign policy. As a superpower, the United States is actively involved in the aggravation or resolution of some of these conflicts (e.g., the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Arab-Israeli conflict). This is an important area for future research on panethnicity, especially in the current globalized and transnational context. 21 In terms of generalizability of our case study, the post-9/11 Middle Eastern and South Asian American experiences are reminiscent of the experiences of German Americans during World War I and Japanese Americans during World War II. As the United States plays an increasingly engaged role in international affairs as a global superpower, other diaspora populations might follow in the footsteps of scapegoated groups like Germans, Japanese, and Middle Easterners/South Asians. Furthermore, beyond the United States, other neoliberal Western immigration states are even more likely to play a hostile role in singling out minority groups, who are increasingly making claims on such states. Therefore, we believe that our theorizing on the effects of punitive state policy on group formation can contribute important insight into the ability of a variety of groups to mobilize under difficult conditions. As such, our alternative framework may in fact be more exportable than the existing theories of panethnicity. Figure 1. Number of US-Based Non-Profit Organizations*, by Ethnic and Religious Categories and Rule Date** 22 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 2001 and After 2000 and Before 23 Figure 2. Numbers of Articles Using Selected Ethnic and Religious Labels in Major National Newspapers, Before 9/11(February 10, 1990-September 10, 2001) and After 9/11 (September 11, 2001-April 11, 2013) 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 1100 1200 1300 1400 1500 1600 1700 1800 1900 2000 Before 9/11 After 9/11 Note: The difference in the percentage of articles that were published before or after 9/11 by ethnic/religious categories is statistically significant, x 2 (8 df, N = 6389) = 506.30, p <.0001. Source: ProQuest National Newspapers Premier, accessible at New York Public Library. See <http://www.nypl.org/collections/articles-databases/national-newspapers-proquest> 24 http://www.nypl.org/collections/articles-databases/national-newspapers-proquest Figure 3. Numbers of Scholarly Books on Selected Ethnic and Religious Categories* by Period of Publication (1989-2000 and 2001-2012) 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 1989-2000 2001-2012 Notes: The difference in the percentage of scholarly books that were published before or after 9/11 by ethnic/religious categories is not statistically significant, Chi-Square (6 df, N = 65) = 4.9081, p =.5557. *The Turkish American category, and specific South Asian American categories (Afghan, Pakistani) are not listed because there were no scholarly books published on these groups. Source: GoogleBooks <http://www.books.google.com> 25 Figure 4. Average Web Search Volume of Selected Ethnic and Religious Labels, United States, 2004-2012* (0-100 range)** " " " " " " " " " " " " 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 Notes: *Data are only available since 2004. **100 would signify peak search volume. Source: GoogleTrends <http://www.google.com/trends/> 26 Figure 5. An Alternative Model of Group Formation Historical Events/ Political Context Role of State vis-a-vis minority groups Group Formation and Mobilization Post-Civil Rights Era (1960s) Compensatory (Civil Rights laws, set-aside programs, affirmative action, entitlements for minorities) Instrumental and Broad Panethnic grouping of disadvantaged minorities (Asian Americans) Post-9/11 Era (2001-present) Punitive (backlash against specific minorities, USA PATRIOT Act, government initiatives) Defensive and Narrow Specific grouping of targeted minorities (Arabs and Muslims) 27 Acknowledgements Research for this paper was supported by grants from the Institute of American Cultures, University of California Los Angeles, the Advanced Research Collaborative, the Graduate Center, City University of New York, and PSC-CUNY. We thank Yen Le Espiritu, Michael Omi, Christopher Bale, Rueben Thomas, Erik Love, Philip Kasinitz and Steven J. Gold for their comments on earlier drafts of this paper. 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NABER (eds) 2008 Race and Arab Americans Before and After 9/11: From Invisible Citizens to Visible Citizens, Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press KIBRIA, N. 2006 ‘South Asian Americans’, in P.G. Min (ed), Asian-Americans: Contemporary Trends and Issues, Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine Forge Press, pp. 206-227 28 LEONARD, K. 1997 The South Asian Americans, Westport, CN.: Greenwood Press LOPEZ, D. and Y. L. ESPIRITU 1990 ‘Panethnicity in the United States: A Theoretical Framework’, Ethnic and Racial Studies, vol. 13, no. 2, pp. 198-224 LOVE, E. 2009 ‘Confronting Islamophobia in the United States: framing civil rights activism among Middle Eastern Americans’, Patterns of Prejudice, vol. 43, no. 3-4, pp. 401-425 MAIRA, S. M. 2009 Missing: Youth, Citizenship, and Empire After 9/11, Durham, NC: Duke University Press MIN, P. G. (ed) 2006 Asian-Americans: Contemporary Trends and Issues, Thousand Oaks: Pine Forge Press OKAMOTO, D. G. 2003 ‘Toward a Theory of Panethnicity: Explaining Asian American Collective Action’, American Sociological Review, vol. 68, no. 6, pp. 811-842 OMI, M. and H. WINANT 1986, Racial Formation in the United States: From the 1960s to the 1980s, New York: Routledge ------- 1994, Racial Formation in the United States: From the 1960s to the 1990s, 2nd edn, New York: Routledge PEW RESEARCH CENTER 2007 ‘Muslim Americans: Middle Class and Mostly Mainstream’, May 22, Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2010/10/ muslim-americans.pdf (accessed May 25, 2013) PEW RESEARCH CENTER 2011 ‘Muslim Americans: No Signs of Growth in Alienation or Support for Extremism’, August 30, Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, http://www.people press.org/files/legacy-pdf/Muslim%20American%20Report%2010-02-12%20fix.pdf (accessed May 25, 2013) PORTES, A. and R. RUMBAUT 2006 Immigrant America: A Portrait, 3rd edn, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press RANA, J. 2011 Terrifying Muslims: Race and Labor in the South Asian Diaspora, Durham, NC: Duke University Press SAMHAN, H. H. 1999 ‘Not Quite White: Race Classification and the Arab-American Experience’, M. W. Suleiman (ed), Arabs in America: Building a New Future, Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, pp. 209-226 SHANKAR, L. D. and R. SRIKANTH (eds) 1998 A Part, Yet Apart: South Asians in Asian America, Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press SHRYOCK, A. 2008 ‘The Moral Analogies of Race: Arab American Identity, Color Politics, and the Limits of Racialized Citizenship’, in A. Jamal and N. Naber (eds), Race and Arab Americans Before and After 9/11: From Invisible Citizens to Visible Citizens, Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, pp. 81-113 TEHRANIAN, J. 2009 Whitewashed: America’s Invisible Middle Eastern Minority, New York: New York University Press WEI, W. 1993 The Asian American Movement, Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press WIMMER, A. 2013 Ethnic Boundary Making: Institutions, Power, Networks, Oxford: Oxford University Press MEHDI BOZORGMEHR is Professor in the Department of Sociology at City College and The Graduate Center, City University of New York (CUNY). 29 http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2010/10/ ADDRESS: The Graduate Center, CUNY, 365 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10016. Email: mbozorgmehr@gc.cuny.edu PAUL ONG is Professor in the Departments of Urban Planning, Social Welfare, and Asian American Studies at the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA). ADDRESS: 5287 Public Affairs Building, UCLA, Los Angeles, CA 90095. Email: pmong@ucla.edu SARAH TOSH is a doctoral student in the Department of Sociology at The Graduate Center, City University of New York (CUNY). ADDRESS: The Graduate Center, CUNY, 365 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10016. Email: stosh@gc.cuny.edu 30 
work_nf7ot37h3zdtjaayempx7b3uqm	----	41592 ghs_15-1 Engaging with the Media in a Pre and Post Brexit World: Racism, Xenophobia and Regulation: A United Kingdom Perspective Kim McGuire University of Central Lancashire ABSTRACT This paper engages with the perception that the UK media was instru- mental in promoting racism and xenophobia in the period before the UK EU referendum. Furthermore, that this promotion led to actual hate crimes within the UK: How and why this occurred are central research issues. However, a further question is why no prosecution took place of either indi- viduals within the media, or media companies themselves, promoting such rhetoric. Primary data analysis consisted of surveying newspaper content, online or otherwise, and particularly the tabloid press, but also EU reports, legislation, including Article 10 and 10.2 European Convention on Human Rights (Freedom of Expression), and European Court of Human Rights cases. Academic literature on Racism and Xenophobia, and their encour- agement was utilised. The conclusions revealed weaknesses in the percep- tion, identification and prosecution of ‘hate speech’ and racist and xenophobic material. Moreover, that prosecution has also proven problem- atic because of competing notions of ‘Freedom of Expression’ for individu- als and organisations. However, regarding the media, the internal procedures, lack of adherence to ethical standards and lack of compulsory external regulation, further enabled such content. The effect cannot be con- clusively determined, although spikes in recorded hate crimes coincided with virulent media content. Key Words: Media, Racism, Intolerance, EU, UK. Regulation, Perception. INTRODUCTION In the UK, various opinion polls have been conducted since the 2016 EU referendum. (European Commission Against Racism and Intolerance, 2016). These have produced “evidence” of many population viewpoints which appear to entail dehumanising or demonising others. The 2016 Euro- pean Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) report on the United Kingdom noted considerable intolerant political discourse in the 255 256 JOURNAL OF HATE STUDIES Vol. 15:255 United Kingdom, particularly regarding immigration, a high number of vio- lent racist incidents, a sharp rise in anti-Muslim violence, as well as record levels of anti-Semitic incidents. In that regard, according to Christian Ahlund the Chair of ECRI, (as cited in Euractiv.com, 2016, October 4) “The Brexit referendum seems to have led to a further rise in ‘anti-for- eigner’ sentiment . . .” Furthermore, the European Commission against Racism and Intoler- ance (ECRI) stated that: . . . the ECRI considers that hate speech in some traditional media contin- ues to be a serious problem, notably as concerns tabloid newspapers. According to NGOs, the media play a prominent role in encouraging prejudice against Roma, Gypsies and Travellers, as well as other vulnera- ble groups. The European Roma and Travellers Forum has expressed concern that some media regularly disseminate biased or ill-founded information about these communities and that they distort and exaggerate facts and reinforce stereotypes. (European Commission Against Racism and Intolerance, 2016, p. 9) This article will analyse the role of the UK media, and in particular the tabloid press, to determine its potential role in promoting xenophobia and racism in the years 2013-2016. It will consider how the oft repeated claims to Freedom of Expression have complicated the regulation of xenophobia within the UK. Moreover, the article will suggest how the media could address these issues more appropriately in the future, as the final deadline for Brexit is on the horizon (October 2019), with the potential for increased xenophobia, racism and violent incidents. It concludes that the absence of ‘perception’ of racism, xenophobia and hate crimes, or proof of this, limits any desired effect. The need for a community of practice, academics, practi- tioners, the public, to raise awareness, challenge racism and promote ethical behaviour continues. Xenophobia is defined herein as literally ‘fear of the stranger’, but more usually the term is taken to mean ‘hatred of strangers’ (Smelser & Baltes, 2001) According to Boehnke, (as cited in NGO Working Group on Migration and Xenophobia, 2001, p.2), Xenophobia can be understood as “an attitudinal orientation of hostility against non-natives in a given popula- tion.” This paper will argue that the press contributed to this hostility, and that this is indicative of existing prejudices: neither are currently being suf- ficiently acknowledged nor controlled. Indeed, the author argues that per- ception of an “undesirable other,” but also a lack of perception of such representations as potentially “hate crimes”, whether the legislation exists or not, should be the essential foci of research and education. As the 2001 Declaration on Racism stated: 2018-19 ENGAGING WITH THE MEDIA IN A PRE & POST BREXIT 257 (xenophobia) . . . is growing out of the existence of essentialist symbolic and normative systems that legitimate processes of integration or exclu- sion. Thus, xenophobic behaviour is based on existing racist, ethnic, religious, cultural, or national prejudice. Xenophobia can be defined as the “attitudes, prejudices and behaviour that reject, exclude and often vil- ify persons, based on the perception that they are outsiders or foreigners to the community, society or national identity”. (Declaration on Racism, 2001) As the Declaration also noted, xenophobia and racism often overlap, but are distinct phenomena: Whereas racism usually entails distinction based on physical characteris- tic differences, such as skin colour, hair type, facial features, etc., xeno- phobia implies behaviour based on the idea that the other is foreign to or originates from outside the community or nation. (ILO, IOM, OHCHR, 2001) For many, the Brexit vote was seen as a response to perceived uncon- trolled immigration, and included refugees, heightened ‘nationalism’, and for some, xenophobia and racism. BREXIT Brexit is more formally known as the United Kingdom European Union membership referendum, but also the EU referendum and the Brexit referendum: the result will lead to British exit from the EU. This referen- dum took place on 23 June 2016 in the United Kingdom (UK) and Gibral- tar. Its aim was to gauge support for the country either remaining a member of, or leaving, the European Union (EU). The referendum resulted in 51.9% of voters voting in favour of leaving the EU (UK votes to LEAVE the EU. n.d.). The United Kingdom government initiated the official EU with- drawal process on 29 March 2017; with the complete withdrawal process originally scheduled for 29 March 2019, changed to 31st October 2019. At the time of writing this article it is unclear when the withdrawal will actu- ally take place. Xenophobia and Racism in the Press. Migration and immigration were crucial issues in the UK in the years before and up to Brexit, and for some influenced their vote. Below analyses how such migration was reported and reveals significant differences in the tabloid and broadsheet press. Indeed, in 2014 The Migration Observatory of 258 JOURNAL OF HATE STUDIES Vol. 15:255 the University of Oxford revealed similar findings in their research on Bul- garians and Romanians in the British National Press for the period Decem- ber 2012 - 1 December 2013. (The Migration Observatory, 2014). Whilst both types of newspapers were concerned with travel, the broadsheets used the following verbs: “come, arrive, move, travel, head.” Tabloids, however, utilised metaphors related to scale, and often in animalistic forms: flood, flock (The Migration Observatory, 2014). This difference is important, since the latter is not only “naturalistic” but also emphasises number and particularly the perception of being “over- whelmed”: any lack of specific content denigrating potential immigrant groups is not indicative of the effect the media may have. The lack of specificity did, however, limit the potential for prosecution. That such rhet- oric is not automatically prosecuted is indicative of the lack of perception of the potential impact of language, whether written or spoken. Criticism is made, but no prosecutions result. Indeed, even politicians used this animalistic and apocalyptic lan- guage. In 2015 the then Prime Minister, David Cameron had called the Calais migrants “a swarm” in an interview (David Cameron criticised over migrant ‘swarm’ language, 2015). The UN Special Representative for International Migration subsequently accused British politicians of adopting a “xenophobic response” to the migrants’ crisis and said that the language had been “grossly excessive”. (David Cameron criticised over migrant ‘swarm’ language, 2015) Other political parties were similarly critical: The Scottish Nationalist Party said the PM’s language risked “inflaming what is already a tense situation”, while Liberal Democrat leader Tim Farron said it risked “dehumanising some of the world’s most desperate people”. (David Cameron criticised over migrant ‘swarm’ language, 2015) Green Party dep- uty leader Shahrar Ali said: “People will be disgusted at Cameron’s Calais comments and he should retract them immediately” (David Cameron criticised over migrant ‘swarm’ language, 2015). As argued above, the per- ception that immigrants and migrants would overwhelm the state, exhibit- ing a simultaneous non-human identity, proliferated within the press, and appeared bolstered by politicians’ statements. Newspapers, particularly the tabloids, had been consistently highlight- ing immigrant numbers for some years up to 2016, with interest “spiking” at times of potential widening of access to the UK and up to Brexit. Aca- demics have charted simultaneous spikes in hate crimes (Devine 2018). Whilst the press contained elements of “truth,” or “fact” regarding empiri- cal evidence, the language used, and the lack of context created a climate of fear for many. The existence of “fact” is a requirement of legislation in states such as Belgium and Ireland, (Article 5 Belgium’s Code, Irish Code 2018-19 ENGAGING WITH THE MEDIA IN A PRE & POST BREXIT 259 of Practice), but similar legislation in the rest of the UK would not necessa- rily make prosecution more effective. Indeed, the press did utilise facts, for example, that from 1st January 2014 Bulgarian and Romanian citizens were free to live and work in the UK after the expiration of controls that had been in place since 2007. However, such facts were accompanied by alarmist rhetoric in various newspapers in the preceding period. In January 2013, for example, The Telegraph gave the headline “250,000 Bulgarians and Romanians ‘head to UK’ ”, with the text not making clear that this was an estimated five-year figure, and with no discussion of the likelihood of these groups making the journey. (The Tele- graph, 2013) Sir Andrew Green, the Chairman of Migration Watch stated that “It is likely to be on a scale that will have significant consequences for housing and public services. . .it will also add further to the competition which young British workers already face” (Johnson, 2013, January 17). Public memory may have seen similarities between the extension to Bulgarians and Romanians and the earlier situation when Poland and other Eastern European countries gained the same rights in 2004. As a result of the latter, “more than one million people arrived in (the UK in) one of the biggest waves of immigration seen in this country.” (Johnson, 2013, January 17) Government ministers, seeing potential similarities and fears, utilised The Telegraph to reassure readers that the 2004 situation would not be repeated. However, they were subsequently criticised for being unable to provide” reassuring figures” (Dominiczak, 2013). The tabloid press created its own panic by stating numbers who would be entitled to come, not always mak- ing it clear that not all would choose to take advantage of this. The Mail Online stated “Up to 70,000 Romanian and Bulgarian migrants ‘will come to Britain’ when controls on EU migrants expire, and that ‘figures could soar if the nearly 1million Romanians already in other EU countries also come” (Webb, 2013). Whilst the language was not ani- malistic, it was accompanied by a visual image suggestive of a destitute alternative cultural group, with the caption highlighting their poverty and that Britain would thus be a desirable prospect. (Webb, 2013) The Telegraph used a photograph of the then Prime Minister David Cameron, looking troubled but resolute at such pronouncements. In May 2013 the Daily Express had stated: Up to 29 million citizens of the two countries will have the right to come to Britain to live when controls barring them from entering the country without a job are dropped at the end of the year. The curbs were intro- duced to prevent a repeat of the immigration chaos when Poland, Latvia and other former eastern bloc countries joined the EU in 2004. The Gov- 260 JOURNAL OF HATE STUDIES Vol. 15:255 ernment has repeatedly refused to give any estimate of the numbers expected to arrive here. But experts predict that up to 250,000 could come to Britain over the next five years. (Daily Express, 2013) By October, the same newspaper headlined with: “Britain is full and fed up: Today join our Daily Express crusade to stop new flood of Romanian and Bulgarian migrants” (Daily Express, 2013). Many urged the PM to “defy Brussels”, suggesting this would give greater control to the Uk over its own borders. Arguably, most British citizens recognised and accepted that being part of the European Union entailed accepting new migrants. However, some politicians, most notably Nigel Farage of the British Nationalist Party utilised imagery suggestive of Nazi propaganda in his campaigns. (Media Mole 2016) Many writers in the press appear to have similarly taken advantage of the fragile social and economic situation. Some had historically been inflammatory on a wide variety of issues, beyond race. Katie Hopkins’ for example, had long been a source of extremist views on class, and race. There is no denying that her article in The Sun, a tabloid newspaper, likening refugees to cockroaches, was poten- tially highly inflammatory, and subsequently criticised by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (Plunkett, 2016, July 28; Stone, 2015). To many her words were perceived as offensive, but not necessarily inciting violence or genocide to which she claimed to be unaware. Whether Hopkins was aware of the 1994 Rwandan genocide, and simultaneous and prior incitement using the term cockroaches is debatable, but does not lessen the offensiveness. Whilst her effect on the public can- not be automatically determined, (Katz 1957), such imagery has historically been seen as influential, and has led to criminal conviction of perpetrators, for example, Mugesera and the 1994 massacre of Tutsis in Rwanda, due to the result (Smith, 2003). Prosecution of those involved in hate speech, or even genocide has, however, historically proven difficult, not solely due to legislation or material facts. Indeed, previous work by this author has con- sidered the legal difficulty of proving a causal link between words and actions, and even the influence of the actors, particularly in severe cases of incitement (Eastwood, McGuire, & Salter, 2013). Mugesera’s lawyer had argued in early 2012 that his trial for the Rwanda massacre was unfair because no complete recording of the speech existed (and thus full context was missing). Decades earlier, the Nuremburg trials of Schmitt, Streicher and Fritzsche revealed that the for- mer two were perceived as the creative source and initiators of antiSemitic propaganda. However, Fritzsche was held to be a mere conduit for the hate speech of others, thus lessening his ‘crime’. I conclude that 2018-19 ENGAGING WITH THE MEDIA IN A PRE & POST BREXIT 261 it is arguable that the explanation for the discrepancies and divergent out- comes in these three cases was related less to the application of settled legal doctrine to material facts, than to the selective interpretation of the facts themselves, driven in part by the subjective impression created by these three individuals (Eastwood, et al., 2013, p.123). In more contemporary context, and with regard to the Hopkins cock- roach article, and potential prosecution, Matt Tee of the Independent Press Standards Organisation used The Guardian newspaper to cite the legal arguments for non-prosecution. He argued that migrants could not be viewed as victims of discrimination even when they were compared to cockroaches. His claims focused upon specific linguistic interpretation of” legal complainant”. He stated the comments were also not covered by the editors’ code, and he was unclear whether Hopkins comments could indeed be prosecuted as an incitement to racial hatred. Tee commented, Migrants as such are not a group that can be discriminated against . . . And actually in our terms for it to be discrimination, the complainant would have had to show that an individual or a group of individuals were discriminated against by that phrase . . . I felt that the phrase was in very bad taste but bad taste is not something that is covered by the editors’ code. (as cited in Plunkett, 2016, July 28) Regarding incitement to racial hatred Tee further added that: There were suggestions with the Katie Hopkins piece that it was an incitement to racial hatred. That’s a legal matter. I don’t think the com- missioner of the Metropolitan police has taken any action over that. . . . In terms of the editors’ code, there wasn’t anything that could lead to a successful complaint against that column. (as cited in Plunkett, 2016, July 28) The Society of Black Lawyers did report Hopkins to the Metropolitan Police, claiming that her words were offensive and xenophobic. Arguably, her comments met the legal threshold for the Public Order Act 1986, Part 111, s18, inciting racial hatred: they could be seen as threatening, abusive or insulting and either intended to stir up racial hatred, or make it likely that racial hatred will be stirred up. However, any prosecution would need to balance this threshold against the rights of people to “robustly exchange views, even when these may cause offence”. (Plunkett, 2016, July 28) Miss Hopkins was interviewed, but later wrote in a tabloid online newspaper, The Mailonline:” During my interview under caution, I deliv- ered a long Hopkins rant about the importance of free speech and how I stood by every word I said and wrote” (as cited in Duell, 2015, November 262 JOURNAL OF HATE STUDIES Vol. 15:255 23). Proving Hopkins’ intent might have proven problematic, and it is sig- nificant that she drew upon the concept of” free speech”. Potentially how influential her words might be in “making it likely that racial hatred would be stirred up” was presumably determined as unlikely, since the Crown Prosecution Service decided not to prosecute. Moreover, it is not an offence if the person is not aware that the material might be threatening, abusive or insulting. Hopkins was presumably deemed insufficiently influential, or there were fears that prosecution would merely” fan her flames” and perhaps make her a martyr to free speech, or not in the public interest, or difficult to prove. She was however, sacked from The Sun newspaper following the furore over the comments. No major politicians were so treated, potentially raising the issue of gender discrimination, or the ease with which writers like Hopkins could be dismissed. Why her column was used by The Sun is a moot point, but her controversialist writing had been her “selling point” throughout her media career. As suggested by the above, and according to the 2016 EU report, UK reporting on immigration, terrorism and the refugee crisis was conflated. Prejudicial comments from well-known political figures were stated to Have an impact on the public and legitimise intolerance . . . (and)can only contribute further to the already high levels of hostility towards cer- tain vulnerable groups, (European Commission Against Racism and Intolerance, 2016,para 38, p.18) The report argued that such perceived influence could be countered by the establishment of a press regulator, (European Commission Against Racism and Intolerance, 2016, p.10) as per the recommendations set out in the Leveson Report (Leveson, 2012). As noted, however, immigrants and refugees were not necessarily covered by press regulation of “discrimina- tion.” Determining serious liability for incitement similarly seems to have proven difficult when comments are made in the public press. The UK cur- rently has two competing supervisory bodies for the press, deemed to be insufficient by the EU report. Below will discuss the difficulties encoun- tered during and following the Leveson Inquiry. Regulating Derogatory or Inflammatory Content In the absence of recognition of discrimination, or outright criminal incitement in the press, the question of how to regulate inaccuracies and prevent potential harm was a continuing issue after the publication of the Leveson Report (Leveson, 2012). The Leveson inquiry was a judicial public 2018-19 ENGAGING WITH THE MEDIA IN A PRE & POST BREXIT 263 inquiry into the culture, practices and ethics of the British press. This was instigated following the News International phone hacking scandal, and was chaired by Lord Justice Leveson, appointed in July 2011. As noted above the EU report of 2016 had called for press regulation, as per this Leveson report. The latter had recommended a new regulatory body to replace the Press Complaints Commission, and self-regulation (ECRI, 2016). The National Union of Journalists issued a statement calling for jour- nalists to “. . . operate within our recognised code of ethics” (Stanistreet, 2012, p. 7). In March 2013 the UK government announced a regulatory framework to be set up in a Royal Charter, but not by Statute. The new regulator would be able to order front page corrections. However, press participation would be crucial. An important departure from the previous press complaints commis- sion is the post- Leveson acceptance of a “conscience clause for journal- ists,” and the acceptance of third party responses to content in the press (Stanistreet, 2012, p. 7). Previously the latter could be refused if persons had not been specifically identified. However, the National Union of Jour- nalists already has a Code of Conduct, s9 of which states that a journalist must not produce material, “likely to lead to hatred or discrimination on the grounds of a person’s age, gender, race, colour, creed, legal status or sexual orientation.” (Ethic Net. n.d). The current Independent Press Standards Organisation (IPSO) Code of Practice states that the press “must avoid prej- udicial or pejorative reference to an individual’s, race, colour, religion, sex, gender identity, sexual orientation or to any physical or mental illness or disability.” (IPSO, December 2018, s12) As the Katie Hopkins case above illustrates, this conscience code has not necessarily led to any actual significant change. It appears that labelling columns such as Hopkins as “opinion” is one method newspapers use to avoid breaching this code, and criminal sanction. As Tee, (cited in Plunkett, 2016, July 28) stated: I think it is important that columnists, particularly where it is very clear that this is a personal opinion, a column, in Katie Hopkins terms or . . . whoever, people who cause mass offence, it is very clear there is a pic- ture at the top of the column, it is very clearly a column, which is their view, their opinion. According to an Article 19 report (Article 19, 2018, 1st March), the main difficulty with regulation of the press is that the UK has no written constitution, and English criminal law has no governing instrument such as a penal code. The report stated: the criminal restrictions upon “hate speech” and the media thus reflect the UK’s piecemeal legal structure. . .’ 264 JOURNAL OF HATE STUDIES Vol. 15:255 (Article 19, 2018, March 1st, p.4). However, I argue that it is the perception of hate crime, or the lack of this perception, that creates the difficulty, irre- spective of whether legislation exists or not. Whilst the police and the Crown Prosecution Service are equipped (subject to funding constraints) and do prosecute individuals engaging in hate speech: the report found that the criminal law has not been used against a media outlet for many years, and never for engaging in ‘hate speech’ in relation to any person or group of persons on the basis of a protected characteristic” . . . There is no mechanism by which the very powerful British print media may be held to account for the disparagement of a group of persons on the basis of a protected characteristic (Article 19, 2018, March 1st, p.4). Arguably, this lack is due to misperception of the purpose of existing legislation, and misrecognition of acts as meeting the threshold for prosecu- tion, even voluntary codes of ethics have not conquered this lack of identification. Media Self-Regulation and Hate Speech Indeed, another potential difficulty for regulation of the press in the UK is that the print media is self-regulated, either by one of the two inde- pendent regulators - the Independent Monitor of the Press (IMPRESS) or the Independent Press Standards Organisation (IPSO) - or by the media itself (e.g. Financial Times and The Guardian). However, there is no need for these regulators to ensure that minorities are represented, and potentially this limits the perception of offence, or racism, or xenophobic content. No figures are available to indicate that minorities are included in any key posts. Moreover, IMPRESS does not regulate any national newspaper, as the latter have refused to join IMPRESS, citing a perceived lack of indepen- dence (Article 19, 2018, March 1st, p.39). Another issue is that some involved in IMPRESS have previously been the object of press investiga- tion for other alleged indiscretions, potentially suggesting a conflict of interest in media regulation. Moreover, as the Article 19 report confirms, and the above commen- tary on the Katie Hopkins article, codes of conduct are limited in what they cover. IMPRESS’s Standards Code, for example, includes provisions about accuracy and non-discrimination, and one provision specifically dealing with hate speech, but only to the extent that it constitutes” incitement to hatred.” (Article 19, 2018, 1st March, p.39). The IPSO’s Editors’ Code of Practice (the ECP) does not contain any provision specifically dealing with 2018-19 ENGAGING WITH THE MEDIA IN A PRE & POST BREXIT 265 hate speech, but does include provisions about accuracy and non-discrimi- nation (Article 19, 2018, p.39, s12 IPSO code of Practice 2018). As the examples above have illustrated, proving that even these stan- dards have been breached has proven problematic. It is often argued that in an increasingly competitive media environment: . . . many media employers have sacrificed reporting standards in pursuit of commercial objectives, overriding ethical values with journalism that is populist, sensational and biased (OECD, 2010). Equally, it is argued that legitimate discussion of immigration and potential effect should not automatically be prevented or portrayed as right wing. It is the language used and the intent that is potentially problematic when considering prosecution. Academic, human rights, and legal articles on discrimination and the rise of hate crime legislation often cite historic tensions, particular the World War Two genocides, if considering mainland Europe (European Net- work of Legal Experts in the Non-Discrimination field, 2011). However, it is clear that immigration in whatever period can create new tensions, since member states of the EU expect freedom of movement, and access to resources, for their peoples. In 2003 Matthew Randall wrote that: Irrespective of party, leading politicians repeatedly highlight issues of exclusion — fears of “invasion”, alleged “threats” and actual prejudices — ensuring a very negative image of immigrants despite their statisti- cally small impact on society. . . . Concerns over crime, disease, terror- ism, detention and surveillance are consistently pushed well to the fore. This lack of balance can be attributed to a number of factors, including the existence of a covert racist ideology and the political expediency of “the race card” — factors that repeatedly compromise the welfare of ref- ugees and immigrants. (Randall, 2003 December 8). The European Convention on Human Rights and Xenophobia and Racism Currently, the European Convention on Human Rights does not specif- ically address the freedom of the media. However, it does allow the free- doms under article 10 to be limited. Considering hate speech, there is the possibility of regulation through the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). The ECtHR does not give carte blanche freedom of speech, and excludes hate speech from protection by means of two approaches provided for by the European Convention on Human Rights: a) by applying Article 17 (Prohibition of abuse of rights) where the comments in question amount to hate speech and negate the fundamental values of the Convention, or b) 266 JOURNAL OF HATE STUDIES Vol. 15:255 by applying the limitations provided for in the second paragraph of Article 10 and Article 11. However, the contexts and purposes of the media and of the speech are seen as crucial. The reasoning behind limitation of Art 10 is illustrated in Witzsch v Germany, where it was stated that comments made in private letters could constitute “Abuse of freedom of expression (that) is incompatible with democracy and human rights and infringes the rights of others. (Witzsch v Germany, 2005, p. 8) Conversely, the European Court of Human Rights in Jersild v Den- mark (1994, Sep 23) emphasised the vital role of the press and audio visual media as” public watchdog”. (Jersild v Denmark 1994, Sep 23, para 31. In this case, where the racist extremist views of members of the Greenjackets were aired on a TV programme, the case concerned whether the conviction of the journalist ‘for having aided and abetted the dissemination of racist remarks violated his right to freedom of expression within the meaning of Article 10 of the [ECHR].” Jersild v Denmark, 1994, Sep 23, para. 25) The ECtHR considered the programme, manner, contents, context, and purpose as crucial. It was stated that: “. . .the object of the programme was to address aspects of the problem, (racism) by identifying certain racist indi- viduals and by portraying their mentality and social background. . . . “ (Jer- sild v Denmark, 1994, Sep 23, para 33) The Court emphasised that the item was broadcast as part of a serious Danish news programme, intended for a well-informed audience, and that there were some features that counterbal- anced the extremist views expressed: although the specific remarks made by the Greenjackets, read out of con- text, were highly offensive, the way in which they were presented and the objective pursued by the applicant were, in the circumstances, sufficient to outweigh the effect, if any, on the reputation or rights of others. (Jer- sild v Denmark, 1994, Sep 23, para. 25) The court stated that: “News reporting based on interviews, whether edited or not, constitutes one of the most important means whereby the press is able to play its vital role of “public watchdog”. (Jersild v Denmark, 1994, Sep 23, para 31) There were, however, seven dissenting judges to the decision that Article 10 rights had been violated. For a further two judges the defendant failed to react against racist remarks and should therefore receive no compensation. It is likely that post Brexit the CJEU will continue to have an influence on UK domestic law. This is because section 6(2) of the EU (Withdrawal) Act 2018 states courts/ tribunals “may have regard to anything done on or after exit day by the European Court, another EU entity or the EU so far as 2018-19 ENGAGING WITH THE MEDIA IN A PRE & POST BREXIT 267 it is relevant to any matter before the court or tribunal.” (EU (Withdrawal) Act 2018 s 6.2). Second, the fundamental rights enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights are unlikely to disappear. Although Section 5(4) of the Act states that the Charter will no longer be part of domestic law, paragraph 106 of the Explanatory Notes says “those underlying rights and principles will also be converted into UK law”. Arguably, this means lawyers will still be able to use case law in which these general principles were referred to, if interpreted as relevant (EU (Withdrawal) Act 2018: Young, 2018). CONCLUSION Whatever legislation exists to promote social cohesion, including the hate crime bias laws that are often included within this, these compete with alternative imagery and rhetoric, and popular interpretations. (Dixon & Gadd, 2006). Whether such disparities could be dealt with by regulation of the press as suggested by the Leveson inquiry, the EU report, self-regula- tion or the CJEU is problematic: the recent examples given above, suggest some difficulties. Indeed, I argue that the failure to perceive some acts as hate crimes remains the “elephant in the room”, limiting the potential to prevent racism and xenophobia, and curb the influence of the press. Thus there is a continued need for a community of practice, including academics and practitioners, to promote ethical journalism and awareness of the exis- tence and reason for ‘hate crime’ legislation and human rights. REFERENCES Anderson, B. (1983). Imagined communities. London, UK: Verso. Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001. Agency. (2016, March 11). Archbishop of Canterbury says it is not racist to fear high level of immigration. The Independent. Retrieved from http://www .independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/archbishop-of-canterbury-says-it-is-not- racist-to-fear-high-level-of-immigration-a6924601.html Article 5 Belgium’s Code of Journalistic Principles. 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work_njmb6yijlzfvpj6kug2zoyndwm	----	CBP412 479 Cognitive and Behavioral Practice 12, 479–490, 2005 1077-7229/ 05/479 – 490$1.00/0 Copyright © 2005 by Association for Advancement of Behavior Therapy. All rights of reproduction in any form reserved. Providing Culturally Sensitive Care for Transgender Patients Shira Maguen, Jillian C. Shipherd, and Holly N. Harris, VA Boston Healthcare System, National Center for PTSD, Women’s Health Sciences Division and Boston University School of Medicine Culturally sensitive information is crucial for providing appropriate care to any minority population. This article provides an over- view of important issues to consider when working with transgender patients, including clarification of transgender terminology, di- agnosis issues, identity development, and appropriate pronoun use. We also review common clinical issues for transgender individu- als seeking mental health care, how these can be addressed within a CBT framework, and the process of setting up a CBT support group within a VA hospital system. CBT group outcome data and demonstrative examples from male to female transsexuals are also presented. SYCHOLOGISTS RARELY RECEIVE TRAINING in transgender is- sues, although a wide range of information exists on how to work with transgender clients in a culturally sensi- tive fashion (e.g., Anderson, 1998; Carroll & Gilroy, 2002; Israel & Tarver, 1997; Lev, 2003; Lombardi, 2001; Lom- bardi & van Servellen, 2000; Pazos, 1999; Raj, 2002). Given the scope of issues that may be identified by trans- gender individuals when seeking therapy, it is important for mental health professionals to educate themselves about this population in order to provide the most clini- cally appropriate, sensitive and supportive care possible. We have yet to find a transgender treatment resource specifically for cognitive behavioral therapists. Cognitive behavioral therapists are in an important position to pro- vide interventions for transgender individuals, given that many presenting complaints will fall under the rubric of evidence-supported therapy (e.g., CBT for trauma recovery, anxiety, and depression). Further, transgender-specific is- sues can also be addressed within a CBT framework. As- sisting transgender individuals in identifying situations, thoughts, and feelings and how these may function to- gether, assisting with good problem-solving behaviors, and psychoeducation about transgender issues are all ser- vices that cognitive behavioral therapists can provide within a therapeutic context. Defining Some Crucial Terms It should be noted that there are a multitude of terms within this community, and existing literature reviews the costs and benefits of using various transgender-related terminology (Carroll, Gilroy, & Ryan, 2002; Feinberg, 1996). Having noted this, we use the term “transgender” as an umbrella term to describe individuals that do not fit into the binary gender categories of male and female. In some ways, providing further definition for subgroups of transgender persons runs counter to the transgender all- inclusive philosophy (Boswell, 1998). However, for the new- comer to this literature, there are some subgroups within the transgender community that can be identified, in- cluding the categories we describe below, although they are not exhaustive. The definitions we include are those most commonly referred to by the transgender clients we have encountered and by existing literature (e.g., Carroll et al., 2002; Israel & Tarver, 1997). For example, “trans- sexuals” are individuals whose gender does not match the sex that they were assigned at birth. Transsexuals often describe feeling that they were born in the wrong body and often take gradual steps toward changing their body to better fit with their internal gender identity. Thus, these individuals are often referred to as “male to female” (MtF; also known as transgender females) or “female to male” (FtM; also known as transgender males). Trans- sexuals often begin hormone therapy and/or undergo a number of transformative surgeries to assist with the gender-changing process. The transition to living full-time in an identified gender is not a linear process but often a complex, intricate, and convoluted journey (e.g., Levine & Davis, 2002; Taft, 2004). Initial confusion is common and sometimes marked by periods of hyper-masculinity/ femininity in a quest to fully understand gender roles (Brown & Rounsley, 2003). Many but not all transsexual individuals ultimately seek to “pass” (i.e., to be viewed by the majority of individuals as one’s identified rather than assigned gender) and move toward living “full time” as their identified gender. It is culturally appropriate to refer to individuals as their self-identified gender, regardless of their appearance or level of transition (i.e., referring to a MtF individual as “she” rather than “he”). P 480 Maguen et al. “Cross-dressing,” a term more appropriate for individ- uals assigned a male gender at birth, also comprises a sub- group of the transgender community. Cross-dressers, also referred to as transvestites in the past, usually live as the “opposite sex” on a part-time basis for a variety of reasons, and may or may not feel incongruence between their as- signed and self-identified gender. These individuals may dress as women at home or at cross-dressing social events but otherwise live life as a male. “Intersexuality,” formerly known as hermaphroditism, is a third subgroup of the transgender community, com- posed of individuals who may be born with male and fe- male biological markers (e.g., ovaries and external male genitalia). Despite having both male and female sex char- acteristics, intersex individuals are usually assigned either a male or female gender at birth by family members and/or medical providers. As they grow older, their assigned gen- der may or may not fit with their self-identified gender. A fourth group within the transgender community con- sists of individuals who feel that they fall somewhere in the middle of the gender continuum. These individuals live openly as what has been defined as “gender outlaws,” “gender queer,” and/or “gender nonconformists,” indi- viduals who are neither male nor female, yet have the outward appearance of both (e.g., breasts and a beard). Gender nonconformists may partially transform their bodies using hormones, may recognize that they do not fit into the existing binary gender categories, and often do not identify as either male or female. Gender Identity Disorder as a Diagnosis Gender Identity Disorder (GID; American Psychiatric Association, 1994) is a psychological diagnosis that de- scribes individuals who demonstrate a cross-gender identi- fication, a prolonged and consistent discomfort with their biological sex, and/or a desire to alter their sex character- istics. The term “gender dysphoria” is also used to de- scribe individuals who manifest distress resulting from an incongruence of biological sex and gender identity. GID is a controversial diagnosis, as is the term gender dyspho- ria (see Bower, 2001; Cohen-Kettenis, 2001; Cole & Meyer, 1998). Some researchers argue that transgender individ- uals are a natural variation on the gender continuum and that by classifying GID in the DSM-IV , transgender indi- viduals are being stigmatized in the same way that gays and lesbians were before removal of homosexuality from the DSM-III (e.g., Bower, 2001; Wilson, 1997). As evidence supporting this position, gender dysphoria is resolved in 87% of male-to-female and 97% of female-to-male indi- viduals after completing sex reassignment surgery (Green & Fleming, 1990). Given the wide range of gender identities that exist, one way to be more sensitive and recognize the diversity of gender identities is to view sex as a continuum rather than as two dichotomous categories (e.g., Hubbard, 1998). This perspective can be viewed as a “transpositive therapeutic stance” (Raj, 2002). Indeed, there is ample evidence in biological research that there are more than two sexes. Fausto-Sterling (1993) advocated for at least five sexes in her groundbreaking article, “The Five Sexes: Why Male and Female Are Not Enough,” and has subse- quently argued that in fact, there are more than five sexes when one accounts for all of the variance in sex di- versity. Similarly, Eyler and Wright (1997) argue for a nine-point continuum when discussing gender. Thus, we believe that both sex and gender should be viewed as existing on continua, with gender being defined as the expression of sex. Transgender Identity Development Little empirical literature exists about transgender identity development. Thus, it is unclear through which specific stages of development these individuals will pass on the way to a cohesive transgender identity. A 14-stage transgender identity developmental model has been pro- posed, beginning with stages marked by anxiety and con- fusion about gender, followed by stages of growing toler- ance and acceptance, and concluding with integration and pride about transgender identity (Devor, 2004). An- ecdotal evidence fits this model well; many transgender individuals go through a stage when they engage in gender- stereotyped activities that are associated with the gender to which they were assigned at birth (Brown & Rounsley, 2003). In retrospect, these individuals often report that this behavior was initiated by a futile desire to become more comfortable with their assigned gender (i.e., Iden- tity Confusion: Stage 2 and Identity Comparison: Stage 3; Devor, 2004). For example, MtF individuals may enlist in the service in the hope that the military will help “trans- form” them (e.g., Brown & Rounsley, 2003; Helms, 2004). As an individual moves through Devor’s (2004) proposed stages, there is a greater acceptance and identification with a transgender identity. Midway through the model, the individual will begin to identify as transgender (Iden- tity Comparison: Stage 7) and seek more information about transgender individuals (Delay Before Acceptance: Stage 8). Next, disclosure of identity begins (Acceptance of Identity: Stage 9), which will lead to garnering re- sources for transitioning into living as one’s identified gender (Delay Before Transition: Stage 10), followed by a formal transition (Transition: Stage 11). In the last stages, an individual lives successfully as the identified gender (Acceptance of Posttransition Gender and Sex Identities: Stage 12), learns to manage stigma and integrates various aspects of identity (Integration: Stage 13), and embraces a transgender identity, sometimes engaging in activism (Pride: Stage 14). Although the model is a heuristic for each of the stages a given individual passes through, there Transgender Treatment 481 are many individual variations in the quest for a cohesive transgender identity. From our perspective at the Veterans Affairs (VA) Healthcare System, this model is particularly salient as it provides a framework for understanding why many MtFs may seek out military employment (e.g., Brown & Roun- sley, 2003). Over the years there has been a noticeable presence of MtF veterans as evidenced by the develop- ment of the Transgender American Veterans Association (TAVA; founded in 2003). Unfortunately, due to the gen- eral lack of training in working with this population, there has been confusion about how to treat MtF veterans, from both a psychological and medical standpoint. It is estimated that levels of bias and misinformation are high among health care professionals and that specialized training is far less frequent with a transgender population (Carroll & Gilroy, 2002). In fact, the insensitivity of health care providers has been cited as the primary reason why transgender individuals do not access services (Sanchez, 2002). Thus, providing services such as the one we detail below can be of particular importance to transgender vet- erans as they pass through each stage of transgender iden- tity development. Presenting Problems in Therapy Many transgender individuals seek therapy as part of the process of transitioning from their assigned sex to their identified gender. In fact, the Harry Benjamin In- ternational Gender Dysphoria Association (HBIGDA), an organization established in 1979 to protect and advo- cate for the appropriate care of transgender individuals, publishes standards of care (see http://www.hbigda.org/). Although controversial (e.g., Meyer et al., 2001), these standards suggest that before starting hormone therapy, a preliminary step in changing gender, transgender indi- viduals should seek therapy and/or an evaluation by a mental health professional who can write them a letter of support. Similarly, letters of support are required for gender reassignment surgery, during which a transgender individual undergoes genital transformation. Although requiring support from a mental health professional is a controversial issue, with some advocating its necessity and others feeling that it is infantilizing and insensitive (Car- roll & Gilroy, 2002), it is currently a necessary part of the process for most transgender individuals who seek to alter their bodies. Given that therapy is often suggested and/or a prereq- uisite for hormone therapy and surgical interventions, mental health professionals working with this population should be aware of the factors that exacerbate risk for mental health problems in transgender individuals. Trans- gender individuals are at risk for a range of clinical issues (Denny & Green, 1996), including but not limited to alco- hol and drug use, HIV, mental health problems (e.g., de- pression or anxiety), family conflict (or ostracism), home- lessness, unemployment, and suicidality (e.g., Clements, Wilkinson, Kitano, & Marx , 1999; Nemoto, Luke, Mamo, Chiang, & Patria, 1999; Reback & Lombardi, 1999). Transgender individuals are also at high risk of discrimi- nation, hate crimes, and physical assault, which in the worst cases result in death (e.g., Burgess, 1999; Welch & Shipherd, 2004). Lombardi, Wilchins, Priesing, and Ma- louf (2001) surveyed 402 transgender individuals and found that 25% experienced transgender-related violence in their lifetime. These rates are consistent with studies of the gay, lesbian, and bisexual community that examine rates of hate crimes (Herek, Gillis, & Cogan, 1999). How- ever, a recent study found that in comparison to their gay, lesbian, and bisexual counterparts, transgender individu- als are more likely to have experienced violent crimes that result in hospitalization or death (Kuehnle & Sulli- van, 2001). Therefore, psychological effects of being the victim of a hate crime may also bring a transgender indi- vidual into therapy for posttrauma-related problems or posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Social isolation and a lack of overall social support are also common in transgender individuals and are barriers to increased self-esteem and self-efficacy. For example, Lombardi (1999) has demonstrated the importance of social networks in transgender individuals’ lives and their effect on an individual’s level of social activity. Social sup- port is conceptualized as a crucial protective ingredient against the development of adverse mental health effects such as depression or anxiety in other populations (e.g., Goldberg, Van Natta, & Comstock, 1985; Windle, 1992; Zimet, Dahlem, Zimet, & Farley, 1988), and individuals with higher levels of social interaction have greater over- all well-being (Luke, Norton, & Denbigh, 1981). Further, social support has consistently been shown to have pro- tective qualities for trauma survivors at risk for developing PTSD (D. W. King, King, Foy, Keane, & Fairbanks, 1999; L. A. King, King, Fairbank, Keane, & Adams, 1998; Taft, Stern, King, & King, 1999). Conversely, individuals who report low social support and high distress are four times more likely to utilize medical services (Kouzis & Eaton, 1998). However, this study was not conducted with trans- gender individuals, and as a result the relationship between social support, distress, and service seeking among trans- gender individuals should be explored in future studies. Social support may serve as an important protective vari- able for transgender individuals that may result in de- creased mental health symptoms and service utilization, es- pecially given high rates of discrimination and victimization. Methods Due to the clinical demand to provide services to MtFs in our VA hospital, a decision was made to begin an MtF 482 Maguen et al. support group within the Women’s Stress Disorders Treat- ment Team (WSDTT). Conceptual Framework Given that there are no models or studies concerning group therapy for transgender individuals, our conceptu- alization of the group drew upon multiple theoretical ap- proaches, but was primarily based in cognitive-behavioral theory with a focus on developing problem-solving skills in multiple domains. For example, group participants were encouraged to openly discuss situations that arose during the week and were encouraged to identify auto- matic thoughts and feelings associated with these trans- gender-related situations. For any given situation, the focus was on challenging maladaptive thoughts, problem solving (including role playing), teaching assertiveness skills (e.g., advocating for oneself with medical providers), and/or simply offering support (e.g., in cases of discrimination). In addition to conceptualizing the group from a CBT perspective, we employed group theories (Yalom, 1995), viewing the group as a social microcosm, with each mem- ber playing a particular role within the group. We were especially attuned to individuals who adopted leadership roles within the group that tended to interfere with their own needs being met. The group also served to instill hope within group members, teach socializing tech- niques, highlight the importance of interpersonal relations, and serve as a corrective emotional experience (Yalom, 1995). We also conceptualized the group from a feminist theory perspective (Worell & Remer, 1992), believing that the group would ultimately serve to empower MtF veterans and give them a voice. We hoped to create an en- vironment where the veterans would be able to trade in- formation that would enhance their lives (e.g., information on health care, employment, housing, etc.), be challenged on issues that led to poor decision-making, and provide empowerment and support in a world where this popula- tion has often been stigmatized and silenced. Because previous transgender group/case studies have not been conducted, our examination of outcome mea- sures was purely exploratory in nature. We hypothesized that the group might influence social support outcomes but that depression, anxiety, and life satisfaction indices would not be changed, given that these were not explicit goals of the group. Procedures We have conducted several of these groups over time, with slightly varying procedures. Specifically, we initially only included MtF transsexuals who were living full time as women, but later changed our policies to include MtF veter- ans at all stages of transition and other gender-questioning individuals. Also, we have experimented with varying lengths of the number of sessions ranging from 8 to 12, but have settled on a 12-week program due to feedback by group members. Data reported in this article were col- lected before and after a 12-week group. We contacted MtF veterans within the VA system through informing primary care providers, word of mouth, and posting flyers around the hospital. The group was time-limited and had a designated discussion topic each week in order to focus the conversation. Our only inclu- sion criterion for the group was that participants were sober from drugs and alcohol during the sessions. Before starting the group, we met individually with each poten- tial group member to assess her needs and find out where she was in her identity development as a transgender per- son. We also reviewed potential topics to be covered in the group. In this individual session, we also discussed confi- dentiality issues, particularly as they related to documenta- tion and each individual’s phase of identity development. The data presented below are from participating group members who provided consent to participate, following approval of the study by the VA Boston Healthcare System Institutional Review Board (IRB). Individuals completed self-report measures prior to the start of the 12-session group and understood that their group participation or treatment was in no way contingent on study participa- tion. Posttreatment data were collected at the 12th ses- sion of the group. Although we chose to organize and present these data in the format of a traditional study, we recognize that these findings are more consistent with a case study due to the number of participants ( n � 6). Participants Six Caucasian MtF transsexuals were present when data were collected pretreatment and the information presented reflect these six women’s responses. The aver- age age of group participants was 47 years ( SD � 9.16; range: 32–59 years). Three participants reported that they had served in the U.S. Navy, two had served in the Marines, and one in the Army. The average length of ser- vice was 4 years ( SD � 1.97; range: 2–6 years). Four veter- ans reported living in an apartment that they rented, and two were homeless. Three of the veterans were unem- ployed, one was disabled, one was employed part-time, and one was employed full-time. Group members had been living as women for an average of 4 years ( SD � 2.97; range � 1 to 7 years). All group members began tak- ing hormones before they began living full-time as women. Group members began hormone therapy an average of 7 years ago ( SD � 4.03; range � 1 to 12 years ago). The average time between starting hormone ther- apy and living full-time as a woman was 3 years (range � 1 to 9 years). Group members varied greatly in the types of surgeries they reported. One group member had not had any surgeries, one had facial surgery, one had tracheal surgery, one had breast surgery, one had an Transgender Treatment 483 orchiectomy (i.e., testicles removed), and one had full sex reassignment surgery (i.e., removal of testes, vaginal construction). Group Structure The group met for 12 weeks in 60-minute sessions and was co-led by two clinicians. Each week, group began with a brief “check-in” with each group member about any transgender-related issues that were pressing. During this period, any progress on behavioral goals (described in Session 1 below) was also reported. The next agenda item was discussion of the specified topic for that week. These topics were culled collaboratively with participants from previous groups and provided a structure for each session (see Table 1). Psychoeducation was provided on the weekly topic and all participants were encouraged to discuss their experiences and consider problem-solving strategies for current issues and future plans. All participants were pro- vided with a small, pocket-sized journal and instructed to keep track of thoughts, feelings, and questions that had arisen during the week. Many veterans used the informa- tion in their journals as a springboard to discuss weekly topics and check-in at the start of group. Group members often compared experiences and offered suggestions to others struggling with similar issues. For many partici- pants, the group was the only forum members had to dis- cuss and problem solve concerning transgender issues. When veterans discussed transgender issues, they were asked to describe a specific situation, as well as their thoughts and feelings related to the particular situation. In this way, each veteran was able to receive feedback and sup- port from both group leaders and group members. While formal thought records were not utilized, when the in- formation shared by the veterans contained irrational thoughts, challenging questions were posed by both group leaders and other group members, which allowed vet- erans to reevaluate some of their automatic thoughts about the situation. Automatic thoughts were specifically challenged by asking veterans to evaluate evidence for and against a specific belief, as appropriate. Group lead- ers also labeled specific dysfunctional thought patterns as they arose (e.g., “emotional reasoning” or “all-or-nothing thinking”). After discussing the topic of the week, group leaders allowed a few minutes for closure and reintegration at the end of group (i.e., leaving the safe group environ- ment and entering an environment that might not be as safe or supportive). During this “check-out” period, veter- ans also specified behavioral goals for the coming week to help them achieve their identified longer-term goals. Based on feedback from previous group participants, an individual session was also provided at the conclusion of the 12-session group for each veteran. During this ses- sion, individualized feedback concerning progress in the group was provided (e.g., goal progress, skill acquisition). In addition, we collaboratively determined future goals for each member and brainstormed about how each veteran could best use future groups to meet her needs. Measures Demographics. We asked each individual to report age, branch of service, years in service, type of current resi- dence, employment status, number of years living as a woman, year a hormone regimen was started, and type of surgery/surgeries received (if any). In addition, partici- pants were asked in which areas of their lives they were currently experiencing significant difficulties, with op- tions of housing, employment, having enough social sup- port, sobriety from drugs and/or alcohol, anxiety and/or depression, and trauma sequelae/PTSD listed as options. Beck Depression Inventory (BDI). The BDI (Beck, Ward, Mendelsohn, Mock, & Erbaugh, 1961) is a widely used self-report checklist measure of depression. Items are rated on a 4-point Likert scale, based on depressive symp- toms over the past week. Responses to each item are added for a total score of global depression, with higher scores indicating more depression. This measure was in- cluded to track fluctuations in mood that occurred over the course of the group and also to monitor suicidal ide- ation in this at-risk population (Carroll, 1999). State and Trait Anxiety Inventory. This scale contains 20 items assessing state anxiety (transitory; STAI-S) and 20 items assessing trait anxiety (chronic; STAI-T), rated on a 4-point Likert scale (Spielberger, Gorsuch, & Lushene, 1970). Half of the items on these measures are reversed scored and then a total is generated to determine anxiety levels, with higher scores reflecting more anxiety. Both the STAI-S and STAI-T were administered to evaluate if anxiety levels could be influenced by the cognitive and behavioral changes encouraged during treatment. Network Orientation Scale (NOS). This scale includes 20 Table 1 Sample Group Topics for a 12-Week Group Week 1: Introductions, ground rules, confidentiality Week 2: Childhood, identity, and development Week 3: Military service and young adulthood Week 4: Personal safety (e.g., drug and alcohol use, HIV risk, hormone injection) Week 5: Employment Week 6: Housing Week 7: Social support Week 8: Family issues and parenting Week 9: Medical issues (e.g., hormone maintenance, surgeries, and health care) Week 10: Disclosure, passing, and socialization Week 11: Body issues and intimate relationships Week 12: Closure 484 Maguen et al. items designed to assess propensity to utilize social sup- port networks in times of need (Vaux, Burda, & Stewart, 1986). All items are rated on a 4-point Likert scale and half the items are reverse scored. A total score is gener- ated with higher scores indicating a positive network ori- entation. This measure was included to evaluate whether the proclivity to utilize social support networks increases following group attendance. Life Satisfaction Index (LSI). This scale consists of 18 items that are designed to assess degree of adjustment and satisfaction with current life circumstances (Neugar- ten, Havighurst, & Tobin, 1961). Patients can rate that they “agree,” “disagree” or are “unsure” for each of the state- ments. Weights are assigned to each of the responses for each item. These weights are then summed to determine overall score on this measure, with higher scores indicat- ing greater life satisfaction. This measure is typically used in the assessment of older adults because the measure compares current life satisfaction with previous perfor- mance in this area (e.g., I am just as happy as when I was younger). Thus, this measure was determined to be ap- propriate for the current population; each participant was asked to compare her life now to her life prior to ac- knowledging her transgender identity. Results Demographic Data At pretreatment, 67% of participants reported prob- lems with housing ( n � 4), 67% reported problems with employment ( n � 4), and 67% reported not having enough psychosocial support ( n � 4). Additionally, 34% of group members reported struggling to maintain sobri- ety from alcohol and drugs ( n � 2), 67% reported prob- lems with anxiety and/or depression ( n � 4), and 67% reported significant trauma histories and problems with PTSD symptoms ( n � 4). Pre-Post Self-Report Data Psychosocial results are presented for each of the five measures administered before and after group. Intra- individual change scores were not calculated given that there were only two data points per group participant. Overall, women in the group demonstrated improve- ment on measures of anxiety and depression from pre- to posttreatment, despite the fact that these symptoms were not specifically targeted for treatment in the group. One possibility is that individuals were able to use skills learned in the group to challenge maladaptive thoughts that also triggered depression and anxiety symptoms. Four of the six participants reported increases in their social support from pre- to posttreatment. However, life satisfaction in- dices decreased for the majority of participants over the course of treatment, perhaps due to the multitude of life changes, including becoming unemployed and homeless, that occurred for several group participants throughout the course of the group (see Table 2). Qualitative Data by Session Participants have provided their consent for inclusion of these illustrative examples through procedures reviewed by the IRB, and we describe these scenarios in general terms in order to fully protect our group members’ iden- tities. These are topics that apply to both group therapy and individual therapy with MtF transgender individuals. Pretreatment Appointments: Confidentiality, Goal Setting, and Information The VA system is one in which records are centrally com- puterized and, as a result, any health care provider can have access to an individual’s therapy notes. We did not want to unnecessarily “out” an individual (i.e., document that she was transgender without the given individual deciding to disclose her transgender identity to other providers). As a result, documentation was openly discussed during individ- ual meetings prior to the start of group. Each group mem- ber with whom we met preferred that we use the pronoun “she” in the notes. Upon consulting with our group mem- bers, we also collaboratively decided to call the group the “women’s identity group,” rather than the transgender identity group. We wanted to respect each individual’s con- fidentiality in the same way that we would not want to “out” individuals who were gay or lesbian. Unfortunately, we have found that other health care providers within the VA system have not been as mindful in their documentation. We advocate for protecting the confidentiality of sensitive information regarding gender identity and discussing this issue with each client in advance of documenting sessions. Goal setting was another topic covered in this individ- ual session. Group members were asked to choose up to three goals that could be operationally defined and were achievable within the time frame of the group (e.g., find- ing housing, scheduling a medical appointment, engag- ing in specific self-care activities). Participants kept track Table 2 Scores for Measures Pre- and Post-Group BDI State Trait NOS LSI Name Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post A 4 3 30 20 32 33 2.5 2.5 33 26 B 23 11 70 55 65 50 2.5 3.0 12 10 C 1 6 29 3 37 32 2.5 2.2 28 26 D 4 9 38 35 39 38 2.2 2.7 20 19 E 32 23 68 56 62 56 2.8 2.9 2 4 F 36 30 51 62 46 59 2.7 4.9 8 9 Note . NOS � Network Orientation Scale; LSI � Life Satisfaction Index. Transgender Treatment 485 of these goals in their journals and progress concerning each of these goals was monitored on a weekly basis during the check-in phase of the group sessions. Each week, group members were reinforced for moving forward with these goals and received assistance with their problem- solving efforts if they were unable to make progress. During the pre-group meetings “fact sheet” handouts were provided to group participants who were seeking in- formation on specific topics (e.g., step-by-step guide on how to legally change your name, local transgender- friendly shopping, information and resources for a num- ber of surgeries, information about hormone therapy, etc.). These fact sheets were used for educational purposes and were especially helpful for those who were early in the transitioning process. This early psychoeducational intervention was designed to create an atmosphere of trust and open exchange regarding information that can be difficult to talk about. Using these fact sheets, it was possible to challenge irrational beliefs about these issues and provide corrective information within a CBT frame- work. Finally, during these initial individual sessions, the rule of sobriety during group sessions was explained and discussed as it applied to each participant. Session 1: Confidentiality, Introductions, and Group Rules During the first group session, confidentiality was re- viewed. Participants were able to meet one another, dis- cuss expectations and concerns regarding group partici- pation, and detail their behavioral goals for the group. Session 2: Childhood, Identity, and Development This early session has assisted in creating bonds among group participants. Specifically, hearing that other trans- gender individuals struggled with similar gender issues in childhood and also felt alienated and confused during adolescence is extremely empowering and affirming for many of our group members. Given that adolescence is a difficult developmental period for most individuals, trans- gender individuals must negotiate a host of additional is- sues related to their gender identity development, which may cause them to feel even more alienated from their peers (Brown & Rounsley, 2003; Israel & Tarver, 1997). Growing up in a world in which gender is dichotomized creates a confusing backdrop for most transgender indi- viduals, especially given the scarcity of role models in this domain. Most transgender individuals in our group de- scribed knowing that they were different during adoles- cence, and even in early childhood (e.g., remembered creating games in which they got to be female), but not being able to label their experience until many years later. Due to feelings of being different, most group members described being “loners” and lacking close friends during the period where the peer group becomes a central facet of development for most adolescents. It is during this time that veterans may develop certain core beliefs about these experiences. As a result, during this group we probe for specific thoughts or beliefs about the self that may have be- come ingrained and need to be challenged (e.g., “Because I am different, no one will want to be close to me” or “if others don’t approve of me, I may not be worthy”). Session 3: Military Service and Young Adulthood For our veterans, early adulthood was a time during which many enrolled in the military, hoping that this hy- permasculine environment would help “set them straight” and facilitate adoption of a male gender identity. For many, the military was a disappointment due to the real- ization over time that their gender identity could not be changed. While many veterans reported playing a hyper- masculine role in order to fit in and be accepted by the group, others reported severe ridicule, and in the worst case, military sexual trauma (i.e., being raped by fellow soldiers). Most described “living a lie” during this period (i.e., pretending to be someone who they were not in order to get through their enlistment). For many, the mil- itary was the final confirmation that they were transgen- der and that this was an immutable identity. Session 4: Personal Safety Personal safety of group members was discussed on multiple levels. Physical safety was important due to the high rates of violence perpetrated against transgender people (e.g., Lombardi et al., 2001). During this group, members are reminded of these high rates and encour- aged to brainstorm about strategies to reduce personal risk (e.g., not traveling alone late at night, carrying a cell phone). We also discuss sexual communication, sexual safety (e.g., using condoms, high-risk partners), and HIV prevention/transmission (e.g., not sharing needles). Some of the group members had multiple risk factors for HIV (e.g., sex work, drug use) and as a result, we discussed the importance of being tested for HIV. Substance abuse was also covered during this session, especially given that reduc- tion of alcohol use was a goal for some group members. Session 5: Employment As our demographic data demonstrate, many individ- uals in the group alternated between having a job and being unemployed. Most group participants had to con- tend with a great deal of discrimination, especially when living full-time as women but not passing easily. As de- scribed by our group participants, discrimination was both overt (i.e., being told not to use the public re- strooms) and covert (i.e., coworkers talking behind an in- dividual’s back). Often, the majority of an individual’s employment history had been experienced as a male. As a result, asking for recommendations from past employers 486 Maguen et al. or describing past jobs that may be more male dominated (e.g., construction) became complicated, sometimes ne- cessitating disclosure of transgender status. Furthermore, a few group participants had transitioned from living full- time as male to female while employed. This caused a great deal of confusion for other workers, and in one sit- uation resulted in the veteran teaching coworkers about what it meant to be transgender. In other cases, it meant losing a job. It was also difficult for our group members to determine if they were fired for valid reasons or due to discrimination when the stated reasons were vague, such as “you were not living up to our standards.” Securing a new job became particularly challenging for individuals who did not pass well as women. Because of the multiple levels of reality-based discrimination, bias, and transpho- bia that group members experienced, many become dis- couraged when seeking employment. As a result, the group served as an important safe haven to challenge maladap- tive thoughts (e.g., “I can’t get a good job because I am transgender”) and assist with problem-solving skills con- cerning seeking transgender-friendly employment. Week 6: Housing In our sample, five of the six participants had been homeless at one point in their lives. In some cases, home- lessness was temporary and occurred after disclosure to a spouse or family member. In other cases, homelessness was a chronic problem, and reportedly compounded by discrimination by potential landlords. Group members reported housing discrimination ranging from subtle (i.e., not returning phone calls or e-mails after disclo- sure) to more direct (e.g., “We don’t have a room for people like you”). An important part of this group is ac- knowledging that discrimination exists while at the same time challenging dysfunctional thoughts that prevent group members from seeking or finding adequate hous- ing. Shared transgender-friendly housing resources was also an important component of this group. For example, when one veteran was homeless and struggling to find a place to live, other group members shared information about the relative merits and problems of the local shel- ters with regard to gender sensitivity. Week 7: Social Support A lack of social support was a commonly discussed problem, and group members generally used the group as a way to connect with other transgender veterans and expand social support networks. While a discussion of ex- isting support was important, the group also focused on thoughts and beliefs that prevented group members from expanding their social networks (e.g., fear of rejec- tion and overgeneralization about the attitudes of others toward transgender individuals). When consistent with specified objectives, group members were encouraged to set goals concerning reaching out to others and expand- ing support systems. Week 8: Family Issues and Parenting Family issues were always an important yet avoided group topic among our members. Similar to gay, lesbian, and bisexual individuals, many transgender individuals were disowned or cut off from their families after a trans- gender identity was disclosed. The majority of group members were no longer speaking to their parents and in rare cases spoke with siblings. This resulted in having to re-create families who accepted them and their transgen- der status, often consisting mainly of friends. Most of the group members struggled with this situation, and wished that their families could accept their current identity. In our experience, this caused fluctuating relationships with the biological family over time, but usually resulted in dis- appointment and a return to the re-created family. For example, one group member who had been living full time as a woman for many years was not allowed to have contact with her brother and his children because the brother feared that the veteran would confuse his chil- dren. Desperately wanting to have contact with her family, the veteran considered dressing as a man to go visit her brother and his family. After identifying automatic thoughts and feelings associated with this specific situation, group leaders and group members were able to offer support but also challenge some of the veteran’s core beliefs about herself and who she needed to be to have a rela- tionship with her family. Ultimately, she decided that dressing as a man to appease her brother would be deny- ing and falsely representing her true identity, something she had worked hard to overcome. Other group mem- bers struggled with religious parents who they feared would never understand or accept their true identity. Fam- ily issues were also complicated when group members had been married to women prior to transitioning and had children or even grandchildren who knew them in their male identities. Oftentimes the veterans felt con- flicted about having contact with their younger children or young grandchildren whom they feared they would “confuse.” In some cases, older children had chosen not to have contact with the veteran for a variety of reasons, which was a significant loss. Other veterans who were at earlier points of transition and were not living full-time as women struggled with disclosure to family members and the best way to tell loved ones about their transgender identity. In this situation, role-playing these interactions in the group offered an opportunity for practice and cor- rective feedback. Anecdotal stories from other group members also allowed for the opportunity to decatastro- phize and challenge all-or-nothing thinking (e.g., moving from “my family will never accept me” to “they may have a hard time at first but they will still love me”). Each of Transgender Treatment 487 the family issues described above offered opportunities to challenge maladaptive thoughts, teach problem-solving skills, and role-play difficult family situations. Week 9: Medical Issues (e.g., Hormone Maintenance, Surgeries, and Health Care) The group was an important forum for individuals to discuss different aspects of medical care and share infor- mation about providers who had been sensitive to their needs. Similar to many mental health providers, the ma- jority of medical providers do not receive training con- cerning how to treat transgender individuals (e.g., Israel & Tarver, 1997). Due to both the ambivalence group members felt about their bodies and the lack of training for medical providers, seeking health care was an uncom- fortable experience for our group participants. As a re- sult, many transgender individuals in the group avoided routine medical care. Further complicating this situation, several group participants were interested in a variety of medical procedures to transform their bodies, ranging from electrolysis to sex reassignment surgeries (i.e., geni- tal surgery). Due to the intricacies and complexities of these surgeries, comprehensive medical care was essen- tial. Our group benefited from the ability to share infor- mation about their experiences and provide advice to one another. For example, when one group member was seeking gender reassignment surgery, others offered ad- vice concerning surgeons and follow-up aftercare from research they had conducted and word-of-mouth in the transgender community. Additionally, all group partici- pants were provided with an opportunity to role-play in order to practice advocating for themselves with medical providers. Through this role-playing activity, group mem- bers were able to make suggestions and challenge mal- adaptive beliefs (e.g., “I don’t deserve specialized care be- cause I am transgender” or “I am not going to be taken seriously, so why bother”). Week 10: Disclosure, Passing, and Socialization Level of disclosure of transgender identity varied among group participants, with some disclosing to only a few select friends/family, and others disclosing to the ma- jority of loved ones and friends. Individuals used the group as an arena to problem solve and receive coaching about whom to tell, under what circumstances, and how to disclose. One example was a group member who wanted to tell her two older sons, to whom she felt close, before beginning her transition into living full-time as a woman. The group was used as a forum to practice and receive feedback about this disclosure as well as to challenge dys- functional thoughts that prevented her from disclosing (e.g., “They will never really be able to accept the real me”). The interaction between passing and disclosure was also important to our group participants. Those who passed well as women (i.e., passed for being a woman in a variety of circumstances) felt more fear about disclosing to others (e.g., “Everyone thinks I am a woman, so why bother telling others?”) than those who felt that they were not as likely to pass as women (“I might as well ex- plain myself since they will know that I am not a genetic female”). The benefits and barriers to disclosure (e.g., Maguen et al., 2005) were reviewed in this context, and the group assisted each member in making a decision that was best for her situation. Socialization was a crucial topic to discuss, given that our group participants had all been raised as men and in a military culture. For example, during the course of the group, some members commented on “feeling weak” for displaying varying degrees of sadness. While it was impor- tant to challenge this dysfunctional thought, the role of socialization was especially crucial to highlight in this sce- nario and in the context of describing the connection be- tween thoughts and emotions. Another common topic with respect to socialization into a new gender role is the issue of emotional closeness in friendships. For example, one group member expressed confusion about a female friend who frequently touched the veteran. Through psychoeducation about the nature of female friendships and by challenging dysfunctional thoughts concerning this relationship, the veteran came to understand that these gestures were expressed within the context of a friendship, rather than as signs of inter- est in a romantic relationship. Week 11: Body Issues and Intimate Relationships Among our group participants, some had romantic re- lationships either as men or as women with varying levels of success, while others had never had romantic and/or sexual relationships. During this session, group members were asked to think about what they were looking for in a partner. For at least one group participant, this was the first time she had considered which qualities she might find desirable, and her first response to this question was “anyone who will accept me.” One of the goals of the group was to empower group members to believe that they have a choice over whom they seek as a partner. All of our group members reported some level of discour- agement because they had bad experiences with dating, especially when they were trying to avoid disclosing their transgender identity. Therefore, when and how to dis- close transgender status was often discussed. General levels of dissatisfaction and discouragement with dating situations were also normalized, and participants were also encouraged to consider that these feelings are also common for genetic females. Body image is a confounding factor as well, and an im- portant aspect of this session is challenging unrealistic ex- pectations of what they hope their bodies will look like in 488 Maguen et al. the future (i.e., challenging notions of a “perfectly” female body). Another goal was working toward acceptance of their bodies in their current form, regardless of how it “fits” or does not fit into the stereotypical female body (e.g., com- ing to accept a larger frame size, bigger hands, etc.). Week 12: Closure While goals were tracked each week, in the final week a summary of progress was reported by each group mem- ber, and a list of maintenance goals or new goals were set for the coming weeks. The last session was also used to summarize what group members learned with respect to understanding the connection between their thoughts and feelings. We also reviewed specific thought-challenging strategies and problem-solving skills that had been used throughout the group. Group members were encour- aged to use the skills they learned and were given the chance to provide feedback to other group members or to group leaders within the context of the group. In the last part of group, members were asked to complete psy- chometric measures so that leaders could track improve- ments of each group member. Finally, individualized feedback sessions were scheduled in order to provide more specific feedback and to allow time for treatment planning specific to each group participant’s needs. Challenges Faced Implementing the Group During the group, each member took on a specific role. For example, one group member who had been liv- ing as a woman for nearly a decade and “passed” well served as a role model in some domains, providing useful information. While she served an important function in the group, it was also important to challenge her to dis- cuss some of her own issues in relation to being transgen- der so she too would be able to access support from group members. Another issue that arose in the group was consistency of attendance. Our MtF veteran popula- tion struggled with socioeconomic issues of employment and homelessness (due to issues of bias, discrimination, and comorbidity), and many group members’ employ- ment status fluctuated during the course of the group, which made attendance difficult. Homelessness and living far from the VA were also issues that affected attendance. During the course of the group, one member moved out of state and was not able to make group meetings. Many of our group members also lived in nearby states or out- side of the metropolitan area, and traveled many hours to attend group, which further highlights the need for more transgender-related services. Discussion While we believe that increasing cultural sensitivity with respect to transgender individuals is important for all therapists, given that seeking mental health care is often required in order for transgender individuals to re- ceive medical care that assists them in leading a gender- congruent life (e.g., seeking hormones, surgeries), we ar- gue that CBT therapists are in a unique position to assist transgender individuals. More specifically, CBT thera- pists are trained to provide evidence-based interventions that can assist transgender individuals with many present- ing problems (e.g., CBT for depression), and the majority of transgender-specific issues can be addressed within a CBT framework (e.g., challenging maladaptive thoughts about being transgender). We hope that the description of our group can serve as a roadmap for both group and individual therapy, and we have made an attempt to high- light some important areas for intervention within a pre- dominantly CBT framework. Transgender individuals face a number of challenges on their journey to living as their self-identified gender. The establishment of a transgender support group is one way to create a safe environment for individuals strug- gling to consolidate their gender identity. Group therapy for these individuals also reduces isolation and allows trans- gender experiences to be mirrored and validated by sim- ilar others. We utilized a cognitive-behavioral framework as the backbone of our group, employing techniques such as challenging maladaptive thoughts and encourag- ing active problem solving, especially involving issues of social support and affiliation. A common cognitive style among our group participants was catastrophic thinking, which had been compounded by repeated experiences with discrimination. Core beliefs also required some modification, given that none of our group members felt they had received acceptance on a societal level, which exacerbated existing negative self-images. Problem-solving skills were also an important area of intervention. Our veterans reported that these strategies were particularly useful when advocating for care in medical settings and when struggling with family or employment issues. The use of role-plays, modeling, and providing constructive feedback was reportedly helpful, especially in the prelim- inary phases of transition when individuals wished to practice disclosing their transgender identities to family members, friends, or coworkers. The power of basic psycho- education and “fact sheets” in this population should not be underestimated. Our veterans stated that this informa- tion was helpful in a number of domains ranging from the basics of establishing a transgender identity (e.g., legal name change) to information about preparing for medical procedures and engaging in safety behaviors (e.g., minimizing HIV risk). Further, the veterans reported that the regular “check-ins” were assistive in motivating behavioral changes they had identified. Group and feminist theories were also helpful and have allowed us to understand each individual’s role Transgender Treatment 489 within the social microcosm of the group as well as the importance of empowerment within a population that experiences chronic discrimination. When instituting this support group, we sought to provide a safe, support- ive, and judgment-free environment, in which veterans could openly explore issues related to being transgender, and receive support and validation from others who had experienced similar struggles. According to Devor (2004), these processes of “witnessing and mirroring” are the foundation for transgender identity formation. More spe- cifically, transgender individuals need to be accurately witnessed and mirrored in the eyes of others in a way that is consistent with an individual’s own self-perception. Devor (2004) argues that in addition to being mirrored by those that are different, transgender individuals also need to be validated by those who are similar. We found that the majority of transgender veterans that we encoun- tered had not previously participated in a group format with similar peers, and that several had little previous face-to-face contact with other transgender individuals (although some had participated in on-line chat groups). For many group members, simply being in such an envi- ronment seemed to reduce transgender-related isolation and stigma. Having this group in an environment such as the VA healthcare system also felt supportive to the veter- ans who had conceptualized being rejected at a systemic level (e.g., by a government organization). We hoped to facilitate creation of a social support environment within the group, given its importance in transgender individu- als’ lives (Lombardi, 1999). Additionally, we hoped to as- sist individuals’ access to support in their communities and to send the message that support can be found in places that each veteran might least expect. In an effort to quantify the benefits of the support group, we attempted to gather some data from our group partic- ipants. Measurement selection was difficult as there are no measures specifically designed to measure the psycho- social impact of a transgender support group. Given these limitations, it is clear that individuals from our group struggled with a number of transgender-related prob- lems, such as employment, housing, and lack of social support. Furthermore, individuals’ depression and anxi- ety scores seemed to decrease, and a propensity to utilize social support networks increased following group partic- ipation, trends that should continue to be investigated in future studies. Life satisfaction indices decreased for the majority of participants, possibly due to life changes such as becoming unemployed and homeless. Future studies should strive to employ a larger sample of transgender in- dividuals that are ethnically diverse and follow these indi- viduals for longer periods of time so that firmer conclu- sions can be drawn from outcome data, and longitudinal effects of the support group can be assessed. Future studies may also want to include measures of stigma, empower- ment, and social isolation to explore whether group treatment influences any of these variables. Ideally, psy- chometrically sound measures that tap relevant con- structs will be developed. In this article, we have tried to provide a brief snap- shot of the transgender individuals with whom we have had contact, their unique issues, the development of the group, and examples specific to working with this popu- lation. Overall, it is clear that we as providers have merely begun to understand the unique issues faced by this group and how to help transgender individuals in the most respectful way possible. Providing sensitive care is necessarily a collaborative process that is in the begin- ning of its evolution. The more providers can be aware of the elements of sensitive care, involving transgender pa- tients in this process, the more we can move towards provid- ing treatment that promotes amelioration of transgender- related problems, education, support, and empowerment. References American Psychiatric Association. (1994). Diagnostic and statistic man- ual of mental disorders (4th ed.). Washington, DC: Author. Anderson, B. F. (1998). Therapeutic issues when working with trans- gender clients. In D. Denny (Ed.), Current concepts in transgender identity (pp. 215– 226). New York: Garland Publishing. Beck, A. T., Ward, C. H., Mendelsohn, M., Mock, J., & Erbaugh, J. (1961). An inventory for measuring depression. Archives of general psychiatry, 4 , 561– 571. Boswell, H. (1998). The transgender paradigm: Shift toward free expression. In D. Denny (Ed.), Current concepts in transgender iden- tity (pp. 55– 61). New York: Garland Publishing. Bower, H. (2001). 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Harry Benjamin international gender dyspho- ria association’s standards of care for gender identity disorders— Sixth version. Retrieved October 25, 2005, from http://www. symposion.com/ijt/soc_2001/index.htm. Nemoto, T., Luke, D., Mamo, L., Chiang, A., & Patria, J. (1999). HIV risk behaviors among male-to-female transgenders in comparison with homosexual or bisexual males and heterosexual females. AIDS Care, 11, 297– 312. Neugarten, B. L., Havighurst, R. J., & Tobin, S. S. (1961). The measure- ment of life satisfaction. Journal of Gerontology, 16, 134– 143. Pazos, S. (1999). Practice with female-to-male transgender youth. Jour- nal of Gay and Lesbian Social Services, 10 , 65– 82. Raj, R. (2002). Towards a transpositive therapeutic model: Developing clinical sensitivity and cultural competence in the effective sup- port of transsexual and transgender clients. International Journal of Transgenderism, 6. Retrieved September 20, 2005, from http:// www.symposion.com/ijt/ijtvo06no02_04.htm Reback C. J., & Lombardi, E. L. (1999). HIV Risk Behaviors of Male-to- Female Transgenders in a Community-based Harm Reduction Program. International Journal of Transgenderism, 3. Retrieved Sep- tember 20, 2005, from http://www.symposion.com/ijt/hiv_risk/ reback/htm. Sanchez, D. (2002). Giving healthcare to transgender patients. Boston: JRI Health, Transhealth & Education Development. Spielberger, C. D., Gorsuch, R. L., & Lushene, R. D. (1970). Manual for the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (self-evaluation questionnaire). Palo Alto, CA: Consulting Psychologists Press. Taft, C. T., Stern, A. S., King, L. A., & King, D. W. (1999). Modeling physical health and functional health status: The role of combat exposure, posttraumatic stress disorder and personal resource attributes. Journal of Traumatic Stress, 12, 3 – 23. Taft, L. A. W. (2004). The long and winding road to social acceptance. Transgender Tapestry,107, 15. Vaux, A., Burda, P., Jr., & Stewart, D. (1986). Orientation towards utilizing support resources. Journal of Community Psychology, 14, 159–170. Welch, L. P., & Shipherd, J. C. (2004, November). Rates of violence and sexual orientation in the transgender community. Poster presentation at the annual meeting of the Association for Advancement of Behavior Therapy, New Orleans, LA. Wilson, K. (1997). Gender as illness: Issues of psychiatric classification. Pre- sented at the sixth annual International Conference on Transgen- der Law and Employment Policy (ICTLEP), Houston, Texas. Windle, M. (1992). A longitudinal study of stress buffering for ado- lescent problem behaviors. Developmental Psychology, 28, 522– 530. Worell, J., & Remer, P. (1992). Feminist perspectives in therapy: An empow- erment model for women. New York: Wiley. Yalom, I. D. (1995). The theory and practice of group psychotherapy. New York: Basic Books. Zimet, G. D., Dahlem, N. W., Zimet, S. G., & Farley, G. K. (1988). The multidimensional scale of perceived social support. Journal of Per- sonality Assessment, 52, 30 – 41. Shira Maguen is now at the San Francisco VA Medical Center. The authors would like to thank the members of the support group for their willingness to share their experiences in this publication. In addition, we would like to thank Lisa Welch for her assistance in preparing this manuscript. We would like to note that these data were presented in part at the Association for Advancement of Behavior Therapy’s 37th annual convention. Address correspondence to Dr. Shira Maguen, San Francisco VA Medical Center, PTSD Program (116P), 4150 Clement St., Building 8, Room 206, San Francisco, CA 94121; e-mail: shira.maguen@va.gov. Received: August 19, 2004 Accepted: May 12, 2005 
work_njv6fciyangtraui274wu5rv6q	----	Education Éducation Dr. Simkin is a family physician and is currently finishing a clinical fellowship in palliative care in Victoria, BC. Note: All physician–patient interactions related in this paper are based on actual cases. This article has been peer reviewed. CMAJ 1998;159:370-5 Not all your patients are straight Ruth J. Simkin, MD A young woman visits a family physician for the first time. During thecourse of a physical examination, the physician asks, “When was the lasttime you had sexual intercourse?” “I’ve never had sexual intercourse,” she replies. “Never?” “No.” “Do you have a boyfriend?” “No.” “Well, don’t worry. You will soon. Let’s talk about birth control.” The physician finishes the discussion about contraception and writes in the chart “Not yet sexually active. Not in relationship. Contraception counselling given.” The patient never returns, but the next year goes to see another family physician for her physical. During the course of the examination, the physician asks, “Are you sexually active with men, women or both?” “Yes,” she replies, “with a woman. I’m a lesbian.” “Are you in a relationship?” “Yes — for 8 years now. In fact, I wonder if my partner could come to see you, too? We’re thinking about having children.” “Of course, I’d be delighted to meet her.” And so begins a long, healthy physician–patient relationship. A physician is taking a history for a new patient. In response to a question posed by the physician, the woman answers, “I’m a lesbian.” The physician glances up, looks her over and counters, “No, you’re not,”and then continues with the history. An HIV-positive woman who identifies herself as a lesbian and who had been admitted to hospital previously for AIDS-related pneumonia goes to a new physician. After she relates her history, the physician declares, “I doubt that you are HIV positive. I think this whole thing is a trick.” The patient leaves feeling as though the physician has insinuated that she would get some benefit from having AIDS.1 Lesbians often receive inappropriate health care because their physicians make incorrect assumptions about them or are not aware of how to solicit rele- vant information from them. The above vignettes illustrate the single biggest problem that lesbians encounter when seeking medical care — invisibility. Soci- ety, including the medical profession, has historically ignored an entire popula- tion of women and thus rendered them “invisible.” This invisibility compounds their vulnerability within a non-accepting medical system. Lesbians encounter many kinds of invisibility. One is a lack of awareness by so- ciety at large and, as a consequence, by the medical profession, as illustrated in the first vignette. Another type of invisibility, more common than might be expected, arises from denial, as illustrated in the second and third vignettes. And then of course there is the invisibility that occurs when a woman is unwilling to identify herself to her physician as a lesbian. The reasons for this unwillingness can range 370 JAMC • 25 AOÛT 1998; 159 (4) © 1998 Canadian Medical Association from fear of rejection or poor treatment by her physician to her own negative self-image and insecurity. Studies show that most lesbians want to disclose their sexual orien- tation to their family physicians but need to feel secure and safe to do so.2 The fear of disclosure is not based solely on emotional factors. Lesbians and gays may be the most victimized group in the US.3 Hate crimes include enduring verbal abuse, threats, physical and sexual violence, property damage and murder. Violence is usually more severe if the woman is identified as being a lesbian. For example, lesbians in universities are assaulted twice as often as heterosexual women.4 Violence is not inflicted only by strangers: in one study 25% of lesbians reported being a victim of a hate crime committed by a family member.5 When women say they are afraid to disclose their sexual orientation, their fear is often based on a very unfortu- nate reality. There are consequences to the invisibility of lesbians. A distrust of the medical system can lead people to seek alternative forms of health care — forms that they con- sider to be more inclusive. Invisibility can also lead to misdiagnosis or underdiagnosis, as will be illustrated in some of the vignettes to come. The emotional health of lesbian patients is perhaps one of the largest consequences of invisibility. If a society does not validate an existence or a relationship, it is very diffi- cult for individuals to do that self-validation in a vacuum. Lesbian culture and community is critical for healthy self- esteem. It is certainly easier and healthier for a person to be congruent in her life and not have to split off different aspects of her existence according to with whom she may be relating. Although there is no difference from the self- esteem between lesbians and heterosexual women,6 it is often difficult for lesbians to act in accordance with their identity because of society’s negative attitudes.7 One other very important consequence of invisibility is invisible families. Somehow, a chart notation of “deci- sions made re: management, friend present” does not carry the same weight as “decisions made re: manage- ment, wife (or husband) present.” Our patients’ support systems often go unnoticed and invalidated. A woman comes running into the emergency ward. “Excuse me, has Mary Smith been admitted? She was in a motorcycle accident.” “Are you family?” asks the nurse. “Well, not really. We live together.” “I’m sorry, I can only give out information to family members.” “But we live together. Please, I must see her. We live together.” “Sorry, only family members are allowed to see her.” The woman sits in the waiting room until a new nurse comes on duty and then approaches the desk again. “Excuse me, has Mary Smith been admitted?” “Are you family?” “Yes, I’m her aunt.” “Oh, she’s in 34B. This way, please.” In this example, the woman gets to see her injured partner. This is a humiliating and worry-filled experience for the woman who was concerned about, and denied ac- cess to, her injured partner. After this incident, the pa- tient’s physician wrote a letter to the hospital board asking for a review of visiting policies in the emergency depart- ment and the intensive care unit (ICU). Physicians can ensure that the emergency department and ICUs of hos- pitals where they have admitting privileges is accepting of self-identified family members. They should also find out to whom their patients want medical information re- leased. More people in same-sex relationships are giving powers of attorney to their partners to prevent just such an incident from occurring. People are family members if they say they are. Many lesbians are estranged from their biological families, so their families of choice become even more important to their well-being. As discussed previously, lesbians are sometimes unwill- ing to divulge their sexual orientation in a medical setting because of the fear of being rejected or treated poorly. Not all women are willing or able to come out. Years ago, physicians tended to be unaware of the existence of a sig- nificant lesbian population or else assumed that their pa- tients’ sexual orientation was of no concern in providing good health care. Now that lesbian culture has become more mainstream, there is much greater awareness of les- bians and their need to be recognized. Recent data have suggested that between 3.6% and 6.9% of women de- scribe themselves as lesbians,8 although Kinsey and associ- ates9 found that 10% of the female population is lesbian. Therefore, a conservative estimate of the number of les- bians in Canada would be between 0.5 and 1.5 million. Unfortunately, the increased awareness has not been ac- companied by a better understanding of how to provide good health care to the lesbian population. Studies pub- lished as recently as 1997 concluded that lesbians’ experi- ences of discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation are so common that such discrimination has been deemed an obstacle to good health care.10 It has been well documented that lesbians have avoided the health care system because of their past discriminatory experiences.11,12 Lesbians have been patronized, intimidated, ignored and subjected to unsuccessful attempts to render them heterosexual. They have endured inappropriate and invasive examinations and questioning.13 Even when physi- cians have been supportive, they have sometimes been ill Not all your patients are straight CMAJ • AUG. 25, 1998; 159 (4) 371 informed or inadequately prepared to answer questions and manage the care of their lesbian patients. The fact that lesbians have been shunned by the tra- ditional health care system may be a major reason why lesbian culture has embraced complementary medicine. When a patient who has been seeing alternative healers does consult a physician, the physician should try to re- spect the process that sent her there and subsequently brought her back to the conventional health care system. A young woman presents with lower abdominal pain and vaginal discharge. In taking her history, the physi- cian asks, “Are you sexually active?” “Yes,” she replies, “sure am. I’m a lesbian.” The physician rethinks the differential diagnosis and moves pelvic inflammatory disease (PID) to the bottom of the list of possibilities. The patient’s symptoms worsen, and she eventually shows up in the emergency department. “Are you sexually active?” asks the attending physician. “Yes,” she replies, “sure am. I’m a lesbian.” “Do you ever have sex with men?” “Sure do. Just because I’m a lesbian doesn’t mean I can’t do boys!” The physician puts PID back at the top of the differ- ential diagnosis. One of the biggest mistakes physicians make is confusing sexual identity with sexual behaviour. They are not the same. It is our behaviour that puts us at risk for illness, not our identities, unless we include hate crimes. Women can iden- tify themselves as lesbians and not be sexually active, and other women can be sexually active solely with other women and not identify themselves as lesbians. Even when physi- cians are aware of the existence of lesbian culture, we need to keep in mind that it is not a rigid and undifferentiated cul- ture, but rather one of extreme diversity. Lesbians are present in every facet of society, just as are heterosexual women. A 72-year-old woman has been losing weight and not sleeping. She is tired all the time. During the course of a physical examination, the physician asks, “Do you live alone?” “Yes,” she sobs. “What about your husband?” “I’ve been divorced for over 40 years,” she replies. The physician does a complete examination, decides the woman is suffering from depression and prescribes antidepressants. The woman does not return. She does, however, go to another physician, who asks, “Do you live alone?” “Yes, I do,” she sobs. “Have you always lived alone?” “No. My roommate lived with me for 37 years. She died just a few months ago.” “Were you very close to her?” “Yes.” “You must miss her very much.” “Yes. I can’t bear to live without her.” And so the physician sends the woman for the be- reavement counselling she desperately needs. Sometimes older lesbians don’t use the same terms as younger ones; for some, it is not easy to say “lesbian,” “dyke” or even “homosexual.” Although this is changing as society changes, there are still many older women who are sexually active with other women and in long- term committed same-sex relationships who would not identify themselves as lesbians. When these women lose their partners, their loss is magnified by the fact that so- ciety does not recognize them as “widows” and they must mourn alone, or with a few friends, in silence. From the perspective of society, their status remains un- changed, although in fact their lives have been shattered. The vignettes presented thus far are examples of how we, as physicians, need to broaden our conceptual beliefs. In the physician–patient interaction presented in the first vignette, the physician believed, as many do, that if the woman was not sexually active with men, then she was not sexually active. In the fifth vignette, the physician believed that if the patient was a lesbian, then she could not be sex- ually active with men. Older women can be and often are involved in meaningful relationships with partners of ei- ther sex, a fact that can easily be overlooked. Some older women with children and grandchildren identify them- selves as lesbians and will need recognition and support from their physicians. Physicians should be aware of how ageism can creep into their thinking. These vignettes are all examples of how assumptions can adversely affect the well-being of others. A 49-year-old woman has been in a relationship with another woman for 14 years. During her annual physi- cal, she asks about her risks for cancer. In the course of the discussion, the physician says, “Well, you don’t need a Pap test every year. Lesbians don’t, you know.” The woman decides not to return to this physician. In- stead, she goes to another physician to discuss cancer risks. “Well,” the new physician says, “there are certain risk factors for cervical cancer: having sex at a young age, having multiple sexual partners of either sex, a history of STDs, infections with human papillomavirus, smoking and, of course, abnormal Pap tests.” The physician goes on to say that cervical cancer, at least uncontrolled cervical cancer, is preventable, but only Simkin 372 JAMC • 25 AOÛT 1998; 159 (4) if screening is done, and that all women should have regu- lar Pap tests according to their medical history and other risk factors. Later in the discussion, the patient mentions that she has heard that lesbians are at higher risk for breast can- cer and asks why. The physician describes the 3 main categories of risk factors: genetic, hormonal and external. Breast cancer in a primary relative, such as the mother or a sister, would put a woman at higher risk. Hormonal factors include num- ber of years of menstrual cycling uninterrupted by child- birth, age of menarche less than 12 years, never having had children or having had children after the age of 30. External factors refer to dietary and environmental fac- tors, alcohol intake, smoking and a history of radiation. Some people believe, incorrectly, that lesbians don’t have children as often as heterosexual women, that they are older when they do have their first child or that they don’t have any children at all. Lesbians were thought to drink more alcohol than the general population, but that’s because all early research was done in a bar con- text.14 That lesbians drink more seems to be much less true now that they are less confined to bars as the only venues for expression of their culture. It is not being a lesbian that affects one’s risks, but rather it is one’s own personal behaviours and exposures that are important. During the course of a medical visit, a woman says, “I am a lesbian just about to start a new relationship. Could you advise me about safe sex?” The physician replies, “I just read an article in a med- ical journal that said that lesbians don’t have real sex any- way. And lesbians don’t get AIDS. Just be thankful you’re a gay woman and not a gay man. But I’m glad you brought this up. What do lesbians do in bed anyway?”12 Upset, the woman leaves the office and goes to see another physician, inquiring again about safe sex. “Good for you for asking,” the physician responds. “Of course lesbians can get AIDS. It’s the activities that you and your partner participate in that put you at risk.” “Look, we don’t do drugs or sleep with men and nei- ther of us has had a transfusion. I’m talking about regu- lar things.” “Okay, but there are other ways women can become infected with HIV. Some women get it from donor in- semination when screening has not been adequate. And don’t forget occupational exposure — lab techs or other medical personnel could have an accident at work. The first thing the two of you need to do is talk about past behaviour. That way you have some idea of potential risks. We do know that woman-to-woman sexual trans- mission of HIV is possible and has occurred.1 Remember, some people don’t always tell the truth, which is one of the risks if you don’t know the person well. Talking about past behaviour with full risk assessment is a mandatory first step.” (See Table 1 for a summary of safer-sex guide- lines for lesbians.) Just as it was once thought that women’s health issues were the same as men’s health issues (and therefore that the results of clinical trials involving men were applica- ble to women), it is now erroneously thought that les- bians’ health issues are the same as women’s health is- sues. What makes lesbian health a category is humanity’s inability to rid itself of homophobia, racism, economic injustices, heterosexism and all the other “isms” and in- equities that exist in our less-than-accepting society. There is no disease process that is specific to lesbians, yet the health care of lesbians is not equal to that of het- erosexual women.15–18 The reasons for this inequity range from blatant homophobia to naïve ignorance. The vi- gnettes presented here illustrate that there are different ways of soliciting information from patients. How we, as physicians, interact with our patients helps define the quality of care we provide. Lesbians do not, as a group, have “different” diseases than heterosexual women; rather it is the nature of the physician–patient interac- Not all your patients are straight CMAJ • AUG. 25, 1998; 159 (4) 373 Latex barriers protect against direct contact; dental dams (rinsed with water first) can be used, but condoms split lengthwise may be preferable; many women prefer household plastic wrap Good latex gloves can provide a very effective barrier Barriers should be used only once by one person, and a barrier should be used only on one side; some women put an “X” on one side so that the barrier does not get inadvertently turned around during sex play Only water-based lubricants should be used with latex barriers or plastic wrap, because oil ruins the integrity of the barrier Sex toys should be well cleaned after each use; they can also be covered with latex barriers (to clean, sex toys should be soaked in rubbing alcohol for 10 minutes and then rinsed with water, or washed in a mixture of 1 part bleach in 10 parts soapy water) STDs such as human papillomavirus (HPV) and vaginitis can be transmitted by direct skin-to-skin contact HPV and Trichomonas may be transmitted through fomites, such as shared towels Women are more at risk during menses and when they have a yeast infection After the risks have been assessed and if they are deemed to be very low, negative HIV tests should be recommended for both partners if they wish to engage in sexual activities without barriers Risk status should be continually assessed, especially if circumstances change Woman-to-woman sexual transmission of HIV is possible HIV is spread through body fluids such as vaginal fluids and menstrual blood HIV can be transmitted from body fluids to cuts on hands or mouth Table 1: Safer-sex points to remember for lesbians tion that defines the quality of health care. The fear of being rendered invisible is a huge barrier to lesbians ap- proaching a new health care provider. We, as physicians, need to ask ourselves what prevents us from asking the “right” questions — those that would allow patients to be comfortable being themselves. Is it simply naïveté, for which some education is needed and nothing more? Might it be bigotry or simply indifference? We need to recognize our prejudices and discomforts and either learn to overcome them or inform patients that their health care needs might be better met by another physi- cian. Understanding and accepting differences do not necessarily imply approval. We do have the means avail- able to educate ourselves so that we can be in an im- proved position to provide more appropriate and better health care to all our patients. Table 2 lists guidelines for providing good health care to lesbian patients. We lesbians want the same respectful and competent health care that everyone else wants. We, as physicians, have a responsibility to provide equitable health care to all. It is acceptable to ask questions and to be less than perfect in interactions with patients if our intent is to empathize and provide the best care that we are able. We can learn together in partnership with our patients and colleagues. We physicians need to increase our own awareness and broaden our conceptual beliefs in order to fulfill that role that has been entrusted to us as health care providers. I acknowledge and thank the following women for their gener- ous gift of time in providing much-appreciated critical ap- praisal: Barb Conyers, Stronach O’Neil, Margo Farr, Caffyn Kel- ley and Nance Poole. Simkin 374 JAMC • 25 AOÛT 1998; 159 (4) Don’t contradict your patients when they make statements about themselves; avoid arguments Roll with resistance, giving your patient time to integrate information and develop trust in you and the process Educate yourself about issues relevant to good health care for lesbians If you can’t support your patients’ identity, refer them to someone who can Involve your patients’ significant others in decision-making and planning Be aware of and display resources in your waiting room to let patients know you are approachable Use inclusive language on all office forms and when talking with your patients Ask your patients if there is something that you’ve missed asking about that they feel is important for you to know Don’t make assumptions Don’t make assumptions Remember that identity does not equal behaviour Examine your own biases — how do they affect your patient interactions? Remember that how you ask questions may be just as important as the questions themselves Table 2: Guidelines for providing good health care to lesbians Gay and Lesbian Medical Association 459 Fulton St., Suite 107 San Francisco CA 94102 tel 415 255-4547 www.glma.org/ An international organization of lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgendered (LGBT) physi- cians, medical students and their supporters. A huge source of information and support. Journal of the Gay and Lesbian Medical Asso- ciation Subscription information: Plenum Publishing Corp. 233 Spring St. New York NY 10013 tel 212 620-8468 fax 212 807-1047 A multidisciplinary, peer-reviewed quarterly, devoted to the study of the health of the LGBT populations. Lesbian Health Bibliography, compiled by Liza Rankow, PA-C, MHS Ordering information: Office of Gay and Lesbian Health Concerns Bureau of HIV Program Services New York City Department of Health 601–125 Worth St., Box 67 New York NY 10013 tel 212 788-4310 fax 212 788-5243 Originally published by the National Center for Lesbian Rights in January 1995. A 50-page booklet listing 798 references relevant to les- bian health issues. Free your mind. The book for gay, lesbian, and bisexual youths — and their allies, by Ellen Bass and Kate Kaufman. New York: Harper Collins Publishers, Inc.; 1996. An ex- cellent resource for young people and anyone who deals with them. National Lesbian and Gay Health Association 1407 S St. NW Washington DC 20009 tel 202 939-7880 This association has a publication list for rel- evant issues and is a good resource. Unfor- tunately, I know of no Canadian counter- part. The Lesbian Health Book, edited by Jocelyn White, MD and Marissa C. Martinez. Seal Press, 1997. Covers many aspects of lesbian health but is mainly anecdotal. One of its strongest fea- tures is the large number of resources listed in each section, for example, old lesbians, par- enting, research and myriad others. Excellent for lesbian patients. The Mary-Helen Mautner Project for Lesbians with Cancer 1707 L St. NW, Suite 1060 Washington DC 20036 tel 202 332-5536; www.sirius.com/~edisol/mautner/index.html Lesbian Mothers Support Society 630 4th Ave NE Calgary AB T2E 0K1 tel 403 265-6433 www.lesbian.org/lesbian-moms/index.html Lesbian Org, an online resource of informa- tion and links www.lesbian.org/ This site leads to many other sites relevant to lesbian health. An excellent resource. Resources for lesbians and their doctors Not all your patients are straight CMAJ • AUG. 25, 1998; 159 (4) 375 References 1. Arnold M. The story of a lesbian with AIDS. In: White J, Martinez M, edi- tors. The lesbian health book. Seattle: Seal Press; 1997. p. 148-59. 2. Geddes V. Lesbian expectations and experiences with family doctors. Can Fam Physician 1994;40:908-20. 3. National Gay and Lesbian Task Force. Anti-gay violence: causes, consequences, responses. Washington: The Task Force; 1986. 4. Duncan DF. Prevalence of sexual assault victimization among heterosexual and gay/lesbian university students. Psychol Rep 1990;66:65-6. 5. Herek GH. Hate crimes against lesbians and gay men: issues for research and policy. Am Psychol 1989;44(6):948-55. 6. Christie D, Young M. Self-concept of lesbian and heterosexual women. Psy- chol Rep 1986;59:1279-82. 7. White J. Primary care of lesbian patients. J Gen Intern Med 1993;8:41-7. 8. O’Hanlan KA. Lesbian health and homophobia: perspectives for the treating obstetrician/gynecologist. Curr Probl Obstet Gynecol Fertil 1995;18(4):93-136. 9. Kinsey AC, Pomeroy W, Martin CE, Gebhard PE. Sexual behavior in the hu- man female. New York: WB Saunders; 1953. 10. Krieger N, Sidney S. Prevalence and health implications of anti-gay discrimi- nation: a study of black and white women and men in the CARDIA cohort. Int J Health Serv 1997;27(1):157-76. 11. Simkin RJ. Lesbians face unique health care problems. CMAJ 1991;145(12): 1620-3. 12. Simkin R. Unique health care concerns of lesbians. Can J Obstet Gynecol Women’s Health Care 1993;5(5):515-22. 13. Rankow E. Breast and cervical cancer among lesbians. Women’s Health Inst 1995;5(3):123-9. 14. Hughes T, Hass A, Avery L. Lesbians and mental health: preliminary results from the Chicago Women’s Health Survey. J Gay Lesbian Med Assoc 1997;1(3):137-48. 15. Robertson P, Schacter J. Failure to identify venereal disease in a lesbian popu- lation. Sex Transm Dis 1981;8(2):75-6. 16. Stevens P, Hall J. Stigma, health beliefs and experiences with health care in lesbian women. Image J Nurs Sch 1988;20(2):69-73. 17. Bybee D. Michigan lesbian health survey: a report to the Michigan Organization for Human Rights and the Michigan Department of Public Health. Lansing (MI): Michigan Organization for Human Rights; 1990. 18. Bradford J, Ryan C. National lesbian health care survey. Washington: Lesbian and Gay Health Foundation; 1987. Reprint requests to: Dr. Ruth Simkin, 1188 Beddis Rd., Salt Spring Island BC V8K 2C8; fax 250 537-9398; rjsimkin@saltspring.com Registration and travel information / Pour inscription et information de voyage CMA Meetings and Travel / Département des conférences et voyages de l’AMC tel 800 663-7336 x2383 fax 613 731-8047 martic@cma.ca CANADIAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION 131st Annual Meeting Sept. 6–9, 1998 Whitehorse, Yukon ASSOCIATION MÉDICALE CANADIENNE 131e Assemblée générale annuelle Du 6 au 9 septembre 1998 Whitehorse (Yukon) H .G . P fa ff 
work_nlp2nbdeondshpdzzgkxdrzwty	----	Microsoft Word - Hegarty paper.doc 1 Author Preprint Published as Tee, N. & Hegarty, P. (2006). Predicting opposition to the civil rights of trans persons in the United Kingdom. Journal of Community and Applied Social Psychology, 16, 70-80. Acknowledgments. This work was completed in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Masters of Science degree in social psychology at the University of Surrey by the first author under the supervision of the second. We thank Chris Fife-Schaw for comments on earlier drafts. Please address correspondence to Nicola Tee or Peter Hegarty at the Department of Psychology, University of Surrey, Guildford, Surrey, GU2 7XH, UK. Abstract Although there is considerable evidence that trans persons are victims of discrimination, social psychologists have rarely explored prejudice against this minority group. We extrapolated from models of heterosexism to test hypotheses about support for and opposition to trans persons’ civil rights. Opposition to trans persons civil rights among 151 participants was correlated with heterosexism, authoritarianism, a belief that there are only two sexes, beliefs that gender is biologically based and several demographic variables. Linear regression showed that heterosexism, authoritarianism, contact with sexual minorities and beliefs in biological gender predicted unique variance in opposition to trans persons’ civil rights. Differences and similarities between prejudice towards sexual and gender minorities are discussed. In the past, social psychologists have taken little account of prejudice against trans people. Within the United Kingdom this term is used to refer to people who live in and identify with the opposite gender, regardless of whether or not they seek surgery (e.g., Press for Change, 1999 see also Borstein, 1995; Califia, 1997; Feinberg, 2004; Whittle, 2000). Legal and sociological studies strongly suggest that trans people face discrimination that ranges from media ridicule (Gamson, 1998) to being targets of hate crimes (Moran & Sharpe, 2002; Valentine, 2003). Yet, trans citizens have only recently gained any non- discrimination protection in the UK (The Sex Discrimination (Gender Reassignment) Regulations 1999; Gender Recognition Act 2004) and remain sporadically across the United States (Currah & Minter, 2000). In the 1990s a broad international movement for trans persons’ civil rights emerged in such arenas as workplace discrimination law, the medical management of sex reassignment surgery, and consciousness raising about hate crimes (Califia, 1997; Wangh, 2003; Whittle, 2000; Wilchins, 1997). We consider the shifting terrain of trans persons’ rights, and non-trans persons’ support for and opposition to those rights in particular to be an interesting social psychological domain. We sought to examine similarities and differences between opposition to trans persons’ rights and heterosexism; prejudice against lesbians and gay men (Herek, 2000). We explored heterosexism as a tentative model for prejudice against trans persons for three reasons. Firstly, the medical pathologizing of trans persons and of lesbians and gay men have overlapping histories (Prosser,1998; Terry, 1999). Secondly, trans persons’ gender identities have often been medically managed in ways that privilege heterosexual people (Bolin, 1988). Thirdly, stereotypes describe lesbians and gay men as ‘gender inverted’ (Kite & Deaux, 1987, but see also Deaux & Lewis, 1984; Simon, 1998; Taylor, 1983); the categories ‘gay’, ‘lesbian’, and ‘trans people’ may be confused for some non- trans heterosexual people. We assessed the relationship between heterosexism, opposition to trans persons’ rights, and several variables. Heterosexism is generally higher among men (Kite & Whitley, 1998), religious persons (Herek, 1987), persons with no personal contact with sexual minorities (Herek & Capitanio, 1996; Pettigrew and Tropp, 2000), and non-psychology 2 students (Ellis, Kitzinger, & Wilkinson, 2002). Sexual prejudice is also strongly correlated with right-wing authoritarianism (RWA, Altemeyer, 1988; Whitley, 1999). We predicted that opposition to trans persons’ civil rights would be similarly related to these demographic and attitudinal variables. Relationships between opposition to trans persons’ civil rights and beliefs about gender were also assessed. First, we constructed a beliefs about gender scale that operationalized Garfinkel’s (1968) claims about the ‘natural attitude’ or default assumptions about gender that operate in Western culture. These beliefs revolve around the assumptions that membership in a sex category is derived from physical facts about genitals and that there are only two legitimate categories of sex. Garfinkel (1968) argued that such default assumptions were moralizing as well as descriptive (see also Kessler & McKenna, 1978; Parlee, 1996; Speer, in press). We predicted that people who endorsed such beliefs would be less likely to support trans persons’ civil rights. Relationships between opposition to civil rights and ontological beliefs about gender were approached in a more exploratory manner. Heterosexism is strongest among heterosexuals who consider sexual orientation to be changeable, yet also a fundamental basis for categorizing people (Haslam & Levi, in press; Haslam, Rothschild, & Ernst, 2002; Hegarty, 2002; Hegarty & Pratto, 2001). Yet relationships between prejudice and essentialist beliefs vary between domains and cannot be easily generalized between them (Haslam et al., 2002). We constructed a measure of beliefs about transsexuality loosely based on Hegarty and Pratto’s (2001) measure of beliefs about sexual orientation, and explored the relationship between essentialist beliefs about prejudice toward trans people. Method Participants. 87 women, 58 men and 6 participants who did not identify their gender participated (mean age 22.0, age range = 19 to 54 years). Participants were students of psychology (n = 90) and engineering (n = 61). Engineers received raffle tickets in return for participation. Participants were nationals of Britain (n = 98), other European countries (n = 19), Asian countries (n = 22), Australasian countries (n =1), African countries (n = 1), South American countries (n = 1), and North American countries (n = 1) or undisclosed countries (n = 8). Participants described their ethnicity as White (n = 83), Chinese (n = 20), Greek (n = 8), Asian Indian (n = 8), Tamil (n = 4), Black (n = 4), European (n = 3), Mixed race (n = 20) and Middle Eastern (n = 1). Many more of the psychologists than engineers were British (91%, 33% respectively), White (85%, 24% respectively) and female (82%, 25% respectively). A participant who identified as transsexual was excluded from the analysis. Materials. Questionnaire booklets including seven multi-item questionnaire measures and additional demographic items were constructed. All questionnaire measures consisted of 7-point Likert items. The beliefs about gender scale was presented first (see Table 1 for items). The beliefs about transsexuality measure, was presented second (see Table 2 for items). Third, participants rated the similarity of sexual and gender minority groups to each other, using 7-point scales ranging from 1 (strongly dissimilar) to 7 (strongly similar). For example, one item read as follows; How similar are gay men and male to female transsexuals? (see Table 3 for items). Fourth, the key measure of opposition to trans persons rights was presented. All items described rights that had historically been statutorily denied to trans persons in the UK (See Table 4 for items). The final three measures were standardized prejudice scales; the short form of Herek’s (1984, 1993) Attitudes to Lesbians and Gay men scale (ATLG), Swim, Aikin, Hall and Hunter’s (1995) Modern Sexism scale (MS) and Altemeyer’s (1996) Right-Wing Authoritarianism scale (RWA). ATLG included five items about gay men and five items about lesbians, MS included eight items, and RWA included thirty. High scores for all three measures 3 indicated higher levels of prejudice. The order of presentation of these three scales was randomized between participants. Demographic information and contact experiences were assessed next. Participants reported their sexual orientation as heterosexual, homosexual, bisexual, or none of these and used forced-choice items to report if they were transsexual, transgendered, or a transvestite. Contact with members of sexual and gender minorities was assessed with five separate items relating to lesbians and gay men, transsexuals, bisexuals, transvestites, and transgendered persons. Each item asked if the participant knew a person with that identity and presented the following forced choice responses; yes, no, not sure and do not understand. Participants reported their religion with an open-ended measure and answered the item Do you consider yourself to be a religious person? using the options yes, no, to some extent, not sure, and don’t understand. Finally, participants reported their gender, age, nationality, and ethnicity with open-ended items. Procedure. Participants completed the materials during regular class sessions and were randomly assigned to questionnaire order conditions. Both the psychology and the engineering students were supervised as they completed the questionnaires and subsequently debriefed. Psychology students received an oral presentation on the results one month after they participated. Results Below we report the reliability of the published prejudice measures (ATLG, MS, and RWA), principal component analyses of the new measures (beliefs about gender, beliefs about transsexuality, similarity and opposition to trans people’s rights), and tests of the hypothesis that opposition to trans persons’ rights and heterosexism have similar correlates. Finally, we report a regression model that predicts support for trans persons’ rights from both demographic and attitudinal variables. All factor analyses reported below involved examination of unrotated matrices and oblimin rotation with Kaiser normalization where there was more than one significant component. Only measures with Cronbach’s α > .70 were analyzed (Nunnally, 1978). Reliability of Published Scales. The relevant ATLG, MS and RWA items were reverse coded. The ten ALTG items and thirty RWA items were averaged to form reliable measures of sexual prejudice and authoritarianism (Cronbach’s α = .92, .83 respectively). The MS scale was unreliable (Cronbach’s α = .68) and was not analyzed further. Reliability of New Measures: Beliefs About Gender. A factor analysis of the ten items revealed three components with Eigenvalues 3.47, 1.12, and 1.02 which explained 34.7%, 11.2%, and 10.2% of the variance. Oblimin rotation was performed as described above. Only Item 10 effectively loaded on the third component which was uncorrelated with the first and second components (r = -.06, -.07 respectively). When the scale was reanalyzed using only the first nine items, two components emerged with Eigenvalues of 3.39 and 1.08 explained 37.7% and 12.0% of the variance respectively. Oblimin rotation revealed the two components to be correlated, r = .42. Since the complete scale was reliable (α = 0.78) we retained all nine items as a single measure. Beliefs about Transsexuality A factor analysis of the twelve items revealed four components with Eigenvalues of 3.17, 1.71, 1.13, and 1.07 which explained 26.4%, 14.2%, 9.4% and 8.9% of the variance respectively. Examination of the scree plot revealed an obvious ‘elbow’ after the second factor. Only the first two components were analyzed. An oblimin rotation revealed that most items loaded on one of the two components, which were uncorrelated, r = .07. Composite scales were formed using items that loaded more heavily than .40 on each scale (see Table 2). The first factor was 4 labeled biological gender and the items that loaded on this factor referred overwhelmingly to beliefs that gender identity always matched biological sex. The second factor was labeled social gender; the relevant items referred to the acculturation of gender identity and the possibility of effective sex reassignment. The biological gender scale was internally reliable but the social gender scale was not (Cronbach’s α = .77, .50 respectively). Consequently, only the former scale was analyzed. Similarities between Sexual and Gender Minorities. A factor analysis of the similarities items revealed two clear components with Eigenvalues of 4.50 and 2.17 that explained 49.9% and 24.1% of the variance respectively. All items loaded clearly on one of these two unrelated components, r = .21 (see Table 3). Items loading on the first factor referred to similarities between homosexuals, cross-dressers, and transsexuals, and items loading on the second factor referred to gender similarities within those groups (see Table 3). Two reliable composite measures of between group similarity and between genders similarity were constructed from the items that loaded on these two components (Cronbach’s α = .92, .87 respectively). Opposition to Trans Persons’ Rights. Finally, a factor analysis of the seven items pertaining to trans persons’ rights revealed a single component with an Eigenvalue of 4.26 that explained 60.9% of the variance. All items loaded on this component (see Table 4). Items were reverse coded and averaged to from a reliable measure (Cronbach’s α = .89). Contact with Sexual and Gender Minorities. For each of the five contact items, ‘yes’ responses were dummy coded as ‘1’ and all other responses were coded as ‘0’ Participants who knew either lesbians and gay men (70.7%) or bisexual men and women (46.0%) had lower levels of ATLG than participants who reported no familiarity with sexual minorities, t (142) = 1.96, p <.05 (Ms = 2.74, 3.30 respectively). Opposition to trans persons’ rights were equivalent among these two participant groups, t <1, (Ms = 3.24, 3.38 respectively). Far fewer participants knew transsexual (14.0%), transvestite (10.7%) or transgender persons (6.7%). Participants who reported familiarity with at least one gender minority group had lower opposition to trans persons’ rights than participants who did not, t (143) = 2.12, p <.05 (Ms = 2.69, 3.38 respectively). However, the two participant groups did not differ in their levels of heterosexism, t <1, (Ms = 2.87, 2.84 respectively). Religiosity. Responses to the religiosity measure were coded on a three point scale including the responses ‘yes’ (3) ‘to some extent’ (2) and ‘not sure’ ‘no’ and ‘don’t understand’ (1). More religious persons opposed trans persons’ rights more, r (144) = .39, p <.001, and were more heterosexist, r(142) = .40, p <.001, and more authoritarian, r (132) = .45, p <.001. Predicting Opposition to Trans Persons’ Rights. The effects of demographic variables on opposition to trans persons’ civil rights were examined using t-tests. Engineers showed greater opposition to civil rights than psychologists, t (149) = 4.78, p <.001 (Ms = 3.93, 2.93 respectively). Men showed greater opposition than women, t (144) = 2.82, p <.01 (Ms = 3.65, 3.03 respectively). Non-British participants showed more opposition than British participants, t (142) = 2.25, p <.05 (Ms = 3.67, 3.15 respectively). Non-White participants showed more opposition than White participants, t (133) = 1.74, p <.01 (Ms = 3.55, 3.12 respectively). Similar relationships were observed for heterosexism. Psychologists were less heterosexist than engineers, t (144) = 6.94, p <.001 (Ms = 2.31, 3.87 respectively). Women showed less heterosexism than men, t (140) = 2.74, p <.01 (Ms = 2.61. 3.28 respectively). British participants showed less heterosexism than non-British participants, t (138) = 4.88, p <.0001 (Ms = 2.54, 3.77 respectively). White participants showed less 5 heterosexism than non-White participants, t (130) = 4.89, p <.001 (Ms = 2.49, 3.77 respectively). Opposition to trans persons’ rights, ATLG, RWA and natural attitudes to gender were all highly correlated with each other (see Table 5). However, neither measure of similarity was correlated with any of these measures. Finally, we conducted a regression analysis to determine which demographic and psychological variables predicted unique variance in opposition to civil rights. The analysis included two prejudice measures (i.e., ATLG and RWA), two belief measures (biological gender and attitudes to gender), contact with members of sexual minorities and gender minorities and five demographic variables (participant’s academic subject, gender, nationality, ethnicity, and religiosity). The resulting model was highly significant F (11, 114) = 7.93, p <.001 and explained much of the variance in the dependent variable (adjusted R 2 = .38, see Table 6). Heterosexism, authoritarianism, contact with sexual minorities, and biological gender beliefs all predicted unique variance in opposition to trans persons’ civil rights. Discussion The present study more found opposition to trans persons’ civil rights among men, engineering students, non-White, non-British, religious, authoritarian, and heterosexist participants and those with little previous contact with gender minorities. As these factors also predicted heterosexism both here and in other studies, these point to similarities between prejudice against trans persons and heterosexism. Several of these predictors were substantively correlated, but right-wing authoritarianism, heterosexism, biological gender beliefs and contact with sexual minorities all predicted unique variance in opposition to trans persons’ civil rights. 1 However, differences in prejudice toward sexual and gender minorities were also evident. Neither prejudice was correlated with perceived similarities between gender and sexual minorities; similarities in prejudice towards sexual and gender minorities does not rest on conceptual confusion between them. There are also important differences between the relationships between prejudice and biological essentialist beliefs in the two domains. Here, more prejudiced participants endorsed items about the biological basis of gender identity. However heterosexist people are more likely to reject than to accept that sexual orientation has a biological basis (Haslam & Levi, in press; Haslam et al., 2002; Hegarty, 2002; Hegarty & Pratto, 2001b). The different might depend upon the practical implications of biological determinism for different minorities. Lesbians and gay men sometimes argue for a biological basis of sexual orientation to show the futility of attempts to change sexual orientations (Whisman, 1994). However, many trans persons rely on sex reassignment, and the belief that gender identity is tied to biological markers of sex or that trans people can be talked out of sex reassignment may undermine the legitimacy of sex reassignment in the minds of some. Thus, both prejudices might be rooted in right wing authoritarian acceptance of, and reliance on, authority to punish those who transgress social norms. However, ill-treatment may look like medical management for some and medical neglect for others. In other words biological determinist beliefs might be correlated with prejudice because they are fitted to the goal of defending and justifying prejudice within particular contexts (Hegarty, 2002; Crandall & Eshleman, 2003) rather than because they are attributional precursors to prejudice (Weiner, Perry, & Magnusson, 1988). Clearly, this study has limitations which caution the interpretation and generalization of its findings. Like others, we found Swim et al.’s (1994) scale to be unreliable (see e.g., Haslam et al., 2002). Our student sample was of modest size. Attitudes and beliefs were measured, but behaviors and behavioral intentions were not. Our items referred largely to 6 transsexuals, but we have presumed that they speak to prejudice against a larger category of trans persons. Further studies, particularly vignette and behavioral studies, are required to examine prejudicial actions toward trans persons. We hope our work will be only the first step towards a social psychological analysis of prejudice against trans persons. Notes. 1. The finding that contact with sexual minorities but not contact with gender minorities emerged as a significant predictor is likely due to the correlation between the two. Participants who had contact with one minority group were disproportionately likely to have contact with the other group, χ 2 (1, N = 144) = 4.31, p <.05. References Altemeyer, B. (1988). Enemies of freedom: Understanding right-wing authoritarianism. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass/Pfeiffer. Altemeyer, B. (1996) The authoritarian specter. Cambridge Ma: Harvard University Press. Bolin, A. (1988). In search of Eve: Transsexual rites of passage. New York: Bergin & Garvey. Bornstein, K. (1995). Gender outlaw: On men, women and the rest of us. Vintage Books. Califia, P. (1997). Sex changes: The politics of transgender. San Francisco: Cleiss Press. Crandall, C.S., & Eshleman, A. (2003). A justification-suppression model of the expression and experience of prejudice. Psychological Bulletin, 129, 414-446. Currah, P. & Minter, S. (2000). Unprincipled exclusions: The struggle to achieve judicial and legislative equality for transgender persons. William and Mary Journal of Women and the Law, 7, 37-66. Deaux, K., & Lewis, L.L. (1984). Structure of gender stereotypes: Interrelationships among components and gender label. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 46, 991-1004. Ellis, S. J, Kitzinger, C., & Wilkinson, S (2002). Attitudes towards lesbians and gay men and support for lesbian and gay human rights among psychology students. Journal of Homosexuality. 44, 121-138. Feinberg, L. (2004). Stone butch blues. St. Paul, MN: Consortium Press. Gamson, J. (1998). Freaks talk back: Tabloid talk shows and sexual nonconformity. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Garfinkel, H. (1967) Studies in Ethnomethodology. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc. HMSO (1999). The Sex Discrimination (Gender Reassignment) Regulations 1999. London: HMSO Haslam, N., & Levi, S.R. (in press). Essentialist beliefs about homosexuality: Structure and implications for prejudice. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin. Haslam, N., Rothschild, L., & Ernst, D. (2002). Are essentialist beliefs associated with prejudice? British Journal of Social Psychology, 41, 87-100. Hegarty, P. (2002). "It's not a choice, it's the way we're built:" Symbolic beliefs about sexual orientation in the United States and in Britain. Journal of Community and Applied Social Psychology, 12, 1-14. Hegarty, P., & Pratto, F. (2001b). Sexual orientation beliefs: Their relationship to anti- gay attitudes and biological determinist arguments. Journal of Homosexuality, 41, 121-135. Herek, G. M. (1984). Attitudes toward lesbians and gay men: A factor analytic study. Journal of Homosexuality, 10, 39-51. Herek, G. M. (1987). Religious orientation and prejudice: A comparisson of racial and sexual attitudes. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 13, 34-44. Herek, G. M. (1993). Assessing heterosexuals' attitudes toward lesbians and gay men: A review of empirical research with the ATLG scale. In B. Greene & G.M. 7 Herek (Eds.), Lesbian and gay psychology: Theory, research, and clinical applications. Psychological perspectives on lesbian and gay issues, Vol. 1 (pp. 206-228). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. Herek, G. M, & Capitanio, J. P. (1996). "Some of my best friends": Intergroup contact,concealable stigma, and heterosexuals' attitudes toward gay men and lesbians. Personality & Social Psychology Bulletin, 22, 412-424. Herek, G.M. (2000). The psychology of sexual prejudice. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 9, 19-22. Kessler, S.J. & McKenna, W. (1978). Gender: An ethnomethodologial approach. University of Chicago Press: Chicago. Kite, M.E. & Deaux, K. (1987). Gender belief systems: Homosexuality and the implicit inversion theory. Psychology of Women Quarterly, 11, 83-69. Kite, M. E. & Whitley, B. E. (1998). Do heterosexual women and men differ in their attitudes toward homosexuality? A conceptual and methodological analysis. In Herek, G. M. (Ed). Stigma and sexual orientation: Understanding prejudice against lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals. Psychological perspectives on lesbian and gay issues, Vol. 4 (pp. 39-61). Thousand Oaks, CA, US: Sage Publications, Inc. Moran, L.J., & Sharpe, A.N. (2002). Policing the transgender/violence relation. Current Issues in Criminal Justice, 13, 269-285. Nunnally, J. C. (1978) Psychometric Theory, 2nd Edn. New York: McGraw-Hill. Parlee, M.B. (1996). Situated knowledges of personal embodiment: Transgender activists’ and psychological theorists’ perspectives on ‘sex’ and ‘gender.’ Theory and Psychology, 6, 625-645. Pettigrew, T. F., & Tropp, L. R. (2000). Does intergroup contact reduce prejudice? Recent meta-analytic findings. In S. Oskamp, (Ed.), Reducing prejudice and discrimination: The Claremont Symposium on Applied Social Psychology (pp. 93- 114). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. Press for Change (1999). Recognizing the rights of transsexual and transgender persons in the United Kingdom. Downloaded from: www.pfc.org.uk/workgrp/pfcrpt1.htm, June 8 th , 2004. Prosser, J. (1998). Transsexuals and the transsexologists: Inversion and the emergence of transsexual subjectivity. In L. Bland & L. Doan (Eds.) Sexology in culture: Labelling bodies and desires (pp. 116-131). Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Simon, A. (1998). Understanding prejudice against lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals. In G. M Herek. (Ed). Stigma and sexual orientation: Psychological perspectives on lesbian and gay issues, Vol. 4. 62-81. Speer, S. (in press). The interactional organization of the gender attribution process. Sociology. Swim, J. K., Aikin, K. J., Hall, W. S., & Hunter, B. A. (1995). Sexism and racism: Old- fashioned and modern prejudices. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 68, 199-214. Taylor, A. (1983). Conceptions of masculinity and femininity as a basis for stereotypes of male and female homosexuals. Journal of Homosexuality, 9, 37-53. Terry, J. (1999). An American obsession. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Valentine, D. (2003). ‘The calculus of pain’: Violence, anthropological ethics, and the category transgender. Ethnos, 68, 27-48. Wangh, S.J. (2003). Double cross: Transmasculinity and Asian American gendering in Trappings of Transhood. In A.J. Aldama & A. Arteaga (Eds.) Violence and the body: Race, gender, and the state (pp. 287-310). Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press. Weiner, B., Perry, R.P., & Magnusson, J. (1988). An attributional analysis of reactions to stigmas. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 55, 738-748. Whitley, B. E. Jr. (1999). Right-wing authoritarianism, social dominance orientation, and prejudice. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 77, 126-134. 8 Whisman, V. (1994). Queer by choice: Lesbians, gay men and the politics of identity. New York: Routledge. Whittle, S. (2000). The transgender debate. Reading, UK; Garnet. Wilchins, R.A. (1997). Read my lips: Sexual subversion and the end of gender. Ithaca, NY: Firebrand Books. 9 Table 1: Factor Loadings on the Beliefs about Gender Scale Item Component 1 2 ___3__ 1. There are only two genders, male or female .77 -.10 .12 2. Only these two genders are morally acceptable and legitimate in our society .65 -.18 .39 3. All adults identify as either male or female .74 -.01 .43 4. If you are either male or female, then you are that gender for all time .65 -.34 -.52 5. All males have a penis and females all have a vagina .37 -.22 .63 6. It’s just a social norm to assign babies to a gender based on what their bodies are like. .28 .35 .65 7. Anyone who is not naturally male or female is a ‘freak of nature’ .25 -.32 .76 8. If someone says they are changing their gender, they are most likely just making a joke or play acting. .28 .03 .65 9. Even a person with ambiguous genetalia is still either male or female .63 .40 .29 10. Possession of a vagina, even one that is man-made through surgery, entitles a person to consider themselves female -.18 .76 -.16___ Note: Highest loading for each component shown in bold. Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy – 0.79, Significance – p < .001 Table 2: Factor Loadings of Items on Trans Persons Beliefs Scale Item Biological Gender Social Gender Gender is determined by biological factors, such as genes and hormones, before birth. .63 -.28 Whether a person sees himself/herself as male or female is largely a matter of upbringing. -.03 .52 Transvestites are people who gain pleasure from cross-dressing. .40 .14 Transsexuals are basically transvestites who wear the clothes of the opposite sex all of the time. .35 .54 All mammals have a physical sex, but only humans have a gender identity. -.07 .73 If someone wants a sex reassignment, their doctor or psychologist can talk them out of it. .71 -.07 Male to female transsexuals are practically all attracted to men and not to women .58 .21 Transsexual people are fooling themselves in believing that they, and not their bodies, determine what their gender identity should be. .82 -.07 There are only three factors that determine gender: internal gonads (e.g. testes), external genetalia (e.g. penis) and chromosomes ( i.e. xx – female and xy – male). .73 -.15 If someone has a sex change operation they have genuinely changed their gender. -.27 .44 Transsexuals should be tolerated but it is difficult to accept them as ‘normal’ people. .24 .52 10 In countries where sex reassignment surgery is not readily available, nobody worries about their gender identity..51 .09 Note: Loadings for items included in scales are in bold. Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy – 0.72 Significance – p < 0.001 11 Table 3: Factor Loadings of Items on Similarities Subscale. Contrasted Groups Component 1 Component 2 Gay men and Male-to-Female Transsexuals .85 -.01 Lesbians and Female-to-Male Transsexuals .85 .03 Drag Queens and Gay Men .81 .07 Drag Kings and Lesbians .83 -.06 Drag Kings and Female-to-Male Transsexuals .84 .06 Drag Queens and Male-to-Female Transsexuals .87 -.263 Drag Queens and Drag Kings .02 .87 Lesbians and Gay Men .00 .90 Male-to-Female and Female-to Male Transsexuals -.01 .90 Note: Highest loading for each component shown in bold. Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy – 0.74. Significance – p < .001. 12 Table 4: Factor Loadings on the Support for Trans Persons’ Civil Rights Scale _____ Item Component Transsexual people should have the right to… have a new passport issued 1 .90 have a new birth certificate issued 1 .55 have a new driving license issued 1 .85 marry someone of the opposite gender from their “new” gender (i.e. the same as their birth gender) 1 .83 have an existing marriage to a person of the same gender as their “new” gender still recognized after transition 2 .79 be treated in a hospital appropriate to their “new” gender 1 .81 be detained in a prison appropriate to their “new” gender 1 .67 Note: Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy – 0.83. Significance – 0.00. 1 Rights which became statutory under the 2004 Gender Recognition Act in the UK. 2 Right currently denied to trans persons seeking statutory recognition under the GRA. 13 Table 5: Correlations of Attitudes, Beliefs and Religiosity by Subject. ________ Rights ATLG RWA Belief Biology Sim(1) Sim(2) ATLG .60*** RWA .54*** .64*** Belief .41** .52*** .44*** Biology .51*** .57*** .41*** .63*** Sim (1) -.02 .20** -.09 .12 .22** Sim (2) -.12 -.01 -.01 .20* .07 .22 ** Rel .39*** .41*** .45*** .15 .30*** .07 -.12_ *p <.05, **p <.01, ***p <.001, Note: Rights = Opposition to Transpersons’ Rights, Belief = Beliefs about Gender, Biology = Biological Gender, Sim (1) = Between Group Similarity, Sim (2) = Between Gender Similarity, Rel = Religiosity. 14 Table 6: Regression Model Predicting Opposition to Trans Persons’ Civil Rights. Standardized β t Prejudice Measures Right Wing Authoritarianism .26 2.72** Attitudes to Lesbians and Gay Men .20 1.84* Belief Measures Beliefs About Gender -.02 <1 Biological Gender .21 2.1 * Demographics Academic Subject .02 <1 Contact with Gender Minorities -.08 -1.08 Contact with Sexual Minorities .20 2.63 * Participant Ethnicity .12 1.62 Participant Nationality .12 1.67 Participant Gender .06 <1 Participant Religiosity .135 1.66 * p<.05, **p <.01. Note: Variables were dummy coded as follows; Academic Subject [1 = psychology, 2 = engineering], Participant Ethnicity [1 = White, 2 = non-White], Participant Nationality [1 = British, 2 = Non-British], Participant Gender [1 = Female, 2 = Male]. 
work_np2kqad3ajbyji2pkbxwodbqcy	----	Heteronormativity and/as violence: the "sexing" of Gwen Araujo Browse Explore more content Heteronormativity and as violence.pdf (121.8 kB) Heteronormativity and/as violence: the "sexing" of Gwen Araujo CiteDownload (121.8 kB)ShareEmbed journal contribution posted on 18.08.2014, 15:37 by Moya Lloyd This paper will examine the violence of heteronormativity: the violence that constitutes and regulates bodies according to normative notions of sex, gender, and sexuality. This violence, I will argue, requires more than a focus on gendered or sexualized physical harms of the kinds normally examined when studying violence against sexual minorities or women. Rather, it necessitates focusing on the multiple modalities through which heteronormativity performs its violence on, through, and against bodies and persons, including through the production of certain bodies and persons as inciting violence in their very being. To establish my argument, I explore the killing in 2002 of trans woman Gwen Araujo and the violence of the legal strategy (the trans panic defense) used in the legal trials that followed her killing. Both forms of violence, I suggest, operate in a similar way, albeit through different mechanisms, to maintain and extend the system of binary morphology that itself entails the perpetual violent materialization of sexed bodies. Categories Political Science not elsewhere classified Philosophy Keywords FeminismViolenceTransgender people History School Social Sciences Department Politics and International Studies Published in HYPATIA-A JOURNAL OF FEMINIST PHILOSOPHY Volume 28 Issue 4 Pages 818 - 834 (17) Citation LLOYD, M.S., 2013. Heteronormativity and/as violence: the "sexing" of Gwen Araujo. Hypatia, 28 (4), pp. 818-834. Publisher John Wiley and Sons (© Hypatia) Version AM (Accepted Manuscript) Publication date 2013 Notes This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: LLOYD, M.S., 2013. Heteronormativity and/as violence: the "sexing" of Gwen Araujo. Hypatia, 28 (4), pp. 818-834, which has been published in final form at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/hypa.12015. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for self-archiving. DOI https://doi.org/10.1111/hypa.12015 ISSN 0887-5367 eISSN 1527-2001 Publisher version http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/hypa.12015 Language en Administrator link https://repository.lboro.ac.uk/account/articles/9468962 Licence CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 Exports Select an optionRefWorksBibTeXRef. managerEndnoteDataCiteNLMDC Categories Political Science not elsewhere classified Philosophy Keywords FeminismViolenceTransgender people Licence CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 Exports Select an optionRefWorksBibTeXRef. managerEndnoteDataCiteNLMDC Hide footerAboutFeaturesToolsBlogAmbassadorsContactFAQPrivacy PolicyCookie PolicyT&CsAccessibility StatementDisclaimerSitemap figshare. credit for all your research. 
work_nprjafljpnb5bddkkr5wqm75bu	----	[PDF] A socioecological measurement of homophobia for all countries and its public health impact | Semantic Scholar Skip to search formSkip to main content> Semantic Scholar's Logo Search Sign InCreate Free Account You are currently offline. Some features of the site may not work correctly. DOI:10.1093/eurpub/cky023 Corpus ID: 3760528A socioecological measurement of homophobia for all countries and its public health impact @article{Lamontagne2018ASM, title={A socioecological measurement of homophobia for all countries and its public health impact}, author={Erik Lamontagne and M. d’Elb{\'e}e and M. Ross and A. Carroll and A. D. Plessis and L. Loures}, journal={European Journal of Public Health}, year={2018}, volume={28}, pages={967–972} } Erik Lamontagne, M. d’Elbée, +3 authors L. Loures Published 2018 Political Science, Medicine European Journal of Public Health Background Measuring homophobia at country level is important to guide public health policy as reductions in stigma are associated with improved health outcomes among gay men and other men who have sex with men. Methods: We developed a Homophobic Climate Index incorporating institutional and social components of homophobia. Institutional homophobia was based on the level of enforcement of laws that criminalise, protect or recognise same-sex relations. Social homophobia was based on the level of… Expand View on Wolters Kluwer academic.oup.com Save to Library Create Alert Cite Launch Research Feed Share This Paper 10 CitationsBackground Citations 2 View All Figures, Tables, and Topics from this paper figure 1 table 1 table 2 figure 2 Homophobia antineoplaston A10 Cessation of life Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome HIV Infections Multi-Institutional Systems Social Characteristics Gross Domestic Product eyespot apparatus Menopause Health Expenditures Physiological Sexual Disorders 10 Citations Citation Type Citation Type All Types Cites Results Cites Methods Cites Background Has PDF Publication Type Author More Filters More Filters Filters Sort by Relevance Sort by Most Influenced Papers Sort by Citation Count Sort by Recency Country level homophobia and protective sexual health behaviours among HIV negative or untested men who have sex with men in 45 countries G. Melendez-Torres, T. Noori, +4 authors A. Bourne Medicine AIDS care 2020 Save Alert Research Feed Attitudes of Nurses to Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Trans (Lgbt) Individuals in Turkey Toraman Aynur, Agartioglu Kundakci Gamze, Ulusoy Sahin Cennet 2021 PDF Save Alert Research Feed The relationship between LGBT inclusion and economic development: Macro-level evidence M. Badgett, K. Waaldijk, Y. Rodgers Economics 2019 8 Save Alert Research Feed Cultural adaptation and validation of a measure of prejudice against men who have sex with men among healthcare providers in western Kenya. Sylvia Shangani, B. Genberg, +4 authors D. Operario Medicine Global public health 2020 Save Alert Research Feed The Legal Vulnerability Model for Same-Sex Parent Families: A Mixed Methods Systematic Review and Theoretical Integration Magdalena Siegel, Constanze Assenmacher, Nathalie Meuwly, Martina Zemp Medicine Frontiers in Psychology 2021 View 1 excerpt, cites background Save Alert Research Feed Are men who have sex with men in Europe protected from hepatitis B? M. Brandl, A. J. Schmidt, U. Marcus, M. an der Heiden, S. Dudareva Medicine Epidemiology and Infection 2020 2 PDF View 1 excerpt, cites background Save Alert Research Feed Curvilinear associations between sexual orientation and problematic substance use, behavioural addictions and mental health among young Swiss men. Matthias Wicki, S. Marmet, J. Studer, O. Épaulard, G. Gmel Psychology, Medicine Addictive behaviors 2020 Save Alert Research Feed HIV testing and engagement with the HIV treatment cascade among men who have sex with men in Africa: a systematic review and meta-analysis. James Stannah, E. Dale, +4 authors Marie-Claude Boily Medicine The lancet. HIV 2019 17 PDF Save Alert Research Feed PrEP rollout in Africa: status and opportunity E. Irungu, Jared M. Baeten Medicine Nature Medicine 2020 3 Save Alert Research Feed Masculinity threat: understanding why Jamaican men report more anti-gay prejudice than Jamaican women M. L. B. Guevara, Keon West Psychology 2020 Save Alert Research Feed References SHOWING 1-10 OF 38 REFERENCES SORT BYRelevance Most Influenced Papers Recency The economic cost of stigma and the exclusion of LGBT people : a case study of India M. Badgett Political Science 2014 33 Save Alert Research Feed Prevalence of internalized homophobia and HIV associated risks among men who have sex with men in Nigeria. S. Adebajo, G. Eluwa, D. Allman, T. Myers, Babatunde A Ahonsi Political Science, Medicine African journal of reproductive health 2012 53 Save Alert Research Feed Homosexuality-Related Stigma and Sexual Risk Behaviors Among Men Who Have Sex With Men in Hanoi, Vietnam H. Ha, J. Risser, M. Ross, N. T. Huynh, Huong T. M. Nguyen Psychology, Medicine Archives of sexual behavior 2015 36 Save Alert Research Feed Internalized homonegativity/homophobia is associated with HIV-risk behaviours among Ugandan gay and bisexual men M. Ross, P. Kajubi, J. Mandel, W. McFarland, H. Raymond Medicine International journal of STD & AIDS 2013 54 Save Alert Research Feed Is Same-Sex Marriage Legislation Related to Attitudes Toward Homosexuality? M. Hooghe, C. Meeusen Sociology 2013 69 PDF Save Alert Research Feed Hidden from health: structural stigma, sexual orientation concealment, and HIV across 38 countries in the European MSM Internet Survey J. Pachankis, M. Hatzenbuehler, +4 authors A. Schmidt Medicine AIDS 2015 179 PDF Save Alert Research Feed Homophobia is Associated with Sexual Behavior that Increases Risk of Acquiring and Transmitting HIV Infection Among Black Men Who Have Sex with Men W. L. Jeffries, Gary Marks, J. Lauby, C. Murrill, G. Millett Psychology, Medicine AIDS and Behavior 2012 132 PDF Save Alert Research Feed Internalised homonegativity predicts HIV-associated risk behavior in European men who have sex with men in a 38-country cross-sectional study: some public health implications of homophobia M. Ross, R. Berg, +4 authors P. Weatherburn Medicine BMJ Open 2013 87 PDF Save Alert Research Feed High prevalence of stigma-related abuse among a sample of men who have sex with men in Tanzania: implications for HIV prevention A. Anderson, M. Ross, J. Nyoni, S. McCurdy Medicine AIDS care 2015 55 Save Alert Research Feed Sexual Stigma, Criminalization, Investment, and Access to HIV Services Among Men Who Have Sex with Men Worldwide S. Arreola, G. Santos, +6 authors G. Ayala Medicine AIDS and Behavior 2014 91 Save Alert Research Feed ... 1 2 3 4 ... Related Papers Abstract Figures, Tables, and Topics 10 Citations 38 References Related Papers Stay Connected With Semantic Scholar Sign Up About Semantic Scholar Semantic Scholar is a free, AI-powered research tool for scientific literature, based at the Allen Institute for AI. Learn More → Resources DatasetsSupp.aiAPIOpen Corpus Organization About UsResearchPublishing PartnersData Partners   FAQContact Proudly built by AI2 with the help of our Collaborators Terms of Service•Privacy Policy The Allen Institute for AI By clicking accept or continuing to use the site, you agree to the terms outlined in our Privacy Policy, Terms of Service, and Dataset License ACCEPT & CONTINUE 
work_nq33kt5nlvc45pidgii6557qgi	----	7 Zločini iz mržnje Restorative practices & hate crime: Opening up the debate theo Gavrielides* Despite recent academic and policy interest worldwide, the concepts of restorative justice and hate crime are relatively new, and the full extent of their implications unknown. This paper aims to encourage further dialogue that will allow a more in-depth understanding of both notions. A review of international case studies was attempted by looking at examples where restorative approaches were successfully applied to address hate incidents. Further research and evaluation is warranted in this grey area before further policies and legislation are reviewed. Keywords: Hate crime, restorative justice, mediation, restoration. Introducing restorative justice for hate crime Understanding Hate Crime Hate crime is any criminal offence committed against a person or property that is motivated by an offender’s hatred of someone because of their: race, colour, ethnic origin, nationality or national origins, religion, gender identity, sexual orientation, or disability (Sibbitt, 1997). Arguably, this is a progressive definition, as many jurisdictions, including Serbia, do not extend it to equality strands other than race and faith (see Gavrielides 2007; Chakraborti 2010). In fact, “hate crime” is not written anywhere in the law. When an offender has pleaded guilty or been found guilty of an offence and the TEMIDA Decembar 2011, str. 7-20 ISSN: 1450-6637 DOI: 10.2298/TEM1104007G Pregledni rad * Dr Theo Gavrielides is the Founder and Director of Independent Academic Research Studies (IARS), Visiting Professorial Research Fellow Panteion University, Visiting Senior Research Fellow Open University and Visiting Scholar Mount Royal University. Email: T.Gavrielides@iars.org.uk Theo Gavrielides 8 court is deciding on the sentence to be imposed, the law requires the judge to treat evidence of hostility based on the aforementioned characteristics as something that makes the offence more serious (i.e. hate crime). Admittedly, hate crime is a relative new area of criminological interest and although the literature has recently risen to the challenge of analysing it, there are still many gaps for both academia and practice (Iganski, 2008). One of the most thorough studies on hate crimes and the profiling of hate perpetrators was carried out by McDevitt and Levin (1993; 2002; 2010). They argued that there are four types of hate crime offenders: 1. “Thrill offenders” i.e., those who commit their crimes for the excitement or the thrill; 2. “Defensive offenders” i.e., those who view themselves as defending their turf; 3. “Mission offenders” i.e., those whose life’s mission is to rid the world of groups they consider evil or inferior; 4. “Retaliatory offenders” i.e., those who engage in retaliatory violence in the belief that by doing so just deserts is served (McDevitt et al: 2002; 2010). Understanding Restorative Justice Moving on to RJ, the term was not coined until the 1970s when Eglash (1977) distinguished three types of criminal justice: retributive, distributive and restorative. He claimed that the first two types focus on the criminal act, deny victim participation in the justice process, and require merely passive participation by offenders. The third type focuses on restoring the harmful effects of these actions, and actively involves all parties in the criminal justice process. RJ, he said, provides: “a deliberate opportunity for offender and victim to restore their relationship, along with a chance for the offender to come up with a means to repair the harm done to the victim…” (p. 2). A number of definitions have since been developed for RJ. For instance, Gavrielides defines it as “an ethos with practical goals, among which is to restore harm by including affected parties in a (direct or indirect) encounter and a process of understanding through voluntary and honest dialogue (2007: 139). Gavrielides argues that RJ “adopts a fresh approach to conflicts and their control, retaining at the same time certain rehabilitative goals” (p. 139). Depending on the structure of the criminal justice system, RJ can appear in various forms and at different stages of the criminal process. This is also Temida 9 dependant on public tolerance and the given cultural and historical context. In the literature, there is consensus that RJ practices consist of: direct and indirect mediation, family group conferences, healing/sentencing circles and community restorative boards (Walgrave, Bazemore 1998; Crawford, Newburn 2003). When introduced into the criminal process, RJ practices can be ‘independent,’ ‘relatively independent ’ and ‘dependent ’. They are ‘independent’, when they divert the criminal case out of the formal process. This occurs at a very early stage of the case, replacing any penal response to crime. The outcome usually precludes re-entrance of the case in the criminal justice system. Practices can be ‘relatively independent’, when they are offered as part of the regular criminal procedure. This can take place at any stage of the case, which is diverted and referred to a mediator charged with reaching an agreement between victim and offender. If this is accomplished successfully, it will have an impact on the outcome of the criminal proceedings. Its most common effect is to reduce sentencing, although there have been cases where charges were dropped altogether. RJ practices are ‘dependent’, when they are situated adjacent to the conventional system. This model is used after the criminal trial has run its course, and is mainly employed in instances of the most serious crime or in the prison context (Groenhuijsen, 2000). Understanding restorative justice for hate crimes Once hate crime cases are diverted into the RJ route, there are four typical steps to restoration. The first step is the referral of the case to the RJ programme. These referrals usually come from people within the justice or social system, such as police, prosecutors, judges, probation officers, social workers or housing officers. They take place at any time from the date of the offence to the period of parole. The second step is the preparation of the case. The victim and the offender are contacted separately by the RJ practitioner (e.g. mediator) who gathers information about the offence and answers questions from both parties. Home visits by the mediator are also common. The third step is the actual meeting (direct or indirect) between the victim and the offender – and in the case of family group conferences and circles – of their families, friends and relatives. The meeting usually starts with a statement from the victim, explaining what it felt to be harmed and posing Theo Gavrielides 10 their questions to the offender – the most common one being “Why me?.” Some practices, however, may choose to start with the offender’s apology. The offender is then invited to give their detailed story of what happened. This introduction is expected to be followed by a constructive and honest dialogue that is facilitated by a neutral practitioner. This focuses on how the offender may repair the harm done and what can be done to reintegrate them back into the community. The dialogue is concluded with an agreement between the victim and the offender which may vary from a written apology to community punishment and compensation, the completion of an education programme, getting a job and holding it down, or making commitment to stay out of trouble. Depending on the programme, agreements and penalties may vary from being strongly retributive to solely rehabilitative. The fourth step involves preparing the file and returning it to the referral source. A precondition for any restorative meeting is that the hate offender has admitted the offence and that all discussions remain confidential and unusable in the formal criminal justice process. Another key principle is that of voluntariness meaning that both parties willingly take part in all stages of the RJ process, which can be interrupted if any party changes their minds. Restorative justice for hate crimes: a knowledge gap Chakraborti (2010) and Walters (2012) have argued that the relationship of RJ with hate crimes has traditionally been treated with suspicion by policy makers, politicians and the public. The research and investment in this area is also underdeveloped for at least two reasons. First, hate crime has traditionally been treated as a ‘grey area’ for RJ practices mainly due to the power imbalances that are created in the victim- offender relationship. Some claim that perpetrators of hate crime fall within a special category of criminological interest, where criminal behaviour is examined as a phenomenon that is attributed to deep-rooted causes (McDevitt et al, 2002). Racist perpetrators, for instance, might not be easily susceptible to rehabilitative and community-based approaches, while victims may be exposed to further victimisation if brought in contact with them – irrespective of how remorseful the perpetrator may seem to be. While most hate crimes involve relatively minor offences (e.g. graffiti, egg throwing, Temida 11 name-calling, intimidation and vandalism), their impact can be much greater and long lasting depending on how the victim and the community perceives them. Hate crimes tend to target our humanity and dignity, and often involve patterns of repeat victimisation evoking a large amount of fear. The second reason relates to a slightly more abstract challenge. The concept of restoration of the status quo ante initially seems to be at odds with the impact that hate crime has on victims and the community. For instance, Pavlich (2004) warms against fixed or absolute ideas of community and is sceptical about what RJ can and cannot do to restore the status quo for the community. Like tort law, RJ is concerned with restoring the parties to the status quo ante through restitution i.e. the position the parties would have been in, had the crime not occurred. For instance, in cases that deal with property crime – or even some crimes against the person – this is attainable. But when hate crime is concerned, this may be more difficult. Some claimed that in most cases, RJ would meet an arrangement that may suit the vengeful victim and a middle-class mediator that will lead to ganging up on the offender, exact the expected apology, and negotiate an agreement that suits everyone (Smith, 1995). Arguably, little social transformation is likely to arise from utilitarian transactions of this sort. However, from the 1990s and especially after the 2001, September 11th tragic events, hate crime has become a significant area of concern for public policy internationally. For example, only one year after September 11th , Human Rights Watch warned the US government that its officials should have been better prepared for the hate crime wave that followed the terrorist attacks. An increase of 1700% was recorded for anti-Muslim bias crime1. This violence was directed at people solely because they shared – or were perceived as sharing – the national background, or religion, of the hijackers and al-Qaeda members deemed responsible for attacking the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon. Consequently, in the search for practices and policies that could bring balance to community tensions, and address integration questions, RJ principles and practices started to appear appealing. According to Tiemessen (2004), the use of RJ in resolving international tensions such as those that followed the Rwanda genocide – otherwise called gacaca justice – make RJ topical for Western democracies. Further research and investment are now debated. 1 Human Rights Watch (accessed 2003) http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/september11/ Theo Gavrielides 12 Contextualising restorative justice and hate crime One of the challenges in starting a thorough debate on the relationship between RJ and hate crime is the ability to contextualise them. Unless present in the mediation room, it is indeed hard to imagine the dynamics and the context that RJ takes when applied for hate offences. To help contextualise RJ for hate crimes and without any ambition to compare or reach any conclusive arguments, our research reviewed international case studies that were extracted from the extant, limited literature. The case studies involve conflicts at both the inter-personal and inter-community level (see Table 1). They stretch from low level hate incidents in schools to serious hate crimes in the community. Their selection and basis of success relied on the limited information that was made available through the literature and is measured by the cases’ outcome, their promptness, cost effectiveness, and the extent of the restoration they have achieved for all parties including the community. The case studies are not meant to be conclusive but indicative of the breadth and context that RJ can take when dealing with hate incidents whether punishable or not. Table 1: Case studies of RJ practices for hate offences LOCATION INCIDENT PRACTICE INVOLVED PARTIES INVOLVED OUTCOME Minnesota, US Racist incidents within a school Direct/ indirect mediation, RJ letters, conferences 150 students, their families, teachers, school personnel Avoided litigation, encouraged school cohesion, updated school policy Israel and the occupied territories Hate crime and act of terrorism Direct victim offender mediation Two Arab hate crime offenders, Jewish victim, Probation Service Settlement of the case in lieu of penal conviction, victim and their family satisfaction achieved Southwark, London, England Hate offences (mostly racist violence and homophobia) Direct and indirect mediation, letters of apology Juvenile and adult perpetrators of hate incidents and victims, community Case diversion, settlement in lieu of penal conviction, victim satisfaction, reduction in recidivism Oregon, US Racism and xenophobia following September 11th 2001 Direct mediation and follow up healing circle Muslim victim and White male offender, the community and families Case diversion, settlement in lieu of penal conviction, reintegration, victim satisfaction Temida 13 LOCATION INCIDENT PRACTICE INVOLVED PARTIES INVOLVED OUTCOME Rwanda Genocide Direct and indirect mediation, reconciliation committees Genocide and hate crimes involving Tutsis and Hutus Reviving the collapsed criminal justice system by diverting criminal cases to RJ, some reconciliation Slough, England Inter-racial tensions between Sikh and Muslim communities Direct and indirect peer mediation Groups of young people among whom conflict was identified as a problem Prevention, community cohesion, integration, restoration of conflict Lambeth, London, England Bullying in schools (racist, homophobia, disablism) Peer mediation, staff mediation and restorative conferences Pupils, school personnel, the police Prevention, community cohesion, change of school policy Minnesota, US case study This case involved racial tensions that occurred between White and Black/ Asian pupils while in school. After several unsuccessful interventions, the school used mediation and restorative conferences/ letters between the students, their families and school personnel. Victims gave their testimonies and everyone shared their experiences and fears. Serious cases were concluded without the need for litigation, a stronger community spirit was encouraged within school, which subsequently adopted mediation as the first official step in dealing with racial conflicts (Coates et al, 2006). Israel and the occupied territories case study The case involved two young Arab offenders who committed an armed robbery against a Jewish victim who experienced the offence as hate crime and an act of terrorism. The parties agreed to attend direct mediation. This allowed the victim to explain her fears and understand the reasons behind the actions. The offenders’ families were involved in the process by providing support to their children and the victim. The meeting ended with a settlement by the participants, which was later accepted by the juvenile court in lieu of a conviction. All parties expressed feelings of satisfaction and relief and the families were able to move on with their lives (Umbreit, Ritter, 2006). Theo Gavrielides 14 Southwark, London, England case study Since 2002, a community-based mediation centre in Southwark has been dealing with over 60 hate offences per year. These are deemed to have the potential of developing to serious punishable crimes. One typical case involved a Turkish and a White British family living in local social housing estate. Crimes had been committed by both families against one another. The police was about to prosecute when face-to-face mediation was employed. The White British family had committed racist offences against members of the Turkish family whose son had committed property offences against the White British family. After a successful process, the police dropped the charges and reconciliation was achieved between the parties. Oregon, US case study This case involved face-to-face mediation between a White male who was arrested for causing terror through prank telephone calls, and a victim from a minority community who answered the calls. These took place after the 2001 September 11th attacks and were made to the Islamic Cultural Centre in Eugene, Oregon. The person who answered the phone was a practising Muslim who received the act as hate crime against him and his family. The mediation led to an apology and the adoption of reparatory measures, which diverted the case from the formal criminal process. It was also followed up by a separate healing circle that was attended by community members, who through this process supported both parties (Coates et al, 2006). Rwanda case study After the 1994 genocide in Rwanda where some 800,000 people were systematically slaughtered (about 10% of the total population), the international community responded with the creation of the ad hoc ‘International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda’ (ICTR). In the recitals of the UN Resolution 955/94 establishing the Court, RJ is evidently prominent. For instance, it uses the words “national reconciliation and…the restoration and maintenance of peace…”. However, in the political and societal environment of post-genocide Rwanda, it was easier for the retributive penal response to prevail (Tiemessen, 2004). Temida 15 But alas, the Rwandan criminal justice system was hopelessly ill equipped to detain, prosecute and try the 200,000 suspects who were held on remand for over seven years. Drumble said: “At the present rate of progress, it will take hundreds of years to clear the backlog of cases” (2000: 1221). In November 2002, an indigenous system of local tribunals called Gacaca was used as the raw material for institutional adaptation in furtherance of a holistic RJ orientated response to genocide. Gacaca led to the development of a communal judicial system, which aimed to aid reconciliation and speed up the trials. Gacaca’s success is measured by the level of participation by the Rwandan people, who are being called upon to confess to crimes committed, elect judges and give testimony to what they experienced during the genocide. According to Tiemessen (2004), “Gacaca justice is meant to be as intimate as the genocide itself” (57). The Gacaca strategy is planned in four phases. The first focuses on raising awareness about Gacaca and increasing knowledge about the law. The second is concerned with the election of Gacaca judges, while the third deals with confession, testimony, and reconciliation. The fourth phase focuses on re-integration of prisoners back into society through a work programme. “Gacaca represents a model of RJ because it focuses on the healing of victims and perpetrators, confessions, plea-bargains, and reintegration” (Tiemessen, 2004: 58). Consolata Mukanyiligira, coordinator with the Avaga ‘Association of Genocide Widows’, told to the ‘Integrated Regional Information Networks’ (IRIN) that Rwandans were firstly concerned with finding who killed their loved-ones and where they were buried, so they could lay them to rest with dignity. After that, she said: “We are obliged to reconcile, because we are neighbours”. The pilot Gacaca trials had gone “very well” so far, Deogratias Kayumba, of the ‘National Human Rights Commission’, told IRIN. However, as with every pilot programme, one can easily identify various flaws in the system. These included cases of people being paid to desist from giving evidence, threats against those giving evidence, and politicians in some rural areas advising people to keep quiet. Slough, England case study This is a slightly different case in the sense that it did not involve a crime per se, but focused on the preventative and community cohesion side of inter- Theo Gavrielides 16 racial conflicts within a locality. These tensions involved the settled Sikh and Muslim populations in Slough who in the mid 1990s experienced antagonism and disintegration. Through peer mediation, young people from these two communities, learned to co-exist and support each other. Community leaders encourage community cohesion through face-to-face mediation of the conflicts that occurred and could have been processed through more formal criminal justice processes. Lambeth, London, England case study Although not always considered hate crime in the narrow sense, bullying due to racism, homophobia, disablism or sexism can either develop to a more serious offence or have equal if not more detrimental effect on the victim than hate crime per se. Instead of dealing with bullying incidents in the formal way by calling the police or formal structures, schools in the London Borough of Lambeth divert these cases to peer mediation programmes. Through direct meetings and follow up conferences with the parents, community cohesion within the school context and ad hoc re-dress is achieved. The local authority evaluates these practices annually and provides the funding and a dedicated worker to develop them across the borough (Select Committee on Education and Skills, 2006). Concluding Reflections RJ and hate crimes are relatively new phenomena. This presents challenges for policy makers and researchers. This paper set off to explore the applicability of RJ with hate crimes by looking at existing practices from around the world. This paper has taken the first step in contextualising RJ for hate crimes. The case studies presented suggest that it is a mistake to safely promise that all restorative programmes can reduce hate crime, enhance community relationships, prevent further offending or build better societies. However, RJ should not be dismissed as an appropriate option for hate incidents. Nevertheless, to make its application more widely available, the objectives of restorative practices will need to convince the public, the community and victims and offenders of hate crime. Temida 17 To win the battle against hate crime and its consequences – whether at a local, national or international level – there must be a breakdown of the stereotypes, attitudes and worldviews that foster it in the first place. As illustrated by the case studies, this battle is being fought on a daily basis not only by criminal justice agencies, but also within schools, places of workship, families, person-to-person relationships and community based organisations. The criminal justice system has set up mechanisms to facilitate this battle, but its limited retributive and punitive approach does not always encourage a process of dialogue, which appears to be one of the means for combating prejudice and fear. RJ is one form of this dialogue. References Barnett, R. (1977) Restitution: A New Paradigm of Criminal Justice. Ethics: An International Journal of Social, Political, and Legal Philosophy, 4, pp. 279-301. Chakraborti, N. (2010) Hate Crime: concepts, policy, future directions. Devon: Willan Publishing. Coates, R., Umbreit, M., Vos, B. (2006) Responding to Hate Crimes through Restorative Justice Dialogue. Contemporary Justice Review, 1, pp. 7-21. Crawford, A., Newburn, T. (2003) Youth Offending and Restorative Justice: Implementing Reform in Youth Justice. Devon: Willan Publishing. Drumble, M. (2000) Sclerosis: Retributive Justice and the Rwanda Genocide. Punishment & Society, 3, pp. 287-307. Eglash, A. (1977) Beyond Restitution: Creative Restitution. In: J. Hudson, B. Galaway (eds.) Restitution in Criminal justice: A critical assessment of sanctions. Lexington, MA: DC Heath and Company, pp. 91-99. Gavrielides, T. (2007) Restorative Justice Theory and Practice: Addressing the Discrepancy. Helsinki: HEUNI. Gavrielides, T. (2008) Restorative justice: the perplexing concept. Conceptual fault lines and power battles within the restorative justice movement. Criminology and Criminal Justice Journal, 2, pp. 165-183. Groenhuijsen, M. (2000) Victim-Offender Mediation and Procedural Safeguards Experiments and Legislation in Some European Jurisdictions. In: The European Forum for Victim Offender Mediation and Restorative Justice (ed.) Victim-offender Theo Gavrielides 18 mediation in Europe: making restorative justice work. Leuven: Leuven University Press, pp. 69-82. Iganski, P. (2008) Hate crime and the city. Bristol: Policy Press. Levin, J., McDevitt, J. (1993) Hate Crimes: The Rising Tide of Bigotry and Bloodshed. New York: Plenum. McDevitt, J., Levin J., Bennett, S. (2002) Hate Crimes Offenders: An Expanded Typology. Journal of Social Issues, 2, pp. 303-317. McDevitt, J., Levin J., Nolan, J., Bennett, S. (2010) Hate Crime Offenders. In: N. Chakraborti (ed.) Hate Crimes: Concepts, policy, future directions. Devon: Willan Publishing, pp. 124-145. Pavlich, G. (2004). What are the Dangers As Well As the Promises of Community Involvement? In: H. Zehr, B. Toews (eds.) Critical Issues in Restorative Justice. Monsey, New York: Criminal Justice Press and Willan Publishing, pp. 173-183. Select Committee on Education and Skills (2006) Memorandum submitted by Luke Roberts, Lambeth Children and Young Peoples’ Service, London: House of Commons. Sibbitt, R. (1997) The Perpetrators of racial Harassment and racial Violence. Home Office Research Study 176. London: Home Office. Smith, D. (1995) Criminology for Social Work. Basingstoke: Macmillan. Sullivan, D., Tifft, L., Cordella, P. (1998) The Phenomenon of Restorative Justice: Some Introductory Remarks. Contemporary Justice Review, 1, pp. 7-20. Tiemessen, A.E. (2004) After Arusha: Gacaca Justice in Post-Genocide Rwanda. Africa Studies Quarterly, 1, pp. 57-76. Umbreit, M., Ritter, R. (2006) Arab Offenders Meet Jewish Victim: Restorative Family Dialogue in Israel. Conflict Resolution Quarterly, 1, pp. 99-109. Walgrave L., Bazemore, G. (1998) Restoring Juvenile Justice: An Exploration of the Restorative Justice Paradigm for Reforming Juvenile Justice. Monsey, New York: Criminal Justice Press. Walters, M. (in press) Hate crime in the UK: promoting the values of dignity and respect through restorative justice. In: T. Gavrielides (ed.) Rights and Restoration Within Youth Justice. Canada: de Sitter Publications. Temida 19 theo Gavrielides Restorativna praksa i zločini mržnje: Otvaranje debate Uprkos povećanom akademskom i političkom interesu u poslednje vreme, koncepti restorativne pravde i zločina mržnje su relativno novi, a pun obim njihovih implikacija ostaje nepoznat. Ovaj rad ima za cilj da podstakne dalji dijalog koji će omogućiti bolje razumevanje oba pojma. U ovom radu je načinjen pokušaj da se da pregled studija slučajeva iz više država u kojima je restorativni pristup uspešno primenjen kao reakcija na zločine mržnje. Dalja istraživanja i evaluacije su poželjne u ovoj sivoj zoni pre bilo kakvih daljih razmatranja prakse i zakonskih rešenja. Ključne reči: zločini mržnje, restorativna pravda, medijacija, restoracija. 
work_nucx7325izbxtninhogwadjqam	----	TSpace Research Repository tspace.library.utoronto.ca This article was made openly accessible by U of T Faculty. Please tell us how this access benefits you. Your story matters. A social ecological approach to understanding correlates of lifetime sexual assault among sexual minority women in Toronto, Canada: results from a cross- sectional internet-based survey Carmen Logie, Ramona Alaggia, Marie-Jolie Rwigema Version Publisher’s PDF Citation (published version) Logie, C. H., Alaggia, R., & Rwigema, M. J. (2014). A social ecological approach to understanding correlates of lifetime sexual assault among sexual minority women in Toronto, Canada: results from a cross- sectional internet-based survey. Health Education Research,29(4), 671-682. doi:10.1093/her/cyt119 Copyright/License CC BY-NC-ND Publisher’s Statement n/a How to cite TSpace items Always cite the published version, so the author(s) will receive recognition through services that track citation counts, e.g. Scopus. If you need to cite the page number of the author manuscript from TSpace because you cannot access the published version, then cite the TSpace version in addition to the published version using the permanent URI (handle) found on the record page. A social ecological approach to understanding correlates of lifetime sexual assault among sexual minority women in Toronto, Canada: results from a cross-sectional internet-based survey C. H. Logie 1,2 *, R. Alaggia 1 and M. J. Rwigema 1 1 Factor-Inwentash Faculty of Social Work, University of Toronto, 246 Bloor Street West, Toronto, ON, Canada M5S 1V4 and 2 Women’s College Research Institute, Women’s College Hospital, University of Toronto, Toronto, ON, Canada *Correspondence to: C. H. Logie. E-mail: carmen.logie@utoronto.ca Received on May 2, 2013; accepted on December 2, 2013 Abstract Stigma, discrimination and violence contribute to health disparities among sexual minorities. Lesbian, bisexual and queer (LBQ) women ex- perience sexual violence at similar or higher rates than heterosexual women. Most research with LBQ women, however, has focused on mea- suring prevalence of sexual violence rather than its association with health outcomes, individual, social and structural factors. We conducted a cross-sectional online survey with LBQ women in Toronto, Canada. Multivariate logistic regres- sion analyses were conducted to assess correlates of lifetime sexual assault (LSA). Almost half (42%) of participants (n¼415) reported experi- ences of LSA. Participants identifying as queer were more likely to have experienced LSA than those identifying as lesbian. When controlling for socio-demographic characteristics, experiencing LSA was associated with higher rates of depres- sion, sexually transmitted infections (STIs), receiving an STI test, belief that healthcare pro- viders were not comfortable with their LBQ sexual orientation, and sexual stigma (overall, perceived and enacted). A history of sexual vio- lence was associated with lower: self-rated health, overall social support, family social sup- port and self-esteem. This research highlights the salience of a social ecological framework to inform interventions for health promotion among LBQ women and to challenge sexual stigma and sexual violence. Introduction Sexual minorities experience pervasive health dis- parities associated with stigma, discrimination and violence [1–4]. Chronic stress stemming from these social contexts of stigma, discrimination and vio- lence contributes to health inequities [3, 5]. For ex- ample, a national US study (n¼34 653) reported that lesbian, gay and bisexual (LGB) persons had higher risk for the onset of post-traumatic stress dis- order (PTSD) than heterosexuals, in part due to LGB person’s elevated exposure to interpersonal violence [6]. Lesbian, bisexual and queer (LBQ) women ex- perience sexual violence at similar [e.g. adult sexual assault (ASA)] or higher (e.g. childhood sexual abuse) rates than heterosexual women [7–14]. There is an urgent need to better understand the interplay between sexual violence, health outcomes, individual, social and structural factors among LBQ women. Sexual violence among sexual minority women Although study findings highlight that LBQ women experience health disparities and are particularly vulnerable to certain types of violence (e.g. hate crime, childhood sexual abuse) there is a dearth of HEALTH EDUCATION RESEARCH Vol.29 no.4 2014 Pages 671–682 Advance Access published 10 January 2014 � The Author 2014. Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved. For permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.com doi:10.1093/her/cyt119 Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/her/article-abstract/29/4/671/634470 by University of Toronto Library user on 01 February 2018 nited tates n = 34 , ( ) LBQ population-specific information about types and correlates of sexual assault (in line with previ- ous studies [10, 11, 14] we use the term ‘sexual as- sault’ to include the scope of sexual assault, sexual violence, forced sex, sexual abuse and rape; we use ‘sexual assault’ and ‘sexual violence’ interchange- ably. We acknowledge there are varying conceptual definitions of sexual assault and sexual violence [14]) [6, 8]. A recent systematic review by Rothman et al. [14] explored prevalence rates for various types of sexual assault victimization, includ- ing lifetime sexual assault (LSA), childhood sexual assault (CSA), ASA, intimate partner sexual assault (IPSA) and hate crime-related assault, and con- cluded that these types of violence were elevated for LGB populations. For example, although esti- mates from the United States indicate 11–17% of women have experienced LSA [15, 16], systematic review results reported lesbian and bisexual (LB) women had prevalence rates of LSA from 16% to 85% [14]. The wide variance was in part attributed to study design, with population-based studies re- porting lower rates of sexual violence in comparison with convenience samples, as well as widely varying sampling methods and definitions of sexual assault and sexual orientation [14]. Friedman et al.’s [9] meta-analysis indicated that female sexual minorities were 1.5 times more likely to have experienced CSA than female heterosexuals. Although LB women were more likely than gay/bi- sexual men to report CSA, ASA, LSA and IPSA, LB women remain greatly underrepresented in sexual violence research in comparison with GB men [14]. Few studies assess the gender or sexual orien- tation of perpetrators of sexual violence among LB women, and this is also true for IPSA studies where there is a knowledge gap regarding whether perpet- rators were same or opposite-sex partners [14]. Social and structural contexts of health among sexual minority women Systematic reviews and population-based studies highlight elevated risks for mental health issues among sexual minority women. Social ecological approaches explore the complex associations between health disparities and social and structural environments [17, 18]. Health outcomes are shaped by individual (e.g. knowledge, attitudes, behavior), social (e.g. social support, sexual networks) and structural (e.g. stigma and discrimination, access to health care) level factors [18]. For example, nu- merous studies indicate higher rates of depression among sexual minority women in comparison with heterosexual women [1, 3, 19–21]. Sexual stigma— a structural factor—has been associated with these higher rates of depression [3] and psychological dis- tress [22]. Sexual stigma refers to social and institutional processes of devaluation of sexual minority identi- ties, communities and same-sex relationships [23]. Forms of stigma include perceived, or felt-norma- tive stigma that refers to awareness of negative so- cietal attitudes and fear of discrimination; and enacted stigma such as overt acts of discrimination and violence [23, 24]. Internalized homophobia refers to individuals’ acceptance of negative beliefs, views and feelings toward the stigmatized group and oneself [23, 24]. Experiences of sexual violence may also be cor- related with depression [13] and PTSD [6, 25] among lesbians. Internalized homophobia was asso- ciated with PTSD among gay male [26] and lesbian [27] sexual assault survivors. Among heterosexual women sexual violence appears to be consistently correlated with alcohol abuse, yet the pattern with LBQ women appears to be different. For instance, one study found that among LBQ women, CSA— but not ASA—was positively associated with alco- hol abuse [10]. Limited research has examined physical and sexual health correlates of LSA among sexual mi- nority women. Childhood sexual abuse was asso- ciated with functional pain in a US based cohort study of sexual minority youth [28]. Functional pain refers to pain without a diagnosed pathology, such as headaches, abdominal and pelvic pain [28]. Another study reported that a history of CSA was associated with the likelihood to engage in sexual risk behaviors in adolescence and adulthood, thus contributing to HIV and sexually transmitted infec- tions (STIs) risk among ‘mostly heterosexual’ C. H. Logie et al. 672 Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/her/article-abstract/29/4/671/634470 by University of Toronto Library user on 01 February 2018 adult sexual assault ( ) crime (HCA) . . - - , ; , s . . young women [29]. Sexual abuse was also corre- lated with HIV risk behaviors among LB students in a US and Canadian cohort study [30]. Response strategies to sexual violence among sexual minority women Sexual minority and heterosexual women tend to have passive response strategies following inci- dences of sexual violence: they either do nothing or only tell someone they trust, as opposed to autho- rities that can intervene [8, 31]. However, some re- searchers argue that sexual minority women are better at coping with violence as a result of mana- ging the stigma of being a sexual minority and sub- sequently developing stronger support networks [7]. Although the literature indicates that LBQ women do access certain support services, there are barriers to access for LBQ women. Concerns regarding stigma and discrimination may result in LBQ women choosing not to disclose their sexual orien- tation to healthcare providers (HCP) [32, 33]. The experiences of LBQ women accessing care may also differ based on sexual identity. For instance, bisex- ual and ‘mostly heterosexual’ women may feel un- comfortable accessing services for lesbians [30]; similarly, lesbians may feel uncomfortable access- ing services that are perceived to be for heterosexual women (e.g. rape crisis centers, shelters) [7, 31]. Study goals and objectives We aimed to address two important gaps in the lit- erature in this study. First, scant research has explored the impact of LSA among sexual minority women [14]. Sexual violence research with LBQ women has predominately focused on prevalence, rather than the impact of such violence on various dimensions of women’s lives, including sexual and mental health outcomes [7]. Second, most studies among sexual minority women have not explicitly measured the associations between LSA and struc- tural factors, such as sexual stigma and barriers to health care. The social ecological approach of understanding individual, social and structural fac- tors associated with LSA among sexual minority women therefore warrants further exploration. Our study was informed by the social ecological framework. The objective of this study was to con- tribute to understanding regarding associations be- tween experiences of LSA and: health outcomes (depression, STI, self-rated health), individual fac- tors (self-esteem, resilient coping, substance use), social factors (safer sex practices, social support) and structural factors (utilization of HIV and STI testing services, barriers to healthcare access, sexual stigma) among sexual minority women in Toronto, Canada. Methods Study design and population We conducted a structured cross-sectional internet- based survey with sexual minority women in Toronto, Canada in December 2011. Inclusion cri- teria for survey participants were adults aged 18 and over, capable of providing online informed consent, who self-identified as (i) a women, (ii) a sexual mi- nority and/or a women who has sex with women, including lesbian, gay, bisexual, queer, ‘other’ and (iii) residing in the Greater Toronto Area. We hired 10 peer research assistants (PRAs), defined as some- one who identifies as a sexual minority women to facilitate participant recruitment; PRAs represented diverse ages, ethnicities and sexualities. Data collection We used modified peer-driven recruitment, where each PRA recruited a pre-specified number of par- ticipants (n¼25) as well as convenience sampling, whereby participants could invite additional partici- pants. Recruitment was primarily undertaken by PRAs through word of mouth and emails to social networks, LGBTQ agencies and ethno-cultural agen- cies. There was an email that briefly outlined the study purpose and inclusion criteria that included a direct link to the survey; this email was distributed by PRAs and agencies. We used a self-administered survey that participants completed online in a loca- tion of their choosing; the survey took �60 min to complete. We aimed to recruit 425 participants. The recommended sample size for logistic regression Correlates of sexual assault among sexual minority women 673 Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/her/article-abstract/29/4/671/634470 by University of Toronto Library user on 01 February 2018 lesbian and bisexual . . , 1 ; 2 ; 3 ten approximately utes (odds ratio: 1.3, P < 0.05, power: 0.80) is 406 as calculated using G*Power 3.1. Research Ethics Board approval was obtained from Women’s College Hospital at the University of Toronto. We designed a survey to collect information on socio-demographic variables, health outcomes, indi- vidual, social and structural factors. We pilot-tested the survey with a focus group of sexual minority community representatives (n¼12) (e.g. LGBT event promoters, artists, community organizers) to acquire feedback to enhance clarity and content val- idity. No identifying information was collected; par- ticipants had the option to choose to include their email address to receive a $20 gift card as honorar- ium for survey completion. Email addresses were erased after the gift card was sent. At the end of the survey, participants were provided with a list of community and online resources for sexual mi- nority women and health and supportive services. Measures We report measures used and Cronbach’s alpha co- efficients from the current analyses. The survey included 105 items. Measures were chosen based on (i) conceptual relevance for the social ecological framework, (ii) established reliability and validity in the North American context, and where possible among LGBQ persons and (iii) shortened scales where possible to reduce participant burden (e.g. with depression symptoms, resilient coping). We summed scale items to calculate total scores for: sexual stigma, depression, safer sex practices, resili- ent coping; sub-scale and total scores were calculated for social support. The intervals for the measures were one unit (e.g. 1 year of age, one scale unit). Lifetime sexual assault We used a single dichotomous item: ‘In your life have you ever experienced forced sex (for example rape or sexual assault)?’ to assess if participants had a history of LSA. Health outcomes Participants self-reported if they had ever been diag- nosed with an STI. Self-reporting of HIV/STI history was effective in a previous study with LBQ women in the United States [34]. The two- item Patient Health Questionnaire-2 was used to assess depression symptoms [35], Cronbach’s a¼0.89 (scale range: 0–6). Participants rated their health using single global self-rated health response recommended by the World Health Organization (score range: 1–5) [36]. Socio-demographic variables We collected the following socio-demographic information: age (years), annual personal income (Canadian dollars), sexual orientation (queer, lesbian, bisexual, gay, other, with options to specify), ethno-racial identity (self-identified) and highest level of education (less than primary, primary, some secondary, secondary, some post- secondary, post-secondary, graduate and post- graduate). Individual factors Resilient coping was measured using the Brief Resilient Coping Scale [37], Cronbach’s a¼0.69 (scale range: 4–20). Self-esteem was measured using the Single-Item Self-Esteem Scale that has participants respond the statement: ‘I have high self-esteem’ on a five-point Likert scale (score range: 1–5) [38]. Substance use was assessed using an eight-point Likert scale single-item meas- ure regarding frequency of drug and alcohol use in the past 3 months (score range: 1–8). Social factors Safer sex practices were measured using the ‘Safer Sexual Behaviors Among Lesbian Women Scale’ [39], Cronbach’s a¼0.70 (scale range: 9–36). The social support measure was based on the Multi-di- mensional Scale of Perceived Social Support [40] (Cronbach’s a¼0.91) (scale range: 12–60) that includes sub-scales to assess support from family (Cronbach’s a¼0.93) (sub-scale range: 4–20), friends (Cronbach’s a¼0.92) (sub-scale range: 4–20) and a significant other (Cronbach’s a¼0.95) (sub-scale range: 4–20). C. H. Logie et al. 674 Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/her/article-abstract/29/4/671/634470 by University of Toronto Library user on 01 February 2018 a ; b ; c one `` '' lifetime sexual assault ( ) . . - - . , , post - (SISE) `` '' 5 - 8 3 - - - - - , - Structural factors The sexual stigma measure was based on the Homophobia Scale [5] (Cronbach’s a¼0.78) (scale range: 12–48), that includes sub-scales to examine both perceived (Cronbach’s a¼0.70) (sub-scale range: 4–16) and enacted (Cronbach’s a¼0.72) (sub-scale range: 8–32) stigma. Participants responded to questions asking if they had ever received (i) an HIV test and (ii) an STI test (not including HIV). Participants also responded to questions asking if they had ever experienced the following barriers to accessing health care: (i) cost travel, (ii) cost medications and (iii) belief that their HCP was not comfortable with their sexual orientation. Data analysis We conducted descriptive analyses to calculate fre- quencies, means and standard deviations for each variable. Data analyses were conducted using IBM SPSS 20. Cronbach’s alpha was conducted to assess scale reliability for each scale. We conducted logis- tic regression analyses based on the social ecolo- gical framework to examine sexual violence and its association with health outcomes, individual, social and structural factors. Multivariate logistic regression analyses were conducted to determine correlates of having experienced sexual assault in one’s lifetime. We first conducted unadjusted logis- tic regression analyses, followed by analyses that controlled for socio-demographic variables (age, education, income, ethnicity, sexual orientation). We also present relative risks (RRs) for significant variables to illustrate the probability of the outcome for those who have a history of LSA in comparison with those with no LSA. Results Study population There were 439 women who participated in the survey; 415 completed the item on LSA and were included in the analyses. Socio-demographic and health characteristics of participants (n¼415) are described in Table I. The mean participant age (n¼396) was 31.44 (SD: 8.13), and the median annual income was $29 000.00 (range: 18–70). Most participants identified as queer (45.5%) fol- lowed by lesbian (29.2%), bisexual (16.1%), gay (4.6%) and other (4.1%). Almost half (41.7%) of participants reported having experienced sexual as- sault. One-fifth (20.5%) of participants reported ever being diagnosed with an STI. Correlates of having experienced sexual violence Logistic regression results are presented in Table II. Participants with a lesbian identity were signifi- cantly less likely to report a history of sexual violence than those with a queer identity [OR: 0.56 (CI: 0.35, 0.89), P < 0.05]. The RR of LSA among queer woman in comparison with lesbians was 2.16. No other socio-demographic characteris- tics were associated with a history of sexual vio- lence. In multivariate analyses, when controlling for socio-demographic characteristics, having experienced sexual violence was associated with significantly higher reported mean frequencies of depressive symptoms [OR: 1.21 (CI: 1.06, 1.39), P < 0.01; RR: 1.17], prevalence of STI [OR: 1.83 (CI: 1.05, 3.18), P < 0.05; RR: 1.86], belief that their HCP was not comfortable with their sexual orienta- tion [OR: 2.45 (CI: 1.29, 4.66), P < 0.01; RR: 2.45] and having ever received an STI test [OR: 2.92 (CI: 1.42, 6.01), P < 0.01; RR: 3.00]. Those with a his- tory of sexual violence also reported higher mean frequencies of sexual stigma (overall) [OR: 1.13 (CI: 1.07, 1.18), P < 0.001; RR: 1.13], enacted sexual stigma [OR: 3.87 (CI: 2.20, 6.84), P < 0.001; RR: 3.79] and perceived sexual stigma [OR: 1.81 (CI: 1.30, 2.51), P < 0.001; RR: 1.78]. A history of forced sex was associated with lower re- ported mean frequencies of: self-rated health [OR: 0.70 (CI: 0.54, 0.92), P < 0.05; RR: 0.69], overall social support [OR: 0.97 (CI: 0.95, 0.99), P < 0.05; RR: 0.96], social support from family [OR: 0.93 (CI: 0.88, 0.98), P < 0.01; RR: 0.92] and self-esteem [OR: 0.61 (CI: 0.48, 0.77), P < 0.001; RR: 0.61]. Participants with a history of LSA were 1.63 times Correlates of sexual assault among sexual minority women 675 Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/her/article-abstract/29/4/671/634470 by University of Toronto Library user on 01 February 2018 - - , - 1 2 1 - ; 2 - ; 3 lifetime sexual assault , Range - ( [ ] ) relative risk ( ) ( [ ] ) ( [ ] ) ( [ ] ), ( [ ] ) ( [ ] ) ( [ ] ), ( [ ] ) self ( [ ] ) ( [ ] ) ( [ ] ) ( [ ] ) more likely to report low self-esteem, 1.44 times more likely to report lower self-rated health, 1.08 more likely to report low family social support and 1.04 times more likely to report low overall social support than those with no history of LSA. Discussion This study’s examination of correlates of experi- ences of LSA among LBQ women revealed dele- terious health outcomes associated with LSA, including exacerbated risk for depression, STI and lower self-rated health. Our findings that individual (self-esteem), social (social support) and structural (barriers to care, access to STI testing, sexual stigma) factors were associated with LSA support the utility of the social ecological framework to understanding LBQ women’s experiences of sexual violence. A social ecological conceptual framework that incorporates these multi-level domains associated with LSA among LBQ women is illustrated in Fig. 1. We categorized multi-level—structural, social, individual—factors and health outcomes Table I. Demographic and health information among survey participants (n¼415) Variables Mean (SD) Age (n¼396) 31.44 (8.13) Annual income (n¼400) 31 651.32 (28 144.14) Range: 18–70, median: 29 000.00 % n Sexual orientation (n¼415) Queer 45.5 189 Lesbian 29.2 121 Bisexual 16.1 67 Gay 4.6 19 Other 4.1 17 Ethno-racial identity (n¼389) White/Caucasian 67.1 261 Black, African Caribbean 18.7 73 Asian 4.2 16 South Asian 4.2 16 Indigenous/Aboriginal 3.8 15 Multiple ethnicities 2.0 8 Education (n¼415) Less than high school 0.7 3 High school or equivalent 7.0 29 Some college/university 14.7 61 College diploma 13.0 54 Bachelor degree 36.9 153 Graduate degree 27.7 115 Self-rated health (n¼415) Excellent 14.2 59 Very good 46.0 191 Good 30.8 128 Fair 7.0 29 Poor 1.9 8 HIV serostatus (n¼415) HIV negative 90.1 374 Don’t know 8.4 35 HIV positive 1.2 5 Don’t want to share 0.2 1 History of an STI (n¼415) Yes 20.5 85 No 79.5 330 History of LSA (n¼415) Yes 41.7 173 No 58.3 242 C. H. Logie et al. 676 Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/her/article-abstract/29/4/671/634470 by University of Toronto Library user on 01 February 2018 , lifetime sexual assault ( ) correlated with LSA that can guide the development of health promotion (e.g. mental, sexual) interven- tions. This framework may inform future research focused on sexual violence and connections with health outcomes (e.g. depression, STI) and resilience (e.g. social support) among sexually di- verse women. Approximately 40% of our sample reported LSA, corroborating median rates of LSA reported among LB women in systematic review results in the Table II. Multivariate logistic regression of factors correlated with LSA among LBQ women in Toronto, Canada (n¼415) Variables a Unadjusted logistic regression analyses, OR (95% CI) P-value Adjusted logistic regression analyses b , OR (95% CI) (n¼341) P-value Socio-demographics Age (n¼396) 0.99 (0.97, 1.03) 0.959 Education 1.03 (0.92, 1.16) 0.636 Income (n¼400) 0.87 (0.70, 1.09) 0.233 Ethnicity (person of color versus white) (n¼389) 0.79 (0.52, 1.23) 0.305 Sexual orientation Queer (ref) 1 Other 0.45 (0.15, 1.32) 0.146 Bisexual 0.77 (0.44, 1.36) 0.371 Lesbian 0.56 (0.35, 0.89) 0.016* Gay 0.49 (0.18, 1.36) 0.174 Health outcomes Depression 1.23 (1.09, 1.38) 0.001* 1.21 (1.06, 1.39) 0.006* Self-rated health 0.66 (0.53, 0.83) 0.000* 0.70 (0.54, 0.92) 0.010* History of STI 2.18 (1.35, 3.53) 0.002* 1.83 (1.05, 3.18) 0.033* Individual factors Resilient coping 1.07 (1.00, 1.16) 0.059 1.08 (0.99, 1.18) 0.105 Self-esteem 0.64 (0.53, 0.79) 0.000 0.61 (0.48, 0.77) 0.000* Substance use-past 3 months 0.89 (0.79, 1.01) 0.069 0.89 (0.77, 1.02) 0.101 Social factors Safer sex practices 0.93 (0.88, 0.98) 0.006* 0.95 (0.90, 1.01) 0.220 Social support (overall) 0.97 (0.95, 0.99) 0.016* 0.97 (0.95, 0.99) 0.043* Social support: family 0.92 (0.88, 0.97) 0.001* 0.93 (0.88, 0.98) 0.005* Social support: friends 0.98 (0.92, 1.05) 0.576 0.97 (0.90, 1.04) 0.422 Social support: sig other 0.97 (0.92, 1.01) 0.196 0.97 (0.91, 1.03) 0.376 Structural factors: stigma Sexual stigma (overall) 1.13 (1.08, 1.18) 0.000* 1.13 (1.07, 1.18) 0.000* Sexual stigma (perceived) 1.68 (1.27, 2.23) 0.000* 1.81 (1.30, 2.51) 0.000* Sexual stigma (enacted) 4.18 (2.56, 6.81) 0.000* 3.87 (2.20, 6.84) 0.000* Structural factors: health services access and barriers to health care Ever had an HIV test (n¼370) 2.21 (1.33, 3.67) 0.002* 1.66 (0.93, 2.96) 0.088 Ever had an STI test (n¼370) 3.64 (1.87, 7.08) 0.000* 2.92 (1.42, 6.01) 0.004* Barrier: belief HCP not comfortable with sexual orientation 2.47 (1.43, 4.28) 0.001* 2.45 (1.29, 4.66) 0.006* Barrier: travel 2.07 (0.99, 4.34) 0.055 2.01 (0.86, 4.71) 0.110 Barrier: medication cost 1.93 (1.16, 3.21) 0.012* 2.35 (1.26, 4.35) 0.007* a n¼415 unless otherwise specified. b Analyses include individual variables with adjustment for socio-demographic variables. *P < 0.05. Correlates of sexual assault among sexual minority women 677 Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/her/article-abstract/29/4/671/634470 by University of Toronto Library user on 01 February 2018 United States [14]. Our findings that LSA was asso- ciated with reported higher mean frequencies of depressive symptoms and prevalence of STI, and lower mean frequencies of self-rated health and self-esteem, corroborate previous research. The negative effects of sexual assault are well docu- mented and include PTSD in up to 50% of sexual assault survivors, and concurrent depression [6, 13, 21, 41]. Our findings that LSA was correlated with lower self-rated health align with Roberts et al. [28] US based cohort study findings with sexual minority youth that reported associations between functional pain and CSA [28]. Indeed our study found associ- ations between LSA and higher STI rates, supported by previous research with samples of predominately heterosexual [42, 43] and sexual minority [29] women. We found lower self-esteem was associated with LSA, self-esteem has been associated with CSA [44]. Similar to another study with lesbians, we found no significant association between sub- stance use and sexual violence [10]. Despite the disproportionate rates of sexual vio- lence experienced by sexual minority women in comparison with heterosexual women, we found no other studies that explicitly measured associations between LSA and perceived or enacted sexual stigma. Our findings that LSA was correlated with higher reported mean frequencies of overall, perceived and enacted sexual stigma suggests that sexual violence may be associated with experiences, perceptions and subsequent expectations of homo- phobia and discrimination. The belief that one’s HCP was uncomfortable with their sexual orienta- tion is another example of a structural barrier experi- enced by LBQ women with a history of LSA. This finding is corroborated by research that highlights heterosexism in women’s sexual health care [45, 46], fear of discrimination from disclosing sexual orientation to HCP [32, 33] and discomfort utilizing services not tailored for their sexual orientation [7, 29, 31]. Other barriers emerged for participants who experienced LSA—medication costs—even when controlling for income and edu- cation. This suggests that factors such as sexual stigma and fear of discrimination may enhance per- ception of other barriers to healthcare access. Despite these barriers, those with a history of LSA did in fact access STI testing more frequently than those without a history of LSA. We are not aware of research that has explored this phenom- enon. Other research, however, suggests that coping with stigma and discrimination has resulted in utilization of services by LBQ women. For ex- ample, some authors have suggested that as a result of having had to cope with sexual stigma, LBQ women tend to access therapy at a higher rate than heterosexual women [7, 10, 13]. LBQ women who have experienced LSA may, therefore, be more ac- customed to accessing healthcare services, and this may also be viewed as a strategy of resilience. Those with a history of LSA reported lower mean frequencies of overall social support and social sup- port from family. This could be associated with sexual stigma from family members due to their sexual minority identity [47, 48]. Lower levels of family social support could also be associated with a history of CSA, especially if the perpetrator was a family member or close to the family. Family sup- port is often compromised with divided loyalties or outright disbelief when the accused perpetrator is a family relation or friend [49]. Structural factors (access to STI testing, barriers to care, sexual stigma) Social factors (social support, safer sex practices) Individual factors (resilient coping, substance use, self-esteem) Health outcomes (depression, STI, self-rated health) Fig. 1. Social ecological approach to understanding correlates of LSA experienced by sexual minority women in Toronto, Canada (n¼415). C. H. Logie et al. 678 Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/her/article-abstract/29/4/671/634470 by University of Toronto Library user on 01 February 2018 . . posttraumatic stress disorder ( ) . . ; Participants with a history of LSA were more likely to identify as queer than lesbian. There is very little understanding of the interplay between LSA and sexual orientation. Previous studies with young women reported higher rates of CSA [29] and LSA [30] among women who identified as ‘mostly heterosexual’ or bisexual [9, 38] in comparison with those identifying as heterosexual. Austin et al.’s [29] thoughtful discussion regarding possible reasons for sexual orientation differences in rates of sexual as- sault include (i) response bias, (ii) sexual identity formation and (iii) different risk factors. First, a woman identifying as queer—a fluid sexual orienta- tion that moves beyond the dichotomies of lesbian/ heterosexual [50]—may be more willing to report sexual violence than other women as they may feel less stigma about having forced sex with men. Second, depending on when sexual assault occurred, it could influence sexual identity formation [29]; for example, adopting a queer identity, rather than a lesbian one, could be more congruent with a history of LSA. Third, persons identifying as lesbian may have more positive group identity and social support than those with other sexual minority identities such as ‘mostly heterosexual’ [28], and this strong group identity and support may reduce vulnerability to abuse by parents, adults and youth [51, 52]. The interplay between sexual orientation and LSA war- rants further attention. The study design has several limitations. First, the non-probability sample limits the generalizability of findings. The sample was recruited by diverse PRAs but oversampled white LBQ women; our sample included approximately one-third visible minorities while almost one-half—47%—of persons in the City of Toronto are visible minorities [53]. Our sample also had higher education levels—with almost 65% holding a bachelor’s degree or higher—than the general population of Toronto where 33% hold a bachelor degree [54]. The online survey method may have contributed to over- sampling LBQ women with access to internet and computer/written literacy; Meyer and Wilson [55] discussed a digital divide in the United States where persons with internet access were more likely to be white. The online survey method and sampling strategy may therefore have introduced selection bias. Second, because of the cross-sectional survey design we could not assess causation. Therefore, a longitudinal design could be more conducive to understanding the relationships between sexual vio- lence, mental and sexual health outcomes, and sexual stigma. As we did not measure PTSD, it is possible that higher rates of depression were asso- ciated with PTSD stemming from sexual assault. In addition, we did not measure internalized homopho- bia—this could have enhanced our understanding of sexual stigma correlates of LSA. Third, we only had one sexual violence occurrence question, limiting understanding of age and frequency for which sexual violence occurred, gender of perpetrator and the number of perpetrators. We did not explore whether sexual violence occurred within a relation- ship or differentiate between the types of sexual vio- lence. Fourth, our measure of resilient coping may not have adequately captured the complexity of re- silience (e.g. coping with trauma, adapting to one’s socio-cultural environment), the ability to cope with multiple risks (e.g. stigma, sexual assault) or access to multiple resources [56, 57]. Fifth, we used a single item question regarding substance use that did not differentiate between alcohol and other substances, precluding an in-depth understanding of this phe- nomenon among participants. Given these limita- tions, further research could engage more diverse samples of LBQ women—perhaps using both on/ offline methods, explore additional resilience and substance use measures and include more detailed questions regarding types and perpetrators of sexual violence. Despite these limitations our study has several strengths. First, this study contributes to theoretical development by exploring health outcomes and in- dividual, social and structural factors associated with LSA among LBQ women. Our findings support the utilization of a social ecological approach to better contextualize sexual violence and its impacts among LBQ women. Second, to our knowledge this is the first study to demonstrate associations between enacted and perceived sexual stigma with LSA among LBQ women. Third, this study highlighted the importance of understanding barriers to Correlates of sexual assault among sexual minority women 679 Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/her/article-abstract/29/4/671/634470 by University of Toronto Library user on 01 February 2018 1 ; 2 3 peer research assistants . . Also , , ly the current accessing health care and the need for training HCP to demonstrate trauma-informed, LGBTQ affirma- tive practice. Enhanced understanding of correlates of LSA among LBQ women can inform the development of multi-level interventions to promote health and reduce stigma and violence. Our findings suggest that LBQ women who have experienced LSA have unique health needs, as they may be particu- larly vulnerable to sexual stigma, depression, STI and report lower self-esteem and self-rated health. These myriad health challenges require a syndemics approach that targets the interaction between these risk factors to allay the health impacts of LSA [9]. On a micro-level, interventions could focus on coun- seling to build strategies to cope with experiences of sexual violence as well as address self-esteem, inter- nalized sexual stigma, depression and STI preven- tion [9, 29]. Meso-level interventions could foster peer support and solidarity, and address family issues. To illustrate, support groups for survivors of LSA could address the particular needs of LBQ women who may have less social support from family due to sexual stigma. On a macro-level, interventions could focus on enhanced competence among providers across a range of systems—educational, mental and sexual health, social services—to better support sexual minorities and provide referrals to LGBTQ commu- nity resources [9, 30]. Clinicians should practice from a trauma-informed approach that screens all patients for a history of sexual assault [14, 30]. For example, as LBQ women who have experienced LSA may be more likely to offer STI testing, sexual health clinics could screen patients for a his- tory of sexual violence and provide resources for support and counseling. Practice competence must involve an understanding of the fluidity and multi- plicity of sexual identities, such as queer, that are not captured in standard categorizations of lesbian, bi- sexual, gay or heterosexual identities [28, 29]. Programming should also promote empowerment and engage youth and others in advocacy [9]. Community-based approaches and interventions to challenge sexual stigma—and sexual violence—are urgently needed [14]. Putting into practice strategies that concomitantly build coping, address depression and STI risk, challenge sexual stigma within com- munity norms and healthcare practice and reduce violence can promote health and wellbeing among sexual minority women. Acknowledgements We acknowledge all the women who participated and shared their time and experiences as PRAs and participants in the survey and focus group. We are also thankful for the E.D. and staff at Women’s Health in Women’s Hands Community Health Centre and Women’s College Research Institute. We thank the anonymous reviewers and Editor for constructive and thoughtful feedback. Funding Canadian Institutes of Health Research (CIHR) Social Research Centre (SRC) in HIV Prevention. Conflict of interest statement None declared. References 1. King M, Semlyen J, Tai S et al. A systematic review of mental disorder, suicide and deliberate self harm in lesbian, gay and bisexual people. BMC Psychiatry 2008; 8: 70. 2. Logie C. The case for the World Health Organization’s Commission on the Social Determinants of Health to address sexual orientation. Am J Public Health 2012; 102: 1243–6. 3. Meyer IH. 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work_nwitzbn7h5chhgwjscobnjplaq	----	STUDIES AND COMMENTS Effect of the European Court of Human Rights case-law on judgments of Polish courts in the crime of hate speech Lecturer Dorota HABRAT1 Abstract The Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and judgments of the European Court of Human Rights set the basic direction of judicial practice in Poland by introducing elementary principles of human rights observance by public authorities. The aim of the study was to analyze the impact of selected judgments of the European Court of Human Rights on the judicature of courts in Poland regarding the limits of freedom of expression in the context of the hate crime. The basic standards and the level of freedom of expression in Polish law, as well as judicial practice in this respect, have been defined. The analysis of standards has been limited to the aspect of the limits of freedom of speech in the context of hate speech. The scope of protection of statements in Polish law is, in principle, consistent with the ECHR jurisprudence. It follows that it is generally acceptable to extend the scope of penalization of statements containing incitement to hatred and violence of a racist or xenophobic nature, in particular, if they take the form of public insults, slander or threats. The jurisprudence of Polish courts is increasingly in line with international standards. Keywords: hate speech, freedom of speech, European Court of Human Rights, criminal law JEL Classification: K14 1. Introduction Freedom of speech is one of the most important elements of modern standard of democratic state in the area of fundamental rights and civil liberties. It is guaranteed by polish Constitution, international legal acts ratified by Poland and by common legal acts. Freedom of speech is subjective right, which does not have, however, absolute character. It means, that in some matters it may be constrained in favour of other legal interest. We deal with that situation in case of acts of hate speech which is pointed out on spreading hatred, reluctance towards person or some special groups of population. Legal entities face the problem of drawing the line between freedom of speech and hate speech. The European Court of Human Rights in Strasburg stands on behalf of obeying human rights and liberties. It is the entity which has great authority in Poland not only because of its legally binding 1 Dorota Habrat – Faculty of Law and Administration, University of Rzeszow, Poland, dhabrat@ur.edu.pl. 6 Volume 9, Special Issue, October 2019 Juridical Tribune judicial decisions but also of its rich judicature. The ECHR impacts on catalogue of standards, which should be taken into consideration in the state process of constituting and executing law. Poland, by joining to the Council of Europe and ratifying European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms2 and acknowledging jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights undertook to accept European standards concerning human rights protection, including, among the others, freedom of speech. With regard to the fact that the Convention3 is a part of Polish legal order it can be directly implemented, and it also acts as a point of reference in Constitutional Tribunal which in Poland is independent and separated from other Polish courts. The primary task of the Constitutional Court is examining compliance of the lower norms of law with resolutions of the Constitution, international legal acts and legal acts. Constitutional Tribunal is obliged to enforce within constitutional verification, principles and methods of interpretation leading to ease potential collisions between Polish standards against standards created by the ECHR4. Taking in mind that the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms indicates basic direction of judicial practise in Poland by implementing basic principles of obeying human rights by public authorities, the main purpose of research was formulated, which was to analyse influence of selected judicial decision by the ECHR on legislation of Polish Courts. Primary standards and level of freedom of speech in Polish law and judicial practise were specified in that area. The analysis of that standards was constrained to the aspects of the boards of freedom of speech in the context of hate speech. 2. The issue of freedom of speech protection in Poland Legal regulations related to freedom of speech in Poland contain international legal acts, European legal acts and national legal act5. One of the most important international legal acts is International Covenant on Civil and Political 2 Poland ratified the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms on 19 January 1993. The opportunity to file complaints to the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg against the Polish state appeared on May 1, 1993. 3 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms drafted in Rome on 4th November 1950, amended by Protocols no 3,5 and 8 and supplemented by Protocol no 2 (Journal of Laws 1993, No. 61, item 284, as amended). 4 Judgment of Constitutional Tribunal from 18 Octobre 2004 r., P 8/04; see more M. Szymura, Stosowanie Europejskiej konwencji praw człowieka w polskim porządku prawnym – przegląd orzecznictwa, [in:] M. Haczkowska, F. Tereszkiewicz (eds.), Europejska konwencja o ochronie praw człowieka – praktyka stosowania i funkcjonowanie w przestrzeni europejskiej, Opole 2016, pp. 23-24; A. Demczuk, Wolność wypowiedzi w orzecznictwie Europejskiego Trybunału Praw Człowieka a polskim prawie i praktyce sądowej, [in:] M. Haczkowska, F. Tereszkiewicz (eds.), Europejska konwencja o ochronie praw człowieka – praktyka stosowania i funkcjonowanie w przestrzeni europejskiej, Opole 2016, p. 147. 5 A. Michalska-Warias, Przestępstwa przeciwko porządkowi publicznemu, [in:] M. Królikowski, R. Zawłocki (eds.), Kodeks karny. Część szczególna. Tom II. Komentarz, Art. 222-316, Warsaw 2017, p. 363. Juridical Tribune Volume 9, Special Issue, October 2019 7 Rights6, which in Article 19 concludes matters concerning freedom of speech. It was highlighted that every human being has right to freedom of opinion and its expression. This right concludes freedom of having own independent opinion, searching, obtaining and dissemination of information and views with all possible resources regardless of any borders7. In case of European regulations, the act which is the most significant is already mentioned in the introduction of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms8. Right to freedom of expressing opinions is mentioned in the Article 10. It must be pointed out that in this document was also undertaken matters concerning constrains in the area of freedom of speech9. This act stated that making use of freedom of speech might be subject to such formal requirements, conditions, constrains and sanctions which are foreseen by legal act and are necessary in democratic society in the interest of state security, territorial integrity and public safety in case of necessity of preventing legal order from disruptions or crimes and protection of health and morality, protection of good name and rights of other people and preventing from disclosing confidential information or guarantee of dignity and impartiality of judicial entities. In the forum of community, significant are also judicial decisions of the European Court of Human Rights in Strasburg, these decisions are very often related to freedom of speech and they should be taken into consideration within using law in Poland. At the national level, the Constitution10 in the Article 54 ensures everyone freedom of expressing views and obtaining and spreading information. Freedom of speech does not have absolute character though11. This freedom can be restricted in lower legal norms. Pursuant to the Article 31 section 2 of the Constitution restrictions in area of using constitutional liberties and rights can be established only in legal act and only then, when it is necessary for democratic state for its security or public safety or for environment protection, public health and morality or liberties and rights of other people. These restrictions cannot breach the essence of liberty and rights. For such restriction in view of public order protection, liberties and rights of other people, crimes of hate speech specified in the Articles 256 and 257 of Criminal 6 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Journal of Laws of 1977, No. 38, item 167). 7 A. Biłgorajski, Granice wolności wypowiedzi. Studium konstytucyjne, Warsaw 2013, p. 157. 8 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, (Journal of Laws of 1993, No. 61, item 284). 9 L. Garlicki, Prawa i wolności, [in:] L. Garlicki (ed.), Konwencja o Ochronie Praw Człowieka i Podstawowych Wolności. Komentarz do artykułów 1-18. Tom I, Warsaw 2010, p. 584; M.A Nowicki, Wokół Konwencji Europejskiej. Komentarz do Europejskiej Konwencji Praw Człowieka, Warsaw 2017, p. 743. 10 Constitution of the Republic of Poland of April 2, 1997 (Journal of Laws of 1997, No. 78, item 483, as amended). 11 P. Sarnecki, Wolności i prawa osobiste, [in:] Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej. Komentarz II, art. 30-86, L. Garlicki, M. Zubik (eds.), Warsaw 2016, p. 295; A. Demenko, Prawnokarna ochrona wolności wypowiedzi. Zarys problemu, [in:], A. Biłgorajski (ed.), Wolność wypowiedzi i jej granice. Analiza wybranych zagadnień, Katowice 2014, p. 39. 8 Volume 9, Special Issue, October 2019 Juridical Tribune Code12 should be acknowledged13. Crime specified in the Article 256 paragraph 1 of Criminal Code consist in propagation of fascism or other totalitarian state system or incitation to hatred based on national, ethnic, race or religious differences. The Article 257 of Criminal Code specifies crimes based on public insults of group of people or individual because of national, ethnic, race or religious affiliation or because of irreligiousness, as well as breaching the personal inviolability due to aforementioned reasons. In context of hate speech crimes there is a principles dispute among lawyers specialized in constitutional law and criminal law. Some authors notice in criminal legal acts threat for constitutional freedom of speech14. As there isn’t one, generally accepted legal definition of hate speech15, within this research was accepted definition of hate speech from Recommendations No. R(97) 20 enacted by the Committee of Ministers of European Councils from 20th October 1997 where hate speech shall be understood as covering all forms of expression which spread, incite, promote or justify racial hatred, xenophobia, anti- Semitism or other forms of hatred based on intolerance, including intolerance expressed by aggressive nationalism and ethnocentrism, discrimination and hostility against minorities, migrants and people of immigrant origin16. 3. The border between hate speech and freedom of speech The main problem connected with practicing by Courts Articles 256 and 257 of Criminal Code is the border between freedom of speech against penalization of hate speech acts. There is a question if penalization of hate speech is a threat for freedom of speech. The dilemma in this matter is on acknowledging if speech which is a hate speech should make use of legal protection or if this speech should not be taken under protection, and this speech itself crossing the borders of liberties which are given to speech. Analysis in this matter requires referring to international standards including judicial decisions of international entities controlling protection of human rights, specifically the ECHR17. Judicial decision of the ECHR is in practice 12 Act of 6 June 1997 The Criminal Code (Journal of Laws of 2018, item 1600, as amended). 13 K. Pałka, M. Kućka, Ochrona przed mową nienawiści – powództwo cywilne czy akt oskarżenia? [in:] Mowa nienawiści a wolność wypowiedzi. Aspekty prawne i społeczne, R. Wieruszewski, M. Wyrzykowski, A. Bodnar, A. Gliszczyńska-Grabias (eds.), Warsaw 2010, p. 42. 14 A. Michalska-Warias, op. cit. (Przestępstwa…), p. 362; W. Mojski, Prawnokarne ograniczenia wolności wypowiedzi w polskim porządku prawnym. Analiza wybranych przepisów, Studia Iuridica Lublinensia 2009, No 12, p. 193. 15 E. Rogalska, M. Urbańczyk, Złożoność zjawiska mowy nienawiści w pozaprawnym aspekcie definicyjnym, „Acta Universitstis Wratislaviensis” No 3780, „Studia nad Autorytaryzmem i Totalitaryzmem 39”, No 2, Wrocław 2017, DOI: 10.19195/2300-7249.39.2.8; p. 118-135. 16 N. Chetty, A. Sreejith, Aggression and Violent Behavior Hate Speech Review in the Context of Online Social Networks.” Aggression and Violent Behavior 40, no. May (2018): 108–18. doi:10.1016/j.avb.2018.05.003, p. 110. 17 A. Gliszczyńska-Grabias, Międzynarodowe standardy wolności słowa a mowa nienawiści, [in:] D. Bychawska - Siniarska, D. Głowacka, Mowa nienawiści w Internecie: jak z nią walczyć?. Materiały z konferencji, Warsaw 2013, s. 45. Juridical Tribune Volume 9, Special Issue, October 2019 9 a huge hint in process of assessing boundaries between hate speech which must be eliminated from public domain and freedom of speech. The analysis of arguments located in judicial decisions of the Tribunal leads to conclusion, that basically hate speech is treated like crossing the boundaries of freedom of speech, which justifies and allows its restrictions18. 4. The European Court of Human Rights judicature in the field of hate speech The standards of freedom of speech are built in great matter by judicial decisions of international legal entities, including the ECHR. This judicature in principle, acknowledges penalizing in state law sentences propagating hatred based on intolerance, inciting to hatred or justifying hatred, it may appear necessary in democratic state, under the condition that all measures used by state will be necessary and proportionally to the target which these measures shall serve19. There are several important judicial decisions of the European Court of Human Rights in Strasburg specifying fundamental standards for freedom of speech protection. The Tribunal in its jurisdiction gives clear suggestions when protection of freedom of expression ends and hate speech begins. Under the Article 17 of the Convention, protection of human rights cannot be claimed if it constitutes an abuse of such a right, that is, it seeks to upend other rights and freedoms conventionally protected. The judgement of the European Court of Human Rights in Strasburg20 in the case of Handyside v. United Kingdom 21 , states that freedom of speech is one of the pillars of a democratic society, it is the basis for its development and condition for the individual’s self-fulfilment. Freedom of speech cannot be limited only to approved information and views or perceived as harmless or indifferent, but also to views which insult, outrage and unreassuring in a state or in a group of society. These are requirements of pluralism, tolerance and openness, without which democratic society cannot exist. The Tribunal stated also that freedom of speech in democratic society cannot be limited only to approved information and views or perceived as harmless or indifferent, but also to statements introducing anxiety and outrage, and this is particularly important to selected representatives of the community22. 18 L.K. Jaskuła, Wolność działalności dziennikarskiej w perspektywie zjawiska mowy nienawiści (wybrane aspekty prawne), [in:] W. Lis (ed.), Status prawny dziennikarza, Warsaw 2014, p. 327. 19 CF. ECHR judgment in the case of Feret v. Belgium, July 16, 2009 (application No. 15615/07). 20 Cf. ECHR judgment in the case of Lingens v. Austria, December 7, 1976, application No. 5493/72; See D.K. Żak, Wolność słowa i odpowiedzialność za słowo na forach internetowych, [in:] W. Lis, Z. Husak (eds.), Praktyczne aspekty wolności wypowiedzi, p. 455. 21 Handyside v. UK, App. no. 5493/72, Ser A vol.24, (1976) 1 EHRR 737. 22 Castells v. Spain, App. no.11798/85, Ser. A vol.236, (1992) 14 EHRR 445. Yaman Akdeniz, ‘To Block or Not to Block: European Approaches to Content Regulation, and Implications for Freedom of Expression’, Computer Law & Security Review, 26.3 (2010), 260–72 <https://doi.org/10.1016/ 10 Volume 9, Special Issue, October 2019 Juridical Tribune The abovementioned judgements concern protection of freedom of speech. However, the Tribunal referred also to hate speech. In the decision on 27 June 2017, the complaint no 34367/14, Belkacem v. Belgium, the Tribunal stated clearly, that the Article 17 of the Convention (concerning decline of protection) can be used only exceptionally and in extreme situations. The purpose thereof is to prevent exercising conventional law, which appellant wishes to assert in the Tribunal. In cases concerning the Article 10 of the Convention, this Article should be used only when it is obvious, that subjective statements were intended to depart from its actual purpose by using the right of freedom of expression in a manner unambiguously inconsistent with the values of the Convention. A decisive matter in the light of the Article 17 is that, whether the purpose of the appellant’s statement was to incitement to hatred or violence, or whether by these statements the appellant sought to invoke the Convention in a way allowing him to conduct activity or to commit acts in order to upend rights and freedoms protected by the Convention. It results that there is no legitimate criticism, also political criticism, and no freedom of expression is protected by such a statement, which seeks to deny other rights and values protected by the Convention: the right to life, the right to freedom of religion, the prohibition of discrimination (including the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation, which the Polish legislator still refuses to recognize), the right to freedom and security, democratic values of the rule of law and the like. 5. Analysis of the relationship between judgments of Polish courts and standards of the ECHR The case-law of Polish Constitutional Tribunal underlines, that specified in the Article 54 paragraph 1 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland freedom of expression should be understood as broadly as possible and include not only personal statements regarding facts and phenomena in all aspects of life, but also presentation of opinions, assumption and forecasts, including information about facts, both real and alleged. In the opinion of the Tribunal freedom of expression is one of the pillars of a democratic society and condition for its development and individual’s self-fulfilment, however in cannot be limited to information and views which are received favourably or perceived as harmless or indifferent 23. Compatibility of constitutional system with international standards of human rights protection requires making “pro-European” interpretation of the Constitution. This justifies the thesis that the scope of protection of statements in national law is, in principle, consistent with the ECHR judicature24. It follows that it is generally acceptable to include in the scope of penalisation statements j.clsr.2010.03.004>. A. Redelbach, Wolność słowa w orzecznictwie Europejskiego Trybunału Praw Człowieka, Ruch Prawniczy Ekonomiczny i Społeczny 2000, No 3, p. 14. 23 See. Judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal of 23 March 2006, K 4/06, OTK ZU 2006, No. 3A, item 32. 24 M. Woiński, Prawokarne aspekty zwalczania mowy nienawiści, Warsaw 2014, p. 117. Juridical Tribune Volume 9, Special Issue, October 2019 11 containing incitement to hatred and racist or xenophobic violence, in particular if they take the form of public insults, slander or threat. The freedom of speech protects not only statements, which are received favourably or perceived as harmless or indifferent, but also statements expressing disapproval, dislike or antipathies. At the same time, freedom of speech is not absolute25. In the case „Gąsior V. Poland” in judgement on 21 February 201226 the ECHR reminded, that freedom of speech is one of the pillars of a democratic society and one of the fundamental conditions for its development and individual’s self-fulfilment. Subject to the second paragraph (Article 10 of the Convention), freedom of expression applies not only to "information" and "views" that are well received or perceived as harmless or indifferent, but also to statements that are offensive, shocking or obstructing. These are requirements of pluralism, tolerance and openness, without which there is no “democratic society”. This confirms the issue of the un-absolute character of freedom of speech. In daily life, the limits of every freedom, including freedom of speech, are the rights and freedoms of others (specified in the Article 31 paragraph 2 of the Constitution). The essence of freedom of speech is the possibility of its collision with other values, especially with the right to privacy and family life. To reconcile these values, the legislator may (based on the Article 31 paragraph 3 of the Constitution) establish a limitation in the use of constitutional freedom of speech when this limitation will serve safety or public order, or protection of the environment, health, public morality or the rights and freedoms of others. An additional limit for the restriction introduced into the national legal system is the prohibition against infringing the "essence" of freedoms and rights (the Article 31 paragraph 3 of the Constitution). Each statutory limitation of a given freedom shall be therefore proportional to required legal protection. There is no doubt that the decisive role in the shape of internal legislation is played by the ECHR judgments, and for that reason they should be regarded as the main point of reference. There is a growing influence of the European Convention on Polish law and legal practice. This applies to issues related to freedom of expression. Strasbourg’s requirements are perceived and taken seriously. An example of the consistent with the Tribunal approach to combating hate crimes was undoubtedly issuing of the General Prosecutor's Guidelines in 2014 to conduct hate crimes proceedings27. The recognition of any pre-trial investigation in hate crimes as a case of special gravity, appointment of specific prosecutors' offices to conduct such cases, or the order to constantly monitor ongoing proceedings was particularly important. Undoubtedly, however, all the rules of conducting cases in cases motivated by hatred, such as impartiality, objectivity or special diligence in revealing the 25 Judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal of 25 February 2014, SK 65/12, see A. Łukaszewicz, Trybunał: wolność słowa ma granice, Rzeczpospolita 2014, 2.26. 26 Gąsior v. Poland application no. 34472/07. 27 Guidance of the Prosecutor General G VII G 021/54/13 of 26 February 2014 available on the website https://pk.gov.pl/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/4e331e3a170f1719e3f846b06a2c5f7d.pdf (accessed 28 January 2019). 12 Volume 9, Special Issue, October 2019 Juridical Tribune motivation of the perpetrator, indicated by the European Court of Human Rights, are within the task of following the rule of law by the prosecutor's office. There are two institutions in Poland authorized to counteract hate speech: The Commissioner for Human Rights (RPO) and the Government Plenipotentiary for equal treatment (Plenipotentiary)28. The Government Plenipotentiary for Equal Treatment is appointed by the Government and acts within the structures of the Prime Minister's Office. The Commissioner for Citizens' Rights performs the function of the body responsible for performing tasks related to the implementation of the principle of equal treatment. It is an independent body subject to the supervision of the Parliament only. The attention to increasingly frequent proposals for amendment of criminal laws that typify hate speech offences should also be drawn. They are primarily related to attitudes changes in the world in relation to certain properties of certain social groups and people belonging to them. Over the years, attempts have been made to amend the provisions of the criminal code by extending the catalogue of features covered by protection against hate speech29. In recent years’ non- governmental organizations working for human rights have been continuously advocating such amendment of the Criminal Code, justifying their conclusions by existing similar recommendations formulated by international bodies dealing with human rights. 6. Conclusion Performed analysis has confirmed that the case-law of the ECHR has a significant role in the shape of the internal legislation of Poland and is treated as an essential reference point. We can notify growing influence of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms on Polish law and judicial practice. Requirements and standards established by the ECHR are noticed and taken into consideration by Polish judges. The provisions of the Convention and the ECHR judgements have designated to the present time the primary direction of judicial practice in Poland by implementing fundamental principles of obeying human rights by the public authorities. Polish courts judicature have been increasingly consistent with international standards. The introduction of appropriate legal regulations aimed at eliminating sources of violations will not take desired effect without the relevant activities of the Executive and the 28 Art. 18 of the Act of 3 December 2010 on the implementation of certain European Union provisions in the field of equal treatment (Journal of Laws of 2016, item 1219). 29 See a parliamentary draft act amending the Act - Penal Code, the 6th term, printing the Sejm No. 425, the document is available online at: http://orka.sejm.gov.pl/Druki6ka.nsf/0/ 426E6F5F4F91E685C125789D00302F25/$file/ 4253.pdf (accessed 3 March 2019); draft act amending the act - Penal code, VII term of office printing of the Sejm No. 340 , the document is available online at: http://www.sejm.gov.pl/sejm7.nsf/druk.xsp?nr=340 (accessed 3 March 2019); a parliamentary draft act amending the Act - Penal Code, the 7th term, printing the Sejm. No. 2357, the document is available online at: http://www.sejm.gov.pl/sejm7.nsf/druk.xsp?nr= 2357 (accessed 10 March 2019). Juridical Tribune Volume 9, Special Issue, October 2019 13 Judiciary. Implementation of legal solutions in practice of public authorities is impossible without their participation. The problem of boundary designation between hate speech and freedom of speech requires consideration of its fluidity, which in practice can be very difficult. Legal boundaries must be drawn cautiously. We should keep in mind that each case of crossing the border of freedom of speech is an exception. The rule is freedom. It should be emphasized that in Poland the principle in dubio pro libertate (in latin: in case of doubt, it should be settled for freedom) is in force, which also refers to freedom of speech. The need to respect in the internal law standards resulting from the judgments of the ECHR means the duty of taking them into consideration in the operation of State authorities and the Constitutional Tribunal should apply the principles and methods of interpretation leading to minimizing possible conflicts between standards resulting from Polish law and standards formed by the ECHR. Bibliography I. Literature 1. Biłgorajski A., Granice wolności wypowiedzi. Studium konstytucyjne, Warsaw 2013. 2. Demczuk A., Wolność wypowiedzi w orzecznictwie Europejskiego Trybunału Praw Człowieka a polskim prawie i praktyce sądowej, [in:] M. Haczkowska, F. Tereszkiewicz (eds.), Europejska konwencja o ochronie praw człowieka – praktyka stosowania i funkcjonowanie w przestrzeni europejskiej, Opole 2016. 3. Demenko A., Prawnokarna ochrona wolności wypowiedzi. Zarys problemu, [in:], A. Biłgorajski (ed.), Wolność wypowiedzi i jej granice. Analiza wybranych zagadnień, Katowice 2014. 4. Garlicki L., Prawa i wolności, [in:] L. Garlicki (ed.), Konwencja o Ochronie Praw Człowieka i Podstawowych Wolności. Komentarz do artykułów 1-18. Tom I, Warsaw 2010. 5. Gliszczyńska-Grabias A., Międzynarodowe standardy wolności słowa a mowa nienawiści, [in:] D. Bychawska - Siniarska, D. Głowacka, Mowa nienawiści w Internecie: jak z nią walczyć? Materiały z konferencji, Warsaw 2013. 6. Jaskuła L.K., Wolność działalności dziennikarskiej w perspektywie zjawiska mowy nienawiści (wybrane aspekty prawne), [in:] W. Lis (ed.), Status prawny dziennikarza, Warsaw 2014. 7. Łukaszewicz A., Trybunał: wolność słowa ma granice, Rzeczpospolita 2014, 2.26. 8. Michalska-Warias M., Przestępstwa przeciwko porządkowi publicznemu, [in:] M. Królikowski, R. Zawłocki (eds.), Kodeks karny. Część szczególna. Tom II. Komentarz, Art. 222-316, Warsaw 2017. 9. Mojski W., Prawnokarne ograniczenia wolności wypowiedzi w polskim porządku prawnym. Analiza wybranych przepisów, Studia Iuridica Lublinensia 2009, No 12. 10. Nowicki M.A, Wokół Konwencji Europejskiej. Komentarz do Europejskiej Konwencji Praw Człowieka, Warsaw 2017. 11. Pałka K., Kućka M., Ochrona przed mową nienawiści – powództwo cywilne czy akt oskarżenia? [in:] A. Bodnar, A. Gliszczyńska-Grabias (eds.), Mowa nienawiści a wolność wypowiedzi. Aspekty prawne i społeczne, R. Wieruszewski, M. Wyrzykowski, Warsaw 2010. 14 Volume 9, Special Issue, October 2019 Juridical Tribune 12. Redelbach A., Wolność słowa w orzecznictwie Europejskiego Trybunału Praw Człowieka, Ruch Prawniczy Ekonomiczny i Społeczny 2000, No 3. 13. Rogalska E., Urbańczyk M., Złożoność zjawiska mowy nienawiści w pozaprawnym aspekcie definicyjnym, „Acta Universitstis Wratislaviensis” No 3780, „Studia nad Autorytaryzmem i Totalitaryzmem 39”, No 2, Wrocław 2017, DOI: 10.19195/2300- 7249.39.2.8. 14. Sarnecki P., Wolności i prawa osobiste, [in:] L. Garlicki, M. Zubik (eds.), Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej. Komentarz II, art. 30-86, Warsaw 2016. 15. Szymura M., Stosowanie Europejskiej konwencji praw człowieka w polskim porządku prawnym – przegląd orzecznictwa, [in:] M. Haczkowska, F. Tereszkiewicz (eds.), Europejska konwencja o ochronie praw człowieka – praktyka stosowania i funkcjonowanie w przestrzeni europejskiej, Opole 2016. 16. Woiński M., Prawokarne aspekty zwalczania mowy nienawiści, Warsaw 2014. 17. Yaman Akdeniz, ‘To Block or Not to Block: European Approaches to Content Regulation, and Implications for Freedom of Expression’, Computer Law & Security Review, 26.3 (2010), 260–72 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.clsr.2010.03.004>. II. Legal acts 1. Act of 3 December 2010 on the implementation of certain European Union provisions in the field of equal treatment (Journal of Laws of 2016, item 1219). 2. Constitution of the Republic of Poland of April 2, 1997 (Journal of Laws of 1997, No. 78, item 483, as amended). 3. Act of 6 June 1997 The Criminal Code (Journal of Laws of 2018, item 1600, as amended). 4. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Journal of Laws of 1977, No. 38, item 167). 5. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, (Journal of Laws of 1993, No. 61, item 284). III. Jurisprudence 1. CF. ECHR judgment in the case of Feret v. Belgium, July 16, 2009 (application No. 15615/07). 2. Judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal from 18 Octobre 2004 r., P 8/04. 3. CF. ECHR judgment in the case of Lingens v. Austria, December 7, 1976, application No. 5493/72. 4. Handyside V. UK, App. no. 5493/72, Ser A vol.24, (1976) 1 EHRR 737. 5. Castells V. Spain, App. no.11798/85, Ser. A vol.236, (1992) 14 EHRR 445. 6. Judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal of 23 March 2006, K 4/06, OTK ZU 2006, No. 3A, item 32. 7. Judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal of 25 February 2014, SK 65/12. 8. Gąsior V. Poland application No. 34472/07. 
work_nxww3fmmdjfuneprgjueqhjulm	----	wp-p1m-39.ebi.ac.uk Params is empty 404 sys_1000 exception wp-p1m-39.ebi.ac.uk no 218644983 Params is empty 218644983 exception Params is empty 2021/04/06-02:18:23 if (typeof jQuery === "undefined") document.write('[script type="text/javascript" src="/corehtml/pmc/jig/1.14.8/js/jig.min.js"][/script]'.replace(/\[/g,String.fromCharCode(60)).replace(/\]/g,String.fromCharCode(62))); // // // window.name="mainwindow"; .pmc-wm {background:transparent repeat-y top left;background-image:url(/corehtml/pmc/pmcgifs/wm-nobrand.png);background-size: auto, contain} .print-view{display:block} Page not available Reason: The web page address (URL) that you used may be incorrect. Message ID: 218644983 (wp-p1m-39.ebi.ac.uk) Time: 2021/04/06 02:18:23 If you need further help, please send an email to PMC. Include the information from the box above in your message. Otherwise, click on one of the following links to continue using PMC: Search the complete PMC archive. Browse the contents of a specific journal in PMC. Find a specific article by its citation (journal, date, volume, first page, author or article title). http://europepmc.org/abstract/MED/ 
work_nzt26fuakjayfmiscld72tnfai	----	Virtual Mentor Virtual Mentor American Medical Association Journal of Ethics March 2010, Volume 12, Number 3: 207-212. HEALTH LAW Liability Considerations for Physician Volunteers in the U.S. Lisa Benrud, PhD, JD, Jacqueline Darrah, JD, MA, and Alison Johnson, RN, MBA Physicians are often asked to provide free or reduced-cost care to uninsured and underinsured community members. Most physicians are willing to help. Participation can take many forms, including seeing patients with Medicaid or other coverage where payment may not cover the cost of services; seeing patients without charge in the physician’s usual clinic; volunteering time at a clinic that provides free or reduced-cost care; treating those in homeless shelters, temporary clinics, or on the streets; and volunteering in disaster relief situations without a formal structure. Under these circumstances, the physician is often unfamiliar with patients and their histories and may be treating them for conditions or stages of disease that are not within the doctor’s regular scope of practice. Supplies and diagnostic capabilities may be limited or rudimentary, and, when treating patients with mental illness or substance abuse issues, the physician may not have access to behavioral health workers to help with treatment decisions. Liability Questions Delivering care under these circumstances often presents liability concerns for physicians. If no fee is charged, does the responsibility of the malpractice carrier change? Do Good Samaritan laws provide protection from legal action, especially in the case of street work or in temporary situations? The practice of medicine may be different in volunteer situations than in a traditional clinical setting. Physicians often rely on diagnostic algorithms when laboratory and other diagnostic tests are not available to the patient for financial or practical reasons. What kind of liability (if any) does the physician incur by diagnosing a patient and recommending treatment in the absence of the usual diagnostic tests? Physicians may also be concerned about issues related to incomplete treatment when they care for indigent populations. If treatment will be unavailable because the patient is uninsured, what is the use of diagnostic testing? State Law Protections for Physician Volunteers Physicians who volunteer in free clinics and community settings and for charitable organizations may be eligible for liability protection under both state and federal law. Most states have some form of limited liability or immunity for physicians who volunteer their professional services, and some subsidize the purchase of malpractice insurance [1]. These protections, and the circumstances under which they apply, vary widely by state. Although state immunity laws provide some protections for www.virtualmentor.org Virtual Mentor, March 2010—Vol 12 207 physicians who provide volunteer medical services, they do not guarantee that physicians will not be sued as a result of volunteering their professional services. It is important to distinguish these state immunity laws from Good Samaritan laws. Good Samaritan laws protect health professionals only when they are providing care in emergency situations. Federal Law Protections for Physician Volunteers The Volunteer Protection Act of 1997: Volunteers of a Nonprofit or Governmental Entity. The Volunteer Protection Act of 1997 (VPA) was enacted to provide minimum protections for volunteers [2]. Testimony in support of the legislation indicated that concern and uncertainty about the potential for personal liability acted as a significant deterrent to volunteering [3]. The VPA establishes a minimum level of protection for volunteers and preempts inconsistent state law unless the state law provides greater protection [4]. A “volunteer” is defined as an individual performing services for a nonprofit organization or government entity who does not receive compensation (other than reasonable reimbursement or allowance for expenses incurred) or any other thing of value in lieu of compensation in excess of $500 per year [5]. The VPA provides immunity for harm caused by the acts or omissions of volunteers serving nonprofit organizations or governmental entities if: • The volunteer was acting within the scope of his or her responsibilities at the time of the alleged act or omission; • The volunteer was properly licensed, certified, or authorized to act, if such license or authorization is needed; • The harm was not caused by willful, criminal, or reckless misconduct; gross negligence; or a conscious, flagrant indifference to the rights or safety of the individual harmed by the volunteer; and • The harm was not caused by the volunteer’s operating a motor vehicle, vessel, aircraft, or other vehicle for which the state requires an operator’s license or insurance [6]. Volunteers protected by the VPA are, however, still subject to state laws of the following types, which the VPA does not preempt: • A state law requiring the nonprofit organization or governmental entity to adhere to risk management procedures, including mandatory training of volunteers; • A state law making the organization or entity liable for the acts or omissions of its volunteers to the same extent an employer is liable for the acts or omissions of its employees; • A state law making limitation of liability inapplicable if the action is brought by an officer of a state or local government pursuant to state or local law; or Virtual Mentor, March 2010—Vol 12 www.virtualmentor.org 208 • A state law making limitation of liability applicable only if the organization or entity provides a financially secure source of recovery for harmed individuals (e.g., an insurance policy within specified limits) [7]. If a volunteer is held liable under these conditions, the VPA limits the award of punitive damages to those cases in which there is clear and convincing evidence of willful or criminal misconduct or a conscious, flagrant indifference to the rights or safety of the individual harmed [8]. The VPA does not apply to volunteers’ misconduct that constitutes a crime of violence or act of international terrorism, a hate crime, a sexual offense, a violation of state or federal civil rights law, or misconduct where the volunteer was under the influence of intoxicating alcohol or drugs [9]. The Federal Tort Claims Act: Volunteer Services Provided by Health Professionals. The Free Clinic Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) Medical Malpractice Program is another source of federal protection for physician volunteers [10]. If all the requirements of the program are met, a health care professional volunteering for a qualifying free clinic will be “deemed” a public health service employee eligible for medical malpractice coverage under the FTCA [10, 11]. This provides the volunteer with immunity from medical malpractice lawsuits resulting from performance of medical, surgical, dental or related functions within the scope of the health care professional’s activity at the free clinic. To qualify for the Free Clinic FTCA Medical Malpractice Program, the clinic and the volunteer health care professional must meet certain requirements. The health care clinic must qualify as a “free clinic,” defined as a health care facility operated by a nonprofit private entity (i.e., a 501(c)(3) organization) that: • Does not accept reimbursement from any third-party payor (including reimbursement from any insurance policy, health plan, or federal or state health benefits program that is individually determined); • Does not impose charges on patients to whom service is provided or imposes charges on patients according to their ability to pay; and • Is licensed or certified to provide health services in accordance with applicable law [12]. A volunteer physician is considered a “free clinic health professional” under the program if the following conditions are met: • The physician provides services to patients at a free clinic or through offsite programs or events carried out by a free clinic; • The physician is sponsored by a free clinic; • The physician provides a qualifying health service (i.e., any medical assistance required or authorized to be provided under Title XIX of the Social Security Act [13]); • The clinic and the physician do not receive compensation for services either from patients directly or from any third-party payor (with the exception of payment to the physician for reasonable expenses incurred or voluntary donations to the clinic); www.virtualmentor.org Virtual Mentor, March 2010—Vol 12 209 • Before the service is provided, the physician or clinic provides the patient with written notification of the extent to which the physician’s legal liability is limited; and • At the time the services are provided, the physician is licensed or certified to provide such health care services in accordance with applicable law [14]. Practical Implications for Physician Volunteers Physicians who volunteer typically need to obtain their own insurance to cover volunteer activities that fall outside federal or state immunity or protection. Physicians should consider the following questions when looking into volunteer opportunities. Does your state have a statute that limits liability for physician volunteers, and if so, what type of protection does the state law provide? Listed below are the most common types of volunteer protection offered by state law. Because state laws vary widely, physicians must investigate what, if any, type of liability protection their state offers for physician volunteers. [1] • Immunity statute where the physician volunteer is not liable for common negligence, but only for gross negligence or willful misconduct. In these states, a patient could not prevail on a malpractice suit against a physician providing volunteer services unless the patient could prove that the physician was grossly negligent in providing the services. • Immunity statute where, under prescribed circumstances, the physician volunteer is considered a state employee when providing uncompensated care and therefore is protected under the state tort claims act. This generally means the state will indemnify the volunteer physician (pay the legal defense costs and cover any monetary damages incurred as a result of a malpractice claim) if all conditions of the statute are met. • A state-established malpractice insurance program which either purchases insurance for physician volunteers or establishes a self-insured pool. Is protection otherwise provided by federal law? These laws, as discussed above, provide a minimum level of protection for physician volunteers in all states. • Is the volunteer opportunity for a free clinic that qualifies under the Free Clinic Federal Tort Claims Act Medical Malpractice Program? If so, the federal government will indemnify the volunteer physician (provided all conditions of the statute are met). • Is protection afforded under the federal Volunteer Protection Act (e.g., providing volunteer care for a nonprofit organization or governmental entity)? If so, the physician volunteer is immune from liability for common negligence (but could still be found liable for gross or reckless misconduct). Are there any conditions or limitations on the available liability protection? Both state and federal volunteer immunity laws typically include some conditions that must be met before the law affords any protection against liability. Most only apply Virtual Mentor, March 2010—Vol 12 www.virtualmentor.org 210 to simple negligence. Therefore, a physician volunteer will not be protected for gross or reckless misconduct. Other common conditions are highlighted below. [1] • Is protection limited to volunteer care provided in or associated with certain settings/organizations such as free clinics, nonprofits, or charitable organizations? Physicians providing volunteer care outside of these settings would not be protected by the state law. • Is patient notification required? Several state laws require the provider to notify the patient of the limitation on liability before providing care. [15] • Are there limits based on a physician’s existing insurance coverage? Some state laws do not provide protection if the physician’s own insurance coverage extends to volunteer care. • Are there limits based on the services provided? Conclusion Are physicians and students immune from malpractice claims when providing volunteer services? The answer is “it depends.” State and federal laws may provide some protection, and the physician’s current malpractice carrier may also include coverage. (Protection from common negligence claims is the most common.) Fears of liability should not deter physicians from volunteering. Rather, physicians should ask questions about the opportunity, including the existence of applicable state immunity statutes, clinic qualification under federal law, and policies on liability limits and patient notification. References 1. Hattis PA, Walton J, Staton S. Understanding Charitable Immunity Legislation: A Volunteers in Health Care Guide. Pawtucket, RI: Volunteers in Health Care; 2003. 2. Volunteer Protection Act, 42 USC sec 14501 (1997). 3. Nonprofit Risk Management Center. State Liability Laws for Charitable Organizations and Volunteers. Leesburg, VA: Nonprofit Risk Management Center; 2009. http://www.nonprofitrisk.org/downloads/state-liability.pdf. Accessed on February 9, 2010. 4. Volunteer Protection Act, 42 USC sec 14502 (1997). 5. Volunteer Protection Act, 42 USC sec 14505(6) (1997). 6. Volunteer Protection Act, 42 USC sec 14503(a) (1997). 7. Volunteer Protection Act, 42 USC sec 14503(d) (1997). 8. Volunteer Protection Act, 42 USC sec 14503(e)(1) (1997). 9. Volunteer Protection Act, 42 USC sec 14503(f) (1997). 10. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. Policy Information Notice 2004-24: Federal Tort Claims Act Coverage of Free Clinic Volunteer Health Care Professionals, Revised June 18, 2009. http://bphc.hrsa.gov/policy/pin0424.htm. Accessed February 9, 2010. 11. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, 42 USC sec 233(o)(1) (1996). 12. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, 42 USC sec 233(o)(3) (1996). www.virtualmentor.org Virtual Mentor, March 2010—Vol 12 211 13. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, 42 USC sec 1396 et seq. (2006). 14. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, 42 USC sec 233(o)(2) (1996). 15. Idaho and Louisiana are examples of states that require the provider to notify the person receiving health services of the limitation of liability under state law. See Idaho Code Ann sec 39-7703 and Louisiana Rev Stat Ann 9:2799.5. Further Reading Shapiro HB. Providing charity care: a primer on liability risk. Fam Pract Manage. 2003;10(1):52-54. Lisa Benrud, PhD, JD, is an associate in the health law practice group of Halleland Lewis Nilan & Johnson in Minneapolis. She counsels providers and managed care plans about Medicare and Medicaid compliance and contracting issues. Prior to attending law school, Benrud spent several years as a clinical psychologist and clinical researcher in large health systems. She received her BA from Luther College, her PhD from the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, and her JD from the University of Minnesota. Jacqueline Darrah, JD, MA, is a shareholder at Halleland Lewis Nilan & Johnson in Minneapolis, providing legal and compliance advice to all types of health care organizations, including health plans, hospitals, clinics, physician groups, and start- up companies. She has expertise in HIPAA, Medicare compliance, the Stark and anti-kickback laws, nonprofit organizations, and county-based health plans. She represents clients in compliance matters, creation and development of new businesses, and other general counsel concerns. Darrah received her legal degree from the Loyola School of Law in Chicago, her master’s in health care administration from the University of Illinois-Springfield, and her undergraduate degree from the University of Illinois, Champaign-Urbana. Alison Johnson, RN, MBA, is part of Halleland Health Consulting, Inc., in Minneapolis. Her practice includes medical management strategies and community plans for vulnerable populations. Her nursing degree is from the University of Washington, she earned her MBA at Western Washington University, and she is currently a doctoral student in psychiatric nursing at the University of Minnesota. Her research interests include health care reform and behavioral health issues. Related in VM Good Samaritan Statutes: Are Medical Volunteers Protected? April 2004 The viewpoints expressed on this site are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views and policies of the AMA. Copyright 2010 American Medical Association. All rights reserved. Virtual Mentor, March 2010—Vol 12 www.virtualmentor.org 212 http://virtualmentor.ama-assn.org/2004/04/hlaw1-0404.html 
work_o22s7jrgl5g2jk5ggvebi5oiii	----	O R I G I N A L P A P E R An examination of sexual orientation group patterns in mammographic and colorectal screening in a cohort of U.S. women S. Bryn Austin • Mathew J. Pazaris • Lauren P. Nichols • Deborah Bowen • Esther K. Wei • Donna Spiegelman Received: 10 October 2011 / Accepted: 4 May 2012 / Published online: 22 May 2012 � Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012 Abstract Purpose Underutilization of cancer screening has been found especially to affect socially marginalized groups. We investigated sexual orientation group patterns in breast and colorectal cancer screening adherence. Methods Data on breast and colorectal cancer screening, sexual orientation, and sociodemographics were gathered prospectively from 1989 through 2005 from 85,759 U.S. women in the Nurses’ Health Study II. Publicly available data on state-level healthcare quality and sexual-orientation- related legal protections were also gathered. Multivariable models were used to estimate sexual orientation group dif- ferences in breast and colorectal cancer screening, control- ling for sociodemographics and state-level healthcare quality and legal protections for sexual minorities. Results Receipt of a mammogram in the past 2 years was common though not universal and differed only slightly by sexual orientation: heterosexual 84 %, bisexual 79 %, and lesbian 82 %. Fewer than half of eligible women had ever received a colonoscopy or sigmoidoscopy, and rates did not differ by sexual orientation: heterosexual 39 %, bisexual 39 %, and lesbian 42 %. In fully adjusted models, state- level healthcare quality score, though not state-level legal protections for sexual minorities, was positively associated with likelihood of being screened for all women regardless of sexual orientation. Conclusions Concerns have been raised that unequal healthcare access for sexual orientation minorities may adversely affect cancer screening. We found small dis- parities in mammography and none in colorectal screening, though adherence to colorectal screening recommendations was uniformly very low. Interventions are needed to increase screening in women of all sexual orientation groups, particularly in areas with poor healthcare policies. Keywords Breast cancer � Colorectal cancer � Screening � Sexual orientation � Bisexual � Lesbian Introduction Breast and colorectal cancer are two of the most common cancers affecting U.S. women. In 2007 in the United States, incidence rates of a new diagnosis of breast and colorectal cancer, respectively, were 1,204 and 397 per 1,000,000 women [1]. In addition, 228 and 141 per S. B. Austin � E. K. Wei � D. Spiegelman Channing Laboratory, Brigham & Women’s Hospital and Harvard Medical School, Boston, MA, USA S. B. Austin (&) � L. P. Nichols Division of Adolescent and Young Adult Medicine, Children’s Hospital, 300 Longwood Ave., Boston, MA 02115, USA e-mail: bryn.austin@childrens.harvard.edu S. B. Austin Department of Society, Human Development, and Health, Harvard School of Public Health, Boston, MA, USA M. J. Pazaris � D. Spiegelman Department of Epidemiology, Harvard School of Public Health, Boston, MA, USA D. Bowen Department of Community Health Sciences, Boston University School of Public Health, Boston, MA, USA E. K. Wei California Pacific Medical Center Research Institute, San Francisco, CA, USA D. Spiegelman Department of Biostatistics, Harvard School of Public Health, Boston, MA, USA 123 Cancer Causes Control (2013) 24:539–547 DOI 10.1007/s10552-012-9991-0 1,000,000 U.S. women died of breast and colorectal can- cers, respectively, in that same year [1]. Although regular screening improves early detection and treatment and potentially reduces mortality [2–5], many U.S. women are not meeting recommendations for routine screening. The American Cancer Society (ACS) recommends that women receive a mammogram once a year beginning at age 40 years [6], and, until 2009, the U.S. Preventive Services Task Force also recommended that annual mammographic screening begin at age 40 [7]. To detect colorectal polyps or cancer, ACS recommends that women and men receive a virtual colonoscopy, double contrast barium enema, or flexible sigmoidoscopy every five years or a colonoscopy every 10 years beginning at age 50 years [6]. Recent data from the National Health Interview Survey (NHIS), a representative sample of U.S. women, indicate that only 53 % of women 40 years and older received a mammo- gram in the past year [8] and 67 % in the past 2 years [9], though among women aged 50–74 years, the percentage screened in the past 2 years reached 81 % [10]. The per- centage of eligible women receiving regular sigmoidos- copies and/or colonoscopies is even smaller. NHIS data from 2008 show that among women aged 50 or older, 53 % have ever received a sigmoidoscopy [9], and 50 % have received either a sigmoidoscopy in the past 5 years or a colonoscopy in the past 10 years [8]. Underutilization of cancer screening has been found especially to affect socially marginalized and economically disadvantaged groups. Women with minority sexual orien- tation, such as lesbian and bisexual women, have been found in some studies to have lower screening rates than their heterosexual counterparts [11–13], though other studies have not found differences [14, 15]. A recent review article found the literature to be mixed as to whether there are sexual orientation group disparities in mammographic screening [16]. In a large sample of 93,311 women in the Women’s Health Initiative (WHI), bisexual women aged 50–79 years were found to be slightly less likely to have received a mammogram in the past 2 years than same-aged hetero- sexuals (82 vs. 84 %) [11]. Similarly, in a combined sample of 12,000 women from seven U.S. surveys of sexual minority women, 73 % of women aged 40–49 years and 83 % of women aged 50–75 years who described them- selves as lesbian or bisexual reported ever receiving a mammogram, compared to an estimated 87–90 % of women in U.S. general population surveys [13]. One study exam- ining colorectal screening rates by sexual orientation using data from the 2001–2008 Massachusetts Behavioral Risk Behavior Surveillance System (BRFSS) found no difference across sexual orientation groups in women aged 50 years and older having ever received colorectal screening [15]. Disparities in breast and colorectal screening rates also have been associated with household income, ethnicity, and state of residence. Women with lower household income have lower rates of breast and colorectal screening relative to women with higher household income [10, 17, 18]. Lower rates of mammography have been found in Latina and American Indian/Alaskan Native women relative to white women [9, 10], and lower rates of colorectal screening have been found in black and Asian women relative to white women [17, 19]. Similarly, differences in health service use have been found to vary by geographic location within the United States due to the accessibility of care, state funding for health programs, and state policies on health insurance. The percentage of eligible women who received a mam- mogram in the past 2 years or ever received a colorectal screening varies by state. Among women aged 40 years and older, in general, those living in the Northeastern states, Florida, Minnesota, and Michigan have the highest rates of mammography in the past 2 years (range of 79–85 %) and women living in states in the South and West have the lowest rates (range 67–73 %) [18]. Among women 50 years or older, lifetime colorectal screening rates are highest along the East Coast (62–74 %), especially in the Northeast (68–74 %), and lowest in the South and some Western states (53–58 %) [17]. Because household income, ethnicity, and state of residence are known to be important determinants of screening disparities, they must be accounted for in studies of sexual orientation patterns in screening adherence. Institutionalized discrimination against sexual minority populations varies widely by state and includes state laws banning same-sex marriage and adoption of children by same-sex couples and the absence of laws protecting sexual minorities against hate crimes or employment discrimina- tion [20, 21]. These types of state-level institutionalized discrimination have been shown to negatively affect mental health of sexual minorities in nationally representative studies [22, 23], though it is not known whether they also affect other health indicators, such as cancer screening. Few studies have examined sexual orientation group differences in cancer screening, particularly colorectal screening, nor have they examined whether state of resi- dence may modify any observed sexual orientation-related screening disparities. We undertook the present study to investigate sexual orientation group differences in breast and colorectal cancer screening in a large cohort of U.S. women and to assess whether screening adherence patterns are affected by state of residence. Method Study sample In 1989, a baseline questionnaire for the Nurses’ Health Study (NHS) II was sent to approximately 520,000 540 Cancer Causes Control (2013) 24:539–547 123 registered nurses living in 14 of the most populous U.S. states, leading to the enrollment of 116,430 women aged 25–42 years (http://www.channing.harvard.edu/nhs/). Receipt of a completed questionnaire served as indication of informed consent for participation. Biennial question- naires have since been sent to the cohort to gather data on disease risk factors, screening behavior, and disease inci- dence. Human subjects research approval was received from Brigham and Women’s Hospital and Harvard School of Public Health. Outcome measures Mammography Almost every NHSII questionnaire asked participants to indicate whether they have had a mammogram in the past 2 years and, if so, whether the mammogram was for rou- tine screening or follow-up due to an abnormal finding. In 1989, the wording of this question was slightly different, asking whether participants had ever had a mammogram and, if yes, the age at first mammogram, how many years since their last mammogram, and the reason for the last mammogram. Colonoscopy/sigmoidoscopy An item on colorectal screening was included on each NHSII cohort questionnaire from 1991 to the present. These questions asked participants whether they had had a colonoscopy or sigmoidoscopy in the past 2 years and for what reason (routine screening or follow-up due to an abnormal finding). Individual-level predictors Sexual orientation In 1995, a measure of sexual orientation identity was added to the NHSII questionnaire [24]. The item read: ‘‘Whether or not you are currently sexually active, what is your sexual orientation or identity? (Please choose one answer)’’ with possible responses: (1) heterosexual; (2) lesbian, gay, or homosexual; (3) bisexual; (4) none of these; (5) prefer not to answer. Our analyses included participants who descri- bed their sexual orientation identity as heterosexual; bisexual; or lesbian, gay, or homosexual. Ethnicity On the baseline questionnaire, women were asked to describe their ancestry choosing from a list of provided categories [25]. Socioeconomic status Participants reported annual household income in 2001, which we then used to create five categories: less than $50,000, $50,000 to less than $75,000, $75,000 to less than $100,000, $100,000 or greater, and missing income. State-level predictors We used two indicators of state-level factors that were hypothesized to affect screening disparities. One was an indicator recently developed and tested by Hatzenbuehler et al. [22] representing the presence in 2005 on the state level of laws specifying sexual orientation as a protected category in hate crimes statutes and banning sexual- orientation-related employment discrimination. We created a binary variable for each U.S. state reflecting the presence or absence of these legal protections, coded 1 or 0, respectively. The second state-level variable we used was a composite measure developed in 2008 by the U.S. Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) to rate the overall healthcare quality available in a state. The measure was continuous and ranged from 0 (worse than average of other states on all health indicators assessed by AHRQ) to 100 (better than average of other states on all health indi- cators assessed by AHRQ) [26]. Statistical analyses To address study aims related to adherence to screening recommendations, we used all available data from study inception in 1989 though the 2005 wave of data collection. We used these data to calculate the proportion of hetero- sexual, bisexual, and lesbian women aged 40–60 years who had received a mammogram in the 2 years prior to a survey wave and calculated the proportion of women aged 50–60 years in each sexual orientation group who had ever received a colonoscopy or sigmoidoscopy since age 50. Women reporting a new cancer occurrence were excluded from analyses of screening behavior from that point on. State of residence is updated each questionnaire cycle, so state of residence at the time of screening report was used in analyses. We then examined orientation group differences in adherence to mammographic screening recommendations using generalized estimating equation methods to generate prevalence ratios (PR) and 95 % confidence intervals (CI) using log-binomial regression and Poisson regression with robust error variance [27, 28] and accounting for repeated measures from participants over multiple waves of data collection using a compound symmetry working correla- tion matrix. Partially adjusted models controlled for age at time of screening, ethnicity, and household income. Fully Cancer Causes Control (2013) 24:539–547 541 123 http://www.channing.harvard.edu/nhs/ adjusted models controlled for these same covariates in addition to the two state-level covariates: presence or absence of sexual-orientation-related legal protections and mean AHRQ score for overall healthcare quality available in a participant’s state of residence. We examined sexual orientation group differences in colorectal screening since age 50 years using multivariable models to estimate PR and 95 % CI. Partially adjusted models controlled for age at time of screening, ethnicity, and household income. Fully adjusted models controlled for these covariates and the two state-level covariates. In addition, we examined possible effect modification of the relationship between sexual orientation and mammographic and colorectal screening by the two state-level indicators by introducing to statistical models interaction terms between sexual ori- entation and state-level indicators. Results From age 40 to 60 years, 85,756 women from the NHSII cohort (73 % of original cohort) provided 360,264 obser- vations included in our repeated measures analyses of mammographic screening (Table 1). From age 50 to 60 years, 32,831 women (87 % of age-eligible women from the original cohort) contributed data to cross-sectional analyses of ever receipt of colonoscopy/sigmoidoscopy during this age period (Table 2). Approximately 1 % of the cohort described themselves as lesbian or bisexual and 94 % as white, and annual household income ranged from less than $50,000 (17 %) to greater than $100,000 (35 %). Sixty-two percent (n = 31) of U.S. states had sexual- orientation-related protections in state law and AHRQ overall healthcare quality rating scores in the states ranged from 26 to 69 with a mean of 48 (standard deviation = 10), where lower score indicated worse overall healthcare quality in a state (not in table). Overall, receipt of a mammogram in the past 2 years among women aged 40 and older was common though not universal and differed slightly by sexual orientation: heterosexual 84 %, bisexual 79 %, and lesbian 82 % (Table 1). Receipt of a mammogram in the past two years was similarly high across age, ethnicity, and income groups, though some disparities were observed. On the other hand, fewer than half of eligible women had ever received a colonoscopy or sigmoidoscopy during the age interval 50–60 years, and rates did not differ by sexual orientation: heterosexual 39 %, bisexual 39 %, and lesbian 42 % (Table 2). In addition, rates of colonoscopy and sigmoidoscopy were low across all age, ethnicity, and income groups and in only the older age group did more than half of women report this type of cancer screening (60 % of women aged 55–60 years). Results of a set of three multivariable models for mammography are shown in Table 3. Bisexual (PR 0.94; 95 % CI 0.90, 0.98) and lesbian (PR 0.97; 95 % CI 0.95, 1.00) women were slightly less likely to have had a mammogram in the past 2 years compared to heterosexual women, and these differences were essentially unchanged when the other individual-level and state-level covariates were added to models. Differences in mammographic screening by ethnicity and household income were simi- larly modest. Each 10-unit elevation of state-level AHRQ healthcare quality score was associated with a 2 % higher likelihood of having had a mammogram in the past 2 years. Interaction terms between sexual orientation and state-level indicators were not statistically significant (p [ 0.05). Table 4 shows results of a set of three multivariable models for colonoscopy/sigmoidoscopy. No significant Table 1 Individual-level sample characteristics and percent receiv- ing mammogram in past 2 years among women participating in the Nurses’ Health Study (NHS) II, aged 40–60 years (n = 85,756) Number of observations in NHSII at ages 40–60 years % (of observations) Percent receiving mammogram in past 2 years at ages 40–60 years (of observations) Total # Obs. = 360,171 Sexual orientation Heterosexual 98.8 (355,831) 83.6 % (297,446) Bisexual 0.4 (1,314) 79.2 % (1,040) Lesbian 0.8 (3,026) 82.2 % (2,486) Age group (years) 40–44 46.1 (165,929) 77.6 % (128,705) 45–49 33.0 (118,726) 86.9 % (103,115) 50–54 16.6 (59,860) 91.4 % (54,691) 55–60 4.4 (15,656) 92.4 % (14,461) Ethnicity African American 1.5 (5,145) 83.4 % (4,291) Asian American 1.5 (5,263) 79.3 % (4,172) Latina 1.3 (4,615) 78.7 % (3,634) White (non- Latina) 94.1 (334,519) 83.7 % (279,922) Other 1.7 (6,056) 83.8 % (5,073) Missing 1.3 (4,573) 84.9 % (3,880) Income \50k 16.3 (45,204) 79.9 % (36,126) 50–75k 27.5 (76,210) 83.3 % (63,452) 75–100k 20.8 (57,823) 84.5 % (48,853) 100k? 35.5 (98,427) 86.6 % (85,238) Missing 22.9 (82,507) 81.6 % (67,303) 542 Cancer Causes Control (2013) 24:539–547 123 differences in screening by sexual orientation or ethnicity were found with the exception of African-American women, who were almost 30 % more likely than white women to have ever received colorectal screening. Household income showed a strong positive association with likelihood of colorectal screening. Interestingly, living in a state with sexual-orientation-related legal protections was associated with 8 % higher likelihood of having received colorectal screening (age-adjusted model, Table 4), but this protective effect was completely atten- uated in the fully adjusted model (Table 4). With each 10-unit elevation of state-level AHRQ healthcare quality score, likelihood of having had a colonoscopy/sigmoido- scopy increased by 9 %. Interaction terms between sexual orientation and state-level indicators were not statistically significant (p [ 0.05). Discussion Breast and colorectal cancer are among the most prevalent cancers in U.S. women, and screening technologies widely available in the United States offer effective methods for early detection. Adherence to regular screening guidelines, however, falls well short of recommendations, particularly for colorectal screening. Concerns have been raised that unequal healthcare access for sexual orientation minorities may affect screening, perhaps due to actual and anticipated discrimination in healthcare settings or to inequities in health insurance coverage due to discriminatory marriage laws at the state and federal level in the United States [29]. In our large, national cohort of women, we found that mammographic screening was only slightly lower in sexual minority compared to heterosexual women. In addition, for colorectal screening, we did not find screening disparities by sexual orientation, though adherence to colorectal screening recommendations was low in women of all groups. Furthermore, we did not find evidence that the presence or absence of sexual-orientation-related protec- tions in state laws modified associations between sexual orientation and mammographic or colorectal screening adherence. Findings from previous studies on disparities in mam- mographic screening have been mixed, with some report- ing rates that were several percentage points lower in sexual minority women compared to heterosexuals [11–13] and some finding no group differences [14, 15]. The only other study we are aware of that has examined colorectal screening in women by sexual orientation did not find differences, similar to our study [15]. For the NHSII cohort overall, the percent receiving a mammogram in the past 2 years (approximately 84 %) was only slightly higher than the percent (81 %) among women aged 50–74 years in a nationally representative NHIS [10]. In addition, for the NHSII cohort overall, the percent of women aged 50–60 years reporting having ever received a colonoscopy or sigmoidoscopy (approximately 40 %) was somewhat lower than the percent of women in NHIS aged 50 and older having received sigmoidoscopy in the past 5 years or colonoscopy in the past 10 years [8, 9]. In sum, though NHSII is made up of nursing professionals, we did not find evidence that mammographic or colorectal screening rates were notably higher in our cohort compared to nationally representative estimates. We found lower rates of mammography in Latina and Asian women but not African-American women compared to white women, which is consistent with some previous research [9, 10]. We found higher rates of colorectal screening in African-American women compared to white women but no other ethnic differences. Our findings for colorectal screening are different from prior studies finding lower rates of colorectal screening in black and Asian women relative to white women [19]. Perhaps, this dif- ference in findings is due to the composition of NHSII, which is made up of women who are current or former Table 2 Individual-level sample characteristics and percent receiv- ing colonoscopy or sigmoidoscopy since age 50 among women par- ticipating in NHSII, ages 50–60 years (n = 32,831) Women in NHSII at ages 50–60 years % (n) Percent ever receiving colonoscopy/ sigmoidoscopy at ages 50–60 years % (n) Total n = 32,831 Sexual orientation Heterosexual 98.7 (32,405) 39.3 % (12,747) Bisexual 0.4 (124) 38.7 % (48) Lesbian 0.9 (302) 42.4 % (128) Age group (years) 50–54 74.2 (24,373) 32.2 % (7,858) 55–60 25.8 (8,458) 59.9 % (5,065) Ethnicity African American 1.6 (512) 47.7 % (244) Asian American 1.4 (460) 44.1 % (203) Latina 1.3 (406) 38.2 % (155) White (non-Latina) 94.1 (30,528) 39.3 % (11,991) Other 1.7 (539) 36.2 % (195) Missing 1.2 (386) 35.0 % (135) Income \50k 16.6 (4,283) 31.7 % (1,357) 50–75k 27.7 (7,118) 37.0 % (2,633) 75–100k 20.3 (5,232) 40.0 % (2,094) 100k? 35.4 (9,103) 46.0 % (4,191) Missing 21.6 (7,095) 37.3 % (2,648) Cancer Causes Control (2013) 24:539–547 543 123 nursing professionals. As expected based on previous studies [9, 17, 18], we found a positive gradient by household income for both screening types, where higher income was associated with higher likelihood of screening. We also found higher quality state healthcare rating, as per AHRQ, to be positively associated with likelihood of a woman receiving colorectal screening. This finding sug- gests that despite existence of colorectal screening tech- nologies throughout the country, a woman’s state of residence strongly predicts her likelihood of benefiting from this type of life-saving technology. Given that all participants in NHSII are or were professional nurses and therefore might be relatively advantaged compared to the general population in terms of knowledge of and access to medical screening, these state-level differences are all the more disturbing. The proportion of NHSII participants who described themselves as lesbian or bisexual make up roughly 1.2 % of the cohort, which is similar to the proportion (1.4 %) found in the WHI cohort, made up of women aged 50–79 years [11], though lower than the proportion (2.9 %) found in the representative sample of women aged 18–64 years responding the Massachusetts BRFSS survey [15]. As the Massachusetts BRFSS includes many women who are younger than those enrolled in NHSII or WHI, it is possible that these differences in proportion lesbian or bisexual represent historical cohort changes in the preva- lence of sexual minority identity in U.S. women [30] or Table 3 Multivariable prevalence ratios and 95 % confidence intervals of receiving mammogram in past 2 years associated with individual- and state-level characteristics in women aged 40–60 years in NHSII (n = 85,756) Age-adjusted models Mammogram in past 2 years at ages 40–60 years PR (95 % CI) a Partially adjusted model Mammogram in past 2 years at ages 40–60 years PR (95 % CI) b Fully adjusted model Mammogram in past 2 years at ages 40–60 years PR (95 % CI) c Sexual orientation Heterosexual Referent Referent Referent Bisexual 0.94 (0.90, 0.98) 0.94(0.90, 0.98) 0.94 (0.90, 0.98) Lesbian 0.97 (0.95, 1.00) 0.97(0.95, 1.00) 0.97 (0.95, 1.00) Age (years) 40–44 Referent Referent Referent 45–49 1.12 (1.12, 1.12) 1.12 (1.12, 1.12) 1.12 (1.12, 1.12) 50–54 1.18 (1.18, 1.18) 1.18 (1.17, 1.18) 1.18 (1.17, 1.18) 55–60 1.19 (1.19, 1.20) 1.19 (1.18, 1.20) 1.19 (1.18, 1.20) Ethnicity African American 0.99 (0.98, 1.01) 1.00 (0.98, 1.02) 1.00 (0.98, 1.02) Asian American 0.95 (0.93, 0.96) 0.95 (0.93, 0.96) 0.95 (0.93, 0.97) Latina 0.94 (0.92, 0.96) 0.94 (0.92, 0.96) 0.95 (0.93, 0.97) White (non-Latina) Referent Referent Referent Other 1.01 (0.99, 1.02) 1.01 (0.99, 1.03) 1.01 (0.99, 1.03) Missing 1.02 (1.00, 1.03) 1.02 (1.00, 1.04) 1.02 (1.00, 1.04) Income \50k Referent Referent Referent 50–75k 1.04 (1.04, 1.05) 1.04 (1.04, 1.05) 1.04 (1.04, 1.05) 75–100k 1.06 (1.05, 1.07) 1.06 (1.05, 1.07) 1.06 (1.05, 1.07) 100k? 1.08 (1.08, 1.09) 1.08 (1.08, 1.09) 1.08 (1.08, 1.09) Missing 1.03 (1.02, 1.03) 1.03 (1.02, 1.03) 1.02 (1.02, 1.03) Presence of sexual-orientation-related protections in state law 1.00 (1.00, 1.01) 0.99 (0.99, 0.99) Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) overall rating for state (per 10-unit increase) 1.01 (1.01, 1.02) 1.02 (1.02, 1.02) a Age-adjusted models: Prevalence ratios from separate multivariate regression models for each variable in table adjusted for age and baseline age b Partially adjusted model: Prevalence ratios from multivariate regression model controlling for sexual orientation, age group, ethnicity, and income c Fully adjusted model: Prevalence ratios from multivariate regression model controlling for all variables in table simultaneously 544 Cancer Causes Control (2013) 24:539–547 123 discomfort among the older cohorts of women with dis- closing a minority sexual orientation identity on a survey. Our study has several limitations. Our colorectal screening analyses included only colonoscopy and sig- moidoscopy, so colorectal screening rates in the cohort may have been higher if nonendoscopic screening were also included. Data were self-reported. Because NHSII is composed predominantly of white women, and the socio- economic range found in the cohort is narrower than in the country as a whole, generalizability may be reduced, though confounding by uncontrolled factors associated with ethnicity and socioeconomic status is also diminished. Women participating in NHSII were all registered nurses at enrollment and so may be expected to have higher rates of screening adherence than women not working in a healthcare profession. It is possible that the magnitude of sexual orientation disparities in screening could be differ- ent in a sample not made up of health professionals. Importantly, though, because all women in the cohort were registered nurses, comparisons across subgroups within the cohort are not biased by involvement in the nursing pro- fession. In addition, sexual orientation was not a factor in recruitment into the cohort; therefore, findings are not affected by this type of enrollment bias. Concerns have been raised that unequal healthcare access for sexual orientation minorities may adversely affect cancer screening. These concerns are well-founded given the strong evidence of actual and anticipated dis- crimination in healthcare settings and inequities in health insurance coverage resulting from discriminatory marriage Table 4 Multivariable prevalence ratios and 95 % confidence intervals of ever receiving colonoscopy/sigmoidoscopy associated with indi- vidual- and state-level characteristics in women aged 50–60 years in NHSII Cohort (n = 32,831) Age-adjusted models Ever colonoscopy/ sigmoidoscopy at ages 50–60 years PR (95 % CI) a Partially adjusted model Ever colonoscopy/ sigmoidoscopy at ages 50–60 years PR (95 % CI) b Fully adjusted model Ever colonoscopy/ sigmoidoscopy at ages 50–60 years PR (95 % CI) c Sexual orientation Heterosexual Referent Referent Referent Bisexual 1.00 (0.75, 1.33) 1.02 (0.77, 1.36) 1.03 (0.78, 1.37) Lesbian 1.10 (0.92, 1.31) 1.11 (0.93, 1.32) 1.11 (0.94, 1.33) Age group (years) 50–54 Ref Ref Ref 55–60 2.59 (2.47, 2.72) 2.57 (2.45, 2.70) 2.57 (2.45, 2.69) Ethnicity African American 1.22 (1.07, 1.38) 1.25 (1.10, 1.42) 1.27 (1.12, 1.44) Asian American 1.12 (0.98, 1.29) 1.11 (0.97, 1.27) 1.11 (0.97, 1.28) Latina 0.96 (0.82, 1.13) 0.97 (0.83, 1.13) 0.99 (0.84, 1.16) White (non-Latina) Referent Referent Referent Other 0.93 (0.81, 1.07) 0.94 (0.82, 1.08) 0.94 (0.82, 1.08) Missing 0.89 (0.75, 1.05) 0.89 (0.75, 1.05) 0.89 (0.75, 1.06) Income \50k, Referent Referent Referent 50–75k 1.16 (1.09, 1.24) 1.16 (1.09, 1.24) 1.16 (1.08, 1.24) 75–100k 1.25 (1.17, 1.34) 1.25 (1.17, 1.34) 1.25 (1.17, 1.34) 1.42 (1.33, 1.50)100k? 1.42 (1.34, 1.51) 1.43 (1.34, 1.52) Missing 1.19 (1.11, 1.27) 1.19 (1.11, 1.27) 1.19 (1.11, 1.27) Presence of sexual-orientation-related protections in state law 1.08 (1.04, 1.11) 1.00 (0.97, 1.04) Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) overall rating for state (per 10-unit increase) 1.10 (1.08, 1.12) 1.09 (1.07, 1.12) a Age-adjusted models: Prevalence ratios from separate multivariate regression models for each variable in table adjusted for age and baseline age b Partially adjusted model: Prevalence ratios from multivariate regression model controlling for sexual orientation, age group, ethnicity, and income c Fully adjusted model: Prevalence ratios from multivariate regression model controlling for all variables in table simultaneously Cancer Causes Control (2013) 24:539–547 545 123 laws in U.S. states and in the federal government [29]. Nevertheless, we found only slight disparities across sexual orientation groups in mammography and none in colorectal screening. It is important to note, however, that rates of colorectal screening were unacceptably low in women across all groups. The absence of sexual orientation dis- parities in a context of universally poor utilization of potentially life-saving colorectal screening technologies is not a reassuring finding. Rather, interventions are needed to increase screening in women of all social and income groups and across all states. Acknowledgments The authors would like to thank the participants and staff of the Nurses’ Health Study II for their valuable contribu- tions as well as the following state cancer registries for their help: AL, AZ, AR, CA, CO, CT, DE, FL, GA, ID, IL, IN, IA, KY, LA, ME, MD, MA, MI, NE, NH, NJ, NY, NC, ND, OH, OK, OR, PA, RI, SC, TN, TX, VA, WA, and WY. The work reported in this manuscript was supported by the American Cancer Society grant RSGT-07-172- 01-CPPB, NIH grants HL64108 and CA50385. NHSII is supported for other specific projects by the following NIH grants: CA67262, AG/CA14742, CA67883, CA65725, DK52866, HL64108, HL03804, DK59583, and HD40882. In addition, the Channing Laboratory has received modest additional resources at various times and for varying periods since January 1, 1993, from the Alcoholic Beverage Medical Research Foundation, American Cancer Society, Amgen, California Prune Board, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Ellison Medical Foundation, Florida Citrus Growers, Glaucoma Medical Research Foundation, Hoffmann-LaRoche, Kellogg’s, Lederle, Mas- sachusetts Department of Public Health, Mission Pharmacal, National Dairy Council, Rhone Poulenc Rorer, Robert Wood Johnson Foun- dation, Roche, Sandoz, U.S. Department of Defense, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Wallace Genetics Fund, Wyeth-Ayerst, and private contributions. S. Bryn Austin is supported by the Leadership Edu- cation in Adolescent Health project, Maternal and Child Health Bureau, HRSA grant T71-MC00009. Deborah J. Bowen is supported by Centers for Disease Control and Prevention grant U48DP001922. References 1. 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Jillson IA (2002) Opening closed doors: improving access to quality health services for LGBT populations. Clin Res Regul Aff 19(2/3):153 30. Butler AC (2005) Gender differences in the prevalence of same- sex sexual partnering: 1988–2002. Soc Forces 84(1):421–449 Cancer Causes Control (2013) 24:539–547 547 123 http://statesnapshots.ahrq.gov/snaps09/index.jsp http://statesnapshots.ahrq.gov/snaps09/index.jsp An examination of sexual orientation group patterns in mammographic and colorectal screening in a cohort of U.S. women Abstract Purpose Methods Results Conclusions Introduction Method Study sample Outcome measures Mammography Colonoscopy/sigmoidoscopy Individual-level predictors Sexual orientation Ethnicity Socioeconomic status State-level predictors Statistical analyses Results Discussion Acknowledgments References 
work_o3t2tz3njne23esc3tfvrtet5i	----	ajps_427_LR How to Analyze Political Attention with Minimal Assumptions and Costs Kevin M. Quinn University of California, Berkeley Burt L. Monroe The Pennsylvania State University Michael Colaresi Michigan State University Michael H. Crespin University of Georgia Dragomir R. Radev University of Michigan Previous methods of analyzing the substance of political attention have had to make several restrictive assumptions or been prohibitively costly when applied to large-scale political texts. Here, we describe a topic model for legislative speech, a statistical learning model that uses word choices to infer topical categories covered in a set of speeches and to identify the topic of specific speeches. Our method estimates, rather than assumes, the substance of topics, the keywords that identify topics, and the hierarchical nesting of topics. We use the topic model to examine the agenda in the U.S. Senate from 1997 to 2004. Using a new database of over 118,000 speeches (70,000,000 words) from the Congressional Record, our model reveals speech topic categories that are both distinctive and meaningfully interrelated and a richer view of democratic agenda dynamics than had previously been possible. W hat are the subjects of political conflict and attention? How does the mix of topic atten- tion change over time? How do we know? These questions are fundamental to much of political sci- ence, including studies of legislative representation (Lowi 1964; Mayhew 1974; Riker 1986), policy agenda change (Baumgartner, Green-Pedersen, and Jones 2006; Baum- gartner and Jones 1993; Kingdon 1995), and issue evo- Kevin M. Quinn is Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley, 490 Simon #7200, Berkeley, CA 94720-7200 (kquinn@law. berkeley.edu). Burt L. Monroe is Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of the Quantitative Social Science Initiative, The Pennsylvania State University, 230 Pond Lab, University Park, PA 16802-6200 (burtmonroe@psu.edu). Michael Colaresi is Associate Professor of Political Science, Michigan State University, 303 South Kedzie Hall, East Lansing, MI 48824 (colaresi@msu.edu). Michael H. Crespin is Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Georgia, 407 Baldwin Hall, Athens, GA 30602 (crespin@uga.edu). Dragomir R. Radev is Associate Professor, School of Information and Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, University of Michigan, 3310 EECS Building, 1301 Beal Avenue, Ann Arbor, MI 48109-2122 (radev@umich.edu). An earlier version of this article was presented to the Midwest Political Science Association and was awarded the 2006 Harold Gosnell Prize for Excellence in Political Methodology. We would like to thank Steven Abney, Scott Adler, Scott Ainsworth, Frank Baumgartner, Ken Bickers, David Blei, Jake Bowers, Janet Box-Steffensmeier, Patrick Brandt, Barry Burden, Suzie Linn, John Freeman, Ed Hovy, Will Howell, Simon Jackman, Brad Jones, Bryan Jones, Kris Kanthak, Gary King, Glen Krutz, Frances Lee, Bob Luskin, Chris Manning, Andrew Martin, Andrew McCallum, Iain McLean, Nate Monroe, Becky Morton, Stephen Purpura, Phil Schrodt, Gisela Sin, Betsy Sinclair, Michael Ward, John Wilkerson, Dan Wood, Chris Zorn, and seminar participants at UC Davis, Harvard University, the University of Michigan, the University of Pittsburgh, the University of Rochester, Stanford University, the University of Washington, and Washington University in St. Louis for their comments on earlier versions of the article. We would like to give special thanks to Cheryl Monroe for her contributions toward development of the Congressional corpus in specific and our data collection procedures in general. We would also like to thank Jacob Balazer (Michigan) and Tony Fader (Michigan) for research assistance. In addition, Quinn thanks the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences for its hospitality and support. This article is based upon work supported by the National Science Foundation under grants BCS 05-27513 and BCS 07-14688. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science Foundation. Supplementary materials, including web appendices and a replication archive with data and R package, can be found at http://www.legislativespeech.org. lution (Carmines and Stimson 1989; Wolbrecht 2000). Conventional approaches to the problem of identifying and coding topic attention have used trained human coders to read documents. The careful and systematic use of human-coder techniques has helped to produce im- pressive data collections such as the Policy Agendas and Congressional Bills projects in American Politics (Adler and Wilkerson 2006; Jones, Wilkerson, and Baumgartner American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 54, No. 1, January 2010, Pp. 209–228 C©2010, Midwest Political Science Association ISSN 0092-5853 209 210 KEVIN M. QUINN ET AL. n.d.) and the Comparative Manifesto Project in com- parative politics (Budge et al. 2001; Klingemann et al. 2006). The impact and usefulness of these data sources to political science is difficult to overstate.1 The great ben- efit of human-coder techniques is that the mapping of words in a text to a topic category is allowed to be highly complicated and contingent. The downside of human- coder techniques is that reliability can be a challenge, per-document costs are generally high, and it assumes that both the substance of topics and rules that govern tagging documents with a specific topic are known a priori. Related tasks in political science have also been ad- dressed using computer-checked dictionaries or, more re- cently, hybrid human/computer (“supervised learning”) techniques. For example, event data coding in interna- tional relations has benefited enormously from the au- tomated coding of news wire feeds using dictionaries created by the Kansas Event Data system (Gerner et al. 1994), and the Policy Agendas and Congressional Bills Projects have moved toward the use of supervised learn- ing techniques to supplement human coding (Hillard, Purpura, and Wilkerson 2007, 2008). When automated approaches substitute computers for humans, the costs of coding are reduced and the reliability is increased (King and Lowe 2003). As with human coding, dictionary methods, and hybrid human/computer classification ap- proaches, both assume that the substance of topics and the features that identify a particular topic are known a priori. Here, we describe a statistical method to topic-code political texts over time that provides a reliable and replicable mapping of words into topics. However, un- like most extant approaches, our method estimates both the keywords that identify particular topics, as well as the division of topics from observed data, rather than assuming these features are known with certainty. Pre- viously, if a researcher was interested in tracking topic attention over time within a set of documents, that re- searcher needed to bring a great deal of information into the analysis. The researcher first needed to define the substance, number, and subdivisions of each topic. Sec- ond, the researcher was required to codify a set of rules or keywords that would allow human coders or a com- puter to place documents into the researcher-created tax- onomy of topics. In contrast, our statistical method of topic-coding text does not require a researcher to know the underlying taxonomy of categories with certainty. In- 1As outlined in the cited books and websites, each of these has inspired expansive research programs with books and papers too numerous to cite here. stead, the division of topics and keywords that identify each topic are estimated from the text. Our statistical topic-coding method opens up the exciting possibility of tracking attention within lengthy political corpora that would be prohibitively expensive for human coders. The only additional input required from the investigator is the total number of categories into which texts should be grouped. To illustrate the usefulness of our approach, we use our statistical model to topic-code the Congressional record for the 105th to the 108th U.S. Senate. The es- timates provide (1) an ontology of topic categories and language choice and (2) a daily data series of atten- tion to different topics in the U.S. Senate from 1997 to 2004. We believe this is the most extensive, temporally detailed map of legislative issue attention that has ever been systematically constructed. We evaluate the validity of our approach by examining (a) the extent to which there is common substantive meaning underlying the keywords within a topic, (b) the semantic relationships across topics, (c) the extent to which our daily measures of topic attention covary with roll calls and hearings on the topic of interest, (d) the relationships between ex- ogenous events (such as 9/11 or the Iraq War) that are widely perceived to have shifted the focus of attention in particular ways, and (e) the usefulness of the produced data for testing hypotheses of substantive and theoretical interest. Categorizing Texts: Methods, Assumptions, and Costs Each method for analyzing textual content imposes its own particular set of assumptions and, as a result, has particular advantages and weaknesses for any given ques- tion or set of texts. We focus our attention here on the basic problem of categorizing texts—placing texts into discrete target categories or bins.2 Methods of text cate- gorization vary along at least five dimensions: (1) whether they take the target categories as known or unknown, (2) whether the target categories have any known or unknown relationships with one another, (3) whether the relevant textual features (e.g., words, nouns, phrases, etc.) are known or unknown, (4) whether the mapping from fea- tures to categories is known or unknown, and (5) whether 2An equally interesting problem is placing texts, or their authors, in a continuous space, the problem addressed by such techniques as WORDSCORES (Laver, Benoit, and Garry 2003; Lowe 2008), WordFish (Slapin and Proksch 2008), and rhetorical ideal point estimation (Monroe and Maeda 2004; Monroe et al. 2007). ANALYZE POLITICAL ATTENTION 211 TABLE 1 A Summary of Common Assumptions and Relative Costs Across Different Methods of Discrete Text Categorization Method Human Supervised Topic A. Assumptions Reading Coding Dictionaries Learning Model Categories are known No Yes Yes Yes No Category nesting, if any, is known No Yes Yes Yes No Relevant text features are known No No Yes Yes Yes Mapping is known No No Yes No No Coding can be automated No No Yes Yes Yes B. Costs Preanalysis Costs Person-hours spent conceptualizing Low High High High Low Level of substantive knowledge Moderate/High High High High Low Analysis Costs Person hours spent per text High High Low Low Low Level of substantive knowledge Moderate/High Moderate Low Low Low Postanalysis Costs Person-hours spent interpreting High Low Low Low Moderate Level of substantive knowledge High High High High High the categorization process can be performed algorithmi- cally by a machine. We are at pains, in particular, to describe how five ways of categorizing texts—reading, human coding, automated dictionaries, supervised learning, and the topic model we describe here—fill dis- tinctive niches as tools for political science. Each of these five methods comes with unique costs and benefits. We find it useful to think of these costs along two main dimensions: (1) the extent to which the method requires detailed substantive knowledge and (2) the length of time it would take a single person to complete the analysis for a fixed body of text. Each of these two types of costs can be incurred at three stages of the analysis: the preanalysis phase where issues of conceptualization and operationalization are dealt with (perhaps in one or more pilot studies), the analysis phase where the texts of interest are categorized, and the postanalysis phase where the results from the analysis phase are interpreted and assessed for reliability and validity. Tables 1A and 1B depict how five major methods of text categorization compare in terms of their underlying assumptions and costs, respectively. The cell entries in Table 1A represent the minimal assumptions required by each method. In the most general sense, the fundamental “method” for inferring meaning from text is reading . For exam- ple, one reader of a specific journal article might at- tempt to place that article into one of a set of sub- stantive categories (e.g., legislative studies / agenda set- ting / methodology / text analysis), while another reader might categorize the text in terms of its relevance (cite / request more information / ignore). Not only might the relevant categories change by reader, but a given reader will create new categories as more information about the text becomes apparent. For some target sets of categories, we could delineate specific features of the text that make particular categories more likely. We can imagine that words like Congress or legislature make it more likely that we place an article under “legislative studies,” that typesetting in LATEX or multiple equations makes it more likely that we place it under “methodology,” and so on. For other target con- cepts, the relevant features are more abstract. To place it in the “cite” bin, we might require that the text display features like importance and relevance. Different readers may disagree on the salient features and their presence or absence in any particular text. This is important for the promise of automation via algorithm. We all use search engines that are useful at helping us find articles that are topically relevant (Google Scholar, JSTOR) or influ- ential (Social Science Citation Index), but we would be 212 KEVIN M. QUINN ET AL. more skeptical of an algorithm that attempted to tell us whether a given article should be cited in our own work or not. As one might expect—since all automated methods require at least some human reading—the act of read- ing a text rests on fewer assumptions than other meth- ods of text categorization. The number of topics is not necessarily fixed in advance, the relationships between categories are not assumed a priori, texts can be viewed holistically and placed in categories on a case-by-case ba- sis, and there is no attempt to algorithmically specify the categorization process. This allows maximum flexibility. However, the flexibility comes with nontrivial costs, espe- cially when one attempts to read large, politically relevant texts such as the British Hansard or the U.S. Congressional Record. More specifically, human reading of text requires moderate-to-high levels of substantive knowledge (the language of the text and some contextual knowledge are minimal but nontrivial requirements) and a great deal of time in person-hours per text.3 Finally, condensing the information in a large text requires a great deal of thought, expertise, and good sense. Even in the best of situations, purely qualitative summaries of a text are often open to debate and highly contested. Human coding (see, for instance, Ansolabehere, Snowberg, and Snyder 2003; Budge et al. 2001; Ho and Quinn 2008; Jones, Wilkerson, and Baumgartner n.d.; and Klingemann et al. 2006) is the standard methodol- ogy for content analysis, and for coding in general, in social science. For such manual coding, the target cat- egories of interest are assumed to be known and fixed. Coders read units of text and attempt to assign one of a finite set of codes to each unit. If the target categories have any relationship to each other (e.g., nesting), it is assumed to be known. There is typically no requirement that the readers use any particular feature in identifying the target category and the exact mapping from texts to categories is assumed unknown and never made explicit. One can tell, through reliability checking, whether two independent coders reach the same conclusion, but one cannot tell how they reached it. Manual coding is most useful when there are abundant human resources avail- able, the target concepts are clearly defined a priori, but the mapping from texts to categories is highly complex and unknown (“I know it when I see it”). By using clearly defined, mutually exclusive, and ex- haustive categories to structure the coding phase, human coding methods require less substantive knowledge than would be necessary in a deep reading of the texts. Nev- 3The Congressional Record currently contains over four billion words and produces another half million—about the length of War and Peace—a day. ertheless, the texts do still need to be read by a human (typically a research assistant) who is a competent reader of the language used in the texts. Further, some moderate contextual knowledge is required during this phase so that texts are interpreted in the proper context. While human coding is less costly than deep reading during the analysis phase, it has higher initial costs. In particular, arriving at a workable categorization scheme typically requires expert subject-matter knowledge and substantial human time. The first steps toward automation can be found in dictionary-based coding , which easily carries the most as- sumptions of all methods here. Examples include Gerner et al. (1994), Cary (1977), and Holsti, Brody, and North (1964). In dictionary-based coding, the analyst develops a list (a dictionary) of words and phrases that are likely to indicate membership in a particular category. A com- puter is used to tally up use of these dictionary entries in texts and determine the most likely category.4 So, as with manual coding, target categories are known and fixed. Moreover, the relevant features—generally the words or phrases that comprise the dictionary lists—are known and fixed, as is the mapping from those features into the target categories. When these assumption are met, dictionary-based coding can be fast and efficient. As with human coding, dictionary methods have very high startup costs. Building an appropriate dictionary is typically an application-specific task that requires a great deal of deep application-specific knowledge and (often- times) a fair amount of trial and error. That said, once a good dictionary is built, the analysis costs are as low or lower than any competing method. A large number of texts can be processed quickly and descriptive numerical summaries can be easily generated that make interpreta- tion and validity assessment relatively straightforward. A more recent approach to automation in this type of problem is supervised learning (Hillard, Purpura, and Wilkerson 2007, 2008; Kwon, Hovy, and Shulman 2007; Purpura and Hillard 2006). Hand coding is done to a sub- set of texts that will serve as training data and to another subset of texts that serve as evaluation data (sometimes called “test data”). Machine-learning algorithms are then used to attempt to infer the mapping from text features to hand-coded categories in the training set. Success is evaluated by applying the inferred mapping to the test data and calculating summaries of out-of-sample pre- dictive accuracy. Gains of automation are then realized by application to the remaining texts that have not been hand coded. There are a wide variety of possible algo- rithms and the field is growing. Again, note that target categories are assumed to be known and fixed. Some set 4One of the important early dictionary systems is the General En- quirer (Stone et al. 1966). ANALYZE POLITICAL ATTENTION 213 of possibly relevant features must be identified, but the algorithm determines which of those are relevant and how they map into the target categories. Some algorithms re- strict the mapping from text features to categories to take a parametric form while others are nonparametric.5 Since supervised learning methods require some hu- man coding of documents to construct training and test sets, these methods have high startup costs that are roughly the same as human-coding methods. Where they fare much better than human-coding methods is in the processing of the bulk of the texts. Here, because the pro- cess is completely automated, a very large number of texts can be assigned to categories quite quickly. In the same way that supervised learning attempts to use statistical techniques to automate the process of hand coding, our topic model attempts to automate the topic- categorization process of reading. The key assumption shared with reading, and not shared with hand coding, dictionary-based coding, or supervised learning, is that the target categories and their relationships with each other are unknown. The target categories—here, the top- ics that might be the subject of a particular legislative speech—are an object of inference. We assume that words are a relevant feature for revealing the topical content of a speech, and we assume that the mapping from words to topics takes a particular parametric form, described below. The topic model seeks to identify, rather than as- sume, the topical categories, the parameters that describe the mapping from words to topic, and the topical category for any given speech. The topic-modeling approach used in this article has a very different cost structure than all methods mentioned so far. Whereas other methods typically require a large in- vestment in the initial preanalysis stage (human coding, dictionary methods, supervised learning) and/or analysis stage (reading, human coding), our topic model requires very little time or substantive knowledge in these stages of the analysis. Where things are reversed is in the postanal- ysis phase where methods other than deep reading are rel- atively costless but where our topic model requires more time and effort (but no more substantive knowledge) than other methods. The nature of the costs incurred by the topic model become more apparent below. A Model for Dynamic Multitopic Speech The data-generating process that motivates our model is the following. On each day that Congress is in session a 5In Table 1A, we code the assumptions for the least stringent su- pervised learning techniques. legislator can make speeches. These speeches will be on one of a finite number K of topics. The probability that a randomly chosen speech from a particular day will be on a particular topic is assumed to vary smoothly over time. At a very coarse level, a speech can be thought of as a vector containing the frequencies of words in some vocabulary. These vectors of word frequencies can be stacked together in a matrix whose number of rows is equal to the number of words in the vocabulary and whose number of columns is equal to the number of speeches. This matrix is our out- come variable. Our goal is to use the information in this matrix to make inferences about the topic membership of individual speeches.6 We begin by laying out the necessary notation. Let t = 1, . . . , T index time (in days); d = 1, . . . , D index speech documents; k = 1, . . . , K index possible topics that a document can be on; and w = 1, . . . , W index words in the vocabulary. For reasons that will be clearer later, we also introduce the function s : {1, . . . , D} → {1, . . . , T }. s(d) tells us the time period in which document d was put into the Congressional Record. In addition, let �N denote the N -dimensional simplex. The Sampling Density The dth document yd is a W -vector of nonnegative in- tegers. The wth element of yd , denoted ydw, gives the number of times word w was used in document d. We condition on the total number nd of words in document d and assume that if yd is from topic k yd ∼ Multinomial(nd , �k ). Here �k ∈ �W−1 is the vector of multinomial probabili- ties with typical element �kw. One can think of �k as serv- ing as a “prototype speech” on topic k in the sense that it is the most likely word-usage profile within a speech on this topic. This model will thus allow one to think about all the speeches in a dataset as being a mixture of K prototypes plus random error. We note in passing that a Poisson data-generating process also gives rise to the same multinomial model conditional on nd . For purposes of in- terpretation, we will at some points below make use of 6The model we describe below differs from the most similar topic models in the computational linguistics literature (Blei and Laf- ferty 2006; Blei, Ng, and Jordan 2003; Wang and McCallum 2006) in several particulars. Among these are the dynamic model, the estimation procedure, and, most notably, the nature of the mix- ture model. In other models, documents have a mixture of topical content. This is perhaps appropriate for complex documents, like scientific articles. In ours, documents have a single topic, but we are uncertain which topic. This is appropriate for political speeches. Ultimately, our assumption allows us to distinguish between, for example, a speech on defense policy that invokes oil, and a speech on energy policy that invokes Iraq. 214 KEVIN M. QUINN ET AL. the transformation �k = ([ log ( �k1 �k1 ) − c ] , [ log ( �k2 �k1 ) − c ] , . . . , [ log ( �k W �k1 ) − c ])′ where c = W−1 ∑W w=1 log( �kw �k1 ). If we let �t k denote the marginal probabilities that a randomly chosen document is generated from topic k in time period t , we can write the sampling density for all of the observed documents as p(Y | �, �) ∝ D∏ d=1 K∑ k=1 �s (d )k W∏ w=1 � ydw kw . As will become apparent later, it will be useful to write this sampling density in terms of latent data z1, . . . , zD . Here zd is a K -vector with element zd k equal to 1 if doc- ument d was generated from topic k and 0 otherwise. If we could observe z1, . . . , zD we could write the sampling density above as p(Y, Z | �, �) ∝ D∏ d=1 K∏ k=1 ( �s (d )k W∏ w=1 � ydw kw )zd k . The Prior Specification To complete a Bayesian specification of this model we need to determine prior distributions for � and �. We as- sume a semiconjugate Dirichlet prior for �. More specif- ically, we assume �k ∼ Dirichlet (�k ) k = 1, . . . , K . For the data analysis below we assume that �kw = 1.01 for all k and w. This corresponds to a nearly flat prior over �k . This prior was chosen before looking at the data. The prior for � is more complicated. Let �t ∈ �K −1 denote the vector of topic probabilities at time t . The model assumes that a priori zd ∼ Multinomial(1, �s (d )). We reparameterize to work with the unconstrained �t = ( log [ �t 1 �t K ] , . . . , log [ �t (K −1) �t K ])′ . In order to capture dynamics in �t and to borrow strength from neighboring time periods, we assume that �t follows a Dynamic Linear Model (DLM; Cargnoni, Müller, and West 1997; West and Harrison 1997). Specifically, �t = F′t �t + �t �t ∼ N (0, Vt ) t = 1, . . . , T (1) �t = Gt �t−1 + t t ∼ N (0, Wt ) t = 1, . . . , T (2) Here equation (1) acts as the observation equation and equation (2) acts as the evolution equation. We finish this prior off by assuming prior distributions for Vt , Wt , and �0. Specifically, we assume Wt = W for all t and Vt = V for all t in which Congress was in session with V and W both diagonal and Vi i ∼ InvGa mma (a0/2, b0/2) ∀i Wi i ∼ InvGa mma (c 0/2, d0/2) ∀i We assume �0 ∼ N (m0, C0). In what follows, we assume a0 = 5, b0 = 5, c 0 = 1, d0 = 1, m0 = 0, and C0 = 25I. For days in which Congress was not in session we assume that Vt = 10I. We have found that this helps prevent oversmoothing. We note that our substantive results are not terribly sensitive to other, more diffuse, priors for Vi i and Wi i . In a web appendix we detail how models fit with a0 = b0 = c 0 = d0 = 1 and a0 = c 0 = 1, b0 = d0 = 10 produce extremely similar results. In what follows we specify Ft and Gt as a local linear trend for �t : Ft = ( IK −1 0K −1 ) t = 1, . . . , T Gt = ( IK −1 IK −1 0K −1 IK −1 ) t = 1, . . . , T. While we adopt a fairly simple model for the dynamics in the Senate data, the DLM framework that we make use of is extremely general. Details of the Expectation Con- ditional Maximization (ECM) algorithm used to fit this model are provided in the web appendix. Model fitting takes between 20 minutes and three hours depending on the quality of the starting values and the speed of the computer. No specialized hardware is required. Viewed as a clustering/classification procedure, the model above is designed for “unsupervised” clustering. At no point does the user pretag documents as belong- ing to certain topics. As we will demonstrate below in the context of Senate speech data, our model, despite not using user-supplied information about the nature of the topics, produces topic labelings that adhere closely to gen- erally recognized issue areas. While perhaps the greatest strength of our method is the fact that it can be used with- out any manual coding of documents, it can also be easily adapted for use in semisupervised fashion by constrain- ing some elements of Z to be 0 and 1. It is also possible to use the model to classify documents that were not in the original dataset used to fit the model. ANALYZE POLITICAL ATTENTION 215 Applying the Topic Model to U.S. Senate Speech, 1995–2004 We present here an analysis of speech in the U.S. Senate, as recorded in the Congressional Record, from 1995 to 2004 (the 105th to the 108th Congresses). In this section, we briefly describe how we process the textual data to serve as input for the topic model and then discuss the specification of the model for this analysis. Senate Speech Data The textual data are drawn from the United States Con- gressional Speech Corpus7 (Monroe et al. 2006) devel- oped under the Dynamics of Political Rhetoric and Polit- ical Representation Project (http://www.legislativespeech .org). The original source of the data is the html files that comprise the electronic version of the (public domain) United States Congressional Record, served by the Library of Congress on its THOMAS system (Library of Congress n.d.) and generated by the Government Printing Office (United States Government Printing Office n.d.). These html files correspond (nearly) to separately headed sections of the Record. We identify all utterances by an individual within any one of these sections, even if interrupted by other speakers, as a “speech” and it is these speeches that constitute the document set we model. For the eight-year period under study, there are 118,065 speeches (D) so defined. The speeches are processed to remove (most) punctu- ation and capitalization and then all words are stemmed.8 There are over 150,000 unique stems in the vocabulary of the Senate over this eight-year period, most of which are unique or infrequent enough to contain little infor- mation. For the analysis we present here, we filter out all stems that appear in less than one-half of 1% of speeches, leaving a vocabulary of 3,807 (W ) stems for this analysis. This produces a 118,065 × 3,807 input matrix of stem counts, which serves as the input to the topic model. This matrix contains observations of just under 73 million words.9 7Corpus (plural corpora) is a linguistic term meaning a textual database. 8A word’s stem is its root, to which affixes can be added for in- flection (vote to voted) or derivation (vote to voter). Stemming provides considerable efficiency gains, allowing us to leverage the shared topical meaning of words like abort, aborts, aborted, aborting, abortion, abortions, abortionist, and abortionists instead of treating the words as unrelated. An algorithm that attempts to reduce words to stems is a stemmer. We use the Porter Snowball II stemmer (for English), widely used in many natural language processing appli- cations (Porter 1980, n.d.). 9Details of the process are provided in the web appendix. Model Output The model contains millions of parameters and latent variables. We can focus on two subsets of these as defining the quantities of substantive interest, the �’s and the z’s. The � matrix contains K × W(≈ 160, 000) param- eters. Each element �kw of this matrix describes the log- odds of word w being used to speak about topic k. If �kw > �kw′ it is the case that word w is used more often on topic k than word w′. This is the source of the se- mantic content, the meaning, in our model. That is, we use this to learn what each topic is about and how top- ics are related to one another. � describes the intratopic data-generating process, so it can be used to generate new “speeches” (with words in random order) on any topic. It can also be used, in conjunction with the other model pa- rameters, to classify other documents. This is useful either for sensitivity analysis, as noted below, or for connecting the documents from some other setting (newspaper arti- cles, open-ended survey responses) to the topical frame defined by this model. Z is a D × K matrix with typical element zd k . Each of the approximately 5,000,000 zd k values is a 0/1 indicator of whether document d was generated from topic k. The model-fitting algorithm used in this article returns the expected value of Z which we label Ẑ. Because of the 0/1 nature of each zd k , we can interpret ẑd k (the expected value of zd k ) as the probability that document d was generated from topic k. We find that approximately 94% of documents are more than 95% likely to be from a single topic. Thus, we lose very little information by treating the maximum zd k in each row as an indicator of “the topic” into which speech d should be classified, reducing this to D (118,000) parameters of direct interest. Since we know when and by whom each speech was delivered, we can generate from this measures of attention (word count, speech count) to each topic at time scales as small as by day, and for aggregations of the speakers (parties, state delegations, etc.). It is also possible to treat ẑd as a vector of topic probabilities for document d and to then probabilistically assign documents to topics. Model Specification and Sensitivity Analysis We fit numerous specifications of the model outlined in the third section to the 105th–108th Senate data. In particular, we allowed the number of topics K to vary from 3 to 60. For each specification of K we fit several models using different starting values. Mixture models, such as that used here, typically exhibit a likelihood surface that is multimodal. Since the ECM algorithm used to fit the 216 KEVIN M. QUINN ET AL. model is only guaranteed to converge to a local mode, it is typically a good idea to use several starting values in order to increase one’s chances of finding the global optimum. We applied several criteria to the selection of K , which must be large enough to generate interpretable categories that have not been overaggregated and small enough to be usable at all. Our primary criteria were substantive and conceptual. We set a goal of identifying topical categories that correspond roughly to the areas of governmental competence typically used to define distinct government departments/ministries or legislative committees, such as “Education,” “Health,” and “Defense.” This is roughly comparable to the level of abstraction in the 19 major topic codes of the Policy Agendas Project, while being a bit more fine-grained than the 10 major categories in Rohde’s roll-call dataset (Rohde 2004) and more coarse than the 56 categories in the Comparative Manifestos Project. Conceptually, for us, a genuine topic sustains discussion over time (otherwise it is something else, like a proposal, an issue, or an event) and across parties (other- wise it is something else, like a frame). With K very small, we find amorphous categories along the lines of “Domes- tic Politics,” rather than “Education”; as K increases, we tend to get divisions into overly fine subcategories (“El- ementary Education”), particular features (“Education Spending”), or specific time-bound debates (“No Child Left Behind”). Results matching our criteria, and similar to each other, occur at K in the neighborhood of 40–45. We present here results for the K = 42 model with the highest maximized log posterior. A series of sensitivity analyses are available in the web appendix. Reliability, Validity, Interpretation, and Application This is a measurement model. The evaluation of any mea- surement is generally based on its reliability (can it be re- peated?) and validity (is it right?). Embedded within the complex notion of validity are interpretation (what does it mean?) and application (does it “work”?). Complicating matters, we are here developing multi- ple measures simultaneously: the assignment of speeches to topics, the topic categories themselves, and derived measures of substantive concepts, like attention. Our model has one immediate reliability advantage relative to human and human-assisted supervised learning meth- ods. The primary feature of such methods that can be assessed is the human-human or computer-human in- tercoder reliability in the assignment of documents to the given topic frame, and generally 70–90% (depending on index and application) is taken as a standard. Our approach is 100% reliable, completely replicable, in this regard. More important are notions of validity. There are sev- eral concepts of measurement validity that can be consid- ered in any content analysis.10 We focus here on the five basic types of external or criterion-based concepts of valid- ity. First, the measures of the topics themselves and their relationships can be evaluated for semantic validity (the extent to which each category or document has a coherent meaning and the extent to which the categories are related to one another in a meaningful way). This speaks directly to how the � matrix can be interpreted. Then, the derived measures of attention can be evaluated for convergent con- struct validity (the extent to which the measure matches existing measures that it should match), discriminant con- struct validity (the extent to which the measure departs from existing measures where it should depart), predic- tive validity (the extent to which the measure corresponds correctly to external events), and hypothesis validity (the extent to which the measure can be used effectively to test substantive hypotheses). The last of these speaks directly to the issue of how the z matrix can be applied. Topic Interpretation and Intratopic Semantic Validity Table 2 provides our substantive labels for each of the 42 clusters, as well as descriptive statistics on relative fre- quency in the entire dataset. We decided on these labels after examining �̂k and also reading a modest number of randomly chosen documents that were assigned a high probability of being on topic k for k = 1, . . . , K . This process also informs the semantic validity of each clus- ter. Krippendorff (2004) considers this the most relevant form of validity for evaluating a content analysis measure. We discuss these procedures in turn. In order to get a sense of what words tended to dis- tinguish documents on a given topic k from documents on other topics we examined both the magnitude of �̂kw for each word w as well as the weighted distance of �̂kw from the center of the �̂ vectors other than �̂kw (denoted �̂−kw). The former provides a measure of how often word w was used in topic k documents relative to other words in topic k documents. A large positive value of �̂kw means that word w appeared quite often in topic k documents. The weighted distance of �̂kw from the center of the �̂−kw, 10The most common is, of course, face validity. Face validity is inherently subjective, generally viewed as self-evident by authors and with practiced skepticism by readers. We believe the results from the model as applied to the Congressional Record (see below) demonstrate significant face validity. But, by definition, there are no external criteria one can bring to bear on the issue of face validity and thus we focus on several other types of validity. ANALYZE POLITICAL ATTENTION 217 TABLE 2 Topic Labels and Descriptive Statistics for 42-Topic Model Topic Labels %a Clarifying Notes 1. Judicial Nominations 1.0/2.4 2. Supreme Court / Constitutional 1.1/3.0 incl. impeachment, DOJ, marriage, flag-burning 3. Campaign Finance 0.9/2.4 4. Abortion 0.5/1.1 5. Law & Crime 1 [Violence/Drugs] 1.3/1.8 violence, drug trafficking, police, prison 6. Child Protection 0.9/2.6 tobacco, alcohol, drug abuse, school violence, abuse 7. Health 1 [Medical] 1.5/2.4 emph. disease, prevention, research, regulation 8. Social Welfare 2.0/2.8 9. Education 1.8/4.6 10. Armed Forces 1 [Manpower] 1.0/1.5 incl. veterans’ issues 11. Armed Forces 2 [Infrastructure] 2.3/3.0 incl. bases and civil defense 12. Intelligence 1.4/3.9 incl. terrorism and homeland security 13. Law & Crime 2 [Federal] 1.8/2.7 incl. the FBI, immigration, white-collar crime 14. Environment 1 [Public Lands] 2.2/2.5 incl. water management, resources, Native Americans 15. Commercial Infrastructure 2.0/2.9 incl. transportation and telecom 16. Banking and Finance 1.1/3.1 incl. corporations, small business, torts, bankruptcy 17. Labor 1 [Workers, esp. Retirement] 1.0/1.5 emph. conditions and benefits, esp. pensions 18. Debt / Deficit / Social Security 1.7/4.6 19. Labor 2 [Employment] 1.4/4.5 incl. jobs, wages, general state of the economy 20. Taxes 1.1/2.7 emph. individual taxation, incl. income and estate 21. Energy 1.4/3.3 incl. energy supply and prices, environmental effects 22. Environment 2 [Regulation] 1.1/2.8 incl. pollution, wildlife protection 23. Agriculture 1.2/2.5 24. Foreign Trade 1.1/2.4 25. Procedural 3 [Legislation 1] 2.0/2.8 26. Procedural 4 [Legislation 2] 3.0/3.5 27. Health 2 [Economics—Seniors] 1.0/2.6 incl. Medicare and prescription drug coverage 28. Health 3 [Economics—General] 0.8/2.3 incl. provision, access, costs 29. Defense [Use of Force] 1.4/3.7 incl. wars/interventions, Iraq, Bosnia, etc. 30. International Affairs [Diplomacy] 1.9/3.0 incl. human rights, organizations, China, Israel, etc. 31. International Affairs [Arms Control] 0.9/2.3 incl. treaties, nonproliferation, WMDs 32. Symbolic [Tribute—Living] 1.9/1.3 33. Symbolic [Tribute—Constituent] 3.2/1.9 34. Symbolic [Remembrance—Military] 2.3/1.9 incl. tributes to other public servants, WWII Memorial 35. Symbolic [Remembrance—Nonmilitary] 2.4/2.3 36. Symbolic [Congratulations—Sports] 0.6/0.4 37. Jesse Helms re: Debt 0.5/0.1 almost daily deficit/debt ‘boxscore’ speeches 38. Gordon Smith re: Hate Crime 0.4/0.1 almost daily speeches on hate crime 39. Procedural 1 [Housekeeping 1] 20.4/1.5 40. Procedural 5 [Housekeeping 3] 15.5/1.0 41. Procedural 6 [Housekeeping 4] 6.5/1.6 42. Procedural 2 [Housekeeping 2] 2.4/0.8 a Percentage of documents (left of slash) and percentage of word stems (right of slash). which we operationalize as rkw = �̂kw − median j =k ( �̂ j w ) MAD � =k ( �̂�w ) , where MAD represents the median absolute deviation, provides a measure of how distinctive the usage of word w is on topic k documents compared to other documents. To take an example, the word the always has a very high 218 KEVIN M. QUINN ET AL. � value, as it is very frequently used. However, it is used roughly similarly across all of the topics, so its value of r is generally quite close to 0. We combine these measures by ranking the elements of �̂k and rk and adding the ranks for each word w. This combined index gives us one measure of how distinctive word w is for identifying documents on topic k. Table 3 provides the top keys for each topic.11 Inspection of these tables produced rough descriptive labels for all of the clusters. After arriving at these rough labels we went on to read a number of randomly chosen speech documents that were assigned to each cluster. In general we found that, with the exception of the procedu- ral categories, the information in the keywords (Table 3, extended) did an excellent job describing the documents assigned to each (substantive) topic. However, by reading the documents we were able to discover some nuances that may not have been apparent in the tables of �̂ values, and those are reflected in the topic labels and clarifying notes of Table 2. In general, the clusters appear to be homogeneous and well defined. Our approach is particularly good at extracting the primary meaning of a speech, without be- ing overwhelmed by secondary mentions of extraneous topics. For example, since 9/11, the term terrorism can appear in speeches on virtually any topic from education to environmental protection, a fact that undermines in- formation retrieval through keyword search.12 It is worth noting that this technique will extract information about the centroid of a cluster’s meaning and lexical use. There will be speeches that do not fall comfortably into any cat- egory, but which are rare enough not to demand their own cluster.13 Reading some of the raw documents also revealed some additional meaning behind the clusters. For in- stance, two of the clusters with superficially uninforma- tive keywords turn out to be composed exclusively of pro forma “hobby horse” statements by Senator Jesse Helms about the current level of national debt and by Senator Gordon Smith about the need for hate crime legislation. The � parameters identify words that, if present, most distingush a document of this topic from all others, for the 11Longer lists of keywords and index values are provided in the web appendix. 12The reader can confirm this by searching on the word terrorism in THOMAS. 13As noted above, about 94% of all documents have a better than 95% chance of being generated from a single topic, over 97% of documents have a better than 75% chance of being generated from a single topic, and over 99% have a better than 50% chance of being generated from a single topic. The bulk of the documents that were not clearly on a single topic have high probabilities of being from two or more “procedural” categories and are thus clearly on some procedural topic. time period under study and for the Senate as a whole. Our approach does not demand that all legislators talk about all topics in the same way. To the contrary, there is typically both a common set of terms that identifies a topic at hand (as shown in Table 3) and a set of terms that identifies particular political (perhaps partisan) positions, points of view, frames, and so on, within that topic. For example, Table 3 lists the top 10 keys for Judicial Nominations (nomine, confirm, nomin, circuit, hear, court, judg, judici, case, vacanc), all of which are politically neu- tral references to the topic that would be used by speakers of both parties. Within these topically defined speeches, we can define keys that are at any given time (here the 108th) the most Democratic (which include republican, white, hous, presid, bush, administr, lifetim, appoint, pack, controversi, divis) or the most Republican (which include filibust, unfair, up-or-down, demand, vote, qualifi, experi, distinguish), clearly reflecting the partisan split over Bush appointees and Democratic use of the filibuster to block them.14 Relationships between Topics and Metatopic Semantic Validity An important feature of the topic model, another sharp contrast with other approaches, is that the � matrix is an estimate of the relationship between each word in the vocabulary and each topical cluster. As a result, we can examine the semantic relationships within and across groups of topics. Given the more than 150,000 parame- ters in the � matrix, there are many such relationships one might investigate. Here we focus on how the topics relate to each other as subtopics of larger metatopics, how they aggregate. The coherent meaning of the metatopics we find is further evidence of the semantic validity of the topic model as applied to the Congressional Record. This type of validation has not been possible with other approaches to issue coding. One approach to discovering relationships among the 42 topics is agglomerative clustering of the � vectors, �̂1, . . . , �̂42, by topic. Agglomerative clustering begins by assigning each of the 42 vectors to its own unique cluster. The two vectors that are closest to each other (by Euclidean distance) are then merged to form a new cluster. This process is repeated until all vectors are merged into 14These words all appear among the top keys using any of the variance-respecting feature selection techniques described in Mon- roe, Colaresi, and Quinn (2008). This includes the simplest method, roughly equivalent to ranking words by z-scores in a multinomial model of word choice with party as the only covariate, and a more computationally complex method based on regularization (a tech- nique designed to reduce noise in such feature selection problems). ANALYZE POLITICAL ATTENTION 219 TABLE 3 Topic Keywords for 42-Topic Model Topic (Short Label) Keys 1. Judicial Nominations nomine, confirm, nomin, circuit, hear, court, judg, judici, case, vacanc 2. Constitutional case, court, attornei, supreme, justic, nomin, judg, m, decis, constitut 3. Campaign Finance campaign, candid, elect, monei, contribut, polit, soft, ad, parti, limit 4. Abortion procedur, abort, babi, thi, life, doctor, human, ban, decis, or 5. Crime 1 [Violent] enforc, act, crime, gun, law, victim, violenc, abus, prevent, juvenil 6. Child Protection gun, tobacco, smoke, kid, show, firearm, crime, kill, law, school 7. Health 1 [Medical] diseas, cancer, research, health, prevent, patient, treatment, devic, food 8. Social Welfare care, health, act, home, hospit, support, children, educ, student, nurs 9. Education school, teacher, educ, student, children, test, local, learn, district, class 10. Military 1 [Manpower] veteran, va, forc, militari, care, reserv, serv, men, guard, member 11. Military 2 [Infrastructure] appropri, defens, forc, report, request, confer, guard, depart, fund, project 12. Intelligence intellig, homeland, commiss, depart, agenc, director, secur, base, defens 13. Crime 2 [Federal] act, inform, enforc, record, law, court, section, crimin, internet, investig 14. Environment 1 [Public Lands] land, water, park, act, river, natur, wildlif, area, conserv, forest 15. Commercial Infrastructure small, busi, act, highwai, transport, internet, loan, credit, local, capit 16. Banking / Finance bankruptci, bank, credit, case, ir, compani, file, card, financi, lawyer 17. Labor 1 [Workers] worker, social, retir, benefit, plan, act, employ, pension, small, employe 18. Debt / Social Security social, year, cut, budget, debt, spend, balanc, deficit, over, trust 19. Labor 2 [Employment] job, worker, pai, wage, economi, hour, compani, minimum, overtim 20. Taxes tax, cut, incom, pai, estat, over, relief, marriag, than, penalti 21. Energy energi, fuel, ga, oil, price, produce, electr, renew, natur, suppli 22. Environment 2 [Regulation] wast, land, water, site, forest, nuclear, fire, mine, environment, road 23. Agriculture farmer, price, produc, farm, crop, agricultur, disast, compact, food, market 24. Trade trade, agreement, china, negoti, import, countri, worker, unit, world, free 25. Procedural 3 mr, consent, unanim, order, move, senat, ask, amend, presid, quorum 26. Procedural 4 leader, major, am, senat, move, issu, hope, week, done, to 27. Health 2 [Seniors] senior, drug, prescript, medicar, coverag, benefit, plan, price, beneficiari 28. Health 3 [Economics] patient, care, doctor, health, insur, medic, plan, coverag, decis, right 29. Defense [Use of Force] iraq, forc, resolut, unit, saddam, troop, war, world, threat, hussein 30. International [Diplomacy] unit, human, peac, nato, china, forc, intern, democraci, resolut, europ 31. International [Arms] test, treati, weapon, russia, nuclear, defens, unit, missil, chemic 32. Symbolic [Living] serv, hi, career, dedic, john, posit, honor, nomin, dure, miss 33. Symbolic [Constituent] recogn, dedic, honor, serv, insert, contribut, celebr, congratul, career 34. Symbolic [Military] honor, men, sacrific, memori, dedic, freedom, di, kill, serve, soldier 35. Symbolic [Nonmilitary] great, hi, paul, john, alwai, reagan, him, serv, love 36. Symbolic [Sports] team, game, plai, player, win, fan, basebal, congratul, record, victori 37. J. Helms re: Debt hundr, at, four, three, ago, of, year, five, two, the 38. G. Smith re: Hate Crime of, and, in, chang, by, to, a, act, with, the, hate 39. Procedural 1 order, without, the, from, object, recogn, so, second, call, clerk 40. Procedural 5 consent, unanim, the, of, mr, to, order, further, and, consider 41. Procedural 6 mr, consent, unanim, of, to, at, order, the, consider, follow 42. Procedural 2 of, mr, consent, unanim, and, at, meet, on, the, am Notes: For each topic, the top 10 (or so) key stems that best distinguish the topic from all others. Keywords have been sorted here by rank(�kw ) + rank(r kw ), as defined in the text. Lists of the top 40 keywords for each topic and related information are provided in the web appendix. Note the order of the topics is the same as in Table 2 but the topic names have been shortened. 220 KEVIN M. QUINN ET AL. FIGURE 1 Agglomerative Clustering of 42-Topic Model J u d ic ia l N o m in a ti o n s , 1 .0 / 2 .4 % S u p re m e C o u rt / C o n s ti tu ti o n a l, 1 .1 / 3 .0 % C a m p a ig n F in a n c e , 0 .9 / 2 .4 % A b o rt io n , 0 .5 / 1 .1 % L a w & C ri m e 1 [ e s p . V io le n c e / D ru g s ], 1 .3 / 1 .8 % C h il d P ro te c ti o n , 0 .9 / 2 .6 % H e a lt h 1 [ M e d ic a l] , 1 .5 / 2 .4 % S o c ia l W e lf a re , 2 .0 / 2 .8 % E d u c a ti o n , 1 .8 / 4 .6 % A rm e d F o rc e s 1 [ M a n p o w e r] , 1 .0 / 1 .5 % A rm e d F o rc e s 2 [ In fr a s tr u c tu re ], 2 .3 / 3 .0 % In te ll ig e n c e , 1 .4 / 3 .9 % L a w & C ri m e 2 [ F e d e ra l, i n c l. W h it e C o ll a r / Im m ig ra ti o n ], 1 .8 / 2 .7 % E n v ir o n m e n t 1 [ P u b li c L a n d s ], 2 .2 / 2 .5 % C o m m e rc e / T ra n s p o rt a ti o n / T e le c o m , 2 .0 / 2 .9 % B a n k in g & F in a n c e / T o rt R e fo rm , 1 .1 / 3 .1 % L a b o r 1 [ W o rk e rs , e s p . R e ti re m e n t] , 1 .0 / 1 .5 % D e b t / D e fi c it / S o c ia l S e c u ri ty , 1 .7 / 4 .6 % L a b o r 2 [ E m p lo y m e n t, e s p . J o b s / W a g e s ], 1 .4 / 4 .5 % In d iv id u a l T a x a ti o n , 1 .1 / 2 .7 % E n e rg y, 1 .4 / 3 .3 % E n v ir o n m e n t 2 [ R e g u la ti o n ], 1 .1 / 2 .8 % A g ri c u lt u re , 1 .2 / 2 .5 % F o re ig n T ra d e , 1 .1 / 2 .4 % P ro c e d u ra l 3 [ L e g is la ti o n 1 ], 2 .0 / 2 .8 % P ro c e d u ra l 4 [ L e g is la ti o n 2 ], 3 .0 / 3 .5 % H e a lt h 2 [ E c o n o m ic s − S e n io rs ], 1 .0 / 2 .6 % H e a lt h 3 [ E c o n o m ic s − G e n e ra l] , 0 .8 / 2 .3 % D e fe n s e [ U s e o f F o rc e ], 1 .4 / 3 .7 % In te rn a ti o n a l A ff a ir s [ D ip lo m a c y / H u m a n R ig h ts ], 1 .9 / 3 .0 % In te rn a ti o n a l A ff a ir s [ A rm s C o n tr o l] , 0 .9 / 2 .3 % S y m b o li c [ T ri b u te − L iv in g ], 1 .9 / 1 .3 % S y m b o li c [ T ri b u te − C o n s ti tu e n t] , 3 .2 / 1 .9 % S y m b o li c [ R e m e m b ra n c e − M il it a ry ], 2 .3 / 1 .9 % S y m b o li c [ R e m e m b ra n c e − N o n m il it a ry ], 2 .4 / 2 .3 % S y m b o li c [ C o n g ra tu la ti o n s − S p o rt s ], 0 .6 / 0 .4 % D e b t / D e fi c it [ ~ D a il y J e s s e H e lm s S p e e c h e s ], 0 .5 / 0 .1 % H a te C ri m e [ ~ D a il y G o rd o n S m it h S p e e c h e s ], 0 .4 / 0 .1 % P ro c e d u re 1 [ H o u s e k e e p in g 1 ], 2 0 .4 / 1 .5 % P ro c e d u re 5 [ H o u s e k e e p in g 3 ], 1 5 .5 / 1 .0 % P ro c e d u re 6 [ H o u s e k e e p in g 4 ], 6 .5 / 1 .6 % P ro c e d u re 2 [ H o u s e k e e p in g 2 ], 2 .4 / 0 .8 % 5 0 1 0 0 1 5 0 2 0 0 2 5 0 H e ig h t Regulation Western Core Economy Social Domestic Constitutional / Conceptual Bills / Proposals Macro DHS Infrastructure Distributive International Policy (Spending / Regulation) Symbolic Procedural [Housekeeping] Notes: Hierarchical agglomerative clustering of �̂1, . . . , �̂K . Clustering based on minimizing the maximum euclidean distance between cluster members. Each cluster is labeled with a topic name, followed by the percentage of documents and words, respectively, in that cluster. a single cluster. The results of this process are displayed in the dendrogram of Figure 1.15 Roughly speaking, the lower the height at which any two topics, or groupings of topics, are connected, the more similar are their word use patterns in Senate debate.16 Reading Figure 1 from the bottom up provides infor- mation about which clusters were merged first (those 15The order of topics given in Tables 2 and 3 is as determined here; the labels were determined prior to the agglomerative clustering. 16Further specifics, with code to reproduce this analysis and fig- ure, are provided in the replication archive. Please note that the agglomerative clustering is not part of the model, but rather a tool (analogous to a regression table) for compactly displaying several important features of the estimates. merged at the lowest height). We see that topics that share a penultimate node share a substantive or stylis- tic link. Some of these are obvious topical connections, such as between the two health economics clusters or between energy and environmental regulation. Some are more subtle. For example, the “Environment 1 [Public Lands]” category, which is dominated by issues related to management and conservation of public lands and wa- ter, and the “Commercial Infrastructure” category are re- lated through the common reference to distributive public works spending. Both contain the words project and area in their top 25 keys, for example. The “Banking / Finance” category and the “Labor 1 [Workers]” category discuss different aspects of economic regulation and intervention, ANALYZE POLITICAL ATTENTION 221 the former with corporations and consumers, the latter with labor markets. Other connections are stylistic, rather than necessarily substantive. The symbolic categories, for example, all have great, proud, and his as keywords. We can also read Figure 1 from the top down to get a sense of whether there are recognizable rhetorical metaclusters of topics. Reading from the top down, we see clear clusters separating the housekeeping procedural, hobby horse, and symbolic speech from the substantive policy areas. The more substantive branch then divides a cluster of conceptual and Constitutional issues from the more concrete policy areas that require Congress to appropriate funds, enact regulations, and so on. Within the concrete policy areas, we see further clear breakdowns into domestic and international policy. Domestic policy is further divided into clusters we can identify with social policy, public goods and infrastructure, economics, and “regional.” Note that what binds metaclusters is language. The language of the Constitutional grouping is abstract, ideological, and partisan. The social policy grouping is tied together by reference to societal problems, suffering, and need. The public goods / infrastructure grouping is tied together both by the language of projects and bud- gets, as well as that of state versus state particularism. The most interesting metacluster is the substantively odd “regional” grouping of energy, environment, agriculture, and trade. Exploration of the language used here shows that these are topics that divide rural and/or western sena- tors from the rest—distributive politics at a different level of aggregation. This approach has the potential to inform ongoing debates about how to characterize the underlying political structure of public policy. Whether such characterization efforts are of interest in and of themselves—we would ar- gue they are—is not of as much relevance as the fact that they are necessary for understanding dimensions of po- litical conflict (Clausen 1973; Poole and Rosenthal 1997), the dynamics of the political agenda (Baumgartner and Jones 2002; Lee 2006), the nature of political representa- tion (Jones and Baumgartner 2005), or policy outcomes (Heitschusen and Young 2006; Katznelson and Lapinski 2006; Lowi 1964). Katznelson and Lapinski (2006) pro- vide an eloquent defense of the exercise and a review of alternative approaches. Speeches, Roll Calls, Hearings, and Construct Validity The construct validity of a measure is established via its relationships with other measures. A measure shows evi- dence of convergent construct validity if it correlates with other measures of the same construct. A measure shows discriminant construct validity when it is uncorrelated with measures of dissimilar constructs (Weber 1990). Construct validity has a double edge to it. If a new measure differs from an established one, it is generally viewed with skepticism. If a new measure captures what the old one did, it is probably unnecessary. In our case, the model produces measures we expect to converge with others in particular ways and to diverge in others. Con- sider a specific policy-oriented topic, like abortion. We expect that, typically, a roll call on abortion policy should be surrounded by a debate on the topic of abortion. This convergent relationship should appear in our measure of attention to abortion in speech and in indicators of roll calls on abortion policy. Figure 2 displays the number of words given in speeches categorized by our model as “Abortion” over time. We also display the roll-call votes in which the of- ficial description contains the word abortion. We see the basic convergence expected, with number of roll calls and number of words correlated at +0.70. But note also that we expect divergence in the indicators as well. Attention is often given to abortion outside the context of an abortion policy vote, the abortion policy nature of a vote might be unclear from its description, and a particular roll call might receive very little debate attention. Consider first, the spikes of debate attention that do not have accompanying roll-call votes. The first such spike is in February of 1998, when no vote was nominally on abortion. The occasion was the Senate confirmation of Clinton’s nominee for Surgeon General, David Satcher, and debate centered around Satcher’s positions on abor- tion. “Abortion” appears nowhere in the description of the vote. Hand-coding exercises would also not code the vote as abortion. For example, Rohde’s roll-call data (Rohde 2004) cover the House, but if extended to the Senate would clearly characterize the accompanying vote on February 10 as a confirmation vote, within a larger procedural category. None of Clausen (1973), Peltzman (1985), or Poole and Rosenthal (1997) extends forward to 1998, but all code previous Surgeon General confirma- tions at similar high levels of aggregation. For example, the C. Everett Koop confirmation vote, in 1981, is coded under the Clausen system as “Government Management,” under Peltzman as “Government Organization” (primar- ily) and “Domestic Social Policy” (secondarily), and un- der Poole and Rosenthal as “Public Health”.17 Satcher would have been coded identically in each case. But it 17These codes are all listed in the D-NOMINATE dataset used for Poole and Rosenthal (1997) and archived on Poole’s website, http://www.voteview.com. 222 KEVIN M. QUINN ET AL. FIGURE 2 The Number of Words Spoken on the ‘Abortion’ Topic Per Day 0 10000 20000 30000 40000 50000 60000 70000 Abortion N u m b e r o f W o rd s J a n 0 1 , 1 9 9 7 M a r 0 2 , 1 9 9 7 M a y 0 1 , 1 9 9 7 J u n 3 0 , 1 9 9 7 A u g 2 9 , 1 9 9 7 O c t 2 8 , 1 9 9 7 D e c 2 7 , 1 9 9 7 F e b 2 5 , 1 9 9 8 A p r 2 6 , 1 9 9 8 J u n 2 5 , 1 9 9 8 A u g 2 4 , 1 9 9 8 O c t 2 3 , 1 9 9 8 D e c 2 2 , 1 9 9 8 F e b 2 0 , 1 9 9 9 A p r 2 1 , 1 9 9 9 J u n 2 0 , 1 9 9 9 A u g 1 9 , 1 9 9 9 O c t 1 8 , 1 9 9 9 D e c 1 7 , 1 9 9 9 F e b 1 5 , 2 0 0 0 A p r 1 6 , 2 0 0 0 J u n 1 5 , 2 0 0 0 A u g 1 4 , 2 0 0 0 O c t 1 3 , 2 0 0 0 D e c 1 2 , 2 0 0 0 F e b 1 0 , 2 0 0 1 A p r 1 1 , 2 0 0 1 J u n 1 0 , 2 0 0 1 A u g 0 9 , 2 0 0 1 O c t 0 8 , 2 0 0 1 D e c 0 7 , 2 0 0 1 F e b 0 5 , 2 0 0 2 A p r 0 6 , 2 0 0 2 J u n 0 5 , 2 0 0 2 A u g 0 4 , 2 0 0 2 O c t 0 3 , 2 0 0 2 D e c 0 2 , 2 0 0 2 J a n 3 1 , 2 0 0 3 A p r 0 1 , 2 0 0 3 M a y 3 1 , 2 0 0 3 J u l 3 0 , 2 0 0 3 S e p 2 8 , 2 0 0 3 N o v 2 7 , 2 0 0 3 J a n 2 6 , 2 0 0 4 M a r 2 7 , 2 0 0 4 M a y 2 6 , 2 0 0 4 J u l 2 5 , 2 0 0 4 S e p 2 3 , 2 0 0 4 N o v 2 2 , 2 0 0 4 ● ● ●●● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●● ● ● 0 1 2 3 Satcher, Surgeon General PBA Ban 2000 Murray Amendments, DOD Partial Birth Abortion Ban, 1997 PBA Ban 2003 Unborn Victims of Violence ● Rollcalls Hearings is clear from reading the transcript that the debate was about, and that attention was being paid to, abortion. Another such spike is in March of 2004, when the Unborn Victims of Violence Act establishing penalties for violence against pregnant women was debated. The House vote on this identical bill is coded in the Rohde data under “Crime / Criminal Procedure” (Rohde 2004). Much of the debate attention, however, centered around the implications of the bill and possible amendments for abortion rights. In both cases, the spike in attention to abortion is real—captured by the speech measure and uncaptured by roll-call measures. Similarly, the speech measure captures subtleties that the roll-call count does not. For example, on or around July 1 in every year from 1997 to 2003, Senator Murray offered an amendment to the Department of Defense Ap- propriations bill, attempting to restore access to abortions for overseas military personnel. The roll-call measure cap- tures these through 2000, but misses them later. This is because the word abortion was removed from the de- scription, replaced by a more opaque phrase: “to restore a previous policy regarding restrictions on use of De- partment of Defense medical facilities.” But with speech, these minor spikes in attention can be seen. Moreover, the speech measure captures when the amendment receives only cursory attention (a few hundred words in 1998) and when it is central to the discussion (2000, 2002). Note also the relationship between speech and hear- ing data. The hearings data are sparse and generally ex- amined at an annual level. At this level of aggregation, the two measures converge as expected—both show more attention to abortion by the Senate during the Clinton presidency (1997–2000) than during the Bush presidency (2001–4). But at a daily level, the measures are clearly capturing different conceptual aspects of political atten- tion. Higher cost hearings are more likely to capture at- tention that is well along toward being formulated as policy-relevant legislation. Speech is lower cost, so more dynamic and responsive at the daily level, more reflective of minority interests that may not work into policy, and potentially more ephemeral. Exogenous Events and Predictive Validity Predictive validity refers to an expected correspondence between a measure and exogenous events uninvolved in the measurement process. The term is perhaps a confus- ing misnomer, as the direction of the relationship is not relevant. This means that the correspondence need not be a pure forecast of events from measures, but can be con- current or postdictive, and causality can run from events to measures (Weber 1990). Of the limitless possibilities, it suffices to examine two of the most impactful political events in this time period: 9/11 and the Iraq War. Figure 3a plots the number of words on the topic that corresponds to symbolic speech in support of the military and other public servants. Here we see a large increase in such symbolic speech immediately after 9/11 (the largest spike on the plot is exactly on September 12). There is another large spike on the first anniversary of 9/11 and then a number of consecutive days in March 2003 that feature moderate-to-large amounts of this type ANALYZE POLITICAL ATTENTION 223 FIGURE 3 The Attention to ‘Symbolic [Remembrance—Military]’ and ‘Defense [Use of Force]’ Topics over Time 0 5000 10000 15000 20000 25000 30000 35000 Symbolic [Remembrance − Military] N u m b e r o f W o rd s J a n 0 1 , 1 9 9 7 M a r 0 2 , 1 9 9 7 M a y 0 1 , 1 9 9 7 J u n 3 0 , 1 9 9 7 A u g 2 9 , 1 9 9 7 O c t 2 8 , 1 9 9 7 D e c 2 7 , 1 9 9 7 F e b 2 5 , 1 9 9 8 A p r 2 6 , 1 9 9 8 J u n 2 5 , 1 9 9 8 A u g 2 4 , 1 9 9 8 O c t 2 3 , 1 9 9 8 D e c 2 2 , 1 9 9 8 F e b 2 0 , 1 9 9 9 A p r 2 1 , 1 9 9 9 J u n 2 0 , 1 9 9 9 A u g 1 9 , 1 9 9 9 O c t 1 8 , 1 9 9 9 D e c 1 7 , 1 9 9 9 F e b 1 5 , 2 0 0 0 A p r 1 6 , 2 0 0 0 J u n 1 5 , 2 0 0 0 A u g 1 4 , 2 0 0 0 O c t 1 3 , 2 0 0 0 D e c 1 2 , 2 0 0 0 F e b 1 0 , 2 0 0 1 A p r 1 1 , 2 0 0 1 J u n 1 0 , 2 0 0 1 A u g 0 9 , 2 0 0 1 O c t 0 8 , 2 0 0 1 D e c 0 7 , 2 0 0 1 F e b 0 5 , 2 0 0 2 A p r 0 6 , 2 0 0 2 J u n 0 5 , 2 0 0 2 A u g 0 4 , 2 0 0 2 O c t 0 3 , 2 0 0 2 D e c 0 2 , 2 0 0 2 J a n 3 1 , 2 0 0 3 A p r 0 1 , 2 0 0 3 M a y 3 1 , 2 0 0 3 J u l 3 0 , 2 0 0 3 S e p 2 8 , 2 0 0 3 N o v 2 7 , 2 0 0 3 J a n 2 6 , 2 0 0 4 M a r 2 7 , 2 0 0 4 M a y 2 6 , 2 0 0 4 J u l 2 5 , 2 0 0 4 S e p 2 3 , 2 0 0 4 N o v 2 2 , 2 0 0 4 Capitol shooting 9/12/01 9/11/02 9/11/03 9/11/04 Iraq War (a) The Number of Words on the ‘Symbolic [Remembrance-Military]’ (‘Fallen Heroes’) Topic Per Day 0 20000 40000 60000 80000 100000 120000 Defense [Use of Force] N u m b e r o f W o rd s J a n 0 1 , 1 9 9 7 M a r 0 2 , 1 9 9 7 M a y 0 1 , 1 9 9 7 J u n 3 0 , 1 9 9 7 A u g 2 9 , 1 9 9 7 O c t 2 8 , 1 9 9 7 D e c 2 7 , 1 9 9 7 F e b 2 5 , 1 9 9 8 A p r 2 6 , 1 9 9 8 J u n 2 5 , 1 9 9 8 A u g 2 4 , 1 9 9 8 O c t 2 3 , 1 9 9 8 D e c 2 2 , 1 9 9 8 F e b 2 0 , 1 9 9 9 A p r 2 1 , 1 9 9 9 J u n 2 0 , 1 9 9 9 A u g 1 9 , 1 9 9 9 O c t 1 8 , 1 9 9 9 D e c 1 7 , 1 9 9 9 F e b 1 5 , 2 0 0 0 A p r 1 6 , 2 0 0 0 J u n 1 5 , 2 0 0 0 A u g 1 4 , 2 0 0 0 O c t 1 3 , 2 0 0 0 D e c 1 2 , 2 0 0 0 F e b 1 0 , 2 0 0 1 A p r 1 1 , 2 0 0 1 J u n 1 0 , 2 0 0 1 A u g 0 9 , 2 0 0 1 O c t 0 8 , 2 0 0 1 D e c 0 7 , 2 0 0 1 F e b 0 5 , 2 0 0 2 A p r 0 6 , 2 0 0 2 J u n 0 5 , 2 0 0 2 A u g 0 4 , 2 0 0 2 O c t 0 3 , 2 0 0 2 D e c 0 2 , 2 0 0 2 J a n 3 1 , 2 0 0 3 A p r 0 1 , 2 0 0 3 M a y 3 1 , 2 0 0 3 J u l 3 0 , 2 0 0 3 S e p 2 8 , 2 0 0 3 N o v 2 7 , 2 0 0 3 J a n 2 6 , 2 0 0 4 M a r 2 7 , 2 0 0 4 M a y 2 6 , 2 0 0 4 J u l 2 5 , 2 0 0 4 S e p 2 3 , 2 0 0 4 N o v 2 2 , 2 0 0 4 Iraqi disarmament Kosovo bombing Kosovo withdrawal Iraq War authorization Iraq supplemental $87b Abu Ghraib (b) The Number of Words on the ‘Defense [Use of Force]’ Topic Per Day of symbolic speech. This corresponds to the beginning of the Iraq War. The number of words on the topic dealing with the use of military force is displayed in Figure 3b. The small intermittent upswings in 1998 track with discussions of Iraqi disarmament in the Senate. The bombing of Kosovo is represented as large spikes in spring 1999. Discussion within this topic increased again in May 2000 surround- ing a vote to withdraw U.S. troops from the Kosovo peacekeeping operation. Post 9/11, the Afghanistan invasion brings a small wave of military discussion, while the largest spike in the graph (in October 2002) occurred during the debate to authorize military ac- tion in Iraq. This was followed, as one would expect, by other rounds of discussion in fall 2003 concern- ing the emergency supplemental appropriations bill for Iraq and Afghanistan, and in the spring of 2004 sur- rounding events related to the increasing violence in Iraq, the Abu Ghraib scandal, and the John Negroponte confirmation. Hypothesis Validity and Application to the Study of Floor Participation Hypothesis validity—the usefulness of a measure for the evaluation of theoretical and substantive hypotheses of interest—is ultimately the most important sort of valid- ity. In this section we offer one example of the sort of 224 KEVIN M. QUINN ET AL. analysis to which attention measures can be applied di- rectly. We return to a discussion of further applications in the concluding discussion. One direct use of these data is to investigate floor par- ticipation itself to answer questions about Congressional institutions, the electoral connection, and policy repre- sentation. Prior empirical work has had severe data lim- itations, depending on low frequency events (e.g., floor amendments; Sinclair 1989; Smith 1989), very small sam- ples (e.g., six bills; Hall 1996), or moderately sized, but expensive, samples (e.g., 2,204 speeches manually coded to three categories; Hill and Hurley 2002). Our data in- crease this leverage dramatically and cheaply. Figure 4 summarizes the results from 50-count mod- els (negative binomial) of the speech counts on all non- procedural topics and selected metatopical aggregations, for the 106th Senate, for all 98 senators who served the full session. Selected hypotheses, discussed below, are repre- sented by shaded backgrounds.18 Congressional behavior is of core relevance to ques- tions about the existence and possible decline of “norms” of committee deference, specialization, and apprentice- ship (Hall 1996; Matthews 1960; Rohde, Ornstein, and Peabody 1985; Shepsle and Weingast 1987; Sinclair 1989; Smith 1989). As noted by Hall, this is a difficult empiri- cal question as the primary leverage has come from floor amendment behavior, a relatively rare occurrence (1996, 180–81). Figure 4 shows that committee membership, but not necessarily service as chair or ranking member, continues to have a substantial impact on the tendency to participate in debate across policy topics. The apprentice- ship norm, as indicated by a negative impact of freshman status, also seems to be present in more technical policy areas, but notably not in common electoral issues like abortion or the size of government. Examination of the data over time could further inform the question of de- cline (Rohde, Ornstein, and Peabody 1985; Sinclair 1989; Smith 1989) and, with the cross-topic variation provided here, the role of expertise costs (Hall 1996) versus norms (Matthews 1960) in both deference and apprenticeship. Since at least Mayhew, Congressional scholars have also been interested in how career considerations affect the electoral connection (Fenno 1978, 1996; Hill and Hur- ley 2002; Maltzman and Sigelman 1996; Mayhew 1974). The sixth and seventh rows of Figure 4 identify two ca- reer cycle effects in the electoral connection and sym- bolic/empathy speech. A senator approaching election is more likely to give speeches in the symbolic (“I am proud 18These are graphical tables (Gelman, Pasarica, and Dodhia 2002; Kastellec and Leoni 2007). Alternative specifications, for both stan- dardized and unstandardized coefficients, and for equivalent mod- els of word count, all show substantively similar results. to be one of you”) and social (“I care about you”) cate- gories than is one whose next election is further in the fu- ture. Conversely, senators who subsequently retired gave many fewer such speeches, adding further evidence to the literature on participatory shirking (Poole and Rosenthal 1997; Rothenberg and Sanders 2000). The last two rows of Figure 4 provide evidence of two (arbitrary) examples of policy representation, un- employment and agriculture. This reflects the notion of representation as congruence between constituency and representation, a subject of considerable scholarly atten- tion (Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Stewart 2001 is a promi- nent example, in a literature that traces at least to Miller and Stokes 1963). Previous studies of congruence have generally been limited, on the legislator side, to mea- sures of position based on elite surveys or roll calls. Jones and Baumgartner (2005) examine the year-by-year con- gruence of relative attention to topic (via hearings) with aggregate (not constituency-level) demand measured by Gallup “most important problem” data. The party and ideology results (rows four and five) also contain interesting insights for our broader interests in how speech can inform our understanding of the lan- scape of political competition. Democrats are more likely to speak on social issues and more likely to speak in gen- eral. Given that Democrats were in the minority in the 106th Senate, this does lend some support to the assertion that speech is better than more constrained legislative be- haviors at revealing thwarted minority party preferences and strategies. Extremity (absolute DW-NOMINATE score) is as- sociated with more speeches on constitutional, interna- tional, and economics topics, but not generally on social issues or geographically driven topics. This could be taken as evidence that the former set of topics is of greater in- terest to ideological extremists. Or—our view—it could be taken as evidence that these are the topics that define the current content of the primary dimension captured by roll-call-based ideal point estimation procedures. The lack of association between “extremism” and attention to other topics is suggestive that those other topics define higher dimensions of the political space. Discussion In this article we have presented a method for inferring the relative amount of legislative attention paid to various topics at a daily level of aggregation. Unlike other com- monly used methods, our method has minimal startup costs, allows the user to infer category labels (as well as the mapping from text features to categories), and can be ANALYZE POLITICAL ATTENTION 225 FIGURE 4 Speech Count Models, 106th Senate Committee Chair/Ranking Freshman Republican Extremity Election Retiring Agriculture Unemployed J u d ic ia l N o m in a ti o n s C o n s ti tu ti o n a l S p e e c h , C a m p a ig n F in a n c e A b o rt io n C O N S T IT U T IO N A L D e fe n s e In t' l A ff a ir s , D ip lo m a c y In t' l A ff a ir s , A rm s C o n tr o l IN T E R N A T IO N A L L a b o r, W o rk e rs B u d g e t L a b o r, E m p lo y m e n t T a x e s M A C R O E C O N O M IC M il it a ry , M a n p o w e r M il it a ry , In fr a s tr u c tu re In te ll ig e n c e R e fo rm F e d e ra l L a w P u b li c L a n d s C o m m e rc ia l In fr a s tr u c tu re C o m m e rc ia l L a w D IS T R IB U T IV E E n e rg y E n v ir o n m e n ta l R e g u la ti o n A g ri c u lt u re T ra d e R E G IO N A L V io le n t C ri m e C h il d P ro te c ti o n M e d ic in e S o c ia l W e lf a re E d u c a ti o n S O C IA L H e a lt h , S e n io rs H e a lt h c a re P ro v is io n H E A L T H E C O N S y m b o li c , H o n o r S y m b o li c , C o n s ti tu e n t F a ll e n H e ro e s S y m b o li c , R e m e m b ra n c e S y m b o li c , S p o rt s S Y M B O L IC T O T A L Notes: Each column represents a negative binomial model of speeches delivered on a given topic, or group of topics, in the 106th Senate, with one observation per senator who served the entire two years (98 in total). Each row of the table represents a covariate: “Committee” (binary indicating whether the senator is on a topic-relevant committee); “Chair/Ranking” (binary indicating the senator is the chair or ranking member of a topic-relevant committee); “Freshman” (binary); “Republican” (binary); “Extremity” (absolute value of Dimension 1 Poole-Rosenthal DW-NOMINATE scores); “Agriculture” (log of state agricultural income per capita, 1997); “Election” (dummy, up for election in next cycle); “Retiring” (dummy, retired before next election); “Unemployment” (state unemployment rate, 1999). Plotted are standardized betas and 95% confidence intervals, darker where this interval excludes zero. Shaded areas represent hypotheses discussed in the text. applied to very large corpora in reasonable time. While other methods have one or more of these features, no other general method possesses all of these desirable prop- erties. While our method has several advantages over other common approaches to content analysis, it is not with- out its own unique costs. In particular, the topic model discussed in this article requires more user input after the initial quantitative analysis is completed. Since no sub- stantive information is built directly into the model, the user must spend more time interpreting and validating the results ex post . This article presents several ways that such inter- pretation and validation can be performed. Specifically, we demonstrate how (a) keywords can be constructed and their substantive content assessed, (b) agglomerative clustering can be used to investigate the semantic rela- tionships across topics, (c) construct validity of our daily measures of topic attention can be evaluated by looking at their covariation with roll calls and hearings on the topic of interest, and (d) predictive validity of our measures can be assessed by examining their relationships with ex- ogenous events (such as 9/11 or the Iraq War) that are widely perceived to have shifted the focus of attention in particular ways. In each case, we find strong support for the validity of our measures. While our method is useful, it will not (and should not) replace other methods. Instead, our data and method supplement and extend prior understandings of the political agenda in ways that have been to date prohibitively expensive or near impossible. Our method is particularly attractive when used as an exploratory tool applied to very large corpora. Here it quickly allows new insights to emerge about topic attention measured at very fine temporal intervals (in our example days). In some applications this will be enough; in others more detailed (and expensive) confirmatory analysis will be in order. There are many potential applications beyond those we have given here for such measures of attention as 226 KEVIN M. QUINN ET AL. this. The dynamic richness of our data allows topic- specific examination of policy-agenda dynamics, and questions of incrementalism or punctuated equilib- rium (Baumgartner and Jones 1993). The dynamic richness also allows us to move beyond static notions of congruence into dynamic notions of responsiveness, illuminating the topics and conditions under which leg- islators lead or follow public opinion (Jacobs and Shapiro 2000; Stimson, MacKuen, and Erikson 1995). Moving another step, there are many possible in- direct applications of the topic model. Once speeches are separated by topic, we can examine the substantive content—the values and frames—that underlie partisan and ideological competition. We can, for example, track in detail the dynamics by which issues and frames are adopted by parties, absorbed into existing ideologies, or disrupt the nature of party competition (Carmines and Stimson 1989; Monroe, Colaresi, and Quinn 2008; Poole and Rosenthal 1997; Riker 1986). Further, once we know the content of party com- petition, we can evaluate the positioning of individual legislators. That is, as hinted above, the topic model is a valuable first step toward using speech to estimate ideal points from legislative speech. This allows dynamically rich, topic-by-topic ideal point estimation, and insights into the content and dimensionality of the underlying po- litical landscape (Lowe 2007; Monroe and Maeda 2004; Monroe et al. 2007). Perhaps most exciting, our method travels beyond English and beyond the Congressional setting, where con- ventional methods and measures can be prohibitively ex- pensive or difficult to apply. We hope this might provide an important new window into the nature of democratic politics. References Adler, E. Scott, and John Wilkerson. 2006. “Congressional Bills Project.” Technical report, University of Washington, Seattle. NSF 00880066 and 00880061. Ansolabehere, Stephen, Erik C. Snowberg, and James M. Snyder. 2003. “Statistical Bias in Newspaper Reporting: The Case of Campaign Finance.” MIT Department of Political Science Working Paper. Ansolabehere, Stephen, James M. Snyder, and Charles Stew- art. 2001. “Candidate Positioning in U.S. House Elections.” American Journal of Political Science 45(1): 136–59. Baumgartner, Frank R., Christoffer Green-Pedersen, and Bryan D. Jones. 2006. “Comparative Studies of Policy Agendas.” Journal of European Public Policy 13(7): 959–74. Baumgartner, Frank R., and Bryan D. Jones. 1993. Agendas and Instability in American Politics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Baumgartner, Frank R., and Bryan D. Jones, eds. 2002. Policy Dynamics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Blei, David M., and John D. Lafferty. 2006. “Dynamic Topic Models.” 23rd International Conference on Machine Learn- ing, Pittsburgh, PA. Blei, David M., Andrew Y. Ng, and Michael I. Jordan. 2003. “Latent Dirichlet Allocation.” Journal of Machine Learning Research 3: 993–1022. Budge, Ian, Hans-Dieter Klingemann, Andrea Volkens, Judith Bara, and Eric Tannenbaum. 2001. Mapping Policy Prefer- ences: Parties, Electors and Governments, 1945–1998. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Cargnoni, Claudia, Peter Müller, and Mike West. 1997. “Bayesian Forecasting of Multinomial Time Series Through Conditional Gaussian Dynamic Models.” Journal of the American Statistical Association 92(438): 640–47. Carmines, Edward G., and James A. Stimson. 1989. 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Quinn. 2008. “Measuring Explicit Political Positions of Media.” Harvard Department of Gov- ernment Working Paper. Holsti, Ole R., Richard A. Brody, and Robert C. North. 1964. “Measuring Affect and Action in International Reaction ANALYZE POLITICAL ATTENTION 227 Models: Empirical Materials from the 1962 Cuban Crisis.” Journal of Peace Research 1(3/4): 170–90. Jacobs, Lawrence R., and Robert Y. Shapiro. 2000. Politi- cians Don’t Pander: Political Manipulation and the Loss of Democratic Responsiveness. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Jones, Bryan D., and Frank R. Baumgartner. 2005. The Politics of Attention: How Government Prioritizes Problems. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Jones, Bryan D., John Wilkerson, and Frank R. Baum- gartner. n.d. “The Policy Agendas Project.” http://www .policyagendas.org. Kastellec, Jonathan P., and Eduardo L. Leoni. 2007. “Using Graphs Instead of Tables in Political Science.” Perspectives on Politics 5(4): 755–71. Katznelson, Ira, and John S. Lapinski. 2006. “The Substance of Representation: Studying Policy Content and Legislative Behavior.” In The Macropolitics of Congress, ed. E. Scott Adler and John S. Lapinski. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 96–126. King, Gary, and Will Lowe. 2003. “An Automated Informa- tion Extraction Tool for International Conflict with Per- formance as Good as Human Coders: A Rare Events Eval- uation Design.” International Organization 57(3): 617– 42. Kingdon, John W. 1995. Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Poli- cies. Boston: Little, Brown. Klingemann, Hans-Dieter, Andrea Volkens, Judith Bara, Ian Budge, and Michael McDonald. 2006. Mapping Policy Pref- erences II: Estimates for Parties, Electors, and Governments in Eastern Europe, European Union and OECD 1990-2003. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Krippendorff, Klaus. 2004. Content Analysis: An Introduction to Its Methodology. 2nd ed. New York: Sage. 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Lowi, Theodore J. 1964. “American Business, Public Pol- icy, Case-Studies, and Political Theory.” World Politics 16: 677–715. Maltzman, Forrest, and Lee Sigelman. 1996. “The Politics of Talk: Unconstrained Floor Time in the U.S. House of Rep- resentatives.” Journal of Politics 58(3): 819–30. Matthews, Donald. 1960. U.S. Senators and Their World. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. Mayhew, David R. 1974. Congress: The Electoral Connection. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Miller, Warren E., and Donald Stokes. 1963. “Constituency In- fluence in Congress.” American Political Science Review 57: 45–56. Monroe, Burt L., Michael P. Colaresi, and Kevin M. Quinn. 2008. “Fightin’ Words: Lexical Feature Selection and Eval- uation for Identifying the Content of Partisan Conflict.” Political Analysis 16(4): 372–403. Monroe, Burt L., and Ko Maeda. 2004. “Rhetorical Ideal Point Estimation: Mapping Legislative Speech.” Society for Polit- ical Methodology, Stanford University. 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work_o3tblmvfibearghoo4g67oo3sq	----	Imagined in Policy, Inscribed on Bodies: Defending an Ethic of Compassion in a Political Context Comment on “Why and How Is Compassion Necessary to Provide Good Quality Healthcare?” Imagined in Policy, Inscribed on Bodies: Defending an Ethic of Compassion in a Political Context Comment on “Why and How Is Compassion Necessary to Provide Good Quality Healthcare?” Dave Mercer* Abstract In response to the International Journal of Health Policy and Management (IJHPM) editorial, this commentary adds to the debate about ethical dimensions of compassionate care in UK service provision. It acknowledges the importance of the original paper, and attempts to explore some of the issues that are raised in the context of nursing practice, research and education. It is argued that each of these fields of the profession are enacted in an escalating culture of corporatism, be that National Health Service (NHS) or university campus, and global neoliberalism. Post-structuralist ideas, notably those of Foucault, are borrowed to interrogate healthcare as discursive practice and disciplinary knowledge; where an understanding of the ways in which power and language operate is prominent. Historical and contemporary evidence of institutional and ideological degradation of sections of humanity, a ‘history of the present,’ serve as reminders of the import, and fragility, of ethical codes. Keywords: Compassion, Ethics, Nursing, Health Politics, Neoliberalism, Austerity, Human Rights Copyright: © 2015 by Kerman University of Medical Sciences Citation: Mercer D. Imagined in policy, inscribed on bodies: Defending an ethic of compassion in a political context: Comment on “Why and how is compassion necessary to provide good quality healthcare?” Int J Health Policy Manag. 2015;4(10):681–683. doi:10.15171/ijhpm.2015.125 *Correspondence to: Dave Mercer Email: dmercer@liverpool.ac.uk Article History: Received: 30 May 2015 Accepted: 8 July 2015 ePublished: 10 July 2015 Commentary School of Health Sciences, University of Liverpool, Liverpool, UK http://ijhpm.com Int J Health Policy Manag 2015, 4(10), 681–683 doi 10.15171/ijhpm.2015.125 Introduction This short commentary is an invited response to Marianna Fotaki’s editorial ‘Why and how is compassion necessary to provide good quality healthcare?’ published in the International Journal of Health Policy and Management.1 It is a timely and valuable contribution to current debates about compassionate care in the context of specific failures in National Health Service (NHS) provision, and mediated reports of diminished public confidence in healthcare more generally. The title poses 2 key questions facing those individuals who, respectively, shape health policy, deliver caring services, or have responsibility for the preparation and training of future practitioners; and to each of these issues, ‘compassion’ and ‘ethical awareness’ are central constructs. Though, as it is noted, they are too often conflated and confused in both intellectual and ‘common sense’ accounts of the constituents of high-quality care; obfuscating individual attributes and organisational cultures. In this reply, key themes from the paper are explored in relation to nursing academe, focusing on education and research which, it has long been argued, represent the foundations of progressive practice. Discussion is framed by an acknowledgement of the Foucauldian concept of ‘discursive practice,’ as a way of understanding the historic and cultural rules that produce different forms of knowledge, and permit certain statements to be made.2 Translated into social research, this set of perspectives is represented by the contribution of discourse analysis as a form of inquiry that prioritises the ‘discursive construction of reality.’3 Here, attention is given to the performative, and collective, function of language in shaping the world around us, where what we ‘know,’ or accept as ‘truth,’ are inextricably linked to power and ideology.4-6 These interrelated themes are elaborated below in terms of healthcare politics, research, practice, and education (wrapped up tidily in university ‘corporate speak’ as ‘knowledge exchange’). Politics and Research In the United Kingdom, healthcare is a political issue. The NHS is the last vestige of traditional socialist ideals of welfare founded on the principle of ‘free to all, at the point of need’.7 As an institution, its values are so deeply embedded in the public psyche that no ‘serious’ political party could campaign on an election manifesto that did not offer to protect the spirit of universality. Or, so it is routinely argued. Yet, results of the May 2015 election across England, Scotland, and Wales tell a different story, where any sense of collectivism was demolished by a surge of nationalism. The Scottish Nationalist Party (SNP) may have purveyed an ‘anti-austerity’ message to the voters and Westminster but, generally, identity prevailed over common interest. The reelection of a Government, freed of any coalition control, which systematically dismantled public services,8 is a harbinger of the ideological landscape upon which future debate about healthcare ethics, and practice, will take place. Activists, academics, and health economists note the http://dx.doi.org/10.15171/ijhpm.2015.125 http://dx.doi.org/10.15171/ijhpm.2015.125 http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.15171/ijhpm.2015.125&domain=pdf&date_stamp=2015-07-10 Mercer International Journal of Health Policy and Management, 2015, 4(10), 681–683682 detrimental effect, on health inequalities, of unchecked neoliberalism,9,10 as a global movement that, in short, celebrates market forces as the basis of political liberty. A scholarly review of how global financial crisis impacts on physical and mental health11 is summarised, more succinctly, as ‘austerity kills.’12 In the UK context, healthcare reforms – as a euphemism for privatisation – are coupled to further attacks on civil liberties with government proposals to abolish the Human Rights Act in favour of a British Bill of Rights; another example of de-universalisation as discursive practice in neoliberal times, where the ethical foundations of freedom and dignity are progressively chipped away. Nurses, typically, work with vulnerable and marginalised groups, framed by a statutory duty of ‘care’ and ‘candour,’ to ‘treat people with kindness, respect and compassion’13; a laudable, and paramount, set of principles that stand proudly against the pro-genocidal discourse of tabloid reporting around immigration, asylum seekers, and refugees.14 The rise of the Nazi Party in pre-war Germany, though, is a dark reminder of how easily dominant nationalist ideologies can hijack intellectual and liberal aspirations, with import for how ethics are taught on nursing programmes today.15 Like all healthcare professionals, nursing research is guided by ethical principles enshrined in the Declaration of Helsinki (2000) that echo the Nuremberg Code (1947); a response to ‘human experimentation,’ and state sanctioned murder, in the death camps of the Third Reich. The history of the Holocaust illustrates the extent to which doctors and nurses were willing to actively collude in bureaucratised killing of adults and children, in their care, with mental illness or a learning disability16-18; actions defended as ‘medical therapy,’ with individual ethics abandoned for the greater good of the ‘fatherland.’ The chief lesson to be learned is not rooted in the character traits of fascist street thugs or tyrannical sadists. Rather, it centres on the appropriation of psychiatric knowledge expressed in the spurious science of eugenics, within an ideological discourse that legitimated ‘mercy killing,’ without mercy19; deviance inscribed on the body of the ‘other.’ Such a ‘history of the present’20 raises profound and troubling questions for contemporary practitioners in the context of an increasingly visible, pan European, right-wing political presence.21,22 Practice and Education Given the past failure of ethics, discussed above, the nursing profession needs to define itself as a ‘moral community,’ coalesced around the ethics of witness and virtue.15 Two major UK inquiry reports, into high-secure care, published in the 1990s23,24 produced finding that characterised the worst excesses of the old asylum system, and led to major structural and legislative changes. They described an insular and oppressive world, with an institutional culture described as racist, sexist, and densely macho. More recent research findings suggest that little has changed since that time, despite massive capital investment and culture-change programmes.25,26 This raises questions for how ethical protection, and compassionate care, can be safeguarded for those groups who are vulnerable, excluded and marked by the stigma of a spoiled identity. Unlike current examples of a collapsed ‘duty to care’,27 related to general service provision for the seriously ill and elderly, prisoners and mentally disordered offenders do not make for the same sympathetic media coverage. The idea of an ‘ethics of testimony’ as being important for nursing philosophy and science is also central to the work of Georges28 who sees self-reflection as one way of challenging Eurocentric reductionism, and reconceptualising the concept of ‘suffering.’ It is suggested that increased attention to structural inequalities like sexism and racism should replace dominant cultural narratives which equate problems with ‘pathology,’ and solutions in terms of ‘therapy.’ Similarly, Ben-Sefer29 argues that it is knowledge of ‘suffering’ rather than ‘history’ that needs incorporating into the design of nursing curricula as a way of combating intolerance and hate crime. The involvement of ‘prisoner nurses’ detained in concentration camps, it is posited, reframes ethical theorising about ‘choice,’ and situates personal decision-making in the context of politics and power relations.30 It is suggested that masculinist discourses of ‘disconnection’ constructed a bio-political space in which moral categories collapsed, and corporeal violence was inscribed on the flesh of the inmate. The disciplinary knowledge of psychiatry, and discursive practice of mental health nurses, is riven with ethical dilemmas from involuntary detention under mental health legislation to ‘treatment’ methods31; described as a ‘web of power’ where tablets and talk can be equally invasive.32 Critical scholars suggest that: “Psychiatry is not a mere medical science: it is an intensely political system of interrelated practices, discourses, and institutions.”33 In such settings, the enactment of concepts like ‘advocacy’ and ‘therapeutic engagement’ are permeated by what is referred to as the ‘capillary power’ of the carceral system, or micro-physics of disciplinary regimes.34 For mental health nurses in general, and forensic staff in particular, any ethical framework is compromised, or constrained, by a dual allegiance to the person (care) and the state (control). More generally, national and international evidence suggests that organisational cultures exert an impact on care and compassion in relation to, both, qualified members of staff and nurses in training.35,36 Typically, this is described as damaging and detrimental to the philosophy of the profession, and quality markers of health policy; a ‘hidden curriculum’ where ‘learning on the job’ in clinical settings incrementally erodes levels of empathy.37 Central to Fotaki’s paper,1 is a real concern about how compassion is cultivated, and embedded, in practice, and her discussion offers a valuable summary of philosophical and pragmatic issues in relation to a recent case study of care failures.27 Against this background, the author of the present paper, with a colleague, was commissioned by NHS North West to undertake a ‘values and behaviours’ evidence review.38 The findings, and themes, were congruent with the work of Fotaki. Concluding Remarks Professor Fotaki has furnished an excellent editorial relating to a very real concern in UK healthcare, which deserves a wide readership for all those concerned with ensuring that compassion and care remain at the heart of service provision.1 It artfully integrates ethical debate with real world strategies, but it is for the individual reader to interpret these in the context of their own role and responsibilities. This is what has been attempted in this response. None of the content Mercer International Journal of Health Policy and Management, 2015, 4(10), 681–683 683 has been challenged, or alternative views expressed. As an academic nurse, with a long career in high-secure care, it was an interesting opportunity to rethink these issues in the context of an organisational culture that personally shaped an ongoing intellectual critique of ethics and politics in forensic psychiatry. I would like to thank the editorial team at IJHPM for inviting me to write this paper, and hope that it complements the original. Ethical issues Not applicable. Competing interests Author declares that he has no competing interests. Author’s contribution DM is the single author of the manuscript. References 1. Fotaki M. Why and how is compassion necessary to provide good quality healthcare? Int J Health Policy Manag. 2015;4(4):199- 201. doi:10.15171/ijhpm.2015.66 2. O’Farrell C. Michel Foucault. London: Sage; 2005. 3. Cameron D. Working with Spoken Discourse. London: Sage; 2001. 4. Fairclough N. Language and Power. 2nd ed. London: Longman; 2001. 5. Wood LA, Kroger RO. doing Discourse Analysis: Methods for Studying Action in Talk and Text. London, Sage; 2000. 6. Potter J, Wetherell M. Discourse and Social Psychology: Beyond Attitudes and Behaviour. London: Sage; 1987. 7. Delamothe T. NHS at 60: Founding principles. BMJ. 2008;336(7655):1216-1218. doi:10.1136/bmj.39582.501192.94 8. 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work_o5jawfyxzrbzzgnu5jcbu2h4ve	----	Gay Rights in Congress © The Author 2016. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the American Association for Public Opinion Research. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com GAY RIGHTS IN CONGRESS PUBLIC OPINION AND (MIS)REPRESENTATION KATHERINE KRIMMEL* JEFFREY R. LAX JUSTIN H. PHILLIPS Abstract Public majorities have supported several gay rights policies for some time, yet Congress’s response has been limited. We document and analyze this tension through dyadic analysis of the opinion–vote relationship on 23 roll calls between 1993 and 2010, revealing a nuanced picture of responsiveness and incongruence. While constitu- ent preferences influence white male Democrats, black lawmakers and white female Democratic lawmakers generally support gay rights and Republicans consistently oppose them, regardless of constituent prefer- ences. Moreover, changes in constituent opinion typically fail to engen- der vote changes. In sum, despite a degree of responsiveness to opinion, we find there is a persistent bias against constituent will on LGB rights. Scholars have long argued that public opinion tends to shape government pol- icy (e.g., Page and Shapiro 1983; Stimson, MacKuen, and Erikson 1995). The potential for policy change in the realm of lesbian, gay, and bisexual (LGB) rights is therefore thought to depend on cultivating public support. Yet, support has not translated straightforwardly into policy gains on LGB rights issues. National and subnational public opinion data show that Americans favor a variety of legal protections for LGB individuals (Egan and Sherrill 2005; Brewer 2008), yet these protections have not always been adopted. It is there- fore difficult to gauge what kind of congressional action—if any—to expect in Katherine Krimmel is an assistant professor of political science at Boston University, Boston, MA, USA. Jeffrey R. Lax and Justin H. Phillips are associate professors of political science at Columbia University, New York, NY, USA. For helpful comments, the authors thank Robert Erikson, John Kastellec, Kelly Rader, participants at the Law and Institutions Conference at Emory University, and seminar participants at Columbia University, the University of Michigan, and Yale University. They also thank Andrea Gardner for outstanding research assistance, and the Human Rights Campaign for sharing their scorecards. *Address correspondence to Katherine Krimmel, Boston University, Department of Political Science, 232 Bay State Road, Boston, MA 02215, USA; e-mail: kkrimmel@bu.edu. Public Opinion Quarterly doi:10.1093/poq/nfw026 Public Opinion Quarterly Advance Access published June 29, 2016 at C olum bia U niversity L ibraries on A ugust 3, 2016 http://poq.oxfordjournals.org/ D ow nloaded from mailto:kkrimmel@bu.edu?subject= http://poq.oxfordjournals.org/ response to the continuing liberalization of opinion on LGB rights. We need to know not only whether, but to what extent, public opinion incentivizes support from different types of legislators in roll-call votes on LGB issues. We study the match and mismatch between opinion and policy on LGB rights, engaging in a deep descriptive case study tied to larger theoretical ques- tions about the role of public opinion in the political process. We develop new tools and approaches to examine how public preferences relate to congres- sional action on LGB rights. Specifically, we analyze roll-call votes on all five major gay rights issues addressed by Congress from the early 1990s to the present: same-sex marriage, adoption, hate crimes, employment nondiscrimi- nation, and military service. We develop an extension of multilevel regres- sion and poststratification (MRP) for this project, to estimate opinion on these issues over time by state and congressional district, and consider the extent to which constituent preferences connect to the votes of members of Congress (MCs). While we find some evidence of responsiveness to opinion, we also document significant breaks, gaps, and lags. Our findings point to a more nuanced understanding of the power and limits of majority will. Moreover, the MRP extension we present herein expands the range of surveys that can be used to estimate district opinion, facilitating future studies of responsiveness. Our case study is also important in its own right: battles over LGB rights have played a central role in America’s ongo- ing “culture wars,” and the policy outcomes of these battles affect the lives of millions of Americans. Our analysis also contributes to long-standing debates over the relative roles of top-down and bottom-up forces in producing civil rights gains, and the appropriate standard of review for LGB rights in federal courts. Theoretical and Empirical Foundations Scholars of Congress have long argued that MCs’ desire for reelection moti- vates them to consider their constituents’ preferences in formulating policy positions (Mayhew 1974; Arnold 1990). Many studies find a positive corre- lation between such preferences and roll-call votes.1 These correlations are stronger on salient matters (Burstein 1981; Page and Shapiro 1983) and moral- ity policy (Mooney and Lee 1995; Lax and Phillips 2012). This suggests we should expect strong opinion effects on LGB rights issues, akin to Miller and Stokes’s (1963) “instructed delegate” model of representation in which MCs know the preferences of the median constituent and act accordingly. Scholars have also shown that the median constituent does not always get her way (Bishin 2000, 2009; Hacker and Pierson 2005). As Fenno (1978) 1. See Miller and Stokes (1963) and, more recently, for example, Clinton (2006); Kousser, Lewis, and Masket (2007); Bafumi and Herron (2010); and Kastellec, Lax, and Phillips (2010). Krimmel, Lax, and PhillipsPage 2 of 26 at C olum bia U niversity L ibraries on A ugust 3, 2016 http://poq.oxfordjournals.org/ D ow nloaded from http://poq.oxfordjournals.org/ famously articulated, MCs have several constituencies to consider. Within an MC’s geographic constituency lie her reelection constituency (electoral supporters), primary constituency (most active and strong supporters), and personal constituency (closest allies and advisors). When their preferences conflict, she may need to prioritize. For Republican lawmakers, religious conservatives create pressure to vote against LGB rights. Correspondingly, LGB individuals and their allies have become a notable constituency of Democratic lawmakers (Fetner 2008). MCs are also likely to face pressure from party leaders. Starting in 1992, the national parties have staked out increasingly divergent positions on LGB rights. These positions play a significant role in party branding (Bishin and Smith 2013).2 Thus, we anticipate partisan differences in responsiveness. Interest group and party pressures should lead Republicans to be less sensitive than Democrats to liberalizing public preferences on gay rights.3 The MC’s own views and background can also matter. Elites who are members of historically oppressed groups might set aside public opinion unfavorable to LGB rights, drawing analogies between their own civil rights struggles and the fight for gay rights. The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) has supported gay rights since the debate over open military service reached the national stage in 1993, even over the objections of many of its members and sometimes black public opinion more broadly (cf., Edsall 1993; Conant 2010; Wallsten 2012), linking the battle for LGB rights to the struggle for African American civil rights (cf., Robinson 2012). Similarly, the National Organization for Women (NOW) has supported the cause since 1971, when it expanded its mission to include lesbian rights. Another reason the median constituent may not get her way is stickiness. Besides potential status quo biases, MCs might not wish to “flip-flop,” even if public opinion has changed. Lawmakers could also be unaware of opinion change, though this is less likely for salient policies. Most existing work on public opinion and LGB rights compares state-level opinion to state policy adoption (e.g., Haider-Markel 2001; Haider-Markel and Kaufman 2006; Lax and Phillips 2009b).4 We cannot assume Congress will match state-level patterns. On the one hand, congressional votes are more visible to the public, so federal lawmakers may be more sensitive to 2. For example, the 1992 Republican platform opposed including sexual preference in federal civil rights statutes, legal recognition of same-sex relationships, adoption of children by gay and lesbian couples, and open inclusion of gays and lesbians in the military; the Democratic platform called for civil rights protections for gays and lesbians and an end to discrimination in the Defense Department. 3. This parallels Brady and Schwartz’s (1995) finding that concern about primary election con- stituencies constrained Republicans’ responses to liberalizing opinion on abortion in the 1970s and 1980s. 4. Lax and Phillips (2009b) showed that clear supermajority support for some policies failed to spur changes in state law. Gay Rights in Congress Page 3 of 26 at C olum bia U niversity L ibraries on A ugust 3, 2016 http://poq.oxfordjournals.org/ D ow nloaded from http://poq.oxfordjournals.org/ public preferences. On the other hand, party pressures are perhaps greater in Congress. Moreover, state-level studies connect opinion to system-level out- comes, rather than individual lawmakers’ votes. The few existing studies of congressional action on gay rights tend to employ coarse measures of constituent preferences and legislative behavior. To capture the former, scholars create indices of pro-gay opinion by averaging constituent preferences across several issues; to capture the latter, they create indices aver- aging roll-call votes and/or cosponsorships (Lewis and Edelson 2000; Haider- Markel 2001; Oldmixon and Calfano 2007). This inhibits precise analysis, since surveys consistently document much greater support for some gay rights policies than others. Further, indices of opinion and policy lack a common metric, severely constraining the inferences one can draw. Researchers can show the degree and direction of the correlation between constituent ideology and roll-call voting, but, unlike our dyadic analysis, cannot tell whether MCs follow their median constituent, whether policy is over- or under-responsive to opinion, whether opinion or ideology is the key, how responsiveness varies across policies, or whether opinion change results in policy change. Notably, Bishin and Smith (2013) depart from the trend of using indices to measure opinion, using MRP to calculate district-level opinion on DOMA. They find that MCs consider opinion generally, and pay particular attention to important subconstituencies, consistent with findings by Bishin (2000, 2009). However, public opinion on this set of votes was exceptionally low (on aver- age, 29 percent of constituents supported same-sex marriage at this time), and a broader analysis is needed. Data and Methods ROLL-CALL VOTES We evaluate the opinion-vote relationship on 23 roll-call votes across the five issue areas considered by Congress between 1993 and 2010. We use survey questions on the issue being voted upon around the time of (almost always before) the vote (see table 5 in the supplementary data online for details). Adoption: There were two House votes on amendments to the Washington, DC appropriations bill to prohibit unrelated couples in Washington, DC from adopting a child (one passed in 1998; one failed in 1999). Same-sex marriage: There were three proposals. (1) The Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) defined marriage as a union between one man and one woman, so that the federal government could not recognize same-sex marriages and no state would be required to recognize those from out of state. It passed both chambers by wide margins. (2) The Federal Marriage Amendment (FMA) aimed to amend the Constitution to define marriage as a union between one man and one woman, but failed to receive the requisite supermajority in the House in 2004, and failed cloture votes in the Senate in 2006. (3) An Krimmel, Lax, and PhillipsPage 4 of 26 at C olum bia U niversity L ibraries on A ugust 3, 2016 http://poq.oxfordjournals.org/ D ow nloaded from http://poq.oxfordjournals.org/lookup/suppl/doi:10.1093/poq/nfw026/-/DC1 http://poq.oxfordjournals.org/ amendment to the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act, suspending the issuance of marriage licenses to same-sex couples in DC, was rejected by the Senate in 2010. Gays in the military: There were four failed votes in 1993 and three successful votes in 2010. Of the failures, two tried to codify a full ban on military service by gays and lesbians, and two aimed to allow the president to decide the issue.5 In 2010, the House voted twice and the Senate once to repeal DADT, the pol- icy prohibiting the military from asking recruits about their sexual orientation but allowing the military to discharge gay service members. Jobs: ENDA sought to prohibit employment discrimination on the basis of sex- ual orientation. It was defeated by one vote in the Senate in 1996, and passed the House in 2007. A 1998 effort to defund President Clinton’s executive orders prohibiting discrimination in the federal civilian workforce failed in the House. Hate crimes: There were votes in both chambers in 2000 and 2009 on a pro- posal to expand existing hate crimes protections to include sexual orientation. In 2000, the measure passed but died in conference committee. In 2009, the bill was signed into law. OPINION ESTIMATION: MR. P GOES TO WASHINGTON To estimate opinion for each roll-call vote in our analysis, we use multilevel regression and poststratification (MRP). This technique, first presented by Gelman and Little (1997), uses national surveys and advances in Bayesian sta- tistics and multilevel modeling to generate opinion estimates by demographic- geographic subgroups. MRP can produce accurate estimates of public opinion by state and congressional district using as few data as in a single national survey and fairly simple demographic-geographic models (Park, Gelman, and Bafumi 2006; Lax and Phillips 2009a, 2013; Warshaw and Rodden 2012). MRP proceeds in two stages. The first estimates a multilevel model of individual survey response as a function of a respondent’s demographic characteristics as well as her state and (where appropriate and available) her congressional district. Our models use gender, race, age, and education.6 We include state- and district-level variables that should be correlated with sup- port for gay rights.7 Finally, we control for slight differences across polls and thus variation in question wording. 5. We interpret a “yea” as a vote to allow gays to serve openly in the military, since this was President Clinton’s position. 6. Gender uses two categories: male and female. Race uses three categories: black, Latino, and white or other. Age uses four: 18–29, 30–44, 45–64, and 65+. Education uses five: less than high school, high school degree, some college, college degree, and postgraduate degree. 7. State effects are modeled as a function of region, percent African American, percent Mormon or Christian Evangelical, and percent voting Democratic in the prior presidential election. District effects are modeled similarly (except for district religion data, which are not available), and are grouped by state effect. Gay Rights in Congress Page 5 of 26 at C olum bia U niversity L ibraries on A ugust 3, 2016 http://poq.oxfordjournals.org/ D ow nloaded from http://poq.oxfordjournals.org/ We then use this model to “predict” opinion for each demographic-geo- graphic type of respondent (e.g., the probability that a college-educated black female in New York of age 30–44 supports same-sex marriage). Then, the opin- ion estimates for each type are weighted (poststratified) by their percentages in actual populations (in the state or district) to form the state or district estimate. Population frequencies come from Public Use Micro Data Samples supplied by the Census Bureau, with conversions to congressional district using the Missouri Census Data Center’s Geographic Correspondence Engine (geocorr2k).8 “CROSS-LEVEL MRP” One challenge in generating estimates by congressional district is that polling data for some issues do not include district identifiers, preventing the direct use of district-level predictors in the modeling stage even if we have them at the poststratification stage. Normally, if we used a variable such as presiden- tial vote measured at the district level, we would predict response for a given hypothetical respondent type using that hypothetical respondent type’s district* the estimated coefficient on district-level presidential vote. We always have the former term (by public record) but sometimes lack the latter term. In these cases, one simple way forward would be to use state-level values and correla- tions for things like presidential vote, with the recognition that the poststrati- fied estimates will then vary only because the demographic composition of each district varies. Fortunately, there is another way forward, which does not ignore district- level correlations, and outperforms the simpler solution described above. This modification to basic MRP runs the modeling stage at the only possible level of aggregation, the state level, but imputes the needed coefficient on (say) presidential vote to be the coefficient on district-level presidential vote as if we had originally done the analysis at the district level. Here, we use state-level (as opposed to district-level) values for presidential vote share in the first-stage response model. Then, in the prediction stage, we multiply the resulting coef- ficients on these state-level variables not with the state-level values but with the congressional district values for presidential vote share. We do the same with percent black. This assumes that the “effect” of aggregate presidential vote on individual response is the same whether measured at the state level or district level, or at least that an estimate from the former is a good estimate of the latter.9 To validate this, we take policies that do have congressional district identi- fiers in the survey data and estimate district opinion using (1) a standard MRP that makes use of the congressional district identifiers; (2) an MRP that uses 8. We use distinct poststratification files for the periods before and after the 2000 national redis- tricting, after the 2003 Texas redistricting, and after the court-required changes to the 2003 Texas redistricting. 9. Ardoin and Garand (2003) call this top-down estimation. Krimmel, Lax, and PhillipsPage 6 of 26 at C olum bia U niversity L ibraries on A ugust 3, 2016 http://poq.oxfordjournals.org/ D ow nloaded from http://poq.oxfordjournals.org/ state-level data for presidential vote and percent black in both the response model and in prediction; and (3) an MRP that uses state-level data for presi- dential vote and percent black in the response model, but district-level values for these variables in the prediction and poststratification phase (our mod- ification). Figure  1 plots estimates of district-level opinion for three issues using survey data that include congressional district (cd) identifiers (on the y-axis) against similar estimates that do not make use of these identifiers (on the x-axis). The top panel uses state-level presidential vote and share black in both the response model and the prediction phase; the bottom panel uses state-level values of these variables in the response model, but district-level values in the prediction phase. The 45-degree line is shown. Our modified MRP strongly improves the accuracy of estimates, compared to using only state-level information in both the response model and prediction, producing estimates of district-level opinion that are very similar to the estimates we get when district identifiers are available. Figure  1. Validating Cross-Level MRP. This figure plots estimates of district-level opinion for three issues using survey data that includes con- gressional district (cd) identifiers (on the y-axis) against similar estimates that do not make use of these identifiers (on the x-axis). The top panel uses state-level presidential vote and share black in both the response model and prediction phase; the bottom panel uses state-level values of these variables in the response model, but district-level values in the prediction phase. The 45-degree line is shown. Gay Rights in Congress Page 7 of 26 at C olum bia U niversity L ibraries on A ugust 3, 2016 http://poq.oxfordjournals.org/ D ow nloaded from http://poq.oxfordjournals.org/ DATA SUMMARY Table 1 displays summary statistics for our 23 roll-call votes and related opin- ion. Our estimates are coded in the pro-gay direction: higher values indicate higher support for gay rights. Results RESPONSIVENESS AND CONGRUENCE If MCs act as instructed delegates on gay rights issues, their roll-call votes should be both highly responsive to and congruent with constituent prefer- ences. That is, a strong positive correlation should exist between constituent opinion and the probability of a pro-gay vote. A congruent vote is one aligned with majority constituent opinion. RESPONSIVENESS Each graph in figure 2 takes one roll-call vote and plots the probability of an individual legislator casting a vote in favor of LGB rights against our estimates of opinion. Responsiveness to public opinion is strong if the logit curve is steep and positively sloped. For each of our 23 roll-call votes, the probability of an MC casting a pro-gay vote is indeed positively correlated to the level of public support for gay rights in the MC’s home district or state. Bivariate regressions show that the slopes of all of the logit curves are statistically sig- nificant at the 95 percent level, and that the slopes vary across policies. CONGRUENCE The opinion–vote relationship appears weaker when it comes to actual con- gruence, and is often biased in one direction or the other. Consider the maps of majority opinion and roll-call votes on DADT and ENDA in figure 3. There are far more conservative votes than there are conservative constituencies. We can see this in figure 2 as well. The dotted line extending from the x-axis indicates the 50 percent opinion level, and the line from the y-axis indicates a 50 percent pro-gay vote probability. The y-value at which the logit curve inter- sects the vertical dotted line is the predicted probability of a pro-gay roll-call vote when public support is 50 percent. The x-value at which the horizontal dotted line intersects the curve is the level of public support needed for the predicted probability of a pro-gay vote to reach 50 percent. In a system of perfect majoritarianism, the regression curves would be very steep at 50 per- cent opinion and pass through the crosshairs in the middle of each graph. This would yield perfect congruence. For some votes (cf., “FMA2006senate”), the curve comes close to this “majoritarian ideal,” but we do not always observe majoritarianism. Krimmel, Lax, and PhillipsPage 8 of 26 at C olum bia U niversity L ibraries on A ugust 3, 2016 http://poq.oxfordjournals.org/ D ow nloaded from http://poq.oxfordjournals.org/ T ab le  1 . O p in io n a n d C on gr u en ce b y R ol l- C al l V ot e V ot e M ea n pr o- ga y op . ( % ) M in . pr o- ga y op . ( % ) M ax . pr o- ga y op . ( % ) P ro -g ay op in io n m aj or it ie s (% ) P ro -g ay vo te (% ) C on gr ue nc e (% ) N et l ib er al v ot e bi as H ou se N et l ib er al v ot e bi as S en at e A D O P T IO N 19 98 ho us e 44 21 63 35 46 69 43 A D O P T IO N 20 00 ho us e 45 21 66 35 50 69 59 D A D T 19 93 ba n se n at e 4 6 2 6 6 6 4 0 63 61 18 D A D T 19 93 b ox er se n at e 4 6 2 6 6 6 4 0 36 77 -8 D A D T 19 93 hu nt er ho us e 48 21 76 45 66 63 79 D A D T 19 93 m ee ha nh ou se 48 21 76 45 40 71 -3 0 D A D T 20 10 ho us e 59 39 79 87 54 68 -1 27 D A D T 20 10 m ur ph yh ou se 59 39 79 87 59 65 -1 46 D A D T 2 01 0 se n at e 58 45 70 88 68 74 -2 1 D C M A R R IA G E 2 01 0 se n at e 4 6 23 6 4 4 4 61 74 12 D O M A 19 96 ho us e 29 12 47 0 17 83 68 D O M A 19 9 6 se n at e 2 8 13 4 4 0 14 86 13 F M A 20 04 ho us e 56 38 77 80 45 62 -1 51 F M A 2 0 0 4 se n at e 55 42 73 78 51 59 -2 8 F M A 20 06 ho us e 54 31 80 65 44 73 -9 5 F M A 2 0 0 6 se n at e 53 4 0 67 58 49 8 0 -9 H A T E 20 00 ho us e 69 47 90 98 54 56 -1 87 H A T E 2 0 0 0 se n at e 67 51 82 10 0 58 58 -4 1 H A T E 20 09 ho us e 71 49 92 10 0 59 59 -1 72 H A T E 2 0 0 9s en at e 69 51 83 10 0 69 69 -2 8 JO B S1 9 95 se n at e 56 29 76 72 4 8 6 4 -2 4 C o n ti n u ed Gay Rights in Congress Page 9 of 26 at C olum bia U niversity L ibraries on A ugust 3, 2016 http://poq.oxfordjournals.org/ D ow nloaded from http://poq.oxfordjournals.org/ V ot e M ea n pr o- ga y op . ( % ) M in . pr o- ga y op . ( % ) M ax . pr o- ga y op . ( % ) P ro -g ay op in io n m aj or it ie s (% ) P ro -g ay vo te (% ) C on gr ue nc e (% ) N et l ib er al v ot e bi as H ou se N et l ib er al v ot e bi as S en at e JO B S 19 98 ho us e 62 32 87 85 59 71 -1 13 JO B S 20 07 ho us e 73 47 92 99 56 56 -1 80 M ea n 54 33 74 64 51 68 -7 3 -1 2 N o te .— T he f ir st t hr ee c ol um ns s um m ar iz e op in io n by d is tr ic t or s ta te . T he f ou rt h is t he p er ce nt ag e of c on st it ue nc ie s w it h pr o- ga y op in io n m aj or it ie s. T he f if th an d si xt h co lu m ns s ho w p er ce nt ag es o f pr o- ga y ro ll -c al l vo te s an d co ng ru en t vo te s, r es pe ct iv el y. T he f in al c ol um ns a re t he n et n um be r of p ro -g ay v ot es , b y ch am be r, lo st d ue t o in co ng ru en ce . T he re i s a la rg e ra ng e in o pi ni on a cr os s st at es a nd d is tr ic ts . S en at e vo te s ar e in i ta li cs . T ab le  1 . C o n ti n u ed Krimmel, Lax, and PhillipsPage 10 of 26 at C olum bia U niversity L ibraries on A ugust 3, 2016 http://poq.oxfordjournals.org/ D ow nloaded from http://poq.oxfordjournals.org/ Figure 2. Basic Relationships. Each graph plots the probability of a pro- gay vote from a logistic regression curve (the dark line) given state or dis- trict opinion (lighter lines are lowess curves). Each x- and y-axis runs from 0 to 100 percent for opinion and the probability of a pro-gay vote, respec- tively. Opinion in states/districts whose MC cast a pro-gay (anti-gay) vote are plotted in a “rug” on the top (bottom) axis. Dotted lines show the 50 percent marks in opinion and vote probability. Panels are ordered by the position of the curve relative to the 50 percent crosshairs (top to bottom, left to right). Gay Rights in Congress Page 11 of 26 at C olum bia U niversity L ibraries on A ugust 3, 2016 http://poq.oxfordjournals.org/ D ow nloaded from http://poq.oxfordjournals.org/ Of course, some degree of incongruence is expected. An MC may not know or care about the difference between 48 and 52 percent support. Mismatches between opinion and voting near the majority threshold are not necessarily of academic interest either. When large supermajorities are needed to bring about a 50 percent chance of a pro-gay vote (i.e., if the logit curve is shifted far to the right of the crosshairs), however, there are significant biases in policymaking Figure  3. Maps of Opinion and Voting on “DADT2010house” and “JOBS2007house.” Krimmel, Lax, and PhillipsPage 12 of 26 at C olum bia U niversity L ibraries on A ugust 3, 2016 http://poq.oxfordjournals.org/ D ow nloaded from http://poq.oxfordjournals.org/ that cannot be explained by uncertainty or dismissed as trivial.10 For exam- ple, in the case of “JOBS2007house,” constituent opinion needs to be 71 per- cent before the MC has a 50 percent probability of casting a liberal vote. For “HATE2009house,” constituent opinion needs to be 68 percent. Consequently, congruence for both is relatively low—only 56 percent for “JOBS2007house” and 59 percent for “HATE2009house.” In contrast, congruence for the 2006 Senate vote on the Federal Marriage Amendment (with a responsiveness curve that passes through the crosshairs) is a whopping 80 percent. Overall, we find that 68 percent of the 6,435 terminal roll-call votes in our analysis are congruent.11 By roll-call vote, congruence ranges from 56 to 86 percent. By issue area, congruence is highest on same-sex marriage (74 per- cent) and lowest on hate crimes (61 percent).12 SYSTEMATIC MISREPRESENTATION While incongruence of different types could theoretically cancel out, it does not. Only 552 of 2,089 (26 percent) incongruent votes are in the liberal direction. Votes against constituent preferences tend to be conservative votes here. The final col- umns of table 1 show the net liberal vote bias—the number of liberal incongruent votes minus the number of conservative ones. In the House, the greatest benefit the pro-gay side ever received from incongruence amounted to 79 votes, while they lost more than 150 votes four times. These mismatches between opinion and voting are often consequential. Under constituent opinion majorities, four roll-call votes would have flipped in the pro-gay direction (“FMA2004house,” “FMA2006house,” “FMA2006senate,” and “JOBS1995senate”), and three would have flipped the other way (“DADT1993senate,” “DADT1993hunterhouse,” and “DCMARRIAGE2010senate”). DIFFERENCES BY PARTY, RACE, AND GENDER Now consider “raw” voting records by MC, shown in figure  4. Each graph plots mean pro-gay opinion against the career percentage of pro-gay votes cast by each MC. The top-left panel captures the positive overall relationship 10. On non–civil rights issues, the same concerns would arise about liberal bias (i.e., instances in which the logit curve is shifted far to the left of the crosshairs). As Madison articulates in “Federalist #10,” however, there are legitimate reasons for MCs to ignore majority opinion that would oppress minority rights. 11. If we consider roll-call votes only where the size of the opinion majority is greater than 60 or 70 percent, then congruence rises to 78 and 86 percent, respectively. 12. To put this in perspective, Lax and Phillips (2009b) find a similar 62 percent level of congru- ence between opinion and policies (not votes) at the state level, which is significantly higher than the 48 percent congruence level that Lax and Phillips (2012) find over a much larger set of policy types. Matsusaka (2010) finds a 57 percent congruence level for a subset of those policies. Finally, Monroe (1998) finds a 55 percent match between national policies and national opinion majorities over a wide set of issues. Gay Rights in Congress Page 13 of 26 at C olum bia U niversity L ibraries on A ugust 3, 2016 http://poq.oxfordjournals.org/ D ow nloaded from http://poq.oxfordjournals.org/ between opinion and roll-call voting. However, this aggregate panel masks significant variation by party and race, shown by the other three panels. Democratic non-black (i.e., white, Hispanic, or other race) MCs drive the aggregate relationship between voting and opinion; neither Democratic black MCs nor Republican MCs show much of a relationship between opinion and voting. Black MCs are concentrated at the top of the graph, and, comparing the flat lowess curve in the top-right graph to the steep curve in the lower left, there is a much weaker relationship between opinion and voting for black Democrats than for non-black Democrats. Democratic female MCs vote Figure 4. Pro-Gay Voting Record Given Opinion, By Party and Race. The unit is the member of Congress, plotted by mean pro-gay votes and mean pro-gay opinion. The size of the points shows the number of votes represented (from 1 to 14). Republicans are shown with squares, white Democrats with circles, and black Democrats with triangles. Lowess curves are displayed. Krimmel, Lax, and PhillipsPage 14 of 26 at C olum bia U niversity L ibraries on A ugust 3, 2016 http://poq.oxfordjournals.org/ D ow nloaded from http://poq.oxfordjournals.org/ similarly to black MCs (see figure  8 in the supplementary data online).13 In sum, black MCs and Democratic female MCs tend to support LGB rights, even when their constituents do not. Republican MCs are far less responsive to the liberalization of opinion on LGB rights than Democrats. Two-thirds of Republicans in our sample have never cast a pro-gay roll-call vote, regardless of opinion.14 These results suggest that public opinion “matters” for roll-call voting only in a broad sense; the success of proposals to extend LGB rights will depend in large part on the composition of Congress. VOTE-SWITCHING We go further by focusing on MCs who cast multiple votes on the same issues over time, to see if opinion change matters (we might not expect votes to change if opinion has not). Since support for gay rights has been steadily increasing over time, we are most interested in studying the extent to which MCs shifted from opposition to support for gay rights. So, we analyze the 687 (of 1,453) pairs in which the first vote was against gay rights. Figure 5 plots pro-gay constituent opinion at the time of the first vote against pro-gay opinion at the time of the second vote. Each point represents a legisla- tor who voted twice on a particular issue. The key area is the top-left quadrant. Here, we have MCs whose constituents did not support gay rights at the time of the first vote, but did at the time of the second. In a world of perfect majori- tarianism, all of the dots in this quadrant would be black (i.e., every legislator should switch his vote). In reality, only 21 percent in this quadrant switched their votes (14 of 23 Democrats switched, while only 2 of 55 Republicans did). White male Republicans who started out with an anti-gay vote in an anti-gay district, whose district shifted to being pro-gay, had only a 4 percent chance of switching to the pro-gay position in the second vote. Similarly situated white male Democrats had a 65 percent chance of switching. Vote switching is related to opinion, in that switchers saw an 8 percent increase in pro-gay opinion between votes on average, while non-switchers saw a 1 percent increase. However, switching is uncommon overall, occur- ring in only 6.3 percent of vote pairs (91 switches), and is particularly rare among Republicans. Almost 40 percent of the Democrats whose constituents switched from anti-gay to pro-gay failed to follow as well. Uncertainty cannot explain all of this resistance—while some of the points in the graph’s top-left quadrant are clustered around the 50 percent mark, many are not (the same is true for the top-right quadrant). Thus, some degree of turnover in both parties may be necessary for LGB rights measures to succeed in Congress. 13. Female Republican MCs are between Democratic and Republican male MCs. See figure 8 in the supplementary data online. 14. Figures 9 and 10 in the supplementary data online show a comparison to MC Nominate scores for context. Gay Rights in Congress Page 15 of 26 at C olum bia U niversity L ibraries on A ugust 3, 2016 http://poq.oxfordjournals.org/ D ow nloaded from http://poq.oxfordjournals.org/lookup/suppl/doi:10.1093/poq/nfw026/-/DC1 http://poq.oxfordjournals.org/lookup/suppl/doi:10.1093/poq/nfw026/-/DC1 http://poq.oxfordjournals.org/lookup/suppl/doi:10.1093/poq/nfw026/-/DC1 http://poq.oxfordjournals.org/ MODELS OF ROLL-CALL VOTES The dependent variable is whether the roll-call vote cast was pro-gay (lib- eral).15 We include indicator variables for Republican, Female, Latino, Black, and Senate. We also include both dimensions of the Poole and Rosenthal meas- ures of MC ideology, DW Nominate 1 and DW Nominate 2. Table 2 displays results from eight model variants, to check robustness across specifications (with further notes in the supplementary data online, pp. iv–v) and to facilitate 15. We performed a similar analysis of congruence. Because the results were substantively identi- cal, we put this in the supplementary data online (see table 4) rather than in the paper. Our discus- sion of congruence in the “Time Trends” section of the paper refers to “bottom line” congruence; that is, we simply look at whether or not MCs voted with the majority in their state or district. The models in the supplementary data online facilitate more complex all-else-equal comparisons. For congruence, however, we believe the bottom line is sometimes more important. Figure 5. Vote Switching. We plot voting behavior for the 687 pairs of votes by the same legislator on the same issue where the initial vote was anti-gay. Each circle is a Republican, each square a white Democrat, and each triangle a black Democrat, filled in when the second vote was pro-gay, and hollow when the second vote was anti-gay. The x-axis shows opinion at time 1 and the y-axis at time 2, with the 45-degree line showing where opinion has not changed. We break the votes into quadrants to show whether opinion at each time was above or below the 50 percent mark. The fraction switching within each quadrant is shown. Krimmel, Lax, and PhillipsPage 16 of 26 at C olum bia U niversity L ibraries on A ugust 3, 2016 http://poq.oxfordjournals.org/ D ow nloaded from http://poq.oxfordjournals.org/lookup/suppl/doi:10.1093/poq/nfw026/-/DC1 http://poq.oxfordjournals.org/lookup/suppl/doi:10.1093/poq/nfw026/-/DC1 http://poq.oxfordjournals.org/lookup/suppl/doi:10.1093/poq/nfw026/-/DC1 http://poq.oxfordjournals.org/ Table 2. Responsiveness Models Responsiveness regressions (Did the legislator cast a pro-gay vote?) Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 b (SE) b (SE) b (SE) b (SE) Opinion 6.2* (0.6) 5.7* (0.5) 4.5* (0.5) 6.0* (0.5) (Slope st. dev) (2.5) (1.9) (1.9) (1.8) Republican –3.7* (0.1) –3.6* (0.1) Female 1.2* (0.1) Fem. * Rep. Latino 0.5 (0.3) Black 0.9* (0.2) Senate 0.3 (0.5) DW Nom1 –5.0* (0.1) Intercept 0 (0.3) 2 (0.3) 0.2 (0.2) 1.7 (0.4) N 6,435 6,435 6,427 6,435 AIC 6,198 3,923 3,454 3,834 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 b (SE) b (SE) b (SE) b (SE) Opinion 4.5* (0.5) 4.3* (0.5) 6.0* (0.5) 3.0* (0.5) (Slope st. dev.) (1.8) (1.8) (1.9) (1.9) Republican .7* (0.2) –3.7* (0.1) –1.1* (0.3) Female 1.1* (0.2) 1.4* (0.3) 1.3* (0.3) 1.4* (0.4) Fem. * Rep. –0.6 (0.3) –0.3 (0.4) –0.7 (0.4) Latino 0.2 (0.3) 0.2 (0.3) 0.5 (0.3) 0.4 (0.3) Black –0.1 (0.2) –0.2 (0.2) 0.5* (0.2) –1.0* (0.3) Senate –0.1 (0.4) –0.1 (0.4) 0.3 (0.5) –0.7* (0.3) Black * Op. –2.0* (0.5) –2.2* (0.5) Latino * Op. 0.2 (0.7) –0.4 (0.7) Republican * Op. –0.8* (0.3) –0.6* (0.3) Female * Op. 0.4 (0.6) 0.8 (0.7) Fem. * Rep. * Op. –0.1 (0.9) –0.5 (1.0) DW Nom1 –5.0** (0.1) –5.7** (0.3) –5.5* (0.3) DW Nom2 –2.2* (0.1) Intercept 0.1 (0.3) –0.2 (0.2) 1.8 (0.4) 1.0 (0.2) N 6,427 6,427 6,435 6,427 AIC 3,405 3,398 3,823 3,062 Note.—Standard errors are shown next to the coefficients. Continuous variables are standard- ized (subtracting the mean and dividing by 2 standard deviations, putting them on the same scale as each other and roughly the same scale as the dichotomous variables). Two-tailed tests are used: *p < .05, **p < .01. Gay Rights in Congress Page 17 of 26 at C olum bia U niversity L ibraries on A ugust 3, 2016 http://poq.oxfordjournals.org/ D ow nloaded from http://poq.oxfordjournals.org/ various “all else equal” comparisons (so raw coefficients must be interpreted with caution). We allow varying intercepts and slopes for opinion. The basic relationship between voting and opinion holds: MCs whose con- stituents demonstrate higher levels of pro-gay support are more likely to cast pro-gay votes, even controlling for party and ideology, which are themselves strongly related to constituent preferences. The effects of opinion remain when we control for Democratic presidential vote share in the state or district, and other similar predictors. At an average value of opinion (in model 1), an additional point of support increases the chance of policy adoption by approxi- mately five percentage points. Party also predicts voting (e.g., models 2, 4, and 7; in models 6 and 8, the Republican coefficient is the effect of party after controlling for Nominate score, a strange all-else-equal comparison). Model 4 shows that blacks and Latinos tend to vote pro-gay relative to whites, controlling for opinion (and not controlling for Nominate). Models 5 and 6 show almost no difference between blacks and whites once we control for Nominate, but this is true only on average, as explained later.16 Regressions confirm that black MCs are more likely to cast pro-gay votes than white MCs (see the positive, significant coefficient on Black in model 4). These models allow for the effect of opinion to vary by MC type. Additional pro-gay support matters less for black MCs than white MCs, as indicated by the negative and significant coefficient on the interaction with opinion in mod- els 7 and 8. For each additional point of policy-specific opinion (in model 7), the probability of a white male Democrat casting a pro-gay vote rises by 5. For white Republicans, the probability only rises by 4, and for black Democrats, it only rises by 3. Table 3 shows the level of pro-gay opinion needed for differ- ent types of MCs to have a 50 percent probability of casting a pro-gay roll-call vote, based on model 7. It is highest for white male Republicans (66 percent support) and lowest for black female Democrats (31 percent support). Overall, we find strong evidence for our hypothesis that support for gay rights should be especially high among MCs belonging to groups that have historically faced discrimination. Though our findings about Latinos depend on model specification, we consistently find that African American and female MCs are especially likely to cast pro-gay votes.17 Turning to differential 16. We generally find no significant differences between the House and Senate (see the supple- mentary data online, pp. iv, vii–viii). 17. Interacting party and gender, we find that the effect of gender varies by party. This is also clear in figure 8 in the supplementary data online. We do not interact race and party, because there is almost no variation in party identification among African American MCs, and little among Latinos. There does not appear to be a particularly strong interaction between party and race for Latinos. Latino Democrats voted pro-gay 90 percent of the time; Latino Republicans voted pro-gay 33 percent of the time. White Democrats voted pro-gay 82 percent of the time; white Republicans voted in the pro-gay direction 11 percent of the time. Latino Democrats are congru- ent 87 percent of the time; Latino Republicans are congruent 57 percent of the time. In com- parison, white Democrats are congruent 82 percent of the time, while white Republicans are congruent 47 percent of the time. Krimmel, Lax, and PhillipsPage 18 of 26 at C olum bia U niversity L ibraries on A ugust 3, 2016 http://poq.oxfordjournals.org/ D ow nloaded from http://poq.oxfordjournals.org/lookup/suppl/doi:10.1093/poq/nfw026/-/DC1 http://poq.oxfordjournals.org/lookup/suppl/doi:10.1093/poq/nfw026/-/DC1 http://poq.oxfordjournals.org/lookup/suppl/doi:10.1093/poq/nfw026/-/DC1 http://poq.oxfordjournals.org/ responsiveness, however, race seems more influential than gender. While women are not any more or less responsive to growing support for gay rights than men, changes in opinion have less influence on African American MCs than their white colleagues. This is primarily because black MCs strongly sup- port gay rights, even if their constituents do not. To further examine the LGB rights–civil rights connection, we coded floor speeches on four of our votes to see what kind of arguments MCs made in favor of LGB rights (see pp. v–vi of the supplementary data online). We found that, for each vote, civil rights arguments played a greater role in speeches by black Democrats, compared to white Democrats or Republicans. Older cohorts of black MCs (i.e., those socialized in the civil rights era) are more likely to cast pro-gay votes, relative to younger cohorts of black MCs, conditioned on opinion. We find no similar relationship for white or Latino MCs. We also find that the sec- ond dimension of Nominate, which tended to represent racial justice issues for much of the twentieth century, also influences voting on gay rights issues (see model 8). This is notable, as Poole and Rosenthal (2007) show that most conflict occurs on the first ideological dimension today. Overall, MCs’ preferences with regard to civil rights appear to influence their willingness to support LGB rights, and this connection is particularly strong for African American MCs. TIME TRENDS The snapshot provided thus far obscures important differences over time, illu- minated in figure  6. Reading these panels in order tells the following story: [1] Mean pro-gay opinion increased over time, from around 45 to around 60 percent. [2] The number of pro-gay opinion majorities increased more sharply, from around 35 to 85 percent. [3] However, the percentage of pro-gay roll-call votes cast increased far less dramatically, from 50 to 60 percent. [4] Surprisingly—for now—overall congruence stayed nearly constant (around 70 percent). [5] and [6] But, the nature of incongruence changed drastically. Incongruence, once leaning to the liberal side, now strongly cuts against pro- gay policy, measured either as a percentage of total incongruence (where the Table 3. “Coin Flip” Points “Coin flip” point Black female Democrats 31 (18, 39) Black male Democrats 39 (29, 45) White female Democrats 40 (35, 45) White male Democrats 46 (42, 50) White female Republicans 60 (55, 64) White male Republicans 66 (62, 70) Note.—We used model 7 to calculate the level of pro-gay opinion needed for a 50 percent probability of casting a pro-gay roll-call vote for six types of MCs, ordered from most pro-gay to least (for the average roll call). Confidence intervals are displayed in parentheses. Gay Rights in Congress Page 19 of 26 at C olum bia U niversity L ibraries on A ugust 3, 2016 http://poq.oxfordjournals.org/ D ow nloaded from http://poq.oxfordjournals.org/lookup/suppl/doi:10.1093/poq/nfw026/-/DC1 http://poq.oxfordjournals.org/ Figure 6. Opinion, Votes, Congruence, and Bias over Time. Averages for each stated quantity are shown over districts or states, as appropriate, over time. The dashed line and dotted lines are lowess curves for all policies and policy area subsets, respectively. Krimmel, Lax, and PhillipsPage 20 of 26 at C olum bia U niversity L ibraries on A ugust 3, 2016 http://poq.oxfordjournals.org/ D ow nloaded from http://poq.oxfordjournals.org/ degree of incongruence is incorporated) or by the net vote bias (under +15 to –25 percent). The predicted conservative vote bias from incongruence now averages 109 votes in the House (i.e., 109 votes are “lost” because MCs are not following constituent opinion) and 25 in the Senate. Breaking this down by party, figure 7 reveals more nuance. Five of the panels parallel panels in the previous figure, and are labeled [P] to indicate as much. They show: [1P] Support for gay rights has grown in both Democratic and Republican constituencies over time. While the parties started roughly in the same place, in terms of opinion in their districts/states, Democrat-represented constituen- cies (DRCs) have grown more liberal at a slightly higher rate than Republican- represented constituencies (RRCs), leading to a small party gap today (roughly five percentage points). [2P] There is a larger and more constant gap in terms of opinion majorities. DRCs went from a rough split between pro-gay and anti- gay majorities to nearly 100 percent pro-gay majorities. Most RRCs have been majority pro-gay since the late 1990s as well (75 percent as of 2011). [3P] Within Congress, we observe a very different pattern. Democrats have steadily voted more pro-gay over time, starting from a relatively high base rate. But, Republicans have remained relatively constant around a much lower rate (less than 15 percent), despite changes in their constituencies. Consequently, while the gap between Democratic and Republican districts has grown only slightly, in Congress it has grown dramatically. (This is consistent with work by Hacker and Pierson [2005], who say increasingly conservative policymaking does not reflect public will.) The final panel focuses more directly on party polarization.18 [4P] Since RRC pro- gay majorities have become far more common, Republican congruence rates have plummeted from 75 to 35 percent. Democratic congruence has increased. [6P] This is partly because DRCs have moved in line with the initial pro-gay voting rates observed, and partly because Democrats have moved to match their increas- ingly pro-gay DRCs by voting along those lines. The initial liberal vote bias by Democrats disappeared by the early 2000s, and they have stayed in line on average since (that is, the remaining incongruence cancels out). Republicans, who started out with balanced incongruence, now show clear conservative bias relative to their RRCs. Congruence remained constant overall because the increase in Democratic congruence balanced the decrease in Republican congruence. The Limits of Responsiveness In his dissenting opinion in Lawrence v. Texas, Justice Antonin Scalia accused his fellow Supreme Court justices of being complicit in a subversion of the 18. The Rice likeness score is the absolute difference between the percentage of yeas cast by each party, subtracted from 100, measuring similarity of pro-gay voting rates between parties. The Rice cohesion score is voting agreement within each party (absolute difference between the yea and nay votes cast within a party) (Rice 1925, 1928). Cohesion has risen and likeness plummeted, a clear display of polarization. Gay Rights in Congress Page 21 of 26 at C olum bia U niversity L ibraries on A ugust 3, 2016 http://poq.oxfordjournals.org/ D ow nloaded from http://poq.oxfordjournals.org/ Figure  7. Parties over Time. Panels other than the last are numbered in parallel with figure 6, but broken down by party. Democrats are shown with solid triangles and a dashed lowess curve; Republicans are shown with open circles and a dotted lowess curve. The bottom-right panel contains Rice like- ness scores (shown with gray open squares and gray solid line) and Rice cohesion scores. Krimmel, Lax, and PhillipsPage 22 of 26 at C olum bia U niversity L ibraries on A ugust 3, 2016 http://poq.oxfordjournals.org/ D ow nloaded from http://poq.oxfordjournals.org/ democratic process, rushing ahead of public opinion: “So imbued is the Court with the law profession’s anti-anti-homosexual culture, that it is seemingly unaware that the attitudes of that culture are not obviously ‘mainstream.’” He invokes the lack of congressional action on LGB rights as clear evidence that the “homosexual agenda” is counter-majoritarian. We actually find the opposite pathology: there is a persistent conservative bias against constituent will on LGB rights. Our analysis might even under- estimate this bias, because it does not account for agenda control. Pro-gay legislation, even when supported by large opinion majorities, is almost never brought to a vote in the House when Republicans control the chamber. Our results suggest that LGB individuals cannot rely on the political pro- cess to further their rights. Support in roll-call votes requires a large (and likely unachievable) supermajority of public support for many MCs; and those MCs who are relatively impervious to gains in public support for LGB rights often constitute a pivotal voting bloc in Congress. LGB individuals may need to turn to courts to protect their rights, and courts would have the grounds to step in to do so—not being able to resolve the problem using normal political processes is one of the reasons that courts raise the standard of review they apply in cases of potential discrimination. LGB individuals seemingly qualify for “suspect class” status; that is, they are a group in need of particular pro- tection on the basis of political vulnerability (a concept introduced by Justice Stone in United States v. Carolene Products).19 Disaggregating MCs by party, gender, and race illuminates important nuances in the opinion–vote relationship that system-level studies, like those conducted at the state level, cannot capture. Increased polarization at the elite level has inhibited responsiveness to the liberalization of opinion on LGB rights. While black MCs and white female Democratic MC generally cast pro- gay votes regardless of their constituents’ preferences, they cannot compete with Republican MCs in terms of numbers, and the latter have maintained their anti-gay stance, even against strong pro-gay majorities. Altogether, these patterns have led to a large partisan gap in responsiveness, and a growing con- servative bias in policymaking. Our findings resist an easy categorization into top-down or bottom-up explana- tions for policy change. There seems to be a top-down process pulling black and female MCs toward gay rights, and bottom-up pressure from the public pushing 19. When the courts deal with discrimination claims, they can apply different standards of review, from the lowest hurdle, rational basis; to intermediate scrutiny; to strict scrutiny, the highest hur- dle. The rational basis test requires only some rational basis for the differential treatment, with a presumption of constitutionality. Strict scrutiny begins with a strong presumption of unconstitu- tionality, which the government can overcome only if it has a compelling interest in the law, which must also be narrowly tailored to that interest. There are two reasons to apply strict scrutiny: a violation of a fundamental right or if the population affected constitutes a “suspect class.” At present, “suspect classes” include race, religion, and national origin. We do not speak here to the “fundamental right” basis for strict scrutiny, but our results speak to the second basis. Gay Rights in Congress Page 23 of 26 at C olum bia U niversity L ibraries on A ugust 3, 2016 http://poq.oxfordjournals.org/ D ow nloaded from http://poq.oxfordjournals.org/ many white Democratic MCs. However, our analysis of vote change shows that Republican MCs are not the only ones who hold their ground against gay rights even when a majority of their constituents grow supportive—many Democratic MCs fail to switch their votes as well. On the whole, opinion change has limita- tions as a tool for achieving civil rights gains. Much depends on the partisan composition of Congress, and even member replacement among Democrats. Scholars have long argued that it is important for women and minorities to hold office because they should be most willing and able to represent people sharing their demographic characteristics (e.g., Pitkin 1967; Sapiro 1981; Phillips 1995; Mansbridge 1999), and have evaluated the extent to which such descriptive repre- sentation occurs (e.g., Swers 1998, 2002; Harris 2012). We cannot speak directly to this, as openly LGB members of Congress are still too few to study systemati- cally. We can look more broadly at the extent to which MCs who are members of historically underrepresented populations represent members of other histori- cally underrepresented populations. Our findings suggest that descriptive repre- sentation can operate in this broader sense; however, this can come at the expense of classic descriptive representation. Like the NAACP, African American MCs (many representing majority-minority states and districts) have sometimes sup- ported LGB rights over the objections of African American constituents.20 The potential for conflict between narrower and broader views of descriptive repre- sentation in Congress is intriguing and deserves further study. We would also like to see more work on dyadic representation and on stop- pages in the democratic process, to put our extended case study into context. Methodologically, we have extended the reach of the MRP opinion-estimation technique, facilitating this substantive research agenda. Supplementary Data Supplementary data are freely available online at http://poq.oxfordjournals. org/. References Ardoin, Phillip J., and James C. Garand. 2003. “Measuring Constituency Ideology in US House Districts: A Top-Down Simulation Approach.” Journal of Politics 65:1165–1189. Arnold, R. Douglas. 1990. The Logic of Congressional Action. 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work_obmt2j5dhfeejf5tb5lkywbqsq	----	Layout 1 http://soc.sagepub.com/ Sociology http://soc.sagepub.com/content/44/5/980 The online version of this article can be found at: DOI: 10.1177/0038038510375737 2010 44: 980Sociology Doug Meyer Differences among LGBT Hate Crime Victims Evaluating the Severity of Hate-motivated Violence: Intersectional Published by: http://www.sagepublications.com On behalf of: British Sociological Association can be found at:SociologyAdditional services and information for http://soc.sagepub.com/cgi/alertsEmail Alerts: http://soc.sagepub.com/subscriptionsSubscriptions: http://www.sagepub.com/journalsReprints.navReprints: http://www.sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.navPermissions: http://soc.sagepub.com/content/44/5/980.refs.htmlCitations: at Mina Rees Library/CUNY Graduate Center on October 20, 2010soc.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://soc.sagepub.com/ http://soc.sagepub.com/content/44/5/980 http://www.sagepublications.com http://www.britsoc.co.uk http://soc.sagepub.com/cgi/alerts http://soc.sagepub.com/subscriptions http://www.sagepub.com/journalsReprints.nav http://www.sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav http://soc.sagepub.com/content/44/5/980.refs.html http://soc.sagepub.com/ 980 Evaluating the Severity of Hate-motivated Violence: Intersectional Differences among LGBT Hate CrimeVictims �� Doug Meyer City University of New York, USA ABSTRACT This article employs an intersectional approach to examine the ways in which lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) people evaluate the severity of hate- motivated violence. Previous studies of LGBT hate crime victims have typically focused on the psychological effects of violence. In contrast, this article explores the sociological components of hate crime by comparing the perceptions of poor and working-class LGBT people of colour with the perceptions of white, middle- class LGBT people.Data were collected from semi-structured, in-depth interviews, conducted in New York City, with 44 people who experienced anti-LGBT vio- lence. Results indicate that middle-class white respondents were more likely than low-income people of colour to perceive their violent experiences as severe, even though the latter experienced more physical violence than the former.This finding suggests that the social position of LGBT people plays an instrumental role in structuring how they evaluate the severity of hate-motivated violence. KEY WORDS bias crime / gay men / hate crime / intersectionality / lesbian women / race / sexuality / social class / violence Introduction A lthough intersectionality frameworks have been used to examine hate crime policies and perpetrators (see McPhail, 2002; Perry, 2001; Strolovitch, 2007), they have not been utilized to explore the experiences of hate crime victims. This article, in contrast, employs an intersectional approach S o c i o l o g y Copyright © The Author(s) 2010, Reprints and permissions: http://www.sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav BSA Publications Ltd® Volume 44(5): 980–995 DOI: 10.1177/0038038510375737 at Mina Rees Library/CUNY Graduate Center on October 20, 2010soc.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://soc.sagepub.com/ 981Severity of hate-motivated violence Meyer to examine the ways in which lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) people evaluate the severity of their violent experiences. Previous studies exam- ining the severity of hate-motivated violence have focused primarily on the psy- chological effects of hate crime (Iganski, 2001; McDevitt et al., 2001; Rose and Mechanic, 2002). Conversely, this article builds on intersectionality scholarship to explore the sociological components of bias-related violence, thereby contin- uing the shift away from an individualistic analysis of hate crime (Grattet, 2009; McGhee, 2005; Meyer, 2008; Moran and Skeggs, 2004). Results are based on semi-structured, in-depth interviews with 44 people who experienced anti-LGBT violence. Findings suggest that middle-class white respondents and low-income people of colour evaluated the severity of hate-motivated violence in different ways. In particular, middle-class white respondents were more likely than low-income people of colour to perceive their violent experiences as severe. The Severity of Hate-motivated Violence Hate-motivated violence, broadly defined as any act of violence motivated by bias or prejudice, has increasingly become an area of scholarly concern (Grattet, 2009; Green et al., 2001). Despite the growing body of research on bias- motivated violence, studies of hate crime victims remain scant (Perry, 2003). Among the few studies that have focused on victims, most have examined the psychological effects of hate crime, suggesting that bias-motivated violence often contributes to symptoms associated with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) such as anxiety, anger and despair (Herek et al., 1997; Otis and Skinner, 1996). Subsequent research has found that victims of hate crime report more trauma-related symptoms than victims of non-bias crime and non-victims (Herek et al., 1999; McDevitt et al., 2001; Rose and Mechanic, 2002). This research has also distinguished among various forms of violence, and, while several studies have shown that victims experience more trauma-related symp- toms from physical attacks than from verbal violence and property-based crimes (D’Augelli and Grossman, 2001; Herek et al., 1997, 1999), other stud- ies suggest that verbal abuse can be as traumatic as physical violence (Boeckmann and Liew, 2002; Rose and Mechanic, 2002). Psychological studies of hate crime victims have undoubtedly revealed the degree to which hate-motivated violence may have traumatic psycholog- ical effects. Nevertheless, these studies generally suggest that hate crime may ‘hurt more’ than other forms of violence, implying that the amount of trauma that victims report is largely contingent upon the type of violence they experience (Iganski, 2001: 626). The cumulative effect of this research implies a hierarchical ranking system, with hate-motivated physical violence usually placed toward the top and verbal violence and non-bias crime placed toward the bottom (Herek et al., 1997; McDevitt et al., 2001). These under- standings of violence have brought attention to LGBT people’s physically violent experiences, yet they have not been explored from an intersectional perspective. at Mina Rees Library/CUNY Graduate Center on October 20, 2010soc.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://soc.sagepub.com/ 982 Sociology Volume 44 � Number 5 � October 2010 Employing an Intersectional Approach to Examine the Perceptions of LGBT Hate Crime Victims Intersectionality theory explores the ways in which systems of oppression such as race, class, gender and sexuality simultaneously structure social relations (Collins, 2000[1990]). Intersectional approaches have traditionally challenged hierarchical understandings of oppression, suggesting that one system of oppression (e.g. sexism) cannot be understood as more fundamental than another (e.g. racism) because both systems are inextricably linked (Crenshaw, 1991; Razack, 1998; Spelman, 1988). Instead, intersectional approaches posit that relations of domination should be understood as an interlocking web of mutually reinforcing power structures, each of which depends on the others (Collins, 2004; McCall, 2005). These approaches, for example, have focused on the continued salience of social class and the effects of class as it intersects with other systems of oppression (Moran, 2000; Taylor, 2007). Rather than hierarchically ranking systems of oppression, intersectionality theory suggests that each system oper- ates in different yet overlapping ways (Collins, 2000; Crenshaw, 1991). If we accept that systems of oppression cannot be hierarchically ranked, then we should also accept that individuals’ experiences of oppression cannot be categorized in hierarchical ways. Previous studies examining the severity of hate-motivated violence, however, have implied that certain forms of violence are more severe or damaging than others (Herek et al., 1999; McDevitt et al., 2001). Examples of this practice include victims being asked to describe their ‘most serious’ violent experience (Rose and Mechanic, 2002: 16) and to explain the crime in which they felt that they were ‘in the greatest physical danger’ (Herek et al., 1997: 201). In these studies, victims describe only one violent inci- dent in detail. As a result, these research methods require victims to discount many of their violent experiences, privileging one violent incident over others. This article attempts to move away from hierarchical understandings of hate-motivated violence, while at the same time accepting that victims may rank forms of violence on their own. This approach privileges rather than marginal- izes the voice of victims. As other hate crime scholars have noted, the experi- ences of victims have not featured centrally in the literature (Blee, 2007; Boeckmann and Turpin-Petrosino, 2002). This deficiency has arguably led to a homogenized portrayal of LGBT hate crime victims, with little attention focus- ing on the differences among them (Dunbar, 2006). Indeed, previous studies of LGBT hate crime victims have focused primarily on the experiences of white gay men, overlooking those of lesbian women, transgender people and LGBT people of colour (Dunbar, 2006; Perry, 2003). These studies also tend to over- look the relevance of social class in structuring LGBT people’s violent experi- ences (Dunbar, 2006; Moran, 2000). Examining the differences among LGBT people remains particularly important, as intersectional approaches have documented the many ways that traditional scholarship has sustained the interests of privileged groups (Crenshaw, 1991; Glenn, 2002; Razack, 1998). Feminist intersectionality theory, for example, at Mina Rees Library/CUNY Graduate Center on October 20, 2010soc.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://soc.sagepub.com/ has challenged some gender scholarship for generalizing from the experiences of white, middle-class women (Collins, 2000; Zinn and Dill, 1996). In contrast, intersectional approaches suggest that not all women experience oppression in the same way, as poor women of colour, for instance, confront obstacles unique to their own social position (Crenshaw, 1991; Hondagneu-Sotelo, 2001). Building on feminist and intersectionality scholarship that has explored how individuals’ experiences differ based on their social location (see Rasche, 1988; Taylor, 2007; Williams, 2006), this article examines differences between middle-class white respondents and low-income people of colour in terms of how they evaluate the severity of their violent experiences. Given the demo- graphic characteristics of the interview sample, I have combined race and class categories, comparing the perceptions of white, middle-class LGBT people with the perceptions of poor and working-class LGBT people of colour. Employing an intersectional approach, this article expands our understanding of hate- motivated violence by revealing how LGBT people of different social positions may evaluate the severity of their violent experiences in distinct ways. Methods Data presented in this article are drawn from a dissertation project which focuses on race, class, and gender differences among LGBT hate crime vic- tims. To examine these intersectional differences, I conducted semi-structured, in-depth interviews with 44 people who experienced violence because they were perceived to be lesbian, gay, bisexual, or transgender. This interview sample was compiled through LGBT advocacy and service organizations in New York City. Seeking a diverse sample, I recruited participants from a wide range of organizations, many of which provide services for LGBT people of colour. At these organizations, recruitment fliers were placed on a bulletin board or in a waiting room. The flier read: ‘Have you experienced violence because you are (or were perceived to be) lesbian, gay, bisexual or transgen- der?’ A broad, open-ended question was used on the flier to attract partici- pants with a variety of violent experiences and to allow respondents to define violence on their own terms. During the interview, participants were asked to describe their violent expe- riences in detail. I then asked follow-up questions regarding their understanding of hate-motivated violence and their perception of its severity. Respondents also completed a short questionnaire in which they provided basic demographic information. The interviews lasted from approximately one to three hours; the median interview was 102 minutes. I transcribed each interview shortly after it occurred and then developed a coding scheme to organize the data. These qualitative coding techniques helped extract patterns among respondents’ answers (Berg, 2004; Miles and Huberman, 1994). Continuing data collection was then used to refine the coding scheme and sharpen my analysis of the discovered themes (Strauss and Corbin, 1994). 983Severity of hate-motivated violence Meyer at Mina Rees Library/CUNY Graduate Center on October 20, 2010soc.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://soc.sagepub.com/ 984 Sociology Volume 44 � Number 5 � October 2010 While most studies of hate crime victims have used a survey method, some social scientists have argued that an interview method best captures the ways in which respondents create meaning (Holstein and Gubrium, 1995; Weiss, 1994). Previous interview studies of LGBT hate crime victims have employed highly structured interviews with a uniform (but small) number of questions asked to every respondent (see Herek et al., 1997). This approach allows for a large sam- ple size, but it prevents respondents from actively constructing their own nar- ratives (Holstein and Gubrium, 1995). In contrast, I employed a less structured approach, allowing respondents to guide much of the discussion and to describe their violent experiences in depth. The interview sample consists of 17 women, 17 men and 10 transgender people. All of the men identified as gay and 13 of the women identified as les- bian; two women identified as heterosexual and two as bisexual. Eight of the transgender people identified as male-to-female (MTF), one as female-to-male (FTM) and one as intersexed. In what follows, I sometimes refer to respondents as ‘queer people’, using this phrase as interchangeable with ‘LGBT people’. Participants ranged from 20 to 62 years old; the median age was 41. Twenty- one participants identified as black, 13 as white, eight as Latino and two as Asian. In terms of educational background, five participants had dropped out of high school, 14 had a high school diploma, six had taken some college courses, 16 had a college degree and three had a postgraduate degree. Every respondent described experiences of anti-LGBT verbal violence. All but six respondents described experiences of anti-LGBT physical violence; all of these respondents were white and middle class. Quantifiable socioeconomic classifications were avoided in the hope of allowing respondents to describe their perceptions and experiences of social class (Taylor, 2009). In addition to educational attainment, respondents were asked to self-identify in terms of social class and to describe their occupational history in detail. Race and class seemed to intersect on these measurements of social class, with most LGBT people of colour being unemployed or identifying as working class and most white respondents describing upper middle-class jobs. Moreover, of the 19 participants who did not attend college, 18 were black or Latino. Conversely, all but one of the white respondents had a college degree. Thus, with regard to the intersection of race and class, most middle- class participants were white and most low-income respondents were black or Latino. This division along race and class lines arose in part from my sampling technique: most of the organizations where I placed fliers appeared to serve a largely middle-class white population or a predominantly working-class black and Latino population. The following sections explore differences among respondents along the lines of race and class. The categories of ‘middle-class white respondents’ and ‘low-income LGBT people of colour’ are meant to reflect race and class differ- ences found within the sample. Of course, these categorizations are imperfect, as race and class identities are more fluid than these categories would suggest (Taylor, 2007). A few white respondents, for example, had fluctuated in and out at Mina Rees Library/CUNY Graduate Center on October 20, 2010soc.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://soc.sagepub.com/ 985Severity of hate-motivated violence Meyer of working-class jobs and some people of colour had previously worked in middle- class occupations. Nevertheless, most white respondents had worked primarily in upper middle-class jobs throughout their lives and most people of colour were unemployed or had worked primarily in working-class occupations. At the same time, considerable differences could be found within each of these groups, as poor LGBT people of colour, for instance, may interpret and experi- ence anti-queer violence quite differently than working-class LGBT people of colour. Still, in this study, the most salient differences in terms of how respon- dents evaluated the severity of their violent experiences were between middle- class white respondents and low-income LGBT people of colour. While the larger project on which this article is based also focuses on the variation within these race and social class groups (Meyer, 2008), this article focuses primarily on the differences between them. Results Results indicate that LGBT people’s reference groups – the groups with which they compare themselves – affect the degree to which they perceive their violent experiences as severe (England, 2010; Hyman and Singer, 1968). That is, LGBT people most often emphasized the severity of their violent experiences when comparing themselves with someone whom they perceived to have experienced relatively little violence. Since poor and working-class LGBT people of colour were typically friends with individuals who had encountered a lot of violence, and white, middle-class LGBT people were not, the latter were more likely than the former to perceive their violent expe- riences as severe. The Role of Others in Structuring How LGBT People Evaluated the Severity of Their Violent Experiences Poor and working-class LGBT people of colour were often encouraged by their friends and family members to compare themselves with individuals who had encountered a lot of violence. For instance, Jayvyn, a 33-year-old black gay man who worked as a secretary, felt that he was consistently compared with people who had experienced more violence than himself: ‘For the longest time, I didn’t see it as a big deal. Everyone kept telling me, “Well, you weren’t hurt, you weren’t killed, like so and so.” But I was hurt. I mean, I had the scars to prove it.’ When Jayvyn expressed the severity of his violent experience – he was called a ‘punk faggot’ and had several glass bottles thrown at him on the street – others diminished its importance by classifying it as commonplace. By suggesting that Jayvyn could have been murdered, others constructed his violent experience as comparatively insignificant. While Jayvyn rejected others’ discourse, some poor and working-class LGBT people of colour seemed more accepting of the reference groups that at Mina Rees Library/CUNY Graduate Center on October 20, 2010soc.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://soc.sagepub.com/ 986 Sociology Volume 44 � Number 5 � October 2010 were suggested to them. Jasmine, a 44-year-old black lesbian woman who worked as a security guard, described her brother’s response when she told him about being assaulted for revealing her sexuality: He told me that I was fortunate not to end up in the hospital like his friend Chris [who was stabbed in gang-related violence] … It made sense, what he said. It could have been worse. I could have ended up in the hospital. I guess I should feel lucky that I didn’t. Jasmine’s brother downplayed the severity of her violent experience by suggest- ing that she could have been hospitalized. By doing so, he seemed to minimize her experience, comparing it with a violent incident that he perceived to have resulted in more serious injuries. Low-income LGBT people of colour fre- quently described this type of response, in which they were encouraged to view their violent experiences as less severe than those of someone else, usually the friend of a family member. As a result, poor and working-class LGBT people of colour may have sometimes perceived their violent experiences as relatively insignificant because they had been encouraged by others to think of the vio- lence in this way. White, middle-class respondents were sometimes encouraged to downplay the severity of their violent experiences, too. In these situations, however, others usually compared middle-class white respondents with individuals who had encountered relatively little violence. For instance, Ted, a 33-year old white gay man who worked as a lawyer, described his mother’s comparison of him with one of her friends: Right after I told her about [being mugged and called a ‘faggot’], she told me this story about her [gay] friend who was almost mugged … It had nothing to do with him being gay and he wasn’t even mugged … I just thought, ‘What does this have to do with me?’ Ted felt that his mother had diminished the severity of his violent experience by comparing him with someone who had not encountered violence. This com- parison, which seemed unfair to Ted, equated his violent experience with an incident that he perceived as trivial. Like most middle-class white respondents, Ted was compared with someone who had encountered less violence than him- self. Poor and working-class people of colour, in contrast, were usually com- pared with individuals perceived to have experienced more violence. Although both middle-class white respondents and low-income people of colour sometimes felt as if others had downplayed the severity of their violent experiences, middle-class white respondents were more frequently encouraged to perceive their violent experiences as severe. For instance, George, a 45-year- old white gay man who worked as a college professor, described the reaction of his friends to him being pushed and called a ‘fag’: ‘Everyone said that I should go to the doctor’s … [One friend] told me that I should report it as a hate crime … Another friend set me up with a therapist. He was a big help.’ White, middle- class LGBT people encountered this type of response – in which others empha- sized the severity of the violence – more often than poor and working-class at Mina Rees Library/CUNY Graduate Center on October 20, 2010soc.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://soc.sagepub.com/ LGBT people of colour. Furthermore, middle-class white respondents were more frequently encouraged to seek help in dealing with the violence. Indeed, the support that George received was essential in motivating him to find insti- tutionalized support. After receiving encouragement from others, George went to the hospital, met with a therapist and reported the incident to the police. The friends and family members of middle-class white respondents fre- quently served as a support network, assisting LGBT people in navigating through institutionalized settings. In these situations, service providers may have – perhaps unwittingly – underscored the severity of anti-queer violence as they tried to alleviate the suffering of white, middle-class LGBT people. Indeed, through their involvement in institutionalized settings, middle-class white respondents had others listening and responding to their demands. At times, poor and working-class LGBT people of colour also received sup- port from their friends and family members. Even so, this assistance rarely con- nected low-income people of colour with institutionalized support; it rarely involved helping them find a doctor, lawyer, therapist or police officer. Instead, it usually focused on providing emotional support. Consequently, low-income LGBT people of colour did not interact with service providers as frequently as middle-class white respondents. The Expectations and Reference Groups of Low-income People of Colour and Middle-class White Respondents Middle-class white respondents and low-income people of colour had different expectations concerning the likelihood of experiencing violence. Most low-income people of colour, for example, thought that anti-queer violence could conceivably happen to them because they knew others who had experienced it. For instance, Tamika, a 53-year-old black lesbian woman who lived in a homeless shelter, expressed little surprise at being assaulted for revealing her sexuality: ‘I wasn’t sur- prised, I almost expected it to happen. Most of us have to go through something like this, I think … Most of my friends have had similar experiences.’ Tamika’s response was common among low-income people of colour, many of whom expected to encounter anti-queer violence because their friends had already experienced it. The expectations of poor and working-class LGBT people of colour seemed related not only to their sexual identities but also to their race and social class positions. Diamond, a 51-year-old black lesbian woman, explained the various types of hate-motivated violence that she could experience: [Being attacked because of my sexuality] might happen again, I have no way of know- ing … It’s a tough world out there. Someone could beat me because I’m black or gay or a woman or some other thing that I have no control over. I mean, I look at my friends and see that most of them have been harassed for at least one of these things. Low-income LGBT people of colour often anticipated experiencing violence in the future, given that their race, class, gender and sexual identities had been attacked in the past. Furthermore, they frequently compared themselves with 987Severity of hate-motivated violence Meyer at Mina Rees Library/CUNY Graduate Center on October 20, 2010soc.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://soc.sagepub.com/ their friends and noted that most LGBT people of colour seem to experience vio- lence at some point in their lives. In contrast to low-income people of colour, most middle-class white respondents said that they did not know anyone who had encountered anti- LGBT violence. Frank, a 51-year-old white gay man who was called a ‘homo’ and had a glass bottle thrown at him on the street, explained the effects of not knowing others who had experienced homophobic violence: ‘It seems like it doesn’t happen to most people because I don’t know anyone who it’s happened to. So, yeah, it was surprising.’ Frank perceived homophobic violence as rela- tively rare because he did not know anyone who had experienced it. This under- standing of homophobic violence then structured his expectations – he expected that it would not happen to him. This finding that low-income people of colour and middle-class white people had different expectations concerning the likelihood of experiencing anti-queer violence supports much of the sociological research on reference groups, in which individuals’ expectations depend on the groups that they use as a stan- dard of comparison (Anderson, 2002; Runciman, 1966). Middle-class white respondents, comparing themselves with their friends, often did not expect to experience anti-queer violence because they did not know others who had encountered it. Low-income LGBT people of colour, in contrast, usually knew others who had experienced some sort of violence, leading these respondents to perceive violence as something they could encounter in the foreseeable future. Evaluating the Severity of Hate-motivated Violence The different expectations and reference groups of low-income people of colour and middle-class white people seemed to affect the ways in which they evalu- ated the severity of their violent experiences. Low-income people of colour, for example, sometimes downplayed the severity of anti-queer violence because their experiences had turned out better than expected. In such cases, they often compared themselves with individuals who had experienced a lot of violence. For instance, Daniel, a 26-year-old black gay man who worked as a reception- ist, was beaten by a white police officer who called him a ‘faggot’. When describing this incident, Daniel compared himself with a gay male friend who was also the victim of homophobic police violence: ‘The cops beat [my friend] much worse. He got it really bad, so I sorta see myself as lucky, in some respects.’ Many people would probably not refer to Daniel – who was hit sev- eral times in the face – as ‘lucky’. In comparison with his friend, though, Daniel could perceive himself as relatively fortunate. After all, his friend was beaten ‘much worse’, in a comparable situation. Similarly, Latoya, a 50-year-old black lesbian woman, was physically assaulted on the street by a man who called her a ‘bitch’ and a ‘dyke’. Latoya seemed to downplay the severity of her violent experience by comparing herself with a friend who had also encountered homo- phobic violence: ‘It was never too violent … Yeah, I had some scrapes, but it’s not like I had to go to the hospital or anything, like [my friend] Jacqueline … I 988 Sociology Volume 44 � Number 5 � October 2010 at Mina Rees Library/CUNY Graduate Center on October 20, 2010soc.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://soc.sagepub.com/ know that it could have been worse.’ Since low-income LGBT people of colour knew others who had encountered a lot of violence, they sometimes focused on how their violent experiences seemed minor in comparison with those of their friends. While low-income people of colour sometimes downplayed the brutality of their violent experiences, middle-class white respondents almost always high- lighted the severity of theirs. White, middle-class LGBT people often responded to questions concerning the severity of violence with phrases such as ‘it’s a big deal’ or ‘it’s a really bad thing to have happened to me’. In contrast, poor and working-class LGBT people of colour rarely used these phrases. Middle-class white respondents often perceived their violent experiences as severe in comparison with what other LGBT people had not experienced. For example, Mark, a 46-year-old white gay man who worked as a lawyer, under- scored the severity of his violent experience – two men called him a ‘faggot’ and stalked him on the street – by comparing himself with other gay men: ‘I wanted to kill someone after it happened … It just seems like this sort of thing doesn’t happen to most gay men. So, I guess maybe that’s why it pissed me off so much.’ Constructing his experience as relatively rare – as something that ‘most gay men’ do not encounter – made it seem extraordinarily awful. Other white, middle-class respondents highlighted the severity of their vio- lent experiences by comparing themselves with their friends. For instance, Julia, a 28-year-old white lesbian woman who worked as a paediatrician, received a homophobic letter from her girlfriend’s mother. Comparing herself with other people whom she knew, Julia emphasized the severity of this experience: ‘It seems like a really bad thing, looking back on it now. I mean, I felt like, “Why would this happen to me?” … Sure, I wasn’t killed or anything, but how many people have to go through this? … It’s just not something anyone I know has to deal with.’ Julie later explained during the interview that she did not know other LGBT people who had experienced violence and she thought that she would not have received a harassing letter if she identified as straight. These comparisons with the people she knew led Julia to perceive herself as relatively deprived, viewing her experience as infrequent (‘how many people have to go through this?’) and severe (‘it seems like a really bad thing’). Along the same lines, Jacob, a 40-year-old white gay man who worked as a doctor, was shoved to the ground for kissing his boyfriend. Assessing the severity of the violence, he compared himself with one of his friends: ‘It felt like such bullshit … My friend Ben, he’s always making out with his boyfriend in public, and this has never happened to him … So, I thought, “Why does this have to happen to me, and not him?”’ Jacob expressed a sense of unfairness by comparing himself with someone who had engaged in similar behaviour, which made his own vio- lent experience seem atypical and extreme. These differences between middle-class white respondents and low-income people of colour correspond with sociological research indicating that middle- class people frequently convey a sense of entitlement (Lareau, 2003; Williams, 2006). Indeed, white, middle-class LGBT people often expressed entitlement 989Severity of hate-motivated violence Meyer at Mina Rees Library/CUNY Graduate Center on October 20, 2010soc.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://soc.sagepub.com/ concerning rights to their personal space, highlighting violations of these rights as reasons for viewing their violent experiences as severe. Low-income people of colour, in contrast, less frequently described their rights as being violated. Of course, poor and working-class LGBT people of colour are not a mono- lithic group. Although they may have been more likely than middle-class white respondents to downplay the severity of hate-motivated violence, low-income LGBT people of colour did sometimes emphasize the brutality of their violent experiences. When doing so, they usually constructed anti-queer violence as widespread. For instance, Lela, a 48-year-old black transgender woman, described her friends’ violent experiences to emphasize the severity of anti- LGBT violence in general: ‘It’s a big problem. All of my friends have experi- enced something negative because they’re trans or gay. Every single one of them … We’re not going away anytime soon, either. The violence just has to stop.’ Lela mentioned other LGBT people’s violent experiences not to construct her own as more severe – as many white, middle-class respondents seemed to do – but to construct anti-queer violence as a serious social problem. Similarly, Jetta, a 28- year-old black lesbian woman, perceived anti-LGBT violence as ubiquitous: It hurts because you can’t escape it. It’s everywhere. I know for a fact that I’m not the only one who has experiences like this. I’m not alone. If everyone could just come together to put a stop to it, then the world would be a lot better off. Knowing others who had experienced anti-queer violence, poor and working-class LGBT people of colour often perceived homophobia and transphobia as affect- ing large numbers of people. Furthermore, low-income LGBT people of colour usually knew others who had experienced violence related to their race and social class positions. In contrast, middle-class white respondents, not knowing others who had experienced anti-queer violence, usually constructed their vio- lent experiences as atypical rather than widespread. Given the qualitative nature of this study, it would be impossible to gener- alize about the types of violence confronting low-income LGBT people of colour and middle-class white people; these data may not reflect societal trends. Moreover, caution should be taken in assuming that violence is normalized for low-income LGBT people of colour (Moran, 2000). Indeed, as highlighted above, low-income LGBT people of colour were often not willing to accept anti-queer violence, perceiving it as a serious social problem that needs to be addressed. Caution should also be taken with regard to associating perpetrators of anti-queer violence with marginalized race and class groups – namely, low- income heterosexual people of colour (Moran, 2000; Taylor, 2007). As other scholars have noted, focusing on random acts of stranger violence in public has led to race and class biases in the criminal justice system, with an overarching emphasis on low-income people of colour’s violent actions (Moran, 2000). Thus, this article’s results may apply only to public forms of anti-queer violence as perpetrated by strangers. Despite these limitations, low-income people of colour in this sample were the most likely to encounter anti-queer physical violence. Approximately half of 990 Sociology Volume 44 � Number 5 � October 2010 at Mina Rees Library/CUNY Graduate Center on October 20, 2010soc.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://soc.sagepub.com/ 991Severity of hate-motivated violence Meyer the middle-class white respondents did not describe an incident of anti-LGBT physical violence; their violent experiences were verbal. Even though the poor and working-class people of colour in this sample also described many incidents of verbal violence, all of these respondents had at least one experience of anti- queer physical violence. Thus, low-income LGBT people of colour seemed to experience more physical violence than middle-class white respondents, and yet the former were less likely than the latter to perceive their violent experiences as severe. Discussion and Conclusion While previous studies examining the severity of hate-motivated violence have found that the amount of trauma that victims report depends on the type of vio- lence they experience (see Herek et al., 1999; McDevitt et al., 2001; Rose and Mechanic, 2002), results from this study revealed significant differences between middle-class white respondents and low-income people of colour in terms of how they evaluate the severity of their violent experiences. These findings sug- gest that researchers examining the severity of anti-LGBT violence should account not only for the type of violence that victims experience but also for the social position of queer people. Indeed, it seems worrisome that most studies of LGBT hate crime victims have constructed bias-motivated physical violence as more psychologically harmful than other forms of violence, while simultane- ously marginalizing the experiences of poor and working-class LGBT people of colour – a social group that may experience physical violence more frequently than other groups. Results from this study do not necessarily contradict the findings of previ- ous studies which have shown that LGBT people perceive hate-motivated phys- ical violence as more severe than verbal violence and property-based attacks (D’Augelli and Grossman, 2001; Herek et al., 1997, 1999). Indeed, respondents sometimes argued that physical violence based on their sexuality or gender identity had caused them more pain than any of their other violent experiences. While taking these voices seriously, we should also be cautious about con- structing hierarchical understandings of violence, as some respondents did not conceptualize their violent experiences in hierarchical terms and others per- ceived forms of discrimination and incidents of verbal violence as more severe than physical attacks. Furthermore, ranking forms of violence seems problem- atic given that many respondents found it painful when others had diminished the severity of their violent experiences. To argue, for example, that physical violence ‘hurts more’ than verbal abuse seems to reinforce the sentiments that many queer people encounter – that some of their violent experiences are not severe. Instead, I would suggest, along with other feminist and intersectionality scholars, that a more useful understanding of violence would define it broadly, constructing all of its forms as harmful (Collins, 1998; Richardson and May, 1999). This conceptualization of violence allows hate crime research to focus at Mina Rees Library/CUNY Graduate Center on October 20, 2010soc.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://soc.sagepub.com/ 992 Sociology Volume 44 � Number 5 � October 2010 on traditional forms of hate crime – physical violence from strangers in public – while also examining the more insidious and everyday forms of hate-motivated violence (Blee, 2007; Moran and Skeggs, 2004). In some sense, a tension exists in this article. While cautioning against hier- archically ranking forms of violence, this article suggests that low-income LGBT people of colour had more experiences of physical violence than middle- class white respondents, which might imply that the former had more traumatic experiences than the latter. The point of this article has not been to suggest that middle-class white respondents did not confront traumatic experiences of anti- queer violence, but merely to suggest that they did not confront physical vio- lence with the same frequency as LGBT people of colour. Thus, this article suggests that while being cautious about conceptualizing violence in hierarchi- cal terms, we should also recognize that real differences exist in terms of the degree to which social groups may experience violence. In the same way as sys- tems of oppression do not affect all social groups equally, individuals experi- ence violence to varying degrees based on their social position. Nevertheless, this emphasis on the differences among social groups should be balanced with sensitivity to the traumatic experiences of all groups. As a result, this balance entails avoiding endless debates over whose traumatic experiences are the worst, while at the same time attending to the ways in which social groups may confront violence in different ways. As feminist and intersectionality scholarship suggests, interview data are structured by the social position of not only the research participants but also the interviewer (Harding, 1991; Reinharz, 1992). As a result, my identity as a white, middle-class gay man inevitably affects the results of this study. Middle- class white respondents, for example, might have been particularly prone to emphasize the severity of their violent experiences to someone they perceived as similar to themselves. Indeed, these respondents often asked if I had also expe- rienced anti-LGBT violence; none of the poor and working-class LGBT people of colour whom I interviewed asked this question. This difference suggests that some white, middle-class LGBT people might have underscored the severity of their violent experiences in the hope of impressing someone of a comparable social position. Nevertheless, during the interview, middle-class white respon- dents described fewer experiences of anti-queer physical violence than low- income people of colour. Thus, middle-class white respondents did not emphasize the severity of their violent experiences to such a degree that they described more incidents of physical violence than poor and working-class LGBT people of colour. This article has compared the perceptions of low-income people of colour and middle-class white people to illustrate how an intersectional approach can be used to complicate existing scholarship – an approach similar to the work of intersectionality scholars examining domestic violence victims (see Crenshaw, 1991; Rasche, 1988; Richie, 1996). Whereas those analyses often outlined the common challenges confronting women of colour, this article has focused on at Mina Rees Library/CUNY Graduate Center on October 20, 2010soc.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://soc.sagepub.com/ how the challenges confronting poor and working-class LGBT people of colour differ from those confronting white, middle-class queer people. This compari- son reveals that the social position of LGBT people plays an instrumental role in structuring how they evaluate the severity of hate-motivated violence, as middle- class white respondents were more likely than low-income people of colour to perceive their violent experiences as severe, even though the latter experienced more physical violence than the former. Acknowledgements This project was supported by a research grant from the Williams Institute at the UCLA School of Law. 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Mechanic (2002) ‘Psychological Distress, Crime Features and Help- seeking Behaviors Related to Homophobic Bias Incidents’, American Behavioral Scientist 46(1): 14–26. Runciman, W.G. (1966) Relative Deprivation and Social Justice: A Study of Attitudes to Social Inequality in Twentieth-century England. London: Routledge. Spelman, E.V. (1988) Inessential Woman: Problems of Exclusion in Feminist Thought. Boston, MA: Beacon Press. Strauss, A. and J. Corbin (1994) ‘Grounded Theory Methodology – An Overview’, in N.K. Denzin and Y.S. Lincoln (eds) Handbook of Qualitative Research, pp. 273–85. London: Sage. Strolovitch, D. (2007) Affirmative Advocacy: Race, Class and Gender in Interest Group Politics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Taylor, Y. (2007) Working-class Lesbian Life: Classed Outsiders. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Taylor, Y. (2009) ‘Complexities and Complications: Intersections of Class and Sexuality’, Journal of Lesbian Studies 13(2): 189–203. Weiss, R.S. (1994) Learning from Strangers: The Art and Method of Qualitative Interview Studies. New York: Free Press. Williams, C.L. (2006) Inside Toyland: Working, Shopping and Social Inequality. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Zinn, M.B. and B.T. Dill (1996) ‘Theorizing Difference from Multiracial Feminism’, Feminist Studies 22(2): 321–32. Doug Meyer Is a sociology doctoral candidate at the Graduate Center of the City University of New York. His research interests include hate crime, feminist and queer studies, and intersectionality theory.He is currently working on his dissertation, in which he explores race, class and gender differences among LGBT hate crime victims. His work has been published in Journal of Gender Studies, Race & Society, and Race, Gender & Class. Address: The Graduate Center at the City University of New York, Department of Sociology, 365 Fifth Ave, New York, NY 10016, USA. E-mail: dmeyer07@yahoo.com Date submitted July 2009 Date accepted May 2010 995Severity of hate-motivated violence Meyer at Mina Rees Library/CUNY Graduate Center on October 20, 2010soc.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://soc.sagepub.com/ 
work_ockexlqfi5d5jlu4xmzpdld2gy	----	untitled Affecting Geospatial Technologies: Toward a Feminist Politics of Emotion* Mei-Po Kwan The Ohio State University Building on earlier contributions to feminist understanding of geospatial technologies (GT), I seek to further develop feminist perspectives on GTalong new directions. I argue that an attention to the importance of affect (feelings and emotions) and the performative nature of GT practices offers a distinctive critical edge to feminist work on GT. I emphasize the need for GT practitioners to contest the dominant meanings and uses of GT, and to participate in struggles against the oppressive or violent effects of these technologies. I argue that only when emotions, feelings, values, and ethics become an integral part of our geospatial practices can we hope that the use of GTwill lead to a less violent and more just world. Key Words: affect, emotion, feminist politics, geospatial technologies, GIS. A genuine feminist politics always brings us from bondage to freedom, from lovelessness to loving. . . . To choose feminist politics, then, is a choice to love. —(hooks 2002) Geospatial technologies include a broadrange of technologies for collecting, stor- ing, displaying, or analyzing geographical infor- mation (e.g., geographical information systems [GIS]; global positioning systems, and remote sensing). Much has been written about the lim- itations and social implications of geospatial technologies (GT) since the early 1990s (e.g., Sheppard 1993; Curry 1994; Pickles 1995). Cri- tiques have focused largely on issues of episte- mology, representation, power, ethics, privacy violation, and the noncivilian deployment of these technologies. With contributions by crit- ical geographers from diverse perspectives, con- siderable progress has been made in the nascent subfields of critical GIS and critical cartography to date (e.g., Schuurman 1999; Kyem 2004; Sheppard 2005; Crampton and Krygier 2006; Del Casino and Hanna 2006; Elwood 2006; Knigge and Cope 2006; Kwan and Knigge 2006; Pavlovskaya 2006; Propen 2006; Sieber 2006; Ghose forthcoming; Kwan and Aitken forth- coming). Among recent critical perspectives on GT, feminist geographers have provided new in- sights since the early 2000s (e.g., Nightingale 2003; Gilbert and Masucci 2005; McLafferty 2005b). Sara McLafferty (2002, 2005a), for instance, examines the role of GIS in feminist activism and explores how GIS-based power- knowledge may empower or marginalize women activists as spatio-political scale shifts. Marianna Pavlovskaya (2002, 2004) examines the link between urban restructuring and the microgeographies of women’s everyday lives in Moscow through a grounded story composed with GIS. Marie Cieri’s (2003) study of queer tourism highlights how GT can be used to ex- plore the gendered and sexualized geographies of urban space. I renegotiate the meanings of GIS at the intersection of science, art, and sub- jectivities (Kwan 2002a). I have also argued that GIS can be a site for deconstructing the binary understanding of geographical method and have called for a recovery of the critical agency of GIS users or researchers (Kwan 2002b, 2004). Much of this work is inspired by feminist cri- tiques of modern science and visualization tech- nologies and by poststructuralist feminist notions like situated knowledge, positionality, reflexivity, and performativity (e.g., Butler 1990, 1993; Haraway 1991; S. Harding 1991, 1998; Grosz 1994). *Earlier versions of this article were presented in the University of Minnesota Department of Geography’s speaker series ‘‘Feminism and Social Theory in Geography,’’ 15 October 2004, and at the Annual Meeting of the Association of American Geographers, Denver, 5–9 April 2005. I thank the audiences of these presentations, and Karen Dias, Jennifer Blecha, and the anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments. The Professional Geographer, 59(1) 2007, pages 22–34 r Copyright 2007 by Association of American Geographers. Initial submission, November 2005; revised submission, June 2006; final acceptance, July 2006. Published by Blackwell Publishing, 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, and 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, U.K. In this article I seek to develop feminist per- spectives on GT along new directions, building on earlier contributions to feminist understand- ing of GT. First, recent feminist thinking in geography has witnessed heightened attention to the importance of emotion in social life and knowledge production (e.g., Bondi 1999, 2003, 2005; Burman and Chantler 2004; Davidson and Bondi 2004; Ekinsmyth et al. 2004; Ettlin- ger 2004; Thien 2004, 2005; Bondi, Davidson and Smith 2005; Tolia-Kelly 2006). As Kay An- derson and Susan Smith (2001, 7) argue, the ‘‘human world is constructed and lived through the emotions’’ and yet feelings and emotions are silenced in both research and social life. Since emotions affect research processes and findings (Bennett 2004) and are highly political but rare- ly an important consideration in public policy (Kwan and Aitken, forthcoming), bringing emotions back to bear upon GT practices may offer new insights about ways of using GT that contest the dominant understanding and mean- ings of GT and their relationships with the so- cial and political world (e.g., using GT as a means of resistance or political protest). Second, nonrepresentational thinking has been influential both within and outside geog- raphy (e.g., Deleuze 1986, 1994; Deleuze and Guattari 1987; Baudrillard 1995, 2001; Thrift 1996, 1997; Smith 2003). Nonrepresentational theories challenge ‘‘the epistemological priority of representations as the grounds of sense-mak- ing’’ or as the means for acquiring knowledge about the world (McCormack 2003, 488). They emphasize the importance of the corporeal, af- fective, and unwritable dimensions of existence and turn our attention from representations to practices and performances (Nash 2000; Kwan and Aitken forthcoming). Critical reflections that nonrepresentational thinking inspired have pushed our understanding of maps, cartog- raphy, and GIS from conventional notions of representations toward feminist notions of per- formance and performativity (e.g., Del Casino and Hanna 2006).1 Artists and scholars in cul- tural studies have recently drawn on these femi- nist notions to explore the use of GTas locative media for self-expression and articulation of emotional geographies (e.g., Parks 2001). These experimentations hint at new geospatial practices (or performances) that contest our understanding of GT as representational or communicative media. In this article I address the two questions raised by Karen Dias and Jennifer Blecha (2007) for this themed issue in light of these recent developments in feminist thinking. I argue that an attention to the importance of affect (feelings and emotions)2 in social life and research and the performative nature of GT practices offers a ‘‘distinctive critical edge’’ to feminist work on GT ( Jenkins, Jones, and Dixon 2003, 59), and that GT can be a fruitful analytic project for feminist geographers. I highlight some recent works by feminist scholars and explore the ways in which they hint at alternative geospatial prac- tices that are more relevant to the contemporary world, especially in light of the current epoch of wars, international conflicts, ‘‘natural’’ disasters, and globalization (Chomsky 1988, 2003; Enloe 1989; Gregory 2004; Hannah 2005; Hyndman 2005, 2007; Sparke 2005). I emphasize the need for researchers, developers, and users (hereafter ‘‘practitioners’’) to contest the dominant mean- ings and uses of GT, and to participate in strug- gles against the oppressive or violent effects of these technologies. Drawing on feminist con- ceptualization of affect (e.g., Thien 2005), I argue that geospatial practices need to be em- bodied and attentive to the effects of emotions, which mediate the social and political processes through which our subjectivities are reproduced ( J. Harding and Pribram 2002; Bennett 2004). This not only involves reintroducing long-lost subjectivities of the researcher, the researched, and those affected by GT back to geospatial practices, but also involves making emotions, feelings, values, and ethics an integral aspect of geospatial practices. Only then will moral geospatial practices become possible, and only then can we hope that the use and application of GT will lead to a less violent and more just world. Bodies and Emotions Matter Geospatial technologies are designed, created, and used by humans, and a large proportion of their application is for understanding or solving problems of individuals and social groups. Bod- ies, however, are often absent or rendered ir- relevant in contemporary practices of GT. This ‘‘omission of the body’’ occurs in two different but related senses ( Johnson 1990, 18). First, although bodies are involved in the develop- ment and use of GT, there is little room in these Affecting Geospatial Technologies: Toward a Feminist Politics of Emotion 23 technologies to allow for any role of the practitioner’s subjectivities, emotions, feelings, passion, values, and ethics. Second, despite the fact that a large number of bodies are affected by the application of GT (e.g., people profiled by geodemographic application, and civilians who were annihilated as ‘‘collateral damage’’ by GPS-guided smart bombs that missed their tar- gets), bodies are often treated merely as things, as dots on maps, or even as if they do not exist (Gregory 2004; Hyndman 2005). The dominant disembodied practices of GT, however, are contestable as they are largely the result of a particular understanding of science and objectivity (Kwan 2002a). This historically specific and socially constructed notion of science, as Donna Haraway (1991) argues, is predicated on the positionality of a disembodied master subject with transcendent vision. With such disembodied and infinite vision, the knower is capable of achieving a detached view into a separate, completely knowable world. The kind of knowledge produced with such disem- bodied positionality denies the partiality of the knower, erases subjectivities, and ignores the power relations involved in all forms of knowledge production (Foucault 1977). Har- away (1991, 189) calls this decorporealized vi- sion ‘‘the god-trick of seeing everything from nowhere.’’ Closely associated with this view of science is a gendered notion of knowledge production and academic scholarship that privileges rational thought over ‘‘irrational’’ emotionality (Bennett 2004). This ‘‘marginalization of emotion,’’ as Anderson and Smith (2001, 7) put it, ‘‘has been part of a gender politics of research in which detachment, objectivity and rationality have been valued, and implicitly masculinized, while engagement, subjectivity, passion and desire have been devalued, and frequently feminized.’’ Geography in particular has tended to ‘‘deny, avoid, suppress or downplay its emotional en- tanglements’’ (Bondi, Davidson, and Smith 2005, 1). Yet, to paraphrase Anderson and Smith, there are times and places where lives are explicitly lived through pain, love, hate, anger, hope, fear, and passion. If the world is imbued with complex emotional geographies, GT practices are more relevant to real lives if they allow us to take the spatial, temporal, and social effects of feelings into account. To neglect how our research and social life are mediated by feelings and emotions is to exclude a key set of relations through which lives are lived, societies made, and knowledge produced (Anderson and Smith 2001). As GT practitioners, our decisions to adopt particular research agendas and engage with particular issues (e.g., emergency response) are often motivated by the emotions provoked by events such as wars, environmental problems, and ‘‘natural’’ disasters (Bennett 2004). In field- work involving interaction between GT re- searchers and research participants, emotions expressed by the researched may provide in- sights about their relationships with others and their social worlds. In social and political con- texts involving interaction among diverse groups of stakeholders, there are inevitably underlying feelings and tensions that cannot be clearly articulated or communicated—like ‘‘the thrown-chairs, the put-downs, the red- faces and the hugs’’ and ‘‘the anger, the frustra- tions, the sadness and the joys’’ in planning meetings that involve the data or results gener- ated by GT (Kwan and Aitken forthcoming). Contemporary life is also imbued with emo- tionally intense encounters brought about by real-time media coverage of events around the globe (e.g., planes crashing into buildings, dead bodies of tsunami victims, and violent encoun- ters in antiglobalization protests). Exploring and developing new GT practices that are at- tentive to bodies and emotions is therefore an important and fruitful feminist project. The critical project that aims to bring bodies and emotions back in GT practices entails sev- eral important elements. As feminist GT prac- titioners, we can appropriate the power of GT, contest the dominant uses of these technologies, and reconfigure the dominant visual practices to counter their objectifying vision. We can ex- periment with new geospatial practices that better articulate the complex realities of gende- red, classed, raced, and sexualized spaces and experiences of individuals. These new practices should help us understand emotions in terms of their ‘‘socio-spatial mediation and articulation rather than as entirely interiorized subjective mental states’’ (Bondi, Davidson, and Smith 2005, 3). While being attentive to how emo- tions, subjectivities, and spaces are mutually constitutive in particular places and at particular times, these new practices should also take into account the existence of different kinds of bod- 24 Volume 59, Number 1, February 2007 ies (e.g., pregnant, disabled, old, mutilated, dead) and their socially encoded meanings in relation to specific spatial, temporal, and cul- tural contexts (Rose 1993; Laws 1997; Domosh and Seager 2001; Longhurst 2001). In the arena of public policy, feminist GT practitioners have a role in questioning decisions that priv- ilege detached rationality and the ‘‘logic of efficiency’’ over emotions (Anderson and Smith 2001, 8). As feminist GT practitioners we deeply care about the subject(s) of our research and are ‘‘emotionally committed to our work,’’ and our geospatial practices should be infused with a sense of ‘‘emotional involvement with people and places’’ (Bondi, Davidson and Smith, 2005, 2). We can develop GT practices that entail this emotional involvement and help express mean- ings, memories, feelings, and emotions for our subjects. We can draw on the emotional power of moving images and the techniques in narra- tive cinema to create GIS movies or visualiza- tions that tell stories about the lives of marginalized people, highlight social injustice, and—we hope—effect social change (Aitken 1991; Aitken and Craine 2006). In the three sections that follow, I discuss several GT projects to illustrate the specific ways in which bodies and emotions can be brought to bear on geospatial practices. Drawing from my recent experimentations and those by feminist scholars in cultural stud- ies and media art, I explore how these projects contest the dominant meanings and visual prac- tices of GT. As these projects are more expres- sive than representational or analytical, taking the form of creative visual or artistic work (e.g., GPS-assisted travelogues and 3D GIS video), they are in a certain sense ‘‘affective GT per- formances’’ that seek to transform GT into affective practices by incorporating the subject- ivities and emotions of the practitioner and research participants as an integral element of the project. Through the use of GT as a medium of self-expression and a means of re- sistance, and to articulate emotional geogra- phies and convey emotionally provocative messages, these nonrepresentational practices hint at ways of using GT that transcend the conventional duality between subject and ob- ject, design and use, author and reader, and representation and practice (Del Casino and Hanna 2006). Subject(ive) Mapping with Global Positioning Systems Lisa Parks (2001, 209), a cultural critic and video artist, contests the meanings of Global Positioning System (GPS) by using it as an in- teractive technology for ‘‘plotting the person- al.’’ She explores whether the GPS can be used to document human movement and everyday experiences in a way similar to that of photog- raphy, home videos, and travelogues. She high- lights the paradoxical nature of GPS and argues the need for critical strategies that struggle over the meanings of satellite technologies. She states that the ‘‘satellite occupies a remote or- bital position beyond users’ reach and outside of the field of vision; satellites have historically been controlled by states and used in myriad ways without citizens’ knowledge, involvement or consent; and satellites are high-tech, high- capital and high-maintenance devices that are seemingly beyond the purview of the popular and the personal’’ ( Parks 2001, 210). Parks con- tends that what state-sponsored and commer- cial digital mapping projects share is their quest for total vision and total knowledge of the planet. She argues that the personal plot ( per- sonal map) she explored works against this cen- tralization of vision and knowledge by insisting that GPS need not be used to articulate the agendas of the state or business. Instead it can be used as a means of storytelling and a technology for self-expression. Parks explored GPS as a means of articulating the politics of location through linking and in- terpreting an individual’s global position (loca- tion data produced through satellites) with her subject position (historically and socially con- stituted identities). Through a discussion of GPS tracks of her movements that she recorded in two recent trips, one in California and the other in Alice Springs, Australia, she illustrates how GPS maps might produce such politics. As Parks (2001, 216) puts it, ‘‘At each juncture I entered a waypoint, ensuring that each moving trace would be remembered. I was reminded here of my own mobility relative to theirs—and that my GPS map of California would look quite different from that of a migrant worker, a Chinese pharmacist, a high-tech executive or a groaning seal for that matter.’’ She suggests that GPS maps (or personal plots) offer ‘‘new ways of visualizing social difference that are based on Affecting Geospatial Technologies: Toward a Feminist Politics of Emotion 25 human movement rather than physiognomy or pigmentation’’ ( Parks 2001, 211). These visu- alizations, she argues, enable us to conceptual- ize more precisely how identities are constituted through material, bodily movements. Like travel photography, Parks (2001, 213) suggests, ‘‘the GPS receiver, rather than cap- turing an objective record, instead generates a visual display that may activate memories of subjective perspective, of a particularly situated point of view.’’ GPS not only registers location coordinates but also records the highlights, landmarks, and special events of one’s journey— those personal experiences that are not coded within conventional maps. In this sense, Parks argues, the GPS map combines the objective and omniscient discourse of cartography with the subjective, grounded experience of the user. Visual representation of the moving body by GPS introduces the possibility of subject(ive) mapping. Although represented as a series of lines and dots, the body’s movement transforms the map from an omniscient view of territory into an individualized expression. By plotting the personal, GPS inscribes embodied practices into the discourse of mapping and allows the user to call into question the objective status of the map by inflecting it with personal move- ment. The producer of the GPS map is none other than the body that traveled, walked, or moved along a certain trajectory carrying a GPS receiver. The practice of plotting the personal, then, figures the user as subject, produced through a series of movements and encounters. Drawing on Paul Virilio (1997) and Gilles Del- euze (1986), Parks calls this subject ‘‘the trajective self,’’ referring to a space in between the subjective and objective that accounts for the ongoing condition of bodily movement. Further, as Parks (2001, 214) suggests, ‘‘GPS mapping involves the act of self-positioning by recording and displaying movements from here to there. The goal of the personal plot is not to reproduce panoramic vistas, but rather to dis- play one’s changing position and archive one’s routes.’’ The GPS maps therefore represent the possibility of a mediated experience, as they often necessitate storytelling and narration be- cause what they reveal is seen and experienced from very specific and personal points of view. When used as a technology of self-reflection, GPS invites the user to see herself as a subject- in-motion, as an author and a reader, reflexively inscribing personal trajectories onto the text of the social world of her everyday life. In this light, GPS receivers can be used as technologies of self-expression, creating spatial interpretation and social understanding as much as they can be used as tracking and monitoring devices. The Amsterdam RealTime Project, as Amy Propen (2006) describes it, shares critical intent similar to Parks’s personal plot. In the Amster- dam project, real-time location data from the GPS-enabled personal digital assistants ( PDAs) of the participants were sent to a central server via wireless Internet connection. As the GPS tracks were visualized against a black back- ground without showing any information about the city (e.g., streets or parcel boundaries), the participants’ movements in real-time construct their own maps and representations of the city. Through creating personalized maps of the city with the performances of their own bodies (re- corded and visualized as GPS tracks), the project participants (who were all volunteers) were the authors (subjects) of these plots and at the same time were being portrayed in these maps (objects). The project therefore contests the conventional distinction between author and reader, subject and object, performance and representation (Del Casino and Hanna 2006). Collaborative 3D GIS Videography As I argued earlier, feminist GT practitioners can draw on the emotional power of moving images and techniques in narrative cinema to create GIS movies that tell emotionally pro- vocative stories or that highlight social injustice (Deleuze 1986, 1998; Aitken 1991; Aitken and Craine 2006). Cinema, in Gilles Deleuze’s (1998, 15) view, tells ‘‘stories with blocks of movements/duration.’’ As Stuart Aitken (1991, 105) argues, the frame-sequence in a motion picture ‘‘portrays the dynamic interaction be- tween people and their social and physical en- vironments,’’ and the foundations of successful narrative cinema lie in a unique portrayal of this dynamic interaction. In a recent project, I explored ways of using moving images generated by GIS for articulat- ing emotional geographies and contesting the objectifying vision of GIS-based 3D geovisual- ization. Drawing on the methods in visual eth- nography, visual sociology, and film studies (e.g., Banks 2001; Pink 2001; Rose 2001; Buck- 26 Volume 59, Number 1, February 2007 land 2003), I created a 3D GIS movie that is more an artistic and expressive visual narrative than an objective recording generated with the aid of scientific visualization. As Sarah Pink (2001) suggests, video materials should not be treated merely as visual facts but rather as representations in which the collaborations and strategies of self-representation of those involved are part of their making. For visual ethnographers, video is not simply a data-col- lecting tool but a technology that participates in the negotiation of social relationships and a medium through which ethnographic know- ledge is produced. Participatory video has been used by feminist geographers in action research that seeks to encourage communities to ‘‘ana- lyze their social world and to explore the con- struction of meaning’’ (Kindon 2003, 143). The collaborative use of video, as Kindon (2003, 143) suggests, has ‘‘considerable transformative potential in terms of the action it may generate.’’ Based on these notions of participatory video and narrative cinema, I developed ‘‘collabora- tive 3D GIS videography,’’ a method of creating videos using moving images rendered by a 3D GIS for articulating the personal experience and story of a particular research participant. I pro- duced a video based on the oral history of a Muslim woman in Columbus, Ohio (who was a key informant of the study), about her feelings when traveling and undertaking activities out- side her home shortly after 11 September 2001 (hereafter ‘‘9/11’’). The purpose of the study was to understand the impact of post-9/11 anti- Muslim hate crimes on the perception of safety and use of public space of the Muslim women in Columbus, Ohio, study. Several months after 9/ 11, I traveled with her for one day as she drove her minivan to undertake her normal out-of- home activities. As we passed through various routes, she recalled her feelings and fear when she saw particular buildings or stores (and her oral narrative was recorded). Using the textual transcripts of such audio recordings, the field notes I took on that day, and the activity diary and map sketches she completed during an in-depth interview, I portrayed her body’s space-time trajectory and her emotions as she moved around the study area with a 3D GIS. Contrary to the high-angle perspective com- monly used in 3D geovisualization, the video that I produced adopts her point of view (in the literal sense) as the vantage point. The moving images of the video show what she saw (ren- dered by 3D GIS) as she drove through various routes in the study area on a particular day after 9/11; her movement is portrayed as a person- alized space-time trajectory that is color-coded to reflect the level of fear and perceived danger she experienced, and the buildings along the road were also color-coded to indicate the level of perceived danger she experienced as she passed them. Audio clips from her oral narrative were also incorporated, resulting in a video that not only shows the routes and the spaces her body moved through, but also tells her story through the images and her oral narrative as she recalls what happened to her life and how she negotiated the hostile urban spaces after 9/11. It shows what she saw and experienced from her personal point of view (i.e., from the position of a driver who was traveling along various roads in the study area). It is a powerful form of indi- vidualized storytelling based on her personal movements, memories, feelings, and emotions. The 3D GIS video I produced seeks to ‘‘pres- ent its subject matter in a subjective, expressive, stylized, evocative and visceral manner’’ (Buck- land 2003, 145). It is not an ‘‘objective’’ or im- partial video recording of anything that can be captured by a conventional video camera. Its scenes have many physical elements that are considered to be parts of the objective reality and scientifically visible ‘‘facts’’ of the study area (e.g., buildings and roads), but they are rendered from the GIS database with symbolic and art- istic techniques, which helped to create an ex- pressive visual narrative that was produced collaboratively with the informant. For in- stance, a green line was used to represent the tiny comfort zone that she experienced as she drove her minivan through a major road in the study area, and the oppressive effect of the hos- tile urban environment was symbolically repre- sented by coloring the surrounding buildings as red blocks. Further, instead of being filmed, represented as a protagonist, and being watched by spectators, the informant does not appear in the video. She is the person who saw and acted, and mainly her emotions, feelings, memories, and experiences find expression in the video. The video produced is therefore not only about her but also for her—she is situated at the center of its production. It portrays her emotional ge- ographies in terms of the dynamic interaction Affecting Geospatial Technologies: Toward a Feminist Politics of Emotion 27 between her feelings and the post-9/11 urban environment of the study area. Through this shift from a spectator’s viewpoint to the prot- agonist’s (subject’s) viewpoint, the video con- tests the objectifying gaze of conventional 3D geovisualization practices through a particular spatial and visual organization of its elements. GT Art Practices as Politics of Resistance As Parks’s and my own work have shown, GT can be appropriated as media for self-expression and articulation of emotional geographies. These experimentations contest the detach- ment, rationality, and objectifying vision en- tailed in conventional GT practices. Map artists and art activists have long created art maps that contest the authority and content of official maps—witness the maps produced by the Sur- realists and the Situationists (Krygier 2006; Varanka 2006; Wood 2006). Art maps are often created by extensively reworking preexisting maps, ‘‘redrawing, digitally altering, painting over, and reorienting the original images’’ (Wood 2006, 10). They point toward worlds other than those mapped in official maps and seek to ‘‘produce new configurations of space, subjectivity and power’’ (kanarinka 2006). Each art map is therefore not only a ‘‘work of art’’ but also a ‘‘political action’’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 12). Similarly, GTcan be appropriated as a digital art medium and used to create artworks that protest against social injustice and violence. GT art practices can be undertaken or per- formed as a form of resistance (Deleuze 1998; Kaufman 1998; Klebesadel 2003). Based on these notions of art practices as pol- itics of resistance, I have explored GIS as an art- istic medium for generating digital artwork using GIS software and data. As GIS was not developed and designed for artistic work, my GIS art project intends to challenge the understanding of GT as scientific apparatus for producing ob- jective knowledge or as an instrument of dom- ination. I seek to destabilize the fixed meanings of GT that have precluded their use in novel and creative ways. Through my GIS art I also articu- late my discontent with the use of GT in wars and international conflicts that result in large num- bers of civilian casualties (Gregory 2004; Hynd- man 2005, 2007). I also protest against the use of these technologies in any applications that vio- late personal rights and privacy, as in geodemo- graphic and surveillance applications. I have explored the aesthetic potential of GIS by experimenting with various artistic styles and techniques (Figures 1 and 2).3 The digital spaces of GIS have been appropriated as my spaces of resistance, which elude state sanction on the more readily recognizable spaces of political protest ( Pile 1997; Wainwright forthcoming). My GIS art project was undertaken out of my sadness in light of the human casualties resulted from the attacks at the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on 9/11 as well as the ensuing wars and violent conflicts in the Middle East. In the project, GIS was used to create digital images that are aesthetically pleasing, but none of the visual elements in these images corresponds to any particular object in the world. For instance, the image shown in Figure 1 was created with three layers of real vector GIS data. The color schemes of these data and their overlay proper- ties were first tweaked in a GIS. The map file was then imported to an image processing program and processed with several artistic filters that transformed it into a drastically different image. Through this abstract and nonrepresentation- al GIS art practice, GIS is momentarily dissoci- ated from any precepts of science, objectivity, transcendent vision, exploitation, surveillance, or control. I thus participated in the cultural politics of contending the meanings of GT (al- beit at a personal level), as cultural politics ‘‘are contestations over meanings, over borders and boundaries, over the ways we make sense of our worlds, and the ways we live our lives’’ (Mitchell 2000, 159). Through this geospatial aesthetics grounded on my concern about the role of GT in global violence, I insist that GT should be used primarily for creating a more just and peaceful world, as when the technologies are used in re- search on environmental justice or for empow- ering marginalized social groups (e.g., Mennis 2002; McLafferty 2005a). In the project, GIS was used as a medium of passionate politics for countering the dominant practices. It is in this sense that my GIS art project can be understood as part of a broader counterhegemonic struggle over GT, as a form of questioning, and a form of protest and resistance. My GIS art project and Parks’s (2001) personal plot, however, are largely personal endeavors. In order to influence public policy 28 Volume 59, Number 1, February 2007 and to effect broader social change, politics of resistance at the individual level needs to be scaled up and connected to collectively prac- ticed politics. The recent trend of increasing collaboration between researchers, artists, and community groups in projects that seek to understand people’s feelings and concerns may be indicative of how this connection can be made (e.g., Rose 1997). For instance, the Greenwich Emotion Map Project engaged art activists and local residents to reflect on the so- cial change taking place on the Greenwich Pen- insula (Nold 2005). It was a mapping project that aimed at understanding how local residents Figure 2 Digital image created with Triangulated Irregular Net- work (TIN) data. Artistic effects were added to the original image with image processing software. Figure 1 Digital image created with three layers of vector data. Artistic effects were added to the original image with image pro- cessing software. Affecting Geospatial Technologies: Toward a Feminist Politics of Emotion 29 feel about the area based on their personal ex- ploration and journeys. In the project, biomap- ping devices worn by participants recorded their emotional response (their body’s level of stimu- lation) to and interaction with their immediate environment, and a GPS tracked the routes they took. On returning to the studio, the informa- tion and photos taken along the way were up- loaded and interpreted by participants to create a personal visual narrative. The resulting emo- tion maps encouraged participants’ personal reflection on the complex relationship between them, their local environment, and their fellow citizens. The project allowed local residents of the Greenwich Peninsula to visualize where they feel stressed and excited, to articulate their concerns, and to engage with wider community issues (Nold 2005). In my study of the post-9/11 experiences of the Muslim women in Columbus, participation in the research seemed to have helped them recognize the need to address the threat of anti-Muslim hate crimes on their everyday life. The key informant, for instance, became an activist in the local Muslim community. She is involved in activities that aimed to mitigate anti-Muslim sentiment and misunderstanding about the Islamic faith (e.g., through interfaith activities and mosque open houses). Although the purpose of my study was to understand the personal feelings and experiences of the partic- ipants, it indirectly led to collectively practiced politics that seeks to change other people’s attitudes toward them. Toward Embodied Practices and Passionate Politics The wars following 9/11 have taken an enor- mous human toll, sometimes with the assistance of GT such as GPS and remote sensing. The failures that Hurricane Katrina revealed, which many had hoped to be able to avoid through the help of GT, are also disconcerting. As feminist GT practitioners, we need to think carefully about the kinds of geospatial practices that are truly relevant to the contemporary world. We should engage in the development of GT prac- tices that help to create a less violent and more just world. I have argued in this article that em- bodied practices and passionate politics of GT that are attentive to bodies, emotions, and sub- jectivities will help us move beyond software and data to focus on real people and real lives. Drawing on recent developments in feminist thinking, I suggest that attention to the import- ance of affect and possibilities of performing ( practicing) GTas resistance would lead to dis- tinctively feminist contribution to research and practice on GT. Feminist geography affords a rare discursive space for making emotions, feelings, values, and ethics an integral part of our work (Whatmore 2002; Ekinsmyth et al. 2004; Sharp, Browne, and Thien 2004; Trauger 2004; Bondi, Davidson and Smith 2005; Kobayashi 2005). Mobilizing emotions in our work not only rep- resents an important element of the feminist project that seeks to recenter bodies in geospa- tial practices, it also entails experimentations with more expressive and evocative forms of visual practices for conveying provocative femi- nist messages. As video artist Pipilotti Rist points out, ‘‘Messages that are conveyed emo- tionally and sensually can break up more preju- dices and habitual behavior patterns than . . . intellectual treatise’’ (cited in Riemschneider and Grosenick 2001, 142). Feelings and emo- tions have long been silenced in research and social life. Bringing them back to bear upon our GT practices would have considerable po- tential for yielding insights about new ways of using GT. In order to effect broader social change, how- ever, it is important to scale our care or concern from the personal/local level up to larger con- texts. Although most of the projects I describe in this article were undertaken as personal endeav- ors, our personal politics of resistance needs to be scaled up to the level of collectively practiced feminist politics. Collaborative projects under- taken by GT researchers, feminist/art activists, and community groups throughout the world offer important inspiration for how this may be accomplished (e.g., McLafferty 2002, 2005a; kanarinka 2006). As feminist GT practitioners, we should develop innovative means to protest against the use of GT for violence and to engage in political activism that turn violence and fear into hope. Only when emotions, feelings, values, and ethics as well as a commitment to social justice become integral elements of our geospatial practices will moral geospatial prac- tices become possible. Only then can GT help create a less violent and more just world.’ 30 Volume 59, Number 1, February 2007 Notes 1 The feminist notion of performativity (based on Ju- dith Butler’s 1990 and 1993 works) concerns the processes through which gender identity and social practices are mutually constituted. As my focus here is on geospatial technologies (not processes of iden- tity formation), this article instead invokes the notion of ‘‘performativity’’ through its more common understanding as ‘‘performance’’ and ‘‘practice.’’ Following Liz Bondi (2005), I argue that the way these notions are used in the article does not depend on any particular theorization of the relationship between emotions and performativity. 2 The term affect can mean many different things and is often ‘‘associated with words such as emotion and feeling’’ (Thrift 2004, 59). Its meanings seem to have derived from different traditions, which include (Thrift 2004) Freudian psychoanalysis (instincts, drives, and emotional impulse), Spinoza’s metaphys- ics (changes in the experiential states of the body through actions and encounters), and the phenom- enological tradition (expressive feeling and behavior manifested through bodily states). 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Beyond the nature/culture div- ide: Corporeality, hybridity and feminist geogra- phies of the environment. In Geography and gender reconsidered, ed. Joanne Sharp, Kath Browne, and Deborah Thien, 21–34. London: Women and Geography Study Group of the Royal Geograph- ical Society. Varanka, Dalia. 2006. Interpreting map art with per- spective learned from J. M. Blaut. Cartographic Perspectives 53:15–23. Virilio, Paul. 1997. Open sky, trans. Julie Rose London: Verso. Wainwright, Joel. Forthcoming. Spaces of resistance in Seattle and Cancún. In Contesting neoliberalism: Urban frontier, ed. Helga Leitner, Jamie Peck, and Eric Sheppard. New York: Guilford. Whatmore, Sarah. 2002. Hybrid geographies: Natures cultures spaces. London: Sage. Wood, Denis. 2006. Map art. Cartographic Perspectives 53:5–14. MEI-PO KWAN is a Distinguished Professor of So- cial and Behavioral Sciences and Dr. Martha L. Corry Faculty Fellow in the Department of Geography, Ohio State University, Columbus, OH 43210-1361. 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work_odcjyjoravep5mqd3izy6inj4i	----	Interspecies Violence and Crimes of Dissent: Communication Ethics and Legitimacy in Message Crimes Involving Wildlife Interspecies Violence and Crimes of Dissent: Communication Ethics and Legitimacy in Message Crimes Involving Wildlife Erica von Essen1 • Michael Allen2 � The Author(s) 2017. This article is an open access publication Abstract In this article, we consider the phenomenon of message crimes involving harm to wildlife from a sociological and criminological perspective. Using a case study of dissident Nordic hunters killing protected wolves to send a message to the state agencies responsible for their conservation, we engage philosophically with the question of wildlife victimhood and why interspecies violence is unjustifiable as a mode of political dissent. As an alternative to the species justice perspective in green criminology, we examine how the acts disrespect animals as moral subjects of public communication and frustrate dialogue regarding what is owed to them in terms of political justice. Introduction In its relatively short life history, green criminology has drawn from a variety of other fields to explore questions of green harms, environmental and species justice (Brisman et al. 2014). In doing so, it has been concerned mostly with description and explanation: what causes individuals, groups, corporations and states to engage in acts harmful to the environment and how does the organization of society promote environmental harms? Perhaps the clearest expression of this approach is to be found in so-called treadmill of production (ToP) theory, which attempts to elucidate the ways in which free market practices trump environmental ideals, laws and regulations, resulting in greater environ- mental degradation (Stretesky et al. 2013). An alternative to this approach has been green cultural criminology, which has focused instead on questions of how agents differently ascribe, construct, or frame meanings of environmental harms, or represent the relationship & Erica von Essen erica.von.essen@slu.se Michael Allen allenmp@mail.etsu.edu 1 Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences, Uppsala, Sweden 2 East Tennessee State University, Johnson City, TN, USA 123 Crit Crim DOI 10.1007/s10612-017-9358-7 http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1007/s10612-017-9358-7&amp;domain=pdf http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1007/s10612-017-9358-7&amp;domain=pdf between economy and ecology generally (Brisman 2015, in press a, c; Brisman and South 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2017, in press a, b; Brisman et al. 2014; McClanahan 2014; McClanahan et al. in press; Mazurek 2017; Schally 2014). Both approaches, however, appear to neglect the question of political legitimation. Here, we have in mind not the framing and construction of meaning by diverse actors, but the public justification of the ideals around justice that undergird environmental laws and regulations in the first place. To a considerable extent, compliance with environmental laws depends on different actors accepting the public justifications offered for them—that is, accepting them as normatively legitimate. Under conditions of pluralism regarding comprehensive concep- tions of justice (Rawls 1993), the legitimacy of law can only be a function of inclusive processes of public communication, deliberation and debate. While deliberative outcomes concerning the justification of laws and regulations may not satisfy everyone, such out- comes can, at least, be seen as legitimate to the extent that all affected actors believe they have had a voice in shaping outcomes. Failures of democratic legitimacy result only when some actors are—or perceive themselves to have been—effectively excluded from such public processes of shaping deliberative outcomes and justifications (Habermas 1984; Bohman 1996). In this article, we consider a particular case of democratic legitimation failure and its implications for wildlife crime—that of Nordic hunters whose frustration with a political process in which they believe themselves to have been marginalized and disrespected has resulted in their turning to crimes of dissent (von Essen et al. 2015). Indeed, some Nordic hunters have resorted to the illegal killing of protected wolves as a way to send a message to the public about their grievances with green laws and environmental regulation they simply do not see as legitimate (Pyka et al. 2007; von Essen and Allen 2015). In order to address the issue of legitimacy failure in relation to conceptions of environmental and species justice, we believe that green criminologists should begin to pay attention to communication ethics and democratic theory, which are best equipped to deal with the phenomenon of illegal wolf hunting as message crime. Message Crimes and Dissent Message crimes are crimes of dissent that are inherently communicative acts. They express denunciation and disavowal of laws (Brownlee 2012), involve engaging authorities in a moral dialogue (Markovitz 2005), and can serve as calls for or discursive openings to political discussion (Smith 2013). In practice, however, much of the communication by crimes of dissent are conveyed indirectly or by proxy rather than openly and clearly in a manifesto (Vanderheiden 2005; von Essen and Allen 2015). Some dissent, for example, communicates mostly by constituting ‘propaganda of the deed’, as direct action retro- spectively sending a statement by inaction and silence, or by way of property damage sending a message to property owners (Martin and Varney 2003; Wee 2004). In this respect, illegal wolf hunting may be seen as a mode of direct action in which the hunters break those specific laws protecting wolves: they indeed dissent by killing and, in so doing, remove one more wolf from the community. But it is also closely aligned to civil dis- obedience (von Essen and Allen 2015) insofar as the illegal act simultaneously commu- nicates the dissenters’ sincere belief that the law is unjust (Rawls 1971) or that it stems from a political process deemed to be illegitimate and is in need of correction (Markovitz 2005; Smith 2013). E. von Essen, M. Allen 123 Crucially, an emerging consensus affirms that such dissent may still operate within circumscribed limits of communication ethics (Medearis 2005). Interpersonal violence is unjustified because it violates a condition of civility, but violence toward property, in most cases, does not disqualify those engaged in civil disobedience from qualifying for moral dialogue (see, e.g., Brisman in press b for a discussion). With respect to interspecies violence—that between human and non-human animals—we stress that, while our article is motivated by our concern with a failure of democratic legitimacy in the process for justifying certain environmental laws and regulations, we are particularly focused on a different kind of legitimacy failure. This is the failure of hunters to achieve communicative legitimacy through their illegal killings of wolves as an expression of their dissent. Ulti- mately, then, we believe there are two failures of legitimacy: (1) the failure of the democratic system for producing legitimate decisions (von Essen and Allen 2017a) and (2) the failure of the hunters to abide by acceptable terms of public communication. Our focus in this article will be squarely on the second of these. Indeed, the question of what dissent may or may not accomplish (Welchman 2001; Sampson et al. 2005; Lovell 2009), and who the targets of dissent might be (Goodwin and Benforado 2015), raises an another question. This concerns crimes of dissent that involve interspecies violence. How civil, and by extension, how justified is harming or killing animals as a form of conscientious political communication (assuming that there is any- thing civil or justified at all about using animals to make a political point)? In the case of harm against domestic animals, the property-owner relationship commonly attributes to the human owner the status of ‘‘victim’’ in cases of wrongdoing to the animal (Yates et al. 2001). But, by contrast, wildlife crimes are more difficult to parse, especially as message crimes. In some countries, wild animals are regarded as state property and the state, through the arm of parliament or some other governmental entity, may decide whether certain predators or invasive species should be exterminated via licensed hunts. To this extent, it is far from clear whether the state, as indeed the ‘owner’ of wild animals, is a victim through bereavement of its protected wildlife or the victimizer of the local com- munities that are made to suffer certain species. While the idea of communicating dissent through acts of harm to wildlife may appear somewhat attenuated to many readers, protest-motivated poaching is a historical phe- nomenon (Manning 1993; Paine 1999). That said, however, the lack of a clear proprietor for wild animals has meant wildlife crimes are understudied and undertheorized (Sollund 2013), and the communicative content of these crimes has been a neglected area of inquiry. Our article should thus be read as a plea for green criminologists to incorporate commu- nication ethics and political philosophy in posing and answering their questions, rather than relying solely on approaches to justice for non-human animals in the moral philosophy literature (Regan 1983; Rowlands 1997). Indeed, as we shall show, contractualist approaches to interspecies justice (where morality is based on contract or agreement) are deeply problematic. But we are, above all, concerned with the need for achieving democratic legitimacy for environmental laws and regulations. Such legitimacy cannot be achieved simply through the imposition of a moral theory—no matter how good that theory may be from the perspective of moral philoso- phy—as the basis for public justification. Achieving legitimacy for environmental laws and regulations requires close attention to the ethics of public communication and the adequacy of public deliberative institutions from the point of view of providing critical uptake for dissenters. In what follows, we contemplate who or what constitutes the target and victims of wildlife crimes of dissent. We outline two propositions in the case of killing wolves. On the Interspecies Violence and Crimes of Dissent: Communication… 123 one hand, the direct victimization of human ‘‘owners.’’ On the other hand, the victim- ization of animals through their illegal killing, which violates a fundamental norm of civility in public communication. Indeed, this norm prescribes that the human participants in such communication should respect the openness of deliberative outcomes. All in all, our article is meant to contribute to ongoing species justice discussions in green crimi- nology by undergirding arguments with theories of communication ethics. In this way, we engage with wildlife as ‘‘complex, contradictory and often politically inconvenient vic- tims’’ (Kearon and Godey 2007, p. 31). We also hope to bring greater philosophical clarity to the notion of a crime of dissent in the context of interspecies justice, building upon our previous work analyzing illegal hunting from the perspective of public communication and democratic legitimacy (von Essen and Allen 2017a). Two Perspectives on the Victims in Wildlife Crime Wildlife as Property The first perspective considers animals as the property of their human owners. Thus, harms done to animals may be intended as an attack on their human owners. While wildlife are, in some places, res nullius or ferae naturae—ostensibly, belonging to no one person (Snijders 2012; Florence 2014)—they may likewise be killed or harmed in order to send a message to the state regarding its wildlife management. In the context of Nordic wolves recently reintroduced and protected as part of the EU Habitats Directive, hunters now ascribe a shadow form of ownership of protected wolves to environmental nongovernmental orga- nizations (ENGOs) and conservationists responsible for their conservation. In Finland, for example, hunters are adamant that ‘‘wolves are the property of the state’’ (Ojalammi and Blomley 2015, p. 22) on the grounds that the state ‘‘puts so much highly visible effort into protecting them, and so attacking them is a means of attacking the state’’ (Holmes 2016, p. 313). This is observed also to apply in Italy, for example, where the protected status of wolves has come to mean state ownership in the eyes of the public (Vitali 2014). Hence, when hunters send severed wolf paws or other body parts of illegally killed wolves to state agencies like the Environmental Protection Agency or to ENGOs associated with their protection (Hagstedt and Korsell 2012)—or when they target wolves with radio-tracked collars whose death will directly be signalled to the relevant authority (von Essen and Allen 2015)—there appears a strong element of wanting to punish the people supportive of the conservation of wolves, an enterprise with which one profoundly disagrees. To be sure, killing wolves also has a practical component: an illegal killing removes one more wolf from the community, thereby making it safer for one’s livestock and hunting dogs, the two principal threats that wolves pose today. That dissent often embodies this dual component—and is not solely a matter of conscientious communication—is now commonly observed by scholars of resistance (Holmes 2007; Vinthagen and Johansson 2013). The epistemic challenge of determining the relative content of defiance and prac- tical motive behind illegal hunting notwithstanding, the aggregate pattern and communi- cation around wolf killings by Nordic hunters signify it as a crime of dissent (von Essen et al. 2015; Pohja-Mykrä 2016). Wolves are no longer seen as part of the common fauna, but as the coddled ‘‘pets’’ of a conservationist urban public, represented in ENGOs over animal welfare and biodiversity conservation (Bisi and Kurki 2008). Because wolves are now symbols onto which broader struggles and resentments are superimposed (Skogen and E. von Essen, M. Allen 123 Thrane 2007; Bell 2015), as well as a charismatic flagship species of the conservation movement, their killing sends a powerful message of dissent to their ‘‘proprietors’’ or ‘‘handlers’’: those supporting their welfare and biodiversity agendas, as well as the state which is obligated to protect certain species according to national and international law. Although understudied in communication theory, killing, stealing or harming wildlife to communicate is surprisingly not a new phenomenon in the context of illegal hunting. In fact, at times, the grammar of such systems of communication has been fairly elaborate and mutually understood by all. In medieval England, for example, the poaching of game, including the category and value of game, where it was felled, and how it was killed, sent specific messages of dissent toward the unpopular landed gentry perceived to have appropriated ferae naturae by enclosures (Manning 1993). Deer-stealing, for example, was followed by venision feasts by commoners andpossessed a clear material gain component. But it also functioned as a statement of defiance in this context. In a more modern context—the case of reindeer in northern Norway, Sweden and Finland—reveals how the indigenous Sami used reindeer theft, harm or killing as a means to transmit messages to different herders in the region with whom there has been ongoing feuding (Paine 1999). Again, it was reindeers’ human proprietors who were the ‘‘victim–owners’’, in the words of Fitzgerald (2010), and considerably less focus was on animal victimhood. In the context of killing wolves as a crime of dissent, the argument thus far has been that victim–owners are, symbolically, conservationists and state actors actively involved in their conservation. But it may be argued further that the victims or targets of such crimes also are the public at large. This follows a trend to expand categories of victimhood across multiple axes of humans (see Brisman this issue), although rarely across species bound- aries (Fitzgerald 2010). How might the killing of wolves by hunters ‘‘victimize’’ the public? First, in the Nordic countries, the wolf is considered a ‘‘public good’’, and the public has strongly supported its reintroduction (Sandström et al. 2014). As is now fre- quently the case, the public features prominently by proxy participation in ENGOs, con- tributing to wolf conservation through financial donations and membership schemes (Johansen and Martin 2008). Second, it can be argued that such illegal killings violate the environmental rights of the public—the right to a common fauna, and the right to the good of biodiversity (Nurse 2016). These rights need not be enacted by the public in the sense that the public does not have to make material use of such goods. Instead, in the present ecosystem services paradigm, protecting wolves simply provides these people with a sense of wellbeing, alleviation of guilt, and nature reconciliation. To this end, these may be ‘‘optional goods’’ rather than fundamental rights, as animal rights activists ultimately choose their convic- tions. The removal of these ‘‘goods’’ via illegal hunting may hence therefore be unfortu- nate, but not constitute a violation of the activists’ fundamental rights (Hadley 2015). In other words, the killing of wolves does not harm human health, economy or security for instance, as might be the case in the (seemingly) more pressing cases of environmental injustice (Hall 2011). Nurse (2016), however, observes that the welfare and viability of wildlife currently constitutes a ‘‘charitable good’’ to humans rather than a fundamental right. At the same time, he suggests that their welfare contributes to fundamental rights: it creates the strongly institutionalized protection of universal civil liberties (p. 176) and it adds ‘‘to the culture of fundamental rights within society which benefits vulnerable groups’’ (p. 177). Expanding the boundaries of victimhood in wildlife crime from direct-owners (landowners on whose land wildlife roams), symbolic-owners (the state and ENGOs) to residual-owners (the community with conservation goals) raises a number of issues. Interspecies Violence and Crimes of Dissent: Communication… 123 Indeed, green criminologists, such as Hall (2011) are upfront and optimistic about increased orientation toward the ‘‘inclusive rather than exclusive’’ (p. 377) understandings of victims across these diverse categories, allowing for the potential for self-identification following, for example, emotional deprivation. But this also reflects the inherently anthropocentric basis of environmental justice, whereby rights and justice through wildlife as means are extended to an increasing diversity of humans (Hiskes 2008; White 2008). As Norton’s (1991) ‘convergence hypothesis’ suggests, however, such anthropocentrism is never bad if it results in recognition of some sort of harm involved in the crime. It does not matter whether it was the concern for harm to wildlife directly or as harm done to the persons supportive of it that provided motivation for recognizing the injustice. So long as the injustice is recognized. Still, one can anticipate the objection from more orthodox scholars: for damage to property (wildlife) to target any one individual, there needs to be a clearly identifiable owner of the property (Hadley 2015). As noted above, hunters have recently attributed shadow ownership of wolves to ENGOs, but whether the ENGOs consider themselves ‘‘victim–owners’’ is an empirical question. Moreover, the broader public’s financial or emotional investment in the welfare of wolves may not meaningfully qualify them as owners in this sense, thereby making a weak case for their being con- sidered ‘‘victimized’’ when wolves are illegally killed by hunters. Wildlife as Direct-Victims in Crimes of Dissent The above-presented view of wolves as intermediaries used to communicate message of dissent to owners can be challenged on the basis of its anthropocentrism. Some green criminologists object to construing sentient animals as utilitarian objects and advocate recognizing the victimhood of the harmed animal (Wellsmith 2011; Sollund 2013). From this perspective, the wolf is a direct victim qua its standing as a subject-of-a-life of illegal killings as in the Nordic countries. This need not necessarily be a controversial position and ascribing the status of ‘‘victim’’ to the wolf does not preclude also considering the humans responsible for wolf conservation as victims. In fact, the victimization of the wolf could be argued as integral to the victimization of its owners (e.g., conservationists, the public, the state). When a rogue associate murders the daughter of the don of the mafia, she is clearly directly victimized at the same time as her father receives a message that also victimizes him. It becomes less straightforward, however, when we take wolves as the target of dissent to its full implications, for example, as scholars unwittingly do when they construe wolves as the targets of hate crimes (Tønnessen 2010; Sollund 2014). A hate crime need not necessarily be a message crime. It might perhaps be a private expresion of hatred, absent any public communicative intent. But supposing it has a public communicative intent, such as ‘I hate you and your kind’, (Jacobs and Potter 2000), there are no compelling grounds to believe that this will be understood by those wolves who survive the targetting of their peers, in the same way this can be recognized by the recipients of such a message by the surviving human victims of racial or gender-based hate crimes. The crime is thereby one purely of retribution and incapacitation, communicating nothing to the surviving wolf community. Aside from hate crimes, it may appear equally—if not more—absurd to send a message to the wolves pitched at the level of justice, as standardly required for crimes of dissent like those involving civil disobedience. After all, the wolves cannot be reasoned with on this level and so, even if we accepted the idea that killing one wolf sends a message of retribution over ‘just deserts’ and of deterrence to other wolves, other wolves cannot plausibly be the recipient of such a message (although wolves may learn to fear humans if E. von Essen, M. Allen 123 they see humans killing other members of their species or pack). Thus, when we bind animals to moral agency, they may accrue greater benefits and rights, including recognition as victims in this case, but this also means imposing on them obligations they cannot justifiably comprehend (Scruton 2000)—as rational interlocutors in a moral dialogue over justice. This might lead to a middleground proposition: wolves are not moral agents who can be held accountable by dissenters, but they are moral subjects onto whom harms can be done by other moral agents, notably human hunters. In this sense, wolves are similar in standing to ‘‘marginal’’ humans who cannot participate in the circumstances of justice or be held accountable for breaches of justice, but who are nevertheless recipients of justice (Tanner 2006). Unfortunately, the practice of illegal killings in the Nordic countries as crimes of dissent demonstrates inconsistency in the wolf’s standing as a moral agent or subject. Indeed, the way some of these killings unfold point unequivocally toward the endorsement of a conception of wolves as direct-victims and as intended targets of communication. First, there appears to be genuine hatred toward wolves among some hunting factions; wolf kills are described as crimes of passion resulting from grief and resentment over the loss of one’s hunting dog, for example, or the maiming of sheep in one’s pen (Skogen et al. 2013; Peltola and Heikkilä 2015). So-called large carnivore retaliatory killings constitutes a chapter unto itself in human–wildlife conflict literature (Liu et al. 2011) and is a partic- ularly strong current in the research conducted on hunters’ relationship with wolves in the Nordic countries. Here, hatred and fear form ‘‘contagious and socially acceptable feelings’’ (Peltola and Heikkilä 2015, p. 719) as drivers of illegal killings (Pyka et al. 2007; Tøn- nessen 2010). Although it is difficult to ensure the illegally killed wolf is the same wolf that killed one’s dog—(‘‘targeted punishment’’ to Goodwin and Benforado 2015, p. 269)— revenge provides a powerful motive whereby any wolf becomes representative of past harms done by wolves in the area. Here, wolves may be the victims of hate—if not hate crimes intended to send a message to the wolf community. Whatever is communicted as hatred of wolves motivating their illegal killing remains internal to the human speech community. This may have a limited epistemic value in communicating the feelings and perceptions of some rural residents to the larger public. But expressions of hatred towards wolves is not by itself a form of communication that promotes reasoned dialogue at the level of justice and so, similar to violent forms of dissent that are more about violence through direct action, in this latter respect, such expressions lack any normatively appropriate epistemic value. The second argument regarding how hunters construe wolves themselves as the direct targets of illegal killings builds upon the observation that hunters often state that particular individual wolves deserve to receive punishment or a message. Typically, hunters charge certain wolves and not others with having breached the tacit terms of interspecies co- existence, whether by moving surreptiously closer to human settlements, displaying ‘un- natural’ behavior, becoming increasingly tame before humans (thereby violating a wild- ness boundary), systematically predating on livestock or domestic animals, or hybridizing with dogs (see, for example, Pohja-Mykrä and Kurki 2014; Hermans 2015; Theodorakea and von Essen 2016). Hence, it is viewed as more justified to kill these particular animals, who are implicitly framed as moral agents capable or cognizant of violating social con- tracts or codes. Binding wolves to such contractual agency thus makes it possible to understand crimes of dissent as being directed against them—as agents capable of such higher-order cognition. This kind of argument, however, replicates the error from the previous arguments of implausibly attributing powers of moral agency to the wolves rather than treating them simply as moral subjects (Regan 1983). Interspecies Violence and Crimes of Dissent: Communication… 123 The third and final argument that currently betrays the view that wolves are direct victims of these crimes of dissent is that if hunters’ reasoning is to believed, they may use these killings as ostensive warnings of deterrence to other wolves. This much can be read from an oft-repeated ‘‘teach-wolves-to-stay-away’’ narrative that is predicated on the need to re-instill a sense of fear of humans in them, alleged to have been lost under the current strict protection policy. While imposing hunting pressure on wolves generally may con- tribute to the species’ adaptation to living separately from humankind, it remains highly questionable to argue that particular kills constitute message crimes to other wolves in the pack for the reasons we have already given. Nevertheless, such strategies of imposing hunting pressure have constituted a way of dealing with wolves in Sweden, to the point where ‘The Swedish System’, as it came to be known internationally, has meant stringing up wolves and making an example of them to their fellow wolves (Bergström et al. 2015). Independent of hunters’ rhetoric surrounding the killing of wolves, there are clearly some ways in which the wolf would seem to qualify for victimhood. In Christie’s (1986) ideal victim framework, animals fulfill every condition: they are weak and vulnerable (Linzey 2009); the offender is ‘big and bad’ in relation (the hunter); the offender and victim had no prior personal relationship (beyond the offender’s generalized hatred for the species); the victim was not in the wrong place at the wrong time—it was in a place where it could not be blamed for being (i.e., nature); and the victim was engaged in respectable behavior when victimized, in the sense that it predated ‘correctly’ within the moral economy of prey animals, namely wildlife (Bogliogli 2009). As we have argued above, the notion that wolves violate standards of respectable behavior when, for example, they predate domestic animals in a human inhabited area—in effect, breaching a con- tractual agreement—is difficult to uphold. Indeed, this conceptual problem with contrac- tualism is powerfully entrenched by the state’s licensing hunting. As we contend, by all accounts, the wolf approximates an ideal victim and the hunter, qua his power, approxi- mates an ideal offender. As such, it is obvious hunters view themselves as victims of wolf attacks to their property, and the wolves as the criminals. Goodwin and Benforado (2015) write that this is easily done by ascribing mental states to non-human animals: while these mental states clearly fall short of the traditional ‘‘guilty mind’’ (p. 641)—or mens rea required for criminal culpability under the law—the ascription of such states enables hunters to (mistakenly) view animals as appropriate targets of moral retribution. In this section, we have outlined the two principal propositions regarding wildlife standing in crimes of dissent that involve sending a message: (1) taking wolves as means by which one punishes the real targets: owners in various constellations of support of them; and (2) taking wolves as direct victims and targets in themselves of dissent. We have shown the propositions are not always mutually exclusive, but that endorsement of the first premise includes a highly inclusive, if anthropocentric, view of victimhood across human categories. The second premise was shown to have some problematic implications for crimes of dissent in terms of taking wolves as communicative, moral agents that is nec- essarily required by political theory. In the next section, we develop an alternative account of victimhood that represents a neutral middleground between these two propositions. It is neutral in the sense that it endorses neither the proposition that wolves—as ‘sentient property’ (Fitzgerald 2010)—are the intermediary means of sending a message to victim–owners nor the proposition that they are moral agents, with whom communication is possible at the level of a public dialogue about justice. Instead, we argue that they are victimized in the sense that these acts violate the terms of civility underlying public communication. E. von Essen, M. Allen 123 Civility and the Openness of Democratic Public Communication In our previous work considering illegal huntering as a crime of dissent, we argued that the hunters could only partly fulfill the conditions of civil disobedience (von Essen and Allen 2015). In particular, hunters violated the ‘publicity condition’ for disobedient public communication by conducting their illegal hunting as ‘shoot, shovel, and shut up’. Here, we take that analysis of hunters violating communication ethics a step further by arguing that illegal hunting is also a violation of civility, where this may be taken as ‘‘a minimal commitment to public reciprocal respect for the other’’ (Arnett and Arneson 1999, p. 285). Civility delegitimizes interpersonal violence between the participants in public dialogue. It does so for the obvious reason that reciprocal public communication is effectively fore- closed when some interlocutors lose their lives at the hands of other interlocutors. In other words, fatal violence replaces dialogue (Martin and Varney 2003); it is the performative termination of dialogue on justice. Civility may or may not be compatible with causing damage to property. Damage to property—perhaps within certain parameters—can facilitate dialogue inasmuch as it does not violate a condition of civility, which is currently ascribed to humans alone (Zinn 1980). Setting fire to buildings may be rude and disruptive, but so long as it does not harm humans, it may qualify as civil disobedience. Indeed, in Medearis (2005)’s words it would be ‘‘exceedingly dangerous […] to suggest that a social movement could never act in such a way as to hinder others’ full and exclusive enjoyment of their property’’ (p. 70). Others, like Hettinger (2007), disagree with this assessment, however, suggesting there is still significant vicarious harm in the case of property damage. Yet still others intimate that the civility condition of dissent is more complex than a violence/non-violence to property distinction (Brownlee 2012) or that some non-violent cases of dissent may result in more harm than violent ones (Lefkowitz 2007). Martin (2008), for example, argues that civility is not an absolute concept but varies according to the norms of a situation. That said, however, civility is a virtue of public communication exercised only within the human speech community, and only then among those members of this community who are capable of meeting the relatively high cognitive demands of reciprocity and ratiocination about justice (Rawls 1994). But, for reasons we have already given, wolves are necessarily excluded from such a contractual agreement. Of course, reciprocal com- munication of, say, emotions, commands, and intentions can also take place among cog- nitively disabled humans and between human and non-human animals, thus creating a basis of solidarity (von Essen and Allen 2017b). But this takes place below the level of civility in public communication about justice. For their part, wolves cannot be civil participants in public dialogue. But there can be civil public dialogue about what is owed to wolves at the level of justice. Here, the exclusion of wolves and other non-human animals, as co-equal moral agents alongside humans in civil public dialogue, might be viewed as anthropocentric, if unavoidably and regrettably so. Indeed, reciprocal justice- dialogue is necessarily human-centred. But this does not preclude the possibility of identifying a sense in which wolves are wronged by being excluded from such dialogue as moral subjects of human concern regarding appropriate terms of interspecies justice. What is this sense? A key aspect of reciprocal respect in public dialogue is the commitment to holding open—not antecedently prejudging or preempting—the outcomes of public reason-giving on a controversial issue of justice (Cissna and Anderson 2003). The purpose of public dialogue is to reach a reasonable agreement on what should count as justice in the Interspecies Violence and Crimes of Dissent: Communication… 123 interlocutors’ relations to one another or in their relations to the moral subject of dialogue who are not also co-equal moral agents participating in the exchange of reasons. Agree- ments are reasonable (Rawls 1994) and democratically legitimate (Habermas 1985) to the extent they are the fuction of reciprocity and respect in this kind of exchange. But illegal hunters violate civility as reciprocity and reasonableness by virtue of their politically dissent acts of killing wolves. Clearly, hunters are the ones dissenting from past reasonable agreements that wolves are entitled to protected status under law as members of an endangered species. It would also just as clearly be appropriate for them to motivate public dialogue that reconsiders this status for wolves potentially moving to a new reasonable agreement on recinding the protected status of wolves. But that is not what illegal hunters do. They violate civility, reciprocity and reson- ableness, by antecedently prejudging and preempting the outcome of public dialogue about the protected status of wolves. Talisse (2005) argues that questions of justice in these cases are essentially settled for the dissenter, by not being subjected to any further scrutiny, consideration or compromise. Here, the hunter’s epistemic confidence (or epistemic ar- rogance as according to Garner 2016) is such that he already knows (or thinks he knows) what justice is in this case and what its implementation requires. At any rate, illegal hunters preempt dialogue in the case of those wolves whose lives they take prior to any new reasonable agreement having been reached on whether to uphold or recind this status. This is fundamentally disrepectful to other interlocutors in the dialogue, but it is also funda- mentally disrepectful to the wolves as the moral subjects of public dialogue in the sense that it fails to take seriously the idea that they are properly moral subject of concern at the level of political justice. If ‘dead men don’t speak,’ as observed for crimes of dissent (Martin and Varney 2003), then, by parity of reasoning, those who would speak on behalf of wolves in open public communication about their protected status of endangered ani- mals cannot speak on behalf of dead wolves. At any rate, they cannot speak on their behalf in the sense of securing any kind of justice for those already dead. Of course, an objection might be raised that public dialogue is cut off only in the case of those dead wolves who have already been killed by the hunters for the purpose of moti- vating a dialogue. Reciprocal and respectful public dialogue may then ensue regarding the protected status of wolves whose lives have not already been taken by the hunters, and of the species generally. Indeed, assuming they were willing to hold a moratorium on any further illegal hunting activities until the outcome of this dialogue has been reached in some new reasonable public decision, the hunters would also show due respect for these living wolves as moral subjects of the dialogue. To be sure, that is a rather large assumption of make—one fraught with practical difficulties: how would such a public dialogue be staged and would it be viewed as fair to all participants rather than biased in favor of some? But still the point remains that it is conceivable that it could honor civility, reciprocity and respect for their interlocutors and the wolves under this idealized and hypothetical condition. That, however, does nothing to change the fact that their continued acts of illegal hunting in the non-hypothetical present do violate these norms. Conclusion This article has argued that the illegal hunting of wolves victimizes and wrongs wolves as moral subjects entitled to treatment according to the terms of a reasonable agreement to be reached through open public dialogue at the level of political justice. Here, we stress that E. von Essen, M. Allen 123 we are talking about political justice. At the level of moral analysis, there may be reasons to say that no wolves should ever be intentionally killed by humans, legally or illegally. At that level, all wolves are potentially the victims of any kind of hunting practice. But we take no stand here on such important questions of moral theory. Our goal for this article has not been to offer some moral theory of justice for wolves. Instead, it has been to encourage a shift in the orientation of green criminology to questions of communication ethics and democratic legitimacy. We contend that some green harms—the illegal killing of protected wolves come about as the result of legitimacy failures of the laws that protect them. The proper response to such harms is, we believe, to take seriously the sincere belief of the hunters that the political system for justifying the legitimacy of environment law has failed in their eyes and to examine possible reforms and innovation in deliberative fora. This indeed is a project we have taken up elsewhere (von Essen and Allen 2017a). In this respect, we have concerned ourselves here not with the legitimacy of the deliberation system for justifying environmental laws and regulations, but with the com- municative legitimacy of hunters’ dissenting act of illegal killing. And, as such, we dis- tinguish between the legitimacy of the communicative act of dissent from a system that is thought to be processually illegitimate and the legitimacy of that system. Indeed, we conclude that the communicative act of illegal wolf killing fails the legitimacy test of civility. Nonetheless, we believe both questions of legitimacy need to be more thoroughly examined by green criminologists. Concepts of species justice will likelier than not fail from the standpoint of the legitimacy of law absent the necessary public process of deliberating their meaning in the case of wolves and other species generally. 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Cullompton: Willan Publishing. Yates, R., Powell, C., & Beirne, P. (2001). Horse maiming in the English countryside: Moral panic, human deviance, and the social construction of Victimhood. Society and Animals, 9(1), 1–23. Zinn, H. (1980). A people’s history of the United States: 1492 to present. New York: HarperCollins. E. von Essen, M. Allen 123 http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11572-014-9364-8 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17524032.2016.1269821 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17524032.2016.1269820 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17524032.2016.1269820 Interspecies Violence and Crimes of Dissent: Communication Ethics and Legitimacy in Message Crimes Involving Wildlife Abstract Introduction Message Crimes and Dissent Two Perspectives on the Victims in Wildlife Crime Wildlife as Property Wildlife as Direct-Victims in Crimes of Dissent Civility and the Openness of Democratic Public Communication Conclusion Open Access References 
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work_ojabyz246bdebpb7stira3coce	----	www.ssoar.info Special Issue on Intergroup Emotions: Introduction Giner-Sorolla, Roger; Mackie, Diane M.; Smith, Eliot R. Postprint / Postprint Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with: www.peerproject.eu Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation: Giner-Sorolla, R., Mackie, D. M., & Smith, E. R. (2007). Special Issue on Intergroup Emotions: Introduction. Group Processes & Intergroup Relations, 10(1), 5-8. https://doi.org/10.1177/1368430206071661 Nutzungsbedingungen: Dieser Text wird unter dem "PEER Licence Agreement zur Verfügung" gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zum PEER-Projekt finden Sie hier: http://www.peerproject.eu Gewährt wird ein nicht exklusives, nicht übertragbares, persönliches und beschränktes Recht auf Nutzung dieses Dokuments. Dieses Dokument ist ausschließlich für den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen Gebrauch bestimmt. Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments müssen alle Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise auf gesetzlichen Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses Dokument nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen Sie dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die Nutzungsbedingungen an. Terms of use: This document is made available under the "PEER Licence Agreement ". For more Information regarding the PEER-project see: http://www.peerproject.eu This document is solely intended for your personal, non-commercial use.All of the copies of this documents must retain all copyright information and other information regarding legal protection. You are not allowed to alter this document in any way, to copy it for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the document in public, to perform, distribute or otherwise use the document in public. By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated conditions of use. Diese Version ist zitierbar unter / This version is citable under: https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-228108 http://www.ssoar.info https://doi.org/10.1177/1368430206071661 http://www.peerproject.eu http://www.peerproject.eu https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-228108 Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 2007 Vol 10(1) 5–8 Special Issue on Intergroup Emotions: Introduction Roger Giner-Sorolla University of Kent Diane M. Mackie University of California, Santa Barbara Eliot R. Smith University of Indiana Author’s note Address correspondence to Roger Giner- Sorolla, Centre for the Study of Group Processes, Department of Psychology, University of Kent, Canterbury, Kent CT2 7NP, UK [email: rsg@kent.ac.uk] Copyright © 2006 SAGE Publications (London, Thousand Oaks, CA and New Delhi) 10:1; 5–8; DOI: 10.1177/1368430206071661 It is hard to imagine studying the psychology of intergroup relations without a theory of group-based emotions. The everyday language of social issues, after all, betrays the importance of emotion in both intergroup prejudice and intragroup cohesion: ‘hate crime’, ‘Black pride’, ‘guilty liberals’, ‘homophobia’, ‘Islamophobia’, ‘angry White males’, ‘name and shame’, and lest we forget the etymology of this last highly charged term, ‘terrorism’. Yet it is only in the past 15 years that theory and research on the interface between emotions and groups has really taken off in social psychology. A look at current journals and conference programs leaves no doubt that group-based emotions are a vigorously studied topic today. Nevertheless, as with any rapidly advancing topic, there is obvious room for further expansion, consolidation, and creativity, and each of the eight articles we have chosen for this special issue illustrates this point admirably. A quick look at the reference and introduction sections of these articles shows the widespread infl uence of two theoretical frameworks con- necting emotions and groups. One of these, intergroup emotion theory (IET; Smith, 1993; Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000; Mackie & Smith, 2002), addresses how, when and why individuals will feel specifi c emotions in reaction to events that bear upon social groups. IET combines in- sights from appraisal theory and social identity theory. Specifi cally, it uses the concept of the social self as a bridge between events seen as relevant to a group and emotions felt by an indi- vidual who identifi es with the group. In an appraisal interpretation, we feel angry at an individual because we see him or her as being the agent of a bad outcome for our own self. Likewise, in the IET interpretation, we can feel angry at another group that we see as the agent of a bad outcome for our own group. This occurs because, in the process of social identifi cation, we invest a portion of our self in the group (Smith & Henry, 1996). Moreover, different specifi c emotions have implications for adaptive action beyond their positive or negative valence (Frijda, 1986). Therefore, research derived from IET can use individual appraisal theories to predict what perceptions will lead to anger and attack, fear and withdrawal, or guilt and compensation between groups—to name only Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 10(1) 6 three of the dozens of meaningfully different emotions. The other theoretical framework concerns itself with the association of emotions with the ingroup versus other groups. Specifi cally, the theory of subjective essentialism sees bias in the attribution of emotions to other groups as one implicit marker of their infrahumanization (Leyens et al., 2000). Complex, secondary emo- tions such as guilt, pride, and nostalgia are seen as uniquely human. Group members also show a well-replicated tendency to see secondary emo- tions as more characteristic of the ingroup than the outgroup, subjectively denying outgroup members a fully human essence. Thus, while IET emphasizes appraisal-generated emotions felt by groups toward other groups, the theory of infrahumanization emphasizes bias in ascribing emotions to other groups, motivated by a reluctance to acknowledge their members as essentially like one’s own group. Although we selected the eight research articles in this issue on their considerable individual merits, they do show some interesting shared sub-themes that work to expand one or both of these theoretical ideas. First, several articles address a specifi c concern that often arises when applying intergroup emotion theory to self- critical emotions such as guilt and shame. A tendency has been observed for individuals high in group identifi cation to show lesser, not greater, amounts of self-critical affect when confronted with blameworthy group actions (Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, & Manstead 1998). A common explanation of this phenomenon is that individuals are motivated to defend against emotions that are painful and threatening to their collective esteem. Three of the articles in this issue examine processes that might serve as such defenses. Mallett and Swim test a number of proposed determinants of intergroup guilt against each other simultaneously across a number of different social groups, and fi nd an overall tendency for justifi cations of intergroup differences to reduce the effects of perceived collective responsibility in predicting guilt. Just as intriguing is the failure of these justifi cations to reduce the im- pact of the perceived importance of the group’s own advantage on guilt; in fact, justifi cations increased with increasing importance. This sug- gests that strong perceived inequalities may create seemingly irrational feelings of guilt, even when responsibility is not acknowledged and justifi cations for inequality are accepted. The article by Gill and Andreychik looks at a concept, ultimately inspired by attribution the- ory, that might be seen as the converse of Mallett and Swim’s justifi cations. External social explan- ations, in these studies, are beliefs that endorse situational causes for the different status of an outgroup. Independently of a number of other plausible infl uences, including internal social explanations, external explanations of group differences predicted greater guilt among Whites toward Blacks in the United States. Here, it is not so much the justifi ability of inequality that accom- panies lower guilt, but its unjustifi ability that accom- panies higher guilt. This offers both a parallel and an interesting contrast to the emerging literature on justifi cations of prejudice. The collective contribution of Zebel, Pennekamp, van Zomeren, Doosje, van Kleef, Vliek, and van der Schalk investigates emotions linked to the Netherlands’ colonial past using an innovative method based on family history. Family is a con- nection to the collective past that is harder to deny than mere nationality. While these studies’ Dutch participants showed little collective guilt for colonial injustices to which they only had a national link, they showed more guilt when they believed their family to have been involved. When group members are faced with past atrocities that defy easy justifi cation, this fi nding points to one way to overcome the historical denial that forms a second kind of defense against collective guilt. This last article also illustrates a second theme that emerges in this issue: novel approaches to group identifi cation’s role in determining the strength of intergroup feelings. Crisp, Heuston, Farr, and Turner offer evidence that the ex- tent of identifi cation with a sports team can affect not just the intensity of group-based 7 Giner-Sorolla et al. special issue on intergroup emotions: introduction emotions, as previously shown, but the qualitative nature of such emotions. This reminds us that identifi cation is not just a volume knob that cranks up the strength of an individual’s group- based emotions, but can determine whether the individual sees him or herself as the protagonist rather than a mere spectator in the group’s dramas. In appraisal theories of emotion, self versus other involvement is often a crucial ap- praisal distinguishing between pairs of very different emotion types. The approach of Crisp and co-authors is thus ripe for application to emotions beyond their initial focus on anger and sadness. Pennekamp, Doosje, Zebel, and Fischer fi nd it necessary to go beyond a simple model of identifi cation in studying the determinants of collective anger among the Dutch Surinamese minority and among women. Here, too, attitudes toward the collective past show their importance. In particular, the perceived relevance of the past to present-day issues predicts collective anger, mediating the effects of identifi cation. Together with the Zebel et al. studies in this issue, these fi ndings make a compelling case that identity extends across social time as well as social space, and that both dimensions of identity need to be measured when predicting reactions to the historical past. A third theme, shared by two articles, examines infrahumanization through denial of secondary emotions as a barrier to positive intergroup outcomes. The study reported by Cuddy, Rock, and Norton takes infrahumanization as its major focus. It assessed public reactions shortly after the devastating and ethnically divisive impact of Hurricane Katrina, and demonstrates that infrahumanization of outgroup members in that context accompanies a lower willingness to help them. No less divisive is the ongoing re- ligious violence in Northern Ireland. Within this setting, the studies reported by Tam, Hewstone, Cairns, Tausch, Maio, and Kenworthy deal with infrahumanization as a barrier to forgiveness in the wider context of intergroup contact and personally felt anger. This article has a particularly welcome integration of perceived and felt emotions, showing the two factors to have independent effects on forgiveness. At the same time, we should not ignore the more subtle interplay shown by Cuddy and colleagues between the personal emotion of empathy and perceived secondary emotions. As they point out, their results suggest that people help an out- group only when they spontaneously empathize with the outgroup members’ uniquely human sentiments. Exploring the relations between personal emotions and perceived outgroup emotions looks to be a particularly promising direction in this area of research. The article by Tapias, Glaser, Keltner, Vasquez, and Wickens contrasts the emotions of anger and disgust in a way that bears on a quite different theoretical perspective relevant to intergroup psychology—namely, attitude theory. Many appraisal theories focus on emotion as an adaptive response to challenges and op- portunities as they arise. At the same time, emotional reactions can inscribe themselves in memory as schematic associations with an attitude object, forming an affective component of attitude that informs future reactions. Tapias and colleagues provide a demonstration of this latter point. They show that the incidental mention of outgroups typically associated with either anger or disgust can prime the experience of that specifi c emotion, and that conversely, chronic susceptibility to anger or disgust goes with more intense attitudes toward the relevant outgroups. This fi nding reminds us that emo- tional associations can be self-sustaining, arising from sources other than adaptation to the cur- rent situation. It also tightly links group-based emotions to individual-level emotions by showing that individual differences in susceptibility have similar effects at both levels. In conclusion, we would fi rst like to thank our authors, all of whom have contributed research of great creativity and rigor. The anonymous reviewers and consulting editors who contributed so many insights to the editorial process, and impressed us with their diligence and promptness, also deserve their share of praise. Our thanks for making this issue possible in the fi rst place go to the editorial board of GPIR, Dominic Abrams, and Mike Hogg. Finally, we are extremely grateful Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 10(1) 8 for the efforts of the GPIR editorial assistant, Katerina Tasiopoulou, without whose talent and dedication this project would have been far more diffi cult and far less organized. References Doosje, B., Branscombe, N. R., Spears, R., & Manstead, A. S. R. (1998). Guilty by association: When one’s group has a negative history. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 75, 872–886. Frijda, N. H. (1986). The emotions. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Leyens, J. P., Paladino, P. M., Rodriguez-Torres, R., Vaes, J., Demoulin, S., Rodriguez-Perez, A. et al. (2000). The emotional side of prejudice: The attribution of secondary emotions to ingroups and outgroups. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 4, 186–197. Mackie, D. M., Devos, T., & Smith, E. R. (2000). Intergroup emotions: Explaining offensive action tendencies in an intergroup context. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 79, 602–616. Mackie, D. M., & Smith, E. R. (2002). Beyond prejudice: Moving from positive and negative evaluations to differentiated reactions to social groups. In D. M. Mackie & E. R. Smith (Eds.), From prejudice to intergroup emotions: Differentiated reactions to social groups (pp. 1–12). New York: Psychology Press. Smith, E. R. (1993). Social identity and social emotions: Toward new conceptualizations of prejudice. In D. M. Mackie & D. L. Hamilton (Eds.), Affect, cognition, and stereotyping: Interactive processes in group perception (pp. 297–315). Smith, E. R., & Henry, S. (1996). An in-group becomes part of the self: Response time evidence. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 22, 635–642. Biographical notes roger giner-sorolla has been on the permanent faculty of the Department of Psychology at the University of Kent at Canterbury since 2001, where he is now Senior Lecturer. He received his PhD from New York University and completed an NIMH post-doctoral fellowship at the University of Virginia. His research interests include affective attitudes and the role of four specifi c emotions – anger, disgust, guilt, and shame – in moral judgments, self-control, and intergroup prejudice. In 2004, together with Rupert Brown, he organized a European Science Foundation workshop on intergroup emotions at Kent, which led to the initial proposal for this special issue of Group Processes & Intergroup Relations. diane m. mackie is professor of psychology and communication at the University of California, Santa Barbara. She received her PhD from Princeton University. Her research interests include the affective antecedents and consequences of intergroup relations, as well as social infl uence and persuasion. With Eliot Smith, she is co-editor of From Prejudice to Intergroup Emotions (Psychology Press, 2002). eliot r. smith is professor in the Department of Psychological and Brain Sciences at Indiana University, Bloomington, and he also holds a Special Chair at the Free University, Amsterdam. His PhD is from Harvard University. His work centers on the role of emotions in prejudice and intergroup behavior, and socially situated cognition. 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work_okwrhfovhrgsnpqypkxtli5d64	----	Introduction to Deconstructing Privilege in the Classroom: Teaching as a Racialized Pedagogy Stud Philos Educ (2018) 37:211–214 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11217-018-9611-x 1 3 Introduction to Deconstructing Privilege in the Classroom: Teaching as a Racialized Pedagogy Shilpi Sinha1  · Shaireen Rasheed2 Published online: 30 March 2018 © Springer Science+Business Media B.V., part of Springer Nature 2018 In a post-Trump climate in the United States, racial tensions and societal divisions have been on the rise. Educational institutions themselves have been the sites of these divisions and tensions, as evidenced by a rise in hate crimes across college campuses and incidences of bullying of immigrant youth in schools. Conversations on diversity and difference through the lens of multiculturalism and tolerance can no longer adequately address issues surrounding the Black Lives Matter movement, The Muslim Ban, current Homophobic policies against LGBTQIA and xenophobic policies targeted towards Hispanics and other immigrant groups. The essays in this series deconstruct issues of privilege and race in the classroom by bringing to bear the lens of intersectionality to philosophical thought. Ethical teacher-stu- dent interactions described through relational and postmodern accounts emphasize teach- ers’ openness, vulnerability and responsiveness to their students, signifying an embodied account of interaction. However, what has been missing from this discussion is how teach- ers’ embodiment is also fundamentally racialized and what effect this may have on the very interactions being described, explored or valued. An underlying assumption of the essays in this special issue is that responsive and hospitable addressing of the societal tensions and divisions that emerge in higher education classrooms, especially those situated in teacher education programs within predominantly white institutions, can only begin to be evinced Versions of the papers in this issue were presented as part of the 2017 Philosophy of Education Society annual conference panel entitled, “Putting the Ethics of Hospitality in Conversation with Raced Bodies and their Experiences,” in Seattle, Washington. * Shilpi Sinha Sinha@adelphi.edu Shaireen Rasheed srasheed@liu.edu 1 Philosophical Foundations of Education, Ruth S. Ammon School of Education, Adelphi University, 1 South Ave., Garden City, NY 11530, USA 2 Philosophical Foundations, Diversity and Social Justice, Post Campus of Long Island University, 720 Northern Blvd., Brookville, NY 11548, USA http://orcid.org/0000-0003-0921-6791 http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1007/s11217-018-9611-x&domain=pdf 212 S. Sinha, S. Rasheed 1 3 if the racialized embodiment of the educator, with all its epistemological and ontological associations is acknowledged and foregrounded. Thus, the purpose of this issue is twofold: first it is an invitation to re-think educational spaces in relation to the racialized bodies of educators and students, and second, to re-think what it might mean within the higher education classroom for hospitality to be enacted through the racialized bodies of educa- tors, where the racialized body encompasses educators of color as well as white educators. Accordingly, some of the questions explored in this issue are the following: How might educators of color be better supported in institutions of higher education? How do educa- tors create pedagogical spaces to help students understand privilege? What happens when students are resistant to understanding issues of privilege? What happens when we ask stu- dents to reflect on their intersectional identities and their multiple lived experiences? How do educators construct their own racialized identities in relation to their students when dis- cussing issues of privilege in the classroom? How are we “ambushed” (Yancy 2012, 2017) by our own racialized bodies in relation to race and privilege? While each of the essays contain different points of emphasis, a common thread may be evidenced in that teaching, understood through the orientation of the racialized bod- ies of educators, is linked in some form to teacher desire, be it the desire for right-relation (Bryzzheva), the never complete, not-an-end-itself desire of the teacher for the fundamen- tally unknowable student (Rasheed), or the desire for a connection with one’s students that enables both student and teacher to interrogate their positionalities (Sinha). Teaching hos- pitably as understood through racialized bodies necessitates a grappling with teacher desire that is not a priori antithetical to the ethic of hospitality, but rather, may allow the teacher to live through the very tension between the singular and universal, or politics and ethics in a way that does not deny the significance of what it means to be a racialized body. In “The Racialized Body of the Educator and the Ethic of Hospitality: The Potential for Social Justice Education Re-visited,” Shilpi Sinha examines how the racialized bodies of educators of color inform their relation to the ethic of hospitality as they interact with their white students. Utilizing Claudia W. Ruitenberg’s analysis of Jacques Derrida’s conception of the aporias of hospitality, Sinha argues that it is only by paying attention to the phenom- enological difference that characterizes raced bodies of color that one may understand how educators of color may best comport themselves to the tension between the self-preserva- tion and self-annihilation that mark the aporias of hospitality. She shows that the racialized body of the educator of color often demands a distinctive comportment towards the ten- sion, which is indicative not of a denial of the ethic of hospitality, but rather, a sojourning with one part of the non-dialectical tensions that characterize hospitality’s aporias. Draw- ing on Charles W. Mills, Linda Alcoff and Sara Ahmed, Sinha lays out the socio-political materiality of race, which is constructed through its relation to (non-ontological) whiteness and white privilege, thereby pointing to the debasement, dispossession and disorientation that has marked and continues to mark bodies of color to this present day. Consequently, she draws attention to the pedagogical implications of the racialized bodies of educators of color in interaction with the white bodies of their students, offering a two-pronged per- spective: (1) how faculty of color in institutions of higher education may be better sup- ported given the cognitive, perceptual, affective, physical, spatial and economic effects of the socio-political materiality of race and (2) how the ethic of hospitality may be taken up by educators of color in ways that the alterity of their white students may be honored while also honoring the lived reality of racialized bodies that is not shed when one takes on the role of teacher. In ‘’From Hostility to Hospitality: Teaching Anti-Racist Pedagogy in a Post-Election Climate,’’ Shaireen Rasheed discusses the challenges faced by educators of color when 213Introduction to Deconstructing Privilege in the Classroom:… 1 3 discussing issues of privilege and race with a predominantly white student body. By elab- orating on Irigaray’s notion of hospitality from the point of view of education, Rasheed offers an alternative phenomenological pedagogy of understanding the other, one that con- nects issues of positionality and orientation with those of an embodied epistemology of difference. By using examples from her own classroom, Rasheed elucidates how she attempts to create phenomenological, transformative, intersectional anti-racist pedagogies grounded in critical self-reflection, where students are engaging in an authentic discourse on the nature of their positionality. This means taking a hard and self-reflective look at how racism, clas- sism and sexism are often embodied in discussions of privilege. By problematizing notions of multiculturalism, tolerance and neutrality that often accompany discussions on race and white privilege, Rasheed urges educators and students to take up ethical questions that con- front the concrete political realities of our times in the classroom. Furthermore, she uses such methodologies to facilitate reflection on the part of the students to study the ontic meanings of their own localized positionalities, and how they construct their different reali- ties and objectivities, as entities, occurrences, processes, events, and facts. In “This is a White Space: On Restorative Possibilities of Hospitality in a Raced Space,” Lyudmila Bryzzheva explores the role of the restorative classroom as a methodological tool to create a ‘right-relation’ pedagogy of racial and social justice. Contextualized within Martin Buber’s I—Thou relationship, she explains right-relation as a central value and an ideal outcome of restorative practices. The I-Thou relationship requires presence, openness and responsiveness. Dialogue that does not appropriate or objectify the Other is a part of all I-Thou relationships and it takes place both in spoken and non-verbal communication. Thus, Buber points to the between, the interhuman world of relation where meeting takes place. But in spite of intentionally trying to create a race-conscious right relation restorative justice framework in her classroom, Bryzzheva explains how she ended up constructing a white space over and over again, until one black female student told her that she was not learning much in her class and a colleague of color having observed her and having read her syllabus, told her that the class benefited mostly white students. In her positionality as a white educator, Bryzzheva realized that often predominantly white classroom spaces mar- ginalize students of color. In her sustained effort to problematize her own ‘historico-racial habits’ when engaging in predominantly white spaces, she envisions an alternative ethics of hospitality, one that allows her to create ‘aporias of unknowability’ to quote Claudia Ruitenberg. Using Ruitenberg’s, Sara Ahmed’s and Luce Irigaray’s concept of hospitality, Bryzzheva further explores how notions of white privilege and race can be deconstructed in classrooms to include non-white spaces. By engaging in questions such as, ‘’What made the space white? How might hospitality affect the restorative possibilities of and in the space?,” she reconceptualizes right-relation as that which necessitates hospitality. Responding to the above three essays, Claudia W. Ruitenberg, in “Hospitality and Embodied Encounters in Educational Spaces,” highlights how Bryzzheva extends the work on hospitality and education by exploring how educational spaces can be marked by white- ness and how hospitality is denied if white educators do not interrogate and change the whiteness of such spaces as they teach racialized students. Ruitenberg further highlight’s Bryzzheva’s essay as illustrating the inevitable tension that arises when she attempts to create equitable spaces in her classroom: a tension between acknowledging one’s stu- dents’ experiences as raced individuals affected by structural injustice, and the alterity of the Other where the Other cannot be reduced to a substitutable example of any social category of difference. Bryzzheva’s description of her classroom experiences thus serve 214 S. Sinha, S. Rasheed 1 3 to showcase, for Ruitenberg, how hospitality is rent by the impossible demand of seeing the student simultaneously through a singular and universal lens, which serves to further underscore, according to Ruitenberg, that while hospitality is challenged by categorizations of social difference and inequality, such as racialization, it is not determined by it. In contrast to Bryzzheva, Ruitenberg notes that Rasheed and Sinha, in their respective essays, examine hospitality from the perspective of racialized educators in interaction with their white students. Ruitenberg emphasizes that an ethic of hospitality is amenable to edu- cational discomfort visited upon students, where students are to be given a realistic under- standing of the world they are coming into, as characterized through racial realities, the struggles of the marginalized and oppressed, and the history of how things have come to be the way they are. Ruitenberg points to Rasheed’s delineations of her classroom interactions with her white students where she provides her students with an honest accounting of being a Muslim and not white, in a white world, to be illustrative of the educational discomfort appropriate to the ethic of hospitality. Ruitenberg underscores that while the combatting of ignorance may be uncomfortable for students, it does not prevent students from the pos- sibility of finding a place in the world. Finally, Ruitenberg situates Sinha’s essay within the broader question of whether the ethic of hospitality can offer anything to the educational situation where students overtly express oppressive ideas. It is here that some points of contention can be seen to arise between Sinha’s uptake of the ethic of hospitality in relation to the racialized body of the educator, and Ruitenberg’s interpretation of the ethic of hospi- tality, with reference to the very notions of how such an ethic is to be understood in relation to the ideas of reciprocity, the teacher’s asymmetrical responsibility and desire. Acknowledgements We would like to thank the reviewers for their very helpful and constructive feedback on the essays in this special issue. References Yancy, G. 2012. Look, a White! Philosophical essays on whiteness. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press. Yancy, G. 2017. Black bodies, white gazes: The continuing significance of race in America, 2nd ed. Lan- ham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. Introduction to Deconstructing Privilege in the Classroom: Teaching as a Racialized Pedagogy Acknowledgements References 
work_olb3cwkbw5abxnu7jstnebylei	----	The Nonverbal Transmission of Intergroup Bias: A Model of Bias Contagion with Implications for Social Policy Social Issues and Policy Review, Vol. 5, No. 1, 2011, pp. 257--291 The Nonverbal Transmission of Intergroup Bias: A Model of Bias Contagion with Implications for Social Policy Max Weisbuch∗ University of Denver Kristin Pauker Stanford University Social and policy interventions over the last half-century have achieved laud- able reductions in blatant discrimination. Yet members of devalued social groups continue to face subtle discrimination. In this article, we argue that decades of antidiscrimination interventions have failed to eliminate intergroup bias because such bias is contagious. We present a model of bias contagion in which inter- group bias is subtly communicated through nonverbal behavior. Exposure to such nonverbal bias “infects” observers with intergroup bias. The model we present details two means by which nonverbal bias can be expressed—either as a veridi- cal index of intergroup bias or as a symptom of worry about appearing biased. Exposure to this nonverbal bias can increase perceivers’ own intergroup biases through processes of implicit learning, informational influence, and normative influence. We identify critical moderators that may interfere with these processes and consequently propose several social and educational interventions based on these moderators. In June of 1998, James Byrd Jr., a Black man, was beaten, chained to the back of a pickup truck, and dragged for miles—his body literally torn to pieces (Cropper, 1998). In October of that same year, Matthew Shepard, an openly gay university student was beaten, tortured, and tied to a wooden fence, left to freeze to death (Brooke, 1998). And as recently as April 2010, three men used a hot wire hanger to brand a swastika into the arm of a disabled Navajo man (U.S. Attorney’s Office, 2010). ∗Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Max Weisbuch, Psychology Department, University of Denver, Denver, CO 80208 [e-mail: max.weisbuch@du.edu]. 257 C© 2011 The Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues 258 Weisbuch and Pauker Hate crimes are disturbing and vivid examples of explicit discrimination. They violate the principles that have, for the last half-century, motivated a deluge of laws, educational programs, public service announcements, and other interven- tions aimed at eliminating discrimination. These interventions have largely been successful in reducing blatant one-on-one discrimination, including hate crimes. Yet accumulated patterns of inequality seem to contradict the relative paucity of blatant one-on-one discrimination. In North America, for example, toxic waste sites are unequally distributed near neighborhoods populated by racial minorities, the racial wealth gap has quadrupled in three decades, and medically necessary cardiac medications are less likely to be prescribed to racial minorities (Bullard, Mohai, Saha, & Wright, 2007; Shapiro, Meschede, & Sullivan, 2010; Smedley, Stith, & Nelson, 2003). Central and South American indigenous men earn as little as one-third of nonindigenous (White) men, Australian Aboriginal infants are twice as likely to be born preterm compared to other Australian infants, and, on average, European citizens opine that their countries are worse off because of immigrants (de Ferranti, Perry, Ferreira, & Walton, 2004; Langridge, Nassar, Li, & Stanley, 2010; Zick, Pettigrew, & Wagner, 2008). In general, inequalities in income, access to housing, and health may be growing rather than receding (e.g., National Research Council, 2004; Pager & Shepard, 2008). There is thus a contradiction between blatant one-on-one discrimination and harmful accumulated patterns of discrimination: the former has been greatly re- duced while the latter is holding strong. Contemporary theories of prejudice and discrimination address this contradiction by postulating that the explicit endorse- ment of egalitarianism is often betrayed by more subtly negative responses to peo- ple from other social groups (Dovidio, Kawakami, Johnson, Johnson, & Howard, 1997; Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, & Williams, 1995). These subtle responses are thought to drive subtle patterns of discrimination that only become obvious when accumulated (e.g., Crosby, 1982), as with the noted racial discrepancies in wealth, preterm births, and proximity to toxic waste. In this article, we argue for modern interventions that target the transmission of these subtle biases. The interventions we propose are based on a new model detailing the transmission of bias. We argue that subtle intergroup bias is unin- tentionally transmitted and maintained through nonverbal behavior in a process that we describe as “bias contagion.” We introduce a two-stage model of bias contagion that can be used to inform interventions for reducing bias contagion and perhaps intergroup bias more generally (see Figure 1). After reviewing the successes and failures of existing antidiscrimination ef- forts, we present the first stage of our bias contagion model. The first stage includes two means by which nonverbal behavior becomes biased. Nonverbal bias can oc- cur because negative out-group attitudes are “leaked” through nonverbal behavior (direct causation) or because worries about appearing biased ironically cause nonverbal bias (indirect causation). The second stage of the model describes how Bias Contagion and Social Policy 259 Fig. 1. The bias contagion model. The left side of the figure illustrates Stage 1 of the model, the expression of nonverbal bias. Nonverbal bias can either occur as a veridical index of the expresser’s intergroup bias (direct causation) or because of worries about and strategies for appearing unbiased (indirect causation). The right side of the figure illustrates Stage 2 of the model, exposure to nonverbal bias. Through implicit learning, exposure to others’ nonverbal biases might lead observers to develop a tacit expectation of others’ affective responses. This tacit expectation may then lead to intergroup bias through normative or informational influence. Stage 2 also includes several important moderators that can interfere with implicit learning, normative influence, and/or informational influence. 260 Weisbuch and Pauker exposure to nonverbal bias causes observers to adopt biased attitudes. Implicit learning, normative influence, and informational influence together characterize this second stage. Next, we propose interventions relevant to each stage of the model. Ultimately, we conclude that biases ranging from racism to homophobia can be greatly reduced through educational and training interventions targeting bias contagion. Twentieth Century Interventions for 21st Century Bias: Success and Failure Intergroup bias is the tendency to respond more favorably to in-groups than out-groups (Hewstone, Rubin, & Lewis, 2002). Such favoritism is reflected in stereotypic beliefs, attitudes, and discriminatory behavior. As we review below, antidiscrimination policies have substantially reduced blatant expressions of in- tergroup bias while leaving more subtle forms of bias intact. Public Policy and Social Norms Have Reduced Bias and Discrimination Intergroup bias is as old as the human species (and perhaps older) and antidis- crimination interventions also have a long history. One clear and recent example is legal intervention. The American Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibited discrimi- nation in all facets of employment, banned segregation in public spaces, including hotels, theaters, and restaurants, and outlawed discrimination in any institution that received federal funds, such as public schools, libraries, or museums. In fol- lowing years, voting and housing discrimination were outlawed and protection was granted to additional groups such as people with disabilities, older adults, and in some cases, gay persons. Recognition for and punishment of discrimination is not limited to North America. For example, the Racial Discrimination Act of 1975 prohibited racial discrimination in Australia and Directives 2000/43/EC and 2000/78/EC in the European Union outlaw discrimination based on race, religion, disability, age, or sexual orientation with regard to public goods and services (housing, employment, social security, health care, and education). Legal interventions are not the only strategies for reducing discrimination. Public service announcements (PSAs) denouncing intergroup bias have been re- peatedly broadcast over television and radio and entire multimedia campaigns have been designed around reducing discrimination. For example, the European Union launched For Diversity, Against Discrimination across 27 countries to inform people about antidiscrimination laws and the benefits of diversity. This campaign included online, print, and TV advertisements, seminars, sports events, and journalist and photo competitions (European Union, 2008). Beyond PSAs, public education has increasingly made tolerance an important component of school curricula (Johnson, 2003). For example, American schools have adopted curricula, such as Facing History and Ourselves or Stop the Hate, aimed at Bias Contagion and Social Policy 261 increasing awareness about diversity, examining discrimination, and reducing prejudice (U.S. Department of Education, 2008). And many organizations have adopted “diversity training” that is heavily predicated on the importance of being unprejudiced (Paluck, 2006; Stephan & Stephan, 2001). For all these efforts, reductions in blatant discrimination have been observed in reports of housing discrimination (Ross & Turner, 2005), workplace discrim- ination (Tomaskovic-Devy et al., 2006), and employment discrimination (Moll, 1991; U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board, 2009). Moreover, strong social norms now exist regarding the inappropriateness of many (though not all) biases. For ex- ample, participants in one study believed it was clearly not OK to feel negatively toward social groups that were targets of antidiscrimination campaigns, such as Black people, Jewish people, people with AIDS, or mentally or physically disabled people (Crandall, Eshleman, & O’Brien, 2002). Consistent with these norms, in the last half-century there have been dramatic declines in self-reported racism, sexism, homophobia, anti-Semitism, and other biases (Anti-Defamation League, 2009; Davis, Smith, & Marsden, 2008; Dovidio & Gaertner, 1998; McHugh & Frieze, 1997; Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995; Quinley & Glock, 1979; Saad, 2010; Schuman, Steeh, Bobo, & Krysan, 1997; Sniderman & Carmines, 1997; Walker, 1994). Public Policy and Social Norms Have Not Eliminated Bias and Discrimination For all the improvement in blatant discrimination, persistent income, housing, environmental, and health disparities between social groups still exist and in some cases, are worsening. In Bolivia, Mexico, and other Latin American countries, for example, indigenous men still earn only 35–65% of what White men earn (de Ferranti et al., 2004). In the United States, African Americans and Latinos earn 70 cents per dollar that Whites earn and the wealth gap between Whites and minorities is increasing sharply (Shapiro, 2004; Shapiro et al., 2010). Worldwide, women are paid about two-thirds of what men are paid (e.g., Tzannatos, 1999). For example, despite the passage of the Equal Employment Opportunity Law in Japan in 1986, Japanese women earn only 60% of their male counterparts (Gelb, 2000). American women earn only 77 cents per dollar that men earn (U.S. Census Bureau, 2009), even after controlling for hours, occupation, parenthood, and other factors associated with pay (Dey & Hill, 2007). Income disparities can be blamed in part (or in whole) on inequitable hiring and advancement processes. Audit studies, which send matched pairs of individu- als who differ only on selected characteristics (e.g., gender, race, and age) to real job openings, reveal significant gender, racial, and age discrimination in hiring (Bendick, Brown, & Wall, 1999; Bendick, Jackson, & Reinoso, 1994; Bertrand & Mullainathan, 2004; Booth, Leigh, & Varganova, 2009; de Beijl, 2000; Heckman & Siegelman, 1992; Neumark, 1996; Pager, 2007). Once hired, upward mobility 262 Weisbuch and Pauker is a special challenge for women and minorities, who are underrepresented in top-level positions in corporations, law, and medicine (Baldi & McBrier, 1997; Calvert Investments, 2008, 2010; Eagly & Karau, 2002; Gelb, 2000; Melkas & Anker, 1997; U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commision, 2003; Wilson, Sakura-Lemessy & West, 1999). Housing discrimination also remains prevalent. Black people, Hispanics, other ethnic minorities, and disabled individuals are typically shown a restricted set of properties, given less assistance with financing, and steered into poorer commu- nities and neighborhoods with more minority residents (Greek Helsinki Monitor, 2006; Harrison, Law, & Phillips, 2005; National Fair Housing Alliance, 2006; Ondrich, Ross, & Yinger, 2003; Phillips, 2010; Turner, Herbig, Kaye, Fender- son, & Levy, 2005; Turner, Ross, Galster, & Yinger, 2002). These minority-heavy neighborhoods (even high-income minority neighborhoods) are targeted by banks for deceptive or predatory loans, particularly in America, ultimately leading to high foreclosure rates and financial devastation in entire communities (Bocian, Ernst, & Li, 2006; Powell, 2009; U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Devel- opment, 2000). Companies even target minority neighborhoods for toxic waste (Brulle & Pellow, 2006; Bullard et al., 2007; Martuzzi, Mitis, & Forastiere, 2010; Morello-Frosch & Jesdale, 2006; Ungvary, Odor, Benyi, & Szakmary, 2005). Given these many obstacles to the “good life,” health disparities are hardly surprising. For example, Australian Aboriginal infants are twice as likely as non- Aboriginal infants to be born preterm and this difference has only increased over time (Langridge et al., 2010). Similarly, African American infants die at twice the rate of European-American infants, and death rates from heart disease, breast cancer, lung cancer, and colorectal cancer are significantly greater for African Americans (James, Thomas, Lillie-Blanton, & Garfield, 2007). Even when factors such as insurance status, income, age, and symptom expression are taken into account, minorities are less likely than Whites to receive quality health care (Barata, de Almeida, Montero, & da Silva, 2007; Nazroo, 2003; Smedley et al., 2003; U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2010). From heinous examples of hate crimes to employment, housing, and health disadvantages to implicitly measured biases, it is clear that intergroup bias is alive and well. This is puzzling given the harsh legal and social penal- ties that, for decades now, have been levied against individuals who exhibit bias. This puzzle cannot be completely explained by functional theories of intergroup bias. For example, these theories often trace the function of in- tergroup bias back to the importance of maintaining ties with the in-group (e.g., Brewer, 1991; Kurzban, Tooby, & Cosmides, 2001; Mahajan et al., 2011; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999), such that explicit consensual norms against bias should have undermined its existence. Moreover, it is difficult for these theories to explain the particular patterns of intergroup bias that emerge within specific cultures. Bias Contagion and Social Policy 263 We propose that mechanisms of cultural transmission can help explain why bias remains an important social problem despite decades of antidiscrimination legislation and proscriptive social norms. Our argument is that people unintention- ally transmit biases to one another through nonverbal behavior in what we refer to as bias contagion. Bias Contagion: What Is It? Our model of bias contagion emphasizes the process of contagion as it pertains to nonverbal behavior. In this section, we define nonverbal behavior, contagion, and bias contagion. Nonverbal Behavior and Nonverbal Bias In keeping with early descriptions (e.g., Darwin, 1872), psychologists com- monly use the term nonverbal behavior to refer to facial expressions, eye gaze, body language, and proxemics. All of these bodily configurations can be observed in the absence of a physical impact on the surrounding environment. Consequently, nonverbal behaviors are nonlinguistic behaviors without a physically instrumen- tal purpose. Nonverbal bias occurs when people exhibit relatively negative (less positive) nonverbal behavior toward specific social groups. Nonverbal behavior is different from actions and verbal behavior. Whereas the influence of nonverbal behavior on the physical world requires other people, action is nonlinguistic behavior that directly influences the physical world. Pushing open a door, moving a tool, and pulling the trigger of a gun are all behaviors that directly act upon and change a physical entity—hence, these are actions. Finally, verbal behavior is the content of speech or writing. Our focus is nonverbal behavior, which we regard as necessary for bias contagion. Bias Contagion English dictionaries (Merriam-Webster, Oxford, and MacMillan) include two definitions for contagion, one for disease and one for psychological states. We argue that contagion describes a general process that can be applied to dis- eases as well as psychological states. Specifically, contagion is a transmission process that occurs given two necessary and sufficient conditions: (1) the ex- pression of a personal state through living tissue and (2) exposure of a recip- ient to that living tissue. In contagion, an embodied state is transmitted from one person to another given the preconditions of bodily expression and simple exposure. This definition of contagion emphasizes expression through living tissue of the host’s body. A few disease examples are broken skin with protruding blood, mucus 264 Weisbuch and Pauker on skin within the nose, saliva on the tongue or lips, and so on. A few psychological state examples are configuration of skin on the face, configuration of the eyes, configuration of the head relative to neck, and so on. In both cases, contagion occurs via evolutionarily ancient media that predate language. Contagion is truly embodied social influence. Our model of bias contagion therefore focuses on nonverbal behavior, accord- ing to the following definition: bias contagion occurs when an individual adopts a psychological bias from simple exposure to nonverbal bias. Bias Contagion: A Model and Evidence Aside from their capacity for being transmitted through contagion, intergroup bias and infectious disease share other characteristics. Both are undesirable and in both cases, considerable effort has been put toward preventing their develop- ment. Interventions against infectious disease largely owe their success to a basic biological theory. Germ theory prompted successful social interventions such as water sanitization, education about the importance of washing, and other clean- liness activities. The success of these interventions is often overlooked by those who assume that vaccines and drugs account for the precipitous drop in American and European mortality from contagious disease during the 20th century. Yet the largest drops in mortality actually occurred prior to medical intervention but fol- lowing germ theory (McKinlay & McKinlay, 1981), implicating the importance of social interventions based on germ theories. Just as the success of behavioral interventions against infectious disease depended on the introduction of an accu- rate theory of transmission, so too might the success of behavioral interventions against discrimination depend on the introduction of an accurate theory of trans- mission. This section details a two-stage model of bias contagion that we hope can provide a foundation for successful antidiscrimination interventions. Stage One: Expression of Nonverbal Bias We argued that the explicit messages conveyed through law, education, and media have effectively trickled-down to the populace, causing them to quiet or eliminate explicit expression of intergroup bias. Outright one-on-one discrimina- tion has been greatly reduced over the last century (Kennedy, 1997; Klarman, 2004; National Research Council, 2004; Ross & Turner, 2005) and in study after study Americans and Europeans report extremely low levels of bias (Anti-Defamation League, 2009; Dovidio & Gaertner, 2000; Schuman, Steeh, Bobo, & Krysan, 1997; Sniderman & Carmines, 1997; Twenge, 1997). Yet subtle means of conveying in- tergroup bias were often left unaddressed in those antidiscrimination messages and the populace might have followed by not addressing their own, more subtle expressions of intergroup bias. For example, Ad Council, an American public Bias Contagion and Social Policy 265 service organization, launched a multimedia campaign in 2008 entitled “Think before you speak” to address the use of antigay language in teens. Using TV ads, radio, print, outdoor, and Web advertising, the campaign focuses on reducing and preventing homophobic language (Advertising Council, 2008). The campaign has resulted in laudable reductions in explicitly biased language (Advertising Council, 2009) but did not address nonverbal behavior and may thus inadvertently allow subtle expressions of bias to slip through the cracks. Consistent with messages conveyed through the media, experiments with Western samples reveal that explicit and verbal discrimination are mostly absent but nonverbal bias is mostly present in one-on-one interactions involving heavy- weight people, Black people, disabled people, and other targets of bias (e.g., Apfelbaum, Sommers, & Norris, 2008; Avery, Richeson, Hebl, & Ambady, 2009; Comer & Piliavin, 1972; Crosby, Bromley & Saxe, 1980; Dovidio, Kawakami, & Gaertner, 2002; Harris, Moniz, Sowards, & Krane, 1994; King, Shapiro, Hebl, Singletary, & Turner, 2006; Kleck, 1968). These experiments suggest that in the present and recent past, nonverbal bias is alive and well, even as explicit expres- sions of bias are considerably muted. Bias pathway one: Direct causation. Widespread expression of nonverbal bias owes in part to the close relationship between affect and nonverbal behavior. For example, in The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals, Darwin (1872) argued that biological mechanisms associated with emotions directly in- fluence nonverbal behavior. He writes, “terror causes the body to tremble. The skin becomes pale, sweat breaks out, and the hair bristles” (p. 90). Modern scholars influenced by Darwin’s approach argue that subcortical brain structures associated with emotion directly cause patterns of facial expression (e.g., Ekman & Friesen, 1969). By this view, facial expressions are directly caused by emotions. This ap- proach is supplemented by a second theory, which posits that affect arises from appetitive and aversive motivational systems (Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1990; Davidson, 2001). The aversive system promotes avoidant and protective processes whereas the appetitive system promotes approach-oriented consummatory pro- cesses. By this view, positive affect gives rise to appetitive nonverbal behaviors such as approaching and relaxed movement whereas negative affect gives rise to protective nonverbal behaviors such as avoidant movement and freezing. A corpus of evidence is consistent with the idea that affective responses are typically reflected in nonverbal behavior. For example, negative affective re- sponses indexed by subcortical activity precede a canonical example of protective nonverbal behavior—the startle reflex (see Davidson, 2001). Additionally, fa- cial electromyography with European samples revealed that affective responses are immediately reflected in positive and negative facial expressions (Dimberg, 1990). Indeed, neural pathways associated with affective experience control facial muscles involved in “genuine” emotion expressions (Rinn, 1984). And there is 266 Weisbuch and Pauker evidence for culturally universal nonverbal expressions of affect, such as in facial expressions, interpersonal distance, and the startle reflex (Ekman, 1971; Izard, 1994; Lang et al., 1990). The relationship between affect and nonverbal behavior likely plays a role in nonverbal bias. When adults have positive affect toward (i.e., like) something or someone, they tend to sit or stand near to it, move toward it, exhibit facial joy in re- sponse to it, and look at it (Chen & Bargh, 1999; Dimberg, 1986, 1990; Mehrabian, 1969; Shimojo, Simion, Shimojo, & Scheier, 2003). When adults have negative affect toward (i.e., dislike) something or someone, they tend to sit or stand far from it, move away from it, and exhibit negative facial expressions in response to it (e.g., Chen & Bargh, 1999; Dimberg, 1986, 1990; Mehrabian, 1969). Many of these rela- tions are present for other species (e.g., Waller & Dunbar, 2005) and human infants (e.g., Tronick, 1989; Weinberg & Tronick, 1994), suggestive of a long ontogenetic and evolutionary history. Hence, positive and negative affect (i.e., attitudes) toward other people may often be observed as immediate nonverbal responses. This sort of “direct causation” is implicated in nonverbal bias, such that biased attitudes predict biased nonverbal behavior. For example, Italian and German participants who scored higher than others on a reaction-time measure of race bias also exhibited less eye contact and more stiffness than others during interracial interaction (Hofmann, Gschwender, Castelli, & Schmitt, 2008). Other studies with American and European samples have shown that reaction-time measures of bias against a social group predicted less smiling (McConnell & Liebold, 2001), less nonverbal friendliness (Dovidio et al., 2002), more negative nonverbal expressions (Richeson & Shelton, 2005) and more avoidant nonverbal behavior (Neumann, Hulsenbeck, & Seibt, 2004) toward that social group than toward others. In general, influential and biologically informed theories of affect suggest that intergroup bias should be reflected in nonverbal behavior and existing evidence supports this position. Bias pathway two: Indirect causation. Intergroup bias is not the only cause of nonverbal bias. In fact, nonverbal bias often appears in the absence of intergroup bias. First, unbiased individuals may worry about appearing biased and because of this anxiety, exhibit negative nonverbal behavior in the presence of certain groups. For example, Americans worried about appearing unbiased in interracial interaction are more likely to restrict movement (Shelton, 2003) and to exhibit nonverbal behavior that seems unfriendly (Norton, Sommers, Apfelbaum, Pura, & Ariely, 2006). We suggest that worries about appearing biased manifest as anxiety (as in Shelton, 2003), which leaks through nonverbal behavior (e.g., Norton et al., 2006). Second, many people throughout Europe and America believe that the best way to be unbiased is to avoid talking and thinking about social identity (cf. Apfelbaum et al., 2008; Verkuyten, 2005). These people endorse “colorblind” Bias Contagion and Social Policy 267 social norms and tend to suppress verbal comments about (1) appearance, (2) the relevant social dimension (e.g., race), and (3) stereotypical activities (e.g., Black people and basketball). Yet these efforts at verbal suppression may ironically produce nonverbal bias. The suppression of thoughts and words about social identity is likely to be both effortful and unpleasant during intergroup interaction (for a review, see Richeson & Shelton, 2007). Indeed, in one study, to the extent that Americans endorsed “colorblind” social norms they were especially likely to both refrain from mentioning race and to exhibit negative nonverbal behavior toward out-group members (Apfelbaum et al., 2008). Finally, colorblindness norms might contribute to nonverbal bias in another way. Normative colorblind behavior prohibits the acknowledgment of social iden- tity such that during interracial interaction, for example, people should be “blind” to race. The nonverbal cues that colorblind individuals do control during social interaction may be misguided attempts to appear colorblind. For these individuals, trying to appear colorblind likely includes averted gaze, bodily freezing, and neg- ative facial responses to racial discussion. The intended message might be “My gaze is averted so I cannot see your social identity; I am not fidgeting or exhibiting nervous movement so your social identity clearly does not make me nervous; but I am upset by the discussion of race since it just is not important.” In short, many of the mannerisms included in nonverbal bias might be intentionally enacted by people trying to appear colorblind. Summary: Pathways to nonverbal bias. People may thus exhibit nonverbal bias whether or not they have the internal experience of intergroup bias. Indeed, the key for contagion, both with respect to disease and psychological states, is that the disease or psychological state exists on the host’s living tissue. People with inactive disease states are often regarded as “carriers” of disease—their blood, mucus, and so on are no less contagious than the blood and mucus of those with active disease states. Likewise, nonverbal bias is equally contagious for people with and without active intergroup bias. Stage Two: Exposure to Nonverbal Bias Regardless of how it happens, nonverbal bias remains widespread. It has been documented in classrooms (Harris et al., 1994), shopping malls (King et al., 2006), and of course, in psychological laboratories (e.g., Dovidio et al., 1997; McConnell & Liebold, 2001). It thus seems likely that most people are exposed to nonverbal bias. To test this idea, recent research examined the prevalence of nonverbal bias on mainstream television (Weisbuch & Ambady, 2009; Weisbuch, Pauker, & Ambady, 2009). The average American, for example, watches around 5 hours of TV every day (Nielsen, 2009) and other countries are increasingly saturated with TV. Hence, to the extent that nonverbal bias appears on many widely viewed 268 Weisbuch and Pauker television programs we can be fairly certain that millions of people are frequently exposed to nonverbal bias. Weisbuch et al., (2009) examined nonverbal bias across 11 American pro- grams that had (in total) well over 100 million weekly viewers. The programs that were examined were exemplary in the sense of including pairs of equal-status White and Black characters. Moreover, transcripts of these shows revealed an absence of verbally communicated race bias. Thus, the television shows that were sampled portrayed an explicitly egalitarian context. Nonetheless, as compared to White characters, Black characters on these shows evoked significantly more negative nonverbal responses from their cocharacters. These findings have been replicated across a different sample of 18 popular television shows with respect to intergroup bias against heavyweight women (Weisbuch & Ambady, 2009). In short, there is strong evidence that millions of people are frequently exposed to nonverbal bias via television. That people are widely exposed to nonverbal bias may still seem a trivial fact when compared to prior times in which people were widely exposed to more blatant biases through actions and words. We agree that exposure to nonverbal bias is in many respects less harmful than exposure to explicit bias. However, we maintain that nonverbal bias is far from trivial. Our position is that nonverbal bias is one of the primary means by which intergroup bias remains a subtle yet substantial societal problem. Exposure to nonverbal bias: Social influence across species and age. The perpetuation of intergroup bias through nonverbal bias has evolutionarily ancient origins and may be a normal part of early human development. We here review the early and ancient origins of bias contagion and then describe the processes through which exposure to nonverbal bias is translated into observers’ own nonverbal biases. From deer mice to human infants to human adults, there is consistent evi- dence that animals become biased in favor of or against other creatures through bias contagion. For example, nonhuman animals seem to “catch” biases from sim- ple exposure to conspecifics’ nonverbal behavior. For these animals, biases are always against creatures that look and act differently from themselves—largely because these other creatures are different species. For example, deer mice ex- hibit avoidance responses and preparatory analgesia to a novel class of flies but only if they have observed other deer mice respond negatively to these same flies (Kavaliers, Colwell, & Choleris, 2001, 2005). Findings like these can be ob- served across the animal kingdom (for a review, see Griffin, 2004). For example, young vervet monkeys come to categorize other creatures as predators (or “not predators”) on the basis of parents’ negative nonverbal responses to those crea- tures; consequently, these young vervet monkeys exhibit negative responses to these predators (Cheney & Seyfarth, 1990). Likewise, rhesus monkeys develop a Bias Contagion and Social Policy 269 fear of snakes after observing conspecifics’ fear responses to snakes (e.g., Mineka, Davidson, Cook, & Keir, 1984). There is also evidence of bias contagion among human toddlers and adults. For example, observation of nonverbal bias against Black people produced in- tergroup bias among Italian toddlers in one study but observation of verbal bias did not exert this same influence on the toddlers (Castelli, de Dea, & Nesdale, 2008). Adults too can become biased following exposure to nonverbal bias and this social influence seems to occur absent conscious awareness. In one set of studies (Weisbuch et al., 2009), for example, American adults observed a series of brief and silent video clips in which White actors interacted with White and Black people. Dependent on experimental condition, the video clips depicted nonverbal bias against Black people or against White people. Participants exhibited greater bias against Black people after observing nonverbal bias against Black people. This effect occurred whether participants’ racial bias was measured via an im- plicit attitude test, affective priming, or self-report. Moreover, another group was unable to consciously identify the pattern of nonverbal bias across the video clips, suggesting that exposure was sufficient for social influence. Similar effects have been observed with female body size, such that exposure to nonverbal bias against heavy women increased American adults’ own bias against heavy people, even though nonverbal bias could not be consciously identified (Weisbuch & Ambady, 2009). Bias contagion clearly occurs and in some cases, it might help to explain widespread patterns of biased behavior. Consider two follow-up studies to those described earlier: regional exposure to nonverbal bias was calculated by exam- ining regional American television ratings for TV programs in which the rate of nonverbal bias was known (Weisbuch & Ambady, 2009; Weisbuch, Pauker, & Ambady, 2011). Regions that were exposed to greater pro-White and proslim non- verbal bias exhibited higher rates of anti-Black hate crimes and disordered eating behaviors, respectively. These results held even after controlling for preexisting rates of hate crimes and disordered eating, after controlling for regional exposure to verbal bias, and after controlling for demographic factors. These studies do not suggest that exposure to nonverbal bias causes people to go out and commit hate crimes but rather that widespread exposure to nonverbal bias might contribute to cultural patterns of intergroup bias. Exposure to nonverbal bias: Pathways of transmission. Exposure to nonver- bal bias seems to infect observers with intergroup bias. There are several viable explanations for this effect. One possible explanation is evaluative condition- ing, in which positive or negative unconditioned stimuli (US) are paired with conditioned stimuli (CS). After many pairings, evaluative ratings of the CS reflect the valence of the US with which they were paired (cf. de Houwer, Thomas, & Baeyens, 2001). As one example of how this reasoning might be applied to bias 270 Weisbuch and Pauker contagion, many pairings of negative nonverbal behavior (US) and Africans (CS), might cause observers to evaluate Africans the same way they evaluate negative nonverbal behavior (i.e., negatively). Yet there are several reasons that evaluative conditioning is an insufficient explanation for bias contagion. Most importantly, if nonverbal behavior is an US for perceivers, then the social group membership of the person expressing that nonverbal behavior should be a CS. In most paradigms, the expressive individual is typically an in-group member—consequently, expo- sure to nonverbal bias should cause perceivers to have negative affect toward their own group—as noted earlier, the opposite occurs. A second possible explanation includes nonverbal mimicry. Perceivers un- intentionally mimic others’ nonverbal behavior (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999) and if nonverbal mimicry produces emotional feedback, then exposure to nonverbal bias against Africans, for example, might lead perceivers to directly experience negative affect toward Africans. Yet this explanation has several limitations. First, exposure to nonverbal bias includes exposure to two people interacting with each other—perceivers could theoretically mimic both parties rather than just the one exhibiting bias. Second, in animal studies the observer animals often do not mimic or are unable to mimic the animals exhibiting nonverbal bias. Finally, even if ob- servers only mimic in-group members and such mimicry does influence observers’ own affect, it is unclear that (1) observers’ would associate their affect with what they observe (e.g., Centerbar & Clore, 2006), (2) how or why observers’ would associate their affect with the out-group partner of the interaction (versus the in- group member), and (3) how or why this associated affect would generalize to the social category (e.g., Black) rather than just the exemplar in the video. In what follows, we detail an account of bias transmission that does not suffer from any of these problems. We detail three elements of the transmission process: implicit learning, informational influence, and normative influence. In particular, we describe how and when exposure to nonverbal bias should and should not lead perceivers to adopt a psychological bias. Implicit learning in bias contagion. We contend that people effortlessly track and represent others’ affective responses to social groups through implicit learning. From research in countries across the globe, it is clear that human observers can track both nonverbal behavior and social identity in the absence of conscious awareness, effort, and intention (e.g., Dimberg, Thunberg, & Elmehed, 2000; Fazio et al., 1995; Gilbert & Krull, 1988; Mason, Cloutier, & Macrae, 2006; Murphy & Zajonc, 1993; Sato & Yoshikawa, 2006; Tiedens & Fragale, 2003). Tracking of both nonverbal behavior and social identity may, through implicit learning, cause observers to develop expectations for others’ nonverbal responses to specific social groups. Implicit learning has been defined in as many as 11 different ways (Frensch, 1998); however, recent accounts characterize it with several requirements. Bias Contagion and Social Policy 271 Implicit learning occurs when exposure to a regularly occurring but complex pattern leads people to unintentionally gain procedural and inarticulable knowl- edge about that pattern (Cleeremans & Dienes, 2008). A final requirement is that people lack metacognition for the learning process (how they learned). Implicit learning seems like an appropriate model for what happens when people are exposed to nonverbal bias. First, implicit learning typically operates with respect to complex environmental patterns and nonverbal bias actually con- stitutes a fairly complex surface pattern. A wide variety of nonverbal behaviors convey affect and even people who share group membership always look different from each other. Hence, affect and social group membership are both expressed in a variety of ways and perceivers must extract both elements and connect them to each other to extract nonverbal bias from a noisy social perceptual array. This procedure can be contrasted with a simple conditioning paradigm in which a word like “fear” is paired with a word like “Latino”—in this case, both affect and social group are given thus greatly simplifying the perceptual pattern. Yet in the cases of bias contagion reviewed earlier, deer mice, monkeys, human toddlers, and human adults were presented with a naturally occurring but perceptually complex array that included conspecific nonverbal behaviors, unique members of a group (or species), and many other visual cues. Thus, as in typical implicit learning paradigms, social perceivers are presented with a complex perceptual pattern. Second, implicit learning is often unintentional and in none of the bias conta- gion studies did perceivers intend to learn covariation between nonverbal behavior and social group membership. Third, the knowledge gained via implicit learning is typically difficult or impossible to verbalize and people who were exposed to a pattern of nonverbal bias in the above examples were unable to verbalize the pattern when asked (Weisbuch & Ambady, 2009; Weisbuch et al., 2009). Fi- nally, implicit learning changes procedural memory and exposure to nonverbal bias seems to guide processing procedures—perceivers regard novel members of social groups as more or less pleasant depending on the pattern of nonverbal bias to which they have been exposed. Bias contagion thus satisfies requirements for implicit learning. We propose that implicit learning is an important foundation for bias con- tagion. Specifically, and consistent with prior work, perceivers’ unintentionally process the nonverbal behaviors and social identities of the people they encounter (e.g., Fazio et al., 1995; Murphy & Zajonc, 1993). In so doing, perceivers learn that certain groups evoke positive or negative responses from certain other groups (i.e., the social identities of both parties are processed). Consistent with implicit learning, the knowledge that is gained is procedural or tacit—subsequent expo- sure to targeted group members leads perceivers to anticipate others’ positive or negative responses to those individuals. Of course, this account cannot be the whole story of bias contagion. Specif- ically, we have argued that through implicit learning observers come to expect 272 Weisbuch and Pauker other people to respond negatively (or positively) toward certain social groups. However, implicit learning stops short of explaining how those observers develop their own positive or negative responses to these groups—this gap is bridged via informational and normative social influence. Informational and normative influence in bias contagion. Once observers have gained expectations for how other people respond to certain social groups, standard informational and normative social influence processes may take over. In informational influence, observers change their attitudes about an object be- cause they have learned something about its properties from observing how oth- ers respond to it. Bias contagion can be a form of informational influence in which observers change their attitudes about a social group because they have learned something about its positive/negative properties from others’ nonverbal bias. Hence, through implicit learning perceivers may expect others to respond negatively toward a social group and for the uniformed perceiver, this expectation may be educational as to the properties of that social group (i.e., safe or danger- ous). Observers who are already certain about the properties of social groups may not be (informationally) influenced by others’ nonverbal responses. Normative influence, however, can occur even when individuals are certain about the properties of an object. This type of influence occurs because observers want to align their responses with others to achieve affiliation with those others. Hence, an individual may be certain that a social group is quite pleasant but upon learning that other people dislike this social group, this individual may shift attitudes (cf. Asch, 1956). These sorts of effects occur among Americans and Europeans but are especially powerful for citizens of more collectivistic countries, such as those in the Far East and Latin America (Bond & Smith, 1996). And unlike informational influence, normative influence occurs even when people are knowledgeable about an attitude object. Pathways of transmission: Moderators. Each pathway of transmission is con- tingent on several preexisting conditions and can therefore be disrupted absent those preconditions. We present these moderators as precursors to social and policy interventions described later. Implicit learning moderators. One precondition of implicit learning is inex- perience. Just as each new case in a correlational study exerts less influence as sample size increases, each new case of intergroup interaction exerts less influ- ence on observers as they are exposed to more and more intergroup interactions. Indeed, in implicit learning the weight of each learning trial should be inversely proportional to the number of trials that have previously occurred. As applied to bias contagion, any intergroup encounter that is observed will have an impact on perceivers that is inversely proportional to the number of intergroup encounters previously observed by those perceivers. Bias Contagion and Social Policy 273 A second precondition in implicit learning is a lack of attention toward the learning process. Implicit learning generates procedural knowledge, which, in turn, influences how observers respond to incoming stimuli. Ironically, the generation and influence of procedural knowledge is disrupted when observers turn their explicit attention to this knowledge (Baumeister, 1984; Beilock & Carr, 2001; Green & Flowers, 1991; Reber, 1976; Wulf & Weigelt, 1997; see also, Wulf & Prinz, 2001). Moderators of informational and normative influence. When the properties of an object are unambiguous to perceivers, informational influence should not occur. Others’ fear of chairs, for example, would have little effect on perceivers already certain about the danger or safety of chairs. Similarly, others’ negative responses to a group should have little effect on perceivers already certain about the positive or negative qualities of those groups. There must be ambiguity or uncertainty about a social group for perceivers to be influenced by nonverbal bias, at least via informational influence. Normative influence, on the other hand, should not occur for observers who have no social needs or requirements. Of course, the need to affiliate with others has been regarded as a basic human need that can be traced to the evolutionary damage instilled by social exclusion (Baumeister & Leary, 1995). Most people are thereby likely to have at least some social needs. However, people do vary in the degree to which they currently feel they are included or “fit in” (Leary, Kelly, Cottrell, & Schreindorfer, 2001) and there is within-person variability as well (cf. Williams, 2007). To the extent that affiliative needs are currently unmet, people may align themselves with the beliefs of their social group, as demonstrated in one study involving participants from 14 countries (Williams, Cheung, & Choi, 2000). Consequently, bias contagion through normative influence should be especially likely for individuals with currently high belonging needs. Normative influence seems to be somewhat limited to the in-group (cf. Hogg & Turner, 1987). For example, all perceivers may encode that a Black person evoked negative responses from a White person but only White perceivers might adopt intergroup bias against Black people. In fact, there is some evidence that people seek to differentiate themselves from the attitudes of devalued out-groups (e.g., Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987) and may thus exhibit intergroup bias that is opposite to the nonverbal bias displayed by devalued out-groups. The key point, however, is that bias contagion that occurs via nor- mative influence should be somewhat limited to the nonverbal bias of in-group members. Pathways of transmission: Summary. People are frequently exposed to non- verbal bias. Moreover, people seem to effortlessly adopt patterns of intergroup bias that are consistent with the patterns of nonverbal bias to which they have been exposed. We outlined processes that might account for how exposure to nonverbal 274 Weisbuch and Pauker bias is translated to intergroup bias in observers. We argued that through implicit learning, observers’ come to expect that certain social groups will evoke especially negative responses from other people. These expectations for others’ responses to certain social groups can then influence observers’ own responses to social groups in one of two ways: through informational influence or through normative influence. We argued that key moderators of bias contagion include experience with intergroup encounters, explicit attention to nonverbal bias, uncertainty about social groups, need for affiliation, and social identity. In what follows, we describe how these moderators can inform social and educational interventions aimed at reducing the transmission of intergroup bias. Bias Contagion: Social and Policy Interventions There are of course a variety of reasons that intergroup bias remains an issue worldwide despite the precipitous decline of blatant one-on-one discrimination and self-reports of bias. One possibility is that the consistent antidiscrimination message delivered by lawmakers, celebrities, judges, media outlets, educators, and organizations has focused on deliberate, verbal, and explicit bias both in content and in form. The content of these messages has emphasized the importance of producing explicit egalitarian behavior and avoiding explicitly biased acts and comments. For example, the most prominent standard of discrimination applied under American law is disparate treatment. Legally defined, disparate treatment occurs when an individual is treated less favorably than others (e.g., is not hired for a job) because of race, color, religion, sex, or ethnic origin. A similar legal definition exists elsewhere in the world, as in the European Union’s Directive 2000/43 and Directive 2000/78, which both address discrimination in the work- place, housing, health care, education, and public access. This legal definition belies the quite blatant requirements for disparate treatment—disparate treatment requires proof of a discriminatory motive, typically interpreted by courts as proof of conscious and explicit intent to discriminate (White & Krieger, 2001). Thus, the focus of messages conveyed by legal precedent and through other social mediums is explicit content—what is said or done quite blatantly—rather than their more subtle content and form. We argue that these subtle messages fuel the endurance of intergroup bias. People are frequently exposed to subtle nonverbal bias and this exposure generates intergroup bias in observers. Thus, it is critical to design interventions that drive at the heart of this contagious process: expression of and exposure to nonverbal bias. The interventions we propose later follow directly from our model of bias contagion and concentrate on two ways to combat intergroup bias: (1) by reducing expression of nonverbal bias and (2) by changing exposure to and transmission of nonverbal bias (see Table 1 for a summary). Bias Contagion and Social Policy 275 Table 1. Proposed Interventions by Model Stage, Pathway Addressed and Moderator Model Pathway Intervention Description stage Moderator addressed type Directed nonverbal training Expression – Direct & Indirect causation Structured training Perception-action training Expression – Direct & Indirect causation Structured training Changes to PC norms Expression – Direct & Indirect causation Education Exposure training Transmission Prior exposure Implicit learning Structured training Conscious correction Transmission Explicit awareness Implicit learning Education Education about groups Transmission Uncertainty Informational influence Education Satiating affiliation needs Transmission Affiliation needs Normative influence Organized interaction Structuring PSAs Transmission Social identity Normative influence Media intervention Note. Please see text for elaboration of each type of intervention. Each intervention is aimed toward a particular stage and pathway in our model, and interventions for the transmission stage are built on moderators described in the model. Reducing Expression of Nonverbal Bias: Social and Policy Interventions Similar to health interventions (e.g., Kleenex), which aim to stop people from leaving bodily remnants of disease, the interventions we suggest in this section are aimed at stopping people from leaving bodily remnants of intergroup bias—in other words, curtailing the expression of nonverbal bias. Directed nonverbal training. Truly biased individuals often attempt to con- ceal intergroup bias (cf. Richeson & Shelton, 2007) only for it to be revealed in nonverbal behavior (Dovidio et al., 1997; Dovidio et al., 2002; Fazio et al., 1995; McConnell & Liebold, 2001). Less biased individuals often worry so much about appearing unbiased that they too exhibit nonverbal bias (Apfelbaum et al., 2008). In both cases, individuals fail to effectively control their nonverbal behavior. An effective intervention might simply train people to better control their nonverbal behavior so that when they want to appear unbiased they can do so. As difficult as it can be to control nonverbal behavior, when given instructions on con- trolling nonverbal cues, feedback on when they succeed or fail, and regular train- ing sessions, individuals can successfully create a positive (nonverbal) impression (see Heinssen, Liberman, & Kopelowicz, 2000; Wallace et al., 1980). In this sort of training, “microbehaviors” (e.g., individual nonverbal behaviors) are orga- nized into a hierarchy and participants are shown how and when to control each 276 Weisbuch and Pauker individual behavior, starting at the bottom of the hierarchy. Thus, individuals learn to sequentially control a given nonverbal behavior and gradually combine control of these individual behaviors into more complex responses. Training proceeds with basic learning principles such as shaping, modeling, rehearsal, reinforcement, and so on. There is evidence that this sort of training can have positive interpersonal consequences. Social skills programs that incorporate nonverbal training have strongly positive effects on social adjustment, on others’ positive impressions, and on individual nonverbal behaviors (Dilk & Bond, 1996). The effectiveness of this sort of intervention has been demonstrated in many countries, for example Canada, China, and Australia (see Heinssen et al., 2000). The results of social skills training programs are thus encouraging and it seems reasonable that the portion of these programs devoted to nonverbal control could be effective in reducing nonverbal bias. Truly biased individuals might improve their ability to conceal their bias and truly unbiased individuals might improve their ability to convey the positive impression they wish to convey during intergroup interaction. Notably, this intervention does not include reference to group membership and is not intended to alter motivation but rather ability to reduce nonverbal bias. The extended and repeated training necessary to institute this particular in- tervention would be an obstacle. Yet this sort of time-intensive program is not unheard of. Cooperative learning, perhaps the most successful school-based in- tervention for prejudice reduction (Paluck & Green, 2009), requires teachers to transform their classrooms or to include teaching “modules” that focus on coop- erative learning. Clearly, these changes involve a great deal of time and effort, but like nonverbal training the purpose of cooperative learning extends beyond prej- udice reduction to other positive outcomes (Roseth, Johnson, & Johnson, 2008). So a time-intensive intervention like nonverbal training does not seem unfeasible given the broad return on investment (e.g., multiple positive outcomes). Perception-action training. In the moment, nonverbal behavior can be diffi- cult to consciously control. Moreover, the international scope of intergroup bias suggests that interventions may be most reliable when they rely on low-level mechanisms likely to be culturally robust. Thus, interventions might be especially reliable to the extent that they eliminate the need for conscious control. One way to do this is to simply create associations between exposure to out-groups and ob- servers’ positive nonverbal behavior. Consequently, exposure to out-groups might automatically evoke positive nonverbal behavior. A recent study has demonstrated that this type of training can reduce interracial bias. Repeated approach-movement responses to Black faces caused Canadian observers to later sit closer to or lean-in toward their Black interaction partners (Kawakami, Phills, Steele, & Do- vidio, 2007). These findings suggest that training people to complete some non- verbal behavior, such as approach-movements toward a Black person, can reduce Bias Contagion and Social Policy 277 one component of nonverbal bias (interpersonal distance). It remains an open question as to whether this particular type of training would reduce nonverbal bias in general. To capture the multiple channels in which nonverbal bias is expressed, an effective intervention might incorporate perception-action training across several channels. For example, White people in North America and Europe often lack eye contact with their Black interaction partners (Dovidio et al., 1997; Hofmann et al., 2008) and such averted gaze is interpreted as dislike (e.g., Burgoon, Coker, & Coker, 1986). To facilitate intergroup eye contact, a dot-probe task could be modified to train White people to look at the eye region of Black people or other stigmatized groups. Indeed, tasks of this type have been successful in training people to look at positive or negative stimuli (Wadlinger & Isaacowitz, 2008, 2011). Hence, participants would quickly identify a dot that immediately followed a stimulus—the dot could replace the eye region of Black faces 80% of the time but replace the eye region of White faces only 20% of the time, for example. Such training might provide a relatively effortless means of increasing intergroup eye contact. Other possibilities include unobtrusively manipulating observers’ facial expression or posture while they look at pictures of different groups. The goal of these interventions is to train muscles to respond to certain groups, so that observers eventually fail to exhibit nonverbal bias. This type of individual-level training would require multiple sessions or phases. For that reason, the ideal implementation of such training is either in the classroom or the organization. It would require that students or employees be granted time on a weekly schedule for completing this perceptual training. The only required equipment is one or more up-to-date computers, inexpensive experimental software, and joysticks. A teacher or human resources liaison would have to be responsible for implementing the instrument and tracking progress. Fi- nally, it is likely that people would require external motivation; supervisors might therefore introduce prizes for the highest levels of perceptual performance. Political correctness norms. We have argued that political correctness norms play an important role in nonverbal bias. They increase fear of appearing biased, consumption of self-regulatory resources, and misguided attempts at nonverbal control. Hence, one possibility for reducing nonverbal bias is to change the content of politically correct norms. Specifically, multicultural norms emphasize social equality through the recognition and celebration of each social identity (Richeson & Nussbaum, 2003; Takaki, 1993; Verkuyten, 2005). Educational interventions that teach multiculturalism rather than colorblindness might help politically correct individuals regain self-regulatory resources during intergroup interactions, since they would no longer need to suppress statements about race, age, or weight. Moreover, multiculturalism encourages an interest in other groups which might manifest engaging nonverbal behaviors such as closer distance, forward lean, and 278 Weisbuch and Pauker eye contact—individuals who want to appear unbiased would likely adopt these positive nonverbal behaviors during intergroup interaction. There is evidence that even brief interventions that teach a multicultural approach yield more pleasant intergroup interaction than do interventions empha- sizing a colorblind approach. For example, in one study with White and Aboriginal Canadian participants, simple prompts to encourage both majority and minority group members to adopt a multicultural approach led members of both groups to exhibit “interest” oriented explicit behavior whereas prompts encouraging a colorblind approach led to more prevention-focused behavior, including explicitly communicated negative affect (Vorauer, Gagnon, & Sasaki, 2009). Similar results have been observed with Turkish and Dutch samples, which adopt more positive out-group attitudes following multicultural priming (Verkuyten, 2005). Yet although broad educational programs aimed toward multiculturalism of- ten have a salubrious impact on intergroup bias (see Stephan, Renfro, & Stephan, 2004) many studies have also indicated a negative impact on intergroup bias (see Rosenthal & Levy, 2010). Consequently, a more modest goal might be to im- plement narrow multicultural interventions that simply emphasize learning about other groups during intergroup interaction (e.g., Goff, Steele, & Davies, 2008; Vorauer et al., 2009). Such interventions might not always impact intergroup bias but for reasons reviewed earlier, they should positively impact nonverbal bias. Summary: Social and policy interventions for reducing expression of nonverbal bias. We have presented three interventions for reducing the expression of nonverbal bias. Two interventions build on programs already implemented in classrooms and the third intervention builds on an empirically validated method of reducing nonverbal bias. These are three examples that focus strictly on changing nonverbal bias rather than on changing underlying intergroup bias. Specifically, we highlighted interventions that might reduce nonverbal bias among people who do exhibit intergroup bias as well as among those who do not. Reducing the Transmission of Bias: Social and Policy Interventions The adoption of intergroup bias typically occurs given the necessary and sufficient condition of exposure to nonverbal bias. But just as certain people are more or less resistant to specific contagious diseases, certain people are also more or less resistant to bias contagion. Earlier, we outlined several moderators of bias contagion likely to capture these individual differences. In this section, we build on our knowledge of those moderators to generate proposals for social and policy interventions. Interfering with implicit learning: Exposure training. As noted earlier, the impact of exposure to an intergroup encounter should be inversely proportional to Bias Contagion and Social Policy 279 the number of intergroup encounters previously witnessed by a perceiver. Inter- ventions that expose people to a large number of unbiased intergroup interactions should be successful in reducing bias contagion. Such interventions are likely to be especially effective with younger populations who conceivably have a lower base rate of intergroup encounters. Consequently, this sort of intervention could be achieved by generating unbiased intergroup interactions (or interactions de- picting a counternormative pattern) and exposing people to these sequences in school-based educational programs. Even for people who have been exposed to a culturally prevalent pattern of nonverbal bias (e.g., pro-White) throughout their lives, there is evidence that exposure to sixty 10-second sequences of the opposite nonverbal bias pattern (e.g., pro-Black) can temporarily reduce intergroup bias (Weisbuch & Ambady, 2009; Weisbuch et al., 2009). Consequently, 10 minutes of exposure to an intensely counternormative pattern of nonverbal bias might produce long-term changes to intergroup bias if an intervention can ensure such exposure occurs on a regular basis. Presentation of such a counternormative pattern could be accomplished in an unobtrusive manner. For example, the observers’ task could be to identify certain features in video clips and those performing the best could receive rewards. This intervention would require no training on the part of teachers or supervi- sors. Exposure sequences could simply be played for observers through a computer or data player (e.g., DVD, Blu-ray). Consequently, this sort of school-based in- tervention would require few resources and potentially little time—especially if exposure could occur in a group setting. As illustrated with similar research on Italian children (Castelli et al., 2008), this type of intervention might be especially effective for preadolescent children. Interfering with implicit learning: Explicit attention. As noted earlier, explicit attention to nonverbal bias should interfere with observers’ tendency to gain tacit expectations that certain groups will evoke negative responses. Of course, explicitly attending to nonverbal bias would require that people gain explicit knowledge that certain groups evoke negative responses. The primary benefit of this intervention would be that observers could explicitly counterargue others’ nonverbal responses, just as they counterargue verbal slurs. If nonverbal bias becomes common knowledge people can intentionally treat it as prejudice and resist conforming. To direct observers’ attention to nonverbal bias, interventions could simply alert people to the presence and undesirable influence of nonverbal bias. This sort of information should be sufficient for motivating people to attend to and correct for nonverbal bias—people indeed prefer to resist subtle influences (for a review, see Wilson & Brekke, 1994). Existing diversity curricula in schools and organizations could simply include added information about the existence and influence of nonverbal bias. From classroom lectures to textbooks, a few sentences about 280 Weisbuch and Pauker nonverbal bias should be sufficient to clue people into this unwanted influence. In fact, research conducted across the world has demonstrated that just a few sentences of this type can reverse or eliminate otherwise subtle social influences (e.g., Golding, Fowler, Long, & Latta, 1990; Strack, Schwarz, Bless, Kubler, & Wanke, 1993). The time required for this intervention would thus be minimal— a few minutes of time from teachers and human resources administrators—and should be applicable in most countries. PSAs and diversity programs with media components could also highlight the influence of nonverbal bias in addition to verbal bias. Some widely used diversity programs, like the “A CLASSROOM OF DIFFERENCE R©” Anti-Bias Study Guide (Anti-Defamation League, 2011), include a unit on examining bias in the media. This unit could easily incorporate information on nonverbal bias in the media. Interfering with informational influence: Education about other groups. To reduce bias contagion via informational influence, educational interventions can simply reduce uncertainty about social groups. The content of this type of inter- vention should focus on the social group properties most relevant to intergroup bias. Specifically, the intervention should focus on properties of groups likely to cause those groups to seem likeable or dangerous. For example, an educational program might focus on evidence that Turkish Germans are not more violent than White Germans, evidence that gay people do not carry more infectious diseases than others, and the high percentage of Muslim people who are not terrorists. Regardless of exact curriculum, there would have to be an emphasis on certainty. Thus, it would be important for highly credible and attractive sources to provide people with easy to understand facts that support a strong argument (Petty & We- gener, 1998). As with an intervention focused on multicultural principles, this type of educational program could be seamlessly integrated with existing educational programs and PSAs to reduce uncertainty about other social groups. Interfering with normative influence: A therapeutic approach. The need for affiliation puts people at risk for normative influence and hence bias contagion. But beyond their susceptibility to social influence, people who have been ostracized, excluded, or are simply lonely are at risk for depression and anxiety, cardiovas- cular disturbances, increased aggression, and suicide (Cacioppo, Hughes, Waite, Hawkley, & Thisted, 2006; Hawkley, Burleson, Bernston, & Cacioppo, 2003; Hoyle & Crawford, 1994; Twenge, Baumeister, Tice, & Stucke, 2001; cf. Baumeis- ter & Leary, 1995). Accordingly, a variety of psychotherapeutic interventions have been established for helping individuals reduce their sense of isolation or need for affiliation (e.g., Forsyth, 1991; Osterman, 2000). If one key to reducing bias contagion is to improve individuals’ sense of belonging, there are thus established educational and social resources that can help in this reduction, including several impactful social–psychological interventions implemented in the United States Bias Contagion and Social Policy 281 that do not require large-scale curricular changes (Cohen, Garcia, Apfel & Master, 2006; Walton & Cohen, 2007; Walton & Cohen, in press). A reduction in bias contagion would simply require an increase in the degree to which these resources are used. This might be accomplished through (1) further sponsorship of early education programs that address students’ social belonging needs, (2) creation of curricular standards in early education programs for meet- ing students’ social belonging needs, and/or (3) a simple social–psychological intervention targeted at buttressing social belonging at a key age. Interfering with normative influence: Structuring PSAs. The role of social identity in normative influence provides clear guidance for prejudice-reduction PSAs aimed toward reducing bias contagion. Counternormative nonverbal bias should be displayed by prototypical members of the targeted in-group—hence, if seeking a reduction in race bias among White Australian perceivers, then White Australian spokespersons should direct more positive nonverbal behav- ior toward Aboriginal than White individuals. Conversely, if seeking a reduction in race bias among Australian Aboriginal perceivers, then Aboriginal spokesper- sons should direct more positive nonverbal behavior toward White than Aboriginal individuals. Summary: Social and policy interventions for reducing transmission of bias. We have suggested that prior encounters with nonverbal bias are likely to modu- late the impact of future encounters with nonverbal bias. And we have argued that explicit knowledge of nonverbal bias may interfere with bias contagion. These ideas implicate the disruption of implicit learning yet there are methods for re- ducing bias contagion that do not depend on principles of implicit learning. For example, we have proposed that informational influence plays a role in bias conta- gion. Consequently, explicit education should be protective against bias contagion to the extent that it includes unambiguous and convincing information about the properties of out-groups. Of course, even knowledgeable people want to “fit in.” For this reason, education about social groups may be insufficient for preventing bias contagion that occurs through normative influence. However, educational and therapeutic programs that encourage affiliation should help people resist such normative influence. In short, we proposed a number of interventions that might reasonably reduce or prevent bias contagion. From the Past to the Future: Social Policy and Bias Contagion The most common antidiscrimination message, driven by law and commu- nicated through educational, media, and organizational outlets, suggests that it is critical for people to monitor their explicit behavior and action but implies that it is unimportant to monitor nonverbal behavior. Although it is not entirely fair to 282 Weisbuch and Pauker lump all antidiscrimination laws, educational curricula, media commentary, and public service announcements together, it is difficult to find an example that en- dorses the eradication of nonverbal bias in addition to more blatant expressions of bias. This emphasis is consistent with a goal of reducing the blatant one-on-one discrimination that was once quite common. And it is clear that this emphasis has, for many countries, played a vital role in reducing explicit one-on-one dis- crimination. From laws requiring racial integration to classroom education about oppression to public service announcements and more, changes in public policy have effectively reduced explicit discrimination at the individual level. Although there remains room for considerable improvement in many parts of the world, an intercontinental focus on reducing explicit discrimination has achieved success in many regions. It is therefore quite unfortunate that the antidiscrimination emphasis on ex- plicit acts and words likely helps to fuel bias contagion. For example, people who are psychologically biased may regulate their explicit behavior but not their nonverbal biases (Dovidio et al., 1997; Fazio et al., 1995; McConnell & Liebold, 2001) and people who are not biased may be so anxious about regulating their explicit behavior that they exhibit nonverbal bias (Apfelbaum et al., 2008). The net result is more, rather than less, nonverbal bias. Moreover, the emphasis on explicit acts and words likely prompts observers to attend to individual acts of explicit dis- crimination and correct for the impact of those acts by tagging them as undesirable or using some other correction tactic (Wegener & Petty, 1997; Wilson & Brekke, 1994)—even children seem to be protected against the impact of others’ explicitly expressed biases (Castelli et al., 2008). Yet observers have not been clued in to nonverbal bias and therefore may not try to correct for it or recognize it as an act of discrimination. Hence, observers may not only be exposed to more nonverbal bias than they would have in the absence of traditional antidiscrimination messages but observers also remain uninformed about this bias and its influence—making them unprotected targets. There is thus a paradox with respect to the impact of traditional antidiscrim- ination messages that focus on explicit discrimination but not nonverbal bias. On the one hand, these messages have been effective in reducing truly egregious ex- pressions of intergroup bias, such as violence and verbal slurs. They have created a new social norm that explicitly denounces intergroup bias and that most people endorse (e.g., Crandall et al., 2002). On the other hand, these traditional messages have not effectively combated bias contagion, nor were they intended to. In fact, these messages may have facilitated the prevalence of bias contagion. This paradox represents a thorny issue for a few reasons. First, single acts of nonverbal bias can hardly be compared to the violent and demeaning acts of discrimination that characterized intergroup bias in times past. Yet bias con- tagion remains a contributor to the same intergroup biases that help to propel broader patterns of discrimination (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2000). 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She earned a PhD in Psychology from Tufts University. Her research explores how a person’s immediate environment and culturally-shaped theories about race impact basic social perception, social interactions, and stereotyping in childhood and throughout development. She is a recipient of the Society for the Psycholog- ical Study of Social Issues (APA Division 9) Dissertation Award (2010) and her work is funded by a K99/R00 Pathway to Independence Award from NICHD. 
work_opay5j45vnbstdpurs6no7jnea	----	1 Tanni Grey-Thompson – ‘The one that got away’: A theological analysis of foeticide, infanticide and the deviant Paralympic success story Sport in Society Braye, Stuart Department of Psychology, Sport & Exercise, School of Social Sciences, Business and Law, Teesside University, Middlesbrough, UK Email: s.braye@tees.ac.uk a Abstract In this essay, I apply a theological perspective to argue that the Paralympic Games, its athletes, and the media, unwittingly collude to demonstrate contempt towards the killing of disabled children, whilst claiming that disability equality has been improved or achieved. I argue that British Paralympic athlete Tanni Grey-Thompson was destined to succeed because many of her potential competitors were denied the right to life. British newspapers and publicly available figures related to the killing of disabled children in the United Kingdom are contrasted against the positive narrative about disabled people promoted by the International Paralympic Committee. I make reference to Christian bio-medical ethics to draw attention to the medical profession’s negative attitudes towards disabled people in the early 1900s, which provided execution techniques for the Nazi holocaust. I conclude by contending that the genocide of disabled children continues unabated despite the positive and dominant discourse attached to the Paralympic Games. Introduction Within disability studies Christianity is largely ignored or placed in a historical context thus ignoring a theological perspective on the lives of disabled people (see Barnes and Mercer mailto:s.braye@tees.ac.uk 2 2011). Similarly, disability sport discourse excludes a theological perspective of disabled people in sport and often dismisses Christianity or contextualizes it historically (see Thomas 2003). The lack of a theological perspective on the elite Paralympic Games and grass roots disability sport is considered an oversight by Watson and Parker (2015). Furthermore, a theology of disability and disability sport are legitimate areas of discourse and contribute much to the broader understanding of disability issues (cf. Braye 2014; Brock and Swinton 2012; Eiesland 1994; Hauerwas 1986, 2004a; Watson and Parker 2015). Paralympic sport is transitory for the athletes, yet being a disabled person is permanent and the circumstances of disability continue for Paralympians beyond sports competition. It would seem logical, therefore, to use the Paralympic Games to raise disability issues beyond the confines of sport due to the International Paralympic Committee’s (IPC) claim that the Games has a positive impact on all disabled people (IPC 2015). The connection between the worldwide foeticide and infanticide of disabled children ought to be directly linked to the global Paralympic Games as it is the antithesis of the equality that the IPC claim is evolving. The United Kingdom’s (UK) Government Department for Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) also support the notion that the London 2012 Paralympic Games had a positive impact, stating: The [London 2012 Paralympic] Games improved attitudes to disability and provided new opportunities for disabled people to participate in society. (DCMS 2013, 3) This type of statement formed a powerful and positive narrative around the London 2012 Paralympic Games that was largely supported by the media and some disabled people. British newspapers The Guardian, The Independent, The Telegraph and The Times, all featured articles that were either about successful Paralympians or other disabled people who promoted a positive message. For instance, on 9 September 2012, former Royal Marine, Arthur Williams, 3 a television presenter and Paralympic cyclist, wrote the following on The Guardian’s official website: In just one and a half weeks, there has been such a profound change in how people perceive disability and that has taken people by surprise. It has shocked a lot of people. As a country, we were really open-minded going into the Games and it has lived up to expectations. No one has been disappointed. (Williams 2012) Disabled commentators like Williams were triumphant because they appeared to suggest that a victory had been achieved in the quest for disability equality. It becomes difficult, and arguably unpopular, to point out that the ‘jubilant games’ portrayal of the Paralympics is not all it seems (Braye, Dixon and Gibbons 2015, 18). However, the evidence ought not to be ignored just because it contradicts the positive Paralympic discourse. My intention is to analyse this contradictory reality as it balances the positive images and stories that emanate from the Paralympic Games. One such contradiction is the rise in hate crimes against disabled people in England and Wales since the London 2012 Paralympics. Statistics reported by the Crown Prosecution Service indicate the following: The number of prosecutions for hate crimes against disabled people has surged by 41.3 per cent from 2015-16. In that same period there were 941 prosecutions for disability hate crimes, official figures show. (CPS cited in The Telegraph July 13, 2016) 4 These figures stand in contrast to the claims of the IPC, the DCMS and the positive media portrayal of the Paralympic Games. Drawing upon previous theological discourse on Christian bio-medical ethics, in this paper I argue that rather than being a successful athlete among equals in an era of increasing equality for disabled people, Tanni Grey-Thompson was destined to succeed because her potential rivals were denied the right to life. I will use the term ‘impairment’ as a description of the shape or function of a person’s body, and the term ‘disability’ to describe the way an individual or society discriminates against a person because of their impairment. This is in line with the social model construction of disability discussed predominantly by UK based disability activists over many years (cf. Barnes and Mercer 2011; Barnes 1991; Campbell and Oliver 1996; French 1994; Goodley 2004; Oliver 1990, 1996; Shakespeare and Watson 1997). In Shakespeare’s (2017, 197) helpful overview of the social and medical models of disability, he describes impairment as ‘individual and private’ and disability as ‘structural and public’. Treating people as medical conditions and the dominance of the medical profession over the lives of disabled people was resisted as the ‘medical model of disability’ by the authors previously listed. They adhere largely to an alternative ‘social model of disability’ that presses society to make changes to accommodate disabled people in spite of their impairments. Within the theology of disability, analyses of these models have been applied and discussed to some extent with contributions related to specific impairment groups (Block 2002; Gillibrand 2010; Ray 2006). Eiesland (1994) considers the social construction of disability more critically, however, the most rigorous analysis is by Morris (2008) albeit specifically related to Deaf people. In the Paralympic Games a contentious medical classification system is applied to athletes for competition (Howe 2008, 2011; Howe and Jones 2006; Peers 2009, 2012). Athletes in some sports, such as wheelchair racing, are placed into competitive groups based on having 5 similar functional ability, rather than being placed into impairment specific groups, such as goalball for people with a visual impairment. As such Grey-Thompson would have been competing in wheelchair racing against athletes with a range of impairments. As we see in the Olympics, a greater number of competitors leads to more fierce competition, and this is commonly recognized as coming from the traditional ‘sports development continuum’ (Hylton 2013, 5). In this traditional model, the structure of sports engagement is illustrated as a pyramid with a broad base of foundation at the bottom ascending to participation, performance and finally excellence at the peak. This is not the case for disabled people in sport and this pyramid has been reconstructed as follows: The structure of sport for disabled people is a precariously balanced upside-down pyramid with excellence at the top in the format of the Paralympics and increasingly in the CG [Commonwealth Games], with limited opportunities below. The pathways are unclear, and where they do exist they are not for all disabled people, and not in all sports. Paralympic participation itself is limited only to those disabled people for whom classification by impairment or function is achievable. (Braye, Gibbons and Dixon 2017, 132-133) My argument is that if there had been less abortions of disabled children then there may well have been a greater source of disabled people from which to draw competitive athletes. Because Grey-Thompson was born with Spina bifida, I use this as a specific example of impairment in relation to foeticide and infanticide. It is one of a number of impairments detectable by antenatal screening, others including: Down’s syndrome, hydrocephalus, anencephaly, Huntingdon’s disease and Duchenne muscular dystrophy (Sharp and Earle 2002). The media discussions about Spina bifida are relevant to my argument as they appear in the same era as 6 Grey-Thompson’s birth. Though I may be appearing to contradict my adherence to the social model by introducing specific impairments here; foeticide and infanticide are often justified by impairment. My position on when life begins is theological, and as such I believe that a child’s life begins at conception and is alive in utero. My position is based on the following Biblical references: For you created my inmost being; you knit me together in my mother’s womb…..My frame was not hidden from you when I was made in the secret place. When I was woven together in the depths of the earth, your eyes saw my unformed body. All the days ordained for me were written in your book before one of them came to be. (Psalm 139:13, 15, 16)1 In Luke’s gospel when the angel Gabriel appeared to Mary, Jesus’ mother, he told her of her relative Elizabeth’s pregnancy with John the Baptist: Even Elizabeth your relative is going to have a child in her old age, and she who was said to be barren is in her sixth month (Luke 1: 36). In the verses that follow Gabriel’s visit to Mary we see that ‘When Elizabeth heard Mary’s greeting, the baby leaped in her womb’ (Luke 1:41). Elizabeth makes several statements after being filled with the Holy Spirit and says, ‘“As soon as the sound of your greeting reached my ears, the baby in my womb leaped for joy”’ (Luke 1:44). The often quoted Christmas passage from Isaiah 6:9 ‘For to us a child is born, to us a son is given…’ can lead us to overlook the fact that Jesus did not suddenly appear as the prophesied child on earth. He did 7 indeed come to earth, specifically to Mary’s womb at conception by God the Holy Spirit for a nine month period. Life for the human Jesus of Nazareth began in utero, and if life is so important to God that it began for Jesus at conception, it would seem logical, from a theological viewpoint at least, to agree. When Carys Davina Grey was born on 26 July 1969, her parents, like many others, could not have imagined what the future would hold for their daughter. She is now Baroness Tanni Grey-Thompson, a Crossbench Peer in the UK’s House of Lords, a former Paralympic athlete and one of the UK’s most recognised disabled people. A distinguished 16 year sporting career over five Paralympic Games, brought her 16 Paralympic medals including 11 gold, four silver and one bronze. In this capacity, she is able to use her experiences to influence a range of issues related to disability equality in the UK. Grey-Thompson is living what would be considered by any standards an interesting and productive life. In the 1960s and 1970s, however, other children with the same impairment as Grey-Thompson – Spina bifida – were denied the right to life by being aborted, or left to die (Eckstein, Hatcher and Slater 1973; Roberts cited in The Times 1972, 2; The Times 1982, 11). Medals and murder In 1969, the first full year after the 1967 Abortion Act was passed, 49,829 abortions were carried out on women living in England and Wales. In 1972 this figure had risen to 108,565 (RCOG 2008). It is clear that the medical profession has worked in some tension over the issue of abortion since it became a legal practice, and the treatment of disabled babies in particular. Four years after the birth of Grey-Thompson an article in The Times newspaper, UK, reported on the attitude of some medical doctors towards disabled children. This had been published as a discussion in the British Medical Journal (BMJ): 8 Dr Hatcher agrees with Mr Herbert Eckstein, a consultant paediatric surgeon, and Dr Eliot Slater a psychiatrist, that “the best for an individual baby and his family may be to let him die within a month”. He suggests that the question “What right have I to recommend withholding treatment?” should be offset against another: “What right do I have to inflict major chronic suffering on another human being and his family?” (Eckstein, Hatcher and Slater 1973; The Times 1973, 3) There is an assumption among these three doctors, at least, that medical knowledge automatically leads to the right ethical decisions. The infanticide they are discussing, bearing in mind that some of those left to die actually survive, is not something for which official figures are kept. The idea that women and their families are ‘horribly oppressed by disabled children’ is beyond the remit of sound medical advice (Saxton 2017, 81). In medical practice, early technological advances meant that doctors were able to monitor unborn babies more closely. Part of these advances led to the detection of some specific impairments in the unborn child, including Spina bifida. Advances in medical technology for some have led to disadvantages – foeticide – for others. The tension over the decisions whether to treat or not to treat, disabled children immediately after birth has been somewhat of an ethical dilemma for doctors. The same article in The Times continues in relation to Spina bifida directly, and in the time covering Grey-Thompson’s birth in 1969: Mr Eckstein said that between 1963 and 1970, most such infants were energetically treated. As the patients became older, it became clear that the handicaps were often severe and that facilities for their care and their education were totally lacking. “For these reasons, some selection for treatment is now widely practised.” ‘Each baby should be assessed individually and the decision to treat – “or especially not to treat” 9 must be taken at consultant level, he said. Dr Slater said: “There has to be an order of priorities: keeping some patients alive means letting others die. We must face as inescapable the duty to let some patients die.” But the financial costs of the preservation of life at all costs were often less than the suffering involved. A child could become “a parasite on the family and destroy it”. The strength of the mother went into supporting the child and this could “completely distort and pervert family life”. He believed it was never of benefit to a mother to be saddled with an abnormal baby. (The Times 1973, 3) This approach, suggests that Grey-Thompson is fortunate to be the one that got away, as it seems that being born with Spina bifida in 1969 was a risky start to life. However, it is evident in the full original article in the BMJ that many medical professionals at this time were against withholding treatment from disabled children, no matter how severe their impairment: The point that has alarmed me recently is that an increasing number of fetuses with spina bifida or hydrocephalus are now recognized before birth, by x-ray. Many of these babies are delivered by caesarean section and I have tried to persuade obstetricians not to resuscitate them if they’re severely deformed – but many have objected violently. (Eckstein Hatcher and Slater 1973, 286) The differences of opinion in the approaches taken in the 1970s highlighted in these extracts remains today. Despite legislation and the wide acceptance of abortion and its place as a relatively safe medical procedure, it is ‘still a distressing experience’ for those involved as the RCOG State: 10 Safe abortion is easily taken for granted and increasing numbers of trainees want nothing to do with this service. Conscientious objection is the right of every doctor but that decision needs careful consideration. Nobody enjoys performing abortions. The doctors who do so are the ones who feel most strongly about reducing the need for abortion, and many work in difficult circumstances giving contraceptive advice to young women. (RCOG 2008) The tensions around foeticide and infanticide of disabled children specifically is apparent in the following extract from a controversial article by Giubilini and Minerva (2013): When circumstances occur after birth such that they would have justified abortion, what we call after-birth abortion should be permissible. In spite of the oxymoron in the expression, we propose to call this practice ‘after-birth abortion’, rather than ‘infanticide’ (2013, 261). Giubilini and Minerva’s perspective has been robustly challenged on ethical grounds by several authors (cf. Beard and Lynch 2013; Beckwith 2013; Manninen 2013; Laing 2013). However, the fact that intellectuals still have such a view places disabled children in a perilous and unique position in comparison to their non-disabled peers. Since the UK Abortion Act of 1967 was passed a total of 8.2 million abortions have been carried out, including over 185,824 in England and Wales in 2015, the year preceding the 2016 Rio Paralympic Games (Dept. of Health 2016; ONS 2008; Saunders 2007). Current statistics show that of these 185,824 abortions, 3,213 specifically related to disabled children under ‘ground E’ of the 1967 Act, which relates to the risk that the child would be born with an impairment (Dept. of Health 2016, 5). During 2015 Scotland had 12,082 abortions, of which 186 were carried out under ‘ground E’ (NHS Scotland 11 2016). Of the 16 abortions in Northern Ireland in the same time period, it is unclear if any were under ‘ground E’ (Dept. of Health NI, 2016). If we take the 2015 figures as a guide for 2016, adding England and Wales 3,213 to 186 in Scotland this gives a total 3399 under ‘Ground E’. This would mean that during the 12 days of the Rio 2016 Paralympic Games, nine disabled children were aborted each day in Great Britain; whilst the Great Britain team won just over 12 medals each day. This reality is far removed from the argument that the Paralympic Games is having a positive impact on the everyday lives of disabled people in wider society. Furthermore, this same comparison can be made in the other 169 countries where abortion is permitted, the majority of which ‘have some provision for terminating pregnancy on the grounds of severe impairment’ (Sharp and Earle 2002, 140). I suggest that the term fetus in some way dehumanizes the unborn child by softening the reality of killing a living human being. I use the term ‘disabled children’ rather than ‘disabled fetuses’ to augment Saxton’s view: When we refer to the fetus as a disabled (rather than a defective) fetus, we personify the fetus via a term of pride in the disability community. (2017, 80) Where abortion is concerned debates centre around several ethical arguments such as: fetal and father rights as subordinate to the mother’s rights and personal autonomy; disability rights and fears around eugenics; at what stage of pregnancy abortions are carried out; the medical counselling offered to women pregnant with a disabled child; the sanctity of life; and, the fact that abortions on disabled children can be carried out up to full term (Sharp and Earl 2002; Pritchard 2005). The quest for women’s rights and personal autonomy has led to the unnecessary deaths of innocent unborn children, probably half of whom were, or are, female. These abortions may have been reasoned as necessary for the mothers, though not necessary 12 for the children. The death of the children was to satisfy the necessities of the mothers. This is not to suggest that my position is anti-feminist, rather that I am pro-life. To be pro-life it does not necessarily follow to be anti-feminist, bearing in mind the fact that females are aborted too. My theological point here is to ‘speak up for those that cannot speak for themselves’ (Proverbs 31:8, 9). The key arguments I listed are not the only considerations of course, but for our purposes we focus on the disabled child. In the same era that these ethical discussions were taking place, the late French biologist, Jean Rostand (1970, 89) was also discussing abortion on the grounds of impairment: I believe that a terrible precedent would be established if we agreed that a life could be allowed to end because it was not worth preserving, since the notion of biological unworthiness, even if carefully circumscribed at first, would soon become broader and less precise. After eliminating what was no longer human, the next step would be to eliminate what was not sufficiently human, and finally nothing would be spared except what fitted a certain ideal concept of humanity. Whatever the motives of the doctors of the 1950s, 60s and 70s, the issues around the killing of unborn and newly born disabled children remain the same. Change of language, medical techniques, the passing of decades and even notions of advancing civilization should not automatically lead us to think too differently about foeticide and infanticide today. In Germany in the 1930s it was medical professionals who were advancing the execution of the chronically sick and implementing what Rostand became concerned about some 40 years later. Hitler’s extermination of those people whose lives were considered ‘not worthy to be lived’ came after Germany’s medical profession had already pedalled the propaganda in the 1930s (Hanauske- Abel 1996, 2; Koop 1980, 91). Indeed, abortion in Germany began around 1900, was supported 13 by the intellectual elite by 1911, and followed by ‘the euthanasia movement against worthless people’ circa 1920 (Koop 1980, 91). Hanauske-Abel (1996, 1453) suggests that in 1933 the direction of the German medical community ‘even outpaced the new government’. The organisation responsible for the killing of children who were chronically sick was surreptitiously called ‘Realms Committee for Scientific Approach to Severe Illness Due to Heredity and Constitution’ (Koop cited in Reagan 1984, 63). In his book on abortion, President Ronald Reagan (1984) included two chapters: one by C. Everett Koop called ‘The slide to Auschwitz’; the other by Malcom Muggeridge called ‘The Humane Holocaust’ (1980). From these two pieces of work, and others, one can conclude that lessons from 20th century attitudes towards disabled people have not been fully learned. For instance, In the 1920s and 30s in Germany, before Hitler was widely known, an acceptance of euthanasia began to emerge. In 1920/2012, two German professors, psychiatrist Alfred Hoche and jurist Karl Binding published a book translated as, Allowing the Destruction of Life Unworthy of Life. They advocated the killing of ‘absolutely worthless human beings’, their reason was that the money saved by killing one human being led to opportunities for others (cited in Muggeridge 1980, 18-19). Following the Nuremburg War Crimes Tribunal an American Counsel, Dr. Leo Alexander, reflected on how the holocaust had begun: It started with the acceptance of the attitude, basic in the euthanasia movement, that there is such a thing as life not worthy to be lived. (Muggeridge 1980, 18) Whether the taking of human life is based on notions around the unworthy life, the quality of life, the cost of life or mercy-killing, the Nazi’s murder techniques and processes had their beginnings in hospitals and were carried out by medical professionals. Indeed, 16 of those convicted of war crimes following WWII were doctors and one a nurse, seven of whom received 14 the death sentence and were hanged on June 2, 1948. Among them were Dr. Karl Gebhardt, who was awarded a PhD in medicine from Munich University in 1923, was president of the German Red Cross, and was also a, distinguished professor of orthopaedics who made an outstanding contribution to the foundation of sports medicine and developed competitive sport for the disabled as a means of therapy…He focused his work on returning the disabled to an active working life. (Silver 2011, 366) The Nazi driven genocide of the 1933-1945 era began with techniques developed earlier by doctors and nurses. What was seen as an inhumane holocaust then, has been superseded by what Muggeridge first called ‘the humane holocaust’ when referring to abortion (Muggeridge 1980, 18). He further explained that in 1979, which was called the ‘Year of the Child’, approximately 50 million abortions were carried out worldwide (Muggeridge 1980, 19). The evidence suggests that when the lines become blurred around quality of life and mercy killing, the most vulnerable in society are most at risk, and none are more at risk than the unborn or defenceless disabled child. I concur with Rostand who, whilst having been an agnostic, had a view with which a Christian theological perspective finds common ground, he stated: I have the weakness to believe that it is an honor for a society to desire the expensive luxury of sustaining life for its useless, incompetent, and incurably ill members; I would almost measure a society’s degree of civilization by the amount of effort and vigilance it imposes on itself out of pure respect for life. It is noble to struggle unrelentingly to save someone’s life as if he were dear to us, when objectively he has no value and is not even loved by anyone. (Rostand 1970, 89-90) 15 It would appear that as a society we remain far removed from this type of thinking today. Beauchamp and Childress (2001) discussed the biomedical ethical issues around treatment of people who are terminally ill. Their premise around ‘considering the patient’s quality of life to considering the patient’s value for society’ has the fear, they suggest, ‘that the “right to die” will be transformed into the “obligation to die”, perhaps against the patient’s wishes and interests’ (Beauchamp and Childress 2001, 126-7). In the UK we live in a society where it appears that the role of the unborn, or newly born, disabled child is to be obliged to die, because that is what, we, as a society have decided is their role. It is against their wishes and interests, it is murder. Subconscious resistance Paralympic athletes, seemingly unaware of the ethical dilemmas mentioned above, find themselves subconsciously adopting the role of the unwanted disabled child and resisting notions of being insufficiently human. Whilst discussing people who he referred to as ‘mentally handicapped’, theologian Stanley Hauerwas (2004b, 193) suggested that, ‘Their existence does not need to be justified – which is but a reminder that no one’s existence needs to be justified’. In this argument that ‘no one’s existence needs to be justified’ there are two points to be considered if we assume that one’s existence is in danger of being unjustified. For example, if group ‘A’ points at group ‘B’ and proclaims ‘your existence is unjustified’ a logical response for group ‘B’ may be to ignore that view because ‘no one’s existence needs to be justified’. However, if group ‘B’ points at itself and proclaims ‘our existence needs to be justified’ we must logically conclude that group ‘B’ has a distorted view of itself based on believing the original claim of group ‘A’. Applying this last point to disability and the Paralympics in particular, the IPC president, Sir Philip Craven, made an interesting comment in The Guardian 16 online (26 August 2012) prior to the London 2012 Paralympic Games. He stated ‘This is sport. It’s not disability anything. I come from sport’ (Gibson 2012). It would appear that Craven is aware, to some extent at least, of the negative views towards disabled people to the extent that he seeks to remove the term ‘disability’ from the world’s largest disability sport event, in the hope that society will refocus only on Paralympians’ athleticism. If I may put this into the imaginary thought process of a Paralympian: I am a disabled person, therefore, I have no value. But if I prove I have athleticism, I have value. Please ignore my valueless disability by focusing on my valuable athleticism. This perceived anomaly of Paralympic athletes as disabled people is an inescapable fact that remains uncomfortably attached to the Paralympics. In their own 2015-2018 strategic plan, the IPC make a number of statements as follows: To make for a more inclusive society for people with an impairment through para- sport. The Paralympic Games are the world’s number one sporting event for transforming society’s attitudes towards impairment. Equality – through sport, para-athletes challenge stereotypes and transform attitudes, helping to increase inclusion by breaking down social barriers and discrimination towards people with an impairment. (IPC 2015, 14) 17 Athletes from all five continents compete in venues full of spectators and an ever expanding global TV audience. Such worldwide reach, means that the Paralympic Games act as a catalyst for greater social awareness thus contributing to the development of a more equitable society with respect and equal opportunities for all. (IPC 2015, 18) The IPC, I argue, appears aware of the weakness associated with disability and the fragility of the disabled athlete dichotomy. Because of this they strongly promote the opposite, denying that disability is a necessary term. Indeed, the term ‘disability sport’ has been replaced with ‘para-sport’, an abbreviation of ‘Paralympic sport’. The term ‘disability sport’ seems to have been dropped by those associated with the Paralympics. I suggest that this can be seen as a veiled plea not to be killed, and this rhetoric continues in the IPC strategy as they set out their raison d'être: To enable para-athletes to achieve sporting excellence and inspire and excite the world. Courage – para-athletes through their performances showcase to the world what can be achieved when testing your body to its absolute limits. Determination – para-athletes have a unique strength of character that combines mental toughness, physical ability and outstanding agility to produce sporting performances that regularly redefine the boundaries of possibility. 18 Inspiration – As role models, para-athletes maximise their abilities, thus empowering and exciting others to participate in sport. (IPC 2015, 14) The IPC is an organization intrinsically associated with disability and an increasingly high sports profile. This creates a problem for disabled people as the views of the IPC become more widely acceptable in society (Braye 2017). The IPC are arguably resisting a negative stereotype of disability, with an overly positive stereotype. However, sport has a unique way of creating a problem for disabled athletes in particular. Tänssjö (1998, 23) posed the question, ‘is our admiration for sports heroes fascistoid?’ He suggested that the admiration of sports heroes rests on the premise that, the very act of admiring such heroes, means ipso facto that those who fail are held in contempt. In relation to this he further argued that ‘the hard core of Nazism was a contempt for weakness’ (Tänssjö 1998, 26) and set out three forms of contempt: First, contempt can take an aggressive form, as was the case with the Nazis. They wanted to exterminate weakness (by exterminating those who were weak). Second, contempt can take a negligent form. We try not to think at all about those for whom we feel contempt. We “think them away”. We treat them as nonexistent. We do not care about them at all. Third, contempt can assume a paternalistic form. We want to “take care” of those “poor creatures” for whom we feel contempt. (Tänssjö 1998, 27) The IPC narrative and those of the athletes who compete in the Paralympic Games fit aptly with the first two forms. Firstly, aggressive contempt; the IPC want to kill off the term disability and deny that it exists, they see it as weak to conform to a disability identity which hinders their progress. The fact that those that take part in the Paralympics as athletes are already identified as heroic suggests to a viewing public that the perceived weakness of disability has 19 been exterminated. Secondly, negligent contempt; Paralympic athletes do criticize non-athletic disabled people for whom they have no care. For instance in 2012, the American Paralympic sprinter, Jerome Singleton stated the following in an interview with The Guardian: We all know somebody with a disability and now we can point to the Games and ask them: “Why aren’t you seeking to become a Paralympian?” (Bagchi 2012) This type of contempt is not criticized by the IPC who appear to support this view in their own strategies. I contend that the IPC is all too aware of the aggressive contempt towards disabled people and they are desperate to distance themselves from it. Furthermore, I suggest, that the aim of the IPC appears to be to distance themselves from other disabled people. They are complying with an implicit obligation that disabled people have to prove that they are valuable to society. In so doing, they actively disassociate themselves from other disabled people, who they see as less valuable. However, to some extent, for a disabled person to have a negative view of another disabled person is to have a negative view of oneself. If disabled people who cannot become Paralympic athletes are treated with contempt by other disabled people, then a hierarchy of disability is apparent. Campbell and Oliver (1996) correctly suggested that disabled people are not a homogenous group, and the Paralympics highlights the many differences (Braye, Dixon, and Gibbons 2015). Criticism goes various ways, and Deal (2003) recalls the experience of living in a residential home in the 1980s: Populated primarily by young men with Duchenne muscular dystrophy, ‘SuperCrip’ was used in a disparaging manner to describe other wheelchair users who took part in marathons, drove cars, etc., using their upper body strength to the full. Hence, these young men with a muscle wasting impairment, ridiculed 20 others (through the use of language) and thus distanced themselves from more athletic groups of disabled people. (Deal 2003, 897-8) Aggressive contempt is, to some extent, the most frightening, and the most vulnerable disabled people are the in utero and new born children. To conclude my overall theological analysis, Jesus clearly addresses his ‘aggressive contempt’ for people who show ‘negligent contempt’ for people he sees as vulnerable and in need: Then he will say to those on his left, ‘Depart from me, you who are cursed, into the eternal fire prepared for the devil and his angels. For I was hungry and you gave me nothing to eat. I was thirsty and you gave me nothing to drink, I was a stranger and you did not invite me in, I needed clothes and you did not clothe me, I was sick and in prison and you did not look after me.’ They also will answer, ‘Lord, when did we see you hungry or thirsty or a stranger or needing clothes or sick or in prison, and did not help you?’ He will reply, ‘I tell you the truth, whatever you did not do for one of the least of these, you did not do for me’. (Matthew 25:41-45) Here, Jesus is closely aligning himself with the most helpless of people and placing their value at a high premium. To care for and feed the hungry, water the thirsty, accommodate strangers, clothe the naked, look after the sick and look after those in prison, is a basic principle of Jesus’ instructions. To carry out these basic tasks is equivalent to ministering to Jesus himself, he says here, to ignore them is un-Christian, and in his eyes, evil. This theological viewpoint has long been preached, practiced and defended by many Christians since the first century and can be a last line of defense when it comes to making decisions about disabled children. If the fear of 21 God prevents the killing of disabled children, then perhaps that is a positive outcome for those children. Conclusion On the evidence I have presented, and that is readily available in the public domain, disabled children who were alive have their lives taken from them on a daily basis. Their lives are ended predominantly on the decisions of medical professionals, and supported by a society that legally permits these acts of contempt for human life. Of the Ten Commandments in the Bible, the sixth is ‘You shall not murder’ (Exodus 20:13) and the so-called ethical reasons that medical professionals use as a justification are nowhere found in Scripture. When referring to murder, Jesus pulls the point right back to saying that someone who gets ‘“…angry with his own brother will be subject to judgment”’ (Matthew 5:22). It appears that medical professionals are able to take the lives of innocent disabled children, without overt anger, based on ethical decisions emanating from their medical opinions. These non-angry acts of contempt for disabled children are very much like what Muggeridge (1980) was referring to when he suggested that abortion was a ‘humane holocaust’. Other Biblical commands are clearly evident such as ‘speak up for those that cannot speak for themselves’ (Proverbs 31:8, 9) and this is the motivation for my argument. These deaths are a human tragedy, it is genocide, and it is a holocaust, humane or otherwise. The fact that millions of children, some of whom were disabled, have been killed, perhaps ought to make us reconsider how humane and civilized we claim to be. I have focused on the foeticide and infanticide of disabled children in the UK during 2015 specifically. However, these alone whilst numbering approximately 3,399 are a small percentage of the total 197,922 children in the UK denied the right to fight for the lives they had (DoH 2016; DoH NI 2016; NHS Scotland 2016). One of the deviant aspects of the 22 Paralympic Games, as I see it, is that whilst it is a spectacular sporting event in its own right, it does give the false impression that equality for disabled people has indeed arrived. It is, perhaps, disappointing that many disabled people, including those involved with the Paralympic Games appear to believe this too. Part of my argument lies in the premise that some of the disabled children whose lives were ended in utero or soon after birth may have become Paralympic athletes. This is of course unknown, but the fact that Grey-Thompson was born with Spina bifida in an era when some medical doctors were ending the lives of other children with the same impairment, is my justification for making the claim. My evidence suggests that we are still in this era of killing children unnecessarily, whilst pretending that we live in a time of advancing equality. The application of the medical model of disability is arguably at its most dangerous in the hands of the medical profession when tasked with the care of society’s most vulnerable people. The Paralympic Games is a sports event for people who acquired an impairment and for the remnant of people who were born with an impairment. I believe that it is right to use the Paralympics to raise important emotive issues such as foeticide and infanticide, particularly since the IPC make bold claims about the Paralympic Games’ ability to improve the lives of disabled people beyond sport and in wider society. 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work_opzorr6b6zhvzlz6rxcufiqjfy	----	No Job Name Feature Article_663 186..194 Nurses’ experience of adjusting to workplace violence: A theory of adaptation Rose Chapman,1,2 Irene Styles,3 Laura Perry4 and Shane Combs1,2 1Curtin University of Technology, 2Joondalup Health Campus, 3Graduate School of Education, University of Western Australia, and 4School of Education, Murdoch University, Perth, Western Australia, Australia ABSTRACT: Workplace violence directed at nurses working in both the mental health and general areas of the hospital is a common occurrence and the impact of these events on all parties may be severe. A consequence of these confronting situations is the possibility that nurse victims will leave the profession. To help administrators facilitate nurses’ psychological recovery, this qualitative study identified how nurses in several areas of a hospital setting adapted to workplace violence, research which has been previously unexamined. This study was the first of its kind to use a theory of cognitive adaptation to explore nurses’ experiences of workplace violence. Participants were found to use the cognitive processes of finding meaning, gaining mastery and enhancing the self to adapt to workplace violence. Critical incident debriefing may facilitate the nurse victim’s psychological recovery following an episode of workplace violence. KEY WORDS: adjusting, cognitive adaptation, nurses’ experience, workplace violence. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND In recent years there has been increased interest in work- place violence (WPV) toward health care providers both internationally and nationally with studies showing that nurses routinely encounter these events (Di Martino 2002; Henderson 2003). Acts of WPV include such things as verbal threats, verbal abuse, sexual harassment, physi- cal intimidation, physical assault, racial discrimination, and property damage (Farrell et al. 2006; Mayhew & Chappell 2003). The impact of WPV to all parties is sub- stantial and includes physical and psychological injury, disruption to patient care, and staff resignation (Arm- strong 2006; Farrell et al. 2006). For a more detailed review of WPV directed at nurses see Chapman and Styles (2006), and Woods and Ashley (2007). Nurses frequently experience incidents of WPV (Di Martino 2002; Henderson 2003), however, although some leave the profession (Farrell et al. 2006) many continue to be part of the health workforce and care for those people that are the most common offenders in these acts, namely, patients (O’Connell et al. 2000). To understand how nurses remain in employment in the health sector and continue to care for the perpetrators of these stressful events, this study explored how nurses adapted their view of themselves and the incident of WPV. The goals of adaptation may be different for the pro- fession, organization and the individual. However, it is safe to assume that all parties want nurses to remain in the health care profession, and to continue to be competent and happy in their work. In this paper we focus only on the adaptation strategies nurses use to achieve and main- tain the integrity of their psychological self and maintain emotional well-being (self-protection) following an episode of WPV. Understanding the strategies nurses use to maintain and enhance their emotional well-being may enable orga- nizations and educators to develop policies and programs to support nurses and reduce the impact of WPV. Correspondence: Rose Chapman, Curtin University of Technology, GPO Box U1987, Perth, WA 6845, Australia. Email: r.chapman@ curtin.edu.au Rose Chapman, RN, PhD, MSc (Nursing). Irene Styles, BSc (Hons), PhD, Dip Ed. Laura Perry, PhD. Shane Combs, RN, BScApp (Nsg), GradDipEmpRel, MClNsg. Accepted December 2009. International Journal of Mental Health Nursing (2010) 19, 186–194 doi: 10.1111/j.1447-0349.2009.00663.x © 2010 The Authors Journal compilation © 2010 Australian College of Mental Health Nurses Inc. In addition, understanding nurses’ adjustment to and their perceptions of being involved in WPV can help prac- titioners capitalize on opportunities to promote positive adaptation. Research has shown that following a threatening event, an individuals’ psychological adjustment is dependent on their ability to cognitively process the experience, develop strategies to help them understand, and then adapt them- selves in some way (Grossman et al. 2000). Effective coping strategies are directly related to a person’s ability to find meaning in and make sense of negative, unex- pected, or threatening events (Fjelland et al. 2007). Studies have shown that finding meaning in a threat- ening event has been associated with positive psychologi- cal and mental health outcomes (Draucker 2001). We were able to locate only one study that explored the meaning that nurses ascribe to acts of WPV (Luck et al. 2007). Luck et al. (2007) examined the impact of WPV on one group of Australian emergency department (ED) nurses and their responses to these situations. The authors found that their participants judged episodes of WPV along three dimensions: personalization of the vio- lence; presence of mitigating factors; and the reasons the perpetrator attended the ED. Luck et al. concluded that these factors informed how the nurses responded, how they chose to manage the episode of WPV, and whether they reported the event. Although Luck et al.’s study demonstrated that ED nurses make complex interpreta- tions following an episode of WPV, they focused on just one cognitive process (the search for meaning) and on only one group of nurses (those working in the ED). Our study builds on Luck et al.’s research by extending the range of cognitive processes employed to adjust to WPV and by including nurses working in several areas of a hospital. Although it is widely accepted by researchers and cli- nicians that violence exists in the ED and psychiatric areas, it appears that there is an assumption that this phenomenon does not occur in other areas of the hospital (Winstanley & Whittington 2004). Although most researchers have investigated these events in discreet areas of the health care setting (ED and psychiatric areas) very few studies (Lam 2002; O’Connell et al. 2000) have investigated the problem in the general hospital setting as a whole (O’Connell et al. 2000) as was the intention of the current study. Therefore this study explored the percep- tions and experiences of nurses working in several areas of the hospital including the ED and psychiatric setting in regards to WPV. In addition to finding meaning, researchers have shown that establishing personal control or mastery is another cognitive process that has a positive psychological effect. Perceptions of mastery reflect individuals’ expec- tation of their ability to influence or control current or future events and those people with greater perceived mastery experience less psychological distress (Townsend et al. 1989). When people fail to gain mastery (that is, control their thoughts, emotions and actions) and feel unable to influence their life circumstances, they are at greater risk of psychological stress (Bengtsson-Tops 2004). Furthermore, to feel better about themselves after a threatening event, individuals will often make cognitive efforts to improve their self-esteem (Dewar 2003). This study utilizes a theory-before-research approach (Berg 2009). We use the theory of cognitive adaptation (Taylor 1983) to understand nurses’ perceptions of being involved in WPV because the focus of the model is on how individuals adapt their views and thinking following a threatening event. An assumption of this study is that nurses who have been recipients of WPV have experi- enced not only an act or threat of physical abuse but also an assault on their psychological self. Thus, to understand the event of WPV and to deal with its consequences, nurses will aim to preserve and enhance their self- identity. While Taylor has developed this model further (Aspinwall & Taylor 1992; 1997), because the original model was more parsimonious and appeared more rel- evant to WPV we considered that the fundamental frame- work was better suited to our purpose. Therefore, Taylor’s (1983) model was chosen to examine whether the model could adequately explain nurses’ experience of coming to terms with an incident of WPV in a non- teaching hospital context. To our knowledge this study is the first of its kind to use a cognitive adaptation framework to explore nurses’ adaptation and adjustment to WPV. As a result, the find- ings from this study will not only build on the literature of WPV but also add new knowledge regarding this phenomenon. AIM This study aimed to explore how nurses adapt to WPV and to examine whether Taylor’s (1983) theory of cognitive adaptation could be used as a framework to understand nurses’ perceptions of being a recipient of these events. Taylor’s framework may enable researchers to identify those resources that nurses use to enable them to return to their previous level of functioning on their wards or departments and to provide effective patient care follow- ing an episode of WPV. ADAPTING TO WORKPLACE VIOLENCE 187 © 2010 The Authors Journal compilation © 2010 Australian College of Mental Health Nurses Inc. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK Taylor (1983) developed a theory of cognitive adaptation to life threatening events following work with cancer patients, rape victims and cardiac patients. She proposes that to achieve a quality of life that is equal to or exceeding that which the person experienced prior to a personally threatening event, the individual is required to engage in a readjustment process. This process focuses on three main themes: the search for meaning, gaining a sense of mastery or control over the event and its consequences, and self-enhancement (see Fig. 1). To protect the integ- rity of their psychological self and maintain emotional well-being (self-protection), individuals use the adaptive process of finding meaning in and gaining control over the event. The search for meaning requires individuals to make sense of the event to understand why the catastrophe occurred and what impact it will have on the rest of their lives. Mastery entails the person regaining control over this and future events. Following an event individuals will usually experience diminished self-esteem and, in order to recover, they are required to find ways to feel good about themselves. According to Taylor, self enhancement is achieved by comparing oneself to others who have not fared as well in a similar situation, and thereby bolstering one’s self-esteem. Moreover, Taylor argues that to suc- cessfully resolve these three processes the individual is required to form and maintain a set of illusions (which other people may or may not consider ‘true’ or ‘correct’). These illusions necessitate individuals to view the known facts in a light that will enhance or maintain their view of themselves. DESIGN The explorative study involved the collection of qualita- tive data through interviews. All 322 nurses working in the ED, restorative, medical, surgical, maternity, paediatric and mental health areas of a non-teaching metropolitan hospital in Western Australia, and who had direct patient contact, were sent letters explaining the purpose of the study and inviting them to participate. As a result 35 nurses who had experienced an incident of WPV agreed to be interviewed in 2006. Theoretical saturation was reached after twenty interviews, that is the researcher failed to obtain any new information and all categories and themes appeared to be complete (Sandelowski 1986). Ethical approval was obtained from the ethics committees of the case study hospital and a university. All nurses participating in the study were given an information sheet about the study and gave written informed consent prior to participating in the interviews. While it was not envisaged that any participant would experience distress from being interviewed, the research- ers still planned for the management of participant dis- tress in line with the university risk management policies. Following the interview the researchers undertook a ‘debriefing’ period with the participant to ensure that they were not experiencing any distress from the interview. The participants in this study were mainly female (three of the 20 participants were males), in their early 40s, had been registered in the profession between six months and 40 years (with a mean of 17.8 years), and mainly worked part-time. Their roles within the hospital included enrolled, registered and clinical nurses and man- agement positions. Interviews Semi-structured interviews or ‘conversations’ were con- ducted to explore nurse participants’ experience of WPV and to gain an understanding about the meaning and interpretations of these events (Llamputtong & Ezzy 2005; Speziale-Streubert & Carpenter 2003). The inter- view questions were derived from the aims of the study, were open-ended, and directed towards uncovering the meaning of the nurse participants’ experience of WPV (Fontana & Frey 2000). An interview guide was used in each interview with a set of questions and prompts to reduce any researcher bias. Some examples of the questions asked are: Can you please tell me about a time when you experienced a violent encounter during work? Can you describe as spe- cifically as possible this event/s? Can you share your thoughts, feelings and perceptions about the situation? The interviews began with the researcher developing trust with the participants: this process was assisted by providing a quiet environment, without interruptions, by being receptive, and by listening non-judgmentally FIG. 1: Conceptualisation of Taylor’s model of Cognitive Adaptation. Meaning Episode of WPV Mastery/ Control Self Enhancement 188 R. CHAPMAN ET AL. © 2010 The Authors Journal compilation © 2010 Australian College of Mental Health Nurses Inc. (Llamputtong & Ezzy 2005). All of the interviews were tape recorded and then transcribed verbatim. DATA ANALYSIS Data were collected and analyzed simultaneously. The interview transcriptions were analyzed using the standard processes of qualitative analysis: coding; finding catego- ries; clustering; and identifying patterns and meaning (Speziale-Streubert & Carpenter 2003). The transcribed data were reflected on and coded line-by-line to identify significant meanings, the coded significant meanings were then clustered and the relationship between them identi- fied. This method confirmed that the themes which emerged from the data were adequate and informative (Morse & Richards 2002; Strauss & Corbin 1990). While we used the three major processes of the conceptual model to analyze the data, we were also alert for other unexpected or novel categories that may have emerged. Rigour was ensured by establishing trustworthiness (Berg 2009; Fossey et al. 2002) and was achieved by addressing credibility and transferability of the data (Lincoln & Guba 1985). Credibility was ensured by giving a sample of the transcripts to two experts in qualitative data analysis. These experts coded and categorized the data individually. There was overall agreement and con- sistency between the experts’ analysis and that of the researchers. Furthermore, participants were contacted to verify the findings (Lincoln & Guba 1985; Sandelowski 1986) and all agreed that the findings reflected their expe- riences. Transferability was established by developing rich descriptions and maintaining an audit trail to allow comparison of our study with those conducted in similar contexts. Following data analysis, 28 descriptions or narratives (four of the interviews provided the researchers with more than one account of an experience of WPV) of the participants’ experiences of WPV were developed. The following section presents the findings from our study and includes pertinent literature that directly relates to the categories and subcategories. The discussion section of the paper will interpret the results more broadly. FINDINGS The three cognitive processes that form the conceptual framework were identified in the data: finding meaning, gaining mastery and self-enhancement. The findings demonstrated that all nurses in our study used these cog- nitive adaptive processes to adjust to their experiences of WPV. Table 1 presents a summary of the original three pro- cesses from the conceptual framework, the frequency with which they were used and examples. In addition, it provides evidence of the subcategories (or finer level pro- cesses) that emerged from, and which afford a better understanding of, the data. The following section focuses on the evidence for each of these processes in turn. In the quotes used in the following sections phrases pertinent to the cognitive process being discussed are italicized. Finding meaning As demonstrated in Table 1 all of the participants in our study sought meaning by describing the event in a logical, step-wise fashion (sequencing) and explaining why it hap- pened: these were identified as two aspects of finding meaning. The explanations attributed causes or reasons for the episodes of WPV and usually related to trying to understand the behaviour of the perpetrator. The pre- dominant external cause attributed to WPV was physical and/or psychological illness and the most frequent inter- nal reason was the inexperience of staff. Finding meaning therefore constituted making sense of these events by presenting the experience in a sequen- tial way and assigning cause. For example, a junior nurse recounted the time when she: . . . was showering an elderly patient who was known to be aggressive. I was inexperienced and thought that I could handle the patient and became over-confident. . . . I bent down to help him assist with his socks and while my head was down like low he swatted me around the head and knocked me sideways. . . . because this gentleman had dementia there was no blame towards him . . . (Mia) Finding meaning has been shown to assist victims of hate crimes to heal. For example, Willis’ (2008) phenom- enological study of gay men who had been victims of one or more hate crimes found that to effectively heal from these events the victims found meaning and ultimately achieved a balanced perspective on the experience. Gaining mastery As shown in Table 1, the nurses used mainly psychological but also physical strategies to achieve control or mastery of these events. Some of these strategies occurred during the incident and others at a later date. A sense of personal control, or mastery, is central to achieving psychological adjustment (Bengtsson-Tops 2004; Marshall & Lang 1990). There is evidence that the nurses in our study regained control of their situations by employing strategies such as attending counselling, ADAPTING TO WORKPLACE VIOLENCE 189 © 2010 The Authors Journal compilation © 2010 Australian College of Mental Health Nurses Inc. reporting the event to the police, initiating physical and chemical restraint and avoiding similar situations until their confidence had been rebuilt. For example Mia explained that ‘I actually avoided the patients who I felt were risky for a few weeks until I built my confidence back up’. Sally was more proactive in her pursuit to regain personal control over her situation: . . . I called security for help and afterwards I talked about it [WPV] . . . we talked it out . . . one of the girls made me a cup of tea and we calmed down and sat down and lucky it wasn’t busy on the ward. And we just talked it through and by talking it through it made us calm down . . . Studies investigating mastery in the psychological and nursing literature have found that a perceived sense of mastery positively influences one’s psychological and behavioural adjustment (Bengtsson-Tops 2004; Marshall & Lang 1990). Although we were unable to locate any literature that investigated nurses’ use of mastery follow- ing an episode of WPV, the findings from our study suggest that this process is part of their psychological adjustment following these events. Self-enhancement We found that the participants in our study used three strategies to boost their self-esteem. As shown in Table 1, they compared themselves favourably with their colleagues, evaluated themselves positively and found benefit to themselves, others or the organization. For example Frank compared himself with a junior doctor: I’ve seen one of our . . . [junior] medical officers, she’s . . . not picking up any clues that she was about to get her head knocked off, she’s just too sweet a person and has no experience . . . this guy was getting that close, he’s raising fists and screeching at her and he’s going to hit her . . . because I have 40 years life experience and a lot of work experience I would have managed the situation better . . . TABLE 1: Summary of the cognitive processes, categories and subcategories within each, frequency of mentions and examples Cognitive process Categories Subcategories Frequency Examples Finding meaning Sequencing 28 Attributing cause Internal Inexperience 7 Young, not picking up cues, over confidence Seniority 4 Coordinating, being a manager Rapport 3 Believing rapport was established Philosophy of care 3 Duty of care for others Displaying anger 2 Being cross External Substance abuse 6 Alcohol and/or drugs Illness 14 Dementia, infection, delirium, mental illness Lack of care 7 Lack of care for family member or patient attributed to nurses Refusing care 7 Absconding, not cooperating, refusing medication Organization 8 Lack of staff, busy shift, long wait times Mood of perpetrator 2 Tired, impatient History of aggression 3 Groups fighting prior to admission Mastery Physical control Calling authority 8 Police, security, senior colleagues, code black Avoidance 6 Walking out, discharging aggressor, refusing to care for them Restraint 5 Physical and chemical Psychological control Debriefing 5 Counselling, talking to colleagues and friends, talking to police Diffusing 7 Talking them down, distracting, explaining, reassuring, apologizing Assertiveness 11 Raising voice, verbalizing, demanding respect, giving ultimatum Nurturing self 5 Humour, tea or coffee, deep breathing, going for a walk Perception of blame 4 Not personalizing event, not perpetrators fault Self-enhancement Comparisons 20 More competent, more experienced, more assertive, being bigger, male Positive view of self 9 Experienced, knowledgeable, emotionally strong, willing to confront Finding benefit Self 26 Learning, more confident, better prepared, more assertive, better clinician, better father, more mature, less arrogant Others 2 Protecting inexperienced staff Organization 3 More security in place, better processes 190 R. CHAPMAN ET AL. © 2010 The Authors Journal compilation © 2010 Australian College of Mental Health Nurses Inc. Although all of the senior nurses in our study used downward comparisons and considered that they were better able to manage WPV than their less experienced colleagues, some of the more junior participants (less than three years experience) were more sceptical of their senior colleagues. These nurses believed that after observing senior nurses managing situations of WPV they themselves would have handled the circumstances better. For example, Alice observed an aggressive interaction between her patient and the shift coordinator and thought she would have handled the situation much better than the coordinator: . . . he’d [patient] been told he’d be moving into a four bed room, he just snapped within five seconds . . . the co-coordinator that went in there [patient’s room] had a different tack to what I would have had . . . because of the way he’d behaved previously . . . . I would have picked that he’d behave that way. If I had been the one telling him he was moving I wouldn’t have even gone into any of that . . . We are not sure why the junior nurses in our study believed they could have better managed the events of WPV that they had observed. Maybe they did indeed have better communication skills or their education prepared them to control the situations more effectively than their senior colleagues. On the other hand, when one is observ- ing WPV from the sidelines and not taking responsibility for the outcome, it may be easier to inflate one’s ability and effectiveness. While it is beyond the scope of this paper to investigate this phenomenon, future research could address nurses’ education and communication requirements to enable them to manage WPV more effectively. The second strategy identified in the literature to restore or enhance one’s self-esteem is construing per- sonal benefit from a negative or threatening experience (Davis et al. 1998; Taylor 1983). The participants in our study considered themselves to be personally and profes- sionally better off than they were prior to the experience/s of WPV. For example, because Jenny has been involved in many episodes of WPV she now considers herself to be better able to manage these events ‘. . . . I’ve had to physi- cally deal with it [WPV] many times in my practice . . . I have [a] better understanding of it [WPV] . . . and [as a result] I’m much better at dealing with it [WPV] now . . .’. In another example Frank thinks he is a much better family man and clinician as a result of being involved in several incidents of WPV because he is more aware of his feelings ‘. . . I recognise things [now] much more quickly and try and spend and do more things at home . . . I think I’m a better clinician and father because I’m more aware of my own feelings . . .’ We argue that being a recipient of WPV is traumatic and has significant impact on a nurse’s psychological self. The literature has shown that finding benefit can mini- mize the negative implications of a traumatic event and is one way a person can assign positive value or significance to their life (Taylor 1983). Our participants considered that they were better clinicians (in one case a better father) as a result of experiencing WPV. According to Taylor both the cognitive restructuring of favourable comparison and construing personal benefit are based on the individual’s ability to maintain a set of illusions. Contrary to the view that positive mental health requires an individual to be in touch with reality, Taylor (1983) contends that not only are illusions necessary but that they are dynamic and can ‘simultaneously protect and prompt constructive thought and action’ (p. 1171). Posi- tive illusions may be adaptive for one’s mental health and well-being (Taylor 1983). In particular those illusions of positive self-evaluation and optimism, and an exaggerated perception of control or mastery, have been suggested as leading to effective cognitive adaptation (Taylor & Brown 1988). DISCUSSION Our study provides a ‘snap shot’ of nurses’ experiences of adapting to WPV in one non-teaching hospital and thus the ability to generalize our findings to other contexts may be limited. However, this study is the first of its kind to explore in some detail nurses’ cognitive adaptation pro- cesses following episodes of WPV and as such offers new knowledge and insights into this phenomenon. Our find- ings indicate that nurses’ reactions to their experiences of WPV can be explained in terms of Taylor’s (1983) theory of cognitive adaptation to traumatic events. All of the clinicians in our study (all of whom had continued to work) had adapted to their experiences of WPV by finding meaning, gaining mastery and enhancing themselves. Finding meaning required our participants to be able to tell of their experiences in a sequential way and make direct attributions as to what caused the episode of WPV. These included what and why the event happened, and who was to blame. On most occasions the nurses ascribed blame to others (usually the patient) as a cause of the event. It is noteworthy that except for their lack of experi- ence, the nurses in our study ascribed causes that they considered they had little or no control over. For example, the nurses felt that they could not control which patients ADAPTING TO WORKPLACE VIOLENCE 191 © 2010 The Authors Journal compilation © 2010 Australian College of Mental Health Nurses Inc. were admitted to the hospital, long wait times for patients to be seen by a health provider, inadequate skill mix of staff, or the offenders’ substance abuse. This is contrary to Taylor’s (1983) findings where the cancer patients in her study attributed causes of their disease to factors that they had some control over such as stress and diet. Taylor asserts that individuals identify causes of life threatening events that are controllable, either immediately or in the future. We argue that this assumption is not necessarily correct because even though the nurse participants in our study considered that they could not control many of the actual causes of WPV they still managed to find strategies that enabled them to regain mastery of the event such as seeking counselling and reporting the incident to the police. A self-enhancement strategy used by the participants was to compare themselves favourably with others. All of the nurses believed that they were better able to manage or deal with WPV than their colleagues. This strategy allowed the participants to maintain their self-esteem and was therefore central to their adjustment and adaptation to WPV. Downward comparison (comparing themselves with people who they consider less able to manage WPV) is a reasonably vigorous method of self-protection against threat (Taylor 1983). Our study affirmed Taylor’s asser- tion that ‘everyone is better off than someone’ (Taylor 1983; p. 1166). For example, the senior nurses compared themselves favourably with junior and less experienced clinicians. However, those junior staff that observed their more experienced colleagues manage an event of WPV considered that they themselves would have handled the situation better if they had been in charge. We would argue that our junior nurses are selecting their social comparison targets to enable them not only to validate themselves but, because their management of these events was hypothetical and untested, also to con- struct a favourable view of themselves and their abilities. An additional reason for this finding could be that nurses may be wearing their experiences of WPV as a ‘badge of honour’ and that this strategy may also be a part of their adaptive process. If this interpretation is correct, what are these medals demonstrating? Could they be evidence of their bravery, knowledge, ability or their qualification to be a member of the nursing profession? If the latter is the case then this may be a further reason that our junior nurses hypothesized positive abilities to manage WPV. It is important to note that we did not interview nurses who had left the profession because of WPV and there- fore it may be that our participants were unusually well- adjusted following their experiences of WPV. To gain a comprehensive understanding of nurses’ adaptation to WPV future research should focus on those clinicians who have chosen to leave the profession because of these events. Although we have presented our findings of meaning, gaining mastery and enhancing self in mutually exclusive categories, many of these cognitive processes may serve more than one function simultaneously. For example, believing one has control (mastery) or making downward comparisons (self-enhancement) may both enhance the self. In our study most participants cognitively adapted to WPV by finding meaning, gaining mastery and enhancing their self-esteem, however, to achieve an effective level of functioning all of these processes appeared to be recur- sive. We postulate that participants may revisit and con- tinually reflect on their experiences, reframing them to achieve self-enhancement and self-protection. These techniques may work toward gaining control of the event and may help guide behaviour in future situations. As a result of these observations we have re-envisaged the theory of adaptation as presented in Figure 2. Although we argue that adaptation to WPV is critical to an individual’s psychological adjustment, many questions remain, such as: Are there long-term negative effects for nurses, organizations and the society at large of adapting and adjusting to WPV? Does a person’s belief that they can control and master WPV make them more vulnerable to these events? In fact, do those individuals with unreal- istic optimism regarding their abilities lead them to ignore the warning signs that an event of WPV is likely to occur and to take unacceptable risks? To build on the under- standings of the process of adaptation evident in this study, and answer these questions, further research is needed. The results of this study have demonstrated that on the whole the nurse participants cognitively adapted to their experiences of WPV. This outcome was achieved by uti- lizing such strategies as finding meaning, gaining mastery Finding meaning Gaining masteryEnhancing self Adaptation FIG. 2: Model of cognitive adaptation to WPV. 192 R. CHAPMAN ET AL. © 2010 The Authors Journal compilation © 2010 Australian College of Mental Health Nurses Inc. and enhancing the self through social comparison and maintaining a set of positive illusions. Therefore, we contend that to assist nurses through the process of cog- nitive adaptation, organizations are obliged to develop policies and practices that provide staff with formal and informal counselling and support services (Dean 2004). In this way nurses may be enabled to reflect on events of WPV shortly after the incident and their psychological recovery will be accelerated (Cembrowicz & Shepherd 1992). This strategy will guide nurses through these dis- tressing incidents and hopefully help them find meaning, take some control and feel better about themselves fol- lowing an event. These policies and interventions would assist hospitals and health agencies to fulfil occupational health and safety requirements that oblige them to miti- gate WPV and support staff following these events (Mor- rison & Love 2003). CONCLUSION All of the participants in this study had experienced WPV perpetrated by either their patients or their friends and family. As a consequence the participants adjusted to their experiences of WPV by using strategies in an attempt to overcome such situations. Our study shows that Taylor’s (1983) theory of cogni- tive adaptation can improve our understanding of nurses’ experiences of WPV. However, we have refined this theory. Firstly, by detailing specific types of strategies which constitute each process and secondly, by arguing that these processes are not functionally mutually exclu- sive. Further, we have suggested that the cognitive pro- cesses involved in adapting and adjusting to WPV are not linear but recursive. Future longitudinal research could address this issue. 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work_oqnocxzfprcepluudbxahxhfoy	----	Young and unafraid: queer criminology’s unbounded potential COMMENT Young and unafraid: queer criminology’s unbounded potential Vanessa R. Panfil 1 ABSTRACT Queer criminology, a fairly young subfield, deals with matters of import for sexual and gender minorities, particularly LGBTQ+ populations. Areas of interest include reducing invisibility and inequity, though these pursuits can sometimes be accompanied with potential pitfalls or unintended consequences. This article provides an overview of the goals and considerations of queer criminology, while focusing on how to cultivate queer criminology’s unbounded potential to help address pressing social problems. Several global issues of immediate con- cern for LGBTQ+ people are identified, such as criminalization and devaluation of their lives, which has resulted in their detainment and torture, persecution when they organize for their rights, overrepresentation in criminal justice settings, and even fatal violence. Included alongside these issues are strategies to produce meaningful work during what seems to be a time of imminent crisis. The author provides strong encouragement to fiercely pursue pro- jects that can improve our understanding, and, ultimately, the lives of LGBTQ+ people. DOI: 10.1057/s41599-018-0165-x OPEN 1 Department of Sociology and Criminal Justice, Old Dominion University, Norfolk, VA 23529, USA. Correspondence and requests for materials should be addressed to V.R.P. (email: vpanfil@odu.edu) PALGRAVE COMMUNICATIONS | (2018) 4:110 | DOI: 10.1057/s41599-018-0165-x | www.nature.com/palcomms 1 12 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 () :,; http://orcid.org/0000-0002-3005-4726 http://orcid.org/0000-0002-3005-4726 http://orcid.org/0000-0002-3005-4726 http://orcid.org/0000-0002-3005-4726 http://orcid.org/0000-0002-3005-4726 mailto:a4.3d www.nature.com/palcomms www.nature.com/palcomms Shared themes in queer criminology Q ueer criminology focuses primarily on issues of import for lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, questioning, intersex, and asexual (LGBTQ+) people, such as their experiences with crime, victimization, the criminal and juvenile justice systems, and as justice system actors. Thus, broader con- cepts that queer criminologists investigate include discrimination, harassment, safety, and fairness. Some would also argue for a more expansive version of “queer” that encompasses not just self- identified LGBTQ+ people, but includes anyone who is outside of society’s boundaries pertaining to sex, gender, or sexuality. This is a related reason for the plus sign (+) in the LGBTQ+ acronym, as “LGBTQ” and similar acronyms cannot meaningfully capture everyone. A major thread in queer criminological scholarship is reducing invisibility of LGBTQ+ people in these contexts, which could include: as victims, in the form of improved records- keeping and integration of news coverage; as individuals navi- gating risk or seeking to avoid victimization or persecution; their overrepresentation and negative experiences in the juvenile and criminal justice systems; as criminal justice professionals who may break norms of paramilitary, hypermasculine organizations; and even as offenders. Many queer criminologists directly advo- cate for queer people’s equity and dignity, and for resources to be allocated to improve their outcomes. Queer criminology’s growth has occurred primarily since 2000, with exponential growth happening from 2014 onward. Several full-length edited volumes (Peterson and Panfil, 2014; Dwyer et al., 2016), special issues of journals (Ball et al., 2014), and monographs (Ball, 2016b; Buist and Lenning, 2016) address queer criminology and its relevant topics. A complete bibliography of queer criminological work is beyond the scope of this piece, but a brief review of some recent queer criminological topics will be illustrative of the range of approaches under this umbrella. Regarding disciplinary concerns, queer criminologists have traced the history of criminology and its heteronormative origins (Woods, 2014), argued for integrating queer theory into social science discourses (Ball, 2016b), and showed the lack of engage- ment with LGBTQ+ topics in criminology and criminal justice curricula (Cannon and Dirks-Linhorst, 2007). Concerning victi- mization, topics have included hate crimes in a global context (Stotzer, 2014), how transgender women navigate their safety after experiencing hate violence (Perry and Dyck, 2014), and experiences with intrafamilial hate violence among gay men and lesbians (Asquith and Fox, 2016), but has also critiqued hate crime laws (Meyer, 2014). Research on the criminal and juvenile justice system experiences of LGBTQ+ people has explored how courts and corrections not only fail them, but cause harm (Mogul et al., 2011), the programmatic needs and requests of sexual minority youth (Belknap et al., 2014), and how transgender women housed in men’s prisons build community and experience prison life (Sexton and Jenness, 2016). Policing research is also well-represented, such as tracing the history of policing queer people and asking whether progressive policies can emerge (Dwyer and Tomsen, 2016), assessing the effectiveness of police liaison programs meant to serve LGBTQ+ communities (Dwyer et al., 2017), and describing how gay and lesbian police officers navigate their occupation (Colvin, 2012). Queer criminology has even explored contexts of offending, such as youth weapons- carrying (Button and Worthen, 2017), how gay gang members construct identity through crime and gang membership (Panfil, 2017), and the dynamics of same-sex intimate partner violence (Messinger, 2017). Unbounded potential Among queer criminological circles, there has been some debate about its intellectual heritage, or what branch of criminology it falls under. For example, some might argue queer criminology is squarely within critical criminology, which “includes a variety of progressive, humanistic, and radical perspectives” (Kauzlarich, 2018, p. 14) that challenge dominant understandings of the contours of crime and criminal justice. Critical perspectives that can be queered also include cultural criminology, with its interest in subcultures, situated meanings and identities, resistance, space/ place, and risk and embodiment (Hayward and Young, 2004), not to mention a very early call for a “queered criminology” origi- nating in an edited volume setting forth agendas for cultural criminology (Ferrell and Sanders, 1995). In contrast, others might suggest that it falls within the purview of feminist criminology, since gender and sexuality have long been foci of this tradition (see, e.g., Daly, 1994), and it has arguably included LGBTQ+ people more consistently than any other criminological subfield. There are practical implications for this debate about where queer criminology “lives” within the context of a larger disciplinary structure. For example, scholars may use indicators to help guide them as to where to send manuscripts, such as to Feminist Criminology versus Critical Criminology, or for which divisions of professional organizations they should perform service. All of these streams of criminology have legitimate claims to helping develop queer criminological work. Personally, I am not interested in figuring out one exclusive “home” for queer criminology, especially as different projects have contributions to make within critical, cultural, or feminist criminology—or elsewhere! In fact, I have argued before that queer criminology, or at least attention to the experiences of LGBTQ+ populations, is of central importance to the larger discipline (Panfil and Miller, 2014), and queer criminologists should strive to make at least some of their work accessible to and conversant with mainstream, even orthodox, criminology. Recent examples of this include queer criminologists’ integrations of recognizable criminological concepts such as the “criminal career” (e.g., Asquith et al., 2017) or testing well-known crimin- ological theories including general strain theory (e.g., Button and Worthen, 2017). And, there are ways forward that would not abandon a critical queer criminology at the discipline’s margins, but would still be active in dialoguing with mainstream crimin- ology in the hopes of “pointing out how its well-entrenched heteronormative and positivistic bad habits are holding it back,” such that we queer criminologists can help make criminology “a better discipline” (Dalton, 2016, p. 30; original emphasis). Furthermore, work that makes meaningful contributions to our knowledge about the safety and well-being of LGBTQ+ people may not appear in criminological outlets. One example is research on unnecessary surgical modification of intersex infants and children: although these surgeries are advised against by patient support groups and various human rights organizations and have been shown to cause both mental and physical harm, they con- tinue to be performed daily in the U.S. (Davis and Murphy, 2013). Part of queer criminology’s unbounded potential is its ability to answer questions of import in today’s diverse world. Thus, in a more general sense, in order to do queer criminological work, I argue that scholars should not feel constrained by deep-seated disciplinary norms or politics that have systematically excluded LGBTQ+ people from humanistic and nuanced exploration. To assume that queer criminology only has contributions to make to academic contexts would be selling it wildly short. Queer criminological work should dialogue not just with the broader field or related interdisciplinary fields, but with the public and community institutions. Many LGBTQ+ people who are not academics, but who still experience what it is like to live as a queer person daily, are very interested in trends of violence against queer people or political moves to restrict their rights, and the implications this has on health and well-being. We need to COMMENT PALGRAVE COMMUNICATIONS | DOI: 10.1057/s41599-018-0165-x 2 PALGRAVE COMMUNICATIONS | (2018) 4:110 | DOI: 10.1057/s41599-018-0165-x | www.nature.com/palcomms www.nature.com/palcomms better utilize public criminology to get information out to the communities that could benefit from it, through social media, community forums, press releases, standard websites, and potentially even open access academic journals. Related to this point of encouraging public criminology and collaboration with community organizations, work on many queer criminological topics exists largely within the public realm already. In fact, much of what we know on topics such as state mistreatment of LGBTQ+ people, fatal violence against trans- gender women, and experiences of queer people in the criminal and juvenile justice systems comes from the grey literature— reports from organizations that conduct research and release it on their own or outside of academic or commercial publishers. Thus, much information about LGBTQ+ populations’ experiences with crime and justice, especially the experiences of LGBTQ+ people of color, comes not from academics, but from organizations or associations doing work on the ground. These include Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, GLSEN (the Gay, Lesbian, and Straight Education Network), National Center for Lesbian Rights, Human Rights Campaign, Trans People of Color Coali- tion, the National Coalition of Anti-Violence Programs, Center for American Progress, the Movement Advancement Project, and Black and Pink. The unbounded potential of queer criminology also exists at the intersection of activism and scholarship. This could be con- ceived of outside the academy, such as scholars engaging in community organizing or volunteerism. However, scholars can also participate in activism through traditional academic acts such as research, teaching, and service—queer criminology as activism (Ball, 2016a). Indeed, a diverse group of queer crimin- ologists themselves note the importance of framing certain dis- ciplinary acts as advocacy, and allowing our scholarship to inform our advocacy and vice versa (Dwyer and Panfil, 2017). Of immediate concern LGBTQ+ people have faced many challenges globally throughout history, and several contemporary revelations are particularly disturbing and concerning. For example, global news media has reported on suspected instances of queer people being system- atically rounded up, detained, tortured, “disappeared,” and/or killed en masse—in modern-day Chechnya, for instance (Rain- sford, 2017). Similarly, it is disconcerting when leaders of republics, such as those of Iran or Chechnya, say, “In Iran, we don’t have homosexuals like in your country [the U.S.]” (Gold- man, 2007), or that there are no gay people in Chechnya (Rain- sford, 2017). Although these statements are likely related to issues of visibility combined with those leaders’ goals for social desir- ability, it also raises unsettling questions about what efforts are being taken to ensure that no gay people exist in their respective locales. Human rights organizations have uncovered state torture and ill-treatment of LGBTQ+ people in countries across the world, in both the global North and the global South (Amnesty International, 2001). In addition, it is estimated that nearly 80 countries have laws criminalizing same-sex sexual contact (Itaborahy and Zhu, 2013). Others have laws that dictate guidelines for self-presentation (such as no “cross-dressing”) or sexual contact (such as prohi- biting “sodomy”) that may not explicitly mention LGBTQ+ people, but are often used to target their daily lives. In some of these countries, many of which are located in the global South, LGBTQ+ rights activists face extreme stigma and violence. They have been doxxed (their addresses/phone numbers or other identifying information released through local media), subjected to police harassment, targeted for interpersonal violence, and/or forced to flee. Several prominent activists, such as Brian Williamson of Jamaica, Xulhaz Mannan of Bangladesh, and Eric Ohena Lembembe of Cameroon, were murdered after their pro- LGBTQ+ activities were publicized; these activists’ lives and good works have been further devalued by victim blaming, and, in the latter two cases, a lack of sincere effort to bring a perpetrator to justice (for more details on each of these individuals’ activism and their murders, see Asquith et al., 2018). Australian queer crim- inologists in particular are thus far leading the way in combining Southern criminology and queer criminology (e.g., Ball and Dwyer, 2018), but hopefully others will serve as allies and colla- borators to scholars and advocates in the global South who are motivated to pursue this work. A related concern that has received much attention in the United States is the incidence of fatal violence against transgender people, especially transgender women of color. Compared to all women, transgender women are estimated to be 4.3 times more likely to be murdered; furthermore, 93 percent of the known transgender homicide victims between 2013–2016 were people of color, three-quarters of whom were African American (HRC and TPOCC, 2016). Just over two-thirds of all victims of anti-LGBTQ + or HIV-motivated hate violence homicides are transgender women of color (NCAVP, 2013). Factors that contribute to this violence include misogyny, false and damaging cultural stereo- types of transgender people as “deceptive,” and perceived support for so-called “trans panic” as a legal justification for homicide (Wodda and Panfil, 2015). Racist, misogynist, and transphobic cultural forces combine to create dangerous scenarios for trans- gender women of color, and interventions into these structural forces are vitally necessary. Queer people, including young LGBTQ+ people, are not only overrepresented in the juvenile and criminal justice systems, but are underserved by social institutions because they are denied equal protection in education, housing, employment, and healthcare. For example, LGBTQ+ youths’ percentages in the juvenile justice system are more than twice their proportion within the general youth population (Hunt and Moodie-Mills, 2012). They may end up in the juvenile justice system through mechanisms such as the school-to-prison pipeline, where LGBTQ + youth are targeted for disciplinary infractions or exclusionary discipline (such as suspension, expulsion, or school transfer) related to their sexual orientation or gender expression (Burdge et al., 2014). They are also overcriminalized for activities such as engaging in age-appropriate sexual exploration with same-sex peers, or for their reactions to familial discord resulting from their LGBTQ+ identities (Majd et al., 2009). Criminal processing sys- tem overreach manifests in many forms, but is perhaps especially egregious in the case of “walking while trans,” where transgender people are arrested for suspicion of prostitution or other “quality of life” offenses simply for existing in certain areas or moving through space (Kellaway, 2015). Institutions similarly fail to protect LGBTQ+ people; only 19 states in the U.S. prevent employment discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity (Bellis, 2017). Transgender and gender non- conforming people are especially vulnerable to discrimination in the workplace, which perpetuates inequality and can even lead to survival crimes (Walker et al., 2018). Furthermore, the current U. S. federal administration has taken steps to allow healthcare workers to refuse services on religious grounds or “conscience” objections, and it seems likely this will include being able to refuse services to LGBTQ+ people (Kodjak, 2018). Because of the potential that LGBTQ+ people may be refused necessary healthcare services under government approval, this could soon be a state violence concern. A caveat relevant to conducting queer criminological research is the risk of unintended consequences, such as our data being used to bolster administrative projects that further surveil, PALGRAVE COMMUNICATIONS | DOI: 10.1057/s41599-018-0165-x COMMENT PALGRAVE COMMUNICATIONS | (2018) 4:110 | DOI: 10.1057/s41599-018-0165-x | www.nature.com/palcomms 3 www.nature.com/palcomms www.nature.com/palcomms control, or criminalize LGBTQ+ people (Ball, 2014; see also Panfil, 2014). Because of the potential criminal justice system overreach mentioned prior, it is probably best to draw from the sensibilities of penal abolition as we proceed. After all, some scholars (e.g., Spade, 2013) have convincingly argued that we as queer scholars and community members should be hesitant to place our trust or resources in the same institutions that have historically marginalized and harmed people like us. Meaningful work The issues and topics that queer criminologists pursue constitute inherently meaningful work. Some projects may not seem to have an immediately obvious policy implication, such as work on identities, but any project that can shine light on LGBTQ+ people’s experiences is valuable. Topics such as those I note directly above are priority areas in my own estimation, but my forthcoming and in-progress projects do not align with all of them. Many of us have our own topical areas of concern that we have been pursuing for years, and I do not mean to imply that we should abandon other work we are doing and take up those particular challenges. In fact, many pressures today may make us feel as though we should be working on something else altogether. Scholars committed to social justice are understandably shaken by both existential and immediate threats to the world order, such as concerns about nuclear warfare and democracy being in crisis. A sense of crisis can accelerate time and make us feel that we must speed up our research process as we race to catch up, but taking more of a “slow science” approach can help us proceed more deliberately and reliably (Werth and Ballestero, 2017). While I do not object to research being reactionary if it evaluates a legal, political, or social change, the projects we thought were crucial at one time in the very recent past are likely still crucial and should not be shelved, and research looking broadly at deeply ingrained societal power structures is still necessary. Similar and complementary sentiments have taken root among and been fostered by many scholars. For example, the 2018 Racial Democracy, Crime, and Justice Network’s summer conference theme was “Staying on Course: Undertaking Crime and Justice Scholarship in an Anti-Science Era.” Queer criminologists (and others) should keep doing the work we feel compelled to com- plete. Even if the work does not seem to be about an extremely pressing social issue relevant to the policy changes of the past couple of years, any queer criminology topic does not suddenly become unimportant in light of other crises. And, more specifi- cally, in order to understand the potential impacts of forthcoming or unfolding policy, a baseline (of sorts) would serve us well. Learning about identities, experiences, activities, meanings, challenges, hopes, fears, personal agency, social support, and other factors in the lives of LGBTQ+ people will better allow us to make sense of how things are and how they could, or should, be. I am certain that we will value possessing diverse threads of scholarship when we are again able to weave larger tapestries. A closing thought on privilege Although I think the tide is turning as the discipline becomes more diverse and its boundaries are pushed, doing queer crim- inology is sometimes still seen as a gamble or capable of produ- cing occupational hazards. I have met many graduate students and early career scholars who have been encouraged to “de- lavender” their CV, or advised that their work on queer people or sexuality was “career suicide,” or told it was a niche topic. Clearly I do not believe these latter two to be true, and certainly would never have followed the advice provided in the former. For those of us who are able to achieve the discipline’s normative markers of success (e.g., advanced degrees, publications, grants) and feel institutionally secure, I hope we continue to use our privilege to work for us to aid others looking to contribute to queer crimin- ology. I recognize that privilege (or the lack of it) can look very different depending on the type of academic institution, the scholar’s career stage, whether they feel they are already a token, whether conducting queer criminological work would open them up to potentially damaging professional risk, and other factors. For those of us who can exercise our discretion, autonomy, and resources to pursue these lines of inquiry and have it not be to our detriment, we should recognize the advantageous position we are in and the unbounded potential that too affords us. It is incumbent upon us to be fiercely committed and to cul- tivate allies where we can. Of course, I would also encourage people who have seniority and pull and who consider themselves to be LGBTQ+ allies to also become outspoken allies of queer criminology, and mentors to the primarily untenured and early career scholars who are undertaking this work. Queer criminol- ogy as a subfield is young, so I do not blame budding scholars or newcomers for feeling wary; more specifically, I do not begrudge them caution or being strategic. However, we must be unafraid enough to push forward. There is too much on the line. Received: 30 April 2018 Accepted: 7 August 2018 References Amnesty International (2001) Crimes of hate, conspiracy of silence: torture and ill- treatment based on sexual identity. Amnesty International Publications, London Asquith NL, Dwyer A, Simpson P (2017) A queer criminal career. Curr Issues Crim Justice 29:167–180 Asquith NL, Fox CA (2016) No place like home: Intrafamilial hate crime against gay men and lesbians. 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Crit Criminol 22:49–63 Peterson D, Panfil VR (2014) Introduction: reducing the invisibility of sexual and gender identities in criminology and criminal justice. In: Peterson D, Panfil VR (eds) Handbook of LGBT communities, crime, and justice. Springer, New York, p 3–13 Rainsford S (2017) Chechen “gay purge” victim: no one knows who will be next. BBC News. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-41645281. Accessed 30 April 2018 Sexton L, Jenness V (2016) “We’re like community”: collective identity and col- lective efficacy among transgender women in prisons for men. Punishm Soc 18:544–577 Spade D (2013) Their laws will never make us safer. In: Conrad R (ed) Against equality: prisons will not protect you. Against Equality Publishing Collective, Lewiston, p 1–12 Stotzer R (2014) Bias crimes based on sexual orientation and gender identity (SOGI): global prevalence, impacts, and causes. In: Peterson D, Panfil VR (eds) Handbook of LGBT communities, crime, and justice. Springer, New York, NY, p 45–64 Walker A, Sexton L, Valcore J, Sumner J, Wodda A (2018) Transitioning to social justice: transgender and non-binary individuals. In: Roberson C (ed) Hand- book of social, economic, and criminal justice. Routledge, New York, NY, p 220–233 Werth R, Ballestero A (2017) Ethnography and the governance of il/legality: some methodological and analytical reflections. Soc Justice 44(1):10–35 Wodda A, Panfil VR (2015) “Don’t talk to me about deception”: the necessary erosion of the trans* panic defense. Albany Law Rev 78:927–971 Woods JB (2014) “Queering criminology”: overview of the state of the field. In: Peterson D, Panfil VR (eds) Handbook of LGBT communities, crime, and justice. Springer, New York, NY, p 15–41 Additional information Competing interests: The author declares no competing interests. 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To view a copy of this license, visit http://creativecommons.org/ licenses/by/4.0/. © The Author(s) 2018 PALGRAVE COMMUNICATIONS | DOI: 10.1057/s41599-018-0165-x COMMENT PALGRAVE COMMUNICATIONS | (2018) 4:110 | DOI: 10.1057/s41599-018-0165-x | www.nature.com/palcomms 5 http://crg.aic.gov.au/reports/1718/31-1112-FinalReport.pdf http://crg.aic.gov.au/reports/1718/31-1112-FinalReport.pdf http://abcnews.go.com/US/story?id=3642673 http://www.advocate.com/politics/transgender/2015/01/27/arizona-appeals-court-overturns-monica-joness-conviction-walking-whi http://www.advocate.com/politics/transgender/2015/01/27/arizona-appeals-court-overturns-monica-joness-conviction-walking-whi http://www.advocate.com/politics/transgender/2015/01/27/arizona-appeals-court-overturns-monica-joness-conviction-walking-whi https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2018/01/18/578811426/trump-will-protect-health-workers-who-reject-patients-on-religious-grounds https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2018/01/18/578811426/trump-will-protect-health-workers-who-reject-patients-on-religious-grounds https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2018/01/18/578811426/trump-will-protect-health-workers-who-reject-patients-on-religious-grounds http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-41645281 http://www.nature.com/reprints http://www.nature.com/reprints http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ www.nature.com/palcomms www.nature.com/palcomms Young and unafraid: queer criminology&#x02019;s unbounded potential Shared themes in queer criminology Unbounded potential Of immediate concern Meaningful work A closing thought on privilege References Competing interests ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
work_osa7vlq5pfaurethk3ebxru5ry	----	The Effects of 9/11 on Attitudes Toward Immigration and the Moderating Role of Education econstor Make Your Publications Visible. A Service of zbw Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft Leibniz Information Centre for Economics Schüller, Simone Working Paper The effects of 9/11 on attitudes toward immigration and the moderating role of education SOEPpapers on Multidisciplinary Panel Data Research, No. 534 Provided in Cooperation with: German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin) Suggested Citation: Schüller, Simone (2013) : The effects of 9/11 on attitudes toward immigration and the moderating role of education, SOEPpapers on Multidisciplinary Panel Data Research, No. 534, Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW), Berlin This Version is available at: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/69518 Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. 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If the documents have been made available under an Open Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence. www.econstor.eu SOEPpapers on Multidisciplinary Panel Data Research The Effects of 9/11 on Attitudes Toward Immigration and the Moderating Role of Education Simone Schüller 534 2013 SOEP — The German Socio-Economic Panel Study at DIW Berlin 534-2013 SOEPpapers on Multidisciplinary Panel Data Research at DIW Berlin This series presents research findings based either directly on data from the German Socio- Economic Panel Study (SOEP) or using SOEP data as part of an internationally comparable data set (e.g. CNEF, ECHP, LIS, LWS, CHER/PACO). SOEP is a truly multidisciplinary household panel study covering a wide range of social and behavioral sciences: economics, sociology, psychology, survey methodology, econometrics and applied statistics, educational science, political science, public health, behavioral genetics, demography, geography, and sport science. The decision to publish a submission in SOEPpapers is made by a board of editors chosen by the DIW Berlin to represent the wide range of disciplines covered by SOEP. There is no external referee process and papers are either accepted or rejected without revision. Papers appear in this series as works in progress and may also appear elsewhere. They often represent preliminary studies and are circulated to encourage discussion. Citation of such a paper should account for its provisional character. A revised version may be requested from the author directly. Any opinions expressed in this series are those of the author(s) and not those of DIW Berlin. Research disseminated by DIW Berlin may include views on public policy issues, but the institute itself takes no institutional policy positions. The SOEPpapers are available at http://www.diw.de/soeppapers Editors: Jürgen Schupp (Sociology, Vice Dean DIW Graduate Center) Gert G. Wagner (Social Sciences) Conchita D’Ambrosio (Public Economics) Denis Gerstorf (Psychology, DIW Research Director) Elke Holst (Gender Studies, DIW Research Director) Frauke Kreuter (Survey Methodology, DIW Research Professor) Martin Kroh (Political Science and Survey Methodology) Frieder R. Lang (Psychology, DIW Research Professor) Henning Lohmann (Sociology, DIW Research Professor) Jörg-Peter Schräpler (Survey Methodology, DIW Research Professor) Thomas Siedler (Empirical Economics) C. Katharina Spieß (Empirical Economics and Educational Science) ISSN: 1864-6689 (online) German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP) DIW Berlin Mohrenstrasse 58 10117 Berlin, Germany Contact: Uta Rahmann | soeppapers@diw.de The Effects of 9/11 on Attitudes Toward Immigration and the Moderating Role of Education* Simone Schüller ABSTRACT The major event of the 9/11 terror attacks is likely to have induced an increase in anti- immigrant and anti-foreigner sentiments, not only among US residents but also beyond US borders. Using longitudinal data from the German Socio-Economic Panel and exploiting exogenous variation in interview timing throughout 2001, I find that the terror attacks in the US caused an immediate shift of around 40 percent of one within standard deviation to more negative attitudes toward immigration and resulted in a considerable decrease in concerns over xenophobic hostility among the German population. Furthermore, in exploiting within- individual variation this quasi-experiment provides evidence on the role of education inmoderating the negative terrorism shock. JEL Classification: F22, I21, J61 Keywords: immigration, attitudes, education, September 11, terrorism Corresponding author: Simone Schüller IZA P.O. Box 7240 53072 Bonn Germany E-mail: schueller@iza.org                                                                   *  Financial support from the German Research Foundation (DFG) for the project “Ethnic Diversity and Labor Market Success” in the DFG-Priority Program “Flexibility in Heterogeneous Labor Markets” is gratefully acknowledged. This paper has benefited from insightful comments by participants of the IZA Brownbag Seminar, the GSOEP Brownbag Seminar, and in particular Costanza Biavaschi, Martin Fischer, Andrew J. Oswald, Ulf Rinne, Dan-Olof Rooth and Klaus F. Zimmermann. All remaining errors are my own.  1 Introduction Several recent studies have examined whether the terrorist attacks in the US on September 11, 2001 (9/11) increased labor market discrimination toward certain minorities, not only in the US (e.g. Dávila and Mora, 2005; Orrenius and Zavodny, 2006; Kaushal et al., 2007; Rabby and Rodgers, 2011), but also in other countries such as Canada (Shannon, 2012), Australia (Goel, 2010), the UK (Braakmann, 2010), Sweden (Åslund and Rooth, 2005) and Germany (Braakmann, 2009; Cornelissen and Jirjahn, 2012). These studies are based on two assumptions. First, that the 9/11 attacks had a direct and significant enough impact on individuals’ attitudes, resulting in an increase in discriminatory behavior toward immigrants as a group or certain minorities. Second, the terrorist attacks in the US are assumed to have caused negative international spillover effects to public sentiments toward minority groups in other countries. The existing empirical literature relies on evidence from aggregate time trends that indicate, for example, dramatic increases in hate crimes against Muslims in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, not only in the US but also beyond its borders. Overall, it is unsurprising that a large-scale terror event such as 9/11 fueled acts of anti-immigrant or anti-Muslim aggression and hostility. However, it remains to be seen whether these events caused attitude shifts among the wider society, and whether such an impact was uniform across all types of individuals. To date, no empirical study has attempted to establish a causal connection between the 9/11 incident and attitude shifts in the overall population, either in the US or beyond its borders, and little is also known about heterogeneous effects. This study offers the first empirical analysis to test the causality of the rela- tionship between a major media event such as the 9/11 terror attacks and public immigration-related attitudes, controlling for aggregate time trends. Besides doc- umenting whether the events of 9/11 resulted in attitudinal changes toward immi- gration outside the US in a European country, this analysis also contributes more generally to the literature concerned with the extent to which people’s views about immigration are driven by factors other than economic self-interest. Several recent studies have consistently found a significant and positive relationship between ed- ucation or skill levels among individuals and their views about immigration (e.g. Scheve and Slaughter, 2001; Mayda, 2006). While these findings have been inter- preted as a reflection of labor-market dynamics, where low-skilled workers are most opposed to low-skilled immigration due to realistic fears about labor market com- petition, another line of scholars have questioned this interpretation. For example, Dustmann and Preston (2007) and Hainmueller and Hiscox (2007, 2010) find that a large component of the effect of education on individual attitudes toward immi- 2 gration is associated with differences in cultural values and beliefs rather than with fear of labor market competition. The contribution of this paper to this strand of literature is twofold. First, utilizing the 9/11 events as an exogenous, non-economic shock, I am able to isolate non-economic drivers of immigration-related attitudes, identifying the extent to which education plays a moderating role in attitude forma- tion in the absence of a realistic threat of economic competition. Second, exploiting intra-individual variation in attitudes over time represents an important contribu- tion to a literature that has been exclusively based on cross-sectional comparisons to date. Using longitudinal data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) allows to examine the impact of the 9/11 attacks on the attitudes of German residents in a quasi-experimental setting. I exploit the fact that annual survey interviews are randomly completed throughout the year, in comparing the attitude levels of pre- and post-9/11 respondents in 2001, and relating these attitudes to the respective attitude levels of the same respondents one year prior. This provides approximate estimates of the causal impact of the terror attacks on the attitudes of the German population toward immigration.1 Furthermore, I examine two types of immigration- related attitudes – individuals’ concerns over immigration and people’s concerns over xenophobic hostility – presuming that the former is mainly associated with evaluations of immigration policies and perceived consequences for the host country, while the latter is more likely related to ethnic prejudice or discrimination (Bauer et al., 2000; Ceobanu and Escandell, 2010). Indeed, I find a non-negligible shift to more negative attitudes toward immi- gration among German residents as a result of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. At the same time, the attacks resulted in decreasing concerns over hostility toward for- eigners. Moreover, I find no evidence of the 9/11 events causing similar changes in individuals’ worries about overall economic development or crime in Germany, which confirms the non-economic nature of the 9/11 shock on immigration-related attitudes. Hence, these results confirm the importance of cultural prejudice in driv- ing immigration-related attitudes and emphasize that public attitude shifts can be potentially triggered by major media events such as the 9/11 attacks. Further investigation shows that a significant 9/11 impact on attitudes toward immigration is mainly prevalent among respondents with below-average education levels, while I find no evidence of a significant attitude shift among highly educated individuals. These results are consistent with a moderating role of education in the 1Similar strategies have been used by Metcalfe et al. (2011) to analyze 9/11-effects on subjective well-being in the UK, and by Goel (2010) to investigate changes in immigrants’ perceptions of racial intolerance and labor market outcomes in Australia as a consequence of 9/11. 3 attitudinal response to the 9/11 attacks. Yet, in terms of concerns about xenophobic hostility, both high- and low-educated respondents reacted equally strongly to the attacks with lower worries about hostility. This might be interpreted as evidence for the limited potential of education to fully shield from non-economic attitude shocks. The paper is organized as follows. The next section provides a brief summary of existing evidence on negative attitude shifts in the aftermath of 9/11 in countries outside the US, with a particular focus on Germany. In Section 3, the data and the employed empirical strategy are introduced. Section 4 details the results of the empirical application for Germany, and Section 5 concludes. 2 Background 2.1 9/11 and Anti-Immigrant Attitudes Strong evidence from aggregate time trends suggests that anti-Muslim sentiments and xenophobic aggression increased considerably among the US population in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. The American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee (2003) reports over 700 incidents targeting Arab Americans or perceived as such, including several murders. Human Rights Watch (2002) and Gould and Klor (2012) refer to data from the FBI Uniform Crime Reporting Program (UCR), showing a 16-fold increase in the reported total number of hate crimes against Muslims from 2000 to 2001. There is also descriptive evidence that the events of 9/11 had a negative im- pact on attitudes toward immigration beyond US borders. In Canada, the Toronto Police Service Hate Crime Unit statistics show a 66 percent rise in hostile acts in late 2001 (Helly, 2004, p.26). Åslund and Rooth (2005) cite aggregate statistics from the Forskargruppen för Samhälls- och Informationsstudier (FSI), showing an 18-percentage-points drop in the fraction of Swedish respondents expressing positive attitudes toward immigration from 51 percent in the period June–August 2001 to 33 percent from September 11 – September 30. With respect to the German popu- lation’s reaction in response to the 9/11 attacks, Brosig and Brähler (2002) describe evidence from four representative opinion surveys collected before and after 9/11, in the form of repeated cross-sections. Their findings suggest a negative change in public attitudes toward certain minority groups, particularly Muslims, with the fraction of respondents who would dislike having Muslims as neighbors rising from 12 percent in June 2001 to 19 percent in April 2002. However, there is no indication that this increase in “social distance” toward Muslims translated into more negative attitudes toward the group of immigrants or foreigners as a whole, as the fraction 4 of respondents expressing a distaste for foreign or guestworker neighbors remained constant at 11 percent. Furthermore, the fear of foreigners in Germany appeared to decrease rather than increase, when comparing 2002 survey responses to results from 1999 (Brosig and Brähler, 2002, p.87–88). In summary, there are suggestions of a negative attitude shift following the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the US, as well as some suggestive indication that the attacks might have also had an impact on attitudes in European countries. However, this evidence is mainly based on aggregate time trends. To the best of my knowledge, no attempts have been made within existing literature to provide systematic empirical evidence of this relationship and directly test the causality of the effects on attitudes toward immigration. However, this might be largely due to limited data availability, since most surveys of attitudes toward immigrants are collected as cross-sectional data. 2.2 The Moderating Role of Education Insofar as the 9/11 terrorist attacks have triggered negative attitudes, there is no direct evidence on whether the 9/11 events had a uniform effect across the entire society or whether it varied between heterogeneous subgroups of the population.2 This study offers first exploratory evidence on the types of individuals most affected in terms of immigration-related attitudes, with a focus on individuals’ educational attainment. I draw on previous literature relating to immigration-related attitude formation to differentiate between groups who are likely at high risk of responding to a negative and intense non-economic attitude shock such as the 9/11 attacks, and those who are expected to be at relatively lower risk of changing their minds. Most studies find that education plays a key role in the perception of immigration and immigrants (e.g. Bauer et al., 2000; Scheve and Slaughter, 2001; Mayda, 2006; Dustmann and Preston, 2007; Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2007, 2010). Gang and Rivera-Batiz (1994) and Fertig and Schmidt (2011) confirm the findings of the low-educated holding relatively more negative attitudes in the German context. However, what lies at the heart of the consistently found positive relationship between educational attainment and attitudes toward immigration and immigrants is controversially debated in the economic literature. On the one hand, the fact that the highly educated hold more favorable attitudes may predominantly reflect their labor market position, which is 2The most closely related study is Cornelissen and Jirjahn (2012), who find negative 9/11-effects in terms of wage discrimination only among low-skilled Muslim employees, and not among the higher skilled Muslims. Assuming that low-skilled Muslims have low-skilled German superiors and co-workers, they attribute this finding to a moderating effect of education in xenophobic attitudes. 5 less vulnerable to typically low-skilled immigration. However, on the other hand, it could also reflect the liberizing effect of education per se, resulting in less ethnic prejudice and greater appreciation of cultural diversity among the highly educated. The context of the 9/11 attacks in 2001 provides a quasi-experimental setting inducing an exogenous shock on individuals’ attitudes toward immigrants and im- migration. In the following, I will argue that this shock has been non-economic in nature and thus increased perceived cultural rather than economic threat. As will be shown in Section 4.1.1, it appears likely that the attacks may not have been per- ceived as associated with increased immigration inflows or changes in immigrants’ skill composition or productivity. In view of 9/11 as a non-economic exogenous shock and against the background of the previous literature on attitude formation, I thus hypothesize that the attacks had a stronger impact on the attitudes of relatively lower educated than highly educated Germans. I furthermore expect a moderating role of education with respect to both individual concerns over immigration as well as worries about hostility toward foreigners. Hence, in contrast to the previous literature, the quasi-experimental setting of the 9/11 attacks allows me to go beyond the analysis of cross-sectional associations and examine within-individual variation in attitudinal reactions to the exogenous shock. In this way, I can not only isolate non-economic from economic drivers of immigration-related attitudes, but also overcome omitted variable issues that might potentially bias cross-sectional analysis. 3 Data and Empirical Setup 3.1 Data This study examines the effects of 9/11 on attitudes toward immigration among German residents. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 act as an exogenous shock providing a powerful quasi-experiment. I use a large longitudinal dataset, consisting of around 20,000 individuals, which allows controlling for individual het- erogeneity and underlying time trends. The German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) is a nationally representative, longi- tudinal study of private households in Germany, conducted in annual waves starting in 1984.3 Respondents are interviewed throughout the year with random timing of the interviews. Although the bulk of interviews usually take place during the first half of each year, a considerable number of respondents are interviewed during the later months. Such data thus provides the unique opportunity to exploit the timing 3See Wagner et al. (2007) for a comprehensive description of this dataset. 6 of survey interviews in 2001 to identify 9/11 effects.4 The two main dependent variables employed in this analysis measure individuals’ concerns over immigration to Germany and hostility toward foreigners or minori- ties in Germany, on a three-point scale ranging from “not at all” to “somewhat” to “very concerned”. In 2000, 32.09 percent of native German respondents were very concerned about immigration to Germany, while 21.90 percent where not at all con- cerned. In the same year, 31.26 percent stated a strong concern over hostility toward foreigners or minorities in Germany, with 16.55 percent not at all worried about this issue.5 Measures of concern over general economic development and about crime in Germany are scaled in the same way as the main dependent variables. Two subsamples are considered in the following. The first includes all individuals aged 17 or older without a so-called migration background6 who were interviewed between January 2000 and December 2001, i.e. the 2000 and 2001 SOEP waves. In- dividuals who took no interview in 2001 or were interviewed on the date of September 11 in 2001 are excluded from the analysis. Moreover, observations with missing in- formation on either of the two main dependent variables are also discarded (1.58 percent of the total sample). This first sample is unbalanced and includes a total of 34,653 observations (16,663 in 2000 and 17,990 in 2001). Next, I consider a second subsample, which additionally includes the two-year period before and after the 9/11 terror attacks, i.e. the waves 1999–2004. This second unbalanced sample consists of 70,799 observations. Table 1 about here Descriptive statistics of the two samples are presented in Table 1. Each of the samples is again split into two groups – the pre-9/11 (control) group including in- dividuals who were interviewed in 2001 between January 1 and September 10, and the post-9/11 (treatment) group consisting of individuals surveyed between Septem- ber 11 and December 31 in the year 2001. Individuals in the post-9/11 group are on average younger, report a slightly higher household income, less likely to be on maternal leave or widowed, and more likely to be single than respondents in the control group. Although it is not clear why such differences occur, it is important to control for these characteristics. 4See Berger (2010) for an example of a previous study exploiting random interview timing in the SOEP, examining the impact of the reactor accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant in 1986 on individual life satisfaction and environmental worries. 5Note that the correlation between the two outcome measures is rather low, the correlation coefficient amounts to 0.0981 in 2000, which justifies separate estimation models for each dependent variable instead of joint modeling. 6An individual is defined as having a migration background if the person is an immigrant to Germany or is born in Germany to at least one immigrant parents. 7 3.2 Empirical Strategy I apply a difference-in-difference approach to identify the effects of 9/11 on in- dividual attitudes of German natives toward immigration and xenophobic hostility, comparing attitude levels of pre- and post-9/11 respondents in 2001 and relating them to the same respondents’ attitude levels one year prior. Ait denotes the level of concern over immigration (hostility toward foreigners) of individual i at time t. Post9/11 is a dummy variable equal to one if the survey interview took place after September 11 in 2001, i.e. in the period from September 12 to December 31 in 2001, and zero otherwise. Year=2001 is a dummy representing the 2001 survey year, the year of the terror attacks, ui is an individual fixed effect, and �it is a time-varying random error term. Ait = α+β1Post9/11it +β2(Y ear = 2001)t +β3[Post9/11it×(Y ear = 2001)t]+ui +�it Parameter β3 is the difference-in-difference estimator that will represent the causal impact of 9/11 on those interviewed between September 12 and December 31 in 2001 (i.e. the average treatment effect on the treated), under the assumption that attitudes of the pre- and post-9/11 group would have changed identically in the absence of the terror events (common trend assumption). This parameter is identified through variation in average attitude levels between respondents who were interviewed before and after 9/11 in 2001, and the comparison of this difference with variation in average attitudes between the pre- and post-9/11 group in 2000. β3 is estimated by applying either pooled OLS with clustering at the individual level, random-effects or fixed-effects models to the above equation. In the following, I will additionally provide estimates of this approach including an extended time period of two years before and after the terror attacks, i.e. the years 1999-2003, to carefully control for underlying aggregate time trends. 8 4 Results and Discussion 4.1 Baseline results Table 2 presents first evidence of a 9/11 impact on individual attitudes toward immigration and concerns over xenophobic hostility in Germany, with estimates us- ing OLS as well as GLS random- and fixed-effects models shown for each dependent variable. With respect to attitudes toward immigration, the coefficients on the in- teraction term between Post9/11 and Year=2001 are statistically significant and positive across all three models. The point estimates range between 0.129 and 0.152, which is around 38 to 44 percent of one within-individual standard deviation in worries about immigration. This indicates that the post-9/11 treatment group ex- perienced a substantial increase in concerns over immigration, while at the same time respondents in the pre-9/11 control group were even slightly less worried about immigration in 2001 than these same individuals reported in 2000. Interestingly, a similar pattern is observed with respect to people’s concerns over hostility toward foreigners or minorities in Germany. Across all three models, the estimated coeffi- cient on the interaction term is significant and negative, with magnitudes ranging from around 29 to 36 percent of one within standard deviation in concerns over xeno- phobic hostility. This implies that the 9/11 attacks did not only result in increased worries about immigration, but also a decrease in worries about xenophobic hostility in Germany. The significant and positive coefficient on Year=2001 indicates that the control group of pre-9/11 respondents instead experienced a moderate increase in such concerns from 2000 to 2001. Table 2 about here This first set of results demonstrate the immediate negative effects of the 9/11 terror attacks in the US on public attitudes in a European country. However, an important assumption is that the attitudes of both the treatment and control group would have followed a similar path in the absence of the treatment. One means of checking this is to consider whether both groups’ attitude levels followed a similar trend in the years preceding 2001 and the years after the event. Figure 1 shows that the average levels of individuals’ worries about immigration and concern over xenophobic hostility follow a very similar trend for both pre- and post-9/11 groups in the two-year periods before and after 2001. However, in the year of the attacks the trend diverges for the two groups, with a noticeable increase in worries about immigration and a considerable decrease in concerns over xenophobic hostility for those interviewed post-9/11 from 2000 to 2001. This is consistent with the estimated treatment effects presented in Table 2. 9 Figure 1 about here In a next step, I incorporate the two years before and after the attacks (survey years 1999-2003) in the empirical analysis, to control more carefully for underlying time trends. In this second set of estimations, controls for gender, age, age squared and log household income, as well as dummies for marital status, labor force status, education, federal state and interview month are added. The results of the GLS models with random and fixed effects respectively are presented in Table 3. With this full specification, the estimated coefficients on the interactions of interest (Post9/11× Year=2001) remain positive and statistically significant in the case of worries about immigration and significantly negative with respect to concerns about xenophobic hostility. In contrast, coefficients on the interaction terms between the post-9/11 treatment group and indicators for the years prior to or post-2001 appear not to be significantly different from zero. This supports the view that, controlling for the relevant covariates, the attitudes of the treatment group do not systematically differ from those of the pre-9/11 control group for reasons other than the exogenous and unanticipated 9/11 terror shock. Note that in the years prior to 2001 both groups are untreated, while both are treated in the years after 2001. We thus only expect both groups to differ in the year 2001 due to interview timings pre- or post-9/11, which appears to be confirmed by the estimation results in Table 3. Overall, the findings fit the evidence on international spillovers based on aggregated time trends. Table 3 about here 4.1.1 Robustness Was the shift toward more negative immigration-related attitudes following the 9/11 terror attacks accompanied by shifts in other, more general types of macro attitudes? Of special interest here are people’s concerns over general economic de- velopment and worries about crime in Germany. Accordingly, Table 4 explores the possibility that the 9/11 attacks also had an impact on these attitudes. Rerunning random and fixed effects models in the specification of Table 3 with measures of worries about economic development and crime in Germany as dependent variables suggests no significant impact of 9/11 on these concerns. For all models in Table 4, the coefficient on the interaction of interest (Post9/11 × Year=2001) is statistically insignificantly different from zero. This suggests that the effects shown in Section 4.1 are not a result of an increased public awareness of security issues or changes in other economic concerns related to immigration. Instead, it is consistent with the inter- pretation of 9/11 representing a non-economic shock. 10 Table 4 about here 4.2 Effect Heterogeneity and the Role of Education Having established empirical evidence that the 9/11 terror events had significant negative effects on individual attitudes toward immigration and resulted in a decrease in worries about xenophobic hostility in Germany, I now investigate whether different types of individuals have been more or less responsive to the 9/11 shock. Along with possible differential effects on individuals according to their education levels, I also examine effect heterogeneity with respect to demographic characteristics such as gender and age, as well as regional foreigner concentration. Tables 5 and 6 recalculate the random effects estimations from Table 3 for split samples by gender, age (i.e. below and above the age of 35), below and above average years of education (i.e. below and above 12 years of education) and federal states with below and above average shares of foreigners, respectively, for both main dependent variables. As indicated by the first set of results in Table 5, men may have been slightly, however not statistically significantly, more responsive than women to the 9/11 at- tacks in terms of worries about immigration. Similarly, younger individuals appear to have reacted more strongly than older people, but these differences are also not very substantial. Furthermore, when comparing respondents in federal states with a relatively low share of foreigners with those in states with a relatively higher share of foreigners, there appear to be no significantly different reactions to the 9/11 events in terms of attitudes toward immigration. The latter finding is particularly interest- ing in the light of empirical evidence from previous studies employing cross-sectional analysis in the German context . For example, Fertig and Schmidt (2001) find that a lower regional foreigner concentration is associated with less favorable immigration- related attitudes among natives on average. However, in response to 9/11, individuals do not seem to update their attitudes toward immigration differently according to whether they reside in a region with a low- or high share of foreigners. The previous background discussion suggests that education may moderate 9/11 effects. Indeed, the estimation results by education level show that the attacks had a larger impact on the group of relatively lower educated individuals than the highly educated. Moreover, the difference is substantial and statistically significant.7 Within the subsample of highly educated individuals, the estimated coefficient on 7I additionally estimated specifications introducing interaction effects instead of split samples by education level. Results are presented in Table A1 in the Appendix for both dependent variables. Similar estimations including interactions with respect to age, gender and regional foreigner share yield non-significant coefficients on the respective interaction terms. These results are available upon request. 11 the interaction Post9/11 × Year=2001 is small in size and not significantly different from zero. Hence, the group of highly educated does not appear to have updated their attitudes toward immigration in the light of the 9/11 events. Table 5 about here The second set of results in Table 6 deals with effect heterogeneity with respect to individual concerns over xenophobic hostility. Interestingly, the estimated coefficients on the interaction Post9/11 × Year=2001 are very similar to each other throughout the split samples, and the differences between males and females, young and old, residents in regions with low and high share of foreigners, and also between the low and the high-educated group are not statistically significant. Consequently, the 9/11 attacks appear to have uniformly lowered individuals’ worries about xenophobic hostility across the population subgroups analyzed. In particular, there is no evidence of a moderating role of education, with both the highly and lower educated reacting equally strongly to the attacks by being less concerned about xenophobic tendencies in the German society. This result is especially striking considering the previous finding of a moderating effect with respect to peoples’ attitudes toward immigration. Table 6 about here However, the ambiguous nature of the measure of individuals’ concerns over xeno- phobic hostility does not allow for a straightforward interpretation of the latter re- sults, as the survey question might in fact trigger diverse connotations. For instance, while one person might report weak concerns over xenophobic hostility due to a distaste for foreigners in Germany or a lack of empathy with them, another indi- vidual may report weak concerns due to their belief that there are no xenophobic tendencies immanent in the German society. The former would therefore reflect an opinion toward minorities or immigrants, while the latter would rather represent an opinion toward fellow German residents. Unfortunately, the different associations related to the survey question are not observable to the researcher, and might even differ according to the respondent’s educational level. The result of lower concerns over xenophobic hostility in response to the 9/11 events could thus either be inter- preted as a shift to more negative attitudes toward immigrants and minorities, or alternatively might indicate a shift to more positive attitudes toward fellow German natives. While it is not possible to clearly distinguish between these two interpre- tations within this study, it is certainly not intuitive to think of a large-scale terror attack as to having resulted in expectations of decreasing xenophobic tendencies in Germany, especially given the German history of xenophobic incidents and violent 12 acts against foreigners (see e.g. Krueger and Pischke, 1997). Against this background, the finding of low- and high-educated respondents reacting equally strongly to the 9/11 events with lower worries about xenophobic hostility casts some doubt on the moderating role of education in this context. The results presented here might rather point at distorting effects due to real or perceived social desirability response bias, which is both higher for the better educated and more prevalent in the more obtrusive question on concerns over im- migration. Studying such distorting effects on expressions of immigration attitudes in survey interviews, e.g. Janus (2010) finds that college graduates are more likely than respondents with a lower educational level to conceal anti-immigration views when asked directly . Stocké (2007) shows that better educated respondents of the German General Social Survey (ALLBUS) perceive stronger social desirability incen- tives when answering racial attitude questions than the less educated. If the survey question on xenophobic hostility is perceived as less obtrusive, especially due to its ambiguous connotation, then its responses may be more in line with individuals’ “true” attitudes. In turn, this would suggest that the finding of a moderating role of education with respect to attitudes toward immigration is solely an artifact of self-presentational concerns. However, I cannot observe respondents’ sensitivity to social desirability pressures within this setting, and thus the above interpretation efforts must remain of a speculative nature. 5 Summary and Conclusion This study highlights that the 9/11 terror attacks in the US had a significant and negative impact on individual attitudes toward immigration and immigrants among native German residents. More specifically, it is shown that the attacks increased worries about immigration by around 38 to 44 percent of one within- individual standard deviation, and lowered concerns over xenophobic hostility by approximately 29 to 36 percent of one within standard deviation. These effects are significant and robust. Moreover, this analysis provides evidence for the role of educational attainment in moderating individuals’ attitudinal responses to a major event such as 9/11. In fact, highly educated respondents have not shown any significant change in attitudes toward immigration in the aftermath of the attacks, whereas the lower educated reacted with a considerable and significant shift to more negative immigration atti- tudes. However, evidence with respect to individual concerns over xenophobic hostil- ity show a different pattern, with both low- and high-educated individuals reacting equally strongly to the 9/11 attacks by lowering their concerns over xenophobic 13 hostility in Germany. Despite the ambiguous character of the measure of attitudes toward xenophobic tendencies, this finding may cast some doubt on a universal mod- erating role of education. 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Schmollers Jahrbuch 127 (1), 139–169. 17 Table 1: Descriptive Statistics Sample 2000-2001 Sample 1999-2003 All Pre-9/11 Post-9/11 All Pre-9/11 Post-9/11 N 34,653 34,046 607 70,799 69,730 1,069 Worries immigration 2.050 2.050 2.044 2.072 2.072 2.028* (0.726) (0.727) (0.710) (0.722) (0.722) (0.744) Worries hostility toward foreigners 2.181 2.181 2.163 2.128 2.128 2.112 (0.679) (0.680) (0.641) (0.666) (0.667) (0.655) Male 0.477 0.477 0.499 0.478 0.478 0.511* Age 46.546 46.577 44.817* 47.237 47.270 45.065 Ln(net household income) 8.321 8.320 8.412* 8.057 8.056 8.148* Lower than secondary degree 0.031 0.030 0.040 0.026 0.026 0.039* Secondary degree 0.801 0.801 0.784 0.803 0.804 0.775* Tertiary degree 0.168 0.168 0.176 0.171 0.170 0.186 Full-time employed 0.423 0.423 0.433 0.421 0.420 0.431 Unemployed 0.099 0.100 0.091 0.101 0.101 0.102 Other Employment 0.205 0.204 0.252* 0.202 0.201 0.247* Retired 0.220 0.221 0.191 0.232 0.232 0.186* Maternity leave 0.020 0.020 0.008* 0.018 0.018 0.007* In education 0.032 0.032 0.025 0.028 0.028 0.027 Married 0.636 0.637 0.608 0.639 0.639 0.609* Single 0.230 0.228 0.292* 0.223 0.222 0.280* Divorced 0.070 0.070 0.059 0.072 0.072 0.071 Widowed 0.064 0.065 0.041* 0.066 0.067 0.040* Notes: Attitude measures (worries) take a value of 1 = not concerned at all, 2 = somewhat concerned, and 3 = very concerned. An individual is assigned to the pre-9/11 group if they were interviewed between January 1, 2001 and September 10, 2001 and to the post-9/11 group if the 2001 interview took place between 12 September and 31 December that year. ∗ Statistically different from pre-9/11 mean at the 5 percent confidence level. Table 2: Worries about Immigration (Worries about Hostility toward For- eigners) and the 9/11 Attacks – Unbalanced Panel, SOEP 2000 – 2001 Worries about Immigration Worries about Hostility OLS RE FE OLS RE FE Post-9/11 -0.073∗ -0.082∗ 0.051 0.042 (0.042) (0.043) (0.034) (0.040) Year=2001 -0.099∗∗∗ -0.097∗∗∗ -0.094∗∗∗ 0.069∗∗∗ 0.071∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗∗ (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) Year=2001 × Post-9/11 0.129∗∗∗ 0.141∗∗∗ 0.152∗∗∗ -0.131∗∗∗ -0.119∗∗∗ -0.103∗∗ (0.043) (0.041) (0.042) (0.045) (0.044) (0.045) Constant 2.102∗∗∗ 2.099∗∗∗ 2.098∗∗∗ 2.146∗∗∗ 2.143∗∗∗ 2.144∗∗∗ (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) N 34,653 34,653 34,653 34,653 34,653 34,653 Source: SOEP 2000–2001, own calculations. Notes: Worries about immigration and worries about hostility toward foreigners take a value of 1 = not concerned at all, 2 = somewhat concerned, and 3 = very concerned. Post-9/11 takes a value of 1 for both years (i.e. 2000 and 2001) if the individual was interviewed between January 1, 2001 and September 10, 2001 and 0 between 12 September 2001 and 31 December 2001. Base year = 2000. Standard errors are in parentheses and, in the OLS case, robust to the clustering by individual identification. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 18 Figure 1: Trends in Worries about Immigration (Worries about Hostility toward Foreigners) Before and After the 9/11 Attacks, SOEP 1999 – 2003 Source: SOEP 1999–2003, own calculations. Note: 2001 is the year of the 9/11 attacks. Thin dashed lines represent the 95%-confidence interval. 19 Table 3: Worries about Immigration (Worries about Hostility toward Foreigners) and the 9/11 Attacks – Multiple time peri- ods, SOEP 1999 – 2003 Worries about Immigration Worries about Hostility RE FE RE FE Post-9/11 -0.033 0.044 (0.076) (0.075) Year=2000 -0.087∗∗∗ -0.080∗∗∗ -0.012∗ -0.001 (0.007) (0.012) (0.007) (0.012) Year=2001 -0.190∗∗∗ -0.182∗∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗ 0.098∗∗∗ (0.007) (0.020) (0.007) (0.020) Year=2002 -0.148∗∗∗ -0.112∗∗∗ -0.039∗∗∗ -0.011 (0.008) (0.029) (0.008) (0.030) Year=2003 -0.195∗∗∗ -0.158∗∗∗ -0.115∗∗∗ -0.079∗∗ (0.008) (0.038) (0.008) (0.039) Year=2000 × Post-9/11 -0.034 -0.047 -0.032 0.002 (0.077) (0.080) (0.078) (0.082) Year=2001 × Post-9/11 0.170∗∗ 0.171∗∗ -0.308∗∗∗ -0.259∗∗∗ (0.079) (0.081) (0.080) (0.083) Year=2002 × Post-9/11 -0.002 -0.007 -0.082 -0.056 (0.078) (0.081) (0.079) (0.083) Year=2003 × Post-9/11 -0.002 -0.005 -0.076 -0.061 (0.079) (0.081) (0.080) (0.083) Male 0.029∗∗∗ -0.107∗∗∗ (0.009) (0.008) Age 0.005∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ (0.002) (0.001) Age-squared/100 -0.003∗ -0.011∗∗∗ (0.002) (0.001) Secondary degree 0.027 0.013 -0.025 0.009 (0.020) (0.029) (0.019) (0.030) Tertiary degree -0.298∗∗∗ 0.018 0.038∗ -0.042 (0.023) (0.041) (0.022) (0.042) Unemployed -0.016 -0.004 -0.030∗∗∗ -0.016 (0.010) (0.013) (0.010) (0.013) Other employment -0.038∗∗∗ -0.015 0.010 0.000 (0.009) (0.011) (0.008) (0.011) Retired -0.015 -0.042∗∗ -0.002 0.003 (0.013) (0.019) (0.013) (0.019) Maternity leave -0.015 0.006 0.018 0.002 (0.019) (0.022) (0.019) (0.022) In education -0.119∗∗∗ -0.037∗ -0.013 -0.062∗∗∗ (0.018) (0.021) (0.018) (0.022) Single -0.100∗∗∗ -0.047∗ -0.030∗∗ 0.013 (0.013) (0.025) (0.012) (0.026) Divorced -0.023 0.017 -0.037∗∗∗ -0.027 (0.014) (0.024) (0.013) (0.025) Widowed -0.088∗∗∗ -0.086∗∗ -0.060∗∗∗ -0.004 (0.018) (0.039) (0.016) (0.040) Ln(net household income) -0.047∗∗∗ -0.012 0.006 0.002 (0.007) (0.010) (0.007) (0.010) Constant 2.504∗∗∗ 2.817∗∗∗ 2.156∗∗∗ 2.501∗∗∗ (0.081) (0.353) (0.076) (0.362) N 70,799 70,799 70,799 70,799 Source: SOEP 1999–2003, own calculations. Notes: See Table 2. Control variables additionally include federal state and interview month dummies. Reference groups include female, married, lower than secondary degree, and full-time employment. Fixed effects models include age dummies rather than continuous age variables. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 20 Table 4: Robustness Check: Other Worries and the 9/11 Attacks – Multiple time periods, SOEP 1999 – 2003 Worries about Worries about Economic Development Crime in Germany RE FE RE FE Post-9/11 0.009 -0.025 (0.068) (0.068) Year=2000 -0.070∗∗∗ -0.067∗∗∗ -0.021∗∗∗ -0.015 (0.007) (0.011) (0.006) (0.011) Year=2001 -0.099∗∗∗ -0.099∗∗∗ -0.063∗∗∗ -0.051∗∗∗ (0.006) (0.019) (0.006) (0.018) Year=2002 0.093∗∗∗ 0.120∗∗∗ -0.110∗∗∗ -0.069∗∗ (0.007) (0.028) (0.007) (0.027) Year=2003 0.359∗∗∗ 0.385∗∗∗ -0.170∗∗∗ -0.123∗∗∗ (0.008) (0.036) (0.007) (0.035) Year=2000 × Post-9/11 -0.103 -0.100 0.008 -0.010 (0.072) (0.076) (0.070) (0.073) Year=2001 × Post-9/11 0.092 0.104 0.014 0.010 (0.073) (0.078) (0.071) (0.075) Year=2002 × Post-9/11 -0.009 -0.015 -0.001 -0.025 (0.073) (0.077) (0.071) (0.074) Year=2003 × Post-9/11 0.026 0.027 0.031 0.009 (0.074) (0.078) (0.072) (0.074) Constant 2.132∗∗∗ 2.303∗∗∗ 2.577∗∗∗ 2.298∗∗∗ (0.067) (0.336) (0.070) (0.323) N 70,693 70,693 70,703 70,703 Source: SOEP 1999–2003, own calculations. Notes: See Table 2. Control variables as in Table 3. Fixed effects models include age dummies rather than continuous age variables. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 21 T a b le 5 : W o rr ie s a b o u t Im m ig ra ti o n . E ff ec t H et er o g en ei ty b y G en d er , A g e G ro u p s a n d E d u ca ti o n W o rr ie s a b o u t Im m ig ra ti o n M a le F e m a le A g e < = 3 5 A g e > 3 5 L o w F S h a re H ig h F S h a re L o w E d u H ig h E d u P o st -9 / 1 1 -0 .0 4 1 -0 .0 2 4 -0 .1 2 3 0 .0 3 5 -0 .0 0 7 -0 .0 5 1 -0 .0 6 4 -0 .0 2 0 (0 .1 0 4 ) (0 .1 1 0 ) (0 .1 2 5 ) (0 .0 9 6 ) (0 .1 2 0 ) (0 .0 9 7 ) (0 .1 1 0 ) (0 .1 0 5 ) Y e a r= 2 0 0 0 -0 .0 8 6 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0 .0 8 8 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0 .0 6 2 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0 .0 9 8 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0 .0 9 3 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0 .0 8 5 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0 .0 8 4 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0 .0 8 8 ∗ ∗ ∗ (0 .0 1 0 ) (0 .0 1 0 ) (0 .0 1 3 ) (0 .0 0 8 ) (0 .0 1 0 ) (0 .0 1 0 ) (0 .0 0 9 ) (0 .0 1 2 ) Y e a r= 2 0 0 1 -0 .1 8 5 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0 .1 9 6 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0 .1 6 3 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0 .2 0 1 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0 .1 8 4 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0 .1 9 9 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0 .1 8 3 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0 .1 9 2 ∗ ∗ ∗ (0 .0 0 9 ) (0 .0 1 0 ) (0 .0 1 3 ) (0 .0 0 8 ) (0 .0 1 0 ) (0 .0 1 0 ) (0 .0 0 9 ) (0 .0 1 1 ) Y e a r= 2 0 0 2 -0 .1 4 5 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0 .1 5 2 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0 .1 4 0 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0 .1 6 1 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0 .1 2 9 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0 .1 6 7 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0 .1 2 7 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0 .1 7 0 ∗ ∗ ∗ (0 .0 1 1 ) (0 .0 1 2 ) (0 .0 1 5 ) (0 .0 1 0 ) (0 .0 1 2 ) (0 .0 1 1 ) (0 .0 1 1 ) (0 .0 1 3 ) Y e a r= 2 0 0 3 -0 .2 0 0 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0 .1 9 0 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0 .1 7 9 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0 .2 1 1 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0 .1 9 6 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0 .1 9 7 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0 .1 8 3 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0 .2 0 0 ∗ ∗ ∗ (0 .0 1 1 ) (0 .0 1 2 ) (0 .0 1 6 ) (0 .0 1 0 ) (0 .0 1 2 ) (0 .0 1 1 ) (0 .0 1 1 ) (0 .0 1 3 ) Y e a r= 2 0 0 0 × P o st -9 / 1 1 -0 .0 5 7 -0 .0 1 2 0 .0 3 7 -0 .0 9 5 -0 .0 8 9 0 .0 0 8 0 .0 1 3 -0 .0 6 1 (0 .1 0 6 ) (0 .1 1 2 ) (0 .1 2 9 ) (0 .0 9 8 ) (0 .1 2 3 ) (0 .0 9 9 ) (0 .1 1 4 ) (0 .1 0 5 ) Y e a r= 2 0 0 1 × P o st -9 / 1 1 0 .1 8 9 ∗ 0 .1 4 9 0 .2 3 9 ∗ 0 .1 0 0 0 .1 7 0 0 .1 9 1 ∗ 0 .2 4 3 ∗ ∗ 0 .0 6 2 (0 .1 0 8 ) (0 .1 1 4 ) (0 .1 3 4 ) (0 .1 0 0 ) (0 .1 2 7 ) (0 .1 0 1 ) (0 .1 1 6 ) (0 .1 0 7 ) Y e a r= 2 0 0 2 × P o st -9 / 1 1 0 .0 7 8 -0 .0 8 3 -0 .0 1 1 -0 .0 3 7 -0 .0 2 3 0 .0 1 6 0 .0 1 7 0 .0 0 7 (0 .1 0 8 ) (0 .1 1 3 ) (0 .1 3 6 ) (0 .0 9 9 ) (0 .1 2 4 ) (0 .1 0 1 ) (0 .1 1 5 ) (0 .1 0 7 ) Y e a r= 2 0 0 3 × P o st -9 / 1 1 -0 .0 2 9 0 .0 1 7 -0 .0 4 7 -0 .0 3 6 -0 .0 2 9 0 .0 2 4 0 .0 7 2 -0 .0 8 3 (0 .1 0 9 ) (0 .1 1 4 ) (0 .1 4 1 ) (0 .0 9 9 ) (0 .1 2 3 ) (0 .1 0 3 ) (0 .1 1 6 ) (0 .1 0 7 ) C o n st a n t 2 .5 0 7 ∗ ∗ ∗ 2 .5 6 1 ∗ ∗ ∗ 2 .4 9 7 ∗ ∗ ∗ 2 .3 8 7 ∗ ∗ ∗ 2 .2 0 1 ∗ ∗ ∗ 2 .5 0 2 ∗ ∗ ∗ 2 .6 6 1 ∗ ∗ ∗ 2 .7 6 3 ∗ ∗ ∗ (0 .1 0 9 ) (0 .1 2 1 ) (0 .2 2 1 ) (0 .1 2 4 ) (0 .1 1 6 ) (0 .1 0 5 ) (0 .1 0 2 ) (0 .1 2 3 ) N 3 6 ,9 4 1 3 3 ,8 5 8 1 9 ,5 0 4 5 1 ,2 9 5 3 2 ,7 6 9 3 8 ,0 3 0 4 4 ,5 0 2 2 6 ,2 9 7 S o u rc e : S O E P 1 9 9 9 – 2 0 0 3 , o w n c a lc u la ti o n s. N o te s: S e e T a b le 2 . R a n d o m e ff e c ts m o d e ls . C o n tr o l v a ri a b le s a s in T a b le 3 . H ig h E d u is d e fi n e d a s in d iv id u a l w it h 1 2 o r m o re y e a rs o f e d u c a ti o n / tr a in in g . H ig h F S h a re in d ic a te s a fo re ig n e r sh a re a t fe d e ra l st a te le v e l a b o v e th e n a ti o n a l le v e l sh a re o f fo re ig n n a ti o n a ls in G e rm a n y in 2 0 0 0 . * p < 0 .1 0 , * * p < 0 .0 5 , * * * p < 0 .0 1 . 22 T a b le 6 : W o rr ie s a b o u t H o st il it y. E ff ec t H et er o g en ei ty b y G en d er , A g e G ro u p s a n d E d u ca ti o n W o rr ie s a b o u t H o st il it y M a le F e m a le A g e < = 3 5 A g e > 3 5 L o w F S h a re H ig h F S h a re L o w E d u H ig h E d u P o st -9 / 1 1 0 .0 0 1 0 .0 8 9 0 .0 1 5 0 .0 7 2 0 .1 3 5 -0 .0 3 1 0 .0 6 3 0 .0 6 6 (0 .1 0 2 ) (0 .1 1 0 ) (0 .1 2 1 ) (0 .0 9 7 ) (0 .1 1 9 ) (0 .0 9 7 ) (0 .1 1 1 ) (0 .1 0 1 ) Y e a r= 2 0 0 0 -0 .0 0 9 -0 .0 1 7 0 .0 0 1 -0 .0 1 7 ∗ ∗ -0 .0 1 1 -0 .0 1 8 ∗ -0 .0 2 7 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0 .0 1 5 (0 .0 1 0 ) (0 .0 1 0 ) (0 .0 1 3 ) (0 .0 0 9 ) (0 .0 1 0 ) (0 .0 1 0 ) (0 .0 0 9 ) (0 .0 1 2 ) Y e a r= 2 0 0 1 0 .0 8 7 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0 .0 6 6 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0 .0 9 7 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0 .0 7 1 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0 .0 7 7 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0 .0 7 2 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0 .0 5 8 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0 .1 1 0 ∗ ∗ ∗ (0 .0 0 9 ) (0 .0 1 0 ) (0 .0 1 3 ) (0 .0 0 8 ) (0 .0 1 0 ) (0 .0 1 0 ) (0 .0 0 9 ) (0 .0 1 1 ) Y e a r= 2 0 0 2 -0 .0 3 6 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0 .0 4 2 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0 .0 5 2 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0 .0 3 5 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0 .0 1 7 -0 .0 6 4 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0 .0 3 4 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0 .0 5 1 ∗ ∗ ∗ (0 .0 1 1 ) (0 .0 1 2 ) (0 .0 1 5 ) (0 .0 1 0 ) (0 .0 1 2 ) (0 .0 1 1 ) (0 .0 1 1 ) (0 .0 1 3 ) Y e a r= 2 0 0 3 -0 .1 0 9 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0 .1 2 0 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0 .1 4 4 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0 .1 0 6 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0 .1 0 0 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0 .1 3 4 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0 .1 0 1 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0 .1 4 2 ∗ ∗ ∗ (0 .0 1 1 ) (0 .0 1 2 ) (0 .0 1 6 ) (0 .0 1 0 ) (0 .0 1 2 ) (0 .0 1 2 ) (0 .0 1 1 ) (0 .0 1 3 ) Y e a r= 2 0 0 0 × P o st -9 / 1 1 0 .0 1 4 -0 .0 8 4 -0 .0 4 4 -0 .0 3 7 -0 .1 6 7 0 .0 7 0 -0 .1 0 7 0 .0 0 9 (0 .1 0 7 ) (0 .1 1 5 ) (0 .1 2 8 ) (0 .1 0 0 ) (0 .1 2 3 ) (0 .1 0 1 ) (0 .1 1 6 ) (0 .1 0 5 ) Y e a r= 2 0 0 1 × P o st -9 / 1 1 -0 .2 8 0 ∗ ∗ -0 .3 4 2 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0 .3 4 3 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0 .3 2 0 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0 .3 8 1 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0 .2 3 2 ∗ ∗ -0 .3 0 8 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0 .3 5 2 ∗ ∗ ∗ (0 .1 0 9 ) (0 .1 1 6 ) (0 .1 3 2 ) (0 .1 0 2 ) (0 .1 2 8 ) (0 .1 0 3 ) (0 .1 1 8 ) (0 .1 0 8 ) Y e a r= 2 0 0 2 × P o st -9 / 1 1 -0 .0 0 7 -0 .1 5 8 -0 .0 4 8 -0 .1 1 4 -0 .1 7 2 -0 .0 1 4 -0 .1 4 8 -0 .0 4 6 (0 .1 0 9 ) (0 .1 1 6 ) (0 .1 3 5 ) (0 .1 0 1 ) (0 .1 2 4 ) (0 .1 0 4 ) (0 .1 1 7 ) (0 .1 0 8 ) Y e a r= 2 0 0 3 × P o st -9 / 1 1 -0 .0 0 1 -0 .1 5 2 -0 .1 6 5 -0 .0 7 1 -0 .1 3 5 -0 .0 4 1 -0 .0 7 3 -0 .1 3 6 (0 .1 1 0 ) (0 .1 1 6 ) (0 .1 4 0 ) (0 .1 0 1 ) (0 .1 2 4 ) (0 .1 0 6 ) (0 .1 1 8 ) (0 .1 0 8 ) C o n st a n t 2 .1 6 3 ∗ ∗ ∗ 2 .0 0 9 ∗ ∗ ∗ 1 .9 0 8 ∗ ∗ ∗ 2 .0 7 5 ∗ ∗ ∗ 1 .5 7 7 ∗ ∗ ∗ 2 .3 2 8 ∗ ∗ ∗ 2 .1 0 3 ∗ ∗ ∗ 2 .2 5 0 ∗ ∗ ∗ (0 .1 0 2 ) (0 .1 1 4 ) (0 .2 0 6 ) (0 .1 1 6 ) (0 .1 1 0 ) (0 .0 9 8 ) (0 .0 9 8 ) (0 .1 1 1 ) N 3 6 ,9 4 1 3 3 ,8 5 8 1 9 ,5 0 4 5 1 ,2 9 5 3 2 ,7 6 9 3 8 ,0 3 0 4 4 ,5 0 2 2 6 ,2 9 7 S o u rc e : S O E P 1 9 9 9 – 2 0 0 3 , o w n c a lc u la ti o n s. N o te s: S e e T a b le 2 . R a n d o m e ff e c ts m o d e ls . C o n tr o l v a ri a b le s a s in T a b le 3 . H ig h E d u is d e fi n e d a s in d iv id u a l w it h 1 2 o r m o re y e a rs o f e d u c a ti o n / tr a in in g . H ig h F S h a re in d ic a te s a fo re ig n e r sh a re a t fe d e ra l st a te le v e l w h ic h is a b o v e th e n a ti o n a l le v e l sh a re o f fo re ig n n a ti o n a ls in G e rm a n y in th e y e a r 2 0 0 0 . * p < 0 .1 0 , * * p < 0 .0 5 , * * * p < 0 .0 1 . 23 Appendix Table A1: Three-Way Interaction – 9/11 Effects and the Moderating Role of Education Worries about Worries about Immigration Hostility Year=2000 -0.066∗∗∗ -0.033∗∗∗ (0.009) (0.009) Year=2001 -0.167∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗ (0.009) (0.009) Year=2002 -0.115∗∗∗ -0.043∗∗∗ (0.010) (0.010) Year=2003 -0.173∗∗∗ -0.110∗∗∗ (0.010) (0.010) High-Edu -0.185∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗ (0.013) (0.013) Year=2000 × High-Edu -0.028∗ 0.047∗∗∗ (0.015) (0.015) Year=2001 × High-Edu -0.029∗∗ 0.058∗∗∗ (0.015) (0.015) Year=2002 × High-Edu -0.062∗∗∗ -0.003 (0.015) (0.015) Year=2003 × High-Edu -0.031∗∗ -0.028∗ (0.015) (0.015) Post-9/11 × High-Edu 0.011 0.030 (0.149) (0.148) Post-9/11 -0.056 0.033 (0.106) (0.105) Year=2000 × Post-9/11 0.026 -0.079 (0.110) (0.111) Year=2001 × Post-9/11 0.306∗∗∗ -0.288∗∗∗ (0.110) (0.111) Year=2002 × Post-9/11 0.022 -0.115 (0.110) (0.112) Year=2003 × Post-9/11 0.078 -0.044 (0.111) (0.113) Year=2000 × Post-9/11 × High-Edu -0.094 0.093 (0.156) (0.157) Year=2001 × Post-9/11 × High-Edu -0.278∗ -0.056 (0.154) (0.156) Year=2002 × Post-9/11 × High-Edu -0.010 0.075 (0.158) (0.160) Year=2003 × Post-9/11 × High-Edu -0.148 -0.083 (0.159) (0.161) N 70,799 70,799 Source: SOEP 1999–2003, own calculations. Notes: See Table 2. Random effects models. Control variables as in Table 3. High-Edu is defined as individual with 12 or more years of education/training. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 24 SOEPpapers 534, Jan. 2013 The Effects of 9/11 on Attitudes Toward Immigration and the Moderating Role of Education ABSTRACT Introduction Background 9/11 and Anti-Immigrant Attitudes The Moderating Role of Education Data and Empirical Setup Data Empirical Strategy Results and Discussion Baseline results Robustness Effect Heterogeneity and the Role of Education Summary and Conclusion References Tables and Figures SOEPpapers 
work_osfwkqkpkfgtbb6xfzwzzcy4fe	----	Exploring how the social model of disability can be re-invigorated for autism: in response to Jonathan Levitt Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=cdso20 Disability & Society ISSN: 0968-7599 (Print) 1360-0508 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/cdso20 Exploring how the social model of disability can be re-invigorated for autism: in response to Jonathan Levitt Richard Woods To cite this article: Richard Woods (2017) Exploring how the social model of disability can be re- invigorated for autism: in response to Jonathan Levitt, Disability & Society, 32:7, 1090-1095, DOI: 10.1080/09687599.2017.1328157 To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09687599.2017.1328157 Published online: 18 May 2017. Submit your article to this journal Article views: 18791 View related articles View Crossmark data Citing articles: 23 View citing articles https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=cdso20 https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/cdso20 https://www.tandfonline.com/action/showCitFormats?doi=10.1080/09687599.2017.1328157 https://doi.org/10.1080/09687599.2017.1328157 https://www.tandfonline.com/action/authorSubmission?journalCode=cdso20&show=instructions https://www.tandfonline.com/action/authorSubmission?journalCode=cdso20&show=instructions https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/mlt/10.1080/09687599.2017.1328157 https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/mlt/10.1080/09687599.2017.1328157 http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1080/09687599.2017.1328157&domain=pdf&date_stamp=2017-05-18 http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1080/09687599.2017.1328157&domain=pdf&date_stamp=2017-05-18 https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/citedby/10.1080/09687599.2017.1328157#tabModule https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/citedby/10.1080/09687599.2017.1328157#tabModule Disability & society, 2017 Vol. 32, No. 7, 1090–1095 https://doi.org/10.1080/09687599.2017.1328157 CURRENT ISSUE Exploring how the social model of disability can be re-invigorated for autism: in response to Jonathan Levitt Richard Woods Nottingham institute of education, Nottingham trent University, Nottingham, UK ABSTRACT Levitt argues that the social model of disability needs to be re-invigorated, potentially by adapting the tool for separate countries. The social model has been successfully applied for some disabled groups in the United Kingdom. However, the social model is not implemented for neurodivergent labels such as autism, through the negative language of autism, causing severe problems for autistic individuals’ daily lives. The social model can be re-invigorated for autism, removing social barriers by changing non-autistic people’s attitudes towards autism through ensuring positive language of autism, preventing the categorisation of autism and fully enacting The Autism Act 2009 and The Equality Act 2010. How is the social model implemented in the United Kingdom? Levitt (2017) argues that the social model of disability should be re-invigorated by making a bespoke social model of disability for each separate country it is applied to. He proposes that the social model has been successful for himself and other disabled people in the United Kingdom over the last 22 years. However, I contest that the social model has been fully implemented in the United Kingdom for all impairment labels, traditionally being successfully deployed for people with phys- ical and sensory impairments, while neurodivergent labels have been left behind in modern times (Graby 2016). While the social model has numerous flaws (Mallett and Runswick-Cole 2014), it is largely associated with physical and sensory impairments, as shown by how blind people use folding canes and have braille at all entrances and stairs. The practice of Universal Design is enshrined in US law but less so in the UK Equality Act 2010, and is not much used in the United Kingdom (Milton, Martin, and Melham 2016); the principle is meaningfully practised, however, when designing new buildings which should be accessible for people with physical and sensory impairments. © 2017 informa UK limited, trading as taylor & Francis Group ARTICLE HISTORY Received 22 March 2017 accepted 28 april 2017 KEYWORDS autism; social model of disability; emancipation; impairment labels; neurodiversity CONTACT Richard Woods n0204544@my.ntu.ac.uk mailto: n0204544@my.ntu.ac.uk http://www.tandfonline.com http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1080/09687599.2017.1328157&domain=pdf DISABILITY & SOCIETY 1091 In the UK education system, inclusion is practised as a form of integration largely due to the dominance of medical/deficit-based discourse utilised to gain extra support for Special Educational Needs and Disability pupils. For instance, the high numbers of autistic pupils with Education Health and Care Plans is a sign of how the education system requires bolt-on support for anyone who is different from the mythical norm (Milton, Martin, and Melham 2016), helping to perpetu- ate ableism and internalised ableism (Campbell 2008). The commonly reported struggles parents face gaining adequate support for autistic pupils often causes severe psychological distress to autistic pupils due to poorly implemented inclu- sion policies (Beardon 2017). Social model is not practised for the autism label The medical model of disability is the dominant model in autism studies (Graby 2016). The UK full-time employment rate for people with autism is stagnant at around 15% (National Autistic Society 2016). Even with The Autism Act 2009 and The Equality Act 2010, autistic individuals could be discriminated against in the Criminal Justice System (Beardon 2008). Autistic individuals expend prodigious amounts of energy forcing themselves to meet Predominant Neurotype (Beardon 2008) demands and expectations, often causing undue psychological harm to themselves (Beardon 2017). This leads to higher suicide rates for autistic individuals: 7.3%–15% of people who have been hospitalised for attempted suicide also have an autism diagnosis. This is much higher than the 1% rate of autism diagnosis we would expect in the general UK population. (Cassidy 2015) The above-average autistic suicide is symptomatic of autistic individuals being compared with Predominant Neurotype societal demands and expectations (Beardon 2017). An example of wider prejudice against neurodivergent labels is the UK government favouring ‘really disabled people’ to the detriment of neuro- divergent labels or unseen disabilities: Disability benefits should go to ‘really disabled people’ not those ‘taking pills at home, who suffer from anxiety’. (Anon 2017) Cuts to welfare in the United Kingdom have thus helped to segregate the different impairment types (Graby 2016), driving internalised ableism. This article, however, argues that the social model should be more widely implemented for all neurodi- vergent labels. Shifting autism research away from causes and biological effects onto services and social issues will also assist autistic individuals by exploring the impact of living in Predominant Neurotype society. Autistic individuals are treated harshly for multiple reasons, primarily due to the language used to describe autism. The language used to describe a topic affects how people treat the topic. This is reflected in the recent rise in hate crime against European Union migrants after the Brexit Referendum in the United Kingdom. For neurodivergent labels, Sayal et al. (2010) suggest that teachers believing pupils 1092 R. WOODS have attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) predisposes the teachers to have negative opinions of the labelled pupils due to labelling effects. The Autism Strategy (Department of Health 2015) explicitly mentions the problems individuals with Asperger’s syndrome face in their everyday lives, due to the misconception that Asperger’s syndrome is mild autism or that Asperger’s syndrome is not autism. Significantly, clinicians over-identified the number of cases of Asperger’s syndrome by ignoring the differential marker of delayed speech development between Asperger’s syndrome and autism, primarily due to the positive connotations of Asperger’s syndrome. The autism discourse is dominated by concepts of autism being a disorder and a deficit (Graby 2016). This allows Predominant Neurotypes to treat autistic people as less than human, because autistic individuals are seen as diminished versions of the perfect Predominant Neurotype person (Campbell 2008). This is a profound type of barrier, something which has to be tackled using the social model of disability. Also, the social model is not implemented for autistic individuals due to the bur- den of adapting to each other being unreasonably and unevenly placed onto autis- tic individuals compared with Predominant Neurotype institutions. Predominant Neurotype society forces autistic individuals to adapt to an environment which is not adapted for autistic individuals. For instance, autistic pupils are forced to learn a social skills curriculum in addition to the national curriculum. With increasing acad- emisation it is less likely that autism-friendly universal design will be implemented (Milton, Martin, and Melham 2016). To compound the imbalance, Predominant Neurotype society ignores the challenges autistic individuals often experience, actively creating a social barrier to their employment (Graby 2016). These factors contribute towards the systematic discrimination and oppression of autistic indi- viduals by Predominant Neurotype society. How do we implement the social model for autistic individuals? Levitt (2017) argues that the social model can be re-invigorated by asking five questions which adapt the social model for individual countries. I contest the limited view of Levitt’s scope and believe that, in order to make the social model ubiquitous, these questions need to be applied to specific impairment labels by each country; universal and consistent application of the social model will benefit people of all impairment labels. Here I reply to Levitt’s questions not from a coun- try’s perspective, but from the perspective of the autism neurodivergent label: (1) ‘Which aspects of the negative influence of society on disability (other than barriers to inclusion) are particularly worth focusing on and how can these be effectively addressed?’ (Levitt 2017, 4). The primary social barrier to be removed is the negative language and discourse of the autism label, such as deficit and disorder, along with removing subcatego- ries and sublevels. For instance, having a blanket Autism Spectrum label where DISABILITY & SOCIETY 1093 a person’s impairment is not measured but described upon diagnosis could help to avoid the negative stereotypes caused by the negative discourse of autism. A blanket Autism Spectrum label could ensure autistic potential is the primary focus when judging autistic individuals (Beardon 2017). Autism emancipation is achieved through not breaking up the autism label, which can help save autistic lives. (2) ‘What ways of using the model (apart from a practical tool) seem promising and how can these ways be fruitfully implemented?’ (Levitt 2017, 4). There is still scope to use the social model in practical ways; particularly, the basic income can be liberating for all disabled people – with every citizen being finan- cially secure, there is less competition and stigma attached to having an impair- ment label. In particular, the removal of needs-based assessment for the levels of ‘impairment’ no longer matters (Mays 2016). A basic income stops discrimination against autistic individuals and other neurodivergent individuals, meaning peo- ple with autism and other neurodivergent people could be as seen being equally impaired and worthwhile to society. This would overcome the current social bar- riers neurodivergent individuals face in gaining employment (Graby 2016). (3) ‘To which groups of people (other than disability professionals in developed coun- tries) is it important to disseminate the model and how can it be conveyed effec- tively?’ (Levitt 2017, 4). Disseminating the social model to all autistic individuals and recognising that each autistic person is the ‘expert’ on their autism will allow for increased autistic self-advocacy and self-regulation. Allowing autistic individuals to control their lives will lead to greater autism emancipation by reducing the mental health dam- age caused by autistic individuals forcing themselves to adapt to Predominant Neurotype societal demands. (4) ’Is it a good idea to present the social model in a manner which is contradictory (as opposed to complementary) to other models or that implies it is the only model conducive to emancipating disabled people?’ (Levitt 2017, 5). From the point of view of neurodivergence, the social model should be seen as being complementary to other disability models. The Nordic countries use and discuss the UK social model in addition to their relational models. The social model is not the only model of disability and the model does have numerous limita- tions. The social model does not always explain how disability is experienced; for instance, the Nordic relational models can sometimes better explain disa- bled people’s experiences (Mallett and Runswick-Cole 2014), for instance how an autistic individual can experience crippling anxiety awaiting an email reply from a Predominant Neurotype person who thinks the autistic individual will be OK while they do not respond to the email (Beardon 2017). 1094 R. WOODS (5) ‘What should be the primary goals of the social model and what steps can we take to achieve these objectives?’ (Levitt 2017, 5). The primary goal of the social model has always been to take the focus from the individual impairment, and to shift the gaze towards societal structures. This now needs to happen by Predominantly Neurotype institutions taking responsibility for making adjustments. The social model should be shifting the burden of making adjustments away from autistic people onto Predominant Neurotype institutions. This can be done by changing the law or fully implementing existing legislation, such as local authorities’ and NHS Trusts’ obligations to The Autism Act 2009, along with institutions enacting reasonable adjustments under The Equality Act 2010, and also changing the autism discourse to take on positive connotations of autism by moving away from toxic words and debates like ‘disorder’ and ‘deficit’. By doing this, Predominant Neurotype society will finally treat autistic individuals as equal to themselves, leading to full autism emancipation. How can the social model achieve full autism emancipation? When implemented, the social model is a powerful tool for achieving emanci- pation of all disabled people. Similar to other neurodivergent labels, the nega- tive discourse about autism helps to ensure that the social model of disability is not applied to it, leading the UK education system to be un-inclusive. Because most autistic individuals simultaneously experience other neurodivergent labels, implementing the social model for autism will spread the social model for more neurodivergent labels. By focusing on stopping the negative discourse of autism, barring the categorisation of the autism label along with proper application of The Autism Act 2009 and The Equality Act 2010, the social model can be used to achieve autism emancipation by creating positive societal attitudes towards autism and shifting the imbalanced burden of adapting away from autistic individuals onto Predominant Neurotype institutions. This can prevent damage to autistic individ- uals’ mental health, helping to prevent the undue loss of autistic lives and leading to the full emancipation of the autistic population. Acknowledgements The author would like to thank Dr Luke Beardon, Dr Mitzi Waltz, Professor Sarah Parsons, Dr Damian Milton, Dr Catriona Stewart and Dr Nick Chown for their separate conversations on autism and the social model of disability. Disclosure statement No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author. DISABILITY & SOCIETY 1095 References Anon. 2017. Disability Benefits: PIPs Should Be for ‘Really Disabled’ (Online). London: British Broadcasting Corporation. Accessed March 21, 2017. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk- 39097019 Beardon, L. 2008. Asperger Syndrome and Perceived Offending Conduct: A Qualitative Study (Online). Ed.D Thesis, Sheffield Hallam University. Accessed January 14, 2017. http://shura. shu.ac.uk/7155/1/Beardon_aspergers_-_full.pdf Beardon, L. 2017. Luke Beardon: Perspectives on Autism (Online Blog). 17 March 2017. Accessed March 23, 2017. https://blogs.shu.ac.uk/autism/?doing_wp_cron=1490259625.4494929313 659667968750 Campbell, F. 2008. “Exploring Internalized Ableism Using Critical Race Theory.” Disability and Society 23 (2): 151–162. Cassidy, S. 2015. Suicidality in Autism: Risk and Prevention (Online). 9 November 2015. Accessed March 22, 2017. http://network.autism.org.uk/good-practice/evidence-base/suicidality- autism-risk-and-prevention Department of Health. 2015. Statutory Guidance for Local Authorities and NHS Organisations to Support Implementation of the Adult Autism Strategy (Online). London: The Department of Health. Accessed January 16, 2017. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/ uploads/attachment_data/file/422338/autism-guidance.pdf Graby, S. 2016. “Unworkable Conditions: Work, Benefits and Disabled People’s Resistance to Capitalism.” Paper presented to Association for Social and Political Philosophy conference, London, 29 June. Accessed April 8, 2017. https://www.academia.edu/28495623/Unworkable_ Conditions_work_benefits_and_disabled_peoples_resistance_to_capitalism_2016 Levitt, J. 2017. “Exploring How the Social Model of Disability Can Be Re-Invigorated: In Response to Mike Oliver.” Disability and Society 32 (4): 589–594. Mallett, R., and K. Runswick-Cole. 2014. Approaching Disability: Critical Issues and Perspectives. 1st ed. London: Routledge. Mays, J. 2016. “Countering Disablism: An Alternative Universal Income Support System Based on Egalitarianism.” Scandinavian Journal of Disability Research 18 (2): 106–117. Milton, D., M. Martin, and P. Melham. 2016. “Beyond Reasonable Adjustment: Autistic-Friendly Spaces and Universal Design.” In Autism and Intellectual Disabilities in Adults, edited by D. Milton and N. Martin, Vol. 1, 81–86. Hove: Pavilion. National Autistic Society. 2016. NAS TMI Employment Report (Online). Great Britain: National Autistic Society. Accessed January 15, 2017. http://www.autism.org.uk/get-involved/media- centre/news/2016-10-27-employment-gap.aspx Sayal, K., V. Owen, K. White, C. Merrell, P. Tymms, and E. Taylor. 2010. “Impact of Early School- Based Screening and Intervention Programs for ADHD on Children’s Outcomes and Access to Services.” Archives of Paediatrics and Adolescent Medicine 164 (5): 462–469. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-39097019 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-39097019 http://shura.shu.ac.uk/7155/1/Beardon_aspergers_-_full.pdf http://shura.shu.ac.uk/7155/1/Beardon_aspergers_-_full.pdf https://blogs.shu.ac.uk/autism/?doing_wp_cron=1490259625.4494929313659667968750 https://blogs.shu.ac.uk/autism/?doing_wp_cron=1490259625.4494929313659667968750 http://network.autism.org.uk/good-practice/evidence-base/suicidality-autism-risk-and-prevention http://network.autism.org.uk/good-practice/evidence-base/suicidality-autism-risk-and-prevention https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/422338/autism-guidance.pdf https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/422338/autism-guidance.pdf https://www.academia.edu/28495623/Unworkable_Conditions_work_benefits_and_disabled_peoples_resistance_to_capitalism_2016 https://www.academia.edu/28495623/Unworkable_Conditions_work_benefits_and_disabled_peoples_resistance_to_capitalism_2016 http://www.autism.org.uk/get-involved/media-centre/news/2016-10-27-employment-gap.aspx http://www.autism.org.uk/get-involved/media-centre/news/2016-10-27-employment-gap.aspx Abstract How is the social model implemented in the United Kingdom? Social model is not practised for the autism label How do we implement the social model for autistic individuals? How can the social model achieve full autism emancipation? Acknowledgements Disclosure statement References 
work_otdli7ievjddpayc75wzyebzxm	----	19419899.2012.700026[1].pdf Psychology & Sexuality Vol. 3, No. 3, September 2012, 226–243 Rural location and exposure to minority stress among sexual minorities in the United States Eric Swanka*, David M. Frostb and Breanne Fahsc aDepartment of Sociology, Social Work and Criminology, Morehead State University, Morehead, KY, USA; bHeilbrunn Department of Population and Family Health, Columbia University, New York, NY, USA; cWomen and Gender Studies Program, Arizona State University, Glendale, AZ, USA (Received 31 August 2011; final version received 3 May 2012) Recently, there has been an increase in the number of studies on minority stress among sexual minorities. Few of these studies have explored the ways in which regional or spa- tial factors influenced the amount of minority stress that lesbians, gay men and bisexuals (LGBs) endure. To see if living in rural and small towns creates stressful social envi- ronments for LGBs in the United States, this study analysed the associations between location and three distal minority stress outcomes, as well as feelings of connectedness to the LGB community. In a sample of self-identified LGBs (N = 285), this study found that rural contexts and small towns often presented harsher social climates for sexual minorities compared with urban locales. LGBs who resided in rural areas tended to feel less connected to LGB communities and experienced higher levels of felt stigma and enacted discrimination. Small town inhabitants displayed some similar patterns, but also reported lower levels of enacted discrimination than expected. Living in Southern states subjected LGBs to more discrimination and less satisfactory connections to LGB communities. Keywords: stigma; discrimination; minority stress; sexual minority; rural environment Structurally and interpersonally, discrimination against lesbian, gay and bisexual (LGB) individuals takes many forms. Homophobia can manifest itself through physical violence and language that chastises and belittles both homosexuality and non-normative gender behaviour. More subtly, homophobia and heteronormativity inform many insidious prac- tices that privilege heterosexuality. Whether via the lack of legal marital rights or the assumption that heterosexuality must be enforced, LGBs often endure hostile environments that monitor and penalise homosexual behaviour in the United States. LGB individuals’ experiences of stigma, prejudice and discrimination, which result from heteronormativity, have been usefully conceptualised as constituting minority stress (Brooks, 1981; DiPlacido, 1998; Hatzenbuehler, 2010; Meyer, 2003a, 2003b; Rosario, Schrimshaw, Hunter, & Gwadz, 2002). Minority stress theory is based on social stress the- ory (Dohrenwend, 2000; Pearlin, 1999), which posits that stressors constitute any factors or conditions that require individuals to adapt to changes intrapersonally, interpersonally or in their environments (Meyer, 2003a; Pearlin, 1999). Factors such as expectations of *Corresponding author. Email: e.swank@moreheadstate.edu ISSN 1941-9899 print/ISSN 1941-9902 online © 2012 Taylor & Francis http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/19419899.2012.700026 http://www.tandfonline.com D o w n lo a d e d b y [ U n iv e rs it y o f M a n it o b a L ib ra ri e s] a t 1 1 :4 2 0 4 S e p te m b e r 2 0 1 2 Psychology & Sexuality 227 rejection, concealment of a stigmatised identity, internalisation of negative social beliefs about one’s social groups or social identity and experiences of discrimination (both acute events and chronic everyday mistreatment) constitute stressors. These factors stem from and reaffirm a hostile everyday living environment for LGBs, thus creating an environment characterised by minority stress. Meyer (2003a) posited that minority stressors can be usefully thought of on a con- tinuum of proximity to the self. Stressors most distal to the self are objective stressors based primarily on the environment, such as prevailing stereotypes, prejudice and discrim- ination. In this category, hate crimes and interpersonal violence directed towards LGB individuals figure centrally, primarily because of the devalued status of sexual minorities within heteronormative cultures. Distal minority stressors lead to more proximal and sub- jective appraisals of the environment as threatening and resulting expectations of rejection. Most proximal to the self is one’s internalisations of negative social attitudes towards one’s minority group (e.g. internalised homophobia). Minority stress processes have been hypothesised to create strain on individuals’ ability to adapt to, and function in, their everyday environments and are therefore associated with lowered well-being and impaired mental health. Mental health disparities between het- erosexuals and LGBs likely stem from differential exposure to minority stress processes (Meyer, 2003a). LGB individuals cope with minority stress in a variety of ways. For example, feeling connected to an LGB community is considered a group-level coping resource for dealing with the negative effects of minority stress (Frost & Meyer, 2012; Kertzner, Meyer, Frost, & Stirratt, 2009; Meyer, 2003a). A sense of connectedness allows LGB individuals to experi- ence self-empowerment. Specifically, feeling part of a community of similar others allows LGBs to make positive social comparisons to other people like them, instead of making negative comparisons, based on heterosexist stigma, to members of the out-group (Crocker & Major, 1989; Herek & Glunt, 1995; Meyer, 2003a). For these reasons, connectedness to the LGB community can play an ameliorative role in the relationship between minority stress and mental health (Major & O’Brien, 2005; Meyer, 2003a). Moreover, the survival of discrimination, when combined with other key interpretative schemas, can push LGB indi- viduals into greater amounts of political activism for LGB rights (Hyers, 2007; Jennings & Andersen, 2003; Swank & Fahs, 2011; Taylor, Kimport, Van Dyke, & Andersen, 2009). Location and sexual stigma Urban sociologists like Wirth (1938) and Fischer (1975) were some of the early theorists who conceptualised that nations, regions and localities can distinguish their cultures from one another through the historical interplay of many social processes (e.g. state interven- tions, amount of industrialisation, migration practices, type of social networks available). Rural areas, or spaces that have high land-to-human ratios and an economic dependence on farming, mining and forestry, have often been conceptualised as communities that prize cultural homogeneity, localism, religiosity and ‘traditional values’ (Miller & Laluff, 1981). In contrast, Wirth (1938) argued that the ‘urban way of life’ generally disrupts ethnocen- tric and authoritarian perspectives. Due to macro issues of city size, population density and greater cultural heterogeneity, city dwellers regularly encounter social systems that transmit new, unique and incompatible moral messages. To cope with diverse and some- times contradictory social cues, city dwellers must learn how to respond to a wider range of opinions as they try to reconcile competing moral and behavioural expectations. This adaptation then normalises flexibility in thought and a greater tendency to accept practices that could be considered unconventional or strange in more rural and small town settings. D o w n lo a d e d b y [ U n iv e rs it y o f M a n it o b a L ib ra ri e s] a t 1 1 :4 2 0 4 S e p te m b e r 2 0 1 2 228 E. Swank et al. Adding to these contextual factors are possible compositional effects. That is, cities or regions may hold higher concentrations of people who possess the traits associated with liberalism – such as higher education levels, less religious fundamentalism or general incli- nation to not see diversity as a threat (Adamczyk & Pitt, 2009; Moore & Vanneman, 2003; Van Dyke, Soule, & Widom, 2001). In fact, Johnson and Stokes (1984) contended that the greater conservativism of Southern communities is partly due to greater prevalence of per- sonal piety (e.g. prayer) and the acceptance of orthodox-fundamentalist religious beliefs (the Bible is inerrant, the ubiquity of human sinfulness or the fear of eternal damnation at the hands of a punitive God). Studies that link heterosexism to regional variation have mostly followed two approaches. When addressing sexual prejudice of heterosexuals, some studies have explored the possibility of gender and sexuality attitudes being spatialised in the United States (Bolzendahl & Myers, 2004; Carter & Borch, 2005; Rice & Coates, 1995; Twenge, 1997). Traditional gender and sexuality scripts are expressed more frequently by people who reside in a small town or rural communities (Bolzendahl & Myers, 2004; Herek, 2002; Johnson, 1999; Konrad & Harris, 2002; Loftus, 2001; Pratte, 1993; Rhodebeck, 1996; Schulte, 2002). Other studies contend that spatial differences also appear within metropolitan areas as suburban heterosexuals seem less supportive of same-sex marriage rights than centre-city heterosexuals (Loftus, 2001). Conversely, other studies have down- played the role of urbanity because they could not detect a significant urban–rural divide in homophobic sentiments (Herek & Glunt, 1993; Lemell & Battle, 2004; Marsiglio, 1993). Other prejudice studies have looked for regional subcultures differences as well. Akin to the Southern subculture of violence studies in criminology (Ellison, 1991; Nisbett & Cohen, 1996), and ‘Southern exceptionalism’ in religious studies (Chalfant & Heller, 1991; Woodberry & Smith, 1998), some studies have examined the Southern effect on gender norms in the United States. Accordingly, people who reside in the ‘Deep South’ (e.g. Mississippi, Georgia, South Carolina, Tennessee, Alabama) were more likely to endorse traditional conceptions of appropriate male and female behaviours (Bolzendahl & Myers, 2004; Carter & Borch, 2005; Eldridge, Mack, & Swank, 2006; Johnson & Stokes, 1984; Konrad & Harris, 2002; Marquart, Nannini, Edwards, Stanley, & Wyman, 2007; Powers et al., 2003; Rice & Coates, 1995; Twenge, 1997). Location and minority stress The empirical literature on how discrimination and minority stress vary across commu- nity contexts is sparse. Since the mid-1990s, there has been a small upsurge in the number of qualitative studies of rural sexualities (Barton, 2010; Bell & Valentine, 1995; Black & Rhorer, 2001; Boulden, 2001; Cody & Welch, 1997; Fellows, 1998; Gottschalk & Newton, 2009; Gray, 2009; Kramer, 1995; McCarthy, 2000; Oswald & Culton, 2003; Tiemann, Kennedy & Haga, 1998; Williams, Bowan & Horwath, 2005; Yarbrough, 2003). Rural- based LGBs overwhelmingly described living in bleak and inhospitable social climates. Their narratives often discuss a hostile rural context that forced sexual minorities into silence, social isolation and fear of moral condemnation and hate crimes. In essence, these studies depict rural families, workplaces and churches as oppressive institutions to flee from, while cities are positioned as providing better contexts for healthy sexual minority identity development. Quantitative studies about minority stress variation by region offer less consistent results than qualitative studies on this topic (Gonzalez, Miller, Solomon, Bunn & Cassidy, 2009; Johnson, Jackson, Arnette & Koffman, 2005; Kosciw, Greytak & Diaz, 2009; Leedy & Connolly, 2007; Waldo, Hessen-McInnis & D’Augelli, 1998). An early Kinsey Report D o w n lo a d e d b y [ U n iv e rs it y o f M a n it o b a L ib ra ri e s] a t 1 1 :4 2 0 4 S e p te m b e r 2 0 1 2 Psychology & Sexuality 229 found that rural gay men lacked access to supportive LGB communities and often had clandestine same-sex sexual encounters with men who never considered themselves gay (Kinsey, Pomeroy & Martin, 1948). A recent study of Canadian LGB adolescents noted that rural youths were confronted more with verbal teasing and physical assaults than their metropolitan counterparts (Poon & Saewyc, 2009). Another national study of LGB high-school students found that students who attended urban schools heard less homopho- bic remarks and dealt with less sexual harassment related to sexual identity than those who attend schools outside of urban areas (Kosciw et al., 2009). However, suburban and Southern students did not report less homophobic bullying than rural and Midwestern stu- dents. Other survey-based studies partially confirmed and rejected aspects of the rural toxicity argument. A recent sample from Wyoming noted that lesbians in smaller towns faced greater levels of public discrimination than those in larger cities (Leedy & Connolly, 2007). However, regional differences were not present for gay men, and small-town les- bians did not face greater levels of homonegativity from parents, siblings and friends. Similarly, rural lesbian mothers experienced more cases of public harassment and rejec- tion than urban lesbian moms, but the spatial differences disappeared when addressing homophobic comments by relatives (Puckett, Horne, Levitt & Reeves, 2011). Also, some evidence indicates that community size does not predict the reported amounts of social stigma for LGBs living with AIDS, yet rural lesbians and small-town gay men were more afraid to disclose their sexual identity than urban LGBs (Gonzalez et al., 2009). Some studies have detected no urban or rural effects on the experience of minority stress for LGBs. For example, a study of LGB senior citizens in nursing homes found that community size did not predict the amount of discrimination they recognised from administrators, staff and other residents (Johnson et al., 2005), and a study of LGB college students found that urban and rural respondents reported similar levels of verbal or physical harassment, access to the LGB community and familial acceptance of their sexual identity (Waldo et al., 1998). Finally, place of residency was unrelated to levels of internalised homophobia, stigma consciousness and the amount of ‘outness’ among urban and rural lesbian mothers (Puckett et al., 2011). In the light of these inconsistent quantitative findings on location and minority stress, additional research is necessary to determine whether the qualitative differences in experi- ences of minority stress in rural and urban locations can be demonstrated quantitatively and on a larger scale. This is necessary given that a separate body of research has argued that geographic differences in the magnitude of disparities in mental health between LGBs and heterosexuals are indicative of potential place-based differences in minority stress (Lewis, 2009). Rural LGB youth are at greater risk for mental health problems such as depression, suicidal ideation and substance use compared with urban LGB youth (Galliher, Rostosky, & Hughes, 2004; Poon & Saewyc, 2009). Although these location-based differences in mental health provide some evidence for the negative effects of minority stress on health for rural LGBs, few recent studies have explicitly tested whether LGBs in rural locations are exposed to greater minority stress than LGBs in urban or suburban locations. To fully analyse the relationship between the rural locations and the minority stress process, one must test how living in a rural location results in increased exposure to minority stress (Meyer, Schwartz, & Frost, 2008). Because sexual stigma (and related prejudices towards gender non-conformity) is prob- ably higher in rural locations, rural LGBs could be at risk for greater exposure to minority stress than urban or suburban LGBs (Bell & Valentine, 1995; Kosciw et al., 2009; Leedy & Connolly, 2007). LGBs are often drawn to urban centres because they often provide vis- ible LGB communities and are often centred on community centres and nightlife. Rural D o w n lo a d e d b y [ U n iv e rs it y o f M a n it o b a L ib ra ri e s] a t 1 1 :4 2 0 4 S e p te m b e r 2 0 1 2 230 E. Swank et al. locations often lack visible LGB communities, although resources dedicated to the pro- motion of LGB health and well-being are often scarce or non-existent (Gonzalez et al., 2009; Oswald & Culton, 2003; Tiemann et al., 1998; Willging, Salvador, & Kano, 2006). Rural LGBs may therefore lack access to community coping resources that are theorised to buffer the negative effects of minority stress, such as psychological connectedness to LGB communities (Frost & Meyer, 2012; Kertzner et al., 2009; Meyer, 2003a). Aims and hypotheses This study aimed to test critical components of both the minority stress and the social stress models. More specifically, we hypothesised that living in rural locations would result in excess exposure to minority stressors and decreased coping resources (Meyer et al., 2008). Specifically, we tested the hypothesis that LGBs living in rural locations would report greater minority stress than LGBs living in more suburban and urban communities. Additionally, given that previous research has identified the unique role of sexual stigma in Southern US culture (Gonzalez et al., 2009; Oswald & Culton, 2003; Tiemann et al., 1998; Willging et al., 2006), we hypothesised that living in the Southern United States would increase exposure to minority stress compared with others living in non-Southern rural locations. In other words, living in a Southern region of the United States may result in added exposure to minority stress, above and beyond the exposure associated with living in a rural location alone. Finally, due to the lack of visible sexual minority populations and community resources available to LGBs in rural areas, we hypothesised that rural and Southern LGBs would report less psychological connectedness to an LGB community compared with urban and non-Southern LGBs. Method Participants This online study analysed data from a sample of 285 LGB women and men recruited from throughout the United States in December 2007. Online surveys offer unique method- ological advantages when studying LGB populations (Herek, 2009; Koch & Emery, 2002; Riggle, Rostokwsky, & Reedy, 2005) for several reasons. First, national random sam- ples often fail to ask questions about sexual orientation and discrimination against sexual minorities. Second, the use of Internet listservs offers access to a national scope of potential respondents. Third, random phone or mail samples are difficult to obtain, in part because researchers vary the definition of who qualifies as LGB, and because complete lists of every LGB person in the United States do not exist. Fourth, convenience samples are often less representative since they attract participants that are too homogeneous (Faugier & Sargeant, 1997) and disproportionally select those who are already ‘out’ and located solidly within the LGB community (Farquhar, 1999; Rhoads, 1997). Finally, in-person recruitment at LGB establishments like bars or clubs would be too selective as well (Riggle et al., 2005), as it would likely oversample those who are younger or more active in the LGB commu- nity, while excluding LGB people who are more closeted and those with disabilities (Butler, 1999). Participants were recruited through 10 email listservs. Two of the listservs contained members of ‘Fairness Alliances’ that sought equality for LGB individuals. Memberships in these email groups were free and most of their participants resided in the Midwestern and Mid-Atlantic states, with the largest contingencies from Kentucky, Ohio, Indiana, Tennessee and West Virginia. The rest of the listservs provided less explicitly politically engaged networks.1 To select these email groups, we selected Yahoo groups that met three D o w n lo a d e d b y [ U n iv e rs it y o f M a n it o b a L ib ra ri e s] a t 1 1 :4 2 0 4 S e p te m b e r 2 0 1 2 Psychology & Sexuality 231 criteria. First, the group had to exist for explicitly social purposes (i.e. they did not mention anything political in the description of their listserv). Some of these groups concentrated on hobbies (e.g. ‘Dykes on bykes’ ‘Gay Square Dancers’ or ‘GLBT Horselovers’), whereas others displayed support group qualities (e.g. ‘Lavender Mothers’ or ‘Kentucky Pride’). Second, we excluded groups that seemed to serve as romantic or sexual matchmaking sites to avoid biasing the sample with an overrepresentation of single participants (we feared that the use of such sites would dramatically lessen the proportion of coupled respondents in the comparison group). Finally, to lessen problems of selection bias along spatial lines, we looked for groups that mentioned the regions that were most common in the political listservs (e.g. Queer Kentucky, Rural Pride of Tennessee or Gay in Ohio). The cover letters sent via the listservs asked potential respondents to click on a link that took them to the study website. The letter solicited the involvement of adults who consid- ered themselves lesbian, gay or bisexual. As expected, the letter stated that involvement in this project was anonymous and voluntary. The response rate to this letter was impossible to calculate since we did not have access to the number of people who belonged to each listserv. The sample of 285 participants had a preponderance of males (58% male) and a mainly Euro-American racial composition (79% European American, 7% Native American, 2% African American, 1% Asian American, 1% Latino/a and 10% ‘refuse to answer’). Ages in the sample spanned a wide range, from age 18 to 75, with 24% under age 30, 54% ages 30–50 and 22% ages 51–75 (x̄ = 39.75, SD = 12.19). The sample included a diverse array of incomes, including 10% below $20,000 per year, 27% $20,000–50,000 per year, 25% 50,000–80,000 per year and 31% over $80,000 per year, with 8% being missing data. Similar to most samples of ‘out’ LGB participants, our sample was highly educated, with 3% having earned a high-school degree, 58% having some college or a bachelor’s degree and 32% having a graduate degree. Participants tended to be distributed in many types of urban and rural spaces, with 26% residing in a large urban centre, 18% residing in a suburb of a large city, 18% residing in a mid-sized city, 23% residing in small towns and 9% living in rural areas. Because the majority of recruitment took place in the geographic South of the United States, 65.2% of participants lived in the South, 15.7% lived in the Midwest, 6.2% lived in the West and 4% lived in the East, with Kentucky, Ohio, Indiana, Tennessee and West Virginia representing the most respondents. Measures Current location When identifying urban–rural distinctions, we asked the question ‘What type of com- munity do you currently reside in?’ All of the close-ended responses dealt with the population density of that community (Hewitt, 1992): rural, small town, midsize city, sub- urban metropolitan and centre-city metropolitan. Participants’ responses were recoded into a system of binary variables as each type of location may differ in the amount of minority stress. The centre-city metropolitan served as the referent group because our aims were to test the degree to which living in more rural locations represented added exposure to minor- ity stress in relation to urban environments, which have been portrayed in the literature as accepting of LGB individuals. An open-ended item asked ‘What state do you currently live in?’ Participants who typed Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas and Virginia were deemed Southern residency. D o w n lo a d e d b y [ U n iv e rs it y o f M a n it o b a L ib ra ri e s] a t 1 1 :4 2 0 4 S e p te m b e r 2 0 1 2 232 E. Swank et al. Minority stress variables This study measured several aspects of minority stress for LGB individuals: felt stigma, enacted discrimination and connectedness to an LGB community. By focusing on distal factors, each variable explored the extent to which sexual minorities encountered hostile or supportive social environments (see Table 1). All measures came from short versions of standardised scales and were coded such that higher scores indicated higher levels of the construct. Shortened versions of measures were used to minimise participant fatigue and survey dropout. The three-item additive scale for felt stigma (adapted from Herek, 2009) dealt with perceptions that people in the participant’s immediate environment were inclined to uni- versally accept or demean homosexuality (Cronbach α = 0.695). By using a 5-point Likert scale, the first item measured the acceptance of sexual minorities in the workplace: ‘At my workplace gays and lesbians are treated with respect’ (strongly agree = 1). The last two items dealt with homonegativity in larger contexts: ‘I fear that most of my neighbors object to my homosexuality’ and ‘In my daily settings most people treat gays and lesbian with thinly veiled hostility’ (strongly agree = 5). Enacted discrimination was measured with 18 questions that addressed how often par- ticipants had endured cases of explicit discrimination because of their perceived sexual identity (Herek, 2009). To address issues of physical violence, harassment and economic discrimination, participants were asked whether these events never occurred, happened once or twice or more times. Examples of physical violence questions included ‘You were hit, beaten, physically attacked or sexually assaulted’. To address anti-gay harassment, respondents were asked to identify whether ‘someone threatened you with violence’ or ‘someone verbally insulted you’ because of LGB identity. To measure economic discrimi- nation, respondents were asked whether they were ‘denied or fired from a job’ or ‘prevented from moving into an apartment or house’ because of their sexual identity. Items also dif- ferentiated between recent and long-term experiences of discrimination (nine items asked whether these events occurred in the last year, while nine addressed whether these events happened when they were 16 years old). The Cronbach α values for enacted discrimination in the last year and since 16 years old were 0.719 and 0.795, respectively. A sense of psychological connectedness to an LGB community was assessed using three items from the Connection to the Gay or Lesbian Community Scale (Szymanski, Chung, & Balsam, 2001). The first item confirmed a desire to be part of an LGB community: ‘Being a part of the lesbian and gay community is important to me’. The second and third items addressed an absence of being a member of the LGB community: ‘I feel isolated and separated from other gays and lesbians’ and ‘I feel like I am the only gay or lesbian in most settings I am in’. In reversing the direction of the coding, higher scores for this additive scale scores suggest greater connection to the LGB community (Cronbach α = 0.707). Control variables Gender and race were treated as binary variables in which female and White were coded as 1, whereas other responses were coded as 0. Age was assessed with an open-ended question and we kept the data in interval form. Income was determined through a scale of family income in the last year (there were 10 categories that started at below $10,000 and ended with above $151,000). Analytical plan. A series of hierarchical ordinary least-squares (OLS) regression mod- els tested the extent to which rurality of location and Southern location predicted exposure D o w n lo a d e d b y [ U n iv e rs it y o f M a n it o b a L ib ra ri e s] a t 1 1 :4 2 0 4 S e p te m b e r 2 0 1 2 Psychology & Sexuality 233 T ab le 1 . D es cr ip ti ve st at is ti cs fo r m in o ri ty st re ss o u tc o m es . E n ac te d d is cr im in at io n N ev er L as t ye ar o n ce Tw ic e o r m o re N ev er S in ce 1 6 ye ar s o n ce Tw ic e o r m o re D en ie d em p lo y m en t 2 4 7 (9 4 % ) 1 1 (4 % ) 3 (1 % ) 1 8 8 (7 1 % ) 4 4 (1 6 % ) 3 1 (1 1 % ) E v ic te d, d en ie d h o u si n g 2 5 8 (9 7 % ) 3 (1 % ) 2 (1 % ) 2 3 6 (9 0 % ) 1 3 (5 % ) 1 1 (4 % ) V er b al th re at s 1 3 1 (4 9 % ) 5 6 (2 1 % ) 7 6 (2 8 % ) 3 2 (1 2 % ) 2 3 (8 % ) 2 1 2 (7 9 % ) T h re at en ed w it h v io le n ce 2 2 8 (8 6 % ) 2 0 (7 % ) 1 6 (6 % ) 1 2 6 (4 7 % ) 5 3 (1 2 % ) 8 4 (3 1 % ) P er so n al p ro p er ty d am ag ed 2 3 9 (9 1 % ) 1 3 (5 % ) 9 (4 % ) 1 6 7 (6 3 % ) 4 2 (1 6 % ) 5 4 (2 0 % ) O b je ct s th ro w n at yo u 2 4 6 (9 4 % ) 8 (3 % ) 6 (2 % ) 1 9 6 (7 4 % ) 3 2 (1 1 % ) 3 5 (1 3 % ) C h as ed o r fo ll ow ed 2 4 3 (9 2 % ) 1 1 (4 % ) 7 (2 % ) 1 7 6 (6 6 % ) 4 0 (1 5 % ) 4 6 (1 8 % ) P u n ch ed , h it , k ic ke d o r b ea te n 2 5 3 (9 7 % ) 6 (2 % ) 1 (1 % ) 2 1 1 (8 0 % ) 2 3 (9 % ) 2 9 (1 1 % ) S ex u al ly as sa u lt ed 2 5 4 (9 7 % ) 5 (2 % ) 3 (1 % ) 2 1 8 (8 2 % ) 2 7 (1 0 % ) 1 8 (7 % ) F el t st ig m a S tr o n g ly ag re e A g re e N o t su re D is ag re e S tr o n g ly d is ag re e M ea n G ay s an d le sb ia n s ar e tr ea te d w it h re sp ec t at m y w o rk p la ce (R ) 7 0 (2 5 % ) 9 3 (3 3 % ) 7 0 (2 5 % ) 2 9 (1 0 % ) 1 5 (5 % ) 2 .3 6 I fe ar th at m o st o f m y n ei g h b o rs o b je ct to m y h o m o se x u al it y 2 8 (1 0 % ) 5 9 (2 0 % ) 6 1 (2 1 % ) 9 3 (3 3 % ) 3 6 (1 3 % ) 2 .8 0 In m y d ai ly se tt in g s m o st p eo p le tr ea t g ay s an d le sb ia n w it h th in ly ve il ed h o st il it y 8 (3 % ) 5 2 (1 8 % ) 5 3 (1 8 % ) 1 2 4 (4 3 % ) 3 9 (1 4 % ) 2 .5 0 D o w n lo a d e d b y [ U n iv e rs it y o f M a n it o b a L ib ra ri e s] a t 1 1 :4 2 0 4 S e p te m b e r 2 0 1 2 234 E. Swank et al. to the minority stress outcomes beyond demographic controls. The same approach exam- ined the extent to which rurality of location and Southern location predicted psychological sense of connection to an LGB community. Variables were entered into the regression equations in two steps. Block 1 included the demographic control variables of gender (1 = male, 0 = female), race/ethnicity (1 = white, 0 = racial/ethnic minority), income and age. Block 2 added the location variables to the controls. Specifically, responses to the item measuring rurality of location were separated into a series of dichotomous variables representing (1) rural, (2) small town, (3) midsize city and (4) suburb of a large metropoli- tan centre. The centre city of a large metropolitan centre was treated as the referent group. The Southern location was added to the model in step (2) (non-Southern states served as the referent group). Our discussion of the explanatory results focused on the final mod- els, because the standardised regression coefficients (β) and R2 change (1R2) detect the spatial factors’ incremental contributions to the variance explained for our four outcome variables. Results Descriptive statistics for enacted discrimination and felt stigma Table 1 offers the descriptive statistics of enacted discrimination and felt stigma items. As a whole, felt stigma was more common than enacted discrimination (suggesting that implied heterosexism is more widespread than overt heterosexism). Cases of recent enacted stigma are relatively rare in this study, while most participants confronted the looming stress of threatened heterosexism. In the lifetime measures, almost nobody escaped heterosexist threats, and roughly two out of five have had their property damaged and over one-third had been chased or denied employment since 16 years old. Very high rates of sexual assault during a lifetime were also discovered (10% were sexually assaulted once in their adulthood and 7% 2 times or more). While felt stigmatization was common for a large segment of the sample, its presence was not a universal norm. At least 30% of respondents noticed homophobia from neigh- bours and 21% felt that ‘thinly veiled’ instances of anger in the community. Nevertheless, the mean was below the mid-point of 3 because the distribution skewed towards the ‘less’ felt stigma categories. That is, 58% of respondents ‘agreed’ or ‘strongly agreed’ that gays and lesbians were respected at their place of employment and between 46% and 57% disagreed to felt stigma items on neighbours and interactions in daily settings. Place variables and felt stigma-enacted discrimination Location-based differences in exposure to the minority stressors of stigma and discrim- ination are presented in Table 2. When exploring the proportion of variance explained by all of the variables, the R2 and 1R2 for the full model were significant in every case (Block 2). This suggests that the spatial and control variables together accounted for at least 9.3% of the variance in these discrimination outcomes and the spatial factors as a group significantly added between 4.7% and 6.7% of the variance explained beyond the control variables. When exploring specific factors, living in a rural location was signifi- cantly associated with increased exposure to stigma as well as more frequent experiences of discrimination since age 16 (β values ranged from 0.168 to 0.161, p < 0.05). Living in a small town was also associated with increased exposure to stigma compared with living in a city (β = 0.154, p < 0.05) but not for any of the discrimination measures. Living in a D o w n lo a d e d b y [ U n iv e rs it y o f M a n it o b a L ib ra ri e s] a t 1 1 :4 2 0 4 S e p te m b e r 2 0 1 2 Psychology & Sexuality 235 T ab le 2 . H ie ra rc h ic al re g re ss io n s fo r re g io n al va ri ab le s, co n tr o ls an d fe lt st ig m a- en ac te d d is cr im in at io n o u tc o m es . F el t st ig m a E n ac te d d is cr im in at io n la st ye ar E n ac te d d is cr im in at io n si n ce 1 6 ye ar s P re d ic to r va ri ab le s B S E B β B S E B β B S E B β B lo ck 1 (c o n tr o ls ) M al e 0 .2 9 7 0 .3 4 2 0 .0 5 5 0 .1 9 8 0 .2 3 2 0 .0 4 6 1 .2 4 5 0 .5 2 2 0 .1 5 4 ∗ W h it e − 0 .0 0 2 0 .4 5 6 − 0 .0 0 1 − 0 .6 4 0 0 .3 7 9 − 0 .0 2 4 − 0 .5 2 7 0 .7 0 6 0 .0 4 7 F am il y In co m e − 0 .5 9 0 0 .1 4 9 − 0 .2 5 0 ∗ ∗ − 0 .0 7 3 0 .1 2 5 − 0 .0 3 8 − 0 .4 6 0 0 .2 2 9 − 0 .1 2 8 ∗ A g e − 0 .0 0 1 0 .0 1 4 − 0 .0 0 4 − 0 .0 2 5 0 .0 1 1 − 0 .1 4 9 ∗ 0 .0 5 3 0 .0 2 1 0 .1 6 6 ∗ R 2 0 .0 6 9 0 .0 2 6 0 .0 7 0 F 4 .5 8 3 1 .5 8 5 4 .5 2 7 B lo ck 2 (f u ll m o d el ) R u ra l re si d en cy 1 .5 3 3 0 .6 3 2 0 .1 6 8 ∗ 0 .8 1 9 0 .4 6 0 0 .1 2 8 2 .1 5 6 0 .9 3 9 0 .1 6 1 ∗ S m al l- to w n re si d en cy 1 .1 9 8 0 .5 6 5 0 .1 5 4 ∗ 0 .2 0 2 0 .4 2 0 0 .0 3 6 0 .8 4 0 0 .8 4 4 0 .0 7 3 M id si ze ci ty 0 .3 2 0 0 .4 3 7 0 .0 5 6 − 0 .1 1 7 0 .3 3 0 − 0 .0 2 8 0 .4 7 4 0 .6 5 1 0 .0 5 6 M et ro p o li ta n su b u rb 0 .2 7 1 0 .4 7 4 0 .0 4 2 − 0 .3 6 8 0 .3 5 2 − 0 .0 7 9 0 .3 3 6 0 .7 0 9 0 .0 3 5 S o u th er n 0 .2 8 8 0 .3 7 6 0 .0 5 0 0 .7 1 4 0 .2 8 0 0 .1 7 0 ∗ 1 .1 2 3 0 .5 5 7 0 .1 3 2 ∗ R 2 0 .1 2 1 0 .0 9 3 0 .1 1 7 F 3 .4 4 8 2 .4 8 1 ∗ 3 .2 8 0 1 R 2 0 .0 5 2 ∗ 0 .0 6 7 ∗ 0 .0 4 7 ∗ N o te s: R ef er en ce ca te g o ri es fo r th e lo ca ti o n va ri ab le s ar e ce n tr e- ci ty m et ro p o li ta n ar ea an d n o n -S o u th er n st at es . C o n tr o l va ri ab le s w er e in cl u d ed in th e fi n al m o d el , b u t th ei r re su lt s ar e n o t sh ow n . ∗ p < 0 .0 5 ; ∗ ∗ p < 0 .0 1 . D o w n lo a d e d b y [ U n iv e rs it y o f M a n it o b a L ib ra ri e s] a t 1 1 :4 2 0 4 S e p te m b e r 2 0 1 2 236 E. Swank et al. Table 3. Hierarchical regressions for regional variables, controls and community outcomes. LGB community connectedness Predictor variables B SE B β Block 1 (controls) Male 0.055 0.255 0.013 White 0.597 0.337 0.109 Family Income 0.386 0.111 0.215∗ Age 0.011 0.010 0.066 R2 0.072 F 4.911∗ Block 2 (full model) Rural residency −0.797 0.430 −0.120∗∗ Small-town residency −0.648 0.383 −0.111 Midsize city −0.170 0.338 −0.034 Metropolitan suburb −0.061 0.327 −0.012 Southern −0.711 0.264 −0.166∗∗ R2 0.118 F 3.690∗ 1R2 0.046∗∗ Notes: Reference categories for the location variables are centre-city metropolitan area and non-Southern states. Control variables were included in the final model, but their results are not shown. ∗p < 0.05; ∗∗p < 0.01. Southern location (regardless of rurality and other control variables) was further associated with heightened exposure to discrimination (both in the past year and since age 16) com- pared with living in other parts of the United States (β values ranged from 0.170 to 0.132, p < 0.05). Place variables and psychological connectedness to the lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender community Results of tests for location differences in feelings of connectedness to an LGB community are presented in Table 3. With significant coefficients of determination for both blocks of variables, it is clear that the spatial factors explained unique variance in participants’ sense of closeness to an LGB community above and beyond the control variables (R2 = 0.072 and 0.118 for both blocks and 1R2 of 0.046 for the spatial factors). Living in a rural location was associated with lower levels of community connectedness compared with living in a centre city (β = −0.120 p < 0.05). Additionally, living in the Southern United States was further associated with lower levels of community connectedness compared with living in another part of the United States (β = –0.166, p < 0.05). Discussion This study addressed possible relationships between location of residency and exposure to minority stress. Specifically, we analysed that the ways living in different types of com- munities were connected to four elements of the experience of minority stress among self-identified LGB individuals: felt stigma, enacted discrimination – short and long terms – and feelings of connectedness to an LGB community. In several instances, results indicated a greater prevalence of minority stress in small towns and rural settings compared with urban environments. The largest impact of living in these communities was found D o w n lo a d e d b y [ U n iv e rs it y o f M a n it o b a L ib ra ri e s] a t 1 1 :4 2 0 4 S e p te m b e r 2 0 1 2 Psychology & Sexuality 237 regarding felt stigma and long-term experiences of enacted discrimination. Specifically, rural and small-town LGBs were more likely to endure a history of subtle discrimina- tion and rural individuals encountered more lifetime discrimination. Conversely, rural and small-town LGBs did not report significantly higher levels of recent discrimination. This difference in significance for lifetime and recent levels of discrimination could be due to an improvement in rural conditions in the past decades or it could be an artefact of methodological problems like too small of a sample size or focusing on the wrong types of discrimination. Clearly, longitudinal data are required to address a relative improvement for rural participants over time. Rural LGBs not only reported greater stigma, but also were more isolated and disconnected from communities that may provide affirmation of their sexual identities, as evidenced by lower levels of community connectedness among rural-living LGBs compared with urban dwelling LGBs. This again supports the argument that centre cities may partially insulate LGBs from some of the felt stigma and isolation that rural communities impose upon sexual minorities. Dwelling in mid-sized cities and the suburbs was not associated with any aspect of minority stress. Although these locations displayed more minority stress than their centre- city counterparts, these differences were not substantial or statistically significant. On the other hand, a Southern residency presented several important ramifications for LGBs. Importantly, Southerners reported higher levels of recent and lifetime enacted discrimi- nation and less connection to the LGB community. These findings clearly suggest that the South is a harsher place for sexual minorities than other regions of the United States. Although the associations between location and minority stress were our primary focus in this study, some other notable findings emerged regarding our control variables of gender, race/ethnicity, income and age. In most cases, the effects of control variables on minority stress were not significant. However, gender occasionally mattered, as gay and bisexual men dealt with more enacted discrimination in their lifetime than lesbian and bisexual women. Further, higher income was associated with fewer experiences of felt or long-term discrimination and greater connections to the LGB community. This sug- gests that gay and bisexual men and poorer sexual minorities might be targeted more for discrimination and may have less of the vital resources that assist in the avoidance of dis- crimination. Age and when people were exposed to discrimination had opposite directions in this study. Younger sexual minorities experienced more recent discrimination, but older sexual minorities experienced a larger amount of lifetime discrimination. The link between older age and lifetime discrimination suggests that older individuals may not experience active discrimination, but they may have lived through years when homophobia and het- erosexism were more explicit, rampant and publicly condoned. Further, older LGBs had greater opportunity to be exposed to discrimination, given they have lived more years since age 16 than younger LGBs. Thus, the association between age and long-term dis- crimination should not be interpreted beyond its role as a control variable in the present analyses. Although we did not examine indicators of LGB health in this study, our findings have significant implications for the larger body of literature examining the connection between minority stress and health. Specifically, rural geographic location represents an important risk factor for increased exposure to some forms of minority stress beyond other disadvan- taged social statuses (e.g. gender, race/ethnicity, income, age). Thus, geographic location needs to be considered in larger models of social stress and minority stress due to its poten- tial implications for the overarching relationship between stress and health among sexual minorities (see Meyer et al., 2008). Even further, rural location limits community coping resources; thus, rural-living LGBs’ resources to cope with minority stressors are further D o w n lo a d e d b y [ U n iv e rs it y o f M a n it o b a L ib ra ri e s] a t 1 1 :4 2 0 4 S e p te m b e r 2 0 1 2 238 E. Swank et al. limited by location, making negative health implications potentially more likely to result from minority stress exposure. Limitations These findings should be interpreted in the light of several study limitations. Some of the biggest measurement limitations could be found in the ability of respondents to detect, label and remember discriminatory experiences. Although some behaviours are considered obviously discriminatory to all observers, some of most insidious discrimi- natory actions transpire in ambiguous or confusing situations (e.g. adolescent boys’ use of ‘fag’ as a form of salutation; Major & Sawyer, 2009). When determining whether an action is discriminatory or not, people often reflect upon a long list of questions: Who is doing the discrimination? Is the behaviour considered harmful and intentional? Is the possible discriminator a member of a respected or disliked group? Does the respon- dent think the victim deserves the discrimination? Clearly, the answers to such questions are sometimes dependent on the characteristics of individual observers, so it would be safe to assume that the measures of felt and enacted discrimination could have prob- lems with reliability and validity. Future research should include a wider range of stress measures, including both subjective and objective methods. Our measures of minority stress are not always ‘place-specific,’ so it is possible that a person who lives in a rural area could have experienced discrimination in another geographical area. Furthermore, we used shortened measures of minority stress in order to reduce participant burden and increase the feasibility of the online survey. Future studies should be conducted to replicate our findings using measures that have more extensive histories of psychometric soundness. People may also differ in their definitions of what is rural or where the boundaries of centre cities and suburbs begin or end in large metropolitan areas. Also, because place of residency is not always constant, a measure of current residency may not reflect the amount of exposure to minority stress in previous locations. Accordingly, some people may have been classified as urban, small town or rural, although the discrimination could have occurred elsewhere (e.g. a recent migrant to a metropolitan area may have remembered discrimination that transpired in that person’s teenage rural years). This study would also have been improved if we included a measure that distinguished bisexuals from lesbians and gays. Although online surveys offered some advantages in the study of LGB populations, they are not without limitations. For example, our choice of listservs generated a higher proportion of respondents from some states (Kentucky and Ohio). The use of an Internet- based survey may introduce other sorts of selection bias since computer usage can vary by age, social class and race. This study had a low percentage of African Americans and high percentage of Native Americans. Likewise, the use of Internet sources can underestimate the proportion of sexual minorities who are more concealed about their sexual orienta- tion. Also, the use of listservs might influence the findings on community connectedness because everyone in the sample was at least connected to other LGBs through an elec- tronic network. However, this limitation does not justify dismissing these findings, given the demographic characteristics of online and mail samples of LGBs have been demon- strated to be ‘practically indistinguishable’ and ‘equivalent’ (Koch & Emery, 2002; Riggle et al., 2005). The smaller sample size has also some limitations. With a larger number of participants, we could have tested for interaction effects between our spatial factors, as the cell size was too small to permit statistical power to detect if rural or small-town Southerners significantly differed from metropolitan Southerners. Finally, caution should D o w n lo a d e d b y [ U n iv e rs it y o f M a n it o b a L ib ra ri e s] a t 1 1 :4 2 0 4 S e p te m b e r 2 0 1 2 Psychology & Sexuality 239 be taken in generalising these findings to other countries. Studies do find cross-national variations in the acceptance and treatment of gays and lesbians (Adamczyk & Pitt, 2009; Štulhofer & Rimac, 2009), with the United States being more heteronormative than several European countries but much less than countries on other continents. The β coefficients of the location and regional differences in minority stress are small to moderate. We do not consider this to be surprising; many factors in addition to location may affect exposure to minority stress that are not included in this study. Further, the goal of this study was not to explain variance in these constructs, but instead to examine loca- tion and regional differences in LGBs’ experiences of minority stress. As a result, small to moderate yet statistically significant differences in minority stress exposure are of practi- cal significance, especially given that many of these differences remained significant after controlling for demographic and Socio-Economic Statuses (SES) factors. Finally, this study probably overlooks some factors that matter in the spatial distribution of minority stress (Adamczyk & Pitt, 2009). Suggesting some possible extraneous factors, rural states produced more lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) hate crimes until one controls for poverty rates and the presence of gay–lesbian community centres (Van Dyke et al., 2001). Also, Southern states embrace greater gender conservatism because they contain higher concentrations of poor religious fundamentalists who have less access to higher education (Moore & Vanneman, 2003). Conclusions In sum, this study offers some unique yet preliminary findings that highlight the role of rural location in LGBs’ experiences of minority stress and community connectedness. By being the first study to systematically examine the urban–rural continuum and exposure to minority stress, this study provides new insights into the relationship between the geo- graphical location and the lives of sexual minorities. These findings certainly suggest that future research should interrogate some of the common assumptions about rural locations as toxic spaces for LGBs and urbanity as an idealised space for LGBs; our results suggest a more complicated picture. In addition, the assumption that the South provides a particu- larly hostile environment for LGBs was mostly supported, highlighting yet another regional risk factor for minority stress that future research should continue to investigate. Certainly, the complicated relationship between minority stress and location of residence emphasises the importance of striving for contextual understandings of LGB individuals’ lives in their social and spatial milieu. Acknowledgements The authors thank Dr. Bernadette Barton, Michele Fiore and Jessica Roe for their assistance in the gathering of data for this study. Note 1. This sampling technique was devised because this study came out of a project that was also trying to examine political activism among gays and lesbians (Swank & Fahs, in press). Notes on contributors Eric Swank is Associate Professor of Social Work at Morehead State University. His sexuality pub- lications explore the relationship between social hierarchies and sexual satisfaction for women as well as sexual prejudice among rural residents. Recently, he has published on political participation among lesbians and gays (Sexuality Research & Social Policy) and ‘ally’ activism among heterosex- uals (Journal of Homosexuality), and has a forthcoming study on the intersections of race, gender and sexuality in political activism (Sex Roles). D o w n lo a d e d b y [ U n iv e rs it y o f M a n it o b a L ib ra ri e s] a t 1 1 :4 2 0 4 S e p te m b e r 2 0 1 2 240 E. Swank et al. David M. Frost is Assistant Professor of Population and Family Health at Columbia University. His research focuses on how stigma, prejudice and discrimination constitute minority stress and, as a result, affect the health and well-being of marginalised individuals. His work on stigma and minority stress has been recognised by grants and awards from the National Institutes of Health, the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues and the New York Academy of Sciences. He received his Ph.D. in social and personality psychology from the Graduate Center of the City University of New York. Breanne Fahs is Associate Professor of Women and Gender Studies at Arizona State University specialising in research on women’s sexualities, critical embodiment studies, radical feminism and political socialisation. Her recent book Performing Sex: The Making and Unmaking of Women’s Erotic Lives (SUNY Press, 2011) interrogated women’s struggles with sexual ‘liberation’, while her next book examines the life and work of author and would-be assassin, Valerie Solanas. She also works as a practicing clinical psychologist specialising in sexuality, LGBTQ issues, gender identity and trauma recovery. References Adamczyk, A., & Pitt, C. (2009). Shaping attitudes about homosexuality: The role of religion and cultural context. Social Science Research, 38, 338–351. Barton, B. (2010). ‘Abomination’ life as a bible-belt gay. Journal of Homosexuality, 57, 464–484. 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work_ouvf4n7vfvbqvnourfxvlxsrke	----	Ethan Frome Human Rights Attitudes and Peer Influence 1 Running Head: Human Rights Attitudes and Peer Influence Human Rights Attitudes and Peer Influence: The Role of Explicit Bias, Gender, and Salience Edward Dunbar, Ed.D.1,3, Megan Sullaway, Ph.D.1,3, Amalio Blanco, Ph.D.2, Javier Horcajo, Ph.D.2, and Luis de la Corte, Ph.D. 2 1Pacific Psychological Associates, 2Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, 3University of California Los Angeles Word Count: 8,500 Key Words: Human Rights, Social Influence, Ambivalent Sexism, Gitano Bias Correspondence should be sent to: Edward Dunbar, Department of Psychology, University of California Los Angeles Los Angeles, California, 90024, USA. e-mail edunbar@ucla.edu. mailto:edunbar@ucla Human Rights Attitudes and Peer Influence 2 Abstract Human rights are an essential element of a civil society. Attitudes about these laws and the role of peer influence in shaping these attitudes, has not garnered much attention. This study examined the strategies individuals employ to influence a peers’ beliefs about human rights laws in Spain. One hundred ninety-six participants at the Universidad Autónoma de Madrid completed measures of human rights knowledge, feelings concerning human rights, political alienation, prejudice, sexism, and ethnic bias towards Gitanos (gypsies). Social power strategies to influence peers’ attitudes about the rights of ethnic minorities (Gitanos) and women were measured on Raven’s Interpersonal Power Inventory. Gitano Bias, feelings about human rights, and Gough’s Prejudice (Pr) scale predicted the endorsement of hard influence strategies. Hostile sexism and the Pr scale predicted the use of both soft and hard strategies concerning women’s rights. Greater effort to influence a peer was employed in a high salience condition (e.g. women’s use of social power concerning the rights of women). Findings indicate that explicit bias, gender, and salience of human rights to the individual contribute to efforts to influence a peer’s beliefs concerning human rights laws. Human Rights Attitudes and Peer Influence 3 Human rights, and polices meant to enforce them, are cornerstones of civil societies. Human Rights have long been an important issue to the international community (United Nations, 2003). This study examined three inter-related issues concerning human rights in a member country of the European Union (EU). These included the relationship between knowledge about human rights and attitudes about these laws, the preferred social power strategies used to influence a peer’s attitudes about human rights, and whether the salience of these laws modified an individual’s efforts to influence peer attitudes about the rights of ethnic minorities and women. Knowledge and Attitudes Concerning Human Rights Human rights initiatives seek to promote voting rights, freedom of speech, the rights of women, economic self-determination, and opposition to ethnic violence (Weisbrodt, 1988). The United Nations and European Union advocate public education about human rights laws and policies. For example, the United Nations promoted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a document to be “ … disseminated, displayed, read and expounded principally in schools and other educational institutions, without distinction based on the political status of countries or territories" (United Nations Website, 2003). This issue remains important for social policy, as exemplified by the recent adoption of laws by the EU that explicitly address human rights at a time of increased minority group in-migration to Europe and associated tensions between ethnic groups throughout the region. The study of attitudes concerning human rights has examined a variety of factors. An individual’s social attitudes reflect the interaction of cognitive, affective, and situational factors (Zanna, 1994). Kravitz and Kleinberg (2000) have proposed that attitudes concerning individual rights are influenced by beliefs relevant to the issue – such as the perceived fairness of such laws – and individual differences such as political orientation. In a study concerning affirmative action attitudes in the U.S., Aberson and Haag found that both attitudes and individual differences Human Rights Attitudes and Peer Influence 4 contributed to the degree of favorableness in how these laws were viewed and that attitudes varied in terms of specific affirmative action practices. However, there is little evidence that knowledge about human rights laws is related to individual’s attitudes about these laws. In conjunction with the efforts to formulate human rights policy, political psychologists have studied citizen comprehension of civil rights laws (Batelaan & Coomans, 1999; Davies, 2000). Price (1993) identifies citizen knowledge, ideological sophistication, and opinion change as constituting three distinct areas of investigation. At present there is limited information about the relationship between knowledge of human rights laws, and attitudes and feelings about the laws themselves (Sales & Garcia-Lopez, 1998). A particularly important human rights issue globally concerns women’s rights. The rights of women constitute a universal social issue. At the same time sexist attitudes have only recently begun to be conceptualized as a type of prejudice (Swim, Aikin, Hall & Hunter, 1995). Prior research has found associations between authoritarianism and hostile attitudes toward women (Walker, Rowe & Quinsey, 1993). A series of international studies concerning sexism elaborates upon the idea of sexism as a form of prejudice; one that encompasses both hostile feelings toward women (Hostile Sexism) and patronizing ideologies about women (Benevolent Sexism) (Glick et al., 2000). The rights of women are critical to the civil society initiative in the European Union; laws have been implemented by the European Union Commission on Human Rights and the Spanish Constitution that explicitly address the question of gender equality, particularly in the areas of sexual harassment and employment rights. Peer Influence upon Human Rights Attitudes Fishbein (2002) has proposed that intergroup attitudes are frequently influenced by peer relationships. These informal social relationships shape both ingroup norms and perceptions of social outgroups. The most influential work in the study of social influence is by French and Raven Human Rights Attitudes and Peer Influence 5 (1959), who proposed a general model of social power. Raven’s subsequent research has distinguished between “hard” strategies, such as explicit reward behavior or coercion, and “soft” relational and logic-based strategies, such as the use of referent or information power (Raven, 1992). Determining how social power is used to shape peer attitudes about human rights extends the work of French and Raven into the area of intergroup research. In addition, examining the question of human rights in terms of social power is particularly important given that many psycho- educational initiatives strive to develop intergroup awareness through peer interaction and cooperative learning. It is therefore important to examine how peer interaction may influence attitudes about the rights of social outgroups. One study that examined peer influence and human rights attitudes found that men and women differ in their endorsement of strategies to influence a peer’s beliefs concerning the rights of ethnic minorities (Dunbar, Blanco, Sullaway, & Horcajo, 2003). This study found that men in Spain endorsed the use of hard influence strategies significantly more so than did women. This is consistent with the literature on gender and social influence generally (Carli, 2001). Interestingly, in the Dunbar et al. study, the possession of knowledge about human rights laws did not lead to greater use of logic-based (i.e., information) arguments to influence a peer toward one’s own point of view on this issue, even though it would seem likely that increased knowledge would be associated with increased use of an information power strategy. In this study, peer influence strategies were examined in terms of human rights attitudes generally. It would be useful to know whether peer influence strategies would vary, based upon the target (gender or ethnic) group that these laws were being used to protect. Attitudes about individual rights may additionally be influenced by the intrinsic meaningfulness or salience of the topic to the individual (Aberson, in press) and perceived threat, as evidenced by the relationship of mortality salience with intergroup bias (Greenberg et al., 1990; Human Rights Attitudes and Peer Influence 6 Wischusen, Nelson, & Pollini, 2002). The salience of human rights laws to the individual and their ingroup may influence how these issues are addressed in peer relationships. In conditions concerning the rights of outgroup persons – a low-salience condition – individuals may be expected to put forth less effort to influence peer attitudes. By comparison, human rights policies that have direct consequence for the individual and their ingroup – a high-salience condition – would be expected to result in a more effortful and complex approach in influencing peer attitudes. In these high salience conditions, the individual’s intrinsic motivation is heightened. Deci and Ryan (1980) note that intrinsic motivation encompasses the individual’s perception of the favorableness of a task and the extrinsic, interpersonal, and intrinsic demands encountered in the realization of a desired outcome. As such, efforts to influence a peer’s attitudes about human rights may be thought to vary based upon the intrinsic meaningfulness of the issue to the individual. Individual Characteristics and Human Rights Attitudes Individual difference variables such as gender (Carter, 1990) and age (Pope-Davis & Ottavi, 1994) have been found to be associated with racism and attitudes concerning employment rights (Kravitz et. al. 2000). Political attitudes, including alienation from the political system, may play a role in attitudes concerning human rights. Reef and Knoke (1993) describe political alienation as the individuals’ absence of support for governmental institutions and the political system itself, rather than a particular governing administration that is in office at a given time. It would seem evident that support for human rights laws would in part be dependent upon belief in governmental institutions as a whole, and that a sense of alienation from and hostility toward democratic forms of government, such as those of E.U. member states, would be associated with negative attitudes concerning human rights laws. Another individual difference variable relevant to intergroup attitudes concerns one’s disposition towards bias in general. Gough’s Prejudice (Pr) scale, has consistently demonstrated Human Rights Attitudes and Peer Influence 7 relationships to bias against ethnic and other minority out-groups (Gough, 1951; Gough & Bradley, 1993; Dunbar, 1995). This scale (also called the “To” or Tolerance Scale in the California Psychological Inventory) has demonstrated cross-cultural validity in predicting bias against indigenous people (Dunbar, Saiz, Stela, & Saiz, 1999) and the endorsement of anti-Semitic and Roma (Gitano) bias (Dunbar & Simonova, 2003). Social and Historical Context of the Current Study This study was conducted in Spain, a multi-lingual and multi-ethnic nation. Spain has undergone significant political change during the past generation. Contemporary Spanish culture incorporates a variety of socializing forces relevant to human rights. As a Latin culture, the male- dominant cultural traditions are significant, but at the same time Spain, as a member of the European Union, is committed to policies supporting the rights of women, ethnic minorities, and gays and lesbians. As instituted under the Constitution of 1978 and its E.U. member status, Spain is governed by both national and EU human rights laws. For example, the Spanish Constitution recognizes the legitimacy of the multi-ethnic status and rights of the citizenry in Article 143 of the Constitution. The current study sought to examine the attitudes toward human rights laws in this specific cultural context. Spain additionally has a notable history for inter-ethnic problems and religious conflict (Menocal, 2002), and the out-migration of minorities during the inquisition. For the past millennium, Gitanos – gypsies - have constituted a visible ethnic minority group throughout Europe. Gitanos play a prominent role in much of Spanish folklore, but at the same time they are often viewed as more criminal, as less work-motivated, and as belonging outside of mainstream Spanish culture (Caton Ortiz & Gómez Jacinto, 1996). Research Questions This study examined the predictors of peer influence strategies concerning the rights of Human Rights Attitudes and Peer Influence 8 ethnic minorities—Gitanos—and women. This latter question was tested in conditions of both low and high salience to the individual. Five hypotheses based upon prior research were proposed, these are described below. H1: Feelings about human rights laws - as measured on the Human Rights Affect Rating - would be correlated with negative attitudes about social issues – as measured on the political alienation and the Pr scales – and measures of explicit outgroup bias - Gitano bias, Hostile Sexism, and Benevolent Sexism. H2: Positive feelings about human rights laws would be predicted by possession of accurate knowledge about these laws when controlling for participant age and gender. It was of interest to consider whether possession of specific knowledge about human rights would positively influence how individuals felt about these laws. H3: As suggested by prior research (Dunbar, et. al. 2003), negative affect concerning human rights laws and an orientation towards outgroup bias would predict the endorsement of “hard” social power strategies to influence a peer’s opinion concerning human rights laws for ethnic minority persons (i.e. Gitanos) and for women. The endorsement of soft strategies would be predicted by possession of accurate knowledge about human rights and greater positive affect concerning human rights laws. H4: It was anticipated that men and women would differ in their endorsement of social power strategies (Carli, 2001) concerning human rights. It was hypothesized that men would report greater effort, or certitude, than women in trying to influence a peer’s beliefs about human rights, replicating the Dunbar et. al. findings (2003). H5: It was expected that peer influence strategies would vary by the salience of the human rights topic. It was anticipated that gender differences in the endorsement of peer influence strategies would decrease or disappear in a high-salience condition – i.e. in which women would Human Rights Attitudes and Peer Influence 9 experience greater consequence - versus debating issues of Gitano rights (a low salience condition). In other words, the strategy selected will vary as a function of the salience to the individual and their ingroup. Method Sample One-hundred ninety-six students (22.5% males, 77.5 % females) enrolled at the Universidad Autónoma de Madrid participated in the study. Participant median age was 21 years (SD = 2.43) with a range from 19 to 36 years. Materials Demographic Variables: Participant age and gender were recorded on a demographic face sheet. Human Rights Knowledge Scale: The 23-item measure of human rights laws and policies in Spain and the European Union was developed by the second author, in consultation with members of the European human rights community. Scale items consisted of factual statements about human rights laws that were evaluated on a 7-point Likert scale, with statements rated from “very certain this is true” to “very certain this is not true.” The statements examined knowledge concerning human rights policies of Spain (“Spain does not have an agency responsible for monitoring the civil rights of minority groups such as Gitanos”) and civil laws (“There are laws in Spain against the advocacy of violence against minority groups such as Gitanos or Jews”), as well as knowledge of EU human rights practices (“The European Union does not have a policy concerning the human rights of social groups such as Gitanos”). The measure consists of four subscales. The first subscale measures knowledge about ethnic violence (e.g. hate crime) laws and consists of four items (M = 13.25, SD = 2.01; α = .76, 95% CI = 12.97 – 13.54). The second subscale of six items measures knowledge about laws concerning protection against discrimination; the scale mean was 23.01 (SD Human Rights Attitudes and Peer Influence 10 = 2.24; α = .69, 95% CI = 22.69 – 23.32). The third subscale of three items measured knowledge of laws concerning hate speech; the subscale mean was 9.07 ( SD = 2.52; α = .64, 95% CI = 8.71 – 9.42). The final subscale measures knowledge of government policies regarding human rights enforcement. This scale consists of 10 items with a subscale mean of 36.19 (SD = 3.13; α = .88, 35.75 – 36.63). Human Rights Affect Ratings: Participants were asked to rate their feelings about human rights laws on three 7-point semantic differential measures, developed by Haddock and Zanna (1999) in their study of attitudes about capital punishment. The three affect pairs (“Positive- Negative, Good-Bad, Like-Dislike”) were aggregated to form a global rating of feelings concerning human rights laws. The scale mean was 9.03 (SD = 3.97, α = .86, 95% CI = 8.47 – 9.59). Higher scores indicate more positive feelings about human rights laws. Political Support – Alienation Scale (Muller, Jukam, & Seligson, 1982) According to its authors, “the intent of the scale is to measure… how well the political system and political institutions conform to a person’s general sense of what is right and proper and how well the system and institutions uphold basic political values of importance to citizens”. The eight-item scale is scored on a 7-point response continuum, with scores ranging from 7 (low support, high alienation) to 56 (high support, low alienation). Items include such questions as “To what extent do you feel that the basic rights of citizens are well protected by out political system?” The scale mean was 25.76 (SD = 8.02; α = .85, 95% CI = 24.63 – 26.89). Prejudice Scale (Pr): The 32 items of Gough’s original Pr scale (Gough, 1951) from the established Spanish version of the MMPI were employed. This scale includes items that reflect a cynical, rigid, bitter perspective on social and intergroup issues. Prior research with the measure has shown cross-cultural reliability in its prediction of outgroup bias (Dunbar, 1995; Dunbar et al., Human Rights Attitudes and Peer Influence 11 1999). The sample scale mean was 9.95 (SD = 4.39, α = .77, 95% CI = 9.33 – 10.58), which is comparable to the normative values reported by Gough in (1951). Gitano Bias Scale: This is a 22-item Likert-type scale that includes negative and positive social attitudes concerning Gitanos. The measure was first developed to examine anti-Roma (i.e., Gitano) attitudes in the Czech Republic (Dunbar & Simonova, 2003). Items measure negative stereotypes such as laziness (“Gitanos do not have a positive relationship to work, they are lazy”), criminality (“Gitanos commit more criminal acts than other people), and problems integrating into mainstream Spanish culture (“Gitanos place greater importance on their own ethnic interests than in the interest of Spain”). The scale mean was 73.34 (SD = 15.38, α = .89, 95% CI = 71.16 – 75.51). Ambivalent Sexism Inventory (ASI): The 22-item Ambivalent Sexism Inventory (Glick & Fiske, 1996) is a self-report measure of sexist attitudes composed of separate 11-item Hostile Sexism (HS) and Benevolent Sexism (BS) subscales. HS reflects “antipathy toward women who are viewed as usurping men’s power” (Glick & Fiske, 2001, 109), and an “adversarial view of gender relations in which women are perceived as seeking to control men, whether through sexuality or feminist ideology” (Glick & Fiske, 2001). Examples of HS items include “Many women are actually seeking special favors, such as hiring policies that favor them over men, under the guise of asking for equality”, and “Women seek to gain power by getting control over men”. BS reflects “a subjectively favorable, chivalrous ideology that offers protection and affection to women who embrace conventional roles” (Glick & Fiske, 2001, p.109), for example “Women should be cherished and protected by men” and “Women, compared to men, tend to have a superior moral sensibility”. BS and HS tend to be modestly correlated. The HS subscale mean was 1.68 (SD =.97, ; α = .87, 95% CI = 1.54 – 1.82). The BS subscale mean was 1.92 (SD = .96, α = .90, 95% CI = 1.79 – 2.01). Human Rights Attitudes and Peer Influence 12 Interpersonal Power Inventory (IPI) (after Raven, Schwarzwald, & Koslowsky, 1998): This 33-item Likert-scaled measure asks respondents to describe forms of social power they would employ to gain the agreement or compliance of another. The IPI measures the forms of social power described by French and Raven (1959). The power strategies include both hard (e.g., personal coercion) and soft (e.g., information) forms of influence strategies. In the current version of the Raven Inventory, all items were worded to reflect interaction with a peer, that is, a person of equal status. Participants were asked to respond to describe their use of social influence strategies under two different condition involving interaction with a peer in which the participant was asked to convince the peer to agree with them on a topic concerning human rights. One condition asked respondents to describe how they would influence a peer to agree with their position about laws protecting the civil rights of Gitanos. The second condition asked respondents to describe how they would influence a peer to agree with their position about laws to guard against discrimination against women. An example of a statement reflecting personal expertise (one of the “soft” influence strategies) on the IPI is “I would probably have had more knowledge about the issue than they would have,” whereas a statement such as “I could have made it more difficult for them to get some special benefits if they disagreed with me” would reflect the use of material reward (a “hard” social influence strategy). Each IPI item is scored on a 7-point Likert scale. Low values reflect a disinclination to use a certain form of social power (1 = almost certainly not a strategy) and high scores a preference to use a strategy (7 = almost certainly a strategy). Each IPI scale consists of 3 items, allowing for a scale range from 3 to 21. For the 11 individual scales, the mean reliability coefficient (alpha) was .70 (range of .51 to .95) for the Gitano condition; for the women’s rights condition the mean alpha coefficient was .63 (scale range from .50 to .95) Procedure Human Rights Attitudes and Peer Influence 13 All measures, with the exception of the Pr Scale and the ASI, were translated from English into Spanish by both the third and fourth authors. The materials were then back-translated by a US- based professional author, fluent in both Spanish and English. The Prejudice Scale items were taken from a prior translation of the MMPI, which has been widely used in Spain. A Spanish language translation of the ASI, which has been used in Spain and other Spanish speaking countries, was kindly provided by the developers of the ASI for use in this study (Glick, 2002, personal communication; Fiske, 2002, personal communication). Participants were solicited at their university and received academic credit for participating in the study. To reduce response bias (Sundberg & Bachelis, 1956) no reference to the topics of inter-group attitudes was made in participant solicitation. All questionnaire materials were administered during regular class sessions. The administration of the materials was as follows: the Prejudice scale was administered first, followed by the Human Rights Knowledge Scale, the Political Support-Alienation Scale, and the Human Rights Affect scale. The ASI followed, then the Gitano Bias Scale. The Interpersonal Power Inventory was administered, and the demographic self-ratings were administered last. On the IPI it was emphasized that participants were to think of a situation in which they would try to change the opinion of a peer who held opposite attitudes from those of the participant concerning, separately, the rights of Gitano persons and the rights of women. The completed materials were entered into a database by a research team supervised by the third author. Analysis of Data The data set was analyzed using SPSS 10.5. This dataset was initially analyzed via computation of zero order correlations to examine the relationships between the independent variables. The hypothesized relationships concerning feelings about human rights laws and peer influence strategies was examined via hierarchical multiple regression (HMR) analysis. The HMR equation allowed for the determination of the (proposed) contribution of individual difference Human Rights Attitudes and Peer Influence 14 variables – i.e., Gitano bias and the Gough Pr scale –after participant demographic and human rights knowledge variables had been entered into the regression model. This research strategy largely replicates the methodology employed in the Dunbar, et. al. study (2004). Finally, a set of analysis of variance computations were conducted to test hypothesis four, in examining how social power varied by gender. Results Relationships between sexism, ethnic bias and Pr Scale. Computed significance tests revealed differences between men (M = 11.14) and women (M=9.60) for the Pr scale, t (183) = 2.04, p<. 05) and the Hostile Sexism Scale (M=2.02 and 1.59 for men and women respectively), t (189) = 2.62, p< .05). Consequently, zero-order correlations were computed separately for women and men. For women the Pr scale was correlated with Gitano Bias, Benevolent Sexism, and Hostile Sexism. Gitano Bias was correlated with Benevolent Sexism and Hostile Sexism for women participants. As found in prior research Benevolent Sexism and Hostile Sexism were intercorrelated. For men the Pr Scale was correlated with Gitano Bias and Hostile Sexism but not with Benevolent Sexism. Hostile Sexism was also correlated with Gitano Bias, and with Benevolent Sexism for men. Relationships between feelings about human rights, Pr Scale, and political alienation. To examine hypothesis one the relationship of the measures of bias and attitudes about human rights and political support/alienation were examined via zero order correlations for women and men. For women, Political Support-Alienation and Human Rights Affect were negatively correlated, in other words, political alienation was associated with less positive feelings about human rights laws. Results for men found a negative correlation between the Pr Scale with Human Rights Affect. Political Support-Alienation was also negatively correlated with Human Rights Affect. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Human Rights Attitudes and Peer Influence 15 Insert Table 1 About Here ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Predicting positive feelings about human rights laws. A hierarchical regression model was computed to test hypothesis two, with the Human Rights Affect Rating serving as the dependent variable. On step one, participant gender and age were entered into the model (Adj. R2 = -.002), F Change = .05, p =n.s.). On step two, the four subscales for knowledge of human rights laws were entered (Adj. R2 = .07, F Change = 3.51, p < .01). Knowledge about government policies to reduce discrimination (B = .29, t = 2.94, p < .004) was the singularly significant predictor to more positive attitudes about human rights. Social influence strategies and Gitano rights. Hypothesis three proposed that hard social influence strategies would be related to bias orientation. To test this hierarchical multiple regression models were computed to examine the endorsement of hard and soft social strategies on the IPI to influence peers’ attitudes concerning Gitano rights. Participant gender and age were initially entered (step 1) followed by the four Human Rights Knowledge subscales (step 2). On step 3 Human Rights Affect was entered; on step 4 the Gitano Bias Scale was entered. Finally, in step 5, the Pr scale was entered into the model. Hard social influence was predicted by participant gender and age, the Human Rights Affect scale, the Gitano Bias scale, and the Pr scale. The soft social influence score of the IPI in the Gitano rights condition was predicted by participant gender and age (Adj. R2 = .09, F Change = 9.29, p < .001). Human Rights Affect, the Gitano Bias scale, and the Pr scale were also significant predictors in the model. These findings are presented in Table 2. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Insert Table 2 About Here ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Social influence strategies and women’s rights. The prediction of hard and soft social Human Rights Attitudes and Peer Influence 16 influence strategies selected to influence peer attitudes concerning women’s issues was examined via a hierarchical regression model. Participant gender and age were entered on step 1 followed by the four Human Rights Knowledge Scales on step 2. On step 3 the Human Rights Affect score was entered; on step 4 the two Ambivalent Sexism Inventory scales – Hostile Sexism and Benevolent Sexism – were entered. Finally, in step 5, the Pr scale was entered into the model. The endorsement of hard social influence tactics on the IPI was predicted by participant demographic status for gender and age combined, Human Rights Affect, the Ambivalent Sexism Inventory, with the Hostile Sexism scale demonstrating a significant predictive relationship. After all these values were entered the Pr scale additionally improved the model. Endorsement of soft social influence tactics concerning women’s rights on the IPI was predicted by participant age. After the human rights knowledge and Human Rights Affect values were entered, Hostile Sexism additionally improved the model. These findings are presented in Table 3. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Insert Table 3 About Here ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Gender differences in the use of social power strategies. As proposed by hypothesis four, gender differences in the endorsement of social influence strategies on the IPI were examined in a series of one-way ANOVA tests. When influence strategies regarding Gitano rights were examined, results indicated significant gender differences for reward-material (F (1,188) = 4.96, p < .05, η2 = .03, power = .60), coercive-personal (F (1,189) = 7.35, p < .01, η2 = .04, power = .79), coercive- material (F (1,188) = 4.44, p < .05, η2 = .02, power = .55), legitimate equity (F (1,188) = 6.41, p < .05, η2 = .03, power = .71), legitimate-reciprocity (F (1,189) = 8.00, p < .01, η2 = .04, power =. 80), Human Rights Attitudes and Peer Influence 17 and expert (F (1,189) = 4.23, p < .05, η2 = .02, power = .53) based influence strategies. Men express greater likelihood of selecting these strategies than women. For men, the preferred peer influence strategies were information (M = 17.62, SD = 2.55), legitimate-position (M = 12.77, SD = 2.94), and legitimate-dependence (M = 12.28, SD = 4.46). Similarly, for women the preferred peer influence strategies were information (M = 17.40, SD = 2.72), legitimate-position (M = 11.80, SD =2.99), and legitimate-dependence (M = 11.79, SD = 3.65). When influence strategies regarding women’s rights were examined using a series of one-way ANOVA tests, gender differences were found for reward-material (F (1,187) = 6.96, p < .01, η2 = .04, power = .75), coercive-personal (F (1,186) = 9.36, p < .01, η2 = .01, power = .35), legitimate- equity (F (1,186) = 9.08, p < .01, η2 = .05, power = .85), and legitimate-reciprocity (F (1,187) = 8.76, p < .01, η2 = .05, power = .84) based influence strategies. Once more men expressed greater likelihood of selecting these strategies than women. However, in contrast to results found in the Gitano rights condition, women and men did not differ in selecting expert and coercive-material strategies to influence a peer about women’s rights. These findings are presented in Table 4. In order of preference, men most strongly endorsed selection of information (M = 17.54, SD = 2.60), legitimate-position (M = 12.79, SD = 2.98), and legitimate-dependence (M = 12.14, SD = 4.14) influence strategies. Women most frequently endorsed information (M = 17.82, SD = 2.25), legitimate-position (M = 11.71, SD = 2.99), and legitimate-dependence (M =11.96, SD = 3.80) strategies. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Table 4 About Here ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- The role of human rights salience upon social influence effort. We expected (hypothesis five) Human Rights Attitudes and Peer Influence 18 that in a high salience condition, peer influence efforts would increase. Specifically it was hypothesized that women would report greater effort through the use of expert and information strategies when attempting to influence a peer about a topic women would have greater concern and commitment to (the high-salience condition), that of gender equity laws, compared to that of Gitano rights. Women were more likely to select expert strategies (t = -8.37, p < .001) regarding gender equity (M = 11.58, SD = 2.33) compared to Gitano equity (M = 9.80, SD = 3.32). Women were also more likely to endorse information strategies (t = -2.10, p < .05) regarding gender equity (M = 17.78, SD = 4.11) compared to Gitano equity (M = 17.49, SD = 2.65), and more likely to endorse Reward-Personal strategies (t = -4.52, p < .01) regarding gender equity (M = 8.83, SD = 4.17) compared to Gitano equity (M = 8.03, SD = 3.47). When the individual strategies were aggregated, it was found that women selected significantly more soft forms of social influence (t =6.21, p < .001) concerning the rights of women (the high-salience condition) than in influencing a peer concerning ethnic minority rights (the low-salience condition). For women, hard influence tactics did not change significantly for women’s rights when compared to the rights of Gitanos. Similar computations for men on the women’s and Gitano rights conditions were conducted. The selection of Reward-Personal strategies was significantly greater (t = 2.17, p < .03) for men in arguing the issue of women’s rights (M = 9.97, SD = 3.69) compared to Gitano rights (M = 8.90, SD = 2.31). Neither the hard or soft aggregated strategies varied significantly for men when comparing Gitano and women’s issues. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Table 5 About Here ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Discussion The results of this study reveal a confluence of factors, including ethnic and gender bias, Human Rights Attitudes and Peer Influence 19 participant gender, and individual differences that are associated with how subjects would try to influence a peer’s attitudes concerning human rights laws. This study has considered the role of peer influence as a socializing process in the formation of young adult’s attitudes about laws and policies designed to protect vulnerable social groups. The relationship of knowledge, explicit bias, and individual differences of political and prejudice orientation were also examined in relationship to the feelings about human rights laws. Findings indicated a modest role for the possession of knowledge concerning human rights policies, on the one hand, and attitudes about ethnic outgroups and the political climate on the other, in examining how individuals feel about these laws. As expected by hypothesis one, positive Human Rights Affect was negatively correlated with Political Alienation for both men and women; Pr scale scores were also negatively correlated with Human Rights Affect, but only for men. Contrary to our expectations Gitano Bias and Ambivalent and Hostile Sexism were not associated with Human Rights Affect. This suggests that opposition to human rights laws is more likely to reflect a general cynicism or estrangement concerning the political process than the expression of explicit bias towards the groups these laws are designed to protect. Consistent with our second hypothesis, Human Rights Affect was predicted by accurate possession of knowledge about government policies to reduce discrimination, one of the four Human Rights Knowledge subscales. Knowledge about hate crime laws, laws governing hate speech, and human rights enforcement did not predict how individuals felt in general about human rights. Characteristics of Peer Influence Concerning Human Rights A variety of factors were examined that might be related to the use of peer influence tactics concerning human rights. For the Gitano rights condition, hard social influence tactics were predicted by participant gender and age, Human Rights Affect, Gitano Bias, and the Pr scale. Soft Human Rights Attitudes and Peer Influence 20 social influence tactics were predicted by participant gender and age, Human Rights Affect, Gitano Bias, and the Pr scale. Contrary to our hypothesis, however, Human Rights Knowledge played no role in the endorsement of soft influence strategies. In the gender equity condition, hard social influence was predicted by a combination of gender and age differences, Human Rights Affect, Hostile Sexism and Pr scores. Soft social influence strategies were predicted by participant age and Hostile Sexism. As predicted (hypothesis four) a consistent gender difference are found in the effort – i.e. the degree - to which social power strategies were endorsed, Men consistently endorsed greater use of social power strategies than did women. This replicates the Dunbar et. al. (2003) finding. However, men and women preferred similar social power strategies. Men and women most frequently endorsed information, legitimate position, and legitimate dependence strategies as peer influence tactics. Efforts to influence a peer’s attitudes about human rights appear to be influenced by both attitudinal and individual difference factors. Participants who endorsed explicitly biased beliefs concerning ethnic minorities and hostile sexism against women endorsed more forceful efforts to shape a peer’s beliefs about human rights. These findings indicate that explicitly biased individuals are consistently more effortful in changing a peers’ attitudes concerning ethnic minority and women’s rights. More tolerant and (relatively) older college-aged participants, by comparison, were less forceful in how they would debate human rights issues with their peers. The role of individual differences, as measured on Gough’s Pr scale, was related to feelings about human rights (for men), explicit bias against an ethnic minority group, and efforts to influence others beliefs about human rights laws. This self-report measure – which consists of items unrelated to outgroup attitudes - reflects a general orientation towards outgroup bias, resulted in the endorsement of both hard and soft influence tactics. The current findings also provide cross-cultural Human Rights Attitudes and Peer Influence 21 evidence of the Pr scale in terms of bias against women. Additionally, it is interesting that this finding was observed for both men and women. This latter finding suggests that individuals who are implicitly oriented towards the endorsement of outgroup bias may in some instances hold negative attitudes concerning the rights and responsibilities of ingroup persons as well. Understanding the attitudes of individuals who explicitly endorse both negative outgroup and ingroup attitudes simultaneously are in need of further study. Salience of Human Rights upon Peer Influence In comparison to our prior observation, a somewhat different impression emerges when the question of the salience of human rights to the participant is considered. As had been hypothesized, women participants were more likely to endorse greater effort to influence a peer about women’s rights – an issue of greater salience – than that of an ethnic outgroup. Women specifically used more soft – i.e., relationship enhancing and ultimately persuasive – tactics in the high salience condition. For women, the choice and effort to employ expert, information and personal reward strategies increased significantly. This is perhaps not surprising, as one would expect that women possess personal experience with gender bias, and thus have more information about, and more expertise in this context than that of Gitano rights. Our findings also illustrate the relevance of self-determination theory as proposed by Ryan and Deci (2000). The efforts by women to modify a peer’s beliefs concerning the rights of woman is consistent with what Ryan and Deci refer to as identified regulation- i.e. the conscious valuing of a behavioral goal (influencing the beliefs of the peer) in such a way that the belief is accepted as personally important (in this case by a peer of the individual). Further, women participants evidenced an internal belief – the issue of equity of women – which they sought to regulate in an interpersonal – i.e. an external - context. Peer influence, as suggested by the Ryan and Deci (2000) model, seeks to satisfy an external demand or reward, in this case for legitimizing the role of human Human Rights Attitudes and Peer Influence 22 rights as a social norm. As suggested by other research, opposition to human rights may be founded upon mortality salience (Solomon, Greenberg, & Pyszczynski, 2000) as well as the expression of ingroup identity. Additionally, however, attitudes reflecting esteem for a civil society (Aberson & Haag, 2003) may also increase both commitment and effort to endorse human rights, this later is a topic was not explicitly examined in our research. Future Directions in the Psychological Study of Human Rights The study of human rights has most frequently been the purview of policy theorists. While there have been numerous useful efforts by psychologists to examine intergroup relations, there is to date no unified model or established methodology for the psychological study of human rights as a distinct area of investigation. Research on this important topic is needed with more diverse samples than the university participants employed on the present study. Adults with more diverse life experiences may perceive greater importance of the issues addressed by laws that protect the rights of minority groups. As such, the recognized limitations of this study include the homogenous nature of the sample, issues of limited life experience that may restrict the ecological validity of the findings, and the simple self-report nature of the methodology. This study examines human rights at the individual and interpersonal level, an area that has received less attention when compared to the fields of political psychology and social policy research. While not attempting to dismiss the importance of these larger social forces upon attitudes, examining the role of peer interaction may yield useful information about informal social learning, attitude manipulation, or naturalistic processes of establishing pro-social beliefs concerning outgroups. Our findings could be of value to future experimental or laboratory methodologies exploring these issues. Further research may also focus upon other human rights policies - such as housing rights, or hate crime Human Rights Attitudes and Peer Influence 23 laws. Experimental study could provide information concerning how individuals reason about, or conceptualize human rights problems. Specifically, it would be of valuable to examine how individuals construe these issues in terms of cognitions and affects in both low and high salience conditions. This implies as well the value of considering both explicit and implicit judgments made about human rights issues. Methodologies that may be fruitfully applied may include articulated thoughts measures (ATSS, Rayburn & Davison, 2002) and implicit attitudes tests (Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998). Incorporating these techniques in future research would be highly desirable in this regard. Laboratory study might also benefit from measurement of intrinsic motivation to advocate (for or against) human rights laws. 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Zero Order Correlations of Measures of Bias Orientation: Men’s and Women’s Relationships on Gough Pr Scale, Gitano Bias, Human Rights Affects, Political Support-Alienation, and Benevolent and Hostile Sexism Gough Gitano Human Rights Political Support/ Benevolent Hostile Pr Scale Bias Affect Alienation Sexism Sexism _________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ Gough Pr Scale -- .30** .17 -.14 .30** .44** Gitano .41** -- .09 .10 .29** .17* Bias Human Rights -.31* .17 -- -.33** .11 .14 Affect Political Support/ .17 .15 -.43* -- .13 -.02 Alienation Benevolent .10 .25 .02 .09 -- .47** Sexism Hostile .35* .53** .12 .15 .34* -- Sexism _________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ Women (n = 148) are above the diagonal and men (n = 43 ) are below Human Rights Attitudes 30 Table 2. Hierarchical Regression Results in Predicting Hard and Soft Social Influence Strategies Concerning Gitano Rights Hard Strategies Soft Strategies . Step Predictor R2 Adj. R2 F Change B t R2 Adj. R2 F Change B t ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 1. Participant Demographics .08 .07 7.60** .10 .09 9.29*** Gender -.15 -3.00** -.16 -2.23* Age -.19 -2.98** -.22 -3.42* 2. Human Rights Knowledge .11 .08 1.20 .12 .09 1.19 Bias Crime Laws .04 1.26 .03 .47 Non-Discrimination Laws .01 -.10 .05. .81 Bias Speech Laws -.03 1.22 .09 1.19 Government Policies -.02 -1.47 -.04 -.48 3. Human Rights Affect Ratings .13 .10 5.84* .11 1.77* .15 .12 6.35* .13 1.85 4. Gitano Bias Scale .17 .13 6.70* .12 1.40* .17 .13 4.65* .07 .96 5. Gough Pr Scale .23 .19 14.87*** .29 3.85** .24 .20 14.88*** .28 3.86*** ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ * p < .01 ** p < .01 *** p < .001 Human Rights Attitudes 31 Table 3. Hierarchical Regression Results in Predicting Hard and Soft Social Influence Strategies Concerning Women’s Rights Hard Strategies Soft Strategies . Step Predictor R2 Adj. R2 F Change B t R2 Adj. R2 F Change B t ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 1. Participant Demographics .05 .04 5.31* .05 .04 9.29 Gender -.11 -1.54 -.03 -.36 Age -.09 -1.34 -.14 -2.00* 2. Human Rights Knowledge .08 .05 1.34 .07 .04 1.19 Bias Crime Laws .02 .30 .05 .67 Non-Discrimination Laws .03 -.38 .03. .06 Bias Speech Laws .13 .19 .13 .49 Government Policies .11 -.15 -.05 -.69 3. Human Rights Affect Ratings .10 .06 3.60* .07 1.06 .07 .04 6.35 .01 .10 4. Ambivalent Sexism Inventory .20 .16 12.38*** .18 .14 4.65*** Hostile Sexism .24 3.11*** .24 3.04*** Benevolent Sexism .06 .76 .10 1.23 5. Gough Pr Scale .23 .18 5.42* .29 3.85* .20 .15 3.12 .13 1.77 _______________________________________________________________________________________________________ * p < .01 *** p < .001 Human Rights Attitudes 32 Table 4. Oneway ANOVA Results for Gender Difference of Social Influence Strategies for Gitano and Gender Equity Issues Gitano Rights Condition Gender Equity Condition Men Women Men Women (n =43 ) (n = 148) (n =43 ) (n = 148) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) f Mean (SD) Mean (SD) f ____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ Reward-personal 8.91 (3.70) 7.82 (3.36 ) 3.36 9.79 (4.36) 8.54 (4.10) 2.93 Reward-material 7.35 (4.05) 5.99 (3.34 ) 4.96* 7.42 (3.80) 5.83 (3.37) 6.96** Coercive-personal 8.30 (3.56) 6.74 (3.25) 7.35** 8.55 (4.08) 6.76 (3.16) 9.36** Coercive-material 5.44 (2.60) 4.62 (2.14) 4.44* 5.19 (2.65) 4.54 (2.26) 2.49 Legitimate-position 12.77 (2.94) 11.80 (2.99) 3.48 12.79 (2.98) 11.71 (2.99) 4.33 Legitimate-equity 6.49 (3.40) 5.27 (2.54) 6.41* 6.53 (3.28 ) 5.17 (2.37) 9.08** Legitimate-dependent 12.28 (4.46) 11.79 (3.65) .54 12.14 (4.14) 11.96 (3.80) .07 Legitimate-reciprocity 6.86 (3.53) 5.44 (2.69) 8.00** 6.67 (3.25) 5.28 (2.52) 8.76** Expert 10.72 (3.71) 9.55 (3.14) 4.23* 11.42 (4.21) 11.64 (4.11) .09 Information 17.62 (2.55) 17.40 (2.72) .24 17.54 (2.60) 17.82 (2.25) .46 Referent 10.53 (3.71) 9.63 (3.21) 2.48 10.33 (3.61) 9.73 (3.25) 1.06 “Hard” Influence Tactics 55.05 (9.77) 47.40 (9.77) 3.17 55.88 (15.87) 49.41 (14.61) 1.68 “Soft” Influence Tactics 52.24 (12.01) 48.55 (13.68) 2.59 52.24 (12.01) 51.97 (9.18) .05 _______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ * p < .05 ** p < .01 33 Human Rights Attitudes Table 5. Women’s Strategy Changes in Low and High Salience Peer Influence Conditions Gitano Rights Condition Women’s Rights Condition . (Low Salience) (High Salience) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) t _________________________________________________________________________________ Reward-personal 8.03 (3.47 ) 8.83 (4.17) -4.52** Reward-material 6.28 (3.55) 6.21 (3.52) .47 Coercive-personal 7.10 (3.38) 7.17 (3.45) -.47 Coercive-material 4.80 (2.26) 4.70 (2.36) .96 Legitimate-position 12.01 (3.04) 11.94 (3.02) .47 Legitimate-equity 5.52 (2.77) 5.51 (2.66) .07 Legitimate-dependent 11.90 (3.85) 11.98 (3.86) -.44 Legitimate-reciprocity 5.74 (2.94) 5.62 (2.76) 1.14 Expert 9.80 (3.32) 11.58 (4.11) -8.37*** Information 17.49 (2.65) 17.78 (2.33) -2.10* Referent 9.81 (3.36) 9.87 (3.32) -.43 Hard influence tactics 48.53 (13.21) 49.11 (14.32) 1.02 Soft influence tactics 46.02 (9.78) 49.71 (9.89) 6.21*** ________________________________________________________________________________ * p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p<.001 34 Human Rights Attitudes Author Note Correspondence should be sent to: Edward Dunbar, Department of Psychology UCLA, Franz Hall, Los Angeles, Ca. 90024; email edunbar@ucla.edu Thanks are expressed to Bert Raven in the revision of the Raven Inventory and Dr. Joseph and Leticia Cervantes in the translation of some of the study measures. Word Count: 8,500 United Nations. (n.d.) Universal Declaration of Human Righ 29, 2003, from http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html. Table 2. Hierarchical Regression Results in Predicting Hard Table 4. Oneway ANOVA Results for Gender Difference of Socia Table 5. Women’s Strategy Changes in Low and High Salience P 
work_ov5h6f5ydbgcdgg5ubhrcpenp4	----	Microsoft Word - 18us040437-1-[4]  Abstract—The Roma people are a nomadic ethnic group native to India, and they are one of the most prevalent minorities in Europe. In the past, Roma were enslaved and they were imprisoned in concentration camps during the Holocaust; today, Roma are subject to hate crimes and are denied access to healthcare, education, and proper housing. The aim of this project is to analyze how the public perception of the Roma people may be influenced by antiziganist and pro-Roma institutions in Europe. In order to carry out this project, we used social network analysis to build two large social networks: The antiziganist network, which is composed of institutions that oppress and racialize Roma, and the pro-Roma network, which is composed of institutions that advocate for and protect Roma rights. Measures of centrality, density, and modularity were obtained to determine which of the two social networks is exerting the greatest influence on the public’s perception of Roma in European societies. Furthermore, data on hate crimes on Roma were gathered from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). We analyzed the trends in hate crimes on Roma for several European countries for 2009-2015 in order to see whether or not there have been changes in the public’s perception of Roma, thus helping us evaluate which of the two social networks has been more influential. Overall, the results suggest that there is a greater and faster exchange of information in the pro-Roma network. However, when taking the hate crimes into account, the impact of the pro-Roma institutions is ambiguous, due to differing patterns among European countries, suggesting that the impact of the pro-Roma network is inconsistent. Despite antiziganist institutions having a slower flow of information, the hate crime patterns also suggest that the antiziganist network has a higher impact on certain countries, which may be due to institutions outside the political sphere boosting the spread of antiziganist ideas and information to the European public. Keywords—Applied mathematics, oppression, Roma people, social network analysis. I. INTRODUCTION HE Roma people are one of the most prominent minorities throughout Europe. They originally come from the Indian subcontinent, and they are a nomadic ethnic group. Roma have been oppressed throughout history: they were enslaved throughout the middle ages and they were victims of the Holocaust. Today, Roma are oppressed and racialized through misrepresentation and restrictions from access to healthcare, education, and proper housing. Roma have been misrepresented in the media and popular culture. They are condemned as dishonest, criminal, dirty, and they are presented as thieves and beggars in newspapers. G. I. Pintea is with Simmons College, Boston, MA 02215 USA (e-mail: pintea@simmons.edu). The Summer Undergraduate Research Program at Simmons (SURPASs) financially supported this research study. Furthermore, they are labeled as a “problem” and as deserving of exclusion [1]. Roma men and women are considered lazy, belligerent, vulgar, dirty, and criminal; Roma women, however, are also subject to sexualized racial harassment, and they face the vulnerability of rape, which is justified through the stereotype of Roma women being “sexually available” [2]. Movies such as The Hunchback of Notre Dame and television shows such as My Big Fat American Gypsy Wedding are more popular examples of misrepresentation in pop culture, and they reinforce current negative stereotypes [3]. Roma are commonly known as “gypsies,” a slur that has become socially accepted. The name “gypsy” comes from “Egyptian,” which is what the English called Roma when they were first known in Britain [4]. Even politicians like Traian Băsescu (former Romanian president) have adopted this term and use it regularly when referring to Roma [2]. Based on such portrayals, Roma experience oppression in European societies in several ways. They are victims of police brutality, they are racialized and “othered,” and they are discriminated against within the criminal justice system [1]. In Hungarian society, for example, Roma are referred to as “an issue” and a “burden to Hungarian society,” and “differences in values” and lifestyle are sometimes brought up as excuses for these instances of othering [5]. Some blame Roma’s education level and suggest it hinders their social and economic integration [5]. Countries like France have enacted mass deportations of Romanian and Bulgarian Roma in the past; other countries, such as Italy, have engaged in similar activity as well [2]. Many European countries have explicitly color-blind policies that prohibit affirmative action based on race [2]. Furthermore, European countries have created laws that limit Roma’s opportunities (e.g. France limits the types of professions available to Roma seeking work), and that do not allow Roma to gain residency, thus forcing them to set up illegal housing that does not meet their basic necessities [3]. Not much research on Roma has been carried out throughout the years. Many countries still fail to collect race- based data, which hinders the possibility of conducting research on Roma and the implementation of policies that can protect Roma. A very small number of psychological studies have addressed discourse and texts about Roma (e.g. discursive research on the prejudice towards Roma in Romania) [1]. Other studies that have focused on Roma used critical discourse analysis (CDA) to evaluate discriminatory language in the media [6], and randomized controlled trials to determine the effects of behavioral intervention for prevention of HIV and STDs in high risk social networks of young Roma Giulia I. Pintea Evaluating the Perception of Roma in Europe through Social Network Analysis T World Academy of Science, Engineering and Technology International Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences Vol:12, No:10, 2018 1304International Scholarly and Scientific Research & Innovation 12(10) 2018 scholar.waset.org/1307-6892/10009625 In te rn at io na l S ci en ce I nd ex , H um an it ie s an d S oc ia l S ci en ce s V ol :1 2, N o: 10 , 2 01 8 w as et .o rg /P ub li ca ti on /1 00 09 62 5 http://waset.org/publication/Evaluating-the-Perception-of-Roma-in-Europe-through-Social-Network-Analysis/10009625 http://scholar.waset.org/1307-6892/10009625 [7]. However, there is a severe lack of studies that made use of social network analysis to study prejudice towards Roma, which is what this project aims to do. With this study we hope to shed some light on the current status of the public’s perception of Roma and on the networks that influence it. We hope to be able to reveal which institutions are the most influential in this matter and to bring awareness to the readers. II. METHODOLOGIES The main methodology used to carry out this project is social network analysis (SNA), which is often used in the social and behavioral sciences. SNA involves graphically plotting networks and mathematically analyzing them through algorithms that yield statistics that help us learn more about the nature of such networks. The individual entities in a network are the nodes or vertices of the graph, and the connections among such entities are referred to as the edges or links. There are previous studies that have used some form of network analysis to study sociological matters, which have focused on selection bias and active avoidance of minority group members [8], as well as interactions between social networks of black and white people [9]. In order to build the antiziganist and the pro-Roma social networks, we first gathered data from peer-reviewed academic journals, news articles, and online archives on large European institutions that we classified as either antiziganist or pro- Roma based on the information we found. Large institutions included political parties, non-governmental organizations, governmental organizations, and hate groups. Institutions were classified as antiziganist if they had expressed antiziganist sentiments through hate speech or if they supported legislation that oppressed Roma (e.g. legislation that prevented Roma from accessing proper housing). Institutions were classified as pro-Roma if they had shown support for Roma people or advocated for their rights and protection. In this classification process, actions were prioritized over statements; discriminatory actions were the determinants of an institution’s categorization, regardless of whether it contradicted statements released in the past. Furthermore, edges or connections among institutions were established if any of the following were found: collaborations on events (e.g. demonstrations); common membership of larger “umbrella” organizations (e.g. UNITED for Intercultural Action); joint letters or statements to governments and partisan organizations; an institution featuring another institutions’ work/publications on its website; financial support between organizations; and statements of endorsement between institutions. The names of larger “umbrella” organizations were recorded in hopes of detecting communities on Gephi within the two networks. We used a network-visualization software called Gephi to plot and analyze the two social networks following the data collection. Gephi obtained measures of density, centrality, and modularity for both social networks, which we used to identify the most influential institutions for each network and determine the extent of interconnectedness among the institutions. The data on hate crimes on Roma were gathered from the database of the OSCE. We gathered the data from 2009 through 2015 for the 24 countries that reported hate crimes on Roma to OSCE; however, due to missing values, we only analyzed the data for the eight countries with the most complete data. The countries that had the most complete data are the following: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Serbia, Sweden, and Ukraine. We used a statistical software called RStudio to obtain a time series plot and examine the trends in hate crimes for the eight countries. III. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION A. Antiziganist Social Network We were able to include a total of 68 institutions in the antiziganist network, which made up the nodes of the network, and we detected 235 connections (or edges) among those institutions (see Fig. 1). Due to the fact that we took into account a multitude of factors to define connections among institutions, this network is directed, such that we specified that some institutions have links from A to B and not necessarily from B to A. According to Gephi, the density of the antiziganist network is of 0.052, and the average path length is of 4.25. Furthermore, we obtained a value of 0.725 for modularity. By looking at individual values for betweenness centrality, we detected the four most influential institutions in the antiziganist social network: the Italian Tricolour Flame Party (0.126); the Hungarian National Guard (0.116); the Hungarian Jobbik Party (0.107); and the Hungarian Civil Guard Association for a Better Future (0.106). B. Pro-Roma Social Network The pro-Roma social network we built is composed of 63 institutions and we were able to detect 328 connections among them (see Fig. 2). This is also a directed network, due to the criteria we used to define the edges. According to Gephi, the pro-Roma network has a graph density of 0.084, and its average path length is of 2.655. The value for modularity we obtained for this network is of 0.354. The observed individual values for betweenness centrality suggest that the following five institutions are the exert the most influence in the pro-Roma network: The OSCE (0.146); the European Roma Rights Centre (0.142); the International Organization for Migration (0.140); Amnesty International (0.139); and the Council of Europe (0.121). C. Hate Crimes on Roma Our raw data consisted of the number of Roma individuals who were victims of hate crimes from 2009 to 2015 for 23 European countries; however, due to missing data for certain years, we only included those nations that had data for at least five of the seven years of interest. This narrowed the number of nations down to the following eight: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Serbia, Sweden,) of the hate crimes, which shows differing trends for the eight nations: Sweden has an increasing trend; Hungary reaches a peak in 2010, and then follows a decreasing trend; and Serbia does not World Academy of Science, Engineering and Technology International Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences Vol:12, No:10, 2018 1305International Scholarly and Scientific Research & Innovation 12(10) 2018 scholar.waset.org/1307-6892/10009625 In te rn at io na l S ci en ce I nd ex , H um an it ie s an d S oc ia l S ci en ce s V ol :1 2, N o: 10 , 2 01 8 w as et .o rg /P ub li ca ti on /1 00 09 62 5 http://waset.org/publication/Evaluating-the-Perception-of-Roma-in-Europe-through-Social-Network-Analysis/10009625 http://scholar.waset.org/1307-6892/10009625 show any patterns or significant decreases or increases in hate crimes on Roma. Fig. 1 Antiziganist social network obtained with Gephi Fig. 2 Pro-Roma social network obtained with Gephi There are several explanations for the observed patterns in hate crimes. It is a possibility that local current events impacted the frequency of hate crimes for certain years. For example, critical elections may have triggered spikes in hate crimes in certain nations. Furthermore, historical events in certain countries may be having an effect on the occurrence of hate crimes on Roma. It could be that those countries that had more occurrences of oppression in the past take a longer amount of time to change the mentality and sentiments that the larger population has towards Roma, thus explaining why certain countries have higher hate crime frequencies than others. We cannot draw any conclusive statements from these data since the data we gathered from the OSCE database come only from countries that have organizations which report these hate crimes. There likely are unreported hate crimes that are included in this analysis and thus we do not have the desirably complete data to draw more telling conclusions. Fig. 3 Time series plot of hate crimes on Roma from 2009 to 2015 for eight European countries: Bulgaria (red), Czech Republic (blue), Hungary (green), Italy (orange), Poland (pink), Serbia (brown), Sweden (black), and Ukraine (grey). The plot was obtained with RStudio D. Discussion The statistics Gephi yielded and the information we obtained from the hate crimes provide us with several pieces of information regarding the dynamics of the two social networks. TABLE I STATISTICS OBTAINED FOR EACH NETWORK Antiziganist Network Pro-Roma Network Density 0.052 0.084 Average Path Length 4.25 2.66 Modularity 0.725 0.354 As shown in Table I, the density of the pro-Roma network, is higher (0.084) than that of the antiziganist network (0.052), meaning that the pro-Roma institutions are more tightly knit. As for centrality, the data show that the average path length for the pro-Roma network (2.66) is lower than that of the antiziganist network (4.25), which suggests that the flow of information is faster among the pro-Roma institutions. Furthermore, although the pro-Roma network has a lower modularity (0.354) than the antiziganist network (0.725), which shows that the antiziganist network has a higher tendency to subdivide into communities, the densities of the two networks are closer to 0 than to 1; thus, we cannot draw any conclusions about communities. Another factor that prevents us from making inferences about communities is the fact that they are most relevant when edges are two-way (as opposed to one-way, like in our study). The difference in modularity also indicates a telling difference in organization between the two types of institutions: despite the pro-Roma network having a higher overall density (at a higher scale), the World Academy of Science, Engineering and Technology International Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences Vol:12, No:10, 2018 1306International Scholarly and Scientific Research & Innovation 12(10) 2018 scholar.waset.org/1307-6892/10009625 In te rn at io na l S ci en ce I nd ex , H um an it ie s an d S oc ia l S ci en ce s V ol :1 2, N o: 10 , 2 01 8 w as et .o rg /P ub li ca ti on /1 00 09 62 5 http://waset.org/publication/Evaluating-the-Perception-of-Roma-in-Europe-through-Social-Network-Analysis/10009625 http://scholar.waset.org/1307-6892/10009625 antiziganist network contains groups of institutions that are highly interconnected at a lower scale. Overall, the results suggest that there is a greater and faster exchange of information between pro-Roma institutions; however, the impact of the pro-Roma network itself is ambiguous when we take the trends in hate crimes into account. The time series plot (Fig. 3), shows different patterns for the eight countries, suggesting that the impact of pro-Roma institutions varies from nation to nation and is thus inconsistent. We speculate that there are other institutions (outside of those that were included in the two social networks in this study) that are affecting pro-Roma and antiziganist institutions’ influence on the public’s perception of Roma. For example, it is a possibility that antiziganist institutions may be exerting more influence on the perception of Roma in certain nations because of media outlets that boost their visibility. This may be helping with the flow of information in the antiziganist network, since political parties in the antiziganist network are featured on the news regularly. Back in 1998, the Bulgarian press showed that “90 percent of hate speech in ‘print media’ involve the Roma” [6]. Today, there is still an ever-present negative portrayal of Roma, which is impacting public policy as well as inflating people’s prejudice towards Roma [11]. Politicians explicitly insult and defame Roma in the media; one example is Zsolt Bayer, the co-founder of the Fidesz Party of Hungary, who compared Roma to animals and said they “shouldn’t be allowed to exist” [10]. This negative language and the policies several governments implement that affect Roma (such as France’s forced Roma deportations) [3] are all contributing to the perception that the European public has of the Roma people [11] by fueling antiziganist views. It is possible that despite the greater interconnectedness of pro- Roma institutions, outside institutions such as media outlets are supporting antiziganist institutions by increasing their visibility and thus increasing the flow of antiziganist ideas to the public, thus impacting the public’s perception of Roma. Overall, it appears that little has changed in terms of the European public’s perception of the Roma people, and the issue seems to be centered around the high visibility of antiziganist institutions. Pro-Roma institutions need to find ways to be in the public eye more frequently so that they can their pro-Roma ideas can reach the public more efficiently. The speculations discussed in this report are not by any means conclusive, due to the several limitations of the data analyzed in this study. First, there may be more edges in both networks that could not be detected throughout this study. Social networks are dynamic, and thus the number of edges in each network will change with the passage of time. Furthermore, there may be more institutions that either oppress or support Roma, meaning that not all nodes could be detected and included in this study. Future studies could build antiziganist and pro-Roma networks on a local scale, such that the influence of the two networks can be analyzed for one nation at a time. Additionally, studies on Roma that use SNA could focus on other areas of the world, such as the Americas; the results would be telling of what types of institutions are most prominent across the world when it comes to influencing the public’s perception of Roma. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS G. I. Pintea would like to thank Dr. Donna Beers for her mentoring and guidance throughout the course of the study. She would also like to thank the Summer Undergraduate Research Program at Simmons (SURPASs) for financially supporting this study. REFERENCES [1] S. Goodman, and L. Rowe (2014). “‘A stinking filthy race of people inbred with criminality’ A discourse analysis of prejudicial talk about Gypsies in discussion forums.” Romani Studies 5, Vol. 24, No. 1 (2014), 25-42. [2] A. Oprea (2012). “Romani Feminism in Reactionary Times.” Signs: Journal of Women in Culture & Society, 38(1), 11–21. [3] K. Grygierowska (2014). “When a Home Is Not a House: The Destruction of Romani Personal Property as a Human Rights Violation.” Emory International Law Review, 28(1), 557–595. [4] J. Matthews (2015). “Mobilising the Imperial Uncanny: Nineteenth- Century Textual Attitudes to Travelling Romani People, Canal-Boat People, Showpeople and Hop-Pickers in Britain.” Nineteenth Century Contexts. [5] T. Kóti, A. Pálóczi, and I. Süli-Zakar (2016). “Integration of Romani People, as the Most Important Internal Political Problems of Hungary.” Human Geography Journal 20(1), 109-120. [6] K. Erjavec (2001). “Media representation of the discrimination against the Roma in Eastern Europe: the case of Slovenia.” Discourse & Society Vol 12(6), 699-727. [7] J. A. Kelly et al. (2006). “Prevention of HIV and sexually transmitted diseases in high risk social networks of young Roma (Gypsy) men in Bulgaria: randomised controlled trial.” British Medical Journal Vol. 333, 1098- 1101. [8] T. H. Stark (2015). “Understanding the Selection Bias: Social Network Processes and the Effect of Prejudice on the Avoidance of Outgroup Friends.” Social Psychology Quarterly, 78(2), 127-150. [9] K. J. Ajouch, T. C. Antonucci, and M. R. Janevic (2001). “Social Networks Among Blacks and Whites: The Interaction Between Race and Age.” Journal of Gerontology: Social Sciences, 56B(2), S112-S118. [10] K. Verseck (2013). “Orban Friend Says Roma ‘Shouldn’t Be Allowed to Exist.’” Spiegel Online. [11] J. Richardson (2014). “Rome in the News: an examination of media and political discourse and what needs to change.” People, Place and Policy 8(1). World Academy of Science, Engineering and Technology International Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences Vol:12, No:10, 2018 1307International Scholarly and Scientific Research & Innovation 12(10) 2018 scholar.waset.org/1307-6892/10009625 In te rn at io na l S ci en ce I nd ex , H um an it ie s an d S oc ia l S ci en ce s V ol :1 2, N o: 10 , 2 01 8 w as et .o rg /P ub li ca ti on /1 00 09 62 5 http://waset.org/publication/Evaluating-the-Perception-of-Roma-in-Europe-through-Social-Network-Analysis/10009625 http://scholar.waset.org/1307-6892/10009625 
work_owgmtmds45as5p7qywm3les44e	----	The Rise of the Radical Right in Europe and the Case of Hungary: ‘Gypsy crime’ defines national identity? Dialogue The Rise of the Radical Right in Europe and the Case of Hungary: ‘Gypsy crime’ defines national identity? KATALIN HALASZ ABSTRACT Katalin Halasz looks at the impact of the profound political, economic and social changes that have swept across Europe. She argues that there is a new wave of racism, xenophobia, anti-Semitism and Islamophobia that has propped up the extreme and radical right on the margins of politics, but also increasingly in the mainstream. She focuses on the worrying implications of the growing escalation in violence against Roma in South and Central-eastern Europe, and the chilling call for a ‘decisive solution to the Roma problem’ in Hungary, which openly embraces anti-Gypsysm. KEYWORDS xenophobia; racism; anti-semitism; immigration; ethnicity Introduction Profound political, economic and social changes that have swept across Europe in the last decades exacerbated clashes between democratic norms and values and radical right ideologies that flourish on the soil of rapid changes and growing anxieties. Fears of the effects of globalization and social tensions evoked by the awareness of Europe as a continent of migration have paved the way for a new wave of identity politics and scapegoat ideologies. Political formations and social movements have emerged that oppose further modernization, European integrationand immigration, and promote the idea of homogeneous nation-states and the rejection of pluralistic democracies. This sentiment is propagating a new wave of contemporary forms of racism, xenophobia, anti-Semitism and Islamophobia and is often used by the extreme and radical right on the margins of politics but also increasingly in the mainstream and even within government in order to gain popularity and votes. Increasing xenophobia and negative public discourse The proliferation of right-wing political movements, and growing numbers of acts of racist and xenophobic violence against Roma, North Africans, Muslims and Jews (just to name a few) occur in a political environment that employs a utilitarian and Development, 2009, 52(4), (490–494) r 2009 Society for International Development 1011-6370/09 www.sidint.org/development/ Development (2009) 52(4), (490–494). doi:10.1057/dev.2009.63 short-term approach to immigration, whereby migrants will come to Europe for a few years, con- tribute to the economy and leave before they become a ‘burden’.1 In addition to its economic contribution, immigration has also been dis- cussed in relation to challenges of demography as offering an evident solution to problems generated by ageing populations. According to estimates, currently 18.5 million people with a migration background live in the territory of the European Union and immigration accounts for 80 percent of the population change today.2 The lack of recog- nition and value placed on the contribution that can and is made to Europe’s economy, society and culture by immigrants is a key feature of the debate. By creating a hierarchy between immigra- tion statuses, those not defined as ‘highly skilled’, and thus not to settle in Europe, are excluded even from recognition of the economic value of immigration, denying society the fruits of their participation in civic, political, social, cultural and economic life. The denial of rights to many migrants, including asylum-seekers, undocumented migrants and others, not only has a negative effect on the indi- viduals concerned but also undermines social cohesion, which is further accelerated by the se- curitization of the migration agenda. The upsurge in terrorism and new political global tensions have fuelled an increasingly visible negative public perception of migration, and the fear of fundamentalism and Islam extremism has led to high levels of xenophobia in many EU countries, triggered anti-Islamic measures and further discrimination based on religion and ethnicity. Legal, policy and practice developments in the fight against terrorism have contributed to an en- vironment whereby direct and indirect forms of discrimination are increasingly tolerated and even mandated in many areas of life.3 Discourse around racism and xenophobia increasinglycentres on migrants and also impacts on the lives of settled religious and ethnic minori- ties. Many ethnic and religious minority groups have been affected by public perception and the negative debate on migration. The negative portrayal of migration by mainstream policy- makers, right-wing groups and by the mass media through stereotypical language and negative images has led to a worrying increase in racism and xenophobia towards migrants and members of religious and ethnic minorities. This has been the case in many European coun- tries including Italy, where the arrival of Roma people from Romania was presented by both med- ia and politicians as an invasion and a threat to the security of the Italian population. Racist senti- ments in public discourse, excited by government officials, fuelled the climate of open hatred and racist violence against the Roma and Romanian nationals. The incident in Ponticelli, a district of Naples where, in May 2008, a Roma girl was accused of having attempted to kidnap a baby, was manipulated and used to amplify the percep- tion of a sense of insecurity and fear.4 These inci- dents have led to increased xenophobic reactions to Roma and to a new decree proposed by the government on public security and a series of provisions that declared a ‘state of emergency’ in several parts of the country due to the presence of ‘nomadic’ communities (i.e. Roma). In early July 2009, a new security package was ratified that directly targets migrants and minorities. The radical right on the rise across Europe The general trend towards far-right populism and right-wing extremism is a present and growing force in Europe (Kober, 2009).With the upsurge of the radical right, racism becomes more socially accepted, racist crimes against migrants and minorities become justifiable under right-wing ideologies.The radical right is a complex phenom- enon that must be investigated in the national context, but its importance and implications on Europe’s diverse communities must be recognized. With a populist-nationalist agenda and by playing on sensitive issues such as immigration and Islam the radical right entered the European Parliament in June 2009. Far-right parties gained seats in Austria, Denmark, Greece, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Slovakia, Romania and the UK. A number of parties described by the national media as far-right, anti-EU and anti-immigration, xenophobic and racist formed a new far-right Halasz: The Rise of the Radical Right in Europe 491 Eurosceptic group, the Europe of Freedom and Democracy group under the leadership of the UK Independence Party. The reinforcement of the right and far-right populism in the European Parliament signals dangerous developments at the national levels. Protecting true Hungarians against Gypsy petty criminals and Jewish state robbers At the time of writing, a day after the Interna- tional Remembrance Day of Roma Victims of the Pharraimos (Holocaust), a 45-year-old Roma QJ;woman was shot dead, and her 13-year-old daughter suffered life-threatening injuries when their house in the eastern Hungarian village of KisleŁ ta was attacked overnight. 5 ‘Based on investigation at the crime scene and earlier experiences, it is likely that this attack is part of a series of attacks on Roma’, the national police said in a statement (Reuters, 2009). Between January 2008 and June 2009, attacks against the Roma took a combined total of eight lives, left dozens of people with injuries, ten of which were life-threatening.6 Anti-Romany sentiment escalated in the country after two mur- ders allegedly carried out by groups of Roma in Olaszliszka in 2006 and in VeszpreŁ m in 2009. The house in KisleŁ ta is located in the outskirts of town and was attacked in the middle of the night, without any apparent provocation.This pattern reflects other attacks against Roma over the past year. In February, in one of the most brutal attacks, RoŁ bert Csorba and his five-year- old son Robika were shot dead when they attempted to flee their home that was set on fire with a Molotov cocktail in TataŁ rszentgy˛rgy. This was soon followed by the murder of Jen˛ KoŁ ka in Tiszal˛k. The police, who have been heav- ily criticized by Hungarian NGOs on official mis- conduct in the TataŁ rszentgy˛rgy case, have set up a 100-men unit to investigate incidents of anti-Roma violence in the past year, offered a reward for information about the identity of the criminals involved in attacks, and tasked the National Investigation Office to take over the investigation (Index,2009). The escalation in violence against Roma in South and Central-eastern Europe has met a growing public sympathy calling for a‘decisive so- lution to the Roma problem’and openly embracing anti-Gypsysm. In the Hungarian domestic politi- cal scene, nationalist and racist rhetoric specifi- cally targeting the Roma, increased with and contributed to the rapid popularity and success of the Movement for a Righter/Better Hungary (Jobbik ^ Jobbik MagyarorszageŁ rt Mozgalom), the second generation of Hungarian nationalist radical party that emerged after the decline of the Hungarian Truth/Justice and Life Party (MIEP ^ Magyar Igazsag es Elet Partja), an influential radical-right force in the1990s. Hungary has a relatively low immigration rate and a largely homogeneous population. The esti- mated 400,000^600,000 Roma has been long subject to prejudice and segregation, and are among the hardest hit by the economic, social and political transformation of the country. Anti- Romany tension and anti-Semitism have had a widespread and strong presence in the country in the last centuries.7 Drawing on the disappoint- ment over the process and outcome of the transi- tion process in the 1990s, the Hungarian Truth/ Justice and Life Party’s traditional nationalist ideology (based on irredentism and the rejection of the Treaty of Trianon that set out the current borders of the country) was supported by the arguments that Jewish and American capital robbed the nation of its assets during the privati- zation process, and this conspiracy continues to date (through globalization and European inte- gration), and that national purity is endangered by the higher reproduction rate of Roma/Gypsies. Since the 2002 national elections, when MIEP did not reach the threshold into parliament, the party went into a slow decline. Racist ideology and ethnic nationalism, however, gained new mo- mentum again after the country’s accession to the European Union, which ‘put a provisional brake on right-wing radicalism’ (Bayer, 2009: 285). Hungary’s foreign and domestic policies that were characterized by the attempt to carve out its place in the international political arena and global capitalism on the one hand, and by the growing public disappointment and lethargy over Development 52(4): Dialogue 492 the government’s performance that eventually led to violent street-riots in the autumn of 2006 on the other, paved the way for Jobbik and its repack- aged old^new radicalism. Through constructing an ideology that builds on the topics and elements propagated by MIEP (a blend of traditional irredentist and ethnic na- tionalism, xenophobia, racism and anti-Semitism) and not shying away from provocative public ac- tions and the use of autocratic symbols and snap- py, easy to read slogans, and by recruiting young charismatic intellectuals as leaders, Jobbik could reach out to the segments of the Hungarian popu- lation that MIEP was not able to: the youth and the people living in the countryside. The reasons for its popularity among the young, 20^35 years old, university educated, mainly male supporters (VarroŁ , 2009) can be traced back to the construc- tion of a sense of belonging for people who seem to have their identity reduced only to be ethnic ‘true Hungarians’, and is based on a simplified ideology and a common purpose to act. The crea- tion of the Hungarian Guard (Magyar GaŁ rda) in 2007 was a crucial step. It has created a ‘grass- roots’ element to the ‘Movement’ and a pool of trained and well-organized volunteer-militia ready to be called on for action for the common ‘Hungarian cause’. The common cause is first and foremost the fight against ‘Gypsy crime’. Jobbik’s political programme is very much a social policy agenda covered with racism (VarroŁ , 2009) and includes elements that resemble leftist ideas: a strong and sovereign nation-state against global capitalist forces and European integration, the working man at the centre instead of money and profit, higher taxation for the rich, public ownership etc. (Magyari, 2009). The‘ethnicization of poverty’ and ‘welfare chauvinism’ goes to the heart of the people who feel the ground slipping away from them and gather under Jobbik’s programme, who dares to tell the truth and ad- dresses real societal problems that other political parties do not: immigrants take away work from Hungarians, the political elite is corrupt and plays the cards of Jewish and other foreign interests, the whole welfare security system is endangered by Roma/Gypsies who are breeding for profit and stealing instead of earning money by honest work. Movement for a Better Hungary took in charge as the only party to face one of the underlying problems of Hungarian society, the unsolved situation of the ever growing gypsy population. It stated ^ what everyone knows but is silenced by ‘political correctness’ ^ that phenomenon of ‘gypsy crime’ is real. It is a unique form of delinquency, different from the crimes of the majority in nature and force.8 As the argument follows, Gypsies commit this particular type of crime not because of their ge- netic pre-determination but because their ‘pecu- liar socio-cultural background’. Jobbik denies racist claims and that they would propagate col- lective guilt of the Roma, but does not address criminality among Hungarians (or, for that matter, ‘petty crimes peculiar to low socio-eco- nomic backgrounds’ independent from ethnicity). Hungary must be protected, depending on the lo- cation, from the Jews in the capital, where anti- Semitism is significantly higher and brings in the votes, and against Gypsies in the countryside (Bayer, 2009). The tools of protection are terrify- ing, in particular for the Roma minority who has witnessed many of the Guard’s black marches through towns and villages in the last two years. Conclusion Group identity is constructed by acting against Gypsies, Jews, sexual and other minorities who are being perceived to be hostile to the‘Hungarian cause’ and is reinforced by every march of the Guard. The sense of impunity for violence against Roma is growing, and the ineffectiveness of law enforcement bodies in charging perpetrators only contributes to this, as does the fact that the 5300-member law enforcement officers’ trade union announced a formal alliance with Jobbik. There is no evidence that members of the Garda are involved in the attacks mentioned above and it remains to be seen whether the inci- dents will be treated as suspect hate crimes and whether the Hungarian government will demon- strate political will in condemning anti-Romany violence. Halasz: The Rise of the Radical Right in Europe 493 Notes 1 A research by the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights on ethnic minorities and discrimination in Europe conducted through interviews to the most representative communities in each country shows a high level of ethnic discrimination and racist crime throughout Europe (FRA, European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2009). 2 Data obtained from Lanzieri, Giampaolo (2008) ‘Statistics in Focus: Population in Europe: 2007: first results’, EUROSTAT, http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY OFFPUB/KS-SF-08-081/EN/KS-SF-08-081-EN.PDF, accessed 2 August 2009. 3 Lynch, Catherine (2008) ‘Racismin Europe’, ENAR ShadowReport 2007, http://www.errc.org/db/04/20/m00 000420.pdf, accessed 2 August 2009. 4 Bencini, Camilla and Sara Cerretelli (2008) ‘Racism in Italy’, ENAR Shadow Report 2007 http://cms.horus.be/files/ 99935/MediaArchive/national/Italy%20-%20SR%202007.pdf, accessed 2 August 2009. 5 The 2nd of August was the day in 1944 where more than 3000 Roma und Sinti in Auschwitz-Birkenau were gassed. Devoting 2 August to the International Remembrance Day of RomaVictims of the Pharraimos (Holocaust) was suggested by the Roma National Congress and the International Romani Union, on a Hearing of the European Roma and Travellers Forum in the Council of Europe, in Strasbourg on 29 June 2009, and was adopted by all participants of the hearing ‘Together against the Anti-ziganism in Europe’. 6 ERRC, European Roma Rights Centre (2009) ‘Attacks against Roma in Hungary January 2008’ ‘6 June 2009’, http://www.errc.org/db/04/20/m00000420.pdf, accessed 2 August 2009. 7 FRA, European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (2009b) ‘Anti-Semitism’ ‘Summary overview of the situation in the EU 2001-2008’, http://www.fra.europa.eu/fraWebsite/attachments/Antisemitism Update 2009 .pdf, accessed 2 August 2009. 8 Jobbik (2009) ‘Movement for a Better Hungary’, http://www.jobbik.com/?page id=2, accessed 2 August 2009. References Bayer, JoŁ zsef (2009) ‘Country Report Hungary’, in Strategies for Combating Right-wing Extremism in Europe, Gutersloh: Bertelsmann StiftungVerlag. FRA, European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (2009) EU Midis at a Glance ^ European Union Minorities and discrimination survey,Vienna: FRA. Index (2009) ‘L˛v˛ld˛zeŁ s KisleŁ taŁ n: egy halott, egy seŁ ruº lt’,3 August 2009. Kober, Ulrich (2009) ‘Introduction: European challenges call for European responses’, in Strategies for Combating Right-wing Extremism in Europe, Gutersloh: Bertelsmann StiftungVerlag. Magyari, Peter (2009) ‘Erosen balos part a Jobbik’, Index,15 June 2009. Reuters (2009) ‘RomaWoman Shot Dead in Latest HungaryAttack’,3 August 2009. VarroŁ , Szilvia (2009) journalist in an interview with the author. Development 52(4): Dialogue 494 
work_owhwpmx44rbz3knd647ltgcwny	----	1 Running head: Self-harm and suicide in alternative subcultures This Corrosion: A systematic Review of the Association between Alternative Subcultures and the Risk of Self-Harm and Suicide Mairead Ann Hughes1*, Susan Frances Knowles2, Katie Dhingra3 Hannah Louise Nicholson4 and Peter James Taylor4 1 Department of Clinical Psychology, University of Liverpool, UK 2 Changing Minds UK, Warrington, UK 3 School of Social Sciences, Leeds Beckett University, England, LS1 3HE 4The School of Psychology, University of Central Lancashire, Preston, UK 5 Division of Psychology & Mental Health, University of Manchester, UK Word count (exc. figures/tables): 4,751 *Requests for reprints should be addressed to Mairead Hughes, The Beacon, HMP Garth, Ulnes-Walton Lane, Leyland, Preston, PR26 8NE (e-mail: hughesm87@hotmail.com). 2 Abstract Background: Rates of self-harm and suicide are increasing in young people. The literature suggests that individuals who identify with alternative subcultures (e.g. Goth) may be at a greater risk. Objective: To explore the prevalence of self-harm and suicide in alternative subcultures and the factors that might contribute to this increased risk. Method: Using a systematic strategy, the databases PsycINFO, Scopus, MEDLINE and Web of Science and the E-Thesis online service (ETHOS) were searched for English language only papers, with no restrictions in terms of date of publication. Papers were selected that included data on the relationship between either alternative subculture identity (e.g. Goth) or preference for alternative music (e.g. Heavy Metal) and self-harm or suicide. Ten quantitative papers were included; seven cross-sectional, two longitudinal and one cross-sectional state level comparison study. Two qualitative papers were also included. Studies were assessed by two reviewers for risk of bias Results: The findings indicated that individuals who associated with alternative subcultures were at a greater risk of self-harm and suicide. Whilst qualitative papers identified potential mechanisms (e.g. exposure to self-harm and the way self-harm is presented or normalised) there remains limited support for these mechanisms. Conclusions: More research is required to understand the association between self-harm, suicide and alternative subculture affiliation, and the factors underlying it. Longitudinal studies and studies focusing on mechanism are particularly important. Keywords: Alternative subculture, heavy metal, self-harm, suicide, systematic review, Goth 3 Practitioner points  The review supports the suggestion that those who identify as belonging to an alternative subculture may be at a higher risk of self-harm and suicidal behaviour. It also presents preliminary evidence that alternative affiliation predicts self-harm over time, and that this effect holds whilst adjusting for a number of likely confounders.  The findings highlight the importance of increasing the awareness of the victimisation and potential risk that these groups hold and suggests areas for intervention in health, educational and social services.  The review does not, however, indicate specifically what it is about alternative subculture affiliation (or alternative music preference) that could contribute to the risk of self-harm. Consequently, studies with a greater focus on mechanisms are needed.  Methodological limitations (e.g. cross-sectional studies, small sample of ‘alternative’ participants, westernised samples) restricted the reliability and validity of the results which impacted on the extent to which the findings could be generalised more widely. 4 Introduction Suicide and self-harm are global public health concerns (Chan et al., 2016), with over 778,000 deaths by suicide recorded worldwide in 2015 (World Health Organisation; WHO, 2017). Suicide is also a leading cause of death in adolescents (Hawton, Saunders, & O’Connor, 2012) and the second leading cause of death in 15-29 year olds (WHO, 2017). Self-harm is one of the greatest predictors of death by suicide in adolescents (Brent, McMakin, Kennard, Goldstein, Mayes, & Douaihy, 2013; Hawton & Harriss, 2007), increasing the risk by up to 10-fold (Ougrin, Tranah, Stahl, Moran, & Asarnow, 2015). Self- harm can also lead to accidental death (Kehrberg, 1997). It has been reported that alternative subcultures may be at an increased risk of self-harm and suicide, though this is also often considered a myth (Liverpool CAMHS, 2016; Mental Health Foundation, 2017). The current review aims to clarify the association between affiliation with alternative subcultures and self-harm or suicide. Self-harm can be defined as any intentional “act of self-poisoning or self-injury carried out by a person, irrespective of their motivation” including self-poisoning or self-injury by cutting (NICE, 2013). Behaviours that fall under this term include Non- Suicidal Self-Injury (NSSI; deliberate self-harm without the desire to die) and suicidal behaviours or attempts (self-injurious behaviours with some intent to end life; Nock, 2010; Nock, Borges, Bromet, Cha, Kessler, & Lee, 2008). Self-harm is a common cause for hospital admissions, with over 300,000 people attending hospital each year in the UK (Clements, Turnbull, & Hawton et al., 2016) and between 300,000 and 420,000 people visiting emergency departments in the US yearly for self-inflicted injuries (Owens, Barrett, Gibson, Andrews, Weinick, & Mutter, 2010). Adolescents appear to be a group who are particularly vulnerable to self-harm with 30,000 adolescents in the UK receiving hospital treatment each year for this purpose (Hawton, Rodham, & Evans, 2006). 5 The US Department of Health and Human Services (HHS, 2012) developed a National Strategy for Suicide Prevention which identified ‘high risk’ groups for self-harm, including ethnic minorities (e.g. South Asian Women) and Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender individuals (LGBT; Al-Sharifi, Krynicki, & Upthegrove, 2015; Baldwin & Griffiths, 2009; Bhui, McKenzie, & Rasul, 2007). Alternative subcultures or social groups may be another high-risk group for self-harm and suicide (Rutledge, Rimer, & Scott, 2008). These individuals have a set of group-specific values and can be identified by distinctive styles and tastes to include clothing and music preference. Some recognised alternative groups include Goths, Emos and Punks (Greater Manchester Police; GMP, 2013). The observation of increased self-harm and suicide in such groups has been apparent in the media in recent years, specifically in relation to ‘Goth’ subculture (Bazian, 2015; Cooper, 2015; Curtis & Carvel, 2005). However, recent clinical guidance and self-help information has suggested this association is a myth (Liverpool CAMHS, 2016; Mental Health Foundation, 2017). The lack of available evidence makes it difficult to confirm or challenge these reports. There are several plausible theoretical pathways to explain the observed link between alternative subculture affiliation and increased risk of self-harm and/or suicide. One possible explanation is that alternative subculture affiliation leads to self-harm, due to increased exposure to additional risk factors, for example victimisation, stigma and hate crime (e.g. verbal and physical aggression; Garland & Hodkinson, 2014). This may contribute to ‘minority stress’ which in turn may reflect the elevated rates of self-harm in these groups (Young, Sproeber, Groschwitz, Preiss, & Plener, 2014). People may then self-harm as way of coping with such stress (Nixon, Cloutier, & Aggarwal, 2002). An example of this victimisation is the social stigma and aggression faced by Sophie Lancaster in 2007, when she was murdered by a group of young males due to her affiliation with Goth culture (Bowes et al., 2015). 6 A second explanation is that self-harm may lead to alternative subculture affiliation, in that individuals choose to identify with the subculture based on their own experiences (Young, Sweeting, & West, 2006; Arnett, 1996). Young people who are vulnerable to low mood and self-harm may be attracted to groups with peers of similar difficulties who validate their experiences through music lyrics (Arnett, 1991; Bowes et al., 2015; Martin, Clarke, & Pearce, 1993; Young et al., 2006; Young et al., 2014). This theory implies that a vulnerability to self-harm and suicide may be the cause of alternative subculture affiliation rather than a consequence. This vulnerability may have been created through earlier exposure to adversity, such as trauma, neglect, isolative environments or bereavements (Arnett, 1996; Healthcare Quality Improvement Partnership; HQIP, 2016). A final explanation is that alternative subculture affiliation leads to self-harm due to the behaviour being modelled by peers or icons, for example music groups or bands (Young et al., 2014). The media may have played a role in reinforcing this message, but it has also influenced the public perception of alternative subcultures and the links with risk behaviours. For example, there has been widespread public concern about the possibility that song lyrics may promote self-harm and suicide (Stack, Gundlach, & Reeves, 1994) which has led to efforts from parents to promote the use of warning labels on certain types of music (Stack et al., 1994). Furthermore, parents bereaved by suicide have accused Heavy Metal groups of promoting suicidal behaviours and have proceeded to sue musicians (Martin et al., 1993). Modelling of peers and advertisement from the media may contribute to the risk behaviours becoming a normative component of such cultures leading to ‘social contagion’, increasing self-harm within those who identify with such groups (Dishion & Tipsord, 2011; Young et al., 2006). There is a cited idea in both research and the media (Bazian, 2015; Cooper, 2015; Curtis & Carvel, 2005) that there is a link between self-harm, suicide and identification with 7 an alternative subculture or having a preference for such music. However, the literature has not yet been systematically reviewed. This systematic review aims to clarify the relationship between both people who self-identify as being a part of an alternative subculture and/or those who have a preference for an alternative style of music (e.g. Heavy Metal, Goth) and the occurrence of self-harm and/or suicide. Whilst alternative subculture affiliation may extend beyond musical preferences, music preference remains a key indicator of affiliation. Method Search Strategy A protocol for this review was pre-registered with PROSPERO (CRD42016045402). The inclusion of qualitative research reflects a departure from protocol, but was made to allow a better exploration of mechanisms linking subculture affiliation and self-harm. The electronic databases PsycINFO, Scopus, MEDLINE and Web of Science were searched from the earliest date to December 2017 using the following key subject terms, identified from scoping searches: “self injur*” OR “self-injurious behav*” OR “self harm*” OR self-harm OR NSSI OR DSH OR “self mutil*” OR “non-suicidal self-injury*” OR “non-suicidal self- injury disorder” OR “self-cut*” OR “self destruct*” OR suicide* AND goth* OR emo OR punk OR subculture* OR “adolescent identity” OR metal* OR “heavy metal*” OR “alternative adolescent subculture” OR “alternative culture” OR “youth subculture*” OR “social group”. Additional controlled vocabulary searches were completed for MEDLINE (self-mutilation OR suicide OR self-injurious behaviour OR suicidal ideation OR attempted suicide OR poisoning AND social identification) and PsycINFO (self-injurious behaviour OR self-mutilation OR suicide OR attempted suicide OR self-destructive behaviour AND social groups OR social identity) and the E-thesis online service (ETHOS) was searched using general key terms (self-harm OR suicide) to capture any additional unpublished theses. 8 The reference lists of included papers were manually searched for any additional papers of relevance and corresponding authors of included papers contacted to enquire about any unpublished potentially eligible research. Screening of data was completed in parallel by two reviewers using the inclusion and exclusion criteria. A third reviewer clarified any uncertainties. This procedure consisted of firstly screening the titles and abstracts, followed by the full texts. Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria We included both quantitative and qualitative research studies but applied different inclusion and exclusion criteria. For quantitative research, studies were included that a) presented new research data, b) included a measure of affiliation to an alternative subculture or of preference for alternative music genres, c) measured self-harm or suicide, and d) were English-language. For qualitative research, studies were included that a) presented new research data, b) sourced qualitative data (e.g. via interview or through secondary sources such as internet forum posts) pertaining to affiliation to an alternative subculture or of preference for alternative music genres, c) sourced qualitative data pertaining to self-harm or suicide, and d) were English-language. Case studies were excluded as our interest was on sample-level themes and trends. Alternative subculture affiliation was defined as: A strong sense of collective identity and a set of group-specific values and tastes. This typically centres on distinctive style, clothing, make up, body art and music preference. Those involved usually stand out to both fellow participants and to those outside the group. Groups typically under the ‘alternative’ umbrella include Goths, Emos, Punks and Metallers (Greater Manchester Police, 2013, para. 2). Adding to this definition, the current review included those who had expressed a preference for ‘alternative’ music, broadly defined as genres that have moved away from or define themselves as distinct from ‘mainstream’ musical genres, including Metal, Punk, Goth or 9 genres otherwise referred to as alternative. Studies where specific numbers or details of alternative subculture affiliation were not described were excluded. Due to potential difficulties with synthesising evidence from qualitative and quantitative approaches (Dixon-Woods, Agarwal, Jones, Young, & Sutton, 2005) we provide a narrative synthesis of these two bodies of research separately. We then contrast and compare the common themes and generate over-arching conclusions within the Discussion. Risk of Bias Quantitative studies that were selected for inclusion were assessed for risk of bias, independently by two raters, using the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) assessment tool that has been used for observational research (Williams et al., 2010). This tool was designed to be adapted to the specific context of the research being reviewed, and has previously been used in systematic reviews of self-harm research (Taylor, Hutton, & Wood, 2014). The tool covers nine domains representing different risks of bias. Each domain is graded as ‘yes’, ‘no’, ‘partial’ or ‘cannot tell’. For qualitative studies, quality of the research (the term “bias” does not necessarily apply to qualitative research and so has not been used here) was assessed by applying the Medical Journal of Australia guidelines for quality assessment in qualitative research (Kitto, Chesters & Grbich, 2008). Ratings against the six domains outlined in these guidelines were made independently by two raters. As with quantitative studies, each domain is graded as ‘yes’, ‘no’, ‘partial’ or ‘cannot tell’ Results Quantitative Studies Summary of Included Papers Ten papers were selected for inclusion; nine from published journals and one an unpublished thesis (O’Connor, 2015). A summary of the study characteristics is presented in Table 1. Seven of the studies were cross-sectional, two longitudinal, and one a cross-sectional 10 state-level comparison. Most of the studies focused on adolescents and young adults from the ages of 14 – 24 years, with one exception which included an additional older age group of 24 – 35 years (Stack et al., 1994). Six of the samples were from student populations. Eight of the ten studies focused on self-harm, one considered both self-harm and NSSI (Young et al., 2014) and one study focused on completed suicide (Stack et al., 1994). Risk of Bias The outcomes of the risk of bias assessment, measured by an adapted AHRQ, are presented in Table 2. Recurrent methodological problems included an absence of power calculations to justify sample size; little information or acknowledgement of the handling of missing data; lack of detail concerning sample characteristics, recruitment methodology and the use of student samples. Lack of sample size justification may mean results are under powered. This is less of a concern for seven of the studies which had large sample sizes (n = 241 to 3694), though the remaining three may be at risk of type II errors, failing to detect actual effects (Burge et al., 2010; Lester & Whipple, 1996; Scheel & Westefeld, 1999). Missing data could create bias depending on how it was handled and the nature of it, particularly if it was missing not at random (MNAR; Sterne et al., 2009). For example, in this context, people with greater self-harm may have been less likely to provide data on self-harm. Six studies used student samples either from secondary schools or universities where opportunistic sampling (e.g. completing the study in regular classes or a single school) may have created further biases (Burge et al., 2010; Lacourse et al., 2001; Lester & Whipple, 1996; Martin et al., 1993; Scheel & Westefeld, 1999; Young et al., 2014). Five studies did not use full validated tools to measure the outcome of self-harm. In many cases, this took the form of using a single question adapted from a longer measure, which may lack content validity and reliability (Hom, Joiner, Bernert, & Joiner, 2016). 11 Similarly, six studies used partially validated or non-validated methods to measure subculture affiliation. Six of the ten studies attempted to control for confounding variables in the analysis, with only four of these adequately controlling for both demographic variables and potential predictors or correlates of self-harm. It is important to control for such confounding variables to obtain accurate parameter estimates of the association between alternative subculture affiliation and self-harm. Alternative Subculture Affiliation Of the four studies that focused on alternative subculture affiliation, alll studies found a significant association between alternative subculture affiliation and self-harm (See Table 1). Two studies were longitudinal in design. However, Young and colleagues (2006) employed a cross-sectional analysis (i.e. did not focus on the change in variables over time). Therefore, we can only infer a direction of effect from one study (Bowes et al., 2015). This study found that participants who affiliated heavily with an alternative subculture identity had a greater risk of self-harm (OR = 5.14; 3.58, 7.36) across a three-year time period (15-18 years; Bowes et al., 2015). An increase in the odds of self-harm of 1.52 (1.42, 1.63) for each unit increase in the 5-point affiliation scale, reduced to 1.33 (1.19, 1.48) when adjusting for confounders to include previous depression and self-harm, gender, early risks factors and victimisation. Two cross-sectional studies (Young et al., 2006; Young et al., 2014) found that those who at least moderately self-identified with an alternative subculture (Goth, Emo, Punk, Mosher) had more than three times the odds of endorsing self-harm (OR = 3.49 – 14.16), NSSI (OR = 3.56 – 3.92) and suicidal thoughts (OR = 3.41), and around six times the odds of having attempted suicide (OR = 5.96). Moreover, the affiliation with ‘Goth’ culture specifically had a stronger association with self-harm (OR = 16.35, CI = 5.06 – 52.91), and 12 was the only subculture that remained a significant predictor of self-harm when other subcultures were adjusted for. However, the large confidence intervals observed possibly reflect the small sample size (n = 15; Young et al., 2006), affecting the precision of the results. Effect sizes remained similar or were larger when confounding variables were adjusted for (e.g. substance use, socioeconomic status, gender, depression). The cross- sectional nature of the analyses of these studies limits the ability to make inferences regarding causality or the direction of effect. Another cross-sectional study (O’Connor, 2015) found Emo participants reported more self-harm (including suicidal ideation) than the Goth participants (d = 1.15 – 1.44), however, a different study found Goth and Emo alternative groups loaded onto a single factor (Young et al., 2014). Out of the four studies discussed, three used non-validated items from larger tools to measure self-harm, but identified similar relationships to the one study that did use validated scales (Young et al., 2014). Music Preference There were small, positive associations between a preference for Heavy Metal music and increased self-harm (five studies); namely suicidal ideation (r = .24; Burge et al., 2010), past suicidal ideation (r = .21; Lester & Whipple, 1996) and suicide risk to include attempted suicide and suicidal ideation (r = .13 – .26; Lacourse et al., 2001). Furthermore, higher percentages of Heavy Metal fans (31-74%) reported suicidal thoughts in comparison to non- fans (35% vs. 14%; Martin et al., 1993; Scheel & Westefeld, 1999). In one study, the association of music preference and self-harm disappeared (B = 0.10-0.14) when adjusting for a range of confounders including self- estrangement/powerlessness, father negligence. normlessness, and substance use (Lacourse et al., 2001) but as these factors were not explored in other studies, conclusions cannot be made. 13 Stack and colleagues (1994) compared geographic regions (US states) and reported a significant positive association (r = .56) between a preference for Heavy Metal music and completed suicide in young people (aged 15- 24 years), which remained evident, though smaller, when confounding variables were controlled for (e.g. divorce, immigration, social economic status, religion and ethnicity; B = .26). Importantly, the design of this study means inferences regarding the association of music preference and self-harm for individuals are not possible, and could reflect the ecological fallacy (Winzar, 2015). The assessment of musical preference (magazine subscription) is also a proxy and it is unclear how well this mirrors musical preference when assessed directly. Qualitative Studies Summary of Included Papers & Quality Assessment Two qualitative papers were identified (See Table 3). One analysed social media postings for two Emo interest groups, and so provided little information concerning sample characteristics (Zdanow & Wright, 2012). The other involved interviews with Emo adolescents alongside an analysis of web-forums (Trnka, Kuska, Balcar & Tavel, 2017). Both studies lacked a justification of the qualitative approach taken (see Table 4), raising uncertainty about whether alternative approaches to the data would have been more suitable. Procedural rigor was also a problem, with a lack of transparency relating to methodological decisions apparent to some extent in both studies. As a result the suitability of the samples to answer the questions posed by the research was limited. For example, it was not always clear how groups had been selected or how Emo affiliation was determined. Both studies also did not engage with issues of reflexivity, which might have influenced study design or implementation. In both studies the use of data from internet forums or social media is potentially problematic. Such posts are made with a primary social and communal 14 function, and it is challenging to separate the function of these postings from their other possible meanings. These issues mean that results from these two studies should be viewed with caution. Alternative Subculture Affiliation Both studies reported common themes around suicide and self-harm being accepted and normalised, presented as understandable responses to life difficulties and valid solutions. At the extreme, this included positive reinforcement and praise relating to reported acts of self-harm. Consistent with wider literature (Taylor et al., 2017), the idea that self-harm can be functional and provide a means of coping with distressing experiences was noted. The data also suggested possible benefits of subculture affiliation, including the sense of acceptance and belonging that can come from being part of a subculture. This mirrors findings from the wider literature on alternative subcultures (Hines & McFerran, 2014; Munsell, 2011). Data suggested that self-harm was at times seen as a part of the Emo subculture but this did not seem as strong a theme, more apparent in Trnka and colleagues (2017) than Zdanow and Wright (2012). Moreover, Trnka and colleagues suggestion of a link between Emo subculture and self-harm relied heavily on their own interpretation of having seen young people with visible scars, and images of injuries online, rather than through direct interview data. It is also not clear to what extent the views identified in these studies reflect the perceptions of young people more generally, and so it is difficult to link these themes specifically to a certain subculture. Discussion The aim of the review was to investigate the relationship that self-harm and suicide has with alternative subculture affiliation, including music preference as a proxy indicator of subculture affiliation. Four quantitative papers identified direct evidence of substantive 15 positive association between alternative subculture affiliation and self-harm. Moreover, one of these studies employed a longitudinal design providing evidence that alternative subculture affiliation may lead to or contribute to risk of self-harm, as opposed to being a consequence or epiphenomena of self-harm. More indirect evidence of this association between alternative subculture affiliation and self-harm came from the six studies that were concerned with musical preference. Small positive associations were found across studies for a preference for Heavy Metal music and self-harm, and one study found an association with completed suicide. Two qualitative papers raise the possibility that normalisation and acceptance of self-harm and suicide within alternative subcultures may reflect one mechanism increasing risk in these populations. However, it is unclear whether these putative mechanisms are something specific to alternative subcultures and so conclusions here should remain cautious. The findings across several studies that participants who identified with alternative subcultures (through self-identification or music preference) also had experiences of adversity, including bullying or victimisation, difficult family relationships and prior emotional and/or behaviour difficulties (Bowes et al., 2015; Lacourse et al., 2001; Martin et al., 1993), provides some support for the suggestion that they are a group that may have pre- existing vulnerabilities to self-harm (Young et al., 2014). However, despite this potential link, several studies (k = 3) found that the relationship between alternative affiliation and self- harm continued to exist after these confounding variables were controlled for (Bowes et al., 2015; Young et al., 2006; Young et al., 2014).Furthermore, the single longitudinal analysis suggested that subculture affiliation is associated with a subsequent increase in self-harm risk. These results appear to work against the hypothesis that the association between alternative subculture affiliation and self-harm results solely from a shared vulnerability. This evidence is preliminary though, and further research, especially longitudinal studies, are needed before firmer conclusions can be drawn. 16 Multiple mediating mechanisms may account for an association between alternative subculture affiliation and self-harm. Self-harm may be a way of coping with the ‘minority stress’ that such groups may experience (e.g. victimisation, stigma, hate crime), or a mechanism that is more inherent to the group affiliation itself, such as modelling, normalisation or even positive reinforcement of self-harm (Young et al., 2014). The latter mechanism was suggested by the qualitative studies, but data is currently lacking to suggest this modelling or normalisation is particularly pronounced in alternative subcultures. It has also been suggested that the morbid aesthetic associated with certain alternative subcultures (e.g. Emo, Goth), results in increased exposure to images and themes linked to self-harm and suicide (Trnka et al., 2017), but again empirical support is lacking. Moreover, images relating to injury, self-harm and suicide are prolific in popular culture outside of alternative subcultures (e.g. controversial television series “13 reasons why”), and the morbid and subversive imagery found within some alternative subcultures such as Goth, can also be balanced with a sense of camp and self-irony (e.g. Mueller, 2008; van Elferen, 2012). These mediating mechanisms clearly require further investigation. It should also be noted that there is evidence of the positive effects of subculture affiliation, in terms of a sense of belonging and community (Hines & McFerran, 2014; Munsell, 2011; Young et al., 2014). Well- designed longitudinal qualitative studies may be valuable here in examining possible mechanisms. The number of participants who identified as ‘alternative’ or who reported self-harm was small in many studies (e.g. less than 10% of overall sample), which may have limited power and reliability of effect estimates. Participants were predominantly young people from western societies (e.g. only one study included an older age group) and so conclusions cannot currently be generalized beyond this context. Alternative subculture affiliation is a culture- bound construct, and different groups will emerge dependent on culture. However, there is 17 some research to suggest that alternative subcultures do exist in non-westernised countries (Bin Quader, & Redden, 2015; Ma, 2002; Mulej, 2011; Rene & Airi-Alina, 2011). Related to this is the possibility that the same subcultures differ across countries (e.g. UK and US Goths or fans of Metal). More cross-cultural studies would help identify such differences Recruitment procedures, inclusion criteria and/or definitions of what constitutes an “adolescent” were not clearly stated in seven studies which may impair comparability of results where different definitions were used. Studies had an over-reliance on self-report measures. These may be beneficial in assessing a taboo subject like self-harm, encouraging more honest responses (Thornberry & Krohn, 2000). Nonetheless, relying on self-report also creates a risk of shared method bias that may have inflated associations. Measures of subculture affiliation and music preference rarely had established psychometric properties, though they typically had good face validity. Poor psychometric properties would affect the validity of findings, for example, if measures do not represent important subcultures. However, a challenge to developing scales in this area is the shifting nature of youth culture. Several studies (k = 5) used single or few item measures of self-harm which may lack content validity and carry a greater risk of error (false positive and false negatives) in identifying self-harm. Future research would benefit from more comprehensive assessment of subculture affiliation and self-harm using validated measures and a variety of assessment mediums (e.g. self-report, interview, etc.). The qualitative studies generally lacked transparency and discussion regarding important aspects of the design and analysis (e.g. sampling strategy, choice of analytic method, reflexivity) and at times presented themes that did not seem well supported by the data. In this review, music preference was included as a proxy to measure the alternative concept, but these two constructs are not directly comparable and had to be explored separately. Moreover, the definition of ‘alternative’ varied between studies, which limits 18 comparability further. In the current review, it was noted that although alternative subcultures were the population of interest, the papers that were explored under this category largely focused on Goth subculture. A final limitation of the review is that it was limited to papers that were available in English language. The review supports the suggestion that those who identify as belonging to an alternative subculture are at a higher risk of self-harm and suicidal behaviour. Moreover, there is preliminary evidence that alternative affiliation predicts self-harm over time, and that this effect holds whilst adjusting for a number of likely confounders. Nonetheless, while a variety of plausible mediating mechanisms exist, it is not yet clear what it is about alternative subculture affiliation (or alternative music preference) that could contribute to the risk of self- harm. This research requires interpretation within the wider context of public concern around alternative subcultures and their impact on the mental health of young people. This public concern has at times, unhelpfully, demonised alternative subcultures and music as a cause of problems including self-harm (Hjelm, Kahn-Harris & LeVine, 2011; Varas-Díaz, Rivera- Segarra, Medina, Mendoza, González-Sepūlveda, 2015). There is currently not adequate evidence to draw conclusions that these alternative subcultures themselves are in any way harmful. Instead a justifiable stance is to view individuals belonging to such subcultures as a group at elevated risk of self-harm, whom we may need to better understand and support There are various possible avenues for interventions with these groups. Increasing the awareness of the victimisation of alternative subcultures through campaigns in order to reduce stigma and empower subcultures may impact on outcomes for individuals (Bowes et al., 2015; World Health Organisation; WHO, 2014). For example, the Sophie Lancaster Foundation has been set up for the purpose of reducing the victimisation of such groups (Young et al., 2014). Another route for intervention would be training health, education and social services staff about the nature and function of both subculture identities and self-harm 19 and suicide, allowing professionals to identify those at risk of self-harm, suicide and contagion and intervene early (Department of Health; DOH, 2012; Dishion & Tipsord, 2011; Young et al., 2014). Introducing preventative programmes to these services could aim to reduce risk behaviours through providing psychoeducation about mental health and help- seeking (Scheel & Westefeld, 1999; Young et al, 2014); engaging families in support programmes/interventions (Fortune, Cottrell, & Fife, 2016) or running groups on problem solving, self-efficacy and skills training (e.g. emotional regulation; Booth, Keogh, Doyle, & Owens, 2014; Sambrook, Abba, & Chadwick, 2007). Working directly with alternative youths might involve developing interventions that build on existing identities, for example being creative in approach, potentially involving music in interventions (Lacourse et al., 2001; Young et al., 2014). This may aid engagement, open up communication and avoid stigma. These findings have clinical implications for services who need to respond to the varied needs of such groups. 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Global health estimates. Geneva, Switzerland: Author. (http://www.who.int/mental_health/management/depression/prevalence_global_health _estimates/en/, accessed 8th January, 2018). Young, R., Sproeber, N., Groschwitz, R., Preiss, M., & Plener, P. (2014). Why alternative teenagers self-harm: Exploring the link between non-suicidal self-injury, attempted suicide and adolescent identity. Biomed Central Psychiatry, 14(1), 137. doi:10.1186/1471-244X-14-137. Young, R., Sweeting, H. & West, P. (2006). Prevalence of deliberate self-harm and attempted suicide within contemporary Goth youth subculture: Longitudinal cohort study. British Medical Journal, 332(7549), 1058–1061. doi:10.1136/bmj.38790.495544.7C. http://www.who.int/mental_health/management/depression/prevalence_global_health_estimates/en/ http://www.who.int/mental_health/management/depression/prevalence_global_health_estimates/en/ 31 Zdanow, C., & Wright, B. (2012). The representation of self-injury and suicide on emo social networking groups. African Sociological Review, 17, 81-101. Retrieved from https://www.ajol.info/index.php/asr/article/view/87564 32 Figure 1. Flow diagram of the selection process Articles identified through electronic databases (PsycINFO; MEDLINE; Scopus; Web of Science) and ETHOS search (grey literature) n = 3206 Articles excluded through title/abstract screening due to not meeting the inclusion criteria n = 2409 n = 12 Full articles searched against inclusion/exclusion criteria n = 47 Additional references for screening from reference lists of included papers and suggestions from corresponding authors: n = 5 Reasons for exclusion: n = 1 review n = 2 not subcultures of interest n = 1 incorrect outcomes n = 4 Reasons for exclusion: n = 10 not new data n = 11 not subcultures of interest n = 6 incorrect outcomes n = 4 case studies/ reviews n = 3 texts not available in English n = 2 unclear how much of sample belonged to the subculture n = 36 Removal of duplicates n = 750 Articles included for review n = 12 Full articles considered for inclusion n = 11 33 Table 1 Characteristics of Included Quantitative Studies Table 1. Summary table of characteristics of included studies Author(s), Year, Country Study Design Sample Characteristics Subculture Affiliation/ Music Preference Measure Self-harm or Suicide Measure Key Findings 1. Bowes et al. (2015) Avon, UK Longitudinal 3694 young people (M age = 17.8 years, SD = 0.5) Adapted Peer Crowd Questionnaire (PCQ; La Greca, Prinstein & Fetter, 2001; Mosbach & Leventhal, 1988) Development and Wellbeing Assessment (DAWBA; Goodman, Heiervang, Collishaw & Goodman, 2011); Clinical Interview Schedule-Revised (CIS- R; Lewis, 1994) A significant positive association was found between the extent to which young people identified as ‘Goth’ at 15 years and self-harm at 18 years old, after adjusting for other potential risk factors (including previous self-harm and depression; OR = 1.33). 2. Burge, Goldblat & Lester (2010) Country not detailed Cross- sectional 77 secondary school students (N = 41 male; M age = 17.5 years, SD = 0.6) Non-validated measure of music preference The Suicidal Ideation Questionnaire (Reynolds, 1986) There was a significant positive association between listening to Heavy Metal music and increased suicidal ideation (r = .24). Heavy Metal music was associated with suicidal ideation in males (r = .30) but not females. 3. Lacourse, Claes & Villeneuve (2001) Canada, US Cross- sectional 275 secondary school students (N = 154 males, M age = 16.22 years) Non-validated measure of music preference Suicidal risk scale which classifies adolescents as ‘high’ or ‘low’ suicidal risk (Tousignant, Hamel & Bastien, 1988) There was a small positive association between preference for Heavy Metal music and suicidal ideation and attempts (r = .13 – .26). Females who had a preference for Heavy Metal music were at significantly greater risk of suicide (r = .26) in comparison 34 to males (r = .13, not significant), determined by higher reports of serious suicidal ideation and attempted suicide (r = .26). However, this finding was diminished when controlling for other risk factors. 4. Lester & Whipple (1996) US Cross- sectional 93 undergraduates (N = 35 male, M age = 24 years, SD = 6.0) Non-validated measure of music preference Non-validated measure of self-harm A significant positive association was found between having a preference for Heavy Metal music and prior suicidal ideation (r = -.21 -.21) but not current suicidal ideation (r =.- .03 - -.13). 5. Martin, Clarke & Pearce (1993) Australia Cross- sectional 247 students (N = 138 males, M age = 14.76years). Non-validated measure of music preference Achenbach Youth Self Report (YSR; Achenbach & Edelbrock, 1987) Significant associations were found between a preference for Rock/Metal music and suicidal thoughts and self-harm. Higher percentages of those who had a preference for Heavy Metal music reported suicidal thoughts (31-66%) and deliberate self-harm (20 – 62%) in comparison to those who had other music preferences (15 - 35% suicidal thoughts; 8-14% self-harm). 6. O’Connor Group 241 young adults Participants self- Risky Behaviour A significant difference was 35 (2015) US comparison correlational (N = 79 males, 10 transgender; M age = 19.8 years, SD = 2.31) (Full study) 218 young adults completed the RBQ-A. identified as Goth or Emo using a nominal scale Questionnaire- Adolescents (RBQ-A; Auerbach & Abela, 2006); Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale- Revised (CESD-R; Eaton, Smith, Ybarra, Muntaner & Tien, 2004). found between participants who identified with alternative subcultures; affiliation with the Emo subculture reported significantly more self-harm (including suicidal ideation) to the Goth subculture (d = 1.15 – 1.44). 7. Scheel & Westefeld (1999) US Cross- sectional 121 high school students (N = 44 males, M age = 17.2 years). Non-validated measure of music preference Suicidal Risk Questionnaire (SRQ; Westefeld, Cardin & Deaton, 1992). Participants who had a preference for Heavy Metal music had more suicidal thoughts than participants who had other music preferences. Within this group, 74% of females reported occasionally or seriously thinking about suicide in comparison to 35% of females who did not report a preference for Heavy Metal music, and 42% of males who had a preference for Heavy Metal music reported occasionally or seriously thinking about suicide in comparison to 15% of males who did not have this preference. 8. Stack, Cross- 50 states, aged 15- Magazine Suicide data from the A significant correlation was 36 Gundlach & Reeves (1994) US sectional state level comparison 24 and 25-34 subscriptions to ‘metal edge’ (a Heavy Metal music magazine) annual Mortality Detail Files (U.S National Centre for Health Statistics, 1988); Population data from U.S. Bureau of the Census (1991). found between youth suicide and preference for Heavy Metal music (r =.56). When covariates were accounted for, a small but significant effect remained (B = 0.26), but other factors were more significant (Black ethnicity; B = -0.41; Divorced; B = 0.30). In the older age group (25 – 34 years), there was no significant effect of a preference for Heavy Metal music and suicide when other factors were controlled for (B = 0.17). 9. Young, Sweeting & West (2006) Scotland, UK Longitudinal 1258 adolescents (N = 640 males, aged 19) Scotland, UK Non-validated measure of subgroup affiliation Computerised version of the diagnostic interview schedule for children (Voice-DISC; West, Sweeting, Der, Barton & Lucas, 2003) A strong positive association was found between affiliation with Goth subculture and self- harm, including attempted suicide (OR = 16.35), which remained after confounders were controlled for (e.g. gender, OR = 1.42; substance use, OR = 2.04; prior depression, OR = 1.13). Positive associations were also found between other alternative subcultures (e.g. Punk, Heavy Metal, Mosher) and self-harm (OR = 3.49 – 4.42), though the association was much stronger 37 for Goth (OR = 14.16) which remained a significant predictor of self-harm when other subcultures were adjusted for. 10. Young, Sproeber, Groschwitz, Preiss & Plener (2014) Germany Cross- sectional 452 students (N = 209 females; aged 14 – 17years). Non-validated measure of subgroup affiliation Self-harm Behaviour Questionnaire (SHBQ; Gutierrez, Osman, Barrios & Kopper, 2001); Functional Assessment of Self- injury (FASM; Nock & Prinstein, 2004). A positive association was found between participants who affiliated with an alternative subculture and NSSI (OR = 3.6 – 3.9), suicidal thoughts (OR = 3.4) and attempting suicide (OR = 6.0) in comparison to their non- alternative peers (OR = 0.69 – 2.25). When confounding variables were adjusted for (e.g. substance use, socioeconomic status, gender) this effect was strengthened with the alternative group being more than 4 times the odds to engage in NSSI (OR = 4.04 – 4.16) and between almost 4 to 8 times the odds of engaging in other forms of self- harm (e.g. suicidal ideation, OR = 3.7 and attempt suicide, OR = 8.10). 38 Table 2. Summary Table of Risk of Bias Assessment for Quantitative Studies Authors Unbiased recruitment of cohort Adequate description of cohort Validated measure for determining self-harm and suicidal behaviour Validated method for ascertaining belonging to an alternative subculture Adequate handling of missing data Analysis controls for confounding variables Analytic methods appropriate Sample size calculated Adequate follow up period (if longitudinal) Bowes et al. (2015) Yes Yes Partial Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Burge, Goldblat & Lester (2010) Partial Partial Yes Partial Cannot tell Cannot tell Yes No N/A Lacourse, Claes & Villeneuve (2001) No Yes Yes Partial Yes Yes Yes No N/A Lester & Whipple (1996) Partial Partial Partial Partial Cannot tell Partial Yes No N/A Martin, Clarke & Pearce (1993) Partial Yes Partial No Cannot tell No Yes No N/A O’Connor (2015) Yes Yes Partial Yes Yes No Yes Yes N/A Scheel & Westefeld (1999) Partial Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No N/A 39 Stack, Gundlach & Reeves (1994) Yes No Yes No Cannot tell Partial Yes No N/A Young, Sweeting & West (2006) Yes Partial Partial Partial Partial Yes Yes No Yes Young, Sproeber, Groschwitz, Preiss & Plener (2014) Partial Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No N/A 40 Table 3 Characteristics of Included Qualitative Studies Table 1. Summary table of characteristics of included studies Author(s), Year, Country Study Design Sample Characteristics Key Themes Trnka et al (2017) Czech Republic Interviews; Online forum data 14 Emo adolescents (aged 15 to 19 years); Individuals participating in online emo forums and social media Suicide as an natural outcome of strong emotion; Suicide as a common solution to life problems; Strange excitement after self-injury; Self-injuries as a mark of affiliation to emo subculture. Zdanow & Wright (2012) South Africa Online forum data Individuals participating in online emo forums and social media. Further participant details not recorded or reported. Normalisation (of self-harm); Nihilism; Glorification (of self-harm); Us versus them; Acceptance; Reason (alternatives to self-harm); Mockery (by others). 41 Table 4 Summary Table of Risk of Bias Assessment for Qualitative Studies Domains derived from Kitto, Chesters & Grbich, 2008. Clarification = Have the techniques of data collection been clearly documented? Are the forms of data analysis completely transparent? Justification = Why is a qualitative approach the best option to answer this question? Why was the particular qualitative research design chosen? Procedural rigour = Have the techniques of data collection been clearly documented? Are the forms of data analysis completely transparent? Representativeness = What sampling techniques have been used to answer the research question? Do the sampling techniques support conceptual generalisability? Interpretation = Has a more conceptual discussion of the results and linkage to existing theory or new theory been developed to explain the relevance of findings to a targeted audience or discipline? Have any negative cases been included and discussed? Reflexivity and evaluative rigour = Has a clear statement of the effect on the data of the researcher's views and the methods chosen been included? Has an explicit evaluation of the relationship between the researcher and those under research, addressing any ethical issues, been discussed? Transferability = Has a critical evaluation of the application of findings to other similar contexts been made? Has the relevance of these findings to current knowledge, policy, and practice or to current research been discussed? Authors Clarification Justification Procedural rigour Representativeness Interpretation Reflexivity and evaluative rigour Transferability Trnka et al (2017) Yes Partial Partial No Partial No Partial Zdanow & Wright (2012) Partial No No Partial Partial No Partial 
work_ox45vrjs2nfejhayyvog5k46um	----	Minority Stress, Resilience, and Mental Health: A Study of Italian Transgender People Journal of Social Issues, Vol. 73, No. 3, 2017, pp. 563--585 doi: 10.1111/josi.12232 This article is part of the Special Issue “Minority Stress, Resilience, and Men- tal Health: A Study of Italian Transgender People,” Cristiano Scandurra, Anna Lisa Amodeo, Paolo Valerio, Vincenzo Bochicchio and David M. Frost (Spe- cial Issue Editors). For a full listing of Special Issue papers, see: http://online library.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/josi.2017.73.issue-3/issuetoc. Minority Stress, Resilience, and Mental Health: A Study of Italian Transgender People Cristiano Scandurra∗, Anna Lisa Amodeo, and Paolo Valerio University of Naples Federico II Vincenzo Bochicchio University of Calabria David M. Frost University of Surrey Transgender people often experience oppression because of gender nonconformity. They represent an extremely stigmatized population at high risk of developing mental health problems. The minority stress model is a theoretical model used to understand social stigma as a potential cause of mental health disparities faced by the transgender population. In Italy, studies applying this model to the transgender population are limited. The current study applied the minority stress model to a sample of Italian transgender people (n = 149), analyzing effects of prejudice events, expectations of rejection, and internalized transphobia, and their interaction with protective factors (resilience and social support), on mental health. The results suggest that exposure to everyday discrimination and internalized transphobia are associated with increased mental health problems, while perceived social support from family and resilience significantly reduced the strength of association between everyday discrimination and mental health. Findings have important implications for both social issues and policies. Transgender is an inclusive term referring to people whose gender identity is not fully aligned with their sex assigned at birth (American Psychological As- sociation [APA], 2015). Researchers are increasingly focused on understanding the processes involved in and the extent of the social stigma effects on the mental ∗Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Cristiano Scandurra, SInAPSi Center, University of Naples Federico II, Via Giulio Cesare Cortese 29, Napoli 80133, Italy phone number: 0039 334 15 23 239 [e-mail:cristiano.scandurra@unina.it]. 563 C© 2017 The Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/josi.2017.73.issue-3/issuetoc http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/josi.2017.73.issue-3/issuetoc 564 Scandurra et al. health of transgender people (Bockting, Miner, Swinburne Romine, Hamilton, & Coleman, 2013; Bradford, Reisner, Honnold, & Xavier, 2013). As argued by some authors (e.g., Hendricks & Testa, 2012), similar to the gay, bisexual, and lesbian populations, transgender people are exposed to chronic social stress, or minority stress, due to their minority identity, which places them at risk for mental health problems. According to the theory (Meyer, 2003a, 2007; see Williams & Mann, 2017, for overview), minority stress has a direct relationship with negative health outcomes, but protective factors—such as support, or community connectedness— can moderate the relation. As suggested by the Institute of Medicine (IOM, 2011), applying the minority stress model in research permits a deeper understanding of the mental health of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) people. The minority stress model has only recently been empirically applied to transgender experiences (Bockting et al., 2013; Testa, Habarth, Peta, Balsam, & Bockting, 2015). Limited work to date has been conducted in Italy, and, to our knowledge, no studies yet exist that have tested the minority stress model in Italian transgen- der people. We aimed to understand the stigma that Italian transgender people experience, and analyze its effects on mental health. Minority Stress in Transgender Populations Leading researchers (e.g., Hendricks & Testa, 2012) and organizations (e.g., APA, 2015) have stressed the need to deepen the understanding of the phenomena related to minority stress among transgender people. A focus on minority stress, indeed, avoids pathologizing or blaming transgender individuals for these health disparities, and instead assumes disparities originate in the stigmatizing social cli- mate to which transgender people are exposed. Regarding the most distal stressors, or prejudice events, evidence indicates that transgender people suffer from high levels of violence and discrimination. For instance, Bradford et al. (2013) found in a sample of 350 transgender people recruited in Virginia that 41% suffered from transgender-related discrimination and that associated factors included gender (i.e., being Female to Male, or FtM), low socioeconomic status, ethnicity, lack of health insurance, younger age at first transgender awareness, history of violence, substance use, and low levels of family support and community connectedness. There is evidence that psychological problems among transgender people stem from minority stress, both distal and proximal. For instance, Lombardi (2009), within a sample of 90 transgender people from California, found that experienc- ing transphobic events are associated with depression and anxiety. Bockting et al. (2013), in a sample of 1,093 U.S. transgender people, reported that social stigma is associated with increased depression, anxiety, and somatization. Considering proximal stressors (e.g., internalized, perceived, or anticipated stigma) and trans- gender health, for instance, Testa et al. (2012) stated that, due to the expectations Minority Stress, Resilience, and Mental Health 565 of violence and discrimination, transgender people tend not to report violence to the police. Hendricks and Testa (2012) recommend paying particular attention to sui- cidality, because rates of suicide attempts by transgender people appear alarm- ing. Clements-Nolle, Marx, and Katz (2006) reported that 32% of their sample (N = 515) had attempted suicide. And, Perez-Brumer, Hatzenbuehler, Oldenburg, and Bockting (2015) reported that high levels of internalized transphobia rep- resent a high risk factor related to suicide attempts. Internalized transphobia, a proximal stressor, consists of “profound shame, guilt, and self-loathing [ . . . ] or more typically, an over-emphasis on passing as a non-transgender woman or man and a discomfort when associating with other transgender individuals onto whom feelings of guilt and self-hatred are projected” (Bockting, Knudson, & Goldberg, 2006, p. 46). Yet, there is evidence that transgender people are able to use adaptive strate- gies, such as resilience and social support, in the face of minority stress (Pflum, Testa, Balsam, Goldblum, & Bongar, 2015; Singh, Hays, and Watson, 2011; Singh, Meng, & Hansen, 2014). Resilience involves the adaptation to risk factors and the capacity to “bounce back” from adversity, buffering the effects of stress on health, promoting social adjustment, and drawing upon individuals’ inner re- sources (Rainone et al., 2017; Zimmerman, 2013). As stated by Meyer (2015), resilience represents an integral part of the minority stress model because its meaning is comprehensible only in its relationship with stress. This is valid also for social support, which, due to the buffering effect on stressors, reduces the likelihood of developing negative health outcomes, making evident the role of re- silience. Considering the evidence of resilience and social support in transgender people, Singh et al. (2011, 2014) found that resilience involves both individual traits and social characteristics. Among these, they highlighted the connectedness to transgender communities, which was effective in reducing negative outcomes of societal and internalized transphobia. In the same vein, Pflum et al. (2015) found that social support can ameliorate the negative mental health outcomes as- sociated with minority stressors. Thus, resilience and social support may function as bufferers of the effect of minority stressors on health. Stigma and Mental Health in Italian Transgender People Only a few studies have focused on minority stress in Italian transgender people. Gerini, Giaretton, Trombetta, and Romito (2009), within a small sample of 44 transgender persons recruited in a hospital in northern Italy, found that they experienced higher levels of prejudice events than the control group of Italian cisgender people recruited in the same clinic. Specifically, before the age of 18, 72% of transgender people suffered from psychological abuse compared with 37% of cisgender people. However, the authors did not find significant differences 566 Scandurra et al. between transgender and cisgender people in mental health problems, or in the effects of prejudice events on mental health. With regard to resilience, Amodeo, Picariello, Scandurra, and Valerio (2015) theorized the positive role that transgender peer groups can have in developing resilience in facing social oppression within an European Union project aimed at empowering young LGBT people who experienced gender- or sexual-based violence. In addition, an empirical study by Amodeo, Vitelli, Scandurra, Pi- cariello, and Valerio (2015) with a small group of Italian transgender individuals (N = 45), found that positive and secure attachment is associated with positive aspects of transgender identity. However, although some findings about distal minority stress and resilience experienced by Italian transgender people have been reported (Gerini et al., 2009), they do not address the link between minority stress and mental health, and do not include proximal stressors, with the exception of a study on internalized transphobia by Scandurra, Amodeo, Bochicchio, Valerio, and Frost (2017a), which evaluated the psychometric characteristics of a scale assess- ing internalized transphobia in a sample of Italian transgender people. They found that internalized transphobia was significantly correlated with enacted stigma and mental health (perceived stress, anxiety, and depression). Notwithstanding, this study did not formally assess the minority stress model in this population. The Current Study The current study applied the minority stress model to experiences of Italian transgender people to increase understanding of social factors contributing to mental health outcomes within the transgender population. The Italian social context and climate is not very accepting of transgender people, and in general of sexual and gender minorities (e.g., Scandurra, Braucci, Bochicchio, Valerio, & Amodeo, in press; Scandurra, Picariello, Valerio, & Amodeo, 2017b). Italy does not currently have a law prohibiting transphobic hate crimes and only recently, in 2015, the Supreme Court of Appeal declared that gender reassignment surgery must not be considered a prerequisite for changing one’s legal gender status. For a picture of the sociocultural context lived by Italian transgender people, see Scandurra et al. (2017a). Due to these social conditions, we expect that minority stress would represent a useful framework to understand the negative mental health outcomes in Italian transgender people that some Italian studies have previously observed (e.g., Colizzi, Costa, & Todarello, 2014; Fisher et al., 2013; Scandurra et al., 2017a). We also expect that these contextual difficulties would elicit in this population the inner resources to cope with stigma, making relevant resilience and support within the context of the minority stress experience. This study had two main aims. The first aim was to explore the types of stigma and the levels of mental health problems experienced by a sample of Italian trans- gender people. The second aim was to test elements of the minority stress model in Minority Stress, Resilience, and Mental Health 567 the Italian context. We hypothesized that minority stressors (prejudice events, per- cieved stigma, and internalized transphobia) would be positively associated with negative mental health outcomes (anxiety, depression, and suicidal ideation), and that this relationship would be moderated by specific protective factors (resilience and social support). Method Data analyzed in the current study are part of a project launched in November 2013, entitled the “Trans Life Survey,” an online survey using purposive sampling aimed at assessing the effects of minority stress on the mental health of Italian transgender people. Sample The eligibility criteria for participation were: (1) self-identifying with a trans- gender identity; (2) being at least 18 years old (the Italian age of consent); and (3) living in Italy for at least 10 years. No cross-dressers or bigender people took part in the survey. For this reason, we have included transsexual and transgender people in the category “transgender.” The sample consisted of 75 transgender women and 74 transgender men. Full demographic characteristics for the total sample and the sample by gender are shown in Table 1. Procedure With the aim of incentivizing participation, 10 participants were drawn by lottery, each winner receiving €100. We asked all of the participants to provide their personal email on a voluntary basis, guaranteeing that the email would be disassociated from their data. Participants were recruited via social media (e.g., Facebook). In addition, Italian NGOs engaging in the promotion of transgen- der rights invited their contacts to take part in the study, facilitating a snowball sampling recruitment procedure. To guarantee the privacy of all participants according to the Italian law 196/2003, collected data were protected by a secure gateway to which only the Principal Investigator (PI) had access. Once the data were downloaded, the PI re- moved all IP addresses and saved the emails of those participants who voluntarily decided to take part in the draw in a separate file. It was only after these proce- dures that the PI shared the data with other researchers. The study was designed to respect all principles of the Declaration of Helsinki on Ethical Principles for Medical Research Involving Human Subjects. Twenty-two participants were removed from the sample because their missing data (range from 57% to 73%) were excessively widespread. Other missing data 568 Scandurra et al. Table 1. Sociodemographic Characteristics among “Trans Life Survey” Participants (N = 149) Characteristics Total (N = 149) n(%) or M ± SD Male to female (n = 75) n(%) or M ± SD Female to male (n = 74) n(%) or M ± SD p Age 33.18 ± 10.96 37.21 ± 12.24 29.22 ± 7.77 <.001 Race/ethnicity Caucasian 147(98) 74(98.7) 73(98.6) .368 Afro-American 1(0.7) 1(1.3) – Latin 1(0.7) – 1(1.4) Education .552 � High school 106(71.1) 55(73.3) 51(68.9) � College or other 43(28.9) 20(26.7) 23(31.1) Monthly income (2013) €* a .492 No income 59(39.6) 30(40) 29(39.2) <600 24(16.1) 12(16) 12(16.2) 600 – 999 31(20.8) 12(16) 19(25.7) 1000 – 1999 20(13.4) 10(13.3) 10(13.5) 2000> 15(10.1) 11(14.6) 4(5.4) Marital status .004 Unmarried 127(85.2) 56(74.7) 71(95.9) Married 9(6) 7(9.3) 2(2.7) Widowed 2(1.3) 1(1.3) 1(1.4) Divorced 3(2) 3(4) – Separated 8(5.4) 8(10.7) – Community .768 Urban 111(74.5) 55(73.3) 56(75.7) Suburban 19(12.8) 9(12) 10(13.5) Rural 19(12.8) 11(14.7) 8(10.8) Religious education .247 Yes 109(73.2) 58(77.3) 51(68.9) No 40(26.8) 17(22.7) 23(31.1) Note. Group differences in age were assessed using the Student’s t-test for independent samples. Group differences in all other variables were assessed through the χ 2 test. a The monthly income has been asked in according to the ranges used by the National Institute of Statistic (ISTAT). M = mean; SD = standard deviation. were handled through a multiple imputation procedure (Graham, 2012), using Amelia II package for R. Measures Sociodemographic characteristics as control variables. Socio- demographic variables included gender (male, female, and other with specification Minority Stress, Resilience, and Mental Health 569 required), age, race/ethnicity, level of education, monthly income, marital status, size of community (urban, suburban, or rural), and religious education (yes/no). Prejudice events. We used two measures to assess prejudice events suf- fered by transgender people. We assessed general discrimination using nine items that asked participants whether they had been fired, rejected when they tried to rent an apartment, evicted, robbed, experienced trouble in finding a job or in hav- ing access to health services, and vebally, physically, and sexually abused. The frequency for each item was measured on a 5-point Likert scale, from 0 (never) to 4 (very often). Each item was directly linked to transgender identity, asking “Considering your transgender identity or expression as the cause, how often have you experienced the following situation?” These items were created following the scales used by Clements-Nolle et al. (2006) and Bockting et al. (2013). The internal consistency reliability of the measure was α = .77. We also assessed everyday discrimination using the Everyday Discrimination Scale (EDS; Meyer et al., 2008). The EDS assesses the frequency of nine types of day-to-day discrimination experiences: being treated with less courtesy, being treated with less respect, receiving poorer services, being treated as not smart, perceiving that people act as if they are afraid of you, perceiving that people act as if you are dishonest, perceiving that people act as if they are better than you, being called names or insulted, and being threatened or harassed. The original scale asks the participants whether each of the specific experiences was caused by sexual orientation, gender, ethnicity, physical appearance, etc. Due to our specific sample, we asked directly: “In your day-to-day life how often have any of the following things happened to you due to your gender identity or expression?” The frequency of these experiences was measured on a 4-point Likert scale, from “never” to “often.” In the present study, the internal consistency reliability was α = .91. Perceived stigma. Perceived Stigma Scale (PSS) is a 6-item measure that assesses the expectations of rejection and discrimination. This measure was based on a scale developed by Link (1987) to assess stigma of mental illness and adapted by Meyer et al. (2008) to assess multiple social categories (i.e., gender, race, sexual orientation, etc.). We adapted the scale to the transgender population, asking the participants “These next statements refer to a person like you; by this we mean persons who have the same gender expression or identity as you . . . . We would like you to respond on the basis of how you feel people regard you in terms of such groups.” Respondents indicated to what extent they agreed with statements such as, “Most employers will not hire a person like you.” Possible responses ranged from “agree strongly” to “disagree strongly” on a 4-point Likert scale, with higher scores indicating higher levels of perceived stigma. In the current study, the internal consistency reliability was α = .89. 570 Scandurra et al. Internalized transphobia. The Transgender Identity Scale (TIS; Bockting, Miner, Robinson, Rosser, & Coleman, 2005; Italian adaption by Scandurra et al., 2017a) is a 26-item measure that assesses positive and negative feelings and attitudes toward one’s own transgender identity. This measure is constituted by four scales: Pride (e.g., “I am proud to be a transgender person”), Shame (e.g., “I sometimes resent my transgender identity”), Passing (e.g., “Passing is my biggest concern”), and Alienation (e.g., “I feel isolated and diverse from other transgender people”). The response options ranged from “strongly disagree” to “strongly disagree” on a 7-point Likert scale. The scale was recoded so that high scores on Pride indicated more positive attitudes and feelings toward one’s own transgender identity, and a high score on Shame, Passing, and Alienation, indicated higher levels of internalized transphobia. In the current study, the internal consistency reliability for the subscales was, α = .84, .89, .86, and .82, respectively. Depression. The Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale (CES-D; Radloff, 1977; Italian adaption by Fava, 1981) is a 20-item measure assessing depressive symptoms experienced during the past week on a 4-point Likert scale, from “rarely or none of the time, less than 1 day” to “all of the time, 5--7 days.” This scale is able to identify clinical depression and to differentiate depressed subjects from those who need support for emotional problems. In trans- gender population, the alarm threshold is detected in the clinical cut-off score of 16 (Clements-Nolle, Marx, Guzman, & Katz, 2001). In the current study, the internal consistency reliability was α = .94. Anxiety. The Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI; Beck, Epstein, Brown, & Steer, 1988; Italian adaption by Sica, Coradeschi, Ghisi, & Sanavio, 2006) is a 21-item measure assessing anxious symptoms experienced during the past month on a 4-point Likert scale, from “not at all” to “severely.” In the Italian sample, the alarm threshold is at the clinical cut-off of 13. In the current study, the internal consistency reliability was α = .95. Suicidal ideation. One question assessed suicide ideation linked to trans- gender identity. Participants were asked whether, due to their gender identity or expression, they have seriously thought about committing suicide. Response options were “yes” or “no.” Resilience. The Resilience Scale (RS; Wagnild & Young, 1993; Italian adaptation by Peveri, 2009) is a 10-item measure assessing the levels of one’s own resilience on a 7 point-Likert scale, from “strongly agree” to “strongly disagree.” Example item is “my life is meaningful.” The internal consistency reliability in the current study was α = .90. Minority Stress, Resilience, and Mental Health 571 Social support. The Multidimensional Scale of Perceived Social Support (MSPSS; Zimet, Dahlem, Zimet, & Farley, 1988; Italian adaption by Prezza & Principato, 2002) is a 12-item scale assessing the level of perceived support on a 7-point Likert scale, from “very strongly disagree” to “very strongly agree.” This measure consists of three scales: (1) Family (e.g., “My family really tries to help me”), (2) Friends (e.g., “I can count on my friends when things go wrong”), and (3) Significant others (e.g., “There is a special person who is around when I am in need”). In the current study, the internal consistency reliability was α = .93, .95, and .92, for the subscales, respectively. Preliminary and Statistical Analyses Two measures—EDS and PSS—used in this study were not previously val- idated in Italy. For this reason, they have been translated into Italian following all the phases suggested by Behling and Law (2000) related to back-translation procedures. Before proceeding with the analyses to verify our hypotheses, Con- firmatory Factor Analyses (CFAs) with the Maximum Likelihood estimation with Robust Standard Errors were performed with the aim of assessing goodness of fit of these measures using R-Studio. Model fit was assessed through the following indices (Kline, 1998): Chi-Square (χ 2), Root Mean Square Error of Approxima- tion (RMSEA), Standardized Root Mean Square Residual (SRMR), Comparative Fit Index (CFI), and Tucker–Lewis Index (TLI). Specifically, the fit indices of the EDS were χ 2/df = 1.74, p = .120; RMSEA = .070; SRMR = .040; CFI = .974; TLI = .962, while that of the PSS were χ 2/df = 1.36, p = .226; RMSEA = .049; SRMR = .020; CFI = .995; TLI = .989. Following the suggestions by Hooper, Coughlan, and Mullen (2009), the goodness of fit indices of these measures can be considered acceptable. In addition, CFA was also performed on the measure of general discrimination, which had goodness of fit indices that also can be consid- ered acceptable: χ 2/df = 1.49, p = .058; RMSEA = .057; SRMR = .052; CFI = .964; TLI = .946. Hierarchical multiple linear regression analyses were performed with anxiety and depression measures as they were dependent continuous variables. Hierarchi- cal binary logistic regression analyses were performed with the suicidal ideation measure as it was a dependent dichotomous variable. In all models of hierarchical regression analyses, we entered demographics in step 1 as covariates, minority stressors (prejudice events, perceived stigma, and internalized transphobia) in step 2, protective factors (resilience and perceived social support) in step 3, and interac- tion terms between minority stressors and protective factors in step 4. In the current study, each interaction term was tested by adding to the model the multiplication of one minority stress measure and one protective factor as hypothesized moderator. To avoid problems related to collinearity of interaction terms, each of them have been included in separate regression models and scores of independent variables 572 Scandurra et al. Table 2. Percentages of Prejudice Events, Perceived Stigma, and Mental Health Problems among “Trans Life Survey” Participants (N = 149) Male to female (n = 74) n(%) or M ± SD Female to male (n = 75) n(%) or M ± SD Total (N = 149) n(%) or M ± SD OR (95% CI) or t (df) p Layoff 25(33.3) 13(17.6) 38(25.5) 0.43 (0.20, 0.92) .029 Troubles in finding a job 47(62.7) 53(71.6) 100(67.1) 1.50 (0.75, 2.99) .246 Troubles in renting an apart- ment 31(41.3) 17(23) 48(32.2) 0.42 (0.21, 0.86) .018 Eviction 17(22.7) 9(12.2) 26(17.4) 0.47 (0.20, 1.14) .096 Troubles in the access to health services 27(36) 36(48.6) 63(42.3) 1.68 (0.87, 3.24) .119 Robbery 28(37.3) 7(9.5) 35(23.5) 0.17 (0.07, 0.43) <.001 Verbal abuse 55(73.3) 52(81.3) 107(71.8) 0.86 (0.42, 1.76) .678 Physical abuse 34(45.3) 21(28.4) 55(36.9) 0.48 (0.24, 0.94) .033 Sexual abuse 19(25.3) 8(10.8) 27(18.1) 0.36 (0.14, 0.88) .025 Everyday discrimination 2.06 ± .77 1.78 ± .66 1.92 ± .73 2.44(147) .016 Anxiety >13a 32(42.7) 38(51.4) 70(47) 1.42 (0.74, 2.71) .289 Depression >16b 49(65.3) 45(60.8) 94(63.1) 0.82 (0.42, 1.60) .568 Suicidal ideation 37(50) 40(53.3) 77(51.7) 0.87 (0.46, 1.66) .684 Note.a Clinical cut-off for anxiety individuated by Sica et al. (2006). b Clinical cut-off for depression individuated by Clements-Nolle et al. (2001). M = mean; SD = standard deviation; OR = odds ratio; CI = confidence interval; t = t-test; df = degrees of freedom. were centered (Aiken & West, 1991). Only significant models were reported. It was not possible to include ethnicity as a control because only two participants were non-Caucasian. Results We provide results of the analyses in two sections. First, descriptive data about types and level of prejudice events and mental health outcomes are presented. Second, we present results of hypothesis testing, differentiating findings on the basis of the mental health outcomes measured in the study (i.e., anxiety, depression, and suicidal ideation). Types and Levels of Prejudice Events and Mental Health The percentages reported in Table 2 refer to specific types of prejudice events that have been experienced by transgender people at least once. To verify if there was a difference between transgender women and men, logistic regressions were performed with gender as an independent variable. The most prevalent type of prejudice event was verbal abuse, followed by troubles in finding a job, troubles in having access to health services, physical abuse, troubles in renting an apart- ment, layoff, robbery, sexual abuse, and eviction. All prejudice events were more frequently reported by transgender women than men, with the exception of ver- bal abuse, troubles in finding a job, troubles in having access to health services, Minority Stress, Resilience, and Mental Health 573 and eviction, for which no gender differences resulted significant. With regard to everyday discrimination, we found more everyday discrimination experienced by transgender women than men. Finally, no significant differences in mental health by gender were found. The percentages of anxiety (47%) and depression (63.1%) were very high in both groups, as well as suicide ideation (51.7%). Indeed, these estimates are vastly disproportionate compared to those observed in the general Italian cisgender population by de Girolamo et al. (2005) as part of the European Study on the Epidemiology of Mental Disorders: lifetime mood disorder (11.1%), anxiety disorder (11.2%), and suicidal ideation (3%). Minority Stress and Mental Health Anxiety. Results for regressions of all mental health measures on minor- ity stress processes are reported in Table 3 . Demographics were not associated with anxiety in the first step of the model. Introducing minority stressors in step 2 explained 22.8% of variation in anxiety. Specifically, higher scores on every- day discrimination, shame, and alienation were associated with higher scores on anxiety. Adding protective factors in step 3 of the regression model explained an additional 3.2% of the variation in anxiety. Specifically, higher levels of re- silience and perceived support from family were associated with lower levels of anxiety. Finally, the addition of the interaction term between everyday discrim- ination and perceived support from family to the regression model explained an additional 3% of the variation in anxiety. This indicates that family support signif- icantly moderated the association between everyday discrimination and anxiety. Specifically, the association between everyday discrimination and anxiety was sig- nificant under conditions of low support (b = −.24; p < .01) and moderate support (b = −.18; p < .05), but not under conditions of high (b = −.03; p = .19) family support. Lastly, the final statistical model for all dimensions accounted for 27.1% of the variance in anxiety. Depression. Demographics were not associated with depression in the first step of the regression model. Introducing minority stressors variables in step 2 explained 30.8% of variation in depression. Specifically, higher scores on everyday discrimination, shame, and alienation were associated with higher scores on depression, while lower scores on pride with higher scores on depression. Adding protective factors in step 3 of the regression model explained an additional 12.1% of the variance in depression. Specifically, higher levels of resilience and perceived support from family were associated with lower levels of depression. Finally, the addition of the interaction term between everyday discrimination and resilience to the regression model explained an additional 6% of the variation in depression. This indicates that resilience significantly moderated the association between everyday discrimination and depression. A further investigation of this 574 Scandurra et al. T ab le 3. R eg re ss io ns of M en ta l H ea lt h M ea su re s on M in or it y S tr es s P ro ce ss es am on g “T ra ns L if e S ur ve y” P ar ti ci pa nt s (N = 14 9) A nx ie ty a D ep re ss io na S ui ci de id ea ti on b B S E 9 5 % C I B S E 9 5 % C I O R S E 9 5 % C I S te p 1: C on tr ol va ri ab le s G en de r (F tM ) 3. 19 2. 52 −1 .7 8, 8. 17 1. 58 2. 08 −2 .5 2, 5. 69 0. 86 0. 44 0. 36 ,2 .0 4 A ge −0 .1 9 0. 13 −0 .4 5, 0. 07 −0 .0 1 0. 11 −0 .2 2, 0. 21 0. 99 0. 02 0. 95 ,1 .0 4 E du ca ti on (� hi gh sc ho ol ) −1 .7 4 2. 57 −6 .8 0, 3. 31 −0 .8 6 2. 10 −5 .0 2, 3. 29 1. 72 0. 45 0. 72 ,4 .1 2 M on th ly in co m e −1 .5 3 0. 92 −3 .3 4, 0. 29 −1 .7 9 0. 76 −3 .2 9, 0. 29 0. 86 0. 16 0. 63 ,1 .1 7 M ar it al st at us (u nm ar ri ed ) 0. 32 1. 28 −2 .1 3, 2. 78 0. 09 1. 07 −1 .9 8, 2. 16 1. 19 0. 23 0. 77 ,1 .8 5 C om m un it y (u rb an ) −1 .3 5 1. 65 −4 .6 1, 1. 90 −0 .0 7 1. 36 −2 .7 5, 2. 61 1. 39 0. 29 0. 78 ,2 .4 8 R el ig io us ed uc at io n −3 .3 3 2. 63 −8 .4 5, 1. 78 −2 .8 9 2. 16 −7 .1 0, 1. 33 1. 01 0. 46 0. 41 ,2 .4 3 R 2 = .0 46 R 2 = .0 47 R 2 = .0 73 ; χ 2 = 8. 33 S te p 2: M in or it y st re ss or s P re ju di ce ev en ts 0. 79 0. 63 −2 .0 3, 0. 44 0. 84 0. 53 −1 .8 7, 0. 19 0. 99 0. 11 0. 80 ,1 .2 4 E D S 6. 25 ** 1. 01 −1 .6 8, 9. 83 3. 71 * 1. 46 −0 .0 4, 7. 46 1. 90 * 1. 14 0. 83 ,4 .3 6 P er ce iv ed st ig m a 2. 33 1. 73 −1 .0 7, 5. 72 0. 50 1. 44 −3 .3 3, 2. 33 0. 96 0. 31 0. 52 ,1 .7 5 P ri de −0 .6 7 1. 07 −2 .7 7, 1. 44 −2 .0 4* 0. 88 −3 .7 7, −0 .3 1 0. 72 0. 19 0. 49 ,1 .0 5 S ha m e 0. 89 * 1. 33 −1 .7 0, 3. 48 2. 22 1. 09 −0 .0 9, 4. 36 1. 70 * 0. 23 1. 08 ,2 .6 8 P as si ng 0. 65 1. 08 −1 .4 7, 2. 79 0. 27 0. 87 −1 .4 5, 1. 99 0. 95 0. 18 0. 66 ,1 .3 6 A li en at io n 2. 16 ** 0. 74 0. 70 ,3 .6 1 1. 33 * 0. 60 0. 13 ,2 .5 2 1. 03 0. 13 0. 80 ,1 .3 2 R 2 = .2 28 ; � R 2 = .2 10 ** * R 2 = .3 08 ; � R 2 = .2 80 ** * R 2 = .2 12 ; χ 2 = 17 .1 8* ** (C o n ti n u ed ) Minority Stress, Resilience, and Mental Health 575 T ab le 3. C on ti nu ed A nx ie ty a D ep re ss io na S ui ci de id ea ti on b B S E 9 5 % C I B S E 9 5 % C I O R S E 9 5 % C I S te p 3: P ro te ct iv e fa ct or s R es il ie nc e −1 .7 1* 1. 26 −4 .2 1, 0. 78 −5 .1 9* * 1. 15 −7 .2 5, −3 .1 3 0. 85 * 0. 81 0. 54 ,1 .3 6 M S P S S fa m il y −1 .3 4* 1. 79 −2 .6 7, 0. 01 −1 .0 5* 0. 55 −2 .1 4, 0. 04 0. 86 0. 12 0. 68 ,1 .0 8 M S P S S fr ie nd s −0 .0 8 1. 03 −1 .8 9, 2. 05 −0 .0 5 0. 89 −1 .7 5, 1. 66 1. 19 0. 19 0. 83 ,1 .7 3 M S P S S si gn if ic an t ot he rs −0 .9 7 1. 06 −1 .1 3, 3. 07 −0 .5 0 0. 89 −1 .2 5, 2. 25 1. 29 0. 19 0. 90 ,1 .8 7 R 2 = .2 41 ; � R 2 = .0 32 ** * R 2 = .4 25 ; � R 2 = .1 21 ** * R 2 = .2 53 ; χ 2 = 5. 44 ** * S te p 4: In te ra ct io n te rm s E D S X M S P S S fa m il y −0 .3 0* 0. 92 −1 .7 7, 1. 84 − − − − − − E D S X R es il ie nc e − − − −0 .4 0* 1. 37 −2 .2 9, 3. 09 0. 39 * 0. 41 0. 18 ,0 .8 9 R 2 = .2 71 ; � R 2 = .0 30 ** * R 2 = .4 31 ; � R 2 = .0 60 ** * R 2 = .2 96 ; χ 2 = 5. 99 ** * N o te .a R es ul ts ob ta in ed fr om hi er ar ch ic al m ul ti pl e li ne ar re gr es si on m od el s. b R es ul ts ob ta in ed fr om hi er ar ch ic al lo gi st ic re gr es si on m od el s. ** * p < .0 01 ; ** p < .0 1; * p < .0 5. B = st an da rd iz ed re gr es si on co ef fi ci en t; S E = st an da rd er ro r; C I = co nf id en ce in te rv al ; O R = od ds ra ti o; R 2 = R -s qu ar e; � R 2 = ch an ge in R 2 ;χ 2 = C hi -s qu ar e of ea ch bl oc k; E D S = E ve ry da y D is cr im in at io n S ca le ;M S P S S = M ul ti di m en si on al S ca le of P er ce iv ed S oc ia lS up po rt . 576 Scandurra et al. relationship indicated that the association between everyday discrimination and depression was significant for those with low (b = −.35; p < .05) and moderate levels of resilience (b = −.19; p < .05) but not for those with high levels of resilience (b = −.03; p = .12). The final model accounted for 43.1% of the variance in depression. Suicidal ideation. A logistic regression was performed to examine the ef- fects of minority stressors and protective factors on the likelihood that participants experienced suicidal ideation. This hierarchical logistic regression revealed that at step 1 demographics did not contribute significantly to the regression model. Introducing minority stressors in step 2 explained 21.2% (Nagelkerke R2) of vari- ation in suicidal ideation and correctly classifying 69.4% of cases. Specifically, everyday discrimination and shame significantly increased the odds of ideating suicide by almost two times. Adding protective factors in step 3 of the regres- sion model also contributed significantly to the regression model, explaining an additional 4.1% of variation in suicidal ideation and correctly classifying 72.3% of cases. Specifically, increasing resilience was associated with a reduction in the likelihood of ideating suicide by almost one. Finally, the addition of the interac- tion term between everyday discrimination and resilience to the regression model contributed significantly to the regression model explaining an additional 4.3% of variation in suicidal ideation. This result indicates that resilience significantly moderated the association between everyday discrimination and suicidal ideation. A further investigation of this interaction indicated that the association between everyday discrimination and suicidal ideation was significant only for those with low (b = 1.62; p < .05) and moderate levels of resilience (b = .62; p < .05), but not for those with high resilience (b = −.39; p = .46). The final model explains 29.6% (Nagelkerke R2) of variation in suicidal ideation, correctly classifying 74.1% of cases. Discussion The current study explored types of minority stress reported by Italian trans- gender people, and their mental health outcomes. Results align with those reported in the literature (primarily U.S.; Bockting et al., 2013; Bradford et al., 2013; Lom- bardi, Wilchins, Priesing, & Malouf, 2001). In general, our findings indicate that the minority stress model can be usefully applied to Italian transgender people. Thus, this study contributes to the international literature aimed at understanding how minority stress is experienced by transgender people and its impact on their health. Indeed, this study’s findings sometimes differ from previous research on minority stress in the transgender population, highlighting the important of testing the minority stress model across differing cultural contexts. At the same time, this is the first study which assesses the minority stress model in Italian transgender Minority Stress, Resilience, and Mental Health 577 people, providing Italian researchers with an overview of the associations between stress, resilience, and mental health within this population. Like prior U.S. work, we found high percentages of prejudice events, and that daily discrimination was higher in transgender women than in transgender men (Bockting et al., 2013). As suggested by Bockting et al. (2013), this could be due to the fact that transgender men “pass” more easily than transgender women; transgender men are less easily targeted for overt discrimination, although not protected from perceived stigma. Regarding mental health problems, we found levels of depressive and anx- ious symptoms and suicidal ideation generally, although not exactly, aligned with previously published rates in the transgender population (Bockting et al., 2013; Budge, Adelson, & Howard, 2013; Nuttbrock et al., 2010). Briefly, in our total sample, 63.1% and 47% experienced, respectively, depressive and anxious symp- toms, and 51.7% suicide ideation. Bockting et al. (2013) and Budge et al. (2013) found depression-related problems in their respective samples at rates of 44.1% and 51.4%, and rates of anxiety at 33.2% and 48.3%. Considering suicide, Nut- tbrock et al. (2010) found that 53% of younger and 53.5% of older transgender participants ideated suicide during the lifespan. Overall, these rates are similar to those observed in our sample. Any differences may be due to contextual or methodological factors that differed in the specific samples or studies. Our main study findings revealed anxiety, depression, and suicide ideation were significantly and partially explained by minority stress processes. Everyday discrimination was more predictive of all three outcomes than major life events. Meyer (2003b) affirms that many researchers underestimate the importance of daily discrimination because it would be linked to subjective perceptions rather than the objective reality of the lived event, thus questioning the use of such a measure as an independent variable of the minority stress model. Nevertheless, these forms of discrimination negatively affect many domains of life. Nadal, Rivera, and Corpus (2010) report many types of daily aggression and harassment experienced by sexual and gender minorities during their life-time, correlating them with psychophysical health problems. The results support internalized transphobia as an important predictor of mental health. In the current study, shame was a significant predictor for all mental health variables, while alienation predicted anxiety and depression, and pride predicted depression. This finding is in line with the Hendrick and Testa’s (2012) claims about the detrimental effects that internalized transphobia has on mental health of transgender people, in the same way as internalized homopho- bia for lesbian, gay, and bisexual population. There is also evidence that in- ternalized transphobia is associated with suicide attempts (Perez-Brumer et al., 2015) and lower self-esteem (Austin & Goodman, 2017), but more research is needed on how transgender mental health is negatively affected by this internal stressor. 578 Scandurra et al. Notably, from our results, passing did not predict negative mental health outcomes. This finding is in line with results obtained by Bockting et al. (2013). A possible explanation is that adopting strategies targeted at not being perceived as transgender would represent a useful coping strategy adopted for protection from adverse outcomes of stigma, rather than a proximal stressor. Finally, the main moderators between stigma and mental health were per- ceived support from family, which protected against anxiety, and resilience, which protected against depression and suicide ideation. Only transgender individuals with high levels of family support were protected from the negative effects of everyday discrimination on anxiety. Similarly, only transgender individuals with high levels of resilience were protected from the negative effects of everyday discrimination on depression and suicidal ideation. This indicates the impact of minority stress on mental health is strong and that family and individual resilience might ameliorate it, but only at high levels. As is the case for sexual minorities, perceived social support represents a notable protective factor for transgender population because it is able to facilitate the management of gender minority stress, increasing more functional ways of coping with distress (Pinto, Melendez, & Spector, 2008). It is noteworthy that, in the current study, among different forms of support, support from family was the only protective factor. To this end, Simons, Schrager, Clark, Belzer, and Olson (2013), recently found that parental support is linked with a higher quality of life among adolescent transgender people recruited in Los Angeles, being associated with higher life satisfaction and lower depressive symptoms. In a recent study by McConnell, Brikett, and Mustansky (2016), on a U.S. sample constituted by 232 LGBT youths aged 16–20 years, youths experiencing lower family support reported greater distress than those with higher family support. Thus, our findings seem to be in line with the prior research. Notwithstanding, in the aforementioned study by Bockting et al. (2013), authors found that family support was negatively associated with psychological distress, but when they considered different forms of support as moderators between enacted stigma and health, they found that only peer support was significant. This finding is different from that observed in the current study and it may be due to cultural differences. Indeed, in Italy people leave their home at a later age, usually living close to their parents and receiv- ing strong support from them (Santarelli & Cottone, 2009). This general trend could explain the heightened significance of family support for Italian transgender people. Similarly, resilience demonstrated a key role in moderating the negative ef- fects of stigma on mental health, decreasing the likelihood of developing negative mental health outcomes. This finding is in line with previous research which highlighted that transgender people are able to use both individual-level strategies (e.g., fostering identity pride, self-esteem, personal mastery, self-acceptance, and emotion-oriented coping; Grossman, D’augelli, & Frank, 2011; Singh et al., 2011, Minority Stress, Resilience, and Mental Health 579 2014) and collective-level actions (e.g., community participation and activism; Singh & McKleroy, 2011) in order to reduce the negative effects of minority stress. Similar to the present findings, Breslow et al. (2015) found that resilience was associated with lower levels of psychological distress, acting as a moder- ator between minority stress and health. Notwithstanding, in our sample only individual-based resilience was assessed. Future research on the Italian trans- gender population should assess community-based resilience to determine if it generalizes to the Italian context. The results of this research would cast light on how to implement and promote specific changes to social policies that could promote community-level inclusion of a stigmatized population such as Italian transgender people. Limitations The current study has important limitations which might affect the gener- alizability of the findings to the entire Italian transgender population. First, this was a cross-sectional study which used an online convenience sample. Although minority stress theory highlights stigma or minority stress as the cause of men- tal health problems, we cannot rule out the possibility that associations due to a third variable, such as gender dysphoria. Future research should use longitudinal designs aimed at assessing the relationship between stigma and mental health over time, and in particular the development of protective factors to cope with stigma. Second, considering the sample composition, this study reported findings re- lated to individuals who identified with binary gender identities and they cannot be generalized to trans individuals who identify with nonbinary identities (e.g., gen- derqueer, gender fluid). Along the same line, participants were almost exclusively Caucasian individuals and this did not allow exploration of the influence of eth- nicity on minority stress processes. This made it impossible for the current study to examine whether findings differed across potentially relevant intersections of race and gender. This limitation highlights that non-Caucasian Italian transgender people are a hard-to-reach population. To this end, Nuccia et al. (2006) highlighted that South American transgender people living in Italy represent a highly vulner- able population because most of them are sex workers and at risk of sexually transmitted infections and HIV. Prunas et al. (2014), in a study analyzing causes and sociodemographic characteristics of murdered transgender people living in Italy, observed that the large majority of the victims were sex workers from South America. On these grounds, it seems to us necessary to assess minority stress, resilience, and mental health at these intersections. Future research should also assess and address the barriers to accessibility, adopting different forms of recruit- ment as a result (for a review on the methodological challenges in this research field, see Frost, 2017, as well as Smedley & Myer, 2014). A related challenge is 580 Scandurra et al. conducting this research in an Italian setting where prejudice event measures (like the one we used) have not been previously validated in Italy. As such, our findings related to these measures should be interpreted with caution. Social and Policy Implications Our results, aligned with the minority stress model, may have important implications in spite of study limitations. The minority stress model was developed to understand better those factors related to the mental health of sexual and gender minorities that are dependent on social contexts and on the internalization of societal attitudes. The Italian context is not highly inclusive for transgender people, that, in one study, reported the second highest rate of transphobic hate crimes (after Turkey; Prunas et al., 2014). As reported by Hatzenbuehler, Keyes, and Hasin (2009), living in locations where gender identity protection policies are lacking increases the likelihood for mental health problems. For instance, in the present special issue, Hatzenbuehler, Flores, and Gates (2017) examined the health consequences for LGBT people living in communities with high or low levels of support for same-sex marriage (see Fingerhut, Riggle, & Rostosky, 2011, and Herek, 2011, for a review of social and psychological implications of same-sex marriage). They found higher levels of well-being in people living in supportive communities, highlighting the effect that local attitudes may have on the health of LGBT individuals. At institutional and structural level, calling attention to minority stress may promote change in social contexts often oppressive for transgender people, con- tributing to a more inclusive society. Our minority stress findings, indeed, indicate a need to draft an Italian legislation on transphobic hate crimes. This supportive and protective social policy would contribute to reducing prejudice derived from gender nonconformity and institutional bias. Italian policymakers should focus on gender diversity needs, making this population and their needs more visible. Doing so may limit stigma and mitigate the effects of stigma, both of which limit opportunities, resources, and well-being due to social conditions, cultural norms, and institutional policies (Hatzenbuehler & Link, 2014). Promoting change at the individual level is not enough. Rather, this change should be produced at a more systemic level along institutional channels, through wide-ranging awareness and trainings aimed at changing the sociocultural climate. Conclusions This is the first study to assess minority stress, resilience, and mental health in Italian transgender people. The results suggest that everyday discrimination and internalized transphobia increase depression, anxiety, and suicidal ideation, and that perceived social support from family and resilience significantly ameliorate Minority Stress, Resilience, and Mental Health 581 the impact of minority stress on mental health. These findings are in line with the minority stress model suggesting that this model can be usefully applied to the Italian transgender population. This study sheds light on the need of promoting resilience and social support as ameliorating factors through psychosocial interventions aimed at reducing gen- der and sexual minority stress (see Chaudoir, Wang, & Pachankis, 2017, for an overview of the most efficient psychosocial interventions). 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Journal of Social Issues, 73(3), 450–461. Zimet, G. D., Dahlem, N. W., Zimet, S. G., & Farley, G. K. (1988). The multidimensional scale of perceived social support. Journal of Personality Assessment, 52(1), 30–41. https://doi. org/10.1207/s15327752jpa5201_2 Zimmerman, M. A. (2013). Resiliency theory: A strengths-based approach to research and practice for adolescent health. Health Education & Behavior, 40(4), 381–383. https://doi.org/10.1177/1090198113493782 CRISTIANO SCANDURRA, PhD, is a Clinical Psychologist, and also holds a PhD in Gender Studies at the University of Naples Federico II. He has partici- pated in many European projects. His research focuses on transgender identity, internalized transphobia, minority stress, homophobic bullying, gender and sexual violence, and prevention of stigma. ANNA LISA AMODEO, PhD, is a Lecturer and Researcher in Clinical Psychology at the University of Naples Federico II. She has participated in and coordinated many European projects. Her research focuses on gender identity and sexual orientation, gender and sexual stigma, homophobic bullying, and individual and group psychodynamic counseling. PAOLO VALERIO, MD, is a Full Professor in Clinical Psychology at the University of Naples Federico II. He is the Head of the SInAPSi Centre (www.sinapsi.unina.it). His research focuses on emotional disorders among late adolescents and young adults, psychodynamic counseling, gender variance, and gender dysphoria. VINCENZO BOCHICCHIO, PhD, is an Assistant Professor in Developmental Psychopathology at the University of Calabria and a Clinical Psychologist. He teaches at the Master Degree of Education Sciences of the same University. He was Visiting Scholar at Columbia University in New York. His research interests are epistemology of clinical psychology, perception, gender issues, and development of ethnic prejudice. DAVID M. FROST, PhD, is a Senior Lecturer in Social and Health Psychology at the School of Psychology of the University of Surrey. His primary line of research focuses on how stigma, prejudice, and discrimination constitute minority stress, affecting the health of marginalized individuals. He also studies how couples psychologically experience intimacy within long-term romantic relationships and how intimacy affects their health. These two lines of research combine within recent projects examining same-sex couples’ experiences of stigmatization and the resulting impact on their relational, sexual, and mental health. https://doi.org/10.1207/s15327752jpa5201_2 https://doi.org/10.1207/s15327752jpa5201_2 https://doi.org/10.1177/1090198113493782 http://www.sinapsi.unina.it 
work_oz34lx3lyvd7bpr74drhknxzzy	----	Munich Personal RePEc Archive Monopoly Capital and Capitalist Inequality: Marx after Piketty Lambert, Thomas Northern Kentucky University January 2016 Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/69615/ MPRA Paper No. 69615, posted 20 Feb 2016 08:50 UTC 1 Monopoly Capital and Capitalist Inequality: Marx after Piketty By Thomas E. Lambert Assistant Professor of Public Administration Northern Kentucky University Highland Heights, KY 41099 Lambertt1@nku.edu 502-403-9795 (cell) Abstract This paper proposes that one major explanation of growing inequality in the United States (US) is through the use of the concept of economic surplus. The economic surplus is a neo-Marxian term which combines the traditional Marxian tenet of surplus value with other ways that surplus value can be invested in a mature, advanced capitalist economy. A rising economic surplus that is not absorbed through growing consumer spending, luxury spending or government spending results in stagnant wages and growing inequality via higher levels of underemployment and greater monopoly and monopsony power among a decreasing number of huge, powerful corporations. Therefore, the politics surrounding the growth of inequality in the US has to be understood first by understanding over accumulation of the economic surplus by those at the top of the US capitalist class. This research note gives estimates of the rising economic surplus over the last several decades in the US as well as how these correlate with the level of inequality. The growth of the economic surplus gives rise and form to the politics of inequality and austerity. As time goes by, the politics of inequality and austerity in the US will be manifested by greater corporate influence in the political system, greater political polarization, less government mailto:Lambertt1@nku.edu 2 effectiveness, and more debates about welfare spending, corporate taxation, taxes on upper income households, and taxes on wealth. Keywords: alienation, economics, fascism, inequality, monopoly capital, occupy movement, political science, socialism, tea party Introduction According to a recent, nationwide opinion poll, approximately 63% of United States (US) survey respondents indicated that US wealth and income differences should be more equally distributed (Newport 2015). In many political discussions and discourse in the US, the topic of economic inequality is growing in importance, especially as one major candidate for US President has made it a cornerstone of his campaign (Talbot 2015). Additionally, the notoriety of Thomas Piketty’s Capital in the Twenty-first Century (2014, English edition) has added grist to the debate since one of Piketty’s main points is that a large degree of economic inequality is the norm in a capitalistic system, not the exception. Piketty contends that some degree of inequality has been driven by the large increases in managerial and CEO pay over the years (p. 24), although a lot of research has failed to show a link between a management team’s pay and corporate performance (Collins 2001, Chemi and Giorgio 2014). Add to this his assertion that rates of return on wealth and assets, or r, are greater than economic growth, or g, then in any society, most of national income tends to accumulate with the investor class, and part of this income becomes more assets and wealth. His central equation, r > g, explains why great concentrations of wealth yield even more wealth concentration as time goes by, especially if r is far above g. Finally, with large concentrations of wealth, inherited wealth becomes more and 3 more important in skewing the wealth toward those in the top income ranges, especially if inheritance and income taxes are kept low by national governments. One solution to extremely skewed wealth distribution would be an international tax on wealth and/or inheritances, but Piketty believes these unlikely to come into effect. Therefore, despite astute analysis of why inequality persists and even becomes worse, Piketty’s recommendations to address it are tenuous given political power imbalances in most societies and the inability of nation-states to coordinate actions to solve problems. Nonetheless, Piketty is at least concerned about the long term impacts of extreme inequality in most nations whereas some mainstream economists do not see it as a big problem if a problem at all. Instead, according to these economists, income and wealth inequalities within a society can be explained mostly by differences in labor productivity and educational attainment differences among those in the labor force (Feldstein 1999). On the other hand, critics of extreme inequality claim that too much income and wealth inequality can result in greater political and social alienation or even turmoil on the part of the citizenry, possibly due to the development of a static class structure or rule by oligarchy (Solt 2008, Newman, Johnston and Lown 2015). One school of neo-Marxist thought, the “monopoly capital” point of view (Baran and Sweezy 1966, Foster 2014 among others), posits that modern inequality exists because of traditional Marxist explanations of worker exploitation and because of the power of land owners in the past and in modern times (a rentier class) and mostly because of the political and market powers of large, modern day corporations (i.e., many oligopolistic and monopolistic consumer markets and monopsonistic labor markets). Market concentration allows for restricted output (excess capacity), which in turn yields high markups on product prices. Restricted output lessens the demand for labor, which along with monoposonistic labor markets (in which workers are 4 limited with regard to employer choices) limit the earnings of workers and raises the unemployment rate beyond what it would be otherwise. In the monopoly capital school of thought, Piketty’s observation of r > g can be easily explained by the degree of corporate and upper class dominance in a society in that market concentration and power in product and labor markets yields higher returns and profits than in competitive markets relative to what workers can earn in wages (Foster and Yates 2014, Andrews 2014). With wages stagnant or not increasing fast enough to keep up with inflation, this makes the degree of labor exploitation even stronger (Piketty 2014, Lambert and Kwon 2015a). Finally, since innovation and the resulting products from innovation usually reach a peak in sales and market share, g is usually low, and so the economy usually tends toward stagnation. That is, according to the monopoly capital point of view, the product life cycle of rapid growth, slow growth, and then peak sales occurs with all products, and if no further innovations are forthcoming to keep an economy growing, then slow or negative growth occurs. This is compounded by the fact that as many industries cease to grow as rapidly as they have in their early stages, jobs are eventually shed as labor saving techniques are introduced, and this can exacerbate any unemployment and inequality problems. Finally, slow growing or declining sales in existing product markets and a lack of new products or markets in which to invest lead to fewer investment outlets for the upper capitalist class. This causes the “economic surplus” of a society to rise, which can be manifested in over accumulation of surplus or under consumption of goods and services. According to Baran and Sweezy (1966), the economic surplus is the amount over and above what is required to produce a given level of output and is normally considered as comprised of things such business profits, property rents, interest payments, and wasteful 5 expenditures on such things as luxury items, advertising, retailing, research and development 1 , finance, and military programs. Using Piketty’s equation (or inequality), since r > g, the surplus of the wealthier classes rises faster than what it can invest in productive investment or assets. Hence, in order to use the excess surplus that is accumulated, the result is spending on many wasteful items according to Baran and Sweezy. Wasteful and non-wasteful activities are seen from a traditional Marxian perspective these that uses a non-productive and productive dichotomy for classifying economic activity and labor. 2 Productive activity or labor includes those activities such as agriculture, manufacturing, mining, utilities, construction, transportation, and some forms of government activity such as education, sanitation, and emergency services (Baran and Sweezy 1966, Shaikh and Tonak 1994, Mohun 1996 and 2014 among others). These activities and labor are considered productive because they produce surplus value and add value in that they satisfy the consumer needs of food, clothing, shelter, education, etc. Those economic sectors that are classified as unproductive add little or no value and are only ancillary to the productive sectors of the economy. Yet, the unproductive sectors are necessary in order to provide an outlet for accumulated surplus that cannot be channeled into productive sectors if the latter are not growing (Baran and Sweezy 1966). For Baran and Sweezy (1966) this combination of surplus value obtained from worker exploitation (where workers produced output greater than their wages) and expenditures for non- productive labor and activities made up their concept of the economic surplus. Therefore, as wages remain stagnant or decline as prices and profits rise (which would cause r to increase even 1 According to them, most research and development revolves around product re-design or re-branding rather than new product development, which is often not fruitful. 2 Some Marxist writer and scholars do not believe that the dichotomy exists or is important (Houston 1997, Laibman 1999) 6 more relative to g in Piketty’s equation) and as non-productive sectors grow, then a nation’s economic surplus would grow. Along with this growth in economic surplus, as wages are stagnant or declining, one would expect to see rising inequality due to rising labor exploitation, and so there should be a high degree of correlation between the economic surplus and inequality. This research note proceeds as follows. Next is a section in which the methods of evaluating the argument that the economic surplus and inequality are linked are discussed. Then a results section summarizes the findings. Finally, a discussion and conclusion elaborate on the research results and offers recommendations for further research. Methods This paper uses time series, least squares regression to predict the levels of income inequality (top 1% income share, including capital gains) and wealth inequality (net private wealth as a portion of all income 3 ) in the US from 1929 to 2013 using the monopoly capital concept of economic surplus as a percentage of GDP. This is a method similar to that used by Lambert and Kwon (2015a) in which they predicted the percentage change in top income shares over a similar time period using different concepts of surplus and other variables. The top 1% income share and wealth to total income numbers come from the World Wealth and Income Database, a database created by Piketty and other researchers of inequality (Alvaredo, Atkinson, Piketty , Saez, and Zucman 2016). The economic surplus as a portion of US GDP was used by Baran and Sweezy (1966) to illustrate the level of exploitation occurring in the US over time. In an appendix by Joseph D. Phillips, the surplus as a portion of GDP is constructed as the sum of business profits, rent, property income, interest, dividends, depreciation, and the value of the 3 This is Piketty’s “beta” concept, which is a nation’s wealth, or capital, over its income. He uses this as a measure of wealth concentration for each nation, and the greater beta is, the greater the degree of wealth inequality. In the US, this has generally ranged from 300 to 500% from the 1870s to 2010 (Piketty 2014, Figure 5.1, p. 165. The data for this paper shows the same pattern. 7 “wasteful” sectors of the economy (e.g., finance, insurance, real estate, services, government etc.) divided by GDP. Later, Shaikh and Tonak (1994) fine-tuned the economic surplus concept as a portion of GDP that is basically the value of Gross Domestic Product less the value of the wages and salaries in the productive sectors of the economy. This paper adapts their concept, which has also been used by other authors (Wolf 1987, Lambert and Kwon 2015a and 2015b). The source of the data is from the US Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) National Economics Accounts tables website, http://www.bea.gov/national/index.htm , and more specifically Table 1.1.5, Gross Domestic Product and Table 6.2A, Compensation of Employees by Industry. 4 This paper contends that there should be a high degree of correlation between the economic surplus and two variables, income and wealth inequality, since capitalist wealth and income are extracted by high rates of labor exploitation and the wasteful investment of surplus into productive and non-productive activities. Results Figures 1 and 2 show that the economic surplus concept and the income and wealth shares are highly correlated and have strong, direct and positive relationships. Table 1, Model 1, shows the economic surplus as a percentage of GDP to be a statistically significant predictor of the income shares of the top 1%, and it explains about 88% of the variation in top 1% income shares. A one percent increase in economic surplus is associated with around a 12% increase in top 1% income share on average. In Model 2, a 1% increase in economic surplus as a share of GDP predicts a 163% increase in the wealth to income percentage on average. Model 2 shows the economic surplus variable to be statistically significant and explains about 73% of the variation in wealth to income. In using ordinary least squares analysis, the Durbin-Watson 4 The World Wealth and Income Database has US data from 1913 to 2014, but only the years 1929 to 2013 are used in this paper because BEA data only goes back to 1929 for the data needed. http://www.bea.gov/national/index.htm 8 statistic is less than the lower critical value at α < 0.05 for both models indicating positive serial correlation, so Newey-West standard errors to correct for any autocorrelation or serial correlation are used in both models (Studenmund 2006, pages 334-335). Discussion and Conclusion The regression results support the hypotheses advanced by this paper. The bulk of the gains made by the upper classes in US society appear to have occurred because of increases in US economic surplus, which grew as a result of stagnant wages to labor (or greater labor exploitation) and greater investment in what Baran and Sweezy (1966) would characterize as “waste”---the unproductive sectors of the US economy (Lambert and Kwon 2015a). Politically, greater labor exploitation and greater inequality in both wealth and income make for a potentially volatile situation according to Piketty (2014). Toward the end of his book The Theory of Capitalist Development (1970 (1942 original), set in the US during the Great Depression and on the eve of its entry into World War II, Paul Sweezy speculates on the question of whether fascism is inevitable in a society which has suffered and continues to suffer a major economic crisis. Similar to the nations that suffered trauma during and after World War I because of economic hardships, military defeat and/or subsequent economic crisis (e.g., Germany and Italy), the US was dealing with high unemployment and excess industrial capacity, although the US had come out of World War I stronger than any other nation in the world. Sweezy believes that a nation which has embarked in imperialist ventures in the past (i.e., has had colonies or territories) and has a capitalist economy, although a faltering one, and has suffered some type of national trauma (war, depression, etc.) is a good candidate for a fascistic takeover of the government. He rejects this as inevitability for the US during the time of his 9 writings for the book, but leaves open the possibility for a later date should circumstances change. Have circumstances changed enough since then? Other writings on fascism and socialism offer some clues as to possible future scenarios. The US has possibly suffered the greatest economic crisis since the Great Depression due to the 2007-2009 Great Recession and its aftermath. Subsequent economic growth after the recession’s “end” in 2009 has been very slow, with stagnant wages, a great number of people dropping out of the labor force, an increase in the official poverty rate, and now an apparent slowdown in the global economy, which could spell more trouble for the US economy (Greenhouse and Leonhardt 2006, Foster and Magdoff 2009, Lambert 2011, Mongiovi 2015, Patnaik 2016). Although illegal immigration has declined during this time period, there still persists a common belief among the working classes that a large number of illegal immigrants are harming the working class (Goo 2015). Additionally, the aftermath of wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and continued problems with terrorist groups such as Al Queda and ISIS have put the nation almost on a perpetual war time footing since 2001. Recently, a watchdog organization that monitors hate groups and hate crimes in the US, the Southern Poverty Law Center, issued a report stating that the number of hate groups that exist in the US rose 14% from 2014 to 2015, mostly due controversies over immigration, newly legalized same-sex marriage, terrorism, and a counter movement against an African-American protest movement (“Black Live Matter”) against police brutality (Chokshi 2016). Many of these groups are claimed to have an extreme rightward orientation, although some consist of African- American separatist groups. The Southern Poverty Law Center also reported that the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) noted an increase in hate crimes against Muslims in 2015. 10 Fascism has been generally defined as a political and economic system which arises from national political and/or economic turmoil and wherein capitalism is seen as chaotic and has to be managed by a strong, nationalistic government led by elites which seeks to unite labor and upper class interests rather than try to exploit class struggle. The capitalist class, however, is allowed to retain its property rights and business interests, although it now has to submit to a “managed” form of capitalism in which industry is organized into large and cooperative cartels (Sabine and Thorson 1973, Carsten 1980, Renton 1999, Amin 2014). In return for full and steady employment, labor gives up its unions and a large number of its rights, which assists with an austerity efforts to balance national budgets and pay off debts. Such a compromise goes a long one in managing social spending that cannot keep up with the chaos (economic downturns), unemployment, poverty, and inequality brought about due to capitalism’s excesses (O’Connor 1973). Piketty (2014) acknowledges that much of the austerity movement in developed and developing countries has emanated from the fact that most bondholders are from the world’s wealthy and upper classes, and therefore, austerity is imposed to make sure that the debt is properly serviced and paid, even if it means harsh conditions for debtor nations. Fascism does seem plausible in other nations that are undergoing austerity due to having to repay debts to the IMF or other financial institutions. Repressive regimes could arise when faced with labor and working class strife arising from a negative reaction to austerity measures. Although there is a more remote chance in the US since many of its financial institutions hold such debt, it is not entirely out of the question. This is due to the possibility of chronic deficits and a debt level at 100% of GDP which the nation does not seem capable of adequately addressing in the current political climate. Inaction with regard to increasing taxes or significantly decreasing spending seems to be the norm now, although this may change if the 11 economy becomes very bad in the future. O’Connor (1973) speculates that greater and greater levels of social spending are necessary in a monopoly capitalist economy due to capitalist interests being able to shift more and more social problems on to the government (spending on unemployment, welfare, and job training, for example). Yet at the same time, capitalist interests resist greater levels of taxation. With the resistance to higher taxes and a rising budget defiti and debt level, austerity and cutbacks are the next option, which in turn could lead to a working class revolt. The reaction to such a revolt, could lead to some type of politically and economically repressive regime. This is a grim but possible scenario unfortunately. Table 1: Times Series, Least Squares Model 1: Dependent Variable is US Top 1% Income Shares including Capital Gains, 1929 to 2013 b (Newey-West standard errors) Constant -21.672 Econ Surplus as Pct. GDP 12.011*** (0.559) Adjusted r 2 : 0.883 n = 85 Model 2: Dependent Variable is Net Private Wealth as Pct. Of Income, 1929 to 2013 12 b (Newey-West standard errors) Constant -110.008 Econ Surplus as Pct. GDP 163.091*** (34.098) Adjusted r 2 : 0.731 n = 85 ***p < 0.01 y = 12.011x - 21.672 R² = 0.8847 0 5 10 15 20 25 0 1 2 3 4 Fig. 1: Econ Surplus (x) and Top 1% income & cap gains (y) Top 1% income inc cap gains Linear (Top 1% income inc cap gains) 13 References Alvaredo, Facundo, Tony Atkinson, Thomas Piketty , Emmanuel Saez and Gabriel Zucman. 2016. “World Wealth and Income Database”, http://www.wid.world/#Home: . Accessed on January 22, 2016. Amin, Samir. 2014. “The Return of Fascism in Contemporary Capitalism”, Monthly Review, 66(04) (September). http://monthlyreview.org/2014/09/01/the-return-of-fascism-in- contemporary-capitalism/ . Accessed on January 23, 2016. Andrews, Charles. 2014. “Professor Piketty Fights Orthodoxy and Attacks Inequality”, Marxism-Leninism Today. http://mltoday.com/professor-piketty-fights-orthodoxy-and-attacks- inequality . Accessed on January 10, 2016. Baran, Paul A. Paul M. Sweezy. 1966. Monopoly Capital: An Essay on the American Economic and Social Order. New York: Monthly Review Press. Carsten, F. L. 1980. The Rise of Fascism, Second Edition. University of California Press: Berkeley and Los Angeles. Collins, James C. 2001. Good to Great: Why Some Companies Make the Leap and Others Do Not. New York, NY: HarperCollins Publishers Inc. y = 163.09x - 110.01 R² = 0.7342 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 0.0% 100.0% 200.0% 300.0% 400.0% Fig. 2: Econ Surplus (x) and Private Wealth to Income % (y) Private Wealth to Income % Linear (Private Wealth to Income %) http://www.wid.world/#Home http://monthlyreview.org/2014/09/01/the-return-of-fascism-in-contemporary-capitalism/ http://monthlyreview.org/2014/09/01/the-return-of-fascism-in-contemporary-capitalism/ http://mltoday.com/professor-piketty-fights-orthodoxy-and-attacks-inequality http://mltoday.com/professor-piketty-fights-orthodoxy-and-attacks-inequality 14 Chemi, Eric and Ariana Giorgi. 2014. “The Pay-for-Performance Myth”, Bloomberg Business. July 22, 2014. http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2014-07-22/for-ceos-correlation- between-pay-and-stock-performance-is-pretty-random . Accessed on January 8, 2016. Chokshi, Niraj. 2016. “The Year of ‘Enormous Rage’: Number of Hate Groups Rose by 14 Percent in 2015”, The Washington Post, February 17, 2015. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/acts-of-faith/wp/2016/02/17/hate-groups-rose-14- percent-last-year-the-first-increase-since-2010/ . Accessed on February 18, 2016. Feldstein, Martin. 1999. “Reducing Poverty, Not Inequality”. The Public Interest, Number 137, Fall 1999. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research. http://www.nber.org/feldstein/pi99.html . Accessed on January 8, 2016. Foster, John Bellamy. 2014. The Theory of Monopoly Capitalism, Second Edition. New York: Monthly Review Press. Foster, J. B., and F. Magdoff. 2009. The great financial crisis: Causes and consequences. New York: Monthly Review Press. Foster, John Bellamy and Michael D. Yates. 2014. “Piketty and the Crisis of Neoclassical Economics”, Monthly Review, 66(6) (November): 1-24. http://monthlyreview.org/2014/11/01/piketty-and-the-crisis-of-neoclassical-economics/#fn55 . Accessed on January 10, 2016. Goo, Sarah Kehaulani. 2015. “What Americans want to do about illegal immigration”, Pew Research Center, Fact-tank. August 24, 2015. http://www.pewresearch.org/fact- tank/2015/08/24/what-americans-want-to-do-about-illegal-immigration/ . Accessed on January 23, 2016. Greenhouse, S., and D. Leonhard. 2006. Real wages fail to match a rise in productivity. The New York Times, August 28. Available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/28/business/28wages. html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. Houston, David. 1997. “Productive-Unproductive Labor: Rest in Peace,” Review of Radical Political Economics, 29(1): 131-139. Laibman, David. 1999. “Productive and Unproductive Labor: A Comment,” Review of Radical Political Economics, 31(2): 61-73. Lambert, Thomas E. 2011. Falling income and debt: Comparing views of a major cause of the Great Recession. World Review of Political Economy 2(2): 247-261. Lambert, Thomas E. and Edward Kwon. 2015a. “The Top 1 Percent and Exploitation Measures,” Review of Radical Political Economics, 47(3): 465-476. http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2014-07-22/for-ceos-correlation-between-pay-and-stock-performance-is-pretty-random http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2014-07-22/for-ceos-correlation-between-pay-and-stock-performance-is-pretty-random https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/acts-of-faith/wp/2016/02/17/hate-groups-rose-14-percent-last-year-the-first-increase-since-2010/ https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/acts-of-faith/wp/2016/02/17/hate-groups-rose-14-percent-last-year-the-first-increase-since-2010/ http://www.nber.org/feldstein/pi99.html http://monthlyreview.org/2014/11/01/piketty-and-the-crisis-of-neoclassical-economics/#fn55 http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/08/24/what-americans-want-to-do-about-illegal-immigration/ http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/08/24/what-americans-want-to-do-about-illegal-immigration/ 15 Lambert, Thomas E. and Edward Kwon. 2015b. “Monopoly Capital and Capitalist Inefficiency,” International Review of Applied Economics., 29(4): 1-20. Mongiovi, Gary. 2015. “Piketty on Capitalism and Inequality: A Radical Economics Perspective,” Review of Radical Economists, 47(4): 558-565. Mohun, Simon. 1996. “Productive and Unproductive Labor in the Labor Theory of Value", Review of Radical Political Economics, 28(4) (December): 30–54. ___________. 2014. “Unproductive Labor in the U.S. Economy, 1964-2010,” Review of Radical Political Economics, 46(3): 355-379. Newman, Benjamin J., Christopher D. Johnston and Patrick L. Lown. 2015. “False Consciousness or Class Awareness? Local Income Inequality, Personal Economic Position, and Belief in American Meritocracy”, American Journal of Political Science, 59 (2): 326–340. April 2015. Newport, Frank. 2015. “Americans Continue to Say U.S. Wealth Distribution Is Unfair”, Gallup Poll. May 4, 2015. http://www.ips-dc.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/CEO-stocking- stuffers-report.pdf . Accessed on January 4, 2016. O’Connor, James. 1973. The Fiscal Crisis of the State. St. Martin’s Press: New York. Patnaik, Prabhat. 2016. “Capitalism and Its Current Crisis”, Monthly Review, 67(8) January: 1- 13. Renton, Dave. 1999. Fascism : Theory and Practice. London: Pluto Press, 1999. eBook Collection (EBSCOhost), EBSCOhost (accessed January 21, 2016). Sabine, George H. and Thomas L. Thorson. 1973. A History of Political Theory, Fourth Edition. Dryden Press: Hinsdale, Illinois. Shaikh, Anwar and E. Ahmet Tonak. 1994. Measuring the Wealth of Nations: The Political Economy of National Accounts. New York: Cambridge University Press. Solt, Frederick. 2008. “Economic Inequality and Democratic Political Engagement”, American Journal of Political Science, 52(1): 48-60. January 2008. Studenmund, A. H. 2006. Using Econometrics: A Practical Guide, 5 th Edition. Pearson Education, Addison-Wesley: Boston, Massachusetts Sweezy, Paul M. 1970 (1942). The Theory of Capitalist Development: Principles of Marxian Political Economy. New York and London: Modern Reader Paperbacks and Monthly Review Press. http://www.ips-dc.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/CEO-stocking-stuffers-report.pdf http://www.ips-dc.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/CEO-stocking-stuffers-report.pdf 16 Talbot, Margaret. 2015. “The Populist Prophet”, The New Yorker. October 20, 2015. http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/10/12/the-populist-prophet . Accessed on January 4, 2016. U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. 2016. GDP and NIPA accounts. Available at http://www.bea.gov/national/index.htm#gdp. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. 2012. Labor force statistics. Available at http://www.bls.gov/cps/cpslutabs. Wolff, Edward N. 1987. Growth, Accumulation, and Unproductive Activity: An Analysis of the Postwar U.S. Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/10/12/the-populist-prophet http://www.bea.gov/national/index.htm#gdp http://www.bls.gov/cps/cpslutabs 
work_oz7zo2ggjnekpjiqrwlwdpddiq	----	‘He wasn’t nice to our country’: children’s discourses about the ‘glocalized’ nature of political events in the Global North BARLEY, Ruth <http://orcid.org/0000-0003-0958-9619> Available from Sheffield Hallam University Research Archive (SHURA) at: http://shura.shu.ac.uk/23666/ This document is the author deposited version. You are advised to consult the publisher's version if you wish to cite from it. Published version BARLEY, Ruth (2018). ‘He wasn’t nice to our country’: children’s discourses about the ‘glocalized’ nature of political events in the Global North. Global Studies of Childhood. Copyright and re-use policy See http://shura.shu.ac.uk/information.html Sheffield Hallam University Research Archive http://shura.shu.ac.uk http://shura.shu.ac.uk/ http://shura.shu.ac.uk/information.html ‘He wasn’t nice to our country’: Children’s discourses about the ‘glocalized’ nature of political events in the Global North Abstract: The accessibility of new media combined with emerging patterns of migration are challenging current definitions of community as we see a shift from close-knit face-to-face interactions to more diverse ‘glocalized’ networks that defines community as a social rather than a spatial dimension. These changes mean that social connections, and fundamentally a person’s sense of belonging, have moved beyond a local neighbourhood to depend upon global networks. This was the case for the children in the current longitudinal ethnographic study that followed one class in a diverse primary school in the north of England every two years from their Reception year to Year 6. This paper draws upon data collected while the children were in Year 6 aged10-11. It uncovers the range of linguistic and semiotic resources that the children used to communicate with their school peers about two recent political events in the Global North - namely the UK’s EU Referendum in 2016 that has resulted in Brexit and the US Presidential Election in late 2016 and Donald Trump’s Inauguration in early 2017. Unearthing the ‘glocalized’ discourses in the children’s narratives, this paper uncovers the connections that the children made between these political events and their nuclear family’s experiences living in the UK and their extended family’s experiences in their countries of origin. In providing an account of the children’s discourses surrounding these political events this paper uncovers the ways in which socio-political events of global significance become meaningful for this group of children and reveals that the children understand the global as situated; constructed within specific contexts and influenced by local interpretations. As the children orientate themselves to media depictions of these events their shifting perceptions of global politics alongside their intersecting experiences of racial, national and religious inequalities come to the fore in their peer interactions at school. Key words: Brexit, Donald Trump, children’s discourses, glocalized networks, translocal assemblage Introduction An anti-establishment revolt against the consequences of globalization has played out recently across the globe with the voting electorate reacting to the power held by the world’s global elite (Akbaba and Jeffrey 2017). Two notable political events in the Global North were the UK’s EU Referendum in 2016 resulting in Brexit1 and the US Presidential Election in late 2016 resulting in Donald Trump’s Inauguration in early 2017. In the UK concerns about immigration and multiculturalism have been cited as being important for those who voted to leave the EU (Hobolt 2016). Similarly concerns over access to healthcare and educational services due to (perceived) levels of immigration played a part in Trump’s election campaign in the USA (Rothwell and Diego-Rosell 2016). Inglehart and Norris (2016) argue that while economic inequality had a role to play in both Brexit and Trump’s election that the rise in nativism cannot be explained by this alone. Rather they argue that the diversity that globalization brings has unsettled the privileged majority in Western societies who resent being told that their traditional values are not politically correct resulting in sections of society feeling marginalized within their own countries. As Mendelsohn (2017:3) suggests, in the context of Brexit, exclusionary identity politics become dominant as ‘national identity seems to have become a mechanism through which our globalizing world is rejected, and familiarity and homogeneity are favored over difference.’ Consequently, these discourses have caused some to revert to a nativist rhetoric (Akbaba and Jeffrey 2017). Tragically, the open racist discourses that underpinned much of the campaigns for both Brexit and Trump have emboldened supporters resulting in a rise in racist attacks in the UK and USA post the respective elections (McCloskey 2017). The month after the EU referendum in the UK police in England and Wales reported a 41% increase in hate crime compared to the same month the year before (Corcoran and Smith 1 ‘Brexit’ is the colloquial term used to describe the UK’s exit from the EU. It stems from the term ‘Britain’s exit’ despite the fact that the UK as a whole is leaving the EU and not just Britain. If Britain, rather than the UK, were leaving the EU there would be no need for negotiations about a hard border on the island of Ireland which if implemented will undermine key principles in the Good Friday Agreement and risk stability in the region (Tonge 2016). This inaccurate conflation of the two terms Britain (comprising of England, Scotland and Wales) and the UK (which also includes Northern Ireland) is a widespread phenomenon. 2016). On 27th August 2016 a Polish national Arek Jozwik was brutally murdered in Harlow in the South of England in what is believed to have been a result of post-referendum racism (Krupa 2016). These attacks have not been limited to EU nationals who currently live in the UK but have also been directed towards non-EU Eastern European nationals as well as nationals from outside of Europe including refugees and asylum seekers. The charitable organisation Tell MAMA, which measures instances of anti-Muslim attacks in the UK, state that in the month following the EU referendum vote, there was a 44% rise in the number of anti-Muslim hate incidents reported to them. The majority of these attacks were directed at non-EU nationals wearing visible Muslim symbols, such as the hijab or burqa. It is important to note, however, that Tell MAMA do not believe that the EU referendum is the underlying cause of anti-Muslim hate crime in the UK but rather it has acted as a trigger for people with latent racial prejudices to feel emboldened to act on their views (Atta 2018). Activists have likened these racist attacks to those that were prevalent in the UK in the 1980s at the height of the Race Riots (Morrison 2016; Burnett 2017). The United Nations are concerned about this growing discrimination. At the end of her mission to the UK, the UN special rapporteur on racism stated that Brexit, coupled with other initiatives such as the controversial Prevent Strategy2, has sparked a grown in racial and religious intolerance in the UK (Achiume 2018). In the USA in the week following Donald Trump’s election the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC) recorded more than 200 complaints of hate crimes including swastikas being drawn on college campuses, female Muslim students being told to remove their hijabs or they would be set alight and children chanting ‘build that wall’ during their school lunch break (Reilly 2016). The SPLC reports that the rise in hate crimes in the immediate aftermath of Trump’s election was higher than the rise in hate crime just after 9/11 (Eversley 2016). 2The Prevent Strategy is part of the UK Government’s counter-terrorism strategy called Contest. Prevent places statutory duties on public organisations such as councils and schools to develop projects to reduce the risk of people becoming involved in terrorist activity. Prevent has been widely criticised by academics, practitioners, community leaders and trade unionists as unfairly targeting and stigmatising marginalised sections of UK- based Muslim communities, promoting division and facilitating discriminatory practices which have been epitomised in a number of high-profile cases some involving children as young as four (Stanford and Ahmed 2016). Children are not immune to these discourses. Wellman’s (2002) concept of ‘glocalized networks’ and McFarlane’s (2009) ‘translocal assemblage’ will be used in this paper to facilitate a focus on the ways in which the Brexit vote and Trump’s election became meaningful for a diverse group of children in a primary school setting in the north of England. Methodology This paper draws on data from a longitudinal ethnography following a primary school class in the north of England every two years from their Reception class (first year of compulsory education in England and Wales when the children were 4-5 years old) to Year 6 (last year of primary education in England and Wales when the children were 10 – 11 years old). The school, Sunnyside3 is a community school4 that is average in size and serves a deprived area of an inner-city in the north of England. Over the course of the seven-year study the total population of the school hovered just below or just over 200 pupils. The school has an attached nursery and therefore catered for children from the age of 3 to the age of 11. As with many inner-city schools in England the local population to the school is ethnically diverse and houses a large proportion of asylum seekers and refugees. This is also reflected in the school population where the majority of pupils are from minority ethnic groups speaking at least 15 different home languages. Many of those joining the school are new to the country, as well as to the school, and few speak English when they arrive. Many pupils are not at this school for the whole of their primary education; large numbers join and leave throughout the year. Many families are asylum seekers or refugees, and some pupils are children of international postgraduate and doctoral students studying at one of two local universities. The school was chosen for this longitudinal study because of its diverse and fluid nature. The central aim of the overall study was to trace children’s diverse identity narratives and their influence on peer friendships during their primary school years. This aim was achieved through the use of observations, participatory visual methods (with an accompanying 3 Pseudonyms are used throughout. 4 In England and Wales community schools are set up and maintained by the local authority, i.e. local government. unstructured or semi-structured interview to uncover emic perspectives) and unstructured interviews with school staff. Ethnographic fieldwork was undertaken every two years, i.e. when the children were in Reception (aged 4-5), Year 2 (aged 6-7), Year 4 (aged 8-9) and Year 6 (aged 10-11). The diversity and mobility of the school population created a unique context in which to study identity and peer friendships within a globalised context. This paper presents data relating to the children’s discourses about Brexit and Trump’s election from the final stage of fieldwork when the children were in their last year of primary school education (Year 6) aged 10 – 11 years old. At this stage of data collection fieldwork took place over an 8 month period and incorporated: • 21 participant observation sessions (totalling 63 hours) • Identity Mapping (participatory visual) activity accompanied by a semi-structured peer interview • four unstructured interviews with school staff During this fieldwork stage there were 29 children in the class: 18 boys and 11 girls. No children in the class had a parent who was born in the UK. A third of the children were from Somali refugee families with leave to remain in the UK while the remaining children were seeking asylum or in the UK on temporary family visas from a range of North African or Middle Eastern countries bar one who was from Eastern Europe. This paper draws on observational data captured in the classroom and in the playground. The fieldnote extracts included below are illustrative examples of the discourses that the children discussed in relation to the Brexit vote and Trump’s election. While I was a participant observer to these discussions and, as will be seen below, was at times actively included by the children in their conversations each of the extracts below records a discussion that was started by the children and was not prompted by a research question. As an ethnographer ‘hanging around’ in the field it was common for the children to involve me in their conversations in this way. Some key demographics for each of the seven children identified in these fieldnote extracts are outlined below: • Umar was born in the UK. His family left Somalia due to the Civil War and have leave to remain in the UK. Umar has been at Sunnyside since nursery. • Natif was also born in the UK. His family left Somalia due to the Civil War and have leave to remain in the UK. Natif arrived at Sunnyside School in 2015 at the start of the Year 5 school year. • Amira arrived with her family in the UK in 2014 from Iraq. They came so that her father could study at a nearby university. Amira joined Sunnyside in Year 4. The family went back to Iraq in the summer of 2017 just after the end of the school year. • Sabirah also arrived with her family in the UK in 2014 from Iraq so that her father could study at a nearby university. Sabirah’s father was friends with Amira’s father in Iraq. The two families came to the UK together and the two girls joined Sunnyside with their siblings at the same time. • Lina and her family arrived in the UK from Libya on a family visa in 2010 so that both of Lina’s parents could engage in post graduate studies. Lina’s family applied to stay in the UK when the Libyan Uprising began in 2011 and have been granted temporary leave to remain. She, and her family, have regular contact with extended family who are still in Libya. Lina has been at Sunnyside since nursery. • Cala was born in the UK. Her family have settled status in the UK after leaving Yemen. She has been at Sunnyside since nursery. • Dalmar was born in the UK. His family left Somalia due to the Civil War and have leave to remain in the UK. He has been at Sunnyside since Year 4. He has a number of cousins at the school including two in the class. Three out of these seven children took part in all four Stages of fieldwork (as part of the overall study), three took part in the final two stages of fieldwork (i.e. Year 4 and 6) and one child took part in the final stage. To add further context to the data extracts included below it is useful to note that all of these children are from practicing Muslim families and actively talked about their religious identities in their peer interactions. Data was analysed using LeCompte and Schensul’s (1999) three levels of inductive ethnographic analysis: the item; the pattern; and the constitutive. At the item level of analysis observational fieldnotes were searched for the following key terms: Brexit, EU, referendum, Article 50, USA, Trump, Clinton, Obama. Data that related to Brexit and Trump’s election were selected to take to Stage 2. At this stage patterns in the data were sought to identify key themes relating to these two political events. These themes were: views on Brexit, views on Trump, views on Clinton, views on Obama, racist discourses, anti-Muslim rhetoric and feeling unwelcome. At the final stage of analysis illustrative examples were selected that embodied these key themes. The illustrative examples are included in this paper. Ethical approval was gained from the university ethics board for each stage of data collection. Pseudonyms for the school and individual children are given throughout. A participatory approach was adopted where children were encouraged to direct the focus of the study and participate in designing research activities and collaboratively analysing the fieldwork data. For more information on how this was done during earlier stages of fieldwork see Author (2014). As Tanner (2017) encourages, I used my reflexive fieldnotes as a tool to analyse my own assumptions about ‘race’/ethnicity and religion in the attempt to make my own privilege visible both within data collection processes and through my writing. 'Reflect[ing] on where one is speaking from' (Raghavan 2017:192) in this way is key to enabling privilege to be named resulting in marginalised silences being given space in which they can be voiced. Children’s discourses on Brexit At different points during this stage of fieldwork the children expressed views on the EU referendum result and I was repeatedly asked which way I had voted gaining a favourable response when I replied that I had voted for the UK to remain in the EU. Some children also commented on specific aspects post the referendum, most notably the triggering of Article 50 of the Treaty of Lisbon. This Article gives all EU member states the right to leave the EU and outlines the procedures that are involved in doing this including a two-year period in which an exit deal can be negotiated. As Dalmar and Umar explain below the UK triggered Article 50 on Wednesday 29th March 2017: I am standing next to the tall wire fence at the school end of the playground as the children run outside. Dalmar and Umar come up to me and Umar asks ‘Do you know what is happening on Wednesday? Its important for us all.’ I think for a minute about what is happening in the school this week before drawing a blank so ask them ‘What’s happening?’ ‘Article 505 is being triggered’, Umar tells me. ‘Do you know what it is?’ Dalmar ask me. ‘Yes,’ I tell them, ‘It starts the process of [Britain] leaving the EU.’ ‘It’s a bad thing,’ comments Umar.’ ‘Yes, its not good,’ agrees Dalmar. ‘Why do you think its bad?’ Umar asks turning to Dalmar. ‘I think its bad cause…’ starts Dalmar before pausing. ‘I think…’ jumps in Umar. ‘You asked Dalmar the question,’ I tell Umar, ‘Let him answer!’ ‘I think its bad for the European people who live here,’ continues Dalmar, ‘and for their children who will have to change school.’ ‘Also, it will be bad for terror attacks like last Wednesday [Westminster Bridge attack in London]. We will be more vulnerable to terror attacks. Do you know they aren’t letting people take laptops on planes?’ Sabirah and Cala who are passing us stop. Cala asks ‘Who? Muslims?’ ‘No everyone from some countries in the Middle East,’ replies Dalmar. ‘What kind of things can’t you take?’ asks Sabirah.’ ‘Anything bigger than a normal phone; Umar chips in, ‘I think an iPhone 2 is too big.’ The girls run off together and Dalmar chases Khaleed who has just run past us. Fieldnote extract: 27th March 2017 This extract not only reveals an understanding of political events that were happening that week but also highlights that the children viewed the implications of Brexit in light of wider events of national importance such as the Westminster Bridge in London attack that had taken place the week before on 22nd March 2017. Due to the extent of the attack, injuries to 5 Article 50 is the article in the Lisbon Treaty that needs to be triggered to start the process for a member state to leave the EU. the general public (including five fatalities) and the background of the attacker being widely, and uncritically, reported as an ‘Islamist terrorist’ this event dominated the UK’s media for a period of time. During other participant observations both Dalmar and Umar, as well as other children, commented seeing footage of this event on news channels with some expressing concern about how ‘Muslims like me’ or ‘Muslims like us’ are being talked about. In some cases the ‘us’ discussed here referred to the individual and their school peers, in other instances to the individual and their family and in other cases to ‘our Muslim brothers’ invoking an understanding of the Arabic concept of Ummah. In relation to Brexit, children also discussed hearing reports of the impact of Brexit on the news. Those who did mention their parents’ views clearly stated that if they were able to vote they had voted to remain in the EU and if they were not eligible to vote that they thought that Brexit was a negative thing. Dalmar’s comments about ‘children who will have to change school’ was echoed by other children in the class who worried that they and their family may have to leave the UK after Brexit and consequently they may have to leave their friends behind. These worries were felt quite strongly even though none of the children in the class were EU citizens. When prompted about why they thought this, children commented that ‘people on the TV say that people who look like me should go away’ or ‘I’ve heard some people telling other people to, ‘Go home’.’ The wider nativist discourses, that contained racist undertones, and were repeatedly reported in the media at the time of the Brexit vote had filtered down into children’s experiences. It was also widely reported at this time by local and national media outlets that there had been a rise in racist hate attacks post the referendum targeting Eastern European migrants (EU citizens and non-EU citizens alike) and ethnic minorities who were not European. Returning to the playground on 27th March, after Sabirah, Cala and Dalmar leave to play elsewhere Umar and I continue to discuss Article 50: I turn to Umar and ask him, ‘What do you think about Article 50?’ ‘I think its bad,’ he replies. ‘Why?’ I prompt. ‘Because people like Professors and Doctors and nurses and teachers can’t get jobs.’ ‘Can’t get jobs here or in Europe?’ I ask. ‘They can’t come here and get jobs. Maybe my mum couldn’t come and get a job here now,’ Umar explains. ‘You know I asked someone the other day if they knew who the Prime Minister was and they said David Cameron!’ He laughs at this. ‘Who did you ask?’ I reply. ‘A boy,’ he tells me, ‘but not one here.’ ‘Who is the Prime Minister?’ I ask. ‘Theresa May,’ he replies while rolling his eyes. ‘What do you think of her?’ I ask him. ‘I don’t like her cause she’s triggering Article 50’ I ask him. ‘Does your mum still work in the polling station?’ I ask him. ‘She wants to change,’ he replies. ‘She did the Brexit one didn’t she?’ I ask. ‘Yes,’ he replies, ‘Did you see her?’ ‘No, I tell him, ‘I went to a different one but I remember you telling me on the day of the vote when you were in Y5. You asked me if I had voted and I said I was going to vote when I left the school.’ ‘Which polling station?’ Umar asks. ‘One behind the train station,’ I reply. ‘Yes, that’s not my mum’s,’ he tells me. Fieldnote extract: 27th March 2017 Despite not being an EU citizen, Umar questions if his mum would be able to work in the UK if the family were to move over now. Putting aside the fact that Umar’s family arrived as refugees and therefore were, and as things currently stand would be, treated differently from economic migrants Umar had picked up on a wider discourse relating to the Leave Campaign’s discourses about immigration levels and the economic impact of this. While, as stated above, this does not fully explain the Brexit vote it does remain a feature of it. Other children in the class expressed similar concerns particularly those whose family had moved to the UK for economic reasons making comments such as ‘Why don’t people want my dad to work here?’ or ‘My mum is a doctor and helps people but some people don’t like it.’ These discourses need to be viewed in the wider local context and experiences that some children in the class have had of frequent right-wing marches in their neighbourhoods. In previous stages of this longitudinal study, some children reported racist incidents at the time of these marches such as ‘Someone pulled off my Auntie’s hijab’, ‘A man spat at my sister and shouted’ or ‘People were banging our letterbox and shouting bad things.’ Children’s discourses on Trump’s election Trumps election in the USA also featured in some children’s discourses. All the children who commented on this event expressed their dislike of him: I am sitting at the back of the classroom next to the reading corner watching the children working at their desks. There is a ‘hum’ of quiet chatter as the class are working. One or two students are moving around. Natif finishes the task and leans over to pick up an old copy of a ‘First News’ school paper. On the front cover the main story there are two large pictures: one of Hilary Clinton and the other of Donald Trump. The text above the pictures reads ‘89% of school children would have voted for Clinton. 11% for Trump. Natif points to the picture of Hilary Clinton, ‘I would have voted for her’, he tells me before asking, ‘Would you have?’ ‘So would I,’ I reply before asking, ‘Why did you want her?’ Natif points to the picture of Donald Trump, ‘He says bad things about Muslims.’ ‘Do you mean ‘cause he’s racist?’ I ask. ‘Racist?’ Natif replies, ‘You mean he’s religionist.’ I nod in agreement. Fieldnote extract: 27th March 2017 Some children engaged in acts of resistance against Trump with comments such as ‘I drew a poo in Trump’s mouth.’ while showing me a photograph of Trump that they had edited. Others expressed very strong feelings about him such as ‘I hate him with all my heart.’ While none of the children explicitly mentioned Trump’s discriminatory ‘Muslim Ban’ these children attributed their dislike of Trump to his negative view of Muslims saying things like ‘he doesn’t like Muslims’ or ‘he isn’t nice to people like me.’ The fieldnote extract below involves three girls in the class: Lina, who originates from Libya, and Amira and Sabirah, who are both from Iraq. While the three girls all criticise Trump, they express different views of Barak Obama dependant on the relationship that he had with their country of origin: I leave the dinner hall and go back to the playground. I walk to the wall and lean on it watching a group of children playing football. Lina comes up to me with Amira. ‘MacDonald is a Scottish name isn’t it?’ Lina asks me. ‘Yes,’ I reply. ‘Do you know how I know?’ she asks. ‘How?’ I reply. ‘Cause of Ronald MacDonald,’ she tells me. ‘Do you know what Mac means?’ I ask. ‘No,’ she replies. ‘It means son of,’ I tell her, ‘so MacDonald is son of Donald.’ ‘Not son of Donald Trump!’ exclaims Amira. ‘No,’ I reply laughing. ‘I don’t like him,’ Amira tells me. Sabirah (who has just joined us) says, ‘I wouldn’t have voted for him. He’s a racist.’ ‘I wouldn’t vote for him either,’ I tell them6. ‘Obama is better,’ Lina tells us all. ‘In some things,’ Amira says slowly. ‘He wasn’t nice to our country [Iraq],’ Sabirah replies indicating to herself and Amira. ‘Mmmm,’ I reply. ‘He wasn’t good to Iraq,’ Amira interjects, ‘He did some good things but some bad things too.’ ‘He gave money to Libya which was good,’ Lina replies.’ Fieldnote extract: 23rd January 2017 As can be seen in this extract, all three girls have an understanding of how American actions have impacted on their countries of origin and have used these events to construct their evaluation of whether Obama’s actions were ‘good’ or ‘bad’. While at this point in time, just over a month after Trump’s inauguration, Trump had not had any high-profile contact with either Iraq or Libya the three girls express a general dislike of him. Interestingly, in comparison to Natif’s assertion above that Trump is ‘religionist’ Sabirah calls Trump ‘racist’ in this conversation. Glocalized networks and children’s discourses about political events in the Global North Contemporary urban settings in the UK, such as the one in the Sunnyside catchment area, are increasingly characterised by the global and ‘superdiverse’ nature of their populations where ‘new, small and scattered, multiple-origin, transnationally connected, socioeconomically differentiated and legally stratified immigrants’ (Vertovec 2007:1024) have arrived and settled (Vertovec 2007; 2017; Blommaert & Rampton, 2011). ‘To acknowledge superdiversity is to recognise that more attention needs to be paid to the diverse social and cultural issues that pattern childhood and the communication economy in which they are embedded’ (Author 2016:478). 6 While I normally did not make my views known to the children unless they asked me a direct question in cases were discriminatory views were discussed (or in some instances expressed) I felt that it was always important to challenge discriminatory discourses. Brown’s (2007) work supports this approach by saying that quick responses that promote equality and inclusion are needed in situations like this to send clear messages to children. Sending this message was more important to me throughout the course of my fieldwork than collecting data. In his seminal work on globalization, Appadurai (1996) highlights how the influence of mass migration and new media have redefined patterns of self-representation and reconceptualised the notion of the local. Building on this, Wellman (2002:14) coined the term ‘glocalized networks’ to refer to the ways in which communities have become defined through their social connections rather than spatially arguing that an individual’s sense of belonging is increasingly dependent on ‘place-to-place connectivity, and not door-to-door’. Similar to the young people in Rowell and Burgess’ (2014) study, the children in the current study developed ‘glocalized networks’ by drawing on linguistic and semiotic resources in communicating with their school peers about the Brexit vote in the UK and Trump’s election in the USA connecting these two events to their own national, religious and racial identities as well as to their families’ experiences both in the UK and their countries of origin. At an earlier stage of fieldwork, during the children’s Reception year, some of the children in the class who originated from Libya, including Lina, likewise drew on a wide range of linguistic and semiotic resources to talk to their peers in England about the Libyan Uprising in 2011. As children from the Libyan Diaspora ‘orientate[d] themselves to media depictions of ‘the naughty person’ (Gaddafi) their sense of ‘home’ and shifting perceptions of what it mean[t] to be Muslim, [they] act[ed] these out in the day-to-day … interactions and structured learning activities at their ‘local’ primary school [in England] (Author 2016: 451- 452). In this instance the children from the Libyan Diaspora were not only influenced by family and peer relationships but also by ‘new media.’ The dynamic nature of the Libyan Uprising, which had direct consequences for some of the children’s extended families, left a mark on the children’s peer interactions at school. As fieldwork progressed and the children got older those whose families had settled permanently in the UK started to take an interest in political events in the UK both in terms of General Elections (discussed elsewhere) and, as this paper shows, the Brexit vote. As research has shown, ‘national consciousness and childhood are viewed as mutually constitutive’ (Cangià 2017:7) where children can actively make sense of their identity, including negotiating any contradictions between discourses, within an identity negotiation process (Pache-Huber and Spyrou 2012). All of the children in the fieldnote extracts relating to Brexit self-defined as having a composite British or English identity alongside a country outside of Europe, for example as English Somali. Having situated themselves in this way they then felt a contradiction after the EU referendum with promotion of the nativist and racist discourses that they had been exposed to. Despite these children’s self-defined composite national identities, they felt, as Mendelsohn (2017:3) describes, rejection by exclusionary identity politics and associated discourses that have been repeatedly and publicly stated post the EU referendum in the UK. As we have seen above, children with no legal EU status feared that they and their families may have to leave the UK due to Brexit. As non-EU nationals including, like many of the children in the class, refugees and asylum seekers repeatedly reported being subject to hate attacks following the referendum (Morrison 2016; Burnett 2017) sadly the children’s fears have a clear basis within the Brexit discourse and the ‘hostile environment’ immigration policy that is being promoted by the UK Conservative government. As we have seen, these children are influenced not only by the relationships that they have with their families and their peers but also by the media and the dominant discourses that are promoted via it. McFarlane’s (2009) concept of the ‘translocal assemblage’ can help us to understand this situation. In an attempt to counter homogeneity McFarlane rejects the idea of the global as an undifferentiated universal space and replaces this with an understanding of the global as situated and consequently as constructed within specific contexts. ‘Translocal assemblage’ is therefore influenced by local interpretations. Within the context of this study, the notion of ‘translocal assemblage’ is helpful in accounting for the ways in which socio-political events of global significance, such as Brexit and Trump’s election in the USA, become meaningful for a group of children in a primary school in the north of England. As children are exposed to wider discourses relating to shifting perceptions of what it means to be Muslim, an immigrant or a refugee their sense of home is brought into question. Trump’s election, which can be viewed as a spatially distant socio-political event, as defined by Wellman (2002), also became salient for some of the children in the class. The children identified racist or ‘religionist’ discourses in Trump’s election campaign that deeply concerned them particularly in relation to the marginalisation of Muslims. We have also seen, in the data extracts above, that some children were aware of how political decisions in other parts of the world, namely in the USA under Obama’s administration, impacted on their countries of origin. This was the case for both children of families who had settled permanently in the UK and those who were planning to return to their country of origin. The consequences of these globally significant events have impacted on this group of children’s peer interactions in a local school context and influenced their discourses relating to national, religious and racial identities. Consequently, the children’s networks are ‘glocalized’ as their sense of belonging has become dependant on social connections rather than spatial proximity. Conclusion This paper adds to previous ethnographic work by showing how salient socio-political evants can be in young children’s identity narratives and how these events can influence their sense of belonging. Within the dynamic contexts of the Brexit vote in the UK and Trump’s election in the USA socio-political dynamics came to the fore in children’s discourses relating to national, religious and racial identities as they linked global contexts to their local experiences. It is important to note that the children’s exposure to and understanding of the implications of political events has broadened as they have progressed through their primary school education. As we have seen, during an earlier stage of this study, while in their Reception class, some children were aware of volatile events in their country of origin and its impact on their family (Author 2016). Now that the children are older they are also aware of political events in their host and other Western countries and are able to link these events to their own and their family’s experiences both in the UK and their country of origin. While this paper has focussed on children’s discourses relating to two nativist votes it is also important to note that in latter stages of this longitudinal ethnography (Year 4 and in Year 6) the children also discussed the impact UK General Elections would, and then did, have on their families and communities both in the UK and their countries of origin revealing a wider interest in political events in the host country. As Schaull (2006:16) stated in his introduction to Paulo Friere’s ‘Pedagogy of the Oppressed’ stated: ‘Education either functions as an instrument that is used to facilitate the integration of the younger generation into the logic of the present system and bring about conformity to it, or it becomes ‘the practice of freedom’, the means by which men and women deal critically and creatively with reality and discover how to participate in the transformation of their world.’ The findings of this study have clear implications for the role of education in a post-Brexit/ post-Trump era. Countering the nativist discourses that have become socially acceptable within some communities and have, as we have seen, such a profound impact on children’s sense of belonging is essential to ensure children’s wellbeing. As McCloskey (2017) argues these social attitudes are poisonous and need to be countered via the values that underpin development educational curriculums. Until education policies and practices critically unpick structures of privilege, such as those that have been displayed since the Brexit vote in the UK and Trump’s election in the USA, power differentials will be replicated and maintained and consequently children will continue to be marginalised in what is becoming a more hostile immigration environment. Reference list Achiume, T. (2018) End of Mission Statement of the Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance at the Conclusion of Her Mission to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. OHCHR. Available at: http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=23073&LangID=E Akbaba, Y. and Jeffrey, B. (2017) The implications of ‘new populism’ for education. London: E&E publishing. Appadurai, A. (1996) Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 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(2016) Post-election spate of hate crimes worse than post-9/11, experts say. USA Today. Available at: https://eu.usatoday.com/story/news/2016/11/12/post-election- spate-hate-crimes-worse-than-post-911-experts-say/93681294/ . http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=23073&LangID=E https://tellmamauk.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/Tell-MAMA-Report-2017.pdf https://tellmamauk.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/Tell-MAMA-Report-2017.pdf https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/559319/hate-crime-1516-hosb1116.pdf https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/559319/hate-crime-1516-hosb1116.pdf https://eu.usatoday.com/story/news/2016/11/12/post-election-spate-hate-crimes-worse-than-post-911-experts-say/93681294/ https://eu.usatoday.com/story/news/2016/11/12/post-election-spate-hate-crimes-worse-than-post-911-experts-say/93681294/ Hobolt, S. (2016) The Brexit vote: a divided nation, a divided continent. Journal of European Public Policy, 23(9), 1259-1277. Inglehart, R. and Norris, P. (2016) Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Populism: Economic Have- Nots and Cultural Backlash. HKS Working Paper No. RWP16-026. Available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2818659 Krupa, J. (2016) The killing of a Polish man exposes the reality of post-referendum racism. The Guardian. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/sep/05/death-arkadiusz-jozwik-post- referendum-racism-xenophobes-brexit-vote . Le Compte, M. and Schensul, J. (1999) Analyzing and interpreting ethnographic data. London, Altamira Press. McCloskey, S. (2017) Brexit, Trump and Development Education. Policy and Practice: A Development Education Review, 24(1):159-168. McFarlane, C. (2009) Translocal assemblages: space, power and social movements. Geoforum 40(4): 561-567. Mendelsohn R. (2017) Transforming the state, challenging the nation: the role of identity politics in the Brexit vote. Political Science Honors Projects. 65. Available at: http://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/poli_honors/65. Morrison, J. (2016) Break-point for Brexit? How UKIP's image of 'hate' set race discourse reeling back decades. In Jackson, D., Thorsen, E. and Wing, D. (eds.) EU referendum analysis 2016: media, voters and the campaign [online]. Poole: Bournemouth University, Centre for the study of journalism, culture and community, page 66-67. Available from: http://bit.ly/EUReferendumAnalysis2016_Jackson-Thorsen-and-Wring_v1 Pache-Huber V and Spyrou S (2012) Introduction: Children’s interethnic relations in everyday life—Beyond institutional contexts. Childhood: A Global Journal of Child Research 19(3): 291–301. Raghavan A. (2017) Towards Corporeal Cosmopolitanism: Performing Decolonial Solidarities. London: Rowman & Littlefield. https://ssrn.com/abstract=2818659 https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/sep/05/death-arkadiusz-jozwik-post-referendum-racism-xenophobes-brexit-vote https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/sep/05/death-arkadiusz-jozwik-post-referendum-racism-xenophobes-brexit-vote http://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/poli_honors/65 http://bit.ly/EUReferendumAnalysis2016_Jackson-Thorsen-and-Wring_v1 Reilly, K. (2016) Racist Incidents Are Up Since Donald Trump's Election. Time Magazine. Available at: http://time.com/4569129/racist -anti-semitic-incidents-donald-trump/ Rothwell, J. and Diego-Rosell, P. (2016) Explaining Nationalist Political Views: The Case of Donald Trump. Available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2822059 Rowsell, J. & Burgess, J. (2014) ‘A tale of Multiple Selves: Im/materializing Identities on Facebook.’ In Burnett, C., Davies, J., Merchant, G. & Rowsell, J. (eds) New Literacies Around the Globe: Policy and Pedagogy, Routledge, London. Shaull, R. (2006) Foreword to Pedagogy of the oppressed, by P. Freire. New York: Continuum. Stanford, B., & Ahmed, Y. (2016). The Prevent Strategy: The Human Rights Implications of the United Kingdom's Counter-Radicalisation Policy. Questions of International Law. 24: 35- 58. Tanner, S. (2017) Killing Victoria: improvisational and emergent teaching and learning. Ethnography and Education, 1-14 [available online before print version]. DOI: 10.1080/17457823.2017.1287581 Tonge, J. (2016). The impact of withdrawal from the European Union upon Northern Ireland. The Political Quarterly, 87(3), 338-342. Vertovec, S. (2007) Super-diversity and its implications. Ethnic and Racial Studies. 30(6): 1024-1054. Vertovec, S. (2017) Talking around super-diversity. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 1-15. [available online before print version]. DOI: 10.1080/01419870.2017.1406128. Wellman, B. (2002) ‘Little boxes, glocalization, and networked individualism’. In Tanabe, M., Besselaar, P. & Ishida, T. (eds.), Digital cities II: Computational and sociological approaches. Berlin: Springer. http://time.com/4569129/racist-anti-semitic-incidents-donald-trump/ https://ssrn.com/abstract=2822059 https://doi.org/10.1080/17457823.2017.1287581 https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2017.1406128 
work_ozdbwjble5edtabdisnnytu4mi	----	NPS_2000021 221..239 SPECIAL ISSUE ARTICLE Neglect, Marginalization, and Abuse: Hate Crime Legislation and Practice in the Labyrinth of Identity Politics, Minority Protection, and Penal Populism Andras L. Pap* Centre for Social Sciences, Budapest, Hungary; Eötvös University, Budapest, Hungary; National University of Public Service, Budapest, Hungary *Corresponding author. Email: pap.andras.laszlo@gmail.com Abstract Using Hungary as a case study and focusing on legislative policies and the practical application of hate crime legislation, this article shows the various ways legal policy can become misguided in the labyrinth of identity politics, minority protection, and penal populism. The first mistake states can make, the author argues, is not to adopt hate crime legislation. The second error arguably pertains to conceptualizing hate crimes as an identity protection but not a minority-protection mechanism and instrument. The third fallacy the author identifies concerns legislative and practical policies that conceptualize victims based on self-identification and not on the perpetrator’s (or the wider community’s) potential perception and classification. The fourth flaw concerns the abuse of the concept of hate crime when it is applied in interethnic conflicts wherein members of minority communities are perpetrators and the victims are members of the majority commu- nities. The fifth is institutional discrimination through the systematic underpolicing of hate crimes. Keywords: hate crimes; identity politics; vulnerability; ethnicity; minority rights; race Introduction Focusing on legislative policies and patterns surrounding the practical application of hate crimes, this article contributes to the ever-complex puzzle of how law conceptualizes and operationalizes race and ethnicity as well as ethno-racial identity. The article will begin by introducing the concept, rationale, and uniqueness of hate crimes. This is followed by an overview of the history of the development of legislative implementation of hate crime provisions worldwide, followed by an identification of some essential questions pertaining to the concept and definition of hate crimes that trigger academic interest and professional (practical) debates. Building on these, as well on the author’s personal experiences as an academic involved with the work of a human rights NGO coalition in Hungary, the author sets forth the definitive issues and dilemmas regarding the concept and definition of hate crimes that are arguably (1) instrumental for theoretically sound and practically efficient policy making and (2) the cornerstone of law enforcement and judicial practice. As for methodology, despite references and examples brought from this country, the article is not an empirical analysis or critical assessment of the legal practice in Hungary, but rather an inquiry on the general conceptual framework and context of a “politically and socially significant term [… and] an umbrella concept with the capacity to unite disparate social movements and to direct attention toward the collective experiences of minority groups and the commonalities in their victimization” (Chakraborti and Garland 2012, 500). © Association for the Study of Nationalities 2020. This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. Nationalities Papers (2021), 49: 2, 221–239 doi:10.1017/nps.2020.21 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:21, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use. https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4546-6632 mailto:pap.andras.laszlo@gmail.com http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://doi.org/10.1017/nps.2020.21 https://www.cambridge.org/core The second part of the article shows the various ways law (and the state) can be misguided in the labyrinthofidentitypolitics,minorityprotection,andpenalpopulism.The firstmistakestatescanmake is not to adopt hate crime legislation. The second error arguably pertains to conceptualizing hate crimes as an identity-protection and not a minority-protection mechanism and instrument. The third fallacy concerns legislative or practical policies that conceptualize victims based on self-identification and not the perpetrator’s (or the wider community’s) potential perception and classification. The fourth issue concernsinstitutionaldiscriminationthroughthesystematicunderpolicingof hatecrimes.Andthefifth problem is an abuse of the concept of hate crime when it is applied in interethnic conflicts wherein members of minority communities are perpetrators and the victims are members of the majority. The core argument of the article is that hate crimes are and should only be minority—and not identity—protection mechanisms. The discussion is necessitated by the fact that inappropriate tailoring of criminal measures can both raise rule of law concerns and impede the initial goal of the legislative measure. Although more and more states legislate against hate crimes and the catalogue of protected characteristics as well as the formats of the legislation are diversifying, the rudimentary question of whom hate crime legislation targets is still under consideration in the literature, as well as in the political discourse. Triggered by experiences in Hungary, a country with an extensive hate crime legislation record followed by a very controversial operationalization, the goal of the article is to present some of the ongoing debates and persistent pitfalls, while also providing an addition to the scarce literature on the legislation and practice, as well as conceptualizations of hate crime outside of the Western, English-speaking world. This article considers the question of whom hate crimes legislation should target from a doctrinal perspective and agrees with Bakalis (2017) that a principled way of deciding the characteristics of hate crime is required. It will conclude that the core concern of hate crime legislation is with the furthering of the broader minority rights agenda. Hate Crimes: Conceptualizations and Definitions Defining hate crimes is not a straightforward task. This is especially true for the purposes of this article, which struggles with the paradox that, while it raises general points for discussion, talking about legislative policies will always need to have specific jurisdictions and textual language as points of reference. It is often said that hate crimes are more a concept than a strict legal definition. The general idea is simple: the state introduces stricter penal sanctions for criminal activity with a specific type of motivation. Thus, hate crimes will entail a base crime, an already punishable criminal offence (.e.g., intimidation, threats, assault, murder, property damage, vandalism, arson, etc.), and a specific motivation of bias or hatred against certain predefined groups with protected characteristics (e.g., race, religion, ethnicity, nationality, sexual orientation, disability, etc.). Tech- nically, hate crime provisions can constitute separate criminal offences or take the form of penalty enhancements, aggravating sentencing clauses or aggravating circumstance clauses. Even though “hate” is most commonly used as a signifier for the offense, the intention to cause harm is understood to include motivations led by an emotionally neutral bias, when the victim is selected because of her presumed (either actual or mistaken) membership in a specific group. Acknowledging apparent similarities and overlaps, academic literature habitually distinguishes between broader and narrower conceptualizations of hate crimes, the latter not including terrorism, genocide, various forms of hate speech, and gender-based violence, thereby also excluding honor crimes and domestic violence. This article limits the discussion on hate crimes to physically violent behavior targeting members of vulnerable minority communities (identified as such by the offender). The Rationale The reason why legislators opt for enhanced sanctioning of hate (or bias) crimes is manifold: such violence is always oppressive in the sense that it reconstructs the prevailing structures of oppression 222 Andras L. Pap Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:21, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use. https://www.cambridge.org/core and reinforces the boundaries of difference. Hate crimes are message crimes, “reminders” of the victim’s “place” in society. Hate crimes are also considered toxic because the victims are interchange- able—being targeted because of what and not who they are. And since they are usually only “at the wrong place at the wrong time,” traditional crime prevention measures are particularly ineffective. Hate crimes may intimidate entire communities through harm caused to individual victims and, by causing unrest, harm the entire society. A further argument for introducing hate crime provisions is that racism, homophobia, xenophobia, and the like are among the beliefs that cannot be tolerated in liberal democracies, and states have a duty to combat these with all applicable means. Schweppe (2012, 174–176) argues thathatecrimes are theultimate victim-ledoffences,asgenerally criminal law ranks offenses by assessing objective severity (e.g., assault, assault causing harm, assault causing serious harm). Hate crimes are punished more harshly due to the motivation of the offender, the subjective experience of the victim, and the impact the crime has on the community with which the victim identifies. Thus, hate crimes differ from other crimes most of all from the perspective of victims, in that they target offenses where victims were chosen not because of who they are but rather because of their actual or presumed membership in a particular group. As for the perpetrator, the specific victim is deindividualized and immaterial, and victims are interchangeable. According to Chakraborti and Garland (2012, 500), there is no universal definition for hate crimes, but leading authority Barbara Perry argued that “it involves acts of violence and intimida- tion, usually directed toward already stigmatised and marginalised groups. As such, it is a mechanism of power and oppression, intended to reaffirm the precarious hierarchies that charac- terise a given social order” (2001, 10). Critics of hate crime legislation argue that the very concept is built on policing thought and punishing (more severely) one’s values and bad character, which, principles aside, are actually not necessarily within the control of the individual and thus lack culpability, a general requirement for criminal sanctioning. They also claim that bad character is bound for criticism, not punishment, which is essentially illiberal and violates state’s commitment to political neutrality, and criminal law, being an ultima ratio tool of social control, is not adequate to remedy to such social problems (Swiffen 2018; Weinstein 1992). Debates and Critical Issues As we will see, the concept of hate crimes raises many theoretical questions with practical implica- tions: (1) What is the moral and political basis of this heightened legal protection? That is, are hate crimes essentially minority- or identity-protection mechanisms? Is there a requirement for the protected characteristic to be inducing somesort of social vulnerability, or is any form of victimization related to any form and type of characteristic the individual considers relevant to her personality worthy of protection? (2) Even if we single out certain identities, such as race, ethnicity, religion, or sexual orientation, does belonging to the majority exclude victimization? In other words, if a group of African Americans attack a white person (because of her being white), should the perpetrators be sentenced more severely? Also, what happens if the group happens to be the majority locally but a minority in the national setting? Furthermore, can members of right-wing majority extremist hate groups qualify as hate crime victims if attacked by members of an ethno-racial minority group? (3) How should membership in the predefined protected groups be ascertained? That is, does self- identification of the victim or the (even potentially mistaken) perception of the offender or the majority community matter more? (5) Furthermore, how are open-ended lists or vaguely defined criteria for protected characteristics, as often and laudably applied in antidiscrimination legislative frameworks, compatible with the principle of nullum crimen sine lege? It should be emphasized that legislators are not in an easy position, as group sensitivities, the complexities of identity politics, and the struggle for symbolic recognition create a political minefield. In what follows, the article will first elaborate some of the above issues and questions and subsequently provide a list of recommendations for legislators on how to avoid political, ethical, and conceptual mistakes. Nationalities Papers 223 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:21, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use. https://www.cambridge.org/core The History of Hate Crime Legislation The concept (and policy) of hate crimes has triggered fierce debates in legal theory and criminology since the 1990s, with dozens of monographs, edited volumes, and hundreds of articles being published on this topic (e.g., Aaronson 2014; Altschiller 2015; Bean 2017; Chakraborti 2010; Chakraborti and Garland 2014; Hall et al. 2015; Hudson 2009; Jacobs and Potter 2001; Jenness and Grattet 2004; Kelly 1993; Levin and McDevitt 1993; Perry 2001). Yet this academic activity has failed to generate a similarly intense public debate. In fact, hate crime legislation is an international success story, with more and more states adopting such provisions, and it is safe to say that it has reached the level of international custom. International organizations such as the OSCE (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe) and the EU have been committed advocates to promote hate crime legislation.1 According to the UN Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute training manual, the concept of hate crime firstly emerged in Europe in the year 1990. In the Copenhagen Document, States participating in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) pledged to take effective measures to provide adequate defense against acts that can constitute incitement to violence against individuals or groups based on national, racial, ethnic or religious discrimination, hostility or hate. […] The term hate crime was officially used for the first time in 2003 by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), at the Ministerial Council Meeting in Maastricht, when States underlined the key role that hate crime legislation plays in ensuring that the criminal justice system has the authority to investigate, prosecute and impose sentences for crimes fuelled by intolerance and discrimination. In 2010, the Astana Declaration issued at the end of the OSCE High-Level Conference on Tolerance and Non-discrimination reiterated commitments and concerns about hate crimes, including those based on racism or xenophobia. (UNIERI n.d., 7) Hate crime legislation seems to be a standard, though not universal, part of criminal legislation. For example, in the USA, the federal government and 48 states have now adopted different variations of hate crime statutes (Walker 2017, 1417). The first wave of hate crime legislation was introduced to combat violence motivated by racism and xenophobia. While in the USA these laws emerged out of the civil rights movement, in Europe it was a response to the victimization of ethnic groups during the Second World War. Following their institutionalization, and as a result of claims made by other minority groups, western democracies further expanded the catalogue of protected grounds (Godzisz n.d., 1; Gerstenfeld 2004). Following, race, ethnicity, religion, sexual orientation, gender identity, disability, alternative subcultures (e.g., Garland 2011), homelessness (e.g., Newburn and Rock 2004), sex workers (e.g., O’Doherty 2011), age, political affiliation, and personal appearance was recognized by legislatures and academic literature. The boundaries of hate crime have also been tested by Gail Mason's (2013) scholarship on violence against pedophiles. Whom to Protect? As we can see, most of the questions pertain to the issue of whom should hate crime legislation address. Schweppe (2012, 177, 185) lists the most commonly protected classes across a wide range of hate crimes legislation: age, citizenship, class, color, disability, economic status, ethnicity, family responsibility, gender, matriculation, membership in a labor organization, marital status, national origin, personal appearance, political orientation or affiliation, race, religion, sex, sexual orienta- tion, social status, physical infirmity, drug addiction, criminal record, pedophile tendencies, mental infirmity, membership of the travelling community, marriage and civil partnership, pregnancy and maternity, and being a physician engaging in performing abortions. 224 Andras L. Pap Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:21, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use. https://www.cambridge.org/core Groups included in hate crime legislation have specific “tools of political and legal persuasion: a well-recognized history of oppression; an established currency in human rights discourse; the backing of an influential social movement; and the capacity to establish empirical credibility for the targeted violence they experience” (Mason 2013, 162). This has led to fierce political and academic debates concerning the “hierarchy of legitimate victims.” Citing Jacobs and Potter (2001), Schweppe observes that hate crime laws are appealing to politicians: “Except for the inclusion of sexual orientation, politicians faced a no lose proposition. By supporting hate crime legislation, they could please the advocacy group without antagonizing any lobbyists on the other side [… and] without making hard budgetary choices. The hate crime laws provided an opportunity to denounce two evils—crime and bigotry—without offending any constituencies or spending any money” (2012, 179). Arguing against the inclusion of the occu- pation of police officer in hate crimes statutes, as advocated under the Blue Lives Matter movement, Walker (2017, 1422, 1427) warns about the dangers of overexpansion of hate crime laws emerging from increasing advocacy efforts by special interest groups leading to a slippery slope of legal favoritism. She claims that occupation does not belong in a hate crime statute, as hate crimes should be reserved for victimization based on fundamental features of identity. Such identities need to include some shared self-consciousness or collective identity, implicating societal fissure lines, or “divisions that run deep in the social history of a culture.” Hate crime statutes, which are largely expressive, she argues, are only meant to target prejudice with a recognized social context. For example, in the case of violence against police officers, there is no evidence suggesting that these crimes would be underreported or insufficiently investigated. Thus, to continue her argument, lacking a minority protection justification, such expansion of hate crime statutes is unfounded. Schweppe (2012, 179, 185, 191) on the other hand argues that developing “moral fault lines” in distinguishing between victim groups and the failure to include demands for recognition actually amounts to exclusion and leads to the further marginalization of the groups and reinforcement of public prejudices. She makes the case for promoting social equality through the criminal justice system and reiterates that by creating hierarchies of victims in hate crimes statutes the criminal justice system actually discriminates arbitrarily between social groups. In line with this, from the perspective of sexual citizenship, Richardson and May (1999) argue that not including sexual orientation in hate crime legislation means that gay people are denied full citizenship as the heteronormative culturally biased society reinforces and reproduces the vision of gay people as nondeserving. Godzisz and Pudzianowska hold that an opposition “to the inclusion of sexual orientation in hate crime laws can be seen as part of the general anti-LGB (or homophobic) discourse” (2016, 176). Chakraborti and Garland (2012) argue that hate crimes should be seen through the lens of vulnerability and difference rather than group identity and history of marginalization, as this will enable the law to also tackle crimes targeting people because of their alternative looks (e.g., Goths or people who are facing homelessness) as hate crimes. The subsequent part of the essay shows the various ways law (and the state) can be misguided in the labyrinth of identity politics, minority protection, and penal populism. Misapprehension No. 1: Neglecting Hate Crime Legislation Philosophical challenges aside, the conceptualization of hate crimes raises numerous technical questions. For example, can victims and perpetrators be members of the same group? What happens if ultra-Orthodox Jews attack nonreligious Jews for not observing the Sabbath? If we recognize domestic violence as a form of hate crime, do we exclude same sex partnership violence? Also, how should nontypical, opportunistic victim-selection models be dealt with: does a perpe- trator who specializes in robbing Chinese small-business owners, presuming that they carry a larger amount of cash, meet the criteria for racial bias? What about robbers targeting customers leaving Nationalities Papers 225 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:21, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use. https://www.cambridge.org/core gay bars in intolerant societies because they have a reason to believe that reporting to the police will be less likely in order to avoid homophobic stigmatization? Is this homophobic hate crime? What about “thrill seeking” offenders, where the motivation (e.g., spraying swastikas on buildings) roots in a desire for excitement and provocation as an antidote for boredom? Given all these, should not the state simply opt for not having hate crime legislation in place at all? Let us bear in mind that hate crimes presuppose a preexisting base crime. Thus, all hate crime offenses will be sanctioned. It is merely this extra, and not entirely uncontroversial, symbolic element at stake. An adequate answer may be that the genie has already left the bottle; hate crime legislation has become a part of international standards and good practices for policing and criminal justice.2 For example, by using the theory of Europeanization as an explanatory frame (and fundamentals first as an operational guideline), Godzisz (2019) explains how hate crime laws are enacted as part of the democratization process, with the support of the OSCE and NGOs, and under EU influence. To eradicate preexisting legislation or to disregard soft law (and in the case of the EU actual legal commitments), recommendations and guidelines by professional organizations, NGOs, and other groups are a blatant rejection of firmly established demands for progressive criminal justice, where talk of the town has for long now been about how to monitor hate crimes and the debate whether to have such legislation is long passé. Once it has been established that it is the zeitgeist to have hate crime provisions, this leaves us only with the question of how to do it right. It needs to be emphasized that the failure to include a specific community among the protected groups logically cannot be equated with discrimination, as the symbolic and political decision to recognize atrocities against certain groups as more serious crimes does not devalue other groups’ participation in the politics of justice. Misapprehension No. 2: Conceptualizing Hate Crimes as Identity-Protection and Not as a Minority- Protection Mechanism and Instrument Consider the following cases in Hungary, where, with an extremely low immigration ratio, especially from outside Europe, the Roma are practically the only visible ethno-racial minority. In March 2009 in Miskolc, a city with a high Roma population, around the time when a series of targeted murders against Roma was ongoing in the country, members of the extreme right-wing paramilitary group the Hungarian Guard—an association later dissolved by the Supreme Court for carrying out racist activities—were marching around in nearby Hungarian villages. Text messages circulated among the local Roma, alleging that skinheads were planning attacks. At around 1 a.m., a car cruising in a Roma neighborhood was attacked by 25–40 Roma locals who assumed that the people in the car were skinheads or members of the Hungarian Guard. The perpetrators had no firearms and they used wooden sticks and stones. The damage caused to the car was HUF 104,000 (approx. EUR 350). 11 perpetrators were identified by the police and taken into pretrial detention—the rest fled and were never identified. A wooden stick was found at the crime scene with “Death to the Hungarians” written on it; however, it unclear by whom the stick was prepared or used. One of the victims had right-wing ties, and the passengers carried several liters of gasoline with them (Index.hu 2013a). In the case, which Petra Bárd calls “fear crime” (2014, 36), the court found all perpetrators guilty of “violence against [members] of a community,” some getting six years’ imprisonment (Gaál 2010). In 2013, the appellate court changed the legal qualification of the case to “antisocial behavior,” which had a significantly lower penalty.3 The appellate court found that members of the Hungarian Guard and skinheads are not protected by the hate crime statute, while “Hungarians” are protected. But the two are not necessarily synonymous, and there was insufficient evidence of racist motivation. In November 2009, a similar incident happened in Sajóbábony, a small town close to Miskolc, where, following a public forum organized by the racist far-right Jobbik party, some 100 members of the New Hungarian Guard (the “successor” of the dissolved Hungarian Guard) were attacked by Roma locals; one of their cars was seriously damaged by wooden sticks and axes with the passengers 226 Andras L. Pap Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:21, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use. https://www.cambridge.org/core suffering light injuries. The victims claimed that their Hungarian ethnicity was the cause of the attack, while the defendants argued that they only wanted to protect their families from the neo- Nazi paramilitary vigilantes. In 2013, nine Roma defendants were sentenced up to four years’ imprisonment. This time the appellate court raised the sentences (Index.hu 2013b).4 This was despite the fact that in a 2011 case involving a physical assault against persons who belonged to the far-right paramilitary Hungarian Guard the Supreme Court took the position that “members of groups established in opposition to national, ethnic, racial, religious or other social groups, and in obvious conflict with legal provisions, clearly cannot enjoy special criminal law protections.”5 Although the high court is committed to the position that hate crime provisions cannot be applied to members of hate groups, judicial practice is uneven.6 And in 2015, the Kúria (formerly Supreme Court) reiterated that members of the majority community can be victims of hate crimes.7 According to the Hungarian Civil Liberties Union, the aforementioned practice fuels worries about cases where Roma are accused of racially motivated hate crimes: “Whereas Roma are the main target of racist violence in Hungary [… ], hate crimes against Roma are systematically under- classified if procedures are at all started [… , and] cases get thrown out during inspection. The […] Court failed to take into account a long history of exclusion, severe discrimination, and inequality that affects the Roma [… ,] a population that had been traumatized by a series of murders by racist extremists” (HCLU 2012). The Hungarian courts’ take on majority-minority dynamics is not out of line with international practice. The British Association of Chief Police Officers’ tactical guidance defines hate crimes as “any incident perceived by the victim to be motivated by hate or prejudice” (ACPO 2005). This article argues that nevertheless the second fallacy legislators can make is classifying and conceptualizing hate crimes as instruments that protect core identities, regardless of whether the personality traits around which these identity claims evolve lead to marginalization and vulnera- bility. An important and defining characteristic of identity politics is that certain crucial identities are worthy of recognition and symbolic appreciation for two reasons: (1) for dignity reasons, because these are simply essential elements of the core of human personality; and (2) for equality reasons, due to the current, or at least historical experience of, systematic marginalization that occurred in relation to these identities. Recognition is thus intertwined with claims for symbolic justice. The peculiarity of criminal law, however, is that it is the most intrusive form of social engineering, and it has always been understood as the last resort, an ultima ratio legal (and social) control measure. This article argues that even if we allow criminal law to be a tool of social policy and social justice, it should only be allowed to be utilized when combatting actual marginalization and documented vulnerability. It should therefore be conceptualized as a minority-protection mechanism and not part of the broad stock of social and political tools available to recognize core identities. As Heyes puts it, “identity politics starts from analyses of oppression to recommend, variously, the reclaiming, redescription, or transformation of previously stigmatized accounts of group membership” (2016). The proliferation of protected characteristics arguably transforms identity politics into a form of penal populism. Bottoms, referring to it as “populist punitiveness,” saw it as the “notion of politicians tapping into and using for their own purposes, what they believe to be the public’s generally punitive stance” (1995, 40; see also Pratt 2007, 2). But again criminal law should be applied in the most restrictive way only, remedying or preventing further marginalization of members in vulnerable minority communities. Several technical consequences emerge from this: (1) the prudent and theoretically consistent road to follow for states is to declare vulnerability (of protected groups and characteristics) as a requirement for heightened criminal sanctioning, and this should be made explicit in legislative wording; (2) legislators should enumerate all potential protected characteristics that are habitually connected to the vulnerability; (3) states should be prepared to address political and ethical questions raised by activists and advocates pertaining to legal conceptualization; and (4) legal conceptualization should nevertheless address the question of mistaken identities and victimization by association. Nationalities Papers 227 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:21, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use. https://www.cambridge.org/core (1) Vulnerability as a Tool to Define and Accentuate “Minority-ness” Let us first explore the concept of “vulnerability.” The UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs defines vulnerability as a state of high exposure to risks and uncertainties, in combination with a reduced ability to protect or defend oneself against those risks and uncertainties and cope with their negative consequences, describing both a universal aspect of the human condition and a peculiar relational condition of individuals or groups (Macioce 2018, 474). Group vulnerability is related to social, historical, and institutional forces, and prejudice and stigma can perpetuate the vulnerability of a particular group of people as well as affect the individual enjoyment of funda- mental rights and social goods. For example, Macioce shows how in D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic—a case concerning Roma students who were assigned to special schools for children with learning difficulties where they received an inferior education based on a simplified curriculum— the European Court of Human Rights found that the applicants suffered discrimination when denied their right to education and stated that Roma have become a specific type of vulnerable minority as “a result of their turbulent history and constant uprooting” (2018, 474).8 The Court also held that people with mental disabilities are a particularly vulnerable group in society due to the considerable discrimination they suffered in the past, where the main indicator of such a particular vulnerability is the harm produced by historical forms of prejudice, misrecognition, and patterns of cultural devaluation that produce specific forms of discrimination, social disadvantage, or material deprivation. The concept of vulnerability attracted a considerable group of enthusiasts who see it as a novel and promising way to encapsulate substantive equality, even a means to shift policies of recognition from protection to empowerment (Malloy 2014; Macioce 2018, 481; Young 1997) as well as to shift relations of privilege and oppression between majority and minorities. According to Macioce, this approach blurs the opposition between majority and minorities, so as to avoid (or to lessen) populist criticisms about the politics of recognition: Identities and group needs are considered only to the extent that they give rise to some specific vulnerability. From this point of view, majorities and minorities are on the same side of the river, because many factors can produce conditions of vulnerability, and every individual can find him/herself in a condition of vulnerability. No resources are taken away from the majority for the sake of minority recognition, nor is there an opposition between insiders and outsiders: Both can be vulner- able, depending on specific situations. (2018, 482) Pertaining to criminal law, Chakraborti and Garland (2012, 505) adopt the definition for vulnerability insofar as it refers to the perception of exposure to danger, a loss of control over the situation, and a perceived inadequate capacity to resist the direct and indirect consequences of victimization. They also add that vulnerability will typically involve groups or individuals who are impoverished, disenfranchised, or subject to discrimination, intolerance, subordination, and stigma. The instructive feature of vulnerability is that it points to the situational nature of othering and underlines that it stems not primarily for group membership and identity but for a particular situation. Applying this concept in hate crime legislation would prevent the abuse or disfiguration of hate crime legislation if it were to protect members of the majority community, even racist hate groups when being victimized by minorities. Furthermore, should this be the legislator’s intent, following Chakraborti and Garland (2012, 500–501) by moving away from identity, groupism, and a fixation on grand patterns of oppression, it allows for a more inclusive framework for victims and an entire reconceptualization of hate crime victimization. Chakraborti and Garland (2012, 504) also point out that traditional hate crime frameworks can fail to recognize the diversity within the broad labels that are used to denote categories of hate crime victims. Citing Ahn Lin, they emphasize the rich diversity of ethnic groups associated with the term and label “Asian American” (Asian Indians, Cambodians, Chinese, Filipinos, Hmong, Japanese, Koreans, Samoans, Thai, and Vietnamese), whose experiences are homogenized by scholars and 228 Andras L. Pap Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:21, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use. https://www.cambridge.org/core policy makers, as is also done with the overbroad categories of BME (black and minority ethnic), LGBT (lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender), and “disabled” communities. They also underline that “accounts of hate crime need to be more attuned to the intersectional nature of identity. For example, the harassment of lesbians may be caused by homophobia and by misogyny […] The higher level of victimization incurred by male-to-female (MtF), as opposed to female-to-male (FtM) transgender [people,] has been explained by gender oppression” (Chakraborti and Garland 2012, 504). Chakraborti and Garland (2012, 503) argue that rather than conceptualizing hate crime victimization through group identity and perceived vulnerability, “difference” should feature more prominently in the ways in which scholars and policy makers across the world think about hate crime in order to enable overlooked and vulnerable victims of targeted violence to receive the recognition. Such groups would include the homeless, elderly and isolated victims, people with mental health issues or drug and alcohol dependency, members of alternative subcultures (e.g., goths or nu-metallers), sex workers or foreign nationals, refugees, asylum seekers, migrant workers, or overseas students (see Blake 2001; Garland 2011; Jenness and Grattet 2004; Herek and Berrill 1992; Newburn and Rock 2004; O’Doherty 2011; Sherry 2010; Wellman 2006). These groups, “lacking either the support of lobby groups or political representation, and typically seen as ‘undesirables’, criminogenic or less worthy than other more ‘legitimate’ or credible victim groups” (Chakraborti and Garland 2012, 503) are commonly excluded from the view of hate crime. This would provide enhanced protection to victims stereotypically perceived as “easy” or “soft” targets of hate crime. It needs to be underlined that vulnerability is not a panacea. Chakraborti and Garland are cognizant of the “paternalistic process of powerful majority group members desig- nating another as vulnerable” and recognize that the term is not entirely uncontroversial, as “references to the disabled as vulnerable, for example, have been criticized for being inherently disablist in automatically conflating disability with vulnerability […] and for casting victims of disablist hate crime as … weak.” (2012, 507). While vulnerability has the advantage of contextualizing migration policy, as it draws attention to the concrete experiences lived by migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers, Hruschka and Leboeuf (2019) point out how in legal and policy discourse on asylum and migration it also has exclu- sionary effects that may amount to a restriction on accessing existing rights if actual access to these preexisting rights is restricted only to those deemed vulnerable (see also Atak et al. 2018; ECRE 2017; IOM 2017; “Vulnerabilities” 2015).9 The introduction of discretionary decision-making competences in immigration and refugee law not only makes the process less transparent but also relativizes “need” and worthiness, reifies victimhood, and fuels a victimhood and vulnerability Olympics. It is also problematic that the introduction of the term led to an increase in the number of sociopolitical and legal categories that actually lack a common definition and systematic under- standing. “Asylum seekers with mental disorders, for example, are recognized as vulnerable under Polish and Italian national law, but not under French and Spanish law. Victims of human trafficking are considered vulnerable in the context of the asylum procedures in Belgium and Greece, but not in Ireland or Croatia. EU Member States seem to apply their own understanding of the concept of ‘vulnerability’” (Hruschka and Leboeuf 2019, 3). As Hruschka and Leboeuf (2019, 3) point out, the imprecise meaning of the term is further blurred by the fact that it may refer to questions of status as well as to specific personal profiles. In the last reform of the CEAS (Common European Asylum System) directives in 2016, the European Commission proposed to replace vulnerability with “special reception needs,” (European Com- mission 2016), which represents a shift from a categorizing refugees, migrants, and asylum seekers by asking about vulnerability to a procedural approach focuses on how vulnerabilities are being addressed. Despite the points above, this article argues that the vulnerability criterion is nevertheless adequate and appropriate in the field of hate crimes because there is an important difference between asylum law and criminal law in the context of narrowing the scope of applicability. In the Nationalities Papers 229 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:21, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use. https://www.cambridge.org/core former, it actually leads to restricting the beneficiaries of certain preexisting rights and protections. On the other hand, in the latter this cannot happen since, as argued before, criminal law provides a heightened, but foremost symbolic protection to victims of crimes not specifically recognized as hate crimes. Therefore, setting forth limitations for collective and individual criteria does not create a zero-sum game, nor a group of “nondeserving” victims. The claim of this article is that hate crimes should be defined as particular minority-protection instruments, where vulnerability is a core and unique concept used to define the protected groups, but it should not be applied on the level of scrutinizing individual victimization. In other words, vulnerability should be applied to accentuate and define the marginalized minority condition that triggers heightened, symbolic criminal protection. Actual, personal vulnerability of the victims could and should be institutionalized as a penalty enhancement, or as aggravating sentencing or the circumstance clause, but it should not be the prism through which hate crimes are concep- tualized. Vulnerability, it is asserted here, should serve the purpose of defining, explaining, and elaborating, but not narrowing, the scope and concept of hate crime protection, a quintessentially minority-protection mechanism. While, as it will be elaborated below, even explicitly racially motivated violence by members of the majority community should be excluded from hate crime conceptualization, vulnerability may serve as a tool for fine-tuning the concept of “minority-ness” and explaining the source of heightened protection. Hence, members of structurally disadvantaged communities, marginalized on the national level, but forming a majority, or being in a dominant position locally, may be found to lack vulnerability in the specific context. Thus, they can conceptually be recognized as perpetrators of hate crimes. Thus, this article endorses the inclusion of vulnerability in statutory definition making, insofar as it is applied for the enumeration of the protected groups. The claim is that, instead of using concepts like difference, an unqualified and undefined vulnerability, group hostility, disadvantage, or equality (Al-Hakim 2015), hate crime victims should be: members of predefined disadvantaged minority communities, where some sort of vulnerability is also detectable. In a slight disagreement with Bakalis, as well as Harel and Parchomovsky (1999), a socially disadvantaged position in general should be the basis of hate crime legislation, accentuating a broader societal concern for the specifically vulnerable. “Social identity,” similar to the broad notion of equality, are insufficient grounds for heightened protec- tion under criminal law, as access to the criminal justice process is in theory guaranteed to all victims of crime in a democratic society governed by the rule of law. And criminal law is not a tool tailored to encourage citizens to think of themselves as members of identity groups or to “celebrate difference,” even if Bakalis (2017) correctly points out that identity groups seeking recognition in hate crime statutes all have in common that they “have historically been oppressed in one way or another, and hence require the strong arm of the law to enable them to lead free and equal lives” (732). Bakalis also correctly refers to Solanke, arguing that “equality law is designed to address oppression rather than just promote diversity” (732). However, hate crimes statutes should not be seen as simply parts of the broader equality agenda, where the list of protected characteristics may, and, arguably should, be much longer than those to whom additional protection under criminal law is afforded. As to be argued below, members of the majority community need not be included in hate crime protections. To rephrase Bakalis, a doctrinally solid hate crime statute needs to provide clear justifications and normative explanations for the additional harm or wrong involved in the targeted offences. They also need to fit within traditional criminal law structures, which require a narrowly tailored legislative phrasing and a reflection of the ultima ratio character and doctrine of criminal legislation. Vague formulations for groups with recognizable justice needs and open-ended lists with a wide discretion for judges to establish vulnerability without a legislative predetermination and enumer- ation of the protected groups, do not meet these criteria. The position argued in this article is thus incompatible with Bakalis, who claims that “if a characteristic has been deemed to be sufficiently persecuted or subjugated that it requires civil law protection under the Equality Act […], then it is justifiable in principle to extend this protection 230 Andras L. Pap Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:21, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use. https://www.cambridge.org/core through the criminal law” (2017, 734). It is asseverated here that criminal law needs more and can only encapsulate less. The key to hate crime legislation is the genuine impact it has on victims, particularly its effect to participate in public life. As Carmody et al. (2015, 22, 27) point out, those who have experienced hate offences report a wider and longer-lasting range of negative psychological impacts. Such impacts include, though are not limited to, loss of confidence, suicidal ideation, panic attacks, trouble sleeping and/or concentrating, nervousness, hyper-sensitivity in relation to repeat victim- ization, powerlessness, and social withdrawal. Furthermore, strategies to avoid repeat victimization impede and inhibit the exercise of minority identity, as the terroristic effect of hate crime often leads to self-segregation and self-imposing limitations on participation in public life. In sum, I advocate here for a theoretical framework and principled rationale for hate crime legislation that is best accommodated within criminal law principles. (2) Enumeration As Bakalis (2017, 721) points out, a separate issue concerns what should be done once the rationale for victimhood has been established: should the identities be exclusive or inclusive? An exclusive approach requires the victims to be specifically named in advance by legislation. An inclusive approach would give discretion to a judge or jury to decide in each case whether the victim falls into the general category of hate crime victimhood. Schweppe (2012) argues for the latter and advocates an open definition for the victims of hate crime, recommending that the jury be given discretion to convict defendants whenever it can be shown that they exhibited group hostility toward a victim because of their personal characteristics, which they share with an identifiable social group. This article argues otherwise. Following from above, it is contended here that legislators should enumerate all potential— mostly visible, immutable, and fundamental—protected characteristics that are habitually con- nected to the vulnerability. It needs to be underlined that criminal law is very different from antidiscrimination law. In antidiscrimination legislation, more protected characteristics is better, and the law will be more inclusive and potent. In fact, even open-ended lists are progressive, allowing to outlaw discrimination for previously undefined characteristics. In criminal law, less is more: legal certainty requires narrowly tailored, thoroughly circumscribed definitions. Otherwise, the “no crime without law (legislation)” (nullum crimen sine lege) principle would be violated.10 Thus, criminal legislation should resist the identity politics driven lobby for recognizing more and more identities and should not give in to accusations of unethical or politically insensitive creation of a hierarchy of valued identities. Being an investment banker maybe an identity that a violent globalization-critical protester targets with hate; yet, the general vulnerability of the group cannot be established. Even if neoliberal economists are being attacked by an angry mob of protesters, it is unwise to qualify this as a hate crime based on bias targeting political opinion. Let us always bear in mind: violence and vandalism are criminal offences and victims are not unprotected or aban- doned, even if no special hate crime provisions are applied in their case. If we expand the list of protected characteristics, we actually effectively marginalize the vulnerable ones by relativizing their vulnerability. It needs to be added that it poses a technical, codification challenge for vulnerability to be included in the statutory criminal provision, as, due to the above elaborated requirement of strict conceptualization in criminal law, the actual assessment and circumscription of such groups and communities should not be left to the judiciary or law enforcement agencies. Instead, the legislator needs to take up this role by relying on social science evidence, similar to how country risk assessment is set forth by government agencies in asylum procedures. The rationale for advocating a strict enumeration policy is also supported by arguments referring to the increased operational burden on the criminal justice system, especially on law enforcement agents who would then have less guidance for navigating in the maze of conceptualization. An even Nationalities Papers 231 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:21, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use. https://www.cambridge.org/core more robust argument, however, pertains to the moral and political responsibility of the legislator to take sides in the politics of justice and the hierarchies of hate. (3) Preparing for a Sensitive Public Discourse Continuing the stance set out above, states—or rather governments—should be prepared to address political and ethical questions raised by activists and advocates inquiring about the peculiarity of standards applied in criminal justice and pointing to the asymmetry in relation to other fields of law and public policy. For example, race, ethnicity, nationality, religion, political opinion, sexual orientation, and gender identity may have different meanings and repercussions in antidiscrimina- tion law, naturalization, asylum law, or affirmative action in comparison with criminal law. (4) Mistaken Classification and Victimization by Association Finally, it is important to emphasize that, although textual language needs to be strict and narrow in requiring vulnerability and setting forth protected characteristics, it has been a habitual practice in antidiscrimination and hate crime practice to extend protections in specific cases for mistaken identities and victims associated with members of the protected groups. Hence, if a straight ally participating in an LGBT march is attacked by homophobic perpetrators, the application of hate crime provisions ought to be in place, just as when a tourist from Mexico is taken for Roma in Eastern Europe and attacked by far-right extremists. Misapprehension No. 3: Applying Hate Crimes for Minority Offenders against Majority Victims In this text, it has been argued that states should conceptualize hate crimes as minority protection instruments. The Hungarian cases discussed demonstrate the absurdity of applying hate crime provisions in cases involving violence against members belonging to the majority community. It has been reiterated that, even if the victims were not members of hate groups and a motivation including animosity toward them as members of the majority community could be established, this should not suffice for classification as hate crimes. It has been argued that a second layer of scrutiny pertaining to vulnerability should be required. The reason for this is that the additional protection afforded by criminal law to specific groups is not rooted in the centrality of identities, nor in the immutability of the protected characteristics alone, but rather in that these personality traits are signifiers for historical or structural patterns of marginalization. Let us be reminded again: all offenders, including minority perpetrators (with racist motivations), will need to face some sort of criminal sanctions for the base crime; only the additional special moral and political message included in hate crimes will be absent. An additional source of distrust for applying hate crime sanctions against members of minority communities pertains to what Lynne Haney (2016) calls penal nationalism, a special form of penal populism, which can equate punitiveness with a national sovereignty and protection along a variety of forms for reimagining community and the lines of social exclusion. Admittedly, there may be legitimate arguments supporting the inclusion of local minorities (who are members of the majority nationally) within the symbolic recognition of hate crime provisions. However, even if individual vulnerabilities may be present in their case, a collective systematic marginalization in the criminal justice system would not be present, nor the need for additional symbolic recognition, since racist violence against them will be naturally condemned by the majority community. This is one of the reasons why the exclusion of racist motivation by members of minority communities against members of the majority community cannot amount to discrimination, as such protections should be reserved to provide compensatory, symbolic protections to groups prevented from full participation in public life. (Particularly difficult cases involve attacks against Jews in Israel or blacks in South Africa.) It needs to be underlined that this conceptualization needs 232 Andras L. Pap Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:21, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use. https://www.cambridge.org/core to be made explicit by the legislator, which can then be balanced by authorizing the judiciary to apply more severe individualized sanctioning under ordinary criminal provisions for the base crimes committed with abhorrent motivation by using the artillery of penalty enhancements. Hard Cases Legislators and policy makers should, however, be prepared to accept that hate crimes may not be a meaningful concept in certain cases, such as in gang-related interethnic violence wherein the minority and vulnerability dimensions, which actually should trigger the entire concept, cannot be conceptualized or operationalized. In a similar vein, it may simply be futile to apply hate crime provisions for cases like a (clearly racially motivated) assault on an Armenian citizen by an Azerbaijani in Switzerland, where the marginalization and vulnerability of the victim are impossible to discern in their initial meaning. To sum up, this article advocates a legislative (and judicial) policy that conceptualizes hate crimes as a minority-protection mechanism. Again, it should be underlined that the reason justifying the exclusion of certain groups and criminal behavior from hate crime conceptualization lies in the fact that an analogy for protected characteristics in antidiscrimination law, where the broadest possible list is desirable, is false, as any form of violence against members of groups not recognized as non-hate crime victims will still be sanctioned by ordinary criminal law. Misapprehension No. 4: Allowing Institutional Discrimination through Systematic Underpolicing of Hate Crimes against Minority Victims It needs to be emphasized that the gravity of the misapprehension of applying hate crimes to minority offenders is further accentuated by the rampant failure to properly diagnose and apply hate crime provisions in general. It mostly happens when members of minority and vulnerable groups are the victims, but the perpetrators are not members of minority and vulnerable groups. Given the fact that law enforcement authorities fail to provide a public service set forth by law, this amounts to institutional discrimination. Indeed, one may even argue that the systematic under- policing of hate crimes amounts to a form of systematic inequality that justifies the very creation of hate crimes. The phenomenon of institutional discrimination is widely documented by domestic and international organizations (Bárd 2017). To go back to the Hungarian case, one example from the Working Group Against Hate Crimes (GYEM) (2013)—a unique NGO coalition established in 2012 to join forces for more effective state responses to hate crimes in Hungary—reviews 24 cases, showing how law enforcement officers systematically fail to protect victims of hate crimes (Dombos et al. 2014). The systemic failures surface in four dimensions: (1) underclassification of hate crimes, (2) failure to undertake law-enforcement action, and (3) failure to take investigative measures. As regards (1) the underclassification of hate crimes, underclassification refers to the phenom- enon that hate and bias motivation is disregarded during the procedure. So, the prosecutor (or the judge) applies the base crime instead of the hate crime provision of the Penal Code. As for (2) the failure to take law-enforcement action, police often fail to take the necessary measures at far-right, extremist assemblies directed against vulnerable groups, even if there is sufficient evidence to suggest that an infringement of law took place. Likewise, failure in investigative measures (3) appears to be a general problem, inasmuch as the investigative authorities fail to question the witnesses, collect the CCTV recordings prior to their deletion, or investigate the motives in order to learn of the social networks and lifestyle of the offenders (e.g., whether they have extremist symbols on their walls or what type of comments they make in public fora). When it comes to underpolicing hate crimes, Hungarian practice is fairly typical. For example, between October 2015 and January 2017 the European Court of Human Rights found Hungary to be in violation of the European Convention on Human Rights in relation to handling hate crime incidents three times.11. In each case, Roma victims’ fundamental rights were violated due to the omissions of hate crime procedures by law-enforcement authorities. Nationalities Papers 233 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:21, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use. https://www.cambridge.org/core Misapprehension No. 5: Conceptualizing Victims Based on Self-Identification and Not by the Perpetrator’s (or the Wider Community’s) Potential Perception and Classification As a corollary to the previous point, hate crimes should not only be minority protection and mere identity-protection instruments: it should also be explicit that, in determining criminal responsi- bility and culpability, the perception and classification of the perpetrator—and as a prime point of reference the perception of the wider community and society—should matter when determining bias and membership in the protected group. A similar argument against identity-based hate crime conceptualization is made by Schweppe (2012, 181) who points to the “disabled” label in legislation, where the victims themselves may not in fact view themselves as such but rather as “differently-abled.” Classification and identification principles have crucial procedural ramifications. First, they impact privacy and data protection. Under European privacy standards, data pertaining to the most commonly protected characteristics—such as race, ethnicity, sexual orientation, and medical condition—are sensitive data, the processing of which either requires anonymization or the written permission of the data subject. This article argues, however, that information pertaining to the perpetrator’s perception and classification should not qualify as sensitive or even personal data. Strictly speaking, it does not actually refer to the status of the data subject (the victim). It is a statement or an inference concerning the state of mind of another person (the offender), and this need not meet a stringent protection. When it comes to protecting members of vulnerable communities from discrimination of criminal victimization, their identification is not relevant. What matters is the perpetrator’s (accurate or mistaken) classification- and perception-based bias. The victim’s identification as a member of a protected group should be relevant insofar as a criminal investigation’s initial focus goes. Thus, if a victim claims to be a victim of a hate crime due to their identity, the police should always classify the case as a potential hate crime and follow proper protocol to substantiate the investigation on these grounds.12 The victim’s identity as member of a protected group, however, is neither a necessary nor sufficient criterion for the verification of the crime as a hate crime. Just because a victim identifies as a member of a protected group does not prove the bias motivation of the crime, nor is it a requirement for a hate crime to be recognized as such for the victim to identify with the protected group. The reason for this is twofold. First, criminal sanctioning should include the aforementioned cases of victimization by mistake and association, when the victim is not an actual member of the protected group. Second, there are legislative standards in criminal law establishing objective criteria for membership in the protected groups. Investigative authorities in most cases do not have—and should not have—means to “verify and validate” what it means to be Jewish or gay for an anti-Semitic or homophobic incident and, according to a thick privacy interpretation, are not even authorized to ask the victim about these personality traits. What matters is the perpetrator’s perception and bias. When lacking a voluntary declaration as regards the identity of the victim, the only question the police may ask is whether the victim would think that the perpetrator could have chosen them due to a presumed membership in the protected group. When it comes to standards of evidence for bias and the role of subjective versus objective classifications, the investigative authorities need to establish two facts: (1) whether the victim could have been perceived by the perpetrator as member of the protected group—for which the general public’s commonly held perception can be established and applied—and (2) whether actual bias toward the group and the victim can be established. This latter is the most difficult part of hate crime investigation, but there is a plethora of national and international guidelines for investigative protocols. Unfortunately, none of the dozens of guidelines and recommendations by international orga- nizations, which could harmonize legislation, reflect adequately on the complexities of hate crimes outlined above, nor are they effectively cognizant of the dangers of overbroad legislation. Most documents follow a benevolently superficial approach expressed, for example, in “Prosecuting Hate Crimes: A Practical Guide,” published by OSCE-ODHIR (Organization for Security and 234 Andras L. Pap Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:21, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use. https://www.cambridge.org/core Co-operation in Europe Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights). As such, the International Association of Prosecutors holds that “hate crimes are criminal acts where the victim is targeted because of her or his group identity […] Almost any crime contained in a penal code can be a hate crime” (OSCE-ODHIR 2014, 16). The British Association of Chief Police Officers’ tactical guidance follows a similar victim-based definition by describing hate crimes as “any incident perceived by the victim to be motivated by hate or prejudice” (ACPO 2005). (And even the aforementioned Uniform Crime Reporting Program document uses such categorization.) Concluding Remarks This article pointed to the various ways legal policy can be misguided in the labyrinth of identity politics, minority protection, and penal populism. It was argued that states should adopt hate crime legislation, as this now is part of the international standard for good and progressive criminal justice. It was also argued that hate crimes should be conceptualized as a minority-protection mechanism, which should not protect identity but identifiable vulnerability on the group level, and that in the legislative language a thorough enumeration of the protected characteristics is warranted by rule of law requirements. It was specifically argued that hate crimes should not be applicable in interethnic conflicts when members of minority communities are perpetrators and the victims are members of the majority. Moreover, hate crimes may not be applicable in all conflicts when race, ethnicity, or nationality are involved, and the exclusion of certain groups or types of conflicts does not amount to discrimination or the denial of citizenship, as all offenders ought to be sanctioned under generally applicable criminal law. The proliferation of protected characteristics is where identity politics turn into a form of penal populism. It was further argued that victimization should not be conceptualized based on self-identification but on the perpetrator’s—or the wider community’s—potential perception and classification. Finally, the view held by international courts and reports was reiterated, namely, that the systematic underpolicing of hate crimes amounts to institutional discrimination. Acknowledgments. The author would like to thank Piotr Godzisz for a thorough read and a lengthy commentary of the manuscript. Disclosure. Author has nothing to disclose. Financial Support. The research project was partly financed from the SASPRO Programme. The research leading to these results has received funding from the People Programme (Marie Curie Actions) European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme under REA grant agreement No. 609427. The research has been further co-funded by the Slovak Academy of Sciences and by DEMOS (Democratic Efficacy and the Varieties of Populism in Europe) H2020 RIA project, as well as the 129018, 129245 and 134962 Hungarian National Research and Innovation Grants. Notes 1 See, for example, the activities of the EU Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA). Also, see Directive 2012/29/EU of October 25, 2012, establishing minimum standards on the rights, support, and protection of victims—specifically making references to victims of hate crime—Council of the European Union (2013), Council Conclusions 2013/JHA of December 6, 2013, on combating hate crime in the European Union, and the Council Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA of November 28, 2008, on combating certain forms and expressions of racism and xenophobia by means of criminal law requires Member States. 2 On the lack of hate crimes laws in Ireland, consider Carr et al. (2017) and Carmody et al. (2015). 3 Miskolci Járásbíróság (repeated I. decision) 22. B. 2418/2011, Miskolci Törvényszék (repeated appellate decision) 3. Bf. 2023/2012. 4 Miskolci Törvényszék (trial court) 4. Fk. 1188/2011, Debreceni Ítélőtábla (appellate decision) Fkf. I. 498/2013. Nationalities Papers 235 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:21, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/AUTO/?uri=celex:32008F0913 https://www.cambridge.org/core 5 Magyar Köztársaság Legfelsőbb Bíróság Bfv.III.87/2011/5. 2011. 6 Kúria Bfv.II.590/2012/18. 2012; Magyar Köztársaság Legfelsőbb Bíróság Bfv.III.87/2011/5. 2011, 5) also see LB-H-BJ-2011-106. 7 3/2015 “büntető elvi döntés” on Debreceni Ítélőtábla Fkhar. II. 248/2014. See Bfv.II.590/2012/18 and EBD 2015 B.3. 8 Application No. 57325/00. 9 The notion of ‘vulnerability’ or ‘vulnerable persons’ is also used in legal instruments, including the Regulations and Directives of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS). 10 The principle of nonretroactivity, a fundamental component of the rule of law, is expressed in Article 15 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: “No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence, under national or international law, at the time when it was committed.” 11 Balázs v. Hungary (Application no. 15529/12), Király and Dömötör v. Hungary (Application no. 10851/13), R.B. v. Hungary (Application no. 64602/12). 12 ECRI’s Policy Recommendation No. 11 recommends that law enforcement records racist incidents, which are defined as “any incident which is perceived to be racist by the victim or any other person”. 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Nationalities Papers 49: 221–239, doi:10.1017/nps.2020.21 Nationalities Papers 239 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:21, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use. https://mdmeuroblog.wordpress.com/about/vulnerabilities/ https://doi.org/10.1017/nps.2020.21 https://www.cambridge.org/core Neglect, Marginalization, and Abuse: Hate Crime Legislation and Practice in the Labyrinth of Identity Politics, Minority Protection, and Penal Populism Introduction Hate Crimes: Conceptualizations and Definitions The Rationale Debates and Critical Issues The History of Hate Crime Legislation Whom to Protect? Misapprehension No. 1: Neglecting Hate Crime Legislation Misapprehension No. 2: Conceptualizing Hate Crimes as Identity-Protection and Not as a Minority-Protection Mechanism and Instrument (1) Vulnerability as a Tool to Define and Accentuate ‘‘Minority-ness’’ (2) Enumeration (3) Preparing for a Sensitive Public Discourse (4) Mistaken Classification and Victimization by Association Misapprehension No. 3: Applying Hate Crimes for Minority Offenders against Majority Victims Hard Cases Misapprehension No. 4: Allowing Institutional Discrimination through Systematic Underpolicing of Hate Crimes against Minority Victims Misapprehension No. 5: Conceptualizing Victims Based on Self-Identification and Not by the Perpetrator’s (or the Wider Community’s) Potential Perception and Classification Concluding Remarks Disclosure Financial Support Notes Referencees 
work_ozlvblku2rabhnbuvkqktre2zy	----	psr09-036a American Political Science Review Vol. 103, No. 3 August 2009 doi:10.1017/S0003055409990050 Gay Rights in the States: Public Opinion and Policy Responsiveness JEFFREY R. LAX and JUSTIN H. PHILLIPS Columbia University W e study the effects of policy-specific public opinion on state adoption of policies affectinggays and lesbians, and the factors that condition this relationship. Using national surveys andadvances in opinion estimation, we create new estimates of state-level support for eight policies, including civil unions and nondiscrimination laws. We differentiate between responsiveness to opinion and congruence with opinion majorities. We find a high degree of responsiveness, controlling for interest group pressure and the ideology of voters and elected officials. Policy salience strongly increases the influence of policy-specific opinion (directly and relative to general voter ideology). There is, however, a surprising amount of noncongruence—for some policies, even clear supermajority support seems insufficient for adoption. When noncongruent, policy tends to be more conservative than desired by voters; that is, there is little progay policy bias. We find little to no evidence that state political institutions affect policy responsiveness or congruence. The rights of gays and lesbians, as part of the so-called “culture wars,” lie at the heart of recentpolitical conflict in the United States, perhaps even affecting the outcome of the 2004 presidential election. Battles over gay rights have been fought most intensely at the subnational level—in legislatures, courtrooms, and direct democracy campaigns—yield- ing a complex policy mosaic. Some states have adopted numerous progay policies; others have few or none. What explains this variation? In particular, significant controversy has arisen over the role of public opinion and how well opinion majorities are respected. This evokes a basic tension in democratic theory. Functioning democracy requires some minimal match- ing of government choice to citizen preference. How- ever, normative concerns quickly arise. Too little re- sponsiveness calls democracy into question, whereas complete popular sovereignty raises the spectre of “tyranny of the majority.” This is particularly true for civil rights because minorities might be unable to rec- tify grievances through electoral processes. A strong relationship between public opinion and policy may suggest successful representative democracy, but still be troubling if it leads to fewer protections or rights for minorities. Struggles over minority rights have played a large role in U.S. history and are among the core conflicts in any diverse democracy. Such struggles have per- haps moved from race to sexual orientation, but basic Jeffrey R. Lax is Assistant Professor, Department of Political Sci- ence, Columbia University, 7th Floor, International Affairs Bldg., 420 W. 118th Street, New York, NY 10027 (JRL2124@columbia.edu). Justin H. Phillips is Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Columbia University, 7th Floor, International Affairs Bldg., 420 W. 118th Street, New York, NY 10027 (JHP2121@columbia.edu). For helpful comments, we thank Bernd Beber, Deborah Beim, Tanya Domi, Robert Erikson, Andrew Gelman, Donald Haider- Markel, Fred Harris, John Huber, John Kastellec, Thad Kousser, Nolan McCarty, Kelly Rader, Robert Shapiro, Melissa Schwartzberg, Yu-Sung Su, and Gerald Wright. Earlier versions were presented at the 2008 State Politics and Policy Conference, Princeton University, SUNY Stony Brook, and the University of Iowa, and we thank par- ticipants for useful discussions. We thank the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research for use of the iPoll archive. tensions remain unresolved. Our inquiry sheds insight into how these tensions play out for gay rights, and, in particular, will allow us to assess the extent to which majoritarian responsiveness has thwarted the objec- tives of the gay rights movement. These questions are not answered by the existing literature, which tends to focus on traditional “New Deal” issues, such as welfare or regulatory policy, or a narrow set of Burger Court social issues, such as abortion and the death penalty (Burstein 2003). Responsiveness in those areas would by no means guarantee responsiveness for minority rights. Indeed, some argue that progay policies are not responsive to opinion, but rather imposed against popular will by liberal elites, interest groups, and ac- tivist judges, pushing what Justice Scalia calls the “ho- mosexual agenda” (Lawrence v. Texas 2003). Further- more, federal and state constitutional law often limits public choice and possibly responsiveness in civil rights issues. Alternatively, it is argued that conservative reli- gious voters exert an undue influence on policy making and have, through political activism and interest group pressure, successfully blocked popular laws extending government protections to gays and lesbians. Is there a liberal or conservative policy bias? Another key concern for democratic theory is how best to translate popular will into government action. Political “engineers” still struggle with issues of insti- tutional design that date back to the earliest debates in political theory and that continue to play a large role in constitutional design today. Can the quality of demo- cratic performance be improved through such choices? Which features of political institutions do so? Does our federal structure itself enhance majoritarianism? In total, we study eight policies of particular impor- tance to the gay rights movement: same-sex marriage, civil unions, adoption by gay parents, hate crimes laws, employment and housing nondiscrimination laws, do- mestic partner health benefits, and sodomy laws. Some of these directly invoke the foundations of personal and familial relationships; others invoke equality in the marketplace. Some are about affirmative rights, such as the right to marry; others offer negative rights, such as protection against discrimination. 367 Gay Rights in the States August 2009 We present theoretical arguments as to when and how public opinion will shape gay rights policies, high- lighting two potential trade-offs in policy responsive- ness. First, we expect a trade-off between a legislator yielding to constituent preferences and pursuing his or her own policy goals. For more salient policies, he or she will prioritize constituent preferences. For less salient policies, it is both easier for the legislator to shirk constituent preferences undetected and less likely that constituents will care even if shirking is detected. Second, we anticipate a trade-off between paying at- tention to policy-specific opinion and following more general cues such as constituent ideology. Again, for more salient policies, legislators will respond more to policy-specific opinion. For less salient policies, when they have less information about constituent prefe- rences, they will instead depend on cues, to the extent they respond to constituent preferences at all. We seek to explain responsiveness variation across states, in terms of ideology, interest group pressure, and institutional features of the state government. First, we explore the degree to which voter or government ideology are instead the main drivers of policy making. Second, we consider the extent to which the differ- ential strength of religious conservatives across states independently explains policy and responsiveness vari- ation. Finally, we hypothesize that responsiveness will be enhanced by institutions that increase the capacity of government to respond to the public, such as leg- islative professionalization, and those institutions that empower opinion majorities, such as the direct election of judges or the availability of the citizen initiative. The empirical literature on gay rights policy making often ignores such institutional variation, despite the frequent claims that the gay rights movement is disad- vantaged in states with majoritarian institutions. To estimate state-level public opinion, we apply re- cent advances that allow us to produce measures of state-level policy-specific opinion using national sur- veys and multilevel modeling. We then test our hy- potheses about the relationship between opinion and policy: whether each policy is responsive to policy- specific opinion, whether policy is congruent with the preferences of opinion majorities, whether responsive- ness to opinion persists after controlling for other in- fluences, and how responsiveness and congruence are conditioned by salience and these other influences. Most studies of responsiveness consider only general measures of ideology or mood and aggregated policy indices. Studies that focus on individual policies are relatively rare and usually cannot connect policies to policy-specific opinion. Gay rights policies represent an excellent arena for parceling out the influence of each. We have a set of related policies, over which opinion varies greatly by policy and by state. Furthermore, be- cause we focus on dichotomous policies (does the state have the policy in question or not?) and because we have survey response estimates directly tied to these dichotomous policies, we can estimate median voter policy preferences and consider their influence in con- trast to general ideology, along with institutional and interest group variation. We also differentiate between responsiveness to opinion and congruence with opin- ion majorities. Our results have implications for the understanding of American federalism. Responsiveness is not only one of the key metrics for evaluating the general suc- cess of democratic institutions, but can also be used to evaluate the efficacy of our federal system. The matching of policy to state, as opposed to national, majorities is the raison d’être of federalism, allow- ing decentralized control, rather than one-size-fits-all policy. Whether state control over gay rights policies actually produces policy reflective of state opinion ma- jorities, therefore, tells us whether federalism produces majoritarian welfare gains. In addition, it sheds light on the long-standing struggle over which majority should govern, given that policy making is shared between fed- eral and local control. But there are troubling norma- tive implications as well, if civil rights and protections are simple accidents of geography. Although gays and lesbians may not face the limits on democratic partici- pation faced by African Americans in their civil rights pursuits, they still need to worry about the tyranny of local majorities. Madison’s Federalist 10 suggests that minorities will best be protected in a larger republic—in this context, has federalism been beneficial for the rights of gays and lesbians? Our results also provide insights into the successes and failures of the gay civil rights movement, and how it might move forward. For example, is it a matter of shifting public opinion on or attention to the particular policies, or are more global ideological swings neces- sary? Should partisan politics be the focus or should in- stitutional reform? Should advocates continue to fight at the state level or push for federal action? What is the trade-off between satisfying the goals of the gay rights movement and satisfying majority opinion? The an- swers to these questions may inform future civil rights movements and suggest new hypotheses for the study of past movements. STUDYING RESPONSIVENESS Earlier research raised significant doubts about pub- lic influence over policy making, based on the lack of substance in political campaigns and on the capacity of the public to play a minimally informed role. At the state level, stronger concerns about citizen atten- tion, the existence of an electoral connection, and the sway of local interest groups led to the dismissal of state-level public opinion by many political scientists (see Treadway 1985). More recent scholarship has es- tablished a body of convincing evidence that national policy changes correspond to trends in public opinion (e.g., Page and Shapiro 1983; Stimson, MacKuen, and Erikson 1995). Even after evidence at the national level accrued, state policy making was still often attributed to factors far removed from public opinion and electoral control (one exception being Page and Shapiro 1983). Erikson, Wright, and McIver strongly disagreed, con- cluding that “state opinion is virtually the only cause of the net ideological tendency of policy in the states” 368 American Political Science Review Vol. 103, No. 3 (1993, 81). Others have reached similar, if less dramatic, conclusions (e.g., Norrander 2000; Brace et al. 2002; see Burstein 2003, 38–9). As Burstein (2003) points out, the central issues in public opinion research are now the degree to which opinion affects policy and the conditions under which it can. Answering these more nuanced questions has proven quite difficult. Work focusing on state-level re- sponsiveness is complicated by the relative paucity of comparable polls across states. Researchers have had to limit themselves to survey questions that have been asked in dozens of compatible national polls. These tend to cover ideology as opposed to opinion on specific policies. Thus, “opinion” can usually only be invoked in the form of “aggregate liberalism” scores, such as those of Erikson, Wright, and McIver (1993) or Berry et al. (1998), which serve as indirect measures of opin- ion. Some policies, for that matter, map quite poorly to general ideology. This is in part why Norrander suggested that “direct measures of public opinion on specific policies will give investigators more valid and precise instruments with which to assess the influence of opinion on state politics” (2001, 122). We thus move beyond the existing literature to tie policy making to opinion relating directly to the poli- cies in question, considering both responsiveness to opinion and congruence with opinion majorities. We ask how much impact opinion has, how responsiveness varies across policies, the relative weight of general ide- ological attitudes and specific policy preferences, how and when opinion majorities can obtain their preferred policies, and how elected representatives trade across issues and within issues in balancing their own prefer- ences and those of their constituents. All this would be difficult if not impossible without policy-specific opin- ion estimates. We construct our estimates of state-level policy- specific opinion using a technique, multilevel regression and poststratification (hereafter, MRP), developed by Gelman and Little (1997) and Park, Gelman, and Bafumi (2006), and systematically assessed by Lax and Phillips (2009). By using these policy-specific estimates, we avoid problems of inference that arise when pol- icy and opinion lack a common metric (Achen 1978; Matsusaka 2001). A high correlation of policy and opinion can reveal a strong relationship between the two; however, without knowing the desired mapping of opinion to policy, one cannot tell if policy is over- or underresponsive to opinion and one cannot tell if there is bias in the liberal or conservative direction. That is, even if a positive correlation exists between policy and opinion, one could not tell if this relationship is biased upward or downward or if it has too steep or shallow a slope (see Erikson, Wright, and McIver 1993, 93). Unlike most studies, we do have opinion and policy on a common metric. We study dichotomous policy choice, such as “Do you favor allowing gay and lesbian couples to marry legally?” Thus, we can directly assess whether policy is actually congruent with a state major- ity’s preferred policy—or if it is instead more liberal or conservative than a majority wants. Furthermore, be- cause our estimates are direct measures of the relevant preferences, rather than aggregate liberalism or some other indirect measure, we can evaluate causality and the role of institutions more cleanly. A sizable literature has analyzed the adoption of individual or small sets of gay-related policies, but without access to policy-specific opinion. For example, many studies rely on demographic or socioeconomic indicators (e.g., population or wealth), and others use general ideology scores, sometimes in combination with interest groups or partisanship.1 Brace et al. (2002) show a connection between attitudes toward homosex- uality and public opinion on AIDS research funding. Haider-Markel and Kaufman (2006) go further than most previous work in testing the relationship between specific policies and attitudes about the general issue area, showing a relationship to hate crimes laws but not to sodomy law repeals or same-sex marriage bans. Overall, this literature has not found a consistent re- lationship between opinion and policy, nor fully incor- porated the new institutionalism by considering how institutional variation explains policy and conditions opinion or other predictors.2 Conclusions cannot be considered determinative without good measures of policy-specific opinion. Positive relationships between ideology and policy need not mean public opinion is truly affecting policy, and the lack of a relationship could be due to measurement error, to the extent gen- eral attitudes do not capture policy-specific opinion. Furthermore, it is difficult to explain policy variation within a state using policy-invariant attitudes. THEORY AND HYPOTHESES Opinion and Ideology. Should we expect gay rights policies to be responsive to policy-specific opinion? Should we expect majorities to prevail in the battles over such policies? Our answer to both questions is a conditional “yes.” There are numerous paths by which opinion can shape policy, but the most obvious is the “electoral connection.” Although goals may be multi- faceted, the desire for reelection has long been esta- blished as a powerful driver, if not the primary driver, of the behavior of elected officials, creating a general incentive to do what the public wants (Mayhew 1974). Even beyond reelection incentives for policy choice, there are selection effects; that representatives are elected means that we should expect them to already reflect their constituents’ views, on average. Also, the public can shape policy directly through the citizen ini- tiative and indirectly through interest group pressure. We generally expect the majority to get its way. In particular, the existing literature argues (e.g., Haider- Markel and Kaufman 2006) that “morality” issues such 1 E.g., Kane 2003, sodomy laws; Dorris 1999, municipal job pro- tection; Wald, Button, and Rienzo 1996, local antidiscrimination policies; Soule and Earl 2001, hate crimes; Haider-Markel 2001 and Soule 2004, same-sex marriage bans. See Haider-Markel and Meier 2003 for a literature review. 2 One exception is Lupia et al. (2009), which shows that state con- stitutional prohibitions of same-sex marriage are affected by the amendment procedures. 369 Gay Rights in the States August 2009 as gay rights will be highly responsive because they in- voke general notions of right and wrong, can be framed in noncomplex ways, and have been at the heart of recent political debate. Although we anticipate responsiveness for the gay rights policies we study, there are also reasons to antic- ipate imperfect and varying responsiveness across poli- cies, institutional settings, and political environments. We would not expect representative democracy to per- fectly capture majority will on every individual policy choice. Salience varies. Policy-making power is divided and shared among many actors, some of which may better represent majorities, whereas others, such as un- elected courts, may have different incentives. Federal and state constitutional law can constrain policy choice, as in all civil rights battles. Furthermore, policy can be inherently slow to change. All these factors could limit responsiveness. Properly assessing the role of opinion means considering the factors that enhance or retard responsiveness. We now address the most important of these. Salience. Legislators and other elected actors need not do what their constituents want on each and ev- ery issue, but rather need to be responsive “enough” or perhaps simply more responsive than their (likely) opponents. This means they face a trade-off in their reelection calculus: how do they meet their respon- siveness “needs” trading across issues and within an issue area? To what extent do they represent their constituents and to what extent do they go their own way? We see one key predictor of how they will resolve these trade-offs to be issue and policy salience—that is, importance and visibility to the public at large, and prominence in public discourse. Elites may also be unaware of their constituents’ views, especially regarding those policies that are less salient. As Burstein argues, we should expect the gov- ernment to do “what the people want in those instances where the public cares enough about an issue to make its wishes known” (1981, 295). For more salient policies, the electoral incentives are that much more clear: on one side, the legislators will have greater information about public opinion, and, on the other side, the greater visibility of policy choice should decrease ability to get away with shirking public will. (Page and Shapiro [1983] cite similar arguments for greater responsive- ness in salient policy areas, particularly those of great social or moral concern.) By giving voters what they want on the more salient issues, legislators may be able to, in other policy areas, pursue their own policy goals, repay interest groups for prior and future support, sa- tisfy core constituencies, and so on.3 Indeed, legislators actually have two potential trade- offs to resolve, each relating to one aspect of salience. The first is to allow themselves greater leeway in terms of their own preferences, which they can follow to the 3 Haider-Markel and Meier (1996, 2003) argue that when salience is low, “interest group politics” dominate and other factors matter less; when salience is high, “morality politics” dominates, and partisanship and attitudes matter more. extent low salience represents low importance to the public. The second response, induced to the extent that low salience means less information about their con- stituents’ specific policy preferences, is to follow cues in lieu of unknown specific policy opinion (see Druckman and Jacobs 2006). The most likely cue is general voter ideology. Thus, we expect salience to condition not only the role of policy-specific opinion, but also the role of dif- fuse voter ideology. We expect that political actors will shift attention to opinion when salience is high and away from it when low. But the other salience trade- off could dampen this effect or even swamp it—when salience is low, the legislators could shift away from car- ing about the public’s preferences overall, so that low salience instead means low responsiveness with respect to ideology (as well as to opinion). Given that all eight policies we study are reasonably salient, we expect the first effect to dominate such that high salience means less net attention to general ideological cues. We assess this empirically later in this article. Nonetheless, the prediction for opinion is clear: higher salience means greater responsiveness. Salience should also lead to greater congruence between state policy and state ma- jorities (as Monroe [1998] finds for national policy and opinion). Whereas the particular gay rights policies we study are not equally salient, they have all received a fair amount of attention, and they all continue to appear on state legislative agendas. The bottom line is that the salience of each issue we study should be sufficient to produce some degree of responsiveness; however, we predict that the most highly salient policies will be the most responsive and most likely to be congruent with opinion majorities. And there is sufficient variation in salience for us to explore such effects. Interest Groups. Elected officials may feel it desir- able or necessary to satisfy key interest groups instead of the median voter, for financial or other reasons. Al- though business groups tend not to take positions on gay rights issues, the most potent form of opposition is the religious right, in the form of both organized in- terest groups and conservative religious voters (Green 2000; Haider-Markel and Kaufman 2006). We thus ex- pect that such voters and religious interest groups will have influence over policy beyond their indirect effects on public opinion itself. Institutions. Finally, institutional characteristics might affect the role of public opinion in two ways. First, institutions may enhance the capacity of gove- rnment to assess and respond to public opinion. States vary widely in the professionalization of their legislatures; that is, some have longer legislative sessions, higher salaries, and more staff. Greater professionalization should increase responsiveness to public opinion. Awareness of public opinion should be higher (in part because they have greater resources to find out what the public wants); longer agendas allow more issues to be considered, including those of relatively lower salience; and outside employment 370 American Political Science Review Vol. 103, No. 3 is less likely to constraint a legislator’s attention to constituent interest. Second, institutions can enhance or limit majori- tarianism. Professionalization should strengthen the electoral connection, in that seats in professionalized chambers are more valuable to hold onto (Maestas 2000). Another institution that is said to increase policy majoritarianism is the citizen initiative. Direct democ- racy allows the voters to circumvent the legislature and propose and adopt policy changes themselves. It is ar- gued that this increases responsiveness directly, and even indirectly, by putting pressure on the legislature to respond rather than cede policy control to voters (Gerber 1996). The existing empirical evidence for in- stitutional effects is, however, mixed (cf. Arceneaux 2002; Lascher, Hagen, and Rochlin 1996). Features of a state’s judicial system might also en- hance majoritarianism. Courts often limit public choice in civil rights issues, so that the responsiveness to public opinion might be thwarted, for good or ill. However, in those states where judges are elected, the judges themselves are tied to the public through an electoral connection: judicial decisions on social issues (e.g., gay rights, the death penalty, abortion) often play a role in judicial elections, even in retention elections. We thus expect greater responsiveness in states that elect their high court judges (see Huber and Gordon 2004). We look for a general effect of elected courts and also look policy by policy. For example, some policies, like adoption and sodomy law, seem heavily influenced by court decisions. In contrast, courts have played little to no role in the creation of employment, housing, or hate crimes protections. Relationship recognition policy (unions, marriage, and domestic partner bene- fits), meanwhile, has been split between legislative and judicial influence. Institutions can also lead to “bias” in the sense that they are more or less likely to produce outcomes fa- voring the policies preferred by gays and lesbians than otherwise called for by public opinion. That is, setting aside responsiveness, they may push policy one way or the other. For example, Haider-Markel, Querze, and Lindaman (2007) argue that direct democracy contests are likely to lead to antigay outcomes. Or, if profes- sionalized legislatures are more “elitist” in the sense of the “culture wars,” then they might be biased in the progay direction. We assess both claims. DATA AND METHODS We first give an overview of the techniques for estimat- ing policy-specific opinion. See Appendix for further details. Opinion Estimation: Methodological Overview The most commonly used method for estimating state- level opinion is disaggregation, pioneered by Erikson, Wright, and McIver (1993). Disaggregation involves combining a large set of national polls and then calcu- lating the opinion percentages disaggregated by state. The principle disadvantage is that a large number of national surveys are required, usually over a very long time period (e.g., 25 years in Brace et al. 2002), to create a sufficient sample size within each state. Even then, smaller states or those seldom surveyed must sometimes be dropped entirely. This often makes it impossible to collect a sufficient number of compatible or contemporaneous surveys. Indeed, we cannot use this approach here: most of the gay rights issues are too rarely polled, and opinion on these issues is not sufficiently stable for disaggregation over long periods of time (Brewer and Wilcox 2005). Fortunately, an alternative exists—the simulation of state opinion using national surveys. Multilevel regres- sion and poststratification, or MRP, is the latest imple- mentation of such a method (Gelman and Little 1997; Lax and Phillips 2009; Park, Gelman, and Bafumi 2006; see Gelman and Hill [2007] for a comprehensive review of multilevel models). In the first stage, a multilevel model of individual survey response is estimated, with opinion modeled as a function of demographic and geo- graphic predictors: individual responses are modeled as nested within states nested within regions, and are also nested within demographic groupings (e.g., four edu- cation categories as one grouping). Instead of relying solely on demographic differences like older incarna- tions of the method, the state of the respondents is used to estimate state-level effects, which themselves are modeled using additional state-level predictors such as region or state-level aggregate demographics not available at the individual level. Those residents from a particular state or region yield information as to how much predictions within that state or region vary from others after controlling for demographics. MRP compensates for small within-state samples by using demographic and geographic correlations. All indivi- duals in the survey, regard less of their location, yield information about demographic patterns that can be applied to all state estimates. The second step is poststratification: the estimates for each demographic-geographic respondent type are weighted (poststratified) by the percentages of each type in actual state populations, so that we can estimate the percentage of respondents within each state who have a particular issue position. Such poststratification can correct for clustering and other statistical issues that may bias disaggregation estimates (see Norrander 2007, 154). Comparisons of MRP with other techniques have demonstrated that it performs very well. Park, Gelman, and Bafumi (2006) compare its results to two alternate ways of producing state estimates by modeling individ- ual response. MRP, which partially pools information across states, does better than not pooling at all—that is, running a separate model for each state’s respondents, the equivalent of using fixed effects and interaction terms for all predictors. And it does better than pool- ing all respondents across states—that is, using only demographic information and ignoring geographic dif- ferences. Lax and Phillips (2009) systematically as- sess MRP, also comparing it to its main competitor, 371 Gay Rights in the States August 2009 disaggregation. They establish the face and exter- nal validity of MRP estimates, by comparing them to actual state polls. MRP consistently outperforms disaggregation, even biasing the baseline toward disaggregation. Indeed, a single national poll and a simple demographic-geographic model (just race and state effects) suffice for MRP to produce highly ac- curate and reliable state-level opinion estimates. MRP estimates using small samples were roughly as accurate as disaggregation samples 10 times as large. Even if disaggregation were feasible for our gay rights polls, MRP has been shown to improve upon it. Estimating Policy-Specific Opinion on Gay Rights The survey questions are roughly as follows4: • Adoption—Do you think there should be adoption rights for gay and lesbian couples? • Hate Crimes—If a hate crime law were enacted in your state, do you think that homosexuals should be covered? • Health—Should there be health insurance and other employee benefits for gay spouses? • Housing—Should there be laws protecting homosex- uals from discrimination in housing? • Jobs—Should there be laws to protect gays and les- bians from discrimination in job opportunities? • Marriage—Do you favor allowing gay and lesbian couples to marry legally? • Sodomy—Do you think homosexual relations be- tween consenting adults should be legal? • Unions—Do you favor allowing gay and lesbian cou- ples to form legally recognized civil unions, giving them many of the legal rights of married couples? We make the assumption that majority opinion on a survey question captures majority opinion on the target policy. We do not believe this to be problematic. The survey questions we use are particularly well connected to policy choice. Although framing or question wording effects might still shift levels of support up or down,5 we address this in part by including poll effects in our estimation process. Our estimates of such effects usu- ally turn out to be small. We model survey response as a function of race, gender, age, education, state, region, aggregate state presidential vote choice, aggregate state religious con- servatism, and poll. These are standard predictors of 4 Exact questions by poll available on request. Responses came from different polls; respondents were not generally asked multiple ques- tions. 5 Measuring congruence requires a sufficiently close relationship be- tween survey question and policy; otherwise, bias up or down across states could change which state policies are labeled congruent (it seems less likely that this would change findings significantly as to the influences on congruence). Responsiveness findings would be less affected by any bias that shifts all state estimates up or down; the responsiveness curves in Figure 1 would simply be shifted left or right, perhaps changing the assessment of how much liberal or conservative bias there is for the policy in question. social attitudes, in general, and on gay rights, in partic- ular (e.g., Cook 1999). We find that demographic and geographic predictors preform quite well in explaining response at the individual level. Table 1 shows our opinion estimates and descriptive statistics. There is significant variation in policy support across states and policies. Within states, opinion also varies quite a bit across issues. Across states, marriage has the lowest mean support and housing the highest. There is far greater support for marketplace equality issues than for policies regulating personal and famil- ial relationships: for example, no state has lower than majority support for housing or hate crime protection, whereas marriage and adoption support hit the low 20s. Policy-specific opinion does correlate to Erikson, Wright, and McIver’s (1993) widely used measure of voter ideology by state. Opinion on job protection has the weakest correlation, at .74, and that on hate crimes the most, at .83. Clearly, our opinion estimates capture something more than simple ideology, as are seen when they are put head to head in the regression analysis. State Policy We gathered data on state policies from the Human Rights Campaign, except for sodomy law data, which came from the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force. State policy is coded as of June 2009, with the exce- ption of sodomy laws, for which we code policy at the time of Lawrence v. Texas (2003), the Supreme Court decision that struck down the criminal prohibition of homosexual sodomy. Policies are coded dichotomously, 1 for the pro- gay policy and 0 otherwise: Adoption (9 states al- low second-parent adoption in all jurisdictions); Hate Crimes (31 states include sexual orientation in hate crimes laws); Health (14 states give state emplo- yees domestic partner benefits, including health insur- ance); Housing (20 states prohibit discrimination in housing based on sexual orientation); Jobs (20 states prohibit discrimination in employment based on sex- ual orientation); Marriage (5 states allow same-sex marriage); Sodomy (35 states had no same-gender or opposite- and-same-gender sodomy law); and Unions (11 states have legal relationship recognition, includ- ing marriage, civil unions, or the provision of some spousal-like rights). We also construct a progay po- licy index counting the total score among the previ- ous. Fewer than half the states have a value of 0 or 1. Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Vermont score 8. Four other states score 7. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION We begin by assessing the basic relationship between policy and policy-specific opinion. We next investigate whether this relationship persists even after controlling for other predictors. 372 American Political Science Review Vol. 103, No. 3 TABLE 1. Opinion Estimates and Summary Statistics Second-Parent Hate Health Civil Mean State Adoption Crimes Benefits Housing Jobs Marriage Sodomy Unions Opinion Alabama 29 ! 61 54 68 53 23 ! 28 ! 34 ! 44 Alaska 43 ! 66 59 75 62 42 ! 49 50 56 Arizona 44 ! 70 ! 62 76 64 44 ! 52 ! 54 58 Arkansas 27 ! 65 51 68 50 25 ! 30 34 ! 44 California 51 ! 78 ! 65 ! 81 ! 68 ! 50 ! 58 ! 58 ! 64 Colorado 48 74 ! 61 78 ! 66 ! 47 ! 55 ! 56 61 Connecticut 54 ! 77 ! 68 ! 81 ! 70 ! 52 ! 56 ! 62 ! 65 Delaware 49 ! 76 ! 66 81 68 41 ! 46 54 60 Florida 45 ! 71 ! 63 76 64 39 ! 49 ! 52 57 Georgia 36 ! 68 58 74 60 30 ! 39 43 ! 51 Hawaii 50 ! 76 ! 62 78 ! 65 ! 49 ! 56 ! 57 ! 62 Idaho 33 ! 59 51 67 53 34 ! 42 ! 40 ! 47 Illinois 48 77 ! 64 ! 80 ! 66 ! 42 ! 50 ! 53 60 Indiana 41 ! 66 54 74 60 35 ! 42 45 ! 52 Iowa 45 ! 72 ! 58 ! 76 ! 62 ! 38 44 51 ! 56 Kansas 39 ! 65 ! 54 73 61 36 ! 41 ! 46 ! 52 Kentucky 32 ! 63 ! 52 69 53 28 ! 35 39 ! 46 Louisiana 36 ! 67 ! 58 76 62 30 ! 34 ! 40 ! 51 Maine 52 75 ! 64 ! 79 ! 67 ! 49 52 ! 58 ! 62 Maryland 49 ! 79 ! 67 82 ! 69 ! 41 ! 50 55 61 Massachusetts 57 ! 81 ! 68 ! 82 ! 70 ! 56 ! 61 ! 69 ! 68 Michigan 47 ! 74 60 78 64 39 ! 44 ! 49 ! 57 Minnesota 47 ! 74 ! 60 78 ! 64 ! 42 ! 49 51 58 Mississippi 29 ! 64 55 71 55 23 ! 28 ! 34 ! 45 Missouri 40 ! 69 ! 54 73 57 34 ! 44 ! 45 ! 52 Montana 43 ! 66 58 ! 73 61 41 ! 51 ! 52 56 Nebraska 39 ! 62 ! 53 72 60 32 ! 39 43 ! 50 Nevada 48 ! 73 ! 63 78 ! 65 ! 46 ! 51 ! 55 ! 60 New Hampshire 52 75 ! 66 80 ! 68 ! 51 ! 53 ! 61 ! 63 New Jersey 53 ! 76 ! 67 ! 81 ! 70 ! 48 ! 53 ! 61 ! 64 New Mexico 47 ! 73 ! 61 ! 78 ! 65 ! 45 ! 52 ! 53 59 New York 56 ! 79 ! 71 ! 82 ! 70 ! 52 58 ! 63 66 North Carolina 36 ! 68 58 74 60 31 ! 34 ! 40 ! 50 North Dakota 41 ! 63 55 73 62 33 ! 41 44 ! 51 Ohio 46 ! 73 60 78 64 39 ! 42 46 ! 56 Oklahoma 26 ! 59 49 ! 65 50 ! 25 ! 32 ! 35 ! 43 Oregon 47 ! 75 ! 61 ! 77 ! 63 ! 45 ! 54 ! 56 ! 60 Pennsylvania 46 73 ! 61 78 66 43 ! 47 52 58 Rhode Island 55 79 ! 67 ! 82 ! 70 ! 53 57 64 66 South Carolina 33 ! 66 57 73 59 28 ! 33 ! 42 ! 49 South Dakota 40 ! 65 55 73 60 35 ! 40 44 ! 51 Tennessee 31 ! 65 ! 54 70 53 26 ! 29 35 ! 45 Texas 37 ! 65 ! 59 74 61 32 ! 38 ! 43 ! 51 Utah 22 ! 55 41 ! 57 40 ! 25 ! 33 ! 31 ! 38 Vermont 55 ! 79 ! 66 ! 81 ! 69 ! 53 ! 56 ! 62 ! 65 Virginia 43 ! 71 62 77 64 37 ! 44 ! 45 ! 55 Washington 51 76 ! 61 ! 79 ! 65 ! 49 ! 56 ! 57 ! 62 West Virginia 41 ! 67 57 75 62 33 ! 38 44 ! 52 Wisconsin 44 ! 73 ! 56 77 ! 62 ! 42 ! 51 ! 50 ! 57 Wyoming 37 ! 59 54 70 58 36 ! 45 45 ! 51 Mean 43 70 59 75 62 39 45 49 55 SD 8 6 6 5 6 9 9 9 7 Total congruent 43 31 16 20 22 46 32 37 247 Notes: Estimates of explicit progay policy support are shown by state (see the Appendix for details). The last column shows mean opinion across all eight policies by state. Checkmarks indicate policy congruence with opinion majorities (of the eight entries for which majority opinion is ambiguous due to rounding, only the following are strictly above 50%: Arkansas-Jobs, Illinois-Sodomy, and Alaska-Civil Unions). 373 Gay Rights in the States August 2009 FIGURE 1. Logistic Regression Plots 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 0 0.5 1 Sodomy 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 0 0.5 1 Adoption 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 0 0.5 1 Marriage 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 0 0.5 1 Civil Unions 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 0 0.5 1 Jobs 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 0 0.5 1 Health Benefits 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 0 0.5 1 Hate Crimes 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 0 0.5 1 Housing 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 0 2 4 6 8 ALL POLICIES (INDEX) P o lic y P ro b a b ili ty P o lic y P ro b a b ili ty P o lic y P ro b a b ili ty Policy Support Policy Support Policy Support Notes: Each graph plots the probability of policy adoption derived from the logistic regression curve given state opinion. The opinion level in states with the policy in question are plotted (in a “rug”) on the top axis and those without on the bottom. Finally, ten randomly sampled logistic regression curves are sketched to show the underlying uncertainty of the estimated coefficients. In each panel, dotted lines show the 50% marks in opinion support and policy probability. Policies are ordered by leftward/rightward shift from the 50% cross-hair. The last panel shows average opinion against the policy index, along with a “loess” curve. Policy and Policy-Specific Opinion Responsiveness. We first present logistic regression analyses of each state policy against policy-specific opinion. The results are graphed in Figure 1, with nu- merical results shown in Table 2. Each graph plots the probability of policy adoption derived from the logistic regression curve given state-level policy-specific opin- ion. The last panel shows average opinion against the policy index, along with a “loess” (locally weighted regression) curve. For all policies, higher policy-specific opinion is associated with a higher probability of policy adoption, a relationship that is both substantively and statistically significant. The slope varies across policies; we explain this variation as follows. The policy index graph shows the aggregate relationship between av- erage opinion and policy. Like the individual policies, the index is also responsive. The curve starts somewhat shallow, but once average opinion rises past 50%, the policy index curve begins to rise steeply. As a first cut, these results suggest policy-specific opinion matters. We can also take advantage of our common metric for 374 American Political Science Review Vol. 103, No. 3 TABLE 2. Policy Responsiveness (Individual Policies and Policy Index) DV = Allow Second-Parent DV = No Same-Sex Sodomy Adoption DV = Allow Civil Unions Prohibition Policy specific opinion .37!! .40!! .29!! .25!! .13!! .06 (.13) (.19) (.09) (.12) (.04) (.06) Government ideology — ".03 — .02 — .00 (.04) (.03) (.03) Voter ideology — .09 — .02 — .14! (.12) (.12) (.09) Intercept "18.95 "18.03 "16.49 "15.48 "4.83 .60 (6.30) (8.80) (5.21) (6.67) (1.90) (4.32) PCP% (PRE%) 88 (33) 90 (44) 88 (45) 90 (54) 77 (27) 79 (33) AIC (residual deviance) 30 (26) 33 (25) 33 (29) 37 (29) 53 (49) 53 (45) DV = Employment DV = Housing DV = Health Benefits Nondiscrimination Law Nondiscrimination Law for Domestic Partners (Sexual Orientation) (Sexual Orientation) (Public Employment) Policy specific opinion .59!! .35!! .84!! .57!! .35!! .21!! (.17) (.20) (.25) (.29) (.11) (.13) Government ideology — .04 — .04 — .04! (.03) (.03) (.03) Voter ideology — .24!! — .19! — .11 (.13) (.14) (.09) Intercept "37.76 "21.37 "64.98 "44.11 "21.90 "14.08 (11.17) (13.19) (19.74) (22.96) (6.53) (8.30) PCP% (PRE%) 85 (63) 83 (58) 85 (63) 88 (68) 83 (43) 85 (50) AIC (residual deviance) 37 (33) 34 (26) 32 (28) 32 (24) 43 (38) 42 (34) DV = Hate Crimes Law DV = Allow DV = Log Policy Index (Sexual Orientation) Same-Sex Marriage (OLS Regression) Policy specific opinion .28!! .22!! .24!! .43!! 1.13!! .86!! (.08) (.11) (.10) (.18) (.06) (.22) Government ideology — .01 — .02 — .13 (.03) (.04) (.16) Voter ideology — .05 — ".24 — .35! (.09) (.15) (.23) Intercept "18.97 "14.41 "13.88 "24.63 1.13 1.12 (5.48) (8.62) (5.13) (9.35) (.06) (.06) PCP% (PRE%) 79 (44) 75 (33) 92 (33) 96 (67) AIC (residual deviance) 46 (42) 50 (42) 27 (23) 28 (20) R2 = .66 R2 = .69 Note: Alaska and Hawaii are excluded. PCP = percent correctly predicted; PRE = proportional reduction of error; AIC = Akaike information criterion. For the index model, we use average opinion within each state. Log policy index is the log of one plus a simple count within each state (0–8), using rescaled coefficients. One-tailed tests are used: !! < .10, !!! < .05. policy and opinion to look at congruence with opinion majorities. Congruence. The responsiveness models show that the slope of policy probability with respect to opinion is steep, but even a steep slope (high responsiveness in that sense) can yield noncongruence (a lack of majori- tarian responsiveness). Figure 1 shows that responsive- ness to housing opinion is high, higher (steeper) than that for sodomy opinion (which is verified by the coeffi- cients in Table 2). However, housing policy is congruent in 12 fewer states. Table 1 indicates which states have congruent policies, with the total number at the bottom. Housing and job protection are congruent in only 20 and 22 states, respectively. Health care benefit policy is congruent in only 16 states. Meanwhile, marriage and adoption policy are highly congruent. Six states are fully congruent (California, Connecticut, New Jersey, Massachusetts, Oregon, and Vermont); two states (Alaska and Pennsylvania) tie for lowest at two congruent policies; the mean is five. To further see how responsiveness and congruence can differ, return to Figure 1. Within each panel, map- ping the point of intersection between the curve and the vertical dotted line over to the y-axis reveals the predicted probability of policy adoption at 50% sup- port. And mapping the point of intersection between the curve and the horizontal dotted line down to the x-axis reveals the needed support level for the pre- dicted probability of policy adoption to reach 50%. The 375 Gay Rights in the States August 2009 cross-hair at the intersection of the two 50% lines marks the point at which 50% public support corre- lates to a 50% chance of policy adoption. For perfect majoritarian control, the slope of the curve would be very steep at 50% (effectively flat otherwise) and hit the cross-hair within each panel. But, in the policy graphs, whereas policy clearly correlates to opinion, the actual curves sometimes fall short of the cross-hair (to the left/above), sometimes hit it, and sometimes overshoot it (to the right/below). That is, policy adop- tion can be biased in the progay direction, on target, or biased in the antigay direction, given the preferences of the policy-specific opinion majorities. This explains the curious comparison between housing and sodomy—the sodomy curve is closer to the 50-50 cross-hairs despite being more shallow. Public opinion can matter strongly, without the majority getting its way much of the time. For adoption and marriage, the 50-50 point is nearly hit, so that policy seems most in line with public sup- port. For sodomy, however, where the curve is to the left of the cross-hair, roughly 40% support leads to a 50% chance of policy adoption and 50% support leads to roughly an 80% chance. For those curves that are to the right of the cross-hair—civil unions, jobs, housing, health, and hate crimes—policy is more conservative than majority opinion warrants. For all of these but civil unions, the probability of policy adoption at 50% support is roughly zero. Or, to flip this, for housing, a 50% chance of policy adoption is not reached until opinion is more than 75%. There is no consistent liberal bias; if anything, we observe a conservative bias. The basic relationship between policy and specific relationship is clear: states with a higher level of policy support are more likely to have the policy. We next evaluate the relationship to policy-specific opinion af- ter other influences on public policy are incorporated into the analysis. Is there truly responsiveness to policy- specific opinion? Is this finding robust? What condi- tions this relationship? Why are some policies more congruent with opinion majorities than others? Adding Elite and Voter Ideology We contrast the effects of policy-specific opinion with those of Voter Ideology, using updated scores based on Erikson, Wright, and McIver (1993), and with the effects of state Government Ideology, using scores by Berry et al. (1998). The former employ national survey data on self-identified liberal or conservative status. The latter measure the ideology of state governments, based on the partisan configuration of state govern- ment and the state congressional delegation’s inter- est group scores (averaged over 1995–2005).6 Higher numbers are more liberal for both measures, which correlate at .6. Table 2 shows the results of including these other predictors in logit models. The more inclusive mod- els show that policy-specific opinion has a consistently 6 Results are similar for how much time Democrats had unified state government control. significant effect on policy adoption independent of elected elites or voter ideology, with the exception of sodomy policy. Specific opinion remains significant in all other models (albeit sometimes smaller in substan- tive magnitude). The other influences are inconsistent across policies. For some, we do find a significant impact of government or voter ideology, whereas for others we do not. When coefficients are standardized (results not shown), the magnitude of the policy-specific opinion effect is almost always much larger than either voter or government ideology (again, with the exception of sodomy policy). The policy index model in Table 2 again reveals clear effects of both policy-specific opin- ion and general voter ideology, but not government ideology (if the policy index is not logged, then opinion matters but not ideology).7 Adding Salience, Interest Groups, and Institutions Sample size when running individual policy models precludes consideration of a larger set of predictors, so we next turn to multilevel models including all policy areas together, with separate intercepts by state and policy. Table 3 shows results.8 As robustness checks, Models R2, R3, and R4, respectively, include no inter- actions, only interactions with institutions, and only the interaction between salience and opinion.9 The most important conditional predictor is salience. There is again a very strong relationship between po- licy and policy-specific opinion, independent of other influences. The average substantive impact of opinion remains high; the impact of a marginal increase of one point of policy-specific opinion around the middle of 7 The results for opinion in the policy index model in Table 2 are almost exactly the same if we use an opinion index based on disag- gregation instead of MRP estimates, correcting for reliability using an error-in-variables approach (eivreg in Stata). Indeed, if we limit the sample to larger states, disaggregation estimates of opinion lead to similar findings to those in Table 3, model R2, albeit with estimates of the opinion effect slightly attenuated by measurement error. Results for opinion or the opinion index are also robust to controlling for 2004 Democratic presidential vote share. 8 Coefficients are standardized to assess relative impact: each contin- uous predictor has mean zero and standard deviation .5. A one-unit change is thus a two standard deviation shift in the underlying predic- tor. This does not change any substantive findings, does no harm in that logit coefficients cannot be interpreted directly, and means that the “base” term given an interaction effect shows the effect at the average value of any interacted rescaled predictor. Voter ideology, government ideology, and professionalization do not have natural scales in any case. The mean of percent religious conservative is 17.5 (standard deviation 13.4). Mean opinion is 55.3 (standard deviation 14.6). Mean size of majority is 62.9 (standard deviation is 8.6). 9 For robustness, we estimated models with fixed effects for state and including either random or no effects by policy (dropping state- invariant predictors); with fixed effects for policy and including either random or no effects by state (dropping policy-invariant predictors); with random effects for state but not policy; and vice versa. We also interacted opinion with liberal majority and with government ideology. Results were similar. Given the sodomy results in Table 2, we also allow the slope and intercept for sodomy policy to vary by including a dummy-variable interaction (sodomy policy # opinion). This increases model fit. Allowing all slopes to vary does not change substantive results and actually reduces model fit; thus, we use the more parsimonious model. 376 American Political Science Review Vol. 103, No. 3 TABLE 3. Policy Responsiveness and Congruence (All Policies) DV: Is policy congruent with DV: Does the state have the progay policy? majority opinion? Model R1 Model R2 Model R3 Model R4 Model C1 Policy-specific opinion 6.10!! 4.48!! 5.00!! 5.66!! 2.64!! (1.51) (1.01) (1.44) (1.07) (.61) Government ideology (liberalism) 1.05! 1.14!! 1.22!! .98! .06 (.77) (.74) (.81) (.70) (.89) Voter ideology (liberalism) 1.74!! 2.06!! 2.24!! 1.55!! ".38 (1.02) (.96) (1.06) (.93) (1.10) Share relig. conservatives "2.10!! "2.29!! "2.62!! "1.75!! 3.37!! (1.21) (1.11) (1.28) (1.04) (1.64) Relig. int. group "1.72!! "1.81!! "1.84!! "1.69!! 1.29!! (.65) (.67) (.68) (.63) (.77) Salience 1.61!! — — 1.60! 2.01!! (.83) (.79) (.64) Salience # opinion 4.54!! — — 4.51!! 2.30!! (1.96) (1.91) (1.09) Salience # voter ideology "3.51!! — — "3.63!! — (1.34) (1.28) Legislative professionalization ".21 — ".48 — .61 (.64) (.67) (.52) Legislative professionalization # .10 — .74 — — opinion (1.13) (1.14) Direct democracy .14 — .18 — .43 (.64) (.67) (.50) Direct democracy # opinion ".58 — ".64 — — (.98) (.99) Elected court .52 — .51 — ".32 (.91) (.95) (.68) Elected court # opinion ".19 — ".26 — — (1.39) (1.41) Progay opinion majority — — — — "2.75!! (.66) Government ideology # progay — — — — 1.12! opinion majority (.88) Voter ideology # progay — — — — 1.80! opinion majority (1.15) Relig. conservatives # progay — — — — "4.66!! opinion majority (1.74) Relig. int. group # progay — — — — "2.36!! opinion majority (.82) Intercept "1.75 "2.00 "2.51 "1.21 3.04 (.93) (.56) (1.44) (.49) (.92) State/policy effects std. dev. 1.45/.40 1.56/.84 1.58/.85 1.44/.30 1.02/.00 PCP (PRE) 91 (76) 92 (77) 91 (77) 92 (77) 87 (66) AIC (residual deviance) 270 (232) 262 (243) 273 (241) 259 (233) 323 (283) Note: N = 384 (AK and HI are excluded). For congruence, opinion is measured as absolute size of the opinion majority (50–100). All continuous variables are standardized by subtracting the mean and dividing by 2 standard deviations, thus putting them on the same scale as each other and roughly the same scale as the dichotomous variables. Multilevel models are estimated using GLMER in R. Policy and state random effects (varying intercepts) are included in the models (standard deviations shown above), along with separate intercept/opinion slope for sodomy policy. PCP = percent correctly predicted; PRE = proportional reduction of error compared to the modal category; AIC = Akaike information criterion (lower is better). Directional predictions use one-tailed tests: ! ! < .10, !! ! < .05. the probability range is an increase of 6 points in pol- icy probability. The effect of policy-specific opinion is far larger than that of government ideology or of gen- eral voter ideology, although both ideology measures perform as expected and are statistically significant. (For sodomy policy, there is still no significant effect of opinion.) We draw out a full set of predicted probabil- ities later in this article, including significance tests. Salience. To measure salience across policies, we con- ducted a search of New York Times articles (2000– 2005) using Proquest to count the number of times 377 Gay Rights in the States August 2009 that the policy was mentioned in conjunction with the words “gay,” “homosexual,” or “same sex.” Salience is the log of the number of such stories. The scores meet standards of face validity: the numbers by policy are second-parent adoption (254), hate crimes (149), health benefits (49), housing (53), jobs (143), marriage (2098), sodomy (170), and civil unions (1558). Marriage and unions receive the highest degree of attention by far, with health benefits at the other extreme, and adop- tion in the middle. Although crude, this measure performs quite well and similar measures have been used with prior suc- cess in studying gay rights policies (Haider-Markel and Meier 1996). This measure is not designed to cap- ture variation in state media coverage because such coverage might be endogenous to policy adoption by state, whereas the national measure will more cleanly capture the relative visibility of each issue. We inter- act this measure with our policy-specific opinion esti- mates. This allows us to test our hypothesis that greater salience will increase the likelihood that political actors will be aware of and yield to policy-specific opinion. Note that one cannot interpret the coefficients directly without taking interaction effects into account: the raw “base terms” are set up to give the effect of opinion at average salience and of salience at average opinion respectively. Consistent with our expectations, there is a strong interaction effect between salience and opinion and between salience and voter ideology. The coefficient on the former interaction term shows that the marginal effect of opinion is greater for higher salience; the co- efficient on the latter interaction terms shows that the marginal effect of voter ideology is smaller for higher salience.10 That is, greater salience induces greater res- ponsiveness to policy-specific opinion and reduces the impact of general attitudes. We draw out these results in detail later in this article. Interest Groups. We include both the state Share of Religious Conservatives (the percent of evangelical Protestants and Mormons; American Religion Data Archive 1990) and a dummy variable for the exis- tence of at least one powerful socially conservative Religious Interest Group functioning within the state (Thomas and Hrebenar [2008], based on interviews with local public officials and political scientists; data from Hrebenar).11 These two variables are only cor- related at .36, so a large number of religious conser- vatives does not guarantee a strong organized interest group. Table 3 shows that the impact of opinion is far larger than that of either religious conservative predictor, 10 Given logistic regression, the greater impact of opinion for high salience can reduce the relative effect of any other predictor; the interaction effects show that this is particularly distinct for ideology. We find no similar direct effect on interest groups, for example, if we add such an interaction. The salience-opinion result persists even if the salience-voter ideology effect is omitted. 11 We do not include a corresponding variable for a powerful gay and lesbian interest group because only Massachusetts has such a group in the Hrebenar data. but both have a clear effect on policy adoption—inde- pendent of the direct contribution they make to state policy-specific opinion and to voter ideology, and inde- pendent of their indirect effect on government ideol- ogy. The fact that the religious conservative predictors have strong influence suggests overrepresentation of such interests.12 Institutions. We also interact our opinion estimates with each institutional variable to test whether they condition the effects of policy-specific opinion. Leg- islative Professionalization scores come from Squire (2007); they range from 0 to 1 and are a weighted combination of measures of salary, days in session, and staff per legislator, as compared to those in Congress the same year. Direct Democracy is an indicator for states that allow either constitutional or statutory citi- zen initiatives. Elected Court is an indicator for states that elect the judges in their highest court (including partisan, nonpartisan, and retention elections; other codings yielded the same results). Table 3 shows no evidence of institutional effects on policy adoption or on the influence of public opinion. None of the institu- tional coefficients are significant at default values, but we conducted hypothesis tests at other values of the predictors, and still found no effects. We return to this finding later.13 Marginal Effects and Predicted Probabilities of Po- licy Adoption. To understand these results, we calcu- lated predicted probabilities of policy adoption under various conditions, using Model R4, graphing some re- sults in Figure 2 (results are similar for Model R1). The solid line in each panel shows the predicted probability (y-axis) across the range of policy-specific opinion (x- axis) for average/default values of each predictor other than those indicated. Low to high is a two standard deviation shift. The effects of opinion on all policies other than sodomy are striking. Moving from low opin- ion (41%) to average opinion (55%) to high opinion (70%), the predicted probabilities of having the progay policy move from 2% to 23% to 84%. The marginal effect of one additional point of policy support on the probability of policy adoption is 3 percentage points (significant at 95%). These shift up or down given the values of other predictors, of course. Greater liberalism (voter or elite) increases the pro- bability of progay policy; conservative religious pres- sures decrease it. The impact of the predictors on 12 The impact of a marginal increase of one percentage point of religious conservatives is a decrease of roughly two points in policy probability (centered at a 50-50 chance). Powerful religious conser- vative interest groups also have an independent and large effect on gay rights policy. Interaction effects between interest groups and opinion were insignificant. 13 We ran models including only one institutional variable at a time, but still found no statistically significant effects. We also tried includ- ing the percentage of the time between 1995 and 2005 that control of the state government was split between the two parties; again, there was no statistically significant effect. We also found no effects if we interacted institutions with voter ideology. Finally, focusing on each individual policy in turn, we found no interactive effect between elected courts and opinion. Institutions also had no significant effect in a policy index model. 378 American Political Science Review Vol. 103, No. 3 FIGURE 2. Predicted Probability of Policy Adoption Given Policy-Specific Opinion 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 0 .25 .5 .75 1 A. High vs. Low Salience Low Avg. High 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 0 .25 .5 .75 1 B. High vs. Low Voter Ideology (High Salience) (no difference) 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 0 .25 .5 .75 1 C. High vs. Low Government Ideology (Average Salience) High Low 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 0 .25 .5 .75 1 D. High vs. Low Voter Ideology (Average Salience) High Low 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 0 .25 .5 .75 1 E. High vs. Low Government Ideology (Low Salience) High Low 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 0 .25 .5 .75 1 F. High vs. Low Voter Ideology (Low Salience) High Avg. Low 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 0 .25 .5 .75 1 G. High vs. Low Share Relig. Conservatives Low High 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 0 .25 .5 .75 1 H. Religious Interest Group? Policy-Specific State Opinion Policy-Specific State Opinion No Yes P r( H a ve P o lic y) P r( H a ve P o lic y) P r( H a ve P o lic y) P r( H a ve P o lic y) Notes: Each graph plots the predicted probability of policy adoption derived from Table 3, Model R1. The default value of each continuous variable is its mean. “Low” values are one standard deviation below this; “high” values are one standard deviation above. Each dichotomous variable is set to zero. The nonshaded regions depict the range of public opinion between low opinion and high opinion—that is, the range where most observations fall. 379 Gay Rights in the States August 2009 policy adoption can be compared. At average opinion, each of these four predictors has a statistically and sub- stantively significant effect on the probability of policy adoption. At low opinion, the impacts are smaller. The effects of salience are more nuanced: there is a clear interaction effect between opinion and salience and between voter ideology and salience. We start by leaving voter ideology at its mean. Panel A shows the striking pattern: the slope with respect to opinion is relatively shallow at low salience, but gets steeper for higher salience. At all levels of salience, opinion has a clear positive and statistically significant effect on policy adoption: the marginal effects of one point of opinion around average opinion are 1 (low salience), 3 (average salience), and 6 points (high salience). As ex- pected, low salience decreases the influence of policy- specific opinion, and high salience increases the influ- ence. To get a 50% chance of policy adoption, you need roughly 57% support if salience is high, roughly 62% if salience is average, and a whopping 73% if salience is low. The effect of salience on the impact of general voter ideology, meanwhile, is almost exactly opposite that on opinion. In Figure 2, panels B, D, and F show the impact of high vs. low voter ideology at different levels of salience. As predicted, high policy salience dulls the impact of general voter ideology. The lower salience is, the flatter the curves (less responsive to policy- specific opinion), and the wider the spread between them (more responsive to voter ideology). The effect of salience on opinion impact can also be seen in pan- els C and E, although government ideology’s effect is not directly increased by low salience, which is why the spread between high and low does not increase as dramatically as for voter ideology. Congruence As noted previously, you can have responsiveness with- out congruence. Therefore, we must explain not only which factors increase responsiveness to policy-specific opinion, but also which factors increase congruence. Institutions might not, for example, increase respon- siveness (increase the slope) but might shift the re- sponsiveness curves leftward or rightward toward the 50-50 mark. Indeed, perfect congruence would occur if all other predictors had no effect, responsiveness had a steep slope, and this slope went through the 50-50 point. We now make congruence the dependent variable, with our opinion measure now the absolute size of the majority, whether pro- or antigay, ranging from 50 to 100 (if we omit this variable, our other results remain similar). The larger the opinion majority, the stronger the signal sent to political actors. We include salience, which can directly increase congruence with majority opinion and interact with size of the majority to fur- ther strengthen the opinion signal. Other interactions with opinion are no longer needed, because the coef- ficients on institutions now show their direct relation- ship to congruence. However, we now need to interact Progay Opinion Majority (a dichotomous variable) with predictors that have an ideological direction but that would not otherwise have a direction with respect to congruence itself. Model C1 in Table 3 shows the results, with pre- dicted probabilities graphed in Figure 3. The results reinforce our previous findings. The same forces that drive responsiveness to public opinion also drive con- gruence with opinion majorities, with some subtle dis- tinctions. As predicted, the strength of the opinion signal (size of the opinion majority) increases the probability of congruence, as does salience. There is also a mutu- ally reinforcing interaction effect between the two.14 In Figure 3, panel A, the the predicted congruence curve is steeper when salience is high. For smaller majorities, congruence likelihood is largely the same regardless of salience, but for larger majorities, salience makes a much larger difference. At average opinion, salience makes a large significant difference in the likelihood of congruence. Next, when the opinion majority is liberal, more liberal government or voter ideology increases con- gruence, as shown in panels G and H. There is no difference for conservative majorities, for which con- gruence is highly likely no matter the nature of voter or government ideology. Panels C, D, E, and F show that either a powerful conservative religious interest group or a higher share of religious conservatives increases congruence with conservative majorities and decreases congruence with liberal ones. Note that the “base” term of Progay Opinion Majority is negative and statistically significant, so that when there is no conservative reli- gious interest group and all other predictors such as salience are set to average/default values, conservative majorities are much more likely to obtain their desired policy (which may in part simply reflect a status quo bias). Having shifted our lens from responsiveness to con- gruence, we now find some slight evidence that institu- tions matter. Higher legislative professionalization has a moderate effect on congruence, shown in panel B, that approaches significance (at 90%). Using an index model, counting congruent policies within each state, professionalization does have a significant effect: the difference between low and high professionalization is on the order of one additional congruent policy (out of eight, with a mean of 4.9). Elected courts and direct democracy do not have statistically significant effects on congruence (and that of courts is incorrectly signed).15 If we run separate and simplified congruence models for each policy (not shown), the estimated effect of having elected courts is usually in the wrong direction (it is significant and in 14 Although effects are generally robust (e.g., if majority size is omit- ted), the magnitude of the interaction term between salience and majority size does depend on specification. 15 Ironically, those policies with the highest court involvement are the most congruent, probably because they are highly salient. One reason why direct democracy might not induce greater congruence or responsiveness is that it is but one democratic pathway. 380 American Political Science Review Vol. 103, No. 3 FIGURE 3. Predicted Probability of Policy Congruence Given Policy-Specific Opinion 50 60 70 80 0 .25 .5 .75 1 A. High vs. Low Salience (Progay Opinion Majority) (Progay Opinion Majority) (Antigay Opinion Majority) (Antigay Opinion Majority) (Progay Opinion Majority) (Progay Opinion Majority) (Progay Opinion Majority) (Progay Opinion Majority) Low Avg. High 50 60 70 80 0 .25 .5 .75 1 B. High vs. Low Legislative Professionalization Low High 50 60 70 80 0 .25 .5 .75 1 C. High vs. Low Share Religious Cons. High Low 50 60 70 80 0 .25 .5 .75 1 D. High vs. Low Share Religious Cons. High Avg. Low 50 60 70 80 0 .25 .5 .75 1 E. Religious Interest Group? Yes No 50 60 70 80 0 .25 .5 .75 1 F. Religious Interest Group? Yes No 50 60 70 80 0 .25 .5 .75 1 G. High vs. Low Government Ideology Low High 50 60 70 80 0 .25 .5 .75 1 H. High vs. Low Voter Ideology Low High P r( C o n g ru e n t P o lic y) P r( C o n g ru e n t P o lic y) P r( C o n g ru e n t P o lic y) P r( C o n g ru e n t P o lic y) Size of Opinion Majority Size of Opinion Majority Notes: Each graph plots the predicted probability of policy congruence derived from Table 3, Model C1. The default value of each continuous variable is its mean. “Low” values are one standard deviation below this; “high” values are one standard deviation above. Each dichotomous variable is set to zero. The nonshaded regions depict the range of public opinion between low opinion and high opinion—that is, the range where most observations fall. 381 Gay Rights in the States August 2009 the wrong direction in the congruence index model). However, it can have a significant positive effect on congruence for same-sex marriage, depending on how many additional predictors are included. At most, this is limited evidence of such an effect. Is Federalism Welfare Improving? One question that motivated this article was whether federalism, that is, decentralized decision making, produces welfare im- provements over uniform national policies. Because we find strong responsiveness to state-level opinion, federalism seems to be working well, but there is still a great deal of policy incongruence. Does federalism truly lead to more congruence than nationally imposed policy would? How congruent is national policy with state opinion majorities? Across all eight policy areas, 62% of the state-level policies are congruent. If we exclude adoption policy, in that no provision exists at the federal level one way or the other regarding second-parent adoption, congruence occurs in 58% of the state-level policies. Suppose current national policy preempted state policies—then congruence would be reduced to 26%.16 By this metric, federalism is welfare improving for state majorities. Despite what Madison might have expected, it is even welfare improving for gays and lesbians (perhaps better than federalism was for the rights of African Americans). This finding corresponds nicely to Justice Brennan’s view that “one of the strengths of our federal system is that it provides a double source of protection for the rights our our citizens (1977, 503).” National policy has indeed been more resistant to progay opin- ion than state-set policy. Indeed, federal policy (again excluding adoption) is only congruent with national majorities in one of seven issues. This suggests that the federal government has been worse at translating ma- jority opinion into policy than the state governments. There are clear welfare-improving actions the fed- eral government could take—a national policy protect- ing gays and lesbians from discrimination in employ- ment and housing, a protection supported by opinion majorities in all but two states, would increase con- gruence with state majorities from 62% to 75%. In fact, if each policy were set by national majority opin- ion, then congruence with state majorities would be 84% (still short of the 100% if state-by-state majorities won). A Comment on “Reverse” Causality As Erikson, Wright, and McIver note, “conceivably it is the policy tendency of the state that drives public preferences rather than the other way around” (1993, 88). In this context, perhaps public support for pro- gay policies rises after the exposure to the policy it- 16 This includes the Supreme Court’s striking of homosexual sodomy laws, which reduced sodomy congruence, prohibition of marriage and civil unions, no health benefits provisions, and no antidiscrimination or hate crimes laws including sexual orientation. self. Although we acknowledge the general problems of assessing causality in responsiveness research, we offer four brief responses. First, Erikson, Wright, and McIver themselves find no such effect. Second, as they argue, there are strong theoretical reasons to suppose that opinion affects policy and the choices of policy makers—would we expect a New York legislator who was moved to the Alabama state house to continue to vote the way he did in New York?—but at best limited theoretical reasons to think that people simply adopt the preferences that match their state’s policy. Third, demographic characteristics, which are (rela- tively) fixed by state, explain a significant amount of the variation in support for progay policies. This is demonstrated elsewhere in the political science liter- ature (e.g., Haider-Markel and Kaufman 2006) as well as by our individual response models. We inspected the state random effects—these are the intercept shifts for each individual state beyond the effects of demogra- phics. For some policies, there is effectively zero resid- ual state-level variation after we control for demo- graphics and region. Therefore, it is highly unlikely that having a progay policy is causing higher progay opin- ion (state-level effects would have to be large enough to shift national correlations between demographics and opinion). Even though small residual state varia- tion exists for other policies, demographics still explain much variation in opinion, so policy adoption can still only have a relatively small effect on state estimates by affecting intercept shifts or national correlations. Moreover, if having the progay policy caused higher opinion, then having the policy would be correlated with positive intercept shifts (higher state opinion af- ter controlling for demographic and regional effects). There was no such systematic relationship. Finally, for civil unions and hate crimes, we have sufficient polling data before policy adoption to gen- erate estimates that cannot have been influenced by respondents’ exposure to the policy. (For hate crimes, we dropped the two states that had already adopted hate crimes protection.) We then retested the relation- ship between these estimates and policy adoption. The effects of policy-specific opinion were robust, remain- ing statistically and substantively similar. CONCLUSION This article is one salvo in larger debates on the ef- fectiveness of democratic institutions, on the merits of federalism, and on the relative roles of ideology and opinion in policy making. We conclude, in agree- ment with Erikson, Wright, and McIver, “state political structures appear to do a good job in delivering more liberal policies to more liberal states and more conser- vative policies to more conservative states” (1993, 95). We move beyond their seminal work by demonstrating responsiveness in the arena of gay rights policies and identifying factors that profoundly shape the relation- ship between opinion and policy adoption. Indeed, we find a deeper form of responsiveness to policy-specific 382 American Political Science Review Vol. 103, No. 3 opinion and not only ideology. Policy is responsive to opinion even controlling for voter ideology, the ide- ology of elected officials, and the interest group and issue environment. Furthermore, policy-specific opin- ion generally has the largest substantive impact on policy. Still, some of our findings do raise concerns for democratic theory. We observe that the strength of the relationship between opinion and policy varies signif- icantly across issues. And, despite responsiveness to opinion, majorities certainly do not always get their way. Some policies consistently reflect opinion ma- jorities; for others, even clear supermajority support seems insufficient for policy adoption. This is most true for hate crime laws and policies that address marketplace equality (e.g., employment, housing pro- tections). Interestingly, most noncongruence is in the conser- vative direction. Majority will is not trumped by pro- gay elites—rather, opinion and policy are disconnected in a way that works against the interests of gays and lesbians. In other words, we do not find any evidence suggesting a consistent progay bias in policy making, as is often argued by opponents of gay rights. Nor is there evidence that governmental elites override conserva- tive opinion majorities (although government ideology does independently affect policy where liberal majori- ties exist). Furthermore, we do not find tyranny of local majorities, in which antigay majorities trump minority rights. For adoption, marriage, and civil unions, con- servative state majorities can win out. But for hate crimes, health benefits, housing protection, and job protection, there is no tyranny of the majority block- ing minority rights. Indeed, here, the majority seems to favor these civil rights protections. A bias toward the status quo cannot alone explain these results; the most glaring instances of incongruence are policies, job, and housing protections that have been debated in the states since the 1970s and for which progay majorities are not a new phenomenon. It may not be surprising that minority rights suffer when the majority is op- posed to them—but our results show that represen- tative institutions do a poor job protecting minority rights even when the public supports the prominority position. Why might this be so? Democratic performance de- pends on context. Responsiveness and congruence are high for salient policies, but when policies are less salient, voters are less likely to get their way. The clearer the signal sent to policy makers, due to a larger opinion majority or higher salience, the more likely is congruence. When signals are less clear, there is a troubling amount of incongruence. To be sure, voter ideology still has an impact; however, as a second-best substitute for true policy preferences, this only goes so far to rectify shortfalls in majoritarian control. It is also notable that the preferences of religious conservatives are “overrepresented.” Their share of the population shapes policy even beyond directly af- fecting public opinion and the composition of state governments. Powerful conservative religious interest groups also strongly affect gay rights policy at the ex- pense of majoritarian congruence. Despite the hopes of political engineers, the “short- falls” in majoritarian congruence that we find are not so easily fixed. There is little evidence that the insti- tutions studied herein will do so. However, it is also true that gay and lesbian rights are not particularly disadvantaged in states with majoritarian institutions: having elected courts or direct democracy does not significantly affect the adoption of gay rights policy one way or the other. The attention paid in the discourse surrounding gay rights to the role of state political institutions in hindering or advancing the gay rights movement may be misplaced. There is some evidence that legislative professionalization might have a small to moderate effect on congruence (although we do not find an effect on responsiveness). For gay rights groups, our findings suggest that opin- ion and salience should be considered strategically. The higher policy salience, the more important is shifting policy-specific opinion. And the higher public support, the more important it is to increase attention to the policy debate. Although it has been argued that keep- ing the scope of conflict small and lobbying discretely is the most likely path to success (e.g., Haider-Markel and Maier 1996), this may not be true for gays and lesbians. There are also “cheap” gains to be had in that adoption of employment and housing protection would actually have majoritarian support in almost all states. Employ- ment and housing protection have received far less attention, perhaps because there is such widespread agreement. Ironically, then, the lack of disagreement and hence attention might have yielded policy not matching opinion majorities, given our salience results. It does not seem particularly fruitful to worry about institutional reform. One would also want to consider Rosenberg’s (2008) finding that seeking such rights in the courts is not likely to be successful. However, if bringing suit increases salience, there might be indirect effects on responsiveness. Moving from politics to political science, this study has demonstrated the value of estimating policy- specific opinion. Policy-specific analysis can thus be an important and useful complement to aggregate- level analysis, in that it allowed us to study over- and underresponsiveness, to study congruence, to explain variation across policies and within states, to address the causality-versus-correlation debate, and to disentangle influences on policy. Future studies of the opinion-policy linkage might be remiss if they ig- nore policy-specific opinion, particularly if studying issues with high salience. Furthermore, although we studied trade-offs in responsiveness given salience in the context of gay rights issues, it might be fruitful to extend this approach to other issues. Next, it remains to be seen whether the lack of institutional effects we found herein is unique to this context and whether a different set of policies might show greater effects. A final substantive question for the future is whether the determinants of responsiveness and congruence in gay rights policy are similar to those that explain state-level 383 Gay Rights in the States August 2009 variation in the rights of African Americans before these policies were trumped by federal legislation in the 1960s. APPENDIX: ESTIMATING POLICY-SPECIFIC OPINION To estimate the determinants of individual-level opinion, we gathered 41 national polls from the Roper Center’s iPoll archive that contain questions on gay policy issues, dating from 1999 through 2008, yielding approximately 80,000 re- sponses divided among the various policies. The polls are random national samples conducted by Gallup, Pew, ABC News, CBS News, AP, Kaiser, and Newsweek. We then com- bined these polls into a single internally consistent data set. For each respondent, we have sex, race (black, Hispanic, or white and other), one of four age categories (18–29, 30–44, 45–64, and 65+), and one of four education cate- gories (less than a high school education, high school grad- uate, some college, and college graduate). Race and gender are combined to form six possible categories (from male- white to female-Hispanic). State and region are included (Washington, DC, as a separate “state” and separate region, along with Northeast, Midwest, South, and West). For each state, we have the percent of evangelical Protestants and Mormons (American Religion Data Archive 1990) and the Democratic presidential election share in 2004. The policy question answers are our dependent variables in the individual response model, coded 1 for progay support and 0 for all others (a negative response, “don’t know,” or “refused”). This captures positive support among all respon- dents, not simply those expressing an opinion. There are, of course, slight variations across polls in question wording and ordering (although each polling firm tends to use the same wording over time). We control for average differences across polls (firms and years) in the model by making the poll itself another grouping variable.17 We run a separate model for each policy question. We use a multilevel logistic regression model, estimated using the GLMER (“generalized linear mixed effects in R”) function (Bates 2005). For data with hierarchical structure (e.g., indi- viduals within states within regions), multilevel modeling is generally an improvement over classical regression. Rather than using “fixed” (or “unmodeled”) effects, the model uses “random” (or “modeled”) effects, at least for some predic- tors. The effects within a grouping of variables (say, state-level effects) are related to each other by their grouping struc- ture and thus are partially pooled toward the group mean, with greater pooling when group-level variance is small and for less-populated groups. The degree of pooling within the grouping emerges from the data endogenously. This is equiv- alent to assuming errors are correlated within a grouping structure. (See Gelman and Hill 2007, 244–8, 254–8, 262–5.) We model the response of individual i, with indexes j, k, l, m, s, and p for race-gender combination, age category, education category, region, state, and poll, respectively, and including an age–education interaction.18 There is more than 17 We also estimated models using the percentage of those in each state who explicitly say yes of those with an explicit opinion—these estimates correlate at approximately 1 with the simple explicit yes estimates, and so results were almost exactly the same. 18 Estimates are robust to variations in specification (e.g., running race and gender as fixed effects or using simpler respondent typolo- gies). Although including respondent religion might be superior to including it only as a state-level indicator, the data are not always available for survey respondents and are not available at all for the one way to write such a model (see Gelman and Hill 2007), but the following seems the most intuitive (omitting error terms): Pr(yi = 1) = logit"1 ! "0 + #race, gender j [i] + # age k[i] + # edu l[i] + # age, edu k[i],l[i] + #state s[i] + # poll p[i] " (1) The terms after the intercept are modeled effects for the various groups of respondents: # race,gender j $ N ! 0, $2race,gender " , for j = 1, . . . , 6 #pollp $ N ! 0, $2poll " , for p = 1, . . . # age k $ N ! 0, $2age " , for k = 1, . . . , 4 #edul $ N ! 0, $2edu " , for l = 1, . . . , 4 # age,edu k,l $ N ! 0, $2age,edu " , for k = 1, . . . , 4 and l = 1, . . . , 4 That is, each is modeled as drawn from a normal distribution with mean zero and endogenous variance. The state effects are in turn modeled as a function of the region into which the state falls and the state’s conservative religious percentage and Democratic 2004 presidential vote share (group-level predictors reduce unexplained group-level variation, leading to more precise estimation; Gelman and Hill 2007, 271), and the region variable is, in turn, another modeled effect: #states $ N ! # region m[s] + " relig · religs + "presvote · presvotes, $ 2 state " , for s = 1, . . . , 51 #regionm $ N ! 0, $2region " , for m = 1, . . . , 5 We calculate predicted probabilities of policy support for each demographic-geographic type. Because we controlled for poll effects, we must choose a specific poll coefficient when generating these predicted values using the inverse logit. We use the latest poll effect where possible. There are 4,896 possible combinations of demographic and state values (96 within each state), ranging from “White,” “Male,” “Age 18–29,” “Not high school graduate,” in “Alabama,” to “Hispanic,” “Female,” “Age 65+,” “College degree or more,” in “Wyoming.” For any specific cell j, speci- fying a set of individual demographic and geographic values, the results allow us to make a prediction of progay support, %j. Specifically, %j is the inverse logit given the relevant predictors and their estimated coefficients based on equation (1). We next poststratify by population percentages; the pre- diction in each cell needs to be weighted by the actual popu- lation frequency of that cell, Nj. For each state, we then can calculate the percentage who support the policy, aggregating over each cell j in state s : ypredstate s = # j %s Nj %j# j %s Nj . We calculate the necessary population frequencies using IPUMS “5-Percent Public Use Microdata Sample” from the 2000 census, which has demographic information for 5% of each state’s voting- age population. See Table 1 and Figure 4 for estimates and comparisons to raw data. census data, so that we could not poststratify by religion. Where possible, we break down poll effects into year and firm effects. 384 American Political Science Review Vol. 103, No. 3 FIGURE 4. Plots of Raw Percentages vs. MRP Estimates by State 0 20 40 60 80 100 0 20 40 60 80 100 Adoption 0 20 40 60 80 100 0 20 40 60 80 100 Hate Crimes 0 20 40 60 80 100 0 20 40 60 80 100 Health Benefits 0 20 40 60 80 100 0 20 40 60 80 100 Housing 0 20 40 60 80 100 0 20 40 60 80 100 Jobs 0 20 40 60 80 100 0 20 40 60 80 100 Marriage 0 20 40 60 80 100 0 20 40 60 80 100 Sodomy 0 20 40 60 80 100 0 20 40 60 80 100 Civil Unions 0 20 40 60 80 100 0 20 40 60 80 100 ALL POLICIES R a w Y e s % R a w Y e s % R a w Y e s % Predicted Yes % Predicted Yes % Predicted Yes % Notes: For each policy, we show the raw percentage supporting the progay policy by state on the y-axis and the MRP estimate plotted on the x-axis. The top 10 states by population have larger dots. The solid line shows the linear regression line for the 10 largest states, the dashed line for the 25 largest, and the dotted line for all states. 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Rienzo. 1996. “The Politics of Gay Rights in American Communities: Explaining Antidiscrimination Ordinances and Policies.” American Journal of Political Science 40 (4): 1152–78. 386 Same−Sex Marriage and Civil Unions: Policy and Public Opinion in the States ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 Utah Arkansas Alabama Mississippi Oklahoma Tennessee Kentucky North Carolina Louisiana Idaho South Carolina Georgia Nebraska Texas North Dakota South Dakota West Virginia Wyoming Missouri Indiana Virginia Kansas Ohio Michigan Wisconsin Alaska Iowa Minnesota Florida Pennsylvania Montana Illinois New Mexico Delaware Arizona Maryland Nevada Oregon Colorado Hawaii Washington Maine California New Hampshire New Jersey Connecticut Vermont New York Rhode Island Massachusetts 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 ● ● Same−sex marriage allowed Same−sex marriage not allowed Civil unions allowed Civil unions not allowed Figure 5: Same-Sex Marriage and Civil Unions: Policy and Public Opinion (Online Appendix only). Opinion is estimated using data from 1994-2008, weighted towards the most recent levels of sup- port. Policy is as of June 2009. 47 Same−Sex Marriage: Explicit Support Over Time ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 Utah Oklahoma Alabama Mississippi Arkansas Idaho Kentucky Tennessee Wyoming Nebraska Georgia South Carolina West Virginia North Carolina Indiana North Dakota Montana South Dakota Alaska Louisiana Kansas Texas Ohio Iowa New Mexico Virginia Arizona Minnesota Oregon Missouri Florida Nevada Illinois Wisconsin Michigan Colorado New Jersey Pennsylvania Hawaii Maryland Delaware Maine Washington New Hampshire Vermont California Massachusetts Connecticut Rhode Island New York 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 1994−6 2003−4 2008−9 ● ● Not Allowed, 1994−6 Not Allowed, 2003−4 Allowed, 2003−4 Not Allowed, 2008−9 Allowed, 2008−9 Figure 6: Same-Sex Marriage Opinion and Policy Over Time (Online Appendix only). Opinion is estimated using subsets of the poll data from the years indicated. States are ordered by opinion in 1994-6. Note that approximately as much change has occurred in the last four years (solid lines) as the previous eight (dashed lines) and that states with higher levels of early support changed the most. Policy is as of June 2009. 48 Public Opinion and Policy in the States: Gay and Lesbian Rights ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 Alabama Mississippi Oklahoma Arkansas Utah Tennessee Kentucky South Carolina Georgia Louisiana North Carolina Nebraska Texas West Virginia North Dakota Idaho Missouri South Dakota Indiana Kansas Wyoming Virginia Iowa Ohio Florida Michigan Delaware Maryland Montana Wisconsin Minnesota Illinois Alaska Pennsylvania Arizona New Mexico Oregon Nevada Colorado New Jersey Hawaii Washington Maine California New Hampshire New York Connecticut Vermont Rhode Island Massachusetts 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● Circles filled for pro−gay policy same−sex marriage 2nd parent adoption for same−sex couples civil unions health benefits for same−sex partners job antidiscrimination hate crimes protection housing antidiscrimination Based on Lax and Phillips (2009) "Gay Rights in the States: Public Opinion and Policy Responsiveness" American Political Science Review Figure 7: Public Opinion and Policy on Gay and Lesbian Rights (Online Appendix only). Opinion is estimated using data from 1994-2008, weighted towards the most recent levels of support. Policy is as of June 2009. 49 Explicit Support for Same−Sex Marriage by State and Age Lax and Phillips (2009): data from 1994 to 2008, estimates weighted for 2008 ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100 Alabama Mississippi Arkansas Oklahoma Utah Tennessee Kentucky South Carolina Louisiana Georgia North Carolina Texas West Virginia Nebraska Idaho Missouri North Dakota Indiana South Dakota Kansas Wyoming Virginia Iowa Ohio Florida Michigan Delaware Maryland Montana Illinois Wisconsin Alaska Pennsylvania Minnesota Arizona New Mexico Nevada Oregon Colorado New Jersey Hawaii Washington California Maine New Hampshire New York Connecticut Rhode Island Vermont Massachusetts 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100 ● ● Age: 65+ 45−64 30−44 18−29 All Figure 8: Same-Sex Marriage Support by Age Cohort (Online Appendix only). Opinion is estimated using data from 1994-2008, weighted towards the most recent levels of support. 50 Since 1996, 30 states ( n ) have passed constitutional amendments banning same-sex marriage. It is currently allowed in five states ( ), but support has risen across the country, even in relatively conservative states. Percentage in each state who support same-sex marriage 1994-6 support same-sex marriage A majority supports same-sex marriage in 0 states support same-sex marriage A majority supports same-sex marriage in 0 states support same-sex marriage A majority supports same-sex marriage in 0 states support same-sex marriage A majority supports same-sex marriage in 3 states 2010 … then the projection is that a majority supports same-sex marriage in 17 states. … then the projection is that a majority supports same-sex marriage in 22 states. 12% 30% 40% 50% 60% 66% Utah 12 22 Okla. 16 26 Ala. 17 26 Miss. 17 27 Ark. 17 29 Tenn. 19 31 Ky. 18 31 S.C. 21 32 Idaho 17 33 Ga. 21 34 1994-6 2010 1994-6 2010 1994-6 2010 1994-6 2010 1994-6 2010 Tex. 24 35 Neb. 20 35 La. 23 36 N.C. 21 36 Kan. 24 37 Mo. 26 37 Ind. 22 37 Wyo. 19 37 S.D. 23 38 N.D. 22 38 W.Va. 21 41 Fla. 26 41 Va. 24 42 Iowa 24 44 Wis. 26 44 Alaska 23 45 Ohio 24 45 Mont. 23 45 Mich. 26 46 Minn. 26 47 Ariz. 25 48 Ill. 26 48 N.M. 24 49 Del. 29 50 Nev. 26 50 Md. 29 51 Pa. 27 51 Ore. 26 52 Colo. 27 52 Wash. 29 54 Hawaii 28 54 Me. 29 55 N.J. 27 55 N.H. 30 55 Calif. 32 56 Conn. 34 57 N.Y. 36 58 Vt. 32 59 R.I. 34 60 Mass. 33 62 % % % % % % % % % % Support in the states for same-sex marriage, from least to most in 2010 TexasUtah Iowa New YorkPennsylvania Outlined states allow same-sex marriage n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n ’95 ’99 ’07 ’10 ’95 ’99 ’07 ’10 ’95 ’99 ’07 ’10 ’95 ’99 ’07 ’10 ’95 ’99 ’07 ’10 10% 30% 50% SELECTED STATES THE NEW YORK TIMES 2525% 1999-2000 3434% 2003-4 3131% 2007-8 3636% 45% of Americans support same-sex marriage, as found in recent polls … Assuming 2010 50% of Americans support same-sex marriage, as a recent CNN poll found … Assuming Note: We use a statistical technique for generating state estimates from national polls. Public opinion is estimated in small demographic categories within each state, and then these are averaged using census information to get state-level summaries. For 2010 estimates, we projected from 2008 state-level estimates using an aggregate national estimate of 45 percent (or 50 percent) support for gay marriage. Nationwide, Over Time, a Gay Marriage Groundswell Politics By ANDREW GELMAN, JEFFREY LAX and JUSTIN PHILLIPS Gay marriage is not going away as a highly emotional, contested issue. Prop- osition 8, the California ballot measure that bans same-sex marriage, has seen to that, as it winds its way through the federal courts. But perhaps the public has reached a turning point. A CNN poll this month found that a narrow majority of Americans support- ed same-sex marriage — the first poll to find majority support. Other poll results did not go that far, but still, on average, showed that support for gay marriage had risen to 45 percent or more (with the rest either opposed or undecided). That’s a big change from 1996, when Congress passed the Defense of Mar- riage Act. At that time, only 25 percent of Americans said that gay and lesbian couples should have the right to marry, according to an average of national polls. The more important turning points in public opinion, however, may be occur- ring at the state level, especially if states continue to control who can get married. According to our research, as recent- ly as 2004, same-sex marriage did not have majority support in any state. By 2008, three states had crossed the 50 percent line. Today, 17 states are over that line (more if you consider the CNN estimate correct that just over 50 percent of the country supports gay marriage). In 2008, the year Proposition 8 was approved, just under half of Californians supported same-sex marriage,. Today, according to polls, more than half do. A similar shift has occurred in Maine, where same-sex marriage legislation was repealed by ballot measure in 2009. In both New York and New Jersey, where state legislatures in the past have defeated proposals to allow same- sex marriage, a majority now support it. And support for same-sex marriage has increased in all states, even in rela- tively conservative places like Wyo- ming and Kentucky. Only Utah is still below where national support stood in 1996. Among the five states that currently allow same-sex marriage, Iowa is the outlier. It is the only one of those states where support falls below half, at 44 percent. This trend will continue. Nationally, a majority of people under age 30 support same-sex marriage. And this is not be- cause of overwhelming majorities found in more liberal states that skew the na- tional picture: our research shows that a majority of young people in almost ev- ery state support it. As new voters come of age, and as their older counterparts exit the voting pool, it’s likely that sup- port will increase, pushing more states over the halfway mark. The authors are professors of political science at Columbia University. WK 3THE NEW YORK TIMES, SUNDAY, AUGUST 22, 2010 By DONALD G. McNEIL Jr. L ET’S all hope that Egypt, Turkey and Jor- dan soon get hit by a nice flood, earth- quake or volcanic eruption. Why? Because they’re down with Pakistan at the bottom of lists of coun- tries that pollsters say hate the United States. And, according to students — and some admin- istrators — of foreign aid, recipients of disaster relief fall in love with America, at least briefly. Disaster relief as geopolitical valentine “has an unseemly aspect,” said J. Brian Atwood, President Bill Clinton’s chief of U.S.A.I.D., the United States Agency for International Develop- ment, who is now dean of the University of Min- nesota’s Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs. “We shouldn’t be using it to proselytize. Helping others has always been an American value.” But, he added, let’s not be unrealistic. Politics does creep in. It is rare that America finds itself so overtly facing off against an ideological foe as it is said to be now in Pakistan’s flooded river valleys. Discussions of the global response inevitably mention that Islamic charities were first on the scene, often adding some have “links to militant fundamentalists” or words to that effect. Pakistan’s president, Asif Ali Zardari, pushes this line while pleading for aid, warning that “negative forces will exploit the situation.” Some consider this an exaggeration. Of course Islamic charities are at work: Pakistan is Is- lamic, and Islam lauds charity just as Christian- ity and Judaism do. “There are a whole range of people working here, largely quietly and un- sung,” Dr. Zulfiqar Bhutta, a Pakistani public health expert who wrote an editorial on the cri- sis in The Lancet medical journal, said in an e-mail. “They are neither Taliban or Al Qaeda, and to call them such is a travesty.” Nonetheless, the idea that the Taliban and the American Army are fighting to see who can hand out tents faster is firmly present in the debate. Pressed on the issue by PBS Newshour, Rich- ard C. Holbrooke, special representative to the region, said the administration was “not oblivi- ous to the political and strategic implications” of its aid. But, he said, “We’re doing this because the people are in desperate need.” Do those other implications matter? Yes, some experts insist. Mark L. Schneider, a former Peace Corps director now with the In- ternational Crisis Group, noted that in polls tak- en by the Pew Research Center’s Global Atti- tudes Project three years before the 2005 earth- quake in Pakistan, only 10 percent of Pakistanis viewed America favorably. In the year following the quake, in which American helicopters flew dozens of rescue missions, 27 percent did. Predator drone strikes have since weakened that goodwill, but “my guess is that it will come up again,” Mr. Schneider said. “The U.S. is the single largest donor to this effort.” Andrew S. Natsios, U.S.A.I.D. director under George W. Bush, now teaches at Georgetown and is an even more fervent believer in using aid to sway minds. “To suggest people won’t have a reaction when they see us feeding our enemies and our friends at the same time is silly,” he said. Before the 2004 tsunami, he said, only 28 per- cent of Indonesians admired the United States, while 58 percent admired Osama bin Laden. Three months later, after Navy helicopters had flown rescue missions and delivered thousands of aid packages, “and after there was a big de- bate in the papers about where ‘our friend bin Laden’ was,” he said, approval of the terrorist leader had fallen to 26 percent and approval of Americans was at 63 percent. (Mr. Natsios cited local newspaper polls gathered by America’s embassy; polling by the Washington non-profit Terror Free Tomorrow shows the same trend.) Every aid package, he pointed out, bore a “From the American People” label his local mis- sion chief had printed. The United States had stopped branding its aid in the 1990s because charities wanted to use only their own labels. “I found that a little hypocritical,” Mr. Natsios said. Now an “American People” label must be used unless it puts a charity’s workers in peril. Other American agencies, he said, envy U.S.A.I.D.’s friendly blue clasped-hands logo, which it inherited from the Marshall Plan. State Department aid is marked with its eagle, while the logo of the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief is a globe with a big red rib- bon. The first can be seen as militaristic; the second confuses Africans who don’t instinctive- ly connect lethal diseases with fabric trimming. The history of disaster relief goes back at least to 226 B.C., when an earthquake struck the island of Rhodes. Ptolemy III of Egypt, ac- cording to the Greek historian Polybius, offered “300 talents of silver and a million artabae of corn,” plus help rebuilding the famous Colossus. Such aid doesn’t always stem from charity alone, said Carol J. Lancaster, dean of George- town’s School of Foreign Service. England helped Portugal after Lisbon’s 1755 earthquake, tsunami and fire. Both were rivals of Spain, she said, “and the enemy of my enemy is my friend.” Americans who wanted to help Ireland during its potato famine had to use their own money be- cause President Polk wouldn’t use tax dollars, Dr. Lancaster said, though he let the Navy carry grain to Cork. American Protestants ran soup kitchens, but pressed diners to convert. (Irish Catholics sneeringly called those who did “soup- ers.”) The most generous gesture may have been $710 sent by the Choctaw Indians, who knew starvation from their own Trail of Tears. After World War I, taxpayers did feed shat- tered Europe. That included Russia in its famine of 1921; the two-year American mission fed and vaccinated millions. But, however many hearts they won, Lenin’s was not one. The Soviets pushed the mission out before the famine ended. Overall, the Pew polls tend to bear out what aid officials believe: that help wins friends. Countries that steadily get lots of American aid with few strings attached — African nations, South Korea, Israel — tend to top the charts of pro-American feelings. And one nation really stands out. Ever since Barack Obama was elect- ed, Kenyans have loved the U.S. In fact, they like it even better than Americans do. Disaster Strategy: The Soft Heart And the Hard Sell It’s impolite to say, but flood relief isn’t just a matter of generosity. A grim fight for friends counts, too. Pakistan C M Y K NYxx,2010-08-22,WK,003,Bs-4C,E1 
work_p2fiozx3k5a2bgvfo7niylc6ji	----	O R I G I N A L A R T I C L E Mental Health in Violent Crime Victims: Does Sexual Orientation Matter? Robert J. Cramer • Dale E. McNiel • Sarah R. Holley • Martha Shumway • Alicia Boccellari � American Psychology-Law Society/Division 41 of the American Psychological Association 2011 Abstract The present study investigates victim sexual orientation in a sample of 641 violent crime victims seeking emergency medical treatment at a public-sector hospital. Victim sexual orientation was examined as it: (a) varies by type of violent crime and demographic charac- teristics, (b) directly relates to psychological symptoms, and (c) moderates the relationship between victim and crime characteristics (i.e., victim gender, victim trauma history, and type of crime) and psychological symptoms (i.e., symptoms of acute stress, depression, panic, and general anxiety). Results showed that lesbian, gay, bisex- ual, and transgender (LGBT) victims were more likely to be victims of sexual assault. Heterosexual victims were more likely to be victims of general assault and shootings. LGBT victims demonstrated significantly higher levels of acute stress and general anxiety. Moreover, victim sexual orientation moderated the association of type of crime with experience of panic symptoms. Also, victim sexual orien- tation moderated the relation of victim trauma history and general anxiety symptoms. Results are discussed in relation to victimization prevalence rates, sexual prejudice theory, and assessment and treatment of violent crime victims. Keywords Sexual orientation � LGBT victim � Violent crime � Anxiety � Sexual assault Sexual orientation is an increasingly important character- istic receiving recent empirical attention in the victimology literature (e.g., Cramer, Chandler, & Wakeman, 2010; Rayburn, Mendoza, & Davison, 2003). The salience of sexual orientation appears to be due to both increasing rates of victimization among, and poor psychological outcomes for, lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) crime victims. The cumulative effect of increasing rates and research culminated in recent social psychological theory (e.g., Herek, Gillis, & Cogan, 2009; Hyman, 2009) and policy change (e.g., passage of the Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act; Human Rights Campaign, 2009). From a theoretical standpoint, sexual minority victim- ization experiences are hypothesized to be a function of society-induced stigma through person–environment interaction (Herek et al., 2009). Briefly, Herek’s collective work (e.g., Herek 2007, 2009; Herek et al., 2009) frames the experience of sexual stigma (i.e., anti-LGBT stigma) as a result of socially constructed definitions of acceptable and moral sexual orientations. Stigma is continually rein- forced through subtle and overt means such as anti-LGBT legislation (e.g., ‘‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’’) and violence (e.g., hate- or bias-motivated crimes), as well as altered behavior on the part of LGBT individuals in order to avoid being targets of discrimination. Potential results of self- and other-generated stigma include poor psychological health (Herek et al., 2009). Perhaps as a direct response to societal stigma, recent federal legislation has provided more protection for LGBT victims of hate crimes. For instance, sexual orientation was added to the list of demographic characteristics protected under the federal definition of a hate crime (HRC, 2009). Generally, offenders convicted of a hate crime are subject to an increased sentence under state or federal sentencing R. J. Cramer (&) Department of Psychology and Philosophy, Sam Houston State University, Huntsville, TX, USA e-mail: rjc021@shsu.edu D. E. McNiel � S. R. Holley � M. Shumway � A. Boccellari University of California San Francisco, San Francisco, CA, USA 123 Law Hum Behav DOI 10.1007/s10979-011-9270-8 guidelines (Department of Justice, 1994). Passage of the Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Pre- vention Act in 2009 also provided resources to local jurisdictions to prosecute anti-LGBT hate crimes (HRC, 2009). Despite these policy advances, LGBT victims of crimes that are not classified as hate crimes are subject to the same limited rights and resources as any other victim. However, unlike heterosexual crime victims, in the instance of non-hate crimes, LGBT victims may still feel enacted stigma. In short, for LGBT individuals, psycho- logical experience of any victimization may fall under Herek et al.’s framework, legislation does not afford such victims expanded rights or resources. Thus, the psycho- logical health of a LGBT crime victim may be particularly at risk for distress as a result of combination of a lack of perceived protection in instances of general victimization and heightened awareness of stigma. In light of the importance of LGBT victimization painted by recent legislative and theoretical work, the present study extends extant literature on LGBT crime victims’ mental health. This is accomplished by examining type of victimization and clinical characteristics of LGBT violent crime victims when compared to heterosexual counterparts. Moreover, victim sexual orientation is investigated as a moderator of the relationship between victim and crime characteristics with psychological out- comes. As a starting point, we review rates and clinical impact among LGBT crime victims. LGBT Victims: Rates of Victimization and Psychological Outcomes Anti-LGBT crimes have increased over the last decade, with particular increases in both sexual assault and mur- der (NCAVP, 2009). Likewise, a high degree (16.7 percent) of all bias-motivated crimes in 2008 was based on sexual orientation (FBI, 2009b). This number escalates (17.7 percent) among hate crimes (i.e., crimes motivated by actual or perceived group membership). The majority of total and physical bias- and hate-motivated LGBT victims were gay males (FBI, 2009b; Herek, 2009). A great deal of literature has specifically addressed rates of violent victimization within LGB samples only. This lit- erature generally lacks direct comparisons to heterosexual victims. Compared to population rates, physical assault rates are generally high (11–20 percent) among school- aged LGB individuals (D’Augelli, Grossman, & Starks, 2006; D’Augelli, Pilkington, & Hershberger, 2002; Pil- kington & D’Augelli, 2006). Sexual assault is only slightly more common (9–22 percent) in this age group (D’Augelli et al., 2006). Trends of interpersonal violence toward LGB persons are comparable in a young adult (D’Augelli, 1992) and older adult (D’Augelli & Gross- man, 2001) samples. Overall, LGB adults are more likely to experience interpersonal violence than heterosexual counterparts (Roberts, Austin, Corliss, Vandermorris, & Koenen, 2010). High rates of sexual minority victimization have coin- cided with a growing literature highlighting negative psychological outcomes for these victims (e.g., Cheng, 2004; Herek, 2007; Herek, Gillis, & Cogan, 2002). Col- lective findings by Herek and his colleagues (Herek, 2007; Herek, Gillis, & Cogan, 1999; Herek, Cogan, Gillis, & Glunt, 1997) indicate that, as with other populations, sexual minority victims are at increased risk for depression, anx- iety, post-traumatic stress, anger, general stress and fear of future harm compared to non-victimized LGB counter- parts. Further evidence by D’Augelli and colleagues (D’Augelli & Grossman, 2001; D’Augelli et al., 2002; D’Augelli, 2006) suggests high rates of PTSD and trau- matic stress among LGB victims, as well as poor mental health indicators of low self-esteem, loneliness, and sui- cidal ideation due to internalized homophobia in LGB older adults. The limited data available comparing gay male to hetersosexual male crime victims shows gay male adults aged 18–24 to suffer higher levels of suicidal idea- tion and depressive cognitions than heterosexual counterparts (Nicholas & Howard, 1998). Interestingly, most theories explicating elevated rates of psychological distress in LGBT individuals implicate the experience of stigma, internalized homophobia, or heterosexism as causal or contributory factors (e.g., Herek et al., 2009; Hyman, 2009; Kaiser, Vick, & Major, 2006). Sexual Orientation as a Moderator of Psychological Outcomes Three known risk factors for negative psychological out- comes among crime victims are victim gender, victim trauma history, and type of crime experienced. Existing data suggest that females are more likely to be victims of interpersonal or sexual crimes (e.g., Felix & McMahon, 2007; FBI, 2009a) and to experience higher rates of neg- ative clinical outcomes such as PTSD or depression (e.g., Koss, Bailey, Yuan, Herrera, & Lichter, 2003) than male counterparts. One’s prior exposure to traumatic events is also positively correlated with clinical syndromes such as depression, post-traumatic stress, and anxiety (Irish, Os- trowski, Fallon, Spoonster, van Dulmen, et al., 2008; Kilpatrick, Ruggiero, Acierno, Saunders, Resnick, & Best, 2003; Marmion & Lundberg-Love, 2008). Number of previous traumas has been noted as a particularly important predictor of development of post-trauma symptoms (Irish et al., 2008). Law Hum Behav 123 The relation between crime type and negative clinical symptoms is somewhat more obfuscated. There is a general positive link between violent crime victimization and psy- chological symptoms (see Hanson, Kilpatrick, Falsetti, & Resnick, 1995 for review). However, distinguishing types of violent crime as they relate to clinical symptoms can inform assessment and treatment of targeted symptoms. The Present Study Current knowledge on rates and characteristics of LGBT victimization is limited in several ways. First, there is a lack of direct comparison of victimization with hetero- sexual crime victims. Second, when examining types of crime, domestic violence is often absent from such litera- ture. We include this in our analysis of type of victimization and sexual orientation. Third, little is known in way of other demographic disparities between LGBT and heterosexual victims. Research Question 1 How do LGBT victims differ from heterosexual counterparts in terms of types of crime and demographic characteristics? Research Question 2 How does victim sexual orientation relate to trauma-associated clinical symptoms (i.e., acute stress, depression, panic, and general anxiety) after victimization? The present study builds on existing data by examining main effects of sexual orientation on a range of trauma-related clinical symptoms, including depressive, general anxiety, panic, and acute stress symptoms. Research Question 3 How does victim sexual orientation moderate the relations between victim and crime char- acteristics (i.e., victim gender, type of crime, and victim trauma history) and the above clinical symptoms? Given ample evidence that gender, trauma history, and crime type are well established risk factors for traumatic symptoms, a next logical step is to examine how sexual orientation moderates these relations. The present study broadly defines clinical symptoms as symptoms of acute stress, depression, panic, and general anxiety. Method Procedure Eligible participants were those who suffered a violent crime and subsequently sought emergency medical treat- ment from San Francisco General Hospital, a level-1 trauma center. These crime victims were originally recruited for potential participation in a demonstration project through the Trauma Recovery Center (TRC) in San Francisco, California. Eligible victims included adults who were aged 18 or older, English-speaking, and not currently receiving mental health treatment. A full description of selection criteria for the demonstration project is docu- mented in previous literature (see Alvidrez et al., 2008; Boccellari et al., 2007). The present study utilizes only cross-sectional baseline data from this project. Participants A total of 655 violent crime victims were assessed for medical health and psychiatric functioning post-victim- ization. Only the 641 participants with data on demographic and clinical variables of interest were used in analyses. Table 1 summarizes demographic information for the overall sample in this study, and by victim sexual orientation. Measures Demographic Information. During the baseline interview, participants were asked about their age, gender, sexual orientation, ethnicity, monthly income, and education level. Sexual orientation was dichotomized into heterosexual and LGBT groups to balance sample size concerns with examination of group differences. Type of Crime. The type of violent crime experienced by participants was classified in one of six categories during data collection: Domestic violence, sexual assault, shooting, stabbing, physical assault, and vehicular assault. If the crime was perpetrated by a current or former intimate partner, it was classified as domestic violence regardless of mechanism of violence (e.g., physical assault, stabbing, etc.). All six categories (i.e., sexual assault, domestic vio- lence, physical assault, shooting, stabbing, and vehicular assault) were used in the conceptualization of crime type where descriptive statistics or frequencies were appropriate analytic procedures (i.e., analysis of Research Question 1). Description of sexual orientation by crime type elaborates on current knowledge of whether LGBT victims differ in frequency of type of crime victimization. When crime type was used as an independent variable in the evaluation of sexual orientation as a moderator of clinical symptoms (i.e., multivariate analyses for Research Questions 2 and 3), it becomes necessary to reclassify or combine the six crime types. Statistical, legal, and inter- vention literature all inform the rationale for the need and method of reclassification. From a statistical standpoint, a minimum of five participants would be necessary in each cell for a univariate or multivariate (e.g., ANOVA, regression) procedure to be conducted (DeCoster, 2006). Law Hum Behav 123 Examination of two cells of crime type for LGBT indi- viduals in the shooting (n = 0) and vehicular assault (n = 1) categories displays failure to meet this criteria. Therefore, reclassification of crime type was necessary for multivariate analyses. We allowed legal and psychological literature to guide the method reclassification of crime type. Given, not all instances of sexual assault are perpetrated by intimate partners. However, a bevy of literature suggests that combining these subtypes is logical. For instance, there is definitional overlap between sexual assault and domestic violence in that approximately 41–76 percent of sexual assault/rape perpetrators are intimate partners, depending on the time period of data analysis (Kilpatrick, Resnick, Table 1 Demographic information by sexual orientation of victim Demographic variable Total sample Heterosexual victims LGBT victims Heterosexual vs. LGBT comparison Gender v2 = 5.15* Male 405 (63.3%) 370 (64.8%) 35 (50.7%) Female 236 (36.7%) 202 (35.2%) 34 (49.3%) Missing 0 0 0 Ethnicity v2 = 18.05* European American 154 (24.1%) 124 (21.7%) 30 (43.5%) African American 297 (46.4%) 276 (48.3%) 21 (30.4%) Hispanic/Latin American 81 (12.7%) 74 (13.0%) 7 (10.1%) Native American/Eskimo 10 (1.6%) 8 (1.4%) 2 (2.9%) Asian American 26 (4.1%) 24 (4.2%) 2 (2.9%) Mixed 62 (9.7%) 56 (9.8%) 6 (8.7%) Other 9 (1.4%) 8 (1.4%) 1 (1.4%) Declined to state 1 (0.1%) 1 (0.1%) 0 (0.0%) Missing 1 1 0 Physical abuse history v2 = 8.02* No 389 (60.8%) 358 (62.7%) 31 (45.0%) Yes 251 (39.2%) 213 (37.3%) 38 (55.0%) Missing 1 1 0 Sexual abuse history v2 = 23.24*** No 470 (73.4%) 436 (76.3%) 34 (49.3%) Yes 170 (26.6%) 135 (23.7%) 35 (50.7%) Missing 1 1 0 Type of crime v2 = 27.67*** Sexual assault 130 (20.3%) 86 (15.1%) 24 (34.8%) Domestic Violence 83 (12.9%) 74 (13.0%) 9 (13.0%) Shooting 97 (15.1%) 97 (17.0%) 0 Stabbing 89 (13.9%) 82 (14.4%) 7 (10.1%) Physical assault 238 (37.1%) 210 (36.8%) 28 (40.6%) Vehicular assault 23 (3.5%) 22 (3.9%) 1 (1.4%) Missing 1 1 0 Type of crime (reclassified) v2 = 11.46*** General assault 447 (69.8%) 411 (72.0%) 36 (52.2%) Relational assault 193 (30.2%) 160 (28.0%) 33 (47.8%) Missing 1 1 0 Mean age (years) 39.50 (SD = 11.3) 35.84 (SD = 11.5) 36.04 (SD = 9.9) t = -0.14 Mean monthly income (dollars) 1,184 (SD = 2,786) 1,094 (SD = 2,030) 1,953 (SD = 6,133) t = -2.41* Mean education (years) 12.23 (SD = 2.5) 12.19 (SD = 2.4) 12.59 (SD = 2.9) t = -1.27 Mean lifetime trauma events 4.56 (SD = 2.4) 4.46 (SD = 2.4) 5.40 (SD = 2.6) t = -3.07** N = 641; test statistics compare heterosexual victims to LGBT victims * p B .05, ** p B .01, *** p B .001 Law Hum Behav 123 Saunders, & Best, 1998; NVC, 1993). Indeed, literature cautions readers to dispel the misconception that most sexual assaults are perpetrated by strangers (Grothues & Marmion, 2006). Conceptually, domestic violence and sexual assault both fall under a broader umbrella of ‘‘relational violence’’ and often involve common themes of intimate interpersonal control (Grothues & Marmion, 2006). Perhaps as a result of the commonalities between sexual assault and domestic violence, law enforcement (e.g., Chen & Ullman, 2010; Felson & Pare, 2005) and victim services (e.g., Macy, Giattina, Parish, & Crosby, 2010; Martin, Coyne-Beasley, Hoehn, Matthew, Runyan, et al., 2009; Zweig & Burt, 2007) often pair sexual assault and domestic violence together as well. In accordance with these bodies of literature, we com- bined sexual assault and domestic violence under the category relational assault. Relational assault includes those with an intimate partner or of a sexual nature, namely domestic violence and sexual assault. The label general assault will be used throughout the rest of this article to denote a combination of crime subtypes falling outside the relational nature. General assault refers to a group of additional violent assaults, including shooting, stabbing, physical assault, and vehicular assault. Trauma History. Participants’ lifetime traumatic history was tabulated using a component of the Posttrau- matic Diagnostic Scale (Foa, Cashman, Jaycox, & Perry, 1997). The scale assesses a maximum of 12 types of trauma including adulthood experiences of natural disasters, accidents, life-threatening illness/sudden death, and physi- cal and sexual assault. The scale also incorporates childhood physical and sexual abuse during childhood. The present study used a total corrected count that did not include the current violent crime. Also, the physical and sexual assault items served as control variables in our analyses. Clinical Symptoms. Clinical variables were assessed using two types of self-report instruments during the baseline interview. General traumatic stress symptoms were measured using the Acute Stress Disorder Scale (ASDS; Bryant, Moulds, & Guthrie, 2000). It contains 21 items, each measured on a 5-point Likert scale, asking participants the degree to which they experienced each symptom over the last month. The present study used the ASDS total score (i.e., sum of all 21 items). Cronbach’s alpha for the total score was .91 for this sample. Depressive symptoms, general anxiety, and panic symptoms were assessed using the Patient Health Ques- tionnaire (PHQ; Spitzer, Kroenke, & Williams, 1999). PHQ subscales exist for levels of depression (nine items), general anxiety (seven items), and panic (20 items), among other diagnostic syndromes. Participants in the present study rated their depressive symptoms over the last 2 weeks, panic symptoms over the last 4 weeks, and general anxiety symptoms over the last 4 weeks. Total scores were used in the present study to capture severity of depressive, general anxiety, and panic symptomatology. Cronbach’s alpha for these subscales were as follows in the present sample: Depression (a = .87), panic (a = .73), and general anxiety (a = .86). Results RQ 1: How do LGBT victims differ from heterosexual counterparts in terms of types of crime and demographic characteristics? Table 1 summarizes results of demographic and crime comparisons by victim sexual orientation (N = 641). Overall, significant demographic differences were found by victim sexual orientation. LGBT victims were relatively equivalent by gender, whereas heterosexual victims were predominantly male. Ethnically, LGBT victims were more likely to be European American, and heterosexual victims displayed higher frequencies of being African American and Hispanic/Latin American. LGBT victims possessed higher mean monthly income, as well as greater rates of total, physical, and sexual trauma history, as compared to heterosexual victims. Age and education level were equivalent by victim sexual orientation. Regarding type of victimization, a chi-square analysis was conducted to evaluate the specific types of crime victimization. Results yielded significant differences in crime type distribution by victim sexual orientation. Het- erosexual victims fell into the following categories in descending order: physical assault, shooting, sexual assault, stabbing, domestic violence, vehicular assault, and one missing. LGBT victims reported crime type in descending order as: physical assault, sexual assault, domestic violence, stabbing, vehicular assault, and shoot- ing. By percentage within groups, LGBT victims were 2.3 times more likely to be victims of sexual assault than heterosexual victims. Percentages of victimization within groups also showed that, compared to LGBT victims, heterosexual victims were much more likely to be victims of shootings (there were no LGBT shooting victims). A second chi-square analysis was conducted for the same constructs, except using the reclassified definition of crime type (i.e., relational versus general assault; see Table 1). Within the LGBT subgroup, type of victimization was relatively equal. However, the ratio of victimization for heterosexual victims was nearly 3:1 with the majority being victims of general assault. RQ2: How does victim sexual orientation relate to trauma-associated clinical symptoms (i.e., acute stress, Law Hum Behav 123 depression, panic, and general anxiety) after victimization? RQ3: How does victim sexual orientation moderate the relations between common victimization risk factors (i.e., victim gender, type of crime, and victim trauma history) and the above clinical symptoms? Multivariate regression analyses were conducted to answer research questions two and three to take into account correlated dependent measures (Cohen, Cohen, West & Aiken, 2003). This approach also allows for evaluation of main and moderating effects in the presence of numerous control variables while decreasing concerns regarding Type I error (see Cohen et al., 2003). Only participants with complete data on all variables of interest were used (n = 627). Independent variables were victim sexual orientation (heterosexual versus LGBT), victim gender, victim trauma history, and type of crime (relational versus general). Control variables were victim age, eth- nicity, income, education, and history of previous physical and sexual assault (i.e., yes or no; see Hyman, 2009 for importance of assault history). Dependent measures were the total score for acute stress on the ASDS, as well as total scores on the PHQ for depression, panic, and general anxiety symptoms. Overall model effect sizes for each dependent measure were assessed using R2, while the magnitude of specific independent, control, and moderator variables were assessed using partial eta squared. Partial eta squared values are only reported for significant effects. Where reported, confidence intervals denote a 95 percent range. Table 2 summarizes the results of this analysis. Overall models were significant for all four dependent measures: acute stress (F [19, 608] = 7.22, p \ .001, R2 = .18, CI = .13 to .23), depression (F [19, 608] = 7.11, p \ .001, R 2 = .18, CI = .13 to .23), panic (F [19, 608] = 8.43, p \ .001, R2 = .21, CI = .15 to .26), and general anxiety (F [19, 608] = 7.41, p \ .001, R2 = .19, CI = .13 to .24). To clarify research question two, main effects of sexual orientation on the four dependent measures can be asses- sed. Results indicate that victim sexual orientation was associated with both acute stress and general anxiety symptoms. Specifically, LGBT victims reported signifi- cantly higher acute stress symptoms (M = 62.68, SD = 14.61, d = .45, CI = -2.99 to 1.87) and more anxiety symptoms (M = 16.34, SD = 3.59, d = .44, CI = -.41 to .74) than heterosexual victims (M = 55.07, SD = 17.05; M = 14.76, SD = 4.32, respectively). Other main effects of victim gender, victim trauma history, type of crime, ethnicity, and education are worth noting. Victim gender was significantly related to symp- toms of acute stress, depression, and general anxiety. Females reported higher levels of acute stress (M = 63.06, SD = 14.70, d = .70, CI = -1.20 to 2.35), depression (M = 23.04, SD = 6.60, d = .57, CI = -.28 to 1.25), and general anxiety (M = 16.51, SD = 3.80, d = .61, CI = .11 to 1.03) than male counterparts (M = 51.77, SD = 16.82; M = 19.15, SD = 6.91; M = 14.02, SD = 4.28, respectively). Victim past trauma history was positively associated with acute stress (b = .97, CI = -.53 to 2.47), depression (b = .35, CI = -.27 to Table 2 Multivariate regression model of independent variables on clinical symptoms Acute stress symptoms Depression symptoms Panic symptoms Anxiety symptoms F gp 2 F gp 2 F gp 2 F gp 2 Independent variables Sexual orientation 3.75* \.01 3.23 – 0.28 – 6.95** .01 Gender 6.32** .01 8.10** .01 2.33 – 9.22** .01 SO 9 Gender 1.52 – 0.23 – 2.98 – 0.02 – Trauma history 9.75** .02 9.84** .02 30.83*** .05 9.28** .01 SO 9 Trauma history 1.14 – 1.91 – 0.01 – 5.30* \.01 Crime type 0.16 – 0.03 – 2.43 – 0.46 – SO 9 Crime type 0.32 – 0.04 – 4.19* \.01 0.03 – Age 2.83 – 0.13 – 0.18 – 1.76 – Physical abuse history 3.28 – 0.19 – 1.97 – 0.47 – Sexual abuse history 0.33 – 1.16 – 0.21 – 0.26 – Ethnicity 1.22 – 0.94 – 2.03* .02 1.36 – Income 2.15 – 2.79 – 0.91 – 3.07 – Education 1.57 – 0.49 – 4.14* \.01 0.02 – Note: SO = sexual orientation; gp 2 = partial eta-squared value; bold values represent significant predictor variable * p B .05; ** p B .01; *** p B .001 Law Hum Behav 123 .97), panic (b = .56, CI = .22 to .90), and general anxiety symptoms (b = .11, CI = -.27 to .49). Crime type was significantly related to panic symptoms, such that victims of relational assault (M = 3.84, SD = 4.07, d = .43, CI = -.15 to .78) reported significantly higher degrees of panic symptoms than victims of general assault (M = 2.18, SD = 3.72). Education was significantly positively related with panic symptoms (b = .12, CI = .004 to .24). Finally, levels of panic symptoms by ethnicity emerged as follows from highest to lowest: Native American/Eskimo (M = 5.78, SD = 4.41), Other (M = 4.56, SD = 4.04), Mixed (M = 3.29, SD = 4.30), European American (M = 3.25, SD = 3.90), Asian American (M = 3.05, SD = 3.99), Hispanic/Latino American (M = 2.63, SD = 4.14), and African American (M = 2.06, SD = 3.61). To examine the moderating role of victim sexual ori- entation on other independent variables, the following interaction terms were included in the multivariate regression analysis: victim sexual orientation 9 victim gender, victim sexual orientation 9 victim trauma history, and victim sexual orientation 9 crime type. Only signifi- cant moderation effects are reported here (see Table 2 for all results). Victim sexual orientation moderated the relationship between crime type and panic symptoms (b = -2.28, CI = -4.46 to -.09, see Fig. 1). Overall, relational assault victims experienced more panic symptoms than general assault victims. Moreover, LGBT victims of relational assaults experienced the most panic symptoms compared to all other subgroups. Finally, victim sexual orientation moderated the rela- tionship between trauma history and general anxiety symptoms (b = .46, CI = .07 to .85, see Fig. 2). LGBT victims reported greater anxiety symptoms overall when compared to heterosexual victims. This disparity is clarified in that LGBT victims with low and high trauma histories experience relatively equivalent levels of anxiety symptoms. However, low trauma heterosexual victims experienced notably less anxiety symptoms than high trauma heterosexual counterparts. Discussion The present study was designed to identify victimization and demographic patterns among LGBT and heterosexual violent crime victims seeking emergency medical care. LGBT victims showed higher rates of sexual assault compared to heterosexual counterparts, a finding consistent with previous research highlighting generally high degrees of sexual assault victimization in LGB samples (e.g., D’Augelli et al., 2006). Of further importance is that het- erosexual victims were more likely to be victims of shootings and general assault, thereby demonstrating important differences between the specific types of crimes these respective populations are at greatest risk of suffering. Prominent demographic disparities emerged between LGBT and heterosexual victims. Noteworthy differences were that heterosexual victims were more likely to be male and of ethnic minority status, whereas LGBT victims had a greater presence of European Americans and even distri- bution by gender. Present hate crime and victim literature (e.g., Cheng, 2004; Cramer et al., 2010; Herek, 2009) tend to focus on a single minority group at a time. Provided the differences in how victim sexual orientation and ethnicity interface, there is apparent need for systematic examination of how subtypes of minority victims (e.g., African Amer- ican LGBT versus heterosexual) experience stigma and Interaction of Victim Sexual Orientation and Type of Crime Predicting Panic Symptoms 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 Heterosexual LGBT Victim Sexual Orientation P a n ic S y m p to m s Relational Assault General Assault Fig. 1 Interaction of victim sexual orientation and type of crime predicting panic symptoms. LGBT lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender Interaction of Victim Sexual Orientation and Trauma History Predicting Anxiety Symptoms 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Heterosexual LGBT Victim Sexual Orientation A n x ie ty S y m p to m s Low Trauma History High Trauma History Fig. 2 Interaction of victim sexual orientation and trauma history predicting anxiety symptoms. Note: High and Low Trauma Histories are defined by ±2 standard deviations from the mean; LGBT lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender Law Hum Behav 123 clinical symptoms. Also warranting attention is the higher frequency of trauma and abuse histories in LGBT victims. This finding is not entirely surprisingly given consistent findings of generally high rates of victimization for LGBT individuals (e.g., Pilkington & D’Augelli, 2006; Roberts et al., 2010). The knowledge that LGBT persons suffer more traumas reaffirms a need for careful assessment and intervention tailored toward such victims’ experiences in order to mitigate poor psychological trajectories. The second aim of the present study was to analyze sexual orientation as a direct and moderating variable on victim acute stress, depression, panic, and general anxiety. Although previous literature portrays a bevy of psychiatric concerns for bias and hate crime victims (e.g., D’Augelli, 2006; Herek, 2007; Herek et al., 1999), present findings extended this body of work in that victim sexual orientation shows a direct and indirect link to anxiety-related symp- toms in a sample of violent crime victims. In way of direct associations, sexual minority victims were more suscepti- ble to experiencing acute stress and general anxiety. Various explanations exist for the role of sexual orien- tation in the experience of increased anxiety-related symptoms for violent crime victims. For example, Hyman (2009) discusses a person–environment model causing poor mental health in lesbian women. Specifically, she postulates that individual and cultural heterosexism incul- cates negative self-views for lesbian women. Internalized homophobia then yields negative mental health outcomes such as stress and anxiety. Herek, Cogan and Gills (2009) offer another perspective of environmental and individual experiences that may influence manifestation of anxiety in this group. Specifi- cally, they identify heterosexist cultural influences as a contributing factor. They further outline three types of person-level stigma experienced by sexual minority per- sons: felt, enacted, and internalized. Enacted stigma may be particularly pertinent to understanding anxiety and LGBT victimization. Enacted stigma involves overt behavioral expressions of bias toward LGBT individuals (e.g., hate crimes, housing discrimination; Herek et al., 2009). Though not hate crimes per se, LGBT victims may experience violent crime as a form of enacted stigma, thereby yielding higher levels of anxiety-spectrum symptoms. Applied to mental health outcomes of LGBT crime victims, both Hyman’s, and Herek and colleagues’ per- spectives raise the possibility that LGBT victims experience crimes as a sexual identity-related interpersonal trauma. They may subsequently internalize negative self- views and experience psychological symptoms (i.e., anxi- ety and acute stress). Moreover, experiences of LGBT crime victims may interact with known risk factors linked to victimization to exacerbate anxiety-related symptoms. Alternatively, mental health may be negatively affected by increased attention to threat by sexual minority persons. Research on social-identity threat has shown that members of stigmatized groups develop belief systems about being devalued, and these expectations cause them to become especially alert or vigilant for signs of devaluation (e.g., Kaiser et al., 2006; Major, Quinton, & McCoy, 2002; Steele, Spencer, & Aronson, 2002). There is a great deal of empirical data showing a bias in attention toward threat- ening stimuli is associated with, and may maintain, anxiety (see review in Cisler, Bacon, & Williams, 2009). Research further suggests that such attentional biases may cause anxiety-spectrum symptoms (MacLeod, Rutherford, Campbell, Ebsworthy, & Holker, 2002; Mathews & Ma- cLeod, 2002). Therefore, because sexual minority persons are members of an oft-stigmatized minority group, they may be particularly vigilant for threat cues, which in turn may produce higher levels of anxiety and negatively impact mental health symptoms. Support for this notion can be seen in our findings that LGBT victims endorsed higher rates of general anxiety and acute stress over the past 4 weeks when compared to heterosexual counterparts. Victim sexual orientation is a relatively untapped moderating victim characteristic to date. The importance of present findings is therefore magnified by demonstrating the moderating role of sexual orientation with anxiety symptoms. Three trends emerged. First, in relation to vic- tim gender, heterosexual males experienced the least, and male sexual minority victims the most, levels of panic. Concerning type of crime, sexual minority victims of relational assault experienced the greatest amount of panic symptoms. Finally, regarding victim trauma history, LGBT victims experience high degrees of general anxiety irre- spective of trauma history, whereas heterosexual victims with little trauma history are buffered against experiencing general anxiety. By using a sample of crime victims presenting for emergency medical treatment (rather than those already enrolled in treatment), this study can inform initial assessment and mental health intervention in this popula- tion. Attention to anxiety-type symptoms is warranted for all sexual minority victims; however, assessment and treatment of these symptoms appears particularly pertinent for male sexual minority victims and LGBT victims of relational assault. Frontline mental and medical health staff such as psychotherapists or emergency department nurses and physicians may draw on these data for chief domains of clinical assessment in sexual minority victims of violent crime. Law pertaining to sexual orientation and victimization offers protection specific to hate crime victims (HRC, 2009). However, present findings indicate that LGBT vic- tims of violent crimes in general are at an elevated risk for Law Hum Behav 123 developing acute stress symptoms, general anxiety symp- toms (particularly if they have a history of trauma), and panic symptoms (particularly if they are victims of rela- tional assault). From a policy evaluation perspective, direct comparison of psychological health for hate crime and non- hate crime victims merits attention. Given the possibility that crimes not classified as hate crimes may be experi- enced as the latter due to internalized stigma, and given the findings that LGB victims experience greater psychological consequences of violent crime in general, there may be a need for extra protection for sexual minority non-hate crime victims. The present study possesses several strengths worth noting. Our results advance this literature through direct comparison to heterosexual victims. Moreover, a majority of the previous sexual orientation victimization literature pertains specifically to hate crimes. The present study broadened this focus to a general sample of violent crime victims. Several limitations of this study can inform future work. Although necessary for statistical reasons, our dichoto- mized definitions of sexual orientation and type of crime necessitate additional research to refine reported associa- tions in this study. Larger samples, and potential oversampling of LGBT victims, may solve these limita- tions. Also, generalizability of present findings cannot be extended to non-injured crime victims, or to injured crime victims who do not seek emergency medical treatment. Replication of our results would be beneficial in such a sample. Additionally, approximately one quarter (24.1 percent) of the present sample was European American. This portion is significantly less than the estimated 48 percent of violent crime victims who were European American in 2009 (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2009). Therefore, extrapolation of findings to predominantly European American samples must be made with caution until replication occurs. 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Abstract LGBT Victims: Rates of Victimization and Psychological Outcomes Sexual Orientation as a Moderator of Psychological Outcomes The Present Study Method Procedure Participants Measures Demographic Information Type of Crime Trauma History Clinical Symptoms Results Discussion Acknowledgment References << /ASCII85EncodePages false /AllowTransparency false /AutoPositionEPSFiles true /AutoRotatePages /None /Binding /Left /CalGrayProfile (Gray Gamma 2.2) /CalRGBProfile (sRGB IEC61966-2.1) /CalCMYKProfile (ISO Coated v2 300% \050ECI\051) /sRGBProfile (sRGB IEC61966-2.1) /CannotEmbedFontPolicy /Error /CompatibilityLevel 1.3 /CompressObjects /Off /CompressPages true /ConvertImagesToIndexed true /PassThroughJPEGImages true /CreateJobTicket false /DefaultRenderingIntent /Perceptual /DetectBlends true /DetectCurves 0.1000 /ColorConversionStrategy /sRGB /DoThumbnails true /EmbedAllFonts true /EmbedOpenType false /ParseICCProfilesInComments true /EmbedJobOptions true /DSCReportingLevel 0 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work_p2yk6sypfnhfrnq5yih2nf6mte	----	From oral histories to visual narratives: re-presenting the post-September 11 experiences of the Muslim women in the USA Mei-Po Kwan Department of Geography, The Ohio State University, 1036 Derby Hall, 154 North Oval Mall, Columbus, OH 43210-1361, USA, kwan.8@osu.edu Since the attacks on the World Trade Center in New York City and the Pentagon in Washington, DC on 11 September 2001, Muslims or Muslim-looking people in the USA have experienced a significant increase in hostility and hate violence. The anti-Muslim hate crimes have affected the lives of these people of color in significant ways. In this article I seek to recover part of the post-September 11 experiences of American Muslims that were obfuscated by the dominant anti-Muslim master narrative, which conflated the Islamic faith with terrorism and constructed all Muslims as dangerous anti-American outsiders. I explore a way of telling stories about these experiences using the expressive power of geospatial technologies. Using the experiences of a Muslim woman in Columbus (Ohio, USA) as an example, I describe how the technological spaces afforded by geographical information systems (GIS) may be used to illuminate the impact of the fear of anti-Muslim hate violence on the daily lives of Muslim women and to help articulate their emotional geographies in the post-September 11 period. Key words: anti-Muslim hate violence, fear, geospatial technologies, GIS, September 11. Introduction The attacks on the World Trade Center in New York City and the Pentagon in Washington, DC on 11 September 2001 were not only shocking to people around the world. It also posed an enormous challenge to the US government: how can the terrorist attacks be explained and how can the citizenry be assured that the government is still capable of securing the safety of the nation and its population? It was apparent to the Bush administration that the most urgent task right after the attacks was to mobilize effective ‘means, mechanisms, procedures, instruments, tactics, techniques, technologies and vocabul- aries’ through which the attacks can be rendered intelligible and their political and social ramifications made less damaging to the administration (Dean 1999: 31). In other words, what ‘technologies of government’ (techniques and practices) or ‘forms of truth’ (rationalities and representations) could the government mobilize to address the problem of security after September 11 (Dean 1999: 31)? The work of Foucault (1991, 1995 [1975]) and the governmentality literature he inspired offer helpful analytical insights to Social & Cultural Geography, Vol. 9, No. 6, September 2008 ISSN 1464-9365 print/ISSN 1470-1197 online/08/060653-17 q 2008 Taylor & Francis DOI: 10.1080/14649360802292462 D o w n l o a d e d B y : [ K w a n , M e i - P o ] A t : 1 9 : 3 1 1 7 A u g u s t 2 0 0 8 the techniques used by the Bush adminis- tration (e.g. Gordon 1991; Raco 2003; Rose- Redwood 2006). A commonly deployed practice, in the context of liberal or neo- liberal governmentality, is to ‘divide popu- lations and exclude certain categories from the status of the autonomous and rational person’ (Dean 1999: 132). When a group of people (whether citizens or not) are labeled irrational, deviant, or evil, the government can explain their actions or the harms they did simply by their irrationality or wickedness instead of explicating the complex social and geopolitical history that might have contributed to those actions (e.g., the pertinent geopolitics in the rise of militant Islamic movements in Central Asia). As summarized by Foucault’s notion of dividing practices, ‘The subject is either divided inside himself or divided from others. This process objectivizes him. Examples are the mad and the sane, the sick and the healthy, the criminals and the “good boys”’ (Foucault 1982: 208). This technique (binary construction of populations) was the disciplinary strategy and the biopolitical tech- nique that the Bush administration used in its ‘war on terrorism’ (Puar and Rai 2002). While proclaiming that freedom and democracy were under attack in his televised address on 20 September 2001, President George W. Bush invoked a series of binary constructions that divide all people in the world into two groups: those who are civilized and those who are uncivilized; those who defend economic freedom and those who would attack America’s way of life; those who support democracy and those who would disrupt it (Butler 2002; Winkler 2006). He grouped all terrorists, including the perpetra- tors of the September 11 attacks, ‘into a homogenous group characterized by opposi- tion to fundamental American values and proclaimed that terrorists “have a common ideology . . . they hate freedom and they hate freedom-loving people”’ (Winkler 2006: 3). He drew a clear line between the two sides in the war on terrorism: ‘if you are not with us, you are against us’ (Butler 2002; Hyndman 2003: 5). Through these binary represen- tations, Bush explained the attacks on September 11 as a clash between those who supported American’s foundational values and those who opposed them (Winkler 2006). Through ‘the biopolitical technique of totali- zation’ he thus constructed an enemy popu- lation against which the US government and the American people can take defensive or retaliatory actions (Rose-Redwood 2006: 472). With these binary constructions of people, a powerful master narrative began to be circulated by other state and non-state actors via mass media and the Internet. This narrative extended the boundary for the group of ‘uncivilized’ or anti-American people (originally intended for the perpetrators of the September 11 attacks) to include all believers of the Islamic faith. Biased statements like ‘Islam is a religion in which God requires you to send your son to die for him’ (by Attorney General John Ashcroft), ‘Islam is an evil and wicked religion’ (by Christian evangelist Franklin Graham), or ‘Muslims are worse than the Nazis’ (by televangelist Pat Robert- son) were broadcast through televised pro- grams. Many images of anti-Muslim signs and symbols were disseminated on the Internet, including a sign that says ‘Avenge U.S.A., Kill a Muslim now’ painted in red on a wall and a bumper sticker that replaces the ‘s’ in ‘Islam’ with a swastika (Aly 2003). As this anti-Muslim narrative that conflated the Islamic faith with terrorism and con- structed all Muslims as dangerous anti- American outsiders captured the popular imagination, many Americans turned their patriotic fervor into anti-Muslim hate violence. 654 Mei-Po Kwan D o w n l o a d e d B y : [ K w a n , M e i - P o ] A t : 1 9 : 3 1 1 7 A u g u s t 2 0 0 8 As Bush’s proclamation on the war on terrorism turned into a military response (Hyndman 2003; Puar and Rai 2002), the anti-Muslim hostility evolved into assaults on the individual bodies of the Muslims or Muslim-looking people (e.g., people of color with distinct attire like the Sikhs) in the USA (Ahmad 2002). As Ahmad (2002: 101) argues, ‘Among the enormous violence done by the United States since the tragedies suffered on September 11 has been an unrelenting, multivalent assault on the bodies, psyches, and rights of Arabs, Muslim, and South Asian immigrants.’ Further, as a result of the highly racialized, state-sanctioned counter-terrorist measures since September 11, the citizen- ship and identities of these people of color in the USA have also been seriously contested (Ahmad 2002). The disciplinary power of the master narrative that totalized all Muslims as terrorists also ‘dissolved’ the Muslim popu- lation into ‘individual bodies that can be kept under surveillance . . . and, if need be punished’ (Foucault 2003: 242). While Muslims and Muslim-looking individ- uals in the USA have experienced a dramatic increase in hate violence since September 11, the response to the anti-Muslim incidents from the media and the administration has been largely muted. As Ahmad (2002) observed, the post- September 11 anti-Muslim killings have been treated differently from other recent hate killings in the USA. While still considered wrong, post-September 11 anti-Muslim hate crimes have largely been understood as the result of a ‘displaced anger’ that ‘the vast majority of Americans sympathize and agree’ (Ahmad 2002: 108). The perpetrators of these crimes were guilty not of malicious intent, but of expressing a socially appropriate emotion in socially inappropriate ways . . . the hate crime killings before September 11 were viewed as moral depravity, while the hate killings since September 11 have been understood as crimes of passion. (Ahmad 2002: 108) This article seeks to recover part of the post- September 11 experiences of American Mus- lims that were obscured by the totalizing master narrative. It explores a way of re- presenting these experiences as counter narra- tives using the expressive power of geospatial technologies. Using the experiences of a Muslim woman in Columbus (Ohio, USA) as an example, the article describes how the technological spaces afforded by geographical information systems (GIS) may be used to illuminate the impact of the fear of anti- Muslim hate violence on the daily lives of Muslim women and to help articulate their emotional geographies in the post-September 11 period. This focus on geospatial technol- ogies is shaped by the aims and purposes of this Special Issue, entitled ‘Spatial Technolo- gies/Technologised Spaces.’ The article attempts to show that geospatial technologies like GIS can integrate a wide variety of geographic data and qualitative materials and can provide a multimedia interactive environment for interpreting and telling stories about people’s lived experiences (Kwan 2002, 2004, 2007; Kwan and Ding 2008). The case of a Muslim woman is drawn upon to illustrate how oral histories may be used to construct GIS-based visual narratives. The article is not primarily intended to be a report of the results of my study on the Muslim women in Columbus. Anti-Muslim hate violence since September 11 Since September 11, Arabs, Muslims, and South Asians in the USA have experienced a Oral histories to visual narratives 655 D o w n l o a d e d B y : [ K w a n , M e i - P o ] A t : 1 9 : 3 1 1 7 A u g u s t 2 0 0 8 dramatic increase in hostility and hate violence (Ahmad 2002). According to the Council on American-Islamic Relations (2002), there were more than 1,500 reported incidents of attack and discrimination against American Muslims by the end of 2002. These incidents include twelve killings, firebomb and arson attacks on Muslim properties (mosques or businesses) and homes, physical assaults with fists, knives or guns, a hate rape, and work- place discrimination. Because of the tightened security measures brought about by the US Patriot Act, a large number of Arabs, Muslims, and South Asians in the USA were profiled, detained or interviewed by law enforcement agents, and many Muslim char- ities and businesses were raided or closed (Council on American-Islamic Relations 2002). While unprecedented effort and resources were committed to protect US citizens and assets in the name of homeland security, ‘homeland insecurities’ is perhaps a more befitting descrip- tion of the post-September 11 experiences of these people of color (Ahmad 2002: 101). The anti-Muslim hate violence has affected the lives of Muslims and Muslim-looking people in the USA deeply. Besides the possibility of being closely watched by surveillance technology as part of the post- September 11 counter-terrorist measures, being verbally abused or physically attacked has become an imminent possibility for the eight million American Muslims. As news about violent anti-Muslim hate crimes reaches them through mass media, the Internet, and friends and relatives, fear of being attacked or harassed in public spaces has become part of their daily lives. The totalization of all Muslims as terrorists by the dominant master narrative has not only produced American Muslims as feared/hated subjects but also turned many of them into fearful subjects. For many American Muslims, negotiating urban spaces in their daily lives has become a hazardous endeavor since September 11. Yet most of the distressing, and even terrifying, post-September 11 experiences of American Muslims have received only scant media attention. Few (if any) serious anti- Muslim incidents have made the headlines— which include an arson attack that totally burned down a mosque, an Indian man wearing a turban (the headdress of Sikhs) was mistaken as a Muslim and shot dead while working at the gas station he owned, a Yemen man was shot twelve times in the back while fleeing from his attacker, and a 15-year-old Muslim girl was raped inside a drug store by an 18-year-old man while he was making anti-Muslim comments (Council on American-Islamic Relations 2002). Vic- tims of these anti-Muslim incidents include not only Muslims but also anyone who looks like a Muslim or an Arab. Many non- Muslims such as Sikh men (with readily identifiable turbans and long beards) and Hindus, and many non-Arabs such as Indians, Pakistanis, and other South Asians were affected. Much of this hate violence, as Ahmad (2002: 104) suggests, ‘depends on a fungibility of “Middle Eastern-looking” or “Muslim-looking” people with the individ- uals who committed the September 11 attacks and leaves Arabs, Muslims, and South Asians enormously vulnerable.’ But the violence has also affected other people of color (e.g., Latinos in Los Angeles), and it was apparent that what is at issue is not that one is Muslim or Arab, but that one is ostensibly ‘non-American.’ This hate violence can be thus be understood, as Ahmad (2002: 104) argues, as the result of ‘racial profiling’s flawed logic (people who “look Muslim” are more likely to be terrorists, therefore if we are attacking terrorism we should attack people who “look Muslim”)’. 656 Mei-Po Kwan D o w n l o a d e d B y : [ K w a n , M e i - P o ] A t : 1 9 : 3 1 1 7 A u g u s t 2 0 0 8 AstudyontheMuslimwomeninColumbus To recover the lived experiences of American Muslims and to understand the impact of anti- Muslim hate violence on their lives, I conducted a study that focuses on the post-September 11 experiences of a group of Muslim women in Columbus (Ohio, USA). The study explored how anti-Muslim hostility affects their daily activities and travel, access to and use of public spaces, as well as perception of the urban environment (especially their perception of safety and potential risk in the city before and after September 11). The study focused on Muslim women because they are especially vulnerable to anti-Muslim hate crimes and discrimination since many of them can be easily identified in public places based on their distinctive religious attire (Moore 1998; Shakeri 1998).1 Women of the Islamic faith who practice such religious attire wear the Muslim headscarf (hijab) in public spaces and in the presence of men outside the family (Shakeri 1998). Further, Muslim women are particularly vulnerable because their traditional gender role in the family renders it necessary for them to undertake many out-of-home activities in their normal daily lives (e.g., chauffeuring children to and from schools). As many of these household responsibilities impose rather restrictive space-time constraint on their daily lives, the need to undertake them can make their lives particularly stressful in the post- September 11 period. To avoid the risk of being harassed or attacked after September 11, some Muslim women might change their religious attire, while some others might modify their normal daily activities and trips (Muslim Women’s League 2001). Like indi- viduals in other social groups who want to avoid violent attacks, they may also change the places they normally visit or the time they visit these places (Pain 1997, 2001; Valentine 1993). The study aims at understanding the short-term and long-term impact of Muslim women’s fear of being attacked on their daily activities and trips, and the strategies they adopted to cope with the threat of anti- Muslim hate violence. Thirty-seven Muslim women who live in Columbus were recruited with the help of a key informant who has been an active member of the local Muslim community for twelve years. Data were collected from these women through mixed methods in a sixteen-month period from late 2001 to early 2003. First, an activity diary survey was conducted to record their activities and trips in a designated survey day. Each activity diary recorded data for all activities that a participant undertook in the survey day, including their starting and ending time, travel mode, street addresses, and pur- poses (e.g., household responsibilities, rec- reational or social purposes, etc.). Oral histories were then elicited through in-depth interviews with each participant shortly after the activity diary survey. They are the partici- pants’ stories about what kind of changes September 11-induced hate violence might have brought to their daily activities and their perception of safety and risk in the urban environment. These oral histories were recorded with digital recorders with the permission of the subjects and transcribed for subsequent anal- ysis. In addition, each participant also sketched on a map of the study area to indicate the activity locations they frequent and the areas they consider unsafe before and after 9/11. Oral history is a method of narrative inquiry that seeks to collect and analyze the stories people told about their lived experiences of past events or major turning points in their lives (Creswell 2007; Denzin 1989; Oral histories to visual narratives 657 D o w n l o a d e d B y : [ K w a n , M e i - P o ] A t : 1 9 : 3 1 1 7 A u g u s t 2 0 0 8 Ritchie 2003). It aims at providing natural and rounded personal accounts based on partici- pants’ first-hand experience, memories, and knowledge through multiple in-depth inter- views using open questions (George and Stratford 2005; Ritchie 2003). Oral history is often considered a helpful means for recover- ing people’s lived experiences of past events based on their memories and personal narra- tives of those events and how they have affected their lives (Creswell 2007; Kwan and Ding 2008; Nagar 1997). They may enrich our understanding of the experiences of those who do not have access to means of publicity and whose thoughts, feelings, and actions are obscured by the dominant discourse (Nagar 1997). As first-hand testimonies, oral histories are imbued with participants’ emotions, feelings and attitudes toward the events or experiences they narrate. Oral histories, however, are not objective accounts of past events and do not provide ‘direct access to other times, places, or cultures’ (Personal Narratives Group 1989: 261). There are inevitably gaps, distortions and omissions in people’s memories, and these memories are shaped by the particular personal, family and social contexts in which they are formed. The focus of oral history is not only on people’s experiences as stories but also on illuminating the social, cultural, and institutional contexts within which those experiences ‘were con- stituted, shaped, expressed, and enacted’ (Clandinin and Rosiek 2007: 42). Oral histories should be understood as co-authored memories since the researcher often ‘writes him- or herself into the life of the subject written about’ (Denzin 1989: 26). They are the results of the participants’ interpretation of their own experiences and the researcher’s interpretation of the participants’ interpret- ation. As the co-produced text is ‘read through the life of the reader,’ its meaning may be further interpreted or re-negotiated by the reader (Denzin 1989: 26). Constructing visual narratives with geospatial technologies I explore in this and the next sections some of the ways in which the technological space afforded by geospatial technologies may be used to tell stories about the post-September 11 experiences of the Muslim women in the USA. Using the oral histories and diary data collected from the subjects as well as the 3D visualization environment of a geographical information system (GIS), I created a visual narrative that focuses on the unfolding of events and personal experiences over space and time. A central element of this visual narrative is a life path that traces the temporal sequence of events based on a person’s activities and trips in space-time. As this method incorporates both the spatial and temporal dimensions of people’s experiences and events, it allows the researcher to articulate how a person’s feelings may change as she visits different places at different times. An early example of the oral and life histories that can be used to construct this kind of visual narratives is Ulrich’s (1990) A Midwife’s Tale. The book provides details about many events and journeys in the life of Martha Ballard (1735 – 1812), a midwife in Massachusetts (USA) who maintained a record of her daily activities for twenty-seven years from 1785 to 1812. Reconstructing Ballard’s life story using her diary and many maps, Ulrich provides a rich and detailed account of her daily life that also sheds light on the lives of rural women in late eighteenth century. Using the account provided by Ulrich, Opdycke (2000) presents Martha Ballard’s life story using a map that shows her movements 658 Mei-Po Kwan D o w n l o a d e d B y : [ K w a n , M e i - P o ] A t : 1 9 : 3 1 1 7 A u g u s t 2 0 0 8 with a set of directed lines in an historical atlas of women in America. This map and Opdycke’s interpretation of Ballard’s activities and journeys together constitute a visual narrative of her life story. In Opdycke’s historical atlas, the life story of Martha Ballard is told with a two-dimensional map, which does not explicitly portray the temporal progression of events (and it is therefore difficult to ‘see’ how Ballard’s journey unfolded over time). Drawing upon the representational frame- work of time geography, which portrays the unfolding of a person’s life and daily activities as a continuous life path in three-dimensional space, geographers have used visual represen- tations that tell life stories with the time dimension as an integral element (e.g., Kwan and Ding 2008). Gregory (1994), for instance, combines the daily path of a dockworker in late nineteenth-century Stockholm with photos and word-pictures to tell the story about what life was like in that particular time and place. Laws (1997) uses the space-time path of a woman’s life course to show the changes in her residential location and spatial mobility from childhood to retirement. The life course diagram she con- structed is a helpful visual device for telling biographical stories. While these attempts to re-present people’s life histories used conventional media (printed maps, diagrams, and pictures), geographers, media artists, and community activists have recently explored how geospatial technologies such as GIS can be used to construct visual narratives that tell stories about people’s lived experiences (e.g., Brown and Knopp 2008; Kwan 2002, 2007; Parks 2001). As GIS can incorporate a variety of materials and data, such as digital photos, video and voice clips, subjects’ handwriting, hand-drawn maps and other sketches collected through in-depth interviews, the digital space afforded by GIS can be used to re-present and interpret oral and life histories (Kwan and Ding 2008). An example of this use of GIS is the Ligon history project, which seeks to preserve the history, culture and memory of an inner-city high school (J. W. Ligon High) in downtown Raleigh (North Carolina, USA) (Alibrandi, Thompson and Hagevik 2000). Besides doc- umenting the African American perspective of life during Ligon High School’s pre- and Civil Rights eras, Alibrandi, Thompson and Hage- vik (2000) used GIS to create a series of historical life maps and construct a biographi- cal narrative of an alumnus, whose daily life paths were reconstructed from his memories. In the above cases, spatial stories (de Certeau 1984) are told using the life path as a narrative device. These stories are more expressive than representational, presented not as objective accounts but as interpreted visual narratives of people’s experiences. Enriching earlier work on GIS-based visual narratives are studies that explore the use of geospatial technologies as a medium for self- expression and the articulation of emotional geographies. For instance, I explored ways of using moving images generated by GIS for articulating people’s emotional geographies (Kwan 2007). Drawing upon the methods in visual ethnography, visual sociology and film studies, I created a collaborative 3D GIS video that is more an artistic and expressive visual narrative than an objective recording gener- ated with the aid of scientific visualization. I suggested that GIS can be used to help ‘express meanings, memories, feelings and emotions for our subjects’ and we can ‘draw upon the emotional power of moving images and the techniques in narrative cinema to create GIS movies or visualizations that tell stories about the lives of marginalized people, highlight social injustice and—we hope—effect social change’ (Kwan 2007: 25). Oral histories to visual narratives 659 D o w n l o a d e d B y : [ K w a n , M e i - P o ] A t : 1 9 : 3 1 1 7 A u g u s t 2 0 0 8 In the next section, I draw upon these recent developments on constructing visual narratives with geospatial technologies and describe a method for telling the post- September 11 story of a Muslim woman in Columbus. This woman was a key infor- mant of the study and will be referred to here using the fictitious name Nada. Based on her oral history and activity diary data, I attempt to visually articulate her fear as she traveled and undertook activities outside her home since September 11 in a multimedia 3D GIS environment. I intend to expose the silences and omissions of the dominant master narrative that obfuscates the impact of post-September 11 anti-Muslim hate violence on her access to and use of public spaces. The story of a Muslim woman: a visual narrative Nada was born and grew up in Egypt. She migrated to the USA 16 years ago with her husband, who was then a graduate student and is now working in an engineering firm as a project manager. The couple, with three children, speak Arabic at home and live in a middle-class and largely White neighborhood in Columbus. Her husband leads her sons to perform the Islamic prayer and accompanying ritual (bowing and kneeling) in an archway in their house every evening when the call to prayer comes off from a preset alarm clock. Nada wears hijab and drives a minivan to chauffeur her children to and from schools and a variety of extra-curricular activities. She is a ‘stay-at-home mom’ and undertakes many out-of-home activities in her daily life for the family, including buying clothes for her husband and driving her 13-year-old son to soccer practices. Nada’s household responsibilities make it necessary for her to travel outside the home. She has been wearing hijab since puberty. Since September 11 she has not changed her religious attire but has greatly reduced her out- of-home activities and trips, especially in the first few days after the attacks. One day several months after September 11, I traveled with Nada while she was driving her minivan to undertake her normal out-of-home activities. As we passed through various routes, she recalled her feelings and fear when she saw particular buildings or stores (and her oral narrative was recorded). Using these audio recordings (in the form of audio clips), the textual transcripts of these recordings, the field notes and photographs I took on that day, Nada’s activity diary data and the map sketches she completed during an interview, I constructed a visual narrative that tells her story using ArcScene (the 3D geovisualization environment of ArcGIS). The central element of the visual narrative is Nada’s life paths for a ‘typical’ weekday before and after September 11. They were created using her activity data and a custom algorithm I developed. They portray not only the activity locations she visited and the routes used to travel from one location to the next but also the starting and ending time as well as the duration and sequence of these activities and trips. Nada’s life paths were color-coded to reflect her sense of safety and the level of fear she experienced as she moved over space and visited different locations: red for ‘danger- ous’, yellow for ‘not safe’, green for ‘moder- ately safe’, and blue for ‘quite safe’. No segment of her life paths was coded ‘very safe’ since Nada has never really felt that way as a Muslim woman living in the USA. This coding scheme, however, does not presume that a person’s sense of safety or fear is mechanically determined by the perceived or actual risk in 660 Mei-Po Kwan D o w n l o a d e d B y : [ K w a n , M e i - P o ] A t : 1 9 : 3 1 1 7 A u g u s t 2 0 0 8 the physical environment. As Koskela (1997: 304) suggests, ‘[F]eelings are not a mathemat- ical function of actual risks but rather highly complex products of each individual’s experi- ences, memories and relations to space’ and it ‘must be accepted that feelings are not measurable.’ Further, as Pain (2008) argues, ‘[F]ear is not simply reactive, but is situated in complex individual and collective emotional topographies and everyday experiences. We should expect fear-provoking events and discourse to be interpreted, resisted and subverted by people in different ways.’ The colors used to code Nada’s life paths are merely one of the ways in which these paths can be symbolically rendered for articulating her emotional geographies. They are intended to be expressive of her post-September 11 experiences rather than representational of any observable or measurable ‘scientific’ facts. In addition to Nada’s life paths, digital data of several geographic features (e.g., buildings, land parcels, rivers, and street networks) were incorporated into the GIS database in order to provide the background for the visual narra- tive. Features identified on Nada’s sketches on the map of the study area were also digitized and incorporated in the GIS. Due to the need to reduce computational intensity and improve the speed in rendering the 3D scenes, only geographic features in the relevant part of the study area were rendered and colored (see Figure 1). Further, qualitative materials col- lected from Nada were linked to specific segments or junctions of the life path. These include photographs, voice clips from the audio recordings, and excerpts from the textual transcripts of her oral history. After these materials were incorporated and linked in the GIS database, symbolic and artistic techniques were used to render 3D scenes that express the changes in Nada’s sense of safety and use of public spaces after September 11. It should be noted, however, that the illustrations in this article are static 2D screen captures from a 3D interactive multimedia GIS environment. These images are by no means equivalent to the visual narrative constructed using the multimedia environment. There are thus obvious limitations in using these 2D images to convey the expressive and emotional power of GIS because they do not provide the same range of sensory and interactive experi- ence of a multimedia visual narrative created using 3D GIS. To be able to appreciate how GIS may help articulate emotional geogra- phies, one needs some direct experience with such a multimedia GIS environment instead of looking at these 2D screen captures. Further, the discussion below refers to the color version of the figures available at ,http://geog-www. sbs.ohio-state.edu/faculty/mkwan/VisNar. html. . Figure 1 shows Nada’s life path on a typical weekday before September 11 and several background geographic features rendered in color (e.g., buildings, rivers, and the street network). Her activities and trips proceed from the bottom to the top along the temporal axis (her stay at home is shown as two vertical segments). The life path is coded blue to suggest that Nada felt ‘quite safe’ but not ‘very safe’ as she moved over space and visited different locations even before September 11. Her first out-of-home activity was dropping off her daughter at an elementary school, which is about ten minutes from home by car. Nada would then return home and go to a mosque to attend a Quran class before making some shopping stops at various stores (e.g., grocery and department stores). After these shopping trips, she would return home, pick up her two sons at their middle schools, and then stay at home for the rest of the day. In the first few days after September 11, Nada did not go out to perform any activity. Oral histories to visual narratives 661 D o w n l o a d e d B y : [ K w a n , M e i - P o ] A t : 1 9 : 3 1 1 7 A u g u s t 2 0 0 8 The Quran classes at her mosque were cancelled for several weeks. Her husband temporarily helped chauffeur the children to and from their schools. Nada had heard about many anti-Muslim incidents in Columbus and did not feel safe even when she was at home. Some of her Muslim friends received death threats or obscene messages on their answer- ing machines. Apparently, there were people who randomly identified Middle-Eastern names in telephone directories, called the numbers and left these messages. She heard that some Muslim children were beaten up at school. She knew that there was an arson attack on a Muslim home that caused the residents to be hospitalized. Nada has a CD- ROM with photographs that show the damage of the Islamic Foundation of Central Ohio on Broad Street, which was vandalized and incurred a US$100,000 loss. This incident was very distressing to Nada, who also heard about the profiling of Muslims and Muslim- looking people at the Port Columbus Inter- national Airport. People of color who look like Muslims were searched and questioned much more intensively than before September 11. This has led Nada to rule out air travel as a viable means for out-of-town travel. Figure 2 symbolically expresses Nada’s feelings about Columbus and the impact of her fear on her use of space. The entire area was covered by a red surface—red is used to represent the highest level of fear in this and subsequent figures—and the vertical yellow line represents her stay at home and lack of mobility over time in this period. This line was coded yellow (not safe) to represent a rather high level of fear even when Nada was at Figure 1 Nada’s life path on a typical weekday before September 11. 662 Mei-Po Kwan D o w n l o a d e d B y : [ K w a n , M e i - P o ] A t : 1 9 : 3 1 1 7 A u g u s t 2 0 0 8 home. As Nada recalled, she did not go shopping as usual immediately after Septem- ber 11, and the Quran classes at her mosque were cancelled for several weeks for safety’s sake. As a result of her fear of anti-Muslim hate violence, Nada made adaptations to her behavior that involved ‘self-imposed restric- tions’ such as staying home and avoiding certain parts of town (Pain 1991: 416). These adaptations and precautions, however, had adversely affected her personal freedom and general quality of life. Several days later, Nada’s fear decreased somewhat. But she still remained at home most of the time (represented by the vertical yellow line; Figure 3). The lower level of fear she experienced was symbolically represented by a lowered surface (in red) that allows certain areas to emerge as dangerous places, which mainly include the Port Columbus International Air- port (on the top left) and East Broad Street (the linear 3D feature on the top right). Nada perceived these two areas as particularly unsafe largely due to the vandalism that occurred in the Islamic Foundation of Central Ohio on East Broad Street and the profiling incidents that targeted Muslims and Muslim-looking people at the airport. These two areas, delineated in Nada’s sketches on the map of the study area and being 2D geographic features originally, are rendered as red 3D objects protruding from below and rise above the lowered red surface. This symbolizes the fear-provoking property of these two areas. Nada resumed most of her pre-September 11 routine activities several weeks later. But her feelings about the public spaces in the study area were not the same as before. Figure 2 Nada’s life path immediately after September 11. Oral histories to visual narratives 663 D o w n l o a d e d B y : [ K w a n , M e i - P o ] A t : 1 9 : 3 1 1 7 A u g u s t 2 0 0 8 As Koskela and Pain (2000: 278) emphasize, ‘[F]ear of crime influences the meaning of place, as much as places influence fear.’ Nada felt that no place besides her home was safe: The safest place for me was home, and the most uncomfortable places were public places . . . I try not to get out of the car. If I have to go out I try not to interact with people unless they start talking to me. I was frustrated and scared and felt the same as my kids. (Nada) Although the anti-Muslim hate violence in Columbus had abated somewhat, Nada still did not want to go out. She, however, had resumed some essential out-of-home activities. For instance, Nada resumed dropping off or picking up her daughter and sons at school. But unlike what she used to do before (like talking to some of the teachers or parents of other school children), she stayed inside the minivan and left the school once the children got in the car. She resumed attending the Quran classes at her mosque but exercised extra caution. She felt more comfortable shopping in a small ethnic grocery store close to her home than in the big supermarkets and department stores she used to frequent. But the small grocer did not have all the things she needed and she still had to go and shop in those big stores. She was not comfortable in dealing with the staff in these stores who may be hostile to Muslims and she would try to find a friendly person when she needed to check out. As she recalled: I didn’t let my feelings hold me back from doing my regular activities. But there is no doubt that I wasn’t Figure 3 Nada’s life path several days after September 11. 664 Mei-Po Kwan D o w n l o a d e d B y : [ K w a n , M e i - P o ] A t : 1 9 : 3 1 1 7 A u g u s t 2 0 0 8 feeling the same as before. At that time, I was uncomfortable over the entire course of my activities. I was trying to see if anyone would look at me in a different way. It was very uncomfortable but I kept going. (Nada) The color-coded life path in Figure 4 expresses Nada’s feelings and sense of safety at that time (i.e., several weeks after September 11). She felt that all shopping activities were dangerous (red vertical segments) and there was no place that she really felt very safe (hence, no segment of her life path is coded ‘very safe’). Only when she was at home (blue vertical segments) or traveling inside her minivan (green segments) that she considered herself quite safe (blue) or moderately safe (green). Areas or urban structures that Nada perceived as unsafe are rendered as red 3D objects, which are now clearly visible in the scene. These include the Port Columbus International Airport (on the top left), East Broad Street (the linear 3D feature on the top right), and several depart- ment stores, grocery stores, and other business buildings (the two clusters of red 3D blocks in the middle and lower left of the figure). With the areas and urban structures perceived unsafe symbolized in this manner, Figure 4 may be viewed as a portrayal of Nada’s personal landscape of fear at that time. Through this process of rendering Nada’s life path and relevant geographic features and incorporating other materials such as audio clips and photographs in an interactive, multimedia 3D GIS environment, I created an expressive visual narrative that tells the story of Nada’s post-September 11 experi- ences. The central visual element of this narrative is Nada’s life path, which temporally organized her oral history and is color-coded to reflect the level of fear and perceived danger she experienced. In Figure 4, for instance, green lines (moderately safe) were used to represent the tiny comfort zones that Nada experienced as she was traveling in her minivan through the streets in Columbus; while the exclusionary effect of the hostile urban environment was symbolically rep- resented by coloring particular buildings as red 3D blocks. This visual narrative tells Nada’s spatial story (de Certeau 1984) as she recalled what happened to her life and how she negotiated the hostile urban spaces after September 11. It turns her oral history into an expressive visual narrative based upon her personal movements, memories, feelings and emotions. Conclusion Binary construction of populations has been the technology of government (in Foucauldian terms) used by the Bush administration to address the problem of security since September 11. The dominant anti-Muslim master narrative, however, has conflated the Islamic faith with terrorism, where American Muslims were constructed as anti-American outsiders. Muslims and Muslim-looking people in the USA have experienced a significant increase in hate violence since September 11. While this has deeply affected their lives, most of their post-September 11 experiences have been obfuscated by the muted response from the media and the administration. In this article I used a Muslim woman’s oral history to construct a visual narrative that recovers part of these experiences. I explored a way of telling stories about these experiences as counter- narratives using the expressive power of GIS. Creating visual narratives, ‘is an intentional, reflective, active human process in which researchers . . . explore and make meaning of experience both visually and narratively’ (Bach 2007: 281). As I suggest elsewhere, visual Oral histories to visual narratives 665 D o w n l o a d e d B y : [ K w a n , M e i - P o ] A t : 1 9 : 3 1 1 7 A u g u s t 2 0 0 8 images, words and numbers can be used together within the multimedia environment of geospatial technologies to compose contextua- lized visual narratives (Kwan 2002). In identifying Muslim women as fearful subjects, I challenge the dominant anti- Muslim narrative that portrays them as terrorists and anti-American foreigners. In doing so I do not intend to construct Muslim women or their responses to post-September 11 hate violence as a homogenous category. Although anti-Muslim hate crimes are ram- pant and the lives of American Muslims have been deeply affected, the participants’ oral histories revealed diverse experiences, reac- tions, and coping strategies in relation to their perceived threat of anti-Muslim hate violence. They were not passive victims of the situation. Some of them, for instance, reached out to the non-Muslim population in Columbus and presented knowledge about Islam in order to counter the misunderstanding and negative images of Islam portrayed by the media. This effort was often supported by both Muslim and non-Muslim organizations. Some adopted a boldness strategy (Koskela 1997) and overcame their fear and continued to undertake their normal daily activities and trips. Although this strategy did not remove the cause of their fear or reduce their risk, it was less costly in terms of their freedom in accessing and using public spaces—since women’s self-imposed restrictions and ‘social and lifestyle precautions . . . are most costly in terms of personal freedom’ (Pain 1991: 420). Despite the observation that participants’ fear tends to be associated with public spaces and that the socio-spatial restrictions many of Figure 4 Nada’s life path several weeks after September 11. 666 Mei-Po Kwan D o w n l o a d e d B y : [ K w a n , M e i - P o ] A t : 1 9 : 3 1 1 7 A u g u s t 2 0 0 8 them faced have been significant, I do not intend to suggest that their experiences can be generalized by some fixed or universalized categories (see also the discussion in Koskela 1997, 1999; Pain 2001). The diversity in their responses and strategies needs to be examined carefully in order to provide a more nuanced account of what happened to their lives since September 11. Acknowledgements This project was supported by grants from the Mershon Center for International Security Studies and the Center for Urban and Regional Analysis of the Ohio State University. Earlier versions of this article were presented at the 2002 Annual Meeting of the Association of American Geographers in Los Angeles and the 2005 Royal Geographical Society and Institute of British Geographers Conference in London. I thank the Muslim women who participated in the study for their time and willingness to share their experiences. I am grateful to three anonymous reviewers for their helpful com- ments and to Rob Kitchin, Deborah Dixon and Mark Whitehead for their patience in the process. Note 1 It may be estimated that about 50 – 70% of Muslim women adhere to the Islamic religious attire (that is, wear loose-fitting outer-garment and the Muslim headscarf (hijab) in public spaces and in the presence of men outside the family) (Kwan and Ding 2008). 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Abstract translations Des histoires orales aux récits visuels: la re- présentation des expériences des femmes musul- manes aux États-Unis au lendemain du 11 septembre Depuis les attaques du 11 septembre 2001 dirigées contre le World Trade Center de New York et le Pentagone à Washington DC, les actes d’harcèlement et de violence motivée par la haine que subissent les Musulmans vivant aux États-Unis ou les personnes qui leur ressemblent ont augmenté de façon marquée. Les crimes de haine perpétrés contre les Musulmans ont été lourds de conséquences pour ces personnes de couleur. L’objectif de l’article est de récupérer une partie des expériences vécues par des Américains de confession musulmane au lendemain du 11 septembre qui ont été escamotées par le grand récit dominant anti-musulman qui faisait l’amalgame entre la foi islamique et le terrorisme et construisait une image de tous les Musulmans comme des étrangers anti- Américains dangereux. Il est question d’examiner ici la manière de raconter des histoires sur ces expériences en ayant recours à la puissance expressive des technologies géospatiales. À travers l’exemple des expériences vécues par des femmes musulmanes de Columbus (Ohio, États-Unis), les espaces technolo- giques créés grâce aux systèmes d’information géographique (SIG) peuvent servir à connaı̂tre l’impact de la peur de la violence haineuse anti- musulmane sur la vie quotidienne des femmes musulmanes et à mieux articuler les éléments de leur géographie émotionnelle en cette période de l’après 11 septembre. Mots-clefs: violence haineuse anti-musulmane, peur, technologies géospatiales, SIG, 11 septembre. De historias orales a narrativas visuales: re- presentando las experiencias de las mujeres musulmanas en los Estado Unidos pos-11 de septiembre Desde los ataques contra el Centro de Comercio Mundial de la ciudad de Nueva York y el Pentágono en Washington DC el dı́a 11 de septiembre de 2001, ha habido un incremento importante en hostili- dades hacia y violencia de odio contra los musulmanes y las personas con aspecto musulmán en los Estados Unidos. Los delitos de odio antimusulmán han afectado las vidas de estas personas de color de manera significativa. En este artı́culo intento recuperar parte de las experiencias de los musulmanes estadounidenses pos-11 de septiembre, las cuales quedaron confundidas por la narrativa maestra predominante que era anti- musulmán y que refundı́a el fé islámico con el terrorismo y que representaba a todos los musul- manes como peligrosos afueranos antiamericanos. Exploro un modo de contar historias sobre estas experiencias, empleando el poder expresivo de las tecnologı́as geoespaciales. Utilizando como ejemplo las experiencias de mujeres musulmanas en Colum- bus (Ohio, EE.UU.), describo como se puede emplear los espacios tecnológicos aportados por los sistemas de información geográfica (SIG) para esclarecer el impacto del temor a violencia de odio antimusulmán sobre las vidas cotidianas de las mujeres musulmanas y para ayudar a expresar sus geografı́as afectivas en el perı́odo pos-11 de septiembre. Palabras claves: violencia de odio antimusulmán, temor, tecnologı́as geoespaciales, SIG, 11 de septiembre. Oral histories to visual narratives 669 D o w n l o a d e d B y : [ K w a n , M e i - P o ] A t : 1 9 : 3 1 1 7 A u g u s t 2 0 0 8 
work_p472dlonhfc5rhjsvs55x3fx64	----	PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE This article was downloaded by: [Canadian Research Knowledge Network] On: 5 March 2010 Access details: Access Details: [subscription number 783016864] Publisher Routledge Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37- 41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK Social & Cultural Geography Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~content=t713708888 Governing sexuality and park space: acts of regulation in Vancouver, BC John Paul Catungal a; Eugene J. McCann b a Department of Geography and Program in Planning, University of Toronto, Toronto, Ontario, Canada b Department of Geography, Simon Fraser University, Burnaby, British Columbia, Canada Online publication date: 13 January 2010 To cite this Article Catungal, John Paul and McCann, Eugene J.(2010) 'Governing sexuality and park space: acts of regulation in Vancouver, BC', Social & Cultural Geography, 11: 1, 75 — 94 To link to this Article: DOI: 10.1080/14649360903414569 URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14649360903414569 Full terms and conditions of use: http://www.informaworld.com/terms-and-conditions-of-access.pdf This article may be used for research, teaching and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, re-distribution, re-selling, loan or sub-licensing, systematic supply or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents will be complete or accurate or up to date. The accuracy of any instructions, formulae and drug doses should be independently verified with primary sources. The publisher shall not be liable for any loss, actions, claims, proceedings, demand or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material. http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~content=t713708888 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14649360903414569 http://www.informaworld.com/terms-and-conditions-of-access.pdf Governing sexuality and park space: acts of regulation in Vancouver, BC John Paul Catungal1 & Eugene J. McCann2 1Department of Geography and Program in Planning, University of Toronto, 100 St. George Street, Room 5047, Toronto, Ontario, Canada, M5S 3G3, catungalj@geog.utoronto.ca; 2Department of Geography, Simon Fraser University, 8888 University Drive, Burnaby, British Columbia, Canada, V5A 1S6, emccann@sfu.ca This paper suggests that the coding and ordering of sexuality and space through definitions of which sexual practices and which representations of sexuality are morally appropriate in public space can be usefully understood as a problem of governance. We argue that attempts to hide or make visible specific sexualities in public space are complicated and politically charged because, while written regulations are relatively cut- and-dried, their implementation, by planners, judges, et al., involves significant discretion and leads to contingent, contestable outcomes. Furthermore, the politics of governing sexual morality and public space is made more problematic when the place where a hegemonic norm of behaviour or morality is publically challenged is an iconic park that attracts intense media attention. The paper elaborates these arguments through two interrelated case studies: a debate over the appropriate location of an AIDS memorial in Stanley Park, Vancouver and the reaction to the killing of a gay man who cruised the park for sex. We conclude by linking our argument to recent statements about the future of geographies of sexuality, arguing for analyses that acknowledge both the contingences and potentialities of categories like ‘the state,’ ‘governance,’ and ‘public space’ and also their structural tendencies and their ongoing association with sexual repression. Key words: public space, sexuality, the state, governance. Introduction Contemporary scholarship in social and cultural geography elucidates how urban public space is produced through interrelated spatial codings, regulations, and represen- tations. The relationship between sexuality and space has been one strong theme in this literature (Bell and Valentine 1995; Brown 2000; Hubbard 2004, 2008; Knopp 1995; Miller 2005). This paper draws upon and extends this theme by addressing how certain expressions of sexuality become problems of governance and objects of political contest in and through one specific form of public space: the urban public park. The uses, coding, and Social & Cultural Geography, Vol. 11, No. 1, February 2010 ISSN 1464-9365 print/ISSN 1470-1197 online/10/010075-20 q 2010 Taylor & Francis DOI: 10.1080/14649360903414569 D o w n l o a d e d B y : [ C a n a d i a n R e s e a r c h K n o w l e d g e N e t w o r k ] A t : 0 5 : 5 0 5 M a r c h 2 0 1 0 regulation of parks are frequently represented by the state and the media as of general public concern, since parks are intended for general use and are, in many cases, seen to be icons of their cities. Our purpose is to link analyses of the spatial codings of sexuality and public space to literatures on the politics of park space, morality, and spatial exclusion through a detailed account of two related cases— debates over the location of an AIDS memorial in Stanley Park, Vancouver and reactions to the killing of Aaron Webster, a gay man who used the park’s trails for sex. They show how sexual codings and transgressions of public space and hegemonic morality are addressed by the state, the media, and the public as problems of governance. We build upon analyses of how the state and the media govern homosexuality through regulatory and representational practices that seek to hide transgressive forms of sexuality from the public gaze. These analyses focus, for example, on how urban planning seeks to order and purify space and address fears that sexual activities ‘“pollute”, “taint” or “con- taminate” other land uses’ (Prior 2008: 342; also Kerkin 2004). They also examine how governance strategies are often entwined with popular media discourses ‘to reassert and reinforce traditional understandings of “men” and “women”, and hetero- and homosexual’ (Bain and Nash 2007: 19). Through these and other forms of socio-spatial ordering and exclusion, ‘the organization of space in Western cities . . . keeps sexual Otherness “out of sight” . . . [by regulating] disorderly sexuality in the midst of a heterosexually ordered city, segregating it from “respectable” populations while making it accessible to those who wish to indulge’ (Hubbard 2002: 357 – 358). We suggest that attempts to code, order, and hide sexual difference are complicated and often made more politically charged because: (1) while regulatory policy is relatively cut- and-dried in its written form, the governance of public space is conditioned by the relative discretion of those bureaucrats and judges who adjudicate on specific cases and who thus produce an uneven and contestable terrain of regulation (Lipsky 1980; Proudfoot and McCann 2008); and (2) the politics of governing sexual morality and public space is made more problematic when the site of transgression—the place where a hegemonic norm of behaviour or morality is publically challenged—is an iconic park that attracts intense debate and contestation in the public sphere. Ideally, iconic parks are understood to represent their community’s core moral values and to be open to all who are ‘respectable,’ who act respectably, or who aspire to respectability. Furthermore, they are places built for visibility: offering opportunities for seeing and being seen while being carefully constructed to offer impressive and pleasing vistas to the recreating public. Parks are usually also the sites of monuments that honour behaviours that are deemed laudable, such as sacrificing one’s life for the nation, or that commemorate events and people who are officially considered worthy of tribute. These monuments are themselves designed to be impressive sights/sites and are often associated with regular rituals where people use the surrounding parks to perform certain acts of memory, politics, and community. Different readings or appropriations of existing monu- ments (Till 2005) or the introduction of new monuments in iconic spaces frequently lead to political controversy since alternative prac- tices of memorialisation can, as Brown (1997: 168) argues in his discussion of an AIDS quilt, undermine attempts to hide and exclude homosexuality from urban space while, 76 John Paul Catungal & Eugene J. McCann D o w n l o a d e d B y : [ C a n a d i a n R e s e a r c h K n o w l e d g e N e t w o r k ] A t : 0 5 : 5 0 5 M a r c h 2 0 1 0 ‘extend[ing] gay visibility . . . [and extending] safe public space for gays and lesbians.’ Transgression, sexual or otherwise, in iconic places of ‘propriety’ and visibility is a particular problem for governance, we suggest, because it frequently prompts par- ticularly vociferous and sometimes violent reactions, since it is regarded by some to be an affront to ‘common values.’ Visible transgres- sion, such as the occurrence or representation of Other sexual practices and identities, destabilizes hegemonic norms while state reactions to those disruptions—efforts to actively shore up or adjudicate the space’s ‘natural’ order—reveal that order as social, power-laden, and uneven. An important element of this governance involves ‘moral coding’ (Domosh 2001: 576), whereby hegemonic definitions of good and bad, appropriate and inappropriate behaviour reflect and shape social interaction and space. The debates over the AIDS memorial and Webster’s killing invite a focus on the spatial politics of sexual morality and its associated geographies since they shed light on the practices through which various actors govern contemporary urban parks. The literature on urban parks addresses how meanings and uses are coded onto these public spaces. Parks are frequently barriers that reinforce spatial divisions between socio-economically distinct neighbourhoods (Gobster 1998; Solecki and Welch 1995) while unequal access to parks conditions and is conditioned by race, ethnicity, class, and gender (Loukaitu-Sideris 1995; Whitzman 2002). These concerns are also evident in analyses of the historical development of urban parks in which the creation of proper, moral citizens is shown to be a key purpose behind their design and governance (Mawani 2005; Rosenzweig 1983). After drawing upon conceptualizations of exclusion, morality, and visibility and inte- grating them in a discussion of the governance of sexuality and park space, the paper presents the two case studies from Stanley Park. These accounts are linked, conceptually and empiri- cally, by how they illuminate the problematics of governing and representing Other sexual practices and identities in iconic park space. We conclude by linking our argument to recent statements about the future of geographies of sexuality, arguing for analyses that acknowl- edge contingences and potentialities of cat- egories like ‘the state,’ ‘governance,’ and ‘public space’ as well as their structural tendencies and their ongoing association with sexual repression. Morality and visibility in the governance of sexuality and park space Our analysis of struggles over what is appropriately seen/hidden in urban public space operates at the intersection of literatures on sexuality and space, moral geographies (Lee and Smith 2004; Matless 2000; Setten 2004; Smith 1998, 2000), and urban govern- ance (Brown 1997, 1999; MacLeod 2002; Proudfoot and McCann 2008). The more specific literature on the social geographies of park space (Ingram 2000; Mawani 2005; Mitchell 2003; Rosenzweig 1983; Schultz 1998; Solecki and Welch 1995; Whitzman 2002) speaks to and can also be enhanced by this analysis since it contains insights into how the creation and management of apparently pure and natural space in cities contribute to hegemonic definitions of ‘wholesome’ and ‘moral’ publics, illustrations of the conse- quences of cultural attempts to maintain social boundaries through the invocation of taboos (Douglas 1966; Sibley 1995), and examples Governing sexuality and park space 77 D o w n l o a d e d B y : [ C a n a d i a n R e s e a r c h K n o w l e d g e N e t w o r k ] A t : 0 5 : 5 0 5 M a r c h 2 0 1 0 of the strategies used by urban planners and other state agents to govern society through spatial practices like segregation and exclusion (Corburn 2007; Kerkin 2004; MacLeod 2002; Prior 2008). For example, Mawani’s (2005) account of the development of iconic park space in Vancouver discusses how, in nineteenth-cen- tury Canadian settler society, proponents of urban greenery argued that parks contributed to the formation of moral British subjects. As in many other contexts, the production of landscape involved a process of racialization whereby moral Britishness, represented and bolstered by parks, was achieved through the denigration of alternative understandings and uses of space and the attendant eviction of indigenous and immigrant people of colour. Similarly, Rosenzweig (1983) shows how urban green spaces have historically been implicated in the socio-spatial governance of working-class people who are framed as in need of wholesome park spaces if they are to learn middle-class values. Parks are similarly implicated in repressive governance of sexu- ality in which the regulation of the space is entwined with attempts to foster and guard specific forms of sexual citizenship. In his study of criminological responses to public sex in Seattle parks, Schultz (1998) notes that public calls for increased policing of gay public sex are often accompanied by the invocation of the middle-class heterosexual family as the appropriate user of local greenspace. The governance of social difference in and through urban parks resonates with geographical approaches to morality, more generally. As Lee and Smith (2004: 2) put it, ‘[m]orality refers to what people believe and what they do in pursuit of, or merely as a reflection of, their own conceptions of the right and the good.’ ‘Moralities,’ they continue, are profoundly geographical products of the uneven development of social relations among people and between people and nature . . . Moralities are, in short, constructed through geographically articulated social interaction. (2004: 7) The spatial practices that produce and reflect moralities entail hegemonic definitions of what/who is in/out of place (Cresswell 1996). In scenic recreational parks, moral judgements are imbricated with how the landscape is seen and who/what is allowed to be seen in it. The aestheticization in these spaces ‘provides an [illusory] image of enjoyable leisure and end- less present’ (Mitchell 2000: 446). Such ‘sanitized images of a mythical urban environ- ment’ (2000: 446) seek to silence sedimented histories of and contested claims to a given place by favouring certain identities and certain social relations over others. The moral judge- ments explicit in these processes of silencing and hiding are folded into the production of hegemonic moral geographies by a wide range of actors from state agents to hate mongers. In her study of anti-gay and lesbian hate crime, for example, Sumartojo (2004: 105) argues that these crimes ‘are exclusionary acts motivated in part by offenders’ desires to assert power over a given space . . . to send a “message.”’ Violence is one end of a range of actions intended to maintain the existing socio-spatial order in the face of difference in public space. Other actors maintain the boundaries of place and morality through state institutions and mainstream media (Heibel 2004; Hubbard 2002; Setten 2004; Valentine 2004; Whitehead 2004). Yet, while many forces seek to maintain the status quo, hegemonies can always be overtly contested or subtly negotiated and undermined and the state is frequently called on to regulate and adjudicate these struggles. 78 John Paul Catungal & Eugene J. McCann D o w n l o a d e d B y : [ C a n a d i a n R e s e a r c h K n o w l e d g e N e t w o r k ] A t : 0 5 : 5 0 5 M a r c h 2 0 1 0 Exclusionary acts are frequently confronted by activists’ attempts to enact ‘the develop- ment—or often the radical claiming—of a space for representation, a place in which groups and individuals can make themselves visible’ to claim their right to space (Mitchell 2003: 33, original emphasis). While visibility can chal- lenge hegemony as part of overt politics, others note that a strategic retreat from visibility in a public space can support a more subtle negotiation and disruption of hegemonic norms. Ingram (2000), for example, explores how the environment of a forested urban park and its adjacent beach enables the formation of spaces of anonymous sexual encounter because its landscape offers numerous concealed spaces for those ‘in-the-know.’ State attempts to control sexuality in the park have never been successful in part because of its configuration. Thus, Ingram argues, the space is somewhat liberatory and autonomous (Bell and Binnie 2000; Brown 2004). The political and strategic deployment of visibility in public spaces also characterizes how the state adjudicates appropriate uses of public space. Bain and Nash argue that the legal system and other state actors frequently seek to keep homosexuality invisible and repressed even in cases where legal decisions appear to promote tolerance: [L]egislative and policy initiatives concerning gays and lesbians [in Canada] . . . often [mean] a de- sexualization and a privatization of gay and lesbian lives which can push alternative sexual practices and identities into the private (and invisible) sphere, causing a division between ‘good gays’ and (disreputable) ‘bad queers.’ (2007: 21) The socio-spatial governance of sexual mor- ality thus involves the ongoing management of what is visible and of the tensions that are produced by governance strategies themselves (Sharp 2005). As Hubbard (2002: 359) argues, ‘the geography of sexuality is shaped by a complex aesthetics of desire and disgust, bequeathing a sexual city that discloses some sights/sites but represses others.’ This focus on strategies of exclusion and visibility in the moral politics of sex frames our discussion of the AIDS memorial debate and the Webster killing in Vancouver’s Stanley Park. Following Lipsky’s (1980: xii) conten- tion that ‘public policy is not best understood as made in legislatures or top-floor suites of high-ranking administrators . . . [but] in the crowded offices and daily encounters’ of bureaucrats, we argue that the analysis of how sexuality in public space is governed through strategies of hiding is complicated by the acknowledgement that neither the state nor the media are monolithic but that, instead, they are comprised of various agents with relative discretion who produce, through their adjudication of specific cases and other mundane practices, uneven regulation which invites further struggle (Proudfoot and McCann 2008). Furthermore, when the public space involved is a particularly iconic, visible one, governance becomes more problematic as media attention ratchets up debates about appropriate behaviour. Efforts to govern sexuality and space by settling disputes about which elements of the former should be seen in the latter lead, paradoxically, to ongoing critique. Stanley Park: recreation, exclusion, and order Near the entrance to Stanley Park, the 1,000 acre heavily forested peninsula on the edge of Vancouver’s downtown (Figure 1), a statue depicts Lord Stanley, a nineteenth-century Governor General of Canada, with his arms Governing sexuality and park space 79 D o w n l o a d e d B y : [ C a n a d i a n R e s e a r c h K n o w l e d g e N e t w o r k ] A t : 0 5 : 5 0 5 M a r c h 2 0 1 0 Figure 1 Stanley Park, Davie Village, and the proposed and final locations of the AIDS memorial. Note: We choose not to identify exactly where Webster’s body was found since it is near the ‘strolls.’ 80 John Paul Catungal & Eugene J. McCann D o w n l o a d e d B y : [ C a n a d i a n R e s e a r c h K n o w l e d g e N e t w o r k ] A t : 0 5 : 5 0 5 M a r c h 2 0 1 0 outstretched in welcome. On the statue’s plinth are his words of dedication: ‘To the use and enjoyment of people of all colours, creeds and customs for all time—I name thee Stanley Park.’ His welcoming sentiment is echoed and extended by britishcolumbia.com (n.d.), a privately owned tourist website which emphasizes the contemporary ideal of the park as a beloved place, open to a vast array of people and activities: ‘So firmly is love for Stanley Park rooted in the citizenry’s soul that in an annual survey carried out by the Georgia Straight, a free weekly paper, readers repeat- edly choose the park as the best place in town to take a romantic stroll, watch the rain fall, experience bliss, have sex, break up, make up, and take visitors.’ Indeed, the park—which is now commonly referred to as an ‘oasis’ in the city—attracts twenty million visitors (residents and tourists) annually (Steele 1988, 1993). Yet its history, like other parts of Vancouver, is characterized by processes of moral ordering and socio-spatial exclusion (Anderson 1991). Soon after the city’s incorporation in 1886, the city council employed a discourse of morality to promote the establishment of an urban park, specifically arguing that recreational landscapes create moral and healthy citizens and curb deviance and violence (Steele 1993). Mawani shows that the park was to be an ‘imperial icon’ to ‘promote and develop the British-ness of British Columbia’ (2005: 325 – 326, original emphasis). Soon after its establishment, it ‘was hailed as an important site of moral, physical and imperial advance- ment’ (Mawani 2005: 326). This colonial project focused specifically on excluding Chinese and Native populations who were resident in the park (Barman 2005). The justification for their removal was framed in terms of health and the inappropriateness of permanent settlement in a space newly designated as suitable only for brief rec- reational visits. The Chinese were the first to be uprooted as their homes were officially defined as ‘threats to public health’ and were burned without warning by local health officials (Mather 1998: 80). Discourses of abjection and threat forced removals, and targeted by-law enforcement accompanied other legal strategies as the state re-ordered the new park space, creating a moral geography of appropriate and inappropriate presence. For example, with its designation as a park, the peninsula became legal property of the City. First Nations and mixed-race residents, whose tenure predated the dedica- tion of the park, were thus prevented from launching their own claims to the land (Blomley 2004; Mawani 2005). These practices are not only things of the past, however. The work of governing the park’s moral geography is ongoing and its socio-spatial order requires constant tending. In turn, it provokes periodic struggles invol- ving, among others, state agencies like the Vancouver Park Board, park users, and, given the park’s iconic status, the general population of Greater Vancouver. The two cases we highlight involve negotiations of Stanley Park’s meanings where different moral under- standings of the landscape collide, leading to significant legal and policy decisions and political struggles, all of which continue to shape and reshape perceptions and uses of the park. In 1996, a memorial to Vancouverites who have died from AIDS was proposed for the park, setting off a protracted debate over appropriate land use. The beating to death of Aaron Webster while cruising (looking for what are often anonymous sexual encounters) in the park in 2001 produced a debate over appropriate behaviour. Both cases highlight actual or potential transgressions of hegemo- nic definitions of what monuments and Governing sexuality and park space 81 D o w n l o a d e d B y : [ C a n a d i a n R e s e a r c h K n o w l e d g e N e t w o r k ] A t : 0 5 : 5 0 5 M a r c h 2 0 1 0 activities belonged in the park and, thus, revealed a spatial politics of sexual morality in its coding and ordering. The discussion is based on a document- based study of government and media sources related to the two cases. This approach was chosen first because the research was con- ducted after the cases occurred, thus barring ethnographic approaches and, second, the research addressed how the debates developed in the public sphere—in the media and other public forums. An online archive of national, provincial and local newspapers provided ninety-six articles—forty-five on the AIDS memorial (August 1995 to July 2004) and fifty-one on the Webster case (November 2001 to March 2005). A survey of key policy and court documents included plans, minutes, court decisions, and tourism marketing materials for the park. A discourse analysis identified instances where reporters, intervie- wees and other actors spoke of: (1) what they understood Stanley Park to be and/or (2) why the AIDS memorial and public gay sex were considered appropriate or inappropriate there. ‘A place to go and feel good’? The AIDS memorial debate In 1995, AIDS Vancouver, a non-profit AIDS-related social service organization, soli- cited support for a public memorial to those who had died from, or had been affected by the disease. They believed in part that a Stanley Park location offered the memorial not only a local but also a national and global audience (Griffin 1995). Inspired by ‘amazing community response,’ the organization peti- tioned the Vancouver Park Board (VPB) to allocate space in Stanley Park for the memorial, which was designed as a series of copper sheets with the names of people who died of AIDS perforating them. The board approved the project overwhelmingly in November 1996 with only one park commis- sioner questioning the proposal and arguing that approval would ‘set a precedent for other groups to demand Stanley Park space’ (Fong 1996a). Later, another commissioner qualified the decision by describing the monument as an exception: ‘we routinely turn [requests] down . . . we have to make sure that only the best of the best is approved’ (Fong 1996a). Two days later, BCTV, a local television station, conducted a phone-in poll on the memorial and its proposed location: 96 per cent of the almost 14,000 respondents opposed the project (Gram 1996). Two days later still, the VPB rescinded its approval, citing massive public opposition, although the Board insisted that its decision was not based solely on the results of the television poll (Gram 1996). The debate that ensued, one largely carried out in the mainstream media, was based squarely on discourses of morality and place, sexuality and memorialization. A pristine park? Normative visions of the park informed both sides of the debate. Echoing another park commissioner’s assertion that Stanley Park is a place that has ‘spiritual resonance with Van- couver,’ a group called Friends of Stanley Park argued that it should be preserved in its current condition with no built additions (Fong 1996b). ‘With green space being more difficult to obtain, why should we be putting more memorials in?’ it asked, while calling instead for ‘organic’ memorials, such as a grove of trees (Fong 1998). Proponents of the memorial, on the other hand, pointed to the myth of parks in general as natural, pristine spaces. Beyond the exercise of power needed to create Stanley Park, this myth 82 John Paul Catungal & Eugene J. McCann D o w n l o a d e d B y : [ C a n a d i a n R e s e a r c h K n o w l e d g e N e t w o r k ] A t : 0 5 : 5 0 5 M a r c h 2 0 1 0 is further undermined by a partial listing of some of the more prominent artificial elements of the contemporary park: an extensive system of roadways, including a major commuter route, numerous restaurants, snack bars, a souvenir stand, a major outdoor swimming pool, Vancouver Aquarium, a children’s petting zoo and miniature train, a carefully tended rose garden, and an outdoor amphitheatre. Further- more, Table 1 lists twenty-one monuments and sculptures, defined by the VPB as ‘major’ elements of the park, that were extant when the AIDS memorial was proposed. Neither was the proposed site pristine, proponents argued, since that part of the park was primarily ‘a place [people] take their dogs to do their business’ (Haysom 1996b; Yeager 1996). Stanley Park’s character as a recreational space also framed debate. According to a letter to the editor, ‘Stanley Park is for recreation purposes, not a place for AIDS memorials, or any other type of memorial’ (Thompson 1996) and a radio caller argued that ‘Stanley Park is a place to go and feel good . . . [n]ot a place to get depressed’ (in Haysom 1996a). A peopled, political park The presence of the politically and aestheti- cally displeasing in public space has tradition- ally stirred reaction (Sibley 1995). In this case, notions of place—and out-of-placeness—fig- ured in the debate. Opponents deemed the memorial to be out of place because it visibly identified the presence of the diseased sex- ualized Other, the immoral, and the anti-social in a space they saw in terms of wholesomeness. Therefore, the proposed memorial was a political transgression, revealing and disrupt- ing unquestioned hegemonic assumptions regarding the park. Some opponents argued that memorials should be reserved for heroic acts and argued that people who have died of AIDS were not heroes. When a VPB commis- sioner likened the memorial to Vancouver’s cenotaph at a public hearing, numerous people walked out, shouting, ‘[t]hey [the war dead] died for you!’ (McCune 1998). Continuing this theme, a local physician, writing to The Vancouver Sun, argued that, ‘The majority of [people with AIDS] are individuals who contracted the virus through sexual contact. . . . A memorial wall pays tribute to a country’s heroes who died for a cause they believed to be noble. What cause have the AIDS victims died for? In what way are they heroes?’ Opponents also argued that the memorial was out of place since people with AIDS, as ‘figures of contamination’ (Sturken 1997: 148), should be in medicalized, private spaces. For other opponents, the issue was about the place of grieving. To one public hearing participant, ‘[t]here are special places for things like these . . . They’re called cemeteries’ (McCune 1998). This comment makes clear that the realm of the emotional is deemed by this speaker to be private, invisible, and out of place in recreational public space (Burk 2003). Proponents of the memorial challenged these discourses by charging that AIDS was a battle—for survival (Bailey 2001; Dixon 1996; Gerlach 1998)—that visible grief is appropriate in public space, and asked rhetori- cally, ‘[are we] seeing an AIDS phobia in this city . . . [a] fear of the disease which has been unspoken until now?’ (Haysom 1996a). This reaction echoes Brown’s (1997) reflection on the Canadian AIDS Quilt display in Vancouver that had occurred two years before the memorial application. For him, such memor- ials, ‘make the AIDS crisis visible, . . . [creat- ing] a space of grief for family and friends, a place for them to remember their dead publically . . . despite society’s traditional Governing sexuality and park space 83 D o w n l o a d e d B y : [ C a n a d i a n R e s e a r c h K n o w l e d g e N e t w o r k ] A t : 0 5 : 5 0 5 M a r c h 2 0 1 0 placement of grief and personal loss in the private sphere’ (Brown 1997: 155 – 156; Till 2005). Sexuality, morality, and public visibility were also clear foci of early media coverage, which concentrated on links between AIDS and the gay community, even though AIDS Vancouver representatives argued that ‘the memorial is for everyone affected by the syndrome’ (Griffin 1995). Even some of those in favour of the memorial equated AIDS with homosexuality in uncritical ways (The Pro- vince 1996). Certain opponents ‘did not shrink from saying that the [AIDS] epidemic . . . [affected] the sodomites’ (Dixon 1996). In addition, a common qualifier to those surveyed by radio and TV stations and other mainstream media outlets was ‘I’m not homophobic, but . . . ’ (Haysom 1996a). The VPB was aware that many opponents of the memorial were homophobic (Fong 1996a; Gram 1996) and, as a result, one commis- sioner contradicted his own ecological philos- ophy by voting for the memorial because ‘[I] will not vote in a manner that may see a victory in this city for bigotry’ (Fong 1998). This reaction was, perhaps, a small victory for proponents of the memorial since they intended it to be a counter-hegemonic memor- ial, a space deliberately focusing on proble- matic social relations which would provoke thought and change opinion. Dixon (1996) underlined this intention by rhetorically asking if ‘contemplative activity [is] an enemy of the recreation of a complete human being?’ Eventually, the VPB’s answer was contained in a revised policy, which empha- sizes, ‘beauty, not controversy, when it comes Table 1 Major monuments and sculptures in Stanley Park (as defined by the Vancouver Park Board) prior to the proposal for the AIDS memorial Monument Vancouver Park Board’s description 9 O’Clock Gun Cast in England in 1816, brought here in 1894, was used by mariners to set their chronometers and also to warn fishers of closings. Chehalis Monument Marks lost lives when two ships collided nearby. David Oppenheimer 1911 bust commemorating Vancouver’s Mayor, 1888 – 1891. Edward Stamp Commemorates where lumber operations first started in the park in 1865. Garden of Remembrance Air Force Memorial plaques. Girl in a Wet Suit Sculpture by Elek Imredy placed on 9 June 1972. Hallelujah Point A former site for Salvation Army prayer meetings. Harding Memorial Commemorating the first visit of a US president. Harry Jerome Famed Vancouver runner. HMS Egeria Marks survey point used by Royal Navy ship in 1898. Japanese Monument Memorial to Vancouver’s Japanese soldiers serving in World War I. Lord Stanley Governor General of Canada (Queen’s representative) in 1888. Lumbermen’s Arch Erected in 1952 to honour BC’s lumber industry and replacing the original Bowie Arch built in 1912 and dismantled in 1947. Pauline Johnson 1913 cairn to famous Vancouver poet. Port of Vancouver Explains Port of Vancouver landmarks. Queen Victoria Built to commemorate her death. Robert Burns Famed Scottish poet. Shakespeare Garden Trees planted that were mentioned in the Bard’s works. SS Beaver Cairn Ship wrecked on the rocks below Prospect Point in 1888. SS Empress of Japan Replica of ship’s figurehead that sailed to the Orient from 1891 to 1922. Stanley Park Centennial 1988 plaque marks the spot where park was originally declared open. Source: Vancouver Park Board (n.d.). 84 John Paul Catungal & Eugene J. McCann D o w n l o a d e d B y : [ C a n a d i a n R e s e a r c h K n o w l e d g e N e t w o r k ] A t : 0 5 : 5 0 5 M a r c h 2 0 1 0 to approving new monuments’ (Todd 1998a). ‘[N]ew monuments,’ they continued, ‘must enhance the design of parks’ (Todd 1998b). Visually pleasing design was to be the future watchword of park governance. Working under its new policy in 1998, the VPB approved the location of the AIDS memorial for Sunset Beach park (Todd 1998a), located immediately south of Davie Village, Vancouver’s gay neighbourhood, and outside the boundary of Stanley Park (Figure 1 and 2). It was officially opened to the public in November 2004, with the following dedica- tion carved into its walkway: ‘this Memorial is located in this park as a place of healing and education within an understanding and com- passionate city’ (AIDS Memorial Society of Vancouver 1998). The park at Sunset Beach does not have the status of Stanley Park and the location of the memorial there may be regarded as a ‘ghettoization’ of the AIDS issue which negates the opportunity for the memor- ial to be located in one of Vancouver’s iconic places of memory and thus lessens the opportunity for it to be viewed by a wider population or to elicit complex and contra- dictory emotions about the past and future of AIDS among the general population. The new policy’s focus on the design and moral neutrality of public space certainly lends credence to worries about the state-sanctioned narrowing of what activities are deemed appropriate in public space (MacLeod 2002; Mitchell 2003), but the details of the case also underscore the constant ideological work necessary to maintain hegemonic codings and emphasizes that state governance is not monolithic, nor a ‘black box.’ Rather, it is contingent on specific situations and the discretion of state agents, like a particular set of Park Board members experiencing certain political pressures. Clearly, the VPB’s final decision meant that memorialization of people with AIDS is not visible and therefore not officially sanctioned in Stanley Park and, through this action, a problem of governance was solved and a hegemonic moral order was settled once more in favour of ‘taken-for- granted’ notions of appropriateness (Matless 2000). Yet, the ability of opposition forces to get the original decision to locate the memorial inside Stanley Park changed highlights the potential (but by no means certainty) for governance decisions to be influenced in more progressive directions in other contexts. Public sex, violence, and moral geography in the Aaron Webster case Such struggles over what should be visible in Stanley Park have not been limited to the AIDS memorial. Certain spaces in the park consti- tute sites for anonymous gay public sex and, simultaneously, strategic sites for community- building and networking (Ingram 1997). These spaces often become the site for and stake in struggles over ‘appropriate’ presence and behaviour in public space, particularly when they are made visible to the general public through media coverage of violence. These cruising grounds, like spaces of memory, become problems of governance that are dealt with using state power that is deployed at the discretion of specific state agents and in a context of often intense political contestation. On 17 November 2001, Aaron Webster’s body was discovered, battered and naked, by a friend taking a late-night stroll in Stanley Park. Subsequent police investigations and media reports implicated four young men in Web- ster’s beating death. Robertson (2005: 485) notes that these men travelled to Stanley Park from their suburban homes, armed with ‘an assortment of golf irons, a pool cue and, possibly, baseball bats,’ specifically to look for Governing sexuality and park space 85 D o w n l o a d e d B y : [ C a n a d i a n R e s e a r c h K n o w l e d g e N e t w o r k ] A t : 0 5 : 5 0 5 M a r c h 2 0 1 0 ‘peeping toms.’ The logic behind this ‘mis- sion,’ it was later revealed in the testimony of the accused, was revenge: one of the accused had once been disturbed by a ‘peeping tom’ in Stanley Park as he and his girlfriend were in his parked car. It was also revealed that the group had gone on several similar forays to the park in the past. That particular evening, the group came upon Aaron Webster, dressed only in socks and boots, smoking near a gay cruising stroll. The group chased him down, repeatedly hitting him with their weapons until he fell to the ground. Webster was pronounced dead by the police and emergency medical personnel who arrived shortly thereafter. The four men—two youths (identified as A.C. and J.S.) and two adults (Ryan Cran and Danny Rao)—were eventually charged with manslaughter. Faced with the prospect of the charges being made more serious, with an associated higher sentence, the defendants argued that the act should not be defined a hate crime because they had been looking for ‘peeping toms,’ not gay men. This argument was partially successful. A.C. and J.S. were tried in youth court (in exchange for testifying against the adults); both were found guilty and sentenced to three years detention. Only in J.S.’s trial was hate crime legislation explicitly invoked to affect the sentencing, however. In delivering his sentence, Youth Court Judge Valmond Romilly utilized the hate crime statute by pointing out that the law protected ‘peeping toms,’ as they constitute ‘groups similar to those defined by sexual orientation in that both represent a sexual lifestyle which some consider deviant and, therefore, these groups would suffer discrimination in a similar manner to gay people’ (Robertson 2005: 486). He also added that, ‘a gay person was “bashed” by the accused and his friends in an area frequented by gays, and in that regard, Figure 2 The AIDS memorial at Sunset Beach park. Source: J. P. Catungal. 86 John Paul Catungal & Eugene J. McCann D o w n l o a d e d B y : [ C a n a d i a n R e s e a r c h K n o w l e d g e N e t w o r k ] A t : 0 5 : 5 0 5 M a r c h 2 0 1 0 I fail to see why it cannot be regarded as a “gay bashing”’ (Robertson 2005: 487). The trial for the adult suspects had a different tenor. Judge Mary Humphries acquitted Danny Rao, citing insufficient evidence linking him to the incident and sentenced Ryan Cran to the minimum number of years (six) sought by Crown prosecutors. In Cran’s sentencing, hate crime legislation was explicitly avoided because the judge felt that there was no proof that the suspect’s motive was hate against gay people (Robertson 2005: 488). Media accounts of the killing and subsequent legal case produced an extended public debate around homophobia, morality and violence in public space and helped spur activists’ attempts to reorder and recode the spaces of the park and the city more generally. Protecting the park from sexual ‘deviance’ Sumartojo notes that through decisions on how to frame and focus the news, the media are able ‘to reflect and influence opinions not only about hate-crime in general, but also about the groups that hate crime laws are designed to protect’ (2004: 93). In covering the killing, reporters repeated that Webster was not only in Stanley Park but, ‘in an area of Stanley Park that is cut with trails known as strolls, where some in the gay community seek anonymous sex’ (Bailey 2001). This focus was accompanied by frequent descriptions of his body as naked, except for hiking boots. In reaction to the media’s narrow focus on Webster’s sexuality, friends and family sought to portray Webster as a complete person, who ‘loved photography and was very good at it, who had a great sense of humour and who was “quite a spiritual person”’ (Skelton and Zacharias 2001). It is unsurprising, however, that gay cruising sites continued to figure prominently in the mainstream media cover- age. The performance of sex—defined as a private act—in public space ruptures the liberal private – public dichotomy that defines appropriateness. Implicitly, much of the coverage and opinion seemed to ask whether the public visibility of ‘inappropriate’ acts in gay cruising sites provokes violence. Homophobic commentary on Webster’s public performance of gay sexuality formed a significant portion of reactions in the media. For instance, Webster’s killing elicited calls to ‘ensure that a park [does not] become an outdoor sex shop that turns off legitimate park users’ (North Shore News 2001). One letter to the editor argued that acts in the place the author called ‘The Fruit Loop’ were a necessary ingredient in a killing which could have been avoided had Webster ‘engaged in whatever type of sex he desired in the privacy of his own home’ (Knight 2001). Another letter-writer blamed Webster for his fate because he ‘[sought] out deserted and poten- tially dangerous areas in order to have anonymous sex’ (Peace River Block Daily News 2001). Quoting a police detective, the letter argued that ‘people who go [to Stanley Park to seek sex] “create a perfect circum- stance to become victims of crime”’ (Peace River Block Daily News 2001). These harsh, blame-the-victim reactions sought to defend the ‘wholesome’ iconic park from deviance. In doing so, they asserted the normalcy of heterosexuality and coded the park space in terms of specific orders of sexual morality. As Brown (2000) notes, such codings serve to ‘closet’ actions deemed out of place. The invisibility and attendant vulnerability entailed in this closeting was highlighted in the wake of Webster’s killing when investigators found it difficult to gather testimony from witnesses who were, in some cases, afraid to reveal their sexuality by admitting their Governing sexuality and park space 87 D o w n l o a d e d B y : [ C a n a d i a n R e s e a r c h K n o w l e d g e N e t w o r k ] A t : 0 5 : 5 0 5 M a r c h 2 0 1 0 presence in the location of the crime (Todd 2003a). In light of both the violence and the harsh judgements of Webster in the media, invisibility became the watchword and pro- tective strategy for many of the cruising ground’s regulars just as prosecutors and community activists sought to shed light on the issue of hate crime. The efforts to bring the killers to account and to make spaces of homophobic violence visible to the state were also confounded by Canadian law’s tendency to assign homosexu- ality to the private, invisible sphere (Bain and Nash 2007) and by its inability to consistently incorporate spatiality into decisions over violent acts. This further element of the socio-spatial production of sexual morality as a problem of governance was epitomized by Judge Humphries’ decision to not define Webster’s killing as a hate crime. Her decision therefore closed off acknowledgement of the spatiality of hate crime (Bellett 2005; Theodore 2005). As Robertson puts it in his critique of the decision, however, Webster performed a gay identity, or space of difference, that was readable as such through action, bodily comportment and time, even to the ilk of the accuseds, and this made him a target, even in the absence of the accuseds’ familiarity with [that area of the park] as a gay space or what a gay man looks like . . . By applying a geographical understanding of the identity of the body and space, it may be asserted that the intersection of the naked body of Aaron Webster and the space of a dark park generally associated with sexual goings- on should have led a reasonable person to conclude that to attack Webster would be an affront if not to the gay community, then to a class of persons who have a sexuality dissimilar from that of the majority. (2005: 499) In her sentencing, Humphries failed to take into account ‘constellations of public – private, action, time and comportment’ (Robertson 2005: 500) in identifying a hateful motivation. Yet, for Robertson, Webster’s presence was certainly ‘queer (or different)’ (2005: 500), if not gay, and it was particularly so, we would suggest, since it involved a taking of space, of being visible in an iconic space where visibility is encouraged but only in strictly constrained forms (Mitchell 2003). His presence disrupted taken-for-granted moral codings. ‘By smoking in place, perhaps even languorously,’ Robertson (2005: 500) continues, Webster expressed the fact that he was appropriating this corner of the park—he was not transiting through with a pet. Through an audacious docility and being outside (as opposed to inside an automobile), as an object, and as a body available to make new acquaintances in the dark he blurred the distinction between the public and private: he drew out the latter to form an ob-scene. (Robertson 2005: 499) So, while Bain and Nash are right to argue that the state’s erasure of a range of sexualities from the public gaze means that the achieve- ment of ‘robust sexual citizenship . . . is often highly problematic, particularly for those whose everyday practices seek to incorporate radical sexual alternatives’ (2007: 31), we would add that through decisions like Humphries’ which ignore context and thus severely narrow definitions of hate crime, state agents also hide and therefore legally ‘bracket,’ certain forms of hate. Yet, it is also important to note that ‘the state,’ in the abstract, does not do anything but that it is specific agents of the state (judges, for example) who hold a certain degree of discretion to make judgements and enforce 88 John Paul Catungal & Eugene J. McCann D o w n l o a d e d B y : [ C a n a d i a n R e s e a r c h K n o w l e d g e N e t w o r k ] A t : 0 5 : 5 0 5 M a r c h 2 0 1 0 regulations. The contrast between Judge Humphries’ understanding of hate crime and that of her youth court counterpart is a case in point, since the same statute was applied in one case but not the other. The ordering of morality, sexuality, and public space—even an iconic public space in which the political stakes are raised by its symbolic importance— becomes, from this perspective, a varied and unpredictable terrain upon which struggle plays out. Beyond Stanley Park: activists’ efforts to recode the city in terms of hate crime While the eventual judgements in the Webster case were largely disappointing to those activists and prosecutors involved, the varied terrain of activism offered other opportunities to work with state agents against endemic homophobic violence. As the investigation into Webster’s death proceeded, activists in the gay community sought to utilize the heigh- tened visibility of parks as cruising sites and their attendant threat of violence to also highlight other sites in Vancouver where homophobic violence takes place. They problematized the narrow spatial bounded- ness of many discussions of Webster’s killing. For example, one argued that homophobia and violence were more rampant in the city than reported and that attacks happened ‘not just in areas where people would frequent for casual sexual encounters’ (in Bailey 2001). Thus, while proponents of the AIDS memorial could be seen to have been thwarted to some extent by its eventual location outside Stanley Park, activists who reacted to Webster’s killing took the opportunity to widen the discussion of the locations of hate crime beyond the park in order to advocate for better protection across the city. Their argument was echoed by a police officer involved in the Webster case who suggested that the suspects were most likely ‘serial gay bashers’ and that they ‘may have cruised down Davie Street or in other areas where there is a highly concentrated gay population’ (in Bolan 2001). Indeed, the argument that cruising sites in parks invite violence fails to explain this broader geogra- phy of homophobic hate crime. After all, parks are not separate from society or the city more widely; they form a part of a much broader social ecology of queer urban spaces. Davie Street is at the heart of the Davie Village neighbourhood, close to the final location of the AIDS memorial, and is generally con- sidered to be a relatively safe and tolerant space in which Other sexual identities are visible (Miller 2005). By highlighting the widespread threat of violence in the city, even in ‘safe’ spaces, activists decided ‘that [it is] not appropriate anymore to just scurry off and not deal with it,’ and so resistance strategies—including some violent retaliation and the involvement of the police— became more common (Carrigg 2003). Activists sought to overcome the ‘[commu- nity’s] historically . . . adversarial relationship with police’ (Morton 2003) and promote a form of community – police collaboration that would not entail simply increased patrols in Stanley Park. They called for more liaisons between gay organizations and the police during hate crime investigations in order to encourage victims to report attacks. In an early attempt to bring GLBT activists into the city’s governance networks, Prideline, a peer-support helpline for victims of gay violence, was launched in collaboration with the Vancouver police in 2003 (Morton 2003). In addition, police visibility in public and institutional spaces, such as their participation in pride parades and the enrolment of gay and Governing sexuality and park space 89 D o w n l o a d e d B y : [ C a n a d i a n R e s e a r c h K n o w l e d g e N e t w o r k ] A t : 0 5 : 5 0 5 M a r c h 2 0 1 0 lesbian officers, were seen as necessary steps (Bolan 2001). And on the seventh anniversary of Webster’s death, in November 2008, a series of ‘Aaron Webster Community Forums’ were launched by a Vancouver LGBTQ community centre in partnership with the police depart- ment. With the tagline ‘Stop the Violence!’ these five events were held throughout the city, not just in Davie Village, and indicated the continued resonance of the Webster case for activists, their continued attempts to expand the spatial scope of their concerns, their ongoing good relationship with the police, but also the ongoing cases of anti-GLBT violence (Rolfsen 2008) that underscore the problems of governing sexual morality and public space in Vancouver. Conclusion In this paper, we have highlighted coding and ordering practices employed by state actors, the media, and community activists, by violent ‘bashers’ and by ordinary people like Webster as they seek to govern, define, and contest hegemonic definitions of appropriate presence and behaviour in an iconic park. Through accounts of a dispute over the location of an AIDS memorial in Stanley Park and of the killing of a gay man in the park, we analyse the relationship between sexuality and public space as a problem of governance continually in the process of being regulated and represented within the public sphere. Recent evaluations of the literatures on geographies of sexuality conclude that scholarship has been somewhat narrow in both its focus on certain types of places where sexualities can be studied and in its deployment of certain standard, relatively under-problematized analytical and political categories. Brown, for example, calls for studies of ‘sexualities as they are lived across the whole city, not just the inner-city leisure zones and gentrified neighbourhoods . . . and [for] research beyond the metropolitan centres of the Global North’ (2008: 1216). Hubbard (2008: 641), for his part, notes that ‘geographies of sexuality overwhelmingly focus on the way that spaces are produced as either heterosexual or homosexual, and con- sequently fail to acknowledge the diverse sexualities that may exist within these broad categories.’ How, then, might our study be positioned in terms of these programmatic statements? Clearly, we do not venture beyond a well- studied city in our analysis. What we do offer is an argument for understanding specific public spaces and their relationship to sexu- ality, even those spaces in well-studied cities, in their own terms rather than as monoliths. Thus, we argue that our two related cases highlight the specific role of iconic public parks in the spatial governance of sexuality. There is something about Stanley Park and places like it that ratchet up media attention and political stakes in debates over regulation. Similarly, we point to a need for the ongoing conceptualization of the governance of public space and sexuality beyond ‘black box’ categories like ‘the state’ (cf. Hubbard 2008: 645 on the ‘“black box” of heterosexuality’). This is not to dismiss, but to build upon, the important and varied work on the relationship between state actors, space, and sexuality. Work on sexuality and public space as problems of governance can continue to explore how the structural characteristics of the state reproduce inequalities and repress- sion but might also conceptualize the state in a similarly open and potentially empowering way as Brown (2008: 1228) hopes sexuality will be understood: ‘as frequently being inconsistent, beyond easy classification, and 90 John Paul Catungal & Eugene J. McCann D o w n l o a d e d B y : [ C a n a d i a n R e s e a r c h K n o w l e d g e N e t w o r k ] A t : 0 5 : 5 0 5 M a r c h 2 0 1 0 as being immanent and “defined” at the moment of the sex act, flirtation or encounter.’ Acknowledgements This paper has benefited greatly from com- ments by Phil Hubbard, Sean Robertson, Marit Rosol, and two anonymous reviewers. Thanks also to John Ng (SFU Cartography Lab) for producing the map. The usual disclaimers apply. References AIDS Memorial Society of Vancouver (1998) Vancouver AIDS memorial dedication, ,http://www.aidsmemorial. ca/The-Memorial/Dedication.htm. (accessed 7 September 2008). Anderson, K. (1991) Vancouver’s Chinatown: Racial Discourse in Canada, 1875 – 1980. Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queens University Press. Bailey, P. (2001) Police believe witnesses saw Stanley Park killing, The Vancouver Sun, 14 Dec.: B.3. Bain, A. and Nash, C.J. 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Abstract translations Gouvernance de la sexualité et de l’espace du parc: des actes de régulation à Vancouver, BC Cet article suggère que le codage et le classement de la sexualité et de l’espace au travers des significa- tions de quelles pratiques sexuelles et de quelles représentations de la sexualité sont appropriées moralement dans les espaces publiques peuvent être utilement compris comme un problème de gouver- nance. Nous disons que des efforts à masquer ou à rendre visible quelques sexualités spécifiques dans l’espace publique sont compliqués et politiquement sensibles car, tandis que les régulations écrites sont relativement claires et définies, leur implémen- tation, par des urbanistes, des juges, etc., implique la discrétion significative et mène à des résultats conditionnels et contestables. De plus, les politiques de gouvernance de la moralité sexuelle et de l’espace publique sont rendues plus problématiques quand l’espace où une norme hégémonique de comportement ou de la moralité est confrontée publiquement est un parc iconique qui attire l’attention intensive des medias. L’article élabore ces arguments avec deux cas études interdépen- dants: un débat sur la localité appropriée d’un mémorial du SIDA à Stanley Park, Vancouver et la réaction au meurtre d’un homosexuel qui arborait le parc à la recherche de sexe. On conclut en établissant un lien entre notre argument et des déclarations récentes au sujet du futur des géographies de la sexualité, en réclamant des analyses qui admettent les potentialités ainsi que les contingences des catégories comme ‘l’état’, ‘le gouvernance’, et ‘l’espace publique’ et aussi leurs tendances structurelles et leur association continue avec la répression sexuelle. Mots-clefs: espace publique, sexualité, l’etat, gouvernance. Gobernando la sexualidad y el espacio de parques: actos de regulación en Vancouver, Columbia Británica Este papel se sugiere que es un problema de gobierno cuando la codificación y ordenación de la sex- ualidad y espacio están entendidos por definiciones Governing sexuality and park space 93 D o w n l o a d e d B y : [ C a n a d i a n R e s e a r c h K n o w l e d g e N e t w o r k ] A t : 0 5 : 5 0 5 M a r c h 2 0 1 0 morales que designan cuales practicas sexuales y representaciones de sexualidad están apropiados. Discutimos que los intentos esconder o revelar sexualidades especı́ficos en el espacio público están complicados y cargados polı́ticamente porque, aunque las regulaciones escritas son relativamente preestablecidos, su implementación, por planifica- dores, juicios, et al., se involucra discreción significativo y se lleva a resultados contingentes y discutibles. Además, la polı́tica de gobernar la moralidad sexual y el espacio público la hace más problemática cuando se desafı́a un parque icónico que representa las normas hegemónicas de conducta y moralidad, y se atrae mucha atención de prensa. El papel se elabora estos argumentos por dos estudios interrelacionados: un debate sobre la ubicación apropiada para un monumento a la SIDA en Stanley Park, Vancouver y la reacción al asesinato de un hombre homosexual quien andaba el parque buscando relaciones sexuales. Concluimos por unir nuestro argumento a declaraciones recientes sobre el futuro de geografı́as de la sexualidad, discutiendo por más análisis que se reconocen ambos contingencias y potencialidades de categor- ı́as como ‘el estado,’ ‘gobierno,’ y ‘espacio público’ y también sus tendencias estructurales y su asociación actual con la represión sexual. Palabras claves: espacio público, sexualidad, el estado, gobierno. 94 John Paul Catungal & Eugene J. McCann D o w n l o a d e d B y : [ C a n a d i a n R e s e a r c h K n o w l e d g e N e t w o r k ] A t : 0 5 : 5 0 5 M a r c h 2 0 1 0 
work_p525c7epsvfrtiq7h7wxjd3tbu	----	Crime and disorder strategic assessment Skip to main content Home Research Outputs People Faculties, Schools & Groups Research Areas Accountancy Africa Ageing Agricultural Management Agriculture Agriculture & Food Animal Care Any Arts Arts & Humanities Biomedical Sciences Biomedical/Medical Sciences/Health Biotechnology & Informatics Business Administration Cancer & Neurodegeneration Cell Signalling Chemical Engineering Chemistry Civil Law Computer Science Computing Social Sciences Criminal Law Education Energy Engineering Fisheries Food Food Analysis Food Management Fossil Fuels Gene Expression Health Higher Education Housing Humanities Infectious Diseases Journalism Education Land Management Law Management & Commerce Mathematics Mechanical Engineering Medical Science Other Miscellaneous Categories Peace Studies Physics Renewable Energy Sources Science & Technology Seafood Vegetables Research Centres/Groups Air Quality Management Resource Centre Applied Marketing Research Group Applied Statistics Group Bat Conservation Research Lab Big Data Enterprise and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory Bristol Bio-Energy Centre Bristol Centre for Economics and Finance Bristol Centre for Linguistics Bristol Economic Analysis Bristol Group for Water Research Bristol Inter-disciplinary Group for Education Research Bristol Leadership and Change Centre Bristol Robotics Laboratory Centre for Appearance Research Centre for Applied Legal Research Centre for Architecture and Built Environment Research Centre for Fine Print Research Centre for Health and Clinical Research Centre for Machine Vision Centre for Moving Image Research Centre for Public Health and Wellbeing Centre for Research in Biosciences Centre for Sustainable Planning and Environments Centre for Transport and Society Centre for Water, Communities and Resilience Collaborative Entrepreneurship Research Group Commercial Law Research Unit Computer Science Research Centre Creative Technologies Laboratory Data Research Access and Governance Network (DRAGoN) Digital Cultures Research Centre Document and Location Research Group Education Innovation Centre Engineering Modelling and Simulation Research Group Environmental Law and Sustainability Research Group Global Crime, Justice and Security Research Group Human Resources, Work and Employment Innovation, Operations Management and Supply Institute for Sustainability, Health and Environment Institute of Bio-Sensing Technology Mathematics and Statistics Research Group Moving Image Research Group Psychological Sciences Research Group Regional History Centre Research Group in Mathematics and its Applications Robotic Engineering and Computing for Healthcare - FET Science Communication Unit Social Justice Research Group Social Science Research Group Software Engineering Research Group Sustainable Economies Research Group (SERG) The WHO Collaborating Centre for Healthy Urban Environment Unconventional Computing Group Visual Culture Research Group Browse By Year By Author By Type About OAI Research Repository All Output Person Project Advanced Search Crime and disorder strategic assessment Ismail, Nasrul Home Outputs Authors Nasrul Ismail Nasrul.Ismail@uwe.ac.uk Abstract Produced for Avon & Somerset Constabulary and Bristol City Council, in line with Bristol's Mayor and the Police and Crime Commissioner (PCC) strategic partnership priorities, to ensure that the funding of £ 202.1 m was spent according to the local area needs. The report received favourable media coverage. Citation Ismail, N. (2013). Crime and disorder strategic assessment Report Type Technical Report Publication Date Dec 31, 2013 Peer Reviewed Not Peer Reviewed Keywords crime, disorder, strategic assessment, needs assessment, Bristol Files Crime and Disorder Strategic Assessment.pdf (1.2 Mb) PDF Download Preview Licence http://www.rioxx.net/licenses/all-rights-reserved Organisation(s) HAS Dept of Health & Social Sciences Research Centres/Groups Centre for Public Health and Wellbeing You might also like Contextualising the pervasive impact of macroeconomic austerity on prison health in England: A qualitative study among international policymakers (2019) Journal Article How do policymakers interpret and implement the principle of equivalence with regard to prison health? 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work_pdv6gqnfqjfotdkmmhbcoertq4	----	Balancing Freedom of Expression and Social Responsibility on the Internet Balancing Freedom of Expression and Social Responsibility on the Internet Raphael Cohen-Almagor1 Received: 5 December 2016 /Accepted: 17 May 2017 / Published online: 6 June 2017 # The Author(s) 2017. This article is an open access publication Abstract This paper reflects on the articles submitted for the Symposium Confronting the Internet’s Dark Side. I discuss some of the criticisms of the book’s theory and my treatment of hate speech. The responsibilities of Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and Web-Hosting Services (WHSs) are in the fore, arguing that as they are the gatekeepers, they need to be proactive far more than they are now. This paper, like my book, strives to suggest an approach that harnesses the strengths and capabilities of the public and the private sectors in offering practical solutions to pressing problems. Keywords Business ethics . Hate speech . Internet gatekeepers . Responsibility. Terror 1 Introduction The Internet’s design and raison d’être are complete freedom, but soon enough people began to exploit the Net’s massive potential to enhance partisan inter- ests, some of which are harmful and anti-social. Given that the Internet has been part of our lives for a relatively short time, the discussions about the costs and harms of the Internet, and how to address them, are in their infancy. The transnational nature of the World-Wide-Web makes regulation very difficult, if not impossible. The articles in this volume reflect on some aspects of the theory invoked in of Confronting the Internet’s Dark Side, on the role of Internet intermediaries, and on the Philosophia (2017) 45:973–985 DOI 10.1007/s11406-017-9856-6 Author of Confronting the Internet’s Dark Side (2015) Special Symposium on Confronting the Internet’s Dark Side: Moral and Social Responsibility on the Free Highway (NY and Washington DC.: Cambridge University Press and Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2015). * Raphael Cohen-Almagor R.Cohen-Almagor@hull.ac.uk 1 School of Law and Politics, The University of Hull, Cottingham Road, Hull HU6 7RX,, UK http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1007/s11406-017-9856-6&domain=pdf lingering problem of hate speech. In this paper, I intend to critically reflect on some of the arguments and to expand on the book’s reasoning. 2 Theory In his article, BBusiness Ethics and Free Speech on the Internet^, Brian Berkey provides much food for thought. He seems to accept that John Stuart Mill’s theory can be a good starting point to discuss freedom of expression on the Internet. He wants to deduce from Mill whether Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and Web- Hosting Services (WHSs) ought to deny service to those who would engage in online hate speech. But he takes Mill’s position too literary with not enough consideration to the dramatic technological and media developments that have taken place since Mill wrote On Liberty in 1869. In another article (Cohen- Almagor 2012) I explained that Mill wrote at a time when there was no mass media. All there was were a few newspapers, read only by the elite. Today the situation is very different. People have access to newspapers, radio, television, the Internet, cell phones, and other technological means of communication that togeth- er influence and shape to one extent or another the reality in which we live. Together these means of mass communication can create and reinforce an atmo- sphere of incitement. Dozens of calls for hatred and violence might create a turbulent atmosphere that is conducive to violence. Frequently, inciting speech, even if repeated and magnified by the media, falls on deaf ears. Sometimes, however, such speech falls on eager ears and can be a factor in inducing the already-persuaded that there is a need to take action; i.e., to move from harmful speech to harmful deeds. It is one thing to throw a lighted cigarette into an empty bin and quite another to throw it in a dry field. As Zechariah Chafee (1946: 397) stated: BSmoking is all right, but not in a powder magazine.^ 3 The Role of Internet Intermediaries The authors of BThe Psychology of Social Networking: The Challenges of Social Networking for Fame-Valuing Teens' Body Image^ argue that social networking seems to satisfy some adolescent developmental needs. First, it allows teens to practice identity establishment through performing self-expression and self-presentation tasks. Second, it provides opportunities for youth to seek social approval from others. Furthermore, adolescents have a strong attraction and aspiration to fame, which has become one of the most highly appreciated values for this age group. Tali Te’enu- Harari and Keren Eyal conclude that youth’s exposure to thin-idealizing content posted by their adored celebrities on interactive and highly engaging social networking sites poses potential challenges for these young, developing individuals and therefore social networking sites should adopt basic norms of moral and social responsibility. This recommendation is hammered time and again in Confronting the Internet’s Dark Side. In my book, I argued that Internet intermediaries should not be equated with telephone service providers or with electric service providers. I explained the major technical differences as well as differences in scope and potential impact. Professor 974 Philosophia (2017) 45:973–985 Berkey criticises me for failing to explain why any of these differences are morally important. I should have made the point clearer. The technological differences are of functional, practical importance. The possibilities that the Internet is offering exceed by far those that are made available by the telephone providers. The Internet cannot be seen as mere electric grid. While these differences are not necessarily morally signif- icant, the practical implications of Internet abuse are certainly morally significant. Therefore I insist that Internet intermediaries should be more responsible and more proactive in ensuring safe use of this innovative and transformative information platform. After refuting the telephone provider and the electric grid analogies, I went on to offer what I believe are better analogies to understand social responsibil- ity on the Internet. I have argued that better analogies are those between the Internet and a large first and second hand bookstore, or between the Internet and a large library. An owner of a bookstore cannot be held responsible for the content of each and every book in her store. She does not read and inspect all the books. Similarly, it can be argued, an Internet provider should not be held accountable for content on its server. But if a bookstore owner is informed that a specific book contains child pornography, some other illegal material, or material that violates copyright, and she does not take the book off the shelves, then the owner may be held legally responsible for violation of the law. And she is also morally responsible. Similarly, it can be argued, is the case on the Internet. ISPs and WHSs have discretion whether their services are opened for all or limited in one way or another. Bookstore owners do have discretion about the books they offer for buyers. Many would like to maintain a quiet and tranquil atmosphere in the store. The books, accordingly, will be for the general readership. Other book owners might opt for a more rowdy atmosphere. They will entertain books of socially problematic material. The likely result would be that the general readership would refrain from visiting those bookstores. Those stores would become niche stores, for particular readers. In both kinds of store, their owners would like to keep the business going. They will listen to warnings about the illegality of certain books. The same, it can be argued, is true of ISPs and WHSs: Provide a notice first, allowing the provider to make a decision about the consequences to which she might be held liable. If the provider/host does not act upon the warning, then it will have to face the consequences. Indeed, on copyrights issues ISPs are expected to assume responsibility. They should also assume moral and social responsibility when violent, anti-social activities are taking place on their servers. Most ISPs and web-hosting companies would not like their servers to be transformed into forums in which people concoct criminal activities. Professor Berkey offers several criticisms with regard to this analogy. First, the discretion that bookstore owners is quite wide, wider than what he would like Internet intermediaries to have. For instance, bookstore owners may operate religious stores that sell only books of one religion or they may opt to sell only books of a certain ideological leaning. I would certainly not wish to see ISPs that adapt only one conception of the good. Having said that, I did mention in my book the possibility of niche bookstores with the immediate implications of being a niche. Philosophia (2017) 45:973–985 975 Professor Berkey further argues that in my view Internet intermediaries are permitted to discriminate only against hate speech. This is incorrect. Throughout my book, I argued that ISPs and WHSs should adopt responsible standards of conduct to protect Netusers from the harms of cyber bullying, terror, crime and hate speech. Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and Web-Hosting Services (WHSs) have become major actors in shaping the informational environment and in influencing users’ experiences and interactions within it. They provide open infrastructure and applica- tions that facilitate digital expression, interaction, and the communication of informa- tion. I argue that Internet intermediaries have social responsibility to the public they serve. They are trustees of the greater good. Gatekeeping entails promoting of an ethical and responsible informational environment in which users can surf the Internet safely and in a way that support the common good. In August 2016, the UK Home Affairs Committee published a report on extrem- ism which affects Muslim communities and arising from the activities of terrorist organisations such as Daesh. The report recommends that the government adopt a sophisticated approach both to identifying the factors which instigate radicalisation and in the measures it takes to tackle radicalisation. The report includes many detailed recommendations about the work of the Metropolitan Police’s Counter Terrorism Internet Referral Unit (CTIRU) and the Europol, the PREVENT strategy and border security; it probes the role of communities, media and technology, aiming to contain radicalization and promote security and peace of mind (House of Commons Home Affairs Committee 2016). When discussing the role of the Internet and social media in facilitating and encouraging terror, the reiterated theme in the report is responsibility. The fight against radicalization and terror requires cooperation of all pertinent stakeholders and shared responsibility to take adequate measures to prevent violence. The report holds that BSocial media companies are consciously failing to combat the use of their sites to promote terrorism and killings. Networks like Facebook, Twitter and YouTube are the vehicle of choice in spreading propaganda and they have become the recruiting platforms for terrorism. They must accept that the hundreds of millions in revenues generated from billions of people using their products needs to be accompa- nied by a greater sense of responsibility and ownership for the impact that extremist material on their sites is having^ (House of Commons Home Affairs Committee 2016). The report calls for a zero tolerance approach to online extremism, including entice- ment to join extremist groups or commit attacks of terror and any glorification of such activities. The report recommends that manuals for terrorists and extremists should be removed from the Internet. The report voiced dismay that social media companies have teams of only a few hundred employees to monitor networks of billions of accounts and that Twitter does not even proactively report extremist content to law enforcement agencies. The report says that Bthese companies are hiding behind their supranational legal status to pass the parcel of responsibility and refusing to act responsibly in case they damage their brands. If they continue to fail to tackle this issue and allow their platforms to become the ‘Wild West’ of the Internet, then it will erode their reputation as responsible operators^ (House of Commons Home Affairs Committee 2016). These are bold and correct statements. The only reservation I have is with regard to the claim that their conduct Bwill erode their reputation as responsible operators^. I do 976 Philosophia (2017) 45:973–985 not think that these companies have tried to gain such a reputation and consequently they were never regarded as responsible by people who have been studying political extremism and terror on the Internet. During the past decade I spoke with dozens of security officers in the UK, the USA, Canada, Australia and Israel. They all voiced their growing frustration with the free speech, neutral attitude adopted by the media giants. Twitter has the most expansive boundaries to freedom of expression. Its terms of service state that BAll Content, whether publicly posted or privately transmitted, is the sole responsibility of the person who originated such Content. We may not monitor or control the Content posted via the Services and, we cannot take responsibility for such Content. Any use or reliance on any Content or materials posted via the Services or obtained by you through the Services is at your own risk^.1 Twitter does have some rules that prescribe content in limited circumstances. 2 Holocaust denial and, more broadly hate speech do not count among those circumstances. YouTube community guidelines include reference to hateful content. It says: 4 Hateful Content Our products are platforms for free expression. But we don't support content that promotes or condones violence against individuals or groups based on race or ethnic origin, religion, disability, gender, age, nationality, veteran status, or sexual orientation/gender identity, or whose primary purpose is inciting hatred on the basis of these core characteristics. This can be a delicate balancing act, but if the primary purpose is to attack a protected group, the content crosses the line.3 Yet on YouTube one may find BThe ‘Holohoax’ exposed in 30 minutes^4 and a number of other BHolhoax^ videos, including the Leuchter Report5 and a string of 23 clips whose common theme is Bno single Jew died in a gas chamber .̂6 Facebook prohibits posting content that is hateful or threatening. Facebook disabled a group called ‘I Hate Muslims in Oz.’ Barry Schnitt explained: BWe disabled the ‘I Hate Muslims in Oz’ group… because it contained an explicit statement of hate. Where Holocaust-denial groups have done this and been reported, we’ve taken the same action^ (Matyszczyk 2009). In May 2010, Facebook took down a page titled BKill a Jew Day,^ which urged Netusers to violence Banywhere you see a Jew^ between July 4 and July 22. 1 Twitter Terms of Service, https://twitter.com/tos 2 The Twitter Rules, https://support.twitter.com/articles/18311-the-twitter-rules 3 Respect the YouTube community, http://www.youtube.com/yt/policyandsafety/communityguidelines.html 4 BThe ‘Holohoax’ exposed in 30 min^, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bpjqf-vNq6I 5 The Leuchter Report, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WLQv_UQ2mJ0&list=PL2zouJfRSfG52G5 LVQwLOD6nj4Ji8l7wE 6 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CsrPt-enplw&list=PLiEJsoZExlCyYwzGLQqwMTT8hvwfI5WYj Philosophia (2017) 45:973–985 977 https://twitter.com/tos https://support.twitter.com/articles/18311-the-twitter-rules http://www.youtube.com/yt/policyandsafety/communityguidelines.html https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bpjqf-vNq6I https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WLQv_UQ2mJ0&list=PL2zouJfRSfG52G5LVQwLOD6nj4Ji8l7wE https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WLQv_UQ2mJ0&list=PL2zouJfRSfG52G5LVQwLOD6nj4Ji8l7wE https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CsrPt-enplw&list=PLiEJsoZExlCyYwzGLQqwMTT8hvwfI5WYj Facebook distinguishes between ‘explicit statement of hate’ and Holocaust denial. Its directors believe that Holocaust denial is not hateful per se and does not therefore contravene the company’s terms of service. The terms of service say: BYou will not post content that is hateful, threatening, pornographic, or that contains nudity or graphic or gratuitous violence^.7 Facebook still hosts the National Association for the Advance- ment of White People. 8 Facebook said that BWe think it's important to maintain consistency in our policies, which don't generally prohibit people from making state- ments about historical events, no matter how ignorant the statement or how awful the event^ (Grossman 2011). How can this stance be reconciled with Facebook prohibition on posting content that is hateful or threatening is something for the Facebook managers to reckon with and answer. 5 Hate Speech Hate speech is a contested topic and the extent that it is debated is exemplified in the articles in this symposium. While Brian Berkey thinks that my intolerance of hate speech is exaggerated, Bhikhu Parekh is inclined to go further than me and insist on not tolerating the bigot at all. I shall first avail myself to discuss Parekh’s critique and then move on to consider Professor Berkey’s arguments. Lord Professor Parekh argues that hate speech is objectionable for both intrinsic and instrumental reasons. He counts the various harms that hate speech inflicts on its targets and rightly explains that the danger of hate speech should be assessed against the prevailing social climate and the lessons from history. Parekh brings the example of a radical group that urges people to kill all elderly parents or all beautiful women. Its intended audience as well as well as its target group would consider this urging as mad or as a poor joke and would dismiss this utterance. But if similar sentiments are expressed about blacks, Jews, or gays, then they would be seriously considered. This is because of the deeply rooted prejudices against these groups, and because the lessons we have learned from history. Lord Parekh is right. We assess the legitimacy of expressions in accordance with social and historical data. To give another example: If someone were to express the thought: Jews should be gassed during the 1920s, the utterance would be dismissed as ridiculous, crazy and also impractical thought. What does it mean gas all the Jews? How is this possible? Even if the audience were to be deeply anti-Semitic, they would still question the validity and practicality of this suggestion to gas all Jews. Today, after the horror of the holocaust, the same statement is likely to evoke strong negative public reaction. The assertion would no longer be dismissed as mad but would be taken most seriously. We do learn some lessons. Lord Parekh speaks in support of a law that would ban hate speech. I addressed the issue in my 2012 article and find myself in much agreement with my good friend Bhikhu. Like him, I think that we have to fight against hate and bigotry. Like him, I think that hate speech has no place in a decent society and deserves to be discouraged. 7 See http://www.facebook.com/terms.php 8 http://www.facebook.com/pages/The-National-Association-for-the-Advancement-of-White- People/102208269835141 978 Philosophia (2017) 45:973–985 http://www.facebook.com/terms.php http://www.facebook.com/pages/The-National-Association-for-the-Advancement-of-White-People/102208269835141 http://www.facebook.com/pages/The-National-Association-for-the-Advancement-of-White-People/102208269835141 Like him I believe there is room to invoke restrictive laws as last resort, after exhausting educational, social and moral means. Parekh and I (and also Waldron 2012) believe that hate speech legislation should protect people’s dignity against assault. It should aim to protect the targets’ equal status in the community, their entitlement to basic justice and to the fundamentals of their reputation. Parekh and I speak of maintaining civility and human dignity. A person’s dignity relates to people’s social standing, the fundamentals of basic reputation that entitle them to be treated as equals in society. Hate speech aims to undermine its target’s reputation by associating characteristics like race, ethnicity or religion with attributes that would disqualify them from enjoying equal standing in society. Hate speech undercut the targets’ entitlement to basic justice and to the fundamentals of their reputation. As students of history, it would be utterly irrespon- sible on our part to turn a blind eye, legitimize or condone in one way or another the existence of such discriminatory, indeed evil talk in society. As Parekh rightly notes, we may differ in our view as to when is time to invoke such laws. We both use the term Blast resort^ but we may differ in our understanding when the time comes to see the necessity in such laws. It seems to me that Parekh would see the necessity of such laws in an earlier stage. When hate speech is concerned, he would be inclined to weigh freedom of expression less favourably than the competing interests of protecting minorities and maintaining civility. Lord Parekh and I share concerns regarding the marketplace of ideas concept. Both of us are cognizant of its limitations.9 Parekh writes that he is Ba little troubled^ by my Bheavy reliance on the Millian Principle of interfering with an individual only when his or her utterances and actions threaten to cause harm to others^. This is because this view puts the onus not on the speaker but on his target group, and in so doing places the latter at disadvantage. Second, because harm is not easy to define, identify and prove. He says that I am right to insist that Bexaggerated and ill-focused remarks about harm should not be made the basis of actions on the internet or elsewhere, but the opposite extreme of requiring a fairly precise casual connection between a particular form of hate speech and a particular kind of harm would not do either .̂ It seems that Parekh sees no value in being tolerant to hate speech. He does not think that such restrictions would go against the spirit of democracy. Quite the opposite. Restrictions on hate speech would benefit democracy and society. Professor Berkey, on the other hand, argues that my definition of hate speech is overly broad though in one sense it is curiously narrow. In my book, hate speech is defined as a bias-motivated, hostile, malicious speech aimed at a person or a group of people because of some of their actual or perceived innate characteristics. It expresses discriminatory, intimidating, disapproving, antagonistic and/or prejudicial attitudes toward the disliked target group (Cohen-Almagor 2015). Berkey thinks that this definition is broad because a great deal of speech is bias motivated, hostile and malicious, and not all of it amounts to hate speech. In his example, Jane watches a video featuring an African American artist performing a violent song. Jane, who is a white woman, does not like it and she posts online comment saying that the artist should be in prison. Professor Berkey rightly says that this comment is bias motivated, hostile and malicious but it is not hate speech. I agree with Berkey. It is not hate speech because it is not aimed at the artist due to his actual or perceived innate characteristics. 9 On this issue, see Pole (1994, 2000). Philosophia (2017) 45:973–985 979 Professor Berkey then considers Jim who posts the following comment: BScientific evidence shows that members of racial group A are naturally more intelligent than members of racial group B^. The statement might be morally repugnant but, Berkey argues, it does not amount hate speech. Now this is an interesting example. For many years, I have been presenting to my students the case of Jean-Philippe Rushton, a Canadian psychology professor who has argued about hierarchy of races: Asians are smarter than whites, who are in turn smarter than blacks. In his book Race, Evolution, and Behavior (1999) Rushton explained that brain and genital size are inversely related, and that races differ in brain size, intelligence, sexual behaviour, fertility, personality, maturation, lifespan, crime and in family stability. He explained that blacks are less intelligent than Orientals and Whites and they are more involved in criminal activities. While the IQ of Orientals is about 106, the IQ of Black people is around 70 to 75. Black people are also more sexually promiscuous and they lack social organization. Here are some quotes from his book: On average, Orientals are slower to mature, less fertile and less sexually active, have larger brains and higher IQ scores. Blacks are at the opposite end in each of these areas. Whites fall in the middle, often close to Orientals (p. 18). Blacks are more aggressive and outgoing than Whites, while Whites are more aggressive and outgoing than Orientals. Blacks also have more mental instability than Whites. Black rates of drug and alcohol abuse are higher (pp. 33-34). Orientals have about 102 million more brain cells than Whites, and… Whites have about 480 million more than Blacks. These differences in brain size probably explain the racial differences in IQ and cultural achievement (p. 58). … the difference in average crime rate means that a much higher percentage of Blacks fall into a life of crime. The 85 average IQ of criminals is almost identical with the 85 average IQ of Blacks, so IQ is related to crime (pp. 94-95). The science behind these assertions is debatable. Rushton’s theory evoked much criticism and has been perceived as racist (Zuckerman and Brody 1988; Anderson 1991; Allemang 2012). His theory attempts to explain everything by the sole criterion of race. It ignores social circumstances and social construction. It does not take into account other, no less important factors, such as individual abilities, class, poverty, education and family infrastructure. But is it hate speech? In the spirit of the liberal marketplace of ideas, the search for the truth and open disputation of ideas with contrasting ideas, one may think that Rushton’s theory is problematic but it should be tolerated and debated. Its scientific facade needs to be exposed and simultaneously the true motives that guide Rushton should be explored. This, indeed, is my belief. Rushton’s theory is a hard case. It is opened to interpretations but it should not be silenced. I also believe that Rushton’s theory was not guided only by scientific methods, that it had underpinning agenda which was not innocent, that it was motivated by other reasons rather than the urge to discover a scientific truth. Rushton (1999, 104) was asked BWeren’t theories about race differences the reason for racism, genocide and the 980 Philosophia (2017) 45:973–985 Holocaust?^ Rushton answered (1999, 104-105): BThe Nazis and others used their supposed racial superiority to justify war and genocide. But just about every idea - nationalism, religion, egalitarianism, even self-defence - has been used as an excuse for war, oppression or genocide. Science, however, is objective. It can’t give us our goals, but it can tell us how easy or difficult it will be to reach our goal. Knowing more about race differences may help us to give every child the best possible education and help us to understand some of our chronic social problems better .̂ With this answer, Rushton was trivializing the Nazi crimes. Nazism was equated with nationalism, religion, egalitarianism, Beven self-defence^. Rushton says nothing about the evil ideas of Nazism per se but how they were used for evil deeds, in the same way that other ideas, including noble ideas such as egalitarianism and well-established ideas such as self-defence, have been used for evil deeds. Then Rushton declares that his science is objective. His commitment is to scientific truth, no matter how crude that truth might be. And then he goes on to argue that his ideas may better children education. But surely not the education of every child. No matter how much you invest in the education of black children, they would not be able to escape their lot. They belong to the inferior race and therefore they are doomed to suffer the consequences of their brute luck. What can help us understand Rushton’s reasoning is his behaviour and conduct outside the scientific world. Rushton was embraced by anti-black associations, by racists and bigots. Rushton not only did not flinch; he accepted their attention and the honour of being their star scientist. In 2002, Rushton was appointed president of the Pioneer Fund, which has for decades funded dubious studies linking race to character- istics like criminality, sexuality and intelligence. Pioneer has long promoted eugenics, or the Bscience^ of creating Bbetter^ humans through selective breeding. Set up in 1937 and headed by Nazi sympathizers, the Pioneer Fund’s mission was "to advance the scientific study of heredity and human differences^.10 It strove to improve the character of the American people through eugenics and procreation by people of white colonial stock. Rushton has spoken on the alleged IQ deficiencies of minorities at conferences of the racist American Renaissance magazine and website, and he has published a number of articles in the group’s newsletter. His work is often published on racist websites, including the anti-immigrant hate site, Vdare.com.11 While appearing before and in support of racist groups, the above-mentioned sensitive and debatable statements then amount to hate speech. The context, as we learned from JS Mill’s theory on liberty (1948), makes a great difference. A questionable race theory when invoked in radical extremist rallies is the fuel for their raging hatred, the validating force for their twisted beliefs, the scientific cloth that legitimized crude beliefs about hierarchy of races. Expressed in such forums, Rushton’s ideas become hate speech. Professor Berkey maintains that my definition of hate speech appears to exclude speech that intuitively should count as hate speech. This is because of the requirement that the speech in question is directed against individuals or groups because of actual or perceived innate characteristics. Berkey understands that as a result hate speech against religious groups cannot be defined as hate speech. By innate characteristics I meant a 10 Pioneer Fund, http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php/Pioneer_Fund 11 SPLC, Jean-Philippe Rushton, https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/extremist-files/individual/jean- philippe-rushton Philosophia (2017) 45:973–985 981 http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php/Pioneer_Fund https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/extremist-files/individual/jean-philippe-rushton https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/extremist-files/individual/jean-philippe-rushton quality or ability that one is born with to be distinguished from a quality or ability one that have learned. Thus hateful speech against religious people would certainly fall within the definition of hate speech. True, people are free to change their religion. They also free to change their sex and/or nationality, as some indeed do. But they are unable to change the past. Hate speech is harmful and dangerous. It may have, indeed it has, significant effect on the lives of targeted groups. In Confronting the Internet’s Dark Side I emphasised the connection between hate speech and hate crime. Bigots, inspired by what they have read online, went on to inflict violence on their targets. I am not going to repeat the evidence provided in the book. Here I want to highlight the connection between hate groups and biochemical warfare. Hate groups have talked for years about using anthrax to strike at the U.S. government. Chemical and biological warfare can result in many casualties, an attractive proposition for hate mongers who opt for harmful action. In 1995, Larry Wayne Harris, a microbiologist and former member of the Aryan Nations, was arrested in Ohio with three vials of bubonic plague toxin he had ordered fraudu- lently by mail from a supplier in Maryland. He was given 18 months on probation. He wrote "Bacteriological Warfare: A Major Threat to North America,^ which may be considered a how-to book. The FBI found legal veterinary anthrax vaccine in the trunk of his car (Slevin 2001a, b). The same year, 1995, members of the Patriot’s Council were arrested in Minne- sota and charged with manufacturing ricin, a deadly biochemical substance, to kill law enforcement officers. In 1998, members of a Texas anti-government group were charged with plotting to infect people with cactus needles dipped in anthrax or the AIDS virus (Slevin 2001a, b). Alexander James Curtis, arrested in 2001 in San Diego on charges of harassing civil rights leaders and vandalizing two synagogues, published an Internet guide in 2000 called BBiology for Aryans^ that described the use of botulism, anthrax and typhoid for terror. Curtis had extensive Internet connections in which he kept in touch with like-minded individuals and had spread his message of intolerance nationwide (Perry 2000). Curtis also published the monthly Nationalist Observer on the Internet and offered a weekly and daily telephone broadcast and a racist Internet magazine in which he advocated biological terrorism and celebrated Blone wolves^ such as Timothy McVeigh and Buford Furrow. Indicted with Curtis were three men who met him through his extensive websites dedicated to preaching racial superiority and violence: Michael Brian DaSilva, 21; Robert Nicol Morehouse, 53; and Kevin Christopher Holland, 22. The four defendants were charged with violating federal civil rights and hate-crime laws that make it illegal to target someone for mistreatment on the basis of race, religion or national origin (Perry and Murphy 2000; Web-Based White Supremacist and followers charged with hate crimes 2000). Other dangerous publications are BBiotoxic Weapons^ and BAdvanced Bio- logical Weapons Design and Manufacture.^ These are virtual cookbooks for anthrax and other biological weapons. Each states it is Bfor academic purposes only.^ The author, Timothy Tobiason, was selling his self-published books and compact discs at gun shows for years. Raymond A. Zilinskas, a senior scientist at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies in Monterey, California., said, Bhe does give some accurate information on how to process spores that I have not seen anywhere else in the open literature’ (Thomas 2001). In brackets I should 982 Philosophia (2017) 45:973–985 mention that cryptome.org posts in the name of freedom of information dan- gerous material, including a detailed patent of ricin.12 And the Los Alamos Primer published documents of the energy department containing what is needed in order to produce an atomic bomb (Serber 1992). This is protected speech under the First Amendment. In this era of global terrorism and nuclear proliferation, I question whether this is also a responsible speech. While my approach prefers adopting standards of civility and social responsi- bility by all stakeholders – Netusers who upload information onto the Net, readers, Internet gatekeepers, countries and the international community at large, and while I see the need for legislation as a last resort after exhausting all other methods short of legislation (education, open debate, deliberative procedures facilitate by the media, discussions and consultations with the Internet industry), Amos N. Guiora argues for legislation. Given the demonstrated impact of social media on our daily lives, Guiora contends that a values–based approach must be buttressed by legal standards and limits. Adopting and re-articulation the American Bran- denburg test,13 Guiora calls for limiting social media speech because we can no longer afford to ignore the harm posed by Internet hate speech. Postings on social media must be assessed on a sliding scale taking into account multiple factors including magnitude, frequency, intent of the platform, and content of the post and platform. 6 Conclusion Why do people differ in their view of such balancing? We are all products of our education and upbringing. We are social beings, influenced by what we witness in our societies, and the values enshrined in our families, significant other group, culture and nation. Freedom of expression is perceived quite differently in the USA, India and in Israel. I think the perception of free speech in Israel is somewhere between India and the USA, probably closer to the American view than to the Indian view. In his critique of the American First Amendment position, Jeremy Waldron notes (2012, 185) that Britain has laws that prohibit racial and religious hatred (Public Order Act 1986) and racial discrimination (Race Relations Act 1976). Hate speech laws aim to protect the public good of dignity-based assurance, and to block the construction of the rival public good that the racists and Islamophobes are seeking to construct among themselves (Waldron 2012, 95). Are these laws illegitimate? Was their enactment inappropriate and their enforcement morally wrong? Furthermore, almost all democra- cies have hate speech laws. Are they all wrong and only the United States, which protects hate speech, is right?14 My book tries to balance one against the other two important principles: freedom of expression and social responsibility. The forefathers of the Internet had the vision of creating a free highway, a public space where everyone can say what he or she has in mind. This wonderful innovation of unfettered platform has backfired. The Internet is 12 http://cryptome.org/ricin-patent.pdf 13 Brandenburg v Ohio, 395 US 444 (1969), https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/395/444 14 For opposing argument articulating the importance of the First Amendment, see Baker (2009, 2012). Philosophia (2017) 45:973–985 983 http://cryptome.org/ricin-patent.pdf https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/395/444 open for use and abuse. We should provide and promote responsible use and we should also fight against those who abuse. The abuse corrupt public space and has posed many challenges on all levels: individual, the community, the state and the international community. We are in the early stages of learning how to cope and how to combat the abuse. Slowly we are developing the necessary tools to enjoy innovation and freedom while, at the same time, we are adopting safeguards and rules of responsible conduct. In my book, I made a distinction between Netusers and Netcitizens. The term BNetuser^ refers to people who use the Internet. It is a neutral term. It does not convey any clue as to how people use the Internet. It does not suggest any appraisal of their use. On the other hand, the term Bnetcitizen^ as it is employed here is not neutral. It describes a responsible use of the Internet. Netcitizens are people who use the Internet as an integral part of their real life. That is to say, their virtual life is not separated from their real life. Even if they invent an identity for themselves on social networks, they do it in a responsible manner. They still hold themselves accountable for the consequences of their Internet use. In other words, netcitizens are good citizens of the Internet. They contribute to the Internet’s use and growth while making an effort to ensure that their communications and Net use are constructive. They foster free speech, open access and social culture of respecting others, and of not harming others. Netcitizens are Netusers with a sense of responsibility. While a great deal is dependent on how we use the Internet, a great deal is also dependent on the Internet gatekeepers. These companies possess immense power. Sometimes it has been said that Facebook and Google have more power than presidents and prime ministers. I do not think that this statement is exaggerated. Power without responsibility is dangerous. Power without responsibility is corrosive. Power without responsibility undermines our well-being. Therefore we must insist that Internet inter- mediaries will take responsibility and ensure that Netusers will be able to enjoy the vast capabilities of the Internet without putting themselves in danger. The Internet’s way should not be in harm’s way. The Internet’s way should be enlightening, innovative, entertaining, productive, voicing the best of humanity. To enable this, boundaries should be introduced, antisocial and violent activities should be curbed, safe environ- ment should be established. This is a combined effort of Netusers, business, countries and the international community at large. Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and repro- duction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made. References Allemang, J. (2012). Philippe Rushton, professor who pushed limits with race studies, dead at 68. The Globe and Mail (2 November), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/philippe-rushton-professor- who-pushed-limits-with-race-studies-dead-at-68/article4901806/?page=3. Anderson, J. L. (1991). Rushton’s racial comparisons: An ecological critique of theory and method. Canadian Psychology, 32(1), 51–62. Baker, C. E. (2009). Autonomy and Hate Speech. In I. Hare & J. Weinstein (Eds.), Extreme Speech and Democracy (pp. 139–157). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 984 Philosophia (2017) 45:973–985 http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/philippe-rushton-professor-who-pushed-limits-with-race-studies-dead-at-68/article4901806/?page=3 http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/philippe-rushton-professor-who-pushed-limits-with-race-studies-dead-at-68/article4901806/?page=3 Baker, C. E. (2012). Hate Speech. In M. Herz & P. Molnar (Eds.), The Content and Context of Hate Speech (pp. 57–80). NY: Cambridge University Press. Brandenburg v Ohio, 395 US 444 (1969). https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/395/444. Chafee, Z. (1946). Free speech in the United States. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Cohen-Almagor, R. (2012). Is law appropriate to regulate hateful and racist speech: The Israeli experience. The Israel Studies Review, 27((2) (Winter)), 41–64. Cohen-Almagor, R. (2015). Confronting the Internet's Dark Side: Moral and social responsibility on the free highway. NY and Washington DC: Cambridge University Press and Woodrow Wilson Center Press. Grossman, M. (2011). Facebook firm on holocaust denial pages, despite survivors’ letter. JTA (28 July), http://www.jta.org/news/article/2011/07/28/3088748/facebook-firm-on-holocaust-denial-pages-despite- survivors-letter. House of Commons Home Affairs Committee (2016). Radicalisation: the counter-narrative and identifying the tipping point. Eighth Report of Session 2016–17 (19 July). Matyszczyk, C. (2009). Facebook disables ‘hate Muslims’ group. CNET News (10 June), http://news.cnet.com/8301-17852_3-10262136-71.html. Mill, J. S. (1948). Utilitarianism, Liberty, and Representative Government (Everyman's ed.). London, J. M. Dent. Perry, T. (2000). California and the west; interagency lab targets digital evidence. Los Angeles Times (15 November), p. A3. Perry, Tony and Kim Murphy (2000). White supremacist, 3 followers charged with harassing 4 officials. Los Angeles Times (11 November), p. A20. Pole, J.R. (1994). A bad case of agoraphobia. TLS (4 February): 13-14. Pole, J. (2000). Freedom of speech: From privilege to right. In R. Cohen-Almagor (Ed.), Challenges to Democracy: Essays in Honour and Memory of Isaiah Berlin (pp. 11–54). Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Ltd.. Rushton, J. P. (1999). Race, evolution, and behavior. Somerset: Transaction. Serber, R. (1992). The first lectures on how to build an atomic bomb, http://books.google.co.uk/books?id= ohfmfYxpZn4C&dq=los+alamos+primer&printsec=frontcover&source=bn&hl=en&ei=LTqKS7 WqCJDw0gSswP3WCw&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=4&ved=0CBYQ6AEwAw#v= onepage&q=&f=false;http://www.cfo.doe.gov/Me70/manhattan/publications/LANLSerberPrimer.pdf. Slevin, P. (2001a). Analysts doubt far right behind anthrax attack; U.S. groups too disorganized. The Seattle Times (5 November), p. A4. Slevin, P. (2001b). In anthrax probe, questions of skill, motive; some terrorism specialists suspect an angry loner with scientific knowledge. The Washington Post (5 November), p. A5. Thomas, J. (2001). A nation challenged: Hate groups; U.S. groups have some ties to germ warfare. New York Times (2 November). Waldron, J. (2012). The Harm in Hate Speech. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Zuckerman, M., & Brody, N. (1988). Oysters, rabbits, and people: A critique of ‘race differences in behaviour’ by J.P. Rushton. Personality and Individual Differences, 9, 1025–1033. Philosophia (2017) 45:973–985 985 https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/395/444 http://www.jta.org/news/article/2011/07/28/3088748/facebook-firm-on-holocaust-denial-pages-despite-survivors-letter http://www.jta.org/news/article/2011/07/28/3088748/facebook-firm-on-holocaust-denial-pages-despite-survivors-letter http://news.cnet.com/8301-17852_3-10262136-71.html http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=ohfmfYxpZn4C&dq=los+alamos+primer&printsec=frontcover&source=bn&hl=en&ei=LTqKS7WqCJDw0gSswP3WCw&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=4&ved=0CBYQ6AEwAw%23v=onepage&q=&f=false http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=ohfmfYxpZn4C&dq=los+alamos+primer&printsec=frontcover&source=bn&hl=en&ei=LTqKS7WqCJDw0gSswP3WCw&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=4&ved=0CBYQ6AEwAw%23v=onepage&q=&f=false http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=ohfmfYxpZn4C&dq=los+alamos+primer&printsec=frontcover&source=bn&hl=en&ei=LTqKS7WqCJDw0gSswP3WCw&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=4&ved=0CBYQ6AEwAw%23v=onepage&q=&f=false http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=ohfmfYxpZn4C&dq=los+alamos+primer&printsec=frontcover&source=bn&hl=en&ei=LTqKS7WqCJDw0gSswP3WCw&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=4&ved=0CBYQ6AEwAw%23v=onepage&q=&f=false http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=ohfmfYxpZn4C&dq=los+alamos+primer&printsec=frontcover&source=bn&hl=en&ei=LTqKS7WqCJDw0gSswP3WCw&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=4&ved=0CBYQ6AEwAw%23v=onepage&q=&f=false Balancing Freedom of Expression and Social Responsibility on the Internet Abstract Introduction Theory The Role of Internet Intermediaries Hateful Content Hate Speech Conclusion References 
work_pf7gpo6defd2zn6dd776lrnpha	----	Stigmatization and racial selection after September 11, 2001: self-identity among Arab and Islamic Americans econstor Make Your Publications Visible. A Service of zbw Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft Leibniz Information Centre for Economics Mason, Patrick L.; Matella, Andrew Article Stigmatization and racial selection after September 11, 2001: Self-identity among Arab and Islamic Americans IZA Journal of Migration Provided in Cooperation with: IZA – Institute of Labor Economics Suggested Citation: Mason, Patrick L.; Matella, Andrew (2014) : Stigmatization and racial selection after September 11, 2001: Self-identity among Arab and Islamic Americans, IZA Journal of Migration, ISSN 2193-9039, Springer, Heidelberg, Vol. 3, pp. 1-21, http://dx.doi.org/10.1186/s40176-014-0020-9 This Version is available at: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/149420 Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. 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If the documents have been made available under an Open Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence. http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ www.econstor.eu Mason and Matella IZA Journal of Migration 2014, 3:20 http://www.izajom.com/content/3/1/20 ORIGINAL ARTICLE Open Access Stigmatization and racial selection after September 11, 2001: self-identity among Arab and Islamic Americans Patrick L Mason* and Andrew Matella * Correspondence: pmason@fsu.edu Department of Economics, 266 Bellamy Building, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL 32306-2180, USA © A m Abstract During the 2000s Arab and Islamic American racial identity selection was subjected to an exogenous racializing event, viz., public and private reaction to the Al Qaeda attacks of September 11, 2001. The Al Qaeda attacks clearly demarcate a period in which there was a structural increase in the intensity of US stigmatization of persons with Islamic religious affiliation and Arab ethnicity. This stigmatization created an exogenous reduction in the expected payoff to acculturation relative to non-acculturation. This paper uses self-identification as white as its measure of acculturation and the fraction of all hate crimes directed at Muslims as its measure of stigmatization after 9/11. Comparing 2002–2012 to 1996–2001, there is a statistically significant and substantively large decrease in the unconditional and conditional probabilities that Arab and Islamic Americans will self-identify as white. The data are combined cross sections of the Current Population Survey Annual Social and Economic Supplement. Jel codes: J11, J15, Z13 Keywords: Race; Identity; Arab; Muslim; Islam; September 11 1. Introduction Economists have long known that racial identity, whether self-selected or assigned, is a statistically significant and substantively large explanatory variable for a wide variety of social and economic outcomes. A strong consensus has emerged among modern evolutionary biologists that human racial categories represent a social construct, not a biological datum (Lewontin 2006; Graves 2006). Biologists have no objective means for assigning various human populations to discrete racial groups. Social dominance creates different environmental conditions for the emergence and persistence of socially constructed races in America (Graves 2006). Consequently, for empirical econo- mists, race is an important explanatory variable in regression models of social outcomes; yet, the empirical insights from evolutionary biology are that race is also a dependent variable. An empirical examination of recent changes in racial self-identity among Arab and Islamic Americans presents an opportunity to address this empirical challenge. Arab and Islamic Americans are overlapping and diverse populations. There are of 3.5 million Arab Americans, with ancestral origins in all 22 Arab countries (Arab American 2014). Sixty 2014 Mason and Matella; licensee Springer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons ttribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any edium, provided the original work is properly credited. mailto:pmason@fsu.edu http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 Mason and Matella IZA Journal of Migration 2014, 3:20 Page 2 of 21 http://www.izajom.com/content/3/1/20 percent are Christians, 24% are Muslims, 13% other religions, and the rest are unaffiliated. Eighty percent of Arabs are citizens and 40% are college educated. Arab Americans are relatively affluent, with a mean income 22% above the national average. There are 2–7 million Muslim Americans (Lipka 2014; U.S. Department of State 2014). They represent the most racially diverse religious group in the America. No single racial or ethnic identity applies to more than 30% of the Muslim American population. Most (63%) are first generation immigrants, coming from at least 77 different countries. Eighty-one percent are citizens. African American Muslims, that is, adherents to the Islamic faith whose cultural roots extend back to American slavery, are variously consid- ered to be one-fifth to one-third of the total for all Muslim Americans (U.S. Department of State 2014). Muslims represent the fastest growing segment of the Arab population. Muslim American education and income are close to the national average: 24% have college degrees and median income is about $50,000. Excluding African American Muslims and focusing solely on persons with ancestral origins in predominately Muslim countries, the US Arab and Islamic populations have a high percentage of first and second generation immigrants seeking to integrate into and acculturate into the American society. An important element of their acculturation involves negotiating the white-black racial identity norm that is everywhere present in American society. For this study, America’s Arab and Islamic population consists of a heterogeneous group of people whose ancestral origins are mostly Northern Africa and Western Asia, but who also include sub-groups from Europe, sub-Saharan Africa, Cen- tral Asia, and Eastern Asia. Some are ethnic Arabs, but many are not. For example, most of the people of Iran are ethnic Persians. Some Arab and Islamic Americans have very dark skin shade, for example, North Africans and Pakistanis, but many much less so. Despite differences in ethnicity, nativity, skin shade, and religion, all persons of North African and West Asian ancestry are classified as “white” in the US Census (Office of Management and Budget 1997). Further, all are subject to anti-Muslim and anti-Arab stereotypes – even those who are neither Arab nor Muslim. But, many members of this population do not self-identify as white and recent historical events may have had a substantial effect on racial self-identity. During the 2000s Arab and Islamic American racial identity was subjected to three sets of large scale racializing events: 1) the public and private reaction to the Al Qaeda attacks of September 11, 2001 (“9/11”); 2) the US invasion of Iraq during March 19, 2003 – May 1, 2003, the controversial war that followed, and its discussion in the 2004 elections; and, 3) the racially charged US presidential election of 2008, where an African American Christian with a Muslim father and an Islamic name was elected President of the United States, as well as the congressional election of 2010. The Al Qaeda attacks were the initial exogenous events, clearly demarcating a period whereby there was a structural increase in the intensity of US stigmatization of persons with Islamic religious affiliation and Arab ethnicity. The political events of 2003–2004 and 2008–2010 reinforced the stigmatization ushered in after 9/11. This stigmatization created an exogenous reduction in the expected payoff to acculturation relative to non-acculturation. To the extent that self-identifying as white reflects Arab and Islamic acculturation into American society, we should observe a discrete reduction in the fraction of Arab and Islamic Americans self-identifying as white during the years following 2001. Mason and Matella IZA Journal of Migration 2014, 3:20 Page 3 of 21 http://www.izajom.com/content/3/1/20 The post-9/11 events are a natural experiment that corresponds closely to an exogen- ous reduction in the public’s willingness to accept Arab and Islamic acculturation into US society. This paper tests whether these racializing events altered the distribution of racial identities among Arab and Islamic Americans. We use nearly two decades of cross-sectional microdata (1996–2012) from the March Supplement to the Current Population Survey. Hence, we are able to examine Arab and Islamic racial self- identification for a substantial period before and after the epochal events of September 11, 2001. Respondent and parental nativity variables allow easy identification of a large sample of 1st and 2nd generation Americans. Although we cannot completely identify 3rd and higher generation Arab and Islamic Americans, language usage, religion, or skin shade, we do find that our results are robust with respect to ancestral origin. Separating the sample according to the timing of racializing events and comparing 2002–2012 to 1996–2001, there is a statistically significant decrease in the unconditional and condi- tional probability that Arab and Islamic Americans will self-identify as white. 2. Stigmatization after 9/11 Individuals from Greater Syria were the first major wave of Arab immigrants to the US, mostly during 1878–1948 (Cainkar 2002a; Majaj 2000). Most of these early Arab immi- grants were Christian. Assimilation and access to the full set of opportunities available in America required becoming a citizen. At the height of the first wave of Arab immigration into the US (1888–1914), one had to be white to be a citizen (except, freedmen and their descendants). Asians were explicitly excluded from whiteness and, hence, not eligible for citizenship. West Asian immigrants argued that they were Caucasian and therefore white, even if Asian. Through a series of court cases, culminating in George Dow v. United States 1915, Syrians were legally declared white. Prior to the creation of Israel in 1948 neither national politics nor foreign affairs had much effect on Arab integration into American society. After that, Arabs in the US were subjected to “political and legal discrimination and monitoring, both by the US government and by private groups (Akram 2002:90).” Nevertheless, Arab immigrants did not develop strong ethnic institutions until the late 1960s and early 1970s. So, although the political concerns surrounding American foreign policies did shape Arab and Muslim integration into American society during 1948 – 1972, Arabs and Muslims were able to integrate into American society and acculturate into white racial identity. During the period from 1972 – September 11, 2001, domestic American politics combined with foreign affairs to redefine the identities of Arab and Islamic immigrants away from their ancestral origins and more toward globalized Pan-Arab, Pan-Muslim, or “Middleastern” identity. But, the shift from ancestral identities toward globalized identities did not affect racial self-identification as white. Post-September 11, 2001 We may think of a racializing event as a macroeconomic and historically substantial social phenomenon that is outside of the gradual evolutionary change associated with social interactions; an exogenous stigmatizing action or set of actions such that there is a discrete increase in the expected payoff of own-group altruism and a discrete increase in the cost of other-group antagonism. As such, a racializing event increases an agent’s expected payoff to playing an own-group racial identity strategy rather than playing an Mason and Matella IZA Journal of Migration 2014, 3:20 Page 4 of 21 http://www.izajom.com/content/3/1/20 acculturation strategy (Darity, Mason, Stewart, 2006). Further, when the precipitating cause of a racializing event is unanticipated, such as the attacks of September 11, 2001, the ex post stigmatization is a natural experiment, exogenous to the evolutionary process of racial identity selection. Arab and Muslim Americans were subject to substantial stigmatization post-9/11. Among other areas of American life, this stigmatization occurred in federal public policies, social interactions across the country, and labor market treatment. For example, the federal public policy response to the Al Qaeda attacks involved an invasive set of government policies specifically targeting Arabs and Muslims. In reference to the period immediately following September 11, 2001, Cainkar (2002a) writes that, “Of the roughly 20 rule changes, executive orders and laws affecting immigrants or non-immigrant visitors, 15 predominantly target Arabs.” Table 1 lists some of these policies1. Shortly after the attacks more than 1,200 Muslim and Arab citizens were detained. Most of these citizens were males of Pakistani and Egyptian ancestry. None were terrorists: 100 were held on minor crimes and 500 were held on im- migration violations. The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) adopted new rules that would allow the federal government to indefinitely detain non-citizens; those detained were disproportionately Arabs and Muslims. On November 9, 2001, the DOJ mailed interview requests to 5,000 Arab and Muslim males, 18 – 33 years of age, who arrived in America after January 2000 on student, work, or tourist visas. These were nominally voluntary interviews. Most recipients complied: 5 people declined to be interviewed, 104 letters returned because of incor- rect addresses. None of the interviews supplied information on the September 11 at- tacks. The same month the US Department of State slowed the visa process for males ages 16 – 45 from Arab and Muslim countries. Further, the INS engaged in mass Table 1 Selected post-September 11, 2001 federal policies targeting Arab and Islamic Americans Date Policy or action Within weeks of September 11, 2001 1,200+ Muslim and Arab citizens were arrested and detained. September 20, 2001 New rule allowing INS to indefinitely detain non-citizens November 9, 2001 DOJ “issued guidelines for “voluntary” interviews of non-citizen men in the US on nonimmigrant visas from countries suspected of harboring terrorists” (all Arab or Muslim). November 2001 State department announced it had slowed the process for granting visas to men ages 16–45 from certain Arab and Muslim countries November 2001 INS announced mass arrests of nonimmigrant students who had violated terms of their visas National origins of students included only Iran, Syria, Pakistan, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, and Yemen December 5, 2001 DOJ directs INS round up 6,000 “young Arab men” who had ignored deportation orders. March 20, 2002 DOJ announces plans to interview another 3,000 Arab and Muslim men for “voluntary” interviews. Men are ages 18 – 33 who have entered the US since September 11, 2001. August 12, 2002 The fingerprinting and registry initiative announced for persons from select Arab and Muslim countries (Cainkar, 2002a). On May 26, 2004 Attorney General John Ashcroft and FBI Director Robert Mueller announced that the FBI would launch a new round of nationwide interviews in Muslim communities (American Civil Liberties Union, 2004). Source: Akram (2002) is the primary source for dates and items included in this table. Mason and Matella IZA Journal of Migration 2014, 3:20 Page 5 of 21 http://www.izajom.com/content/3/1/20 arrests of students who had violated the terms of their visas; all of these students were from Iran, Syria, Pakistan, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, and Yemen. By the first week of December 2001 the DOJ was once again rounding up young Arab and Muslim males for deportation. Specifically, INS rounded up 6,000 “Arab men” who had ignored deportation orders. During Spring 2002 the DOJ started “voluntary” interviews of another 3,000 Arab and Muslim males. These men were 18 – 33 years of age and had entered the US after the attacks of September 11, 2001. Cainkar (2002a) reports that on August 12, 2002 the DOJ finalized plans requiring thousands of visitors from predominately Muslim nations to provide fingerprints to the US government upon arrival in the country and to register with INS after 30 days. Otherwise lawful visitors who failed to provide fingerprints or to register with the INS could be fined or deported. During Spring 2004 the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) once again decided to round up Arabs and Muslims for “voluntary” interviews. On May 28 it was revealed that the Justice Department had targeted 5,000 Muslims and Arabs for questioning, questioning based on religion and ethnicity, and not on individualized criminal suspicion (American Civil Liberties Union 2004). The social interaction response to the Al Qaeda attacks involved nationwide violence against Arabs and Muslims. The FBI records hate crimes by race, ethnicity/national origin (principally, Hispanic or Non-Hispanic), religion, sexual orientation, and disability status. Table 2 presents total hate crimes by year, 1996 – 2011, as well as hate crimes against selected groups: whites, blacks, Hispanics, Jews, Catholics, and Muslims2. The FBI does not record hate crimes against Arabs, Sikhs, Hindus, or others that Americans often mistake for Arabs or Muslims. Hence, the hate crimes recorded in Table 2 under- represent the extent of hate crimes directed at Arab and Islamic Americans. Table 2 Hate crimes against selected groups, 1996-2011 Year White Black Hispanic Jewish Catholic Islamic 1996 12.6% 42.0% 6.4% 12.7% 0.4% 0.3% 1997 12.3% 38.8% 6.1% 13.5% 0.4% 0.4% 1998 10.2% 37.4% 6.2% 14.0% 0.8% 0.3% 1999 9.9% 37.6% 5.9% 14.1% 0.5% 0.4% 2000 10.9% 35.8% 6.9% 13.8% 0.7% 0.4% 2001 9.2% 29.8% 6.1% 10.7% 0.4% 5.0% 2002 9.6% 33.3% 6.4% 12.5% 0.7% 2.1% 2003 11.1% 34.0% 5.7% 12.4% 1.0% 2.0% 2004 10.9% 35.7% 6.2% 12.5% 0.8% 2.0% 2005 11.6% 36.7% 7.3% 11.8% 0.8% 1.8% 2006 11.5% 34.2% 7.5% 12.5% 1.0% 2.0% 2007 9.8% 34.9% 7.8% 12.7% 0.8% 1.5% 2008 9.2% 37.0% 7.2% 13.0% 1.0% 1.4% 2009 8.3% 34.6% 7.3% 14.1% 0.8% 1.6% 2010 8.7% 33.2% 8.1% 13.4% 0.9% 2.4% 2011 8.1% 33.4% 6.5% 12.4% 1.1% 2.5% Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Hate Crimes,” http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/civilrights/hate_crimes. Total is for single-bias incidents. http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/civilrights/hate_crimes Mason and Matella IZA Journal of Migration 2014, 3:20 Page 6 of 21 http://www.izajom.com/content/3/1/20 During 1996 – 2011 hate crimes more or less consistently trended downward for whites and blacks. Hate crimes against whites were 12.64% of all hate crimes in 1996 and 8.11% of all hate crimes in 2011, with total hate crimes against whites dropping from 1106 to 504. Similarly, hate crimes against African Americans decreased from 42% of all hate crimes to 33% of all hate crimes, with total hate crimes dropping from 3674 to 2076. For blacks and whites, there were only very minor increases in hate crimes between 2000 and 2001; in each case, the percentage relative to the total declined. Hate crimes against Jews have more or less remained constant during 1996 – 2011, staying near 12 – 13% of the annual total but declining from 14% of the total in 2000 to 11% during 2001. Hate crimes against Hispanics and Catholics followed a similar pattern; indeed, hate crimes against Catholics fell from 0.70% of the total in 2000 to 0.39% in 2001. By contrast, anti-Islamic hate crimes sky-rocketed in 2001 and have remained high ever since. During 1996–2000, anti-Islamic hate crimes were about 1/3 of 1% of all hate crimes. But, for the year 2001 this number rose to nearly 5%. Total anti-Islamic hate crimes rose from nearly 30 per year to 481 for 2001. Anti-Islamic hate crimes declined from 4.95% of the total in 2001 to 2.08% in 2002, but anti-Islamic hate crimes have shown no signs of returning to pre-9/11 levels. Post-9/11, there has been an increase in labor market discrimination against Arabs, Muslims, and persons of Middle-Eastern descent, especially during the years immedi- ately following the attacks. Davila and Mora (2005) examine the earnings of men in the US, ages 25–40 with ancestral origins in Arab countries, as well as Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran. All men included in their sample worked at least 20 hours per week and at least 32 weeks per year. The earnings of the Arab and Islamic American males are compared to the earnings of US born Non-Hispanic white males. Comparing the change in relative earnings between 2000 and 2002, they find that the Middle Eastern Arab earnings differential moves from −0.152 log points for 2000 to −0.584 log points for 2002, a statistically significant and substantively large decline of 0.432 log points. The African Arab differential is −0.436 log points for 2000 and −0.484 log points for 2002, a statistically insignificant and small decline of 0.048 log points. The Other (Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran) differential is −0.139 log points for 2000 and −0.429 log points for 2002, a statistically significant and substantively large decline of 0.290 log points. Further, Davila and Mora report that a state’s Arab population density had no statistically significant effect on Middle Eastern Arab earnings differential in 2000, but it did have a statistically significant and substantively large effect in 2002. Arab concen- tration had no statistically significant effect on either the African Arab coefficient or the Other coefficient. Finally, Davila and Mora find that the male earnings decline was “fairly symmetrical for workers” at all deciles of the earnings distribution. Rabby and Rodgers (2011) also find deteriorating wage and employment effects for Arab and Muslim males in their examination of post-9/11 labor market discrimination. They find no wage and employment effects for women. However, Rabby and Rodgers find that during 1999–2002, the relative natural log of wages for Arab and Muslim men declined by 0.142 points. During 1999–2004, the relative natural log of wages for Arab and Muslims declined by 0.09 points, though this difference had only a 10% level of significance. Finally, for 1999–2004, Arab and Muslim males 16 – 25 years of age had a relative employment decline of 0.379 points. Mason and Matella IZA Journal of Migration 2014, 3:20 Page 7 of 21 http://www.izajom.com/content/3/1/20 For their sample of males 21–54 years of age, Kaushal et al. (2007) find no stigmitization effect for male employment or hours worked3. However, there is a negative effect for male log of hourly earnings (9 – 12%) and log weekly wages (11 – 14%). Within the first 12 months after September 11, the male hourly wage and weekly wage effects are negative, significant, and substantively large (9 – 11%). The effects are of the same magnitudes for 13–24 and 25–36 months after the attack but are not significant. Comparing September 2004 with September 1997, there is a statistically significant weekly wage decline of 9% for men. Kaushal, et al. report that there are no statistically significant differences in results when the data are restricted to foreign born Arabs and Muslims. However, there are statistically significant different effects when the sample is separated by men living in above median intolerance states (high hate crime incidence) versus living in below me- dian intolerance states (low hate crime incidence). The negative wage effect increases by 11% in high intolerance states, while the weekly earnings effect increases by 13-14%. The wage effect is 6-7% in low intolerance states, while the weekly earnings effect is 7- 8%. But, the results for the low intolerance states are not statistically significant. Kaushal et al. (2007) find that the size and significance of wage effects are robust to using hate crimes per Arab and Muslim population or hate crimes per total population. In states with high hate crimes, September 11 is associated with a 11% reduction in the wages of Arab and Islamic men though it is associated with a 6-9% wage reduction in states with a low incidence of hate crimes. However, the difference in these point estimates is not significant. They also report evidence of a post-9/11 decline in intrastate migration of Arab and Muslim men. Nevertheless, September 11 is not associated with interstate moves from high hate crimes states to low hate crime states. Gould and Klor (2013) use per capita hate crimes, that is, total hate crimes against Muslims relative to the size of the Arab and Islamic population in a state during a given year, to examine changes in measures of assimilation among the US Arab and Islamic population. Gould and Klor argue that hate crimes increase the cost of assimila- tion, while increasing the return to investing in social capital within an Arab or Islamic American’s own community. These incentives lower rates of assimilation. Consider inter-marriage as one indicator of assimilation, which is defined as the frac- tion of Arab and Islamic Americans married to someone who does not have ancestral origins in a predominately Muslim country. Gould and Klor find that post-9/11 mean per capita hate crimes reduce Arab and Islamic inter-marriage by 8.3% and 13.1% for men and women, respectively, relative to their respective means in 20004. Collectively considered, there is evidence of extraordinary stigmatization of Arab and Islamic Americans during the post-9/11 period. Aggressive federal policies made young Arab and Islamic males subject to strong criminal suspicion and adverse legal treat- ment. Social interactions displayed a discrete and large scale increase in intolerance as anti-Muslim hate crimes rose to historical highs and never fully returned to pre-9/11 levels. After the attacks of September 11, 2001 there was an increase in the wage penalty associated with being a person of Arab and Islamic descent, along with evidence of some deterioration in employment among very young males and evidence that Arab and Islamic men were pushed out of high wage industries into low wage industries. These outcomes suggest the formation of an economy with a lower payoff to acculturation for Arab and Islamic Americans: in comparison to the pre-9/11 era, Mason and Matella IZA Journal of Migration 2014, 3:20 Page 8 of 21 http://www.izajom.com/content/3/1/20 Arab and Islamic Americans were less likely to be accepted as white and were less likely to opt for a white identity rather than a non-white identity. 3. The model Consider the random variable Y = {y1 = 0 (white), y2 = 1 (non-white)}. Per Darity, Mason, and Stewart (2006), for a sample of Arab and Islamic Americans. Pr(Y = yj|X) = E(fraction of Arab and Islamic Americans seeking to acculturate into a white identity[−], fraction of Non-Arab and Non-Islamic American ancestry groups willing to accept Arab and Islamic acculturation[−], fraction of social interactions with Arab Americans[+], free rider capacity[−], benefits of own-group racial altruism[+], costs of other-group racial antagonism[−] ) + u = E(X) + u, where the explanatory variables capture the net effect of in-group altruism and between group antagonism and E(…) is the expected payoff of alternative racial strategies. We estimate the following reduced form racial identity equation5. Pr Y ¼ yist � � ¼ Λðβ0 þ β1Agei þ β2Genderi þ β3Completed Years of Educationi þ X8 p¼1 ArrivalPeriodpγp þ X k AncestralGroupkϕk þ X s Statesθs þδAnti‐Muslim Hate Crimes‐PercentistÞ þ uist where Λ(…) is a logit specification with self-identification options j = {white (0), non-white(1)} for individual i who resides in state s during period t; “Ancestral- Groupk,” k = North Africa, sub-Saharan Africa, West Asia, Central Asia, East Asia, and Europe, a vector of binary variables; “States,” s = 1, …, S is a vector of binary variables to capture state fixed effects; “ArrivalPeriodp,” p = 1, …, 8, a vector of binary variables to capture fixed effects of immigrant cohorts arriving in US; and, “Percent Hate Crimes Against Muslimsst” is the fraction of hate crimes directed against Muslims in state s during time t. The arrival periods are Arrived pre-1965, Arrived 1965–1974, Arrived 1975–1981, Arrived 1982–1991, Arrived 1992–2001, Arrived 2002–2003, Arrived 2004–2007, and Arrived 2008–2012. The arrival periods are demarcated by business cycles or major institutional changes. Prior to the Immigration Reform Act of 1965 it was very difficult for persons living in African and Asian countries to legally immigrant to the US. Major recessions occurred during 1975–1975, 1981–1982, 1991–1992, 2001–2002, and the Great Recession that began during the third quarter of 2007. The recessions mark the beginning of a new business cycle. Recessions restructure occupations, industries, finances of governmental units, and public policies and, thus, the US demand for immigrants. Also, these were international recessions that differentially affected national economies and, hence, the supply of immigrants to the US. Immigrants living in the US for a longer period of time have a greater ability to acculturate than more re- cent immigrants; some immigrants from earlier cohorts who failed to acculturate will have left the US. Our identification strategy takes advantage of intertemporal and interstate variation in the extent of hate crimes against Muslims. Importantly, Gould and Klor (2013) find that hate crimes against Arab and Islamic Americans after 9/11 are an “exogenous surge in anti-Muslim sentiment, with variation across states that can be exploited to Mason and Matella IZA Journal of Migration 2014, 3:20 Page 9 of 21 http://www.izajom.com/content/3/1/20 examine whether the backlash affected the assimilation rate of local Muslim immi- grants (page 20).” Pre- and post-9/11 changes in the composition of ancestral origin groups are a potential source of endogeneity bias. Our identification strategy accounts for “compositional changes” by examining multiple sub-groups. Americans of Arab and Islamic descent are extremely diverse in terms of racial self-identification. As such, changes in the fraction of Arab and Islamic Americans self-identifying as white or non-white might occur because of changes in the representation of ancestral groups with persons more or less likely to self-identify as white. Respondents of North African ancestry include persons from Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, and a residual category identified as North Africa. Respondents of West Asian ancestry include persons with origins in Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Pakistan, Palestinean Territories, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey, Yemen, and a residual category identified as the “Middle East.” Europe includes individuals with ancestral origins in Albania and Kosovo. The sub-Saharan sample includes Somalia, Sudan, Senegal, and Sierra Leone. Indonesia and Malaysia are the East Asian countries, while Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Uzbekistan are the Central Asian countries. Additionally, we alter the ancestral composition of the sample. At the broadest level, the full sample includes all persons whose national origin is among the Pew Research Center’s (2011) list of countries with a majority Muslim population: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kosovo, Kuwait, Lebanon, Malaysia, Morocco, Pakistan, Palestinean Territories, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Turkey, Uzbekistan, and Yemen6. Eliminating observations from ancestral groups that were not sampled before 9/11 limits composition bias. So, the “core sample” is limited to persons affiliated with ancestral groups with CPS representation before and after September 11, 2001. Prior to 2002, the March CPS data does not identify individuals with the following ancestral origins: Albania, Algeria, Azerbaijan, Indonesia, Kosovo, Kuwait, Malaysia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somali, Sudan, Uzbekistan, and Yemen. Persons from these groups are included in the full sample but not the core sample. Third, the DOJ special registration program focused on a set of ancestral groups that were to be the subject of special government surveillance and pressure (Cainkar 2002b). These groups would have reduced incentives to acculturate. The “DOJ sample” is a sub-sample of the core sample and is limited to Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Libya, Lebanon, Morocco, Oman, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Syria7. Finally, we also control for compositional bias by separately analyzing native-born and immigrant sub-groups. Regardless of ancestral heritage, native-born persons should be more acculturated than immigrants. The parameter of interest is δ, which yields the causal effect of a change in the nation’s racial environment on the extent of acculturation of Arab and Islamic Americans. The fraction of persons selecting a white racial identity is our measure of acculturation, while anti-Muslim hate crimes as a percentage of all hate crimes captures changes in the nation’s racial environment. Mason and Matella IZA Journal of Migration 2014, 3:20 Page 10 of 21 http://www.izajom.com/content/3/1/20 4. Data and descriptive statistics The hate crimes data are an extract from the DOJ Uniform Crime Reporting Program’s master files. The data cover all US hate crime reports for 1994–2011. Hate crime data are separated into pre- and post-9/11 periods. For each state and each period, “Anti- Muslim Hate Crimes - Percent” includes all the period’s single-bias anti-Muslim hate crimes divided by the period’s total hate crimes. For 2001, the hate crime rate is calculated through September 11; hate crimes for the remainder of 2001 are calculated with 2002. The correction for 2001 and 2002 allows us to match the post-9/11 hate crimes data and the post-9/11 racial identity selection. For each state, intertemporal variation in “Anti-Muslim Hate Crimes - Percent” captures pre- and post-9/11 changes in the nation’s racial environment. For each period, interstate variation in “Anti-Muslim Hate Crimes - Percent” capture’s state specific variations in the racial environment. Hate crime data are merged with data from the 1994 – 2012 Current Population Survey (CPS) Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC), otherwise known as the March supplement. The CPS is a monthly survey of about 60,000 households (or 110,000 persons) conducted by the Census Bureau for the Bureau of Labor Statistics and is the primary source for labor force statistics in the US. It is a probability sample designed to be representative of the civilian non-institutional population of the US. The CPS sample is redesigned, and a new sample is selected after the decennial census. The March CPS provides a large annual sample size, information on ancestry, and multiple years of observation prior to September 11, 2001. Starting in 1994 the CPS continuously includes information on the respondent’s nativity and the nativity of the respondent’s parents. These variables identify native-born persons and 1st and 2nd generation immigrants from predominately Muslim countries, our sample of Arab and Islamic Americans. CPS data permit only partial identification of 3rd or higher generation Arab and Islamic Americans. Zogby (2001) notes that 10% of Arab Americans are 3rd or 4th generation Americans, but 90% are 1st or 2nd generation immigrants. The data do not permit identification of persons who speak Arabic, or who live in an environment where Arabic is spoken, or the religious affiliation of individuals. By comparison, the US Census provides a large number of observations but is available only at 10 year intervals. Moreover, the 2010 Census includes only information from the short-form and hence no information on ancestry. Previously, the 2000 Census provided information from both the short and long forms. The long form Census data are the source of the American Community Survey (ACS). Although there have been changes since implementation, the ACS has been an annual survey since 2000. It provides a large number of observations, though only one year of data prior to the Al Qaeda attacks of September 11, 2001. Beginning in January 1996, budget cuts lead to a reduction in the CPS sample size, from 56,000+ households to 50,000. But, starting in July 2001 the CPS increased its monthly sample size from 50,000+ households to 60,000+ households. These changes had virtually no effect on the characteristics of respondents in the sample or the overall composition of the sample. The 1996 changes reduced the total number of observations for small demographic groups, such as Arab and Islamic Americans, while the 2001 changes increased the total number of observations of small demographic groups. By combining multiple years of observations prior to September 11, 2001 with multiple Mason and Matella IZA Journal of Migration 2014, 3:20 Page 11 of 21 http://www.izajom.com/content/3/1/20 years of observations after this timeperiod, we get large numbers of observations of Arab and Islamic Americans both before and after the Al Qaeda attacks. Descriptive statistics are provided in Table 3. Notably, 76% of the sample self- identified as white during 1994–2001 and 68% self-identified as white during 2002–2012; overall, non-white representation increased from 1/4 to 1/3. Specifically, the percent self-identifying as black and other-race rose from 2% to 7% and from 22% to 25%, respectively. For the pre-9/11 and post-9/11 periods the percentage of all hate crimes that are directed against Muslim Americans increased by an order of five, from 0.52% to 2.53%. About one in five Arab and Islamic Americans are native-born, 68% are immi- grants arriving before or during 2001, and 11% are immigrants arriving after 2001. Figure 1 presents the fraction of individuals self-identifying as white by alternative samples for 1994–2012. There is a strong decrease in the fraction of persons self- identifying as white between March 2001 and March 2002. For the Core sample, the fraction self-identifying as white declined from 77% to 67%. There was some recovery in the fraction of Arab and Islamic Americans self-identifying as white in the years immediately after 2002; nevertheless, by 2008 a permanently lower level of white identity had set in for most groups. Figure 1 also shows that 1994 and 1995 are outliers for native- born Arab and Islamic Americans8. Native Arab and Islamic Americans are considerably Table 3 Descriptive Statistics before and after 9/11 1994-2001 2002-2012 N 4,136 13,087 Europe 0.0000 0.0230 North Africa 0.1328 0.1217 Sub-Sahara 0.0000 0.0519 West Asia 0.6676 0.5342 Arab West Asia 0.3293 0.2776 Central Asia 0.1996 0.2242 East Asia 0.0000 0.0450 Completed Years of Education 13.51 13.51 Age 39.93 41.05 Male 0.5628 0.5319 Native-born 0.2155 0.2104 White 0.7631 0.6757 Black 0.0168 0.0715 Other-race 0.2200 0.2528 Percentage Anti-Muslim Hate Crimes 0.0052 0.0253 Year of Arrival Pre-1965 0.0493 0.0284 Year of Arrival 1965-1974 0.0898 0.0503 Year of Arrival 1975-1981 0.1888 0.0930 Year of Arrival 1982-1991 0.2626 0.1867 Year of Arrival 1992-2001 0.1940 0.2682 Year of Arrival 2002-2003 0.0000 0.0440 Year of Arrival 2004-2007 0.0000 0.0767 Year of Arrival 2008-2012 0.0000 0.0424 Except Completed Years of Education and North Africa, all intertemporal differences are statistically significant at 1%. North Africa difference is statistically significant at 5 percent. Descriptive statistics are weighted averages. 0.00 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.60 0.70 0.80 0.90 1.00 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 Core Na�ve Immigrant Figure 1 Fraction of Arab and Islamic Americans self-identifying as white, alternative samples: 1994–2012. Mason and Matella IZA Journal of Migration 2014, 3:20 Page 12 of 21 http://www.izajom.com/content/3/1/20 more likely than immigrant and younger Arab and Islamic Americans to self-identify as white. Interestingly, for native Arab and Islamic Americans the post-9/11 racial environ- ment appears to have deepened a pre-existing trend to reduce self-identification as white. Regardless of sample composition and ancestral origin, racial self-identification is subject to considerable variation between and among Arab and Islamic American ancestral groups. Among Central Asians white identification declined from 26% to 13% between 2001 and 2002. For North Africans, the decrease was from 90% to 82%. West Asians are a strong majority of the data for all years. This group has a 24 percentage point increase in white self-identification between 1994 and 1996. This is a pure composition effect. For 1994 West Asia includes 125 observations and all are for Iran. West Asia includes 292 observations in 1995, but Iranians are 41% of those observations. From 1996 onward, Iranians are less than 1/3 of the West Asian sample. Accordingly, nearly all of our analysis concentrates on observations from 1996 onward. 5. Results Using the full, core, and DOJ samples, alternative logistic regressions of the racial identity equation are presented in Table 4. All individuals are 15–64 years of age and we use observations for 1996–2012. The results are robust across samples: the odds of selecting a non-white racial identity, that is, self-identifying as either other-race or black, decrease with education and age, increase by 14–21% for males, increase considerably for more recent immigrants, and increase for persons of North African, sub-Saharan, East Asian, and Central Asian ancestral origin relative to West Asians. However, the odds that Arab and Islamic Americans of European origin will select a non-white racial identity decline by 87% relative to West Asians. A one percentage point increase in hate crimes yields a 9% increase in the relative odds that Arab and Islamic Americans will select a non-white racial identity. The Table 4 Results about non-white racial identity Full Core DOJ Odds s.e. p-value Odds s.e. p-value Odds s.e. p-value Age 0.9838 0.0022 0.00 0.9871 0.0024 0.00 0.9904 0.0026 0.00 Male 1.1437 0.0558 0.01 1.1567 0.0614 0.01 1.2056 0.0692 0.00 Years of Education 0.9707 0.0074 0.00 0.9743 0.0081 0.00 0.9883 0.0091 0.20 Arrived pre-1965 1.4209 0.3425 0.15 1.1189 0.2783 0.65 1.4868 0.3992 0.14 Arrived 1965-1974 1.6787 0.2439 0.00 1.2378 0.1928 0.17 1.2253 0.2074 0.23 Arrived 1975-1981 3.2840 0.3443 0.00 2.4128 0.2697 0.00 2.1884 0.2660 0.00 Arrived 1982-1991 3.0731 0.2628 0.00 2.2666 0.2092 0.00 2.1555 0.2153 0.00 Arrived 1992-2001 4.0637 0.3139 0.00 2.9202 0.2449 0.00 2.8611 0.2639 0.00 Arrived 2002-2003 4.0817 0.5558 0.00 2.9522 0.4546 0.00 2.2671 0.3961 0.00 Arrived 2004-2007 5.4360 0.6086 0.00 3.7727 0.4865 0.00 4.0329 0.5611 0.00 Arrived 2008-2012 5.1654 0.7393 0.00 3.7182 0.5859 0.00 4.0901 0.6737 0.00 State Fixed Effects yes yes yes Europe 0.1329 0.0558 0.00 North Africa 1.8923 0.1382 0.00 2.0642 0.1530 0.00 1.2095 0.1073 0.03 Central Asia 34.90 2.1257 0.00 40.31 2.5573 0.00 36.30 2.4231 0.00 East Asia 53.80 6.8682 0.00 Sub-Sahara 32.61 3.8402 0.00 Anti-Muslim Hate Crimes 1.0914 0.0252 0.00 1.0889 0.0257 0.00 1.0895 0.0283 0.00 Constant 0.0638 0.0088 0.00 0.0628 0.0093 0.00 0.0482 0.0078 0.00 N 15,512 13,489 11,773 Chi-Square 8,673 6,962 6,569 p-Value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Pseudo R2 0.4296 0.4140 0.4357 Log likelihood −5,758 −4,926 −4,253 Individuals 15–64 years of age, for years 1996–2012. Mason and Matella IZA Journal of Migration 2014, 3:20 Page 13 of 21 http://www.izajom.com/content/3/1/20 stability of this coefficient across all three samples suggests that although individuals represented by the DOJ sample were subjected to greater governmental legal activity than other Arab and Islamic Americans, the post-9/11 national environment reduced incentives to acculturate for all Arab and Islamic Americans. Unobserved “culture effects” represent a potential endogeneity problem. If unobserved cultural effects favoring non-white identity increased after 9/11 then racial identity selection might have changed in response to these unobserved cultural factors rather than a change in the racial environment. If so, our statistical correlation between racial identity selection and anti-Muslim hate crimes contains some degree of spurious correlation. We check for unobserved cultural bias by restricting our sample to elderly persons, that is, persons age 65 and above. Compared to otherwise identical school-age and working-age persons, elderly persons have a stronger cultural attachment to Arab identity and Islamic religion than their younger counter-parts (Elver 2012). Elderly Arab and Islamic Americans are subjected to the same or higher unobserved cultural influences as younger Arab and Islamic Americans, but elderly persons have much less incentive to change their racial identity selection, to change their behaviors and actions, or to move to another location in response to exogenous changes in the racial environment. Moreover, native-born elderly Arab and Islamic Americans are more invested in the Mason and Matella IZA Journal of Migration 2014, 3:20 Page 14 of 21 http://www.izajom.com/content/3/1/20 dominant racial identity (white) than either younger or immigrant elderly Arab and Islamic Americans. Restricting our sample to individuals at least 65 years of age, the logistic odds ratio for anti-Muslim hate crimes is 0.32 with a standard error of 0.30 (p-value = 0.28) for native-born elderly Arab and Islamic Americans9. Moreover, the p-value = 0.53 for the χ2 statistic of the log-likelihood goodness-of-fit test. Similarly, the logistic odds ratio for anti-Muslim hate crimes is 0.10 with a standard error of 1.28 (p-value = 0.20) for immigrant elderly Arab and Islamic Americans. Hence, in our logistic regression evaluation, for both native-born and immigrant elderly Arab and Islamic Americans, the odds ratio for anti-Muslim hate crimes has the incorrect value (less than 1) and is statistically insignificant. These results are inconsistent with the presence of unobserved cultural effects creating endogeneity bias. As an additional check for the presence of endogeneity bias resulting from unobserved culture, we use a non-parametric difference-in-difference estimator to derive point estimates for the effect on the change in the post-9/11 national environment on racial self-identification of Arab and Islamic Americans. All Arab and Islamic Americans received the same treatment associated with the Al Qaeda attacks of 9/11, but the treat- ment is likely to be much less effective for the elderly than for working-age and school-age persons. Hence, we treat elderly Arab and Islamic Americans as the control group. Restricting our analysis to native-born persons at least 65 years of age and the core sam- ple for 1996–2001, all individuals self-identify as white (n = 187). But, for 2002–2012, 0.0223 self-identify as non-white (s.e. = 0.1479, n = 314). For the same group of immigrant Arab and Islamic Americans, 0.1154 self-identify as non-white (s.e. = 0.3202, n = 234) pre-9/11 and 0.2027 self-identify as non-white (s.e. = 0.4022, n = 893) post-9/11. Hence, among native-born elderly Arab and Islamic Americans the post-9/11 increase in non- white racial identity = 0.0223 (t-stat. = 2.67) and among immigrant Arab and Islamic Americans the post-9/11 increase in non-white identity = 0.0873 (t-stat. = 3.51). Restricting our analysis to native-born working-age and school-age persons, that is, persons 15–64 years of age, and the core sample for 1996–2001, 0.0762 of native-born Arab and Islamic Americans self-identify as white (s.e. = 0.2657, n = 616). Post-9/11 non- white self-identification is 0.2096 (s.e. = 0.4071, n = 2238). For the same group of immi- grant Arab and Islamic Americans, 0.2848 self-identify as white (s.e. = 0.4514, n = 2500) pre-9/11 and 0.3698 self-identify as non-white (s.e. = 0.4828, n = 8294) post-9/11. Hence, among native-born working-age and school-age Arab and Islamic Americans the post-9/11 increase in non-white racial identity = 0.1333 (t-stat. = 9.7), and among immigrant Arab and Islamic Americans the post-9/11 increase in non-white identity = 0.0850 (t-stat. = 8.12). The point estimates of the difference-in-difference effects for native-born and immigrant Arab and Islamic Americans are 0.1110 (t-stat. = 6.90) and −0.0023 (t-stat. = 0.09), respectively. Hence, the non-parametric difference-in-difference estimator also suggests a statistically significant increase in post-9/11 non-white racial identification among native-born Arab and Islamic Americans caused by differences in the US racial environment. Our core statistical argument is that negative changes in the nation’s racial environment after the Al Qaeda attacks of September 11, 2001 discouraged Arab and Islamic Americans from acculturating into dominant racial identity norms. The extent of Mason and Matella IZA Journal of Migration 2014, 3:20 Page 15 of 21 http://www.izajom.com/content/3/1/20 acculturation is measured by the fraction of persons selecting a white racial identity. Changes in the nation’s racial environment are captured by anti-Muslim hate crimes, which spiked to historical levels after 9/11 and did not return to their pre-2001 levels. The statistically significant relationship between racial identity selection and hate crimes reported in Table 4 controls for composition changes and culture effects, which are potential sources of endogeneity bias that might confound our ability to establish a casual relationship between racial identity selection and hate crimes. “Immigration bias” is another potential endogeneity problem. Immigration bias is selection bias arising from changes in the potential racial identity of immigrants arriving after 9/11. Specifically, the nation’s post-9/11 racial environment may not have caused changes in racial identity selection of Arab and Islamic Americans; rather, it may have caused changes in the type of immigrants coming to America – within ancestral groups, encouraging relatively more immigrants who are likely to select a non-white racial identity. Or, post-9/11 changes in the countries of origin – related to or unrelated to the Al Qaeda attacks on the US – may have changed the type of immigrants arriving in the US. If immigration bias is a source of spurious correlation, then we should observe no hate crimes effect for native-born persons. Table 5 presents selected odds ratios when the data are separated for native-born persons and immigrants and separate logistic regressions are estimated for the full, core, and DOJ samples. Figure 1 shows that immigrants are more likely to self-identity as non-white than native-born persons. The statistical results in Table 5 show that changes in acculturation for native-born persons are more sensitive to changes in the post-9/11 racial environment. In particular, a one percentage point increase in anti- Muslim hate crimes will increase the odds of non-white identity selection by 25–28% for native-born persons, but 6–7% for immigrants. These results are inconsistent with immigration bias as a source of an endogeneity problem. As an additional check for immigration bias, we estimate logistic and multi-nomial logit versions of the racial identity equation with a restricted sample of immigrants. Specifically, we use the core sample of immigrants but exclude the elderly and immi- grants arriving on or after 2002. Observations are for 1996–2012. If post-9/11 selective immigration is a source of endogeneity bias, we should not observe a hate crimes effect with this restricted sample of immigrants. For the logit specification, the odds ratio associated with anti-Islamic hate crimes is 1.0244, suggesting that among immigrants arriving before 9/11 there is a 2.4 percent increase in the odds of self-identifying as non-white during the post-9/11 period10. But, this coefficient is not significant (p-value = 0.30). The multi-nomial logit equation provides nuance. Considering anti-Muslim hate crimes, the relative risk ratio for self- identifying as other-race rather than white is 0.9642, suggesting that immigrants arriving before 9/11 are less likely to self-identity as other-race during the post-9/11 period. But, this coefficient is not significant (p-value = 0.16). The relative risk ratio for self-identifying as black rather than white is 1.3030, suggesting that immigrants arriving before 9/11 are 30% more likely to self-identity as black during the post-9/11 period. This coefficient is significant (p-value = 0.0000). Collectively considered, the magnitude and direction of the differential effects in Table 5 plus our additional results when post-9/11 immigrants are excluded from the immigration sample suggest that immigration bias is not a cause of spurious correlation between racial self-identity and hate crimes. Table 5 Non-white racial identity selection among Arab and Islamic Americans, by nativity, selected coefficients, logistic regression Native-born Full Core DOJ Coef. s.e. Odds Coef. s.e. Odds Coef. s.e. Odds Age −0.052 0.007 0.949 −0.045 0.008 0.956 −0.043 0.009 0.958 Male 0.087 0.119 1.091 0.021 0.132 1.021 0.012 0.145 1.012 Completed Years of Education 0.041 0.023 1.042 0.037 0.026 1.038 0.045 0.028 1.046 muslim_percentage_prepost 0.232 0.070 1.261 0.250 0.071 1.284 0.224 0.078 1.251 N 3,104 2,706 2,257 Chi-Square 1,137 988 930 p-Value 0.000 0.000 0.000 Pseudo R2 0.363 0.377 0.405 Log likelihood −996 −817 −683 Immigrant Full Core DOJ Coef. s.e. Odds Coef. s.e. Odds Coef. s.e. Odds Age −0.010 0.003 0.990 −0.010 0.003 0.990 −0.007 0.003 0.993 Male 0.162 0.055 1.176 0.173 0.059 1.188 0.220 0.064 1.246 Completed Years of Education −0.033 0.008 0.967 −0.033 0.009 0.968 −0.019 0.010 0.981 Muslim Hate Crimes - Percent 0.059 0.025 1.061 0.063 0.026 1.065 0.070 0.028 1.072 N 12,337 10,670 9,422 Chi-Square 7,331 5,746 5,446 p-Value 0.000 0.000 0.000 Pseudo R2 0.443 0.416 0.437 Log likelihood −4,617 −4,040 −3505 Individuals 15 – 64 years of age, for years 1996 – 2012. Complete regression also has state fixed effects, ancestral origin controls, year of arrival fixed effects in addition to variables in the table. Mason and Matella IZA Journal of Migration 2014, 3:20 Page 16 of 21 http://www.izajom.com/content/3/1/20 However, differences in the racial identity equation for native-born and immigrant Arab and Islamic Americans are revealed in Table 5. For example, gender effects are greater among immigrants. Relative to females, the odds of a male selecting a non- white identity increases by 18% (full and core samples) – 25% (DOJ sample). Gender is insignificant for native-born persons. Notably, also, highly educated native-born Arab and Islamic Americans are more likely to select a non-white identity. Sometimes this coefficient has large standard errors. Among immigrants, the odds of selecting a non-white identity decline with completed years of education. Selective relative risk ratios (RRR) from multinomial logit specifications of the racial identity equation are presented in Table 6. The upper panel use all observations for the full, core, and the DOJ samples. The middle and lower panel use only native-born and immigrant observations, respectively, to estimate each of the equations. For all equa- tions, selecting white is the base outcome with relative risks ratios presented for select- ing other-race or selecting black. The relative risk of Arab and Islamic Americans selecting other-race declines with age. Among native-born persons and immigrants, a one year increase in age will reduce the relative risk ratio by 1% and 6%, respectively. The relative risk of selecting black also declines with age, but the effect is small (less than 0.50%) and statistically insignificant in each of the DOJ equations, that is, the equations with the ancestral groups subjected to the most intense governmental actions. Table 6 Relative risk ratios of Arab and Islamic American racial identity selection, by nativity, selected coefficients Full sample Core DOJ Other race Coef. s.e. RRR Coef. s.e. RRR Coef. s.e. RRR Age −0.017 0.003 0.983 −0.015 0.003 0.985 −0.012 0.003 0.988 Male 0.164 0.055 1.178 0.165 0.060 1.180 0.192 0.063 1.211 Completed Years of Education 0.003 0.009 1.003 0.003 0.010 1.003 0.011 0.010 1.011 Muslim Hate Crimes - Percent 0.035 0.026 1.035 0.031 0.027 1.031 0.035 0.029 1.035 Black Age −0.012 0.004 0.988 −0.009 0.004 0.991 −0.002 0.005 0.998 Male 0.069 0.088 1.071 0.076 0.098 1.079 0.174 0.114 1.191 Completed Years of Education −0.093 0.012 0.911 −0.092 0.014 0.912 −0.091 0.016 0.913 muslim_percentage_prepost 0.299 0.054 1.348 0.302 0.055 1.353 0.341 0.068 1.407 All N 15,512 13,489 11,773 Chi-Square 12,692 8,641 7,748 p-Value 0.000 0.000 0.000 Pseudo R2 0.489 0.433 0.442 Log likelihood −6,642 −5,664 −4,884 Other race Coef. s.e. RRR Coef. s.e. RRR Coef. s.e. RRR Age −0.071 0.010 0.932 −0.064 0.011 0.938 −0.062 0.012 0.940 Male −0.015 0.143 0.986 −0.051 0.156 0.950 −0.084 0.168 0.920 Completed Years of Education 0.096 0.028 1.101 0.082 0.030 1.086 0.092 0.032 1.097 Muslim Hate Crimes - Percent 0.143 0.081 1.154 0.156 0.082 1.169 0.121 0.089 1.129 Black Age −0.025 0.010 0.975 −0.012 0.012 0.988 −0.005 0.014 0.995 Male 0.196 0.205 1.216 0.128 0.235 1.136 0.223 0.274 1.250 Completed Years of Education −0.033 0.042 0.967 −0.063 0.046 0.939 −0.074 0.051 0.928 Muslim Hate Crimes - Percent 0.516 0.180 1.676 0.544 0.185 1.723 0.606 0.241 1.832 Native-born N 3,175 2,819 2,351 Chi-Square 1,607 1,308 1,208 p-Value 0.000 0.000 0.000 Pseudo R2 0.424 0.419 0.446 Log likelihood −1,094 −908 −749 Full Core DOJ Other race Coef. s.e. RRR Coef. s.e. RRR Coef. s.e. RRR Age −0.011 0.003 0.989 −0.011 0.003 0.990 −0.008 0.003 0.992 Male 0.202 0.061 1.224 0.197 0.066 1.218 0.231 0.069 1.259 Completed Years of Education −0.005 0.010 0.995 −0.003 0.010 0.997 0.004 0.011 1.004 Muslim Hate Crimes - Percent 0.011 0.028 1.011 0.013 0.029 1.013 0.024 0.031 1.024 Black Age −0.008 0.004 0.992 −0.010 0.005 0.991 −0.003 0.006 0.997 Male 0.048 0.100 1.049 0.087 0.110 1.091 0.176 0.127 1.192 Completed Years of Education −0.095 0.014 0.909 −0.098 0.015 0.907 −0.097 0.018 0.907 Muslim Hate Crimes - Percent 0.267 0.058 1.306 0.268 0.059 1.307 0.310 0.072 1.363 Immigrant N 12,337 10,670 9,422 Chi-Square 10,975 7,212 6,417 p-Value 0.000 0.000 0.000 Pseudo R2 0.505 0.437 0.442 Log likelihood −5,370 −4,651 −4,051 Individuals 15–64 years of age, for years 1996–2012. Complete regression also has state fixed effects, ancestral origin controls, year of arrival fixed effects in addition to variables in the table. Mason and Matella IZA Journal of Migration 2014, 3:20 Page 17 of 21 http://www.izajom.com/content/3/1/20 Mason and Matella IZA Journal of Migration 2014, 3:20 Page 18 of 21 http://www.izajom.com/content/3/1/20 Completed years of education has a negative effect on the relative risk of selecting a black racial identity relative to selecting white, though the effect is insignificant for native-born Arab and Islamic Americans and about 9% for immigrants. The relative risk of selecting other-race is not significantly related to completed years of education for immigrants, but rises by 10% for a one year increase in completed years of education of native-born Arab and Islamic Americans. The relative risk of selecting black are positive and large for both immigrant and native-born males, but the effects are not measured with precision. The relative risk of selecting other-race declines with native-born males, but this coefficient is also insignificant. The relative risk of male immigrants selecting other-race is 22%–26% higher relative to female Arab and Islamic immigrants. A one percentage point increase in anti-Muslim hate crimes has a positive but small (1%–2%) and insignificant effect for immigrant Arab and Islamic Americans selecting other-race relative to selecting white. Among native-born persons, this coefficient suggests the relative risk ratio will increase by 13%–17%, though it has a large standard error in the DOJ equation. A one percentage point increase in hate crimes encourages a substantively large and statistically significant increase in the relative risk of Arab and Islamic Americans selecting a black identity. For immigrant and native-born Arab and Islamic Americans the relative risks of selecting a black identity increases by 31%–36% and by 68%–83%, respectively. Finally, we test for “mobility bias” as a potential endogeneity problem. Specifically, did non-white Arab and Islamic Americans disproportionately relocate to high anti-Muslim hate crimes locations during the post-9/11 period? If so, the changes in Arab and Islamic racial identity selection may not have been caused by changes in the post-9/11 racial environment. The null hypothesis in this case is that controlling for relocation, anti-Muslim hate crimes are not significantly related to Arab and Islamic racial identity selection. We test for mobility bias by identifying all persons who lived in a different region between adjacent years. The identifiable regions are New England, Middle Atlantic, East North Central, West North Central, South Atlantic, East South Central, West South Central, Mountain, Pacific, and persons who lived abroad during the previous year. Using the core sample for persons 15–64 years of age and for years 1996–2012, we exclude all persons who lived abroad or who lived in a different national region during the previous year for each year after March 2002. Both regional movements and the commission of hate crimes take time; hence, we keep in the sample both movers and stayers for March 2002. The point estimates and associated measures of statistical significance are identical to those presented for each of the logitstic and multinomial regions of Tables 5 and 6, respectively11. Accordingly, the data reject mobility bias as a potential endogeneity problem. This is consistent with Kaushal et al. (2007), who find that post-9/11 intrastate mobility of Arab and Islamic Americans declined by three per- centage points (20%) and that there is no statistical evidence that post-9/11 stigmatization is associated with interstate migration to avoid discrimination. 6. Summary and discussion This paper has investigated the following question. Did the public and private reaction to the Al Qaeda attacks of September 11, 2001, followed by the US invasion of Iraq Mason and Matella IZA Journal of Migration 2014, 3:20 Page 19 of 21 http://www.izajom.com/content/3/1/20 during March 19, 2003 – May 1, 2003 and the long war that followed and its discussion in the elections of 2004, as well as the racially charged US presidential election of 2008 and the election of 2010 stigmatize Arab ethnicity and Islamic religious affiliation? These racializing events correspond closely to an exogenous reduction in the public’s willingness to accept Arab and Islamic acculturation into US society. This approach to empirically examining racial identity as a dependent variable bypasses endogeneity problems that have not been fully addressed in the previous literature. We used inter- state changes in the percentage of hate crimes targeted at Muslims to identify exogen- ous changes in the post-9/11 racial environment. This paper finds that these stigmatizing events altered the distribution of racial identities among Arab and Islamic Americans. A one percentage point increase in anti- Muslim hate crimes is associated with a 9% increase in the odds an Arab or Islamic American will self-identify as non-white, that is, either black or other-race. The point estimates for native-born persons and immigrants are 28% and 7%, respectively. The results are robust to multiple potential sources of endogeneity bias: composition effects, immigration bias, unobserved culture effects, and mobility bias. The results are also qualified in some important ways. Namely, the sample analyzed in this paper included only Arab and Islamic Americans of with ancestral origins in predominately Muslim countries. Also, because the data do not permit complete identification of 3rd or higher generation Arab and Islamic Americans we are unable to determine if our results apply to the most socially integrated Arab and Islamic Americans. Knowing whether there has been a change in the racial self-identity of the most “Americanized” sub-groups would provide additional important information on the fluidity of racial identity. Historically, Americans think of race in terms of a black-white binary classification, based on skin shade and hypo-descent. Persons of Asian descent do fit neatly into this limited classification scheme. Recent research on Arab and Islamic identification suggests that racial categorization may be substantially more complex than envisioned by policy- makers, academics, and the general public. Finally, the empirical results uncovered in this study hold important implications for the theoretical analysis of racial identity research. Although skin tone is likely an important determinant of racial identity selection among Arab and Islamic Americans, it is of considerable consequence to note that the racializing events of 2002–2012 pushed individuals into racial minority status based on religion and linguistic ancestral origins – regardless of skin shade. Endnotes 1Unless otherwise stated, these events are extracted from Akram (2002). 2These are single-bias incidents, that is, if a hate crime is directed toward an African American Muslim, the FBI determines if the crime is directed against the individual because he is black, a Muslim, or both. There are extremely few multi-bias incidents. 3Kaushal et al. (2007) find no wage and employment effects for Arab and Muslim women. 4Additional measures of assimilation include fertility rates (higher for non-assimilated), labor force participation for women (lower among non-assimilated), and English fluency (lower among non-assimilated). Gould and Klor find that hate crimes are associated with Mason and Matella IZA Journal of Migration 2014, 3:20 Page 20 of 21 http://www.izajom.com/content/3/1/20 higher fertility rates among Arab and Islamic males and females; reduced female labor force participation; and, decreased the use of English at home as well as English proficiency. 5See Ajrouch and Jamal (2007) for a similar empirical specification. 6There were no CPS observations on individuals from following majority Muslim countries: Bahrain, Brunei, Burkina Faso, Chad, Comoros, Djibouti, Gambia, Guinea, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzistan, Libya, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mayotte, Niger, Oman, Qatar, Tajikistan, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, United Arab Emirates, and Western Sahara. 7Several DOJ ancestral groups are excluded from our sample for alternative reasons. Eritrea and North Korea are not Arab or Islamic groups. Algeria, Indonesia, Kuwait, Somalia, Sudan, Yemen are not in the core sample. There were no observations from Bahrain, Qatar, Tunisia, and United Arab Emirates. 8For 1994 and 1995 there are 14 and 96 observations, respectively, for the native-born sample. 9In order to economize on tables, we do not present the results here. The results, however, are available upon request. The elderly logistic equation is slightly different from the others. The likelihood function does not converge if we use state fixed effect; hence, we substitute US national region fixed effects. The reported results use the core sample. 10Results are not presented here, but are available from the author upon request. 11Results are available upon request. Competing interests The IZA Journal of Migration is committed to the IZA Guiding Principles of Research Integrity. The authors declare that they have observed these principles. Acknowledgements The authors would like to thank the responsible editor and anonymous referees for providing excellent editorial and substantive comments. Responsible Editor: Amelie Constant Received: 3 April 2014 Accepted: 8 September 2014 References Ajrouch K, Amaney J (2007) Assimilating to a white identity: the case of Arab Americans. Int Migrat Rev 41(4):860–879 Akram SM (2002) The aftermath of September 11, 2001: the targeting of Arabs and Muslims in America. Arab Stud Q 24(2 & 3):61–118 American Civil Liberties Union (2004) Arab and Muslim Communities Should Not be Targets of Racial Profiling. http://www.aclu.org/national-security/aclu-warns-resurrecting-voluntary-interview-program-arab-and-muslim- communities-sh. June 22, 2004 Arab America (2014) Arab Americans. David Communications, Washington, DC, http://www.arabamerica.com/contact. php, August 8, 2014 Cainkar L (2002a) “No Longer Invisible: Arab and Muslim Exclusion After September 11”, Middle East Report 224 (December 23, 2002) Cainkar L (2002b) Special Registration: A Fervor for Muslims. 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J Hum Resour XLII(2):275–308 Lewontin RC (2006) Confusions about Human Races. http://raceandgenomics.ssrc.org/Lewontin/ http://www.aclu.org/national-security/aclu-warns-resurrecting-voluntary-interview-program-arab-and-muslim-communities-sh http://www.aclu.org/national-security/aclu-warns-resurrecting-voluntary-interview-program-arab-and-muslim-communities-sh http://www.arabamerica.com/contact.php http://www.arabamerica.com/contact.php http://raceandgenomics.ssrc.org/Graves/ http://raceandgenomics.ssrc.org/Lewontin/ Mason and Matella IZA Journal of Migration 2014, 3:20 Page 21 of 21 http://www.izajom.com/content/3/1/20 Lipka M (2014) New Muslim American Council Aims to Measure a Diverse Community. Pew Research Center, http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/03/20/new-muslim-american-council-aims-to-measure-a-diverse- community/, August 8, 2014 Majaj LS (2000) Arab-Americans and the meanings of race. 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New York: Zogby International doi:10.1186/s40176-014-0020-9 Cite this article as: Mason and Matella: Stigmatization and racial selection after September 11, 2001: self-identity among Arab and Islamic Americans. IZA Journal of Migration 2014 3:20. Submit your manuscript to a journal and benefi t from: 7 Convenient online submission 7 Rigorous peer review 7 Immediate publication on acceptance 7 Open access: articles freely available online 7 High visibility within the fi eld 7 Retaining the copyright to your article Submit your next manuscript at 7 springeropen.com http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/03/20/new-muslim-american-council-aims-to-measure-a-diverse-community/ http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/03/20/new-muslim-american-council-aims-to-measure-a-diverse-community/ http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/fedreg_1997standards/ http://iraq.usembassy.gov/resources/information/current/american/statistical.html http://iraq.usembassy.gov/resources/information/current/american/statistical.html Abstract 1. Introduction 2. Stigmatization after 9/11 Post-September 11, 2001 3. The model 4. Data and descriptive statistics 5. Results 6. Summary and discussion Endnotes Competing interests Acknowledgements References << /ASCII85EncodePages false /AllowTransparency false /AutoPositionEPSFiles true /AutoRotatePages /PageByPage /Binding /Left /CalGrayProfile (Dot Gain 20%) /CalRGBProfile (sRGB IEC61966-2.1) /CalCMYKProfile (U.S. Web Coated \050SWOP\051 v2) /sRGBProfile (sRGB IEC61966-2.1) /CannotEmbedFontPolicy /Error /CompatibilityLevel 1.4 /CompressObjects /Tags /CompressPages true /ConvertImagesToIndexed true /PassThroughJPEGImages true /CreateJobTicket false /DefaultRenderingIntent /Default /DetectBlends true /DetectCurves 0.1000 /ColorConversionStrategy /LeaveColorUnchanged /DoThumbnails true /EmbedAllFonts true /EmbedOpenType false /ParseICCProfilesInComments true /EmbedJobOptions true /DSCReportingLevel 0 /EmitDSCWarnings false /EndPage -1 /ImageMemory 1048576 /LockDistillerParams true /MaxSubsetPct 100 /Optimize true /OPM 1 /ParseDSCComments true /ParseDSCCommentsForDocInfo true /PreserveCopyPage true 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work_pfepccogxjdnrhhqpy7hds5cna	----	THE US COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: CHALLENGING THE STATUS QUO THE US COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: CHALLENGING THE STATUS QUO By Leonard A. Leo and Don Argue S ince the United States was founded, freedom has been its cornerstone, and religious freedom—the right to accept or reject a religion or belief system according to one’s conscience, and practice it freely and peacefully—has been a pivotal right.1 Freedom of religion or belief is the first liberty to appear in the First Amendment to the US Constitution. For billions of people abroad, religion is a powerful source of identity, meaning, and purpose, and the freedom to practice one’s own religion or belief system remains paramount. Yet according to a Pew Research Center study released in August 2011, 70 percent of the world’s population dwells in countries where religious freedom is highly restricted.2 Throughout much of the globe, religious freedom and related human rights are egregiously and routinely violated. Created by the 1998 International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA), the US Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF), on which we serve, reports on countries whose governments engage in or tolerate severe abuses, such as detentions, disappearances, imprisonment, torture, and mass murder. USCIRF makes independent recommendations to the President, Secretary of State, and Congress on behalf of reform. Religious freedom abuses—whether caused by government action or inaction—should not go unnoticed or unchallenged. This is not just an opinion of the United States or a reflection of its First Amendment, but a basic tenet of international human rights law. In 1948, the international community created and adopted the landmark Universal Declaration of Human Rights, including Article 18, which states that: Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance. Leonard A. Leo served as Chair of the US Commission on International Religious Freedom from 2009 to May 2012 and was originally appointed as a Commissioner in 2007 by President George W. Bush. He is currently the Executive Vice President of the Federalist Society for Law & Public Policy Studies. He has been active in several international forums, including service as a US delegate to the UN Commission on Human Rights. Don Argue served as Vice Chair of the US Commission on International Religious Freedom from 2010 to March 2012 and was originally appointed as a Commissioner in 2007 by Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid. He served on the President’s Advisory Committee on International Religious Freedom during the Clinton Administration, and was also appointed by President Clinton to the first official delegation of US religious leaders to visit China to discuss religious freedom. He is currently Chancellor of Northwest University. the review of faith & international affairs | 67 D ow nl oa de d by [ D r D en ni s R . H oo ve r] a t 12 :2 2 03 O ct ob er 2 01 2 Since 1966, the governments of 167 countries have signed the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), a binding treaty that includes language similar to Article 18 of the 1948 Declaration. Nations around the world also affirmed the 1981 Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, as well as other instruments that confirm that freedom of thought, conscience, and religion or belief is a universal and fundamental human right. Standing for religious freedom around the world is a humanitarian, moral, and legal duty. It is also a practical necessity, one that is crucial to the security of the United States and the post-9/11 world. Time and again, research has found that countries that honor and protect religious freedom have more vibrant political and democratic institutions, rising economic and social well-being, diminished tension and violence, and greater overall stability. In contrast, nations that trample on or fail to protect basic human rights, including religious freedom, provide fertile ground for poverty and insecurity, war and terror, and violent, radical movements and activities. The assassinations in 2011 of two high-ranking government officials in Pakistan for their opposition to blasphemy laws remind us of how religious extremism and religious freedom violations are destabilizing a critical partner and creating a climate of impunity by fueling hatred and violence against both Muslims and non-Muslims. In today’s battle against terrorismand extremist ideology, the key is to offer a competing—and compelling—vision of freedom, peace, and prosperity, and a foreign policy that places a premium on the freedom of thought, conscience, and religion/belief that advances this effort. Supported by America’s culture and heritage, backed by international law and treaty, and made indispensable by critical security needs, the right to freedom of religion or belief for all deserves the US government’s strong and steadfast support. USCIRF Activities It was in response to violations of this right that Congress passed IRFA in 1998, which created USCIRF, as well as the Office for International Religious Freedom in the US Department of State and the position of Ambassador-at-Large for International Religious Freedom. As the only government commission of its kind in the world, USCIRF was structured by Congress as an independent and bipartisan federal government commission with the capacity to speak candidly and act effectively in pursuit of its mission. The Commission leverages its strengths in a variety of ways. It gathers information at home and abroad, issues annual reports to the executive branch and Congress, and works in conjunction with advocates of human rights and religious freedom in every arena, including congressional offices on both sides of the aisle. The Commission also advises and works closely with the White House and State Department officials, members of academia, and religious and civil society leaders, and it has participated in multilateral meetings with the United Nations, European Union, and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). Each year, along with its annual report, USCIRF provides policy recommendations to the US government in accordance with IRFA. The Act requires the President, who has delegated this function to the Secretary of State, to designate as “countries of particular concern” (CPCs) those nations that commit systematic, ongoing, and egregious violations of religious freedom. These nations qualify as the world’s most severe religious freedom violators. The Commission recommends countries that, in its view, meet the CPC threshold. For 2012, USCIRF recommended that the following countries be designated as CPCs: Burma, China, Egypt, Eritrea, Iran, Iraq, Nigeria, North Korea, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam. RELIGIOUS EXTREMISM AND RELIGIOUS FREEDOM VIOLATIONS ARE DESTABILIZING A CRITICAL PARTNER AND CREATING A CLIMATE OF IMPUNITY the us commission on international religious freedom 68 | fall 2012 D ow nl oa de d by [ D r D en ni s R . H oo ve r] a t 12 :2 2 03 O ct ob er 2 01 2 Along with CPC recommendations, the Commission also provides recommendations to the US government for dealing with nations placed on USCIRF’s Watch List. The list includes countries where religious freedom violations engaged in or tolerated by their governments do not meet the CPC threshold but are serious enough to require close monitoring. The Watch List provides advance warning of negative trends that could develop into severe violations of religious freedom, thereby providing policymakers with the opportunity to engage early, increasing the likelihood of preventing or diminishing violations. As of 2012, the following countries were placed on USCIRF’s Watch List: Afghanistan, Belarus, Cuba, India, Indonesia, Laos, Russia, Somalia, and Venezuela. USCIRF Highlights from the Past Decade Since its inception, USCIRF has made important strides in advancing freedom of religion and related human rights. First and foremost, the Commission has succeeded in raising the overall profile of religious freedom with the US executive branch and Congress through its letters, public statements, hearings, travel, and participation in international meetings and conferences. Working with Congress, USCIRF’s policy recommendations and findings have been acknowledged and incorporated into dozens of bills and resolutions over the past decade. Working with federal agencies, the Commission has collaborated, shared information, and provided advice on matters relating to religious freedom. USCIRF also has met with high-level officials, including foreign dignitaries from numerous countries, to press the case for the right to religious freedom. The Commission has been cited frequently in the media, and has been quoted or referred to in articles, editorials, and opinion pieces in leading publications and broadcast news reports. Second, USCIRF has played a positive role on key issues relating to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion or belief. Among these issues is reforming US refugee and asylum policy, specifically the United States government’s treatment of asylum seekers fleeing severe violations of religious freedom and related human rights. In 2005, USCIRF released a study containing recommendations on how the federal Departments of Homeland Security (DHS) and Justice could improve the treatment of asylum seekers in expedited removal.3 In 2007, the Commission issued a report card grading the response of these agencies.4 Following publication of the 2005 study, the Justice Department announced some measures to protect legitimate asylum seekers and improve the way the immigration courts and the Board of Immigration Appeals were performing. Based on USCIRF’s recommendations, DHS appointed its first Senior Refugee and Asylum Policy Advisor in February 2006. In 2009 and 2010, through its Immigration and Customs Enforcement agency (ICE), DHS announced changes in its parole determination policies and conditions of detention that also reflected the Commission’s recommendations. Another key issue is the so-called “defamation of religions” resolution through which the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) repeatedly has sought a global consensus for an international law against blasphemy. Years of effort by USCIRF, the State Department, members of Congress, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) helped bring about a marked decrease in the support for the resolution between 2008 and 2010. As a result, in 2011 the UN Human Rights Council instead adopted consensus resolutions on “combating intolerance, negative stereotyping and stigmatization of, and discrimination, incitement to violence, and violence against persons based on religion or belief.”5 The new resolutions properly focus on protecting individuals from discrimination or violence, instead of religions from criticism; protect the adherents of all religions or beliefs, instead of favoring one religion; and do not call for legal restrictions on peaceful expression, but positive measures, such as education and outreach. The new resolutions call for criminalization only in the case of incitement to imminent violence, which is the US First Amendment standard. USCIRF welcomes this new approach, but remains concerned that the OIC has not abandoned its global anti-blasphemy efforts. The United States and other UN member leonard a. leo and don argue the review of faith & international affairs | 69 D ow nl oa de d by [ D r D en ni s R . H oo ve r] a t 12 :2 2 03 O ct ob er 2 01 2 states that support universal human rights must remain vigilant. Besides its successes in drawing greater attention to freedom of religion or belief and in advancing key issues relating to this right, a third way in which USCIRF has moved the ball forward has been its responses to specific countries that are severe violators of this freedom. In Sudan, the world witnessed a significant triumph for religious freedom when a free and fair referendum took place in the south in January 2011 and led to the birth of South Sudan in July. The referendum resulted from the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), signed in 2005, which ended the 22-year North–South civil war that the Khartoum regime triggered by its militant attempts to impose its radical version of Islam on southern Sudanese Christians and animists. The Commission had long made Sudan a critical issue. In 2001, USCIRF successfully recommended that the President create the position of a special envoy to coordinate efforts to bring peace to Sudan. The efforts of the special envoy helped lead to the CPA. In recent years, USCIRF called for Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s direct engagement in the implementation of the CPA and was instrumental in strengthening working ties between the government of South Sudan and religious groups that proved essential for facilitating voter education and turnout during the referendum process. The Commission also helped bring together Southern Sudanese with the US judiciary and other public and private US institutions to help begin the process of providing capacity-building and technical assistance to an independent South Sudan. Another example is North Korea. The Commission released two reports that provided unique information on the religious freedom violations of one of the world’s most notorious human rights abusers.6 Featuring extensive interviews with refugees, the reports affirmed that North Korea’s radical hostility to religion played a major role in the torture, imprisonment, and execution of Christian refugees repatriated from China, and revealed North Korea’s draconian attempts to halt Protestantism’s spread from China. This was the latest chapter in a grim story of how North Korea’s once-vibrant religious life has been supplanted by a quasi-religious cult of personality centered on its dictatorial leader and his son. In Iran, in response to the government’s systematic, ongoing, and egregious violations of religious freedom, USCIRF has called repeatedly for the US government to identify Iranian officials and entities responsible and impose travel bans and asset freezes on those individuals. Previously, no sanctions against Iran had targeted human rights violations; the Commission worked with congressional offices to develop such sanctions. These sanctions are included in CISADA, the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act (PL 111-195). CISADA requires the President to submit to Congress a list of Iranian government officials, or persons acting on their behalf, who are responsible for human rights and religious freedom abuses; bars their entry into the United States; and freezes their assets. The executive order President Obama issued in September 2010 sanctioned eight Iranian officials for having committed serious human rights abuses after the Iranian presidential election in June 2009. Five more Iranian officials —along with three governmental entities—have since been sanctioned, bringing the total number of sanctioned officials to 13. Prior to the passage of CISADA, the Commission had recommended sanctions for a number of Iranian officials, including eight of the 13 sanctioned thus far. Concerning Russia, USCIRF was one of the first official US bodies to call attention to the steady rise in violent hate crimes against members of certain ethnic and religious communities, including members of religious minority communities, from Muslims and Jews to Jehovah’s Witnesses. This effort helped lead to official Russian recognition of hate crimes as a major problem. The Commission also was the first US government entity to undertake an in- depth study of Russia’s 2006 NGO law and its wide-ranging effects on religious communities. In Saudi Arabia, in February 2012, King Abdullah pardoned Hadi Al-Mutif, an Ismaili Muslim man who had been one of the longest- held religious prisoners in the world since being jailed in 1994 on charges of apostasy. For years, USCIRF had highlighted his case and advocated the us commission on international religious freedom 70 | fall 2012 D ow nl oa de d by [ D r D en ni s R . H oo ve r] a t 12 :2 2 03 O ct ob er 2 01 2 with high-level Saudi officials and the US government for Al-Mutif’s release. In addition, due to USCIRF’s engagement, six young Shi’a Muslims in Saudi Arabia were released in February 2011. USCIRF raised concerns about these individuals during its January/February 2011 visit. The six were released on February 23, 2011 after a year in detention without charges, despite a limit of six months for pretrial detention under the Saudi criminal procedure code. The Commission has focused sustained attention on extremist references in Saudi textbooks, which teach hatred toward other religions and, in some cases, promote violence. Funding originating in Saudi Arabia is used globally to finance radical religious schools and mosques, hate literature, and other endeavors that support religious intolerance and, in some instances, violence toward non-Muslims and disfavored Muslims. One of the countries reportedly impacted by this funding is Pakistan. In November 2011, USCIRF released a groundbreaking report, “Connecting the Dots: Education and Religious Discrimination in Pakistan.”7 This study of Pakistani students and teachers in madrassas (religious schools) and public schools revealed widespread attitudes of religious intolerance, which fostered societal discrimination against the nation’s religious minority communities. These attitudes of intolerance can lead to acts of violence, such as the assassination in January 2011 of Salman Taseer and in March 2011 of Shahbaz Bhatti, government officials who were ardent defenders of human rights and religious freedom and staunch opponents of Pakistan’s blasphemy law. It was USCIRF that had introduced the US government to Minister Bhatti and his vital work. After Minister Bhatti was slain, the Commission worked with congressional offices to have a resolution introduced in his honor that pressed for improvements on these issues. Conclusion By any measure, the battle to promote and protect the right to freedom of religion or belief around the world remains an uphill one. From its inception, USCIRF has been charged with the essential mandate of highlighting abuses and recommending positive steps the US government can take in response. In creating USCIRF, Congress unveiled a model that fits the mandate —a bipartisan entity that operates as a truly independent commission within the federal government. In December 2011, Congress reaffirmed its support by reauthorizing the Commission, ensuring that USCIRF will continue to have an independent voice in helping raise the importance of religious freedom and related human rights to US foreign policy, offering timely advice, and bringing greater accountability to the process. In the struggle for freedom, USCIRF and like- minded organizations have a critical advantage in today’s information age. With instant communication available through the Internet and social media platforms, the calls for protection of this fundamental right are being amplified as never before. They are being heard across nations and continents, demanding an end to the status quo of repression and impunity. The inescapable message they bring is clear: religious freedom matters, as do other human rights, and must be honored. It is time for governments around the world to hear and heed this vital message, for the sake of freedom and dignity, prosperity, and security. v 1. Portions of this essay are adapted from our article “International Religious Freedom: Why it Matters and How to Protect It,” published in the summer 2011 issue of International Affairs Review. 2. Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, “Rising Restrictions on Religion.” August 9, 2011 http://www.pewforum.org/Government/Rising-Restrictions- on-Religion(2).aspx 3. USCIRF, “Report on Asylum Seekers in Expedited Removal.” 4. USCIRF, “Expedited Removal Study Report Card: Two Years Later.” 5. UN Human Rights Council, Resolution 16/18. 6. See USCIRF, “‘Thank You, Father Kim Il Sung’: Eyewitness Accounts of Severe Violations of Freedom of Thought, Conscience, and Religion in North Korea,” and USCIRF, “A Prison Without Bars: Refugee and Defector Testimonies of Severe Violations of Freedom of Religion or Belief in North Korea.” Beginning in 2009, USCIRF partnered annually with The Database Center for North Korean Human Rights on annual religious freedom status reports. 7. USCIRF, “Connecting the Dots: Education and Religious Discrimination in Pakistan.” leonard a. leo and don argue the review of faith & international affairs | 71 D ow nl oa de d by [ D r D en ni s R . H oo ve r] a t 12 :2 2 03 O ct ob er 2 01 2 http://www.pewforum.org/Government/Rising-Restrictions-on-Religion(2 http://www.pewforum.org/Government/Rising-Restrictions-on-Religion(2 References Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life. “Rising Restrictions on Religion,” August 9, 2011. Online at http://www.pewforum.org/Government/Rising- Restrictions-on-Religion(2).aspx (accessed May 1, 2012). UN Human Rights Council. Resolution 16/18, adopted March 24, 2011. Online at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/G11/127/27/PDF/ G1112727.pdf?OpenElement (accessed May 1, 2012). US Commission on International Religious Freedom. “Report on Asylum Seekers in Expedited Removal,” February 8, 2005. Online at http://www.uscirf.gov/ index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1892 (accessed May 1, 2012). US Commission on International Religious Freedom. “‘Thank You, Father Kim Il Sung’: Eyewitness Accounts of Severe Violations of Freedom of Thought, Conscience, and Religion in North Korea,” December 2005. Online at http://www.uscirf.gov/images/stories/pdf/nkwitnesses_wgraphics.pdf (accessed May 1, 2012). US Commission on International Religious Freedom. “Expedited Removal Study Report Card: Two Years Later,” February 6, 2007. Online at http://www. uscirf.gov/news-room/press-releases/284-february-6-2007-uscirf-expedited-removal-study-report-card-two-years-later.html (accessed May 1, 2012). US Commission on International Religious Freedom. “A Prison Without Bars: Refugee and Defector Testimonies of Severe Violations of Freedom of Religion or Belief in North Korea,” March 2008. Online at http://www.uscirf.gov/images/A_Prison_Without_Bars/prisonwithoutbars.pdf (accessed May 1, 2012). US Commission on International Religious Freedom. “Connecting the Dots: Education and Religious Discrimination in Pakistan,” November 2011. Online at http://www.uscirf.gov/images/Pakistan-ConnectingTheDots-Email(3).pdf (accessed May 1, 2012). the us commission on international religious freedom 72 | fall 2012 D ow nl oa de d by [ D r D en ni s R . H oo ve r] a t 12 :2 2 03 O ct ob er 2 01 2 http://www.pewforum.org/Government/Rising-Restrictions-on-Religion(2 http://www.pewforum.org/Government/Rising-Restrictions-on-Religion(2 http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/G11/127/27/PDF/G1112727.pdf?OpenElement http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/G11/127/27/PDF/G1112727.pdf?OpenElement http://www.uscirf.gov/index.php?option=com_content&amp;task=view&amp;id=1892 http://www.uscirf.gov/index.php?option=com_content&amp;task=view&amp;id=1892 http://www.uscirf.gov/images/stories/pdf/nkwitnesses_wgraphics.pdf http://www.uscirf.gov/news-room/press-releases/284-february-6-2007-uscirf-expedited-removal-study-report-card-two-years-later.html http://www.uscirf.gov/news-room/press-releases/284-february-6-2007-uscirf-expedited-removal-study-report-card-two-years-later.html http://www.uscirf.gov/images/A_Prison_Without_Bars/prisonwithoutbars.pdf http://www.uscirf.gov/images/Pakistan-ConnectingTheDots-Email(3 
work_p4zyrpkne5ag7b5ifmhq5smvrq	----	Cultivating the Niche CULTIVATING THE NICHE: A STUDY OF THE ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES OF STANDARDS-BASED CERTIFICATION ORGANIZATIONS IN THE U.S. ORGANIC FOOD INDUSTRY A Dissertation Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Cornell University in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy by Brandon H. Lee January 2007 © 2007 Brandon H. Lee CULTIVATING THE NICHE: A STUDY OF THE ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES OF STANDARDS-BASED CERTIFICATION ORGANIZATIONS IN THE U.S. ORGANIC FOOD INDUSTRY Brandon H. Lee, Ph.D. Cornell University 2007 Standards-based certification organizations (SBCOs) as a source of market order have been largely neglected as a topic of study by social scientists, particularly when compared to other sources of order such as the state and the market. This dissertation presents three papers that examine the origins of SBCOs, their impact on broader regulatory structure, and how they influence market entry and exit rates in the U.S. organic food industry. The first paper, “Fences and Gates: An Inductive Case Study of Standards- Based Certification Organizations in the U.S. Organic Food Industry,” employs qualitative evidence to develop a typology of SBCOs and then quantitatively assesses what facilitating conditions led to the founding of distinctive SBCO forms in U.S. states. Findings from this paper suggest that the codification of standards and certification processes initially served as a “fence” that established a boundary around the concept of organic but which subsequently served as a “gate” by which industry outsiders entered the organic industry and engendered endogenous field-level change, significantly altering the trajectory of the market. The second paper, “Mechanisms Generating Variation: Regulatory Change in the Organic Food Industry,” empirically examines how different SBCO forms influence variation and evolution in the content of industry law. This approach moves beyond extant dichotomous conceptualizations of regulation that dominate institutional analyses of regulatory structure. The results of this paper provide answers to questions of when and under what conditions private governance organizations influence variation and evolution of industry regulation. The third paper, “Certifying the Harvest: The Role of Standards-Based Certification Organizations in Market Entry and Exit Dynamics,” examines how SBCOs, through key processes of creation of standards, advocacy, verification of compliance, and endorsement, influence patterns of market entry and exit of organic producers. Drawing on state-level and firm-level data sets spanning a 15-year period (1986–2000), I show that SBCOs stimulate entry into the market and that the certification they provide to individual firms inhibits market exit and moderates the competitive effects of increasing form density. iii BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH Brandon Lee received his undergraduate degree in political science and anthropology from Brigham Young University in 1999. During his undergraduate studies, he spent a year conducting ethnographic research on land tenure, indigenous legal systems, and linguistics in Spanish-speaking communities in Mexico and K’iche-speaking communities in Guatemala. After graduation, he directed student field study programs in Mexico and Guatemala and served as a consultant to the energy industry. He received his M.S. in organizational behavior from the School of Industrial and Labor Relations at Cornell University in 2003 and received his Ph.D. in the same field and school in January 2007. He recently accepted a position at London Business School as an assistant professor of strategic and international management. Brandon is married to Josie Lauritsen; their son, Noah Benjamin, was born in June of 2004. iv DEDICATION For Josie v ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The completion of this dissertation would not have been possible without the support of a number of people and organizations. I first acknowledge the key role played by the late Bob Stern in recruiting me to Cornell and encouraging me to pursue a Ph.D. Working as his research assistant in the late stages of his life both inspired and humbled me. More recently, I have benefited greatly from the help of my committee, Pam Tolbert, David Strang, and Wes Sine. I owe much to Pam Tolbert for becoming my chair late in the process. Her keen insight, encouragement, and empathy have significantly shaped my own goals as a scholar. I especially thank Wes Sine for his incredible attentiveness to my intellectual and professional development and, more important, for his desire to be a true friend in every sense of the word. I am grateful to friends who, on a day-to-day basis, provided needed encouragement, humor, and insight. In particular, I thank Shad Morris, Ben Dunford, Ariel Avgar, Matt Allen, Ed Carberry, Shon Hiatt, Marco Hauptmeier, and Sangchan Park. I especially thank my office mate of several years, Kelly Patterson, for many “productive” hours of work and good times. I am deeply indebted to my parents and siblings for their love and ongoing encouragement. I also acknowledge the hard work of Stephen DeGrow, a smart and meticulous research assistant. I thank The Community Alliance with Family Farmers for providing me the directories that have served as the basis for many of the analyses in this dissertation. Many thanks go to the Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation. Their generous funding provided the means for much needed research assistance. Finally, I must give most thanks to my wife, Josie, for her boundless love and patience. Her contribution to my life and this dissertation is central. I also acknowledge the birth and joy of my son, Noah, which brought urgency and clarity to the purposes behind this dissertation. vi TABLE OF CONTENTS BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH.........................................................................................iii DEDICATION .............................................................................................................. iv ACKNOWLEDGMENTS .............................................................................................. v TABLE OF CONTENTS ..............................................................................................vi LIST OF FIGURES .....................................................................................................viii LIST OF TABLES ........................................................................................................ ix PAPER 1: FENCES AND GATES: AN INDUCTIVE CASE STUDY OF STANDARDS-BASED CERTIFICATION ORGANIZATIONS IN THE U.S. ORGANIC INDUSTRY................................................................................................. 1 INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................. 1 THE ORGANIC FOOD MOVEMENT AND INDUSTRY GOVERNANCE...... 5 Local Nonprofit SBCOs ................................................................................... 10 OCIA ................................................................................................................ 12 State Certification Organizations ..................................................................... 13 A TYPOLOGY OF SBCOs.................................................................................. 15 Dimension 1. Source of Solidarity ................................................................... 16 Dimension 2. Authority Structure .................................................................... 21 Dimension 3. Social control/social relations .................................................... 24 Dimension 4. Incentive structure...................................................................... 26 Dimension 5. Specialization ............................................................................. 28 DATA AND METHODS ..................................................................................... 30 Modeling SBCO Foundings ............................................................................. 34 RESULTS............................................................................................................. 35 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION .................................................................. 42 REFERENCES ..................................................................................................... 46 PAPER 2: MECHANISMS GENERATING VARIATION: REGULATORY CHANGE IN THE ORGANIC FOOD INDUSTRY ................................................... 52 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................ 52 THEORY .............................................................................................................. 55 EMPIRICAL CONTEXT ..................................................................................... 60 HYPOTHESES..................................................................................................... 64 DATA AND METHODS ..................................................................................... 71 RESULTS............................................................................................................. 77 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION .................................................................. 82 APPENDIX A: CODING SHEET FOR ORGANIC FOOD LAWS AND AMENDMENTS .................................................................................................. 91 REFERENCES ..................................................................................................... 96 PAPER 3: CERTIFYING THE HARVEST: THE ROLE OF STANDARDS-BASED CERTIFICATION ORGANIZATIONS IN THE ORGANIC FOOD INDUSTRY .. 103 INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................. 103 vii THEORY AND HYPOTHESES........................................................................ 107 SBCOs and Standards Creation...................................................................... 108 SBCOs and the Advocacy of Standards ......................................................... 110 SBCOs and Processes of Verification ............................................................ 111 Endorsement/Certification.............................................................................. 114 CONTEXT ......................................................................................................... 116 DATA AND METHODS ................................................................................... 118 Dependent Variables ...................................................................................... 120 Independent Variables .................................................................................... 120 Control Variables............................................................................................ 121 ANALYSES ....................................................................................................... 122 RESULTS........................................................................................................... 124 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION ................................................................ 130 REFERENCES ................................................................................................... 133 viii LIST OF FIGURES FIGURE 1.1: CUMULATIVE NUMBER OF SBCOs, 1970–2000 .............................. 9 FIGURE 1.2: GEOGRAPHIC PATTERNING OF SBCOs, BY FORM..................... 11 FIGURE 2.1: NUMBER OF ORGANIC FOOD LAWS AND AMENDMENTS PASSED, 1970–2000 ....................................................................................... 65 FIGURE 2.2: BOXPLOTS OF SIMILARITY SCORES, BY YEAR ......................... 80 ix LIST OF TABLES TABLE 1.1: IDEAL-TYPICAL DIMENSIONS OF COLLECTIVIST- DEMOCRATIC AND BUREAUCRATIC ORGANIZATIONS* ................... 16 TABLE 1.2: DIMENSIONS OF STANDARDS-BASED CERTIFICATION ORGANIZATIONAL FORMS........................................................................ 30 TABLE 1.3: CORRELATION MATRIX FOR OCIA FORM-FOUNDING ANALYSES ..................................................................................................... 37 TABLE 1.4: CORRELATION MATRIX FOR STATE SBCO FORM-FOUNDING ANALYSES................................................................... 38 TABLE 1.5: CORRELATION MATRIX FOR LOCAL SBCO | FORM-FOUNDING ANALYSES................................................................... 39 TABLE 1.6: LOGISTIC REGRESSION MODELS OF SBCO FORM FOUNDING ..................................................................................................... 40 TABLE 2.1: STATES PASSING A LAW AND NO SUBSEQUENT AMENDMENTS .............................................................................................. 78 TABLE 2.2: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND CORRELATIONS FOR REGULATORY INERTIA ANALYSIS ......................................................... 83 TABLE 2.3: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND CORRELATIONS FOR REGULATORY ELABORATION ANALYSIS............................................. 84 TABLE 2.4: REGULATORY INERTIA ANALYSIS, BY STATE (GENERALIZED LEAST SQUARES FIXED EFFECTS REGRESSION MODELS) ........................................................................................................ 85 TABLE 2.5: REGULATORY ELABORATION ANALYSIS, COUNT OF AMENDMENTS, BY STATE (ZERO-INFLATED NEGATIVE BINOMIAL MODELS) ................................................................................... 86 TABLE 3.1: CORRELATIONS FOR MARKET ENTRY........................................ 125 TABLE 3.2: CORRELATIONS FOR MARKET EXIT ............................................ 126 TABLE 3.3: NEGATIVE BINOMIAL REGRESSION MODELS OF MARKET ENTRY, 1986–2000....................................................................................... 127 TABLE 3.4: MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD ANALYSIS: ORGANIC FOOD MARKET EXIT, 1986–2000 ......................................................................... 128 1 PAPER 1: FENCES AND GATES: AN INDUCTIVE CASE STUDY OF STANDARDS-BASED CERTIFICATION ORGANIZATIONS IN THE U.S. ORGANIC INDUSTRY INTRODUCTION Recent theoretical and empirical work underscores the central role that audiences1 play in the construction and maintenance of form identity, product categories and classification structures (Zuckerman 1999; Pólos, Hannan, and Carroll 2002; Rao, Monin and Durand 2003, 2005). Organizational scholars argue that the identity of a particular organizational form/population “inheres in the expectations, assumptions, and beliefs held by agents . . .” and that “ownership of an organization’s identity resides within an organization’s audience rather than within the organization itself” (Hsu and Hannan 2005:476). These audiences, therefore, wield substantial power to influence the fate of organizational populations. For example, Zuckerman (1999) demonstrated that firms that are not easily categorized by securities analysts into pre-existing industry classifications are viewed as less legitimate and suffer a discount reflected in their stock price. Complementing Zuckerman’s study, Hsu (2006) shows how the evaluative schemata developed by individual movie critics shape their own subsequent decisions regarding the movies they review. As these schemata become more coherent, movies belonging to favored genre categories tend to receive greater critical attention. Wade, Porac, Pollack, and Griffin (2006) explore similar processes associated with Financial World’s ranking of exemplary CEOs. They find that while stockholders initially value these rankings (positive abnormal stock returns following the announcement of the awards), over time the effects dissipate and become negative in succeeding months. CEOs materially benefit from the award yet 1 “Audiences” refer to “collections of agents with an interest in a domain and control over material and symbolic resources that affect the success and failure of the claimants in the domain” (Hsu and Hannan 2005:476). 2 face heightened expectations about future performance, and CEO compensation continues to improve as long as return on equity remains positive. However, if return on equity turns negative, compensation for awarded CEOs is lower than for CEOs who never won an award for an equivalent level of performance. Despite sustained interest in how such third parties impact the fate and dynamics of organizational forms, there is scant research on the origins of such audiences and the classification structures they employ (but see Bowker and Star 1999). As Pólos et al. note, “The framework we propose . . . requires simply that such codes come into existence and that controllers of valued resources use these codes in granting and withholding access to the resources . . . we simply assert that certain social codes exist and get enforced, without specifying who does the enforcing and how” (2002:95–96, emphasis added). To address this theoretical gap, this paper explores the origins and variation of standards-based certification organizations (referred to hereafter as SBCOs) in the U.S. organic food industry. By SBCO, I mean an organization whose primary purpose is to create and promote standards, verify the compliance of other organizations to those standards, and formally acknowledge that an organization has met the standards through the conferral of a certification, endorsement, or accreditation. Engaging in collective action to develop intra-industry standard-setting bodies as a way to establish a product’s identity and stabilize exchange is an important strategy for entrepreneurs seeking legitimacy for their nascent industry. These bodies “set the bar” and evaluate whether or not firms meet that standard. Such accreditation/certification processes are central to continued maintenance of well-established fields such as health care (Ruef and Scott 1998; Scott et al. 2000), higher education (Zajac and Kraatz 1993; Casile and Davis-Blake 2002), nonprofits (Litwack and Hylton 1962; Singh, House, and Tucker 1986), and college sports (Stern 1981; Washington 2004). Although there is a 3 significant amount of research on the legitimation processes of accreditation, there is relatively little work that considers the origins of such bodies in nascent markets. To uncover key conditions/antecedents and mechanisms that lead to the establishment of SBCOs, I employ both qualitative and quantitative evidence to develop an inductive case study of the U.S. organic food industry from 1973 to 2000. I gathered data on all founding events of organic SBCOs in the United States from 1970 to 2000. This time frame captures the founding of the first SBCO and tracks all other SBCOs founded through 2000, when federal standards dramatically changed the market landscape. This context provides a suitable arena to examine the founding and evolution of the SBCO as a primary source of industry governance2 over an extended time period. Using a multi-method approach, I draw on archival data sources and over 20 interviews with organic growers and SBCO employees (past and present, including presidents and directors). Adapting Rothschild and Whitt’s (1986) typology of collectivist-democratic and bureaucratic organizations, I first illustrate how SBCOs within the organic food industry varied along five key dimensions: source of solidarity, authority structure, social control/relations, incentive structure, and specialization. After categorizing these various forms of SBCOs, I focus on the temporal and geographic patterning of SBCO founding and quantitatively assess what types of facilitating conditions predict the founding of each form of SBCO. While a substantial body of research has examined temporal variation in broader types of industry governance structures and their impact on industry and organizational dynamics (Campbell, Hollingsworth, and Lindberg 1991; Ruef and Scott 1998; Scott 2 Governance structures refer to “all those arrangements by which field-level power and authority are exercised involving, variously, formal and informal systems, public and private auspices, regulative and normative mechanisms” (Scott et al. 2000:172–173). Given the central importance of SBCOs to markets and yet the paucity of social science research on their influence on organizational fields (Arhne et al. 2000), I bracket my discussion of governance in this paper to SBCOs. 4 et al. 2000), it has neglected the possibility and implications of spatial variation in their emergence and importance. While this work counters institutional determinism by emphasizing temporal variation and contingency, there is additional theoretical value in exploring the antecedents and facilitating conditions that generate unique types of governance organizations in geographically differentiated locales. The findings of this paper are consistent with extant research that demonstrates how the emergence of new types of economic activity and the infrastructure that supports them often require and always benefit from a supportive ideological base (Stinchcombe 1965; Aldrich and Fiol 1994; Rao, Morrill, and Zald 2000; Scott et al. 2000:174; Simons and Ingram 2004). In the context of the U.S. organic food industry, early organic growers collectively organized to distinguish organic from ordinary food by developing a set of processes and practices of how organic food should be cultivated. They collectively acted to codify these practices in standards and certification procedures that allowed them to create a “discursive opposition” (Campbell 2005:51) to conventional agricultural practices and products by which they demarcated a solid jurisdictional boundary around the organic food category. In this way, early SBCOs and the standards and certification processes they developed served as “fences” differentiating their products from conventionally produced food in the marketplace. However, this extensive theorization (Strang and Meyer 1993) and subsequent codification led to the diffusion and transposition of the organic concept to different locales that became instantiated in a host of unique forms of SBCOs, enabling the entry of “movement outsiders” to begin to populate the market and engender change among all participants (including incumbents) in the marketplace. In this way, SBCOs served as “gates”—providing a means by which outsiders to the organic movement could access, participate in, and significantly alter the trajectory of the growing market. 5 This understanding provides insight into questions of endogenous field-level change in institutional theory (Greenwood and Suddaby 2006). I find that geographically differentiated locales provide seedbeds for the emergence and development of unique intra-industry governance arrangements. As these arrangements diffuse and are “translated” (Czarniawska-Joerges and Sevon 1996; Campbell 2005) to fit local social and institutional contexts, they become sources of institutional variation and contestation as spatially dispersed pockets of economic activity are knit together through industry growth and consolidation. These processes provide insight into how industry-generated governance structures facilitate “market incursions into previously protected fields” (e.g., Zelizer 1978; Thornton and Ocasio 1999; Ahmadjian and Robinson 2001; Lounsbury, Ventresca, and Hirsch 2003), which represent a “pressing need for research” (Davis and Marquis 2005:341). In the next section, I focus on the development and origins of third-party certification organizations in the organic food industry. I then use quantitative data to illustrate the factors and antecedents that drive heterogeneity in SBCO organizational form. I conclude with a discussion of the various ways that the study of SBCOs can expand our understanding of institutional change. THE ORGANIC FOOD MOVEMENT AND INDUSTRY GOVERNANCE The early North American organic movement built upon earlier food reform movements such as the early vegetarian and whole wheat crusades, the pure food campaigns, and the back-to-the-land movement.3 Its chief advocate in the United States was J. I. Rodale, a publisher-turned-organic farmer. In the early 1940s, Rodale purchased a farm in Pennsylvania and, with no experience as a farmer, drew heavily on the work of a cohort of scholars and farmers4 who believed that agriculture was 3 See chapter three of Peters 1979 for a review of these movements. 4 Prominent pioneers of organic agricultural thought and practice and their writings include: F. H. King, Farmers for Forty Centuries, or Permanent Agriculture in China, Korea, and Japan, 1911; Rudolph 6 better understood and practiced through biological and ecological principles. Important organic farming practices used and tested by Rodale included green manuring, drainage techniques, composting, and soil aeration. These practices were grounded in the belief that all waste must return to the soil to replenish necessary nutrients and minerals, creating an unbroken chain of health from waste to soil to plant to animal to human. To advocate organic farming practices more widely, Rodale launched a magazine in 1942 called Organic Farming and Gardening. The magazine served as a “meeting place” where readers exchanged ideas regarding their organic agriculture experiences (Rodale 1942:14). Rodale also founded the Soil and Health Foundation (which later became the Rodale Institute), through which he published highly influential books that became key sources of information for pioneering organic farmers. In his 1948 book, Rodale attempted to formalize the concept of organic agriculture by issuing a creed of “organiculturists,” outlining the fundamental principles and practices of organic agriculture: Organiculturists are: . . . opposed to artificial or chemical fertilizers . . . make compost by Sir Albert Howard’s Indore process . . . see soil as a living, breathing entity which requires that crops are rotated and that land must lie fallow at regulated intervals . . . observe the Law of Return, restoring to the soil all plant residues that came from it . . . reject the use of poison sprays in orchards and on farm crops . . . are not in favor (at least at this time) of the use of human excrement or sewage sludge on food crops . . . and are trusted with the sacred trust of producing food that will impart health to the people who consume it. As a patriotic duty he assumes the obligation to preserve the fertility of the soil, a precious heritage that he must pass on, undefiled and even enriched, to subsequent generations. (p. 68) Rodale’s early efforts to generate interest and support for organic food were largely unsuccessful. In the first year of publication, Rodale’s magazine had only ten Steiner, Agriculture: A Course of Eight Lectures, 1924; Sir Albert Howard, An Agricultural Testament, 1940; and Lady Eve Balfour, The Living Soil, 1943. 7 subscribers. However, the virtues and value of organic food became increasingly salient as broader movements surrounding environmentalism drew the public’s attention to the dangers of pesticides and other agricultural chemicals (Carson 1962). During the 1960s and 1970s, organic agriculture and its associated practices resonated with an increasing audience of gardeners, farmers, and consumers. By 1960, subscriptions to Rodale’s publications had risen to 260,000. By 1980, subscriptions to Organic Gardening reached above 1,3000,000. As interest in organic farming grew, maintaining the integrity of the organic concept became paramount for movement farmers and consumers. As a 1972 article in Organic Gardening and Farming emphasized, “We’ve all got to raise our voices and let the rest of the country know that organic is our word, that it means something to us, and that we are going to defend it to the best of our ability” (Rodale 1972:44). In an effort to fend off misrepresentation and fraud, initial solutions offered by movement insiders included growing the food yourself, buying from a trusted farmer, or enquiring about the retailer’s definition of organic and his relationship to the farmer. Despite these short-term solutions, Rodale (1971) realized that the development of a viable organic market would require a more systematic verification method: “Eventually, a foolproof organic certifying procedure will have to be developed, or the commercial market for unchemicalized food will not develop” (p. 74). In 1971, under Rodale’s supervision, Organic Gardening and Farming (OGF) initiated a pilot organic certification program in California. The program consisted of obtaining a commitment from each farmer to build or maintain three percent humus content in the soil within five years. An organic seal was developed to identify the commitment, commodity, and location of the farmer. Soil analyses, residue analyses, and personal inspections were also part of the program (Allen 1971:81). The OGF certification program grew to include regional groups in twenty states. After two 8 years, OGF phased out the certification program because it was believed that “certification programs are best developed by organic farmers and the people directly associated with the distribution and consumption of their harvests, on a grass-roots, regional basis” (Foote and Goldstein 1973:89). Rodale’s pilot program was discontinued in 1973. Following the discontinuation of this program, a myriad of certification organizations cropped up across the U.S. during the next thirty years. While significant variation existed in these organizations in terms of their geographic scope, motivations, organizational structures, target clientele, and procedures, their primary functions included the establishment of standards and the certification and verification of “organically grown” claims from farmers. This involved extensive paperwork, annual and spot inspections, various crop and soil sampling, payment of dues and fees, and an agreement to abide by practices and rules set by the certification organization. Over time, certification organizations achieved significant normative, extralegal power to deal with those growers not measuring up to the standards. That power was manifest in SBCOs’ ability to prohibit a certain crop to be sold as certified organic, to impose fines, and to decertify a grower not in compliance with the standards and required procedures. In these matters, the burden of proof nearly always rested on the suspected grower (Guthman 2004). As such, SBCOs clearly retained substantial power not only in defining the parameters of what organic included, but also in determining who could actively be a player in the emerging market. Early standards creation and certification efforts in the 1970s were organized around local nonprofits that primarily represented the interests of small, organic farmers (whose products and anticapitalist ideologies were largely ignored by mainstream agribusiness). As the organic food market grew in the 1980s, the Organic Crops Improvement Association (OCIA) entered the certification field by developing 9 an international, federated structure that facilitated the entrance of larger farms and agribusiness interests into the emerging market. Finally, in the mid-1980s (and particularly in the early 1990s), state governments established their own certification agencies, and private certification organizations began to populate the field.5 The emergence and growth of SBCOs in the U.S. organic food industry exhibited fairly distinct temporal and spatial patterning. Figure 1.1 shows the temporal emergence of SBCOs in the U.S. organic food industry from 1970 to 2000 and Figure 1.2 shows their spatial emergence. FIGURE 1.1: CUMULATIVE NUMBER OF SBCOs, 1970–2000 5 Information on private certification organizations was not readily forthcoming, and although they captured much of the certification market (particularly the certifier Quality Assurance International), data were not available on the states in which these for-profit certifiers operated. Furthermore, during the study period, only six for-profit certification organizations populated the field, making statistical analysis difficult. 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 Year N um be r of S B C O s State SBCO Local SBCO OCIA 10 In the remainder of this section, I draw upon interviews and historical archival data sources to describe these three categories of certification organizations. Local Nonprofit SBCOs By local nonprofits, I refer to SBCOs that were incorporated as nonprofit organizations at the intrastate level and were formed by local organic growers. These organizations almost exclusively certified growers within their state of founding (although some in later years of the industry began to certify beyond the borders of their founding state). Following the termination of the OGF program, the California Certified Organic Farmers (CCOF) became the first organization to independently certify growers. In the first newsletter published by CCOF (1974), the founders of the organization wrote, We feel that the primary purpose of our organization is to rid the organic food industry of the phonies. As an organization and as individuals, we are dedicated to this purpose. By offering to the public organically grown food that has been certified by our organization, we feel that in due time all consumers will be able to walk into health food or natural food stores and be certain that he is buying organically grown food which it is so labeled. Our individual dedication to this organization is not for personal profit or glory, but merely for the protection of the consumer and the honest members of this industry. To this cause we have all devoted much time, effort and money and for this cause we will continue. (p. 2) After the creation of CCOF, nonprofit certification organizations formed from local networks of farmers throughout the United States. As shown in Figure 1.2, all certification organizations in the United States before 1985 were local nonprofits. The earliest certification organizations appeared in California, Oregon, Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Michigan, and Minnesota. Over time, more local nonprofits were founded throughout the Northeast, primarily along the eastern seaboard and then moving south and west. 11 1980 1990 2000 LEGEND No SBCO Local SBCO OCIA Chapter State SBCO FIGURE 1.2: GEOGRAPHIC PATTERNING OF SBCOs, BY FORM 12 Local nonprofit SBCOs absorbed much of the risk and costs associated with experimentation and illegitimacy in the early moments of the industry. Their collectivist ideals served as a sustaining motivation in the face of limited economic benefit accruing to early growers. These local nonprofit SBCOs were institutional entrepreneurs that established the identity, legitimacy, and accountability of the organic industry, guaranteed the quality and value of its products and services, and increased the integrity and reliability of growers. They accomplished this through the creation of a set of standards and verification procedures that subsequently diffused and were transposed in other locales by a variety of actors. OCIA Although founding generation members of social movement organizations may be attached to a broader social movement and its ideology, second generation members often tend to be oriented more toward the goals and services of only a particular organization, rather than those of the movement at large (Rothschild and Whitt 1986). In a similar fashion, a “second generation” form of SBCO exhibited marked differences from its early local nonprofit predecessors. In 1985, the Organic Crop Improvement Association (OCIA) grew out of Organic Farms, Inc., a wholesale distributor in Beltsville, Maryland, that sought a summer source of fresh vegetables that could not be grown in the South. To this end, OCIA established two pilot programs, one in Vermont and one in Quebec. As part of the programs, OCIA demanded certification from growers, funding their participation for the first year with the understanding that growers would then take responsibility to run the program thereafter. OCIA was to then serve as an accreditation body over these and all other existing certification programs, including local nonprofits. However, local nonprofits declined the proposition in order to maintain control over their own standards and certification processes. 13 Although the program stalled in Vermont (for reasons that will be explicated in more detail below) the program caught on in Quebec and then spread to Ontario. By 1986, OCIA had 35 members (CAAP 1986). Shortly thereafter, OCIA grew significantly, establishing chapters and affiliates throughout various parts of the United States and Canada, focusing on serving international markets for certified organic food primarily in Europe and Japan. By 1989, OCIA had established chapters in 11 states and boasted a membership in North, Central, and South America of over 6,000 producers. In the United States, OCIA established a strong presence in Illinois, Indiana, and Nebraska, and then fortified its influence and presence in other Midwestern states. By 2000, OCIA had 35 chapters in 16 states. Much of the later growth of the organization came from the founding of multiple chapters in the same state.6 State Certification Organizations Beginning in 1985, state bureaucracies forayed into organic certification. In 1985, Washington state lawmakers gave the director of the Department of Agriculture the prerogative to create and modify a materials list7 and to be responsible for the enforcement of the law. This was the most power given to a state department of agriculture to this point in the industry. Exercising that power in 1986, the Washington Department of Agriculture created the first state-run certification organization in the United States, a move that subsequent state departments of agriculture would follow, beginning with Texas. Public pressure and the recognition of the potential revenue for the state played important roles in initiating these two states’ involvement in the organic food market. 6 The majority of OCIA-dominated states had multiple chapters (11 out of 16). 7 A materials list refers to materials listed as either allowed, restricted, or prohibited in the production, processing, and handling of organic food. 14 The Washington program materialized as a result of grassroots efforts by the grower-run Tilth Producer’s Cooperative (TPC) that previously certified organic producers. In 1985 this group, along with a local five-store retail consumers’ cooperative, began pushing for an organic food law. Two years later, additional legislation mandated the establishment of a certification program under the Washington Department of Agriculture (Friedman and Fishman 1989). In contrast to Washington, whose legislation was driven by industry participants, the Texas Department of Agriculture was proactive, taking the initiative to establish a state organic program. To determine the potential of the organic food market, the Texas Department of Agriculture (TDA) conducted a survey and found that there existed a potential $35 million organic market in Texas, with 90 percent of the products coming from California. To capture some of that market, the TDA implemented a comprehensive certification program to encourage Texas producers to farm organically in order to supply their own state’s demand for such products. The Texas legislature approved $45,000 for the development of the program, which served as a model for other state programs (Friedman and Fishman 1989). The efforts of the Washington and Texas Departments of Agriculture set the stage for other states to take a proactive role in the industry. As shown in Figure 1.1, state agencies did not get involved in certification until 1986—long after local nonprofit SBCOs had laid the groundwork by developing standards, providing models of how to organize, and establishing markets. After the initial founding of the first state-sponsored certification organizations in Washington and Texas, a spate of other state organization foundings occurred. By 1993, 8 additional states had established state certification organizations. By 2000, that number reached 14. The geographic pattern of state certification foundings shows that most state certification organizations were founded primarily in the Rocky Mountain States, the 15 Southwest, and the South Central states of Oklahoma, Texas, and Louisiana. Figure 1.2 shows that state certification organizations were largely founded in states that had neither local nonprofit nor OCIA chapters. A TYPOLOGY OF SBCOs Although each of the three forms of certification organizations discussed above performed the same functions of setting industry standards and verifying compliance to those standards, they varied in important ways. This variance and its relationship to the temporal and spatial history of the industry is theoretically significant because the geographic and temporal patterning indicates the way in which SBCOs first served as jurisdictional “fences” but then later and in different geographic locations served as “gates” by which growers distinct from those pioneering the industry entered the industry. To develop the distinctions between SBCO forms, I adapt Rothschild and Whitt’s (1986) typology of ideal types of bureaucratic and collectivist-democratic organizations to highlight five important dimensions (source of solidarity, authority structure, social control/relations, incentive structure, and specialization) along which differences in these forms can be identified. Table 1.1 outlines and describes these dimensions. As the foregoing analysis of these dimensions illustrates, the three major categories of SBCOs in the organic food industry (local nonprofit, OCIA, and state- level certifiers) adhere roughly to a continuum in which the ideal types of bureaucratic and collectivist-democratic are at each end. It should be emphasized that this typology is a continuum, given that few organizations completely embody purely bureaucratic or collectivist-democratic ideals. What follows is a narrative analysis of each of the five dimensions as they apply to the three major categories of SBCOs in the organic food industry. These dimensions then offer a point of departure for examining the conditions that predict the presence of one form of SBCO over another. 16 TABLE 1.1: IDEAL-TYPICAL DIMENSIONS OF COLLECTIVIST- DEMOCRATIC AND BUREAUCRATIC ORGANIZATIONS* Dimensions Collectivist-democratic Bureaucratic Source of Solidarity Ideological; strength contingent upon the number and intensity of adherents to ideology Self interest; strength of solidarity contingent upon shared material interests Authority Structure Resides in the collectivity as a whole; rules are minimized and developed by democratic means Resides in individuals by virtue of their incumbency in office and/or expertise; universal, fixed rules are developed and implemented by office incumbents Social Control/Relations Social control based on personalistic and/or moral appeals Concept of community is paramount. Relations are personal and intrinsically valuable Social control achieved through supervision, standardized rules and sanctions Concept of impersonality is paramount. Relations are role based and instrumental Incentive Structure Normative and solidarity incentives prevail over material incentives Remunerative incentives prevail over norms and solidarity Specialization Functions are generalized and organization often provides additional services beyond its officially stated purpose Functions are specialized and segmented * Adapted from Rothschild and Whitt 1986 Dimension 1. Source of Solidarity For many industry pioneers, participation in the early organic movement was largely predicated upon ideological grounds. The source of solidarity for these participants was a set of shared ideals-turned-practices, many of which were part and parcel of larger countercultural movements of the time. Many of the “political” enthusiasts were hangers-on from the 1960s, initially student, civil-rights, and environmental activists, turned now to the land. These enthusiasts frequently thought of themselves as organizers, bent on mobilizing 17 the organic movement to a new political self-consciousness . . . These advocates were articulate in other visions of the movement, including anarchist, Marxist, communal, and decentralist ideals. This “politics”, vaguely stated, left many questions unanswered, but it created a distinct identity for many enthusiasts. (Peters 1979:12) One industry insider describes the countercultural landscape of the time as follows: What else was happening back in the early mid 70s? The back-to-the-land movement. So you had a lot of communes. You had a lot of people that were militantly opposed to capitalism who were trying to set up an alternative production and distribution system, not necessarily Marxist, but not necessarily pursuing profit either. They were trying to figure out how to fulfill a higher objective. Paramount among them was the Sunburst Commune in Santa Barbara County. Amigo Bob came out of that. A whole lot of people who are still in organic farming today, got started on communes. And were trying to figure out ways to keep organic food moving without having to deal with the Man. That is really hard to explain to people about what that meant for organizational stability and accountability and all that. (Interview, June 20, 2006) The “‘politics’, vaguely stated” and “the higher objective” mentioned in these quotes refer to the primary source of solidarity for early movement actors. Based on a critique of mainstream systems of production, distribution, and consumption, the ideological impetus for the organic food movement was a commitment to all- encompassing economic, social, and ecological ideals. An early industry publication articulates these ideals as follows: The wheel on the back cover . . . depicts a wholistic alternative to a corporate industrial food system. Though it might be argued that food is food regardless of the system by which it is produced, the differences between the commercially and ecologically accountable systems to food and agriculture are major. Differences in motivation, rationale and worldview manifest themselves in the way land and people are mobilized, how food is produced and how foods are distributed and ultimately utilized. By definition, the corporate industrial food system is profit motivated. This places a priority on immediate results and accountability measured in terms of economic gains. What follows is a stress on maximum yield stimulated by intensive use of capital and technology 18 accompanied by exploitation of energy and displacement of people. Though considerations for conservation, ecology and social implications are best alluded to, they are secondary and rhetorical at best. In contrast, a system of food and agriculture motivated more by ecological and social considerations over profit accountability is based on a different set of assumptions which expresses itself in stressing optimum over maximum yields; techniques that value human and biological inputs over technological ones; energy conservation over energy exploitation; methods that are labor intensive more than capital intensive, especially where the later is limited and former is abundant. On the time scale, the concern is with posterity as well as immediate gains. The implications of such contrasting regard for resources, people and food command serious attention. (Fujimoto 1976:v) As the earliest certifiers in the industry, composed primarily of industry pioneers, local nonprofit SBCOs shared the ideological source of solidarity of the early movement at large. Seeking to protect their ideals and the products they embodied, local nonprofits formed to promote and endorse conceptions of “organic” that were consistent with early movement trends. In emotive, dogmatic language, CCOF, the first local nonprofit SBCO, clearly alluded to its ideological roots in its first newsletter. . . . more and more energy and dollars are spent every year in devitalizing, refining, and generally rendering useless and sometimes dangerous the food the world so desperately needs. This same sort of “wisdom” takes our most precious resource—the soil, and violates and rapes it in every way possible. It turns this source of life both literally and figuratively into concrete and sees to it that fewer and fewer people have access to it . . . To re-make our lives with unprocessed and organically grown foods is no longer a fad or life style, it’s becoming a necessity. The more people that we can expose to these foods, the better their lives will become, and the better chance we will all have for survival. In many ways it’s a dark picture, but at the same time it’s the most exciting challenge we have yet to face. (Hillyard 1974:14) 19 While the motivations of individual members varied,8 local nonprofits that followed continued to found largely on the ideological groundwork of movement pioneers such as CCOF. In contrast to local nonprofits, OCIA members’ participation in the organic industry was unequivocally rooted in market-related concerns. Many of the OCIA farmers I interviewed suggested that their transition from conventional to organic agriculture was driven by economic necessity/opportunity. One farmer in Montana reported, “I wouldn’t be farming today if it weren’t for organics . . . I got into organics because I was broke and had a lot of new land that was virgin sod . . . I got into it purely because of economics” (Interview, May 22, 2003). Another OCIA- certified farmer from Iowa reported that her transition to organic was simply a consequence of trying to cut costs as interest rates escalated during the late 1980s. To save money, she began to reduce the amount of chemicals she used on the land. This slow reduction allowed her to eventually transition into organic farming, which ultimately prevented her farm from going bankrupt. This motivation was echoed by a farmer in Ontario who stated, “I don’t think we were taking advantage of a consumer 8 A recent critique of the literature that examines growers’ motivations for practicing organic agriculture suggests that the organic/conventional divide that casts organic farmers as purely ideological and conventional farmers driven only by economic profit is a false dualism (Guthman 2004). Guthman argues that the dichotomy neglects how motivations shift as a result of individual agronomic and financial success and/or broader changes in the growth of the organic market. Nonetheless, it is undisputed that farmers that entered agriculture as organic farmers indeed identify very strongly with the idea that organic agriculture is a countercultural ideology. It is also generally true that smaller growers more closely identify with social movement ideals, whereas larger farms are (or were) nearly always operate under a more business-oriented logic (Guthman 2004). With regard to local nonprofits and their founders, I find a similar phenomenon: those that founded these organizations tended to be much more committed to the idealism underpinning organic agriculture than were other types of certification organizations. However, it is naïve to think that local nonprofit SBCOs did not permit farmers to be certified who were driven primarily by economic motivations. For example, one informant, in describing the membership motivations of the local nonprofit SBCO that she was involved with, suggested that there was “a mix between people who got into it because of philosophical/ideological reasons and people who were really practical, business oriented; there wasn’t a surfeit of business-oriented people, but some of them became that way when they realized that was the only way it was gonna work, you know what I mean? [laughing]” (Interview, June 28, 2006). 20 that was interested in organics. We were trying to recover more of our costs of production by not using chemicals” (Interview, June 16, 2005). OCIA farmers not only certified to address cost issues of production, they also wanted to satisfy the demands of downstream buyers and wholesalers in the value chain. A Kansas grain grower explained that he initially resisted certification because he did not want to have to deal with the bureaucracy. He noted, “Back in the day, it was just a phone call and an affidavit. This was all that certification consisted of” (Interview, May 28, 2003). However, he finally decided to certify in 1984 when he sent a millet crop to Arkansas, where it was not accepted. It was at that point he decided to become certified. Similarly, an Ontario farmer recounted that growers in his OCIA chapter and those in the Saskatchewan chapter came to third-party certification by necessity: “Their customers in Europe needed some guarantee that some kinds of standards were being used in certification. From Saskatchewan, a lot of wheat was going to Europe. They got involved in OCIA because of marketing opportunities . . . their market dictated to them that they had to do that” (Interview, June 16, 2005). He further noted, “I think their market was dictating to them to have a third-party certification more so than the farmers themselves were” (Interview, June 16, 2005). As quotes from OCIA farmers indicate, the market-driven necessities of conventional farmers at the time allowed OCIA leadership to draw on a clear-cut economic source of solidarity to establish and promote their certification efforts. As one farmer puts it, the transition from conventional to organic farming was made easier because the OCIA representative “was really a salesman. He got people enthused and farmers had heard that organic oats were a good deal” (Interview, June 10, 2003). The ideological source of solidarity that was so evident in local nonprofit certification, and the organic movement at large, was conspicuously diminished for 21 OCIA and its “conventional, run-of-the-mill farmers” (Interview, June 16, 2005), as one informant called them. The contrasting sources of solidarity were described by an OCIA farmer: “I started going to the Anaheim food show in ’92 and that was a trip— that was a trip. The people in that show, I mean, I had never seen these kind of weird people in my life, really in my life—it was something.” When asked if OCIA had “weird people” in their ranks, she said, “Some, but very few. Most came from people who were just about to lose their farms and this [organic farming] was something that will maybe work . . . and I know people that it has saved their farm (Interview, July 23, 2004). In contrast to local nonprofit SBCOs and OCIA, each of which had clearly evidenced sources of solidarity, state SBCOs embodied more of the ideal bureaucratic organization. According to Weber (1978), modern bureaucracy is established on the basis of rational-legal authority. Consistent with Weber’s conception of bureaucracy, state SBCOs exhibited ideal-typical characteristics such as rule and role formalization, impersonal and instrumental relations, valorization of remunerative incentives, and advancement based on achievement. These bureaucratic elements obviated the need for other sources of solidarity (ideological, regional, etc.) for the continued maintenance of state SBCOs; they had the institutional mandate and financial backing of the respective state governments. Dimension 2. Authority Structure Rothschild and Whitt note that the “collectivist-democratic organization rejects bureaucratic justifications for authority. Here authority rests not with the individual . . . but resides in the collectivity . . . collectives seek not the transference of power from one official to another, but the abolition of the pyramid in toto: organization without hierarchy” (1986:51). Although local nonprofit SBCOs were not as opposed to organizational hierarchy as the ideal-typical collectivist organization, 22 they exhibited a clear preference for and commitment to decentralized and democratic decision-making. For example, one of the founders of the Northeast Organic Farmers Association of Vermont, a local nonprofit, described the organization’s process for writing standards: “We had a committee and we drafted some standards and extracted some comments and feedback from people and it went on a few rounds and then we agreed upon it. We had a pretty strong commitment to a democratic, open process” (Interview, June 28, 2006). Commenting on the structure of authority in the California Certified Organic Farmers (CCOF), Guthman (2004) states, “There was a strong countercultural element within CCOF and among nonaffiliated organic growers as well, evidenced in the idiom they used in reference to their annual meetings: ‘tribal gatherings.’ This idiom was barrier enough to other, less countercultural growers for a long time. In addition, the original CCOF growers were notably resistant to formality; it was not until the late 1980s that CCOF received proper tax status from the Internal Revenue Service and filed its first tax returns” (p. 112).9 CCOF strove to have members vote and control the establishment of standards and direction of the organization. A former employee of two local nonprofit SBCOs stated that all early certification organizations had a very similar commitment to decentralized and democratic decision-making processes (Interview, June 20, 2006). In contrast to the organizational structure of local nonprofit SBCOs that preserved collective decision making as much as possible, as an international certifier, OCIA established chapters in multiple states that had six or more members and then appointed unpaid chapter presidents to be responsible for completing all of the paperwork associated with certification and inspection for each farmer. OCIA members were actively recruited to join chapters, and OCIA would establish a chapter 9 Nonetheless, they did see the need for some structure: “While it is possible for short-lived groups to operate without defined levels of authority, all organizations that intend on being around for a while must set down their delineation of authority” (Cain 1984:4). 23 only if a minimum number of farmers would certify. While the chapters completed all of the paperwork and conducted inspections, decisions about standards were made by the international body. One of the founders describes his justification for a federated structure: . . . one of the things I noticed was that everyone was developing their own standards and my idea was to have a standard that was universal across the country . . . My idea was to take the chapters and form an international body where all of the chapters belonged and everyone worked on the same standards. We met in Albany [New York] and there was quite a number of different groups represented there. [all OCIA groups—it was very loose at that time]. We agreed to work on one set of standards and we left that meeting with an international body to take care of standards. (Interview, June 16, 2005) This approach was not amenable to the participants in the OCIA pilot program in Vermont. The director of the program at that time noted, OCIA was in VT for only year or two. I mean mostly people were very suspicious, it began to seem like something that wasn’t what was advertised as and the growers weren’t having the control that they were promised. They didn’t want to pay the cost of affiliating with this national thing, they didn’t have an interest in national markets, so they decided to turn it into, I think at that point it was turned into the name, Vermont Organic Farmers which is what it still is. (Interview, June 28, 2006) Similar disillusionment occurred at a much later date in Montana. Before 1999, Montana growers were certified largely by OCIA. In an effort to gain local control, a group of farmers sought to develop a state certification program. The legislature gave seed money for an investigation of the certification process. They polled all organic growers in the state, and more than 60 percent of the growers wanted a state-run certification program. The program was put in place in 2001. In the case of state SBCOs, all authority to make decisions resided with the department and the various individuals responsible for administering the program (generally the state department of agriculture). Nonetheless, state SBCOs generally 24 had an advisory board constituted of department employees, organic producers, consumers, and cooperative extension employees. These boards assisted the director of the program in formulating and carrying out the state organic program. Nonetheless, there were clear delineations of authority, and that authority resided with individuals by virtue of their incumbency in office (Weber 1978; Rothschild and Whitt 1986). Dimension 3. Social control/social relations Generally speaking, collectivist organizations tend to shun the use of centralized authority or standardized rules to achieve social control. Rather, they rely on personalistic and moralistic appeals to achieve social control (Rothschild and Whitt 1986). Inherent in the functional purpose of SBCOs is to monitor and verify the degree of compliance by organizations that subscribe to their standards. Consequently, SBCOs rely on some supervision, standardized rules, and procedures to legitimately claim to achieve their purposes. Nonetheless, the degree to which social control in certification occurred via social relations (personalistic/moralistic) versus impersonal and impartial third-party verification varied by SBCO form. For instance, certification of farms by early local nonprofit SBCOs occurred through what one informant called “the buddy system.” This referred to the practice of organic growers certifying one another—no truly impartial third party was doing the monitoring. He stated that most early certification was done “largely by the buddy system. And it remained by the buddy system until I was hired [1987]. Not that there was anything wrong with it. I mean, seriously the buddy system was an economic way of market enforcement that required accountability and responsibility on a very personal basis. You had your peers, competitors and neighbors checking you out” (Interview, June 20, 2006). When asked whether it was successful and whether farmers lived up to the standards, he said, 25 “It depends on who you ask and if you are asking me, the situation was adequate up until a certain point” (Interview, June 20, 2006). By virtue of being an internationally federated organization with multiple chapters in multiple locales, OCIA naturally relied on more centralized authority and standardized rules to achieve social control. However, while OCIA centralized much of the decision-making regarding the creation and modification of standards, it was fairly decentralized in other ways. Consequently, there were wide disparities in the running of many of the chapters (Guthman 2004). One of the founders of OCIA recounted the state of affairs in the organization’s early days: . . . I got interested in the third-party thing by being questioned in the marketplace and knowing that we had to have standards. In the early days, there wasn’t anything organized, and so we organized our own standard based on European standards, IFOAM standards, basically. And . . . I would do a lot of my own inspections. (Interview, June 16, 2005) An informant who worked for OCIA suggested that because certification decisions were made locally, the door was opened for opportunism and fraudulent practices in OCIA chapters: . . . decisions about things like the standards were set up to be more national, to be done for the whole system. But the certification decisions were made locally. I don’t have any first-hand information about this, but I have certainly heard enough stories about the cronies club in the local areas tolerating some shady things. (Interview, June 28, 2006) Documentation of OCIA’s activities in California revealed similar issues. In the 1990s in California, OCIA for a time had growers directly paying the inspectors of their farms. Additional internal controversies involving allegations of improper certification practices led to the disbarment of the California chapter. Furthermore, OCIA was implicated in a 1995 suit that named OCIA and QAI (a private certifier) as having 26 certified fungicide-treated bananas (Guthman 2004). OCIA, like local nonprofits, were engaging in “buddy system”-like tactics but became mired in controversy. Social relations in OCIA were ostensibly characterized much more by impersonality and instrumentality and a disinterest in community building than were social relations among local nonprofit certifiers’ growers. One of the founders of OCIA noted that OCIA farmers were “an independent lot,” and a past president, commenting on the willingness of OCIA members to lobby for legislation, noted that “Most of them [the farmers] said, ‘I just want to farm my fields’” (Interview, July 23, 2004). Social control, particularly in the context of certification, differed significantly for state SBCOs relative to local nonprofit SBCOs and OCIA. By virtue of being run by the state, state SBCOs brought added credibility and objectivity to verification and certification processes through impersonal, impartial, and standardized third-party verification. For example, the Texas program redressed “some of the more difficult issues that have been plaguing the organic industry for years ” by ensuring objective third-party certification through hiring independent inspectors, implementing a pesticide residue testing program, clarifying farm questionnaires, and bolstering its materials list (Friedman and Fishman 1989:135). Dimension 4. Incentive structure Instead of relying on remunerative incentives, collectivist organizations depend on a sense of shared purpose and relational ties to generate commitment to the organization (Etzioni 1961; Zald and Ash 1966; Kanter 1968; Rothschild and Whitt 1986). Local nonprofit SBCOs relied heavily on work that was accomplished through underpaid and, more often, volunteer labor. One of the first paid employees for a local nonprofit SBCO recalled a conversation with one of the founders of the SBCO: 27 I had the good fortune of speaking with __ __ before he passed on. And __ was many things, but he was a person who was definitely a partisan for a decentralized farmer-based system. To his dying day, true to his word, I mean he had nothing against me personally, but he thought I was an absolute parasite for taking a salary based on taxing farmers. You know, “death to the bureaucrats who prey on the lives of the peasants.” And that perspective persisted. You know what, [this organization], through its volunteer structure, and through its dedication, survived. (Interview, June 20, 2006) He further commented on the work of one of the early presidents of the SBCO: Still, __ maintained the organization. He did the minimum that was needed to keep it afloat. Many people said he did more than the minimum needed. Without compensation, he put in a tremendous amount of time and kept it alive . . . with [this organization] it was a labor of love. (Interview, June 20, 2006) Like its local nonprofit counterparts, OCIA was initially established using a set of volunteers to accomplish the work of certifying all farms. At the local level, OCIA would appoint an unpaid chapter president who was responsible for completing all of the paperwork for each farmer in the chapter. A past director of OCIA reported that the system did not work because “those were volunteer positions and you can’t get people to continually volunteer and it always ends up with one person doing all the work. People have to want to do that and understand that they have to contribute and that it’s work” (Interview, July 23, 2004). The use of volunteers in OCIA was a concern from the beginning, according to one of the founders: . . . being a membership organization, one of the drawbacks was that everyone wanted to belong to the organization and get their work done for near nothing. But we didn’t have the funding to pay all the people that were doing the work to get the applications ready and doing the actually reviewing and end up giving the certification. So everything was volunteer and the people that were good at it soon got burned out and they weren’t being rewarded. The organization with that system was not working very well in my opinion and soon, me and several other guys decided to start a new group that was a fee for service. If someone wanted to be certified, you were a client rather than a member. We went down that road. OCIA disappeared in Ontario for some of the reasons that I mentioned. There was nothing wrong with their standards or 28 their actual certification. It’s just the organization just couldn’t survive under that model of volunteer help. (Interview, June 16, 2005) These quotes suggest that from the very beginning, OCIA was unable to function using a volunteer system to accomplish its goals because such a structure was not conducive to the members it was meant to serve. As noted, one of the founders of OCIA broke away and started a group that relied on a bureaucratic structure that treated those seeking certification as “clients” rather than “members.” State SBCOs obviously did not draw on normative and solidarity incentives to ensure that employees performed their expected activities and tasks. While employees of state SBCOs were often sympathetic to the ideals espoused by many of those in the local nonprofit SBCOs, their organization did not have to rely on their employees’ commitment to the ideal to ensure continued functioning of the organization. Receiving a salary also had the effect of increasing continuity in personnel as they were adequately compensated for their work. Dimension 5. Specialization Many local nonprofit SBCOs engaged in a variety of tasks beyond the core function of certification such as public relations (direct personal contact, booths at fairs, slide shows, developing educational packages for distributors and retailers, etc.), information sharing through monthly newsletters, conferences/workshops, marketing efforts, and political lobbying. In the absence of substantial support from university extension services and other traditional sources of agricultural information and assistance (Lipson 1997), these organizations used their ideological source of solidarity to be both repositories and disseminators of expertise of organic production practices. The degree to which OCIA engaged in ancillary functions such as educational outreach, information sharing, and political lobbying was eclipsed by growers’ sole 29 interest in certification. One of the founders of OCIA disappointedly recounts, “The OCIA concept was, Organic Crop Improvement Association. [The purpose] was to certify crops and improve crops. This concept was lost at day one. People came to the organization to become certified, not to improve crops. It was really driven by economics” (Interview, June 16, 2005). As such, OCIA was essentially an organization whose core specialization was certification. Based on interviews conducted, OCIA did not engage in any additional services, advocacy, or community- awareness efforts. Consistent with the aims of state SBCOs to eliminate conflicts of interest (growers certifying growers), the state was only in the business of certification. Among local nonprofit SBCOs, technical assistance to farmers often went hand-in- hand with certification. By contrast, state SBCOs were valued in the industry for their potential to be more objective, credible, and less prone to personal distortions. Table 1.2 summarizes the three forms of SBCOs, arraying them on a continuum from more collectivist in nature to more bureaucratic. Local nonprofit SBCOs are more collectivist in nature, OCIA chapters tend to fall in the middle, and state-run SBCOs are more bureaucratic. Having inductively developed this typology of SBCOs in the U.S. organic food industry from interviews and other sources of qualitative data, I now shift attention to questions of conditions that supported the presence of the various forms of SBCOs. As mentioned in the introduction, given that increasing attention is being paid to the role of audiences (i.e., critics, industry analysts, certification/accreditation bodies, etc.) in facilitating the emergence of particular organizational forms and markets, it is important to understand the origins of these audiences. Theory regarding the founding of organizations (Stinchcombe 1965) and the insights gained from the case study suggest that particular antecedent and facilitative conditions will tend to 30 foster distinct forms of SBCOs. This quantitative analysis is an effort to validate those claims derived from the inductive case study of SBCOs. TABLE 1.2: DIMENSIONS OF STANDARDS-BASED CERTIFICATION ORGANIZATIONAL FORMS More Collectivist More Bureaucratic Local SBCO OCIA State SBCO Dimensions Source of Solidarity Primarily Ideological Primarily Economic N/A Authority Structure Decentralized authority; democratic decision making on standards Centralized authority; decision making regarding standards done at headquarters All decisions regarding standards made by legislature and state departments of agriculture; often employed an advisory board Social Control/Relations Growers certify growers Growers certify growers Objective and reliable third party certification Incentive Structure Reliance on shared purpose and volunteer labor to accomplish organizational tasks and goals Little shared purpose; consequently, the use of volunteer labor was not sustainable Remunerative incentives Specialization and Organizational Focus Performed many tasks and functions beyond its stated purpose of certification Primary focus on certification Only performed certification functions to maintain objectivity and credibility Given the ideological nature of local nonprofit SBCOs, I expect that states that are more amenable to collectivist-democratic ideals and to anti-mass consumer and anti-capitalist ideas will be more likely to experience the founding of a local nonprofit SBCO. I would also predict that states with established organic food industry infrastructure would also be more likely to experience local nonprofit SBCO founding. 31 Based on the findings from the qualitative component of this research, it is reasonable to expect that OCIA chapters are more likely to be founded in states with larger agribusiness interests. Finally, given state SBCOs’ bureaucratic nature and their reliance on the state for financial and institutional support, it stands to reason that greater legal and regulatory infrastructure would be a precursor to their creation. Hence, I expect that states that pass more comprehensive state organic policies and regulation will be more likely to establish a state SBCO. DATA AND METHODS Because I focus on the differential conditions that facilitate the emergence of distinct SBCO forms across states and over time, the state-year is the natural unit of analysis. The window of observation is from 1970 to 2000. 1970 serves as the baseline year because it was in that year that Rodale initiated preparations for the first certification program. The window ends in 2000, the year that the USDA released the final regulations that preempted all previous state organic food laws and rules. Dependent variable. SBCO founding is the dependent variable. I parsed founding into three distinct categories: the founding of a local nonprofit SBCO, the founding of the first OCIA chapter in a state, and the founding of a state SBCO. These data for the dependent variable come from multiple sources. For a yearly compilation of all SBCOs in existence in the United States, I drew from the National Organic Directory (NOD; 1983–1984, 1986–2001), published by the Community Alliance with Family Farmers. I also consulted three additional directories10 to capture all certification organizations that existed prior to their listing in the NOD. If directories did not list a founding date for the certification organization, calls were made to the organization to obtain it. If the organization had been dissolved, I contacted affiliated farmers or 10 One published by the Organic Farming Research Foundation, another by the Agricultural Marketing Service of the USDA, and a third by ATTRA (Appropriate Technology Transfer for Rural Areas). 32 organizations to obtain both a founding date and a dissolution date for the particular organization. Independent variables. The first set of independent variables in the model that are expected to predict the presence of a local nonprofit SBCO include the percentage of liberal voters in a state (Liberal voters) and the number of organic food wholesalers in a state (Wholesalers). I use the percentage of liberal voters in a state (Liberal voters) because states that had a solid left-leaning political base would be more likely to embrace the ideological underpinnings of local nonprofit SBCOs. The measure comes from Wright, Erikson, and McIver (1985) and is a time-invariant measure culled from 76,000 respondents to 48 CBS News–New York Times general population and voter polls at the state level from 1974 to 1982. The measure is the percentage of people polled in a state that described their political views or themselves as “liberal” when it comes to political matters. The wholesaler variable is drawn from the NOD and from Food Co-ops: An Alternative to Shopping in Supermarkets (Ronco 1975), both of which list wholesalers that sell natural and organically grown or produced food. The NOD provides the most comprehensive listing of all wholesalers carrying organically produced food from 1983 to 1984 and 1986 to 2000. Foods Co-ops was published in 1975. Although the food co-op movement also included the related natural food movement, the food co-op movement had a symbiotic connection to the development of organic food because the purveyors and customers of natural food stores shared the same anti-system ideological underpinning of pioneering organic farmers. To develop a longitudinal variable from these two sources that would cover the length of the observation period, I first established that the two sources were similar. I compared the 1983 wholesaler data from the NOD with the 1974 Food Co-ops data. I found a .86 correlation between 33 the two data sources. I then interpolated the NOD data and compared the interpolated 1974 NOD data with the 1974 Food Co-ops data and found a .75 correlation. Based on these correlations, I combined the Food Co-ops and the NOD data and linearly interpolated and extrapolated to generate values for the missing years of data. To assess whether OCIA arises in states with greater agribusiness interests, I include a proxy measure for the presence of large farms in a state (Land/farms). To calculate Land/farms, I divided the total amount of farmland in a given state by the number of farms, thus providing a measure of the average size of farm in a given state. Finally, the independent variable expected to influence the presence of state SBCOs is a measure of the number of total provisions codified in law or administrative rules for each state-year (Total state provisions). This provides an assessment of the comprehensiveness of legal structure in a state. For this measure, I gathered data on all organic food laws and administrative rules from the first law passage in 1973 through the end of the observation period. To tabulate the total number of provisions present in state law or state administrative rules between 1973 and 2000, I first consulted Westlaw. While Westlaw maintains a fairly comprehensive historical record of all U.S. statutes, administrative laws, and amendments, I found it necessary to conduct archival research to find legislation predating Westlaw’s database. After obtaining the first appearance of organic food legislation or administrative rules in each state, I then coded each state-year according to the number of provisions that each law contained. For each mention of a new provision, the state- year received a one for that provision; otherwise, it received a zero. I summed across all provisions for a total number of provisions in a given state for a given year and then worked forward coding changes in the law reflected in amendments. Control Variables. A number of agriculturally related measures that may influence SBCO founding dynamics are included as controls. First, I control for the total number 34 of farms in a state. Because this variable was skewed, I took the natural log and call this variable Number of farms. Second, I control for the change in amount of farmland in a state (Change in acres). I also control for the change in the number of farms in a state (Change in # of farms). Finally, I control for the percentage of gross state product that is generated through agriculture (Farm revenue/GSP). Because these data were not available for the first seven years of the observation period, I used the STATA ipolate and epolate commands. I also control for significant changes in the legal environment of the certification organizations. I do this by creating a variable called Novel provisions. This variable is a cumulative measure of the number of novel provisions across U.S. states. By novel, I mean a provision that has never been codified in law. At the national level, I also control for the total number of SBCOs in the United States (Cum # SBCOs). Finally, I control for the presence of other forms of SBCOs in a state. Unless otherwise noted, all variables were constructed from historical agricultural data from the National Agricultural Statistics Service of the USDA. Modeling SBCO Foundings I use random effects logistic regression models to assess the effects of independent variables on the probability of the founding of a particular form of SBCO, clustering on state to reduce the bias associated with pooled, cross-sectional panel data. I do not use fixed effects models because they are unable to estimate effects for panel data that include cases for which there is no variation in the dependent variable over time. The majority of states do not experience the founding of any one kind of these certification organizations. Consequently, much of the sample is lost using fixed effects models. Nonetheless, several robustness checks were performed, including logistic and complementary log-log models that clustered observations by state and 35 calculated robust standard errors to control for heteroscedasticity (White 1982). These models produced results similar to those reported here. RESULTS Tables 1.3, 1.4, and 1.5 report the summary statistics and correlations of the variables. Table 1.6 presents the results obtained from the SBCO analysis. Models 1 and 2 report the results of the analysis of OCIA founding; models 3 and 4 report those of state SBCO founding; models 5 and 6 report those of local nonprofit SBCO founding. Overall, national variables such as the cumulative number of SBCOs and the number of novel legal provisions have a legitimating effect, encouraging the founding of all forms of SBCOs. Regarding the founding of OCIA chapters, states with greater numbers of farms and greater numbers of wholesalers predict the founding of OCIA chapters. Consistent with expectations, states dominated by larger farms (Land/farms) are more likely to experience OCIA-chapter founding. Models 3 and 4 report the results from the analysis of State SBCO founding. In these models, both local SBCO and OCIA chapter variables are negatively related to the founding of a state SBCO (and marginally significant in the case of local SBCO). With the exception of a few states (i.e., Washington and New Hampshire, whose local nonprofit SBCOs successfully petitioned the state to take responsibility for running certification programs), local nonprofits and OCIA chapters generally sought to retain their ability to certify organic producers without competition from the state. Many state programs, as expected, arose from decisions by state legislators and bureaucrats to pass laws that enabled the creation of a state certification program as demonstrated by the positive and significant predictor variable of Total state provisions. These types of state programs often arose in states with little organic infrastructure. For example, a state program was established in Nevada in 1998 even though only one major 36 wholesaler of organic food existed in the state at that time. This is somewhat borne out in the analysis, as the variable Wholesalers is a negative predictor of state programs, albeit not statistically significant. Finally, the founding of the local nonprofit form is, as expected, significantly and positively predicted by the variables Wholesaler and Liberal voters. It is also important to note that whereas the variable Land/farms is a positive and significant predictor of OCIA-chapter founding, it is negative and significant for the founding of local nonprofit SBCOs. This demonstrates that OCIA chapters were established largely in agribusiness-oriented states and local nonprofit SBCOs were not, providing initial indications that through OCIA, larger, less ideologically committed farmers entered into the organic market.11 Notably, the presence of an OCIA chapter in a state inhibits the founding of local nonprofit SBCOs, as does the presence of state SBCOs (dropped from models 5 and 6 due to perfect negative predictions of local nonprofit SBCOs). In other words, once state SBCOs are established in states, no local nonprofit SBCOs are founded in those states, and once OCIA chapters are formed in states, it is unlikely that a local nonprofit SBCO will be founded in those same states. 11 Further analyses that predict the size of producer and commitment to organic ideals are needed to substantiate this claim. 37 TABLE 1.3: CORRELATION MATRIX FOR OCIA FORM-FOUNDING ANALYSES Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 1. OCIA founding 2. Number of farms .07 3. Change in acres -.01 -.20 4. Change in # farms -.01 -.20 .51 5. Farm revenue/GSP .00 .02 -.01 .01 6. Novel provisions .07 -.02 .04 .06 -.01 7. Cum. # SBCOs .08 -.17 .10 .23 -.03 .09 8. State SBCO .00 -.04 .04 .15 -.01 -.05 .46 9. Local SBCO .06 -.07 .11 .10 -.01 .11 .24 -.12 10. Wholesalers .11 .16 -.04 .12 -.01 .01 .00 .01 .29 11. Liberal voters .00 -.42 .13 .07 -.08 -.01 -.01 -.04 .29 .24 12. Land/farms .01 -.35 -.03 .09 .02 .00 -.08 -.07 -.24 -.08 .13 13. Total state provisions .00 .03 .01 .20 -.01 -.03 .49 .78 .00 .13 -.04 -.07 38 TABLE 1.4: CORRELATION MATRIX FOR STATE SBCO FORM-FOUNDING ANALYSES Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 1. State SBCO founding 2. Number of farms -.04 3. Change in acres .02 -.14 4. Change in # farms .01 -.22 .33 5. Farm revenue/GSP .00 .02 .00 .01 6. Novel provisions .09 -.01 .04 .04 -.01 7. Cum. # SBCOs .11 -.03 .05 .21 -.02 .06 8. OCIA .02 .22 -.01 .04 .01 .02 .50 9. Local SBCO -.02 -.03 .10 .15 -.02 .05 .35 .07 10. Wholesalers -.02 .15 -.08 .11 -.01 .00 .11 .10 .27 11. Liberal voters .00 -.35 .09 .10 -.08 -.01 .00 -.04 .32 .24 12. Land/farms .02 -.39 -.08 .10 .03 .00 -.05 -.01 -.29 -.08 .08 13. Total state provisions .12 .08 -.05 .13 .00 .04 .40 .27 .27 .51 .08 -.02 39 TABLE 1.5: CORRELATION MATRIX FOR LOCAL SBCO FORM-FOUNDING ANALYSES Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 1. Local SBCO founding 2. Number of farms .00 3. Change in acres .02 -.10 4. Change in # farms .02 -.20 .39 5. Farm revenue/GSP -.01 .02 .00 .02 6. Novel provisions .10 -.01 .04 .06 -.01 7. Cum. # SBCOs .01 -.05 .03 .21 .00 .09 8. OCIA -.05 .13 -.02 .02 .02 .09 .53 9. Wholesalers .15 .17 -.02 .08 -.02 -.03 .01 .10 10. Liberal voters .07 -.37 .06 .01 -.09 -.03 -.12 -.06 .20 11. Land/farms -.08 -.49 -.05 .15 .02 .01 .10 .05 -.09 .22 12. Total state provisions -.05 .09 .03 .21 .00 -.06 .53 .13 .13 -.09 .06 40 TABLE 1.6: LOGISTIC REGRESSION MODELS OF SBCO FORM FOUNDING OCIA form State form Local nonprofit form Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Number of farms .661** 1.159** -.202 -.083 .074 .189 (.249) (.398) (.366) (.259) (.162) (.215) Change in acres*100 .024 .077 .075 .185 .029 .033 (.105) (.117) (.222) (.210) (.012) (.143) Change in # of farms*100 -.010 -.015 -.017 -.035 .002 .007 (.011) (.011) (.036) (.026) (.012) (.017) Farm revenue/GSP .167 .238 -.821 -.177 -.082 .224 (.646) (.696) (7.085) (8.944) (.766) (1.259) Novel provisions .079+ .079+ .190** .147* .116** .126** (.041) (.042) (.062) (.060) (.040) (.041) Cum. # SBCOs .044** .065** .131* .106* .011 .049** (.015) (.017) (.064) (.042) (.025) (.015) State SBCO -.646 .623 (.870) (1.075) Local SBCO .519 .357 -1.465+ -1.356 (.494) (.601) (.869) (.855) OCIA SBCO -.787 -1.003 -1.898 -2.411* (.845) (.872) (1.174) (1.130) Wholesalers .062* -.282 .123* (.028) (.204) (.054) Liberal voters .051 .078 .201* (.083) (.081) (.079) Land/farms .691* -.130 -1.249** (.283) (.337) (.481) Standard errors in parentheses; + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 41 TABLE 1.6 (Continued) OCIA form State form Local nonprofit form Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Total state provisions -.085+ .180** -.117 (.048) (.053) (.076) Constant -12.516** -19.925** -8.388* -9.752* -4.722* -10.119** (2.861) (5.454) (3.496) (3.940) (2.034) (3.466) Observations 1184 1184 1336 1336 952 952 Log likelihood -105.300 -97.686 -56.059 -49.892 -116.424 -97.554 42 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION In this paper, I have documented the emergence and expansion of standards- based certification organizations (SBCOs) in the organic food industry. There are clear temporal and geographic patterns of SBCO founding, and I have linked SBCO organizational form founding to distinctive facilitating state-level conditions. The initial development of the organic food industry occurred in states such as California, Maine, and Oregon that had strong, left-leaning political bases and populations of farmers and consumers that promoted an anti-mass consumer, organic ideology that facilitated the creation of an infrastructure of organic food wholesalers. In turn, these states experienced the creation of local nonprofit certification organizations. As the organic market grew, other states, dominated by large farms and agribusiness interests, experienced the founding of another SBCO form—OCIA. Growers in these states were less driven by ideology than those in states from which the original organic grassroots movement emerged. Instead, they saw the organic food industry as an economic opportunity. The founding of OCIA chapters in several key agricultural states facilitated the entry of much larger farmers into the organic industry. Increased legislative activity in the late 1980s and early 1990s generated the impetus and legal machinery necessary for state departments of agriculture to establish state-run SBCOs, constituting a third, unique SBCO form. By highlighting how distinct SBCO forms took root in different states characterized by distinct facilitative conditions, I have sought to expand understanding of how conditions in different locales led to the instantiation of a set of industry principles and practices in distinctive organizational forms that fostered the emergence and growth of an industry. I have argued that the theorization and development of a set of standards and certification procedures by early organic pioneers served as a ”fence”—enacting a solid boundary around organic agriculture by which consumers 43 could differentiate organically grown products from conventionally grown food. Yet the codification of standards and the routinization of certification procedures facilitated the diffusion of organic to different locales, becoming instantiated in new governance organizations which subsequently served as “gates” by which outsiders to the organic movement entered into the organic marketplace, fostering endogenous change in the shape and trajectory of the industry. An important limitation of this study should be noted. It is difficult to extricate ideological explanations of organizational outcomes from material explanations because ideology fundamentally shapes organizational behavior as it does human agency (Simons and Ingram 1997) and influences organizational goals, strategies, structures, and processes (Scott Morton and Podolny 2002; Haveman and Khaire 2004). As such, it is hard to determine if particular SBCO forms were founded in states for ideological reasons, for the particular material benefits they provided to their clients, or both. It is possible that one form of certification organization may have appealed to some groups of producers more than to others. For example, OCIA- certified producers had access to international markets that producers certified by local nonprofit SBCOs did not. However, access to distant, national, and international markets has ideological ramifications as initial organic principles valued locally grown and locally consumed—a tension that is currently generating a substantial amount of controversy and press (Brady 2006; Economist 2006). Nonetheless, extricating material and ideological motivations would greatly enhance theoretical understanding of these processes. Future research should pay greater attention to the role of geography in facilitating the emergence and transposition of unique sets of actors, institutions, logics, and governance structures. Extant conceptions of institutional change in organization theory are dominated by temporal explanations. For example, changes in 44 governance structures in industries are considered over time, but rarely across polities or locales (e.g., Campbell et al. 1991; Scott et al. 2000). Similarly, shifts in institutional logics have been conceptualized as uncontested, higher order organizing principles that operate historically (quantified as period effects) that homogenously influence organizations within a given field (e.g., Thornton 2002). Greater appreciation for the fragmented nature of organizational fields and institutional environments is needed (Meyer, Scott, and Strang 1987; Powell 1991; Schneiberg and Soule 2005). Biggart and Beamish point out that “conventions of coordination are historically developed and local, and explain why the same industry is organized differently in different places. Differences are the result of actors’ pragmatic attempts to coordinate with others over time; multiple means of coordination are possible” (2003:457). These conventions often become localized institutions that can inform higher order institutional processes. For example, state legislators relied heavily on the standards and certification procedures when passing state law. In turn, federal lawmakers and bureaucrats drew heavily upon the legal-structural elements that had been created and subsequently refined by state-level actors and legislatures. Hence, being attentive to the various localized conventions and institutions that embody multiple interests and logics can inform understanding of broader, field-level institutional change. Another fruitful avenue to extend this research is to more fully explore the antecedents and consequences of outsider incursions into markets for what Rothschild and Whitt (1986) refer to as “oppositional goods and services.” These oppositional goods and services come into existence as a result of institutional entrepreneurs that “see some important social need that is unfilled by conventional businesses or public agencies” (p. 116). These types of markets are important from a public policy perspective because they are often the source of substantial economic and social 45 change that can fundamentally redefine preexisting norms, practices, and institutions. For example, organic pioneers sought to “establish a completely new system of food production and distribution” (Belasco 1989:69). While not entirely achieving their objectives, the pioneering work of organic activists has significantly altered agricultural practice and consumer behavior, making organic agriculture the fastest growing niche in U.S. and global agricultural markets. Other examples of oppositional goods and services include renewable-energy technologies, microcredit, fair-trade products, and green building—all of which seek to alter dominant institutions and extant production and distribution practices in their respective fields. 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The law, through instrumental as well as normative and cultural-cognitive means, has significant outcomes for organizational forms (Hannan and Freeman 1989; Fligstein 1990; Ranger-Moore, Banaszak-Holl, and Hannan 1991; Halliday, Powell, and Granfors 1993; Dobbin and Dowd 1997; Schneiberg 2002; Ingram and Rao 2004), the distribution of property rights (Campbell and Lindberg 1990), the adoption and curtailing of practices within firms (Edelman 1990, 1992; Mezias 1990; Sutton, Dobbin, Meyer, and Scott 1994; Edelman, Uggen, and Erlanger 1999; Kelly 2003), organizational performance (Carroll, Goodstein, and Gyenes 1988; Ingram and Simons 2000), and the creation and subsequent expansion of new markets (Dobbin 1994; Carruthers, Babb, and Halliday 2001; Fligstein 2001; Fligstein and Stone Sweet 2002). Despite insights generated through this research, the growing body of literature on law and markets has come under critique for its conceptualization of regulation as a uniform, exogenous environmental element— a “one-dimensional background incentive system reshaping parameters for means-ends rational calculation . . . without having the potential of altering the fundamental nature, goals or meaning of economic activity” (Stryker 2003:13). As this critique indicates, law has been operationalized in most studies as either a dichotomous variable (passed or not passed; e.g., Wade, 53 Swaminathan, and Saxon 1998) or as “regulatory periods” (e.g., Ranger-Moore et al. 1991; Dobbin and Dowd 1997). Within such blunt-edged conceptualizations, variation that exists in the content and potential efficacy of law is not adequately accounted for. Nor are there clear explanations within these conceptualizations for the sources of regulation and how or why shifts in its content occur over time and across polities. To advance this literature, Stryker (2003) and Edelman and Stryker (2005) suggest that organizational sociologists move beyond theorizing law as an exogenous element to consider law and economy as “deeply embedded in social action and organization and linked through political and institutional mechanisms” (p. 527). Since relatively little is known about how organizations impact legal structure (much more is known about the inverse), treating law as a dependent variable is a significant move toward this end. However, there are a few studies that have treated law as a dependent variable, but these studies still generally under-specify outcomes by conducting formal modeling that constrains law to either or a “1” or a “0”—present or absent (e.g., Zhou 1993; Soule and Zylan 1997). This dichotomous operationalization masks much of the complexity and distinctiveness that accrues within legal code over time and space.1 Without an understanding of this complexity, institutionalization is often uncritically cast as a 1/0 affair (Strang and Sine 2002; Schneiberg and Clemens 2006:217). The foregoing study argues that disrupting the trend of analytically homogenizing legislation opens possibilities for understanding variation in the content of what is being diffused (Strang and Soule 1998) and its relationship to intra-industry governance organizations—an approach that “presents a rich set of questions for new institutionalism” (Ingram and Clay 2002:532). 1 For example, Zhou (1993:545) treats licensing legislation as “institutionally similar” (and thus codes it dichotomously); Ingram and Rao (2004) similarly consider their dependent variable as a discrete event, coding the imposition of greater taxes on chains dichotomously (1/0). 54 Recent work (Schneiberg and Bartley 2001; Strang and Bradburn 2001; Ingram and Rao 2004; Schneiberg and Soule 2005) has begun to move toward a more nuanced understanding of the origins, antecedents, and factors that account for regulation within a market. These studies advance theories of state-market relations by tracing the influence of particular actors and institutional processes on the enactment of regulation. In addition to identifying antecedents, these studies move beyond the dichotomous modeling of law as present/absent to differentiate between distinct types of regulation.2 I advance this research agenda here by focusing needed attention on how standards-based certification organizations (SBCOs)3—key sources of industrial order in many industries—influence the content and evolution of state regulation. Such an approach is congruent with ongoing conversations in political science regarding the blurring of public and private governance (Streeck and Schmitter 1985; Stoker 1998; Pierre and Peters 2000; Kersbergen and Van Waarden 2004). Although theoretical work has highlighted the key role that associations and standards organizations play in the governance of markets and industries (e.g., Streeck and Schmitter 1985; Brunsson and Jacobsson 2000; Campbell, Hollingsworth, and Lindberg 1991; Scott, Ruef, Mendel, and Caronna 2000), an understanding of the relationship between these types of governance organizations and the state is relatively undeveloped. In this paper, I consider the dynamic nature of law content, hoping to answer questions regarding when and under what conditions private governance organizations influence legal dynamics. 2 For instance, Schneiberg and Bartley (2001) used a competing-risks model to determine the antecedents of full rate-control legislation versus weaker, antidiscrimination legislation in the early fire insurance industry. In their study of anti-chain-store laws, Ingram and Rao (2004) modeled both the enactment and the repeal of legislation. 3 By SBCO, I mean an organization whose primary purpose is to create and promote standards, verify the compliance of other organizations to those standards, and formally acknowledge that an organization has met the standards through the conferral of a certification, endorsement, or accreditation. 55 This question is theoretically significant for several reasons. First, there is limited research on the influence of private governance institutions (Ingram and Clay 2000) such as SBCOs, particularly vis-à-vis the state. Second, with only two notable exceptions, which will be reviewed below (Grattet, Jenness, and Curry 1998; Strang and Bradburn 2001), studies of industry legal structures primarily consider general patterns of diffusion, not the specific content of laws. By accounting for patterns of variation in content, my study provides a more precise, nuanced understanding of the relationship between the state and private governance within an industry context. Third, to this point, the only theoretically significant, longitudinal categorization of the content of law (Grattet et al. 1998) has not been empirically tested, nor has it been applied specifically to a market/industry context. Building on this promising but still emergent body of work, this study takes as a point of departure the notion that accounting for the differential content of laws and the political processes that drive them is crucial to a comprehensive theory of state-market relations. To develop this theory, I highlight contributions from two different approaches that serve as starting points. One set of these studies emphasizes how organizational actors influence law creation and change, establishing a middle ground between overly structural or overly interest-based explanations of regulation. A second subset of studies focuses direct attention on laws, their specific provisions, and their internal dynamics, addressing current weaknesses in the literature that deemphasizes law as a phenomenon to be explained. Taken together, these studies highlight the importance of considering the role of organizational action and interests in impacting the content and trajectory of law. THEORY In counterpoint to conventional accounts of diffusion and institutional change that suggest that the adoption of structure and practices are driven initially by 56 perceptions of efficiency and then become legitimate and taken for granted (Tolbert and Zucker 1983; Zhou 1993; Grattet et al. 1998), a set of scholars are increasingly integrating political factors into accounts of the creation and spread of legal and regulatory policies and structures (Schneiberg and Bartley 2001; Schneiberg 2002; Ingram and Rao 2004; Edelman and Stryker 2005; Schneiberg and Soule 2005). For example, Schneiberg and Soule (2005) found that the institutionalization of insurance- rate regulation among U.S. states represented a “settlement” resulting from political conflicts over competing models of industrial order. This settlement was a product of social movement mobilization and multilevel institutional processes that resulted in a “multiplex, fractured institutional field” (p. 152). Federated state systems allowed for “diverse but largely uncorrelated and relatively weak pockets of institutionalization . . .” and “the presence of multiple platforms and ports of entry create[ed] possibilities for broadly organized but competing projects, the development of institutional contradiction within or across levels, and the institutionalization of multiple, even contradictory, industrial orders” (p. 156). This research demonstrates that diffusion can be profoundly political and is driven by “the political dynamics of opposition, argumentation, contestation, and compromise” (p. 156). Such political contestation and its influences provide an agency and action-oriented approach to institutionalization in which extant institutional arrangements are viewed as settlements arrived at through “articulation, layering, bricolage, and recombination rather than homogenization or convergence” (p. 157). Similarly, Ingram and Rao (2004) reveal how competition between rival organizational forms can be manifest in broader regulative structures. Using the anti- chain-store movement and the countermobilization by chain stores of the early twentieth century as a context, they demonstrate how multilevel political and institutional dynamics influenced the passage and repeal of state-level anti-chain-store 57 legislation. A Supreme Court ruling deeming constitutional an anti-chain-store law in Indiana spurred 27 additional state legislatures to enact legislation that imposed higher taxes on chain stores. Counter-mobilization efforts on the part of chain stores ensued. Chain stores fought tax legislation and sought to improve their public image through a collective association called the National Chain Store Association (NCSA). From their analysis, Ingram and Rao found that the number of independent stores and the degree of independent homogeneity4 predicted the passage of anti-chain-store legislation. By contrast, and consistent with the counter-mobilization thesis, the number of chain stores prevented the enactment of such laws. This research underscores the idea that endorsement and support of the state is not a given nor an exogenous outcome of broader social and economic changes as much current research maintains. Rather, it is often the outcome of actions of competing organizations and broader institutional processes within an industry. Given that laws and rules are central to social order in virtually every facet of social life, a focus on legal structure provides a useful context to understand the mechanisms that generate and challenge order in organizational fields/markets. In a study of the British Columbia Water Act from 1914 to 2002, Jennings, Schulz, Patient, Gravel, and Yuan (2005) found that the evolution of water law was characterized by periods of incremental expansion and increased complexity that were punctuated by legal rule consolidation and rewriting that resulted in functionally differentiated law. Consolidation of BC water law transformed organically evolved, redundant legal structures into modern, structurally unique sets of rules that displaced particularistic rules with fewer, broadly applicable rules meant to cover a broad class of situations. Such dynamics tend to increase “the modularity of the rule system and thereby 4 Homogeneity in this setting refers to the degree to which independent stores within a state belonged to the same retail segments (e.g., druggists, shoe stores, grocers). A Herfindahl index was used to construct this variable. 58 facilitates independent adaptation by its parts” (Jennings et al. 2005:643). While this paper places needed attention on the nature and evolution of the corpus of law, it neglects the role of actors that may have driven and/or been served by these rule changes. Two other relevant studies focus attention on the content of law. In a study of the content of hate crime laws in the United States, Grattet et al. (1998) identify two mechanisms that contribute to variation in content across state laws: exclusivity and domain expansion. Exclusivity refers to the practice of adopting a law as a symbolic gesture (generally to appease constituencies) and leaving it unrevised even as updated versions appear in other states. To illustrate the mechanism of exclusivity, Grattet et al. point to the fact that most states passed a single hate crime law at only one point in time (only 8 of 33 adopted more than one type of hate crime law, and only 3 of those 8 did so through subsequent amendments). Once this initial law was passed in most states, legislators remained committed to that approach and did not amend it even when more progressive laws were passed in other states. In the absence of updating laws to be consistent with contemporary trends, exclusivity contributed to overall legal heterogeneity. The second mechanism, domain expansion,5 refers to the process by which initial, narrowly written statutes gave way to more expansive ones. According to Grattet et al. (1998), as the existence of a particular category of law becomes institutionalized and thus taken for granted, legislators and their constituencies are more apt to amend/tailor the law. In the context of hate crime law, they find that once the existence of such law was well established, state legislatures were able to more 5 Drawing from social problems literature, domain expansion refers to “increases in the ‘substantive territory’ (in terms of both activities and protected statuses) covered by the law and/or institutions positioned to construct and respond to a social problem” (Grattet et al. 1998:291). For example, Best (1990) describes how particular definitions of child abuse gained currency among professionals. “Child abuse” replaced an earlier, narrower concept of “battered child,” and the phrase “child abuse and neglect” was eventually favored over just “child abuse.” 59 fully elaborate on the basic form that was available for imitation. Elaboration on the basic theme of hate crime legislation led to increased diversity of legal content in the later period of diffusion. While this study develops important mechanisms to account for variation in legal content, it, like the water law study, fails to account for the role of interests in these processes. By contrast, Strang and Bradburn (2001) attend to both content and interests in a study of the content of state-level health maintenance organization (HMO) legislation. Before the passage of the federal HMO Act, there was high variation in the content of state laws. Following the passage of this federal legislation, this heterogeneity declined rapidly. The federal law and various model laws established by industry associations such as the National Association of Insurance Commissioners and the National Association of HMO Regulators provided state legislators with templates to guide their efforts to fashion and enact legislation in their respective states. Strang and Bradburn deduce that convergence upon a set of core legal provisions occurred due to the availability of these models, which were promoted through strong associational networks. Nonetheless, some elements of the state laws were more susceptible to political action. For example, states with more HMOs were more likely to pass legislation mandating “dual choice,” which provided HMOs with mandated access to employee groups, but were less likely to pass laws that 1) provided plan members a say over HMO governance; and 2) that mandated open enrollment, which opened plans to all people despite their insurance risk. The findings of this study suggest that HMOs were not the drivers of HMO policy, but their reaction to state law demonstrated that HMOs mobilized to amend both state and federal regulatory provisions to their benefit. This study is an important step in linking variation in law content with the configuration of interests present in organizational fields. 60 Integrating these two sets of studies, important theoretical advances are to be had by pursuing research that examines the role of organizational action in regulatory change and evolution. Based on the findings of these studies, it is plausible that intra- industry governance organizations such as SBCOs may be important in shaping the dynamics of legal regulation of industries. In the following section, I introduce the empirical context for this study, which is then followed by hypotheses, data and methods, results, and conclusions. EMPIRICAL CONTEXT In December of 2000, the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) issued binding rules to govern the organic food industry with the intent to assure consumers that agricultural products labeled as organic meet consistent and uniform standards. These rules were implemented the following spring, and the USDA granted a transitional period that extended to October of 2002. As part of this sweeping federal program, the USDA established the National Organic Program (NOP), whose purpose is to develop and implement national standards to govern the marketing of agricultural products as organically produced. NOP regulations require that agricultural products labeled as organic originate from farms or handling operations certified by a state or private agency that has been accredited by USDA. However, prior to the federal standards and accreditation system, a patchwork of SBCOs and state organic food laws6 served as the primary source of governance and enforcement in the U.S. organic food industry. In 1973, Oregon passed the first state-level regulation, predating the federal legislation by 17 years. Drawing heavily on the principles, practices, and standards developed by organic grower communities and nascent certification programs, the Oregon 1973 regulation included a definition 6 For the purposes of this paper, I refer to both statutory law (law enacted by the legislative branch of government) and administrative law (the legally binding body of regulations, rules, and orders of administrative agencies in the government) when I use such terms as “law,” “regulation,” or “statutes.” 61 of “organic food” 7 and “organically processed food”; required that organic producers keep records for two years; dictated that anything labeled as organic shall contain no more than 10 percent of the allowable residues of any pesticide or other synthetic or artificial substances; promulgated rudimentary livestock rules and banned the use of antibiotics; required that certifier contact information be on the label of the organic food; mandated the state to investigate reasonable reports of violations of the law; and included a provision that made illegal the labeling of something as organic that was not produced in accordance to the law. Thus, this first organic food law, while only two pages, codified into law key definitions, basic production rules and processes, and punitive measures. Soon after the Oregon regulation, a number of states passed organic laws— Massachusetts in 1978 and Maine, California, and Connecticut in 1979. The Connecticut and Massachusetts laws were succinct, whereas those of Maine and California were more comprehensive in scope. California’s definition of organic moved beyond that of Oregon’s by including both prohibited and permitted materials for use in the production, harvesting, and processing of organic food products. For example, the law permitted the use of Bordeaux mixes, soluble kelp, lime, sulfur, gypsum, and soap but prohibited the use of petroleum solvents, diesel, and all other petroleum fractions. This list of appropriate and prohibited substances became known as the “materials list.” Following its initial appearance in California law, similar materials lists found their way into much of the subsequent regulation established in other states. In addition, the California law was particularly innovative in linking the term “organic” directly to the state code through labeling. The 1979 legislation required that all products marketed as organic include on their label the following 7 “Food which has been grown: without being subjected to pesticides, synthetic fertilizers, or other synthetic chemicals: in soil in which the humus content is increased only by the addition of natural matter: and in soil in which the mineral content is increased only by the application of natural mineral fertilizers of other natural matter” (Oregon 1980). 62 phrase: “Organically Grown in Accordance with Section 26569.11 of the California Health and Safety Code” (California 1979:3146). Following the passage of these early laws, a handful of Plains states, including North Dakota, South Dakota and Nebraska, passed organic food laws. These laws were more concise and had little in common with existing laws in California, Oregon, and Maine. Although all of these states defined organic, none required organic labeling to comply with state code. Verification methods were limited to state- conducted inspections in most states. Punitive elements were scant, with the majority of laws only outlining a mislabeling clause. Pioneering a dramatically different type of law in 1985, Washington passed legislation that mandated the creation of a state-run organic certification program, initiating a move that subsequent states would follow. Texas shortly thereafter also established a state certification program. Although the Washington and Texas laws included many of the provisions common to the California and Maine laws, Texas added a number of novel provisions that gave the State Department of Agriculture clear jurisdiction over the creation and enforcement of organic standards. The department developed a certification program, retained the right to inspect property and records, and had the power to take punitive measures against violators of the law. Such power was manifest in the form of injunctions, revocation of certification status, imposition of fines, and the issuing of stop-sale orders. Having comprehensive models of state programs to build from, other states began passing organic food laws and establishing state certification organizations. Between 1989 and 1990, 13 states passed legislation, with 8 establishing state-run certification organizations. These laws differed dramatically from those established in the late 1970s and were more consistent with the 1988 Texas law. They all included a definition of “producer,” created a state label (e.g., “Idaho Certified Organic”) and 63 mandated the respective state departments of agriculture to create a certification program. Other common provisions included mislabeling clauses, fines, inspections by the state, revocation of certification status, and definitions of “processor,” “distributor,” and “certification.” Nearly all of these laws mandated the establishment of an advisory board. The board generally consisted of department employees, organic producers, consumers, and cooperative extension employees. The board assisted the director in formulating and carrying out the state organic program. In some cases, this board was given power to levy fees to ensure the continued functioning of the certification program. Prevalent in these laws were provisions requiring producers to register with the state and provisions to assure that all food labeled as organic was in compliance with the state code. Also present was a shift in the constitutive language of the law. The longer, more explicit definitions of organic found in earlier laws were either replaced by the term “certified organic” or supplemented with language indicating the need to certify products. For example, Colorado’s 1989 law defined organic as “agricultural products grown or produced in Colorado without the use of synthetic pesticides, synthetically compounded fertilizers, or synthetic growth hormones and certified by the department as complying with all standards and regulations established by this article” (Colorado 1989:1376, emphasis added). Thus, laws that redefined “organic” to mean “certified organic” required all food labeled as organic to be compliant with state code. This development coupled with the authorization to conduct certification equated to a significant increase in state participation in the industry. States with existing organic food laws also saw the period from 1989 to 1990 as a time to revisit and amend these laws. Texas, Washington, Colorado, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, California, Oregon, Minnesota, Wisconsin, North Dakota, and Maine all amended their laws to update the legal language and increase the 64 comprehensiveness and efficacy of their laws. For example, in all of these states, idiosyncratic definitions of “organic” were supplemented with definitions that included “certified organic.” In the case of California, which had the most comprehensive organic food law at the time (with the exception of states with state- run certification programs), amendments required certification organizations and producers to register with the state. They also mandated the imposition of fines for those who mislabeled products. Between 1973 and 2000, 36 states passed organic food laws. These laws exhibited significant variation in their content. Some states passed statutes of just one paragraph, whereas others exceeded 60 pages of text. Figure 2.1 shows the temporal patterning of state-law passage and amendments. HYPOTHESES To move beyond dichotomous conceptualizations of regulatory structure that tend to dominate diffusion and institutional literatures (Strang and Soule 1998), I focus on mechanisms that generate variation in legal content. Content variation is an important topic of study because it allows assessment of the degree of convergence/divergence of regulatory structures across polities. Further, it permits more accurate mapping of particular legal content to specific field-level interests (Strang and Bradburn 2001). I focus on two key mechanisms responsible for variation in law content. The first mechanism is regulatory inertia. By regulatory inertia, I refer to regulation that is passed but is then left unrevised even as more efficacious or legitimate versions of similar regulation exist in other states.8 Therefore, as laws change over time, those states that do not update their laws contribute to overall legal heterogeneity. 8 Regulatory inertia is similar to Grattet et al.’s (1998) concept of exclusivity. 65 FIGURE 2.1: NUMBER OF ORGANIC FOOD LAWS AND AMENDMENTS PASSED, 1970–2000 A second mechanism that can contribute to legal heterogeneity in a comparative analysis is regulatory elaboration. By regulatory elaboration,9 I refer to the refinement or expansion of existing legal structure. Legal elaboration occurs through formal legislative amendment or through bureaucratic rule processes. Legal elaboration is an important element of legal evolution because it represents efforts to clarify extant regulation and/or expand the scope and efficacy of existing rules. Such efforts are generally driven by interested parties with sufficient resources to instigate change, or alternatively, by crises that require the state to revisit previously mandated regulation. 9 Regulatory elaboration is similar to Grattet et al.’s (1998) concept of domain expansion. 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 Law passage Amendments 66 While both inertia and elaboration mechanisms work against conformity and standardization of regulation across states, past research suggests they do so for contrasting reasons that function as a result of temporal differentiation. In their study of hate crime legislation, Grattet et al. (1998) find that inertia occurred in the early history of hate crime laws because states did not yet have a dominant model to look to when crafting legislation. By contrast, elaboration occurred later because once the general principles of the legislation were in place, legislators were freer to expand the domain of hate crime law to include broader conceptions of what constituted a hate crime and what groups received protected status under the law. Based on their findings, the authors conclude that timing is everything: “the content of a state’s law is contingent upon when it enters the ongoing institutionalization process” (Grattet et al. 1998:303). I examine this conclusion and the conceptual/predictive power of regulatory inertia and elaboration in the context of organic food industry law. The first hypothesis I propose is to assess if inertia and elaboration occur in a similar temporal fashion in the U.S. organic food industry as was found in the context of hate crime legislation. Thus, Hypothesis 1: Regulatory inertia in state organic food laws will occur during the early period of industry law passage. Regulatory elaboration will occur in the later period. According to Grattet et al. (1998), timing should explain the occurrence of regulatory inertia and elaboration. However, I posit that timing may not be the primary factor in determining differential content of law. As a host of scholars suggest (Schneiberg and Bartley 2001; Strang and Bradburn 2001; Schneiberg 2002; Ingram and Rao 2004; Schneiberg and Soule 2005), organized interests play a central role in 67 shaping regulatory structures. More specifically, Strang and Bradburn (2001) have shown how interests have impacts on the differential content of the law itself. As noted in the previous paper, SBCOs were central to the development of the organic food industry because they created and promulgated standards, verified growers’ compliance with those standards, and then provided a certification or endorsement to compliant growers. The development of these key conventions decreased the information asymmetries between producer and consumer regarding product quality (Akerlof 1970) and facilitated the rationalization of the nascent market for organic products, moving it from a “movement” to an “industry.” SBCOs generally rely on normative pressure and incentives to get other organizations to adopt and subsequently adhere to their standards (Brunsson and Jacobsson 2000). To preserve their normative power, they tend to avoid efforts by the state to control their affairs. For example, when federal legislation was a possibility in the early 1990s, one local nonprofit SBCO reported being wary of the “possibility of government agencies taking over certification” and adamantly maintained that “any organic legislation should allow for the presence of private certification organizations” (Sills 1989:11). This local SBCO formed a committee to “study the possible appropriate changes in the state law and form a consensus about our role in federal legislation” (Sills 1989:11). While SBCOs tend to avoid being controlled by the state, SBCOs nonetheless frequently seek to influence and control state policies (Brunsson and Jacobsson 2000; Sassen 1998; Hirst and Thompson 1996) in order to limit intrusive state intervention and to preserve and enhance their own normative power within their respective field of influence. Further, SBCOs, like industry associations and other collective actors, can be influential in the regulatory process because legislatures and state agencies tend to rely on industry groups for expertise, information, and, in the case of agencies, for 68 personnel to carry out their duties (Breyer 1982; Yeager 1990; Edelman and Stryker 2005). SBCOs in particular can exert substantial influence because of their pre- existing intra-industry governance mechanisms that can easily serve as models for state legislation. Despite ostensible justification for participation in influencing the construction of regulatory infrastructure, not all SBCOs engage in efforts to shape state-level regulatory structure. Recent calls to explain sources of heterogeneity in organizational fields (Lounsbury and Ventresca 2002; Schneiberg and Clemens 2006) suggest that disaggregating organizational forms into more distinct categories may reveal much regarding their resource mobilization potential, fundamental differences in ideologies, and the scope and/or focus of distinct organizational forms. Understanding these subtle differences can shed light on the degree to which organizational forms can succeed in achieving higher order institutional outcomes. In the context of the U.S. organic food industry, I argue that certain SBCOs exhibited features and proclivities that allowed them to serve broader purposes beyond core functions associated with certification and made them more likely to be interested in fostering state-level regulatory infrastructure. I maintain that these two factors had implications for the regulatory dynamics of the states in which they were located. In the previous paper, I arrayed SBCOs along five key dimensions (source of solidarity, authority structure, social control/relations, incentive structures, and specialization) that highlighted salient differences in the degree to which SBCOs could be classified as more collectivist or more bureaucratic in orientation. Local nonprofit SBCOs tended to maintain a shared ideology that served as a primary means of cohesion and commitment manifest in the use of volunteer labor to accomplish organizational goals and day-to-day tasks. This facilitated the ability to engage in collective behavior that would benefit the organic market as a whole. Such ideological 69 commitment is noted as a key element of solidarity within business groups (Granovetter 2005). Further, local nonprofit SBCOs were more likely to have control over local institutions, to make decisions that would affect the behavior of local organizations, and to redress conflict within the community rather than resort to an extra-local organization to resolve the issue. Furthermore, local nonprofit SBCOs and their members were generally focused on state and local marketing outlets for their products. Finally, these organizations engaged in various activities such as the creation and distribution of monthly newsletters, hosting conferences, and giving on-site workshops that enhanced their ability to mobilize and lobby for organic food laws. Anecdotal evidence suggests that certification organizations, recognizing the need for regulation, initiated most of the early organic food laws (California Action Network 1989). For example, in California, CCOF wrote the 1990 legislation and worked closely with Assemblyman Sam Farr (D-Monterey) to pass it into law (Brammer 1989). In an editorial in the CCOF newsletter, a retailer of organic food reflected upon the political power that CCOF had developed: I think the work CCOF has done for this legislation produces benefits much more valuable than the legislation itself. CCOF has positioned itself and the California organic trade as a player in Sacramento. It has made political connections and won some respect. It has opened up lines of communication with CDFA and has clearly identified CDHS’ lack of desire to serve the organic trade. With more money and support from other sectors in the California organic trade, we will be able to exercise some political muscle in the coming years and make real changes. (Fishman 1989) Interviews with local nonprofit SBCO members and employees revealed similar efforts by SBCOs to participate in both the writing and passage of state organic food laws. For example, the Maine Organic Farmers and Gardeners Association (MOFGA) actually wrote Maine’s first organic labeling law. MOFGA played a central role in writing the subsequent amendments following the initial law passage (Interview, January 17, 2002). Given their mobilization capacity generated through 70 shared ideology, past organizational experience, and existing infrastructure, and their focus on local markets, I posit: Hypothesis 2a: States with local nonprofit SBCOs will be more likely to experience regulatory elaboration. Hypothesis 2b: States with local nonprofit SBCOs will be less likely to experience regulatory inertia. In contrast to local nonprofit SBCOs’ bottom-up approach, chapters of the nationally federated certification organization, OCIA, were founded largely through a top-down process in which OCIA employees actively recruited conventional farmers into organic markets. Unlike their local nonprofit counterparts, OCIA members were interested primarily in certification and the economic gains to be had from growing organic. Consequently, they had less of an ideological component motivating their membership and actions in the marketplace, decreasing their potential mobilization capacity. In addition, OCIA chapters focused on national and international markets (outside the jurisdictional boundaries of state governments), which made them presumably less affected by and less interested in state-level legislation.10 Consequently, OCIA members left state-level political lobbying to other players in the growing industry. When asked about OCIA’s role in lobbying for state legislation, a past director of OCIA said, “OCIA was interested, but they really didn’t guide the chapters in that respect. They would tell the chapters that you should do this [lobby for legislation] but they really didn’t supply guidance.” She indicated that OCIA members 10 This is similar to Ingram and Rao’s (2004) finding that chain stores (national organizations with national interests) sought influence through the Supreme Court, whereas independent stores, with their relatively limited resources and organization, pursued a strategy that targeted public opinion and state legislatures. While OCIA and local nonprofits were not directly in conflict in the same way the independent and national chains were over anti-chain-store legislation, they were similar with regard to their strategies and capabilities. 71 were largely indifferent to lobbying for state legislation: “. . . Most of them [the farmers] said, ‘I just want to farm my fields’” (Interview, July 23, 2004). An informant from Ohio corroborated this finding, suggesting that while OCIA was not active in lobbying for a state organic food law, the local certification organization, the Ohio Ecological Food and Farm Association (OEFFA), was the driving force behind its passage. As such, I posit that OCIA’s influence on state-level laws would tend toward inertia—if a law is passed in a state dominated by OCIA, I would expect it to be revisited with less frequency. According to this line of reasoning, I hypothesize: Hypothesis 3a: States with OCIA chapters will be less likely to experience regulatory elaboration. Hypothesis 3b: States with OCIA chapters will be more likely to experience regulatory inertia. DATA AND METHODS Given that the United States is a fragmented state structure (Meyer and Scott 1983), U.S. states have historically been the sites of substantial legal, political, and economic activity that results in geographically distinct institutions, governance structures, meaning systems, and practices (Markusen 1985, 1987; Saxenian 1994). Because I focus on the relationship between SBCOs and legal structure across states and over time, the state-year is the natural unit of analysis for this study. The window of observation is from 1970 to 2000. 1970 serves as the baseline year because it was in that year that Rodale initiated preparations for the first certification program. The window ends in 2000, the year that the USDA released the final regulations that preempted all previous state organic food laws and rules. 72 Dependent Variables. Data for the dependent variables in this study are drawn from all state organic food laws and administrative rules from the first law passage in 1973 through the end of the observation period in 2000. I first consulted Westlaw to obtain all legal code in all states related to organic food production between 1973 and 2000. While Westlaw maintains a fairly comprehensive historical record of all states’ legal statutes, administrative laws, and amendments, I found it necessary to conduct archival research to access legislation predating Westlaw’s database. After obtaining all organic food legislation/administrative law (and subsequent amendments) for each state, I coded each state-year according to the number of provisions that each law contained.11 For each mention of a new provision, the state-year received a one for that provision, otherwise, zero. See Appendix A for a list of all provision categories. This vector of 1 and 0s became the basis for the dependent variable Legal variation. Because a vector of over 100 provisions is unwieldy for analysis, I used the vector to generate a similarity score for each state. To do so, I first established a baseline from which to compare all state-years. This baseline was the first law passed (Oregon 1973). To compute similarity of all other state-years to the Oregon 1973 law, I used the Sorenson-Dice binary-based similarity measure (Dice 1945): cba a ++2 2 11 Issues of intercoder reliability are important to consider when coding messages and textual artifacts (Neuendorf 2002). However, intercoder reliability is markedly more important for latent, rather than manifest, content because with latent content, coders must make subjective judgments and interpretations based on their own mental schema (Potter and Levine-Donnerstein 1999). Legal regulation is manifest content because regulatory language seeks to be as plain as possible by defining key terms, clearly stating the obligations and rights of persons affected, and delineating key elements of compliance. As such, it is substantively much easier to code than latent ideas present in conversations or in newspaper stories. Therefore, I alone coded all data, taking care to capture all provisions in all state regulation. To do this, I began with one state law and coded all regulatory elements. I then coded a second piece of legislation. If the second had new provisions, I created a new category for that provision and went back and checked the first law for the new provision. Once I had reviewed all legislation for all states (and all subsequent amendments), and exhausted the number of possible provisions across state-years, I then re-read all statutes once more to check for any miscoding that may have occurred in earlier statutes read. 73 where a is the co-occurrence of a provision in both laws; b is the presence of a provision in the Oregon 1973, but not in the other state-year being compared to the baseline; and c is the inverse (presence of a provision in the state-year being compared, but not present in the Oregon 1973 year). The Sorenson-Dice measure is in a class of similarity measures that do not consider negative co-occurrences.12 As apparent from the measure, Sorenson-Dice weights positive co-occurrences of provisions, which in the case of organic food laws is favorable because it emphasizes the active inclusion in a law. The raw similarity measure calculated for each state-year thus shows how much a given state in year t deviates from the original vector of provisions in the Oregon 1973 law.13 Instead of inferring inertia by simply considering which states passed one law but then never altered that law (Grattet et al. 1998), I develop a more complex measure that takes into account legal content variation among all states on a temporal basis. To construct this measure, I calculated the mean similarity score for all laws by year for each year of the observation window. I then subtracted each state’s similarity score in year t from the mean similarity score for all states in year t. A higher value (values ranged from .27 to -.37) for a particular state-year set of provisions means it is less similar to the Oregon 1973 law than the overall mean for that year. Conversely, a lower value means that a particular state-year configuration of provisions is more similar to the Oregon 1973 law than the overall mean for that year. For example, in 2000, Montana had a similarity score of .6; it was the state most similar to Oregon 1973 for that year. However, the overall mean for 2000 was .23. Thus, Montana in 2000 deviated from the yearly mean score in 2000 by .37. In contrast to Montana 2000, the opposite condition exists for Nebraska 1986. Nebraska 12 In a study of molecular markers, the Sorenson-Dice coefficient was found to be an effective and efficient measure, prompting the authors to suggest its use for practical applications (Duarte, Santos, and Melo 1999). 13 Because Oregon 1973 was used as the baseline, I excluded Oregon from the data set. 74 passed a law in 1986, with the similarity score being .13. As such, Nebraska was quite different from Oregon 1973. In 1986, the mean similarity score for all states was .40, suggesting that the overall mean of all state similarity measures for 1986 was closer to the Oregon 1973 law than was Nebraska’s. Consequently, the Nebraska 1986 law deviated from the 1986 mean by .27. Because I am interested in the degree to which a state is inertial in its state law content for a given year, I take the absolute value of the difference between the mean similarity score for all states at year t and the similarity score for each state at year t. This yields a dependent variable capable of capturing individual state deviation from the yearly mean in either direction (+ or -). Thus, the dependent variable, once the absolute value is taken, ranges from 0 to .37. To analyze Legal variation, I used a linear regression model. Because the data set consists of multiple state observations, observations are not independent, violating a core assumption of ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. As such, these data are prone to serial and cross-sectional autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity. To correct for these problems, I use the xtreg command with the fixed effects option in Stata 9 to model the dependent variable Legal variation. Because the dependent variable ranges from 0 to .37 and is truncated, tobit analyses were conducted and resulted in identical results as reported here. To assess the degree of regulatory elaboration, I operationalized the second dependent variable in this study as the number of amendments passed. Amendments to the law such as renumbering or making cosmetic changes to the entire code are excluded from the analysis. Any states that had not passed an organic food law are also excluded from the analysis. Given the large amount of zeros present in the data, I use a zero-inflated negative binomial model using the zinb estimation procedure in Stata 9. Because there are multiple observations for the same state in the analysis, I 75 correct for the possible violation of independence among observations by calculating the standard errors of coefficient estimates using a robust clustering technique, clustering on state (White 1982). Both dependent variables are updated annually to account for any change in laws. Independent Variables. The primary independent variables of interest are the type and presence of SBCOs. For data on certification organizations, I consulted multiple sources. For a yearly compilation of all certification organizations in existence in the United States, I drew from the National Organic Directory (NOD; 1983–1984, 1986– 2001), published by the Community Alliance with Family Farmers. I also consulted three additional directories14 to capture all certification organizations that existed prior to their listing in the NOD. If directories did not list a founding date for the certification organization, calls were made to the organization to obtain it. If the organization had been dissolved, I contacted affiliated farmers or organizations to obtain both a founding date and a dissolution date for the particular organization. Based on these data-gathering techniques, I am confident that I captured all certification organizations that had existed during our observation period. To indicate the presence of a local nonprofit SBCO in any given state-year, I simply use a dichotomous variable (1 present, 0 absent). Control Variables. To rule out alternative explanations for inertia and elaboration, I control for a host of variables that may influence these legal dynamics. First, I control for a number of agricultural-related measures such as the total number of farms in a state (logged) (Number of farms), the change in the number of farms (Change # farms), and the percentage of state GSP that is generated through agriculture (Farm revenue/GSP). I also control for the degree to which a state’s agricultural production is concentrated in larger farms (Farmland/farms). For this measure, I divide the total 14 One published by the Organic Farming Research Foundation, another by the Agricultural Marketing Service of the USDA, and the third by ATTRA (Appropriate Technology Transfer for Rural Areas). 76 amount of agricultural farmland in a state by the total number of farms. These data come from the National Agricultural Statistics Service of the United States Department of Agriculture. I also control for state SBCOs (State SBCO) because they spawned many amendments as they adapted legal and regulatory structure to better suit their needs. I also control for the number of organic wholesalers (Wholesalers) given that they had substantial interest in the governance arrangements of the industry and played a key brokerage function between farms and retail outlets in the marketing channels of organic food.15 Given that the broader public may influence law passage, I include a control for the percentage of liberal voters in a state (Liberal voters). This measure comes from Wright, Erikson, and McIver (1985) and is a time-invariant measure culled from 76,000 respondents to CBS News–New York Times polls at the state level between 1974 and 1982. I also control for party strength at the state legislative level. Political scientists have shown that party strength can facilitate or impede the passage of particular kinds of laws (Brown 1995; Peterson 1995). Because the organic food movement was aligned with environmental and counterculture movements in the 1960s and 1970s, I control for the degree to which Democrats control state legislatures (Percent democrat). Because the percentage of senate seats occupied by Democrats is highly collinear with the percentage of house seats occupied by Democrats (.88), I include the 15 These data are from the NOD and Foods Co-ops: An Alternative to Shopping in Supermarkets (Ronco 1975), both of which list wholesalers that sell natural and organically grown or produced food. The NOD provides the most comprehensive listing of all wholesalers carrying organically produced food from 1983 to 1984 and from 1986 to 2000. Foods Co-ops was published in 1975. To develop a longitudinal variable from these two sources that would cover the length of our observation period, I first established that the two sources were similar. I compared the 1983 wholesaler data from the NOD with the 1974 Food Co-ops data. I found a .86 correlation between the two data sources. I then interpolated the NOD data and compared the interpolated 1974 NOD data with the 1974 Food Co-ops data and found a .75 correlation. Based on these correlations, I combined the Food Co-ops and the NOD data and linearly interpolated and extrapolated to generate values for the missing years of data. 77 percentage for the Senate. These data were collected from the Statistical Abstract of the United States. I also include a measure of the cumulative number of laws passed (# states w/law) to control for broader institutional processes of mimicry and learning (Haveman 1993; Haunschild and Miner 1997; Strang and Soule 1998). Finally, in the analysis of legal variation, I include the number of amendments passed (Amendments). I also control for the proportion of states in each state’s agricultural region that have passed an organic food law (% regional states w/law). To construct this variable, I rely on the USDA-designated farm regions. All variables in all analyses were lagged one year. RESULTS To evaluate hypothesis 1, that regulatory inertia occurs during the early period of industry law and regulatory elaboration occurs in a later period, I draw attention to Figures 2.1 and 2.2, which plot the number of laws and amendments passed over the time period of the study and show box plots of similarity scores for the years 1979 to 2000, respectively. Figure 2.1 reveals, consistent with predictions from institutional theory (if one simply considers a 1/0 adopt/not adopted dichotomy), a global trend of institutionalization within the industry with regard to state law. Looking at the entire United States, law passage followed a typical “s-curve” that characterizes most diffusion patterns. The same table shows the cumulative number of amendments passed over the same time period. As law passage slows down in the early 1990s, amendments, which were well below 10 in the first 20 years of the observation period, increase monotonically over the course of the last 10 years of the observation period. This pattern suggests that regulatory elaboration did indeed occur in the latter period of the study. Once a “basic” law was in place, states tended to amend their respective 78 laws in the later period of the study, elaborating and expanding institutional structure and control mechanisms. With regard to regulatory inertia, Table 2.1 lists all states that passed a law without ever amending it. As demonstrated, only one (Massachusetts) of the first five states to pass an organic food law never amended it. In contrast to Grattet et al.’s (1998) prediction that regulatory inertia would occur early on in the period of law passage, 64 percent of exclusive law passage (as they defined it) occurs in the last third of the observation period; 93 percent of exclusive law passage occurs in the last half of the observation period. TABLE 2.1: STATES PASSING A LAW AND NO SUBSEQUENT AMENDMENTS State Year Massachusetts 1978 Nebraska 1986 South Dakota 1988 Wisconsin 1988 Ohio 1989 Rhode Island 1990 Vermont 1990 Virginia 1990 Indiana 1993 North Carolina 1993 Pennsylvania 1994 Georgia 2000 Michigan 2000 Missouri 2000 Mean=1991; s.d.=6.1 years Employing the similarity index, Figure 2.2 provides an alternative perspective on inertia. Defining inertia as deviation from the yearly mean of similarity, a different pattern emerges. Box plots are particularly useful for exploring questions of variation because they provide information about the median, the interquartile range (capturing the 79 middle 50% of the values), the extreme values within 3/2*IQR, and outliers that lie 1.5 times beyond the IQR. As apparent in Figure 2.2, the IQR from 197916 to 1987 is quite large, suggesting a fair amount of variation within those yearly averages of the similarity score. For instance, in 1979, Massachusetts and Connecticut had scores of .31 and .30, respectively, whereas Maine and California were much more similar to the Oregon 1973 law, with similarity scores of .62 and .56, respectively. The median score sinks dramatically in 1985 with laws in New Hampshire and Washington differing radically from the other existing laws at the time. Between 1987 and 1990, the median score again falls substantially. From 1990 on, the national mean similarity score varies little, with a high in 1992 of .265 to a low of .231 by 2000. While the IQR is getting smaller, the whiskers become elongated over time and outliers appear, suggesting that while the majority of states are converging within the IQR, there are others that are introducing variation in two ways. First, consistent with the mechanism of regulatory inertia, variation enters through the passage of a law that is similar to Oregon 1973 but is never amended (represented by the upper whiskers and outliers in Figure 2.2), despite ongoing change to the national mean similarity measure. Second, heterogeneity may enter through the passage of a law (represented by the lower whiskers and outlier in Figure 2.2) that diverges significantly from OR 1973 and from the yearly mean. It should also be noted that the majority of states that pass amendments fall within the IQR (59% are passed by states that fall within the IQR; 13% are passed by states below the 25th percentile; 29% are passed by states with similarity scores above the 75th percentile). From these graphical analyses, I conclude that hypothesis 1 is partially supported. Regulatory inertia certainly exists in state-level organic food regulation, but it does not necessarily occur in the early period of the observation window as it did in 16 There is no box plot shown for 1978 because Massachusetts and Oregon were the only states that had any organic regulation to that point. In 1978, Massachusetts has a similarity score of .18. 80 the context of hate crime legislation. With regard to regulatory elaboration, there is evidence that individual states are expanding their laws in the later period of law passage, but the states passing amendments generally fall within the yearly IQR, suggesting that regulatory elaboration occurs for states but that regulatory elaboration does not necessarily result in greater legal variation. FIGURE 2.2: BOXPLOTS OF SIMILARITY SCORES, BY YEAR I now turn to the remaining hypotheses that consider the impact of SBCOs on regulatory elaboration and regulatory inertia. Tables 2.2 and 2.3 report the descriptive statistics and correlations between the variables used in the analyses. Table 2.4 presents the results of the legal variation analysis. It should be reiterated here that the dependent variable is the absolute value of the similarity score of each state in year t less the mean similarity score for year t. In other words, a high value is equivalent to 20001999 1998 1997 1996 1995 19941993199219911990198919881987198619851984198319821981 1980 1979 Year 0.4000 0.2000 0.0000 Si m ila ri ty 81 deviation in either direction from the mean for that year. Model 1 contains the control variables. States with state SBCOs are less likely to deviate from yearly national mean similarity scores. This is also true of states with higher percentages of Democrats in the senate and greater numbers of wholesalers. As the number of organic food laws increase, individual states’ laws are less likely to diverge from the mean similarity measure, suggesting general convergence. By contrast, states with larger farms (Farmland/farms) are more likely to have laws that deviate from the yearly mean. This holds true for states located in farm regions that have higher percentages of states that have passed laws previously. Model 2 adds the SBCO variables. Consistent with hypothesis 2b, states with local nonprofit SBCOs are less likely to have laws that deviate from the national mean for year t, although this variable is marginally significant. However, hypothesis 3b is strongly supported, with OCIA, the federated SBCO, leading to increased variation from the national mean for year t. These findings support the contention that SBCO infrastructure significantly influences the dynamics of legal variation across time and space. Table 2.5 presents the results from the analysis total amendments. Model 3 contains the control variables. In this analysis, state SBCOs and states with greater numbers of wholesalers are more likely to pass amendments. It should be noted that these two variables positively predict regulatory elaboration and negatively predict deviations from the national yearly mean of similarity. This suggests that in states where state SBCOs operate and where there are greater numbers of wholesalers, there will be greater regulatory elaboration and greater congruence with these states’ laws and the national yearly similarity average. This makes sense given that the state uses its legislative and regulative machinery to operate its state SBCO. Wholesalers, as critical linking pins between SBCOs and consumer markets, encouraged greater 82 regulation as key brokers who sought to decrease information asymmetries regarding product quality and to decrease coordination costs across state boundaries through streamlining certification and regulation. Model 4 includes the SBCO variables. Hypotheses 2a and 3a are both supported, with local nonprofit SBCOs being strong predictors of legal amendments and OCIA being a strong negative predictor of legal amendments. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION The purpose of this paper was to shed light on how legal dynamics within one industry context unfold over time and across polities. While recent work has made significant gains in understanding how and under what conditions political and institutional factors influence the passage (and repeal) of state laws, questions of legal variation and other important legal dynamics such as amendment processes have been largely neglected. Nonetheless, an “appreciation of heterogeneity and the relative incoherence of fields is crucial . . . for empirical explorations of institutional change” (Schneiberg and Clemens 2006:210). 83 TABLE 2.2: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND CORRELATIONS FOR REGULATORY INERTIA ANALYSIS Variable Mean Std. Dev. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 1. Similarity .10 .08 2. State SBCO .30 .46 -.23 3. Percent Democrat .55 .15 .02 .07 4. Wholesalers 6.49 17.74 -.12 -.09 -.02 5. Change # farms 14.22 1454.47 .01 .14 -.03 .07 6. Farm revenue/GSP .02 .03 -.08 -.19 -.28 -.07 -.17 7. Farmland/farms .66 .84 -.02 .03 -.25 -.07 -.01 .26 8. Change in acres -100.00 438.67 .03 .06 .12 -.10 .21 -.02 -.19 9. Number of farms (ln) 10.01 1.41 -.01 -.03 -.08 .23 .07 .33 -.13 -.04 10. # states w/law 27.68 8.77 -.09 .27 -.16 .02 .07 -.01 .11 -.02 .10 11. % regional states w/law .63 .19 -.11 .28 -.15 .16 .19 .09 .12 -.02 .10 .59 12. Amendments .13 .40 -.10 .26 -.02 .10 .11 -.07 .00 -.07 .04 .04 .16 13. Local nonprofit SBCO .46 .50 .18 -.40 .10 .24 -.02 -.37 -.45 .06 .03 -.20 -.24 .01 14. OCIA .33 .47 .02 -.30 -.22 .04 -.11 .46 .22 -.08 .40 .21 .08 -.12 -.06 84 TABLE 2.3: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND CORRELATIONS FOR REGULATORY ELABORATION ANALYSIS Variable Mean Std. Dev. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 1. Amendments .74 3.33 2. State SBCO .30 .46 .22 3. Liberal voters 20.45 4.14 .02 -.11 4. Percent Democrat .55 .15 .05 .07 .31 5. Wholesalers 6.90 17.93 .03 -.10 .26 -.02 6. Change # farms 43.99 1448.54 .07 .13 -.07 -.03 .07 7. Farm revenue/GSP .02 .02 -.01 -.19 -.49 -.27 -.08 -.15 8. Farmland/farms .64 .80 .07 .05 -.14 -.25 -.07 .00 .27 9. Change in acres -98.85 443.35 -.05 .06 .01 .12 -.09 .23 -.01 -.20 10. Number of farms (ln) 10.03 1.37 .02 -.03 -.30 -.10 .24 .08 .33 -.11 -.03 11. # states w/law 27.55 9.20 .03 .29 -.23 -.17 .03 .04 .02 .12 -.01 .08 12. % regional states w/law .63 .19 .04 .26 -.20 -.16 .17 .19 .11 .13 -.02 .11 .61 13. Local nonprofit SBCO .49 .50 -.03 -.46 .39 .10 .23 -.04 -.36 -.45 .06 .04 -.27 -.25 14. OCIA .32 .47 -.06 -.28 -.18 -.22 .03 -.16 .51 .25 -.09 .38 .21 .06 -.11 85 TABLE 2.4: REGULATORY INERTIA ANALYSIS, BY STATE (GENERALIZED LEAST SQUARES FIXED EFFECTS REGRESSION MODELS) Variable Model 1 Model 2 State SBCO -.025** -.028** (.008) (.008) Percent Democrat -.091** -.083** (.031) (.031) Wholesalers -.001** -.001** (.000) (.000) Change # farms .000 .000 (.000) (.000) Farm revenue/GSP .325 .371 (.234) (.232) Farmland/farms .083** .077** (.024) (.024) Change in acres .000 .000 (.000) (.000) Number of farms (ln) .004 .021 (.045) (.045) # states w/law -.002** -.002** (.000) (.000) % regional states w/law .119** .123** (.028) (.028) Amendments -.001 .000 (.005) (.005) Local nonprofit SBCO -.013+ (.007) OCIA .020** (.007) Constant .038 -.130 (.465) (.465) Observations 419 419 Number of states 35 35 R-squared .17 .19 Standard errors in brackets. Note: Liberal voters variable dropped due to time invariance. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 86 TABLE 2.5: REGULATORY ELABORATION ANALYSIS, COUNT OF AMENDMENTS, BY STATE (ZERO-INFLATED NEGATIVE BINOMIAL MODELS) Variable Model 3 Model 4 State SBCO 3.190** 4.576** (.504) (.831) Liberal voters .027 .016 (.090) (.077) Percent Democrat 1.401 1.481 (2.138) (2.298) Wholesalers .025** .022* (.009) (.009) Change # farms .000 .000* (.000) (.000) Farm revenue/GSP 18.43 58.883** (15.926) (15.131) Farmland/farms -.119 .696* (.226) (.286) Change in acres -.001** -.001** (.000) (.000) Number of farms (ln) -.081 -.037 (.301) (.300) # states w/law -.099* -.026 (.039) (.044) % regional states w/law 2.859 -.112 (2.393) (1.935) Local nonprofit SBCO 3.321** (.804) OCIA -1.662* (.695) Constant -2.246 -5.961+ (3.260) (3.401) Log pseudo likelihood -237.654 -231.565 Wald test Χ2 52.43 64.82 Degrees of freedom 11 13 Note: n=411. Robust standard errors in parentheses. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 87 Moving beyond dichotomous conceptualizations of industry legal infrastructure by focusing on processes that generate variation in legal content and amendments to preexisting laws, I have sought to provide a broader conceptualization of regulatory evolution, opening theoretical and empirical opportunities to more fully understand institutional change. To do this, I have modified explanations of two key processes that work against homogenization of legal structure—regulatory inertia and regulatory elaboration (Grattet et al. 1998). In the context of the U.S. organic food industry, I found evidence of regulatory elaboration (amendments) occurring in the later period of law passage. However, states passing amendments were generally within the yearly inter-quartile range of the similarity index (see Figure 2.2), suggesting that while an individual state’s domain or jurisdiction over the organic industry expanded at the state level, such expansion did not necessarily translate into greater overall legal variation. In contrast, regulatory inertia contributed significantly to overall legal heterogeneity in the context of organic food law. However, in contrast to the findings of a study of U.S. hate crime legislation (Grattet et al. 1998), I found that regulatory inertia was not confined to the early period of the observation period. Rather, regulatory inertia—as measured as the passage of a single law with no subsequent amendments—occurred primarily in the later period of legal structuration in the organic food industry. I also found that inertia measured as deviation from a yearly similarity score occurred in two ways. First, some states passed laws and never amended them, even as the overall mean similarity index decreased over time (as illustrated in Figure 2.2 by the upper whiskers and outliers of the box plots). Second, other states passed laws that were even less similar than the overall mean similarity index was to the baseline Oregon 1973 law (the lower whiskers and outlier of the box plots shown in Figure 2.2). For example, a number of states, late in the observation period, passed laws that consisted of a single provision (i.e., Maryland, 1990; North 88 Carolina, 1993; Missouri, 2000). Thus, while regulatory inertia occurred in this context, it did not occur in the early period of the observation window as suggested by Grattet et al., nor was it confined to states that passed a single law and never amended it. A second and more consequential modification of Grattet et al.’s (1998) study is that while the authors conclude that “the content of a state’s law is contingent upon when it enters the ongoing institutionalization process” (p. 303), I have shown that intra-industry governance organizations also significantly influence processes of regulatory inertia and elaboration. This approach, which focuses on the role of interests and preexisting industry-governance infrastructure in generating legal-content variation, has the potential to inform questions of which legal principles and configurations of provisions are produced and which come to dominate an industry (Edelman and Stryker 2005). Focusing on local nonprofit SBCOs and the federated SBCO OCIA, I found that the presence of a local nonprofit SBCO in a state predicts significant regulatory elaboration in terms of amendments to existing legal structure, whereas the presence of an OCIA chapter negatively predicts amendments. In terms of regulatory inertia, states dominated by local nonprofit SBCOs are less likely to have idiosyncratic laws when compared to the national mean similarity measure for each year. In contrast, the presence OCIA significantly predicts the presence of idiosyncratic laws. These findings contribute to existing literature in a number of ways. First, by examining the variation of content of laws, this study moves beyond extant conceptualizations of institutional change that tend to focus on a structurally deterministic, binary conceptualization of institutionalization to place emphasis on heterogeneity—an increasingly important element of institutional analysis, demonstrated by recent studies of institutional change and its effects (Schneiberg and 89 Bartley 2001; Sine, Haveman, and Tolbert 2005; Schneiberg and Clemens 2006). Focusing on the degree to which a particular state’s laws deviate from mean similarity scores across all states provides clues into the impact of institutional processes versus political processes in dictating the content, scope, and efficacy of industry regulation (Edelman and Stryker 2005). Greater precision in measuring this type of heterogeneity in institutional structure, coupled with greater attention to the location and relative power of various stakeholders within a particular organizational field, can provide a solid foundation for moving beyond institutional theory’s historical focus on the effects of institutions (Dacin, Goodstein, and Scott 2002) and toward a more robust examination of processes of institutional creation and transformation. Second, disaggregating organizational forms into more distinct categories allows for a more nuanced understanding of the differential impact of seemingly similar forms on broader field-level institutions and relations. Recent work in social movement theory has transcended the dichotomy of viewing organizational structure as either suppressing mobilization capacity (i.e., Michels 1962; Piven and Cloward 1979; Rothschild and Whitt 1986) or facilitating it (McCarthy and Zald 1977) to examine more carefully how organizational attributes influence the ability to mobilize (see Clemens and Minkoff 2004; Edwards and McCarthy 2004:136–138). For example, Edwards and McCarthy note, “The choice of organizational form can have direct implications for the ability of an ongoing SMO to build the organizational capacity for certain types of collective action, such as grass-roots mobilization and litigation” (2004:137–138). Clemens and Minkoff echo that idea, “Rather than being homogenized as a ‘resource,’ particular organizations sustain distinctive cultures of interaction and shape trajectories of mobilization. The answer to ‘how shall we organize?’ (Clemens 1996) proves to be consequential for the development of actors as activists and the prospects for organized political action” (2004:157). They further 90 note that “distinctive styles of organizing also make activism attractive to different potential activists” (2004:157), suggesting that organizational form can influence who becomes members of one organization and not another. While SBCOs are not social movement organizations, local nonprofit SBCOs exhibited tendencies similar to those of SMOs. As such, in this study, I attempted to differentiate the capacity of local nonprofit certification organizations from that of a federated SBCO. While future research must more fully explicate the differential impact of organizational capacity from underlying motivations and scope of focus regarding legislative outcomes, this study nonetheless show clear differences in institutional outcomes for different types of SBCOs. More research that appreciates the role of organizational variety or heterogeneity in generating differential institutional outcomes is needed to validate and corroborate the findings in this study. 91 APPENDIX A: CODING SHEET FOR ORGANIC FOOD LAWS AND AMENDMENTS Provisions organic is defined organic is defined as certified organic certification is defined Producer is defined Producer must register with state Processor must register with state Handler must register with state Producer is certified by state Regulation of materials Approaches to regulation certifier has a Materials List for generic materials certifier emphasizes avoiding prohibited practices/materials, not soil building or other `positive' goals Materials for crop production Raw manure: required interval after use before crop can be harvested Fungicide-treated seed is prohibited or regulated Treated seed okay if organic is unavailable Non-certified annual seedlings prohibited Use of GEO/GMO materials prohibited Use of GEO/GMO derivatives prohibited Biosolids (sewage sludge) prohibited Irradiation prohibited Sprouts Organic crop management requires recordkeeping designates the number of years records must be kept state officials have access to a producer/processor's etc. records, land, warehouses, etc. Organic plan required plan submitted annually on-site inspection at least annually Crop rotation required for annual plants time between pesticide and harvest time between fertilizer and harvest `Transitional organic' product labeling is permitted Soil nutrient test is required for certification Soil residue test is required for certification the FDA or EPA % of minimum pesticide residues allowable prohibits the commingling of organic and conventionally grown products `Parallel production' is allowed, if additional record keeping/organizational requirements are met Rotating fields in and out of organic production (even with full transition time) is prohibited When irrigating, operator must practice water conservation Certification program management General points 92 Provisions affidavits are mentioned as legitimate means of verification Annual renewal of certification Annual inspection of operation state performs unannounced second inspection on all first-time applicants state performs unannounced inspections on a random set of recertifying operators state reserves the right to make unannounced inspections at any time state will investigate reasonable reports of violations certified operator can appeal decertification decision Unintentional contamination Buffer zone requirements (space separation, physical barriers, runoff diversion) Operator must test irrigation water regularly for contamination by organically prohibited materials Regular residue tests required for soil Regular residue tests required for crops Allowable residue level for residues in produce Crop with residues over allowed limit can never be labeled `certified organic', regardless of reason Consequences of drift of prohibited materials on to certified crops or land, when drift is not due to fault of certified operator Crop cannot be labeled `organic', regardless of amount of drift Affected land is automatically decertified, regardless of the amount of drift Enforcement procedures Organic plan emphasized as enforcement tool Audit trail emphasized as enforcement tool (not just for animals) Medical records for individual animals (or flocks, for fowl) must be traceable through life cycle Animals must be individually identified on body by physical marker or tag (except fowl) Record keeping system must be adequate to ensure products of treated animals are not labeled organic Animals treated with prohibited materials must be identified on body of animal (with tag, etc.) to ensure no confusion (except fowl) Organic Processing Processors must keep records/time Audit Trail Product guidelines by labeling category `Organic' on principal display panel (PDP) requires 95±100% organic ingredients Requires a different percentage `Made with organic' (MWO) on PDP requires 50±95% organic ingredients Requires 70±95% organic ingredients Products with some organic ingredients, but not enough to make the `MWO' cutoff, can say `contains organic [ingredients]' on information panel Organic ingredients cannot be identified if entire product does not meet criteria for `organic' label certification of processing is required for `organic [product]' and `MWO [ingredients]' label claims certification of processing is required even if labeling only identifies organic ingredients on side panel Product composition For `organic' and `MWO' products: Non-agricultural ingredients should be minimized certifier encourages using 100% organic ingredients, or requires preferential use of organic ingredients Genetically engineered ingredients are prohibited Irradiated ingredients are prohibited 93 Provisions Nutritional quality should be preserved in processing This is emphasized in processing section, not just in principles of organic production certifier allows an expanded set of non-agricultural ingredients in `MWO' products certifier allows any ingredient to be used in `COI' products that are certified organically processed Processors making only `COI' products are exempted from some non-composition requirements Facility management Organic plan is required `Parallel production' is allowed, if additional record keeping/organizational requirements are met Procedures to ensure organic integrity HACCP or similar system involving critical control points ISO 9000 series certification Extra withdrawal time required after fumigation with a prohibited material Regular or required residue testing of products certifier can test for residues if reason for suspicion `Ecologically sound' waste management plan Producer must minimize packaging Handling regulations (and defined) Must be licensed with state retailer not considered a handler Retailer must keep records =2 if handler, =1 if retailer year records must be kept by retailers Requires retailers to maintain audit trail certifier has detailed description of requirements for non-processor handlers Handlers dealing in only MWO or COI products are subject to less restrictive standards Handlers are subject to less restrictive standards or a less thorough certification and inspection process, if organic sales are below a specified level With each transaction in supply chain, both buyer and seller (if certified) must record transaction, date, and volume exchanged All processors and handlers must maintain audit trail sufficient to track raw materials from supplier to retail On-farm processors must meet all processing standards Organic labeling guidelines Processed and unprocessed products labeled `organic' Label is required to be sold as organic When two products come from two different cert orgs., must have both names on label mandates the creation of a state organic label (e.g. Montana Certified Organic) if the product is labeled as organic, it meets the state code certifier must pre-approve entire label Label on retail item must identify certifier of the final handler or distributor of product certifier contact information is required on retail item In multi-ingredient products, listing same ingredient from organic and non-organic sources is prohibited In multi-ingredient products, listing an ingredient as `organic when available' is prohibited if less than all of the ingredients are not organic, then not organic All products labeled `organic' "organic when available" label not acceptable Producers name/address on the label `Transitional' product labeling 94 Provisions Transitional product certifiable Transitional product can use same logo as certified organic Label, seal, or statement contains the word `organic' Labeling through distribution chain: `Organic' required on invoice `Organic' required on non-retail container (box, bin, case, pallet) certifier ID required on invoice certifier ID required on non-retail container (box, bin, case, pallet) provides other cert. , in addition to `organic' or `transitional' Seal is a registered trademark Statements on packaged multi-ingredient foods For products labeled `organic' on PDP: certifier name may appear on PDP certifier logo may appear on PDP certifier name may appear on label certifier logo may appear on label `Organic' must be smaller than product ID Individual id. of organic ingredients on info panel Statement of percent organic ingredients Organizational structure Program is self-sufficient in funding State programs: program has advisory board the dept of ag. is an organic certifier dept of ag contracts out cert. to a private entity dept. of ag sets certification procedures/organic regulations certifier is licensed, authorized, or approved in some way be state(s) in which it operates Advisory board is mandated by statute number of people on board board producer board processor board handler board environmentalist board technical board state ag/extension Consumer rep retailer misc. board Board has input in standards decisions Board has final decisions for standards Board has input in de/certification decisions Board has final decision for de/certification designates the composition of that board creates a fund especially for organic creates avenue for complaints to be heard Interactions with other certifiers and national bodies 95 Provisions Standards state intent to create reciprocity agreements STATE POWERS provision outlining mislabeling as unlawful Unlawful to certify in violation of statute Unlawful to produce, handle, or process organic food unless registered with state Unlawful to make a false statement Unlawful to forge, falsify, fail to obtain, retain, disclose records unlawful to advertise label, or represent that fertilizer or pesticide may be used when it is a prohibited substance Unlawful to commingle whether or not the law stipulates a fine for any unlawful activity amount of fine specified type of fine 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Zhou, Xueguang. 1993. “Occupational Power, State Capacities, and the Diffusion of Licensing in the American States: 1890 to 1950.” American Sociological Review 58(4):536–552. 103 PAPER 3: CERTIFYING THE HARVEST: THE ROLE OF STANDARDS-BASED CERTIFICATION ORGANIZATIONS IN THE ORGANIC FOOD INDUSTRY INTRODUCTION Traditional economic explanations conceptualize the origins of markets as unproblematic and as a given. Arrow (1974), for example, states, “Although we are not usually explicit about it, we really postulate that when a market could be created, it would be” (quoted in Sarasvathy and Dew 2005:533–534). Williamson (1985) similarly reflects an uncritical attitude toward the origins of markets by stating, “In the beginning, there were markets” (p. 87). More recent work in historical economics suggests that “institutions organically emerge in the initial stages of market development as unintended and unforeseeable results from the pursuit of individual interests” (Greif 2005:728). The underlying assumptions of these quotes are that markets emerge through atomized market behavior, that entrepreneurs engage in optimal decision making, and that consumers have well-defined preferences. Economic sociologists, organization theorists, and strategists have challenged these assumptions, emphasizing the collective, political, and often unintended nature of processes associated with new market emergence. A growing number of scholars acknowledge the significant amount of “institutional work” needed to lessen uncertainty and ambiguity to an acceptable level before a market can be established and grow (Zucker 1986; Fligstein 1996; Garud, Jain, and Kumaraswamy 2002; Stinchcombe 2002; Rao 2004). Recent work in organization theory underscores the importance of institutional entrepreneurs in the creation of new institutions and industries. To date, research in this vein has focused on delineating the processes and strategies by which institutional entrepreneurs are able to embed new “beliefs, norms and values into social structures” 104 and precipitate institutional change (Rao, Morrill, and Zald 2000:240). Much of this research is grounded in social movement theory (See McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996), focusing on key processes including the identification of political opportunities, appropriate framing and theorization of problems and solutions, and mobilization of key constituencies. Studies of institutional entrepreneurship highlight the skill of institutional entrepreneurs in forging new institutions in the face of existing ones (Fligstein 1997). For example, activities such as “demonstration events” sponsored by supporters of new technologies allow potential consumers to gain firsthand experience with radically new technologies to assess their utility, reliability, and validity.1 A central, yet understudied means by which institutional entrepreneurs mitigate concerns over legitimacy and uncertainty is through the creation and promulgation of standards (Garud et al. 2002). In the absence of support from key institutional actors (the state and the professions) that are often initially reluctant to endorse new/marginal economic practices and innovations that deviate too far from taken-for-granted ways of consumption and product use (Leblebici, Salancik, Copay, and King 1991), standards-based certification organizations2 (referred to hereafter as SBCOs) are often organized by interested actors who create and promulgate standards in an effort to supply market order. Like institutions that “make new labels, and the labels make new kinds of people” (Douglas 1986:108), standards and the organizations that promote them can wield tremendous classificatory power by providing “ontological closure” around a particular product definition (Pinch and Bijker 1987) and by allocating material and social resources to people and organizations based on criteria embodied in standards. Through the use of 1 Examples include the telephone (Fischer 1992), the bicycle (Smith 1973), and the automobile (Rao 1994; 2004). 2 By standards-based certification organizations, I refer to organizations whose primary purpose is to create and/or promote standards, verify the compliance of other organizations with those standards, and formally acknowledge that an organization has met the standards through the conferral of a certification, endorsement, or accreditation. 105 measurement, recording, and ranking processes, new social entities are brought into existence (Espeland and Stevens 1998). Given the potential for standards to channel behavior, some scholars suggest they be placed on equal footing with markets and hierarchies because of their ability to facilitate contact, coordination, and anonymous market exchange (Brunsson 2000). Yet, standardization has been largely neglected by the social sciences when compared with other sources of order such as the state, markets and organization (Brunsson and Jacobsson 2000). In this paper, I respond to this call by examining how SBCOs structure and provide order in nascent market settings. Specifically, I seek to answer the following questions: How do SBCOs provide market order? How do the activities of SBCOs influence market entry and exit rates? While a significant body of literature has accumulated on the role of standards in technology fields,3 we know relatively little about the dynamics of standards in new nontechnological product markets in which the standards themselves are central to the value of the product they are purported to describe and evaluate (Espeland and Stevens 1998:338). In other words, these types of standards serve to differentiate otherwise identical products in a market. While there is no visible difference in the products or services provided, there are clear differences in the processes and inputs used in producing the good. For example, fair-trade coffee looks and tastes no different from conventional coffee. However, there is a price premium for fair-trade coffee because its value is derived from a set of standards that 3 Scholarly work on the role of technology standards has shown that common technological standards facilitate compatibility and interoperability between products or networks of products. These shared standards must emerge before firms can evaluate products and exchange in the marketplace (Garud et al. 2002). Significant work in economics and strategy has demonstrated how the creation of technological standards generates network externalities (Katz and Shapiro 1985; Farrell and Saloner 1986). Technology standards can also lead to path dependence, irreversibility, and lock-in (David 1985; Arthur 1989). “Dominant design” is a closely related concept because it provides firms with the possibility of enjoying monopolistic control of the market (Utterback and Abernathy 1975; Tushman and Anderson 1986). For a recent review of this literature, see Quelin, Abdessemed, and Durand 2001. 106 requires importers to meet international criteria, pay a minimum price per pound for coffee, and provide credit and technical support to farmers. The U.S. organic food industry provides an ideal context to explore these research questions because, as is the case in a number of other product markets, the value of the product is derived from processes and inputs of the production rather than solely from the product itself.4 In recent years, organic agriculture has grown into a 26-billion-dollar industry, making it the fastest growing sector in both U.S. and global agricultural markets. Although organic production accounts for less than .2 percent of U.S. agricultural output, it has posted a 21 percent yearly growth rate since 1997, and organic cropland has doubled over the same period. Despite such robust growth and the recent passage of federal regulations governing the industry, organic agriculture was marginalized for much of its history. In the early years, both market mechanisms and extant institutional structures failed to provide organic farmers with the stability and support necessary to grow beyond local and specialized niche markets. Because organic agricultural production uses no chemical fertilizer or pesticides and generally results in smaller yields and higher labor costs than conventional agriculture, organic production was seen by the majority of the American farming establishment and policymakers as unscientific and inefficient—a regression to agriculture of the 1930s. The logic of sustainability and ecology underlying organic food production was inconsistent with prevailing logics in conventional agriculture that centered on technology and efficiency. Being excluded from existing channels of access and having little assistance from agricultural market mechanisms, movement insiders mobilized resources to create and advocate a viable set of standards that differentiated organic production techniques and products from those of mainstream agriculture. Consequently, organic farmers, through the 4 Sustainable lumber and paper, green energy, “cruelty free” personal care products, bird-friendly coffee, and other fair-trade commodities all derive their value in this way. 107 development of standards, certification, and labeling processes, sowed the seeds for a movement/market that has quietly grown up in the shadow of conventional agribusiness and now dominates the sector in terms of growth. In the following section, I theoretically explore how standards and SBCOs structure markets and firm behavior, motivating my hypotheses concerning the relationship of SBCOs and their activities to market entry and exit. I then provide a brief historical narrative of the U.S. organic food industry, highlighting the important role of SBCOs in its success. Following this narrative, I present the analyses, results, and conclusion. THEORY AND HYPOTHESES Institutional entrepreneurs are organized actors that have an interest in particular institutional arrangements and who skillfully leverage resources (cultural, social, and material) to create new institutions or transform existing ones (DiMaggio 1988; Fligstein 1997; Rao et al. 2000; Maguire, Hardy, and Lawrence 2004). Garud et al. (2002) outline key actions taken by institutional entrepreneurs: Institutional entrepreneurs create a whole new system of meaning that ties the functioning of disparate sets of institutions together . . . They define, legitimize, combat or co-opt rivals to succeed in their institutional projects . . . Assuming the role of champions, they energize efforts toward collective action and devise strategies for establishing stable sequences of interaction with other organizations to create entirely new industries and associated institutions. (pp. 196–197) Garud and colleagues point out that “the presence or absence of common standards impacts innovation within a technological field” (2002:198), implying that organizations that create and advocate standards in a particular field will likely influence the behavior of other organizations within that field. SBCOs can also accredit those same organizations, providing them with a possible buffer from 108 environmental selection pressures (Wiley and Zald 1968; Durand and McGuire 2005). A number of studies have considered how standards and/or certification processes influence well-established fields such as health care (Ruef and Scott 1998; Scott, Ruef, Mendel, and Caronna 2000), education (Wiley and Zald 1968; Zajac and Kraatz 1993; Casile and Davis-Blake 2002; Durand and McGuire 2005), nonprofits (Litwack and Hylton 1962; Singh, House, and Tucker 1986), and college sports (Stern 1981). Yet few studies have focused on how SBCOs influence firm entry and exit in nascent markets. I propose that SBCOs fulfill four roles critical to new market niche creation and growth. First, SBCOs create standards. Although SBCOs create standards for a variety of reasons (Brunsson 2000), I focus in this paper on the intentional use of standards to differentiate one product from another, with the explicit intent to create a market for that product. Second, SBCOs serve as advocates or evangelists (Stinchcombe 2001) of their standards, seeking to gain adherents. Third, once a firm has adopted standards, SBCOs exert normative control over it through verification processes to guarantee that standards are followed. Fourth, SBCOs provide an endorsement or certification to those organizations found in compliance with the standards promulgated. SBCOs and Standards Creation Sociologists have long been interested in the concept of market order. Durkheim explored the noncontractual aspects of contracts, and Weber examined the centrality of institutions and reputation in economic transactions. Contemporary sociologists have continued to examine the source and outcomes of market order in a vast array of settings.5 For example, scholars approaching industry and technology creation from a cultural/cognitive perspective (e.g., Pinch and Bijker 1987; Garud and 5 See Biggart and Beamish 2003 for a thorough review. 109 Rappa 1994; Porac, Ventresca, and Mishina 2002) begin with the premise that new products and services are not necessarily easily understood or commensurable. As such, “product ontologies” serve as cognitive understandings that concatenate product attributes, usage conditions, and buyer characteristics into a coherent bundle that clearly defines a product or service. This then allows the product or service to be exchanged in market transactions (Porac et al. 2002). Scholars from the Conventions School (Favereau 2002) provide a related, yet distinct, explanation of the origins of market ordering mechanisms. Sidestepping the market versus hierarchies question, Conventions School scholars focus on how individuals achieve economic coordination “via obedience to rules, norms, and intersubjectively mediated action of various forms” (Biggart and Beamish 2003:456). As such, economic coordination results from the interpretive and pragmatic actions of market actors to collectively determine with others how to handle uncertainty in particular situations. Bundles of conventions then become solutions to thorny market problems and these conventions have the propensity to congeal and become reified— similar to institutions (Biggart and Beamish 2003). Solving these types of coordination problems is antecedent to the emergence and growth of new markets, technological regimes, products, and organizational forms (Leblebici et al. 1991; Garud and Rappa 1994; Garud et al. 2002; Schneiberg 2002). Formal standards can embody product ontologies and generate conventions that provide the needed structure, coherence, and meaning to products, actors, and actions in new market arenas. By formal, I mean “the development of an abstraction of a large amount of concrete data, arrived at in such a way that further social action is governed by that abstraction, without in general going back to the original data” (Stinchcombe 2001:3). For example, having a blueprint that is approved by a client eliminates the necessity of continually returning to the client for her approval 110 regarding design preferences at each significant stage in the building process (Stinchcombe 2001). When formalization works well, its purpose is the same as the purpose of the substance on which it is based—a license to practice medicine is typically regarded as an appropriate reflection of a doctor’s knowledge and skill. As such, there is no need on the part of a new patient to “go behind” the abstraction (the doctor’s license to practice medicine) to examine the doctor’s educational and professional background. Ideally, for an abstraction to be continually effective in governing economic action, it should be accurate (does not misdescribe the situation that is to be governed), economical (captures cleanly and orderly only that which is necessary to be easily understood), sufficient (it contains all aspects of a situation that are necessary for effective governance), and have sufficient scope (the range to which the abstraction system can be applied is wide enough for most situations that have to be acted upon to be included) (Stinchcombe 2001). While these conditions constitute an adequate system of abstraction, the system itself should also be communicable to those organizations or people that perform the relevant activities affiliated with the abstraction. To be communicable, a given abstraction should be able to be transmitted to, understood by, and believed by a receiver of the abstraction. Further, the abstraction, to be efficacious and not break down, must exhibit characteristics of transparency and durability. SBCOs and the Advocacy of Standards Standards not only need creators, they also need advocates. Unlike the state, standardizers have no coercive power to induce others to adopt their standards. Indeed, standards can be seen as “pieces of general advice offered to large numbers of potential adopters” (Brunsson and Jacobsson 2000:2). Because standards are usually voluntary, standardizers must expend considerable effort to convince a target audience 111 of the need and benefits of adopting a particular standard. While an abstraction must be adequate and communicable, it must also be communicated. The need for advocacy of standards is particularly high in nascent markets/industries that rely on standards for the success of their radical new product. In the beginning of such markets, advocates of the products must make claims about the utility and desirability of the radical new product (Rao 2004); they must evangelize an understanding of what the product is, what it does, and why it is useful. In contrast to the conventional coercive, mimetic, and normative mechanisms that generate sets of similar organizations (DiMaggio and Powell 1983), evangelism is an alternative, yet effective, mechanism that explains how the “conversion” tactics of the evangelistic advocates spread a new form of organization (Stinchcombe 2002). SBCOs and Processes of Verification SBCOs not only increase and formalize advocacy efforts but also facilitate the adoption of standards through “enrolling” individuals or organizations. Once organizations enroll and adopt standards, they must often modify their organizational structures and activities, submit to information gathering, and allow on-site access to SBCOs, particularly if they want to receive continued SBCO endorsement. Continued and honest monitoring provides important “signals” (Spence 1973) for both the certifier and the certified. These signals cannot be entirely symbolic because audiences will soon begin to discount the signal if it does not adequately correspond to the underlying quality or characteristic it represents (Zucker 1986). However, if the abstraction remains consistent with the reality it represents, legitimacy accrues for both the abstraction as well as the concept behind it (e.g., “fair trade” becomes more cognitively legitimate with each additional wholesaler submitting to the prescribed standards and monitoring). Therefore, standardizers will be more successful in seeing their standards adopted if they create a formal organization of which other 112 organizations become members. Through this formal organization, standardizers can require members to adhere to their standards and can verify compliance through monitoring activities. Through these processes, voluntary standards begin to take on a rule-like character, which equates to power: Rule systems as important social technologies become resources and stakes in social interaction and the strategic structuring of social life. Thus, they cannot be viewed as simply “neutral” or “technical means” of realizing certain purposes . . . [They constitute] a power resource which social agents utilize in their struggles and negotiations over alternative structural forms and development of social systems, serving their interests. (Burns 1986:28–29) Through this power, SBCOs increase their ability to determine continuing membership, set additional rules, and pool resources for continued dissemination of standards and education of would-be adopters. This increased power can also lead to advantageous positioning to influence broader regulatory structures, create status differentiation among actors, and eclipse competing standards (Ahrne, Brunsson, and Garsten 2000). If a set of standards takes hold among a group of organizations, they have the propensity to generate commensuration—rendering two things equal (Espeland and Stevens 1998). For example, commensuration is achieved when a processor of tomato sauce can combine for processing organic tomatoes grown by multiple producers in multiple locations with confidence that all are grown according to the same principles and processes. Likewise, customers can be indifferent to the origin of the tomato or the idiosyncratic characteristics of the grower because the standard commensurates or renders one organic tomato equal to another. In the presence of standards and agreement on those standards (and consequently commensuration), the price mechanism can begin to operate, reflecting the quality of the product or service. It should be noted that commensuration can occur in markets in the absence of standards, but standards tend to increase a market’s durability. 113 As outlined above, SBCOs can play a key role in creating a fertile context for growth in new industries. First, by creating standards, they make claims about the nature and characteristics of a product. This activity is particularly important in markets where it is difficult to visually distinguish similar products from one another. Second, SBCOs act as institutional entrepreneurs by evangelizing standards and infusing them with value. Third, SBCOs exercise normative control over a firm once it adopts the SBCOs standards, and as more organizations adopt the standards, SBCOs gain increasing normative control over the field. Finally, through monitoring efforts, SBCOs maintain their own integrity and verify the claims of those they monitor. This results in increased legitimacy for both the individual firm and the concept that the standards represent. SBCOs serve as direct knowledge-diffusion mechanisms that help to establish the identity, legitimacy, and accountability of the new industry, the quality and value of its products and services, and the integrity and reliability of firms (Baum and Rao 2004). Although the mere presence of standards in a new industry could feasibly increase entry into a new market, I propose that SBCOs provide mechanisms of stability, control, and monitoring that encourage market entry in a way that standards alone cannot. When those espousing a set of standards create formal organizations, they increase the potency of their standards because they have more organizing instruments at their disposal to promulgate the standards and to influence the behavior of adopters (Arhne et al. 2000). Although it may be that not all players within a field adopt SBCO standards, actions taken by SBCOs generate legitimacy and reliability for a new market. As such, I hypothesize the following: Hypothesis 1: Greater numbers of SBCOs in a given geographic area will increase rates of market entry. 114 Endorsement/Certification An additional function of SBCOs is to provide a certification or endorsement that validates the claims a person or an organization makes. Past research has demonstrated the need for organizations to seek out endorsements from institutional actors (Singh, House, and Tucker 1986; Baum and Oliver 1991; Ruef and Scott 1998). Scott (1987) refers to this type of institutional mechanism as authorization. Authorization is the legitimation of the structural features or elements of an organizational form through legitimation by a superordinate unit. A key feature of this mechanism that distinguishes it from coercion is that the subordinate unit is “not compelled to conform but voluntarily seeks out the attention and approval of the authorizing agent” (Scott 1987:502). The ability to gain such endorsement increases flows of legitimacy, status, and access to resources and market channels. Following this logic, I hypothesize the following: Hypothesis 2: Having certification from an SBCO will decrease a firm’s likelihood of market exit. A centerpiece of social exchange theory is that actors’ reputations are constructed based in part on the reputations of their associates (Blau 1964). A significant amount of literature has demonstrated that status tends to flow across relationships (Merton 1973; Burt 1987; Podolny and Stuart 1995; Stuart, Hoang, and Hybels 1999). For example, Stuart et al. (1999) demonstrate that the prominence of a firm’s exchange partners influences the success of that firm. This idea is founded on the premise that resource holders will tend to value more highly the evaluations of a prominent actor because they implicitly assume that prominent actors are more likely 115 to discern quality under conditions of uncertainty than less prominent ones (see Stuart et al. 1999:319). Given this argument regarding status, I posit the following: Hypothesis 3: The greater the prominence of a certifier that certifies a firm, the less likely that firm will be to exit the market. Certification may also provide particular benefits to early entrants in a nascent industry. A wealth of literature has been generated around the concept of first-mover advantages (e.g., Lieberman and Montgomery 1988). Advantages include economic rents, market control, establishing switching costs, and channel control. While first- mover advantages exist, evidence suggests that such advantages are moderated by a firm’s resources and capabilities (Szymanski, Troy, and Bharadwaj 1995). Third-party certification can be conceptualized as a key firm resource in new markets where unambiguous measures of quality are rare. Furthermore, there are benefits in terms of establishing credibility within a value chain if a firm’s products and services are third- party certified. For example, wholesalers or other buyers in the value chain may require certification as a precondition for purchase. It is reasonable to believe that early entrants that are certified will be more likely to establish and maintain key transaction partners and, by extension, to remain longer in the market than firms that are not. Therefore, I propose the following: Hypothesis 4: Having certification from a third party will enhance the advantages of early entry and will decrease the likelihood of market exit. In addition to theorizing a direct effect of third-party certification on the likelihood of exit, I posit that benefits of certification will increase in the face of 116 increased competition. Population ecology has demonstrated that powerful selection mechanisms begin to operate as competition within an organizational population increases (Hannan and Freeman 1989). Under such a scenario, the ability for organizations to obtain scarce resources (and thus shelter themselves from strong selection forces) will increase their survival chances. Thus, certification can mitigate the effect of increasing competition. Hence, Hypothesis 5: Third party certification will moderate the effects of increased competition on organizational exit. CONTEXT The origin of the U.S. organic food industry has its roots in the early decades of the 20th century. A fringe group of scholars and farmers6 who believed that agriculture was better understood and practiced through biological and ecological principles, conducted experiments, compiled knowledge, and disseminated their findings. In the early 1940s, J. I. Rodale, a publisher-turned-organic farmer, purchased a farm in Pennsylvania and began farming according to the methods and practices of these early pioneers of organic agriculture. To complement his efforts on his experimental farm and to demonstrate the utility of organic methods, Rodale launched a magazine in 1942 through which readers shared their organic agriculture experiences (Rodale 1942:14) and subsequently published a number of highly influential books that became key sources of information for pioneering organic farmers. Rodale found little widespread success in the first 20 years of his efforts. However, his vision of a radically different food system gained greater momentum as broader movements 6 Among the most prominent pioneers and writings in the organic movement were: F. H. King, Farmers for Forty Centuries, or Permanent Agriculture in China, Korea, and Japan, 1911; Rudolph Steiner, Agriculture: A Course of Eight Lectures, 1924; Sir Albert Howard, An Agricultural Testament, 1940; and Lady Eve Balfour, The Living Soil, 1943. 117 surrounding environmentalism drew the public’s attention to the dangers of pesticides and other agricultural chemicals. During the 1960s and 1970s, organic agriculture and its associated practices resonated with an increasing audience of gardeners, farmers, and consumers. As interest in organic farming grew, maintaining the integrity of the organic concept became paramount for movement farmers and consumers. Recognizing the changes that would accompany increasing consumer demand, Rodale’s son wrote in 1971, For a long time, organic farming was a labor of love. Organic farmers rejoiced in the purity of an untarnished Nature, and farmed without chemicals for the sheer joy of saving the soil. Many of those organic farmers managed to make money too, but they were guided more by principle than by an urge to profit . . . some money-oriented farmers are prepared to accept a loose definition of what organic means. The problem is with marketers, not farmers because they are hungry to get a slice of the pie. (p. 73) In the face of increasing opportunism, Rodale began to develop a systematic verification system. In 1971, Rodale’s magazine, Organic Gardening and Farming, initiated a pilot organic certification program in California. The program consisted of obtaining a commitment from each farmer to build or maintain a three percent humus content in the soil within five years. An organic seal was developed to identify the commitment, commodity, and location of the farmer. Soil analyses, residue analyses, and personal inspections were also part of the program (Allen 1971:81). In 1972, the Organic Gardening and Farming (OGF) program included a questionnaire that asked farmers for information regarding the acreage committed to organic production, types of crops to be raised, normal problems facing the farmer (i.e., weeds, insects, fungus disease, and soil fertilizing), and organic methods and materials used. The OGF certification program grew to include regional groups in 20 states before it was terminated in 1973. After the termination of the program, farmers in various states 118 developed their own certification programs to continue to ensure the integrity of organically grown produce. Beginning with about 50 farmers, the California Certified Organic Farmers (CCOF) became the first organization following the termination of the OGF program to certify growers. After the creation of CCOF, certification organizations formed from local networks of organic farmers throughout the United States. The early certification organizations appeared in Oregon, Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Michigan, and Minnesota. In addition to certification services, nonprofit certification organizations dedicated significant organizational resources to information sharing through monthly newsletters, conferences, and on-site workshops. In the absence of substantial support from university extension services and other traditional sources of agricultural information and assistance, these organizations became repositories of expertise, refining, accumulating, and disseminating knowledge of organic production practices. After a time, other types of certification organizations got involved in the industry. State departments of agriculture and for-profit firms entered the industry to provide third-party certification. While multiple verification processes existed, wholesalers increasingly demanded certified organic products. Phrases such as “we only accept CCOF certified products” or “we sell Oregon Tilth certified products” began to fill wholesaler directories. The growth and expansion of SBCOs had significant implications for producers entering the industry. In the following section, I describe the data and methods employed in my analysis of these implications and then explain my results. DATA AND METHODS The bulk of the data for this study comes from the National Organic Directory (NOD; 1986–2001), published by the Community Alliance with Family Farmers. This was the industry’s most comprehensive listing of producers, wholesalers, resource 119 groups, certification organizations, retailers, support businesses, and manufacturers in the United States. Listing in the directory was free for all organizations over the duration of the study period. I depart from the norm in organizational ecology that considers the beginning of a directory as a signal of the birth of a new organizational population. Directories generally appear fairly early in an industry’s development (Carroll and Hannan 2000:168), yet firms in the “industry” are often already functioning with operations well underway before the publication of the first directory. For example, the first certification organization began in 1973, and a handful of farmers had been farming organically since the early 1940s. However, the National Organic Directory did not begin publication until 1986. Therefore, instead of conceptualizing a directory as evidence of the “birth” of an organizational population, one can see a directory as an effort to knit together a national market from otherwise disparate buyers and suppliers: “When one finds a continuous series of directories of a given kind of organization, a publisher believes many others will want to find the firms to sell to or to buy from . . . the purpose of the directory is to create markets; otherwise it is of only scientific interest, and will not make any money for the publisher” (Stinchcombe 2002:419, emphasis added). An email from a key informant at the Community Alliance for Family Farmers (CAFF, the organization that produced the directory) alludes to the idea that the National Organic Directory served to create a broader market for organic products: It is inspiring to think that this organization, in its various incarnations, really did affect the organic foods industry, starting at a time when there *was* no industry—just isolated growers . . . It’s amazing to realize it now, but when CAFF started the National Organic Directory, it was almost impossible to find organic produce unless you knew someone who grew it. The whole thing was word of mouth. Gleaners (“food conspiracies”) from city co-op living groups would go out into the countryside, from farm to farm, looking for well-grown food. All summer long, dilapidated trucks full of hippies lurched down our 120 driveway in plumes of dust, hoping to fill up with organic fruit. (Personal correspondence, November 16, 2005) Consequently, I conceptualize entries and exits into and out of the directory as entries and exits from the marketplace rather than births and deaths of organizations. Dependent Variables There are two dependent variables in this paper: market entry and market exit. In this study, I focus on the population of organic producers. The unit of analysis for the market entry is U.S. state. The unit of analysis for market exit is the individual producer. I measure market entry as the count of all new farms that are listed in the NOD at time t, which is updated annually over the course of the observation period. To measure market exit, I constructed annual spells for each farm, beginning with the first time the farm is listed in the directory until the time that it disappears from the directory. Independent Variables Standards-Based Certification Organizations. To test the effect of SBCOs on market entry (hypothesis 1), I include a measure of the total number of certification organizations present in each U.S. state for each year of the observation period. To verify information on certification organizations listed in the NOD, I also consulted three additional directories,7 thereby capturing all certification organizations operating in the United States during the observation period of this study. Certification. To test hypothesis 2, I include a dummy variable for each year a firm is third-party certified. SBCO prominence. To test hypothesis 3, regarding the prominence of the third- party certifier, I generate a prominence score for each firm on a yearly basis that 7 One published by the Organic Farming Research Foundation, another by the Agricultural Marketing Service of the USDA, and the third by ATTRA (Appropriate Technology Transfer for Rural Areas). 121 reflects the proportion of all farms certified by the certification organization j that certifies the farm i at time t. Certification x early entrants. To test hypothesis 4, I interact a dummy variable for all firms founded prior to 19908 with the dummy variable for third-party certification. Certification x density2. To test the moderating effect of third-party certification on competition (hypothesis 5), I include an interaction term with third- party certification interacting with producer density.2 Unless otherwise noted, all data for these measures are derived from information found in the NOD. Control Variables I control for a number of important variables. First, I include a number of industry-related controls: the amount of land in farms, number of farms, change in the number of farms, change in the amount of land in farms, and the average size of farms in a state. These data come from the National Agricultural Statistics Service of the United States Department of Agriculture and are measured at the state level. Second, I control for the number of legal provisions passed in a state related to organic food. These data come from Westlaw and state administrative and regulatory codes. Third, I include a number of demand controls. I attempt to capture demand from buyers by controlling for the number of wholesalers in a state. I also include a measure of broader consumer demand. Because there is no data on the actual consumer demand for organic products during the period of study, I include a proxy for consumer demand. Because members of environmental groups tend to be more concerned about the impact of pesticides and fertilizers on the environment, I posit that Sierra Club members are more likely to be consumers of organic food than the average consumer. 8 Following a food scare in 1989 involving a carcinogenic chemical growth regulator on apples, demand outstripped supply, and the organic industry grew beyond local niche markets to a broader national marketplace (Lipson 2001). 122 Therefore, I include a yearly count of Sierra Club membership by state to capture consumer demand. To account for the possibility of reverse causation (increasing demand for certification leading to the creation of more SBCOs), I also control for demand for certification by including change in prior foundings of farms and change in prior percentage of producers certified. Fourth, I control for supply by including measures of the number of producers and number of producers squared in a state. Including the squared term of this variable is consistent with population ecology conventions to capture competitive effects associated with density (Hannan and Freeman 1989). Finally, I control for firm-level characteristics including whether or not a firm is an early entrant (entered directory before 1990), age in the industry, and the degree to which a firm is vertically integrated. To calculate the degree of vertical integration variable, I summed the number of services that the firm provides as listed in the directory. For example, if a firm is listed as a producer, but also lists under “services” that the firm is a retailer, shipper, and processor, then the firm receives a score of 4. All covariates are lagged one year and updated annually. The unit of analysis in the entry models is U.S. state; in the exit analyses, it is the firm. ANALYSES To model market entry, I reverted to the negative binomial model because the data violated a key assumption of the Poisson regression (that the conditional mean of yearly foundings equals its variance). The negative binomial model remedies this problem by adding a parameter to account for the dispersion of the dependent variable. Given that the dependent variable is a measure of state counts over time, the observations are not independent. As such, it violates the assumption of independence among observations. Therefore, I use a negative binomial random effects model to account for the state-specific random effect. Doing so allows for interdependent 123 observations by modeling unobserved influences shared by all the counts of a state. The form of the model is: iijiij x θβθλ )exp()( = where λij is the predicted foundings in state i in year j, θi is a gamma- distributed random effect for region i, and xijβ represents the vector of independent variables and coefficients for state i in year j. I estimate random effects models in Stata 9 using the xtnbreg command. To model market exit, I use discrete-time event history methods because the exact timing of market exit is not known and there are many “tied” events in the data. Employing discrete time models can handle these problems without introducing bias into the parameter estimates (Kalbfleisch and Prentice 1980; Yamaguchi 1991). I use a complementary log-log model, which is appropriate for longitudinal binary dependent variables and is able to handle multiple events within the same time period. The model can be expressed as: itit XtP ')())1log(log( βα +=−− where the hazard of exit in each year is equivalent to Pit , the conditional probability that exit occurs to firm i in year t, given that it has not already occurred and X is a vector of covariates. I selected the complementary log-log discrete time model over the more common logistic regression model because the complementary log-log is a discrete time analogue model to a continuous time hazard model (Singer and Willett 2003). Although my data on market exit is discrete because of data measurement issues (i.e., annual directory information), it is inherently a continuous process. I use the xtcloglog command in Stata 9 to model market exit. 124 RESULTS Tables 3.1 and 3.2 report the correlations for the market entry and market exit analyses, respectively. Table 3.3 presents the results from the negative binomial regression of market entry clustered on state. Model 1 is a baseline model with only controls. Model 2 includes the number of SBCOs in a state to test hypothesis 1. The variable is found to be positive and highly significant, suggesting that greater SBCO presence leads to increased entry into the market, supporting hypothesis 1. Controlling for demand for certification (captured by the inclusion of the change in prior foundings and change in prior percent certified), each additional certification organization in a state increases entry rates by 53 percent and is highly significant in predicting market entry. Thus, hypothesis 1 is supported. Table 3.4 presents the results from the maximum likelihood analysis of market exit. Model 1 presents the baseline model. Model 2 includes the firm-level third-party certification variable. The variable is negative and significant, supporting hypothesis 2. Controlling for important firm-level variables such as early entry, age, and vertical integration, firms that are third-party certified are 57 percent less likely to exit from the market. Model 3 includes the measure of SBCO prominence. It is not significant, but the sign is in the expected direction. Model 4 includes an interaction term for certification and early entrance into the market. The sign is in the expected direction, but just misses the .1 significance level. Model 5 includes the interaction term for certification and producer density squared. This variable is negative and significant (supporting hypothesis 5), suggesting that firm-level certification moderates the curvilinear (competitive) effects of producer density. Model 6 is the full model. Certification shows a clear negative and significant effect in all previous models. The interaction term certification x density squared is also significant in models 5 and 6, suggesting that the finding is robust in the face of multicollinearity. 125 TABLE 3.1: CORRELATIONS FOR MARKET ENTRY Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 1. Farmland 2. Number of farms .63 3. Change in # farms .21 .07 4. Change in farmland -.13 -.06 .20 5. Farms/acres .25 -.24 .04 -.13 6. Sierra Club .10 .26 .10 -.05 -.25 7. Wholesaler density .07 .15 .08 -.08 -.07 .50 8. Change in prior foundings .04 .06 .00 -.04 -.02 .20 .27 9. Change in prior % certified -.02 .00 .00 .03 -.03 -.02 -.04 .04 10. Producer density .08 .15 .11 -.08 -.04 .43 .93 .14 -.05 11. Producer density2 .05 .12 .07 -.07 -.04 .34 .82 .23 -.04 .90 12. # legal provisions .23 .22 .24 -.02 .06 .21 .29 .07 -.01 .33 .24 13. # legal provisions2 .31 .27 .25 -.02 .09 .22 .24 .03 -.01 .29 .21 .93 14. % producers certified .00 .06 .10 -.04 -.09 .20 .09 .01 -.20 .13 .05 .27 .20 15. Number SBCOs -.09 .16 .01 .03 -.25 .45 .35 .09 .02 .31 .25 .30 .20 .38 126 TABLE 3.2: CORRELATIONS FOR MARKET EXIT Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 1.Farmland 2.Change in # farms .29 3.Change farmland -.12 .34 4.Farms/acres -.30 -.02 -.06 5.Sierra Club .49 .13 -.26 -.31 6.Producer density .41 .16 -.26 -.23 .73 7.Producer density2 .36 .15 -.22 -.21 .63 .97 8.% Certified producers -.01 .07 -.03 -.02 -.07 .05 .03 9.Wholesaler density .41 .11 -.26 -.24 .76 .84 .79 -.11 10.Legal provisions .50 .28 -.16 -.09 .58 .68 .61 .21 .52 11.Early entrant .02 -.07 -.03 .00 .00 -.09 -.09 -.31 .00 -.18 12.Age in industry .06 .12 -.03 -.04 .11 .23 .23 .23 .07 .26 .29 13.Vertical integration .03 -.02 -.03 .00 .09 .05 .05 -.18 .11 -.01 .17 .02 14.Certification .03 .04 -.02 -.08 .05 .07 .07 .30 .00 .12 -.19 .11 -.05 127 TABLE 3.3: NEGATIVE BINOMIAL REGRESSION MODELS OF MARKET ENTRY, 1986–2000 Variable/ Model # 1 2 Farmland 8.90e-06 1.24e-05* (7.13e-06) (6.49e-06) Number of farms 6.76e-07 -5.67e-07 (4.32e-06) (3.96e-06) Change in # farms -1.38e-04*** -9.72e-05** (5.23e-05) (4.60e-05) Change in farmland 5.62e-05 2.75e-05 (1.65e-04) (1.43e-04) Farms/acres .175 .212 (.148) (.133) Sierra Club .360*** .303*** (.095) (.091) Wholesaler density -.002 -.000 (.006) (.004) Change in prior foundings .034*** .045*** (.006) (.006) Change in prior % certified 1.788*** 1.757*** (.312) (.310) Producer density .005 .007 (.007) (.006) Producer density2 3.03e-05 9.55e-06 (2.66e-05) (2.38e-05) Number of legal provisions .061*** .052*** (.018) (.017) Number of legal provisions2 -.002*** -.001*** (.000) (.000) % producers 3rd party certified .381 .278 (.265) (.258) Number of SBCOs .423*** (.083) Constant -3.537*** -3.408*** (.875) (.813) Wald χ2 223.63*** 283.44*** Degrees of Freedom 14 15 * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; n=700; 50 states 128 TABLE 3.4: MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD ANALYSIS: ORGANIC FOOD MARKET EXIT, 1986–2000 Variable/ Model # 1 2 3 4 5 6 Control Variables Number of farms 3.71e-07 4.03e-07 5.45e-07 3.09e-07 4.09e-07 3.53e-07 (1.17e-06) (1.17e-06) (1.19e-06) (1.17e-06) (1.17e-06) (1.19e-06) Change in # of farms -1.22e-04*** -1.24e-04*** -1.25e-04*** -1.22e-04*** -1.24e-04*** -1.21e-04*** (3.25e-05) (3.25e-05) (3.25e-05) (3.25e-05) (3.25e-05) (3.25e-05) Change in farmland 2.96e-05 2.86e-05 3.23e-05 3.16e-05 2.83e-05 3.34e-05 (1.32e-04) (1.33e-04) (1.33e-04) (1.34e-04) (1.32e-04) (1.33e-04) Farm/acres -.041 -.050 -.040 -.048 -.046 -.039 (.062) (.062) (.063) (.062) (.062) (.063) Sierra Club .089** .095** .097** .096** .095** .097** (.039) (.039) (.039) (.039) (.039) (.039) Producer density -.014*** -.015*** -.014*** -.014*** -.015*** -.014*** (.005) (.005) (.005) (.005) (.005) (.005) Producer density2 8.31e-05*** 8.94e-05*** 8.57e-05*** 8.69e-05*** 1.11e-04*** 1.09e-04*** (2.85e-05) (2.86e-05) (2.91e-05) (2.87e-05) (3.04e-05) (3.13e-05) % certified producers -.057 .091 .093 .108 .034 .048 (.216) (.219) (.219) (.220) (.222) (.223) Wholesaler density -.002 -.002 -.002 -.002 -.002 -.002 (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) Legal provisions -.005 -.004 -.005 -.004 -.004 -.005 (.005) (.005) (.005) (.005) (.005) (.005) Early entrant -.448*** -.514*** -.511*** -.340* -.495*** -.261 (.122) (.124) (.124) (.178) (.124) (.183) Age in industry (ln) -.202*** -.188*** -.187*** -.180*** -.182*** -.172*** (.056) (.056) (.056) (.056) (.056) (.056) * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; n=2854, 915 firms 129 TABLE 3.4 (Continued) Variables/ Model # 1 2 3 4 5 6 Control Variables Age in industry (ln) -.202*** -.188*** -.187*** -.180*** -.182*** -.172*** (.056) (.056) (.056) (.056) (.056) (.056) Vertical integration -.172*** -.170*** -.172*** -.170*** -.171*** -.172*** (.034) (.034) (.034) (.034) (.034) (.034) Certification Variables Certification -.322*** -.272** -.258** -.215* -.091 (.095) (.119) (.108) (.112) (.144) Cert x early entrant -.299 -.389* (.226) (.231) SBCO Prominence -.347 -.143 (.495) (.506) Cert x density2 -2.61e-05* -2.99e-05** (1.36e-05) (1.42e-05) Constant -.877** -.748** -.777** -.826** -.805** -.931** (.369) (.370) (.373) (.376) (.372) (.382) Wald χ2 139.38*** 149.01*** 149.37*** 146.93*** 151.30*** 149.68*** Degrees of Freedom 13 14 15 15 15 17 130 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION The intent of this paper was to explicate the role of standards-based certification organizations in the structuring of new markets and to quantitatively assess their effects on market entry and exit dynamics. Theoretically, I have argued that SBCOs create standards, advocate for their adoption, and then verify and certify claims made by adopting organizations. The formal market entry analysis supports the claim that in the organic food industry, SBCOs served as both mitigators of uncertainty and sources of legitimacy by actively creating and evangelizing standards at a broader market level and, at the same time, verifying organic claims and providing endorsements to compliant firms. Controlling for alternative explanations, the analysis suggests that for each additional SBCO in a state, entry rates into the organic market increase by 53 percent. The exit analysis suggests that firm-level certification decreases the likelihood of exit from a market for which a firm has “authorization” to participate in. Such certification can decrease the probability of exit by 57 percent. Further, there is evidence that certification moderates the effects of competition, providing a buffer for organizations against the competitive effects resulting from increasing density within a market. The moderating effect of certification on early entry is not strongly supported. Based on these results, this study makes multiple contributions. First, it extends research on institutional entrepreneurship by moving beyond process explanations of institutional change to focus on how the actions of SBCOs influence market dynamics of exit and entry. SBCOs and their standards are inherently normative by nature (Scott 1995) and the normative dimensions of institutions are understudied (Casile and Davis-Blake 2002). By focusing on the normative efforts of SBCOs to impose order on a marketplace, this study provides evidence that entry and 131 exit decisions on the part of firms are subject to broader normative institutional influences. Another related contribution supports the growing research agenda focused on structural aspects of new industry creation, which has begun to examine how new market niches and industries become taken for granted. By focusing on the role of standardization and certification processes, I advance this agenda and answer calls from institutionalists concerned with the role of standards and norms in fostering entrepreneurial activity (Hwang and Powell 2005) and entrepreneurship scholars that recognize the need for increased attention to the structural and institutional aspects of the environment that are beyond the control of entrepreneurs but that nonetheless shape the existence of entrepreneurial opportunities and the efficacy of entrepreneurial efforts (Eckhardt and Shane 2003). Finally, by focusing on an industry in which standards “create” the underlying product value, this research expands our conception of the role of standards in market creation and growth beyond the important concepts of network externalities and interoperability that are well established in the technology literature. Many new market niches (particularly those concerned with the environmental and social externalities associated with more “traditional” means of production) depend heavily on the integrity of standards, verification methods, and endorsement processes for value and continued market growth. Thus, it behooves scholars to understand the way in which these nascent markets are employing standardization and certification processes. This preliminary study signals many opportunities for future research. First, this analysis is limited to organic producers only. Future research on the role of standards in nascent markets would benefit from examining how standardization influences all firms along the value chain. For example, because organic wholesalers 132 act as the key interface between producers and retail markets, they are in a position of dominance (Hawley 1950). Given their position of both power and uncertainty, wholesalers may have been the greatest advocates for third-party certification. Examining how third-party certification impinges on and changes value-chain dynamics among different organizations would be a promising future direction. A second avenue for research would be to examine the implications of the organizational vehicle of the standards. For example, Garud et al. (2002) highlight the inherent tensions that arose as Sun Microsystems attempted to both create and enforce Java as a standard. Future work should examine whether more objective nonprofit and government certification organizations face different challenges than for-profit certification organizations. Future work could match particular characteristics of firms with particular types of SBCOs. For example, small farmers often preferred to certify with locally based certification organizations, whereas larger farms and processors tended to seek out for-profit, internationally focused certification organizations. An analysis of these relationships may yield interesting SBCO-specific dynamics as the marketplace for both organic food and certification developed. Finally, in this study, I have assumed that the effects of the actions taken by SBCOs and their endorsement are constant over time. I have also assumed (aside from the early entry/certification interaction variable) that the relative salience or value of the certification to broader constituencies is constant as well. Future work should determine the degree to which the broader institutional environment endorses or even requires third-party certification as a prerequisite for participation in a particular market. This study provides a solid foundation from which to develop this broader set of theoretical questions. Grappling with these ideas will advance understanding of how standards-based certification organizations influence new market creation in a more nuanced fashion. 133 REFERENCES Ahrne, Goran, Nils Brunsson, and Christina Garsten. 2000. Standardizing through organization. In N. Brunsson and B. Jacobsson (eds.), A World of Standards. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Allen, Floyd. 1971. Looking for the organic America, part II: The program to certify organic farmers. Organic Gardening and Farming, 8(9): 80–83. Arrow, Kenneth J. 1974. The Limits of Organization. New York: Norton. Arthur, Brian W. 1989. Competing technologies, increasing returns, and lock-in by historical events. 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work_pho56qvftvhcxgfh6qonjyhcuy	----	[PDF] Affect in social media: The role of audience and the presence of contempt in cyberbullying | Semantic Scholar Skip to search formSkip to main content> Semantic Scholar's Logo Search Sign InCreate Free Account You are currently offline. Some features of the site may not work correctly. DOI:10.1017/S0140525X16000728 Corpus ID: 206264325Affect in social media: The role of audience and the presence of contempt in cyberbullying @article{Haig2017AffectIS, title={Affect in social media: The role of audience and the presence of contempt in cyberbullying}, author={Ella Haig}, journal={Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year={2017}, volume={40} } Ella Haig Published 2017 Psychology, Medicine Behavioral and Brain Sciences Abstract Gervais & Fessler's Attitude–Scenario–Emotion (ASE) model is a useful tool for the detection of affect in social media. In this commentary, an addition to the model is proposed – the audience – and its role in the manifestation of affect is discussed using a cyberbullying scenario. The presence of contempt in cyberbullying is also discussed.  View on Cambridge Press researchportal.port.ac.uk Save to Library Create Alert Cite Launch Research Feed Share This Paper 3 CitationsBackground Citations 2 View All Topics from this paper Social Media 3 Citations Citation Type Citation Type All Types Cites Results Cites Methods Cites Background Has PDF Publication Type Author More Filters More Filters Filters Sort by Relevance Sort by Most Influenced Papers Sort by Citation Count Sort by Recency OMG U #Cyberbully! An Exploration of Public Discourse About Cyberbullying on Twitter M. C. McHugh, S. Saperstein, R. Gold Computer Science, Medicine Health education & behavior : the official publication of the Society for Public Health Education 2019 6 View 2 excerpts, cites background Save Alert Research Feed Fuzzy information granulation towards interpretable sentiment analysis Han Liu, Ella Haig Computer Science GRC 2017 2017 40 PDF View 2 excerpts, cites background Save Alert Research Feed Art and painful emotion M. Strohl Psychology 2019 1 Save Alert Research Feed References SHOWING 1-10 OF 23 REFERENCES SORT BYRelevance Most Influenced Papers Recency Cyberbullying on social network sites. An experimental study into bystanders' behavioural intentions to help the victim or reinforce the bully S. Bastiaensens, H. Vandebosch, K. Poels, K. V. Cleemput, A. DeSmet, I. Bourdeaudhuij Psychology, Computer Science Comput. Hum. Behav. 2014 153 PDF View 2 excerpts, references background and methods Save Alert Research Feed A philosophical and evolutionary approach to cyber-bullying: social networks and the disruption of sub-moralities T. Bertolotti, L. Magnani Sociology Ethics and Information Technology 2013 17 View 1 excerpt, references background Save Alert Research Feed Ganging up or sticking together? Group processes and children's responses to text-message bullying. S. Jones, A. Manstead, Andrew G. Livingstone Psychology, Medicine British journal of psychology 2011 59 PDF View 1 excerpt, references background Save Alert Research Feed Following you home from school: A critical review and synthesis of research on cyberbullying victimization R. Tokunaga Psychology, Computer Science Comput. Hum. Behav. 2010 1,486 PDF View 1 excerpt Save Alert Research Feed I tweet honestly, I tweet passionately: Twitter users, context collapse, and the imagined audience Alice E. Marwick, D. Boyd Computer Science, Sociology New Media Soc. 2011 2,313 PDF View 2 excerpts, references background Save Alert Research Feed From humor recognition to irony detection: The figurative language of social media Antonio Reyes, P. Rosso, D. Buscaldi Computer Science Data Knowl. Eng. 2012 242 PDF View 1 excerpt, references background Save Alert Research Feed Common Sense Reasoning for Detection, Prevention, and Mitigation of Cyberbullying K. Dinakar, Rosalind W. Picard, H. Lieberman Computer Science TIIS 2012 273 PDF View 3 excerpts, references background Save Alert Research Feed Detecting Sarcasm from Students' Feedback in Twitter Nabeela Altrabsheh, Ella Haig, Sanaz Fallahkhair Psychology, Computer Science EC-TEL 2015 10 PDF View 2 excerpts, references background Save Alert Research Feed Automatic detection of cyberbullying on social networks based on bullying features Rui Zhao, A. Zhou, K. Mao Computer Science ICDCN 2016 81 View 1 excerpt, references background Save Alert Research Feed Knock, Knock. Who's There? The Imagined Audience E. Litt Sociology 2012 356 View 2 excerpts, references background Save Alert Research Feed ... 1 2 3 ... Related Papers Abstract Topics 3 Citations 23 References Related Papers Stay Connected With Semantic Scholar Sign Up About Semantic Scholar Semantic Scholar is a free, AI-powered research tool for scientific literature, based at the Allen Institute for AI. Learn More → Resources DatasetsSupp.aiAPIOpen Corpus Organization About UsResearchPublishing PartnersData Partners   FAQContact Proudly built by AI2 with the help of our Collaborators Terms of Service•Privacy Policy The Allen Institute for AI By clicking accept or continuing to use the site, you agree to the terms outlined in our Privacy Policy, Terms of Service, and Dataset License ACCEPT & CONTINUE 
work_pkl3u2xjsbddxp4ec3vev7jzty	----	1 Mozambican immigrants to South Africa: Their xenophobia and discrimination experiences Miriam Moagi1*, Gail Wyatt2, Maboe Mokgobi3, Tamra Loeb2, Muyu Zhang2 and Mashudu Davhana- Maselesele4 1Department of Nursing Science, Faculty of Health Sciences, University of Pretoria, Pretoria, South Africa 2Department ofPsychiatry and Bio-behavioral Sciences, Semel Institute for Neuroscience and Human Behavior, Los Angeles, CA, USA 3Faculty of Social and Health Sciences, Monash South Africa, Roodepoort, South Africa 4North-West University, Mahikeng, South Africa1 *Corresponding author email: Miriam.Moagi@up.ac.za Abstract We explored Mozambican immigrants’ lived experiences of xenophobia and discrimination in South Africa. Informants were 15 Mozambican immigrants (female = 7, male = 8) living in an informal settlement in Zandspruit, Gauteng Province. They completed open-ended written narratives on xenophobic and discriminatory experiences. Following thematic analysis, we identified three themes to characterise the Mozambican immigrants’ experiences of xenophobia and discrimination: (i) abusive attitudes, (ii) ethnic discrimination, and (iii) scapegoating. The Mozambican immigrants’ experiences of xenophobia and discrimination are consistent with findings from the extant international literature on ingroup/outgroup social strife with real or perceived scarcity of resources. Keywords: attitudes, discrimination, immigrants, Mozambique, South Africa, xenophobia Introduction Xenophobia and discrimination against black immigrants to South Africa has been in the local and international news several times in the past decade (Bekker & Carlton, 2010; Lovegrove, 2014; Solomon & Kosaka, 2013) . Xenophobia is defined as attitudes, prejudices and behaviour that reject, exclude and often demean a person, based on the perception that they are outsiders or foreigners to a community or society (Adjail & Lazaridis, 2013). Xenophobic violence and discriminatory acts have their roots in race, ethnicity, gender, and geographical affiliations in the face of real or imagined scarcity of resources (Sebola, 2017), or group affiliation insecurity (Misago, 2015). Any human social attribute can be grounds for in-group and out-group membership, which in the face of competition for resources can result in hate crimes by “in-group” members against “out-group” others (Kinge 2016). In societies with a history of racism and/or ethnocentrism, xenophobic and discriminatory attacks occur along racial/ethnic lines. South Africa is a case in point with its long history of racism dating back to the European colonial period (Kinge, 2016; Sebola 2017; Crush & Ramachandran, 2014, 2008) . Additionally, the country has a long history of ethnocentrism in which indigenous populations privileged their linguistic, cultural, and geographical identities; often with hostility against those of different cultural and linguistic background (Idehen & Osaghae, 2015; Matsinhe, 2011). Within this context historic ethnocentrism could occur against black immigrants from other African countries with a different cultural linguistic heritage. South Africa has attracted a sizeable influx of black Africans from other African countries seeking economic opportunities and/or human rights protections (Adeagbo, 2011; Adjai & Lazaridis, 2013; Crush & Pendleton, 2012). A large number of the immigrants are unskilled or semi-skilled and generally settle in the informal settlements near major cities such as Pretoria, Johannesburg, Cape Town, and Durban (Crush & Ramachandran, 2014). South African informal settlements are comprised of poor families illegally occupying subserviced city council land, creating “a shanty town” of make-shift structures “built mostly from scrap material” (Housing Development Agency: HDA, 2013, p . 7). Resident South Africans in Informal settlements derogatively refer to Mozambican immigrants (and other black African immigrants to South Africa) as “kwerekwere”, “Amakwere- mailto:Miriam.Moagi@up.ac.za 2 kwere”, or “Amagrigamba” (black people who cannot speak the regional local South African language) . This designation can fuel hostilities towards immigrant blacks from neighbouring countries who do not speak the language of the South African region where they’ve settled (Solomon & Kosaka, 2013). To our knowledge, little research has been conducted on xenophobia and discriminatory attitudes towards Mozambican immigrants The Mozambican population is the largest foreign national population in regional Zandspruit, Gauteng Province of South Africa (Lovegrove, 2014). Mozambique and South Africa are neighbouring countries. Due to the arbitrariness of the territorial borders that the two countries inherited from the European colonial period, several cultural-linguistic communities, such as the Tsonga and Zulu cultural community territories, cross the national boundaries. Mozambique is South Africa’s largest trading partner, with South Africa mainly exporting goods to Mozambique. According to the World Bank (World Bank Data Team, 2018), South Africa is an upper middle- income country, while Mozambique is a low-income country In 2010, almost 70% of the Mozambican population lived on/or less than US$1.90 a day, compared to 16.6% in South Africa. Thus, Mozambican immigrants come to South Africa expecting to find jobs that pay better salaries, good living conditions, and a society with a welcoming attitude. However, the immigrants may encounter xenophobia and discrimination by black South Africans, once their country of origin is known or if they speak a different language or dialect. The informal economy in South Africa relies on the cheap and easily exploitable labour of undocumented immigrants mostly from Mozambique, and other African countries. The migrants’ willingness to work for low wages and to enter this informal economy is perceived as taking opportunities from South Africans, resulting in animosity between the two groups (Kinge, 2016). We sought to explore the lived experiences of xenophobic and discriminatory attitudes towards Mozambicans. Our specific research question was: “What are the lived experiences of xenophobic and discriminatory attitudes towards Mozambican immigrants in the informal sector of South Africa”? Method Research design We used an exploratory-descriptive qualitative research approach to explore the lived experiences of xenophobic and discriminatory attitudes towards Mozambican immigrants in an informal settlement in South Africa An exploratory-descriptive qualitative research approach is one aimed at understanding the phenomenon (i e xenophobia in the case of the current study) without imposing any theoretical lens . It was appropriate for the present study as the goal was to characterise xenophobia and discrimination experiences of Mozambican immigrants to South Africa. Participants and setting We sampled 15 Mozambican immigrants (female = 7; age range = 22 to 69 years) from the Zandspruit informal settlement in the Gauteng Province of South Africa. All 15 participants spoke isiTsonga (Shangaan). In addition, the immigrants also spoke one or both of English and isiZulu. Two of the informant immigrants self-reported to be undocumented. The immigrants had lived in South Africa for at least three months or longer. Procedure and data collection We obtained permission to conduct the study from the Institutional Review Board of the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) and the Human Sciences Research Council’s Research Ethics Committee (HSRC-REC) (Ethical clearance numbers: UCLA IRB#14-000712; HSRC-REC 3/22/10/14) . We informed participants of the purpose of the study and asked them to provide oral consent in lieu of written consent Interviews were conducted in a private room to promote privacy We ensured participants’ confidentiality by using numbers to code responses instead of names. The informant immigrants completed open-ended written narratives on their lived experiences of xenophobia and discriminatory attitudes in South Africa. After the 15 narrative interviews, we believe the data to have reached saturation. 3 Data analysis Data were analysed using Braun and Clarke’s (2006) six stages of thematic analysis methods f or recognising, examining, and recording themes within the data: familiarisation with the data, generating initial codes, searching for themes, reviewing themes, defining and naming themes, and producing the report The first listed author and an independent coder collaboratively identified the themes from the data analysis. Results Three themes emerged from the analysis namely: abusive attitudes, ethnocentric discrimination, and scapegoating. The results are substantiated by verbatim quotations (participant identifier codes are indicated in brackets). Theme 1: Abusive attitudes by local residents About four of the 15 Mozambican immigrants (26.7%) perceived to have experienced abuse by South African citizens for being foreigners. The specific abuses included emotional, physical, and verbal abuse. For instance, some of the immigrants observed: [We] hear people saying we must go back home to our countries as we do not belong to South Africa. [P#12, male] [They] they call immigrants “amakwerekwere” [P#12, female] ... [and some locals] come and loot the shop saying we are taking their jobs, we are not voting, we do not have proper documents, they are suffering alone to keep the government in power. [P#15, male] ...I don’t have a husband now because South African people killed him because they accused him of being a thief. Now my children don t have a father. [P#2, female] [We] live in fear, [as] many foreigners were tortured [and] burned alive, others were stabbed to death because they were [black] African immigrants, it was very traumatic as no one was helping us even the police came after a long time when an immigrant person is dead. [P#4 male] These findings on emotional, physical, and verbal abuse are similar those reported in several previous studies with different immigrant groups in South Africa (see for example Charman & Piper, 2012; Kinge, 2016, Lovegrove, 2014; Misago, 2009; Morapedi, 2007). Theme 2: Immigrants are discriminated against A total of nine immigrants (60%) reported to experience ethnic discrimination in accessing work and other human services. For instance, some of the immigrants made these observations: Denial of access to human and civic community services [We are denied access] to at clinics or hospitals of being “Lekwerekwere” [speakers of a foreign language] [our children are] called names and reminded that they are foreigners. [P#6, female] [Our children may not be] allowed to attend school because they were not... citizens. [P#3, male] It is difficult for us immigrants to get access to employment especially permanent job [because we are denied] South African identification document.[P#10, male] Remuneration discrimination I worked for three months as a garden boy for a black man in Gauteng without pay. When that man was supposed to pay me my salary he said that he will not pay me because I am a foreigner and said to me that I can do whatever I want. [P#8, male] 4 I worked for a South African man, he promised me that I will get paid when I am done with my job,[after] instead of him paying me, he asked me for my documents, when I said I don t have documents, he gave me a certain document saying I must sign it first for him to pay me. [P#14, male] I worked for a certain company [and] was paid less money and when I asked for an increase on my salary they tell me that foreigners do not qualify for a salary increase because they do not have proper documents. [P#11, male] Deprivation of property rights I have lost a house and land in another area because I am an immigrant; I was told that I didn’t vote, so if I want to own a house I must go back to my country. [P#7, female] My house that I bought from a South African citizen was taken away from me; I was told that I do not qualify to have a house because I am not a citizen of SA. [P#9, female] Although we participate in public protests with the locals, they reminded us that we are not citizens after getting concessions from their government.[P#13, male] The findings indicate immigrants to experience high levels of intolerance and hostility from South African informal settlement residents, as well as threats to their livelihoods and properties. These acts are contrary to the “New South Africa” built on inclusiveness and tolerance (Kinge, 2016). Undocumented immigrants are more likely to work full time, but their jobs are low paying, often below minimum wage, and unstable (Yoshikawa & Kalil 2011) . This psychological and emotional pressure can have a significant toll on the psychological and physical wellbeing of immigrant children (Chaudry, et al., 2010). Theme 3: Scapegoating for any problem faced by South Africans Two of the 15 immigrants (13.33%) reported to be blamed for social evils bedevilling South Africa; including increased rates of HIV/AIDS, increased crime rate, and unemployment. For instance, the immigrants said: ... whenever there is a crime which has been committed within the community, immigrants are being blamed, and by the police [too]. they always use immigrants as scapegoat. [P#5, male] Immigrants [are accused] of bringing drugs in South Africa for taking jobs from South African citizens. [P#1, female] ... During xenophobia [attacks], South African citizens were blaming immigrants [for] taking their jobs. [P#1, female] South African officials and the police (Chan, 2015) often mistreat Mozambicans. Due to their undocumented status, they are unable to report crimes, and the women and children are thus especially vulnerable to abuse and rape (Osman, 2009; Pretorius, 2004). Additionally, negative attitudes are fostered by the media, who make statements such as “migrants are flooding and swarming into South Africa”, “illegals or “illegal foreigners” (Kinge 2016, p 38; Nyamnjoh, 2006; Tevera 2013) The media plays an important role in the shaping of views and attitudes towards immigrants (Adeagbo, 2013) . Much of the negativity towards immigrants rests in their undocumented status. Implications for South Africa and it’s immigration policies The United Nations High Commission for Refugees advocates for the humane treatment of asylum s eekers, refugees, and (by extension) immigrant workers who also may be refugees (UNHCR, 2011) . South Africa is signatory to this UNHCR instrument. Yet, xenophobia and discrimination towards immigrants makes South Africa one of the most migrant-unfriendly countries in the world (Crush & Ramachandran, 2009). 5 The wave of xenophobic attacks in South Africa against African immigrants has tarnished the country’s image, both internationally and in the South African Development Community (SADC) region. African countries, including Nigeria and Namibia, have started expelling South African citizens in response to xenophobic attacks. Additionally, they no longer support South African businesses in their jurisdictions (Chen, 2015). Xenophobic violence has also damaged the South African economy which had previously attracted many foreign investors (Cordeur, 2015). Xenophobic attacks and the poor response from the South African government have tarnished the country’s image as a leading member of the African Union (Kinge, 2016; Matunhu, 2011). The South African government should provide for immigrant-friendly documentation processes so that those who are residents of informal settlements are protected from labour exploitation and other abuses Moreover, the media could host regular symposia to educate both South African and immigrant people of the rights of the immigrants under the law. Limitations of the study and suggestions for future research One study limitation includes the fact that it was carried out in one informal settlement only and with a small sample of informants. Findings may be different in different informal settlements and with a larger sample size. Moreover, the written narrative approach to data collection has the limitation to restrict the self -reporting of those with poorer written language. Future studies could utilise verbal interview approaches for richer data reporting.. Conclusion Mozambican immigrants in Gauteng, Zandspruit informal settlement, South Africa, experience chronic xenophobia and discrimination. Black immigrant foreigners living in these settlements are traumatised and feel unsafe Mozambican immigrants have reported frustrations in acquiring the right documentation. Lack of proper documentation increases vulnerability to exploitation and crime. In South Africa, xenophobia has damaged the informal employment sector, resulting in higher unemployment rates due to the displacement and burning of immigrant shops that employed South Africans (Sanchez, 2015) . Tourism from African countrie s has also decreased Endnote 1 Author affiliation at date of article accepted for publication. References Adeagbo, O. A. (2013). ‘We are not criminals, we are just victims of circumstances’: An exploration of experiences of Nigerian immigrants’ men that married South African women in Johannesburg. 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work_poeg5sjpobfprdjq4yfz64d3m4	----	Journal of Interpersonal Violence 1 –16 © The Author(s) 2016 Reprints and permissions: sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav DOI: 10.1177/0886260515624233 jiv.sagepub.com Article Experiences of Discrimination, Harassment, and Violence in a Sample of Italian Transsexuals Who Have Undergone Sex-Reassignment Surgery Antonio Prunas,1,2,3 Elisa Bandini,4 Alessandra D. Fisher,4 Mario Maggi,4 Valeria Pace,5 Luca Quagliarella,5 Orlando Todarello,5 and Maurizio Bini3 Abstract The present study aims to provide an overview of experiences of discrimination, harassment, and violence in a sample of Italian transsexuals who have undergone sex-reassignment surgery (SRS). Lack of support for gender transition from family members was also assessed, before and after SRS. Data were collected in the context of a multicentric study (Milan, Florence, and Bari) on SRS outcome. Patients who underwent SRS were contacted and asked to fill out a questionnaire concerning experiences of 1University of Milano-Bicocca, Italy 2Associazione Italiana Sessuologia e Psicologia Applicata, Milan, Italy 3Ospedale Niguarda-Ca’ Granda, Milano, Italy 4Careggi University Hospital, Florence, Italy 5University of Bari, Italy Corresponding Author: Antonio Prunas, Dipartimento di Psicologia, Università degli Studi di Milano Bicocca, Edificio U6, Piazza dell’Ateneo Nuovo 1, 20126 Milan, Italy. Email: antonio.prunas@unimib.it 624233 JIVXXX10.1177/0886260515624233Journal of Interpersonal ViolencePrunas et al. research-article2016 at Unimib Bicocca / Sage on January 13, 2016jiv.sagepub.comDownloaded from mailto:antonio.prunas@unimib.it http://jiv.sagepub.com/ 2 Journal of Interpersonal Violence discrimination, harassment, violence, and crime they might have experienced in previous years. Seventy-two participants took part in the research: 46 were male-to-female (MtF; 64%) and 26 were female-to-male (FtM; 36%). Thirty- six percent of the total sample (with no differences between MtF and FtM) experienced at least one episode of harassment, violence, or discrimination. The workplace was reported to be the social area with the highest risk of discrimination and harassment (22% of participants). Reports of more than one incident of discrimination, harassment, and violence characterized the majority of participants in the MtF sample. Compared with previous studies carried out in other countries, a much larger proportion of participants could count on a supportive family environment before and after transition. Our results show that Italian society at large is prejudiced against transsexuals, but at a more “micro” level, having a trans person as a family member might result in a protective and tolerant attitude. Keywords transgenderism, discrimination, violence, LGBT, sex-reassignment surgery Introduction Several studies, carried out both in the United States and in Europe, have shown that transgender1 people—more so than any other sexual minority group (Browne & Lim, 2008)—are often victims of discrimination, harass- ment, or violence as a result of social stigma (Bockting et al., 2013). This can take the form of overt physical violence and lead to murders perpetrated by both strangers and known people (Harper & Schneider, 2003; Prunas et al., 2015). The issue of transphobic violence has indeed reached alarming propor- tions in Italy which, according to a recent report from Transgender Europe (2015), is the second European country in the number of homicides of trans- gender people between 2008 and 2014; in spite of these figures, there is pau- city of research in the field. A National U.S. survey on violence against transgender people revealed that 48% of respondents had been victims of assaults, including sexual assault and rape, and 78% had experienced verbal harassment (Wilchins, 1997). Other studies conducted in the United States found that 43% of participants had been victims of violence or crime, with 75% attributing the motive to either transphobia or homophobia (Xavier, 2000). Research carried out in Europe showed similar figures. In 2006, a large U.K. survey found that 73% of transgender people had experienced some at Unimib Bicocca / Sage on January 13, 2016jiv.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://jiv.sagepub.com/ Prunas et al. 3 kind of harassment in public places, and that 10% had experienced violent behavior (Whittle, Turner, & Al-Alami, 2007). Another research report from the United Kingdom found that transgender people are, compared with les- bian, gay, bisexual persons, at higher risk of becoming victims of hate crimes: twice as likely to experience physical violence and 3 times as likely to experi- ence harassment (Browne & Lim, 2008). Similar results were also found in a large survey carried out across several European countries (Turner, Whittle, & Combs, 2009). The most recent study has been carried out by the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (2014), involving participants from 28 countries and, for the first time, the large sample of participants allowed comparisons between different subgroups of trans people (i.e., transsexuals, cross dressers, transgender, gender variant, and queer). The survey showed that more than half of the whole sample of respondents (54%) felt discriminated against or harassed in the year preceding the survey because they were perceived as trans. People at higher risk of feeling discriminated against were of a young age, jobless, or from a lower income class. Work was found to be the area of social life in which the likelihood of being discriminated against was higher, with 37% of trans respondents reporting discrimination when looking for a job and 27% discrimination at work. Breaking down the whole sample in subgroups, transwomen (i.e., natal males who identify themselves as women) and -people who self-identified as transgender were found to be particularly at risk for discrimination when looking for a job and at work. Looking at respondents’ nationalities, 22% of the Italian respondents reported a preva- lence of discrimination in the workplace, while 43% of them felt discrimi- nated against when looking for a job. These results are in line with previous studies carried out in the United States (Grant et al., 2011; Lombardi et al., 2001). In particular, several reports focusing specifically on MtF and FtM transsexual participants showed that up to 57% of transsexual people reported losing a job, diffi- culty getting a job, or job discrimination (Clements, Katz, & Marx, 1999; Reback, Simon, Bemis, & Gaston, 2001; Sugano, Tooru, & Operario, 2006; Sykes et al., 1999). Health care was also found to be an area of discrimination as around 20% of all respondents who accessed health care services (22%; 17% in Italy) or social services (19%) in the year preceding the survey felt health care provid- ers discriminated against them because of being trans (European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2014). The general results showed that the annual incidence rate of violence or harassment is around one incident per two trans respondents, which is twice as high as the incidence rates for lesbian, gay, and bisexual respondents. This at Unimib Bicocca / Sage on January 13, 2016jiv.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://jiv.sagepub.com/ 4 Journal of Interpersonal Violence means that one in two trans persons indicate that they were attacked or tar- geted through insults, threats, or violence in the year preceding the survey. The present study aims to provide an overview of experiences of discrimi- nation, harassment, and violence in a sample of Italian transsexuals who have undergone sex-reassignment surgery (SRS). The reasons for shedding light on such experiences are manifold. First of all, the phenomenon of violence against lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, intersex2 (LGBTI) minorities has reached alarming proportions in the country, although there is an unexplainable paucity of research in this area. According to Amnesty International (2013), for example, the Observatory for Security against Discriminatory Acts of the Ministry of the Interior reported 40 cases of hate crimes motivated by sexual orientation from 2010 to March 2013 in Italy. The non-governmental organization (NGO) Gay Helpline (offering free legal and psychological counseling to victims of discrimination and violence) received information about 750 cases of verbal and physical attacks targeting LGBTI individuals in 2011. Second, although violence motivated by race, ethnicity, nationality, or religion is a specific crime in Italy (according to Law n. 205, June 25, 1993, also known as “Legge Mancino”), a violent act committed on the grounds of gender identity and sexual orientation is not prosecuted as a hate crime. According to the Penal Code (Art. 61), “general aggravating circumstances” may apply when a crime is perpetrated either for trivial purposes or with cruelty, but such circumstances have been applied only on rare occasions to crimes against the LGBT community (Prunas et al., 2015). This lack of legis- lation implies that transphobic motives are unlikely taken into consideration in the investigation, prosecution, and sentencing of a crime and, as a conse- quence, no official data on the prevalence of hate crimes against the trans community in Italy are available as of yet. It is also remarkable that the gender transition process in itself can be more difficult in Italy compared with other European and extra-European countries. Indeed, although Italy was one of the first countries with a spe- cific legislation regulating gender transition3 (Godano et al., 2009), such a law appears outdated nowadays and not aligned with the European Union (EU) directives and the Current Version of the World Association for Transgender Health (WPATH) Standards of Care (Coleman et al., 2011). Court approval is still mandatory for undergoing SRS at the end of 12 continuous months of living in a gender role congruent with one’s gender identity. This period is still defined in the Italian courts as “real life experience.” Finally, the present study focuses specifically on transsexual people with the aim of providing a full picture of quality of life and global functioning at Unimib Bicocca / Sage on January 13, 2016jiv.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://jiv.sagepub.com/ Prunas et al. 5 after SRS, not limited to satisfaction with surgery results and functional out- come after surgery. Method Data were collected in the context of a study aimed at assessing outcome of SRS in Italian transsexuals, between November 2012 and March 2015. The research was carried out in three different centers providing hormonal and/or surgical treatment for people suffering from gender dysphoria, in line with clinical guidelines provided by the WPATH (Coleman et al., 2011). The three centers are located in Milan (Northern Italy), Florence (Central Italy), and Bari (Southern Italy). Researchers in these three sites contacted all the patients who had previously received SRS by telephone or email to ask for their participation in the study. The questionnaires were either completed in a paper-and-pencil format or by means of an online survey platform. All questionnaires were completed anonymously to ensure confidentiality, and the surveys were taken after participants pro- vided a written informed consent. No remuneration was offered for study participation. The study was approved by the Institutional Review Board (IRB) of Milan-Bicocca State University. Measures Participants were asked to fill in a questionnaire aimed at assessing post- surgical satisfaction, sexually and in overall quality of life, which included questions concerning experiences of discrimination, harassment, violence, and crime of which they may have been victim in previous years. The experi- ences assessed included the following: •• being fired or losing a job because of transsexualism •• experiencing harassment or discrimination at work from a co-worker, manager, or boss, because of transsexualism •• experiencing harassment or discrimination from a doctor, nurse, or other health care provider because of transsexualism •• being a victim of violence or crime because of transsexualism For each of the previous experiences, participants were invited to respond by means of a dichotomous scale (happened/never happened) and, in the case of a positive answer, they were invited to provide a brief description of the event. at Unimib Bicocca / Sage on January 13, 2016jiv.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://jiv.sagepub.com/ 6 Journal of Interpersonal Violence The level of support from family members before and after SRS was also assessed by means of a 5-point Likert-type scale from “very sup- portive” to “very unsupportive” (with the additional option of “not applicable”). The questionnaire was originally developed by Anne Lawrence (2003) and then adopted in her study on SRS outcome (Lawrence, 2003, 2005). Participants Seventy-two participants took part in the study and returned the question- naire fully completed by hand or online; the response rate was 37% (i.e., 37% of all potential participants in the three centers who were asked for participa- tion completed the survey). It must be pointed out, however, that no data on the total number of SRSs carried out in the country are available; therefore, no conclusion can be drawn about the representativeness of this sample to the overall population of Italian transsexuals who underwent SRS. The only national study available so far (Caldarera & Pfäfflin, 2011) provides figures up to 2008, but results are tentative and marked by some relevant method- ological drawbacks.4 Among the respondents, 46 were self-identified as male-to-female (MtF) transsexuals (64% of the total sample) and 26 were self-identified as female- to-male (FtM) transsexuals (36% of the total sample). Mean age was 39.65 years (SD = ±12.31; age range = 18-72 years) in the MtF sample and 34.77 years (SD = ±7.79; age range = 21-50 years) in the FtM sample; the age difference between the two groups reached statistical significance (Student’s t = 1.82; p < .05). In the MtF sample, 30 (65%) participants had a paid job at the time of study participation, eight (17%) were looking for work, three (7%) were full- time students, five (11%) were housewives or retired. In the FtM sample, 16 (62%) participants had a paid job, eight (30%) were looking for work, two (8%) were full-time students. Mean time since SRS was 6.13 years (SD = ±7.24; range = 1-34 years) for MtF and 4.15 years (SD = ±5.37; range = 1-22 years) for FtM. All MtF participants underwent vaginoplasty, but only one participant in the FtM sample underwent phalloplasty (i.e., surgical construction of a penis); all other participants in the FtM sample underwent hysterectomy, ovariectomy, and mastectomy (i.e., surgical removal of uterus, ovaries, and breast, respectively).5 The distribution of participants by center was as follows: Milan 45%, Florence 33%, and Bari 22%. at Unimib Bicocca / Sage on January 13, 2016jiv.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://jiv.sagepub.com/ Prunas et al. 7 Data Analysis All analyses were performed using SPSS 22.0 (IBM, Amonk, NY). Descriptive statistics were used to describe the sociodemographic character- istics of the sample and the frequencies of experiences of harassment, dis- crimination, and violence. Given the small sample size and the small numbers in contingency tables, for categorical data Fisher’s exact test was used to assess the presence of significant differences in the prevalence of the vari- ables of interest (harassment, discrimination, and violence) between the MtF and the FtM sample. Finally, Student’s t test and chi-square test were used as appropriate to assess the association between sociodemographic variables and experiences of harassment, discrimination, and violence. Results Lack of support from family members before and after SRS. Data on the sup- portiveness/unsupportiveness of family environment in the two samples, before and after surgery, are shown in Table 1. To allow comparison with previous studies, results from Lawrence’s (2003) study referring to a large sample of MtF participants are also provided. Table 1. Support From Family Members Before and After Transition. Overall (n = 72) MtF (n = 46) FtM (n = 26) Results From Lawrence (2003) in MtF (%) Before SRSa Very unsupportive 6 (8%) 4 (9%) 2 (8%) 27 Somewhat unsupportive 2 (3%) 2 (4%) 0 18 Neither 17 (24%) 8 (17%) 9 (35%) 6 Somewhat supportive 20 (28%) 16 (35%) 4 (15%) 22 Very supportive 26 (36%) 15 (32%) 11 (42%) 28 After SRSb Very unsupportive 4 (5%) 4 (9%) 0 — Somewhat unsupportive 2 (3%) 1 (2%) 1 (4%) — Neither 8 (11%) 3 (6%) 5 (19%) — Somewhat supportive 16 (22%) 12 (26%) 4 (15%) — Very supportive 40 (56%) 24 (52%) 16 (61%) — Note. MtF = male-to-female; FtM = female-to-male; SRS = sex-reassignment surgery. aFor one participant in the MtF group, the question was not applicable. bFor two participants in the MtF group the question was not applicable. at Unimib Bicocca / Sage on January 13, 2016jiv.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://jiv.sagepub.com/ 8 Journal of Interpersonal Violence Table 2. Experiences of Discrimination, Harassment and Violence in MtF and FtM Transsexuals. Overall (n = 72) MtF (n = 46) FtM (n = 26) Fisher’s Exact Test, p Ever been fired because of transsexualism 11 (15%) 10 (22%) 1 (4%) 0.048, p < .05 Ever experienced harassment or discrimination at work because of transsexualism 16 (22%) 13 (28%) 3 (11%) 0.142, n.s. Ever experienced harassment or discrimination from a health care provider because of transsexualism 10 (14%) 8 (17%) 2 (8%) 0.311, n.s. Ever been a victim of violence or crime because of transsexualism 10 (14%) 8 (17%) 2 (8%) 0.311, n.s. At least one of the above experiences 26 (36%) 19 (41%) 7 (30%) 1.489, n.s. Note. MTF = male-to-female; FtM = female-to-male. Given the small sample size, to allow a statistical comparison between the MtF and the FtM group, the participants who defined their family members as “somewhat” to “totally unsupportive” of their gender transition were aggregated to form a single group. The prevalence of a so-defined unsupport- ive family environment showed no difference between the MtF and FtM sample, either before or after surgery (before SRS: Fisher’s exact test = 0.702, p > .05; after SRS: Fisher’s exact test = 1.0, p > .05). In the MtF sample, the comparison between before and after SRS showed that for four of six participants whose family members were unsupportive before surgery, the situation did not change after surgery. For another partici- pant, the level of support from family improved dramatically after surgery, and for the last one the situation even worsened (from “somewhat” to “very unsupportive”). As for the FtM sample, the situation improved for two participants after surgery, dramatically in one case (from “very unsupportive” to “very sup- portive”) and slightly in the other (from “very unsupportive” to “somewhat unsupportive”). Experiences of harassment, discrimination, violence, and crime. Table 2 summa- rizes experiences of harassment and discrimination in the two samples. In both samples, the highest number of episodes of discrimination and harassment occurred in the workplace, with a prevalence of up to 28% in the at Unimib Bicocca / Sage on January 13, 2016jiv.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://jiv.sagepub.com/ Prunas et al. 9 MtF sample, with no significant difference between MtF and FtM (Fisher’s exact test = 0.142, p > .05). Experiences of harassment and discrimination from health care providers were reported by 17% of the MtF sample and 8% of the FtM sample, with no significant differences between the two samples (Fisher’s exact test = 0.311, p > .05). The same prevalence rates, 17% of the MtF sample and 8% of the FtM sample, were reported for being a victim of violence and crime. To obtain a global picture of the prevalence of participants in the two samples who were ever victims of any of the aforementioned experiences, a summary variable was created showing that 36% of the total sample experi- enced at least one episode of harassment, violence, or discrimination (41% in the MtF sample and 30% in the FtM sample). In the FtM sample, having ever been victims of violence, harassment, or discrimination because of transsexu- alism showed no association with the participants’ age (Student’s t = −0.999, df = 24, p > .05), time since social transition (Student’s t = −0.628, df = 24, p > .05), level of education or having/not having a paid job (continuity cor- rected χ2 = .031, df = 1, p > .05); however, the time since undergoing SRS was significantly longer for those who had been victims of violence, harassment, or discrimination compared with those who had not (8.29 ± 7.78 years vs. 2.63 ± 3.29 years; Student’s t = −2.652, df = 24, p < .05). In the MtF sample, having ever been victims of violence, harassment, or discrimination showed no association with the participants’ age (Student’s t = −0.957, df = 44, p > .05), time since SRS (Student’s t = −0.679, df = 44, p > .05), time since social transition (Student’s t = 0.451, df = 44, n.s.), level of education or having/not having a paid job (c.c. χ2 = .841, df = 1, p > .05). In only the MtF sample, we also compared participants who reported one episode of violence, harassment, and discrimination (20%) against those who reported multiple episodes (22%). No difference was found between the two groups in age or job status. It was not possible to carry out the same compari- son in the FtM group because of the small sample size. Finally, the participants who reported having ever been victims of crime or violence were asked to further specify, by means of a series of options, the type of events they experienced. The results are summarized in Table 3. No difference in prevalence was found between the two groups for any type of violence examined. Discussion This is the first multicentric study conducted in Italy on experiences of dis- crimination, harassment, and violence in transsexual clients who underwent SRS. at Unimib Bicocca / Sage on January 13, 2016jiv.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://jiv.sagepub.com/ 10 Journal of Interpersonal Violence Our results show that 36% of the total sample reported at least one episode of discrimination and harassment at work, discrimination by a health care provider, or violence. These results provide more optimistic figures com- pared with other European studies (European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2014) and reports from Italy (Transgender Europe, 2015). No difference was found in the overall prevalence rate between MtF and FtM transsexuals, a result at odds with previous surveys showing that trans- women are generally at higher risk (European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2014; Kenagy, 2005; Stotzer, 2009). Yet, once the prevalence of spe- cific types of discrimination and harassment was compared between the two samples, one difference emerged with MtF transsexuals reporting more fre- quently the experience of having been fired because of their transsexualism. Such result might be explained by gender inequality, that is, the valuation of masculinity over femininity. From this perspective, while transmen have to face less censure as they are conforming to the socially respected traits of masculinity, transwomen are at higher risk of being intensely harassed or discriminated in the workplace for both abandoning masculinity and choos- ing femininity (Schilt & Westbrook, 2009). Generally speaking, the workplace emerged as a social area with high risk for discrimination and harassment with 22% of the participants reporting experiences of harassment and discrimination connected to being transsexual at work. This result is in line with previous surveys carried out in the United States and in Europe (European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2014; Lombardi, Wilchins, Priesing, & Malouf, 2001). For instance, the 2011 Report of the National Transgender Discrimination Survey (Grant et al., 2011) showed that the workplace is a major area of discrimination for transgender Table 3. Episodes of Crime Reported by Participants in the Two Samples. MtF (n = 8) FtM (n = 2) Fisher’s Exact Test, p Assault (not sexual) 6 1 0.409, n.s. Rape or sexual assault 2 0 0.532, n.s. Robbery 2 0 0.532, n.s. Burglary or theft 1 0 1, n.s. Extortion or blackmail 1 0 1, n.s. Abduction or kidnapping 0 0 — Unjustified arrest 1 0 1, n.s. Vandalism 0 1 0.361, n.s. Note. MTF = male-to-female; FtM = female-to-male. at Unimib Bicocca / Sage on January 13, 2016jiv.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://jiv.sagepub.com/ Prunas et al. 11 people, which might take the form of unemployment or underemployment, harassment, and mistreatment, job loss or denied promotions, both in MtF and in FtM respondents. Also, in line with previous research (Lombardi et al., 2001), reports of more than one experience of discrimination, harassment, and violence were characteristic in the majority of participants in the MtF sample. The number of experiences of discrimination, harassment, and violence showed no relationship with the participants’ age or socioeconomic status, suggesting that such episodes might be actually explained as a result of one single system of inequality (Meyer, 2012; that is, belonging to a sexual minority group). However, another possible explanation is that it might be connected to a sample bias (as discussed in limits of the study). Our data also allowed us to assess the supportiveness/unsupportiveness to gender transition among family members before and after SRS. This is par- ticularly important as previous studies on the long-term outcomes of SRS indicated that adequate support from family can play a key role in predicting the well-being of transsexuals after surgery, especially in MtF transsexuals (Carroll, 1999; Eldh, Berg, & Gustafsson, 1997), although later studies did not provide further support to these results (Lawrence, 2003). Our data show that only around 10% of participants had to face an unsupportive family environment before and after SRS surgery; no differ- ence was found between MtF and FtM transsexuals. This prevalence rate is considerably lower than what was found in previous studies in the United States by means of the same assessment instrument; Lawrence (2003) found in a large sample of post-surgery MtF transsexuals that 45% of them described their family environment as at least somewhat unsupportive to their gender transition, providing no data on possible attitude change after the surgery. Such a discrepancy is probably explained by cultural differ- ences between Italy and the United States: Sociologists and economists have in fact shown that family ties tend to be much stronger in Italy (and in other countries in the Mediterranean basin) than in Northern European countries and in the United States (Alesina & Giuliano, 2013; Reher, 1998). Therefore, the family-oriented nature of the Italian society may reflect in a more favorable attitude toward a family member who decides to undergo gender transition, but research is needed to support this hypothesis. Another possible explanation is that Lawrence’s (2003) study was published over 10 years ago, and the differences with the current study might be connected to a change in the attitude toward transgender people. Finally, it should be pointed out that this result might again reflect a selection bias, as those who obtain SRS might actually be those whose families show the most support- ive attitude. at Unimib Bicocca / Sage on January 13, 2016jiv.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://jiv.sagepub.com/ 12 Journal of Interpersonal Violence Our results also show that, for the majority of participants who could not rely on a supportive family environment before SRS, the situation did not improve at all after surgery, and therefore the unsupportive attitude does not “naturally” change once the gender transition is carried out. This result might call for the need for specific psychological interventions directed toward the unsupportive family to be carried out in the context of the trans- sexual person’s transition. Italian transsexuals are exposed to discrimination, harassment, and vio- lence as much (if not even more) than those in any other European country but, living in a family-centered society, they can generally rely on a more supportive attitude from their family members than in other European or extra-European countries in which family ties tend to be weaker. Overall, our results show that the Italian society at large is still prejudiced against trans- sexuals, but at a more “micro” level, having a trans person as a family mem- ber can result in a protective and tolerant attitude. This study suffers from several methodological limitations. First of all, the sample under investigation cannot be considered represen- tative for all transsexual clients but rather for transsexual clients requesting SRS according to the International Standards of Care. This is not at all a complete picture of the trans population which is characterized by high levels of heterogeneity and cannot be simply reduced to a single group of individuals undergoing standardized hormonal treatments and SRS (Giami & Beaubatie, 2014). Second, although the rate of returned questionnaires (37%) is comparable with that of previous studies of the same kind (Lawrence, 2003), it is plausi- ble that the participants studied may not constitute a representative sample of all those at the three centers who have undergone SRS, nor of the overall population of Italian transsexuals who ever underwent SRS. No reliable data have ever been provided on the exact number of SRSs carried out in the coun- try, and estimates currently available are in fact tentative and marked by some relevant methodological drawbacks (Caldarera & Pfäfflin, 2011). Finally, non-respondents were not contacted to assess the presence of rel- evant differences from respondents. Persons who experienced positive results might have been more likely to reply and take part in the current research because of their feelings of gratitude; on the contrary, some individuals who experienced unsatisfactory surgical outcomes may have committed suicide, become isolated, or been victims of violence (Prunas et al., 2015); these fac- tors could possibly have biased our results toward more positive outcomes. In spite of these shortcomings, our findings call for the need to introduce in Italian legislation the notion of hate crime as a crime perpetrated on the grounds of gender identity. In recent years, the Parliament has rejected several at Unimib Bicocca / Sage on January 13, 2016jiv.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://jiv.sagepub.com/ Prunas et al. 13 times draft laws aimed at extending the scope of existing legislation on hate- motivated violence to include sexual orientation and gender identity (Senato della Repubblica Italiana, 2013). Such a new law might encourage trans peo- ple to report any discrimination incident they experience to authorities. Furthermore, future research should provide further data on larger sam- ples of transsexual participants and also broaden the scope of the present study by providing data on Italian transgender participants who do not self- identify as transsexuals and do not come to clinical attention. Acknowledgments The authors are heartily grateful to Mr. Ray Valido for editing the English version of the manuscript. Declaration of Conflicting Interests The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article. Funding The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publi- cation of this article. Notes 1. “Transgender” is often used as an umbrella term for people whose gender identity and/or gender expression differs from what is typically associated with the sex they were assigned at birth, and therefore transcend society’s traditional gender roles or expressions. Within the transgender spectrum, transsexual people are those whose gender identity is the opposite of the assigned sex at birth, and thus they may pursue changes in their body by means of hormones and/or surgery to “transition” their physical features to match their internal sense of gender (Spicer, 2010). Transsexual women are referred to as male-to-female (MtF), and trans- sexual men as female-to-male (FtM). Even when referring specifically to trans- sexual people, several authors prefer to use the term transgender indiscriminately. However, in Italy the term transsexual is still broadly used, and all the participants in the present study self-identified as such. In Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (5th ed.; DSM-5; American Psychiatric Association, 2013), transsexualism is represented as gender dysphoria, which is characterized by a marked incongruence between the individual’s expressed/experienced gender and the gender others would assign him or her, causing clinically significant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or other important areas of functioning. 2. “Intersex” is a general term used for a variety of conditions in which a person is born with a reproductive or sexual anatomy that does not seem to fit the typical definitions of female or male. at Unimib Bicocca / Sage on January 13, 2016jiv.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://jiv.sagepub.com/ 14 Journal of Interpersonal Violence 3. Legge 14 Aprile 1982, n. 164: “Norme in materia di rettificazione di attribuzione di sesso,” Official Gazette of the Italian Republic 19482, n. 106, p. 2879. 4. 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AIDS and Behavior, 10, 217-225. at Unimib Bicocca / Sage on January 13, 2016jiv.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://jiv.sagepub.com/ 16 Journal of Interpersonal Violence Sykes, D. L. (1999). Transgender people: An invisible population. California HIV/ AIDS Update, 12(1), 1-6. Transgender Europe. (2015). Reported deaths of 1,731 murdered trans and gen- der diverse persons from January 2008 until December 2014. Retrieved from http://www.transrespect-transphobia.org/uploads/downloads/2015/TMM- IDAHOT2015/TvT-TMM-Tables_IDAHOT-2015_EN.pdf Turner, L., Whittle, S., & Combs, R. (2009). Transphobic hate crime in the European Union. Retrieved from http://www.ucu.org.uk/media/pdf/r/6/transphobic_hate_ crime_in_eu.pdf Whittle, S., Turner, L., & Al-Alami, M. (2007). Engendered penalties: Transgender and transsexual people’s experiences of inequality and discrimination. London, England: Equalities Review. Wilchins, R. A. (1997). The first national survey on transviolence. Waltham, MA: GenderPAC. Xavier, J. (2000). The Washington transgender needs assessment survey. Final report for phase two: Tabulation of the survey questionnaires; presentation of findings and analysis of the survey results; and recommendations. Washington, DC: Administration for HIV and AIDS. Author Biographies Antonio Prunas, PhD, is psychologist and sex therapist and associate professor in Clinical Psychology at the Department of Psychology, University of Milan-Bicocca, Milan, Italy. Elisa Bandini, MD, is psychiatrist and research assistant at the Department of Biomedical, Experimental and Clinical Sciences, Careggi University Hospital, Florence, Italy. Alessandra D. Fisher, MD, PhD, is endocrinologist and research assistant at the Department of Biomedical, Experimental and Clinical Sciences, Careggi University Hospital, Florence, Italy. Mario Maggi, MD, is full professor of Endocrinology at the University of Florence, and Head of the Department of Biomedical, Experimental and Clinical Sciences, Careggi University Hospital, Florence, Italy. Valeria Pace, PhD, works as a psychologist at the Gender Dysphoria Unit, Department of Psychiatry, Bari University Hospital, Bari, Italy. Luca Quagliarella, PhD, works as a psychologist at the Gender Dysphoria Unit, Department of Psychiatry, Bari University Hospital, Bari, Italy. Orlando Todarello, MD, is full professor of Psychiatry at the University of Bari and Head of the Psychiatric Unit at Bari University Hospital, Bari, Italy. Maurizio Bini, MD, is head of the Unit for Disorders of Fertility at Niguarda Ca’ Granda Hospital, Milan, Italy. at Unimib Bicocca / Sage on January 13, 2016jiv.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://www.ucu.org.uk/media/pdf/r/6/transphobic_hate_crime_in_eu.pdf http://www.ucu.org.uk/media/pdf/r/6/transphobic_hate_crime_in_eu.pdf http://jiv.sagepub.com/ 
work_pqx6amwxurhmlhwdifieq4s37q	----	Anti-Asian Hate Crime During the COVID-19 Pandemic: Exploring the Reproduction of Inequality Anti-Asian Hate Crime During the COVID-19 Pandemic: Exploring the Reproduction of Inequality Angela R. Gover1 & Shannon B. Harper2 & Lynn Langton3 Received: 10 May 2020 /Accepted: 11 June 2020 / Published online: 7 July 2020 # Southern Criminal Justice Association 2020 Abstract Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) is believed to have emerged in Wuhan, China in late December 2019 and began rapidly spreading around the globe throughout the spring months of 2020. As COVID-19 proliferated across the United States, Asian Americans reported a surge in racially motivated hate crimes involving physical violence and harassment. Throughout history, pandemic-related health crises have been associated with the stigmatization and “othering” of people of Asian descent. Asian Americans have experienced verbal and physical violence motivated by individual- level racism and xenophobia from the time they arrived in America in the late 1700s up until the present day. At the institutional level, the state has often implicitly reinforced, encouraged, and perpetuated this violence through bigoted rhetoric and exclusionary policies. COVID-19 has enabled the spread of racism and created national insecurity, fear of foreigners, and general xenophobia, which may be related to the increase in anti- Asian hate crimes during the pandemic. We examine how these crimes – situated in historically entrenched and intersecting individual-level and institutional-level racism and xenophobia – have operated to “other” Asian Americans and reproduce inequality. Keywords Hate crime . COVID-19 . Coronavirus . Pandemic . Asian American . Asian American Journal of Criminal Justice (2020) 45:647–667 https://doi.org/10.1007/s12103-020-09545-1 * Angela R. Gover Angela.gover@ucdenver.edu Shannon B. Harper sharper@iastate.edu Lynn Langton laustell@rti.org 1 School of Public Affairs, University of Colorado Denver, 1380 Lawrence Street, Suite 500, Denver, CO 80204, USA 2 Department of Sociology, Iowa State University, 510 Farm House Lane, Ames, IA 50011, USA 3 RTI International, 701 13th St NW, Suite 750, Washington, DC 20005, USA http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1007/s12103-020-09545-1&domain=pdf https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6628-3814 mailto:Angela.gover@ucdenver.edu Introduction “I have seen this incredible seesaw effect. We can go back to the turn of the century, when Chinese were the only people to be legally excluded from this country because people were so fearful of the jobs they were taking. That was seemingly a place that we would never go to anymore, that level of vitriol. We’ve seen it, though, in waves since then: World War II, we had an Asian enemy; Korean War, we had an Asian enemy; Vietnam War, we had an Asian enemy. And then we had Asian enemies that were economic in nature.” ~ Janet Yang (2020). In the last week of 2019, the world began to take notice of reports out of Wuhan, China hospitals about an increase in pneumonia cases of unexplained origin (Wang, Horby, Hayden, & Gao, 2020). Soon thereafter, scientists found that these illnesses were due to a new type of coronavirus (i.e., severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 [SARS-CoV-2]), which causes a disease referred to as COVID-19 (i.e., 2019 coronavirus disease) (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention [CDC], 2020a). It is believed that the virus spread from animals to humans in Wuhan’s open-air “wet markets” that sell fish and raw meat to consumers (CDC, 2020a), and by mid-January 2020, began to spread rapidly throughout Asia and globally (Schumaker, 2020). By the end of January, the World Health Organization (WHO) declared a “Public Health Emergency of International Concern” (CDC, 2020b). As all Americans grew accustomed to a “new normal” secluded lifestyle (e.g., social distancing requirements and stay-at-home orders) and mounting anxieties about the spread of COVID-19, Asian Americans (i.e., people of diverse ethnicities with origins in East Asia and Southeast Asia1) – have been additionally burdened by heightened racial tension and associated racist microaggressions and verbal attacks. Asian Amer- icans have also reported a surge in a second epidemic targeting them specifically – racially motivated hate crimes involving physical violence and harassment – despite the disease impacting people of all races/ethnicities (Chiu, 2020). Under the Hate Crime Statistic Act (28 U.S.C. § 534), hate crime is defined as “crimes that manifest evidence of prejudice based on race, gender and gender identity, religion, disability, sexual orientation, or ethnicity.” Hate crime may be used to “other” minority racial/ethnic groups who are perceived as dangerous (i.e., belief that people of Asian descent are solely responsible for causing and spreading COVID-19) and outside their place of belonging (Grove & Zwi, 2006). Othering is embedded in racism (i.e., perceptions of white racial superiority) and xenophobia (i.e., fear of foreigners). Othering involves a process whereby the group at the top of the racial hierarchy (exemplified by whiteness in America) and/or individuals who believe that Asian Americans do not rightly belong in the U.S., seek to maintain the status quo by defining which members of society do and do not fully belong (Perry, 2001). Asian Americans have experienced physical violence/hate crime and harassment (e.g., violent attacks during establishment of Chinatowns in the late 1800s [Chen, 2000]), persistent marginalizing stereotyping (e.g., the perpetuation of the “yellow 1 People with origins in East Asia (Chinese, Japanese, Korean, Okinawan, Taiwanese, Tibetan) and Southeast Asia (Bruneian, Burmese, Cambodian, Filipino, Hmong, Indonesian, Laotian, Malaysian, Mien, Papua New Guinean, Singaporean, Timorese, Thai, Vietnamese). 648 American Journal of Criminal Justice (2020) 45:647–667 peril” myth at the turn of the 20th century [Mudambi, 2019]), and verbal attacks and microaggressions motivated by individual-level racism and xenophobia from the time they arrived in America in the late 1700s up until the present day (Chen, 2000). At the institutional-level, the state (i.e., the federal and state governments) has often implicitly/ explicitly reinforced, encouraged, and perpetuated this violence through racist and xeno- phobic discriminatory rhetoric and exclusionary policies (e.g., Chinese Exclusion Act of 1881 [Yung, Chang, & Lai, 2006]). COVID-19 has enabled the spread of racism and created national insecurity, fear of foreigners, and general xenophobia, which may be associated with the increase in anti-Asian hate crime during the pandemic (Vachuska, 2020). Using the lens of othering theory, we examine how these crimes – situated in historically entrenched and intersecting individual- level and institutional-level racism and xenophobia – have operated to other Asian Amer- icans, thus reproducing inequality. A mix of media and empirical sources are used to critically explore this dynamic. This paper positions anti-Asian hate crime during the COVID-19 pandemic historically and in relation to racist and xenophobic othering. We expand scholarship through examining the pandemic-driven hate crime experiences of Asian Americans to more definitively define the concept of othering. Defining Hate Crime According to the Department of Justice (DOJ, n.d.), a hate crime involves a criminal act, including violent crime such as harassment, assault, murder, arson, vandalism, or threats to commit such crimes against a person or his/her property due to their real or perceived race, color, religion, nationality, country of origin, disability, gender or sexual orientation. Conversely, some incidents of bias and hate that occur against marginalized groups meet the legal definition of harassment, but are considered “hate incidents” or acts of prejudice that do not rise to the level of a criminal act (DOJ, n.d.). These are defined as “acts of prejudice that are not crimes […] and do not involve violence, threats, or property damage” (DOJ, n.d., n.p.). This paper primarily focuses on anti-Asian hate crimes involving criminal physical violence or harassment; however, we also examine studies and media accounts of anti-Asian “hate incidents” that involve verbal violence or microaggressions and violent crime (i.e., hate incidents and hate crimes were not disaggregated). Hate crime statutes vary widely across states and jurisdictions and are defined to include varying bias motivations that often carry penalty enhancements (DOJ, n.d.). Some states require the prosecutor to prove that bias was a “substantial factor” in the perpetrator’s motivation for committing the crime against a person or persons of a protected category if the crime is to be considered a hate crime and receive penalty enhancements under state law (DOJ, n.d.). Conversely, under federal hate crime laws, bias can be an “incidental factor” in the commission of the crime (DOJ, n.d.). Othering Theory Othering is a concept found in the literature in reference to a dominant group margin- alizing a non-dominant group in some way. Originating out of prejudice and fear, the American Journal of Criminal Justice (2020) 45:647–667 649 act of othering involves a process that labels those thought to be different from oneself (Weis, 1995), wherein the racial group with the most power in American society (e.g., whites) or the group that believes they have “civic belonging” (i.e., believe they intrinsically belong in the U.S.) (Kim & Sundstrom, 2014) stigmatize and distance individuals who are racially different (i.e., Asian Americans) (Grove & Zwi, 2006; Kim & Sundstrom, 2014). Othering also serves to reinforce these dominant groups’ notions of their own “normality,” and position those who are different as deviant through a historical and ongoing process of marginalization, disempowerment, and social exclu- sion (Grove & Zwi, 2006). Asian Americans and Historical Experiences of Othering In 2018, the estimated number of Asians in the United States was 22.2 million (U.S. Census Bureau, 2019), and they are projected to become the largest immigrant group in the U.S. by 2055 (Horowitz, Brown, & Cox, 2019). Among all racial groups in the U.S., Asians are the fastest growing, increasing by 72% between 2000 and 2015 (Lopez, Ruiz, & Patten, 2017). Recent studies show that as a bloc, voters from the Asian American community are wielding an influential voice in critical electoral battleground districts, and trends show that they have leaned increasingly Democratic in the past few elections (Zheng, 2019). The numbers of Asian American political candidates and elected officials have risen sharply as well (Zheng, 2019). The following description of the early Asian immigrant experience seeks to place the othering of Asian Americans into a historical context, leading up to today’s pandemic- driven experiences ranging from microaggressions and verbal harassment to assault and other violent hate crimes. Early Asian Immigrant Experience Established groups with civic belonging in the U.S. have long perceived new waves of immigrants with some degree of resentment (Fussell, 2014). Historically, all immigrant groups different from the existing white, English-speaking, Protestant American ma- jority have endured high degrees of suspicion as they fought to gradually establish their place within American culture (Alba & Foner, 2006). Unfortunately, in various forms, this nativist attitude (intricately tied to xenophobia) has reflected institutional racism, including restrictive federal immigration policies and legalized racial quotas and exclusions, some of which specifically targeted Asian immigrants (Kil, 2012). Addi- tionally, violent racialized attacks on Asian communities by white majority groups throughout American history, especially during the 19th and 20th centuries, demonstrate the social entrenchment of this xenophobic mindset in the U.S. over time. The California Gold Rush of the mid-1800s lured the first large group of Asian immigrants to the continental U.S.: Chinese entrepreneurs seeking to strike gold (Yung et al., 2006). Unfortunately, most did not achieve the overblown promises of profit (Yung et al., 2006). Unable to return to China and forced to compete for their livelihoods with white “forty-niners” (i.e., white migrants named for the year they began to arrive in California – 1849) from the eastern U.S., these laborers were cast as scapegoats for white migrants' employment frustrations due to their different looks, 650 American Journal of Criminal Justice (2020) 45:647–667 language, and customs (Yung et al., 2006). Forced to work for less than their white counterparts, Asian immigrants labored and lived under harsh conditions, toiling in dangerous mining operations and railroad construction (Yung et al., 2006). During this time, Chinese laborers faced institutional racism from the U.S. government in the form of undue tax burdens and legislative barriers to citizenship (Yung et al., 2006). Additionally, Chinese immigrants brought opium to the United States when they arrived to participate in the Gold Rush, and eventually established opium dens (i.e., places to buy, sell, and smoke opium) in Chinatowns throughout the West (Ahrens, 2013). Many Americans eventually became addicted to the drug, which resulted in a national drug panic (Ahrens, 2013). Collectively, these historical events and injustices culminated in the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, the first legal decree banning an entire ethnic group from immigration and eligibility for U.S. citizenship (Kil, 2012). The Act was primarily fueled by racist and xenophobic fears among white working- class laborers about depressed wages, and fanned by a proliferation of “Chinese invasion” rhetoric in the media. Such language is just one example of the “hordes of immigrant invaders” trope long-used throughout U.S. history to support varying political agendas (Zimmer, 2019). The Chinese American communities of the late 1800s responded to housing segre- gation policies by forming Chinatowns in major U.S. urban centers where they constructed governing bodies to maintain community order (Chen, 2000). Instead of facing severe, racially-motivated maltreatment in mines or factories, many Chinese workers chose self-employment through restaurants, retail establishments, and laun- dries (Chen, 2000). Unfortunately, several of these communities faced a rash of violent, deadly attacks perpetrated by the white majority, sometimes escalating to residents being run out of town with their homes burned to the ground (Chen, 2000). The early 1890s saw a new influx of immigrants from Asian countries, primarily out of Japan, to work in agriculture as well as logging, fishing, mining, and service professions (Aoki, 2010). White resentment and calls for Japanese exclusion laws soon followed resulting in “The Gentleman’s Agreement” of 1908 between the U.S. and Japan, whereby Japan agreed to stop further labor immigration to the U.S. (Aoki, 2010). However, thousands of wives, parents, and children of current Japanese resi- dents were allowed to immigrate; and in the face of U.S. racial segregation, Japanese families came together to establish enclaves along the West coast (Aoki, 2010; Lee, 2002). Like the Chinese before them, Japanese and Korean newcomers faced legisla- tive barriers to land ownership, citizenship, and education inspired by racism, which concluded with a 1924 amendment to the Chinese Exclusion Act that denied citizens from any Asian nation to immigrate to the U.S. These anti-Asian laws remained in place until 1943 (Lee, 2002). After Japanese victories in the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese Wars at the turn of the 20th century, a new “yellow peril” stereotype arose in the U.S typecasting Asians of all ethnicities, domestic and foreign, as threatening agents bent on world domination (Mudambi, 2019). This pernicious stereotype othered Asian Americans as bloodthirsty, sneaky foreigners who were not to be trusted in the same way as Americans of other ancestries. The yellow peril myth perfectly and troublingly set the stage for the next chapter in the American government's discriminatory treatment of Asian communities as the U.S. entered World War II (Lyman, 2000). American Journal of Criminal Justice (2020) 45:647–667 651 Japanese Concentration Camps In what remains one of the most shameful violations of constitutional rights in U.S. history, President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed an executive order allowing for the forced removal of the entire Japanese population of the U.S. West coast (the majority of whom were American citizens) two months after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December of 1941 (Conrat & Conrat, 1972). Allowed only to bring what they could carry, over 120,000 persons of Japanese ancestry were herded into concentration camps surrounded by barbed wire and guarded by armed military personnel, where they remained through the duration of the war (Howard, 2009). Anyone with 1/16th or more Japanese blood was eligible for removal, perceived as a potential threat (Burton, Farrell, Lord, & Lord, 2011). Ironically, due to xenophobic paranoia and fear of Japanese American sabotage, the U.S. military at Hickham Base in Honolulu, HI had parked their airplanes in a contained area to be more easily guarded, making the planes “sitting-ducks” for air attacks by Japanese bombers (Miller, 1992). Despite the wide-ranging feelings of distrust by the larger society towards Asian Americans at that time, tens of thousands of Asian American soldiers of varying ethnicities enlisted and served with valor during the war (Parks, 2004). With the passage of the Immigration Act in 1965 which struck down race as a barrier for immigration, Asian immigrants flowed into the U.S. once again (Yung et al., 2006). New waves of East Asian immigrants arrived in the U.S. through the mid to late twentieth century (Chin, 1996). As these new groups of Americans integrated into U.S society, a new stereotype proliferated: the myth of the “model minority” (Chou & Feagin, 2015). The model minority stereotype promotes the notion that Asian Amer- icans are a monolithic group who have enjoyed great success in American society due to a cultural emphasis on a strong work ethic, natural-born intelligence, and through stressing the importance of education and achievement within their families (Chou & Feagin, 2015). Such a seemingly affirmative representation of an entire race masks a negative dynamic of consistently relegating Asian Americans to a permanent foreigner status (i.e., othering) when compared to other Americans (Chou & Feagin, 2015). Additionally, this myth works to confirm the belief that America does not have any racial discrimination problems, suggesting that all racial groups operate on an equal playing field with the hardest working groups inevitably rising to the top of their own accord, share equal privilege, and do not experience obstacles brought on by others' racist attitudes and behavior (Chou & Feagin, 2015). Finally, in some respects, this myth fosters suspicion and resentment towards Asian communities and immigrants as a whole (McGowan & Lindgren, 2006). Stigmatization and Pandemics The devastating impact of infectious disease has loomed large throughout human history causing more fatalities than any other medical cause (Pappas, Kiriaze, Giannakis, & Falagas, 2009). Unfortunately, eruptions of xenophobia have historically followed close on the heels of pandemics. Especially when viral outbreaks are deadly, fear often drives those at risk to place blame on some “other,” or some group external to their own national, religious, or ethnic identity (Muzzatti, 2005). Sickness cultivates 652 American Journal of Criminal Justice (2020) 45:647–667 fear, which in turn cultivates bias (Muzzatti, 2005). Consequently, minority groups have often found themselves erroneously blamed for spreading germs, as insiders perceived them to be “dirty” or “sickly” (Taylor, 2019). As a nation built by waves of new immigrants, newcomers to the U.S. have traditionally borne the brunt of corresponding waves of othering in the form of ignorance and blame for a myriad of societal maladies, most notably those concerning infectious disease; a few examples include Irish Catholic immigrants held responsible for “Irish disease” (cholera), Jewish immigrants blamed for “consumption” (tuberculosis), Irish and German newcomers blamed for yellow fever (McKiven, 2007), and Italian immigrants blamed for polio (Cohn, 2012). The COVID-19 pandemic is not the first time a public health crisis has resulted in the othering and disparate treatment of Asian Americans. When the bubonic plague began in San Francisco, CA in 1900, public health officials implemented a race-based response by quarantining Chinese residents in Chinatown, the epicenter of the out- break, while allowing white merchants to leave (Barde, 2004). More recently, East Asians across the globe experienced stigmatization during the SARS outbreak of 2002- 2004 (Eichelberger, 2007). Despite comprising a tapestry of diverse ethnicities, Asian Americans have been historically viewed as a monolith, othered by the myth of the model minority in times of peace and economic security, while othered as a scapegoat in times of economic adversity, wars, or pandemics. Anti-Asian Hate Crime during the COVID-19 Pandemic Prior sections have explored how anti-Asian racism and xenophobia in the U.S. have been reproduced and historically entrenched at the individual- and institutional-levels during times of crisis and significant change so as to other Asian Americans and reinforce their inequality. The sections below examine how hate crime exacted in response to the COVID-19 pandemic is an extreme and exacerbated replication of this othering process; and how institutional-level racist and xenophobic rhetoric targeting Asian Americans has established the structure through which individual-level hate crimes occur. What’s in a Name? The WHO (2015) followed their “Best Practices for the Naming of New Human Diseases” in selecting “COVID-19” as the name for the disease caused by SARS- CoV-2. These best practices endeavor to avoid offending any cultural, social, national, regional, professional, and/or ethnic groups (WHO, 2015). According to Dr. Keiji Fukuda, the WHO Assistant Director-General for Health Security, disease names can create significant consequences in terms of backlash against affected religious or ethnic groups (WHO, 2015). WHO (2015) best practices also advocate the avoidance of geographic locations or references to culture, population, or language that incites fear. Disregarding the WHO’s (2015) official nomenclature, President Donald Trump publicly used the terms “Chinese virus” or “China virus” for COVID-19 in various tweets between March 16–18, 2020 (Fallows, 2020), as well as in a White House press American Journal of Criminal Justice (2020) 45:647–667 653 conference on March 19th, and then repetitively defended his use of the terms throughout March and early April (Chiu, 2020). A widely circulated image captured at the March 19th press conference shows the president’s notes with the “corona” in “coronavirus” crossed out and replaced with “Chinese” (Smith, 2020). When confronted about his use of the “Chinese” descriptive rather than the WHO-official “COVID-19” term, the president responded, “It’s from China. That’s why. It comes from China. I want to be accurate” (Fallows, 2020). While President Trump repeatedly referred to COVID-19 as the “Chinese virus” or “China virus,” Secretary of State Mike Pompeo preferred the term “Wuhan virus” (Rogers, 2020). Additionally, an unnamed White House staffer allegedly used the term “kung flu” (Boyer, 2020). Some argue that such terminology is both racist and xenophobic (Chiu, 2020) as it promotes anti-Asian bias and exclusion (Little, 2020), which may increase the risk of hate crime (Cabanatuan, 2020). The president’s early rhetoric undoubtedly did not serve to protect the Asian community. Before Trump made these remarks in mid- March, racist acts and harassment targeting Asian Americans had already surged; they continued to increase through March and April following his statements (Haynes, 2020). On the coattails of President Trump’s remarks, other political officials have also used derogatory language to blame the Chinese for causing COVID-19. For example, Senator John Cornyn (R-TX) said in a press conference on March 18th that China was to “blame” for the spread of COVID-19 because they are a “culture where people eat bats and snakes and dogs and things like that” (Wu, 2020). On March 23rd, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued a warning that white supremacists may use the crisis to justify harm or violence against Asian Americans (Mallin & Margolin, 220). Also in late March, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) antici- pated that there would be a surge in anti-Asian hate crime during the pandemic and therefore alerted law enforcement agencies to be on heightened alert for bias-motivated incidents (Mallin & Margolin, 2020). According to a recent not yet published news content analysis (detailed in the San Francisco Chronicle) conducted by Professor Russell Jeung of the Asian American Studies department at San Francisco State University, the number of “hate incidents” reported in the media increased in response to the xenophobic language used by public officials (Cabanatuan, 2020; Jeung, 2020). Moreover, Dr. Jeung remarked that the timing in the sharp rise in hate incidents specifically coincided with the president’s use of the term, “Chinese virus” (Jeung, 2020; Kang, 2020). He argued that his findings demonstrate that political language can provoke racial hatred and associated violence (Sheyner, 2020). At the same time, it appears that the study defines “hate incidents” as involving aggregated hate crimes and hate incidents, making it difficult to distinguish between the two. Similarly, in the week following the president’s March 19th press conference, the “Stop AAPI Hate” (AAPI refers to Asian American and Pacific Islander) website that includes an anti-AAPI harassment, discrimination, and violent attacks self-reporting tool, recorded 673 “racist incidents” (Cabanatuan, 2020); however, it is not known how many of these incidents apply directly to the Asian community. Similar to Dr. Jeung’s (2020) study, “racist incidents” likely involve the aggregate of hate crimes and hate incidents. Additionally, in a pre-print manuscript, Vachuska (2020) analyzed Google Trends data and found that attitudes toward minority racial groups have been affected by the 654 American Journal of Criminal Justice (2020) 45:647–667 COVID-19 pandemic. Specifically, to measure anti-Chinese sentiment, the author examined the proportion of and relationships among searches for a specific racial epithet used to describe a person of Chinese descent, coronavirus searches, Chinese restaurants, etc. (Vachuska, 2020). The author reported strong evidence of a relation- ship between COVID-19 and an increase in anti-Chinese sentiment, including discrim- inatory treatment towards the Asian community and Chinese restaurants (Vachuska, 2020). More research is needed to clarify anti-Asian hate crime trends during and following the COVID-19 pandemic. As awareness grew about the growing number of hate incidents and hate crimes against Asian Americans, accusations of racism and xenophobia around the president’s insistence on using the term, “Chinese virus,” exploded in the media. The White House responded to the uproar by accusing the media of manufacturing “fake outrage” over nothing, citing previous epidemics named after geographic locations: Spanish flu, West Nile, zika virus, and ebola (Mangan, 2020). However, the WHO (2015) appropriately named the novel coronavirus “COVID-19” to avoid a connection with a geographic area and therefore circumvent the stigmatization of people living in that area or of similar ancestry worldwide. The correlating increase in hate crimes against Asian Americans during the COVID-19 pandemic (Jeung, 2020; Vachuska, 2020) underlines the importance of avoiding geography in the naming of communicable diseases (Little, 2020).2 On March 23, 2020, President Trump walked back his use of the term “Chinese virus,” noting in a network news interview that the American people were already well aware of the virus’ true origins; however, he declined to apologize for using the geographic descriptor (Leigh, 2020). Additionally, the president declared that Asian Americans should not be blamed “in any way, shape, or form” for COVID-19 (Samuels, 2020). He also denounced the recent spate of pandemic-related racial attacks on Asian Americans (Samuels, 2020). Unfortunately, for many hate crime victim advocates and Asian Americans, this change of heart came too late; too much damage had already occurred (Shyong, 2020). One could argue that in the critical early days when the language coming from America’s leadership set the tone, concerns about its effects on Asian Americans had been negligent at best, and destructive at worst. Hate Crime Data The Hate Crime Statistics Act of 1990 requires the federal government to collect data about crimes motivated by race, religion, sexual orientation, or ethnicity (FBI, n.d.). The nation’s largest sources of crime data, the FBI’s Uniform Crime Report (UCR) and the Bureau of Justice Statistics’ (BJS) National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS), provide national estimates of hate crime (Masucci & Langton, 2017). Both sources define hate crime according to the federal definition noted in the Introduction. Hate crime data are also collected by advocacy organizations that provide assistance to marginalized communities (e.g., Southern Policy Law Center, Asian Pacific Policy Planning Council, Anti-Defamation League) (Gladfelter, Lantz, & Ruback, 2017; 2 Additionally, it is important to note that hate crimes against Asian Americans may have increased following national awareness of COVID-19 regardless of the president’s problematic rhetoric. American Journal of Criminal Justice (2020) 45:647–667 655 Jenness & Grattet, 2001). Each of these data sources have significant limitations (Gladfelter et al., 2017). UCR and NCVS data have been utilized in the present study because they are the largest and most representative of the population. We examined hate crime data from the two collections for the 16-year period from 2003 to 2018, the years of data available for both sources.3 Both collections provide data on annual counts of racially-motivated hate crime. The UCR enables these counts to be disaggregated by the specific type of racial bias motivating the offense (e.g., anti-Asian bias; anti-African American bias; anti-Hispanic violence, etc.), while the NCVS statistics can be disaggregated by the race of the victim. The sections below describe the two collections and what they tell us about anti-Asian hate crime prior to COVID-19. Throughout these data sections, we refer to anti-Asian hate crime; however, both the UCR and NCVS numbers include hate crimes against Pacific Islanders and Native Hawaiians as well. Because the NCVS is based on a sample, it is necessary to aggregate several years of data to have sufficient sample sizes for reliable estimates of anti-Asian hate crime. UCR hate crime counts were calculated from Hate Crime Statistics Program data available on the FBI (2003–2007, 2014-2018) website, and NCVS estimates were generated from the public-use data files available through the National Archive of Criminal Justice Data (n.d.) (BJS, 1992–2018). UCR The FBI annually collects summary crime data from thousands of city, county, college and university, state, tribal, and federal law enforcement agencies nationwide through the UCR Program. Through a supplementary collection to the UCR, the Hate Crime Statistics Program, the FBI additionally collects data on hate crime incidents, offenses, and victims, including details about the offender’s bias motivation and whether he or she was motivated by anti-Asian bias. Although the UCR hate crime statistics can be used to identify victims of anti-Asian bias, it should be noted that the bias motivation is based on the offender’s perceptions of the victim. In other words, the victim may not necessarily be of Asian descent, but if the offender believed they were and targeted them for that reason, the incident would be counted as an anti-Asian hate crime. The FBI data also distinguish between single-bias hate crime incidents, and multiple-bias incidents in which the offender(s) was motivated by two or more biases. The discussion below examines single-bias hate crimes, which account for the majority of UCR hate crimes (about 98% in 2018), as we are interested in hate crimes motivated by anti- Asian bias alone. It is also important to note that both the UCR and NCVS include hate crime data involving Asian Americans and documented and undocumented Asian immigrants (Addington, 2008). UCR data reveal that during the 5-year period from 2003 to 2007, there was an average of 9314 victims of single-bias hate crimes. Of those victims, 67.0%, (n = 6241) 3 The NCVS hate crime data are available in public-use files beginning in 2003. For both collections, the most recent year of data available is 2018. Both data collections operate on a calendar year (January–December). Once the collections close on December 31st, the BJS and FBI spend several months cleaning and processing the annual files and typically release the data several months later in the summer or fall. In other words, 2019 data are expected to be released in the late summer or early fall of 2020. 656 American Journal of Criminal Justice (2020) 45:647–667 were motivated by racial/ethnic/ancestral bias. Among these 6241 racially motivated hate crimes, 4.1% (n = 254) were motivated by anti-Asian bias. In comparison, during the most recent 5-year period from 2014 to 2018, there was an average of 7690 single- bias hate crime victims, of which 59.6% (n = 4581) were targeted due to racial/ethnic/ ancestral bias, and anti-Asian bias accounted for 3.8% (n = 176) of these crimes. Across these two 5-year periods, there was a 26.6% decrease in single-bias racially motivated hate crimes, and a 30.8% decrease in anti-Asian motivated hate crime. When interpreting UCR hate crime statistics it is important to take into account the underreporting problems associated with these data. In 2018, for example, at least 80 cities in the U.S. with populations over 100,000 people reported zero hate crimes for the year. Underreporting may occur at the agency-level because reporting to the FBI is voluntary. Within agencies, underreporting may occur due to the difficulty law en- forcement officers have identifying objective evidence of the bias motivation to determine whether or not the incident is a hate crime (Gladfelter et al., 2017). A victim must identify the crime as motivated by prejudice in order for law enforcement to classify it as a hate crime; and when detectives investigate, they must collect evidence to prove that the incident was motivated by bias, which is often challenging and unclear (Gladfelter et al., 2017). In regard to the latter however, the determination, about whether to charge the offense as a hate crime often falls on the prosecutor, not the police. In addition, UCR data may undercount hate crime if victims do not report to police because they do not believe the racially motivated violence was a crime, have language and cultural barriers, lack trust in the government and police, have a fear of retaliatory violence, and/or believe that they will not be taken seriously by criminal justice system actors (Davis & O’Neill, n.d.). NCVS The NCVS has been used to collect hate crime data since 2003 (Masucci & Langton, 2017). Unlike the UCR that includes offenses known to and reported by police departments, the NCVS collects information from a nationally representative sample of households about experiences with crime both reported and not reported to police (i.e., the “dark figure of crime”). Upon identifying that a respondent has experienced crime, the NCVS asks victims if they have any reason to believe that the victimization was a “hate crime or crime of prejudice or bigotry” (NCVS, 2016 [question 161]). Victimizations are only categorized hate crimes if the victim can provide certain types of evidence to support an affirmative response (Addington, 2008). Additionally, the NCVS asks hate crime victims about the types of bias they suspected motivated the crime (Masucci & Langton 2017). NCVS data reveal that from 2003 to 2007, there was an average of 265,062 annual hate crime victimizations, of which 67.1% (n = 177,946) were motivated by racial/ ethnic bias. About 2.5% of hate crime victimizations were against persons identifying as Asian, Pacific Islander or Native Hawaiian (n = 6625), and the vast majority (>99%)4 were motivated by anti-racial/ethnic bias. During the more recent 2014– 2018 period, there was an average of 224,435 total hate crimes with 57.7% (n = 4 NCVS data suggest that all hate crime victimizations against Asians were motivated by racial or ethnic bias; however, the data are based on a sample so this is not a true 100%. American Journal of Criminal Justice (2020) 45:647–667 657 128,474) motivated by racial/ethnic bias. About 2.7% of the hate crime victimizations were against Asians, Pacific Islanders, or Native Hawaiians (n = 6158), again with the vast majority (94%) motivated by the offender’s racial or ethnic bias. Across the two periods, it appears that hate crime overall declined by 15.3%, and hate crimes against people of Asian descent declined by 7.0%; however, the differences between the estimates are not statistically significant when the confidence intervals are taken into account. Importantly, the NCVS data also reveal that less than half of hate crime victimizations overall (43.2%) are reported to police, and this is true among Asian victims as well (47.6%). Reconciling Variations in Estimates The UCR reported a large percentage decrease (30.8%) in anti-Asian motivated hate crime while the NCVS indicated a small percentage decrease (7.0%) across the two 5- year time periods. Discrepancies in percentages suggest vast underreporting of hate crime to police and magnify the hidden nature of hate crime against Asian Americans in the U.S. today. Indeed, NCVS hate crime data reveal that 47.6% of Asian victims do not report to the police. While both results reflect a decrease in hate crimes motivated by anti-Asian bias across time, the large differences between the two statistics make it unclear how extensive the decrease is. After the COVID-19 pandemic has subsided, scholars should compare old and new UCR and NCVS hate crime data to determine whether the prevalence of anti-Asian hate crime has markedly increased/changed.5 Inconsistencies in both sources’ anti-Asian hate crime data collectively show the limitations of using official data to accurately estimate the prevalence of hate crime. Additionally, the vast difference between the UCR’s and NCVS’s reported numbers of racially motivated hate crimes is striking and problematic. For example, from 2003 to 2007, UCR data indicate that there were 6241 hate crimes motivated by racial/ethnic prejudice, while NCVS data demonstrate that 177,946 hate crimes involved racial/ ethnic bias motivation, which is an approximate 186% difference between the two. Discrepancies between the two data collections make it difficult to determine the actual pervasiveness of racially motivated hate crime in the U.S. across time. NCVS data is arguably more reliable than UCR data because it includes both reported and unreported hate crimes. With this in mind, NCVS data suggest that anti-Asian hate crime has remained an alarming problem across time, while UCR data imply the opposite (or a less alarming persistent trend). Assessing 2020 Hate Crime Data Data from the 2020 NCVS and UCR Hate Crime Statistics Program are expected to be released in late 2021. At that point, researchers will be able to assess both the extent to which law enforcement data show a spike in anti-Asian hate crimes known to police 5 It is important to note that when thinking about comparing any kind of percent declines, the FBI treats their numbers as a complete enumeration, when in reality, there is agency- and item-level missingness among the data. The FBI does not produce standard errors so it is difficult to determine whether an apparent change in a number is actually within the margin of error. 658 American Journal of Criminal Justice (2020) 45:647–667 and whether there were changes in the numbers of Asian victims of hate crimes reported or not reported to police. Although the two data sources may not be consistent in terms of the magnitude of any spike, together they should provide empirical evidence about whether the qualitative, anecdotal suggestions of a pandemic-related increase in anti-Asian hate crimes was true nationwide. Together the two sources will show whether there were overall increases in the number of hate crimes against Asian Americans and whether the victims were comfortable seeking help from the police. Personal Experiences of Hate Crime During the COVID-19 Pandemic Social media has played a significant role in publicizing racialized attacks against Asian Americans during the COVID-19 pandemic. Tweets have exposed instances of anti- Asian hate crime involving physical violence and harassment, mainly after bystander videos were posted and picked up by the broader media. Twitter hashtags such as #WashTheHate and #HateIsAVirus trended on social media platforms as users responded to the incidents they viewed on their screens (Elder, 2020). For example, New York City police urged the victim of a COVID-19 hate crime to come forward and make a report after a video surfaced on February 5th of a man physically and verbally assaulting her while she was wearing a facemask in a Chinatown subway station, calling her a “diseased (expletive)” (Sosa & Brown, 2020). In another incident on March 10th, a Korean American woman in midtown Manhattan was grabbed by the hair, shoved, and punched in the face by an assailant (Miles, 2020). The perpetrator yelled at the victim, “You’ve got coronavirus, you Asian (expletive)” and “Where’s your (expletive) mask?” (Miles, 2020). The victim suffered a dislocated jaw (Miles, 2020). One of the most horrific examples of COVID-19-related hate crimes occurred on March 14th at a Sam’s Club in Midland, TX, when a perpetrator attacked a family from Myanmar, stabbing three victims including a 2-year-old girl and a 6-year-old boy (Aziz, 2020). The assailant told police he feared the victims were Chinese and infecting others with the coronavirus (Aziz, 2020). Another extreme example occurred on April 5th, when an Asian American woman in Brooklyn was doused with acid by a man who snuck up behind her as she was taking her trash outside her front door, causing second degree burns to her body, face, and hands (Moore & Cassady, 2020). In late March, a 26-year-old Asian American man in a Brooklyn subway explained how a man spat in his face, and when he asked the man why he did so, the perpetrator yelled at him, “You (expletive) Chinese spreading the coronavirus!” (Moore & Bensimon, 2020) The perpetrator then unzipped his jacket and pointed to a weapon saying, “You wanna do this?” (Moore & Bensimon, 2020). Psychological Effects of Hate Crimes Many scientific studies have established a correlation between racialized victimization and poor mental health outcomes (e.g., Gee, Spencer, Chen, Yip, & Takeuchi, 2007). Since the emergence of COVID-19, there has been a 22% total increase in people accessing the Mental Health America anxiety screening tool; among users, the increase in Asian American respondents has been 39% (Campbell & Ellerbeck, 2020). Research also suggests that hate crime victims experience more severe consequences compared to American Journal of Criminal Justice (2020) 45:647–667 659 victims of non-hate crimes (Mellgren, Andersson, & Ivert, 2017). Specifically, McDevitt, Balboni, Garcia, and Gu (2001) reported that bias crimes impact victims differently than non-bias crimes in that victims of bias crimes are more fearful and experience intrusive thoughts following their victimization. Institutional-Level Response Federal Response In the last week of March 2020, Congresswoman Grace Menge (D-NY) introduced a resolution calling for all public officials to condemn anti-Asian discrimination (Jeung, Kulkarni, & Choi, 2020). Additionally, the resolution called for federal law enforce- ment agencies to address pandemic-related hate crimes through data collection, docu- mentation, and investigation (Jeung et al., 2020). Finally, Menge called for states to set up multi-agency task forces to address COVID-19-related racial bias concerning safe retail access, fair employment, and quality mental health services in educational settings for Asian American students and others affected by the pandemic (Jeung et al., 2020). While many in the Asian community appreciated Trump’s March 23rd reversal regarding his use of the term “Chinese virus” and the positive comments he made about Asian Americans, advocates continue to await a meaningful response from the federal government, such as the creation of a DOJ Task Force to address hate crimes against the Asian community (Warner, 2020). As Matt Nguyen-Ngo, Civil Rights Fellow at the nonprofit OCA-Asian Pacific American Advocates expressed, “Trump did say Asian Americans are not to blame, but he hasn’t done anything beyond that […] It’s been a very lackluster response” (Chapman, 2020; Kang, 2020). At a March 26th White House press briefing on the pandemic, when asked what he is doing to stop anti-Asian hate crimes in the country, Trump replied, “I don’t know” (Chapman, 2020). In addition to the lack of response from the Oval Office, neither the DOJ nor the CDC have done much to respond to the pandemic. In the past, the CDC has responded quickly to prevent racialized violence, as it did during the 2003 SARS outbreak (far less prevalent or deadly than COVID-19), and the DOJ acted quickly after the 2001 terror attacks (Campbell & Ellerbeck, 2020). Lamenting the lack of action, a group of 12 U.S. senators penned a letter to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights requesting official guidance on federal response: “There has not been a concerted effort from federal agencies to prevent and address anti-Asian sentiment related to the COVID-19 pan- demic” (Campbell & Ellerbeck, 2020). In response, Assistant Attorney General, Eric Dreiband stated that hate crimes would be prosecuted to the full extent of the law (Campbell & Ellerbeck, 2020). State Response On February 13, 2020, in response to the recent uptick in verbal attacks and other racial incidents targeting Asian Americans in Los Angeles, CA, county officials held a news conference denouncing racist incidents against the Asian community related to fears 660 American Journal of Criminal Justice (2020) 45:647–667 around COVID-19 (Capatides, 2020). Officials urged the public not to buy into stereotypes and misinformation about Asians, specifically citing two separate bullying incidents in public schools that resulted in the hospitalization of school-aged victims (City News Service, 2020). In a more concrete response to the increase in harassment and physical assault directed at Asian Americans due to COVID-19, New York’s Attorney General, Letitia James established a state hotline for reporting hate incidents and hate crimes (New York Attorney General, 2020). Discussion/Conclusion: Anti-Asian Hate Crime and the Reproduction of Inequality Despite a long history in North America and increasing numbers and political influence today, Asian American communities have continued to experience a recurring dynamic of othering. Racism and xenophobia woven into the social fabric may generate harmful individual-level attitudes and actions against Asian Americans that other and exclude them from national belonging. Racially dominant and/or well-established groups in America that hold social power have historically resented the arrival and presence of less well-established and influential groups such as Asian Americans, perceiving them as “foreigners” outside of their “proper” place of belonging and a threat to notions of community and sovereignty (Grove & Zwi, 2006; Kim & Sundstrom, 2014). Such nativist and xenophobic resentments intricately overlap with racism, wherein those in power fear and resist those who look different, speak dissimilar languages, and have unique cultural practices in comparison. As a result, the othering of Asian Americans has been historically repetitive in the form of bigoted exclusionary practices and violence, thus serving to entrench their foreigner and marginalized status and maintain the racial and nationalist hierarchy. One could argue that the social and institutional entrenchment of racism and xenophobia has resulted in the repetitive re-emergence of anti-Asian stereotypes across time. For example, the prevalent discrimination and bigotry wrought by the yellow peril and the model minority myths further marked and established Asian Americans as inherently different from the majority population (McGowan & Lindgren, 2006). Additionally, institutionalized processes and government policies (elevated tax bur- dens, education and housing segregation, land ownership restrictions, and barriers to Asian immigration and citizenship [Zimmer, 2019]), further sustained the othering of Asian Americans. This othering process is amplified and replicated during pandemics when wide- spread fear of catching disease engenders prejudice against groups that are different from the majority population, positioning them as effective scapegoats (Muzzatti, 2005; Taylor, 2019). Ostracizing Asian Americans in this way metaphorically builds a wall between those socially perceived as most important (i.e., whites) and those perceived as less important (i.e., Asian Americans), creating a boundary where “never the two shall meet.” This othering dynamic has reemerged during the COVID-19 pandemic, as illustrated by President Trump’s and other political officials’ use of racially derogatory language (Fallows, 2020; Rogers, 2020; Wu, 2020). As cognitive linguists Lakoff and Johnson (2003) have long established, metaphors are ubiquitous in forming our world view. The adjective “Chinese” in “Chinese virus” American Journal of Criminal Justice (2020) 45:647–667 661 is particularly problematic as it associates the infection with an ethnicity. Connecting group identities with explicitly medical language serves to categorize those group identities as other. Historically, this connection has influenced anti-immigrant rhetoric and policy in the United States. The WHO’s (2015) best-practices in naming infectious diseases exemplifies the importance of severing this connection in order to avoid stigma against geographic locations and ethnic groups. Though most public officials eventually reversed course in their “China virus” rhetoric, regardless of whether this reversal was motivated by a sudden altruistic understanding or by political calculation, the damage had already been done. At any rate, any commitment to avoiding the public othering of Asian Americans was short-lived. As late as April 17, 2020, President Trump put out a tweet criticizing House Speaker Nancy Pelosi for making a February trip to San Francisco’s Chinatown in support of Asian American owned busi- nesses, after declaring in another tweet that he had already “closed the BORDER TO CHINA” (capitalized letters used by the president) (Behrmann, 2020). This seeming failure to distinguish between the residents of San Francisco’s Chinatown and foreign nationals from the nation of China reinforces the idea of their enduring foreignness. Additionally, through the late spring of 2020, political focus increasingly turned to placing blame for the COVID-19 pandemic on the nation of China; a by-product of this focus is increased suspicion and fear in the American consciousness towards Asian Americans, creating the perfect climate to cultivate further hate crime (Jeung et al., 2020). One could argue that the historical perpetuation of this othering process, embedded in fear of perceived outsiders and racial hatred, has allowed for more extreme, violent, and devastating violence and state abuse, such as the Japanese Concentration Camps following the Pearl Harbor attacks (Conrat & Conrat, 1972), and the seeming influx of hate crime we see today with the COVID-19 pandemic. Hate crimes during the COVID-19 pandemic are an extreme manifestation of othering illustrating the replica- tive and cumulative effects of the historical embeddedness of racism and xenophobia. That is, perpetrators exact violence to dehumanize and ostracize Asian Americans, stigmatizing and “marking” them as deviant to destroy their sense of belonging (Kim & Sundstrom, 2014), encourage and perpetuate ongoing exclusion, sustain feelings of superiority, and restore feelings of normalcy and comfort. It is likely that this rash of COVID-19 related hate crimes and incidents will have enduring deleterious psycho- logical, emotional, and physical effects on Asian American victims and Asian com- munities, exacerbated by decades of generational trauma (Comas-Díaz, 2016). Argu- ably equally as devastating is the damage to society of normalizing the othering of any minority group based on race, ethnicity, religion, national origin, disability, gender identity, and/or sexual orientation. Although immigration status was not specifically explored in this paper, it is important to note that Asian immigrants without citizenship status may experience exacerbated devastating health effects of COVID-19 hate crime as they have reduced access to resources that may help to address that harm due to fears of deportation upon reporting (Dorn et al., 2011). COVID-19 is a public health matter, not a racial one (Jeung et al., 2020). Not only is it critical to stop the spread of COVID-19, but also the racial hatred it has produced (Jeung et al., 2020). It is also essential that we take the lessons learned from racialized fear derived from historical events and apply that knowledge to feelings of fear and anxiety during the pandemic (Jeung et al., 2020). Unfortunately, the pandemic-related stigmatization of Asian Americans and Asians across the globe may continue long after 662 American Journal of Criminal Justice (2020) 45:647–667 the cessation of COVID-19. Americans must confront incidents of discrimination head- on: in schools, workplaces, businesses, and public spaces, in addition to demanding a robust response from law enforcement and the federal and state governments when hate crimes occur (Jeung et al., 2020). In summary, across time, socially entrenched racism and xenophobia toward Asian Americans have repetitively recurred through individual-level prejudiced attitudes and actions. Moreover, these attitudes and actions have been reinforced by institutional-level support during times of crisis or great change, including the coronavirus pandemic. As a result, racial/ethnic inequality has been reproduced through the establishment of an “us. vs. them” modus operandi that relegates Asian Americans to the bottom of the social hierarchy, wrongly and maliciously marking them unworthy of the same rights and treatment as those at the top. 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Dr. Gover’s published work appears in over 100 journal articles and edited volumes (i.e., book chapters) such as Child Abuse & Neglect, Violence and Victims, Journal of Interpersonal Violence, Journal of Child Sexual Abuse, and Violence Against Women. Dr. Gover remains active in her profession by serving on editorial boards for several journals in her field. Her current research focuses on the criminal justice system’s response to intimate partner violence, specifically, domestic violence offender treatment, personal protection orders, and law enforcement officer attitudes towards domestic violence. Shannon B. Harper, Ph.D., is an Assistant Professor of criminal justice in the Sociology Department and U.S. Latino/a Studies Program at Iowa State University. Dr. Harper’s research explores the relationship between intimate partner violence and intimate partner homicide (IPH) and the gendered contexts through which both occur. She examines the neighborhood social and structural factors that influence IPH, as well as how the criminal justice system and community resources operate to address it and the abuse that precipitates it. Dr. Harper’s work also investigates how race/ethnicity, class, and gender intersect to shape marginalized survivors’ interpersonal victimization experiences, specifically Latina and African American women. Her published works can be found in multiple peer-reviewed journals and edited volumes. Lynn Langton, Ph.D., is a Senior Research Criminologist at RTI International. Her research focuses on victimization, victim services, sexual violence, hate crime, financial fraud and white-collar crime, police- community relations, and survey methodology. Prior to joining RTI in 2018, Dr. Langton served as Victimization Unit Chief for the Bureau of Justice Statistics where she directed numerous large-scale national projects, including the National Crime Victimization Survey. American Journal of Criminal Justice (2020) 45:647–667 667 https://doi.org/https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/second-generation-last-great-wave-immigration-setting-record-straight https://doi.org/https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/second-generation-last-great-wave-immigration-setting-record-straight https://doi.org/https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/second-generation-last-great-wave-immigration-setting-record-straight https://doi.org/https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/second-generation-last-great-wave-immigration-setting-record-straight https://doi.org/https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/second-generation-last-great-wave-immigration-setting-record-straight https://doi.org/https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/second-generation-last-great-wave-immigration-setting-record-straight https://doi.org/https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/second-generation-last-great-wave-immigration-setting-record-straight https://doi.org/https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/second-generation-last-great-wave-immigration-setting-record-straight Anti-Asian Hate Crime During the COVID-19 Pandemic: Exploring the Reproduction of Inequality Abstract Introduction Defining Hate Crime Othering Theory Asian Americans and Historical Experiences of Othering Early Asian Immigrant Experience Japanese Concentration Camps Stigmatization and Pandemics Anti-Asian Hate Crime during the COVID-19 Pandemic What’s in a Name? Hate Crime Data UCR NCVS Reconciling Variations in Estimates Assessing 2020 Hate Crime Data Personal Experiences of Hate Crime During the COVID-19 Pandemic Psychological Effects of Hate Crimes Institutional-Level Response Federal Response State Response Discussion/Conclusion: Anti-Asian Hate Crime and the Reproduction of Inequality References 
work_pr7qwi7a4jhvjd3d4w5j4lgjjq	----	Paper presented at the International Conference, Law and Society in the 21st Century Politicking the Personal: Examining Academic Literature and British National Party beliefs and wishes about intimate interracial relationships and mixed heritageI Mike Sutton** and Barbara Perry * Abstract Drawing heavily on our earlier work in this area (Perry and Sutton 2006; 2007), this article discusses the issue of Intimate Interracial Relationships (IIRs) within the context of the UK Government’s current concerns with social cohesion and provides an overview of the literature on hate and prejudice against those in IIRs in the UK and USA. Following an examination of the official statistics and the numbers of mixed race people in England and Wales, we move on to provide a brief but disturbing glimpse of what it would mean if the BNP’s long-term dream of winning a national election were actually to happen in light of their Official Website published proposed policies against IRRs and mixed heritage people. “There is no better point of departure for sorting out the type of racial community we really want than the subject of interracial intimacies.” (Kennedy, R. p33. 2003). 1 EARLIER DRAFT PAPER PRIOR TO PUBLICATION Introduction: Intimate Interracial Relationships, Multiculturalism, Social Capital and Cohesion We would like to begin this article by making one major point. Namely, that while in this article we focus upon the UK and USA, we are in no doubt that it is extremely important that academics understand more about how Intimate Interracial Relationships (IRRs) are the target of hate groups and hate crimes in other countries. In this article our main ambitions are simply to play a part in beginning to get this relatively taboo topic on the policy oriented academic agenda. Clearly much more research than that which we have conducted is required, and while that is beyond the scope of our current work it is needed to examine this strangely neglected topic to any degree that might help to fill this important knowledge gap. At the time of writing, despite criticisms, the British Government’s current ‘race relations’ agenda remains focused upon closing equality gaps by promoting social cohesion. The primary objective of this social cohesion policy making is to facilitate better bonding and bridging capital for minority ethnic communities in British society. The Government Cabinet Office’s concepts of bonding and bridging capital are taken from the work of Putnam (2000) and an earlier Cabinet Office Strategy Unit paper (2002). Putnum, a political scientist, exploits the concept of social capital that was first developed by Bourdieu (see: Bourdieu 1986), and later by Coleman (1988), to show how people secure benefits as members of social networks, as a feature of communities and nations (Walters 2002). Putnam’s bonding capital is essentially 2 EARLIER DRAFT PAPER PRIOR TO PUBLICATION those aspects of a community’s life such as family, religion, language and culture that links its members together. Bridging social capital refers to the networks that link members of a particular social group with wider society. The British Government’s aim to develop community cohesion is based upon seeking to achieve the primary objective of developing more bridging capital within minority ethnic communities – against the straining benefits and the purported drawbacks of bonding capital in those communities. Explaining that a lack of bridging capital might account for the relatively large economic disadvantages of Pakistanis and Bangladeshis in Britain, the Cabinet Office Report, Ethnic Minorities and the Labour Market (2003), goes on to say that it is not so clear why Black Caribbeans experience such large economic disadvantages – since they appear to be the most socially integrated minority ethnic group. Here, it is important to emphasise that the crucial, indeed the only, empirical measure actually used to date by the British Government to determine the extent of social isolation between white and minority ethnic communities is the percentage of men and women from different minority ethnic groups, living in the Greater London area with a white partner (Cabinet Office 2003. p37). Therefore, one of the Government’s key measures of social cohesion between ethnic groups and the majority white population appears to be the proportion of those in intimate interracial relationships. The problem While the UK Government clearly sees IIRs as a measure of successful social cohesion, there is a degree of social resistance to such relationships. A recent online 3 EARLIER DRAFT PAPER PRIOR TO PUBLICATION survey conducted by the BBC (2007) found that only a third of Britons think people in the UK are very tolerant of mixed race relationships. Contrary to such optimistic popular headlines such as “Interracial relationships increasingly accepted” (Stokes, 1996), and “Interracial Marriages Ending Barriers” (Fletcher, 1998), intimate interracial relationships (IIRs) frequently evoke hostile, even violent responses. Those engaged in or perceived to be engaged in IIRs, are subject to ridicule, abuse, even violence. In this article we draw links between prejudice and violent victimization – hate crime – perpetrated against interracial couples in both the UK and USA. This is a strangely neglected area in criminology and other fields of bias, prejudice and hate crimes research, particularly since contemporary work in this area, for example, suggests that a great deal of ‘racial’ violence has for many years been attributed to retaliation in the face of men and women crossing the dual boundaries of ‘racial’ and sexual propriety (Perry 2001; Hopkins Burke and Pollock 2004). This was the tragic lesson learned by black murder victims Anthony Walker, killed in Merseyside (UK) in 2005 and Jody-Gaye Bailey, killed in Florida USA in 2006. Both were killed by young white men offended by their relationships with white men and women. The most dramatic illustration are the murders committed by Joseph Paul Franklin – it is estimated that between 1977 and 1980 he took the lives of thirteen the black and white victims, all of whom had been involved in IIRs. Why does this problem exist? Racialised depictions of sexual purity, dangerousness, appetites, desirability and ‘perversion’ are part of the performative construction of sexual respectability and disreputability, normalcy and deviance. Ethnosexual frontiers are exotic, but volatile 4 EARLIER DRAFT PAPER PRIOR TO PUBLICATION social spaces, fertile sites for the eruption of violence. Racial, ethnic, or nationalist defence and enforcement of in-group sexual honour and purity strengthens ethnic boundaries and subjugates members enclosed inside ethnic borders. Negative images or accusations about the sexuality of ethnic ‘others’ contribute to the creation of disreputable and toxic outgroups and can be used to justify their exclusion, repression, or extermination (Nagel, 2003: 55). Our earlier work in the subject area of this article (Perry and Sutton 2006; 2008) focused upon a broad spectrum of hostility to IRRs in both the USA and UK. In this article we develop that work to focus specifically upon the published 2005 general election manifesto of the British National Party (BNP) and writings by its leader, Nick Griffin, regarding IIRs and mixed heritage people (http://www.bnp.org.uk/). The BNP have been careful since 2007 to remove from their website many of the papers that we examined for our research. Unfortunately for them, in the world of the WWW that they have so readily raced to exploit, delete never means deleted and their old texts have been copied from their website and archived by us for current and future generations of criminologists, sociologists, lawyers and political scholars. In the UK, the BNP won 50 council seats in the May 2007 local elections. They received an average of 14.7 per cent of votes within the 742 borough and district wards they contested in England. In the Eastern region, BNP candidates averaged 19 per cent and in the East Midlands 18.5 per cent (Searchlight 2007). In local elections in 2008 the BNP made further small gains and now have 55 councillors (see: http://www.hopenothate.org.uk/elections/results_2008.php), including a seat on the London Assembly (see: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/7381633.stm ). 5 EARLIER DRAFT PAPER PRIOR TO PUBLICATION http://www.bnp.org.uk/ http://www.hopenothate.org.uk/elections/results_2008.php http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/7381633.stm Reflecting upon these figures, Searchlight (2007) notes that the BNP is not yet Britain’s fourth political party but that many commentators believe unless the current voting trend is reversed it will not be long before it is. This serves to get things into perspective, because the BNP are unlikely to ever win a general election in the UK. This article is, therefore, not intended as a warning of impending nationalist rule in Britain. Rather, our aim is to begin to articulate what might be useful consciousness raising issues for those inclined to vote BNP, or else not vote at all, in local areas where the BNP is establishing political footholds. Our aim is to show also how the BNP have exploited the technology of the WWW to promote their racist messages and use them in a deliberate effort to recruit like minded individuals and sway others to their way of thinking. Official Statistics for ‘racial’ mixing in Britain The 2001 Census found that 87.5 per cent of the population of England and Wales (seven out of eight people) are ‘White British ’II. And it also reveals that Britain has one of the highest rates in the world of inter-ethnic relationships (BBC 2007). In 1997 a half of black men and a third of black women living in London had a white partner (Modood, et al.1997). However, only a very small proportion of all marriages are inter-ethnic and in England and Wales the figure is 2 per cent. Most of these mixed marriages included a white partner and the most common type of mixed marriage comprises a white and a mixed race partner. Nationally, those who are Mixed ‘race’ are most likely to be married to a white person. Almost half of young Black men born 6 EARLIER DRAFT PAPER PRIOR TO PUBLICATION in Britain and three in ten Black Caribbean men are married to White women (National Statistics 2007b). The number of mixed race people in the UK grew by more than 75 per cent during the 1990’s to some 677,000 which is around 15 per cent of the minority ethnic population. For the first time, the 2001 census allowed respondents to record their ethnicity as mixed race and revealed that with 50 per cent of those ticking one of the four types of mixed race options available being under 16, this is now the UK’s fastest growing ethnic minority group. Mixed race people now account for1.2 per cent of the total population and they are the fastest growing ethnic minority group in Britain. Nearly three per cent of all under 16 year olds are mixed and nearly five per cent of under- fives (Guardian 2007). And these are national figures, in urban centres such as London, Birmingham, Manchester and Nottingham the figures are much higher than this where BME communities are particularly concentrated. For example in Nottingham two per cent of people are Mixed White and Black Caribbean (National Statistics 2007a) and 8 per cent of school age children are Mixed (CRE 2007). In Lewisham, South London, 11 per cent of school children are Mixed. Research by the Home Office (Salisbury and Upson 2004) reveals that people of mixed race were at a greater risk of crime than all other groups across a range of offence types including racially motivated victimisation. The reasons for this are likely to be varied and complex and without further research speculation is not particularly helpful. That said, it does raise a number of telling questions regarding the likely impact of media and political prejudice against IRRs and the children that are born from these unions. Little is known about the influences of US civil rights 7 EARLIER DRAFT PAPER PRIOR TO PUBLICATION history, news media, popular entertainment television and the movie and music industries upon American and British people’s perceptions about IRRs, but in this global Information Age we would hypothesise that they will be significant to say the least. These influences are discussed in detail in the next section. The Literature on Intimate Interracial Relationships Our examination of the literature in this area reveals considerable evidence of popular and academic intolerance for ‘racial’ mixing that is part of a long legacy of discrimination, harassment and hate crimes. Minority ethnic groups are perceived generally as threatening – in social, economic and political terms and are especially feared, ridiculed and censured on the basis of their presumed sexualities. Black and Minority Ethnic (BME) male sexuality is constructed frequently as a dangerous force that is hazardous to white women and a threatening to white men (Daniels, 1997: 93). Moreover, BME women are also feared and reviled or sometimes desired - on the same basis: they are racialised, exotic ‘others’ who do not fit the Western ideal of womanhood. Additionally, whether male or female, whether cast as over- or under-sexed, BME people are most at risk when they visibly cross the racialised sexual boundaries by engaging in interracial relationships. On the basis of these controlling images of BME people, white women and especially white men are fearful and suspicious of the sexualities of the ‘other’. Speaking of the 8 EARLIER DRAFT PAPER PRIOR TO PUBLICATION white fear of black bodies in particular, West (1993: 119) contends that this fear is rooted in visceral feelings about black bodies and fuelled by sexual myths of black men and women - either as threatening creatures who have the potential for sexual power over whites, or as harmless, desired underlings of a dominant white culture. White Western culture has long held to disparaging controlling images of the sexualities of black people. Foremost among these has been the tendency to imagine them as (Frankenberg, 1993: 75): “…excessive, animalistic, or exotic in contrast to the ostensibly restrained or ‘civilized’ sexuality of white women and men”. At different times, in different contexts, most non-white groups have been perceived as sexual predators, guided by their animal-like instincts. Since all but the white ‘race’ were historically held to be subhuman creatures anyway, it was a small step to paint the ‘others’ sexuality in similar terms. Unlike their ‘white superiors’, BME people had not learned to tame their sexual desires, nor to direct them toward ‘appropriate’ people, i.e., members of their own ‘race’. Because the plantation economy of the USA led to large numbers of African people being shipped there as slaves, fear of BME communities ‘race’ mixing with white Americans has been a much more longer running and intense issue in the USA than it has been in Britain – where the issue of IIRs only arose to any really notable extent following the arrival of the commonwealth immigrants who were encouraged to settle there in the late 1950’s. Consequently, there is much more American literature in this area than British. This USA literature does, however, provide important insights into White and Black concerns about IIRs that are relevant to the British experience. 9 EARLIER DRAFT PAPER PRIOR TO PUBLICATION In historically chauvinistic cultures like the US and the UK, it is not surprising to observe popular cultural constructions that reaffirm raced and gendered hierarchies. What is surprising – indeed dismaying – however is to find images within critical academic discourse that are also problematic for, if not disparaging of IIRs. Consequently, writers, commentators and others who engage in general discourse that adopts this line cause immense difficulties and tensions for mixed heritage offspring (Ali 2003), feeding and reinforcing more banal popular resentment. As Moran (2001) makes clear, constructions of the racialised and sexualised ‘other’ find scholarly purchase in two popular accounts of IIRs, “juxtaposing rational calculation with irrational lust” (Moran, 2001: 114). The first of these popular notions is exceptionalism, wherein: “Someone with a devalued racial status becomes exceptional by acquiring unusually attractive characteristics through fortune, hard work or both” (Moran, 2001: 114). Only the ‘exceptional’ few can gain access to white privilege via this assimilationist effort. It does not truly challenge or blur the colour line since it is, in fact, so circumscribed by the particular genetic, social and economic attributes of those few individuals. In contrast, exoticism implies that the rationale for IIRs lays only in lustful attraction to the exotic and foreign ‘other’ – racial differences become a: “…source of sexual titillation” (Moran, 2001: 115). This account accepts the taken for granted stereotype that black people are highly sexualised both physiologically and culturally and it is informed by the aforementioned controlling images that see others in largely sexual terms. Such a construction enables hostility toward interracial relationships deemed to be inherently deviant because they are grounded only in lust – not love – and boundary transgressing lust at that. 10 EARLIER DRAFT PAPER PRIOR TO PUBLICATION While generally supporting of IIRs as a matter of personal choice in a free society, Kennedy (2003: p102) tells us about how ugly and exploitative manipulation can be at the heart of some of these relationships. Notably, however, he does not touch upon this side of things with white men and black women. Nagel (2003) is less supportive of IIRs and describes those in interracial relationships in course and sometimes, arguably, seedy terms as simply ethnosexual Settlers and Sojourners – who are crossing ethnosexual frontiers. The essence of Nagel’s explanation for interracial relationships is couched in a history of what she calls ethonosexual imaginings that basically seems to imply that so many black men are choosing white women in the USA because they conform to the European ideal of beauty and are perhaps eroticised as past forbidden fruit. And the implication of Nagel’s explanation here is that white women choose their black partners because they eroticise them as hypersexual, hyper masculine beings. Strangely, the academic-taboo issue of white men with black women partners is again ignored. However, From Nagel’s same explanatory source of ethonosexual imaginings white men are portrayed as seeking out Asian women because they are believed to be hyper-feminine, petite, exotic and compliant. And yet Asian women are in turn portrayed as choosing white men – why - simply because they are economically powerful. Contrary to this position, other writers in the field (see: Letherby and Marchbank 2002), speculate that Asian mail order brides may not be as exploited as many feminist writers suppose, because the Internet may offer them a degree of agency (albeit limited) that they otherwise would not have in seeking better educational and economic conditions. Letherby and Marchbank (2002) also suggest that the reason South East Asian women are attracted to white American men is because they look like Hollywood movie stars. The source of this revelation is a US 11 EARLIER DRAFT PAPER PRIOR TO PUBLICATION Government report on the mail order bride industry (www.wtw.org/mob/mobappa.htm). Given the statistics regarding the much lesser proportion of black women in white black interracial relationships in both the UK and the USA, more research is needed to determine the extent to which these statistics are shaped by community pressure, physical attraction (or lack of) on the parts of either male or female notions of desirability, or opportunities to meet potential partners. Nagel’s (2000) work is important in that it enables us to lay down some obvious ethno sexual hypotheses that we can then test through research in this area to understand why the statistics on IIRs are so gendered. This is an important area for social policy, not least from the perspective of Asian men and Black women, who it appears from an analysis of the literature, must be – when compared to Asian Women and Black men - either lacking in social and economic opportunities, confidence, freedom or notions of desirability. And it is also important to seek out the truth regarding existing interracial marital choices - rather than relying upon a convenient academic reworking of old ethnosexual stereotypes by way of explanation. Unfortunately, these simplistic, and racially offensive, explanations are all that Nagel offers to explain these socially compelling statistics. But, in her final paragraph Nagel (p.261) paradoxically refers to those in IIRs in a more heroic vision as ethno sexual resisters, revolutionaries and innovators who overcome the scrutiny of observers. Clearly, without any empirical research to go on, Nagel is covering her bets as to the motives and private meanings in interracial relationships. 12 EARLIER DRAFT PAPER PRIOR TO PUBLICATION http://www.wtw.org/mob/mobappa.htm Problems occur in Letherby and Marchbank’ s (2003) attempt to assess what they describe as popular discourse notions that white men who marry with the assistance of online Thai bride marriage agencies are in effect ‘buying women’ because they are pathetic losers who are ineligible as dating partners in their own society. Without the benefit of any empirical research that takes into account in-depth interviews with these marriage partners, Letherby and Marchbank (p76) are reduced to applying stereotypical female notions of male eligibility in terms of wealth and power with no reference to looks, compatibility and personality. Conversely, USA writers in support of IIRs and seeking to debunk what they describe as myths surrounding sexual deviancy as the main attraction for interracial couples, also lacking any empirical evidence, are left to rely upon their own untested theories regarding the legacy of slavery to explain why there are relatively few white men in black white heterosexual intimate relationships (Yancy and Yancy 2002: 42): “One may wonder why black women, who attend college in greater numbers than black men, do not interracially marry as often as black men. There are two possible reasons for why this is the case. First, black women have historically suffered sexual abuse at the hands of white men, thereby making it harder for black women to build romantic interest in white men. Second, white women and black men may share a greater affinity for each other due to a shared experience of discrimination by white men. Black women experience both sexism and racism, whereas white men set up the power structure. This gives those two groups little chance for developing an affinity for each other. As we get further away from the period of time when white men were free to sexually abuse black women, we may witness an increase in the number of black women who enter interracial relationships. This will remove some of the 13 EARLIER DRAFT PAPER PRIOR TO PUBLICATION pressure causing this resentment.” While Yancy and Yancey’s (2002) theory may be true, it is it is contrary to the findings of other research on attraction (Buss 2003) that women in both the USA and UK are particularly attracted to powerful men – particularly women living in the USA. Further, we need also to consider whether the gender differences in IIRs might be explained, at least in part, by the colour line being policed by black men. If this is happening on a wide enough scale then it could mean, for reasons of other racial stereotypes, that many white men feel sufficiently physically intimidated by this as to be deterred from black and white interracial dating. To repeat the point already made, here is a clear case for more empirical research. Legal regulation of IIRs in the USA Our examination of BNP beliefs about IRRs is covered within the third and final main section of this article. Before moving on to look at that however, it is useful at this point to examine how American history provides insights into past mistakes that are the natural result of racist policies in this area of private life. Historically there have been legal strictures against IIRs in the USA. This came into being as early as 1662, when Virginia became the first state in the “New World” to enact legislation prohibiting miscegenation. Shockingly, it would take over 300 years for such prohibitions to be repealed by edict of the Supreme Court of American in 1967. In the intervening years, legal regulation of IIRs in the USA would take myriad, often contradictory forms, allowing “sexual transgress” between white men and some 14 EARLIER DRAFT PAPER PRIOR TO PUBLICATION ‘women of colour’ but not others, while generally banning similar relationships between white women and any ‘men of colour’. As late as the twentieth century, for example, it was a federal offence in the USA to transport white women across state lines for immoral purposes – such that black men travelling with white women were subject to criminal prosecution. Moreover, in 1924, Virginia enacted the provocatively titled “Bill to Preserve the Integrity of the White Race,” which prohibited any white/non-white unions. By 1967, eleven states still had anti- miscegenation legislation on the books. The prohibitions on interracial unions took a variety of forms, all of which sent very direct messages about the relative value of whiteness over ‘colour’. Most typical were those statutes barring IIRs outright. However, during the era of slavery, these were supplemented by legislation that essentially stripped white women of white privilege in the event of their involvement with black men in particular. So ‘defiled’ were women in such situations deemed to be that they could be banished from the community, or required to ‘serve’ their husbands’ masters. Similarly, any children born of such unions were denied access to their mothers’ white privilege by being designated slaves themselves. Anti-miscegenation laws were primarily intended to police the colour line between black people and white people, thereby preserving white privilege and ‘white purity’. However, as immigration patterns shifted over time, attention turned also to the regulation of relationships between whites and other non-whites – primarily Chinese and Japanese entering the USA in the latter part of the nineteenth century. The western states – California in particular – led the way in restricting marriage options 15 EARLIER DRAFT PAPER PRIOR TO PUBLICATION for Chinese, banning any White-Asian unions. In 1907, Congress went so far as to strip white American women of their citizenship if they married foreign nationals,” such that (Moran, 2001: 32) the: “…marital autonomy of White women was sacrificed to preserve racial distinctions.” Hostility toward interracial relationships and interracial sexuality is ultimately grounded in the essentialist understanding of racial difference. Boundary crossing is seen in this context to be not only unnatural, but threatening to the rigid hierarchies which have been built around these presumed differences. Dreams of the BNP The Mission Statement of the BNP that was published on its official website in the Summer of 2007 is effectively based upon a fundamental desire to keep Britain white: “…we call for an immediate halt to all further immigration, the immediate deportation of criminal and illegal immigrants and the introduction of a system of voluntary resettlement whereby those immigrants who are legally here will be afforded the opportunity to return to their lands of ethnic origin assisted by a generous financial incentives [sic] both for individuals and for the countries in question.” This bedrock of desire for a more white Britain is picked up by many articles written by official contributors to the BNP website’s ‘Articles’ section. Despite the Tartuffian 16 EARLIER DRAFT PAPER PRIOR TO PUBLICATION nature of the BNP on the issue of race, an article on the site that was written by an author named as Harry Preston in 2004 is not untypical in seeking to whip up racist fervour: ‘The teeming masses of immigrants and their progency who now huddle in our inner cities are largely irreducible. They could never be assimilated even if we, or they, wanted it. Their numbers increase prodigiously. The religion of many of them, Islam, which has the meaning of submission, is better fitted to unthinking obedience to religious authority then to the mindset of a freeborn man or woman, perhaps particularly a woman…. …Will we just sit back and throw away the unique achievement and sacrifice of many centuries, supinely casting ourselves into a new Dark Age, through folly and self-seclusion? Or will we be worthy of our history and ancestry and rise to this new, deadly challenge?’ Rather than seeing immigration and its resulting IRRs as arising from colonial links, economic forces and natural mixing between people who are attracted to one another the BNP write about immigration and IRRs in the language of conspiracy theorists as a forced social experiment that has gone wrong. While claiming not to be a racist himself, the BNP leader Nick Griffin engages with the BNP website in what can only be described as a literary form of the childs party game Twister: “We don’t hate anyone, especially the mixed race children who are the most tragic victims of enforced multi-racism, but that does not mean that we accept miscegenation as moral or normal. We do not and we never will.” 17 EARLIER DRAFT PAPER PRIOR TO PUBLICATION And: “So while we don’t hate other peoples, we would rather mix with our own. In a nutshell, we want to walk down our streets and see the familiar faces which a hundred generations would all have recognised as ‘British’ – and all normal people of all races feel the same way.” And further: “We live in a System in which the current masters of politics, popular entertainment, education and the legal system are overtly, even fanatically in favour of what they call integration, which honest scientists call miscegenation, and which we recognise as a form of genocide.” White racists’ fears of IIR’s Arguably there is no element of this planet’s human population that is more concerned about IIRs than the white supremacists who are found predominantly in the USA and the white nationalist BNP movement. Their discourses of race and gender represent an extreme position on miscegenation that nonetheless resonates with popular imagery. Their strictures against interracial unions are an attempt to control and regulate equally those who are not white and not male. The womb of the white woman must be preserved for the bearing of pure, white children. ‘Men of colour’ must not, ultimately, be permitted to defile that vessel (Ferber and Kimmel; 2004). 18 EARLIER DRAFT PAPER PRIOR TO PUBLICATION Moreover, white supremacists in the USA consider white women to be especially to blame for what they call ‘racial suicide’ (see: www.kkkk.com): Anti-miscegenation rhetoric thus seeks to reaffirm the boundaries between genders and between races, to reaffirm the appropriate “place” of white women and non-white men. (Daniels 1993). Such hostility toward interracial relationships is grounded ultimately in the essentialist understanding of ‘racial’ difference. Boundary crossing is seen not only as unnatural, but threatening to the rigid hierarchies that have been built around these presumed differences. Whether god-given or biologically derived, the white ‘race’ is deemed inherently superior – intellectually or else culturally – and worth preserving for the sake of ethnic group preservation, peace, civilization a just society and even bio-diversity. The creation of race categories and valuations represents a means of identity construction for both ‘whites’ and other ‘races’. ‘Race’ is seen as an essence that carries with it inherent differences between groups, differences which are claimed as justification for ‘natural’ hierarchies. The Ku Klux Klan (KKK) states this position very clearly (Sapp, Holden and Wiggins, 1991: 123- 124): “Our main and fundamental objective is the Maintenance of the Supremacy of the White Race in this Republic. History and physiology teach us that we belong to a race which nature has endowed with an evident superiority over all other races, and that the Maker in thus elevating us above the common standard of human creation has intended to give us over inferior races a domination from which no human laws can permanently derogate.” 19 EARLIER DRAFT PAPER PRIOR TO PUBLICATION Strom’s treatise on miscegenation (Strom, A at www.FREESPEECH.com) provides ample evidence of this perspective. The title of Strom’s essay – “Racemixing - Worse Than Murder: Murder is Homicide; Racemixing is Genocide” - is indicative of the tone of his argument. Strom fears that the increase in interracial births will ultimately lead to the elimination of the ‘white race’, and with it all hope for progress and civilization. For him and others of like mind, ‘race-mixing’ constitutes part of the genocidal agenda of non-white ‘races’. Strom links the rhetoric of white supremacy with that of anti-miscegenation, arguing that the ‘white race’s’ (Strom, A, at www.FREESPEECH.com): “. . . continued existence would undoubtedly (sic) be assumed by our superior intelligence and unmatched technology, if it were not for those who practice and promote the genocide of our people through racial mixing. By their actions they are killing us . . . They kill infinite generations of our future. Their crime - the crime of racial mixture - is far, far worse than mere murder.” Race mixing is deemed to be yet another symptom of the loss of white power and identity, since it violates the sacred order of the established hierarchy. Moreover, it directly threatens the perpetuation of the ‘white race’ (National Alliance, at www.natall.com/free-speech), since: “Every White man who commits the crime of marrying a non-White will not be fathering any White children. Every White woman who pollutes her body and her spirit by marrying a non-White will not be giving birth to any White children. And by their actions they will be committing the crime of misleading White boys and girls to 20 EARLIER DRAFT PAPER PRIOR TO PUBLICATION follow their example.” Consequently, white supremacist miscegenation elicits calls for enforced racial purity as a means of correcting the emerging imbalance in the relationship between ‘whites’ and ‘non-whites.’ The latter must be put back in “their place,” by force, if necessary. Such responses are especially encouraged where the “race-mixing” is “involuntary,” i.e., where white women have been forcibly raped by ‘men of colour.’ White supremacists are masters of the perpetuation of controlling images of ‘men of colour’ that portray them as “animal-like” or “less than human” in their sexual appetites. Roots “100 Facts About Blacks and Whites” (See: http://www.americancivilrightsreview.com/african101facts1.html ) makes consistent reference to the “simian-like” nature of Africans, with such phrases as “similar to an ape,” “approximating the simian form,” Alike that of the gorilla,” or “thus more characteristic of an ape.” For white consumers of this racist discourse, these characterisations distance ”US” from “THEM” in a very dramatic way, constituting the “Other” as non-human and therefore not subject to the same respect, rights and protections as their white counterparts. Keen to be seen to distance themselves from such overt and obviously atavistic race hatred, the BNP have disingenuously adopted the politics of BME identity politics in order to frame the white majority as a threatened tribe in danger of an ethnic holocaust that will make white people an oppressed and victimised minority group ‘in their own country’ leading to a genetic ‘holocaust’ for white British people. Here their arguments are not framed in terms of the old racist fears of ‘them’ having ‘our’ women (or vice versa) but, in spurious genetic notions and cultural loss fears of the 21 EARLIER DRAFT PAPER PRIOR TO PUBLICATION http://www.americancivilrightsreview.com/african101facts1.html growth of IIRs and the mixed race birth rate. However, BNP leader Griffin and other writers on the BNP website cannot resist hedging their bets by dabbling with white supremacy to promote notions of White European people being on the whole physically, mentally and culturally superior to those who are Black or of mixed ethnic heritage. The essentialist, mutually exclusive categories of belonging that frame hostility toward those in IIRs assume an either/or understanding of identity, in which one is forced to choose “a side.” Discrete, “normally” impermeable boundaries are assumed. Consequently, identity formation is often concerned with “drawing boundaries, engaging in boundedness, configuring rings around” the categories of difference (Weis, Proweller and Centrie, 1997:214). The task of difference, then, is to police the borders between categories. There is no room for elision or “border crossing,” since this would threaten the “natural” order. This is neatly demonstrated in a review of Jill Olumide’s book The Alchemy of Mixed Race (Olumide 2001), by Mansaray (2003) using a quote form one of the authors respondents: ‘As a white woman out on my own, I can go anywhere. As a white woman with my black kids I am called names. As a white woman out with black kids and a black man, I am a ‘white bitch’ and my kids are ‘black bastards’ (p.31).. Either side of these borders is significant to the extent that each is “posted” with exclusionary signs that keep whites on one side of the fence, and blacks on the other. They are integral, then, in creating the boundaries that inform public responses to IIRs. 22 EARLIER DRAFT PAPER PRIOR TO PUBLICATION The profoundly anti-IIR stance of the BNP that can be read in its manifesto, by clicking on the ‘Policies’ tab on its official website and in the on-line articles written by its leader Nick Griffin (recently removed from their website) provide, arguably, a written excuse for racist abuse against those in IIRs and against mixed race people. In such a context, those perceived to be publicly involved in IIRs may become vulnerable to attack. With this in mind, Miller’s (1995:57) questions can be answered: “... when does ... confrontation with difference have negative effects: when does it lead to great difficulty, deterioration, and distortion, and to some of the worst forms of degradation, terror and violence - both for individuals and for groups - that human beings can experience?” The answer: when boundaries are threatened, when men or women, black or white, ‘forget their place’, when they reach across ‘raced’ borders and dare to become intimately involved with the ‘wrong’ person (Perry and Sutton 2006, 2007). The threat must be repressed, and, in the context of IIRs, raced boundaries of sexuality preserved. It is here that hate crime can emerge as a response to either media and/or party political portrayal of these “unnatural” relationships, as a punishment for those in the real world who have chosen an inappropriate partner. Within the essentialist understanding of identities, there is very little space for ambiguity, or for crossing the boundaries between categories of difference. In other words, accountability involves the assessment of behavior as either conforming or deviating from culturally normative standards. Whenever we ‘do difference’ - which is a recurring effort - we leave ourselves open to reward or censure. So it is that we are discouraged from the “attempt to cross the line, to transgress, desert or quit” (Bourdieu, cited in Fine, 23 EARLIER DRAFT PAPER PRIOR TO PUBLICATION 1997:58). The stuff of nightmares 1. What would happen if the white supremacist dreams of the BNP came to fruition and they formed a government? To begin with, over 4.6 million peopleIII would find themselves living in a frightening and hostile land as unwelcome non-white people who will be re-defined to begin with not as citizens but as “visitors” either from their place of birth outside the UK or otherwise from their ‘ethnic homelands’ overseas. And imagining this nightmare world of BNP dreams their Party leader Nick Griffin writes in the BNP website articles section: “We all know that our first aim is to once shut the gates on any further immigration, to put an end to anti-white discrimination, and to spend whatever it takes to persuade non-whites to return to their ethnic homelands that Britain once again becomes – and will remain for all time – the fundamentally white nation that it always was before 1948. And we all know that this will mean that a greatly reduced number of non-whites who have integrated with our society and who accept the new position will be allowed to stay and be granted full protection of the law as citizens. They and their descendants – and any failure or any group to adjust its birth rate to match ours would have to be taken as a sign that they have not integrated and cannot stay – can live here on that basis for as long as they accept the democratically 24 EARLIER DRAFT PAPER PRIOR TO PUBLICATION expressed wishes of the native British whose country this must always be.” Griffin goes on to describe what would be in store for nearly 1 million mixed race who do not leave the country - the non-white people that he claims to hate the least. In seeking to discourage any further mixing of non-white with white people and perhaps also, presumably mixed race with mixed race people, Griffin’s proposed nightmare policies include: 1. Discouraging mixing by inserting negative plot lines in TV soaps 2. Having an education system that teaches children of different races to understand the essentially unnatural and destructive nature of miscegenation 3. Replacing promotion with rejection – but not persecution! 4. Implementing ‘national preference schemes’ to further weaken any remaining tendency of white young people to seek partners from other ethnic groups. Summary, conclusions and the way forward The main focus of this paper has been to explore issues of bias and hate directed at those in IIRs with an aim to provide a review of the literature and determine the way forward for future research.. To that end, there are two main questions that we raised in it. The first arises from a concern to determine what is really down 25 EARLIER DRAFT PAPER PRIOR TO PUBLICATION there at the very roots of much of the racism and hate crime perpetrated in both the US and UK; that is, to probe at what is in effect a taboo area for empirical research in order to find out exactly how popular perceptions of racial and gender propriety shape reactions to men and women involved in interracial relationships. This question addresses the fundamental need to understand the influences of the past upon the present. The second question asks about the present day specific dynamics and impact of these prejudices: who is prejudiced against whom, in what way, where, when, why and with what effect? Both of these questions are important. The first is about motivation. When we understand the motivation for offending we can devise policies and strategies to tackle it. The second is about knowing more about the way that something actually happens. This enables us to fine tune policies and strategies to real life situations –to increase their likelihood of impacting on the right people in a sensible way. Knowing who suffers the highest incidence of particular types of race and ethnic prejudice, how to recognise it happening and the seriousness of impact enables us to target scarce resources where they are most needed. Taking things forward: in order to understand how, where, when and the effect of prejudice and violence against those in interracial relationships it is important to talk with victims. Here there is a great need to undertake grounded research with those currently in IIRs or those who have past experience. Among other things we need to ask victims about their experiences of prejudice to determine what anti interracial behaviour looks like. We need to determine what the repertoires of 26 EARLIER DRAFT PAPER PRIOR TO PUBLICATION anti-interracial relationships are. In other words what do perpetrators of hate, prejudice and bias say to those in interracial relationships during the abuse stage? Understanding the dynamics of victimisations means finding out from the victims and perpetrators themselves the finer details about these prejudicial and criminal behaviours in order to determine: who does what to/with whom, where, when, how and with what effect? Questions focused on these areas are useful because they enable us more finely to tune policing, anti-hate crime reduction initiatives and policy making to fit better the social systems or interpersonal interactions that cause and shape social exclusion, prejudice, anti-social behaviour and crime. In effect, the questions above: · Reveal previously unknown motivational factors for particular manifestations of prejudice including REP offending choices · Identify the risks for potential victims · Help to assess the importance of particular REP attitudes and crime facilitators – such as the influence of the Far Right or other political rhetoric · Enable us to understand more about what prejudicial attitudes and violence against those in interracial relationships looks like. · Provide key information to inform strategies for dealing with the problem Quite clearly then we need to ask what we know about victimisation of those in IIRs and how prejudice affects life chances and choices. Is informal policing of the colour line gendered? And how do men and women do difference differently? Most of the literature in this area is US focused and a peculiar omission in much 27 EARLIER DRAFT PAPER PRIOR TO PUBLICATION of the literature is the acceptance of the need to discuss in great detail the social issues surrounding black men in IIR’s with white women – but very little consideration of the same issues surrounding Black women in IIR’s with White men. This comparative lack of interest in how racism and gender issues particularly impact upon black women has been highlighted by Mirza (2003: 121): “Gender is still seen as a white woman’s issue, while it is taken for granted that ‘race’ is a black male issue. Black and minority ethnic women appear to fall into the cracks between the two. They are often invisible, occupying a ‘blind spot’ in mainstream policy and research studies that talk about women on one hand and ethnic minorities on the other.” So that: “In effect, a gap remains between policy and legislation on one hand, and experience and practice on the other. At the heart of this gap is the lived reality of black and minority ethnic women.” There is a puzzling element of enigmatic and unfinished academic business regarding reactions to interracial intimacies. This article has sought to highlight what we do and do not know about public reactions to IIRs and shows, in particular, that the knowledge gaps in this area are dramatic. If we are to understand how the long lived and hackneyed ethnosexual stereotypes, and their consequent behaviours affect those in interracial relationships, we must engage in research that involves collecting in-depth information from these very people. Here we agree with Ali (2003: 27) that such research should not be about ‘Othering’, rather it should seek to examine: “…how things are and what they really mean to real people – like us. 28 EARLIER DRAFT PAPER PRIOR TO PUBLICATION Whatever the findings of future research, fostering IIRs as government policy would be untenable because, even though the proportion of minority ethnic people in IIRs with white people is seen by the UK Cabinet Office as a sound indicator of social cohesion, albeit an extremely dubious and white-centred indicator, government ethnic matchmaking of any kind belongs in the domain of dictatorships and other totalitarian regimes that both culminated and terminated in the west along with the drive to breed Aryan supermen and women. However, if those engaged in IIRs suffer discrimination and harassment, and others wish to engage or remain in IIRs but do not do so for fear of such treatment, then this is an area deserving policy intervention in any democratic and civic society. 29 EARLIER DRAFT PAPER PRIOR TO PUBLICATION REFERENCES Ali, S. (2003) Mixed-Race, Post-Race: Gender, New Ethnicities and Cultural Practices. Oxford. Berg. BBC (2007). Changing Face of Britain: Britain’s blurring ethnic mix. (http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/static/in_depth/uk/2002/race/changing_face_of_brita in.stm) Bourdieu, P. (1986): The forms of capital. In: John G. Richardson (ed.): Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociology of Education. New York: Greenwood Press. Buss, D. M. (2003). The evolution of desire: strategies for human mating. Basic Books: New York Cabinet Office (2003) Ethnic Minorities and the Labour Market. Cabinet Office. London. Coleman, J. S. (1988) ‘Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital.’ American Journal of Sociology, 94 (supplement) S95-S120. CRE (2007). Start talking. http://www.cre.gov.uk/Default.aspx.LocID- 0hgnew0ui.RefLocID-0hg01b00100600g001.Lang-EN.htm 30 EARLIER DRAFT PAPER PRIOR TO PUBLICATION http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/static/in_depth/uk/2002/race/changing_face_of_britain.stm http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/static/in_depth/uk/2002/race/changing_face_of_britain.stm http://www.cre.gov.uk/Default.aspx.LocID-0hgnew0ui.RefLocID-0hg01b00100600g001.Lang-EN.htm http://www.cre.gov.uk/Default.aspx.LocID-0hgnew0ui.RefLocID-0hg01b00100600g001.Lang-EN.htm Daniels, R. (1993) "Chinese Americans” Coming to America. New Jersey: Harper. Daniels, J. (1997). White Lies: Race, Class, Gender, and Sexuality in White Supremacist Fine, M. (1997). Witnessing Whiteness. In M. Fine, L. Weis, L. Powell and L. M. Wong (eds.). Off White: Readings on Race, Power and Society. New York NY: Routledge. pp: 57-65. Ferber, A. and Kimmel, M. (eds) (2004) Privilege and Power. Boulder CO. WestviewPress. Fletcher, M.A. (1998). America's Racial and Ethnic Divides: Interracial Marriages Eroding Barriers. Washington Post, Monday, December 28, 1998; Page A1. Available online at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/national/daily/dec98/melt29.htm Frankenberg, R. (1993). White women race matters: The social construction of whiteness. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. Guardian (2007) http://society.guardian.co.uk/societyguardian/story/0,,1865214,00.html Hopkins Burke, R. and Pollock, E. (2004) ‘A Tale of Two Anomies’. Internet Journal of Criminology (www.internetjournalofcriminology.com). 31 EARLIER DRAFT PAPER PRIOR TO PUBLICATION http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/national/daily/dec98/melt29.htm http://society.guardian.co.uk/societyguardian/story/0,,1865214,00.html Kennedy, R. (2003) Interracial Intimacies: Sex, Marriage, Identity and Adoption. New York. Pantheon Books. Letherby, G. and Marchbank, J (2002) ‘Cyber-chattels: buying brides and babies on the Net.’ In Yvonne Jewkes (ed.) Dot.cons: Crime, deviance and identity on the Internet. Cullompton, Devon. Willan Publishing. Mansaray, J. (2003) The Alchemy of Mixed Race. Review essay. The Global Review of Ethnopolitics. Vol. 2, No 3-4, March/June pp.100-106. Miller, N. (1995). Out of the Past: Gay and Lesbian History from 1969 to the Present. New York NY: Vintage Press. Mirza, H. S. (2003). ‘All the women are white, all the blacks are men - but some of us are brave’: Mapping the consequences of invisibility for black and minority ethnic women in Britain. In Mason, D. (ed.), Explaining Ethnic Differences: Changing patterns of disadvantage in Britain. Bristol: Policy Press. Modood, T et al., (1997) Ethnic Minorities in Britain. London: Policy Studies Institute. Moran, R. (2001) Interracial Intimacy: The regulation of race and romance. Chicago. University of Chicago .Press. 32 EARLIER DRAFT PAPER PRIOR TO PUBLICATION Nagel, J. (2003) Race, Ethnicity, and Sexuality: Intimate Intersections, Forbidden Frontiers. New York. Oxford University Press. Press. National Statistics (2007a) http://www.statistics.gov.uk/census2001/profiles/commentaries/ethnicity.asp National Statistics (2007b) Ethnicity and identity. Inter-ethnic Marriage: 2% of marriages are inter-ethnic http://www.statistics.gov.uk/cci/nugget.asp?id=1090 Olumide, J. (2001) Raiding the Gene Pool: the social construction of mixed race. London. Pluto Press. Perry, B. (2001) In the Name of Hate: Understanding Hate Crimes. New York. Routledge. Perry, B. and Sutton, M. (2006) Seeing Red over Black and White: Popular and Media Representations of Interracial Relationships as Precursors to Racial Violence. Canadian Journal of Criminology and Criminal Justice / Revue Canadienne de criminology et de justice penale. Volume 48, Number 6, October 2006 Perry, B. and Sutton, M. (2008) (in press) Crossing the Line: Discourses on Intimate Interracial Relationships in the US and UK. In Poynting, S. and Wilson, J. (eds) Sticks and Stones: Writings and Drawings on Hatred. Sydney. Sydney Institute of Criminology and Federation Press. 33 EARLIER DRAFT PAPER PRIOR TO PUBLICATION http://www.statistics.gov.uk/census2001/profiles/commentaries/ethnicity.asp http://www.statistics.gov.uk/cci/nugget.asp?id=1090 Putnam,R. (2000). Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community. New York. Simon and Schuster. Salisisbury, H. and Upson, A. (2004). Ethnicity, victimisation and worry about crime: findings from the 2001/02 and 2002/03 British Crime Surveys. Home Office. London. Sapp, A.D. Holden, R. N. and Wiggins, M. (1991). Values and belief systems of right wing extremists: rationale and motivation for bias motivated crimes, The Police Response to Bias Motivated Crime. University of Illinois-Chicago: Office of International Criminal Justice. Searchlight (2007). BNP fail to advance but warning signs are there. http://www.hopenothate.org.uk/index.php?getPage=ea Stokes, F (1996). Interracial Relationships Increasingly Accepted. Online. Internet. 22 October http://members.fortunecity.com/obia1/interracial.html Walters, W. (2002) ‘Social Capital and Political Sociology: Re-imagining Politics?’ Journal of the British Sociological Association, Vol. 36. Number 2. 377-397. Weis, L., A. Proweller and C. Centri (1997). Re-examining “A Moment in History:” Loss of Privilege Inside White Working Class Masculinity in the 1990s. In M. Fine, L. Weis, L. Powell and L. M. Wong (eds.). Off White: Readings on Race, Power and Society. New York NY: Routledge. Pp. 210-226. 34 EARLIER DRAFT PAPER PRIOR TO PUBLICATION http://www.hopenothate.org.uk/index.php?getPage=ea http://members.fortunecity.com/obia1/interracial.html West, C. (1993) Race Matters. Boston. Beacon Press. Yancy, G.A. and S. Yancy (eds) (2002) Just Don’t Marry One: Interracial dating, marriage and Parenting. Valley Forge. Judson Press. ENDNOTES Dr Mike Sutton is co-founder and General Editor of the Internet Journal of Criminology. He is Currently Reader in Criminology and Director of Nottingham Centre for the Study and Reduction of Hate Crimes, Bias and Prejudice, Nottingham Trent University, England. Professor Barbara Perry is Professor of Criminology, Justice and Policy Studies. University of Ontario Institute of Technology. Oshawa, Ontario, Canada. I This article is based upon a paper that was presented at the International Conference, Law and Society in the 21st Century. Berlin 2007. II http://www.statistics.gov.uk/census2001/profiles/commentaries/ethnicity.asp III http://www.statistics.gov.uk/cci/nugget.asp?id=273 35 EARLIER DRAFT PAPER PRIOR TO PUBLICATION http://www.statistics.gov.uk/census2001/profiles/commentaries/ethnicity.asp http://www.statistics.gov.uk/cci/nugget.asp?id=273 
work_pthapf72pvfdbd2lkib2n32khe	----	Pro Justitia τ.1 (2018) E-ISSN: 2529-0401 Available online at https://ejournals.lib.auth.gr/projustitia © 2018 by Author(s). This is an open-access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0). See https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ 94 Bias or hate incidents as criminal acts – The new provision of Art. 361 B of the Greek Penal Code Petros Alikakos Judge, Ph.D., Council of Europe’s HELP trainer, CEPEJ expert 1. Hate incident in the international legal literature In the international doctrine hate or bias incident1 consists the attack against a person or a property, which is motivated wholly or in part by the intolerant attitude of the offender against a tribe, religion, disability, national origin, sexual orientation or gender identity2. According to the prevailing legal theory hate incident relates to an act which is not in itself a criminal offense, but consists of hatred because of the race, color, religion, descent, national or ethnic origin, sexual orientation, gender identity or disability of the victim3. According to this point of view hate incident is an act that could become a hate crime, provided, however, that it would fell in the form of a fixed offense of the Criminal Code. As examples of hate incidents we could prescribe: the verbal abuse, such as articulation of offensive jokes or jokes using insulting phrases4, verbal harassment, coercion or intimidation of children, adults, neighbors, physical aggression, such as pushing, telephone prank calls, billboard posters, graffiti, dropping litters in a garden as derogatory behavior. In the above examples we could also qualify actions such as providing food in a public place to a certain group of individuals, determined by gender, religion, race or ethnic origin, or blood 1 We could also use the term “prejudicial incident”, as in several legal orders we find the term «prejudicial crime» or «crime with prejudicial motive». 2 http://www.davidson.edu/student-life/multicultural-life/hate-crime-and-bias-incidents, http://www.tolerance.org/supplement/identifying-and-responding-bias-incidents, http://www.mpac.org/programs/hate-crime-prevention/what-is-a-hate-crime.php 3 https://www.citizensadvice.org.uk/wales/discrimination/hate-crime/what-are-hate-incidents-and-hate-crime/, http://www.davidson.edu/student-life/multicultural-life/hate-crime-and-bias-incidents/ , https://csl.uchicago.edu/get-help/bias-response-team/hate-crimes-and-bias-incidents/, http://archive.adl.org/campus/guide/bias_incidents.html#.VcMlE_mSw_B 4 The use of the term "refugee" or "gypsy" may not contain violence. What matters is the context surrounding these terms, such as when the context is hostile or used with racist or xenophobic character. https://ejournals.lib.auth.gr/projustitia http://www.davidson.edu/student-life/multicultural-life/hate-crime-and-bias-incidents http://www.tolerance.org/supplement/identifying-and-responding-bias-incidents http://www.mpac.org/programs/hate-crime-prevention/what-is-a-hate-crime.php https://www.citizensadvice.org.uk/wales/discrimination/hate-crime/what-are-hate-incidents-and-hate-crime/ http://www.davidson.edu/student-life/multicultural-life/hate-crime-and-bias-incidents/ https://csl.uchicago.edu/get-help/bias-response-team/hate-crimes-and-bias-incidents/ http://archive.adl.org/campus/guide/bias_incidents.html#.VcMlE_mSw_B Pro Justitia τ.1 (2018) E-ISSN: 2529-0401 Available online at https://ejournals.lib.auth.gr/projustitia © 2018 by Author(s). This is an open-access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0). See https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ 95 donations provided that the collected blood would be given to a certain group of people with specific characteristics in the base of distinctive behavior5. Hate incidents are mainly located in campuses and workplaces. As part of the university life are addressed by internal regulations against discrimination or codes of conduct of the departments responsible for the staff6. In the U.S. literature we find plenty of hate incidents recorded within the academic or school life, and of course in workplaces. As examples they have been registered as hate incidents: 1. reference of derogatory comments by the teachers for certain groups, such as women, religious minorities, racial minorities or people with disabilities. It is also noted7 that students are reluctant to report such incidents because of the power relationship developed with teachers, 2. reference of sexist comments, jokes or gestures in the workplace, 3. demonstration in workplaces of images or objects containing inappropriate sexual messages, as many people in these areas are likely to be negatively affected by these images and by the comments that will accompany them8. 2. The consequences of the hate incident in the society Particularly when they are being repeated in a certain frequency and when they gain wider appeal, hate incidents are capable to build strongly racist trends in the society. The repetition of these forms of discrimination and racism and its tacit acceptance by society, can lead to the creation of a racist culture, which can affect subconsciously and consciously persons, who they constitute a society or a social group, and ultimately they can become even customary treatment conditions9. It should also be stressed that hate incidents are the anteroom of hate crimes. Gordon Allport10 states that there is a risk of escalation. Allport formed a pyramid, starting from verbal violence, continuing to the discrimination and ending in the physical violence and extermination. In this sense, in order to avoid escalation of hostility to more harmful levels, 5 https://www.citizensadvice.org.uk/wales/discrimination/hate-crime/what-are-hate-incidents-and-hate-crime/, https://www.citizensadvice.org.uk/wales/discrimination/hate-crime/what-are-hate-incidents-and-hate-crime/, http://www.mpac.org/programs/hate-crime-prevention/what-is-a-hate-crime.php 6 http://www.davidson.edu/student-life/multicultural-life/hate-crime-and-bias-incidents/ 7 http://www.davidson.edu/student-life/multicultural-life/hate-crime-and-bias-incidents 8 http://www.davidson.edu/student-life/multicultural-life/hate-crime-and-bias-incidents 9 So was the case of student unions in the US, which encouraged the use of fancy dress costumes and behavior patterns, thus creating stereotypes with a hostile content to racial or ethnic groups of people: http://www.davidson.edu/student-life/multicultural-life/hate-crime-and-bias-incidents 10 The Nature of Prejudice, Cambridge, Wesley Publishing, 1954. https://ejournals.lib.auth.gr/projustitia https://www.citizensadvice.org.uk/wales/discrimination/hate-crime/what-are-hate-incidents-and-hate-crime/ https://www.citizensadvice.org.uk/wales/discrimination/hate-crime/what-are-hate-incidents-and-hate-crime/ http://www.mpac.org/programs/hate-crime-prevention/what-is-a-hate-crime.php http://www.davidson.edu/student-life/multicultural-life/hate-crime-and-bias-incidents/ http://www.davidson.edu/student-life/multicultural-life/hate-crime-and-bias-incidents http://www.davidson.edu/student-life/multicultural-life/hate-crime-and-bias-incidents http://www.davidson.edu/student-life/multicultural-life/hate-crime-and-bias-incidents Pro Justitia τ.1 (2018) E-ISSN: 2529-0401 Available online at https://ejournals.lib.auth.gr/projustitia © 2018 by Author(s). This is an open-access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0). See https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ 96 Allport stressed the importance of the response, when phenomena are still at the base of the pyramid. In the U.S. literature we could identify several examples where inaction against "innocent" incidents resulted in the physical extermination of the victims of these incidents. In particular, it is referred a student suicide incident, who occasionally became victim of hate incidents by his housemates, as a result of his sexual preferences. The act of suicide ultimately was prosecuted as a hate crime, with the aggravating circumstances that this offense has. An early, however, and effective response to the incidents of violence could possibly avert the fate of his desperate step. In a broader context, in the wider interpersonal and social relations, police authorities have assessed the gravity of the facts and they call for the reporting of such incidents, so that they can record them, without, although, the ability of their criminal response11. The modern trend promotes the creating of online anonymous reporting of hate incidents. In the United Kingdom there is an online system called “True Vision”12. Through this system everyone anonymously is able to report an incident of violence, choosing the local police force and filling out a form, which can describe the incident of violence, giving also details about the victim and the perpetrator. The site provides information on the outcome of the petition and the possible response of the police in this. 3. The gravity of the problem Typically, as mentioned above, hate incidents take place in educational units13. Apart from universities or schools, frequently incidents are growing in areas as workplaces (see above). It thus becomes apparent that the size of the problem expands and occupies almost the entire spectrum of society. This problem becomes more pronounced, as hate incidents are being spread throughout the society, as forms of social or political action. This is coupled with the lack of legislative provision at criminal, administrative or disciplinary level, regarding the suppression and treatment of such phenomena and finally makes the size of the problem particularly acute. 4. Fighting the problem in international and European level 11 https://www.citizensadvice.org.uk/wales/discrimination/hate-crime/what-are-hate-incidents-and-hate-crime/ 12 www.report-it.org.uk 13 http://www.sa.ucsb.edu/responding-to-distressed-students/concerns/hate-crimes-hate-incidents-or-hazing/hate- crimes-or-hate-incidents , http://www.davidson.edu/student-life/multicultural-life/hate-crime-and-bias-incidents , https://csl.uchicago.edu/get-help/bias-response-team/hate-crimes-and-bias-incidents https://ejournals.lib.auth.gr/projustitia https://www.citizensadvice.org.uk/wales/discrimination/hate-crime/what-are-hate-incidents-and-hate-crime/ http://www.report-it.org.uk/ http://www.sa.ucsb.edu/responding-to-distressed-students/concerns/hate-crimes-hate-incidents-or-hazing/hate-crimes-or-hate-incidents http://www.sa.ucsb.edu/responding-to-distressed-students/concerns/hate-crimes-hate-incidents-or-hazing/hate-crimes-or-hate-incidents http://www.davidson.edu/student-life/multicultural-life/hate-crime-and-bias-incidents https://csl.uchicago.edu/get-help/bias-response-team/hate-crimes-and-bias-incidents Pro Justitia τ.1 (2018) E-ISSN: 2529-0401 Available online at https://ejournals.lib.auth.gr/projustitia © 2018 by Author(s). This is an open-access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0). See https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ 97 Already in the context of hate speech, which is not a criminal offense in many countries, the ministerial meeting of the OSCE in 2003 adopted the position that there is the possibility that hate speech can lead to hate crime phenomena14. According to the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racist Violence of the UN of 196515, the parties should not permit authorities or institutions, at national or local level, to promote racial discrimination (art. 4c). According to Article 6 of the Convention, the Parties shall ensure effective legal protection against all acts of racial discrimination, enabling compensation to victims of such acts16. Hate incidents, when they are isolated incidents that take place at work, at school or at the university, they may be addressed by the mechanisms of these institutions. They even could be approached in the context of therapeutic or restorative justice, especially when incidents occur on campuses or in the neighborhood17. On another level, however, when incidents of violence or hate incidents are forms of "social action", which receive special publicity, carried out in public and addressed to an indefinite number of people, the extent of their impact to the community should be taken into account. Since the discriminatory treatment based on gender, religion, national origin, etc. takes these broader dimensions, we see that the limits to violence or hate crime are blurring, especially in the form of one or other of the so called honor crimes. Moreover, according to the recent EU Directive 2012/29, to which member - states should have complied by November 15, 2015, it requires (Art. 22) from member - states to take all necessary measures, in order to provide early protection to the victims of hate crimes. Moreover, according to the above Directive the training for public order forces should be specialized, so as they would be able to understand hate crimes and take the appropriate 14 Resolution 4/2003, ministerial meeting of OSCE in Maastricht. 15 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, which was adopted by the no 2106 (XX) Resolution of the General Assembly of U.N. on 21-12-1965 and entered into force on January 4, 1969. 16 «States Parties shall assure to everyone within their jurisdiction effective protection and remedies, through the competent national tribunals and other State institutions, against any acts of racial discrimination, which violate human rights and fundamental freedoms contrary to this Convention, as well as the right to seek from such tribunals just and adequate reparation or satisfaction for any damage suffered as a result of such discrimination». Already the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination of the UNHC on Human Rights monitors the member states for their compliance with the Convention (http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cerd/ ). 17 http://www.tolerance.org/supplement/identifying-and-responding-bias-incidents https://ejournals.lib.auth.gr/projustitia http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cerd/ http://www.tolerance.org/supplement/identifying-and-responding-bias-incidents Pro Justitia τ.1 (2018) E-ISSN: 2529-0401 Available online at https://ejournals.lib.auth.gr/projustitia © 2018 by Author(s). This is an open-access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0). See https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ 98 measures to protect the victims of such crimes. Finally, in accordance with Decision 9/200918 of the OSCE Ministerial Council held in 2009, member - states were obliged in that incentives violence will be recognized and condemned by the public authorities and the political leadership. 5. Hate or bias incidents and human rights from the point of ECtHR case law ECtHR in a series of decisions argued that States have, in accordance with the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), the obligation of their own motion to investigate the existence of racial motivation in crimes, when it is probable. On the contrary, according to the Court, 'would be tantamount to turning the authorities their back in the specific nature of the acts, which is however particularly destructive of fundamental rights" and that consists a violation of the prohibition of discrimination enshrined in Article 14 of the Convention19. The Court emphasizes that in crimes of violence based on racial or religious discrimination, the state should set high demands. Investigators and prosecutors must recognize fluently and give the highest priority to violence elements involved in violence or hate crime. They should further take all measures, so that in a short time could be able to collect evidence on the intention and mood of the offender and lead the perpetrator to justice20. From the case law of the Court interesting is the case Dordevic v. Croatia21, which is one of the few cases, in our view, that considered a hate incident. In this case, a mother and a son lived in a ground floor apartment in Zagreb, Croatia, next to a primary school. Between 2008 and 2011 they suffered permanent harassment by schoolchildren. Incidents escalated and the minor son was derided in the street, strangers urinated in front of the door of their house, they threw stones at the windows and eventually caused burns to the hands of the child with cigarettes. These offenses had a negative effect on the child, who became antisocial and finally suffered psoriasis due to the accumulated stress. The mother of the minor reported the incidents to the competent authorities (social services, police, school), but according to the 18 See also http://www.osce.org/cio/40695. We should extol the efforts of the OSCE against hate crimes through mainly by the actions of the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), one of which is the creation of a specific crime reporting website hate the states - members (http://hatecrime.osce.org/ ). 19 Nachova and Others v. Bulgaria, (Grand Chamber), 6 July 2005, par. 160-168: http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-69630. 20 Milanovi v. Serbia, (Chamber Judgment), (Final) 20 June 2011: http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-102252 21 (Chamber Judgment), (Final) 24 October 2012: http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001- 112322#{%22respondent%22:[%22HRV%22],%22documentcollectionid2%22:[%22GRANDCHAMBER%22,% 22CHAMBER%22],%22itemid%22:[%22001-112322%22]} https://ejournals.lib.auth.gr/projustitia http://www.osce.org/cio/40695 http://hatecrime.osce.org/ http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-69630 http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-102252 Pro Justitia τ.1 (2018) E-ISSN: 2529-0401 Available online at https://ejournals.lib.auth.gr/projustitia © 2018 by Author(s). This is an open-access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0). See https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ 99 Court sufficient measures were not taken. In this case the Court held that the competent authorities, although they knew of the continued harassment of the applicant and her son, however, they did not take the necessary measures to identify the magnitude of the problem, so as to avert further escalation of violence. Although the Court does not require that ECHR member states would institutionalize this type of legislation to combat hate incidents or hate crimes, however categorically the Court recognizes that "hate crimes require a proportional response to the induced damage on the part of criminal justice22”. As hinted above, ECtHR has not employed the concept of the hate incident in a direct way. This attitude, however, of its case-law, when the Court had to deal with hate crimes or hate speech, always interpreted according to the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, we believe that allows the inclusion of some forms of hate incidents in the criminal system of the member states. Especially since that is going to take place an express provision in the criminal legal system of the member states, then the ECtHR will be called in the future to determine the semantic nature of the hate incident more precisely. 6. The new article 361 Β of the Greek Penal Code De lege lata according to the provision of Art. 16 par. 1 of Law no. 3304/2005, whoever violates the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of ethnic or racial origin or religion or other beliefs, disability, age or sexual orientation, provided for by this law, during the sale of goods or the provision of services to the public is punished by imprisonment of six (6) months up to three (3) years and with a fine of one thousand (1,000) to five thousand (5,000) euro. This provision has been in force in the Greek legal order for over ten years (since 27 January 2005). Therefore, we notice that at the level of the trading of goods or services (Article 4, 1) there is already a ban on discrimination for the above reasons. In the above context and in the direction of the criminal answer to incidents of violence, the newly introduced provision of article 361 B of the the Greek Penal Code (P.C.), as it was added by art. 29 law no. 4356/2015 (Government Gazette A / 181 of 24.12.2015), regulates the occurrence of violence or hatred and is correctly included in the relevant chapter of crimes against honour. This provision extends the criminal protection of Law no. 3304/2005, as described above, to the field of voluntary humanitarian supply of goods and services23. 22 Secic v. Croatia, (Chamber Judgment), (Final) 31 August 2007, par. 66: http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-80711. 23 According to the introductory report of the new provision: "the extension of criminal protection in the field of voluntary humanitarian supply of goods and services is deemed necessary, because in these cases, the detestable exclusion does not merely diminish the victim's social performance but denotes the denial of his own human property, thus humiliating the victim but also propagating to the community the notion that there are lives stripped of the person's personality, for food or for treatment ". https://ejournals.lib.auth.gr/projustitia http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-80711 Pro Justitia τ.1 (2018) E-ISSN: 2529-0401 Available online at https://ejournals.lib.auth.gr/projustitia © 2018 by Author(s). This is an open-access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0). See https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ 100 The first paragraph of the new article defines the basic form of the crime. According to this provision, "any person who supplies goods or services or announces by public invitation the provision or supply of such persons by excluding out of contempt persons due to their race, color, ethnic or ethnic origin, birth, religion, disability, sexual orientation, identity of sex is punishable by imprisonment of at least three (3) months and by a pecuniary penalty of at least one thousand and five hundred (1 500) euro'. The second paragraph defines the aggravating form: "if in the act of the preceding paragraph two (2) or more persons have been involved, the act is punishable with an imprisonment of at least six (6) months and a fine of five thousand (5,000) to twenty five thousand (25,000) euro. The new provision harmonizes with the Greek Penal Code system and is in line with the provision of Article 81a of the Penal Code, which defines hate crime. Its objective condition requires the supply of goods or the provision of services or the announcement by public call for the supply or supply thereof. We consider it to be a cumulatively mixed crime, which can be realized in three different ways of behavior. In this sense, the perpetrator of the crime by committing a single way or type of the offense, also carries out a separate offense and the provisions on the cumulative sentence (94 P.C.) is applied. However, there may be a relationship between the acts and the continuation of the same crime (98 P.C.) would be applied. Finally, in the case of committing a single form of the crime, it is no eligible to change the accusation to another form, than that for which the accused is being introduced to the criminal trial. The above offence is also an offense of over-subjective subjection, as the legislator demands it to be "out of contempt". This condition should not in principle be overshadowed, because the Penal Code introduces in most cases subjective elements of the wrongdoing that make the subjective hypostasis 'superfluous'. The concepts are known, such as: "selfishness", "fugitive", "cruel behavior", "cruel offense", "compassion", "malice", scattered in provisions of the Greek Penal Code (articles 199, 300, 358, 394, paragraph 4, 406, 407). The phrase "out or hatred" set out in Article 81a of the Penal Code on racist crime could be also adopted. However, the legislator chose the phrase "out of contempt" because in Article 81a of the Penal Code the perpetrator has already committed an unfair act against the victim, has already externalized an illegal behavior that can reach up to the culpable offense of malice. In contrast to Article 361b of the Penal Code, the offender's conduct is not subject to any prior tension and is criminalized firstly by the adoption of this article, thus making the offense of 361 B PC an actual crime in comparison to the principal crime that is the insult (art. 361 P.C.). For the assessment of contempt, account shall be taken of the circumstances and particularities of the act referred to in Art. 361 Β P.C. In the introductory report of the new provision, it is mentioned in this regard that the element of contempt is not sufficient to be inherent in the subjective intentions and motives of the perpetrator, but should characterize the objective meaning of the act of exclusion. It is to be inferred from the circumstances and the particular characteristics of the act, the actual humiliation of the victim. The legislator also https://ejournals.lib.auth.gr/projustitia Pro Justitia τ.1 (2018) E-ISSN: 2529-0401 Available online at https://ejournals.lib.auth.gr/projustitia © 2018 by Author(s). This is an open-access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0). See https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ 101 stresses in his report that exclusion from services and goods should objectively be seen as the victim's actual contempt. 7. Conclusion Hate or bias incidents are found in the bottom of an escalation pyramid, which finally peaks to hate crime. The criminal response to the hate incident is needed more, when hate incidents take place as acts of public and/or political action. In this case their inclusion in to the penal code as criminal acts against the honor is the only severe answer of the state. So is the response of the Greek legislator after the last amendment of the Greek Penal Code with the article 361 B according to art. 29 of the law no. 4356/2015. The criminal provision of the new Article 361B of the Greek Penal Code broadcasts a teaching message. The role of criminal law is also a pedagogical role for the society as a whole. The inclusion in the penal code of a provision penalizing the occurrence of violence or hatred, especially in the form of social action, such as the new provision of Art. 361 B of the Greek P.C., conveys to the citizen the message of cultural maturity and of human cooperation. On the international level ECHR protects the right to the integrity of the person and it forbids the discrimination and the racist and intolerant behavior in many articles such as 2, 3, 8, 9, 10. The provision of the hate or bias incident as criminal acts in the criminal codes of the respective states – members of the Council of Europe will help the structure of a European standard and a European consensus, that will contributes in the fight against racist and intolerant behaviors in Europe. https://ejournals.lib.auth.gr/projustitia 
work_pvnfac44zvb55ngnkxbi6hhq3m	----	00472794_40-4.qxd:JSP Social Policy Digest Online Fran Bennett and Ken Jones iii Articles Said Shahtahmasebi, Eric Emerson, Damon Berridge and Gillian Lancaster Child Disability and the Dynamics of Family Poverty, Hardship and Financial Strain: Evidence from the UK 653 Susan Harkness and Martin Evans The Employment Effects of Recession on Couples in the UK: Women’s and Household Employment Prospects and Partners’ Job Loss 675 Jonathan Roberts Trust and Early Years Childcare: Parents’ Relationships with Private, State and Third Sector Providers in England 695 Sadie Parr Family Policy and the Governance of Anti-Social Behaviour in the UK: Women’s Experiences of Intensive Family Support 717 Kath Browne, Leela Bakshi and Jason Lim ‘It’s Something You Just Have to Ignore’: Understanding and Addressing Contemporary Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Trans Safety Beyond Hate Crime Paradigms 739 Richard Giulianotti The Sport, Development and Peace Sector: A Model of Four Social Policy Domains 757 David Taylor Wellbeing and Welfare: A Psychosocial Analysis of Being Well and Doing Well Enough 777 Jochen Clasen and Alexander Goerne Exit Bismarck, Enter Dualism? 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Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:32, subject to the Cambridge Core https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/S0047279411000547 https://www.cambridge.org/core JOURNAL OF SOCIAL POLICY VOLUME 40 OCTOBER 2011 PART 4 SOCIAL POLICY DIGEST ONLINE Fran Bennett and Ken Jones iii ARTICLES Said Shahtahmasebi, Eric Emerson, Damon Berridge and Gillian Lancaster Child Disability and the Dynamics of Family Poverty, Hardship and Financial Strain: Evidence from the UK 653 Susan Harkness and Martin Evans The Employment Effects of Recession on Couples in the UK: Women’s and Household Employment Prospects and Partners’ Job Loss 675 Jonathan Roberts Trust and Early Years Childcare: Parents’ Relationships with Private, State and Third Sector Providers in England 695 Sadie Parr Family Policy and the Governance of Anti-Social Behaviour in the UK: Women’s Experiences of Intensive Family Support 717 Kath Browne, Leela Bakshi and Jason Lim ‘It’s Something You Just Have to Ignore’: Understanding and Addressing Contemporary Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Trans Safety Beyond Hate Crime Paradigms 739 Richard Giulianotti The Sport, Development and Peace Sector: A Model of Four Social Policy Domains 757 David Taylor Wellbeing and Welfare: A Psychosocial Analysis of Being Well and Doing Well Enough 777 Jochen Clasen and Alexander Goerne Exit Bismarck, Enter Dualism? Assessing Contemporary German Labour Market Policy 795 Mark Considine, Jenny M. Lewis and Siobhan O'Sullivan Quasi-Markets and Service Delivery Flexibility Following a Decade of Employment Assistance Reform in Australia 811 Anne Daguerre Antipoverty Programmes in Venezuela 835 terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0047279411000547 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:32, subject to the Cambridge Core https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/S0047279411000547 https://www.cambridge.org/core BOOK REVIEWS Ed Howker and Shiv Malik (2010), Jilted Generation: How Britain Has Bankrupted Its Youth. London: Icon Books. £8.99, pp. 246, pbk. Francis Beckett (2010), What Did the Baby Boomers Ever Do For Us? London: Biteback Publishing. £12.99, pp. 218, pbk. David Piachaud, John Macnicol and Jane Lewis (2009), Just Ageing? Fairness, Equality and the Life Course: A Think Piece on Intergenerational Equality. London: Centre for the Analysis of Social Exclusion. pp. 87, pbk. 853 Peter Taylor-Gooby (2009), Reframing Social Citizenship. Oxford: Oxford University Press. £47, pp. 218, hbk. £21.99, pbk (2010). 856 Kristian Niemietz (2011), A New Understanding of Poverty: Poverty Measurement and Policy Implications. London: The Institute of Economic Affairs. £12.50, pp. 244, pbk. 857 Andrew Wallace (2010), Remaking Community? New Labour and the Governance of Poor Neighbourhoods. Farnham: Ashgate. £55, pp. 159, hbk. 859 Majorie Mayo and John Annette (eds.) (2010), Taking Part? Active Learning for Active Citizenship and Beyond. Leicester: National Institute of Adult Continuing Education. £24.95, pp. 322. pbk. 860 Vladimir Rys (2010), Reinventing Social Security Worldwide: Back to Essentials. Bristol: Policy Press. £19.99, pp. 126, pbk. 861 Herbert Obinger, Peter Starke, Julia Moser, Edith Gindulis and Stephan Leibfried (2010), Transformations of the Welfare State: Small States, Big Lessons. Oxford: Oxford University Press. £50, pp. 320, hbk. 863 Vic George (2010), Major Thinkers in Welfare: Contemporary Issues in Historical Perspective. Bristol: The Policy Press. £70, pp. 274, hbk. 865 Peter Dwyer (2010), Understanding Social Citizenship: Themes and Perspectives for Policy and Practice (second edition). Bristol: Policy Press. £19.99, pp. 260, pbk. 866 Morag McDermont (2010), Governing Independence and Expertise: The Business of Housing Associations. Oregon: Oxford and Portland. £30, pp. 189, pbk. 868 Lena Dominelli (2010), Social Work in a Globalizing World. Cambridge: Polity Press. £16.99, pp. 211, pbk. 869 United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (2010), Combating Poverty and Inequality: Structural Change, Social Policy and Politics. Geneva: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development. $45, pp. 360, pbk. 871 Mark W. Frazier (2010), Socialist Insecurity: Pensions and the Politics of Uneven Development in China. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. £21.95, pp. 210, hbk. 873 ERRATUM 875 terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0047279411000547 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. 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work_pvve6jr44fegdge5lgd6myzzhy	----	1 The Affinity between Online and Offline anti-Muslim Hate Crime: Dynamics and Impacts By Imran Awan and Irene Zempi Abstract Following the recent terrorist attacks in Paris and Tunisia in 2015, and in Woolwich, south-east London where British Army soldier Drummer Lee Rigby was murdered in 2013, there has seen a significant increase in anti-Muslim attacks. These incidents have occurred offline where mosques have been vandalized, Muslim women have had their hijab (headscarf) or niqab (face veil) pulled off, Muslim men have been attacked, and racist graffiti has been scrawled against Muslim properties. Concurrently, there has been a spike in anti-Muslim hostility online, where Muslims have been targeted by campaigns of cyber bullying, cyber harassment, cyber incitement and threats of offline violence. Against this background, we examine the nature and impacts of online and offline anti-Muslim hate crime. We draw on our different experiences of conducting research on anti-Muslim hate crime, using two independent research projects in order to consider the affinity between online and offline anti-Muslim hate crime. We argue that, in reality, online/offline boundaries may be more blurred than the terms imply. For victims, it is often difficult to isolate the online threats from the intimidation, violence and abuse that they suffer offline. Moreover, victims often live in fear because of the possibility of online threats materialising in the ‘real world’. We conclude that there is a continuity of anti-Muslim hostility in both the virtual and the physical world, especially in the globalized world. Key Words Anti-Muslim hostility; victims, hate crime; Online; Offline 2 Introduction In the current climate, Muslims are increasingly finding themselves under siege (Awan 2012a; Lambert and Githens-Mazer, 2011; Poynting and Perry, 2007; Poynting and Mason, 2007). Anti-Muslim hate crime has increased significantly following the terrorist attacks of 9/11 in the US and 7/7 in the UK (Byers and Jones, 2007; Hanes and Machin, 2014; Poynting and Noble, 2004; Poynting and Mason, 2006). More recently, the murder of British Army soldier Drummer Lee Rigby in Woolwich in May 2013 has fuelled the growth of anti- Muslim hostility on social media as well as in the streets of Britain. According to the Measuring Anti-Muslim Attacks project (Tell MAMA, 2014; 2015), there has been a significant spike in anti-Muslim attacks, ranging from online threats, incitement and harassment to actual physical attacks and arson in public. Moreover, the activities of Islamic State militants such as the murder of British aid worker David Haines in September 2014 demonize Islam and Muslims and as a result, ‘legitimize’ anti-Muslim attacks both online and offline (Dodd and Williams, 2014). At the same time, certain European countries have applied restrictive measures and bans on the practice of Islam in the public sphere. In 2009 Switzerland banned the construction of new mosque minarets. In 2011 France became the first European country to ban the wearing of the face veil in public places including public buildings, educational institutions, hospitals and public transport. Belgium was the second European country after France to enforce a similar ban. In Spain, the city of Barcelona and other regions have brought in similar bans, as have some towns in Italy. Similar restrictions have been introduced outside of Europe too. In 2011 the Canadian government made it illegal for Muslim women to wear a face veil at citizenship ceremonies, while in West Australia a law requiring Muslim women to remove their face veil in order to prove their identity to police was passed in 2013. In the wake of the rise of terrorist group Isis, a number of Australian politicians have called for the banning of the face veil in public in New South Wales, Australia on the basis that it could be used for the purposes of terrorism (Barker, 2014). Seen through the prism of security and risk, Muslims in the West have emerged as the new ‘folk devils’ of popular and media imagination (Zempi and Chakraborti, 2014). Within this paradigm, Islam is understood as a violent 3 political ideology, religion and culture; Muslim men are perceived as the embodiment of terrorism, fundamentalism and extremism; and Muslim women are viewed as the personification of gender oppression in Islam, especially if they are veiled. Ultimately, such stereotypes provide fertile ground for manifestations of offline anti-Muslim hate crime for example, verbal abuse, physical assault, and property damage in the public space (Awan, 2012b) as well as online anti-Muslim hate crime, for example, via social networking sites such as Facebook, Twitter, Bebo and MySpace (Awan, 2014). Specifically, for far right groups such as the English Defence League (EDL), online activity is central to its organizational identity and as such social media sites such as Facebook and Twitter are the favored mode of communication between their online sympathizers, as it allows them and other groups (such as far-right British nationalist political party Britain First) to use them to hold online posts, but also to organize offline attacks. Online communicative messages are used in order to engage with members as regards offline protests and demonstrations which often risk stoking up fear, and promoting anti-Muslim hatred and in some cases actual offline violence (Citron, 2014). Against this background, we examine the nature and impacts of online and offline anti-Muslim hate crime. We draw on our different experiences of conducting research on anti-Muslim hate crime, using two independent research projects in order to consider the affinity between online and offline anti-Muslim hate crime. We argue that Muslim women are more vulnerable to intimidation, violence and harassment, both online and offline. Also, we highlight that individual experiences of online and/or offline anti-Muslim hostility increase feelings of insecurity and vulnerability amongst victims, thereby diminishing their sense of belonging, confidence and willingness to integrate into society. Moreover, we consider the collective impacts associated with online/offline anti-Muslim hostility through notions of a worldwide, transnational Muslim community, the ‘‘ummah’’, which connects Muslims from all over world. We suggest that, in reality, online/offline boundaries may be more blurred than the terms imply. We conclude that for victims, it is often difficult to isolate the online threats from the intimidation, violence and abuse that they suffer offline. Rather, there is a continuity of anti- Muslim hostility in both the virtual and the physical world, especially in the 4 globalised world. Correspondingly, victims live in fear because of the possibility of online threats materialising in the ‘real world’. Methods The findings in this paper are based on two independent research projects that we are attempting to bring together in order to compare the relative online and offline experiences. Specifically, Awan’s (2014) study examined anti- Muslim hate crime on Twitter. He analyzed a random sample of 500 tweets from 100 different Twitter user profiles, in order to look for patterns emerging about Muslim communities on this social media platform. His study analysed tweets between January 2013 and April 2014, using the hashtags #Woolwich, #Muslim, and #Islam in order to examine patterns emerging regarding online anti-Muslim hate crime on Twitter. Hashtags allow an opportunity to use specific terms such as Muslim and Islam, as a means to see how Muslims were depicted both before and post the Woolwich attack. Indeed, these terms had appeared on the Twitter search engine as words that had recently “trended” in the United Kingdom (UK). The study used a mixed methodology as part of a wider content analysis utilizing qualitative and quantitative data gathering techniques embedded within grounded theory. The study also included the use of the electronic database NVivo. By using the software system NVivo, Awan (2014) was able to collate and identify comments, posts and patterns that emerged through ‘high frequency’ words. The comments and posts investigated were then compiled into a large word cloud. The word cloud was analyzed using a word frequency count that was created to explore core issues and recurring themes around how Muslims were being viewed on social media. All the social media comments were imported into NVivo and the author was able to analyze the comments with the use of visualization tools such as the NCapture tool, which is a web browser extension that allowed the author to quickly and easily capture web content via social media data such as Twitter for further analysis. Zempi’s (2014) doctoral research took the form of a qualitative study based on semi-structured interviews with veiled Muslim women in Leicester between 2011 and 2012. Specifically, the study comprised of 60 individual interviews and 20 focus group interviews with veiled Muslim women who have 5 been victims of anti-Muslim hostility in public in the UK and elsewhere. Individual, in-depth interviews allow for ‘rich’ data to be collected with detailed descriptions (Hennink et al., 2011). This approach is especially valuable for researching sensitive issues that require confidentiality and a more intimate setting for data collection, and this is especially appropriate for ‘hard to access’ groups such as veiled Muslim women. Focus group interviews incorporate the strengths of qualitative research in terms of gathering ‘rich’ data whilst generating additional insights through group interactions (Curtis and Curtis, 2011). In the context of this study, the focus group method afforded the possibility of open discussion amongst veiled Muslim women with similar or different experiences of anti-Muslim hate crime whilst, at the same time, highlighting collectively held beliefs and attitudes. Prospective participants were identified through local Muslim organisations including mosques, Muslim schools and Islamic centres, as well as local Muslim university student societies, and Muslim women’s groups. Participants unaffiliated to any local Muslim organizations or groups were also recruited through snowball sampling. All interviews were anonymised and the research participants were given pseudonyms to protect their anonymity. At the time of the fieldwork, the veiled Muslim women who took part in the study were residents living in Leicester. According to the most recent Census data, Leicester is a city located at the heart of the East Midlands of England and has a population of approximately 330,000 (Office for National Statistics, 2011). Leicester residents hail from over 50 countries from across the globe, making the city one of the most ethnically and culturally diverse places in the UK. In view of its diverse mix of cultures and faiths, Leicester is commonly depicted as the UK’s most ethnically harmonious city and as a successful model of multiculturalism both nationally and internationally. Moreover, Leicester has a large and rapidly expanding population of Muslims and niqab- wearing women, making it an ideal site in which to conduct this particular study. 6 Understanding the nature of online and offline anti-Muslim hate crime In the British context, a hate crime is any criminal offence which is perceived, by the victim or any other person, to be motivated by hostility or prejudice on particular grounds – race, religion, sexual orientation, transgender status and disability. Hate crime is not limited to just physical attacks, but includes a wide range of potential crimes from offensive graffiti, damage to property, abusive and threatening messages, harassment, intimidation and verbal abuse (Perry, 2001). Perry (2001: 10) argues that hate crime is about offenders pursuing a level of control and power and states that a hate crime must involve “…acts of violence and intimidation, usually directed towards already stigmatized and marginalized groups. As such it is a mechanism of power and oppression, intended to reaffirm the precarious hierarchies that characterize a given social order...” Within a sociological framework, hate crime is a qualitative distinct form of aggression. In essence, hate crime victimisation serves as a visible indicator of the motives of the perpetrators. It indicates the perpetrator's bias and prejudice, and serves symbolic and instrumental functions for the perpetrators. A ‘hate’ message is communicated to a community or group and the symbolic status of the victim motivates the perpetrators. It is irrelevant if victims actually identify themselves as members of a particular socially identifiable group. In the eyes of their perpetrators, they symbolise a despised social group. According to Tell MAMA (Measuring Anti-Muslim Attacks) recent data analysis they found 548 verified incidents (of 729) reported to them concerning anti-Muslim abuse. The majority of incidents took place online (402 out of 548). Almost, a fifth of service users reported repeat offline incidents of anti-Muslim hate with Muslim women suffering more offline incidents than men. Anti-Muslim hate crime falls under the category of religious hate crime, which is where it is perceived, by the victim or any other person, to be motivated by hostility or prejudice based upon a person's religion or perceived religion (Keats, 2014). According to the Association of Chief Police Officers in the UK, online hate crime includes illegal hate content that aims to incite hatred based on the grounds of race, religion and sexual orientation. This 7 could include; words; posts; forums; videos; chatrooms; pictures and websites. The Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) who are tasked with prosecuting people who have committed communication offences via social media, argue for there to be an offence of online hatred there must be; (i) A credible threat of violence and damage to property; (ii) Communications must specifically target an individual or individuals based on harassment; (iii) Communications that have breached a court order and (iv) The communications must be grossly offensive, obscene, indecent or false. Hall (2013: 5) argues that “These definitions are notable because they allow for anyone to be a victim of hate crime, and for any offence or incident to be recorded and investigated by the police as a hate crime.” The UK policy and legal interpretation of hate crime has also divided the term into different areas from hate motivation, hate incidents, and hate crimes. The operational definition in England and Wales states that hate motivation is where “Hate crimes and incidents are taken to mean any crime or incident where the perpetrator’s hostility or prejudice against an identifiable group of people is a factor in determining who is victimized” (College of Policing, 2014: 3). The definition included here is broader in the sense that the victim does not have to be a member of a group. A hate incident on the other hand is described as: “Any non-crime incident which is perceived by the victim or any other person, to be motivated by hostility or prejudice based on a person’s race or perceived race, religion or perceived religion, sexual orientation or perceived sexual orientation, disability or perceived disability, or transgender or perceived to be transgender” (College of Policing, 2014: 3). Hate incidents are important because they are defined as particular crimes that can often escalate into further crimes or tension in a community. For example, comments made by an evangelical Protestant preacher, named Pastor James McConnell who described Islam as a ‘heathen’ doctrine and argued that Muslims ‘could not be trusted’ were investigated by police as a potential hate incident, because of the nature of the comments which were construed as potentially aiding an act that could lead to an escalation of violence and community tensions (BBC News, 2014). 8 That stated, it is important to recognise that the visibility of Islam is key to revealing the individual’s Muslim identity and thus triggering online and/or offline anti-Muslim attacks. Indeed, a key finding that emerges from our case studies is that the visibility of victims’ Muslim identity is key to triggering anti- Muslim attacks, both online and offline. For example, in terms of social networking sites individuals might be perceived as ‘Muslim’ because of their name, appearance in their profile picture (dress for women and beard for men) and comments indicating their affiliation with Islam. With respect to public spaces, individuals might be identified as ‘Muslim’ primarily because of their appearance, dress and location (for example, attending the mosque). Similarly to the virtual world, where actual and potential victims are identified through the visibility of their Muslim identity, ‘perceived’ Muslims are equally vulnerable to intimidation, violence and abuse on the street. Public visibility is a critical element to prejudice given that “perceptible differences are of basic importance in distinguishing between out-group and in-group members” (Allport, 1979: 132). The power of social perception along with negative attributions ascribed to those viewed as visibly different is a key element to understanding hate crime in general and anti-Muslim hate crime committed against individuals more specifically (Byers and Jones, 2008). Without what Allport (1979) refers to as “visible differences” in the form of social dress, perceived in-group and out-group membership would not be ascribed. He refers to the merging of the “symbol” (e.g., physical and cultural attributes) and what the symbol is perceived to stand for (e.g., terrorism, enemy) as “condensation” whereby the visible difference and the ascribed meaning given to the symbol come together, thus, creating a key element of the necessary perceptual formula for prejudice (Jacobs and Potter, 1998: 13). We also found that in addition to the ‘visibility’ of a person’s Muslim identity, gender was key to triggering attacks both online and offline. For example, Awan (2014) found that the majority of victims of online anti-Muslim hate crime were ‘visible’ Muslim women, particularly those wearing the hijab or niqab. Similarly, Zempi (2014) found that niqab-wearing women were persistent and multiple victims of anti-Muslim hate crime offline. Whilst suffering manifestations of anti-Muslim hostility in public, some participants 9 had also suffered persistent online abuse including name-calling, threats to physically harm, online stalking and sexual harassment (Zempi, 2014). Typically, males are overwhelmingly the victims of hate crime but in the case of anti-Muslim hate crime, it is the females who are most often attacked (Perry, 2015). This applies to both online and offline anti-Muslim hate crime, as our case studies demonstrate. As Perry (2014) points out, Muslim women are more vulnerable to anti-Muslim hate crime and this is very much in contrast to the demographics of hate crime generally, which tend to target men disproportionately. Githens-Mazer and Lambert’s (2010) London study also found that while racist violence typically targets men, Muslim women are more vulnerable to religiously motivated hate crime. Poynting and Noble (2004) found that women had experienced racism, abuse or violence since 11 September 2001 more than men. An Australian Community Relations Commission (Dreher, 2006) on post-9/11 experiences of Muslims found that 50.4% of the victims were female, whereas only 44.4% were male (the remainder were institutions/buildings). Abu-Ras and Suarez’s (2009) American study of the PTSD effects on Muslims after 9/11 found that a significantly larger proportion of women (86.3%) than men (54.9%) had experienced hate crime. In light of these findings, it is important to note that in comparison to men, women are more visibly identifiable as ‘Muslim’ through their dress. Unless they wear the jubba (male Muslim robe), men are not easily identifiable as Muslim even if they wear a beard. This indicates that Muslim men are less ‘visible’ than Muslim women. Zempi and Chakraborti (2014) point out that gender precipitates manifestations of anti-Muslim hostility on the basis that the visibility of the Muslim veil, coupled with popular perceptions about veiled Muslim women as oppressed, dangerous and segregated, mark them as ‘uniquely’ vulnerable to online and offline manifestations of anti-Muslim hostility. Perry (2014) argues that for veiled Muslim women, the anti-Muslim violence they experience is different in its dynamics from that perpetrated against Muslim men. Relatedly, Abu-Ras and Suarez (2009: 59) highlight the complexity of these women’s identities as follows: (i) their gender status as women, who generally face more discrimination in access to educational, financial, health, and social resources; (ii) their cultural identity that is shaped by structural social and 10 cultural constraints provided by gender socialization and patriarchal processes, that also justify certain types of discrimination; (iii) their status as immigrants and minorities in a Western country and the resulting social and economic marginalization; (iv) their language barriers, which often result in loss of power, influence, and control over their family members; (v) their religious identity, which results in their separation from men and the wider society; and (vi) their Islamic dress code that symbolizes modesty and physical integrity, and identifies them from non-Muslims, marking them as targets for hate crimes, discrimination, and possible violations of their bodily integrity (Perry, 2014). In relation to the motivation of hate crime perpetrators, Perry (2015) emphasizes that hate crimes involve acts of violence and intimidation, usually directed towards already stigmatized and marginalised groups. As such, it is a mechanism of power and oppression, intended to reaffirm the precarious hierarchies that characterize a social order. Participants in Zempi’s (2014) study made explicit reference to the type of language used by the perpetrators, which signified their motivations for the attack. For example, they had been called names such as ‘terrorists’, ‘Muslim bombers’ and ‘suicide bombers’, which indicate the perpetrators’ perceptions of veiled Muslim women as a security or terrorist threat. Awan (2014) found that there were a number of terms that were used to describe Muslims in a negative manner; these included the words ‘‘Muslim pigs’’ (9%), ‘‘Muzrats’’ (14%), ‘‘Muslim Paedos’’ (30%), ‘‘Muslim terrorists’’ (22%), ‘‘Muslim scum’’ (15%), and ‘‘Pisslam’’ (10%). Tell MAMA (2014) has also examined the use of words on social media to describe Muslims from January 2013 to December 2013, collating high-frequency words that were directly related to anti-Muslim hate and prejudice. They also found the words ‘‘Ninja’’, ‘‘Muzrats’’, and ‘‘Paedo’’ being used against Muslims (Tell MAMA, 2014). After examining the 500 tweets, and looking at the use of language to depict Muslims in a negative light, Awan (2014) constructed a typology, consisting of eight different people identified as cyber trolls; that is, people who are using social networking sites such as Twitter to produce a sustained campaign of hate against Muslims. These are the “trawler” (a person who has gone through other people’s Twitter accounts to specifically target people with a Muslim connection); the 11 “apprentice” (someone who is fairly new to Twitter but nonetheless has began to target people with the help of more experienced online abusers); the “disseminator” (someone who has tweeted about and retweeted messages, pictures, and documents of online hate which are specifically targeting Muslims); the “impersonator” (a person who is using a fake profile, account, and images to target individuals); the “accessory” (a person who is joining in with other people’s conversations via Twitter to target ‘visible’ Muslims); the “reactive” (a person who following a major incident, such as the Woolwich attack, will begin an online campaign targeting actual and perceived Muslims); the “mover” (someone who regularly changes their Twitter account in order to continue targeting someone from a different profile); and finally, the “professional” (a person who has a huge number of people following on Twitter and regardless of consequences, he/she will launch a major campaign of hate against Muslims; this person is also likely to have multiple Twitter accounts which are all aimed at targeting Muslims). Another key finding that emerges from our case studies is the fact that anti-Muslim hate crimes increased both online and offline following ‘trigger’ attacks including terrorist attacks carried out by individuals who choose to identify themselves as being Muslim or acting in the name of Islam. Such ‘trigger’ attacks include the 7/7 terror attack that hit London in July 2005 and the 9/11 terror attack that hit the United States in September 2001 (see also Hanes and Machin, 2014; Poynting and Mason, 2006). According to Byers and Jones (2007) terrorist attacks such as 9/11 have a significant impact on the rise of anti-Muslim hate crime. For them, they act as ‘trigger’ events that culminate in the increase of actual changes in social behaviour. They found that anti-Muslim hate crime increased on average from 0.6136 reported per week before 9/11 but that increased to 28.44 following 9/11 after spiking to nearly 200 reports one single week. Similarly, Poynting and Mason (2006) have examined the post 9/11 response towards Muslims in Britain and Australia. They found that anti-terror and security policies had in effect criminalised Muslims as being ‘‘evil’’ and a ‘‘fifth column’’ enemy, thus creating the “othering” of Muslim communities. They reported how in the immediate aftermath of ‘trigger’ events such as 9/11, there was an upsurge in anti- Muslim hostility. 12 More recently, both online and offline anti-Muslim hate crimes increased following terrorist attacks of national significance such as the Woolwich attack and terrorist attacks of international significance such as the Charlie Hebdo attack in Paris, and attacks in Copenhagen and Tunisia. Hanes and Machin (2014) argue that if attitudes toward groups like British Muslims are altered by ‘trigger’ attacks and by media coverage of attacks, then this reflects the proposition of “attitudinal shocks,” where a driver of hate crimes is the level of hatred or bigotry for a particular group in society, which may be influenced by media framing and coverage of attacks. In this context, shifts in underlying bigotry from attitudinal change following events like terrorist attacks seem to be potentially important determinants of hate crime incidence. . Spikes in anti-Muslim hate crimes and incidents following ‘trigger’ events are not confided to offline settings; rather, the offline pattern is replicated online (Awan, 2014). That said, it is important to note that anti- Muslim abuse occurring online can be categorized as being “cyber harassment,” “cyber bullying,” “cyber abuse,” “cyber incitement/threats,” and “cyber hate” (Wall, 2001). Indeed, online offender personality traits seem to have been formed from those seeking and searching for an ‘‘identity’’, which allows them to use and exploit social and political beliefs as an ideology which has no respect for the individuals or groups it targets (Prince, 2012; Lagerlof, 2004; McKenna and Bargh, 1998; Tajfel, 1970). This therefore can result in them trying to use online methods as a means of self-protectionism and false patriotism such as far right groups, which are apt at fuelling anti-Muslim hostility. Often this is played out by abusive, threatening and coordinated tweets or through the use of sites like Facebook to send messages of hate which include the use of visual images to target particular individuals and communities. Many of the comments posted online through social networking sites have an extremist and incendiary undertone (Awan, 2014). Moreover, they are not confined to social networking sites but include blogging sites, online chat rooms, and other virtual platforms, which have been used to promote online cyber hate and anti-Muslim attacks (Allen, 2014), often in the form of racist jokes and stereotypical “banter” (Weaver, 2013). As these incidents often go unchecked, this type of ‘‘low-level’’ online abuse leads to 13 the normalization of such behaviour and even an escalation to physical attacks (Allport, 1954). As Feldman et al. (2013: 11) point out, comparatively to offline hate crime ‘much less attention has been paid to online hate crime, which can be the precursor to more physically threatening offline incidents’. Understanding the individual impact of anti-Muslim hostility Crime can incur a number of different ‘costs’ following a victimization experience that involve emotional, psychological, physical and financial liabilities (Waldron, 2012). However, victims who have been targeted on the basis of their perceived ‘‘difference’’ and ‘‘otherness’’ are likely to experience a host of negative emotions that are qualitatively distinct from those experienced following victimization that is not motivated by hate or fear towards the ‘‘Other’’. The wider hate crime literature demonstrates a ‘unique’ impact associated with targeted victimization (Botcherby et al., 2011; Smith et al., 2012; Williams and Tregidga, 2014). In the context of anti-Muslim hate crime, both online and offline attacks upon Muslims ‘‘hurt’’ more than ordinary crimes as they are seen as an attack upon the victims’ core identity (Zempi and Chakraborti, 2014). In this context, the impact of anti-Muslim hate crime may exceed that of ‘normal’ crime because of victims’ perceived and actual vulnerability due to their affiliation to Islam. A key feature of targeted victimization is that single incidents tend to be part of a long-term pattern of victimization, a recurring and, in some cases, constant feature of one’s everyday life. From this perspective, anti-Muslim hate crime – similar to other forms of hate crime – is not a static problem, but instead should be seen as a dynamic social process involving context, structure and agency (see also Chakraborti and Zempi, 2012; Bowling, 1999; Kelly, 1987). For Rowe (2004), the fact that this victimization is part of the routine of the victim’s daily experience makes the abuse more, rather than, less serious. From this perspective, online and/or offline anti-Muslim hate crime can place a potentially huge emotional burden on actual and potential victims. It can damage their sense of belonging, confidence and feelings of safety (Bowling, 2009). Given that they are targeted because of the ‘visibility’ of their Muslim identity (which is easily identifiable because of their Muslim name and/or 14 Muslim appearance in either the virtual world or the physical sphere), victims are unable to take comfort in the belief that what happened to them was simply random and ‘‘could have happened to anyone’’. Rather, they are forced to view this abuse as an attack on their Muslim identity and this has severe implications for the levels of confidence and feelings of security (Spalek, 2005). Correspondingly, Zempi (2014) found that veiled Muslim women’s confidence had been severely affected as a result of their recurring experiences of online and offline anti-Muslim hostility, as demonstrated in the quotes below. Everyone thinks we are the enemy. I feel that I don’t have the right to be here. It crushes my self-esteem. (Parveen) We feel like social lepers that no one wants to engage with. (Maryam) The threat of anti-Muslim hate crime has long-lasting effects for individual victims including making them afraid to leave their homes and feeling like social outcasts. Zempi (2014) found that veiled Muslim women were often reluctant to leave the house through fear of being attacked particularly on the street, in parks, in shops and on public transport. At the same time though, many participants reported feeling like ‘‘prisoners in their own home’’. As the following quotations show, negotiations of personal safety can create a sense of imprisonment on the basis that they restrict veiled Muslim women’s participation in society, despite decreasing exposure to anti-Muslim hostility in public. It stops me from going out. I only go out when it is absolutely necessary, for example, to go to the shops or for medical treatment. (Latifah) It feels like we are under house arrest. People have locked us up without realising it. (Duniya) 15 People are being hypocritical in their argument that women in niqab are oppressed because they oppress us. We are stuck at home all day. (Focus group participant) As Hindelang (2009) points out, for crime to occur the prime actors – the offender and the victim – must have the occasion to intersect in time and space. By removing themselves from public space, actual and potential victims reduce the chances of being subjected to anti-Muslim hostility. Accordingly, veiled Muslim women spoke of feeling safe by confining themselves to their home as much as possible, with many participants explaining that they used the internet to connect with the outside world (Zempi, 2014). In this case the home was understood as a retreat from the hostility of the outside world and a key source of personal sense of security. However, the fact that women often experienced online abuse indicates that they could not feel safe even online. In this regard, the threat of online abuse creates social isolation for Muslims who are effectively cut off from their online social life because the abuse and harassment they are receiving online. For many individuals social media is a lifeline. For example, for those with disabilities, life limiting conditions, caring responsibilities, leaving or being driven off social media would leave them completely isolated. At the same time, participants described living in fear because of the possibility of online threats materialising in the ‘real world’ (Zempi, 2014). Therefore, the affinity between online and offline anti-Muslim hate crime ‘‘forces’’ some Muslims to withdraw from wider social participation, as this might be seen as the ‘‘only way’’ to be safe from the threat of anti-Muslim hostility. Furthermore, offline experiences of anti-Muslim hostility coupled with the potential for future attacks can affect and sometimes seriously damage the quality of life of victims and their families. Zempi (2014) found that on many occasions, veiled Muslim women’s children were affected by this victimization, especially since they were witnesses of such incidents. For young children, witnessing their mother being abused was confusing and extremely upsetting, as indicated below. 16 I was on my own with my five year old daughter in London, going to get the bus so I was crossing the road. A man in a big car, it was an English man in his 50s, pulled down his window and shouted swear words. Then my daughter started crying. She kept talking about it all day saying ‘‘Why was that man so horrible mummy?’’ (Nadia) The incident at Sainsbury’s in Leicester [a white English man shouted ‘‘Get the fuck out of my country’’], my children witnessed it and my younger daughter was very upset because she couldn’t understand why it happened. She was like ‘‘Why is he saying that mummy? We are British, aren’t we?’’ (Aisha) Similarly, Awan (2014) found that online anti-Muslim hate had a devastating impact upon victims and their families. Clearly, online threatening and abusive comments, for example through visual images, fake profiles, Facebook messages, online YouTube videos and tweets, can have a detrimental effect on the individuals who are targeted as well as their families (Waddington, 2010). A political director recalls the impact of online anti-Muslim hate comments on his family. He stated that: To say that I find the relentlessly hostile coverage of Islam, coupled with the personal abuse that I receive online, depressing is an understatement. There have been times – for instance, when I found my wife curled up on our couch, in tears, after having discovered some of the more monstrous and threatening comments on my New Statesman blog – when I've wondered whether it's all worth it. We argue that hate crime, hate incidents and hate speech can have direct impacts for individuals, both online and offline. For example, this is particularly strong when considering hate speech online that aims to threaten and incite violence. Hate speech in this context is any form of language used to depict someone in a negative fashion with regards their race, ethnicity, gender, 17 religion, sexual orientation or physical and mental disability with promotes hate and incites violence (Yar, 2013). This also links into the convergence of emotional distress caused by hate online, the nature of intimidation and harassment online, and the prejudice that seeks to defame groups or an individual, through speech intending to intimidate. Some of those sites include the Bare Naked Islam site which has a daily forum and chatroom which uses hate speech to incite racial hatred and animosity. The hate comments made online can have a negative impact on the victims who are targeted and can be very upsetting and unsettling for them and their families (Awan, 2014). Below is a direct quote from an article by Fiyaz Mughal (2013), the Director for Tell MAMA with regards the impact of online anti-Muslim hostility: Tell MAMA were contacted about four months ago by a young 15- year-old who explained that her picture had been placed on a website without her approval and it transpired that the young girl had then received targeted hate tweets and comments because of her faith. Her avatar showed a young girl with a hijab on, looking rather innocent. Having received anti-Muslim tweets, she responded back with some confidence and then extracted herself from the conversation. What she subsequently found out was that a range of strangers and far right supporters began to make explicit comments about her and they posted statements that humiliated her faith, her sexuality and aggressively abused her privacy. This case, which lasted over nine weeks, has had a huge impact on this girl. Both the emotional and psychological stress caused to her must not be underestimated. Moreover, the fact she was reluctant to report this incident to her family because of the social taboo attached had also exacerbated the internal pain she was suffering. This case also demonstrates that online behaviour can be normalised by offenders, which allows a perpetrator to use anonymity, manipulation, and social control to target their victims (Douglas et al., 2005). However, while this form of cyber hate often remains ‘‘invisible’’, due to offenders deleting tweets and also because the perpetrator can often 18 hide their identity, the offline threat remains very real for victims and their families (Hall, 2005). Understanding the collective impacts of anti-Muslim hostility We found that the impacts of anti-Muslim hostility are not restricted to individual victims and their families; rather, the harm extends to the wider Muslim community (Awan, 2014; Zempi, 2014). In other words, the individual fear and vulnerability discussed above is accompanied by the collective fear and vulnerability of all Muslims, particularly those individuals who have a ‘‘visible’’ Muslim identity in the virtual and physical space. As mentioned earlier, one of the key characteristics of anti-Muslim hate crime is its apparent randomness amongst ‘‘visible’’ Muslims. Drawing on Perry’s (2001) seminal work on hate crime, it could be argued that the identity of the individual victim is potentially irrelevant as the victim is likely to be chosen on the basis of their ‘‘visible’’ membership in the Muslim community rather than any individual characteristics. Viewed from this perspective, victims are often interchangeable on the premise that they represent the Muslim ‘‘Other’’. As Perry (2001) highlights in the context of targeted victimization, anti-Muslim hate crime is directed toward the community and not simply the individual victim. Correspondingly, the intent of the act is to subordinate and intimidate not only the individual victim but also the entire community to which the victim belongs. This type of targeted violence can be seen as a ‘‘message’’ which is designed to tell the wider Muslim community that they are “unwelcome” and ‘‘don’t belong’’, thereby extending the impact of this victimization beyond the actual, immediate victim to instill fear in the whole of the targeted community (see also Chakraborti and Garland, 2009). Throughout interviews and focus group discussions with veiled Muslim women, the consensus view amongst participants was that the wider Muslim community is under attack by virtue of the fact that ‘an attack on one Muslim is an attack on all’ (Zempi, 2014). For Muslims this is a crucial aspect of their faith; they are one body in Islam and ‘when any part of the body suffers, the whole body feels the pain’. This is demonstrated in the following quotations: 19 You feel it as a whole. Whilst it is an attack on the individual, it’s actually an attack on Islam as a whole. Therefore, it has an effect on everybody. We talk very much about the ummah, so any part of that which is attacked is felt across the whole community. (Layla) We feel we are all under attack. When it has happened to another sister or brother it does affect me. It affects all of us. (Focus group participant) In our religion, we believe we are all one body. If one person is hurt, it’s like a part of our body is hurt so we all have to be concerned when women in niqabs are at risk. (Focus group participant) In this sense, anti-Muslim hostility is unique in the consciousness of the wider Muslim community through notions of a worldwide, transnational Muslim community, the ummah, which connects Muslims in the UK with other Muslims throughout the world (see also Zempi and Chakraborti, 2014). An appreciation of the concept of ummah and its implications has relevance for understanding the community impacts of anti-Muslim hostility. In essence, the notion of ummah reframes the parameters of what defines national identity in Islam, and reflects the development of a robust collective identity amongst the world’s Muslims, which cannot be adequately explained exclusively within the framework of religious fellowship. According to Mandeville (2003, p. 135), ‘Muslims living in diaspora – particularly in the West – are of varied and diverse ethnic origins. What links them together, however, is a shared sense of identity within their religion, an idea most clearly located within the concept of the ummah’. The cumulative impacts of anti-Muslim hostility can disrupt notions of safety within the Muslim community on the basis that fellow Muslims are equally vulnerable to attacks by virtue of their group membership. In addition, the collective impacts of anti- Muslim hostility reinforce the sense of alienation experienced by members of the ummah-based community. At the same time though, it is important to challenge any notion of the essentialised Muslim community (Bolognani, 2007). The reified notion of ummah as a homogeneous religious cluster 20 simplifies the enormous levels of diversity and heterogeneity amongst its members, including variations around age, gender, race, ethnicity, language, sexual orientation and socio-economic status (Alexander et al., 2007). Indeed, an understanding of the different layers of identity surrounding the core identity of ummah has significance for understanding the diversity of Muslims’ experiences. Clearly there are differences across Muslim communities; however, the concept of ummah demonstrates that despite these differences, Muslims feel connected through their religious beliefs and therefore their collective Muslim identity globally keeps them connected. Indeed, in some instances the threat of anti-Muslim hate crime is so ‘‘real’’ that it can cause Muslims to change the way that they live their lives. For example, some Muslims are driven to adopt western names and pretend not to be Muslims at all, whilst others emphasize their Asian-ness in order to draw boundaries between themselves and other ‘‘visible’’ Muslims (Afshar, 2008). In this context, the actual and perceived threat of anti-Muslim hate crime acts as a form of ‘‘emotional terrorism’’ in that it segregates and isolates Muslims, in terms of restricting their freedom of movement and changing their patterns of social interaction, both in the public and virtual sphere. As mentioned earlier, the anonymity aspect in cases of online abuse is extremely frightening as the perpetrator could be anyone (Gelber, 2011). Equally worryingly, the online threats can escalate into the physical space. Thus, the affinity between online and offline anti-Muslim hostility limits pivotal aspects of identity-building, such as using social media as well as visiting friends, going to University and attending the mosque. This demonstrates that the fear and reality of online and offline anti-Muslim hostility restricts Muslims’ participation in society (Bleich, 2011). Perry and Alvi (2012) point out that this is not a voluntary choice, but the ‘‘safe’’ choice. Whether individually or collectively, the reality of online and offline anti-Muslim hate crime creates ‘‘invisible’’ boundaries, across which members of the Muslim community are not ‘‘welcome’’ to step. The enactment of both virtual and physical boundaries impacts upon ‘‘emotional geographies’’ in relation to the way in which Muslims perceive the spaces and places around and outside their communities of abode (Perry and Alvi, 2012). Rather than risk the threat of being attacked, either verbally or physically, many 21 actual and potential victims opt to retreat to ‘‘their own’’ communities. The fear of online harassment and physical violence reinforces these offline and online boundaries whilst contributing to ongoing withdrawal and isolation. From this perspective, anti-Muslim hostility affects the wider society on the basis that it isolates and excludes Muslims, thereby creating fear, resentment and mistrust of the ‘‘Muslim other’’. The separation of communities based on the ‘‘us- versus-them’’ binary has created a situation in which both Muslims and non- Muslims live in fear of each other. This separation prevents ‘‘us’’ and ‘‘them’’ from interacting with each other and increases fear of engagement on both sides. As such, anti-Muslim hostility promotes the notion of ‘‘parallel lives’’ both online and offline. Conclusion In this article, we have examined the nature and impacts of both online and offline anti-Muslim hate crime. Specifically, we have used our research projects as case studies in order to consider the affinity between online and offline anti-Muslim hate crime. We found that Muslim women are more vulnerable to intimidation, violence and harassment, both online and offline. Also, individual experiences of online and/or offline anti-Muslim hostility increase feelings of insecurity and vulnerability amongst victims, thereby diminishing their sense of belonging, confidence and willingness to integrate into society. We also found that for victims and their families, it is often difficult to isolate the online threats from the intimidation, violence and abuse that they suffer offline. Rather, there is a continuity of anti-Muslim hostility in both the virtual and the physical world, especially in the globalised world. Correspondingly, victims live in fear because of the possibility of online threats materialising in the ‘real world’. This shows that in reality, online/offline boundaries may be more blurred than the terms imply. In addition, we considered the collective impacts associated with online/offline anti-Muslim hostility through notions of a worldwide, transnational Muslim community, the ‘‘ummah’’, which connects Muslims from all over world. We argued that whether Muslims are targeted online or offline, anti-Muslim hate crime is commonly perceived by victims to be an attack on Islam and Muslims as a 22 whole. In this regard, the abuse that individual victims suffer online and/or offline is linked to the suffering of Muslims globally through the ummah. Ultimately, this discussion shows that a multifaceted partnership approach is vital when tackling online and offline anti-Muslim hatred. As we have discussed, previously hate crime victimisation serves as a visible indicator of the motives of the perpetrators. It indicates the perpetrator's bias and prejudice, and serves symbolic and instrumental functions for the perpetrators. As a result, we argue that a new international and national online hate strategy should be adopted, that highlights online and offline anti- Muslim abuse and ways in which the police can deal with such incidents. 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work_pvwj55bxp5axpagtzl66mrr6ei	----	The side-taking hypothesis for moral judgment The side-taking hypothesis for moral judgment Peter DeScioli Available online at www.sciencedirect.com ScienceDirect A recent theory proposes that moral judgment is an evolved strategy for choosing sides in conflicts. Evidence from moral psychology undermines previous evolutionary theories of morality focused on cooperation. I show how the side-taking hypothesis explains these otherwise puzzling patterns of moral judgment — especially its focus on actions rather than intended consequences. Moral judgment offers an alternative to choosing sides based on status or relationships by conditioning support on disputants’ actions rather than their identities. Observers can use moral judgment to take the same side, avoiding costly fights among themselves, while dynamically changing who they support in different conflicts. Observers can benefit from moral side-taking even when condemnation harms other individuals and society. Address Stony Brook University, Stony Brook, NY, United States Corresponding author: DeScioli, Peter (pdescioli@gmail.com) Current Opinion in Psychology 2016, 7:23–27 This review comes from a themed issue on Evolutionary Psychology Edited by Steven Gangestad and Josh Tybur http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.copsyc.2015.07.002 2352-250/# 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. Imagine you are alone on a desert island when a hulking man says to hand over your food supplies or he will kill you. You protest that his threats are morally wrong. How much protection could your moral judgment really pro- vide? If you had to choose, would you defend yourself with a hand axe or moral arguments? Now imagine instead that there are fifty people on the island. In this case, morality might actually be the better weapon: a persuasive moral argument could rally dozens of armed defenders to your side. A recent theory begins to uncover how something so seemingly feeble as moral judgment could possibly offer real advantages in evolutionary competition. DeScioli and Kurzban [1 �� ] argued that this puzzle can be resolved by thinking about how humans choose sides in conflicts. A persuasive moral argument can launch a barrage of stones at an opponent. It can sever an opponent’s relationships, cut off trade and supplies, and cast them into exile. However, these powers require an audience who will www.sciencedirect.com listen to moral accusations. Hence, a critical challenge is figuring out why observers care about who is right and wrong, and why they can sometimes be persuaded to oppose wrongdoers, even their own family and friends. Explaining moral judgment, not cooperation Traditional evolutionary theories of morality focus on understanding cooperation [2–4]. These theories do an excellent job of explaining why humans and other ani- mals care for offspring, cooperate in groups, trade favors, communicate honestly, and respect property. However, they do not explain moral judgment — why humans compute the wrongness of actions, announce moral judg- ments, condemn other people’s violations, and debate over moral rules. For example, kin selection explains why many animals care for their own offspring; it does not explain why humans morally judge other parents who neglect offspring — an unusual behavior absent in other species. Research from moral psychology reveals the information- processing structure of moral judgment (reviewed in [5]), which is the primary evidence for distinguishing its evolved functions [6]. Moral judgment takes as input a person’s action and computes as output a wrongness value for that action. People then announce their moral evalua- tions, argue about the wrongness of actions, and show hostility toward wrongdoers. Moral judgment’s focus on actions is among its most distinctive and mysterious features. Similar to Kant’s deontological philosophy, people often judge actions such as lying, theft, killing, premarital sex, or blasphemy to be morally wrong even when these actions can achieve better outcomes [5,7,8]. A well-known example is peo- ple’s judgments that it is morally wrong to kill one person to save five people in the footbridge trolley problem [9]. Deontological judgment is puzzling because evolved decision mechanisms are usually consequentialist in that they evaluate the outcomes of actions rather than the actions themselves. For example, people’s precautionary judgments aim to avoid injury (an outcome) rather than judging skydiving or bullfighting (actions) to be inher- ently injurious. Why then do humans assign moral values to actions? Moral judgment is not required for cooperation: Many non-human organisms cooperate while few, perhaps none, assign moral values to actions. Neither is moral judgment a particularly effective executor of cooperation: Research shows that people frequently behave selfishly even when they judge the same behavior to be immoral Current Opinion in Psychology 2016, 7:23–27 mailto:pdescioli@gmail.com http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.copsyc.2015.07.002 http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/00000000 24 Evolutionary Psychology [10]. Another idea is that moral judgment enforces co- operation by punishing cheaters. But this theory too predicts consequentialist mechanisms, specifically pun- ishment aimed at deterring harm. Instead, research shows that people’s moralistic punishments are aimed at retribution rather than deterrence [11], and its targets include harmless and beneficial behaviors such as same- sex marriage, birth control, interest-bearing loans, and scientific inquiry. In fact, moral judgment can be extremely destructive: moral condemnation reduces economic efficiency [12], incites political extremism [13 �� ,14], damages close rela- tionships [15], radicalizes terrorists [16], motivates sexual- orientation hate crimes [17], and blocks medical services for pregnant women, people addicted to drugs, and HIV patients [18,19]. A common fallback for cooperation-based theories is to attribute evidence inconsistent with cooperation to mis- takes in moral cognition due to erroneous information [20] or simple heuristics [21,22]. These proposals stand on weak theoretical ground because people’s deontological ‘‘mistakes’’ are large in magnitude, highly structured, and absent in non-human animals as well as other types of human judgments (e.g., welfare, precautions, economics). They also stand on weak empirical ground. Haidt [5] tested and falsified a mistake hypothesis by finding that people condemn actions that even they themselves report to cause little or no harm. Kurzban et al. [23�] tested and falsified a mistake hypothesis by finding that participants reported greater willingness to kill a brother to save five brothers, compared to killing a stranger to save five strangers, contradicting the claim that deontic resistance to killing is driven by altruism heuristics. DeScioli et al. [24] tested and falsified a mistake hypothesis by finding that people are more likely to choose harmful omissions when there is a threat of punishment, contradicting the claim that people’s greater willingness to harm by omis- sion than commission results from cognitive errors (see also [25,26]). In short, theories of cooperation explain many features of human social life. If humans were Vulcans from Star Trek, these theories might also explain morality. However, the data show that humans are hybrid Vulcan-Kantians whose moral judgments focus not only on intended outcomes but also on the particular actions people choose. Our Kantian side formulates moral rules of action, argues about the rules, and creates the diversity of moral systems across cultures. It is the aspect of morality that is most distinctively human and challenging to understand. Is morality mightier than the sword? There is little evidence in other animal species of moral judgment, moral announcements, or moral accusations, much less moral debates. Non-human animals do not Current Opinion in Psychology 2016, 7:23–27 argue about the morality of sharing food, paying debts, same-sex relationships, or military invasions, even when they exhibit these behaviors. To understand such an unusual trait, it might help to consider other distinctive features of human social ecology. One possibility is hu- man conflict. Conflict is much more complicated in humans than most animals because people not only support each other in fights, but also switch sides [27]. In most animals, fighting is largely a matter of assessing the power of a single opponent and knowing when to back down [28,29 � ], but assessment is much more difficult when the opponent can recruit help from other individuals [30]. An opponent who initially appears weak can suddenly multiply in strength with the arrival of a crowd of supporters. This complexity applies not only to fistfights and arrow volleys but also to verbal arguments and gossip campaigns. In the arena of human conflict, moral judgment is a powerful weapon. Accusations of wrongdoing such as lying, infidelity, or blasphemy can mobilize a mob of aggressors against an opponent. Moral condemnation turns cold shoulders toward colleagues, sends terrorists after political cartoonists, and pulls nations into costly wars. In this social environment, it is easy to see why natural selection would favor psychological adaptations for using moral judgment against opponents, and for avoiding pro- hibited actions to escape the wrath of condemners. The difficulty is understanding why an audience cares about right and wrong, and why their punishment is directed at a diverse and changing list of particular actions. Choosing sides The audience members observing a human conflict face their own challenges. Humans live in dense social net- works and individuals often have cross-cutting ties to both sides of a conflict. When both sides request support from the same person, that person will inevitably damage at least one relationship, creating a difficult choice. Further, to assess the consequences of their side-taking decisions, observers also need to evaluate how other observers will choose sides. One side-taking strategy is bandwagoning — supporting the higher-status against lower-status fighter. This tactic curries favor with the more powerful disputant and joins with others using the same strategy. However, bandwa- goning can set a dangerous precedent: higher-status in- dividuals learn that they can easily exploit lower-status individuals, creating a threat to everyone except the top of the hierarchy. A second side-taking strategy is alliance-building — supporting one’s own supporters [27,31]. By teaming www.sciencedirect.com The side-taking hypothesis for moral judgment DeScioli 25 Figure 1 coordination Third Parties (condemnation) Actor (conscience) Second Party (revenge) Current Opinion in Psychology Diagram of a strategic interaction among two disputants and multiple third-party observers who choose sides. Third parties face a problem of coordination because if they choose different sides then they each pay the costs of fighting each other. Moral judgment allows third parties to choose the same side, minimizing their own costs, by opposing the disputant who has taken the most morally wrong action. Distinct psychological mechanisms (shown in parentheses) manage each role in the game. From: DeScioli, P., & Kurzban, R. (2013). A solution to the mysteries of morality. Psychological Bulletin, 139, 477–496, APA, reprinted with permission. up, individuals can combine their power against formida- ble single opponents. However, alliances create new problems. Snyder [32] showed how forming alliances is a social dilemma similar to an arms race. Everyone forms alliances to protect against everyone else’s alliances. The result is that when conflicts occur they can quickly spread to include many supporters, creating larger and more costly fights. Moreover, when everyone supports their own allies, the sides tend to be evenly-matched and fights are more likely to escalate. Hence, alliances create a coordination problem among observers such that if they take opposing sides then they will all endure higher fighting costs. Ethnographic research shows the costly consequences of alliances, especially in small-scale societies without strong policing institutions [33–35]. Trivial squabbles can quickly expand to hundreds of people brawling as outsiders intervene to support family and friends. People in many cultures are also obligated to avenge an ally’s murder by killing their enemies, leading to endless cycles of violence [36,37]. Due to the high costs of supporting allies, evolution might have favored alternative strategies for choosing sides that allow observers, at least in some cases, to disregard their alliances and take the same side. Moral judgment as a side-taking strategy Moral judgment offers a third strategy for choosing sides [1 �� ] (see Figure 1). Observers morally judge the actions of each disputant and then side against the person who chose the most morally wrong action. If a majority of observers use this strategy, and also share the same moral rules, then they will take the same side, such as opposing a liar, thief, or blasphemer. Choosing the same side reduces observers’ fighting costs by avoiding evenly- matched, escalating disputes. Observers benefit by taking the same side because they coordinate their choices to avoid an evenly-matched and costly fight. Moreover, observers achieve coordination without empowering high-status individuals to exploit them in the future. That is, moral side-takers achieve dynamic coordination: They take the same side without always siding with the same people because their choices are based on actions rather than identities. According to the side-taking hypothesis, humans assign moral values to actions so that when conflicts occur, observers can dynamically coordinate to choose the same side. Moral judgment focuses on actions in order to create an alternative to choosing sides based on who the dis- putants are, including their statuses and relationships. Moral judgment includes an ideal of impartiality [38 �� ] for the same reason: Observers must (at least appear to) compromise their personal relationships if they are to avert divisive and escalating alliances. This is why people are sometimes willing to oppose family and friends for moral reasons. People announce and argue about moral www.sciencedirect.com judgments [39] in order to negotiate side-taking. Humans show aggression toward wrongdoers because morality is built for battle, mainly for fighting other people’s battles. Humans debate moral rules because these rules deter- mine who wins particular kinds of disputes. Moral debates are essentially meta-fights — fights over how fights will be settled. Experiments show that people advocate for the moral rules that most benefit them [40,41 � ,42,43,44 �� ]. At the same time, group members need to agree on the moral rules if they are to serve a coordination function. This is why humans are averse to moral disagreements and anxiously seek consensus about moral rules. A side-taking function allows for flexibility in the content of moral rules. From the observers’ perspective, choosing the same side as others is paramount; which side they support is less important. For example, observers can use either a rule against stealing or a rule against refusing to share, even if the two rules lead to opposite wrongdoers in a dispute over resources, as long as they agree about which rule to apply. Like all coordination games [45,46], moral judgment has multiple equilibria because alternative and opposite rules can be equally effective at synchronizing Current Opinion in Psychology 2016, 7:23–27 26 Evolutionary Psychology observers’ decisions. This flexibility allows moral rules to change over time and to vary across cultures. It also allows for destructive rules because moral judgment is designed for synchronizing side-taking rather than pro- moting welfare. Importantly, moral side-taking does not displace band- wagon or alliance strategies. Just as different moral regimes are equilibria, so too is moral side-taking only one among other equilibria for choosing sides. An indi- vidual’s best side-taking move depends on how other group members choose sides, as well as the precise costs and benefits for themselves and their family and friends [47,48 �� ]. Due to multiple equilibria, domains of social life vary in whether conflicts are resolved via hierarchy, alliances, or moral rules. Conclusions The side-taking hypothesis holds that moral judgment is a strategy for choosing sides in conflicts. Observers use moral judgment to choose the same side while also dynamically changing who they support by focusing on disputants’ actions rather than their identities. The side- taking hypothesis helps understand why people blame and punish perceived wrongdoers, why moral judgment focuses on actions rather than intended consequences, and why moral condemnation damages relationships and societies. References and recommended reading Papers of particular interest, published within the period of review, have been highlighted as: � of special interest �� of outstanding interest 1. �� DeScioli P, Kurzban R: A solution to the mysteries of morality. Psychol Bull 2013, 139:477-496. Proposes the side-taking theory for moral judgment. The paper develops the side-taking game as a model of the adaptive problem that moral cognition functions to solve. It then applies the model to explain deontic moral judgment, moralistic punishment, and moral impartiality. 2. de Waal FBM: Good Natured: The Origins of Right and Wrong in Humans and Other Animals. Harvard University Press; 1996. 3. Ridley M: The Origins of Virtue. Viking: Penguin Books; 1996. 4. Wright R: The Moral Animal. Pantheon; 1994. 5. Haidt J: The Righteous Mind. Vintage Books; 2012. 6. DeScioli P, Kurzban R: Mysteries of morality. Cognition 2009, 112:281-299. 7. Baron J, Spranca M: Protected values. Organ Behav Hum Dec 1997, 70:1-16. 8. Tetlock PE: Thinking the unthinkable: sacred values and taboo cognitions. Trends Cogn Sci 2003, 7:320-324. 9. Mikhail J: Universal moral grammar: theory, evidence and the future. Trends Cogn Sci 2007, 11:143-152. 10. Batson CD, Thompson ER: Why don’t moral people act morally? Motivational considerations. Curr Dir Psychol Sci 2001, 10:54-57. 11. Carlsmith KM, Darley JM, Robinson PH: Why do we punish? Deterrence and just deserts as motives for punishment. J Pers Soc Psychol 2002, 83:284-299. Current Opinion in Psychology 2016, 7:23–27 12. Frank RH: The Darwin Economy: Liberty, Competition, and the Common Good. Princeton University Press; 2011. 13. �� Ryan TJ: Reconsidering moral issues in politics. J Polit 2014, 76:380-397. This paper reports survey studies and finds that moral conviction incites political extremism and hostility. 14. Skitka LJ: The psychology of moral conviction. Soc Pers Psychol Compass 2010, 4:267-281. 15. Gottman JM, Silver N: The Seven Principles for Making Marriage Work. Random House; 1999. 16. Atran S: Talking to the Enemy: Faith, Brotherhood, and the (Un)Making of Terrorists. HarperCollins; 2010. 17. FBI: Hate Crime Statistics. 2012 http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ ucr/hate-crime/2012. 18. Marlatt GA, Larimer ME, Witkiewitz K (Eds): Harm Reduction: Pragmatic Strategies for Managing High-Risk Behaviors. Guilford Press; 2011. 19. Singer P: The Real Abortion Tragedy. Project Syndicate; 2012 http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/ the-real-abortion-tragedy-by-peter-singer. 20. Turiel E: The development of morality. In Handbook of Child Psychology: Social, Emotional, and Personality Development, vol 3. Edited by Damon W, Eisenberg N. Wiley; 1998:863-932. 21. Sunstein C: Moral heuristics. Behav Brain Sci 2005, 28:531-543. 22. Gigerenzer G: Gut Feelings: The Intelligence of the Unconscious. Viking Press; 2007. 23. � Kurzban R, DeScioli P, Fein D: Hamilton vs Kant: pitting adaptations for altruism against adaptations for moral judgment. Evol Hum Behav 2012, 33:323-333. Experiments examine judgments about moral dilemmas to test whether deontic moral rules function as simple heuristics for altruism. The results contradict the altruism-heuristic hypothesis: participants report greater willingness to kill a brother to save five brothers, compared to killing a stranger to save five strangers. 24. DeScioli P, Christner J, Kurzban R: The omission strategy. Psychol Sci 2011, 22:442-446. 25. DeScioli P, Asao K, Kurzban R: Omissions and byproducts across moral domains. PLoS ONE 2012, 7:e46963. 26. DeScioli P, Bruening R, Kurzban R: The omission effect in moral cognition: toward a functional explanation. Evol Hum Behav 2011, 32:204-215. 27. DeScioli P, Kurzban R: The alliance hypothesis for human friendship. PLoS ONE 2009, 4:e5802. 28. Arnott G, Elwood RW: Assessment of fighting ability in animal contests. Anim Behav 2009, 77:991-1004. 29. � Pietraszewski D, Shaw A: Not by strength alone. Hum Nature-Int Bios 2015, 26:44-72. This paper uses scenario studies to examine children’s inferences about power and alliances in conflicts. 30. 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Choosing sides Moral judgment as a side-taking strategy Conclusions References and recommended reading 
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work_q7xrig5mrjaxhaf5fdx4msumte	----	GUEST EDITORIAL Oak Creek Killings: The Denial of a Culture of Oppression Balbinder Singh Bhogal Published online: 2 October 2012 # Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2012 Force without justice is tyrannical. Justice without force is gainsaid, because there are always offenders; force without justice is condemned. It is necessary then to combine justice and force; and for this end make what is just strong, or what is strong just. And thus being unable to make what is just strong, we have made what is strong just. (Blaise Pascal, Pensées et opuscules, 1670, frag. 298) It is unfortunate that attacks of such horror and devastation are reported on without any critique of how the wider culture in which they occur is itself culpable. The media, itself conditioned by and conditioning of that wider culture, time and time again lay the blame at the feet of the figure of the lone criminal, by means of which the culture and society at large are relieved of any need for cross-examination, let alone personal introspection. The recent shootings at the Oak Creek Gurdwara in Wisconsin, however, sadly cannot be reduced to individual pathology. In its targeting of a community at their place of worship, this tragic event points to an unacknowledged culture of modern (religio-secular) conditioning that implicates state power, media power and intellec- tual power.The State would like us to believe such incidents are a 'tragic shooting' (Barak Obama) and an act of 'senseless violence' (Mit Romney), as though this event is merely a blip in an otherwise trouble-free space and history of secular liberal democracy. But what we know as secular modernity is in crisis, and the cracks in the wall make increasingly apparent the weak foundations upon which it is based: the domination of others through the violence of colonialism, imperialism and neo- colonialism. It is this very foundation that becomes visible in the actions of individ- uals and groups who feel emboldened to kill as a righteous activity. Indeed, of recent mass shootings, the Oak Creek tragedy instigated by Wade Page bears poignant SOPHIA (2012) 51:335–339 DOI 10.1007/s11841-012-0342-0 B. S. Bhogal (*) Hofstra University, Hempstead, NY, USA e-mail: balbinder.bhogal@hofstra.edu parallels to the rampage of the Norwegian white supremacist Anders Breivik, whose motive was ‘self-defense’ because he felt under siege by multiculturalism and Muslims. The 33-year-old Breivik had the audacity to plead ‘not guilty,’ and after a ten-week trial, he recently received a 21-year sentence for killing 77 people. But what in our Western, liberal, modern culture allows Breivik to adopt such an unrepentant tone? The comparison of these two events, however, should not stop short with the biographies of disaffected individuals, but rather tackle the larger and more fundamental crisis that afflicts us all − the crisis of modern religio-secularity that has been historically formed by a systemic privileging of whiteness. Nor can the Oak Creek event be reduced to the next chapter in 9/11 fall out. After the murder of Balbir Singh Sodhi in Phoenix on 15 September 2001, whom his attackers presumed was an al-Qaeda sympathizer on account of his beard and turban, many in the Sikh community sought to educate the American public that ‘Sikhs are not Muslims’. This distancing of oneself from the other (‘we are not like them’) was both callous in its further stigmatization of Islam as blameworthy and contrary to Sikh ethics and traditions that rest on principles of equality and inclusivity as exemplified by the teachings of the Sikh Gurus. (Even the briefest of examinations of the Guru Granth Sahib points to the Gurus’ ethical stance in relation to the other and the marginal as seen in their inclusion of non-Sikh saints of higher and lower castes, their denial of elite languages in favor of the vernacular, and their defense of the right to practice different religious traditions and of women’s equality.) Hence, while under- standable as a strategy of self-defense, the blaming of American ignorance of religious diversity (such that Balbir Singh Sodhi’s murder was reduced to a case of mistaken identity) was an all too convenient scapegoat for it failed to examine the current history of minorities being attacked for simply being different. Sikhs are attacked for being Sikh, for being a minority just like Muslims and a whole host of others (Blacks, Latinos, South and East Asians, Indigenous Indians, Aboriginal peoples, women, the LGBTQ communities, Occupy protestors, etc.). The events of 11 September 2001 are irrelevant to these attacks, for such targeting of minority communities has occurred well before and after that date and continues to occur. The particular history of anti-Sikh violence in the US can be traced back to the riots in Bellingham, Washington (1907) and Live Oak, California (1908), where Sikhs, taunted as ‘rag heads,’ were hounded and driven out from the city borders by an angry white ‘mob of 500 men and boys’ proud to have ‘cleansed the city of the Sikhs’ (Bellingham Morning Reveille). As such, the killings of Sikhs at Oak Creek are better understood as the most recent in a long history of Western subjugation of non-white (non-heterosexual male) communities, bringing to the fore the continued injustices of a neo-colonial global- ized economy dominated by the Euro-American West. The issue here is that differ- ence is primarily defined in terms of not being part of a white mainstream culture whose Christian roots have more recently become masked by the rhetoric of a liberal secularism. The answer is not to ‘keep the religion, drop the turban and beard,’ because it is precisely this ‘secular-liberal’ demand that sanctions the persistence of intolerance and hate. The demand eschews a legacy of racist attacks that has long been seen as legitimate social behavior from a white worldview. Nor should this event be reduced to yet more fodder for the gratuitous, intermi- nable and polarized debates (whether regarding religion vs. secularity, tradition vs. 336 B.S. Bhogal modernity or guns vs. no-guns). This is not only a call for decency and respect for the victims and their families, but more urgently it is a call that public debate not sidestep the roots of the problem. Violence and hate are not dependent upon guns, and hate crimes would continue even if all the guns in the world were banned. To respond to the recent murders only in terms of the desirability or otherwise of gun ownership is not only far too simplistic, but also part of the problem, for it perpetuates the notion that a solution is easy and therefore obviates the difficulty of societal self-reflection. The Huffington Post reports that just minutes after the news of this horrific tragedy,a tweet from the Westboro Baptist Church read, ‘God sent another shooter?’ (Margie J. Phelps) and then ‘Beautiful work of an angry God who told Wisconsin to keep their filthy hands off his people (WBC)!’ (Fred Phelps Jr). If our goal in discussing such events is to understand why they happen, we cannot afford to simply slate both the shooter and his ideological supporters as suffering from ‘fringe madness’ or being mere ‘ignorant idiots.’ What if ‘fringe’ racism is actually an integral part of the mainstream? The structures that mask and reinterpret systemic whiteness create a culture of invisibility that works to cast the gaze of suspicion on all those who are visibly different. How many in our society see blacks in the way Zimmerman viewed Trayvon Martin? How many frame Asians (like Page and Breivik) and Latinos (like those vigilantes who patrol the southern US border)? How many view the other as an outsider with an unthought suspicion that already legitimizes a level of violence and righteousness in equal measure? If these views are recognized as societally embedded, then we must ask what the trajectory is from which this asymmetrical colonial/historical difference has emerged – one that ensures the place of Euro-Americans as top dog? If one recalls that by the 1930s Europe had colonized 84.6 % of the land surface of the entire globe (Loomba 1988), one cannot but begin to question the extent of the hegemony and homogeneity of this ‘modern/colonial world system’ of the Western ‘first world’ (Mignolo 2000, 2011). As others from the Global South (Latin America, Asia and Africa) have argued, we need to reflect on what the colonial or historical difference is (Dussel 1996; Chakrabarty 2000; Mandair 2009) if we are serious in our analysis of the present, which is more than ever bifurcated by the oppression from the privileged and the exploitation of the marginalized. It is crucial to discover how secularity itself is inseparable from the religious culture out of which it emerged, just as modernity is constitutionally imbricated in colonialism. Sikhs are not strangers to state-sponsored and orchestrated violence. Indeed, the fact that this shooting happened in a Gurdwara cannot but bring to mind the brutal desecration of the Akal Takht and the Harimandir Sahib by the Indian army in 1984 where thousands of innocent civilians were massacred. Given that the recent events at Oak Creek Gurdwara echo this collective trauma of 1984, there is then a peculiar sensitivity required in reflecting upon this horrific event and a renewed and desperate need to ask difficult and searching questions. The Sikh community needs to resist the rush to placate social anxieties, as this is exactly how the secular state seeks to domesticate their political voice by co-opting it to a passive religio-secular liberalism. The persistent denial of the colonial foundations of modernity reinscribes a tragically uneducated view that the difference between developed and underdeveloped, first world and third world, north and the global south, the west and the rest, the super- powers and the powerless is somehow natural, cultural or civilizational – rather than the direct result of the violent epistemic and economic colonial and imperial projects Oak Creek Killings: The Denial of a Culture of Oppression 337 of the Euro-American West. Though the language of civilized vs. barbaric may no longer be in vogue given the influence of cultural relativism, the colonial mindset resurfaces in the distinction drawn between secular rational moderns and irrational religious primitives. This latter secular/religious distinction gained currency in the nineteenth century as European colonial powers classified their colonized subjects according to a newly constructed notion of religion as a general and universally applicable concept. Popula- tions were organized and disciplined under the new nomenclature of Hinduism, Buddhism, Jainism, Sikhism, etc., from the vantage of a colonial epistemic gaze that simultaneously and exclusively reserved for European Christians a critical secular consciousness. Where colonizers were political rational agents, the colonized were perceived through the lens of irrational religious emotion, unable to think ‘critically’ or ‘historically’ given their attachment to ‘myth’, ‘ritual’, ‘fantastic speculation’ and ‘superstition.’ An active recognition of this colonial legacy necessitates alternative modes of political engagement that relinquish the dominant knowledge/power of the secular west. It is through the institutionalization (via discourses of ‘religions’ and ‘religious plurality,’ ‘multiculturalism’ and ‘cultural diversity,’ ‘historical periods’ and ‘rational civilizations’) that the denial of the West’s modern secular colonial culture of oppression and hate becomes normalized. The Global South of Latin America, Africa and Asia has only been allowed to ‘enter’ the West via a horizontal rhetoric of inclusivity, plurality and diversity. They have not been able to ‘engage as equals’ from the standpoint of their own epistemic and economic centers, for Western Euro-American culture has violently claimed for itself the voice of universal enunciation and value. The consequence is that white supremacy from above (institutional power) maintains the vertical hierarchy of the historical/colonial difference as foundational, which bursts with alarming and horri- fying frequency in white supremacy from below (populist movements of hate). If it is the case (according to Sahil Bhatia’s ‘Peter King Must Go’ article in Foreign Policy 10 August 2012) that domestic terrorist attacks are more likely to be perpetrated by ‘white supremacist lone wolves’ than Islamic extremists, then only the colonial/ historical difference begins to explain why only the latter is pursued as an organization and movement and the former as acts of ‘senseless individuals’ gone AWOL. The hierarchical forms of power that are constituted by the colonial/historical difference need to be explored if we are not to elide this insidious racist disease of always translating the other from the perspective of the modern Western neo-liberal ‘first world.’ We need to discover a way of translating the others’ difference that allows for the possibility of seeing in their very difference a revelatory voice. We need to seek a new frame of cultural comparativity where one’s difference is not perceived to be a threat or a virus but precisely that which enhances the whole that remains invisible otherwise. The haunting irony in this Oak Creek tragedy is that this is exactly what the Sikh Gurus achieved; their writings reflect a truth that is commu- nicated through multiple voices, languages, castes and diverse religious traditions. To be a Sikh one needs the other to be different. A Sikh’s own self-definition includes the other, because only together as a heterogeneous group do we get to glimpse the diversity of existence as a gift. Justice without force is gainsaid, because there are always offenders. Collectively, then, we should embark on the project to make what is just strong and combine justice 338 B.S. Bhogal with force. Or is this a project that we are simply unable to do? The history of the Sikh Gurus begs to differ. As the Sikh Gurus advised, we should fear none and inspire none to fear, love the other and serve the other, learn from all and protect the other – even die for the other. But they also taught Sikhs to discipline or uproot those that persistently hate, pollute and tear apart life’s fabric. This ethical call is not only to be answered by a state scrutiny of white supremacist groups, but also of the structures, programs, laws, parties and state, academic and media institutions that profess tolerance but consciously or subconsciously provide cover and/or support for such groups. Particular crimes, and the wider discourses of hate that legitimate them, need challenging and dismantling – otherwise, we are all complicit in aiding the unjust to gain strength and maintain power over the just. References Chakrabarty, D. (2000). Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial thought and historical difference. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press. Dussel, E. (1996). Underside of modernity: Apel, Ricoeur, Rorty, Taylor, and the philosophy of liberation. New York, NY: Humanities Press. Loomba, A. (1988). Colonialism/postcolonialism. London and New York: Routledge. Mandair, A. (2009). Religion and the specter of the west: Sikhism, India, postcoloniality and the politics of translation. New York: Columbia University Press. Mignolo, W. (2000). Local histories/global designs: Coloniality, subaltern knowledges, and border thinking. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Mignolo, W. (2011). The darker side of western modernity: Global futures, decolonial options. Duke University Press. Oak Creek Killings: The Denial of a Culture of Oppression 339 Oak Creek Killings: The Denial of a Culture of Oppression References 
work_qajmwcepljfw3fppzqgeu7r7h4	----	1 This is the authors’ accepted manuscript. The final published version of this work (the version of record) is published by Emerald Insight in Safer Communities in September 2017 available at: https://doi.org/10.1108/SC-05-2017-0020. This work is made available online in accordance with the publisher's policies. Please refer to any applicable terms of use of the publisher. Racism, Prevent and education: insisting on an open space Joanna Haynes, Plymouth Institute of Education joanna.haynes@plymouth.ac.uk Rowena Passy, Plymouth Institute of Education R.Passy@plymouth.ac.uk Abstract In this article we first discuss the Brexit referendum and its links to changes in the nature of racism in England, drawing on Burnett’s (2013) work to demonstrate how ‘local conditions, national politics and global conditions’ have prompted violent racism in new areas of the country. Within this atmosphere of heightened tension, anti-Muslim abuse and attacks have risen over the past two years, with a proportion of these incidents taking place in universities. We then examine the implications of the counter-terrorist Prevent agenda, arguing that educators’ statutory duty to ‘have due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism’ is in considerable tension with the university statutory duty to uphold freedom of speech/academic freedom; this ‘duty of care’ effectively requires university staff to act as agents of the state. We argue that this threatens to damage trust between staff and students, restrict critical enquiry and limit discussion, particularly in the current circumstances of sector insecurity that have arisen from a combination of neoliberal policies and falling student numbers. We then examine disturbing trends that characterise students as vulnerable and university life as potentially damaging to well-being, and how these link to anti-extremism dialogue that is expressed in epidemiological and therapeutic language; the vulnerable are framed pathologically, as ‘at risk’ of radicalisation. Developing the argument on how these conditions present a threat to freedom of speech/academic freedom, in the final section we argue that universities must keep spaces open for uncertainty, controversy and disagreement. Introduction This article arises from the Brexit: Crime, Justice and Society conference held at Plymouth University in April 2017. The reaction to the presentation, in which delegates showed a deep interest in the issues we were raising, together with the invitation to contribute to this Special Issue, encouraged us to write this position piece in the short time available. In what follows we have further developed our initial ideas about the connections between Brexit, racism, the Prevent agenda, discourses around student vulnerability, and their effects on higher education. https://doi.org/10.1108/SC-05-2017-0020 mailto:joanna.haynes@plymouth.ac.uk mailto:R.Passy@plymouth.ac.uk 2 Context: the times we’re in The Brexit referendum in June 2016 appeared to unleash a renewed polarisation within British society, seen particularly in an ‘emboldened’ and ‘celebratory’ racism (Bagguley cited in Kaheeli, 2016) that framed immigrants and refugees as the enemy that needs to be expelled or kept out of Britain. While the rise of such views from (often) the political far right can also be seen in Europe (Chakelian, 2017), British media reports at the time of the referendum showed a spike in racism and hate crime (e.g. Chakrabortty, 2016; Kaheeli, 2016; Versi, 2016), and this was supported by subsequent analysis of crime statistics that demonstrated an increase of 41 per cent in incidents of racist or religious abuse in the month following the vote (BBC, 2016). Such reports need to be treated with caution, but it was notable that the Brexit campaign included considerable racist and xenophobic rhetoric, which presents the possibility that the referendum was a kind of ‘trigger’ event that can ‘galvanise tensions and sentiments’ (Awan & Zempi, 2015, p.9) against those who seemingly have a different heritage. More cautiously, perhaps, Ford and Goodwin (2017) argue that the campaign stimulated a ‘high-profile and deeply polarizing debate’ over issues such as identity, nationalism, social values and social change (p.28) and that it ‘exposed and deepened a … set of cleavages that are largely cultural’ (p.29). These views of divisions within British society may partially be explained by Bagguley’s (2016) suggestion that, over the last decade, a central part of anti-European Union discourse in the British media has been a sense that Britons are different to other Europeans, and that this has given rise to a generalised type of racism that is aimed at those who are perceived to be outside the category of ‘white English’ (cited in Kaheeli, 2016). However Sivanandan (1989 cited in Taras, 2013, p.422) comments that … racism never stands still. It changes shape, size, contours, purpose, function, with changes in the economy, the social structure, the system and, above all, the challenges, the resistances, to that system (Sivanandan, 1989 cited in Taras, 2013, p.422). Burnett (2013) argues that violent racism has been ‘spreading’ from major cities in the UK to areas that previously had no such history (p.3), and that this needs to be understood in terms of the interaction between ‘local realities, national politics and global conditions’ (p.4). He contends that demographic changes, in which ‘new’ migrants find themselves in cities or areas that until recently have had a majority white British population, have resulted in racist attacks against asylum seekers, migrant workers and international students. More established communities, such as Muslims, have also been targeted, largely through hostility generated by the so-called ‘war on terror’. He suggests that that ideas of multiculturalism undermining national identity, of Britain becoming overwhelmed by migration, and of migrants’ perceived responsibility for local economic difficulties have taken hold in the media, thereby legitimising the core racist, anti-immigration messages of the political far right. He argues that in response, more mainstream political parties have competed to demonstrate their strength on issues connected to asylum, immigration and race, which has 3 deepened hostility around these issues. And, since 2010, austerity politics have widened economic inequalities within and between localities, and have reduced the number of, and available expertise in, advice and support centres around the country for those targeted by racist abuse. This has left individuals, including students, and families isolated and vulnerable, without access to the type of established support structure that have been developed over years within larger, industrial cities that experienced earlier waves of immigration (Burnett, 2013, pp.4-6). Within this environment of heightened fear and tension, the organisation Tell MAMA (2016) reports that incidents of anti-Muslim abuse and attacks in public areas of the UK rose by over 300 per cent in 2014/5, with women disproportionately targeted. Their findings are supported by a recent Taskforce report on hate crime in universities (UUK, 2016), which demonstrates that Muslim women are particularly likely to experience hate crime on campus: Evidence submitted to the Taskforce suggested that a rise in religious and race hate crime, exacerbated by a wider climate of anti-Muslim hate crime and harassment, means that female Muslim students are at greater risk of attacks. The NUS Black Students’ Campaign also stated that ‘72% of Muslim women have experienced verbal abuse and threatening behaviour relating directly to their visible Muslim presence’ (UUK, 2016, p.26). Solutions for the Taskforce lie in reporting, supporting and monitoring systems within individual universities, with an emphasis on the ‘duty of care’ within higher education institutions (HEIs). It is important to remember, however, that one important aspect of any university’s duty of care stems from the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act (HM Government, 2015a, Section 26) which, since September 2015 and as part of the ‘Prevent’ counter-terrorist agenda, has placed a statutory duty on UK universities to ‘have due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism’. The Prevent agenda has been controversial from its instigation; as part of the government’s counter-terrorism strategy, launched originally in 2007 in response to the 2005 terrorist bombings in London, it was initially widely criticised for the lack of clarity in its aims, and for its divisive effects both between Muslim and other communities and within the different Muslim communities in Britain (e.g. Kundnani, 2009; Thomas, 2010, 2017). Following a review under the Coalition government (HM Government, 2011) the current iteration has presented university frontline staff with a difficult situation in which they are ‘‘responsibilised’ for spotting radicalisation’ (Thomas, 2017, p.315) while upholding the other statutory duty to promote academic freedom and freedom of speech. In the following sections, we examine these two duties and the tensions between them, arguing that this creates distinctive issues for the higher education sector. We then explore the idea of student vulnerability, both in terms of the narrative of the contemporary student and the student ‘at risk’, contextualising these tensions in the wider climate of an 4 increasingly marketised higher education environment. We argue that, despite the potential difficulties of creating and maintaining an environment conducive to discussion and deliberation, this conjuncture provides new opportunities to sustain the open and dialogical space that should characterise good quality higher education. Policy and precariousness: insecurities within the academic community The HEI Guidance to the Prevent legislation (HM Government, 2015b, p.5) states that governmental concern about students’ potential to be drawn into terrorism includes ‘not just violent extremism but also non-violent extremism, which can create an atmosphere conducive to terrorism and can popularise views which terrorists exploit’. The details of how and what to identify, however, are left unspecified in the Guidance, other than noticing ‘changes in [students’] behaviour or outlook’ (HM Government, 2015b, p.4), while the extremism in a more general Guidance publication is defined as ‘vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs’ (HM Government, 2015c, p.2). The whole gives the impression of a porous set of ideas about what might constitute extremism (of any kind) and how it could be identified, leaving higher education institution (HEI) staff positioned as important frontline staff against the threat of terrorism but with an uncertain conceptual or practical framework within which to carry out these duties. It is noticeable in this context that the university statutory duty to uphold freedom of speech/academic freedom is mentioned in passing in these documents. In the HEI Guidance, for instance, upholding these freedoms is mentioned only in relation to the question of inviting external speakers, suggesting that HEIs should ‘consider carefully whether the views being expressed, or likely to be expressed, constitute extremist views that risk drawing people into terrorism or are shared by terrorist groups’ (HM Government 2015b, p.4). However, Saeed and Johnson (2016, p.40) suggest that the Prevent-related duty of care ‘trumps the possibility’ of academic freedom in practice. They argue that the duty of care relating to extremism is ‘in direct contradiction’ to the Education Reform Act of 1988, which states the importance of ensuring that academic staff have the freedom to test received wisdom, put forward new and controversial ideas or unpopular opinions ‘without placing themselves in jeopardy of losing their jobs or privileges they may have at their institutions’ (HM Government, 1989, cited in Saeed & Johnson, 2016, p.40). In a burgeoning body of critical literature relating to the Prevent legislation and agenda, a number of commentators (e.g. McGovern, 2016; O’Donnell, 2016a; Thomas, 2017) have argued that the Prevent strategy amounts to HEI staff being charged with the responsibility of identifying and reporting on people who have committed no crime and who may (or may not) be currently involved in some kind of ‘non-violent extremism’, or who may potentially be involved in some kind of extremism or terrorism in the future. These authors suggest that placing this duty of care within the realms of pre-crime – rather than committed crime – has profound implications for both staff and students. Neither of these groups can be certain about the boundaries of what it is acceptable to say within the context of their work and 5 study, and both O’Donnell (2016a) and McGovern (2016) argue that this uncertainty, together with the positioning of HEI staff effectively as agents of the state, will have the consequence of destroying trust, restricting inquiry and limiting discussion. Indeed, researchers are beginning to find that Religious Education initial teacher education students are limiting their engagement with issues related to racism, culture and faith (Elton-Chalcraft et al, 2017) and that Muslim students are self-censoring because of the environment of mistrust within their HEIs (Saeed & Johnson, 2016). This early research demonstrates the practical difficulty of balancing the duty of upholding freedom of speech/academic freedom with the duty of care to students and staff, and seems to support Saeed and Johnson’s view that the duty of care trumps that of upholding freedom of speech. But it also gives rise to questions about the prevalent conditions within HEIs that can – and do – influence staff and student responses. McGovern (2016) argues universities are becoming increasingly risk-averse as neoliberal policies of marketisation and privatisation have shifted towards HEIs, and that the Prevent agenda will deepen what he refers to as ‘cultures of compliance’ (2016, p.49). We agree, and suggest that some of the symptoms of neoliberal policies experienced by schools in England and elsewhere are now spreading to the HEI sector; just as choice, competition and privatisation in the school sector have led to new forms of accountability to state, school managers, parents and pupils (Passy, 2013), so universities are discovering the implications of developing and implementing marketing strategies, of the impact of so-called ‘league tables’ and of providing government-required, publicly accessible data on such issues as student employability. These include increasing amounts of time spent on bureaucratic procedures such as lesson planning; different kinds of pupil data and teacher performance data in schools are reflected in university requirements that staff monitor student attendance, collect data around teaching quality (increasingly so in anticipation of the Teaching Excellence Framework) and cope with complex information technology systems that are aimed at making all processes visible and accessible. While none of this is necessarily a bad thing per se, the amounts of time involved sap energy (e.g. NASUWT, 2016; NUT, 2014) that would be more productively harnessed to, for instance, creative mediation of the two potentially conflicting duties discussed above. At the same time, universities are also experiencing a collective insecurity on a number of different levels. First the so-called demographic dip, in which fewer young people in the country mean a diminished number of potential students (Fazackerly, 2017), coupled with fears relating to fewer permitted international students as a means of reducing government- imposed levels of immigration (Foster, 2017) and the repercussions of Brexit on student numbers, are causing HEIs across the country to reduce staffing levels, sometimes drastically (Pidd, 2017). This institutional insecurity is mirrored in university staff, who are rightly concerned about the uncertainty of their employment, and in university students, who are no longer guaranteed a smooth passage from university to graduate-level jobs (Brown et al, 2011; Standing, 2015), giving rise to a kind of collective anxiety in which it is simply easier to keep one’s head down rather than open up possible avenues for controversy or discord. 6 We argue that most people need an element of security in order to function as confident, independent thinkers who are unafraid of taking possible risks, whether they are university staff – who need to create an atmosphere of trust in which all are free to question, to discuss controversial topics and to be uncertain about knowledge, and who have the responsibility to carry out research on controversial or unpopular issues – or students, who need to feel secure enough to participate in potentially risky discussions without jeopardising their marks or prompting greater surveillance of their actions. This combination of increased workload and an insecure academic community, when taken in the context of the social and political trends discussed in the first part of this article, are precisely the conditions in which the inherent tensions between the duty to uphold freedom of speech/academic freedom and the Prevent-related duty of care can become magnified. In addition any ‘cultures of compliance’ (McGovern, 2016, p.49) can become more pronounced. The issue is given further complexity by individual universities’ approach to implementing the Prevent-related duty of care, exemplified by Olohan et al’s (2015) presentation at a Universities UK Prevent conference, in which they examine the tensions between the different agendas of the different agencies involved in Prevent in HEIs. The central question for this presentation is who leads the implementation process: if led by university security, the authors argue that the process will focus primarily on security; if led by registry, they claim it will focus on compliance; if led by student services, they suggest it will focus on safeguarding and community cohesion. This potentially brings in new levels of institutional uncertainty and adds a further layer of ambiguity around the working relationships between students and HEI staff. In the following section, we consider shifts in these relationships by examining discourses around student welfare, the practices that they engender, and how staff and students are positioned within these discourses. We then discuss the implications for staff and student critical engagement in HEIs. Care and concern in the ‘total’ university community As student bodies have become more diverse in terms of age and background over the past 30 years or so, and as students have increasingly managed their studies alongside other roles such as carers and workers, HEIs have had to reconsider the role and extent of student support (Jacklin & le Riche, 2009). The variety and complexity of students’ lives, in which they balance such demands within a competitive and precarious economic climate, have shifted the terms of relationships between students and academic staff. There are growing pressures for staff to be more aware of, and to address any additional pressures on students, particularly as they have become consumers of higher education and are accumulating large debts in order to complete their studies. Within this context, we suggest that academics are increasingly positioned as providers of ‘extra’ care, not only from the Prevent-related duty discussed above, but also from the wider case that is currently being made – with growing purchase – that student wellbeing in general, and their mental health in particular, is a cause for wider concern. Statistics indicate that the percentage of the student 7 population affected is small, at 0.8 per cent in total in 2013 (UUK, 2015, p.5), but 27 per cent of students responding to a recent survey reported that they had experienced a mental health condition while at university, with depression and anxiety the most frequently cited (YouGov UK, 2016). More recently Marsh (2017) reports on the rapidly increasing dropout rate of university students on grounds of poor mental health, citing the Higher Education Statistics Agency finding of 1,180 students experiencing mental health problems and leaving university early in 2014/5, a rise of 21 per cent on figures for 2009/10. Marsh also reports a large rise in the numbers of students seeking counselling, and draws on quotations from former health minister Norman Lamb to underscore the sense of increased pressure on university counselling services as an unfolding crisis. What is particularly pertinent for this paper, in terms of the positioning of students as vulnerable and in need of protection and of academics as needing to be alert to students’ mental health, is the reported view of a student health GP cited in the article: Dominique Thompson, a student health GP, said she feared students could be leaving early as they struggled to cope with the gulf between school teaching and university education (Marsh, 2017). What is the ‘gulf’ to which this article alludes? A Universities UK report attributes the growth in mental health issues in part to student life being a time of greater transition, change, encounters with different cultures and financial strain (UUK, 2015). We believe that it is important to recognise the particular pressures on the current generation of students. It is also vital to examine how a particular narrative of stress might lead to overly pessimistic conclusions about students’ general wellbeing and capacity to engage with university learning. While it is evident that the enormous burden of debt on students is growing and financial constraints are exerting different kinds of pressures, the notion of encounter with change and difference as a ‘risk factor’ in mental wellbeing is contestable. To contest this view is not to question the provision of good services to students with mental health issues, nor the accuracy of the reported increase of such conditions. However, the notion of such a ‘gulf’ and problematic encounter with the new is at odds with the idea of university education as adult education; as an opportunity for broadening of intellectual and social horizons, and finding a way in the world in dialogue with others. Appearing to characterise students as mentally fragile and generally insecure can be a powerful (and probably unhelpful) framework for those starting or engaged in university studies. Positioning students as (young) people who need ever higher levels of guidance and oversight also suggests that all staff should be fully alert to the ‘signs’ of potential vulnerability and know what course of action to take, thereby indicating expectations about the kinds of services available in the university community. The same GP cited in Marsh’s (2017) article discussed above suggests that the solution lies in providing increased access to relevant study skills, alongside a wide range of mental health and wellbeing options; a kind of supermarket of total services. While we are not denying the importance of these services, we are arguing that notions of student fragility and of university life as ‘dangerous’ 8 present a wider threat to academic freedom and open discourse that are historically at the core of university education. This is a situation perhaps unwittingly exacerbated by the accountability measures taken by HEI staff to demonstrate students’ satisfactory engagement with their studies, which Macfarlane (2015) argues reduces student autonomy and freedom, and has a negative effect on students’ rights and capacity … to choose how to use study time, to learn as individuals, to speak or be reticent, and to develop their own ideas and values (Macfarlane, 2015, p.339). It is important to recognise how this wider narrative of stress and vulnerability, if accepted without question, shapes epistemic relations in the university setting. If student fragility is placed in the foreground of academics’ concerns, it has the potential to have negative effects on the ways in which they regard students in their capacities as knowers. The so-called and generalised ‘vulnerability’ of young people and of students to new and different knowledges, and the powerful emotions that they might arouse, appears to have become deeply embedded in the discourses and culture of education, including in the Prevent policies discussed above. The idea of radicalism itself has become tainted with implications of psychological imbalance and disconnected from the search for new ideas to address social and worldly ills. We could say that it is a concept that has been appropriated (Sukarieh & Tannock, 2016). O’Donnell (2016b) suggests this results in a silencing of dissent, and she questions the ways in which anti-extremism discourse is expressed in epidemiological and therapeutic language: the ‘vulnerable’ are framed pathologically, as ‘at risk’ of radicalisation. Such ‘vulnerability’ has an elusive quality, as it refers to a future potential risk, rather than a tangible and present danger. Extremist ideas are portrayed as highly contagious viruses that spread easily and take hold; students and young people, particularly from Muslim communities, are regarded as more likely to be ‘infected’. The vulnerable student is characterised as a diminished subject, whose capacity to resist infection, now or in the future, is reduced by virtue of youth, instability, or religious and cultural association. O’Donnell argues that Prevent constitutes a pedagogical and epistemic injustice, by denying credibility to those who contest it and by constructing racialized frameworks that present Muslims as routinely suspect. Muslim students, and others, are subjected not only to stereotyping, but are further denied credibility or the capacity for political dissent, on the grounds of that stereotyped identity. She also argues that Prevent is anti-educational because it ‘securitises’ education (2016a, p.2); by framing the Prevent duty of care as safeguarding the community, academics are positioned not only as guardians and protectors, responsible for identifying the ‘symptoms’ of vulnerability, but also in the frontline of intelligence gathering. It is easy to see how such framing might lead to self-censorship and silencing, and contribute towards a wider climate of anxiety, distrust and suspicion between students and staff. In his review of Prevent policy enactment in schools and FE colleges, Thomas (2017) argues that readings of its enactment have to be carefully nuanced and take into account the 9 ‘engaged contestation’ (2017, p.306) by, for example, front line professionals, Muslim organisations and trade unions. Thomas argues ‘the day-to-day lived reality of educational experience can often look and feel significantly different from the picture painted in elite-level policy discourse, thanks to the ways that ground-level institutions like schools interpret and ‘enact’ these top-down policy strictures’ (2017, p.311). There is clear opposition to the Prevent agenda from education unions (e.g. UCU, 2015), Muslim organisations such as the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB, 2015) and, as we have seen above, from members of the academic community. All argue that the policy discriminates against Muslims and that it stifles freedom of speech. The distinctive space of dissension at Prevent’s ground level enactment in higher education policy contexts post-Brexit, together with the responses of academics and of student societies and unions, are issues that we argue require further research. As a preliminary, this paper has mapped out some of the prevailing policy strictures and discourses. In order to stay in business, universities are competing for students, and the competition is intense (Doward & Ratcliffe, 2016). The expansion of the HE sector has taken place under the banner of widening participation and upward social mobility. Marketing departments are driven by the need to portray a distinctive experience for students: a ‘total’ and good value package for money that will manage not only the ‘delivery’ of academic courses, but housing, health and well-being, employability and a bright future. In this new culture of extra care in universities, pastoral relationships between academics and students are increasingly imbued with a marketised version of the ‘student experience’, with promises of active participation, success and upward social progress. Academics, already worried about their job security, are expected to micro-manage this student experience, arguably drawing their energies and attention away from the core activities of teaching and research. It is important to note these features of the higher education market, and the additional uncertainty Brexit has created for European and international students and staff. At the same time, the political climate is a rapidly changing and fluid one, and the challenge to neo-liberal values appears to be gaining momentum, including in relation to higher education in the UK, where we have recently seen calls to account for vice chancellors’ levels of pay (Adams, 2017) and for the abolition of student fees (Mason, 2017) and mitigation of student debts (Walker, 2017). On the other hand, in a speech on delivering value for taxpayers and students, Jo Johnson, the current Minister of State for Universities, Science, Research and Innovation, has suggested students would get better value for money through the introduction of (neo-liberal) contracts between students and universities that specify the details of their university education (Johnson, 2017). In the light of this dispute over policy and the political fluidity of Brexit negotiations, Thomas’s (2017) call to closely observe and note contestation and ground level enactment of policy seems particularly pertinent and well advised. In the following section, we turn to consideration of ground level responses and pedagogies that might offer holding grounds or antidotes to the kind of insecurities that are circulating. Critical engagement in higher education 10 The creation of ‘safe spaces’ in higher education is important for critical engagement with sensitive and controversial topics, including those associated with Prevent. However it is also a troublesome idea because there is always a tension between maintaining students’ confidence and willingness to explore difficult ideas and the rights of tutors and students to challenge each others’ beliefs and views, and the idea of what constitutes a safe space is contested. This has recently provoked considerable public debate in the press. On the one hand former NUS president Malia Bouattia defends the policy of ‘no platform’ for racist, xenophobic and homophobic speakers on campus, arguing that the policy is necessary to preserve safe spaces on campus, where students are free from threat or intimidation (Bulman, 2016). On the other hand, this particular interpretation of safe spaces has been attacked in the House of Commons by UK Prime Minister Theresa May as undermining not only free speech but also posing a threat to innovation in the interests of social and economic progress. May describes freedom of expression as a fundamental British value (Mason, 2016). However, the same government is responsible for the Prevent legislation and guidance around that legislation, offering – at best – mixed messages about how to enact that freedom of expression. There is the risk that silence, avoidance, overreaction or tension are increasingly likely as staff and students grapple with concepts such as protection, extremism and radicalisation within the context of the staff legal obligation to identify and report those vulnerable to extremism. These trends represent a real and unevenly distributed threat to the rights of students to speak and of others to hear them speak in the university classroom. We suggest that these conditions are not conducive to open and critical engagement and consequently present a threat to academic freedom and freedom of speech. Critical enquiry and engagement are typically associated with courage, openness, robustness and the normalisation of passionate expression and disagreement. On the other hand, the provision of a safe classroom can elicit notions of caution, protection and control within the context of student vulnerability. Staff and students’ capacity to be comfortable with uncertainty seems to be at the heart of this issue. Critical enquiry relies on the free expression of perspectives and on uncertainty and doubt in the face of strongly held ideas, beliefs and values. However, as Chetty (2017) has pointed out, under the Prevent guidelines some varieties of doubt seem to be automatically suspect and indicative of unsound mind. What kinds of culture, relationships and teaching expertise do these real and present dilemmas about freedom of expression demand? What is the antidote to insecurity and vulnerability? We want to argue that much greater attention and resource needs to be given to the kind of pedagogical knowledge and conditions required to keep the space of robust and confident critical dialogue open in university classrooms and on campus, and that this is a question to mobilise the interests of students and staff alike. O’ Donnell (2017) argues that, unlike indoctrination, education is all about critical enquiry, exploring and questioning a range of different ideas in order to come to a deep understanding of a given subject (O’Donnell, 2017). She further suggests that educators are committed to creating the conditions for contestation in classrooms, but cautions that this is 11 troublesome when education institutions are required to justify and shape their practice with direct reference to a security agenda (O’Donnell, 2017). Embracing doubt and uncertainty as essential aspects of education can be seen as the first step in creating conditions for disagreement, for uncertainty is a close relative of curiosity. Naturalising disagreement and contention is a further step in keeping the space of free expression open, and should become an ingrained habit. Similarly, becoming familiar with emotional upheaval and learning to value the power of negative affect to inform and illuminate both our thinking and understanding of the most pressing issues of our times are important aspects of the educative process (Shotwell, 2011). Conclusion Our discussion has shown how different current trends and discourses in contemporary Britain that relate to Brexit, racism, the marketisation of higher education and perceptions of student vulnerability are changing the nature of the relationship among HEI staff and students, and potentially closing down the spaces for open discussion on sensitive and controversial issues. The tension between the statutory duty of HEI staff to report people that they believe to be at risk of radicalisation needs to be examined and mediated with the statutory duty of upholding academic freedom and freedom of speech to avoid any further reduction in the willingness of all to engage with difficult issues in university classrooms. This would reduce the richness of a university education in which students should have the opportunity to explore, examine and experiment with ideas and issues; to engage critically with each other and the world around them, and to experience at a practical level the democratic processes of dialogue and discussion – all of which help to encourage a well- informed, thoughtful and politically-engaged citizenry. For these reasons, it is essential that we strive to keep these spaces open for uncertainty, controversy and disagreement in HEIs. References Adams, R. (2017) University vice-chancellors are paid too much, says Lord Adonis, Guardian, 13 July. 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work_qctzfpbpwfhl3akxiug73rumvq	----	Untitled http://pps.sagepub.com/ Science Perspectives on Psychological http://pps.sagepub.com/content/8/5/521 The online version of this article can be found at: DOI: 10.1177/1745691613497965 2013 8: 521Perspectives on Psychological Science David J. Lick, Laura E. Durso and Kerri L. Johnson Minority Stress and Physical Health Among Sexual Minorities Published by: http://www.sagepublications.com On behalf of: Association For Psychological Science can be found at:Perspectives on Psychological ScienceAdditional services and information for http://pps.sagepub.com/cgi/alertsEmail Alerts: http://pps.sagepub.com/subscriptionsSubscriptions: http://www.sagepub.com/journalsReprints.navReprints: http://www.sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.navPermissions: by Kerri Johnson on September 12, 2013pps.sagepub.comDownloaded from Perspectives on Psychological Science 8(5) 521 –548 © The Author(s) 2013 Reprints and permissions: sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav DOI: 10.1177/1745691613497965 pps.sagepub.com In recent years, lesbian, gay, and bisexual (LGB) civil rights have become a topic of intense sociopolitical debate. These debates have resulted in notable improve- ments for LGB individuals around the world, including the extension of partner benefits to same-sex couples and legal protections for LGB individuals who face hate crimes. In stark contrast to these legal successes is con- tinued social prejudice against LGB individuals, evi- denced by high suicide rates among LGB adolescents and social policies that espouse the death penalty for LGB adults (e.g., the Ugandan Anti-Homosexuality Bill). Although these incidents bring much-needed attention to LGB suicide and homicide, public and academic dis- courses have paid surprisingly little attention to the fact many LGB individuals also suffer disparities in everyday physical health relative to their heterosexual peers. These health difficulties are more common than suicide or homicide and incur serious costs to personal well-being and global public health, yet their determinants remain largely unstudied. In this review, we summarize the growing literature on LGB physical health disparities, outline the social determinants of those disparities, and provide a detailed agenda for future research on these important topics.1 LGB Lives in Public and Scientific Discourse Recent political debates have brought LGB people to the forefront of public sentiment, and their frequent experi- ences with prejudice and discrimination have received careful attention. Indeed, numerous scholarly reports have detailed high rates of antigay victimization, with one meta-analysis estimating that as many as 80% of LGB individuals experience some form of harassment through- out their lives (Katz-Wise & Hyde, 2012; see also Balsam, Rothblum, & Beauchaine, 2005; Berrill, 1992; Herek, Cogan, & Gillis, 2002). The public is increasingly aware of these sobering statistics: In the past several years, Internet users have posted over 50,000 It Gets Better vid- eos describing instances of violence against LGB indi- viduals, and viewers have watched these videos more than 50 million times (Savage & Miller, 2012). 497965PPSXXX10.1177/1745691613497965Lick et al.Sexual Minority Health research-article2013 Corresponding Author: David J. Lick, UCLA Department of Psychology, 1285 Franz Hall, Box 951563, Los Angeles, CA 90095-1563 E-mail: david.lick@ucla.edu Minority Stress and Physical Health Among Sexual Minorities David J. Lick1, Laura E. Durso2, and Kerri L. Johnson1,3 1Department of Psychology, University of California, Los Angeles; 2The Williams Institute, University of California, Los Angeles; and 3Department of Communication Studies, University of California, Los Angeles Abstract Lesbian, gay, and bisexual (LGB) individuals suffer serious mental health disparities relative to their heterosexual peers, and researchers have linked these disparities to difficult social experiences (e.g., antigay victimization) and internalized biases (e.g., internalized homophobia) that arouse stress. A recent and growing body of evidence suggests that LGB individuals also suffer physical health disparities relative to heterosexuals, ranging from poor general health status to increased risk for cancer and heightened diagnoses of cardiovascular disease, asthma, diabetes, and other chronic conditions. Despite recent advances in this literature, the causes of LGB physical health problems remain relatively opaque. In this article, we review empirical findings related to LGB physical health disparities and argue that such disparities are related to the experience of minority stress—that is, stress caused by experiences with antigay stigma. In light of this minority stress model, we highlight gaps in the current literature and outline five research steps necessary for developing a comprehensive knowledge of the social determinants of LGB physical health. Keywords minority stress; health disparities; lesbian, gay, and bisexual (LGB) health; sexual minority health by Kerri Johnson on September 12, 2013pps.sagepub.comDownloaded from 522 Lick et al. LGB victimization has become such a prominent topic in part because it is associated with significant functional impairment. Indeed, an extensive literature on minority stress suggests that LGB individuals face mental health disparities due to their frequent experiences with antigay stigma (Hatzenbuehler, 2009; Meyer, 2003). These dis- parities range from heightened odds of major depression and generalized anxiety (Cochran, Sullivan, & Mays, 2003; Gilman, Cochran, Mays, Ostrow, & Kessler, 2001) to disproportionate alcohol, tobacco, and illicit drug use (Burgard, Cochran, & Mays, 2005; Cochran, Keenan, Schober, & Mays, 2000) and heightened risk for both attempting (Cochran & Mays, 2000; Garofalo, Wolf, Wissow, Woods, & Goodman, 1999; Hatzenbuehler, 2011) and completing suicide (Richardson, 1995) relative to population averages. Despite strong evidence of mental health difficulties in LGB communities, studies of physical health have lagged behind. Of nearly 4 million studies about physical health published in English between 1980 and 1999, only 0.1% reported effects for LGB participants (Boehmer, 2002), and few explored LGB health outcomes unrelated to HIV/AIDS (Harcourt, 2006). By the year 2000, research on LGB physical health was so sparse that the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services identified LGB health as a primary focus of its Healthy People ini- tiative through the year 2020 (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2010). In the wake of the Healthy People initiatives, nearly two dozen rigorous empirical studies have compared non-HIV-related physical health outcomes between LGB and heterosexual adults. Although knowledge of LGB physical health outcomes has begun to coalesce, extant findings span disciplines ranging from epidemiology to health psychology, medi- cine, and public health. Consequently, syntheses of rele- vant literature are lacking. Furthermore, comprehensive theories that incorporate previous findings about the causes and correlates of such disparities are practically nonexistent (Meads, Carmona, & Kelly, 2012). In this article, we offer a detailed review highlighting both the existence of LGB physical health disparities and their social determinants. We situate our review within a minority stress framework, arguing that difficult social experiences arouse stress for LGB people, in turn altering psychological processes, health behaviors, and physio- logical functioning, which ultimately compromise physi- cal health. We should note at the outset that there has been one other major effort to review the literature on LGB health, which documented mental as well as physi- cal health problems in LGB communities, including those related to HIV/AIDS (Institute of Medicine, 2011). In con- trast, our review focuses on physical health disparities that are not directly related to sexual activity, highlighting LGB health problems that have received limited attention in previous work. Our review also includes research pub- lished after the Institute of Medicine report, and therefore incorporates the most current evidence in this burgeon- ing field. Perhaps most importantly, the Institute of Medicine report listed minority stress as one of four frameworks for understanding LGB physical health, but its breadth precluded a detailed analysis of the ways in which minority stress gets under the skin to affect long- term physical health for LGB individuals. Our research pinpoints specific processes that may uniquely and inter- actively link social experiences to LGB physical health. As such, we view this article as an extension of previous work and an answer to recent calls for more detailed theorizing about the causes of physical health disparities related to sexual orientation (Harcourt, 2006; Institute of Medicine, 2011; Meads et al., 2012). LGB Physical Health Despite early inattention, research on LGB physical health has recently gained momentum. At present, there are a sufficient number of studies to reach preliminary conclu- sions about physical health difficulties in LGB communi- ties. We briefly synthesize these findings below, limiting our analysis to research published in English that describes health outcomes unrelated to sexually transmitted infec- tions, which have already received considerable attention. At times, we do discuss studies that reveal damaging phys- iological effects of minority stress for HIV-positive gay men; however, HIV infection was not the outcome of interest in these studies. Rather, they addressed basic ques- tions about the physiological correlates of minority stress, which are relevant to the LGB community at large and therefore important for our review. Evidence of LGB physical health disparities A growing body of research indicates that LGB people are at risk for a wide array of physical health difficulties, ranging from poor overall health status to heightened incidence of specific diseases (see Table 1 for summaries of results). The findings reveal that, relative to hetero- sexuals, sexual minority individuals generally rate their own health to be poor (Fredriksen-Goldsen, Kim, & Barkan, 2012; Frost, Lehavot, & Meyer, 2011), report a higher number of acute physical symptoms and chronic health conditions (Sandfort, Bakker, Schellevis, & Vanwesenbeeck, 2006), report that their health status cur- tails their ability to engage in everyday physical activities (Conron, Mimiaga, & Landers, 2010; Fredriksen-Goldsen, Kim, et al., 2012; Kim & Fredriksen-Goldsen, 2012), and exhibit a higher prevalence and younger onset of disabilities such as use of a walking assistant (e.g., cane, (text continues on p. 7) by Kerri Johnson on September 12, 2013pps.sagepub.comDownloaded from 523 T ab le 1 . Su m m ar y o f P re vi o u s St u d ie s D em o n st ra ti n g P h ys ic al H ea lt h D is p ar it ie s B et w ee n L G B a n d H et er o se xu al I n d iv id u al s St u d y C o u n tr y Sa m p lin g M et h o d Sa m p le S iz e Fi n d in gs K o b lin e t al . (1 99 6) U SA C o n ve n ie n ce 15 ,5 65 g ay m en G ay m en h ad h ei gh te n ed r at es o f n o n -H o d gk in 's l ym p h o m a, H o d gk in ’s d is ea se , an d a n al c an ce r. R at es o f an al c an ce r w er e u n re la te d t o H IV d ia gn o se s. Lo ck & S te in er (1 99 9) U SA C o m m u n it y sa m p le o f C al if o rn ia h ig h sc h o o ls 1, 43 9 h et er o se xu al 10 6 LG B 22 4 u n su re LG B p ar ti ci p an ts h ad m o re e at in g an d d ie ti n g p ro b le m s, as w el l as m o re g en er al h ea lt h p ro b le m s th an d id h et er o se xu al s. K av an au gh -L yn ch , W h it e, D al in g, & B o w en ( 20 02 ) U SA P o p u la ti o n -b as ed ca se -c o n tr o l 91 2 h et er o se xu al 59 l es b ia n N o te : Sa m p le s iz e va ri ed d ep en d in g o n t h e d ef in it io n o f se xu al o ri en ta ti o n ( e. g. , b eh av io r vs . se lf -i d en ti fi ca ti o n ). O n av er ag e, t h e sa m p le s in cl u d ed 91 2 h et er o se xu al a n d 5 9 le sb ia n w o m en . W o m en d ef in ed a s le sb ia n s b as ed o n t h ei r m ar it al s ta tu s an d n u m b er o f se xu al p ar tn er s h ad i n cr ea se d r is k o f in va si ve b re as t ca n ce r co m p ar ed t o h et er o se xu al s. W o m en d ef in ed as l es b ia n s b as ed o n c o n tr ac ep ti ve u se h ad n o d if fe re n ce s in in va si ve b re as t ca n ce r co m p ar ed t o h et er o se xu al s. D ia m an t & W o ld (2 00 3) U SA Lo ca l p ro b ab ili ty (C al if o rn ia ) 4, 02 3 h et er o se xu al 69 b is ex u al 43 l es b ia n Le sb ia n /b is ex u al w o m en h ad h ig h er r at es o f h ea rt d is ea se th an d id h et er o se xu al s. B is ex u al w o m en h ad m o re d ay s o f p o o r p h ys ic al h ea lt h i n t h e p as t m o n th t h an d id h et er o se xu al s. L es b ia n s w er e le ss l ik el y th an h et er o se xu al s to r ep o rt e xc el le n t h ea lt h . R o b er ts , D ib b le , N u ss ey , & C as ey (2 00 3) U SA C o n ve n ie n ce w it h m at ch ed c o n tr o ls (s is te rs ) 32 4 h et er o se xu al 32 4 le sb ia n Le sb ia n w o m en w er e at h ig h er r is k f o r ca rd io va sc u la r d is ea se th an w er e h et er o se xu al s d u e to g re at er a b d o m in al /v is ce ra l ad ip o si ty . C as e et a l. (2 00 4) U SA N at io n al c o h o rt 89 ,8 12 h et er o se xu al 31 7 b is ex u al 69 4 le sb ia n Le sb ia n /b is ex u al w o m en w er e at h ig h er r is k f o r b re as t ca n ce r an d c ar d io va sc u la r d is ea se t h an w er e h et er o se xu al s. D ib b le , R o b er ts , & N u ss ey ( 20 04 ) U SA C o n ve n ie n ce w it h m at ch ed c o n tr o ls (s is te rs ) 32 4 h et er o se xu al 32 4 le sb ia n Le sb ia n s w er e at h ig h er r is k f o r 5- ye ar a n d l if et im e b re as t ca n ce r th an w er e h et er o se xu al s, d es p it e n o d if fe re n ce s in o ve ra ll ra te s o f b re as t ca n ce r sc re en in g. H ec k & J ac o b so n (2 00 6) U SA N at io n al p ro b ab ili ty 12 8, 67 7 h et er o se xu al 43 0 m en i n s am e- se x re la ti o n sh ip 38 7 w o m en i n s am e- se x re la ti o n sh ip B o th m en a n d w o m en i n s am e- se x re la ti o n sh ip s h ad m o re lif et im e d ia gn o se s o f as th m a th an d id p eo p le i n d if fe re n t- se x re la ti o n sh ip s. W o m en a n d m en i n s am e- se x re la ti o n sh ip s w er e m o re l ik el y to e xp er ie n ce a st h m a w it h in t h e p as t 12 m o n th s th an w er e th o se i n d if fe re n t- se x re la ti o n sh ip s. (c on ti n u ed ) by Kerri Johnson on September 12, 2013pps.sagepub.comDownloaded from 524 St u d y C o u n tr y Sa m p lin g M et h o d Sa m p le S iz e Fi n d in gs Sa n d fo rt , B ak k er , Sc h el le vi s, & V an w es en b ee ck (2 00 6) N et h er la n d s N at io n al p ro b ab ili ty 9, 27 8 h et er o se xu al 90 b is ex u al 14 3 le sb ia n /g ay Le sb ia n /g ay p ar ti ci p an ts r ep o rt ed m o re a cu te p h ys ic al sy m p to m s in t h e p as t 2 w ee k s an d m o re c h ro n ic co n d it io n s th an d id h et er o se xu al s, i n cl u d in g m o re re sp ir at o ry p ro b le m s, i tc h in g, p ai n i n n ec k /s h o u ld er s, d iz zi n es s fo llo w ed b y fa lli n g, o st eo ar th ri ti s in t h e h ip o r k n ee , in te st in al p ro b le m s, s ev er e h ea d ac h es , an d u ri n ar y in co n ti n en ce . B is ex u al m en r ep o rt ed f ew er c h ro n ic co n d it io n s th an d id h et er o se xu al m en , b u t th ey r ep o rt ed n o d if fe re n ce s in s p ec if ic c h ro n ic h ea lt h c o n d it io n s. C o ch ra n & M ay s (2 00 7) U SA Lo ca l p ro b ab ili ty ( C A ) 1, 99 9 h et er o se xu al 67 b is ex u al 15 8 le sb ia n /g ay 51 h o m o se xu al ly e xp er ie n ce d h et er o se xu al B is ex u al w o m en r ep o rt ed m o re h ea lt h c o n d it io n s th an d id h et er o se xu al s, i n cl u d in g d ig es ti ve p ro b le m s, b ac k p ro b le m s, ch ro n ic f at ig u e, f u n ct io n al h ea lt h l im it at io n s, a n d p o o r o ve ra ll h ea lt h . Le sb ia n s w er e m o re l ik el y to r ep o rt a rt h ri ti s th an w er e h et er o se xu al s, a n d b o th l es b ia n a n d b is ex u al w o m en w er e m o re l ik el y to r ec ei ve d is ab ili ty i n co m e th an w er e h et er o se xu al s. H o m o se xu al ly e xp er ie n ce d h et er o se xu al w o m en w er e m o re l ik el y th an h et er o se xu al s to r ep o rt a st h m a an d b ac k p ro b le m s. A ft er c o n tr o lli n g fo r H IV s ta tu s, g ay m en w er e m o re l ik el y th an h et er o se xu al s to re p o rt h ea d ac h es . H o m o se xu al ly e xp er ie n ce d h et er o se xu al m en w er e m o re l ik el y th an h et er o se xu al s to r ep o rt l iv er d is ea se , d ig es ti ve p ro b le m s, h ea d ac h es , h ea rt d is ea se , as th m a, a n d c h ro n ic f at ig u e. W an g, H au se rm an n , C o u n at so u , A gg le to n , & W ei ss ( 20 07 ) Sw it ze rl an d V en u e- b as ed p ro b ab ili ty w it h m at ch ed c o n tr o ls 47 7 h et er o se xu al m en 47 7 ga y m en G ay m en w er e m o re l ik el y to r ep o rt c o m m o n p h ys ic al sy m p to m s, m o d er at e/ se ve re p h ys ic al s ym p to m s, a n d a h ig h er n u m b er o f sy m p to m s th an w er e h et er o se xu al s. G ay m en w er e m o re l ik el y th an h et er o se xu al s to h av e b ee n tr ea te d f o r b ro n ch it is i n p as t 12 m o n th s; t o h av e cl in ic al ly el ev at ed l ev el s o f ch o le st er o l, b lo o d p re ss u re , o r gl u co se ; to h av e ac ti vi ty l im it at io n s d u e to a p h ys ic al c o n d it io n , co m m o n s ic k n es s sy m p to m s, a n d m o d er at e/ se ve re si ck n es s sy m p to m s in t h e p as t 4 w ee k s af te r co n tr o lli n g fo r d em o gr ap h ic f ac to rs . B ra n d en b u rg , M at th ew s, Jo h n so n , & H u gh es ( 20 07 ) U SA C o n ve n ie n ce 27 9 h et er o se xu al 55 0 le sb ia n Le sb ia n w o m en h ad h ei gh te n ed r is k f o r 5- ye ar a n d l if et im e b re as t ca n ce r, d es p it e n o d if fe re n ce s b et w ee n l es b ia n a n d h et er o se xu al w o m en i n c an ce r sc re en in g b eh av io rs . T ab le 1 . (c o n ti n u ed ) (c on ti n u ed ) by Kerri Johnson on September 12, 2013pps.sagepub.comDownloaded from 525 St u d y C o u n tr y Sa m p lin g M et h o d Sa m p le S iz e Fi n d in gs Sa n d fo rt , B ak k er , Sc h el le vi s, & V an w es en b ee ck (2 00 9) N et h er la n d s N at io n al p ro b ab ili ty 4, 14 0 h et er o se xu al m en 25 b is ex u al m en 64 g ay m en 5, 13 8 h et er o se xu al w o m en 65 b is ex u al w o m en 79 l es b ia n w o m en G ay m en r ep o rt ed m o re a cu te p h ys ic al c o m p la in ts d u ri n g p re vi o u s 14 d ay s an d m o re c h ro n ic c o n d it io n s th an d id h et er o se xu al m en . B is ex u al w o m en h ad m o re c h ro n ic co n d it io n s th an d id h et er o se xu al w o m en , b u t b is ex u al m en h ad f ew er c h ro n ic c o n d it io n s th an d id h et er o se xu al m en . St ee le , R o ss , D o b in so n , V el d h u lz en , & T in m o u th ( 20 09 ) C an ad a N at io n al p ro b ab ili ty 60 ,9 37 h et er o se xu al w o m en 42 4 b is ex u al w o m en 35 4 le sb ia n w o m en B is ex u al w o m en r ep o rt ed m o re r es p ir at o ry d is o rd er s, h ig h er ra te s o f p o o r/ fa ir p h ys ic al h ea lt h a n d h ig h er r at es o f h yp er te n si o n ( o n ce a d ju st ed f o r o th er v ar ia b le s) t h an d id h et er o se xu al s. D ill ey , Si m m o n s, B o ys u n , P iz ac an i, & S ta rk (2 01 0) U SA Lo ca l p ro b ab ili ty ( W A ) 30 ,1 12 h et er o se xu al m en 23 5 b is ex u al m en 49 8 ga y m en 47 ,5 05 h et er o se xu al w o m en 56 1 b is ex u al w o m en 58 9 le sb ia n w o m en Le sb ia n /b is ex u al w o m en r ep o rt ed p o o re r p h ys ic al h ea lt h an d m o re a st h m a th an d id h et er o se xu al s; b is ex u al w o m en re p o rt ed h ig h er r at es o f d ia b et es a n d i n cr ea se d o d d s fo r h yp er te n si o n t h an d id h et er o se xu al s. G ay /b is ex u al m en re p o rt ed m o re a ct iv it y lim it at io n s d u e to p o o r h ea lt h t h an d id h et er o se xu al s. C o n ro n , M im ia ga , & L an d er s (2 01 0) U SA Lo ca l p ro b ab ili ty ( M A ) 25 ,3 87 h et er o se xu al m en 19 4 b is ex u al m en 92 6 ga y m en 39 ,7 01 h et er o se xu al w o m en 43 2 b is ex u al w o m en 71 9 le sb ia n w o m en O ve ra ll, L G B p ar ti ci p an ts r ep o rt ed m o re a ct iv it y lim it at io n s an d a st h m a th an d id h et er o se xu al s. B is ex u al w o m en re p o rt ed h ig h er r at es o f fa ir /p o o r h ea lt h a n d a ct iv it y lim it at io n s th an d id h et er o se xu al s. L es b ia n /g ay p ar ti ci p an ts w er e m o re l ik el y th an h et er o se xu al s to r ep o rt a ct iv it y lim it at io n s. L es b ia n /b is ex u al p ar ti ci p an ts w er e m o re l ik el y th an h et er o se xu al s to h av e m u lt ip le C V D r is k s. La n d er s, M im ia ga , & C o n ro n ( 20 11 ) U SA Lo ca l p ro b ab ili ty ( M A ) 65 ,0 88 h et er o se xu al 2, 27 1 LG B LG B p ar ti ci p an ts h ad m o re l if et im e d ia gn o se s o f as th m a th an d id h et er o se xu al s, d es p it e b ei n g si gn if ic an tl y yo u n ge r. M cN ai r, S za la ch a, & H u gh es ( 20 11 ) A u st ra lia Lo n gi tu d in al p ro b ab ili ty 8, 08 3 ex cl u si ve ly h et er o se xu al w o m en 56 8 m ai n ly h et er o se xu al w o m en 10 0 b is ex u al w o m en 99 l es b ia n w o m en Le sb ia n s re p o rt ed m o re c an ce r d ia gn o se s th an d id h et er o se xu al w o m en . B is ex u al w o m en r ep o rt ed p o o re r p h ys ic al h ea lt h t h an d id h et er o se xu al a n d l es b ia n w o m en . B is ex u al a n d m ai n ly h et er o se xu al w o m en r ep o rt ed m o re as th m a th an d id h et er o se xu al w o m en a ft er c o n tr o lli n g fo r sm o k in g b eh av io r. W al la ce , C o ch ra n , D u ra zo , & F o rd (2 01 1) U SA Lo ca l p ro b ab ili ty ( C A ) U n re p o rt ed O ld er g ay /b is ex u al m en h ad h ig h er r at es o f h yp er te n si o n , d ia b et es , p h ys ic al d is ab ili ty , an d f ai r/ p o o r h ea lt h t h an d id h et er o se xu al s. O ld er l es b ia n /b is ex u al w o m en h ad h ig h er ra te s o f p h ys ic al d is ab ili ty a n d f ai r/ p o o r h ea lt h t h an d id h et er o se xu al s. T ab le 1 . (c o n ti n u ed ) (c on ti n u ed ) by Kerri Johnson on September 12, 2013pps.sagepub.comDownloaded from 526 St u d y C o u n tr y Sa m p lin g M et h o d Sa m p le S iz e Fi n d in gs Fr ed ri k se n - G o ld se n , K im , et a l. (2 01 2) U SA Lo ca l p ro b ab ili ty ( W A ) 31 ,5 09 h et er o se xu al m en 23 9 b is ex u al m en 52 9 ga y m en 49 ,0 92 h et er o se xu al w o m en 53 6 b is ex u al w o m en 62 6 le sb ia n w o m en LG B p ar ti ci p an ts r ep o rt ed a h ig h er p re va le n ce o f d is ab ili ty th an d id h et er o se xu al s, d es p it e b ei n g yo u n ge r an d m at ch ed f o r h ea lt h b eh av io rs . E ve n a ft er a d ju st in g fo r ag e d if fe re n ce s, l es b ia n /b is ex u al w o m en r ep o rt ed h ei gh te n ed ra te s o f ar th ri ti s an d b is ex u al w o m en r ep o rt ed h ei gh te n ed ra te s o f lif et im e as th m a an d f re q u en t p o o r h ea lt h i n co m p ar is o n w it h h et er o se xu al s. G ay /b is ex u al m en r ep o rt ed m o re f re q u en t p o o r p h ys ic al h ea lt h t h an d id h et er o se xu al s. K im & F re d ri k se n - G o ld se n ( 20 12 ) U SA Lo ca l p ro b ab ili ty ( W A ) 4, 50 6 h et er o se xu al 60 H is p an ic b is ex u al 41 H is p an ic l es b ia n 93 6 n o n -H is p an ic W h it e le sb ia n 79 5 n o n -H is p an ic W h it e b is ex u al H is p an ic l es b ia n /b is ex u al w o m en r ep o rt ed m o re a st h m a an d h ig h er r at es o f d is ab ili ty t h an d id H is p an ic h et er o se xu al s. H is p an ic b is ex u al w o m en a ls o r ep o rt ed m o re a rt h ri ti s an d p o o r ge n er al h ea lt h t h an d id H is p an ic h et er o se xu al s. N o te : T h is t ab le e xc lu d es s tu d ie s o f LG B h ea lt h w it h o u t a h et er o se xu al c o m p ar is o n g ro u p . T h e st u d ie s ar e p re se n te d i n c h ro n o lo gi ca l o rd er a n d a lp h ab et ic al ly w it h in e ac h y ea r. C V D = ca rd io va sc u la r d is ea se . T ab le 1 . (c o n ti n u ed ) by Kerri Johnson on September 12, 2013pps.sagepub.comDownloaded from Sexual Minority Health 527 wheelchair; Fredriksen-Goldsen et al., 2012). Alongside these general indices of poor health, sexual minority individuals evidence heightened rates of specific health conditions. For example, people who identify as LGB (Conron et al., 2010; Landers, Mimiaga, & Conron, 2011) and those who report being in a same-sex relationship (Heck & Jacobson, 2006) report more asthma diagnoses than do people who identify as heterosexual or report being in a different-sex relationship. Self-identified LGB individuals also report more headaches (Cochran & Mays, 2007; Lock & Steiner, 1999), chronic diseases and aller- gies (Lock & Steiner, 1999), and osteoarthritis and serious gastro-intestinal problems (Sandfort et al., 2006) than do their heterosexual peers. Collectively, these findings reveal notable physical health problems among LGB adults in general. Whereas the above findings broadly demonstrate phys- ical health disparities related to sexual orientation, other studies reveal disparities in specific subpopulations of LGB individuals. For example, lesbian and bisexual women commonly report poorer overall physical health than do heterosexuals (Cochran & Mays, 2007; Kim & Fredriksen-Goldsen, 2012). Furthermore, sexual minority women—especially bisexual women—report heightened rates of asthma, urinary tract infections, and Hepatitis B and C (McNair, Szalacha, & Hughes, 2012; see also Kim & Fredriksen-Goldsen, 2011). In one early study, proxy measures of female sexual orientation (e.g., unmarried women with no history of male sex partners) were associ- ated with heightened risk of invasive breast cancer (Kavanaugh-Lynch, White, Daling, & Bowen, 2002); self- defined lesbian and bisexual women also report height- ened risk for (Brown & Tracy, 2008; Cochran et al., 2001; Rankow, 1995) and diagnosis of some cancers (McNair, Szalacha, & Hughes, 2011). One particularly compelling study revealed heightened breast cancer risk among lesbi- ans in comparison with their biological sisters (Dibble, Roberts, & Nussey, 2004). Finally, a smaller body of work revealed that sexual minority women exhibit more cardio- vascular disease risk factors (Case et al., 2004; Conron et al., 2010) and higher rates of cardiovascular disease diag- noses (Diamant & Wold, 2003) than do heterosexual women. Sexual minority men display similar patterns of health difficulties. In comparison with heterosexual men, gay men are at elevated risk for cardiovascular disease (Wang, Hausermann, Counatsou, Aggleton, & Weiss, 2007), and they report a higher total number of acute and chronic health conditions (Sandfort, Bakker, Schellevis, & Vanwesenbeeck, 2009), as well as more activity limita- tions due to debilitating physical conditions, greater risk for chronic disease (e.g., high blood pressure, high blood glucose), and more frequent reports of moderate/severe pain and fatigue (Wang et al., 2007). Gay men also report more headaches and urinary incontinence than do straight men (Sandfort et al., 2006). Moreover, gay men receive more cancer diagnoses (Koblin et al., 1996) and have lower cancer survival rates (Dean et al., 2000) rela- tive to heterosexuals. Thus, research over the past decade has revealed that LGB people in general, and subgroups of the LGB popu- lation in particular, suffer serious physical health dispari- ties in comparison with their heterosexual peers (for a detailed review, see Institute of Medicine, 2011; for details of each study described above, see Table 1). These find- ings span both community-based and population-based samples from diverse geographic locations, offering com- pelling evidence of physical health problems in LGB communities. Minority stress and LGB health Evidence of LGB physical health disparities has grown rapidly over the past decade, but theories about the causes and correlates of these disparities remains sparse. In line with recent reports (Institute of Medicine, 2011) and previ- ous theorizing in the domain of mental health (Meyer, 2003), we propose that LGB physical health disparities are related to minority stress processes that follow exposure to social stigma. Indeed, several recent studies have linked minority stress to physical health complaints. In one study, LGB young adults’ reports of headaches increased as a function of self-reported exposure to homophobic remarks (Woodford, Howell, Kulick, & Silverschanz, 2012). In another, LGB adults who experienced high rates of minor- ity stress (i.e., reports of discrimination, rejection, internal- ized homophobia, and identity concealment) reported more total physical health problems (e.g., chronic dis- eases) and poorer overall health than those who experi- enced less minority stress (Frost et al., 2011). In a large convenience sample, expectations of rejection, internal- ized homophobia, and recalled experiences with victim- ization predicted physical symptom severity among lesbians and gay men (Denton, 2012). Finally, a recent cross-sectional study found that reports of lifetime victim- ization and financial barriers to healthcare predicted poor physical health and disability among LGB older adults (Fredriksen-Goldsen, Kim, et al., 2012). Whereas these findings forged an association between social stigma and physical health complaints among LGB individuals, the mechanisms linking sexual orientation-related stigma to physical health outcomes remain poorly articulated. In the next section, we provide a brief overview of minority stress as it relates to LGB mental health and present a theo- retical model that extends these concepts to LGB physical health. by Kerri Johnson on September 12, 2013pps.sagepub.comDownloaded from 528 Lick et al. Minority stress and LGB mental health. Previous research has documented epidemic rates of antigay stigma around the world. Upwards of 94% of LGB adults report experiencing verbal harassment related to their sexual orientation (Herek et al., 2002), with 17%–28% reporting physical assault and property damage (Berrill, 1992; Katz-Wise & Hyde, 2012). There have been more than 15,000 federally reported hate crimes against sexual minority individuals in the United States since 1998, mak- ing sexual orientation the second most frequent category of single-incident hate crimes after race (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2011). Moreover, reports of hate crimes against all racial, ethnic, and religious groups decreased from 2010 to 2011, but reports of hate crimes against LGB individuals increased, making sexual minorities the only group assessed by the U.S. Department of Justice to experience a recent upsurge in reported victimization (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2011). Thus, researchers have highlighted the existence of both health difficulties and frequent experiences with stigma among LGB individuals. These two observations may be causally related. Indeed, minority stress theory (Meyer, 2003, 2007) suggests that experiencing or even fearing antigay stigma arouses feelings of distress that can have profound consequences for personal well-being. More specifically, the theory proposes that LGB individuals face two types of stressors related to their sexual orienta- tion. Distal stressors are external events that are psycho- logically taxing, including discrete encounters with victimization and structural forms of stigma (e.g., marriage inequality; Meyer, 2003, 2007). Proximal stressors are conflicts internal to the LGB individual triggered by experi- ences with victimization. These conflicts include conceal- ment of one’s minority identity (Frable, Blackstone, & Scherbaum, 1990; Pachankis, 2007), anxiety about future experiences with prejudice (Burns, Kamen, Lehman, & Beach, 2012; Meyer, 2007; Pachankis & Goldfried, 2006), and negative feelings about one’s own sexual orientation (i.e., internalized homophobia; Meyer, 2003; M. E. Newcomb & Mustanski, 2010; Shidlo, 1994). Minority stress is the accrual of distal and proximal stressors over the life span that may eventually overwhelm coping resources and compromise well-being. Minority stress theory has enjoyed widespread empiri- cal support as a framework for understanding LGB men- tal health disparities. In a seminal study on this topic, gay men who reported high levels of minority stress were three times more likely to report elevated psychological symptoms (e.g., anxiety, hopelessness, poor self-esteem) in comparison with peers who reported lower levels of minority stress (Meyer, 1995). Subsequent studies have buttressed this negative association between minority stress and psychological well-being in LGB communities (DiPlacido, 1998; Hatzenbuehler, Nolen-Hoeksema, & Erickson, 2008; Kimmel & Mahalik, 2005; Kuyper & Fokkema, 2010, 2011; Lehavot & Simoni, 2011). Others have demonstrated that LGB people who live in stigma- tizing social environments report frequent experiences with distal stressors (Lick, Tornello, Riskind, Schmidt, & Patterson, 2012; Oswald, Cuthbertson, Lazarevic, & Goldberg, 2010) and that living in such negative environ- ments is associated with high rates of psychological dis- tress, depressive symptoms, and negative affect (Goldberg & Smith, 2011; Lick et al., 2012), as well as suicide attempts (Hatzenbuehler, 2011). Overall, these studies have dem- onstrated associations among antigay stigma, minority stress, and mental health outcomes within LGB communi- ties. Though less common, several studies have linked minority stress to differences in mental health between LGB and heterosexual communities (Hatzenbuehler, Corbin, & Fromme, 2008; Lewis, 2009). For example, in a nationally representative sample, LGB individuals reported more numerous and frequent victimization experiences than did heterosexuals, and experiences with victimiza- tion fully mediated the association between sexual orien- tation and psychological distress (Mays & Cochran, 2001). Collectively, these findings have provided robust empiri- cal support for minority stress as a way of understanding poor mental health outcomes among LGB individuals. Minority stress and LGB physical health. In light of strong evidence linking minority stress to LGB mental health disparities, it seems plausible that minority stress is also associated with LGB physical health disparities. Indeed, mental and physical health are intricately related to one another (Cohen & Herbert, 1996; Salovey, Roth- man, Detweiler, & Steward, 2000). For example, psycho- logical stress is associated with dysregulated immune functioning (Miller & Chen, 2010), poor antibody response following vaccine (Segerstrom & Miller, 2004), acute health problems (e.g., susceptibility to common cold, flu, headache; Cohen, Tyrrell, & Smith, 1991; DeLongis, Folkman, & Lazarus, 1988), and chronic dis- ease (e.g., cardiovascular disease, cancer; Cohen, Janicki- Deverts, & Miller, 2007) in the general population. Also, a growing body of evidence suggests that LGB physical health problems are correlated with experiences of minority stress (Denton, 2012; Frost et al., 2011; Wood- ford et al., 2012). In spite of these links, several alterna- tive explanations have also been proposed to account for physical health problems observed among LGB people. Before detailing our minority stress theory of LGB physi- cal health, it is important to consider these alternatives. First, many of the health disparities described in previ- ous research could be related to the high prevalence of HIV/AIDS among gay men, as those conditions compro- mise the immune system and lead to opportunistic infec- tions that generally hinder physical health. Consistent with by Kerri Johnson on September 12, 2013pps.sagepub.comDownloaded from Sexual Minority Health 529 this possibility, one previous study found that controlling for HIV status nullified disparities in heart disease, liver disease, digestive problems, and urinary incontinence between gay and heterosexual men (Cochran & Mays, 2007). However, comorbid physical health conditions do not account for all of the observed disparities. Indeed, gay men were still more likely to report migraine headaches after controlling for HIV status in Cochran and Mays (2007). Moreover, evidence of physical health difficulties among sexual minority women, who are not at heightened risk for HIV/AIDS, suggests that immunodeficiency cannot fully explain the health issues facing LGB adults. Thus, HIV/AIDS diagnoses may explain some disparities, but they do not account for all of the variance in physical health outcomes related to sexual orientation. Second, any study examining links between social stigma and sexual minority health must contend with the fact that disparities could be due to either social causa- tion or social selection. Social causation is the explana- tion espoused by minority stress theory—namely, that difficult social experiences cause stress and result in poor health outcomes. Though numerous findings are consis- tent with this hypothesis, associations between antigay stigma and poor health may also be explained by social selection—the idea that well-adjusted LGB individuals voluntarily select more supportive environments, whereas poorly adjusted LGB individuals remain in more stigma- tizing environments. Systematic data on this issue are sparse, but there is some reason to believe that social selection does not fully explain LGB physical health dis- parities. First, migration patterns of LGB people do not differ markedly from those of heterosexual people (Gates, 2007), suggesting that health disparities linked to antigay stigma are not simply caused by well-adjusted individuals leaving stigmatizing environments and poorly adjusted individuals remaining in stigmatizing environments. Moreover, qualitative researchers have noted that many factors other than a desire to flee stigma may drive LGB migration, including pursuit of a spouse who moves for occupational reasons and relocation to be a family care- giver (Howe, 2007). Thus, although we cannot rule out social selection as a factor contributing to LGB health, it is not likely to provide a full explanation of the observed disparities. Finally, some researchers have suggested that LGB health disparities might be an artifact of the sampling tech- niques and self-report format characterizing most work in this field. Indeed, the vast majority of studies have relied on self-reports of both exposure to minority stress and health outcomes, resulting in potential same-source report- ing biases. Relying on self-report may yield other biases as well. For example, gay men who participate in surveys may exhibit high rates of neuroticism (e.g., Bailey, 1999; Van den Aardweg, 1985), which may lead to overreporting of the incidence and severity of health problems that do not actually exist. However, it remains unclear whether minority stress is a cause or a consequence of such poten- tially heightened rates of neuroticism among gay men. Moreover, only those LGB people who are open about their sexual orientation respond to surveys; individuals who are open about their sexuality may also be open about other aspects of their lives that are considered diffi- cult and personal (e.g., health problems), resulting in an overestimation of health problems among LGB individuals (Savin-Williams, 2008). This hypothesis is certainly impor- tant to consider, but it does not appear to account for the health disparities observed in the current literature, insofar as studies that control for socially desirable responding have still revealed notable physical and mental health dif- ficulties among LGB individuals (Rosario, Schrimshaw, & Hunter, 2009; Sandfort, Bos, Collier, & Metselaar, 2010). Finally, studies of the general population have revealed that negative affect confounds self-reports of both physical health and perceived stress (Watson & Pennebaker, 1989), suggesting that LGB physical health disparities may be related to heightened levels of negative affect at baseline among sexual minority individuals. It is important to note, however, that negative affect is associated with self-reported health outcomes but not with actual health outcomes (Watson & Pennebaker, 1989). As new popula- tion-level datasets that include measures of sexual orienta- tion and objective indices of physical health become available (e.g., National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey, Add Health Wave IV), researchers can address these concerns directly. For now, we note that several studies have uncovered significant associations between sexual minority status, stressful social encounters, and physical health with objective outcome measures (e.g., medical records, Hatzenbuehler et al., 2012; biomarkers, Huebner & Davis, 2005), allaying some concerns about reporting bias. Thus, although they may have some influence on LGB health, comorbid disease, social selection, and sampling biases are each insufficient to account for the widespread disparities noted in the existing literature. We propose that minority stress provides an important additional explanation of LGB physical health disparities for several reasons. First, minority stress is strongly related to other measures of well-being—most notably to mental health (Meyer, 2003, 2007). Second, previous theorizing sug- gests an association between minority stress and LGB physical health (Institute of Medicine, 2011). Third, sev- eral recent studies provided evidence linking minority stress to physical health complaints including headaches, chronic diseases, poor general health, disability, and symptom severity among LGB individuals (Denton, 2012; Fredriksen-Goldsen, Kim, et al., 2012; Frost et al., 2011; Woodford et al., 2012). by Kerri Johnson on September 12, 2013pps.sagepub.comDownloaded from 530 Lick et al. Although recent research has forged a tenable associa- tion between minority stress and LGB physical health, the specific mechanisms linking antigay stigma, stress pro- cesses, and health remain unclear. Below, we highlight several ways in which social experiences set into motion a cascade of health-relevant events that may culminate in physical health disparities for LGB individuals (see Fig. 1).2 At the sociocultural level, LGB individuals face frequent stigma and discrimination related to their sexual orientation, which can result in high levels of minority stress. Furthermore, discriminatory social policies pre- clude LGB individuals from receiving adequate medical attention, limiting preventative care and exacerbating existing health conditions in the sexual minority commu- nity at large. At the individual psychological level, experi- ences with such sociocultural stressors arouse feelings of distress (e.g., anxiety, hopelessness), which may alter physical functioning by way of harmful cognitions (e.g., hypervigilance) and poor health behaviors (e.g., sub- stance use). Finally, at the microbiological level, stressful events alter the functioning of immune, neuroendocrine, and autonomic nervous systems (ANS), eventually lead- ing to wear and tear on the body that may be manifested in physical health difficulties. As shown in Figure 1, we conceptualize these factors as being systematically related, such that stressful events (i.e., sociocultural stressors) are linked to LGB health outcomes by way of appraisal processes, psychological and physiological stress responses, and health behaviors. Reviewing empirical evidence for each of these mechanisms will substantiate our and others’ claims that minority stress helps to explain physical health outcomes in LGB communities, thereby providing a more nuanced theoretical understanding of the social determinants of LGB health. Determinants of LGB physical health disparities Sociocultural stressors and LGB physical health. Sociocultural stressors are the first factors that we pro- pose help to explain LGB physical health disparities. Researchers have long recognized that stigma and health disparities are not equally distributed across social ecologies—that is, some areas are more stigmatizing than others, and stigma-rich environments may be especially stressful for minority inhabitants (Link & Phelan, 2001). In line with this observation, we define sociocultural stressors as social trends that vary as a function of the attitudes prevalent in a given geographic location and affect the well-being of LGB inhabitants. Previous research on this topic has pinpointed three levels of anal- ysis relevant to LGB physical health: (a) interpersonal stressors, (b) institutional stressors, and (c) broader struc- tural stressors. In the following sections, we review Sociocultural Stressors Appraisal and Cognitive Style Psychological Stress Responses Health Behaviors Health Status Physiological Stress Responses Fig. 1. Conceptual model illustrating proposed mechanisms underlying LGB physical health disparities. The model indicates that the associa- tion between sociocultural stressors and sexual minority health is mediated through appraisal processes, psychological and physiological stress responses, and health behaviors. This model is meant to be conceptual; some of the associations have not been tested empirically. by Kerri Johnson on September 12, 2013pps.sagepub.comDownloaded from Sexual Minority Health 531 findings at each of these levels of analysis to clarify the ways in which sociocultural factors are associated with LGB physical health. Interpersonal stressors: Discrete acts of prejudice and discrimination. The unequal distribution of stigma throughout society manifests in higher rates of victimiza- tion against some people and in some areas than others. Indeed, LGB individuals are among the most frequent targets of interpersonal stigma (Herek, 1992), and LGB people who live in stigma-rich environments face espe- cially high rates of victimization (Herek, Chopp, & Strohl, 2007; Lick et al., 2012). We propose that such frequent experiences with antigay stigma result in psychological distress that ultimately hinders the physical health of LGB individuals. In line with our proposal, LGB individuals frequently experience discrete acts of prejudice and discrimination (Katz-Wise & Hyde, 2012), and these experiences are associated with psychological distress (Mays & Cochran, 2001; Meyer, 1995, 2003, 2007). Furthermore, LGB adults who live in stigmatizing environments (e.g., states with discriminatory social policies and few pro-LGB organiza- tions) report facing higher rates of interpersonal stigma (Lick et al., 2012) and also report greater psychological distress (Hatzenbuehler, Keyes, & Hasin, 2009; Hatzenbuehler, McLaughlin, Keyes, & Hasin, 2010) than do those living in environments with more favorable cli- mates. The psychological distress associated with such frequent victimization likely helps to explain disparities in LGB physical health (Pascoe & Smart-Richman, 2009), as distress is associated with poor physical health out- comes in the general population (McEwen, 2006; McEwen & Stellar, 1993; Seeman, Singer, Rowe, Horwitz, & McEwen, 1997). We are not aware of evidence specifi- cally linking victimization to psychological distress and physical health in sexual minority communities, but exist- ing findings suggest that LGB individuals who live in stig- matizing environments are frequently exposed to interpersonal prejudice and discrimination, which are associated with psychological distress that in turn may hinder physical health. Aside from the more direct psychological and physio- logical impacts of discrete interpersonal stressors, LGB individuals who live in stigma-rich environments may also face health concerns because they conceal their sex- ual identity in order to prevent future victimization (Pachankis, 2007). Such concealment can serve as a posi- tive coping strategy in the short-term by helping LGB individuals to avoid victimization ( Jones et al., 1984), but it is associated with a host of psychological consequences in the long-term, including depressive symptoms (Frost & Bastone, 2008; Frost, Parsons, & Nanin, 2007), negative affect and anxiety (Frable, Platt, & Hoey, 1998), poor self-esteem and elevated psychiatric symptoms (Frable, Wortman, & Joseph, 1997), and psychological strain (Ragins, Singh, & Cornwell, 2007). As mentioned above, findings from the general population indicate that such heightened distress hinders physical functioning (McEwen, 2006; McEwen & Stellar, 1993; Seeman et al., 1997). In fact, several previous studies uncovered asso- ciations between sexual orientation concealment and physical health outcomes among HIV-positive gay men, linking concealment to increased diagnoses of cancer and infectious diseases (e.g., bronchitis, tuberculosis; Cole, Kemeny, Taylor, & Visscher, 1996), dysregulated immune function (i.e., decreased CD4 T lymphocytes; Cole, Kemeny, & Taylor, 1997; Cole, Kemeny, Taylor, Visscher, & Fahey, 1996), and even mortality (Cole et al., 1997). Collectively, these findings suggest that LGB indi- viduals who live in stigmatizing environments may face frequent victimization that leads them to conceal their sexual orientation, with negative implications for long- term health. Structural stressors: Discriminatory social poli- cies. Aside from interpersonal experiences with preju- dice and discrimination, structural factors may also act as stressors that impact LGB physical health. Much of the work on this topic has focused on marriage equal- ity within the United States, and current findings sug- gest three specific ways in which marriage rights (or lack thereof) may affect LGB health. First, public debates about marriage benefits are associated with heightened feelings of distress among LGB individuals (e.g., anxiety, mood, and substance use disorders; Hatzenbuehler et al., 2010; Riggle, Rostosky, & Horne, 2010; Riggle, Thomas, & Rostosky, 2005), perhaps because the rhetoric surround- ing marriage debates often characterizes sexual minor- ity individuals as immoral, sexually promiscuous, and noncommitted. These feelings of distress disrupt physi- ological functioning and ultimately compromise physical health (Cohen et al., 2007; McEwen, 2006; Seeman et al., 1997). Associations among same-sex marriage debates, psychological distress, and physical health have not been directly tested among LGB individuals, but two recent studies provide suggestive evidence linking marriage policy to physical health. In the first, Stotzer (2011) docu- mented a significant increase in hate crimes related to sex- ual orientation during years in which the public debated granting partner benefits to same-sex couples (e.g., dur- ing and after the Proposition 8 decision in California). Physical injuries sustained from these hate crimes may help to explain some LGB physical health complaints. In a second study, Hatzenbuehler et al. (2012) found that 12 months after marriage was legalized for same-sex couples in Massachusetts, gay and bisexual men showed a significant decrease in medical care visits, as indicated by Kerri Johnson on September 12, 2013pps.sagepub.comDownloaded from 532 Lick et al. by medical records. These effects were significant among both partnered and nonpartnered men, suggesting that supportive marriage policies carry notable benefits for the sexual minority community at large, including indi- viduals who are not in long-term partnerships. Marriage rights may also affect LGB physical health by conferring relational benefits. In particular, marriage offers increased social support and relationship satisfac- tion to LGB individuals who might otherwise be single or cohabiting (Hardie & Lucas, 2010; Liu, Wang, Keesler, & Schneider, 2011). These relational benefits are associated with physical health in the general population (Wilson & Oswald, 2005), insofar as married individuals have sig- nificantly lower mortality (Brockmann & Klein, 2004; Mete, 2005), fewer diagnoses of cardiovascular disease and lung cancer (Hibbard & Pope, 1993), lower rates of Alzheimer’s disease (Helmer et al., 1999), and better self- rated health ( Joung, Van De Mheen, Stronks, Van Poppel, & Mackenbach, 1998) relative to single or cohabiting individuals. Although these effects have not been repli- cated in LGB samples, the findings highlight a general pathway by which the benefits of marriage—or the con- sequences of marriage denial—may contribute to LGB physical health (Buffie, 2011; Herdt & Kertzner, 2006). Finally, marriage confers tangible benefits relevant for health—most notably, insurance coverage for wedded partners (Institute of Medicine, 2011; U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2011). For example, 35 states currently do not offer legal recognition to same-sex couples, thereby limiting insurance coverage available to partners of sexual minority individuals (Ash & Badgett, 2006; Human Rights Campaign, 2013). Such benefit deni- als are important because more than 60% of insured Americans obtain healthcare coverage through their spouse or family members (Badgett, 2004). Indeed, one study estimated that same- and different-sex unmarried couples were 2 to 3 times more likely to be uninsured than were different-sex married couples (Ash & Badgett, 2006). LGB people may therefore have poorer health out- comes than heterosexuals because discriminatory social policies prohibit them from receiving adequate insurance to cover the costs of medical care. We discuss the impli- cations of limited insurance benefits for LGB individuals in greater detail in the next section. Aside from marriage rights, other social policies may also act as structural stressors that limit access to medical care and affect subsequent health outcomes among LGB individuals. For example, it is currently legal in 29 U.S. states to fire someone on the basis of their actual or per- ceived sexual orientation (Human Rights Campaign, 2013). Without employment nondiscrimination policies, LGB individuals have no legal recourse to cope with job loss. These considerations increase anxiety about sexual orientation disclosure in the workplace (Ragins et al., 2007) and therefore may heighten psychological distress (Pachankis, 2007) and health difficulties. Furthermore, LGB people experience frequent discrimination in hiring practices and compensation (Badgett, 2001; Badgett, Lau, Sears, & Ho, 2007; Tilcsik, 2011), which may lead to financial hardship. Financial hardship is a general stressor affecting many millions of people (Ahmed, Mohammed, & Williams, 2007; Haan, Kaplan, & Camacho, 1987; Leon & Walt, 2001), but it is especially common in sexual minority communities (Badgett, 2001), despite LGB indi- viduals’ generally high levels of education (Black, Sanders, & Taylor, 2007). Indeed, LGB adults— especially lesbian women—are more likely to fall below the pov- erty line and use government assistance programs than are their heterosexual counterparts (Albelda, Badgett, Schneebaum, & Gates, 2009). Thus, sexual minority indi- viduals may be especially likely to live in poverty, which is associated with serious health disparities in the popula- tion, generally (see Ahmed et al., 2007; Haan et al., 1987; Leon & Walt, 2001), and underutilization of medical care in LGB communities, specifically (Fredriksen-Goldsen, Emlet, et al., 2012). Institutional stressors: Limited access to and quality of healthcare. Finally, features of the medical institu- tion itself limit LGB individuals’ access to and receipt of quality care. The first important pathway here involves health insurance. As noted above, many LGB individu- als lack insurance coverage due to limited partner ben- efits (Cochran et al., 2001), and for some people this renders medical care prohibitively expensive (Badgett, 2004). Indeed, numerous studies have pinpointed a lack of insurance coverage as a barrier to receiving adequate medical care among LGB individuals (Cochran, 2001; Dia- mant, Wold, Spritzer, & Gelberg, 2000; Lauver et al., 1999; Marrazzo, 2004; A. K. Matthews, Brandenburg, Johnson, & Hughes, 2004; Trippet & Bain, 1992), which may result in untreated or poorly managed health conditions. Even among LGB individuals with adequate insurance benefits, prejudice among healthcare workers may com- promise the quality of care they receive. These concerns are so prevalent, in fact, that fears of discrimination are listed as a primary reason why LGB individuals avoid healthcare settings altogether (Petroll & Mosack, 2011) and/or conceal their sexual orientation from healthcare providers (Bergeron & Senn, 2003; Eliason & Schope, 2001; Stein & Bonuck, 2001). Concealment not only harms physical health by altering physiological function- ing among LGB individuals (Cole, Kemeny, et al., 1996; Cole et al., 1997), but it also disrupts physical health more indirectly by affecting the care provided by medical professionals. Indeed, LGB adults have special medical needs (e.g., anal pap smears among sexually active gay men) that likely go unmet when patients conceal their by Kerri Johnson on September 12, 2013pps.sagepub.comDownloaded from Sexual Minority Health 533 sexual orientation from healthcare workers (Bergeron & Senn, 2003; Cochran et al., 2001; Diamant et al., 2000; Moran, 1996; Petroll & Mosack, 2011; Tjepkema, 2008; White & Dull, 1997). Thus, fears of discrimination stem- ming from previous experiences with antigay stigma may lead LGB adults to avoid healthcare settings or to conceal their sexual orientation from medical providers, resulting in a low standard of care that contributes to long-term physical health problems (Hutchinson, Thompson, & Cederbaum, 2006; Stevens, 1996; Stevens & Hall, 1988). Alongside negative health outcomes for LGB adults who conceal their sexual orientation from medical pro- viders, structural aspects of the medical institution itself limit the quality of care offered to LGB adults. In particu- lar, medical providers lack confidence in their knowledge of sexual minority health (McNair, Anderson, & Mitchell, 2001; Trippet & Bain, 1992), with nearly half of all medi- cal students reporting unease when treating LGB clients (Obedin-Maliver et al., 2011). One reason for such dis- comfort is that medical students receive an average of only 2.5 to 5 hours of training about LGB health (McGarry, Clarke, Cyr, & Landau, 2002). In fact, one recent study revealed that one third of medical schools provided zero hours of clinical training related to LGB health (Obedin- Maliver et al., 2011). Providers’ insecurities about treating LGB clients adversely affect the doctor–patient relation- ship and may limit quality of care, insofar as LGB patients who perceive their doctors to be unknowledgeable about sexual minority issues schedule fewer medical visits, are less compliant with treatment, and undergo fewer pre- ventative tests in comparison with those who perceive their doctors to be more culturally competent (Rankow & Tessaro, 1998; Stevens, 1996; Wang et al., 2007). Thus, even among LGB individuals who have insurance bene- fits and who disclose their sexual orientation to health- care providers, doctors’ limited training and lack of confidence regarding LGB health issues may result in poor healthcare for sexual minorities, compromising their overall health. Conclusions and research gaps. As reviewed here, sociocultural factors act as distal stressors that may play an important role in the health of LGB individuals. First, many social environments stigmatize homosexuality. LGB individuals who live in such negative environments face high rates of victimization, arousing psychological dis- tress that may compromise physiological functioning. Discriminatory social policies expose LGB individuals to additional stigma and block them from receiving ben- efits that are important for maintaining good health (e.g., relational satisfaction). Finally, institutional factors within the healthcare system, including a lack of appropriate training and limited insurance coverage for same-sex partners, affect the quality of healthcare available to LGB people, ultimately damaging their health. Collectively, these stressors may create new health problems or exac- erbate existing ones, and they must be addressed as we hone our knowledge of LGB physical health disparities. Overall, data linking sociocultural stressors to LGB physical health are fairly strong. Indeed, a growing num- ber of studies have explored objective measures of social climate (e.g., Hatzenbuehler et al., 2009; Hatzenbuehler et al., 2010; Lick et al., 2012) and structural barriers to healthcare (e.g., Obedin-Maliver et al., 2011; Wang et al., 2007), allaying concerns about biased reporting. Furthermore, researchers in this area have begun to employ population-based methods to examine sociocul- tural stressors underlying LGB health (e.g., Hatzenbuehler et al., 2009; Hatzenbuehler et al., 2012), resulting in large samples with few self-selection concerns. Despite increasingly rigorous studies linking sociocul- tural stressors to LGB physical health outcomes, several notable omissions deserve mention. One such omission is a lack of diversity in study samples. For example, many studies of healthcare utilization have explored outcomes among White lesbian and bisexual women. It is impor- tant for researchers to replicate these findings among sexual minority men and LGB people of color, especially in light of mounting evidence that individuals with mul- tiple minority identities (e.g., Black and gay) face espe- cially poor outcomes (Albelda et al., 2009; Balsam, Molina, Beadnell, Simoni, & Walters, 2011). Furthermore, investigations of insurance coverage among sexual minority adults have focused primarily on LGB couples. It is critical for future researchers to extend these findings to single LGB people, who may also face barriers to obtaining adequate insurance. Also, despite multiple studies demonstrating high rates of distress among LGB people who live in stigmatizing social environments (e.g., Hatzenbuehler et al., 2009), many fewer studies have explored the basic link between social climate and expe- riences of antigay victimization. Additional research on this topic will be important in the coming years. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, previous work in this area has linked sociocultural stressors to factors that are theo- retically related to LGB physical health (e.g., psychologi- cal distress) based on data from the general population. Few studies have directly linked sociocultural factors to feelings of stress and physical health outcomes among LGB individuals. Additional data on these topics will allow for even stronger conclusions about the role of sociocultural stressors in LGB physical health. Psychological stress processes and behavioral factors linking minority stress and LGB physical health. The second set of factors that we propose link social experiences to LGB physical health are psy- chological and behavioral in nature. These factors are by Kerri Johnson on September 12, 2013pps.sagepub.comDownloaded from 534 Lick et al. functionally related to the sociocultural stressors we described previously, as they are a primary means by which socially patterned stigma gets under the skin to affect individual health outcomes. In the language of minority stress theory, psychological and behavioral pro- cesses are the proximal stressors triggered by experi- ences with distal stressors. The extant literature has highlighted three such processes that may link social experiences to LGB physical health: (a) psychological distress, (b) cognitive appraisal style, and (c) health behaviors and beliefs. Psychological distress and physical health. Work on mind–body interaction suggests that psychological and physiological states are intricately connected (Cohen & Herbert, 1996; Salovey et al., 2000). Indeed, hundreds of studies in the general population have revealed nega- tive health implications of psychological stress (McEwen, 2006; McEwen & Stellar, 1993; Pascoe & Smart-Richman, 2009; Seeman et al., 1997). These studies have linked psychological stress to dysregulated immune function (Miller & Chen, 2010), poor antibody response following vaccine (Segerstrom & Miller, 2004), acute health prob- lems (e.g., susceptibility to the common cold, flu, sore throat, headache; Cohen et al., 1991; DeLongis et al., 1988), and chronic disease (e.g., cardiovascular disease, cancer; Cohen et al., 2007). In light of this evidence, we propose that psychologi- cal distress following experiences with stigma is a pri- mary pathway leading to LGB health deficits. In line with this hypothesis, several large studies have linked high rates of psychological distress to physical health out- comes among LGB individuals. For example, in a study of the U.S. population, sexual minority participants reported higher levels of psychological distress than did exclusively heterosexual participants; these differences in psychological distress fully explained most health dis- parities observed between lesbian and heterosexual women (e.g., digestive complaints, chronic fatigue syn- drome, arthritis), and some, but not all, disparities observed between gay and heterosexual men (e.g., heart disease, liver disease, back pain; Cochran & Mays, 2007). In the Netherlands, lesbian/gay participants reported more acute mental health problems and poorer psycho- logical well-being overall than did heterosexuals. Controlling for these markers of psychological distress eradicated associations between sexual orientation and the total number of both acute and chronic physical health conditions reported by LGB participants (e.g., respiratory problems, osteoarthritis, headache; Sandfort et al., 2006). These data do not permit causal claims, but they suggest that high levels of stress due to antigay stigma may help to explain physical health difficulties in sexual minority communities. Cognitive appraisal and appraisal style. Maladaptive cognitive styles may also arise from stigmatizing experi- ences and affect physical health among LGB individu- als. Previous research has pinpointed two such cognitive styles, both of which are related to fears of future vic- timization: perceptual vigilance and rejection sensitivity. With regard to perceptual vigilance, many research- ers have theorized that experiences with stigma make minority individuals hyperconscious of their social envi- ronment in order to anticipate and avoid stigmatizing encounters in the future (Allport, 1954; Crocker et al., 1998; Meyer, 2003). Such persistent alertness is associ- ated with negative health outcomes in diverse popula- tions (Schnittker & McLeod, 2005). For example, Williams and Neighbors (2001) reviewed evidence of perceptual vigilance among Black individuals, who are frequent tar- gets of prejudice. They argued that such constant vigi- lance alters physiological functioning—especially of the ANS—and that this helps to explain heightened rates of cardiovascular disease in Black communities. Studies in the general population have supported this link between perceptual vigilance and cardiovascular functioning, demonstrating heightened systolic and diastolic blood pressure among participants who were vigilant to nega- tive social messages (Gump & Matthews, 1998). Although similar associations have not been tested in LGB commu- nities, researchers have demonstrated that experiences with antigay victimization make LGB individuals vigilant to threats in their social environment (Pachankis, Gold- fried, & Ramrattan, 2008). Collectively, these data suggest that vigilance may be an important psychological factor affecting LGB cardiovascular health. Experiences with victimization may not only make tar- gets vigilant to potentially harmful social situations, but also sensitive to future rejection. Research in the general population has revealed that some individuals are highly anxious about social rejection (Downey & Feldman, 1996). Such heightened anxiety interferes with physio- logical functioning, as indicated by dysregulated inflam- matory (Slavich, Way, Eisenberger, & Taylor, 2010) and hypothalamic–pituitary–adrenal (HPA) axis responses (Tops, Riese, Oldehinkel, Rijsdijk, & Ormel, 2008), as well as by upregulated indicators of physical pain (Way, Taylor, & Eisenberger, 2009) among rejection-sensitive adults. Rejection sensitivity and concomitant physiologi- cal problems may be especially pronounced among sexual minority individuals. Indeed, two studies have uncovered higher rates of social anxiety among LGB adults relative to heterosexual adults (Pachankis & Goldfried, 2006; Safren & Pantalone, 2006). Other studies have linked such elevated rates of rejection sensitivity to physical health outcomes among gay men. For example, one early study demonstrated faster disease progression and greater rates of mortality among HIV-positive gay by Kerri Johnson on September 12, 2013pps.sagepub.comDownloaded from Sexual Minority Health 535 men who were high in rejection sensitivity than in those who were lower in rejection sensitivity (Cole et al., 1997). A subsequent study argued that rejection-sensitive gay men become socially inhibited after experiencing social rejection in order to avoid future stigma, which has nega- tive implications for their health. In that study, HIV- positive gay men who were highest in social inhibition showed the poorest responses to antiretroviral treatment, even after controlling for demographics, duration of HIV infection, and relevant health behaviors (Cole, Kemeny, Fahey, Zack, & Naliboff, 2003). Thus, sexual minority individuals may be prone to rejection sensitivity due to previous experiences with stigma, and this sensitivity is associated with dysregulated physiological functioning and poorer health outcomes in the community at large. Health behaviors and beliefs. Social experiences may also affect LGB physical health by altering health behav- iors and beliefs. Specifically, LGB people may engage in unhealthy behaviors in order to reduce psychological discomfort following experiences with antigay stigma. If many LGB individuals experience victimization and engage in such risky behaviors to cope with psychological distress, their peers may come to view such behaviors as normative, leading to harmful behaviors and poor health outcomes even among those who do not personally face prejudice. Evidence for these links between social expe- riences and health behavior is quite robust, providing a solid foundation for this portion of our theory about the determinants of LGB physical health disparities. Many studies have indicated that LGB people fre- quently use substances that put their health at risk. For example, LGB individuals report high rates of tobacco, alcohol, and illicit drug use relative to heterosexuals (Beatty, Madl, & Bostwick, 2006; Cochran, Ackerman, Mays, & Ross, 2004; Hatzenbuehler, Corbin, et al., 2008; Hughes & Eliason, 2002; King et al., 2008; McCabe, Boyd, Hughes, & d’Arcy, 2003; McCabe, Hughes, & Boyd, 2004; Ortiz-Hernández, Gómez, & Valdés, 2009). In fact, one meta-analysis reported 190% greater odds of any sub- stance use for LGB youth than for heterosexual youth, with even higher odds for lesbian and bisexual individu- als (340% and 400%, respectively; Marshal et al., 2008). These heightened odds of substance use among sexual minorities were most pronounced for injection drugs (odds ratio = 7.23), followed by cigarettes (odds ratio = 4.23) and cocaine (odds ratio = 3.09). Other evidence suggests that such high rates of sub- stance abuse are associated with difficult social experi- ences among LGB people. In one large sample, LGB adults’ experiences with antigay victimization and inter- nalized homophobia were positively associated with alcohol and drug use (Weber, 2008). In a population- based study, LGB adults who reported multiple experiences with discrimination had nearly four times greater odds of experiencing a substance use disorder in the past year (McCabe, Bostwick, Hughes, West, & Boyd, 2010). In other studies, the amount of antigay rejection reported by LGB participants explained individual differ- ences in tobacco, alcohol, and illicit drug use, even after controlling for demographic factors and social desirabil- ity (Rosario et al., 2009). Finally, in a prospective study, self-reports of internalized homophobia, discrimination, and rejection sensitivity were positively associated with substance use among gay men (Hatzenbuehler, Nolen- Hoeksema, et al., 2008). Collectively, these findings reveal that experiences with minority stress predict substance use among LGB individuals, which has clear links to physical health problems (McBride, 1992; P. A. Newcomb & Carbone, 1992; Rehm et al., 2009; Ronksley, Brien, Turner, Mukamal, & Ghali, 2011). For example, LGB peo- ple who experience minority stress are at heightened risk for smoking tobacco (Hamilton & Mahalik, 2009). Smoking is unambiguously linked to asthma, some can- cers, and cardiovascular disease (McBride, 1992; P. A. Newcomb & Carbone, 1992), all of which are more prev- alent in LGB relative to heterosexual samples (see Diamant & Wold, 2003; Heck & Jacobson, 2006; Landers et al., 2011; McNair et al., 2011). Thus far, we have argued that experiences with minor- ity stress lead to poor health behaviors among LGB peo- ple, which directly harm their physical health. The link between minority stress and health behaviors may also affect LGB health outcomes more indirectly by altering perceptions of health norms. Specifically, LGB individuals who do not experience minority stress may witness unhealthy behaviors among their peers and come to view them as normative (i.e., pluralistic ignorance; Prentice & Miller, 1993), increasing the probability that they will engage in similar behaviors in the future (Hamilton & Mahalik, 2009). In line with this hypothesis, a prospective study found that lesbian women drank more alcohol than did straight women during high school and that gay men increased their alcohol consumption at a faster rate than did straight men during the transition from high school to college (Hatzenbuehler, Corbin, et al., 2008). The percep- tion that alcohol consumption was normative for their peer group drove such heightened drinking behavior among sexual minority youth; that is, perceptions of social norms mediated the association between sexual orienta- tion and substance abuse. Another study showed that indi- vidual health beliefs and peer group norms both predicted psychological distress, engagement in positive health behaviors (e.g., exercise), and risk for drug use among young men who have sex with men (Traube, Holloway, Schrager, & Kipke, 2012). Thus, minority stress may increase risky behaviors among LGB people by altering perceived norms in the LGB community. by Kerri Johnson on September 12, 2013pps.sagepub.comDownloaded from 536 Lick et al. Conclusions and research gaps. Existing data suggest that stigmatizing social experiences affect psychological and behavioral processes that in turn hinder the health of sexual minority individuals. In particular, experi- ences with prejudice and discrimination are associated with psychological distress, which portends poor physi- cal health in both general and LGB populations. Minor- ity stress also involves maladaptive cognitive appraisals, such as vigilance to interpersonal threats and rejection sensitivity, which have negative health consequences. Finally, exposure to minority stress is associated with increased substance use among LGB people. Such risky health behaviors are so common that members of the LGB community view them as normative, increasing the likelihood that they will engage in similar behaviors in the future, thereby compromising the health status of the LGB community at large. Several notable gaps exist in this otherwise robust lit- erature. First, evidence linking individual psychological and behavioral responses to LGB physical health relies almost entirely on cross-sectional designs and self- reports. Studies that explore psychological and behav- ioral sequelae of minority stress with experimental manipulations and objective measures could rule out potentially confounding factors (e.g., social desirability) and clarify the causal directions of these effects. Furthermore, many of the health-compromising pro- cesses described here rely on data from non-LGB minor- ity groups or the general population (e.g., perceptual vigilance among African Americans). In the future, it will be important to replicate these effects with LGB samples. It is also worth noting that most work in this area con- cerns gay men; far fewer studies examine lesbian and bisexual individuals. To gain a more comprehensive understanding of population-level associations between psychological and behavioral stress responses and sexual minority health, researchers should aim to explore these underrepresented groups more fully. Finally, although researchers have paid a great deal of attention to LGB health behaviors, substance abuse has been the primary focus of this work. Other behaviors, such as binge eating and physical inactivity, are also associated with experiencing stigma (Durso, Latner, & Hayashi, 2012; Puhl & Heuer, 2010; Puhl, Moss-Racusin, & Schwartz, 2007). Indeed, internalized homophobia is associated with bulimic behavior among gay men (Reilly & Rudd, 2006), and lesbian women report restricted access to family plans at fitness centers as a reason for physical inactivity (Brittain, Baillargeon, McElroy, Aaron, & Gyurcsik, 2008). Future studies should extend these investigations to clarify the behavioral antecedents of LGB health disparities. Physiological factors linking minority stress and LGB physical health. Finally, physiological factors are critical for understanding LGB health disparities, because they describe how stressors “get under the skin” to affect physical functioning. Despite the importance of this topic, the ways in which psychological and behavioral processes affect physiological functioning among LGB people remain largely unclear. Based on several studies from LGB populations and many from the general popu- lation, we have identified three physiological pathways that may link minority stress to LGB physical health: (a) altered functioning of the HPA axis, (b) dysregulated immunity, and (c) exaggerated ANS reactivity. In the short term, these physiological responses help the body to meet demands of external stressors. Over time, how- ever, repeated activation may produce allostatic load, which ultimately takes a toll on physical functioning and produces health disparities (McEwen, 2006; McEwen & Stellar, 1993; Seeman et al., 1997). HPA axis. Minority stress may impact physiology via hormone regulation. Cortisol is a steroid hormone released by the HPA axis in response to stressors that are socially threatening (Dickerson & Kemeny, 2004). Over time, chronic social stress can lead to dysregulation of the HPA axis (i.e., high levels of circulating cortisol; exag- gerated or blunted cortisol responses to novel stressors), which is associated with a host of negative health out- comes (e.g., cardiovascular disease, diabetes; Lovallo & Thomas, 2000; Lundberg, 2005). A great deal of work in the general population has established links between social stress, HPA functioning, and downstream health (for a review, see Dickerson & Kemeny, 2004). Some preliminary evidence suggests that minority stress affects HPA functioning among LGB individuals. For example, one of the first studies to explore physio- logical correlates of minority stress compared salivary cortisol of gay and bisexual men who disclosed their sexual orientation at work with those who did not (Huebner & Davis, 2005). Disclosure was associated with significantly heightened cortisol during the workday after controlling for baseline levels at home. The authors argued that disclosing one’s sexual orientation at work elevates the risk of experiencing victimization related to one’s sexual orientation (see Pachankis, 2007; Waldo, 1999), arousing concerns about social rejection and therefore stimulating a cortisol response. Persistently high levels of circulating cortisol are associated with a host of poor health outcomes for which LGB individuals show elevated risk (e.g., cardiovascular disease; Lundberg, 2005). Results from Huebner and Davis (2005) suggest that disclosing one’s sexual orientation may arouse concerns about social evaluation, stimulating cortisol responses that accrue over time to damage health. At the same time, concealing one’s sexual orientation may damage health via dysregulated immune function (Cole, Kemeny, et al., by Kerri Johnson on September 12, 2013pps.sagepub.comDownloaded from Sexual Minority Health 537 1996; Cole et al., 1997). Although researchers have yet to experimentally compare the physiological correlates of disclosure and concealment in a single study, these find- ings suggest that acts of disclosure and concealment both negatively affect LGB physical health but that each does so by different means. Thus, LGB individuals may be in a double bind: Disclosing their sexual orientation may put them at risk for social rejection and exaggerated cortisol responses, but concealing their sexual orientation may put them at risk for anxiety and dysregulated immunity. These possibilities highlight multiple routes by which sexual-orientation-related stressors may affect physical health in LGB communities. ANS reactivity. Social experiences may also impact physiology via ANS reactivity. Indeed, social stressors (e.g., giving a speech before unresponsive judges) are associated with exaggerated ANS responses measured via heart rate and blood pressure reactivity, as well as poor recovery from such activity, among healthy adults (e.g., Kirschbaum, Pirke, & Hellhammer, 1993; Uchino & Garvey, 1997). Furthermore, cardiovascular reactivity and poor recovery are well-known risk factors for health problems, insofar as people who show exaggerated cardiovascular responses to stressors are most likely to develop hypertension, atherosclerosis, and cardiovascu- lar disease (Bongard, al’Absi, & Lovallo, 2012; Lovallo & Wilson, 1992). Moreover, a large literature has linked discrimination to cardiovascular reactivity and health in other minority communities, especially Black communi- ties. Laboratory and epidemiological studies have dem- onstrated that Black individuals who report high rates of discrimination experience dysregulation in daily cardio- vascular functioning and cardiovascular health problems in the long term (for a review, see Williams & Moham- med, 2009). Both the general importance of ANS reactivity for phys- ical health and recent evidence from racial minority com- munities support the notion that minority stress may help to explain disparities in cardiovascular disease and disease risk documented among LGB individuals (e.g., Case et al., 2004; Diamant & Wold, 2003). Furthermore, Perez-Benitez, O’Brien, Carels, Gordon, and Chiros (2007) compared car- diovascular recovery of healthy gay men who disclosed their sexual orientation during a laboratory experiment with recovery of those who did not disclose their orienta- tion. They found greater recovery among gay men who disclosed their sexual orientation—a pattern that is at odds with previous observations of elevated cortisol levels fol- lowing disclosure (Huebner & Davis, 2005). However, the recovery trend was only prevalent among gay men who tended to conceal their sexual orientation in everyday life but disclosed it during the study. The authors argued that persistent concealment of one’s sexual orientation is stressful (see Frable et al., 1998; Pachankis, 2007), leading to chronic cardiovascular arousal. For individuals who reg- ularly concealed their sexual orientation, disclosure may have momentarily reduced this stress, as evidenced by the greater recovery for gay men who tended to conceal their sexual orientation before the study. This work adds to the small but growing literature demonstrating links between minority stress processes—especially sexual orientation disclosure—and physiological functioning among LGB individuals. Immune system. Immune functioning is a third route by which experiences of minority stress may impact physiology. Research in psychoneuroimmunology has consistently linked social stressors to increased inflam- mation, as indicated by circulating levels of proinflamma- tory cytokines (e.g., Cohen et al., 2012; Steptoe, Hamer, & Chida, 2007). Studies have also linked psychological stressors (e.g., job strain, caregiving) to poor antibody responses following immunization (Cohen, Miller, & Rabin, 2001). More generally, a meta-analysis of more than 300 empirical studies indicated robust associations between psychological stress and diverse indicators of immune function (Segerstrom & Miller, 2004). Collec- tively, these studies suggest that psychological stress affects the immune system, resulting in inflammatory processes and poor antibody responses that leave the body susceptible to disease (Segerstrom & Miller, 2004). Among LGB individuals in particular, concealing sex- ual orientation negatively impacts immune function—this is consistent with Perez-Benitez et al.’s (2007) findings. Specifically, HIV-positive gay men who concealed their sexual orientation in one study exhibited significantly higher incidences of cancer, infectious diseases, and mor- tality in a 5-year longitudinal study (Cole, Kemeny, et al., 1996). Demographic, behavioral, and psychological dif- ferences among participants did not account for these effects, but poor immune functioning and faster disease progression among gay men who concealed their sexual orientation did (see Cole et al., 1996). Thus, in much the same way that sexual orientation disclosure aids cardio- vascular recovery, concealment appears to hinder immune functioning, at least among HIV-positive gay men, leading to disease progression and poor health out- comes overall. Aside from established links between chronic sexual orientation concealment and immune dysregulation, other forms of minority stress may also affect immune functioning. Indeed, in the general population, acute social-evaluative threats such as those elicited by the Trier Social Stress Test (Kirschbaum et al., 1993) affect the number and function of immune cells in the body. Fleeting experiences with antigay stigma may have simi- lar effects on LGB individuals’ immune systems. Because by Kerri Johnson on September 12, 2013pps.sagepub.comDownloaded from 538 Lick et al. stigma is a common experience of social-evaluative threat for sexual minorities, LGB people may face constant immune dysregulation, which ultimately wears on the body and hinders physical health. However, researchers have yet to provide empirical support for such associa- tions between acute stressors and immune functioning among LGB individuals; this is an important goal for future work. Conclusions and research gaps. As reviewed here, several recent studies have linked experiences of minor- ity stress to dysregulation of the HPA axis, immune sys- tem, and ANS among LGB adults. It is important to note that dysregulation of these systems is associated with physical health problems in the general population (see Cacioppo, Tassinary, & Berntson, 2007), and specific dis- ease processes among gay men (Cole, Kemeny, et al., 1996). Thus, we propose that minority stress is likely to affect physiological functioning among LGB individuals. Although existing studies have revealed potential links between minority stress and physiological functioning for LGB people, the data are sparse, and methodological limi- tations of existing studies warrant comment. First, most research to date has relied on small convenience samples, compromising our ability to generalize beyond those samples. Second, most studies have focused exclusively on the physiological functioning of gay men, some of whom were HIV-positive, which raises questions about the applicability of the findings to broader sexual minority populations. Furthermore, most work on this topic has relied on cross-sectional designs and self-reports of minor- ity stress (e.g., sexual orientation disclosure), limiting our ability to draw causal inferences. Also, many of these studies examined a single biomarker, and this narrow focus may obscure interactions among diverse physiologi- cal systems following exposure to minority stress. Perhaps most important, the ways in which discrete instances of physiological dysregulation manifest in poor health for LGB individuals remain unclear. Allostatic load models suggest that repeated stress exposure leads to chronic dysregulation of multiple physiological systems; over time, such dysregulation wears on the body and compromises physical health (McEwen, 2006; McEwen & Stellar, 1993; Seeman et al., 1997). However, strikingly few studies have examined allostatic load among LGB individuals. In one study, Adams (2008) used data from the National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey to compare allostatic load between LGB and heterosexual participants based on nine stress-related biomarkers: sys- tolic blood pressure, diastolic blood pressure, body mass index, resting heart rate, glycohemoglobin, C-reactive protein, albumin, HDL cholesterol, and total cholesterol. After equating LGB and heterosexual subgroups on demographic factors and health behaviors, there were no differences in allostatic load between groups. There are several potential reasons for the non-significant allostatic load effect in this study. First, allostatic load may not be the mechanism by which physiological dysregulation affects LGB physical health. However, this explanation seems improbable due to the data linking stress to allo- static load and poor physical health in the general popu- lation (e.g., Seeman et al., 1997). Second, we have argued that poor health behaviors help to explain physical health outcomes among LGB adults. In particular, increased substance abuse following minority stress may contribute to LGB health disparities. However, Adams (2008) con- trolled for health risk behaviors, which may have eradi- cated differences in allostatic load between the LGB and heterosexual subsamples. Indeed, if LGB people engage in riskier behaviors than heterosexual people due to dif- ferential exposure to minority stress, and if these behav- iors are linked to health disparities, then adjusting for differences in risk behavior between LGB and hetero- sexual participants may have occluded important physi- ological differences between the groups. Current data do not permit strong inferences about these possibilities, and the fact that so few studies have examined allostatic load in LGB communities suggests that this topic deserves a great deal more attention in the future. Future Directions for Research on LGB Physical Health Sexual minority health has become a pressing concern for scholars, policymakers, and medical professionals around the world. A number of recent studies have dem- onstrated poorer health outcomes among LGB individu- als relative to heterosexual individuals, but there is little theory about the causes and correlates of those dispari- ties. In this article, we endeavored to improve knowledge in this area by linking evidence of LGB health disparities to difficult social experiences that arouse stress. Although our review relied on empirical evidence from both LGB and general populations to pinpoint specific pathways by which social experiences may impact physical health in LGB communities, there is still much work to be done. We now outline five goals that future researchers must meet if we are to achieve a comprehensive knowledge of LGB physical health. This call-to-arms implores col- leagues in the allied fields of public health, epidemiol- ogy, psychology, sociology, and medicine to provide new insights about the social determinants of LGB physical health. Researchers must collect new epidemiological data on the existence, frequency, and correlates of LGB physical health disparities A growing number of studies have uncovered physical health disparities related to sexual orientation. Still, we by Kerri Johnson on September 12, 2013pps.sagepub.comDownloaded from Sexual Minority Health 539 need additional epidemiological research on the form and frequency of these disparities. This is especially true because evidence supporting the most dramatic dispari- ties often comes from single studies (e.g., higher rates of cardiovascular disease among lesbian women; Diamant & Wold, 2003). New studies will help to clarify the preva- lence rates of such severe disparities. Furthermore, whereas some studies have uncovered increased disease diagnoses among LGB individuals (e.g., cancer: Koblin et al., 1996; asthma: Kim & Fredriksen-Goldsen, 2012), many existing studies have investigated disease risk fac- tors rather than diagnoses per se. This is partially due to a reliance on younger LGB samples (e.g., Adams, 2008; Landers et al., 2011), which may not yet exhibit signs of disease. As this area of research matures, studies of clini- cally significant diagnoses among aging LGB adults will be increasingly important (Wallace, Cochran, Durazo, & Ford, 2011). It is also worth noting that most epidemio- logical evidence of LGB physical health problems has relied on self-reports from sexual minority adults. In the future, studies that explore archival data, medical records, and physician observations are necessary to confirm pre- vious findings and obviate potential confounds in self- reports of physical health (e.g., malingering). Moreover, researchers have demonstrated a wide variety of physical health disparities between LGB and heterosexual adults, ranging from asthma to cancer and cardiovascular dis- ease. Because only a handful of studies have examined each outcome, it was necessary to combine them for the purposes of this review. Still, it is likely that some dispari- ties are more common than others and that minority stress is a better predictor of some disparities than others. In the future, it will be important to gauge the relative frequency of each of these health outcomes and to tease apart their common and unique predictors. As more pop- ulation-based surveys and medical records include ques- tions about sexual orientation, it will become increasingly feasible to address these issues. Aside from additional data on the form and frequency of LGB physical health disparities, we need more popu- lation-level data about correlates of such disparities. Indeed, most epidemiological work in this area has examined only sexual minority status and health out- comes, without testing potential mechanisms linking these variables. Based on existing literature, epidemiolo- gists should strive to include several additional measures in future studies. First, measures of both lifetime and recent exposure to antigay prejudice, as well as expecta- tions of future prejudice, are necessary to draw stronger links between distal stressors and health outcomes among LGB individuals. Furthermore, to help clarify conflicting findings about the health costs and benefits of sexual orientation disclosure, epidemiological studies should include measures of disclosure (e.g., time since sexual orientation disclosure, frequency of sexual orientation disclosure). Previous findings from convenience samples indicated that frequent exposure to antigay stigma leads to internalized homophobia, which may be associated with poor physical health; population-level data are nec- essary to buttress these claims. Finally, we have almost no information about factors that may buffer associations between sexual minority status and poor health. Population-level data about community connectedness, identity pride, and family acceptance would help us understand how and why some LGB individuals flourish and others do not. As epidemiological studies include more measures of perceived discrimination, sexual orien- tation disclosure, internalized homophobia, and stress- buffering factors, we will be able to reach stronger conclusions about potential mechanisms linking sexual minority status to physical health outcomes. Researchers must systematically rule out potential confounds of the minority stress account of LGB physical health Future work must also rule out competing theories that may account for LGB physical health disparities. Comorbid diagnoses of HIV/AIDS are especially impor- tant, as they may explain some health problems observed among gay men (see Cochran & Mays, 2007). Response biases and social desirability represent other important confounds, as most studies in this area rely on self-report. In the future, studies that control for comorbid disease and gather data from multiple sources would allay these methodological concerns. Several recent studies provide creative methods for achieving these goals. For example, future researchers might sample sibling pairs in which one individual identifies as LGB and the other identifies as heterosexual (see Balsam et al., 2005) to reduce poten- tial confounds related to rearing and early family experi- ences. Similarly, researchers might examine objective measures of health outcomes (e.g., medical records and biomarkers; see Hatzenbuehler et al., 2012; Huebner & Davis, 2005) to mitigate concerns about biased self- reports. Adopting these and other novel methods will greatly enhance the evidentiary basis for conclusions in this literature. Researchers must clarify the causal directions of physiological processes proposed to drive LGB physical health disparities Although results from cross-sectional studies have revealed associations between experiences with minority by Kerri Johnson on September 12, 2013pps.sagepub.comDownloaded from 540 Lick et al. stress, physiological functioning, and physical health out- comes for LGB individuals, the correlational nature of the data obfuscates causal inferences. For example, it remains unclear whether some negative psychological states observed among LGB individuals (e.g., neuroticism, neg- ative affect) are a cause or a consequence of minority stress and its related physical health problems. Controlled experiments that provide causal evidence are a crucial next step for this area of research. In particular, studies that experimentally manipulate minority stress and objec- tively measure physiological outcomes in a laboratory setting will help to clarify the direction of association between social experiences and LGB physical health. Researchers who investigate health difficulties in other minority communities have made great strides toward specifying causal directions, and these efforts can serve as a template for new work with LGB communities. Indeed, research with African American participants has consis- tently revealed that stigma leads to physiological changes that are associated with long-term health disparities (Blascovich, Spencer, Quinn, & Steele, 2001; Brondolo, Gallo, & Myers, 2008; Guyll, Matthews, & Bromberger, 2001; Krieger, 2012; K. A. Matthews, Salomon, Kenyon, & Zhou, 2005). Despite theoretical rationales for similar links between social experiences and physiological functioning in sexual minority communities, only a few studies have tested the effects of minority stress on physiology among LGB individuals. Furthermore, extant research has explored only a few physiological mechanisms in isolation (e.g., salivary cortisol, cardiac recovery, immune responses). In the future, researchers will gain from replicating these findings and exploring how multiple bodily systems inter- act following exposure to minority stressors. This work will help to clarify specific pathways by which minority stress gets under the skin, and it may reveal promising avenues for interventions that reduce morbidity in LGB communities. Aside from controlled experiments, other research designs will also be helpful in clarifying causal pathways linking stigma to physical health outcomes in LGB com- munities. Indeed, whereas laboratory studies are useful for examining interpersonal forms of minority stress, they are less useful for pinpointing broader sociocultural determinants of LGB physical health (e.g., discriminatory social policies). Longitudinal datasets with representative geographic variation, valid measures of sexual orienta- tion, and objective measures of physical health will be especially helpful in exploring these broader aspects of minority stress. Overall, a multimethod approach that incorporates controlled experiments, prospective and longitudinal studies, and quasi-experimental datasets will provide the most comprehensive knowledge of causal mechanisms underlying LGB health disparities. Researchers must carefully examine links between mental and physical health in LGB communities Psychological and physiological systems are intricately connected, such that dysregulation in one area may lead to dysregulation in the other (Irwin, 2008; McGregor & Antoni, 2009). For example, researchers have high- lighted complex interactions between depression and immune functioning in the general population, such that depressed individuals exhibit heightened inflamma- tion, which in turn may fuel further depression (Raison, Capuron, & Miller, 2006). Thus, to fully understand LGB physical health disparities, we must understand their associations with psychological health. Traditionally, however, LGB mental health and physical health are studied in isolation and by different disciplines. When researchers have assessed both domains of well- being, they have tended to treat one as a confound of the other (e.g., exploring physical health after control- ling for mental health status), thus obscuring meaning- ful interactive effects. Interdisciplinary research teams that integrate both domains of well-being will advance the field toward a more nuanced understanding of LGB health. Researchers must explore the developmental timeline of LGB physical health disparities Finally, most studies of sexual minority health have relied on reports at a single time point and often from a fairly young sample of adults. These studies provided useful information about LGB health disparities, but they have resulted in limited knowledge of those disparities across the life span. This is an especially important limitation in light of “critical periods,” or points during development in which people are highly susceptible to stress (Taylor, 2009), which have received increasing attention in health research. LGB individuals’ first experiences disclosing their sexual orientation may represent a critical period, wherein social rejection from family and friends acts as a potent stressor that predicts future health (Ryan, Huebner, Diaz, & Sanchez, 2009; Ryan, Russell, Huebner, Diaz, & Sanchez, 2010). As LGB individuals come out at earlier stages of development (Ryan, 2003), critical periods may become increasingly important for understanding their long-term health. Longitudinal studies that follow LGB individuals from the time they come out (or even before they come out) until later adulthood will help us to understand the time course of physical health problems in the LGB community. by Kerri Johnson on September 12, 2013pps.sagepub.comDownloaded from Sexual Minority Health 541 Conclusion In summary, a growing body of research reveals that LGB individuals suffer physical health disparities relative to their heterosexual peers, ranging from poor overall health to activity limitations, disability, disease risk factors, and specific diagnoses. In this article, we provided the first comprehensive overview of various pathways by which social factors may hinder LGB physical health, providing a starting point for more detailed theorizing about the social determinants of LGB health disparities. Still, there is much work to be done. In particular, it is critically important for future researchers to employ laboratory and longitudinal methods to understand the causal time course of LGB health disparities. Such new studies have the potential to inform multiple disciplines, highlighting not only important links between sexual orientation, minority stress, and physical health, but also correlates and confounds of these issues (e.g., single vs. coupled LGB individuals; exclusively lesbian/gay vs. bisexual individuals). We certainly have our work cut out for us, but these topics cannot be ignored, as they concern the morbidity of millions of sexual minority individuals and inform both local and federal policy decisions. If research on this topic continues with the vigor of the past 10 years, then by the time the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services releases their Healthy People guidelines for 2030, we are confident that scholars and policymakers will have a more complete knowledge of LGB physical health that will be useful in mitigating such serious concerns. Declaration of Conflicting Interests The authors declared that they had no conflicts of interest with respect to their authorship or the publication of this article. Notes 1. We focus specifically on the physical health of LGB individu- als, as they share a common stigma related to their sexual ori- entation (i.e., attraction to members of the same sex). Although transgender individuals are often included in discussions of sexual minority populations and may experience discrimina- tion based on their sexual orientation, they also face distinct stigmas and health issues related to discrepancies between their biological sex and gender identity. Therefore, it does not seem appropriate or feasible to review the literature on LGB and transgender health in the same article. We limit the current review to health disparities specifically related to sexual orien- tation, fully recognizing that a detailed review of transgender health warrants its own analysis. 2. Throughout our review, we rely primarily on research con- ducted with LGB samples. In cases in which there has been little or no research conducted with sexual minority participants, we extend our review to the health implications of stigma for other minority groups but only when necessary. 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work_qdq3qgff6rbi7cdmufsjqsme34	----	European journal of American studies, 14-4 | 2019 European journal of American studies  14-4 | 2019 Special Issue: Spectacle and Spectatorship in American Culture “Somebody do Something!”: Lynching Photographs, Historical Memory, and the Possibility of Sympathetic Spectatorship Amy Louise Wood Electronic version URL: http://journals.openedition.org/ejas/15512 DOI: 10.4000/ejas.15512 ISSN: 1991-9336 Publisher European Association for American Studies Electronic reference Amy Louise Wood, « “Somebody do Something!”: Lynching Photographs, Historical Memory, and the Possibility of Sympathetic Spectatorship », European journal of American studies [Online], 14-4 | 2019, Online since 23 December 2019, connection on 10 December 2020. URL : http:// journals.openedition.org/ejas/15512 ; DOI : https://doi.org/10.4000/ejas.15512 This text was automatically generated on 10 December 2020. Creative Commons License http://journals.openedition.org http://journals.openedition.org http://journals.openedition.org/ejas/15512 “Somebody do Something!”: Lynching Photographs, Historical Memory, and the Possibility of Sympathetic Spectatorship Amy Louise Wood Figure 1: Pat Ward Williams, “Accused/Blowtorch/Padlock” (1986). Digital Image ©Whitney Museum of Art/Licensed by Scala/Art Resource, NY. 1 “There’s something going on here. I didn’t see it right away” reads the text. And so the artist compels us to look closely. At the center of the piece, in a row, sit four panels of photographs, each bordered with a wooden frame. With more scrutiny, it becomes clear that the four images are pieces of the same photograph. A black man is tied to a tree. It is an image that is both grossly familiar—as the text says, “you’ve seen one “Somebody do Something!”: Lynching Photographs, Historical Memory, and the Po... European journal of American studies, 14-4 | 2019 1 lynched man, you’ve seen them all”—and strangely jarring. After all the man is not hanging from a tree; he even appears to be still alive, as the tension in his legs suggests he is bearing some of his own weight. 2 What the piece does not tell us is that this man, named Robert “Bootjack” McDaniels, 26 years old, was lynched in 1937 in Duck Hill, Mississippi. He was apparently a bootlegger who, along with his compatriot, Roosevelt Townes, had been whipped and threatened by local whites for his illegal activities. When a local merchant was murdered, the two men became prime suspects and were arrested. As they were being led to the county courthouse to stand trial, a mob of about 200 white men kidnapped them, took them to a clearing in the woods, beat them, and cut them with knives. The mob then used gasoline blowtorches on them to extract their confessions. Once satisfied, the mob shot McDaniels to death and burned Townes alive. A third suspect, Everett “Shorty” Dorrah, had been brought to the clearing to watch, before he was horsewhipped and ordered to leave the state.1 Figure 2: Robert “Bootjack” McDaniels, April 13, 1937 3 A local photographer documented this sequence of events and sold selected images out of his studio in Grenada, Mississippi. These images, which include the one in Figure 2, as well as another of Townes hogtied to a tree, differ from the conventions of most lynching photographs in that they depict the torture being enacted, rather than capturing its aftermath or even an interrupted or staged moment in the process. The lynchers are not visible, as they are in many such photographs, in which mobs stood proudly around their victims, but their presence is clearly felt in the tug of the chains that bind McDaniels’ hands, pulling his body away from the tree. 4 Some fifty years later, in 1986, African-American artist Pat Ward Williams used this image of McDaniels in the piece shown in Figure 1, entitled, “Accused, Blowtorch, Padlock.” Williams is a conceptual artist who works in a variety of media, weaving “Somebody do Something!”: Lynching Photographs, Historical Memory, and the Po... European journal of American studies, 14-4 | 2019 2 together historical and autobiographical images that deal with memory and race in America. Her work also impels viewers to physically and intellectually interact with the art, which is what she wants us to do in encountering this piece.2 She has surrounded the panels of photographs with a series of questions and statements that challenge not only the lynching, but the act of photographing it. Her text asks, “Did he take the camera home and then come back with the blowtorch?,” evoking a metaphorical association between the camera and the weapon as instruments of violation.3 She also contests those who would exhibit such an image by reproaching Life magazine for publishing the photograph, which it did in 1937 and then again in 1955 (the page number she gives, p. 141, refers to the 1955 publication), and suggests that Life’s editorial decision was ideologically loaded with real-world political effects: “Life magazine published this picture. Could Hitler show pics of the Holocaust to keep the JEWS in line?” In other words, publishing the image was a means of racial control. 5 The form of Williams’ text, not only its content, expresses a sense of personal outrage. The words are handwritten, scrawled and shaky, connoting not written language but speech, and angry speech. It is a shouting voice, screaming to be heard above the power of the violent image. And then the scrawl of text ends with “Somebody do something,” written in the present tense, as if she asking the viewer to intervene in the scene or respond in some way to what is happening in the photograph. 6 Several things are happening in this piece. First, Williams collapses any distinction between the torturer and the act of photographing or even exhibiting an image of that torture. Then, in her final statement, she collapses past and present. The torture is ongoing; it exists in the present. These two points are related, since her text implies that the continued existence of the photograph extends the victim’s torture. Moreover, Williams emphasizes the emotional impact—the affect—that viewing this torture produces. That affect, as manifest in both the content and the form of the text, is visceral, and its physical intensity calls upon us to feel sympathy, as in to feel with or alongside (sym-) the suffering (pathos) of another. Our sympathy is twofold; we are horrified by the sight of the victim’s torture, but also we feel alongside the artist –in fact, it’s her suffering that calls out to us directly. 7 *** 8 This piece is a memorial to lynching, to the horror of thousands of African Americans tortured and killed throughout the Jim Crow era. Lynching has served as the primary metaphor, or what Leigh Raiford has called the “primal narrative,” through which African Americans have interpreted their subjugated status in the US and have responded to racial injustice in the present.4 If lynching is a primal metaphor, lynching photographs have served as the visual symbols of that metaphor. As such, they have the capacity to activate popular consciousness about racist violence in the past and guide public discourse about it by producing in the viewer a meaningful ethical engagement with that past, what many scholars have termed “bearing witness.”5 As Ann Kaplan has argued, viewing another’s suffering becomes an act of witnessing when one is so emotionally aroused by the scene that one is transformed to the point of feeling “vaguely responsible” and thus motivated to act. Kaplan terms this emotional response one of empathy, as the viewer imagines him/herself in the moment—though, as I explain below, I prefer the term sympathy. An ethical engagement need not entail a direct intervention, but can consist of a shift in perspective of the world and one’s own responsibilities in it.6 “Somebody do Something!”: Lynching Photographs, Historical Memory, and the Po... European journal of American studies, 14-4 | 2019 3 9 But what does it mean to bear witness to past atrocities? Can the spectatorship of a historical image of racial suffering produce a sympathetic, and thereby ethical, engagement with present-day injustice? The status of lynching photographs as symbolic forms, as icons, I believe, opens up the possibility of such encounters. That iconic status strips the photograph of any historical specificity, so that its subject comes to represent something greater than itself.7 Removed from history, the photograph remains ever-present, speaking to ongoing injustice and trauma. What’s more, its iconic status renders the spectator’s relation to the image somewhat fluid. New meanings can be imposed on an image through text, framing, and context, as well through the viewer’s subjective positioning, all of which can potentially reposition the spectator to stimulate an affective response, not only to the lynching victim, but to those suffering in the present. In other words, lynching photographs can help create an ethical historical memory of racial violence, engaging with the past to reflect upon the present and demanding a reckoning with present-day injustice. This is what, for African Americans, Raiford has called “black critical memory,” an interpretation of the past that forms black political and social identities and mobilizes social justice movements.8 But, I contend, lynching photographs also create the possibility of a white sympathetic encounter with the historical memory of lynching. In that context, Williams’ plea for “somebody [to] do something” in the face of Townes’ long-past torture does not seem out of time or place. 10 By historical memory, I am referring to ideas that groups and individuals might hold about past events that they never experienced or witnessed first-hand. These memories are, by their very nature, social. For one, they come to be framed, learned, and transmitted through groups and institutions in families, schools, museums, and the media—acts of transfer that make remembering possible at all. That is, there exists no understanding or mental image of historical events outside social representations of them. What’s more, social groups make decisions about what is memorable and what is not, often to meet the needs and concerns of the present. In other words, historical memories derive only from present-day social judgments about what is important to apprehend and convey. The formation of historical memories is, to be sure, a contested process, as whose memories come to dominate in the public sphere is dependent on social power, and that process can also entail misremembering and even forgetting. This is especially so in the context of histories of race and violence in the United States, as various social groups hold very different memories of this past, which, in turn, structure their responses to present-day racial violence.9 In particular, while for many black Americans the memory of lynching is visceral and ever-present—that “primal narrative”—for many white Americans it is hazy, distorted, or forgotten. Yet that misremembering can be disrupted through self-reflective acts of displaying and looking at lynching photographs, much as Williams does in “Accused/Blowtoch/Padlock.” 11 This paper will consider the creation of an ethical historical memory of racist violence in the United States by tracing the exhibition history of the photograph of Bootjack McDaniels’ torture and murder. It reflects on the ways in which text and context can shape affect and, in turn, sympathetic engagement. It will also consider public responses to lynching photographs more broadly to argue that, although black and white spectators tend to respond to these photographs in different ways, whites can engage in a parallel process of critical memory through a form of sympathetic spectatorship.10 “Somebody do Something!”: Lynching Photographs, Historical Memory, and the Po... European journal of American studies, 14-4 | 2019 4 12 *** 13 We are well aware today that a photograph is not a transparent or objective reflection of an event; that is, the documentary realism of photography is somewhat of an illusion. A photograph represents only a snapshot of time; it does not tell us what happened before and after the moment or what is happening outside the frame, nor can it capture sound or mood. Yet, despite these limitations, photographs have an unusual capacity to construct and transmit historical memories of an event, especially so with acts of atrocity such as lynching. That capacity is undoubtedly due to the authority we bestow on photographs as objective records of the past. Unlike oral or written accounts of the past, a photograph appears not to have a mediator, especially as the subjective position that is inherent in any photograph—the eye of the cameraperson—is concealed. The authority granted to a photograph is compounded in instances of human atrocity, which challenge our assumptions about imaginable human behavior. Through its indexical function, the photograph provides the proof that violence demands; we know that this event took place because somebody was there to capture it on film.11 The supposed realism and immediacy of that image prompts an emotional response that sears itself into memory. Photographs of atrocity can shock the viewer out of complacency—horrify, repel, and sadden. 14 Indeed, rather than casting doubt on the past, the fact that photographs represent only a defined moment in time contributes to their capacity to facilitate historical memories. Those memories depend on some sort of tangible manifestation that condenses what is actually a complicated and ambiguous past into an accessible form and brings conflicting group or individual recollections into a schematic, conventional unity.12 Photographs stabilize the past into an unchanging and easily readable image, what Susan Sontag has likened to a “quotation, or a maxim, or a proverb.”13 They have, in that sense, what has been called an “iconic presence,” making present a moment through representation that is otherwise lost to time. The “iconic presence” speaks also to the aura around a photograph, through its intrinsic association with death, or a moment lost in time, so they appear as a ghostly remnant of the past.14 In that sense, photographs operate much like memory itself, bringing to life the past in a shadowy, yet vivid—immediate, yet approximate—way. 15 Many public responses to Without Sanctuary, a collection of over 100 photographs, many of which were published in 2001 and have been exhibited in various cities over the past eighteen years, attest to this authority that lynching photographs hold. In his forward to the book, Without Sanctuary, Congressman John Lewis writes that, although as a child growing up in Alabama he heard stories about lynchings, they “seemed nightmarish, unreal—even unbelievable.” The photographs, however, “make real the hideous crimes that were committed against humanity.... [and] bear witness especially since many Americans will not (don’t want to) believe such atrocities happened in America.”15 In other words, photographs force an ugly truth on a reluctant and disbelieving public and provide them a visual vocabulary through with which to comprehend this violence. Viewers of the Without Sanctuary collection in various exhibitions across the country and online have recorded similar responses. The images, viewers claim, offer a “realistic representation” of lynching, a “brutal truth and reality” that “burn[s] the idea into our heads to remember.” They are “disturbing” and “bone-chilling,” yet “eye- opening,” revealing the full scale of the horror for viewers. As one viewer posted, “I knew our past was a horrible and dark time, but I never imagined it looked like this.”16 “Somebody do Something!”: Lynching Photographs, Historical Memory, and the Po... European journal of American studies, 14-4 | 2019 5 16 Yet these qualities of atrocity photographs are precisely what make them problematic as vehicles for historical memory, as many critics have pointed out.17 As Williams makes clear in her piece, the violence represented in the image is bound up in the act of photographing, a fact that heightens the sickening horror of the images. Lynching photographs thus make an individual’s death—already horrific not only because of the torture he suffered, but because that suffering was made public so casually—public once again. The sensationalism of the image potentially renders the present-day viewer a voyeur, another lynching spectator. The lynching victim, in turn, is rendered an anonymous icon, a representation of all black suffering, frozen in time, the effect of which is to potentially reify black victimhood.18 17 What’s more, some have argued, repeated exposure to atrocity images can anesthetize viewers from the past trauma represented in them, a distancing which ultimately produces ethical or political indifference.19 Encountering the images in the quiet comfort of a gallery or in the security of their homes, viewers are potentially offered a screen from any real engagement from the horror of the moment. And the representation of the event ultimately comes to replace any real understanding or knowledge of it. Instead, the images can feed a simplistic narrative of the past and prompt conventional, predictable responses to it.20 18 These challenges inherent in the exhibition of atrocity photographs have led to an impulse not to look, to remove the images from view.21 John Lewis has said that his wife refuses to open the book version of Without Sanctuary.22 This same impulse can be seen in the work of contemporary artists such as Kerry James Marshall and Ken Gonzalez- Day, who, unlike Williams, have grappled with the relationship between memory and lynching photography by recreating the images in their work, yet obscuring the bodies of the dead in them.23 The National Memorial for Peace and Justice, which the Equal Justice Initiative (EJI) opened in Montgomery, Alabama, in 2018 to commemorate the victims of lynching, includes no photographs, to haunting effect. At the center of the site is a large, semi-enclosed square containing 800 steel slabs, each representing 800 counties in which lynchings were committed. They are suspended from the ceiling frame, as if to resemble hanged bodies. Elsewhere on the six-acre lot, replicas of the slabs are laid on the ground, lined up in rows, appearing like coffins. The omission of photographs was intentional. As EJI executive director Bryan Stevenson told the Montgomery Advertiser, “I think for some people ‘Without Sanctuary’ created this optic that was shocking, and we were less interested in shocking optics.” The EJI wanted to emphasize the communities in which this violence took place, rather than suffering of individual victims.24 Indeed, the EJI will deliver to any county its slab to be displayed on site as a memorial. In doing so, the hope is that communities will take responsibility for their history, that is, to bear witness. Yet, would the EJI memorial be as evocative and powerful as it is if viewers did not already know what a lynching looked like? 19 *** 20 The history of the Duck Hill photo can be instructive in formulating how to look at lynching photographs in a way that leads to an ethical engagement with the historical memory of lynching. Lynching photographs were detached from historical specificity and rendered into symbols from their very first appearances. For the defenders of lynching, they could stand as representations of white supremacy and power over black beastliness. For anti-lynching activists, they became symbols of white barbarism and the failure of American democratic ideals.25 As a photograph moves in and out of “Somebody do Something!”: Lynching Photographs, Historical Memory, and the Po... European journal of American studies, 14-4 | 2019 6 different visual and ideological contexts, it comes to reflect the needs of a particular moment in time.26 This was true of the photograph of Bootjack McDaniels’ lynching, long before Williams used it in “Accused/Padlock/Blowtorch.” 21 In 1937, it was the first photograph of a lynching of a black man to be published in the mainstream, national press.27 This lynching attracted relatively significant national attention at the time because it occurred just as the U.S. House of Representatives was debating the passage of the Gavagan Bill, a bill that would make lynching a federal crime, thereby allowing the federal government to place sanctions upon communities in which a lynching took place. This bill, introduced by New York Congressman Joseph Gavagan, a white man who represented black Harlem, was one of many similar attempts to pass anti-lynching legislation in the 1920s and 1930s. The Gavagan Bill passed the House 277-118, largely along sectional lines, a legislative victory that was helped by the news of the Duck Hill lynching.28 Time magazine reported that, two days before the vote, debate in the House “rose to a furious crescendo” after one representative read from a press report the details of the torture enacted upon Townes and McDaniels.29 McDaniels and Townes were to stand in for all lynching victims at that moment, and their lynching was the kind of atrocity an anti-lynching bill was meant to punish. 22 Soon afterwards, Life magazine published the photograph of Bootjack McDaniels’ tortured body, flanked on either side by headshots of Congressmen Gavagan and Hatton Summers (D-TX), the lead opponent of the bill, with the headline “One Lynching Spurs Congress to Stop Others,”—a positioning meant to direct the viewers’ interpretation of not only the lynching photograph as one with high political stakes, but also the bill itself: this is the kind of atrocity over which these men were battling.30 Time magazine similarly published another photograph from the Duck Hill lynching, one that showed both McDaniels and Townes, naked and hogtied to a tree, in the frame, beside its story about the Gavagan Bill.31 Then, in December of that year, when the same bill was being debated in the Senate, a poster that included both images appeared outside the Senate chamber. It also was published in the Chicago Tribune amidst a series of ads and a photograph of a black dance performance [see figure 3].32 Beyond brief captions, most of these outlets provided few details about the lynching itself, or McDaniels and Townes, or their alleged crime.33 But to serve their purpose, these images did not require context; they were meant to serve as a visual rallying cry to garner support for the bill. The Memphis Press-Scimitar, which also printed the photograph of McDaniels alone, did so “only in hope that it will cause such a feeling of revulsion that there will never be another like it.”34 “Somebody do Something!”: Lynching Photographs, Historical Memory, and the Po... European journal of American studies, 14-4 | 2019 7 Figure 3: Chicago Tribune, 5 December 1937, H2 23 The press’s use of the Duck Hill photographs were very much in line with how the black press and the NAACP had been using lynching photographs for years. Since Ida B. Wells first printed an illustration of a lynching, rendered from a photograph, in her 1894 anti-lynching pamphlet, A Red Record, activists had used lynching images to provide visual documentation to a potentially disbelieving public that these atrocities were happening, and to arouse “revulsion” in viewers as a means to galvanize the anti- lynching movement. In doing so, they displaced these photographs entirely from the local circumstances and sentiments that had produced them. The authenticity or journalistic specificity of the images were not that important to them. They rarely offered any details about the victims, and provided little context for their murders. Often one lynching photograph would be used in many different contexts, with the name and date of the victim erased from the images. The NAACP furthered this practice when it began publishing lynching photographs in its newspaper, the Crisis, and in various anti-lynching pamphlets and posters. For anti-lynching activists, the photographs served as interchangeable symbols of white brutality and black suffering. 35 Their efforts substantiate the notion that the meaning of a photograph is not intrinsic to the image; rather, meaning is created—an emotive reaction produced— through the ideological context in which it is viewed. 24 This use of lynching photographs fit with activists’ broader rhetoric, which placed emphasis not on black victimhood, but on the depravity of white mobs. Lynching, activists tended to argue, was a crime not so much against black communities or families but against American civilization and democracy. Their political rhetoric and imagery made surprisingly little mention of race or racial prejudice. In fact, the black victim—a too-visible reminder of black criminality—became largely eclipsed, while the members of the mob, as defilers of justice and law, moved to the front and center of anti-lynching discourse. These editorial decisions appealed to white liberals and “Somebody do Something!”: Lynching Photographs, Historical Memory, and the Po... European journal of American studies, 14-4 | 2019 8 moderates who might harbor fears about black criminality, but who also believed in law and order, and wanted to see America as a civilized and just nation. In that context, it made sense not to provide readers with any details about the victims or the events that allegedly precipitated the lynching. Photographs depicting only the lynched man’s body were exceptional in the black press for that reason; editors often preferred photographs that showed the surrounding mob.36 25 Eighteen years later, in January 1955, the photograph of McDaniels’ lynching appeared as part of the Family of Man exhibition at the Museum of Modern Art in New York, organized by photographer Edward Steichen. The exhibition included a large assortment of images from across the world that depicted a wide array of human experiences, and was accompanied by a book, also entitled Family of Man, which has been in print ever since. The exhibit derived from a post-war liberal and modernist impulse that sought to draw connections between diverse human experiences as universal experiences—to see, in Steichen’s words, “the essential oneness of mankind throughout the world.”37 Ascribing authenticity to the photographic images, Steichen imagined that photography could reveal essential human truths. Rather than pictorial representations produced from distinct human subjectivities, Steichen believed that the images in the exhibition could act as direct reflections of fundamental human realities, mirrors “of the universal elements and emotions in the everydayness of life.” 38 The exhibit was arranged thematically, beginning with photographs depicting love and sexuality, progressing to birth, childhood, and other moments of celebration, and then turning to darker moments of war, violence, and finally death. The photographs were hung on the bare white walls of the museum with no context, on the assumption that the images spoke for themselves.39 26 The Duck Hill lynching photograph was actually removed from the Family of Man exhibition soon after it opened and did not appear in the book. The image was apparently attracting too much attention, thereby disrupting the exhibition’s overall theme of collectivity and universality. According to Steichen’s assistant at the time, Wayne Miller, “the theme of the show [would be] interrupted by this individual photograph…. the presentation [of the photograph] was dissonant to the composition.” 40 Indeed, as John Szarkowski has noted, the exhibit was designed to be a holistic experience, in which all 500 photographs were to “speak with one voice.”41 Although Steichen seemed more concerned with the impact of the photograph on the exhibition, rather than on the prospective viewer, his decision to excise it from the show acknowledged, on some level, that in 1955 lynching could not be reduced to a collective human experience, and that to display such an image within the context of this exhibition was to diminish its horror. “Somebody do Something!”: Lynching Photographs, Historical Memory, and the Po... European journal of American studies, 14-4 | 2019 9 Figure 4: Life Magazine, 14 February 1955. Henri Cartier-Bresson, “China,” ©Magnum Photos; Yasuhiro Ishimoto, “Little Ones,” ©Kochi Prefecture, Ishimoto Yasuhiro Photo Center; reproduced with permission. 27 Before Steichen had the image permanently removed from the exhibition, however, Life magazine chose to publish it as part of a Family of Man photographic essay in February 1955 in conjunction with the MOMA exhibition. Since many of the images in the exhibition had been borrowed from Life’s archives, the exhibition was as much an advertisement for Life as the magazine’s photo-essay was a promotion for the show. Besides its commercial ties to the collection, Life, with a comfortable, white middle- class readership of about six million, was a suitable venue in which to promote the exhibition; Steichen’s vision matched Life’s entire moral and aesthetic approach to news. In its introduction to the photo-essay, Life announced that the pictures portray “the emotions which all members of the human family share, no matter in what country or at what stage of civilization they live,” anticipating that its viewers would reflect upon the similarities and continuities between diverse human experiences.42 28 The image of Bootjack McDaniels’ tortured body appeared on a two-page spread, entitled “Tensions Turn to Dread and Hate,” along with three other photographs: a crowd scene before the Communists invaded Shanghai; a scene in which a young boy, having a tantrum in suburban Connecticut, swings a board at his mother; and, diagonally opposite the lynching photograph, a photo captioned, “Playtime Torment in Chicago Park,” in which two white children are tied to a tree in some sort of game. [See figure 4.] These images were not presented together in Steichen’s exhibition or in his book; these juxtapositions were Life’s editorial decision. Through them, lynching, and by extension ongoing racial conflicts in America, were conflated with Cold War anxiety and postwar suburban unrest. 29 In placing the image of McDaniels’ torture with these other images, Life replaced its original racial and political significance with another, arguably just as menacing, ideological meaning. The effect of this placement was to equate otherwise “Somebody do Something!”: Lynching Photographs, Historical Memory, and the Po... European journal of American studies, 14-4 | 2019 10 incomparable experiences of human pain and suffering. Perhaps the juxtaposition of two children tied to a tree in a game and a man being tortured to death was intended to suggest an underlying terror in childhood play. Yet instead, the tragedy of lynching was diminished, rendered into another “domestic” conflict with which Life readers, largely white and middle-class, were meant to identify. 30 The caption Life chose for the photograph—“Death Slump at Mississippi Lynching, 1937”—also serves to unburden the image of its racist origins. It tersely relates the time, place, and event so that the image comes to signify something much broader than McDaniels’ lynching, becoming a generalized representation of suffering. The phrase “Death Slump” is particularly jarring. The phrase directs the viewer’s response to the image by reimagining the violence that is represented; in fact, it elides the violence. The caption suggests the man is dead, but, as noted, a closer look reveals he’s not— quite. “Slumping” and “death” do not connote murder, and certainly not torture, but rather a spontaneous or natural loss of life. “He suddenly slumped over,” we might say. Viewers in 1955 could read this caption and look at this image without absorbing the knowledge that this man was being tortured to death. Any emotional impact of the image is weakened, and viewers could remain comfortable in their own detachment from injustice. Unlike the use of this photograph at the height of the anti-lynching movement, this placement entirely disregarded lynching as a specific historical practice perpetrated against African Americans. 31 What is significant here, however, is not that the reprinting of the photograph itself caused any numbing effect in viewers; rather, the context in which it is situated allows viewers a voyeuristic glance while remaining disengaged. Yet the historical and social position of the viewer also matters. After all, looking at this image in the present day, viewers are likely to be horrified, not only by the photograph, but by Life’s seemingly casual editorial decisions. Perhaps in 1955 viewers would have been able to immediately contexualize this image in the light of current racial conflicts—though this photo-essay was released some seven months before the murder of Emmett Till and about ten months before the Montgomery Bus Boycott.43 32 It was not until 1986, when Pat Ward Williams used it for her piece, that the photograph of McDaniels’ lynching appeared again in a public setting. Williams has stated in reference to this piece, “I raise the question of responsibility in the print media… I ask the viewer to think about what he thinks when he sees this image. Is it information or terrorism?”44 In other words, the photograph provides historical evidence of an act of terrorism (i.e.: it is information), but the photograph itself functioned as an instrument of terror. In her question, and in the piece itself, she provokes viewers to become aware of their potential complicity in this act of terrorism as spectators, even consumers, of it. Yet in protesting the exhibition of this image, Williams herself makes a public presentation of it. In order to transform the image from an act of terrorism to a protest against terrorism, she must shift its meaning through her arrangement of the photograph, the text she attaches to it, and the spaces in which she chooses to exhibit it. As one critic noted, her recontextualization rendered her use of the photograph very different from “a member of the KKK finding the same image and tacking it up on his wall.”45 In that sense, Life’s error, one that leads Williams to accuse the magazine of terrorizing intent, was not that it published the photograph, but that it did so in ways that did not detach the photograph enough from its original, “Somebody do Something!”: Lynching Photographs, Historical Memory, and the Po... European journal of American studies, 14-4 | 2019 11 white supremacist meaning, or, alternatively, by detaching it too much from that context. 33 Williams’ caption, “Accused/Blowtorch/Padlock,” directs the viewer’s response to the four images of McDaniel’s lynching at the center of the piece, and, in doing so, replaces the historical erasure of the Life caption. While the phrase “death slump” elided the actions of the lynch mob, Williams places the emphasis back upon the perpetrators by naming their objects of torture. The term, “accused” could presumably function in several different ways. It could refer to McDaniels, who was referred to as the “accused” in contemporary news accounts.46 But placed before the words “blowtorch” and “padlock,” and situated alongside her accusatory text, the “accused” can be understood as the men who tortured McDaniels and took this picture, or Life magazine that published it, or even the viewer gazing upon it. In that sense, her title forces a moment of self-reflection on the spectator. 34 The scrawled words and the wooden, three-dimensional frames with which Williams surrounds the images also direct the viewer’s interpretation of those images, compelling us to share her horror at the atrocity before us.47 Alluding to the term “sound-bite,” one reviewer referred to these scratches of phrases as “word-bites” that Williams supposedly borrowed from snippets of commentary she had read or heard over the years.48 “Word-bites” aptly connotes violence and fury. Replacing “word” with “sound” also describes our encounter with them; we do not hear them but read them, as our eyes are compelled to pour over her words, much as they pour over the images. The frames serve to separate the images from her text. One reviewer has likened the frames to windows that allow viewers to enter into the experience of human suffering in the images.49 Lucy Lippard, similarly, has argued that the window frames, which Williams has used in other works, compel us “to look through it and enter into the picture’s reality.” These commentaries interpret Williams’ intention as similar to Life magazine’s presentation of the photograph. That is, the photo serves as an entry into an experience of human suffering with which viewers are meant to empathize. At the same time, Lippard says that the frames serve as a “distancing device,” suggesting that viewers can remain inoculated against that suffering.50 35 It might actually be more useful to think of these frames not as window frames that provide entries into shared human experiences, but as picture frames. As such, they denaturalize the images of McDaniels’ tortured body and signify that they are pictorial representations; that is, the images are constructed from a subjective and ideological point of view—that of the lynch mob—which reminds us that the violence is bound up in the photograph itself. The frames thus serve to highlight the conflation of the act of torture and the act of representing or exhibiting that torture, and make viewers aware that they are spectators of both. If the frames do distance viewers from the images, they do so not to anesthetize them from McDaniels’ suffering, but, much as the text does, to remind them of their own complicity in it. 36 Williams’ arrangement of the images similarly makes conspicuous the links between the act of lynching, the act of photographing the lynching, and the act of watching a lynching. Williams had divided the photograph of McDaniels’ lynched body into individual body parts, effectively ripping it out of its context in order to recontextualize it. The division also replicates visually the destruction and objectification of McDaniels’ body that the lynching itself enacted. The images literally break McDaniels apart, just as the lynch mob did. As viewers, we are then forced to “Somebody do Something!”: Lynching Photographs, Historical Memory, and the Po... European journal of American studies, 14-4 | 2019 12 reenact and confront the essential violation of this torture. The close-up shots of McDaniels’ body verify that it is indeed a human body that is being violated—a hand, a torso, a neck, a face. The effect appears to be objectifying, but since it draws attention to the mob’s objectification of McDaniels, the effect actually serves to re-humanize him. In challenging the viewer in these ways, Williams’ piece does not allow for any aesthetic distancing or voyeuristic complacency. 37 Although Williams situates the photograph of McDaniels’ lynching firmly within the history of racism and racist violence in the United States, the piece does not particularize this lynching. Viewers do not learn McDaniels’ name, when this happened and where, or even what exactly is happening to him. Like the anti-lynching activists of the early twentieth century, she renders McDaniels’ death into iconography. His death is to stand in for all African-American suffering; his torturers for all white racism— including ongoing racial violence in the 1980s. Certainly, this image would have had particular resonance in 1986, when a series of high-profile crimes against African Americans led many activists and political leaders to publicly declare racial violence a rising problem.51 In 1982, a white gang had beaten Willie Turks to death in Brooklyn. In 1983, Michael Stewart was killed from blunt force trauma while in police custody in New York after his arrest for spraying graffiti in a subway station. A NYPD officer shot Eleanor Bumpers in her Bronx apartment in 1984. That same year, Bernhard Goetz generated national controversy when he shot four black teenagers, paralyzing Darrell Cabey permanently, after they approached him for money in the New York subway. Many white Americans hailed Goetz as a hero for his vigilante stand against the purported plague of black crime, while others, including the New York Police Commissioner, likened his act to a lynching. In 1986, a group of white teenagers beat and chased three black men, including Michael Griffith, in Howard Beach, Queens, forcing Griffith to run into traffic, where he was killed—an event New York mayor Ed Koch called a “modern lynching.”52 The sense Williams conveys in “Accused/ Blowtorch/Padlock” that the lynching of McDaniels is happening now, and that someone can intervene, was, therefore, not entirely theoretical or rhetorical. 38 These events all happened in the context of national debates over hate crimes legislation that imposed harsher penalties on crimes committed due to racial or ethnic bias. Many states began passing hate crime laws in the 1970s and 1980s, and the US Congress began debating the first federal hate crimes legislation in 1985. As Christopher Waldrep has argued, the difference between a lynching and a hate crime is largely semantic. The term “hate crime,” however, places the culpability for the violence on individual perpetrators, rather than an entire community, as the term “lynching” does. The effect on African Americans is nevertheless the same, for a hate crime or a lynching both arouse that terrifying sense of racial fear; in short, they terrorize.53 Williams’ use of the term “terrorism” is thus pointed in this context. And by implicitly directing viewers to draw connections between past and present-day lynchings, she challenges the rhetoric of “hate crimes” to demand a sense of collective white responsibility. 39 At the same time, Williams shows awareness of the dangers of detaching lynching photographs from history. “There’s something going on here. I didn’t see it right away. After all, you see one lynched man you’ve seen them all,” her text reads. “You’ve seen one lynched man you’ve seen them all”—the phrase implies that one anonymous victim can stand for all the rest; it’s the multiplicity of the atrocity that matters, not the “Somebody do Something!”: Lynching Photographs, Historical Memory, and the Po... European journal of American studies, 14-4 | 2019 13 individual. But the phrase also draws attention to the common concern that, bombarded with atrocity photographs, present-day viewers can begin to overlook them or suffer from compassion fatigue. Yet, by juxtaposing “I” and “you” in the construction of these sentences, Williams aligns herself with her viewers’ potential indifference and then impels them out of that apathy to participate with her in protest, to read the rest of her text. 40 *** 41 Just above the wooden frames, Williams’ text reads, “Can you be BLACK and look at this?,” suggesting that a black viewer will feel particularly horrified and violated by the image. Her question evokes that “primal narrative,” that visceral feeling of identification with the lynching victim and a sense that the terror of lynching persists in the present. Elizabeth Alexander has written movingly of how black racial identity has been forged through a collective traumatic memory of physical vulnerability, a “bottom-line blackness” that can obscure class, regional, generational, and other differences between African Americans. That memory, which “resides in the flesh,” is re-activated by visual scenes of black suffering, a feeling echoed in “Blowtorch/ Accused/Padlock,” as well as in many black viewers’ responses to Without Sanctuary.54 As Hilton Als wrote in his introduction to the collection, “I felt my neck snap and my heart break, while looking at these pictures.”55 One African American teacher said of the collection, “When I look at those pictures... I don’t just see a lifeless body. I look at those pictures, and I see my son, I see my brother, I see my father. If I’m looking at that lifeless figure long enough, I see myself.”56 An interactive display at the 2012 exhibition in Charlotte, North Carolina, of one photograph of a mass lynching, asked visitors, “Where would you be in this photograph?” and prompted to them to record their answers on Post-It notes to display next to the photograph. Many black viewers wrote “I would be hanging from the tree.” In addition, as Als points out, lynching photographs remind black viewers of their own objectification –that they are the objects of the white gaze, never the subjects of looking. Indeed, historically, the power of looking at black bodies in pain belonged to whites.57 42 But what of non-African-American viewers? What of white viewers today? Some black commentators have assumed that white Americans largely respond to these images with indifference or even complicity, a generalization that supposes a monolithic white interpretation. For example, emphasizing the bearing of the past on the present, Hilton Als intimates that white spectators implicitly identify with the members of the lynch mob or its white spectators, for, as a black man, he is excruciatingly aware that, to many whites, he is viewed as a potential criminal, a threat. He has been “lynched by eyes,” he writes. “It’s that experience of being watched and seeing the harm in people’s eyes—that is the prelude to becoming a dead nigger,” he tell us.58 It is true that many white viewers are reluctant to draw those connections, in part because time and context has led them to feel detached from the unmitigated white supremacy of Jim Crow America. On their Post-It notes at the Charlotte exhibit, white visitors invariably wrote that they would be “at home” or “not there,” anywhere but at the scene of the lynching—a self-serving thought, but probably not true. The emotional impact of the image—the horror of it—leads them to dis-identify with the white mobs or spectators, and, vice versa, that dis-identification furthers the repulsion they feel.59 Yet that process of dis-identification might also lead them to exaggerate the historical distance between the lynching and present-day events, to feel that lynching and the racism it “Somebody do Something!”: Lynching Photographs, Historical Memory, and the Po... European journal of American studies, 14-4 | 2019 14 represents is safely ensconced in a past reality. They can, in turn, feel comforted by their own shock and disgust. 43 But what might an ethical white spectatorship entail, one that acknowledges white culpability for past crimes and collective responsibility for present-day injustices? One alternative might be for white viewers to feel shame as they look at these photographs. Many commentators on the Without Sanctuary website forum speak of the “shamefulness” of lynching, or feeling “ashamed” of this past. In doing so, they are acknowledging a personal relationship to past atrocities and even an identification with the white mobs or spectators. As Courtney Baker has argued, shame can lead to ethical action, as it “destabilizes one’s comfort with oneself” and prompts one to reevaluate one’s “social habits.”60 Shame, in fact, was a common response among white Americans to the increasing publication of lynching photographs in anti-lynching campaigns and even in mainstream newspapers in the 1920s and 1930s, an emotional response that led not to the eradication of racist violence, but to its relative invisibility, as mobs could no longer perform public lynchings with impunity, and white communities hid the signs and remnants of their violence, including photographs, away.61 In that sense, shame can produce a false reckoning with one’s failings. As Martin Berger has written about Civil Rights-era photography, white shame in response to images of white brutality effected little actual political change. Instead, shame can work against empathy, as it leads one to focus on the self and one’s own discomfort, rather than the suffering of others. Rather than work to rectify wrongs, the ashamed subject seeks to displace blame and to conceal his/her responsibility.62 44 Others have claimed that looking at atrocity photographs can be a potentially ethical and redemptive act if viewers recognize the common bonds of humanity that unite them with the victims in these images—in particular, what Courtney Baker calls the “elemental… human condition of vulnerability,” or human suffering. To recognize the pain of another in this way is to engage in an active form of looking that Baker calls “humane insight.”63 This insight challenges assumptions that the act of looking is an intrinsically objectifying act when the object of the look is “the other,” that is, a colonizing gaze that denies the humanity and subjectivity of the sufferer. The risk of this approach, however, is that the lynching victim’s suffering is universalized in a way that flattens the historical specificity of racist violence in the US, which can lead to uncritical approaches to racism. The photographs become iconographic in a different way, not as symbols of black suffering, but as representations of collective misery or, in turn, human barbarism. As such, the images become visual citations, or quotations, through which we can conceptualize any present-day or future atrocity.64 Some viewers of Without Sanctuary, for instance, drew analogies between lynching and terrorism after 9/11, homophobic violence, or anti-Arab violence, or between lynching photographs and the images of Abu Ghraib prisoners.65 The “primal narrative” of lynching, in this sense, is an elastic one which can be deployed for multiple purposes and with varying degrees of complexity.66 This form of insight risks decontextualizing the lynching victim to the point that the long history of black subjugation and white supremacy is obscured altogether, and there is no white reckoning with that past—which is why Life ’s inclusion of the Duck Hill photograph in its Family of Man photo-essay appears so jarring to us now.67 These uses ultimately can do a disservice to historical memory, contributing to a harmful misremembering that can create a kind of visual exploitation of the lynched body. “Somebody do Something!”: Lynching Photographs, Historical Memory, and the Po... European journal of American studies, 14-4 | 2019 15 45 It is possible, though, for white viewers to engage in “humane insight” while, at the same time, acknowledging the racial particularity of black suffering rooted in the histories of slavery and Jim Crow. Such an insight must feel a shared human vulnerability, a physical connection with others, while at the same recognizing differences in subjective experiences between self and other, differences contingent upon social position and one’s relationship to history. That is, one can feel the suffering of another, approximately, while also knowing that one is not actually feeling it. Sympathy, in this regard, serves as a more useful term than empathy. It can be unethical to empathize in the sense of placing oneself in the position of others when one cannot possibly experience their suffering; to do so can deny one’s own relative position of security. Sympathy, however, connotes feeling alongside with rather in place of. 46 Sympathy—and its cousin, compassion—have been critiqued as emotions laden with value judgments and implied hierarchies. They emerged in the seventeenth century to connote the feeling of placing oneself in the experience of another, and were viewed by Enlightenment thinkers such as David Hume and Adam Smith as essential for moral thinking and ethical action.68 By the nineteenth century, sympathy lay at the heart of sentimental humanitarianism, or the idea that what united humanity, and the human and animal world, was not intellect or reason, but its shared capacity to feel pain. Since sentimentalism was the province of middle-class and elite white Euro-Americans, of those who had the time and comfort, or the detachment from suffering, to suffer on behalf of others, it came to be associated with class and racial privilege. Sympathy soon connoted pity, the emotion of feeling for someone below one’s station, rather than a feeling of shared pain among equals. In the twentieth century, psychologists replaced sympathy with empathy, from the German word “einfuhling,” meaning to “feel into,” which involves a process of imitation or simulation, of experiencing another’s feelings as one’s own by projecting one’s own feelings into the experience of another.69 Feminist and postcolonial scholars, however, have come to critique empathy, since it presumes that people respond to the same suffering in the same way, without acknowledging differences in historical or social experience and power. Empathy can also potentially obscure or erase the voices of marginalized groups. Indeed, the problem with “bearing witness” is that the witness, by implication, is granted authority to speak for another. In short, empathy recreates the same hierarchies that sympathy came to denote.70 47 In this light, sympathy and compassion warrant a resurrection, if we remember their etymological roots denoting both suffering (pathos/passion) and with (sym/com). Pathos involves an intensity of response that is both emotional and visceral, rooted in the original dual association of pathos with passion and passivity. While today we tend to understand passion as an intense, positive feeling toward an object, the word still retains an earlier notion of being acted upon, for instance, when we describe feeling passionate as being captivated or taken by something. In feeling pathos, then, one is reminded of one’s physical vulnerability—one’s passivity, the feeling of being acted upon—for grief or repulsion are bodily reactions as much as they are feelings. Our pathos thus forces a connection to the external world, which, when we are horrified, shocked, or saddened, has penetrated our subjective isolation. That loss of boundaries around the self and that awareness of the external world creates a new form of knowing which connects us to others. In that way, sympathy, unlike empathy, does not connote feeling the same as others or speaking from their position; rather, it suggests a “Somebody do Something!”: Lynching Photographs, Historical Memory, and the Po... European journal of American studies, 14-4 | 2019 16 looser connectivity, an approximation of fellow feeling, but a fellowship nonetheless. As Dorota Golanska has argued, this is what happens when we encounter the trauma of others. We can feel sympathy with others only when we feel our own vulnerability through an affective response to their suffering. But unlike empathy, that response acknowledges the differences between one’s own position and that of the other. One feels, not in place of another, but alongside the other. In this sense, to witness is not to speak for another, but instead, implies that one has a connected, albeit not identical, experience of a traumatic event with another.71 48 Works of art can serve as critical objects to prompt a sympathetic response to trauma, since a function of art is to generate emotional responses and change perceptions, and art makes and conveys meaning through the sensations that it produces. Art can, in that way, enable emotional connections to others.72 Indeed, “einfuhling” was first used in reference to aesthetics in the 1870s, to conceptualize how people experience art and, through art, come to feel the perspectives and mental states of others. Just as we can “feel into” or simulate the feelings of others, we can experience the properties of art as our own because they produce affective reactions in us, much as the physical expressions or movements of other people can.73 Scholars of trauma have understood memorial art or memorial sites as functioning in a similar way. In encountering the suffering of others through art, the viewer experiences a milder or muted form of trauma.74 49 Atrocity photographs could intensify a sympathetic response since, due to their documentary realism, they create a virtual or mediated experience; one is in the scene, as a witness to the victim’s suffering, while, at the same time, aware that is one removed from the scene. Indeed, we are moved toward a sympathetic response to the suffering in a photograph when we recognize the image as a representation of atrocity, rather than as a transparent reflection of a reality.75 “Accused/Blowtorch/Padlock” successfully makes viewers aware of the representational nature of the image through the way Williams breaks up the image and frames it, as well as through her text. 50 To understand this emotive effect of atrocity images, however, is to disrupt the emphasis we place on the visual authority of the photograph. That authority derived from a western ocular-centrism, which focused on the visual as the primary source of knowledge. We know this atrocity happened because we can see it. Instead, if we focus on the photograph’s emotive power, the body becomes the primary vehicle for knowledge; we know the suffering of the victim because we ourselves feel an approximation of it in our affective reaction to the image.76 This is what Elizabeth Alexander means when she says that black memory “resides in the flesh” and is activated by witnessing scenes of black suffering. But white sympathy, even without the same racial identification, can also “reside in the flesh,” though horror, disgust, and heartache, and spur an ethical engagement with historical memory. Of course, as has been shown, that affective response is conditioned not by the photograph itself, but by the context in which it is viewed, the text and framing, and the knowledge viewers bring to their encounter with the image, including references to other images. Williams’ texts guides viewers toward a specific affective response through her framing of the image and the accompanying self-reflexive text. By commenting on her spectatorship of the photograph, she compels us to feel the pain of her encounter with the lynching photograph and to recognize our own spectatorship at the same time. “Somebody do Something!”: Lynching Photographs, Historical Memory, and the Po... European journal of American studies, 14-4 | 2019 17 51 The first exhibition of Without Sanctuary in the Ruth Horowitz Gallery in New York was criticized for its un-reflective and voyeuristic display of the photographs, which were exhibited on blank, white walls, without explanatory text beyond simple captioning. Subsequent exhibitions of the Without Sanctuary collection responded to these critiques by providing more context, including content about anti-lynching activism—all of which was meant to circumscribe viewers’ responses to the images. These exhibits also sought to foster a self-reflexive spectatorship, drawing attention to the representation of the images as historical documents, rather than as transparent windows into the past, through interactive questions and through the exhibit design itself.77 For instance, cut-outs in the walls compelled viewers to watch each other view the photographs, creating an unsettling awareness of their own spectatorship. The effect was to foster a sympathetic engagement with the photographs. 52 Sympathy, because it involves a turn away from the self and toward a connection with others, is a precondition for ethical action. This view also rests on the theory that emotions are relational, that is, they are felt toward something or someone and promote connection to others. They are also expressive or performative in the sense that they generate effects– including a new knowledge of the world and a sense of responsibility for it.78 This effect is what can lead Williams to scrawl “Somebody do Something!” beside a photograph of a lynching from fifty years ago and compel viewers to want to intervene. 53 *** 54 Viewers’ subjective relationship to the past atrocity will also shape their encounter with its representation. As noted above, black and white viewers encounter lynching photographs in palpably different ways. Yet, in my analysis of “Accused/Blowtorch/ Padlock,” I have used the language of a single “viewer,” or “we,” as if there could be one definitive encounter with the piece, because it itself directs viewers toward a specific interpretation. The success of a piece like “Accused/Padlock/Blowtorch” is that it compels all viewers to take Williams’ point of view as a black woman, to sympathize with her pain– and to bear witness to it. In that sense, to have an ethical encounter with lynching photographs is to understand them as both historical and not historical at the same time. Indeed, the erasure of historical particularity is not an unfortunate byproduct of historical memory; it is exactly how historical memory functions effectively. Our encounter with “Accused/Padlock/Blowtorch,” which itself collapses past and present and compels us to interpret McDaniels’ torture as ongoing, testifies to this process. In my analysis, I have used the present tense, just as Williams does; there is no other tense to use, as memory is not about the past but the present. 55 In this light, it is not coincidental that so many protests in the aftermath of high-profile murders of African Americans at the hands of police in the past few years have involved a pointed, sympathetic identification with the victims. In response to the death of Eric Garner in 2014, “I Can’t Breathe” was printed on posters and t-shirts— Garner’s final words, heard on the digital recording of his murder, as the police put him in the chokehold that killed him. “Hands Up, Don’t Shoot” became a protest refrain in the aftermath of Michael Brown’s death in Ferguson, Missouri, in 2014. “I am Trayvon” was plastered on hoodies and placards after the 2012 murder of Trayvon Martin, as was “I am Sandra Bland” after the mysterious death of Bland, held in custody after an arrest for a traffic violation in 2015. “Somebody do Something!”: Lynching Photographs, Historical Memory, and the Po... European journal of American studies, 14-4 | 2019 18 56 The effect of this sympathetic identification is to press the point that the racial climate in the U.S., both past and present, indicts all African Americans as potential criminals— and that this indictment is a form of oppression that affects every black person in America. “We Can’t Breathe.” “This could be me—I could be Trayvon. I could be gunned down in the street.” This identification also highlights the innocence of the victims of police brutality. The right-wing media quickly tried to draw attention to their criminal pasts, to subvert the narrative that these were guiltless people, killed for no reason. In creating an identification between themselves and these victims, protesters are undermining this counter-narrative. 57 It is also an identification steeped in historical memory. For African Americans to embrace these memes aligns with Alexander’s conception of black social memory. Alexander wrote in 1995 that the video of Los Angeles police officers beating Rodney King “activated” collective black identity, rooted in memories of black suffering, leading black viewers to feel themselves “implicated” in King’s fate.79 Williams had the same affective response to the lynching of Bootjack McDaniels. Something similar happened when video footage of police killings—of Garner, Philando Castile, and others —appeared across the internet and on television news in the past five years. As happened with high-profile killings in the 1980s, the murders were likened to “legal lynchings,” the videos to lynching photographs. As Koritha Mitchell has written, “these videos often end up making a statement very similar to that conveyed by lynching photographs: This can be done to people of color because they are not true citizens” (emphasis in original).80 Commentators on the Without Sanctuary website forum have drawn similar connections. 58 But the historical memory of lynching may also prompt white viewers to interpret present-day images of police brutality against African-Americans sympathetically. In response to these images, Mitchell has lamented that “watching the brutalization of people of color fails to inspire empathy” in many white Americans.81 Yet lynching photographs can create a historical context through which white viewers can interpret present-day acts of racist violence. As one teacher posted on the Without Sanctuary website forum: “I’ve been trying to get my class of 12th graders, all white, to understand the underlying reasons for the protests [against police killings.]… I had the constant sense that I was not making any headway. I showed them this [site] today. They left class in stunned silence, their heads bowed. I think today I finally started to get through to them.”82 What’s more, perhaps surprisingly, a good number of white people were photographed wearing “I am Trayvon Martin” hoodies or carrying “We Can’t Breathe” signs. At first glance, this is an offensive identification, as they appear ignorant and unfeeling about their advantaged social position as white persons in America. But it’s hard to imagine that any white person who would wear a “I am Trayvon Martin” hoodie or who would carry a “We Can’t Breathe” sign would not know this. Instead, their identification could be read as clumsy attempts to grapple with their affective response to the brutality they have witnessed, to mistake sympathy for empathy. This response, nevertheless, prompted them take some sort of ethical action —to do something—in this case, to protest. “Somebody do Something!”: Lynching Photographs, Historical Memory, and the Po... European journal of American studies, 14-4 | 2019 19 NOTES 1. Howard Kester, “Lynching by Blow Torch,” part 7, Series A, Reel 13, National Association for the Advancement of Colored People Files, microfilm edition (hereafter NAACP Files); Chicago Defender, 17 April, 1937, 2; Memphis Press Scimitar, 14 April, 1937, 1-2; Time, 26 April 1937, 16-17. 2. Dora Apel, Imagery of Lynching: Black Men, White Women, and the Mob (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2004), 211-214; Elizabeth Hess, “Window Pain,” Village Voice, 16 February 1991. 3. This association is a common one. As Susan Sontag has written in On Photography (New York: Anchor Books, 1977), 14-15, “Just as the camera is a sublimation of the gun, to photograph someone is a sublimated murder.” 4. Leigh Raiford, “Photography and the Practices of Critical Black Memory” History and Theory 48 (December 2009), 112-129; On lynching as a metaphor, see Jonathan Markovitz, Legacies of Lynching: Racial Violence and Memory (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2004), xvii. 5. E. Ann Kaplan, “Empathy and Trauma Culture: Imaging Catastrophe” in Empathy: Philosophical and Psychological Perspectives, eds. Amy Coplan and Peter Goldie (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 256, 270; Barbie Zelizer, Remembering to Forget: Holocaust Memory Through the Camera’s Eye (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 10-11; Frances Guerin and Roger Hallas, eds., The Image and the Witness: Trauma, Memory, and Visual Culture (New York: Wallflower Press, 2007), 6. 6. Kaplan, “Empathy,” 257, 268, 275. 7. Citing the work of Ella Shohat and Robert Stam, Jonathan Markovitz, Legacies of Lynching, 35, discusses how “representations of oppressed groups are unavoidably caught up in a process whereby they stand for something greater than themselves.” 8. Raiford, “Photography,” 113. 9. On the social dimensions of memory, see: Maurice Halbswachs, On Collective Memory [1925] (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992); Paul Connerton, How Societies Remember (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989); David Middleton and Derek Edwards, eds., Collective Remembering (London: Sage Publications, 1990); James Fentress and Chris Wickham, Social Memory: New Perspectives on the Past (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1992); Natalie Zemon Davis and Randolph Starn, “Introduction: Memory and Counter-Memory,” Representations 26 (Spring 1989), 1-7; Barbie Zelizer, “Reading the Past Against the Grain: The Shape of Memory Studies,” Critical Studies in Mass Communication 12 (June 1995), 214-239; On the relationship between history and memory, see Steven Knapp, “Collective Memory and the Actual Past,” Representations 26 (Spring 1989), 123-149; Peter Burke, “History as Social Memory,” in Thomas Butler, ed., Memory, History, Culture, and the Mind, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989); David Thelen, “Memory and American History,” Journal of American History 75:4 (March 1989), 1117-1129. For more on lynching photographs and historical memory, see Amy Louise Wood and Susan Donaldson, “Lynching’s Legacy in American Culture,” Mississippi Quarterly 61: 1-2 (2008), 5-25. 10. This essay focuses on African-American and white responses to lynching photographs. Other groups—Native Americans, Mexicans, Chinese, and other immigrants—were the victims of lynchings throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, but lynching does not stand as a “primal narrative” for these groups, nor was it central to their civil rights activism. There are a few photographs of white lynching victims, of various ethnicities, in the Without Sanctuary collection, but the vast majority of victims depicted are African Americans. For these reasons, the public commentary on lynching photographs has focused on black and white viewers. 11. Zelizer, Remembering to Forget, 10, 84-87; Roland Barthes, Camera Lucida: Reflections on Photography, translated by Richard Howard (New York: Hill and Wang, 1981), 76; John Taylor, Body “Somebody do Something!”: Lynching Photographs, Historical Memory, and the Po... European journal of American studies, 14-4 | 2019 20 Horror: Photojournalism, Catastrophe, and War (New York: New York University Press, 1998); Guerin and Hallas, eds., The Image and the Witness, 2, 11. 12. Zelizer, Remembering to Forget, 4-8; Astrid Eril and Ann Rigney, eds., Mediation, Remediation, and the Dynamics of Cultural Memory (New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2009), 1-5. 13. Susan Sontag, Regarding the Pain of Others (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2003), 22; James Polchin, “Not Looking at Lynching Photographs,” Guerin and Hallas, eds., The Image and The Witness, 214. 14. Marianne Hirsch, “Surviving Images: Holocaust Photographs and the Work of Postmemory” in Barbie Zelizer, ed., Visual Culture and the Holocaust (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press,), 231; Sontag, On Photography, 70; Barthes, Camera Lucida, 13-14; Guerin and Hallas, eds., The Image and the Witness, 11-12. 15. John Lewis, “Forward,” in James Allen, Without Sanctuary: Lynching Photography in America (Santa Fe, NM: Twin Palm Publishers, 2000), 7. In the context of both lynching photographs and present-day images of police brutality, Koritha Mitchell has noted that black suffering is only acknowledged when it is seen, whereas many white Americans are quick to “sympathize” with white victims of gun violence without any visual evidence of this violence; in fact, news media outlets are likely to deem images of white victims of violence as too terrible, too indecent to show. This is true to a certain extent, yet, the responses of Lewis, Williams and other African- American viewers of lynching photographs—as well as copious evidence of white responses to photographs of white suffering—belie Mitchell’s point. See Mitchell, “What I Learned about Police Brutality Videos from Studying Images of Lynching,” Vox, 28 July, 2016, https:// www.vox.com/2016/7/28/12241082/police-brutality-lynchings-self-care (accessed 8 March 2019). 16. This assessment is based on reading viewers’ comments in guest books at exhibitions of Without Sanctuary in Atlanta, Georgia (2002) and Charlotte, North Carolina (2012), as well as online at www.withoutsanctuary.org. For quotations listed above, see visitors’ comments, 14 April 2013, 25 August 2012, 19 November 2014, 20 November 2014, 20 February 2013, www.withoutsanctuary.org (accessed 11 March 2019). 17. Most photographs, like the one of Bootjack McDaniels, were taken by local, professional photographers to commemorate the event for the community, often for commercial profit, or, sometimes, by members of the mob with their amateur Kodaks. Rare are photographs taken by journalists or outside observers. See Amy Louise Wood, Lynching and Spectacle: Witnessing Racial Violence in America (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2009), 77. 18. For this point of view, see Grace Hale, “Exhibition Review,” Journal of American History 89:3 (2002), 993-94; JoAnn Wypijewski, “Executioners’ Songs,” The Nation, 27 March 2000, 30, 34; Raiford, “Photography,” 120; For an overview of critical reactions to Without Sanctuary, see Dora Apel, “On Looking: Lynching Photographs and the Legacies of Lynching after 9/11,” American Quarterly 55 (2003): 464-466. 19. Sontag, On Photography, 20-21; Taylor, Body Horror, 14. 20. Martin Berger, Seeing Through Race (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011), 72, makes this point about scenes of brutality captured in civil rights-era photography; see also Raiford, “Photography,”120; Susan Crane, “Choosing Not to Look: Representation, Repatriation, and Holocaust Atrocity Photography” History and Theory 47 (October 2008): 309-330. 21. These same challenges led to Susan Sontag’s critique of photographs in her 1977 volume, On Photography. She later revised her understanding to find the redemptive power in looking in Regarding the Pain of Others, 110-111, in part because she considered the refusal to look a privilege of those in wealthy nations. 22. “Emory Asks Public to Help Decide Fate of Controversial Exhibit,” Creative Loafing [Atlanta, GA], Dec. 9, 2000, 41. “Somebody do Something!”: Lynching Photographs, Historical Memory, and the Po... European journal of American studies, 14-4 | 2019 21 23. For more on these artists, see Raiford, “Photography,” 112-129; Shawn Michelle Smith, “The Evidence of Lynching Photographs,” in Dora Apel and Shawn Michelle Smith, Lynching Photographs (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008), 28-32. 24. Quoted in the Montgomery Advertiser, 25 April, 2018, https://www.montgomeryadvertiser.com/story/news/2018/04/25/without-sanctuary-and-how- we-remember-lynching/499641002/ (accessed Dec 30, 2018); on this point, see also Jason Morgan Ward, “The Legacy Museum: From Enslavement to Mass Incarceration; The National Memorial for Peace and Justice,” American Historical Review 123: 4 (October 2018), 1272. 25. For more on how viewers in the past received and interpreted lynching photographs, see Wood, Lynching and Spectacle, especially, 75-76; 183-193. 26. Sontag, On Photography, 17-19. 27. Wood, Lynching and Spectacle, 212. 28. New York Times, 16 April 1937, 1; Time, 26 April 1937, 17. 29. Time, 26 April 1937, 17. 30. Life, 26 April 1937, 26. The only other white-owned newspaper I know of that published the image of Bootjack McDaniels was the Memphis Press-Scimitar, 14 April 1937, 2, which was highly unusual for a southern paper at the time. The Press-Scimitar, however, was fiercely anti-lynching. The black press covered both the lynching and the Gavagan Bill widely, though they did not publish images of the lynching at the time, presumably because they could not obtain copies. The Pittsburgh Courier, 24 April 1937, 1, published an image of the lynching site, with the bodies removed, and the Atlanta Daily World, 20 April 1937, 1, published Roosevelt Townes’ mugshot to accompany their coverage of the lynching. White-run news outlets such as the Associated Press, Time, and Life, apparently purchased the images from the photographer. Yet when the NAACP tried to purchase them for its files, it found that the pictures had been distributed by Campbell’s Studio in Grenada, Mississippi, but was told that it could not obtain any. Life magazine told the NAACP in a letter that “the pictures which we had were taken by someone who does not care to become a storm centre (sic) and has accordingly instructed us to refrain from giving his name to anyone.” Life to the NAACP, 4 May 1937, Part 7, Series A, Reel 13, NAACP Files, Microfilm. 31. Time, 26 April 1937, 16. 32. Wood, Lynching and Spectacle, 197. 33. The exception was Time, 26 April 1937, 16-17, which did provide a summary of events, likely similar to the one read on the floor of the House. 34. Memphis Press Scimitar, 14 April 1937, 2 35. For more on anti-lynching activists’ use of these images, see Wood, Lynching and Spectacle, 186-211. 36. Ibid., 204-207. 37. Edward Steichen, The Family of Man (New York: Museum of Modern Art, 1955; reprint 1983), 3. 38. Ibid. 39. On the Family of Man exhibit, see, Eric Sandeen, Picturing an Exhibit: The Family of Man and 1950s America (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1995); John Szarkowski, “The Family of Man,” Studies in Modern Art 4 (1994), 30; Kevin Salemme, “Chasing Shadows: Steichen’s Dream of the Universal,” History of Photography 29:4 (2005), 372-377. 40. Quoted in Sandeen, Picturing an Exhibit, 49-50. 41. Szarkowski, “The Family of Man,” 30. 42. “Common Bonds of Man,” Life, 14 February 1955, 132. 43. Interestingly, Life, 7 March 1955, 18-20, published only one Letter to the Editor in response to this page of the photo-essay. The letter referred only to the picture of Communists entering Shanghai and commented that the people in the photograph did not look “panicked.” 44. Quoted in Deborah Willis and Howard Dodson, Black Photographers Bear Witness: 100 Years of Social Protest (Williamstown, MA: Williams College Museum of Art, 1989), 18. “Somebody do Something!”: Lynching Photographs, Historical Memory, and the Po... European journal of American studies, 14-4 | 2019 22 45. Kellie Jones, “In Their Own Image,” Artforum International 29:3 (November 1990), 138. 46. New York Times, 14 April 1937, 52; New York Amsterdam News, 17 April 1937, 1. 47. Apel, Imagery of Lynching, 214. 48. Jones, “In Their Own Image,”138. 49. Hess, “Window Pain,” 91. 50. Lucy Lippard, Mixed Blessings: New Art in a Multicultural America (New York: Pantheon Books, 1990), 37. 51. Christopher Waldrep, African Americans Confront Lynching: Strategies of Resistance from the Civil War to the Civil Rights Era (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2009), 120. 52. Markovitz, Legacies of Lynching, 46, 70-84. 53. Waldrep, African Americans Confront Lynching, 113-127. 54. Elizabeth Alexander, “’Can you be BLACK and Look at This?’: Reading the Rodney King Video(s)” in The Black Public Sphere Collective, eds., The Black Public Sphere: A Public Culture Book(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 81-98; this conception of black memory is similar to Marianne Hirsch’s conception of “postmemory” to refer to the secondary trauma of descendants of Holocaust survivors, a trauma, she argues, that is activated through encounters with Holocaust photographs. Hirsch explains that, rather than desensitize postmemory survivors to the atrocity, repeated exposure to the images connects them more tightly to the experience of the older generation. See Marianne Hirsch, “Surviving Images: Holocaust Photographs and the Work of Postmemory,” Yale Journal of Criticism 14 (2001), 218. 55. Hilton Als, “GWTW,” in Without Sanctuary, 38. 56. Quoted in Apel, “On Looking,” 465. 57. Hilton Als, “GWTW,” 39; See also Raiford, “Photography,” 126; Apel, “On Looking,” 468. 58. Hilton Als, “GWTW,” 39. 59. James Polchin, “Not Looking at Lynching Photographs,” 213. 60. Courtney R. Baker, Humane Insight: Looking at Images of African American Suffering and Death (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2015), 65-66. For more on shame and lynching photographs, see Dora Apel, “Lynching Photographs and the Politics of Public Shaming,” in Apel and Smith, Lynching Photographs, 43-78. 61. Wood, Lynching and Spectacle, 262-63; Apel, “Lynching Photographs,” 45. 62. Berger, Seeing Through Race, 74-75. 63. Baker, Humane Insight, 13. 64. Zelizer, Remembering to Forget, 13, 203-09. 65. Polchin, “Not Looking,” 214; Apel, “On Looking,” 461, 473-74; Susan Sontag, “Regarding the Torture of Others,” New York Times Magazine, 23 May 2004, 124-29; Luc Sante, “Tourists and Torturers,” New York Times, 11 May 2004, A23. 66. Markovitz, Legacies of Lynching, 70. 67. Apel, “On Looking,” 473-44; Martin Berger, Seeing Through Race, 67-68, points out that historically whites have been incapable of viewing black bodies in pain in universal terms. 68. Amy Coplan and Peter Goldie, eds., Empathy: Philosophical and Psychological Perspectives (Oxford University Press, 2011), x-xi; Dorota Golanska, Affective Connections: Toward a New Materialist Politics of Sympathy (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2017), 182-183. 69. Coplan and Goldie, Empathy, xii-xiii; Golanska, Affective Connections, 183. 70. Golanska, Affective Connections, 184-85. 71. Golanska, Affective Connections, 186-197; See also, Judith Butler, “Precarious Life, Vulnerability, and the Ethics of Cohabitation,” Journal of Speculative Philosophy 26 (2012): 135-136. 72. Golanska, Affective Connections, 49-52; Jill Bennett, Empathic Visions: Affect, Trauma, and Contemporary Art (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005), 1-21. 73. Coplan and Goldie, Empathy, xii. 74. Golanska, Affective Connections, 131; Bennett, Empathic Visions, 11. “Somebody do Something!”: Lynching Photographs, Historical Memory, and the Po... European journal of American studies, 14-4 | 2019 23 75. Bennett, Empathic Vision, 8-10; Polchin,“Not Looking,” 213, similarly argues that we can avoid the “normalisation” of lynching photographs if we “resist [the] slippage between reality and image, between experience and representation”—in other words, by keeping in mind the artifice of the photograph; Berger, Seeing Through Race, 77, notes that psychological experiments have shown that viewers are more likely to respond sympathetically and be moved to act to photographs of suffering than when witnessing violence in real life. 76. Golanska, Affective Connections, 4-9; in this view, affect, experienced in the body, is not separate from cognition, but part and parcel of it. 77. Apel, “On Looking,” 463; Polchin, “Not Looking,” 207-210; for a defense of the original Ruth Horowitz Gallery showing, see Bettina Carbonell, “The Afterlife of Lynching: Exhibitions and the Re-Composition of Human Suffering,” Mississippi Quarterly 62 (Winter 2008/Spring 2009), 197-215. 78. Coplan and Goldie, Empathy, ix; Sara Ahmed, “Affective Economies,” Social Text, 79 (Vol 22, No 2) (Summer 2004), 117-139; Golanska, Affective Connections, 32-33; Kaplan. 79. Alexander, “Can You Be BLACK and Look At This?,” 89. 80. Koritha Mitchell, “What I Learned;” David G. Embrick, “Two Nations, Revisited: The Lynching of Black and Brown Bodies, Police Brutality, and Racial Control in ‘Post-Racial’ Amerikkka,” Critical Sociology 41 (2015), 835-843; Keisha N. Blain, “Ida B. Wells, Police Violence, and the Legacy of Lynching,” Black Perspectives (July 8, 2016), www.aaihs.org/ida-b-wells-police-violence-and- the-legacy-of-lynching/ (accessed 7 August 2017). 81. Mitchell, “What I learned.” 82. Forum, 19 March 2015, www.withoutsanctuary.org (accessed 11 March 2019). ABSTRACTS This paper traces the history of one specific photograph and its exhibition over time from the 1930s through the 1980s: that of the lynching of ‘Bootjack’ McDaniels, tortured to death by a white mob in Duck Hill, Mississippi, in 1937. I use that history to reflect more broadly on how lynching photographs have shaped popular consciousness about racist violence at different moments in time. They are able to do so, in good part, because of their iconographic qualities. These photographs, like many historical photographs, tend to detach past events from historical specificity and, subsequently, render the past into symbolic form, which allows new meanings to be imposed on them through the text and context that surround them. Those new meanings can direct viewers’ emotional responses to the images. This process of recontextualization allows for a meaningful ethical engagement with both historical and present-day suffering. In these ways, lynching photographs have been crucial to the formation of black historical memories of violence and injustice in the United States. Through this same process of recontextualization, I argue, lynching photographs make it possible for white Americans to engage ethically with racist violence, in the past and the present, through what I call “sympathetic spectatorship,” – an emotionally empathic form of looking that also involves an awareness of social difference. INDEX Keywords: Lynching, photographs, Without Sanctuary, Pat Ward Williams, Robert McDaniels, historical memory, sympathy, bearing witness “Somebody do Something!”: Lynching Photographs, Historical Memory, and the Po... European journal of American studies, 14-4 | 2019 24 AUTHOR AMY LOUISE WOOD Amy Louise Wood is a professor of history at Illinois State University, where she teaches courses in American cultural and intellectual history. She is the author of Lynching and Spectacle: Witnessing Racial Violence in America, 1890-1940 (University of North Carolina Press, 2009), and is currently writing a history of criminology and prison reform in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. “Somebody do Something!”: Lynching Photographs, Historical Memory, and the Po... European journal of American studies, 14-4 | 2019 25 “Somebody do Something!”: Lynching Photographs, Historical Memory, and the Possibility of Sympathetic Spectatorship 
work_qh6mugpvgfgqfcot5p6zkz3f6m	----	Connolly, Cathy, & Leedy, M.Gail (2006). Out in the cowboy state: A look at gay and lesbian lives in Wyoming. Journal of Gay and Lesbian Social Services, 19(1) 17-34. (ISSN: 1053- 8720) Taylor & Francis doi:10.1300/J041v19n01_02 Out in the Cowboy State: a Look at Gay And Lesbian Lives in Wyoming Cathy Connolly and Gail Leedy ABSTRACT We know relatively little about the lives and experiences of gays, lesbians, and bisexuals who live in rural areas, with early research tending to focus on the challenges of rural living. The present survey research examined the experiences and beliefs of gays and lesbians living in Wyoming. Findings highlight the interactions across personal, familial, community and societal levels. Differences based on gender and community size were found for the respondents' experiences with discrimination and their interest in the pursuit of "gay rights." Of special interest is the importance ascribed to the geographical community and the paucity of community- based resources. ARTICLE Our understanding of gay, lesbian and bisexual (GLB) lives has been shaped by studies conducted on urban populations. The earliest studies, conducted at the Kinsey Institute, were based on data collected in San Francisco during 1969-1970 (Bell, Weinberg, & Hammersmith, 1981; D‟Augelli & Hart, 1987). Similarly, urban samples were also used in the sociological studies of the 1970‟s and 1980‟s by Blumstein and Schwartz (1983), Harry and DeVall (1978), Levine (1979), and Weinberg (1983). In contrast, we know relatively little about the lives and experiences of the GLB persons who reside in rural areas or in geographically isolated communities. Early researchers such as Moses and Buchner (1980) concluded that rural gay life is difficult and unsatisfying: Rural areas are likely to be characterized by conservatives, traditionalism, religious fundamentalism, isolation of atypical or deviant members, resistance to change, high visibility, lack of confidentiality, and a tendency to view problems as personal rather than system based. (p.173) D‟Augelli and Hart (1987) also posited that “rural living poses distinct frustrations for people personally at ease with their sexuality” (p. 85). Other studies conducted during the 1980s, often from a clinical or social service perspective, characterized rural gay life similarly (Breeze, 1985; Gunther, 1986, 1988; Savin-Williams, 1989). This characterization of rural life as being hostile to GLB persons has remained fairly constant over the ensuing years. Smith (1997) argues that in rural communities, more traditional values are dominant and the boundaries are often closed, allowing for less toleration of variability in ways of life. Many organizations within rural areas are closed to gays, so that they must either seclude themselves from such organizations, or spend great amounts of energy trying to “pass,” or hide their sexual orientation and appear to be heterosexual. Therefore, GLB persons living in rural areas may experience extreme social isolation. Less negative portrayals of lesbian and gay life in rural areas have also been presented in more recent literature. GLB persons living in semi-rural and rural areas have reported high levels of self-esteem, community support and solidarity (Bonfitto, 1997; Waldo, Hesson- McInnis, & D‟Augelli, 1998). Cody and Welch (1997), in their examination of coping strategies of gay men to the challenges of rural life in northern New England, reported that all but one of their respondents concluded that the benefits of rural living mitigated the challenges. The space provided by rural areas may be an important element for such coping. In Farm Boys, by Will Fellows (1996), a compilation of sto- ries from gay men who grew up on Midwest farms, wooded areas and open spaces were often regarded as a sanctuary from the pressures associated with being different. The rural countryside has also provided the key component necessary for developing geographically-based lesbian communities (Bell & Valentine, 1995; Rudy, 2001; Valentine, 1997). Research specific to gay men living in Wyoming has been presented by Boulden (2001). In his qualitative study, the gay men indicated that they enjoyed membership in a rural community, and enjoyed the people. However, they also reported fearing the community due to the dominant role of heterosexism. “Don‟t ask, don‟t tell” was the over-riding rule. Boulden found that the gay community in Wyoming is loose and hard to find. In light of these sparse and often conflicting data, the present study sought information specific to the GLB population residing in Wyoming. The “Cowboy State” presents an interesting milieu for GLB lives. With a population of 500,000 people, or 5.1 people per square mile, Wyoming is second only to Alaska in population density across the US states (US Census Bureau, 2005). Only one city, Casper, ranks as metropolitan with a population of 53,011; and only two other cities, Cheyenne and Laramie, have populations exceeding 20,000. Until the late 1990‟s, Wyoming‟s GLB population was by and large invisible. This changed dramatically in 1998. Matthew Shepard, a University of Wyoming student, was brutally murdered due to his sexual orientation. The aftermath of this murder included the widely publicized convictions of Russell Henderson and Aaron McKinney in 1999. Since then, Matthew Shepard has become an international symbol for hate crimes against gays, and Wyoming‟s gay community has been exposed or “outed.” DATA AND METHODS With the exception of the qualitative study by Boulden (2001), there are no systematic studies of a gay and lesbian population in a frontier area within the United States. Therefore, data for this study were exploratory. A survey was developed and was distributed throughout Wyoming in early 1999. The survey instrument was four pages and concentrated on collecting quantitative data in the five general areas. The initial section of the survey requested descriptive, demographic information, including age, gender, sexual orientation, educational background, and county of residence within Wyoming. We chose not to ask the respondents‟ race, income, employment status or size of home community, even though these are typical and meaningful variables. Confidentiality was of major concern for many respondents, and, with the low population of Wyoming, the collection of additional demographic data could have allowed the researchers to discern the respondent‟s identity, leading to decreased participation in the survey. The second section of the survey focused on the participants‟ ties to their communities. This section included questions asked about their opportunities to interact within their residential community, and their perceptions of attitudes regarding lesbian and gay individuals in their home region. The next section focused on the participants‟ degree of disclosure of sexual orientation. This section included questions about their perceptions of attitudes regarding lesbian and gay individuals in their residential community, and if the respondent was “out” to family, friends and co-workers and the perceived attitudes in response to the disclosure. The last two sections focused on the importance of equal rights to the respondents and their experiences with discrimination. Equal rights examined included the right to marry, adopt children, bring forth discrimination claims at work, hospital visitation of an ill partner, equal and adequate health care, custody of/or visitation of children, and non-discriminatory housing policies. Experiences with discrimination explored these same areas. The survey was distributed in a variety of ways. Considering the overall population of Wyoming, its geographic size, and the lack of openly gay venues within the state, a purposive sampling technique presented the best method for gathering sufficient data. The three most successful means for sample distribution included: in-person distribution to friends and acquaintances, especially those in campus groups such as the University of Wyoming‟s Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender Association (LGBTA); through the newsletter of the United Gays and Lesbians of Wyoming (UGLW); and in-person distribution at a gay-friendly event in the state capitol, Equality Begins at Home. It must be recognized that the sampling method used and self-selection of respondents significantly limits the generalizability of these results. RESULTS Surveys from outside of Wyoming as well as those from individuals not self-identified as lesbian, gay, bisexual or transgender were discarded. Summaries of demographic data are presented in Table 1. Data from 47 women (39 self-identified as lesbian and eight as bisexual) and 40 men (36 gay and four bisexual) were analyzed. The respondents resided in 11 of Wyoming‟s 23 counties. The responses were divided into three geographic designations: the “University County” which is home to the only four year university in the state and has a total population of 32,000; the “High Population Counties” consisting of the two counties with the highest population densities and two most populated cities (population densities are 12.5 and 30.4 persons per square mile); and the “Low Population Counties” comprised of the remaining eight counties (mean population density 4.0). The respondents ranged in age from 19 to 70 years, with an overall mean age of 36.0 years. There was a significant difference in respondent age across the three county designations, F (2, 83) = 4.69, p < .05, with the University County having younger respondents and the High Population Counties having slightly older respondents (see Table 1). No other statistically significant differences were found for these demographic data. “Out” as gay/lesbian. Respondents were asked whether they were “out” (i.e. their orientation is known) to family, friends, and co-workers. The majority of respondents were “out” or “somewhat out” in most areas of their lives. Table 2 indicates the respondents‟ perceptions of the attitudes of their parents, friends and co-workers to their disclosure of their sexual orientation. Interestingly, every respondent who was out at work reported that his or her coworkers‟ attitudes were either mixed or positive; no respondents indicated that coworkers held negative attitudes towards them due to sexual orientation. The same was true for being out to friends, and the friends‟ responses. In contrast, 16.9% of the respondents indicated that their parents‟ response was negative, and only 33.8% reported that their parents responded in a positive manner to their sexual orientation. The respondents were asked to provide comments related to their coming out experiences, and five comments dealt specifically with family relationships. These comments conveyed the idea of the mixed responses they had received. For instance, a 29 year old gay man wrote, “Came out to my parents in a fight. Things have worked out but was tough (sic) to go there for a while.” A 23 year old lesbian wrote, For 2.5 years, my mother said it was a phase. Then she took to calling me “trash” and “junk”; she accused me of being a child molester; and she made it clear that I was welcome at “home” only because my father said I was. (My dad made me a wood carving of flowers when I first came out). My mother has been better since Matt Shepard was killed. Presumably, this woman was referring to the idea that Matthew Shepard‟s death was instrumental in helping her mother understand the difficulties of being gay or lesbian, and promoting acceptance of gays and lesbians (Advocate, 2002). Community Ties.We were interested in the respondents‟ perceptions of their community ties and social networks. The majority of respondents (86.0%) reported that they have at least some ties with GLB people within their home communities, and this did not differ across county designations (see Table 3). The respondents were asked to indicate if opportunities for connections existed within the following areas: social events, community programs or services, and the workplace. As expected, social functions provide the greatest opportunities for forming such ties, with 64% of the respondents indicating they have at least some opportunities here. There were no differences in this aspect across the various county designations. In contrast, few opportunities were reported in the workplace (20.2% of the respondents) and in community services and programs (23.6%) across all three county designations. This lack of opportunities was especially noticeable for the services/ programs designation in the Low Population Counties and even the University County, X 2 (2, N = 86) = 19.8, p < .01. In the workplace, the trend was similar for the Low Population Counties, but this difference failed to reach significance. Importance of Legal Rights. Respondents were asked to use a 4 point scale to rate the importance of attaining rights in seven areas (1 = not important; 4 = high level of importance). Overall, respondents expressed a high desire for rights in all seven areas, with mean scores ranging from 3.29 for adoption rights to 3.93 for the right to visit partner in the hospital. A multivariate analysis of the responses on these statements was performed, using respondents‟ gender and county designation as main variables and age as a covariate. No differences were found in any of these statements based on gender, and these factors were not correlated with age. Experiences of Discrimination. Respondents were asked to indicate if they believed they had experienced discrimination due to their sexual orientation. Twelve different areas were included in this section. Overall, as shown in Table 4, low levels of discrimination were reported, with no category having a mean response greater than 2.5, where 1 = no discrimination and 4 = high level of discrimination. The only category in which a majority of respondents indicated that they had experienced discrimination was harassment and/ or victimization. These twelve discrimination statements were reduced to three factors using an unweighted least squares factor analysis with varimax rotation (Stevens, 1992). The factors which emerged accounted for 64.4% of the variance (Table 5). The first factor, “Societal-level Discrimination,” included discrimination in taxation, in securing insurance, and marriage. The second factor, “Institutional-level Discrimination,” included discrimination in housing, hospital visitation, and credit/banking. The final factor, “Personal or Community-level Discrimination,” included discrimination in employment opportunities and termination, membership in community groups and harassment/ victimization. Scores for these three factors were calculated for each of the respondents by summing their scores on the included items and converting to the original 4-point scale. Overall, low levels of discrimination were reported for each of the factors. Multivariate analysis was used to determine differences in discrimination scores across county designations and based on gender, using age as a covariate. There were patterns of differences for both county designation and gender. For Personal/Community Level discrimination, there was a significant interaction effect between the county designation and gender, F (2, 79) = 3.49, p = .04. As seen in Table 6, the women‟s scores were similar regardless of their home county, while the men in the University County reported lower levels of discrimination than do the men in the other county designations. Five respondents‟ written comments regarding their coming out experiences addressed this level of discrimination.A 35 year old gay man, from a low population county wrote, “Coming out is scary, every time. The community as a whole does not accept it, so there‟s no enclave–Everything is „in secret‟.” Another gay man, 42 years old, wrote, “When I came out, I was living in a town of 250 and those who knew me well were OK with it, those who didn‟t totally shunned me.” There was also a significant interaction between gender and County designation for Institutional Level discrimination scores, F (2, 79) = 3.46, p = .04, which was primarily accounted for by the difference in the men‟s and women‟s scores living in the Low Population Counties. As seen in Table 6, men‟s scores were fairly even regardless of county of residence, while those women living in the Low Population Counties reported higher levels of institutional discrimination than men or women in any other combination. Written comments also were provided which relate to this level of discrimination. A 32 year old lesbian from a Low Population County wrote, “I taught high school . . . for four years and have a lot of experience and stories of being a closeted teacher and witnessing school homophobia.” Another ex-teacher wrote, “I am very concerned about the lack of a support system in our high schools and junior highs.” The lack of support within the schools was also referred to by a 27 year old year old gayman who recalled, “. . . being a young high school student who did not have positive role model to look to for help.” This problem carried over to the community college setting, as well. A lesbian wrote, “I do the Safe Zone training at . . . A faculty member is proposing an „anti-Safe Zone‟ program to make our campus safer for heterosexuals.” For Societal Level Discrimination, there was no difference across the county designations, but there was a significant gender difference, F (1, 79) = 5.27, p = .03, with women expressing higher levels of perceived discrimination than men (see Table 6). Written comments were often specific to the state of Wyoming. A 30 year old gay man in a Low Population County wrote, “In Wyoming we are geographically isolated. There need to be central places to talk and get support for gays and lesbians, not just in Cheyenne.” Another indicated that, “In Wy [sic] I am very discreet–people may have bias–I never say anything.” Two men referred to the state‟s failure to pass a hate crime bill. A 49 year old gay man wrote, I am extremely upset and disturbed that the „anti hate crime bill‟ did not pass in this the so called „equality state‟. My plans are to move to Oregon, where I lived before–where state laws protect me as a gay citizen. The impact of such isolation and oppression was also touched on. A 36 year old male from the University County wrote, “Many of us, myself included, come from conservative backgrounds. In order to be „gay‟ we have to amputate a measurable part of ourselves.” Subtle forms of oppression were also indicated. A gay man in a High Population County indicated that, “We cannot openly show our affection in public and I believe this is the greatest form of discrimination I have experienced.” Several respondents provided positive comments, although not directly related to Wyoming. A gay male living in the University County indicated that, “The more comfortable I am with myself (inc. being out), the more acceptance I receive from others,” While another wrote: I was outed after attending a vigil for Mathew (sic) Shepard by a newspaper reporter, who quoted me. Now I amout at work and socially in almost 100% my life. It was a difficult transition but ultimately I would never want to go back to where I was. It has been liberating and so good and right. DISCUSSION This study reports on several characteristics, experiences and perceptions held by gay men and women of Wyoming. It is important to realize that the experiences of the lesbian and gay persons of this study include the interactions of familial, personal, community and societal levels. Each of these areas will be discussed as it relates to the present data. Oswald (2002) explores the idea of intentionality in managing disclosure of sexual orientation. By being deliberate about disclosure, lesbians and gays can determine which family members can provide support versus those who, if sexual orientation were known, would result in additional distancing or antagonism. Such intentionality is supported by the respondents‟ careful disclosure at their place of employment. Those who have chosen to be out at work have not been responded to negatively. Likewise, this is true for those who are out to their friends. The same degree of selectivity does not appear to carry over to the parental relationship, in that the majority of the respondents are out to their parents, even though only about a third reported that they received a positive response. This exemption from intentionality may be accounted for the importance of familial relationships. Laird (1993) has theorized that support from family members is a critical component for gays and lesbians, due to the primacy of familial relationships throughout life. However, as D‟Augelli, Hershberger, and Pilkington (1998) have discussed, disclosure of sexual orientation to family members is a complex and challenging step for lesbians and gays to undertake. Further results from our study can help us understand the place of gays and lesbians within Wyoming communities. There are several concepts regarding “community” that are relevant to our discussion. The more traditional view of community is that of a geographically based and/or function-based grouping of people that provides for social activities, work, education, family activities and shared values (Reiss, 1959; Warren, 1978). Within this context, it is apparent that gays and lesbians have both support and challenges within their home communities. The importance of the geographic community to the GLB respondents is evident, in that almost 80% report that they are active within their community. The majority of respondents indicated that they are able to form ties with other GLB persons. Opportunities for these ties are most apparent at the personal/community level, within social settings. While this is encouraging and apparent even in the Low Population Communities, the same respondents indicate fewer opportunities within the organizational context of the community, including the workplace and with community services and programs. The school setting was mentioned as an institution particularly prone to homophobia. The lack of services and the level of personal/community discrimination are especially apparent for those living in the Low Population Counties. It is important to note that Wyoming has no gay bars or bookstores, nor any regular places for gays and lesbians to meet and socialize (Berry, 1995). Woolwine (2000) discusses the gay community in terms of local organizations, in which those individuals who identify as members of the community support the various local gay organizations because of a sense of connection and duty. A relative lack of such a community within Wyoming and a corresponding paucity of supportive local service organizations, especially within the least populated counties, are reported here. Another recently developed concept of community is that of loosely connected networks Wood & Judikis, 2002). Woolwine (2000) discusses this specifically in relation to GLB population, referring to it as the imagined community. This level of community may yet play an important role for Wyoming GLB persons. Recently, increased access to virtual GLB communities via internet use and electronic mail has allowed greater interactions with other GLB persons and increased access to GLB information (Haag&Chang, 1997). Also there is an active state organization, now known as Wyoming Equality, which has publishes a newsletter and maintains an internet site. Therefore, some level of interaction with other GLB persons is currently possible, even for those in the most rural and remote areas of Wyoming. These indirect forms of interactions may facilitate the Wyoming respondents‟ connection to Woolwine‟s imagined community. Gender is also a factor which must be considered. In the present study, gay men living in the University County can experience a degree of safety that is not available in the other areas of the state. This was true even in the face of the beating death of Matt Shepard. However, it is the lesbians who perceive that their lives are impacted by discrimination at the societal level. Also institutional level discrimination is high for those lesbians living in Low Population Counties. According to a report on the Status of Women in the States prepared for the Institute for Women‟s Policy Research (Caiazza & Shaw, 2004), Wyoming women experience high rates of suicide, low earnings, low levels of health insurance, and underrepresented among business owners. Thus, the current reports by lesbians regarding discrimination felt at the institutional and societal level is consistent with the status of women, regardless of sexual orientation, within Wyoming. The experiences of the GLB persons in this current study are not homogeneous, in that variations were seen across county designations. Although the state of Wyoming as a whole is considered rural, there are variations population distributions which are important to consider. The most densely populated Low Population County barely exceeds the criteria for classification as frontier, with 7.0 persons per square mile (Ricketts, Johnson-Webb, & Taylor, 1998). It is those residents in these counties which report the highest levels of discrimination at both the community/personal level and at the institutional level. Further, these respondents report the fewest opportunities for services and programs for GLB persons. Implications for practice: These findings emphasize the importance of developing programs to build upon the strengths of rural communities for GLB persons. As outlined in Smith and Mancoske‟s 1997 handbook for social service practitioners, the addition of such services can greatly enhance the well being of gay and lesbian residents, allowing them to enjoy the benefits of rural living without risking discrimination, oppression and isolation. Because it is unrealistic to expect that agencies within rural communities would establish programs specifically for GLB persons, it is thus even more important for human service providers in such areas to be aware of the unique needs of these populations. Administrators and service providers must work to limit their own heterosexism and homophobia and advocate for culturally competent services and programming. Limitations: While this study presents interesting data regarding the lives of GLB persons in Wyoming, there are a number of limitations. It must be recognized that the sampling method used and self-selection of respondents significantly limits the generalizability of these results. Additionally, there were areas within the state which were not represented and areas, such as the University County, which were over-represented. Further, our desire to maintain anonymity and confidentiality of respondents restricted the collection of demographic data which may have added a meaningful level of analysis. CONCLUSIONS The unique setting, history and culture of Wyoming must also be factored in. Wyoming‟s official motto is “Equal Rights,” and it prides itself on its rugged individualism and “live and let live” attitude. In spite of this, Wyoming is often equated with homophobia. The murder of Matthew Shepard in 1998 has left an enduring mark on this state. Both the rugged individualism and the homophobia of Wyoming are poignantly brought together in the award-winning movie Brokeback Mountain (2005), based on the short story written by Annie Proulx (1997). Our study, completed within this unique geographical and cultural setting, emphasizes both the strengths and challenges of life for rural lesbians and gays. REFERENCES Bell, D.,&Valentine, G. (1995). Queer country: Rural lesbian and gay lives. Journal of Rural Studies, 11(2), 113-122. Bell, A. P., Weinberg, M. S., & Hammersmith, S. K. (1981). Sexual preference: Its development in men and women. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Berry, L. (1995, May 15:). Coming out in the cowboy state. Casper Star Tribune, pp. C1. Blumstein, P., & Schwartz, P. (1983). American couples: Money, work, sex. New York: Morrow. Bonfitto, V. (1997). The formation of gay and lesbian identity and community in the Connecticut River Valley of Western Massachusetts, 1900-1970. 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work_qicl4jht7zbcdf6gdaxd7axuwa	----	Discourse from #TheRealUW: What Tweets Say about Racial Concerns at a Predominately White Institution $ € £ ¥ social sciences Article Discourse from #TheRealUW: What Tweets Say about Racial Concerns at a Predominately White Institution Karl Vachuska * and Jack Brudvig Department of Sociology, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Madison, WI 53706, USA; jbrudvig@wisc.edu * Correspondence: vachuska@wisc.edu Received: 2 December 2017; Accepted: 15 January 2018; Published: 29 January 2018 Abstract: In March 2016, after a series of hate crimes victimized students of color on campus, students at the University of Wisconsin-Madison started #TheRealUW movement against racism on campus. In order to exemplify racism on campus, students of color took to social media to share personal experiences and opinions on racism, affixing “#TheRealUW” to their posts. In this article, we analyze what students of color on the social media site, Twitter, spoke about and took issue against. The plurality of #TheRealUW tweets centered primarily on instances of subtle or explicit verbal racism. These experiences had impacted a variety of aspects of students of color’s lives, including mental health, housing, access to spaces, and overall quality of education. Students also discussed isolation, marginalized representation in the University’s decisions, and their relationship with authority. The many tweets clearly demonstrate the breadth of racism at predominately white institutions and indicate that inequality of peer and faculty social resources, opportunities, and experiences is a significant perpetuator of a variety of forms of racial inequality at predominately white institutions, but that racism in institutional and systemic forms is also an area of concern for students. Keywords: race; race relations; higher education; predominately white institution; students of color 1. Introduction #TheRealUW was a social media campaign beginning in mid-march 2016 in which students of color at the University of Wisconsin-Madison took to social media to share their experiences of racism at the university, affixing “#TheRealUW” to their posts on various social media sites. The months before had been a challenging time for minority groups at UW-Madison, as dozens of hate and bias incidents were reported to University administration, with many being publicized in media and informal social spaces. For students of color at this large predominately white institution, outcome disparities are quite significant. The 4-year graduation rate for white students (61%) is nearly twice that of black students (38%) (Retention and Graduation Rates 2017). A 2017 survey also revealed that 50% of students of color at UW-Madison feel they do not “belong” on campus (Campus Climate Survey 2017). Much research has been done on the experiences of students of color at predominately white institutions, with much focus particularly on Black students. In this research, however, we will not look at one particular race, but instead look at the inequalities non-white students face on the campus relative to their white peers. By examining students’ experiences as exposed on the social media site, Twitter, we find that a significant source of racism is inequality of social experiences and opportunities between students of color and white students. We further find that this inequality manifests itself in a number of forms of racial inequality, including inequality of mental health, experience within housing, access to spaces, and overall quality of education. Despite the localized context of racism, we find institutional inequalities, racially motivated misconduct of authorities, and a lack of diversity to still be significant areas of concern for students of color. Soc. Sci. 2018, 7, 21; doi:10.3390/socsci7020021 www.mdpi.com/journal/socsci http://www.mdpi.com/journal/socsci http://www.mdpi.com http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/socsci7020021 http://www.mdpi.com/journal/socsci Soc. Sci. 2018, 7, 21 2 of 13 2. Literature Review The experiences of college students of color remains a multifaceted and pressing topic of social research. In reviewing the relevant literature, what emerges are several interconnected themes rather than a single grand narrative. In particular, a meta-analysis of the issue “consistently calls attention to the isolation, alienation, and stereotyping” with which students of color contend in Predominately White Institutions (PWIs) (Harper and Hurtado 2007). Such racial tension is hypothesized to be especially acute “in environments where there is little concern for individual students”, a symptom of many large PWIs with enrollment in the tens of thousands (Hurtado 1992). At such large institutions, the unique concerns of minority groups are less likely to receive unique attention; unsurprisingly, there is a significant disparity between minority students and their white counterparts in their detection of problems in the campus climate (Hurtado 1992). Despite this disparity, almost all students interviewed in a study of five large PWIs, irrespective of race, “deemed their institutions negligent in the educational processes that lead to racial understanding” (Harper and Hurtado 2007). In other words, it does not go unnoticed when universities “have diversity plastered everywhere” while failing to facilitate constructive cross-racial engagement, treating race as an unspoken four-letter word (Harper and Hurtado 2007). Failures such as these are among the chief reasons that “isolation, alienation, and stereotyping” is felt so acutely by students of color, while remaining undetectable to many white students. The more engagement students (especially whites) had with peers outside their race during their undergraduate years, the less likely they were to display racial bias (Levin et al. 2003). Of course, it is difficult to tell in which direction the causal relationship is stronger. Perhaps nowhere is campus racial stratification more pronounced—and white students more blind to this fact—than on frat row. The Interfraternity Council president at one particularly large university claimed that “If we did not have the Black frats, our chapters would have more diverse members”, ignoring the fact that only twenty-nine students held membership in these black fraternities (Antonio et al. 2004). Indeed, the persistence of an unwelcoming fraternity climate for students of color is one of the more explicit vestiges of higher education’s elitist and racist history. The continual recurrence of blackface minstrelsy at fraternities, along with their fondness for caricaturing and debasing hip hop culture, is a reminder that black performativity as a source of humor and entertainment among whites is still alive and well (Patton 2008). The historical basis for campus climate deficiencies is further shown by the disparities in faculty representation, or, for that matter, most positions of power within the institution (6% Black faculty, 4% Hispanic faculty (NCES 2017)). Not only is this lack of representation frequently cited by students of color as a reason for their perceived lack of belonging, it also helps us understand the “consciousness-powerlessness paradox” preventing necessary changes from occurring: despite their awareness of student alienation, most staff (especially those of color) indicated their “reluctance to call attention to these trends for fear of losing their jobs or political backlash . . . of being seen as troublemakers” (Harper and Hurtado 2007). This tendency becomes quite understandable in light of the fact that even among faculty, Black and Hispanic professors achieve tenured positions at a substantially lower rate (4% Black, 3% Hispanic (NCES 2017)). Instead, staff indicated that they would “privately strategize with students” to help them make the best out of a bad situation, but “felt powerless in voicing observations to senior administrators and White colleagues” (Harper and Hurtado 2007). One of the most compelling pieces of evidence for PWIs disadvantaging black students is the marked contrast—in both described experience and academic outcomes—at PWIs compared to historically black colleges (HBCs), which around one-fourth of black students attend. One of the most serious consequences of student alienation at PWIs is disengagement with—and consequently, decreased interest in furthering—their education: 75% of Black Ph.Ds, 75% of Black army officers, 80% of Black federal judges, and 85% of Black doctors spent their undergraduate years at HBCs, despite Soc. Sci. 2018, 7, 21 3 of 13 the fact that only 15% of Black master’s or professional degrees are awarded by these institutions (Roebuck and Murty 1993; Brown and Davis 2001). These findings make a clear statement about the source of the college achievement gap: It is not for a lack of sufficient preparation, but a lack of the social and cultural capital needed to create an environment conducive to success. The lack of social networks that “provide information and influence” along with the undervaluation of particular forms of cultural knowledge (e.g., “refined” versus “unrefined” tastes) make it harder for students of color to find their place in an environment based on social networks or systems of valuation different from their own (Brown and Davis 2001). By contrast, environments where black cultural capital is more valuable are highly conducive to success. As an example, one way black students carry greater cultural capital at HBCs has to do with religious affiliation: 60% of students enrolled in HBCs identify as Baptist, compared to 20% at PWIs (Mcdonald 2011). The African Methodist Episcopalian Church, as well, is affiliated with or has an especially strong presence on many HBCs. Given that religion is, in some sense, a built-in social support system, sharing it with a majority of one’s peers is among the most powerful sources of belonging students can feel. However, the relative success of students of color at HBCs applies to secular institutions as well. Walter Allen (1992; via Brown and Davis 2001) identified how several of their unique characteristics help explain this phenomenon: (1) Greater dedication to the “maintenance of the Black historical and cultural tradition” through coursework and extracurricular activity; (2) More representation in key leadership roles; (3) Greater economic empowerment (HBCs often have “the largest institutional budget within the black community”); (4) More role models “to interpret the way in which social, political, and economic dynamics impact Black people”; and (5) Greater emphasis on producing graduates who are competent in researching, understanding, and addressing issues of concern to minorities. These qualities stand in marked contrast to those of PWIs, where, despite their promotion of diversity, educators tend to address racial issues through the lens of “color-blindness”; that is, a belief that all social categories “should be dismantled and disregarded, and everyone should be treated as an individual” (Richeson and Shelton 2003). Multiculturalism, on the other hand, might be viewed as the opposite approach: such differences should be acknowledged, taken into consideration, and even celebrated; failure to do so “undermines the cultural heritage of non-white individuals, and, as a result, is detrimental to the well-being of ethnic minorities” (Richeson and Shelton 2003). Support for the multiculturalism argument came from an Implicit Association Test administered to 52 white Dartmouth undergrads. First, half of the group read passages promoting a color-blind approach to racial issues, while the other half read one promoting a multicultural approach. After this, they were administered the test, with the color-blind group scoring significantly higher in their pro-white bias (Richeson and Shelton 2003). This sheds light on a commonality that Davis et al. (2004) found in interviews with black undergraduates: “Students were aware of how important it was to them to be the same as others in learning and social settings”, again describing the “isolation, alienation, and stereotyping” induced not necessarily by overt acts of racism, but by being in the presence of a large cohort of students simply unaware of their own biases, subtle or unsubtle. Indeed, we would expect, almost by definition, that someone espousing a “color-blind” ideology, as many on college campuses do, would perceive themselves to be less biased than average. However, as the Dartmouth study bore out, such an approach may not necessarily result in lower bias after all: quite the opposite. The personal descriptions gleaned from Davis et al. (2004) take this a step further, falling into categories showcasing which themes are most prevalent at PWIs: (1) Unfair or condescending treatment from the college (e.g., classroom offenses or administrative unresponsiveness to complaints); (2) The feeling by black students that they always “have to initiate the conversation” in order to make any connections with hesitant white students and faculty; (3) The resulting appearance of one’s differences; when black students were not feeling unnoticed or “invisible”, this was replaced by (or was Soc. Sci. 2018, 7, 21 4 of 13 felt simultaneously with) “super visibility”: the feeling that they “have to represent every black student in here”; and consequently (4) The tired refrain: “I have to prove I am worthy to be here”. Contrada et al. (2000) identify “stereotype confirmation-concern”—that is, “the chronic apprehension about appearing to confirm an ethnic stereotype”—as one of the top sources of ethnicity-related stress. On the other hand, “own-group conformity pressure” is a commonly felt stressor which, for example, may discourage African-Americans from excelling academically to avoid “acting white”. Transitioning from one situation where the latter stressor is more salient to another situation where the former stressor is more salient—namely, the transition between high school and college—could conceivably create cognitive dissonance not conducive to academic success. According to Jennifer Crocker and Steele (1998) the negative effects of such social stigmas are determined in part by an individual’s appraisal of the “identity threat” posed by the “stigma-relevant stressor as potentially harmful to his or her social identity, and as exceeding his or her resources to cope with those demands”. This can set off a chain of undesirable effects. Most individuals possess built-in threat-reduction mechanisms, which lead to “involuntary stress responses such as anxiety, vigilance to threat, and decreased working memory capacity”. Other potential coping strategies include “blaming negative events on discrimination, identifying more closely with the threatened group, and disengaging self-esteem from threatening domains”. Needless to say, improved well-being and academic performance are rarely seen as byproducts of these reactions. 3. Background The University of Wisconsin-Madison is a campus of about 43,000 students, located in Madison, WI, the capital of Wisconsin, birthplace of the progressive movement, and a city of about 250,000 people. UW-Madison is approximately 75% White, 5% Asian, 5% Hispanic, 2% Black/African-American, and 9% International (Enrollment Reports 2017). About 61% of students are from Wisconsin. (Enrollment Reports 2017) Public school students in Wisconsin are about 73% White, 4% Asian, 10% Hispanic, and 10% Black/African-American (Public School Enrollment Data 2017). Despite this greater level of diversity, most white students in Wisconsin come from school districts with much less diversity. In 2016, 47.1% of the school districts in Wisconsin enrolled 90% or more white students, and 76% enrolled 80% or more white students. (Public School Enrollment Data 2017) A lack of cross-racial interactions for many incoming students leads to challenges for white students encountering greater racial diversity in college, fostering greater self-segregation (Nacoste 2015). UW-Madison has a history of racial issues on campus. In the 1980s, a series of racial hate incidents prompted protests by black students on campus (Yamane 2002). In response, the University made an institutional change: a three-credit ethnic studies requirement in order for undergraduates to graduate (Yamane 2002). Seen as a victory then, some students see the requirement as not enough today. Cross-racial interactions are incredibly limited on campus, and students describe campus as “the most racially segregated place I’ve ever seen”, as students of color spend time primarily with students of color and white students spend time primarily with white students (Vetterkind and Palasz 2016). In early March 2016, a hate incident occurred at one of the predominately minority learning communities (Herzog 2016). A male student attacked and harassed a black female student, calling her “poor” and telling her “she didn’t deserve to be here, that she wasn’t pulling her own weight because she was on scholarship” (Herzog 2016). The perpetrator also called her “all kinds of names relating to her race, her class, and her gender” (Herzog 2016). Finally, the perpetrator spit on her (Herzog 2016). A few days later, #TheRealUW began trending on social media as students shared experiences of racism, bias, discrimination, and discontent with the university (Herzog 2016). Although the movement seemed to be triggered by a single hate and bias incident, there had been rising racial tension throughout the school year (Schneider 2016). A variety of hate incidents had gone public in the months preceding, with incidents ranging from anti-Semitic to anti-Native American (Schneider 2016). The hashtag trended on multiple forms of social media, including Twitter, Facebook, and Instagram. The hashtag grew quickly with thousands of tweets being tweeted and retweeted within the first few Soc. Sci. 2018, 7, 21 5 of 13 days. Quickly discovering it, the University’s administration released multiple statements in response, and media outlets released a number of journalism pieces about it (Schneider 2016). Dialogue initially centered on the exemplification of students of color ’s stories of racism on campus; however, discussion of current events was also brought into the dialogue, including discussion regarding an incident in which a black student was arrested in class. There was no focus on just one race, and students of all minority races shared their experiences. The movement shifted from a digital movement to a physical movement, and “TheRealUW” demonstrated all over campus, such as at dining halls on campus and even at a campaign event for 2016 presidential candidate Bernie Sanders (Schneider 2016). One of the most prominent demonstrations of #TheRealUW movement was in response to the arrest of a black student in class that occurred in April, one month after the movement initially began (Savidge 2016). In response to the deemed-inappropriate conduct of police, students marched across campus, occupying a library and blocking off a street for several hours (Savidge 2016). Although social media participation was briefly ignited in the wake of this event, as twitter will show, minimal content has been generated by students since then. In this analysis, we examine uses of the hashtag “TheRealUW” on twitter. We selected this medium because it appeared this was the platform most students were sharing their experiences on. The open access to Twitter content coming from public accounts also made the site a prime choice for analysis. We examined the 2644 publicly available tweets that included #TheRealUW and were published between March 2016 and August 2017. Despite such a wide time frame, a majority (2315) of the tweets were published just in March or April of 2016. We excluded 357 tweets that appeared to be published from accounts that were non-individuals (Universities, groups, organizations, media outlets, etc.) Tweets were coded into the categories below on the basis of their own content or referenced content. Since tweets must be short, assumptions occasionally had to be made on whether a tweet implied something that was not stated. #TheRealUW was colloquially known to refer to racism at UW-Madison, and it was assumed in certain tweets that individuals were implying their statement demonstrated racism based on “#TheRealUW” being affixed to it. Some tweets did fit into multiple categories, and many tweets examined did not fit into any of the categories so will not be discussed. 4. Tweets 4.1. Verbal Racism One hundred twenty-six tweets described first-hand experiences as the victim of perceived explicit or implicit verbal racism, bigotry, or perceived discrimination. Another eighty tweets described others’ experiences. Many of the incidences described would be defined as microagressions, while other examples were explicitly racist. Experiences of microagressions, instances where students were slighted with a racial implication, were shared in a variety of contexts, and while many were miscellaneous, a few distinct trends did emerge. Students of color described incidences in which they were often stereotyped based on their race, and assumed to be a student-athlete based on their status as a student of color on a college campus. One student tweeted “I started a running tally of how many times my black male friends are mistaken for athletes”. Incidences of students’ tweets also included instances where race was inappropriately referred to in classrooms. In one such trend, students of color often complain of general discourse among white students in which they doubt the validity of students of color being accepted into the university on equal terms or receiving a scholarship under equal terms. One student tweeted “#therealUW where if you have a sports scholarship they worship you but if your scholarship is for anything else you don’t deserve to be here”. Other instances of racism students experienced on campus were quite explicit, and directed at a particular student, or generalized as part of discourse among white students. While one student tweeted how they overheard two white students flat out say “they hate every Asian, wished UW was Soc. Sci. 2018, 7, 21 6 of 13 back to normal & white”, another tweeted “My story? Being laughed at and told “F**king Asian. This is not the place you should be” on a night out”. Incidences of subtle racism tend to be more common than incidences of blatant racism, and although on an individual basis are arguably less traumatizing, the cumulative effects of them can be “devastating” (Solorzano et al. 2000). Discourse among students agreed with this finding, and seemed to indicate that these acts of subtle racism were so frequent of an occurrence that they shaped their everyday experience at UW-Madison. One student tweeted “Not from the past, I still get that kind of comments everyday” affixed to an article about students’ microagressions on campus. Instances of blatant racial harassment have been found to affect the emotional health of students of color, leading many to fear for their safety (D’Augelli and Hershberger 1993). As one student wrote, “Something is profoundly wrong with our campus culture if POC (people of color) can’t walk down the street without fearing verbal abuse #therealUW” Another student tweeted “my march madness has been dealing w racist events happening to friends, fear/anxiety in white spaces & lack of motivation. #therealUW”. Instances of both explicit and implicit racism were widespread and well-documented, with several hundred students of color at UW voluntarily sharing stories that referred to particular instances of these that they had experienced, and these forms of racism overall made up the plurality of #therealUW tweets. Outside of verbal racism, many tweets mentioned incidences where students of color believed they had been discriminated against by their peers on the basis of their race, barring them from an opportunity. As one student tweeted “Getting denied entry into a party while your white friends gain entry or getting followed out to ask if you’d stole something”. Racial discrimination is nothing new, and students of color on college campuses do not seem to be exempt from any of the everyday occurrences that racial minorities have to deal with all across the United States. Another student tweeted “#therealUW where in an exam no one wants to sit by you in fear you’ll copy off them”. For students of color, discrimination manifests itself differently from verbal racism, where rather than just having unequal social experiences compared to their white peers, discrimination may block the social experience from occurring in the first place, creating an inequality of social opportunities. 4.2. Mental Health Eight tweets identified instances of general explicit or implicit verbal racism and bigotry as negatively affecting students’ mental health. Explicit or implicit verbal racism often borders on harassment, and the effects of social isolation also further how social inequality is reflected in a student of color ’s mental health (Landrine and Klonoff 1996). Only a few students made this direct connection in their tweets, but some described the impact campus cultural incompetence has on mental health quite pointedly. One student wrote “being a student of color at UW means jeopardizing ur sanity for the sake of educating your white peers”. The scope of the incidences described in many other tweets made obvious the capacity of these experiences to inflict stress on an individual’s mental health. Evidence, in fact, has long shown that acts of racism and hate can take a toll on an individual’s health, particularly mental health (Wallace et al. 2016). Recently, it has been discerned that black students at predominately white institutions across the United States face a looming mental health crisis as they cope with the burden of overt and covert racism (McGee and Stovall 2015). Some students’ tweets, while not elaborating on the connection between racial issues and mental health, were simply students of color professing their claim to mental health challenges, within the context of #TheRealUW as exemplifying the prevalence and effect of racial injustices on campus. One student tweeted “This University has been such a strain on my mental health #therealUW” while another replied “my displacement to Wisconsin was the start of me truly losing it”. For many students of color, the challenge presented in regard to deciding between a world-class education and enduring a toxic social environment can most likely be summed up in one tweet “Do I have to choose between my humanity and my education?” Soc. Sci. 2018, 7, 21 7 of 13 4.3. Housing Fifteen tweets identified instances of general explicit or implicit verbal racism and bigotry as negatively affecting students’ housing experience. At UW-Madison, all on-campus housing is communal to some extent. Students further have little control over what on-campus housing they are assigned to, and for the sake of proximity to campus, are geographically limited from living too far outside of campus. This means, for the most part, that students of color have little control in getting away from white students and detrimental environments as a whole. Vera-Toscano and Ateca-Amestoy (2008) found that housing satisfaction is heavily determined by the quality of social interactions in and around one’s dwelling. Shook and Fazio (2008) found that students in interracial two-person dorms reported lower levels of satisfaction and less involvement with their roommate. Tweets by students emphasized how their own or someone else’s roommate had acted in a racially demeaning way. One student tweeted a lengthy experience in which he had been accosted, harassed, and called a racial slur on the very floor of a residence hall where he lived. One student shared an experience where she worked in housing and a student’s parents requested “a white person to help her move in”. Explicit instances of racism such as this demonstrate how racism can manifest itself into an inequality of housing-related experiences between white students and students of color. One tweet shared an article of how a UW-Madison fraternity was suspended after a black member complained of the “hostile, discriminatory environment”. Alongside the article, a student wrote “Sad that so many people don’t feel safe or welcomed in their homes.” 4.4. Access to Spaces Eleven tweets identified instances of general explicit or implicit verbal racism and bigotry as negatively affecting access to spaces. Students of marginalized groups are often subject to spaces where they fear psychological of emotional harm (Holley and Steiner 2005). In these spaces, particularly ones subject to interpersonal interactions, students may “not feel secure enough to take risks, honestly express their views, and share and explore their knowledge, attitudes, and behaviors” (Holley and Steiner 2005). For more general spaces, students may not want to even use these spaces, and will feel motivated to avoid them (Feagin and Sikes 1996). While some students will feel uncomfortable and inhibited from full participation in a classroom as a result, this also can mean that for various areas around the University, such as “residence halls and streets with popular off-campus housing”, students of color will not feel comfortable being in these areas (Washington et al. 2016). The 2016 survey at UW-Madison found that students of color tend to avoid areas where white students congregate to consume alcohol, in fear of harassment (Washington et al. 2016). This further contributes to the notion that relations between students of color and white students facilitate a divide in the accessibility of the University’s resources. The inaccessibility perpetuated by acts of racism and exclusivity were highlighted in one student’s tweet “Today I couldn’t go out to watch the sun rise cos I am scared of this campus. I am scared to exist. & that is on you @UWMadison!”. Instances of racism, verbal or subtle, provoke students of color to avoid places where white students congregate. Some students’ tweets drew the connection between racism and avoidance more blatantly, as one student put it “I avoided campus/downtown because I didn’t want to deal with being called ‘n*gger’”. Students’ fear of racial harassment as well as general sense of discomfort in areas with many white students demonstrates the negative effects racism uniquely has on college campuses. 4.5. Quality of Education Forty-three tweets identified instances of general explicit or implicit verbal racism and bigotry as negatively affecting a student of color ’s quality of education. On predominantly white campuses, racial divides manifest as social divides within classrooms, students of color feel isolated and vulnerable, and white students of the racial majority fail to foster an inclusive environment (Tienda 2013). Soc. Sci. 2018, 7, 21 8 of 13 Disparities persist in students of color ’s contact with faculty compared to white students (Chang 2005). Positivity of students of color’s perception of their campus as well as the general level of interaction with other students has been found to be correlated with increased contact (Chang 2005). Implicitly and explicitly racist statements and actions isolate and disengage students of color from equal participation in the classroom and from equal relationships with instructors. Many students of color do not feel comfortable fully participating in classes for fear of psychological or emotional harm (Holley and Steiner 2005). Given long-held racial tensions, relationships between students of color and everyone else in the classroom can be predisposed to be stressed (Hurtado 1992). One student tweeted “#therealUW is when the Ochem TA tells the class to turn and work in groups and everyone turns their back on you” Being the numerically dominant group in a classroom offers a number of privileges to white students that students of color do not have (Tienda 2013). Students of color in predominately white classrooms tend to participate less than students of color in majority-minority classrooms (Howard et al. 2006). Another student tweeted “#therealUW where you find yourself silent in a class discussion when you know the answer but in fear of being undermine(d) you don’t speak”. For many students of color, fear provokes disengagement based on expectations surrounding racial tensions, even if nothing in that particular classroom has been provoked yet. For many students, their relationships with their instructors, peers, and the classroom as a whole can be damaged by racist statements that went unresolved (Washington Department of Education 2010). Several tweets referred to these instances. As one student wrote “Arguing with your WHITE male professor on why using the terms mulatto and colored people are not acceptable in your AfroAM class #therealUW”. Another student tweeted “when you get told to “go back to Mexico” by a person in your class and you call them racist and they say “oh sorry it’s just a joke”.” Countless examples such as these and others demonstrate how racial incompetence is fracturing relationships and structures for students of color in classrooms. 4.6. Isolation and a Lack of Diversity Thirty-one tweets expressed sentiments that the isolation minorities face and a lack of diversity on campus are issues. Students identified two major consequences of belonging to a minority group at a majority-dominant institution. One problem directly stems from the isolation, alienation, and negative social effects that arise from them (Lewis et al. 2000). The other is inherently caused by the unique needs of that small group being ignored (Eriksen 2010). The effect of racial isolation on a campus as large as UW-Madison is concerning, and some students voiced their problems with it through tweets. As one student put it “I like this digital studies class but it would be even better if I wasn’t the only black person in it”. Isolation contributes to the alienation students of color at predominately white institutions feel, furthering their dissatisfaction with their experience there (Shingles 1979). Students of color are inherently at a disadvantage by not having like-raced peers and faculty around them at all times, as white students are essentially guaranteed (Denson and Chang 2009). Another student voiced her concern with poor role-modeling on campus as she stated that “Not once have I seen a Hispanic professor. The only Hispanic faculty I have seen are three custodians in my residence hall”. For students of color, racial isolation fosters alienation and difficulty finding role models, two distinct challenges not affecting white students on campus. While it may be inherently challenging to be a minority at a majority-white institution, reflecting the state’s diversity and offering equal accessibility to the state’s students is also a significant issue at UW-Madison. Every minority group except for Asian is significantly underrepresented at UW-Madison relative to the state’s public schools (Enrollment Reports 2017; Public School Enrollment Data 2017). Many students voiced their qualms with the University’s lack of diversity and inaccessibility to minority races. One student tweeted “#therealUW where #Native students are less than 1% of student body . . . on their own land”. Another student tweeted, “mos def think i’m deserving of my full scholarship, and i think many more students of color are that have been overlooked. #therealUW”. Soc. Sci. 2018, 7, 21 9 of 13 4.7. Lack of Institutional Support One hundred eleven tweets described how the university marginalizes the needs of students of color. Students of color have frequently been disappointed in attempts at action, both on the part of fellow students who proclaim an interest in dismantling racism, as well as the University as a whole, which has a responsibility to do so. One student voiced her disappointment: “Everybody “wants” to be an ally. Sadly, the allyship that actually works ain’t sexy enough for some of y’all”. With an extremely liberal student body, there are many social justice organizations on campus and in Madison. However, white students, even with good intentions, still fail to foster supportive environments for students of color at predominately white institutions (Tienda 2013). Outside of students themselves doing little to eradicate racism, the University administration and its faculty themselves fail to take proper action in creating a more inclusive campus climate. Administration at predominately white institutions can overlook the needs of students of color, resulting in continued disparities and tension (Nelson 1969). As one student tweeted “The danger in #Madison is that it always ends with conversations”, suggesting that UW often responds to racial incidents with dialogues that lead to little change as opposed to actual action that might provoke something more substantial. Some students further substantiated the gap between white students and students of color’s needs being met as a difference of perspective, with one student tweeting “You may all have the comfort of thinking these (are) isolated incidents, but we don’t”. As overarching discourse continues to demonstrate the significance of students of color’s needs not being met, the phrase tweeted by multiple students speaks collectively for the perspective of students of color on campus: “I repeat: UW-Madison does not deserve its students of color”. 4.8. Criminal Justice System/Authority While only five tweets described first-hand experiences of being mistreated by law enforcement/authority, sixty-one tweets expressed the sentiment that this was an issue. In the history of the criminal justice system or authority as a whole in the United States, there has been a historical legacy of mistreatment of people of color. Today, this historical legacy has been improved upon substantially, but inequalities persist (Brunson 2007). The criminal justice system today is set up in a way that systemically oppresses individuals of color (Murakawa and Beckett 2010). Police officers themselves and individuals carrying the right to physical legal authority have been found to tend to be biased against individuals of color, particularly black people (Johnson 2004). Students of color affirm that they believe their experiences of mistreatment by authority are racially based. One student tweeted her experience of how she received a disciplinary referral to the University for watching Netflix too loudly and was documented as “sassy”. Many students’ tweets referred to a particular incidence in which a black student was arrested and removed from his lecture class for alleged graffiti. Students voiced how the incident demonstrated that the University had a greater commitment to arresting this student than they did to any other aspect of his life: “They care more about him getting locked up than him graduating”. One student tweeted “The first thing I want to know when choosing a great #university is will I get arrested in class?”, while another replied “And will the color of my skin make it more likely?”. The mistreatment of students of color by law enforcement was also referred to in some tweets in miscellaneous examples of biased treatment. Tweets described incidences where students of color were the victim of a crime and there was insufficient action on the part of the authorities. Several tweets exemplified the injustice in how students of colors are directly victimized without authority acting fairly in response. Referring to a race-based hate crime incident on campus, one student tweeted “the fact that no charges were pressed for the harassment in Sellery, but I was LITERALLY ARRESTED for smoking pot”. In terms of hate crimes particularly, students repeatedly expressed discontent with how the police and the University respond to incidents of racial hate. One student summed it up as follows: “being a student of color, you always feel unsafe on campus”. Students of color shared multiple stories of harassment or violence in which the perpetrator was met with no or subpar legal repercussions. Soc. Sci. 2018, 7, 21 10 of 13 One student shared a story of how a Latino friend was the victim of a blindside attack by four white men, and that the police drove by and took no action in interfering. This was exemplified by tweets from #TheRealUW, which reveal that students of color continue to perceive racism as a threat to their relationship with law enforcement and other forms of authority. 5. Discussion The unique social experiences and opportunities affecting students of color are a focal point of concern for students’ dialogues. These inequalities manifest themselves in multiple aspects of the lives of students of color, including mental health, housing, access to spaces, and overall quality of education. This central inequality of social experiences and opportunities refers to the individual racism that white students and faculty impose on students of color. This individual racism can be blatant or subtle racial statements or individual discrimination. The experiences of students brought to light uniquely how these instances—which do not affect white students—play a role in the lives of students of color, fostering a set of race-based inequalities on a college campus. Although research has well-analyzed the unique experience of students of color at a predominantly white institution, this research draws a line between the experiences and manifestations of particular racial inequalities. Although students’ testimonies on #TheRealUW overwhelmingly focused on individual acts affecting students, students of color also voiced their concerns on distinct issues, such as institutional and systemic racism and disparities. As the University of Wisconsin-Madison deals with widespread incidences of social racism, students of color at other universities protest in response to slightly different racial issues. In the spring of 2015, students of color at the University of Virginia held demonstrations following the beating of a black student by campus law enforcement officers (Townes and Ollstein 2015). Students also expressed frustration with businesses discriminating against students on the basis of race. In 2017, students of color at American University in Washington D.C. demonstrated after bananas were symbolically “lynched” along with racially hateful messages scrawled around campus (McLaughlin and Burnside 2017). Juxtaposed to students of color at UW-Madison starting #TheRealUW movement in the wake of an act of individual racism, these three examples highlight different forms of racism on three different campuses that all elicited strong reactions from students of color. Despite the distinct incidents, in the wake of each of these events, students of color at all of these universities acknowledged microagressions as a significant issue they face (Townes and Ollstein 2015; McLaughlin and Burnside 2017). Much of the racism described by students of color at UW-Madison was subtle and appeared to be unintentional on the behalf of the perpetrator. At many universities around the United States, the racism students of color take issue with is blatantly hateful, such as the appearance of white nationalist fliers and recruitment materials at over 150 different college campuses in 2017 (Crawford 2017). Given the lack of experience with diversity that many incoming students at UW-Madison come in with, a higher level of unintentional racism, particularly at UW, would make sense, but would be difficult to conclude without comparable data from other universities. During the summer of 2016, UW-Madison began experimenting with a cultural competency program for incoming students. This program, called “Our Wisconsin”, was initially tested on around 1000 incoming freshmen and was “aimed at increasing knowledge about cultural differences and promoting community among incoming students” (Hoverman 2016). Results indicated that students were more likely to agree that learning about diversity was important, felt more comfortable talking about race, and were more likely to question a friend about a biased or stereotypical comment after completing the course (UW-Madison Expanding Diversity Training Programs 2017). The program was later divided into two mediums in summer 2017, one that would be required for all incoming students, and a second that would be optional. A Black Cultural Center was also opened on the campus in 2017 and University Health Services also expanded their mental health services with outreach specifically for students of color (Campus Climate Progress Report: Fall 2017). Several other small initiatives to promote the conversation on race and inclusion have also been developed. The University of Soc. Sci. 2018, 7, 21 11 of 13 Wisconsin-Madison is certainly taking action to attempt to shift the racial climate, but the impacts of these changes still remain unclear. The breadth of effects of negative social experiences and opportunities reaffirms the importance of increasing cultural competence at predominately white institutions. Institutional and systemic barriers, which are still of concern to students of color, drive racial inequality in terms of access to institutions of higher education. However, factors such as social experiences and opportunities further disenfranchise students of color that have already overcome one barrier, adding a second disadvantage for racial minorities. Particular effort needs to be applied to eradicating the individual racism that plagues the lives of students of color. Author Contributions: Karl Vachuska conceived and designed the research; Karl Vachuska performed the research; Karl Vachuska and Jack Brudvig analysed the data; Karl Vachuska and Jack Brudvig wrote the paper. Conflicts of Interest: The authors declare no conflict of interest. References Allen, Walter. 1992. 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Introduction Literature Review Background Tweets Verbal Racism Mental Health Housing Access to Spaces Quality of Education Isolation and a Lack of Diversity Lack of Institutional Support Criminal Justice System/Authority Discussion References 
work_ql6sirjo3rcxngtpwkakbdploi	----	JOME_003_02_01-Allen.indd © koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2014 | doi 10.1163/22117954-12341285 Journal of Muslims in Europe 3 (2014) 137-159 brill.com/jome Exploring the Impact of Islamophobia on Visible Muslim Women Victims: A British Case Study Chris Allen Institute of Applied Social Studies, University of Birmingham Edgbaston, Birmingham, West Midlands B15 2TT England c.allen.2@bham.ac.uk Abstract This article presents the empirical findings from a British-based project that sought to explore the nature and impact of ‘street-level’ Islamophobia on women who are visibly recognisable as Muslim—hereafter referred to as visible Muslim women in this article. Drawing on the findings from in-depth interviews with twenty visible Muslim women, this article highlights how despite the fact that such Islamophobia is largely manifested in low-level ways it has significant impacts on the everyday lives of its victims as also the way in which their identities are both perceived and defined. In doing so, this article considers how the experience of Islamophobia not only affects the daily life of these women and their families, but also affects their sense of belonging to British society while making them re-evaluate how they feel about being British. Keywords Islamophobia – Muslim women – gender – identity – Britain – Britishness – belonging – hate crime Introduction: “it kind of makes you think people hate you because of the way you dress” The body of scholarly work focusing on Muslim women in contemporary Western spaces is one that has been growing over the past decade and a half. Whilst some of this focuses on the broader experience of Muslim women in 138 Allen Journal of Muslims in Europe 3 (2014) 137-159 ‘the West,’1 much of it tends to be located in specific geographic or national con- texts. Indicatively this includes Wing and Smith2 and Bowen3 and Fernando4 in the context of France, Jouli and Amir-Moazami5 as also Amir-Moazami6 in Germany, Salih7 in Italy, Bracke8 in the Netherlands, Predelli9 in Norway, Helbling in Switzerland,10 and McGinty11 in Sweden among others. Elsewhere, as in the British context, scholarly work focusing on Muslim women has been ‘issue-based,’ for example the negotiation of Muslim women’s identities within a ‘Western’ setting as seen in the work of those such as Ali,12 Knott and Khocker,13 1 Abu‐Lughod, Lila, “Do Muslim women really need saving? Anthropological reflections on cultural relativism and its others,” in American anthropologist 104.3 (2002), pp. 783-790. 2 Wing, Adrien Katherine, and Monica Nigh Smith, “Critical Race Feminism Lifts the Veil: Muslim Women, France, and the Headscarf Ban,” in uc Davis L. Rev. 39 (2005), p. 743. 3 Bowen, John R., “Why the French don’t like headscarves: Islam, the state, and public space,” in European Review 15.3 (2007), pp. 397-400. 4 Fernando, Mayanthi, “Exceptional citizens, Secular Muslim women and the politics of difference in France,” in Social Anthropology 17.4 (2009), pp. 379-392. 5 Jouili, Jeanette S., and Schirin Amir‐Moazami, “Knowledge, empowerment and religious authority among pious Muslim women in France and Germany,” in The Muslim World 96.4 (2006), pp. 617-642. 6 Amir-Moazami, S., “Dialogue as a Governmental technique: managing gendered Islam in Germany,” in Feminist review 98 (2011), no. 1, pp. 9-27. 7 Salih, Rubah, “Confronting Modernities Muslim Women in Italy,” in isim Newsletter 7 (2001), p. 2; Salih, Ruba, “Muslim women, fragmented secularism and the construction of interconnected ‘publics’ in Italy,” in Social Anthropology 17.4 (2009), pp. 409-423. 8 Bracke, Sarah, “Subjects of debate: secular and sexual exceptionalism, and Muslim women in the Netherlands,” in Feminist review 98.1 (2011), pp. 28-46. 9 Predelli, Line Nyhagen, “Interpreting Gender in Islam A Case Study of Immigrant Muslim Women in Oslo, Norway,” in Gender & Society 18.4 (2004), pp. 473-493. 10 Helbling, Marc, “Islamophobia in Switzerland: A new phenomenon or a new name for xenophobia?” in Value change in Switzerland (2010), pp. 65-80. 11 McGinty, Anna Mansson, “Formation of alternative femininities through Islam: Feminist approaches among Muslim converts in Sweden,” in Women’s Studies International Forum. 30.6. (2007). 12 Ali, Yasmin, “Muslim women and the politics of ethnicity and culture in Northern England,” in Sahgal Gita, & Nira Yuval-Davis, Refusing holy orders: women and fundamen- talism in Britain,” (London: Virago Press, 1992), pp. 101-123. 13 Knott, Kim, and Sajda Khokher, “Religious and ethnic identity among young Muslim women in Bradford,” in Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 19.4 (1993), pp. 593-610. 139Exploring the Impact of Islamophobia Journal of Muslims in Europe 3 (2014) 137-159 Afshar et al.,14 Dwyer,15 Brown16 and Haw.17 Significant in this has been the issue of the visibility of Muslim women especially in relation to ‘veiling’— typically used to refer to the wearing of the hijab or niqab—for whom Dwyer,18 Tarlo19 and Afshar20 have offered particularly insightful studies. Trying to explain the significance of this growing body of work is Kapur.21 For her, the growing interest is a consequence of the fact that the ‘visibil- ity’ of Muslim women in contemporary Western spaces is increasingly un- noticeable. As she notes, the mere presence—and subsequent recognition—of the Muslim woman in contemporary Western settings is such that it disrupts the order of normality that typically exists within them. In today’s Western societies therefore—Britain included—the identity of Muslim women is both seen and understood to be problematic. Such identities are far from homog- enous or fixed however. As Maleseic is right to note, identity is a fluid and protean, somewhat theoretically thin and unarticulated concept.22 Thijl,23 14 Afshar, Haleh, Muslim Women in West Yorkshire, (London: Taylor and Francis, 1994). 15 Dwyer, Claire, “Contradictions of community: questions of identity for young British Muslim women,” in Environment and Planning 31.1 (1999), pp. 53-68; Dwyer, Claire, “Negotiating diasporic identities: Young british south Asian Muslim women,” in Women’s Studies International Forum 23.4 (2000). 16 Brown, Katherine, “Realising Muslim women’s rights: the role of Islamic identity among British Muslim women,” in Women’s studies international forum 29:4 (2002), pp. 417-430; Brown, Katherine, “The promise and perils of women’s participation in uk mosques: the impact of securitisation agendas on identity, gender and community,” in British Journal Politics and International Relations 10:3 (2008), pp. 472-491. 17 Haw, Kaye, “Being, becoming and belonging: Young Muslim women in contemporary Britain,” in Journal of Intercultural Studies 31.4 (2010), pp. 345-361. 18 Dwyer, Claire, “Veiled Meanings: young British Muslim women and the negotiation of differences,” in Gender, Place and Culture: A Journal of Feminist Geography 6.1 (1999), pp. 5-26. 19 Tarlo, Emma, “Hijab in London: metamorphosis, resonance and effects,” in Journal of Material Culture 12:2 (2007), pp. 131−156. 20 Afshar, Haleh, “Can I see your hair? Choice, agency and attitudes: the dilemma of faith and feminism for Muslim women who cover,” in Ethnic and Racial Studies 31.2 (2008), pp. 411-427. 21 Kapur, Ratna, “The tragedy of victimisation rhetoric: Resurrecting the ‘native’ subject in international/post-colonial feminist legal politics,” in Harvard Human Rights Journal 15:1 (2002), pp. 1-38. 22 Malesevic, Sinisa, Identity as ideology: understanding ethnicity and nationalism, (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2006). 23 Sunier, Thijl, “Constructing Islam: places of worship and the politics of space in the Netherlands,” in Journal of contemporary European studies 13.3 (2005), pp. 317-334. 140 Allen Journal of Muslims in Europe 3 (2014) 137-159 like Baumeister,24 Handler25 and Bauman26 before him, acknowledges that the concept of identity is largely a modern one, which social scientists have only really been interested in for the past few decades. But as Thijl goes on to explain, not only do identities develop in relation to others—as opposed to the self and the process of self-definition—but so too do they and their recog- nition by others become ever more closely related and important. Identities therefore are constructed out of dialogical processes where sharp disparities and divergences can exist between the chosen identities of the self and the constructed identities of the perceived.27 This is evident in an embryonic group of British-focused studies exploring the relationship between Muslim women’s identities and the phenomenon of Islamophobia, including Franks,28 Afshar et al.,29 Allen,30 Chakraborti and Zempi,31 and Moosavi.32 As Chakraborti and Zempi put it, Muslim women’s identities have been reduced—and subsequently essentialised—to the mere recognition of outward manifestations including the hijab, niqab or other rec- ognisable form of Islamic attire (abaya, jilbab or burqa for example). For them, it is the recognition of these outward (visible) manifestations that have come to contemporarily symbolise Muslim women’s identity, in turn prompting the association with a whole range of constructed notions that are inherently and undeniably ‘other’ and which embody all that is perceived to be wrong, problematic and threatening about Islam and Muslims. This is what Allen refers to as the ‘normative truths’ about Muslims and Islam.33 As Chakraborti 24 Baumeister, Roy, Identity: cultural change and the struggle for the self, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986). 25 Handler, Richard, “Is ‘identity’ a useful cross-cultural concept?” In John R. Gillis (ed.) Commemorations: the politics of national identity, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), pp. 27-40. 26 Bauman, Zygmunt, Identity, (Cambridge: Polity, 2004). 27 Taylor, Charles, Multiculturalism and the politics of recognition, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), p. 34. 28 Franks, Myfanwy, “Crossing the borders of whiteness? White Muslim women who wear the hijab in Britain today,” in Ethnic and Racial Studies 23.5 (2000), pp. 917-929. 29 Afshar, Haleh, Rob Aitken, and Myfanwy Franks, “Feminisms, Islamophobia and identi- ties,” in Political Studies 53.2 (2005), pp. 262-283. 30 Allen, Chris, Islamophobia, (Farnham: Ashgate, 2010). 31 Chakraborti, Neil, and Irene Zempi, “The veil under attack Gendered dimensions of Islamophobic victimization,” in International review of victimology 18.3 (2012), pp. 269-284. 32 Moosavi, Leon, “The racialization of Muslim converts in Britain and their experiences of Islamophobia,” in Critical Sociology 0896920513504601 (2014), pp. 1-16. 33 Allen, Islamophobia. 141Exploring the Impact of Islamophobia Journal of Muslims in Europe 3 (2014) 137-159 and Zempi note, such is the impact of this that contemporarily Muslim women are perceived to be more threatening than Muslim men not least because they cannot be mistaken, denied or concealed. In reiterating Kapur, it is this which causes disruption in public spaces,34 a point which resonates with existing research that shows how women who are visibly Muslim are more likely to become victims of Islamophobia in public ‘street-level’ spaces than anyone else. Chakraborti and Zempi argue that in spite of this recognition, there remains a paucity of evidence about the experience and impact of Islamophobia on visible Muslim women. Drawing upon the findings from a small project that sought to engage with visible British Muslim women who had experienced Islamophobia in the public spaces, this article provides some new insights which seek to contribute towards better understanding not only the experience of visible Muslim women victims of Islamophobia but also how this subse- quently impacts on their everyday lives. As part of this, the role of identity— both perceived and self-defined—is given some consideration. Beginning with an overview of the methods and approaches employed, this article offers a criti- cal overview of Islamophobia before setting out new empirical findings gleaned from interviews with twenty visible British Muslim women. Considering how their experiences of becoming victims of Islamophobia became manifested and impacted, this article concludes with a reflection on the existing body of scholarly work in the light of any new learning to have emerged. Engaging Muslim Women: Making Visible the Invisible Identifying and engaging visible Muslim women victims of Islamophobia would appear to be one of the main barriers for there being a paucity of evidence providing relevant insights into the experience and impact of Islamophobia on visible Muslim women.35 As research undertaken at the European level suggests, this is because the majority of Muslim women who experience Islamophobia tend not to report this to either the police or indeed any other 34 Kapur, Ratna, “The tragedy of victimisation rhetoric: Resurrecting the ‘native’ subject in international/post-colonial feminist legal politics.” 35 Allen, Chris and Jorgen Nielsen, Summary Report on Islamophobia in the eu after 11 September 2001, (Vienna: European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia, 2002); Choudhury, Tufyal, Muslims in the uk: policies for engaged citizens, (London: Open Society Institute, 2005); Allen, Islamophobia. 142 Allen Journal of Muslims in Europe 3 (2014) 137-159 statutory agency.36 Consequently, both Muslim women and the Islamophobia they experience remain relatively absent within official data and monitoring processes. One method of overcoming this in the British setting has been the provision of community-based third-party reporting mechanisms and ser- vices.37 Building upon the success of according third-party reporting status to the Community Security Trust in 2001 with whom Britain’s Jewish com- munities report their experience of anti-Semitism, the British Government recently funded a similar service for Britain’s Muslim communities. Known as ‘Tell mama’ (‘mama’ being an acronym for ‘measuring anti-Muslim attacks’), the service offers support to victims of Islamophobic hate crimes at the same time as providing them with an opportunity to record details of their experi- ence. If the victim agrees, mama also logs the incident with the victim’s local police force. From University of Teeside38 verified data, mama recorded 584 Islamophobic incidents between 1 April 2012 and 30 April 2013. Of these, around a quarter (26 per cent) took place in public spaces. 58 per cent were recorded as being perpetrated against Muslim women of whom four fifths (80 per cent) stated they were visibly identifiable as ‘Muslim.’ This data resonates with analyses undertaken elsewhere in Europe, where visible Muslim women repeatedly emerge as the most likely targets for street-level Islamophobia.39 The type of Islamophobia the British Muslim women encountered also reflects that which occurs at the European level. As Allen and Nielsen noted in their moni- toring of Islamophobia in the European Union post-9/11, the vast majority of Islamophobic incidents experienced by visible Muslim women was ‘low level,’40 namely that which occurred in ordinary and everyday settings and was likely to be manifested as verbal abuse, spitting, having headscarves or face veils removed, harassment and similar. Whilst high level incidents were recorded— 36 Allen & Nielsen, Summary Report on Islamophobia in the eu after 11 September 2001; Fundamental Rights Agency, Data in focus: Muslims, (Vienna: fra, 2009). 37 Iganski, Paul, “Too few Jews to count? Police monitoring of hate crime against Jews in the United Kingdom,” in American Behavioral Scientist 51:2 (2007), pp. 232-245. 38 Copsey, Nigel, Janet Dack, Mark Littler and Matthew Feldman, Anti-Muslim hate crime and the far-right, (Middlesbrough: Centre for Fascist, Anti-Fascist and Post-Fascist Studies, 2013). 39 Commission on British Muslims & Islamophobia, Islamophobia: a challenge for us all, (London: Runnymede Trust, 1997); Allen & Nielsen, Summary Report on Islamophobia in the eu after 11 September 2001; Fundamental Rights Agency, Data in focus: Muslims; Allen, Islamophobia. 40 Allen & Nielsen, Summary Report on Islamophobia in the eu after 11 September 2001. 143Exploring the Impact of Islamophobia Journal of Muslims in Europe 3 (2014) 137-159 for example threatening or aggressive behaviour, violence and physical harm— these were relatively rare. This was the case with the mama data also. Working with mama enabled some of the barriers to identifying and engag- ing Muslim women victims of Islamophobia to be overcome. Given the rela- tionship of trust mama had forged with those reporting their experience of Islamophobia, its staff were best placed to act as a bridgehead between vic- tim and researcher. Having contacted a number of women who had used the service, mama’s staff explained the proposed research to them and answered any questions they had at the same time as offering reassurance about con- fidentiality and anonymity if they chose to participate. mama’s staff, having obtained the consent of those women who were interested, connected them with the research team who proceeded to undertake in-depth interviews with them. In total, 20 interviews were completed between March and June 2013. Of those interviewed, 15 said they normally wore hijab or some other form of headscarf on a day-to-day basis; four, the niqab or other form of full-face cov- ering; one, another form of ‘Islamic’ attire she described as making her ‘look’ Muslim. Visible Muslim women, as opposed to all Muslim women and Muslim men, were identified to participate given they reflected the majority of female victims reporting into mama and because it was here that the relationship between identity and recognition was most likely to be evident and therefore best explored.41 In terms of the ages of interviewees, the youngest was 15 when she became a victim of street-level Islamophobia (16 when interviewed); the oldest was 52 years old. Most however were between the ages of 20 and 40 (six between the ages of 20 and 30, a further six between the ages of 30 and 40). As regards ethnicity, the interviewees reflected the primary ethnic groupings found within today’s British Muslim communities including Pakistani (seven women), Bangladeshi (four), Arab (three), Somali (three) and White British (three). One ethnic group that was not accessed were Black British converts but this is a reflection of the type of people using mama rather than anything else. Because investigations into a number of incidents were ongoing by the police, all iden- tifying features including details relating to location or individual people were completely removed at the time of transcription. However, in trying to chal- lenge Chakraborti and Zempi’s observation that ‘veiled’ Muslim women are neither seen nor heard,42 all of the women interviewed were attributed with 41 Chakraborti & Zempi, “The veil under attack: gendered dimensions of Islamophobic victimization.” 42 Chakraborti & Zempi, “The veil under attack: gendered dimensions of Islamophobic victimization.” 144 Allen Journal of Muslims in Europe 3 (2014) 137-159 pseudonyms to encourage the reader to associate the experience with a ‘real’ person as opposed to a faceless (invisible) participant. One final point relates to the use of the term ‘victim’ not least because the term is not without problem. In reflecting on this, it is worth reiterating the premise adopted by Chakraborti and Zempi43 who employ the term but coun- ter this by acknowledging that not every visible Muslim woman will become a victim of Islamophobia. In line with this therefore, this research does not seek to either promote a victim culture or suggest, whether implicitly or explicitly, that all Muslim women—visible or otherwise—either do or indeed will, expe- rience Islamophobia. However, whilst the term is problematic and is not always appropriate when referring to the lived experiences of all Muslim women, in the context of this article and in line with existing scholarly work, it continues to function as a useful descriptor and so retains legitimacy in terms of usage. Critical Islamophobia: Beyond Mere Fear One of the challenges faced by those such as mama—as indeed those under- taking resonant research—is how to appropriately define Islamophobia and how to frame what might constitute an Islamophobic experience or incident. This is not least due to the fact that Islamophobia remains a complex and at times, contested concept. Most definitions—including those preferred at the European level44—appear to have evolved out of literalist interpretations, many from the definition posited by the Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia. For it, Islamophobia was rather simplistically seen to be a fear or dislike of Islam and by consequence, all Muslims also.45 In many populist and public discourses, this literalist interpretation remains in circulation, reflected in the arguments put forward by critics and detractors of Islamophobia who contend that there is little discrimination or hate in being ‘fearful’ of Islam. Shyrock acknowledges this when he suggests that usage of the term tends to 43 Chakraborti & Zempi, “The veil under attack: gendered dimensions of Islamophobic victimization.” 44 Allen & Nielsen, Summary Report on Islamophobia in the eu after 11 September 2001; Allen, Islamophobia. 45 Commission on British Muslims & Islamophobia, Islamophobia: a challenge for us all. 145Exploring the Impact of Islamophobia Journal of Muslims in Europe 3 (2014) 137-159 be overly simplistic and somewhat impervious to nuance.46 For Sayyid47 and Readings et al.,48 such criticisms require differentiation: between the analytical, where Islamophobia is a contested and nebulous category and the polemical, where it is more typically located in the discourses of those venting grievances, smugly pontificating, or canvassing politicians and policymakers.49 As Vakil50 adds, it is far more important to be clear about is meant when Islamophobia is used rather than what it means in any essential sense. Within an academic context, Klug argues that the term has recently ‘come of age,’51 a point Moosavi52 rightly understands as meaning that Islamophobia is no longer a concept to be contested but more importantly to be understood. As he explains, academic studies must now knowingly avoid literalist interpre- tations in the same way that those researching homophobia and anti-Semitism have, neither of which were ever suitable or functional as literal descriptors. One way of doing so is to engage with those adopting a more critical approach to understanding Islamophobia, for instance those such as Allen,53 Esposito and Kalin,54 Taras,55 Sheehi,56 and Lean.57 For all, Islamophobia is necessarily understood to be far more than a mere phobia or fear. For Allen58 and Sheehi,59 46 Shyrock, Andrew, Islamophobia Islamophilia: Beyond the Politics of Enemy and Friend, (Indiana University Press: Bloomington, 2010), p. 9. 47 Sayyid, Salamn, “Thinking through Islamophobia” in Sayyid, Salman & Vakil, AbdoolKarim, (Eds.), Thinking trough Islamophobia: Global Perspectives, (Hurst: London, 2010), pp. 1-4. 48 Readings, George, James Brandon and Richard Phelps, Islamism and language: how using the wrong words reinforces Islamist narratives, (Quilliam Foundation: London, 2011). 49 Sayyid, “Thinking through Islamophobia.” 50 Vakil, AbdoolKarim, “Who‘s afraid of Islamophobia?” in Sayyid, Salman & Vakil, AbdoolKarim, (Eds.), Thinking trough Islamophobia: Global Perspectives, (Hurst: London, 2010), pp. 271-279. 51 Klug, Brian, “Islamophobia: a concept comes of age” Ethnicities 12:5 (2012), pp. 665-681. 52 Moosavi, Leon, “Orientalism at home: Islamophobia in the representations of Islam and Muslims by the New Labour government,” Ethnicities 14:3 (2014), pp. 1-23. 53 Allen, Islamophobia. 54 Esposito, John and Ibrahim Kalin, Islamophobia: the challenge of pluralism in the 21st cen- tury, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). 55 Taras, Raymond, Xenophobia and Islamophobia in Europe, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2012). 56 Sheehi, Stephen, Islamophobia: the ideological campaign against Muslims, (Atlanta: Clarity Press Inc, 2011). 57 Lean, Nathan, The Islamophobia industry: how the right manufactures fear of Muslims, (London: Pluto, 2012). 58 Allen, Islamophobia. 59 Sheehi, Islamophobia: the ideological campaign against Muslims. 146 Allen Journal of Muslims in Europe 3 (2014) 137-159 Islamophobia is and indeed functions as an ideology, conceived and embedded within the individual, communal, social and global patterns of thought and meaning about Muslims and Islam. For them, that which becomes known— and subsequently understood—about Muslims and Islam does so through sys- tems of signifiers and symbols which pertain to influence, impact upon, and inform the social consensus about Muslims and Islam as an undeniable ‘other.’60 It is worth noting that for Allen, the visible outward manifestations of Muslim women’s identity are a key way in which this occurs, Muslim women’s visibility functioning as signifiers that are socially constructed to embody Islamophobic meanings and understandings. Islamophobia is therefore not restricted to any specific action, practice, discrimination or prejudice but exists in the process of identification and recognition that in turn results in such meanings and understandings being unquestioned and accepted as natural and normative of Muslims, Islam or both. For Clarke,61 this supports the construction of forms of order about who ‘we’ are and, through processes of stigmatisation, marginalisation and intoler- ance, who ‘we’ are not. In doing so, Muslims become reduced to an undeniable ‘other’ for whom a myriad negative and stereotypical attributions become irre- movable and eternally fixed: the opposite to the notion of identity as suggested previously. As Allen puts it, these become what he terms the ‘normative truths’ about Muslims and Islam.62 These ‘truths’—the meanings and understandings that ideologically inform Islamophobia—are made known through a vast array of different actions, utterances, images and texts that function symbolically through being recognised, meaningfully understood and subsequently utilised to shape, inform or indeed reinforce, opinions, attitudes and prejudices. For Allen, this is no more evident in the way in which visible Muslim women are conceived and understood than in the way they are vilified and attacked in the expression of physical Islamophobia. This does not mean that all recipients to such ‘truths’ are Islamophobic, far from it. Instead, such truths are able to be deployed in order to rationalise and justify exclusionary practices and actions against Muslims if the recipient is so inclined. More so however, that shape and duly inform that which might be described as ‘Islamophobia-thinking.’ One important and routinely overlooked aspect of Islamophobia’s exclu- sionary practices are those perpetrated through the subjection to, or threat 60 Allen, Islamophobia; Allen, Chris, “Between critical and uncritical understandings: a case study analyzing the claims of Islamophobia made in the context of the proposed ‘Super- Mosque’ in Dudley, England,” in Societies 3:2 (2013), pp. 186-203. 61 Clarke, Simon, Social theory, psychoanalysis and racism, (Palgrave: London, 2003). 62 Allen, Islamophobia. 147Exploring the Impact of Islamophobia Journal of Muslims in Europe 3 (2014) 137-159 of violence. So whilst Githens-Mazer and Lambert,63 and indeed Moosavi,64 are right in noting that violence against Muslims is a minority activity, where it is deployed it is likely that the normative truths of Islamophobia will be informing the motivation, rationale and justification of those behind such actions and practices. And this would appear evident in the way in which mama seeks to conceive of and define what they term an Islamophobic incident. For mama, an Islamophobic incident includes any malicious act directed at Muslims, their material property or organisations where there exists evidence that the victim or property was targeted because of Muslim identity. In other words, an Islamophobic incident is one which would appear to be motivated, rationalised or justified by the normative truths in circula- tion about Muslims and Islam. In doing so, a clear and coherent understand- ing of what an Islamophobic incident is can be not only be defined but so too applied to research into that which is experienced by visible Muslim women as indeed others. In line with Vakil,65 it is therefore far more important to be clear about is meant when Islamophobia is used rather than what it means in any essential sense. mama’s understanding clearly fits with this approach and is utilised here. Experience: “Take that fucking thing off ” The majority of incidents involving visible Muslim women recorded by mama were low-level. Most however centred on the expression and manifestation of verbal abuse being directed at the Muslim women involved. In all, this was experienced by 13 of the women interviewed. For some, the abuse was direct and seemingly one-dimensional. Maryam for example spoke about how she was called a “fucking Muslim” while sitting in her car at traffic lights. Naureen too was abused in her car although her experience was perpetrated by parents at the school her children attended. Shaken by the encounter, she said her first thoughts were about the safety of her children not least because she had to leave them at the school. A recurrent feature in the type of verbal abuse expe- rienced was the accusation of the women being a ‘terrorist’ or the implication 63 Githens-Mazer, Jonathan and Robert Lambert, Islamophobia and anti-Muslim hate crime: a London case study, (Exeter: University of Exeter European Muslim Research Centre, 2010). 64 Moosavi, “The Racialization of Muslim Converts in Britain and Their Experiences of Islamophobia.” 65 Vakil, “Who‘s afraid of Islamophobia?” 148 Allen Journal of Muslims in Europe 3 (2014) 137-159 that they were either supportive or capable of terrorism. Shagufta experi- enced this while travelling on a busy train to university during the morning rush hour. Sitting on her own, she recounted how two men boarded the train and sat next to her. Soon after, she said they began laughing at her before one loudly referred to her as “a terrorist.” Deciding to move seats, she said one of the men then “tapped me on my head, making remarks about my hijab . . . ” before announcing to the rest of the train that she had a bomb in her bag. Alia’s experience was similar. Having been called “a terrorist,” her male accuser then loudly complained that she was intimidating him. When asked by Alia how she was intimidating him, he explained that it was because she was “a Muslim.” On reflection, Alia said “I found it hilarious and annoying . . . I’m kind of small and he was a huge guy, I don’t look terrorising or intimidating yet he does.” For her, it was inconceivable that she could ever have physically intimi- dated him. One way of trying to explain such a view held by the perpetrator might be to consider the observation made by Chakraborti and Zempi about how contemporarily Islam is perceived as being little more than a ‘terrorist religion.’66 Applying this to Allen’s notions of normative truths would therefore seem to suggest that even though there was no evidence whatsoever that Alia was involved in—or even supported—any form of terrorism, the mere recog- nition of her being Muslim meant that she was perceived by the perpetrator as being exactly that. As the normative truths suggest, all such stereotypical and entirely Islamophobic views are signified—and justified—by the recogni- tion of the outward, visible manifestations of Muslim women’s identities. Such would also seem to fit with Chakraborti and Zempi’s observation about how the visibility and subsequent recognition of Muslim women was also increas- ingly being seen to be threatening. As such, the perceived threat posed by the recognition of Alia as Muslim therefore was enough to make the perpetrator feel—as he put it—‘intimidated.’ The visibility and significance of Muslim women was a prominent feature of the experience of many of those interviewed. For many, their hijab, niqab or other recognisable feature of being ‘Muslim’ appeared to be the thing that prompted the perpetrator’s ire. This was the case for 27 year old Fatima. She spoke about how during her lunch break from work a man she had not previ- ously met suddenly began tugging at her hijab in the street while shouting, “take that fucking thing off.” A few weeks earlier, she explained that she had again experienced something similar. This time it was a woman that she did not 66 Chakraborti & Zempi, “The veil under attack: gendered dimensions of Islamophobic victimization,” p. 277. 149Exploring the Impact of Islamophobia Journal of Muslims in Europe 3 (2014) 137-159 know. She explained how while attending the hospital, the woman grabbed at her hijab as she walked by, aggressively shouting “yuck” in her face. While both the perpetrators were unknown to Fatima, Deborah’s experience was perpe- trated by a group of women she claimed she saw twice every week at her local gym. Explaining how she was at the gym and waiting for her yoga class to start, Deborah said she noticed that one of the group appeared increasingly agitated, aggressively pointing and directing comments at her. Eventually, the woman walked over to Deborah followed by the rest of the group. When in front of her, the aggressive woman addressed Deborah as “Mrs Ussama bin Laden,” before adding how the group of women “ . . . do not like your clothes . . . go back to Afghanistan, go and eat some pork.” Deborah explained how the way she looked had not seemed to have been problematic before that particular incident. Deborah found these comments particularly jarring because as she explained, she would have described her ethnicity as being White British, something she said would have been apparent from being able to see her face. Deborah’s comments about this raise a number of interesting issues about eth- nicity, and consequently identity, as perceived by others in comparison to how one might self-define it. First, it would appear that from the point of view of the perpetrators, Deborah was recognised as Muslim first and foremost through the identification and recognition of the visible ‘otherness’ of her clothing. In doing so, this prompted the association of her identity with certain prac- tices of Islam, evident in the fact they made reference to eating—or not as the case may be—pork. Underpinning this definition of a Muslim woman, there appeared to be two of the normative truths that are widely circulated about Muslims and Islam: the first being that all Muslims are violent, the second that all Muslims are a homogenous entity without any internal differentiation or difference. This could be seen in the way in which the perpetrators spoke about the need for Deborah to ‘go back to Afghanistan’ whilst also addressing her as ‘Mrs Ussama bin Laden.’ For the perpetrator, not only was Deborah the same as Muslims in Afghanistan but she also seemingly had all of the traits and qualities attributed to them. For the perpetrators, her Muslim identity was therefore that which defined what she was more so than anything else. This was also evident in the second issue Deborah’s experience raises about identity as perceived by others in comparison with self-definition. As the com- ments of the perpetrators highlight, there would appear to have been a com- plete lack of recognition of Deborah’s White British ethnicity. Indeed from the comments made, it would seem that her actual or at least self-defined ethnic identity was rendered irrelevant, superseded by the identification and recogni- tion of her as Muslim. Such is not without precedent. According to Moosavi, 150 Allen Journal of Muslims in Europe 3 (2014) 137-159 it is a common feature of the Islamophobia experienced by White British con- verts to Islam.67 For him, this relates to processes of essentialisation that do not merely racialise victims but more accurately, re-racialise them. Because of the conflation of Islam ‘non-Whites’—another identified normative truth—all White Muslims therefore duly become reduced to being recognised as either ‘not-quite-white’ or just ‘non-white.’68 While Moosavi argues that this can be a discreet process, here that process was rather more explicit as indeed was the experience of another of the White British converts interviewed. For Rachel, alongside the more Muslim-specific abuse she experienced, she spoke about how a driver shouted “Fucking Paki bastard” at her. Again, her visible White British ethnicity would appear to have been invisible or at least rendered irrel- evant. Resonating with Moosavi’s findings, she explained: “it doesn’t matter how white you are . . . he gave me a really dirty look and said ‘fucking Paki bastard.’ ” Clearly some essentialisation occurs but more so, the mere recognition of one’s Muslim’s identity—via the recognition of the visible, outward manifestations of the Muslim women’s clothing and appearance—by the perpetrators of Islamophobia would appear to be such that Muslim markers of identity com- pletely subsume all other markers of identity. How the victim might choose to self-identify would therefore appear secondary at best, irrelevant at worst. For some of those interviewed, verbal abuse was a precursor to somewhat more high-level experiences of Islamophobia. Yara spoke about how having dropped her children at school, she was followed home by a woman pushing a child in a pram who repeatedly shouted “fuck off ” at her every time she turned to see if she was still being followed. Just as Yara went to enter her family home, she said the woman quickly rushed towards her and screamed, “why do you look so ugly . . . why are you covering your face?” Yara explained how the woman then spat at her. Two nights later, Yara went on to tell about how her house had been attacked by a group of people who threw stones and rocks through the windows. As she put it, “we were very frightened . . . we had lots of pieces of glass on the bed [and] I had some bruises as a result.” In her mind, there was no ques- tion that the two incidents were linked. Halima had a similar experience when she and her family moved into a new area. Noticing a large group of local youths regularly congregating near her house, she said that within a few weeks the group had begun to shout abuse at her about wearing the niqab every time she left her house. Over time, Halima 67 Moosavi, “The Racialization of Muslim Converts in Britain and Their Experiences of Islamophobia.” 68 Moosavi, “The Racialization of Muslim Converts in Britain and Their Experiences of Islamophobia.” 151Exploring the Impact of Islamophobia Journal of Muslims in Europe 3 (2014) 137-159 said that not only did the abuse increase in volume but it also became increas- ingly threatening. As she explained, this culminated in two men from the group arriving at her home one evening at which point they violently attacked both her and her brother with bicycle chains. Despite the police subsequently arresting the men, Halima said they were soon bailed and while given court orders banning them from going near her home, she said that she often saw them loitering nearby along with group who continued to be abusive and threatening towards her and her family. She explained how she felt the moti- vation behind her being the target of this behaviour was such that it was not necessarily against her as an individual but because of her being Muslim. As she put it, “these people hate us for no apparent reason, they hate us because of our background and our religion.” For Halima, her recognition of being Muslim was most important. Being Halima, was irrelevant. Something similar was apparent from interviewing another of the women. Lubna spoke about how on waking one morning, she discovered that a number of decomposing pig’s heads had been positioned around the outside of her house including one on a window ledge and another on the front doorstep. Somewhat defiantly she said, “ . . . they must have thought that this kind of thing will intimidate us because we are brown and do not eat pork . . . it was done to intimidate us but these were just idiots trying to shock us.” The recognition of Lubna as Muslim would again appear relevant, not least in her acknowledge- ment of the association of her Muslim identity with the religion of Islam, as before in the recognition by the perpetrators about restrictions on pork being haram. Potentially more interesting though was the self-awareness shown by Lubna in suggesting that her experience of Islamophobia had been a direct consequence of the murder of serving British serviceman, Lee Rigby, by two Muslims on the streets of south London in May 2013. Whilst there was no evi- dence to suggest a direct link, Lubna expressed little doubt about interlink- ing the two quite separate incidents. Given that the incident took place in the immediate aftermath of Rigby’s murder so the connection was, for her at least, unquestionable. Initially describing the incident as “ridiculous,” she went on to explain how she felt it was more about “revenge” against Muslims rather than anything else. As she went on, her and her family were targeted because in the minds of the perpetrators Muslims were indistinguishable from each other thereby making all Muslims in some way responsible or accountable for Rigby’s murder. Maybe going beyond that which had been expressed and understood by a number of the other women interviewed, Lubna appeared to be inadvertently acknowledging the function of the normative truths; informing and shaping Islamophobia and Islamophobia-thinking in such ways that all Muslims become fixed as a homogenous and unchanging whole. 152 Allen Journal of Muslims in Europe 3 (2014) 137-159 Consequently, all Muslims become seen to be equally responsible, account- able and culpable for all that is done in the name of Islam or by any individual Muslims anywhere in the world. ‘Revenge’ therefore can be seen to acquire a fake legitimacy that also becomes ‘common sense,’ something that Lubna clearly understood. Impact: “it kind of makes you think people hate you because of the way you dress” When asked about the impact of being a victim of Islamophobia, the women interviewed initially identified a range of emotions that were caused by their experience. Unsurprisingly, these were typical of the emotions experienced by victims of other, similar types of hate-motivated crime. As such, these were typically complex and multi-layered and included such feelings as anger, annoyance, shock, fear, vulnerability and anxiety.69 As Mahmooda put it, her experience of being verbally abused left her “really shaken . . . scared and fearful and vulnerable.” Rehana too spoke about how the impact was immediate, such that she experienced a range of emotions as soon as she had been abused. As she explained, “ . . . I cried in the middle of the street . . . I did not feel safe . . . I felt fearful and worried about my life.” Other emotions prompted by the experience included feelings of humiliation, isolation, embarrassment, disgust and sad- ness, all of which were expressed as having had a hugely detrimental impact on the women’s everyday lives and wellbeing. Fear however was the most common emotion expressed by the women interviewed. For some, this significantly impacted on their day-to-day activi- ties and behaviours. As Halima put it, becoming a victim of Islamophobia made her too scared to go shopping. She went on to say that she no longer felt able to go out as normal and so instead, she began to go out in “a secretive way” in order to avoid all of the people she thought might want to abuse or attack her. Similarly, Rehana explained how the experience had made her feel that she was no longer able to go out “walking on my own or in the evenings.” Feelings of fear and its subsequent impact was not restricted to the victims themselves however. As some of the women explained, fear and a sense of being increas- ingly vulnerable impacted how the victims saw their own families as also how their families saw them. For Mahmooda, she explained how she felt increas- ingly anxious for “my family and friends.” For Yara, it was similarly evident in 69 Chaplin, Rupert, John Flatley and Kevin Smith, Crime in England and Wales 2010/11, (London: Home Office, 2012). 153Exploring the Impact of Islamophobia Journal of Muslims in Europe 3 (2014) 137-159 the fact that she no longer felt that it was safe to let her children play in the garden or go to friends’ houses. For Kelly, her experience of Islamophobia impacted her family in another way with them becoming increasingly con- cerned about her safety and wellbeing. As she explained, when her parents heard she had been a victim of Islamophobia, they pleaded with her to stop wearing the hijab. Their argument for this was because they no longer wanted her to ‘look’ Muslim because they felt that this made her more vulnerable to attack and abuse. For them, if she no longer looked Muslim then the likeli- hood of her being a victim would be reduced. For them also, there was a clear understanding that Kelly being recognisably Muslim was directly linked to the likelihood of her experiencing Islamophobia. For some of the women interviewed, the impact of Islamophobia was grounded in their experiences and understandings of society and their place in it. For them, this meant that they became more suspicious, not just of British society per se but more so of ordinary people; for some, of everyone. This was apparent in the comments of Shareefa. Having been repeatedly abused by a group of young people, some of whom had called her “ninja” and put fireworks through her letterbox, Shareefa said the experience made her fear for her own safety and the safety her seven month old baby. As she explained: It made me feel very scared . . . I was scared to go out on the street or into the area on my own. It made me think continuously that I need some sort of self-defence class so I know how to defend myself and protect my children . . . you start to think that something is going to happen. It kind of makes you feel like somebody is ready to attack you in the street . . . it kind of makes you think people hate you because of the way you dress. And then you start linking everything as being anti-Muslim and that may well not be the case. For example, some people give you a look which may be nothing . . . but It is the “but” at the end of her comment however that is maybe most telling, highlighting the fact that while Shareefa was aware that the vast majority of ordinary British people were unlikely to be Islamophobic and thereby want to attack her, her experience had nonetheless cultivated a very real sense of doubt and suspicion in her mind to the extent that she genuinely feared that not only would something similar happen again but more so that anyone was capable of attacking her. This was similar for Iffat who after being verbally abused while walking through a train station explained how experiencing Islamophobia “makes you paranoid . . . you start to think that everybody has the potential to insult you.” 154 Allen Journal of Muslims in Europe 3 (2014) 137-159 This was the case for Maryam too who explained how her personal experience made her reflect on Muslims more broadly: I didn’t feel that way before [the incident] . . . before I used to think that everyone is ok with us [Muslims]. But now something like this happens and it challenges what you think. I don’t think they understand just how it all feels. They’ve got no idea. They don’t understand . . . This was similar for Alia also, who responded by explaining how experiencing Islamophobia: kind of makes you think people hate you because of the way you dress. And then you start linking everything as being anti-Muslim and that may well not be the case Whilst few directly acknowledged it, what would seem to have been underpin- ning these comments was how experiencing Islamophobia changed how they felt about who they were; how their self-defined identity made them question who they were within wider British society. This was likely to be initiated by feelings of being ‘different’ and being visibly seen—and more importantly, recognised—as Muslim. As such, one of the greatest impacts of their experi- ence would appear to be the fact that Islamophobia has the potential to make its victims become more aware of their differences, demarcating them not only as Muslim but more so as Muslim ‘others.’ Around half of those interviewed not only spoke about reflecting on their place within British society but also on their sense of belonging. While feel- ings of anger, shock and fear were at times quite immediate, these particular impacts—of belonging in terms of individual, community, society and Britain more broadly—seemed to occur after the incident. As Alia put it, “it makes you think about integrating . . . you just put your boundaries up.” For Naureen however, the response was much stronger. As she said, “my husband does not want to stay in this country. He does not feel we belong here . . . we do not feel that we are welcomed . . . they see us as strangers who do not belong.” Such feelings were relatively common and were evident in the comments of Halima also who spoke about how “we now see a totally different aspect of British society . . . I feel that I do not belong to England, I just want to move away and never look back.” Unlike Halima, Maryam did not want to move away. Nonetheless her comments resonated. For her, the experience of Islamophobia prompted her to question not just herself and her place in Britain but also the position and place of all Muslims in Britain. As she put it, “maybe we are hated . . . I feel we’re 155Exploring the Impact of Islamophobia Journal of Muslims in Europe 3 (2014) 137-159 not going to be accepted as British, like we’re always going to [be] seen as an out- sider.” Again, the demarcation of the ‘us’ and ‘them’ featured significantly albeit without necessarily being specifically referred to. From the interviews alone, it would be extremely difficult to draw any con- clusions about the extent to which the impact of the women being victims of Islamophobia might have on their self-defined identities as Muslim women. Whilst it would appear that their experiences were clearly relatable to identity, seen in the way in which many of the women spoke in terms of their personal and individual experiences having resonance with all Muslims more broadly, it might have been that their experience had merely accentuated or increased awareness of their potential demarcation on the basis of difference that, in time, might change or return to any pre-incident understandings. An interest- ing perspective however did emerge from the somewhat poignant, reflective observations of Samina. As she put it: I know my background is Bangladeshi but I would not know how to live there. I do not feel that I belong to Bangladesh. But when things hap- pen to you then the identity crisis comes in and you feel that you do not belong to anywhere. You start to question your identity: am I a British Muslim or a Bangladeshi Muslim? For her, the impact of Islamophobia was undoubtedly significant. Not only did it seem to bring about a change in the way in which she understood her own identity but so too did it make her question the positioning of that iden- tity within contemporary Britain and British society. As the Runnymede Trust report noted almost a decade and half ago, British Muslims routinely felt that their values, loyalties and commitments were being questioned as a conse- quence of experiencing Islamophobia, something that in turn made them question their own identities as British.70 What is interesting is that such expe- riences would seem to suggest that it is not the ‘Muslim’ part of the women’s identities that are thrown into question or prompt a process of re-negotiation as a consequence of Islamophobia but instead the ‘British’ part. Given that none of the Muslim women interviewed even referred to a change—however minimal—to their Muslim identity, maybe it is possible that some aspects of identity can indeed be fixed and unchanging. 70 Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia, Islamophobia: a challenge for us all. 156 Allen Journal of Muslims in Europe 3 (2014) 137-159 Conclusion: “. . . then the identity crisis comes in” Responding to the observations of Chakraborti and Zempi71 therefore and posi- tioning this within the context of wider scholarly work into Muslim women in contemporary Western spaces, the aim of this article was to contribute towards improving understanding about the experience and impact of Islamophobia against visible Muslim women in the British setting as well as the experience and impact of Islamophobia more generally. In doing so, this article sought to begin the process of ensuring the voice and experience of Muslim women no longer remained ‘invisible’ and that their experiences, feelings, emotions and responses to such incidents were given the consideration they rightly deserve. Nonetheless, the experience of those women interviewed cannot be seen to be representative or generally applicable to all British Muslim women or indeed Muslims without differentiation. From interviewing 20 visible British Muslim women, it became evident that their visible, outward appearance not only reflected their self-defined Muslim identity but so too acted as a signifier that prompted the recognition of them as being Muslim by others; relevant here to those perpetrating Islamophobia. In doing so, their visibility seemed to be able to catalyse a negative response or reaction in the typical normality of various public spaces. Some of the Islamophobia experienced was opportunistic and ad hoc, some appeared to be rather more pre-meditated and measured in terms of targeting an identifi- able ‘Muslim.’ Indeed all of the incidents embodied a recognition of Muslim identity that also subsequently became the focus of the Islamophobic inci- dent. Consequently, none of the women interviewed would have been able to take comfort in the knowledge that their experience “could have happened to anyone.”72 They could not have; all of the incidents were precipitated on the identification and recognition of Muslim identity. As such, the perpetrators targeted the women because they were able to be visibly identified as Muslim: to stress, visibly identifiable as ‘Muslim’ rather than being identifiable as ‘a Muslim.’ This is important as the latter would have required an acknowledge- ment of the victims being individuals, something that was far from evident in any of the interviews undertaken. 71 Chakraborti & Zempi, “The veil under attack: gendered dimensions of Islamophobic victimization.” 72 Chakraborti & Zempi. “The veil under attack: gendered dimensions of Islamophobic vic- timization,” p. 272. 157Exploring the Impact of Islamophobia Journal of Muslims in Europe 3 (2014) 137-159 From these, a relationship between the visibility and invisibility of Muslim women began to emerge. In terms of visibility, and in reiterating Kapur,73 it would seem true that the visible Muslim woman cannot go unnoticed in contemporary public spaces. Despite claims that Muslim women are invis- ible therefore, in reality they are not and most likely cannot be. As Allen and Nielsen rightly noted,74 given their visibility embodies difference so the mere presence—let alone identification and recognition—of Muslim women in public spaces will be such that it will clearly demarcate ‘them’ from ‘us’; demar- cating Muslims and Islam to ‘us’ and ‘our’ way of life, ‘our’ values and so on. In the wake of events such as the brutal murder of Lee Rigby—as well as 9/11 and 7/7 beforehand—that demarcation of difference thus has the capacity and capability to attract and be associated with ever greater detrimental attributes, those which through the attribution and association with terrorism, among other things, have codified a perceived threat against ‘us’ that is as physical and violent as indeed it is social and cultural. All duly become normative truths. As experienced by some of the women, all Muslims therefore are seen to present such a threat. Given the visible Muslim woman is the contemporary sig- nifier of Muslims and Islam, so she becomes the physical embodiment of this. As Klaus and Kassel put it,75 the visible and outward manifestations of Muslim women go beyond the mere material and physical, and are transformed into something that is rather more ideological. Resultantly, that visibility feeds into, and is indeed understood through, Islamophobia-thinking thereby becoming easier to justify and legitimise Islamophobic exclusionary practices. For the perpetrators therefore, it is likely they believe that the Islamophobia being manifested against individual women is in fact justified and rationalised on the basis that in reality, they are attacking Muslims and Islam per se. As before, they are attacking them for being ‘Muslim’ as opposed to being ‘a Muslim.’ As Deborah put it, “the whole Muslim community is held collectively responsible for what happens.” And this is where the link between visibility and identity becomes impor- tant. Because visible Muslim women signify all Muslims and Islam without differentiation, so their individualities and particularities become reduced. Irrespective of what is visible and known therefore, visible Muslim women become essentialised through the symbolic attribution of various stereotypical 73 Kapur, Ratna, “The tragedy of victimisation rhetoric: Resurrecting the ‘native’ subject in international/post-colonial feminist legal politics.” 74 Allen & Nielsen, Summary Report on Islamophobia in the eu after 11 September 2001. 75 Klaus, Elizabeth and Susanne Kassel, “The veil as a means of legitimisation: An analysis of the interconnectedness of gender, media and war,” in Journalism 6:3 (2005), pp. 335-355. 158 Allen Journal of Muslims in Europe 3 (2014) 137-159 and ideological universalities, many of which are inherently Islamophobic.76 Muslim women’s identities therefore—more appropriately, the recognition of them—can be argued as being both embodying of and the target for which Islamophobia is manifested. And the consequence of this is that the visibil- ity of Muslim women’s identities renders the individual invisible and irrele- vant, leaving all visible Muslim women de-individualised and de-humanised. Drawing on the observations of Sayyid writing about the process and impact of the essentialisation of Muslims and Islam, as he rightly puts it, the outcome is little more than ‘erasure.’77 As regards the self-defined identities of the visible Muslim women inter- viewed, something quite interesting was apparent. Whilst Samina spoke about how, after becoming a victim of Islamophobia, “ . . . the identity crisis comes in . . . ” that ‘crisis’ was not about those women’s Muslim identities but instead about their ethnic, hyphenated or national identities and by consequence, where and how they felt they belonged. This can be seen in the reflections of Rachel and Deborah and how they spoke about the impact prompting them to re-evaluate their ethnic identity and to what extent they were seen to be White British by others. For others such as Halima, Maryam and Naureen, the response was far more acute with some wanting to move to another country or speaking in terms that questioned the likelihood of British society ever being accepting of Muslims as an integral and more importantly, ‘normal’ part of it. Without doubt, the experience of Islamophobia made a number of the women interviewed feel as though they no longer belonged. Most poignant in this respect was Samina: “You start to question your identity: am I a British Muslim or a Bangladeshi Muslim?” Given the centrality of their Muslim identities in the process of identi- fication and recognition as well as the experience of becoming victims of Islamophobia, it is interesting therefore that none of those interviewed gave any indication that their experience made them question or re-evaluate their self-defined Muslim identities in any way whatsoever. A few did speak about changing the way they looked but this was solely in relation to the way in which their families had sought to pressurise them to do so. None spoke about the need to change the way they looked—their visible identity as Muslim— as something they themselves had at any time contemplated or considered. For them, despite clearly understanding that their visible Muslim identity was potentially problematic—something they knew and acknowledged as ear- 76 Allen, Islamophobia. 77 Sayyid, Bobby, A fundamental fear: Eurocentrism and the emergence of Islamism, (London: Zed Books, 2003). 159Exploring the Impact of Islamophobia Journal of Muslims in Europe 3 (2014) 137-159 marking them as potential targets for further Islamophobia—there remained a sense that their self-defined Muslim identities were in some ways unmove- able and fixed. This offers an interesting juxtaposition given that ideological manifestations of Islamophobia seek to construct Muslims—especially visible Muslim women—as being an undeniable ‘other’ for whom a myriad of negative and stereotypical attributions become irremovable and eternally fixed. This research therefore clearly supports the view that sharp disparities and diver- gences can and indeed do clearly exist between identities that are chosen and self-defined and those which are attributed or perceived by others.78 However, whilst scholarly work would seem to suggest that identities are far from fixed, the findings from this research seem to begin to intimate that whether in the process of construction or self-definition, some aspects of an individual’s iden- tity would appear to be able to remain unquestioned and unchanging. In both instances, it was the ‘Muslim’ part of this which appeared to be rather less prone to change than those relating to ethnicity, nationality and so on. Might it be possible therefore that certain facets of one’s identity can indeed be and remain fixed? Maybe, but to fully substantiate this answer further investigation would be necessary. But maybe it is the process of Islamophobia that has the capability to fix identities that go beyond the self-defined as also those that are rather more perceived and attributed. 78 Taylor, Multiculturalism and the politics of recognition. 
work_qo6zxta2bvakfkpovjr7ulkkfm	----	[PDF] Racial discrimination and health among Asian Americans: evidence, assessment, and directions for future research. | Semantic Scholar Skip to search formSkip to main content> Semantic Scholar's Logo Search Sign InCreate Free Account You are currently offline. Some features of the site may not work correctly. DOI:10.1093/epirev/mxp009 Corpus ID: 18676512Racial discrimination and health among Asian Americans: evidence, assessment, and directions for future research. @article{Gee2009RacialDA, title={Racial discrimination and health among Asian Americans: evidence, assessment, and directions for future research.}, author={G. Gee and Annie Ro and Salma Shariff-Marco and D. Chae}, journal={Epidemiologic reviews}, year={2009}, volume={31}, pages={ 130-51 } } G. Gee, Annie Ro, +1 author D. Chae Published 2009 Medicine Epidemiologic reviews Research shows that racial discrimination is related to illness among diverse racial and ethnic populations. Studies of racial discrimination and health among Asian Americans, however, remain underdeveloped. In this paper, the authors review evidence on racial discrimination and health among Asian Americans, identify gaps in the literature, and provide suggestions for future research. They identified 62 empirical articles assessing the relation between discrimination and health among Asian… Expand View on PubMed academic.oup.com Save to Library Create Alert Cite Launch Research Feed Share This Paper 281 CitationsHighly Influential Citations 14 Background Citations 93 Methods Citations 9 Results Citations 14 View All Topics from this paper Abnormal behavior Illness (finding) Mental disorders Paper Mentions News Article Ini mengapa kebigotan adalah masalah kesehatan masyarakat The Conversation 10 December 2018 News Article Why bigotry is a public health problem The Conversation 21 November 2018 News Article Teachers: Don’t Force Students to Speak for an Entire Culture Education Week 16 October 2018 News Article Effort to Diversify Medical Research Raises Thorny Questions of Race Scientific American 10 August 2018 281 Citations Citation Type Citation Type All Types Cites Results Cites Methods Cites Background Has PDF Publication Type Author More Filters More Filters Filters Sort by Relevance Sort by Most Influenced Papers Sort by Citation Count Sort by Recency Race, Discrimination, and Coping Methods in North America Samuel Kareff, Melissa Ogden Political Science 2013 2 PDF View 1 excerpt, cites background Save Alert Research Feed Racial discrimination and disability among Asian and Latinx populations in the United States. Kyle Waldman, A. Stickley, Beverly Araújo Dawson, H. Oh Psychology, Medicine Disability and rehabilitation 2020 Save Alert Research Feed A systematic review of studies examining the relationship between reported racism and health and wellbeing for children and young people. N. Priest, Y. Paradies, Brigid Trenerry, M. Truong, S. Karlsen, Y. Kelly Psychology, Sociology Social science & medicine 2013 360 Save Alert Research Feed Comparing Measures of Racial/Ethnic Discrimination, Coping, and Associations with Health-Related Outcomes in a Diverse Sample Maureen R. Benjamins Psychology, Medicine Journal of Urban Health 2013 18 PDF Save Alert Research Feed Discrimination and Psychiatric Disorder Among Asian American Immigrants: A National Analysis by Subgroups M. Li Psychology, Medicine Journal of Immigrant and Minority Health 2013 8 Highly Influenced View 5 excerpts, cites background and results Save Alert Research Feed Associations Between Major and Everyday Discrimination and Self-Rated Health Among US Asians and Asian Americans Harvey L. Nicholson Psychology, Medicine Journal of Racial and Ethnic Health Disparities 2019 View 3 excerpts, cites background Save Alert Research Feed Race/Ethnicity and Self-Reported Levels of Discrimination and Psychological Distress, California, 2005 D. Byrd Medicine Preventing chronic disease 2012 20 PDF Save Alert Research Feed The state of research on racial/ethnic discrimination in the receipt of health care. V. Shavers, P. Fagan, +4 authors Edward Rorie Medicine American journal of public health 2012 235 PDF Save Alert Research Feed Discrimination and psychological distress: does Whiteness matter for Arab Americans? S. Abdulrahim, S. James, R. Yamout, W. Baker Psychology, Medicine Social science & medicine 2012 65 PDF Save Alert Research Feed The pervasive effects of racism: experiences of racial discrimination in New Zealand over time and associations with multiple health domains. R. Harris, D. Cormack, +4 authors Roimata Timutimu Medicine Social science & medicine 2012 164 Save Alert Research Feed ... 1 2 3 4 5 ... References SHOWING 1-10 OF 215 REFERENCES SORT BYRelevance Most Influenced Papers Recency Social Status Correlates of Reporting Gender Discrimination and Racial Discrimination Among Racially Diverse Women Annie Ro, Kyung-hee Choi Psychology, Medicine Women & health 2009 28 View 1 excerpt, references background Save Alert Research Feed Effects of racial/ethnic discrimination on the health status of minority veterans. L. Sohn, N. Harada Medicine Military medicine 2008 15 PDF View 2 excerpts, references background Save Alert Research Feed Racial/ethnic disparities in health: the interplay between discrimination and socioeconomic status. X. Ren, B. Amick, D. Williams Psychology, Medicine Ethnicity & disease 1999 240 View 1 excerpt, references background Save Alert Research Feed Discrimination and health among Asian American immigrants: disentangling racial from language discrimination. H. C. Yoo, G. Gee, D. Takeuchi Medicine Social science & medicine 2009 147 View 3 excerpts, references background and results Save Alert Research Feed Does health predict the reporting of racial discrimination or do reports of discrimination predict health? Findings from the National Longitudinal Study of Youth. G. Gee, K. Walsemann Sociology, Medicine Social science & medicine 2009 116 View 1 excerpt, references background Save Alert Research Feed Racial/ethnic discrimination and health: findings from community studies. D. Williams, H. Neighbors, J. Jackson Medicine American journal of public health 2008 1,496 PDF View 2 excerpts, references background Save Alert Research Feed A nationwide study of discrimination and chronic health conditions among Asian Americans. G. Gee, M. Spencer, J. Chen, D. Takeuchi Medicine American journal of public health 2007 355 View 3 excerpts, references background Save Alert Research Feed Perceived Medical Discrimination and Cancer Screening Behaviors of Racial and Ethnic Minority Adults L. Crawley, D. Ahn, M. Winkleby Medicine Cancer Epidemiology Biomarkers & Prevention 2008 95 PDF View 3 excerpts, references background Save Alert Research Feed The impact of perceived racial discrimination on the mental health of Asian American and Latino college students. W. Hwang, S. Goto Psychology, Medicine Cultural diversity & ethnic minority psychology 2008 274 PDF View 2 excerpts, references background Save Alert Research Feed Racism and health: the relationship between experience of racial discrimination and health in New Zealand. R. Harris, M. Tobias, M. Jeffreys, Kiri Waldegrave, S. Karlsen, J. Nazroo Sociology, Medicine Social science & medicine 2006 377 Highly Influential PDF View 6 excerpts, references background Save Alert Research Feed ... 1 2 3 4 5 ... Related Papers Abstract Topics Paper Mentions 281 Citations 215 References Related Papers Stay Connected With Semantic Scholar Sign Up About Semantic Scholar Semantic Scholar is a free, AI-powered research tool for scientific literature, based at the Allen Institute for AI. 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work_qpvfrjgh2bc43b7obukithjupa	----	City, University of London Institutional Repository Citation: Cooper, G. ORCID: 0000-0003-2367-8626 (2019). Why livestreaming symbolises journalism's current challenges. Journalism, 20(1), pp. 167-172. doi: 10.1177/1464884918806753 This is the accepted version of the paper. This version of the publication may differ from the final published version. Permanent repository link: https://openaccess.city.ac.uk/id/eprint/21364/ Link to published version: http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1464884918806753 Copyright and reuse: City Research Online aims to make research outputs of City, University of London available to a wider audience. Copyright and Moral Rights remain with the author(s) and/or copyright holders. URLs from City Research Online may be freely distributed and linked to. City Research Online: http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/ publications@city.ac.uk City Research Online http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/ mailto:publications@city.ac.uk Why livestreaming symbolises journalism’s current challenges’ by Dr Glenda Cooper, City University of London glenda.cooper.1@city.ac.uk Every day, on average 96 fatal shootings occur in the US (Everytownresearch, 2018); most do not command any attention except from grieving relatives and the courts. Yet on the 6 and 7 July 2016, two events happened which did end up with worldwide attention. The first was the shooting of Philando Castile by police in Falcon Heights, Minnesota; the second was that of five police officers in a bloody shoot-out in Dallas1. But what made them stand out was because they were captured on onlookers’ smartphones, and then livestreamed. Livestreaming, by ordinary people using apps such as Facebook Live or Periscope2 symbolises the current biggest challenge to journalism. It encapsulates the collapsing of boundaries around what a journalist is, or what journalism does. It has a direct effect on what journalists themselves see as the key challenges to their profession – the failure of the traditional economic model, and the rise of fake news. It allows use of more graphic imagery. And crucially it also points up the problem of information inequality: while there may be high quality media production, many citizens remain information poor (Kennedy and Prat, 2017). In the past, the authorship of news stories used to be journalist-only spaces where ordinary people appeared as archetypes in narratives, or as sources for comments - the outraged passerby, the grieving widow(er), the ‘vox pop’. This changed in the early 2000s with the introduction of phones which could capture images and footage - so-called ‘user-generated content’ (UGC)3 - combined with the growth of social media sites which could distribute it. While the gamechanger moment was the 2004 South Asian tsunami (Gillmor, 2005), by the 2005 7/7 London bombings the stills and video taken by onlookers was considered “more newsworthy than professional content” (Hermida and Thurman, 2008:344 ). The concept of gatekeeping (White, 1950) changed to ‘gatewatching’ (Bruns, 2008). In a world of budget cuts, it proved particularly attractive to mainstream media because such content was also usually free. As one foreign correspondent ruefully commented, why would any editor spend money sending a young journalist to a crisis zone “when they’re getting perfectly good wobbly pictures from some person in the middle of it” (Cooper, 2016). The ability for ordinary people to tell their own stories has been a positive one heralding a paradigm shift from one “in which once the media was the centre of the universe and now the user is the centre of the universe” (Robinson and De Shano, 2011: 977). Early UGC relied on mainstream media to disseminate it, social media platforms have enabled them to bypass media organisations. Livestreaming allows viewers to experience the story as it happens, with immersivity, real-time interaction and sociality (Haimson and Tang, 2017). Unsurprisingly, journalists have found this shift difficult to deal with. One of the most highly-prized values in journalism has been that of the act of witness: the journalist as guarantor of the veracity of events (Seaton, 2005:188). So, to defend their craft “against incursions from non-journalists” (Carlson, 2015:9) – journalists started to clone and co-opt the tropes of UGC (Wahl-Jorgensen, 2015). In some cases this was done by adopting a first-person emotive approach - sites like Vice News have particularly employed this with pieces like ‘My Grandma The Poisoner’ (Reed, 2014). Media organisations have also adopted the methods that their UGC-creating viewers and readers employ - tweeting, uploading smartphone pictures or short videos, and livestreaming themselves, rather than wait for a conventional news bulletin or newspaper edition (Cooper, 2016). However by adopting such tropes, journalists also lay themselves open to the problems that afflict UGC: failure of trust, and increasingly graphic imagery. In the early days of UGC, many researchers posited that audience believed such content was seen as more authentic (Wardle and Williams, 2008). Yet things were not always what they seemed. The fake ‘shark’ pictures from Hurricane Sandy might have caused amusement (Burgess et al, 2012) but in a country like Syria where many journalists were unable to get access, understanding has often heavily depended on UGC which may be created by activists with their own agendas (Johnstone, 2015). Such misinformation has been possible because of three things: ease of distribution/cost; difficulty of regulation; and the decline of trust among the audience. These are all inter-related: anyone with a Wordpress blog or livestreaming app can disseminate information for free. With far more operators involved in exchanging information then regulation is much more complicated. And with these low costs and multiple operators, reputations are far more expendable and information spread around much more quickly. But mainstream journalists, already being tarnished with ‘spin’ REF were then caught up in the audience’s conviction that all information providers were guilty of providing ‘fake news’. This was exacerbated in the wake of scandals such as that of the UK phonehacking (Keeble and Mair, 2012) and in the distancing between mainstream media and audience in the Brexit coverage, followed by the Grenfell Tower disaster (Snow, 2017). Finally, UGC, and livestreaming in particular, has disrupted the journalistic norm that the moment of actual death is never shown (Zelizer 2010) with cases such as Neda Agha-Soltan in June 2009, Drummer Lee Rigby in 2013 and Jordi Mir’s footage showing the death of Ahmed Merabet during the Charlie Hebdo attacks (Mortensen, 2011; Sweney, 2014; Satter, 2015). When the Bangkok bomb blast happened in 2015, a Periscope user Derek van Pelt filmed the aftermath live, exposing viewers to traumatic images before the content creator realised he was filming body parts (Brown, 2015). Since then, suicides, murders, hate crimes, terrorist attacks have all become Facebook Live ‘events’ (Toor, 2016; Levinson and Jamieson, 2017; Griffin, 2017; BBC, 2018).. How should journalism therefore deal with the challenge of livestreaming? First, UGC has been a disruption to the journalistic field, and has benefited the public, with the chances of ordinary people’s perspective being heard and with many playing a role in civic engagement. While not counting themselves as journalists, by bringing news to light and revealing stories in the public interest they may as yet being performing ‘acts of journalism’ (Stearns, 2013). Yet whether editors embed or provide a link to a livestream of a breaking news story has editorial implications and embodies the relationship they want to have with creators of content. By choosing to embed, the media site is taking more ownership and implicitly identifying themselves with the footage. With linking there is more distance, and that the viewer then has to take their own decision as to whether to view material. What livestreaming does tell us however is that the ethical problems that journalists face today are no different just because technology has changed. Most responsible media organisations would still subscribe to the norms that journalists should respect privacy, credit people for their own work, think carefully before releasing violent content rather than allowing it to circulate and not propagate fake news – whether that content comes via livestreaming or traditional methods. But these ethical questions are less about the tactics – the how and when to use social media, because any journalist or media organisation who abide by longstanding journalistic norms should be able to judge what is best to do. The real crisis is whether the public and journalists themselves can mount a sufficiently robust defence of public service journalism, with the plurality of information that a democracy needs to operate and be credible. In one way the news is good. In a crowded media space, in 2018 the BBC still attracts a weekly global news audience of 376m (BBC Media Centre, 2018). Levels of trust in mainstream media have risen across Europe in the past year according to the EBU’s 2018 Trust in Media report – as a consequence of people being unsure what they should trust on social media and online (EBU, 2018), while fewer people are seeking out news via social media (Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism, 2018). For mainstream media organisations there could be an opportunity to show that they can offer something that the noise of social media and user-generated content cannot: the drive to explain and put news in context. This is urgently needed however, the main concern for a democratically healthy society that information inequality is tackled. Many still remain information poor (Kennedy and Prat, 2017). In 2016, the year of the US election and the Brexit referendum, there was a runaway Facebook Live winner: a woman trying on a Star Wars mask and laughing as she did so (Wagner, 2016). 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Newman, N. 2018, Digital News Report 2018, Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism, Oxford. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 2007, 12 April-last update, Participative Web: User-Created Content DSTI/ICCP/IE(2006)7/FINAL 12 [Homepage of OECD], [Online]. Available: http://www.oecd.org/sti/38393115.pdf [2015, 12 May]. Reed, J. 2014, 6 October-last update, My Grandma the Poisoner [Homepage of Vice News], [Online]. Available: https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/avywv4/my- grandma-the-poisoner-0000474-v21n10 [2018, 24 June]. Robinson, S. & De Shano, C. 2011, "'Anyone can know': Citizen journalism and the interpretive community of the mainstream press ", Journalism: Theory, Practice, Criticism, vol. 12, no. 8, pp. 963-982. Satter, R. 2015, 11 January-last update, Witness to Paris officer's death regrets video [Homepage of Associated Press], [Online]. 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Toor, A. 2016, 14 June-last update, French terror suspect reportedly streamed attack on Facebook Live [Homepage of The Verge], [Online]. Available:https://www.theverge.com/2016/6/14/11930916/france-terrorist-larossi- abballa-facebook-live-video [2018, 27 April]. Wagner, K. 2016, 8 December-last update, ‘Chewbacca Mom’ was the most popular Facebook Live video this year by a mile [Homepage of Recode], [Online]. Available:https://www.recode.net/2016/12/8/13870670/facebook-live-chewbacca- mom-most-popular [2018, 24 June]. Wahl-Jorgensen, K. 2015, "Resisting epistemologies of user-generated content? Cooptation, segregation and the boundaries of journalism" in Boundaries of journalism: Professionalism, practices and participation, eds. M. Carlson & S.C. Lewis, Routledge, . Wardle, C. & Williams, A. 2008, ugc@BBC: Understanding its impact on contributors, non-contributors and BBC news’ , BBC, http://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/knowledgeexchange/cardiffone.pdf. White, D.M. 1950, "‘The “Gate Keeper”: A Case Study in the Selection of News’", Journalism Quarterly, vol. 27, no. 3, pp. 383-390. Zelizer, B. 2010, About to Die, 1st edn, OUP, Oxford. http://www.oecd.org/sti/38393115.pdf https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/avywv4/my-grandma-the-poisoner-0000474-v21n10 https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/avywv4/my-grandma-the-poisoner-0000474-v21n10 http://bigstory.ap.org/article/5e1ee93021b941629186882f03f1bb79/ap-exclusive-witness-paris-officers-death-regrets-video http://bigstory.ap.org/article/5e1ee93021b941629186882f03f1bb79/ap-exclusive-witness-paris-officers-death-regrets-video https://www.channel4.com/news/by/jon-snow/blogs/mactaggart-lecture-edinburgh-2017 https://www.channel4.com/news/by/jon-snow/blogs/mactaggart-lecture-edinburgh-2017 http://ethicaljournalismnetwork.org/assets/docs/062/150/329303e-0d75796.pdf http://ethicaljournalismnetwork.org/assets/docs/062/150/329303e-0d75796.pdf http://www.theguardian.com/media/2014/jan/06/itv-bbc-lee-rigby-murder-coverage http://www.theguardian.com/media/2014/jan/06/itv-bbc-lee-rigby-murder-coverage https://www.theverge.com/2016/6/14/11930916/france-terrorist-larossi-abballa-facebook-live-video https://www.theverge.com/2016/6/14/11930916/france-terrorist-larossi-abballa-facebook-live-video https://www.recode.net/2016/12/8/13870670/facebook-live-chewbacca-mom-most-popular https://www.recode.net/2016/12/8/13870670/facebook-live-chewbacca-mom-most-popular http://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/knowledgeexchange/cardiffone.pdf 1 In June 2017, police officer Jeronimo Yanez was acquitted of all charges including manslaughter in the case of Philando Castile but was not allowed to return to active duty. Micah Xavier Johnson who shot the Dallas officers was killed by a bomb disposal remote controlled vehicle. 2 Periscope which was introduced in 2015 and Facebook Live in 2016 are the most popular, although Instagram also allows live video 3 The term ‘user-generated content’ is highly contested, with many alternatives being suggested, including ‘citizen journalism’, ‘citizen witnessing’ and ‘accidental journalism’, but it is generally accepted as the least bad option. In this context I am using as a basis the OECD’s definition – that it requires some kind of creative effort, publication and it is created outside normal professional routines and practices – i.e. it is produced by non-professionals, “without expectation of profit or remuneration but the primary goals being to connect with peers, level of fame and desire to express oneself” (OECD, 2007). 
work_qsbi7zwkmjg2fnw2vlgbpnb5ye	----	Book Reviews 143 Goodey suggests that the discrimination, bullying and segregation of people who we label as having learning disabilities are the result of this inclusion phobia. Recent work around hate crime (Richardson et al., 2015) found that just under half of the people with learning disabilities and/or autism who took part in their survey reported experiences of disability hate crime and so Goodey is quite right to point out that this is one of the ways in this group is targeted as ‘different’. Difference is the focus of his fourth chapter.2 Of course it is also the case that staff working with this group of people are often excluded (Bradshaw and McGill, 2015), for example because of their association with people with learning disabilities. Beadle-Brown et al. (2014) found that people who were living or working with this socially excluded group also reported victimisation. Goodey’s book explores the concept of causes, tracing these through history, culminating in parental blame and guilt and finally to the location of learning disability entirely within DNA, therefore locating ‘the problem’ within the child himself or herself. In his chapter on assessment, Goodey argues that we assess what we feel is measurable, hence intelligence becomes something which we assess and therefore refer to as ‘real.’ Finally, he explores his notion of inclusion phobia through the development of the classification and diagnosis of autism spectrum conditions. Goodey ends by suggesting that a solution would be for all ‘vulnerable’ people to be supported by their local communities (as would have been the case historically) and suggests that services are actively contributing to the prevention of people being able to lead ordinary lives. He ends with stating that ‘Inclusion is not a good idea that needs to be promoted, it is the state of nature’ (p. 166). It is the in ingroup, those who do the excluding, where policy change must be targeted. Jill Bradshaw University of Kent, UK doi:10.1017/mdh.2016.116 Loren Graham, Lysenko’s Ghost: Epigenetics and Russia (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 2016), pp. 209, $24.95, hardback, ISBN: 9780674089051. In 1948, at the end of a week-long session of the Lenin All-Union Academy of Agricultural Sciences (VASKhNIL) in Moscow, Trofim D. Lysenko announced that he had received the support of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union for his anti-genetic theories. What followed was not just a purge of genetics and geneticists across the Soviet Union, but the rest of the Communist Bloc as well. Lysenko seemed to have succeeded, as one author put it, in ‘set[ting] the clock back’ by renouncing the most important advance in twentieth-century biology. A lost generation of would-be geneticists were forced to follow other paths of research, and by the time it was over there was a palpable sense of having been left behind. What they were now free to discover was a genetics that to a large extent had been developed in reaction to Lysenko’s crime of exploiting his connections in a totalitarian political system in order to escape having to subject his theories to the judgement of his peers. Historians of the Lysenko controversy owe an enormous debt to Loren Graham. The chapter where Graham covered what was at the time a recent event in Science and Philosophy in the Soviet Union (1966), was part of the first wave of literature on what 2 L. Richardson, J. Bradshaw, J. Beadle-Brown, A. Malovic and J. Himmerlich, “‘I felt that I deserved it”: Experiences and implications of Disability Hate crime’, Tizard Learning Disability Review, 21 (2016) 80–88. https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/mdh.2016.116 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:28, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1017/mdh.2016.116&domain=pdf https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/mdh.2016.116 https://www.cambridge.org/core 144 Book Reviews David Jorvasky termed ‘the Lysenko affair’. Though numerous books and articles appeared in the immediate aftermath of the VASKhNIL session, describing what had happened and was still ongoing, the period after Lysenko’s downfall was when ‘Lysenkoism’ was finally treated from a critical perspective. Graham has returned to the topic over the years in a voluminous output of literature, as though never quite satisfied he has said enough. Now with his new book, Lysenko’s Ghost, Graham has produced something of supreme value – proof that Lysenkoism still matters. Surprisingly, or perhaps not, restoring Lysenko’s reputation as a hero of Russian science has become the bailiwick of an increasingly large number of local nationalists engaged in composing their own version of the history of the Soviet Union. There have been a number of strategies in this effort, including even what is purported to be photographic evidence that Lysenko’s argument trees should be planted in clusters so they could co-operate for survival has proved correct. However, none is more potent – and potentially effective – than presenting Lysenko as the precursor to epigenetics. Among the reasons this claim has gained currency is that it is not without merit. After all, C. H. Waddington’s first studies were published in Lysenko’s mouthpiece journal, Agrobiologia, at a time when they were not getting a hearing in the West. This was in part due to a defensiveness towards Lysenko which resulted in a reactionary suspicion of theories which might in any way challenge the priority of the gene, versus the environment, in evolution. Now epigenetics is recognised as an important contribution to our knowledge of the function of genes, and is a vibrant area of research. But is coincidence causality? Can the man who denied genes existed be given credit just because editorial evidence indicates he was the only one willing to listen? Among other supreme merits of Graham’s book is that he is willing to render a verdict. While acknowledging that by doing so he is stepping out of his traditional role as reporter of scientific history, he believes the stakes merit that he do. After providing a fluent account of the history of eugenics, genetics and Lamarckian heredity in Russian science, including highly evocative accounts of his personal encounters with Soviet biologists – including Lysenko – Graham delivers a verdict: ‘No.’ Graham’s reasoning is sound. There is nothing in Lysenko’s writings to indicate he had any conception of the science he is credited with anticipating. Even worse, as Graham clearly testifies, Lysenko is culpable of the death and ruin of numerous Soviet geneticists and their colleagues behind the, at the time, aptly named ‘iron curtain’. The only caveat, or better said, question for future research, is to what extent this very fact – that Lysenko is guilty of abusing power to snuff out challenges to his ideas – is the reason he should not be credited as a sponsor of Waddington’s ideas? A casual read through popular accounts of epigenetics today shows that Jean-Baptiste Lamarck – whose theories Lysenkoists alternately denied and embraced – is granted this honour routinely. Could Lamarck have had any more of a clue about all of this than Lysenko? Or is that beside the point? This question and a few others will make Graham’s book invaluable reading for those who are already well-versed in the history of Lysenkoism, as well as those who might be hearing it for the first time. It is notable that Graham’s account of the rise of neo- Lysenkoism in Russia today seems mapped out onto the history of the rise and fall of its namesake. This part of the book is essential reading for those interested in current trends in Russian science, and proof that the story is not over. William deJong-Lambert Bronx Community College, CUNY, USA https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/mdh.2016.116 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:28, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/mdh.2016.116 https://www.cambridge.org/core *-2.9pc 
work_qszb3noao5bitnp7xj6dzygq3a	----	PPS_2000219 701..704 From the Editors The Uses of Violence Michael Bernhard and Daniel O’Neill Considering Violence T he vast majority of content in this issue addresses violence. In its many forms it has been central to the study of politics from ancient times, and to the discipline of political science from its inception. Physical coercion is one of the most common means by which power is exercised, along with material and moral forms of suasion (Etzioni 1971, 357-59). For Weber, coercion and material calculus are the means by which authority can be enforced when rulers cannot establish legitimacy (Weber 1978, 214). Violence is essential to the exercise of power and enforcement of political order. However, when it is turned against powerholders it can also be a means to overturn existing relations of power and patterns of order. Of course, it is not the only means to do so, and non- violent forms of resistance have been shown to be as effective, or even more so, in many contexts (Sharp 1973; Chenoweth and Stephan 2011). On a micro-level, the effects of violence have been demonstrated to be highly deleterious to human beings well beyond the obvious proximate physical effects. It brings trauma that stays with the individuals subjected to it, and often those who inflict it, for the rest of their lives, and its negative effects may continue to impact future generations (Browning 1992; Lifton 1968, 1973, 1986). Still there are some political theorists who argue that violence has a cathartic role in overcoming the effects of degrading and demeaning aspects of unjust rule. This was influentially articulated by the syndicalist Georges Sorel in his Reflections on Violence (1961 [1908]) and was taken up as a kind of cult practice by the interwar far-right (Mann 2004). Frantz Fanon, one of the most influential theorists of national liberation in the postwar era, also discussed the use of violence as a means to shake off the degrading effects of colonialism (1961). The short-term effects of violence from a macro- perspective are almost universally negative. Destruction of property and loss of life have negative impacts on welfare and economic progress. In comparison to non- violent protest, violent protest is much more dangerous for democratic rule (Teorell 2010; Celestino and Gledistch 2013; Bayer, Bethke, and Lanbach 2016). However, from a more distal perspective violence can lead to changes in structural conditions that represent barriers to economic, political, and social change. Here we are not talking about some sort of purposive social engineering but the unintended consequences of large-scale violence. Once unleashed, there is no telling what its epiphenomenal effects might be. Barrington Moore notes this in his discussion of the origins of Western liberal democracy: “The Revolt of the Netherlands, the Puritan Revolution, the French Revolution, and the American Civil War did help to break down in each case a different historical set of institutional obstacles to the establishment of Western liberal democracy, though it is of course impossible to prove that they were necessary to bring about this result” (1969, 6). Violence was intrinsic to these processes, which in retrospect we see as forms of progress. Similarly, it took the military defeat of Nazism, and the partition of Ger- many between East and West to break German traditions of militarism, reaction, and the Iron and Rye political economy that impeded the emergence of stable democracy (Bernhard 2001). The ramifications of this for the relative peace and stability in Europe since 1945 are critical. In Sheri Berman’s recent work (discussed in this issue in a Critical Dialogue with Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson), the emergence of democracy is depicted as a process through which remnants of the ancien régime are dismantled and replaced by modern, competitive, and more politically egalitarian forms of rule. In France it took almost one hundred years, four revolutions, and defeat in major war before the old regime was sufficiently weakened to permit the emergence of a durable democracy. The first attempt at democratic rule failed during the Revolution of 1789, and it took the defeat of Bonaparte in the first European global war, the Revolutions of 1830 and 1848, the defeat in the Franco-Prussian War, and the failure of the Paris commune before the competitive system of government of the French Third Republic, based only on universal male suffrage, was stabilized by the Consti- tution of 1875 (Berman 2019, ch. 6; Hanson 2010, ch. 4). Still, one does not create progress by design through violence, and we should rightly be skeptical of those who propose such a thing. Violence has large-scale and wide- reaching consequences and, under a fortuitous set of doi:10.1017/S1537592720002194 © The Author(s), 2020. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the American Political Science Association. September 2020 | Vol. 18/No. 3 701 https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592720002194 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:31, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592720002194 https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592720002194 https://www.cambridge.org/core circumstances, those consequences can remove obstacles to the emergence of novel forms of rule like democracy. This is not always the case, of course. Other massively violent episodes such as the imposition of Western colo- nialism have left countries with long-term legacies that have yielded highly exploitative extractive economic orders that promote dictatorial rule (Kohli 2020). And some- times colonialism and imperialism have, indeed, been successfully defeated by violent means, although this, too, has never been pretty. The Special Section The articles that compose our special section on the uses of violence are decidedly not in this macro-perspective. Many of them, though, capture microlevel countermovements made in reaction to progress. From a macro-level perspec- tive, episodes of democratic progress often result in the diminution of the inherited privileges of the past as well as full incorporation of newly empowered populations pre- viously excluded from the full benefits of citizenship. This helps explain why the construction of stable democratic systems is so difficult and time-consuming. Moreover, episodes of progress in turn lead to episodes of backlash where social forces whose privilege was erased by demo- cratic progress attempt to reassert their prerogative power. Several pieces in this issue show how violence has been used by traditional authorities in an attempt to reassert their domination over parts of the population that have successfully weakened those bonds. Backlash of this sort in the United States has been directed most recently at women, African Americans, and immigrants. Two of our articles examine the uses of violence in support of misogyny. In “The Cost of Doing Politics? Analyzing Violence and Harassment against Female Politicians,” Mona Lee Krook and Juliana Restrepo Sanín produce an innovative typology that allows us to concep- tualize five different forms of violence used to marginalize female politicians: physical, psychological, sexual, eco- nomic, and semiotic. In her contribution, “Public Emo- tions and Variations of Violence,” Stacey Hunt probes the reasons behind an outbreak of acid attacks against women in Colombia. She explores the affective economy of con- sumption and desire for explanations of Colombia’s his- tory of violence, and links ideas that explain its persistence as a misunderstood passion for the beauty of women to this startling upsurge in disfiguring intimate violence. Turning to race, it is important to note that despite the abolition of slavery more than 150 years ago, every attempt to secure African American equality since then has been met with counter-movements that attempt to both maintain and transform white supremacy. Abolition and reconstruction were countered by segregation, Jim Crow, and lynching, and the successes of the civil rights movement with the carceral state and voter suppression. Three pieces in the special section examine the racist uses of violence to confine African Americans to a persistent status as second-class citizens. In “Rule by Violence, Rule by Law: Lynching, Jim Crow and the Continuing Evo- lution of Voter Suppression in the U.S.,” Brad Epperly, Christopher Witko, Ryan Strickler, and Paul White discuss the conditions under which the suppression of African-Americans has been carried out by legal as opposed to violent means. They illustrate its utility for white racists with illustrations from the post- reconstruction era and the contemporary wave of voter suppression in the United States. In “The Strange Fruit of the Tree of Liberty: Lynch Law and Popular Sovereignty in the United States,” Michael Gorup explores how and why lynchings of African Americans in front of large crowds were central to the construction of a racialized notion of “the people” in America. Gorup argues that through the violent public spectacle of lynching, popular sovereignty in the United States was arrogated exclusively to white people, while African Americans were consti- tuted as second-class citizens and social subordinates. The third piece addressing the role of violence in race relations assesses its impact on African American political consciousness and behavior. In “Reconceptualizing Polit- ical Knowledge: Race, Ethnicity, and Carceral Violence,” Cathy J. Cohen and Matthew D. Luttig show that carceral state violence leads to fundamental differences in what constitutes political knowledge for black and white Ameri- cans. The results of simplistic tests that show whites to be more politically knowledgeable than blacks are reversed when questions on carceral violence are included in such tests. Furthermore, Cohen and Luttig also show that those who have the greatest knowledge of carceral violence are less likely to participate in politics, demonstrating that the repressive and disempowering impact of the carceral state goes well beyond the daily indignities of aggressive policing and the harsher punishments received by African Americans. Our final piece on repressive backlash turns to religious prejudice with a focus on the recent increase in violence against American Jews. Using the FBI’s data on religious hate crime, Ayal Feinberg determines which conditions promote the targeting of American Jews in “Explaining Ethnoreligious Minority Targeting: Variation in U.S. Anti-Semitic Events.” He focuses on four areas: target concentration, target distinguishability, number of hate groups, and stimuli that increase target salience. He finds that hate crimes directed against Jews are concentrated where there are large numbers of Jews and hate groups, where Jewish populations are less assimilated and thus distinguishable from the population at large, and in response to triggering events like Israeli military action. The diversity of our selections for the special section points to other uses of violence beyond backlash. Eduardo Moncada’s “The Politics of Criminal Victimiza- tion: Pursuing and Resisting Power” reminds us that 702 Perspectives on Politics Articles | From the Editors https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592720002194 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:31, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592720002194 https://www.cambridge.org/core violence is inscribed in class relations as well as race and gender relations or religious hatred. Violence has also long served as a means to expropriate value from vulnerable populations. Using intensive fieldwork among informal street vendors in large Latin American cities, Moncada sheds light on the resistance behaviors adopted by vendors in response to expropriation of their earnings by organized protection rackets. He reminds us that violence is not always an effective means to exercise power, and this is often the result of the ingenuity of those subjected to it in avoiding its pernicious effects. One of our selections addresses the potential liberating effects of violence along the lines discussed at the outset of this introduction. Güneş Murat Tezcür examines the Kurdish insurgency in Syria and the role of women fighters there in “A Path Out of Patriarchy? Political Agency and Social Identity of Women Fighters.” Based on a novel dataset containing information on 9,000 militants and a host of in-depth interviews, the study finds that mobiliza- tion into the ethnic insurgency was a pathway for unedu- cated Kurdish women to escape the bonds of patriarchal domination. Whether this effect will be permanent or temporary, especially given uncertainty about the out- come of the struggle, has yet to be determined. Our last selection looks at how the depiction of violence in media impacts our attitudes towards it. In “Wait, There’s Torture in Zootopia? Examining the Prevalence of Torture in Popular Movies,” Casey Delehanty and Erin Kearns look at depictions of torture and its effectiveness in popular American motion pictures from 2008 to 2017. They raise the issue of whether this depiction has helped to legitimize torture in American popular culture. The inclu- sion of torture in major motion pictures is ubiquitous, even in movies for children, and it is overwhelmingly depicted as effective. Furthermore, it is presented in a starkly Manichean fashion, where movie protagonists only rely on torture as a last-minute measure to avoid deadly threats, and their antagonists use it to target innocent victims or to punish their opponents. Other Content In this issue we also include Alexander Livingston’s article “Tough Love: The Political Theology of Civil Disobedience,” which focuses on the early development of Martin Luther King’s commitment to “aggressive love.” This approach brought the uses of non-violence, rather than violence, to the fore of the discussion on how to achieve political ends. Livingston locates the origins of this concept in black theologians’ engagement with Indian anticolonialism and traces its particularistic development through King’s early Civil Rights activism. For Livingston, King’s commitment to responding to oppression with aggressive love illustrates a crucial, if paradoxical dimen- sion of civil disobedience: the importance of affirming civility while enacting non-violent resistance, thereby fusing political confrontation together with a commitment to political pedagogy. The research content of the issue closes with a provoca- tive reflection from Jack Goldstone and Larry Diamond. In “Global Demographic Change and the Future of Democracy,” they ponder the combined impact of demo- graphic stagnation in advanced democratic states and large-scale population growth in Central America, sub- Saharan Africa, and the Middle East. They argue that these twin developments have had adverse effects on democracy globally. The combination of poor economic perform- ance, climate change impacts, and bad governance in the latter has led to waves of asylum seekers to the econom- ically wealthy democracies. This wave of immigrants from new areas of the globe has provoked anxiety, resurgent nationalism, and support for populist strong men in the former. Goldstone and Diamond stress the importance of demographic stability, good governance, and the creation of economic opportunity in developing regions of the globe as the solution to creating a more democratic and stable future in both regions. A Journal in the Plague Year Perspectives on Politics continues to publish, though we do so under a set of challenging conditions brought about by the coronavirus global pandemic. The print edition of the journal is suspended due to disruptions beyond the control of Cambridge University Press. Instead, both they and we will focus on the online edition. Normal processing of manuscripts continues, although the number of submissions has slowed somewhat. This usually happens at the end of the spring semester when academics concentrate on writing and grading finals and transitioning to research mode in the summer months. We will know more about the pandemic’s effects in the coming months when we see if submissions pick up as usual. It is perhaps fortuitous that we find ourselves in a submission lull, as it is more difficult to find reviewers these days. Many of us have had to make abrupt transitions to on-line teaching, and those of us with school-age children face a greater burden of care and in some cases schooling. We are fully cognizant of these challenges, and their gendered dimensions, and understand why many colleagues cannot take on assignments at this time and are more prone to be a bit late in completing them. Thus, if you submit, please be patient with us; things operate a bit slower in a plague year. Our biggest challenges come on the book review side of the journal. The disruption of global supply chains means that many of the big publishing houses are no longer shipping hard copies of books. We know that many reviewers prefer to work with them, but when our current inventory is assigned, we may have to work with electronic versions of the books. Our current stock will take us through September 2020 | Vol. 18/No. 3 703 https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592720002194 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:31, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592720002194 https://www.cambridge.org/core the end of the present volume (for the 2020 calendar year) and maybe a bit beyond. This supply chain breakdown complicates our task in selecting books for review. And, as on the article side of the journal, it is a bit harder to find reviewers. The authors of book reviews face the same set of challenges we all do in terms of finding new ways to work in a timely and effective fashion. Thus, we ask for your understanding and patience with the book review section. We will do everything we can to prevent the number of books reviewed from falling off precipitously, and to ensure the timeliness of those reviews insofar as we are able. We are committed to keeping the operation of the journal as normal as possible through the uncertainty of the current crisis and what comes next. We are very fortunate to have the backing of well-run organizations like the American Political Science Association, Cam- bridge University Press, and the University of Florida. As academics, we need to acknowledge our privileged position in our current cataclysm. Most of us who are tenured or on tenure-track lines continue to draw our salaries, and much of what we do is conducive to on-line delivery that allows us to practice physical distancing. We need to be conscious of this and do what we can to help colleagues in our discipline who do not have permanent employment, graduate students who face uncertain job prospects, and undergraduates who find themselves in precarious situations because of the economic ramifica- tions of the pandemic. Finally, we need to acknowledge that while the pandemic is striking fellow human beings of all nations and social classes, in our country the highest toll is being paid by those who do not share our privilege, specifically minority populations in our large urban cen- ters, as well as those who continue to provide “essential” service work, especially those who do so for modest pay. And, as ever, the burden of increased care work in response to the pandemic often falls disproportionately on the basis of gender. This situation exists precisely because of the kind of violent backlash against progress that many of the authors in the special section discussed earlier illuminate for us. References Bayer, Markus, Felix S. Bethke, and Daniel Lambach. 2016. “The Democratic Dividend of Nonviolent Resistance.” Journal of Peace Research 53(6): 758–61. Berman, Sheri. 2019. Democracy and Dictatorship in Europe: From the Ancien Régime to the Present Day. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Bernhard, Michael. 2001. “Democratization in Germany: A Reappraisal.” Comparative Politics 33(4): 379–400. Browning, Christopher R. 1992. Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland. New York: Harper Collins. Celestino, Mauricio Rivera, and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch. 2013. “Fresh Carnations or All Thorn, No Rose? Nonviolent Campaigns and Transitions in Autocracies.” Journal of Peace Research 50(3): 385–400. Chenoweth, Erica, and Maria J. Stephan. 2011. Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict. New York: Columbia University Press. Etzioni, Amitai. 1971. The Active Society. New York: Free Press. Fanon, Frantz. 1961. The Wretched of the Earth. New York: Grove Weidenfeld. Kohli, Atul. 2020. Imperialism and the Developing World. New York: Oxford University Press. Hanson, Stephen. 2010. Post-Imperial Democracies: Ideology and Party Formation in Third Republic France, Weimar Germany, and Post-Soviet Russia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Lifton, Robert J. 1968. Death in Life: Survivors of Hiroshima. New York: Random House. ——. 1973. Home from the War: Vietnam Veterans— Neither Victims nor Executioners. New York: Simon & Schuster. ——. 1986. The Nazi Doctors: Medical Killing and the Psychology of Genocide. New York: Basic Books. Mann, Michael. 2004. Fascists. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Moore, Barrington. 1969. Reflections on the Causes of Human Misery and Upon Certain Proposals to Eliminate Them. Boston: Beacon. Sharp, Gene. 1973. The Politics of Nonviolent Action. 3 vol. Boston: Porter Sargent. Sorel, Georges. 1961. Reflections on Violence. New York: Collier Books. Teorell, Jan. 2010. Determinants of Democratization: Explaining Regime Change in the World, 1972–2006. New York: Cambridge University Press. Weber, Max. 1978. Economy and Society. 2 vol. Berkeley: University of California Press. 704 Perspectives on Politics Articles | From the Editors https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592720002194 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:31, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592720002194 https://www.cambridge.org/core Statement of Mission and Procedures Perspectives on Politics seeks to provide a space for broad and synthetic discussion within the political science pro- fession and between the profession and the broader schol- arly and reading publics. Such discussion necessarily draws on and contributes to the scholarship published in the more specialized journals that dominate our discipline. At the same time, Perspectives seeks to promote a complemen- tary form of broad public discussion and synergistic under- standing within the profession that is essential to advancing scholarship and promoting academic community. Perspectives seeks to nurture a political science public sphere, publicizing important scholarly topics, ideas, and innovations, linking scholarly authors and readers, and pro- moting broad refl exive discussion among political scien- tists about the work that we do and why this work matters. Perspectives publishes work in a number of formats that mirror the ways that political scientists actually write: Research articles: As a top-tier journal of political sci- ence, Perspectives accepts scholarly research article sub- missions and publishes the very best submissions that make it through our double-blind system of peer review and revision. The only thing that differentiates Perspectives research articles from other peer-reviewed articles at top journals is that we focus our attention only on work that in some way bridges subfi eld and methodological divides, and tries to address a broad readership of political scien- tists about matters of consequence. This typically means that the excellent articles we publish have been extensively revised in sustained dialogue with the editors to address not simply questions of scholarship but questions of intel- lectual breadth and readability. “Refl ections” are more refl exive, provocative, or pro- grammatic essays that address important political science questions in interesting ways but are not necessarily as systematic and focused as research articles. These essays often originate as research article submissions, though sometimes they derive from proposals developed in con- sultation with the editor in chief. Unlike research articles, these essays are not evaluated according to a strict, double- blind peer review process. But they are typically vetted informally with editorial board members or other col- leagues, and they are always subjected to critical assess- ment and careful line-editing by the editor and editorial staff. Scholarly symposia, critical book dialogues, book review essays, and conventional book reviews are developed and commissioned by the Associate and Book Review Editor, based on authorial queries and ideas, editorial board suggestions, and staff conversations. Everything published in Perspectives is carefully vetted and edited. Given our distinctive mission, we work hard to use our range of formats to organize interesting conver- sations about important issues and events, and to call atten- tion to certain broad themes beyond our profession’s normal subfi eld categories. For further details on writing formats and submission guidelines, see our website at http://www.apsanet.org/ perspectives/ https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592720002194 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:31, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592720002194 https://www.cambridge.org/core The Uses of Violence Considering Violence The Special Section Other Content A Journal in the Plague Year 
work_quebdj4ygbfffibwn6mvijb2ju	----	Enriching the university experience through volunteering: a pilot project Browse Explore more content Enriching the University Experience through Volunteering - accepted version.pdf (122.68 kB) Enriching the university experience through volunteering: a pilot project CiteDownload (122.68 kB)ShareEmbed journal contribution posted on 22.06.2015, 12:34 by Laura L. Garius, Louise Nicholas This article details the first year of a collaborative effort between a campus-based university and its local Victim Support scheme. The key innovative component was that student volunteers were trained to provide support to peers who experienced crime. Not a formal evaluation, this article outlines how the work appeared beneficial to the university, its students and Victim Support. The first two benefited through improved on-campus service to victimized students and to those who were trained and worked as volunteers. Victim Support benefited from increased numbers of volunteers and consequently improved services. Some implementation difficulties are also described. This study provides a platform for further efforts and their more formal evaluation. Categories Language, Communication and Culture not elsewhere classified Studies in Human Society not elsewhere classified Keywords Access to servicesPeer supportStudentsVictimsVoluntary sector History School Social Sciences Department Communication, Media, Social and Policy Studies Published in International Review of Victimology Volume 21 Issue 2 Pages 233 - 245 Citation GARIUS, L. and GROVE, L.E., 2015. Enriching the university experience through volunteering: a pilot project. International Review of Victimology, 21 (2), pp. 233 - 245 Publisher SAGE Publications Ltd / © The Author(s) Version AM (Accepted Manuscript) Publisher statement This work is made available according to the conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0) licence. Full details of this licence are available at: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ Publication date 2015 Notes This article was published in the journal, International Review of Victimology [SAGE Publications Ltd / © The Author(s)]. The definitive version is available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0269758015571474 DOI https://doi.org/10.1177/0269758015571474 ISSN 0269-7580 eISSN 2047-9433 Publisher version http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0269758015571474 Language en Administrator link https://repository.lboro.ac.uk/account/articles/9475919 Licence CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 Exports Select an optionRefWorksBibTeXRef. managerEndnoteDataCiteNLMDC Categories Language, Communication and Culture not elsewhere classified Studies in Human Society not elsewhere classified Keywords Access to servicesPeer supportStudentsVictimsVoluntary sector Licence CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 Exports Select an optionRefWorksBibTeXRef. managerEndnoteDataCiteNLMDC Hide footerAboutFeaturesToolsBlogAmbassadorsContactFAQPrivacy PolicyCookie PolicyT&CsAccessibility StatementDisclaimerSitemap figshare. credit for all your research. 
work_qw3pikmiwzcodpkqndavlmpnja	----	Our Contributors Our Contributors Feminist Teacher, Volume 19, Number 1, 2008, pp. 83-85 (Article) Published by University of Illinois Press DOI: For additional information about this article [ This content has been declared free to read by the pubisher during the COVID-19 pandemic. ] https://doi.org/10.1353/ftr.0.0019 https://muse.jhu.edu/article/255829 https://doi.org/10.1353/ftr.0.0019 https://muse.jhu.edu/article/255829 f e m i n i s t t e a c h e r v o l u m e 1 9 n u m b e r 1 83 © 2 0 0 8 by t h e b o a r d o f t r u s t e e s o f t h e u n i v e r s i t y o f i l l i n o i s Our Contributors Jeong-Hye Hwang Choe is a graduate stu- dent in the department of chemistry at the University of Illinois at Chicago. Sara L. Crawley is an assistant profes- sor of sociology and affiliated faculty in women’s studies at the University of South Florida. She has published in such femi- nist journals as Gender & Society, Journal of Lesbian Studies, and Hypatia, and she recently co-authored the book Gendering Bodies with Lara J. Foley and Constance L. Shehan. Alesha Durfee is an assistant professor in the women and gender studies program at Arizona State University. Her research focuses on domestic violence, the social construction of victimization, and social policy. She has taught several courses in these areas, including “Women and Vio- lence” and “Gender, Religion and Global Violence.” Outside of academia, she has worked as a victim advocate in law enforce- ment and the criminal justice system. Julie Ellefson is a professor of chemistry at William Rainey Harper College in Palatine, Illinois. Abby L. Ferber is a professor of sociol- ogy, the director of women’s studies, and the director of the Matrix Center for the Advancement of Social Equity and Inclu- sion at the University of Colorado at Colo- rado Springs. She is the author of White Man Falling: Race, Gender, and White Supremacy; co-author of Hate Crime in America: What Do We Know? and Making a Difference: University Students of Color Speak Out; and co-editor (with Michael Kimmel) of Privilege: A Reader; and editor of Home-Grown Hate: Gender and Orga- nized Racism. She has co-edited two new volumes: The New Basics: Sex, Gender, and Sexuality (Oxford University Press, 2008) and The Matrix Reader: Examining the Dynamics of Privilege and Oppression (McGraw-Hill, 2008), both designed for classroom use. She is a member of the Smart-Girl Board of Directors and chairs the Program Committee. Patricia Gately is a professor of English at Truman State University, where she has taught interdisciplinary courses on the Bloomsbury group. Kristina R. Knoll is a doctoral candidate in the Women Studies Department at the University of Washington, Seattle. Her dissertation, “Locating Feminist Disability Studies,” reflects on some of the current conceptualizations in feminist disability studies arenas, as well as future goals, by incorporating interviews with more than ten scholars whose work spans both femi- nist and disability studies topics. Addi- tional areas of inquiry for Knoll include sexual violence; psychopathology and stigma; bridging activism and theory; stu- dent mentoring and advising; and medical and psychological ethics and the ethics of care. Jennifer E. Lewis is an associate profes- sor in the Department of Chemistry at the University of South Florida. Her research interests focus on current trends in the teaching and learning of chemistry at the undergraduate level, including the evalu- ation of curricular reform implementations with an eye toward both effectiveness and equity. Her research publications have appeared in Chemistry Education: Research and Practice, The Journal of Chemical Education, and The Journal of Research in Science Teaching. Kathryn E. Linder is a graduate student in feminist pedagogy at the Ohio State Uni- versity. Maralee Mayberry is currently the chair- person of the Department of Sociology at the University of South Florida. She has written and taught extensively in the areas of sociology of education, feminist science studies, and feminist pedagogy. A long- time advocate of interdisciplinary curricu- lum and innovative teaching approaches, Mayberry and her colleague Ellen Cronan Rose compiled an anthology, Meeting the Challenge: Feminist Pedagogy in Action (Routledge 1999), to illustrate how feminist pedagogy can be implemented in a variety of disciplinary settings. Her involvement in feminist science studies originated with a National Science Foundation grant to develop curricular programs linking the natural sciences to the social sciences and humanities. This work is reflected in a series of journal articles (appearing in Transformations; Journal of Women and Minorities in Science and Engineering; Journal of Research on Science Teaching; and the National Women’s Studies Associa- tion Journal) and culminated in a co-edited book, Feminist Science Studies: A New Generation (Routledge 2001). Mayberry is currently involved in a funded research project in four Pinellas County School Dis- trict high schools. The purpose of the study is to identify the relationship between Gay- Straight Alliance activities and school pat- terns of action and inaction that either sup- port or inhibit organization level change of importance to sexually-marginalized youth. Catherine Hurt Middlecamp is a distin- guished faculty associate at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, where she holds a joint appointment in chemistry and in inte- grated liberal studies. She is the editor- in-chief for Chemistry in Context, a project of the American Chemical Society. Her chemistry courses are organized around real-world topics such as air quality, ozone depletion, and global climate change, and her current work is on bringing the sus- tainable use of resources into the chemis- try curriculum. Marlynne Nishimura teaches in the Col- lege of Education and for the Department of Chemistry at the University of Illinois at Chicago. Dana Perry is a professor of chemistry at Harold Washington College in Chicago. Karen Rosenberg is a doctoral candidate in women studies at the University of Washington in Seattle. Prior to entering graduate school she worked as a legal advocate for a feminist anti-domestic violence agency. Her research interests include feminist pedagogy, feminist social movements, and legal mobilization by social movement actors. 84 co nt r i b u to r s f e m i n i s t t e a c h e r v o l u m e 1 9 n u m b e r 1 85 Sally Sayles-Hannon is the A-Plus Project coordinator at Texas Women’s University. Georgann Cope Watson works as an administrative assistant, a teaching assistant, a part time instructor, and a researcher at Brock University. She is cur- rently a graduate student in Educational Studies. Residing in that undefined space between staff and faculty gives her a unique perspective on educational orga- nizations as cites of struggle for feminist pedagogies. Her research interests include feminist pedagogy in various contexts including adult education, online educa- tion and outdoor education. Stacy Wenzel is a co-director of the Prairie Group at the University of Illinois at Chi- cago. Rhonda L. Williams received her EdD degree from Kansas State University in 2003. She is currently an assistant profes- sor in counseling and human services. As a school counseling practitioner of twenty years, Dr. Williams has received state and national school counseling awards. She has served on the Smart-Girl board and has been instrumental in the implementa- tion and development of the Smart-Girl program in Colorado Springs. Currently, Dr. Williams is involved in expanding the Smart-Girl curriculum and training of pro- gram guides and coaches. Donald J. Wink is a professor of chemistry and a member of the Learning Sciences Program faculty at the University of Illinois at Chicago. 
work_qxoejax4j5hddpgbk7lhihg45a	----	Antisemitism on Twitter: Collective Efficacy and the Role of Community Organisations in Challenging Online Hate Speech https://doi.org/10.1177/2056305120916850 Creative Commons Non Commercial CC BY-NC: This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution- NonCommercial 4.0 License (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/) which permits non-commercial use, reproduction and distribution of the work without further permission provided the original work is attributed as specified on the SAGE and Open Access pages (https://us.sagepub.com/en-us/nam/open-access-at-sage). Social Media + Society April-June 2020: 1 –20 © The Author(s) 2020 Article reuse guidelines: sagepub.com/journals-permissions DOI: 10.1177/2056305120916850 journals.sagepub.com/home/sms SI: Re-Imagining a More Trustworthy Social Media Future Introduction With the increase in the use of digital communication tech- nologies such as social media networks, online hate speech has become an increasingly prevalent and visible problem which threatens cohesion and trust among online citizens, and hence, their ability to work together to control their environ- ment, what social scientists have term “collective efficacy” (Sampson et al., 1997). Social media acts as a polarization amplifier—it opens up a potential space for the galvanizing of attitudes and emotions, through the spread of negative expression toward minority groups and counter-narratives accelerated by algorithm driven partisan network contagion (Sunstein, 2017). Over the past decade, social media has become a safe harbor for launching campaigns of antisemi- tism, including harassment and criminal threats directed at members of the Jewish community. In the first 6 months of 2019, Community Security Trust (CST, 2019), a charity that supports the Jewish community, recorded 323 online antise- mitic incidents in the United Kingdom, representing 36% of all incidents. This represents an increase of 46% on the same period the year before. Understandably, antisemitism on social media has become a matter of concern in the Jewish community and in broader public debate. Although conven- tional hate crime recording (i.e., police crime records and Crime Survey of England and Wales), has been improving, both online and offline antisemitic incidents are significantly under-reported, leading to a significant dark figure. Unlike 916850 SMSXXX10.1177/2056305120916850Social Media <span class="symbol" cstyle="Mathematical">+</span> SocietyOzalp et al. research-article20202020 Cardiff University, UK Corresponding Author: Sefa Ozalp, Cardiff University, Cardiff CF10 3WT, UK. Email: ozalpas@cardiff.ac.uk Antisemitism on Twitter: Collective Efficacy and the Role of Community Organisations in Challenging Online Hate Speech Sefa Ozalp , Matthew L. Williams, Pete Burnap, Han Liu, and Mohamed Mostafa Abstract In this article, we conduct a comprehensive study of online antagonistic content related to Jewish identity posted on Twitter between October 2015 and October 2016 by UK-based users. We trained a scalable supervised machine learning classifier to identify antisemitic content to reveal patterns of online antisemitism perpetration at the source. We built statistical models to analyze the inhibiting and enabling factors of the size (number of retweets) and survival (duration of retweets) of information flows in addition to the production of online antagonistic content. Despite observing high temporal variability, we found that only a small proportion (0.7%) of the content was antagonistic. We also found that antagonistic content was less likely to disseminate in size or survive for a longer period. Information flows from antisemitic agents on Twitter gained less traction, while information flows emanating from capable and willing counter-speech actors—that is, Jewish organizations—had a significantly higher size and survival rates. This study is the first to demonstrate that Sampson’s classic sociological concept of collective efficacy can be observed on social media (SM). Our findings suggest that when organizations aiming to counter harmful narratives become active on SM platforms, their messages propagate further and achieve greater longevity than antagonistic messages. On SM, counter-speech posted by credible, capable and willing actors can be an effective measure to prevent harmful narratives. Based on our findings, we underline the value of the work by community organizations in reducing the propagation of cyberhate and increasing trust in SM platforms. Keywords antisemitism, collective efficacy, hate speech, social media, twitter https://uk.sagepub.com/en-gb/journals-permissions https://journals.sagepub.com/home/sms mailto:ozalpas@cardiff.ac.uk http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1177%2F2056305120916850&domain=pdf&date_stamp=2020-06-18 2 Social Media + Society previous research that has aimed to outline patterns of online antisemitism (e.g., Anti-Defamation League [ADL], 2018; Finkelstein et al., 2018; Woolley & Joseff, 2019), this article illustrates a scalable methodology that can identify future antisemitic communications and reveal patterns of online antisemitic perpetration at source. Furthermore, this article addresses the “collective efficacy” phenomenon on social media in the case of controlling antisemitic communications. In this article, we present an analysis of the production and propagation of online antagonistic content targeting Jewish people posted on Twitter between October 2015 and October 2016 in the United Kingdom. We collect data from Twitter’s streaming API using keywords which explicitly make reference to Jewish people and/or to Jewish identity and locate 2.7 million tweets from UK-based users. Drawing on emerging computational criminology methods, we train a machine learning algorithm to classify antisemitic content on Twitter with high accuracy and at scale (Burnap & Williams, 2015, 2016; Williams & Burnap, 2016). After illustrating significant variability in the frequency of antagonistic tweets related to Jewish identity, we identify three “spikes” in antagonistic content, the highest of which follows the sus- pension of MPs from the Labour party over antisemitism allegations. We then examine these three spikes by building statistical models around 15-day study windows. We model Twitter information flows (retweets) and explore (1) the inhibiting and enabling factors of online antisemitism, (2) the propagation of antisemitic content in terms of size (num- ber of retweets) and survival (duration of retweets), and (3) the types of actors (e.g., Jewish organizations, antisemitic actors, media agents, MPs) that gain significant information flow traction. This article contributes to academic literature in the following three distinct ways: it introduces a super- vised machine learning model capable of identifying future antisemitic incidents, it reveals patterns of online antisemi- tism perpetration at source, and for the first time, it intro- duces collective efficacy as a useful concept for interpreting the countering of online hate in a social media context. Literature Review Hate Crimes, Social Media, Cyberhate Hate crimes have the potential to damage the fabric of trust between communities within society by undermining social cohesion. Current literature underlines the importance of the social polarization behind the mechanics of hate crime vic- timization. Gerstenfeld (2017) argues that the motivation behind hate crimes is not necessarily the hate directed toward the individual victim but rather the victim’s per- ceived “outgroup” status. Complementing this view, Perry (2001, p. 5) explains that hate crimes aim to polarize com- munities by sending “messages” to the wider community of the “others” that they must “conform to the standards” set by the privileged majority. From a broad societal point of view, fluctuations with regard to polarization can be observed through hate crime statistics. Studying hate crime figures from conventional quantitative data sources such as police crime records and self-report studies (e.g., victimiza- tion and crime surveys) may prove to be beneficial in order to understand the patterns of divisive tensions within a soci- ety, provided that biases attached to these data sources are carefully considered when drawing conclusions. Data from conventional sources suggest that hate crime is on the rise in England and Wales. According to the most recent records, hate crimes recorded by the police in England and Wales have increased by 17%, from 80,393 (2016/2017) to 94,098 (2017/2018) (Home Office, 2018). The upward trend in police-recorded hate crime has been seen since 2012/2013. Figures have more than doubled (123%) in England and Wales with an increase from 42,255 (2012/2013) to 94,098 (2017/2018). Although these figures are important barometer of societal tensions between groups, criminolo- gists have long argued that the statistics produced by police are insufficient to paint a complete picture to understand both general and hate crime patterns. Existing criminological literature illustrates a number of limitations of police recorded crime data such as non-uniform recording practices across police forces, improvements, and changes in police recording practices over time, and changes in legislation and classification of offense types (Maguire, 2007; Tilley & Tseloni, 2016). In relation to hate crimes, these data sources are incomplete as at least half of all hate victims do not report their victimization (Williams & Tregidga, 2014). A recent Home Office (2018) report recognizes some of the shortcom- ings of police recorded hate crime figures, suggesting that the increases in recent years are “largely driven by improve- ments in police recording” (p. 7). Another useful conventional data source to understand hate crime victimization figures is the Crime Survey of England and Wales (CSEW). Surveying a nationally repre- sentative sample of roughly 35,000 households each year, the CSEW is regarded “as a gold-standard survey of its kind” (Flatley, 2014, p. 199). Recent estimates from the CSEW show that racial and religious aggravated hate crimes increased by 4.5%, from 112,000 per year (2013–2015, two-year average) to 117,000 per year (2015–2017, two- year average). Combined estimates suggests that there were 184,000 hate incidents per year from 2015/2016 to 2017/2018 (Home Office, 2018, p. 7). Despite the robust nature of CSEW statistics, they are limited by their reliance upon victim interviews. Some victims of hate incidents might not be willing to report hate crime in victimization surveys. For instance, the wording (i.e., using the term “hate crime”) of questions in surveys can be problematic. Williams and Tregidga (2014, p. 948) found that while some survey respondents may find the word “hate” too restrictive, others may be confused by the word “crime,” hesitating “whether their experiences constituted acts serious enough to be clas- sified as crimes”. Correspondingly, some victims prefer not Ozalp et al. 3 to report the prejudiced incidents they experienced either to the police or in surveys, leading to dark figures in hate crime victimization rates. Given the shortcomings of conventional police hate crime and victimization data, it is important to supplement these with other sources to paint a more complete picture. New data sources, such as internet searches and social media com- munications, lend themselves well to the analysis of public sentiment trends. Recent computational and social science advances in machine learning and statistical modeling allow researchers to utilize new “big data” sources to address a variety of social research questions, such as tracking the spread of influenza (Ginsberg et al., 2009) or to build psy- chological constructs of nations linked to GDP (Noguchi et al., 2014). Furthermore, Twitter posts have been used to investigate the spread of hate speech following terrorist attacks (Williams & Burnap, 2016) and to estimate offline crime patterns (Williams et al., 2017). Besides conventional hate crime statistics, othering and divisive sentiment trends within society can also manifest in subtler forms, such as prejudiced online communications. Referred to as cyberhate, these divisive and prejudiced online communications have been present since the dawn of the public internet in the 1990s (Wall & Williams, 2007; Williams, 2006). Similar to offline hate crimes, the motivation of cyberhate perpetrators is rarely the hate of individual victims, but the community of “others” in which they represent (Douglas et al., 2005). Previous cyberhate literature illustrates that perpetrators tar- get victims because of their perceived belonging to groups with protected characteristics such as sexual orientation (McKenna & Bargh, 1998), race (Leets, 2001), and religion (Williams & Burnap, 2016). By analyzing prejudiced online communications, we can identify the ebb and flow of soci- etal tensions through the monitoring of subtler “hate inci- dents,” many of which would not reach the criminal threshold used by law enforcement agencies, and therefore, would not be included in conventional hate crime statistics. Therefore, current researchers and practitioners should take advantage of the affordances provided by online communications data and supplement conventional statistics with cyberhate perpe- tration in order to shed light on “dark” figures of hate crime victimization trends. Collective Efficacy and Social Media Social media companies have generally presented themselves as strong advocates of free-speech and have until very recently allowed hate speech to proliferate on their platforms. Online hate speech has become an increasing problem that to date has been largely controlled by online community coopera- tion, what social scientists term “collective efficacy” (Sampson et al., 1997, p. 918). Sampson (2001) describes collective efficacy as “the linkage of mutual trust and shared willingness and intention to intervene for the com- mon good” (p. 95). On social media platforms, an abundance of cyberhate speech in the absence of capable and willing counter-speech actors can reduce collective efficacy which, in turn, can result in decreased trust in platforms, their users, and online communities. On the contrary, if capable, trustworthy and willing actors on social media platforms can successfully intervene cyberhate perpetrators with counter-speech, we can observe the benefits of online collective efficacy. Current research on online collective efficacy is scarce. In a demo- graphically balanced survey of Americans, Costello et al. (2017) explored the presence of online collective efficacy and found that 21.3% of respondents reported that they observe others telling perpetrators of cyberhate to stop, and 21% indi- cated that they witnessed others defending victims of cyber- hate. However, their logistic regression model failed to demonstrate a statistically significant association—neither positive nor negative—between either form of collective effi- cacy and being targeted by cyberhate.1 Therefore, unlike the long-proven negative correlation between the perception of collective efficacy in offline communities and offline crime rates (Mazerolle et al., 2010; Sampson et al., 1997), the effec- tiveness of collective efficacy on social media platforms is yet to be proven in the literature. Data from social media platforms can be utilized to explore the effectiveness of collective efficacy on online communities. Social media communications can be ampli- fied and redistributed through platform-specific dissemina- tion mechanisms such as retweeting (Boyd et al., 2010). This unique conversational aspect of online communica- tions enables researchers to study online information propa- gation networks and information flows. Unlike traditional methods, such as surveys or interviews, through studying information flows through retweets, researchers can “iden- tify what information or sentiment is being endorsed and propagated by users, and which users have the most or least influence in the spread of such messages” (Williams & Burnap, 2016, p. 215). By comparing the retweet rates of trustworthy and capable users engaged in counter-speech practices to rates of retweets of biased and prejudiced users engaged in spreading divisive messages and cyberhate, arguably researchers can measure a proxy of collective effi- cacy in online communities. Related Work: Offline and Online Antisemitism In this article, we focus our attention solely on the growing problem of online antisemitism in the United Kingdom, which is an important policy and community safety issue. In a survey conducted by the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) among individuals who consider themselves Jewish in eight European countries, including the United Kingdom, 75% (n = 5,847) stated that they consider online antisemitism as a problem (European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2013, p. 12). In addition, 75% of the respondents who were exposed to negative statements toward Jews (n = 5,385), cited the internet as the medium that 4 Social Media + Society exposed them to negative sentiments (European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2013, p. 25).2 Of those who were exposed to antisemitic harassment (n = 1,941), which can be both online and offline, only 23% stated that the inci- dent was reported to the police, to another organization or both, while 76% stated that the event was not reported at all (European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2013, p. 49). Given the staggering rates of non-reported antisemitic victimization and the growing concerns about online anti- semitism, FRA suggested that the “EU Member States should consider establishing specialised police units that monitor and investigate hate crime on the internet and put in place measures to encourage users to report any antisemitic con- tent they detect to the police” (European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2013, p. 12). To our knowledge, there are no specialised units dedicated to tracking online antisem- itism at the source in any EU states to date. Previous research on detecting and analyzing online anti- semitic incidents at the source is of particular interest to this study. Analyzing over 100M posts from multiple social media platform hosting “fringe” communities, 4 chan’s Politically Incorrect board (/pol/) and Reddit’s The_Donald subreddit and Gab, Finkelstein et al. (2018) argued that online antisemi- tism and racist online communications increased consider- ably following divisive offline political events such as the 2016 US election.3 By training word2vec models, they devised a text-based methodology which predicts similar words that are likely to appear together in the same context. Although useful for exploring keyword-based discussions of online fringe communities, the unsupervised nature of this methodology limits its practicality for classifying future individual antagonistic instances. Barring this article, most of the existing research on the detection of online antisemi- tism are commissioned or conducted by Jewish civil society organizations such as the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) and Community Security Trust (CST).4 From January 2017 to January 2018, ADL collected more than 18 million tweets using keywords referring to Jews and Jewish identity (ADL, 2018). By randomly sampling 1,000 tweets per week that matched with a complex Boolean query and manually anno- tating n = 55,000, ADL predicted 4.2 million tweets (23.5% of all tweets collected) were antisemitic within the study period. In another mixed-methods study on Twitter, Woolley and Joseff (2019) explored antisemitism among 5.8 million tweets containing political hashtags during the 2018 US midterm election campaign. Human annotation of 99,075 filtered tweets revealed that 54.1% contained antisemitic conspiracy theories and 46.45% contained derogatory terms.5 Although these three studies are important to understanding trends in online antisemitic sentiment, none detail the accuracy of the content classification results or provide a discussion of com- mon information retrieval metrics such as precision, recall, and F-measure. Finally, none of these studies suggests a methodology to accurately identify future antisemitic inci- dents without human annotation. Given the limitations of current research, new research on the automated detection of antisemitic cyberhate and the sta- tistical dynamics of its propagation is needed. Instead of relying on conventional “terrestrial” data sources, this article reveals patterns of online antisemitic perpetration at source. Although there are multiple social media platforms where antisemitism can be traced, we exclusively draw on Twitter data due to the ease of access and the ability to explore infor- mation propagation networks through the retweeting mecha- nism. Following a human annotation phase, we trained a supervised machine learning classifier that is capable of clas- sifying antisemitic content at scale. Informed by the collec- tive efficacy theory, our hypotheses address the enablers and inhibitors of antisemitic content within UK-based Twitter communications. Hypotheses H1: Offline events and discussions concerning Jews will act as “trigger events” and be observed as spikes in online communications related to Jewish identity. The event-specific increase in hate crimes is an established phenomenon in the literature. For instance, Hanes and Machin (2014) observed significant increases in hate crimes reported to the police in the United Kingdom following 9/11 and 7/7 terror attacks. Similarly, in the aftermath of Woolwich terror attack in 2013, Williams and Burnap (2016) observed a sud- den spike and a rapid de-escalation in the frequency of racial and religious cyberhate speech within the first 48 hours of the attack. Findings from these studies indicate that galvanizing “trigger” events such as socially divisive political events and terror attacks motivate prejudiced incidents against outgroups and lead to an increase in incidents targeting minorities, which is reflected in hate crime statistics. Informed by previous research, we hypothesize that offline events that trigger debate around Jewish identity will migrate to social media. H2: Pre-identified antisemitic Twitter users will be posi- tively correlated with the production of antagonistic con- tent about Jews. The second hypothesis tests whether Twitter users flagged by Jewish civil society organizations as antisemitic due to their previous online behavior are predictive of cyberhate production. H3: Trustworthy and capable actors will be positively associated with larger size of information flows. H4: Trustworthy and capable actors will be positively associated with longer survival of information flows. H3 and H4 operationalize collective efficacy theory on Twitter. Sampson (2001) underlines the importance of “mutual Ozalp et al. 5 trust and shared willingness” for the capable and trustworthy actors who are willing to “intervene for the common good.” On Twitter, by comparing the retweet rates of trustworthy and capable users to rates of retweets of biased and prejudiced users engaged in spreading divisive messages and cyberhate, researchers can measure a proxy of the collective efficacy phe- nomenon. These hypotheses test whether trustworthy and capable agents, such as Jewish community organizations, veri- fied accounts, official police accounts, and Members of Parliament (MPs), are associated with larger size and longer survival of information flows, lending evidence for the effec- tiveness of collective efficacy within the particular community of interest on Twitter. H5: Antagonistic content about Jews will not propagate further in size, within the study period. H6: Antagonistic content about Jews will not survive over time, within the study period. H5 and H6 extend the previous research on computational criminology by exploring the propagation dimension of the antagonistic speech targeting Jews and Jewish identity (Williams & Burnap, 2016). Within the study period, if cyberhate does not propagate in size and if it does not survive over time, we can tentatively infer an association between collective efficacy and a reduction in the impact of the infor- mation flows containing antagonistic sentiments within the particular community of interest on Twitter. Informed by previous research, we assume that antisemitic tweets will be negatively associated with both size and survival of informa- tion flows. Methodology Data Collection and Preprocessing The data used in this study were collected using the COSMOS platform (Burnap et al., 2015), a free software tool that allows researchers to connect directly to Twitter’s streaming Application Programming Interface (API) to col- lect real-time social media posts by specifying keywords. The following keywords were used for data collection: “jew, jewish, jews, antisemitic, antisemitic, antisemitism, anti- semitism, anti semitic, anti semitism, bonehill, stamford hill, golders green, neo nazis, neo nazi, neonazi, neo-nazis, nazi, nazis.”6 These keywords are a combination of generic terms and terms relating to a far-right demonstration directed at the Jewish community in Golders Green in north London, reflecting events in the United Kingdom at the time of the data collection. This list was not intended to be a compre- hensive set of keywords relating to all aspects of antisemitic hate speech. In particular, much antisemitic hate speech comes in the form of conspiracy theories (or allusions to such theories) and image-based hate speech—such as memes—that would not be captured by these keywords (Finkelstein et al., 2018; Woolley & Joseff, 2019). This caveat should be borne in mind when assessing the overall quantity of antagonistic content measured by this research and the generalizability of the findings. The data used for this analysis include tweets posted between 16 October 2015 and 21 October 2016 and were collected in real-time, ensuring all tweets matching with the keywords are collected. The raw dataset for the complete study period contained 31,282,472 tweets.7 The dataset was imported into the R environment (R Core Team, 2018), which is an open-source statistical pro- gramming language, for preprocessing and exploratory data analysis (EDA). The first aim of preprocessing was to infer the location of users from tweet metadata and extract UK-based tweets from the whole dataset. Unless Twitter users explicitly opt-in to share their geo-locations each time they post a tweet, latitude and longitude coordinates are not provided in the metadata. The majority of Twitter users in this dataset (>99%) opted out of sharing these exact geo-data. Three different approaches were adopted to infer Twitter communications from the United Kingdom, using the metadata of each tweet. First, we derived a list of UK-based place names (referenced as the UK pattern henceforth). Using pattern matching techniques, the UK pattern was identified within the account description of the users. Second, the UK pattern was identified within the user reported locations field (shown under profile pictures). Finally, London and Edinburgh were selected from Twitter time-zone user selections (the only two UK-based time zones Twitter provides). In total, 2,677,058 tweets were identified as emanating from UK-based users.8 The number of tweets identified as emanating from the United Kingdom in this study is therefore 8.5%. This figure is in line with general global usage patterns: in Q2 2016 there were circa 313 mil- lion active Twitter accounts, and approximately 6.4% of these accounts were located within the United Kingdom (Statista, 2019). The second aim of preprocessing was to classify user types that were of interest for analysis. Using conventional data science methods and tweet metadata and collaborating with organizations with subject expertise, six user types of interest were identified, that is, Media Agents, MPs, Celebrity Agents, Police Agents, Jewish Organisation Agents, and known Antisemitic Agents. To identify Media Agents, pat- tern matching was used against a list of keywords that the media frequently employ in their account descriptions (the media pattern). In total, 181,363 tweets were identified as emanating from Media Agents.9 Drawing on previous work by Bejda (2015), we used a list of the most followed celebri- ties on Twitter and by matching them with the users in the dataset, identifying 80 tweets from Celebrity Agents. To identify MP Agents, we used a list of Twitter handles of 590 MPs who served between the 2015 and 2017 general elec- tions, identifying 2,950 tweets.10 To identify Police Agents, a list of force area Twitter accounts was used in combina- tion with identifying lower level accounts (e.g., at basic 6 Social Media + Society command unit). In total, 162 tweets were identified as ema- nating from Police Agents. To identify Jewish Organization agents, we pattern matched user descriptions against the terms “Jew,” “Jewish”, and “Jewry” and identified all Jewish organizations followed by @CST_UK. A resulting 102 Jewish organization agents were found in the UK dataset, generating 11,599 tweets in the study period. To identify known antisemitic agents, we used a pre-defined list of 24 accounts which was supplied by CST. In total, 13,240 tweets were identified as posted by these agents.11 All other users that did not fall into any of these agent types were classified as “other” agents. Tweet Classification We devised a supervised machine learning methodology to classify antagonistic content related to Jews in the Twitter dataset. Work on identifying hate speech has shown variable success rates with accurate classification across multiple protected characteristics. In particular, machine learning has been found to be most accurate at classifying anti-Muslim hate speech (see Burnap & Williams, 2015). Building a clas- sifier to identify antisemitic hate speech proved particularly problematic due to the high degree of disagreement between human coders on what they considered as hateful. Much of the confusion stemmed from a conflation of antisemitic and anti-Israel content on Twitter.12 Given this complexity, a two-stage process to attaining gold standard, human annotation was performed to create a training dataset for the machine learning classifier (see Appendix A for a detailed discussion). The training dataset included 853 human-validated tweets, where 388 instances were annotated as antagonistic toward Jews and Jewish identity and 465 were annotated as non-antagonistic. This human-annotated dataset was used as the gold standard to train the machine learning classifier. We experimented with multiple supervised learning techniques when building the classifier. Both 10-fold cross-validation and 70/30 split validation results suggested that overall, the most efficient machine learning technique for classifying antagonistic content in this dataset was Support Vector Machines com- bined with a Bag of Words approach (see Appendix B for a detailed discussion of other algorithms we experimented with and Appendix C for the computational cost of the study). In total, this method identified 9,008 original tweets as antagonistic, representing 0.7% of the 1,232,744 original tweets in the UK dataset. This is commensurate with the volume of antagonistic tweets related to Muslim identity following terror attacks in the United Kingdom (0.9%; see Williams & Burnap, 2016). Upon inspection of the classifi- cation results, we are confident that the classifier was able to distinguish between antagonistic content related to Jews and non-antagonistic posts that contained a combination of the keywords used to generate the dataset over the 12-month period of the study. Exploratory Data Analysis and Descriptive Statistics In the first stage of EDA, we visualized the UK dataset and the antagonistic sub-dataset to identify periods of interest to the next stage of analysis. The periods of interest were then isolated for statistical modeling to identify the enablers and inhibitors of the production of antagonistic content, and the factors that predict information flow size and survival. Figure 1 presents a daily aggregated time- series line graph of overall tweet frequency (black line) and antagonistic tweets (red line) based on the UK dataset. The volume of tweets containing the keywords used for the col- lection varies considerably over time. For instance, the highest peak in the complete study period for all tweets is around 28 April 2016, the day that Ken Livingstone was suspended from the Labour Party, and the day after Naz Shah MP was suspended, both for alleged antisemitic com- ments. This observation indicates offline events probably trigger online discussions that contain the keywords used in the collection, confirming both H1 and previous research (Hanes & Machin, 2014; Williams & Burnap, 2016). The Figure 1 also compares the volume of antagonistic tweets to all tweets using the same scale, illustrating their relatively low frequency over the study period. Figure 2 presents a line graph of antagonistic content related to Jews in the UK dataset. Even though the fre- quency pattern of antagonistic tweets is not identical to the pattern of all tweets presented in Figure 1, there are simi- larities. For example, the highest peak in antagonistic tweets is late April/early May 2016, following the Shah/ Livingstone events. The second highest peak in antagonis- tic content is mid-June 2016, which is also in line with the peak in mid-June in Figure 1, indicating antagonistic con- tent peaks and falls are in line with general discussions about Jews on Twitter. The EDA enabled us to visualize the temporal patterns of both antagonistic and non-antagonis- tic tweets in the UK dataset. As the primary aim of the analysis was to predict the enablers and inhibitors of the production of antagonistic content and of the propagation of information flows through statistical modeling, we selected three events of interest around the highest three peaks in Figure 2: Event 1 includes all tweets posted between 27 April 2016 and 13 May 2016, Event 2 includes all tweets posted between 15 June 2016 and 1 July 2016, and Event 3 includes all tweets posted between 12 August 2016 and 28 August 2016. Information Propagation Models Dependent Measures. There are two dependent measures in information propagation modeling: Size of information flows (measured by counting the number of retweets) and Survival of information flows (measured by counting the seconds between the first and last retweet within the study period). In Ozalp et al. 7 Figure 1. Tweet frequency (12 months). Figure 2. Antagonistic tweet frequency (12 months). terms of size, the number of retweets is a measure of the vol- ume of public interest and endorsement of the information, while survival (or duration) is a measure of the persistence of interest over time. These measures are established in the lit- erature on online social networks and information propaga- tion (Burnap et al., 2014; Yang & Counts, 2010). 8 Social Media + Society Independent Measures. Three sets of variables were entered as independent predictors of information flow size and sur- vival in the models: Content factors, Social factors, and Con- trol factors. Content factors relate to the text of the tweet. The following text content factors were included: sentiment (binary negative/positive), URLs pointing to an external source (such as a news item), hashtags which create an inter- est-based micro-network, and antagonistic content, which is the outcome of our machine learning classifier. Social factors relate to the characteristics of user accounts. In the models, the following user social features were included: number of followers, verified status, and agent type. The presence of police agents and celebrities were either extremely small or non- existent across all three events of interest. Therefore, police and celebrity agents were re-classified under other agents and five agent types were included: media, MPs, Jew- ish organizations, known antisemitic accounts, and other agents. Multiple control factors were included that have been shown to influence the flow of information in social media networks (Zarrella, 2009). These include time of day and day of week. Tables 1 to 3 present descriptive statistics for each event we selected to model in this study. Antagonistic Content Models Dependent and Independent Measures. For predicting the production of content, which was antagonistic toward Jewish identity, we used the results of our machine learning classi- fier for the original text as the dependent variable. We con- verted classification results into a binary numeric format where “1” represents antagonistic content and “0” represents non-antagonistic content. For independent variables, we used the same independent variables (i.e., content factors, social factors, and control factors), as described in the infor- mation propagation models. Methods of Estimation Information Propagation Size Model. To predict the size of information flows, we use zero-inflated negative binomial (ZINB) regression.13 We fit ZINB regression models as the size measure is best described as a count of retweets, where zeroes were present (i.e., some tweets were not retweeted dur- ing the study period). Zero-inflated count variables represent types of events that are largely not experienced by the majority Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of Event 1 (N = 156,498). Variables Coding Mean Std. dev Dependent variables Size (retweets) Range: 0–376 0.3056077 3.240511 Survival (seconds) Range: 0–1,349,131 2,604.136 28,456.9 Antagonistic speech 0 = no; 1 = yes 0.0049841 0.0704222 Independent variables Content factors Sentiment –1 = negative; 0 = neutral; 1 = positive –0.3825608 0.7140561 URL 0 = no; 1 = yes 0.5482818 0.497665 Hashtag 0 = no; 1 = yes 0.1995105 0.3996337 Social factors MPs 0 = no; 1 = yes 0.0017828 0.0421853 Jewish org. and media 0 = no; 1 = yes 0.0041726 0.0644608 Antisemitic agent 0 = no; 1 = yes 0.0061918 0.0784441 Media agent 0 = no; 1 = yes 0.1069407 0.3090388 Other agent 0 = no; 1 = yes 0.8809122 0.3238928 Verified 0 = no; 1 = yes 0.0319748 0.1759337 Number of followers Categorized into 1–10th percentiles 5.499367 2.872617 Control factors Work 0 = no; 1 = yes 0.4250214 0.4943478 Commute morning 0 = no; 1 = yes 0.1128002 0.3163494 Commute evening 0 = no; 1 = yes 0.1349091 0.3416275 Evening 0 = no; 1 = yes 0.2530831 0.4347795 Night 0 = no; 1 = yes 0.0741863 0.2620746 Sunday 0 = no; 1 = yes 0.1185766 0.3232907 Monday 0 = no; 1 = yes 0.0959948 0.2945851 Tuesday 0 = no; 1 = yes 0.0818094 0.2740749 Wednesday 0 = no; 1 = yes 0.1466536 0.3537614 Thursday 0 = no; 1 = yes 0.252016 0.4341718 Friday 0 = no; 1 = yes 0.180456 0.384568 Saturday 0 = no; 1 = yes 0.1244936 0.3301449 Ozalp et al. 9 of the sample. In this case, it is retweets where the majority of tweets are not retweeted with a minority being retweeted. Lin- ear regression models are not appropriate for count variables given the nonnormal distribution of the errors. We opted to use ZINB regression over zero-inflated Poisson (ZIP) regression because the dependent variable was overdispersed. Information Propagation Survival Model. To predict the sur- vival of the information flows, we used Cox’s proportional hazards regression (1972). Our interest here was to model the factors that pose hazards to the survival of information flows, that is, duration of a retweet (in seconds) within the study period. Therefore, positive relationships indicate an increased hazard to survival of information flows. Cyberhate Model. Since this variable was best described as binary (0 = non-antagonistic; 1 = antagonistic), we estimated the production of antagonistic content by using generalized ordered logit regression, which allows for the identification of predictive factors. Results Cyberhate Model Results of cyberhate models for each event are presented in Table 4. Across all events, accounts identified as antisemitic by CST were most likely to produce antagonistic content related to Jews, lending strong evidence in support of H2. This is unsurprising given the nature of these accounts and their posting history. This finding also lends strong evidence in support of the semantic accuracy of the machine learning classifier built for this study. The only other variables that increased the likelihood of the production of antagonistic content were the control factors of day of week and time of day. All remaining factors in the analysis decreased the likeli- hood of the production of antagonistic content. Social fac- tors, such as type of tweeting agent, account verification status, and retweet count, were all negatively associated with the production of antagonistic content. Across all events, verified accounts, those that Twitter deem are “of Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of Event 2 (N = 78,432). Variables Coding Mean Std. Dev Dependent variables Size (retweets) Range: 0–1,550 0.3546384 8.780562 Survival (seconds) Range: 0–1,407,814 2,170.419 31,109.54 Antagonistic speech 0 = no; 1 = yes 0.0088484 0.0936496 Independent variables Content factors Sentiment –1 = negative; 0 = neutral; 1 = positive –0.4498929 0.7063633 URL 0 = no; 1 = yes 0.5154784 0.4997635 Hashtag 0 = no; 1 = yes 0.1851413 0.3884146 Social factors MPs 0 = no; 1 = yes 0.00102 0.0319212 Jewish org. and media 0 = no; 1 = yes 0.0050362 0.0707878 Antisemitic agent 0 = no; 1 = yes 0.0035827 0.0597489 Media agent 0 = no; 1 = yes 0.0864061 0.2809645 Other agent 0 = no; 1 = yes 0.903955 0.2946548 Verified 0 = no; 1 = yes 0.227841 0.1492154 Number of followers Categorized into 1–10th percentiles 5.498317 2.873169 Control factors Work 0 = no; 1 = yes 0.4225061 0.4939613 Commute morning 0 = no; 1 = yes 0.1166361 0.3209882 Commute evening 0 = no; 1 = yes 0.1086546 0.3112074 Evening 0 = no; 1 = yes 0.25561 0.4362063 Night 0 = no; 1 = yes 0.0965932 0.295405 Sunday 0 = no; 1 = yes 0.1052887 0.306927 Monday 0 = no; 1 = yes 0.088089 0.2834262 Tuesday 0 = no; 1 = yes 0.0919013 0.2888884 Wednesday 0 = no; 1 = yes 0.1459863 0.3530948 Thursday 0 = no; 1 = yes 0.2582492 0.4376745 Friday 0 = no; 1 = yes 0.218444 0.4131929 Saturday 0 = no; 1 = yes 0.0920415 0.2890864 10 Social Media + Society public interest and authentic,” were significantly less likely to be associated with antagonistic content, compared to non- verified accounts. Many of these accounts belong to celebri- ties, public figures, politicians, news organizations, charities, corporations, and government departments. Media Agents and, unsurprisingly, Jewish organizations and media were also significantly less likely to produce antagonistic content. These negative associations add further evidence in support of the accuracy of the machine learning classifier. Similar to previous research on the spread of online hate speech, tweets containing links to other content (URLs) were less likely to contain antagonistic content. URLs are possibly less common in antagonistic tweets given linked content (most often popular media sources) is less likely to support antisemitic opinion. Contrary to previous research (Williams & Burnap, 2016), the inclusion of hashtags in tweets was negatively associated with the production of antagonistic content across the three events. This may sug- gest users publishing antisemitic content do not aim to increase the discoverability of their messages outside their follower networks. Information Propagation Size Model Table 5 presents the results of the size models. Sample size in each event only indicates original tweets, with the number of retweets entered as the dependent variable. Incidence-Rate Ratios (IRRs) are used to indicate the magnitude of the effect on retweets.14 Of particular note is the negative relationship between antagonistic content and the size of retweets. In all three events, antagonistic content did not propagate in terms of size (IRR: 0.285, 0.510, and 0.441, respectively), provid- ing strong support for H5 and confirming previous work on anti-Muslim online hate speech (Williams & Burnap, 2016). Correspondingly, the content posted by antisemitic agents identified by CST did not propagate to a significant extent across the three events. This double negative pattern pro- vides further confidence in the accuracy of the machine learning classifier for antagonistic content related to Jewish identity. It is important to note that while this content did not propagate, it was produced and published by a minority of Twitter users during the events under study. Across all three events, content posted from Twitter veri- fied accounts was most likely to be retweeted in volume, an Table 3. Descriptive Statistics of Event 3 (N = 55,298). Variables Coding Mean Std. dev Dependent variables Size (retweets) Range: 0–191 0.1843466 2.29645 Survival (seconds) Range: 0–1,395,227 2,073.954 26,842.71 Antagonistic speech 0 = no; 1 = yes 0.0074144 0.0857877 Independent variables Content factors Sentiment –1 = negative; 0 = neutral; 1 = positive –0.4014069 0.7193844 URL 0 = no; 1 = yes 0.5159499 0.4997501 Hashtag 0 = no; 1 = yes 0.1651597 0.371328 Social factors MPs 0 = no; 1 = yes 0.0007414 0.0272195 Jewish org. and media 0 = no; 1 = yes 0.0039423 0.0626642 Antisemitic agent 0 = no; 1 = yes 0.004105 0.0639395 Media agent 0 = no; 1 = yes 0.0837824 0.2770637 Other agent 0 = no; 1 = yes 0.9074288 0.2898332 Verified 0 = no; 1 = yes 0.0199284 0.1397555 Number of followers Categorized into 1–10th percentiles 5.497649 2.873597 Control factors Work 0 = no; 1 = yes 0.3803754 0.4854835 Commute morning 0 = no; 1 = yes 0.1157546 0.3199334 Commute evening 0 = no; 1 = yes 0.1172918 0.3217705 Evening 0 = no; 1 = yes 0.2668451 0.4423147 Night 0 = no; 1 = yes 0.1197331 0.3246521 Sunday 0 = no; 1 = yes 0.19413 0.395533 Monday 0 = no; 1 = yes 0.1291909 0.3354142 Tuesday 0 = no; 1 = yes 0.1176896 0.3222431 Wednesday 0 = no; 1 = yes 0.1253933 0.3311674 Thursday 0 = no; 1 = yes 0.1253572 0.3311264 Friday 0 = no; 1 = yes 0.1611632 0.3676847 Saturday 0 = no; 1 = yes 0.1470758 0.3541847 Ozalp et al. 11 unsurprising finding given the types of users behind these accounts. In all but one of the events (Event 3), MPs were highly likely to be retweeted. This pattern is repeated in rela- tion to Jewish organizations, providing strong support for H3. Across all three events, Media Agents were positively associ- ated with larger size of information flows, supporting previ- ous research that indicates “old media” greatly influence the flow of information on “new media” platforms (Williams & Burnap, 2016). Information Propagation Survival Model Table 6 presents the results of the information flow survival models for the three events. Positive estimates in the Cox regression models are interpreted as increased hazards to survival and, therefore, a reduction in the duration of information flows on Twitter. In all events, antagonistic content is negatively associated with long-lasting informa- tion flows. In two of the events, it emerges as having the highest positive hazard ratio. Supporting H6, this finding corroborates previous that shows online antisemitic hate speech does not propagate in terms of size or survival (Williams & Burnap, 2016). Figures 3, 5 and 7 visualize the survival estimates of antagonistic content in the 15-day analysis windows of each event. They show that these anti- semitic information flows survived between 1 and 3 days. This sharp de-escalation once again lends evidence to H6 and resonates with research that shows offline hate crime following trigger events has a “half- life” (King & Sutton, 2013; Legewie, 2013). It seems likely that this offline pat- tern is replicated in relation to online antagonistic content concerning Jews. Table 4. Generalized Ordered Logit Regression Predicting Production of Antagonistic Content for Each Event. Event 1 Event 2 Event 3 Odds ratio Std. err. Odds ratio Std. err. Odds ratio Std. err. Content factors Retweet count 0.781** 0.074 0.963 0.039 0.849 0.109 Sentiment 0.685*** 0.039 0.651*** 0.042 0.712*** 0.055 URL 0.493*** 0.038 0.586*** 0.048 0.597*** 0.064 Hashtag 0.806* 0.079 0.843 0.092 0.685* 0.112 Social factors MPs 1.000 (empty) 1.000 (empty) 1.000 (empty) Jewish org. and media 1.000 (empty) 0.493 0.497 1.000 (empty) Antisemitic agent 1.201 0.545 1.451 0.453 1.536 0.904 Media agent 0.644** 0.101 0.537** 0.106 0.305*** 0.104 Ref: Other agent Verified 0.826 0.259 0.502 0.231 0.188 0.189 Number of followers 0.978 0.013 1.002 0.014 1.028 0.019 Control factors Work 0.600*** 0.072 0.868 0.120 0.710* 0.107 Commute evening 0.677** 0.101 1.267 0.200 0.835 0.156 Commute morning 0.602** 0.088 0.977 0.165 0.720 0.143 Evening 0.607*** 0.078 1.199 0.168 0.737 0.116 Ref: Night Sunday 1.047 0.150 0.826 0.130 1.065 0.193 Monday 1.292 0.186 0.891 0.146 0.918 0.188 Tuesday 1.131 0.179 0.797 0.134 1.212 0.240 Thursday 0.907 0.113 0.854 0.109 1.310 0.249 Friday 1.144 0.146 1.136 0.141 1.113 0.210 Saturday 1.047 0.148 0.900*** 0.143 0.759 0.157 Ref: Wednesday (mid-week) Constant 0.011*** 0.002 0.010*** 0.002 0.010*** 0.002 Model fit Log likelihood –4,790.623 –3,885.211 –2,360.954 Chi-square 235.87 171.79 112.73 Sig 0 0 0 Pseudo R2 0.024 0.0216 0.0233 N 155,566 78,352 55,039 Significance codes: *: 0.05; **: 0.01;***: 0.001. 12 Social Media + Society Figures 4, 6, and 8 visualize the survival estimates for dif- ferent agent types. Unexpectedly, antisemitic agents emerged as having the fourth and fifth highest negative hazard ratios in Event 1 and Event 3. This indicates that information flows emanating from some of these agents during these events were likely to outlast those emanating from other agents at some points in the 15-day analysis windows. These figures show that, while information flows from antisemitic agents can last between 3 and 7 days, these are in a minority, as many of them die out rapidly (indicated by the steep decline in the red lines). Conversely, many more information flows emanating from Jewish organizations survive between 3 and 7 days in all events (indicated by a less steep decline in the green lines). This finding is novel and shows information flows from antisemitic agents gain less traction in terms of duration than flows produced by organizations challenging these negative narratives on social media. Furthermore, information flows emanating from Jewish organizations emerge as having the lowest hazard to survival across all events, strongly supporting H4. General Media Agents emerged as having positive hazard ratios for all three events, with many information flows dying out evenly over the study window (the yellow line). As indicated in previous research, this is likely to be a result of Table 5. Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial Regression Predicting Counts of Retweets (Size Models). Event 1 Event 2 Event 3 IRR Std. err. IRR Std. err. IRR Std. err. Content factors Antagonistic speech 0.285*** 0.069 0.510** 0.124 0.441* 0.144 Sentiment 0.996 0.018 0.758*** 0.022 0.990 0.033 URL 1.942*** 0.054 2.319*** 0.100 2.570*** 0.132 Hashtag 0.806*** 0.027 0.743*** 0.039 0.788*** 0.049 Social factors Verified 5.004*** 0.269 7.295*** 0.727 6.750*** 0.784 MPs 1.500* 0.311 5.916*** 2.525 0.817 0.464 Jewish org. and media 1.241 0.193 1.237 0.273 0.841 0.249 Anti-semitic agent 0.890 0.114 1.038 0.268 0.889 0.259 Media agent 1.242*** 0.049 1.263** 0.085 1.132 0.090 Ref: Other agent Control factors Commute morning 0.969 0.038 0.949 0.066 1.427*** 0.108 Evening 0.970 0.031 0.701*** 0.036 0.984 0.056 Night 0.561*** 0.032 0.617*** 0.049 0.561*** 0.047 Sunday 1.197*** 0.061 0.947 0.081 1.786*** 0.155 Monday 0.970 0.053 1.066 0.099 1.276* 0.120 Tuesday 0.877* 0.050 1.038 0.091 0.778* 0.077 Thursday 1.444*** 0.061 1.869*** 0.128 1.142 0.110 Friday 1.093 0.051 1.130 0.079 0.947 0.086 Saturday 1.172* 0.059 1.537*** 0.135 1.167 0.108 Ref: Wednesday (mid-week) Constant 0.340*** 0.017 0.266*** 0.020 0.173*** 0.017 Binomial model (Inflation/excess zeros) Number of followers –0.442*** 0.009 –0.419*** 0.013 –0.343*** 0.014 Constant 2.987*** 0.045 2.763*** 0.067 2.396*** 0.086 Model fit Log likelihood –62,519.62 –28,983.15 –17,194 Chi-square 2,882.14 1,905.2 1,038.26 Sig. p = .00 p = .00 p = .00 LRT for alpha = 0 p = .00 p = .00 p = .00 Vuong z = 35.89, p = .000 z = 22.32, p = .000 z = 14.88, p = .000 Zero obs 144,140 72,931 51,922 Non-zero obs 12,358 5,501 3,376 Total obs 156,498 78,432 55,298 IRR: Incidence-Rate Ratio; LRT: Likelihood Ratio Test; MPs: Members of Parliament. Significance codes: *: 0.05; **: 0.01;***: 0.001. Ozalp et al. 13 Figure 3. Kaplan-Meier survival estimates for antagonistic tweets in event 1. Table 6. Cox Regression Predicting Hazards to Tweet Survival (Survival Models). Event 1 Event 2 Event 3 Haz. ratio Std. err. Haz. ratio Std. err. Haz. ratio Std. err. Content factors Antagonistic speech 1.379 0.282 1.111 0.2 1.662 0.463 Sentiment 1.036** 0.013 1.005 0.019 0.974 0.024 URL 0.941** 0.02 0.886*** 0.028 0.924 0.039 Hashtag 0.885*** 0.021 0.709*** 0.026 0.803*** 0.039 Retweet count 0.959*** 0.002 0.987*** 0.001 0.955*** 0.004 Social factors Number of followers 0.980*** 0.004 0.970*** 0.006 1.012 0.007 Verified 0.974 0.032 0.863** 0.044 0.965 0.067 MPs 0.862 0.1 1.346 0.246 1.427 0.487 Jewish org and media 0.699*** 0.064 0.704** 0.079 0.767 0.129 Anti-semitic agents 0.887 0.068 1.237 0.171 0.85 0.153 Media agents 1.049 0.029 1.014 0.044 1.113 0.064 Ref: Other agents Control factors Commute morning 0.974 0.027 0.855*** 0.038 0.993 0.055 Evening 0.941** 0.021 1.001 0.034 0.983 0.041 Night 0.734*** 0.033 0.800*** 0.05 0.771*** 0.05 Sunday 1.082* 0.039 1.084 0.063 1.092 0.068 Monday 1.051 0.039 1.005 0.063 0.913 0.063 Tuesday 1.077 0.043 1.037 0.062 1.11 0.082 Thursday 1.099** 0.032 1.168** 0.053 1.099 0.079 Friday 1.005 0.032 1.085 0.051 0.968 0.064 Saturday 0.995 0.035 0.971 0.058 1.036 0.07 Ref: Wednesday (mid-week) Model fit Log likelihood –10,1741.56 –41,331.34 –23,455.95 Chi-square 1,396.32 484.26 278 Sig. 0 0 0 N 12,183 5,465 3,319 Significance codes: *: 0.05; **: 0.01;***: 0.001. Figure 4. Kaplan-Meier survival estimates for agent type in event 1. 14 Social Media + Society frequent news turnover, where new stories replace old ones on a daily basis. These new stories create new information flows that replace the old (Williams & Burnap, 2016). Discussion In this article, we demonstrated how using social media (meta)data when coupled with computational criminology methods (i.e., pattern matching, supervised machine learning classification detecting cyberhate, information propagation modeling) can contribute to conventional hate crime record- ing practices and extend our understanding of online trends of antisemitism. Our analysis showed significant variability in the frequency of antagonistic tweets related to Jews over the 12-month study period. Supporting H1, we demonstrated offline events, such as the antisemitism row in the Labour party, can trigger online discussion around Jewish identity and antisemitic sentiments. The analysis also revealed the frequency of antagonistic content was on average 32% higher in the second-half of 2016. CST found a similar sustained increase in incidents reported both on and offline in the same period (CST, 2017). Similar to previous research related to anti-Muslim sentiment on Twitter (Williams & Burnap, 2016), we found that only 0.7% of tweets referring to Jews and Jewish identity were classified as antagonistic. Although this finding contradicts with previous higher antisemitism rates of global tweets (ADL, 2018), it suggests that only a small proportion of the content relating to Jews on UK-based Twitter are antagonistic, confirming previous research (Williams & Burnap, 2016). Across all three events subjected to statistical modeling, our logit model predicting the presence of hate speech sug- gests that accounts identified as antisemitic by CST were most likely to produce antagonistic content, while verified and media accounts were least likely. These findings lend strong support for the H2 and provide evidence in support of the accuracy of the machine learning classifier built for this study. H5 and H6 also demonstrated that antisemitic content was less likely to be retweeted in volume and to survive for long periods across all events, supporting previous research on the “half-life” of hate speech on social media (Burnap et al., 2014; Williams & Burnap, 2016). Non-propagation in terms of size means that antagonistic content was not retweeted (shared by other Twitter users) to a great extent and most of the time none at all. This is an encouraging find- ing which indicates that the majority of Twitter users do not endorse these types of posts through the act of retweeting. Non-propagation of hate within the Twitter community might be interpreted as a demonstration of collective efficacy on Twitter. However, we would like to remain conservative with this claim as there may be other confounding factors. Research shows that where antagonistic content is retweeted, it is contained within online “echo chambers” of like-minded Figure 5. Kaplan-Meier survival estimates for antagonistic tweets in event 2. Figure 6. Kaplan-Meier survival estimates for agent type in event 2. Figure 7. Kaplan-Meier survival estimates for antagonistic tweets in event 3. Ozalp et al. 15 individuals and if the size of this community is likely to affect the volume of information propagation. The small (in terms of retweeting) but sustained (in terms of survivability) information flows of a minority of antise- mitic agents indicate that there is limited endorsement of these Twitter narratives. Yet, where there is support, it ema- nates from a core group who seek out each other’s messages over time: an “echo chamber” of like-minded individuals who encourage and amplify each other. This suggests that contagion of antagonistic information flows appears to be contained and, while it may be viewed by others, it is unlikely to be accepted and disseminated widely by other users beyond such groups. We also reported some positive results, particularly with regard to the representation of collective efficacy on social media (Sampson, 2001; Sampson et al., 1997). In support of H3 and H4, this study revealed that information flows ema- nating from Jewish organizations gained significant traction during two of the three events, as evidenced by the combined positive size and survival findings. We found that information flows from antisemitic agents on Twitter gain less traction in terms of duration than information flows produced by organi- zations challenging these negative narratives lending tenta- tive support to the effectiveness of “collective efficacy” on social media. This suggests that when organizations which aim to counter harmful narratives such as antagonistic speech become active on social media platforms, their messages propagate further and achieve higher longevity than antago- nistic messages. This is a positive finding that underlines the importance of the work of organizations that aim to protect communities and increase collective efficacy on social media. Conclusion Police crime and CSEW figures indicate that hate crimes have increased significantly in the past few years in the wake of the vote over the UK’s future in the EU and recent terror attacks. Despite being useful, conventional hate crime recording practices are limited by their reliance on victims or witnesses reporting incident. Correspondingly, the FRA sur- vey shows more than three-quarters of antisemitic harass- ment are never reported, leading to a dark figure in hate crime records. There is a clear policy and community safety need to devise new methodologies to detect and analyze online antisemitic incidents, as highlighted by the FRA. Given the sheer size of social media communications at any given hour, manually sifting through millions of posts every month to detect cyberhate would be extremely laborious, if even possible. Computational approaches without human input, such as unsupervised learning and clustering, are lim- ited when detecting future instances of cyberhate. Instead of relying on “terrestrial” data or reports from the public on antisemitic victimization, this study used a relatively novel online source, Twitter, to mine big social media data to reveal patterns of perpetration at the source using a supervised machine learning classifier. By doing so, this study has dem- onstrated how a unique blend of computational and social science techniques can be harnessed to transform and ana- lyze these new forms of data to gain insight into the growing problem of online antisemitism in the United Kingdom. Findings from this study should be a source of some opti- mism. A key finding of this study is that information flows emanating from Jewish organizations, capable and willing counter-speech actors, had a significantly higher size and survival of retweets. While antisemitism is present on Twitter and can cause severe offense when it is not removed, it is challenged by positive content, which is present in greater amounts, lasts longer, and spreads further than hate content. Measuring the production of cyberhate, and the size and sur- vival of information flows, this study is the first to evidence the classic sociological notion that collective efficacy can be observed on social media. Our findings suggest that counter- speech posted by credible organizations can be an effective measure to prevent harmful narratives, such as online anti- semitism. Based on our findings, we underline the value of the work of charities and organizations that aim to protect communities, such as ADL and CST. The presence of such organizations on social media is key to increasing trust in digital communications and platforms and reducing the propagation of cyberhate. We end this article with suggestions for future research. The online pattern of antagonistic content related to Jews, as identified by text-based classification methods, can act as a proxy for the ebb and flow of antisemitism in the United Kingdom. However, it should be noted that we did not cap- ture tweets that expressed antisemitic conspiracy theories (or allusions to such theories) or antisemitic images posted with- out accompanying the antisemitic text. Future research investigating the production and propagation of image-based cyberhate and antisemitic theories can further improve our understanding of online antisemitism. Furthermore, the quantitative nature of our collective efficacy observation prevents us from understanding which type of actions from willing and credible actors helps reduce cyberhate perpetra- tion. Future research should look at whether publishing counter-hate speech and counterclaims reduce cyberhate on social media platforms and if so, which types of counter- messages are more effective to reduce the negative effects of hate speech. Acknowledgements This research was undertaken using the supercomputing facilities at Cardiff University operated by Advanced Research Computing at Cardiff (ARCCA) on behalf of the Cardiff Supercomputing Facility and the HPC Wales and Supercomputing Wales (SCW) projects. The authors acknowledge the support of the latter, which is part-funded by the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) through the Welsh Government. 16 Social Media + Society Declaration of Conflicting Interests The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article. Funding The author(s) disclose receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: This research was supported by Community Security Trust. ORCID iD Sefa Ozalp https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4104-1541 Notes 1. The same study reports that a smaller number of respondents indicated that they frequently tell the cyberhate perpetrators to stop (10.2%) or frequently defend the victims (13.7%). The authors also report a positive association between cyberhate victimization and those who personally confronted cyberhate perpetrators themselves (termed as self-help in this article). This group was 1.73 times more likely to be targeted by the cyberhate, unlike those who witnessed the presence of collective efficacy. 2. The internet was followed by “in a social situation” with 51%, “among the general public” with 47% and “at political events” with 42% as the most common places where respondents encountered antisemitism. 3. Although understanding the differences and similarities between these three platforms, especially their user base, plat- form-specific regulations, and platform information propaga- tion mechanics is important, limited space precludes a lengthier discussion here. See Finkelstein et al. (2018) for a discussion. 4. Both ADL and CST aim to record, aggregate, and report anti- semitic incidents and help victims of antisemitic abuse. While the former focus their efforts to the United States, the latter focus on the United Kingdom. 5. The authors report that “age-old anti-Semitic tropes and con- spiracies are flourishing, particularly among Twitter users that identify as Republicans and/or supporters of President Trump” (p. 10). The most common conspiracy was related to “Soros” keyword with 85% of tweets containing this keyword being antisemitic. The authors also observed that majority of users spreading antisemitic sentiments were human operated (i.e., they were not bots) and of those, only 4.7% were suspended by 15 March 2019. 6. To prevent missing keywords relevant to Jewish identity, we consulted and agreed these keywords with CST. 7. Twitter’s streaming API has a policy of allowing users to col- lect 1% of worldwide daily Twitter communications. The vol- ume of data collected for this study did not breach Twitter’s daily limits at any point. We ensured this by looking at the total number of tweets collected during the study period and we did not observe the total number of tweets plateau at any given hour, suggesting that our dataset has never been throttled by the 1% API limit. Therefore, it is unlikely there are any miss- ing data based on rate limiting for this study. 8. This figure is calculated by counting retweets and original tweets separately. We report this figure to be consistent with the original larger dataset the UK subsample was filtered from. The number of original tweets (excluding retweets) is 1,232,744. 9. False positives were anticipated due to commonly used key- words in the media pattern. For example, any Twitter user can add the keyword “reporter” to their description (which can even contain a negative sentiment, for example, “I don’t trust reporters”), leading to false positives. To check the accuracy of the identification, a random sample of 100 users was manu- ally inspected for false positives. Only 13 false positives were identified, meaning 87% of true positives of Media Agents were identified correctly. 10. This list was compiled by a web service (i.e., http://www. mpsontwitter.co.uk), which tracks Twitter accounts of MPs. Please note that only 590 out of 650 had active Twitter accounts. 11. Note that not all of this content was identified as antagonistic in the analysis. 12. CST (2017, p. 27) notes that: ‘Clearly it would not be accept- able to define all anti-Israel activity as antisemitic; but it cannot be ignored that contemporary antisemitism can occur in the con- text of, or be accompanied by, extreme feelings over the Israel/ Palestine conflict. Discourse relating to the conflict is used by antisemitic incident offenders to abuse Jews; and anti-Israel dis- course can sometimes repeat, or echo, antisemitic language and imagery. Drawing out these distinctions, and deciding on where the dividing lines lie, is one of the most difficult areas of CST’s work in recording and analysing hate crime’. 13. Given the nature of the social media data (i.e., data are not sampled from a larger population), rather than statistical sig- nificance, effect sizes should be interpreted primarily across all models. 14. An IRR is a univariate transformation of the estimated coef- ficient for the ZINB model. It is a relative difference measure used to compare the incidence rates of events (retweets) occur- ring at any given point in time. A score above 1 indicates an increased incidence rate ratio and below 1 a reduced incidence rate ratio for retweets. References Anti-Defamation League. (2018). Quantifying hate: A year of anti- semitism on Twitter. https://www.adl.org/resources/reports/ quantifying-hate-a-year-of-anti-semitism-on-twitter Bejda, M. (2015). 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(2010, May). Predicting the speed, scale, and range of information diffusion in Twitter. In Proceedings of the Fourth International Conference on Weblogs and Social Media (p. 4). Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence. Zarrella, D. (2009). The Science of Retweets. https://cdn2.hubspot.net/ hub/53/file-13207809-pdf/docs/science-of-retweets-201003.pdf Author Biographies Sefa Ozalp is the Lead Data Science Researcher at HateLab, Cardiff University. His research interests include online antagonism, data mining, applications of social data science, machine learning, big data and high-performance computing, quantitative criminology, and computational social science. Matthew L. Williams is the Director of HateLab and the Social Data Science Lab, and Professor of Criminology in the School of Social Sciences at Cardiff University. His main areas of research activity are Hate Crime, Hate Speech and Extremism Online, Computational Social Science, Cybercrime/Human Factors in Cybersecurity. Pete Burnap is Professor of Data Science & Cybersecurity at Cardiff University. He is Director of Cardiff’s Social Data Science Lab, as well as the Academic Centre of Excellence in Cyber Security Research (ACE-CSR). He has been involved in grants in worth in excess of £14 m, leading large awards from EPSRC, ESRC, and industry on the topics of social data science and cyber- security analytics—the fusion of AI, cybersecurity, and risk. He is co-director of the Data Innovation Accelerator (DIA)—a £3.75 m investment in upskilling SMEs in South Wales to develop innovative AI-driven products and services. He sits on the UK Government’s AI Council, advising on the implementation of the industrial strategy in AI and the Data Economy. Han Liu is currently a Research Associate in Data Science in the School of Computer Science and Informatics at Cardiff University. His research interests include data mining, machine learning, neural networks, rule-based systems, intelligent systems, expert systems, fuzzy systems, big data analytics, granular computing and applica- tions in natural language processing and computer vision. Mohamed Mostafa (PhD, MBCS) is a Senior Lecturer of Data Science at the Cardiff School of Technologies. His research inter- ests include data science, machine learning, social network analysis, and human-computer interaction. Appendix A Creating a Training Sample for the Supervised Learning Classifier During the process of machine classification experimentation, it became evident that human annotators struggled with clas- sifying antisemitic “hate speech” with a high degree of accu- racy. In the first stage, we sampled 4,000 tweets from the UK dataset and used the online Figure 8 service to source human annotators to perform annotation tasks on each tweet to deter- mine, in their view, whether it was antagonistic in relation to Jews. Human coders were asked to identify tweets containing “Antagonistic content related to Jewish identity” with a Yes/No response. Given the complexity of criminal law relat- ing to online hate and the high threshold used by prosecutors, the term “hate speech” was not used to avoid coder confusion between tweets that may constitute a criminal offense, and those that may be offensive, but not reach the criminal thresh- old. Using the term “hate speech” may have also resulted in too few tweets being labeled, resulting in insufficient data to train the machine learning classifier. We requested four anno- tators per tweet and removed instances from the training data if the inter-annotator agreement score dropped below 75%. In the second stage, human annotations from the Figure 8 dataset were checked against the text sample of offensive online communications provided by CST and adjustments were made where misclassifications were identified. In the next stage, we conducted a manual “sanity checking” using a sample of antagonistic text from Twitter, Facebook, emails, and other forms of online communications provided by CST. These texts were either reported to CST by the public or identified by CST staff, and were deemed to contain anti- semitic words and phrases. Not all of the text examples met the criminal threshold set out by the CPS for hate speech on social media. However, many of them were deemed suffi- ciently offensive to warrant requests to social media provid- ers to delete content for infringing platform Terms of Service. Informed by these antagonistic text examples, we checked the consistency of the human annotation on the Figure 8 subsam- ple with at least 75% agreement score (n = 1,322). Where deviations were evident, we made adjustments to Figure 8 coder annotations. For example, tweets coded as antagonistic toward Jews in the Figure 8 dataset, that were clearly only anti-Israel in nature, were recoded as not-antisemitic. In total, 29% of the Figure 8 subset was adjusted in this way. Although multiple processing steps meant that the number of tweets used for the training dataset was less than the initial 4,000 tweets sampled for human annotation, we are confident that the training sample was semantically representative of the classification problem at hand. Figure 8. Kaplan-Meier survival estimates for agent type in event 3. https://cdn2.hubspot.net/hub/53/file-13207809-pdf/docs/science-of-retweets-201003.pdf https://cdn2.hubspot.net/hub/53/file-13207809-pdf/docs/science-of-retweets-201003.pdf Ozalp et al. 19 Appendix B Supervised Machine Learning Classifier for Online Antisemitism on Twitter In preparation for machine classification, the original text was transformed into feature vectors by using three feature extraction (FE) methods: Bag of Words (BOW), N-Grams (NG), and Typed Dependencies (TD). Four machine learn- ing methods were used for training classifiers to identify antagonistic content about Jews: Decision Trees (DT), Naïve Bayes (NB), Support Vector Machine (SVM), and Fuzzy Rules. The results of the classification experiments are provided in Table 7 using standard text classification measures of the following: precision (P) (i.e., for class x, how often are tweets classified as x when they should not be [false positives]—a measure of true positives normalized by the sum of true and false positives); recall (R) (i.e., for class x, how often are tweets not classified as x when they should be [false negatives]—a measure of true positives normal- ized by the sum of true positives and false negatives); and F-Measure (F), a harmonized mean of precision and recall. The results for each measure range between 0 (worst) and 1 (best). We provide results for the hateful class (Yes), non- hateful class (No), and overall (average over Yes/No). Initially, we used a 10-fold cross-validation approach to test the supervised machine learning method. This functions by splitting the dataset into 10 equal randomly shuffled subsets and iteratively using 9 folds to train the classifier and 1 fold to test it. After 10 iterations the results are averaged. It is particularly useful with small labeled datasets as was the case in this instance. Table 1 shows that SVM + BOW performed best. The high performance of SVM + BOW is likely due to the case that the SVM algorithm only needs a small number of instances as support vectors for teaching a classifier (identifying the boundary to separate the two classes in multi-dimensional feature space). As the dataset is small, it is likely that features such as words are more effective as they will occur in each class more frequently than bigrams, trigrams, and typed dependencies. We experimented further using a 70/30 split on the data to train and test the supervised machine learning method. This functions by training the classifier with fea- tures from 70% of the manually coded dataset, and classify- ing the remaining 30% as “unseen” data, based on the features evident in the cases it has encountered. The accuracy of the classification process is then determined. This process was repeated five times using the mean average of all runs to calculate the overall accuracy. Table 8 shows only the results for the “Yes” class (hateful language), and that SVM + BOW performs best again—this time with perfect classification, while the performance of the other methods is much lower. Again, the high performance of SVM + BOW is likely due to the SVM algorithm needing only a small number of instances Table 8. Classification Results for Antisemitism Hate Speech—70/30 Split. FE DT NB SVM Fuzzy P R F P R F P R F P R F BOW 0.680 0.610 0.640 0.770 0.090 0.160 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.530 0.490 0.510 NG 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.330 0.500 0.330 0.670 0.440 1.000 0.400 0.570 TD 0.750 0.050 0.100 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.900 0.080 0.140 0.580 0.130 0.210 BOW: Bag of Words; DT: Decision Trees; F: F-Measure; FE: Feature extraction; NB: Naïve Bayes; NG: N-Grams; P: Precision; R: Recall; SVM: Support Vector Machine; TD: Typed Dependencies. Table 7. Classification Results for Antisemitism Hate Speech—10 Fold Cross Validation. Feature extraction DT NB SVM Fuzzy P R F P R F P R F P R F BOW No 0.656 0.738 0.694 0.562 0.953 0.707 0.665 0.776 0.716 0.607 0.791 0.687 Yes 0.630 0.536 0.579 0.662 0.111 0.190 0.665 0.531 0.590 0.638 0.418 0.506 Overall 0.644 0.647 0.642 0.607 0.574 0.474 0.665 0.666 0.659 0.621 0.623 0.606 NG No 0.583 0.761 0.660 0.545 1.000 0.706 0.621 0.798 0.699 0.591 0.821 0.687 Yes 0.549 0.348 0.426 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.633 0.418 0.503 0.599 0.320 0.417 Overall 0.568 0.575 0.555 0.300 0.550 0.388 0.626 0.627 0.611 0.595 0.596 0.566 TD No 0.549 0.974 0.702 0.545 1.000 0.706 0.545 0.968 0.698 0.551 0.957 0.699 Yes 0.571 0.041 0.077 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.464 0.034 0.062 0.556 0.064 0.115 Overall 0.559 0.554 0.421 0.300 0.550 0.388 0.509 0.548 0.412 0.553 0.555 0.436 BOW: Bag of Words; DT: Decision Trees; F: F-Measure; NB: Naïve Bayes; NG: N-Grams; P: Precision; R: Recall; SVM: Support Vector Machine; TD: Typed Dependencies. 20 Social Media + Society as support vectors for teaching a classifier. With the small sample size, exposing the classifier to more examples of hate speech in the training process improves its ability to learn generalized word use which has led to an exact match between human and machine annotated labels for the hateful class. In other cases, such as decision trees and probabilistic approaches such as the NB method, more data actually cause further confusion—exemplifying the difficulty in using highly frequent words extracted from the short informal text as features, with such a small “gold standard” dataset. Appendix C Computational Cost of This Study Unlike traditional quantitative datasets, such as survey or panel data, “big data” collected from social media platforms are not structured to answer social research questions. We conducted a series of preprocessing steps to filter the dataset to UK-based tweets in accordance with the research ques- tions, extract the metrics that would be used to build statisti- cal models and automatically identify antagonistic tweets by training a machine learning classifier. It is important to note that in computational social science research, where the big data are captured from the “wild,” it is common practice to spend more time on preprocessing the data. The process of cleaning and structuring raw datasets according to research questions is also called data wrangling and it usually takes 80% of the time spent on data analysis. It is, therefore, worth mentioning the computational data processing cost of the conducted in this study in order to provide perspective for the reader. Performance wise, our data processing pipeline was relatively slow. Once we were confident with our query inferring UK-based location from metadata, we extracted roughly 2.7M tweets from UK-based users. We tested the performance of the data processing on a small sample on a single core on a local desktop computer. Our initial performance tests indicated that it took 4.5 sec- onds to extract various metrics for statistical modeling (agent type, antagonistic content classification, etc.) for each tweet on average. This was not feasible, given the size of the dataset. Roughly, this would take a single desktop computer running on 1 physical core 140 days. To shorten the processing time, we refactored our code in a parallelised fashion and run the process on High-Performance Computing (HPC) servers of the Supercomputing Wales. This allowed our “Big Data” processing job to be split and run concur- rently over multiple cores and multiple nodes, allowing us to complete the whole data processing (i.e., classification and extraction of independent variables) just under 24 hours. We are grateful to Supercomputing Wales for enabling this research to run in such a short time. 
work_qzbhwlxjhzechmfcw5wmfxaotq	----	Political Approaches to Tackling Islamophobia: An ‘Insider/Outsider’ Analysis of the British Coalition Government’s Approach between 2010–15 University of Birmingham Political Approaches to Tackling Islamophobia Allen, Chris DOI: 10.3390/socsci6030077 License: Creative Commons: Attribution (CC BY) Document Version Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record Citation for published version (Harvard): Allen, C 2017, 'Political Approaches to Tackling Islamophobia: An ‘Insider/Outsider’ Analysis of the British Coalition Government’s Approach between 2010–15', Social Sciences, vol. 6, no. 3, 77, pp. 1-19. https://doi.org/10.3390/socsci6030077 Link to publication on Research at Birmingham portal General rights Unless a licence is specified above, all rights (including copyright and moral rights) in this document are retained by the authors and/or the copyright holders. 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Apr. 2021 https://doi.org/10.3390/socsci6030077 https://research.birmingham.ac.uk/portal/en/persons/chris-allen(9f691767-9503-4ff6-8447-23cb85a83df1).html https://research.birmingham.ac.uk/portal/en/publications/political-approaches-to-tackling-islamophobia(6ae3f5b5-f2ad-42b6-af49-773c30c19768).html https://research.birmingham.ac.uk/portal/en/publications/political-approaches-to-tackling-islamophobia(6ae3f5b5-f2ad-42b6-af49-773c30c19768).html https://research.birmingham.ac.uk/portal/en/journals/social-sciences(aa5c3d5c-a09a-43c0-aef6-18a1ad1c8a3d)/publications.html https://doi.org/10.3390/socsci6030077 https://research.birmingham.ac.uk/portal/en/publications/political-approaches-to-tackling-islamophobia(6ae3f5b5-f2ad-42b6-af49-773c30c19768).html $ € £ ¥ social sciences Article Political Approaches to Tackling Islamophobia: An ‘Insider/Outsider’ Analysis of the British Coalition Government’s Approach between 2010–15 Chris Allen Department of Social Policy, Sociology and Criminology, University of Birmingham, Birmingham B15 2TT, UK; c.allen.2@bham.ac.uk Received: 16 June 2017; Accepted: 10 July 2017; Published: 17 July 2017 Abstract: Soon after the Conservative-led Coalition government came to power in 2010, Baroness Sayeeda Warsi announced that Islamophobia had passed the ‘dinner-table test’ in contemporary Britain. Resultantly, the need to address Islamophobia was identified as a priority for the Coalition. This article critically analyses how the Coalition sought to achieve this and the extent to which it was successful. Focusing on the period 2010–15, this article initially frames what is meant by Islamophobia, before briefly setting out how it had been responded to by previous British governments. Regarding the Coalition, a threefold approach is adopted that considers the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Islamophobia, the Cross-Government Working Group on Anti-Muslim Hate, and the political discourses used by the Coalition about Muslims and Islam more generally. Concluding that the Coalition failed to meet the high expectations set by Warsi’s speech, this article considers why this might have been so. Keywords: Islamophobia; British politics; Coalition Government; Conservative Party; discrimination; Muslims; minority communities 1. Introduction “It seems to me that Islamophobia has now crossed the threshold - For far too many people, Islamophobia is seen as a legitimate—even commendable—thing. Islamophobia should be seen as totally abhorrent—just like homophobia or Judeophobia—we need political leadership. Government has got to show that it gets it” (Warsi 2011). Almost a decade and a half after Islamophobia first entered the British political space via the Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia’s (CBMI) ground-breaking report, Islamophobia: a challenge for us all (Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia 1997), Baroness Sayeeda Warsi’s 2011 speech was a welcome development for those that had been lobbying subsequent British governments for political interventions to address this discriminatory phenomenon. Popularly referred to as her ‘dinner-table test’ speech, Warsi’s pronouncements were seen as a watershed moment, affording Islamophobia the political recognition it had been missing for too long (Allen 2010b, 2013c). As co-chair of the Conservative Party at the time, Warsi’s speech was unquestionably catalytic, prompting the establishment of the All Party Parliamentary Group (APPG) on Islamophobia, followed by the Cross-Government Working Group on Anti-Muslim Hate (Working Group) shortly after. So too did it catalyse high expectations, with many believing that the Conservative-led Coalition Government was, as Warsi put it, going to be the first to ‘get it’ in addressing Islamophobia in Britain. Two drivers are put forward as to why it was necessary for the Coalition to ‘get it’. The first relates to the fact that in the wake of the 7/7 terrorist attacks on the London public transport system in July 2005, there was a sharp increase in the number of street-level hate crimes targeting British Muslims in Soc. Sci. 2017, 6, 77; doi:10.3390/socsci6030077 www.mdpi.com/journal/socsci http://www.mdpi.com/journal/socsci http://www.mdpi.com http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/socsci6030077 http://www.mdpi.com/journal/socsci Soc. Sci. 2017, 6, 77 2 of 19 everyday settings (Chakraborti and Zempi 2012; Zempi and Chakraborti 2014; Allen 2015). While the prevalence of such hate crimes was extremely difficult to quantify at the time given the lack of any formal monitoring mechanisms being in place (Hargreaves 2014), anecdotal evidence suggests that the problem was significant enough to make politicians believe that an appropriate response was necessary (Allen 2013c). This has been further reinforced by the fact that since 7/7, similar patterns have been evident after almost all terrorist attacks where the perpetrators either self-identify as Muslim, or claim to act in the ‘name of Islam’. The second relates to Morey and Yaqin (2011) observations that Muslims are in the contemporary setting routinely conceived as a homogenous ‘Other’ which presents a very real, ongoing, and at times apocalyptic threat to ‘our’ values, democracies, identities, and way of life. For Ansari (2012), such discourses have been both overt and covert in the mainstream of Europe’s political spaces over the past two decades. In Britain, she argues that this was particularly evident among the discourses of the far-right and how those such as the British National Party (BNP) used these to make inroads into the mainstream. Primarily targeting white, working class audiences in areas where there were high levels of social and economic deprivation, not only did the BNP stress the threat posed by both Muslims and Islam through campaigns titled ‘Islam Out of Britain’ and ‘Islam Referendum Day’, but so too did the BNP convey to its target audience how the Muslim ‘Other’ was believed to be responsible for many of the social ills they were encountering. Consequently, constructions of the Muslim ‘Other’ became relevant within political discourses in the British setting (Allen 2010a). This article argues that in spite of the unprecedented political recognition afforded to Islamophobia by the Coalition, little more was offered in terms of addressing the phenomenon than by the preceding New Labour government. Resultantly, this article argues that governmental approaches to tackling Islamophobia in the British political space continue to be ineffectual, thereby rendering policy approaches necessarily meaningless. In doing so, this article critically reflects on the Coalition government’s approach to addressing Islamophobia during its term of government between 2010 and 2015. Initially framing what is meant by Islamophobia, this article briefly sets out the approaches to addressing the phenomenon preferred by previous British governments. From here, a threefold approach is adopted. First, a consideration of the establishment, function, and subsequent outputs from the APPG on Islamophobia; second, a similar consideration of the Anti-Muslim Hate Working Group; and thirdly, a brief analysis of the political discourses of the Coalition about Muslims and Islam more generally. In conclusion, this article reflects on the extent to which the Coalition met the expectations prompted by Warsi’s speech in seeking to address Islamophobia in contemporary Britain. In doing so, this article contributes new and timely thinking to the relatively embryonic body of scholarly studies relating to the phenomenon of Islamophobia and more importantly, scholarly studies about Islamophobia within the field of politics and policy. This article therefore has both academic and political salience. 2. Methodology The three-stranded methodological approach underpinning this article is unique in the context of the existing literature. The first strand comprises an analysis of existing policy and scholarly resources, and other publicly available sources including those accessible in the media and online spaces. The second strand comprises an analysis of previously unpublished documents and similar resources that were only made available to those engaged in the Coalition’s APPG and Working Group. This was possible through the author having participated in both the APPG and Working Group from November 2010 through to October 2014 in an independent ‘expert’ capacity. It is necessary to stress that this participation was non-partisan and received no remuneration whatsoever. It did however afford a number of unprecedented opportunities to engage with British governmental ministers, members of Parliament, and other appropriate political actors, including both Muslims and non-Muslims that had been co-opted to represent a range of civil society and community organisations and groups. This engagement took the form of face-to-face meetings, workshops, and both formal and Soc. Sci. 2017, 6, 77 3 of 19 informal conversations, along with electronic communications including emails, online forums, and the sharing of documents. Throughout the process of participation, research notes were kept by the author through which observations, reflections, and thoughts were recorded. These research notes comprise the third strand. Given the methodological approach preferred, the significance of one’s positionality is crucially important, not least because the author was both a participant and participatory within the political mechanisms that provide the primary focus of this article. It is therefore likely that some blurring of the boundaries between insider and outsider perspectives will have taken place. While this particular form of participation fell short of the activist research identified by Huisman (2008), it nonetheless allowed unprecedented access to the political spaces, actors, and mechanisms that indeterminably shaped the way in which Islamophobia was being addressed in the British political setting. Noting that knowledge about these spaces, actors, and mechanisms can be as invisible as they are inaccessible to most, such an embedded participatory approach meant that access to discussions and debates that had the potential for new and unique insights and understandings to be made available. An oft-cited criticism of such an approach is that it jeopardises objectivity (Spano 2005, 2006). While acknowledged, such criticisms can be countered by questioning the extent to which true objectivity can ever be achieved. Similarly, too, with those who posit criticisms that demand the ‘decontamination’ of research findings (Monahan and Fisher 2010). Again, while rightly acknowledging these, such arguments are typically incoherent and without foundation. This article is therefore premised on the basis that the embodied knowledge inherited clearly outweighs any concerns about lack of objectivity (Sherif 2001; Heidegger 2002). Lastly, the limitations of political mechanisms and policy interventions seeking to address discriminatory phenomena must be acknowledged. For Blakemore and Drake (1996) and Daniels and Macdonald (2005), this is because political mechanisms and policy interventions typically only seek to curb certain behaviours, rather than change public attitudes. According to Bhavani et al. (2005), irrespective of the mechanisms and interventions in place, such will only ever address the effects and rarely ever the causes. Accordingly, they refer to interventions having an impact at the micro level rather than the macro. Applying this to contemporary manifestations of Islamophobia, it is likely that any political mechanisms or policy interventions will have the greatest impact on curbing the activities of those perpetrating street-level Islamophobic attacks (Allen 2014), as opposed to what Allen (2010b, 2013a) terms ‘Islamophobia thinking’: what people commonly ‘think’ and ‘know’ about Muslims and Islam. This is because Islamophobia thinking (macro Islamophobia) is—in line with other discriminatory phenomena—extremely complex, given that it has evolved out of centuries of asymmetric power relations (Allen 2010b; Sheehi 2011). In terms of addressing discriminatory phenomena in the British political space, Afridi (2015) identifies a range of political mechanisms and policy interventions that have been historically deployed. These variously include: education and training; legal sanctions and enforcement; counselling and mentoring; changing procedures within institutions; increased monitoring; target-setting; and cross-community interaction. Bhavani et al. (2005) suggest two categories within which all can be placed: formal and informal. For them, formal interventions refer to new policies or legislation that are introduced or put in place, whereas informal interventions are more fluid and incorporate projects, initiatives, and targeted activities, as also discourses and narratives. Formal and informal categorisations will be used throughout this article as a means of not only improving understanding, but so too positioning the political mechanisms and policy interventions implemented to address Islamophobia within the broader focus of how other similar discriminatory phenomena have been addressed in Britain historically. Soc. Sci. 2017, 6, 77 4 of 19 3. Context and Findings 3.1. Framing Islamophobia As noted previously, Islamophobia was first afforded recognition in the British political space following the publication of the CBMI’s 1997 report. The first time Islamophobia had been defined, the CBMI simplistically described it as a shorthand way of referring to “the dread or hatred of Islam...and, therefore, to fear or dislike all or most Muslims” (Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia 1997, p. 1). It added that Islamophobia was evident through certain “recurring characteristic(s) of closed views” (Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia 1997, p. 1). It illustrated the ‘closed views’ as being when Muslims and Islam were presented as being an enemy, as violent, aggressive, unchanging, threatening, separate, or ‘Other’, among others (Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia 1997). For Allen (2010b), this was too simplistic because if the ‘closed views’ were seen to be illustrative of Islamophobia, so any corresponding ‘open views’—as set out in the CBMI report as a more balanced and ‘rational’ approach to presenting Muslims and Islam—had to necessarily be seen to be illustrative of ‘Islamophilia’. As he concludes, not only might a blanket Islamophilia be as unwelcome and unhelpful as an Islamophobia equivalent, but so too might the focus on a starkly binary approach have the potential for everything about Muslims, Islam, and Islamophobia to be simplistically seen in terms of black or white, good or bad, and so on. As Allen (2010b) rightly notes, the black or white has the potential to negate the ‘grey’, where the greatest complexity and most challenging questions relating to discriminatory phenomena typically reside. Allen (2010b) cites the CBMI’s overly-simplistic approach as one of the main reasons why Islamophobia failed to be taken seriously—and subsequently addressed—in the British political space. To explain this, he refers to the ‘race relations problematic’ (Hall 1979) and the challenge to convince those with political influence and power of the importance, and subsequent need to address, discriminatory phenomena. As Hall puts it, if they remain unconvinced, then it is likely that the only interventions that will emerge will be phoney and patronising and at the expense of those most likely to encounter the more tangible realities of prejudice, discrimination, bigotry, and hate. As Hall (1979) goes on, this detrimentally impacts those lobbying for interventions to address discriminatory phenomena, in that they typically resort to naïve arguments about just ‘how bad’ discriminatory phenomena are thereby overlooking the far more harsher realities. Some point to the CBMI in this respect, highlighting how it not only failed to effectively communicate the reality and seriousness of Islamophobia, but so too provide appropriate supporting evidence (Halliday 2002). Scholarly studies have now shifted away from such overly-simplistic approaches to conceiving Islamophobia. While some contestation is ongoing, the direction of travel is captured by those such as Klug (2012), who argues that Islamophobia has ‘come of age’ and Moosavi (2014) who argues that it is pointless to continually contest whether islamophobia exists. Further evidence of this scholarly shift is evident in a growing number of studies including those by Allen (2010b), Sheehi (2011), Lean (2012), Taras (2012) and Carr (2016), each of whom develop thinking beyond the simple and literal in order to provide a more critical and informed analysis. An example of this can be found in the work of Allen (2010b) and Sheehi (2011), who both argue that Islamophobia functions as an ideology; one that is embedded in a vast array of individual, communal, social, and global patterns of thoughts and meanings that inform what is routinely accepted as being known and understood about Muslims and Islam. As such, it is akin to the macro forms of discriminatory phenomena referred to previously. Allen (2010b) describes these as the ‘normative truths’ of Islamophobia and can be best illustrated through considering manifestations of Islamophobia that involve threat or subjection to violence. Noting that Githens-Mazer and Lambert (2010) and Moosavi (2015) rightly stress that such manifestations are relatively rare, when such manifestations do occur, Allen (2010b) argues that it is likely the perpetrator will asymmetrically deploy the normative truths as a means through which to motivate, rationalise, or justify. In this respect, the macro (cause) can be seen to act as the catalyst Soc. Sci. 2017, 6, 77 5 of 19 for the micro (effect): the normative truths thereby not only inform thinking, but more importantly, catalyse and subsequently rationalise the perpetration and subsequent manifested act of Islamophobia. However, such understandings are somewhat removed from how Islamophobia tends to be understood in the political and public spaces, where it continues to be simplistically defined, vaguely conceived, and routinely contested. While some such as Vakil (2010) argues for a complete suspension of any engagement with Islamophobia, in doing so, he miscasts the issue. Despite Islamophobia continuing to be simplistically conceived and failing to be afforded any appropriate political recognition, it has nonetheless been established in the contemporary lexicon through having had considerable investment from both critics and advocates alike. While problematic, it is within this context that the Coalition government both understood and subsequently sought to address Islamophobia. From the outset, it must be stressed that the Coalition’s approach had no clear definition or conception of Islamophobia upon which it was founded. At best, its understanding of Islamophobia was vague and lacking clarity. Consequently, a similar approach is adopted here, whereby no preference is shown towards any single definition. This necessarily prompts three points of clarification. First, Islamophobia in the context of this article is understood to be akin to other discriminatory phenomena for instance racism or homophobia. Second, it is extremely rare for discriminatory phenomena to be singularly or universally defined, and so Islamophobia is far from exceptional in this respect. Finally, while the focus here is on the political and policy, scholarly studies are employed where appropriate to frame and inform the thinking and arguments put forward. 3.2. Religious Discrimination, Islamophobia and New Labour Prior to the CBMI’s 1997 report, there was scant recognition of any form of religiously motivated discrimination in the British setting (Allen 2013b). While McLoughlin (2010) notes political recognition first emerged in the mid-1980s, Cooper (2004) is right to balance this by stressing how this recognition was largely confined to Britain’s left-leaning urban conurbations. At the national level, recognition was first evident in the aftermath of the Satanic Verses affair in 1989 when a number of Muslim organisations began to call for legislation to make religious discrimination unlawful (Weller 2006). Supported by the Commission for Racial Equality (CRE), the UK Action Committee on Islamic Affairs (UKACIA) was the first to propose specific interventions via its 1993 report, Muslims and the Law in Multi-Faith Britain: the Need for Reform. Citing Britain’s 1975 White Paper on racial discrimination, UKACIA suggested it provide a suitable template for similar legislation to protect religious communities and individuals (Allen 2013b). While Islamophobia was still to be named, things changed in 1994 with the publication of a report by the Runnymede Commission on Anti-Semitism (1994). Setting out evidence to suggest that religiously-motivated hate was transforming, the report not only expressed concern about how Muslims and Islam were being increasingly targeted, but so too did they boldly decide to name it as Islamophobia. Resultantly, the CBMI was established and its report was published in 1997 to coincide with the election of the New Labour government. As Weller put it, this “moved the terms of the debate quite significantly...(introducing) into public discourse the notion that, alongside shared dynamics of discriminatory experience, there may also be particularities of Muslim experience signalled by the word ‘Islamophobia’” (Weller 2006, p. 306). Calling for ‘decisive action’, the CBMI proposed 60 wide-reaching interventions. However, as Allen (2010b) notes, given the reluctance of New Labour to adopt many of the recommendations, so the decisive action called for failed to materialise. Nonetheless, New Labour was quick to acknowledge religion and markers of religiosity in terms of formal policy interventions. Quickly introducing the Human Rights Act 1998—formally establishing the right to freedom of religion or belief in the British constitution—New Labour also commissioned research into religious discrimination soon after. In the ensuing report, Religious Discrimination in England and Wales (Weller et al. 2001) it was shown that a majority of those Muslims engaged in the research felt that discrimination against them was on the rise. While so, the report was criticised for failing to name this particularistic manifestation of discrimination as Islamophobia (Weller 2006). Recommending that Soc. Sci. 2017, 6, 77 6 of 19 existing race relations legislation be extended, further research was commissioned which explored the legal aspects of doing so (Hepple and Choudhary 2001). While acquiring suitable evidence, New Labour always appeared reluctant to recognise Islamophobia as a particularistic phenomenon. This was apparent in the wake of 9/11, when, despite a backlash against Muslims being evident (Allen and Nielsen 2002), it preferred not to attribute it with any specific name. It was somewhat anomalous then when John Denham, a New Labour minister at the time, spoke of Islamophobia being a cancer-like phenomenon (Allen 2013c). In fact, New Labour rarely referred to Islamophobia during its 13 years of government from 1997 to 2010. Of the few times it did, some useful insights can be drawn about how other discourses about Muslims and Islam framed understanding. In 2010, the then Prime Minister Gordon Brown said during an interview with the Muslim News that if his party were to win the forthcoming general election, it was committed to doing more to address Islamophobia (Allen 2010b). While so, the interview was about the need to strengthen counter-terror legislation and so the offer to do more to address Islamophobia appeared to be little more than a mere ‘bargaining chip’ that sought to co-opt Muslims and their communities into endorsing and supporting policies that continued to unduly target them (Khan 2009; Kundnani 2015). In fact, many of New Labour’s political discourses about Muslims or Islam were unquestionably framed within policies relating to security, counter-terror, and Islamist extremism. The same was also true regarding political and policy interventions. So, when legislation was introduced to protect against assault or abuse on the basis of religion, it was included as part of the Anti-Terrorism, Crime & Security Act 2001. Across its 13 years of government, New Labour’s discourses routinely and repeatedly co-joined the discrimination faced by Muslims with counter-terror, security, and extremism. As numerous studies state, this was problematic in that it reinforced many of the public’s fears and anxieties about Muslims and Islam (Briggs et al. 2006; Spalek and McDonald 2009; Allen 2013c; Kundnani 2015). Consequently, it is possible that the ‘normative truths’ were somewhat more reinforced than refuted under New Labour. However, it must be noted that New Labour did introduce formal equality-type interventions that extended existing protections against discrimination on the basis of ‘race’, ethnicity, gender, and disability to those relating to age, sexual orientation, and religion or belief. Incorporated within the Equality Act 2006, and further strengthened by the Equality Act 2010, Riddell and Watson argue that this brought about “radical change” (Riddell and Watson 2011, p. 191). In addition, the 2006 Act also necessitated the creation of the Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC), a public body required to promote and enforce equality and non-discrimination laws in England, Scotland and Wales. As with Weller’s research previously (Weller 2006), the EHRC was also criticised for failing to recognise a particularistic Islamophobia (Allen 2013c). In the ensuing years, little has changed, with Islamophobia continuing to receive scant attention (Woodhead 2010). An example of this can be seen in the EHRC’s reluctance to disaggregate cases of discrimination reported to it on the basis of religion or belief in the same way it does in relation to ‘race’ and ethnicity. Not only does this contribute towards a general lack of clarity about the true scale and prevalence of Islamophobia (Hargreaves 2014), but so too does it suggest that not all discriminatory phenomena have been similarly and equitably responded to in terms of the historical and contemporary British settings. 3.3. The Coalition’s Approaches to Addressing Islamophobia If a particularistic Islamophobia was unacknowledged by New Labour, the same cannot be said of the Coalition government that followed. Soon after winning the 2010 general election and having declared itself to be a government that ‘did god’ (Watt 2010)—a statement that sought to deliberately demarcate it from New Labour’s ‘we don’t do god’ approach (Allen 2011c)—Warsi’s ‘dinner-table test’ speech was seen as a signal of intent. Stating that ordinary British people were increasingly comfortable saying things about Muslims and Islam they would feel uncomfortable saying about other religions and their communities, Warsi’s Islamophobia was undoubtedly particularistic. Targeting the middle classes via the ‘dinner-table’ reference, Warsi lambasted them for having historically been the Soc. Sci. 2017, 6, 77 7 of 19 very same people for whom challenging racism and other forms of discrimination would have been the norm. For her, nowadays they were the ones normalising Islamophobia. Unsurprisingly, Warsi’s speech was roundly criticized. Rod Liddle in the Spectator for example, described Warsi’s speech as “the most intellectually muddled and facile speech I think I have ever read from a senior politician” (Liddle 2011). Maybe aggrieved that he was singled out by Warsi, Liddle reaffirmed why he believed that being Islamophobic was common-sense: “There are gradations of spite, violence, persecution and insecurity within Islam: but what there always is, beyond all doubt, is spite, violence, persecution and insecurity” (Liddle 2011). Nonetheless, Warsi’s prioritising of Islamophobia garnered immediate traction, prompting the Coalition to back the creation of the APPG on Islamophobia, while also establishing the Cross-Government Working Group on Anti-Muslim Hatred. This approach was not without precedent, as a similar approach had been successfully used by New Labour as regards Antisemitism a decade or so beforehand (Allen 2013c). The use of different descriptors for each offers an interesting insight into the ongoing contestation of Islamophobia in the political spaces, as also the Coalition’s lack of clarity. From speaking to key political actors, the decision to use ‘Anti-Muslim Hate’, rather than ‘Islamophobia’ for the Working Group, was in response to a report by the Quilliam Foundation. A Muslim-led counter-extremism organisation, Quilliam claimed that Islamophobia had been exploited by ‘Islamists and Wahhabis’, and so if politicians used the term, it would hand a “propaganda coup” to the Islamists (Readings et al. 2011, p. 14). While lacking evidence to support such claims, it is interesting that political actors would openly state that Islamophobia was a term they could not endorse. By the end of the Coalition’s five years in government, however, political actors were again using the term, thereby rendering Quilliam’s unsubstantiated claims somewhat invalid. It is worth noting that scholarly evidence has never substantiated Quilliam’s claims. 3.3.1. The APPG on Islamophobia Despite being launched after the Coalition won the 2010 general election, it is likely the APPG would have been established whoever had won, as political support had been agreed at a closed parliamentary meeting in March the same year (Allen 2013c). As informal cross-party groups, APPGs have neither official status within Parliament, nor any formal endorsement from the government at the time (Parliament UK 2010). Consequently, the APPG’s association with the Coalition was rather more consequential. Nonetheless, the Coalition supported the APPG and had one of its politicians—Conservative Member of Parliament (MP), Kris Hopkins—appointed as Chair. Launched in November 2010, the APPG’s remit was to investigate the forms, manifestations, and extent of discrimination against Muslims in today’s Britain; review the effectiveness of relevant legislation; review existing mechanisms for recording anti-Muslim hate crimes; and investigate the role of the media in fostering intolerance towards Muslims. Investigative, rather than implementative, it was necessary for a concurrent mechanism—namely the Working Group—to be established through which any ensuing recommendations could be duly considered and subsequently implemented. Despite being described by as ‘a momentous occasion’ by Hopkins at the launch (Allen 2011a) the APPG was soon dogged by controversy. Having appointed iENGAGE—a London-based Muslim organisation sometimes that was also sometimes referred to as ENGAGE—as Secretariat, a number of the APPG’s members resigned in protest including the Chair and Vice-Chair, Lord Janner of Braunstone (Gilligan 2011). These were prompted by allegations in the media that individuals associated to iENGAGE were known to be ‘Islamist sympathisers’. From the subsequent investigation into the controversy commissioned by the APPG (Allen 2011a), the situation prompted the remaining members to argue that if iENGAGE did not resign, then it should be forced to do so, neither of which happened. Instead, what ensued was a highly polemical and damaging series of ‘tit-for-tat’ exchanges involving various individuals associated with iENGAGE and its critics in the media and online. Aside from the polemics, some questions about iENGAGE’s suitability in terms of its expertise and capacity were justified. However, there is little doubt that these tangible concerns became subsumed in what became Soc. Sci. 2017, 6, 77 8 of 19 an increasingly acrimonious and public ‘trial by blog’, damaging the credibility of the APPG, as well as the political agenda to address Islamophobia (Allen 2011a). Culminating in a vote by the APPG’s members, iENGAGE were eventually removed as Secretariat almost a year after the controversy began. Subsequently relaunched in November 2011, the APPG once again mustered tentative cross-party support (Bright 2011). This, time however, there was very little apparent leadership or strategy. From discussions with two political actors involved in the APPG, both attribute this to the decision not to appoint an external Secretariat. Instead, Secretariat responsibilities were given to the private staff of the APPG Co-Chair, who at the time was Simon Hughes (former Deputy Leader of the Liberal-Democrats and MP for Bermondsey and Old Southwark). Why and who made this decision remains unclear and so requires further consideration. This includes questioning the extent to which the Co-Chairs felt that there were no suitable candidates for the Secretariat role. While so, it is unlikely that this would have been the case. At the closed Parliamentary meeting in March 2010, a broad coalition of partners came together to lobby for the APPG, including organisations such as the Runnymede Trust, representatives from academic institutions including the universities of Birmingham and Exeter, and various Muslim organisations that had greater reach, longer histories, and more appropriate expertise than iENGAGE. From documents seen, iENGAGE seem to have begun to lobby individual political actors sometime after the initial meeting, although the precise justification for this remains unknown. Nonetheless, as the March 2010 meeting illustrates, there were various options available to the Co-Chairs as regards those suitable for appointment as Secretariat. Maybe other factors were at play, not least the problems that might have been attributed to ‘Muslim-ness’ or Muslim identity. As Allen (2010b) notes, there is a tendency for Islamophobia to be seen to be both the problem and preserve of Muslims. Might this have been why it was Warsi—a political actor at the time who identified as Muslim—who was required to publicly recognise the need to address Islamophobia? As Allen explains, while Islamophobia directly and discriminatorily targets Muslims for being ‘Muslim’, so too is Islamophobia routinely seen to be the fault of Muslims because of their actions, beliefs, and so on. This results in many suggesting that only Muslims can ‘solve’ the issue of Islamophobia, something that can be inappropriately and unhelpfully reduced to discourses that infer Muslims need to be ‘less Muslim’ (Allen 2010b). If so, then might the Co-Chairs have thought that only Muslims or a Muslim organisation for instance could have been appointed as Secretariat? Albeit speculative, if Muslim identities were seen to be inherently problematic, and therefore likely to attract similarly adverse levels of scrutiny and criticism as iENGAGE did previously, might this have been what one political actor candidly meant when suggesting that the decision not to appoint a Muslim organisation as Secretariat was the “safer option”? Despite having categorically achieved little, the APPG was once more relaunched in May 2013 (Allen 2013b) and showed little sign of improving its leadership and strategy. Consequently, its activities became increasingly sporadic and lacking coherence. On reflection, it is difficult to find any evidence that the APPG ever overcame the initial obstacles it encountered with iENGAGE. This would seem to have been further compounded by the subsequent decision to appoint private secretaries as Secretariat who—like iENGAGE before them—neither had the expertise nor capacity demanded of them. This can be illustrated by a conversation with one of the private secretaries that were afforded Secretariat responsibilities. When asked why the APPG had failed to produce any briefings or minutes from its different meetings as per other APPGs, they explained that this was because the private secretaries had completely overlooked the need to record the oral evidence that had been presented during meetings, or collect the accompanying written evidence. The complete void of outputs from the APPG is therefore unsurprising, as there would appear to be no known records for many of its earliest hearings and activities. 3.3.2. The Cross-Government Working Group on Anti-Muslim Hate The Working Group was launched in January 2012 and, as noted previously, was established to work collaboratively with the APPG. Comprising independent members that included representatives Soc. Sci. 2017, 6, 77 9 of 19 of Muslim organisations and non-Muslim civil society organisations, alongside imams and academics, all were deemed to have been identified on the basis of their relevant expertise. Housed in the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG), the Working Group also included representatives from all governmental departments, the Association of Chief Police Officers, and the private secretaries of individual politicians who held a particular interest in the matter being considered. While never being formally ratified, the terms of reference initially circulated stated that the Working Group would do the following: work with key partners and government departments to make recommendations for government and others to reduce Islamophobia; respond to local or international events; review trends in anti-Muslim sentiment and hatred; increase and improve the reporting and recording of Islamophobia; and report progress to Parliament (Working Group, unpublished). In contrast to the APPG, the Working Group appeared better structured and soon established a work programme that included various sub-groups that reflected individual expertise. Consequently, sub-groups were created that sought to focus on the media, data collection, and research evidence, among others. While each were active, as illustrated by the media sub-group quickly meeting with the Office of Communications (the UK’s communications regulator, OFCOM), the Press Complaints Commission, and the Society of Editors, there was however a clear lack of strategic remit about what the sub-groups were seeking to achieve. Few of those active in the sub-groups were clear about what they were meant to be working towards, whether they should be gathering evidence, facilitating briefings, making recommendations, or something else. The same was symptomatic of the Working Group more broadly. While some members saw it to be a mechanism through which the Coalition could be held to account over certain issues, this was contested by others. Consequently, the lack of any agreed terms of reference detrimentally impacted on both the Working Group’s internal dynamics, as also its external activities. An example of this became evident when only three independent members deemed it appropriate to put their names to a letter to the then Education Minister, Michael Gove, that sought to criticise his response to the Operation Trojan Horse hoax allegations about an ‘Islamist takeover’ of Birmingham schools (Clarke 2014). It is worth noting that all allegations relating to a ‘takeover’ were subsequently refuted. Those who did sign the letter believed at the time that Gove should have been questioned about the allegations. Those who did not were somewhat more reluctant to explain why, with one suggesting that an ‘arm’s length’ approach would be more beneficial to monitor developments. It is worth noting that despite the significance of the enquiries and fallout from the Operation Trojan Horse allegations, the Working Group made no comment whatsoever about it either publicly or privately. The issue of public versus private was another cause of disagreement among the Group’s membership. While discussed at length, those members who advocated a public profile argued that doing so would help raise awareness of Islamophobia, attribute the Working Group with greater political influence, and offer a more informed and objective voice to the media, among others. The counter arguments can be captured in the comments of one member who stated that there was no good argument to convince them of “putting my head above the parapet”. As they went on to explain, they did not want to become a target for criticism and so preferred to engage with politicians without it being publicly made available. Resultantly, the Working Group not only remained largely invisible inside government due to its reluctance to hold politicians to account, but so too outside of government due to a collective reluctance by members to be held publicly accountable by those they claimed to represent. Questions also remain unanswered about how and by whom decisions were made in relation to the Working Group. An example of this can be seen in relation to the decision-making process about a piece of research requested by the Working Group. Culminating in submitting a formal research proposal to the DCLG in 2013, a number of the independent members identified the need to establish a comprehensive evidence base relating to Islamophobia in the contemporary British setting, in order to better understand its scale, prevalence, and character. Duly agreed by the DCLG, a decision was taken away from the Working Group meetings to commission an intern from the University of Warwick, with no known expertise or knowledge about Islamophobia or even Muslim communities to undertake Soc. Sci. 2017, 6, 77 10 of 19 the research, in preference of those members who were academics and had appropriate expertise in the field. In spite of protests by a number of the members, the research went ahead and was duly completed and presented to the Working Group in May 2014. Despite unanimous agreement among the membership that the findings should be made publicly available in the form of a report, a further decision was made some weeks later and away from the Working Group to the contrary. To date, the research remains unpublished without any comment or explanation why. The Working Group encountered other problems also, one of which can be illustrated by focusing on the need to review the evidence relating to the recording of Islamophobic incidents and attacks. Much of this depended on the data to be provided by the recently established Tell MAMA (an acronym for ‘measuring anti-Muslim attacks’). Funded by the Coalition, MAMA sought to provide a third-party reporting service for victims and witnesses of Islamophobia to record details and obtain further advice and support where appropriate. Similar to the service provided by the Community Safety Trust (CST) for victims of Antisemitism, the data collected was to be published annually, from which trends and developments could be identified and duly responded to (CST 2015). The CST has also used this data to lobby politicians, the police, and media, among others. Unlike the CST however, MAMA was publicly scrutinised and subsequently attacked shortly after its launch seemingly giving credence to Warsi’s observation that Muslims—including their organisations—are treated quite differently from those associated and affiliated with other religious communities. Indeed, one might question the underlying motivations given that those attacking MAMA were the same individuals that had previously attacked iENGAGE. Noting the APPG’s investigation, it observed that these same individuals had historically had an “uneasy relationship with some Muslims, their communities and organisations” (Allen 2011a, p. 42). Regarding the journalist Andrew Gilligan for instance, the report noted how he routinely used the term ‘Islamist’ as “others might use an insult. Branding an individual, organisation or institution an ‘Islamist’ or an ‘Islamist ally’ carries with it a slur on the recipient” (Allen 2011a, p. 44). MAMA continued to attract criticism. Following the murder of the British serviceman Lee Rigby by two Islamists on the streets of London in May 2013, MAMA’s CEO—who was also one of the original independent members of the Working Group—released data to the media in support of claims he made that there had been a dramatic rise in Islamophobic incidents in the immediate aftermath of the killing. Reported widely, MAMA’s critics questioned the validity of the data and lodged a formal complaint with the Press Complaints Commission. Subsequently investigated, it ruled that MAMA had indeed exaggerated its claims (Gilligan 2014). While the investigation was ongoing, however, the Coalition announced that it was to cease funding to MAMA (Gilligan 2013). While outside the remit of the Working Group, the decision had ramifications nonetheless. Not only did this prompt a resignation from the Working Group, but so too was a decision made that MAMA’s data should no longer be used. Given that MAMA’s data has since been independently verified by the University of Teeside (Copsey et al. 2013; Feldman and Littler 2014), the decision would appear to have been somewhat premature, given the detrimental impact it had in working towards the better recording and monitoring of Islamophobia for which a sub-group had been established. It also prompts questions about the political influence certain external actors appear to be able to exert as regards Islamophobia, Muslims, and Islam. In terms of interventions, one might consider the sub-group that worked towards establishing Srebrenica Genocide Memorial Day. While the first memorial day was held in 2013, the sub-group responsible for this was quite unlike the others in that it was largely driven by one member who appeared to have been working towards this prior to being appointed to the Working Group. Other ‘positive image’ interventions were also endorsed by the Working Group and included the Big Iftar (Department for Communities and Local Government 2014), which sought to invite non-Muslims to participate in the traditional meal which signals the end of the fast during the month of Ramadan and We Remember Too (We Remember Too 2013), which raised awareness about Muslims that fought as part of the Allied Forces during World War II. While neither intervention was a direct outcome of the Working Group’s activities, they were publicised as tangible ‘successes’ in later cross-governmental Soc. Sci. 2017, 6, 77 11 of 19 communications (DCLG email, unpublished). While contestable, it is the nature of the interventions that can be seen to be most problematic particularly when considered through the lens of Hall’s study of anti-racism (Hall 1979). For him, such interventions tended to be premised on the basis that the substitution of positive images or messages in preference of any negative equivalent would have a beneficial outcome in terms of tackling discrimination, bigotry, and hate. As Hall goes on to explain, however, because these interventions are overly simplistic and lack any intrinsic value, those who receive the positive images typically dismiss them as being phoney and patronising, seeing them as being rather more superficial than meaningful or real. The extent to which Srebrenica Genocide Memorial Day, the Big Iftar, and We Remember Too had any real or tangible impact in addressing Islamophobia must therefore be questioned. Given that these were the only outputs from the Working Group, so it must be concluded that along with the APPG, it too failed to ‘get it’ in terms of addressing Islamophobia. 3.4. Coalition Discourses About Muslims and Islam As various studies have shown, political discourses can be utilised as conduits through which unwritten and unofficial policies and policy-thinking are aired, affirmed, reiterated, and reinforced (Fischer and Forester 1993; Becker et al. 2012). Given the marked shift in the Coalition’s discourses about Muslims and Islam over its five years in government, so it might be necessary to consider the extent to which this had an impact in terms of addressing Islamophobia. As before, the Coalition’s political discourses were initially overwhelmingly positive and acknowledged a particularistic Islamophobia. This changed in the government’s latter years, to the extent that its discourses became indistinguishable from its New Labour predecessor. This can be illustrated by the Coalition’s 2013 report into extremism (Extremism Task Force 2013) and has indeed been echoed in recent speeches by the Prime Minister Theresa May, who, in 2013, was Home Secretary and thus had responsibility for tackling extremism. Both then and now, while Islamophobia was specifically referred to as positioned within discourses about counter-terror and extremism: “extremism of all kinds, including the Islamophobia and neo-Nazism espoused by the murderer of Mohammed Saleem to justify his terrorist attacks against mosques in the West Midlands” (Extremism Task Force 2013, p. 1). The similarities between May and Brown’s speeches are therefore striking. While the primary focus of their speeches was about the need for additional counter-terror legislation, both included statements about the need to incorporate formal interventions within that legislation to concurrently address Islamophobia. So, while May put forward that the Coalition would require the police to record Islamophobic hate crime in line with Antisemitism (McIntyre 2015), what became apparent was that in line with its New Labour predecessor, the Coalition’s discourses appeared to increasingly conceive Islamophobia as a phenomenon that was rather more symptomatic and consequential of terrorism and extremism than the particularistic discrimination in previously had. Further similarities between the Coalition and New Labour are also evident. Aside from terrorism and extremism, both government’s discourses disproportionately focused on what Parekh (2006) refers to as the ‘problems’ attributed to Muslims and Islam. As regards the Coalition, this included: Jeremy Browne questioning whether the state should protect young Muslim women from having the veil ‘imposed’ on them in schools (Swinford 2013); Jeremy Hunt suggesting similar in the health sector and the right of patients to ‘see the face’ of clinical staff (Cooper 2013); and Michael Gove appointing Peter Clarke—the former head of Scotland Yard’s counter-terrorism command—to investigate the Operation Trojan Horse allegations (Peachey 2014). It is interesting that the Chief Constable of West Midlands Police condemned the latter as a ‘desperately unfortunate appointment’, given the message it sent to Muslim communities (Pidd and Dodd 2014). Similar too with New Labour and the extensive list offered by Allen (2010b): John Reid’s call for Muslim parents to look out for the ‘tell-tale signs’ of extremism; ministers at the Department of Education issuing guidelines to universities urging them to ‘spy’ on Muslim and ‘Muslim-looking’ students; Ruth Kelly announcing that Muslim organisations needed to do more to defend core British values; and Jack Straw’s comments that the niqab was a barrier to integration. For both governments, Muslims and Islam were undeniably seen to be problematic. Soc. Sci. 2017, 6, 77 12 of 19 As with New Labour, there was resonance between the discourses of the Coalition and some within the far-right milieu (Allen 2013a). A good illustration of this is Prime Minister David Cameron’s 2011 speech in Munich. Declaring the end of British state multiculturalism, Cameron blamed its demise on the threat posed by Islamist extremism (New Statesman 2011). While Cameron was saying this, a rally was taking place in Luton to celebrate the second anniversary of the English Defence League (EDL), a far-right, counter-jihadi street movement (Allen 2011b). At the rally, the EDL’s leaders delivered speeches that similarly focused on the perceived threat posed to Britain by Islamist extremism. In the media’s reporting of the two speeches, not only did the latter gain publicity for resonating with that of the Prime Minister, but so too did it acquire legitimacy. Reiterating Allen, “the messages taken . . . categorically reinforced the idea that Muslims and Islam were something that was causing ‘us’ problems: a problem that was threatening ‘our’ culture, ‘our’ values, ‘our’ way of life” (Allen 2010a, p. 230). As was shown previously, such discourses not only reinforce pre-existing fears and anxieties about Muslims and Islam, but so too do they place Muslims and their communities under increased pressure, potentially increasing feelings of anger, alienation, and mistrust, while also giving credence to extremist ideologies (Briggs et al. 2006; Spalek and Lambert 2008; Khan 2009). If one revisits the notion of ‘Islamophobia thinking’, it could be argued that the Coalition’s latter discourses about Muslims and Islam potentially gave credence to this via the perpetuation of what were previously referred to as normative truths. 4. Analysis Both commendable and promising, Warsi’s speech was without doubt unprecedented. Creating exceedingly high expectations that the Coalition would be the first government in British political history to ‘get it’ as regards the need to address Islamophobia, quite the opposite was true, in that it comprehensively failed. Putting in place political mechanisms that were both resonant and replicating of the blueprint that had previously been successful in addressing Antisemitism, that same blueprint did not ensure the same successful outcomes regarding Islamophobia. In terms of formal interventions, it could be argued that the Coalition achieved less than its New Labour predecessor, a government that Allen (2013c) roundly criticised for its failure to adequately respond and subsequently address Islamophobia. In this respect, New Labour did at least introduce a number of formal interventions that had potential to indirectly address Islamophobia through extending the equalities framework to include protection against discrimination on the basis of religion or belief and the introduction of legislation that made incitement to religious hatred unlawful. As regards informal interventions, some of the Working Group’s independent members were confident that the likes of Srebrenica Genocide Memorial Day, the Big Iftar, and We Remember Too would have a positive impact as regards addressing Islamophobia. However, this remains open to debate as per the reservations expressed previously. At the micro level, the impact of these interventions is likely to have been negligible, not least because informal interventions have been shown to have the greatest impact in addressing discriminatory phenomena at the macro level (Bhavani et al. 2005). However, even at the macro, the impact of these interventions has to be questioned given the lack of reach each had. Factor in that they were also never formally endorsed by the Coalition government, or indeed either the APPG or Working Group, and that potential appears to be lessened even further, not least through lacking authority and credibility. To recall Hall (1979), it is also unknown the extent to which those who did engage and participate in the interventions saw them as being positive and authentic, or as he put it, phoney and patronising. Having publicly prioritised the need to address Islamophobia, why then did the Coalition government fail? From monitoring and analysing the Coalition’s approaches, three broad considerations would appear to be relevant in trying to explain this. The first might be described as being broadly political. Given the Coalition’s early discourses, it would seem that the political will to address Islamophobia was evident early on. From participating in both the APPG and Working Group, however, a pertinent observation was that there were a few politicians that were keenly and publicly Soc. Sci. 2017, 6, 77 13 of 19 supportive of doing so. For the APPG, the driving force was Simon Hughes, and to a lesser degree Jack Straw, who incidentally was not a member of the Coalition government. For the Working Group, the equivalent was Warsi. It must be noted, however, that almost all governmental departments were represented at the Working Group’s meetings and so a cross-governmental awareness at least was known to be apparent. The question then is the whether this awareness was ever transformed into the necessary political leadership that Warsi stated was so desperately needed. Little evidence is available to suggest that it did. To this extent, it is worth considering the Coalition’s discourses and whether they reinforced ideological forms of ‘Islamophobia thinking’, rather than combatted Islamophobia per se. Bhavani et al. (2005) offers a useful illustration. Having monitored British political discourses about ‘race’ and racism, they noted that many political actors routinely deployed discourses that focused on the perceived ‘problems of race’ as a means of negating or deflecting attention from political discourses that were focusing on the need to address racism and its causes. Something similar might be evident in how the Coalition shifted its political discourse from needing to address Islamophobia to instead needing to address the ‘problems’ of Muslims and Islam. If so, then might it be necessary to question the authenticity of the Coalition’s discourses and seeming commitment to addressing Islamophobia from the outset? Political theory relating to functionalism might offer an insight. In this respect, religion is reduced to the political function performed by the religion, its institutions, communities, and individual actors. Consequently, function is determined and managed within the political spaces by political actors and institutions and not by the religions, their institutions, communities, or individual actors. Resultantly, religion and the religious are not only negated, but so too become secondary to politics and the political. As such, was it possible that the discourses and political mechanisms put in place to address Islamophobia might have had an alternative function? Might that function have been one that sought to bring Muslims ‘on-side’ as a means of supporting the political process of addressing the ‘problems’ of Muslims and Islam that were seen to be rather more pressing and important to those within the political spaces? From participating in both formal and informal interventions, this was something that cannot be easily dismissed. The second broad consideration centres on those co-opted to support the Coalition’s approaches to addressing Islamophobia. While the blueprint for addressing Islamophobia was similar to that preferred to address Antisemitism, informal discussions with different Muslim actors highlight a number of significant factors that not only highlight the sharp differences between Britain’s Jewish and Muslim communities, but why replicable approaches failed to be similarly successful. Regarding the differences between Jewish and Muslim communities, these are various and many. Among those identified as significant are that Muslims in Britain have a far shorter history, are greater in size, and have more complex intra-community diversity. Other important factors include the significantly different socio-economic statuses of each community, levels of educational attainment, indices of deprivation and poverty, sectarian and theological tensions, migration and settlement histories, and the impact of geopolitics among various others. Britain’s Muslims and Jewish communities are therefore not in any way like-for-like. It is also worth noting that in the British legal system, Jewish communities have historically been recognised as a ‘racial group’ on the basis of their attributed mono-ethnicity. This has never been the case for Muslims who are undoubtedly multi-ethnic. Consequently, addressing Antisemitism necessarily begun from a quite different legal start-point aside from any mitigating socio-political or cultural differences. It is worth noting that Muslims have only been afforded protection on the basis of discrimination since the introduction of religion-specific legislation under New Labour (Allen 2013c). However, maybe the most significant difference is in how Muslims have failed to effectively organise and represent themselves, an observation that can be illustrated by a meeting between the Antisemitism and Islamophobia Working Groups in 2013. Attending on behalf of the Antisemitism Working Group were three independent members, each of whom had specific expertise about the following aspects: Britain’s Jewish communities, the British legal system, and Jewish theology. Soc. Sci. 2017, 6, 77 14 of 19 In contrast, twelve independent members attended on behalf of the Islamophobia Working Group, for whom it would have been difficult to identify similar specific expertise. It could be argued therefore that the way in which British Muslims engage with government—process, identification, representation, and so on—is in itself problematic. In this respect, questions should be asked about how the Working Group was constructed—was membership determined by political actors, by expertise (as the original intimations suggested), or was it by certain Muslims be that in the form of organisations or individual actors? While unknown, it is maybe pertinent to reiterate that a number of the original Working Group members were affiliated to the Muslim Leadership Panel (What Do They Know 2012). Observable differences relating to organisation and representation was evident in a comment made by one of the Antisemitism Working Group’s independent members, who said that most important when engaging with politicians was the need for a unified front. As he explained, the Antisemitism Working Group never allowed personal, community, or theological differences to become something that politicians might seek to exploit. This was not observable among the Islamophobia Working Group. On the contrary, some independent members routinely criticised other well-known Muslim organisations, certain ‘types’ of Muslim (for instance, Salafis), and various individual Muslims. Such first-hand observations therefore run counter to Jones et al.’s study which claims that politically engaged British Muslims neither want to ‘compete’ against each other, nor appear to be ‘self-appointed’ (Jones et al. 2014). This was not the case with regards those co-opted to the Working Group, as evidenced by the disproportionate number of independent members affiliated to the Muslim Leadership Panel and the significant claims they make about representation made in a letter to Eric Pickles (What Do They Know 2012), the ministerial lead for the DCLG where the Working Group was housed. On the contrary, some of those co-opted appeared quite happy to both openly ‘compete’ and put themselves forward as ‘self-representatives’. Interestingly, there were also a number of observable incidents when independent members who identified as Muslim seemed to internalise the perceived ‘problems’ of Muslims and Islam. An example of note included an independent member, who identified as Muslim, arguing that it was more pressing to address the widespread homophobia and sexism he claimed was endemic within Britain’s Muslims communities than it was Islamophobia. The final consideration relates to the influence of external actors, in particular the handful of journalists and media commentators referred to previously. While the focus on them here has been necessarily brief, it is suggested that a more detailed investigation which analyses their respective articles and comment pieces might would be extremely valuable. This would be especially given the undue influence they have as regards shaping and determining various decisions and functions relating to the political mechanisms and processes, but also the views about certain Muslim organisations and individuals. In this respect, an observation made in the APPG’s investigation into the Secretariat furore appears relevant: “questions (need) to be asked about some of the issues they pursue, some of the criticisms they posit, some of the language and terminologies they employ also . . . it is also right to highlight and consider the use and attribution of value-loaded terminologies and language, to ask whether the criticisms and accusations that were made within such value-loaded frames were employed deliberately to bring down iENGAGE, the APPG or both” (Allen 2011a, p. 47). This final point is especially important. While it might be argued that as an investigative journalist, Andrew Gilligan for example is right to focus on ‘Muslim’ issues, organisations, and actors, it cannot be overlooked that he does so at the same time as routinely and repeatedly deploying terminologies and descriptors that function as slurs and insults (Allen 2011a). Given this is clearly evident, why does he continue to have such an unwieldy influence? Maybe the premise for any further investigation might be Warsi’s observation that Muslims and Islam are spoken about and referred to somewhat differently from other religions and their respective communities. Soc. Sci. 2017, 6, 77 15 of 19 5. Conclusions When the Coalition government came to power in May 2010, it did appear to be a government that had indeed ‘got it’ regarding the need to address Islamophobia. Hindsight, however, suggests something quite different, no more seemingly ‘getting it’ than any previous government. In this respect, the Coalition failed in much the same way that its predecessors had. While so, there would appear to be no single factor that was wholly causal or verifiable in trying to explain this categorical failure. Therefore, one might be right to speculate as to the extent to which there was ever any true intent about the need to address Islamophobia. Admittedly, the Coalition did adopt a markedly different public approach to its predecessor; its assertive and confident pronouncements seeming to establish a significant shift. In hindsight, one might rightly question the extent to which the latter was any more genuine or committal than the reticence shown by Blair and Brown previously. Maybe one need question why, in spite of quite different public statements, both the New Labour and Coalition governments categorically failed? Could it have been that both envisaged the ‘problems’ attributed to Muslims and Islam as being more pressing, and therefore more important, in terms of requiring a political and policy response? Maybe both governments viewed extremism and terror to be of greater import than Islamophobia in terms of its wider societal impact? Maybe both were somewhat more cynical and merely saw making timely statements about Islamophobia as a means by which to co-opt and bring ‘on side’ Muslims and their communities. The evidence available here offers little beyond mere speculation and so it is recommended that a more systematic comparative analysis of the political discourses of both the Coalition and New Labour governments about the Muslim ‘Other’ and the ‘problems’ attributed to them be undertaken. From critically reflecting on the Coalition government more specifically, what emerges is a complex and contested picture—one that appears to be somewhat confused at times not least because of the many unknowns that continue to exist. The ‘momentous occasion’ spoken about at the APPG’s 2011 launch now appears as overblown, as the opportunity to address Islamophobia appears to have been lost. With the changes in government since 2015—from a Conservative-led Coalition to a Conservative-majority government in 2015, to a much weakened Conservative-led Coalition government supported by the Democratic Unionist Party in 2017—one can only speculate on whether addressing Islamophobia will remain a priority. If it does, then the terror attack on the Finsbury Park mosque in June 2017 may afford some insight as to what form it might take. Focusing on the government’s immediate response, Theresa May—now in her role as Prime Minister—declared that it was the intention of her government to address the evil that is Islamophobia. In line with her earlier comments as Home Secretary, however, she once again referred to Islamophobia as a ‘form of extremism’; once again making the link between the discriminatory phenomenon and the policy agenda relating to security, counter-terrorism, and extremism. Without a doubt, this does not look like the political leadership Warsi said was necessary in her now infamous ‘dinner table test’. Instead, it looks like May’s government still does not ‘get it’, thereby meaning that it is highly unlikely that Islamophobia will be suitably and appropriately addressed in the foreseeable future at least. Conflicts of Interest: The author declares no conflict of interest. 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This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/). http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jis/etl001 https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/136128/response/336750/attach/html/4/2011%2011%2014%20MLPmembers1.tif.html https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/136128/response/336750/attach/html/4/2011%2011%2014%20MLPmembers1.tif.html http://creativecommons.org/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/. Introduction Methodology Context and Findings Framing Islamophobia Religious Discrimination, Islamophobia and New Labour The Coalition’s Approaches to Addressing Islamophobia The APPG on Islamophobia The Cross-Government Working Group on Anti-Muslim Hate Coalition Discourses About Muslims and Islam Analysis Conclusions 
work_qzez2rn2afazvbz74fl77xcr4e	----	Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1977116Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1977116 Social Constraints, Agency, Inter-organizational Tie Formation and Knowledge Diffusion Jason Greenberg, PhD Leonard N. Stern School of Business, NYU 40 West 4th Street, Suite 706 New York, New York 10012 Phone: (212) 998-0229 jgreenbe@stern.nyu.edu David M.J. Lazer, PhD Northeastern University Departments of Computer Science and Political Science and Program on Networked Governance John F. Kennedy School of Government Harvard University Cambridge, MA 02138 d.lazer@neu.edu Maria C. Binz-Scharf, PhD The City College of New York Department of Economics and Business 160 Convent Avenue New York, NY 10031 mbinzscharf@ccny.cuny.edu Ines Mergel, PhD Department of Public Administration and International Affairs Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs Syracuse University 436 Crouse-Hinds Hall Syracuse, NY 13244 iamergel@maxwell.syr.edu Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1977116Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1977116 Social Constraints, Agency, Inter-organizational Tie Formation and Knowledge Diffusion ABSTRACT Social capital is currently one of social structure‘s most prominent and debated manifestations. However, we have a limited understanding of how social ties as the basis of social capital form in the first place. From one perspective social capital is viewed as: ―investment in social relations with expected returns in the marketplace‖ (Lin 2001, p. 19). A second perspective on social capital formation stresses contextual and environmental features beyond the control of individuals that may yield benefits Both perspectives are based on premises implicating various motives and structural constraints pertaining to relationship formation including: exchange, power, and dependency; legitimacy seeking or preferential attachment based on status or prestige; homogeneity or homophily and related selection processes; propinquity; or cultural or institutional forces. These categories of mechanisms do not, however, specify a model of how social relationships as social capital are formed in the first place. If social capital results from ―investment strategies,‖ it is important to determine what these strategies are. If social capital originates from structural factors beyond individual control it is important to clarify what mechanisms lead to tie formation within social structures. The objective of this research is to specify mechanisms of social tie formation and reinforcement by peering inside the black-box of foci (Feld 1981) in which social ties are formed. We do so by focusing on the structural contexts within which individual (micro-level) ―corporate actors‖ form social relationships for knowledge acquisition that results in macro-level knowledge sharing. A mixed-method analytical approach is employed to this end. Findings illustrate how the subtleties of social structure define the parameters within which social relationships are (strategically) formed. 1 Social Constraints, Agency, Inter-organizational Tie Formation and Knowledge Diffusion INTRODUCTION Social capital is currently one of social structure‘s most prominent and debated manifestations (Bourdieu 1985; Portes and Sensenbrenner 1993; Portes 1998, 2000; Lin 2001), and its purview has been extended to various levels of social life from individuals to organizations to states and countries (Gulati 1999; Putnum 2000; Ingram, Robinson, and Busch 2005; Powell, White, Koput, and Smith 2005; Paxton 2007). Defining and describing what social capital entails and how it relates to (un)desirable outcomes has thus motivated substantial research (see Portes 1998; Mouw 2003, 2006 for reviews). However, we have a limited understanding of how social ties as the basis of social capital form in the first place (Sorenson and Stuart 2008). The objective of this research is to address this gap in the literature. There are two primary views on the basis of social capital. From one perspective social capital is viewed as: ―investment in social relations with expected returns in the marketplace‖ (Lin 2001, p. 19). Consistent with this view, Bourdieu (1985) argued that social capital arises from individual investment strategies of human and cultural capital in sociability. A second perspective on the origins of social capital stresses contextual and environmental features largely beyond the control of individuals. How social environments shape residents‘ life chances is an example (e.g., Wilson 1987; Mayer and Jencks 1989; Jencks and Mayer 1990; Sampson 2001; Sampson, Morenoff, and Gannon-Rowley 2002). The mechanisms linking macro social forces to individual outcomes can be blunt and blatant or sharp and subtle (e.g., Small 2009). However, a cornerstone of structuralist approaches is the idea that social context and the capital it affords are enabling or constraining above and beyond individual action (sees generally Sampson 2008). Individuals begin life with varied levels of access to human capital, social networks, and a host of other productive or destructive conditions simply by virtue of whom their parents are and 2 where they live (Loury 1989, p. 272). These initial conditions, in turn, have a bearing on subsequent networking opportunities and outcomes, as well as human capital development (Coleman 1988). Both of these overarching categories of social capital formation presuppose various motives for relationship formation and activation including: exchange and dependency (Homans 1958, 1961; Blau 1964; Yuchtman and Seashore 1967; Benson 1975; Cook 1975; Pfeffer and Salancik 1978; for a review see Cook and Whitmeyer 1992); legitimacy seeking or preferential attachment (e.g., Young and Larson 1965; Stuart 1998); or homogeneity or homophily and related social attraction and selection processes (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook 2001; see also Rauch 1997). Structural constraints and facilitators include propinquity (e.g., Powell, White, Koput, and Smith 2005; Sorenson and Stuart 2008) and cultural or institutional forces (Saxenian 1994; e.g., Almeida and Kogut 1999; Small 2009). Motives are, however, almost never observed; rather, they are extrapolated based on context. The motive compelling organizations to form relationships may presumably be resource dependencies (e.g., Pfeffer and Salancik 1978) and thus underlying economic logics of utility maximization generally defined. Similarly, structural features such as propinquity may lead to tie formation due to search cost minimization, homophily, or a higher likelihood of chance encounters. These presumed motives do not, however, reveal how social relationships as social capital are formed in the first place. If social capital results from ―investment strategies,‖ it is important to determine what these strategies are. This is not an easy task because the formation of a tie today is often the result of preexisting ties (see, e.g., Gulati and Gargiulo 1999). This endogeneity, as well as the opacity of network content (Burt 2008, p.953) and actors‘ motivations result in considerable ambiguity about the origin of social ties as social capital. On the other hand, if social capital 3 originates from structural factors beyond individual control it is important to clarify what mechanisms lead to tie formation within social structures. The objective of this research is to identify mechanisms of social tie formation and reinforcement by peering inside the black-box of foci (Feld 1981) in which knowledge sharing ties are formed (see Figure 1 below). We do so by focusing on the structural contexts within which individual (micro-level) ―corporate actors‖ 1 form social relationships (link 3 in the figure) for knowledge acquisition that yield macro-level knowledge transmission (link 4 in the figure) (Alexander 1987; Blau 1987; Coleman 1987, 1994, 1998). This focus on the action of corporate actors is important. As noted above, significant attention has been devoted to the patterns and consequences of the boundary spanning activities of macro social entities such as organizations. This research treats organizations as social actors in and of themselves that engage in this boundary spanning activity. This focus is sensible when describing the patterns of inter-organizational ties. However, it is not well-suited to reveal how organizations develop social capital and span boundaries in the first place. Observing that organizations in close proximity are more likely to have a joint venture agreement, for example, does not reveal how the agreement forms. Moreover, using individual-level mechanisms as explanations for patterns among macro-level social entities necessitates some consideration. This follows because organizations qua organizations do not run into each other at foci and decide to form joint ventures. Corporate actors make these links in concrete ways by and for themselves and on behalf of their organizations. And not all equally situated and endowed corporate actors 1 We thus assume that organizations have institutionally defined and delegated rights, responsibilities, and incentives that enable their (micro level) agents to interact, engage, and establish formal and informal ties with other macro social entities (organizations) by interacting with other micro level corporate actors (Blau 1964; Coleman 1990, pp. 12-13; Ch. 16). 4 make these links in similar foci. Discerning differences and similarities across similarly situated corporate actors is thus important. ----------------------------------- Insert Figure 1. about here ----------------------------------- We employ a mixed-methods approach to do so. In the next section we describe the strategic research site—professional forensic DNA scientists employed in state crime laboratories. Survey data are then used to paint a picture of the social structure of knowledge sharing relationships and constraints among these labs across states. We employ these quantitative methods for descriptive rather than predictive purposes, so formal hypotheses are not proposed. Focus is then devoted to the qualitative evidence, which is particularly well suited to inform how knowledge sharing relationships form within foci, which is the novel theoretical contribution offered here. We conclude with a summary and discussion of theoretical implications and potential extensions. STRATEGIC RESEARCH SITE: FORENSIC DNA ANALYSIS LABORATORIES The objective of this research is to identify and describe the mechanisms leading to social tie formation between corporate agents that lead to knowledge diffusion between macro-social entities. We thus require a strategic site in which tasks are inherently complex and require more than codified instructions—that is, a context in which knowledge is embedded in both individual actors and the specific social systems in which they work (on organizational knowledge see, e.g., Cook and Brown 1999; Tsoukas and Vladimiou 2002). We also require a setting in which knowledge is constantly changing, which implies that actors must constantly update their knowledge. 5 We identified an institutional field that evidenced these characteristics: government-run laboratories that analyze forensic DNA. The work of forensic scientists is knowledge-intensive, specialized, and highly complex, and it is subject to constantly changing technology (Self- identifying citation omitted). The minimum educational requirement for forensic scientists 2 is a Bachelor of Science degree, and most scientists hold degrees in chemistry or biology. Many DNA analysts also have a Master of Science degree (often required for supervisory positions) in chemistry, biology, or forensic science. Supervisors often have doctorate degrees. Given the educational requirements and the subsequent task-specific human capital required, this field evidences many of the characteristics of science and academia as individuals must constantly update their knowledge and skills, and this learning process often occurs through networks and institutional mechanisms such as professional conferences. There are DNA laboratories at the federal, state, and local levels. These labs are generally non-hierarchically arranged. State labs generally do not have authority over local labs, nor do federal over state labs. However, there are elements of hierarchy within the system with respect to: (1) the infrastructure (the FBI promulgates rules regarding access to the national database); (2) resources (e.g., lab funding); and (3) federal regulation. Neither the size of a single lab nor the number of labs in a given state necessarily reflects the size (or population) of the host state. Rather, it is a result of historical development due to: state and local jurisdictions that attribute more or less importance to DNA analysis; institutional 2 The field of forensic science is defined by the American Association of Forensic Scientists as ―the application of the natural sciences to matters of the law.‖ 6 entrepreneurship (a successful lab is more likely to expand); and geographical necessity (states with greater land area may see the need for geographically dispersed labs). Although procedural rules and regulations vary between labs and across jurisdictions, the core work of forensic scientists in government crime labs is essentially the same. It includes: determining the usefulness of a DNA sample provided by crime scene investigators; the preparation of a sample for analysis; the interpretation of DNA mixtures (e.g. when the DNA of two or more individuals is present in a sample); creating DNA profiles; and uploading the DNA profiles of convicted offenders into a database. The vast majority of procedures involved in these tasks are codified in painstaking detail in the labs‘ manuals, which are constantly updated to reflect the rapid change of technological advancement and resulting new procedures. Furthermore, the FBI issues regulations that govern access to the Combined DNA Index System (CODIS). CODIS is software that links and operates local, state, and national databases of DNA profiles from convicted offenders, crime scene evidence from unsolved crimes, and missing persons. CODIS allows for the electronic comparison of these profiles. The objective of the database is to link known individuals to crimes, as well as crimes to each other. The state component of the database is known as the State DNA Index System (SDIS), where a subset of these profiles is also uploaded into the National DNA Index System (NDIS). Lab procedures are regularly audited under the auspices of the FBI to ensure compliance with standards set by the National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST). Compared with private sector fields, this setting is thus ne in which there are considerable pressures towards sharing (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). Inter-lab competitive forces for relationships should thus be subdued. Despite this high level of codification, a considerable amount of ambiguity and discretion remains in the work of DNA forensic scientists. For example, the processing of DNA mixtures 7 requires interpretation. There are a number of statistical that can be used in similar cases, and different labs prescribe the use of different statistics (Butler 2005). Another example is the adoption of newly available technologies. In addition to decisions concerning what technology to use, there are different private equipment vendors to choose from with varying levels of quality and support. The choice of which vendors to use is thus consequential as it can significantly influence both the efficiency and efficacy of a lab. Finally, there is a wide range of discretionary management issues ranging from human resource issues to decisions concerning the design of new laboratory space. In summary, DNA laboratories in the United States offer a good site within which to study knowledge sharing across salient macro-structural boundaries: First, there is a rather limited and clearly definable population of laboratories (about 180), with at least one laboratory in every state; second, each laboratory, and individuals within laboratories, have significant discretion concerning boundary spanning and sharing activities; and, third, each lab‘s ability to fulfill its responsibilities is contingent on constantly acquiring and internalizing new knowledge. QUALITATIVE AND QUANTITATIVE DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS Qualitative data collection. DNA labs exhibit variation in terms of size, location, structure, and expertise. To ensure that we developed a comprehensive understanding of the field of enquiry we sampled firms across various strata. Respondents for this study were selected through purposeful sampling (Yin 1994) according to the professional roles held by members of the community in a single case study design with multiple sites. This method of sampling allows for comparability between the respondents while allowing for variation across labs types to achieve representativeness. Participant recruitment began with state CODIS administrators. We assumed that these individuals had a greater need to connect to their peers in other labs because there is only one 8 CODIS administrator per lab, and CODIS is the mechanism used for inter-state sample comparisons. After a first round of telephone interviews, two of the authors attended several CODIS conferences and interviewed state administrators in-person. Attending these conferences allowed the authors to gain insights into the interaction patterns of CODIS administrators. Early participants in the study led us sequentially to additional important respondents within the community (Miles and Huberman 1994). We stopped recruiting additional respondents when we started getting very similar responses and therefore had reached saturation in our sample. Our final pool of respondents consisted of 33 individuals, from 30 labs and 26 states. We conducted semi-structured, open-ended interviews with these informants that lasted between thirty minutes and two hours. The interviews covered the following topics: Description of work function and work environment; knowledge required for the job; sources of knowledge; and nature, extent, and methods of community engagement. As our data collection proceeded, we also included specific questions about the nature of ties to individuals in other labs. Table 1 below provides a description of the qualitative interviewees. For more detail on data acquisition see (self-identifying citation omitted). ----------------------------------- Insert Table 1. about here ----------------------------------- In addition to the aforesaid data collection efforts, two of the authors visited several crime labs and observed forensic scientists in their places of work. These were not full-fledged ethnographies. However, the observers were nonetheless able to get a far richer appreciation of the localized settings, inter-lab variations in culture and practice, and work functions of scientists in different labs (Emerson, Fretz, and Shaw 2001). 9 Qualitative data analysis. The analytic process was driven by the objective of making sense of the data by identifying recurring patterns. To this end, we followed the coding and analysis process described in Miles and Huberman (1994). All interviews were transcribed verbatim, coded, and interpreted by the authors and a team of research assistants. Throughout the data analysis process, we followed a procedure of iterating between our conceptual framework, the data, and the literature (Strauss 1987). All interviews were transcribed verbatim, and coded: First, each of our qualitative research team members ―open coded‖ the interview transcripts as they became available and labeled meaningful passages. Second, we then met as a team and discussed each label, resulting in an initial list of codes (Miles and Huberman 1994). This list of codes was used by a team of research assistants to subsequently code all interviews with the help of the qualitative research software. Trained research assistants were instructed to code line by line; thus the smallest coding unit was a single line of text. Each member of the research team also wrote memos or notes about codes and their relationships, which became part of the data. One author periodically met with the team of research assistants and discussed issues that arose during individual coding. Once the initial coding was complete, a senior research assistant ran a comparison of coding to ensure intercoder reliability; 85% of the codes were similarly identified by different coders. This is considered an acceptable level of inter-coder reliability (Smith, Feld, and Franz 1992). Discrepancies between the individual coders were discussed until an agreement was reached. The third step entailed axial (or pattern) coding. This entails subsuming similar codes into meta-codes (Miles and Huberman 1994). For example, we clustered all codes that referred to the way individuals search for knowledge, what sources they turn to, and the rationales behind those choices, into a meta-code entitled ―search strategies.‖ Finally, fourth, we constructed 10 matrix displays (Miles and Huberman 1994) to study the relationship between meta-codes and select characteristics of the respondents. Survey data. Surveys were administered to representatives of DNA labs in the United States in December of 2005. Complete responses were received from 37. By implication we did not receive responses from all states. Consequently, in Table A1 in the Appendix we tabulate and test for differences between responding and missing states. Descriptive results suggest that, on average, states that did respond tend to be larger and have more lab facilities and capacity than those that did not. However, differences are not statistically significant. 3 We then supplemented the survey data with external data from each state from government sources. These external data include population and economic statics and dynamics, geographic information, institutional (regional) affiliations, crime statistics, and information about forensic lab size, capacity, and prior assistance to other labs. Using data from government sources external to the survey mitigates concerns of common methods bias (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Jeong-Yeon, and Podsakoff 2003). Table 2 below provides detail concerning each of the specific datum, its source, its mean and standard deviation. Directed knowledge sharing ties across states. Survey participants were asked the following question to determine which labs in which states outside their own they contacted for assistance: ―When your laboratory seeks additional expertise in difficult DNA cases (e.g., trace evidence, DNA mixtures, kinship analysis) in which labs are the individuals you would typically consult?‖ Respondents were asked to check next to each of the 50 US States and the District of Columbia if they contacted a lab therein for assistance. A dummy coded variable is thus specified such that (Xij = 0 or Xij= 1, but Xij does not necessarily = Xji). That is, assistance seeking 3 States for which we have consequential ―missingness‖ include: Alaska, DC, Florida, Idaho, Kentucky, Maine, Michigan, Mississippi, Nevada, North Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Washington, and Wyoming. 11 is construed as directed—lab i may seek the assistance of lab j but lab j need not seek the assistance of lab i. Explanatory variables. Based on our initial qualitative and observational data collection we developed an appreciation for the importance of professional association meetings for establishing and maintaining contacts and accessing new knowledge. These meetings are foci (Feld 1981). We thus expect to observe a positive relationship between the number of meetings that corporate actors of labs in different states both attended and the likelihood that a knowledge sharing tie exists between the states’ labs. To test this we compute a variable ranging from 0 to 6 (mean = 3.658; SD = 1.473) denoting the number of various professional conferences scientists in labs i and j both attended in the past two years. We should observe that laboratories in adjoining states such as New York and New Jersey are more likely to have a directed knowledge sharing tie than New York and Alabama. One reason for this is the movement of personnel between laboratories, as indicated in our qualitative data analyses. Moreover, adjoining states are more likely to have collaboration opportunities as a result of regional crime patterns (Stouffer 1940; Brantingham and Brantingham 1981; Canter and Gregory 1994; Harries 1999). It thus follows that to the extent that offenders commit crimes in other jurisdictions (states) than those in which they reside, they are more likely to do so in: (a) adjacent states, and/or (b) jurisdictions that are closer. Consequently, labs are more likely to have DNA hits for offenders in adjacent or close states, and are thus more likely to have knowledge sharing ties with such labs. We thus expect that laboratories in different states are more likely to have knowledge sharing ties with laboratories in other states as a function of proximity (see, e.g., Sorenson and Stuart 2001; Kalnins and Chung 2006). A dummy variable denoting states i and j are adjacent is thus calculated (mean = 12 0.09; SD = 0.286). We also create vectors of measures to capture location differences and those pertaining to similarity across other characteristics. For geography we include (ln) distance (mean = 6.772; SD = 0.809); and dummy variables indicating that states i and j are in the same Census region (mean = 0.234; SD = 0.424) or Health and Human Services Region (mean = 0.089; SD = 0.234) respectively. From a functional perspective, labs in states with a greater capacity to assist with investigations should be more likely to be contacted by other states‘ labs for assistance. We thus compute measures that get at each state‘s labs‘ capacity to assist with investigations. These measures include global mean-centered measures of the number of: investigations state j’s labs assisted in 2003( #(investigations aided)j,’03 – Σ ), forensic samples (#(forensic samples)j,’03 – Σ ), and offender profiles (#(offender profiles)j,’03 – Σ ) in j’s databases. To capture preferential attachment or a Matthew Effect (Yule 1925; Merton 1968; 1985; 1988; Havemann, Heinz, Wagner-Döbler 2005) we include a measure of each alter states‘ labs indegree that is centered around the global mean: I(deg)j – Σ . This mechanism implies that net of functional differences accounted for with the measures outlined above, we should observe that labs in given states (i) are more likely to seek counsel from labs in different states ( j) if other states ( m) also seek counsel from j. We also calculate measures that vary over ego and alter dyads concerning the relative crime and economic conditions in each state to measure similarities (homophily) and differences in the states‘ crime, social, and economic conditions that may compel one state‘s labs to seek counsel from labs in another state. These measures include: differences in per capita income 13 between states i and j at time t-1 (|Per capita incomei,‘04 – Per capita incomej,‘04|); comparative changes in population growth rates between states from t-2 to t-1 (|∆(% pop. growth)i,‘03-‗‘04 – ∆(% pop. growth)j, ‘03-‘04|); the absolute difference in the number of hate crimes (|# hate crimesi,‘04 – # hate crimesj,‘04|), comparative changes in murder rates (|∆(%murders)i,‘03‘-‘04 – ∆(%murders)j, ‘03-‘04|), and rapes (|∆(%rapes)i,‘03-‘04 – ∆(%rapes)j, ‘03-‘04|). We focus on these crimes because of their relative prominence, as well as the importance of DNA evidence in apprehending and convicting perpetrators in such cases. We also calculate similar metrics specific to each alter state, j (# hate crimesj, ‘04, ∆(%murders)j, ‘03-‘04, ∆(% rapes)j, ‘03-‘04), based on the intuition that states with higher rates of these crimes may receive more public exposure. These metrics are all lagged based on the nature and availability of the data. The length of the respective lag of each measure is noted in table 2 below, along with a description of the measure along with its source. Finally, as a structural control, we specify a dummy variable indicating reciprocity (Xij= Xji=1), which occurs quite rarely in our data (mean = 0.009; SD = 0.094). --------------------------------- Insert Table 2. about here --------------------------------- Statistical model. We use quantitative data to determine which factors lead a lab in a specific state to contact a lab in a different state for counsel and advice on difficult cases. Modeling this process is complicated because of structural autocorrelation arising from the dependency between observations in the same row or column (Krachhardt 1988). We thus employ an MRQAP model (a linear probability model in this context) that is robust to multicollinearity and skewness using the double semi-partialling method proposed by Dekker, Krachhardt, and Snijders (2007). P-values are computed using 2000 – 3000 permutations. PRESENTATION OF FINDINGS 14 ---------------------------------- Insert Figure 2. about here ---------------------------------- The social structure of inter-state DNA lab knowledge sharing Figure 2 is a graphical depiction of the digraph. Some basic descriptive statistics of the digraph indicate one large component and one isolate (South Carolina). The average geodesic distance (among reachable dyads) is 3.287. The mean raw (normalized) indegree is 2.622 (7.282), with a standard deviations of 2.654 (7.373). These figures indicate that most states do not have a significant amount of contact with labs in other states, but there are a few labs that seek or provide counsel to several other states. Outdegree (indegree) network centralization is 29.63% (23.92%), which suggests that directed ties are not concentrated around a few hubs. Finally, measures of centrality indicate that states such as California, Texas, Illinois, and Pennsylvania are frequently cited as states housing labs to which labs in other states turn to for counsel with difficult cases. The state of Virginia has the largest indegree. In order to determine what factors lead to these ties, we turn now to the regressions. ---------------------------------- Insert Table 3. about here ---------------------------------- Table 3 above presents coefficients from MRQAP linear probability regressions. The first model includes variables measuring propinquity and geography. As noted above, because crimes tend to be perpetrated within close proximity to offenders‘ homes (Stouffer 1940; Brantingham and Brantingham 1981; Canter and Gregory 1994; Harries 1999), it follows that to the extent that offenders commit crimes in other jurisdictions (states) than those in which they reside, they are more likely to do so in: (a) adjacent states, and/or (b) states that are geographically closer based 15 on distance. Consequently, labs should be more likely to have DNA hits for offenders in adjacent or close states, and should thus more likely to have knowledge sharing ties with such labs. Our quantitative evidence substantiates this intuition. Sharing a border with a state (adjacency) increases the probability of also seeking counsel from a DNA lab in that states (b = 0.184; SE = 0.178; p <.001 (two-tailed test)). Similarly, if a state lab is in the same Census region as that of another state it is also more likely to seek counsel from a lab in that other state (b = 0.031; SE = 0.121; p <.1). On the other hand, (ln) distance between states decreases this likelihood (b = - 0.019; SE = 0.081; p <.1). Figure 4 below depicts a potential reason for this pattern that is consistent with the story outlined above. The figure illustrates the number of DNA ―hits‖ in Massachusetts‘ that can be matched to those in other states. Most of the hits are concentrated in the Northeast in states that are adjacent to Massachusetts. ---------------------------------- Insert Figure 4. about here ---------------------------------- The primary source of social connections and knowledge transfer—mentioned by nearly every one of our informants in the qualitative interviews—is attendance at several different professional meetings. Co-attendance at professional meetings is important for several reasons. First, it affords the opportunity to deepen and broaden existing social relationships. Second, it provides a venue for the exchange of best practices and emerging knowledge. Finally, meetings are a focus (Feld 1981) or setting (Sorenson and Stuart 2008) where new ties can form—ties that may extend beyond geographic areas. Models 2 and 3 include the measure of the number of professional meetings representatives of labs in states i and j both attended. Model 2 is an unconditional model and model 3 includes the measures of propinquity and geography. The results of both models 16 indicate that as the number of meetings i attended that j also attended increases, so too does the probability that i seeks help from j in difficult cases (model 2: b=0.016; SE = 0.037; model 3: 0.014; SE = 0.086; both p <. 05). 4 Among the most consistent findings in the various literatures concerning networks is that they tend to exhibit power-law distributions (Barabási and Albert 1999; Newman 2005; Clauset, Shalizi, and Newman 2009). These distributional realizations may be the result of preferential attachment processes or a Matthew Effect (Yule 1925; Merton 1968; 1985; 1988; Havemann, Heinz, Wagner-Döbler 2005). In our context such processes imply that a lab in state i is more likely to seek counsel in difficult cases from labs in state j (but not necessarily vice versa) if that lab is more frequently contacted by other labs (m) for advice. This may be due to past performance differences or those pertaining to perceptions thereof. An example of the essence of this process playing out in our research site is recounted by a deputy director in a NY lab, who was asked about who he contacts for information. His response is telling: ―Usually it‘s a telephone call or an email to colleagues that I know. I find the information is more the opposite. [i.e., people usually contact NYC rather than vice versa].‖ Model 3 includes a measure of indegree for state j. The estimate suggests that states (i) are indeed more likely to seek counsel from labs in another state (j) if other states‘ labs (m) also seek counsel from labs in state j (b = 0.025; SE = 0.078; p <.001). Functional differences and perceptions thereof may not be tightly coupled (Merton 1968). Our quantitative data allow for a nice distinction of the two. We have data on directed (indegree), as just noted. Additionally, we have quite granular data on the economic, social, and criminological characteristics of different states. We also collected data on each state‘s lab- 4 A squared term could not be estimated along with the main effect due to excessive collinearity. 17 specific capabilities (number of samples, offender profiles) and prior level of investigations aided that enable us to directly measure and thus distinguish states‘ labs actual ability and past willingness to assist with investigations. Not surprisingly, these coefficients are correlated with an ―alter‖ (j) lab‘s indegree: .70 with the number of offender profiles; .67 with the number of forensic samples; and .70 with the number of investigations aided. These correlations suggest that directed ties seeking counsel on hard cases are indeed informed by the ability and willingness of a target lab to offer assistance. There is, however, an important and sizeable effect that cannot be attributed to these functional concerns that implicates other processes. In model 5 we specify an unconditional model that includes three measures that capture state j‘s functional capacity and past willingness to assist with DNA cases. The evidence suggests that labs are more likely to contact labs in other states for assistance if they have evidence that state has a greater than average willingness to aid in investigations. The same is true if it has a larger than average number of offender profiles. However, once the other measures are included (in model 6) these effects no longer achieve statistical significance at conventional levels. Estimates in model 6 also suggest that the comparative crime, economic, and social conditions of the states does not have a bearing on the likelihood of seeking assistance across states. Finally, there is strong evidence that labs are likely to seek counsel on difficult cases from labs that seek counsel from them (b = 0.786; SE = 0.061; p < .001). That is, there is strong tendency towards reciprocity. The quantitative evidence provides a picture of the social structure of state-run DNA laboratories in the United States in and around 2005. It also describes what factors are associated with assistance seeking across states. Results indicate that propinquity and geography matter. Having a place to meet and socialize also matters, as does preferential attachment. These data do 18 not, however, afford leverage to open the black-box of tie formation. We now turn to the qualitative evidence that does. Search for knowledge Analytical technologies constantly evolve. As a result, scientists in the labs we studied are compelled to constantly update their knowledge. In coding the qualitative responses we observed a consistent pattern concerning the sequence of knowledge search: technicians first reviewed documents (internal manuals, audit documents, and professional websites). If this search failed to yield answers, they would then seek the counsel of experts within their labs on the matter. For example, Bob* 5 , an assistant in a NY lab, put it: […] we have a chain of command, if I had a question, or a concern about a policy that I feel like is not in existence for example, like the manual doesn’t address something, and I’ve never been trained in how to address something, so I would go to [supervisor’s name excluded] first. Although, I kind of know in the back of my head, she’s not going to know the answer to this, or she doesn’t have the discretion to decide, okay, you’re right, there’s no policy, this is the policy. She’s going to have to take my question to[leader’s name removed] who’s the technical leader […] This was more frequently the case in the largest labs that had the most internal resources. It also serves as a meaningful baseline when interpreting other findings. That is, a knowledge search process that begins by referring to codified material. Figure 1 provides a stylized depiction of how individual organizational actors (employees) develop social capital that: (1) spans organizational boundaries; and (2) links laboratories, thus allowing knowledge and assistance flow. This figure is based on the qualitative evidence from our case as well as prior research. 5 This and all other names are pseudonyms. 19 Social capital formation The primary source of social connections and ultimately knowledge transfer—mentioned by nearly every one of our informants—is attendance at professional meetings. This co- attendance can lead to knowledge transfer and the establishment of individual, scientist-level ties between labs that that are otherwise unlikely given the geographic distance and size differences of labs; for example, an inter-organizational link between a large lab in NY and one in a small state established by individual scientists. As Jonah of a NY lab states: […] No, I mean the social aspects can’t be ignored. That’s one of the biggest perks of going to those things. But going to the conferences and listening to the lectures and seeing the post presentations, and seeing what people are doing out there is amazing, ‘cause there are some people in these Podunk little college towns that are doing forensic research that is cutting edge stuff and it’s great. We see these posters and we’re blown away. And we come back here and we say listen, we have to call that guy and talk to him about his, whatever he developed, protocol, procedures, whatever, and see if we can implement that in this laboratory ‘cause it’s feasible, we can do that. Professional association meetings are thus an important focus (Feld 1981) in which relationships form and strengthen. Consequently, lab administrators use them strategically—an investment in sociability (Bourdieu 1985; Lin 1991) that leads to social capital. Claire, a CODIS administrator stated it thusly: We had 2 people at that meeting. I try and send as many people as I can to conferences like that. Not just to listen to the papers, but also it’s a good way to meet up with everyone else in the other labs and share stories and get information. So yeah, we attend as many conferences as we can. John, a deputy director, also stresses the social aspect of meetings But if people have met at meetings—what I find in the meeting, it’s not always the content that’s important, but also the contacts that I make, they’re both important. I meet my colleagues at these various meetings, and then we network at the meetings. So I find I get as much out of dinner, lunch and talking to people as I do for the scientific sessions. And 20 that’s not to say the meeting’s not important for scientific sessions, because I don’t want to be quoted that way. It is important to note that many of the meetings are funded by either the government or commercial vendors who sell the analytical technologies used by the scientists. This funding makes it possible for many of the scientists to attend the conferences who might not otherwise be able to. This institutional structure is thus a vital force that helps foster the conditions for social tie formation and subsequent knowledge diffusion across labs. Micro social mobility and macro knowledge flow: The important of audits and employee mobility Prior research has revealed how champions such as consultants are often the conduits of the diffusion of new practices (e.g., Covaleski and Dirsmith 1988; DiMaggio 1991; Sitkin, Sutcliffe, and Schroeder 1994).Our fieldwork suggests a similar mechanism: institutional audits. Institutional audits are a particularly interesting basis of knowledge transference across organizations. Audits are typically conducted by seasoned individuals in the field. When they visit a site they thus serve multiple purposes. First, they serve a role of auditor by evaluating laboratories. In the process they also afford access to their stocks of knowledge gleaned from their own site and the other sites they have visited. Second, a visit to a site affords the opportunity for an interpersonal connection (much like academic talks and subsequent one-on- one faculty meetings). These connections can serve as the link connecting two laboratories across states that serves as a conduit for knowledge transfer across space. Cathy describes this process thusly: I think we have one of the most thorough training programs in the country, and I base that on audits of other laboratories, and I’ve done about 50 audits of different laboratories. There’s another source of contacts that I have and a good base knowledge of who does what. That helps me out a lot there, those audits. I always go to the experienced people first. And I have experiences in some areas and I’m able to answer those questions, but areas I don’t, I try to find people and identify people when I go out to 21 meetings that have experiences in areas that I don’t ‘cause I can’t be experienced in every area; there’s just not enough time in the day. Prior research shows that the localization or movement of individuals (micro social units of analysis) across salient macro-social divides has a significant bearing on the concentration, distribution, and diffusion of knowledge. This transfer can occur when employees or owners from one firm make lateral moves to other firms, or found their own firms (Argote and Ingram 2000; Phillips 2002; Song, Almeida and Wu 2003). For example, the interorganizational mobility of scientists can lead to the localization of knowledge within macro-level social boundaries such as regions (Saxenian 1994; Almeida and Kogut 1999; Rosenkopf and Almeida 2003). Structural rules that inhibit this movement can thus have implications for knowledge flows across organizations (Marx Strumsky, and Fleming 2009). Similarly, the mobility of individuals can also lead to the dissolution of the linkages among macro social entities. The movement of professionals from one firm, A, to another, B, for example, often leads to the dissolution of an existing business relationship between firms (e.g., between A and C) as manager, i, moves from firm B to firm C (see, e.g., Broschak 2004; see also Baker, Faulker, and Fisher 1998). We also find that inter-organizational and inter-state knowledge transfer originates from the movement of colleagues across labs. Brandon, a DNA tech leader, put it thusly: Well it comes in one of two groups, and that’s folks that I came to know personally, by working with them. Two of my former bosses are on that list. Actually I guess three of my former bosses are on that list. […] SUMMARY & CONCLUSIONS Significant attention has been devoted to the patterns and consequences of boundary spanning activities, information search and sharing, and isomorphism of organizational knowledge and practice. In much of this research organizations are viewed as social actors in and of themselves that engage in this boundary spanning activity. This focus is sensible when 22 analyzing the patterns of organizational ties. However, it is not especially well-suited to the study of the mechanisms governing how and why organizations develop social capital and span boundaries in the first place. In this research we unpacked the black box of organizational social capital formation boundary spanning activity. By using unique qualitative and quantitative data from a knowledge intensive industry—US government crime laboratories involved in DNA analysis—we identified several mechanisms leading to boundary spanning activity. The quantitative data we provide a picture of several of the mechanisms, as well as the antecedents of isomorphism processes. Results reveal that structural features, chance meetings, and the initiative of lab leaders (and to a lesser extent subordinates) lead to boundary spanning activity, access to distinct pools of knowledge, and, ultimately, isomorphism. Thus social structure exhibits significant subtleties. On one hand, structural forces clearly contour and condition the nature of knowledge flow across organizational boundaries. Institutional forces create the conditions for tie formation by providing funding for scientist travel to professional conferences, or by dictating the timing and actors involved in institutional audits. However, this funding does not, in itself, lead to tie formation. That requires the action of individuals in pursuit of knowledge. 23 REFERENCES Alexander, Jeffrey C. 1987. The Micro-Macro Link. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. 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Mechanisms linking macro social entities to micro entities (e.g., employment contracts) 3. Relationships between micro social entities 4. Link between macro social entities enabled by micro level (corporate agents) 1 2 2 3 4 29 FIGURE 2. DIRECTED KNOWLEDGE SHARING TIES BETWEEN DNA LABS IN THE USA, 2005 Note: Free-form Kamada-Kawai algorithm used for graph layout. Average geodesic distance (among reachable dyads) = 3.287 Overall (weighted) graph clustering coefficient=0.147 (0.117) Mean (normalized) indegree = 2.622 (7.282); standard deviations = 2.654 (7.373) Network centralization (outdegree) = 29.63% Network centralization (indegree) = 23.92% 30 FIGURE 3. STATES WEIGHTED BY NUMBER OF DNA MATCHES WITH SAMPLES FROM MASSACHUSETTS 31 FIGURE 4. STYLIZED DEPICTION OF MECHANISMS LEADING TO KNOWLEDGE DIFFUSION Individuals Mechanism Organizational ties (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) Note: Mechanisms ―A,‖ ―B,‖ and ―C‖ identified in our field work; mechanisms ―D,‖ ―E,‖ and ―F‖ identified in prior literature and our quantitative analyses. Lowercase a and b represent individual corporate actors (e.g., CODIS administrators); i and j denote labs. Meetings/ Conferences b a b a Organization audit b a j i Employment transition b a j i j i b a Geography b a Homophily j j Preferential attachment j j b a 32 TABLE 1. OVERVIEW OF INTERVIEWS CONDUCTED Professional role* Affiliation: State lab Affiliation: Local lab Total Lab director 8 2 10 Technical leader 7 3 10 CODIS administrator 8 5 13 Total 23 10 33 * In cases where individuals hold multiple roles, the highest-ranking role is indicated. 33 TABLE 2. DESCRIPTION OF KEY VARIABLES Variable Mean S.D. Year Source Knowledge sharing tie between states (ij,ji, Xij≠Xji,)…………………………………….......………… 0.073 0.260 2005 Survey Σ professional meetings employees of states i and j co- attended……………… ……………………………………………… 3.658 1.473 2003 – 2005 Survey Reciprocity (Xij=Xji=1)……………………….………………. I(deg)j – Σ …………………………………………….. 0.009 0.000 0.094 2.761 2003 – 2005 2003 – 2005 Survey Survey State j’s capacity to assist with investigations: #(investigations aided)j,’03 – Σ #(forensic samples)j,’03 – Σ …….... #(offender profiles)j,’03 – Σ …….... Comparative and state-specific dynamic |(i – j)| crime environments: | # hate crimesi,‘04 – # hate crimesj, ‘04|…..………………. |∆(% murders)i,‘03‘-‘04 – ∆(% murders)j, ‘03-‘04|……......….. 0.000 0.000 0.000 210.33 17.121% 1210.919 4174.435 117495.945 299.667 26.294% 2003 – 2004 FBI Uniform Crime Reports/ DOJ/FBI/CODIS |∆(% rapes)i,‘03-‘04 – ∆(% rapes)j, ‘03-‘04|………....….....…. # hate crimesj, ‘04……………...………………….…….... ∆(% murders)j, ‘03-‘04………….......……...……….……… ∆(% rapes)j, ‘03-‘04………………………..………………. 10.108% 165.243 -0.608 1.773 10.492% 255.359 16.485 10.162 Comparative state economic and population metrics: |Per capita incomei,‘04 – Per capita incomej,‘04|…....….…. |∆(% pop. growth)i,‘03-‗‘04 – ∆(% pop. growth)j, ‘03-‘04|..…. $5,495.79 0.631% $4,149.43 0.55% 2003 – 2004 Regional Economic Information System, Bureau of Economic Analysis, US Department of Commerce Geography and institutional measures: State-to-state distances (LN distance)………..…….…… 6.772 0.809 2005 GIS States i and j share a border (i.e., are adjacent)………... 0.090 0.286 2005 U.S. Census States are in the same Census region…………………….. 0.234 0.424 2005 U.S. Census States are in the same Health and Human Services region……………...………………,…………….… 0.089 0.284 2005 U.S. Dept of Health and Human Services Note: Italicized variables are dichotomous (0/1). Statistics calculated at the state or dyadic level (indicated by ―survey‖). 34 TABLE 3. MRQAP REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS PREDICTING DIRECTED TIES BETWEEN DNA LABS IN STATES I AND J MODEL: VARIABLE: 1. Propinquity b(SE) 2. Co- attendance at meetings b(SE) 3. Propinquity + Co-attendance b(SE) 4. Indegree b(SE) 5. Functional Considerations b(SE) 6. States‘ crime, Economic, and Population trends b(SE) 7. Final model b(SE) States i and j are adjacent………........................ 0.184*** (0.178) 0.181*** (0.14) 0.176*** (0.124) 0.135*** (0.212) States are in same Census region……………………….…... 0.031# (0.121) 0.033* (0.095) 0.036* (0.083) 0.02 (0.204) LN(Distance) between states i and j…...........……….. -0.019# (0.081) -0.019# (0.083) -0.016 (0.068) -0.016# (0.203) Σ of meetings i and j co- attended…………………….... Reciprocity (Xij=Xji=1)……… I(deg)j – Σ ………….... #(investigations aided)j,’03 – Σ … #(forensic samples)j ,’03 – Σ …… #(offender profiles)j ,’03 – Σ …..... |# hate crimesi,‘04 – # hate crimesj, ‘04|….................. 0.016** (0.037) 0.014* (0.086) 0.011* (0.083) 0.025*** (0.078) 0.000* (0.031) -0.000 (0.031) 0.000** (0.031) 0.000 (0.056) 0.009* (0.184) 0.786*** (0.061) 0.024*** (0.197) 0.000 (0.203) -0.000# (0.202) 0.000# (0.200) -0.000 (0.187) 35 |∆(%murders)i,‘03‘-‘04 – ∆(%murders)j, ‘03-‘04|................. |∆(%rapes)i,‘03-‘04 – ∆(%rapes)j, ‘03-‘04|…………... |Per capita incomei,‘04 – Per capita incomej,‘04|……… |∆(% pop. growth)i,‘03-‗‘04 – ∆(% pop. growth)j, ‘03-‘04|.......... Intercept……………………... 0.180 0.014 0.123 0.116 0.072 -0.000 (0.05) -0.002** (0.04) -0.000** (0.039) -0.022# (0.043) 0.013 0.000 (0.21) -0.000 (0.206) -0.000 (0.191) -0.014 (0.197) 0.138 R 2 Adjusted R 2 Probability # of permutations # of observations 0.072 0.070 0.000 2000 1332 0.008 0.008 0.012 2000 1332 0.078 0.076 0.000 2000 1332 0.151 0.148 0.000 2000 1332 0.038 0.036 0.000 2000 1332 0.017 0.014 0.000 2000 1332 0.234 0.227 0.000 3000 1332 Source: Unique data; see table 2 above for a description of the data sources. Note: Unstandardized coefficients presented. MRQAP computed via Double-Dekker Semi-Partialling. Italicized variables are dichotomous (0/1). #P < .05 (one-tailed test) *P < .05 (two-tailed test) **P < .01 (two-tailed test) ***P<.001 (two-tailed test) 36 APPENDIX TABLE A1. EVALUATION OF POTENTIAL SAMPLE SELECTION Sources: See table above for sources of each measure. Note: T-tests performed assuming equal or unequal variance (more liberal results shown, i.e., those more likely to evidence a difference). States (+DC) for which we have consequential ―missingness‖ include: Alaska, DC, Florida, Idaho, Kentucky, Maine, Michigan, Mississippi, Nevada, North Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Washington, and Wyoming. #P <.1 (two-tailed test) *P <.05 **P <.01 ***P <.001 VARIABLE RESPONSE MISSING RESPONSE Mean SE Mean SE t-test p value Population, 2004…………… 6,241,057 1,154,646 4,481,164 1,297,474 0.312 ∆ population, '03-'04……….. 0.810 0.097 1.162 0298 0.279 ∆ % murder, '03 - '04….…… -0.608 2.748 4.943 6.982 0.469 # of hate crimes, '04……….. 169.833 43.504 109.643 39.885 0.314 # of labs in state……………. 3.865 0.764 2.357 0.589 0.125 # of offender profiles, '03….. 84,070.46 19,582.66 61,727.14 25,408.78 0.492 # of forensic samples, '03…. 3513.27 695.739 2128.143 900.487 0.233 # of investigations aided, '03. N 922.514 37 201.82 642.357 14 370.03 0.513 37 TABLE A2. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS: MRQAP REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS PREDICTING DIRECTED TIES BETWEEN STATE I AND J’S DNA LABS Model Description Key estimates, b(SE) Model Notes A1 Model 1 w/ HHS regions instead of Census regions 0.018(0.118), ns MRQAP A2 Model with attributes of i: ∆(# rapes)i,‘03-‗04 # hate crimesi,‘04 Per capita incomei, ‗04 -0.000(0.025),ns -0.000(0.031), ns 0.000(0.033), ns MRQAP A3 A4 Model with attributes of j: ∆(# rapes)j,‘03-‗04 # hate crimesj,‘04 Per capita incomej, ‗04 Model 7 with # hate crimesj,‘04 0.000(0.012), ns 0.000(0.019)* 0.000(0.023), ns -0.000(0.054),ns MRQAP MRQAP All other coefficients consistent with underlying model 
work_r3drbomj7zdjvp7evryhh2fdry	----	‘I have not witnessed it personally myself, but…’: epistemics in managing talk on racism against immigrants in Ireland A c c e p te d A rt ic le This article has been accepted for publication and undergone full peer review but has not been through the copyediting, typesetting, pagination and proofreading process, which may lead to differences between this version and the Version of Record. Please cite this article as doi: 10.1002/ejsp.2539 This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. DR. RAHUL SAMBARAJU (Orcid ID : 0000-0003-4936-8079) Article type : Research Article ‘I have not witnessed it personally myself, but…’: epistemics in managing talk on racism against immigrants in Ireland Dr Rahul Sambaraju1 and Dr Anca Minescu2, 1School of Psychology, Trinity College Dublin, University of Dublin, Ireland. 2Department of Psychology, University of Limerick, Ireland. Author note: Please direct queries to: Dr Rahul Sambaraju, Email: leo.sambaraju@gmail.com The authors declare that there are no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article. Abstract Social psychologists who study racism or prejudice argue that various versions of these are constructed in ways to suppress or minimize its relevance. However, researchers have not particularly examined how knowledge-claims about racism can also be variously made or negotiated in attending to the relevance of racism. We offer such an A c c e p te d A rt ic le This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. examination through a discursive psychological analysis of interview talk with Irish nationals on immigration, since in these settings issues of immigration and racism are not readily relevant. Findings show that participants treated how knowledge of racism can be accessed and who has the rights to make knowledge-claims about racism, as relevant. Epistemic access and rights were negotiated in ways that showed sensitivity to possibilities for suppressing alternative claims about racism. These findings are discussed in relation to current social psychological and discursive approaches to racism. Keywords: prejudice, racism, epistemics, witnessing, Ireland, immigration. In this paper we report findings on how epistemics of racism become relevant, and, are constructed and negotiated, in ways to manage talk on racism in the context of immigration into Ireland. These issues, while central to explicating racism, have rarely been the exclusive focus of examination. We conducted this study in Ireland, which offers unique opportunities to examine these issues. Our analysis focuses on how Irish nationals make relevant and negotiate epistemic issues in talk on racism against immigrants in Ireland. Social psychologists interested in examining issues of prejudice and/or racism, routinely study migration (Verkuyten, 2017). Migration that is either voluntary or forced, such as enslavement or asylum/refuge-seeking, implicates concerns that are of central interest to social psychologists. One important concern is that of prejudice. Social psychological studies on prejudice trace their origins to Allport’s (1954) text The Nature of Prejudice. Katz (1991) points to two noteworthy aspects of this seminal work. First, the relevance of prejudice goes beyond mere differences in phenotype (skin colour) in also attending to issues between ethnic or other social groups, such as migrants. A c c e p te d A rt ic le This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. Second that, both internal mental states (e.g.: personality) and external societal factors are implicated in ‘ethnic attitudes or aversions’, which were further posited as being central to the manifestation of prejudice in the form of discriminatory acts. These arguments continue to form the crux of much social psychological research in the form of examining social identity processes (Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971) or perception in intergroup relations (Xiao, Coppin, & Van Bavel, 2016). Social psychologists who employ a discourse analytic perspective, however, point to several problems with such understandings of prejudice (Billig, 1985; Hopkins, Reicher, & Levine, 1997). Alongside a central critique of the role of attitudes in explicating social behaviour (Potter & Wetherell, 1987), discourse analytic researchers point to particular problems with using the above outlined versions of prejudice. First, these notions of prejudice seriously limit empirical understandings and examinations of individuals’ situated actions (Wetherell, 2012). For instance, this notion offers a limited view of what is an unprejudiced action and who is a non-prejudiced person, someone identified as a ‘liberal’ and/or ‘rational’ individual. However, Figgou and Condor (2006) show that individuals in academia and lay settings employ various versions of prejudice and prejudicial action. To use any singular notion of prejudice would then limit the analytical focus (also see Durrheim, Quayle, & Dixon, 2015). Second, Potter and Wetherell (1987) point to how the use of this concept can allow for structural, systemic, and other broader forms of oppression and discrimination to flourish, since problematic outcomes are attributed to few ‘racist’ or ‘prejudiced’ individuals. Third, researchers argue that lay persons in their mundane interactions employ similar ideas of prejudice and how it works, and use these for practical ends. For instance, Figgou and Condor (2006) show that such versions are used to exculpate certain actors from being held accountable for their problematic actions. Rather, discursive researchers argue that prejudice is better examined as a situated discursive accomplishment (Edwards, 2003; Edwards & Potter, 1992; Wetherell & Potter, 1992). What this means is that discursive researchers examine discourse to explicate prejudice. A c c e p te d A rt ic le This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. Discursive approaches to racism and/or prejudice However, analysing talk of racism is beset with difficulties because speakers generally do not make explicit issues of race, ethnicity, or prejudice (Augoustinos & Every, 2007a). Researchers then employ distinct discourse analytic techniques to examine prejudice, which implicate various positions on the relations between discourse and social phenomena (Whitehead, 2017). Broadly, one set of discourse analytic studies that are critical in their focus, proceed with a prior definition or conceptualization of prejudice or racism. Another set of approaches that take inspiration from ethnomethodology (Garfinkel, 1967), refrain from adopting such definitions and treat racism or prejudice as a concern for participants (in contrast to ‘researchers’) themselves. Proceeding from this, three relevant differences can be formulated. First, in the former approach, researchers proceed with the analysis in ways to identify or treat some parts of data as instantiating racism or prejudice (van Dijk, 2000). In the latter approach, researchers proceed with examining how it is that participants treat some utterance or event as racist (or not) and attend to relevant concerns that arise in doing so. Second, in the former, racism or prejudice is explicated in terms of broader socio- political contexts (Goodman, 2010), social structures (van Dijk, 2001), or power differences (Essed, 1991), whereas in the latter such behaviour is explicated through properties and features of discourse and social interaction (Buttny, 1997). Third, in the former approach researchers employ analytical concepts such as ‘discourses’ (Barker, 2001) or interpretative repertoires (Wetherell, 2003) and examine how it is that these serve to maintain and propagate racism and/or discrimination. In the latter, analytical concepts such as preference organization (Whitehead, 2015) or membership categories (Stokoe & Edwards, 2007) are used to examine how people themselves make claims to, challenge, and negotiate racism or prejudice. While this classification is bound to gloss over details in specific analytic instances, this shows that for studies on racism or prejudice, making claims on data, such as that a specific utterance or statement is ‘racist’ or ‘prejudicial’ is not a straightforward matter. Moreover, this is the case for participants themselves. Thus, research A c c e p te d A rt ic le This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. shows that talk on racism or prejudice, that is ‘race-talk’ (Durrheim et al., 2015), is problematic in various ways (Augoustinos & Every, 2015). Critical approaches to race-talk One central finding from critical approaches is that racism involves descriptions and categorizations of individuals as problematic ‘others’. This process, called othering (Riggins, 1997), can involve making relevant ethnic membership (Reeves, 1982), citizenship (Goodman & Speer, 2007), or culture (Hanson-Easey & Augoustinos, 2010). Findings relating to migrants, refugees, and asylum-seekers show that various versions of nation and national identification are made salient and the absence of this on their part is treated as a warrant for their exclusion or limited access to opportunities (Every & Augoustinos, 2008; Hansen-Easey & Augoustinos, 2010). Since these features are routinely made relevant in ways that are problematic, researchers (van Dijk, 2000; Billig, 1999) argue that these are accompanied by ways in which racism or prejudice on the part of those doing othering are managed. First, practices of othering are accompanied by ways of obfuscating or minimizing issues of prejudice or racism (Augoustinos & Every, 2015). One of the earliest studies on migration in the United Kingdom (Reeves, 1983), shows that parliamentarians pointedly minimized issues of race in debates on Black peoples’ migration into the United Kingdom. Reeves (1983) shows that British parliamentarians’ warrants for exclusion and limited rights to Black peoples, cast reasons for exclusion as those aimed at preventing potentially problematic race relations than as an inherent problem with Black peoples. Reeves called this ‘discoursive deracialisation’ (also see Goodman & Burke, 2010). Second, researchers show how other means of suppressing and minimizing the role of prejudice or racism include disclaimers, such as ‘I’m not a racist, but…’ (van Dijk, 1992), denials of racist or prejudicial intent (Augoustinos & Every, 2010), and treating racism as a matter of the past (Bonilla-Silva, 2005). Social psychologists argue that a potential reason for this suppression and removal of explicit racial or prejudicial identification is that it is likely that making race relevant will A c c e p te d A rt ic le This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. invite assumptions of irrationality and therefore opposition (Billig, 1988), or that there are social taboos (Augoustinos & Every, 2007b). Problematically this also extends to those who face racism. Verkuyten (2005) shows that those in minority groups in The Netherlands might themselves suppress issues of racism and discrimination. He argues that doing so allows for possibilities of social mobility and managing blame. The above findings are usually discussed under the thesis of ‘new racism’ (Barker, 2001), which argues that racism takes place in less explicit and more ‘covert’ ways. However, there are issues with such an approach. First, in using some specific version of racism, analysts might make claims that are not always relevant in the data (Schegloff, 1988). Second, social psychologists (Condor, Figgou, Abell, Gibson, & Stevenson, 2006) note that prejudice- related actions are dialogic accomplishments that take place in particular interactions and that these implicate participants in various ways. Therefore, some researchers focus on examining how racism and attending implications are accomplished, challenged, and negotiated within interactions. Ethnomethodology inspired approaches to race-talk A central concern here is to examine how it is that speakers themselves orient to racism in interactions than to start with a prior definition of racism. For instance, researchers examine the various constructions of the very nature of racism, such as that it is “factual” versus merely “in someone’s head” (Potter, 1996). Potter & Wetherell (1988) show how Pakeha speakers in New Zealand work to produce their accounts on Pacific Islanders’ behaviours as factual claims through a range of resources. Another concern is to explicate the various resources that participants use in negotiating talk on racism. Research shows that participants hold themselves as accountable in treating race or ethnicity as relevant for others’ behaviours (Buttny, 1997). For instance, researchers show how common-sense understandings of people as members in ethnic or racial groupings are involved in engaging with racism. Here, analysts draw upon membership categorization analysis (Sacks, 1992), which examines how people categorize themselves and others as members in particular categories, A c c e p te d A rt ic le This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. and the outcomes of this for the interaction. In examining such issues in South African settings, Whitehead (2011) shows that racial-categorizations of “self” and “others” become relevant in occasions where this need not be the case. The argument here is that the routine relevance of race in explicating social action in South Africa, allows for the use of these categorizations. Findings also show that talk on race-related matters is an accountable issue for those who experience it. Kirkwood, McKinlay, & McVittie (2012) show that refugees in Scotland who were victims of racially-motivated violence, found it hard to attribute violence to racism or prejudice in research-interviews. The authors argue that doing so would risk accusing their host nation of being a problematic place. One way speakers might attend to these concerns of accountability is through the use of reported speech. Buttny (1997) argues that a central advantage of reporting what others may have said is that it allows for supplying context or sub-text in ways that offers particular inferences on what is being reported. In examining reporting of racism-related talk, Buttny and Williams (2000) show that African-American students employ reported speech to readily allow for the inference that the events being reported are indicative of racism. For these two approaches then, a central concern is on how to establish or explicate the relevance of racism for some utterance or event. This is because racism is variously understood by researchers and participants alike in various social, historical, and political contexts (Figgou & Condor, 2006). While no single version of racism is ubiquitously applicable, several times race- relevant actions occur without making relevant race or ethnicity. It is then the case that social psychologists and other researchers have to address this in various ways. However, how might participants themselves address the issue regarding the relevance of racism? How, and when, might they make relevant and manage issues arising from making claims about racism? For instance, Essed (1988) discusses an issue where accounts of “covert” or implied racism given by Black women in The Netherlands risked being discounted for being “over sensitive” or lacking appropriate grounds. McKenzie (2003) in his examination of talk by American and British residents in Kuwait, shows how A c c e p te d A rt ic le This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. speakers made claims to having “become” racist by social contagion, in ways to mitigate inferences that they were already and always racist and to claim current entitlement to knowledge about racism. Issues of how it is that someone possesses or can make claims to knowledge about racism are then consequential for how these are taken-up in interactions. Arguably issues of knowledge, such as access to it, are implicated in actions such as denials of racism (Augoustinos & Every, 2007a, 2015; Goodman, 2014), and reporting and/or accounting for personal experiences of racism. For instance, research shows that for those reporting their own experiences, these are not treated as relevant or sufficient grounds for claiming racism. Louw- Potgieter (1991) showed that Black students in a South African university similarly oriented to problems with accounting for what the author calls ‘covert racism’. Issues of how and who can make claims about or have knowledge about racism, then, are important concerns since an outcome of the negotiation of these issues could contribute to suppression of racism. To examine these issues a discursive psychological approach is particularly useful. Epistemic issues in racism Discursive psychologists argue for re-specifying the examination of psychological phenomena (Edwards & Potter, 1992). They propose focusing on how traditional psychological concerns such as memory, cognition, and knowledge are oriented to by participants themselves. These arguments share common ground with ethnomethodology in so far as a discursive psychological examination focuses on participants’ own practices of constructing and making relevant psychological concerns. Thus, Potter (1996) shows disclaiming knowledge through utterances such as ‘I don’t know…’ are better examined for the actions these accomplish in interactions, such as managing stake, than as mere reflections of internal mental states (also see Hutchby, 2002). A c c e p te d A rt ic le This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. Similar examination of attending to and making relevant knowledge claims, than the content of knowledge, is a concern for conversation analysts (Heritage, 2012a). Here, researchers show that issues of epistemics, that is access to, certainty of, and differential rights and responsibilities towards knowledge are displayed and negotiated in interactions (Stivers, Mondada, & Steensig, 2011). The argument here is that access to knowledge is not only governed by social norms (for instance that ‘doctors are treated as knowledgeable about medical issues’), but also that these issues are active concerns for people in interactions (Heritage & Raymond, 2005). Further, certain forms of knowledge (and access to them) are treated as normatively allocated to or accessible by particular types of persons, either through their membership in social categories or other contingencies (Drew, 1991). Pomerantz (1980) classifies these either as Type I knowables, those that people have rights to or “own”, or as Type II knowables, those that are available as a matter of contingency. Scholars argue that epistemics underlie not only social action in specific instances, but are also implicated in (re)producing and constructing social relations (Raymond & Heritage, 2006). Researchers then cannot assume that speakers’ access to knowledge is unproblematic. Rather that knowledge claims are oriented to as bound-up with identities, group membership, and other forms of social organization and are matters for negotiation in interactions. What this means for social psychological examination of racism or prejudice is that speakers’ claims to knowledge of racism cannot be treated as unproblematic phenomena. Racism, either in the form of actions or utterances, is not self-evident. Rather it is constructed as such (Potter, 1996). Similarly knowledge about racism cannot be treated as instantiating unproblematic access to some stable state of affairs in the World. Rather these are open to negotiation. In particular, issues of identities and group membership become relevant in examining claims about racism (cf. Essed, 1988). It is then of much interest to examine how epistemic issues are involved in making claims about racism. We take-up such an examination in a setting where these issues are likely to be relevant: immigration into the Republic of Ireland. A c c e p te d A rt ic le This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. The present study Scholars argue that in Ireland, owing to its complex migration history (Conway, 2007; Gilmartin, 2013), issues of racism and discrimination against migrants are also complex (Garner, 2003; Lentin, 2007). These features make Ireland a unique context in which to examine epistemic issues involved in racism. Over much of nineteenth and twentieth centuries Irelandi was an ‘emigration nation’ (Crowley, Gilmartin, & Kitchin, 2008). Recently however there has been a notable immigration into Ireland mostly from counties within the European Union (EU) and also from countries outside the EU such as Nigeria, India, and Philippines (Gilmartin, 2013). In 2017, there was a net inward migration of 19,800iiiii (CSO, 2017). Gilmartin (2015) argues that examining migration in Ireland needs to focus on both emigration and the more recent immigration. Researchers argue that on the one hand, policies in Ireland are just as exclusionary as those in other European nation-states (Honohan, 2010; Lentin, 2007). They draw attention to Ireland’s membership in ‘Fortress Europe’ and therefore promoting problematic exclusion of non-European others (Lentin & McVeigh, 2002). On the other hand, emigration of Irish peoples’ and their subsequent racialisation (Hickman, 1998) and exclusion (Ghaill, 2000) offer sympathetic understandings of minorities and their exclusion (Garner, 2003). Conway (2006) for instance argues that despite an expectation that nationalist discourse in Ireland would involve antipathy towards migrants, media discourse between 1996 and 2004, rarely shows this. Conway (2006) contends that such inclusionary discourse is embedded in perceived ‘historical duty’ of Ireland, which in itself is grounded in experiences of Irish emigration during the Irish famine alongside a deep desire to be perceived as a progressive nation among other nations. In contrast, Burroughs (2015) in an analysis of Irish newspaper discourse between 2002 and 2009 shows prevalent problematic representations of ‘illegal immigrants’ and overt calls for ‘control’ of such migration. The argument here is that this problematic othering involved consolidating particular versions of belonging in Ireland, such as those A c c e p te d A rt ic le This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. which include undocumented Irish migrants in the United States of America.. Alongside such research findings, broader public debate fluctuates between treating Ireland as a welcoming country for ‘foreigners’, and masking practices of discrimination and exclusion that are prevalent (Ryan, 2015). Recent statistics also show pervasive instances of hate-crime and discrimination in Ireland (Ryan, 2015). The Central Statistics Office of Ireland recorded increasing numbers of hate crimes from 2013 onwards, where most involved racially aggravated assaults than homophobic or transphobic incidents (ENAR Ireland, 2016). A report by, iReport a hate-crime monitoring agency, notes 435 reported incidents in the year 2016 (Michael, 2016). Recent scholarship also shows various forms of ongoing discrimination. Joseph (2017) documents the operations of a ‘racial hierarchy’ that place Irish citizens at the top and Black migrants at the bottom, with other European migrants in the middle, in the Irish labour market. Other researchers points to pervasive ‘anti- Muslim racism’ (Carr & Haynes, 2015). However, issues of racism face neglect either in the form of denials of its relevance (Ryan, 2015) or official neglect as seen in the absence of effective hate-crime legislation (Carr & Haynes, 2015). Ireland is notable among nation-states within the EU in not having far right political parties. Garner (2007) argues that one reason for this is that the Irish state itself is racialized with the consequence that racism and exclusion of non-Irish others takes place without an explicit invocation of race or ethnicity. For Ireland then, its history of migration and present relevance of racism both implicate a not-so-straightforward acceptance of immigration as problematic or racism as prevalent (Gilmartin, 2015). For Irish nationals then these issues are likely to be seen as ambiguous. This is in contrast to much research where immigration is routine and is likely to be treated as problematic through denials and disclaimers (Augoustinos & Every, 2007a). This sets-up two interrelated questions: A c c e p te d A rt ic le This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. a) How are issues of making knowledge-claims about racism in Ireland relevant for and oriented to by Irish nationals? b) How are these claims constructed and the accompanying issues managed? These are the focus for the present study. While in naturally-occurring interactions these issues can become relevant in unpredictable ways and, given previous research, might not be explicitly mentioned, researcher-generated talk offers useful opportunities for such examination (Stokoe, 2010). Therefore, we conducted an interview study that topicalized issues of migration and racism. Method In the present study immigration, discrimination, racism, anti-racism, and benefits of immigration were discussed by Irish nationals Data and Participants The data here are transcripts of 20 semi-structured interviews. The interviewers (n=2) [neither of the authors was an interviewer] and the interviewees (n=20) were both Irish nationals studying at a local Irish public university. One interviewer, J, a male postgraduate student is White Irish and the other interviewer, T, a female undergraduate student is a non-White Irish personiv. The interviewees were all ethnic White Irish, with an age range of 18-45, male and female, and, were studying various courses at an undergraduate or postgraduate level. The interviewees were recruited through convenient sampling techniques and the interviews conducted at various locations on the campus in the summer of 2015. They were informed that the interviews were part of a study examining lay perspectives on immigration in Ireland. Interviews involved discussions on immigration, contact, possibilities of discrimination, racism, possible redressals, and ended with discussions on benefits of migration into Ireland. In this way, the interviews covered a broad range A c c e p te d A rt ic le This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. of topics that routinely made relevant immigration and Ireland. This way of structuring the interview schedule allowed for mitigating possible issues with sensitivity of the topics being discussed. Both the interviewers were treated as participants and their informed consent was also obtained. The study in this form was given ethical approval by the university’s relevant ethics committeev. The interviews recorded were transcribed by the first author in accordance with the modified Jeffersonian system (Jefferson, 2004). These transcripts were read and thoroughly re-read to gain an intimate familiarity with the data. Subsequently, specific parts of transcripts were coded as dealing with Irish emigration and current immigration, ambivalence towards immigration, and negotiating views on racism in Ireland. Since the particular focus here was examining talk on racism, those aspects of the interview interaction where these became relevant were selected. These were subsequently read to identify specific features, such as denials of racism and disclaimers that are routine. This procedure brought into focus talk where participants negotiated knowledge-claims about racism in Ireland. These occurred in talk initiated by opening questions on “thoughts on racism, discrimination, or fair treatment”. From these, particular question-answer sequences were selected for inclusion and fine-grained analysis as described below. Analytical procedure Parts of the transcripts thus selected, were analysed using discursive psychological approaches (McKinlay & McVittie, 2008; Potter & Hepburn, 2008). This involves examining psychological concepts and concerns as discursive accomplishments in particular occasioned settings. The implication of this for social psychological examination is that issues of concern, such as prejudice, group membership, and intergroup relations are more usefully examined as constructions and orientations of participants themselves (McKinlay & McVittie, 2008). Analysts examine how it is that these are constructed and engaged with in particular interactions. In so doing, the analytic focus is A c c e p te d A rt ic le This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. on the social action being accomplished in and through such constructions. This has specific implications for analysing interview data (Potter & Hepburn, 2005). Interviews are routine social scientific data gathering techniques and, are designed and conducted in ways to work as “views-gathering” tools (Brinkmann, 2013). Data so obtained can be analysed in various ways, inclusive of those that provide insights into interviewees’ “thoughts” and “opinions”. For the present purposes however we treat interview interactions as sites of accomplishing social action. Following Talmy (2011), we treat these as unique speech events where both participants bring to bear particular resources and engage in accomplishing not just the ‘research interview’ but also various other social actions as they become relevant. In the present case we also employ techniques and concepts of conversation analysis such as question design (Hayano, 2014; Raymond, 2003), preference organization (Pomerantz & Heritage, 2012), and epistemics (Heritage, 2012a, 2012b). Conversation analysts (Schegloff, 2007) describe several features of questions, such as that these generally form the first-pair parts in adjacency pairs and these set-up particular types of responses as second-pair parts (Sacks, 1987). In his seminal discussion on questions, Sacks (1995: 54) argues that questions effectively give the questioner control over the conversation. This is particularly so in the case of interviews not merely because the interviewer routinely asks questions, but also the fact that the interviewer asks pre-scripted questions as a matter of participating in the interview. Stivers and Robinson (2006) argue that in responding to questions, answers are systematically preferred over non-answers, indicating a preference for progressivity in interactions. That is, speakers work to offer some answer response instead of not answering or simply declaring ‘I don’t know’. Keevallik (2011) (also see Pomerantz (1984)) argues that “no knowledge” responses are problematic and routinely treat the question and its premises as problematic. This also implies that non-answers and ‘I don’t know’ responses then become analytically interesting (cf. Hutchby, 2002). A c c e p te d A rt ic le This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. Heritage (2012a) argues that questions and responses centrally implicate differences across an epistemic gradient [with (K+) and without (K-) knowledge]. Routinely, interviews are conducted to “know more”, either about the participant(s) or about a topic. The interviewer then is in a markedly “K-“ position and the interviewee in a “K+” position (also see (Rapley & Antaki, 1998)). Heritage (2012b) calls such knowledge access, rights to it, and expectations the epistemic status in distinction to epistemic stance, where the latter involves negotiating how matters of epistemic status become relevant and are negotiated in interaction. In that, the first is relatively fixed within particular epistemic domains (for instance in clinical settings the doctor’s knowledge is normatively different from that of the patient), whereas the second is the instantiation and negotiation of one’s status in specific occasions in the interaction (however patients might challenge and negotiate knowledge-claims offered by doctors of their symptoms). While the implications of this for analysing research-interview talk are being examined more thoroughly elsewhere, for the present case, the interviewees were treated as, and oriented to their participation as, those who legitimately possess knowledge of racism or prejudice. This procedure then allowed for a close examination of how it is that issues of knowledge-claims were made or became relevant and managed in the interactions, and the outcomes of doing so. Results Given the vast and wide ranging social psychological research discussed above, and our own common cultural knowledge, we can expect that the interviewees would distance themselves from racist ‘views’ or as being racists themselves (cf. Pomerantz & Zemmel, 2003). Rather, we expect accounts about possibilities for discrimination and/or racism in Ireland. These are the focus of our examination here. The findings show that participants treated making claims about racism or prejudice as involving negotiation of access to certain knowledge based on which such claims could be made. This negotiation of epistemic access allowed them to manage issues in the ongoing talk on racism. Researchers (Hutchby, 2001; Wooffitt, 1992) note that speakers’ claims to witnessing allows A c c e p te d A rt ic le This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. for establishing the factual status or authenticity of the claims being made. Here, issues of epistemic access to particular forms of information were made relevant in three ways: 1) they witnessed or had ready access in ways to demonstrate racism; 2) they witnessed or had ready access in ways to demonstrate anti-racism, however with epistemic limitations, and 3) they could not witness either because of circumstances or their non-migrant status. These are examined below. Ready access to racism In this section, we analyze two extracts where interviewees offer witnessed accounts of instances that readily qualify as being racist. Extract 1 comes from the transcript of an interview with a postgraduate male student, labelled J10, with the interviewer J. The talk shown below comes after a generic discussion on racism. Extract 1. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 J J10 J J10 J J10 yes (.) uh um an in Ireland uhm do you think racism ub is an issue (.hhh) yea a hundred percent uhm really think this ah just as a culture there of: you put >Irish people first< and then hmmh especially (.) u:hm black people the-you know they they come second you know uhm yea sometimes like you ca- you hear people shouting things on the street even inside Limerick when I was: (.) I I worked in work experience there on site in A c c e p te d A rt ic le This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. 9 10 11 12 13 Limerick there for eight months:: (.hh) and you'd have heard a lot of comments even as people pass (.) black people like ↑get out of our country or what the fuck are they doing there or you know I mean I do think that there is a certain element of that but The interviewer’s question sets-up a yes/no involved response to the claim that racism maybe an issue in ‘Ireland’ (line 1). In asking the question at this stage of participation, the interviewer treats the interviewee as in a position to have knowledge about issues being discussed (K+). In addition, the polar question sets-up a “yes”-involving (or its variants such as “yeah”/”yea”/others) acceptance as the preferred response (Raymond, 2003). While, accepting this can be somewhat problematic since racism is problematic, the interviewee offers a type-conforming acceptance: ‘yea a hundred percent’ (line 2). The interviewee readily and emphatically accepts that racism is an issue in Ireland and shows affiliation with the agenda of the interviewer, indicating that talk on racism in Ireland can now proceed. The interviewee starts with generic descriptions of ‘just as a culture’ (line 2): ‘you put Irish people first and then’ (line 3). The inference offered is that ‘Irish people’ are given preference over ‘others’. This however is not readily accepted by the interviewer as fulfilling the task of responding to the question or is treated to show that more needs to come, as seen by the minimal acceptance/continuer: ‘hmmh’ (line 4). The interviewee then offers further descriptions on people who are not given preference. In offering this as ‘especially’ (line 5) the case the interviewee treats the forthcoming to readily demonstrate racism (in lieu of attending to the interview tasks): ‘Black people you know they’d be they come second you know uhm’ (lines 5-6). This however, is presented as a generic A c c e p te d A rt ic le This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. example of what would be racism: ‘you know uhm’. To this, the interviewer indicates acceptance through his ‘yea’ (line 7). The reference to ‘Black people’ works to make relevant discrimination based on skin colour / ethnicity and readily allows for claims about racism. In sum, the interviewer and the interviewee jointly establish the appropriate content for making claims about racism in Ireland. The interviewee offers such content at lines 8 through 13, which involves a series of claims about what were perceptually noticed – ‘heard’ (line 10) – in and around Limerick city. Here, the interviewee offers particular information on his own activities that present him as a witness: ‘when I was I worked in work experience there on site’ (line 9). Furthermore, claims such as that he had worked for ‘eight months’ (line 10) and that in that time he had ‘heard a lot of comments’ (line 10) similarly work to confer an unproblematic and stable witness status to the interviewee. The speaker thus establishes the authenticity of the claims being made (Hutchby, 2001; Wooffitt, 1992) through presenting himself as a witness. The interviewee then reports what he had ‘heard’ as a witness. This reporting is interesting for it is prefaced with ‘comments even as people pass’ (lines 10-11), which shows that the to-be- reported content was in no way instigated by those at the receiving end of these comments and thus establishes the role of racism or prejudice in the comments that are purportedly made. The comments themselves are offered in a three-part listing (Jefferson, 1990) format: ‘get out of our country’ (lines 11-12), ‘what the fuck are they doing there’ (line 12) and ‘you know I mean’ (line 12). The last item is hearable as a list-completer, which shows that there are several items in the list that can be brought up if required. In being presented as a three-part listing (Potter, 1996) the interviewee treats the comments offered as similar in being hearably racist. In this way, the interviewee offers “appropriate” evidence for being able to make claims that racism is an issue in Ireland. In the next extract, we similarly see the use of witnessed-description in establishing that immigrants do face discrimination in Ireland. A c c e p te d A rt ic le This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. Extract 2 comes from an interview with a female undergraduate interviewee, labelled J2. The talk shown comes after discussions on immigration into Ireland and their treatment. Here we see J2 describing a violent event that is rendered as indicative of racial discrimination, in response to the interviewer’s question on her ‘opinion’. Extract 2. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 J J2 J J2 J J2 J uhm in your opinion would imm -migrants face discrimination e::m I: I'd say so (.) I think it's actually my: cousin no my aunt's ↓nephew he was called up for bullying in school like he punched some Polish kid and (unclear) the kid in the face because hmmh u:hm he said that >their fathers were taking his father's jobs< okay so I think maybe:: (.) they would face some discrimination because people might view them as taking away money from the state that they actually want themselves or jobs that they want themselves okay A c c e p te d A rt ic le This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. In response to the question, the interviewee at line 2 offers a hedged acceptance: ‘em I: I’d say so’. The initial ‘em’ indicates a forthcoming response that does not readily align with the question (Schegloff, 2010). In that her response is neither a ready affirmation nor disaffirmation of possibilities of discrimination. Rather, what the interviewee narrates before this is an account of violence presented as an instance of discrimination, at lines 2-5. The narration describes a violent incident (cf. Kirkwood et al., 2012): ‘punched some Polish kid and (unclear) the kid in the face’ (lines 3-4) [although the audio here is unclear, it is likely that this is also a violent act]. The descriptor ‘Polish kid’ serves to establish that the narration is about discrimination of migrants. However, the subsequent descriptions of the reasons involved in this violent act attend to mitigating irrational impulses such as prejudice (Billig, 1988). These reasons attributed to the attacker, through reported speech (Holt, 1996), offer a possibly reasonable basis for the attack: ‘their fathers were taking his father’s jobs’ (lines 4-5). Here however, the footing shift (Goffman, 1979) presents her as merely reporting the words of her nephew than as holding these views herself. This allows her to distance herself from the implications of stating that migrants do cause problems for Irish residents and treats the ongoing talk as unrelated to her own views. The alternative explanation in the form of a routine or expected event in the institution of a school – ‘called up for bullying in school’ (line 3) – works to mitigate inferences that her nephew is prejudiced or is wanting in character. However, her subsequent narration and the latter conclusion or summary offers reasons for inferring discrimination, without prejudicial intent. She avows the occurrence of instances of ‘some discrimination’ (line 7), such as that those engaging in these might “view” migrants as dispossessing ‘Irish’ peoples. In responding to interviewers’ questions, the interviewees have given broadly accepting responses that endorse the claim that discrimination and/or racism are issues in Ireland for migrants or people of colour. These accounts attended to two issues: first that, the account being given is to be heard as an instance of racism or prejudice and not any other type of event. Second that, the A c c e p te d A rt ic le This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. interviewee had direct access to such events, that is, they were witnesses to these (Hutchby, 2001). In the next set of extracts, interviewees orient to issues with making these claims in cases where they describe the absence of discrimination against migrants. Ready access to anti-racism Here, interviewees offer accounts that aim to demonstrate that racism is not an issue in Ireland. This however brought-up alternative epistemic issues, which are subsequently negotiated. Extract 3 comes from an interview transcript with a female undergraduate student, labelled as T. The talk shown below comes after discussions of the interviewee’s relations with immigrants. Extract 3. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 T T1 T T1 and-uhm do you think they're fairly treated in Ireland u::hm (.) I think (1.3) <work wise> ↑yes I think I think they are u::m I know that my colleagues who I work with u:m the majority of the manager positions are filled by foreign nationals u::m who: >aren't Irish< so: I: don't think they're discriminated against in the workplace hmmh but I do think that society still has a negative (.6) perspective on them A c c e p te d A rt ic le This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. Here the interviewee’s response indicates a not-so-straightforward oncoming account, through delaying the oncoming type-conforming response: ‘u::hm (.) I think (1.3) <work wise> ↑yes’ (line 2). The delay indicates that her overall response is not merely an acceptance or rejection of the claims in the question, rather that it involves re-specifying the context within which she would offer the response: ‘work wise’ (line 2). Additionally, her slower enunciation and the marked emphasis on subsequent acceptance – ↑yes – indicate her re-specification of her abilities to align with what is required of her in this interaction. In this way, she negotiates her epistemic stance for the purposes of this interaction in offering her account on fair treatment of migrants. Her subsequent account, at lines 2-4, offers evidence from employment settings that support her re-specified acceptance. This is done in ways that establish her access to knowledge about fair treatment. In that, she describes the goings-on and those involved as known to her: ‘I know that my colleagues who I work with’ (lines 2-3). The relational categorization ‘colleagues who I work with’ allows for ready inferences on relations between her and those others that she is making claims, namely that they work together. This then mitigates potential undermining of her knowledge-claims. Her claims about the relative proportions of ‘foreign nationals’ (line 4) in particularly prominent work positions – ‘manager positions’ (line 3) – as in the ‘majority’ (line 3), highlight the favourableness towards non-Irish persons in workplace. While this can be interpreted in several ways, she treats this to imply the absence of discrimination: ‘I don’t think they are discriminated against in the workplace’ (lines 4-5). Here however, the interviewee orients to a particular issue, namely that her access to such information is avowedly limited: ‘workplace’. This is interesting in two ways: first, our knowledge is always ‘partial’ (Keevallik, 2011: 205) and therefore this avowal is analytically interesting. Second, in Extracts 1 and 2, interviewees could readily cite one or few instances in making claims about racism in Ireland. Together then, we see that in indicating that her knowledge is limited, the interviewee A c c e p te d A rt ic le This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. makes relevant the limited-ness of her knowledge on racism or discrimination against migrants in Ireland. Her subsequent speculative avowal that migrants do or can face discrimination from an unspecified ‘society’ through ‘a negative perspective’ (line 7), is in the first instance a more complete response in coming after the interviewer’s minimal continuer (‘hmmh’ at line 6). It also works to mitigate issues arising from her limited access. In the next extract, we see that issues with limited access implicate epistemic rights. Extract 4 comes from the interview transcript with a female postgraduate interviewee, labelled T7. The talk shown below follows discussions on her relations with migrants. Here again we see the interviewee orienting to the required response to the question as contingent on evidence. Extract 4. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 T T7 T T7 T T7 (oh cool) andum (.) do you think they're fairly treated in Ireland (.tch) em <I would say> if I think about (.7) the particular people I’m thinking of I would say that they'd probably would say yes hmmh I would say that they would say yes uhm but I'm (.8) probably aware that there are probably a lot of others hmmh who wouldn't feel that way A c c e p te d A rt ic le This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. The interviewer’s question starts off being informal and treats the response to be given as one in a series of views-generating questions: ‘andum’ (line 1). The interviewee does not offer the preferred type-conforming acceptance (or the dispreferred rejection), until after displaying potential non- alignment and disaffiliation (Stivers, 2008) with the interviewer’s project – ‘em I would say’ (line 2) – and re-specifying the basis for giving a response: ‘if I think about (.) >the particular people I’m thinking of< I would say yes’ (line 3). This re-specification makes relevant that her response is restricted by limited knowledge or access to information and particularly that this takes the form of ‘people’ she knows. The footing shift (Goffman, 1979) from presenting herself as reporting on treatment of migrants in Ireland to merely reporting what certain unspecified persons might say, treats the problem as one where the interviewee cannot accept or reject the claims in the interviewer’s question with necessary certainty. In particular, the interviewee treats these unspecified persons as more appropriate in attending to the interview tasks: ‘the particular people I’m thinking of I would say that they'd probably would say yes’ (lines 2-3). Subsequent to a continuer from the interviewer, the interviewee partially repeats (Bolden, 2009) her earlier turn in ways to select what would be the ‘answer’ to the interviewer’s question: ‘I would say that they would say yes’ (line 5). This again presents the interviewee as merely reporting (Buttny, 1997) what certain unspecified others would give as response to the interviewer’s question. In identifying those who are more appropriately capable of responding to the question, the interviewee makes relevant issues with her epistemic rights to access the issues involved and negotiates this through introducing other unspecified actors as in a position to access such knowledge. Subsequently the interviewee attends to implications about possibilities for her to make any claims about the issue. In particular, she treats it that while the individuals she’s ‘thinking of’ might not treat racism as an issue, there could be unspecified ‘lot of others’ (line 6) who might offer A c c e p te d A rt ic le This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. alternative accounts. For the interviewee then, responding to the question is oriented to as involving her epistemic rights to knowledge of discrimination. In the above extracts, interviewees treat their epistemic status as limiting the possibilities for providing responses and manage such trouble. In that the interviewees treated witnessing instances of anti-racism as insufficient in making broader claims about racism or prejudice in Ireland. They were sensitive to possibilities that their claims could potentially suppress possible instances of racism or discrimination. In the following extracts, alternative issues with avowing limitations to epistemic access and status are negotiated. Issues with access to racism In our corpus we did not come across any participant making the claim that there was no racism in Ireland or that racism is not an issue in Ireland. Rather we see claims such as those examined below. Extract 5 comes from the transcript of an interview with a postgraduate female student, labelled here as T9, with the interviewer ‘T’. The talk shown below comes early in the interview subsequent to discussions on the interviewee’s generic perspectives on immigration. A c c e p te d A rt ic le This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. Extract 5. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 T T9: T: T9 T: T9 T: T9 cool andum do you think they're fairly treated in Ireland (1.1) u::hm some might argue that they're not that um they kind a face a lot of racial prejudice and discrimination mhhm u::m when it comes to the work place and stuff like that u:m hm I have not witnessed it personally myself (.) but from listening to a couple of friends that have immigrated into the country mhhm they do feel that there is an element of discrimination against them While the interviewer’s question sets-up a type-conforming acceptance with the claim that migrants are ‘fairly treated in Ireland’ (line 1), as the preferred response, the interviewee neither accepts nor rejects the claims in the question. The delay and the subsequent, ‘u::hm’ (Schegloff, 2010) prefaced response, shows an oncoming not-so-straightforward response. This is seen in her introduction of certain unspecified others as those who have an ‘answer’ to the question. The interviewee shifts her footing (Goffman, 1979) from being the person giving her opinion and therefore being held A c c e p te d A rt ic le This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. responsible for it, to somebody merely reporting about it through others’ opinions: ‘some might argue’ (line 2). She attributes to these unspecified others the argument that migrants ‘kind a face a lot of racial prejudice and discrimination’ (lines 2-3). Similar to Extract 4, the interviewee here presents herself as epistemically in a K- (Heritage, 2012a) position relative to certain others who might attest to racism or prejudice. However, in contrast to the earlier extracts (3 & 4), she does not offer claims to have epistemic access to alternative knowledge that can attest to minimal or absence of racism or prejudice. Rather she accounts for reporting (Holt, 1996) others, through avowing issues with epistemic access: ‘I have not witnessed it personally myself’ (line 7). However, she goes onto contrast her epistemic limitations with the experiences of migrant friends: ‘they do feel that there is an element of discrimination against them’ (line 11). First, this manages implications that she uses knowledge that she has access to (or not) in making broader claims about racism. Second, experiences (cf. Edwards, 2003) attributed to her migrant friends are possibly weaker epistemic claims than witnessed events. However, in privileging those epistemic claims, she treats migrants as epistemically privileged or having epistemic rights to knowledge of racism. What this does in the present case is to manage claims that despite not having direct epistemic access to racism she will not participate in suppression of racism. In Extract 6, the interviewee treats making claims about racism or prejudice as outwith her normative epistemic access. This comes from the transcript of an interview with a female postgraduate student labelled here as J8, with the interviewer J. Prior to this talk shown here the interviewee had discussed issues of racism in general. Here, the discussion relates to ‘Ireland’ in particular. A c c e p te d A rt ic le This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. Extract 6. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 J: J8 J: J8: J J8: okay and in Ireland u:h is racism an issue uhm I personally like don't (.) I ever witnessed racism to be honest yea so I don't really think it’s a problem but (.) then again like its different when you're at the immigrant (.) so I don't know how they see it like do they yea experience it in like I might like just mightn't notice because I probably don't spend that much time with immigrants The interviewee’s response starts with a hesitation marker – ‘uhm’ (line 2) – and treats epistemic access as relevant. In particular, she avows that she has no epistemic access: ‘I personally like don’t ever witnessed racism to be honest’ (line 2). Here, the following are of interest. First, through the honesty phrase (Edwards & Fasulo, 2006) the interviewee treats her claim as possibly not taken up seriously and manages it. Second, the extreme case formulated (Pomerantz, 1986) description – ‘don’t ever’ – allows for treating racism as a non-witness-able event. Together, her response treats it that access to events or instances of racism are beyond her abilities. The interviewer accepts this formulation as relevant to the ongoing interaction through the continuer ‘yea’ (line 3). This allows the interviewee to make the conclusion – ‘so’ – that ‘I don’t really think it’s a problem’ (line 4). However, an issue with her avowal, and the conclusion offered, is A c c e p te d A rt ic le This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. that her claims extend to issues that are perhaps outwith her rights to know. In that, she could be taken as denying possibilities of or dismissing complaints about racism. She resolves such trouble through first, nominating certain relevant ‘others’ as those who have privileged access: ‘it’s different when you’re at the immigrant’ (lines 4-5). This allows her for the inference that she is not denying such possibilities. Rather that, her foregoing account is to be taken as reflecting her abilities to make these claims. In particular, her avowal that ‘I don’t know how they view it like’ (line 5) offers specific reasons why she is incapable of making claims about this issue. The interviewee works-up a self- categorization that is markedly different to those who can experience or see racism / discrimination. In that she treats her access to information on racism as contingent on her not being a minority or migrant. The interviewer’s ‘yea’ continues to treat the interviewee’s account as relevant and allows for her ongoing speculative description on migrants: ‘do they (yea) experience it in life like’ (lines 5- 7). Through this she offers the inference that migrants can legitimately access such information and therefore make claims. However, this would risk treating racism as merely an experience for migrants and similar others. Her subsequent descriptions account for her limitations to accessing such information: ‘I might I just mightn’t notice because I probably don’t spend that much time with immigrants’ (lines 7-8). In so doing, she mitigates treating racism or prejudice as merely a perception than as an ‘out-there’ occurrence. In these last extracts then, interviewees avow issues with their abilities to access information on racism or prejudice in ways that go beyond mere contingencies. Rather they treat access to knowledge of racism as implicating rights. A c c e p te d A rt ic le This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. Discussion In this study, we focused on epistemic issues in race-talk as attended to and managed by participants in the context of immigration into Ireland. Interview interactions among Irish students that involved discussions on several topics related to immigration in Ireland were analysed. The present analysis shows that speakers treated access to witness-able racism as relevant. This was centrally involved in their negotiation of epistemic rights to knowledge on racism or discrimination in Ireland in ways to manage arising implications. Interviewees negotiated epistemic rights in three ways. First, in Extracts 1 and 2, interviewees offered ready evidential accounts that presented them as witnesses to instances of racism (cf. Hutchby, 2001). These accounts also attested to the nature of events being witnessed as constituting racism through claims about ethnic (‘Black people’ in Extract 1) or migrant (‘Polish kid’ in Extract 2) others (cf. Louw-Potgieter, 1991). Second, interviewees oriented to their claims about witnessing anti-racism as limited and inconsequential. While they described instances in ways to claim that racism is perhaps not a concern in Ireland, they oriented to issues with the relevance of their epistemic access. In that, in Extracts 3 and 4, we see interviewees orienting to the possibility that their avowals of access are perhaps incomplete. Third, in Extracts 5 and 6, this incompleteness is more clearly seen in interviewees’ avowals that they do not have epistemic rights to such knowledge. The accompanying avowals that they have not witnessed racism were treated as of limited consequence in favour of (possible) accounts from certain others. These others, migrants, were treated as in possession of or with privileged access to knowledge about racism. In this way, interviewees negotiated epistemic rights to racism. However, this negotiation of rights also involved orienting to concerns that are unique for racism or prejudice related issues (Goodman, 2014). A pervasive finding in discursive research on racism is that speakers attend to possible implications of coming across as those who are racist or prejudicial (Augoustinos & Every, 2007a). Scholars treat this as a central feature contributing to A c c e p te d A rt ic le This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. pervasive suppression of racism or prejudice. In the present case, we see that interviewees are ‘live’ to these concerns. The ready description of certain events, describing anti-racism, and avowing not having witnessed racism, all attend to concerns over suppressing racism or race-related concerns. In particular, interviewees treated epistemics of racism as implicated in contributing to possible suppression of racism. For instance, in Extract 6 we see the interviewee being sensitive to possible implications of claiming that racism is merely an experience for migrants. While their witnessing allowed for claims about racism, their witnessing anti-racism and not having witnessed, brought-up issues of relative privileging of knowledge: their epistemic access versus rights to such knowledge. In some ways, this distinction reflects Pomerantz’s (1980) classification of knowledge either as Type I or II knowables. Her argument is that Type I knowables are those that individuals possess or expected to possess knowledge of as a matter of normative rights whereas Type II are those for which access to knowledge is given through occasioned contingencies. However, what the analyses show is that speakers themselves orient to the distinction between contingent access and access as a matter of right. This was negotiated in ways that had implications for social action, such as those of claiming that racism is an issue in Ireland or not, and the consequences of this. It is then the case that, of concern for participants was not merely on how it is that one can access knowledge of racism (being more perceptive for instance), but also on who it is that can be treated as in possession of legitimate rights to have access to knowledge about racism. These were negotiated in ways to make and manage claims about racism in Ireland. In the present case epistemic issues were negotiated in interview interactions where the interviewer made relevant particular assumptions (cf. Potter & Hepburn, 2005) about the social phenomena being discussed. Primary among these is that racism is perhaps not widely accepted as relevant for Ireland (Gilmartin, 2015). Interviewees were being invited to offer assessments (Heritage & Raymond, 2005) on racism and/or discrimination in Ireland. Interviewee responses then broadly affiliated with such presuppositions in avoiding giving “no knowledge” responses, which A c c e p te d A rt ic le This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. would indicate trouble with the question (Keevallik, 2011), and instead offering “no-access” responses, where relevant. Interviewers neither treated interviewees’ negotiation of epistemic rights as problematic nor challenged their claims about epistemic access. Interviewees and interviewers jointly treated negotiation of epistemic rights as relevant, in ways to privilege migrants as those who have better access to knowledge of racism. These orientations resonate with findings from other studies that examine broader phenomena such as media discourses on migration and racism in Ireland (Burroughs, 2015; Conway, 2007). In settings such as Ireland, where it is routinely held that racism and anti-racism simultaneously occur (Lentin & McVeigh, 2004) and where complexities of migration (Gilmartin, 2013; 2015) upend the standard story of an inward migration that is unwanted or problematic, it is perhaps the case that issues of epistemic access and rights become available as resources for negotiating talk on racism. The experiences and accounts of Irish emigrants to the United Kingdom or the United States of America, and the subsequent racialisation and exclusion (Ghaill, 2002; Gilmartin, 2015), while complex, could perhaps inform such explicit negotiation of rights. However, this is beyond the scope of the present study to affirm. What the present findings do offer, however, is certain contributions to current social psychological and discursive psychological work on racism or prejudice. First, findings show that alongside negotiations of whether specific events or actions constitute racism (Essed, 1988; Potter & Wetherell, 1988), issues of access to events or actions are open to negotiation. Second, while previous findings show that claims about experiencing racism are either suppressed or are hard to report (Louw-Potgieter, 1991; Kirkwood et al, 2012), issues of how access to such knowledge are made relevant or negotiated have rarely been examined. The present findings show that in such cases, negotiation of epistemic rights could offer alternative warrants for claiming, or resisting challenges to such claims, about racism. Third, the present findings also show how epistemic issues can underpin denials and suppression of racism, such as through showing that claims to ‘owning’ A c c e p te d A rt ic le This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. knowledge about racism are distinct from claims to not having ‘access’ to racism. Denials of racism on the behalf of others, such as minorities, could possibly implicate negotiation of rights to possess knowledge about racism. In that, avowing limited access or not having rights to such knowledge allows for possible claims that racism is perhaps not serious or relevant, which if made directly (e.g.: ‘racism is not an issue anymore’) would amount to an active suppression of racism (cf. Verkuyten, 2005). This alternative allocation and negotiation of epistemic rights shows that perhaps racism as oriented to by those in the majority is distinct from that oriented to by those in the minority or those who face it. In particular that, minorities have epistemic authority (cf. Stivers et al., 2011) in matters of racism. While participants could use issues with epistemic access and negotiate epistemic rights in ways to suggest that minorities have privileged access to knowledge on racism, we researchers and analysts could usefully take-up that lesson in focusing on minority accounts to enrich theory and/or at least take note of this distinction in informing future research. Limitations and conclusions The study involved research interviews with student participants where one of the interviewers was non-White Irish. The analysis shows that interviewees’ responses were not notably different. Also, student participation in research and particularly on topics that are socially relevant is important to any healthy social environment. Their views then are neither marginal nor less important, but are rather as relevant as the views and talk of any other social group. While the data were researcher- generated (cf. Speer, 2002), our examination treated these as interactions between two participants: the interviewer and the interviewee. Also, it could be argued that epistemic issues are pervasively relevant anyway and particularly so in interview interactions. However, the present analysis and findings show that the relevance of epistemic rights and access was negotiated in ways to attend to implications and concerns over claiming or suppressing racism (Augoustinos & Every, 2015). These findings then are particularly relevant for an examination of racism. A c c e p te d A rt ic le This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. To conclude, the present findings show that issues of epistemics are relevant in negotiating racism. While talk on racism and immigration is sensitive and this is attended to and managed in several ways, negotiation of epistemic rights and access, offers a meaningful resource in navigating this sensitivity. Rights to make claims about racism are differentially distributed in ways that give those who face racism authority. Social psychologists and discursive researchers can then incorporate this privileging of epistemic access in researching and theorizing racism Acknowledgements We are extremely thankful to three anonymous reviewers for their comments and suggestions on our manuscript. We are particularly thankful to the editor Dr Clifford Stevenson for his input and suggestions that helped us improve the quality of the manuscript. We declare no conflict of interest in publishing this work. References Allport, G. W. (1954). The Nature of Prejudice. Reading, Massachusets: Addison-Weasley. Augoustinos, M., & Every, D. (2007a). The language of "Race" and "Prejudice": A discourse of denial, reason, and liberal-practical politics. Journal of Language and Social Psychology, 26(2), 123- 141. Augoustinos, M., & Every, D. (2007b). 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Telling Tales of the Unexpected: The Organization of Factual Discourse. Hempstead, UK: Harvester Wheatsheaf. Xiao, Y. J., Coppin, G., & Van Bavel, J. J. (2016). Perceiving the World Through Group-Colored Glasses: A Perceptual Model of Intergroup Relations. Psychological Inquiry, 27(4), 255-274. i The overall population of Ireland in April 2017 is estimated to be 4,792,500 (CSO, 2017). ii Hhowever, this is a decrease in immigration of non-Irish nationals from 2016 (CSO, 2016). iii Gilmartin (2013) argues that while such statistics for immigrants are likely to be accurate, information on emigrants might obfuscate issues of whether those emigrating are Irish nationals or not. iv This arrangement was not part of an intentional design, but was accidental as students were interning with the second author. v The ethical approval obtained, prevents us from archiving and sharing our data as set out and encouraged by the EJSP. First, at the time of the study, the participants were not informed of the possibility of sharing their data with unnamed others who were not part of the research team (who were named). Second, the ethical approval was contingent on storing the data either on password protected university computers or personal computers of the PI and co-PI, only for 7 years from collection. Therefore, we cannot archive or share the data as set out and encouraged by the EJSP. 
work_r4mq4ztbuzdgrbtx34rb6ybsle	----	A theoretical framework for antigay aggression: Review of established and hypothesized effects within the context of the general aggression model⋆ Dominic J. Parrott* Department of Psychology, Georgia State University, P.O. Box 5010, Atlanta, Georgia, 30302-5010, United States Abstract Theory and research on antigay aggression has identified different motives that facilitate aggression based on sexual orientation. However, the individual and situational determinants of antigay aggression associated with these motivations have yet to be organized within a single theoretical framework. This limits researchers’ ability to organize existing knowledge, link that knowledge with related aggression theory, and guide the application of new findings. To address these limitations, this article argues for the use of an existing conceptual framework to guide thinking and generate new research in this area of study. Contemporary theories of antigay aggression, and empirical support for these theories, are reviewed and interpreted within the unifying framework of the general aggression model [Anderson, C.A. & Bushman, B.J. (2002). Human aggression. Annual Review of Psychology, 53, 27–51.]. It is concluded that this conceptual framework will facilitate investigation of individual and situational risk factors that may contribute to antigay aggression and guide development of individual-level intervention. Keywords Antigay aggression; Aggression; Prejudice; Homosexuality (attitudes toward) 1. Introduction Antigay violence has been a long-standing social problem for many years. Reports in the early 1990’s indicated that over one third of gay men and lesbians were victims of interpersonal violence and up to 94% experienced some type of victimization related to their sexual orientation (Fassinger, 1991; National Gay and Lesbian Task Force, 1990). Consistent with these data, a recent national probability sample found that one in five sexual minority adults were victims of a person or property crime due to their sexual orientation, and approximately 50% have been verbally insulted or abused because of their sexual orientation (Herek, in press- a). Social advocacy groups, however, estimate that countless cases of antigay intimidation, verbal harassment, and physical assault occur every day but go unreported (NCAVP, 2005). Moreover, because numerous states do not have data collection statutes for hate crimes based on sexual orientation, it is likely that documented cases of antigay hate crimes underestimate the frequency of these acts. Indeed, the true prevalence of the problem is largely unknown. ⋆The development of this article was supported in part by grant R01-AA-015445 from the National Institute of Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism. I would like to thank John L. Peterson for his helpful comments on earlier versions of this article. * Tel.: +1 404 413 6287; fax: +1 404 413 6207. E-mail address: parrott@gsu.edu. NIH Public Access Author Manuscript Clin Psychol Rev. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2009 July 1. Published in final edited form as: Clin Psychol Rev. 2008 July ; 28(6): 933–951. doi:10.1016/j.cpr.2008.02.001. N IH -P A A uthor M anuscript N IH -P A A uthor M anuscript N IH -P A A uthor M anuscript Hence, the need to elucidate the processes associated with aggression against this population is clearly important. Over the past 25 years, a great deal of research has been dedicated toward this aim. Numerous scholars have proposed theories of antigay aggression (Ehrlich, 1990; Herek, 1986, 2000; Franklin, 2000; Kimmel, 1997; Kite & Whitley, 1998) that explore mechanisms by which sociocultural and/or individual factors facilitate antigay violence. To elucidate these processes further, Herek (in press-b) defined sexual stigma as “the negative regard, inferior status, and relative powerlessness that society collectively accords to any nonheterosexual behavior, identity, relationship, or community” (pg. 2) and described how sexual stigma is expressed toward sexual minorities. At the societal level, sexual stigma is referred to as heterosexism. This ideology is manifested in various social customs and institutions (e.g., religion, the legal system) and provides “the rationale and operating instructions for that [antigay] antipathy” (Herek, 2004; pg. 15). At the individual level, the internalization of sexual stigma by heterosexuals is referred to as sexual prejudice (Herek, 2004, in press-b; Pharr, 1988; Neisen, 1990). Importantly, within the context of an individual-level interaction, heterosexism sanctions the individual’s expression of sexual stigma (e.g., individual prejudice, aggression) toward sexual minorities. Thus, whereas sexual prejudice may not always be a primary motivation for antigay aggression, “the importance of cultural heterosexism cannot be underestimated” (Herek, 1992; pg. 164). Sociocultural explanations of antigay violence also emphasize the development of heterosexual masculinity, especially during adolescence. Numerous scholars posit that men are defined, and learn to define themselves, by what they are (e.g., successful, dominant, tough) as well as what they are not (e.g., feminine, homosexual) (e.g., Brannon, 1976; Deaux & Kite, 1987; Herek, 1986; Kimmel, 1997; Kite, 2001; Pleck, 1981). Accordingly, men may be especially motivated to differentiate between the masculine in-group and the feminine out-group by denigrating and attacking gay men (Hamner, 1992). This conceptualization developed from social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986), which stipulates that individuals derive self-esteem by denigrating or attacking out-groups. In support of this view, recent data suggest that the assertion of manhood via ritualized violence toward gays is more prevalent among men who reside in geographic areas with more gender equality (Alden & Parker, 2005). Indeed, in areas with more gender equality, the distinction between masculinity and femininity is less salient. This presumably motivates men to seek more extreme ways of defining themselves as “not feminine,” one of which is attacking the feminine out-group (e.g., gay men). Taken as a whole, sociocultural theories posit that heterosexism and masculine socialization processes converge to promote antigay violence. A fundamental strength of these “macro level” theories is their ability to explain the broader societal context in which antigay violence occurs and, in turn, inform social policy aimed at reducing antigay hate crimes. However, individual attitudes toward gay men and lesbians vary greatly (Herek, 1992). Accordingly, “micro level” theories attempt to make sense of individual variability by explaining the individual and proximal situational factors that facilitate antigay aggression. Of course, individuals will tend to engage in antigay violence only when the psychological functions served by individual determinants are consistent with broader sociocultural factors (Herek, 1992). Nevertheless, theoretical emphasis on individual and immediate situational determinants of antigay aggression is important because it elucidates specific variables that trigger individual antigay attacks. In addition, exploration of these individual motivations provides valuable information that may guide risk assessment and intervention targeted toward the individual. Despite the existence of substantial theory on antigay violence, the bulk of research in this area examines individual motivations (Alden & Parker, 2005). Hence, in accordance with the need to elucidate the processes associated with antigay aggression, the purpose of the present article is to provide a theoretical framework for examining individual Parrott Page 2 Clin Psychol Rev. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2009 July 1. N IH -P A A uthor M anuscript N IH -P A A uthor M anuscript N IH -P A A uthor M anuscript and situational factors that facilitate antigay aggression. As such, significant attention to the “macro level” forces, which explain the facilitative social context for antigay violence, is beyond the scope of this article. Organizing existing “micro level” research on antigay aggression within a heuristic conceptual framework will afford several advantages. First, numerous motivations for antigay aggression have been advanced and each have garnered some empirical support. By organizing these findings within a single conceptual framework, the fundamental principles and processes that underlie antigay aggression may be better understood. Second, an extensive research literature on human aggression exists that can guide our understanding of antigay aggression. While domain-specific theories of aggression are sometimes drawn upon in the antigay violence literature (e.g., Bandura, 1983; Campbell & Gibbs, 1986; Eron, 1987), these two bodies of research are rarely connected in such a way that generates new lines of empirical inquiry. By more effectively linking current knowledge of theoretically based risk factors for antigay aggression to a well-supported conceptual framework for aggressive behavior, new research and theory on antigay aggression may be stimulated and reciprocally inform existing theories on aggressive behavior in general. Third, despite recent advancements in our understanding of antigay aggression, the application of scientific knowledge to reduce antigay aggression has lagged behind. An individual-focused framework for antigay aggression will serve to guide new research aimed at predicting in whom, and under what circumstances, aggression toward sexual minorities is most likely. In turn, these data will aid the development of prevention or treatment interventions aimed at attenuating antigay aggression at the individual level. Indeed, for risk assessment and preventative interventions to make a significant and lasting impact, they must develop from theoretically based research that makes clear predictions regarding the predisposing factors for antigay aggression. As such, the principal aim of this article is to use an existing theoretical framework for aggressive behavior, the general aggression model (GAM; Anderson & Bushman, 2002), to explain and guide research on antigay aggression. This endeavor will organize existing research on antigay aggression, link those findings to the broader aggression literature, stimulate new lines of research, and guide the application of antigay aggression research to applied settings. This article begins with a review of the GAM and contemporary theories of antigay aggression. Theoretically based risk factors for antigay aggression are then organized within the context of the GAM. The resulting conceptual framework is then discussed in terms of its ability stimulate future research and guide the application new findings. 2. The general aggression model 2.1. Overview The GAM (Anderson & Bushman, 2002; Anderson & Carnagey, 2004) is an integrated model for the motivation and emission of aggressive behavior. Developed over the past decade, this model incorporates the most prominent theories employed to explain aggressive behavior, including cognitive neoassociation theory (Berkowitz, 1990), social learning theory (Bandura, 1983, 2001), script theory (Huesmann, 1986, 1998), social-information processing theory (Crick & Dodge, 1994; Dodge & Crick, 1990), excitation transfer theory (Zillmann, 1983), and social interaction theory (Tedeschi & Felson, 1994). Thus, the GAM represents a parsimonious conceptualization of aggressive behavior that can explain the variety of motives for aggressive behavior (for an extensive review and empirical support, see Anderson & Bushman, 2002). Parrott Page 3 Clin Psychol Rev. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2009 July 1. N IH -P A A uthor M anuscript N IH -P A A uthor M anuscript N IH -P A A uthor M anuscript 2.2. Description of the GAM The GAM is composed of input variables, routes, and outcomes (see Fig. 1). At the most fundamental level, the GAM posits that an aggressive response is influenced initially by the interaction of two input variables (i.e., individual differences and situational factors). Depending on the nature of a particular input variable, aggressive behavior may be more (e.g., trait aggressivity, provocation) or less likely (e.g., high empathy, sitting in church). Collectively, these factors increase aggressive behavior through three distinct but interrelated routes (affect, cognition, arousal). Activation of these routes facilitates access to anger-related feelings, aggressive thoughts, and real or perceived physiological arousal, respectively. An associative network purportedly links these three routes, such that initial activation of one pathway (e.g., angry affect) increases the accessibility of other pathways (e.g., hostile cognitions). Upon activation of one or more of these pathways, the individual immediately appraises the situation and other relevant factors prior to emitting a behavioral response. This process, termed immediate appraisal, is automatic and very fast. If time and/or cognitive resources are not available for further processing, immediate appraisal results in an impulsive action that may be aggressive or non-aggressive. If time and cognitive resources are available, the individual evaluates further the results of the primary appraisal, as well as other relevant factors, in a more thoughtful and deliberate manner. This process, termed reappraisal, is conscious, slow, and leads to a thoughtful action that may be aggressive or non-aggressive. The likelihood of an aggressive response is largely dictated by the content of the appraisal as influenced by activation of the various pathways. However, reappraisal also involves consideration of pertinent features of the situation, potential causes for the event, and the meaning of the potential outcomes. Thus, to the extent that reappraisal heightens awareness of provocative cues or positive outcomes of aggression, the likelihood of aggression increases. Ultimately, these complex appraisal processes dictate an individual’s final choice of action (i.e., the outcome). The subsequent social interaction then influences the input variables in the short-term (e.g., immediate situational factors) and long-term (e.g., reinforcing personality or attitudinal variables associated with conflict resolution). For example, an aggressive response may elicit higher levels of provocation from the target, which in turn will facilitate the emission of additional aggressive responses by the individual. Likewise, an aggressive response may be reinforced by the target “backing down” and, as a result, reinforce the perpetrator’s belief that aggression is an appropriate tactic in some, or all, situations. 3. Contemporary theories of antigay aggression 3.1. Overview Numerous scholars have attempted to explain the motives that impel a person to harm others based on their sexual orientation. The most prominent theories are reviewed below. At the foundation of most theories in this area is the widely supported assertion that sexual prejudice is a key determinant of antigay aggression. As defined by Herek (2000, p. 19), sexual prejudice is a dispositional characteristic that incorporates “all negative attitudes based on sexual orientation, whether the target is homosexual, bisexual, or heterosexual.” Moreover, Herek (2000) asserts that sexual prejudice is “almost always directed at people who engage in homosexual behavior or label themselves gay, lesbian, or bisexual” (p. 9). Indeed, as reviewed below, extant literature clearly demonstrates a positive relation between sexual prejudice and the perpetration of antigay aggression. Parrott Page 4 Clin Psychol Rev. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2009 July 1. N IH -P A A uthor M anuscript N IH -P A A uthor M anuscript N IH -P A A uthor M anuscript 3.2. Enforcement of the male gender role Herek (1984, 1986, 1988) posits that one function of sexual prejudice is to make clear distinctions between male and female gender roles. In short, sexual prejudice serves a social- expressive function that “defines group boundaries (with gay men on the outside and the self on the inside)” (Herek, 1986; pg. 573). In support of this theory, studies indicate that male sexual prejudice is strongly associated with adherence to traditional gender roles (Ehrlich, 1990; Kilianski, 2003; Parrott, Adams, & Zeichner, 2002; Polimeni, Hardie, & Buzwell, 2000; Sinn, 1997; Whitley, 2001). Thus, the purported function of antigay aggression, which may be viewed as a behavioral expression of sexual prejudice, is also to enforce a rigid gender role dichotomy. At a more fundamental level, the enforcement of male gender norms affirms the perpetrator’s masculine identity (Franklin, 1998; Hamner, 1992; Kimmel, 1997; Kite & Whitley, 1998). Indeed, pertinent theory posits that masculinity is defined by that which is not feminine (Brannon, 1976; Deaux & Kite, 1987; Herek, 1986; Kimmel, 1997; Kite, 2001; Pleck, 1981). As such, the most critical component in one’s developing masculine identity is arguably “the renunciation of the feminine” (Kimmel, 1997; pg. 22). Inasmuch as male–male intimate or sexual behavior is viewed as an extreme gender role violation, gay men are especially high risk targets for male assailants who seek to affirm their masculine, or antifeminine, identity. Of course, endorsing traditional beliefs of masculinity and femininity does not directly translate into antigay aggression. Rather, men who frequently question their masculinity or have it questioned by other men are presumably more likely to exaggerate stereotypical masculine behaviors (e.g., aggression toward gay men) in order to maintain gender dichotomy and reaffirm their heterosexual masculinity. This proposed mechanism applies to individually perpetrated antigay assaults, and is especially pertinent to group perpetrated antigay assaults (see below). 3.3. Thrill seeking According to Franklin (1998, 2000), antigay assailants who are not driven by sexual prejudice are, instead, motivated by social dynamics. This latter group includes perpetrators who are motivated by thrill seeking. Typically, thrill seeking behavior involves a desire to have fun, seek excitement, and experience pleasure from engaging in certain risky activities. However, thrill seeking antigay assailants, who tend to be male or female adolescents, satisfy these desires specifically through aggression toward gay, lesbian, bisexual, or transgender individuals. They see sexual minorities as “easy targets” for victimization, attack them seemingly out of boredom, minimize the harm they cause, and view their acts as funny or amusing. It is worth noting that thrill seeking assailants do not target sexual minorities exclusively. Rather, antigay aggression perpetrated by these individuals is part of a general pattern of violence, delinquency, and criminal behavior directed toward other minorities and society in general (Franklin, 2000; Levin & McDevitt, 1993). Franklin (1998, 2002) has argued that a common theme for these perpetrators is their perception of being economically disadvantaged and socially disempowered. From a social identity perspective (Hamner, 1992), individuals lower in the social system may only derive a positive evaluation of their in-group by attacking out-groups held in even lower social regard (e.g., gay men, lesbians). Thus, these real or perceived social class divisions presumably elicit negative sentiment toward sexual minorities, who are perceived to possess undeserved privileges despite their sexual deviancy. 3.4. Defense motivation Psychoanalytic theory posits that antigay aggression results from the use of reaction formation to cope with one’s unconscious anxiety about being gay and/or experiencing homosexual urges Parrott Page 5 Clin Psychol Rev. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2009 July 1. N IH -P A A uthor M anuscript N IH -P A A uthor M anuscript N IH -P A A uthor M anuscript (West, 1977). Data in support of this viewpoint is limited. Most notably, Adams, Wright, and Lohr (1996) assessed sexual arousal patterns in heterosexual men who viewed male–female, female–female, and male–male erotica. Not surprisingly, all participants demonstrated significant sexual arousal to male–female and female–female erotica. However, sexually prejudiced men, but not their non-prejudiced counterparts, demonstrated significant sexual arousal to male–male erotica. This finding provided tentative empirical evidence that a man’s experience of presumably unwanted sexual arousal to other men may motivate sexual prejudice and antigay aggression due to his fear of being gay. Nevertheless, this narrow etiological view of antigay aggression has been largely dismissed by contemporary research and theory. For example, Herek (1986) posited that antigay aggression serves a broader ego-defensive function that reduces anxiety from psychological conflicts associated with gender and sexuality.1 Broadly defined, this conceptualization of defensive antigay aggression reflects the perpetrator’s “insecurities about personal adequacy and meeting gender-role demands” (pg. 566) rather than his unconscious fear of being gay. Franklin (2000, 2002) distinguished between two types of defensive antigay aggression. Consistent with the work of Herek (1986), the first type, termed psychological defensiveness, stems from internal psychological conflicts. In the second type, antigay aggression protects the assailant from the perceived threat posed by presumably “sexually predatory” sexual minorities. Data support both of these explanations, especially with respect to the link between psychological defensiveness and physical aggression (Franklin, 2000). 3.5. Group dynamics While antigay aggression may be perpetrated by a lone individual, it is quite common that assaults are committed simultaneously by small groups or by one individual in front of peers (Weissman, 1992). In fact, nearly 30% of all documented victims of antigay attacks reported the involvement of multiple perpetrators (e.g., NCAVP, 2003, 2005). Among a sample of young male college students, however, nearly 75% of individuals who reported aggression toward a gay individual reported doing so while in the context of a group (Franklin, 2000). These data clearly indicate that the group context is especially likely to elicit antigay aggression. In an analysis of hate crime perpetrators, McDevitt, Levin, and Bennett (2002) noted that “most hate crime offenders are young males for whom respect from their peers is incredibly important” (pg. 313). Franklin (1998) similarly posited that the primary motivation for antigay group assailants is to “prove both toughness and heterosexuality to friends” (pg. 12). This explanation essentially extends the “reaffirmation of masculinity” conceptualization to the group context. Indeed, group perpetrated aggression toward gay men — much like group rape of women — represents an extreme social display of masculinity and public adherence to traditional male gender norms (Franklin, 2004). Though dysfunctional, these exaggerated masculine displays clearly demonstrate one’s own heterosexuality and masculinity to other men. As Franklin (1998) concluded, the group views gay men as “a dramatic prop, a vehicle for a ritualized conquest through which assailants demonstrated their commitment to heterosexual masculinity” (pg. 12–13). As such, the theorized role of peer group dynamics in the perpetration of antigay aggression suggests that the group context, especially the male group context, may serve as a potent situational risk factor for antigay aggression. 1In addition to the defensive-expressive function of sexual prejudice, Herek (1986) also proposed a social-expressive function (reviewed above) and a value-expressive function. He posited that sexual prejudice, and antigay aggression, does not serve all three functions for all people. Rather, sexual prejudice may serve a defensive function for one person, while serving a social-expressive function for another. Parrott Page 6 Clin Psychol Rev. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2009 July 1. N IH -P A A uthor M anuscript N IH -P A A uthor M anuscript N IH -P A A uthor M anuscript 4. The GAM as a conceptual framework for antigay aggression The reviewed literature indicates that antigay aggression is facilitated primarily by gender role enforcement, reaffirmation of masculinity, thrill seeking, defensive functions, and group dynamics. It is worth noting that these theories are not mutually exclusive. For example, one individual may attack a gay man purely “for the fun of it” (i.e., thrill seeking), whereas another individual’s behavior may be motivated by thrill seeking as well as a demonstration of masculinity to his peer group (i.e., group dynamics, reaffirmation of masculinity). This notion of multiple determinants for antigay violence has been echoed by other theorists (Franklin, 1998; Herek, 1992)2. This fact highlights the utility of a parsimonious conceptual framework for aggression toward gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender individuals. Indeed, by accounting for multiple personological and situational input variables, the GAM provides a heuristic framework that accounts for multiple predictors of and pathways to antigay aggression. I will now review literature in support of these theories using the GAM as a guiding conceptual framework. First, a selective review of pertinent individual difference and situational factors will be presented to illustrate their independent and joint effects on antigay aggression and affective, cognitive, and physiological routes to aggressive behavior. Second, a general discussion of these findings will be presented to elucidate the role of appraisal processes that ultimately lead to an aggressive response. 4.1. Individual difference risk factors 4.1.1. Gender and age—Survey data indicate that 80% of antigay assailants are male and tend to be in their late teens or early twenties (NCAVP, 2005). Consistent with these data, heterosexual men, relative to heterosexual women, report higher levels of sexual prejudice toward gay men than toward lesbians (Gentry, 1987; Herek, 1988; Kite, 1994; Lim, 2002, Whitley, 1987). Not surprisingly, 60–75% of antigay hate crimes are directed toward gay or transgender men (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2006). In accordance with the observed gender differences in antigay assailants, it is well-established that men are more directly aggressive than women (Bettencourt & Miller, 1996). However, it is worth noting that aggression may be expressed in a variety of ways (Parrott & Giancola, 2007), and pertinent literature indicates that women tend to express aggression in an indirect, relative to a direct, manner (Richardson & Green, 1999). In fact, some studies suggest that women are actually more likely than men to use indirect aggressive tactics (Bjorkqvist, Osterman, & Kaukianen, 1992). In light of these findings, future research must be sensitive to the various ways that aggression toward sexual minorities may be expressed. By preventing a myopic focus on direct aggression, discovery of the pathways to female-perpetrated antigay aggression will be more likely. It is worth noting that a hypermasculine gender role may be more predictive of aggression than one’s actual gender (Richardson & Hammock, 2007). Perhaps for this reason, the most prominent theories of antigay aggression are based upon masculine ideology and, as such, only purport to explain male-perpetrated aggression. With these theories as the only framework upon which to guide subsequent empirical inquiry, the majority of research in this area has relied largely upon male samples. As a result, pathways to female-perpetrated antigay aggression have not been investigated. The application of the GAM might address this limitation and stimulate new research and theory on factors that facilitate antigay aggression 2In Franklin’s (1998) discussion of multiple determinism, she posits that social, cultural, psychological, and situational factors converge to facilitate antigay violence. As discussed previously, a review of “macro level” social or cultural determinants is beyond the scope of this article. As such, only individual psychological and situational factors will be discussed. Parrott Page 7 Clin Psychol Rev. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2009 July 1. N IH -P A A uthor M anuscript N IH -P A A uthor M anuscript N IH -P A A uthor M anuscript in women. For example, women’s endorsement of masculine attributes (e.g., tough, strong) may represent an important predictor of female-perpetrated antigay aggression. Overall, the need for research on female antigay perpetrators has been echoed in previous reviews (Kite & Whitley, 2003). 4.1.2. Summary—Consistent with gender differences in non-biased aggression (Bettencourt & Miller, 1996), research shows that young men are the most typical antigay assailants. This finding suggests that age and gender moderate the expression of antigay aggression. Accordingly, most theory and research on antigay aggression involves male perpetrators. Thus, research with female assailants is clearly needed. However, this finding also begs the question of whether older adults continue to engage in antigay aggression, albeit using tactics that are not direct. Indeed, a middle-aged man may not attack a gay man as part of a “street gang,” but he may indirectly harm a gay man by spreading rumors at work. The aggression literature also indicates that women tend to utilize indirect, rather than direct, aggressive tactics. This suggests that many female antigay assailants may go unnoticed because their tactics are circuitous. As such, future studies in this area will benefit from considering the many ways that aggression may be expressed, rather than relying solely on the assessment of direct, physical antigay aggression. Finally, research indicates that gender role adherence is more predictive of antigay aggression than one’s gender. Thus, assessment of women’s adherence to masculine norms is one necessary step to elucidate pathways to female-perpetrated antigay aggression. 4.1.3. Sexual prejudice—Although popular opinion and victim accounts suggest that sexual prejudice causes antigay aggression, only two laboratory-based investigations have examined this link (Bernat, Calhoun, Adams, & Zeichner, 2001; Parrott & Zeichner, 2005). Under the guise of a competitive reaction time task, participants administered various intensities of electric shocks to an opponent who they believed to be a heterosexual or gay male. Immediately prior to this task, all participants viewed depictions of male gender role violations (i.e., male– male erotica). Results indicated that sexually prejudiced men exposed to violations of the traditional male gender role displayed higher levels of aggressive behavior toward the gay, relative to the heterosexual, male opponent. A link between sexual prejudice and antigay aggression was not observed following exposure to male–female erotica (Parrott & Zeichner, 2005). Consistent with these findings, survey-based studies have demonstrated that sexual prejudice is positively associated with self-reported past aggressive behavior toward gay men (Franklin, 2000; Patel, Long, McCammon, & Wuensch, 1995; Roderick, McCammon, Long, & Allred, 1998). Pertinent research also indicates that sexual prejudice and exposure to male gender role violations interactively activate an affective route to aggression. Several studies have shown that when sexually prejudiced men are exposed to gay men, they report higher levels of anger and anxiety relative to non-sexually prejudiced men (Bernat et al., 2001; Ernulf & Innala, 1987; Parrott & Zeichner, 2005; Parrott, Zeichner, & Hoover, 2006; Van de Ven, Bornholt, & Bailey, 1996). In addition, recent studies using startle eye blink methodology indicate a clear link between sexual prejudice and negative affect (i.e., high startle magnitude) after viewing pictures of nude men or nude gay male couples (Mahaffey, Bryan, & Hutchison, 2005a,b). Considerably fewer studies have evaluated the effects of sexual prejudice, and its interaction with other individual and situational factors, on cognitive- and arousal-based routes to aggression. Parrott et al. (2006) found that sexually prejudiced men demonstrated biases in anger-related cognitive processing following exposure to male gender role violations. Research also suggests that individuals who endorse high levels of both sexual prejudice and anger proneness are more likely to report hostile attitudes toward a gay victim of a hate crime (Rayburn & Davison, 2002). Unfortunately, no study to date has evaluated the effects of sexual prejudice on real or perceived physiological arousal. Parrott Page 8 Clin Psychol Rev. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2009 July 1. N IH -P A A uthor M anuscript N IH -P A A uthor M anuscript N IH -P A A uthor M anuscript 4.1.4. Summary—The literature reviewed in this section indicates that sexual prejudice is a risk factor for antigay aggression. Especially in conjunction with exposure to sexual violations of the male gender role, sexual prejudice facilitates antigay aggression and is associated with two hypothesized routes to aggression. Importantly, recent evidence indicated that anger in response to gay men mediated the relation between sexual prejudice and self-reported past antigay aggression (Parrott & Peterson, in press). These data are consistent with the GAM. In addition, inasmuch as sexual prejudice functions to make clear distinctions between male and female gender roles, these findings are consistent with contemporary theories that highlight gender role enforcement and reaffirmation of masculinity as motivators of antigay aggression. Nevertheless, more research is clearly needed in this area. First, there is no research that examines the interactive effect of sexual prejudice and other potential risk factors on real or perceived physiological arousal. Second, with only two published studies to support the link between sexual prejudice and hostile cognition (Parrott et al., 2006; Rayburn & Davison, 2002), more research is needed to replicate and extend this line of inquiry. Third, as Herek (2004) notes, “sexual prejudice will not always predict specific [antigay] behaviors” (pg. 19). Rather, other factors are important as well, such as characteristics of the immediate situation and the individual. As such, future research must strive to identify those variables that increase, or decrease, the likelihood that sexual prejudice will lead to antigay aggression. Investigation of the function(s) served by an individual’s prejudice (e.g., social expressive, ego defense) may illuminate pertinent situational triggers. Relatedly, it will likely be important to investigate how the internalization of cultural variables might facilitate sexually prejudiced antigay aggression. For example, there is a “commonly held belief that [sexual prejudice] is more prevalent in the black community than in society at large” (Brandt, 1999; pp. 8–9), and recent data support this view (Lewis, 2003). Thus, African-American men may be especially likely to report high levels of sexual prejudice which, in turn, may facilitate antigay aggression, especially toward African-American gay men. 4.1.5. Traditional gender role beliefs—As previously noted, studies indicate that male sexual prejudice is strongly associated with adherence to traditional male gender roles and hypermasculinity (e.g., Kilianski, 2003; Polimeni et al., 2000). Moreover, Herek (1986, 1988) proposes that antigay aggression stems from the perpetrator’s attempt to affirm his masculinity through the enforcement of these gender norms. As such, it makes intuitive sense that rigid adherence to traditional male gender roles will potentiate antigay aggression. Despite this clear theoretical connection, very little research has been conducted in this area. Recent studies have linked traditional masculine gender role beliefs to engagement in “antigay behaviors” (Patel et al., 1995; Whitley, 2001). However, “antigay behaviors” included both aggressive acts (e.g., “I have gotten into a physical fight with a gay person because I thought he or she had been making moves on me”) and avoidant acts (e.g., “I have changed seat locations because I suspected the person sitting next to me to be gay”). This lack of specificity obscures the link, if one exists, between traditional beliefs of the male gender role and antigay aggression. This limitation was addressed by recent survey and laboratory-based research. In an anonymous survey of nearly 500 young adults, Franklin (2000) found that a substantial proportion of antigay assailants perceived their actions to be enforcing gender norms. Consistent with this finding, Parrott & Zeichner (in press) conducted a laboratory-based study that examined the effects of extreme masculine gender role beliefs (i.e., hypermasculinity) and exposure to male gender role violations on antigay anger and aggression. Similar to prior research (e.g., Parrott & Zeichner, 2005), male–female and male–male erotica were used to manipulate male participants’ exposure to male gender role violations. Results indicated that among men who viewed male–male erotica, hypermasculinity predicted increases in anger and higher levels of physical aggression toward a gay, relative to a heterosexual, man. In contrast, among men who viewed male–female erotica, hypermasculinity did not predict increases in Parrott Page 9 Clin Psychol Rev. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2009 July 1. N IH -P A A uthor M anuscript N IH -P A A uthor M anuscript N IH -P A A uthor M anuscript anger and was not differentially associated aggression toward the heterosexual or gay opponent. 4.1.6. Summary—Pertinent literature suggests that traditional male gender role beliefs represent an individual difference risk factor for antigay aggression. These beliefs are positively associated with anger and aggression toward gay men, especially following exposure to male gender role violations. These findings adhere well to the GAM. Unfortunately, research has not evaluated the effects of male gender role beliefs, or its interaction with other personological or situational variables, on hostile cognition or arousal. In addition, the relation between men and women’s beliefs about the female gender role and aggression toward female sexual minorities has not been investigated. These gaps in the literature appear especially ripe for investigation. Nevertheless, the reviewed literature is consistent with contemporary theories of antigay aggression (e.g., Herek, 1986; Kite & Whitley, 1998). Specifically, because men who endorse traditional male gender role beliefs also demonstrate extreme adherence to masculine ideology, they are threatened when confronted by violations of the traditional male gender role. Consequently, these men are at increased risk to respond with stereotypical masculine emotions (e.g., anger) and behaviors (e.g., aggression). This expression of aggression purportedly functions to enforce traditional gender norms as well as reaffirm one’s masculine identity. 4.1.7. Masculine gender role stress—The stress associated with gender role identification varies for each sex. For example, research indicates that men who violate traditional masculine gender role norms face greater social condemnation than women who violate traditional female norms (Pleck, 1981). Perhaps due to this fact, O’Neil (1982) posited that, to the extent a heterosexual man fears the appearance of violating these norms (i.e., of appearing “feminine”), he will display exaggerated, and sometimes dysfunctional, characteristics of the male role. Indeed, one unifying theme of male gender role conflict is men’s fear of appearing feminine (David & Brannon, 1976; O’Neil, 1981), especially in the presence of other men (Kimmel, 1997). This theme is supported by recent research (Wilkinson, 2004) and is consistent with both the proposed defensive–expressive and social-expressive functions of antigay aggression (Herek, 1986). Specifically, antigay aggression directly allays one’s fear of being perceived as feminine, gay, or otherwise non-masculine and simultaneously reaffirms masculine identity to oneself and others. In response to this literature, Eisler and Skidmore (1987) introduced the construct of masculine gender role stress. In contrast to masculinity, which reflects some traits that are socially desirable for most men, masculine gender role stress refers to a man’s “appraisal of specific cognitions, behaviors, or situations as stressful and undesirable” (Eisler, Skidmore, & Ward, 1988; p. 135). Accordingly, men who report high masculine gender role stress display increased anger “when a situation is viewed as requiring ‘unmanly’ or feminine behavior” (pg. 125). In short, these men tend to experience negative emotions (e.g., anger) in situations where they have their masculinity threatened. Masculine gender role stress appears especially likely to facilitate antigay aggression when an individual is confronted with a situational masculinity threat. Although no study to date has directly evaluated this hypothesis, indirect evidence is found in related literatures. For example, research indicates that men who report high levels of masculine gender role stress are more likely to use aggressive tactics in situations where a female threatens their masculinity (Eisler, Franchina, Moore, Honeycutt, & Rhatigan, 2000; Franchina, Eisler, & Moore, 2001). In addition, masculine gender role stress is positively associated with the activation of routes to aggression. For example, research suggests that men who endorse high levels of masculine gender role stress report higher levels of anger, more negative attributions, and heightened Parrott Page 10 Clin Psychol Rev. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2009 July 1. N IH -P A A uthor M anuscript N IH -P A A uthor M anuscript N IH -P A A uthor M anuscript cardiovascular reactivity in response to situational threats of traditional masculinity (Cosenzo, Franchina, Eisler, & Krebs, 2004; Eisler et al., 2000; Franchina et al., 2001; Lash, Eisler, & Schulman, 1990; Moore & Stuart, 2004). Independent of the situation, research has also shown a positive relation between masculine gender role stress and anger (Eisler et al., 1988). 4.1.8. Summary—The literature reviewed in this section clearly identifies masculine gender role stress as a risk factor for aggressive behavior. In accordance with the GAM, masculine gender role stress, particularly in conjunction with situational threats to one’s masculinity (e.g., peer “gay baiting”), is especially likely to activate affective, cognitive, and arousal routes to aggressive behavior. These data are consistent with current theories that emphasize reaffirmation of masculinity and peer dynamics as motives for antigay aggression. Specifically, when men with high levels of gender role stress are in a situation that threatens their masculinity (especially in the presence of other men), they will react with heightened levels of anger, anger- related cognitions, and physiological arousal. According to the GAM, activation of these pathways will significantly increase the likelihood of an aggressive response, particularly toward traditionally ‘non-masculine’ targets (e.g., gay men). Indeed, the targeted expression of stereotypical masculine behavior (i.e., aggression) toward gay men may function to demonstrate masculinity to oneself or others. Research is sorely needed to test these hypotheses. 4.1.9. Right wing authoritarianism—Right wing authoritarianism is a personality trait comprised of three related clusters, including submission to authority figures, acceptance of aggression perceived to be sanctioned by authority figures, and extreme adherence to social conventions (Altemeyer, 1996). From a behavioral standpoint, individuals who are high on this trait tend to be submissive to established authority figures, display aggression when they believe authorities approve such behavior, and engage in activities that uphold traditional social norms. Not surprisingly, over three decades of research indicate that right wing authoritarians are more likely to hold prejudiced attitudes toward out-groups (Altemeyer, 1981, 1986, 1996). Although Altemeyer (1996) has referred to right wing authoritarians as “equal opportunity bigots” (pp. 26), research indicates that authoritarianism is particularly associated with negative attitudes toward groups (e.g., sexual minorities) condemned by authority figures (e.g., Herek, 1988; Whitley, 1999). Indeed, a recent meta-analysis reported a strong positive correlation between right wing authoritarianism and antigay attitudes (Whitley & Lee, 2000). While a portion of this relation is attributable to gender role ideology, recent data indicate that other factors account for approximately 90% of the variance (Wilkinson, 2004). Wilkinson (2004) explained this finding by concluding that right wing authoritarians may perceive sexual minorities as part of a “hegemonic hierarchy (‘them not us’) that exists without any need for any additional information regarding gender roles or typicality” (pg. 129). 4.1.10. Summary—While a great deal of research has evaluated the link between right wing authoritarianism and sexual prejudice, no studies have examined its effects on antigay aggression or hypothesized routes to aggression. This is an especially fertile area for future investigation that may be guided by the GAM. For example, research indicates that authoritarian aggression is positively associated with traditional beliefs regarding male, but not female, gender roles (Duncan, Peterson, & Winter, 1997). Inasmuch as right wing authoritarians perceive the male gender role to be more rigid than the female gender role (Michaels, 1996), their maintenance of hegemonic boundaries may facilitate more powerful emotional, cognitive, and physiological reactions to male, relative to female, sexual minorities. This hypothesis is also consistent with theories that highlight the enforcement of gender roles as a primary motive for antigay aggression (Franklin, 1998; Kite & Whitley, 1998). Similarly, research is needed to elucidate other situational forces that motivate the right wing authoritarian Parrott Page 11 Clin Psychol Rev. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2009 July 1. N IH -P A A uthor M anuscript N IH -P A A uthor M anuscript N IH -P A A uthor M anuscript toward antigay attacks. By definition, authoritarians submit to the will of established authority figures. Given this strong disposition, right wing authoritarians may be more inclined to engage in behaviors sanctioned by their immediate group cohort. Thus, as a situational risk factor, a group context that endorses or engages in an antigay attack may propel the right wing authoritarian toward antigay aggression. 4.2. Situational risk factors 4.2.1. Exposure to gender role violations—Exposure to sexual violations of the male gender role (e.g., gay men kissing) may motivate perpetrators to attack gay men in an effort to enforce these gender norms (Herek, 1986, 1988). Consistent with these data, research clearly indicates that sexually prejudiced men who are exposed to sexual violations of the traditional male gender role experience increases in anger and negative affect (Bernat et al., 2001; Parrott & Zeichner, 2005), display biases in processing of anger-related information (Parrott et al., 2006), and behave more aggressively toward a gay, relative to a heterosexual, man (Bernat et al., 2001; Parrott & Zeichner, 2005). Moreover, traditional male gender role beliefs interact similarly with exposure to male–male gender role violations to facilitate anger and antigay aggression (Parrott & Zeichner, in press). This collective evidence indicates that exposure to male–male gender role violations is an important situational risk factor for antigay aggression. It is worth noting that, after controlling for personological variables (e.g., sexual prejudice), exposure to extreme male gender role violations (e.g., male–male erotica) is positively associated with self-reported feelings of anger (Parrott & Zeichner, 2005) and physiological measures of negative affect (Mahaffey et al., 2005a). In contrast, research does not support an independent effect on hostile cognition, arousal, or aggression. Indeed, exposure to male gender role violations only activated hostile cognition (Parrott et al., 2006) and aggressive behavior (Parrott & Zeichner, 2005) upon interaction with other variables (e.g., sexual prejudice, hypermasculinity). These findings provide strong evidence for the interaction of situational and individual difference variables in the prediction of antigay aggression. 4.2.2. Summary—In accordance with the GAM, exposure to sexual violations of the male gender role is a situational facilitator of antigay aggression in some men. The reviewed literature is also consistent with theories of antigay aggression that highlight the enforcement of traditional gender roles. Inasmuch as antigay aggression serves a social-expressive function that defines group boundaries (Herek, 1986), exposure to extreme violations of one’s rigid gender role dichotomy is likely to incite anger and facilitate antigay aggression. A limitation of this research is that existing laboratory findings possess low external validity due to the fact that these studies used male–male erotica as examples of male gender role violations. Realistically, sexually prejudiced men are unlikely to put themselves in situations where they would be exposed to sexually graphic male–male behavior. Thus, several important questions remain unanswered. First, it is unclear whether these findings stem from the essence of male–male sexual behavior or the graphic nature of the stimuli. Future research that employs more accessible depictions of sexual male–male gender role violations (e.g., two men kissing) or interactions between research participants and a self-identified gay confederate is needed to tease apart this confound. Second, the extent to which male gender role violations must possess a sexual component to facilitate sexually prejudiced anger and antigay aggression is not known. Clearly, exposure to graphic depictions of male–male sexual activity is one such situational trigger. However, violations of the traditional male gender role might also include a man doing housework or a man who throws a football in an “effeminate” manner. To answer this question, a series of studies may be envisioned in which participants are randomly assigned to view sexual male–male gender role violations (e.g., male–male intimate relationship behavior or erotica) or a non-sexual male gender role violation (e.g., a man doing housework). Emotional, Parrott Page 12 Clin Psychol Rev. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2009 July 1. N IH -P A A uthor M anuscript N IH -P A A uthor M anuscript N IH -P A A uthor M anuscript cognitive, physiological and, ultimately, biased aggressive responses could then be assessed. Indeed, the GAM provides a useful framework from which to guide important new research in this area. 4.2.3. Alcohol and substance intoxication—Anderson and Bushman (2002) contend that alcohol and substance intoxication serve as indirect situational facilitators of aggression, especially among people who possess aggression-related traits and/or are exposed to other aggression-promoting situational cues. This conceptualization is in accordance with other theories of alcohol- and substance-related aggression (e.g., Chermack & Giancola, 1997; Graham, Wells, & West, 1997; Taylor & Chermack, 1993). As such, the effects of individual (e.g., sexual prejudice) and situational (e.g., exposure to male gender role violations) variables that predict antigay aggression should be exacerbated by acute intoxication from alcohol or other substances known to facilitate aggression (e.g., cocaine). Unfortunately, not one study has directly tested this hypothesis. Only one published study has examined the link between alcohol intoxication and the expression of any type of prejudice (Reeves & Nagoshi, 1993), though the inebriate’s expression of aggression was not assessed. The lack of research in this area is surprising for several reasons. First, in a survey of hate crime perpetrators, 58% reported a history of substance abuse and approximately 33% were intoxicated at the time of the offense (Dunbar, 2003). Second, anecdotal reports gathered from victims indicate that many acts of aggression against gay men are reportedly committed under the influence of alcohol or in/around bars (Human Rights Campaign, 2000). Consistent with these findings, Franklin (2000) found that antigay assailants consumed alcohol more frequently than non-assailants. Finally, like research on alcohol-related aggression, research on prejudice and discriminatory behavior has a long history in the psychological literature. The fact that these two literatures have yet to be meaningfully linked limits theoretical development and prohibits the application of any synergistic scientific advancement. There is clearly a need for research in this area. In conducting this research, it will be important for researchers to consider pertinent theory, consistent with the GAM, which explains how alcohol and other substances facilitate aggression. Specifically, theorists posit that a key mechanism of alcohol-related aggression is inhibition conflict (Steele & Josephs, 1990), which occurs in situations where simultaneous pressures to engage (i.e., instigatory cues) or not to engage (i.e., inhibitory cues) in aggressive action are present. Steele and colleagues (Steele & Josephs, 1990; Steele & Southwick, 1985) postulate that alcohol intoxication facilitates aggression in these situations by narrowing the inebriate’s attention to these instigatory cues. Recent laboratory evidence supports this view (Giancola & Corman, 2007). This conceptualization may be extended to other substances to the extent that a drug’s intoxicating effects have a narrowing effect on attention. Accordingly, in the context of their justification–suppression model of prejudice, Crandall and Eshleman (2003) argue that the alcohol intoxication will facilitate the behavioral expression of prejudice, “but only to the extent that those prejudices are suppressed” (p. 425)3. When the simultaneous pressures of instigatory cues (e.g., a situation that fosters the expression of those prejudiced attitudes) and inhibitory cues (e.g., one’s disposition toward suppressing prejudices) are salient, alcohol is most likely to increase prejudicial aggression. Stated differently, to the extent that an individual freely expresses his or her prejudice (i.e., no inhibition conflict), alcohol is not hypothesized to exacerbate behavioral expression of those prejudices. 3Crandall and Eshleman (2003) do not make specific predictions regarding the effects of other drugs on the expression of prejudice. Nonetheless, it is assumed that their hypotheses may be expanded to include other substances that have a narrowing effect on attention. Parrott Page 13 Clin Psychol Rev. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2009 July 1. N IH -P A A uthor M anuscript N IH -P A A uthor M anuscript N IH -P A A uthor M anuscript 4.2.4. Summary—The effects of acute alcohol intoxication, as well as intoxication resulting from other substances (e.g., cocaine), on antigay aggression clearly merit investigation. Future research in this area may benefit by considering several theoretically derived lines of inquiry. First, prior theory and research indicate that alcohol intoxication exacerbates the influence of aggression-promoting personality traits on the experience of anger (Eckhardt, 2007; Parrott, Zeichner, & Stephens, 2003), aggressive thoughts (Eckhardt, 2007), and aggressive behavior (e.g., Pernanen, 1991). However, it is not known whether alcohol or other substances exert the same moderating effect on traits (e.g., sexual prejudice, traditional male gender role beliefs) that facilitate antigay aggression. Second, future studies might examine the joint effects of alcohol/substance use and other situational risk factors on antigay aggression as well as negative affect, hostile cognition, and arousal. For example, alcohol may serve to exacerbate pre-existing tendencies to become angry after exposure to male–male gender role violations. Third, pertinent theory (Crandall & Eshleman, 2003; Steele & Josephs, 1990) suggests that alcohol will only facilitate the behavioral expression of prejudice among individuals who attempt to suppress their prejudice. Given the existence of an instrument that assesses individual differences in the suppression of antigay prejudice (Plant & Devine, 1998), this area is also ripe for future research. These and other lines of research involving alcohol and substance use will inform current theories of antigay aggression. Inasmuch as intoxication unleashes pre-existing behavioral tendencies, research might illuminate further those theories that point to gender role enforcement, reaffirmation of masculinity, defensive functions, and/or thrill seeking as motivations for antigay aggression. Notably, recent data indicate that alcohol facilitates social bonding in small groups (Kirchner, Sayette, Cohn, Moreland, & Levine, 2006). This finding has interesting implications for the influence of group dynamics on antigay aggression. Specifically, to the extent that alcohol-induced social bonding amplifies the influence of group members on one another, peer pressure may be an especially powerful force that motivates individual displays of masculinity among intoxicated individuals (e.g., alcohol-related antigay aggression). 4.3. Appraisal processes The literature reviewed thus far highlights distal predictors of aggressive behavior. However, the GAM posits that more proximal appraisal processes ultimately determine behavioral outcomes (e.g., aggression). Immediate appraisals involve automatic information processing that lead to impulsive action. Reappaisals involve controlled information processing that lead to thoughtful action. While these processes may be distinguished on a conceptual level, both automatic and controlled information processing likely underlie most aggressive acts (Bushman & Anderson, 2001). Nevertheless, it is useful to illustrate how appraisal processes may differentially influence the likelihood of antigay aggression. Many acts of antigay aggression clearly stem from reappraisal processes. That is, when deciding between an aggressive or non-aggressive response, perpetrators engage in very deliberate, conscious thought. They consider their beliefs about gender roles, beliefs about their masculine identity, and scripts or schemas that may guide their interactions with gay, lesbian, bisexual, or transgender individuals. In addition, they likely consider positive outcome expectancies for action. Indeed, there is little doubt that anticipated outcomes from antigay aggression (e.g., restoration of masculinity, acceptance of peer group, getting a “thrill”) are especially important to perpetrators. As Anderson and Bushman (2002) note, reappraisal processes may even increase the level of anger “as the damage to one’s social image becomes more apparent” (pg. 41). For example, as a perpetrator continues to think about his masculinity being threatened, his likelihood of emitting an aggressive response increases. The hypothesized role of reappraisal processes is supported by case reports of antigay aggression. Specifically, Parrott Page 14 Clin Psychol Rev. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2009 July 1. N IH -P A A uthor M anuscript N IH -P A A uthor M anuscript N IH -P A A uthor M anuscript antigay assaults typically share the common feature of a perpetrator or perpetrators who consciously planned or deliberated prior to the attack (NCAVP, 2005). These qualitative data suggest that controlled information process underlie many acts of antigay aggression. Unfortunately, no direct test of this hypothesis has been conducted. According to the GAM, a history of reinforcement for antigay aggression will also increase the likelihood of future aggression toward sexual minorities. Research on the effects of video game violence provides an interesting insight into this hypothesis. Carnagey and Anderson (2005) found that video games which reward aggressive behavior increase hostile thoughts that, in turn, facilitate aggression. As applied to antigay aggression, the reviewed literature suggests that perpetrators’ aggression can be positively reinforced (e.g., reaffirmation of one’s masculinity) or negatively reinforced (e.g., decreases in state gender role stress). To the extent that such reinforcement occurs, antigay cognitions will become chronically accessible and antigay aggression will be more likely. It is worth noting that peer groups are an especially likely source of these types of reinforcement (Franklin, 1998; McDevitt et al., 2002). In the long term, repeated reinforcement for antigay aggression, as well as repeated activation of antigay cognitions, will lead to the development of aggressive scripts and schemas. As part of the reappraisal process, these easily accessible and well-rehearsed knowledge structures will serve to facilitate the expression of antigay aggression. With repeated use, however, these cognitive processes will become automatized. As these knowledge structures are accessed with less effort, they may guide behavior at the level of immediate appraisal. The implication of this development is significant. Anderson and Carnagey (2004) state that “a person who repeatedly ‘learns’ through experience or through cultural teachings that a particular type of person is a ‘threat’ can automatically perceive almost any action by a member of that group as dangerous” which can “easily lead to a ‘shoot first, ask questions later’ mentality” (pp. 173). As applied to antigay violence, heterosexism and masculine socialization processes systematically “teach” a person that sexual minorities are a threat. Consequently, automatic use of these knowledge structures may contribute to the formation of attitudes (e.g., sexual prejudice, perception of gays as an inferior social group) that also increase one’s likelihood of antigay aggression. It is possible that these perpetrators, who access antigay aggressive scripts with such ease, will be driven to antigay aggression by the slightest situational cue or whim, will engage in these acts with the most recurrence, and will be least responsive to intervention. Collectively, these processes may represent an important intersection between “macro level” and “micro level” determinants of antigay violence. 5. Methodological considerations for future research Thus far, I have reviewed empirical research on numerous risk factors for antigay aggression and demonstrated how these variables may be adapted into the theoretical framework of the GAM. As a result, numerous theoretical limitations of past research have been identified and suggestions for future research have been advanced. However, examination of this literature also highlights methodological limitations of previous research that merit attention. It is clear that most research on antigay aggression has relied on self-report measures to assess pertinent individual difference risk factors (e.g., sexual prejudice), mediating variables (e.g., anger), and outcome variables (e.g., retrospective reports of antigay aggression). While this methodological approach has its advantages, self-reports of presumably undesirable behaviors (e.g., aggression) may be limited by response biases. Thus, the use of more objective assessment tools would effectively complement prior research. For example, to the extent that assessment of sexual prejudice may be biased by socially desirable responding, use of implicit measures, such as the implicit association test (Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998), seems warranted. Likewise, more objective assessment of anger, hostile cognition, or arousal may be Parrott Page 15 Clin Psychol Rev. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2009 July 1. N IH -P A A uthor M anuscript N IH -P A A uthor M anuscript N IH -P A A uthor M anuscript achieved via facial analysis (Ekman & Friesen, 1975) or electromyography (EMG), psychophysiological measures of arousal (e.g., galvanic skin response), or well-established cognitive tasks (e.g., Stroop task), respectively. Finally, only recently has research in this area employed laboratory methods to assess antigay aggression. While some have criticized the external validity of laboratory aggression paradigms (Tedeschi & Quigley, 1996, 2000), numerous studies have demonstrated their validity (reviewed in Anderson & Bushman, 1997; Berkowitz, 1989; Giancola & Chermack, 1998). Regardless of the perceived artificiality of these tasks, laboratory aggression paradigms effectively evaluate theoretical mechanisms that are believed to operate in more naturalistic aggressive interactions (Anderson & Bushman, 1997). It is also worth noting that most research on antigay aggression relies on undergraduate samples of young men. Although young men are most often perpetrators of antigay aggression, results from prior research need to be extended to broader adult samples beyond male college students. Specifically, large population-based studies are required to determine whether hypothesized and established effects in the present review apply to adult males in general. If results of these studies are consistent with prior work, then the prevalence of these effects would provide compelling support for their application in developing community interventions to reduce antigay violence in the United States. 6. Implications for prevention and treatment Conceptualizing antigay aggression through the lens of the GAM will inform applied work to reduce antigay aggression. Unfortunately, a comprehensive discussion of potential applied considerations not only goes beyond the scope of the present article, but also goes beyond existing literature in this area. Indeed, it is not prudent to outline specific recommendations for individual intervention without a substantial research foundation. As such, it is proposed that the next, and most important, step in this area is to provide a framework to guide the basic research that is needed to better understand antigay aggression. After these efforts establish incontrovertible pathways to antigay aggression, researchers in this area will be more effective in developing community and individual prevention and treatment programs. Nevertheless, some applications merit preliminary consideration. At the input level, it seems reasonable to suggest that reducing individual sexual prejudice would decrease one’s risk of antigay aggression. Certainly, interventions that target heterosexism and masculine socialization processes should have a “trickle down” effect to the individual. However, several strategies that directly target the individual are also possible. First, clinicians can identify how sexual prejudice and antigay aggression reinforce the individual’s behavior (e.g., reaffirmation of masculinity, reducing anxiety). In turn, techniques that reduce these reinforcing effects or allow the individual to obtain that reinforcement in another way might be used (Herek, 1992). For example, interventions could be designed that promote self-esteem in groups at high risk for antigay violence (e.g., adolescent males) (Hamner, 1992). Second, a consistent finding in the antigay aggression literature is that individuals who report low levels of sexual prejudice also report knowing someone who is gay (Herek & Capitanio, 1996). Thus, interventions to reduce sexual prejudice may seek to increase individuals’ positive interactions with or challenge stereotypes of gay, lesbian, bisexual, or transgender persons. Finally, individuals’ beliefs about themselves (e.g., socially disempowered) or the world (e.g., sexual minorities are a low status social group) may be targeted with schema change techniques (Dobson & Hamilton, 2003). Interventions that target mediational mechanisms (i.e., anger, cognition, arousal) presumed to facilitate antigay aggression may also be effective. High arousal and dysregulated emotional states characterized by poor anger regulation and high sensation seeking can be improved by Parrott Page 16 Clin Psychol Rev. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2009 July 1. N IH -P A A uthor M anuscript N IH -P A A uthor M anuscript N IH -P A A uthor M anuscript utilizing empirically-validated anger management therapies that include relaxation training as well as cognitive and behavioral skill enhancement (Deffenbacher, Dahlen, Lynch, Morris, & Gowensmith, 2000; Deffenbacher, Oetting, & DiGuiseppe, 2002). Furthermore, hostile cognitions can be modified and/or managed with well-established cognitive techniques, including thought stopping, problem-solving skills training, self-reinforcement, and urge control. More broadly, well-established skills taught in cognitive–behavioral therapy may also prove beneficial, such as identifying and challenging irrational thoughts. Such techniques may also effectively modify appraisal and reappraisal processes. Finally, inasmuch as contact with a member of an out-group (e.g., a gay man) elicits anger among heterosexual persons, certain types of intergroup contact might attenuate negative affective reactions and, in turn, reduce the likelihood of antigay aggression. Consistent with this view, research suggests that intergroup contact that includes equal status between the groups, a norm supporting positive relations, and cooperative (relative to competitive) interactions reduces anxiety and increases positive affect in response to out-group members (Dovidio et al., 2004; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2000). Another avenue worthy of investigation involves the enhancement of self-regulatory strength. Research indicates that interactions with out-groups deplete self-regulatory strength which, in turn, exhausts limited capacity resources needed to regulate behavior (Richeson & Shelton, 2003). Interestingly, research also suggests that self-regulatory exercise can reduce individuals’ susceptibility to self-regulatory depletion and, presumably, to behavioral dysregulation (Gailliot, Plant, Butz, & Baumeister, 2007). Though tentative, these findings have promising implications for the reduction of antigay aggression motivated by sexual prejudice or other dispositional characteristics. Indeed, “self-regulation can be the trump card of personality” (Baumeister, Gailliot, Dewall, & Oaten, 2006; pg. 1796). 7. Summary and conclusions Over the past 25 years, scholars have advanced numerous explanations for antigay aggression. Recently, empirical data supporting some of these theories has begun to emerge. For example, research clearly shows that young men are the most typical antigay assailants, though there is reason to believe that female-perpetrated antigay aggression may go unnoticed due to their tendency to use circuitous aggressive tactics. Numerous laboratory and survey studies have also demonstrated that sexual prejudice is positively associated with antigay aggression as well as two hypothesized routes (i.e., anger, hostile cognition) to aggression. Similarly, research has linked traditional beliefs about the male gender role to the perpetration of antigay aggression, especially following exposure to violations of the male gender role. Data indicate that masculine gender role stress is an individual difference risk factor for aggressive behavior and may also predict antigay aggression. Pertinent theory suggests that antigay aggression perpetrated by thrill seeking assailants may be perpetuated by sensation seeking tendencies and/or real or perceived social disempowerment. Future research is needed to examine the effects of these variables on antigay, and other bias-motivated, aggression. Right wing authoritarianism is associated with sexual prejudice and, purportedly, with antigay aggression. However, research is also needed to evaluate this proposed link. Extant literature also points to situational factors that may elicit antigay aggression. Although exposure to sexual violations of the male gender role independently elicits anger in men, this risk factor exerts its most powerful effect on antigay aggression upon interaction with other pertinent individual risk factors (e.g., sexual prejudice). The group context, especially peer pressure within the group, also appears to be an especially powerful facilitator of antigay violence. Finally, research suggests that alcohol and substance use is linked to antigay assaults. Although no studies have explicated this presumed relation, pertinent theories of alcohol- and substance-related aggression and the expression of prejudice exist to guide future research. Parrott Page 17 Clin Psychol Rev. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2009 July 1. N IH -P A A uthor M anuscript N IH -P A A uthor M anuscript N IH -P A A uthor M anuscript By integrating these findings within the framework of the GAM, numerous theoretically derived avenues for future research may be envisioned. For example, studies are needed that examine the interactive effects of identified personological (e.g., sexual prejudice, perceived social disempowerment) and situational (e.g., exposure to violations of the male gender role, peer pressure) variables on hypothesized routes to antigay aggression. Most notably, input variables that elicit real or perceived physiological arousal and hostile cognition require substantial investigation. Inasmuch as researchers seek to evaluate situational effects of gender role violations on antigay aggression, it is necessary for future studies to utilize more socially visible and realistic displays of male–male or female–female interactions. The effects of alcohol, and other aggression-promoting drugs, on antigay aggression have eluded scientific attention to date. Future research is needed to test pertinent theory in this area. These are but a few of the many research questions that are yet unanswered. In conclusion, the foregoing review has argued that the general aggression model will facilitate investigation of “micro level” individual and situational risk factors that may contribute to antigay aggression. I have outlined important implications of conceptualizing the antigay violence literature in this way. First, as new findings on antigay aggression begin to accumulate, they can be organized and interpreted through the lens of a heuristic theory of aggressive behavior. This will permit integration of a breadth of research on aggressive behavior, inclusive of antigay and other bias-motivated aggression. Second, expanding the theoretical “playing field” will likely stimulate new and exciting research on antigay aggression. As previously noted, the cognitive and physiological reactions of antigay offenders have eluded significant investigation. Indeed, conceptualizing antigay aggression within the heuristic framework of the GAM can stimulate new research in this area. Third, as knowledge regarding pertinent risk factors and pathways to antigay aggression accumulates, the general aggression model will provide a framework to guide the development of individual-level intervention. This endeavor will serve the ultimate goal of aggression research, which is to reduce violence in our society. References Adams HE, Wright LW, Lohr BA. Is homophobia associated with homosexual arousal? Journal of Abnormal Psychology 1996;105:440–445. [PubMed: 8772014] Alden HL, Parker KF. Gender role ideology, homophobia, and hate crime: Linking attitudes to macro- level anti-gay and lesbian hate crimes. 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Alcoholism: Clinical and Experimental Research 1993;17:1066–1071. Richardson DR, Green LR. Social sanction and threat explanations of gender effects on direct and indirect aggression. Aggressive Behavior 1999;25:425–434. Richardson DR, Hammock GS. Social context of human aggression: Are we paying too much attention to gender? Aggression and Violent Behavior 2007;12:417–426. Richeson JA, Shelton JN. When prejudice does not pay: Effects of interracial contact on executive function. Psychological Science 2003;14:287–290. [PubMed: 12741756] Roderick T, McCammon SL, Long TE, Allred LJ. Behavioral aspects of homonegativity. Journal of Homosexuality 1998;36:79–88. [PubMed: 9670102] Sinn JS. The predictive and discriminant validity of masculinity ideology. Journal of Research in Personality 1997;31:117–135. Steele CM, Josephs RA. Alcohol myopia: Its prized and dangerous effects. American Psychologist 1990;45:921–933. [PubMed: 2221564] Steele CM, Southwick L. Alcohol and social behavior I: The psychology of drunken excess. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 1985;48:18–34. [PubMed: 3981386] Tajfel, H.; Turner, JC. A social identity theory of intergroup behavior. In: Worchel, S.; Austin, WG., editors. Psychology of intergroup relations. Chicago: Nelson-Hall; 1986. p. 7-24. Taylor SP, Chermack ST. Alcohol, drugs, and human physical aggression. Journal of Studies on Alcohol 1993;(Suppl No 11):78–88. Tedeschi, JT.; Felson, RB. Violence, Aggression, & Coercive Actions. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association; 1994. Tedeschi JT, Quigley BM. Limitations of laboratory paradigms for studying aggression. Aggression and Violent Behavior 1996;1:163–177. Tedeschi JT, Quigley BM. A further comment on the construct validity of laboratory aggression paradigms: A response to Giancola and Chermack. Aggression and Violent Behavior 2000;5:127– 136. Van de Ven P, Bornholt L, Bailey M. Measuring cognitive, affective, and behavioral components of homophobic reaction. Archives of Sexual Behavior 1996;25:155–179. [PubMed: 8740521] Weissman, E. Kids who attack gays. In: Herek, GM.; Berrill, KT., editors. Hate crimes: Confronting violence against lesbians and gay men. Newbury Park, CA: Sage; 1992. p. 170-178. West, DJ. Homosexuality re-examined. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press; 1977. Whitley BE. The relationship of sex-role orientation to heterosexuals’ attitudes toward homosexuals. Sex Roles 1987;17:103–113. Whitley BE. Right-wing authoritarianism, social dominance orientation, and prejudice. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 1999;77:126–134. Whitley BE. Gender-role variables and attitudes toward homosexuality. Sex Roles 2001;45:691–721. Whitley BE, Lee SE. The relationship of authoritarianism and related constructs to attitudes toward homosexuality. Journal of Applied Social Psychology 2000;30:144–170. Wilkinson WW. Authoritarian hegemony, dimensions of masculinity, and male antigay attitudes. Psychology of Men and Masculinity 2004;5:121–131. Zillmann, D. Arousal and aggression. In: Geen, R.; Donnerstein, E., editors. Aggression: Theoretical and empirical reviewsTheoretical and methodological issues. 1. New York: Academic Press; 1983. p. 75-101. Parrott Page 23 Clin Psychol Rev. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2009 July 1. N IH -P A A uthor M anuscript N IH -P A A uthor M anuscript N IH -P A A uthor M anuscript Fig. 1. The general aggression model. Note. From “Human aggression” by C.A. Anderson and B.J. Bushman, 2002, Annual Review of Psychology, 53, p. 34. Copyright 2002 by Annual Reviews. Reprinted with permission. Parrott Page 24 Clin Psychol Rev. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2009 July 1. N IH -P A A uthor M anuscript N IH -P A A uthor M anuscript N IH -P A A uthor M anuscript 
work_r5jauo3ldfhlnek6cw4gqvbshu	----	Victims as vote-winners? The antisocial behaviour/ hate crime nexus HEAP, Vicky <http://orcid.org/0000-0003-4311-1758> and DUGGAN, Marian Available from Sheffield Hallam University Research Archive (SHURA) at: http://shura.shu.ac.uk/14742/ This document is the author deposited version. You are advised to consult the publisher's version if you wish to cite from it. Published version HEAP, Vicky and DUGGAN, Marian (2013). Victims as vote-winners? The antisocial behaviour/ hate crime nexus. Criminal Justice Matters, 94 (1), 24-25. Copyright and re-use policy See http://shura.shu.ac.uk/information.html Sheffield Hallam University Research Archive http://shura.shu.ac.uk http://shura.shu.ac.uk/ http://shura.shu.ac.uk/information.html Victims as Vote-Winners? Exploring the ASB / Hate Crime Nexus Marian Duggan and Vicky Heap consider the connectedness of contemporary victim policies. Synopsis: Anti-social behaviour (ASB) and hate crime share a number of connections: both are relatively recent notions, both are underpinned by their subjective nature and both have laid the foundational concepts for reimagining the 'victim' in the criminal justice system. Over the past two decades, victims of crime and ASB have been promoted to the forefront of criminal justice policy developments. The status of victims has been elevated, but in a prescriptive manner that determines the most appropriate course of action. The paper explores whether continued efforts by the Coalition to elevate victims’ status will actually benefit victims, or are a case of political posturing to secure the populist law and order vote, using the ASB/hate crime nexus as an example. Paper: The capitalisation of social issues by Governments is a key tactic in fighting and winning elections. Issues relating to the criminological arena are usually focused on targeting crime and punishing criminals; victims have – until relatively recently – been an afterthought in the Criminal Justice System (CJS). Despite the advent of the crime-drop in the 1990s, New Labour began creating a whole new conduct-regulating discourse around anti-social behaviour (ASB) as a means of capitalising on penal populism. This broadening of the criminological gaze focused on targeted, harmful or annoying behaviours which were not strictly criminal, but which resonated strongly with the voting public who demanded enhanced responses from police and politicians. Furthermore, it began to highlight and elevate the status of victims within the CJS by addressing such quality of life issues. This was quickly followed up with a new-look approach to tackling another form of targeted victimisation: ‘hate crime’. New Labour passed a series of laws which addressed acts motivated by a prejudice towards a victim’s actual or perceived identity category in relation to race, religion, sexual orientation, disability and - now - gender identity (albeit not ‘gender’). Since assuming power in 2010, the Coalition Government has appeared to revise and extend the ‘victim-focused’ work of the previous New Labour administration by introducing a raft of victims’ policies. With both recorded and perceived crime rates still falling, addressing victimisation is perhaps seen as the best method of upholding the ‘strong on law and order’ ideology particularly favoured by the Blue proportion of the Coalition. This approach may also be salient financially in times of austerity, due to the high cost of more traditional crime control policies such as increasing the prison population. Furthermore, this rhetoric pertaining to protect victims fulfils the populist vote-winning criteria. Taking the ASB/hate crime nexus, this paper illustrates the very different political and policy responses to quite similar forms of victimisation. Whilst a separatist approach may prove politically advantageous, duplications, inconsistencies, blurred boundaries and misinformation abound which may ultimately prove detrimental for the most vulnerable in society. Common Characteristics; Different Domains ASB and hate crime share some common characteristics: they often encompass what is termed ‘low level’ victimisation or harassment (verbal abuse, intimidation, criminal damage, breach of the peace, minor assault) by similar cohorts (young people, often in groups of three or more) and go largely unreported as a result of victim perceptions of CJS capabilities to intervene (Heap, 2010; Duggan, 2012). In some cases (such as Fiona Pilkington, see below), the complexity of categorising people in one camp or the other has resulted in statutory failures and tragic circumstances. The subjective power given to victims in determining what constitutes ASB and hate motivation is unprecedented in any other part of the CJS. For ASB, victimisation is distinguished by whether the perpetrator’s behaviour causes harassment, alarm or distress. This elastic definition is set to extend further with the implementation of the Anti-Social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill (due to receive Royal assent in spring 2014), with the inclusion of behaviours that are capable of causing nuisance and annoyance. With hate crime, a successful prosecution on the basis of the perceived motivation can enhance sentences by up to two years (for section 146 motivators: sexual orientation, disability, gender identity), or constitute a recognised hate crime conviction (race or religion). Parallels can also be found in the relationship between ASB and hate crime victims and their perpetrators, with there often being some degree of familiarity (Mason, 2005) which may adversely impact on a victim’s willingness to report incidents. This may negatively impact on the Government’s drive to boost the number of restorative justice interventions among ‘lower level’ types of victimisation as fears around retribution or retaliation may be enhanced by this degree of familiarity among victim(s) and perpetrator(s) (Walters and Hoyle, 2012). Similarities also abound with regards to reasons for non-reporting. Heap (2010) has noted a silence around highlighting ASB to the authorities as being linked to fear of repercussions and/or perceived inaction on the part of statutory agents, factors replicated in much hate crime literature (Chakraborti, 2009). To address this, various reporting mechanisms have been established which indicate a discernible difference in procedure for ASB and hate crime. The ‘partnership’ approach adopted to tackle ASB means reports can be made to a number of agencies including the police, local authorities and social housing providers. However, this results in numerous issues ranging from double counting incidents between agencies to cases of unidentified repeat victimisation. For hate crime, the establishment of ‘third-party reporting’ via public authorities, community centres and online forms allows victims to report incidents and crimes to an intermediary without having to engage directly with the police. This in turn means that many incidents may not be officially recorded and, in some cases, result in under counting or discrepancies between what is recorded where. In spite of these similarities, a key difference between ASB and hate crime is how an incident is responded to. The victim’s identity, their perception of motivating factors and the nature of the incident(s) are integral to discerning what the incident is categorised as and what protocol is employed. Seemingly similar incidents may be classed as ASB if the victim does not fall into one of the recognised hate crime strands and hate crime if they do. As ASB is regarded as sub- criminal and 'low level', most victim experiences are noted, with victims given a diary to detail further incidents in order to build a case. In contrast, policy guidelines for hate crime in some policing areas (such as South Yorkshire) dictate that a responding officer must make contact with the victim within one hour of the incident being logged. The difference between these responses has been illustrated by the tragic case of Fiona Pilkington, who killed herself and her severely disabled daughter in 2007 after years of harassment by local youths. During misconduct proceedings against members of Leicestershire Police, it emerged that over thirty reported incidents had been logged as ASB rather than disability hate crime. For this people affected by disability prejudice in particular, extra vigilance is required to avoid hate crimes being recorded as ASB due to the victim being unaware of more applicable legislation existing. Increasing the public’s knowledge of policing practices and procedures can enhance and ensure suitable responses. Within the hate crime domain, many statutory and third sector organisations exist which are dedicated to informing minority communities of criminal justice processes related to targeted victimisation. By contrast, this is not as pronounced for victims of ASB, who therefore may not even bother reporting incidents in the first place if they feel that the police are unwilling or unable to help them. This may mean that victims become more disillusioned with a CJS which they see as prioritising a ‘hierarchy of victimisation’ which is not in their favour. Or, as ASB is not identity-dependent, it may also be seen as a ‘catch-all’ for those who do not see themselves reflected in legislation addressing the ‘targeted’ aspect of victimisation. Alternatively, victims who are aware of which policy is currently being championed and who are in a position to choose may tailor their reporting on the basis of what appears to be the more guaranteed resolution. The ASB/hate crime nexus remains an issue to those who fall within this legislative black-hole, with their fate determined by the both the victim’s knowledge of available procedures, and the quality of the individual receiving and categorising the initial report. Thus, tangible gaps in provision persist, particularly surrounding the delineation between seemingly similar forms of victimisation. Empowering Victims, Shaping Political Outcomes? With a 2015 general election looming, it is perhaps unsurprising that the Coalition’s revived interest in ASB policy illustrates a politically salient pledge to ‘(re)focus on the victim’. Drawing on failings from the Pilkington case (and others), the ASB, Crime and Policing Bill outlines plans for a ‘Community Trigger’ which requires relevant bodies to review their responses to complaints of ASB if a threshold level of reports is met. This delegation of more public responsibility and (limited) power in cases where persistent ASB is seen to be affecting a community should theoretically provide victims with a riposte if their needs have not been met. It also demonstrates a bottom-up approach to dispersing power where previous attempts to give victims a ‘voice’ in crime prevention have been top-down. The establishment of political figureheads such as: Victims’ Champion (2009 - 2010); Champion for Active, Safer Communities (2010 - 2012); Victims’ Commissioner (2010 onwards); Victims’ Minister (2010 onwards) all sought to raise the profile of victims within the CJS. It is clear that the status of some victims has been elevated, but in a prescriptive manner that determines the most appropriate course of action. However, the 'appropriateness' of this action can be called into question as to whether it serves the needs victim, or if instead it is predicated on the political wishes of the authorities. (1489 words) Dr Marian Duggan is a Senior Lecturer in Criminology at Sheffield Hallam University. Dr Vicky Heap is a Lecturer in Criminology at Sheffield Hallam University. References Chakraborti, N (2009) ‘A Glass Half Full? Assessing Progress in the Policing of Hate Crime’. Policing. 3(2): 121-128. Duggan, M (2012) Queering Conflict: Examining Lesbian and Gay Experiences of Homophobia in Northern Ireland. Farnham: Ashgate. Heap, V. (2010) Understanding Public Perceptions of Anti-Social Behaviour: Problems and Policy Responses. PhD, University of Huddersfield. Mason, G. (2005) ‘Being hated: stranger or familiar?’ Social and Legal Studies: An International Journal. 14(4): 585-605. Walters, M. and Hoyle, C. (2012) ‘Exploring the everyday world of hate victimization through community mediation’. International Review of Victimology, 18 (1): 7-24. 
work_r5pquzusije3pnrg4u7rvatgk4	----	Paper - RRH Act MLR #3.rtf This is the refereed author version of: Goodall, Kay E., Incitement to Religious Hatred: All Talk and No Substance?. Modern Law Review, Vol. 70, No. 1, pp. 89-113, January 2007. DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2230.2006.00627.x Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1893/262 The final publisher version is available from: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2230.2006.00627.x http://hdl.handle.net/1893/262 http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2230.2006.00627.x 1 Incitement to Religious Hatred: all talk and no substance? The Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006 has a frenetic history. It is the culmination of six attempts in Parliament in the last twelve years to make incitement to religious hatred unlawful.1 Each attempt has met with intense criticism. But now that the legislation is here, what may it achieve? The background to the legislation The first version of the Racial and Religious Hatred Bill2 aimed to revise the entire existing offence of incitement to racial hatred, adding hatred of others on the grounds of their religious beliefs.3 Many thought this too wide. Lord Lester complained that the provisions were ‘using a steamroller to crack a nut’,4 Geoffrey Robertson QC described them as ‘unnecessary and clumsily framed’,5 and the Telegraph declared: ‘now you face jail for being nasty to Satanists’.6 It was indeed wide. Incitement was to be by words, behaviour, or material which were ‘threatening, abusive or insulting’. Intention to stir up religious hatred was not necessary. The offence would be committed if the words, behaviour or material were likely to be seen or heard by any person in whom they were likely to stir up such hatred.7 During the debate, the Lords narrowed the offence in several ways, of which three in particular – the ‘Lester’ amendments – are significant. First, the Lords introduced a saving for freedom of expression, discussed later. Second, they removed the ‘likely to’ test, so the offence could be committed only if it could be shown that the person had intended to stir up hatred. Third, they altered the mode of incitement from abuse, insult or threat to simply threat. In the Commons at third reading, the government tried to replace the ‘likely to’ element with a new test of subjective recklessness. They were spectacularly defeated and the Lester amendments stayed.8 The media reported a mood of relief:9 creating an offence of incitement * Thanks to Francis Bennion, Adam Tomkins, Colin Gavaghan, Anna Burnside and ATH Smith for their helpful comments. The opinions expressed here, and of course any mistakes, are mine alone. 1 Lord Lester proposed two amendments to the Criminal Justice and Public Order Bill, June 1994 and the (Lord) Bishop of Oxford moved an amendment in July 1994. Lord Avebury introduced a Religious Offences Bill in 2001. The government has tried three times: in the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Bill in 2001; in the Serious Organised Crime and Police Bill, introduced in November 2004 and (successfully) in the Racial and Religious Hatred Bill, introduced June 2005. 2 Bill 11, 54/1; introduced 9 June 2005. 3 It also proposed minor changes in the wording of the existing offence: I will not discuss those here. 4 Anthony Lester in Lisa Appignanensi (ed.) Free Expression is No Offence (London: Penguin, 2005) 234. See also the highly critical comments later made by FAR Bennion in ‘Gilding the Lily on Religious Hatred’ (2005) 14(1) The Commonwealth Lawyer 35. 5 Quoted in Ruth Gledhill et al. The Times February 7 2005. 6 Headline over report by Joshua Rozenberg, Legal Editor, The Telegraph 10 June 2005. 7 Schedule, paragraphs 5-11, Bill 11 54/1, which would have been inserted as sections 18-23 of the 1986 Act. 8 HC Deb 31 January 2006 vol 442 cols 235-244. This was only the second defeat suffered by new Labour in the House of Commons since 1997. 9 David Charter The Times 1 February 2006, Michael White; Tania Branigan The Guardian 1 February 2006, Ben Russell; James Lyons; Brendan Carlin and Neil Tweedie The Telegraph 1 February 2006. Similar views were presented in the red-top press. 2 to religious hatred was seen as unpopular and illiberal10 and many argued that the Lester amendments created a sharper, more effective piece of legislation which had less impact on freedom of expression. Were they right? This article will consider the many questions which the new Part 3A raises. It will conclude that an offence confined to requiring proof of intention simply will not work. The new offence The Act creates a new Part 3A of the Public Order Act 1986 for England and Wales.11 Like the law on racial hatred,12 Part 3A casts a wide net. It covers speech and actions. It includes displaying material, publishing it and distributing it, and sometimes even possessing it. Those who present or direct a play, or distribute, show or play a recording, or include a programme in a programme service,13 may all be caught within the offence. The prosecution must show that the words, behaviour or material were threatening, and that the person intended to stir up religious hatred. ‘Religious hatred’ is defined in section 29A as ‘hatred against a group of persons defined by reference to religious belief or lack of religious belief’. The offence need not be committed in public. It can take place in private. A person may commit the offence in a private dwelling by using threatening words or behaviour or displaying (with the requisite intent) any written material which is threatening, if he has any reason to believe that this might be seen or heard by people outside. Woe betide those who live in modern tenements? The offence can also be committed in an inchoate form, such as storing material with the intention of broadcasting it. Any offence which includes written and broadcast material will extend beyond territorial borders. Part 3A will mostly not apply to Scotland, but anyone being recorded or producing material in Scotland may commit the offence if for instance their writings appear in England or their material is broadcast over the border.14 Given the many activities which may be caught by Part 3A, politically active people need to know what is now illegal. What harms did law fail to catch, and what harms will it capture now? This is a difficult question to answer. Gaps in the law ‘When the Lord Chancellor started to talk about gaps in the law, he made me think of a rather over-zealous dentist looking round the teeth of a patient to see whether any holes need stopping’.15 10 Such views were expressed throughout the parliamentary debates: see Jonathan Petre The Telegraph, 31 January 2006, Leader The Guardian January 31 2006, Matthew Tempest; Polly Toynbee The Guardian January 31 2006 as examples of the last comments before the final Commons debate. 11 Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006 s 4. 12 Which remains unchanged. 13 This will include a cable ‘programme service’: for a definition, see the Broadcasting Act 1990 s 201. 14 Although Part 3A does not extend to Scotland other than police powers, it will affect anyone whose legal activities in Scotland also take place in England and Wales, as where Scottish newspapers are circulated in England or Scottish programme material is shown in England. See HA Kerrigan QC and Neil Addison Joint Opinion of Counsel for the Christian Institute re the Impact on Scotland of the Racial and Religious Hatred Bill (2005) http://www.christian.org.uk/scotland/religioushatred/kerrigan&addison_opinion.pdf 15 Lord Peyton of Yeovil HL Deb 8 November 2005 vol 439 col 554. 3 One of the most compelling arguments against creating an offence of incitement to religious hatred was that English law adequately addresses the mischief already, or mostly does so.16 Many felt that the problem was lack of enforcement, not lack of legislation. Some critics accused the government of playing to Muslim voters disenchanted by UK involvement in Iraq, rather than addressing a genuine problem.17 Others complained that the gap was so narrow that filling it caused more problems than it solved. There has been immense confusion over this point. There is certainly a powerful body of criminal law which can tackle behaviour displaying religious prejudice. From religiously aggravated abuse and violence to criminal harassment; from the Ecclesiastical Court Jurisdiction Act 1860 to the Malicious Communications Act 1988; from incitement to crime to aggravated breach of the peace,18 most incidents would have been covered by existing law; usually public order offences. There is ample law to cover anyone who has targeted person or property, or committed a breach of the peace. If the offender is motivated by or displays racial or religious hostility, this may also attract an enhanced sentence.19 The typical case involves words or behaviour directed against individuals, but the law can also capture actions with more generic targets. In Norwood v DPP, a man displayed a British National Party (BNP) poster beside a photograph of one of the twin towers in flames and a crescent and star surrounded by a prohibition sign.20 This display did not target any specific person, but Norwood was convicted of a religiously aggravated offence under section 5(1)(b) of the Public Order Act 1986.21 There is also the common law of incitement. If one incites another to commit a criminal act, this too is an offence. If a preacher exhorts his flock to ‘go forth and slay the unbelievers’, he may be prosecuted. Yet supporters of the Bill often gave a very different impression. Members of Parliament offered examples of supposed gaps in the criminal law which they maintained the new offence would fill. On several occasions the examples were (no doubt unintentionally) misleading. Members listed incidents where Muslim women, including White converts, were spat at; where a White Muslim woman was verbally abused when she was observed wearing a hijab on a bus and where unnamed people incited others to fire-bomb Muslim homes. As 16 Baroness Kennedy HL Deb 11 October 2005 vol 437 col 247; Lord Lester of Herne Hill 11 October 2005 vol 437 col 175. 17 Lord Lester of Herne Hill HL Deb 25 October 2005 vol 438 col 1075; Ian Paisley, Boris Johnson and John Baron HC Deb 21 June 2005 vol 435 cols 718-745. 18 While breach of the peace is not classified as a criminal offence in English law (although it can be a constituent of an offence), it has been classified as such for the purposes of Articles 5 and 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (see Steel v UK (1999) 28 EHRR 603, 637) and it is a crime within Scots law. 19 The relevant provisions are ss 28-32 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, as amended by s 39 of the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, which add sentence enhancement to nine existing offences; and s 145 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, which applies to all other offences. In Scotland, sentence enhancement for racial aggravation is governed by s 96 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, while religious aggravation is covered by s 74 of the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 2003. The test for the equivalent offences is ‘malice and ill-will’ (see below). In Northern Ireland, statutory sentence enhancement for inter alia racial and religious aggravation was introduced by paragraph 2 of the Criminal Justice (No.2) (Northern Ireland) Order 2004. 20 Norwood v DPP [2003] EWHC 1564 (Admin); 2003 WL 21491815 (QBD (Admin Ct)). 21 s 5(1)(b) provides that a person is guilty of an offence if he inter alia ‘displays any writing, sign or other visible representation which is threatening, abusive or insulting, within the hearing or sight of a person likely to be caused harassment, alarm or distress thereby’ and intends (see s 6(4)) that it be threatening, abusive or insulting, or is aware that it might be. Norwood was convicted of the offence as religiously aggravated under s 28(1)(b) of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998. 4 Evan Harris MP pointed out during debate, all these could have been caught already.22 As baffled MPs discovered, the real gap was hard to spot. Government spokespersons were intractable when pressed to give examples:23 one of the few helpful statements is to be found in Lord Falconer’s speech at second reading in the Lords.24 For practical purposes,25 the sole area in which law was lacking is where a person incites another, not to crime, but to religious hatred. It is not unlawful to feel hatred, so incitement to hatred is not in itself an offence. Incitement to racial hatred is unlawful because it has been made so within the Public Order Act 1986.26 People were free to incite other forms of hatred. This is the crux. This brought about the many attempts to legislate. It was only when someone incited another to hate others, or acted in a way which was likely to stir up that hatred - without going so far as to incite them to commit any offence - that the gap appeared. If the hatred thus stirred up was deemed ‘racial’, an offence had been committed. If the hatred stirred up was deemed ‘religious’, the incitement was lawful. This gap is tiny. There were only 76 prosecutions for racial hatred between 1987 and 2005.27 In most cases it matters little whether hatred expresses itself as religious or racist because it will can be caught under another heading of law. The gap lies almost entirely in naming acts as religious hatred, rather than in prohibiting them. If not for the unfortunate way in which the jurisprudence has been interpreted, this might be little more than a sophist’s distinction. But precedent has determined that certain faiths are ‘mono-ethnic’. It is thus easier for the prosecution to establish that an attack on Jews or Sikhs is to be deemed ‘racial’. Judaism and Sikhism have been defined as mono-ethnic faiths in British law.28 Demographic research in fact supports this. Most Sikhs in Britain share Indian ancestry,29 and Jewish identity is mostly passed on through lineage rather than by conversion. While Jewish ancestry is more diverse than Sikh, the sense of Jewish identity is strong. Even among younger British Jews, recent research found that ‘almost all participants… felt themselves to be members of an ethnocultural group.’30 22 Sadiq Khan, Emily Thornberry, Evan Harris HC Deb 21 June 2005 vol 435 col 721-737. Dr Harris cited the three examples above. For relevant law, see for instance the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, ss 28(1)(a) and (2), as amended, and the common law offence of incitement. 23 See in particular the debates in HC Deb 21 June 2005 vol 435 cols 668-762. 24 Lord Falconer of Thoroton, HL Deb 11 October 2005 vol 437 cols 162 and 169. He explained that ‘[t]he problem …is where you are addressing people other than the people whom you are insulting or abusing with a view to stirring up hatred among them against a particular religious group’ and gave several examples, such as a Muslim cleric preaching righteous hatred of Christians to a Muslim audience. (It was not clear however why some of the examples were not covered by existing law.) 25 The 2003 Report of the Select Committee on Religious Offences discussed some other miniscule gaps: there is an interesting summary in chapter 3 Religious Offences in England and Wales vol 1 HL 95-I (2003). 26 Part 3; ss 17-23. 27 HL Deb 11 October 2005 vol 437 col 274. 28 Mandla v. Dowell Lee [1983] 2 AC 548 (HL), 565. Jews and Sikhs were specifically identified in Mandla as groups defined by ethnic origins. This was a civil definition based on the definition in s.3 of the Race Relations Act 1976, but criminal law has adopted this definition: s.28 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 replicates s.3 except that it also includes ‘citizenship’ and clarifies that it is irrelevant for the offence that the victim is also a member of a religious group. 29 In the 2001 Census, 91 per cent of British Sikhs were recorded as ‘Indian’ (and 97 per cent of Jews were recorded as ‘White’): National Statistics, Focus on Ethnicity and Identity, ONS 2005, 6. 30 J Sinclair and D Milner ‘On being Jewish’ (2005) 20(1) Journal of Adolescent Research 91, 112. British Jews themselves tend to see Jewishness as an ethnic rather than solely a 5 In contrast, Islam and Christianity are worldwide religions.31 So, incitement to hate Jews, Sikhs (or Gypsy travellers32) can fall within the racial hatred provisions, while incitement to hate Muslims or Christians33 it seems cannot. We will return to the inconsistencies in that reasoning later. What is important for now is that it is here where the anomaly lies. It is this distinction which has upset many. Thus although the existing law covered almost all of the potential cases, the problem was not the breadth of the gap but its significance. A brief visit to the British National Party website provides an apposite example. The site is regularly purged of statements which may attract legal action. There is guidance for contributors from party leader Nick Griffin: ‘[a]ny connection between sex, particularly sex crime, and members of ethnic 'minorities' is dynamite’. He adds: ‘Emotive words, however justified they may be, must be avoided. Truth hurts, so words like 'alien', 'vermin', 'gang' instead of 'group', and such like must be avoided. A white rapist may be described as a 'beast' or an 'animal', but a black one must merely be a 'criminal'.’34 With this in mind, it is not difficult to decode the following statement, from an article called ‘The Islamic Menace’: ‘The hidden epidemic of molestation, abductions and rape of scores of white girls in northern English cities, all show the inherent tendency that the teachings of the paedophile Mohammed have had on some of his followers.’35 It is likely that the statement is not simply anti-Muslim but racist, and will be read so by BNP supporters. Yet the BNP’s legal advisers seem to believe it is not unlawful (surprisingly so, considering the reference to ‘white’ girls). This statement is nothing more than an incitement to hatred, so the racial/religious distinction becomes crucial. We see this in a later comment by Griffin: ‘We can sometimes get away with criticising Zionists, but any criticism of Jews is likely to be legal and political suicide.’ It is because far right activists have so successfully exploited the distinction between ‘racial’ and ‘religious’ that Muslims in particular have demanded the new offence. There are other reasons: where wider common law already covers the field, a new nominate offence can make it easier to monitor prevalence, label the offender and identify a criminal history if the person re-offends. But it is the distinction between Muslims and adherents of other faiths religious identity: Stephen Miller, Marlena Schmool and Antony Lerman Social and Political Attitudes of British Jews (London: Institute for Jewish Policy Research, 1996) ch.7. 31 In fact, as DT Goldberg has pointed out, ‘[t]here are larger numbers of Muslim people today who are members of European or European-derivative societies than vice versa.’ ‘Racial Europeanization’ (2006) 29(2) Ethnic and Racial Studies 331, 360. 32 CRE v Dutton [1989] QB 783 (CA), 801 and 806. Note that this only applied to a subset: those of Romany origin. The Race Relations (Northern Ireland) Order 1997 specifically defines Irish travellers as a racial group (see also A Racial Equality Strategy for Northern Ireland 2005-2010, OFMDFM, NI). 33 There is little authority for this point as regards Muslims. In the only reported case on Muslims as a ‘racial group’, the civil case of Walker v Hussain [1996] ICR 291 (EAT), ‘Muslims’ in the abstract were taken to be a religious, not a racial group, but the arguments are not explored in the appeal judgment. Sebastian Poulter cites an unreported decision of an industrial tribunal which goes into more detail: see Poulter ‘Muslim Headscarves in School: Contrasting Legal Approaches in England and France’ (1997) 17(1) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 43, 62-65. 34 http://www.bnp.org.uk/articles/race_act.htm, accessed 8 February 2006. 35 http://www.bnp.org.uk/articles/islamic_menace.htm, accessed 8 February 2006. 6 which allowed far-right activists to revile minority ethnic Muslims while other religious groups were better protected by law. It is because the far right so viciously exploit this anomaly that so many campaigned so hard to introduce the new offence. If the anomaly had been trivial, and if the offence had already been clearly labelled by the criminal law, then new legislation might have been unnecessary. It would have done little other than demonstrate that governments believe that electorates have short memories, and that it is easier to make new law than to remind them of what exists already. But the anomaly was real, and serious. The meaning of religious hatred The legal source of this anomaly, however, is elusive. It is widely thought that Jews are always covered by the racial hatred provisions, while Muslims are not. This is wrong. The relevant case law has sometimes been misunderstood by commentators, and we lack interpretative guidance from cases taken to appeal. As ATH Smith has observed, in public order cases the higher courts have been loath to give it.36 The confusion appears to come from the belief that this was the conclusion reached in R v DPP, ex p. Merton LBC.37 Critics claim that Crown refused to bring a case against a BNP activist solely on the grounds that the literature he produced was anti-Muslim and hence anti- religious, not racist.38 It is true that this was the Crown’s initial decision, but they later changed it, stating that the position of Muslims is uncertain and that this did not prevent prosecution. In fact, Merton was simply a refusal to grant leave to apply for judicial review. The Council wanted a declaration that Muslims were a racial group under section 17 of the Public Order Act 1986, separate from any criminal proceedings, but Tucker J correctly ruled that a court could not be asked to decide a hypothetical question. There is a genuine legal distinction, but it is a matter of degree and circumstance. If anti- Judaic literature is deemed to have a solely religious target, Jews would be left unprotected. Indeed Lester and Bindman argued in 1972 that the provisions on incitement to racial hatred ‘left members of the Jewish community without legal protection against religious as distinct from racial persecution’.39 In practice, though, the presumption is that a reference to Jewishness in hate literature is racist.40 It has not been difficult to prove. In R v Edwards,41 for instance, a cartoonist drew a racially stereotypical image of a Jew draining human blood. The key events which first demonstrated the need for legislation - Caunt, Leese and fascist activities from the 30s onwards - were characterised by open anti-Semitism or express links with Nazism.42 36 ATH Smith The Offences Against Public Order (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1987) 43. 37 R v DPP, ex p Council of London Borough of Merton [1998] EWHC Admin 1009; CO/3019/98 (27 October 1998). A report is available at www.bailii.org 38 See eg KS Dobe & SS Chhokar ‘Muslims, ethnicity and the law’ (2000) 4 International Journal of Discrimination and the Law 369, 373. (This excepted, this is an excellent article). The error may have come from a misreading of an article by Peter Jepson ‘Tackling religious terminology that stirs up racial hatred’ (1999) NLJ 554, 556 where he briefly refers to the case. 39 Anthony Lester and Geoffrey Bindman Race and Law (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1972) 363. See also Bob Hepple (1966) 29 MLR 306, 308. 40 This was recognised in Mandla v. Dowell Lee [1983] 2 AC 548 (HL), 561, where Lord Fraser of Tullybelton said obiter: ‘it is inconceivable that Parliament would have legislated against racial discrimination intending that the protection should not apply either to Christians or (above all) to Jews’. 41 R v Edwards (1983) 5 Cr App R (S) 145, 147. 42 Caunt spoke openly of his anti-Semitism and Leese’s supporters collected him from prison waving swastikas. See Anthony Lester and Geoffrey Bindman Race and Law (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1972) 343-352. 7 In contrast it will often be impossible to show the link between Islamophobic material and racist intent. It is however open to a prosecutor to show an established history of racist activity against British Muslims. Proving this link is complex because anti-Muslim hostility is more than simply anti-‘Asian’ hostility.43 Indeed, British-Asian Muslims themselves have a strong religious identity. Research suggests that religion is often central to how these groups differentiate themselves, particularly among the first generation.44 Muslim identity is not simply ethnic identity. But there has been a successful prosecution in Scotland of a BNP activist who produced anti- Muslim hate literature. In 2002, BNP activist David Wilson was convicted of distributing leaflets containing false accusations about Muslims in Glasgow’s Pollokshields.45 The leaflets claimed that ‘Muslim racists’ were ‘running amok’ and attacking ‘white’ residents. Evidence was given to the court that the ethnic origin of most Muslims in Pollokshields was South Asian. The sheriff concluded that the terms Muslim and Pakistani were used interchangeably in that community. Wilson was convicted under section 19(1)(a) of the 1986 Act for stirring up racial hatred. He appealed, and the decision of the sheriff was affirmed.46 The two types of hatred are often entangled to their roots. Even in the flagrantly racist case of Edwards, the Jewish man was depicted in what was claimed (falsely) to be a religious practice – eating human blood at the festival of Purim. The problem is not bad law: it is simply that there is a blurred line and a need for proof – and perhaps also a stronger will is needed somewhere in the criminal justice process. Fair comment on Islam - or racial hatred? Extreme racism denigrates people and represents them as inferior: they endure a lower social or economic status and become targets of hatred or contempt. It is irrational, imputing characteristics to a whole group. It is also xenophobic, because the group is identified by supposed ethnic origin. With this in mind, consider Norwood, which associated Islam with terrorist bombing. Islam is a mainstream world religion, not a warrior cult. It cannot therefore be a legitimate criticism of Islam to imply that most or all Muslims actively abet terrorism. There is also abundant evidence that most British Muslims practise a moderate form of Islam, so it cannot be a legitimate criticism of British Muslims to associate them with terrorism. What is true of British Muslims is that few have a long British ancestry. Ethnically, they are ‘other’. Only 4 per cent of British Muslims were classified as ‘White British’ in the 2001 43 For evidence suggesting anti-Muslim discrimination in employment, separate from ethnic identity in the UK, see J Lindley ‘Race or religion? The impact of religion on the employment and earnings of Britain’s ethnic communities’ (2002) 28(3) Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 427. 44 Peter Aspinall ‘Should a question on “religion” be asked in the 2001 British census’ (2000) 34(5) Social Policy and Administration 584, 588-591. 45 PF v Wilson Sh.Ct. 24 October 2002, unpublished (my thanks to the Crown Office for providing a copy of Sheriff Ruxton’s decision). This was the first Scottish prosecution for a racial hatred offence under the 1986 Act. See also the civil case of Walker v Hussain, cited above at FN 32. In this case the workplace was held to have two distinct racial groups: a European one and one originating from the Indian sub-continent, nearly all of whom were Muslim. It was held that discrimination on grounds of Muslim holidays was indirect racial discrimination. In Scotland, it was held in Empower Scotland v Khan [2005] UKEAT 0012, 2005 WL 2608279 (EAT) 2nd September 2005, that in a workplace where 90 per cent of Pakistanis were Muslims, an insult aimed at Muslims could be read together with the statement that ‘You Pakistanis are all the same’ and amount to race discrimination. Across the UK, 92 per cent of Pakistanis and Bangladeshis are Muslim: National Statistics, Focus on Ethnicity and Identity ONS (2005) 6. 46 Wilson v PF [2005] HCJAC97, 2005 SCCR 686. 8 Census, and nearly three-quarters had South Asian origins.47 Also, British Islam is typically seen by white British people as being Asian, because it is the South Asian (usually Pakistani) Muslims who represent Islamic interests in British political debate.48 The bigotry displayed in Norwood has the hallmarks of racism. Race or religion might define exactly who falls into the hated category, but we have already seen reports of Hindus and Sikhs subjected to anti-Muslim abuse. Because most British Muslims do not have White British ancestry, it will sometimes be possible to prove that ‘Muslim’ has been used as a racist marker – perhaps where the defendant has a history of racist activism. Mark Norwood, for instance, was a regional organiser for the BNP. Because Islam is a mainstream religion, it will also sometimes be possible to distinguish between (a) angry criticisms of Islamic practices and (b) anti-Muslim abuse which is motivated by racist bigotry. It is lawful to express angry criticism of a specific extremist Muslim organisation, or to mount a hate-filled attack on characteristics which most British Muslims do have (for instance, a belief that women should cover their hair), or to denounce Islamic states which enforce harsh Hadd offences under Sharia law. These are all quite different from the sweeping anti-Muslim hatred which depicts British Muslims as members of a warrior cult or (as in Griffin and Collett49) a rapist sect. Griffin and Collett defamed a group of people, most of whom are South Asian in origin and almost all of whom are not ‘White British’. Had they offered fair comment on Islam - however intemperate – that would be different. If an Islamic sect in the UK advocates violence, both the state and individuals can legitimately respond. The state can proscribe the offending organisation.50 The activism of a Mark Norwood could focus only on that particular sect and so be a legitimate critique which could – depending on the circumstances - be expressed with great force. At present, it is nothing of the sort. Here lies the basis for a manageable legal distinction. The term ‘racial hatred’ has not been definitively classified in criminal law as excluding any hatred expressed in religious terms. The words are to be given their ordinary and natural meaning, and while it is harder to prove that hatred targeted at Muslims addresses a racial group, it can be done. How might law distinguish between racial and religious? Both the reason Part 3A was introduced, and the root of the furious opposition to it, is this separation between ‘racial’ and ‘religious’. Many presume that ‘race’ is a clear and fixed quality of identity, while religion is not. There is much truth in this - and it would be invidious to talk up the uncertainty of the marginal case while resolutely ignoring the racial ascriptions of everyday experience. We are right to make law in the belief that people are singled out because of their ‘race’, and treated well or badly depending on the racial identity usually ascribed to them. Race, for most people, most of the time, is indeed clear and fixed. Religious affiliation, in contrast, is often less easily discerned by others and is not immutable (even if it is rare that people face an open choice in which faith to adopt). And religious affiliation has an obvious political and moral component, while someone’s skin colour and 47 In the 2001 Census, 74 per cent were recorded as coming from an Asian ethnic background (39 per cent having been born in Asia), while only 11 per cent came from any White ethnic group: National Statistics, Focus on Religion ONS (2004) 5. It is not clear whether those from Mixed backgrounds also had some Asian or White ancestry, though the proportion is in any case small. 48 Pnina Werbner ‘Theorising complex diasporas: purity and hybridity in the South Asian public sphere in Britain’ (2004) 30(5) Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 895, 898. 49 Griffin is reported as having taken advantage of a conviction of young Asian men for rape by saying (as part of a long tirade) ‘These attacks are going to continue, because that is what the Qur'an says. The bastards that are in that gang, they are in prison so the public think it's all over. Well it's not. Because there's more of them.’ The Guardian January 18 2006. 50 By order under the Terrorism Act 2000, Part 2. 9 facial features may give no guidance at all about a person’s allegiances or beliefs. It does make sense for law to distinguish religion and ethnicity. The need to reach decisions in particular cases does not however mean that legal personnel should strive to create definitions which can be packaged up and carried from case to case. It is not just that ‘racial’ classifications (in their narrowest sense) have no sound biological basis.51 Ethnic classifications too have no logical one beyond social and historical convenience. Instead they are a mishmash of skin colour, geographical ancestry, nationality and local community identity.52 Nationality is the only element which can reasonably said to be dominated by a co-ordinated set of rules, because its categories are created by law. There is no other absolute marker for distinguishing these social, not biological categories. And even if such absolute markers existed, they would not mesh with local perceptions. Hostile racial ascriptions are highly contextual. At different times and in different places, a person may ‘pass as white’ or be singled out as alien. Meanwhile those who are always seen as alien may be ‘one of us’ or ‘one of them’ depending on whether their community is seen as integrated into British cultures. ‘Race’ may be mostly clear and fixed but racist hostility is volatile and hard to predict. Religion, too, needs to be understood both as faith and as social category – as a way of marking out groups. In Scotland and Northern Ireland, sectarian conflict is between two groups who use religion mostly as a social category: it is not a battle of faith between devout believers.53 Yet conflict over faiths persists: the most recent report of the US Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism lists 37 ‘foreign terrorist organisations’, of which at least 22 are expressly religious.54 The problem for law is that (as we saw above) British Muslims and South Asians are often seen by others as interchangeable. Islam has a significant public identity in Britain and so we cannot simply assume that anti-Muslim hostility is racist. But ‘Muslim’ as a term of abuse in Britain is often shorthand for other-than-white. Tariq Modood et al argue that ‘there is a palpable racialization of Muslims going on in Britain’55 – in other words, Muslim is often used to mean someone who looks ‘Asian’. This needs to be recognised in criminal law. Lawyers’ perceptions, or prosecutorial decisions - or both - have become riddled with irrelevant and ahistorical distinctions taken from civil discrimination. Criminal actions are not so easy to subdivide. A civil case may well consider a pattern of discrimination, while criminal prosecutions typically centre on a single incident. Yet social conventions in the UK now discourage explicit racist speech. This makes it hugely problematic to identify any single act as racist and to find evidence to justify that decision. Emo Gotsbachner has demonstrated how racism in everyday discourse is often expressed by omission and emphasis rather than by unambiguously prejudiced speech - often one can judge whether a statement is racist only in the context of 51 While the relative incidence of genes varies among different human populations, they do not tend to vary in a way which indicates precisely demarcated groups. ‘Race’ as a means of genetic classification, without more, is rejected by the overwhelming majority of modern biologists. There is a wealth of writing on this, but for short and authoritative recent statements, see issue 5(8) of Nature Reviews Genetics (2004). 52 Again, there has been a torrent of material on this topic. The best work on ethnicity comes from social scientists: two intelligent introductions are John Solomos and Les Back Racism and Society (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1996) and Kenan Malik The Meaning of Race (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996). 53 See L Philip Barnes ‘Was the Northern Ireland Conflict religious?’ (2005) 20(1) Journal of Contemporary Religion 55, 59 ff. Barnes points out, for instance, that those most directly involved in the violence in Northern Ireland were not the most religious, and that the main churches did not sanction the violence. 54 US Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2004 (DSP, 2005) 92-111. 55 Tariq Modood, Richard Berthoud and James Nazroo ‘”Race”, Racism and Ethnicity’ (2002) 36(2) Sociology 419, 422. 10 the whole exchange.56 Civil law is better placed to do this and so it makes sense to distinguish the ‘racial’ and the ‘religious’ in civil discrimination law. The concept of racial intent in criminal law however rests on a particularly shaky house of cards. A ‘contextual meaning’ approach to incitement cases, judicially developed, is long overdue. Successive judgments in the aggravation case law have led to more contextual interpretations. In the particular circumstances of a case, words such as ‘African’,57 ‘bloody foreigners’58 and ‘immigrant’59 have all been enough to convict for an offence racially aggravated. Most recently in R v Rogers, the Court of Appeal held: ‘Hostility demonstrated to foreigners because they are foreign can be just as objectionable as hostility based on a more limited racial characteristic. All who are black form a racial group, defined by reference to colour, within section 28(4), as do all who are white. This demonstrates the width of the concept of racial group in this context. It is no great extension of the concept to embrace within a single racial group all who are foreign.’60 It would not be a huge leap to alter the law so that the use of referent words as a surrogate for race expressly fell within incitement to racial hatred. Lord Lester twice proposed an amendment which would have achieved this.61 If this worked, it would capture racial hatred directed at minority ethnic Muslims – the core problem which the government declared it wished to tackle. If so, then the sole gap left would be incitement to hatred directed at white Muslims. And even there, White people victimised (for instance) because of their relationships with Asian Muslims are covered by the racially and religiously aggravated offences.62 While incitement to hatred against them, couched in religious terms, could become a widespread problem, there is not enough evidence to justify introducing an ambiguous new law for this alone. So is this the solution? Unfortunately, it may not be. The problem is that there are two phenomena we associate with ‘religious hatred’: • incitement to hatred motivated by racism disguised as antipathy towards a religion • incitement to hatred genuinely motivated by religious or anti-religious belief. The first is what Part 3A was designed to combat; the second is what it is far more likely to catch. Drawing on John Brewer’s work on sectarianism,63 we can take this analysis a little further. There are three relatively common problems in the UK: • religion used as a surrogate for racism (as in the opportunist change of language in far-right literature) 56 Emo Gotsbachner ‘Xenophobic normality: the discriminatory impact of habitualised discourse dynamics’ (2001) 12(6) Discourse and Society 12(6) 729, 731. 57 R v White [2001] EWCA Crim 1756 at [17-19]; 1 WLR 1352: the word was said to have a ‘racial connotation.’ 58 DPP v M [2004] [2004] EWHC Admin 1453 at [31]; 1 WLR 2758. The hostility was in the context of that case directed at a member of a group of people defined ‘by reference to race’. See also R v Rogers [2005] EWCA Crim 2863 at [20]; [2006] 1 Cr App R 14. 59 Att Gen’s Reference No.4 of 2004 [2005] EWCA Crim 889 at [24]; [2005] 1 WLR 2810. 60 R v Rogers [2005] EWCA Crim 2863 at [20]; [2006] 1 WLR 962 at 968. The case is under appeal to the House of Lords. 61 This was first proposed on 16 March 2005 for the Serious Organised Crime and Police Bill and the text can be found at http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/ld200405/ldbills/024/amend/ml024- ire.htm. 62 Crime and Disorder Act 1998, ss 28(1)(a) and (2), as amended. 63 JD Brewer ‘Sectarianism and racism, and their parallels and differences’ (1992) 15(3) Ethnic and Racial Studies 352, 358. 11 • religion acting as a social marker for other conflicts, economic or social (as in most Protestant/Catholic sectarianism in the UK)64 • religion as a source of conflict in its own right (as in the aggressive activities of extremist Muslims and Christians against other faiths). We will see in the last section how difficult it is to design clear legislation which captures the first two problems. Until religious extremists adapt their rhetoric, it may be primarily the third group which is vulnerable to Part 3A. Such activists are just as deserving of punishment (and indeed may have links to the far right themselves) but any appearance of bias will be politically destructive. The ‘ordinary meaning’ of ‘hatred’ ‘I would like to incite people to hate bigotry, and I am worried about provisions that say that I cannot go round inciting people in that way. That incitement - which, as we have heard, involves loathing and intense dislike - is integral to our tradition.’65 The flaws I have described above are part of a deeper weakness in the law. The words of the Act are largely the language of ordinary speech, but ordinary speech does not define their legal purpose. Much of the disagreement over whether Part 3A conflicts with freedom of expression comes from a reluctance to address the distinction between legal meaning and colloquial meaning. ‘Hate’ used in ordinary discourse has many meanings, including justified dislike. As Tony Wright MP observed in the quote above, it includes loathing of religious bigotry. Even in this most passionate use of the term, inciting others to feel the same should not amount to religious hatred in the statutory sense. Part 3A will have to be interpreted in the light of much other law. It will be interpreted through prior case law on racial hatred – after all, this statute has come about primarily because of that well-established principle of statutory interpretation. If incitement to racial hatred was not understood in the light of restrictive precedent on the meaning of ‘racial group’, this new statute would probably never have been proposed. It may be however that the meaning of ‘hatred’ will be left to juries as judges fall back on the argument that the word should be given its ‘ordinary meaning’.66 Back in 1987, ATH Smith gave a vivid example of the conflicting outcomes which can result from this approach.67 While there is a powerful argument that juries normally do not need to be directed on the meaning of ordinary words,68 more guidance would be helpful here. There are however limits. The statute must be understood within all the usual guides to legislative intention. It is the constitutional duty of the judge to discern the legal meaning69 of 64 L Philip Barnes ‘Was the Northern Ireland Conflict religious?’ (2005) 20(1) Journal of Contemporary Religion 55, 56 and ff. 65 Dr Tony Wright, HC Debs 21 June 2005 vol 435 col 730. 66 See Brutus v Cozens [1973] AC 854, though note that this case is often mistakenly taken as authority for the proposition, without more, that the meaning of an ordinary word is not a question of law. 67 ATH Smith The Offences Against Public Order (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1987) 42-43, citing two cases in which leaflets were handed out to soldiers, urging them to desert. Despite the similar facts, one was held to amount to ‘insulting’ behaviour while the other was not. See also Geoffrey Bindman ‘Incitement to racial hatred’ (1982) NLJ 229, 300, on ‘ordinary meaning’ in Brutus v Cozens, above. Bindman argued that the uncertainty this causes had discouraged prosecutions. See also Timothy AO Endicott’s critical commentary in ‘Questions of law’ (1998) 114 LQR 292. 68 FAR Bennion Statutory Interpretation: A Code (4th ed.) (London: LexisNexis Butterworths, 2002) 1016. 69 In short, ‘the meaning that correctly conveys the legislative intention’: FAR Bennion Statutory Interpretation: A Code (4th ed.) (London: LexisNexis Butterworths, 2002) 381. There 12 the text - not to construe it with unfettered discretion either for the benefit of the accused or to help the state achieve a conviction. Part 3A will also be governed by human rights law. Article 10 ECHR states that freedom of expression can be limited only when that is objectively necessary to protect, for instance, public order in a democratic society. The test of necessity has been glossed in case law and is not a matter of discretion for governments alone. States interfering with this right must demonstrate a pressing social need and give relevant and sufficient reasons for what they do.70 The court has emphasised the importance of ‘pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness’.71 Freedom of religious expression too is protected by Article 9 ECHR and that applies to atheists and critics of religions as much as believers. Any limits must be proportionate to the aim of achieving one of the public goods listed in the Convention. All this will limit the scope of Part 3A. If I make what seems like an obvious point, it is because it has not always been fully grasped by legal commentators, who can appear to argue that the courts will do as they may with the law. Andrew Myers in the New Law Journal in June 2005 made the extraordinary claim that ‘a (true) report about Hindu extremists burning a bus full of children on their way to Sunday school in India, or a BBC documentary [which] draws attention to the discrimination of women in countries that have adopted Sharia law … [is] likely to stir up hatred of Hindus and Muslims respectively, and thus be crimes’. He added that ‘If the Bill is passed, WH Smith will commit a crime every time a Bible or Koran is sold in its shops.’72 This is simply wrong. This reading of the provision (even in its original draft at first reading) could not possibly be endorsed by any responsible British court. Denmark has been held in breach of the Convention for convicting a documentary-maker of aiding and abetting the dissemination of a racist statement. In a radio interview, members of a far-right racist organisation used foul racist abuse. Despite the exceptionally offensive language, the European Court of Human Rights stressed that ‘freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic society.’73 The Racial and Religious Hatred Bill’s most formidable parliamentary critic, Lord Lester, stated in debate that there was not ‘the slightest doubt’ that reading from a sacred text of one of the main world religions could not in itself amount to an offence under the Bill, even in its original draft.74 The analogy with selling a sacred text is clear. But even without the guidance of the ECHR decision or the observations of a senior legal figure, it is wrong to suggest that a court could have correctly interpreted the law in this way. The British judiciary have a chequered record in protecting civil liberties but this does not mean that legislation can impliedly empower them to convict BBC documentarians of religious hatred for fair reporting of world events. And it surely goes without saying that no British court would have convicted booksellers for selling bibles. may be real doubt over what the legal meaning is – even when the literal meaning seems clear - but the range of possible meanings is limited. My thanks to Francis Bennion for explaining his concept to me (private correspondence). 70 Handyside v UK (A/24) (1979-80) 1 EHRR 737, 753-754. 71 Handyside, ibid 754. 72 Andrew Myers ‘A crime to tell the truth’ (2005) 155 NLJ 957. 73 Jersild v Denmark (A/298) (1995) 19 EHRR 1 at [31]. 74 HL Deb 24 January 2006 vol 441 col 1068. This refers solely to reading aloud from one of these texts, in the absence of any other activities inciting hatred: such a reading could of course contribute to an offence if it was used as part of those activities. On the other hand, it is possible that the offence as the government originally framed it could in fact have caught someone who read solely from a sacred text, without intent to stir up hatred, in an inflamed situation. Nevertheless, as the offence now requires proof of purposive intention, it is difficult to imagine a situation where someone could be unjustly convicted in such circumstances. 13 Even so, the complaints in their political shape have force. Fears of a ‘chilling effect’ are not just rhetoric. And it was disingenuous for government spokespersons to claim that the first draft of the Bill would be construed strictly by judges.75 As Bennion has emphasised, it is often supposed that criminal statutes are to be construed strictly.76 In fact it is not the job of the court to approach a clear statute with the presumption that the defendant is to be set free if at all possible. If a statute is clear, it is to be interpreted to achieve its purpose, and this is as true of criminal statutes as it is of civil ones. A statutory provision with penal effect is to be interpreted narrowly only if there is real doubt over what it means. So, if governments decide during the passage of a penal Bill that judges are to construe it strictly, they have two choices: they can word the Bill so that it directs the judges to do so, or they can leave the Bill so ambiguous that the judges are forced to. Unfortunately the government chose ambiguity. While it is a central principle that a person should not be penalised except under clear law, it is not the only criterion, and it is certainly not a licence to patch up deficiencies which were pointed out to Parliament during the passage of the Bill. Armed by the interpretative rule in section 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998, a judge can indeed adopt a secondary interpretation which protects human rights, but the Joint Human Rights Committee had already stated that in its view the proposed legislation was human rights-compliant.77 It was misleading to argue that judges would repair any flaw. And the paramount concern in providing for the accurate interpretation of any piece of legislation must be to draft an adequate bill in the first place - not to add savings, make parliamentary statements and leave judges with an unnecessary duty to clarify it. Furthermore, the presumption that new legislation is to be interpreted in the light of related law may not prove particularly helpful in interpreting Part 3A. This would limit interpretation, but not enough to relieve all reasonable fears. First, Part 3A is separate from the provisions on incitement to racial hatred and the wording used is not identical. Although it is part of ‘the family of all public order offences dealing with hatred against groups of people’,78 there is greater scope for interpreting the statutory language differently. Second, precedent on racial hatred states that the word ‘hatred’ is to be given its ordinary and natural meaning (the usual presumption unless there is doubt). There is little evidence that key people have thought about the need to distinguish the word ‘hatred’ from its colloquial connotations. During the passage of the Bill, Government spokespersons stated that there was no need to include a definition of the word because ‘it is a word that a jury could perfectly well understand.’79 In most areas of criminal legislation this is indeed acceptable practice. But while it is common for penal legislation to use terms from everyday speech, this particular area of crime policy is riddled with a loose use of language. The term ‘hate crime’ is unsuitable to describe the statutorily aggravated offences in the UK, yet has become the preferred label. Perhaps because of this commentators regularly use ‘hatred’ as a synonym when discussing the provisions of statutes which enhance sentence 75 It was suggested that this would be achieved by guidelines issued at a later date. Charles Clarke MP HC Deb 21 June 2005 vol 435 col 679; Paul Goggins MP, HC Stand Committee E 28 June 2005 vol 435 col 38; 30 June 2005, col. 98; HC Deb 11 July 2005 vol 436 col 599 and 31 January 2006 vol 442 col 192; Lord Bassam of Brighton HL Deb 11 October 2005 vol 437 col 280. Reference was also made by Lord Mackay of Clashfern to a Home Office memorandum on guidance in HL Deb 25 October 2005 vol 438 cols 1095 and 1125, but this is not now available. 76 FAR Bennion Statutory Interpretation: A Code (4th ed.) (London: LexisNexis Butterworths, 2002) 705-709. 77 Fourth Report of Session 2004-05, Scrutiny: First Progress Report, HL 26, HC 224 para 1.129. Eighth Report of Session 2004-05, Scrutiny: Fourth Progress Report, HL Paper 60, HC 388 para 2.64. Fourteenth Report of Session 2004-05, The Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination para 94. These comments referred to similar provisions in earlier Bills. 78 Lord Lester HL Deb 24 January 2006 vol 441 col 1075. 79 Lord Falconer of Thoroton HL Deb. 11 October 2005 vol 437 col 163-164. 14 where an offence is aggravated.80 This is useful shorthand for a complex topic, used to make the law clearer to the passing reader, but its results are unfortunate. Offences aggravated by racial hostility can include incidents in which offensive racist language was used, whether or not the defendant intended them to have a racist impact. They are wider in scope than the concept of a ‘hate’ crime implies. A violent youth might use a foul racial epithet while committing an offence for other motives. He need not feel racist hatred. It may be enough that the mens rea is proven for the basic offence and that there be evidence that he abused the victim using racist language. In DPP v Pal, Simon Brown LJ stated: ‘... I would wish to make it perfectly plain that I will reject also an argument put before us ... to the effect that section 28(1)(a) has no application to ... street arguments when insults may be thrown without thought being given to whether the same are racially abusive, which conduct is already covered by other offences’. 81 Beyond that, the evidential burden is on the defendant to show that he or she did not intend those words to be racially hostile. In DPP v Green, Rafferty J said: ‘Section 28(1)(a), as distinct from (b), creates a racially aggravated offence without the requirement to prove a racist motive. Disposition at the time is irrelevant.’82 It is ‘everyday racism’ which such law captures, not only the pre-meditated obsessions of a few racist activists. Conviction of a crime of ‘hatred’, in contrast, carries connotations of premeditated activity, such as that associated with far-right racist organisations. There are good arguments for punishing careless racial slurs. In a society where racism is rife and certain groups are repeatedly targeted to their fear and detriment, use of racial epithets during an offence can be inimical to public order and community relations, beyond any damage caused by the basic offence. The state can declare that it ‘takes racism seriously’ by enhancing sentence, and such laws may deter some citizens from open expressions of prejudice.83 There are serious implications, though, if the public and employers do not understand what it is that the legislation punishes. If many think that a conviction for an aggravated crime is proof of an act of ‘hatred’, they will attach a tag of pre-meditated bigotry to convictions for something else. If the offenders are characterised as purveyors of extreme forms of racism, 80 There are many examples in the press (see eg The Guardian 2 October 2003; The Scotsman 1 December 2004, The Herald 22 November 2004; The Herald 23 March 2005; The Herald 21 January 2006). There are also examples in parliamentary debates (HC Deb 31 January 2006 vol 442 col 233) and government reports (see eg the Select Committee on Religious Offences Religious Offences in England and Wales vol 1 HL 95-I (2003) para 2.12; Working Group on Hate Crime, Consultation Paper, (Scottish Executive: The Stationery Office, 2003) para. 1.5; NIO Consultation Paper Race Crime and Sectarianism Crime Legislation in Northern Ireland, 2002, 6; also in the Summary Paper, 3). The first report does state the law precisely in Appendix 5, as does the second report in its footnote. There are also several examples in academic discussions. 81 DPP v Pal 2000 WL 191187 (DC) at [14]; [2000] Crim LR 756. 82 DPP v Green [2004] EWHC QB 1225 at [16]. 83 On the other hand, in an interesting article, Paul H Robinson and John M Darley argue that criminal legislation often does not act as deterrent, and further argue that there is a responsibility to make law known when it is ‘counter-intuitive’, as I suggest this law is. ‘Does Criminal Law Deter? A Behavioural Science Investigation’ (2004) 24(2) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 173-205. For a thoughtful and intelligent discussion of arguments for and against such legislation in the UK, see in particular Mohammed M Idriss ‘Religion and the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 [2002] Crim LR 890. For an insightful discussion, which has not dated, of the broader aims of public order law, see ATH Smith The Offences Against Public Order (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1987) ch 1. 15 the message is lost. Those convicted should be stigmatised for their express acts of abuse, not for imagined acts of hatred. ‘Hatred’ is a resonant word and it threatens to dominate wherever racial and religious crime are discussed. Take the conviction of Abu Hamza al-Mazri for both incitement to religious hatred and soliciting to murder (among others) in 2006.84 In press commentary on his case, the hatred offence was given more emphasis, particularly in headlines.85 I did a small experiment by searching Technorati, a blog search engine, for the words ‘Abu Hamza’. 27 of 100 posts mentioned Hamza’s convictions. Of these, only 11 mentioned soliciting to murder at all, while 13 focused solely on incitement to racial hatred.86 While this survey can hardly be described as a representative sample of public perceptions, it suggests that some people will equate Hamza’s case with Griffin and Collett’s. If they then compare Hamza’s conviction with the jury’s failure to reach a verdict in Griffin and Collett, this may be politically troublesome. These sorts of misunderstandings are particularly worrying when we consider a recent American study of attitudes towards “hate crime” legislation. The researchers found that people who opposed “hate crime” legislation were more forceful in trying to get others to share their views than were those who supported such legislation.87 If it happens that people also tend to behave this way in the UK, then this could heighten the confusion in which Part 3A and its ilk are already mired. Popular discussion (in everyday life, not just in public debate) may be dominated by hostile discourses in which the opponents are more outspoken than the supporters. What proportion of the British public have anything like an accurate understanding of hostility and hatred as terms of art in criminal law? Yet, without this, how will recruiters know why they are excluding someone from an appointment,88 or foreign immigration officers know why they are refusing a British person a right of residence abroad? How will the public be able to debate free speech cases if people misguidedly compare the outcomes of trials for different crimes? The government must address this before the calls for prosecutions under Part 3A come flooding in. Compliance with Convention rights The most vociferous attacks on the Bill concerned freedom of expression. This is a right imbued with such totemic power in the contemporary British press that a reader might be forgiven for thinking that cities might fall and economies slide into the ocean before the British public would countenance the silencing of a single voice. The various views of British people are not of course represented in media ideologies. But a government should not underestimate the power of the speech trump card. The problem is that the freedom of expression claim is not as straightforward as it seems. As a political argument that the legislation could create a ‘chilling effect’ which scares the layperson to silence, it has power. As a legal argument, however, there are two difficulties with it. 84 BBC News 7 Feb 2006 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/4690224.stm 85 A few also emphasised it in the body of their reports: see eg Philip Johnston The Telegraph 8 February 2006; Paul Owen and agencies The Guardian 9 February 2006; Gary Younge The Guardian 4 Feb 2006; Daily Mail 12 January 2006. 86 www.technorati.com , accessed 7 March 2006. Four posts were in another language which I did not translate; two were repeat posts and two were inaccessible. I counted only those posts in which people discussed Hamza’s convictions in their own words. 87 Edward Dunbar and Andres Molina ‘Opposition to the Legitimacy of Hate Crime Laws’ (2004) 4(1) Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy 91. 88 The Solicitor General for Scotland, for instance, remarked in committee that the impact of a conviction for a religiously-aggravated offence ‘on future job applications and emigration would be significant’: Scottish Parliament Report, Justice 2 Committee, 10 December 2002, col 2430. The implication for a conviction for incitement to religious hatred in England is clear. 16 First, the parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights said repeatedly that even the earlier, broader version of the Bill was unlikely to contravene Convention rights. A reconvened Committee did change its position and say of the equivalent provisions in the original version that the new offences ‘could arguably have an adverse effect on free speech’ in terms of Art.10 unless amended ‘to make specific reference to advocacy of religious hatred that constitutes incitement to hostility, violence and discrimination’.89 The Committee did not expand on this but it probably meant (a) a need to prove purposive intention; (b) a wish to restrict the offences to words or behaviour which are threatening (leaving out those which are abusive or insulting); and (c) a legislative guarantee that this would not interfere with legitimate debate. But ‘arguably’ does not suggest that the Committee felt certain, and at best there is disagreement on this point. Given the safeguards in UK law, it is unlikely that any conviction would have breached Convention duties. Since the legislation has been narrowed down even Lord Lester, the most outspoken member of the Committee, has declared himself content.90 The more likely outcome is not an ECHR appeal, but the complete failure of the legislation to achieve any convictions for anti-Muslim hatred at all. The UK has repeatedly been criticised for not adjusting British criminal law to cover religious hatred as a surrogate for race.91 Second, the UK may already be in breach of Convention rights. Both its approach to ‘racial’ hatred and the English common law of blasphemy appear incompatible with the Convention. Assumptions about the interpretation of ‘racial’ hatred mean prosecutions will usually only be brought where there has been incitement to hatred against the ‘mono-ethnic’ faith groups. Also, common law on blasphemy and blasphemous libel92 protects only Christianity. Both these distinctions raise a question under Article 14 ECHR. Article 14 requires that the Convention rights be secured without discrimination on a range of named grounds, which include race and nationality. It is justifiable to discriminate only where this is done objectively for a reasonable purpose and is no more than is necessary to achieve that purpose. Both the narrow interpretation of ‘racial’ and the selective protection offered by blasphemy seem arbitrary in the light of racial equality. What are the reasonable purposes which justify these distinctions? Furthermore, as Part 3A will not apply to Scotland, there will be a difference between the two jurisdictions. However, as Northern Ireland has long had separate provision on incitement to religious hatred which differs from British law, this may not itself found a case on discrimination. On blasphemy, there is Article 9 ECHR. This protects freedom of thought, conscience and religion. The Commission has held in Kokkinakis v Greece that this includes the right to express religious beliefs and to proselytise,93 as part of the right of freedom of expression under Article 10. However, the decision was not unanimous and Mr Kokkinakis’ manner while proselytising was ‘inoffensive’. It is not clear how more robust religious rivalry would be treated. Even so, Art.5 ECHR permits punishment only when ‘prescribed by law’, and the law of blasphemy was described by the Law Commission over twenty years ago as unacceptably vague and broad.94 The European Court of Human Rights did hold in Wingrove v UK that the high threshold test for blasphemy set by the English courts was a safeguard against 89 HC/HL First Report (2005-06) para 5.2. 90 HL Deb 24 January 2006 vol 441 col 1075. 91 Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland CERD/C/63/CO/11 para 21. The European Commission against Racism and Intolerance also criticised the distinction which is made in UK law between ‘racial’ and ‘religious’ groups: Second Report on the United Kingdom, CRI (2001) 6 para 43; General Policy Recommendation N°7: National legisla tion to combat racism and racial discrimination CRI (2003) 8 para IV 18(d); and Third Report on the United Kingdom, CRI (2005) 27 para 14. The Select Committee on Religious Offences has pointed out however that the problems are now mostly addressed by other law: Report of the Select Committee on Religious Offences Religious Offences in England and Wales (2003) HL 95-I, paras 95-98. 92 See ch 3 of the Report of the Select Committee on Religious Offences, ibid. These offences no longer exist in Scotland. 93 Kokkinakis v Greece (A/260-A) (1994) 17 EHRR 397. 94 Law Commission Offences Against Religion and Public Worship (1985). 17 arbitrariness.95 The legal advice which informed Wingrove has however been criticised96 and although the matter is not settled, the balance of arguments suggests that English blasphemy law is incompatible. The legal position is not simply that the UK has an imperfect body of law which has been criticised by international observers. It may have an enforceable obligation to change its law. It needed to act on incitement to religious hatred, and it may have to abolish the law of blasphemy. Whether Part 3A is the best way to achieve the former remains to be seen. Does freedom of expression need special protection? In response to fears, the Lords added to the Bill a saving explicitly protecting freedom of expression, now found in section 29J: ‘Nothing in this Part shall be read or given effect in a way which prohibits or restricts discussion, criticism or expressions of antipathy, dislike, ridicule, insult or abuse of particular religions or the beliefs or practices of their adherents, or of any other belief system or the beliefs or practices of its adherents, or proselytising or urging adherents of a different religion or belief system to cease practising their religion or belief system.’ This should have been unnecessary, given the emphasis on freedom of expression in prior law and given that Part 3A is now worded more restrictively than the law on racial hatred because it leaves out ‘abuse’ and ‘insult’ and confines the criminal act to ‘threat’. Lord Lester called the new saving ‘a unique addition to the criminal code,’97 but that is hardly a compliment. It adds a further layer to the legislation. While the presumption is that savings are liberally construed, any unforeseen omission will still raise questions which will need to be resolved in court. It is also not the purpose of a saving to narrow a provision further, as Lord Lester appeared to intend.98 This is not good drafting. And even if it did achieve what Lord Lester desired, it would give Article 10 ECHR too high a priority over Article 9. On the other hand, the Bill’s defenders were unconvincing too. On safeguards, Home Secretary Charles Clarke protested that ‘a complaint must be accepted by a police officer’, ‘the police must investigate and acquire evidence’ and ‘the case must be referred to the Crown Prosecution Service, which will assess it by applying evidential and public-interest tests’.99 All are routine requirements. More significant is that the Attorney General must give consent for prosecution,100 and usually the Director of Public Prosecutions will too. But Bennion rails against laws which remove the right of private prosecution.101 Charles Clarke listed several more ‘safeguards’ which resembled the normal criminal justice process, but he also noted that the case must go before a jury. This in fact is one of the problems in interpreting the legislation. Viscount Colville of Culross pointed out that juries do not give reasons, so to ensure the law is applied accurately, and to furnish an appeal, much – perhaps too much - depends on what the judge said in summing up.102 Furthermore, the 95 (17419/90) (1997) 24 EHRR 1 at [61]. 96 Report of the Select Committee on Religious Offences Religious Offences in England and Wales (2003) HL 95-I at paras 12, 14 and 40. See also ECRI Second Report on the United Kingdom (CRI, 2001) 6 para 43, in which the blasphemy law is described as discriminatory. For a recent critique of the blasphemy laws, see FAR Bennion ‘A New Reason for Blasphemy Reform’ (2005) JP 169, 609, 629. 97 HL Deb 24 January 2006 vol 441 col 1075. 98 HL Deb 25 October 2005 vol 438 cols 1076-1077. On savings, see FAR Bennion Statutory Interpretation: A Code (4th ed.) (London: LexisNexis Butterworths, 2002) 619. 99 Paul Goggins HC Standing Committee E 30 June 2005 col 105. 100 At 29L. 101 FAR Bennion ‘Gilding the Lily on Religious Hatred’ (2005) 14(1) The Commonwealth Lawyer 35. 102 HL Deb 11 October 2005 vol 437 cols 198-199. 18 House of Lords recently emphasized in Wang that a jury is entitled to direct a verdict of guilty where there is some evidence to support it, however perverse that verdict may seem to be.103 Clarification in courts of appeal would help, but it has been argued specifically in defence of the new law that few people have been prosecuted for incitement to racial hatred and that few prosecutions are expected under the new law, because its aim is to deter.104 Perhaps, then, the ‘freedom of expression’ saving is necessary in this complex area of law. Ideally, a well- drafted provision should be narrow enough that any remaining doubt would be dispelled by reference to Convention rights and precedent on racial hatred. But as lay juries must reach a verdict ‘in all the circumstances’, it is probably better that a saving was included. Silencing hate speech: the evolution of signifiers This brings us back to lay conceptions of the new law. Will the disquiet which enveloped the Bill now deaden public debate? I mentioned above that the racial hatred law has led to few prosecutions. Government spokespersons claim that it has been a deterrent105 but it is dangerous to assume that the legislation has silenced the right people. Together with the public uncertainty over the scope of Part 3A, this lack of prosecutions and convictions may enhance, not dispel, the chilling effect. In the context of the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, Adam Tomkins says it ‘is the splintering of terrorism from ordinary criminal justice that results in human rights abuses’.106 Without cases to adjudicate upon, bad law is not even judicially clarified, let alone exposed to judicial review. Yet talk of the chilling effect within religious debate can be deceptive. This claim is most familiar in debates about terrorism, where it makes more sense. Supporters of small terrorist organisations rarely write for national newspapers. Tamil Tigers have not been testing out the limits of their rights of free speech under the Terrorism Act 2000107 in the pages of the Guardian or the Times. The limits of incitement to religious hatred, however, will quickly be tested by mainstream commentators. The BNP website will soon demonstrate the furthest reaches of the nasty but lawful. Terrorism and religious debate should not be carelessly compared. The key problem may not be the chilling effect, but the difficulty of constructing a strong case to take to trial. We saw above that a major justification for creating Part 3A is that extremist organisations specialise in pushing the limits of the law. Yet it is obvious that racist organisations will adapt to the new law just as they did to the old. Hatred is a subset of obnoxious speech. That criminal law permits most of us to be rude and nasty most of the time is simply one aspect of our freedom to tell glaring, provably nonsensical, lies. The duty to truth is imposed only on relatively few professionals speaking within their sphere of authority. Tackling particular aspects of incitement to hatred is always going to be problematic for the criminal law, because freedom of expression permits people not just to present a biased version of the truth but also to tell dangerous lies. If the link between the lie and the harm is too indirect, no offence is committed. Incitement to racial hatred and now incitement to religious hatred are statutory exceptions to the general rule that the law permits people blatantly to mislead each other. The trial of Nick Griffin and Mark Collett for incitement to racial hatred was hailed as proof that the existing law catches religious hatred. It is not. The case could only be brought because Griffin and Collett were secretly recorded in private and so spoke more openly than they 103 R v Wang [2005] 1 WLR 661, [2005] EWCA Crim 3238. 104 Paul Goggins HC Deb 21 June 2005 vol 435 col 759. 105 Paul Goggins HC Deb 21 June 2005 vol 435 col 759. 106 Adam Tomkins ‘Readings of A v Secretary of State for the Home Department’ [2005] Public Law 259, 265. 107 The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (the ‘Tamil Tigers’) are a proscribed organisation under Sch.2 of the Terrorism Act 2000: see The Terrorism Act 2000 (Proscribed Organisations) (Amendment) Order 2001 SI 1261. 19 would in public. Their speeches contain several references to Asians and ‘Whites’. Without these, there would have been insufficient evidence to prosecute. If the retrial succeeds, it will not demonstrate that anti-Muslim hatred could have been captured within the racial hatred law, as some have claimed. It will simply show that careless crypto-racists can get caught. When only some types of incitement to hatred are made an offence, and when some types of abuse are identified as worse than others by the use of specified words and symbols, bigoted ingenuity quickly adapts. In Scotland, where sectarianism at football matches has become a regular form of ritual sparring, the law of religious aggravation has had to be made more sophisticated, and thus wider. Section 74 of the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 2003 mostly copies the English provisions on religious aggravation. The Scottish legislation, however, has some additions. The English law specifies in section 28 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, as amended, that the aggravation is founded on ‘hostility based on the victim's membership (or presumed membership) of a racial or religious group’. Membership can include association with members of that group. A ‘religious group’ means ‘a group of persons defined by reference to religious belief or lack of religious belief’. The Scottish equivalent provides that the aggravation is founded on ‘malice and ill-will based on the victim's membership (or presumed membership) of a religious group, or of a social or cultural group with a perceived religious affiliation’108 which as in England and Wales includes association with members of that group. A religious group means: ‘a group of persons defined by reference to their- (a) religious belief or lack of religious belief; But it also covers: (b) membership of or adherence to a church or religious organisation; (c) support for the culture and traditions of a church or religious organisation; or (d) participation in activities associated with such a culture or such traditions.’109 The Scots provision is broader because of the kinds of offence it aims to tackle. Scottish sectarianism is a complex subject, but sectarian hostility (or ‘malice and ill will’) was seen by the Scottish Parliament as associated most frequently with football rivalry. This is expressed by oblique linguistic associations and referential symbols. For an outsider, this symbolism is bewildering. Rangers fans have thrown potatoes onto the pitch to annoy the Catholic/Irish- identified Celtic fans,110 while their opponents have worn German flags as a provocative celebration of the new Pope.111 Both sides have adapted apparently harmless songs such as the traditional ‘Fields of Athenry’ and Tina Turner’s ‘Simply The Best’. Now, singing even the harmless lyrics is inflammatory. Football fans, in close contact with both fellow supporters and their rivals, develop exquisitely arcane references which can be interpreted, accurately, as sectarian insults. The British National Party cannot draw on such close interaction between itself, its members and its targets and so has less opportunity for such sophistication. Even so, bigotry is fluid and fast- changing and new terms of abuse spread fast. Allusions are easily understood. Recently a Scottish court official was suspended after allegedly sending an email describing Irish people as ‘green scum’.112 The statutory convolutions in which the Scottish Parliament wound itself to tackle sectarianism are instructive for those tackling expressions of religious hatred in England and Wales. It seems easier to gather evidence against minority religious preachers 108 s 74(2)(a) – my emphasis added. 109 s 74(7) – my emphasis added. 110 Devil’s Advocate Sunday Herald August 14 2005. 111 Alan Pattullo The Scotsman 25 April 2005. 112 Douglas Fraser The Herald February 1 2006. 20 than against racist far-right activists. Nick Griffin, after all, denies that he is a racist.113 Can Part 3A meet the challenge? The problem of proving intention The final question then is: can Part 3A work? Branch after branch has been hacked off. Lord Lester insisted that the Government’s original proposals suffered from ‘the twin vices of vagueness and uncertainty and over-breadth and a lack of proportion’.114 The Lords then took out the ‘likely to’ test and limited the offence to ‘threatening’ words, material or behaviour. They aimed to create a statute which would do precisely the job for which it was designed, and no more. But that ‘likely to’ test so criticised by the Lords was inserted in Britain’s incitement to racial hatred provisions in 1976,115 precisely because research had found that the need to prove purposive intention116 was so restrictive that prosecutions were likely to fail.117 So, Parliament broadened the offence. No longer was there a need to prove intent to stir up hatred: it was enough that it was ‘likely to’ be stirred up. Despite this, no floodgates opened. Peter Thornton noted that there were few prosecutions under section 5A, and they rarely succeeded.118 In 1986 Parliament revised the law again: this time the prosecution could prove either intent or likelihood. It was still not enough. Attorneys General feared that high-profile cases would fail and were reluctant to consent to prosecutions. One might think that a religious hatred provision would be different. But between 1970 and 1987, Northern Ireland had just such a provision on incitement to religious hatred - with a purposive intention test just like that in Part 3A. And, as Brigid Hadfield pointed out in 1984, the wording of the Northern Irish provision was ‘such as to render highly unlikely a successful prosecution under it’.119 Three years later Parliament re-wrote the Northern Irish provisions to include an alternative ‘likely to’ test, based on the British offence.120 Yet even though the Northern Irish law encompasses actions which ‘arouse fear’ as well as those which stir up religious hatred, records show just one conviction so far.121 Part 3A covers a wider range of actions than the 1965 Act did (particularly actions in private dwellings) but the threshold test of intent is the same. It will be possible to infer intent, even if the person denies it.122 But the prosecution will probably have to prove the purposive intention 113 BBC news report February 3 2006. 114 HL Deb 25 October 2005 vol 438 col 1074. 115 The new provision, inserted by s 70 Race Relations Act 1976, became s 5A of the Public Order Act 1936. It was repealed by s 40(3), Sched. 3 Public Order Act 1986. 116 On purposive intention, see Richard Card (2000) Public Order Law (Bristol: Jordans, 2000) 139 and 187. 117 Home Office Racial Discrimination Cmnd 6234 (1975) at para 126. CERD praised the change: see Ineke Boerefijn and Joanna Oyediran in Sandra Coliver Striking a Balance (Essex: Article 19, 1992) 27. 118 Peter Thornton Public Order Law (London: FTPL, 1987) 61. 119 Brigid Hadfield ‘Incitement to religious hatred’ [1984] PL 231, 241. On the other hand, Patricia M Leopold (‘Incitement to hatred – the history of a controversial criminal offence’ [1977] PL 389, 401-402) rather dismissively claims that this was less a flaw of the legislation and more that ‘a Northern Irish jury was unable to be objective about a case of incitement.’ 120 The Public Order (Northern Ireland) Order 1987, Part 3 (ss.8-17). The change followed criticisms that the earlier provisions were ineffective: see T Murphy in Sandra Coliver Striking a Balance (Essex: Article 19, 1992) 267. 121 HL Deb 3 March 2005 vol 431 col 34 (WA). The data date back only to 1993, as there are no records available before that. The previous legislation only led to one (failed) prosecution between 1970 and 1992: see T Murphy in S Coliver ibid. 122 See Anthony Lester and Geoffrey Bindman on intent in the 1965 Act: Race and Law (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1972) 362. 21 to stir up religious hatred.123 What is worrying that both Hadfield and Thornton mention cases where no conviction was ever achieved – not because the police did not investigate, or because the Attorney General refused to allow a prosecution, but because the test of purposive intention was too difficult to surmount.124 It will be even harder to get a conviction under Part 3A, because it permits abuse and insult. A person will have a defence under the freedom of expression saving if he intended ‘only’ to insult or express antipathy. In the example above from the BNP website, it is unlikely that the comments would amount to words which are ‘threatening’.125 Also, the authors could argue that they are expressing antipathy towards the religious practices of some Muslims who find authority for their actions in the Koran, but not all Muslims. We may suspect otherwise, but as the article links passages of the Koran to the actions of ‘some’ followers, a jury could decide that the article was protected by section 29J. The website does elsewhere disavow both racist and anti-Muslim intent126 and this might persuade a jury not to convict.127 So if the BNP website can continue publishing such comments, what comfort can Muslims draw from the new law? ‘The second clip has another woman relating how another Muslim has told her daughter “Us Pakis are going to have to watch what we’re doing with you young ’uns now.” Together the clips make it crystal clear that for me to have used the phrase “Paki street thug” to describe a specific type of swaggering young scumbag – equivalent, as I told the jury on Friday, to the “hoodies” and “white trash” who besmirch our own community – was not intended to be, and could not possibly be taken to be, any kind of racist slur or insult. In Keighley, as in fact all over working class Britain, the word is a simple, neutral, descriptive term, used by all communities.’ 128 To back up their claim that they were not using abusive language, Griffin and Collett were allowed to show the jury video extracts of a documentary which alleges that South Asian people refer to themselves as ‘Pakis’. This was supposed to demonstrate that the word is inoffensive. Bindman has pointed out that the 1965 test also allowed wily defendants to produce dubious material in the courtroom, supposedly to prove their innocent intentions.129 For incitement to racial hatred today, proof of intention is not essential, but for religious hatred it is. Prosecutors will fear bringing a case where purposive intention has to be proved, if it can become a showroom for arguments like this. The legislative history in Britain and Northern Ireland suggests that the new Part 3A will be almost unenforceable. Without a confession, it will be very difficult to prove the purposive intention. Perhaps some extremist clerics who confess their intentions may be caught, which would be no bad thing; and much more legitimate than deporting them without trial. But those at whom the legislation was supposedly aimed – racist activists – will have little trouble adapting their rhetoric. The Lords have pruned this statute so hard they have left it a stump. Minority faith leaders will see this as a betrayal. The only way in which we can have genuinely free expression is to protect those minorities who would also like to exercise it. A society does not have freedom of expression if white 123 See Richard Card Public Order Law (Bristol: Jordans, 2000) 87. 124 Brigid Hadfield ‘Incitement to religious hatred’ [1984] PL 231, 242; Peter Thornton Public Order Law (London: FTPL, 1987) 61. 125 The word has been given its ordinary meaning: Brutus v Cozens [1973] AC 854. 126 http://www.bnp.org.uk/candidates2005/manifesto/manf4.htm (‘we are not ‘racists’’) and http://www.bnp.org.uk/articles/islamic_menace.htm (‘we have nothing against Muslims’). 127 Although not always - see Patricia M Leopold’s discussion of R v Jordan [1967] 1 All ER 486, in ‘Incitement to hatred – the history of a controversial criminal offence’ [1977] PL 389, 395. 128 From Nick Griffin’s online blog 30 January 2006 http://freespeechontrial.blogspot.com/ 129 Geoffrey Bindman ‘Incitement to racial hatred’ (1982) NLJ 229, 300. 22 activists can freely stir up hatred and so ensure that their minority victims become too frightened to reply. But the result of the final amendments to Part 3A is - in law at least - almost entirely a return to the status quo. Its sole effect is likely to be on public perceptions of what is unlawful. The greatest barrier to public enlightenment is likely to be pundits who will not be able to resist telling tall tales about the silencing of free speech. Parliament must accept some of the blame. Part 3A may be so misunderstood that perhaps it is just as well that it has been made useless. But international observers will not stay silent, and the UK may have to answer for its errors. 
work_rd3ztajakzhppbwvrxmv3xqeay	----	Advances in Autism ASD and Hate Crime Journal: Advances in Autism Manuscript ID AIA-08-2017-0015.R1 Manuscript Type: Review Paper Keywords: Autism Spectrum Disorder, Hate crime, Criminal Justice System, Victim Advances in Autism Advances in Autism Hate Crime & Flagging • Has any person, regardless of whether or not this is the victim, perceived this as a hate crime? If yes – has it been flagged as a hate incident (where the conduct does not amount to a criminal offence) or a hate crime? • Consider the evidence which makes this a hate crime-this will involve analysis of hostility, motivation and vulnerability. (a) “that, at the time of committing the offence, or immediately before or after doing so, the offender demonstrated towards the victim of the offence hostility based on a disability (or presumed disability) of the victim”. (b) “that the offence is motivated (wholly or partly) by hostility towards persons who have a disability or a particular disability.” • Has the interview dealt with identification of hostility? • Has the case been flagged as involving a vulnerable victim? • Does the case fall within any other hate crime categories, for example domestic abuse; homophobic; transphobic; racial or religious? • Does the perpetrator have Autism and, if so, should alternative disposal be considered? Fig 1: Autism: Checklist for Prosecutors Version 1.0 Page 1 of 13 Advances in Autism 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 Advances in Autism Hate crime against people with Autism Spectrum Disorders Introduction It is estimated 15% of adults worldwide have a disability (Hughes et al, 2012), with Autism Spectrum Disorders (ASD), affecting an estimated 1.1% of the adult population in England (Brugha et al, 2012). This article offers a perspective from the United Kingdom (UK), where there is significant legislation in place relating to ASD and other disabilities that are aimed age equality, inclusion and protection of rights as citizens. The definition of Hate Crime differs across the UK. In England and Wales hate crimes are defined as ‘any hate incident, which constitutes a criminal offence, perceived by the victim or any other person, as being motivated by hostility or prejudice’. Whilst in Scotland it is: ‘crime motivated by malice or ill will towards a social group.’ In Northern Ireland, although there is no definition of hate crime in law, this type of offence is still recorded by the Police. Hate crimes or incidents are motivated or thought to be motivated by prejudice and hostility towards a person’s disability, race, religion, transgender identity or sexual orientation. It is these five strands that identify Hate Crimes. In Northern Ireland and Scotland, in some cases sectarianism is also included as a Hate Crime (Amnesty International, 2016). The understanding of the concept of ‘hate crimes’ and how they are perceived by individuals has meant that there is, as such, no real consensus as to the key characteristics. One school of thought is that hate is secondary as a motive, with the primary motivation as seeing the individual as different (Gerstenfeld, 2004). Whoever the target of hate crimes the definition published within the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry 1 (Mac Pherson Report 1999) is 1 1 The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry[ conducted by Sir William Macpherson followed the racially motivated murder of Stephen Lawrence, and reported the original Metropolitan Police Service investigation had been incompetent with fundamental errors, e.g. failing to give first aid, failing to follow obvious leads or to arrest suspects. The report found the force to be institutionally racist. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/277111/4262.pdf Page 2 of 13Advances in Autism 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 Advances in Autism often seen as the benchmark and can be applied to other areas, i.e. ‘any crime, which is perceived to be racist by the victim or any other person’. So, for individuals with ASD Hate Crimes are any crime which targets them because they have an ASD or that the person perceives the crime has been committed against them because they have an ASD. Hate crimes cover a range of offences that are threatening or harmful to the person including verbal abuse, harassment, bullying or intimidation, physical attacks, threats of violence, abusive phone or messages or hate mail, online abuse via social media, posting of discriminatory literature or posters, criminal damage to property such as graffiti or arson and malicious complaints. Globally, about half a million adults die every year because of interpersonal violence (Hughes et al. 2012). Hate crimes may be directed at individuals or the group they are a part of, or identify with. Hate crimes aimed at an individual not only affect that person but can also function to bring terror to all who are in that group and serve to compromise its wellbeing and security (Perry 2001). Therefore, the emotional and psychological impact hate crime, even attacks on individuals are seen as hurtful to both the victim and the group they are seen to be a part of (Iganski, 2008). Hate crime and People with ASD In the UK, a substantial proportion of people with ASD live either in the family home, or with support in their own home or a residential service. How much contact people have with their community and the support to access their community safely often depends on where they live and their level of ability (Emerson and Hatton, 2008). Adults with ASD have persisting negative effects on learning and development of independence in adulthood (Howlin et al. 2004). In 2007, the yearly cost to society of each adult with ASD in the UK was estimated to be £90,000 (Knapp et al. 2007). It is recognised that significant numbers of adults with ASD are more vulnerable to co-existing conditions such as intellectual disability (ID). Those adults with more severe presentations of ASD or who have severe ID are more likely to be recognised and supported so may be less at risk of being a victim of Hate Crimes. Page 3 of 13 Advances in Autism 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 Advances in Autism Those with higher levels of functioning tend to be overlooked in the community and are less likely to receive or seek the necessary support from social and local authority services (Gravell, 2012). (National Audit Office, 2009). This lack of engagement makes them more vulnerable to victimisation (Archer & Hurley, 2013). The evidence as to how hate crime, affects people with ASD is limited and most of the data available on this offence is related to overall disability discrimination (Hughes et al. 2012). Given the overlap and scarcity of studies on hate crime that are ASD specific, literature into hate crimes against people with ID is a valuable source, with rates of 31% of adults with mild or severe ID living in communal care establishments having ASD (Brugha et al, 2012). In 2004, the National Learning Disability Survey for England found that 43% of people with ID had reported being bullied at school, 32% did not feel safe in their home or community; 9% had been a victim of crime, and 2.8% had been assaulted, which is above the population average. Those with lower support needs were more likely to be the victims of crime and bullying. Additionally, within the ID population, those who were younger and those from a lower socio-economic background were also found to be more vulnerable to crime and bullying. Furthermore, rising numbers of media reports emphasise cases of physical violence, sexual abuse, and hate crime inflicted on individuals with ID and ASD in homes, institutions, communities, and other settings (Quarmby, 2011; BBC news reports 2009, 2011, 2014; Krug et al. 2002; Guardian news report, 2011). However, whether this increase indicates a rising prevalence of violence against individuals with disabilities, more consistent reporting to authorities or greater media coverage than historical coverage previously, is unclear as stated previously. In general people with disabilities seem to be at an increased risk of interpersonal violence (Hughes et al. 2012; Quarmby, 2011) because of several factors: exclusion from education and employment, the need for personal assistance with daily living, reduced physical and emotional defences, communication barriers that hamper the reporting of violence, societal stigma, and discrimination (Quarmby, 2011; Nosek et al. 2001, Saxton et al. 2001; Beadle- Brown et al. 2014). The Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC) research (2009) into Page 4 of 13Advances in Autism 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 Advances in Autism the safety and security of disabled people reported that violence and hostility is a daily experience for some people with disabilities. The nature of victimisation is varying, however, the report found that it is persistent and re-occurring. As mentioned earlier the evidence on ASD and hate crime is limited and it is only since 2012, has there been a concentrated interest in autism ‘hate crime’; this is partly in response to legislative pressure as a result of the Autism Act 2009, the first disability specific legislation in the UK. This has coincided over the last decade, with an increasing interest in disability hate crime and victimisation in generaL (EHRC, 2009; British Crime Survey, 2013). Although the term ‘hate crime’ is part of common language; awareness of it has not translated into better understanding or reforms within the public sector (Roustone et al. 2011; EHRC, 2009; Hemmings et al. 2013; Department of Health, 2010; Garland, 2012). With the introduction of the Autism Act 2009 and Autism Strategy 2010, there has been a momentum to provide better provisions for adults with autism; and although an increasing amount of research has been done to quantify violence against individuals with disabilities, there is a significant gap in the literature with regards to autism hate crime or victimisation (Beadle-Brown et al. 2014; Archer & Hurley, 2013; Garland, 2012; King & Murphy, 2014). Study methods and the definitions of autism, victimisation and violence vary widely, and the literature is inconclusive on quantitative syntheses of hate crime relating to autism. Often in studies ASD is poorly defined, for example, ID has been used interchangeably with autism (Beadle-Brown et al. 2014; Hughes et al. 2012). Hate Crime and ASD Bullying A survey from the National Autistic Society (2013) reported that more than half of people with ASD including Asperger syndrome they spoke to had been bullied or harassed as adults, and furthermore let down by the criminal justice system. Fisher et al (2010) compared adults without disabilities to individuals with ID, who were more likely to experience social victimization, related to money/theft, teasing/persuasion, and abuse. Their narrative results Page 5 of 13 Advances in Autism 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 Advances in Autism and findings indicated that although individuals who were higher functioning were more aware of vulnerable situations, they still experienced victimisation at rates similar to those less able to detect risk (Risk ratio – 1:5). Victims of sex crimes Brown-Lavoie et al. (2014) explicitly explored the risk of sexual victimization in individuals with ASD and what increased that risk. They compared ninety-five adults with ASD and 117 adults without ASD through questionnaires regarding sexual knowledge sources, actual knowledge, perceived knowledge, and sexual victimization. Individuals with ASD obtained less of their sexual knowledge from social sources, more sexual knowledge from non-social sources, had less perceived and actual knowledge, and experienced more sexual victimization than controls. The increased risk of victimization by individuals with ASD was partially mediated by their actual knowledge. Individuals with ASD were between two and three times more likely to experience sexual contact victimization, sexual coercion victimization, and rape than comparison group. Regardless of sex, both male and female individuals with ASD were more likely to be sexually victimised. This is the first study to use self-report to ask adults with ASD about their actual and perceived sexual knowledge and experiences of victimisation. With the link between knowledge and victimization having important clinical implications for interventions. Responses to ASD hate crime The countries in the UK have their own prosecuting bodies, so procedures may differ. In Scotland it is the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service (COPFS), whereas in England and Wales it is The Crown Prosecution Service (CPS). The function though is similar, which is to follow strict criteria to establish whether there is enough evidence to pursue a prosecution and whether it is in the public interest to proceed. The CPS is given as an example in Figure 1. INSERT FIGURE 1 AROUND HERE Page 6 of 13Advances in Autism 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 Advances in Autism Many police services have publicly acknowledged that previously they have neglected the problem of disability hate crimes and have failed to give it the same status and attention as they have to racial, religious, or homophobic hate crimes (Gravell, 2012). The research and campaigning work of charitable organisations such as the National Autistic Society and MENCAP, has greatly helped to bring attention to the issues of hate Crime relating to ASD and ID in the public domain. One example is that hate crimes has been a topic and key focus of discussions by the All Party Parliamentary Group (AAAPG) on Autism. APPGs are informal, cross-party, interest groups of Members of Parliament and Peers i.e. those interested in a particular issue, including civil servants, advocates, carers and most importantly individuals with autism, for 2014. There are also other organisations who provide support and continue to raise awareness for the needs of those subject to hate crimes, such as the National Police Autism Association who have developed a network of champions to provide local support in to police Forces raising awareness and helping with discussion of personal, work and service delivery issues. This type of support is crucial in promoting awareness given the fact often people with Autism may go unidentified whilst at the police station. In terms of helping someone to report crime there are resources such as the True Vision webpage http://report-it.org.uk/home which explains about hate crime and how to get support and report it. Some police forces will now also offer cards which have numbers for victims to report hate crime, or to give in at the police station to inform the police they have autism, one such scheme is operated by Bedfordshire Police. To support individuals, it is necessary to have a variety of effective reporting mechanisms to ensure that any disabilities are identified, including hidden impairments, or ‘hidden disabilities’, such as, ‘autism’ and ‘learning disability’. Victims must then be supported sufficiently, their evidence given in the most effective manner and kept fully informed of what is happening in their case. This is the idealised version of how disability hate crime should be dealt with. (Challenge it, Report it, Stop it, 2012). Change has come about, mainly due to concerns that have been raised in relation to how the police have dealt with disability hate crime in recent years because of this interest. Whilst there is an acknowledgment that progress has been made in relation to certain hate crimes, there is a lack of confidence that society’s attitudes towards those with disabilities Page 7 of 13 Advances in Autism 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 Advances in Autism has progressed at the same pace (Gerstenfeld, 2004; Garland 2012). It is the case it is often tragedy that can create the greatest awareness and acts as a catalyst for change. Fiona Pilkington, killed herself and her severely disabled daughter in 2007 after years of harassment and intimidation. The family had complained to police about the abuse on 27 separate occasions between 2004 and 2007, and twice petitioned their local MP on two separate occasions. The Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC), which investigates police complaints, published its review into the Pilkington case in May 2011. The investigation concluded that among the failings of the police was not identifying the family as vulnerable, which meant police did not provide a structured, cohesive response to the prolonged antisocial behaviour they endured. Although this may have changed opinion and helped bring about changes in the way we support and treat victims hate crimes, societal change still needs to be worked on. A recent newspaper article on the area where the Fiona Pilkington tragedy occurred suggests little has changed for residents locally with incidents of abuse common place. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/long_reads/fiona-pilkington-frankie-pilkington- suicide-learning-disabilities-bullying-hate-crime-a8004526.html Discussion Even though progress has been made in the UK there is still a need to create further awareness of what disability hate crime is, its scope and its victims. Increasing the reporting of disability hate crime has always been difficult for a number of reasons, such as lack of support, not knowing the process or just through fear. Processes to manage disability hate crime need to be embedded within the routine working practices of the police and CPS who should work together to enhance how to identify and progress these cases. (Gravell, 2012). The Joint Disability Hate Crime Review (Brereton, 2013) came about following a culmination of pressure from the public as well as other bodies with regards to tackling the issues of victimisation. The review recommends that together with the Challenge it, Report it, Stop it report (HM Government, 2012) there is sufficient scope given recent progerias to “provide a unique opportunity for the police, CPS and probation trusts to implement changes to policies and procedures. Practices need to be changed to work towards improved outcomes Page 8 of 13Advances in Autism 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 Advances in Autism for victims and contribute to changing society’s attitudes.” In April 2005 section 146 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (s.146 CJA 2003) was introduced which created the ‘sentencing provision’ relating to the punishments for perpetrators of disability hate crime. There is still argument that disability hate crime requires additional status given that social attitudes are still ill informed (Gravell, 2012; Beadle-Brown et al. 2014; King & Murphy, 2014). There is still a lack of clarity and understanding as to what constitutes a disability hate crime and confusion between policy definitions and statutory sentencing. Currently the court can regard the defendant’s behaviour as an aggravating feature if (a) the offender has demonstrated hostility based on a disability or (b) the offence was motivated by hostility towards persons who have a disability. This causes difficulties not only for practitioners in the identification and recording of disability hate crime but also for members of the public, including victims who are disabled (Joint Disability Hate Crime Review, 2013; Brereton, 2013). A clear recommendation from public reports is that, improvements need to be made by the police and CPS in how they identify and record disability hate crime. All police, CPS and probation staff need to be fully aware of the statutory provision in and there needs to be a common policy definition that is universally recognised and applied at ‘ground level’, which is simple to interpret. This has been outlined very concisely in the Joint Disability Hate Crime Review, 2013. The under reporting of disability hate crime remains a significant concern and needs to be addressed (NAS Hate Crime Survey, 2013; Brereton, 2013). It is still the case victims are not empowered or getting the support and help to report disability related hate crimes. This means is that those being targeted and most vulnerable are not able to reach out for adequate support which in turn perpetuates their situation further and threatens both their mental health and general wellbeing and negative impact on their quality of life. There is also evidence to suggest that those with ASD and ID in these situations will be more likely to present in forensic and clinical settings (King and Murphy, 2014). A key recommendation from the Joint Commissioned report (2013) is that the CPS needs to improve its performance in relation to the quality of case preparation to ensure that disability hate crimes are effectively prosecuted. For this to happen there needs to be greater awareness of autism throughout the Criminal Justice System (CJS). This follows the admission that people can feel uncomfortable around and about disability and have widely Page 9 of 13 Advances in Autism 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 Advances in Autism varying levels of experience of interaction with disabled people (EHRC 2013). This may go some way to addressing the low levels of reporting that exists. It is these attitudes and current experiences that need to be challenged to ensure disability hate crimes are treated on an equal footing to the other strands of hate crime such of race, religion, sexual orientation or transgender identity and remember that many people with ASD will also belong to one or more of the other groups at risk of hate crime. Conclusion In summation, the current academic literature is not very clear with regards to how it defines hate crime or victimisation for adults with ASD and ID. It is crucial to take in to account the experiences of this vulnerable population, as public policy currently is reflecting that there is a need for further provisions and support for these victims. The CJS, police and probation want to tackle this; however, the academic literature is sparse in its understanding of the issues. The literature is mostly on the experiences of children and adolescents. Clearly, reports in the public domain are arguing that adults with ASD are being targeted. Therefore, it would be useful to map what understanding is present in the current academic literature on adults with ASD and does it reflect the discussion above. Additionally, it would be useful to see where the gaps are to inform future research. Page 10 of 13Advances in Autism 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 Advances in Autism REFERENCES Amnesty International (2016) Tackling Hate Crime in the UK Archer, N., & Hurley, E. A. (2013). A justice system failing the autistic community. Journal of Intellectual Disabilities and Offending Behaviour, 4(1/2), 7-7. Beadle-Brown, J., Richardson, L., Guest, C., Malovic, A., Bradshaw, J and Himmerich, J. (2014). Living in Fear: Better Outcomes for people with learning disabilities and autism. Main research report. Canterbury: Tizard Centre, University of Kent. BBC News (January 23, 2009) Dementia relatives admit abuse. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/health/7842549.stm BBC News (June 20, 2011). Police ‘fail’ disabled people suffering hate crime. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-13836337 BBC News (October 7, 2014). Bijan Ebrahimi murder: IPCC report complete. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-bristol-29521557 Brereton, S. (2013). Living in a Different World: Joint Review of Disability Hate Crime. Probation Journal, 60(3), 345-346. British Crime Survey, 2013 Brugha T, Cooper S.A., McManus S., Spiers, N. and Tyrer, F. (2012) Estimating the Prevalence of Autism Spectrum Conditions in Adults: Extending the 2007 Adult Psychiatric Morbidity Survey. London: NHS, The Health and Social Care Information Centre. Department of Health. (2010). Fulfilling and rewarding lives, the strategy for adults with Autism in England. London: Department of Health. Equality and Human Rights Commission (2009). Disabled people's experiences of targeted violence and hostility. Manchester, NH. Fisher, M. H., Moskowitz, A. L., & Hodapp, R. M. (2012). Vulnerability and experiences related to social victimization among individuals with intellectual and developmental disabilities. Journal of mental health research in intellectual disabilities, 5(1), 32-48. Page 11 of 13 Advances in Autism 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 Advances in Autism Garland, J. (2012). Difficulties in defining hate crime victimization. International review of victimology, 18(1), 25-37. Gerstenfeld, P.B. (2004). Hate Crimes: Causes, Controls and Controversies. Sage; London. Gravell, C. (2012). Loneliness and Cruelty: People with Learning Disabilities and Their Experiences of Harassment, Abuse and Related Crime in the Community. Lemos & Crane: London. Hemmings, C., Deb, S., Chaplin, E., Hardy, S., & Mukherjee, R. (2013). Review of research for people With ID and mental health problems: A view from the United Kingdom. Journal of Mental Health Research in Intellectual Disabilities, 6(2), 127-158. Home Office, Ministry of Justice, Office for National Statistics. (2013). An Overview of Hate Crime in England and Wales. London: Home Office. Howlin, P., Goode, S., Hutton, J., Rutter, M. (2004) Adult outcome for children with autism. Journal of Child Psychology Psychiatry, 45 (2), 212- 229. Hughes, K., Bellis, M. A., Jones, L., Wood, S., McCoy, E., Eckley, L., Bates, G., Mikton, C., Shakespeare, T & Officer, A. (2012). Prevalence and risk of violence against adults with disabilities: a systematic review and meta-analysis of observational studies. The Lancet, 379 (9826), 1621-1629. Iganski, P. (2008). ‘Hate Crime’ and the City. The Policy Press; Bristol. Joint Disability Hate Crime Review, 2013 King, C., & Murphy, G. H. (2014). A Systematic Review of People with Autism Spectrum Disorder and the Criminal Justice System. Journal of autism and developmental disorders, 1- 17. Knapp, M., Romeo, R., Beecham, J. (2007). Economic Consequences of Autism in the UK. Mental Health Foundation and Autism Speaks. London, England Krug, E.G., Dahlberg, L.L., Mercy, J.A., Zwi, A.B., Lozano, R. (2002). World report on violence and health. World Health Organization, Geneva. Page 12 of 13Advances in Autism 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 Advances in Autism MacPherson W. "The Inquiry Into The Matters Arising From The Death of Stephen Lawrence" Mac Pherson Report: 24 February, 1999. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/277111/4 262.pdf National Autistc Society 2010 Nosek, M. A., Foley, C.C., Hughes, R.B., CA Howland, C.A. (2001). Vulnerabilities for abuse among women with disabilities. Sex Disability, 19, 177–190. Perry, B. (2001). In the Name of Hate: Understanding Hate Crimes. Routledge; London. Quarmby, K. (2011). Scapegoat: why we are failing disabled people. Portobello Books, London. Roulstone, A. Thomas, P. & Balderston, S. (2011) Between hate and vulnerability: unpacking the British criminal justice system’s construction of disablist hate crime. Disability and Society, 26 (3), Saxton, M., Curry, M.A., Powers, L.E., Maley, S., Eckels, K., Gross, J. (2001). ‘Bring my scooter so I can leave you’. A study of disabled women handling abuse by personal assistance providers. Violence Against Women, 7, 393–417. Page 13 of 13 Advances in Autism 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 
work_rdfnv7n7gfd7pedqbspucedd44	----	Caste-based crimes and economic status: Evidence from India Journal of Comparative Economics 43 (2015) 204–226 Contents lists available at ScienceDirect Journal of Comparative Economics j o u r n a l h o m e p a g e : w w w . e l s e v i e r . c o m / l o c a t e / j c e Caste-based crimes and economic status: Evidence from India http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jce.2014.10.005 0147-5967/� 2014 Association for Comparative Economic Studies. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/). ⇑ Fax: +91 11 27667159. E-mail address: smriti@econdse.org Smriti Sharma ⇑ Delhi School of Economics, University of Delhi, Delhi 110007, India a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t Article history: Received 5 June 2014 Revised 24 October 2014 Available online 4 November 2014 JEL classification: J15 K42 O12 Keywords: Caste Crimes India Sharma, Smriti—Caste-based crimes and economic status: Evidence from India Crimes against the historically marginalized Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (SC and ST) by the upper castes in India represent an extreme form of prejudice and discrim- ination. In this paper, we investigate whether changes in relative material standards of liv- ing between the SCs/STs and upper castes – as measured by the ratio of consumption expenditures of SCs/STs to that of upper castes – are associated with changes in the inci- dence of crimes against SCs/STs. Based on the hierarchical social structure implied by the caste system, we posit that an increase in the expenditure ratio is positively correlated with the incidence of crimes committed by the upper castes against the lower castes. Using official district level crime data for the period 2001–2010, we find a positive association between crimes and expenditure of SC/ST vis-á-vis the upper castes. Further, distinguish- ing between violent and non-violent crimes, we find it is the violent crimes that are responsive to changes in economic gaps. Moreover, this relationship is on account of changes in the upper castes’ economic well-being rather than changes in the economic position of the SCs and STs. Journal of Comparative Economics 3 (43) (2015) 204–226. Delhi School of Economics, University of Delhi, Delhi 110007, India. � 2014 Association for Comparative Economic Studies. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/ by-nc-nd/4.0/). 1. Introduction In India, former untouchable castes and several tribal groups continue to be subjected to discrimination, economic and social exclusion and a stigmatized identity (e.g., Deshpande, 2011; Navsarjan Trust, 2010; Thorat and Newman, 2010). Addi- tionally, similar to hate crimes in other parts of the world, these groups have been victims of crimes and atrocities at the hands of the upper castes – largely on account of their low caste identity – in the form of rape of women, abuse by police personnel, harassment of lower caste village council heads, illegal land encroachments, forced evictions and so on (Human Rights Watch, 1999). These instances are in blatant violation of the Indian constitution that abolished untouchability and upholds the ideal of equality among all citizens. In 2006, acknowledging the gravity of the problem, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh equated the practice of untouchability to that of apartheid (Rahman, 2006). We analyze crimes against the historically disadvantaged Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes i.e. former untouchables and marginalized tribes (SCs and STs respectively), by the upper castes. The objective of this study is to examine whether regional variations in the incidence of violence by the upper castes against the lower castes are systematically linked to http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1016/j.jce.2014.10.005&domain=pdf http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jce.2014.10.005 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ mailto:smriti@econdse.org http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jce.2014.10.005 http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/01475967 http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jce S. Sharma / Journal of Comparative Economics 43 (2015) 204–226 205 variations in relative group economic outcomes of lower castes and tribes and upper castes (as measured by the ratio of per capita expenditure of SCSTs to that of the upper castes). Based on the hierarchical social structure implied by the caste sys- tem such that the upper castes have traditionally been economically better-off than the lower castes with resulting social dominance, we posit that an increase in the ratio of SCST expenditures to upper caste expenditures is positively correlated with the incidence of crimes committed by the upper castes against the lower castes. Theoretically, an increase in the expenditure ratio could lead to either a decrease or an increase in the incidence of caste- based crimes. It could lead to a decrease on account of various factors. An increase in the ratio of expenditures, by improving the relative economic position of SCSTs could result in an increased ability to defend themselves against physical harm by the upper castes by investing in better security measures. It could also lend them greater confidence to report crimes to the police thereby leading to a possible reduction in future crimes.1 Further, an improvement in their bargaining power could lead to the upper castes having greater respect for the low castes. Conversely, there could be an increase in the incidence of caste-based crimes as firstly, SCSTs could be perceived as more attractive targets for violence especially where the motivation is to extract some form of economic surplus. Secondly, they may be perceived as a threat to the established social, economic and political position of the upper castes. Thirdly, if an improvement in the expenditure ratio is on account of a worsening of the upper caste economic position, crimes could be used as a means of asserting their superiority and expressing their frustration at their worsened relative economic position. Therefore, which of these effects dominate constitutes an interesting empirical question. While there is some literature on general violent crimes in India (Dreze and Khera, 2000; Prasad, 2012; Roy, 2010) and crimes against women (Iyer et al., 2012; Sekhri and Storeygard, 2014), crimes against SCs and STs remain under-researched. This paper, among the first to analyze data on crimes committed against SCs and STs, has been largely facilitated by the avail- ability of crime data at the district level starting 2001. Bros and Couttenier (2012) use cross-sectional district-level crime data for 2001 and find crimes against SC and ST groups to be higher in districts that have greater commonality of water sources. Common water sources imply water sharing between castes which is considered ritually polluting for the upper castes and is often countered with acts of violence against the lower castes. Our study investigates a different hypothesis and exploits the panel structure of the data through which fixed unobservable factors can be controlled. Using district level official data on crimes against SCs and STs and per capita expenditures as a proxy for material standard of living, we find that the incidence of caste violence is positively correlated with the ratio of expenditures of lower castes and tribes to that of upper castes. Dividing the crimes into predominantly violent and non-violent crimes, we find that changes in relative material standards of living between groups lead to changes in violent crimes, particularly those aimed at extracting some form of economic surplus or property from the victims. Moreover, these are driven by changes in the upper castes’ economic well-being rather than changes in the economic position of the lower castes and tribes. Although caste-based discrimination has largely been discussed in the context of labor markets and access to public goods (see Deshpande, 2011; Thorat and Newman, 2010 for a review), this is among the first studies to quantitatively ana- lyze extreme discrimination in the form of crimes targeted at the SC and ST groups. As anecdotal evidence suggests that lower castes are targeted predominantly on the basis of their caste identity, broadly speaking, such crimes are comparable to hate crimes. Thus, our study is a new contribution to the discussion of group-based violence in the Indian context. How- ever, there is an extensive social science literature from the United States that has studied racial violence and this paper builds on that literature. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a background of the existing inequalities on account of the caste system and an overview of the hate crimes literature. Section 3 describes the dataset and the empirical framework. Section 4 presents the summary statistics and results. Section 5 discusses robustness checks and other concerns and Section 6 concludes. 2. Related literature 2.1. The Indian caste system The caste system is an arrangement of the Hindu population into several thousand groups called ‘jatis’ (castes). These groups have emerged from the ancient ‘varna’ system according to which society was divided into initially four, later five, hereditary, endogamous, mutually exclusive and occupation-specific groups. At the top of the varna system were the ‘Brahmins’ (priests and teachers) and the ‘Kshatriyas’ (warriors and royalty), followed by ‘Vaishyas’ (merchants and money- lenders) and finally the ‘Shudras’ (engaged in lowliest jobs). Over time, the Shudras split into two tiers, with those engaged in the most menial jobs being called the ‘Ati-Shudras’. The Ati-Shudras were considered untouchable, such that any contact with them was seen as polluting.2 They were forced to live in segregated housing, denied access to schools and places of wor- ship attended by upper castes, and required to maintain physical distance from upper castes in order to not pollute them. Addi- tionally, there are the indigenous tribes (or the Adivasis) who on account of geographical isolation, primitive agricultural practices and distinct social customs have been socially distanced and face large-scale exclusion from mainstream Indian society. In 1950, the Constitution extended affirmative action to Dalits and Adivasis (officially termed as Scheduled Castes 1 Iyer et al. (2012) find that the political empowerment of women by way of higher mandated representation at local government levels induces strong positive effects on reporting of crimes by women. 2 Former untouchables prefer to identify themselves as ‘Dalit’ as a term of pride. 206 S. Sharma / Journal of Comparative Economics 43 (2015) 204–226 and Scheduled Tribes respectively) in the form of reservations in national and state legislatures, local governments, institutions of higher education and government jobs. In addition, there is a third category known as the ‘Other Backward Classes’ (OBCs) to which reservations have been extended since the early 1990s. This group, while not burdened with the stigma of untouchability, was socially and educationally backward. While affirmative action extended to SCs and STs has made a discernible positive impact in some dimensions such as pov- erty, redistribution of state resources, and some public goods provisions (e.g., Pande, 2003; Besley et al., 2004; Chin and Prakash, 2011), gaps remain between the SCST and non-SCST groups. Shah et al. (2006) in a survey of 565 villages across 11 large states in 2001–2002 document the widespread practice of untouchability in a significant proportion of villages. Moreover, there is a burden of a ‘stigmatized ethnic identity’ (Berreman, 1971) that even richer Dalits continue to live with.3 There is ample evidence suggesting that upper castes use and justify various forms of violence as tools to ensure adherence to caste-based norms and traditions by the lower castes. Attacks often take the form of collective punishment, whereby entire communities are punished for the perceived transgressions of individuals who seek to alter established norms or demand their rights. A report by the National Commission of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (1997) succinctly states ‘‘Whenever Dalits have tried to organize themselves or assert their rights, there has been a backlash from the feudal lords resulting in mass killings, gang rapes, looting of Dalit villages’’ (p:2). This stresses that significant policy initiatives have not been accompanied by social integration and tolerance across caste lines. 2.2. Hate crimes Hate crimes are characterized by a deliberate intention to victimize an individual because of his membership in a certain social group. The most crucial element that differentiates hate crimes from similar non-hate crimes is the underlying moti- vation.4 A review of the literature, most of which comes from the United States and Europe, indicates that among other things, relative economic position of the dominant group vis-à-vis the subaltern group is an important determinant of hate crimes. Gale et al. (2002) model hate crimes as a function of ill will on the part of the perpetrator with respect to the victim by extending Becker’s (1981) model of envy and altruism. While altruism implies that one’s utility function depends positively on the well-being of another, envy implies the opposite. Because relative status matters in Becker’s framework, it is plausible that if the income gap between the minority and dominant group reduces, this could provoke envious members of the dom- inant group to resort to violence as a way to reduce the well-being of minority members. Using American state-level data for 1992–1995, they find the ratio of black income to white income to be positively associated with hate crimes. Our paper can be considered closest in terms of motivation to Mitra and Ray (2014) inasmuch as they too consider the relationship between group-wise economic progress and inter-group conflict. Their theoretical model explains the incidence of ethnic conflict as a function of economic progress of two groups in society where members of either group can be aggres- sors or victims. Using data on Hindu-Muslim riots from India, they find that Hindu per-capita expenditures have either a negative effect or no effect on conflict while the coefficient on Muslim per-capita expenditures is positive. However, there are two crucial differences between the two studies. Firstly, they analyze communal riots, which represent violence involv- ing a large group of people, while we study individually targeted caste-based crimes. Secondly, and more importantly, their data do not allow separation of perpetrators and victims by religion, except by inference, whereas in our data, the identifi- cation between victims (SCST) and perpetrators (non-SCST) is clear from the start. Competition theory suggests that inter-group conflict is heightened when niches that the minority and dominant groups traditionally operated in start to overlap. Niches could be in the form of occupational sectors, residential patterns, etc. Jacobs and Wood (1999) using data for 165 U.S. cities find that as economic competition for jobs increases between blacks and whites, murders of blacks by whites increase. Additionally, cities with a black mayor experience more murders of blacks by whites.5 D’Alessio et al. (2002) find that economic competition (measured by the ratio of black and white unemployment rate) has a negative effect on crimes committed by whites against blacks. On the other hand, political threat (ratio of black to white voters) has no significant effect on interracial crimes. Studies of riots and lynchings also suggest that competition for jobs leads to greater inter-racial violence (e.g., Price et al., 2008; Beck and Tolnay, 1990; Olzak, 1990). The defended neighborhoods view suggests that hate crimes are used as an exclusionary tactic for turf protection and to maintain the existing hierarchy in society. Many hate crimes result from dominant group concerns about minority group encroachment. Research by Lyons (2007) on Chicago neighborhoods and by Green et al. (1998) on New York communities indicates that racially motivated hate crimes are higher in traditionally white neighborhoods experiencing an influx of minority population. The frustration-aggression thesis of Dollard et al. (1939) and Hovland and Sears (1940) suggests that during periods of economic stress, there is an innate tendency to lash out against a vulnerable scapegoat, which is often an out-group that may be linked to the source of the stress. Pinderhughes (1993) documents attitudes of white hate crime offenders and finds that they blame their economic insecurity on affirmative action policies that increase competition with minorities. 3 The following account by a Dalit surgeon effectively summarizes the sentiment behind ‘stigmatized ethnic identity’: ‘‘I am a micro-surgeon specializing in hand and spinal reconstruction, and am [a Member of Legislative Assembly] from Bihar, but I still remain very much a dalit- a dhobi, to be precise- open to routine humiliation from the upper castes.’’ (Kanaujia, 2007) 4 See Green et al. (2001) for a review of definitional and conceptual issues related to hate crimes. 5 In a similar vein, Becker (1957) finds that older and more educated blacks face greater discrimination. S. Sharma / Journal of Comparative Economics 43 (2015) 204–226 207 3. Data and methodology 3.1. Crime data The crime data used in this paper are from the annual publication ‘Crime in India’ by National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB), Government of India. This data is based on complaints filed with the police. While crimes against SCs and STs were reported at the state level since 1992, only since 2001, data on different types of crimes against SCs and STs have become available at the district level. The distinctive feature of this dataset is its classification system. The data are defined in a way such that the victim belongs to the SC/ST group and the perpetrator to a non-SC/ST group. It should be noted at the out- set that data are not collected by the NCRB under the following circumstances: (i) when the victim is non-SC/ST and perpe- trator is SC/ST; (ii) when both victim and perpetrator are SCs/STs; and (iii) when both victim and perpetrator are non-SCs/ STs.6 For this study, we use the crime data from 2001 to 2010 for 415 districts that make up the 18 large states.7 There are two main types of crimes: those reported under the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and those that are registered under the Special and Local Laws (SLL). While the IPC category includes mostly violent crimes that affect the broader population in general, the SLL are enacted to counter other social practices prohibited by various laws. IPC crimes include: (i) murder, (ii) rape, (iii) physical assault or hurt, (iv) kidnapping, (v) robbery, (vi) arson, (vii) dacoity8 and (viii) other classified IPC crimes. Other classified IPC crimes constitutes a residual category that includes crimes such as assaulting public servants, killing cattle, criminal trespass and intimidation. Crimes under SLL are: (i) Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955, and (ii) The Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. These acts constitute special social enactments to safeguard the interests of SC/ST groups. Examples of crimes included under SLL are: denying admission to Dalits into places of recreation and worship, educational institutions and hospitals; denying Dalits access to water sources; wrongfully occupying land owned by SC/ST; stripping them naked; practice of untouchability; compelling them to do bonded labor or scavenging jobs and so on.9 The rules of the Prevention of Atrocities Act specify provisions for rehabilitation and compensation of victims and setting up of special courts to expedite the trial of cases. Broadly, the IPC crimes include acts of overt force and aggression and are predom- inantly violent crimes. On the other hand, SLL crimes are untouchability related offences with the intention of humiliating mem- bers of the lower castes, with some amount of violence. Hence, they are largely non-violent crimes. The issue of under-reporting of crime is a standard limitation of most official data on crime, even for developed countries. Moreover, low caste victims are likely to hesitate in reporting a crime due to reasons that include fear of reprisals, lack of confidence in the police, and shame in reporting a crime where they have been targeted on account of their social identity. Ideally, one would like to use victimization surveys to study crimes of this nature. However, in the absence of such data, this paper makes use of the best available nationally representative data and we believe that is a good starting point, especially since quantitative evidence on crimes against SCs and STs is limited.10 The district fixed effects in our regression are able to control for the district-specific time-invariant component of under-reporting. 3.2. Explanatory variables Since our unit of analysis is the district, district-level information on the explanatory variables is calculated from the large-scale household surveys conducted once in five years by the National Sample Survey Organization (NSSO). We use NSS data from the ‘Consumer Expenditure Survey’ and ‘Employment-Unemployment Survey’ modules of 1999–2000 (55th round) and 2004–2005 (61st round). Since there were changes in some district boundaries between the two rounds of NSS data, we make the districts comparable using the weights provided by Kumar and Somanathan (2009).11 In order to utilize the entire time series of district-level crime data from 2001 to 2010 and also to match it with the two rounds of district-level data from NSS, for the first period, we aggregate crimes for years 2001 to 2005 and for the second period, we aggregate crimes for years 2006 to 2010. This aggregation also overcomes the problem of many districts reporting zero crimes in a single year. Therefore, we have a two period panel with 415 districts in each period. The primary variable of interest is the material standard of living of SCs/STs relative to that of the upper castes.12 In order to measure standard of living, we calculate monthly per capita consumption expenditure (MPCE) from the NSS Consumer Expenditure Survey.13 Thus, our principal variable is defined as the logarithm of ratio of SCST expenditure to upper caste 6 Data on crimes against SCs/STs, women and children are collected since these groups are considered vulnerable. 7 These are: Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Punjab, Uttar Pradesh, Uttarakhand, Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh, Kerala, Tamil Nadu, Bihar, Jharkhand, Orissa, West Bengal, Madhya Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Gujarat, Rajasthan and Maharashtra. 8 Dacoity is when five or more persons conjointly commit or attempt to commit a robbery. 9 The complete list of SLL crimes against SC/ST is in Appendix A. 10 The India Human Development Survey (IHDS) of 2005 asks households whether they have been victims of theft, burglary, physical hurt or threats. However, there is no way of knowing if crimes against SCs/STs were committed by non-SC/STs. Prasad (2013) in a comparative analysis of the IHDS and NCRB data finds that while the NCRB data is under-reported, there is a positive and significant relationship between police-recorded and victim-reported crimes. This suggests that official data are indicative of actual crimes and can enable identification of high and low crime districts. 11 District mappings across the two rounds of NSS data have been listed in Appendix B. 12 The NSS defines four broad social groups: Scheduled Castes (SCs), Scheduled Tribes (STs), Other Backward Classes (OBCs) and ‘Others’. ‘Others’ is a reasonable approximation of the upper castes. 13 Details on computation of real monthly per capita consumption expenditure are in Appendix C. 1999–2000 is used as base year. 208 S. Sharma / Journal of Comparative Economics 43 (2015) 204–226 expenditure. Ideally, one would like to use some measure of income to study differences in standard of living but that is difficult to collect in a developing country like India. In developing countries, expenditure serves as a good proxy for income for several reasons. Firstly, at low levels of income, savings are negligible resulting in a close correspondence between income and con- sumption expenditure. Secondly, wage or earnings data, even when reliable, may not account for days of employment and sea- sonality of work. Moreover, wage or earnings data in the NSS is reported only for those who are employed in regular salaried jobs or as casual labor and not for those who are self-employed. However, wage data for casual workers are often missing or unreliable. Thirdly, payment is often in kind and wage data typically accounts only for the monetary component of earnings. Finally, like in the case of agricultural households, a household is both a production and consumption unit and it is difficult to distinguish between receipts and outflows (Deaton, 1997). In addition to the above, we control for share of SCSTs in the district population and its squared term. Becker (1957) sug- gests that the effect of the minority group size can go in either direction. An increase in numbers could reduce prejudice and hostility on account of greater interaction between dominant and minority groups or ‘strength in numbers’ could help minority groups to better protect themselves. On the other hand, an increase in minority group size could have an adverse effect by fueling fears that the minority group is trying to challenge the dominant group.14 District-level average monthly per capita expenditure accounts for overall prosperity in the region. Expenditure-based Gini coefficient accounts for overall inequal- ity in the district. We control for percentage of population living in rural areas since caste-based crimes are likely to be a pre- dominantly rural phenomenon due to beliefs in caste hierarchies being more deep-seated. Educational attainment is controlled for by introducing categorical variables for different levels of education: illiterate, primary, secondary, higher secondary and above. Unemployment is an important determinant of crime since unemployed people with no legal income are more likely to engage in illegal activities.15 However, in India, like in other developing countries, the underemployment rate is a more accu- rate measure of time utilization (National Commission for Enterprises in the Unorganised Sector, 2008). Underemployment is commonly defined as the underutilization of labor time or skills of the employed either due to seasonality of work or lack of sufficient work.16 Percentage of males in the 15–24 age groups in the population represents the size of the group that is most likely to engage in criminal activity. We also control for political competition at the state-level by using effective number of parties (Laakso and Taagepara, 1979) that is calculated using data from the state assembly election reports from the Election Commission of India.17 We would expect states with greater electoral competition (larger effective number of parties) to be more sympathetic to the cause of the SCST groups thereby leading to lesser violence against them. Wilkinson (2004) finds that Indian states with higher effective number of parties experience fewer Hindu-Muslim riots. 3.3. Empirical specification Our main empirical specification uses a linear fixed effects regression model. The general form of the estimating equation is: 14 Blu subordi share o 15 Evi rates to inciden 16 Det 17 The total nu ydt ¼ a1 þ a2 edt þ Rkh kXkdt þ dd þ ct þ�dt ð1Þ where the dependent variable ydt is the logarithm of the SCST crime rate per 100,000 SCSTs in district d in time period t. Our primary variable of interest edt is logarithm of the ratio of expenditure of SCs/STs to upper castes. X k dt is the vector of k con- trols in district d at time t which includes the following: district MPCE, share of SCs/STs in the population and its squared term, share of the population residing in rural areas, Gini coefficient, underemployment rate, share of population in different education categories (illiterate, primary, secondary, with higher secondary and above being omitted group), share of young males in the population and effective number of parties. District fixed effects dd control for the time-invariant district- specific under-reporting of crime, long-standing caste relations in the district, etc. A time dummy ct controls for factors that are common across districts but vary across time such as changes in national-level policies that might affect caste-based crimes. �dt is the error term. Standard errors are clustered at the district level to account for possible correlated shocks to district-level crimes over time. Based on the hierarchical nature of inter-caste relations discussed previously, we expect the coefficient of the expenditure ratio, a2 , to be positive. An alternative specification uses group-wise expenditures instead of relative expenditures to determine which group’s economic changes are driving this relationship: ydt ¼ b1 þ b2 SCSTexp þ b3OBCexp þ b4 UCexp þ Rkl k Xkdt þ xd þ gt þ edt ð2Þ mer (1958) posits that perceived threat among the dominant group manifests in the following ways: (i) a feeling of superiority; (ii) a feeling that the nate group is intrinsically different; (iii) a feeling of exclusive claim over certain privileges; and (iv) a fear that the subordinate group desires a greater f the dominant group’s prerogatives. dence on the relationship between unemployment rates and hate-motivated crimes is quite mixed. For example, Falk et al. (2011) find unemployment positively affect violent and non-violent right wing extremist crimes in Germany. However, Krueger and Pischke (1997) find no relationship between ce of anti-foreigner crimes and unemployment rate in post-unification Germany during 1991–1993. ails on calculation of underemployment and unemployment rates are in Appendix D. formula for effective number of parties is n ¼ 1=Rp2i where pi is the proportion of votes received by party i in the state elections. Instead of using the mber of parties, this measure places greater weight on parties that have a higher share of votes as compared to those with a low vote share. Table 1 Summary statistics. Variable Col. 1 Col. 2 Col. 3 Col. 4 Col. 5 Col. 6 Both periods Period 1 Period 2 Mean Std dev Mean Std dev Mean Std dev Crime incidence: Total crimes against SCSTs 430 (419) 418 (435) 441 (403) IPC crimes against SCSTs 288 (351) 275 (351) 302 (352) SLL crimes against SCSTs 142 (176) 144 (174) 140 (178) IPC body crimes against SCSTs 95 (113) 93 (112) 97 (114) IPC non-body crimes against SCSTs 193 (281) 182 (272) 205 (289) General IPC crimes 21,033 (20,059) 19,503 (18,370) 22,564 (21,530) Crime rates: SCST total crime rate 99.8 (135.1) 104.4 (164.3) 95.3 (97.7) SCST IPC crime rate 66.5 (107.1) 68.9 (125.6) 64.2 (84.6) SCST SLL crime rate 33.3 (52.7) 35.5 (58.6) 31.2 (46) SCST body crime rate 23.1 (42.1) 24 (44.3) 22.2 (39.7) SCST non-body crime rate 43.5 (75.4) 44.9 (89.6) 42 (57.9) General IPC crime rate 1544.3 (1492.7) 1552.9 (1884.3) 1535.7 (954.5) Explanatory variables: SCST MPCE/upper caste MPCE 0.68 (0.16) 0.71 (0.16) 0.64 (0.17) MPCE 535.1 (186.3) 471.3 (132.2) 598.9 (209.5) SCST MPCE 433.17 (128.2) 394.53 (100.6) 471.72 (140.8) Upper caste MPCE 679.07 (274.2) 574.53 (172.2) 783.85 (314.7) Other backward classes MPCE 523.11 (179.1) 459.39 (126.3) 585.9 (200.2) % SCST population 29.8 (15.2) 29.9 (15.5) 29.6 (15) % Rural population 79.39 (17.3) 79.31 (18.1) 79.48 (16.5) % Underemployed 16.02 (7.6) 15.33 (7.5) 16.7 (7.5) % Young males 9.41 (1.9) 9.31 (1.7) 9.52 (2) Gini (based on MPCE) 0.25 (0.05) 0.24 (0.04) 0.27 (0.06) Effective number of political parties 4.6 (1.3) 4.4 (1.3) 4.7 (1.4) % Illiterate 45.87 (15.4) 47.9 (15.6) 43.8 (14.9) % Primary education 19.92 (6.4) 19.56 (6.6) 20.18 (6.1) % Secondary education 24.06 (9.1) 23.34 (9.4) 24.78 (8.7) % Higher secondary and above education 10.15 (5.7) 9.06 (5.2) 11.24 (6.1) Note: Total crimes against SCSTs is the sum of IPC and SLL crimes against them. IPC crimes are the sum of murder, rape, kidnap, hurt, dacoity, robbery, arson and other IPC crimes. SLL crimes are the sum of crimes registered under the Prevention of Atrocities Act and the Protection of Civil Rights Act. IPC body crimes are the sum of murder, rape, kidnapping and physical assault. IPC non-body crimes are the sum of dacoity, robbery, arson and other IPC crimes. Mean and standard deviation for crime incidence have been rounded off to whole numbers. Crime rate against SCSTs computed per 100,000 SCST population. General IPC crime is total IPC crimes less IPC crimes against SCSTs (proxy for crimes against non-SCSTs). General IPC crime rate is calculated per 100,000 non-SCST population. Young males refer to males in the 15–24 age groups. MPCE refers to real monthly per capita expenditure. S. Sharma / Journal of Comparative Economics 43 (2015) 204–226 209 where the dependent variable ydt is the logarithm of the SCST crime rate per 100,000 SCSTs in district d in time period t and b2; b3; b4 are the coefficients on logarithm of expenditure terms for each of the three broad social groups: SCSTs, Other Backward Classes (OBCs) and upper castes (UCs) respectively. Since we have group-wise expenditures, we do not control for overall expenditure. The other control variables, district fixed effects and time dummy are included the same way as in Eq. (1). 4. Analysis 4.1. Summary statistics Table 1 contains the summary statistics for each of the two periods separately as well as for the full data. Of the average 430 total crimes against SCSTs per district, approximately 288 are IPC crimes and 142 are SLL crimes. We define SCST total crime rate as the number of total crimes against SCSTs per 100,000 SCST population. IPC crime rate and SLL crime rate are similarly defined. The SCST total crime rate is 100 while the SCST IPC crime rate is 67 and SCST SLL crime rate is 33. Among the IPC crimes, the body crime rate is 23 and non-body crime rate is 43. On average, crime rates against SCSTs registered a decline between the two periods. The average district MPCE is Rs. 535. The SCST average MPCE is Rs. 433, while it is Rs. 679 and Rs. 523 for the upper castes and OBCs respectively. Between the two periods, all social groups witnessed an increase in expenditures: SCST expenditures increased 19.6 percent, whereas expenditure of upper castes and OBCs grew 36.4 percent and 27.5 percent respectively, indi- cating that the rate of increase was slowest for the SCST groups. Therefore, this translates into a decline in the ratio of SCST expenditure to upper castes’ expenditure over the two periods from 71 percent to 64 percent. SCSTs account for 29 percent of the district population and 79 percent of the population is in rural areas. The underem- ployment rate is around 16 percent. Males in the 15–24 age groups make up 9 percent of the population. 46 percent of the Table 2 Effect of relative economic status on crimes against SCSTs. Col. 1 Col. 2 Col. 3 Total crime rate IPC crime rate SLL crime rate Ln (SCST exp/UC exp) 0.304⁄⁄ 0.355⁄⁄ 0.298 (0.118) (0.149) (0.294) Ln (expenditure) �0.008 �0.378 0.413 (0.283) (0.389) (0.591) % SCST population �0.087⁄⁄⁄ �0.1⁄⁄⁄ �0.08⁄⁄⁄ (0.0096) (0.011) (0.022) % SCST population squared 0.0007⁄⁄⁄ 0.0009⁄⁄⁄ 0.0006⁄⁄ (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0003) % Rural population 0.005 0.0004 0.005 (0.0041) (0.0053) (0.0098) Gini 1.050 2.656⁄⁄ �0.378 (1.009) (1.239) (1.942) Underemployment rate 0.003 0.003 0.011 (0.0043) (0.0058) (0.0089) % Young males �0.014 0.022 �0.031 (0.0163) (0.0241) (0.0343) % Illiterate �0.01 �0.001 �0.019 (0.0096) (0.0131) (0.0217) % Primary education 0.008 0.007 0.005 (0.0129) (0.0165) (0.024) % Secondary education �0.0021 �0.0083 0.001 (0.0132) (0.0177) (0.0272) Effective number of parties 0.0344 0.134 �0.386⁄⁄ (0.0716) (0.0977) (0.162) Number of districts 828 828 828 F 16.45 9.96 4.53 R2 0.342 0.221 0.126 Note: Standard errors clustered at the district level are reported in parentheses. All regressions include district fixed effects, time dummy and a constant term. All dependent variables are in logarithm terms. Crime rate is number of crimes per 100,000 SCST population. IPC crimes are the sum of murder, rape, kidnap, hurt, dacoity, robbery, arson and other IPC crimes. SLL crimes are the sum of crimes registered under the Prevention of Atrocities Act and the Protection of Civil Rights Act. For education dummy variables, ‘higher secondary and above’ is the omitted category. ⁄ Significant at 10%. ⁄⁄ Significant at 5%. ⁄⁄⁄ Significant at 1%. 210 S. Sharma / Journal of Comparative Economics 43 (2015) 204–226 population is illiterate, 20 percent have completed primary education, 24 percent have completed secondary education and only 10 percent has completed higher secondary and higher levels of education. The state-level effective number of parties is around 4.6. 4.2. Regression results Table 2 presents the main results. In column 1, the dependent variable is the total crime rate against SCSTs. The coefficient of the expenditure ratio is positive and significant, as expected. Since crime rates and expenditure ratios show a downward trend between the two periods, a coefficient of 0.304 indicates that a 10 percent decrease in the expenditure ratio or wid- ening of the gap between lower and upper castes is associated with about a 3 percent decrease in total crime rate. Share of SCSTs in the district population and its quadratic term are negative and positive respectively, suggesting that an increase in the share of SCSTs is associated with a decrease in victimization and the decrease is slower as the share of SCSTs increases. Coefficients on the share of SCST variables imply a decrease of 6.3 percent in total crime rate for a 10 percent increase in share of SCSTs. Across all regressions, we obtain a convex relationship between crime rates and the share of SCSTs. This is in line with Krueger and Pischke (1997) who find that while the percentage of foreigners has no effect on anti-foreigner crimes in western Germany, in eastern Germany, foreigner victimization rate falls as their relative number increases. In fact, in all regressions that follow, the share of SCSTs is a consistently robust determinant of crimes and often has higher economic significance or magnitude than the expenditure variables. We now disaggregate the total crimes into IPC crimes and SLL crimes with the former being the largely violent crimes and the latter representing the non-violent caste-based crimes. In column 2 of Table 2, the dependent variable is the IPC crime rate against SCSTs. We use the same explanatory variables as in column 1. Results are qualitatively similar to column 1. A 10 percent decrease in the expenditure ratio is associated with a 3.5 percent decrease in IPC crimes – largely violent Table 3 Effect of group-wise expenditures on total, IPC and SLL crime rates. Col. 1 Col. 2 Col. 3 Total crime rate IPC crime rate SLL crime rate Ln (SCST expenditure) 0.138 �0.134 0.496 (0.191) (0.309) (0.474) Ln (UC expenditure) �0.341⁄⁄ �0.563⁄⁄⁄ �0.158 (0.143) (0.185) (0.341) Ln (OBC expenditure) �0.0393 0.112 �0.107 (0.196) (0.319) (0.454) % SCST population �0.091⁄⁄⁄ �0.097⁄⁄⁄ �0.091⁄⁄⁄ (0.009) (0.0109) (0.0251) % SCST population squared 0.0008⁄⁄⁄ 0.0009⁄⁄⁄ 0.0008⁄⁄ (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0003) % Rural population 0.0052 �0.0004 0.006 (0.0041) (0.0053) (0.0102) Gini 0.978 2.652⁄⁄ �0.393 (0.936) (1.142) (1.898) Underemployment rate 0.0009 0.002 0.0109 (0.0043) (0.0057) (0.0095) % Young males �0.0163 0.0269 �0.0448 (0.0158) (0.0253) (0.0349) % Illiterate �0.0077 0.0031 �0.0195 (0.0098) (0.0131) (0.0211) % Primary education 0.0092 0.0093 0.0045 (0.0133) (0.0164) (0.0239) % Secondary education 0.0045 0.0028 0.0043 (0.0128) (0.0166) (0.0276) Effective number of parties 0.0428 0.151 �0.396⁄⁄ (0.0707) (0.0975) (0.164) Number of districts 818 818 818 F 15.81 9.54 4.25 R2 0.345 0.218 0.127 Note: Standard errors clustered at the district level are reported in parentheses. All regressions include district fixed effects, time dummy and a constant term. All dependent variables are in logarithm terms. Crime rate is number of crimes per 100,000 SCST population. IPC crimes are the sum of murder, rape, kidnap, hurt, dacoity, robbery, arson and other IPC crimes. SLL crimes are the sum of crimes registered under the Prevention of Atrocities Act and the Protection of Civil Rights Act. For education dummy variables, ‘higher secondary and above’ is the omitted category. ⁄ Significant at 10%. ⁄⁄ Significant at 5%. ⁄⁄⁄ Significant at 1%. S. Sharma / Journal of Comparative Economics 43 (2015) 204–226 211 crimes – committed by the upper castes against the SCST groups. Overall higher inequality in the district, as measured by the Gini, is positively associated with IPC crime rates. This result is in accordance with other literature that finds inequality to be significant determinant of violent crimes in society (e.g., Kelly, 2000; Fajnzylber et al., 2002). In column 3 of Table 2, the dependent variable is the SLL crime rate against SCSTs. In this regression, the expenditure ratio coefficient is insignificant thereby indicating that the relative economic position of SCSTs vis-à-vis the upper castes is not associated with the SLL crime rate. The coefficient on the effective number of parties which was insignificant in columns 1 and 2, is now negative and sig- nificant implying that as the number of parties competing in the state increases, SLL crimes against SCSTs register a decline. To understand how group-wise economic progress is related to the incidence of caste violence, in Table 3, instead of using expenditure ratio, we enter the logarithm of group-wise expenditures: expenditure of SCSTs, expenditure of OBCs and the expenditure of upper castes. In column 1, the dependent variable is the SCST total crime rate. While OBC expenditure and SCST expenditure have no significant association with crime rate, the upper castes’ expenditure coefficient is negative and significant implying that a 10 percent increase in their expenditure is associated with a 3.4 percent decrease in crime rates.18 As we show later as a robustness check in Section 5, upper castes’ expenditure has no influence on the incidence of non caste-based general crimes implying that it is the lower castes that are differentially targeted with changes in the economic position of upper castes. Moreover, as our data indicate, the average expenditure increased most rapidly for the upper castes and slowest for the SCST groups, thereby increasing the gap between the two groups and diminishing the perceived threat asso- ciated with the economic position of the subordinate group relative to the dominant group. 18 The reason for 10 fewer observations in Table 3 as compared to Table 2 is that in five districts in each period, there was no household belonging to OBC category and therefore, these districts get dropped in the group-wise expenditure specification. 212 S. Sharma / Journal of Comparative Economics 43 (2015) 204–226 In column 2, the dependent variable is the SCST IPC crime rate. Again, while SCST and OBC expenditure is insignificant, a 10 percent increase in upper castes’ expenditure is associated with a 5.6 percent decrease in IPC crime rates. In column 3, the dependent variable is the SCST SLL crime rate. All the group-wise expenditure terms are insignificant. The coefficient on the effective number of parties is negative and significant. As in Table 2, the Gini coefficient is positively associated with IPC crime rate but uncorrelated with SLL crime rate. Results from Tables 2 and 3 jointly show that firstly, while the expenditure ratio is an important determinant of caste- based crimes, it is the perpetrator characteristics and not the victim characteristics driving the results. Secondly, while vio- lent IPC crimes are correlated with the changes in the economic status of groups, non-violent SLL crimes are not. This seems to be consistent with anthropological accounts from field surveys that indicate increases in violent acts by upper castes whenever lower castes try to assert their rights that may be perceived as challenging existing caste hierarchies. Also, low castes are often made scapegoats and instant violent punishment is meted out to them as revenge in the event of upper castes feeling insecure of their own dominant economic or social position.19 On the other hand, non-violent SLL crimes that seek to insult and humiliate victims on account of their lower social status occur on a more routine basis as a result of preju- diced long term social attitudes, for instance beliefs about hierarchy or the ‘‘right’’ order of the world, place of the Dalits in the social hierarchy and therefore, they might not be as closely related to changes in economic status. This also relates to the idea of ‘‘stigmatized ethnic identity’’, discussed in Section 2.1, which implies that economic mobility of Dalits is not always correlated with their social mobility, such that even middle class or rich Dalits continue to be vulnerable to discrimination and routine humiliation. In Table 4, we decompose the IPC crimes into two mutually exclusive categories: crimes against body and non-body crimes. Body crimes are the sum of murder, rape, kidnapping and physical assault/hurt. Non-body crimes are the sum of dacoity, robbery, arson and other classified IPC crimes and comprised of largely property crimes. In columns 1 and 2, where the dependent variable is the SCST body crime rate, we report results of the expenditure ratio specification and the group- wise expenditure specification respectively. Neither expenditure ratio nor the upper castes’ expenditure is associated with the incidence of body crimes. In columns 3 and 4, the dependent variable is the SCST non-body crime rate. Column 3 indi- cates a positive association between the expenditure ratio and non-body crimes. In column 4, upper castes’ expenditure is negatively associated with non-body victimization. The coefficient on the Gini is positive and significant for the non-body crimes but not for the body crimes. These results suggest that it is the non-body crimes component of the IPC crimes against SCSTs that is responsive to changes in the expenditure ratio and upper castes’ expenditure. This indicates that IPC crimes against SCSTs occur as crimes with the objective of expropriating or wresting economic surplus from the victims rather than inflicting physical bodily harm. In fact, this observation is supported by evidence on the ground, wherein Dalits are often deprived of their property or markers of material wealth by way of their houses being set on fire or damaged, looting of cash or valuables and forced evictions if caste hierarchies are threatened (e.g., Senthalir, 2012; Katulkar, 2013). An assumption that is tenable and crucial to this study and especially for our finding of non-body, property crimes being sensitive to changes in economic positions is that the perpetrators can observe the changes in material standard of living of victims. Studies show that the lower castes have made significant strides in terms of consumption expenditure and asset accumulation and specifically, in their expenditures on items of conspicuous consumption. For instance, Prasad et al. (2010) through a recall survey of Dalit households, document substantial changes over two decades in their ownership of consumer durables such as cellphones, scooters, televisions, in grooming practices, eating habits, and expenditure on social occasions such as weddings. All this signals social status and a pattern of status upgrading which are easily observable.20 5. Robustness checks and other concerns This section discusses robustness checks and considers questions and concerns that might follow from the results and addresses how we mitigate these concerns. The first robustness test is to check the sensitivity of our results to alternative methods of measuring standard of living. In order to do this, we use the underemployment rate instead of the per capita expenditure. This is similar to D’Alessio et al. (2002) and Jacobs and Wood (1999) who use the ratio of unemployment rate of blacks and whites to measure economic competition between racial groups. In panel (A) of Table 5, we regress the crime rates per 100,000 SCSTs on the ratio of underemployment rate of SCSTs to that of upper castes. Results show that the ratio of underemployment rates has a negative and significant coefficient, indicating that a decrease in the ratio or intensifying of economic competition between castes is associated with an increase in violence. Further, in panel (B) of Table 5, we use group-wise underemployment rates of SCSTs, OBCs and upper castes. We see that it is only the upper caste underemployment rate that is significant and positive, suggest- ing that an increase in the underemployment rate of the upper castes is associated with them committing more crimes against SCSTs. Moreover, mirroring our results using expenditure specifications, we find underemployment variables to be significant only for total, IPC and non-body crimes and not for SLL or body crimes. 19 ‘‘When Dalits from the Dalit colony of Veludavur village in Villapuram district, Tamil Nadu, demanded their right to participate in a government auction of common properties in Veludavur, members of seven neighboring caste Hindu villages attacked their colony, destroying 400 huts, attacking women, children, and the elderly, and displacing 700 Dalit families.’’ Center for Human Rights and Global Justice and Human Rights Watch (2007, p. 60). 20 When Dalits do acquire land, the right of access to land is routinely infringed and their land is often illegally encroached upon by upper castes (Human Rights Watch, 1999). Table 4 Body crimes and non-body crimes. Col. 1 Col. 2 Col. 3 Col. 4 Body crime rate Body crime rate Non-body crime rate Non-body crime rate Ln (SCST exp/UC exp) 0.0559 0.417⁄⁄ (0.154) (0.186) % SCST population �0.0897⁄⁄⁄ �0.0929⁄⁄⁄ �0.100⁄⁄⁄ �0.0985⁄⁄⁄ (0.0113) (0.0105) (0.0127) (0.0146) % SCST population squared 0.0007⁄⁄⁄ 0.0008⁄⁄⁄ 0.0009⁄⁄⁄ 0.0009⁄⁄⁄ (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) Gini 0.362 0.417 4.086⁄⁄⁄ 4.039⁄⁄⁄ (1.122) (1.048) (1.439) (1.356) Ln (SCST expenditure) �0.259 �0.225 (0.292) (0.365) Ln (UC expenditure) �0.182 �0.691⁄⁄⁄ (0.190) (0.221) Ln (OBC expenditure) 0.193 0.308 (0.297) (0.361) N umber of districts 828 818 828 818 F 10.34 9.41 7.74 8.09 R2 0.211 0.202 0.180 0.180 Note: Standard errors clustered at the district level are reported in parentheses. All dependent variables are in logarithm terms. Crime rate is crimes per 100,000 SCST population. Body crimes are the sum of murder, rape, kidnapping and physical assault. Non-body crimes are the sum of dacoity, robbery, arson and other IPC crimes. Controls included (but not shown) are percent rural, percentage of young males, education dummies, log of expenditure, underemployment rate and effective number of parties. All regressions include district fixed effects, time dummy and constant term. ⁄ Significant at 10%. ⁄⁄ Significant at 5%. ⁄⁄⁄ Significant at 1%. Table 5 Underemployment rate as an alternative explanatory variable. Total crime rate IPC crime rate SLL crime rate Body crime rate Non-body crime rate Panel A. Relative underemployment specification (SCST underemp/UC underemp) �0.019⁄⁄⁄ �0.035⁄⁄⁄ �0.015 �0.021 �0.027⁄⁄⁄ (0.006) (0.010) (0.013) (0.014) (0.010) Underemployment rate 0.001 0.002 0.010 �0.000 �0.001 (0.004) (0.006) (0.009) (0.006) (0.007) Observations 827 827 827 827 827 R2 0.345 0.235 0.126 0.231 0.184 Panel B. Group-wise underemployment specification SCST underemployment �0.001 0.000 �0.009 �0.001 0.001 (0.004) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) OBC underemployment �0.010 �0.009 0.014 �0.006 �0.013 (0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.007) (0.008) UC underemployment 0.012⁄⁄⁄ 0.011⁄⁄ 0.009 0.008 0.011⁄ (0.004) (0.005) (0.009) (0.005) (0.006) Observations 822 822 822 822 822 R2 0.359 0.217 0.134 0.207 0.177 Note: Standard errors clustered at the district level are reported in parentheses. Controls included (but not shown) are SCST%, SCST% squared, percent rural, percentage of young males, education dummies, log of expenditure, Gini and effective number of parties. All regressions include district fixed effects, time dummy and constant term. ⁄ Significant at 10%. ⁄⁄ Significant at 5%. ⁄⁄⁄ Significant at 1%. S. Sharma / Journal of Comparative Economics 43 (2015) 204–226 213 The second test examines the robustness of our results to changes in particular variable definitions. As can be seen in Table 6, we re-estimate the regressions using alternative variable definitions as follows: (i) measuring the dependent vari- able as crimes per 100,000 total population instead of 100,000 SC/ST population (panel A); (ii) using district-level real per capita net domestic product instead of district-level per capita expenditure as a measure of level of development of district Table 6 Robustness checks using alternative variable definitions. Total crime rate Total crime rate IPC crime rate IPC crime rate SLL crime rate SLL crime rate Panel A. Measuring crime rate per 100,000 total population Ln (SCST exp/UC exp) 0.311⁄⁄⁄ 0.362⁄⁄ 0.305 (0.117) (0.149) (0.290) Ln (SCST expenditure) 0.136 �0.113 0.44 (0.179) (0.304) (0.468) Ln (UC expenditure) �0.285⁄ �0.511⁄⁄⁄ �0.0924 (0.154) (0.187) (0.342) Ln (OBC expenditure) �0.0745 0.076 �0.141 (0.18) (0.306) (0.453) Number of districts 828 818 828 818 828 818 R2 0.07 0.218 0.029 0.082 0.059 0.124 Panel B. Using district per capita net domestic product Ln (SCST exp/UC exp) 0.315⁄⁄⁄ 0.362⁄⁄ 0.292 (0.122) (0.153) (0.308) Ln (SCST expenditure) 0.079 �0.177 0.259 (0.213) (0.327) (0.497) Ln (UC expenditure) �0.359⁄⁄ �0.579⁄⁄⁄ �0.219 (0.148) ((0.189) (0.354) Ln (OBC expenditure) �0.053 0.089 �0.13 (0.198) (0.324) (0.458) Number of districts 793 783 793 783 793 783 R2 0.356 0.367 0.226 0.227 0.149 0.149 Panel C. Using unemployment rate Ln (SCST exp/UC exp) 0.293⁄⁄ 0.348⁄⁄ 0.277 (0.117) (0.150) (0.292) Ln (SCST expenditure) 0.0110 �0.212 0.350 (0.184) (0.311) (0.473) Ln (UC expenditure) �0.323⁄⁄ �0.543⁄⁄⁄ �0.108 (0.154) (0.186) (0.347) Ln (OBC expenditure) �0.0342 0.107 �0.135 (0.177) (0.303) (0.458) Number of districts 828 818 828 818 828 818 R2 0.349 0.444 0.221 0.254 0.125 0.180 Panel D. Using Theil Index Ln (SCST exp/UC exp) 0.259⁄⁄ 0.331⁄⁄ 0.244 (0.113) (0.151) (0.288) Ln (SCST expenditure) �0.00311 �0.247 0.301 (0.180) (0.299) (0.467) Ln (UC expenditure) �0.263⁄ �0.514⁄⁄⁄ �0.0561 (0.145) (0.193) (0.336) Ln (OBC expenditure) �0.0183 0.133 �0.0873 (0.175) (0.296) (0.458) Number of districts 828 818 828 818 828 818 R2 0.34 0.44 0.222 0.254 0.127 0.186 Panel E. Using Seat Share for Effective # of Parties Ln (SCST exp/UC exp) 0.301⁄⁄⁄ 0.360⁄⁄ 0.257 (0.115) (0.150) (0.292) Ln (SCST expenditure) 0.0974 �0.138 0.402 (0.175) (0.292) (0.478) Ln (UC expenditure) �0.302⁄ �0.534⁄⁄⁄ �0.06 (0.154) (0.186) (0.345) Ln (OBC expenditure) �0.0273 0.141 �0.176 (0.176) (0.294) (0.462) Number of districts 828 818 828 818 828 818 R2 0.361 0.455 0.237 0.262 0.123 0.185 Note: Standard errors clustered at the district level are reported in parentheses. All dependent variables are in logarithm terms. All regressions include controls as in previous regressions and district fixed effects, time dummy and constant term. ⁄ Significant at 10%. ⁄⁄ Significant at 5%. ⁄⁄⁄ Significant at 1%. 214 S. Sharma / Journal of Comparative Economics 43 (2015) 204–226 Table 7 Alternative specification of dependent variable. Total crimes IPC crimes SLL crimes Body crimes Non-body crimes Panel A. Relative expenditure specification Ln(SCST exp/UC exp) 0.298⁄⁄ 0.351⁄⁄ 0.285 0.051 0.413⁄⁄ (0.118) (0.151) (0.288) (0.154) (0.188) Ln(expenditure) 0.071 �0.305 0.508 0.030 �0.264 (0.268) (0.381) (0.588) (0.328) (0.427) Observations 828 828 828 828 828 Panel B. Group-wise expenditure specification Ln(SCST expenditure) 0.242 �0.030 0.598 �0.154 �0.121 (0.181) (0.305) (0.473) (0.281) (0.363) Ln(UC expenditure) �0.295⁄⁄ �0.519⁄⁄⁄ �0.107 �0.138 �0.646⁄⁄⁄ (0.148) (0.188) (0.334) (0.189) (0.225) Ln(OBC expenditure) �0.072 0.078 �0.137 0.159 0.275 (0.190) (0.313) (0.456) (0.288) (0.354) Observations 818 818 818 818 818 Note: Dependent variable is ln (1 + number of crimes). Standard errors clustered at the district level are reported in parentheses. Controls included (but not shown) are SCST%, SCST% squared, percent rural, percentage of young males, education dummies, underemployment rate, Gini and effective number of parties. Log of population is used as scaling variable on right hand side. All regressions include district fixed effects, time dummy and constant term. * Significant at 10%. ** Significant at 5%. *** Significant at 1%. S. Sharma / Journal of Comparative Economics 43 (2015) 204–226 215 (panel B)21; (iii) using the unemployment rate instead of the underemployment rate (panel C); (iv) using the Theil Index instead of Gini as an inequality measure (panel D)22; (v) using seat share instead of vote share to calculate the effective number of par- ties (panel E). Our results are robust to using these alternative measures of variables. As a third robustness check, instead of using the log of the crime rate per 100,000 SCSTs as the dependent variable, we use the natural log of the number of crimes and estimate the model using linear fixed effects regressions. In order to avoid losing observations where the number of crimes are zero, we add a small value of 1 to the number of crimes. We control for log of total population on the right hand side in addition to the other control variables. In Table 7 (panels A and B), we report results using the relative expenditure and group-wise expenditure specifications respectively for total crimes, IPC crimes, SLL crimes, body crimes and non-body crimes. Results using these specifications are in line with those from Tables 2 and 3. A fourth test involves iteratively running the entire set of regressions by dropping one state at a time, to rule out the con- cern that results could be driven by particular high crime states such as Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh or Uttar Pradesh, such that excluding observations from those states might alter our results. Results using the SCST total crime rate as dependent variable reported in Tables 8 and 9 for the relative expenditure and group-wise expenditure specifications respectively indi- cate that our results are robust to such exclusions. The bottom panels of both tables show that our results hold even when we drop the high crime states of Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh simultaneously. A fifth concern is that the crimes against SCSTs could be a part of the overall trend of crimes in the district. If the relative economic status of caste groups is also correlated with general non-caste related crimes in the district, then we cannot con- clude that it is only crimes against SCSTs that are uniquely linked to relative group economic positions. In order to check for this, in Table 10, we present results of linear fixed effects regressions where the dependent variable is logarithm of ‘general IPC crime rate’. The general IPC crime rate is calculated as total IPC crimes in the district less IPC crimes against SCSTs per 100,000 non-SCST population.23 If the coefficients on our expenditure variables turn out to be insignificant, we can rule out this concern. In column 1, the coefficient of the expenditure ratio is insignificant, as are the group-wise expenditures in column 2, which stress the fact that differences in material standard of living between caste groups uniquely affect crimes against SCST groups and are not associated with general IPC crimes in society. Note that a measure analogous to the general IPC crime rate cannot be constructed for SLL crimes since the types of SLL crimes related to SCSTs (Protection of Civil Rights Act and Prevention of Atrocities Act) do not find parallels with SLL crimes affecting the broader population.24 Therefore, a ‘general SLL crime rate’ would not be meaningful. However, we can construct measures of ‘general body crime rate’ and ‘general non-body crime rate’ along the lines of general IPC crime rate. Results for the general body crime rate in column 4 indicate that the upper caste expen- diture is negatively correlated with the incidence of body crimes affecting the general population. It should be recalled that 21 This includes all states with the exception of Gujarat for which we were unable to obtain data. 22 The formula for Theil Index is T ¼ Rp ð1=nÞ � ðyp=lyÞ � lnðyp=lyÞ n o where n is the number of individuals in the population, yp is the income of person p and ly is the average income of the population. 23 Since the NCRB does not have information on crimes against non-SCSTs, this is a proxy variable that attempts to capture the same idea. It should be noted that while this is the closest approximation of general crimes (i.e. those not targeted at SCSTs) given the available data, it is inclusive of crimes where both victims and perpetrators are SCSTs. 24 For instance, some of the SLL crimes with respect to the general population are: Excise Act, Dowry Prohibition Act, Arms Act, Prohibition Act, etc. Table 8 Excluding states one at a time: relative expenditure specification. Excl. Andhra Pr. Excl. Bihar Excl. Chhattisgarh Ln (SCST exp/UC exp) 0.304⁄⁄ 0.287⁄⁄ 0.323⁄⁄⁄ (0.120) (0.113) (0.119) Number of districts 782 760 814 R2 0.341 0.361 0.346 Excl. Gujarat Excl. Haryana Excl. Himachal Pr. Ln (SCST exp/UC exp) 0.326⁄⁄⁄ 0.309⁄⁄ 0.303⁄⁄ (0.121) (0.121) (0.119) Number of districts 793 796 806 R2 0.354 0.329 0.346 Excl. Jharkhand Excl. Karnataka Excl. Kerala Ln (SCST exp/UC exp) 0.289⁄⁄ 0.292⁄⁄ 0.309⁄⁄ (0.115) (0.122) (0.120) Number of districts 792 788 800 R2 0.336 0.338 0.339 Excl. Madhya Pr. Excl. Maharashtra Excl. Orissa Ln (SCST exp/UC exp) 0.288⁄⁄ 0.301⁄⁄ 0.314⁄⁄ (0.130) (0.128) (0.122) Number of districts 752 768 768 R2 0.359 0.329 0.378 Excl. Punjab Excl. Rajasthan Excl. Tamil Nadu Ln (SCST exp/UC exp) 0.299⁄⁄ 0.329⁄⁄⁄ 0.354⁄⁄ (0.119) (0.124) (0.138) Number of districts 800 768 783 R2 0.347 0.340 0.356 Excl. Uttar Pr. Excl. Uttarkhand Excl. West Bengal Ln (SCST exp/UC exp) 0.347⁄⁄ 0.246⁄⁄ 0.265⁄⁄ (0.135) (0.115) (0.117) Number of districts 704 808 794 R2 0.293 0.354 0.353 Excl. UP, MP and Rajasthan Ln (SCST exp/UC exp) 0.326⁄⁄ (0.162) Number of districts 568 R2 0.32 Note: Standard errors clustered at the district level are reported in parentheses. Crime rate is crimes per 100,000 SCST population. All dependent variables are in logarithm terms. Controls included (but not shown) are SCST%, SCST% squared, percent rural, percentage of young males, education dummies, log of expenditure, underemployment rate, Gini and effective number of parties. All regressions include district fixed effects, time dummy and constant term. ⁄ Significant at 10%. ⁄⁄ Significant at 5%. ⁄⁄⁄ Significant at 1%. 216 S. Sharma / Journal of Comparative Economics 43 (2015) 204–226 none of the expenditure variables in Table 4 were significant in determining SCST body crime rates. In columns 5 and 6, we do not find the coefficients of the expenditure ratio and group-wise expenditures to be significant in explaining general non-body crime rates. These results indicate that factors driving body and non-body crimes against SCSTs indeed differ from those against the broader population. For the sixth robustness check, we resort to using a different estimation methodology and model the number of crimes against SCSTs as count data and employ a negative binomial regression model. In panel (A) of Table 11, the 5 columns list results using the relative expenditure specification for number of total crimes, IPC crimes, SLL crimes, body crimes and non- body crimes against SCSTs. In panel (B) of Table 11, the same five outcome variables are regressed on the group-wise expen- diture specification. In all these regressions, we add the logarithm of the SCST population on the right hand side. Since the relative expenditure and group-wise expenditures are in log form, the coefficients can be interpreted as elasticities. As is evi- dent from Table 11, our results are robust to alterations in the estimation methodology. Seventh, while the relationship between hate crimes and non-hate motivated crimes has not been clearly established in the literature, one might argue that areas with higher levels of general crimes are more susceptible to the occurrence of caste-based crimes on account of poorer law enforcement machinery, among other things. It should be noted that the district fixed effects are possibly accounting for a general culture of violence or criminality in the district. However, the general crime rate is surely not time-invariant and is something that varies across the period. To that end, we include the ‘general IPC crime rate’ in the regression equation. Results from panels (A) and (B) of Table 12 indicate that our main results for total, IPC and SLL crimes are robust to controlling for the general IPC crime rate. Moreover, we find that the coefficient on general Table 9 Excluding states one at a time: group-wise expenditure specification. Excl. Andhra Pr. Excl. Bihar Excl. Chhattisgarh Ln (SCST expenditure) 0.095 0.068 0.163 (0.196) (0.183) (0.192) Ln (UC expenditure) �0.358⁄⁄ �0.346⁄⁄ �0.358⁄⁄ (0.145) (0.138) (0.144) Ln (OBC expenditure) �0.027 �0.012 �0.066 (0.203) (0.193) (0.197) Observations 772 750 804 R2 0.345 0.360 0.349 Excl. Gujarat Excl. Haryana Excl. Himachal Pr. Ln(SCST expenditure) 0.175 0.148 0.124 (0.197) (0.191) (0.196) Ln(UC expenditure) �0.354⁄⁄ �0.336⁄⁄ �0.345⁄⁄ (0.146) (0.145) (0.143) Ln(OBC expenditure) �0.072 �0.013 �0.008 (0.199) (0.200) (0.212) Observations 783 786 800 R2 0.357 0.333 0.342 Excl. Jharkhand Excl. Karnataka Excl. Kerala Ln(SCST expenditure) 0.157 0.197 0.154 (0.194) (0.197) (0.197) Ln(UC expenditure) �0.309⁄⁄ �0.296⁄⁄ �0.338⁄⁄ (0.135) (0.147) (0.146) Ln(OBC expenditure) �0.051 �0.024 �0.033 (0.190) (0.204) (0.200) Observations 782 778 790 R2 0.340 0.340 0.343 Excl. Madhya Pr. Excl. Maharashtra Excl. Orissa Ln(SCST expenditure) 0.035 0.097 0.196 (0.195) (0.205) (0.195) Ln(UC expenditure) �0.336⁄⁄ �0.346⁄⁄ �0.330⁄⁄ (0.156) (0.158) (0.154) Ln(OBC expenditure) �0.075 �0.064 �0.027 (0.201) (0.201) (0.211) Observations 742 758 758 R2 0.370 0.333 0.384 Excl. Punjab Excl. Rajasthan Excl. Tamil Nadu Ln(SCST expenditure) 0.105 0.119 0.196 (0.192) (0.203) (0.195) Ln(UC expenditure) �0.349⁄⁄ �0.385⁄⁄ �0.397⁄⁄ (0.144) (0.151) (0.173) Ln(OBC expenditure) �0.039 �0.055 �0.013 (0.208) (0.209) (0.199) Observations 790 758 773 R2 0.350 0.345 0.359 Excl. Uttar Pr. Excl. Uttarkhand Excl. West Bengal Ln(SCST expenditure) 0.252 0.152 0.013 (0.226) (0.192) (0.193) Ln(UC expenditure) �0.337⁄⁄ �0.308⁄⁄ �0.326⁄⁄ (0.162) (0.142) (0.141) Ln(OBC expenditure) �0.095 �0.037 0.011 (0.209) (0.196) (0.203) Observations 694 804 784 R2 0.294 0.359 0.358 (continued on next page) S. Sharma / Journal of Comparative Economics 43 (2015) 204–226 217 Table 9 (continued) Excl. UP, MP and Rajasthan Ln (SCST exp) �0.016 (0.253) Ln (UC exp) �0.358⁄ (0.188) Ln (OBC exp) �0.176 (0.234) Number of districts 558 R2 0.343 Note: Standard errors clustered at the district level are reported in parentheses. Crime rate is crimes per 100,000 SCST population. All dependent variables are in logarithm terms. Controls included (but not shown) are SCST%, SCST% squared, percent rural, percentage of young males, education dummies, underemployment rate, Gini, and effective number of parties. All regressions include district fixed effects, time dummy and constant term. ⁄ Significant at 10%. ⁄⁄ Significant at 5%. ⁄⁄⁄ Significant at 1%. Table 10 Falsification tests using general crime rates. General IPC crime rate General body crime rate General non-body crime rate Col.1 Col.2 Col.3 Col.4 Col.5 Col.6 Ln(SCST exp/UC exp) 0.060 0.142 �0.002 (0.053) (0.087) (0.059) Ln(SCST expenditure) 0.110 0.104 0.058 (0.093) (0.203) (0.096) Ln(UC expenditure) �0.019 �0.228⁄⁄ 0.047 (0.060) (0.111) (0.071) Ln(OBC expenditure) �0.003 �0.212 �0.025 (0.099) (0.181) (0.111) Observations 828 818 828 818 828 818 R2 0.394 0.373 0.288 0.261 0.319 0.297 Note: Standard errors clustered at the district level are reported in parentheses. Crime rate is calculated per 100,000 non-SCST population. All dependent variables are in logarithm terms. Controls included (but not shown) are percent rural, percentage of young males, education dummies, log of expenditure, underemployment rate, Gini and effective number of parties. All regressions include district fixed effects, time dummy and constant term. ⁄ Significant at 10%. ⁄⁄ Significant at 5%. ⁄⁄⁄ Significant at 1%. 218 S. Sharma / Journal of Comparative Economics 43 (2015) 204–226 crime rate is positive and significant suggesting that districts with higher levels of general crimes do in fact experience greater victimization of the SC/ST community. Endogeneity is another potential concern. Targeted crimes of a violent nature against the SCST community could be a debilitating force leading to reduced earnings and expenditures, which would make them further worse-off compared to the upper castes. This reverse causality concern could be potentially mitigated by the fact that we are using crimes data beginning one year after the expenditure. However, the crime data may be serially correlated such that crimes in the present period are correlated with crimes in the immediate past and future periods. While a dynamic panel model can be used with lagged values of crimes and expenditures as internal instrumental variables (IV) to address this concern, unfortunately, dis- trict-level crimes data is available only from 2001, which is the first year of the study period. Further, given available data and the nature of the problem at hand, it is difficult to find a credible external IV or an exogenous policy change that cor- relates with changes in expenditures, but does not affect caste-based crimes. Omitted variable bias could also exist but that should be controlled to some extent by our use of district fixed effects. We acknowledge that given the potential endogeneity concern, our results should not be interpreted in a causal manner. Another possible concern could be out-migration of SCs and STs on account of such targeted violence from their districts to other lower crime districts.25 If this were the case, our coefficients would be underestimated. While, we cannot control for this possibility in our regression analysis since the NSS data do not allow us to identify migration, we cite findings from other 25 Tolnay and Beck (1992) find that southern counties in USA that witnessed high levels of mob violence against blacks during 1910–1930 experienced greater black out-migration as compared to other counties. Table 11 Alternative estimation methodology. Total crimes IPC crimes SLL crimes Body crimes Non-body crimes Panel A. Negative binomial regressions using relative expenditure specification Ln(SCST exp/UC exp) 0.263⁄⁄ 0.286⁄⁄ 0.196 0.104 0.349⁄⁄ (0.104) (0.137) (0.188) (0.133) (0.165) Ln(expenditure) 0.302 0.038 0.304 0.192 0.269 (0.188) (0.239) (0.292) (0.250) (0.263) Observations 824 820 810 806 810 Panel B. Negative binomial regressions using group-wise expenditure specification Ln(SCST expenditure) 0.212 �0.049 0.497 0.033 0.043 (0.164) (0.214) (0.290) (0.222) (0.245) Ln(UC expenditure) �0.265⁄⁄ �0.441⁄⁄⁄ 0.023 �0.130 �0.521⁄⁄⁄ (0.122) (0.159) (0.220) (0.154) (0.192) Ln(OBC expenditure) 0.179 0.290 �0.271 0.157 0.391 (0.159) (0.195) (0.311) (0.236) (0.212) Observations 806 802 792 788 792 Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Controls included (but not shown) are SCST%, SCST% squared, percent rural, percentage of young males, education dummies, underemployment rate, Gini and effective number of parties. Log of SCST population is used as scaling variable on right hand side. All regressions include district fixed effects, time dummy and constant term. ⁄ Significant at 10%. ⁄⁄ Significant at 5%. ⁄⁄⁄ Significant at 1%. Table 12 Including a control for general crime rates. Total crime rate IPC crime rate Body crime rate Non-body crime rate Panel A. Relative expenditure specification Ln(SCST exp/UC exp) 0.247⁄⁄ 0.305⁄⁄ 0.013 0.369⁄ (0.122) (0.151) (0.153) (0.188) General IPC crime rate 0.953⁄⁄⁄ 0.836⁄⁄⁄ 0.721⁄⁄⁄ 0.793⁄⁄⁄ (0.123) (0.167) (0.163) (0.190) Observations 828 828 828 828 R2 0.436 0.266 0.248 0.211 Panel B. Group-wise expenditure specification Ln(SCST expenditure) 0.030 �0.219 �0.336 �0.307 (0.184) (0.305) (0.292) (0.362) Ln(UC expenditure) �0.322⁄⁄ �0.548⁄⁄⁄ �0.169 �0.677⁄⁄⁄ (0.153) (0.185) (0.184) (0.222) Ln(OBC expenditure) �0.036 0.114 0.195 0.311 (0.178) (0.301) (0.289) (0.344) General IPC crime rate 0.981⁄⁄⁄ 0.768⁄⁄⁄ 0.706⁄⁄⁄ 0.741⁄⁄⁄ (0.123) (0.173) (0.167) (0.205) Observations 818 818 818 818 R2 0.442 0.255 0.236 0.206 Note: Standard errors clustered at the district level are reported in parentheses. Crime rate is measured per 100,000 SCST population. All dependent variables are in logarithm terms. General IPC crime rate is (log of) total IPC crimes less IPC crimes against SCSTs per 100,000 non-SCST population. Controls included (but not shown) are SCST%, SCST% squared, percent rural, percentage of young males, education dummies, log of expenditure, underemployment rate, Gini and effective number of parties. All regressions include district fixed effects, time dummy and constant term. ⁄ Significant at 10%. ⁄⁄ Significant at 5%. ⁄⁄⁄ Significant at 1%. S. Sharma / Journal of Comparative Economics 43 (2015) 204–226 219 data sources to examine this issue. Bhagat (2009) using 2001 Indian Census data documents that 62 percent of the internal migration in India is in the form of intra-district migration. Inter-district and inter-state migration account for 24 percent and 13 percent respectively of total internal migration. For males and females, employment and marriage respectively are the primary reasons for migration indicating that migration is on account of reasons other than violence. More crucially, since our unit of analysis is the district and the largest stream of migration is intra-district, our results are not likely to be affected. One could also claim that the effects we observe are really those of changes in reporting of crimes rather than changes in actual incidence of crime. We argue that is not the case. Firstly, reporting is expected to a function of victim characteristics 220 S. Sharma / Journal of Comparative Economics 43 (2015) 204–226 but what is explaining the crime rate in our results are not victim but perpetrator characteristics (Table 3). This gives us good reason to believe that what we are observing is a case of incidence rather than reporting of crime. Secondly, the SLL crimes are caste-based crimes motivated solely by the lower caste status of the victims. Also, SLL crimes result in more serious pen- alties and punishments for perpetrators. Therefore, this should be the category that is most likely to be sensitive to reporting by victims.26 However, as our regressions indicate, SLL crimes are not associated with changes in economic status. Finally, and more in the nature of a caveat, is the fact that since the analysis is conducted at the level of the district, noth- ing can be definitively said about the nature of individual motivations that leads to the incidence of such crimes. This means that theories that make predictions about individual incentives to engage in such behavior that do not vary across districts, cannot be tested. Having said that, with the available data, these results provide evidence that variations in relative group economic positions are linked to variations in violence levels. 6. Conclusion This paper provides one of the first analyses of crimes against Scheduled Castes and Tribes in India with a view to under- standing how a change in the gap between upper and lower castes’ standard of living is associated with the victimization of the SCST community. We find that changes in relative economic position between the lower castes and upper castes are pos- itively correlated with changes in the incidence of crimes, such that a widening of the gap in expenditures between the lower and upper castes is associated with a decrease in crimes committed by the upper castes against the SCSTs. Further, between the IPC and SLL crimes it is the violent IPC crimes that are responsive to changes in economic gaps. Moreover, this is driven by an improvement in the economic well-being of the upper castes rather than a decline in the economic position of the lower castes. We interpret this as the upper castes responding to changes in threat perception created by changes in the rel- ative positions between the two groups. As a re-affirmation of this conjecture, we find that among the largely violent crimes, it is the non-body crimes – crimes that seek to deprive the victim of his property symbolic of his material progress – that are affected by the changes in relative standards of living. Even though the magnitudes of the associations we obtain are small, this paper documents a perverse consequence of inter-caste equality. We are not suggesting that reducing inequalities is undesirable, but stressing that despite significant social and economic transformation, caste hierarchies continue to remain deeply entrenched in contemporary India and these fraught caste relations often result in violent outcomes that our paper discusses. To that end, a policy recommendation would be to strengthen the judicial response to caste-based atrocities so as to serve as an effective deterrent for perpetrators and to attempt to establish a broader anti-discriminatory climate in the country. While the Prevention of Atrocities Act, 1989 mandates special legal provisions such as special public prosecutors to ensure speedy trial of cases, setting up of special courts in every district, no bail for perpetrators, and socioeconomic rehabilitation and protection of victims and witnesses, in practice, the implementation is severely deficient. For instance, at the end of 2007, 79 percent of cases remained pending for trial showing no significant progress over a pendency rate of 82.5 percent in 2001 (National Coalition for Strengthening SCs and STs Prevention of Atrocities Act, 2010). Such failures in filing, investigating and pursuing cases empower potential perpetrators by signaling that crimes against lower castes will go unpunished and also further disempowers marginalized communities by eroding their trust in the legal system. Moreover, a regular occurrence of such crimes may lead to secondary victimization i.e., it creates a sense of vulnerability and anxiety not just for the victim but also for the wider community (McDevitt et al., 2001).27 While our analysis uses the most disaggregated official data that are available, which is a good starting point, a study at the village level would make the analysis much richer since the occurrence of such events is highly dependent on more local dynamics. Future research can aim to do the following: one, study the occurrence of such violence through victimization sur- veys; two, exploit overlaps in caste and religion identities to study the incidence of crimes; three, use newspaper reports to construct measures of crime incidence since this allows a clear identification of the caste of victims and perpetrators. As was mentioned earlier, the police collect data on crimes by non-SCSTs against SCSTs since these groups are considered vulnerable and figure prominently in public policy. But it would be interesting to study other classifications as well since this might allow us to identify for instance, the extent of retaliation, if any, by the lower castes and tribes. Also, since SCs and STs are a heterogeneous group – although constitutionally assigned the same status – it would be interesting to measure conflict among various sub-castes on account of some sub-castes progressing politically or economically more than others. Acknowledgments I am grateful to Ashwini Deshpande, Parikshit Ghosh, Deepti Goel and two anonymous referees for their detailed com- ments. Thanks are also due to Saurabh Singhal, Jeffrey Nugent, J.V. Meenakshi, Abhiroop Mukhopadhyay, Jared Rubin, Willa Friedman, Rachel Gisselquist and participants at the UNU-WIDER 2014 Conference on ‘‘Inequality: measurement, trends, impacts and policies’’, PacDev 2013, IRES 2012 Workshop, ISNIE 2012, WEAI 2012, Delhi School of Economics, Indian 26 Iyer et al. (2012) find better reporting of SLL crimes after lower castes obtain mandated representation in local councils. 27 Levin and McDevitt (1993) also argue that such crimes have a more deleterious effect since victims of such crimes are ‘interchangeable’ i.e. they are singled out on the basis of their social identity and not out of any prior personal vendetta. S. Sharma / Journal of Comparative Economics 43 (2015) 204–226 221 Statistical Institute and Jawaharlal Nehru University for their comments, and to officials at the National Crimes Records Bureau, India for providing the data and clarifying my queries. A previous version of this paper was circulated under the title ‘‘Hate Crimes in India: An Economic Analysis of Violence and Atrocities against Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes’’. All remaining errors are mine. Appendix A. Crimes against SCs/STs included in Special and Local Laws (SLL) (1) The Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955 Sections 3–7A of the Act define the following as offences if committed on the ground of ‘‘untouchability’’: 1. Prevention from entering public worship places, using sacred water resources. 2. Denial of access to any shop, public restaurant, hotel, public entertainment, cremation ground, etc. 3. Refusal of admission to any hospital, dispensary, educational institutions, etc. 4. Refusal to sell goods and render services. 5. Molestation, causing injury, insult, etc. 6. Compelling a person on the ground of untouchability to do any scavenging or sweeping or to remove any carcass, etc. (2) The Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 Whoever, not being a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe: 1. Forces a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe to drink or eat any inedible or obnoxious substance. 2. Acts with intent to cause injury, insult or annoyance to any member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe by dumping excreta, waste matter, carcasses or any other obnoxious substance in his premises or neighborhood. 3. Forcibly removes clothes from the person of a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe or parades him naked or with painted face or body or commits any similar act which is derogatory to human dignity. 4. Wrongfully occupies or cultivates any land owned by, or allotted to, or notified by any competent authority to be allotted to, a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe or gets the land allotted to him transferred. 5. Wrongfully dispossesses a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe from his land or premises or inter- feres with the enjoyment of his rights over any land, premises or water. 6. Compels or entices a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe to do ‘begar’ or other similar forms of forced or bonded labor other than any compulsory service for public purposes imposed by Government. 7. Forces or intimidates a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe not to vote or vote for a particular can- didate or to vote in a manner other than that provided by law. 8. Institutes false, malicious or vexatious suit or criminal or other proceedings against a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe. 9. Gives any false or frivolous information to any public servant and thereby causes such public servant to use his lawful power to the injury or annoyance of a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe. 10. Intentionally insults or intimidates with intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe. 11. Assaults or uses force to any woman belonging to a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe with intent to dishonor or outrage her modesty. 12. Being in a position to dominate the will of a woman belonging to a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe and uses that position to exploit her sexually to which she would not have otherwise agreed. 13. Corrupts or fouls the water of any spring, reservoir, or any other source ordinarily used by members of the Sched- uled Caste or the Scheduled Tribe so as to render it less fit for the purpose for which it is ordinarily used. 14. Denies a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe any customary rite of passage to a place of public resort or obstructs such members so as to prevent him for using or having access to a place of public resort to which other members of public or any section thereof have a right to use or access to. 15. Forces or causes a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe to leave his house, village, or any other place of residence. Appendix B. Mapping districts across 1999–2000 and 2004–2005 Since there were changes in the district boundaries between the NSS 55th and 61st rounds, it is important to make the districts comparable across the two rounds so that a panel can be constructed. In order to do so, weights calculated by Kumar and Somanathan (2009) have been used. This appendix details for each state, the changes that have been made to districts to make them compatible between the two NSS rounds. New ‘‘child’’ districts have been merged back to their ‘‘parent’’ districts in the NSS 55th round. Where a new ‘‘child’’ district was formed by carving out areas from multiple ‘‘parent’’ districts, the exact weights have been reported. 222 S. Sharma / Journal of Comparative Economics 43 (2015) 204–226 There were no changes across the two NSS rounds for the following states: 1. Kerala 2. Andhra Pradesh 3. Orissa 4. Himachal Pradesh. Uttar Pradesh: 1. Hamirpur and Mahoba were combined to form Hamirpur district. 2. Kaushambi and Allahabad were combined to form Allahabad district. 3. Bahraich and Shrawasti were combined to formed Bahraich district. 4. Kushinagar and Deoria were combined to form Deoria district. 5. Varanasi and Sant Ravidas Nagar were combined to form Varanasi district. 6. Gautam Buddha Nagar was formed from parts of Ghaziabad and Bulandshahar and the weights were 0.55 and 0.45 respectively. 7. Sant Kabir Nagar was formed from parts of Basti and Sidharthnagar and the weights were 0.91 and 0.09 respectively. 8. Ambedkar Nagar was formed from parts of Faizabad and Azamgarh and the weights were 0.98 and 0.02 respectively. Uttarakhand: 1. Rudraprayag district was formed from parts of Chamoli, Tehri Garhwal and Garhwal and the weights were 0.65, 0.3 and 0.05 respectively. 2. Almora and Bageshwar were combined to form Almora district. 3. Nainital and Udham Singh Nagar were combined to form Nainital district. Haryana: 1. Panchkula and Ambala were combined to form Ambala district. 2. Fatehabad and Hissar were combined to form Hissar district. 3. Rohtak and Jhajjar were combined to form Rohtak district. Punjab: 1. Moga was formed from parts of Ferozepur and Faridkot and the weights were 0.2 and 0.8 respectively. 2. Nawanshahr was formed from parts of Jalandhar and Hoshiarpur and the weights were 0.71 and 0.29 respectively. 3. Muktsar and Faridkot were combined to form Faridkot district. Madhya Pradesh: 1. Sheopur and Morena were combined to form Morena district. 2. Umaria and Shahdol were combined to form Shahdol district. 3. Neemuch and Mandsaur were combined to form Mandsaur district. 4. Harda and Hoshangabad were combined to form Hoshangabad district. 5. Katni and Jabalpur were combined to form Jabalpur district. 6. Dindori and Mandla were combined to form Mandla district. Chhattisgarh: The state was formed on November 1, 2000 when 16 districts in south-eastern Madhya Pradesh gained separate statehood. In the NSS 1999–2000, the state of Chhattisgarh did not exist in the data whereas it did exist in the NSS 2004–2005 round. 1. Raipur, Mahasamund and Dhamtari were combined to form Raipur district. 2. Surguja and Koriya were combined to form Surguja district. 3. Bilaspur, Korba and Janjgir-Champa were combined to form Bilaspur district. 4. Bastar, Kanker and Dantewada were combined to form Bastar district. 5. Jashpur and Raigarh were combined to form Raigarh district. 6. Kabirdham (Kawardha) was formed from parts of Rajnandgaon and Bilaspur and the weights were 0.68 and 0.32 respectively. S. Sharma / Journal of Comparative Economics 43 (2015) 204–226 223 West Bengal: 1. Uttar Dinajpur district and Dakshin Dinajpur were combined to form West Dinajpur district. Rajasthan: 1. Hanumangarh and Ganganagar were combined to form Ganganagar district. 2. Sawai Madhopur and Karauli were combined to form Sawai Madhopur district. Gujarat: 1. Anand and Kheda were combined to form Kheda district. 2. Dahod and Panchmahal were combined to form Panchmahal district. 3. Navsari and Valsad were combined to form Valsad district. 4. Porbandar and Junagadh were combined to form Junagadh district. 5. Narmada was formed from parts of Bharuch and Vadodara and the weights were 0.89 and 0.11 respectively. 6. Patan was formed from parts of Banskantha and Mehsana and the weights were 0.17 and 0.83 respectively. Maharashtra: 1. Gondia and Bhandara were combined to form Bhandara district. 2. Hingoli and Parbhani were combined to form Parbhani district. 3. Washim and Akola were combined to form Akola district. 4. Dhule and Nandurbar were combined to form Dhule district. Karnataka: 1. Bagalkot and Bijapur were combined to form Bijapur district. 2. Chamrajnagar and Mysore were combined to form Mysore district. 3. Gadag, Haveri and Dharwad were combined to form Dharwad district. 4. Koppal and Raaichur were combined to form Raichur district. 5. Udupi and Dakshin Kannada were combined to form Dakshin Kannada district. 6. Davanagere was formed from parts of Bellary, Chitradurga and Shimoga and the weights were 0.15, 0.56 and 0.29 respectively. Tamil Nadu: 1. Kancheepuram and Thiruvallur were combined to form Chengelpattu district. 2. Madurai and Theni were combined to form Madurai district. 3. Salem, Namakkal and Karur were combined to form Salem District. 4. Tiruchirappalli, Ariyalur and Perambalur were combined to form Tiruchirappalli district. 5. Since Thiruvarur district was formed out parts of Thanjavur and Nagapattinam and the weights were not available, it was assumed to be 0.5 each. Bihar: 1. Sheohar and Sitamarhi were combined to form Sitamarhi district. 2. Munger and Lakhisarai were combined to form Munger district. 3. Sheikhpura and Nalanda were combined to form Nalanda district. Jharkhand: The state was formed on November 15, 2000 by carving out 18 districts of Bihar. The eighteen districts namely Garhwa, Palamu, Chatra, Hazaribagh, Koderma, Giridih, Deoghar, Godda, Sahebganj, Pakur, Dumka, Dhanbad, Bokaro, Ranchi, Lohardaga, Gumala, West Singhbhum and East Singhbhum were included under the state of Bihar in the 1999–2000 NSS data but under Jharkhand in the 2004–2005 NSS data. Appendix C. Real monthly per capita expenditure calculation This section discusses the calculation of monthly per capita expenditure using NSS consumer expenditure surveys of 1999–2000 and 2004–2005. 224 S. Sharma / Journal of Comparative Economics 43 (2015) 204–226 Reference period: This is the period of time to which the information collected relates. It may vary from item to item. Mixed Reference Period (MRP) refers to 365-day recall for low-frequency items and 30-day recall for everything else. Uni- form Reference Period refers to 30-day recall for all items (high and low frequency). NSS 61st Consumer Expenditure Survey (2004–2005): The reference periods used in the 61st round for different groups of consumption items are given below: 1. ‘Last 30 days’: all food; pan, tobacco and intoxicants; fuel and light; miscellaneous goods and services including non-institutional medical, rents and taxes. 2. ‘Last 30 days’ and ‘Last 365 days’: clothing, bedding, footwear, education and medical (institutional) and durable goods. NSS 55th Consumer Expenditure Survey (1999-2000): For food, pan, and tobacco, each household was asked to report all items over both a 7-day and 30-day recall period. At the same time, the traditional 30-day recall period for durables, clothing, educational and institutional medical expenses was replaced by a 365-day recall only. 1. ‘Last 7 days’ and ‘Last 30 days’: food items, pan, tobacco and intoxicants. 2. ‘Last 30 days’: fuel and light, miscellaneous goods and services including non-institutional medical, rents and taxes. 3. ‘Last 365 days’: educational, medical (institutional), clothing, bedding, footwear and durable goods. Since the data collection methodology in the 55th round was different from those in other rounds of NSS data, there is a problem of deriving compatible estimates across rounds for the purposes of comparison (see Sen and Himanshu, 2004 for details). In calculating the MPCE, the 30–365 day estimates have been used for both rounds. Firstly, we add up expenditures on 30-day recall basis for food items, pan, tobacco, intoxicants, fuel and light, non-insti- tutional medical, conveyance entertainment, rents and taxes. To this we add expenditures on 365-day recall basis for clothing, bedding, footwear, education, institutional medical and durables that have been adjusted for a 30-day recall per- iod. Monthly per capita expenditure is then derived by dividing this total expenditure on 30-day recall by the household size. From the two NSS rounds, we obtain MPCE at nominal prices. In order to assess the real changes in MPCE, we use the official poverty lines specified by the Planning Commission as deflators. The poverty lines are stated separately for the rural and urban sectors. In order to derive the combined rural–urban MPCE, the sector-wise deflated MPCE are combined using population weights for rural and urban sectors. 1999–2000 is used as the base year for these calculations. Appendix D. Unemployment and underemployment rate calculation Employment and unemployment are measured using three different approaches, viz. usual status, current weekly status and current daily status. The reference period for these approaches differs – being 365 days preceding the date of survey for ‘usual status’, 7 days preceding the date of survey for ‘current weekly status’ and each day of the 7 days preceding the date of survey for ‘current daily status’. For this analysis, the unemployment rate is based on the usual status measure and the underemployment rate is based on the current daily status measure. A person could be in one or a combination of the following three activity or work statuses during a reference period, (i) working or engaged in economic activity; (ii) not engaged in economic activity but either making tangible efforts to seek work or being available for work if the work is available; (iii) not engaged in any economic activity and also not available for work.(i) and (ii) are associated with ‘being in labor force’ and (iii) with ‘not being in the labor force’. Within the labor force, (i) and (ii) are associated with ‘employment’ and ‘unemployment’ respectively. The usual status refers to: 1. The usual principal activity status (UPS): conditional on being in the labor force, a person is considered employed if he has spent a relatively longer time during the 365 days preceding the date of survey (i.e. major time criterion) engaged in economic activity. 2. Usual principal and subsidiary activity status (UPSS): widens the UPS definition by considering a person as employed if he has pursued some subsidiary economic activity for 30 days or more during 365 days preceding the date of survey. For this analysis, the unemployment rate is based on the broader UPSS measure. The unemployment rate is calculated as the ratio of the number of people employed to the number of people in the labor force. Underemployment is commonly defined as the underutilization of labor time of the workers. Some of the persons cate- gorized as usually employed, do not have work throughout the year due to seasonality in work, etc. as a result of which their labor time is not fully utilized – they are, therefore, underemployed. We use the current daily status among the usually employed to construct an underemployment measure. The current daily activity status for a person is determined on the basis of his activity status on each day of the reference week. Each day of the reference week is comprised of either two ‘half days’ or a ‘full day’ for assigning the activity status. For S. Sharma / Journal of Comparative Economics 43 (2015) 204–226 225 recording time spent on activities pursued by a person in a day, an intensity of 1 is given for an activity that was done for full day and an intensity of 0.5 for the activity that was done for half day. A person is considered employed for the full day if he had worked for 4 h or more during the day. 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Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. http://refhub.elsevier.com/S0147-5967(14)00104-8/h0270 http://refhub.elsevier.com/S0147-5967(14)00104-8/h0275 http://refhub.elsevier.com/S0147-5967(14)00104-8/h0280 http://refhub.elsevier.com/S0147-5967(14)00104-8/h0285 http://refhub.elsevier.com/S0147-5967(14)00104-8/h0290 Caste-based crimes and economic status: Evidence from India 1 Introduction 2 Related literature 2.1 The Indian caste system 2.2 Hate crimes 3 Data and methodology 3.1 Crime data 3.2 Explanatory variables 3.3 Empirical specification 4 Analysis 4.1 Summary statistics 4.2 Regression results 5 Robustness checks and other concerns 6 Conclusion Acknowledgments Appendix A Crimes against SCs/STs included in Special and Local Laws (SLL) Appendix B Mapping districts across 1999–2000 and 2004–2005 Appendix C Real monthly per capita expenditure calculation Appendix D Unemployment and underemployment rate calculation References 
work_rfazxc3nbrdizjssgs7wbrjtqe	----	Book 1.indb 295 Ostale teme Restorative Justice Training in Intercultural Settings in Serbia, and the Contribution of the Arts maRian liebmann* This paper describes restorative justice training courses the author delivered in Serbia and Montenegro in the period 2003-2006, set in the context of the post-conflict situation, and reflects on the intercultural elements added to this course. The author also makes reference to recent work on hate crime and restorative justice in the UK as an extreme example of intercultural conflict. The final two sections discuss the potential of the arts in providing an extra (non-verbal) tool in this work, using as examples two courses the author ran in Serbia. Key words: restorative justice, diversity, art, conflict, hate crime, mediation. Introduction This paper is a reflection on restorative justice trainings held in Serbia, and the way they took account of the intercultural settings in Serbia. The basic restorative justice training is described, and then the way in which training in diversity issues came to be seen as necessary and were included through a supplementary course. Role plays in this course were based on intercultural scenarios brought by course participants. Between the practi- tioner courses and the Training for Trainers, participants were asked to medi- ate five cases before attending the Training for Trainers course. Several of these cases involved intercultural issues, and show how participants adapted their training to work successfully with these. TEMIDA 2016, vol. 19, br. 2, str. 295-308 ISSN: 1450-6637 DOI: 10.2298/TEM1602295L Pregledni rad Primljeno: 19.2.2016. Odobreno za štampu: 2.7.2016. * Dr Marian Liebmann is international leading expert in the field of restorative justice and art therapy, United Kingdom. E-mail: marian@liebmann.org.uk. Marian Liebmann (2016) Restorative Justice Training in Intercultural Settings in Serbia, and the Contribution of the Arts 296 This paper aims to show how restorative justice training can be adapted to work successfully with intercultural issues in Serbia. It also demonstrates the use of the arts in providing a non-verbal channel to enhance understand- ing and provide another dimension of communication. Restorative justice training in Serbia and Montenegro 2003-2006 This was a project of UNICEF in Belgrade. An independent consultant was working with youth justice professionals in Niš (in south-east Serbia) after the conflict in former Yugoslavia, and they identified restorative justice as the practice they wanted to bring into the youth justice system. So, the first pilot training course (one week long) was for that group – lawyers, social workers, teachers, social pedagogues, psychologists and some school students and residents in care homes. This first course was very successful and enabled UNICEF to obtain funding from the Swedish government for a three-year pro- ject. In all, I trained 180 victim-offender mediators, and trained 50 of these to be trainers. New groups were identified as the project progressed, and in the end there were six pilot projects. A sensitive venture was the training at the Juvenile Correctional Insti- tution, Kruševac, as this included a group of guards as well as teachers and social workers, not a usual combination. All went well, and there was substan- tial follow-up support from a UNICEF consultant. The head psychologist at the institution set up a mediation service, with its own rooms, and it has contin- ued to function up to the present, handling about 20 cases a year. Two training courses were carried out in Montenegro, the first in the capi- tal Podgorica, the second in Bijelo Polje, a small town in the north of Montene- gro – this was because of a change in the decision of site for the pilot project. Another strand was to provide training for 15 mobile teams of social workers, with four workers attending from each district, mainly social work- ers and psychologists. These mobile teams consisted of state social workers helped by NGOs to provide help for families affected by the conflict, e.g. pro- viding clothes and shoes for children in remote districts so that they could attend school. Restorative justice skills were seen as helpful for the many cases of young people in trouble with the law. Finally, I trained social workers Temida, vol. 19, br. 2, str. 295-308 297 in Belgrade and also postgraduate students undertaking a mediation course at Belgrade University (Liebmann, 2005a). The complete training included: a) 5 days victim-offender mediation training, including role plays; b) 2 days refresher course addressing gaps and specific points, with more role plays; c) 3 days diversity training, focusing on working with minorities, especially Roma; d) 5 days training of trainers, includ- ing preparation of course sections with feedback from others. Mediation and cultural diversity course The need for cultural diversity training arose from the first pilot course with the Niš group. It was seen as necessary because Serbia has quite a diverse population from all the countries surrounding it (Bulgaria, Hungary, Albania as well as the ex-Yugoslavian countries), and many towns and cities have a large Roma population, most of whom are very poor and are discrimi- nated against almost as a matter of course. Many of the young offenders who were to be involved in restorative justice were from the Roma community, so it was important to treat them with respect. I was quite apprehensive about this training, given the events of the previous ten years in the Balkans, but it seemed possible to discuss prejudice and ways of working with it. Most participants thought the course had helped them to recognise their preju- dices, the first step on the road in this field. They also recognised the need to involve adults from the Roma population in the organisation of the service and maybe to train as mediators. The few minority participants in this course were initially very quiet, but when asked to contribute, had very relevant con- tributions to make. The course was based on materials from National Family Mediation in UK (with permission), and additional material developed by me. The course included the following topics: 1) Pre-course task: cultural autobi- ography; 2) Sharing cultural objects; 3) Definitions of culture; 4) Cultural mes- sages from family of origin; 5) Groups in society experiencing prejudice; 6) Feelings (a) experiencing prejudice (b) being prejudiced; 7) Challenging preju- dice; 8) Feelings of being in a minority; 9) Minorities’ needs in mediation; 10) How inequalities can affect mediation; 11) Working with cultural diversity; 12) Communication barriers, conscious and unconscious; 13) Perceptions based on partial knowledge; 14) Working with interpreters; 15) Next steps. Marian Liebmann (2016) Restorative Justice Training in Intercultural Settings in Serbia, and the Contribution of the Arts 298 Role plays Role plays were based on real cases brought by participants, e.g. a) assaults arising from racist insults, mostly from Serb boys to Roma boys; b) mediations between Roma and Serb boys which included insulting comments; and c) theft from an Albanian bakery resulting in conflict between communities Mediation cases resolved Between the Practitioner Courses and the Training for Trainers, par- ticipants were asked to mediate five cases, and write up one of them. This defined eligibility for attending the Training for Trainers course. Some of these cases included cultural issues: 1) theft of music keyboard by Roma youth; 2) burglary of tools from poor family of German descent; 3) fight between Serb and Roma boy, escalated by Roma boy’s cousins; 4) large- scale fight based on prejudice, involving IDPs, Roma, Albanian, Croatian and Kosovo participants; and 5) discussion of peace councils in traditional areas, mediating after a death to prevent vengeance killing. Case study: Large-scale fight based on prejudice In a region of Serbia where there was ongoing conflict between Serbs, Bosnian Muslims and Kosovan IDPs, a Roma family of Albanian ethnicity from Kosovo had been settled as IDPs in a centre. They complained of persistent discrimination against them. One day in a café a local resident who was drunk provoked them; a local man stood up for them but a brawl ensued, which escalated to about 100 people. The drunk man was injured and lost his mobile phone. The police arrested many people. Another Roma man (of Croatian ori- gin) tried to make things better. The police asked the Mobile Teams to help and mediators visited all parties. They mediated between the drunk man and the local man who stood up for the Roma family; and between these and the Croatian Roma. The family from Kosovo took the offer of a move to another area they hoped would be more tolerant of minorities. In this way the media- tors managed to resolve conflict between parties of different cultures and eth- nicities – otherwise intercultural conflicts would have escalated into violence. Temida, vol. 19, br. 2, str. 295-308 299 Case study: Burglaries in a rural neighbourhood A family of German descent lived in a rural area, and because they were from a different culture, kept themselves to themselves. They had four chil- dren and were very poor - they received some basic help from the social services. The mother had suffered from mental illness for 20 years and did not leave the house. The father and two older sons had committed minor thefts in the past. The third son contacted the Mobile Team for help when he was charged with several burglaries from neighbouring summer cottages of food, tools and cleaning materials. The police recovered all the goods, neatly stacked in a room in the boy’s house. Court proceedings had already started, but the judge agreed to mediation taking place alongside. Although there was no expectation of any impact on the court, the offender said he wanted to meet the victims. His father accompanied him. There were three victims, all elderly people who were not well off and had worked hard on their cot- tages, hoping to move there eventually. They wanted to see who had com- mitted the burglaries. Because of the difference in cultures, neither side had had much contact with each other. The boy started his story tearfully, and said his father had been involved. The father confessed that he was indeed the real thief; he had just taken his son along for company. He was horrified to find that he knew the victims and said he would never have stolen the things if he had known they were the owners. An agreement was made, and when this was presented to the court, the judge dismissed the case against the son, and started a case against the father. The agreement included: apologies from father and son, the father to take a more responsible position as a role model, a promise that in future dif- ficulties the family would seek help instead of harming others, and a promise not to re-offend. Not in the agreement but equally important was the fact that they had met and begun to build a relationship. Mediators had helped an intercultural dialogue into being (Liebmann, 2005b). Case study: Fight between Serb boy and Roma boy A Serb boy and a Roma boy, both 16, had a fight in which the Roma boy, as the smaller one, got beaten up. Two older cousins of the Roma boy then beat up the Serb boy. Meanwhile the Serb boy was expelled from school for Marian Liebmann (2016) Restorative Justice Training in Intercultural Settings in Serbia, and the Contribution of the Arts 300 his behaviour. Groups were asked to make suggestions as to who should be involved in the mediation process and why. The groups came up with several possibilities: • Include everyone - the four young people, all their parents, three repre- sentatives of the school (including the principal if possible), including two mediators - making a group of about 17. • Include just the two original boys, as 16-year-olds could handle media- tion independently of their parents (although parents’ permission might be needed). If mediation is successful, then work out a mechanism for communicating with everyone else, or hold a larger meeting as above. • Include the four boys (three Roma and one Serb) and two more to support the Serb boy. All these would be viable and good ways of approaching this case. In each case mediators would use their skills to elicit the intercultural issues between the Serb and Roma boys, and help them to address these without violence. In this way they could help develop better intercultural understand- ing (Liebmann, 2003). Restorative justice and hate crime Hate crime is the expression of prejudice or bias against the group that the victim is seen to be part of, e.g. violence against black people, Jews, Mus- lims, gay people, disabled people, etc. – just because they are members of these groups. As such, it is a manifestation of failure of intercultural dialogue. Hate crime perpetrators often commit crimes out of prejudice, which may be based on ignorance. For instance, a paediatrician in the UK received a fire- bomb through her house letter-box because the offender thought she was a paedophile – he did not know the difference. Research in the UK has shown that restorative justice can help with hate crime by: a) lowering anxiety, anger and fear; b) increasing understanding; c) resolving conflicts; and d) stopping hate behaviour. Independent community-based services do better than stat- utory services, because they are able to spend more time with participants and also do not label them (Walters, 2014). Temida, vol. 19, br. 2, str. 295-308 301 The following case studies from my home city, Bristol, UK, show the work of two organisations in this field. Case study: Racist comments about a black student A black student discovered racist comments on two white flatmates’ computers. She was very upset and reported it to the police, but they were unable to take action as it was considered a ‘private conversation’. The police and SARI (an NGO working against racism and inequality) worked together and contacted the university, exploring the possibility of a restorative approach. The victim’s family was involved. All parties were visited by the police and SARI to explain the approach. A restorative conference was held for all concerned, and the victim was able to ask why her flatmates had used racist abuse against her, an opportunity she would not have had if the case had gone to court. The flatmates offered a heartfelt apology and the three students resumed their friendship and continued sharing their flat. This case shows how RJ facilitators were able to help participants rebuild an intercul- tural relationship which had broken down because of the prejudiced behav- iour of one party. Case study: Alleged racism, threats and intimidation This case was passed on from SARI to Bristol Mediation, a community mediation service, because it did not have a clear victim and offender – it involved two men who both alleged racism, threats and intimidation, based on their different cultures. Many agencies had been involved without suc- cess. However, both parties said they wanted to resolve the issues between them. English was a second language for one of the parties, so an interpreter was arranged who was also a mediator. Mediators visited both parties, who spoke about the effect of the situation on them. The mediators explored their anxieties and helped them plan what they wanted to say to each other. At the joint meeting, they were able to talk about these things. They became angry at times, but an extra room had been arranged, so that mediators could continue to work with them separately until they were ready to come back together. They made a written agreement, which the mediators followed up to see if it was working. Both parties were extremely grateful. Thus mediators Marian Liebmann (2016) Restorative Justice Training in Intercultural Settings in Serbia, and the Contribution of the Arts 302 were able to help two people of different cultures to understand each other better and to stop their threatening behaviour towards each other (Lieb- mann, 2015). The potential of the arts Most dialogue in intercultural work takes place through verbal means. However, sometimes words are an inadequate medium for the issues and feelings that need to be expressed. The examples below show two different ways in which I used arts methods in conflict resolution work. Picturing truth and reconciliation I contributed to a conference in Belgrade in October 2004 run by the Vic- timology Society of Serbia on ‘Truth and reconciliation in the former Yugoslavia: Where are we now and where to go?’ I ran an art workshop for participants to express thoughts and feelings about the past and hopes for the future. The participants were from several different backgrounds and cultures in Serbia. The structure of workshop was as follows: • Introductions • Warm-up activity • Looking at the past • Hopes for the future • Final comments The results of these were: 1) introductions – important for participants to choose own level; 2) warm-up activity – ‘completing scribbles’ – playful and relaxing; 3) looking at the past – emotional portrayals of loss; 4) hopes for the future – good coming out of bad, stability, bright colours, houses for all; and 5) final comments – enjoyment, surprise, relief, ability to express themselves. Even in such a short workshop, it seemed that it was possible to share difficult areas of the past, and move on to looking at hopes for the future. The use of art materials seemed to facilitate the expression of aspects difficult to put into words, and provide another way of bringing people together, as they shared their pictures (Liebmann, 2004). Temida, vol. 19, br. 2, str. 295-308 303 Art and conflict courses These workshops use simple art materials to explore conflict issues (Lieb- mann, 1996), and include different art exercises according to the group and time available, from the following menu: • Conflict – first reactions and quick pictures; • Symbols/ metaphors of conflict – that sum up the essence of an aspect of conflict; • Painting conflicts – sometimes leading to a realisation of the first step towards resolving it; • Visual mediation – starting with a picture of conflict, a partner acts as ‘mediator’ and draws another picture using the same elements but rearranging them slightly to show a different way of looking at the con- flict; • Squiggles – pair exercise in completing drawings, often leading to sur- prises and realisation of assumptions made; • Sharing space with a partner using art materials in silence – a metaphor for the many kinds of sharing, often involving conflict – personal, group, international; • Passing round drawings – interpreting what is already on the paper and adding a contribution; • Visual whispers – a visual version of the whispering game where a message gets progressively distorted as it travels around the group; • Group picture – showing group dynamics, which may involve conflict; • Drama tableaux – based on conflict pictures, using ‘body sculpts’ to work from conflict to resolution and find steps in between; • Reflections on work done over the whole workshop, and any discoveries. The course I ran in Serbia in 2006 was for a mixed group of therapists and mediators – these two groups turned out to have fairly different professional cultures, which caused some conflict in the group. The exercise on symbols of conflict resulted in pictures of an explosion, a brick wall, a broken world (but showing how it could fit together again), and a cracked egg (but showing the birth of a chicken, something new to come out of a breakage). These are shown in figures 1-4 below. Marian Liebmann (2016) Restorative Justice Training in Intercultural Settings in Serbia, and the Contribution of the Arts 304 Figure 1: Explosion Figure 2: Brick wall Temida, vol. 19, br. 2, str. 295-308 305 Figure 3: Broken world Figure 4: Cracked egg In the visual mediation exercise (see above for details), one set of pictures showed a rearrangement of bottles giving less prominence to the broken one (see figure 5). This change was then translated back to the ‘real life’ situation of the participant. Marian Liebmann (2016) Restorative Justice Training in Intercultural Settings in Serbia, and the Contribution of the Arts 306 Figure 5: Visual mediation We also used simple drama techniques, such as drama tableaux, a way of freezing body postures, to show conflict situations and the resulting emo- tions (Fine, Macbeth, 1996; Thompson, 1996). A drama tableau of one conflict situation moved from a scenario of everyone displaying aggressive gestures – to relaxing these – to holding hands– to a big hug. This led to discussion of the steps needed to resolve that conflict in real life. These arts exercises can result in participants ‘seeing’ new ways of deal- ing with conflicts in their lives. Many conflicts have a cultural component to them, sometimes unconscious, and arts can make them visible in a non- threatening way, leading to new perspectives on the conflicts and issues. Temida, vol. 19, br. 2, str. 295-308 307 Conclusion In this paper I have tried to demonstrate the way in which restorative jus- tice can help with intercultural conflicts. This requires the skills of restorative justice and awareness of intercultural aspects of conflict. My work in 2003- 2006 used mediation as the method, with the addition of cultural awareness. The contribution of the arts can add a further dimension to the verbal work and extend the possibilities of creating empathy and understanding. References Fine, N., Macbeth, F. (1996) Playing with Fire: The Creative Use of Conflict. In: M. Liebmann (ed.) Arts Approaches to Conflict. London: Jessica Kingsley Publishers, pp. 36-67. Liebmann, M. (1996) Giving it Form: Exploring Conflict through Art. In: M. Liebmann (ed.) Arts Approaches to Conflict. London: Jessica Kingsley Publishers, pp. 153-160. Liebmann, M. (2003) Report to UNICEF on Mediation and Cultural Diversity Training Course for Nis Group. Unpublished report. Liebmann, M. (2004) Picturing Truth and Reconciliation. Temida, 4, pp. 73-76. Liebmann, M. (2005a) Restorative Justice Training in Serbia. Mediation in Practice, 2, pp. 13-19. Liebmann (2005b) Report to UNICEF on Mediation and Cultural Diversity Training Course for Mobile Teams. Unpublished report. Liebmann (2015) Review: Mark Walters: Hate Crime and Restorative Justice: Exploring Causes, Repairing Harms. Restorative Justice: An International Journal, 2, pp. 307-310. Thompson, J. (1996) Stage Fights: Violence, Conflict and Drama. In: M. Liebmann (ed.) Arts Approaches to Conflict. London: Jessica Kingsley Publishers, pp. 68-91. Walters, M. (2014) Hate Crime and Restorative Justice: Exploring Causes, Repairing Harms. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Marian Liebmann (2016) Restorative Justice Training in Intercultural Settings in Serbia, and the Contribution of the Arts 308 maRian liebmann Trening o restorativnoj pravdi u interkulturalnim sredinama u Srbiji i doprinos umetnosti U radu su opisani treninzi o primeni restorativne pravde, koje je autorka sprovela u Srbiji i Crnoj Gori, u periodu između 2003. i 2006. godine. Treninzi su smešteni u kontekst post-konfliktnog društva, pri čemu je poseban akcenat stavljen na interkulturalne elemente. Takođe, u radu se ukazuje na skorije bavljenje zločinima iz mržnje, kao ekstremni primer interkulturalnog konflikta i primene restorativne pravde u ovim situacijama u Ujedinjenom Kraljevstvu. U poslednje dve celine rada, na primeru dve obuke sprovedene u Srbiji, analizira se potencijal koji ima umetnost kao dodatna (neverbalna) alatka u primeni restorativne pravde u interkulturalnim sredinama. Ključne reči: restorativna pravda, različitost, umetnost, konflikt, zločini iz mržnje, medijacija. 
work_rfytymgivnbvfjuqcfw2gqltxy	----	A survey of current social network and online communication provision policies for offender identification Graeme Horsman Department of Computing, Engineering and Technology Faculty of Computer Science The David Goldman Informatics Centre St Peter's Way Sunderland SR6 0DD Email: graeme.horsman@sunderland.ac.uk Phone: 0191 515 2381 Abstract Online forms of harassment, stalking and bullying on social network and communication platforms are now arguably wide-spread and subject to regular media coverage. As these provision continue to attract millions of users, generating significant volumes of traffic, regulating abuse and effectively reprimanding those who are involved in it, is a difficult and sometimes impossible task. This article collates information acquired from 22 popular social network and communication platforms in order to identify current regulatory gaps. Terms of service and privacy policies are reviewed to assess existing practices of data retention to evaluate the feasibility of law enforcement officials tracking those whose actions breach the law. For each provision, account sign-up processes are evaluated and policies for retaining Internet Protocol logs and user account information are assessed along with the availability of account preservation orders. Finally, recommendations are offered for improving current approaches to regulating social network crime and online offender tracking. Keywords: Social Media Networks; Crime; Regulation; Internet; Cyber Crime; Harassment 1 Introduction Online platforms have now revolutionised modern day communication. However, in light of recent global events, social media has now become a platform for those to voice both positive and negative sentiment, requiring greater regulation by both the social networking sites themselves and the police (Awan, 2016). With a reported 2.3 billion social network users worldwide (Statista, 2016), the regulation of user behaviour on https://cas-03.uni.ad.sunderland.ac.uk/owa/redir.aspx?C=jdZta7WfQUWhu-6abHNI5TkV859z-9MIDJu06dISlxWdHakd-PcFg7--wX2tMvV551DANgbVPcY.&URL=https%3a%2f%2fcas-02.uni.ad.sunderland.ac.uk%2fowa%2fredir.aspx%3fC%3dLXzTRZ8R4USsecIzldl-9vrnkii9HNMIQgbnF7O3nDyKYu-zlko5mKhMBoX9nvZhJPuJIqM0B1E.%26URL%3dmailto%253agraeme.horsman%2540sunderland.ac.uk these platforms is a difficult task. In 2015, Vodafone and YouGov surveyed around 5,000 teenagers across 11 countries, where 41% of respondents admitted to feeling depressed or helpless from acts of cyberbullying and a further 18% feeling suicidal (Vodafone, 2015). In addition, a quarter of those surveyed had actively closed their social media accounts due to acts of cyberbullying (Vodafone, 2015). Similarly, the Association of School and College Leaders (2016) reported that 41% of the school leaders surveyed reported an increase in acts of students being cyberbullied. In 2016, anti-bullying charity Ditch the Label (2016) surveyed 8,850 persons aged 12-20, with 6 out of 10 of those reported to have been bullied, indicating that they had experienced this online. Despite the many benefits offered by online communication and social networks, a darker side is also apparent. Social networks and online forms of communication are frequently identified as problems in the battle against online harassment and abuse. In 2014, ‘a total of 38 out of 45 police forces saw a rise in the number of crime reports that involved Facebook’ (Birchley, 2015) with ‘the Metropolitan Police, receiving 1,207 crime reports which mentioned Facebook, up from 935 in 2013 and 997 in 2012’ (Evans, 2015). Further Evans (2015) reports that over ‘16,000 alleged crimes involving Facebook and Twitter were reported’ across all United Kingdom (UK) police forces for the period of 2014/15. The Twitter platform is regularly subject to scrutiny due to the volume of trolling (an act of posting ‘inflammatory or inappropriate messages or comments online for the purpose of upsetting other users and provoking a response’ (Dictionary.com, 2016)) which occurs (BBC News, 2016a) and the service has been criticised for failing to be proactive in regulating and removing offending content, such as that posted by the extremist cleric Anjem Choudary (BBC News, 2016b). Other examples of social network abuse include the 2011 England riots where such provision were used to organise mass congregations and crime, with Williams et al. (2013) suggesting that at the time, police were ill-equipped to deal with analysing this content. Yet it remains questionable as to whether some five years later, law enforcement are in a better position to tackle these issues. Reports of sexist and misogynistic comments targetting those on Youtube and Twitch have also received media coverage (BBC News, 2016c), yet such incidents form merely a small part of a far greater issue. Frequently high-profile personalities are targeted, where recent examples include Stephen Fry, Jennifer Lawrence, Matt Lucas and Sinead O’Connor, prompting their exit from such platforms (Cohen, 2014). In addition, attacks upon Sara Payne, the mother of murdered school girl Sarah Payne, and Zelda Williams, the daughter of the now deceased Robin Williams show an altogether more sinister side of the harassment which can be suffered online (Cohen, 2014). These instances form only a small subset of the overall volume of abuse which is experienced by everyday individuals. Acts of online abuse can now be considered relatively common and form part of a greater issue and debate surrounding the need for greater regulation of social networks, a point alluded to in the House of Commons Home Affairs Committee (2016) report into Radicalisation. Social media companies are consciously failing to combat the use of their sites to promote terrorism and killings. Networks like Facebook, Twitter and YouTube are the vehicle of choice in spreading propaganda and they have become the recruiting platforms for terrorism. They must accept that the hundreds of millions in revenues generated from billions of people using their products needs to be accompanied by a greater sense of responsibility and ownership for the impact that extremist material on their sites is having (House of Commons Home Affairs Committee, 2016, p.34). Hate crime is also becoming an increasing issue for social network platforms. In the wake of the UK’s vote to leave the European Union (commonly referred to as ‘Brexit’), MP Andy Burnham highlighted a subsequent fivefold increase ‘in race hate comments on social media channels’ (HC Deb, 2016). This is backed by GLA Conservatives’s (2015) survey which reported 68% of the 308 individuals reviewed had encountered hate crime online. The Mayor's Office for Policing And Crime (MOPAC) (2016) states that currently social media is providing offenders with a ‘veil of anonymity’ which is prohibiting effective regulation of their conduct, and have recently acquired funding from the Home Office Police Innovation Fund (PIF) to develop an online hate crime hub (MOPAC, 2016). In any of the aforementioned acts, where forms on online content overstep the mark and fall foul of domestic or international legislation, the identification on an offender is key to the effective regulation of illegal behaviour. Studies have shown online environments can ‘lower behavioral inhibitions’, encouraging disclosures and derogatory actions (Suler, 2004; Lapidot-Lefler and Barak, 2012), yet where an account holder cannot be identified there is a lack of accountability for their conduct. This provides an issue for law enforcement when trying to regulate and apprehend social network offenders, potentially leaving any victims vulnerable for sustained online abuse. This article examines the terms of service, privacy policies and functionality of 22 social network and communication provision in an effort to establish the current feasibility of tracking offenders who post content on these platforms in breach of both policy and law. Account sign-up processes are evaluated along with policies for the retention of data which could be used to identify those in breach. Finally, conclusions and recommendations are drawn. 2 Regulatory problems Guidelines supporting those subject to cyberbullying and online harassment on social networks exist on various organisation portals designed to support those subject to these acts. Childline (2016) identify Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, Instant messaging (IM), Snapchat, ASKfm and Tumblr, and provide guidance for those subject to abuse on these platforms and how to block and report it. The charity ‘Family Lives’ (2016) provides guidance on dealing with cyberbullying on Facebook, Twitter, Youtube, Whatsapp, Snapchat and Instagram. Other charities offering similar advice and resources include The CyberSmile Foundation (2016) and the NSPCC (2016). Policing social media content is notoriously difficult and arguably, we are yet to see effective forms of regulation in force across many platforms. The Select Committee on Communications’s Report (2014) indicated that this is due to the fact that ‘there is no consistent attitude taken by website operators: some require the use of real names (Facebook, although they do not actively confirm users' identities); some allow anonymity but challenge impersonation (Twitter) and others allow absolute anonymity’. The volume of users combined with large quantities of network traffic continue to pose issues (Kavanaugh et al., 2012). Techniques for regulating online social network content typically fall within one of two categories, proactive or reactive. Proactive measures address content before and as it happens and attempt to prevent its appearance on a given platform in the first instance. Online filters and keyword matching are methods for highlighting posts of a particular type and prevent certain forms of language from being submitted (Bekkers et al., 2013). Yet the speed of linguistic developments mean that these methods can only serve a limited purpose and may quickly become ineffective as new offensive terms or phrases are developed or ways to circumvent their use are discovered (through the use of punctuation, special symbols to break up the plain text meaning of a word). The application of sentiment analysis has also been offered as a way of improving the identification of offending messages (Ceron et al., 2014). Social media platforms have also taken steps to encourage users to be proactive about reporting incidents online as opposed to waiting for a response from the network itself, introducing the notion of self-policing and user-regulation. Facebook have an inbuilt reporting system (Facebook, 2016e) with similar process witnessed on other platforms such as Twitter (2016d) and Instagram (2016d). Yet despite such methods, it remains arguable that the complete prevention of abuse is unachievable. Regardless of form, where content is posted that reaches it’s intended target (i.e. a victim’s account) in breach of regulations, a reactive response must be formed in order to reprimand those responsible. Where message content breaches platform policies or legislation, it may be deemed necessary to identify and prosecute the individual responsible for the post. This is particularly necessary in numerous cases including those of online harassment and threatening behaviour where in the UK, the circumstances of the case satisfy the test defined in the Code for Crown Prosecutors (Crown Prosecution Service, n.d.). The test is twofold where first evidential sufficiency must be achieved (‘a prosecutor must be satisfied that there is sufficient evidence to provide a realistic prospect of conviction’), before consideration must be given as to whether a prosecution is in the public interest. Before this test can be implemented, consideration must be given as to whether there is sufficient evidence available allowing the physical poster of any message content to be identified in the first instance. This can be a difficult process, and one where success is subject to the governance and guidelines of the platform from which the abusive content took place. In many circumstances, there is insufficient data available to identify account holders, hindering effective law enforcement investigation. In absence of the ability to identify an offender, there can often be no legal case to proceed with. On many platforms, regulatory issues exist right from the account creation process, where fake information can often be used to open an account (Barrett, 2016), providing a starting point for analysis in this article. 2.1 Implementing effective regulatory measures for identifying account holders In simple terms, effective regulatory measures on social networks allow for the assessment and evaluation of posted content and the enactment of measures to reprimand those who breach both the social media platform terms of use or legal authority. In order to do this, a social media platform should be able to hold its users to account for the content they post, where essentially they must be identifiable when behavioural breaches occur. To achieve this, social media networks have three current options for account validation, namely direct, indirect and metadata validation: Direct validation: Direct validation requires the user to submit accurately their name and identifying information during the creation of their account, and, being able to attribute any posted content to these details. The problem here relates to the term ‘accurate’ and the fact that as already highlighted, most social media networks do not accurately validate user input. Typically, social network signup procedures require users to input criteria which include name, age and email address. However there is generally no processes in place to accurately authenticate this content. Despite so-called ‘real-name’ policies, seen with platforms such as Google+ (however, their policy was subsequently rescinded in 2014 (Vincent, 2014)) and Facebook (2016e), name data is not authenticated. As a result, account name data cannot be relied upon as a source of offender identifiable information for law enforcement in some cases, which has lead to an abundance of unattributable accounts created solely for purposes such as trolling. The implementation of an effective name validation process would be onerous and require acts similar to those seen in online monetary transactions or where documentary proof of identity can be captured and verified. When considering that many of the social network provisions seek to attract users via a no-fuss sign-up process to prevent users from disengaging, it is unlikely that these type of verification processes will ever be implemented. Similar concerns surround the use of a valid email address (see Section 3.2 for an analysis of sign-up processes). Indirect Validation: Indirect validation methods may be used to identify an account holder based on their actions and is subject to the behaviour of the offender. For example, those users who have their identity validated indirectly include those who post or send identifiable message content through disclosure of personal information or media. This can include for example, the posting of imagery where an offender is present and can be identified or textual content disclosing identifiable details; these could be potentially accidental disclosures. The problem faced here is that those who create accounts solely for the purpose of abuse are likely to omit the inclusion of personally identifiable content and therefore the use of indirect validation methods is limited. Metadata Validation: Metadata validation surrounds the attributing of an account to an individual from the metadata left behind by their interaction with the service. The effectiveness of this validation form is often dependant on the service provider and their policies regarding the collection and retention of data, and, their willingness to co-operate with law enforcement. Typically relevant metadata could include: 1. Internet Protocol (IP) Address: IP information can (not always, subject to spoofing) be used to identify an internet connection from which offending communications were made, and potentially their location. 2. Device information: This includes information such as the user's device type and telephone number if they are accessing services via a mobile device. 3. Geolocational data relating to the poster of content. The above information can be classed as ‘log data’ and is subject to the following limitations. 1. Log retention: In regards to metadata account validation, the retention of logged data poses a number of issues. The first issue comes from the assumption that relevant data is stored in the first instance. In cases where no appropriate logs are retained, account identification via metadata is not feasible, creating a significant issue, as account usage metadata is arguably the most likely source of data which is of use to law enforcement. Even when log data is retained, the length of time is critical, where sufficient time must be provided to ensure the necessary legal authority is sought in order to obtain the data. Given that many platforms witness significant volumes of traffic, a factor impacting the length of time data is retained is often the cost of having to store the data in the first place. It is not feasible for many organisations to suffer the cost of retaining all traffic indefinitely, but in some instances, where data is only kept for a matter of weeks, it may not be enough time for an effective response. Therefore log retention times can hinder investigation attempts. 2. Type of log data collected: The type of data collected is also key to an effective investigation. Service providers may omit to collect the necessary metadata to validate an account. 3. Account and data deletion: The removal of posted content can pose an issue, for example where an individual posts a message and then intentionally deletes it. If the victim has not made a record of the offending messages then law enforcement remain reliant on the service provider to have retained a copy of this content. The problem here is two-fold, where issues come from those who delete individual offending content, and/or, decide to delete the offending account. As with the problem of log retention noted above, storage space becomes an issue. Given the volume of traffic, it is unlikely that inactive content (i.e. deleted) will be retained for any substantial period of time or potentially at all. Therefore if the user choses to a) delete content and/or b) delete the offending account. Law enforcement are reliant on the service providers maintenance of retrievable content. In some cases, this may not be available. 3 Taking a look at existing platforms This article has highlighted 22 social network, online communication and blogging websites in order to analyse their current account signup processes, terms and conditions and privacy policies in an attempt to assess the feasibility of tracking the physical users of offending accounts. These provision were chosen based on their popularity and having been highlighted as potentially problematic platforms by charities like the NSPCC (2016) and Childline (2016). The services analysed are:- Facebook, Twitter, MySpace, Instagram, Snapchat, Youtube, Reddit, ASKfm, Tumblr, Vine, Bebo, Quora, Flickr, Hi5, Pinterest, Buzzfeed, Badoo, Scribd, Wordpress, Foursquare, Vimeo and LinkedIn. 3.1 Age of use As with most online services, the terms and conditions associated to each platform define the age a person must be before they can legally sign up for the service. From the 22 services, 16 define this age as 13 years and above. Badoo, Hi5 and Buzzfeed identify this age as 18. LinkedIn specify age requirements specific to country of origin (13 years old for all countries except People's Republic of China, Netherlands, United States, Canada, Germany, Spain, Australia and South Korea). Finally Youtube and Vine state that users must be old enough to form a binding legal contract. Despite defining an age, similar to the issues with validating name information on account sign-up, there are no age validation procedures when a user creates their account (although many services (see Myspace (2016d) for example) will delete your account if they suspect you are not of an appropriate age) and therefore this information cannot be relied upon to support tying a physical individual to an account. This lack of validation is also potentially placing some population demographics at risk, particularly children. Nominet’s (2014) survey into child social media usage states that by ‘age 10, over half (59%) of children have used a social network’ in breach of platform terms and conditions. As a result, ‘21% of those surveyed stated they had posted negative comments by the average age of 11 and 43% had messaged strangers by an average age of 12’ (Nominet, 2014). Such concerns are exacerbated when it is considered that any form of inappropriate content targeted at a child may not be attributable to a physical offender, through a lack of traceability on these platforms. 3.2 Sign-up process The account sign-up process for the 22 services highlighted in this article provides the first source of potentially useful information for tracking down an individual attributed to an offending account. When analysing the signup process it was found that all 22 services requested at least the name of the individual (full or first and last names), with no means of validating the accuracy of inputted content. All 22 services offered signup via an email address, with Twitter and Facebook offering a dual sign-up process of either email or mobile telephone number (verified via SMS message). Of the 22 services, only LinkedIn prevented users from using the service (successfully logging on) without first validating the email address used to signup for an account via sending a registration confirmation email to that account. As a result, the other 21 services could be accessed by supplying fake name details and a fake email address, providing that it was entered in the format of a legitimate email account provider. For tests within this article, a fake randomly generated email prefix string was added to ‘@gmail.com’ and successfully used to sign in. Although this may seem trivial, in reality it causes greater difficulty for law enforcement attempting to track individuals. Not only does it encourage the creation of trolling accounts as it can take seconds to generate an account on these platforms without the need to first create a valid email address, but it also lessens the chance of the user inputting identifiable content in the signup process. For example, where a valid, accessible email account is needed in order to activate an account on sign-up for any of the above social network services, in some cases an individual may opt to use their personal email address without contemplating the potential to be identified later, which may have been set up for legitimate purposes with accurate details (see Figure 1 for an example of how the use of an email service provider may also provide traceable information). At which point, a service provider may store a record the email address used at signup and attribute it to the offending account and therefore law enforcement may be able to contact to the email service provider for additional content. Figure 1. An overview of the signup process Yet the problem faced by social networks and the lack of validation of account sign-up details also exists with email service providers. This article also analysed the signup process at both Outlook and Google Mail in order to acquire an email address, arguably two of the most popular email service providers. Outlook requested that on sign-up, users provide a secondary backup email address and verification mobile number in addition to name, location and age data. The benefit here is that where a user must provide a mobile number to verify, providing a record of the number is kept, network service provider records may be queried in order to potentially identify the actual user of the account (subject to spoofing and pay-as-you-go numbers). Outlook requires this data before allowing the account to be created, however it accepted a number of ‘55555555555’ and a randomly generated email address, with the suffix ‘@gmail.com’. The problem this presents is that even though there is a requirement for what appears to be extra validation, it also cannot be relied upon. Similar processes were witnessed on the Google Mail platform. 3.3 Terms, conditions and privacy Given the issues present on sign-up for the 22 services, offending tracking may be reliant on what was previously coined as metadata account validation in Section 2.1. To assess the feasibility of law enforcement achieving this, Table 1 presents a breakdown of the key inclusions in the terms of service and privacy policies of all 22 platforms, with a focus on IP log retention and account content and deletion procedures. Service Is IP info stored? How long is it retained? Key policy points of interest Facebook Yes Does not say. IP related information:- “When you delete IP content, it is deleted in a manner similar to emptying the recycle bin on a computer. However, you understand that removed content may persist in backup copies for a reasonable period of time (but will not be available to others)” (Facebook, 2016a). Information around data deletion:- “Information associated with accounts will be kept until an account is deleted, unless we no longer need the data to provide products and services” (Facebook, 2016b). Accounts can be deactivated, essentially placing it in a suspended state. They can be reactivated at any time. When an account is deleted, the following are key points of interest taken from Facebook’s account deletion information (Facebook, 2016c):- ● Deletion is delayed for a few days after it's requested. If you log in during this time, deletion is canceled. ● Access can’t be regained once the account is deleted. ● It may take up to 90 days to delete data stored in backup systems. Your info isn't accessible on Facebook during this time. ● Data related to an account may not be deleted. For example, a friend may have messages from you after the account is deleted. ● Copies of some material (ex: log records) may remain in Facebook databases but are disassociated from personal identifiers. Additional retained device information:- “Attributes such as the operating system, hardware version, device settings, file and software names and types, battery and signal strength, and device identifiers. Device locations, including specific geographic locations, such as through GPS, Bluetooth, or WiFi signals. Connection information such as the name of your mobile operator or ISP, browser type, language and timezone, mobile phone number and IP address” (Facebook, 2016b). Users can self-disclosure account information and download their Facebook profile data (Facebook, 2016g). Twitter Yes Does not say. IP related information:- “Given Twitter's real-time nature, some information (e.g., IP logs) may only be stored for a very brief period of time” (Twitter, 2016b). The privacy policy (Twitter, 2016c) suggests IP data may be available for up to 18 months. Information around data deletion:- Users can deactivate their account. A user then has 30 days to reinstate the account before permanent deletion. “After deactivation, your account should be removed within a few minutes, however some content may be viewable on twitter.com for a few days.” (Twitter, 2016a). If the account is not reinstated after 30 days, Twitter will begin the process of deleting the https://twitter.com/ account, which can take up to 1 week (Twitter, 2016a). Some content may be indexed by search engines beyond Twitter's control. Twitter’s ‘default is almost always to make the information you provide through the Twitter Services public for as long as you do not delete it’ (Twitter, 2016c). ‘Content deleted by account holders (e.g., Tweets) is generally not available’ (Twitter, 2016b). Instagram Yes Does not say. IP related information:- Given the volume of real-time content on Instagram, some information may only be stored for a short period of time (Instagram, 2016a). Information around data deletion:- Users have both the option to permanently delete and suspend their account option (Instagram, 2016b). There is no indication on how data is tret when an account holder deletes individual content (photos etc). Instagram's privacy policy (2016c) discloses account sign up details, analytics, log and device identifier content are retained but the length of time is not stated. Myspace Yes Does not say. Information around data deletion:- As per the Myspace Privacy Policy - “even after you cancel your Account or delete information or Profile Content, copies of some information from your Account or Profile(s) may remain viewable in circumstances where, for example, you have posted information on another User's Profile, shared information with a Third-Party Linked Service, or if another Visitor or Member copied, stored or shared your information or has a copy of the link to content you shared on the Myspace Services. To the extent permitted by applicable law, we may also retain backup information related to your Account and associated Profile(s) on our servers for as long as is reasonably necessary after cancellation for fraud detection, site operation or to comply with applicable law or our internal security policies. Please be aware that, due to the nature of certain internet and mobile technologies outside of our control, such as caching and networked technology, your Account may not be instantly inaccessible to others, and there may be a delay in the removal of your information and content from elsewhere on the internet and from search engines.” (Myspace, 2016a) Foursquare Yes Does not say. Information around data deletion:- As per Foursquare’s privacy policy - “Because of the way we maintain Foursquare, such deletion may not be immediate, and residual copies of your profile information or posts may remain on backup media for up to ninety (90) days. Notwithstanding the foregoing, we will retain information as required by applicable law and we will not delete any information that has already been aggregated or anonymized…. Even after you remove information from your account or profile, copies of that information may remain viewable elsewhere, to the extent it has been shared with others, it was otherwise distributed pursuant to your privacy settings, or it was copied or stored by other users. Removed and deleted information may remain on backup media for up to ninety (90) days prior to being deleted from our servers” (Foursquare, 2016a). Device and account usage information (operating system, browser information etc.) captured. Snapchat Yes Does not say Information around data deletion:- As per Snapchat’s privacy policy - “On our end, that means that we automatically delete the content of your Snaps (the photo and video messages that you send your friends) from our servers after we detect that a Snap has been opened by all recipients or has expired” (Snapchat, 2016a). In addition, the policy also acknowledges the possibility of data recovery from the local device - “It’s also possible, as with any digital information, that someone might be able to access messages forensically or find them in a device’s temporary storage” (Snapchat, 2016a). The period of time information exists before deletion depends on the type of message you post on Snapchat:- ● Snaps: Automatically deleted after they’ve been viewed by all recipients. Opened Snaps typically cannot be retrieved from Snapchat's servers by anyone, for any reason. Snapchat servers are designed to automatically delete unopened Snaps after 30 days. ● Chat messages: Automatically deleted after sender and recipient have seen it and swiped out of the Chat screen – unless either party presses and holds to save it. ● My Story: Automatically deleted 24 hours after each Snap is posted. ● Live Stories: Live Story or Local Story Snaps may be archived (no indication of time) (Snapchat, 2016c). Information around account deletion:- As per Snapchat’s privacy policy - “If you ask to delete your account, you will have up to 30 days to restore your account before we delete your information from our servers. During this period of time, your account will not be visible to other Snapchatters.” (Snapchat, 2016a). Youtube Yes Does not say Myactivity.google.com and https://takeout.google.com provide a means for analysing historics activity on the Youtube platfomr (subject to the account user changing proviacy settings). Although retention periods are not disclosed, the following example of content typically disclosed to law enforcement with suitable authority is provided. ‘Subpoena: ● Subscriber registration information ● Sign-in IP addresses and associated time stamps Court Order: ● Video upload IP address and associated time stamp ● Information obtainable with a subpoena Search Warrant: https://takeout.google.com/ ● Copy of a private video and associated video information ● Private message content ● Information obtainable with a subpoena or court order’ (Google, 2016) Reddit Yes Potentially 100 days (Reddit, 2016a) IP related information:- As per the privacy policy - “Except for the IP address used to create your account, Reddit will delete any IP addresses collected after 100 days” (Reddit, 2016a). Information around account deletion:- “When you delete your account, your profile is no longer visible to other users and disassociated from content you posted under that account. Please note, however, that the posts, comments, and messages you submitted prior to deleting your account will still be visible to others, unless you delete such content” (Reddit, 2016a). ASKfm Yes Does not say Information around account deletion:- Where an account is deactivated, the user “should ordinarily be able to restore the account and the whole of the profile within 12 months of deactivating it but we cannot guarantee that this will always be the case” (ASKfm, 2016a). In regards to closing an account, “once processed, profile data will be removed from the Services and any questions to friends will be converted to anonymous questions (in other words, questions asked will remain visible but will appear to be from an anonymous user). A user will be able to reactivate their account by logging back in for a period of 30 days after your request to leave ASKfm is processed. At the end of that period the account will be deleted and all “likes” which you have added to questions will be removed. We will delete the data as soon as reasonably practicable, but in certain cases limited types of data, including log files and backups, may take up to 90 days to be fully deleted” (ASKfm, 2016a). Tumblr Yes Does not say Information around account deletion:- “Deleting an Account may not fully remove the content you have published from our systems, as caching of, backups of, copies of, or references to your Account Information may not be immediately removed. In addition, given the nature of sharing on the Services, some of the public activity on your Account prior to deletion (such as reblogs of your blog posts) may remain stored on our servers and accessible to the public”. (Tumblr, 2016a). Vine Yes Potentially up to 18 months IP related information:- “If not already done earlier, we will either delete Log Data or remove any common account identifiers, such as your username, full IP address, or email address, after 18 months” (Vine, 2016a). Information around account deletion:- “Disconnecting your Vine account will immediately revoke our authorization to cross-post on your behalf or otherwise access that account and we will delete information obtained from that connection (other than information that was publicly posted on Vine, such as profile information), which may take some time” (Vine, 2016a). Badoo Yes Does not say Information around account deletion:- Accounts can be deactivated and restored within a 30 day period. If not restored in this time, an account will be permanently deleted within 14 days from the expiration of the deactivation period. “Information (such as contact history) is deleted by us over a longer timescale, by way of housekeeping on a periodic basis. Removed and deleted information may persist in backup copies for up to 30 days to enable restoration, but will not be available to others in the meantime” (Badoo, 2016a). Scribd Yes Does not say No information available. Wordpress Yes Does not say Information around content deletion:- “If you delete content, Automattic will use reasonable efforts to remove it from WordPress.com, but you acknowledge that caching or references to the Content may not be made immediately unavailable” (Wordpress, 2016a). Buzzfeed Yes Does not say Information around content deletion:- “All content submitted by you to the Services may be retained by us indefinitely, even after you terminate your account” (Buzzfeed, 2016a). Quora Yes Does not say Information around account deletion:- Accounts can be deactivated (placed in a suspended state). “Deleting your Quora account means that the following content will be removed from public view: your profile including photos and bio, your answers, comments, blog posts, votes, endorsements, and messages. Questions you may have asked will remain, since questions on Quora are community owned, but will not be associated with your name publicly” (Quora, 2016a) “Once you confirm, your account will be deactivated immediately and the deletion process will begin. After this point, you’ll have 14 days to change your mind and reactivate your account by logging in. Once the 14 day grace period has expired and your account has been deleted, your content and profile will no longer be publicly accessible. Older versions of your content or account may be stored indefinitely by Quora in the form of backups or internal logs” (Quora, 2016a). Flickr Yes Does not say Flickr is a product of Yahoo and therefore information is acquired from Yahoo’s privacy policy (Yahoo, 2016a). Following Yahoo’s Data Storage and Anonymisation policy (Yahoo, 2016b), ● “Yahoo’s anonymisation policy applies only to search log data. ● Yahoo stores this data in an identifiable form for up to 18 months. ● IP addresses within search user log data will be anonymised or deleted within 6 months from the time of collection.” Limited information is available regarding how deleted data/accounts are handled. Pinterest Yes Does not say. Information around account deletion:- “Following termination or deactivation of your account, or if you remove any User Content from Pinterest, we may retain your User Content for a commercially reasonable period of time for backup, archival, or audit purposes. Furthermore, Pinterest and its users may retain and continue to use, store, display, reproduce, re-pin, modify, create derivative works, perform, and distribute any of your User Content that other users have stored or shared through Pinterest” (Pinterest, 2016a) Hi5 Yes Indefinitely “All personal information collected by hi5 in connection with your use of the Site and described in this Privacy Policy, including without limitation your name, location, email address, photos and videos, friend connections, messages, comments, login information, IP address and other data, will be stored by hi5 indefinitely” (Hi5, 2016a). Vimeo Yes Does not say Information around account deletion:- “You may delete your account at any time. Basic accounts may be deleted from the Vimeo Service if they remain inactive (i.e., the user fails to log in) for a continuous period of at least six (6) months. Subscription accounts will remain active until the end of the subscription term and any renewal term” (Vimeo, 2016a). LinkedIn Yes Potentially 7 days after account deletion, at which point logs are depersonalized (LinkedIn 2016a). IP related information:- Potentially 7 days after account deletion, at which point logs are depersonalized (LinkedIn 2016a). However, LinkedIn’s law enforcement guidelines (2016b) suggests there is a 24 month limit on IP information from law enforcement data requests in unusual cases. Information around account deletion:- “We retain the personal information you provide while your account is in existence or as needed to provide you services. We may retain your personal information even after you have closed your account if retention is reasonably necessary to comply with our legal obligations, meet regulatory requirements, resolve disputes between Members, prevent fraud and abuse, or enforce this Privacy Policy and our User Agreement. If you close your account(s), your information will generally be removed from the Service within 24 hours. We generally delete closed account information and will de-personalize any logs or other backup information through the deletion process within 30 days of account closure. We de- personalize within 7 days (although we do maintain 30 days worth of web server logs for security, debugging, and site stability purposes only) by creating aggregate data sets that cannot be traced back to individuals” (LinkedIn 2016a). Bebo Unknown. Nothing is stated in the Privacy Policy Information around content deletion:- “If you or we remove your User Content, BEBO might retain your User Content for a commercially reasonable period of time for backup, archival, or audit https://www.linkedin.com/psettings/account-management/close-action-needed regarding IP address content (Bebo, 2016a). purposes. Furthermore, BEBO and other Users might retain and continue to display, reproduce, transmit, modify, re-arrange, and distribute any of your User Content that other Users have transmitted on the App” (Bebo, 2016b). 4 Discussion of regulations As can be seen within Table 1, the stance taken by social media platforms in regards to data deletion and retained information varies. To analyse this content, discussions are broken down into two areas, data deletion and IP information. 4.1 The problem with deleting content Content on these platforms is volatile and often vulnerable to the original poster’s intentions to delete or keep any posted messages. As a result, police guidelines indicate that an individual should attempt to make record of any offending content as soon as it is identified as it may be the only chance to capture a record of it (ACPO, 2012; Hampshire Police, n.d.; Westyorkshire Police, n.d.). The problem remains that even where content is identified or recorded by a victim, it could be removed at any point from the service in question, potentially before relevant metadata can be preserved for identification purposes. There is no consistent approach to deleted data in the 22 platforms analysed, and although guidance is provided around deleting an account, there is little guidance as to how deleted account content is handled or archived by service infrastructure. In relation to deleted account content, where an offender chooses to delete their actual account time is crucial to ensuring potential evidential data is retained. The problem here is that law enforcement must obtain the relevant legal authority to comply with the terms and conditions of the social network services before data can be disclosed and this process can be slow. This is compounded by the fact that there is no actual defined consistent period of retention from which law enforcement authorities can make an informed judgement as to the feasibility of requesting data from these services. This ambiguity within policies can cost both time and money, leading to unsatisfactory case outcomes, and provides an area in need of improvement and clarity. From the 22 platforms examined in this article, the following platforms provide guidance targeted at law enforcement:- Facebook (2016d), Pinterest (2016b), Twitter (2016b), Snapchat (2016b), Myspace (2016b), Tumblr (2016b), Instagram (2016a), ASKfm (2016b), Badoo (2016a), Youtube (Google, 2016), Reddit (2016b), LinkedIn (2016b), Flickr (Yahoo, 2016b), Foursquare (2016b) and Wordpress (2016). These guidelines aim to explain the processes involved in submitting a request for information. One of the key processes for supporting law enforcement when interacting with social network platforms is the preservation order, allowing potentially evidential account data to be stored (not disclosed), pending relevant legal authority. Here, requests can be made to preserve data in connection with an offence, providing the correct legal authority is obtained for future disclosure, where generally a 90 period of preservation is set (Brunty and Helenek, 2014). For example, Facebook will preserve account data for 90 once relevant legal requests have been made (Facebook, 2016d). A 90 day preservation period is also obtainable from Twitter (2016b), Tumblr (2016b), ASKfm (2016b), Reddit (2016b), Instagram (2016a), Foursquare (2016b), Flickr (Yahoo, 2016b), LinkedIn (2016b), Snapchat (2016b) (one additional 90-day period of extension can be requested in addition, making a total of 180). Myspace (2016c) preserve account data for 180 days. Wordpress (2016b) preserve data for 45 days and Pinterest’s (2016b) law enforcement guidance does not define a period of preservation. Often, the preservation order must specify the boundaries of the request in terms of time and amount of information from a specific account (Sammons, 2015). A blanket request for information may not be suitable, placing emphasis on suitable recognisance around an event to ensure that evidential information is contained within the requested period. It must also be noted that many social networks inform the account holder subject to a preservation order once it has been submitted (Sammons, 2015). Many current investigations involve Social Networking Sites. It is imperative that early consideration is made around securing Social Networking Profiles that fall within the investigation. The best evidence is available from the service provider however they are often located outside of the UK and may or may not secure the content on the appropriate request via the force CSP/ISP SPOC. As such the investigator should always secure a copy of what is seen by them as this may be the only opportunity to secure this evidence before it changes. ACPO!!!!- link in 4.2 IP logs As highlighted previously, IP log information can be a key source of information for identifying offenders. However, none of the 22 platforms clearly define their log retention period. For example, Reddit states that ‘will delete any IP addresses collected after 100 days’ (Reddit, 2016a) but does not indicate what IP information it retains and whether it stores it for at least 100 days before deletion, with Hi5 stating this information is kept indefinitely (Hi5, 2016a) and Bebo does not comment on the issue. From Table 1, it can be seen that a common stance is to indicate that IP logs are collected but to omit to determine a time frame. As with ambiguity surrounding account and content deletion policies, the lack of a determined and consistent stance on retention can be detrimental to law enforcement's ability to mount an effective investigation and in some circumstances may also deter an attempt in belief that the relevant information does not exist. 4.2.1 Request method and extracted data formats Request methods and extracted data format Establishing levels of access and engagement with social media platforms by law enforcement is difficult. The procedures associated with making a request for data vary depending on the social media platform, with limited information available. Facebook operate a ‘Law Enforcement Online Request System’ accessible and authenticated through the use of a valid law enforcement email address (also used for their associated product Instagram (2017)) (Facebook, 2017). Instagram highlight that those who do not submit via the law enforcement portal (opting for mail or email), then longer response rates may be witnessed (Instagram (2016a)). This process should be compared with services such as Myspace who simply offer contact methods of fax, mail or email, directed towards an appropriate legal department (Myspace (2016c)). In addition, there is limited information available within available policy information on the platforms analysed to indicate expected request response times. Establishing the format which law enforcement will receive any retained data is also difficult to ascertain due to limited disclosure of information in policy information. Twitter (2016b) indicate that content will be provided in electronic format which can be opened using generic word processing software. Further, Google's ‘Takeout’ function allows standard users to download an archive of their data containing information relating to Google's various products, where the format of data varies depending on content (for example, contacts are provided in vCard form, Google Drive documents provided in Microsoft Office associated formats). Although not stated, a similar standard for extracted data may be adopted for law enforcement, but this would need to be established on a case by case basis. 4.3 Location and cooperation Location has an impact on communication and cooperation with the provision in question. Of the 22 platforms analysed, 20 are based in the United States (US) and are governed by US law, with ASKfm is based in Dublin and Badoo in UK. Therefore those operating outside of these locations must seek cross-jurisdictional compliance with these organisations which may not in all circumstances be straightforward, and costly in terms of time and money. This can sometimes be achieved through Mutual Legal Assistance (MLA), which ‘is a method of cooperation between states for obtaining assistance in the investigation or prosecution of criminal offences. MLA is generally used for obtaining material that cannot be obtained on a police cooperation basis, particularly enquiries that require coercive means’ (Gov.uk, 2016). However, cooperation with social network provision is not guaranteed, a problem which has become a somewhat controversial matter of discussion in recent years, centering around arguments of freedom of speech, privacy and alleged government spying regimes. For example, The Select Committee on Communications (2014) indicated that recently, French authorities had to endure a lengthy court battle with Twitter for the disclosure of account details for those posting of anti-Semitic tweets. Twitter’s (2016e) Transparency Report surrounding received information requests, indicates that compliance can vary. The United Kingdom (UK), Japan and US form the 3 current biggest requesters of data from Twitter. From statistics reported from January to June 2016, information was supplied by Twitter in 82% of requests from the US, 61% from Japan and 76% from the UK. When taken in context, 453 requests for information from the US were unsuccessful, 282 from Japan and 151 from the UK. In comparison, Facebook’s (2016h) Government Request Report shows the US, India and UK to be the biggest requesters. From statistics reported from July to December 2015, information was supplied by Facebook in 81% of requests from the US, 51% from India and 82% from UK. When taken in context, 3654 requests for information from the US were unsuccessful, 2724 from India and 754 from the UK. In these circumstances, potentially evidential information may have been withheld, potentially prohibiting an investigation. 4.4 Recent developments in the United Kingdom: Investigatory Powers Act 2016 With a focus on developments within the United Kingdom, the recent enactment of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 and its potential impact on social media investigations must be 8 G. Horsman / Digital Investigation xxx (2017) 1e11 Please cite this article in press as: Horsman, G., A survey of current social network and online communication provision policies to support law enforcement identify offenders, Digital Investigation (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.diin.2017.03.001 considered. Often termed the ‘Snoopers Charter’, the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 (IPA16) received royal assent on the 29th November 2016. Despite receiving criticism for implementing various powers considered by some as being for the purposes of mass surveillance through bulk data retention, the IPA16 came into force on December 30th 2016 and its many powers include the facilitation of the preservation of Internet Connection Records (ICRs) for 12 months by telecommunications service. ICRs are defined under section 62(7) IPA16 as records of the visits made to online services and websites by a user, used to examine where a user has been online. This is elaborated by the Home Office's (2016a, p17) Communications Data Draft Code of Practice stating ‘an ICR will only identify the service that a customer has been using. It is not intended to show what a customer has been doing on that service’. Yet, the bulk maintenance of ICRs by Internet Service Providers may only provide limited assistance in social media investigations (by potentially determining if a user has accessed a particular platform) due to the fundamental limitations imposed by an ICR, particularly in relation to the user of mobile device social media applications. This was reported by Adrian Kennard (2015), Managing Director Internet Service Provider Andrews & Arnold Ltd to the Joint Committee on the Draft Investigatory Powers Bill who stated that even ‘if the mobile provider was even able to tell that she had used twitter at all (which is not as easy as it sounds), it would show that the phone had been connected to twitter 24 h a day, and probably Facebook as well. This is because the very nature of messaging and social media applications is that they stay connected so that they can quickly alert you to messages, calls, or amusing cat videos, without any delay’. Despite this being an issue with retained service provider information, the IPA16s deliberately wide definition of ‘telecommunications service’ still may provide some assistance to law enforcement. The Home Office's (2016b, p6) Interception of Communications Draft Code of Practice indicates that ‘Internet based services such as web-based email, messaging applications and cloud-based services are, therefore, covered by this definition’, where Smith (2016) indicates that social media services would be incorporated. In addition, the powers of the IPA16 extend to ‘an operator outside the UK who provides a telecommunications service to people in the UK, or controls a telecommunication system in the UK’ (Smith, 2016). Providers are under an obligation to take reasonable practicable steps to give effect to any served warrant (see section 43 IPA16), regardless of their geographical location (Stringer, 2017). Therefore powers under the IPA16 are potentially enforceable via injunction against foreign social media providers (noted previously in Section “Location and cooperation” in relation to geographical location of many providers) subject to potential conflict with any foreign jurisdictional conflict (Smith, 2016). In such instances, social media providers may be required not only to maintain information regarding accesses to their platforms, but in turn, disclose this information subject to the correct legal processes being followed. 5 Concluding thoughts As shown above, there are two main areas which currently pose an issue in the regulation of social network crime, account validation and retention policies. First, account validation remains a clear issue and is unlikely to be addressed soon. Validated accounts would not only allow effective identification but also act as a deterrent to individuals as the perceived anonymity offered by the Internet is partially combatted. Yet as already highlighted, the processes needed to achieve this are unlikely to be favourably adopted by social network services. Second, data retention also remains an issue, and one which is likely going to get worse, largely due to the significant volumes of traffic witnessed across these platforms. At present, the task of retaining data is onerous and in absence of legal regulations forcing retention, the task of doing so is simply voluntary. Retaining all data indefinitely is not feasible and not necessarily needed, and to some extend, retention is already occurring. However, to improve current processes, clarity, transparency and consistency of retention processes is needed, an issue shown in Table 1. It is proposed that the global adoption of a single standard for retaining data in terms of length of time and type is required for all social network services, yet the feasibility of achieving this without legal regulation is debatable. Ideally, IP logs should be maintained for long enough for this information to support investigatory processes, yet arbitrarily defining a period of time is not effective. Instead, collaboration between platforms must take place with law enforcement organisations to ensure that the data is retained for long enough to cover the period from first reporting of a crime by a victim up until legal processes are suitably activated to secure the disclosure of information. Preservation orders (as discussed above) provide some support but it is necessary to scrutinise further whether the commonly define period of 90 days is long enough to meet the required standard for disclosure of information from the service in question. Transparency in data retention times may also serve as a deterrent to those utilising the platforms. Where clear guidance is given regarding how long user actions are maintained, there may be a greater chance of potential offenders not breaching regulations in fear of detection. Achieving satisfactory retention of data must be balanced against the right for privacy and freedom of speak, a debate which is likely to continue for some time. 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work_rgeljdn32nhw3bibb6uhh5nksm	----	religions Article Mistaken Identities: The Media and Parental Ethno-Religious Socialization in a Midwestern Sikh Community Meenal Rana 1,*, Desiree B. Qin 2 and Carmina Vital-Gonzalez 3 1 Child Development, Humboldt State University, Arcata, CA 95521, USA 2 Human Development and Family Studies, Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI 48823, USA; qindesiree@gmail.com 3 Psychology, California State University Chico, Chico, CA 95929, USA; cvital@mail.csuchico.edu * Correspondence: meenal.rana@humboldt.edu Received: 24 July 2019; Accepted: 30 September 2019; Published: 12 October 2019 ���������� ������� Abstract: Strong anti-Islamic sentiments increased dramatically after the 9/11 terror attacks on the United States, leading to an uptick in prejudice and the perpetration of hate crimes targeting Muslims. Sikh men and boys, often mistaken for Muslims, suffered as collateral damage. The overall health of both communities has been adversely affected by these experiences. Faced with such realities, communities and parents often adopt adaptive behaviors to foster healthy development in their children. In this paper, drawing on interviews with 23 Sikh parents from 12 families, we examine Sikh parents’ ethno-religious socialization of their children. The confluence of media stereotyping and mistaken identities has shaped Sikh parents’ beliefs regarding their children’s retention/relinquishment of outward identity markers. Sikh parents, in general, are concerned about the safety of their boys, due to the distinctive appearance of their religious markers, such as the turban. They are engaged in a constant struggle to ensure that their children are not identified as Muslims and to protect them from potential harm. In most of the families in our study, boys were raised to give up wearing the indicators of their ethno-religious group. In addition, many parents took responsibility for educating the wider community about their ethno-religious practices through direct communication, participation in cultural events, and support of other ethno-religious minorities. Policy implications are discussed. Keywords: parent ethno-religious socialization; mistaken identities; stereotypical media images; identity markers; Sikhism 1. Introduction On a Sunday morning in August 2012, an American named Michael Page attacked a Gurdwara (Sikh temple) in Oak Creek, Wisconsin. He killed five men and one woman; all five male victims were wearing their turbans, an integral part of their religious faith (Gast 2012). In another incident a turban-wearing New Yorker, Sandeep Singh, was run over by a pickup truck. The driver, Joseph Caleca, called Singh a “terrorist” after dragging him for some distance with his vehicle (Dubensky 2015). In a more recent incident, a gunman shot a Sikh man in Kent, Washington (Le 2017). Similar hate crimes against Sikhs have proliferated since 9/11. Since the election of President Trump, Islamophobia and anti-immigrant bigotry, fear, hatred, and otherization have intensified (Sunar 2017). The role of the media in constructing the stereotypical portrayal of Muslims and the effects of that image on Muslim communities in the United States have been well reported (Abbas 2004). Moreover, the portrayal of Muslims in popular media has intensified stereotypical images of several other ethno-religious groups in the United States, among them Sikhs Religions 2019, 10, 571; doi:10.3390/rel10100571 www.mdpi.com/journal/religions http://www.mdpi.com/journal/religions http://www.mdpi.com http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/rel10100571 http://www.mdpi.com/journal/religions https://www.mdpi.com/2077-1444/10/10/571?type=check_update&version=2 Religions 2019, 10, 571 2 of 19 (Ahluwalia and Pellettiere 2010; Kromidas 2004; Kumar 2016). The influence of popular media in stigmatizing ethno-religious minority families and their socialization practices is an understudied phenomenon. Superficial understanding of intergroup differences often gives rise to misidentification of minorities on the basis of appearance alone. In the United States, the media often mistakes Sikh men and boys for Muslims because of perceived similarities in their appearance (e.g., turbans and beards). The physical and mental health of both Muslim and Sikh communities have suffered similarly (Ahluwalia and Pellettiere 2010; Kumar 2016). A 2013 survey conducted by The Pluralism Project (2013) at Harvard University shows that since 9/11 about 83% of Sikhs have either experienced hate crimes or known someone who has fallen victim to bigotry. A study conducted by The Sikh Coalition (2014) shows that 50% of Sikh children are bullied at school; when the sample is restricted to practicing Sikhs who wear turbans, the number is even higher (67%). Nevertheless, few studies have examined how Sikh immigrant communities and families deal with the elevated hostility and discrimination engendered by prejudicial representation in popular media. In addition to its contribution to existing research on immigrant parent socialization, more specifically ethno-religious socialization and discrimination, our study adds to the scant body of research on the role of popular media in stereotyping certain groups and creating “otherization.” More importantly, our study acknowledges that popular media plays an important role in Sikh families’ parental ethno-religious socialization. The turban worn by Sikh men, one of the articles of their faith, is particularly implicated in the aforementioned problem of misidentification. The turban has deep-rooted historic and religious significance for Sikh men; they believe it is a gift from their Gurus, and wear it as an assertion of equality among all people. It also represents faithfulness to the Sikh values of service, compassion, and justice (Guru Nanak Mission 2008). In the face of multiple pressures—globalization, individual choice, societal pressure, and religious prejudice—Sikh men and boys must consciously decide whether or not to continue wearing their turbans. The former option does not necessarily constitute alienation from the deep-rooted spiritual values of the religion, but is instead an adapted form of religiosity. This paper focuses on the role of stereotyping and mistaken identity in Sikh parents’ ethno-religious socialization of their children, particularly with regard to boys, who are more prone to misidentification and more often than not prioritized within traditional families. Since boys and men are more vulnerable to bullying and discrimination due to their outward identity markers, the focus of this study was ethno-religious socialization of boys. 1.1. The Sikh Community in the United States There have been three waves of Sikh immigration to the United States: (1) Farm laborers and railroad workers migrated to California in the 1800s; (2) post-1965 Hart-Cellar Act new immigrants, seeking higher education and family reunification; and (3) asylum seekers, who came in the late 1980s and early 1990s following the Hindu-Sikh riots in India (Crossette 2004). The vast majority of Sikh immigrants to the United States come from India (Mann 2006). There are currently approximately 280,000 Sikhs in the United States, accounting for 10% of all Asian Indians (The Association of Religious Data Archives 2010). According to the American Sikh Organization, this number could, in fact, be as large as 500,000 (Pew Forum 2012). The majority of Sikhs speak Punjabi as their first language. Similar to many other immigrant groups in the United States, Sikhs have put down roots, built homes, established communities, demonstrated their patriotism by purchasing or leasing agricultural lands, and joined the military (Mann 2006). However, their integration into American culture has been fraught in some regards; certain workplaces, for example, prohibit head coverings, facial hair, jewelry, and weapons. The exterior markers of Sikh identity include long hair worn in a turban, a blunt sword, and a steel bracelet—symbolic representations of holiness, leadership, order, justice, protection for the weak, strength, and integrity (Guru Nanak Mission 2008). After the 9/11 attacks, the turban was invoked in the racial profiling used by counter-terrorism surveillance technologies (Puar and Rai 2002). As a result of the ensuing problem of misidentification, Sikh Religions 2019, 10, 571 3 of 19 communities have found support in collective practices that serve as antidotes to negative stereotypes (Ahluwalia and Pellettiere 2010; Kurien 2014). The media-influenced marginalization of Sikh communities has been especially challenging for parents as they negotiate the ethno-religious socialization of their children. There is limited (and somewhat dated) research available on Sikh families and children: One notable example is Gibson (1989) study of Sikh American students’ strong performance in schools despite their limited language abilities, cultural differences, and subjection to prejudice. Another study, which examined the immediate after-effects of 9/11 on Sikh youth in American schools, found that many Sikh students were altering their appearances in order to fit in with the mainstream (Verma 2005). A more recent qualitative phenomenological study examined how five Sikh men coped with the experiences of discrimination in New York City after 9/11 (Ahluwalia and Pellettiere 2010). Nonetheless, few studies have examined how Sikh immigrant families and communities engage in ethno-religious socialization with their children in view of media-generated stereotyping. 1.2. Parental Racial/Ethno-Religious Socialization In addition to fostering individual child development, minority parents must socialize their children to construct and negotiate their ethnic identities across two or more cultures, languages, and often nations (García-Coll et al. 1996). The manner in which parents transmit information, values, and perspectives pertaining to ethnicity and race to their children is commonly referred to as ethnic or racial socialization (Hughes et al. 2006). Ethnic/racial socialization includes parental practices that promote cultural, racial, and ethnic pride; create mistrust of other groups; and prepare their children for potential racism. This socialization could be proactive or reactive, overt or covert, and initiated by children or parents (Hughes et al. 2006; Umaña-Taylor and Fine 2004). Proactive socialization involves preparing children for prejudice and discrimination they might encounter. Reactive socialization is the processing done with children after encounters with discriminatory behaviors. Parents may use direct messages such as “you should be proud to be a Sikh”, i.e., overt socialization; or they may take them to Gurdwara (Sikh temple) to observe the community’s various religious practices, i.e., covert socialization. These interactions may be initiated by children as well as by parents (Hughes et al. 2006). Parents may use modeling, encourage their children to attend church or temple, take them to community gatherings, supply relevant literature, tell stories about the history of their race and religion, and share advice about socializing their children (Hughes et al. 2006). Immigrant parents keep in touch with their extended family members in their home country—another means of maintaining their cultural ties (Ferguson et al. 2016). Parents’ ethnic/racial socialization of their children is affected by individual experiences of discrimination (Caughy et al. 2002), along with immigration history, current status in the host country, connections with home country, and social capital embedded in the community (Berry and Sam 1997; Okagaki and Bingham 2005; Yosso 2005). According to the integrative model of child development proposed by García-Coll et al. (1996), social constructs such as racism, discrimination, and oppression can promote adaptive parenting socialization strategies designed to help children cope with discrimination and bolster their self-image. Sikh parents must negotiate the conflict between their religious values (i.e., egalitarianism, fearlessness, and social justice) and the need to prepare their sons for fallout discrimination in the current Islamophobic environment. The safety of their children must be their top priority. Some ethno-religious considerations in Sikh families’ socialization might include: Intergenerational relationships, the history of Sikhism, the acculturation gap between parents and children, sense of community, and role of extended family members in raising children. There are studies of ethnic and racial socialization in African American families and minorities such as Latino Americans (Hughes 2003; Romero et al. 2000; Umaña-Taylor and Fine 2004), Asian American families, and transracial adoptees (Yoon 2004). There is, however, a significant paucity of research on parental ethno-religious socialization practices in immigrant and minority families, more specifically Religions 2019, 10, 571 4 of 19 Sikh families. The few studies on Asian Indian parents, for example, gloss over the Sikh community’s identity as a separate ethnic group (Inman et al. 2007). Differentiating between religion and ethnicity is often difficult. Often, parents socialize their children via religious practices, thus integrating religion into their ethnic identity. This paper hence considers the two variables as a single construct: Ethno-religious identity (Stout 1975). Sikh parents may want their children to internalize religious values (i.e., equality, service, social justice, fearlessness, strength, honesty) and cultural values (i.e., respect for elders, sharing food, etc.) at the same time. Oftentimes, the religious and cultural values are intertwined. For example, the value of sharing food is connected to service in Sikhism. The community lunch, langar, is thus an ethno-religious event. Similarly, the outward markers of Sikhism evidence cultural and religious integration. These markers are associated mainly with boys, who are traditionally viewed as transmitters of the religion to the next generation. Drawing on Bronfenbrenner’s bioecological framework (Bronfenbrenner 1979), we examine Sikh immigrant parents’ ethno-religious socialization strategies given the Islamophobic environment, media-induced misidentification, and ethno-religious community support. We integrate parent socialization practices (Hughes et al. 2006) and adaptive parenting strategies (García-Coll et al. 1996) into the microsystem layer (i.e., innermost layer with proximal processes) of the model. We also examine how parenting strategies are affected by the parents’ education, occupations, and personal ethno-religious experiences and identities. According to Bronfenbrenner, there are bidirectional processes within the microsystem: Family-driven socialization of the children, and youth-driven socialization of the parents (Umaña-Taylor et al. 2013). In this paper, we focus on the parents’ point of view. At the macrolevel, we integrate the role played by popular media in stereotyping minorities, which might affect Sikh parents’ ethno-religious socialization of their sons on both the familial and community levels (Matin et al. 2008). The media have similarly affected African American parental socialization of their sons. Studies show that their priority is to protect their sons from harm, more specifically according to a recent study, by “disavowing the thug image of African American males” (Dow 2016, p. 161). In Dow’s study, 60 mothers, from both the upper and middle classes, reported using four different strategies to manage their sons’ “thug” image. They facilitated their sons’ experiences in different environments in order to expose them to different cultures, subcultures, and communication styles. They managed the environment by guiding their sons’ regular social interactions. These mothers were also engaged in minimizing their sons’ images and emotions by encouraging or discouraging certain appearances/behaviors, such as “not allowing their sons to wear hoodies” or “making them join some relaxation classes to control their emotions during negative interactions with other peers or teachers in schools” (p. 181). The goals of gender socialization of boys in African American families—to foster self-reliance and “mistrust” for others when it comes to displaying their masculinity—may be incongruent with their values of “community, communalism, and cooperation” (Howard et al. 2013, p. 227). The parents in the study encouraged their sons to avoid displaying masculinity and to stay away from other groups in order to protect themselves from harm. African American parents also reported using “barrier socialization”, explaining to their children about the kinds of difficulties they might face due to a less positive evaluation of their race (Smalls and Cooper 2012). Along the same lines, this paper examines the different strategies Sikh parents use to socialize their boys. 1.3. The Role of Popular Media in Framing Public Perception In addition to current events and news, the mass media deals with “social norms, customs, and standards ranging from behaviors to beauty” (Mok 1998, p. 185). The media contributes to shaping dominant narratives in public discourse, including attitudes toward immigrant and minority groups (Angeles 2010). According to Matin et al. (2008), the macro level factors such as media depictions and the sociopolitical environment interact with each other to stigmatize certain groups. In this paper, we Religions 2019, 10, 571 5 of 19 refer popular media as mainstream news media, not the social media or other forms of mass media. When the media does not deliver an impartial, accurate or balanced picture of a particular group, the distorted impressions created are usually too powerful to be corrected by rational interpretation, especially when consumers have limited exposure to cultural diversity. For example, according to the Sikh American Legal Defense and Education Fund (SALDEF 2011), “on 6 May 2011, CNN and the Financial Times published online articles about Osama bin Laden using images of a Sikh to supplement the news stories. Both images were featured on the outlets’ homepages and were likely viewed by millions of readers”. The SALDEF made both outlets aware and managed to have the images removed after a few hours, but such misrepresentations often go unnoticed. Biased media representation of a particular group leads to stereotyping. For example, media portrayal of Mexican immigrants crossing the borders without documentation causes some people to regard all Mexicans as “undocumented”. Media portrayal of Asian Americans as a “model minority” engenders the view that “all” Asians perform well academically and professionally. Likewise, the association of crimes with African Americans and Latino Americans can shape racial attitudes towards these groups (Holt 2013). Media stereotypes often contribute to such prejudice and discrimination on the basis of gender, race, nationality, religious affiliation, and sexual orientation, for disadvantaged groups (Bennett 2000; Bush and Furnham 2013; Holt 2013; Mok 1998; Plakoyiannaki and Zotos 2009; Saracho and Spodek 2007). The media representation of Muslims has always been problematic. According to a meta-analysis of 345 studies conducted between 2000 and 2015, most studies on Muslims and Islam are conducted in the United States followed by United Kingdom, Australia, and Canada, all non-Muslim majority countries, from a “White man’s” perspective and limited or no Muslim voices in them (Ahmed and Matthes 2017). The 9/11 attacks had exacerbated the already negative representation of Islam as an “irrationally violent, monolithic, homogenized, and sexist religion” and Muslims framed as “uncivilized, militants, terrorists, oppressing their women, and against us” (p. 4). There have been increased anti-Muslim sentiments since Donald Trump took the President’s office, which has led to direct physical and verbal attacks on Muslims and other ethno-religious minorities including Sikhs. These attitudes against a certain group have strong implications for mental health and general well-being (Ewart and Kate 2018). Still this topic is missing from the academic conversations. The media plays an important role shaping the racial attitudes of both children and adults. Ponterotto and Pedersen (1993) observed, “Children, adolescents, and adults develop perceptions of racial/ethnic groups consistent with the way members of these groups are portrayed (or not portrayed) in the media” (p. 32). Kromidas (2004) captured reactions to post-9/11 images of Muslims among a group of 8–9-year-olds in a New York City school. The children expressed bias and negativity, saying that Muslims “like money”, “like to kill people”, “don’t talk English”, “eat out of dirty pots”, “are poor”, “are terrorists”, and “have long hair” (p. 20). Many children reported acquiring these ideas from media representations. In a recent study by Brown et al. (2017), these negative attitudes towards Muslims have not changed much. The U.S. children in the study did not consider Muslim children as Americans, based on their knowledge from media, unless they have prior contacts with Muslim children. In another study, Hussain (2010), a professor of theological studies, noted that when he asked college students about their perception of “Islam” in the months following 9/11, their typically negative perceptions were based on popular media images. In all its modalities, the media enacts powerful public pedagogies that shape the social identities of children, family, gender, and race (Luke 1994, p. 340). This influence is manifested not only in prejudices and stereotypes, but also in the adaptive parenting practices of minority families as they try to protect their children and to help them navigate the world (García-Coll et al. 1996). According to a more recent study of Mexican parents, Cruz-Santiago and García (2011) noted that parents often use a combination of control and support strategies—i.e., adaptive parenting strategies—to protect their children from the dangers of society. The fact that American popular media has often misrepresented Sikh men as terrorists because of their turbans and beards (Joshi 2006) has become an important context for Sikh parents in their Religions 2019, 10, 571 6 of 19 ethno-religious socialization of their children. This paper addresses the following two research questions: (1) How do members of a small Midwestern Sikh community, particularly parents, perceive media portrayals of Muslims and Sikhs after 9/11?; (2) How do those perceptions shape the ethno-religious socialization of their children? In addition to popular United States media, we also examine how Sikh heritage media feature in parents’ ethno-religious socialization of their children, especially boys. 2. Methods The paper draws on data from a larger ethnographic study that investigated Sikh parental ethno-religious socialization practices in a Midwestern community in 2011–2012. The study consisted of more than 90 h of ethnographic fieldwork data and in-depth interviews with 23 Sikh parents (11 mothers and 12 fathers). For this paper, we draw on in-depth interview data regarding how Sikh parents perceive media portrayal of Sikhs and how these perceptions influence their ethno-religious socialization practices. 2.1. Sikh Family Contexts The parents in this study are part of a small Sikh community (roughly 50 Sikh families) in a Midwestern town of about 116,000 (Lansing, Michigan population: Census 2010 Interactive Map, Demographics, Statistics, Quick Facts). In terms of migration history, nine out of the 12 male participants in the study first migrated to New York between 1984 and 1994 as adolescents or young adults. In many cases, their first jobs were as taxi drivers. Of these nine men, all but one traveled to India to marry Indian Sikh women; one married a Sikh woman whose parents had also migrated to NY from India. In the late 1990s, after starting their own families, they moved to a small Midwestern town where they had existing networks (e.g., extended family members, friends, someone from their Indian village) in place. When asked why they chose to move here, they mentioned a few more reasons: (1) Relatively good quality public schools in the area; (2) the close-knit Sikh community, where “they could live as if they were living in a small village in India”; (3) the opportunity to exercise social control, through ethno-religious community, in child rearing due to the small geographical area of the town; and, (4) many men in the community valued the ownership of convenience stores and viewed it as a sign of upward social mobility. Three of the male participants came directly to this Midwestern town because of pre-existing networks; they were married in India before migrating. The elderly members of the community founded the Gurdwara (Sikh temple) in 2004 to help families keep their children connected to their ethno-religious heritage. The community gathers every Sunday at Gurdwara for worship and community lunch, taking pride in sharing their food and culture with guests from different backgrounds. 2.2. Access to the Community The first author, who is a native Hindi speaker, immersed herself in the community Gurdwara. There was some initial skepticism about her intentions, given that she was neither a Sikh nor a native Punjabi speaker, but she soon began building rapport with the community. She spent almost every Sunday for 10 months attending services, community lunches (known as langar), festivals, and community events. She earned the trust of community members by actively engaging in various services in the Gurdwara (known as Sewa, one of the values of Sikhism) such as starting a playgroup to involve young children in meaningful activities during the service, helping the women in the community kitchen, and tutoring young children. The first author is a native Hindi speaker from the state of Haryana in northern India, which is adjacent to Punjab. These existing linguistic ties between the two languages facilitated communication in this study. The second author, a Chinese American female, was the first author’s dissertation advisor. Religions 2019, 10, 571 7 of 19 2.3. Participants The study was approved by the Institutional Review Board (IRB) at the first and second authors’ university at the time of data collection. The participant selection criteria called for families who attended the Gurdwara frequently and who had at least one son between the ages of 10 and 18. All but one of the participating families (one father was a widower) were two-parent families—a highly valued norm in Indian society (Singh 2011). Participants were asked to sign informed consent forms and culturally appropriate pseudonyms are used in our paper to protect their anonymity. “Singh”, the last name for all male participants, and “Kaur”, the last name for all female participants, have their origin in Sikh history. Sikhism originated with the idea of creating equality among its followers and protecting its people, especially women and children, from the atrocities of Muslim rulers. The uniform last name is grounded in the principle of equality. We use Singh and Kaur as last names and pseudonyms for first names. Table 1 presents the demographics of the participants. Table 1. Demographics of the participants. Parents Characteristics Father (N = 12) Mother (N = 11) Mean Age (years) 42 (SD = 2.6) 37 (SD = 3.8) Education College graduates = 2 High school = 7 High school dropouts = 3 College graduates = 2 Some college = 2 High school = 4 High school dropouts = 3 Occupation Convenience Stores = 11 Auto insurance agent = 1 * Professional = 1 Homemakers = 4 Full time convenience stores = 2 Half time convenience stores = 2 Hospital = 2 Professional = 1 * One father began working as an auto insurance agent in addition to owning a convenience store. The mean ages of the fathers and mothers at the time of the interviews were 42 and 37 years, respectively. All but one of the men owned convenience stores, a common occupation in this community. Four women were homemakers, two worked full-time, and two half time, at their families’ convenience stores; two worked at a local hospital and one was a professional. The women and children attended the Gurdwara more frequently than the men, who were occupied at their convenience stores on Sundays. All convenience stores owned by the families were located in rough and distressed neighborhoods. Most participants in the study lived in three different neighborhoods, not where the stores were located. Two families lived in upper middle class, predominantly white and Asian neighborhoods. The other ten lived in middle (N = 7) and lower class (N=3) neighborhoods along with other minority groups. The children of the community went to public schools in the area, where they interacted with children from other cultural and religious backgrounds. Since most men migrated to the United States as either adolescents or young adults and assumed work and family responsibilities early on, over half of them had no post-secondary education. At least four women had attended or graduated from college. Many of the fathers took pride in their economic prosperity though they were not asked about their income. National trends of occupation and education among the Sikh community are not noted in the literature. The 12 families that participated had a total of 35 children (2–4 children per family): 25 males and 10 females aged 4 to 21 (mean age = 12.8 years; SD = 4.65). The home language was Punjabi. Children used Punjabi to communicate with their parents and other community members, but they spoke English to one another. 2.4. Data Collection The first author gathered the data for this study. In all but two interviews, the questions were asked in Hindi and the answers were provided in Punjabi. On average, each interview lasted for about 45 min. Parents were interviewed separately. Of the twelve fathers, five were interviewed in their Religions 2019, 10, 571 8 of 19 homes and seven at their convenience stores. Ten of the eleven mothers were interviewed in their homes and one at the family’s store. The topics covered in the interviews included immigration history, adaptation to the United States, parents’/grandparents’ socialization goals, the Sikh religion and its role in child rearing, the role of the Sikh community in parenting/grandparenting, media images of Muslims and their impact on the Sikh community, and issues of racism and discrimination. The researcher’s ongoing involvement in the community facilitated the development of culturally appropriate questions designed to elicit meaningful responses from the participants (Gallagher-Thompson et al. 2003). In addition to the interview data, we also draw on the first-author ’s extensive ethnographic fieldwork notes from conversations with community members and observations of interactions during Sunday services and community lunches, festivals, and functions. 2.5. Data Analysis The interviews were recorded, transcribed, and translated into English. A native Punjabi speaker checked 30% of the transcripts to ensure the accuracy of transcription and translation and confirmed about 98% accuracy in translation. We addressed the 2% discrepancies by asking this person clarifying questions and reworking the transcripts. We used the qualitative software, Nvivo 9 to code the translated data. Though she came from a similar background and geographical origin as the participants, the first author was still an outsider: Not a fluent Punjabi speaker, not a Sikh, and with a different migration history. Reflecting on how these characteristics might have affected the data analysis process helped eliminate personal bias. The first author, along with the third author (a native English speaker) coded the interview and ethnographic fieldwork data, identifying common themes related to the effects of media. Interview transcripts and relevant ethnographic field notes were reviewed several times to create tentative labels for open coding. Examples included “grandparents bringing literature for congregation” and “books and reading materials on Sikhs”. For the axial coding, we identified relationships among the open codes, for example the relationship between the above two codes was labeled “cultural socialization”. Following that, we determined core variables that encompassed most of the data in certain categories, a process known as selective coding. For example, The Role of Sikh Media in Ethno-religious Socialization. The process involved rereading data to group it under selective codes (Strauss and Corbin 1998). The authors met 3–4 times for 30–45 min each to check accuracy and consistency in coding. A Sikh professional, not from this community, was consulted to explain religious and cultural nuances in the manuscript, for example the historical context of the last names “Singh” and “Kaur”. 3. Findings Our analyses suggest that our participants were keenly aware of media misrepresentation and confusion of Sikhs and Muslims as well as elevated levels of hate crimes and discrimination after 9/11. The majority had elected to have their sons give up outward markers of religious identity in order to protect them. They also actively engaged in both community and personal efforts to educate the general public about their culture and religion and used Sikh media to socialize their children in their ethno-religious development. Below we present four major themes related to the role of popular media: (1) Parental identity markers, (2) parental decisions about their sons’ identity markers, (3) parental strategies to counter mistaken identity representation in the wider community, and (4) the role of media in ethno-religious socialization of the children. 3.1. Parental Identity Markers The interviewees explicitly addressed the connection between media images and their ethno-religious identity and expression thereof. For example, one of the participants said, “They [mainstream] have hard time differentiating between Sikhs and Muslims. And it is not their fault. Media portrays us all the same.” After 9/11 and the ensuing media misrepresentation, many Sikh parents Religions 2019, 10, 571 9 of 19 reported feeling set apart by their appearance, but endeavored to make sense of their experiences. This could be attributable to their resilience or to internalization of their experiences with discrimination. Amrit Singh, the father of two daughters and a son, commented, “Media made a big deal out of it . . . you know there were some hatred crimes against Muslims and Sikhs and we look alike because we wear turbans like Arabs.” Gurpreet Singh, the father of three sons, discussed increased surveillance at airports post 9/11: After 9/11, it is just impossible to pass the security without having any hassles. In the beginning right after that, they would ask us to take out our turban, but these days, they just check without asking to take it off. However, if they suspect someone, then they make sure that the person takes off his turban. It is a problem, but I also believe that this is a safety issue. If I have to take off turban for officers to ensure safety for 700-1000 people traveling in day, why not? The participants shared a wide variety of personal considerations with regard to their outward appearance. Amrit Singh reported that neither he nor his family had ever faced any problems though his discomfort after 9/11 caused him to cut his hair and change his appearance. He suggested that the media has exaggerated the hate crimes. Amrit Singh suggested that while Sikh immigrants in other areas may have faced increasing harassment and discrimination post 9/11, he had not had problems in this small Midwestern city. Others were affected more strongly. Praneet Kaur, a professional and mother of a boy and girl, was very conscious of her looks and wanted to stay away from “the typical media image of Sikhs.” She also decided that her son would not grow his hair, as is traditional for both Sikh men and women. Males tie their hair in turbans and females wear braids, the former being more noticeable than the latter. Praneet shared, Um, I am not the typical, traditional Sikh girl. I got my hair cut . . . .I want to look good. Moreover, I do not want to look different than my colleagues. They have a typical mindset of how Sikhs look like through TV and other popular media. I want to debunk that. I don’t want to make a pigtail every single day. So for me, I have my own values that I have to be respectful to other people in the house, and that’s what I want them [my children] to know. Interestingly, a number of parents had already made the decision to not retain outward religious markers even before 9/11 occurred. Jagdeep Singh, a professional with a son and a daughter, had internalized the negative connotations: I used to have a turban till my college. I cut my hair just 6–7 months before coming to the United States. I also cut my beard after a year when I started working in [name of the American city] because I looked different, I spoke different and they were not just able to adjust with me and I assessed what was important. Was my beard so important? No . . . I wanted to make myself comfortable working with them. I wanted myself to make appealable [sic] for them to be able to work with me. Jagdeep Singh spoke in detail about the discrimination he had faced at work. He claimed on the one hand that not keeping the outward markers was his personal choice and not the result of prevalent media images, while admitting on the other hand that he made those choices because his colleagues were not comfortable with his appearance and accent. Some of the other fathers had cut their long hair and removed the turban before coming to the United States. There are several possible explanations for this phenomenon. Many fathers migrated to the United States after Hindu-Sikh riots erupted in India in 1984, following the assassination of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi by two of her Sikh bodyguards. The participants could conceivably have decided to camouflage their identities as they fled in search of asylum. The fear of persecution, anticipation of the unknown or of an unwelcoming reception in the new country or workplace, were all factors. Religions 2019, 10, 571 10 of 19 Some parents changed their appearances and later reverted. In the wake of 9/11, Amrit Singh sought to differentiate his appearance from that of Arabs. However, when Dr. Manmohan Singh, a Sikh with turban and beard, became the Prime minister of India for two terms and brought Sikhs more positive visibility in the media, he reversed this decision. He said, I had cut my hair. I was scared at the time when 9/11 happened. Many of our Sikh brothers were mistreated because these people [Americans] couldn’t see us separately from Arabs. If you see Muslims in general, not all of them grow their hair or wear turban. But people watched those images on TV, the terrorists and Muslims. So I didn’t want to grow [my hair] at that time. And now you know Manmohan Singh has been the prime minister of India for two terms. People in the world know who Sikhs are. So I have developed some confidence too (laughing). 3.2. Parental Decisions about Their Sons’ Identity Markers Fallout from media images of Muslims shaped the Sikhs’ perceptions surrounding their identity markers, as well as their ethno-religious socialization goals appropriate to their children’s retention of outward identity markers. A few families decided that their sons would keep their hair long (N = 4), others did not want their young sons to grow their hair (N = 3), and some decided to cut, or let their sons cut, their long hair after personal experiences of teasing or hearing about an incident in the community or through the media (N = 5). In the words of Harpreet Singh, the father of three sons: “No, we decided not to keep turban for our boys. I have heard that there is some bullying and teasing with kids who wear patka (a form of small turban that boys wear), so why to put my children at risk of being teased and harassed.” Praneet Kaur articulated similar views about wanting her son to fit in: “I don’t expect him to grow his hair and wear patka. I want him to be as accommodating as possible—I don’t want somebody to picking on him because he wears patka. You know what has happened in New York, in California, and at many other places after 2001. So I am okay without it.” Along the same lines, Paramjeet Kaur, the mother of two sons and one daughter was very wary of having her sons grow their hair. The media images of hate crimes and bullying against Sikhs were so strong in her mind that she did not want to rely on the solutions offered by Sikh media: No, we haven’t had that restriction since their young age. You must know if we use pagdi (turban), they may be subjected to teasing and bullying in school because we are aware by media. Actually recently media, especially Sikh media, has started propagating that there is no such thing now in schools. Sikhs are free—they can wear turban and swords in school. But no, I don’t believe it. Racism still occurs. We don’t want to put our children at risk of racism—in school people may ask them, “Why are you wearing turban in school?” Our kids should not feel embarrassed because of those things. Most parents were keenly aware of harassment incidents that occurred in other places through the popular media and expressed their strong desire to protect their children from these traumatic experiences. The parents who decided that their boys should keep the identity markers (N = 4) articulated the importance of teaching their children the meaning of the markers so that they could educate their peers and teachers in school. The children who kept their turbans were younger than the ones who had cut their hair. One possible explanation is that younger children may not be as susceptible to bullying as older children. Another is that as children grow, they get more self-conscious about their looks and care more about fitting in with their peers. Moreover, older children might have more tools to resist the authority of their parents as they strive for autonomy. The more educated parents decided not to focus on outward markers as part of their sons’ identity in first place. There is limited data regarding the degree to which this decision was affected by the media. Religions 2019, 10, 571 11 of 19 3.3. Parental Strategies to Counter Misidentification in the Wider Community The parents in the study used several strategies to counteract negative images and protect their children while helping to develop/maintain their positive ethno-religious identity. Participants also described their daily endeavors to educate people about Sikhism and to counteract media misrepresentations. Jagdeep Singh commented on interactions with his coworkers “Sometimes they ask if we are Muslims or Arabs. We tell them how different we are . . . . We also tell them about the history of Sikhism if they dig deeper.” Sukhvinder Singh, the father of two sons, shared the importance of clearing up any confusion that people may have. When asked why people confuse Sikhs with Muslims, he said, Media. The world changes quickly when they see the things happening in the world. Some people used to ask after 9/11 attack because I wear this patka, but I think I never had trouble telling them that I was a Sikh from India. Charanpreet Singh, the father of two sons and a daughter said, “Well [they do] not [ask] directly. Sometimes people ask about my headgear. I tell them. But after 9/11 happened, people used to ask me if I was a Middle Eastern or Arabic person.” The interviewer: “How did you feel?” Charanpreet Singh: “I thought they were just curious. It is always good to clarify that for them rather than letting them keep wondering—you know what I mean.” Jagdeep Singh, a professional, also talked at great length about the responsibility of educating people as to how he was different from Muslims and how Sikhism differs from Islam: They ask me for sure. It comes from how I speak. I have a heavy Punjabi accent (laughing) and of course by my last name (Singh). I tell them who I am—I have to differentiate for them if I am a Hindu, Muslim, or Sikh. Many people don’t have much exposure. Not many parents reported visiting their children’s schools other than to attend parent-teacher meetings. With two exceptions, the parents did not speak much about advocating for their children in their schools. This could be due to lack of education in the community. Sardeep Singh, the father of a son and a daughter, spoke of a certain professional who contributed to educating the wider community about Sikhism: “He would wear his turban and would go to each school and teach the children about Sikhism. He provided all the books on Sikhism in the [name of city] school libraries.” In an effort to reach out to the broader community, this Sikh community organizes a Sikh Parade every year around the time of the festival of Baisakhi in April, a spring harvest festival that marks the advent of new year in Sikh calendar. The community members invited the first author to the Sikh Day parade, an event that promotes awareness of the Sikh community. Amrit Singh shared the use of media in outreach, “We distribute books about Sikhism on the Sikh day parade. We also have lots of media coverage—newspaper, TV channels on that day.” While Sikh parents and communities have suffered negative outcomes due to popular media confusion of them as Muslims, they also adopt media tools in their efforts to reach out and educate the public. Interestingly, the Sikh community joined the protest in support of the Muslim community during an anti-Muslim event led by the Florida pastor, Terry Jones. The first author asked one of the participants what motivated the Sikh community to do so given that they usually struggle to differentiate themselves from Muslims. His response was, “This could happen to any one of us. If we stand by their side, they will stand by ours. Also the media would know that the Sikh community came forward to help the Muslim community. People would start understanding the difference better.” Overall, many fathers and community members took responsibility for educating the wider community about Sikhism and tried to prevent misidentification of Sikhs as Muslims in everyday life. This effort to differentiate themselves, as mentioned previously, was not the result of anti-Muslim sentiment. Religions 2019, 10, 571 12 of 19 3.4. The Role of Media in the Ethno-Religious Socialization of Children The parents identified the Sikh community and media as important means of ethno-religious socialization. Mothers were generally more active in connecting their children with the Gurdwara, with the support of the fathers who articulated the importance of connecting their sons to the wider Sikh community; they also valued the elderly and “wise” community members helping youth navigate the history of the Sikh religion. Parents also used transnational news to keep themselves abreast of what was happening overseas. The constant comparison of Sikh youth in India with those growing up in the United States emerged as a salient subtheme. 3.5. Cultural Socialization Parents reported using various forms of media to teach and retain the Punjabi language. Some bring Punjabi religious literature from the Gurdwara to teach their children Gurmukhi (a system of writing the Punjabi language). Others subscribe to Indian television channels. Praneet Kaur used audiotapes to teach her children about religion, This morning, I played “Japu ji Sahib path” on tape for the first time ever. This tape had translation of Japu ji sahib path in English. And it tells you a practical way of living your life. And [name of son] came and he sat there with me and he listened to it very carefully. And those are exactly the things that I would like him to get from our religion. The parents also shared that attending Gurdwara every Sunday with their children and listening to the Punjabi hymns sung by the priest also play an important role by encouraging the children to ask questions. In the Gurdwara, the management screens English translations of the Punjabi hymns so that the children can decipher their meaning. The Gurdwara also maintains a library of Punjabi books and religious scriptures for children. 3.6. Global Awareness The media also helps parents keep abreast of changes in their native Indian communities and thus influences their ethno-religious socialization decisions. Some fathers compared their children with youth growing up in India. Tejpreet Singh, father of two sons and a daughter, talked at length about drug addiction problems among youth in India. Oh yes, it has been a big news on lots of channel recently. And kids in India these days are not that respectful as we used to when we were growing up. We are losing the values of respect there. We have more of these values here. Sukhvinder Singh, the father of two boys, added: The youth in India are cutting their hair. If you watch television or read newspaper, you will see lot of them without turban now. Also these [American] people often do not understand who we are. So why bother [keeping outward identity markers]? In conclusion, parents used various media sources to educate their children about the ethno-religious practices of Sikhism. The parents shared that they used Indian media to keep themselves updated on religious and cultural life in India. 4. Discussion The experiences of Sikh communities and families have changed drastically since 9/11. They have been subjected to elevated levels of hate crimes rooted in media misrepresentation of them as Muslims. Even though Sikhs have been mistaken as Muslims and their children, especially boys, have faced bullying and discrimination, we want to emphasize that it is not okay to direct the violence and animus towards Muslim children. In this study, we examine how Sikh immigrant parents in one community Religions 2019, 10, 571 13 of 19 respond as they socialize their children, especially sons who stand out because of their outward identity markers, in this new environment. Our findings show that post 9/11, Sikh parents used adaptive parenting strategies to protect their sons from potential harm (Cruz-Santiago and García 2011; Dow 2016; García-Coll et al. 1996). While most parents in the study did not feel directly affected by media images of Muslims and the subsequent misidentification of Sikhs, media and the social environment do play an important role in their own identity as well as their ethno-religious socialization of their children. Keenly aware of the potential danger their sons may face due to media misrepresentation and report of hate crimes, the majority of parents in our study decided to encourage their sons to relinquish outward identity markers such as long hair worn in a turban. Our results confirm previous research findings on the experiences of Sikhs after 9/11 (Ahluwalia and Pellettiere 2010; Verma 2005). Many parents in the study focused on inculcating the Sikh values of service, respect, and equality by visiting the Gurdwara frequently for cultural and linguistic enculturation for their children. Our study also makes a number of important contributions to studies on immigrant and minority parent socialization. First, most studies on parent socialization have focused on ethnic-racial socialization (Hughes 2003; Hughes et al. 2006). Few studies have examined immigrant parents’ ethno-religious socialization of their children (Inman et al. 2007; Umaña-Taylor and Fine 2004; Yoon 2004). Still fewer studies have focused on the role of both mainstream and immigrant heritage media in parental socialization. Drawing on intensive ethnographic fieldwork and in-depth interviews with members of one Midwestern Sikh community, we documented parental responses to media misrepresentation and how they shape their ethno-religious socialization of their children. Previous studies have not examined the relationship between popular media and socialization. Dow (2016) study on African American parents’ attempts boys to debunk the image of “thug” through socialization confirms that the media can exacerbate negative images of certain groups, causing parents to take responsibility for protecting them from harm. Our study is an important contribution to literature on the socialization of minority boys. It also considers the important construct of ethno-religious socialization, which is understudied. The findings suggest that parental background, including education, gender, occupation, and social cognition—beliefs, perceptions, attitudes, and expectations—affects their socialization efforts (Okagaki and Bingham 2005). Only four of the twelve families decided to keep their children’s outward markers. The decision was influenced by their own experiences as well as awareness of trends in India. Parental socialization was a combination of proactive (i.e., preparing children in anticipation of prejudices) and reactive (i.e., taking action after the child has encountered the prejudice) and covert and overt strategies (Hughes et al. 2006; Umaña-Taylor and Fine 2004). Only a few parents (N = 2) were able to advocate for their children in schools or to educate others about their ethno-religious practices in schools. This could be a function of lack of education and language skills. Moreover, parents who were more educated decided not to focus on outward markers as part of their sons’ outward identity markers in the first place. This decision could be attributed to fear of more discrimination, internalization of discrimination, or their own conscious efforts to assimilate (Caughy et al. 2002). There were no reported gender differences in how mothers and fathers perceived media images, though mothers took a more active role in bringing their children to the Gurdwara and fathers reported a more active role in protecting their sons from potential bias and connecting them to the wider Sikh community. Since boys and men are more vulnerable to bullying and discrimination due to their outward identity markers, the focus of this study was ethno-religious socialization of boys. Our findings also show that racism against Sikh children and families existed before 9/11. When these Sikh families moved to the small Midwestern town from NYC in the 1990s, there was little awareness of the Sikh faith in the area; many children in the Sikh community were teased and bullied based on their outward identity markers. After 9/11, things intensified. The confluence of media news and lack of awareness in the broader US community has shaped Sikh parents’ ideologies that are appropriate to their children’s retention of outward identity markers and their attempts to protect their children from bigotry. We collected this data in 2011–2012. We could only speculate that Religions 2019, 10, 571 14 of 19 anti-immigrant and anti-minority religions sentiments have only intensified since the enactment of Trump’s anti-immigrant policies and his anti-Muslim agenda. Our findings also show that the Sikh community and media played important roles in parents’ ethno-religious socialization practices (Bronfenbrenner 1979). The Gurdwara helped the families in their socialization goals by providing a niche for cultural and linguistic resources, religious history, and support from community members, a form of community cultural wealth (Kurien 2014; Yosso 2005). The community used educated advocates to represent their group; the annual Sikh Day parade was one of the means of educating the broader community about Sikhism. The community also supported Muslims by participating in a protest against an anti-Muslim event in the area to demonstrate solidarity against racism, discrimination, and “otherization”. The Sikh media served as a means of support for parental cultural socialization and an antidote to the images of Muslims (or Sikhs mistaken for Muslims) as they appear in the popular media. The media images of “9/11 terrorists” were very powerful and led people, primarily nationalists who had limited interactions with Sikh and Muslim communities, to label anyone with a turban and beard as “a terrorist”. Instances of bullying that parents were aware of included young boys being teased as girls and older boys being confused with Muslims and called “terrorists” (Verma 2005). When the media does not present balanced portrayals of a particular racial or ethnic group—positive and negative, strengths and weaknesses, triumphs and losses—the consumers often make incorrect inferences. The group that becomes the target of this biased portrayal or oppression has to assume responsibility for educating others and debunking stereotypes. Even though most participants in the study responded by giving their experiences a positive spin, many seemed to have internalized them. Negative messages about different groups can create profound implicit and explicit bias among children; these stereotypes are often solidified by media portrayal of those groups (Killen and Rutland 2011). This “education about self” process, especially when it comes to the debunking of stereotypes, could put additional pressure on members of a minority group. Sikhs often seek out their families, communities, and faith to help cope with the discrimination they face due to mistaken identity (Ahluwalia and Pellettiere 2010; Hall 2002). Social representations can become personal representations and affect the content and values that constitute one’s identity. This can pose a threat to identity development among minority communities and their members, which in turn may affect coping strategies employed by the victims (Jaspal and Cinnirella 2010). Many ethnoreligious minority group members face discrimination at various levels: Individual, institutional, and cultural (Kumar 2016). Additionally, media representations and negative stereotypes of particular groups (e.g., portraying African Americans as “violent and aggressive”, associating Muslims with “terrorist activities”, depicting Asians as “model minorities”) may threaten identity formation process in these groups (Riek et al. 2006). It is of the utmost importance to present balanced and fair social representations of different racial, ethnic, religious, national groups, and gender and sexual orientations; it is also imperative to avoid “otherization” of certain groups. Adults can play an important role in mitigating the effects of biased media representations and schools can support their students by creating environments that are more inclusive and (re)educating while debunking stereotypical representations. The media can also be beneficial to immigrant and minority communities. For example, in the present study, the parents used Sikh media to socialize their children in their religion and culture to help them form their ethno-religious identities. The mothers used various ways of teaching their children about Gurus and the history of Sikhism—audio recordings, translated audio and videotapes, storytelling, Punjabi TV channels, and translated religious scripts. The grandparents who traveled often to India brought English books about Sikhism to the Gurdwara library so that children could borrow them. Our study has a number of limitations. First, it only presents parents’ and community members’ views; the youth’s views on media, parental ethno-religious socialization, and their effects on identity are not included. It is important for future research to examine how Sikh youth themselves perceive Religions 2019, 10, 571 15 of 19 media portrayal and parental socialization efforts and construct their ethno-religious identities. Second, findings from this study cannot be generalized to other Sikh communities in the US. The small Midwestern Sikh community in our study had limited members and resources. The scenario might have been different in other Sikh communities with greater resources in urban areas where large number of immigrants settle. It is important for future research to continue to examine the role of diverse communities in supporting parental socialization. Despite these limitations, our study demonstrates that media representations are an important factor in ethno-religious socialization, one that is overlooked in extant studies on immigrant and minority parental socialization. Our study contributes to the family socialization literature regarding parental decision-making, ethno-religious socialization, influence of the media, identity and discrimination, racism and stereotyping based on race, class, gender, ethnicity, and religion. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study of ethno-religious socialization conducted in a Sikh community with a focus on popular media’s effects on adaptive parenting. Our study also adds to the limited number of studies done with children of Sikh immigrant families, a group that is experiencing elevated levels of racism and hate crimes. We also believe that this study could be replicated with Muslim parents’ socialization of their children in the face of negative portrayal of “Muslims” in media. According to The Association of Religious Data Archives (2010). estimates, there are more than four million Muslims in the United States. We need more studies on parent socialization and adaptations in other ethno-religious minority families. 5. Implications Biased media portrayals of different groups (on the basis of social constructs such as race, gender, sexuality, etc.) can have long-lasting impressions, particularly on young minds. Negative images and attitudes may make members of a certain group feel unsafe and alienated to the point of compromising their mental health. In such circumstances, ethno-religious families and communities sometimes make adaptive compromises in order to protect their children. Accurate representations of people and communities are vital to the promotion of critical thinking. There is a need for safe spaces within which open analytical discussions about sensitive issues can take place with all sides of the issue represented. Media-focused research would do well to direct its efforts at examining the role of biased messages, their tone and frequency, in the creation of stereotypes and thus foster judicious consumption of information. Adults can help by being positive role models for children and teaching young minds to be more accepting of diversity and difference while working together to establish common ground. Elementary school teachers can make a conscious effort to welcome home cultures into their classrooms through the choice of material. Teachers in higher grades can offer topics for class projects and presentations that address the differences, including media portrayal of minorities. Mental health professionals should be aware of different media portrayals of diverse groups of people and the possibility that their clients may have internalized popular images in order to understand their identity and mental health discourse (Mok 1998). These efforts are especially important in the current socio-political environment of the United States in which Islamophobia, xenophobia, and bigotry are prevalent. Stress caused by otherization, stigmatization, and stereotyping may take mental and physical tolls on the health of minority families. White mainstream families do not have to think about the racial socialization of their children. Unlike many ethno-religious minority groups, White families do not have to go through the constant loyalty test—that they could be Sikhs or Muslims and Americans at the same time. Macro level influences, such as Islamophobia, mistaken identities, bigotry, and negative portrayal of ethno-religious minority affect family dynamics and ethno-religious identity formation of youth. We know that if someone is under constant stress, the Hypothalamic-Pituitary-Adrenal axis, our bodies’ stress response, is overly stimulated and releases unhealthy amounts of cortisol that can result in health problems. Even though the Sikh parents in our study, especially fathers, took active roles in teaching the wider community about their ethno-religious practices, this ongoing responsibility Religions 2019, 10, 571 16 of 19 to educate people about their culture and religion might exacerbate the stress on their families. It is important to understand the ethno-religious practices of the group to provide culturally appropriate tools for healing. The study has implications for other ethno-religious minority groups. Author Contributions: For this research article, each authors’ contributions included: M.R. was responsible for the conceptualization, methodology, software, validation, formal analysis, investigation, resources, data curation, writing the original draft, review and editing, and supervision of the Undergraduate Assistant (C.V.-G.). D.B.Q., who supervised M.R.’s doctoral dissertation, contributed to the conceptualization, methodology and review and editing for this manuscript. C.V.-G., the undergraduate Assistant at the time of preparation of this manuscript contributed to literature review, formal analysis, and validation of data findings. Funding: This research received no external funding. Acknowledgments: We would like to thank Janine Woolfson for meticulously editing many versions of this manuscript. Thanks to all the participants for sharing their stories with us, of courage and vulnerability, as immigrant parents in socializing their sons in Sikh faith. Sincere appreciation to our cultural consultants, Praneet Randhawa, Assistant Professor, Department of Marketing and Entrepreneurship, University of Baltimore and Manohar Singh, Dean, Southern Connecticut State University, for sharing their insights on Sikhism and Punjabi language and culture. Conflicts of Interest: The authors declare no conflict of interest. References Abbas, Tahir. 2004. After 9/11: British South Asian Muslims, islamophobia, multiculturalism, and the state. The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 21: 26–38. Ahluwalia, Muninder K., and Laura Pellettiere. 2010. Sikh men post-9/11: Misidentification, discrimination, and coping. Asian American Journal of Psychology 1: 303–14. 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Available online: https://www.sikhcoalition.org/resources/go-home-terrorist-a-report-on-the- bullying-of-sikh-american-school-children/ (accessed on 11 October 2019). Umaña-Taylor, Adriana J., and Mark A. Fine. 2004. Examining ethnic identity among Mexican-origin adolescents living in the United States. Hispanic Journal of Behavioral Sciences 26: 36–59. [CrossRef] Umaña-Taylor, Adriana J., Katharine H. Zeiders, and Kimberly A. Updegraff. 2013. Family ethnic socialization and ethnic identity: A family-driven, youth-driven, or reciprocal process? Journal of Family Psychology 27: 137–46. [CrossRef] Verma, Rita. 2005. Dialogues about 9/11, the media and race: Lessons from a secondary classroom. Radical Teacher 74: 12–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/144078339403000304 http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/1099-9809.4.3.185 http://www.pewforum.org/global-religious-landscape.aspx http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/03090560910989966 http://dx.doi.org/10.1215/01642472-22-3_80-75 http://dx.doi.org/10.1207/s15327957pspr1004_4 http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/17201592 http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/(SICI)1520-6629(200001)28:1&lt;79::AID-JCOP8&gt;3.0.CO;2-N http://saldef.org/news/cnnandftimage/#.WDKn67Lx7IU http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10643-007-0199-y http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.adolescence.2011.12.007 http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/22248921 http://dx.doi.org/10.25253/99.2017193.03 http://www.thearda.com/QL2010/QuickList_113.asp http://www.thearda.com/QL2010/QuickList_113.asp http://pluralism.org/research-report/post-9-11-hate-crime-trends-muslims-sikhs-hindus-and-jews-in-the-u-s/ http://pluralism.org/research-report/post-9-11-hate-crime-trends-muslims-sikhs-hindus-and-jews-in-the-u-s/ https://www.sikhcoalition.org/resources/go-home-terrorist-a-report-on-the-bullying-of-sikh-american-school-children/ https://www.sikhcoalition.org/resources/go-home-terrorist-a-report-on-the-bullying-of-sikh-american-school-children/ http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0739986303262143 http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0031105 Religions 2019, 10, 571 19 of 19 Yoon, Dong Pil. 2004. Intercountry adoption: The importance of ethnic socialization and subjective well-being for Korean-born adopted children. Journal of Ethnic and Cultural Diversity in Social Work 13: 71–89. [CrossRef] Yosso, Tara J. 2005. Whose culture has capital? A critical race theory discussion of community cultural wealth. Race Ethnicity and Education 8: 69–91. [CrossRef] © 2019 by the authors. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/). http://dx.doi.org/10.1300/J051v13n02_04 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1361332052000341006 http://creativecommons.org/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/. Introduction The Sikh Community in the United States Parental Racial/Ethno-Religious Socialization The Role of Popular Media in Framing Public Perception Methods Sikh Family Contexts Access to the Community Participants Data Collection Data Analysis Findings Parental Identity Markers Parental Decisions about Their Sons’ Identity Markers Parental Strategies to Counter Misidentification in the Wider Community The Role of Media in the Ethno-Religious Socialization of Children Cultural Socialization Global Awareness Discussion Implications References 
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work_ri44bqilmvddxhxaknknuqxk5a	----	No Job Name Neo-Nazi Nationalism Amy Cooter* University of Michigan Abstract In an effort to understand how supremacists may respond to future socio-political events, this article examines how White Aryan Resistance (WAR), as a major player in the White Supremacist Movement (WSM), conceptualises nationalism and who qualifies as a ‘real’American. I use discourse analysis on two year’s worth of WAR newsletters: twelve monthly issues before the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and twelve issues after this date. Only partial support is found for outcomes that the existing nationalism literature would predict, suggesting that those who research the right-wing must better understand the WSM’s sense of status loss to adequately predict future violent action from these groups. I show that WAR did not increasingly target Arabs after the attacks, which may have enhanced their membership and mobilisation efforts, but that this decision was a rational response in the context of status threats and limited movement resources. Introduction Nationalism generally refers to feelings of belonging that individuals have toward their national groups, which may be demarcated by physical boundaries of a state or by imagined boundaries of ethnicity, culture, or religion. I examine how an important component of the White Supremacist Movement (WSM) – White Aryan Resistance (WAR) – conceptualises nationalism and how this understanding influenced their response to the terror attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11). Understanding WAR’s version of nationalism helps link previous literatures on nationalism and white supremacy. Analysing WAR’s response to 9/11 allows us to better predict when unpopular movements may mobilise or expand following events of national importance. This may additionally help us understand why supremacist groups choose particular targets for violent activity, which is useful information for law enforcement agencies seeking to prevent such violence. * Amy Cooter is a sociology Ph.D. candidate at the University of Michigan and is a recipient of a National Science Foundation Graduate Research Fellowship. Her research interests include the examination of how conservative movements and organisations navigate the broader socio-political arena. She is currently studying the modern militia movement. Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism: Vol. 11, No. 3, 2011 365 The White Supremacist Movement It is important to note that organised white supremacist activity may be conceptu- alised as part of a larger social movement. Although some researchers resist using the term ‘movement’ to refer to ‘regressive’ or right-wing collective behaviour, Kathleen Blee (2003), Jessie Daniels (1997), and Abby Ferber (1999), three of the foremost authors on white racist groups, are among those acknowledging a White Supremacist Movement.1 Organised white supremacist activity should be consid- ered a social movement for the following reasons. Definitions of social movements typically resemble Jeff Goodwin and James Jasper’s statement that, ‘Social move- ments are conscious, concerted, and sustained efforts by ordinary people to change some aspect of their society by using extra-institutional means’ (Goodwin and Jasper 2009:3). Social movements have some continuity over time, and some researchers may be uncomfortable with the WSM’s relatively consistently low level of activity. Low activity is not equivalent to no activity, particularly when white supremacist activity spikes in response to major social change like the election of the country’s first black president. Even very successful movements have varying degrees of group cohesiveness and action over time (Stryker, Owens, and White 2000). Some scholars may object to the characterisation of the WSM as a social movement because of its relatively small membership base. However, groups that require a high degree of trust due to the nature of their beliefs and activities have incentives to remain small and may have a higher than normal proclivity for ousting members who fall out of favour with the group (Bernstein 1997; Gamson 1997). This can be seen in religious sects as mainstream as Catholics or Methodists (Stark and Finke 2000). Size alone is not sufficient grounds for discounting movement status. Finally, a frequent complaint about social movements literature generally is that it tends to only study successful social movements; at worst, the WSM is unsuccessful at accomplishing meaningful social change. Lack of success does not violate movement status, and studying the WSM may add to the social movements literature because of the few studies of unsuccessful movements. White Aryan Resistance and Tom Metzger There are many groups of various sizes within the larger WSM, and they are active across the globe. Some groups have utilised these international connections in various ways (e.g., on the role of the internet for maintaining an international movement, Back 2002) – a topic deserving of its own study – but WAR has remained focused on a domestic strategy. As a guest author in one of its newsletters notes, ‘WAR has often stated that you confine your activities to the US and urge other Americans to do the same, which is a sensible, sound policy in view of Europe’s race laws’ (An Irish Londoner 2001:6). It is true that the international picture is made extremely complicated by varying national laws restricting WSM activity (Anti-Defamation League n.d.), and it is why my focus here is on the WSM in the United States. However, it is important to note that WAR’s founder and leader Tom Metzger believes that these laws weaken Amy Cooter: Neo-Nazi Nationalism 366 both the scope and aspirations of the movement in other countries, making racially-aware whites in the United States superior to supremacists elsewhere, in his view. According to Metzger (2000:3), ‘only a tiny minority are willing to sacrifice themselves in an attempt to stop [a non-white invasion] . . . there is no support from outside the country for any such action. Europe and Russia have their own problems.’ Precise goals and ideology may vary across groups of the WSM, but they have in common a belief in the superiority of the white race, a hatred for non-whites, and a desire for a socio-political environment where white men have exclusive power. WAR represents one of the more extreme groups in the WSM, and has been linked to a variety of racially motivated violence including the brutal murder of Ethiopian student Mulugeta Seraw in 1988 (Langer 2003), links to the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing (Stern 1996), the likely involvement in the 2005 attempted murder of District Court Judge Joan Lefkow (Southern Poverty Law Center 2005), and 2009 connections to and support for the shooter at Washington D.C.’s Holocaust Museum (Metzger 2009). WAR should be understood as a largely Neo-Nazi group2 (Berlet and Vysotsky 2006; George and Wilcox 1996), which are typically considered to be newer groups, relative to the Ku Klux Klan (KKK), for example, with on-average younger members who admire Adolf Hitler, Nazi Germany, and its symbols; WAR’s most recognised symbol is that of a large, snarling wolf whose pupils have been replaced by swastikas. As Chip Berlet and Stanislov Vysotsky (2006) note, WAR should be understood as a political, rather than religious or youth cultural group within the WSM, but their appeal to youth should not be overlooked. Most WAR members are between thirteen and twenty-five years old (Anti-Defamation League n.d.), and it is believed that many members join other WSM groups as they age out of groups like WAR (Hamm 1993). The young age and early indoctrination of WAR members is likely one factor that contributes to its violence. Studying more problematic components of the WSM like WAR that have a proclivity for trying to effect social change through violent action – as opposed to groups that merely complain about similar issues – can lead to a better understand- ing of which WSM groups and actions should receive the most law enforcement attention. WAR’s relative transparency through their distribution of items like the newsletters analysed here also allows for investigation of beliefs likely held by other WSM groups that are not as forthright or easily accessed. My claim is not that WAR’s response to 9/11 necessarily represents how every WSM group reacted to this event, but rather that WAR’s perspectives represent the WSM attitudes that are most socially problematic. Understanding the most problematic and violent components of the movement is critical for allocating law enforcement’s limited resources. WAR was started by Tom Metzger, who is now considered a demagogue of the entire WSM. Some argue that, for all practical purposes, Metzger and WAR are synonymous. This may be true, but Metzger’s visibility and importance in the larger WSM are undeniable. His successes as well as failures have shaped how other groups in the movement have strategised, recruited, and mobilised members, and it is useful to understand more about his background due to his role as creator Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism: Vol. 11, No. 3, 2011 367 and editor of the newsletters. Metzger was born in 1938 in Indiana, and little is known about him until he was drafted into the United States Army following high school. Although he quickly achieved the rank of corporal, his stint in the military was brief (Anti-Defamation League 2002; Hamm 1993), and Metzger joined the John Birch Society3 soon after ending his army career in 1961. Finding the Society less reactionary and violent than he desired, Metzger spent the next decade shifting his affiliation from one supremacist group to another until starting his own organisation called the White Brotherhood. This organisation was intended to be a kind of racist army that would perpetrate violent acts against minorities in California, where Metzger then resided. Apparently finding his Brotherhood ineffective, Metzger and his Brotherhood joined the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, led by David Duke, in 1974. Only four years later, Metzger and Duke had a falling out: Metzger wanted to advocate and initiate violence against non-whites, while Duke was unwilling to do so (Hamm 1993). Metzger then established and led a group called the California Knights of the KKK, dabbled in politics, and served as a minister for a Christian Identity church.4 By 1980, Metzger was facing pressure from both KKK leaders and mainstream politicians because of his extremist views. He changed the name of his organisation, first, in 1980 to the White American Political Association, and again in 1983 to White Aryan Resistance – WAR (ibid.). At the same time, he began to publish the newsletter analysed here, also titled WAR. In 1988, Metzger’s dream almost ended when three WAR adherents beat Mulugeta Seraw, an Ethiopian immigrant studying in the United States, to death and said their actions were a result of the victim’s race. Metzger initially praised the actions of the murderers, and the Southern Poverty Law Center brought a wrongful death civil suit on behalf of Seraw’s family against Metzger and his son John, who had become a notable WAR actor. The Metzgers chose to represent themselves at trial, and in 1990, a jury rendered a $12.5 million verdict against them and WAR. To this day, the Metzger’s wages are garnished as part of the settlement (Langer 2003). The lawsuit certainly was a shock to the entire WSM, limited WAR’s ability to be politically active, and likely sent many sympathisers underground. However, the verdict also heightened many WSM members’ sympathy for Metzger and further aggravated their feelings of being unfairly treated by the criminal justice system and government generally. Despite the verdict, Metzger did not halt production of his newsletter, and it has been printed quarterly or monthly since its inception in 1983, although the current version is in electronic format and has been renamed The Insurgent. WAR as an organisation, while weakened following the civil verdict, is far from dead, and like many of its fellow WSM groups, has experienced a resurgence of interest and possibly membership in the wake of the economic downturn and election of the United States’ first African-American president. Theoretical Background – Nationalism There are continuing debates about the nature and definition of nationalism. Some authors, for example, focus on nationalism’s political nature (e.g., Gellner 1983), Amy Cooter: Neo-Nazi Nationalism 368 some highlight its cultural aspects (e.g., Hobsbawm 1992; Smith 1996), and others demonstrate how extreme forms of ‘ultra-nationalism’ may lead to violence to protect the interests of those in power (e.g., Billig 1989; Payne 1996:14). It is John Breuilly’s definition of nationalism that I rely on here, because of its simultaneous attention to nationalism’s political focus and its ability to recursively influence collective identity. Breuilly also recognises that not all constituents of a given nation may be content with its present form, and indicates that social actors can use identity-based nationalistic appeals in attempts to undermine and shift in their favour the power of the existing state. The definition is as follows: ‘[N]ationalism’ . . . refer[s] to political movements seeking or exercising state power and justifying such actions with . . . political doctrine[s] built upon three basic assertions: (a) There exists a nation with an explicit and peculiar character. (b) The interests and values of this nation take priority over all other interests and values. (c) The nation must be as independent as possible. (Breuilly 1982:3) First, WAR members are ideally seeking to co-opt state power – the power to define whites as Americans and others as not, while at the same time influencing other whites, including politicians, to agree with and enforce this definition. The degree of desired enforcement varies somewhat across subgroups of Neo-Nazis, and ranges from the yearning for a separate United White States within the current U.S. boundaries, to the total extermination of all non-whites presently in the country. WAR favours the latter (see, e.g., ‘How can I help stop Blacks from taking America . . . ? The answer is simple. Kill them all’, WAR 2000b:4). Second, WAR construes the United States’ ‘explicit and peculiar character’ as founded, built, and civilised by whites, for whites. In its true form, they say, the United States is the paragon of intellectual, technological, and other advancement, but the greatness of the state has been hampered by the large numerical presence of non-whites. Third, WAR’s stated key goal is the preservation of the white race. They believe that the presence of non-whites in the United States not only hampers the nation, but imminently threatens the very existence of whites because of interracial marriage and crime. Members say that the preservation of the race should be every white person’s primary concern, and that it should take priority over individual or family concerns. In WAR’s words, as included in a page of ideological statements that remain constant across newsletter issues, ‘The great White Aryan race must be advanced and protected at all costs and above all other interests.’ Fourth, and as part of the effort to both maintain the race and restore the ideal version of the state, WAR strongly opposes international cooperation, either in the form of the United Nations, or through international trade and labour exportation. The extreme nature of WAR’s ideal, racialised nation as explained above should be reminiscent of the distinction between civic and ethnic nations (Brubaker 1992).5 Citizenship status in civic nations is typically governed by the principle of Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism: Vol. 11, No. 3, 2011 369 jus soli. That is, individuals gain citizenship by being born within the physical boundaries of the state and by presumably ideologically supporting the nation’s agreed upon moral and political principles regarding rights and responsibilities. For example, the United States is considered to be a civic nation whose citizens typically live within the physical geographical boundaries recognised as belonging to the state, and whose citizens are expected to uphold ideals such as freedom and equality, which are considered central to the nation’s principles. Conversely, legal membership in ethnic nations is determined solely by ances- try. An example of this is Germany in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Individuals were not considered citizens of the German state merely because they were born within its boundaries – instead, they must have been born into families considered German by heredity, according to the principle of jus sanguinis. Similarly, children of immigrants could never have been considered truly German, and offspring of German families abroad would have been considered German even if they had never set foot within the boundaries demarcating the physical state. However, while nations are often considered to be either civic or ethnic, clear-cut distinctions do not always exist. Some researchers argue, for example, that the United States cannot be considered a wholly civic nation because despite the shared rhetoric of equal opportunity, great economic and other disparities remain between the majority white population and minority non-white groups (Fenton 2006). Others emphasise that the civic–ethnic distinction should never be overly reified because the concepts should be understood as ideal types on opposite ends of a heuristic continuum (Zubrzycki 2002). Real nations, in other words, necessarily incorporate both political/civic and cultural/ethnic distinctions. In practice, the United States may thus be considered a largely civic nation, within which ethnic boundaries are often salient. It is in this milieu that WAR operates. Members of this and other white supremacist groups are certainly aware of the civic myths of equality and diversity that permeate the current understanding of the United States as a nation. As members of the larger WSM, however, they interpret their own interpersonal interactions from an ethnicised standpoint, and desire an ethnic definition for the nation through their frequent expression of a belief that American citizenship should only be synonymous with whiteness. Given WAR members’ yearning for this idealised all-white state that works only for whites’ perceived best interests, it is also useful to include Anderson’s (2006) concept of imagined communities. ‘Imagined communities’ refers to those that exist largely in the collective mind of its members; they are the result of shared understandings of what a particular nation and its customs should be. Anderson intended for the concept of imagined communities to apply to existing nations, for even within these, it is impossible for members to know all other members of the nation, and the nation’s degree of sovereignty and community may in reality differ from the shared image of those principles that its constituents hold. In WAR’s case, ‘imagined’ is a bit more literal than this, as their desired version of the state does not (and in fact, cannot) exist in reality. This does not, however, prevent WAR members from envisioning themselves as part of a larger collective Amy Cooter: Neo-Nazi Nationalism 370 of racially pure white people who want to be part of an all-white state that works to preserve white interests. Finally, Anderson privileged the role of printed media in facilitating communication and increasing the perceived bond among members of an imagined community. While WAR’s newsletters serve this function, it should not be forgotten that there are also vast online networks that enable continual facilitation and reinforcement of white supremacists’ sense of community (Adams and Roscigno 2005; Futrell and Simi 2004). Theoretical Background – WSM Literature Other WSM researchers have explored the roles that gender and especially mas- culinity play for recruitment to and involvement in the movement (Blee 2003; Ferber 1999). James Aho6 (1990) and Rory McVeigh (2009) are among the authors who privilege the role of economic and political anomie in understanding involve- ment in extremism. In Seymour Lipset and Earle Raab’s (1978:155) reverse formulation of status loss called ‘status preservatism’, groups that are losing status – either concretely, in the form of economic status, or more diffusely in the form of social capital – attempt to maintain or regain this status by aligning themselves with groups that had prestige at some point in the past. Debra Oswald (2005) discusses how symbolic, as well as real, threats to identity can invoke prejudice and exclusionary behaviour. White supremacist examples of this would perhaps be more clear-cut during the height of the Klan’s popularity in the 1920s when racism was more socially acceptable and the Klan was seen as a visible, active, and powerful political group (McVeigh, Myers, and Sikkink 2004); however, modern white suprema- cist members still find identity support in joining groups that seek to re-affirm the value of whiteness7 even if those groups currently have less socio-political power. Other researchers (Adamson 2000; Olzak and Shanahan 2003) have illus- trated how white solidarity and even violence, particularly among youth, can result from perceived threats to white dominance in a variety of arenas ranging from neighbourhoods and housing to local job opportunities. This again can be attributed to perceived status loss or relative deprivation to non-white groups, and is linked to the concept of ethnic competition as explained by Susan Olzak (1992). Jessie Daniels’ (1997) perspective essentially combines the gender and status- loss trains of thought by linking supremacist notions of white masculine identity to movement understandings of the nation, while discussing the role of fear of outsiders and loss of control. She indicates that the WSM’s notion of the nation ‘is synonymous with “whiteness” and working – or middle-class masculinity . . . [it] is fragmented and subsumed under “race”’ (Daniels 1997:36–37). However, she does not discuss how this notion of the nation relates to existing nationalism literature or the potential ability to anticipate future WSM action. Colin Flint (2004:171) discusses ethnic nationalism and diaspora with reference to WSM examples, and speculates that public condemnation of WSM violent activity may in fact reinforce and encourage further violence, rather than reduce it. I suggest this could occur because WSM activists interpret disapproval from officials or Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism: Vol. 11, No. 3, 2011 371 others who supposedly represent non-white interests as further support for their violent expressions of alienation. To my knowledge, this is the first attempt to empirically draw implications for WSM behaviour, as well as ideology, by evalu- ating change following a major socio-political event like 9/11. My work is intended to be a complement to that of the above authors. Data and Methods The internet’s role in promulgating white supremacist ideology should not be underestimated (see, e.g., Daniels 2009); however, newsletters are a more appro- priate data source than WAR’s online content for this purpose. WAR’s newsletters are targeted toward existing, subscribing members, who presumably agree with WAR’s ideology, rather than a more ambivalent public accessing their website. Newsletters therefore reflect WAR’s ideology in its purest form; ideology is not softened in an effort to make it more palatable for potential recruits who are not yet as extreme as existing WAR members, as is sometimes the case with online content. Additionally, in 2001, it appears that greater time and effort was consist- ently invested in the newsletters, as they had been continually produced for nearly twenty years, while online content was (and is) only sporadically updated. The general format of the WAR newsletter consists of sixteen pages of writing and two or three fliers for racist T-shirts or jewellery. The front page is either a political cartoon or picture of a movement member or opponent, along with the contact information for WAR. An editorial by Tom Metzger is next, followed by a page of brief statements about WAR’s standpoint on various issues. This page remains constant across all newsletters in the sample, and the statements on this page are the standard, ‘party line’ variety addressing fourteen different issues ranging from race to religion to economics. Next are ‘letters to the editor’ and Metzger’s responses, then a page of ‘news updates’ that are blurbs of interest or continuations of questions directed to Metzger. Then are five pages with articles of various lengths, typically written by ‘WAR associates’, although occasionally one about some race-based conflict is taken directly from the Associated Press or another news agency. Six pages of advertisements for racist stickers, racist literature, CDs, and videos with recorded racist radio shows or music, all of which may be purchased from WAR, follow. Advertisements for racist memorabilia are not included in the analysis because the items are almost identical across all issues in the sample, and are comprised lists of one hundred or more titles with no detail as to content. Finally, racist political cartoons are smattered throughout each newsletter, and these are included in the analysis because they are clearly visible, are very polarising, and typically relate directly back to the newsletter content. I used a total of twenty-four monthly newsletters dating from September 2000 to October 20028 in the analysis. Because of the small sample size, chi squared or other statistical tests lack power here. Instead, I first used an approach similar to semiotic clustering, a form of content analysis that strives for an understanding of the culture of the group being studied (Barley 1983; Feldman 1994; Manning 1987; Tavory and Swidler 2009) to verify which concepts merited qualitative Amy Cooter: Neo-Nazi Nationalism 372 investigation. I then proceeded to a discourse analysis of these key themes. Discourse analysis allows for a qualitative, contextual understanding of the text in question that is more nuanced than what content analysis alone can provide, and the newsletter quotations throughout this paper are representative of how the concepts are reflected throughout the sample. Nationalism It may be unsurprising that supremacist groups like WAR have a framework for understanding nationalism that is different from that of most Americans. However, understanding exactly how and why their understanding is different is useful for interpreting, and perhaps predicting, their response to events of national relevance. For example: It is good to be proud of your country and its history, but your country is not your nation. Our Race is our Nation and the only nation we owe allegiance to. For if our Race ceases to exist it will not matter one iota what lands it resided in nor what it did while it was there. (WAR 2000c:9) This quote confirms how WAR desires an ethnic definition of the nation by seeing ‘race’ and ‘nation’ as synonymous and denying any importance of ‘the land’, or a country’s physical boundaries. At the same time, it privileges race over any kind of governmental or other authority, much as Daniels (1997) claimed. More explicitly, a short article in the December 2001 newsletter reads: ‘Country’ means a place to visit. ‘Nation’ a people of common ancestry. ‘Sovereignty’ means a people’s right to keep race and culture intact; a right to self-determination. ‘America’ once meant ‘a people, a nation of common ancestry, practicing and defending the idea of self-determination’. (Associate 2001b:9) Clearly, the proposed definition of nationalism again demonstrates an ethnic interpretation of the nation. The definition of country shows ‘nation’ and ‘country’ are not synonymous, but this time the implication runs deeper and flippantly indicates that the idea of one’s country has no visceral meaning for WAR members. The inclusion of sovereignty, whose definition is in contrast to WAR’s claims that the white race is being overrun and controlled by other racial groups, is meant to highlight this perceived fact and the disenfranchisement WAR members feel. The past-tense definition of America reveals that WAR believes the United States no longer is a white nation, and is therefore no longer a nation at all. Other selections indicate that WAR also does not view traditional symbols of the nation, such as the American flag, in the same way as most Americans. They say, for example, ‘The flag of our race is the swastika. The red and blue of the Jew flag symbolizes the colors of the white race after being kicked and beaten by the Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism: Vol. 11, No. 3, 2011 373 fucking traitors in “our” government’ (Associate 2001c:5). Note the quotations around the word ‘our’, illustrating how WAR does not feel the government represents their interests, and note the use of the swastika as their racial-national symbol. Few Americans seem to believe that the government intentionally works against their best interests as WAR members do, and most responded quite differently to the terror attacks. Following 9/11, the imagined community of patriotic Americans at least intensified, if not expanded, as many people from a variety of racial and ethnic backgrounds gained a heightened awareness of their status as Americans as a result of the attacks. This was amplified by extended media coverage that portrayed the terrorists as attacking all of ‘us’. Along with this heightened aware- ness of collective ‘Americanness’, there was an almost immediate rise in patriotic sentiment demonstrated through greater numbers of American flags being dis- played in homes and businesses across the country, for example (see Li and Brewer 2004). Arabs and 9/11 There was also a substantial rise in anti-Arab sentiment after 9/11 when the public learned that men from the Middle East were responsible for the terror attacks (Oswald 2005). Barbara Perry (2003) has discussed how there was long-standing anti-Arab bias in the United States that only needed a polarising event to result in an outbreak of violence, particularly when national leaders implicitly condone such action. Daniel Christie (2006) has documented the large spike in anti-Arab hate crimes following the attacks. Importantly, other scholars (e.g., Shaheen 2000; Suad, D’Harlingue, and Wong 2008) have noted that many Americans conflate ‘Arab’ with ‘Muslim’, to the extent that anti-Arab and anti-Muslim sentiment should likely be considered equivalent; this is certainly true for WAR, as demon- strated in quotations below. WAR’s overall Arab message is somewhat convoluted: Arabs are non-white and therefore not accepted as equals, but at the same time, the actions of the Arab terrorists are lauded as exemplars of ideal action in the vein of lone wolfing advocated by the WSM. I’m sorry (no, I suppose I’m not), but as a White person whose only goal is the survival of my race, I will not turn to support a government that is killing us just because some towel heads did what a white man should have done. (Associate 2001c:5) If a number of Muslims can create such havoc giving their lives for a cause, why aren’t you doing more. (Metzger 2002:8) The perspective on 9/11 is clearer, as illustrated by two quotes from Tom Metzger: [The prevalence of race mixing and inactive whites] is why I do not get excited at all when an Arab crashes a plane into the Center Of World Trade Amy Cooter: Neo-Nazi Nationalism 374 Centers or into the Policing Power Pentagon Center that will support the disease that is killing us at all costs. (Metzger 2001b:2) I am far more afraid of the Iron Heel Government than I am of any Middle Eastern Arab. None of my friends have ever been killed by an Arab, but several have been killed by agents of the Iron Heel. (Metzger 2001c:2) Taken altogether, these selections confirm that WAR members were little impacted by the events of 9/11; because their ideal imagined community differs so much from the nation in reality, the terror attacks were not perceived as a personal affront to WAR constituents. Metzger explicitly says that he did not know anyone who was killed on that day, so does not care about the thousands who died. In fact, WAR as a whole sees the attacks as positive for two reasons: it was an attack on a government, on a nation that does not represent white interests, and it was a model for ideal action. Violence and Mobilisation WAR is no stranger to violence, and one of its most central ideologies is that of ‘worse is better’. Metzger says he borrows this from Vladimir Lenin and means that the worse things become for more whites – the worse status loss they experience – the more likely they are to band together with WAR’s cause and demand change.9 This perspective, of course, assumes that all whites would have the same racialised interpretation of harmful social events. Here is an instance where a WAR subscriber indicates that riots, illegal immigration, and general social disorder by non-whites will force more whites to racially-aware action: I am of the opinion that it will only take one or possibly two really large terror attacks on the scale of 9/11 to create chaos in this country. Starting in large, non-white majority areas, they will instantly seize any breakdown of order to rampage and pillage and thus force White men to act at last! Also, any breakdown of the border security will bring a million muds over the border all at once on a holiday scavenger hunt. That will send the dominoes falling. (Associate 2002:4) As a result of this ‘worse is better’ philosophy, it would have been reasonable to expect a shift to a more violent, action-based rhetoric in the newsletters following 9/11. Combined with increased out-group animosity among the general American public, this could also have led to a more potent and successful WSM. In other words, many Americans who are not part of the WSM may nonetheless hold racist beliefs (Kinder and Sears 1981). These people had a clearly identified racial-cultural ‘other’ against whom they could direct their frustration after 9/11. It is possible that more people would have been accepting of some degree of racially-motivated violence after the terror attacks. Christie’s (2006) work sup- ports this, as does Figure 1, which shows the number of anti-Muslim (as a proxy Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism: Vol. 11, No. 3, 2011 375 for anti-Arab) hate crimes as a percent of all religion-motivated hate crimes from 1995 to 2007. There is a jump of more than 25% in the year 2001 compared to the previous year. Blacks and Jews The content analysis revealed, however, that WAR did not take this approach. They neither advocated more violence, nor increased targeting of Arabs in their rhetoric. Instead, WAR largely continued targeting blacks and Jews. References to blacks are generally stereotypical slurs and dismissals of intellect or work ethic. Others laud contemporary examples from the news of whites, especially women, who had fended off black criminal offenders, and urge similar action, as in the following example. White Power needs to be restored to America. I can’t even walk in my own neighborhood without being scared of a mugging, shooting, or stabbing. I don’t act like I hate Blacks around people or friends, only on the Internet. And I myself have been mugged three times and stabbed once and all three times it was done by Blacks. (WAR 2000a:3) More extreme entries yearn for the systematic lynching policies of the past in hopes of returning a sense of fear and race-based hierarchy to their communities. Negative characterisations of Jews include stereotypical slurs and assessments of physical undesirability and greediness, but primarily rely on WAR’s belief that Figure 1. Chart of Anti-Muslim Hate Crimes, 1995–2007 0 1 0 2 0 3 0 P e rc e n t 1995 2000 2005 2010 Year as a % of all Religiously Motivated Hate Crimes Anti-Muslim Hate Crimes Source: FBI Uniform Crime Reports, http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/hatecm.htm#bias (accessed April 2009). Amy Cooter: Neo-Nazi Nationalism 376 Jewish elites control the government and work to undermine white authority and success. As far as ‘rag heads’ being ‘much worse than the average American Jew,’ how could they be? The Jews are much worse than any of our enemies (with the single exception of White race traitors) because they are wily and clever, and have enough intelligence and power to serve as the architects of our ultimate destruction, if we allow them to do so, . . . [and will] demolish what little is left of Western civilization. (Metzger 2001d:2) As a rule, Jews produce nothing but take more than anyone else in society. They are dishonest and litigious too. Most lawyers are Jews. Nobody likes lawyers. Most of the people who own the banks are Jews. When was the last time you heard anyone tell you how happy he was with his bank’s rates, account fees, extraneous charges, etc. (WAR 2001:6) These characterisations of Jews as powerful, smart, and financially secure are reflective of WAR members’ sense of inferiority on these dimensions. They resent that social and political power, which has traditionally been embedded in male whiteness in the United States, seems to now be beyond their grasp. Perhaps surprisingly, there is not a single reference in the sample to the conspiracy theory that Jews were the masterminds behind the 9/11 attacks – a theory that was fairly prevalent among some in the general American population, as well as in Europe. Instead, WAR believes that Muslims initiated the attack because the United States generally supports Israel in Middle East conflicts. Backing Israel, a group particularly on the outs with most of the civilized world, is proving highly hazardous to our health in this country. Now we have an entire complex of buildings leveled to the ground with thousands of dead people. Why? Because the U.S. decided to back the biggest bunch of parasites on the face of the planet: the Jews. (Associate 2001a:5) Discussion WAR stuck with familiar out-group targets of blacks and Jews after 9/11 instead of shifting their focus to Arabs. These two groups were likely most salient in WAR members’ daily lives (although this may now be different in 2011), but this consistency meant that WAR lost an opportunity to increase their membership and sympathisers. Does this mean that WAR was incapable of assessing the social climate for the benefit of the movement, as some research on the right-wing has claimed (e.g., Crenshaw 2000)? Immediately after the attacks, and especially after the implementation of the Patriot Act in November 2001, the government’s ability to monitor both individual and organisational communications and activities was greatly increased. Domestic hate groups like WAR were thought to receive particular attention, and this Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism: Vol. 11, No. 3, 2011 377 resultant climate of increased surveillance by and distrust of government likely made WAR members feel they were more distant than ever from their idealised all-white nation, as seen below. The Congress and Senate are about to be given cart blanche to kick anyone’s ass they don’t like, especially White Separatists. Most will be so afraid when approached by Thought Police that all the years I have urged people to just say, I Have Nothing to Say, will go down the drain in a matter of seconds. (Metzger 2001a:4, emphasis in original) The reaction [to 9/11] will create a quick move toward an even greater police state, as the public demands the Iron Heel to protect them. (Metzger 2001c:2) These selections indicate that WAR believed the U.S. government was hostile toward white interests even prior to 9/11, but believed the terror attacks would exacerbate this and lead to further fragmentation of the WSM. Further, WAR’s ‘worse is better’ scenario had been achieved, at least for a time, when the terrorists successfully executed a plot that caused thousands of deaths and some degree of quotidian disruption for almost all Americans. WAR believed an appropriate level of terror or chaos had been enacted across the United States and saw little reason to encourage more of the same kind of action that would likely jeopardise their limited financial and membership resources. An alternative explanation would be that WAR responded to the Patriot Act and increased surveillance with fear, rather than disdain. Under this explanation, WAR would have avoided mobilisation efforts to reduce the probability of facing popular criticism and legal scrutiny. However, praising violence as an ideal, efficacious tactic continued after 9/11, as did rhetoric that was scornful of the government and its actions. The above quotations also indicate contempt for WSM members who are intimidated by governmental pressure, and there were no newsletter items after 9/11 that suggested a shift to a more moderate or cautious ideology. Self-censoring thus has less support as an explanation for WAR’s lack of mobilisation after 9/11 than does resource preservation. Neither explanation would support the claim that right-wing groups are incapable of assessing social events for the benefit of the movement. Rather, it was a rational response within the context of an identity that is experienced as alienated from the nation. Conclusion The results here add to the existing knowledge on WSM groups in a few different ways. First, they provide a modification to Daniel’s (1997) depiction of the WSM’s understanding of nationalism: not only is it white and predominately male, but national inclusion is limited to those whites who are willing to take real, violent action to regain a white state. Second, the results demonstrate that the existing nationalism theories do not adequately account for the alienation and status loss experienced by WSM members. Without first understanding the strength and nature of diaspora WSM members have from an imagined, ethnic nation and the Amy Cooter: Neo-Nazi Nationalism 378 violent ends they advocate to achieve it, the nationalism literature would predict greater attitudinal and behavioural change from WSM members than what is seen here. Though Flint (2004) does discuss a feeling of diaspora among these groups, this article presents, to my knowledge, the first systematic analysis of how groups in the WSM respond to a major event and indicates that groups likely to be targets of WSM violence do not change much over time. This consistency in targeted groups illustrates a need for increased attention to the kinds of groups WSM members have regular interactions with in order to predict future violent action. For example, a casual observer may have been completely surprised in the summer of 2009 by the shooting at the D.C. Holocaust Museum – a Jewish target. However, given what the results here indicate about WSM targets and sources of threat, an attack on a recognised, visible institution that represents Jewish and egalitarian interests is to be expected during a time of heightened economic stress and increased perceived racial threat due to the presence of the United States’ first black president. Understanding this relatively fixed pattern of response should allow for better resource allocation in law enforcement and other groups that seek to limit the harm done by WSM groups. Since 9/11, there was little activity or resurgence on the part of WSM groups in the United States until late 2008 and early 2009. Their self-imposed period of abeyance ended as the presence of a black First Family undoubtedly increased the salience of blacks in the lives of white supremacists and heightened their sense of status loss. There were several public incidents of ‘non-racists’ sending racist emails and other communications that were derogatory toward Obama and his family, and while 2008–2009 newsletters were not available at the time of this draft, chatter on racist websites was at an all-time high around the inauguration. We also witnessed the first real outbreak of violence perpetuated by WSM members in many years with the murder of an abortion doctor and the shooting at the D.C. museum. In the months and years ahead, it is in the best interest of law enforcement and academics alike to be mindful of the WSM’s sense of status loss and under- standing of the nation in an effort to anticipate and mitigate future violence. Notes 1 Some authors have distinguished between supremacist, separatist, and nationalist groups (e.g., Daniels 1997). I use the umbrella term ‘supremacist’ here because the notion that whites are superior to all other races is at the root of the supremacist and nationalist frameworks as well. 2 Sometimes WAR is referred to as a Skinhead group, and racist skinheads are often understood as a subset of Neo-Nazis that particularly lauds hate music (Daniels 1997; George and Wilcox 1996; Hamm 1993; Kaplan 2000). I prefer the broader term ‘Neo-Nazi’ because ‘Skinhead’ is now often a misnomer due to a push toward mainstream normativity; modern racists, even Skins, are frequently encouraged to not shave their heads, obtain stark racist tattoos, or participate in other visible signifiers of their racist identity in order to appear more ‘normal’ and blend in with mainstream society (see Cooter 2006). 3 The John Birch Society is a libertarian group that purportedly works to defend individual rights and the U.S. Constitution, but has multiple links to different racist organisations like the KKK (Lipset and Raab 1978). Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism: Vol. 11, No. 3, 2011 379 4 Christian Identity claims whites are the true descendants of the biblical Adam, while the Jews are devious pretenders to the Israelite lineage who were spawned from a liaison between Eve and Satan (Walters 2000). 5 For WAR, race, ethnicity, and culture are essentially synonymous. 6 Aho also believes the role of religion is essential to right-wing involvement. Notably, WAR for the most part disdains religious, particularly Christian, participation because they believe it causes adherents to have an egalitarian, rather than racially-aware, outlook. 7 The goal of this paper is not to debate the definition of ‘white’ or ‘whiteness’, but it should be noted that these terms refer to socially constructed categories that have shifted over time (Garner 2007). Many social scientists are likewise concerned with reifying these social categories and the attendant, historical white dominance by studying whiteness or white supremacist groups without adequately fleshing out these concepts (Ferber 1999). However, as Brubaker and Cooper (2000:5) note, ‘reification is a social process, not only an intellec- tual practice’, and this project tries to understand the inner workings of a white supremacist group – similarly to Weber’s Verstehen. It therefore takes as its starting point the under- standings of racialised categories as defined by the group itself without addressing their correspondence to biological or social reality. 8 Newsletters are not printed in January, so two additional, sequential issues are included to provide the full sample. 9 This ideology is distinct from, though similar to, another philosophy Metzger is known for advocating: the ‘Third Position’. 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work_rkhjotgcwfgsplqcx7m7m2672y	----	Middlesex University Research Repository An open access repository of Middlesex University research http://eprints.mdx.ac.uk Allan, Helen T. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9391-0385 (2017) Editorial: Ethnocentrism and racism in nursing: reflections on the Brexit vote. Journal of Clinical Nursing, 26 (9-10) . pp. 1149-1151. ISSN 0962-1067 [Article] (doi:10.1111/jocn.13627) Final accepted version (with author’s formatting) This version is available at: http://eprints.mdx.ac.uk/20889/ Copyright: Middlesex University Research Repository makes the University’s research available electronically. Copyright and moral rights to this work are retained by the author and/or other copyright owners unless otherwise stated. The work is supplied on the understanding that any use for commercial gain is strictly forbidden. A copy may be downloaded for personal, non-commercial, research or study without prior permission and without charge. Works, including theses and research projects, may not be reproduced in any format or medium, or extensive quotations taken from them, or their content changed in any way, without first obtaining permission in writing from the copyright holder(s). They may not be sold or exploited commercially in any format or medium without the prior written permission of the copyright holder(s). Full bibliographic details must be given when referring to, or quoting from full items including the author’s name, the title of the work, publication details where relevant (place, publisher, date), pag- ination, and for theses or dissertations the awarding institution, the degree type awarded, and the date of the award. If you believe that any material held in the repository infringes copyright law, please contact the Repository Team at Middlesex University via the following email address: eprints@mdx.ac.uk The item will be removed from the repository while any claim is being investigated. See also repository copyright: re-use policy: http://eprints.mdx.ac.uk/policies.html#copy http://eprints.mdx.ac.uk http://eprints.mdx.ac.uk/20889/ mailto:eprints@mdx.ac.uk http://eprints.mdx.ac.uk/policies.html#copy Now that the dust after the Brexit vote is beginning to settle, it seems timely to consider how the debates on the UK’s exit from the European Union are linked to issues around overseas educated nurse migration to the UK. And to consider how the consequences of Brexit might shape nursing in the UK and our relationships with our European nursing colleagues. Leaving the EU (whatever that might mean in the end) may have rather more serious effects for me personally than I had anticipated before the vote on June 23rd. My contact with the idea of Europe began when I was sent to stay with a French family in 1969 where I learnt to speak French reasonably well albeit largely because they spoke no English. I didn’t feel alienated – just fascinated by a different culture and way of being. I am now a UK and a Swiss citizen as I married into a large Swiss-French family. The cousins meet up at regular intervals from all over Europe. In that sense I feel and have always felt a strong connection to Europe and generally cringe over displays of nationalism. However, following the Brexit vote, I may not be able to travel easily in Europe if visas are demanded by other EU countries. So as a family we are in the process of applying for Swiss passports; many of my Irish friends are applying for Irish passports for the same reasons – we wish to travel unheeded across Europe and to retain a connection with Europe. It feels like a political statement somehow - an attempt to stay connected with Europe at some level . We may be lucky to have that loophole. I can’t imagine what a restricted freedom of movement across the EU will mean for those who currently work in the UK in terms of travelling home but also, and importantly, in terms of their right to work in the UK. The negotiations to leave might restrict the freedom of movement altogether of course and there could be a total withdrawal of free movement. It goes without saying that the NHS and the care sector relies heavily on internationally recruited nurses including nurses from European countries to ‘prop’ up the workforce. There are up to 110,000 health workers from Europe, including over 20,000 EU trained nurses and 80,000 health care assistants working in the UK (Buchan 2016). As Jeremy Hunt (2016), a Remain campaigner said “We simply could not do without their contribution.” In my work life, I am a member of the European Academy of Nursing Scientists (EANS). The purpose of the Academy is to be a scientific community in Europe providing inspiration, collaboration and academic leadership in nursing. We do this by sustaining a forum of European nurse scientists who are developing and promoting knowledge in nursing through research and scholarly achievement in the pursuit of excellence (http://european-academy- of-nursing-science.com). The President of EANS felt it necessary to reassure our European colleagues shortly after the vote that the British members of the Academy would still continue to be active members of our community. However at this Summer’s EANS doctoral Summer school at Halle University in Germany, I once again observed that there have only ever been a few UK doctoral students at this event which is always well attended by other EU nurses particularly those from Scandinavia. I have always found the lack of UK students at these Summer schools at the very least puzzling and now, after Brexit, perhaps troubling. I think our lack of presence may be indicative of a wider ethnocentric view of nursing among British nurses which extends to a devaluing of European as well as non-European nursing (Allan 2007). Allied to an ethnocentric view of nursing in the UK are wider and more entrenched racist views (Allan et al 2004; Larsen et al 2005; Smith et al 2008). I’m not suggesting that the British nursing PhD students are themselves ethnocentric. Their funding might not stretch to cover a Summer school, their managers might not give them the time off, their ability to juggle families and study might just not allow them the luxury of two weeks scholarly time in contact with their European peers. But the result is that our PhD students miss out on networking and scholarly discourse with their peers. This sends a message that the UK doesn’t participate in Europe. The demonizing of migrants and an anti-foreigner rhetoric during the campaigning for the referendum led to fears for existing migrants and a spike in hate crimes; the number of hate crimes rose by 42% immediately after the vote in June this year (Stone 2016). BBC News reported that the United Nation’s Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination said it was “seriously concerned” that British politicians whipped up hatred and then “failed to condemn” racist abuse during the campaign. The UN also expressed concern about the negative portrayal of ethnic minorities in the British media. However I believe that anti-migrant and anti-foreigner rhetoric (seen so vividly and painfully this Summer) is unsurprising - a resurgence of the entrenched institutional racism in organizations across the UK including the NHS. In 2004 colleagues and I first wrote about institutional racism in the NHS and care home sector. We were approached by the Royal College of Nursing who had observed an increase in the number of telephone contacts from overseas educated nurses, complaining about their unfair treatment by colleague, patients and/or managers in the NHS and care homes. We conducted a focus group study of 69 overseas educated nurses working in private care homes and the NHS to ask them about overseas educated nurses’ experiences of their recruitment and work experiences in England and Wales (Allan et al 2004). Our findings described how direct and indirect individual racism reproduced indirectly racist systems and processes which deeply affected these nurses’ lives. These racist attitudes and behaviours were directed to nurses who were White and foreign as well as those who were from Black and Minority Ethic groups and from overseas. Because for quite a while I went to work in a country hospital and the fact I was foreign trained, although I’d worked here and had a midwifery qualification from here it was still more important the fact that I was foreign and people just treated me in such an odd way. (Female, 56 years old, South African, white, D grade) Being treated in such an odd way, as different and unequal, being seen as other, could be prompted by a nurse’s accent, skin colour and importantly, by the way s/he performed nursing (Allan 2007) and the way s/he learnt (Allan 2010). No matter if they know you are an overseas qualified nurse the way you are being approached or addressed is quite different completely from the so called UK trained nurses because they look at you as if you don’t have anything upstairs at all. They look at you as if you don’t know anything relating to nursing. So such attitude actually demoralize (a) human being. (Male, 39 years old, Nigeria, black, D grade) Our study was called ‘We Need Respect’ and was lifted from the following quote: “there’s no ethics of nursing here. The respect is not just there and the racism… If not for the parliament that passed that issue allowing nurses to come to UK and be working so, they wouldn’t have accepted us. So the racism is there, we are just fooling ourselves. We know it is there and they are not accepting us (Female, 54 years old, Nigeria, black, D grade) In a larger study, Professor Pam Smith and I with colleagues from the Open University undertook an interview based study to which we recruited over 70 overseas educated nurses, and 30 mentors and managers to explore how overseas educated nurses’ careers were developing in the UK. This was a multi-site study done in collaboration with the RCN (Smith et al 2006). Our findings confirmed the findings from the earlier study, namely that http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-37193140 direct and indirect racism formed part of overseas educated nurses’ experiences when working in the NHS as well as in care home sector. In addition, these nurses experienced poor career progression. We argued that indirect racism worked against these nurses, who frequently had further training, education and extensive experience, from being promoted to senior positions in the NHS. Overseas educated nurses described the details of everyday indirect racism as they struggled to understand promotion mechanisms where their education and experience were seen as irrelevant for the UK context. Worryingly these nurses reported a high number of allegations of poor practice brought against them by their British colleagues. We argued that these allegations were socially constructed in the sense that they were brought by their colleagues who struggled to value difference and diversity in the workforce; whose views of nursing were ethnocentric. As the Nigerian nurse says above, “they are not accepting us”. Their nursing practices were seen as other and suspicious. If the overseas educated nurse couldn’t find a way to fit in, they alienated their British colleagues and paid the price of being different – no promotion and at its worst, an allegation of incompetence or unsafe practice. More recent work carried out in London (Allan & Westwood 2015) points out that these racist practices have not disappeared; they have mutated into different forms. We cite the employment of overseas educated nurses as health care assistants for periods of up to eleven years where their skills and knowledge are taken advantage of by Trusts and their colleagues as examples of unthinking racist practices. We have never argued that these racist practices and systems are consciously racist but emerge from unreflective practices in an increasingly unstable and busy working environment (Allan et al 2016). Spaces to talk about difference and diversity and how racist practices may be unwitting are not available in NHS as time for learning becomes squeezed even further and the NHS becomes even less of a learning organization (Melia 2006). I think the recruitment of overseas educated nurses both from the EU and outside the EU has been what might be called an unintended consequence (for the individual) of a public act or policy; where individuals struggle as they cope within a system that is unprepared for their inclusion. The pity is that we’ve been here before as the history of migration in nursing shows. Sadly, nurse education is not immune from racism – currently I have a PhD student who is exploring the experiences of BME nursing and midwifery academics and their career progression. The early literature seems to suggest that there are racist practices in nurse education which militate against BME nurse lecturers progressing in their careers equally as their White colleagues. I believe that the debates for and against Brexit built on existing ethnocentric and xenophobic attitudes to difference in our society; nurses and Nursing of course are part of our society and may merely reflect those racist attitudes. However in reflecting them, they also reproduce them leading to racist practices of direct and indirect discrimination which affect our colleagues from British BME backgrounds as well as those BME and White migrants. Therefore, in my mind, the consequences of Brexit will shape nursing in the UK and our relationships with our European nursing colleagues for the worse unless we actively work to prevent that happening. Paraphrasing Richards (2016), after Brexit it is even more important that as academics and nurses we continue to co-operate to build nursing knowledge and work towards exposing and mitigating exclusionary and racist practices across Europe. And on a practical level, negotiations with the EU must ensure that the NHS . retains high quality trained nurses irrespective of where they trained. References Allan H T, Larsen J, Bryan K & Smith P (2004) The social reproduction of institutional racism: internationally recruited nurses’ experiences of the British Health Services. Diversity in Health and Social Care.1(2):117-126. Allan H T (2007) The Rhetoric of caring and the recruitment of overseas nurses: the social reproduction of a care gap. Journal of Clinical Nursing Special Edition 16(12):2204-2212. Allan H T (2010) mentoring overseas nurses: barriers to effective and non-discriminatory mentoring practices. Nursing Ethics 17(5), 603-613 Allan H T, Cowie H & Smith P A (2009) Overseas nurses’ experiences of discrimination: a case of racist bullying. Journal of Nursing Management. 17: 898-906 Allan H T, Kelly D, Smith P A, Traynor M (2016) Buchan J (2016) Mixed messages fuel uncertainty over Brexit. Nursing Standard 30(46), 28 Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (2016) cited by Butler P (2016) Guardian Friday 26th August 2016 https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/aug/26/politicians-rise-hate-crimes-brexit- vote-un-committee. Accessed 26th September 2016 Hunt J (2016) Language tests for overseas nurses relaxed, amid fears of Brexit exodus. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/06/27/overseas-nurses-to-be-given-extra- chance-to-pass-language-tests/. Larsen J, Allan H T, Bryan K & Smith P (2005) Overseas’ nurses motives for working in the UK: global perspectives or local prejudice. Work, Employment & Society. 19(2):349-368 Melia, K. (2006) R000271191 – Nursing in the new NHS: a sociological analysis of learning and working. www.esrc.ac.uk/ESRCInfoCentre/Plain_English_Summaries/LLH/health_wellbeing/index41 3. Access 14/11/06 Smith P A, Allan H T, Larsen J A, Mackintosh M M, Henry L (2008) Valuing and recognising the talents of a diverse workforce. http://www.surrey.ac.uk/fhms/research/centres/crnme/Files/issue%204%20- %20REOH%20number%20two%20(June%20'07).pdf Accessed 23/09/2016 Stone J (2016) Politicians anti-immigrant rhetoric fueled post Brexit hate crime spike. Independent Friday 26th August 2016. Accessed 26th September 2016 https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/aug/26/politicians-rise-hate-crimes-brexit-vote-un-committee https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/aug/26/politicians-rise-hate-crimes-brexit-vote-un-committee http://www.esrc.ac.uk/ESRCInfoCentre/Plain_English_Summaries/LLH/health_wellbeing/index413 http://www.esrc.ac.uk/ESRCInfoCentre/Plain_English_Summaries/LLH/health_wellbeing/index413 http://www.surrey.ac.uk/fhms/research/centres/crnme/Files/issue%204%20-%20REOH%20number%20two%20(June%20'07).pdf http://www.surrey.ac.uk/fhms/research/centres/crnme/Files/issue%204%20-%20REOH%20number%20two%20(June%20'07).pdf 
work_rls2qzgrwnhttmazfxckew2gii	----	Hate crimes in India Vol.:(0123456789) Jindal Global Law Review (2020) 11(1):1–5 https://doi.org/10.1007/s41020-020-00119-0 1 3 EDITORIAL Hate crimes in India M Mohsin Alam Bhat1 Published online: 4 August 2020 © O.P. Jindal Global University (JGU) 2020 Violence driven by sectarian hostility is back on the centre stage of India’s public dis- course. Since 2015, numerous incidents of hate violence have dramatically unfolded on the pages of both old and new media. While we still do not have any official num- bers, data drawn from media sources indicates a considerable spike in incidents of indi- viduals being targeted on the ground of their identity.1 Many of these incidents have involved mobs attacking members of caste and religious minorities, often in the context of cow protection or inter-faith relationships.2 India has had a long and tortuous history of sectarian mass violence.3 The country was born in the throngs of the tragic Partition in 1947 that led to more than two mil- lion deaths.4 Since then, there have been hundreds of incidents of what in India are often described as ‘communal riots’.5 Sectarian mass violence is intimately related — in terms of causes and effects — to political ideologies and ambitions.6 Violence has M Mohsin Alam Bhat—Associate Professor. * M Mohsin Alam Bhat mabhat@jgu.edu.in 1 Jindal Global Law School, O.P. Jindal Global University, Sonipat, India 1 See Alison Saldanha and Karthik Madhavapeddi, ‘Our New Hate-Crime Database: 76% of Victims Over 10 Years Minorities; 90% Attacks Reported Since 2014’ (Fact Checker, 30 October 2018). https :// archi ve.factc hecke r.in/our-new-hate-crime -datab ase-76-of-victi ms-over-10-years -minor ities -90-attac ks- repor ted-since -2014/. Accessed 17 July 2020. 2 Annie Gowen, ‘A Muslim and a Hindu Thought They Could be a Couple. Then Came the ‘Love Jihad’ Hit List.’ (The Washington Post, 26 April 2018). https ://www.washi ngton post.com/world /asia_pacif c/a- musli m-and-a-hindu -thoug ht-they-could -be-a-coupl e-then-came-the-love-jihad -hit-list/2018/04/26/25701 0be-2d1b-11e8-8dc9-3b51e 028b8 45_story .html. Accessed 17 July 2020; Rahul Bhatia, ‘The Year of Love Jihad in India’ (The New Yorker, 31 December 2017). https ://www.newyo rker.com/cultu re/2017-in- revie w/the-year-of-love-jihad -in-india . Accessed 17 July 2020. 3 Asghar Ali Engineer (ed),  Communal Riots in Post-Independence India (2nd edn, Universities Press 1997); Ashutosh Varshney, Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life: Hindus and Muslims in India (Yale University Press 2002). 4 Gyanendra Pandey,  Remembering Partition: Violence, Nationalism and History in India (Cambridge University Press 2001); Ian Talbot and Gurharpal Singh, The Partition of India (Cambridge University Press 2009). 5 Steven I Wilkinson, ‘Riots’ (2009) 12 Annual Review of Political Science 329. 6 Zoya Khaliq Hasan, ‘Communalism and Communal Violence in India’  (1982) 10(2) Social Scien- tist 25. http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1007/s41020-020-00119-0&domain=pdf https://archive.factchecker.in/our-new-hate-crime-database-76-of-victims-over-10-years-minorities-90-attacks-reported-since-2014/ https://archive.factchecker.in/our-new-hate-crime-database-76-of-victims-over-10-years-minorities-90-attacks-reported-since-2014/ https://archive.factchecker.in/our-new-hate-crime-database-76-of-victims-over-10-years-minorities-90-attacks-reported-since-2014/ https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/a-muslim-and-a-hindu-thought-they-could-be-a-couple-then-came-the-love-jihad-hit-list/2018/04/26/257010be-2d1b-11e8-8dc9-3b51e028b845_story.html https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/a-muslim-and-a-hindu-thought-they-could-be-a-couple-then-came-the-love-jihad-hit-list/2018/04/26/257010be-2d1b-11e8-8dc9-3b51e028b845_story.html https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/a-muslim-and-a-hindu-thought-they-could-be-a-couple-then-came-the-love-jihad-hit-list/2018/04/26/257010be-2d1b-11e8-8dc9-3b51e028b845_story.html https://www.newyorker.com/culture/2017-in-review/the-year-of-love-jihad-in-india https://www.newyorker.com/culture/2017-in-review/the-year-of-love-jihad-in-india 2 Jindal Global Law Review (2020) 11(1):1–5 1 3 often accompanied sectarian mobilisation in the context of elections.7 The most striking problem throughout this history has been state complicity in violence, and impunity of state and non-state actors.8 While there is a need for more research, contemporary incidents of hate violence appear to follow these patterns. Most of the reported incidents have involved tar- geting of individuals rather than mass violence. But they continue to ft into, and often serve, a political ecosystem.9 Incidents of violence have often preceded and followed political hate speech.10 And as is the case with sectarian mass violence, the report on legal accountability here remains dismal.11 This special issue seeks to make three contributions. First, it reckons with the contemporary. What are the historical antecedents of contemporary hate violence in India? In what ways is the present moment a continuation from the past? What new challenges for the law does it pose? Second, it seeks to advance the conversation around hate violence by taking legal categories seriously. What categories are best attuned to capture the personal and social harm of violence? How should we best interpret these legal categories to advance the ends of justice? Third, the issue takes the role of institutions seriously. How should we evaluate the role of criminal justice institutions in addressing — or maintaining — impunity? What are the best institu- tional strategies to address violence? 1 Situating the contemporary This issue self-consciously situates itself in the current moment. On 1 April 2017, a mob of self-styled gau rakshaks (cow protectors) attacked and killed Pehlu Khan only a few kilometres from Delhi.12 Pehlu, a 55-year-old dairy farmer, was 12 Abhishek Dey, ‘“He Said He Was Hindu, They Let Him Go”: How One Man Escaped an Attack by Cow Vigilantes in Alwar’ (Scroll.in, 6 April 2017). https ://scrol l.in/artic le/83380 0/%20he-said-he-was- hindu -they-let-him-go-how-one-man-escap ed-an-attac k-by-cow-vigil antes -in-%20alw ar. Accessed 5 April 2020. 7 Paul Brass, The Production of Hindu-Muslim Violence in Contemporary India (University of Wash- ington Press 2011); Steven I Wilkinson, Votes and Violence: Electoral Competition and Ethnic Riots in India (Cambridge University Press 2004). 8 See Surabhi Chopra and Prita Jha (eds), On Their Watch: Mass Violence and State Apathy in India, Examining the Record (Three Essays Collective 2014). 9 See Nilanjan Mukhopadhyay, ‘Lynching and Trolling: Why Political Parties Can’t Absolve Themselves of Responsibility’ (The Economic Times, 8 July 2018). https ://econo micti mes.india times .com/blogs / et-comme ntary /lynch ing-and-troll ing-why-polit ical-parti es-cant-absol ve-thems elves -of-respo nsibi lity/. Accessed 17 July 2020; Shoaib Daniyal, ‘The Modi Years: What has Fuelled Rising Mob Violence in India?’ (Scroll.in, 23 February 2019). https ://scrol l.in/artic le/91253 3/the-modi-years -what-has-fuell ed- risin g-mob-viole nce-in-india . Accessed 17 July 2020. 10 Nimisha Jaiswal, Sreenivasan Jain, and Manas Pratap Singh, ‘Under Modi Government, VIP Hate Speech Skyrockets - By 500%’ (NDTV, 19 April 2018). https ://www.ndtv.com/india -news/under -naren dra-modi-gover nment -vip-hate-speec h-skyro ckets -by-500-18389 25. Accessed 17 July 2020. 11 KTS Tulsi, ‘Fear of Law has Evaporated as Cases of Lynching Have Become Regular and Brazen’ (Outlook, 23 December 2019). https ://www.outlo okind ia.com/magaz ine/story /india -news-opini on-fear- of-law-has-evapo rated -as-cases -of-lynch ing-have-becom e-regul ar-and-braze n/30250 3. Accessed 17 July 2020. https://scroll.in/article/833800/%20he-said-he-was-hindu-they-let-him-go-how-one-man-escaped-an-attack-by-cow-vigilantes-in-%20alwar https://scroll.in/article/833800/%20he-said-he-was-hindu-they-let-him-go-how-one-man-escaped-an-attack-by-cow-vigilantes-in-%20alwar https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/blogs/et-commentary/lynching-and-trolling-why-political-parties-cant-absolve-themselves-of-responsibility/ https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/blogs/et-commentary/lynching-and-trolling-why-political-parties-cant-absolve-themselves-of-responsibility/ https://scroll.in/article/912533/the-modi-years-what-has-fuelled-rising-mob-violence-in-india https://scroll.in/article/912533/the-modi-years-what-has-fuelled-rising-mob-violence-in-india https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/under-narendra-modi-government-vip-hate-speech-skyrockets-by-500-1838925 https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/under-narendra-modi-government-vip-hate-speech-skyrockets-by-500-1838925 https://www.outlookindia.com/magazine/story/india-news-opinion-fear-of-law-has-evaporated-as-cases-of-lynching-have-become-regular-and-brazen/302503 https://www.outlookindia.com/magazine/story/india-news-opinion-fear-of-law-has-evaporated-as-cases-of-lynching-have-become-regular-and-brazen/302503 3 1 3 Jindal Global Law Review (2020) 11(1):1–5 transporting cows he had recently purchased from a cattle fair across the border in the State of Rajasthan. The video of the gruesome act that was soon circulating online generated both outrage and alarm. This, unfortunately, was not an isolated incident. Over the next many months, a series of violent incidents — with Dalit and Muslim victims — came to dominate the public discourse. In July 2018, the for- mer Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, Deepak Misra, warned against India turn- ing into a ‘mobocracy’.13 These incidents of vigilantism and mob lynching were a reminder of the deep social cleavages in our society. They also soon exposed the limitations in the crimi- nal justice system. Commentators and activists noted the failure of the police to rein in the perpetrators. They also noted the tremendous costs of this violence for the victims and survivors, as well as for the social fabric. While this special issue was being fnalised, Delhi was on fre. From December 2019, there were unprecedented protests against the Citizenship Amendment Act, 2019.14 The legislation introduced a religious test for citizenship for a country that many have always seen to be founded on secularism.15 The inspiring mobilisation adopted the constitutional language of equality and inclusion in the face of tre- mendous political opposition. Just as the protests were dealing with the impact of COVID-19, shocking violence broke out in Delhi on 23 February 2020. The vio- lence, initially directed at the protestors, spread like wildfre, resulting in more than 50 casualties and hundreds of displaced citizens. The sectarian violence was a reminder that this special issue must foreground its immediate context even as it sought to intervene academically. This context made the intervention urgent and signifcant. The interviews with Harsh Mander and Teesta Setalvad — two of the foremost activists in the feld — keep this issue grounded in the concrete realities of violence, impunity, and accountability. Both Mander and Setalvad chart the histories of sectarian violence in India — from the Partition violence, the various episodes of mass communal violence, to the recent spate of more localised incidents of lynching. They draw from their extensive expe- rience of legal activism to explore the entrenched institutional problems that have inhibited legal accountability. They also offer the political causes and stakes of bat- tling hate violence. Signifcantly, their experiments with legal interventions offer important resources to scholars and researchers interested in constructing social sol- idarities and litigation strategies. Nikhil Roshan’s photo-essay further grounds this special issue. It highlights both the context as well as the ethical stakes involved. Through images and text, Roshan explores the horrors of the recent Delhi violence. He presents a vivid portrayal of what we may often miss in our study of hate violence. We do see the loss of life. 13 Tehseen S. Poonawalla v Union of India & Others (2018) 9 SCC 501. 14 Human Rights Watch, “Shoot the Traitors”: Discrimination Against Muslims under India’s New Citi- zenship Policy (April 2020). 15 Niraja Gopal Jayal, ‘Citizenship Amendment Act: ‘Principle of Discrimination Based on Faith will be Difficult to Limit’’ (The Indian Express, 24 December 2019). https ://india nexpr ess.com/artic le/expla ined/india n-const ituti on-citiz enshi p-amend ment-act-modi-govt-61817 61/. Accessed 17 July 2020. https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/indian-constitution-citizenship-amendment-act-modi-govt-6181761/ https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/indian-constitution-citizenship-amendment-act-modi-govt-6181761/ 4 Jindal Global Law Review (2020) 11(1):1–5 1 3 But we may fail to see how everyday poverty and segregation enable violence. His contribution reminds us that overt violence breaks out from intractable — and often invisible —marginalisation. 2 Framing hate crime The political and legal category that is conventionally used to describe sectarian vio- lence in India is ‘communal riot’. As Setalvad points out in this issue, the use of the word ‘riot’ potentially mischaracterises the nature of the violence, which is often targeted against minorities and accompanied by state complicity. She argues that the category of ‘pogrom’ is better suited to describe the nature and impact of sectarian violence in the Indian context. The Supreme Court’s July 2018 order, which acknowledged the harms of hate violence, laid down a series of guidelines to counter it.16 The Court framed its inter- vention in terms of the category of ‘lynching’.17 In their contribution to the issue, Bhat, Bajaj, and Kumar point out how — despite the Court’s extensive guidelines — police personnel have often operated with an interpretation of the category that runs counter to the stated objectives of the judicial order. This discussion illuminates the value of paying close attention to the words we use to describe violence within and outside legal discourse. Joanna Perry’s contribu- tion to the issue is a strong expression of this keen attention on how legal categories visibilise violence, create spaces of institutional redress, and travel transnationally. Perry argues in favour of adopting the hate crime framework in India, which in her view invites institutions to focus on protection for marginalised groups facing vio- lence, rather than treating them as the problem. The core of her contribution offers an institutional and contextual account of how the hate crime concept has travelled into local national contexts. She notes that this can be best understood as a vernacu- larisation of the concept: national state and non-state actors adopt the concept crea- tively by often formulating ‘partner concepts’ that suit the local contexts. She thus advocates creative, strategic, and hybrid ways of battling hate crime by evolving local techniques, defnitions, and institutional modes. She argues that ‘vigilantism’ can be such a partner concept in India, which can incorporate the normative and institutional goals of the hate crime concept while being responsive to the specifc challenges in the country. While Perry focuses on vigilantism as a potential partner concept in India, Van- dita Khanna’s contribution develops the concept of ‘targeted violence’. Using the Delhi High Court’s judgment18 in the Hashimpura massacre case as a springboard, she develops the normative contours of targeted violence. Specifcally, she shows the concept’s potential for making the autonomy and dignity harms of violence legally legible. 16 Tehseen S. Poonawalla v Union of India & Others (n 13). 17 ibid. 18 Zulfikar Nasir & Others v State of Uttar Pradesh & Others 2018 SCC Online Del 12153. 5 1 3 Jindal Global Law Review (2020) 11(1):1–5 This focus on legal categories — rather novel in the Indian context — can gener- ate a more searching academic conversation about how various manifestations of hate crime are connected. There is now an important feld of scholarship on caste- based violence or atrocities. How is the category of caste atrocities conceptually, legally, and normatively related to that of hate crime based on other identities like religion, race, ethnicity, disability, or sexual orientation? Does thinking of them within the rubric of hate crime enhance our understanding of violence and generate more compelling solidarities? Or will we lose out on nuance and specifcity? We hope the special issue generates this dialogue. 3 Legal institutions The third theme of this special issue is the promise and limitations of legal institu- tions. In her contribution, Perry quotes legal anthropologist Sally Engle Merry on one of the most profound challenges of law. While the state is often the major vio- lator of human rights, Merry writes, ‘ironically it is also the agent for carrying out human rights reforms.’19 The nuances of this central dilemma are apparent in the interview with Mander. He describes the long legal battle for legal justice in cases of sectarian violence. The debate on the Prevention of Communal and Targeted Violence (Access to Justice and Reparations) Bill, 2011 is of particular relevance. As he notes, the specifc chal- lenge in India has been not to proliferate criminal law, but to strengthen institutional accountability. His account perhaps reveals the need for a constant acknowledgment — on the part of advocates, lawyers, and activists — of the law’s entrenched limita- tions to counter violence. This is also the core of Bhat, Bajaj, and Kumar’s contribution. They provide a sobering account of the Supreme Court’s celebrated judgment against mob lynch- ing.20 Their detailed interviews with police officials, and the account of one police investigation in a lynching case, show that the fate of court orders and criminal leg- islation remains precariously subject to the quotidian exercise of police discretion. This exercise is shaped by and channels entrenched police culture and institutional bias. The conversation about legal reform, thus, must also integrate the systemic questions of prejudice, power, and democracy. Publisher’s Note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. 19 Sally Engle Merry,  Human Rights and Gender Violence: Translating International Law into Local Justice (University of Chicago Press 2009) 5. 20 Tehseen S. Poonawalla v Union of India & Others (n 13). Hate crimes in India 1 Situating the contemporary 2 Framing hate crime 3 Legal institutions 
work_rlzcyqkspngblczohsdw2wfbsm	----	1 Group Identity, Empathy and Shared Suffering: Understanding the “community” impacts of anti-LGBT and Islamophobic hate crimes Mark A. Walters University of Sussex, United Kingdom Jennifer Paterson University of Sussex, United Kingdom Liz McDonnell University of Sussex, United Kingdom Rupert Brown University of Sussex, United Kingdom Abstract This article examines the indirect impacts of hate crimes on LGBT and Muslim communities in the United Kingdom. Based on 34 qualitative interviews, we explore both the perceived meaning of "community" in the context of targeted victimization, and the emotional and behavioural effects that anti-LGBT and Islamophobic hate crimes have on other members of the victim's group. Building on previous quantitative data undertaken as part of a larger programme of research, this study helps to explain how and why hate crimes have significant indirect consequences on two distinct but commonly targeted communities. The focus on LGBT and Muslim communities allowed us to draw out similarities and commonalities across different groups, further enhancing understanding of the impacts of hate crime. In particular, the article highlights how for many LGBT and Muslim people feelings of anger and anxiety about hate crimes were linked to enhanced levels of empathy towards those that they share a group identity with. These empathic bonds often gave rise to a sense of "shared suffering", with 2 participants frequently feeling connected to group members worldwide through their common experiences of hate and prejudice. Although group identity was important to many participants' sense of belonging to LGBT or Muslim communities, it was clear that the most profound impacts of hate crime were experienced when incidents occurred within someone's local area. This highlighted the importance of location as a key variable in understanding both the meaning of "community" and the indirect impacts of hate crime. Keywords Hate crime; community; group identity; intergroup emotions; empathy Introduction There have been significant increases in the number of recorded hate crimes in both Europe and the United States over the past two years (Southern Poverty Law Centre, 2016; Home Office, 2018). The huge spikes in recorded incidents have attracted extensive media and social media coverage. Technological advancements in the ways in which “news” is now delivered mean that awareness of hate crimes can spread well beyond the local communities where they occur. Such is the reach of some new media platforms that what occurs in one community can be seen, heard and felt in communities on every corner of the globe within minutes. The devastating attack in Orlando is a case in point. The news of the targeted killing of 49 people and injuring of 50 others at an LGBT venue in Florida spread internationally within hours. An outpouring of emotion and, in turn, community activism was witnessed as LGBT and non-LGBT allies converged to make a stand against what some labelled an act of “homophobic terrorism” (Schweppe and Walters, 2016). Within just 24 hours, vigils were being held globally involving thousands of people demonstrating in the streets of London, Sydney, Hong Kong, Bangkok, and many cities beyond (Taylor, 2016). The terrorizing effects of hate crime are often used by policy makers and legislators to justify the treatment of hate-motivated offences as a distinct type of 3 offending that requires a specific legislative response. Yet little is known, empirically at least, about the exact nature and extent to which hate crimes indirectly impact targeted communities. Perry and Alvi (2012: 70) point out that: “If we are to continue to insist that one of the primary reasons for differentiating bias-motivated crime from its non-bias-motivated counterpart is the effect on the broader community, we need to firmly establish this dynamic.” It is on this dynamic that this article focuses. Connecting previously analysed quantitative data (Paterson, Brown, & Walters, 2018a; 2018b; Paterson, Walters, Brown, & Fearn, 2018; Walters, Paterson, Brown, & McDonnell, 2017) with 34 in- depth qualitative interviews, we examine how indirect experiences of hate crimes can impact upon two commonly targeted groups: LGBT people and Muslim people. Our combined analyses reveal a more nuanced understanding of how hate incidents affect entire identity groups, while additionally building upon contemporary conceptions as to the ways that “community” is defined and experienced by LGBT and Muslim people in the context of targeted violence. The ripple effect of hate incidents There is now substantial evidence on the direct impacts of hate crime that clearly illustrates the damaging consequences of such incidents (e.g. Benier, 2017; Herek et al., 1999; Iganski and Lagou, 2015; McDevitt et al., 2001). For example, Herek and colleagues (1999) found that lesbian and gay victims of homophobic hate crime were more likely to report greater levels of anger, depression, post-traumatic stress, and anxiety compared to victims of non-hate crimes. Lesbian and gay victims of hate crimes were also more likely to be fearful of future incidents of crime while additionally experiencing “greater perceived vulnerability”, compared with victims of non-hate motivated offences (Herek et al., 1999: 6). Numerous other studies that have examined the impacts of different types of hate crime have, collectively, provided cogent evidence that prejudice-based offending is more likely to have profound emotional and behavioural effects on those who are victimized (Home Office, 2018). 4 But do the same emotional and behavioural reactions to hate crime extend beyond the direct victim to those who share the same or similar characteristics? A number of scholars have asserted that hate crimes are likely to have the effect of terrorizing other people who share the same or similar identity characteristics to that of the victim (Iganski, 2001; Weinstein, 1992). These in terrorem (intimidation) effects mean that a single incident of hate is likely to have emotional and behavioural impacts that quickly reach across entire communities (Noelle, 2002; Perry and Alvi, 2012). Although by no means its intention, the media’s reporting of hate violence is also likely to help to promote a message of danger to minority communities. Such a message, it has been asserted, is likely to create climates of fear amongst minority groups who worry that they too will be attacked (Herek and Berrill, 1992: 3; Iganski, 2001, pp. 630–31; Herek et al., 1999). If this is true, it means that a single act of hate-motivated violence may result in entire communities of people experiencing a heightened sense of vulnerability, anxiety and fear about future targeted victimization (Perry and Alvi, 2012). There is some limited qualitative (and quantitative) research that supports these assertions. For instance, Noelle (2002) conducted a small study involving questionnaires and semi-structured interviews with LGB participants in the wake of the homophobic murder of Matthew Shepard in the USA in 1998. Using assumptive world theory, her findings suggested that high profile homophobic violence can have significant impacts on other gay, lesbian and bisexual people’s assumptions that “their” world is a safe and/or benevolent place. She reported that the respondents reported feeling personally threatened as a consequence of sharing the victim’s social identity. Other reactions included avoidance (less willingness to be open about their sexual orientation) and/or proaction (a desire to confront homophobia in society). Other qualitative studies have also begun to explore the likely emotional and behavioural indirect impacts of hate crime. For instance, Bell and Perry’s (2015) small focus group study into the community impacts of anti-LGB hate crimes in Canada found that some members of LGB communities engaged in “victim- blaming”, such as where they considered gay male victims to have provoked their 5 attack by not curbing their effeminate behaviours. The authors argue that such attitudes were an attempt at self-preservation, in order to manage their own feelings of fear about homophobic violence (see also Perry and Alvi, 2012). Participants also spoke of feeling vulnerable, which led to them making changes to the way they dressed and expressed themselves. In a previous study, Perry and Alvi (2012) found that feelings of anger about others’ targeted victimization could also have a mobilizing effect on community members, including the desire to educate others about identity “difference”. However, other researchers have pointed out that feelings of anger may give rise to further acts of hate-motivated violence as individuals who feel threatened by outgroup members seek to retaliate against them (McDevitt et al., 2002). More recently, Paterson et al. (2018a) found that feelings of shame caused by indirect experiences of hate crime may give rise to a desire to retaliate amongst some community members. The role of “community” Understanding the likely community impacts of indirect hate crimes involves a nuanced exploration of the concept of “community” itself. Noelle (2002: 45) states that it is the shared group membership of targeted individuals that leads to a “vicarious traumatization” effect. But why does forming a shared identity mean that indirect experiences of hate crimes have particular impacts on group members? The answer to this question lies in an understanding of both identity, as forming part of an individual’s sense of self, and its symbiosis with individuals’ perceived position within a “community” of people. “Community” is an elusive concept which is contested amongst social scientists. It can have differing meanings, depending on context or the purpose for which it is used (Bauman, 2001). Normative assumptions about community have given rise to a common vernacular where it is often used as a descriptor for the purpose of certain policies and practices. Within law and order discourse, “community” has often been used imprecisely to refer to local neighbourhoods who are assumed to hold a homogenous collective purpose and who typically share a single physical location (Crawford, 2002). Broad statements referring to “community safety” or 6 “community wellbeing” are often used by government officials without proper explication as to whose safety and wellbeing is being targeted (Crawford, 2002). A number of sociologists have attempted to identify a more coherent meaning of community. For instance, Studdert asserts that communities can only be formed through action or speech, and are “impossible to perform without the presence of other people” (Studdert, 2006: 2). Conceptualized in these terms, Studdert argues that community is better understood as a verb rather than a noun, as it is the doing of community that gives it its true meaning. This means that community is contingent on action, or more precisely, on social interaction (sociality). Sociality is established where people share social spaces that result in routine inter- personal interactions that make up individuals’ general living patterns. By interacting in physical spaces, a common purpose or collective interest develops, resulting in the formation of a social bond (and potentially social capital, i.e. the capacity to draw on the support of other individuals within a community) amongst individuals. Within these physical spaces of sociality a “culture” is also likely to develop, serving to establish (and re-establish) the ways that people live. The social mores and values attached to a community give rise to certain norms and social rituals, which can shape the way that members of a community interact and socialize in any given location. For other scholars, however, individuals do not necessarily need to share common space or even a common interest to form a community, but instead simply share an “essence” through which members form a bond with one another (Lash, 1994). Kennedy and Roudometof (2004: 6) explain that communities are “units of belonging whose members perceive that they share moral, aesthetic/expressive or cognitive meanings, thereby gaining a sense of personal as well as group identity.” Accordingly, while “communities” will frequently be defined by space and location, they are not necessarily bound by territory, and may instead simply be constructed via the sharing of an identity that gives individuals a collective meaning, and potentially shared cultural norms. This latter conception is not dissimilar from the social psychological conception of social identity articulated by Tajfel and Turner (1986) in their social identity theory (SIT). SIT proposes that individuals form attachments and a sense of belonging to 7 groups with whom they share similar identity-defining characteristics. Group- based identities can comprise a variety of different attributes, including (amongst others) political beliefs, religious beliefs, social class, ethnicity, nationality, or sexual orientation. When people perceive themselves as being part of a group, they acquire that “ingroup” identity, thereby becoming members of a specific community (e.g. the “gay community” or the “Muslim community”). Any given social identity may be chronically salient for a person, or may become personally relevant only in certain intergroup contexts – for example, where an incident or some public discourse highlights the significance of a particular group membership. The psychological process by which individuals develop a sense of belonging with a group has been defined as self-categorization (Turner et al., 1987). Self- categorization leads individuals to perceive themselves as less unique and more “typical” of someone who shares characteristics with other members of the given group. These group characteristics are typically expressed via the articulation of certain attitudes, beliefs and behaviours that are directly associated with that group membership. Connected to self-categorization is intergroup emotions theory (IET), which posits that intergroup behaviour is driven by emotions that are predicated on social categorization of self as belonging to an ingroup (and not to an outgroup) (Mackie and Smith, 2015; Smith, 1993, 1999). Ingroup members, this theory argues, evaluate events in their social environment in terms of their outcomes for the group as a whole (known as intergroup appraisal). Hence, an attack against another ingroup member is likely to be experienced by other group members as an attack against all members (see e.g. Gordijn et al., 2001; Mackie et al., 2000). IET theorists propose that where groups feel threatened by conduct that discriminates against them, this will result in emotional reactions amongst group members (predominantly anger and anxiety), which are then thought to instigate certain behaviours (e.g. proaction and avoidance respectively). It is through understanding minority communities as collective “ingroups” who are likely to be connected emotionally, that we can begin to comprehend more fully the indirect impacts of hate-motivated crimes. Below, we explore data collated as part of the Sussex Hate Crime Project (SHCP) using quantitative surveys, experiments and qualitative interviews to examine the emotional and behavioural 8 impacts that indirect experiences of hate crime have on two commonly targeted identity groups in the UK: LGBT communities and Muslim communities. Findings from the Sussex Hate Crime Project The question of whether hate crimes have indirect impacts on other group members formed the focus of a five-year research project (Paterson, Walters, Brown & Fearn, 2018). Quantitative data reported elsewhere, based on cross- sectional and longitudinal surveys and experiments with over 3,000 LGBT and Muslim people, have provided evidence that simply knowing someone in the local community who had been a victim of a hate crime, had significant impacts on group members’ emotions (especially anger and anxiety) (Paterson et al., 2018a; 2018b). In turn, those emotions were linked to proactive behavioural intentions (e.g. joining rights-based groups, community-focused charities, and being more active on social media) and avoidance (e.g. avoiding certain locations and changing one’s appearance) (Paterson et al., 2018a). Moreover, longitudinal and experimental studies also found that media exposure to hate crimes had lasting demobilizing impacts on actual behaviours (Paterson et al., 2018b). The researchers found that a key mediating factor explaining these enhanced impacts of indirect hate crimes was empathy – i.e. the willingness or capacity to feel the emotions of others (Batson et al., 1997). Individuals from within LGBT and Muslim groups were more empathic towards other ingroup members’ experiences of hate crime and it was this capacity to vicariously feel “other’s pain” that resulted in heightened emotional responses for hate crime victims compared to non-hate crime victims. While these quantitative findings support the claim that hate crimes have significant “community” impacts, and that these are linked to both identity and empathy, it remains unclear as to the ways in which group members identify with their ingroup to form identity-based “communities”, and why some members feel stronger levels of membership to, and empathy with, these groups than others. These questions are addressed in the analysis presented below. 9 Methodology The SHCP focused exclusively on the indirect effects of anti-LGBT and anti- Muslim hate crime. Both groups remain frequent targets of hate, with data from the Crime Survey for England and Wales suggesting that each group has experienced a significant increase in hate crimes in recent years (Home Office, 2018). The decision to research these two groups was also based on the fact that it enabled the researchers to explore whether differences in relation to identity traits and how the two communities engage in community-based practices affects the ways in which hate crimes impact group members. This qualitative study is based on a sample of 34 in-depth interviews (16 participants who identified as LGBT and 18 who identified as Muslims). Interviewees were recruited with the help of our partner LGBT and Muslim organizations and via “snowballing”, which is used to identify new interviewees via those already interviewed (Bryman, 2012: 202–203). Participants’ ages ranged from 18–53 (LGBT) and 18–59 (Muslim). Gender was self-assigned by participants and included: 10 Male, three Female, one Male to Female Trans, one queer, and one gender queer woman (LGBT); and 12 Male and six Female (Muslim). The sexual orientations of participants were also self-categorized and included: nine gay, five bisexual, one lesbian and one queer (LGBT); and 16 heterosexual and two unassigned (Muslim). The ethnic backgrounds of participants were listed as: 10 White, two unassigned, one European, one White Other, one Black African, and one mixed race (LGBT); and four Bangladeshi, four mixed race, two Arab, two Muslim, two unassigned, one British Bangladeshi, one British Pakistani, one Indian and one Afghani (Muslim). Within the interview guides there were four main areas of enquiry: community identification and identity; experiences of direct and indirect hate crime (and consequent emotions and actions); experiences and perceptions of the current criminal justice system responses to hate crime; and the potential of restorative justice in hate crime cases. This article focuses on community identification and indirect experiences of hate crime, including exploring how indirect hate crimes (against ingroup members and outgroups) are processed by victims, and 10 examining the role that group identity plays in emotional and behavioural responses to such incidents. Interviews were coded using NVivo and a primarily deductive thematic analysis was employed (Braun and Clarke, 2006). This allowed us to categorize findings based on nodes (themes) and to create sub-themes which emerged across the data as they related to our key theoretical perspectives (SIT and IET) (Braun and Clarke, 2006). This approach also enabled us to highlight both the commonalities and differences that existed between the two cohorts of interviewees (LGBT and Muslim). The study received ethical approval from the Cross-Schools Research Ethics Committee at the University of Sussex. All names referred to in this article have been changed to protect the anonymity of participants. Understanding “community” as part of the community impacts of hate crime: the importance of location Interviewees were asked a number of questions regarding their feelings of belonging to either LGBT communities or Muslim communities. We asked each participant whether they felt connected in any way to these communities at a local, national and/or global level. We then asked participants about how strongly they felt their identity as LGBT or Muslim meant to them and how their identity impacted on the way they viewed the world. Within the LGBT group, twelve out of 16 interviewees stated that they either currently felt, or had previously felt, part of the LGBT community in their local area. Membership of the community was predominantly linked to knowing other LGBT people, living in a defined LGBT area, and/or participating in local LGBT events. Within the Muslim group, a similar proportion of participants (15/18) felt that they were part of the local Muslim community, with two stating that they were not active members. For one interviewee, this was because he was Shia and the local mosque was Sunni, and one stated he was not a “proper” member which was linked to his (lack of) devoutness. 11 A minority of LGBT participants noted that they did not feel connected to any local LGBT community, nor did they particularly seek this out. Some of these individuals resisted the idea that they should be part of any identity-based community at all. One participant spoke in terms of “I” being “just me”, rather than being characterized as a gay or lesbian (for example) person. Another participant commented: No, I just generally see myself as an individual and as part of everybody. I don’t like to categorize in a group, ‘cause I believe that you’d open yourselves up to other people’s opinions and that. I just try and be myself as in generally just fit in and, yeah, just to get on with everyone. I don’t see it as this ... in a group or a community. (Karen/LGBT) Beyond being part of a local community, seven LGBT and seven Muslim participants stated that they felt some sense of belonging to a UK-wide LGBT or Muslim community. For LGBT participants, this was often characterized through their activities as engaging with people via campaigning, or by accessing UK-wide information via news outlets (e.g. Pink News). Others also participated in large scale events such as city Pride marches. For Muslim participants, rather than focusing on events and activities, the majority of individuals evoked a religious doctrine to support their view of national identity, such as the idea of “brotherhood” and “one nation” – the idea that all Muslims are the brothers of other Muslims. For Muslims then, the sense of belonging was directly linked to a religious idea that connected individuals together by belief and community support for one another. As the main belief of Islam of the actual religion Islam is brotherhood, that’s the way … I feel a part. So it’s about brotherhood, you know? It’s about supporting each other in times of need, donating. So only that way, yeah. (Mohammed/Muslim) Only two Muslim participants felt that they were not part of a UK-wide Muslim community. In one case the interviewee stated they were just a “normal Muslim”, while for the other they again linked this partly to being Shia as opposed to a Sunni Muslim. 12 A slightly smaller, but still significant, proportion of LGBT participants (six) saw themselves as belonging to a global LGBT community. This global community was based on sharing a common identity that transcended other spatial, cultural, ethnic or national identities. One interviewee described this as follows: It’s an identity that will sort of define me and place me in certain social situations wherever I go, and it will give me something in common with other people in other places, so ... in a way, yeah. (Abi/LGBT) An even higher proportion of Muslim participants (14/18) stated that they felt part of a global Muslim community. As with national community, this perception was frequently linked to the notion of brotherhood: As a Muslim, all Muslims are brothers and we are all alike, we consider ourselves to be one big family. So that’s the teaching of the Prophet and that’s the Muslim belief, so if one Muslim’s hurt everyone else is hurt. So we are pretty much all the same. So that’s how I see it. But also I know people from other communities, other countries. And most of the people in my community are from all over the ... world literally. There is not one single country they don’t come from. (Abdul/Muslim) This expression of shared global identity was often mediated, for both groups, through the empathic connections that LGBT and Muslim people felt towards other group members (concurring with our quantitative findings, Paterson et al., 2018a). This was articulated by one LGBT participant who remarked: I mean … you grow up as gay, struggling with your … you know the same expectations of you perhaps won’t be fulfilled, or you know that you are [different] in some ways from other people that you’re at school with … So you kind of know that anyone that goes through that anywhere in the world will have some sort of struggle in terms of their day-to-day existence or just their life; so you can kind of ... you have some sort of empathy with people who are in more difficult situations than you, which are those ones that you read about in the papers. (Martin/LGBT) Such comments suggested that a sense of belonging to a “community” could be fostered where individuals feel a sense of shared suffering. The research indicated 13 that increased empathy towards other group members is likely to heighten the emotional responses to group-based attacks, which in turn, strengthens a person’s connection to the group. Community-based practices and engagement as forming part of “community” The degree to which individuals felt part of identity-based communities was often influenced by the extent to which they engaged in community-based practices. Thirteen different practices were identified by LGBT participants as ways people felt that they were “part of” an LGBT community (whether local, national or global). Most commonly (n=12), participants spoke of their involvement in charities or charity events such as Pride, Terrence Higgins Trust, Stonewall, or LGBT switchboards. Half of the LGBT participants also spoke of socializing with other LGBT friends as a way of expressing their group identity, while seven reported going to gay pubs/clubs, and six people mentioned their connection to the LGBT community through work. As with LGBT participants, six Muslim participants mentioned charity involvement that included Islam awareness activities, setting up mosques, and relief aid as being central to their community membership. However, a significant difference emerged between the LGBT and Muslim samples in relation to practice-based engagement. For most Muslims, their local mosque was a single site where relationships, friendships, as well as prayer as a routine activity, served to confirm their Muslim identities. Sixteen out of 18 Muslim participants stated that going to mosque was the main way in which they engaged with or felt part of the Muslim community. Strength of group identity as forming part of community membership In order to explore further the relationship between an individual’s strength of identification as LGBT or Muslim and their experiences of hate crime, we asked participants how strongly they felt attached to their identity as LGBT or Muslim. 14 There was a range of responses amongst LGBT participants in relation to the individual importance of their sexual orientation. Only three people stated that it was “very important” to them; for one interviewee below this was linked to the process of “coming out” and self-acceptance: Yeah, it’s very important to me. It’s interesting because my partner … it’s not very important to him; it’s just something you do. Whereas I have a really, really difficult time coming out and coming to grips with myself ... So now that I have properly … I’m really quite proud of the fact that I am. And it is quite a big part of who I am, and I will tell people. And I’m quite a “straight-acting” gay, if that makes sense, so it’s ... a lot of people don’t realize, so I feel the need to tell them [laughs] ... Really odd sometimes, but, yeah, I am quite proud of it, and it is a lot of who I am, ‘cause … it really formed who I am today, so it’s very important for me. (Dan/LGBT) For a larger group of people (six), it was not especially important in terms of how they saw themselves in the world, while five LGB interviewees positioned themselves somewhere in between these two positions, recognising the significance of their sexual orientation but saying that their identity was made up of other things as well. The idea that an LGBT identity was mobilized as a result of interactions with others or based on social categories was mentioned by six participants and this is important in terms of differences with the Muslim sample and in relation to experiencing hate crime, which could clearly activate a negative self-awareness. I think in a political way more than a personal way. I feel like, because I am queer, it’s important to engage politically with that and sort of demand, where it’s appropriate or where it’s possible, that people are capable of dealing with that issue. So I find it more important … if I’m, like, in the situation where there is discrimination going on, or … broadening the options for people in my identity group, I suppose. (Abi/LGBT) Whereas participants in the LGBT sample had varied and context specific views of the importance of their sexual orientation, Muslim participants told a different story about the importance of their Muslim identity. Seventeen of the 18 Muslim 15 participants stated that their Muslim identity was a central part of how they saw themselves. Often interviewees mentioned the fact that they had been brought up this way and sometimes that they were proud of it. It’s very important. I believe that I am a strong Muslim. The first identity in fact I would say being a Muslim is my first identity I would say. And there is no way I would hide it. I would deny it never. I would go straight forward to anyone and I would say I’m a Muslim because that is what my religion taught me to be. The main identity is you are a Muslim, you are a person, you are a human. And as part of it, being Muslim is really important to me. (Alisha/Muslim) Not surprisingly this strong front-stage identity, often embedded from an early age and sanctioned through prayer and religious practices, meant that a Muslim identity shaped behaviour in a much more noticeable way than in the LGBT sample. Fourteen interviewees said that being a Muslim significantly shaped their behaviour in a proactive way. For example, Islamic doctrine guided their everyday life and their sense of morality, marking a clear difference with the LGBT participants who did not feel that their sexual orientation or gender identity offered them a single way to live their lives. [T]he Holy Book of Qur’an it’s got every answer to every steps in your life. So it kind of reflects everything you do in your life. So if you, say, step out of the door the book tells you what to do, how to behave with people, how to be yourself, how to find your inner self; the book tells everything. So I would say it’s really connected to your life. (Alisha/Muslim) Our data support the assertions central to IET that individuals form group attachments via sharing identity traits, which in turn help to shape their values and social norms. However, the data also revealed how some group identities are more homogenous than others, and that the influence that identity has on perceptions of “self” can differ depending on the centrality that the group identity has on its members’ “way of life”. 16 Intersecting identities Clearly, for many individuals their group identity is either a central or significant part of who they are. However, it is important to acknowledge that some people form attachments to multiple groups (communities) with some of these identities intersecting. The impacts of intersectionality have been explored in the context of various types of targeted victimization, such as gender and Islam (Zempi, 2016), disability and gender (Balderston, 2013), ethnicity and trans identity (Grant et al., 2011), and LGBT identity and social class (Meyer, 2010). Within this qualitative study, there was some evidence to suggest that holding multiple identities can exacerbate, or at least affect, individual responses to hate crime. Seven interviewees spoke about more than one identity affecting their perceptions of threat of targeted anti-LGBT or Islamophobic victimization. For example, Abi, who identified as queer, stated that they felt more vulnerable to rape than homophobia and therefore avoided places where their body was viewed by others as female, or they would act more “male” in those places to repel unwanted sexual attention. Similarly, for Kylie, their gender identity was much more salient than their sexual orientation as bisexual when considering targeted victimization: The sexuality side of it isn’t really that significant to me at all. However, the gender side of things is very, very important. You’ll probably find that most transgender people would say that; ‘cause gender’s one of the most fundamental things in your identity, frankly. The fact that I’m trans does throw some ... spanners in the works, but it’s definitely a very significant thing. (Kylie/LGBT) In the Muslim cohort of interviewees, four mentioned the intersecting categories of their perceived race or colour and being a Muslim, and how it was hard to unravel these identities in terms of why they believed Muslims are the targets of hate crime. “First of all you’re part of a religion which is probably one of the most hated religions of the Western world at the moment. And second of all, you fall within a minority even after you ... well you fall into another minority because of the colour of your skin. So it just makes it a double negative.” (Rahim/Muslim) 17 Intersectionality is clearly significant to understanding the nature and dynamics of some forms of hate crime. Although many individuals feel part of a discrete “community” and that their identity as LGBT or Muslim is central to how they view the world, for others their experiences of prejudice may be marked by a complex relationship between different identity characteristics. Unpacking the effect that each of these identities has on individuals’ emotional responses to hate crime victimization is no easy task. We are left unclear as to whether threats to an individual’s gender identity or sexual orientation, or Muslim faith or ethnicity, is the key factor causing their heightened emotional response to hate crime. The degree to which a part of an individual’s identity shapes their experiences of hate is likely to depend on spatial and temporal variables; such as where bodies are more or less vulnerable to targeted victimization depending on the time, place, and the social activity that an individual is participating in. Thus, while it is likely that the intersectionality of identities creates a distinct and complex sense of “self” for some individuals, it is also likely that individual identity traits become more or less salient depending upon the situational context within which individuals experience prejudice and hate. The indirect impacts of hate crime victimization The vast majority of interviewees stated that they were aware of hate crimes directed at LGBT or Muslim people across all three levels under discussion: local, national and global. Ten LGBT participants mentioned local hate crimes that involved physical assault; eight interviewees had recalled indirect hate crimes that involved murder; four people talked about indirect verbal hate incidents; one interviewee mentioned rape; while another mentioned vandalism. Amongst the Muslim cohort, 11 had indirectly experienced verbal assault; eight assaults; seven criminal damage to mosques; while three people mentioned hearing about activities organized by far-right organizations (e.g. the “English Defence League”). Analysis of the interviews revealed that there was a clear distinction between the levels of threat resulting from indirect hate crime and the emotional responses to it. For many participants, the closer the indirect experience of hate crime was to 18 their home (in a physical sense), the more their thinking shifted from “it could have been me” in an abstract sense to “it might be me next time”. This illustrated that an individual’s perception of a realistic threat is likely to be much stronger where the actual incident is close to them in proximity. The most commonly experienced emotions that participants stated they felt as a consequence of local and/or national indirect hate crimes were in the anger and anxiety categories. Eleven LGBT and 13 Muslim participants spoke predominantly about incidents making them feel angry or disgusted: Totally disgusted. Totally disgusted. Why should somebody be attacked for their sexuality? It’s just sickening. Totally disgusted. (Sally/LGBT) These anger-based emotional responses could be directly linked to a number of behavioural reactions for both LGBT and Muslim participants. Six LGBT and seven Muslim participants mentioned proactive behaviours as a result of feeling angry. Many of these individuals stated that they also experienced further feelings of defiance, which resulted in a strengthening of identity: I can’t say I feel scared, no, because I think to be defiant and I’ll stand by who I am and I’ll stand; and I’ll feel more so if we back off or feel frightened then you’re allowing people to win. The more we put ourselves out there and, you know, carry on with our everyday duties and be happy in yourself, then you shouldn’t give two hoots what anybody else around ... and they’ll end up being the ones who are the minority then – it won’t be a majority, it’ll be a minority and, you know, instead of hiding away we’ll just show them that we’re not afraid and we’re not scared to be who we are; we’re all entitled to have, live our lives the way we want to live ... (Karen/LGBT) This finding concurred with earlier research by Noelle (2002: 45) who found that some indirect experiences of hate were characterized by an angry “reactance effect” that inspired some to increase their levels of political activism. It is this type of reaction that can lead to proactive behaviours intended to “fight back” against prejudice and hatred, often by raising awareness about hate crimes and educating others about “difference” (see also, Paterson et al., under review; Perry and Alvi, 2012: 69). 19 Wanting to do something … So it might be something like posting stuff on Facebook about this ... Or part of a campaign for signatures … Or mention it in passing to different people of any particular group I’m talking to … Or I might bring up the situation in a group like at the nursery when we’re surrounded by, people that might not necessarily consider LGBT friendly just to raise the bar a little bit … (Nick/LGBT) When I talk, I talk a lot about Islam and I share my actual values with anyone, with taxi drivers, with anyone ... I’m proud of being Muslim the way that when I talk about it, but it doesn’t stop me to talk about this now … I talked about this event a lot with different people – Muslims and British – non-Muslim people. (Fatima/Muslim) Various other emotions were cited by participants in response to indirectly experiencing hate crime. These included anxiety, fear, shock, hurt, and worry (cited by 12 LGBT participants and eight Muslim participants as a response to indirect hate crime). These feelings were often linked to an increased wariness and vigilance as well as avoidant behavioural intentions, such as a reluctance to return to certain locations. Yeah, it does affect my behaviour … Because I become more fearful and would avoid going to certain places that I feel might be a risk to my safety. And especially within certain times, I would avoid walking within those areas … (Zainab/Muslim) These indirect impacts illustrate that hate crimes continue to threaten the liberty and mobility of LGBT and Muslim communities and can limit group members’ desire to interact with the rest of society. In order to avoid targeted victimization, some individuals learn to negotiate their safety by adopting strategies that help to minimize the risk of victimization (Perry and Alvi, 2012: 67). This can include actively changing physical appearance such as dressing differently, modifying gesticulations and mannerisms, and even tone and timbre of one’s voice (O’Neill, 2017). Five interviewees discussed in detail how they attempted to hide their true identity from the world by changing their behaviour or appearance in order to avoid victimization (examples included acting more masculine or avoiding showing affection to partners in public spaces). One Muslim interviewee spoke of how he 20 would often “play down” his religiosity by saying things such as “I’m not really practising” and “I used to drink alcohol” (both untrue) so that others would relate to him more. Others took more extreme measures in an attempt to fit in, with one interviewee (a “Black African gay female”1) explaining that she had even tried to cure herself of homosexuality. During the interview she revealed that she had gone to great lengths to search for “cures” on the internet so that she could return home to be with her friends and family who had previously threatened to kill her when they found out she was a lesbian. Collectively, these damaging emotional and behavioural impacts often gave rise to a more reflective feeling of sadness (noted by six interviewees). Such responses were sometimes phrased in philosophical tones, in which people contemplated more broadly the meaning of hate crime at a societal level: Well … disappointment and sad, because in the end of the day hate crime against anything or anyone is not good; no one wants to be hated, especially if it comes to religion, because everyone wants to practise his religion. There should be a freedom of practising your own religion, no matter what religion it is. And in the Qur’an there’s a saying “lakum dinukum waliyadin”, which means “You have your religion, I have mine”. As long as you respect my religion, I will respect your religion. But if you come to me and offend me and you’re really hurting my feelings, then I’m not going to let you hurt my feelings and my family and my religion. So of course I will prevent that, no matter what it will cost. (Hamza/Muslim) The comments highlighted in this section illustrate what can be termed as an emotionally intersectional experience of hate crime. The data showed how the processing of emotions can begin with expressing anger, and are often swiftly followed by feelings of vulnerability, which for some, then shifts to a more reflective emotion of sadness. For others, indirect hate incidents can give rise to a conscious and more political resistance to the oppressive effects that hatred has on minority communities. Indeed, while at the social level some LGBT and Muslim people may feel forced to moderate their identity, there is, for some, a strong belief that this is unfair, unjust and must be resisted. This finding demonstrated again how some 1 Participants self-described their identities. 21 community members will be prepared to mobilize against perceived injustice, and this will mean that their group identity becomes an even more entrenched part of their perception of “self”. Global experiences and impacts of indirect hate crimes Beyond the local and national level, fifteen LGBT interviewees also cited indirect instances of global LGBT hate crime including laws and brutal incidents of violence in Russia, Uganda and South Africa. A further eleven Muslim participants mentioned incidents of global Islamophobic hate crime and this included a wide range of contexts such as countries banning Islamic dress, and the conflict in Palestine and Syria. In both cases much of the “hate” that was spoken about related to state-sponsored violence that resulted in the ill-treatment or persecution of LGBT and Muslim people. For LGBT people, this often referred to brutal violence, torture and even murder. For Muslim people, hate incidents referred to both religious-based killings, but also laws which limited Muslim people from expressing their religious and cultural norms. Participants’ experiences of global anti-LGBT and anti-Muslim hate crimes and discrimination brought up a range of feelings that were both similar and distinct from indirect experiences at the local or national level. Most common were feelings of anger (LGBT n=9; Muslim n=5) and sadness (LGBT n=5; Muslim n=3). A higher number of LGBT people (11) than Muslims (3) said they would avoid or have avoided certain countries as a result of hate crimes/discrimination against group members in that country. I won’t be booking any holidays to Uganda or Russia … I will always google the country and see how well their kind of ... what their views are to homosexuality, you know? I think it is something that would affect my behaviour because I wouldn’t choose to go to certain countries that are notoriously hostile. (Chris/LGBT) As with local and national experiences, ten LGBT participants and three Muslim participants intended to, or did, involve themselves in activism of various kinds that 22 related to the treatment of group members abroad, including petitions, campaigning, and posting on social media. Overall, there were some similarities and differences in the emotional and behavioural reactions to hate crime at the global level. Again, it was empathy, as experienced through shared suffering, that resulted in both LGBT and Muslim people feeling strongly about others’ experiences of hate and which, in turn, resulted in both proactive and avoidant behaviours. It’s upsetting and it’s angering ‘cause it’s just the fact that you can sort of empathize with that person and to think that you might potentially go through that kind of pain just for something you’ve never even chosen, you know, you just are gay. That’s upsetting, but it also makes you really angry, especially when it’s getting the approval of the sort of government, you start to think, well how is this okay? (Isabelle/LGBT) Unlike local and national indirect experiences of hate crimes, participants tended to feel less anxious and worried about global crimes. This alluded again to the centrality of spatial sensitivity as being an important factor affecting emotional responses to indirect hate crime. Hence, although group identity alone is likely to provoke a strong reaction in ingroup members, the location and participation in physical community may well be significant to our understanding of the gravity of indirect impacts experienced by targeted groups. Reactions to hate crimes targeting another group In order to compare individuals’ reactions to hate crimes that are committed against outgroup members we asked all participants about their feelings about other types of hate-motivated crimes (for LGBT participants we asked about racial and anti-religious hate crimes, and for Muslim participants we asked about racial and sexual orientation based hate crimes). Overall, LGBT people were generally disturbed and upset by other types of hate crime and all thought they were “wrong”. Participants spoke of the links between 23 themselves as a minority group and other minority groups that were also under threat: I suppose in some ways it does, because you think, if people are still attacking another minority, that there is still a lot of ignorance out there … So in that sense, yes it does make me worry … (Josh/LGBT) It is likely that this perception of threat is linked to a perceived similarity with other victims of different types of hate crime, and perhaps to a shared victim identity. Indeed, other researchers have found that more positive attitudes may be engendered across groups by highlighting similarities in their discriminatory experiences (Cortland et al., 2017). During the interviews there was also qualitative evidence to support a hypothesis that similarity in discriminatory experiences results in an amplified emotional reaction. Eight LGBT people and eight Muslim participants described how they felt anger as a result of race hate crimes, and five LGBT people also stated that they also felt anger about anti- religious crimes: Well, you do imagine who is doing that, and you know that you’re living on the same street as them or in the same town as them, and you know that they’re capable of smashing up a mosque and killing a guy, and you wonder what else they’re capable of, I guess ... and what else they would react to – they’re volatile, angry people who hate difference ... So that sort of means that we’re all screwed if we’re different. (Abi/LGBT) Comments such as these highlighted how targeted violence of all types can give rise to concerns amongst other groups that they too could be vulnerable to the same types of prejudice. In other words, it may give rise to a sense of “will it be us next?” Although other group hate crimes elicited strong emotions such as anger, it was clear from both groups that the gravity of harm caused by these incidents was not as severe as incidents committed against their ingroup. Key to understanding the depth of the emotional reactions was again empathy. Although both LGBT and Muslim people were saddened by other forms of hate, it was clear that levels of empathy were likely to be greater for victims within participants’ own community. 24 Perhaps in general terms you perhaps are more likely to empathize with someone in more of a similar position to you; so perhaps a racial attack or a racial hate crime may be against someone of a different gender to me or a different race to me … it might not maybe affect me as much … because … if it was someone who was LGBT and you think, well that could have been me, whereas obviously I wouldn’t think that I could have been like an Indian girl, but I might think I might have been that gay man who was attacked. (Martin/LGBT) Discussion: conceptualizing community and understanding the indirect harms of hate This study illustrates the complexity of both group identity, as forming part of a “community”, and the differing impacts that ingroup (community) membership can have on emotional and behavioural reactions to incidents of hate. The qualitative data showed that both LGBT and Muslim people are likely to feel an affinity with others who share their identity characteristics. However, the strength of this bond can differ depending on a number of interconnected variables. For instance, we found that Muslim identity was shared to a greater degree than LGBT identity because Muslim people experienced a stronger moral bond that was based on a shared cultural and religious belief system. This was linked to the concept of brotherhood (noted by several of our interviewees), or “ummah”, which means “community of believers” (Zempi, 2016: 121). The moral and religious values central to brotherhood were intrinsically linked to the practice of Islam, as expressed via frequent attendance at Mosque. Within the LGBT group local and national communities tended to be more fluid, with individuals feeling that their group identity played less of a role in shaping their sense of self and their “world views”. LGBT people also tended to share physical spaces less regularly, meaning that they did not “perform” their group identity in this way as often. 25 Our findings highlight the complexity of the concept of “community”, as converging with both identity characteristics and social performativity (as it is connected to group identity). That is to say, while community can be constituted by action (including language, dress, and rituals), which is shaped by individuals’ sense of group identity, the relationship between action and identity may be more or less salient depending on a number of factors. Thus, while we might accurately refer to the existence of the “LGBT community” and “Muslim community”, the cohesiveness of these “units of belonging” (Kennedy and Roudometof, 2004) may well depend on such factors as the strength of the groups’ shared values and moral beliefs, as well as their local access to group communal institutions and social spaces where members will perform and re-perform parts of their collective identity (i.e. sociality: Studdert, 2006). Many LGBT and Muslim people also felt connected to global communities; though fewer individuals identified as feeling they belonged to such a collective. As with local and national communities, Muslim people tended to feel a stronger sense of global identity than LGBT people, which was again due to the concept of brotherhood. Brotherhood or ummah transcends local or national boundaries to form a single global community of Muslims who share certain beliefs and cultural norms. The strength of brotherhood or ummah can be such that it also transcends ethnic or linguistic differences. It is this umbrella group identity that connects Muslims everywhere. This finding is significant to both our understandings of “community” and the indirect impacts that hate crimes are likely to have globally. It demonstrated that simply sharing an “ingroup” characteristic was enough for individuals to feel that they were part of a collective group, despite individuals not personally knowing or socializing with other “members” of that group. Clearly then, “community” is a highly nuanced concept that can be partly established, and then shaped, by locality and sociality, but it can also be fostered simply through membership of a group identity. Important to understanding global communities in the context of hate crime is the emotionality of group members. Many LGBT and Muslim people felt connected to global communities, not just because they held a common identity, but because they shared experiences that this identity gave rise to. In relation to LGBT and Muslim people, this common experience was one of targeted 26 victimization and discrimination, which gave rise to an experience of shared suffering amongst group members. This sense of shared suffering, in turn, gave rise to strong empathic connections amongst group members that provoked the main emotional response of anger. While it was true that most participants felt a sense of community, either via physical sociality or by sharing an identity trait, for some LGBT participants their identity was not seen as important to their perception of “self”. These individuals consciously resisted identifying themselves as being part of a group. Such resistance appeared to be an attempt to demonstrate that sexual orientation does not define individuality, and that human beings should not be reduced to a single identity trait. Paradoxically, these political beliefs may serve to both strengthen and weaken group identity. Those who displayed strong political beliefs about identity were the most proactive in defending the rights of LGBT people in a manner that asserted group identity. However, in doing this, some individuals advocated ideas that served to underplay the importance of “community” in favour of a more individualized view of humanity. We see here evidence of a philosophical tension within identity politics, between on the one hand advocating of group-based rights, while simultaneously promoting liberal values that foster a more individual-based human rights agenda. Other individuals held intersecting identities, which meant that there was not always a clear part of an individual’s group identity that resulted in their vicarious experiences of harm. Some individuals who experienced heightened emotional responses did so because of threats both to their gender and sexual orientation, or because of threats to their religious beliefs and racial background. Some noted that it was their gender identity, rather than their sexual orientation, that was the most salient feature that caused them fear of future targeted violence. It is not clear in such cases which “community” an indirect victim belongs to, or whether an intersecting identity (e.g. a “queer woman” or “Muslim woman”) is in and of itself an “ingroup” identity. Nevertheless, the data showed that most participants felt that they belonged to different levels of community, which could be directly linked to the nature and dynamics of the indirect effects of hate crimes. SIT and IET accurately predicted 27 the types of emotional responses that group members were likely to experience as a result of indirectly experiencing hate crime at all levels of community. Most prominent were anger-based emotions, which resulted in certain behavioural responses (specifically, activities aimed at strengthening group identity, as well as raising awareness about the problem of hate crime). Hate crimes against both LGBT and Muslim people in a local or national context also gave rise to more anxiety-related emotions in both samples. Such emotions were frequently linked with avoidant behaviours, such as avoiding certain areas of town or changing physical appearance and mannerisms in order to avoid victimization. Forced behavioural changes such as these amount to both an individual and a social (cultural) harm. The expression of identity within groups is frequently performed as part of one’s sociality, which allows members to create identity- based norms, values and “ways of being”. By denying themselves such performativity, LGBT and Muslim people are forcibly adhering to a heteronormative or a White Christian identity that denies them the capacity to truly express themselves. The denial of identity-based expression in public spaces means that many individuals feel forced to seek the sanctuary of “ingroup” community spaces. Benier (2017) notes that this risks damaging social cohesion, ultimately leading to the breakdown of inter-community relations. Those who retreat into safe spaces in order to avoid victimization may choose to dissociate themselves from dominant outgroups with the result that some communities become segregated and detached from other local and national communities (Benier, 2017). Two key factors emerged as affecting the gravity of emotional harms and behavioural responses to indirect hate crime. First, emotional and behavioural reactions were amplified where a realistic threat was closer in proximity. This meant that a hate crime against someone known to the victim in their local neighbourhood resulted in more pronounced negative emotions that could directly result in both proactive or avoidant behaviours. Such a finding illustrated that, while community may be formed through group identity alone (and amplified by a sense of shared suffering), location was a prominent factor that impacted upon the strength of group identity, which then mediated how greatly an individual would be affected by indirect experiences of hate crime. 28 Second, the study showed that group members’ capacity for empathy was key to understanding the enhanced harms of indirect hate crime. The capacity to feel others’ pain means that hate crimes are more likely to give rise to emotional and behavioural reactions to indirectly experiencing hate crime victimization. This was especially evidenced during discussions about global suffering of ingroup members, but also when exploring the indirect impacts of hate crimes against other groups. In relation to the latter, individuals spoke of feeling angry about incidents but to a lesser degree than same group hate crimes, while fewer individuals also spoke of feeling vulnerable or anxious as a result (though these feelings were still observed amongst some interviewees). Finally, we had expected that strength of group identification would also affect group members’ reactions to indirect hate crimes. However, it was not clear from the qualitative data whether the level of group identity or connection to “community” mediated the types and level of harms experienced by group members. Muslim identities were certainly more unequivocal, central, and regularly enacted through religious practice/guidance, while LGBT identities were more fluid and contextual, and although there were shared practices, these were more socially based. Nonetheless, regardless of these slightly diverging experiences of identity and community, the perception of threat appeared to be similar across the groups. Indeed, both communities responded in ways predicted by IET (proactive and avoidant), showing that some minimal level of group identification is all that is needed to elicit group members’ responses to indirect hate crimes. The research showed that the indirect experiences of hate crime result in distinct types of harm, which are likely to affect entire communities of people. A key difference between hate and non-hate motivated offences is that the impacts of hate ripple out to other people who share a group identity, often causing emotional and behavioural harms that go well beyond the general anxieties and desires for safety and security that are typically caused by crime. A nuanced comprehension of community that takes into consideration locality, sociality and local practices, as well as group identity, is key to understanding both the types and gravity of harms caused by targeted victimization. If we are to more effectively respond to the deleterious impacts of hate crime, be it in law or via criminal justice interventions, 29 we must first understand the extent to which such incidents indirectly affect entire communities of people. Only then can the state offer a more comprehensive framework of measures that can properly address both the direct and indirect effects of hate. 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Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 111–125. https://www.theatlantic.com/photo/2016/06/worldwide-vigils-and-memorials-for-orlando-victims/486782/ https://www.theatlantic.com/photo/2016/06/worldwide-vigils-and-memorials-for-orlando-victims/486782/ Abstract Keywords Introduction The ripple effect of hate incidents The role of “community” Findings from the Sussex Hate Crime Project Methodology Understanding “community” as part of the community impacts of hate crime: the importance of location Community-based practices and engagement as forming part of “community” Strength of group identity as forming part of community membership Intersecting identities The indirect impacts of hate crime victimization Global experiences and impacts of indirect hate crimes Reactions to hate crimes targeting another group Discussion: conceptualizing community and understanding the indirect harms of hate References 
work_rngiuton2jbyzn4akarlik2oue	----	Journal of Identity and Migration Studies Volume 7, number 1, 2013 69 RESEARCH ARTICLES Fear of Violent Victimization among the Foreign-Born Viviana ANDREESCU Abstract. In general, most studies that examined the relationship immigrants – criminal behavior focused on the immigrants’ involvement in criminal activities as offenders and/or the effects of immigration on crime rates. Only limited research looked at the levels of victimization and perceived safety experienced by immigrants in their receiving countries. Using the most recent available data from the European Social Survey (Round 5/2010), the present quantitative analysis conducted on a representative sample of residents in United Kingdom (N=2422) tries to determine the levels of criminal victimization and fear of violent crime associated with foreign nationals living in a European country, where immigration is generally unpopular. Although foreign-born persons living in United Kingdom appear to have a higher degree of victimization (vicarious and direct) than natives, the inter-group difference is not sufficiently large to be significant at p< .05.Nevertheless, compared to natives, first-generation immigrants manifest a significantly higher level of fear of violent victimization. Results also show that in addition to inter-group differences in the levels of perceived unsafety and experiences with victimization, the effects of fear-of-crime correlates vary in intensity among respondents differentiated by their country of birth. In addition, one’s level of acculturation contributes to differences in fear of crime among immigrants. Keywords: fear of crime, fear of crime correlates, immigrants, victimization, United Kingdom. Introduction On December 26, 2011, in the early hours of Boxing Day, (a public holiday in UK), Anuj Bidve, a 23-year old international postgraduate student from India, was shot in the head at point-blank range as he walked with friends near their hotel in Salford, Greater Manchester. Initially, the detectives treated the crime as a hate crime, suspecting it may have been racially motivated. According to a Facebook Viviana ANDREESCU JIMS - Volume 7, number 1, 2013 70 page set up in Mr. Bidve's memory, he "was killed for not answering a simple question - What's the time?” (Press Association 2011). In July 2012, the 21-year old, Kiaran Stapleton, a local factory worker, was found guilty of murder and sentenced to life in prison. No clear motives for the crime were provided at the trial, though it could have been part of a gang initiation ritual (see BBC News, 2012), a hate crime, or just a random act of violence. In the past decade several incidents that involved immigrants as victims of crime have been exemplified in research reports (see OSCE/ODIHR 2007, 2012) and portrayed by the media. Nevertheless, due to recording practices and immigrants’ general unwillingness to report to the police that they have been victims of crime, especially if they are undocumented immigrants, it is difficult to determine with exactitude what proportion of the foreign-born people have been victimized in recent years in United Kingdom or in other countries. Yet, based on recent information it could be concluded that a relatively large number of immigrants (particularly non-white residents) have been victims of hate crime. For instance, the British Government’s Home Office statistics indicate that during the period 2011-2012, there were 43,748 hate crimes recorded by the police in England and Wales. Approximately 82% of these crimes were racially motivated and 4% were religion-motivated hate crimes (Home Office 2012). In sum, in 2011, there were 50,688 hate crimes reported to the police in England, Wales, Northern Ireland and Scotland. Approximately 20,000 of them have been prosecuted in England, Wales, and Scotland, and 12,651 cases were sentenced in England and Wales (OSCE/ODIHR 2012, 135). Although official records do not indicate how many of these crimes involved foreign nationals, it is reasonable to assume that immigrants, especially those who are part of visible minority groups, have been among the victims. It should be noted that more than other countries in the region, United Kingdom has seen the benefit of major initiatives by law enforcement and prosecution services to introduce training and procedures making the implementation of hate crime legislation a major priority. Based on the most recent report of the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) it can be noticed that even if most member states of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) now collect information on hate crimes, in many cases data are missing, are not updated, or are reported in an extremely limited manner. Even when hate crime legislation is on the books, most countries fall short Fear of Violent Victimization among the Foreign-Born JIMS – Volume 7, number 1, 2013 71 on implementation. France, Greece, Hungary, Netherlands, Portugal, or United States, for example, have hate crime legislation, but almost nothing to show with regard to reporting or prosecutions for hate crime incidents to be included in the most recent ODIHR annual report. Because most countries underreport or do not report at all data on hate crimes, out of the 57 OSCE member states, United Kingdom appears to have the largest number of hate crimes reported to the police in 2011. Nonetheless, the authors of the ODIHR report noted that currently, hate crimes continue to represent a serious problem across the region, forming a spectrum of violence ranging from intimidation, threats, vandalism and assault to arson and murder (OSCE/ODIHR 2012). Over the past two decades, among the studies that examined the effects of immigration on different socioeconomic and cultural aspects of life there is an increasing body of research that focused on immigrants’ involvement in criminal activities or the effect of immigration on variations in crime levels (see Butcher & Piehl 1998; Davies & Fagan 2012; Desmond & Kubrin 2009; Herzog 2009; Kubrin & Ishizawa 2012; Martinez 2000; Martinez & Stowell, 2012; Ousey & Kubrin 2009; Reid, Weiss, Adelmann & Jarrett 2005; Tonry 1997; Wortley & Tanner 2006). Some of these studies (mostly conducted in United States) concluded that immigration does not contribute significantly to increases in levels of crime, while other studies even found a significant negative relationship between immigration and crime levels, suggesting that “immigration generally serves a protective function, reducing crime (see Zatz & Smith 2012, 141).” In United Kingdom, for instance, arrest data indicate that a black native is 4.2% more likely to have been arrested than a white native, while a black immigrant is 2.8% less likely to have been arrested than a white native, all else equal. In addition, 2007 OECD data showed that compared to other Western European countries, such as Switzerland, France, Germany, Finland, Denmark, Austria, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, or Norway, foreigners were only slightly overrepresented in UK prisons. In Switzerland, for example, foreign inmates represented in 2007 approximately 71% of the prison population, while only 23% of the country population were foreign-born. Comparatively, in United Kingdom, about 9% of the residents were immigrants, while foreign inmates represented about 11% of the prison population (Bell & Machin 2011, 83). Nevertheless, public perceptions are more likely to be influenced by media depictions of crime than by the results of scholarly research studies. Referring to Viviana ANDREESCU JIMS - Volume 7, number 1, 2013 72 Great Britain, Bowling and Phillips (2002, 79) noted that the media and political reactions to the public disorders registered in UK in the late 1970s and 1980s contributed significantly to a lasting popular perception of “black people as disorderly and criminal.” Moreover, the authors acknowledged the media 'loudness' about the criminality of immigrant minorities and the media relative 'deafness' about the victimology of the same immigrant minorities (Bowling and Phillips 2002). Although there is extensive international literature on the criminalization of immigrant minorities in many western countries (Hawkins, 1995; Schissel and Brooks, 2002; Tonry, 1997), especially in relation to black immigrants in countries such as Australia (Collins, 2005, 2007), Canada (James, 2002; Chan and Mirchandani, 2002; Wortley, S. and Tanner, J. 2006) and United Kingdom (Bowling and Phillips 2002; Cathcart, 2000; Cook and Hudson, 1993; Gilroy, 1987), systematic research on all immigrants as victims of crime and the effects of victimization on the immigrants’ sense of safety is relatively limited. The present analysis intends to contribute to the literature on fear of crime by discussing these issues. In particular, this study will compare natives and foreign-born people in terms of victimization (vicarious and direct) and fear of violent crimes, when controlling for individual-level variables, such as institutional and interpersonal trust, socioeconomic status, subjective health, perceived discrimination, age, ethnicity, gender, and place of residence. Based on Census data there were 7,505,010 foreign-born people in England and Wales in 2011, representing approximately 13.4% of the total population (56.1 mil. people) in these two countries of the United Kingdom (Migration Observatory, 2012). In 2011, there were around 3 million more foreign-born people in England and Wales than in 2001. Taking into account this significant increase in immigrant population levels, the fact that recent surveys show strong public support for the governing Coalition’s policy meant to reduce immigration dramatically (Mulley 2012, 3), and considering that a significant percentage of native Britons are less likely to favor multiculturalism or to see immigration as beneficial to the country (see Andreescu 2011), it is important to determine if hostile attitudes toward the foreign-born (ethnic minorities in particular), may be expected to translate into anti-immigrant crime in the near future in United Kingdom. In addition, the extent of fear of violent victimization experienced by immigrants should be known because feelings of insecurity may not only negatively affect a person’s general Fear of Violent Victimization among the Foreign-Born JIMS – Volume 7, number 1, 2013 73 well-being, but they may undermine the community cohesion and social stability making the immigrants’ integration in the receiving country more difficult. Explaining fear of crime Since the 1960s, when the fear of crime concept entered the criminological literature, an impressive number of scientific research studies examined the propensity of fear of victimization and the factors that influence variations in people’s perceived unsafety, as well as the effects of fear of crime on one’s quality of life. Fear of crime has become a significant social and political issue and attracted so much social scientific research because it is widely perceived as a significant social problem (Gray, Jackson & Farrall 2008, 375). At the individual level, fear of crime may limit social interaction and may negatively affect one’s general well-being, physical and mental health included. Adams & Serpe (2000) contend that fear of crime may act as a chronic stressor and Collins (2007, 65) considers fear of crime a form of vicarious victimization. At the community level, fear of crime may have detrimental effects as well. When residents are afraid they might be victimized, the sense of community is reduced and the capacity of the community to act as an effective source of informal social control is diminished. As a result, fear of crime may indirectly cont ribute to increases in criminal activity at the local level (Maxfield 1984). Although a positive correlation should exist between crime levels and fear of crime, research demonstrated that this was not always the case (Wyant 2008). In fact, a recent study that used data from 21 European countries found that the proportion of respondents who are fearful decreases as the country crime rate increases (Reese 2009). “Given the weak relationship between crime and fear, scholars have unsurprisingly looked elsewhere for explanations (Jackson 2009, 366).” According to Halle (1996), the three theoretical approaches identified in the studies of fear of crime are the vulnerability perspective, the experience with victimization perspective, and the ecological perspective, which mostly focuses on the effect of contextual factors on fear of crime or perceived risk of victimization. The vulnerability framework considers that persons who lack effective defense mechanisms and have a lower ability to control successfully pote ntial victimization events will manifest a higher level of fear of crime than individuals Viviana ANDREESCU JIMS - Volume 7, number 1, 2013 74 who perceive themselves as being better equipped to deal with threatening circumstances. From this perspective it is expected that women, the elderly, social minority groups (e.g., racial and ethnic minorities, sexual minorities, or persons with disabilities), and those who are economically disadvantaged will have a higher perceived risk of victimization. Research showed frequently that women and the elderly, two groups that are less likely to be victimized in most societies, paradoxically, have higher levels of fear than men or younger persons, respectively (see Chiricos, Hogan and Gertz 1997; De Donder, Verte and Messelis 2005; Garofalo 1979; Lagrange & Ferraro 1989; Lane & Meeker 2000; Reese 2009; Scott 2003; Taylor, Eitle, and Russell 2009; Ziegler & Mitchell 2003). A few exceptions, however, exist. For instance, Dammert & Malone (2003) did not find a significant linear relationship between age and fear of crime, while other researchers (e.g., Chadee & Ditton 2003; Jackson 2009; Kanan & Pruitt 2002; Liu, Messner, Zhang, & Zhuo 2009; Taylor, Eitle, and Russell 2009; Yun, Kercher & Swindell 2010) found that younger people and not the elderly have higher levels of fear of victimization. Mixed results were also obtained when the relationship minority status – fear of crime was examined. Some studies concluded that persons belonging to racial/ethnic minority groups have higher levels of fear (Hough 1995; Jordan & Gabbidon 2010; Salisbury and Upson 2004; Skogan & Maxfield 1981; Walker, 1994), while other studies did not find inter-group differences in perceived safety when the race or ethnicity of the respondent was considered (e.g., Wyant 2008). In general, research examining the effect of individual-level factors on fear of crime found that a higher socioeconomic status was associated with lower levels of fear of crime and a diminished perceived risk of victimization (Jordan & Gabbidon 2010; Lane & Meeker 2000; Lee & Ulmer 2000; Scott 2003; Taylor, Gottfredson & Brower 1984 ). Yet, other studies did not find that variations in fear of crime were significantly influenced by one’s income and/or education (Clemente & Kleiman 1977; Toseland 1982; Wyant 2008). Studies focusing on fear-of-crime correlates also examined the effect of contextual factors. From this ecological perspective, it was found that certain characteristics of the place influence variations in residents’ level of fear of crime. For instance, fear of victimization was higher in larger urban areas than in smaller cities or in rural areas (Bankston et al. 1987; Keane 1992; Scott 2003; Yin 1980) and a positive relationship between the population size of the residential http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/?term=Taylor%20J%5Bauth%5D http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/?term=Eitle%20D%5Bauth%5D http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/?term=Russell%20D%5Bauth%5D http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/?term=Taylor%20J%5Bauth%5D http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/?term=Eitle%20D%5Bauth%5D http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/?term=Russell%20D%5Bauth%5D Fear of Violent Victimization among the Foreign-Born JIMS – Volume 7, number 1, 2013 75 community and the level of perceived unsafety was identified as well (Clemente & Kleinman 1977; Toseland 1982). In addition, researchers found that persons living in neighborhoods characterized by higher levels of collective efficacy, where people trust and help each other, were less afraid of being victimized than individuals living in communities with a lower level of social integration (Gibson et al. 2002). In sum, as Jackson (2009, 366) noted, research provided strong evidence regarding the importance of public concerns about neighborhood disorder, social cohesion and collective efficacy when explaining variations in fear of crime (Ferraro, 1995; Wyant, 2008). The victimization perspective examines the effects of direct and indirect experiences with victimization on fear of crime. Research findings are not universal in this case as well. While some researchers found that persons who have been victims of crime tend to have higher levels of fear of crime (Ferraro 1995; Kanan & Pruitt 2002; Lee & Ulmer 2000; Reese 2009; Skogan & Maxfield 1981; Taylor, Eitle & Russell 2009; Yun et al. 2010), other scholars (Clemente & Kleiman 1977; Liska, Lawrence & Sanchirico 1982) did not identify a significant relationship between one’s experience with crime and fear of victimization. Victimization and fear of crime among immigrants “Crimes motivated by racism, xenophobia, anti-Semitism, extremism and intolerance of the other remain a daily reality across the European Union (EU), as evidence collected by the Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA) consistently shows (FRA 2012a, 13).” Results of the European Union Minorities and Discrimination Survey (EU- MIDIS), the first EU-wide survey related to victimization and based on random samples of members of immigrant and ethnic minority groups in the 27 EU Member States (N = 23,500) shows that sizeable proportions of members of minority and immigrant groups in the EU perceive themselves to be the victims of ‘racially motivated’ criminal victimization. Specifically, the EU-MIDIS report on minorities as victims of crime shows that the average rate of criminal victimization for all groups surveyed was 24%. On average, based on comparisons with data from the European Crime and Safety Survey, minorities are victims of personal theft, assault, or threat more often than the majority population. The study also shows that people belonging to visible minority groups report higher levels of victimization than immigrant or minority groups who look similar to the majority population. For instance, Roma (10 %), Sub-Saharan Africans (9 %) and North Africans (9 http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/?term=Taylor%20J%5Bauth%5D http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/?term=Eitle%20D%5Bauth%5D Viviana ANDREESCU JIMS - Volume 7, number 1, 2013 76 %) were, on average, most likely to have been assaulted or threatened with violence at least once during the 12 months period that preceded the data collection. The groups with the highest perceived rates of racially motivated in-person criminal victimization were the Roma in the Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia; Somalis in Finland and Denmark; and Africans in Ireland, Italy and Malta. It should be noted that respondents indicated that most incidents of assault or threat were not committed by members of right-wing extremist groups (FRA 2012b, 3). Since 1982, the British Crime Survey (BCS) included questions asking respondents in England and Wales about their experience with victimization and if they worry about crime. The 2000 BCS indicated that in 1999, on average, 4.2% of adults in England and Wales were the victim of one or more violent crimes. Blacks were listed among the adults most at risk of violence with a 5.4% victimization rate. However, that figure was equal to the percentage of men age 25-44, who were victims of violent crimes and was significantly lower than the proportion of young men age 16-24 who have been victimized (20.1%). In terms of fear of crime, results showed that 37% of Black respondents (i.e., persons who classified themselves as Black-African, Black-Caribbean or Black-Other) and 41% of Asian respondents (i.e., those who classified themselves as Indian, Pakistani or Bangladeshi) were very worried about their home being burgled, compared to 18% of white respondents (Kernshaw et al. 2000, 37- 47). Based on 2003 data from the Offending, Crime and Justice Survey (OCJS), a nationally representative self-report offending survey of around 12,000 people in England and Wales, 45.8% of natives and 46.4% of immigrants have been victims of crime and 11.5% of natives and 10.5% of immigrants have been victims of violent crimes. A review of the British Crime Surveys from 2005/2006 to 2009/2010 (N = 165,169; sampling ages 16-65) indicated that the proportion of immigrants who have been victimized (27.1%) was slightly lower than the percentage of victimized natives (30.7%). Similarly, 3.1% of immigrants declared being a victim of a violent crime vs. 4% of natives (Bell & Machin 2011, 73-74). These results indicate that, at least in England and Wales, the victimization rates (including violent victimization) were not significantly different when immigrants and natives were compared. However, the fear of crime was higher among immigrants, especially when they belonged to visible minority groups (e.g. Blacks and South-Asians). The 2008 Garda Public Attitudes Survey, the tenth in a series of national surveys commissioned by the police force in Ireland ((An Garda Síochána) and conducted on a representative sample of adults (N=10,032) showed that 9.2% of the respondents have Fear of Violent Victimization among the Foreign-Born JIMS – Volume 7, number 1, 2013 77 been themselves or a member of their household victims of crime in 2007. Approximately 1.5% of the respondents in the overall sample declared they had been subjected to a racist incident. The sample included 8% non-Irish nationals. In this subsample 9% of non-European Union immigrants and 7% of immigrants from countries belonging to the European Union experienced some racist incident. In another section of the survey, the majority of the respondents (57%) agreed with the statement “people who are different are likely to experience ridicule or personal attack on our streets.” In the overall sample, 37% of respondents declared they worry about becoming a victim of crime and 44% declared they worry about a member of their family becoming a victim of crime. The large majority of the sample (89%) declared that crime is increasing in Ireland. Fear of crime was higher in urban areas (except the capital city, Dublin) than in rural areas (Browne 2008, 32-53). In addition, non-Irish nationals (apart from British nationals) were also found to be less likely to be ‘concerned about crime’ than Irish nationals, once their prior history of victimization was controlled for (Browne 2008). It is difficult to determine if ethnic minorities or immigrants belonging to visible minority groups had higher levels of victimization or fear of crime than the majority because the 2008 Irish survey did not record the respondents’ ethnicity. Using survey data from Sweden, Martens found that immigrants had a higher fear of victimization than natives. In addition, immigrants were found to have a higher level of victimization than native Swedes when three aspects of crime against the person (i.e., violence causing death, serious violence, and threats of violence) were considered. Regarding property crimes, the reviewed surveys did not indicate significant inter-group differences in terms of victimization rates. The factors associated with increased victimization rates among both immigrant and indigenous groups were: youth, being single, living in public housing and living in an urbanized environment (Martens 2001). An analysis based on data from the 2004 General Social Survey on Victimization conducted in Canada on a representative sample that included approximately 24,000 households showed that immigrants had a rate of violent victimization (i.e., sexual assault, robbery and assault) that was considerably lower than that of the Canadian-born population (e.g., 68 violent incidents against immigrants per 1,000 population, compared to 116 incidents per 1,000 for non-immigrants). However, even if immigrants were less likely to be victims of violent crime, and despite being more likely to feel that there was no social disorder in their neighborhood, they expressed slightly higher levels of fear than the Canadian-born population. For example, immigrants felt less safe than Canadian-born individuals when walking alone in their area after dark, when using public transportation Viviana ANDREESCU JIMS - Volume 7, number 1, 2013 78 alone after dark, and when alone in their home in the evening or at night (Perreault 2008). Using data from the 2004 International Crime Victimization Survey conducted on a probability sample (N=7000) in Australia, Johnson (2005, 4) concluded that immigrant minorities were not more likely to be victims of crime than natives. However, the author acknowledged that immigrants from Middle East were underrepresented in the sample and that the survey did not collect information about racially motivated hate crimes. Additional analyses showed that when looking at fear of crime, those who spoke at home a language other than English reported higher levels of fear (Johnson 2005, 34). Another research study conducted in Sydney, Australia on a sample (N=825) that included mostly immigrants (i.e., 80% of the respondents had a non-English speaking background) revealed that immigrants were both perpetrators of crime and victims of crime, and that the fear of crime was strongly present in the immigrant community (i.e., about 63% of the immigrant adults surveyed were very concerned about crime) (Collins 2007, 63). In United States data regarding crimes that involve immigrants as victims are not specially collected and it is difficult to determine if victimization rates are different when immigrants are compared to natives. Yet, it seems that in recent years there was registered an increase in racially motivated hate crimes against all Latinos, regardless of their immigration status. According to FBI hate crime statistics, in 2007 anti-Latino hate crimes (N=595) were almost 40% higher than in 2003 (N=426) (Mock 2007). A recent analysis that made use of FBI, Census, and Department of Homeland Security data found that hate crimes against Hispanics, which are the largest ethnic minority group in United States, tend to follow immigration trends. On average, from 2000 to 2004, US states reported an average of 10 anti-Hispanic crimes per year, with a higher incidence in the West and Northeast, even if immigration appears evenly distributed across US regions. While 44% of anti-Hispanic hate crimes were property crimes, more than half of them (56%) were crimes against the person, intimidation representing the majority of offenses. The authors of the study also noted that hate crimes against Hispanics are less frequent in areas where Hispanics are more numerous. Drawing on traditional theories of intergroup conflict and in particular on minority threat theory, the authors found support for the hypothesis that recent changes in Hispanic legal immigration are positively related to hate crimes targeting Latinos. However, the measure of economic threat, the overall state economic conditions, or the white-to-Hispanic unemployment rate had no significant impact on anti-Hispanic hate crime (Stacey, Carbone-López, and Rosenfeld 2011). According to the most recently published FBI report there were 6,222 hate crimes Fear of Violent Victimization among the Foreign-Born JIMS – Volume 7, number 1, 2013 79 reported in United States in 2011. These crimes involved 7,713 victims and 60% of the incidents (including offenses like vandalism, intimidation, assault, rape, or murder) were crimes against persons. Racial bias and ethnicity/national origin bias motivated the majority (58.5%) of the reported hate crimes (FBI 2012). Although not too many studies examined the level of fear of crime among immigrants in United States, research results indicate that in general, immigrants tend to worry more about crime than natives do. A comparative study conducted among high- school students from Brownsville, Texas determined that Hispanic immigrant juveniles were more fearful of weapon associated victimization than nonimmigrant juveniles. In addition to age, gender, seeing other students carry weapons, and involvement with student clubs/organizations, another significant predictor of fear of crime was a low level of acculturation (i.e., the language spoken at home was not English) (Brown & Benedict 2004). A study that examined the correlates of fear of crime among Korean immigrants in Chicago found that foreign-born Koreans have significantly higher levels of fear of crime than US-born Koreans. Results showed that measures of acculturation explained variations in fear of crime among immigrants. For example, English proficiency and length of residence were negatively related to fear of crime, while exposure to media and attachment to ethnic friends and the Korean culture were positively related to fear of victimization (Lee & Ulmer 2000). Although the authors do not indicate the extent of victimization experienced by immigrants, a more recent study conducted among Chinese immigrants in Houston, Texas shows that immigrants who have been victims of violent or property crimes had significantly higher levels of fear than immigrants without criminal victimization experience. Results also showed that age, acculturation, and socioeconomic status were negatively related to fear of crime, while perceptions of neighborhood crime as being problematic had a positive relationship with fear of crime (Yun et al. 2010). In a qualitative study based on 61 interviews conducted in Phoenix, Arizona with Latino immigrants from Cuba, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Mexico, Menjívar and Bejarano (2004) concluded that immigrants’ perceptions of crime and safety in the United States are also shaped by the immigrants’ experiences with crime and victimization in their homelands, which serve as a point of reference. For instance, Cuban respondents, who experienced low crime levels in Cuba, acknowledged a high level of fear of crime, even if they were living in relatively safe communities. On the other hand, Salvadoran respondents, who were living in more crime-prone neighborhoods in the United States, but were used to witness violence and higher crime rates in their homeland, perceived their community in the host country as being safe. http://www.tandfonline.com/action/doSearch?action=runSearch&type=advanced&result=true&prevSearch=%2Bauthorsfield%3A%28Menj%C3%ADvar%2C+Cecilia%29 Viviana ANDREESCU JIMS - Volume 7, number 1, 2013 80 Methodology The present analysis is conducted on data from a representative sample of residents in United Kingdom, who in 2010 participated at the European Social Survey (ESS Round 5, 2010, 2012). The main objectives of the analysis are: to determine if there are variations in victimization rates when natives and immigrants are compared; to compare the inter-group levels of fear of violent victimization; to examine the effects of the fear-of-crime correlates on perceived fear of violent victimization, and to determine if the same individual-level factors are more likely to influence perceptions of safety when foreign-born people are compared to native Britons. In order to answer the research questions, bivariate and multivariate analyses have been conducted. The dependent variable, fear of violent victimization is a composite variable that includes responses at two questions: (1) “How safe do you – or would you - feel walking alone in your neighborhood after dark?” (2) “How often, if at all, do you worry about becoming a victim of violent crime?” The variables are significantly and positively correlated (Pearson r = .26; p < .001).The obtained summative index has been recoded into a dummy variable (i.e., code 1, if respondent is afraid all or most of the time, and zero otherwise). The selected predictors of fear of violent victimization and the control variables used in this analysis are presented below. Experience with victimization is a dummy variable. Respondents who answered ‘yes’ at the question “Have you or a member of your household been the victim of a burglary or physical assault in the last 5 years?” were coded one, and zero otherwise. Police distrust – the variable takes values from zero (complete trust) to 10 (complete distrust). Contact with police – a dummy variable coded 1 for persons who had contact with police and zero for those who did not have any contact with police. Interpersonal distrust – this composite measure includes three questions (i.e., Most people can be trusted or you can’t be too careful; Most people try to be fair or try take advantage of you; Most of the time people are helpful or mostly looking for themselves), each with scores that varied from 0 (complete trust) to 10 (complete distrust). A factor of interpersonal distrust has been computed through principal component analysis. Only one factor has been extracted (Eigenvalue = 1.920; variance explained = 64%). The factor loadings varied from .786 to .815. The Cronbach’s Alpha Fear of Violent Victimization among the Foreign-Born JIMS – Volume 7, number 1, 2013 81 reliability coefficient for this index was .72. Subjective general health is an ordinal-level variable that takes values from 1 (very good health) to 5 (very poor health). Perceived discrimination – is a dummy variable. Respondents who declared they belong to a discriminated group were coded 1 and the others were coded zero. The indicator referred to perceived discrimination based on ethnicity, age, gender, sexual orientation, language, or religion. Financial difficulties – a dummy variable, coded 1 if a person stated that it is difficult and very difficult to live on present income and zero otherwise. Immigrant status – is a dummy variable, coded one if a person was born abroad, and zero if the respondent was born in United Kingdom. Residency – persons living in large urban areas (including suburban areas) were coded one and zero otherwise. Gender, a dummy variable, was coded one for females and zero otherwise. Age – two dummy variables were created and used in this analysis. Age 20-24, was coded one for people in this age group and zero otherwise. Age 65 and over was coded 1 for persons in this age group and zero otherwise. Preliminary analyses (not included) showed that persons belonging to these two particular age groups had the highest levels of fear of violent crime. Ethnic minority – coded 1 if the respondent is part of an ethnic minority group and zero otherwise. Prior research (Brown & Benedict 2004; Lee & Ulmer 2000; Yun et al. 2010) found that the level of acculturation associated with the foreign-born has a significant impact on immigrants’ perceptions of safety and their perceived risk of victimization. Acculturation can be defined as a multi-dimensional process that involves language (i.e., usage of the official language of the dominant culture), sharing the cultural beliefs and values of the dominant majority, and a structural assimilation that refers to the integration of a minority group (e.g., immigrants) into the social structure of the majority group (Hazuda, Stern and Haffner 1988). The two immigrant-specific variables used in this analysis as measures of acculturation are the language most often spoken at home (a dummy variable coded 1 if the respondent speaks at home a language other than English and zero if the respondent mostly speaks English at home) and the length of time in United Kingdom (a continuous variable that measures the number of years spent by the respondent in the host country). It is hypothesized that persons having a higher level of perceived vulnerability (i.e., females, older residents, ethnic minorities, persons who perceive themselves as being discriminated and those who are economically Viviana ANDREESCU JIMS - Volume 7, number 1, 2013 82 marginalized, persons with poor health, and people who are foreign-born) as well as those who directly or indirectly experienced victimization will have a higher level of fear of violent crimes. In addition, it is anticipated t hat persons who tend to distrust the police and people in general will feel less safe than, respectively, individuals who express confidence toward the police and tend to perceive their fellow citizens as trustworthy. Taking into account the fact that most violent crimes are recorded in large urban areas and that young males are overrepresented among the victims and the offenders involved in violent crimes (see Bell & Machin, 2011), young age and residency in large cities are expected to be positively related to fear of violent victimization. It is anticipated that foreign - born persons characterized by a low level of acculturation (i.e., non-English language spoken at home; short time since arrival in UK) will have higher levels of fear of crime than persons better integrated in the British society. Results Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics (means and standard deviations) for the overall sample and separately for two subsamples – immigrants and natives. In addition, bivariate analyses have been conducted to observe if there are inter-group differences in terms of the variables used in this analysis. It can be noticed that the foreign -born population in this sample represents approximately 11%. It can also be observed that foreign -born persons appear to express a significantly higher level of fear of crime than native Britons (t=1.97; p<.05). While 35% of the natives are afraid they might be violently victimized, 41% of the immigrants share a similar fearful attitude. The two subsamples do not appear to differ significantly (at p < .05) in terms of levels of interpersonal trust and socioeconomic vulnerabilities such as financial difficulties and perceived discrimination, or gender structure, which are variables usually considered relevant predictors of fear of crime. Although the difference is not significant at p< .05, it should be noted that the proportion of foreign-born people who directly or vicariously experienced victimization (23%) is higher than the proportion of native Britons (19%) who had a similar experience. In addition, immigrants have a significantly lower number of contacts with police and seem to have more positive perceptions of police than natives do. The proportion of senior citizens among the foreign -born is also Fear of Violent Victimization among the Foreign-Born JIMS – Volume 7, number 1, 2013 83 significantly lower than the proportion of the natives who are 65 years old and over. It can be observed that immigrants perceive their general health in more positive terms than natives do. This is not surprising taking into account the fact that the average age for the subsample of immigrants is 44 (std.dev. = 18.44), while the average age for the subsample of natives is 51 (std. dev. = 18.91). It can be also noticed that foreign-born people are more likely than natives to live in large urban areas, where crime levels and the risk of victimization tend to be higher. Additionally, almost half of the respondents (43%) in the subsample of immigrants belong to a minority ethnic group, while in the subsample of natives, ethnic minority respondents represent only 3%. Although, on average, the immigrants in this sample lived in United Kingdom for 23 years, it should be noted that approximately four out of ten immigrants (39%) speak at home a language other than English. Table 1: Descriptive statistics and independent-samples t-tests Variable All (N= 2422) Immigrants (N = 271) Natives (N = 2151) t-test p Me an SD Mean SD Me an SD Fear of violent crime .36 .480 .41 .493 .35 .478 1.970 .049 Interpersonal distrust .00 0 1.00 .10 1.02 - .01 .996 1.710 .087 Police distrust 3.8 3 2.44 3.51 2.63 3.8 8 2.41 - 2.370 .018 Contact with police .37 .482 .31 .463 .38 .484 - 2.113 .035 Victimization .19 .392 .23 .420 .19 .389 1.691 .091 Foreign-born .11 .315 Ethnic minority .08 .273 .43 .496 .03 .189 12.97 .000 Financial difficulties .19 .394 .22 .416 .19 .391 1.302 .193 Subjective health 2.1 1 .965 1.89 .912 2.1 5 .97 - 4.178 .000 Perceived discrimination .12 .319 .15 .355 .11 .315 1.774 .076 Age 20-24 .06 .232 .08 .273 .05 .226 1.787 .074 Age 65 and over .25 .435 .18 .385 .26 .440 -2.938 .003 Residency (big city) .31 .463 .49 .501 .29 .454 6.759 .000 Gender (female) .56 .496 .54 .499 .56 .495 -.745 .457 Language spoken at home Length of stay in UK - - - - .39 22.9 .488 20.3 - - - - Viviana ANDREESCU JIMS - Volume 7, number 1, 2013 84 Further analyses examined the simultaneous effect on variation in fear of violent victimization of a selected number of fear -of-crime determinants. The results of the multivariate analyses conducted on the entire sample and separately on each subsample are presented in Table 2. The first model, which includes all respondents, shows that when controlling for all the variables included in this analysis, foreign-born persons have a significantly higher level of fear of violent victimization than natives do. In addi tion, as anticipated, females, senior citizens, persons in poor health, residents of large cities, persons who tend to distrust their fellow citizens, and persons who experienced victimization are more likely to feel unsafe and are more afraid of becoming a victim of a violent crime than, respectively, males, very young and middle -age adults, persons in good health, residents of towns and rural areas, persons who trust people in general, and those who were not victims of crime. Due to the fact that a relatively large proportion of the immigrants included in this sample belonged to ethnic minority groups, in order to avoid multicollinearity, the variable ethnic minority was used only in the comparative analyses presented in Table 2 as well. The second model includes the subsample of foreign born individuals, while the third model includes the subsample of natives. Results indicate that while there are some similarities between foreigners and natives who are afraid of being victimized, inter-group differences exist as well. For instance, both natives and foreign-born people who experienced victimization directly or indirectly are more likely to be afraid of becoming a victim of a violent crime. Also, in both subsamples women and those who consider their health as being poor tend to have significantly higher levels of fear of violent crime. The odds of being afraid of violent victimization are however increased by a factor of 2.7 (OR = 2.718) for native women and by a factor of 2.3 (OR = 2.292) for foreign - born women, suggesting that gender has a stronger effect on structuring feelings of perceived unsafety among UK-born residents than is does among foreign-nationals. On the other hand, direct or vicarious experience with victimization, seems to have a stronger im pact on immigrants’ level of fear of crime (OR = 2.201) than it does on natives’ fear of violent victimization (OR = 1.291). Foreign-born people who have been victimized are twice more likely to be afraid of being victims of crime than their counterparts w ithout victimization experience. On the other hand, natives who have experienced victimization are Fear of Violent Victimization among the Foreign-Born JIMS – Volume 7, number 1, 2013 85 only 30% more likely to be afraid of violent crime than natives without victimization experience. Even if the inter-group difference in odds ratios (OR) is not very large, the effect of perceived health is stronger among immigrant people (OR = 1.533) than among natives (OR = 1.432). Table 2: Logit estimates for fear of violent victimization Variable All (N=2422) Immigrants (N=271) Natives (N=2151) B (SE) Exp(B) p B (SE) Exp(B) p B (SE) Exp(B) p Interpersonal distrust .305 (.050) 1.356 .000 .144 (.156) 1.155 .357 .331 (.053) 1.393 .000 Police distrust .007 (.020) 1.007 .713 -.051 (.065) .951 .436 .013 (.021) 1.013 .546 Contact with police .135 (.100) 1.145 .178 .311 (.317) 1.365 .327 .121 (.107) 1.129 .256 Victimization .307 (.119) 1.359 .010 .789 (.346) 2.201 .023 .255 (.128) 1.291 .047 Foreign-born .358 (.148) 1.430 .016 Financial difficulties .201 (.119) 1.222 .090 .918 (.364) 2.504 .012 .120 (.128) 1.128 .346 Subjective health (poor) .361 (.049) 1.435 .000 .428 (.169) 1.533 .012 .359 (.052) 1.432 .000 Perceived discrimination .114 (.144) 1.121 .428 -.492 (.427) .611 .249 .145 (.157) 1.156 .354 Age 20-24 years .305 (.197) 1.357 .122 .342 (.531) 1.408 .519 .387 (.216) 1.473 .073 Age 65 years and over .578 (.111) 1.782 .000 -.258 (.484) .772 .593 .623 (.117) 1.864 .000 Residency (big city) .472 (.099) 1.603 .000 .484 (.295) 1.622 .101 .465 (.107) 1.592 .000 Gender (female) .955 (.096) 2.598 .000 .829 (.303) 2.292 .006 1.000 (.103) 2.718 .000 Ethnic minority .313 (.311) 1.367 .314 .311 (.265) 1.365 .241 Language (non- English) .631 (.315) 1.880 .045 Length of stay .020 (.010) 1.021 .036 Constant -2.501 .082 .000 -2.89 .056 .000 -2.545 .078 .000 Nagelkerke R 2 .159 .205 .164 Chi-sq. df p Chi-sq df p Chi-sq. df p Goodness of fit 14.204 8 .077 6.873 8 .551 12.379 8 .135 Viviana ANDREESCU JIMS - Volume 7, number 1, 2013 86 Interpersonal distrust increases significantly one’s level of fear of violent crime only in the subsample of natives. Only in the subsample of UK-born people, persons age 20-24, senior citizens, and residents of large urban areas tend to be afraid more often than others of violent crimes. Whereas having financial difficulties increases the level of fear of victimization in both subsamples, the variable has a significant positive association with the dependent variable only in the subsample that includes foreign-born persons. Economically disadvantaged persons are 2.5 more likely to be afraid of violent victimization than immigrants who live comfortably. While gender has the strongest influence on variation in fear of violent crime in the natives’ subsample, having financial difficulties has the stronger impact on immigrants’ feelings of insecurity. Although the other predictors (e.g., police distrust, police contact, perceived discrimination, and minority status) included in the models presented in Table 2 preserved almost in all instances the direction of the anticipated effects, their impact on fear of violent crime was not sufficiently strong to be significant. Results also show that immigrant persons characterized by a lower level of acculturation (i.e., those who speak at home most often a language other than English) are almost twice (OR = 1.880) more likely to be afraid of violent victimization than immigrants who speak English at home. Although as indicated by additional analyses the likelihood of a foreign-born speaking at home a language other than English decreases significantly with the number of years an immigrant spent in the host country (r = -.295; p< .001), in the multivariate model the variable length of time in the host country did not have the anticipated negative relationship with the dependent variable. It should be noted that immigrants who lived for more years in UK are more likely to be persons 65 years old and older (r = .60; p< .001) who are also more likely to perceive their health as being poor (r = .31; p<. 001), factors shown to be associated with higher fear of victimization. To summarize, compared to native Britons who are not afraid of violent victimization, natives who worry about their safety are more likely to be persons who experienced victimization, females, senior citizens, persons in poor health, residents of large urban areas, and individuals with low interpersonal trust. Among the foreign-born, those who fear violent victimization have been exposed to crime, are more likely to be females, persons with health problems, individuals with low socioeconomic status, and persons who are not well integrated in the host society, despite the fact that some migrated to United Kingdom many years ago. Fear of Violent Victimization among the Foreign-Born JIMS – Volume 7, number 1, 2013 87 Discussion and conclusion This study finds partial support for the social vulnerability hypothesis. Consistent with prior research (Brown & Benedict 2004; Lee & Ulmer 2000; Kernshaw et al. 2000; Martens 2001; Perreault 2008) foreign nationals in this sample have a significantly higher fear of violent crime than native Britons, even if the immigrants’ experience with victimization was not significantly higher than the natives’ exposure to crime. Also, as found in most studies that examined the fear of crime correlates, both native and immigrant females had significantly higher levels of fear of violent victimization than their male counterparts. In both subsamples, as hypothesized and consistent with prior research (Taylor et al. 2009) persons with physical limitations and in poor health expressed higher levels of fear than individuals in good health. However, perceived discrimination and being part of a racial/ethnic minority group did not influence significantly variations in fear of violent crime in any of the subsamples examined here. In addition, age seemed to explained variations in perceived safety only in the subsample of natives, where senior citizens, and at some extent, younger persons (age 20-24) seemed to express higher levels of fear than the reference category (i.e., persons age 25 -64 or younger than 20 years old). On the other hand, one’s socioeconomic status appears to influence significantly only the immigrants’ perceptions of safety. Although this analysis recognizes the merit of the vulnerability perspective, it offers a stronger support for the crime experience perspective. As found in other studies (Ferraro 1995; Kanan & Pruitt 2002; Lee & Ulmer 2000; Reese 2009; Skogan & Maxfield 1981; Taylor, Eitle & Russell 2009; Yun et al. 2010), results showed that when controlling for a set of selected predictors, experience with victimization was positively and significantly related to fear of violent crime in both groups. Nonetheless, it should be noted that victimization (direct and/or vicarious) had a much stronger effect on immigrants’ perceptions of safety than it did on natives. Regarding the effect of contextual factors, residency in large urban areas was associated significantly with higher levels of fear of crime only for the subsample of native Britons. Similarly, support for the integrative model is found only within the subsample of natives. While native Britons who live in areas where people are fair, trustworthy, and help each other tend to have http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/?term=Taylor%20J%5Bauth%5D http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/?term=Taylor%20J%5Bauth%5D http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/?term=Eitle%20D%5Bauth%5D Viviana ANDREESCU JIMS - Volume 7, number 1, 2013 88 significantly lower levels of fear of crime, differences in interpersonal trust do not seem to affect significantly the immigrants’ perceptions of safety, even if the direction of the effect is the same in both subsamples. Despite the fact that in both samples individuals who had more frequent contacts with the police are more likely to worry about their safety, the effect is not strong enough to be significant. In addition, the level of confidence toward t he police does not appear to influence significantly personal feelings of safety, at least when people refer to fear of violent victimization. This finding differs from other studies (e.g., Bennett 1994; Jackson et al. 2009; Reynolds et al. 2008) that identified a significant negative relationship between fear of crime and trust in the police. However, these studies examined the level of fear in general, including fear of property crime, while the present analysis focused only on people’s concerns regarding personal crime. Even if the measures used here to determine the level of acculturation associated with foreign-born individuals are limited and the English language proficiency (an important component of the acculturation process) was only indirectly estimated, consistent with prior research (Brown & Benedict 2004; Johnson 2005; Lee & Ulmer 2000; Yun et al. 2010), this analysis also found that individuals who speak more often at home a language other than the official language (which could be considered an indicator of a lower integration in the host society), appear to worry more often about being victimized. In addition, it was anticipated that more years an immigrant spends in the host country, better integrated he/she would be and as a result, percept ions of safety would be similar to those expressed by natives. Yet, the results indicate that the immigrants’ feelings of unsafety tend to increase with their length of stay in the host country. Additional analyses showed that the foreign -born individuals who lived in United Kingdom for more than 23 years (N = 101), which is the average length of stay for the sample, have certain characteristics that could explain the positive relationship between length of stay and fear of crime. For instance, 55% of the immigrants in this group are females, 42% are over 65 years old, and 25% of them are less likely to speak English at home. In addition, they have, on average, more health problems than natives do. These findings suggest that physical vulnerability or a low level of acculturation, or a combination of these two factors could explain an increase in fear of violent victimization among the first generation of immigrants who relocated to UK more than two decades ago. Fear of Violent Victimization among the Foreign-Born JIMS – Volume 7, number 1, 2013 89 In conclusion, this study indicates that indiv idual-level variables that account for variations in fear of crime in general, also work relatively well in explaining variations in perceived risk of violent victimization. Yet, although this research shows that certain factors, such as gender, physical v ulnerability, and experience with victimization are significantly related to fear of personal crime in both populations (natives and foreign-born), inter-group differences exist regarding the strength of these effects. In addition, certain predictors of fe ar of crime influence perceptions of safety in one group, but not in the other, suggesting that individual dissimilarities in culture and nationality may account for variations in perceptions and emotions, including worries about crime. Similar to prior research, the current study found that compared to natives, immigrants worry more often about becoming victims of violent crime. While inter-group differences in experience with victimization and a relatively low level of acculturation associated with almost 40% of the foreign-born sample might partially explain discrepancies in the level of fear when immigrants and natives are compared, it is possible that current perceptions of (un)safety may be relative to the immigrants’ experiences with crime and victimization in their homelands (see Menjívar and Bejarano 2004). For example, in 2002, according to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the United Kingdom received more refugees than any other country (i.e., 15.2% of the worldwide total of 555,310 asylum applications). As a reflection of major conflicts and persecution, the main origin cou ntries of asylum applicants were at the time, Iraq (4,375), Zimbabwe (2,750), Somalia (1,835), Afghanistan (1,350), and China (905) (Somerville, Sriskandarajah and Latorre 2009). It is reasonable to assume that refugees, who were fleeing war zones and extreme violence, would perceive crime levels in United Kingdom as being relatively low compared to crime rates in their homelands. Considering that most asylum seekers belong to ethnic/racial minority groups, it is not surprising that ethnic minority status (43% in the subsample of immigrants) was not significantly related to fear of violent crime in this study. Conversely, economic migrants, such as those relocating for work from other European countries, especially after the European Union enlargement, migh t have different expectations that could negatively affect their perceptions of crime and safety in the host country. As a secondary analysis, the present research was limited by the existing http://www.tandfonline.com/action/doSearch?action=runSearch&type=advanced&result=true&prevSearch=%2Bauthorsfield%3A%28Menj%C3%ADvar%2C+Cecilia%29 Viviana ANDREESCU JIMS - Volume 7, number 1, 2013 90 data and detailed background information about immigrants, frequ ency and specifics of victimization, the rationality of people’s feelings of insecurity, as well as other potentially important predictors of fear of crime could not be included in the statistical models. Although in an attempt to determine the collective efficacy that characterizes the community where people live a proxy indicator (i.e., interpersonal trust) was created, other ecological variables that would have offered specific information about the neighborhood conditions (e.g., crime and delinquency levels; physical incivilities; characteristics of the housing stock; ethnic, cultural, and socio-demographic composition of the community; community segregation level, etc) have been omitted because data were not available. Despite its limitations, this study suggests that not only demographic and socioeconomic differences shape perceptions of crime and safety. In addition to environmental factors, life experiences and cultural factors play an important role and they should be considered when strategies mean t to create more cohesive and safer communities are formulated. 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(2012) ‘Why Some Immigrant Neighborhoods Are Safer than Others: Divergent Findings from Los Angeles and Chicago.” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 641: 148-173. http://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2012/annual-hate-crimes-report-released/annual-hate- Fear of Violent Victimization among the Foreign-Born JIMS – Volume 7, number 1, 2013 93 Lagrange, R. L. and Ferraro, K. F. (1989) “Assessing Age and Gender Differences in Perceived Risk and Fear of Crime” Criminology 27(4): 697-729. Lane, J. and Meeker, J. W. (2000) “Subcultural Diversity and the Fear of Crime and Gangs” Crime & Delinquency 46(4): 497-521. Lee, M. S., Ulmer, J. T. (2000) “Fear of Crime Among Korean Americans in Chicago Communities.” Criminology. 38(4): 1173–1206. Liska A. E, Lawrence J. J. and Sanchirico A. (1982) “Fear of Crime as Social Fact.” Social Forces. 60: 760– 770. Liu, J., Messner, S.F., Zhang, L. And Zhuo, Y. 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Migration Observatory at the University of Oxford (2012) 2011 Census: Total Foreign-Born Residents of England and Wales 2001 vs. 2011, http://migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/data-and- resources/charts/2011-census-total-foreign-born-residents-england-and-wales-2001-vs-2011, accessed October 12, 2012. Mulley, S. (2012) Migration Review 2012/2013 (London, UK: Institute for Public Policy Research). Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)/Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) (2007) Hate Crimes in the OSCE Region: Incidents and Responses. Annual Report for 2006. Warsaw, Poland: OSCE/ODIHR Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)/Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) (2012) Hate Crimes in the OSCE Region: Incidents and Responses. Annual Report for 2011. Warsaw, Poland: OSCE/ODIHR Ousey, G. C., and Kubrin, C. E. (2009) “Exploring the Connection between Immigration and Violent Crime Rates in U.S. cities, 1980–2000.” Social Problems 56: 447–73. Perreault, S. (2008) “Immigrants and Victimization, 2004.” Canadian Centre for Justice StatisticsProfile Series. No. 18. Statistics Canada Catalogue no. 85F0033 (Ottawa: Minister of Industry). Press Association (2011) Student’s Gun Murder a Hate Crime. December 29, 2011. http://uk.news.yahoo.com/fifth-arrest-over-students-murder-074348681.html?nc, accessed December 29, 2011. Reese, B. (2009) “Determinants of the Fear of Crime.” International Journal of Sociology 39(1): 62-75. Reid, L. W., Weiss, H. E., Adelman, R. M., and Jarett, C. (2005) “The Immigration-Crime Relationship: Evidence across U.S. Metropolitan Areas.” Social Science Research 34: 757–80. Reynolds, K. M., Semukhina, O. B., and Demidov, N. N. (2008) ”A Longitudinal Analysis of Public Satisfaction with the Police in the Volgograd Region of Russia 1998-2005.” International Criminal Justice Review 18:158-189. http://www.tandfonline.com/action/doSearch?action=runSearch&type=advanced&result=true&prevSearch=%2Bauthorsfield%3A%28Menj%C3%ADvar%2C+Cecilia%29 http://uk.news.yahoo.com/fifth-arrest-over-students-murder-074348681.html?nc Viviana ANDREESCU JIMS - Volume 7, number 1, 2013 94 Salisbury, H. and Upson, A. (2004) Ethnicity, Victimisation and Worry about Crime: Findings from the 2001/02 and 2002/03 British Crime Surveys. Findings 237. London: Home Office Research Development and Statistics Directorate. Schissel, B. and Brooks, C.(eds.) (2002) Marginality & Condemnation: An Introduction to Critical Criminology, Halifax, Nova Scotia: Fenwood Publishing. Scott, H. (2003) “Stranger Danger: Explaining Women's Fear of Crime.” Western Criminology Review 4(3): 203–214. Skogan, W. G. and Maxfield, M. G. 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(1997) “Ethnicity, Crime, and Immigration: Comparative and Cross-National Perspectives.” Crime and Justice 21: 1-29. Toseland, R. W. (1982) “Fear of Crime: Who is Most Vulnerable?” Journal of Criminal Justice 10(3): 199- 209. Walker, M. A. (1994) “Measuring Concern about Crime: Some Inter-Racial Comparisons.” British Journal of Criminology 34(3): 366-378. Wortley, S. (2002) “Misrepresentation or Reality? The Depiction of Race and Crime in the Toronto Print Media” in B. Schissel & C. Brooks (eds), Marginality and Condemnation: An Introduction to Critical Criminology (Halifax, Nova Scotia: Fernwood). Wortley, S. and Tanner, J. (2006) “Immigration, Social Disadvantage and Urban Youth Gangs: Results of a Toronto Area Survey.” Canadian Journal of Urban Research 15(2): 18-37. Wyant, B. R. (2008) “Multilevel Impacts of Perceived Incivilities and Perceptions of Crime Risk on Fear of Crime.” Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency 45(1): 39-64. Zatz, M. S. and Smith, H. (2012) “Immigration, Crime, and Victimization: Rhetoric and Reality” Annual Review of Law and Social Science 8: 141-159. Ziegler, R. and Mitchell, D. B. (2003) “Aging and Fear of Crime: An Experimental Approach to an Apparent Paradox.” Experimental Aging Research 29(2): 173-187. Yin, P. P. (1980) “Fear of Crime among the Elderly: Some Issues and Suggestions.” Social Problems 27(4): 492-503. Yun, I., Kercher, G. and Swindell, S. (2010) “Fear of Crime among Chinese Immigrants” Journal of Ethnicity in Criminal Justice 8(2): 71-90. http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/?term=Taylor%20J%5Bauth%5D http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/?term=Eitle%20D%5Bauth%5D http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/?term=Russell%20D%5Bauth%5D 
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work_rphl7f2m5nebpppytvmqdn3yoa	----	Disability, human rights and the limits of humanitarianism This is a repository copy of Disability, human rights and the limits of humanitarianism. White Rose Research Online URL for this paper: http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/94343/ Version: Accepted Version Article: Liddiard, K. (2015) Disability, human rights and the limits of humanitarianism. Disability and Society , 30 (9). pp. 1445-1448. ISSN 0968-7599 https://doi.org/10.1080/09687599.2015.1062220 eprints@whiterose.ac.uk https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/ Reuse Unless indicated otherwise, fulltext items are protected by copyright with all rights reserved. The copyright exception in section 29 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 allows the making of a single copy solely for the purpose of non-commercial research or private study within the limits of fair dealing. The publisher or other rights-holder may allow further reproduction and re-use of this version - refer to the White Rose Research Online record for this item. Where records identify the publisher as the copyright holder, users can verify any specific terms of use on the publisher’s website. Takedown If you consider content in White Rose Research Online to be in breach of UK law, please notify us by emailing eprints@whiterose.ac.uk including the URL of the record and the reason for the withdrawal request. mailto:eprints@whiterose.ac.uk https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/ Disability, Human Rights and the limits of Humanitarianism, edited by Michael Gill and Cathy J. Schund-Vials, Surrey and Burlington, Ashgate, 2014, 252 pp., £58.50 (Hardback), ISBN 978-1-4724- 2091-6 Kirsty Liddiard, School of Education, University of Sheffield k.liddiard@sheffield.ac.uk This powerful collection of transdiscipinary and transnational essays begins with a comprehensive in- troduction (pgs. 1-14) which sketches out for its reader the significance of disabled people’s protesta- tions to austerity across the globe. By detailing activist efforts in the UK, Greece, Madrid, South Ko- rea, Bolivia, and Afghanistan, as editors Gill and Schund-Vials situate disabled people’s voices as cen- tral right from the beginning of this volume. In short, the volume both engages with and critiques “human rights” and humanitarianism. Without doubt, the book more than meets this aim, and it does so with a broad reach. For example, its well-organised chapters touch upon poverty; media; represen- tation; humanitarian emergencies; protest and activism; education; HIV/AIDS; LBGTQQIA rights; violence; organ trafficking/markets; law and globalisation - to name just a few. An asset of the book is its global focus, emphasising that, as a disability studies community, we’re moving away (albeit slowly) from a dominant Western disability studies and towards a more interesting and ethical terrain. Chap- ters focus on, for example, disability in humanitarian emergencies in India (Hiranandani, ch. 6); HIV/AIDS and socio-economic rights in South Africa (Apon Strehlau, ch. 11); and many chapters draw upon international and global discourses, economies, and markets in their analyses. Thus, I real- ly enjoyed this collection, and would like to use this review to sketch out why. From the beginning, Mark Sherry’s chapter (ch. 1), The Promise of Human Rights for Disabled People and the Reality of Neoliberalism, is a grounding first chapter. I enjoy the way Sherry writes: always without pretention, and always with plenty of passion. In just the first few pages readers unfamiliar with the realities of many disabled people’s lives are given a striking awakening as to the (often cruel) conditions that materialise for disabled people in neoliberal times. Developing this analysis, in chapter 3 Armineh Soorenian intricately weaves together the politics of representation and rhetoric with the reality of disabled women’s lives. She uses hate crime to identify the exacerbation of discrimination against disabled women’s human rights. For example, quoting a contributor to a recent Guardian Comment is Free article Soorenian embodies for her reader the lived realities of negative representa- tion upon disabled women’s rights to feel safe and secure in their own communities: ‘On days when the media runs anti-disabled stories, it’s safest to stay indoors’ (Gleneg 2012, unpaged in Soorenian 2014). Taking the reader delicately through the (seemingly rampant) negative representations of disa- bility and disabled people which have flourished in recent times as a right wing British press licks the boots of the (now tired) Coalition austerity rhetoric, Soorenian then layers over a (harrowing) analysis of hate crime. In foregrounding representation, she offers an important context for her reader, subtly showing that this context is necessary - a precursor - for what we have come to know as “hate crime” to emerge. For example, to understand (if even possible) the act of a person (Anthony Anderson) uri- nating over a disabled woman (Christine Lakinski) as she lay dying, all the while encouraging a friend to film it, one first has to understand the cultures of hate which lie beneath such a torturous act. Soorenian sketches out the depth and breadth of the materialisation of cultures of hate: from “indi- vidual” acts of torture to institutional violence: in this case, the UK’s Crown Prosecution Service, de- spite filmed evidence, did not pursue criminal charges. Thus, Soorenian explicitly shows how public policy, austerity, legal systems, disability and domestic violence organisations, and negative imagery and rhetoric combine to reveal rights discourses - particularly those which protect from abuse and violence - are largely ineffective and relatively powerless in the face of the increasing vulnerability and precarity of disabled people in the current UK context. Moving forward, one thing I relish about this book is its explicit engagement with that which we have come to know as “human”. Inevitably, it’s necessary to refer to the construct of the human - as the foundational subject upon which “human” rights are built - to articulate why and how some humans have more access to protection through human rights than others. Contributions to this book helpfully fortify others’ interrogations of the (Humanist) human and imagined alternatives, for example, the dishuman (see Goodley and Runswick-Cole 2014; Goodley, Lawthom, and Runswick-Cole 2014; Goodley, Runswick-Cole and Liddiard, f.c; see also dishuman.com). Two particular chapters in the mailto:k.liddiard@sheffield.ac.uk book offer some meaty theoretical richness here - that of Titchkosky (ch. 7) and Erevelles (ch.13). For example, Titchkosky’s rigorous chapter, in her words, ‘examines the divisions and distinctions human rights discourses makes between person, disability, and impairment as a way to explore the (dis)associations that still happen everyday between people and the category of the ‘human’’ (pg. 119). This analysis leads her to ask some pertinent critical questions (pg. 132) with which all disability stud- ies scholars might fruitfully engage, whether our primary inquiry rests with questioning the ‘human’ or not. Erevelles’ chapter (ch.13) thoughtfully engages in what she calls a ‘political anatomy of the body’ to critique and resist burgeoning celebrations of the posthuman as always-transgressive. Erevelles’ usual style means that this is articulated in a way that is as faithful (to historical material- ism) as it is penetrating. For example, speaking of (impaired) enslaved bodies, Erevelles (pg. 225) poignantly asks: ‘It is possible to praise the fragility, malleability, and instability of such bodily boundaries borne out of so much violence as either transgressive or transformative?’ Later in the chapter, she draws upon Scheper-Hughes' work on the transnational commodification of organs and Ahmed’s affective economies to locate these “markets” in materialist contexts which serve to uncover - as she argues - that ‘posthuman transgressions unwittingly echo neoliberal logic where bodies are free to assemble/disassemble (becoming disabled) to form affective (partial/temporary) relationships that celebrate flexibility, desire, and freedom unmediated by the political economy of transnational capital- ism’ (pg. 232). Important contributions such as this are critically grounding in the context of the ‘posthuman turn’ and require us to pause for a moment and take caution (Braidotti 2013). Lastly, one of my favourite chapters is that of Eunjung Kim (ch. 8) who takes her reader through the complexities of the politics of spectral vulnerability. For reasons of space, I draw attention only to two powerful cases upon which Kim draws to build her arguments. The first, The Girl Store, an online “humanitarian” donation site which ‘pleads with customers to pretend to “buy a girl” before traffick- ers do’ (pg. 141). I urge readers to view the site (http://www.the-girl-store.org) while reading Kim’s analysis 1 : ‘the campaign casts Indian girls on display as already trafficked and presents alluring imag- es of them as waiting for visitors to buy them back’ (pg.147); a form of “humanitarian trafficking” (Friedner in Kim 2014: 147). The second is Kim’s analysis of a Korean protest in which 80 disabled protesters crawled across a busy city bridge - taking 7 hours in total - to fight the State’s lack of care service provision for disabled people. In her powerful analysis, Kim articulates the efficacy of this par- ticular spectral protest as rooted in protesters’ performances of; claims for; and embodiment of vul- nerability in the collectivity of their action: ‘In their willingness to perform crawling and to make visi- ble the hidden daily struggles and the deaths, the activists defy the privatisation and futurity of vul- nerability. By radically embodying vulnerability here and now, the crawlers ironically become no longer pitiable but instead evidence against the presume of self-sufficiency and self-care’ (pg. 152). In sum, I highly recommend this collection. Its chapters offer breadth and depth, engaging with “disa- bility” and “human rights” in fresh and, often, provocative ways. The editors’ desire to resist ‘a teleo- logical narrative of progress in order to dwell upon the challenges and potentialities contained in dis- courses and praxes of human rights and humanitarianism’ (pg. 3) is more than realised: the collection makes space for critical debate of what it means to have access to “rights” as currently constructed in neoliberal capitalist economies. Above this, I enjoyed every single chapter - what more could one want from a book than that? References Braidotti, R. (2013) The Posthuman Turn. 1st lecture presented at the 2013-14 Women’s Studies Initia- tive: Gender and Science, Department of Social Medicine, Duke University Goodley, D., Lawthom, R. and Runswick-Cole, K. (2014) ‘Posthuman disability studies’, Subjectivity, 7, 342-361 Goodley, D. and Runswick-Cole, K. (2014) ‘Becoming dis/human: Thinking about the human through disability’, Discourse: Studies in the Cultural Politics of Education, DOI: 1080/01596306.2014.930021 Goodley, D., Runswick-Cole, K. and Liddiard, K. (in press) ‘The DisHuman Child’, Discourse: Special Issue ‘Fabulous Monsters: alternative discourses of childhood in education’. 1 Ensure you watch the site intro. http://www.the-girl-store.org/ 
work_rqw5nvjlurh6nobez4bsf6qqnm	----	Editorial Editorial Shirley Gatenio Gabel1 & Susan Mapp2 Published online: 6 December 2016 # Springer International Publishing 2016 The election of Donald J. Trump to the presidency of the USA this November left many people with questions, anx- iety, and fear about their lives, the lives of vulnerable pop- ulations, and the future in both the USA and throughout the world. In the days that followed, the USA saw protests occurring across the nation, some of which turned violent. The Southern Poverty Law Center reported a large uptick in the number of hate crimes occurring immediately after the election. Fear and suspicion on all sides of the political spectrum are pervasive. We hold no crystal ball but we offer our human rights declarations, covenants, and treaties as a reminder of who we aim to be. These international instruments were created following the horrors of the Holocaust and World War II. These instruments need to be held in reverence as the world we know is being re-conceptualized. We remind you all that the principles of participation for all, non-discrimination, transparency, accountability, and equity need to be a part of all policies and practices of our governments and we take to ensure that a light shines throughout the world. According to the International Federation of Social Workers’ Statement of Ethical Principles, “Principles of human rights and social jus- tice are fundamental to social work…Social work is based on respect for the inherent worth and dignity of all people, and the rights that follow from this. Social workers should uphold and defend each person’s physical, psychological, emotional and spiritual integrity and well-being.” This holds true for every person, regardless of the vote they cast, or did not cast. It is only as time passes that we will be able to see how campaign rhetoric moves into governmental action. What we do know is that as social workers who have chosen this pro- fession as our life calling, it is incumbent on us to uphold these ethics. That we must speak up for the voice that is not heard, that we must advocate for those whose human rights are threatened. We are trained in how to advocate for human rights and it is this work we must do. * Shirley Gatenio Gabel gateniogabe@fordham.edu Susan Mapp mapps@etown.edu 1 Graduate School of Social Service, Fordham University, 113 West 60th Street, New York, NY 10023, USA 2 Elizabethtown College, One Alpha Drive, Elizabethtown, PA 17022-2298, USA J. Hum. Rights Soc. Work (2016) 1:155 DOI 10.1007/s41134-016-0026-8 http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1007/s41134-016-0026-8&domain=pdf Editorial 
work_rqzguizbdzcnnfcgv3fnz7wpha	----	93 Ostale­teme Zlo­či­ni­mr­žnje Mi li Ca ko va če vić* Zlo či ni mr žnje tek po sled njih go di na iza zi va ju iz ve sno in te re so va nje na še struč ne jav-no sti. U član ku su iz lo že ne po je di ne de fi ni ci je zlo či na mr žnje, po šav ši pre sve ga od an glo sak son ske li te ra tu re, ko ja se po naj vi še ba vi ovom pro ble ma ti kom. Cilj ra da je da se iz vr ši ana li za na ših za kon skih re še nja u ve zi sa kon tek stom o ko me go vo ri mo, te da se do ne kle raz mo tre po re klo i vr ste pred ra su da ko ja se sma tra ju mo ti vom zlo či na mr žnje, uz uka zi va nje na od re đe ne fak to re ko ji do pri no se na stan ku pred ra su da. Na kra ju, uka zu- je mo na mo guć no sti za bor bu pro tiv zlo či na mr žnje, od no sno za pre ve ni ra nje istih. Ključ ne re či: zlo či ni mr žnje, pred ra su de, vik ti mi za ci ja, ne tr pe lji vost, go vor mr žnje De­fi­ni­sa­nje­zlo­či­na­mr­žnje U li te ra tu ri se su sre će mo se raz li či tim de fi ni ci ja ma zlo či na mr žnje, s tim što ni jed na od njih ne ospo ra va da su u pi ta nju zlo či ni mo ti vi sa ni pred ra su da ma. Pred ra su de se pre vas hod no ti ču žr tvi ne pri pad no sti raz li či tim ma njin skim gru pa ma, ili ka kvih nje nih lič nih oso bi na. Ta ko, mo že mo re ći da zlo čin mr žnje pod ra zu me va pri me nji va nje raz li či tih ob li ka na si lja pre ma žr tva ma ko je su oda bra ne po kri te ri ju mu ra sne, na ci o nal ne, et nič ke i ver ske pri pad no sti, ili na osno vu sek su al nog opre de lje nja, ko jim kri te ri ju mi ma se mo že pri do da ti još i in va lid nost i men tal na za o sta lost žr tve. Vr še nje ova kvih de li ka ta in spi ri sa no je že ljom da se po je din ci, ili či ta ve gru pe li ca ugro ze i za stra še, ka ko bi se ose ti li ne be zbed nim i bes po moć nim, te pri nu đe nim na ži vlje nje u stal nom stra hu od no vih na pa da. Po sle di ce zlo či na mr žnje ne ogle da ju se sa mo u či nje ni ci da su od re đe ni pri pad ni ci ma njin skih gru pa li še ni pra va da ži ve spo koj no, već i u na ru ša va nju har mo nič nih od no sa u ši roj za jed ni ci, ko joj vik ti mi zi ra ni po je din ci i gru pe pri pa da ju. TEMIDA Decembar 2009, str. 93-103 ISSN: 1450-6637 DOI: 10.2298/TEM0904093K * Prav ni fa kul tet Uni ver zi te ta u Be o gra du, sa rad nik u na sta vi, E-mail: bucak80@gmail.com Mi li ca Ko va če vić 94 De fi ni ci ja zlo či na mr žnje ko ju je dao ame rič ki FBI gla si da su u pi ta nju de lik ti ko ji ma se ugro ža va ju i po vre đu ju ka ko fi zič ka li ca, ta ko i ma te ri jal na do bra, a ko ji su mo ti vi sa ni, u ce lo sti ili de li mič no, pred ra su da ma u ve zi sa ra snom, na ci- o nal nom i et nič kom pri pad no šću ošte će nih, nji ho vim re li gij skim ube đe nji ma, sek su al nim opre de lje nji ma ili nji ho vom in va lid no šću (Shi vely, 2005: 2). Slič na de fi ni ci ja da ta je i od stra ne Spe ci jal ne gru pe za bor bu pro tiv zlo či na mr žnje, oform lje ne u ame rič koj dr ža vi Ma sa ču sec, shod no ko joj su u pi ta nju zlo či ni ini ci ra ni, u pot pu no sti ili de li mič no, mr žnjom pro tiv po je di na ca zbog nji ho ve, stvar no po sto je će ili umi šlje ne, ra sne, re li gij ske, na ci o nal ne i pol ne pri pad no sti ili sek su al nog opre de lje nja. Ova kvi zlo či ni mo gu pod ra zu me va ti na pa de va tre- nim oruž jem, pod me ta nje po ža ra, psi hič ko zlo sta vlja nje i ver bal ne pret nje.1 Što se ti če upo tre be sa mog ter mi na zlo či ni mr žnje, isti pred sta vlja pre vod iz ra za ko ji na en gle skom je zi ku gla si „ha te cri me“. Na ve de ni ter min upo tre- blja va se in ten ziv no ši rom sve ta po čev od 1990. go di ne ka da je u ame rič kom Kon gre su usvo jen „The Ha te Cri me Sta ti stics Act“. Ovim ak tom omo gu će no je in ten ziv no pri ku plja nje po da ta ka o za stu plje no sti i pri ro di zlo či na mo ti vi sa nih, pre sve ga ra snim, pred ra su da ma (Ja cobs, Por ter, 1998: 4-25). To što je na ve- de ni ter min po pu la ri san tek 1990. go di ne, ne tre ba da nas na ve de na za klju- čak da zlo či ni mr žnje ni su bi li za stu plje ni, u me ri do volj noj da po bu di in te re- so va nje jav no sti, i u pe ri o du pre po me nu te go di ne. Bit no je na po me nu ti da u pred ra su de ko je mo ti vi šu po či ni o ce na zlo či ne mr žnje to kom 1994. go di ne bi va ubro ja na i in va lid nost vik ti mi zi ra nih li ca. 1 Evo pri me ra ne kih kon kret nih zlo či na mr žnje: naj po zna ti ji je slu čaj ubi stva bri tan skog ti nej- dže ra, cr ne pu ti, Step he na Law ren ca, ko ga je jed ne ve če ri to kom 1993. go di ne dok je če kao auto bus na pa lo pet mla di ća iz bov ši ga no že vi ma; u dr ža vi Va jo ming u SAD dva mu škar ca su 1998. go di ne pre tu kla i opljač ka la jed nog mla di ća ho mo sek su al nog opre de lje nja, ko ga su po tom ve za li za ogra du, da bi ne sreć ni čo vek pre mi nuo pet da na ka sni je usled za do bi je nih po vre da; i na pod ruč ju na še ze mlje je bi lo ma ni fe sto va nja zlo či na mo ti vi sa nih pred ra su da- ma, naj tra gič ni ji slu čaj do go dio se u Be o gra du 1997. go di ne, ka da su dva Skin hed sa na uli ci pre tu kla do smr ti Du ša na Jo va no vi ća, tri na e sto go di šnjeg Ro ma, a ovaj gnu sni zlo čin iza zvao je bu ru ne ga tiv nih re ak ci ja na še sve u kup ne jav no sti. Temida 95 Po­jav­ni­ob­li­ci­i­eti­o­lo­gi­ja­zlo­či­na­mr­žnje U SAD se, se za hva lju ju ći po me nu tom „The Ha te Cri me Sta ti stics Act“, već du ži niz go di na vr še op se žna pri ku plja nja i ana li ze sta ti stič kih po da ta ka o zlo- či ni ma mr žnje. Ta ko je kon sta to va no, shod no po da ci ma ame rič kog Bu re au of Ju sti ce Sta ti stics da je u pe ri o du od ju la me se ca 2000. go di ne do de cem- bra me se ca 2003. go di ne vr še no u pro se ku, na go di šnjem ni vou, oko 191.000 kri vič nih de la oka rak te ri sa nih kao zlo či ni mr žnje. Da bi se ot kri lo da li jed no kri vič no de lo za i sta po se du je od li ke zlo či na mr žnje, po treb no je utvr di ti da je mr žnja re al no i ma ni fe sto va na na me stu zlo či na. Sma tra se da se mr žnja is ka- zu je kroz ver bal no iz ra ža va nje, kao i pri me nji va njem raz li či tih sim bo la. U pe ri- o du ome đe nom da tim vre men skim okvi rom, zlo či ni mr žnje bi li su in spi ri sa ni pre sve ga ra snom ne tr pe lji vo šću, dok je ani mo zi tet naj re đe is po lja van pre ma in va lid nim li ci ma. Da lje, čak 84% od ukup nog bro ja iz vr še nih kri vič nih de la spa da lo je u do men na sil nič kog kri mi na li te ta. U an glo sak son skoj li te ra tu ri i prak si is ti če se da se mo ti vi, ko ji od li ku ju vr še nje kri vič nih de la oka rak te ri sa nih kao zlo či ni mr žnje, mo gu po de li ti na če ti ri vr ste: 1) po tra ga za uz bu đe njem i za ba vom 2) od bra na-uči ni o ci ovih kri vič nih de la pred u zi ma ju ih u po gre šnom ube đe- nju da im od pri pad ni ka ma njin skih gru pa pre ti ne ka opa snost 3) osve ta-uči ni o ci ta kvih kri vič nih de la že le da ade kvat no re a gu ju na po na ša- nja ko ja tu ma če kao uvre dlji va po se be i se bi bli ska li ca 4) ra di is pu nja va nja iz ve sne mi si je-ta kvi na pa sni ci ima ju vr lo ja ka pre du be đe- nja i ve ru ju da se bo re za svo je ide a le ta ko što se agre siv no po na ša ju, kao, na pri mer, pri pad ni ci eks tre mi stič kih de sni čar skih gru pa (Shi vely, Mud ford, 2007: 11). Oso bi to za bri nja va to što iz pre zen ti ra ne po de le pro iz i la zi da po je di ni uči- ni o ci zlo či na mr žnje pro na la ze od go va ra ju će na či ne da ra ci o na li zu ju svo je kri- mi nal no po na ša nje. Ve o ma slič na upra vo iz ne toj po de li je ste i kla si fi ka ci ja mo ti va zlo či na mr žnje, ko ju opre de lju je K. Fran klin. Autor ka je pro u ča va la mo ti ve na pa da na ho mo sek su al nu po pu la ci ju u San Fran ci sku. Ona kon sta tu je da li ca ho mo sek- su al nog opre de lje nja bi va ju na pad nu ta za to što na sil ni ci ve ru ju da im pre ti opa snost od ho mo sek su a la ca, ko je do ži vlja va ju kao sek su al ne pre da to re. Po je- din ci su ube đe ni da na pa da ju ći ova li ca šti te dru štvo od ne mo ra la i pro mi sku- Mi li ca Ko va če vić 96 i te ta. Po sto je i dru gi mo ti vi ko ji na vo de na zlo či ne mr žnje, pa ta ko ima i na pa- sni ka ko ji mal tre ti ra ju žr tve iz pu ke po tre be za pre kra ći va njem vre me na, ili pak iz že lje za sa mo do ka zi va njem i sti ca njem pre sti ža u gru pi ko joj pri pa da ju. Ne ret ko će uči ni lac pred u ze ti ka kav akt mr žnje i da bi se po vi no vao ko dek su gru pe u či jem je sa sta vu, iako to sam za pra vo i ne že li (Fran klin, 1998). O po sle di ca ma sa ko ji ma se no se žr tve zlo či na mr žnje go vo re re zul ta ti is tra- ži va nja spro ve de nog u Ka li for ni ji u pe ri o du od 1993. go di ne do 1996. go di ne. Is tra ži va nje je ob u hva ti lo 2.300 li ca ho mo sek su al nog opre de lje nja, ko ji su u pe ri o du to kom pet go di na ne po sred no pre spro vo đe nja da tog is tra ži vač kog pro jek ta bi li žr tve kri vič nih de la iz obla sti zlo či na mr žnje. Na i me, utvr đe no je da se po sle di ce vik ti mi zi ra nih ovim de li ma, bit no raz li ku ju od po sle di ca vik ti mi- zi ra no sti ka kvim dru gim de lik ti ma. Žr tve su pre tr pe le in ten zi van stres, a iz gu- bi le su ne po vrat no i ose ćaj bez bed no sti u sop stve nom okru že nju, što ih je uči- ni lo ra nji vim. Ošte će ni su te ško pod no si li to što su bi li na pad nu ti zbog od li ka ko je či ne deo nji ho vog iden ti te ta, a ima li su uti sak da je sre di na ne pri ja telj ski na stro je na pre ma nji ma, čak i ka da to re al no ni je bi lo ta ko. Bit no je na gla si ti da su ose ća nja de pre si je i ljut nje, bi la pri sut na i po pro to ku či ta vih pet go di na od mo men ta vik ti mi za ci je. O psi ho lo škim po sle di ca ma go vo ri i po da tak shod no ko me je tek 1/3 žr ta va pri ja vi la zlo čin mr žnje. Is tra ži va či ce ne da su psi ho lo ške po sle di ce zlo či na mr žnje slič ne i u slu ča je vi ma ka da su žr tve na pad nu te usled dej stva ka kve dru ge pred ra su de, osim pre du be đe nja u ve zi sa ho mo sek su al no- šću (He rek, Gi lis et al, 1999: 1-13). Kao što vi di mo, zlo či ni mr žnje re zul ti ra ju stva- ra njem at mos fe re ne si gur no sti i stra ha u vik ti mi zi ra nih li ca, ali isto ta ko iza zi va ju i dis har mo ni ju u či ta vom dru štvu za hva će nom pred ra su da ma. Opa snost zlo či na mr žnje ba zi ra se i na pret po stav ci da sva ko mo že po sta ti žr tva, jer je kod ovih zlo či na ne bit no ko ja in di vi dua kon kret no bi va pa siv ni su bjekt pri iz vr še nju de lik ta. Na i me, žr tva se ne oda bi ra zbog to ga što je uči- ni lac do bro po zna je, ili za to što joj za me ra zbog ne kih nje nih lič nih ka rak te ri- sti ka, sta vo va ili po stu pa ka. Na pro tiv, zlo čin mr žnje obič no pod ra zu me va da je žr tva oda bra na na su mič no, pro sto za to što je pri pad nik ka kve ra sne, ver ske ili bi lo ko je dru ge ma njin ske gru pe. Uko li ko uči ni lac zlo či na mr žnje, re ci mo, ima po tre bu da is ka li svoj bes i pre zir pre ma ver ni ci ma jed ne re li gi je, bi lo ko ji ver ski sled be nik da tog opre de lje nja po slu ži će toj svr si. Sa dru ge stra ne, po me ni mo i za ključ ke for mu li sa ne na osno vu po da ta ka Bri tish Cri me Sur vey iz 2000. go di ne, shod no ko ji ma je oko 40% ra sno mo ti vi sa nih zlo či na iz vr- še no od stra ne uči ni la ca po zna tih ošte će ni ma, dok su ošte će ni do bro po zna- va li li ca ko ja su ih na pa la u 7% slu ča je va (Ma son, 2005: 837-859). Ako i pri hva- Temida 97 ti mo mo guć nost da se žr tva i uči ni lac ne ret ko po zna ju, od no sno da zlo či ni ma mr žnje bi va ju vik ti mi zi ra ni po je din ci iz bli žeg okru že nja na pa sni ka, uto li ko je in tri gant ni ji od go vor na pi ta nje šta je uzrok vr še nja ovih kri vič nih de la. Da bi smo pro nik nu li u su šti nu zlo či na mr žnje mo ra mo raz ja sni ti iz če ga po ti če mr žnja, kao naj ne ga tiv ni je ose ća nje pre ma lju di ma ko ji nas okru žu ju. Za pra vo, u li te ra tu ri pro na la zi mo i mi šlje nja shod no ko ji ma se zlo či ni mr žnje od li ku ju pre ja kim pred ra su da ma u sve sti uči ni la ca ovih kri vič nih de la, ne go od i stin skom mr žnjom pre ma pri pad ni ci ma ma njin skih gru pa, ili uop šte no pre ma lju di ma ko ji se raz li ku ju. Ta ko bi smo, po mi šlje nju emi nent nog ame- rič kog psi ho lo ga G. All por ta auto ra de la The Na tu re of Pre ju di ce, pred ra su du mo gli od re di ti kao ose ćaj ogor če no sti pre ma iz ve snoj oso bi i bez raz lo žno osu- đi va nje te in di vi due. Onaj ko se dr ži pred ra su da ne po ko le blji vo sto ji iza njih, i ni ka ko ni je spre man da kri tič ki pre i spi ta svoj stav. Na pa snik je ube đen da je oso ba pre ma ko joj ga ji pred ra su de i sa ma za slu žna za nje go va ne ga tiv na ose- ća nja spram nje, što mu isto vre me no omo gu ća va da ne kri vi sa mog se be zbog to ga što udo vo lja va sop stve nim ni skim po bu da ma (Ja cobs, Por ter, 1998: 13). Sle po ve ro va nje u pred ra su de omo gu ća va po je din cu da se ose ća nad moć no, da uz dig ne ni vo sop stve nog sa mo po što va nja, ili pak, da okri vi pri pad ni ke gru pa ko je mr zi za so ci o e ko nom ske pro ble me ko ji ga op te re ću ju. Ta ko, na pri- mer, uči ni o ci zlo či na mr žnje prav da ju svo je po stup ke ti me što se be sma tra ju us kra će nim, i to zbog pri vi le gi ja ko je pri pad ni ci po je di nih ra sa i na ci ja uži va ju pri upi si va nju u ško le ili pri za po šlja va nju. Ni ko la Rot kon sta tu je da je neo du sta- ja nje od pred ra su da ko ri sno u re a li zo va nju dve funk ci je. Sa jed ne stra ne, ono omo gu ća va po je din cu da se uklo pi i bu de pri hva ćen u gru pi ko ja je po bor nik da te pred ra su de, a sa dru ge stra ne obez be đu je na gla ša va nje vla sti te vred no- sti, pod vla če njem in fe ri or no sti pri pad ni ka ne ke dru ge gru pe (Rot, 1974: 104). Ne ka da će obi ča ji i kul tu ra ko ji se ne gu ju u da toj dru štve noj sre di ni do pri- ne ti raz vi ja nju sklo no sti ka zlo či ni ma mr žnje. Ne ret ko se de ša va da de ca od ra- sta ju ći, sva ko dnev no slu ša ju ste re o tip ne pri če shod no ko ji ma su pri pad ni ci raz- li či tih ver skih ili na ci o nal nih gru pa pro sti, pri mi tiv ni, glu pi, pr lja vi, škr ti, sklo ni kra đi i ne ra du. Ako oso ba sta sa va okru že na od ra sli ma ko ji ma je svoj stve no ne po što va nje lju di ko ji se raz li ku ju od njih sa mih, usvo ji će isto vet ne sta vo ve i to kao ne što pot pu no pri rod no i pri hva tlji vo. Op šte je po zna to da sa svim ma la de ca raz li či tih ra snih i na ci o nal nih pri pad no sti mo gu da uži va ju u me đu sob nim har mo nič nim od no si ma i za jed nič koj igri, dok for mi ra nje pred ra su da na stu pa tek sa nji ho vom da ljom so ci ja li za ci jom i kroz kon tak te sa od ra sli ma. Mi li ca Ko va če vić 98 Psi ho a na li ti ča ri sma tra ju da pred ra su da ma mo gu bi ti op te re će ne in di- vi due ko je se ina če od li ku ju ne kim pa to lo škim ka rak te ri sti ka ma lič no sti, ali i oso be zdra vog men tal nog sklo pa, ko je se sle po dr že svo jih sta vo va i ni su sprem ne da se raz vi ja ju i da uče kroz sti ca nje no vih is ku sta va. Za to je nu žno ras te re ti ti lju de od raz li či tih neo sno va nih pre du be đe nja, ko ja ih na vo de na ta kva ne po želj na ose ća nja, kao što je to, bez sva ke sum nje, mr žnja. Ta ko je, na pri mer, ši ro ko za stu pljen stav da su svi lju di ho mo sek su al nog opre de lje nja de ge ne ri sa ni, da pred sta vlja ju opa snost po oko li nu, ali i da kon tro li šu po li ti- ča re i me di je za hva lju ju ći enorm nim svo ta ma nov ca ko ji ma ras po la žu. Po pu- la ri sa nje opi sa nih sta vo va la ko do vo di do omra že no sti pri pad ni ka ove po pu- la ci je, pa čak i do ta ko eks trem nih mi šlje nja shod no ko ji ma ho mo sek su al ce tre ba fi zič ki eli mi ni sa ti (Young-Bru ehl, 2003: 152-159). Što se ti če ob li ka u ko ji ma se is po lja va ju zlo či ni mr žnje vi de li smo da oni mo gu dra stič no da se raz li ku ju, te da se mo gu ma ni fe sto va ti u, bar pri vid no be nig ni jim for ma ma, kao što su vre đa nje i ver bal ne pret nje, do ta ko dra stič- nih ob li ka, kao što su na no še nje te ških te le snih po vre da, pa i ubi stvo. Po sta- vlja se pi ta nje da li po sto ji po tre ba za uvo đe njem po seb nih kri vič nih de la, ko ji ma bi se iz dvo je no in kri mi ni sa la ona po na ša nja ko ja kri vič ni za ko ni i ina če za bra nju ju, s tim što bi im oso be nost da va la mo ti vi sa nost od re đe nim pre du- be đe nji ma spram vik ti mi zi ra nih. Ima osno va i sta no vi šte da je do volj no uz već po sto je ća kri vič na de la na na če lan na čin pred vi de ti ote ža va ju ću okol nost ko ja obez be đu je stro ži je ka žnja va nje, uko li ko su de la pred u ze ta zbog mo ti vi sa no- sti pred ra su da ma. Vi de će mo da su u prak si za stu plje ne obe al ter na ti ve. U kri vič nim za ko ni ma po je di nih ze ma lja pred vi đe na su po seb na kri vič na de la ko ji ma se in kri mi ni šu one rad nje ko je ugro ža va ju pra va raz li či tih ma njin- skih gru pa. Ta ko je u ma đar skom kri vič nom za ko nu u čl. 174/b pro pi sa no kri- vič no de lo na slo vlje no kao „na si lje pro tiv čla na na ci o nal ne, et nič ke, ra sne ili re li gij ske gru pe“. Za kon pro pi su je da ovo kri vič no de lo vr ši onaj ko na pad ne oso bu ili je pri nu di da ne što uči ni ili tr pi, a iz raz lo ga što žtr va pri pa da od re đe- noj ra snoj, na ci o nal noj, et nič koj ili ver skoj gru pi. Te ži ob lik istog kri vič nog de la, za ko ji je pred vi đe na ka zna do osam go di na za tvo ra, či ni li ce ko je pri iz vr še nju osnov nog ob li ka pri me ni si lu, upo tre bi oruž je, na ne se te šku po vre du žr tvi ili je mu či, kao i uko li ko je do šlo do udru ži va nja ra di vr še nja ova kvih kri vič nih de la. Sa dru ge stra ne, u ne kim dr ža va ma se pred vi đa kri vič nim za ko nom da će se, u slu ča ju da se već po sto je ći ob li ci kri vič nih de la iz vr še zbog mo ti va u ve zi sa pred ra su da ma, to ce ni ti kao ote ža va ju ća okol nost. Ta ko, na pri mer, austrij ski kri vič ni za kon u čl. 33 pred vi đa da će se ra sna mr žnja i kse no fo bi ja uvek tre- Temida 99 ti ra ti kao ote ža va ju ća okol nost, i to bez ob zi ra na kon kre tan ob lik kri vič nog de la o ko me je reč. Pro iz i la zi da po je di ne dr ža ve pro pi su ju po seb na kri vič na de la ko ji ma se ma ni fe stu ju zlo či ni mr žnje, dok za ko ni ne kih dru gih ze ma lja pred vi đa ju kao ote ža va ju ću okol nost mo ti vi sa nost uči ni la ca ka kvom pred ra su dom ili, pak, od re đu ju kao kri vič no de lo pred u zi ma nje sva ke one rad nje ko ja slu ži iza zi va- nju ili pod sti ca nju mr žnje za sno va ne na pred ra su da ma. Su­zbi­ja­nje­zlo­či­na­mr­žnje Oči gled no je da su zlo či ni mr žnje iz u zet no kom plek sna po ja va, te da, zbog dru štve ne opa sno sti ko ju pod ra zu me va ju, tre ba pru ži ti ade kvat nu pa žnju nji- ho vom pro u ča va nju. Mo ra mo bi ti sve sni da ni su sa mo po je di ne gru pe li ca iz lo- že ne ri zi ku da bu du vik ti mi zi ra ne, jer ne po sto ji ni ka kva sve o bu hvat na i is crp na li sta pred ra su da ko je na vo de na vr še nje ovih kri vič nih de la. Na i me, pred ra su de se mo gu raz vi ti i ma ni fe sto va ti pre ma sva kom onom li cu ko je se na ne ki na čin raz li ku je bi lo od na pa sni ka, bi lo od gru pe ko joj ovaj pri pa da. Ipak, sma tra mo da je is pra van stav na šeg za ko no dav ca ko ji ni je pred vi deo po seb na kri vič na de la ko ji ma bi se ma ni fe sto va li upra vo zlo či ni mr žnje, ni ti je na na če lan na čin pred vi deo po sto ja nje ka kve ote ža va ju će okol no sti ko ja bi se ti ca la mo ti vi sa no sti uči ni o ca pred ra su da ma u ve zi sa lič nim od li ka ma žr ta va po je di nih kri vič nih de la. Na la zi mo da ne po sto ji oprav dan raz log zbog ko ga bi bi lo ko ja li ca tre ba lo po zi tiv no dis kri mi ni sa ti, pa ta ko ni po osno vu pri pad- no sti ma njin skim ra snim, na ci o nal nim i ver skim gru pa. Ce ni mo da ni dru ga či je sek su al no opre de lje nje, ili bi lo ko ja dru ga oso be nost ko ja nas iz dva ja od osta- lih, ni je oprav dan osnov ni ti za ka žnja va nje, ni ti za pri vi le go va nje po je di na ca. Iz dva ja njem bi lo ko jih gru pa li ca upu ću je mo po ru ku da po sto ji ne ka su štin ska raz li ka iz me đu kri vič nih de la iz vr še nih pre ma raz li či tim li ci ma, iako bi, bar u oči ma za ko na, svi mo ra li bi ti jed na ki. U skla du sa na ve de nim i Ustav Re pu bli ke Sr bi je (Slu žbe ni gla snik RS br. 83/06) za bra nju je dis kri mi na ci ju po bi lo kom osno vu, a oso bi to po osno vu: ra se, po la, na ci o nal ne pri pad no sti, dru štve nog po re kla, ro đe nja, ve ro i spo ve sti, po li tič kog ili dru gog ube đe nja, imov nog sta nja, kul tu re, je zi ka, sta ro sti i psi hič kog ili fi zič kog in va li di te ta. Sled stve no re če nom, u na šem Kri vič nom za ko ni ku (Slu žbe ni gla snik RS br. 85/05) ni je pred vi đe no stro ži je ka žnja va nje u slu ča ju da je ošte će ni po je di nim kri vič nim de li ma, na pri- mer te škom te le snom po vre dom ili si lo va njem, pri pad nik ka kve ra sne, ver ske ili Mi li ca Ko va če vić 100 ko je dru ge, ma njin ske gru pe. Me đu tim, Kri vič ni za ko nik u čl. 128 pred vi đa kri- vič no de lo po vre de rav no prav no sti, kao jed no od kri vič nih de la pro tiv slo bo da i pra va čo ve ka i gra đa ni na. Ovo kri vič no de lo vr ši li ce ko je us kra ti ili ogra ni či gra đa ni nu pra va ga ran to va na Usta vom i za ko nom, ili mu, pak, da je po vla sti ce ili po god no sti, ru ko vo de ći se pri tom gra đa ni no vom na ci o nal nom ili et nič kom pri pad no šću, ra som, ve ro i spo ve šću, po li tič kim ili dru gim ube đe njem, po lom, je zi kom, obra zo va njem, dru štve nim po lo ža jem, so ci jal nim po re klom, imov nim sta njem ili ka kvim dru gim lič nim svoj stvom. Te ži ob lik istog kri vič nog de la či ni slu žbe no li ce ko je opi sa ne rad nje pred u zi ma u sklo pu vr še nja slu žbe. Sa dru ge stra ne, Kri vič ni za ko nik RS u čl. 317 pred vi đa i kri vič no de lo iza zi va- nja na ci o nal ne, ra sne i ver ske mr žnje i ne tr pe lji vo sti, u gru pi kri vič nih de la pro- tiv ustav nog ure đe nja i bez bed no sti dr ža ve, či me je ja sno ma ni fe sto va no ka kav se zna čaj pri da je ži vlje nju u du hu op šte to le ran ci je, rav no prav no sti i po što va nja me đu sob nih raz li či to sti. Osnov ni ob lik ovog kri vič nog de la či ni ono li ce ko je iza- zi va ili ras pi ru je na ci o nal nu, ra snu ili ver sku mr žnju ili ne tr pe lji vost me đu na ro- di ma ili et nič kim za jed ni ca ma, ko je na sta nju ju Sr bi ju. Što se ti če ne tr pe lji vo- sti, za ko no da vac, kao što vi di mo, ne to le ri še ini ci ra nje i po pu la ri sa nje iste, iako ne tr pe lji vost pod ra zu me va ne ga tiv no ose ća nje sla bi jeg in ten zi te ta u od no su na ose ća nje mr žnje. No, i mr žnja i ne tr pe lji vost pri pre ma ju te ren za eks ce sna po na ša nja pre ma pri pad ni ci ma od re đe nih na ro da i et nič kih za jed ni ca (Sto ja no- vić, 2006: 689). Te ži ob lik de la za stu pljen je u slu ča ju ka da su mr žnja i ne tr pe lji- vost iza zi va ne, ili ras pi ri va ne, pri nu dom, zlo sta vlja njem, ugro ža va njem si gur no- sti, iz la ga njem po ru zi sim bo la da te na ci o nal ne, et nič ke ili ver ske gru pe, te ošte- će njem tu đih stva ri i skr na vlje njem spo me ni ka i gro bo va. Za naj te ži ob lik istog kri vič nog de la pro pi sa na je ka zna za tvo ra od dve do de set go di na, a on po sto ji u slu ča ju ka da je mr žnja iza zi va na, ili ras pi ri va na, pu tem zlo u po tre be po lo ža ja ili ovla šće nja, ili pak uko li ko su na stu pi li ne red, na si lje ili dru ge te ške po sle di ce po za jed nič ki ži vot na ro da, na ci o nal nih ma nji na i et nič kih gru pa Sr bi je. Po sta vlja se pi ta nje ka ko dru štvo mo že da se za šti ti od mr žnje, ko ja je i po red da nas do stig nu tog ni voa ci vi li za cij skog raz vo ja i da lje ite ka ko pri sut na. Pu ko za o štra va nje ka zne ne po li ti ke spram uči ni la ca kri vič nih de la mo ti vi sa nih pred ra su da ma ne će bi ti do volj no za re ša va nje po sto je ćih pro ble ma. Upra vo na ovom me stu do la zi mo do pro ble ma go vo ra mr žnje, pu tem ko ga se po pu la ri šu i ja ča ju pred ra su de. Sla že mo se sa sta no vi štem Jo va na Ći ri ća ko ji sma tra da je go vor mr žnje ne ret ko pret hod ni ca zlo či na mr žnje (Ći rić, 2006: 199). Me đu tim, pro blem go vo ra mr žnje otva ra i kom plek sne pro ble me u ve zi sa ga ran to va- njem slo bo de mi šlje nja i iz ra ža va nja. Ustav Re pu bli ke Sr bi je za bra nju je sva ko Temida 101 iza zi va nje i pod sti ca nje ra sne, ver ske, na ci o nal ne ili ka kve dru ge ne rav no prav- no sti, mr žnje i ne tr pe lji vo sti, te bi ga ran to va nje po što va nja tog na če la tre ba lo da bu de isto vre me no i me ra ko jom će se even tu al na cen zu ra li mi ti ra ti. Sva- ka ko, mno go je lak še for mu li sa ti na če la rav no prav no sti i slo bo de iz ra ža va nja, ne go omo gu ći ti nji ho vu fak tič ku sim bi o zu u sva ko dnev nom ži vo tu. Bor ba pro tiv zlo či na mr žnje zah te va osmi šlja va nje kom plet ne stra te gi je ko ja će se po ste pe no spro vo di ti na ne pre ki dan i tra jan na čin, i ko ja zah te va mno go vi še od pu ke pro kla ma ci je na če la jed na ko sti svih gra đa na. Na ovom me stu ne će mo se upu šta ti u ko men ta ri sa nje od re da ba Za ko na o za bra ni dis- kri mi na ci je (Slu žbe ni gla snik RS br. 22/09), ima ju ći u vi du da pri me na istog još ni je ot po če la. U sva kom slu ča ju, ve ru je mo da je po treb no po pu la ri sa nje de mo krat skih vred no sti i op šte to le ran ci je. U tom ci lju nu žno je edu ko va ti gra- đa ne pu tem sku po va, tri bi na i kroz sve dru ge po god ne for me, ko je će omo gu- ći ti da što ve ći broj lju di bu de upo znat sa ovom pro ble ma ti kom. An ga žo va nje na ja ča nju sve sti o po tre bi po što va nja sva ke in di vi due mo ra bi ti sve in ten ziv- ni je i do pre ti do sva kog po je din ca, jer i oni ko ji pro pa gi ra ju pred ra su de da nas ima ju pri li ku da se ko ri ste pre i muć stvi ma sa vre me nih sred sta va ko mu ni ka ci je. Zna mo da ni je do zvo lje no na te le vi zi ji, ra di ju ili po sred stvom štam pa nih me di ja, pre zen ti ra ti sa dr ža je ko ji po pu la ri šu ra zno vr sne pred ra su de, kao i da po li ci ja spre ča va sku po ve ko ji bi bi li na me nje ni ši re nju mr žnje i ne tr pe lji vo- sti. Me đu tim, u sa vre me no do ba tu je i in ter net, ko ji omo gu ća va la ko sti ca- nje zna nja i sve op šte ši re nje kul tu re, ali je isto vre me no i po zor ni ca na ko joj sva ko mo že da iz no si svo ja ube đe nja, bez ika kve cen zu re. Do volj no je sa svim skrom no pred zna nje iz obla sti in for ma tič kih teh no lo gi ja, obez be đi va nje jed- nog per so nal nog ra ču na ra i pri stu pa in ter ne tu, ka ko bi bi lo ko ste kao pri li ku da ši ro kom audi to ri ju mu pre zen ti ra sva ko svo je uve re nje, u onoj for mi i obi mu za ko je se opre de li po sop stve nom na ho đe nju. Po seb nu opa snost pred sta- vlja či nje ni ca da de ca u sve ra ni jem uz ra stu pri stu pa ju in ter ne tu, i to bez ro di telj skog nad zo ra. Sto ga se u po je di nim dr ža va ma pred u zi ma ju teh nič ke me re za su zbi ja nje go vo ra mr žnje u ovom vir tu el nom sve tu. Te mom mr žnje na in ter ne tu ba vi li su se i uče sni ci kon fe ren ci je odr ža ne u Ota vi, u de cem bru 2005. go di ne u or ga ni za ci ji Ka nad skog od bo ra za ljud ska pra va (the Ca na dian Hu man Rights Com mis sion), ka da je kon sta to va no da ovaj pro blem zah te va zna čaj nu pa žnju, jer pred sta vlja od i stin sku pret nju po što va nju ljud skih pra va.2 2 Više o zaključcima sa konferencije na: http://www.chrc-ccdp.ca/pdf/HateOnInternet_bil.pdf , pri stu plje no 27.02.2009. godine Mi li ca Ko va če vić 102 Mo ra mo bi ti sve sni či nje ni ce da i u sa vre me no do ba po je din ci ma pre ti opa- snost sa mo zbog to ga što se na ne ki na čin raz li ku ju od ve ći ne, što upra vo na gla- ša va zna čaj uz di za nja sve sti o po što va nju i slo bod nom ma ni fe sto va nju in di vi du- al no sti sva kog čo ve ka. Do dat no nas obes hra bru je sa zna nje da raz log za agre- siv ne is pa de, u na še vre me na pret ka kul tu re i na u ke, vi še ne mo ra bi ti sa mo pri- pad nost ma njin skoj na ci o nal noj ili ver skoj gru pi, ili pak ho mo sek su al nom opre- de lje nju, već i in va lid nost, pa čak i du šev na bo lest i za o sta lost. Ni je do volj no re a go va ti sa mo pu tem kri vič no prav nih me ha ni za ma, jer je nu žno iz ra ža va nje sve op šte dru štve ne osu de pre ma svim onim ak ti ma ko ji nas one mo gu ća va ju da ži vi mo bez bed no i do sto jan stve no, bez ob zi ra na to ka kva su na ša ide o lo ška i ver ska ube đe nja, ko li ko smo dru ga či ji od dru gih, ili ka kvog smo po re kla. Li­te­ra­tu­ra Ći rić, J. (2006) Go vor mr žnje, Re vi ja za kri mi no lo gi ju i kri vič no pra vo, 3, str. 199 -223 Fran klin, K. (1998) Psychosocial Motivations of Hate Crimes Perpetrators, rad pre zen ti ran na go di šnjoj kon fe ren ci ji Ame rič ke aso ci ja ci je psi ho lo ga od 1998. go di ne, http://eric.ed.gov/ERICDocs/data/ericdocs2sql/content_storage_01/0000019b/80/16/ f0/8f.pdf , pri stu plje no 27.02.2009. go di ne He rek, G, Gil lis, J. et al (1999) Psycho lo gi cal squ e al of ha te cri me vic ti mi za tion among les bian, gay, and bi se xu al adults, Jo ur nal of con sul ting and cli ni cal psycho logy, http:// psychology.ucdavis.edu/rainbow/html/violence.pdf, pri stu plje no 03.03.2009. go di ne Ja cobs, J, Por ter, K. (1998) Ha te Cri mes: Cri mi nal Law $ Iden tity po li tics. Ox ford Ma son, G. (2005) Ha te cri me and the ima ge of the stran ger, The Bri tish Jo ur nal of Cri- mi no logy, 45, str. 837-859 Rot, N. (1974) Ra sne i et nič ke pred ra su de u Ž. Ga vri lo vić (ed) Ra si zam, ra se i ra sne pred- ra su de. Be o grad: Sa vre me na ad mi ni stra ci ja Shi vely, M. (2005) Study of Li te ra tu re and Le gi sla tion on Ha te Cri me in Ame ri ca, fi nal re port sub mit ted to the Na ti o nal In sti tu te of Ju sti ce. Was hing ton Shi vely, M, Mul ford, C. (2007) Ha te Cri me in Ame ri ca – the De ba te Con ti nu es, Na ti o- nal In sti tu te of Ju sti ce Jo ur nal Sto ja no vić, Z. (2006) Ko men tar Kri vič nog za ko ni ka. Be o grad: Slu žbe ni gla snik. Young-Bru ehl, E. (2003) Ho mop ho bis: a di ag no stic and po li ti cal ma nual in D. Moss (ed) Ha ting in the First Per son Plu ral. New York Temida 103 Mi li Ca ko va Ce viC Ha­te­cri­mes The re is not much in te rest for the su bject of ha te cri me in our li te ra tu re. In the ar tic le, the aut hor de fi nes ha te cri me, ba sed on the facts ma inly from the An glo sa- xon li te ra tu re, and tri es to ex pla in the ori gin of pre ju di ce. The re is a de scrip tion of fac tors which can be the ca u se for the se cri mes to oc cur. The aut hor hig hlights the im por tan ce of pre ven ting bi as mo ti va ted cri me. The ar tic le ends with so me pro po si- ti ons abo ut how to fight ha te cri mes. Key words: ha te cri me, pre ju di ce, vic ti mi za tion, in to le ran ce, ha te spe ech 
work_rue6yanzsvglxduyq563eeqf54	----	JEiE-Vol2.indd December 2016 5 EDITORIAL NOTE Editorial Board We are pleased to announce the second issue of the Journal on Education in Emergencies (JEiE). This issue features articles that analyze educational programs for marginalized and vulnerable populations living in a wide range of circumstances of crisis or conflict, and that examine resilience as a response to these emergency settings. Given the recent increase in hate crimes in the U.S. and much of Europe, the rise of misogyny and racism around the globe, and growing fears of refugees, “outsiders,” and those who appear different from the mainstream, the importance of research focused on marginalization and on efforts to bridge social divides takes on a heightened sense of urgency. Although all of the articles in this issue were written before the recent voter upheavals in the U.K. and the U.S., many of the ideas they address speak to these divides—as the field of education in emergencies has always attempted to do. Paradoxically for educators working and writing in the field of education in emergencies, despite the surge of hostility toward immigrants and refugees in the past several years, we also have seen an exponential increase in attention to education in countries affected by conflict. This has brought new actors to focus on these issues (e.g., Gordon Brown, Erna Solberg, Malala Yousefzai) and new efforts to promote education in these contexts. Although this attention provides an important opening for JEiE, it simultaneously underscores the tension between internationalizing initiatives like the journal on the one hand, and the national, inward-looking responses from those who feel left out of the global economy and citizenry on the other. Most of the populations described in the articles in this issue live on the edge of the globalized world, where they face inequity, social marginalization, and violence, in both conflict-affected rural villages in Afghanistan and the urban metropolis of Delhi, India. Although JEiE sits squarely on the side of international cooperation and collective action, it also speaks to the concerns and challenges faced by marginalized populations who may be left out of unequal economic arrangements or be left on the sidelines by intensifying global communications and interconnectedness. We hope the articles in this issue will help us move forward collectively to increase support for the marginalized populations living in conflict or crisis anywhere, Journal on Education in Emergencies6 EDITORIAL BOARD and to understand factors that may promote their participation and sense of belonging in society. In the following, we provide a brief overview of the fall 2016 issue of JEiE and a short comment on what we hope this work will achieve. FALL 2016 ISSUE OVERVIEW JEiE features theoretical or empirical research articles that address key questions that have been raised by emergency education programs or are related to populations living in crisis, and they contribute to the evidence and the advancement of knowledge on EiE. The field notes are often written by practitioners or hybrid practitioner-researcher teams who are working with or studying the work of an implementing partner. They address innovative or unusual approaches, progress, and challenges in designing, implementing, and evaluating EiE programs or initiatives, and may include critical reflections about questions that these initiatives raise. This issue of JEiE contains five articles (three research articles and two field notes) and three book reviews that cover a range of regions, scholarly and policy topics, and types of research design. The first research article, “Finding a Way Forward: Conceptualizing Sustainability in Afghanistan’s Community-Based Schools,” explores issues critical to the sustainability of community-based education (CBE) in Afghanistan. As authors Michelle Bellino, Zuhra Faizi, and Nirali Mehta note, CBE models “have gained recognition across diverse contexts for closing access gaps, leveraging local assets, and shaping cost-effective and culturally relevant educational opportunities in marginalized communities” (p. 11). One key reason to promote CBE is to ensure that marginalized rural communities, and especially the girls who live in them, are able to access the kind of educational opportunities that are more readily available to economically advantaged urban populations. However, remaining questions about the sustainability of CBE threaten to undermine its purpose and long-term prospects. The authors conducted interviews and observations with parents, teachers, students, educational officers, and school shuras (management committees) across eight communities in two of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces, which enabled them to hear directly from local community members about their experiences with and perceptions of CBE. The authors argue that “the success of CBE models depends on how various actors define sustainability and what it is the model is seeking to sustain . . . [I]ncreased community interest and capacity to sustain CBE is at odds with the current policy approach, which anticipates the eventual handover of all community-based schools to the government” (p. 11). This article speaks to the December 2016 7 EDITORIAL NOTE importance of providing continuous, quality education to marginalized rural communities—not only in Afghanistan but around the world. In the next research article, “Will you send your daughter to school? Norms, Violence, and Girls’ Education in Uruzgan, Afghanistan,” authors Dana Burde and Jehanzaib Khan continue the focus on Afghanistan in this issue. They use survey data and complementary qualitative interview data to explore why parents choose to send their boys and girls to school in Uruzgan, Afghanistan; what prevents them from doing so; and what kinds of normative tensions emerge as they face these decisions. The authors share three significant findings: First, that parents who send both sons and daughters to school are more likely to prioritize the value of education. Second, that parents who report experiencing or having personal knowledge of a higher number of attacks against education are less likely to send their children to school. Finally, the authors note that “normative struggles over girls’ education take place primarily within the local community and society rather than between foreign organizations and the local population” (p. 42). Regardless of their own level of education and, in some cases, whether or not their children attend school, both men and women in these Afghan villages cite tenets of Islam as a key motivation for educating girls as well as boys. The authors conclude that the greater challenge for aid workers is therefore pragmatic (ensuring security) rather than normative (diffusing beliefs about the appropriateness of education). The last research article in this issue, “Resilience of LGBTQIA Students on Delhi Campuses” by Anjali Krishan, Apurva Rastogi, and Suneeta Singh, assesses the impact of a recent law that re-criminalized homosexuality in India. The article describes how this law has affected lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans*, queer, intersex, and asexual/ally (LGBTQIA) communities on college campuses in Delhi and explores students’ resilience—a common framework used to understand coping mechanisms during crisis. As the authors note, the Indian LGBTQIA community “moved overnight from an era of cautious optimism into one in which homophobia is legally sanctioned” (p. 83), thus propelling them into a state of crisis. The law renewed LGBTQIA community members’ vulnerability to discrimination, exclusion, and threats of physical violence. The authors examine how the law has affected university students on Delhi campuses as they face legal and social persecution. They show how, although “protective and promotive resilience strategies” (p. 81) help them cope, these students still struggle to gain acceptance of their LGBTQIA identity within a context of fear of persecution and abuse. Through qualitative interviews, focus groups, and survey research, the authors identify strategies that can lead to positive, lasting social change. Journal on Education in Emergencies8 EDITORIAL BOARD The first field note in this issue of JEiE is taken from ethnographic observations conducted during what seems to some an unfortunate moment in U.S. history— the military occupation of Iraq. The article, “A School Under Fire: The Fog of Educational Practice in War” by Kathe Jervis, presents her account of studying an unusual school and her observations of this little-known footnote in the history of the U.S. military occupation in Iraq. In mid-2007, when the war in Iraq was at its height, the author accepted a job documenting the beginnings of a school designed and operated by the U.S. military in Iraq for Iraqi juveniles captured in war. The author was tasked with (1) documenting the situation of the approximately 900 teenage Iraqi detainees in this school run by the U.S. military, and (2) describing their educational program and leisure-time activities. Data collection included both semi-structured and informal conversations with the detainees, their teachers and guards, other soldiers with whom they came in contact, and those in the military hierarchy who made decisions about the curriculum, as well as extended observations of the students’ daily life in school. The author’s aim was to note elements missing from the program, raise questions about texts and materials, and offer ideas to decision-makers as the school developed. The article is adapted from the field notes and interview data the author maintained as part of this assignment. In addition to raising “questions about the role of the U.S. military in providing education to detained Iraqi juveniles,” the article offers a detailed description of daily life in the school (p. 115). In the second field note, “School-Based Intervention in Ongoing Crisis: Lessons Learned from Implementing a Combined Psychosocial and Trauma-Focused Approach in Gaza Schools,” authors Jon-Hakon Schultz, Laura Marshall, Helen Norheim, and Karam Al-Shanti describe an effort to address the multiple priorities that most educators working in countries affected by conflict must consider as they design education in emergencies programs: local needs, local culture, international guidelines for best practice, and research-based methods. To illustrate these key points, the authors present lessons learned from the Better Learning Program—a school-based education in emergencies response in Gaza— that combined psychosocial and trauma-focused approaches while incorporating international guidelines. The intervention was designed as a “multi-level approach to help teachers, school counselors, and parents empower schoolchildren with strategies for calming and self-regulation” (p. 142). The program was carried out with 35,000 students in 40 schools over 2.5 years, the aim being to “regain lost learning capacity and strengthen resilience in the school community” (p. 142). Initially, all pupils received the intervention, but the program later focused December 2016 9 EDITORIAL NOTE only on those who reported having nightmares and sleep disturbances. The field note reflects on both the intervention process and the steps involved in documenting it. To complement these excellent and informative articles and round out the fall issue, we present three book reviews. In the first, reviewer Susan Shepler discusses The Outcast Majority: War, Development, and Youth in Africa by Marc Sommers (2015), published by University of Georgia Press. The book details the large gap between outcast youth in war-affected Africa and the international development enterprise, arguing that supporting these youth requires “an understanding of the marginalization, exclusion, and sense of alienation that so many experience” (p. 157). The second book, reviewed by Elizabeth Buckner, is Arab Dawn: Arab Youth and the Demographic Dividend They Will Bring by Bessma Momani (2015), published by University of Toronto Press. As Buckner notes, Momani describes macro-level changes that are affecting youth in the Arab world, “including globalization, rising education levels, communications technology, urbanization, and neoliberalism” (p. 161). She says the book would be an excellent choice for “an undergraduate class on globalization, youth cultures, or the Middle East,” or would “serve well as a short introduction to those unfamiliar with the region” (p. 161). The third reviewer, Yoby Guindo, examines Education and Empowered Citizenship in Mali by Jaimie Bleck (2015), published by Johns Hopkins University Press. Guindo notes that this book demonstrates that “increased education is correlated with more engaged forms of political participation, such as campaigning for government officials and considering a run for office” (p. 163). Guindo considers Bleck’s arguments well structured, well written, and believes they will likely find a strong audience among academics, as well as those interested in learning more about Mali’s political culture. We are pleased to showcase such a wealth of scholarly work on issues critical to our field, and we hope that each article will stimulate debate and insights into issues facing vulnerable and marginalized populations around the world. Journal on Education in Emergencies10 EDITORIAL BOARD LOOKING TOWARD THE NEXT ISSUE We are excited to continue to support and work with the INEE community and the group of scholars, policy-makers, and practitioners who focus on education in emergencies in their work. While JEiE strives to cover an inclusive array of theories, topics, and regions, we also will occasionally publish an issue that focuses primarily on one region or continent, or on one subject area. For example, our spring 2017 issue will be a special issue on education and peacebuilding. We will likely feature another special issue (topic be announced) in fall 2017. We are fortunate to have an expansive audience via the INEE and our other academic and professional networks, which ensures the extensive dissemination of these critical articles. We invite you to join us in this collective endeavor and urge you to consider submitting your EiE-related studies to JEiE, which we believe will deepen and broaden the power of EiE as a social movement. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Thank you very much to Heddy Lahmann, our tireless managing editor, without whom this issue of JEiE would not have been possible, and to our terrific JEiE interns and technical editors Kylie Garner, Sarah Haroun Sualehi, and Pamela Montalbano. Thanks to New York University for housing the journal and providing a small grant from the International Education program director’s research budget to cover student staff stipends. Thank you, too, to Dean Brooks, Lindsey Fraser, and Peter Transburg at INEE, to our copy editor, Dody Riggs, and to our JEiE designer, Erik Ramirez, and to our many anonymous reviewers who will be acknowledged by name in our subsequent issues. Finally, we wish to note that, as with most journals, JEiE board members and reviewers volunteer their time to read, review, and offer feedback on all articles. Thank you, too, to these colleagues. 
work_rvyrvx3gnrhvhfnmgzm3f4oo7q	----	Contamination of overt data with covert data Northumbria Research Link Citation: Pickles, James (2018) Contamination of overt data with covert data. Research Ethics, 14 (4). pp. 1-3. ISSN 1747-0161 Published by: SAGE URL: https://doi.org/10.1177/1747016117721281 <https://doi.org/10.1177/1747016117721281> This version was downloaded from Northumbria Research Link: http://nrl.northumbria.ac.uk/38070/ Northumbria University has developed Northumbria Research Link (NRL) to enable users to access the University’s research output. Copyright © and moral rights for items on NRL are retained by the individual author(s) and/or other copyright owners. Single copies of full items can be reproduced, displayed or performed, and given to third parties in any format or medium for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes without prior permission or charge, provided the authors, title and full bibliographic details are given, as well as a hyperlink and/or URL to the original metadata page. The content must not be changed in any way. Full items must not be sold commercially in any format or medium without formal permission of the copyright holder. The full policy is available online: http://nrl.northumbria.ac.uk/pol i cies.html This document may differ from the final, published version of the research and has been made available online in accordance with publisher policies. To read and/or cite from the published version of the research, please visit the publisher’s website (a subscription may be required.) http://nrl.northumbria.ac.uk/policies.html https://doi.org/10.1177/1747016117721281 Research Ethics 2018, Vol. 14(4) 1–3 © The Author(s) 2017 Article reuse guidelines: sagepub.com/journals-permissions DOI: 10.1177/1747016117721281 journals.sagepub.com/home/rea Creative Commons Non Commercial CC BY-NC: This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 License (http://www.creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/) which permits non-commercial use, reproduction and distribution of the work without further permission provided the original work is attributed as specified on the SAGE and Open Access pages (https://us.sagepub.com/en-us/nam/open-access-at-sage). Contamination of overt data with covert data James Pickles Northumbria University, UK Abstract A research project was conducted which explored LGBT (lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender) hate crime. Participants were invited to share their narratives and personal experiences of hate crime, discrimination and violence through semi-structured interviews. The study helped us understand how people who experience ‘hate’ responded to, managed and reconciled the identities for which they were victimized. This case study focuses on a situation where a research participant requested a copy of an interview they gave for the hate crime project. The interview copy was to be used for the participant’s own personal purposes. The participant’s request potentially risked the contamination of ethical (overt) data collection, with their own covert data gathering. The ethical implications of this scenario raise many questions for ethicists and researchers to discuss. Keywords hate crime, LGBT, research ethics, research methods, research participants, sexuality research The participant agrees to take part in a semi-structured interview for a research project you are conducting. The standard procedure to take part is to read through an information sheet outlining how their interview will be used, and to sign a con- sent form acknowledging that they understand the purpose of participation. All Corresponding author: James Pickles, Northumbria University, Faculty of Arts, Design and Social Sciences, Lipman Building, PGR Office, NE1 8SB, UK. Email: james.pickles@northumbria.ac.uk 721281REA0010.1177/1747016117721281Research EthicsPickles research-article2017 Case Study https://uk.sagepub.com/en-gb/journals-permissions https://journals.sagepub.com/home/rea mailto:james.pickles@northumbria.ac.uk http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1177%2F1747016117721281&domain=pdf&date_stamp=2017-07-13 2 Research Ethics 14(4) personal information is anonymized with pseudonyms to protect the identities of all participants. During the interview the participant describes and explains their experiences of discrimination and hate crime. Two weeks pass and then your par- ticipant asks for a copy of the interview recording (recording A). Nowhere on the consent form you both signed does it state that a participant can request of copy of their interview. However, as part of the Data Protection Act (1998) they have a right to request information that they have provided. They also disclose that they want to use this recording for a public art piece they are creating which will shed light on the discrimination they experience. The purpose of the interview record- ing is to shed light on the participant’s personal experiences of discrimination. However, the consent agreement, which you both signed, stated that the interview was only to be used for the LGBT hate crime research output. The recording was never meant to support an independent art piece, which was being created as part of a university degree programme. Consent agreements are conventionally used to reassure the participant that the researcher will not use the participant’s interview recording for additional purposes. In this case study, it was the participant who sought to use the recording for purposes the interview was never meant to support. The art project will play two separate recordings, concurrently, on a loop. The interview recording (recording A) is to be used alongside an additional audio recording, which the participant alone carried out covertly. The participant’s recording (recording B) is of a meeting between LGBT peers, at which you both were present, outside of your research parameters. During the meeting, the partici- pant was verbally discriminated against by their LGB peers. The use of recording A alongside the meeting recording B, which has been gathered without ethical consent procedures, challenges the ethics of how data are used and combined. Additionally, the participant’s request for the recording A, which they provided as part of the LGBT hate crime project, challenges the ownership of data you collect. This raises the question about whether your data will be tarnished if used in con- junction with ethically ambiguous data. Further, your voice is on both recordings, which risks revealing both of your identities if they are played concurrently. The participant argues that there are valid reasons for both of the recordings to be used together. The participant also notes that the art project on discrimination, of which both recordings will be used, is closely tied with the original LGBT hate crime project you are conducting. The covert meeting recording B and the overt interview recording A being used jointly has several purposes. Firstly, it is to highlight the participant’s experiences of discrimination within the LGBT community by their LGB peers. The request for recording A is so they can highlight this using their own voice captured in the recording. Secondly, it is to demonstrate this lived/experienced discrimination through their additional, covert recording B of the meeting. This is done by using Pickles 3 the examples of the participant being discriminated against at the meeting by LGB people. The combined use of both recordings being played concurrently will either ‘whistle blow’ the discrimination they experience from their LGB peers, and implement some change, or it will compromise your entire research project con- ducted on LGBT hate crime, which is separate from the participant’s artistic work. There is also the possibility that it will potentially do both of these things. Questions for discussion: •• Do you give them a requested copy of your data? •• Does this risk contaminating and compromising your entire research project? •• Would you design an agreement where you are anonymized in their work? •• Would you report them for obtaining data for their own research and profes- sional practice, as part of a university degree course, covertly? Declaration of conflicting interests The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship and/or publication of this article. Funding All articles in Research Ethics are published as open access. There are no submission charges and no Article Processing Charges as these are fully funded by institutions through Knowledge Unlatched, resulting in no direct charge to authors. For more information about Knowledge Unlatched please see here: http://www.knowledgeunlatched.org http://www.knowledgeunlatched.org 
work_ry7qtra7afa2jphchrsblzpsoa	----	Journal of Social Issues, Vol. 58, No. I, 2002, pp. 177-193 Studying Hate Crime with the Internet: What Makes Racists Advocate Racial Violence? Jack Glaser* University of California, Berkeley Jay Dixit New York City Donald P. Green Yale University We conducted semistructured intervie\vs with 38 participants in White racist In- ternet chat rooms, examining the extent to which people would, in this unique environment, advocate interracial violence in response to purported economic and cultural threats. Capitalizing on the anonymity and candor of chat room in- teractions, this study provides an unusual perspective on extremist attitudes. We experimentally manipulated the nature and proximity of the threats. Qualitative and quantitative analyses indicate that the respondents were most threatened by interracial marriage and, to a lesser extent, Blacks moving into White neighbor- hoods. In contrast, job competition posed by Blacks evoked very little advocacy of violence. The study affords an assessment of the advantages and limitations of Internet-based research with clandestine populations. Under what conditions do people advocate racial violence? In particular, are people who openly embrace ideologies of racial hierarchy in a constant state of readiness to respond to racial threats, or are certain types of threats particularly evocative? Since Myrdal (1944), scholars have observed that threats of miscegena- tion tend to evoke the strongest emotional reactions from avowed racists, yet at *Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Jack Glaser, Goldman School of Public Policy, 2607 Hearst Ave., University of California, Berkeley, CA 94720-7320 [e-mail: glaserj@socrates.berkeley.edu]. We wish to thank Jon Drummond, Rob MacCoun, and seven anony- mous reviewers for their very helpful comments on earlier drafts. 177 © 2002 "The Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues 178 Glaser, Dixit, and Green the same time, there exists an extensive literature that explains racial animus by reference to economic competition and other "realistic" sources of conflict (e.g., Olzak, 1990; Tolnay & Beck, 1995). This topic, like so many in the domain of intergroup conflict, presents the researcher with a wide array of measurement problems. In addition to problems of dissembling and self-presentation (Crosby, Bromley, & Saxe, 1980), special ideo- logical populations, such as those belonging to White separatist movements, are often deeply suspicious of authorities and outsiders. Although interviews with avowed racists have been conducted in past research (Ezekiel, 1995), it remains unclear whether the views expressed have been tailored to the interview setting. In order to observe this population as unobtrusively as possible, we used the Internet, applying a randomized survey procedure to examine the conditions under which individuals who participate in White racist chat rooms would be willing to advocate violence in response to a racial threat. This approach benefits from a combination of features unique to the Internet: the guarantees of anonymity in communication, and the abundance of hate group communication forums there. It should be noted at the outset, however, that our study does not measure actual illegal conduct. Rather, our approach is to study the advocacy of racially motivated crime, under the assumption that the causes of advocacy are related to the causes of illegal conduct itself. Motifs of Ethnic Violence It has long been observed that different types of ethnic groups are targets of different types of prejudice, discrimination, and violence (Horowitz, 1985). Research on hate crime, unlawful conduct motivated by prejudice against a social group, emphasizes this theme by demonstrating quantitatively how different groups are victimized. For example, Jews, often stereotyped as affluent and greedy, are more frequently the victims of vandalism than assault. Gays and lesbians, who are perceived to be a moral and sexual threat, are more often the victims of physical assault. Blacks are attacked in a variety of ways, including acts of vandalism and intimidation, apparently in an attempt to confine African Americans to a subordinate status and keep them physically separate from Whites. The present analysis focuses on hate crime against African Americans and will compare the factors that have most prominently been thought to precipitate such acts: economic competition, turf violation, and interracial dating, marriage, and/or sex. We focus on anti-Black hate crime for several reasons. First, because the nature of hate crime appears to vary as a function of the target group, it is prudent to focus on one group in order to isolate predictor variables. Given that, we chose to focus on anti-Black hate crime in part because Blacks are by far the most frequently victimized group according to federal statistics (e.g., U.S. Department of Justice, 1997). Additionally, our previous research (e.g., Green, Glaser, & Rich, 1998) on Hate on the Internet 179 causes of hate crime also focused on Blacks, and the present study allows us to clarify and extend that analysis. Societal factors and motivation. What kinds of threats trigger the most vig- orous racist reaction? Historical analyses have attributed Hitler's rise to poor macroeconomic conditions (e.g., Eberhard, 1998; Turner, 1996). Similarly, dom- inant social science approaches to understanding hate crime assume instrumental antecedents like competition for material resources. This dates back at least to Hovland and Sears's (1940) demonstration that the price of cotton (and other eco- nomic indicators) in the post-Civil War Deep South correlated negatively with the number of lynchings of Blacks. Although Hovland and Sears conducted their analyses to find support for the frustration-aggression hypothesis (Bollard, Doob, Miller, Mowrer, & Sears, 1939), their finding quickly became a cornerstone of so- ciological studies of economic threat and intergroup violence (e.g., Olzak, 1990; Pinderhughes, 1993; Tolnay & Beck, 1995). Theories of realistic group conflict (e.g., Bobo, 1988), wherein competition for material resources underlies intergroup strife, are also bolstered by such findings. However, recent analyses of historical and contemporary data indicate that economic variables are not reliable predictors of hate crime (Green, Abelson, & Garnett, 1999; Green, Glaser, & Rich, 1998; Green, Strolovitch, & Wong, 1998). Green, Glaser, and Rich (1998) found that when time series data involved in earlier analyses were reanalyzed and extended in time, economic conditions bore a weak and inconsistent relationship to lynching. Furthermore, contempo- rary data revealed no reliable correlations between unemployment, an important economic factor, and hate crime against Blacks, Asians, Jews, or gays and les- bians (Green, Glaser, & Rich, 1998). Rather than flowing directly from economic downturns, hate crime seems to coincide with hard times when political leaders seize on economic conditions in order to marshal resentment against minority groups. What little is known about the motives of those who belong to racist groups or engage in racially motivated crime also suggests the importance of noneco- nomic factors. Green et al. (1999) conducted a telephone survey of known White supremacists and hate crime perpetrators in North Carolina, having identified such people based on media reports. The respondents were not aware of the selection criteria. Green et al. (1999) found that, in comparison to a general-public control sample, supremacists and hate crime perpetrators were not more economically frustrated or pessimistic about future finances. However, they were considerably more opposed to interracial marriage and migration of minorities into tradition- ally White communities. Supremacists in particular also appeared more concerned with threats to cultural identity (e.g., banning of the Confederate flag). With respect to anti-Black violence in particular, historical analyses reveal that lynchings often resulted from the perception and accusation that a Black 180 Glaser, Dixit, and Green man had committed sexual assault against, had a consensual relationship with, or even simply looked at a White woman (Hodes, 1997; Tolnay & Beck, 1995; Wright, 1990). More contemporary anti-Black hate crimes (e.g., cross burnings) are often precipitated by territorial incursion by Blacks into predominantly White communities (Green, Strolovitch, & Wong, 1998). Interracial dating and marriage is still taboo, at least implicitly, and in some circles explicitly, with Alabama taking until the year 2000 to expunge a law (albeit one rendered moot by federal legislation) prohibiting interracial marriage, and this by only a 60% to 40% popular vote. Thus, we theorize that hate crime against African Americans typically results not so much from economic concerns or frustrations, or competition for material resources, but more often from the perceived threat to the integrity, separateness, and hegemony of the ingroup. We set out to test this thesis by examining the differential effects of economic, geographic, and genetic threat on White racists' advocacy of hate crime. All three threats are interrelated, but our hypothesis is that the threat of genetic incursion is the most evocative. This conceptualization is in some ways consistent with Ezekiel's (1995) the- ory of the racist mind. Ezekiel argues that White racists often fear for their own survival and that belonging to supremacist groups gives them comfort and re- assurance. Support for the importance of cultural threat, especially with regard to interracial sex, also comes from Hodes (1997), whose historical analysis sug- gests that miscegenation in the 19th-century Deep South came to be perceived by Whites as a threat and a justification for lynching primarily after emancipation, when subordination of Blacks was no longer facilitated through the institution of slavery. The purpose of the present research is to employ and test an Internet-based, unobtrusive survey method to determine the social factors that are most likely to incite bias-motivated violence. The question is, what form of threat by minorities, in this case African Americans, is most likely to yield an inclination by racists to commit violence against them? Accordingly, we posed scenarios that might be perceived as threatening, regarding interracial marriage, minority in-migration (i.e., Blacks moving into one's neighborhood), and job competition (i.e., compet- ing with a Black person for a job). These were selected to reflect genetic (cultural), geographic (cultural), and economic threats, respectively, each representing funda- mental and prototypical examples of these types of threats in the interracial realm. In addition to investigating the effects of different types of threats, we assess the impact of threat proximity, that is, whether the threat occurs at the personal, lo- cal, or national level. This factor is potentially important because White separatist rhetoric often dovetails with nationalistic concerns (i.e., many separatists advo- cate deporting racial and ethnic minorities to other countries or continents), but for practical reasons it seems likely that action (e.g., violence) will be taken or advocated when threat is immediate or proximal. Hate on the Internet 181 Method The Utility of the Internet In order to test hypotheses about the likelihood of committing a hate crime, we required an unusual sample, one that would have sufficient variability in this regard (i.e., contain a relatively large portion who would be inclined to condone hate crimes), and one that would be willing to express such dispositions. Similarly, we needed to conduct this study in a milieu that would enable the expression of hate crime advocacy, with sufficient anonymity and confidentiality for our participants and ourselves. The Green et al. (1999) survey of supremacists and hate crime perpetrators made significant inroads in this regard, but the sample size was very limited and the telephone public opinion poll format restricted the survey to relatively formal and tame questions. Fortunately, with the advent of the Internet, we were afforded the opportunity to gain entree to the world of White racist hate groups, surveying them in an environment that encourages open expression. Over 100 million Americans used the Internet in 1999 (Cole et al., 2000). White pride Web sites appear to be particularly active on the Internet (Anti- Defamation League, 1999; Whine, 1999). Organized racist presence on the Internet began no later than 1985 (Anti-Defamation League, 1999) and has increased to include hundreds of Web sites, file archives, chat rooms, mailing lists, newsgroups, etc. (Franklin, 2000; Klanwatch, 1998). Racists on the Internet tend to express their views rather freely, at least when they are interacting with those they perceive to be like-minded. For this reason, and because of their prevalence there, we decided to use the Internet Relay Chat (IRC) "rooms" affiliated with racist organizations as our venue, and the partici- pants therein as our sample. In this manner we can assess attitudes and behavioral inclinations that racists might otherwise be reluctant to reveal. Our goal was to compare factors that are likely to inspire hate crime, specif- ically those discussed above: economic threat (i.e., job competition), territorial threat (i.e., minority in-migration to neighborhoods), and genetic threat (interra- cial marriage). In order to accomplish this, we visited various IRC chat rooms sponsored by White supremacist groups and conducted randomized interviews. Posing as a new visitor to the chat rooms, our interviewer presented scenarios of different kinds of threats and recorded the responses. These responses were then coded for their advocacy of violence so that we could compare the extent to which different types of threat differentially inspire advocacy of hate crime. Design We employed a 3 (threat type: interracial marriage, minority in-migration, job competition) by 3 (threat level: personal, local, national) design. One important 182 Glaser, Dixit, and Green feature of the design is that it was neither fully within- or between-participants, nor was it a mixed-factorial design in the typical, orthogonal sense. We adopted an unusual, pseudo-Latin square design to maximize the number of respondents in each condition of the experiment. Although there are a large number of racist Web sites, the number of chat rooms is more limited, and our preliminary monitoring of these rooms indicated that many of the participants were the same people, jumping around from room to room. Consequently, there appeared to be a universe of only several hundred at the most. Because we anticipated that only a subset of this population would be willing to converse one-on-one with a chat room neophyte (the interviewer) with whom they were not familiar, we attempted to increase the number of respondents in each condition of the experiment by utilizing a partial within-participants design. It most likely would be awkward and suspicious for the respondents if all nine scenarios were posed to each of them, or if they were posed a series of similar questions with only one parameter changed. It was decided that we could pose three scenarios each, if only one was drawn from each level of each variable. Specifically, one group of respondents got all the scenarios in the diagonal of Table 1 (personal interracial marriage, local in-migration, and national job competition). Similarly, another group heard about personal in-migration, local job competition, and national interracial marriage. Finally, another group was asked about personal job competition, local interracial marriage, and national in- migration. In this manner, all nine conditions were filled with a limited sized sample without raising suspicion. Ethics In order for us to gather candid responses without raising suspicion, we could not obtain informed consent. The Yale human participants committee agreed that respondents would have been very unlikely to participate, that those who did would not have been representative, and that responses would have been sig- nificantly biased. We believe, and the Yale committee concurred, that the lack of informed consent was acceptable because respondents participated without Table 1. Scenarios Comprising 3 x 3 Design of the Quasi-Experimental Survey Marriage In-migration Job competition Personal My sister is talking about I found out this Black J found out I'm competing getting manned to this couple is moving in with a Black man for my Black man. next door to me. promotion at work. Local Lots of White women in my Lots of Blacks are At my work, White people neighborhood are getting moving into my have to compete with Blacks married to Black men. neighborhood. for promotions. National All over the country. Black All over the country. All over the country, Blacks men are getting married Blacks are moving into are taking White people's to White women. White neighborhoods. jobs. Hate on the Internet 183 coercion, in a public forum, discussing topics that were common subjects of conversation there. Finally, respondents' identities were protected, through the use of their own pseudonyms and our careful separation in the data set of these pseudonyms from the responses they provided. Procedure The interviewer entered various chat rooms, posing as a curious neophyte. In an IRC chat room one can engage in real-time conversations with any or all of the visitors there. Chat rooms are ideal for this study because their participants are especially likely to express otherwise socially taboo sentiments and proclivities (McKenna & Bargh, 1998, 2000). In each visit, the interviewer made small talk until he was able to engage an individual in a dialogue. At this point the interviewer randomly selected a sequence of experimental conditions (e.g., personal-marriage, local-in-migration, and then national-job competition). There were 18 possible orderings to ensure that scenario order would be a random variable and that the interviewer would not be able to anticipate the next scenario he was to give. The interviewer posed each scenario after the respondent appeared to have played out his or her response to the previous scenario. The interviewer typically carried out the discussion "in view of" the chat room but did not engage other participants in the same room on the same day. We employed a semistructured interview approach (Smith, Harre, & Von Langenhove, 1995) wherein the interviewer engages in a relatively free-flowing discussion, making sure to cover certain topics. This approach allowed for a real- istic discussion with survey questions embedded naturalistically, thereby increas- ing the likelihood of candid and representative responses. The danger that the interviewer's own hypotheses might bias his interactions with respondents was mitigated by the random selection of the conditions just prior to posing each scenario. Thirty-eight people were interviewed in all. They were all voluntary partici- pants in the chat room in which they were surveyed. No demographic data were obtained on the respondents because this might have served to undermine their anonymity and to raise suspicion about the interviewer. As described above, three of the nine scenarios were posed to each respondent. A few respondents left the chat room after responding to only one or two of the three scenarios, thus reducing the total number of responses from the expected 114 to 107. Responses were recorded by logging the text of the discussions and downloading it for later coding. The responses were coded for the extent to which the respondent advocated violence in some form during the course of his or her response. Blind to the condition of the experiment, the interviewer and another author rated each response on a 6-point scale from 0 (no advocacy of violence) to 5 (advocacy of extreme violence). It is plausible that the interviewer could have T84 Glaser, Dixit, and Green recognized the responses and recalled the condition, but this was impossible for the other author, who had not seen the data prior to coding. Nevertheless, the interrater correlation was reasonably high (r — .82). Although the author who had not participated in data collection was not able to recognize the specific responses, he nevertheless was aware of the design of the experiment, may have been able to infer the scenarios to which some of the responses were made, and may have had hypotheses similar to those of the experimenter, which may have served to bias his ratings. To address this concern, we had a third, doubly blind (i.e., unaware of design or conditions, or for that matter the nature of the study in general) person rate the responses on the same scale for their advocacy of violence. The correlation between this rater's ratings and the average ratings of the first two raters (used in the data analyses) was .90, indicating strong correspondence. Results Narrative Analysis Perhaps the greatest power of this study lies in the qualitative analysis of the types of responses the different scenarios evoked. The specific statements made by our respondents were often very strongly worded, revealing clear opinions that differed substantially as a function of threat type. They offer a rich source for analysis of racists' attitudes toward minorities and committing violence against them. It should be noted that the style of communication in chat rooms is very informal and, even more so than with e-mail, typing is often sloppy. We have not corrected errors in the following quotes. Interracial marriage. The data clearly reveal that responses with regard to interracial marriage, especially at the personal level, were the most volatile. For example, one respondent stated, "better kill her. kill him and her. pull a o j . . . im not kidding, i would do it if it was my sister, i would gladly go to prison then live a free life knowing some mud babies were calling me uncle whitey." Another respondent advised, in a manner reminiscent of the days of lynchings, "Hang his black ass." One person cautiously suggested the following: "Im not saying how I would stop it, nor am I encouraging you to do this, but, there are many murders in America today, some for the better of our race, and it is fairly easy to get away with one. Not that I am telling you to go out and murder someone though!" It is not certain, but this respondent appears to be advocating violence while being careful not to do so directly. There is certainly an aspect of encouragement (i.e., "it is fairly easy to get away with one") in his comments. A few people responded to the personal-interracial marriage scenario without advocating violence (e.g., "well I wouldn't have anything to do with her if I were you."), but the clear majority (9 out of 13) expressed some advocacy of violence, Hate on the Internet 185 mostly extreme violence. Further evidence for the evocative nature of interracial marriage is available in spontaneous responses to other threats. For example, one respondent stated with regard to in-migration, "I don't let it get to me, they stay with their space and I stay in mine.... The thing that upsets me most is seeing so many white girls dating black guys." Responses to interracial marriage at the local level were, in contrast, notably brief and bland. Respondents expressed some concern (e.g., "Thats sad. Yuck that makes me sick," "man that to bad," "then move"), but were generally more passive and helpless (e.g., "sorry man, I don't know what to say"). Only 1 respondent out of 14 in this condition indicated a disposition toward violence, recounting his own assault of a Black man who married his cousin, for which he claimed to have been prosecuted. At the national level, the responses to interracial marriage were somewhere between the personal and local in terms of advocacy of violence, with most being tepid, but a few exhibiting support for extreme violence (e.g., "They should all be shot."). Minority in-migration. At least at the personal level, in-migration evoked a range of responses. Many were mild and even restrained, such as, "I don't like it but we canf't] do anything." Others were more extreme: "I would run the niggers and all non-whites oil of my city... kill some nigger ass." Others recommended specific action that would qualify as hate crime but was not necessarily violent (e.g., "Spraypaint 'niggers beware' on the door before they even move in. If they catch wind of it, I doubt they will even finalize the buy"). At the local and national levels, in-migration moved only a few respondents to advocate some form of action (e.g., "make his ass move out of there") but for the most part responses were passive and even resigned (e.g., "move." "Yep.... It's happening everywhere"). Job competition. The threat of job competition elicited a more consistently mild reaction. Although one respondent did advocate extreme violence ("kill him") with regard to a personal-level scenario, most responses were tepid and reasoned, such as, "all you can do is try your best." In response to the personal-level threat, several inquired about the qualifications of the Black competitor, one suggesting filing suit for reverse discrimination. At the local level, responses were similar, with the exception of one person who advocated framing the Black competitor: "I say set em up for a bust get em fired and away from our women." Notably, in this case, spontaneous reference is again made to interracial dating/marriage, suggesting that it is a chronically salient threat. At the national level as well, responses tended to be political, focusing on issues of affirmative action, rather than violent. One person volunteered, "asian are taking white jobs too!" suggesting that whereas job competition from Blacks may not be much of a threat, competition from other groups may be. 186 Glaser, Dixit, and Green The clear differences in the types of reactions to different scenarios reveals to some extent that the threat to the integrity of the group, be it cultural or genetic, is a relatively potent predictor of violent tendencies toward outgroup members. The genetic aspect of this is evidenced by the specific references to the outcome of inter- racial marriage: "mud babies." This conclusion is bolstered by data from additional inquiries we made. On one occasion, after completing the relatively structured part of the interview, the experimenter asked, more comparatively, "Of blacks marry- ing white women, blacks moving into white neighborhoods, and blacks taking white jobs, which of these do you think is the most threatening?" The response was "integration of races, obviously!" When the interviewer pressed further the respondent indicated that he meant integration through intermarriage, restating, "obviously." Quantitative Analysis Although the analytic strength of this research appears to lie in the com- pelling narrative of the responses, the data can also be analyzed quantitatively. Accordingly, Table 2 reports the mean degree of advocacy of violence in each condition of the experiment, based on the 6-point (0-5) scale ratings. These results reinforce our qualitative assessment. The average level of advocated violence was greatest when respondents were presented with the issue of interracial marriage as compared to job competition or in-migration. Averages were also higher when these threats were framed in personal terms. Local threats elicited low levels of advocated violence, with national threats falling in between. These results can be tested more rigorously using regression analysis, mak- ing allowances for the unusual design of this experiment. The quasi-Latin square Table 2. Advocacy of Violence as a Function of Threat Type and Level Threat level Threat type Interracial marriage In-migration Job competition Column mean Personal 2.46 (2.21) n = 14 1.5 (2.23) n = I l 0.54 (1.47) ( 7 = 1 2 1.54 (2.11) n = 37 Local 0.18 (0.67) n = 14 0.0 (0.0) « = 16 0.0 (0.0) n = l 0.07 (0.41) « = 37 National 1.43 (2.44) n = 7 0.0 (0.0) » = 9 0.29 (1.21) n = 17 0.46 (1.46) « = 3 3 Row mean 1.34 (2.04) « = 35 0.46 (1.38) n = 36 0.32 (1.18) « = 36 Note. Scores represent mean responses from ratings on a 6 -point scale from 0 (no advocacy of violence) to 5 (advocacy of extreme violence). Standard deviations are in parentheses. Hate on the Internet 187 design of the experiment, in which each respondent was presented with multi- ple scenarios (but not all scenarios), increased the number of participants in each condition, but the observations are not statistically independent. The disturbances associated with one observation are likely to be correlated with others. In order to address this problem, we report robust standard errors derived from bootstrap- ping. That is, 150 samples of size 107 (the size of the total sample) were drawn (with replacement, necessarily) from the original data set. The empirical sampling distribution of these regression estimates is used to calculate the standard errors. The second problem also arises from the limited size of each treatment condi- tion. In randomizing the placement of respondents into conditions, and due in large part to false starts (e.g., refusals to engage in discourse), our group sample sizes became lopsided. Before we could fully rectify this, it became evident that we had tapped out much of the available sample and suspicion was beginning to mount about our presence and repeated statements and questions. As a result, we were left with condition cells of varying sizes (ranging from 7 to 17). This imbalance reduces the statistical power of our test but does not lead to biased inference. The regression includes four predictors of advocated violence. The first two are dummy variables associated with the type of threat: one dummy marks inter- racial marriage and the other in-migration (with job competition being the omitted category). The second set of dummy variables marks the level of threat: one dummy for personal threat and the other for local (with national threats being the omitted category). The regression reported in Table 3 indicates that interracial marriage significantly increases advocated violence by an average of 1.1 scale points rela- tive to job competition (t = 2.7, p < .01, two-sided test). Similarly, personal threats significantly increase advocated violence (/ = 2.22, p <.05, two-sided), relative to national threats, whereas local threats significantly decrease them (£ = 2.03, Table 3. Regression Analysis of Effect of Threat Type and Threat Level on Advocacy of Violence Estimates Robust standard errors Threat type Interracial marriage 1.09** .41 In-migration .32 .29 Threat level Personal .91* .41 Local -.61* .30 Constant .14 .25 Note. Threat types include interracial marriage, minority in-migration, and job competition. Threat levels include personal, local, and national. Job competition and the national threat level serve as omitted categories and can be considered the neutral (zero) reference point against which to compare the other parameter estimates. One hundred fifty random replications were conducted to generate robust standard errors in order to allow for the nonindependence of the conditions (i.e., that each respondent was in conditions at multiple, but not all, levels of both variables) and uneven sample sizes across conditions. Adjusted R1 = .20, N = 107. Asterisks indicate that the estimate differs significantly from the neutral (zero) reference point for that variable (i.e., job competition for threat type, national for threat level) as follows: * p <.05, two-tailed; **p<.0l, two-tailed. 188 Glaser, Dixit, and Green p < .05, two-sided). No significant interactions between the level and type of threat emerge, using two-sided tests. Discussion "The greatest existing cause of lynching is the perpetration, especially by black men, of the heinous crime of rape..." —Theodore Roosevelt (cf. Wright, 1990, p. 77) The thousands of lynchings of Southern Blacks, often on trumped up charges, during the post-Reconstruction period represent an early form of what we now might call "hate crime." President Roosevelt's take on the cause of lynching about a century ago must be considered within the historical context of the time. Accounts of lynchings often involved the accusation of the rape of a White woman by a Black man. Although Roosevelt's conclusion, influenced by the propaganda of the time, was almost certainly misguided, it nevertheless may offer a valuable insight into the mind of the hate crime perpetrator: that violence against members of other races may be particularly linked to concerns over interracial mixing. Indeed, it is clear from the present study that interracial marriage is the idea that most upsets racists on the Internet and is likely to drive them to advocate anti-Black hate crime. Consistent with Green, Strolovitch, and Wong (1998) and Green et al. (1999), there is also some response to territorial incursion, but only at the personal level. In keeping with the findings of Green, Glaser, and Rich (1998) as well as Green et al. (1999), but inconsistent with Hovland and Sears (1940) and studies that followed, job competition, an economic variable, inspired very little advocacy of violence against Blacks at any level. The propensity for interracial marriage and minority in-migration to evoke extreme responses among White racists on the Internet is perhaps exemplified in the frequent, spontaneous invocations of the expression "14 words." This is White separatist code for, "We must secure the existence of our people and a future for White children," and it serves as a rallying cry of sorts, but clearly reflects concerns about race mixing. The effect of threat level, although of less theoretical interest than threat type, was fairly clear. Scenarios posed at the personal level were by far the most evocative. This may be the case because scenarios of this sort are the most concrete and conducive to giving advice. Specifically, it seems more likely that one would advocate some form of action to someone who faces a "problem" personally and so, in this respect, this variable is not very informative or interesting. However, this was not equally true across types of threat. Job competition had the same small effect at the national and personal levels, where responses often indicated that such threats either were beyond one's control or would work themselves out, this based on the belief that Blacks are inferior and will not be able to retain such jobs. Hate on the Internet 189 We must also consider why the national level evoked some advocacy of vio- lence but the local level had no effect whatsoever. The most plausible explanation for this is probably that threats posed at the national level triggered thoughts tied to the rhetoric of hate groups who tend to speak nationalistically and lament the declining state of the country, which they often attribute to "lazy" and criminal minorities and immigrants. The local threat level, on the other hand, may have been too abstract, tapping neither the empathic response of the personal level nor nationalist dogma. It is nevertheless surprising that this level evoked virtually no advocacy of violence, especially with regard to minority in-migration, which is often a community concern, or at least perceived to be. Impact of the Internet on Race Relations The utility of the Internet as a venue for studying racist extremists is a derivative of a potentially troubling reality: that such groups are prevalent in cyberspace. Although their prevalence is undisputed, there is some debate over whether or not the Internet has been a boon for racist groups. In fact, a Web site called Hatewatch that had functioned to list and monitor Web-based hate groups since 1995 recently shut itself down, offering the explanation that it had completed its mission and concluding that the Internet has had a negative impact on hate (Dixit, 2001). Although White racist groups have proliferated on the Internet in recent years, there appears to have been no corresponding increase in membership in these groups or in hate crime rates. In fact, one might argue that the prevalence of racist groups on the Internet works to reduce hate crime, perhaps by providing less physical, more rhetorical outlets for hate. Furthermore, the presence of hate groups on the Internet has in many ways made them more transparent to the public, which in turn facilitates monitoring by watchdog groups, government and private alike, not to mention social scientists. Nevertheless, perhaps in part because of the inherently underground nature of White separatist groups, extending back to the days of the hooded Ku Klux Klan, there is no direct evidence available that the Internet has not helped to proliferate hate groups. Furthermore, the potential of the Internet as a tool for communication, organization, and information dissemination among extremist groups is undeniable, and although it may have its incidental benefits (e.g.. transparency), it clearly warrants scrutiny. Methodological Considerations In addition to providing insight into the mentality of White separatists and perhaps the antecedents of hate crime, the present study offers a methodological innovation that should generalize to other research questions and prove useful in the future. Specifically, by unobtrusively surveying people on the highly anony- mous, yet public, forum of the Internet, and specifically in chat rooms, we are 190 Glaser, Dixit, and Green able to open up avenues of research not previously available to most researchers. There are numerous groups that are difficult to gain access to, either because of their marginality or because of illicit aspects of their behaviors that make self- disclosure potentially costly. McKenna and Bargh (1998, 2000) have also suc- cessfully employed Internet-based research to reach populations that would be difficult to access. The present study adopted a more surreptitious approach, per- haps more appropriate when measuring variables relating to illegal behavior such as hate crime and when dealing with populations that are suspicious of researchers and other outsiders. This approach could be adopted for other populations, such as terrorist or militia groups, child pornographers, and illegal weapons traders, whose members would also be unlikely to respond candidly to explicit survey questions, and the potential is clear for public good arising from greater understanding of such groups. In order to carry out such research, however, we must consider the thorny issues of deceit and informed consent. As noted above, deceit with regard to the identity of the interviewer (and, in fact, that he was an interviewer at all) was essential for the success of the study. Otherwise, respondents would have been very unlikely to participate, or to respond candidly if they did. For the same reasons, obtaining informed consent was impossible. Fortunately, the use of the Internet had the added advantage of ensuring the anonymity of our respondents, all of whom use pseudonyms in the chat rooms. We further promoted their anonymity and confidentiality by separating even their pseudonyms from their data, assigning random numerical codes. Additionally, the public forum nature of the chat rooms mitigates the need for informed consent. Nevertheless, such research should always be carried out with the utmost regard for the confidentiality and safety of the sample. Limitations Despite the seeming clarity of the results, there are several limitations of the study that should be acknowledged. First, this study was conducted at one moment in time, and only through replication can one ascertain whether, for example, the motive power of economic threat was undermined by the generally favorable economic conditions that prevailed at the time of our study. This investigation is also limited by the relatively small size of the sample, which was compromised in part by rising suspicion among potential respondents. McKenna and Bargh (1998) faced similar problems in their e-mail survey of posters on White supremacist (and other ideologically extreme) newsgroups, where some posters were warning others to not respond to the survey and generating rumors about its being conducted by government agencies like the FBI. This may prove to be a chronic problem with research on this population, which appears to have limited numbers participating in chat rooms at any given time. However, incremental replications over time, as new Hate on the Internet 191 cohorts join and grow tired of the chat rooms, could ultimately yield a substantial database of knowledge. Furthermore, we would recommend that future studies of this sort employ a purely between-participants design to minimize the appearance of inquisitiveness on the part of the ostensive neophyte (i.e., the interviewer). We are somewhat more sanguine about other aspects of the study, in particular the sincerity with which respondents expressed their views. One respondent went so far as to reveal the types of code words that are used over ham radios to form posses and plan hate crimes. Of greater concern than the sincerity of the responses is the possibility that, because of the anonymity of the Internet and the culture of the chat rooms, responses reflected a greater level of endorsement of violence than respondents actually felt. Nevertheless, as far as we can tell, there is little cause for concern that respondents were not genuine. We must also consider the possibility that the very presence of the interviewer, as a curious neophyte, influenced the responses, perhaps invoking more bravado. Although we made every effort to be nondescript, this possibility is still real, but it should not represent a confound in the design and results with regard to relative differences in advocacy of violence as a function of threat type and level. Perhaps more complex is the issue of how advocacy of violence relates to actual illegal conduct. It is telling that several respondents, but by no means a majority, indicated that they had, indeed, themselves committed violent hate crimes in the past and provided some detail of them. Needless to say, we cannot be sure that such statements are true. They could simply reflect a certain form of false bravado, even under conditions of anonymity. The possibility remains, however, that some overlap exists between racist ideology and racist action (Green et al., 1999). Consequently, variables that are diagnostic for this group may be important in predicting hate crime. Conclusion In sum, because of the nature of Internet-based communication, particularly chat rooms, we were able to observe a group and form of behavior that would otherwise be difficult for scientists to study. By assessing their responses to vari- ous types of threat, we develop a better understanding of the motives and beliefs that animate those who advocate and perhaps commit hate crimes. These results are consistent with our past findings that economic threat, whether in the form of declining cotton prices, increases in unemployment, or heightened job com- petition, does not in itself trigger violent ideation. Rather, perceived threats to White hegemony and separateness, via in-migration and especially interracial sex and marriage, generate a visceral reaction against outgroups. These findings are important insofar as they shed light on the parlance used to incite fear by racist ideologues, both past and present. 192 Glaser, Dixit, and Green Although further research is clearly warranted, the present study has some important policy implications. First, it offers a methodological approach that policy analysts can employ to survey otherwise inaccessible groups (e.g., separatists, child pornographers, weapons traders) to better understand their motivations and behaviors. Second, as noted above, the findings, in conjunction with past research, challenge the presumption that economic conditions are direct determinants of intergroup violence. Those concerned with reducing such socially destabilizing phenomena should look to other factors, including extremist group belief systems, which may prove more worthwhile targets of change. Similarly, it is questionable as to whether the Internet itself serves to promote racial violence, but clearly it can be employed as a means to understanding, and perhaps reducing, such bigotry and conflict. References Anti-Defamation League. (1999). Poisoning the Web: Hatred online. Washington, DC: Author. Bobo, L. (1988). Group conflict, prejudice, and the paradox of contemporary racial attitudes. In P. A. Kate & D. A. Taylor (Eds.), Eliminating racism (pp. 85-114). New York: Plenum. Cole, J. I., Suman, M., Schramm, P, van Bel, D., Lunn, B., Maguire, P., Hanson, K., Singh, R., Aquino, J., & Lebo, H. (2000). The UCLA Internet report: Surveying the digital future. Los Angeles: University of California at Los Angeles, Center for Communication Policy. Crosby, F., Bromley, S., & Saxe, L. (1980). Recent unobtrusive studies of Black and White discrimi- nation and prejudice: A literature review. Psychological Bulletin, 87, 546-563. Dixit, J. (2001, May 9). A banner day for neo-Nazis [On-line]. Available: www.salon.com/tech/ feature/2001/05/09/hatewatch/index.html Dollard, J., Doob, L. W., Miller, N. E., Mowrer, O. H., & Sears, R. R. (1939). Frustration and aggression. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Eberhard, K. (1988). The Weimar Republic. Boston, MA: Unwin Hyman. Ezekiel, R. S. (1995). The racist mind: Portraits of American neo-Nazis and Klansmen. New York: Viking. Franklin, R. A. (2000). The hate directory [Internet Website]. Available: www.hatedirectory.com Green, D. P., Abelson, R. P., & Garnett, M. (1999). The distinctive political views of hate-crime perpetrators and White supremacists. In D. A. Prentice & D. T. Miller (Eds.), Cultural divides: Understanding and overcoming group conflict (pp. 429-464). New York: Russell Sage Foundation. Green, D. P., Glaser, J., & Rich, A. O. (1998). From lynching to gay-bashing: The elusive connection between economic conditions and hate crime. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 75, 82-92. Green, D. P., Strolovitch, D.. & Wong, J. (1998). Defended neighborhoods, integration, and racially motivated crime. American Journal of Sociology, 104, 372^03. Modes, M . E . (1997). White women. Black men: Illicit sex in the nineteenth-century South. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Horowitz, D. (1985). Ethnic groups in conflict. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. Hovland, C. I., & Sears, R. R. (1940). Minor studies of aggression: VI. Con-elation of lynchings with economic indices. Journal of Psychology. 9, 301-310. Klanwatch. (1998). 474 hate groups blanket America: God, rock 'n' roll and the Net fuel the rage. Intelligence Report Special Issue: 1997, the Year in Hate, Winter, 1998, 89. McKenna, K. Y. A., & Bargh, J. A. (1998). Coming out in the age of the Internet: Identity "demarginal- ization" through virtual group participation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 75, 681-694. Hate on the Internet 193 McKenna, K. Y. A., & Bargh, J. A. (2000). Plan 9 from cyberspace: The implications of the Internet for personality and social psychology. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 4, 57-75. Myrdal, G. (1944). An American dilemma: The Negro problem and modern democracy. New York: Harper. Olzak, S. (1990). The political context of competition: Lynching and urban racial violence, 1882-1914. Social Forces, 69, 395-421. Pinderhughes, H. (1993). The anatomy of racially motivated violence in New York City: A case study of youth in Southern Brooklyn. Social Problems. 40, 478^192. Smith, J. A., Harre, R., & Von Langenhove, L. (1995). Rethinking methods in psychology. New York: Sage. Tolnay, S. E.. & Beck, E. M. (1995). A festival of violence: An analysis of Southern lynchings, 1882- 1930. Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press. Turner, H. A. (1996). Hitler's thirty days to power: January 1933. Reading, PA: Addison-Wesley. U.S. Department of Justice. (1997). Hate crime statistics 1997. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, FBI Criminal Justice Information Services Division. Whine, M. (1999). The use of the Internet by far right extremists [On-line]. Available: http:// www.ict.org.il/articles/right-wing-net.htm Wright, G. C. (1990). Racial violence in Kentucky, 1865-1940: Lynchings, mob rule, and "legal lynchings." Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press. JACK GLASER is an Assistant Professor in the Goldman School of Public Policy at the University of California, Berkeley. After earning his PhD in psychology from Yale University in 1999 he received a National Institute of Mental Health National Research Service Award to serve as a postdoctoral fellow at UC Berkeley's Institute of Personality and Social Research. Glaser studies intergroup bias at multiple levels of analysis and manifestations, including implicit stereotyping and prejudice, racial profiling, and hate crime, and has interests in the psychology of electoral politics and political ideology. JAY DLXIT is a prize-winning New York City-based freelance writer. His work has appeared in Rolling Stone, The Village Voice, Salon.com, and Psychology Today. He received his bachelor's degree, cum laude, in psychology, with distinction in the major, from Yale University in 1998, where he wrote for The New Journal, including an article about White supremacists on the Internet. DONALD P. GREEN is A. Whitney Griswold Professor of Political Science at Yale University, where he has taught since receiving his PhD from UC Berkeley in 1988. Since 1996, he has served as Director of the Institution for Social and Policy Studies, an interdisciplinary research unit at Yale. His scholarly interests include hate crime, political behavior, public opinion, campaign finance, and research methodology. 
work_s2qkozkw6bbsxdqjoytux3s4ui	----	Editors' Note. | Semantic Scholar Skip to search formSkip to main content> Semantic Scholar's Logo Search Sign InCreate Free Account You are currently offline. Some features of the site may not work correctly. DOI:10.3138/cbmh.32.1.5 Corpus ID: 42570856Editors' Note. @article{Hung2015EditorsN, title={Editors' Note.}, author={N. Hung and Cristina Sepe}, journal={Canadian bulletin of medical history = Bulletin canadien d'histoire de la medecine}, year={2015}, volume={32 1}, pages={ 5-6 } } N. Hung, Cristina Sepe Published 2015 Medicine Canadian bulletin of medical history = Bulletin canadien d'histoire de la medecine View on PubMed utpjournals.press Save to Library Create Alert Cite Launch Research Feed Share This Paper Related Papers Abstract Related Papers Stay Connected With Semantic Scholar Sign Up About Semantic Scholar Semantic Scholar is a free, AI-powered research tool for scientific literature, based at the Allen Institute for AI. Learn More → Resources DatasetsSupp.aiAPIOpen Corpus Organization About UsResearchPublishing PartnersData Partners   FAQContact Proudly built by AI2 with the help of our Collaborators Terms of Service•Privacy Policy The Allen Institute for AI By clicking accept or continuing to use the site, you agree to the terms outlined in our Privacy Policy, Terms of Service, and Dataset License ACCEPT & CONTINUE 
work_s2vpvhtaefesbdktzh2vfa2goa	----	21 Journal of Muslim Mental Health ISSN1556–4908 Volume 13, Issue 1, 2019 http://dx.doi.org/10.3998/jmmh.10381607.0013.102 Microaggressions on the University Campus and the Undergraduate Experiences of Muslim South Asian Women Raisa Manejwala, Psy.D. Email: raisamanejwalapsyd@clearviewcounselingcenter.com Wahiba Abu- Ras, Ph.D. Professor Adelphi University School of Social Work Garden City, New York 11530 Tel. (732) 343- 1238 Email: Abu- ras@adelphi.edu Abstract After the events of 9/11, increased Islamophobia led to a significant increase in both overt and covert discrimination toward the Muslim American population. Since Islamophobia adversely affected the Muslim American population’s well- being in a variety of settings, it is important to understand its impact on Mus- lim American college students. The major objective of this study was to examine a number of experiences and perceptions of religious- based discrimination on campus. Individual face- to- face interviews were conducted with 12 Muslim South Asian female undergraduate students who were recruited from five local universi- ties in urban settings of the northeast region of the U.S. This study used Mousta- kas’s (1994) transcendental phenomenological approach to identify seven major themes: (a) Pathology of different religious groups, (b) assumption of religious homogeneity, (c) endorsing religious stereotypes, (d) a belief that Islamophobia is common and will continue, (e) confusion, (f) a desire to educate others about Islam, and (g) positive coping and support. All participants reported experienc- ing microaggressions, even those who may not be easily identified as Muslim. 22 Raisa Manejwala and Wahiba Abu-Ras The study results may help students, professors, and university counselors gain awareness of the impact of discrimination experienced by a religious minority group on campus and determine preventive measures to promote their safety and wellbeing. Keywords: Islamophobia, Muslim, South Asian, discrimination, microaggression, university Overview It is commonly believed that most universities and colleges enjoy an open and safe environment. However, several studies (Feagin, 1992; Feagin & Sikes, 1994; Feagin, Vera, & Imani, 1996; Franklin & Boyd‐Franklin, 2000) have shown that students of color studying at predominantly White universities are more likely than White students to experience feelings of discrimination and microaggres- sions on campus (Harwood, Huntt, Mendenhall, and Lewis, 2012). Protests and student resistance over racial issues at the University of Missouri and other campuses in 2015 sparked a debate over racism and discrimination at colleg- es across the United States (Eligon & Pérez- Peña, 2015; Solorzano & Bernal, 2001). Islamophobia (irrational fear of Islam or Muslims) has increased in the U.S. in response to political and economic tensions and the media’s skewed lens of Islam and Muslims. Given the current anti- Muslim political climate in the U.S. and significant increase of overt and subtle religious discrimination toward the Muslim American population, especially post 9/11 (Rippy & New- man, 2006) and the 2016 U.S. presidential campaign (Abu- Ras, Suárez, & Abu- Bader, 2018; Clay, 2017), it is particularly important to understand the impact of Islamophobia on Muslim college students. Muslim college students may ex- perience discrimination and microaggressions in distinct ways as compared to other minority groups on campus because many outside of Islam believe that the culture and lifestyle of Muslims are incompatible with the Western way of life (Pew Research Center, 2006). Microaggressions toward Muslim college students can be viewed as the “new” prejudice that has evolved as a product of contemporary American sentiments (Edwards, 2010). Approximately 3.3 million Muslims live in the U.S and the population is estimated to double by 2050 (Mohamed, 2016). As the American Muslim pop- ulation continues to grow, the number of Muslim college students will see a parallel increase; this study aims to identify trends that could affect the wellbe- ing of this growing population. Racial slights that occur in educational or work settings may negatively impact an individual’s psychological health (Nadal, Wong, Griffin, Davidoff, & Sriken, 2014) and perception of their life on campus (Harper, Davis, Jones, McGowan, Ingram, & Platt, 2011; Nadal et al., 2014). Studies have focused on a range of religious discrimination in a variety of set- Microagressions on the University Campus 23 tings and the impact on the general Muslim American population (Abu- Ras et al., 2018; Aroian, 2012; Livengood & Stodolska, 2004; Park, Malachi, Sternin, & Tevet, 2009; Tummala- Narra & Claudius, 2013). Impact of Religious Discrimination on Muslim Mental Health Discrimination is defined as the beliefs, attitudes, institutional arrangements, and acts that tend to denigrate or deny equal treatment to individuals or groups based on racial characteristics or group affiliation (Clark, Anderson, Clark, & Williams, 1999). The impact of discrimination and victimization of minority groups is well documented in the psychology literature. Racial and religious discrimination have similar effects and outcomes on an individual’s wellbeing and may lead to physical and mental health problems (Kessler, Mickelson, & Williams, 1999; Sellers & Shelton, 2003). Rippy and Newman’s (2008) study of 190 Muslim Americans found that perceived religious discrimination and/ or hate crimes were associated with a high level of stress. In a sample of 102 Muslim participants, Abu- Ras and Suárez (2009) revealed that over 70 percent reported posttraumatic symptoms post 9/11, such as increased arousal, fatigue, problems with concentration, and anxiety. In their most recent study of 1,130 Muslim Americans, Abu- Ras and colleagues (2018) found that participants with longer tenures in the United States who rated themselves as religious re- ported feeling less safe in the U.S. and had higher levels of stress that were correlated with higher levels of perceived religious discrimination. Although many Muslim Americans have experienced psychological symptoms as a re- sult of discrimination, a study of 83 participants found that almost all avoided seeking therapy due to a lack of culturally competent services at mental health agencies (Abu- Ras & Abu- Bader, 2008). Despite the negative impact many Muslims experienced due to post- 9/11 discrimination, some individuals took a proactive stance and practiced posi- tive coping strategies. Livengood and Stodolska (2004) found that participants attempted to change broader societal attitudes with “random acts of kindness” (p. 201) and efforts toward interfaith communication and outreach activities. Additionally, many members of the American Muslim community provided the public with educational materials about Islam (Abu- Ras & Abu- Bader, 2008). Abu- Ras, Senzai, and Laird’s 2013 study of 62 American Muslim physi- cians reported participants’ increased involvement and visibility in community events about Islam. Regarding more personal strategies, several studies indicat- ed that many Muslims used religious coping by first turning to God when seek- ing help and comfort in times of stress (Abu- Ras & Abu- Bader, 2008; Abu- Ras & Suárez, 2009; Carter, 2010; Hallak & Quina, 2004; Livengood & Stodolska, 2004; Nadal, Issa, Griffin, Hamit, & Lyons, 2010). 24 Raisa Manejwala and Wahiba Abu-Ras Despite the many studies on overt discrimination against Muslim Ameri- cans and its impact (Abu El- Haj, 2007; Abu- Ras & Suárez, 2009; Abu- Ras et al., 2018; Khanlou et al., 2008; Livengood & Stodolska, 2004; Rippy & Newman, 2008), few studies focus specifically on subtle discrimination toward Muslim Americans (Aroian, 2012; Park et al., 2009; Tummala- Narra & Claudius, 2013). Since the college years are a period when many students learn to develop their self- concepts and identities (Nadal et al., 2014), it is important to understand if discrimination has a unique or similar effect upon Muslim college students compared to the Muslim population outside of college. To the authors’ knowl- edge, this study is the first to address this phenomenon with this particular segment of the Muslim American population. Microaggressions The concept of microaggression is defined as “brief and commonplace daily ver- bal, behavioral, and environmental indignities, whether intentional or unin- tentional, that communicate hostile, derogatory, or negative racial slights and insults that potentially have harmful or unpleasant psychological impact on the target person or group” (Sue et al., 2007, p. 273). The major classifications of microaggressions are based on the intentions of the perpetrators, the sever- ity of the act, and the underlying messages that are expressed. Microassaults are conscious comments or behaviors that are made to intentionally hurt or humiliate an individual, microinsults are often unconscious, subtle behaviors that are rude and insensitive, and microinvalidations are statements that dis- credit the psychological experiences of individuals (Nadal et al., 2010). Since microaggressions can be very subtle, targets may find it difficult to identify which demographic aspect was the major cause of the discrimination (Abu- Ras & Suárez, 2009). Additionally, victims may feel confused and perplexed as to whether they actually experienced a microaggression since the aggressive act can be ambiguous and transpires outside the level of conscious awareness (Nadal et al., 2010). It has been argued that individual differences may contrib- ute to one’s perception of a situation or act as discriminatory. For instance, in- dividuals with strong group, nationalist, or ethnic identification are more likely to report personal experiences of ethnic discrimination and perceive them- selves as targets of discrimination (Major, Quinton, & McCoy, 2002; Sellers & Shelton, 2003; Operario & Fiske, 2001). Johnston and Nadal (2010) noted how “passing” relates to microaggressions; in this case, Muslims who do not wear religious attire may “pass” as non- Muslim and thus may not experience the same types or number of microaggressions as people more easily identifiable as Muslim. Since many Muslim women wear hijab, (i.e., cover their hair or wear dis- Microagressions on the University Campus 25 tinct outer clothing), they are often easily identified as Muslim. Therefore, the idea of “passing” can be examined by interviewing a range of Muslim women, those who wear hijab and those who don’t. Additionally, due to social gender norms, female participants may be more likely than male participants to be more open with a female researcher. These factors coalesced into the research- er’s decision to interview female participants exclusively. Few studies on racial microaggressions have examined the experiences of South Asian Americans (Alvarez, Juang, & Liang, 2006; Sue, Bucceri, Lin, Nadal, & Torino, 2009). South Asians (individuals with family origins in Af- ghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, or Sri Lanka) constitute one of the fastest growing groups of Asian immigrants in the U.S. (Inman & Tummala- Narra, 2010). In fact, the most common ethnicity that Muslim Americans reported was South Asian (Varieties of Worship, 2001). Hate crimes targeting not only Arab Americans and Muslim Americans, but also South Asian Americans have increased post- 9/11 (Finn, 2011; Wang, Siy, & Cheryan, 2011). The current study will focus particularly on Muslims of South Asian descent. Currently, there are only a few studies about the impact of microaggres- sions on religious minority groups, which may lead to overlooking their needs and ways to address them (Nadal, Griffin, Hamit, Leon, Tobio, & Rivera, 2012). A theoretical taxonomy on religious microaggressions was proposed by Nadal and colleagues (2010) based on categories and themes of racial microaggres- sions described by Sue and colleagues (2007). Nadal and colleagues (2010) proposed six categories of microaggressions based primarily on religion and are likely independent of other identities (e.g., race, ethnicity, gender, and im- migration status). The six categories are as follows: (a) Endorsing religious ste- reotypes: statements or behaviors that communicate false, presumptuous, or incorrect perceptions of certain religious groups; (b) exoticization: instances where other religions are viewed as trendy or foreign, and sends the message that such religions are trivial and not sacred; (c) pathology of different religious groups: statements and behaviors in which individuals categorize some reli- gious practices or traditions as being deviant; (d) assumption of one’s own reli- gious identity as the norm: comments or behaviors that convey one’s presump- tion that their religion is the standard and behaves accordingly; (e) assumption of religious homogeneity: statements in which individuals assume that everyone in a given religious group looks, behaves, and thinks the same; and (f ) denial of religious prejudice: incidents in which individuals claim that they are not reli- giously biased, even if their words or behaviors may indicate otherwise. Nadal and colleagues (2012) validated their proposed taxonomy of reli- gious microaggressions toward Muslims or members of any other religious mi- nority group. Specifically, their pilot study with 10 Muslim participants used focus group interviews to explore experiences with religious microaggressions. 26 Raisa Manejwala and Wahiba Abu-Ras Their findings supported four of the six themes from the theoretical taxonomy proposed by Nadal and colleagues (2010), including endorsing religious stereo- types, pathology of the Muslim religion, assumption of religious homogeneity, and exoticization. Nadal and colleagues (2012) suggested that further research is needed to examine the coping processes and reactions to microaggressions among Muslim Americans. Purpose and Significance of the Current Study In a number of previous studies, Islamophobia has been demonstrated to have a negative impact on the lives of Muslim Americans in a variety of settings. To the author’s knowledge, this information has never been gathered about effects on the university campus. The overarching research question and purpose of this study was to explore, describe, and understand the incidence of perceived religious discrimination among Muslim American students on five university campuses in urban settings of the northeast region of the U.S. In particular, the current study focused on the experiences and perceptions of microaggres- sions in university settings among Muslim South Asian female undergraduate students. Method Research Design The current study used a qualitative method to collect and analyze data to un- derstand the phenomenon of perceived religious discrimination toward Mus- lim South Asian female undergraduate students on five university campuses. Qualitative research is the best method to use when a topic has received little empirical attention (Morrow & Smith, 2000). Moustakas’s transcendental phe- nomenological approach (1994) allowed for an in- depth exploration of the participants’ subjective experiences. A semi- structured questionnaire was used to collect data from 12 participants regarding their experiences and percep- tions of religious microaggressions in academic, employment, and social set- tings on campus. Recruitment Process The participants were recruited in three ways from September 2014 to Febru- ary 2016 from five local medium- to- large American universities in urban set- tings of the northeast. First, the first author contacted leaders of student orga- Microagressions on the University Campus 27 nizations from each of the universities and explained the purpose of the study. Upon their agreement, they disseminated the study announcement during club meetings and prayer gatherings and through e- mail using their listserve. Sec- ond, the first author posted flyers advertising the study at these universities. Third, the first author attended on- campus events with Muslim students, dis- tributed flyers, and met with potential participants. Additionally, some partici- pants referred the researcher to other classmates, generating a snowball sample. Inclusion criteria. Participants were eligible to take part in this study if they: (a) self- identified as Muslim; (b) self- identified as South Asian (family originally from Afghani- stan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, or, Sri Lanka); (c) were 18 years of age or older; (d) were enrolled at an undergraduate institution; (e) self- identified as female; (f ) experienced at least one incident of perceived religious- based discrimination in the university setting; and (g) spoke English. Since most acts of religious- based discrimination are often incepted by physi- cal appearance, careful attention was given to participants who wore tradition- al Muslim attire (e.g., hijab or headscarf ). Study Procedure A total of twelve students participated in this study. The first author contacted each participant twice, the first contact being a phone screen aimed to deter- mine if the volunteer met each inclusion criteria of the study. Eligible volun- teers met with the researcher to review the informed consent document and participate in the individual face- to- face interview in a private setting on cam- pus. The semi- structured interview protocol designed for this study sought the participants’ description of the role Islam plays in their lives, definition of discrimination, and experience of being treated equally and feeling included on campus. The protocol also asked participants about their experiences and perceptions of religious microaggressions in different sectors including the classroom, work place, and social settings on campus. All individual interviews were audio- recorded and each lasted approximately 60 to 90 minutes in du- ration. Upon completion of the interview, each participant completed a brief paper- and- pencil demographic questionnaire. The form asked participants to identify their date of birth, marital status, country of family origin, language(s) spoken, number of years living in the U.S., citizenship status as a U.S. student or international student, and level in college. Each participant was compensated with a $10 gift card to the bookstore Barnes & Noble. 28 Raisa Manejwala and Wahiba Abu-Ras Data Analysis All interviews were transcribed by the first author. First, horizontalization in- volved creating a list of significant statements from each transcript that pro- vided an understanding of how the participants experienced the phenomenon. Second, these significant statements were clustered into themes. From the the- matic analysis, two kinds of descriptions were developed using the method developed by Moustakas (1994): (a) a textural description (what participants experienced), and (b) a structural description (how the participants experi- enced it in terms of the conditions, situations, or context). For quality assur- ance, the second author reviewed all codes and themes followed by comments and revisions. Lastly, both types of descriptions were combined to convey an overall essence of the participants’ common experiences. The essence captures the meaning ascribed to the experience (Moerer- Urdahl & Creswell, 2004). For a robust analysis, the first author consulted with peers, a process known as peer debriefing. Peer debriefing supports the credibility, or “believability,” of the data in qualitative research (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). Peer debriefers chal- lenge the analysis and explore alternative approaches in order to maintain ob- jectivity and determine if the conclusions are valid. Three graduate students volunteered as peer debriefers and were trained in analyzing the data using Moustakas’s (1994) transcendental phenomenological method. In addition, to avoid any possible research bias, the first author: (a) bracketed her own views beforehand in order to establish a clear boundary between the researcher’s views and experiences and those of the participants (Moustakas, 1994), and (b) used a reflexivity journal to describe her observations of the participants’ attitudes and actions and reflect on how data collection and analysis was im- pacting her personally and professionally (Maxwell, 2005). Results Participants’ Background The 12 participants ranged from first year to senior levels in college with a mean age of 19.75 years. All participants were born in the United States and had lived in the country their entire lives. Half of them identified their coun- try of family origin as Pakistan and the other half as Bangladesh. Most of the participants (58%) did not wear hijab or any attire that easily identified them as Muslim, but all described Islam as central to their identity and regularly en- gaged in religious practices. In general, the participants defined discrimination as “treating an individual differently based on their appearance and/or back- ground” and “not giving people equal opportunities because they’re a certain Microagressions on the University Campus 29 sex, race, religion, sexual orientation, etc.” Themes Seven themes emerged from the data analysis: (a) pathology of different reli- gious groups, (b) assumption of religious homogeneity, (c) endorsing religious stereotypes, (d) a belief that Islamophobia is common and will continue, (e) confusion, (f ) a desire to educate others about Islam, and (g) positive coping and support. The following section will introduce these themes and provide supporting examples for each to describe the experiences and perceptions of religious discrimination among the participants. Theme 1: Pathology of different religious groups. This type of religious microaggression involves actions which send the mes- sage that Muslims are somehow abnormal. The vast majority of participants described receiving stares that made them feel “uncomfortable,” “tearful,” “self- conscious,” “guilty,” “scrutinized,” “judged,” “alone,” and “unaccepted by soci- ety.” A participant described receiving a stare while walking on campus: “You think of yourself as a normal person, and then you’re reminded that you’re not.” Another participant, not wearing religious attire, described feeling unsafe on the university shuttle bus after being stared at by another student: My hijabi friend and I were taking the [university shuttle] bus back to her apartment right off- campus and we got this look and it made my skin crawl. This look was that bad. I knew it wasn’t because he was sexualizing me, even though I’ve had that, too. This was specifically, like, [in a judg- mental tone], “You’re a Muslim.” Other participants discussed friends and classmates no longer interacting with them after disclosing their Muslim identity. One participant shared an in- cident that occurred in which a friend volunteered to massage her hand for her after completing an in- class group activity and stated, “After I told my friend in class that I’m Muslim, he let go of my hand [and stopped massaging it]. After I told him I’m Muslim, he never talked to me.” Almost every participant described experiencing this type of microaggression and their examples con- veyed the message they were treated as inferior to the majority group. Theme 2: Assumption of religious homogeneity. This theme discounts the individuality and variety of ethnic and cultural groups of Muslims around the world. Most participants (75%) shared incidents 30 Raisa Manejwala and Wahiba Abu-Ras that endorsed this assumption. For example, a participant interpreted an inci- dent when a woman at a campus bus stop told her she was not expecting her to speak perfect English and shared: “She obviously did not expect to hear perfect English from me because to her, I guess, I didn’t look like I would be able to speak proper English.” This type of microaggression sends the message that Muslims are foreign and do not speak English. Even though many Muslims, such as all the participants in this study, are born and raised in the U.S., they can be treated as though they are not from the U.S. due to perceptions of their religious identity. Another participant described a random off- topic remark made by her professor in class: “Yoga pants are not allowed to be worn in Mus- lim countries.” She expressed her feelings about her professor’s use of the term “Muslim countries” and the assumptions of homogeneity in such places: I think, sometimes, people assume that when they say ‘Muslim countries,’ they also mean everyone who comes from these Muslim countries. It feels kind of strange. It feels kind of targeting. At times, it can feel like they’re talking about you or your family. In this instance, the professor assumed that everyone living in predominantly Muslim countries does not wear a certain type of clothing that is form- fitting and there is no individuality in one’s attire. Theme 3: Endorsing religious stereotypes. A common stereotype linked with this minority group is that all Muslims are affiliated with terrorism. One participant relayed that her professor stated in class that “terrorists are towelheads,” which is a derogatory term used to refer to Muslims, Arabs, or South Asians who wear turbans or other head covering. Other participants expressed statements made by classmates that endorsed this stereotype. For example, one participant described a social event on campus, Meet- A- Muslim Day, and stated, “A friend told me a student walked by the table of Muslim students and shouted, “It’s ISIS! It’s ISIS!”” This “joking” inci- dent conveys that a perception that every person who identifies as Muslim is a violent terrorist. Another participant shared an experience working with a group of students in the classroom: In the middle of preparing for our presentation, my group member just randomly asks me, ‘So I heard about the bombing in . . . or, terrorist attack in some Middle Eastern country. So why are you people always trying to bomb people?’ Microagressions on the University Campus 31 This incident led the participant to feel “disconnected” with her group mem- bers. Such statements endorsing this stereotype can be viewed as overtly Is- lamophobic. Theme 4: A belief that Islamophobia is common and will continue. Many of the participants (75%) expressed a belief that Islamophobia is com- monplace and discrimination toward the Muslim population will continue throughout their lives. A few described it in their everyday lives as “a common theme,” “natural,” and “normalized.” The participants described expecting dis- crimination against Muslims to occur at their on- campus workplace and in the classroom. For example, one participant described expecting to hear Islamo- phobic comments in each class after her professor once stated: “Africans and Asians can’t put a government together.” She described bracing for the offense: “I feel on edge, like whenever it becomes a controversial topic in class, it’s like, Oh, no! They’re about to whip out something wild I’m going to have to live with.” This participant demonstrates that Muslim students may feel uncom- fortable in the classroom, which is generally believed to be a safe environment for students. This incident is also an example of when it is difficult to attribute whether the microaggression is based on religion, race, ethnicity, or some com- bination of several factors. A second participant described her feelings about the future after she perceived that a classmate did not speak to her because of her visible Muslim identity: “After this experience, I felt very insulted and I again felt that feeling of, wow, things are going to be very hard for me in the future. This kind of feeling like I’m being held back.” This theme portrays that many of the participants believe that they will continue to experience Islamo- phobia and that it will interfere with achieving their future goals. Theme 5: Confusion. Many of the participants’ (58%) reactions to microaggressions on the college campus involved feelings of confusion. Participants described not understand- ing the incident, wondering why they were being treated differently, feeling uncertain of how to respond, and feeling unsure of their responses. A partici- pant expressed confusion after a student on the campus shuttle was staring at her and her Muslim friend: “While he was staring, I thought, Oh my God. Is this really happening? Is what I’m thinking actually happening?” This incident displays that Muslims may not recognize the subtle nature of microaggressions. Another participant pondered about her response to a classmate who she felt was attacking her stance on the Iraq war: “But after my classmate made that comment, I was, like, should I not have said what I said? Should I not have 32 Raisa Manejwala and Wahiba Abu-Ras defended my people?” This theme communicates that the subtlety of microag- gressions may often lead to confusion, doubt, and questions about what oc- curred and if they responded appropriately. Theme 6: A desire to educate others about Islam. Most of the participants (75%) expressed the need to educate the American public about Islam and challenge stereotypes and prejudicial attitudes toward Muslims. Since they believed other students had a very limited understand- ing of Islam and held misconceptions of Muslim people, they felt “pressured and responsible” to educate them about the religion. Most of the participants explained they are welcoming of questions on how they practice their faith, yet feel anxious when teaching others, and thus would like to be more educated and prepared themselves. Additionally, some commented being asked many questions about their religion and feeling that their statements and actions were in a way representing Islam. One participant expressed feeling respon- sible for representing her entire faith: I think it goes both ways. Sometimes when events happen, it’s nice to be able to speak out [about Islam] and then have people support you in that, but then at the same time, I just want to live my life and go to my classes, go to a party or something, and not have to worry about, ‘Okay, let me make sure I’m representing Islam perfectly every single time I step out of my house.’ I’m just a college kid. Most of us are just college kids. That’s not a responsibility I should have on my shoulders. This statement depicts that Muslim students on the university campus may perceive themselves as a spokesperson for the entire Muslim population. Fur- thermore, participants believed they need to teach Islam by conveying through their actions that they do not align with the stereotypes and misconceptions. Another participant who does not wear religious attire described her change in behavior after she perceived that others were more friendly and approach- able to her than to her friend wearing hijab: “When someone asks, ‘What are you?’ then I become hesitant because I want to know their stance on Muslims first because I want to portray myself better before I have to tell them.” This participant expressed that she does not want others to know she is Muslim and feels as though she must work harder than others to prove her positive quali- ties before she discloses her religious identity. This theme shows that many participants believe their experiences of microaggressions are somewhat the result of others’ limited understanding of and misconceptions about Islam and, even though they express an interest to educate others, they may still feel it is overwhelming and unjust to undertake this role. Microagressions on the University Campus 33 Theme 7: Positive coping and support. All but one of the participants engaged in healthy and positive coping meth- ods. They reached out to family, friends, professors, and members of the cam- pus Muslim Students Association (MSA), who they viewed as trustworthy for support. In addition to becoming more engaged in defending their religion, they felt the need to pursue more knowledge about their religion and further strengthen their own Muslim identity. Other participants made more efforts to connect with other non- Muslim students, engage in activism on campus, and become more involved in on- campus organizations. A participant described the national backlash against her university’s MSA due to the group’s stance against a movie screening on campus and expressed her increased activism: After this screening experience, I’ve gone out to WAY more diversity events, WAY more politically active events, just because it was the first big thing that I felt obligated to go to all these things for. Since then, I’ve gone to everything. Another participant described her response to her professor’s generalization about Muslims in class: In the course evaluation, I said, ‘There are just some things that you said throughout this semester that have no . . . I feel like you should consider [what you said] and think about a little bit. It’s not that it makes you a bad person or a bad teacher, because I think you’re a good one.’ I was polite. I wasn’t off- putting. This participant used her experience as an opportunity to provide positive and constructive feedback to her professor when she was asked to complete a course evaluation at the end of the semester. Altogether, where possible, the partici- pants used their experiences to improve their understanding of themselves and help Muslims and other vulnerable groups who also face discrimination. Descriptions and Essence of the Experience When the participants described their experiences with religious discrimina- tion on their university campus, they used words such as “stared,” “ignorant,” “lonely,” “unfair,” “judged,” “confused,” “pressured,” and “targeting.” Partici- pants encountered ignorance of others about Islam and felt a responsibility to educate them about their religion. They expressed “Islamophobia is real” and “discrimination is going to exist.” Moreover, they described feeling excluded by non- Muslim students. Many participants expressed feeling confused about 34 Raisa Manejwala and Wahiba Abu-Ras what they experienced and doubtful about their responses. The participants experienced these incidents in a variety of settings on the university campus, including classrooms, university shuttle buses, on- campus jobs, libraries, social events, club meetings, and the university’s MSA social media webpage. The perpetrators of the discrimination were both students and professors. A major- ity of participants reached out to family, friends, and professors for emotional support. Many of them turned these painful experiences to learning moments about themselves and to educating others. These experiences also increased their motivation to stand against discrimination by getting more involved in their own Muslim community and showing more support of other minority groups. The essence of the experience is being generalized and feeling judged by those who have a limited understanding of Islam, and that family, friends, and professors can be sources of support. Discussion Although there has been much research on the experiences and impact of Is- lamophobia on the Muslim American population post- 9/11 (Abu- Ras, Suárez, & Abu- Bader, 2018; Abu- Ras & Abu- Bader, 2008; Abu- Ras & Suárez, 2009; Aroian, 2012; Livengood & Stodolska, 2004; Park et al., 2009; Tummala- Narra & Claudius, 2013), little research has been conducted on Islamophobia on the university campus. While most of the participants did not wear hijab or any religious attire, all the participants perceived to have experienced microaggres- sions. This finding did not support the idea of “passing” (Johnston & Nadal, 2010); participants who could pass as non- Muslim still perceived to have expe- rienced the same types and amounts of microaggressions as those more easily identifiable as Muslim. Additionally, study participants described Islam as an es- sential aspect of their identity. Since individuals who demonstrate strong group identification are more likely to perceive themselves as targets of discrimination (Operario & Fiske, 2001), the participants are likely to have interpreted the am- biguous nature of most microaggressions as indeed discriminatory. The results of the current study support three themes from the proposed taxonomy of religious microaggressions (Nadal et al., 2010). These supported themes include pathology of different religious groups, assumption of religious homogeneity, and endorsing religious stereotypes. Four additional themes emerged based on the experiences of the participants. One of these emerg- ing themes was feelings of confusion about the incidents, which supports the literature that victims can be unaware of the microaggressive act or comment (Nadal, 2008; Sue et al., 2007). Other themes that emerged were the desire to educate others about Islam and to increase their understanding of Islam and Muslims. Participants also became more engaged and active in on- campus Microagressions on the University Campus 35 organizations. These results correspond with other studies on the problem- focused coping strategies (proactive stance) many Muslims have used in re- sponse to discrimination (Abu- Ras & Abu- Bader, 2008; Abu- Ras et al., 2013; Livengood & Stodolska, 2004). Another emerging theme was the belief among participants that Islamophobia is a common phenomenon of American society and will continue throughout their lives, which supports the notion that micro- aggressions are a contemporary form of discrimination in American society. Finally, the ultimate essence, or common experience, of the participants with regard to microaggressions was feeling that non- Muslims who often gen- eralized and judged them held a very limited understanding of Islam. As the American media continues to project narratives of Muslims as violent terror- ists, many Americans will likely continue to hold prejudicial attitudes toward this minority group. These attitudes may lead to intentional or unintentional discriminatory acts toward the Muslim American collegiate population. Thus, it is important for the media and other institutions to promote balanced images of this community, which can ultimately contribute to reducing Islamophobia and improving the wellbeing of the Muslim population in general and the col- lege experience for Muslim students in particular. Limitations and Implications for Research and Clinical Practice Although this is the first study to address microaggressions toward Muslim students on university campuses, it has its own limitations. First, the current study used a small sample size of 12 participants; it is challenging to obtain a bigger sample of stigmatized minority students who may be afraid to take part in this type of study. Thus, it is important to continue qualitative as well as quantitative research on microaggressions in the university setting to bet- ter understand its impact on Muslim American college students. Second, this study only included participants in the northeast urban region of the U.S. who identified as female and South Asian. It is recommended that future studies attempt to sample other campuses in different geographic areas (as the cul- ture and politics of a region can influence the types of microaggressions ex- hibited) and more diverse ethnic and racial groups. Different gender, ethnic, racial, and age groups present various intersectional identities, and thus may have unique or different experiences of overt and subtle discrimination. Third, including students fluent in English might bias the sample toward more active or involved students while excluding others. Future research can compare the experiences of Muslim international students whose second language may be English to Muslim U.S. students. Given that universities influence the social and intellectual growth of stu- dents (Pushkin & Colon- Gonzalez, 1998), administrators have an obligation 36 Raisa Manejwala and Wahiba Abu-Ras to enhance the racial climate on campus. Further research about religious dis- crimination toward Muslim college students can inform the design of effective interventions and educational programs in the university setting (e.g., courses on world religions for students, cultural competency training for professors). Educational programs for students, faculty, and administrators to increase awareness about microaggressions and their impact can demonstrate a com- mitment to combating microaggressions on the university campus (Nadal et al., 2014). Research can also help mental health professionals at university/ college counseling centers understand the kind of discrimination Muslim stu- dents may encounter, be aware of their own biases regarding this population, and provide culturally sensitive interventions for the Muslim students who do seek help from professional providers. For instance, university counselors can help students develop effective coping strategies when encountering microag- gressions (Nadal et al., 2014). They can also empower students to advocate for the Muslim student population and other minority groups on campus. 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work_s2ywkfnvize47dgfmbtm6a3bni	----	Original Citation: Internalized Stigma and Psychological Well-Being in Gay Men and Lesbians in Italy and Belgium Melanie D.Otis Publisher: Published version: DOI: Terms of use: Open Access (Article begins on next page) This article is made available under terms and conditions applicable to Open Access Guidelines, as described at http://www.unipd.it/download/file/fid/55401 (Italian only) Availability: This version is available at: 11577/3169821 since: 2020-04-28T10:58:24Z 10.3390/socsci4041229 Università degli Studi di Padova Padua Research Archive - Institutional Repository See discussions, stats, and author profiles for this publication at: http://www.researchgate.net/publication/285393153 Internalized Stigma and Psychological Well- Being in Gay Men and Lesbians in Italy and Belgium ARTICLE in SOCIAL SCIENCES · DECEMBER 2015 DOI: 10.3390/socsci4041229 READS 29 5 AUTHORS, INCLUDING: Giorgia Lorenzi University of Padova 2 PUBLICATIONS 0 CITATIONS SEE PROFILE Marina Miscioscia University of Liège 16 PUBLICATIONS 0 CITATIONS SEE PROFILE Alessandra Simonelli University of Padova 62 PUBLICATIONS 19 CITATIONS SEE PROFILE All in-text references underlined in blue are linked to publications on ResearchGate, letting you access and read them immediately. 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Sci. 2015, 4, 1229–1242; doi:10.3390/socsci4041229 social sciences ISSN 2076-0760 www.mdpi.com/journal/socsci Article Internalized Stigma and Psychological Well-Being in Gay Men and Lesbians in Italy and Belgium Giorgia Lorenzi 1, Marina Miscioscia 2,*, Lucia Ronconi 3, Caterina Elisa Pasquali 1 and Alessandra Simonelli 1 1 Department of Developmental and Social Psychology, University of Padova, Via Belzoni, Padova 35131, Italy; E-Mails: giorgialorenzi89@gmail.com (G.L.); cpasquali@alliant.edu (C.E.P.); alessandra.simonelli@unipd.it (A.S.) 2 Department of Psychology and Clinics of Human Systems, University of Liège, B-33 Boulevard du Rectorat, Liege 4000, Belgium 3 Advisory Service of Statistic, University of Padova, Via Venezia, 12/2, edificio Psico 2, Padova 35131, Italy; E-Mail: l.ronconi@unipd.it * Author to whom correspondence should be addressed; E-Mail: mmiscioscia@ulg.ac.be; Tel.: +39-347-488-4730; Fax: +39-498-276-547. Academic Editor: Melanie D. Otis Received: 29 July 2015 / Accepted: 25 November 2015 / Published: 1 December 2015 Abstract: Several studies have shown that internalized homophobia is a risk factor for mental health illness in homosexual individuals, whereas the perception of social support is a protective factor for their psychological well-being. In line with those studies, the present research has investigated the levels of internalized homophobia, anxiety, depression and social support, among two groups of gay men and lesbian individuals living in two European countries (N = 194: 86 Italian and 108 Belgian), where legislations grant different civil rights to lesbian and gay individuals (LG). The main goal of this research has been to verify the possible differences between the two groups. Results showed some significant differences in terms of observed levels of internalized homophobia, which was higher in the Belgian gay men’s group compared to the Italian one. Furthermore, path analysis emphasized the role of social support as a potential factor of mediation between internalized homophobia and mental health. Keywords: sexual minority; homosexuality; mental health; social support; LGBT rights OPEN ACCESS Soc. Sci. 2015, 4 1230 1. Introduction The main goal of this research is to understand whether the legislative context of the country of residence could influence the psychological well-being of lesbian and gay individuals (LG); our hypothesis was investigated by comparing two groups of LG individuals living in two different European countries. Earlier studies observed a higher incidence of mental health disorders and alcohol abuse among LG people compared to heterosexuals, in particular when considering individuals who lived in countries where legislation does not guarantee and defend their civil rights [1,2]. Being aware of the socially repressive and hetero‐sexist environment in which LG people live seems to have an impact on their decision to fight against it, for example defending the traditional family, composed of a mother, father and their biological child, or even to mask their own sexual identity. While this may allow LG individuals to avoid direct homophobic experiences, it increases, as a consequence, the risk of developing physical, and/or psychological problems, such as drug abuse or eating disorders and sexually-transmitted diseases such as HIV or Syphilis due to unsafe sexual behaviors [3]. This field of investigation has identified two principal and distinct risk factors which include those group-specific minority stressors and general psychological processes that are common across minority sexual orientations. Meyer [4] postulated that members of sexual minority groups are exposed to stigma, namely, risk and stress factors connected with personal and social conditions which originate from belonging to a marginalized and stigmatized group. According to Hatzenbuehler [5], this stigma-related stress generates higher levels of general emotion dysregulation, social/interpersonal problems, and cognitive processes, increasing the risk for the onset of some kind of psychopathology. The cognitive processes affected by exposure to stigma-related stress are conceptualized as thought processes (both the content of thoughts, as well as the process of thinking) that exacerbate, maintain or prolong symptoms of depression and anxiety [1]. One aspect of psychological health that impacts sexual minorities is the concept of internalized homophobia [6]. This refers to a self-perception—whether conscious or not—specifically used to denote the set of feelings and negative attitudes oriented toward one’s own or others’ sexual minority status [3]. A wide variability on internalized homophobia intensity exists among lesbian, gay men, bisexual, transsexual (LGBT) individuals. In part, differences in level of internalized homophobia seem to depend on social variables, such as the geographical location of residence, for example, the urban or rural context, social class, family convictions, namely, the family beliefs about someone being a sexual minority, and personal psychological variables, such as low self-esteem, vulnerability to environmental conditioning and adopted coping strategies [7–9]. In general, the degree of internalized homophobia present seems to have a central role in gay men and lesbian individuals’ development and adaptation, referring particularly to the process of formation of sexual identity and the level of visibility and disclosure of one’s sexual minority status (coming out). According to Montano (2007), between the discovery of same-sex attraction and the acceptance of a LGB (lesbian-gay men-bisexual) identity as an integral part of one’s overall identity, there is a temporal time-lag. Generally, the first steps of the LGB identity formation process are characterized by confusion and desperation, low self-esteem and poor self-acceptance. Over time LGB people tend to develop positive Soc. Sci. 2015, 4 1231 attitudes toward their identity, to increase their personal and social contacts with other LGB persons and thus, have an increased desire to continue coming-out [10]. Indeed, a correlation between high levels of internalized homophobia and poor sexual identity development, low levels of self-disclosure and problematic aspects of the coming-out process has been demonstrated [6,10,11]. Rowen and Malcom (2002) found higher levels of internalized homophobia were correlated with lower stages of LGB identity formation. Additionally, internalized homophobia was significantly related to lower levels of self-concept related to physical appearance, to lower level of self-esteem and emotional stability, as well as being related to higher levels of sex guilt [11]. In this line, the connecting link between internalized homophobia and mental and physical well-being has been supported by results obtained from various studies. These have also highlighted relevant associations with the onset of mental disorders, such as substance abuse and eating disorders, with risky behavioral patterns, such as involvement in high risk sexual behavior [4,12–18]. A meta-analysis performed by Newcomb and Mustanski [19] on 31 studies, which analyzed 5831 homosexual and bisexual individuals in total, also confirmed this relationship. A strong correlation between internalized homophobia and psychopathological manifestations, such as depression and anxiety, was observed. Similar to findings involving other minority groups, in LGBT individuals, the perception of social support was found to be an important protective factor, protecting LGBT persons from stressful experiences and preventing the development of psychological diseases [5]. The role of family support has remained undisputed, even though it may vary according to age: in fact, since adolescence, the peer group increasingly influences the identity of individual, considering in particular the amount of time that it is spent together by people of this developmental stage [20]. A study by Mustanski, Newcomb and Garofalo [21] underscored the extent to which peer support plays a role in promoting people’s well-being across the life course, and highlighted that the impact of social support provided by friends is even greater than the level of support given by family [22]. Furthermore, LGBT groups and associations seem to constitute an important source of social support; the involvement in these groups has been shown to enhance positive coping strategies and to offer important skills inside of a supportive community and environmental framework allow these people to become more capable of dealing with difficulties [23]. 2. Goals of the Study In accordance with the literature presented above, our research aimed to explore the levels of internalized homophobia, anxiety and depression among two groups of gay men and lesbian individuals living in two different European countries with different legislations and civil rights extended to LGBT individuals: Italy and Belgium. The choice to recruit subjects in Italy and Belgium is motivated by the legal differences that exist in terms of civil rights of homosexual population. Presently, Belgium represents one of the leading countries in recognizing and protecting civil rights among LGBT people. According to the “Europe Annual Review of the Human Rights Situation of LGBTI People in Europe” (2014) [24], published by the ILGA (International Lesbian and Gay Association), Belgium is second over 49 European countries taken into consideration by the LGBTI (Lesbians, Gays, Bisexuals, Transsexuals, Intersexuals), whereas Italy ranks 32nd when legislation on civil rights is considered. Since 2003, Belgium has legally recognized civil marriage for same-sex https://www.researchgate.net/publication/10765963_Correlates_of_Internalized_Homophobia_and_Homosexual_Identity_Formation_in_a_Sample_of_Gay_Men?el=1_x_8&enrichId=rgreq-d306c8ab-2a0e-4082-975a-523b8230e71b&enrichSource=Y292ZXJQYWdlOzI4NTM5MzE1MztBUzozMDIyMTgzOTYyNzQ2ODhAMTQ0OTA2NTg4ODEyMg== https://www.researchgate.net/publication/10765963_Correlates_of_Internalized_Homophobia_and_Homosexual_Identity_Formation_in_a_Sample_of_Gay_Men?el=1_x_8&enrichId=rgreq-d306c8ab-2a0e-4082-975a-523b8230e71b&enrichSource=Y292ZXJQYWdlOzI4NTM5MzE1MztBUzozMDIyMTgzOTYyNzQ2ODhAMTQ0OTA2NTg4ODEyMg== Soc. Sci. 2015, 4 1232 couples, and since 2006, LGBTI persons living in Belgium have had access to legal adoption and medically-assisted procreation procedures. Moreover, strict and rigorous laws regarding hate crime were ratified by the Belgian government, which led to a decrease in aggression and harassment targeting LGBT people. On the contrary, LGBT people in Italy do not enjoy the same legal protections. In fact, no legislation relative to same-sex civil unions exists, and the status of being legally married is not even legally recognized yet. In terms of hate crimes based on sexual orientation and gender identity, the Italian legislature, after a long period of inactivity, recently started to make the first steps forward. In 2013, it was suggested that the “Reale-Mancino” law be extended to include homophobia and transphobia crimes with the aim of sanctioning and condemning actions, behaviors and slogans, inciting violence and discrimination toward minorities. Furthermore, another purpose of our study is to investigate the perception of social support and the possible connections between internalized homophobia and mental health. It is hypothesized that the two samples will show different levels of internalized homophobia, highlighting the role that the sociocultural environment may have. As Italy a hetero-sexist country in comparison to Belgium, we presume that this sociocultural environment will influence the dimension of internalized homophobia. For this reason we assume that the Italians participants will show higher level of internalized homophobia than Belgian ones [6]. We also hypothesize: (a) the presence of a significant association between internalized homophobia and psychopathological diseases, such as anxiety and depression, among both samples, in line with previous research data which have underlined a tight link in this sense [4]; and (b) an inverse relation between presence and level of internalized homophobia with the degree of perceived social support, interpreting the latter as a significant mediation factor in the relation between internalized homophobia and psychological well-being [21,25]. 3. Methodology 3.1. Participants This study involved two groups of LG people recruited in Italy and Belgium. The number of participants totaled 194 where 86 are Italians and 108 are Belgians (range of age 18–63 years). The strategy adopted for recruitment could be divided in two steps. Firstly, we presented our research idea to the presidents of all LGBT associations located in the cities of Liege, Belgium, and Padova, Italy. We provided interested associations with our contact information (telephone number and e-mail) and some advertising flyers that described the study. We sent to those who wanted to participate at the study a link by e-mail to complete the questionnaires online or we took an appointment to compile a paper version of the test. The paper version was been completed, only in the presence of the researcher, in an adequate room provided by a LGBT association. Secondly, in an effort to increase the number of study participants, we promoted our research through word of mouth and at the 2013 Gay Pride in Brussels, Belgium where we distributed informational flyers with our contact information. Data was collected over a four-month period (December 2012 to March 2013). Participation in the study was voluntary. Questionnaires in Italian language were provided to Italian participants; in French language to Belgian participants. The questionnaire took approximately 30 min to complete. Soc. Sci. 2015, 4 1233 Bisexual and under-age participants were excluded from the final sample. Bisexuals were excluded due to a low number of participants. 3.2. Measuring Instrument A set of self-report instruments were provided to each participant. In addition to obtaining socio-demographic information, the following constructs were measured: anxiety, depression, internalized homophobia, and social support. Socio-demographic questionnaire. This instrument was created specifically for this research in order to collect socio-demographic information of participants, such as ages, information concerning their coming-out, and relationship status. These factors have been found to be connected with the dimension of the internalized homophobia in literature [7–9] and also provide us the information regarding the description of the two samples. State-Trait Anxiety Inventory, y form (STAI-Y) [26–28]. The STAI-Y is an instrument used to investigate the Anxiety dimension. The scale is composed of 40 items (20 to investigate state Anxiety, 20 to investigate trait Anxiety), and it is assessed using a 4-point Likert-type scale. For the current study, participants completed only the items concerning the trait Anxiety dimension. Cronbach’s alpha for the current sample was α = 0.94 for men and 0.90 for women. Beck Depression Inventory-II (BDI-II) [29–31]. The BDI-II is a self-report instrument consisting of 21 items evaluated by a 4-point Likert-type scale (item range 0–3, total range 0–63). The scale investigates the intensity of depressive symptoms in adults and adolescents, as well as depression risk in normal population. Cronbach’s alpha = 0.92 for men and 0.89 for women. Measure of Internalized Sexual Stigma for Lesbians and Gay Men (MISS-LG) [32]. The MISS-LG is a self-report questionnaire that investigates negative attitudes that gay men, lesbians manifest with respect to both homosexuality and one’s self. This scale is composed of 17 items measured by a 5-point Likert-type scale (scale range 17–85), and it includes three subscales: identity, social disease, and sexuality. The identity subscale denotes an inclination to express a negative self-attitude as gay or lesbian individual, and to consider sexual stigma as a part of identity. The social disease represents the fear coming from a public identification as homosexual in the social environment and those negative internalized convictions regarding acceptability of homosexuality. The sexuality subscale examines the negative evaluation in terms of quality and duration of intimate same-sex relationships, and the negative view of gay or lesbian sexual behaviors. Some examples of items related to gay men are: “When I have sex with a man, I feel awkward”; “When I realize that I am demonstrating feminine behaviour, I feel embarrassed”. Some examples of items for lesbians are: “The thought of being lesbian makes me feel depressed”; “Lesbians can only have flings/one- night stands”; “At university (and/or at work), I pretend to be interested in the typical arguments of women”. Cronbach’s alphas for the whole scale were 0.89 for men and 0.87 for women. Multidimensional Scale of Perceived Social Support (MSPSS) [20,33]. The MSPSS is a 12-item self-report questionnaire which utilizes a 7-point Likert-type scale (scale range 12–84) that assesses one’s personal perception of social support. The scale is subdivided into three subscales (Family, Friends, and Significant Other). Examples items are: “I get the emotional help and support I need from my Soc. Sci. 2015, 4 1234 family”; “My friends really try to help me” Cronbach’s alphas for the total scale were 0.92 for men and 0.85 for women. 4. Results 4.1. Preliminary Analysis In the first two tables, we present preliminary analysis of the samples. Firstly, this analysis provides us the information about the demographic variables that are necessary for the discussion of the results. In fact, age, relationship status, and information concerning coming-out could have an impact on the degree of internalized homophobia. In the women’s groups (Table 1), the average age of the Italian women is significantly higher from Belgians (t (85) =4.830, p < 0.001), while women of the Belgian group disclosed their homosexuality earlier than the Italian group (t (82) = 3.956, p < 0.001). Considering that the strategy for the recruitment is the same one for both countries, this difference of age in the two groups could suggest that the way for the Italian lesbian women toward the definition of their own sexual orientation is much longer than Belgian ones. Besides, as reported in Table 2, the study shows that 77% of the Belgians declared their own sexual orientation to their mother, while among the Italian group, only 51% did (χ2 [1, N = 87] = 6.46, p < 0.05); 71% of the Belgian lesbians also made coming-out with their father, whereas only 44% of Italians did (χ2 [1, N = 87] = 6.140, p < 0.05). Table 1. Mean and standard deviation of age and age at the time of Coming-Out of each group. Gay men (N = 107) Lesbians (N = 87) Italians Belgians T test p value Italians Belgians T test p value M SD M SD t value p M SD M SD t value p Age 29.6 8.64 27.3 9.30 1.325 0.188 35. 8.77 26.2 7.21 4.83 0.000 C.O 20.2 5.10 20.1 4.52 0.098 0.922 24. 7.26 19.1 5.13 3.95 0.000 Note: C.O. Age: coming-out age. Table 2. Percent frequencies and significances regarding demographic variables. Gay men Lesbians Demographical variables Italians Belgians p value Italians Belgians p value % % p % % p Coming-out to mother 62.8 78.1 0.08 51.2 77.3 0.01 * Coming-out to father 60.5 68.8 0.38 44.2 70.5 0.01 * Coming out other family member 51.28 71.9 0.03 * 48.8 63.6 0.16 Relationship status 0.20 0.00 ** Single 34.9 50 11.6 47.7 Couple 34.9 34.4 20.9 36.4 Cohabitation 18.6 7.8 62.8 9.1 Married 4.7 6.3 0 4.5 Other 7 1.6 2.3 0 Divorced 0 0 2.3 2.3 Note: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. Soc. Sci. 2015, 4 1235 Finally, considering the relationship status, 48% of the Belgian women were single, while 63% of the Italian lived together with their partner (χ2 [5, N = 86] = 31.86, p < 0.001), Chi-square analysis have shown that, for what concerns gay men (Table 2): disclosure of sexual orientation to other family members (χ2 [1, N = 107] = 4.76, p < 0.05), 72% of Belgians disclosed their homosexuality to some relatives, whereas 51% of Italians did so. 4.2. Descriptive Statistics and Differences between Italian and Belgian For what concerns the first goal of this study, due to socio-political differences between the countries, we have hypothesized to observe higher levels of internalized homophobia, anxiety and depression in Italians participants. In t test analysis (Table 3), some significant results have emerged by comparing the two groups of Italians and Belgians gay men, regarding the degree of internalized homophobia: significant results were obtained in the total internalized homophobia variable, t (105) = −2.63, p < 0.05, in the social disease, t (105) = −2.87, p < 0.01, and sexuality, t (105) = −2.07, p < 0.05, dimensions of the questionnaire. Table 3. Mean, standard deviation, t value and p value comparing Italian and Belgian gay men’s samples. Measuring Instrument Italians (N = 43) Belgians (N = 64) M SD M SD t value p STAI-Y 42.35 12.89 43.52 10.80 −0.51 0.614 BDI 10.95 11.37 9.40 7.68 0.85 0.400 HIT 1.59 0.57 1.92 0.69 −2.63 0.010 * HIS 1.71 0.69 2.19 0.91 2.87 0.005 ** HISE 1.46 0.44 1.67 0.54 −2.07 0.41 * HII 1.53 0.80 1.81 0.96 −1.54 0.126 MSPSS 64.98 13.89 65.36 13.17 0.87 0.886 Note: STAI-Y = State Trait Anxiety Inventory; BDI= Beck Depression Inventory; HIT = Total Internalized Homophobia; HIS = Social Internalized Homophobia; HISE = Internalized Homophobia Sexuality; HII = Internalized Homophobia Identity; MSPSS = Multidimensional Scale of Perceived Social Support; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. We hypothesized an effect of the participant’s age on the dimensions of internalized homophobia, for these reasons, we have checked the effects on the “Age” and “Country” variables by the ANCOVA statistical analysis. The significant result, regarding sexuality dimension, was falsified, F (1,104) = 3.467, 0.05. Contrary results haven’t shown significant differences regarding anxiety, depression and perceived social support. For Lesbian groups, as it can be seen in Table 4, the analysis shows no significant differences among the two groups in all studied dimensions, contrary to the subscale regarding “Sexuality” in the MISS-L questionnaire. This significant difference has been falsified by the ANCOVA analysis that demonstrated the effect of the variable “Age” on the “Nationality” cancelled the significance bond to the scores (F (1,84) = 0.978, p = 0.326). Soc. Sci. 2015, 4 1236 Table 4. Mean, standard deviation, t value and p value comparing Italian and Belgian lesbian’s groups. Measuring Instruments Italians (N = 43) Belgians (N = 44) M SD M SD t value p STAI-Y 39.79 8.69 43.23 9.20 −1.79 0.077 BDI 8.35 7.81 10.98 8.40 −1.51 0.134 HIT 1.41 0.42 1.51 0.57 −0.99 0.327 HIS 1.57 0.64 1.56 0.70 0.09 0.928 HISE 1.15 0.25 1.29 0.36 −2.12 0.037 * HII 1.44 0.58 1.68 1.01 −1.33 0.187 MSPSS 68.74 9.26 67.77 11.87 0.43 0.672 Note: STAI-Y = State Trait Anxiety Inventory; BDI = Beck Depression Inventory; HIT = Total Internalized Homophobia; HIS = Social Internalized Homophobia; HISE = Internalized Homophobia Sexuality; HII= Internalized Homophobia Identity; MSPSS=Multidimensional Scale of Perceived Social Support; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. 4.3. Correlations and Path Analysis As regards the second goal, we hypothesized significant correlation between internalized homophobia and psychological diseases (anxiety and depression). Tables 5 and 6 show the results of the correlation analysis. We use these analyses in order to study the relationship between the variables. In both samples, the anxiety and the depression are significantly correlated with internalized homophobia, whereas in the gay men the social support has a negative correlation with Internalized Homophobia. In lesbians, the internalized homophobia is not significantly correlated with social support. The anxiety shows also a positive correlation with depression, furthermore, both anxiety and depression, are significantly negatively correlated with social support. Table 5. Bivariate Pearson correlations among the instruments, in the two lesbian populations: the superior triangle refers to the Italian participants (N = 43), the inferior triangle to the Belgian participants (N = 44). Variables 1 2 3 4 Instruments 1 STAI-Y - 0.726 ** −0.646 ** 0.332 * 2 BDI 0.720 ** - −0.332 * 0.346 * 3 MSPSS −0.552 ** –0.371 * - −0.292 4 MISS-L 0.286 0.166 −0.050 - Note: STAI-Y = State Trait Anxiety Inventory; BDI = Beck Depression Inventory; MSPSS = Multidimensional Scale of Perceived Social Support; MISS-LG = Measure of Internalized Sexual Stigma for Lesbians and Gay; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. Soc. Sci. 2015, 4 1237 Table 6. Bivariate Pearson correlations among the instruments, in the two masculine populations: the superior triangle refers to the Italian participants (N = 43), the inferior triangle to the Belgian participants (N = 64). Variables 1 2 3 4 Instruments STAI-Y - 0.784 ** −0.642 ** 0.765 ** BDI 0.704 ** - −0.332 * 0.709 ** MSPSS −0.497 ** −0.502 ** - −0.577 ** MISS-L 0.547 ** 0.558 ** −0.050 ** - Note: STAI-Y = State Trait Anxiety Inventory; BDI = Beck Depression Inventory; MSPSS = Multidimensional Scale of Perceived Social Support; MISS-LG = Measure of Internalized Sexual Stigma for Lesbians and Gay; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. The third goal was to verify the role of social support in influencing the development of internalized homophobia, anxiety and depression disorders. The correlation analysis shows that the perceived social support can diminish the symptomatology of anxiety and depression. For that reason, we have hypothesized that the social support is a significant mediator between internalized homophobia and Mental Health. To this purpose we performed Path Analysis using LISREL 8.70 with the ML estimation method, where internalized homophobia is the independent variable, social support the mediator, anxiety and depression the dependents variables. We have performed Path Analysis only for the Gay men group as we did not find statistical differences between the two lesbian group regarding the observed dimensions. The direct effects are shown in the following figures. As regard the indirect effects, the two models show that the social support is a significant mediator between internalized homophobia and psychological heath (depression and anxiety) for both samples: Italian and Belgian. Nevertheless, the indirect effect is higher in the Italian group than in the Belgian one. Figure 1 reports standardized path coefficients for the Italian group; two significant direct effects emerged: the first one regards the degree of internalized homophobia, which had an effect on the levels of anxiety, depression and social support; the second one regards the degree of perceived social support, which influenced the levels of anxiety reported and symptoms of depression. Furthermore, the indirect effect of internalized homophobia on anxiety, mediated by social support, is significant β = 0.17, p < 0.05; the indirect effect of internalized homophobia on depression is also significant β = 0.28, p < 0.05. Figure 1. Path Analysis Model of relation between Internalized Homophobia variables, Anxiety, Depression, and Social Support among the male Italian sample, * p < 0.05. Soc. Sci. 2015, 4 1238 Figure 2 reports standardized path coefficients for the Belgian group; two significant direct effects need to be underlined in this sample, as well as in the Italian group: the first one concerns the degree of internalized homophobia which had a role in influencing the levels of anxiety, depression and social support; the second one regards the degree of perceived social support which is related to the levels of anxiety and symptoms of depression. Considering this sample, the indirect effect of internalized homophobia on anxiety is significant β = 0.15, p < 0.05; as well as the indirect effect of internalized homophobia on depression β = 0.15, p < 0.05. Figure 2. Path Analysis Model of relation between interiorized homophobia variables, anxiety, depression and Social Support among the male Belgian sample, * p < 0.05. 5. Discussion In light of the analyses conducted in this study, our first hypothesis has not been confirmed. Belgian gay men have obtained mean scores of internalized homophobia significantly higher than the Italian gay men sample. This contradiction in the results could suggest that the internalized homophobia could be associated to intrapersonal and interpersonal dimensions such as significant relationships that should be investigated in future studies. In support of this hypothesis, the Belgian group is composed of 50% singles while the Italian group is composed of 58% individuals who are in couples or live together. Moreover, we hypothesized that responses from the Italian gay men in relation to the internalized homophobia dimension might have been influenced, consciously or not, by their strong desire to offer a healthy complete and positive own “homosexual” group image. In the last few years, the debate about LGBT civil rights in Italy has increased considerably. In this context LGBT associations promote a culture of respect for differences in order to improve the quality of life of LGBT people and to obtain civil rights protections. However, it is necessary to affirm that results cannot be generalized due to our convenient samples. The second hypothesis, regarding possible correlations between internalized homophobia and mental health disorders, such as anxiety and depression, was supported. The correlation confirmed previous works presented in literature, in both lesbian and gay men groups [4,21]. A strict relation between internalized homophobia, mental health problems and social support has been observed in both the lesbian’s and gay men’s groups. Results that emerged from the current study, in fact, emphasize how high levels of internalized homophobia are associated to high levels of psychological diseases [4,21]. Soc. Sci. 2015, 4 1239 Concerning the third hypothesis, differences between levels of perceived social support of the two groups were observed. According to our expectations, social support resulted in being negatively correlated to internalized homophobia; at the same time, high levels of social support are correlated to low levels of psychopathological diseases (anxiety and depression ) [5,21,25]. Path analyses allowed to observe the effective role of mediation of the perceived social support variable in relation to the levels of internalized homophobia and mental health (considering anxiety and depression) among both groups. The relevant direct effect of homophobia influencing mental health was also underlined: this kind of influence seems stronger than an indirect influence. Generally the results have emphasized that, in both groups, the perceived social support indirectly influence the mental health of the LG people, increasing the sense of psychological well-being. These aspects are in line with current literature; in fact, the social support represents an important factor of protection for the psychological health of the gay people. This is happening regardless of the country in which they live, and recognition of the civil rights for the people LG. The manifestations of homophobia, especially in the most advanced countries with regard to social rights, have the tendency to be revealed in a subtle and veiled way. These results offer some valuable indications to the experts who operate in this field, regarding the implications of internalized homophobia in the process of construction one’s identity; for this reason early interventions, for example in the school environment, could be increased. 6. Limitations of the Study The main shortcoming of the study is represented by the use of a sample that was recruited through their participation to the Gay Pride in Brussels in 2013 and their collaborations with different LGBT-focused associations. The strategy of recruiting a convenience sample, composed of volunteers, inevitably excluded the part of the population which denies their sexual orientation or do not express their own sexuality, or further do not participate in associative and cultural initiatives promoted by the LGBT world. The data collection methods used for the current study may also be somewhat problematic. We used two methods for collecting the data, the first one corresponded to the online questionnaire and the second one to the paper-pencil questionnaire. We decided to use both in in order to increase the number of participants. Nevertheless, the sample cannot be considered as representative of the two national populations due to the reduced sample size. 7. Conclusions This research confirms that internalized homophobia directly and indirectly affects the psychological health of LG people. In future research, it will be important to focus on the implications of the sexual stigma in the process of sexual identity’s construction. It may be interesting to study some aspects in more depth in relation to the coming-out process and the reactions that it may cause afterwards, examining also sources of social support that may influence psychological well-being. In addition, we could observe risks and protective factors which affect the intergeneration transmission of psychopathology; in this regard, the longitudinal study could be a valuable resource. We hope that the results presented here will encourage further exploration concerning homosexual well-being. Soc. Sci. 2015, 4 1240 Acknowledgments We wish to thank all the LGBT associations for their contribution in promoting this research. We did not receive grants in support of our research work, and we did not receive funds to cover the costs to publish in open access. Author Contributions Giorgia Lorenzi, Marina Miscioscia and Alessandra Simonelli conceived and designed the study; Giorgia Lorenzi administered the questionnaires and followed all the steps; Marina Miscioscia supervised all the steps and write the article, Lucia Ronconi analyzed the data; Alessandra Simonelli contributed to find sources and supervised the study and Caterina Elisa Pasquali contributed to the writing of the paper and checked the English. Conflicts of Interest The authors declare no conflict of interest. References and Notes 1. Mark L. Hatzenbuehler, Katherine M. Keyes, and Deborah S. Hasin. “State-level policies and psychiatric morbidity in lesbian, gay, and bisexual populations.” American Journal of Public Health 99 (2009): 2275–81. 2. Mark L. Hatzenbuehler, Katie A. McLaughlin, Katherine M. Keyes, and Deborah S. 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work_s5czqmf6mjgx5dtgmotcful3ay	----	Author information Article first published online HOW TO CITE July 2019 UPPADOV A “Unsafe Education”: Misconduct and Abuse in the Risk University Andrea Lombardinilo* * Department of Law and Social Sciences, Gabriele d’Annunzio University, Chieti-Pescara, Italy. Email: andrea.lombardinilo@unich.it Lombardinilo, A. (2019). “Unsafe Education”: Misconduct and Abuse in the Risk University. Italian Journal of Sociology of Education, 11(2), 372-394. doi: 10.14658/pupj-ijse-2019-2-18 372ITALIAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY OF EDUCATION, 11 (2), 2019 “Unsafe Education”: Misconduct and Abuse in the Risk University Andrea Lombardinilo* Abstract: The paper deals with the increasing phenomenon of sexual harassment in the academic environment, according to the figures of The Guardian investigation concerning sexual misconduct in UK Universities. In particular, Cambridge University recorded the highest number of incidents, after introducing a new reporting system. Thanks to its communicative impact, The Guardian investigation allows a further analysis into the reasons why universities failed to tackle sexual misconduct and did not succeed in enacting reforms to support and protect victims. This could be one of the most significant aspects of post-modern universities, partly enhanced by the perception of danger, both psychological and physical. Thanks to The Guardian’s investigation, and media emphasis on those figures, it is possible to interpret universities as places of risk in an era marked both by connected knowledge and relationships and by mass slaughters and the collective risks sometimes stemming from the involvement in research activities in unsafe countries. Sexual harassment in universities – perpetrated especially by students, as The Guardian inquiry emphasizes – sheds a light on the silent but painfully awkward situation of victims, usually unable to denounce the misconduct perpetrated by both students and staff. Keywords: risk society, university, misconduct, education, report * Department of Law and Social Sciences, Gabriele d’Annunzio University, Chieti- Pescara, Italy. Email: andrea.lombardinilo@unich.it 373ITALIAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY OF EDUCATION, 11 (2), 2019 “Unsafe Education” Lombardinilo A. Introduction. “How did it get to this?": The Guardian investigation on sexual harassment “Universities are home to a rape epidemic. Here’s what they can do”. The headline of the article by Emily Reynolds (2018) alerted the academic com- munities, students and their families to the risks related to sexual miscon- duct in universities. This is what The Guardian investigation about sexual harassment in UK universities shows, a year after the recommendations is- sued by the higher education representative body Universities UK (UUK). The attempts to tackle any potential incorrect and illicit behavior inside higher education institutions seem to have failed. A total of 4,500 students from 153 different UK institutions responded to the study, whose results - published in March 2018 - are quite shocking: 62% of university students and graduates have experienced sexual violence (accordingly to the Rape Cri- sis definition), including groping harassment, unwanted touching, coercion, sexual assault, rape. The most shocking figure is that 8% of female respondents claimed they had been raped at university, double the 4% of all women in England and Wales that the Office for National Statistics estimates. This is one part of the most relevant data diffused by The Guardian soon after the conclusion of the investigation about sexual harassment in universities, carried out through a questionnaire anonymously filled up by former and current students. This figure was opportunely emphasized in the sub-headline of the article: “Near- ly one in 10 female students who responded to a study of sexual violence in higher education said they had been raped. How did it get to this?” (Reyn- olds, 2018). To the fore is the journalistic representation of risk inside educational institutions, not rarely involving violent events (terrorist massacres, mass shooting, fanaticism, abductions, rapes, etc.). Furthermore, the risks con- nected to the academic mobility in the alleged “unsafe” countries (especial- ly in North Africa, Middle East and Latin America) should not to ignored, as the assassination of Giulio Regeni in Egypt and Valeria Solesin in Paris demonstrate. The death of the 24 year old Erasmus student Giacomo Nicolai, stabbed in Valencia in March 2017, along with the demise of Davide Maran in Lubiana on March 2018 suggest an underestimation of the risks concealed in a foreign country featuring different cultural paradigms and linguistic patterns (Lombardinilo, 2018b). When something bad happens to a student or a young researcher en- gaged abroad, media reports usually emphasize the criminal events, reported as crime news. This is what happened when English student Meredith Ker- cher, attending the “Università per stranieri” in Perugia, died on November 1, 2007, assassinated in the notorious house in via della Pergola. The long ju- 374ITALIAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY OF EDUCATION, 11 (2), 2019 “Unsafe Education” Lombardinilo A. dicial proceedings involving the former American Erasmus student Amanda Knox and the Italian engineering student Raffaele Sollecito became a media spectacle, both morbid and obsessive, with a particular focus on the alleged sexual implications of Meredith’s murder. In that case, the involvement of foreign students in a criminal affair was abundantly exploited by media as an added value in terms of informative relevance1. Despite the mystery still enveloping the story, the involvement of the three university students indicates the possibility that any education expe- rience may indirectly engender a negative event, especially when violence springs from the use of drugs. The myth of educational institutions as safe spaces becomes strained whenever students are compelled to undergo vio- lent misconduct, inside and outside the educational perimeters. The recurrent shootings on American campuses and in schools, as well as abuse by primary school staff and the frequent cases of bullying involving students in Italy, focuses reflection on why violence is perceived by public opinion only as a remote perspective within educational spaces (Scanagatta & Maccarini, 2009). Hence the media relevance of reports involving assassi- nated university students and researchers, especially those regularly attend- ing degree courses in their own universities. Much less relevant appear the concealed and specious forms of violence nestling in the academic environment, usually involving students. Sexual harassment has been neglected and underestimated for a long time, although many foreign universities have a specific office for the prevention of harass- ment and discrimination (Ophd). The UUK investigation sheds light on a deep-rooted and diffused phenomenon, probably unexpected in the dimen- sion denounced by the newspaper. Nevertheless, the risks permeating the academic environment may refer not only to the uncertain identity of the perpetrators, often presenting psychic and medical conditions, but also to the misconduct of students and staff leading to sexual harassment and phys- ical abuse. This fact seems to mark our globalized modernity as well, triggered by ea- gerness for progress and connectivity. In the background is the phenomenol- ogy of risk society, surveyed by Beck referring to the metamorphosis of our communicative strategies: “In times of digital communication, world risk society accounts for an important structural dynamic through which global risks create new forms of ʽcommunitiesʼ. To realize this structural dynamic 1 That incident was reported worldwide and even became the subject of a movie. Further- more, Amanda’s experience was described in several documentaries. Exonerated as a mur- der suspect, Amanda is nowadays hosting a TV show about women who have been publicly shamed, even though she was at the center of a high-profile murder trial Rudy Guede’s conviction for raping and then killing Meredith is judicial truth, which does not wipe out suspicion on Raffaele and Amanda, who allegedly took part in a sexual game that went wrong. 375ITALIAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY OF EDUCATION, 11 (2), 2019 “Unsafe Education” Lombardinilo A. means to understand the metamorphosis of modern society in the digital age” (Beck, 2016, p. 127). Higher education institutions are no exception, insofar as the transition to digitalization has implied deep changes both in learning and teaching skills (Peters & Roberts, 2012). Furthermore, internationalization and rationaliza- tion compel universities to build more dynamic scheduling, since accredita- tion and evaluation can no longer be neglected. Such profound changes are fueled by the communicative accelerations going on in the public sphere (Boccia Artieri, 2012; Castells, 2001). The audience’s perception of academic activities is sometimes dimmed by the negative news regarding professional misconduct, as Coetzee (2000) recounts in his novel Disgrace. Bad news is good news, of course. Nonethe- less, the UUK report on sexual harassment deals with a phenomenon unrea- sonably underestimated, involving countless silent victims. The journalistic evidence on this issue certifies students’ participation in the investigation, emphasizing the efficiency of the anonymous involvement. On the one hand, the shocking figures published by The Guardian im- pose an attentive reflection on the collaborative synergies inside academic environments, confirming Sennett’s analysis on the politics of cooperation going forward in functional institutions (Sennett, 2012). On the other hand, the misconduct reported by students seems to strengthen the concept of the individualized society proposed by Bauman, especially if we are dealing with the contrast between togetherness and individual style: “Individualization is here to stay: all who think about the means to deal with its impact on the fashion in which we all conduct our lives must start from acknowledging this fact” (Bauman, 2001, p. 50). Risk society matches the individualized communities, in which the atom- ized individuals strive to pay attention to the sources of risks concealed in the daily act (Alexander, 2012). Universities and schools are not perceived as risk places, despite the not infrequent cases of infrastructural collapse, poi- soning and abuse, both psychological and physical. The “symbolic capital” of academic actors (Bourdieu, 1988) is fading away, obscured by journalistic reports dedicated to the bad behavior of academic staff. The figures of the UUK investigation deserve to be framed into a sociological and communi- cative pattern, so as to realize the origins and the dimensions of a worrying tendency involving young university students. Furthermore, the UUK investigation allows us to focus on the interpre- tation of universities as risk places, overshadowed by violence, uncertainty and insecurity. These facts are rife enough to impose a close reflection on academic misconduct: “Young women are often terrified about the conse- quences if they make a complaint about a staff member. So often, when they 376ITALIAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY OF EDUCATION, 11 (2), 2019 “Unsafe Education” Lombardinilo A. do, the university’s chief concern is to downplay any wrongdoing and pro- tect its own reputation by keeping the whole thing quiet” (Reynolds, 2018). Downplay and wrongdoing are the keywords of this embarrassing phe- nomenon, undermining the traditional image of universities as safe places. Once again communication is a fundamental documentary resource, espe- cially when it is broadcasted by authoritative media (Morcellini, 2013). Risk society and university of risk: sociological notes The rise of the phenomenon of misconduct and sexual harassment, along with the potential risks concealed in activities involving young researchers and students while abroad, legitimate a sociological interpretation of the academic environment as a risky place, featured by a tendency to minimize or underestimate the consequences of bad behavior. This might be one of the main characteristics of our post-modernity, probed by Maffesoli (2003). Even though the boundary between connivance and abuse of power is usually clear-cut, the increase of sexual harassment imposes a careful reflec- tion on the degeneration of behavior inside educational institutions, in line with the construction of the risk society drawn by Beck and the individu- alized society probed by Bauman. This heuristic approach can perhaps be developed through an analysis of the devaluation process of the traditional symbolic and intellectual paradigms, undermined by consumer fever, both social and economic (Baudrillard, 2017). Educational institutions are no exception, since they have increasingly freed themselves of the solid old patterns of social value. The sense of un- certainty hovering around social actors matches the interpretative limits of our postmodern condition, marked by the end of “great narrations” (Lyotard, 1984), bolstered by the eagerness for connectivity and virtual participation in the relational dimension. What Beck emphasizes about the digital meta- morphosis of our world is worth specific consideration: “Digital communication has become the historical space for public communication. In the past it used to be particular territorial spaces, such as streets, public, churches. The advantages of the digital space are evident: groups can organize without moving physically, costs are low, the exchange happens in real time, physical violence is ruled out. In this sense protest and participation in the web are possible.” (Beck, 2016, 135). The idea of the “Politics of visibility” evokes the contradiction within the practice of the internet as a relational environment. Together with the un- deniable advantages of the non physical relationships taking form in the digital space, we are reminded that the psychological violence emerging on the internet can engender worrying consequences, as daily reports show. If 377ITALIAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY OF EDUCATION, 11 (2), 2019 “Unsafe Education” Lombardinilo A. we take into account the profound changes fired by digital interactions in universities as well, then we observe the new forms of violence and psycho- logical pressures going on in academic environments, despite the outstand- ing advantages of digital exchanges (De Martin, 2017; d’Alessandro, 2016). Although “physical violence is ruled out”, the web society, and in partic- ular the educational actors, cannot set aside the sources of risk stemming from the erratic frequenting of the internet sphere, where images and words can be misused or manipulated. This is why Beck dwells on the appearance of “public bads” within the communication sphere, as The Guardian inves- tigation confirms, inasmuch as the journalistic report of abuse and miscon- duct represents the acknowledgment of a new social and civil awareness by the victims of sexual harassment, in universities and at home as well. The risk society triggers the disappearance of the ideas of safety, secu- rity and shelter, wiped out by the decline in religion, family and solidarity. Moreover, the media narration fuels the sense of precariousness marking the rise of global insecurity, fostered by the specter of terrorism, mass slaughter and natural catastrophes. Everything is about to become public, thanks to connected broadcasting: “Side-effects or risk publicness, which centers on the production and distribution of bads (risks), develops in competition and conflict with this. Here the metamorphosis of communication and the public di- mension begins to unfold. Side-effects publicness focuses on the cul- turally perceived violations of nationally organized progress that are widely ignored in the mainstream public.” (Beck, 2017, pp. 130-131). Crimes and misconduct that once could be neither told nor reported are now investigated by media and newspapers, thus feeding a new culture of publicity about physical and psychological abuse perpetrated by public ac- tors2. Violence perpetrated by subjects beyond suspicion usually becomes a media issue, since audiences are eager to be informed about misconduct or disgrace involving powerful people. Ambivalence seems to be one of the possible keywords of our relational dynamics, made more complex by the overlapping of digital interactions (Altheide & Snow, 1979). This is what Bauman pointed out in reference to the value instability of the individualized society: “Ambivalence, ambiguity, equivocality... These words convey the feeling of mystery and enigma; they also signal trouble, whose name is uncertainty, and a dismal state of mind, called indecision or hesitation” (Bauman, 2001, p. 57). The lack of safety interlaces with the per- 2 This is the case of reports of sexual harassment involving the American film producer Harvey Weinstein, reported on media by countless actresses. Weinstein’s case became a media affair, bolstered by the debate going forward on the social networks. 378ITALIAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY OF EDUCATION, 11 (2), 2019 “Unsafe Education” Lombardinilo A. ception of violence as an incumbent risk, hence our need to be protected by alarm systems. Furthermore, diffidence may represent a self-protection remedy, imposed by our awareness of the risks inherent in everyday encounters and relation- ships, both occasional and professional. This is why Goffman’s theory of everyday life as a representation can supply us with useful advice on how to decipher the symbolic ambiguity of our life, coping with the ambiguity of words and gestures (Goffman, 1959). The academic environment, according to Bourdieu’s idea of symbolic capital, is an authoritative interactional laboratory, marked by best practices and drawbacks as well. This is why we can still exploit the metaphor of the “embattled university” to underline the potential risks lurking in academic environments, as Habermas (1967) did soon after the murder of the German student Benno Ohnesorg in Berlin on June 2, 1967. The construction of the University in democracy was inspired by the need to counteract the protests and clashes between students, police and academic governance, so as to lay the foundations of the incoming mass university. Furthermore, the image of Paul Virilio’s University of disaster allows us to reflect on the negative events happening in academic contexts, usually covered by silence. To the fore are the consequences of technological globalization: “Inhabiting the inhabitual every bit as much as harmful and uninhabitable instantaneity, the delocalization of our activities also taints the realm of knowledge essential for life, in particular, social life” (Virilio, 2009, p. 8). Unexpectedly, globalization collides with social identity, undermined by the risks of individual indeterminacy. This is why Bauman’s focus on “modernity and clarity: the story of a failed romance” can be applied to educational institutions, as The Guardian investigation seems to bear out. Ambivalence is one of the most underestimated drawbacks of our everyday relationships, especially when role and functions are exploited in terms of power practice3. Sometimes the boundary between evidence and suspicion can be unfath- omable, thus nourishing the sense of ambiguity corroding professional and inter-personal interactions. In this sense, the advent of the cosmopolitan civ- ilization engenders a new awareness of the risks concealed in places, institu- tions, environments once considered safe through the lack of perception of risks in such public structures. 3 “Instinctively or by learned habit, we dislike and fear ambivalence, that enemy of secu- rity and self-assurance. We are inclined to believe that we would feel much safer and more comfortable if situations were unambiguous – if it were clear what to do and certain what would happen if we did it” (Bauman, 2001, p. 56). 379ITALIAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY OF EDUCATION, 11 (2), 2019 “Unsafe Education” Lombardinilo A. The communicative speedup makes us aware of the dangers hovering around social and private engagement, inasmuch as the instant sharing of information and images enables social actors to be more conscious of the negative consequences stemming from bad behavior and breach of trust. To the fore is the slow but constant dismantlement of public institutions, de- prived of the authoritative value once recognized on a larger scale. This is what Bauman highlights when he dwells on old and new violence, within the wider framework of the individualized society: “Ours are times of transition in as far as the old structures are falling apart or have been dismantled, while no alternative structures with an equal institutional hold are about to be put in their place. It is as if the moulds into which human relationships were poured to acquire shape have now themselves been thrown into a melting pot.” (Bauman, 2001, p. 212). In such a fluctuating scenario, violence is an incumbent hypothesis, no longer connected to decay phenomena, but also related to the appearance of new forms of distress. Wholesale slaughter at schools and universities and terrorist attacks indifferently striking private and public places imply the rapid breakdown of educational institutions as safe environments, often reported by media exploiting an emotive theatricalization. Misconduct and abuse in nursery schools, hospitals, asylums and old peo- ple’s homes may keep pace with increasing sexual harassment and miscon- duct in educational institutions, including sports facilities, where the risk perception has never been so high as in our times. Safety is on the verge of belonging to the past when trust and faith were social clues. The common perception of uncertainty becomes a permanent condition of suspicion with such attention focused on the potential risks posed even by those closest to us and those beyond all suspicion: “The newly named varieties of family and neighborhood violence – such as marital rape, child abuse, sexual harassment at work, stalking, prowling – illustrate the ʽreclassificationʼ processes. The phenome- na which all these outrage-and-panic-generating catch-words try to grasp are not new. They have been around for a long time, but either they were treated as ʽnaturalʼ and suffered in silence like other unwel- come yet unavoidable nuisances of life, or they stayed unnoticed, like other features of ʽnormalityʼ.” (Bauman, 2001, pp. 213-214). Bauman pays attention to the social meaning of this reclassification pro- cesses, triggered by the new communicative relevance that global violence gains in the public digital spheres. This is made possible by the faltering pro- jection of a globalized community, allegedly founded on the unconditioned sharing of values, cultures, behavioral patterns (Augé, 1992). 380ITALIAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY OF EDUCATION, 11 (2), 2019 “Unsafe Education” Lombardinilo A. Once again, cohabitation may fail when institutions are not able to dilute the consequences of sudden changes, as the migration phenomena show. Foreigners are usually those most at risk, projected as they are into an un- known and rarely hospitable world. As a matter of fact, the condition of the foreigner described by Sennett fits this sociological framework, featuring violence risks: “Since the foreigner cannot become a universal citizen, cannot throw off the mantle of nationalism, then the only way he or she can cope with the heavy baggage of culture is to subject it to certain kinds of displacement, which lighten its burdensome weight.” (Sennett, 2012, p. 92). The sense of displacement afflicting the post-modern society described by Boudon (1984) is strengthened by the need to escape from violence and abuse, as asylum-seekers escaping from war areas show. Nonetheless, Bau- man (1997) invites us not to underestimate certain forms of violence perpe- trated in so called safe environments, especially educational and religious contexts. The project of a universal cohesion founded on culture and education is becoming weaker and weaker, despite attempts to implement international- ization and mobility. The media relevance on “educational crimes” (such as sexual harassment, mass shootings and professional misconduct) has fortu- nately emphasized the lack of normality once characterizing such violence, often unnoticed or untold (Axelrod, 2002). This is why our communicative acceleration supplies a new social con- sciousness about the diffusion of such a collective emergency, as The Guard- ian inquiry shows. Sexual harassment and stalking are some of the risks hiding in every professional context, increasingly reported by the media and victims. The construction of a digital public opinion may effectively fuel the process of emotional and psychological analysis of such tendencies, ever more urgent when they involve educational actors. This is made possible by the fact that “the discursive vitality of the public sphere plays a role in this process” (Habermas, 2009, p. 135). The new interactional and informative potentials offered by the internet are an outstanding source of participation for students, who may bolster the reflexive process about improvement of the educational act (Biggs & Tang, 2011). The metaphor of the “embattled university” proposed by Graubard and Ballotti (1970) in the Seventies should be accepted in the light of the new digital evolutions of academic environments, subjected to new forms of risks, both individual and collective (Lombardinilo, 2018a). The way to tackle the worrying scenario drawn by The Guardian inquiry should give due regard to the recuperation of the old academic authority, to be achieved through the practice of assessment, rationalization, efficiency 381ITALIAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY OF EDUCATION, 11 (2), 2019 “Unsafe Education” Lombardinilo A. and legitimacy. This is what Stanley Hoffman pointed out in the volume edited by Graubard and Ballotti: “Efficiency and legitimacy today go together. Efficiency requires the capacity to take an over-all view of the university’s problems so as to redefine its purposes. Legitimacy requires a less authoritarian and oli- garchic structure, in which the constituents have a greater sense of re- sponsible involvement (by contrast with mere emotional commitment without corresponding responsibilities).” (Hoffman, 1970, p. 203). Responsibility is the main keyword of the reformist process still involving European universities, almost twenty years after the launch of the Bologna Process and the construction of a harmonized academic system. Unfortu- nately, the lack of offices for the prevention of harassment and discrimina- tion can induce people to perpetrate violence towards the weakest actors attending our schools and universities. Students are often left alone when something wrong or bad happens. This is why “broadening and democratization should not be separated” (Hoffman, 1970, p. 203), especially in times of globalized knowledge and per- manent connectivity. Democratization, efficiency, information and legitima- cy are to be adopted by universities worldwide, striving to contrast behav- ioral misconduct and tackle the negative effects of uncontrolled power. The most relevant risk is the underestimation of the effects of abuse. This is one of the most important targets of the risky university of our times, closely related to the recovery of a new form of responsibility, more effective and reliable, along with the dismantlement of the traditional values of authority (Brown, 2009; Bowden & Marton, 1998). Misconduct in the academic environment: research and narrative perspectives The increase of rapes and sexual harassment in universities imposes a specific reflection on the more general phenomenon of sexual abuse in the workplace. The journalistic evidence gained on the misconduct in the aca- demic environment sheds a light on the stronger awareness of victims, fam- ilies and audience about the risks of an “unsafe” education. The presence of offices for the prevention of harassment and discrimina- tion in UK and US Universities confirms the attention paid to a dangerous tendency inside the higher education institutions, often enhanced by the spiral of silence and shame. This is what some important researches aim to demonstrate, focusing on the causes and consequences of sexual harassment perpetrated both by students and staff inside academic contexts. Some general researches highlight a number of violent events on cam- puses and define the strategies for action, as for example Hoffman, Schuh 382ITALIAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY OF EDUCATION, 11 (2), 2019 “Unsafe Education” Lombardinilo A. and Fenske (1998) did. Campus violence is paradigmatically the title of the work edited by Whitaker and Polland (1993), pointing out typologies, caus- es and measures able to tackle these issues. The list of general research on violence both in schools and universities could be longer. Mention should be made of the recent work by Clark and Kuhn (2017), Violence in schools, colleges and universities, further investigating the relationship between awk- wardness and behavior among the youngest. The book published by Bennett-Johnson (2004) deals with the American situation and analyzes the influence of mainstream violence on daily life in schools and colleges. Bullying is no exception, as Cowie and Myers (2016) demonstrate, also considering the cross-national aspects of the issue. In the meantime, scientific research tries to focus on the situation featuring sin- gle countries afflicted by a particular social emergency. Quinian, Fogel and Taylor (2017) deal with Sexual Violence at Canadian Universities: Activism, Institutional Responses, and Strategies for Change. They focus on the increase of sexual harassment episodes in a country considered safe. Furthermore, Khaminwa and Nyambura (2006) analyzed the emerging violence in Kenya’s public universities, claiming the right to build a culture of peace and dialogue. Meanwhile, Dzurgba (2004) dealt with the Violence and bloodshed in Nigerian universities, marking the need to achieve peace and academic excellence as well. These works enable fuller awareness of the local characteristics of violent events inside schools and universities, espe- cially in risky countries and safe environments. They confirm the deep social and educational shifts going on in the risky society drawn by Beck (1992), even though scholars aim to define some possible actions to prevent sexual harassment in educational systems as well. This is what Carrigan Wooten and Mitchell (2017) do in their Prevent- ing Sexual Violence on Campus: Challenging Traditional Approaches through Program Innovation. This book flanks the works by Murphy and van Brunt (2016), proposing a guide for Practitioners and Faculty to tackle sexual vio- lence in higher education. Alastair J. D. Hibberd (2017) is more focused on How University Policymakers Problematize Sexual Violence on Their Campus, thus developing ‘a Policy Discourse Analysis’ on the issues. Vohlídalová’s (2012) book highlights the phenomenon of Sexual Harassment in universi- ties from women’s point of view, reporting the barriers in Women’s Educa- tional Paths and showing students’ coping strategies. All these recent works can be allegedly connected to other older re- searches, pointing out the social and educational emergency engendered by violence at universities and schools. Such is the case of Long Tillar’s (1980) Sexual harassment in Employment: Legal perspectives for University Adminis- trators, along with Wright Dziech & Weiner’s The Lecherous Professor: Sexual 383ITALIAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY OF EDUCATION, 11 (2), 2019 “Unsafe Education” Lombardinilo A. harassment on Campus (1990), revolving around the misconduct and abuse of power by academics. M. Diane Jordan’s (1999) research dedicated to Sexual Harassment: A Sourcebook of Policies in Colleges and Universities, proposed in some reformist paths to tackle the academic abuse and develop a new culture of respect and loyalty. The violence inside academic contexts may become a narrative issue, as Nobel prize-winner John Maxwell Coetzee’s Disgrace shows. The story of the relationship between an English literature professor, David Lurie, and his student Melania Isaacs, focuses on the interlacing of violence, loneliness and disease, as the novelist emphasizes in reference to the inappropriate ex- ploitation of the professional status to seduce young subjects. The relationship between the professor and his student, reported by the family and punished by the academic institutions, leads to the justified dis- missal of the professor, who gives up any attempt to defend himself from the charge of sexual harassment and professional misconduct. This novel, commented on by Carine M. Mardorossian in an essay entitled Rape and the Violence of Representation in J. M. Coetzee’s Disgrace, provides a harsh and ruthless image of south-African academic reality, described realistically as follows: “Coetzee’s book exposes not just the contingency of justice but also the deeply racialized nature of this contingency, whether the response to rape occurs in black South Africa or in the white liberal context of the university” (Mardorossian, 2011, p. 72). To the fore is the dialectics between ambiguity and spontaneity, with a focus on the risks inherent in the construction of sentimental interactions between teachers and students. What happens to the main character of Co- etzee’s Disgrace deals with the moral and ethical deconstruction of the edu- cational environment, reported by the novelist as an unfathomable tendency of our post-modern society, especially in a country marked by a high degree of violence. 52 years old and divorced, Coetzee’s character “has, to his mind, solved the problem of sex rather well” (Coetzee, 2000, p. 1), frequenting a prostitute who suddenly decides to interrupt the relationship. Professor Lurie regular- ly gives lectures at university, but without any particular enthusiasm. His lessons are neither exciting nor fashionable, inasmuch as he is more concen- trated on his research about Byron than on didactic engagement. Coetzee precisely describes his apathy: “Because he has no respect for the material he teaches, he makes no impression on his students. They look through him when he speaks, forget his name. Their indifference galls him more than he will admit. Nevertheless he fulfils to the letter his obligations toward them, their parents, and the state.” (Coetzee, 2000, p. 4). 384ITALIAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY OF EDUCATION, 11 (2), 2019 “Unsafe Education” Lombardinilo A. Despite his apparent proficiency, his world is confined within the uni- versity library, affording an escape from the failures of his private life4. But one day something unpredictable happens. Professor Lurie is unaware of the catastrophic consequences of the casual meeting with a student on the way home: “He is returning home one Friday evening, taking the long route through the old college gardens, when he notices one of his students on the path ahead of him. Her name is Melania Isaacs, from his Ro- mantics course. Not the best student but not the worst either: clever enough, but unengaged.” (Coetzee, 2000, p. 11). Briefly, he falls in love with her, underestimating the dramatic develop- ments of the facts. The family’s reports and the academic inquiry lead to his dismissal from the university management. These facts undermine the fam- ily’s perception of university as a secure place, thus nourishing the idea of an “unsafe” education, the concept of a “university in ruins” (Readings, 1996) embodied by inappropriate behavior and sexual misconduct. Coetzee’s narrative representation of such an issue helps us in further investigating the media and social impact of crimes connected to abuse of power inside the educational sphere, framed into the sociological pattern proposed also by Paul Virilio (2009) in his University of disaster. To the fore is the lack of prudence and attention in the practice of misconduct by academic actors involved in sexual affairs. Professor’s Lurie’s words in the presence of the academic investigator are highly damaging: “There are more important things in life than being prudent” (Virilio, 2009, p. 49). This is his answer to his colleagues on the internal committee, appointed to inquire about the facts. The decision not to respond to the charges and the acceptance of the version of facts proposed by those accusing him seem to enhance the perception of the academic environment as a narcissistic ac- tor, so persuaded of the role and authoritativeness of their intellectual in- volvement. Lurie embodies the essence of post-modern egotism, leading to the underestimation of the boundary between seduction and prevarication. Whereas his colleagues try to persuade him to backtrack and admit his mor- al errors, he does not seem at all interested in convincing the prosecution of his repentance5. 4 “He spends more time in the university library, reading all he can find on the wider Byron circle, adding to notes that already fill two fat files. He enjoys the late-afternoon quiet of the reading room, enjoys the walk home afterwards: the brisk winter air, the damp, gleaming streets” (Coetzee, 2000, p. 11) 5 Thus, when Dr Rassool is requested of his opinion, he points out: “Yes. I want to register an objection to these responses of Professor Lurie’s, which I regard as fundamentally eva- sive. Professor Lurie says he accepts the charges. Yet when we try to pin him down on what it is that he actually accepts, all we get is subtle mockery. To me that suggests that he accepts the charges only in name. In a case with overtones like this one, the wider community is 385ITALIAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY OF EDUCATION, 11 (2), 2019 “Unsafe Education” Lombardinilo A. Coetzee’s novel shows the social and representative force of the literary medium, especially when novels cope with the social phenomenology of re- ality. Misconduct and sexual abuse in universities worldwide are no excep- tion, in compliance with the sociological and educational factors related to the infraction of the academic reputation. Literary narration may represent a sociological medium, especially when a great novelist such as J. M. Coetzee decides to probe the contrast between instinct and reason inside and outside the academic environment6. The Guardian and the figures of a concealed scandal: journalistic evidences The Guardian extensively emphasized the figures of the UUK report, thus highlighting the dimension of a real educational emergency. The relation- ship between “Rape and sexual assault” is accepted as an alarming reality found in universities, where students may become victims of the academic staff’s misconduct. This is what Sally Weale and David Batty point out in The Guardian on October 21, 2016. In their article, entitled “University abuse report fails to tackle staff attacks on UK students”, they deal with the serious situation out- lined by the UUK recommendations, which had the merit of denouncing not so rare inappropriate behavior on academic campuses, often tolerated by both students and academic governance. It is in particular the failure to tackle sexual harassment that is emphasized in the report, properly focused on the persistent silence imposed on this issue. The inquiry was begun in 2015 due to the growing alarm about harass- ment and sexual violence in universities. It concerns the way some of them intended to contrast the problem. The main purpose is to create a “zero-tol- erance culture”, recommending the creation of a centralized reporting sys- tem and an annual conference to share experiences and good practices. This endeavor requires well-trained staff, capable of realizing the real needs of students and dealing with the conspiracy of silence. Communication, information and sharing are three strategic keywords, and a reporting system actively tackling misconduct and violence towards young women. Furthermore, the taskforce has published guidance to univer- sities about managing situations in which a student’s behavior may consti- entitled –” (Coetzee, 2000, p. 50). 6 As Carin Mardorossian argues, “the disciplinary hearing to which Lurie is subjected as well as its parodying of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s proceedings also seem to legitimize Lurie’s perspective so much so that his appeal to an instinctual paradigm of Byronic desire ultimately feels less extreme than the university’s appropriation of human rights discourse in response to his crime” (Mardorossian, 79). 386ITALIAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY OF EDUCATION, 11 (2), 2019 “Unsafe Education” Lombardinilo A. tute a criminal offence. This guidance is about to replace the so-called Zellick guidelines dating back to 1994. In particular, The Guardian’s report dwells on the reactions of the cam- paigners, providing journalists with significant evidence of the violence suf- fered by academic staff. The UUK report may be interpreted as a valuable sample of anti-academic cooperation, targeted to contrast a seriously under- estimated phenomenon. “Campaigners said the report, by the higher education representative body Universities UK (UUK), failed to tackle staff-student harassment adequately, focusing almost exclusively on incidents between students but also described it as a positive first step.” (Weale & Batty, 2016). The alarming figures of the report require a prompt tackling strategy, in- asmuch as sexual harassment and rapes risk being an endemic disease, with such dangerous consequences for the reliability and attractiveness of univer- sities. Communication and reports may enforce awareness of the relevance of the problem, as the Guardian inquiry shows. “Changing the Culture” is the last of a series of exclusive reports (in The Guardian) certifying the scale of sexual harassment and violence perpetrated by students and university staff on students and more junior colleagues. The social function of this com- municative strategy is empowered by the gravity of the problem, imposing an attentive reflection on the risks lurking on university campuses. The Guardian received approximately 200 statements, mainly from wom- en, “detailing incidents of sexual harassment, assault and rape, carried out by staff often on postgraduate and PhD students at a wide range of UK univer- sities, including those in the elite Russell Group” (Weale & Batty, 2016). The report confirms that students’ and academic misconduct concern both public and private universities, with no differentiation of social origin, financial condition or religious faith. Allegedly, the relationship between violence and educational contexts has nothing to do with belonging to a specific academic community, since risks are found in every relational environment ruled by hierarchy and submission. Furthermore, the report highlights the scale of online harassment and hate crimes, especially involving the social networks. To the fore is the lack of effective counteraction and academic shortcomings in understanding the gravity of such shocking evidence7. The report paints a picture of the academic environment as a social space not free of the uncertainties and risks permeating other professional con- 7 The report revealed a worrying lack of data within universities on how many UK students are affected by incidents of sexual violence. The taskforce, made up of university leaders, students and academic experts, also highlighted shortcomings in prevention and response in some institutions (Weale & Batty, 2016). 387ITALIAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY OF EDUCATION, 11 (2), 2019 “Unsafe Education” Lombardinilo A. texts, in which misconduct and abuse are even more frequent. The educa- tional institutions should be safe from any behavioral abuse, especially when they lead to interpersonal embarrassment. This aspect is underlined by for- mer Universities minister Jo Johnson: “We must now ensure that the work this taskforce has done goes on to make a real difference to students across the country. So I have asked UUK to survey progress in six months and make sure universities are doing all they can to protect the safety and security of their students.” (Weale & Batty, 2016). Hareem Ghani, the National Union of Students (NUS) women’s officer, emphasized the social impact of the issue, also connected to the advent of the “post-Brexit society”: “We know sexual harassment and violence is prev- alent on our campuses and women are disproportionately affected by this. In our post-Brexit society we have become only too aware of the steep rise in hate crime” (Weale & Batty, 2016). The worrying scenario depicted by the UUK taskforce and their recommendations for improvement were confirmed by The Guardian investigation, summarized in the article by David Batty and Elena Cherubini, entitled “UK universities accused of failing to tackle sexual misconduct” (March 28, 2018). Along with the shocking figures of the investigation, the report deals with the shortcomings of universities in tackling sexual abuse and violence, as the same sub-headline points out: “Guardian investigation finds many have not enacted reforms to support and protect victims”. The communica- tive emphasis on the academic defaults interlaces with the social relevance of such a worrying scenario, afflicting UK university campuses to such a large extent. This is what The Guardian report highlights, supplying students with a small sample survey they could fill up online anonymously. What is more shocking is that Freedom of information (FoI) found there were at least 1,953 reports of sexual misconduct perpetrated by students and staff at UK universities in the past seven years. These figures come from the analysis of the requests sent to 132 universities. “There were another 213 incidents over this period where the alleged perpetrator’s identity was not recorded, which universities noted might include further allegations against students and staff” (Batty & Cherubini, 2018). Hence follows the construction of a culture of suspicion, involving both academic staff and students. This is why The Guardian investigation may help us wipe out all the possible misunderstandings and underestimations of the phenomenon, especially because it deals with the capability of univer- sities to contrast drawbacks and criticalities, regardless of any minimizing attempt. Nevertheless, the features display a limited progress in tackling the spread of academic misconduct: 388ITALIAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY OF EDUCATION, 11 (2), 2019 “Unsafe Education” Lombardinilo A. “The report also found that a fifth of institutions included in the sur- vey had made very limited progress, and overall there was far less ev- idence of new measures to address staff-to-student misconduct. It also called for a greater focus on hate crime and hate-based harassment.” (Batty & Cherubini, 2018). Despite the high number of cases of abuse perpetrated on women by the academic staff, universities have culpably underestimated the repetition of such cases, only occasionally leading to suspension or expulsion. This is what Sarah Green, co-director of the “End Violence Against Women coali- tion”, presumes: “It’s disappointing that the reporting is so inconsistent. The UUK taskforce made some strong recommendations but we are worried that momentum is being lost” (Batty & Cherubini, 2018). The gender relevance of the phenomenon is emphasized by The Guardian investigation, according to the tendency to exploit the academic role to per- petrate violence on weak subjects who may often prefer not to report abuse rather than undergo a judicial experience. Nevertheless, universities are try- ing to tackle the spread of harassment, as the Freedom for information (FOI) survey highlights. There were at least 732 investigations into sexual misconduct by students and staff. At least 54 staff were suspended, usually on a temporary basis during an investigation. Only 20 staff were banned from teaching. This was also usually a temporary measure. Less than half (62) of the universities surveyed offered training on sexual consent to students, and this was only compulsory at six institutions. The university that recorded the most incidents was Cambridge. Between 2011-12 and 2017-18 there were at least 215 reports of student and staff mis- conduct. This high number compelled university to introduce a new system allowing students and staff to disclose incidents anonymously, “leading to 128 reports in none months”. In contrast, only three complaints were re- corded between 2011-12 and 2015-16. The second highest number of cases over seven years was recorded at Durham University (88), where a full-time officer is dedicated to this problem. The vast majority of allegations – at least 1,133 – were made against students, compared with 264 against staff. Of course, government stigmatizes such a worrying tendency. The uni- versities minister, Sam Gyimah, said: “We encourage institutions to take a proactive response to tackle sexual harassment, including ensuring that stu- dents feel confident and able to report any issues” (Batty & Cherubini, 2018). In spite of the attempts to contrast such problems, The Guardian highlights that UK universities have been accused of a complacent and inadequate re- sponse to sexual harassment and gender violence after a Guardian investi- gation found inconsistencies in the support and services offered to victims across the country. This is what is reported in another article entitled “UK 389ITALIAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY OF EDUCATION, 11 (2), 2019 “Unsafe Education” Lombardinilo A. universities accused of complacency over sexual misconduct”: “Almost two- thirds of universities said they did not have harassment advisers or sexual violence liaison officers who had in-depth training on responding to sexual misconduct” (Batty, Bengtsson, & Weale, 2018). Briefly, the features of The Guardian investigation show the scale of a phenomenon that the same academic institutions might have minimized in some cases, also because of the tendency of the victims not to report the abuse perpetrated inside the academic environment. Nonetheless, some sig- nificant research confirms the gravity of such an issue, mining the credibility of higher education systems. For example, in the volume entitled Gender based violence in university communities: Policy, Prevention and educational initiatives, the editors Sundari Anitha and Ruth Lewis (2018) point out that until recently, higher education in the UK has largely failed to recognise gender-based violence (GBV) on campuses. Thanks to the UK government task force set up in 2015, universities are becoming more aware of the issue, hence the first in-depth overview of re- search and practice in GBV in universities, provided by academics and prac- titioners. They set out the international context of ideologies, politics and institutional structures underlying responses to GBV elsewhere in Europe, in the US and in Australia, and consider the implications of implementing related policy and practice. Presenting examples of innovative British approaches to engagement with the issue, the book also considers UK, EU and UN legislation to give an international perspective, making it of direct use to discussions of ‘what works’ in preventing GBV. However, universities are trying to tackle the diffusion of such a plague, both in the UK and America, where “State legis- latures have responded, for example, by increasing the drinking age and im- plementing state laws related to hate crimes, antihazing, and ‘duty to warn’” (Hartwell & Kushilab, 1998, p. 273). Universities have strengthened student codes of conduct, provided escort services, increased security, and developed educational programs regarding a variety of topics addressing violence on campus including “date rape”, sex- ual harassment, domestic violence, and “hate-speech” activities. This is what K. Hartwell Hunnicutt and P. Kushibab underline in The Legal Response to Violence on Campus, focused on the potential legal strategies to be developed to contrast academic misconduct and abuse. These attempts cope with the need to renovate the administrative or- ganization of university government (Frank & Gabler, 2006), with specific attention on the effective inclusion of students and young researchers in the decisional processes, as claimed by Habermas (1967) when the students’ movement was about to take form. The reform of the academic government should take into account the process of inclusion nurtured by the advent of 390ITALIAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY OF EDUCATION, 11 (2), 2019 “Unsafe Education” Lombardinilo A. the connected society, founded on synchronized relationships and interac- tions. Divisions and contrasts inside the academic space may hamper the sci- entific and social growth of a functional system inspired by the constant interaction between students and teachers, since the appearance of the first medieval universities (Kerr, 2001). This is why “Leaders seeking to manage growth added administrative divisions that reflected a growing need to coordinate staff and resources. New units such as strategic planning, enrollment management, and re- search and assessment came into being and added to the complexity of administration while expanding the layers of bureaucracy.” (Alfred & Rosevear, 2000, p. 1). All these factors go to outline the idea of a risk university, marked by uncertainties, dangers, worries, difficulties. This is why the metaphor of the “embattled university” proposed by Grabaurd and Ballotti can still be useful to interpret the dire straits concealed in academic life. This issue concerns the definition of “the styles of academic culture”, related by Jill Conway to the crisis of academic institutions, requiring a proactive approach in terms of reform planning: “The present crisis in universities should not be regarded as the result of a breakdown of authority which brings in its train the politicization of a community which was formerly a-political. It should be viewed instead as a crisis in which the university is no longer able to carry on the political task which it has hitherto managed with some success.” (Conway, 1970, p. 49). The figures of The Guardian investigation force us to reflect on the al- most permanent crisis condition of our post-modern universities, affecting the value and ethic sphere of the academic act, entangled in the recurrence of misconduct and inappropriate behavior. The journalistic narration of such drawbacks compels scholars and academic operators to pay more attention to this phenomenon, framed into the sociological and educational scenario of the risk university taking form in our complex times (Znaniecki, 1996). Conclusion The figures of The Guardian inquiry, together with the recent research results, demand careful reflection on the difficulties involved in tackling the phenomenon of sexual harassment in academic environments, specifically in England. The Guardian investigation helps us probe not only the communicative impact of such an issue, but also the heuristic dimension of this problem, 391ITALIAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY OF EDUCATION, 11 (2), 2019 “Unsafe Education” Lombardinilo A. dealing with the risks within educational contexts. The sociological frame- work provided by Ulrich Beck and Zygmunt Bauman may legitimate the interpretation of academic institutions as risky places, strengthened by the dangers residing in countries and cities considered to be insecure. Furthermore, the metaphor of the embattled university drawn by Gra- baurd and Ballotti and the idea of the university of disaster developed by Virilio direct attention to the concealed risks, both physical and psychologi- cal, permeating academic institutions. The media narration of violent events inside universities confirms the close relationship between journalistic rel- evance and unexpected infractions, with particular regard to the criminal events taking place in locations usually considered safe. Sexual harassment and misconduct require prompt tackling strategy by universities, compelled to counteract the abuse of power perpetrated by stu- dents and academic staff, as Coetzee relates in his novel Disgrace. Profes- sor Lurie’s story is both a paradigmatic case and a worrying representation, inspired by the underestimation of ambiguity and superficiality. Coetzee’s novel deals with the social, professional and media implications of Lurie’s sentimental involvement with his student, thus engendering the negative opinion of citizens, colleagues and relatives. His resignation from university is the failure of his educational endeavor, specifically due to the report of his misconduct. The rhetoric on sexual harassment mingles with the harshness and ruth- lessness of violence perpetrated on the weakest subjects, at times subjugated by the fascination of role and authoritativeness.UK universities seem to be linked to the worldwide academies, probed by researchers and novelists in order to analyze the social and educational implications connected to “un- safe” education. A few rare cases cannot undermine the credibility and effec- tiveness of the academic engagement. As Veblen remarked in 1918, “the presence of scholars and scientists of accepted standing is indispensable to the university to the university, as a means of keeping up its prestige” (Veblen, 1968, p. 128). Nonetheless, we must not neglect the drawbacks stemming from the rapid metamorphosis that universities face in the era of globalization (Serpieri, 2018), marked by the media inquiry on the risks hidden (or imagined) in daily life (Barnett, 2013). References Alexander, J. C. (2012). Trauma. 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work_s5kldl62e5dblb2n4lb7bvzkdi	----	Criminalisation, Protection and Rights: Global Tensions in the Governance of Commercial Sex This is a repository copy of Criminalisation, Protection and Rights: Global Tensions in the Governance of Commercial Sex. White Rose Research Online URL for this paper: http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/87961/ Version: Accepted Version Article: Sanders, TLM and Campbell, R (2014) Criminalisation, Protection and Rights: Global Tensions in the Governance of Commercial Sex. Criminology and Criminal Justice, 14 (5). 535 - 548. ISSN 1748-8958 https://doi.org/10.1177/1748895814543536 eprints@whiterose.ac.uk https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/ Reuse Unless indicated otherwise, fulltext items are protected by copyright with all rights reserved. The copyright exception in section 29 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 allows the making of a single copy solely for the purpose of non-commercial research or private study within the limits of fair dealing. The publisher or other rights-holder may allow further reproduction and re-use of this version - refer to the White Rose Research Online record for this item. Where records identify the publisher as the copyright holder, users can verify any specific terms of use on the publisher’s website. Takedown If you consider content in White Rose Research Online to be in breach of UK law, please notify us by emailing eprints@whiterose.ac.uk including the URL of the record and the reason for the withdrawal request. mailto:eprints@whiterose.ac.uk https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/ 1 Special Issue 2014 The Governance of Commercial Sex: Global Trends of Criminalisation, Punitive Enforcement, Protection and Rights Editorial Introduction Criminalisation, Protection and Rights: Global Tensions in the Governance of Commercial Sex Dr Teela Sanders (University of Leeds) & Rosie Campbell (Durham University). Corresponding author: t.l.m.sanders@leeds.ac.uk rosiecamp1@aol.com Biographies Teela Sanders in a Reader in Sociology at the School of Sociology and Social Policy, University of Leeds. Her research focus is on the intersections between gender, regulation and the sex industry, recently completing an ESRC project on the stripping industry, the findings of which appear in Flexible Workers: Labour, Regulation and the Political Economy of the UK Stripping Industry (Routledge, 2014). Rosie Campbell is a sociologist who has carried out research on sex work and sexual exploitation in a number of regions of the UK for 17 years. In 2013 Rosie received an OBE for services to women, showing her extensive involvement in sex work politics in the UK and beyond. Final word count – 6,588 mailto:t.l.m.sanders@leeds.ac.uk 2 Criminalisation, Protection and Rights: Global Tensions in the Governance of Commercial Sex Dr Teela Sanders (University of Leeds) & Rosie Campbell (Durham University). Abstract In this special issue we examine the global trends in the governance of commercial sex over the past decade and set out where this collection contributes to critical understandings of the governance of commercial sex through an analysis of the global legal, policy and policing trends. This collection of papers addresses the continued moves towards state control of sexual behaviours and sexual activities that do not fit dominant scripts for what constitutes ‘appropriate’ citizenship. The focus on the lived experience of the law, criminal justice system and policing practices for sex workers is the overarching theme of this special issue, as we contemplate the realities of the governance of sex work. Keywords: Criminalisation, Decriminalistion, Human Rights, Sex Work, Violence 3 Introduction In this special issue we examine the global trends in the governance of commercial sex over the past decade and set out where this collection contributes to critical understandings of the governance of commercial sex through an analysis of the global legal, policy and policing trends. This collection of papers addresses the continued moves towards state control of sexual behaviours and sexual activities that do not fit dominant scripts for what constitutes ‘appropriate’ citizenship. It is important to acknowledge that although this issue deals mainly with the female sex industry, these global issues are not exclusive to this group as such trends shape the governance of male and transgender sex work (documented by Smith and Laing 2012), but with additional legal and policy implications. The governance of sex work through law and policy has historically been a contested area with stark contradictions between legality and reality. Current models of governance vary across the globe, mapped across the three well established categorisations of regulatory models; decriminalisation, legalisation and criminalisation (Harcourt et al 2005). In the last decade in many parts of the globe there has been a significant shift towards or a re-entrenchment of a criminalisation agenda as the preferred strategy to govern commercial sex. This has created further tensions between enforcement of punitive anti-prostitution laws and the rights of sex workers, including their right to protection and safety. The tensions in approaches to regulation reflect the theoretical tensions between those who maintain sex work is a form of violence against women that is inherently oppressive and damaging (Barry 1995; Farley 2004; Jeffreys 2009), with other sex radicals who draw on activist and personal experience of those who are empowered by choices made to use sexual labour as a form of work (Chapkis 1997).There are others who are attempting to move the ‘sex wars’ debate beyond the binary of opposing views by identifying sex work as a more complex, nuanced and diverse phenomenon (for a review see Sanders, O’Neill and Pitcher 2009: 5-12). These tensions between regulation and ideology are reflected in policy and practice with a range of consequences for the lived experiences of sex workers. The focus on the lived experience of the law, criminal justice system and policing practices for sex workers is the overarching 4 theme of this special issue, as we contemplate the realities of the governance of sex work. Criminalisation as a Dominant Global Trend Although there are separate histories of oppression, criminal sanctions, incarceration, police coercion and ostracisation for those involved in the commercial sex industries in countries known for extreme regimes such as China (Ren 1999) 1 where there is current evidence of thousands of women involved in sex work being sent to ‘re-education’ labour programmes (Tucker and Ren 2008), there are flavours of such extremism becoming evident in Western countries. The legislation to outlaw prostitution, to criminalise the sellers, buyers or organisers, and use punitive law enforcement to achieve this has become an equally dominant narrative and practice in the Western world over the past twenty years (Kantola and Squires 2004). Much of the criminalisation agenda over the past decade across Europe and beyond, has favoured what has come to be known as the ‘Swedish approach’ or the ‘Nordic model’, with a focus on criminalising demand. The ultimate aim of this model is claimed to be a reduction in the purchase of sex and the overall ‘demand’ for commercial sex, which will challenge the objectification of women and move towards greater gender equality. As the paper by Levy and Jakobssen in this issue describes, in 1999 the Swedish government introduced a law that made purchasing – or attempting to purchase - sexual services a criminal offence, punishable by a six month fine or imprisonment (Ekberg 2004). The Nordic countries of Norway, Iceland and Denmark soon after followed this model, providing a strong anti-prostitution policy which began to sweep parts of mainland Europe (Skilbrei and Holmstrom 2011). Whilst the public discourse around the Swedish model insists its aim is gender equality, others have underlined how the fear of migration to the Nordic countries originally fuelled the ban on commercial sex (Kulick 2003). The Swedish model, with its clear focus on ‘demand’ has been promoted globally across Europe and beyond, pushing principles of abolitionism, sex work as violence against women, with the primary utopian goal of eradicating sex work (Brooks- Gordon 2010; Sanders and Campbell 2008). States that in the past have had more complex relationships with the governance of prostitution have begun to support the Swedish model. For instance, in this issue Kotiswaran maps how the Indian state 5 has been keen to reinforce the criminalisation of commercialised prostitution since the 1950s, but refreshed European support for this approach has strengthened the calls to criminalize demand in recent years. Some countries have been influenced by the discourse of the Swedish model which has been a powerful influence in government debates, review of law and policy. Currently governed by law that makes the activities surrounding the sale, organisation and purchase of sex illegal (Kingston 2012; Sanders 2012; Hammond 2014), the UK model of governance has been criticised for being un-policeable, piecemeal, discriminatory and shaped by outdated conceptualisations of gender relations and male and female sexuality (Sanders 2009; Scoular and O’Neill 2007). Yet groundswell for the Swedish model continues. In December 2014 the lower house of the French parliament voted to pass a proposed law to make it a crime to pay for sexual services and is currently in the process of becoming statute. Most recently in the UK, the All Party Parliamentary Group reported in 2014 that the insufficient laws against ‘perpetrators’ promotes the country as a ‘lucrative destination for trafficking’ (2014:6). The APPG recommends legal changes in favour of criminalising the purchase of sex because of the ‘gendered imbalance of harm within prostitution, and as such is detrimental to wider strategies which pursue gender equality’ (2014:5). Whilst the recommendations from the APPG are to remove sex workers from the criminal justice system, the overall position is that government should only consider the sex industry as violence against women in law, policy and language. Whilst there are no legislative powers transferred to this group of politicians, the message across parties appears to be officially more in line with the Swedish model than ever before. The background to how the UK has moved from a relatively liberal stance on prostitution under Wolfenden in the 1950s, who drew a stark distinction between those in need of protection with private activities outside the remit of state control, are discussed in this special issue. Scoular and Carline provides the most up to date mapping of how the UK has adopted both the rhetoric of ‘criminalising demand’ whilst at the same time a ‘sanction with support’ model of ‘rehabilitating’ sex workers through Engage and Support Orders. What this paper contributes to the special issue is evidence of how the ‘victim and victimizer’ framework is operationalised on the ground, through the implementation of new legal tools since 2009, and how 6 police, practitioners and sex workers are experiencing the Engage and Support Orders. Overall then there has been somewhat of an ‘Europeanization’ of the criminalisation of prostitution, evident in European Parliamentary action in 2007, where in an effort to sign up to anti-trafficking protocol, 20 of the then 43 nation states declared their position as abolitionist (Sanders, O’Neill and Pitcher 2009:122). Yet despite the majority of nation states claiming it is their intention to eradicate prostitution, the Council of Europe made a clear statement that governments should refrain from criminalising sex workers but that dignity and respect of choice, where there is no coercion or force, should be maintained (ibid:124). Yet efforts to abolish prostitution continue at a political level, evident through the actions of the European Women’s Lobby, who in 2012 launched a campaign ‘Together for a Europe Free from Prostitution’.2 Such attempts to get European wide support to oppose commercial sex was again achieved in 2014 when the UK Labour MEP Mary Honeyball, who publicly declared that the majority of women in prostitution are trafficked in a BBC Newsnight interview, 3 proposed a report that the EU parliament accept the ‘Nordic model’ of criminalising the purchase of sex whilst decriminalising the sale of sex. 343 MEPs voted in favour of the statement (139 voted against and 105 abstained), making this the formal approach of the EU parliament. 4 The vote in favour happened despite the presentation of a strong evidence base of the dangers and consequences of criminalisation on sex workers, and the outright rejection of the report from organisations such as Amnesty, UNAIDS and Human Rights Watch. At the time of writing (June 2014) Amnesty International, whilst continuing to seek prosecutions on crimes such as human trafficking, adults involved in child prostitution and crimes against sex workers, have taken the step to consult on the proposal to adopt a policy of decriminalisation of sex work because: we have seen evidence to suggest that the criminalisation of sex work leads to social marginalisation and an increased risk of human rights abuses against sex workers. The evidence also suggests that decriminalisation could be the best means to protect the rights of sex workers and ensure that these individuals receive adequate medical care, legal assistance and police protection. 5 7 This stance from the leading human rights organisation follows after the support for the decriminalisation of sex work of international organisations such as the World Health Organization and the UN Women. 6 It is these organisations who work on the ground with practitioners and sex workers who see the realities of harsh penalisation and abuses of sex workers within a criminalised model that offer alternative solutions to general eradication policies. The Effects of Criminalisation on Lived Experience Whilst criminalisation as a model of governance takes hold in many jurisdictions, one of the core aims of this special issue is to draw on examples of international empirical research to examine how the everyday lives of sex workers including their human and employment rights, and those of others in the industry, have been affected by this punitive movement in the governance of commercial sex. A range of studies have highlighted the damaging impact of criminalisation on sex workers daily lives throughout the globe. Arnott and Crago (2009) highlighted how criminalisation in Botswana, Namibia and South Africa creates sex workers vulnerability to violence, extortion from law enforcement officers, human rights violations and ultimately fosters a lack of safe working conditions which heightens vulnerability to HIV. In a short animated film as part of a research project by Pamela Chen, “Rights not Rescue” documents the experiences of sex workers from these three countries. 7 New research from Levy and Jakobssen in this collection illustrates how in Sweden there has been a blatant rejection of harm reduction or support for sex workers other than through rehabilitation which is promoted as the most important and legitimate forms of social care support. The murder of Swedish sex worker and activist Petite Jasmine in 2013 has been held up by sex worker rights activists 8 as the direct outcome of policies which attempt to impose rehabilitation and deny any aspect of sex worker agency or voluntary engagement in sex work. 9 Forced rehabilitation has been adopted, sometimes as part of efforts to ‘help’ sex workers, which in fact are forms of incarceration. For example, Human Rights Watch has raised concerns about the removal of sex workers, placing them in detention centres in Cambodia (Human Rights Watch 2010) and China (Human Rights Watch 2013). Such policies have been met with protest from sex worker rights networks and organisations. 8 Sex Workers’ Rights Advocacy Network (SWAN)10 is a network of organisations advocating for sex worker rights in Central Eastern Europe, Commonwealth of Independent States and South East Europe. Their work has highlighted police repression and violence as a pressing human rights issue for sex workers in the region and an outcome of national policies that tolerate violence against sex workers. SWAN documented a wide range of abuses including; high levels of police assaults on sex workers and extortion (Macedonia, Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan, Serbia, Bulgaria, Russia, Latvia and Lithuania) and forced HIV testing (Latvia, Kyrgyzstan, Ukraine) in contravention of UN guidelines (see Crago 2009). This special issue charts other effects of criminalisation, treating commercial sex as a ‘social order’ problem, and those who work in it as problematic offenders or misguided victims (Scoular and O’Neill 2007). The legislative framework in England and Wales has been identified as compounding the vulnerability of violence towards sex workers (Kinnell 2008), risking individual and public health (Cusick and Berney 2005) and distancing individuals from support services, such as drug intervention (Pitcher et al 2006). Kinnell (2006) argues that the law in the UK and how it has been enforced is directly linked to and shapes violence experienced by sex workers. It is without doubt that governing prostitution through criminalisation, which increases stigma and the ‘discourse of disposability’ (Lowman 1992), has the effect of increasing violence and murder against sex workers. Elsewhere, Sanders and Campbell (2007) have argued that it is largely the ways in which sex work is managed that affects the levels of safety and protection sex workers are afforded and that alternative solutions that ‘design out violence’ are necessary. An important turn of events for demonstrating the dangers of a criminalised system are presented by the victorious legal challenges brought by sex workers in Canada to demonstrate the impact of criminalisation on sex workers’ lived experiences (Lowman 2011). Revealing the high levels of violence and murder against sex workers in Canada, groups of sex workers have succeeded in challenging the criminalisation laws in the Supreme Court, the main argument being that the laws prevent the women being safe (MacCharles 2013). It is because of the consequences of criminalisation and not recognising or making provisions in law for 9 voluntary adult sex work, that alternative models of governing are important to consider as viable governance options. Alternatives to Criminalisation Moving beyond the criminalisation agenda, we seek to critically explore the ways in which various models of regulation are currently operating including alternatives to criminalisation such as legalisation and decriminalisation and the impact and outcomes of these models. We hear little in the media, policy arenas and academic research on the variations of commercial sex governance across Europe. Across the Eurozone, governance differs greatly as some governments give the Swedish model little consideration but rather have continued with polices of legal regulation for instance in Austria, Switzerland, the Netherlands and Germany. Whilst stricter rules around the process of legally working in prostitution have been recently introduced in the Netherlands (Outshoorn 2012), the model of a regulated sex work market is still evident, with clear policy distinctions between voluntary sex work and forced activities. In Switzerland the law allows for local regulation to determine areas and hours of work and gained attention in 2013 for the introduction of ‘drive in sex boxes’ in a zoned area of Zurich. 11 In Germany, TAMPEP (2010) describe sex work as recognized as an activity but not as a profession. The Prostitution Act introduced in 2002 addresses ‘civil, labour and social aspects of the relationships between sex workers and their clients and/or employers’ (TAMPEP 2010:18), allowing self employment and employment contracts, enabling sex workers to access unemployment benefits, pension and health insurance and sex workers income is taxable. Contracts between sex workers and brothel owners are legal and sex workers have a right to wages, owners cannot specify sexual practices and prices only place of work and hours. Examples here demonstrate the resistance to the criminalisation agenda, favouring an entirely different approach based on an employment framework (see Abel this issue). In places such as Nevada, USA and New Zealand where non-criminalised models of governance exist, it is arguable that there is less precariousness in the experiences of sex workers. Brents, Jackson and Hausbeck (2010) provide lengthy evidence and discussion of how the legalised brothels of Nevada (an anomaly in the otherwise 10 blanket criminalisation across the USA – see Weitzer 2010) provide employment/rights based approaches to selling sex in environments that are safe, secure, and respectful of the workers. In this collection we provide the latest reflections on alternative models which have at the heart an emancipatory approach that prioritises the views and needs of sex workers in their models of governance. Revealing how the UK context of criminalisation and the legalised system in the Netherlands can produce the same effects of alienating sex workers, in this issue Pitcher and Wiljers argue that ‘decriminalisation of sex work is a precondition to secure sex workers’ labour and human rights’. Presenting new findings on the effects of these opposing models of governance, the authors highlight how including sex workers in policy and enabling them to have control over their working conditions should be the basis of any ‘rights based’ model of governance. When evaluating models of governance, those that do acknowledge voluntary adult consensual commercial sex, and therefore do not treat prostitution as a crime, are in a minority. In New Zealand, certainly for indoor workers, a decriminalised environment has enabled workers to operate as entrepreneurs with support from civil laws and employment frameworks (Abel et al., 2009). Here, since the introduction of the Prostitution Reform Act, 2003, there has been full recognition of prostitution as a legitimate profession and subjected to all general employment regulations (Armstrong 2011). Ten years on, in this issue Gillian Abel assesses the merits of the decriminalisation system in New Zealand, looking at the effects on prostitution. Yet in this paper, it is acknowledged that the model is very specific to the culture, environment and politics of the nation state, and that there have been limited ripple effects to other countries. The Struggle for Sex Worker Rights and Recognition The legal and socio-cultural framework within which sex workers live and work, often embodying criminalisation, stigmatisation and human rights violations, provides a challenging context for resistance and self organisation. Yet globally a struggle for rights and recognition has emerged, particularly evident in the work of sex worker rights based organisations and campaigning groups. In 2005, The International Committee for the Rights of Sex Workers in Europe organised prior to running a conference at which a Declaration of the Rights of Sex Workers 12 in Europe and a 11 Manifesto for Sex Worker Rights was ratified by representatives from sex worker organisations from over 30 countries. These overarching activities that set out the rights of sex workers have been the bedrock of other international campaigns. Many groups have organised around issues of health, safety and rights. Crago (2008) brings together the voices and experiences of sex worker activists from Brazil to Slovakia to Bangladesh, highlighting how sex workers and their allies have formed networks and alliances, influenced policies, established local health initiatives and advocated for ‘the health and social justice issues of their local communities’ (Crago 2008:4). The Durbar Mahila Samanwaya Committee (DMSC), West Bengal, India who coined the statement ‘only rights can stop the wrongs’ created one of the largest sex worker unions globally, consisting of 65,000 male, female and transgender sex workers. Amongst its other achievements are taking part in a sex worker rally to the national parliament, running health clinics for sex workers, literacy programs and a microcredit program (Crago 2008). Hardy (2010) described three waves of sex worker unionising over the past century, 13 referring to the third wave of organising taking place in the global south. One example is the AMMAR union in Argentina, where sex workers initially came together to draw attention to issues of injustice and exploitation to the attention of the more established and general worker unions. Originally campaigning against restraint techniques used against sex workers in prison, since 1994 they have campaigned for access to healthcare, welfare benefits and that abuse and violence to sex workers be taken seriously. In 2007 AMMAR was recognised legally as an official union and they continue to campaign to get sex work recognised as work in law, with some 38,000 members. 14 Sex worker groups have used international human rights instruments to raise and challenge sex worker rights violations. In 2013 SZEXE The Association of Hungarian Sex Workers presented a report to the ‘United Nations Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women’ (CEDAW) to highlight systematic and institutionalised discrimination and violence against female sex workers in Hungary. They reported that despite the legalisation of sex work in Hungary since 1999, Hungarian authorities had not instigated legal 12 working areas for sex workers, who were still fined, arrested and detained, with new laws converting fines to higher penalties. The Global Network of Sex Work Projects unites many regional and national sex worker rights networks providing a sex worker led global network of sex worker organisations committed to; sex worker self determination, opposing all forms of criminalisation and recognising sex work as work. It carries out and supports campaigns for sex worker rights globally and produces a wide range of information resources and briefing papers for example ‘The Smart Persons Guide to HIV and Sex Work’ 15 and ‘Sex Work is Not Trafficking’.16 It organises around key international events such as the International Aids Conference to enable sex worker representation and participation. The Global Network of Sex Work Projects has influenced international policies and guidance since 2009, co-chaired with UNAIDS the UNAIDS Advisory Group on HIV and Sex Work, advising the UN from a best evidence and human rights perspective. Equally it has been an important opposing voice against the Presidents Emergency Plan for Aids Relief’s (PEPFAR) “anti prostitution pledge” which requires organisations taking funding from the AIDS program to sign up to a pledge that they oppose prostitution. What is noticeable over the last two decades is that in some jurisdictions the sex work rights movements and specific campaigns have been listened to and integrated into legal changes and practice initiatives. Here the voices of sex workers, their rights, and health and safety considerations have been key in shaping policy and legal development. For example in Gillian’s Abel’s paper the advocacy of the New Zealand Collective of Prostitutes clearly influenced central government policy development leading to decriminalisation in 2003. In the case of the path to decriminalisation in New Zealand, The Department of Labour’s Occupational Safety and Health division developed guidelines for owners and sex workers with input from sex worker rights groups in Australia (Scarlett Alliance) and the New Zealand Collective of Prostitutes. Also in this collection, Pitcher and Wjiers comment on the Dutch model of governance, which provides another example of a model which includes sex worker rights groups as stakeholders and recognises sex work as work, using licensing frameworks of governance. 13 In some countries whist a framework of criminalisation remains there have been some policy initiatives at a local level that indicate a shift towards more protection rather than enforcement based approaches. For instance, the policy in Merseyside, North West England, where since 2006 crimes against sex workers have been treated as hate crime. Campbell (2014) has documented the several key strands constituting the ’hate crime approach’ including a policing response with limited enforcement of the prostitution laws, proactive efforts by police at senior and operational levels to acknowledge sex workers as citizens and members of the community, to build trust and encourage reporting of crimes. In addition there has been specialist support for sex worker victims of crime and the hate crime policy itself including sex workers as a hate crime group alongside lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender people and BME communities. She argues that sex workers experiences fit various definitions of hate crime victimisation: including established ones that stress ‘othering’, social hierarchies, and define hate crimes as expressions of power and prejudice (Perry 2001, Sheffield 1995, Hall 2005) , ‘against those without rights, privilege and prestige’ (Chakraborti and Garland 2009) and emphasise groups who experience historical social marginalisation and acts of violence and intimidation which ‘put them in their place’. This she argues connects directly with an substantive literature on the enduring stigmatisation, ‘othering’ and social marginalisation of sex workers. This has long been identified as creating hostility and prejudice towards sex workers, leading to a denial of rights, lack of protection and victimisation (O’Neill 1997, 2007). Campbell argues the hate crime approach has had seen real advantages for a group who have been relatively unprotected by law and policy from victimisation, including the concrete outcomes whereby an unprecedented number of offenders who have committed crimes against sex workers were brought to justice, supports changes in operational policing practices and attitudes and also recognises issues of prejudice, ‘othering’, ‘and targeting which shape sex workers experiences of victimisation. Approaching crimes against sex workers as hate crime locates sex worker safety in the public protection arena and recognises the rights of sex workers to safety and access to justice, complimenting a wider rights based approach to inclusion, citizenship & social justice for sex workers (O’Neill 2007), as such it has resonated with some sex worker rights groups globally. Campbell concludes: ‘As a model for national policies 14 placing strategies to address crimes against sex workers under the hate crime banner offers a rights based none stigmatising policy home (Campbell, 2014: 65). The Global Issue of Migration, Sex Work and Trafficking It is impossible to discuss global trends in sex work policy without discussing the impact of debates, policy and laws relating to trafficking for sexual exploitation, or as several theorists have stressed the problematic conflation of sex work and trafficking (Busza 2004; Day 2010). Claims that the sex industries of many countries are populated by a majority of trafficked victims have dominated many national debates about sex work and spawned legislation and policies which have further criminalised elements of the sex industry. The moral panic over sex trafficking is highlighted by re-current claims by some trafficking lobby groups that legalised systems cause trafficking (see O’Brien 2011) or that large scale sporting events such as the Olympics cause an increase in trafficking (Ward 2011, Global Alliance Against Trafficking in Women, 2012). Yet despite the enormous definitional and methodological problems in capturing those who are ‘trafficked’, as well as the highly politicisation of such data as detailed in the case of the USA and Australia by O’Brien (2011), ideological positions that conflate prostitution with trafficking continue to inform many debates, laws and operational policing (see discussion above regarding Sweden). One effect of the focus on trafficking rather than a more nuanced approach to commercial sex that recognises voluntary sex work found in countries such as the Netherlands, has meant governments have paid much less attention to the complexities of trends in migration and mobility. Hence the lived experiences of migrant sex workers across sex industries throughout the globe are rarely considered separately from those legitimate cases of coercion and forced labour (Agustin 2007). The work of Chin (2013) provides a rare glimpse into the lives of non-trafficked migrant sex workers who use mobility to global cities such as Kuala Lumpur as an opportunity to only not survive but to succeed in high level consumption and lifestyle through engaging in sex work. Mai (2013) proposes a more complex and fluid understanding of the relationship between migration and the sex industry which recognises conditions of increased exploitability and 15 fragmentation for all in the globalised world. The practice of sex work must be considered within the broader economic nexus between work, mobility and displacement on the global stage in order to devise relevant and useful policy which addresses exploitation where it is exists but equally recognises agency. Conclusion This editorial has attempted to introduce the broader global themes which permeate the academic debates and research agendas, bourne out of the governance activities which attempt to control, constrain and contain commercial sex and those who engage in it. Whilst much of the global governance of commercial sex evolves around the utopian aim of eradicating the sex industry through methods of criminalisation, incarceration and rehabilitation, the evidence of a rights based movement of sex workers, working nationally and through a more powerful international agenda, demonstrates the mix of voices in the sex work debates. So whilst the outlook for sex workers appears generally to be one where their rights are replaced with ideological concerns around the morality of commercial sex, or generalisations about the ‘harms’ of the institution of prostitution, on the ground the reality is less clear-cut. Sex workers have struggled to organise, unite and mobilise resources, yet this editorial has documented, as does this special issue in parts, that sex workers are organising across the globe and to some successful ends. As the paper by Kotiswaran argues, the three-fold typology of criminalisation, legalisation and decriminalisation may need to be reconsidered based on the intentions of the stated goals in each country and the actual local politics that frame the governance of sex work. We would argue that the proliferation of localised models of governance within countries may not reflect the overarching laws to govern prostitution through criminalisation, and that with continued partnerships between sex workers, allies and practitioners (including researchers), policy and policing can work in the interest and safety of sex workers rather than against them. References 16 Abel, G., Fitzgerald, L., Brunton, C. (2009) The impact of decriminalization on the number of sex workers in New Zealand, Journal of Social Policy, 38: 3 Agustin, L M (2007) Sex at the Margins: Migration, Labour Markets and the Rescue Industry. London: Zed Books. All Party Parliamentary Group on Prostitution and Global Sex Trade (2014) Shifting the Burden: Inquiry to assess the operation of the current legal settlement on prostitution in England and Wales HMSO, London Armstrong, L (2011) 'Managing Risks of Violence in Decriminalised Street-Based Sex Work: A Feminist (Sex Worker Rights) Perspective. PhD Thesis, University of Wellington, NZ Arnott, J and Crago, A.L. (2009) Rights not Rescue: A Report on Female, Male, and Trans Sex Workers’ Human Rights in Botswana, Namibia, and South Africa, Open Society Institute, Public Health Program, New York. Barry, K (1995) Prostitution and Sexuality, New York: New York University Press. Brents, B., Jackson, C and Hausbeck, K (2010) The State of Sex: Tourism, Sex, and Sin in the New American Heartland. Routledge New York Brooks-Gordon, B (2010) Bellwether Citizens: The Regulation of Male Clients of Sex Workers, Journal of Law and Society 37 (1): 145-170. Busza, J (2004) Sex Work and Migration: the dangers of oversimplification: a case study of Vietnamese women in Cambodia Health and Human Rights 7 (2): 231-249 Campbell, R. (2014) Not Getting Away With it: linking sex work and hate crime in Merseyside, Chakraborti, N. and Garland, J, (eds) Responding to Hate Crime: The Case to Connecting Policy & Research, Bristol: Policy Press. Chakraborti, N. and Garland, J, (eds) Responding to Hate Crime: The Case to Connecting Policy & Research, Bristol: Policy Press. Chapkis, W. (1997) Live Sex Acts: Women Performing Erotic Labour, New York: Routledge. 17 Crago, A.L (2009) Arrest the Violence: Human rights abuses against sex workers in central and eastern Europe and central asia, Sex Workers’ Rights Advocacy Network. Crago, A.L (2008) Our Lives Matter: Sex Workers Unite for Health and Rights, Sexual Health and Rights Project, Open Society Institute, New York. Cusick, L., and Berney, L. (2005). Prioritizing punitive responses over public health: commentary on the Home Office consultation document Paying the Price. Critical Social Policy, 25 (4) 596-606. Day, S (2010) The re-emergence of ‘trafficking’: sex work between slavery and freedom Journal of the Royal Anthropological Society 16: 816-34 Ekberg, G (2004): “The Swedish Law that Prohibits the Purchase of Sexual Services: Best Practices for Prevention of Prostitution and Trafficking in Human Beings” Violence Against Women 10(10): 1187-1218. Farley, M. (2004) '"Bad for the Body, Bad for the Heart": Prostitution Harms Women Even if Legalized of Decriminalized', Violence Against Women 10 (10): 1087-1125. Global Alliance Against the Traffic in Women (2011) What’s the cost of a rumour? A guide to sorting out the myths and the facts about sporting events and trafficking, GAATW, Bangkok. Thailand. Hall, N. (2005) Hate Crime, Cullompton: Willan Publishing. Harcourt, C., Egger, S. and Donovan, B. (2005) Sex Work and the Law, Sexual Health 2 (1): 121-128. Hardy, K (2010) ‘If you shut up they kill you’ Sex Worker Resistance in Argentina in (eds) Hardy, K., Kingston, K and Sanders, T New Sociologies of Sex Work Ashgate, Surrey. Hammond, N (2014) Paying for sex, policy and the state: Resisting the regulation of commercial sex Social Policy and Society forthcoming 18 Human Rights Watch (2013) Swept Away: Abuses Against Sex Workers in China, Human Rights Watch. Human Rights Watch (2010) Off the Streets: Arbitrary Detention and Other Abuses Against Sex Workers in Cambodia, Human Rights Watch. Jeffreys, S (2009) Prostitution, trafficking and feminism: an update on the debate Women’s Studies International Forum 32 (3): 316-320 Kantola, J. and Squires, J. (2004) 'Discourses Surrounding Prostitution Policies in the UK', European Journal of Women's Studies 11 (1): 77-101. Kingston, K (2010) Intent to Criminalize: Men who Buy Sex and Prostitution Policy in the UK in (eds) Hardy, K., Kingston, K and Sanders, T New Sociologies of Sex Work Ashgate, Surrey. Kinnell, H (2008) Violence and Sex Work in Britain, Cullompton: Willan. Kinnell, H (2006) Murder Made Easy: The final solution to prostitution? in Campbell, R & O’Neill, M (eds), Sex Work Now, Cullompton: Willan Kulick, D (2003) Sex in the New Europe. Criminalization of clients and the Swedish fear of penetration Anthropological Theory 3 (2): 199-218. Lowman, J (1992) Street Prostitution Control: Some Canadian Reflections on the Finsbury Park Experience, British Journal of Criminology 32 (1): 1–17. Lowman, J (2011) Deadly inertia: a history of constitutional challenges to Canada’s Criminal Code sections on prostitution. Beijing Law Review 2(2): 33-54. MacCharles, T (2013) Supreme Court prostitution case: judges challenge government to justify brothel ban. Available at: http://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2013/06/13/supreme_court_prostitution_case_j udges_challenge_government_to_justify_brothel_ban.html ( accessed 21st January 2014). Mai, N (2013) Embodied Cosmopolitanisms: The subjective mobility of migrants working in the global sex industry Gender, Place and Culture 20 (1): 107-124 O’Brien, E (2011) Fuelling Traffic. Abolitionist claims of a causal nexus between legalised prostitution and trafficking. Crime, Law and Social Change 56: 547-565 Outshoorn, J (2012) Policy Change in Prostitution in the Netherlands: From Legalization to Strict Control Sexuality Research and Social Policy 9: 233-243 Perry, B. (2001) In the Name of Hate: Understanding Hate Crimes, London: Routledge. 19 Pitcher J., Campbell, R., Hubbard, P., O’Neill, M., and Scoular, J. (2006) Living and working in areas of street sex work: from conflict to coexistence. Bristol: Policy Press. Ren, X. (1999) Prostitution and economic modernization in China. Violence against Women 5: 1411-1436. Sanders, T (2009) Controlling the Anti-Sexual City: Sexual Citizenship and the Disciplining of Female Sex Workers. In Special issue ‘Urban safety, anti social Behaviour and the Night-time Economy’ Criminology and Criminal Justice 9 (4) 507- 525 Sanders, T (2012) Policing commercial ‘sex work’ in England and Wales in Policing Sex (eds) by P Johnson and D Dalton, Routledge. Pp 135-148 Sanders, T and Campbell, R (2007) Designing Out Violence, Building in Respect: Violence, Safety and Sex Work Policy. British Journal of Sociology 58 (1) 1-18 Sanders, T and Campbell, R (2008) What's Criminal About Female Indoor Sex Work? In Letherby, G., Birch, P., Cain, M., and Williams, K (eds) Sex as Crime Cullompton, Devon, Willan. Sanders, T., O’Neill, M and Pitcher, J (2009) Prostitution: Sex Work, Policy and Politics, London: Sage Scoular, J and O’Neill, M (2007) ‘Regulating Prostitution: social inclusion, responsibilization and the politics of politics of prostitution reform’. British Journal of Criminology, 47 (5):764-778. Sheffield, C. (1995) ‘Hate Violence’ in P. Rothenberg (ed.) Race Class and Gender in the United States, New York: St Martin’s Press. Skilbrei, M., and Holmstrom, C (2011) Is there A Nordic Prostitution Regime? In Crime and Justice in Scandinavia (eds) Tonry, M and Lappi-Seppala, T. University of Chicago Press, Chicago pp 479-517 Smith, N. and Laing, M. (2012) 'Introduction: working outside the (hetero)norm? Lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and queer (LGBTQ) sex work'. Sexualities, 15 (5-6):517-520. TAMPEP (European Network for HIV/STI Prevention and Health Promotion Amongst Migrant Sex Workers) (2010) Sex Work Migration Health: A Report on the 20 Intersections of legislations and policies regarding sex work, migration and health in Europe, TAMPEP International Foundation, Netherlands, www.tampep.eu Tucker, J, D., and Ren, X (2008) Sex Worker incarceration in the People’s Republic of China, Sexually Transmitted Infections 84: 34-35 Ward, H (2011) The safety of migrant and local sex workers: preparing for London 2012 Sexually Transmitted Infection 87: 368-369 Weitzer, R (2010) The Movement to Crimininalize Sex Work in the United States, Journal of Law and Society, 37 (1) 61-84 1 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-22520455 2 http://www.womenlobby.org/spip.php?rubrique187&lang=en 3 http://www.iusw.org/2014/02/laura-lee-dr-belinda-brookes-gordon-on-newsnight/ 4 http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2014/feb/26/meps-vote-criminalise-buying-sex- european-parliament 5 http://www.amnesty.org/en/sex-workers-policy 6 Other organisation supporting decriminalisation include: the Global Commission on HIV and the Law, the UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Health, Canadian HIV/AIDS Legal Network, Human Rights Watch, the Kenya National Human Rights Commission, the Open Society Foundations, and the South African Commission on Gender Equality. 7 http://pamelachen.com/projects/rights-not-rescue/ 8 http://titsandsass.com/the-bloody-state-gave-him-the-power-a-swedish-sex-workers-murder/ 9 Jasmine separated from an abusive partner and lost custody of her children following reports to social services that she was sex working and custody was given to her ex partner. Rose Alliance the Swedish Sex Worker organisation she became active with as a result of her experiences explained that she lost custody because of social services ‘she refused to see her sex work as a form of self harm ‘. She then fought for access and custody through the courts and was due to go to the high courts in autumn 2013. Contact visits had started and it was at one of these that her ex abusive partner killed her and stabbed a social worker in attendance. 10 http://swannet.org/about 11 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/switzerland/10247035/Switzerland-opens-drive-in- sex-boxes-to-make-prostitution-safer.html 12 http://www.sexworkeurope.org/resources/declaration-rights-sex-workers-europe 13 The first two waves refer to sex workers in developed countries taking the issue of sex workers rights to the labour movement process. 14 http://katehardy.wordpress.com/2008/07/18/despite-violence-and-marginalisation-sex-workers-in- argentina-are-leading-the-way-on-hivaids-prevention/ 15 http://www.nswp.org/sites/nswp.org/files/Smart%20Guide%20to%20HIV%20and%20Sex%20Work.pd f 16 http://www.nswp.org/sites/nswp.org/files/SW%20is%20Not%20Trafficking.pdf http://www.tampep.eu/ http://www.womenlobby.org/spip.php?rubrique187&lang=en http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/switzerland/10247035/Switzerland-opens-drive-in-sex-boxes-to-make-prostitution-safer.html http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/switzerland/10247035/Switzerland-opens-drive-in-sex-boxes-to-make-prostitution-safer.html http://www.sexworkeurope.org/resources/declaration-rights-sex-workers-europe 
work_s5qcqzfk4zdpbhxhvqbahybkfa	----	Access to primary health care for asylum seekers and refugees: a qualitative study of service user experiences in the UK INTRODUCTION Migrants use emergency health services more, and for lower acuity conditions, than non-migrants across Europe.1 It has been speculated that this is due to barriers accessing primary care. Research shows that asylum seekers and refugees (ASR) have diverse and additional healthcare needs to host populations.2–5 Multiple sources suggest ASR face difficulty accessing appropriate health care in their host countries.6–10 A recent European literature review highlighted difficulties with communication, poor doctor–patient relationships, and culturally inappropriate primary care.11 In 2012, as part of the government’s aim to decrease immigration from the ‘hundreds of thousands to the tens of thousands’, then Home Secretary Theresa May declared the UK would become a ‘really hostile environment’ for those classified as irregular migrants.12 The policy changes that ensued restricted refused asylum seekers’ entitlements to services, including NHS care.13,14 In 2017, charging for health care was extended, with costs to be paid before treatment. Though GP services remain free, charges now apply to community services allied to primary care.15 Doctors of the World UK recently found that 13% of vulnerable migrants who attempted to register with a GP were incorrectly refused because of their immigration status.16 There is growing concern from both practitioners and migrant-rights advocacy groups that changes to charging regulations amplify access difficulties.15,17–20 Healthcare access can be defined as the degree of fit between patients and the healthcare system.21 Penchansky and Thomas suggest that access consists of specific, yet overlapping, dimensions — accessibility, availability, acceptability, affordability, and accommodation.22 Saurman later expanded this theory to include awareness (Box 1).21 There have been recent calls for research on country-specific issues surrounding ASR access to primary care.11 In the UK, existing research into ASR access to health care was either conducted before the implementation of new charging regulations,23–25 or focuses specifically on secondary care.26 No studies examine refugees’ and asylum seekers’ experiences of accessing primary care since the implementation of new charging regulations. This study addresses this gap, using Penchansky and Thomas’s modified theory of access as its analytical framework. METHOD Sample recruitment Criterion-based sampling was used to recruit ASR who had resided in the UK for <5 years and accessed primary health services in the past 2 years.27 Fliers outlining the research process and inclusion criteria were distributed to voluntary and community organisations (VCOs) supporting Research C Kang, LLB, medical student; R Farrington, MRCGP, SFHEA, DTM&H, PGCHE, GP and senior clinical lecturer, School of Biology, Medicine, and Health; L Tomkow, MA, MRCP, geriatric medicine specialist registrar and PhD researcher, Humanitarian and Conflict Response Institute, School of Arts, Languages, and Cultures, University of Manchester, Manchester. Address for correspondence Louise Tomkow, Humanitarian and Conflict Response Institute, Ellen Wilkinson Building, University of Manchester, Oxford Road, Manchester M13 9PL, UK. Email: louise_tomkow@hotmail.com Submitted: 2 October 2018; Editor’s response: 30 October 2018; final acceptance: 6 November 2018. ©British Journal of General Practice This is the full-length article (published online 12 Feb 2019) of an abridged version published in print. Cite this version as: Br J Gen Pract 2019; DOI: https://doi.org/10.3399/bjgp19X701309 Cara Kang, Louise Tomkow and Rebecca Farrington Access to primary health care for asylum seekers and refugees: a qualitative study of service user experiences in the UK Abstract Background Asylum seekers and refugees (ASR) face difficulty accessing health care in host countries. In 2017, NHS charges for overseas visitors were extended to include some community care for refused asylum seekers. There is growing concern that this will increase access difficulties, but no recent research has documented the lived experiences of ASR accessing UK primary health care. Aim To examine ASR experiences accessing primary health care in the UK in 2018. Design and setting This was a qualitative community-based study. ASR were recruited by criterion-based sampling through voluntary community organisations. Method A total of 18 ASR completed face-to-face semi- structured recorded interviews discussing primary care access. Transcripts underwent thematic analysis by three researchers using Penchansky and Thomas’s modified theory of access. Results The qualitative data show that participants found primary care services difficult to navigate and negotiate. Dominant themes included language barriers and inadequate interpretation services; lack of awareness of the structure and function of the NHS; difficulty meeting the costs of dental care, prescription fees, and transport to appointments; and the perception of discrimination relating to race, religion, and immigration status. Conclusion By centralising the voices of ASR and illustrating the negative consequences of poor healthcare access, this article urges consideration of how access to primary care in the UK can be enhanced for often marginalised individuals with complex needs. Keywords access to health care; asylum seekers; qualitative research; refugees. e537 British Journal of General Practice, August 2019 ASR in Greater Manchester. The VCOs run free community drop-ins that provide non- medical support and activities to ASR of all ages and backgrounds. VCO staff facilitated enrolment. Informed consent was obtained through the provision of information in an accessible format. Participants were briefed verbally by the lead researcher and provided with a participant information sheet, translated if needed. They were given at least 2 days to consider their participation. Before undertaking the interview, participants gave formal written consent, using a professional interpreter if required. Data collection Semi-structured interviews were used to explore participants’ experiences.28 An interview guide was developed collaboratively by the research team, which included an experienced clinician. Interviews were conducted in private at VCO premises, familiar locations for participants. Professional interpreters were offered. Interviews were audiorecorded. Audiorecordings were transcribed by university-approved professional transcription services. Saturation was determined when no new subthemes emerged.29,30 Ethical considerations University of Manchester ethical approval was granted. Professionally accredited interpreters were required to sign a confidentiality clause. The nature of the sample meant that many of the participants had experienced traumatic events; therefore, avoiding distress and re-traumatisation were prioritised. The interviewer had >10 years’ experience working with ASR, and gave participants time and the option to withdraw if signs of distress were shown. The data collected were anonymised. Pseudonyms are used in this paper. No identifiable information was collected, and data were stored on password-protected devices. Participants received travel expenses and a £20 voucher. Data analysis Transcripts were read, and experiences of accessing primary care were coded into Penchansky and Thomas’s modified theoretical framework of access; free codes were assigned when this theory was insufficient (Box 2). The six domains were analysed in turn, and subthemes were identified from the coded data. Often, these subthemes traversed multiple main codes; this complexity is addressed in the discussion. Transcripts were analysed individually by two researchers, before undertaking collaborative review to ensure consistency and enhance reliability. The third researcher, having read the transcripts, reviewed the themes and subthemes. RESULTS In all, 18 participants were interviewed in 2018. The sample included seven males and 11 females aged 18–47 years. Six were refugees, five of whom arrived through family reunion; eight were asylum seekers, and four were refused asylum seekers. Participants had resided in the UK for between 4 months and 5 years. The sample is broadly representative of the current countries of origin of those seeking asylum in the UK31 — Pakistan (four), Sudan (four), Syria (four), Iran (two), Libya (one), Eritrea (one), Ivory Coast (one), and Guinea (one). The dominant narrative expressed by participants was that primary care services were difficult to navigate and negotiate. This was due to multiple factors, many How this fits in A number of studies suggest that asylum seekers and refugees (ASR) face barriers accessing primary health care in the UK. However, the policy around charging migrants for health care has recently changed, and no studies have examined ASR access to primary health care since. This study takes a qualitative approach and explores ASR experiences of accessing primary care. The results could be used by healthcare providers to improve access to primary care for ASR. Box 1. The dimensions of accessa Dimension Definition Components and examples Accessibility Location Proximity to the patient in time and distance Availability Supply and demand Sufficient services and resources to meet volume and needs of the patient Accommodation Organisation Well organised to accept patients, and patients are able to use the services. This includes hours of operation, appointment systems, and facility structures (for example, wheelchair access) Affordability Financial cost Direct and indirect costs for patients Acceptability Consumer perception The attitude of patient towards the care provider and the characteristics of the service, including social and cultural concerns Awarenessb Communication and Effective communication and information information strategies with patients, including consideration of context and health literacy aAdapted from Patel et al, 2017.16 bModified as per Saurman, 2016.21 British Journal of General Practice, August 2019 e538 of which demonstrated crossover between the dimensions of access described in Penchansky and Thomas’s modified theory; this interconnectedness is examined in the discussion. For the purposes of analysis, the dominant theme from each dimension is described, with reference to empirical data. Accommodation As in other studies, language barriers were a significant barrier to access.11 Many participants struggled to complete GP registration paperwork. None reported being offered linguistic assistance by primary care staff; instead, they capitalised on the skills of informal social contacts: ‘They gave me a [registration] form and I have to fill that form … which is not easy for me. I call one friend … he knows English better than me, and through the phone we filled it. I would send him a picture from the paper, and through the phone he translated to me what I should write here.’ (Mustafa) Issues around interpretation were pervasive, and impacted participants’ engagement and treatment. One participant, Amena, was 8 months pregnant and had been referred for investigation of abdominal pain: Interpreter for Amena: ‘She had a scan on Thursday, but didn’t understand anything. After the scan, she go into the doctor. The doctor herself was very frustrated and upset, because there was no interpreter so she couldn’t communicate with her.’ Researcher: ‘But does she know what to do, say, when she goes into labour? Does she know where she should go to give birth to the baby?’ Interpreter for Amena: ‘No, nothing. She knows nothing.’ Another reported lack of interpretation, resulting in inappropriate dental treatment: ‘I have pain in my teeth too much. I couldn’t speak English very well, and I have nobody to help me, so I am very, very upset. I have pain … and when I see my dentist, they removed my teeth. When I come home, I say my pain is left side and they remove my right side. I go to the dentist and I say: “Where is my tooth?” The dentist says: “Oh, I am so sorry.” They took the wrong one. Still pain is this side … but he’s doing the wrong side, but still pain in my face.’ (Aisha) Many spoke about more nuanced negative effects of not having an interpreter: ‘The doctor couldn’t speak our language and, at that time, they had no interpreters. It was really bad, yeah. So, we hardly used to go. So, if we had like very pain, then we used to go. Because it was embarrassing, you know, telling doctors in a sign language. It made me feel like I had no self-esteem. I avoided going to the doctors.’ (Laila) ‘I had to translate a lot for my parents. They didn’t give us any interpreter. I even struggled speaking English with her, but they still didn’t help. I had to go [to interpret] during school time. I was in lessons, and I got called that I need to leave high school. It was not a good experience, because I had to leave my study for the doctor.’ (Sadia) These accounts highlight the far-reaching physical, mental, and social harm caused by inadequate interpretation — invasive treatment performed incorrectly, individuals feeling embarrassed when accessing care, and children missing school to interpret for parents. Awareness A minority of participants reported receiving information about the NHS on arrival to the UK. When this occurred, it appeared to enhance knowledge of how to access services. However, the majority reported a lack of awareness of NHS structure, and described confusion over how to navigate and negotiate access to health care, including uncertainty about how to arrange appointments. Many were unclear which provider to access for which service: ‘I’d been waiting maybe more than 45 or 50 days after I go to my lawyer. She asked Box 2. Subthemes identified from data analysis Dimension Subtheme Accommodation Language and interpretation Awareness Service navigation and negotiation Knowledge about eligibility for care Knowledge of NHS charging regulations Affordability Difficulties paying for medication or prescriptions Difficulties paying for dental treatment Accessibility Difficulties paying for transport costs The impact of asylum dispersal accommodation on continuity of care Availability Long waiting times for appointments Short appointment times Acceptability Positive experiences in medical consultations Negative experiences in medical consultations Discrimination on grounds of race, religion, and immigration status e539 British Journal of General Practice, August 2019 me: “Did you go to the GP?” I said: “I registered, but no one called me.” And then she said she needed to send a mail to my GP, and she gave me a letter. And after the second day they called me, the GP, and they tell me: “Why didn’t you make an appointment?” And I told her: “I don’t know the procedure, you know? How can I know I have to call for an appointment or something?” No one told me about this. Now, I’ve been looking, because I have a problem with my teeth. I don’t know where I need to go — to my GP, near to my place, or if I go to another place?’ (Mustafa) The confusion between dental services, emergency services, and general practice was prevalent in the narratives. Many participants did not know how to call an ambulance in an emergency, whereas others reported ringing the ambulance service to ‘get advice’: ‘I don’t know … how to use an ambulance service to call them or, like, how to get ambulance.’ (Hassan) ‘I think same like a movie, I need to call 911?’ (Mustafa) Interviews were carried out 6 months after the introduction of prospective charging for access to community services. None of the participants was aware of the recent change to regulations, and none reported being charged. Affordability GP services in the UK are currently free to ASR and refused asylum seekers.32 Asylum seekers are prohibited from working, and receive £37.75 per week. Consequently, they are entitled to free prescriptions, dental treatment, and eye tests under the low- income scheme using an HC2 certificate.33 Some participants reported the HC2 application as a lengthy process. Here, the bureaucracy associated with demonstrating low income emerges as a barrier to access: ‘We received a HC2 letter. We normally get it after [waiting] 6 months, but if you don’t have that letter … you won’t get your medication. You have to show it.’ (Laila) ‘With my dad … we went to the GP. He didn’t have that letter, we were waiting for it. But we told them we were asylum seekers, we can’t pay, we can’t afford to buy medicines. The lady said: “You still need an NHS letter. We can’t give you … we can’t just provide you.” We needed the medicine in an emergency, but she didn’t give it us.’ (Sadia) ‘She uses medication, like iron tablets, vitamin D tablets when she came over. So, she went to the GP and explained to them. They say, “We can’t prescribe every single thing you’re asking for.”’ (Interpreter for Sepideh) Despite being eligible for free dental care, many participants reported being charged: ‘When I went to my dentist, they ask me give £100. They charge me, and that was really a shock, even besides having this, you know, HC2 form. To be honest, very scary when they ask so much money. That was a really bad experience.’ (Bina) Many of the participants related attending the GP with dental problems. This phenomenon is widespread, due to scarcity of NHS dentists.34 It appears especially problematic when combined with lack of awareness and economic challenges. Accessibility Despite participants reporting that medical consultations were provided free of charge, the £37.75 weekly allowance made travel to health centres challenging: ‘It’s not easy, because Home Office … they give you £37.00 every week. So this one, it is for your food … you take some for your food, and you keep for your bus ticket.’ (Mohamed) ‘A ticket would literally cost £5.60, so then we have only £24 left to spend per week, for clothes, to eat, and everything. So that’s why we normally used to walk.’ (Laila) ‘If I’m not able to afford for a bus fare, even if 1 hour [away], I have to walk rather than take a bus.’ (Sepideh) Availability Many participants were unhappy with long waiting times to see a GP. Moreover, they felt that GP appointments were too short, and that the biopsychosocial complexity associated with forced migration meant that longer consultations were required: ‘As a refugee, [I] suffer from traumatic events. That’s why [I] feel that [I] need sometimes more time … in the appointment to explain. And [I] feel that [I] have psychological problems, and sometimes a problem with [my] families and how they react with [my] children, so [I] need more time to explain. [I] feel relieved when they British Journal of General Practice, August 2019 e540 listen and they give time to explain, and then [I] do the check. This make [me] comfortable and [I] can trust this doctor.’ (Maya) Acceptability Participants’ experiences of medical consultations were mixed. The majority of participants found their interactions with medical professionals to be positive: ‘Well, the doctor in here, they are the most awesome people I have seen in the country.’ (Ali) ‘I have felt very respected and valued. The doctors have been really respecting us.’ (Sadia) A minority described negative experiences. One participant perceived their GP to be asking inappropriate questions: ‘I felt … like he needed to finish because he had a meeting. I didn’t feel he cared about what I said, but he just needed to ask … to write. I told him what happened to me [torture], and he asked me a question. I don’t understand why he asked. He said: “Why, if this is in 2013, you are coming now?” This is feeling so bad for me. I think this is not his issue to ask me why. He’s not supposed to ask me this question.’ (Mustafa) Several participants reported experiencing discrimination from staff at the surgery owing to their race, religion, or immigration status: ‘Especially the staff in the reception, the staff working in GP reception, some of them real [sic] racist. I saw more than three times, and always one girl … she really, really racist. I don’t know how to explain that, but her body language is racist … turned her face other side. [She] shouldn’t be racist or make something, because GP for all people. If you want to be racist, be racist in your home or away, not in your job.’ (Abu) ‘I wear a hijab … but some of them, receptionists, there was that white lady, she was so racist. I was in the queue, it was my turn, but the next lady … there was a girl behind me; she called her first rather than me, even though I was next. I even told her: “I’m next. I’ve been waiting here.” It’s just, it made me feel like, that just because I’m wearing a hijab, just because of my religion, she acted, like, differently with me.’ (Sadia) ‘So, when the receptionist is asking, “are you British, asylum, refugee?” there are people at the back. I might want to keep it confidential, and I don’t want to tell other people. They ask in front of everyone, so you’re embarrassed to tell them: “Yeah, I am.” They just shout, like: “Okay, what’s your status?”’ (Laila) These excerpts focus on multiple facets, but are united by the description of discrimination. There appears to be a cavalier attitude to confidentiality in some instances. DISCUSSION Summary This qualitative study shows that ASR face multiple barriers when accessing primary health care. A lack of awareness of the structure and function of NHS services made the healthcare system difficult to navigate and negotiate. Language barriers and inadequate interpretation in primary care creates both immediate and long-term barriers to accessing care. Discrimination at GP surgeries relating to race, religion, and immigration status was reported. These factors intersect with the difficulties of the asylum system and the multifaceted social marginalisation experienced by ASR in the UK to compound the barriers to accessing health care. Strengths and limitations Participants were known to ASR support organisations, thus the sample cannot be considered representative of all ASR and refused asylum seekers. Moreover, those selecting to take part may be more open or eloquent, or have more germane experiences of healthcare systems. ASR not accessing support organisations may be more marginalised, and thus face greater issues with access.25 Language presented some difficulty; despite using trained interpreters, communication was occasionally challenging during the interviews. The use of Penchansky and Thomas’s modified theoretical framework facilitated a systematic and rigorous analysis of the data. The structure of the theory enhances the replicability of the study, and draws attention to findings that may otherwise have been overlooked. However, at times the theory was not a natural fit, as some subthemes traversed multiple themes. One example is language and interpretation. Although this has been discussed in reference to accommodation, it also impairs access through availability (as e541 British Journal of General Practice, August 2019 the presence of an interpreter effectively shortens consultation time), awareness (as language impairs communication to gain knowledge about services), acceptability (as those with language difficulties face greater discrimination), and affordability (as non-English speakers are less likely to negotiate exemption forms in a timely manner). As a result, the subthemes were not easily compartmentalised; instead, the analysis resulted in an interconnecting web. This brings to the fore the complex and intersecting socioeconomic barriers faced by this population. In light of this, further academic exploration using intersectionality as a theoretical approach may be warranted.35–37 Comparison with existing literature Though this research parallels existing findings showing that ASR face multiple barriers when accessing health care, the data also reveal novel findings. Interestingly, a recent systematic review exploring healthcare professionals’ experiences of providing care for ASR26 mirrors the findings in this study of service users. A lack of awareness of the structure and function of NHS services emerged as a dominant theme. Participants told of confusion between GP, dental, and emergency medical provision, and described not knowing that making appointments to see clinicians was a necessary step, and calling 999 for non-urgent medical advice. In some cases, this lack of awareness resulted in a mismatch between expectation and reality, and influenced participants’ perceptions of what was acceptable care. The extent to which lack of awareness features in the data suggests it requires further academic exploration, as well as raising questions about who is responsible for educating new arrivals to the UK about accessing the NHS. Language barriers and inadequate interpretation in primary care have long been identified,25 and are echoed here. Participants’ experiences illustrate the consequences of failing to provide interpretation services, thus attention is drawn to the fundamental importance of effective communication in consultations. Moreover, the pervasive yet nuanced effects of this have been highlighted, including the burden this places on family members, and its impact on patients’ self-esteem. Participants reported discrimination at GP surgeries relating to their race, religion, and immigration status. Racism has been shown to impair access to health care.38 Though institutional racism in the NHS, and concern over the stigma posed by the status of refugee, have been reported in other studies, the authors are unaware of literature directly documenting accounts of discrimination towards patients within UK primary care.39–45 In the current political climate, with hate crime rising, these accounts of racism and Islamophobia are of concern and warrant further exploration.46,47 It is important to acknowledge the diversity of the study sample and the complexity of the data. Participants had a range of cultural backgrounds, migration trajectories, and health needs. This complexity intersected with the difficulties of the asylum system and the multifaceted social marginalisation experienced by ASR in the UK. For example, the weekly allowance of £37.75 positions ASR in poverty, often unable to buy essential items, including food.38 Despite primary health care being free, participants’ accounts demonstrate how poverty can act as a secondary barrier to access. Travel by public transport to appointments is unfeasible due to cost, prolonged waiting for certificates to prove eligibility for free prescriptions left some unable to access medications, and, even with proof of eligibility, dental treatment remained unaffordable. The participants interviewed occupy intersecting positions of social, political, and economic disadvantage, and thus have multiple complex needs that cut across all domains of Penchansky and Thomas’s modified theory. Implications for research and practice The results have drawn attention to the fundamental importance of good basic primary care and the human cost of poor access. Examples of poor practice in all domains of access have been highlighted. In some cases, this contravenes existing guidance. NHS England states that individuals are not required to declare their immigration status on registering with a GP.48 The BMA advises that practice staff should not attempt to interpret patients’ immigration status.49 Doctors of the World has developed a ‘safe surgeries toolkit’ to help practices facilitate access to primary care services.50 Issues warranting further analysis have been identified, including a closer examination of discrimination towards patients in primary care, and deeper exploration of awareness in both ASR patients and healthcare professionals. Additionally, this research supports Saurman’s notion that the dimension of awareness should be included in theoretical thinking on access, particularly when researching marginalised populations whose literacy of mainstream systems may be limited.21 Funding The research was supported through student projects at the University of Manchester. Ethical approval Ethical approval was granted by the University of Manchester Ethics Committee 2 (Ref: 2018-3672-5602). Provenance Freely submitted; externally peer reviewed. Competing interests The authors have declared no competing interests. Acknowledgements The authors would like to thank the participants for taking part in this research, and the individuals at the voluntary and community organisations for their facilitation of the interviews. Open access This article is Open Access: CC BY 4.0 licence (https://creativecommons.org/ licenses/by/4.0/). Discuss this article Contribute and read comments about this article: bjgp.org/letters British Journal of General Practice, August 2019 e542 It is crucial to highlight examples of good practice in primary care. Many participants reported positive experiences of medical consultations, though they often stated longer appointments were needed to address biopsychosocial complexity. Providing accessible patient-centred care for marginalised populations benefits both patients and the care system long- term, including through the reduction of unscheduled care. The empirical findings have implications for clinical practice. First, provision of good interpretation can have far-reaching biopsychosocial benefits. Second, longer appointment times for those with complex needs establishes an effective therapeutic relationship. Third, recognition of the lack of knowledge some ASR have of the structure and function of the NHS can tackle consequent difficulties for access. Finally, the authors call for action against discrimination from healthcare staff towards patients in primary care. This is a pertinent and timely issue, given the instrumentalisation of the NHS in the government’s current hostile environment policies, and the rise in hate crimes and Islamophobia in the UK. e543 British Journal of General Practice, August 2019 REFERENCES 1. Credé SH, Such E, Mason S. 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work_s7w33lbrofccnkemvcwrs52pvy	----	Ethnographic understandings of ethnically diverse neighbourhoods to inform urban design practice Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=cloe20 Download by: [University of Sheffield] Date: 31 October 2017, At: 04:13 Local Environment The International Journal of Justice and Sustainability ISSN: 1354-9839 (Print) 1469-6711 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/cloe20 Ethnographic understandings of ethnically diverse neighbourhoods to inform urban design practice Clare Rishbeth, Farnaz Ganji & Goran Vodicka To cite this article: Clare Rishbeth, Farnaz Ganji & Goran Vodicka (2017): Ethnographic understandings of ethnically diverse neighbourhoods to inform urban design practice, Local Environment, DOI: 10.1080/13549839.2017.1385000 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13549839.2017.1385000 © 2017 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group Published online: 10 Oct 2017. Submit your article to this journal Article views: 684 View related articles View Crossmark data http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=cloe20 http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/cloe20 http://www.tandfonline.com/action/showCitFormats?doi=10.1080/13549839.2017.1385000 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13549839.2017.1385000 http://www.tandfonline.com/action/authorSubmission?journalCode=cloe20&show=instructions http://www.tandfonline.com/action/authorSubmission?journalCode=cloe20&show=instructions http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/mlt/10.1080/13549839.2017.1385000 http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/mlt/10.1080/13549839.2017.1385000 http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1080/13549839.2017.1385000&domain=pdf&date_stamp=2017-10-10 http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1080/13549839.2017.1385000&domain=pdf&date_stamp=2017-10-10 Ethnographic understandings of ethnically diverse neighbourhoods to inform urban design practice Clare Rishbeth , Farnaz Ganji and Goran Vodicka Department of Landscape, University of Sheffield, Sheffield, UK ABSTRACT The aim of this paper is to inform urban design practice through deeper understanding and analysis of the social dynamics of public outdoor space in ethnically diverse neighbourhoods. We hypothesise that findings from ethnographic research can provide a resource that improves cultural literacy and supports social justice in professional practice. The primary method is a meta-synthesis literature review of 24 ethnographic research papers, all of which explore some dimensions of public open space use and values in UK urban contexts characterised by ethnic and racial diversity. We summarise thematic understandings and significance of neighbourhood places of shared activity, parks, spaces of passing-by and of retreat. We evaluate the implications for intercultural social dynamics, exploring the spatial and temporal dimensions of conviviality and racism in public open space. We then argue that it is possible to develop principles for urban design practice informed by this work, and propose four for discussion: maximising straightforward participation, legitimising diversity of activity, designing in micro-retreats of nearby quietness and addressing structural inequalities of open space provision. We conclude that ethnographic research can provide detailed insights into the use of the public realm and also inform a more nuanced understanding of outdoor sociality relevant for an increasingly diverse society. The challenge is two-fold: for ethnographers to become less cautious in engaging with decisions and priorities regarding how cities change, and for urban designers to explicitly embed informed understandingsofdifferenceintotheirbroaddesireforinclusivepublicspace. ARTICLE HISTORY Received 19 August 2016 Accepted 8 September 2017 KEYWORDS Public open space; literature review; ethnicity; diversity; urban design; UK Introduction This paper addresses the need for intentional cultural competency in urban design, and how this can be foregrounded and supported by a deeper understanding of difference (as argued by Agyeman 2012). We specifically address intercultural dynamics and patterns of use within designed environ- ments, suggesting that notions of sociability in the public realm are too often based on simplistic and homogenous visions of public life and use of public spaces, and lack description or response to the complexity and fluidity of local populations. Outdoor public space is vital to the quality of life in urban neighbourhoods, and equally the place where everyday practice can most strongly reflect personal and communal cultures of sociability (Dines et al. 2006). “Hanging out” is an often unconsidered, banal activity, but the temporal, relational and material dimensions of this can provide important insights into community values within the © 2017 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ ), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. CONTACT Clare Rishbeth c.rishbeth@sheffield.ac.uk Department of Landscape, University of Sheffield, Sheffield S10 2TN, UK LOCAL ENVIRONMENT, 2017 https://doi.org/10.1080/13549839.2017.1385000 D ow nl oa de d by [ U ni ve rs it y of S he ff ie ld ] at 0 4: 13 3 1 O ct ob er 2 01 7 http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1080/13549839.2017.1385000&domain=pdf http://orcid.org/0000-0002-1648-5183 http://orcid.org/0000-0002-6707-0981 http://orcid.org/0000-0002-7730-3507 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ mailto:c.rishbeth@sheffield.ac.uk http://www.tandfonline.com public sphere. Though designers and managers of urban spaces promote the desirability and attrac- tiveness of these as places to spend time, often the reality is more problematic. Shaped by percep- tions of difference (racialised, gendered, class and age-related), users are tacitly codified as welcomed lingerers or unwelcomed loiterers (Owens 2002). In this paper, we argue that a lack of critical understanding of diverse patterns of socialising, and naivety regarding the use of everyday stereotypes, can unwittingly perpetuate professional practices that marginalise the experience of “low-income communities and neighbourhoods of colours” (Zavestoski and Agyeman 2015, p. 7). There are structural inequalities that frame the timeliness of this, and shape the specific focus of this paper on ethnic diversity in public open space. Wolch et al. (2014), acknowledging intersections of ethnicity, race and class, set out the extent by which ethnic background shapes environmental injustices with relation to spatial equity in access to greenspace (see also Agyeman 2013), and these patterns are reflected more broadly in the exclusion- ary impacts of regeneration (Watt and Minton 2016). These infrastructures are grounded in the local; in reported differences in recreational use of greenspace relating to ethnicity, and how personal experiences of being outdoors are informed by racisms as well as convivial multiculture (Wise and Noble 2016). In the UK context, the focus of this paper, the extensive Natural England survey of outdoor recreation (Burt et al. 2013) found that people from Black and Minority Ethnic (BME) back- grounds made 62% fewer visits to “the natural environment” compared to the rest of the adult popu- lation (p. 13), and that far more of these visits (78% compared to 37% for the rest of the population, p. 15) were within an urban rather than rural environment. Yet urban public open space cannot be conceived as an egalitarian zone. British crime statistics over many years reflect that people from all BME groups are at higher risk of personal attack than white people, with a rise over recent years in race and religious hate crime (Webster 2017, p. 208). These bare statistics summarise but do not ade- quately reflect individual experiences of navigating urban localities, often carefully explored in focused qualitative work (e.g. Nayak (2017) in the UK addressing British Bangladeshi young women). Racialised understandings of public space are explicitly presented in images relating to #blacklivesmatter in America and in mass migration movements across Europe. While academia rightly attends to deep understanding of these dynamics, on-going political contexts require collec- tive action. This paper addresses what this “collective action” may imply for people with professional roles relating to urban outdoor places, and starts to stitch up this gap between the “deep understand- ings” of academic fieldwork and urban design priorities and decisions. Planners and designers have a responsibility for “managing our co-existence in shared space” (Healey 1997, p. 3). In an era of increasing diversity, this requires an agility to understand and work within divergent ideas of what constitutes common culture. Mainstream urban design theory and practice are explicitly pro-social: the importance of socialising in outdoor public spaces is pro- moted (Jacobs 1961, Whyte 1980, Gehl and Gemzoe 1996, Carmona et al. 2003) and the benefits for well-being have been well documented (Cooper et al. 2014). However, as outlined in the previous paragraph, this goodwill is clearly not enough. While Wolch et al. (2014) reason that spatial environ- mental injustices “warrant intervention” (p. 237) and propose that “the active involvement of urban planners, designers, and ecologists is … essential”, the regeneration process integral to urban design practice can itself be a vehicle for displacement and increased segregation of people of colour (Anguelovski 2016). There is evidence for problems both of representation, and of a lack of cultural competency to engender necessary debate and learning. Only 6.3% of registered architects and town planners in the UK are from BME backgrounds, and the numbers are in decline (Creative Industries Federation 2015, p. 10). Professionally accredited curriculums and forums often sideline questions of ethnicity and race. An event in April 2015 on the role of urban design and social equity organised by African American Student Union of Harvard University’s Graduate School of Design highlighted absences within the curriculum, “there are no urban design courses on race and justice” (Mock 2015). In the UK, the situation is similarly colour-blind. Though the annual Urban Design Group con- ference 2014 headlined a social egalitarian theme “Design for All”, not a single paper or address listed 2 C. RISHBETH ET AL. D ow nl oa de d by [ U ni ve rs it y of S he ff ie ld ] at 0 4: 13 3 1 O ct ob er 2 01 7 in the proceedings focused on ethnicity or race.1 Anecdotally but consistently, professional practices relating to urban design demonstrate a collective disengagement with socio-political urban contexts, the intrinsic impacts of difference, and in particular the differing experiences of public space by people of colour. Within this broad context of inequitable infrastructures and absences, the aim of this paper is to inform urban design practice through deeper understanding and analysis of the dynamics of ethni- cally diverse neighbourhoods. The paper initially explores current contexts with regard to cultural competency in urban design practice, policy and scholarship, giving some nuance and detail to the assertions made in this introduction. We then introduce the methodological approach of this study, a comprehensive review of 24 recent ethnographic studies that describe in detail everyday social uses of outdoor space in ethnically diverse urban contexts in the UK. We use a meta-synthesis method to examine these sources. The findings are presented and discussed in three sections. The first section gives a brief overview of the findings organised by a socio-spatial framework, the second conducts a deeper analysis of these with relation to social dynamics of proximity, shaped by both conviviality and racism. The third section highlights the connection between the meta-analy- sis and professional practice, what can be learnt? We propose four priorities for practice that could have specific and significant benefits within ethnically diverse urban contexts. In the conclusion, we argue that this process of engaging with ethnographic research can be a means of informing design policy and practice, and that findings from ethnographic research can provide a resource that improves cultural literacy and supports social justice in professional practice. Intercultural competency in current urban design practice, policy and scholarship In this section, we briefly outline the current situation regarding approaches to ethnic diversity within the urban design field across practice, policy and scholarship. Though we have highlighted the seeming lack of public discussion of diversity, it could be stated that the local specificity of urban design practice, involving planning processes and different levels of consultation, does respond effectively to the nuances of local cultures. There are multiples critiques regarding the limitations of this process (Sandercock 2003, Healey 2012, Campbell et al. 2014, Bur- ayidi 2015) and some of these have particular relevance when addressing contexts with special racial and ethnic dimensions. Firstly, development is predominantly driven by the market, embedded in vested interests, and therefore consultation processes are mostly tokenistic in scope and genuine influence (Swyngedouw et al. 2002). Secondly, participation becomes even more contested within ethnically diverse areas, particularly “when the attributes of race and ethnicity are used as fixed iden- tifiers” (Beebeejaun 2006, p. 5), and when there is little thought or ambition given to addressing tra- ditional power hierarchies. Thirdly, consultation processes are usually underfunded and therefore often rushed. This has a broad impact on their legitimacy, but specifically is likely to contribute to the marginalisation of commonly unheard voices within planning and design process. Deep under- standing is seldom achieved in tight timeframes. More embedded forms of collaboration with communities do exist and provide some encourage- ment for reflection of locally specific diversity within urban design. As these gain momentum and critical attention, these have been discussed collectively as creative or design activism, or critical spatial practices (Awan et al. 2011). This broad description relates to diverse and heterogeneous groups of practitioners (Hyde 2012, Oswalt et al. 2013, Gadanho et al. 2014, Kee and Miazzo 2014, Lerner 2014, Lydon and Garcia 2015) who are operating in a wide range of contexts and cultural inter- actions. At best, these approaches are rooted in specific communities, with interventions often initiated through a local proposing and distilling of ideas. Addressing existing power issues are embedded within an understanding of the need for highly situated, ethical and creative engagement integral to a long-term strategy for change. The projects often engage with ethnic diversity, some more explicitly than others, with the work of Teddy Cruz (USA/Mexico), atelier d’architecture auto- gérée (France) and Marjetica Potrc (Netherlands/South Africa) that “investigate strategies for LOCAL ENVIRONMENT 3 D ow nl oa de d by [ U ni ve rs it y of S he ff ie ld ] at 0 4: 13 3 1 O ct ob er 2 01 7 responding to underrepresented communities and areas of conflict” (Urbonas et al. 2017, p. 1) worthy of particular note in this respect. There is much that can be learnt from these practices; however, the application for mainstream urban design is inevitably limited by the significant timescales required for genuine engagement, the human resources and social capacity required. Though methods and priorities of working with diverse communities can undoubtedly learn from individual good practice, embedding this in effective strategic policy is crucial for wider scale impact. Race and social justice initiatives in America (Seattle, 2015–2017) or community cohesion strategies in the UK (Department for Communities and Local Government 2009) tend to be spatially dislocated, explored through institutions and vulnerable to changes in the political landscape (Cantle 2016). Pre- dominantly within the US, for example, Project for Public Spaces is a longstanding platform for pla- cemaking that includes some focus on intercultural dimensions of public spaces. Within a European context, the Intercultural Cities initiative by the Council of Europe (2016) is seminal in promoting good practice that rises to the challenge of changing circumstances such as refugee mass move- ments. However, it is limited in terms of engaging with the local public realm or with professional bodies outside of social policy and governance. A UK focus on intercultural dynamics and local scale was thoughtfully explored in the “Equally Spaced? Public space and interaction between diverse communities” Demos report (Lownsbrough and Beunderman 2007); however, this appeared to have had limited influence and impact. This criticism could apply to many of the above initiatives: that responding to ethnic diversity is too often seen as a niche interest, rather than raising a call for institutional change or as shaping core professional skills. In terms of informing urban design practice, too often the focus of research in urban design, plan- ning and landscape architecture fields (overviewed by Fincher and Iveson 2008, examples Talen 2008, Lawton 2013) is not on the micro scale and the everyday experiences of public spaces. A deeper understanding is needed; one which engages with intercultural dynamics and outdoor sociability within superdiverse urban contexts, which has the ability to connect with socio-political agendas regarding representation and equality, and has the ambition to situate these with regard to practice (Agyeman and Erickson 2012). Research by Hou (2013), Madanipour (2004), Tornaghi, Knierbein (Tor- naghi and Knierbein 2014), Rishbeth (Rishbeth and Finney 2006, Powell and Rishbeth 2012), Mehta (2009), Rios (2009, 2015) and Kim (2015) contributes in different ways and contexts (mostly in the US and Europe) to address the broad challenge set out in this paper. However, although individually rich and tending towards ethnographic methods, this work serves mainly to highlight potential than provide a coherent body of research. In this paper, we look in a slightly different direction, aiming instead to examine the potential of ethnographic scholarship from other disciplines, primarily sociology, anthropology and human geography. Can non-design disciplines, usually unintentionally, inform and support urban design practice? These disciplines are well established and have developed a wealth of urban ethnographies that address intercultural dynamics in a wide range of locations, and, sometimes obliquely, describe the affordances for outdoor sociability. “Ethnography is the major social science with the best hope for throwing off conceptual blinders” (Kim 2015, p. 10). In particular, can publications emerging from these research projects play an important role in developing understanding and improving urban design practice in ethnically diverse neighbourhoods? Methodology In this paper, we use the term “ethnography” as a collective term for research using qualitative and situated methodologies. The purpose of ethnographic research is to understand cultures and values informing human behaviour through the use of in-depth case studies (Creswell 1998), and of writing this into coherent and compelling narratives (Back 2015). In this sense, it is a highly appropriate approach for exploring the social dimensions of outdoor public spaces. There is a well-established tradition of urban ethnography, with methods intending to provide rich insights into everyday life, “thick descriptions” (Geertz 1973, p. 6), usually over extended periods 4 C. RISHBETH ET AL. D ow nl oa de d by [ U ni ve rs it y of S he ff ie ld ] at 0 4: 13 3 1 O ct ob er 2 01 7 of time (far beyond those afforded by a traditional design process), with combinations of detailed observation and interviewing. Increasingly these have been concerned with everyday practices and interactions within localities characterised by ethnic diversity, and often seek to understand aspects of sociability, conviviality, racism, prejudice and adaptation. Significant examples of aca- demics deploying longitudinal ethnographic methods and integrating methods common to design practice such as on-site visual notation, can be found in the work of Hall (2012, understand- ings of spatio-temporal patterns in a local café) and Kim (2015, mapping and critique of sidewalks in Ho Chi Min City). It seems clear from these studies, and as argued and exemplified by AIGA (2013), Helsinki Design Lab (2013) and Cranz (2016) that ethnographic methods have potential to inform design form. Our focus here is more specifically on systematically and critically exploring the existing ethnographic scholarship of ethnically diverse areas, in order to highlight its additional value for urban design practice. Developing a meta-synthesis of urban ethnographic urban research Meta-synthesis is a method of analysis of qualitative material that allows for “bringing together and breaking down of findings, examining them, discovering essential features and, in some way, com- bining phenomena into a transformed whole” (Schreiber et al. 1997, p. 314). In this paper, we present data from recent ethnographic research that relates to the use and values of the public realm in ethnically diverse contexts, as presented in 24 published academic papers (describing 21 discrete research projects). The data within these were recorded and thematically coded, with com- parative and exemplar material discussed and contrasted to draw out significance with regard to public space theory and practice. The criteria for selection of the research projects was that they were: (a) situated in an urban or town context in the UK, with some reference to public outdoor environments, (b) addressed aspects of ethnic diversity and social relations; (c) findings were published within the last 10 years (2006–2016) in a peer-reviewed journal. The research projects typically had fieldwork periods of between one and three years. The national scope of the selection process covered a range of locations, without the challenge of reflecting international complexities in migration contexts. The findings from the meta-synthesis are presented in the following order, developed using a grounded theory approach to coding of themes: (a) Information about how outdoor spaces are used in ethnically diverse contexts. This section describes the data organised thematically by typologies of urban places, focusing on the spatial and temporal qualities of public space use. (b) Dynamics of intercultural sociability recorded in these studies. This section addresses dynamics of conviviality and exclusion, and how these are reflected in use of the urban realm. The final methodological stage is that of evaluation and critical reflection of the process. Our col- lective expertise as authors, with professional backgrounds in urban and landscape design, and diverse ethnic identities, supported a specialised and incisive approach to this stage. Here we propose “principles for urban design practice”, and then reflect more broadly on the implications of the findings of the meta-synthesis for practice and professional development. It is possible to state that these research projects form an underutilised resource for urban design practitioners? And if so, what are the academic and institutional directions that should be supported in order enable more effective engagement? Overview of research projects and publications The 21 projects selected as meeting the above criteria were unevenly distributed across the UK, and broadly reflect locations commonly the focus of research on ethnic diversity. Thirteen of these are LOCAL ENVIRONMENT 5 D ow nl oa de d by [ U ni ve rs it y of S he ff ie ld ] at 0 4: 13 3 1 O ct ob er 2 01 7 located in London (or include case studies here), and most of the other projects are in large cities primarily in the midlands or north of England, with one study in Scotland and one in Northern Ireland (Figure 1). We were keen to specifically select research that addressed issues of interactions between groups of different ethnic backgrounds and ages. Approximately half of the projects did this expli- citly (for example: Clayton 2009, 2012, Powell and Rishbeth 2012, Rogaly and Qureshi 2013, Wes- sendorf 2013, 2014) while the others focused on certain characteristics of group and individual identity (ethnicity: Knowles 2013, Clark 2014, age: Clayton 2009, 2012, Reynolds 2013) and interro- gated dynamics of difference predominantly through the lens of this particular identity. Whilst Figure 1. Locations of research projects. 6 C. RISHBETH ET AL. D ow nl oa de d by [ U ni ve rs it y of S he ff ie ld ] at 0 4: 13 3 1 O ct ob er 2 01 7 most scoped a geographically defined area, usually a borough or neighbourhood, some addressed particular typologies of urban places, the commercial street (Hall 2015), markets (Watson 2009, Hiebert et al. 2015), parks (Watson and Ratna 2011, Neal et al. 2015) and even a road junction (Koch and Latham 2012). The stated focus of the 24 selected papers is varied and includes issues of social cohesion and integration (Cook et al. 2011, Clark 2014); conviviality (Kesten et al. 2011, Rogaly and Qureshi 2013); experiences, belonging and place attachment of migrants (Philips et al. 2007, Clayton 2009, 2012, Reynolds 2013, Rhys-Taylor 2013, Rishbeth and Powell 2013, Neal et al. 2015) and street markets and local economy (Watson 2009, Hiebert et al. 2015). It is notable that none of these papers are specifically focused on the design of public space. Only three authors included photographs of the places under discussion, indicating a general disinterest or lack of prioritisation with regard to the visual character or spatial qualities of the urban landscape (Table 1). UK contexts relating to superdiversity and urban space Our analysis of this research, and the periods of fieldwork in the studies themselves, are shaped by socio-political contexts. While the UK is a country characterised by migration over scores of decades, many urban locations are now described as “superdiverse” (Vertovec 2007) reflecting the increased complexity of population characteristics, interplays of race, ethnicity, length and security of residence, educational and family contexts. Notable terrorist attacks of the last 15 years, both in the UK and in other countries, have shaped everyday understandings of the public realm as a place that has the potential to be dangerous, and this danger is frequently conflated with racial visibility. There has been an increase in anti-migration movements and in hate crime, specifically with respect to people of Muslim faith (Ministry of Justice 2013). These stress points are exacerbated by wider con- texts of austerity measures, overcrowded housing and the increase of insecure employment experi- enced by both low- and middle-income groups (Peck 2012, Watt and Minton 2016). Since most of this research was undertaken, mass movements of migrants from Syria and North Africa have led to an increase in both anti-immigrant rhetoric and multiple acts of collective support (Darling 2016). All of these contexts are relevant because they shape the experience of the public realm: of visibility of difference, of potential communal conviviality and resilience, and as a place of suspicion as well as pleasure. A socio-spatial analysis of public space use in ethnically diverse locations This section is the first of two which outlines the findings from the meta-synthesis. This process included a coding of data presented within the papers relating to sites, activities and inter-per- sonal outcomes of use of public open space in the case study sites. This first section is a brief scoping section which focuses primarily on the “where”, describing the spatial and temporal qual- ities of locations within the public realm that appear to be socially important in ethnically diverse contexts. To resolve these into themes required a balance of precision and inclusivity with regard to typologies, not intending to describe every possible urban environment, but to select those that were discussed in multiple papers and to indicate in the brief headings both qualities of social affordance and of specific landscape quality. These themes are spaces of shared activity, leisure in parks, passing-by and nearby quietness. For each theme we highlight key examples from the ethnographic studies that demonstrate how the physical context and designed inten- tions of urban spaces shape potential for intercultural interactions to differing extents. This section provides the spatial context for the second section reporting from the meta-synthesis work, in which we address the material with a deeper level of analysis, specifically addressing the social dynamics of intercultural public places, and how these may support conviviality or conflict. LOCAL ENVIRONMENT 7 D ow nl oa de d by [ U ni ve rs it y of S he ff ie ld ] at 0 4: 13 3 1 O ct ob er 2 01 7 Spaces of shared activities Places that are busy with activity are frequently the focus of ethnographic studies addressing ethnic diversity in public space. Here we highlight two typologies of shared activities that were addressed by Table 1. Overview of 24 selected papers. Author/year Location Keywords or title (when keywords not provided) Journal Cattell et al. (2008) East London Public space, well-being, social interactions, social relations, therapeutic landscapes, community cohesion Health and Place Clark (2014) Glasgow Roma, Govanhill, Glasgow, migration, integration, stigmatisation, welfare, intersectionality, identity, community People, Place and Policy Clayton (2009) Leicester Multiculturalism, community cohesion, interethnic relations, everyday geographies, identities, belonging Social & Cultural Geography Clayton (2012) Identity, multiculturalism, racism, community, place, youth Ethnic and Racial Studies Cook et al. (2011) Northern UK A8 migration, integration, neighbourhood, mixing, good relations, everyday encounters Population, Space and Place Hall (2015) South London City, migration, super-diversity, locality, ethnography, street Ethnic and Racial Studies Kesten et al. (2011) Milton Keynes Community, diversity, multiculture; new city spaces, ordinary city, Policy, urban spaces, young people Journal of Intercultrual Studies Knowles (2013) North London Visibility, urban space, ethnicity, superdiversity, Nigerian London Ethnic and Racial Studies Koch and Latham (2012) West London Public space, London, conviviality, matriality, atmosphere, inhabitation Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers Koch and Latham (2013) On the Hard Work of Domesticating a Public Space Urban Studies Koutrolikou (2012) East London Spatialities of Ethnocultural Relations in Multicultural East London: Discourses of Interaction and Social Mix Urban Studies Neal et al. (2015) Leicester, Milton Keynes and East London Multiculture, encounter, diversity, public space, public parks, materiality, practices Population, Space and Place Philips et al. (2007) Leeds and Bradford Leeds, Bradford, British Asians, ethnic segregation, urban narratives, multicultural Britain Population, Space and Place Reynolds (2013) London ‘Them and Us’: ‘Black Neighbourhoods’ as a Social Capital Resource among Black Youths Living in Inner-city London Urban Studies Rhys-Taylor (2013) East London Smell, multiculture, race, taste, street markets, urban Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power Powell and Rishbeth (2012) Sheffield Place attachment, migration, ethnicity, landscape, United Kingdom, audio narratives TESG – The Tijdschrift voor Sociale en Economische Geschiedenis Rishbeth and Powell (2013) Migrants, ethnicity, landscape perception, public realm, walking methods Landscape Research Rogaly and Qureshi (2013) Peterborough Diversity, right to the city, regeneration, conviviality, Muslims, EDL Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power Rosbrook- Thompson (2015) Oldfield and London Belonging, citizenship, denizenship, liberalism, urban sociology Urban Studies Selim (2015) Derry/Londonderry Derry/Londonderry , contact, social conflict, everyday life, segregation Cities Watson (2009) London, Milton Keynes, Leicester The Magic of the Marketplace: Sociality in a Neglected Public Space Urban Studies Watson and Ratna (2011) Leeds Space for leisure, British Asians, intersectionality, thinking intersectionally Leisure/Loisir Wessendorf (2013) East London Super-diversity; neighbourhoods; London; cultural diversity; everyday multiculturalism; encounters Identities Wessendorf (2014) Conviviality, London, neighbourhood, social interactions, super-diversity European Journal of Cultural Studies 8 C. RISHBETH ET AL. D ow nl oa de d by [ U ni ve rs it y of S he ff ie ld ] at 0 4: 13 3 1 O ct ob er 2 01 7 a number of the research projects: markets or informal trading spaces, and open air events such as local festivals. The findings suggest that the common purpose and focus on action supports inclusiv- ity and equality of encounter. Watson (2009) in her research on social relations in market places notes that the “easily sociality” environments of markets is facilitated by the informality of trading relations, the open access but dense interactions of the physical environment, and clear legitimacy of purpose for hanging around. Interaction is intrinsic to the very nature of a market (Cattell et al. 2008), and the ongoing “act of civility” that occurs in the middle of the regular trading behaviours is in itself a form of social cohesion (Hiebert et al. 2015). Though this is predominantly a fleeting encounter, the repetition and continuity of buying and selling support the possibility for recognition and affection of sorts, allowing a disruption of stereotypes both between traders and customers and between the market traders themselves (Koutrolikou 2012). In Ridley Road market, Hackney, “many described how the market functioned to create social bonds across different ethnicities, particularly between the old Jewish families and more recent Afro-Caribbean and Asian traders” Watson (2009, p. 1586). The opportunity to buy specialised food, the (sometimes touristic) ambience of markets (Watson 2009), and the multi-sensory experiences of smell and taste (Rhys-Taylor 2013) all shape emotive qualities of a pleasurable sociable environment, and one that can positively reflect the impacts of migration in shaping daily life. The structured layout and temporal rhythms of market stalls create a density of busyness within a clear spatial order. The integration within market spaces of non-shopping related activities makes them more adaptable and inclusive; with Koch and Latham (2012) highlighting how elderly users enjoy lingering in markets through the enjoyment of being part of a busy environment. Markets are not necessarily, or even usually, permanent structures. Temporary markets, including stalls at a London street junction (Koch and Latham 2013) and car boot sales in Peterborough (Rogaly and Qureshi 2013) offer “low-key” and “inclusive spaces” for practicing togetherness (Rogaly and Qureshi 2013, p. 433) and arguably shape a “domestication of public space” (Koch and Latham 2013). The processes of becoming public (in deed as well as in name) happens through practices of appropriation, embodiment, mutual recognition and working out of differences; these practices are intrinsically shaped, supported or frustrated by the materiality and functionality of the designed space (Koch and Latham 2012, 2013). Even more flexible and transient than market spaces, the meta-synthesis highlighted the potential influence of festival and event spaces as occasional “encountering zones” (Koutrolikou 2012). Com- munity events are commonly described as exemplars of conviviality (Neal et al. 2015) and as a way for different groups to be seen as having an “ethos of mixing” (Wessendorf 2013). In research relating to an event in Leeds promoted for the local British Asian community, Watson and Ratna (2011) argue that the establishment of cultural events that represent specific migrant communities supports being, claiming and belonging in spaces of leisure. They propose that this may increase the active participation of these groups in public spaces through a range of outcomes: developing a sense of community, emerging feelings of place attachment, and fostering a positive sense of iden- tity. However, this does not necessarily reflect intercultural dimensions of socialising in these spaces. Many would claim that that event-based interventions are limited in having an effect in decreasing existing conflicts (Valentine 2008, Koutrolikou 2012), as they are too situational and fleeting to develop social bonds and friendship (Selim 2015). Parks as spaces of shared leisure Parks (the predominant typology of “outdoor” recreational places) are shown to be spaces for ethnic mixity and loose social ties, a leisure destination, a place undemanding of a shared language or sus- tained interactions (Cattell et al. 2008, Koutrolikou 2012, Neal et al. 2015). Neal et al. (2015) specifically focus on materialities and affordances of parks in mediating social interactions and a sense of inter- cultural togetherness across diverse cultures and ethnicities. A sense of place, emotions and LOCAL ENVIRONMENT 9 D ow nl oa de d by [ U ni ve rs it y of S he ff ie ld ] at 0 4: 13 3 1 O ct ob er 2 01 7 meanings are evoked by micro-spaces within parks and in turn influence social relations. The ease of mundane behaviours provides points of informal contact: dog walking, play facilities, ice-cream and café queues. Neal et al. (2015) describe the significance of parks as places of elective leisure, framed by a shared sense of affection and mutual choice to be there. Parks can be valued as less socially demanding environments compared to markets and shopping streets (Cattell et al. 2008); however, organised or specific group activities set within a park do offer opportunities for more sus- tained interactions. Park-based healthy walk programmes in Sheffield helped recently arrived Pakis- tani women to become more familiar with their local environment, and casual interactions with older women on the walks provided opportunities for “intergenerational bridging” (Powell and Rishbeth 2012). Neal et al. (2015) describe how exercising in parks is increasingly popular across different eth- nicities and “doing this activity bring together ethnically different participants, the park setting, the things in the park, as well the physicality of exercising and produce a series of interactive micro- material and social intimacies” (p.471). Locations for children’s play and sport venues are spaces of encounters shared for a particular purpose. Spontaneous encounters in these places have the potential to result in social ties and friend- ships over time; not only for the active participants in play activities but also for the supervising parents (Cattell et al. 2008, Koutrolikou 2012). The collective use of space and the overlap of interests can bring together new and established communities and are sometimes especially valuable when integration is implicit rather than explicit (see Mayblin et al. 2016 for discussion of a football league integration initiative in Poland). However, Clayton (2009) discusses how the spatial and material characteristics of a fenced football pitch, referred to by the young participants as “the cage”, became a site of conflict over the ownership of space among young users of different ethnic back- grounds in Leicester. We revisit spatialities of exclusion in a later section. Streets as spaces of passing-by Streets are the immediate areas of the public realm in which differences are encountered outside of the home. The linear spatial quality of streets, frequency of connecting nodes and acts of movement all shape a different kind of affordance for social interactions. Cattell et al. (2008) describe the seren- dipitous casual interactions that happen during everyday activities walking to school, work, running and walking dogs in passing-by spaces of streets, the epitome of the fleeting but with potential to be repeated. Streets can be sites of common courtesy, or of a seeming lack of it, as judged by a Jamaican woman in Sheffield “Greeting people was important to her, and she missed the importance given to the manners in Jamaica” (Rishbeth and Powell 2013, p. 170). Both of these research projects underline the regularity and continuity of walking along local streets to support a sense of familiarity and sense of local belonging. Transcultural connections can also be important for first-generation migrants, catching echoes of a past life in the city bustle or in glimpses of nature (Cattell et al. 2008, Rishbeth and Powell 2013). The visibility of walking in a neighbourhood is mostly incidental but may be strategic or even pol- itical. Selim (2015) discussed how symbolic walks are performed as a sign of integration in a divided city in Northern Ireland as outward projections of an intended togetherness. In places where street presence is associated with problems, the intentional use of this visibility as a stage to demonstrate a different narrative can be a strategy of resilience, as detailed in Glasgow context where stigmatised Roma migrants organised clean-ups of their local area (Clark 2014). Spaces of retreat and nearby quietness “An Indian woman was frustrated by the absence of places to sit down (such as cafés with outdoor tables) on her local busy shopping street, her fleeting exchanges with long-term acquaintances could never turn into more meaningful encounters” (Cattell et al. 2008, p. 554). Where in the city is it poss- ible to extend these incidental connections? A spatial detail observed across a number of papers was 10 C. RISHBETH ET AL. D ow nl oa de d by [ U ni ve rs it y of S he ff ie ld ] at 0 4: 13 3 1 O ct ob er 2 01 7 the importance of quietness nearby to busyness as a condition for developing sociability. Cafés with outdoor seats close to shopping streets, or situated within markets, allow a place of retreat but with the affordance of allowing visible and audible connection with a flow of people (Cattell et al. 2008, Watson 2009). Other micro-spaces such as benches located near the playgrounds and informal sitting spaces such as packaging cases or stairs are spaces to start or to continue conversation near the crowd (Watson 2009, Neal et al. 2015). The porous edges of public and private spaces give opportunities for interaction while feeling the security of being near home: “for a middle- aged mother on a housing estate … the front drive provided temporary relief to her routine as a place where she could sit down and have a cup of tea with her neighbour” (Cattell et al. 2008, p. 550). Intercultural social dynamics in outdoor places This is the second section relating to the findings of the meta-synthesis. We now address more specifically the different social dynamics at play, focusing on how these are shaped by the particu- larity of the urban context. Knowles (2013) in her conclusion to the geographies of Nigerians in London suggests that “urban spaces in which superdiversity can be visibly articulated sustain an active co-presence of urban citi- zens in proximate worlds”. Visual permeability, the design quality of openness of outdoor public environments, supports “seeing and being seen” enabling mutuality of presence. Who passes by and what they are doing (fumbling for bus money, cheering up a child, carrying shopping) allows for a fundamental human to human emotional connection not reliant on conversation (Koch and Latham 2012). The loose solidarity engendered by this appeared to be strengthened when locations were places of elective leisure, such as parks (Neal et al. 2015), festivals (Watson and Ratna 2011), foot- ball pitches (Clayton 2009) or markets (Watson 2009). Other users, however, seemingly different from the viewer, are temporarily and tacitly defined as “insiders” through this shared choice of place or activity. Cattell et al. (2008) in east London and Rishbeth and Powell (2013) in Sheffield both link this visibility (often foregrounding the visibility of multiculture) with the process of deepening place attachment, an affiliation and sense of belonging within a located community. Visibility can lead to familiarity. This can be conceived as moving from a reading of difference as “other” to a “commonplace diversity” in which multiculture of population is an unconsidered norm (Wessendorf 2013). But, more relevant to design scales is the dynamic (reported across many studies) of serendipitous fleeting conviviality also perceived by participants as supporting inte- gration? “You do get to know people [when jogging], not on a deep level, but if you saw them down the street you’d say hello. And that’s the beginning of a community” (Cattell et al. 2008, p. 553). Intermittent mundane contact is not usually location specific – it can happen along a street, in a bus, in a shop – but chances are increased when a location is busier, when there are estab- lished temporal patterns of use, where there are nodes (paths crossing or points of gathering), and where the atmosphere of the space is relaxed rather than stressed (Koch and Latham 2012). Authors often made reference to Putnam’s framework of bonding and bridging (2000) in being specific about qualities of ethnic integration – in which “bonding” describes interactions within a known group, and “bridging” describes interactions between groups. Was there evidence for outdoor situated encounters that bridged the difference, especially in ways that might be conceived as meaningful and going beyond the fleeting? Certainly more frequent reference was made to bonding social connections, developing and strengthening relationships within a group with some aspect of common identity. This seemed most common with relation to youth networks (Clayton 2009, Reynolds 2013) but also seen by clustering of social groups of different ages and backgrounds in parks (Neal et al. 2015) and in habits of elderly Yemani migrants sitting on benches outside the Mosque in Sheffield (Powell and Rishbeth 2012). Conversely, though there were many examples of bridging conviviality and loose ties, for example conversations at markets (Watson 2009, Hiebert et al. 2015), the literature very rarely offered any specific instances of these fleeting encounters devel- oping into ongoing friendships across ethnic groups. The only times this dynamic was specifically LOCAL ENVIRONMENT 11 D ow nl oa de d by [ U ni ve rs it y of S he ff ie ld ] at 0 4: 13 3 1 O ct ob er 2 01 7 noted (still somewhat inconclusively) were times and places related to sport and exercise: playing knockabout football (Clayton 2009), and more organised group activities such as fitness bootcamps (Neal et al. 2015) and healthy walking (Powell and Rishbeth 2012). While it is important to note this lack of specific evidence, it does not necessarily negate the broader thrust of the collected findings in representing the importance of the public realm for ongoing sociability. Incidental and serendipitous encounters of the kind noted in local public spaces will mostly not instigate friendships, but they may be an “important positive precursor” (Phillips and Robinson 2015) instrumental in developing from acquaintance to friend, and providing a means by which cross-cultural bridging capital is strengthened. While noticing the points of common connection, it is also important to pay attention to places where the visibility of ethnic identities may influence or re-enforce private prejudice (Valentine 2008). The urban condition of “the being together of strangers” (Young 1990) is inevitably shaped by notions of self and others, and often reflects broader stereotypes, especially in contexts of per- sonal unease. One of the strengths of careful ethnographic research is the chance to hear from dis- parate voices about the dynamics and effects of “being in public”, and gain a better understanding of how these are shaped by the values of the “viewer”. What is often socially constructed as morally reprehensible and anti-social for non-Roma is actually seen as being social, hospitable and inclusionary by Roma themselves. For example, “loitering on street corners” is actually socialising with friends and “improper” rubbish disposal is actually forms of recycling and income generation. (Clark 2014, p. 8) Wessendorf (2013) in her study of Hackney noted the importance of an “ethos of mixing”. Cultural defined groups (not exclusively ethnically identified in this research) were judged negatively as not wanting to mix (Orthodox Jews and Hipsters) compared to groups viewed more positively (Turkish and Vietnamese). This perception was shaped by the visual presence (or absence) of a low-key participation, often simply a “turning up” in community and commercial interactions, local shops, schools, playgrounds and summer fetes. The findings of the meta-synthesis highlight the relevance of location as well as identity being important in developing perception, and also to the impact of this on free movement and equal par- ticipation in public space. Clayton (2012, p. 1674) asserts “identities and everyday opportunities are constrained by the requirement for BME [Black and Minority Ethnic] young people to negotiate and adapt to dominant spaces of whiteness” (Nayak 2003, Back 2005). This is reiterated in the findings across the papers examined here, many of which reflect stigmatisation and fixing of identity based on class and socio-economic status (Skeggs 2004). It is not surprising that groups at the bottom of these hierarchies – in the UK these might commonly be identified as young people, black, Muslim, new migrants – are those who are most vulnerable to being “othered” and impacted by the lived experience of prejudice enacted in urban spaces (Garner 2007). There was clear evidence of “avoidance strategies” (Van der Burgt 2015) being used by people who felt negatively judged by their visibility in certain spaces across the city. These can reflect entrenched political and cultural divides, as described most poignantly in the Northern Ireland nor- malisation of ethno-national territorial landscapes “our kids can’t use that park. Any time they try to use it they’re stoned out” (Selim 2015, p. 21). The street as a place of public gaze was important as a staging of cultural values; Powell and Rishbeth (2012) noting a young Yemeni woman as feeling judged when walking in particular residential streets “because there are a lot of Arab men and women always looking you and judging you … seeing if your scarf is on properly” (p. 77). Ethnic back- ground or racial appearance is commonly combined with age and gender to inform perceptions of safety or unsafety. “Women, particularly Muslims, felt especially vulnerable when walking in public spaces, commenting that ‘you get hassled’, ‘targeted’, ‘picked on’” (Philips et al. 2007, p. 230). Being isolated was also commonly cited as a problem, with people from non-white backgrounds worried about relocating to, or even passing through, predominately white neighbourhoods where they felt more exposed to a racist gaze (Philips et al. 2007, Clayton 2009, Powell and Rishbeth 12 C. RISHBETH ET AL. D ow nl oa de d by [ U ni ve rs it y of S he ff ie ld ] at 0 4: 13 3 1 O ct ob er 2 01 7 2012, Reynolds 2013). Parks and greenspaces, though valued by many, were also cited as problematic localities, probably due to the low levels of use which can make users, especially young people, feel vulnerable to hate crime (Cattell et al. 2008, Clayton 2009). Throughout the synthesis of the research papers, drawing together accounts of very different localities and diverse groups, it is possible to evidence and give life to some simple, but often over- looked, understandings for urban design. The use of public space reflects the heterogeneity of society: “normal use” or a “normal user” does not exist. People are perceived differently relating to intersections of gender, racial and ethnic, age and class identities. The experience of these stereo- types and judgments over time can contribute to practices of segregation in spatial and temporal terms. However, conviviality and incidental participation in the outdoor public realm can have a double benefit, to establish a sense shared humanity of everyday life between two or more people, and in giving visibility to others of a commonplace diversity that shapes new ideas about local belonging. Ethnography informing design practice We argue that these understandings can and need to inform practice. We suggest that engaging with ethnographic research, as represented by this meta-synthesis, does give some direction for priorities, which we outline below. Undoubtedly these need to be tested and refined with regard to local con- texts. These are not intended to be only of relevance in ethnically diverse locations; on the contrary, they describe broadly applicable good practice. But we suggest they are especially important in areas of high ethnic diversity, whether in urban neighbourhoods historically shaped by migration or areas of new housing, and are one way in which planning and design practice can improve intercultural connectivity and combat inequalities in the urban realm. Firstly, support activity in the public realm that allows for low-barrier, straightforward participation. Many of the times and places that were notable for conviviality with and among strangers were places of purposeful doing, and the actions associated with this were simply understood and unde- manding. Markets, playgrounds and sports facilities allow people to play clearly defined roles (shopper, parent, footballer), alongside others but without requiring extensive conversation. A paral- lel can be drawn with findings of positive intercultural engagements in commercial chain cafes (Jones et al. 2015); the relative uniformity and codes of behaviour of these establishments allows for easy expertise and equality that appears to support a sense of shared experience. Though we hope outdoor places would not aim to emulate the blandness of corporate branding of chain cafes, these spaces shape an interesting challenge for thinking through how people from diverse back- grounds can easily do something alongside each other in public environments. An appropriate plan- ning and design approach may be to identify busy locations in the city or neighbourhood, and examine how the first step to participation may be made easier. The ethos of the “public” in urban space also gives affordance for something often limited in indoor spaces, diversity of activity. Participation in public space may be varied: paddling in fountains, people watching, photo taking, lunch eating, reading, playing sport, shopping, resting, listening to music, smoking, drinking, skateboarding, mending cars, using phones, doing homework, running, walking dogs, barbequing, tai chi, cycling, waiting. So, secondly, management approaches should legitimise different uses of public space wherever possible, recognising leisure as socially con- structed, and in nearly all instances reflective simply of different forms of socialising and relaxation. Co-locations of multiple activities, with thoughtful design to address possible practical conflicts, can help engender the dynamic of elective leisure (Neal et al. 2015) and a shared awareness of everyday multiculture (Wise and Velayutham 2009). Thirdly, maximise the potential of the edges of busy places to provide opportunities for micro- retreat, thus enabling longer conversations. The research suggests that fleeting positive encounters happen in diverse areas where there is ongoing movements of people, especially taking into account repeated temporalities such as work commutes, shopping habits, school day routines. Busyness is LOCAL ENVIRONMENT 13 D ow nl oa de d by [ U ni ve rs it y of S he ff ie ld ] at 0 4: 13 3 1 O ct ob er 2 01 7 useful for spontaneous encounters, but nearby quietness gives an invitation to extend that encounter, an exemplar here may be a café located in the market (Watson 2009). This may be a pocket park near a school, or simply a well-positioned bench (Bynon and Rishbeth 2015). It may mean paying attention to making attractive the nodes within the flow, bus stops, stations and the entrances to buildings such as supermarkets and libraries. Strategic allocations of resources for high-quality environments should priorities these connections and affordances, and ensure they are safe to use. Finally, by focusing on planning, design and management for pleasurable places of encounter, is there a danger of neglecting the challenge of inequality? More intensively managed, higher quality public spaces are generally located in more affluent neighbourhoods rather than the typical urban areas of settlement for new migrants characterised by disadvantage and stretched service provision (Phillips and Robinson 2015). People from non-white backgrounds are more likely to be victims of crime, and therefore, more likely to make choices about how to use public space based in part on previous experiences of racial harassment (Clayton 2012, May 2015). These are entrenched issues, and while the built environment professions cannot address them in isolation, there is a requirement not to exacerbate the problem, and to think creatively where changes might have the most impact. Perceptions of hanging out as problematic, for example Roma people “loitering on street corners” (Clark 2014, p. 41) or Kurdish men clustering in a derelict garage (Powell and Rishbeth 2012) may be gradually addressed if places of seating are available which are clearly attractive, hospitable and designed for gathering in groups. Resource allocation should seek to right historic inequalities with regard to scarcity of resources (even if that resource is prosaic a ball playing cage (Clayton 2009)), so that the need for local competitive behaviour is reduced. Equally, reducing crime (or per- ceptions of crime) is not unrelated to the provision of pleasurable places that encourage lingering across different sectors of society, age, gender, class and ethnic background. Busy places with diverse activities, flows of users and high levels of visibility and people watching provide Jacob’s “eyes on the street” and improve safety for all (Jacobs 1961). Conclusion In this concluding section, we review the significance of the above findings, reflecting on the strengths and limitations of engaging with ethnographic research to improve cultural competency in the built environment professions (Agyeman 2012). There are provocative challenges. It is reason- able to argue that ethnographers are too cautious in engaging with the potential, politics and practi- calities of changing urban places, that they draw back from a means of curating and communicating their research for decision-making. They appear to be wary of being seen as deterministic or simplis- tic, unable to state, even provisionally, how their in-depth expertise may provide valuable learning in broader professional contexts. Equally, a general enthusiasm for socially focused design (e.g. Gehl and Gemzoe 1996) can lead to complacency among landscape architects and urban designers, a serious lack of criticality. It is not appropriate to promote parks as cheerful melting pots of diverse friendships and shared leisure without also addressing issues of intimidation and racially motivated hate crime. The scope of this paper can be framed as a call for ethnographers to consider the influence their research may have with regard to urban design. Our methodological process demonstrates that data from ethnographic research can be of high value in refining questions, shaping priorities, and some- times informing the detail, of urban design practice. We note that the focus of our inquiry was often significantly different from the aims of the original research, and would have benefited from being able to access information and contexts that that ethnographers do not necessarily find meaningful to highlight in their published research; the most significant example of this is the need for visual information regarding the spatial qualities of discussed places such as parks. This critique offers an opportunity in institutional settings in which the applications and “impact” of research are increas- ingly foregrounded (in the UK context this is now embedded in the Research Excellence Framework (Khazragui and Hudson 2015)). Clearly the findings need to become accessible, curated and 14 C. RISHBETH ET AL. D ow nl oa de d by [ U ni ve rs it y of S he ff ie ld ] at 0 4: 13 3 1 O ct ob er 2 01 7 communicated with a view to an applied relevance; and the academics themselves are unlikely to be able to independently make these judgements. Strategic collaboration between ethnographers and built environment academics (or practitioners) can serve to capture, focus and share rich data and offers the former the intellectual challenge of explicitly engaging with the future shape of urban areas. In this paper we proposed four principles for practice: maximising straightforward participation, legitimising diversity of activity, designing in micro-retreats of nearby quietness and addressing struc- tural inequalities of open space provision. In formulating these, demonstrably derived from the meta- synthesis data, we suggest it is possible to “stick your neck out” – not to claim universality but to start a discussion on decisions and priorities that can be engaged with beyond the local. It is an argument both for the importance of the form of physical design, and that ethnographic findings can constitute a first step in the process of designing inclusive public spaces. There is a need to better embed eth- nographic methods into urban design education, learning from disciplines such as sociology and anthropology the importance of explicitly engaging with cultural difference, inequality and power relationships. Over time this supports development of the cultural competencies of urban design pro- fessionals (Agyeman and Erickson 2012, Rios 2015), and shapes a professional body engaged and skilled at responding to the cultural complexities shaped by globalisation and superdiversity across different scales of the urban environment. In calling for collaboration, we also affirm the need for urban design ethnographers, the need for research methods and questions to emerge and be shaped within urban design and landscape archi- tecture scholarship. Currently exemplified by some of the academics listed earlier (Hou, Mandipour, Mehta, Rishbeth, Rios, Kim and others), the scope and ambition of work needs to be expanded and given more strategic impact within professional bodies, educational centres and pan-national organ- isations. Academic research in this area is often connected with practice, and there are clear benefits to engaging with multiple case studies across different contexts to move away from perceiving ethnic diversity as a “fringe issue”. The Interdisciplinary Centre for Urban Culture and Public Space, (SkuOR, Austria2), which focuses on international and cross-cultural perspectives and exploration of unique local cultural, social and professional practices offers one relevant model. We finish by reiterating the need for an authentic professional engagement with ethnic difference and changing population profiles. In thinking through dimensions of racial and ethnic diversity in public space, it is important to recognise the potential of convivial encounters while not turning a blind eye to seemingly entrenched power structures. For too long, these dynamics have been overly simplified, with a cultural dimension largely missing from critiques of sociability in public space, and a failure to recognise racial inequality in public space access and use. We suggest that it is ethical, timely and relevant to debate how urban and landscape design can play a vital role in a more culturally competent and socially equitable society. Notes 1. Conference programme: http://www.udg.org.uk/events/urban-design-all-toward-life-less-ordinary 2. Institution website: http://skuor.tuwien.ac.at/en/about/structure Acknowledgements This work develops findings and positions explored in the ‘Walking Voices’ research supported by the UK Economic and Social Research Council [RES-000-22-1797]. We are also grateful to the anonymous peer reviewers for their helpful advice in strengthening the final paper. ORCID Clare Rishbeth http://orcid.org/0000-0002-1648-5183 Farnaz Ganji http://orcid.org/0000-0002-6707-0981 Goran Vodicka http://orcid.org/0000-0002-7730-3507 LOCAL ENVIRONMENT 15 D ow nl oa de d by [ U ni ve rs it y of S he ff ie ld ] at 0 4: 13 3 1 O ct ob er 2 01 7 http://www.udg.org.uk/events/urban-design-all-toward-life-less-ordinary http://skuor.tuwien.ac.at/en/about/structure http://orcid.org/0000-0002-1648-5183 http://orcid.org/0000-0002-6707-0981 http://orcid.org/0000-0002-7730-3507 References Agyeman, J., 2012. Cultural competency: towards culturally inclusive practice [online]. Julian Agyeman. Re-imagining equal- ity, living within limits. Available from: http://julianagyeman.com/2012/08/cultural-competency-towards-culturally- inclusive-practice/ [Accessed 20 Nov 2015]. Agyeman, J., 2013. Introducing just sustainabilities. London: Zed Books. 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D ow nl oa de d by [ U ni ve rs it y of S he ff ie ld ] at 0 4: 13 3 1 O ct ob er 2 01 7 http://www.udg.org.uk/sites/default/files/uploads/Conference-2014-Programme.pdf Abstract Introduction Intercultural competency in current urban design practice, policy and scholarship Methodology Developing a meta-synthesis of urban ethnographic urban research Overview of research projects and publications UK contexts relating to superdiversity and urban space A socio-spatial analysis of public space use in ethnically diverse locations Spaces of shared activities Parks as spaces of shared leisure Streets as spaces of passing-by Spaces of retreat and nearby quietness Intercultural social dynamics in outdoor places Ethnography informing design practice Conclusion Notes Acknowledgements ORCID References 
work_sa5wjqdnarcrjlorsddnmymm7i	----	Beyond Backlash: Assessing the Impact of Judicial Decisions on LGBT Rights Beyond Backlash: Assessing the Impact of Judicial Decisions on LGBT Rights Thomas M. Keck This article evaluates the widespread scholarly claim that the courtroom vic- tories of the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender rights movement have invariably provoked a counterproductive political backlash. Those victories have indeed provoked conservative countermobilization, but that has not been their only or even their most prominent effect. Assessing the political reaction to the movement’s judicial victories, the policy impact of those vic- tories, and the alternative strategic paths that were available to the movement at the outset, I argue that here, as elsewhere, legal mobilization has sometimes been a promising avenue for pursuing policy changes whose prospects were otherwise quite limited. J udicial decisions defending the rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) persons have regularly been criticized for going too far, too fast. It is no surprise that opponents of gay rights have denounced these decisions as examples of illegitimate judicial activism, but some supporters of gay rights have also criticized them as strategically unwise. In doing so, these supporters have echoed a long-standing scholarly argument that rights-based litigation strategies are ineffective at best and counterproductive at worst. In the gay rights context, one version of this argument has been particularly prominent: even when rights advocates win in court, those victories inevitably spark a political backlash, with the voters and their elected representatives reversing the judicial decisions and enacting regressive policies that are worse than the status quo ante. A closer inspection of the actual sequence of victories and de- feats for LGBT rights advocates in the United States, both in court and out, complicates this backlash narrative to a significant degree. Law & Society Review, Volume 43, Number 1 (2009) r 2009 Law and Society Association. All rights reserved. 151 For helpful comments on or assistance with this article as it proceeded through various drafts, I would like to thank Jeb Barnes, David Garrow, Julie Gozan, Bill Haltom, Art Leonard, Richard Price, Carroll Seron, Ken Sherrill, Stephen Siegel, Miriam Smith, and several anonymous reviewers. In addition, Professor Leonard’s monthly publication, Les- bian/Gay Law Notes, was an invaluable resource. Please address correspondence to Thomas M. Keck, Department of Political Science, Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY 13244-1090; e-mail: tmkeck@maxwell.syr.edu. i:/BWUS/lsr/370/tmkeck@maxwell.syr.edu Judicial decisions supporting LGBT rights have repeatedly fueled political countermobilization, but that has not been their only or even their most prominent effect. To the contrary, litigation has contributed in a variety of ways to expanding the rights of LGBT persons to act on their sexual identities without government interference, to be protected from invidious discrimination, and to form family relationships that are recognized by the state. If the backlash thesis is misleading even in this contextFwhich its proponents have recently adopted as an illustrative case providing clear confirmation of their preexisting thesisFthen it may be worth reexamination in other contexts as well. The Backlash Thesis One of the leading claims of the scholarly literature on the limits of judicial power is that unpopular judicial decisions provoke political reactions that undercut their effectiveness. This thesis has been developed most fully by Klarman, who has argued for more than a decade that the chief impact of the Supreme Court’s landmark de- cision in Brown v. Board of Education (1954) was to exacerbate the racist rhetoric and segregationist policies that characterized Southern politics at the time. On Klarman’s account, Brown sparked massive resistance, polarizing Southern racial politics and undermining the efforts of white moderates. As a result, when Southern blacks turned to direct action protest in the early 1960s, they were met with in- creasing violence. Because it was Northern revulsion at Bull Connor’s fire hoses and police dogs that led to the 1964 Civil Rights Act, Klar- man sometimes suggests that the Brown litigation ultimately produced progress on civil rights (Klarman 2004:385, 441–2; see also 1994). At other times, however, he emphasizes that racial liberalism was grad- ually but steadily advancing before the Court clumsily intervened, sparking a resurgence of white supremacy and thus undermining the very cause the justices were hoping to promote (2004:442, 464–5). Toward the end of his 2004 book on civil rights, Klarman identifies same-sex marriage (SSM) litigation as one of several recent examples that fit the counterproductive pattern set by Brown (2004:465). Elab- orating the claim in a subsequent article, he insists that the Massa- chusetts high court’s landmark 2003 decision legalizing SSM met a fate similar to that which followed every other effort by judges to defend a rights claim that lacked popular support: ‘‘The most sig- nificant short-term consequence of Goodridge [v. Department of Public Health 2003], as with Brown, may have been the political backlash that it inspired. By outpacing public opinion on issues of social reform, such rulings mobilize opponents, undercut moderates, and retard the cause they purport to advance’’ (Klarman 2005:482). 152 Impact of Judicial Decisions on LGBT Rights Like Klarman, Rosenberg is most well known for his revisionist and pessimistic account of Brown but has also advanced a similarly negative assessment of contemporary SSM litigation. Where Klar- man has long emphasized the political backlash sparked by Brown, Rosenberg has generally characterized the decision as inconse- quential rather than counterproductive, emphasizing that judges are usually unwilling and always unable to impose unpopular rights on the nation at large. In the original 1991 edition of The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change?, Rosenberg noted the backlash phenomenon only in passing, and he even re- sponded to an early version of Klarman’s argument by objecting that Klarman had overstated Brown’s negative impact (1991:342, 1994; see also Garrow 1994). In a revised 2008 edition of The Hollow Hope, however, Rosenberg has added 80 pages of new ma- terial on SSM litigation, extensively documenting the conservative countermobilization that followed the LGBT rights movement’s state high court victories in Hawaii, Vermont, and Massachusetts. According to this backlash narrative, SSM litigators won three big cases from 1993 to 2003, but each of these judicial decisions provoked political setbacks that made things worse. The Hawaii Supreme Court’s 1993 decision in Baehr v. Lewin reached no final judgment on the state’s discriminatory marriage laws but imposed a legal standard for justifying those laws that the state was unlikely to meet. Far from advancing the cause, however, this judicial vic- tory produced a state constitutional amendment reversing the de- cision, a similar state constitutional amendment reversing a copycat judicial decision in Alaska, a federal statute declaring that the na- tional government would not recognize SSMs and authorizing state governments to refuse such recognition as well, and statutory bans on SSM in more than 30 states by the end of 1999. At that point, the Vermont Supreme Court revived the movement’s hopes by ordering the state to extend all the rights and benefits of marriage (though not the name) to same-sex couples, but this victory in Baker v. State of Vermont was followed by six more states banning SSM, including constitutional bans in Nebraska and Nevada. In Vermont itself, the state legislature responded to the court by enacting a Civil Unions Act in 2000, but the legislators paid for this decision at the polls, with an unusually large number of incumbents voted out of office later that year. Finally, 2003 witnessed the U.S. Supreme Court’s invalidation of the last remaining criminal sodomy statutes in Lawrence v. Texas, followed several months later by the first de- cision from an American court to actually legalize SSM (Goodridge v. Department of Public Health 2003). In a pattern that should now be clear, these landmark victories led to significant electoral setbacks, including President George W. Bush’s reelection the following year and the enactment of 23 new state constitutional bans on SSM by Keck 153 2006. In sum, the litigation campaigns waged by LGBT rights ad- vocates have regularly provoked both electoral and policy setbacks, reversing the gains won in court and producing executives, legislatures, and eventually judiciaries that are less supportive of LGBT rights than they were before. Despite objections from a number of quarters, the general ar- gument about the limited and unintended consequences of judicial decisions has been widely influential. This account is sometimes presented as a cautionary lesson for judges, urging them to temper principle with prudence (Posner 1997; Rosen 2003, 2006; Sunstein 1996:96–8). In addition to this lesson about judicial humility, the backlash account is often framed as a warning to (or rebuke of ) movement activists, whose purportedly unreasonable demands for the courts to guarantee equal marriage rights are blamed for every subsequent political setback. The most recent iteration of this ar- gument has revolved around whether SSM advocates are to blame for President Bush’s 2004 reelection, but the wisdom of the SSM lawsuits has been a subject of considerable debate within the LGBT rights movement for a long time. When the Hawaii suit was filed in 1991, most leaders of the movement opposed the effort. The case was initiated by three same-sex couples and their private attorney, and both the Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund and the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) declined invitations to sign on. Writing two years earlier, the executive director of Lambda Legal had noted that ‘‘[a]s far as [he could] tell, no gay organization of any size, local or national, [had] yet declared the right to marry as one of its goals’’ (Stoddard 1989:11–12). This choice was partly ideologicalFsome gays and lesbians had no interest in joining the patriarchal institution of marriageFbut it was partly strategic as well, with most advocates concluding that the goal was politically unattainable at the time. The organized movement is now fully committed to the SSM campaign, but some of its most prominent scholarly supporters have continued to object on strategic grounds. Relying heavily on Rosenberg’s account, Rimmerman has emphasized the limited capacity of judicial institutions to effectively construct and implement public policy and has suggested that the 1993 Baehr decision did ‘‘more for opponents of lesbian and gay marriage than for its proponents’’ (2002:78). Expressing the point even more sharply, D’Emilio has complained that ‘‘[t]he campaign for same-sex marriage has been an unmitigated disaster. Never in the history of organized queerdom have we seen defeats of this magnitude.’’ In fact, ‘‘[t]he battle to win marriage equality through the courts has done something that no other campaign or issue in our movement has done: it has created a vast body of new antigay law’’ (2006:10, emphasis in original; see also 2007:59). Echoing the conclusions of the Rosenberg/Klarman thesis, 154 Impact of Judicial Decisions on LGBT Rights these internal movement critics have complained that litigation leads either to judicial defeats that achieve nothing or to judicial ‘‘victories’’ that provoke a counterproductive backlash. Either way, litigation campaigns draw resources from alternative strategies that are likely to be more effective. A number of detailed scholarly accounts of LGBT rights litiga- tion have advanced more optimistic (or at least more nuanced) assessments, but these works have drawn less attention than have the broad critiques of litigation. In a noteworthy comparative study, Smith (2008) has argued that the American LGBT rights movement has been less successful than its Canadian counterpart over the past 15 years, but that much of the success that both movements have had has been the product of litigation. Likewise, Andersen’s definitive study of Lambda Legal emphasizes ‘‘both the promise and the limits of legal mobilization as a tactic for achieving social reform’’ and makes clear that ‘‘there are at least some circum- stances in which reformers can be served by turning to the courts’’ (Andersen 2005:216). Citing Rosenberg, Andersen agrees that ‘‘courts do not have the capacity to produce social change when their decisions diverge too radically from the values and expecta- tions of the other two branches of government,’’ but she insists nonetheless that ‘‘litigation [has] produced some favorable shifts in the legal and cultural frames surrounding gay rights’’ (2005: 216–18). Eskridge likewise acknowledges the ‘‘antigay backlash’’ provoked by Baehr but also notes that ‘‘the litigation in Hawaii sowed the seeds for [the subsequent litigation in] Vermont’’ (Eskridge 2002:26, 45). Drawing on interviews with many of the key partic- ipants, Eskridge concludes that ‘‘Baehr opened up lesbian and gay imaginations to the possibility that their relationships might be rec- ognized by the state as civil marriages, and it can hardly be surpris- ing that many of the galvanized ended up as plaintiffs in court’’ (2002:45). Drawing on a similar set of interviews a few years later, Pinello argues that Goodridge brought about enormous social change . . .. With nearly all other state and national policy makers at odds with its goal, the Massachusetts [high court] nonetheless achieved singular success in expanding the ambit of who receives the benefits of getting mar- ried in America, in inspiring political elites elsewhere in the country to follow suit, and in mobilizing grass-roots supporters to entrench their legal victory politically. (2006:192–3; see also Mezey 2007) Courts and Causal Mechanisms These competing assessments are rooted in competing con- ceptions of judicial power and historical change. If American courts Keck 155 are too weak to do anything helpful, then LGBT rights advocates should stop appealing to them for help. But if litigation sometimes has positiveFeven if complexFeffects, then it may remain a promising avenue for pursuing policy changes whose prospects are otherwise quite limited. The original edition of The Hollow Hope (Rosenberg 1991) sparked a vigorous debate in the sociolegal literature, and from the beginning, one of the chief complaints has been that Rosenberg’s account of social change conveyed a sense of inevitability that ob- scured the contingencies of human history (McCann 1992, 1996; Garrow 1994). Rosenberg (1991:169) and Klarman (2004:468; 1994:14) each argue that mid-twentieth-century racial progress would have occurred regardless of the actions of judges and lawyers, and in their recent work, they have each extended this causal narrative to the gay rights context. Klarman emphasizes that ‘‘[t]he demographics of public opinion on issues of sexual orientation virtually ensure that one day in the not-too-distant future a substantial majority of Americans will support same-sex marriage’’ (2005:484–5), and Rosenberg likewise details the increasing public acceptance of gays and lesbians, as evidenced by public opinion polls, legislative change, the policies of leading corporations and professional associations, and the representation of gays and lesbians on television and in movies (2008:407–15). They each argue that discrimination against gays and lesbians has decreased in recent decades, but that ‘‘these changes are not primarily the result of litigation. Rather, they are the result of a changing culture’’ (Rosenberg 2008:415; see also Klarman 2005: 484–5; D’Emilio 2005:12, 2006:10–11). Treating law and culture as wholly separate independent vari- ables, these accounts fail to adequately explore the causal signifi- cance of the litigation campaigns. Rosenberg is surely correct that the television shows Ellen and Will & Grace have helped make LGBT persons more visible and less hated than before, but it is not clear why he treats this claim as mutually exclusive with the prop- osition that SSM lawsuits have helped make LGBT persons more visible and less hated than before. Likewise, it is certainly true that controversial court decisions sometimes provoke immediate and hostile political reactions, but even then, their long-term causal implications tend to be complex and multidirectional. Unpacking these causal dynamics can be difficult, but the alternative is to accept an overly simple set of causal attributions. Throughout the Clinton and Bush eras, the legal and political conflicts over LGBT rights have been highly decentralized, with multiple simultaneous battles proceeding in various state judiciaries, 12 federal circuits, and at times the Supreme Court, the White House and the gover- nors’ mansions, the halls of Congress and the state legislatures, and in about half the states, the direct democracy process as well. As Smith has argued at some length, this sort of institutional 156 Impact of Judicial Decisions on LGBT Rights fragmentation has slowed the pace of LGBT rights progress in the United States, contributing to a constant and complex pattern of starts and stops, advances and retreats, successes and failures (2008:182). Amidst this configuration of causal forces, however, there are a variety of mechanisms by which litigation and court decisions have sometimes produced meaningful change. Most directly, court orders are sometimes effectively imple- mented. In at least 20 states, for example, litigation led directly to the decriminalization of consensual sodomy, with a long series of state-court victories from 1990 to 2002, followed by the U.S. Supreme Court’s landmark 2003 decision in Lawrence. Similarly, while much has been made of the political reaction to judicial de- cisions expanding partnership rights, state officials have complied with the vast majority of those decisions, including the widely noted cases legalizing SSM or civil unions (CUs) in Vermont, Massachu- setts, New Jersey, and California, as well as a number of state court decisions expanding partnership rights in smaller ways.1 Even where advocates have relied primarily on legislative strategies, litigation has sometimes been necessary to remove legal barriers to such legislative change. For example, LGBT rights advocates have won statutory protections against employment dis- crimination in 20 states, along with similar protections in a number of local jurisdictions. Each of these policy changes was the result of legislative action, but in at least one state, such legislative action was constitutionally precluded until the Rehnquist Court’s 1996 deci- sion in Romer v. Evans. By persuading the High Court to invalidate the Colorado constitutional provision prohibiting such antidis- crimination protections, LGBT rights litigators enabled the state’s legislature to adopt these protections a decade later. If not for this decision, moreover, opponents of gay rights would have replicated Colorado’s Amendment 2 in other states, and it is likely that the effort to enact antidiscrimination protections via democratic means would have been closed off in a substantial portion of the country. Less directly, but no less significantly, successful instances of rights-claiming often heighten expectations that further change is possible, particularly by ‘‘altering the expectations of potential activists that already apparent injustices might realistically be challenged at a particular point in time’’ (McCann 1994:89; see also 1 The earliest such decision I am aware of is Braschi v. Stahl Associates Company, 74 N.Y.2d 201 (NY Ct. of App. 1989), in which the ACLU’s Lesbian and Gay Rights Project persuaded New York’s high court to construe the term family member in New York City’s Rent and Eviction regulations to include domestic partners. See also Tanner v. Oregon Health Sciences University, 971 P.2d 435 (Or. Ct. of App. 1998); Snetsinger v. Montana University System, 104 P.3d 445 (Sup. Ct. Mon. 2004); Alaska Civil Liberties Union v. Alaska, 122 P.3d 781 (Sup. Ct. Alas. 2005); and Martinez v. County of Monroe, 850 N.Y.S.2d 740 (App. Div. 4 th Dept. 2008). Keck 157 Garrow 1994). In this regard, as Eskridge has argued, the Baehr decision ‘‘contributed to the politics of recognition by stirring the aspirations of GLBT people everywhere in the country’’ (Eskridge 2002:3). Indeed, every judicial decision expanding marriage rights for same-sex couples has inspired more couples to claim such rights. The courtroom victories in Hawaii sparked further litigation in Alaska and, even more important, political organizing followed by further litigation in Vermont (Andersen 2005:183–4, 197–8). In turn, the courtroom victory in Vermont sparked the litigation that led to Goodridge (2003), with Mary Bonauto of Gay & Lesbian Advocates & Defenders (GLAD) serving as lead attorney in both New England cases. And the most immediate and widespread reaction to Goodridge was not opposition, but mass public action by supporters, with thou- sands of same-sex couples holding public weddings in almost every region of the country. Drawing on interviews with 50 such couples, Pinello argues that Goodridge led to a significant increase in political participation among LGBT persons. Indeed, the decision ‘‘had a profound inspirational effect for the marriage movement, among elites and the grass roots . . .. Time and again, same-sex couples volunteered in interviews across the nation that they never expected marriage to be available to them during their lifetimes. Yet Goodridge opened a floodgate of heightened expectations’’ (2006:190–3). In addition to heightening expectations among supporters, legal mobilization can sometimes transform the agenda of the nation’s lawmakers as well. Before the 1993 Baehr decision, no state legis- lature had passed even a limited domestic partnership bill; the vast majority were unwilling even to consider the issue. But the decision had what Eskridge calls an ‘‘agenda-seizing’’ effect (2002:3), fueling the efforts by advocates on both sides and drawing the broader public’s attention as well. McCann has demonstrated that ‘‘[o]ne key to effective legal mobilization as a movement building strategy [is] the tremendous amount of mainstream media attention generated by dramatic . . . lawsuits’’ (McCann 1994:58), and Rosenberg doc- uments an exponential increase in media coverage of SSM from 1980 to 2004 (Rosenberg 2008:382–400). Rosenberg argues that the rise in coverage was driven more by the political reaction to the litigation than by the litigation itself, but even so, the litigants had launched a process that transformed the issue from one that law- makers everywhere were ignoring to one that was firmly placed on the nation’s agenda. Once there, of course, SSM advocates lost many of the legislative battles to come, but they won some battles too, with elected legislators in 12 states voting to expand the legal rights of same-sex couples between 1997 and 2008. One reason lawmakers became increasingly willing to expand partnership rights after Baehr is that the Hawaii decision imme- diately changed domestic partnership policies from radical, 158 Impact of Judicial Decisions on LGBT Rights cutting-edge proposals to moderate compromises (Dupuis 2002:92; Andersen 2005:237). In other words, by pushing the policy enve- lope, ambitious litigation can clear space for legislative progress in its wake. In Hawaii itself, the 1993 Baehr decision led to the state’s 1997 Reciprocal Beneficiaries Act, which fell far short of full equality but nonetheless granted gay and lesbian couples more legal rights than anywhere else in the nation at the time. Asking for too much, too soon is sometimes counterproductive, but aggressive demands can also shift the spectrum of compromise in valuable ways. In this sense, every state legislature that has expanded partnership rights has done so in the shadow of the ongoing litigation campaign. The operation of this causal mechanism does not require judges to per- suade or enlighten legislators who were once opposed or blinded, though Eskridge (2002) and Pinello (2006) have documented several instances in which that appears to have occurred. The mechanism simply requires judges to provide political cover for legislators to declare their support for a policy that they previously considered too great a political liability. In this regard, it is no coincidence that a steady stream of state legislatures has enacted antidiscrimination laws while the SSM conflict has proceeded in the courts. Opponents of gay rights once fought these policies tooth and nail, but compared to equal marriage rights, the prohibition of employment discrimination now seems significantly less threatening. Even when they spark substantial opposition, moreover, court decisions can change the policy status quo in ways that are difficult to reverse. As Smith (2008) has argued, LGBT rights have pro- gressed more rapidly in Canada than in the United States in part because of the greater degree of centralized authority in Canada’s parliamentary system. But once gay rights advocates have won a policy victory in the United States, the famously gridlocked American lawmaking process begins to work in their favor. Before Baker (1999) and Goodridge (2003), SSM opponents in Vermont and Massachusetts needed only to block legislative proposals to expand partnership rights, while SSM supporters had to run the gauntlet of legislating in a system of separated powers. After the decisions, those positions were reversed. In addition to reversing the relevant veto points, these deci- sions immediately created a group of people with a vested interest in defending the new, legally recognized same-sex partnerships. In the first eight months of SSM in Massachusetts, more than 6,000 gay and lesbian couples married, and many of these 12,000 citizens subsequently expended significant political effort to defend their existing marriages (see Table 4 ahead). Once these marriages were in place, moreover, it became more difficult for opponents to maintain that they would have severely negative social conse- quences. In a development that SSM advocates predicted, by Keck 159 spring 2005, the vast majority of Massachusetts residents indicated to pollsters that SSM had had no negative impact on the quality of life in the state (Garrow 2004; Adams 2005). In a variety of ways, then, judicially crafted policies can have significant self-reinforcing effects. By compelling compliance, re- moving barriers to legislative change, heightening expectations, forcing the issue, pushing the policy envelope, providing an excuse for sympathetic or apathetic legislators, reversing the relevant veto points, and creating new constituencies inspired to claim and defend their rights, even unpopular judicial decisions can prove difficult to dislodge. With these causal mechanisms in mind, I turn now to an examination of the broad patterns of legal and political change affecting LGBT rights from May 1993, when the Hawaii Supreme Court first threatened to legalize SSM, through Novem- ber 2008. In the course of this examination, I assess the degree to which these patterns are consistent with three principal claims advanced by backlash proponents: (1) that judicial victories have regularly been followed by political defeats, (2) that the end result has been regressive policy change, and (3) that some other strategic choice would have worked better. The Political Reaction As I have noted, backlash proponents argue that judicial vic- tories are almost always followed by electoral setbacks. This claim is true but partial, as judicial victories are sometimes followed by electoral gains as well. On both counts, the causal relationship between the court decisions and the subsequent developments is complex, but if the judges and litigators are to be blamed for everything bad that follows their decisions, they may deserve some credit for the good things that follow as well. With respect to the initial round of litigation in Hawaii, Rosenberg’s and Klarman’s primary emphasis has been the negative legislative response in Congress and the state capitolsFa policy reaction that I examine belowFbut there were some clear electoral consequences as well. These electoral consequences were mostly, but not entirely, negative. The 1993 Baehr decision came down in the midst of a period of heavy use of ballot initiatives by opponents of gay rights. This strategy had succeeded in Colorado the previous year and was rapidly proliferating nationwide. The chief electoral impact of Baehr was to add SSM bans to the list of antigay policies that were regularly included in these initiatives. The fact that the Hawaii and Alaska electorates voted by significant margins to reverse pro-SSM judicial decisions was certainly a setback for the movement, as were the large number of antigay initiatives adopted at the 160 Impact of Judicial Decisions on LGBT Rights municipal level during this period. Often overlooked are the elec- toral defeats of antigay initiatives in Idaho, Oregon, and Maine, but the balance is clearly negative on the whole, as indicated by the top row of Table 1. In Vermont, the local legislative reaction to the high court ruling was positive, but backlash proponents have emphasized the subsequent electoral setbacks that occurred (Rosenberg 2008: 344–7). On this account, the Baker decision (1999) forced Ver- mont’s legislators to take a politically unacceptable position, and those legislators paid for it at the polls. As Eskridge has noted, the Table 1. Electoral Aftermath of Judicial Victories Time Period Electoral Setbacks Electoral Victories Between HI and VT decisions Antigay initiatives in Cincinnati, OH; Tampa, FL; Lewiston, ME, and 16 localities in OR (1993); Alachua Cty, FL; Austin, TX; Springfield, MO; and 10 localities in OR (1994); ME (1998) Defeat of antigay initiatives in ID, OR (1994); ME and West Palm Beach, FL (1995); Ypsilanti, MI (1998); Spokane, WA (1999) Defeat of antidiscrimination provisions in Lansing, MI (1996); Ft. Collins, CO; Fayetteville, AR; and Ogunquit, ME (1998); Albuquerque, NM; and Greeley, CO (1999) Enactment of antidiscrimination provision in South Portland, ME (1998) Anti-SSM constitutional amendments in HI and AK (1998) Enactment of DP policy in San Francisco (1994) Repeal of DP policy in Northampton, MA (1995) Between VT and MA decisions Statutory ban on SSM in CA and constitutional bans in NE and NV (2000–2002) Democrats retain control of VT Senate and governorship (2000) GOP captures VT House (2000) Defeat of antigay initiatives in OR (2000); Traverse City, Kalamazoo, and Huntington Woods, MI (2001); Miami-Dade Cty, FL; Westbrook, ME; Ypsilanti, MI; and Tacoma, WA (2002) Antigay initiatives in ME and Ferndale, MI (2000) Enactment of DP policies in Miami Beach, FL (2001); Cleveland Heights, OH (2003) Ban on DP benefits in Houston, TX (2001) Enactment of antidiscrimination provisions in Weston, FL (2000); Sarasota, FL (2002) Between MA and NJ decisions Constitutional bans on SSM in 16 states (2004–Oct. 2006) State legislative pickups in MA (2004–2005) Pres. Bush’s reelection and GOP Senate victories in KY, SD, OK (2004) Defeat of antigay initiative in ME and repeal of anti-ay initiative in Cincinnati, OH (2005) Between NJ and CA decisions Constitutional bans on SSM in 7 states (Nov. 2006) Defeat of SSM ban in AZ (2006) Rejection of DP law in CO (Nov. 2006) State legislative pickups in MA (2006) Democrats recapture Congress (2006) Note: DP 5 domestic partnership. Sources: Andersen (2005); Lesbian/Gay Law Notes (1994–present; http://www.qrd.org/ qrd/www/legal/lgln). Keck 161 fall 2000 statewide elections were ‘‘conducted in significant part as a referendum on civil unions’’ (Eskridge 2002:81), and 16 incum- bent legislators who supported the civil union bill were unseated (Eskridge 2002:80–2; Pinello 2006:33; Robinson 2001). This elec- toral backlash was real, but its severity should not be overstated. The state house switched hands from Democratic to Republican, and from pro–civil union to anti-, but the senate and governor’s mansion remained in the hands of civil union supporters. The Democratic governor who signed the civil union bill was reelected handily, as was the Democratic lieutenant governor, who supported full marriage equality. Democrats who supported the civil union bill were elected secretary of state and state auditor as well. The only statewide race won by the GOP was for the U.S. Senate, where incumbent Senator Jim Jeffords bucked his party to support the civil union bill, was reelected in a landslide, and then quit the Republican Party a few months later. The local electoral reaction to the 2003 Goodridge decision was even more striking. As Massachusetts legislators considered their options, there was much discussion about the electoral costs that their colleagues had suffered in Vermont just three years earlier. But this time around, SSM advocates successfully fended off all seven primary challenges faced by their legislative supporters in 2004, while unseating two incumbents who opposed SSM and picking up three open seats as well. SSM supporters picked up three additional seats in special elections held in early 2005, and in 2006, they captured the governor’s mansion as well, with SSM supporter Deval Patrick elected to succeed SSM opponent Gover- nor Mitt Romney (Bonauto 2005; Pinello 2006:45–72). In sum, once Goodridge’s dust had settled, the state’s elected institutions were significantly more supportive of SSM than they had been at the outset. These electoral gains enabled SSM advocates to defeat multiple constitutional amendments designed to reverse the Good- ridge decision, culminating in a June 2007 vote in which SSM opponents were unable to persuade even one-quarter of the state legislators to keep their proposed amendment alive. Contempora- neous accounts attributed this final victory for Goodridge to heavy lobbying by the national gay rights groups and the state Demo- cratic leadership, as well as influential pressure from the legislators’ married gay constituents (Belluck 2007; Phillips & Estes 2007; Wangsness & Estes 2007). The nationwide electoral impact of Goodridge was more com- plex, but it was far from uniformly negative. The most direct result was that voters in 16 states enacted anti-SSM constitutional amend- ments in 2004, 2005, and the first half of 2006. These amendments represented significant policy setbacks for SSM advocates, and they may have had broader electoral consequences as well. Klarman 162 Impact of Judicial Decisions on LGBT Rights emphasizes that they were approved by such large marginsFthe median vote share for these 16 proposals was 73.9 percentFthat they represented a stinging popular rebuke of the Massachusetts judges, and Klarman and Rosenberg each argue that the presence of these amendments on state ballots in November 2004 contrib- uted to President Bush’s reelection and the GOP’s pickup of four additional seats in the U.S. Senate. Since President Bush and the Republican Senate subsequently named then-Judges John Roberts and Samuel Alito to the Supreme Court, Klarman suggests that SSM litigators may bear responsibility for entrenching a conserva- tive judicial majority as well (2005:468). In drawing out these electoral implications, Rosenberg and Klarman each rely more heavily on the post-election spin advanced by SSM opponents than on the leading accounts of the election by professional political scientists. They each note that Republican political adviser Karl Rove ‘‘appeared to stifle a grin’’ when asked whether he was ‘‘indebted’’ to the Massachusetts high court; they each quote Robert Knight’s observation that ‘‘President Bush should send a bouquet of flowers’’ to Massachusetts Chief Justice Margaret Marshall; and they each emphasize the widely noted exit poll in which 22 percent of voters indicated that ‘‘moral values’’ was the most important issue facing the nation (Klarman 2005:467, 482; Rosenberg 2008:370, 376). One of the leading scholars of American elections and public opinion has argued that the wide- spread attribution of President Bush’s reelection to Goodridge is substantially misleading, but neither Rosenberg nor Klarman ad- dresses his arguments (Fiorina et al. 2006:145–57; see also Hillygus & Shields 2005; Egan & Sherrill 2006). Nonetheless, the backlash proponents are certainly correct that the Goodridge decision was polarizing and unpopular and that the national Republican Party stoked this unpopularity with some success in November 2004. Rove and his fellow Republican operatives helped place anti-SSM amendments on the ballot in key swing states, and those initiatives may have aided Republican candidates up and down the ballot. Taken together, Rosenberg and Klarman make a strong case that the Massachusetts decision contributed to President Bush’s victo- ries in Ohio and Iowa and to GOP Senate victories in Kentucky, Oklahoma, and South Dakota (Klarman 2005:467–70; Rosenberg 2008:369–82). But while the Goodridge decision clearly mobilized opponents of SSM, it seems to have mobilized supporters as well. In February 2004, San Francisco Mayor Gavin Newsom responded to President Bush’s recent denunciation of the ‘‘activist judges’’ of the Massa- chusetts court by announcing that city officials would begin issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples. Within weeks, 4,000 such couples had married in the streets of San Francisco, drawing Keck 163 nationwide front-page coverage and inspiring a variety of copycat efforts, with 3,000 marriages performed by public officials in Port- land, Oregon, and similar but smaller actions in Asbury Park, New Jersey; Sandoval County, New Mexico; and New Paltz, New York (Andersen 2005:235–6; Mezey 2007:109–13). In short, the Good- ridge decision sparked a wave of mass action to claim the rights that the Massachusetts court had promised. Rosenberg and Klarman emphasize that Mayor Newsom’s actions provoked yet more back- lash, but again, those actions seem to have inspired supporters as well as opponents. In particular, they encouraged more same-sex couples to claim their rights and more public officials to support those claims. In addition to the copycat actions by local executive officials, the controversy led to a nationwide wave of new SSM lawsuits, with the leading national LGBT rights organizations filing state constitutional challenges in Connecticut, Florida, Maryland, New York, Oregon, and Washington during the spring and sum- mer of 2004. Mayor Newsom’s actions also drew the litigators into such a challenge in California, and Lambda Legal continued to pursue the state constitutional challenge it had filed in New Jersey in 2002. Most of these lawsuits eventually ended in defeatF although even these, as I note below, often sparked legislative progressFbut three of them resulted in landmark victories. In New Jersey, California, and Connecticut, the state legislature vol- untarily expanded partnership rights while the legal challenges were pending, but in each case, the state high court held that the existing policies did not go far enough. In October 2006, the New Jersey Supreme Court ordered the state to provide same-sex couples with all the legal rights and benefits of marriage; a year and a half later, the California Supreme Court ordered the state to provide same-sex couples with access to marriage itself; and five months after that, the Connecticut Supreme Court followed California’s lead (Lewis v. Harris 2006; In re Marriage Cases 2008; Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health 2008). The New Jersey and Connecticut victories are particularly no- table for causing no discernible electoral backlash. Lewis v. Harris (2006) came down two weeks before the nation’s congressional elections, including a close Senate race in New Jersey, but it had no apparent electoral spillover, either locally or nationally. Civil union supporter Robert Menendez won the Senate race, helping the Democratic Party to capture both houses of Congress for the first time in 12 years, and unlike 2004, the national exit polls revealed little evidence that SSM was a key issue, despite the presence of anti-SSM initiatives on the ballot in eight states (Egan & Sherrill 2006). In a landmark development, one of these initiatives was defeated, receiving support from just 48.2 percent of Arizona voters, and in contrast to 2004, only two of the eight received more 164 Impact of Judicial Decisions on LGBT Rights than 70 percent support. The Connecticut decision likewise came down shortly before a national election, and likewise seemed to have little effect. Some SSM opponents in the state urged the public to support an already-existing ballot measure calling for a conven- tion to propose amendments to the state constitution, but 59 per- cent of the state’s voters rejected the proposal, and the high court’s decision took effect shortly after the election. In contrast, the California Supreme Court’s May 2008 marriage decision was reversed at the polls, with 52 percent of the state’s voters supporting an anti-SSM constitutional amendment on No- vember 4, 2008. This vote represented a major setback for the LGBT rights movement, a setback compounded by the voters’ enactment of anti-SSM amendments in Arizona and Florida on the same day, as well as a ballot measure banning unmarried couples from fostering or adopting children in Arkansas. Notably, however, the California vote does not appear to have ended the long- running campaign for SSM in the state. To the contrary, SSM supporters have responded with dozens of protests throughout the state, a novel and probably long-shot legal challenge to the amend- ment, and plans for an initiative campaign to re-amend the state constitution, perhaps as early as 2010 (Garrison 2008). Given the increasing public support for SSM in the stateFvoter opposition to the state’s two anti-SSM initiatives increased from 38.6 percent in 2000 to 47.8 percent in 2008, and according to the 2008 exit polls, it reached as high as 61 percent among 18- to 29-year-old votersFit seems likely that the final word has not yet been heard.1 The available polling data indicate a similar pattern of increas- ing public support for SSM nationwide. As indicated in Table 2, national polls conducted since Goodridge almost always find at least 30 percent support for SSM and on several occasions have found Table 2. Public Support for Same-Sex Marriage Before HI Decision Between HI and VT Between VT and MA Between MA and NJ Between NJ and CA After CA Decision NORC/GSS 12 CNN/Time 23–27 26–31 33 30–32 40 42–47 Newsweek 30–35 29–35 34–35 33 Pew 27 30–35 29–39 38–40 Gallup 23 27–35 34–39 31–39–42 40–46 Quinnipiac 31–35 34 36 ABC News 37 36–41 FOX News 22 26 25–33 CBS/NYT 28–40 30–34 Harris 10–11 15–16 26–27 NBC/WSJ 25–28 32 30–32 AP 31 34 35 Note: Poll results in regular typeface are from Rosenberg (2008:400–7); those in bold were compiled by the author. NORC/GSS is the National Opinion Research Center’s General Social Survey. Keck 165 support exceeding 40 percent, marking an unambiguous increase over pre-Baehr levels. Public support for extending the legal rights of marriage without the name has increased even more dramat- ically. Finding a pre-Baehr baseline for comparison on this point is difficultFpolling on ‘‘civil unions’’ did not occur until the concept was invented in Vermont in 2000Fbut Rosenberg has identified some early polls that provide close approximations. As indicated in Table 3, when a 1989 Gallup poll asked whether ‘‘homosexual couples [should] have the same legal rights as married couples,’’ only 23 percent of respondents said yes. In the wake of the Vermont decision, Gallup found 40 percent support for the proposition that ‘‘gay partners who make a legal commitment to each other should . . . be entitled to the same rights and benefits as couples in tradi- tional marriages,’’ and after Goodridge, Gallup found support as high as 56 percent for ‘‘allow[ing] homosexual couples to legally form civil unions, giving them some of the legal rights of married couples.’’ Rosenberg also cites a 1991 poll conducted by Princeton Survey Research Associates (PSRA) in which 39 percent of respon- dents indicated that homosexual couples should ‘‘be able to get the same job benefits as a married couple’’ (Rosenberg 2008:405). After Table 3. Public Support for the Legal Rights of Marriage Without the Name Before HI Decision Between HI and VT Between VT and MA Between MA and NJ Between NJ and CA After CA Decision Support for rights of marriage without the name Gallup (same rights as . . .) 23 40 Gallup (CUs, some legal rights) 40–49 49–54–56 PSRA (same job benefits) 39 Newsweek (health insurance and other employee benefits) 58–59 58 60 ABC/Wash. Post (same benefits, such as health benefits, etc.) 37 ABC (CUs, legal rights in areas such as health insurance, etc.) 40 45–51 54 Pew (legal agreements with many of the same rights) 45 48–53–54 51 Quinnipiac (CUs, many of the legal rights) 40–45 45 CNN (CUs, some of the legal rights) 40–49 54 Combined support for SSM and CUs Quinnipiac 68 65 FOX 43 51–53 60 National Exit Poll 60 LA Times 61–64 56 CNN 47–53 51 Newsweek 47–51 50 57 CBS/NYT 53–59 57 58 Note: CU 5 civil unions. Poll results in regular typeface are from Rosenberg (2008:400–7); those in bold were compiled by the author (from publicly available on- line sources, most of them from http://pollingreport.com/civil.htm). PRSA is Princeton Survey Research Associates. 166 Impact of Judicial Decisions on LGBT Rights Goodridge, Newsweek found 60 percent support for ‘‘health insurance and other employee benefits for gay spouses,’’ and other polls with different question wording have found support ranging from 40 to 54 percent. The breadth of public support for granting same-sex couples the legal rights of marriage is most clearly indicated by polls pro- viding respondents with the full range of policy options: that is, asking whether they support SSM, civil unions, or no legal recog- nition for same-sex couples. As indicated in the bottom half of Table 3, aggregating the public support for SSM and civil unions in these polls makes clear that a position that ‘‘would have been con- sidered a utopian gay fantasy’’ at the outset of the litigation cam- paignFthat same-sex couples should have access to all the legal rights and benefits of marriageFnow receives consistent support from popular majorities (Hirsch 2005:ix; see also Egan & Sherrill 2005b; Persily et al. 2006:43–4). Evan Wolfson, Mary Bonauto, and their fellow LGBT rights litigators probably deserve some credit for this increased support. At the very least, they should not be blamed for increasing public opposition to gay rights, because no such increase has occurred. The Policy Impact Even if the general public has not turned against gay rights, the courtroom victories may have provoked regressive policy change Fthat is, legislative actions that left LGBT rights advocates worse off than they were at the beginning. In support of this claim, backlash proponents repeatedly emphasize that 45 states have banned the recognition of SSM, with 27 of those states enshrining the ban in their state constitutions.2 The Utah legislature was the first to act, clarifying its own rules for marriage eligibility just months after the Baehr decision in 1993 and prohibiting the recog- nition of out-of-state SSMs two years later. As a number of states considered similar measures, Congress declared in the 1996 Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) that the federal government would not recognize SSMs and that each state was free to refuse recognition as well. ‘‘Long after the current homophobic panic is over,’’ D’Emilio notes, ‘‘these DOMA statutes and state constitu- tional amendments will survive as a residue that slows the forward movement of the gay community toward equality’’ (2007:61; see also Klarman 2005:466; Rosenberg 2008:416). 2 Note that the latter number does not include Hawaii. Hawaii’s voters adopted an anti-SSM amendment in 1998, but unlike the other 27 state constitutional amendments on the topic, this one merely authorized the legislature to limit marriage to opposite-sex couples. As such, Hawaii remains free to legalize SSM by simple legislative action. Keck 167 This claim implies a greater degree of policy retrogression than has actually occurred. No state recognized SSM prior to the onset of litigation, so the statutory bans effected no actual change of policy. The constitutional bans have made it more difficult for SSM advocates to achieve their desired policy change, but in the vast majority of these 27 states, the odds that either the legislature or the courts would have legalized SSM were pretty low from the beginning. If and when SSM comes to states such as Alabama, Mississippi, Oklahoma, and Texas, it is likely to be the result of a federal judicial order, and state constitutional prohibitions will not stand as a bar to such federal legal action.3 In 17 of these 27 states, the policy setback was somewhat worse, as the language of the constitutional ban either clearly or poten- tially prohibits state recognition of civil unions and domestic part- nerships as well as SSM. Many of these 17 states were unlikely to recognize such statuses anyway, but in at least eight of them, the constitutional ban has rendered some existing policies legally vulnerable. Prior to the recent amendments, at least one local jurisdiction or state agency (such as a public college) in Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Ohio, Texas, Utah, and Wisconsin provided domestic partnership benefits to its employees. In four of these states, at least one local jurisdiction maintained a domestic partnership registry for local residents as well.4 The full legal effect of the anti-SSM amendments on these policies is not yet clear, but the Michigan Supreme Court has already held that public employers in the state can no longer offer domestic partnership benefits, and it is likely that LGBT residents of the other seven states will face similar threats to their existing rights and benefits.5 The scope of these existing rights is quite narrowFnone of these states had anything approaching a statewide marriage lawFbut for the affected couples, the deprivation (or potential deprivation) may well have significant adverse consequences. These concrete policy setbacks, however, should be weighed against the concrete policy advances that have occurred during the same period. Most directly, tens of thousands of same-sex couples have won access to legal rights and economic benefits that they did 3 Judging by their legal treatment of LGBT persons more generally, California and Wisconsin are the only states in which an anti-SSM constitutional amendment foreclosed an effort to achieve legal recognition for same-sex couples that had any reasonable chance of success in the near term (Pinello 2006:176). 4 In the other nine states that adopted constitutional bans that may apply to civil unions and domestic partnershipsFAlabama, Arkansas, Idaho, Nebraska, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, and VirginiaFI have been unable to find any record of such policies on the books prior to the enactment of the constitutional amend- ment, though some isolated policies may have escaped my notice. 5 National Pride at Work v. Governor of Michigan, 748 N.W.2d 524 (Mich. 2008). See also Brinkman v. Miami University, 2007 Ohio 4372 (Ohio Ct. of App., 2007). 168 Impact of Judicial Decisions on LGBT Rights not have before. Beginning with Hawaii, every state in which a court has ruled in favor of expanded partnership rights for same- sex couples has indeed subsequently seen an expansion of such rights. None of these expansions represent full victories for SSM advocates, but in every state, there has been progress rather than retrogression. Several additional states have expanded partnership rights in the absence of a court order, and most if not all of these policy changes are at least partly attributable to the ongoing litigation campaign. All told, since the Hawaii suit was filed, 10 states and the Dis- trict of Columbia have created a legal status, similar to marriage, which same-sex couples may choose to enter.6 The specific rights and benefits attached to these alternative legal statuses vary from state to state, but even the narrowest policies provide certain crucially important rights that legal spouses take for granted, such as the right to own property jointly, to make medical decisions for one another, and to inherit property and receive life insurance benefits in the event of a partner’s death. Seven states provide same-sex couples with all or virtually all of the state law rights and benefits of marriage, including parental rights. Given the impor- tance of such rights and benefits, it is no surprise that more than 80,000 couples have chosen to take advantage of them, as indicated in Table 4. An even greater number of same-sex couples have benefited from the rapid proliferation of employer-provided do- mestic partnership policies that has coincided with the SSM litiga- tion campaign. When the Baehr decision came down in 1993, only a handful of private employers offered such policies; by 2008, more than 8,000 did so. Among Fortune 500 corporations, the number providing such benefits rose from 10 in 1993 to 270 in 2008.7 In the public sector, no states provided domestic partnership benefits to their own employees until 1994; by 2008, 15 states (and the District of Columbia) did so (ibid.). Many of these policy changes resulted directly or indirectly from litigation. In California, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and Ver- mont, state lawmaking institutions complied with judicial decisions ordering expanded partnership rights. In Hawaii, the legislature 6 In addition, New York has extended a narrow set of rights to unmarried couples, regardless of gender, who meet a statutorily defined set of criteria (as opposed to affir- matively registering with the state), and Nevada has authorized adults to make written designations of other, unrelated adults for purposes of hospital visitation and funeral arrangements. 7 These numbers are drawn from the Human Rights Campaign’s database of employee benefit policies, available at http://www.hrc.org/issues/workplace/search_employers.htm. See also the Human Rights Campaign Foundation Report, ‘‘The State of the Workplace for Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual, and Transgender Americans, 2006-2007,’’ available at http://www.hrc.org/ documents/State_of_the_Workplace.pdf. Keck 169 helped reverse such a decision, but simultaneously granted some of the rights that the litigants had sought. In California, Connecticut, New Jersey, and New York, lawmakers expanded partnership rights while an SSM lawsuit was pending in the state’s courts. In each of these states, elected legislators were relatively supportive of LGBT rights before the SSM suit was filed, but they were unwilling to expand partnership rights until they had the political cover provided by the legal challenge. In Oregon and Washington, legis- lators ducked the issue while litigation was pendingFperhaps hop- ing the courts would take the hot potato off their handsFbut stepped in once the judges refused to do it for them. In other words, they responded to recently concluded lawsuits by voluntarily extending some of the legal rights that same-sex partners had unsuccessfully sought in court. Only in Maine and New Hampshire have legislators significantly expanded partnership rights in the absence of local lit- igation, and even there, they surely did so at least in part because the prior, litigation-prompted policy changes in neighboring states had raised the expectations of local gays and lesbians. The expansion of workplace domestic partnership benefits has generally been less directly tied to litigation, but here too, legal mobilization has played a role. Alaska, Montana, and Oregon have each extended domestic partnership benefits to public employees as a result of court orders, and even those employers who have adopted such policies in response to other forms of pressure have surely been influenced by the pervasive litigation on this issue since Baehr. After all, it was the SSM lawsuits that first drew public attention to the difficulties faced by gay and lesbian couples Table 4. Number of Same-Sex Marriages, Civil Unions, and Domestic Part- nerships by State HI CA VT MA NJ ME CT WA Annual Total Total to Date 1997 293 293 293 1998 148 148 441 1999 62 62 503 2000 46 4,894 1,709 6,649 7,152 2001 70 3,980 1,876 5,926 13,078 2002 117 8,187 1,707 10,011 23,089 2003 117 6,596 1,398 8,111 31,200 2004 136 5,615 712 6,121 2,832 373 15,789 46,989 2005 141 6,202 452 2,060 1,068 205 649 10,777 57,766 2006 158 6,038 429 1,442 943 163 681 9,854 67,620 2007 160 5,406 333 545 2,437 184 214 3,169 12,448 80,068 Total 1,448 46,918 8,616 10,168 7,280 925 1,544 3,169 80,068 Note: Not included in this table are the District of Columbia, which has maintained a domestic partnership registry since 2002; and New Hampshire and Oregon, whose civil union and domestic partnership policies took effect in early 2008. The numbers re- ported for California, Hawaii, and Washington are marginally inflated, as their domestic partnership or reciprocal beneficiary statuses are each open to certain strictly defined adult family relationships other than same-sex couples. 170 Impact of Judicial Decisions on LGBT Rights in accessing health insurance and other spousal benefits, and it was the lawsuits that transformed workplace domestic partnership policies from a cutting-edge proposal in the early 1990s to the moderate compromise they represent today. SSM advocates have repeatedly supported such compromise policies as important steps toward their goal of full marriage equality. Most SSM advocates endorsed the civil union proposal during the pivotal Vermont legislative debates of 2000, and as Eskridge has argued at some length, this sort of incremental policy change has often been followed by subsequent expansion (Eskridge 2002; see also Andersen 2005:184–8; Robinson 2001). In California, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, Vermont, Washington, and the District of Columbia, SSM advocates succeeded in enacting some limited statewide recognition of same-sex relationships and subse- quently expanding the range of legal rights and benefits offered to such couples. As I have noted, moreover, all this legislative progress has occurred in the shadow of the ongoing litigation campaign. Examining partnership rights as part of a broader continuum of LGBT rights issues, Eskridge (2000) paints an even clearer picture of incremental policy change over time. Beginning in the 1970s, states have tended to reform their regulations of gays and lesbians in the following sequence: decriminalizing consensual sodomy, establishing protections against hate crimes, prohibiting discrimination in the workplace (and sometimes in public accom- modations), establishing some minimal legal recognition for same- sex partnerships (particularly at the municipal level), and then expanding the scope of that recognition in a series of steps toward full marriage equality. Backlash proponents often claim that pre- mature litigation efforts have the effect of derailing a movement’s more cautious campaigns through democratic institutions, but this incremental pattern of state-level policy change has continued without significant interruptionFand may even have accelerated Fduring the period of active SSM litigation. Consider the state-level policy changes on four leading LGBT rights issues in the wake of the courtroom victories in Hawaii, Vermont, Massachusetts, and New Jersey, as summarized in Table 5. In the six years following the Baehr decision, only two state legislatures repealed their criminal sodomy laws, but this progress was no slower than it had been in the years leading up to Baehr. Twenty state legislatures had repealed their sodomy laws in the 1970s and early 1980sFgenerally as part of a wholesale adoption of the Model Penal CodeFbut this wave of legislative reform had run its course by 1983 (Andersen 2005:60–72). Likewise, the will- ingness of state courts to invalidate criminal sodomy laws appears to have been unaffected by the Hawaii decision. If anything, they became more willing after the decision than before, with courts in Keck 171 Michigan and Kentucky doing so in the early 1990s and courts in Tennessee, Montana, Georgia, and Maryland doing so in the late 1990s. On the issue of hate crimes regulation, there had been somewhat more legislative progress prior to Baehr, but this prog- ress continued after the decision. From May 1993 through the end Table 5. State-Level Legislative Change After Judicial Victories Time Period Legislative Setbacks Legislative Victories Between HI and VT Decisions Constitutional ban on SSM in AK (1998) Sodomy decriminalization in NV (1993); RI (1998) Constitutional authorization of legislative ban on SSM in HI (1998) Hate crimes regulation in ME, NV (1995); MA (1996); AZ, DE, LA, NE (1997); CA, KY, RI (1998); MO, VT (1999) Statutory restrictions on SSM in UT (1993); HI (1994); UT (1995); AK, AZ, DE, GA, ID, IL, KS, MI, MO, NC, OK, PA, SC, SD, TN (1996); AR, FL, IN, ME, MN, MS, MT, ND, TX, VA (1997); AL, IA, KY, WA (1998); LA (1999) Antidiscrimination laws in RI (1995); NH (1997); CA, NV (1999) Partnership rights in HI (1997); CA (1999) Between VT and MA Decisions Constitutional bans on SSM in NE (2000); NV (2002) Sodomy decriminalization in NY (2000); AZ (2001) Statutory restrictions on SSM in CA, CO, CT, SD, WV, TX (2000); MO (2001); TX (2003) Hate crimes regulation in CT, KY, NY, TN (2000); HI, RI, TX, (2001); NJ, PA (2002); HI, NM (2003) Antidiscrimination laws in MD, RI (2001); NY (2002); CA, NM (2003) Partnership rights in VT (2000); CA (2001); CA, CT, DC (2002); CA, DC, NV (2003) Between MA and NJ Decisions Constitutional bans on SSM in AR, GA, KY, LA, MI, MO, MS, MT, ND, OH, OK, OR, UT (2004); KN, TX (2005); AL (June 2006) Hate crimes regulation in CT (2004); CO, MD (2005) Statutory restrictions on SSM in NH, OH (2004) Antidiscrimination laws in ME (2005); DC, IL, WA (2006) Partnership rights in ME, NJ, NY (2004); CT (2005); CA, NY, DC (2006) Between NJ and CA Decisions Constitutional bans on SSM in CO, ID, SC, SD, TN, VA, WI (Nov. 2006) Hate crimes regulation in OR (2007); NJ (2008) Antidiscrimination laws in CO, IA, NJ, OR, VT (2007) Partnership rights in NH, NJ, OR, WA (2007) Note: Some states are listed more than once under the same legislative subject because they enacted more than one relevant legislative expansion or contraction of LGBT rights. For example, some enacted hate crimes laws covering sexual orientation and subsequently expanded those laws to cover gender identity, while others have repeatedly expanded or contracted the range of legal rights offered to same-sex couples. Under antidiscrimination laws, I have included only those that prohibit discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation and/or gender identity in private employment. Many of these states also ban such discrimination in public employment and public accommo- dations, and some do so in public schools as well. Sources: Eskridge 1999, 2000; Lesbian/Gay Law Notes (multiple issues; see sources for Table 1). 172 Impact of Judicial Decisions on LGBT Rights of 1999, 12 states expanded their hate crimes protections for LGBT persons. Only Hawaii and California extended formal legal recognition to same-sex partnerships during this period, but since no states had done so prior to Baehr, this level of activity repre- sented a positive change. On only one key legislative priority of LGBT rights advocates did the Hawaii decision appear to stall for- ward progress. In the two years preceding Baehr, six states had amended their antidiscrimination laws to expand protections for LGBT persons; in the six years following it, only Rhode Island, New Hampshire, California, and Nevada did so. The pattern of legislative change in the wake of Baker v. State of Vermont (1999) was similar. The legislatures of Arizona and New York repealed their states’ criminal sodomy statutes (as did courts in Arkansas, Massachusetts, and Minnesota), and 10 states enacted or expanded laws covering hate crimes against LGBT persons. The hate crimes laws represented a nationwide legislative response to the October 1998 murder of Matthew Sheppard in Wyoming, but the December 1999 marriage decision from the Vermont Supreme Court does not appear to have slowed this response. In addition, California, Maryland, New Mexico, New York, and Rhode Island extended their antidiscrimination laws to cover sexual orientation and/or gender identity; the District of Columbia joined Vermont in extending formal legal recognition to same-sex couples; Connect- icut extended some minimal legal rights to unmarried couples and commissioned a study to assess options for providing further such rights; and California repeatedly expanded the range of legal rights provided to domestic partners, culminating with a 2003 statute extending all state law rights and responsibilities of mar- riage. Again, none of this progress came quickly, but it was no slower than it had been prior to the onset of SSM litigation. In the wake of Goodridge (2003), the pace of antigay legislation picked up considerably, but the pace of pro-gay policy change picked up as well. Just prior to Goodridge, the Lawrence decision (2003) had decriminalized sodomy in the 13 states that had not yet done so, thus removing this issue from the LGBT legislative agenda. Most states had already made at least some legislative response to antigay violence by this point as well, but three states extended their hate crimes laws during this period, and three states and the District of Columbia extended their antidiscrimination laws. Anecdotal evidence indicates that the post-Goodridge backlash made some state legislators more reluctant to enact gay rights policies, but these barriers have not proven insuperable. In Illinois, for example, early reports blamed the Massachusetts decision for sinking a then-pending antidiscrimination bill, but the legislature enacted an even stronger bill three years later (Brown 2003). During this same period, the elected institutions in five states and Keck 173 the District of Columbia expanded the range of partnership rights provided to same-sex couples. Following the 2006 decision in Lewis v. Harris, LGBT rights advocates witnessed the most remarkable year of legislative success in the entire history of the movement. In 2007 alone, Oregon ex- tended its existing hate crimes law to cover gender identity, and Colorado, Iowa, New Jersey, Oregon, and Vermont extended their antidiscrimination laws, marking a significant acceleration of leg- islative progress on this issue. In addition, New Hampshire, New Jersey, and Oregon extended the full range of spousal rights and benefits to same-sex couples, and Washington extended a substan- tial list of such rights as well. It is too soon to assess the full policy impact of the California marriage decision. The state’s voters re- versed the decision in November 2008, but the legal status of the approximately 18,000 SSMs that were performed prior to Election Day remains unclear. Elsewhere, SSM advocates continued their legislative progress from the year before. Washington expanded the list of legal rights extended to domestic partners, as did the District of Columbia. New York Governor David Paterson directed all state agencies to recognize lawful SSMs from other jurisdictions, and Massachusetts repealed the residency requirement that had prevented most out-of-state same-sex couples from marrying there. Massachusetts also extended Medicaid benefits, at state expense, to same-sex spouses who were ineligible for federally funded benefits, and Missouri authorized same-sex partners to designate one another to make decisions regarding the disposition of remains in the event of one of their deaths. None of these policy changes received as much national media attention as the anti-SSM initiatives enacted in November, but they are not insignificant. Table 6 summarizes the overall pattern of state-level policy change from May 1993, when the Baehr decision came down, through November 2008. At the outset, 23 states still criminalized Table 6. State-Level LGBT Rights Policies, 1993–2008 Number of states . . . May 1993 November 2008 . . . with statutory prohibitions on SSM 3 45 . . . with constitutional prohibitions on SSM 0 27 . . . with constitutional prohibitions on SSM that do or may prohibit recognition of CUs, DPs, and the like 0 17 . . . with criminal prohibitions on consensual sodomy 23 0 . . . with hate crimes statutes that cover sexual orientation 11 32 . . . with hate crimes statutes that cover gender identity 1 12 . . . with antidiscrimination statutes that cover sexual orientation 8 20 . . . with antidiscrimination statutes that cover gender identity 1 12 . . . that offer domestic partnership benefits to public employees 0 15 . . . that grant some legal rights to non-employee same-sex couples 0 11 . . . that grant substantial legal equality to same-sex couples 0 7 . . . that issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples 0 2 174 Impact of Judicial Decisions on LGBT Rights consensual sodomy, as did the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico; no state does so today. Only 11 states had laws addressing hate crimes on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity; 32 states have such laws today. Only eight states prohibited private employers from firing a worker on the basis of his or her sexual orientation, and only one did so on the basis of gender identity; today, those numbers are 20 and 12, respectively. No state provided any legal recognition or economic benefits to same-sex partnerships, and only a small number of local jurisdictions did so. Today, 15 states provide health care benefits to the same-sex partners of their own employees, with 11 of them extending some broader set of legal rights to same-sex couples as well. Compared to What? Despite these policy victories, backlash proponents repeatedly charge that SSM advocates have been lured by the ‘‘myth of rights’’ to adopt a suboptimal strategy. In a concluding section of his 2008 chapters on SSM, titled ‘‘When Will They Ever Learn?’’ Rosenberg complains that if SSM advocates had read his book, they ‘‘could have foreseen the negative reaction to the Hawaii litigation’’ and they would have avoided ‘‘succumbing to the ‘lure of litigation’’’ (Rosenberg 2008:419). Instead, as with so many other left-liberal movements since the mid-twentieth century, the liberal agenda was hijacked by a group of elite, well-educated and comparatively wealthy lawyers who uncritically believed that rights trump politics and that successfully arguing before judges is equivalent to building and sustaining political movements . . .. Political organizing, political mobilization and voter registration may not be glamorous, or pay six-figure salaries, but they are the best if not the only hope to produce change. (2008:430–1) Rosenberg provides no direct evidence that LGBT rights litigators have been so taken in by a civics-book understanding of American courts as to repeatedly ignore what would have been preferable strategies. (Even less does he provide any evidence that the move- ment litigators are blinded by their own desires for wealth and glamour.) Legal mobilization scholars have long observed that it is difficult to find any actual litigators who have succumbed to the myth that legal rights are magic recipes for instant change, and as Andersen makes clear, the observation holds for LGBT rights advocates. She concludes her study of Lambda Legal by noting that ‘‘every litigator’’ she interviewed was ‘‘well aware that the struggle for legal reform does not begin and end in the courtroom’’ (2005:214–15; see also McCann 1992:728–9, 1994). Keck 175 Leaving aside the question of the advocates’ motivations, the backlash argument amounts to a series of post hoc judgments that particular instances of litigation were strategically unwise because they provoked more political opposition than some other available strategy would have provoked. In Rosenberg’s judgment, strate- gies that emphasized legislation rather than litigation and incre- mental rather than radical change would have provoked less opposition and hence been more successful (2008:383, 417). Klarman has likewise emphasized that when gay rights litigators began pushing for SSM in the early 1990s, there was strong public support for the decriminalization of sodomy, the prohibition of employment discrimination, and the extension of limited domestic partnership benefits, but not for SSM. By forcing SSM to the fore, courts (and litigators) undermined the cause (2005:475–7). In claiming that SSM advocates in the early 1990s should have pursued their goals both more cautiously and more democrati- cally, backlash proponents tend to mis-specify the actual strategic dilemma that these advocates faced. The modern wave of SSM lawsuits was not initiated by the national LGBT rights organizations and could not have been stopped by them. It was initiated by gay and lesbian couples in Hawaii (and elsewhere) seeking health in- surance, parental rights, and other legal and financial protections for their families (Andersen 2005:239; Chauncey 2004:87–136; Egan & Sherrill 2005a; Garrow 2004). The actual choice faced by movement leaders was whether to join and help shape these efforts or to watch them continue as uncoordinated actions of individual plaintiffs and their private counsel. Since the latter choice would have left the advocacy organizations with no influence over im- portant tactical decisions regarding when and where to file, what to argue, and whether to appealFand since it might also appear as a significant rebuke of their own members and supportersFall the national LGBT rights organizations eventually signed on. But they did so only when it became clear that the Hawaii case was headed to the state high court with or without them, at which point they concluded that it was unwise to let the courts rule on the issue without having heard from the nation’s most knowledgeable and experienced LGBT rights advocates (Andersen 2005:178; Eskridge 2002:16–8; Garrow 2004; Pinello 2006:23–30). From this angle, in a world of constant litigation by friend and foe, the choice faced by movement leaders is not whether the courts should be involved but whether they should hear your claims before deciding your fate. Once having joined the fray, moreover, the LGBT rights ad- vocates did not decide to litigate and do nothing else. Like their opponents, these advocates have relied on both judicial politics and democratic politics, making a series of tactical decisions in individual 176 Impact of Judicial Decisions on LGBT Rights circumstances. Drawing on their earlier experience litigating against criminal sodomy laws and the military ban on service by gays and lesbians, they were well aware of the cautious, incremental, and deferential tendencies of judicial institutions, and they knew full well that their efforts had to proceed on multiple, simultaneous fronts. As such, when the leaders of the LGBT public interest bar signed onto the SSM campaign, they collectively agreed to litigate only where the odds seemed most in their favor and, in the meantime, to devote significant resources to a broader campaign of public education, media relations, and legislative lobbying (An- dersen 2005:178–83). These advocates selected Vermont as the site of their first test case, but they held off on launching the suit until four years after the initial Hawaii decision; only then did they conclude that their political organizing had progressed far enough to make a judicial victory sustainable (Johnson 2000; Eskridge 2002:45–8). Their landmark victory in Baker (1999) seemed to confirm the viability of the test-case strategy, and they moved quickly to identify their next targets. As with Vermont, they sought out states whose courts had been relatively supportive of gay rights (indicating that their legal arguments would get a fair hearing) and whose political cultures were relatively supportive as well (indicating that the strength of any backlash would be relatively contained) (Anderson 2005:219–20; Garrow 2004). These factors led them to file suit in Massachusetts in 2001 and New Jersey in 2002, with the litigators in each case building on years of local political organizing on behalf of increased partnership rights (Bonauto 2005; Pinello 2006:34– 41). Unlike the Hawaii suit, then, the legal battles in Vermont, Massachusetts, and New Jersey were intentionally chosen by the LGBT rights organizations. Each of these lawsuits led to a land- mark legal victory, and each of these victories survived the result- ing political backlash. SSM advocates filed a number of other suits that turned out less well, but even there, it is not clear that the strategic decision to file them was wrong. After Baehr (1993), SSM was on the nation’s legal and political agendas whether LGBT rights advocates liked it or not. Thus, they no longer had the option of taking the status quo for granted and focusing on something else. The SSM campaign had been launched by same-sex couples acting independently; once launched, the issue was kept on the table by conservative opponents. In Massachusetts, for example, SSM opponents were pursuing a state constitutional amendment well before Goodridge was filed. In this context, LGBT rights advocates could either play defense or open some new fronts of their own. Their opponents were pursuing every available avenueFattacking SSM at the polls, in state and federal legislatures, and in state and federal courtsF Keck 177 and it is not clear how a unilateral decision to steer clear of one of these avenues would have helped their cause. That said, SSM advocates often decided to discourage litigation when the time was not right. Prior to the Hawaii case, movement litigators repeatedly rejected requests to bring SSM lawsuits, and while that litigation was pending, the leading advocates discour- aged gay and lesbian couples from filing or continuing SSM law- suits in Alaska, Arizona, Florida, and New York. After the Baker decision in Vermont, the leading national LGBT rights organiza- tions jointly issued a pamphlet that discouraged precipitous litiga- tion by same-sex couples, and after Lawrence and Goodridge, they discouraged further unplanned litigation in Arizona and Florida. In 2006, the national LGBT rights groups urged the Ninth Circuit to dismiss a constitutional challenge to DOMA, and in 2008, they issued yet another pamphlet discouraging litigation.8 The fact that LGBT rights advocates have often decided not to litigate a particular claim at a particular time and place suggests that when they have decided to litigate, it is because they have concluded that such a tactic is more promising than (or comple- mentary to) the available alternatives. As Zackin (2008) has noted in another context, social movements often turn to judicial politics only after democratic politics proves unavailing. In this light, it is noteworthy that prior to the litigation campaign, SSM advocates had made very little progress in state or federal legislative institu- tions. Several local gay rights organizations were lobbying for state- wide domestic partnership policies in the 1990s, but these policies were quite limited in scope, and their advocates were having very little success. The D.C. City Council voted to create a domestic partnership registry in 1992, but Congress blocked the bill from taking effect for another 10 years. The California legislature voted to do so in 1994, but Governor Pete Wilson vetoed the bill. The first such policy to become law was Hawaii’s Reciprocal Beneficiaries Act, but that act was the direct result of litigation. Prior to the onset of that litigation, no state legislature was willing to extend even limited partnership rights to same-sex couples. This legislative unresponsiveness has extended even to issues where the public is broadly supportive of LGBT rights. For at least 30 yearsFsince the Gallup Poll began asking the question in 1977F a majority of the public has agreed that ‘‘homosexuals should . . . have equal rights in terms of job opportunities.’’ For the past 15 years, the level of support has exceeded 80 percent (see http:// 8 Most of the events referenced in this paragraph are documented in the monthly publication Lesbian/Gay Law Notes, available at http://www.qrd.org/qrd/www/legal/lgln/. See also Andersen (2005:187), (Dupuis 2002:62–3), Garrow (2004). The 2008 pamphlet, titled ‘‘Make Change, Not Lawsuits,’’ is available at http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/lgbt/camar riage_joint_20080609.pdf. 178 Impact of Judicial Decisions on LGBT Rights www.gallup.com/poll/1651/Homosexual-Relations.aspx). Despite repeated efforts, however, Congress has failed to enact the Employ- ment Non-Discrimination Act. More than 80 percent of the public now thinks that gays and lesbians should be allowed to serve in the military as well, but again, Congress has failed to respond (Egan & Sherrill 2005b; Mezey 2007:179–80, 221–2). As noted above, LGBT rights advocates have had more success in banning employment discrimination at the state level, but most of this progress has come in the midst of the SSM litigation campaign. Likewise with sodomy decriminalization, at the time Baehr was filed, the substantial public support for reform was not producing legislative change (Andersen 2005:60–72). In addition to overstating the degree of legislative progress that had occurred prior to the litigation campaign, backlash proponents generally fail to acknowledge that when LGBT rights advocates did win legislative victories, these victories frequently provoked polit- ical backlash. As Lemieux has argued, the backlash thesis rests on a (sometimes implicit) claim that controversial judicial decisions tend to provoke a more severe negative reaction than otherwise similar legislative decisions. Lemieux finds little evidence to support this claim in the abortion context, noting that Roe v. Wade sparked substantial opposition but that the pro-choice movement’s earlier attempts at abortion reform via state legislative action had pro- voked a similar reaction (2004:218–9). The story of conservative countermobilization in response to legislative protections of gay rights is similar, with citizen lawmaking procedures repeatedly used to repeal gay rights policies that have been enacted by elected officials (Andersen 2005:149; Mezey 2007:31–2). Some episodes of this story are so well-known that it is hard to justify the lack of attention given to them by backlash proponents. As early as 1977, Anita Bryant made national headlines with her campaign to repeal the antidiscrimination ordinance that had been enacted by the Dade County Metropolitan Commission in Florida. The popular singer and advertising icon spearheaded a populist backlash that produced not only a local referendum repealing the ordinance but also a state statute imposing a blanket prohibition on adoptions by ‘‘homosexuals.’’ Signed by the governor just one day after the Dade County referendum, this statute represented a sig- nificant retrogression in parental rights for gays and lesbians in Florida (Rimmerman 2002:127–9). The Bryant campaign sparked several similar efforts in the late 1970s, and once gay rights advo- cates started winning legislative victories more often, their conser- vative opponents repeatedly responded with this sort of electoral countermobilization. The most well-known story took place in Colorado, where a series of state and local lawmakers either enacted or considered Keck 179 proposals to ban discrimination against gays and lesbians in the late 1980s and early 1990s, prompting local leaders of the religious right to launch a campaign to amend the state constitution to pro- hibit any governmental unit in the state from adopting or enforc- ing such policies. The state’s voters enacted this proposal in November 1992, a result that immediately prompted copycat efforts around the country. Over the next three years, similar bans on antidiscrimination protections reached statewide ballots in Idaho, Maine, and Oregon, and local ballots in more than 30 jurisdictions in Florida, Ohio, and Oregon. Each of the statewide initiatives was narrowly defeated at the polls, but most of the local measures were successful. The LGBT rights movement responded with multiple state and federal legal challenges, raising both pro- cedural and substantive objections to these antigay initiatives. After several preliminary victories in state courts, this litigation campaign culminated in Romer v. Evans, the 1996 Supreme Court decision invalidating Colorado’s Amendment 2 (Andersen 2005:151–2, 253–4, note 13). Romer v. Evans was a landmark legal victory for the LGBT rights movement, but its precise scope remained somewhat unclear. Op- ponents exploited this ambiguity by continuing to advance antigay initiatives that were distinguishable from Amendment 2, either because they merely repealed existing antidiscrimination protec- tions (rather than banning their future enactment) or because they applied to a single local jurisdiction (rather than statewide). In a series of initiatives and referenda in Maine, for example, the voters repealed the state’s antidiscrimination protections for gays and lesbians in 1998, blocked the reenactment of those protections in 2000, and nearly repealed them again after their legislative reenactment in 2005. At the local level, the frequency of antigay initiatives slowed somewhat after Romer, but opponents of gay rights continued to respond to the legislative enactment (or con- sideration) of antidiscrimination protections with ballot campaigns designed to repeal (or forestall) those protections. Such measures have reached the ballot in at least eight local jurisdictions since 1996, including Miami-Dade County, in an unsuccessful 2002 rerun of the Anita Bryant campaign.9 In similar fashion, the legislative expansion of partnership rights for same-sex couples has repeatedly sparked countermobi- lization. In at least 28 local jurisdictions since 1993, the actual or prospective expansion of partnership rights by elected officials has provoked either a ballot campaign seeking to repeal the policy or a 9 The jurisdictions include Fort Collins, CO (1998); Ypsilanti, MI (1998, and again in 2002); Traverse City, MI (2001); Kalamazoo, MI (2001); Huntington Woods, MI (2001); Miami-Dade County, FL (2002); Westbrook, ME (2002); and Tacoma, WA (2002). 180 Impact of Judicial Decisions on LGBT Rights lawsuit seeking to invalidate it. In nine of these jurisdictions, this countermobilization has been successful.10 When local elected officials around the country began issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples in spring 2004, SSM opponents responded with lawsuits in San Francisco and in New Paltz, New York, each of which was successful in halting the local efforts.11 State lawmakers that have expanded partnership rights have often sparked similar reactions. Hawaii’s Reciprocal Beneficiaries Act, Vermont’s Civil Unions Act, and California’s series of domestic partnership laws have each provoked legal challenges as well as electoral backlashes, and when the Oregon legislature enacted both domestic partner- ship and antidiscrimination statutes in 2007, opponents responded with petition drives against both statutes and, once the state ruled they had collected insufficient signatures, a federal constitutional challenge to the state’s signature verification process.12 In short, all victories by LGBT rights advocates have sparked legal and political countermobilization, regardless of whether the victories occurred through legislative, executive, or judicial chan- nels. Each such victory has been a defeat for opponents of LGBT rights, and here, as in the abortion context, ‘‘defeats in the leg- islature, just as surely as defeats in the courts, are likely to generate opposition when issues remain contested’’ (Lemieux 2004:244). In this light, the strategy of avoiding political backlash by steering clear of the courts seems unlikely to work. How Weak Is the Weakest Branch? Given the complex pattern of decentralized policymaking on LGBT rights issues, it is difficult to reach a definitive evaluation of the movement’s overall success. But whether or not the policy vic- tories summarized in Tables 5 and 6 outweigh the defeats, it does not seem reasonable to treat this record as evidence supporting a sweeping indictment of the movement’s leaders. LGBT rights 10 From 1994 to 2001, initiative or referendum campaigns led to the repeal of existing domestic partnership policies in Austin, Texas; Columbus, Ohio; Northampton, Massa- chusetts; and Santa Clara County, California; a ballot initiative banned the enactment of such a policy then under consideration in Houston; and state high courts invalidated such policies in Atlanta, Boston, Minneapolis, and Arlington County, Virginia. In addition, the cities of San Francisco and Santa Barbara, California; Denver, Colorado; Chicago, Illinois; New Orleans, Louisiana; Portland, Maine; Cambridge, Massachusetts; Albany and New York, New York; Chapel Hill, North Carolina; Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; and Vancouver, Washington have all faced legal challenges to one or more of their domestic partnership policies, as have public school districts in Illinois and Wisconsin and counties in Arizona, Florida, and Maryland. 11 Lockyer v. San Francisco, 95 P.3d 459 (2004); Hebel v. West, 25 A.D.3d 172 (Sup. Ct. NY, App. Div., 3rd Dept. 2005). 12 Lemons v. Bradbury, No. 08-35209 (9th Cir., August 14, 2008). Keck 181 advocates have surely made some strategic errors along the way, but since their efforts have produced widespread legal and policy gains, the sharply negative conclusions (and the hectoring tone) of the backlash accounts seem unwarranted. Put another way, the backlash narrative captures several important features of the recent history of LGBT rights litigation, but it does not support the sweep- ing and one-sided conclusions that have often been drawn from it. Rosenberg and Klarman are right that courts usually will not act until some progress has been made in the culture at large, but as Frymer (2003) has recently emphasized, they may still act before any other lawmaking institution is willing to do so. Likewise, Rosenberg and Klarman are right that ‘‘litigation on behalf of the relatively disadvantaged, if successful, is likely to be met with powerful political resistance,’’ and that ‘‘[l]itigation is unlikely to help those most des- perately in need’’ (Rosenberg 2008:417; Klarman 2004:463). But all political strategies employed by or on behalf of the relatively disad- vantaged are likely to be met with powerful political resistance, and all such strategies are unlikely to help those most desperately in need. The fact in need of explanation is why some such strategies overcome these odds in a particular context. What was it about the combination of litigation, lobbying, direct action, and all the rest that produced dramatic progress on civil rights in the 1950s and 1960s and dramatic progress on gay rights 40 years later? The lesson of these historical episodes is that the effectiveness of legal mobilization is quite variable, depending on a variety of contextual factors, including political and legal opportunity struc- tures and the political and legal resources available to advocates. As McCann has argued at some length, ‘‘[c]ourt decisions and legal norms are not self-generating forces of defiant action. Rather, they constitute only potential resources that may or may not be mobi- lized in practical action. Moreover, the effectiveness of legal mo- bilization is likely to vary widely with differing groups, issues, and circumstances’’ (1994:91; see also Andersen 2005). In seeking to impose a single narrative on the role of courts in American politics, purveyors of the backlash thesis flatten this complex reality. For outsider groups facing public and private violence, the criminalization of their family relationships, and systematic dis- crimination in all sectors of civil society, constitutional litigation may look like a fool’s errand. But it may nonetheless be the best available tool. So long as this country’s courts remain open to groups whose interests are inadequately represented in our elected institutions, those groups will turn to the courts, in conjunction with other protest strategies, in an effort to eke out what victories they can. Conventional scholarly wisdom has it that the story of all such efforts since Brown is a story of failure. That wisdom may not be so wise. 182 Impact of Judicial Decisions on LGBT Rights References Adams, William Lee (2005) ‘‘Gay to Wed,’’ Newsweek (May 23) 12. 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Shields (2005) ‘‘Moral Issues and Voter Decision Making in the 2004 Elections,’’ 38 PS: Political Science and Politics 201–9. Hirsch, H. N. (2005) ‘‘Introduction,’’ in H. N. Hirsch, ed., The Future of Gay Rights in America. New York: Routledge. Johnson, Greg (2000) ‘‘Vermont Civil Unions: The New Language of Marriage,’’ 25 Vermont Law Rev. 15–59. Klarman, Michael J. (1994) ‘‘Brown, Racial Change, and the Civil Rights Movement,’’ 80 Virginia Law Rev. 7–150. Keck 183 FFF (2004) From Jim Crow to Civil Rights: The Supreme Court and the Struggle for Racial Equality. New York: Oxford Univ. Press. FFF (2005) ‘‘Brown and Lawrence (and Goodridge),’’ 104 Michigan Law Rev. 431–89. Lemieux, Scott (2004) ‘‘Constitutional Politics and the Political Impact of Abortion Lit- igation: Judicial Power and Judicial Independence in Comparative Perspective.’’ Ph.D. diss., University of Washington. McCann, Michael (1992) ‘‘Reform Litigation on Trial,’’ 17 Law and Social Inquiry 715–43. FFF (1994) Rights at Work: Pay Equity Reform and the Politics of Legal Mobilization. Chi- cago: Univ. of Chicago Press. FFF (1996) ‘‘Causal versus Constitutive Explanations (or, On the Difficulty of Being so Positive . . . ),’’ 21 Law and Social Inquiry 457–82. Mezey, Susan Gluck (2007) Queers in Court: Gay Rights Law and Public Policy. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. Persily, Nate, et al. (2006) ‘‘Gay Marriage, Public Opinion and the Courts.’’ University of Pennsylvania Law School, Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 06-17, http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=900208. Phillips, Frank, & Andrea Estes (2007) ‘‘Right of Gays to Marry Set for Years to Come,’’ Boston Globe, 15 June, p. A1. Pinello, Daniel (2006) America’s Struggle for Same-Sex Marriage. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press. Posner, Richard A. (1997) ‘‘Should There Be Homosexual Marriage? And If So, Who Should Decide?,’’ 95 Michigan Law Rev. 1578–87. Rimmerman, Craig A. 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Stoddard, Thomas (1989) ‘‘Why Gay People Should Seek the Right to Marry,’’ 2 Out/ Look 9–13. Sunstein, Cass R. (1996) ‘‘Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided,’’ 110 Harvard Law Rev. 4–101. Wangsness, Lisa, & Andrea Estes (2007) ‘‘Personal Stories Changed Minds,’’ Boston Globe, 15 June, p. A1. Zackin, Emily (2008) ‘‘Popular Constitutionalism’s Hard When You’re Not Very Pop- ular: Why the ACLU Turned to Courts,’’ 42 Law & Society Rev. 367–95. Cases Cited Alaska Civil Liberties Union v. Alaska, 122 P.3d 781 (Sup. Ct. Alas. 2005). Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993). Baker v. State of Vermont, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999). 184 Impact of Judicial Decisions on LGBT Rights Braschi v. Stahl Associates Company, 74 N.Y.2d 201 (NY Ct. of App. 1989). Brinkman v. Miami University, 2007 Ohio 4372 (Ohio Ct. of App. 2007). Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Goodridge v. Dept. of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). Hebel v. West, 25 A.D.3d 172 (Sup. Ct. NY, App. Div., 3rd Dept. 2005). In re Marriage Cases, 43 Cal. 4th 757 (Calif. Sup. Ct. 2008). Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health, 289 Conn. 135 (Conn. Sup. Ct. 2008). Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). Lemons v. Bradbury, No. 08-35209 (9th Cir., August 14, 2008). Lewis v. Harris, 908 A. 2d 196 (N.J. 2006). Lockyer v. San Francisco, 95 P. 3d 459 (2004). Martinez v. County of Monroe, 850 N.Y.S.2d 740 (App. Div. 4th Dept. 2008). National Pride at Work v. Governor of Michigan, 748 N.W.2d 524 (Mich. 2008). Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). Snetsinger v. Montana University System, 104 P.3d 445 (Sup. Ct. Mon. 2004). Tanner v. Oregon Health Sciences University, 971 P.2d 435 (Or. Ct. of App. 1998). Statutes Cited Civil Unions Act, 15 V.S.A. § 1201 et seq. (2008 [originally enacted 2000]). Defense of Marriage Act, 1 U.S.C. § 7 and 28 U.S.C. §1738C1996. Reciprocal Beneficiaries Act of 1997, H.R.S. § 572C-3 et seq. (2008). Thomas M. Keck is Associate Professor of Political Science at Syracuse University’s Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs. He is the author of The Most Activist Supreme Court in History: The Road to Modern Judicial Conservatism (University of Chicago Press, 2004). Keck 185 186 Impact of Judicial Decisions on LGBT Rights 
work_sadf2fhocvfmdabmp2cexbw7ry	----	Cyber Hate Speech on Twitter: An Application of Machine Classification and Statistical Modeling for Policy and Decision Making Cyber Hate Speech on Twitter: An Application of Machine Classification and Statistical Modeling for Policy and Decision Making Pete Burnap and Matthew L. Williams The use of “Big Data” in policy and decision making is a current topic of debate. The 2013 murder of Drummer Lee Rigby in Woolwich, London, UK led to an extensive public reaction on social media, providing the opportunity to study the spread of online hate speech (cyber hate) on Twitter. Human annotated Twitter data was collected in the immediate aftermath of Rigby’s murder to train and test a supervised machine learning text classifier that distinguishes between hateful and/or antagonistic responses with a focus on race, ethnicity, or religion; and more general responses. Classification features were derived from the content of each tweet, including grammatical dependencies between words to recognize “othering” phrases, incitement to respond with antagonistic action, and claims of well-founded or justified discrimination against social groups. The results of the classifier were optimal using a combination of probabilistic, rule-based, and spatial-based classifiers with a voted ensemble meta-classifier. We demonstrate how the results of the classifier can be robustly utilized in a statistical model used to forecast the likely spread of cyber hate in a sample of Twitter data. The applications to policy and decision making are discussed. KEY WORDS: Twitter, hate speech, Internet, policy, machine classification, statistical modeling, cyber hate, ensemble classifier Introduction Research using traditional surveys and interviews has identified that crimes with a prejudicial motive are influenced in the short term by singular events such as widely publicized murders (Phillips, 1980, on homicide), riots (Bobo, Zubrinsky, Johnson, & Oliver, 1994, on race relations), and court cases and terrorism (King & Sutton, 2013, on hate crime; Legewie, 2013, on anti-immigrant sentiment). Hate crimes have been shown to cluster in time and tend to increase, sometimes dramatically, in the aftermath of an antecedent or “trigger” event (King & Sutton, 2013). The impacts of hate crime on individuals and communities are well documented (see Williams & Tregidga, 2014) and most research is preoccupied with where hate crimes happen (risky neighborhoods, demographic factors, etc.), while there is little research that looks at when they happen. King Policy & Internet, Vol. 9999, No. 9999, 2015 1 1944-2866 # 2015 The Authors. Policy & Internet published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc. on behalf of Policy Studies Organization This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. Published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc., 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA, and 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford, OX4 2DQ. http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ and Sutton (2013) report that 481 hate crimes with a specific anti-Islamic motive occurred in the year following 9/11, with 58 percent of them perpetrated two weeks following the event (4 percent of the at-risk period). Such evidence demonstrates that crimes entailing a prejudicial motive often occur in close temporal proximity to galvanizing events, such as terrorist attacks. It is during this period that decision makers, particularly those responsible for minimizing the risk of social disorder through community reassurance, local policing, and the online governance of hateful and antagonistic content, require additional informa- tion on the likelihood of disruption. Hate crimes are communicative acts, often provoked by events that incite retribution in the targeted group, toward the group that share similar character- istics to the perpetrators (King & Sutton, 2013). Collecting and analyzing temporal data allows decision makers to study the escalation, duration, diffusion, and de- escalation of hate crimes following “trigger” events. However, decision makers are often limited in the information that can be obtained in the immediate aftermath of such events. When data can be obtained, they are often of low granularity, subject to missing information (hate crimes are largely unreported to the police), and invariably retrospective. However, the recent widespread adoption of social media offers a new opportunity to address these data problems. The continued growth of online social networks and microblogging Web services, such as Twitter, enable a locomotive, extensive and near real-time data source through which the analysis of hateful and antagonistic responses to “trigger” events can be undertaken. Such data affords researchers with the possibility to measure the online social mood and emotion following large-scale, disruptive, and emotive events such terrorist attacks in near real-time. Twitter is a defensible and logical source of data for such analysis given that users of social media are more likely to express emotional content due to deindividuation (anonymity, lack of self-awareness in groups, disinhibition) (Festinger, Pepitone, & Newcomb, 1952). There is also a case history relating to the expression of hateful sentiment on social media in the United Kingdom, providing evidence of “real world” criminal justice response to, and therefore criminalization of, online acts of targeted hateful communication. For example, in 2012, Liam Stacey was sentenced to 56 days in prison for posting racially offensive comments on Twitter after a U.K. Premier League footballer’s cardiac arrest, and in 2014, Declan McCuish was jailed for a year for tweeting racist comments about two Glasgow Rangers football players. To date there has been very little research into the manifestation and diffusion of hate speech and antagonistic content in social media in relation to events that could be classed as “trigger” events for hate crimes. In 2013, the murder of Drummer Lee Rigby in Woolwich (London) by Islamic extremists led to an extensive social media reaction. Given the extreme terrorist motive and public nature of the actions it was conceivable that the public response might include written expressions of hateful and antagonistic sentiment toward a particular race, ethnicity, or religion, which could be interpreted as “hate speech.” In this article, we present a supervised machine learning text classifier trained 2 Policy & Internet, 9999:9999 and tested to identify online hate speech—or cyber hate—using data collected from Twitter in the immediate aftermath of Lee Rigby’s murder. The data were annotated by human coders, who were asked to decide whether the tweets they were shown contained hateful and/or antagonistic responses toward minority groups. As “Big Data” is a growing topic of study, and its use in policy and decision making a current subject of debate (González-Bailón, 2013), we discuss the use of supervised machine learning tools to classify a sample of “Big Data,” and how the results can be interpreted for use in policy and decision making. Data from Twitter, and social media more generally, are exceptionally noisy and contain a great deal of grammatical variance, misinformation, and mundane chatter. Due to the poor veracity of such data in its raw form, its use in policymaking is somewhat hindered. A key contribution of this study is therefore the production of a machine classifier that could be developed into a technical solution for use by policymakers as part of an existing evidence-based decision-making process. Further contributions of the paper are the identification of nuanced features of cyber hate on social media using a particular type of syntactic relationship within text as a classification feature, and the application of an ensemble machine classifier to cyber hate. We include a section on how the classifier can be finely trained to suit the needs of policymakers, in order to minimize error and maximize confidence in results. We then demonstrate how the results of the classifier can be robustly utilized in a statistical model used to forecast the likely spread of cyber hate in a sample of Twitter data. Related Work The analysis of subjective language has been widely applied to the classifica- tion of opinions and emotions in text (Wiebe, 2005). Indeed, sentiment analysis, which aims to annotate text using a scale that is a measure of the degree of negative and positive sentiment within the text, has been applied to data collected from social media to determine emotional differences between genders on MySpace (Thelwall, Wilkinson, & Uppal, 2010b) and study levels of positive and negative sentiment in Facebook (Ahktar & Soria, 2009) and Twitter comments (Bollen, Goncalves, Ruan, & Mao, 2011; Thelwall, Buckley, & Paltogou, 2011) following real-world events. Specifically focusing on hateful and/or antagonistic content, Greevy and Smeaton (2004) classified racist content in Web pages using a supervised machine learning approach with a bag-of-words (BoW) as features. A BoW approach uses words within a corpus as predictive features and ignores word sequence as well as any syntactic or semantic content. This approach can lead to misclassification due to word use in different contexts and, if words are used as a primary features for classification, it has been shown that combining sequential words into n- grams (list of words occurring in sequence from 1–n) improves classifier performance by incorporating some degree of context into the features (Pendar, 2007). However, an n-gram approach can suffer from the problem of high levels Burnap/Williams: Machine Classification of Cyber Hate Speech 3 of distance between related words—for example, if related words appear near the start and near the end of a sentence (Chen, Zhou, Zhu, & Xu, 2012). Dadvar, Trieschnigg, and de Jong (2013) used profane words in a social media account username, references to profanities and bullying-sensitive topics, and first and second person pronouns to classify antagonistic behavior on YouTube. Dinakar, Jones, Havasi, Lieberman, and Picard (2012) also focused on the identification of cyberbullying using a BoW approach, but also incorporated lists of profane words, parts-of-speech and words with negative connotations as machine learning features. Furthermore, they included a common-sense reasoning ap- proach to classification by using a database that encoded particular knowledge about bullying situations (e.g., associating wearing dresses with males). Burnap et al. (2013) developed a rule-based approach to classifying antagonis- tic content on Twitter and, similarly to Dinakar et al. (2012), they used associational terms as features. They also included accusational and attributional terms targeted at a person or persons following a socially disruptive event as features, in an effort to capture the context of the term use. Their results demonstrated an improvement on standard learning techniques (see also Williams et al., 2013). Chen et al. (2012) identified offensive content by using profanities, obscenities, and pejorative terms as features, weighted accordingly based on the associated strength of the term, as well as references to people. They also produced a set of rules to model offensive content, showing an improvement on standard machine learning approaches in terms of a much-reduced false negative rate. Identifying syntactic constructs that tend to be insulting or condescending is a key function of the “Smokey” abusive message classification tool (Spertus, 1997), which uses pattern matching and syntactic positioning of words within text to classify content at a message level. Mahmud, Ahmed, and Khan (2008) followed a similar approach but also incorporated relationships between terms to identify “flaming” behavior online. The identification of syntactic relationships within text is possible via the development of parsing tools such as the Typed Dependency parser from Stanford (Marneffe, MacCartney, & Manning, 2006), though this has yet to be applied to hate speech. Data Collection We collected the study data set from Twitter during a two-week time window following the “trigger” event—the murder of Drummer Lee Rigby in Woolwich, London, UK on May 22, 2013. To ensure we maximized the collection of data surrounding the event we used the search term “woolwich,” which would include many references to the events at Woolwich and also the main hashtag surrounding the event “#woolwich.” The hashtag convention is widely used on Twitter to link an individual’s thoughts and comments to an event. The two-week data collection window was imposed based on three factors. First, existing research indicates that public interest in events typically spikes a short time after the event, and then rapidly declines (Downs, 1972). Second, this 4 Policy & Internet, 9999:9999 first point was confirmed by tracking the search term “Woolwich” using the Google Trends service,1 which records the relative number of searches performed on Google over time. Within two weeks, the use of “Woolwich” in Google searches had almost returned to preevent levels. Third, more than half of all hate- related attacks following 9/11 occurred within two weeks of the event; and we wanted to measure the immediate reaction to such events and capture data that perhaps would not otherwise be available to policy and decision makers due to the time taken to collect, record, and process hate crime results, and therefore be proactive in the first two weeks to reduce harm to targeted social groups in an appropriate manner. Social media data lend themselves to this purpose given their inherent fine-grained temporal characteristics. Tweets are produced by the second, while curated and administrative data have a much higher degree of latency in terms of both availability to decision makers and measurement of reaction. A total of 450,000 tweets were collected during the study window. Data Annotation—Crowdsourcing Building models to classify data according to a predefined coding scheme is an essential task in digital social research, used for the purposes of understanding social interactions, beliefs, emotions, and the like. In this research, once the Twitter data were collected, we built a supervised machine learning classifier to distinguish between hateful and/or antagonistic responses with a focus on race, ethnicity, religion, and more general responses, following the event. To complete this subjective task using large-scale data analytics, which is absolutely necessary for the volumes of data produced, we used machine classifiers to learn the features of tweets that are indicative of the class they belong to (cyber hate or general response). Once features were learned, we applied the model to the whole data set. However, it was essential to understand and explain the limitations of the learned model by producing model-specific classification performance results, such as precision and recall per class, and confusion matrices (terms that are explained in detail later). Thus, we needed a “gold standard” against which to test the classification model. Commonly, this is obtained by sampling from a larger data set and employing human annotators to label each data point (tweet) according to a coding frame (Burnap et al., 2013). The coding frame serves as a set of categories or classes into which each data point can be classified. Computationally crowdsourcing human annotations is now becoming popular, and Web services such as CrowdFlower or the Amazon Mechanical Turk provide programmatic application programming interfaces (APIs) through which researchers can automatically upload a data set, coding frame, and set of instructions for annotation. The results of the annotation tasks can then be split into training and testing data sets for machine learning. From the 450,000 tweets collected, we sampled 2,000 to be human coded. Coders were provided with each tweet and the question: “is this text offensive or antagonistic in terms of race ethnicity or religion?” They were presented with a Burnap/Williams: Machine Classification of Cyber Hate Speech 5 ternary set of classes—yes, no, undecided. We utilized the CrowdFlower online service that allows for Human Intelligence Tasks, such as coding text into classes, to be distributed over multiple workers. Workers can sign up to the service to participate in tasks in return for micropayments (small payments set by the task creator based on the number of tasks completed to an acceptable standard). Task creators can also specify a range of worker requirements such as location and experience, and can verify the level of expertise via test questions. Results from workers can then either be accepted or rejected, based on level of agreement with other workers. CrowdFlower recruits from its pool of workers until each unit of analysis (in this case, each tweet) is annotated by a minimum number of workers, as specified by the task creator. We required at least four human annotations per tweet as per the convention in related research (Thelwall, Buckley, Paltogou, Cai, & Kappas, 2010a). CrowdFlower provides an agreement score for each annotated unit, which is based on the majority vote of the trusted workers (Kolhatkar, Zinsmeister, & Hirst, 2013). Because CrowdFlower continues to recruit workers until the task is complete, there is no guarantee that all workers will annotate the same set of units. Indeed, in this case we had 158 workers contribute to the task, each annotating a sample of tweets. Therefore we cannot calculate traditional interrater reliability scores, such as Krippendorf’s Alpha or Cohen’s Kappa to determine agreement between all annotators. However, CrowdFlower has been shown to produce an agreement score that compares well to these classic measures (Kolhatkar et al., 2013). Based on the output from our annotator task we can determine agreement on each unit. The purpose of the experiments performed in this article are to establish the accuracy of a machine classifier when annotating tweets as hateful and/or antagonistic or not, and thus it is the agreement score for the unit of analysis (each tweet), and not the overall human agreement for all units that is important for validation. We removed all tweets with less than 75 percent agreement and also those upon which the coders could reach an absolute decision (i.e., the “undecided” class)—again, following established methods from related research (Thelwall et al., 2010a). The results of the annotation exercise produced a “gold standard” data set of 1,901 tweets, with 222 instances of offensive or antagonistic content (11.68 percent of the annotated sample), which could be classed as cyber hate (referred to below as the “cyber hate sample”), and 1,679 instances of nonhateful or antagonistic commentary (88.32 percent), which we will refer to as “benign.” Ten percent of each class was subsequently used as a sample from which to identify appropriate features to build a cyber hate classifier. This subsample was not used when testing the classifier. Feature Selection It was evident from the cyber hate sample that many of the terms used in cyber hate were expletives or derogatory, targeted at specific social groups. The sample contained words that are well known derogatory terms for black, asian, 6 Policy & Internet, 9999:9999 and muslim social groups, as well as derogatory adjectives (e.g., “black savages”). It was evident that the words of the tweets were going to be particularly useful features for the classification task. Using the words of the text to be classified, known as a BoW technique, is not a particularly novel approach to text classification, but the frequency of particular unigram (single word) and bigram (two word) terms were overwhelming and needed to be utilized. Of more interest from a sociological and common sense reasoning perspective were the numerous instances in the cyber hate sample of calls for collective action and hateful incitement toward social groups exhibiting protected characteristics. For instance, there were exclamations such as “send them home,” “get them out,” and “should be hung.” These exclamations clearly follow a pattern that could be encoded in parts-of-speech notation [e.g., Verb, Pronoun, Noun; Verb, Pronoun, Adverb; Verb, Verb, Verb(PT)]. However, the benign sample also displayed an abundance of similar patterns, such as “leave them alone,” or “they are peaceful.” Thus, parts-of-speech tagging to produce features to inform the machine classifier was avoided, as it seemed highly likely to cause confusion between the classes. Instead, we implemented the Stanford Lexical Parser, along with a context-free lexical parsing model, to extract typed dependencies within the tweet text (Marneffe et al., 2006). Typed dependencies provide a representation of syntactic grammatical relationships in a sentence (or tweet in this case) that can be used as features for classification. The following example explains the meaning of such relationships and how they can be used as features to inform the machine classifier. Consider the sentence: “Totally fed up with the way this country has turned into a haven for terrorists. Send them all back home.” The typed dependency parser returns the following output: [root(ROOT-0, Send-1), nsubj(home-5, them-2), det(home-5, all-3), amod- (home-5, back-4), xcomp(Send-1, home-5)] Within the output we can see five instances of typed dependencies. The second instance (nsubj(home-5, them-2)) identifies a relationship between “home” and “them,” with “home” being the fifth word in the sentence and “them” appearing before “home” as the second word. Word order within a sentence is preserved in the type dependency and provides a feature for classification as well as the syntactic relationship between words. The relationship identified by the parser in this case is nsubj, which is an abbreviation of nominal subject. This will include a noun phrase (“them”), which is the syntactic subject in the sentence, and an associated relational term (“home”). Linguistically therefore, the term “them” is associated with “home” in a relational sense. Sociologically, this is an “othering” phrase, which essentially distances “them” from “us” through the relational action of removing “them” to their “home,” as perceived by the author of the tweet. Burnap/Williams: Machine Classification of Cyber Hate Speech 7 Similarly, the third typed dependency (det(home-5, all-3)) identifies a det relationship, which is short for determiner, where a link is established between a noun phrase and its determiner. The noun phrase here being “home” (as in a place) and the determiner being “all.” Again, this falls into an “othering” behavior, suggesting that the entire social group to which the Woolwich perpetrators belonged should have a relationship with “home,” which we can assume means the perceived “home” of the social group by the author of the tweet (i.e., “not my country”). This combination of linguistics and sociology potentially provides a very interesting set of features for the more nuanced classification of cyber hate, beyond the BoW approach that utilizes expletives and derogatory terms. It allows a more common-sense reasoning approach to classifying cyber hate by considering the integration of “othering” terms and calls for retribution action into the classification features. Data Preprocessing and Feature Preparation Each tweet was computationally transformed into a word vector—a list of all the individual words (tokens) in the tweet. All tokens we transformed to lower case to avoid capitalized versions of words being treated as separate features to lower case versions of the same word. Nonalphanumeric characters other than those present in emoticons and exclamatory punctuation were removed, stop words were removed, and we stemmed each token to ensure that multiple representations and tenses of a word could be considered as a single features; for example, “attacked,” “attackers,” and “attacking” can all be reduced to “attack” so the machine can consider the verb as a single predictive feature, as well as the various forms of the verb. Tokens within each tweet were then clustered into sequential groups of tokens, or n-grams, ranging from one to five tokens in length to preserve an element of context for each word by encapsulating their surrounding words within a feature. Single tokens, or unigrams, were prominent in the cyber hate sample in the form of expletives or derogatory terms. Two-token combinations, or bigrams, were also present in the form of combinations of expletives, adjectives, and derogatory terms. Three-token terms (trigrams) could represent “othering” and incitements of retributional action, such as “send them home” or “get them out.” Four- and five-token terms contained extended but similar phrases. The BoW approach used here is fairly unsophisticated as a feature identifica- tion method, as it weights each n-gram equally as a feature and is likely to lead to confusion within the classification task when words occur frequently in both classes. Therefore, two experiments were conducted at the classification stage where in the first experiment all n-grams were retained as classification features, while in the second, only hateful and derogatory terms sampled from an online racial slur database2 were retained, and the remaining n-grams were removed. Classification results were produced for each experiment. It was expected that the hateful terms would be predictive of cyber hate, but we were interested to see if other terms were also statistically significant predictors. 8 Policy & Internet, 9999:9999 To produce a more sophisticated classifier capable of learning the grammati- cal structure of tweets containing cyber hate, each tweet was transformed into a set of typed dependencies using the Stanford Parser. Each typed dependency was considered as a unigram feature, and we again performed clustering on all the typed dependencies in a tweet to identify groups of between one and three typed dependency n-grams that represented the syntactic structure of each tweet. The number of possible typed dependency relationships produced by the Stanford model is around 50, and we suspected that not all relationships would be useful for classification. As with the BoW experiments, at the classification stage we performed a two- step approach. The first experiment involved testing the classifier using all typed dependencies as features. We then performed a meta-analysis to better determine which features were more statistically significant at classifying cyber hate. To achieve this we ran a Bayesian Logistic Regression (BLR) using the typed dependency features extracted from the 10 percent sample of gold standard cyber hate and benign tweets. We used the model output of the BLR to establish a list of statistical coefficients relating to the probability of each typed dependencies n- gram occurring in a hateful or antagonistic tweet. The list was sorted to identify the most likely forms of typed dependency relationship to occur in the cyber hate class, and these relationships alone were retained as predictive features when the classifier was retrained and re-evaluated in a second experiment. Finally, we combined both experiments and produced a final testing scenario to determine if combining the BoW, typed dependencies, and hateful and derogatory n-grams would prove to be the optimal set of features. Model Selection Given our feature set of specific words and syntactic features, we aimed to create a set of results and related model that could be used to inform policymakers of the risk of cyber hate spreading online following events that are likely to incur a hateful or antagonistic response toward a specific social group. To produce experimental results we used the Java Weka machine learning libraries to develop a number of supervised classifiers that were trained and tested using the features discussed in the previous section. Each tweet was transformed into a feature vector—a list of attributes that represent the tweet for the purposes of training a classifier. Each vector included the actual class the tweet belonged to based on the human annotation exercises (reduced to a binary “Yes” or “No” as to whether it was hateful or antagonistic or not), and a list of n- grams that either included words, typed dependencies, or a combination of both, depending on the feature set used to train the classifier. Given the prevalence of individual words or short combinations of words in the cyber hate sample, it was appropriate to implement a classifier that would make decisions based on the likelihood of feature occurrence. We implemented a BLR classifier as a probabilistic approach. This classifier identifies statistical coefficients for each feature in a vector based on the likelihood of that feature Burnap/Williams: Machine Classification of Cyber Hate Speech 9 appearing in any of the classes available (“Yes” or “No”) and uses this to predict the classes of previously unseen tweets. Rule-based approaches to classifying antagonistic content have been shown to produce promising results in previous research, and the case of cyber hate seemed similar to other work in its accusational and targeted construct. Therefore, we employed a Random Forest Decision Tree (RFDT) as a rule-based approach to classification. A decision tree approach was chosen because it iteratively identifies the feature from the vector that maximizes information gain in a classification exercise—or put another way, it quantifies the significance of how using one n- gram as a rule to classify a tweet as “Yes,” reduces the uncertainty as to which class it belongs to. Performing this step multiple times creates a hierarchical and incremental set of rules that can be used to make classification decisions. A Random Forest implementation of a decision tree was used because it iteratively selects a random subsample of features in the training phase and trains multiple decision trees before predicting the outputs and averaging out the results, maximizing the reduction in classification error (Breiman, 2001). The approach combines the results of a number of decision trees to identify the optimal set of rules, which was appropriate in this case because of the amount of noise and grammatical variance within the training and testing data sets. A Support Vector Machine (SVM) was also used to determine if a spatial classification model would improve or enhance on a probabilistic or rule-based model. Feature vectors are plotted in high-dimensional space, and hyperplanes (lines that separate the data points) are used to try to find the optimum way to divide the space such that the tweets belonging to “Yes” and “No” classes are separated. Multiple hyperplanes can be used and the optimal hyperplane will be the line that maximizes the separation between classes. The rationale for the use of an SVM classifier was to determine whether cyber hate tweets and general responses to an event could be separated by spatial differences in lexical or syntactic features, as well as with probability and rules to determine predictive feature efficiency. In addition to the three individual classifiers, we also implemented an “ensemble” classifier where a combination of all three was used to make a final classification decision. We used a voting meta-classifier, which produces a classification result for each base classifier (BLR, RFDT, and SVM) during the training phase, before making a decision on which model to use based on its prediction accuracy. A choice can be made based on the base classifier with the maximum probability or minimum probability; the results of all base classifiers can be averaged; or a majority vote can be taken. We implemented the maximum probability to make classification decisions, based on selecting the classification function that is most statistically likely to reduce error. Classification Results A 10-fold cross-validation approach was used to train and test the supervised machine learning methods. This approach has previously been used for building machine classifiers for short text (e.g., Thelwall et al., 2010a). It functions by 10 Policy & Internet, 9999:9999 iteratively training the classifier with features from 10 percent of the manually coded data set, and classifying the remaining 90 percent as “unseen” data, based on the features evident in the cases it has encountered in the training data. It then determines the accuracy of the classification process and moves on to the next iteration, finally calculating the overall accuracy. The results of the classification experiments are provided in Table 1 using standard text classification measures of: precision (i.e., for class x, how often are tweets classified as x when they should not be—a measure of false positives); recall (i.e., for class x, how often are tweets not classified as x when they should be—a measure of false negatives); and F-Measure, a harmonized mean of precision and recall. The results for each measure range between 0 (worst) and 1 (best). The formulae for calculating these results are as follows (where TP ¼ true positives, FP ¼ false positives, TN ¼ true negative, and FN ¼ false negative): Precision ¼ TP=TP þ FP Recall ¼ TP=TP þ FN F � Measure ¼ 2 � ððP � RÞ=ðP þ RÞÞ Because of the specific interest in the accurate detection of hateful and antagonistic content, the results reported in Table 1 are the precision, recall and f- measure for the Yes class ONLY. The number of false positives (instances where benign content has been classified as cyber hate) and false negatives (where cyber hate has been classified as benign) are also reported. Table 2 provides results for the best performing classifier and includes both Yes and No classes, as well as an overall performance score. Table 3 presents the confusion matrix for the best performing classifier with a breakdown of classifier error. In Table 1, the bold text indicates the best performance results for precision, recall, FP, and FN for each feature set. In cases such as the n-gram hateful terms feature set, the whole row is bold because there was no difference between the performance of the classifiers. The shaded areas indicate the best overall perform- ing feature set for each classifier. The results suggest that overall the most efficient features for classifying cyber hate are n-gram typed dependencies combined with n-gram hateful and antagonis- tic terms. In fact, the hateful terms alone achieved the same precision performance but had a lower performance for recall. The number of false negative results (missed instances of cyber hate) was 7 percent higher when using hateful terms alone. This is an interesting result as it provides evidence to suggest that human annotators identify hateful or antagonistic content on Twitter that does not necessarily contain hateful or antagonistic terms, and requires a more nuanced representation of what is deemed cyber hate when aiming to classify tweets. The use of a more sophisticated set of features as well as a BoW has successfully contributed to this requirement. A 7 percent improvement may seem fairly small, but considering the size of the initial corpus was 450,000, and in the annotated random sample of these data around 11 percent was considered hate speech by the human annotators, we could infer that there were around 49,500 Burnap/Williams: Machine Classification of Cyber Hate Speech 11 T a b le 1 . C y b e r H a te C la ss ifi ca ti o n R e su lt s B L R R F D T S V M V o te d E n se m b le (M a x P ro b a b il it y ) P R F P R F P R F P R F n -G ra m w o rd s (1 – 5 ) w it h 2 ,0 0 0 fe a tu re s 0 .7 6 F P ¼ 4 6 0 .6 7 F N ¼ 7 4 0 .7 1 0 .7 6 F P ¼ 3 8 0 .5 5 F N ¼ 9 9 0 .6 4 0 .8 0 F P ¼ 3 8 0 .6 9 F P ¼ 6 9 0 .7 4 0 .7 3 F P ¼ 5 8 0 .7 1 F N ¼ 6 5 0 0 .7 2 n -G ra m h a te fu l te rm s 0 .8 9 F P ¼ 1 9 0 .6 6 F P ¼ 7 5 0 .7 6 0 .8 9 F P ¼ 1 9 0 .6 6 F N ¼ 7 5 0 .7 6 0 .8 9 F P ¼ 1 9 0 .6 6 F N ¼ 7 5 0 .7 6 0 .8 9 F P ¼ 1 9 0 .6 6 F N ¼ 7 5 0 .7 6 n -G ra m w o rd s (1 – 5 ) w it h 2 ,0 0 0 fe a tu re s þ h a te fu l y e rm s 0 .7 5 F P ¼ 4 0 0 .5 5 F N ¼ 1 0 0 0 .6 4 0 .8 1 F P ¼ 2 1 0 .4 2 F N ¼ 1 2 8 0 .5 6 0 .7 4 F P ¼ 5 0 0 .6 5 F N ¼ 7 8 0 .6 9 0 .6 8 F P ¼ 7 0 0 .6 6 F N ¼ 7 5 0 .6 7 n -G ra m ty p e d d e p e n d e n ci e s 0 .5 2 F P ¼ 5 0 0 .2 5 F N ¼ 1 6 7 0 .3 4 0 .5 6 F P ¼ 3 6 0 .2 1 F N ¼ 1 7 6 0 .3 0 0 .5 3 F P ¼ 4 8 0 .2 4 F N ¼ 1 6 8 0 .3 3 0 .4 9 F P ¼ 5 7 0 .2 5 F N ¼ 1 6 7 0 .2 5 n -G ra m re d u ce d ty p e d d e p e n d e n ci e s 1 F P ¼ 0 0 .1 8 F N ¼ 1 8 3 0 .2 9 0 .9 7 F P ¼ 1 0 .1 4 F N ¼ 1 9 0 0 .2 5 1 F P ¼ 0 0 .1 7 F N ¼ 1 8 5 0 .2 8 1 F P ¼ 0 0 .1 8 F N ¼ 1 8 3 0 .2 9 n -G ra m re d u ce d ty p e d d e p e n d e n ci e s þ h a te fu l te rm s 0 .8 9 F P ¼ 1 9 0 .6 9 F N ¼ 7 0 0 .7 7 0 .8 9 F P ¼ 1 9 0 .6 8 F N ¼ 7 1 0 .7 7 0 .8 9 F P ¼ 1 9 0 .6 9 F N ¼ 7 0 0 .7 7 0 .8 9 F P ¼ 1 9 0 .6 9 F N ¼ 7 0 0 .7 7 n -G ra m w o rd s (1 – 5 ) w it h 2 ,0 0 0 fe a tu re s þ n -G ra m re d u ce d ty p e d d e p e n d e n ci e s þ h a te fu l te rm s 0 .8 7 F P ¼ 1 6 0 .5 0 F N ¼ 1 1 1 0 .6 3 0 .8 8 F P ¼ 1 0 0 .3 2 F N ¼ 1 5 0 0 .4 2 0 .8 8 F P ¼ 1 8 0 .5 9 F N ¼ 9 1 0 .7 0 0 .8 3 F P ¼ 2 7 0 .6 0 F N ¼ 8 8 0 .7 0 12 Policy & Internet, 9999:9999 instances of cyber hate in the corpus. Overlooking 7 percent of these would lead to more than 3,000 hateful or antagonistic tweets being missed; so for policy- making purposes, the 7 percent improvement achieved by introducing the typed dependency features is significant if an accurate snapshot of the level of hateful and antagonistic emotive responses to an event is to be achieved. The number of false positives in the best performing classifiers was 19, which constitutes 0.009 percent of the test data. Other classifiers reduced the number of false positives to below 19 (to zero in once instance), but the recall performance in these instances was far below that of the best performing classifiers, meaning that a reduction in false positives was also accompanied by an increase in false negatives. It is essential to retain a balance of minimized false positives and false negatives. In all cases, the voted ensemble classifier matched or improved upon the recall of each of the individual base classifiers. This suggests that combining the output of the respective probabilistic, rule-based and spatial classifiers, and selecting the classification decision of maximum probability can assist policy and decision makers in reducing the oversight of hateful or antagonistic content. While the base classifiers all achieved fairly similar results using the most efficient features set, given the improvement of recall across all other experiments when using a voted classifier, it would seem pertinent to consider the use of the voted classifier as a first choice when applying the cyber hate classifier to unseen data. The full results of the cyber hate classifier are reported in Table 2. It is clear that the precision and recall of the non-hateful responses is very high (P ¼ 0.96, R ¼ 0.98). The precision of the “Yes” class is also high (P ¼ 0.89), showing a low number of false positives, but there are improvements to be made to the recall of the “Yes” class (R ¼ 0.69) before significant confidence can be given to the results for policy- and decision-making purposes. Table 3 shows 70 misclassifications where cyber hate was classified as a benign response by the classifier, suggesting Table 2. Voted Classifier Full Results Voted Classifier P R F Yes 0.89 0.69 0.77 No 0.96 0.98 0.97 Overall 0.95 0.95 0.95 Table 3. Voted Classifier Confusion Matrix Human Coders Yes No Machine Yes 152 70 No 19 1,660 Burnap/Williams: Machine Classification of Cyber Hate Speech 13 a further refinement is required to detect more discrete hateful and antagonistic content. To give some insight into the qualitative narrative of cyber hate we have provided some instances of typed dependencies that were probabilistically more likely to occur in cyber hate than the benign class in Table 4. We can see that the content of tweets focuses on a response to religious and ethnic minority social groups from the wider population (e.g., black muslims). There are phrases suggestive of incitement to respond with actions (e.g., burn Korans) and claims of well founded or justified discrimination against social groups (e.g., “I told you black people...”). Given this reflective and responsive narrative it would seem pragmatic to include more semantic rules and constructs into feature identifica- tion in future in order to improve classifier performance. Cautionary Caveat Once a supervised machine learning classifier has been developed it can be used on a larger sample to classify new and unseen data, and inform policy decisions directly or via additional models. First and foremost it is essential to remember that supervised machine learning classifiers build models of what they perceive to be the features indicative of specific classes—in this case, hateful and antagonistic content. As a result, if new or unseen features occur, such as different types of language or content with mixed meaning, it can cause confusion in the classifier and produce inaccurate results. We can classify new instances, but we must always bear in mind the limitations in the existing model (i.e., not all instances of cyber hate were identified by our model), and that variance in the way people respond to such events may compound this. Table 4. Probabilistic Features Highly Likely to be in Cyber Hate Typed Dependency Qualitative Description det(religion-5 a-4) Determiner (a specific reference to a noun phrase) discussing “a” “religion” in a particular context amod(people-7 black-6) Adjectival modifier (a descriptive phrase related to a noun phrase) discussing “people” who are “black” aux(burn-6 to-5) dobj(burn-6 korans-9) Auxiliary (a form of “be,” “do,” or “have”) action phrase using “burn” and “korans” amod(muslim-40 black-39) Adjectival modifier (a descriptive phrase related to a noun phrase) discussing “muslims” who are “black” det(muslim-40 a-38) amod (muslim-40 black-39) Determiner (a specific reference to a noun phrase) discussing “a” “muslim” in the context of a “black” “muslim” dobj(told-4 you-5) amod (people-7 black-6) Direct object (an accusatory object of the verb) “told” “you” (e.g., “I told you”) in the context of “black” “people” advmod(seen-3 just-2) dobj(seen-3 video-4) dobj(getting-9 shot-10) Adverbial modifier (a descriptive phrase related to a verb) “just” “seen,” that is commenting on what has just been witnessed dobj(burn-6 korans-9) Direct object (an accusatory object of the verb) “burn” “korans” Note: Using a classifier to inform a statistical model. 14 Policy & Internet, 9999:9999 That said, what we have tried to achieve with the classifier is to assist human decision making using a machine to handle the large volumes of data produced by the general public in response to a large-scale emotive event. The results of the cyber hate classifier are reasonably high, especially when considering that around 5 percent of our human-annotated sample had to be removed because the three out of four humans could not agree which class a tweet belonged to. It is worth remembering that while machine learned models are not always accurate in their judgment, humans are also susceptible to disagreement and confusion. Cyber Hate and Contagion Modeling In the following example we demonstrate how the supervised machine learning classification model of cyber hate can be applied to the whole corpus of 450,000 tweets to help determine to what degree hateful or antagonistic content is spreading—a measure of the contagion effect of cyber hate in response to a specific event. This could help inform those responsible for minimizing the risk of social disorder through community reassurance, local policing, and the online gover- nance of hateful and antagonistic content, as to whether cyber hate is likely to spread. One way to measure the impact of cyber hate on the spread of information on Twitter is to treat cyber hate as a predictive feature in a statistical regression model where the dependent variable (the outcome you are trying to predict) is the number of retweets a tweet is likely to receive. Theoretically, the more retweets a tweet receives, the more people are likely to see it, increasing the risk of public exposure and opportunity to propagate and respond to cyber hate. By measuring the statistical associated strength of cyber hate within a model of retweet counts, we can determine the likelihood of hateful and antagonistic content being retweeted, and therefore spreading to a large number of people. We can define a tweet that has been retweeted a large number of times as an information flow (Lotan, 2011). Table 5 shows the result of a zero-inflated negative binomial model of information flow “size.” The dependent variable is a count measure of the number of retweets a tweet actually received following the Woolwich event. The statistical predictors of the count include the number of followers of the person sending the tweet, the time of day the tweet was sent, the content of the tweet (hashtags, URLs), the sentiment polarity (þve, –ve), the number of press headlines on the day the tweet was made, and the type of agent sending the tweet (e.g., press, police, politician). The data for these features were all derived from the data set collected from Twitter. For more details on how these were derived we recommend the reader study a related paper that examined the social media reaction in greater detail (Burnap et al., 2014). In this instance we are only interested in the impact of cyber hate as an example of how machine classification can help inform the modeling of online social reaction. If we look at the incidence rate ratio (IRR) column in Table 5 we can see the strengths of association for each predictor variable with the dependent “retweet” Burnap/Williams: Machine Classification of Cyber Hate Speech 15 count, as indicated by the IRR. We can use the IRR to report the strength of causal associations between certain factors and the information flow size, enabling us to identify quantitatively which factors are more important than others. Where an IRR >1, the difference is associated with a positive increase in the dependent variable (retweet count), so in the case of the “URL” variable which records whether or not a tweet contains a URL, the results indicate that the rate of retweet for tweets containing a URL is 1.55 times higher than the rate for tweets without a URL. Thus, a URL increases the chances of a tweet being retweeted. Where an IRR <1, there is a negative effect. If we look at the “Cyber Hate Speech” predictor we see the IRR is 0.55 (rounded to 2 decimal places), which means that the Table 5. Zero-Inflated Negetive Binomial Regression Model Predicting Counts of Retweets Count of Retweets Poisson Model (Count/True Zeros) Coef. SE IRR TimeLagRT5 0.000** 0.000 1.000 Tweet count �0.215** 0.015 0.807 Commute morning 0.030 0.048 1.030 Work 0.014 0.038 1.015 Commute evening 0.074 0.045 1.077 Evening �0.010 0.040 0.990 Ref: Commute night Sunday �0.133** 0.041 0.875 Monday �0.302** 0.047 0.739 Tuesday �0.344** 0.051 0.709 Thursday �0.365** 0.058 0.694 Friday �0.311** 0.044 0.733 Saturday �0.122** 0.052 0.853 Ref: Wednesday Hashtag 0.217** 0.025 1.242 URL 0.439** 0.026 1.551 Sentiment 0.322** 0.018 1.380 Google search 0.005** 0.001 1.005 Press headlines 0.000* 0.000 1.000 News agent 1.460** 0.044 4.304 Police Agent 1.742** 0.408 5.708 Political agent 0.670** 0.150 1.954 Far right political agent 0.632* 0.327 1.882 Ref: Other agent Cyber hate speech �0.604** 0.107 0.546 Constant 0.543** 0.126 1.721 Binomial model (inflation/excess zeros) Number of followers �0.899** 0.017 - Constant 4.586 0.063 - Model fit Log-L �92,196.36 Chi-square 2,594.57 Sig. p ¼ 0.00 LRT for alpha ¼ 0 p ¼ 0.00 Vuong Z ¼ 45.00; p ¼ 0.00; Na ¼ 210,807 Notes: *p < 0.05, **p ¼ <0.01.1.aReduction due to removal of retweets, leaving only original tweets. 16 Policy & Internet, 9999:9999 inclusion of hateful or antagonistic content in a tweet reduces the rate of retweet by a factor of 0.55 (or 45 percent), suggesting that a response to this event that contains a hateful or antagonistic element, as determined by the machine classifier, is in fact reducing the likelihood of the tweet being widely spread. For policymakers, the combination of the cyber hate machine classifier with the statistical predictive model of the retweet likelihood given the features of the tweet could be useful in determining the changing dynamic of cyber hate on Twitter over time, and as an event unfolds. At any point in time a new corpus of tweets can be collected via the Twitter API, and the number of retweets each tweet has received is available from the metadata provided by Twitter. If the machine classifier is used to detect cyber hate within the corpus, and the statistical model is subsequently rerun, the difference in IRR from one period of time to another can be illustrative of the changing dynamic of cyber hate in Twitter over time. For instance, if the IRR for the “Cyber Hate Speech” predictor in the model is 0.55 at time x, and 0.75 at time y, it suggests an increase in the rate of retweets containing cyber hate and therefore provides an indication that hateful and antagonistic content is actually spreading more at time y. One limitation of our approach is that the classification of cyber hate is dependent upon the language used in response to an event, which may not predeterminable prior to an event. Therefore, from these results we are not suggesting that the hate propagation IRR could be compared to a preevent baseline, rather that while the event is unfolding policymakers can study fluctuations within the analysis window following the event. The utility of identifying fluctuations following the event include monitor- ing the enabling and inhibiting factors of propagation of hate, such as further connected events (e.g., a protest march, news coverage, published opinion pieces, and political speeches). Conclusion In this article we have developed a supervised machine learning classifier for hateful and antagonistic content in Twitter. The purpose of the classifier is to assist policy and decision makers in monitoring the public reaction to large-scale emotive events, such as the murder of Drummer Lee Rigby in Woolwich in 2013. Previous research showed that 58 percent of hate crimes following 9/11 were perpetrated two weeks following the event (4 percent of the at-risk period). Data are available in near-real time from online social networks and microblogging websites such as Twitter, which can allow us to monitor the prevalence of hateful and antagonistic responses online in the period immediately following the event, when risk of hateful responses is highest. Hateful and antagonistic responses have led to imprisonment of the person posting the tweet—possibly as part of a risk reduction response by the judicial system. The classification results showed very high levels of performance at reducing false positives and produced promising results with respect to false negatives. Our implementation of individual probabilistic, rule-based, and spatial classifiers Burnap/Williams: Machine Classification of Cyber Hate Speech 17 performed similarly across most feature sets, but the combination of the classification output of these base classifiers using a voted meta-classifier based on maximum probability matched or improved on the recall of the base classifiers in every experiment, suggesting that an ensemble classification approach is most suitable for classifying cyber hate, given the current feature sets. This could be due to the noise and variety of types of response within the data, with some features proving more effective with different classifiers. The novel inclusion of syntactic features using typed dependencies within tweets as machine learning features reduced the false negatives by 7 percent over the baseline BoW features, providing a significant improvement when considering the volumes of data produced in response to such events. Our corpus of 450,000 tweets was collected in the first two weeks following the event, and it would be extremely difficult for human effort to manually parse these data to determine levels of public antagonism within all the responses. The improvement in machine classification using typed dependencies also suggests that cyber hate comprises content that is not instantly identifiable by words that are traditionally associated with hateful and discriminatory remarks, and requires a more nuanced approach to text classification beyond words alone. For instance, there was a prevalence of “othering” terms, such as “send them home” and “get them out,” as well as incitements to undertake hateful retribution such as “burn korans” and “should be hung.” The typed dependency approach was able to identify these as useful features for classification. We developed an illustrative example using cyber hate as classified by a machine as a predictive feature in a statistical regression model. The model produced IRRs for retweet activity given a set of features for each tweet. The model showed a reduction in retweet rate ratio when a tweet contained a hateful or antagonistic response, suggesting a stemming of the flow of content on Twitter when a tweet contained cyber hate. This combination of machine classification and statistical modeling can—while accepting the limitations of machines with respect to utilizing a learned set of predictive features that are not an absolute reflection of all the possible combinations and permutations of cyber hate characteristics—produce aggregated statistics and prevalence indicators for hateful and antagonistic responses to an event on social media, including the relative spread of cyber hate on Twitter over time. Our results are reflective of the individual event under study so we make no claims as to the generalizability of the classifier or the statistical model. However, through this case study, we have established for the first time a method and a set of results that others could replicate following similar and disparate events, in order to build up a body of work from which more generalizable results can emerge. For example, following an event prompting a hateful homophobic response, a data analyst could collect data, perform the annotation task, and replicate our method. We hope this article acts as a clarion call for further research into cyber hate and its manifestation in social media around events, and the development of technical solutions that are informed by such research. 18 Policy & Internet, 9999:9999 Pete Burnap, Ph.D., Lecturer, Cardiff School of Computer Science & Informatics, Cardiff University, Cardiff, UK [burnapp@cardiff.ac.uk]. Matthew L. Williams, Ph.D., Reader, Cardiff School of Social Sciences, Cardiff University, Cardiff, UK Notes This work was supported by the Economic and Social Research Council and Google Data Analytics Research Grant: “Hate Speech and Social Media: Understanding Users, Networks and Information Flows” [ES/K008013/1]. 1. http://www.google.com/trends/. 2. http://www.rsdb.org/. References Ahktar, J., and S. 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work_sbttr5ogmrc3dh4hcjs3svglcu	----	Mid Sweden University This is a published version of a paper published in Scandinavian Journal of Public Health. Citation for the published paper: Leander, K., Berlin, M., Eriksson, A., Gillander Gådin, K., Hensing, G. et al. (2012) "Violence.: Health in Sweden: The National Public Health Report 2012. Chapter 12." Scandinavian Journal of Public Health, 40(Supplement 9): 229-254 URL: http://dx.doi.org/DOI: 10.1177/1403494812459609 Access to the published version may require subscription. Permanent link to this version: http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:miun:diva-18109 http://miun.diva-portal.org http://sjp.sagepub.com/ Scandinavian Journal of Public Health http://sjp.sagepub.com/content/40/9_suppl/229 The online version of this article can be found at: DOI: 10.1177/1403494812459609 2012 40: 229Scand J Public Health and Maria Danielsson Karen Leander, Marie Berlin, Annika Eriksson, Katja Gillander Gådin, Gunnel Hensing, Gunilla Krantz, Katarina Swahnberg Violence : Health in Sweden: The National Public Health Report 2012. Chapter 12 Published by: http://www.sagepublications.com can be found at:Scandinavian Journal of Public HealthAdditional services and information for http://sjp.sagepub.com/cgi/alertsEmail Alerts: http://sjp.sagepub.com/subscriptionsSubscriptions: http://www.sagepub.com/journalsReprints.navReprints: http://www.sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.navPermissions: What is This? - Dec 13, 2012Version of Record >> at Mittuniversitetet on December 28, 2012sjp.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://sjp.sagepub.com/ http://sjp.sagepub.com/content/40/9_suppl/229 http://www.sagepublications.com http://sjp.sagepub.com/cgi/alerts http://sjp.sagepub.com/subscriptions http://www.sagepub.com/journalsReprints.nav http://www.sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav http://sjp.sagepub.com/content/40/9_suppl/229.full.pdf http://online.sagepub.com/site/sphelp/vorhelp.xhtml http://sjp.sagepub.com/ © 2012 the Nordic Societies of Public Health DOI: 10.1177/1403494812459609 Scandinavian Journal of Public Health, 2012; 40(Suppl 9): 229–254 Summary In Sweden and in other countries, it has become increasingly common to view violence from a public health perspective. This chapter presents a descrip- tion of interpersonal violence with an emphasis on violence in close relations, particularly in partner relationships. According to the Swedish Crime Survey 2010, approximately one in ten inhabitants was exposed to violence, threats or harassment of some kind in 2009. Young people and single mothers with small children are particularly vulnerable to violence. According to Statistics Sweden’s ULF surveys (Survey on Living Conditions) for 2004–2005, 17 per cent of men and 12 per cent of women aged 16–24 years reported having been subjected to violence or serious threats at some time in the previous 12 months. Boys and men are more frequently subjected to lethal violence and to violence resulting in hospitali- sation than girls and women. Similarly, men also make up a majority of the victims of assaults reported to the police. On the other hand, domestic violence and work-related violence more often involve women than men, and sexual violence is chiefly directed at girls and women. Most women and children who are subjected to assault are acquainted with the perpe- trator, while this only applies to a minority of male victims. Women are four to five times as likely to be killed by a partner as men. Partner assaults against women, rapes, and gross violations of a woman’s integrity account for a fifth of all reported crimes of violence (against women and men combined). Violence in partner relationships has significant consequences for physical and mental health; between 12,000 and 14,000 women seek outpatient care each year as a result of violence committed by a partner. Violence can also have serious social reper- cussions: isolation, financial difficulties, sick leave from work, unemployment, etc., and women sub- jected to this form of violence can be prevented from seeking medical or other assistance. Children are often involved. Approximately 10 per cent of all chil- dren have experienced violence in the home and 5 per cent have experienced it frequently. Many children who witness violence are also beaten themselves. In 2006, the Swedish National Board of Health and Welfare estimated the annual socioeconomic cost of violence against women to be between SEK 2.7 and 3.3 billion, SEK 38 million of which were direct medical costs. Factors affecting the risk of violence in partner relationships are related both to the social structure and individual character of the perpetrator. Trends in violence have moved in different direc- tions. Today, more people in all age groups, with the exception of the most elderly (aged 65–84), report that they have been exposed to threats or violence Violence Health in Sweden: The National Public Health Report 2012. Chapter 12. KAREN LEANDER1 †, MARIE BERLIN2, ANNIKA ERIKSSON3, KATJA GILLANDER GÅDIN4, GUNNEL HENSING5, GUNILLA KRANTZ5, KATARINA SWAHNBERG6 & MARIA DANIELSSON2 1Department of Public Health Science, Karolinska Institutet, Stockholm, Sweden, 2Swedish National Board of Health and Welfare, Stockholm, Sweden, 3National Council for Crime Prevention, Stockholm, Sweden, 4Department of Health Sciences, Mid Sweden University, Sundsvall, Sweden, 5Department of Community Medicine and Public Health, Gothenburg University, Gothenburg, Sweden, and, 6Department of Clinical and Experimental Medicine, Linköping University, Linköping, Sweden † Deceased Correspondence: Maria Danielsson, Swedish National Board of Health and Welfare, 106 30, Stockholm, Sweden. E-mail: maria.danielsson@socialstyrelsen.se 459609CCP0010.1177/1403494812459609K. Leander et al.Violence 2012 at Mittuniversitetet on December 28, 2012sjp.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://sjp.sagepub.com/ 230 K. Leander et al. than in the 1980s. In recent years, however, the increase has halted; there has even been a decline among young people aged 16–24. Crimes of violence reported to the police are growing in number, and the number of reports of work-related violence, for example, has more than doubled since the mid 1970s. The number of rapes reported to the police has also risen significantly in recent year, and the vic- tims are on average becoming younger. Furthermore, rape and gross violation of a woman’s integrity (com- bined) are now almost as common as robbery. This increase is probably due to a combination of greater willingness to report crimes, a lower tolerance thresh- old for violence, legislative changes and an increase in the number of violent acts committed. The rise in violence represented by crime statistics is not reflected in the proportion of people who have suffered serious physical injuries as a result of vio- lence. Over the past ten years, the number of deaths resulting from violence has declined among women and men. Hospital statistics also show that although the percentage of people receiving treatment has remained relatively stable, more people are now seeking hospital treatment following a sexual assault. Introduction Both in Sweden and internationally, it has become increasingly common to address the problem of vio- lence from a public health perspective. In the mid 1990s, the World Health Organisation (WHO) declared violence prevention and violence research, particularly in connection with women and children, a public health priority [1]. The World Report on Violence and Health was published in 2002 [2]. Among its aims was the launching of a worldwide campaign against violence. This is the first time a separate chapter of the Swedish Public Health Report has been devoted to the subject of violence. It is one way of responding to the WHO appeal for a focus on violence from a pub- lic health perspective. WHO distinguishes three main categories of vio- lence: self-directed violence, interpersonal violence and collective violence. This chapter deals with the second category, i.e. violence between individuals or groups of individuals. The emphasis is on violence in close rela- tions and, in particular, violence in partner relationships. Although violence against intimates mainly involves women and children, elderly people are also affected. It is difficult to know with any certainty how wide- spread violence is in society today. According to police statistics, only a small proportion of the popu- lation are victims of crimes of violence each year. However, one in every ten respondents in other sur- veys that question people about their exposure to violence report having been exposed to violence in the past year. Clearly many crimes of violence are not reported to the police. The number of unreported cases varies according to the type of crime, the seri- ousness of the crime and the victim’s relationship to the perpetrator. Serious crimes of violence are reported more often than minor ones, and crimes where the perpetrator is a stranger are reported more often than crimes commit- ted by an acquaintance or family member. It is believed that the number of unreported crimes is greatest in the case of sex crimes and crimes against children, although these are often serious. The National Council for Crime Prevention (BRÅ) estimates that less than half of all personal robberies, approximately a third of all cases of assault, approximately a fifth of all cases of threats and harassment and just over a sixth of all sex crimes are reported to the police [3]. This chapter begins with a review of the frequency of violence in different age groups, followed by a dis- cussion of the contexts in which violence occurs, i.e. the nature of the victims’ relationship to the perpe- trator and the types of location in which violence takes place. This is followed by a more in-depth examination of violence against family members, i.e. violence in partner relationships, violence against the elderly and honour-related violence. The chapter concludes with a presentation of trends in crime over time on the basis of existing statistics. The prevalence of violence based on various sources To gain an understanding of the characteristics and prevalence of violence, three types of sources are drawn on: statistics on crimes reported to the police, questionnaire surveys and the Swedish National Board of Health and Welfare’s Patient Registry and Cause of Death Register. For the questionnaire surveys, data are taken mainly from Statistics Sweden’s Survey on Living Conditions (ULF) and the annual Swedish Crime Survey (SCS) administered by the National Council for Crime Prevention (BRÅ). The frequency with which women and men in various age groups fall victims to violence is discussed below. Hospitalisation Boys and men are more frequently hospitalised for severe injuries following an assault than girls and women (Figure 1). Young women and men aged 15– 29 are most likely to require hospital treatment as a result of violence, and it is in this age group that we find the most substantial gender disparities. Cranial injury is common in cases of assault among people who are hospitalised. at Mittuniversitetet on December 28, 2012sjp.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://sjp.sagepub.com/ Violence 231 Lethal violence More men than women die as a result of violence. An annual average of 30 women, 51 men, and 4 children (0–14 years) were killed in 2004–2006 according to the Cause of Death Register. Among children and the elderly (over 75 years of age) more women than men die from violence (Figure 2). The highest percentage of men who die as a result of violence is found in the 45–59 age group while the highest proportion of women are aged 30–59. Just over half of these women were killed by their current or former partner. Thus four to five times as many women as men are victims of lethal violence in partner relationships [4]. Young people most exposed to violence and threats Approximately one in ten inhabitants was exposed to some form of violence, threats or harassment in 2006, according to Swedish Crime Survey (Table I). Threats and harassment were the most common forms of violence. It is more common for younger people than for the elderly to be subjected to violence or serious threats of violence, according to ULF studies (Figure 3). In 2004–2005, 17 per cent of men and 12 per cent of women aged 16–24 reported having been subjected to violence or serious threats at some time in the pre- vious 12 months. The reverse is true of people in 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 0–14 15–29 30–44 45–59 60–74 75+ Women MenNumber Age Figure 2. Age patterns among deaths following an assault. Number of people who died following an assault*. Women and men in various age groups, averages for 2004–2006. * ICD10 code: X85–Y09. Source: Cause of Death Register, Swedish National Board of Health and Welfare. 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 16–24 25–34 35–44 45–54 55–64 65–74 75–84 Women Men Age Per cent Figure 3. Age patterns among people exposed to violence or serious threats. Percentage of people who had been subjected to violence or seri- ous threats in the previous 12 months. Women and men in differ- ent age groups, 2004–2005. Source: Survey of Living Conditions (ULF), Statistics Sweden. Table I. Types of violence and threats. Percentage of people exposed to different types of violence and threats in the past 12 months. Women and men aged 16–79, 2006. Women Men All Threats 4.9 4.2 4.6 Assaults 2.0 3.0 2.5 of which serious assaults* 0.4 0.6 0.6 Sex crimes 1.3 0.3 0.8 Personal robberies 0.7 1.4 1.1 Harassment incidents 5.2 3.9 4.6 Total (any type of threat/ harassment) 10.8 10.3 10.5 *Refers to assaults serious enough to require a visit to a doctor, nurse or dentist. Source: Swedish Crime Survey (SCS), National Council for Crime Prevention (BRÅ). 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 0–14 15–29 30–44 45–59 60–74 75+ Women MenNumber per 100,000 Age Figure 1. Age patterns among hospitalised assault victims. Number per 100,000 inhabitants who were hospitalised following an assault* at some time during the year. Women and men in vari- ous age groups, averages for 2008–2010. * ICD10 code: X85–Y09. Source: Swedish National Patient Register, Swedish National Board of Health and Welfare. at Mittuniversitetet on December 28, 2012sjp.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://sjp.sagepub.com/ 232 K. Leander et al. middle age, where more women than men are affected. Among those aged 45–54, twice as many women as men had been subjected to violence or serious threats of violence. Among the elderly, more men than women had been exposed to violence. Approximately half the incidents involved physical violence while half involved threats of violence. It is mainly women who avoid going out alone in the evenings through fear of assault, robbery or some other form of molestation. In the 2007 National Institute for Public Health survey, 41 per cent of women and 9 per cent of men aged 18–84 reported that they often or sometimes avoided going out alone in the evenings. Assaults reported to the police The most common violent crime reported to the police is assault, defined in the Penal Code as an act which results in bodily injury, sickness or pain to/in another person, or which places them in a state of powerlessness. In 2007, over 82,000 crimes of assault were reported, just over half of which had been com- mitted against men or boys aged 15 or older, a third of which had been perpetrated against women or girls aged 15 or older, and the remainder of which had been committed against children under the age of 15 (Figure 4). Thus just over 60 per cent of adult victims were male and almost 40 per cent were female. In 2007, 9,600 cases of assault against children under the age of 15 were reported to the police. In the same year, statistics were be recorded separately for girls and boys for the first time. However, these data are still incomplete, although data are available on cases of assault against males and females aged 15–17 (Figure 4). Sex crimes According to the SCS, 1.3 per cent of women and 0.3 per cent of men reported having been sexually coerced, assaulted or molested in 2006 (Table I). Only 17 per cent of these sex crimes were reported to the police [3]. The most common sex crime reported to the police is sexual molestation, i.e. bodily contact of a sexual nature which is not intimate or prolonged enough to be classified as sexual intercourse. These represented almost half of all sex crimes reported in 2007. Rapes accounted for just over a third of all sex crimes. Nearly 90 per cent of these were registered as completed rapes and 10 per cent as attempted rape. In the case of completed rapes, roughly a quar- ter of the victims were under the age of 15 [5]. Just over 10 per cent of rape victims under the age of 15 were boys, whereas rape victims aged 15 or older were generally women [6]. Sexual coercion, exploi- tation etc. accounted for approximately 10 per cent of reported sex crimes, with persons under the age of 15 accounting for three-quarters of the victims of these offences. Hate crimes Hate crimes range from graffiti on the wall of some- one’s house to murder. It is the underlying motive which determines whether an offence is defined as a hate crime. There are no special codes for hate crimes in the police’s reporting system. Since 2008, how- ever, the system has included a special field for sus- pected hate crimes. A survey of hate crimes was conducted by BRÅ in 2007. In order for a crime to be considered a hate Children 0–6 yrs 2% Children 7–14 yrs 10% Girls 15–17 yrs 1% Women 18+ yrs 31% Boys 15–17 yrs 3% Men 18+ yrs 53% Figure 4. Crimes of assault reported to the police. Assaults reported to the police in 2007 (including aggravated offences) by age and gender. Percentages. Total number of reported assault offences: 82,262. Source: National Council for Crime Prevention (BRÅ) [5]. Rape 38% Sexual coercion, exploita- tion 10% Sexual molesta- tion 49% Other 3% Figure 5. Sex crimes reported to the police. Sex crimes reported to the police in 2007 by type of crime. Per- centages. Total number of reported sex crimes: 12,563. Source: National Council for Crime Prevention (BRÅ) [5]. at Mittuniversitetet on December 28, 2012sjp.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://sjp.sagepub.com/ Violence 233 crime in the survey the perpetrator had to belong to a pre-defined majority group and the victim to a sim- ilarly pre-defined minority group. It was also essen- tial that the crime be motivated by the perpetrator’s negative attitude toward the victim’s skin colour, nationality, ethnic background, religious beliefs or sexual orientation. A hate crime motive was identi- fied in just over 3,500 crime reports. The motives were xenophobic (70 per cent of all cases), homo- phobic (20 per cent), Islamophobic (6 per cent) and anti-Semitic (2 per cent). Just over 20 per cent of hate crimes were violent offences, and approximately 35 per cent took the form of unlawful threats and/or molestation. Violent crimes were not as prominent among offences with a religious motive as among crimes based on xenophobic or homophobic motives (Figure 6). These crimes generally involved men. Approximately 80 per cent of suspected perpetrators were men, as were approximately 70 per cent of the victims. The crimes, which occurred in every possi- ble type of location, were committed in schools or in the workplace more often than in places of public entertainment [7]. In two studies (1996–1997 and 2003–2004), BRÅ asked schoolboys and schoolgirls (pupils in the 8th and 9th grades of compulsory school and the 1st and 2nd years of upper-secondary school) if they had been subjected to violence at any time during the previous 12 months because of their ethnic background. In the most recent study, which included just over 10,000 young people, 7 per cent of pupils of foreign background (born abroad with foreign-born parents) answered that they had been. The corresponding figure for pupils of Swedish background (born in Sweden with native-born par- ents) was 2 per cent. Most of the incidents had taken place during leisure time, on the street, at a disco or at a youth recreation centre. There was nothing to suggest that any appreciable change had taken place between the two studies [8]. Who commits violence and where? The available statistics provide a measure of insight into the victim’s relationship to the perpetrator. Perpetrators are predominantly men, whether the violence is directed at women or men. When the vic- tim is a woman, however, the perpetrator is more often a family member or person close to the family. Street violence and violence in the home and in the workplace According to the ULF surveys, women make up the majority (60 per cent) of victims of violence or threats of violence in the home or in connection with work, whereas 70 per cent of victims of violence in public places are men (Table II). The difference between men and women in this regard is even more marked among young people when it comes to location. Young males aged 16–24 are subjected to violence in public places (so-called street violence) three times more 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 Xenophobic Islamophobic Anti-Semitic Homophobic Crimes of violence*/unlawful threats/molestation Agitation against a minority group Defamation Vandalism Other crimes Per cent Crime motive Number of crimes2,489 206 118 723 Figure 6. Hate crimes. Hate crimes by motive, 2007. Percentages. *Included in hate crimes are the following categories: lethal violence, assault and violence against a public servant. Source: Klingspor, Molarin, Sporre [7]. at Mittuniversitetet on December 28, 2012sjp.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://sjp.sagepub.com/ 234 K. Leander et al. often than young females. In cases of street violence reported to the police, the majority of the perpetrators and approximately half the victims were under the influence of alcohol [9]. Young women, on the other hand, are subjected to violence and threats in the home twice as often as young men. Single women with young children constitute a particularly vulnerable group with 15 per cent of this group having been exposed to violence in the home in 2003 [10]. According to the 2005 ULF survey, violence in public places was twice as common as violence in the home. Underestimates of violence in the home tend to be larger, because the perpetrator is often acquainted with the victim and may even have been present at the interview [11]. According to the 2000–2001 ULF sur- vey, women failed to report an estimated 105,000 threats of violence or violent incidents to the police for fear of reprisals or for family reasons [12]. Table II shows the number of victims of violence or threats. It should be noted that the same person may have been subjected to several incidents of vio- lence or threats. Half of all reported incidents occurred while the victim was at work. Acquainted or unacquainted perpetrator Most of the women and children assaulted (just over 70 per cent) were acquainted with the perpetrator, compared with only slightly over 30 per cent of male assault victims. These figures are based on assaults reported to the police (Figure 7). In almost half of all reported assaults on women, the perpetrator was the victim’s current or former partner [13]. The same finding emerged from a public health survey con- ducted by Stockholm County Council: half the women exposed to violence in the previous 12 months Table II. Location and type of incident. Estimated number of people who have been subjected to violence or serious threats, by type and location of incident, and by gender (per cent). People aged 16 and over, 2005. Number of people Percentage Women Men Total Subjected to violence or serious threats 508,000 48 52 100 In the home* 106,000 60 40 100 In public place 205,000 31 69 100 In connection with work 203,000 58 42 100 Subjected to physical violence of which: 254,000 42 58 100 Violence requiring medical attention 45,000 39 61 100 *In most cases, the victim’s own home, but can also include the homes of others. Source: Survey of Living Conditions (ULF), Statistics Sweden. 60 80 100 Stranger, outdoors Acquaintance, outdoors Per cent 0 20 40 Children 0-6 yrs Children 7-14 yrs Girls 15-17 yrs Boys 15-17 yrs Women 18+ yrs Men 18+ yrs Total Acquaintance, indoors Stranger, indoors Figure 7. Relationship with the perpetrator and location of reported criminal assaults. Assault victims by group and by the victim’s relationship to the perpetrator (known and unknown to the victim) and location of assault (indoors or outdoors). Children, women, and men in various age groups, 2007. Source: National Council for Crime Prevention (BRÅ) [5]. at Mittuniversitetet on December 28, 2012sjp.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://sjp.sagepub.com/ Violence 235 reported that the perpetrator had been their current or former partner [14]. By comparison, the same sur- vey found that approximately one in ten male victims of violence cited a partner as the perpetrator. As regards reported assaults against children aged 0–6, the perpetrator is acquainted with the victim in nine cases out of ten, and is often a parent or step- parent. In most cases these assaults occur indoors. Among children aged 7–14, assaults also tend to occur indoors and are committed by a person known to the victim, although this is somewhat less common than among victims aged 0–6. The majority of suspected perpetrators identified in these cases (approximately 60 per cent) were under the age of 15 and thus had not yet reached the age of criminal responsibility. A further 15 per cent were between the ages of 15 and 20. Almost a fifth of all women whose injuries were seri- ous enough to require hospitalisation in 2005–2007 reported having been assaulted by their partners (Figure 8). Just over a tenth had been injured as a result of sexual assault. Only a small number of men had been injured as a result of abuse by a partner or other person acquainted with the victim, and none had been hospitalised as a result of sexual assault. Approximately 98–99 per cent of those suspected of sex crimes in 2007 were men, and 20–25 per cent were between the ages of 15 and 20 [5]. Lethal violence is more common in socially mar- ginalised environments and a large proportion of the perpetrators have or have had a mental illness. A quarter of the men who killed a woman in an inti- mate relationship, committed suicide after the crime. With regard to rapes among adults (aged 15 or older) reported to the police in 2006, the victims and the perpetrators were strangers in 33 per cent and superficial acquaintances in 41 per cent of all cases. Approximately 17 per cent of all reported rapes occurred in intimate relationships, i.e. the perpetrator was either the victim’s current or former partner [16]. The remaining 9 per cent of rapes were committed by other family members or close acquaintances. Violence in close relationships The data sources cited in the introduction do not provide a complete picture of the scope of violence. Moreover, the picture is distorted because unre- ported cases are more numerous for certain violent offences than for others. Under-reporting is more prevalent in instances of violence that occur in close relationships and in private environments hidden from public view. There is also more under-reporting of crimes viewed as particularly shameful, e.g. sex crimes and child abuse. Violence in close relationships includes violence within partner relationships, against children, against the elderly, and honour-related violence. Violence in close relationships is distinguished by two features: the victim is more or less dependent on the perpetra- tor, and the violence is often recurrent, forming part of the victim’s daily life. The emphasis in this section is on violence in partner relationships, which mainly affects women and their children. Assaulted by a partner 19% Assaulted by another f amily member or an acquain- tance 4% Sexual assault 9% Women Assulted by a person who is not a f amily member or an acquaintance 68% Assaulted by a partner <1% Men Assulted by a person who is not a f amily member or an acquaintance 98% Assulted by another f amily member or an acquaintance 2% Figure 8. People admitted to inpatient treatment as a result of different types of assault. Proportion (per cent) of those admitted to inpatient treatment at some point during the year as a result of assault, by type of assault. Girls/ women and boys/men, 2005–2007. An average of 579 girls/women and 2,074 boys/men per year, received inpatient treatment as a result of assault in 2005–2007. Source: Swedish National Patient Register, Swedish National Board of Health and Welfare. at Mittuniversitetet on December 28, 2012sjp.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://sjp.sagepub.com/ 236 K. Leander et al. Violence in partner relationships Violence in partner relationships refers here to vio- lence that occurs within a current or former relation- ship, i.e. violence committed by a current or former spouse, cohabitee, boyfriend or girlfriend, or partner in an LAT (Living Apart Together) relationship. Swedish studies of men’s violence against a female partner show that 1–3 per cent of all women have been exposed to physical violence committed by their cur- rent or former partner in the past year [14, 17]. The Swedish National Board of Health and Welfare esti- mates that at least 75,000 women in Sweden are sub- jected to some form of violence in partner relationships each year [18]. However, this figure, based on official statistics with the deficiencies they entail, is unreliable. Both Swedish and foreign studies show that women who have been subjected to violence by a male partner are often repeated victims [19]. Data on the percent- age of women subjected to partner violence should therefore be supplemented with information on how often such incidents recur in order to gain a compre- hensive picture of the scope of this problem. A national study conducted in 2001 indicates a high lifetime prevalence of violence against women [20]. Lifetime prevalence here refers to the percentage of vic- tims who have been subjected to violence at some point in their lives after the age of 15. Otherwise estimates are normally limited to a particular year. According to the study, 7 per cent of cohabiting women had been sub- jected to physical violence by their current spouse or cohabitee at some point in their lives. Among women who had previous relationships, 28 per cent had been subjected to physical violence by a former partner at some time. A study of violence in same-sex relation- ships showed that a quarter of those surveyed had been subjected to some form of psychological, sexual or physical violence in a current or previous relationship (including heterosexual relationships) [21]. A study of pregnant women in Sweden showed that nearly 3 per cent had suffered physical violence from a male partner, former partner or another rela- tive in the year preceding pregnancy, and that just over 1 per cent had been subjected to violence during or directly after pregnancy [22, 23]. These and other studies contain examples of cases where violence commenced when the woman became pregnant, and cases where ongoing violence became more severe during the pregnancy. A WHO study from 20051 showed that between 4 and 12 per cent of the women questioned were subjected to physical violence during pregnancy, and in over 90 per cent of the cases, the perpetrator was the biological father of the child [24]. International studies have shown that violence against women is a global problem [24, 25]. Sample studies among women in Canada, Finland and Norway have reported high lifetime prevalence of exposure to violence in partner relationships [26– 29]. A review of studies from several Western coun- tries has shown that 25–30 per cent of all women are subjected to violence by a partner at some point, and that 2–12 per cent are affected each year [30]. From a global perspective, the more serious forms of vio- lence against women also include human trafficking for sexual purposes, sex slavery, exploitation of labour, physical and sexual assaults against prosti- tutes, child-killings involving female victims, the abortion of female foetuses, the neglect of female children, and rapes committed in times of war [31]. Controlling or situational violence in partner relationships Violence in partner relationships can assume many forms. However, two main patterns may be distin- guished: controlling violence and situational violence [2, 32–34]. Controlling violence is serious and escalatory, involving an admixture of different forms of violence, terror, harassment and threats. The perpetrator’s behaviour is dominating and controlling. The over- whelming proportion of victims are women subjected to violence by their male partners [35]. According to the WHO report on violence and health, there is very little to indicate that women engage in violence of this kind [2]. The same applies to sexual violence by women against male partners [36], which is more often used in self-defence or in response to men’s violence. Situational violence in partner relationships is triggered by certain stressful situations in which frus- tration and anger erupt into physical aggression. In most cases the perpetrator does not feel the need to control the other person. This kind of violence is committed by both women and men. In some rela- tionships it is reciprocal or initiated by the woman [2, 34]. Controlling violence is often thought of as a pro- cess, whereas situational violence is described in terms of separate incidents. While it is probably easier to capture situational violence in public health surveys and the like, other methods also need to be used to study controlling violence, according to the WHO [2]. It has been argued that women commit violence in partner rela- tionships to the same extent as men, but these asser- tions are often based on studies that primarily capture situational violence rather than the kind of violence aimed at dominating or breaking down one’s partner [36]. Controlling violence results in physical injuries to a greater extent than other partner violence, and psychological conditions such as depression, low at Mittuniversitetet on December 28, 2012sjp.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://sjp.sagepub.com/ Violence 237 self-esteem, fear (sometimes fear for one’s life), and higher levels of consumption of medical care and medication [2, 35, 37]. Consequences of partner violence Research based on clinical studies and questionnaire surveys clearly shows that violence in partner rela- tionships has a severe impact on victims’ physical and mental health, both in the short term and long term [2, 32–34]. Even long after the violence has ceased, a strong connection persists between wom- en’s ill health and their exposure to violence [24]. Studies in Sweden and other countries have shown that domestic violence is linked to suicide attempts among women [38–40]. In an Australian study, the percentage of women who reported having injured themselves, or having recently been on the point of doing so, was nine times higher among those who had been subjected to violence by their partners than among other women [41]. A questionnaire survey of women who had been in contact with the psychiatric care sector in Skåne in 2003 showed that 70 per cent had been subjected to physical, psychological or sex- ual assaults at some point in their lives, usually by an intimate and often on repeated occasions [42]. A study was conducted in the four Norrland (northern Sweden) county councils of the links between reported physical violence or threats of violence (not limited to violence in partner relationships), and reported ill health among women and men. Among women aged 30–44 who had been subjected to violence or threats, the proportion who suffered from nervousness and anxiety was many times higher than among those who had not been exposed, once social background and smoking habits had been taken into account [43]. Mental illness is more common among women than among men, but it is not known to what extent this is due to violence. According to a Norwegian study, the combination of physical and sexual violence that haunts the lives of many abused women is particularly harmful [44]. Certain specific diagnoses for which women seek medical care may be a sign that they have been sub- jected to sexual assault, both within and outside close relationships. Diagnoses often linked to sexual assault are chronic pelvic pain, other conditions involving prolonged pain, infections, post-traumatic stress dis- order (PTSD), eating disorders, self-destructive behaviour, chronic mental illness and other psychiat- ric disorders [45–48]. These health problems may be the result of violence without the connection being apparent to the woman herself or to healthcare pro- viders. Sexual assaults also frequently lead to a num- ber of gynaecological and reproductive complaints as well as to sexual problems, particularly with respect to orgasm and sexual satisfaction [49]. The authors of an Australian study estimated, on the basis of disability-adjusted life years (DALYs), that women’s burden of disease was mainly attribut- able to mental illness [50]. Seventy-three per cent of the burden of disease was attributed to issues such as depression, anxiety and suicide, while 22 per cent were attributable to harmful health behaviours, such as smoking tobacco and misuse or abuse of alcohol and illegal drugs. Less than 1 per cent were the result of physical injury. The authors also estimated that violence in partner relationships was responsible almost 8 per cent of the total burden of disease among all adult women under the age of 45 in the Australian state of Victoria, where the study was conducted. Partner violence can also entail serious social con- sequences for woman, such as isolation, difficulty in obtaining help, including healthcare [51], strained relations with employers, financial problems caused by absence from work due to illness, and unemploy- ment as a result of difficulty in maintaining normal working relationships [2]. Constant fear, restricted freedom of movement and the knowledge that the children are also being affected by the violence, can also bring about a significant deterioration in the quality of the victim’s life [52]. Each year, women in Sweden make between 12,000 and 14,000 outpatient visits to hospitals, emergency care units or primary care providers following violence in a partner relationship. Domestic violence is responsi- ble for more absences from work than street violence and work-related violence [12]. Sixteen per cent of peo- ple who had been subjected to domestic violence called in sick, compared with 6 per cent of those who had been exposed to street violence, and just below 3 per cent of those who had been subjected to violence linked to work. Although the data were not broken down by gender, they indicate that single women with children seek medical care or take sick leave as a result of vio- lence more often than other people [11]. Prolonged absence due to illness, i.e. of more than 30 days, is ten times more common among those who have been sub- jected to domestic violence than among those who have been exposed to street violence. On the other hand, street violence is responsible for more than half of all incidents of violence requiring medical treatment. In a 2006 report by the Swedish National Board of Health and Welfare, it was estimated that violence against women costs society between SEK 2.7 and 3.3 billion annually, of which direct medical care costs account for between SEK 23 and 38 million [18]. To these figures must be added costs arising in connection with sick leave and lost future productivity. at Mittuniversitetet on December 28, 2012sjp.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://sjp.sagepub.com/ 238 K. Leander et al. Violence becomes normalised A recurring question is why so many women remain in abusive partner relationships. One theory is predi- cated on the so-called normalisation process: vio- lence is perpetuated by becoming a part of daily life, i.e. it becomes normalised and is gradually accepted by both the man and the woman [53]. The process is characterised by two important mechanisms: the woman is isolated, and the man switches between violence and warmth. By means of threats and emotional manoeuvres, the man is able to frighten the woman to the point where she adapts, then gradually isolate her from contact with her par- ents, siblings, friends and others. She is cut off from people in her surroundings who might otherwise be able to protect and help her and show her the unac- ceptability of her situation. When a man first becomes abusive he will often veer between violence and shows of warmth and consideration. He may be dev- astated after having used violence and promise that it will not happen again. This interplay helps to strengthen the man’s power; he controls the switch between good and evil. A third mechanism, accord- ing to this model, is that the dominance of the male partner is eroticised, and several violent incidents end in rape and other forms of sexual violence [46]. Women who live under such circumstances gradually lose their sense of reality and may even come to assume guilt for the man’s controlling and violent behaviour. Typical factors that trigger violence in such relationships are men’s jealousy and feelings of ownership, their expectations regarding women’s domestic duties, and the feeling of being entitled to punish ‘their’ woman for misdeeds perceived as chal- lenging their authority [54]. Some women are nonetheless able to keep a net- work of people close to them who are aware of the violence [55]. Women who eventually succeed in breaking off the relationship have often tried to do so before, and the process is marked by feelings of love, fear, hate, pity, guilt and hope. The break-up is often hastened by various ‘turning points’, for example when the woman realises that her life is at stake and/ or that her children are vulnerable, when she loses all hope for the relationship, and when outside help arrives at the right time. Violence is not limited to ongoing relationships. According to the ULF surveys, single women are subjected to violence or threats seven times as often as cohabiting women. One explanation for this is that it is both emotionally and practically easier to talk about such incidents if one does not share a home with the perpetrator. Another explanation is that separations and violence are connected – partly because a separation can lead to violence and partly because violence can be the cause of separation. Research has shown that more serious forms of vio- lence against women often take place when a rela- tionship is coming to an end. It has also been shown that homelessness among women is often the result of their having been subjected to violence in their former home [14, 35]. Another noteworthy finding of the ULF surveys is that single women with small children are the group at highest risk of violence. Approximately 15 per cent had been subjected to violence or threats in the home in 2003 [10]. Mothers living alone who lack social resources, i.e. who have a range of problems in terms of finances, education, health, employment and social networks, are exposed to recurrent vio- lence up to ten times as often as single women gen- erally [14, 56]. Structure of society and individual risk factors both significant Many explanations for men’s violence against women have been proposed over the years [57]. In 1994, BRÅ identified two fundamental approaches [58, 59]. The first is concerned with the question of why some men subject women to violence while others do not. The second approach, which in the view of the authors of the present report has greater validity, focuses on the significance of men’s dominance over women in society as a whole. In the background material to the 1998 legislation on a woman’s right to freedom from violence, gender inequality and sex discrimination (the Violence against Women Reform), the imbalance in power relationships between the sexes was identified as the fundamental cause of men’s violence against women [60]. An evaluation of the measures taken by govern- ment agencies to combat men’s violence against women [61] was published in 2004, and in this eval- uation, too, the explanatory models were divided into two main groups. In the first group, interpreta- tions were based on the concept of a “gender power order”, in which power is conceived as based on a “social structure where men are superior to women, and where men’s exercise of power thereby confirms a gender power hierarchy” [61]. This may be regarded as a feminist perspective. The second group was characterised by “deviance interpretations”, where violence is seen as a marginal problem and the perpetrators and victims are regarded as deviant indi- viduals. Here, explanations of violence are sought in deviant behaviours among men who perpetrate vio- lence. Attention is focused on the most deviant men, men who suffer from severe mental illness, are seri- ous criminals or substance abusers, or men from at Mittuniversitetet on December 28, 2012sjp.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://sjp.sagepub.com/ Violence 239 particularly patriarchal cultures. However, the authors felt that this approach distanced violent men from others, thereby concealing the links between violence, gender and power [61]. One of their con- clusions was that government agencies principally apply the deviance model, which weakens initiatives taken to combat violence. Several attempts have also been made to combine different explanatory models. One approach has been to distinguish between the basic preconditions for vio- lence, in this case the gender power order, and trigger- ing factors such as alcohol or individual circumstances [57]. In other approaches, the feminist perspective is used as “cement” between the gender-power perspec- tive and other explanatory models [62]. The concept of “intersectionality” has also been introduced to emphasise that several social power hierarchies can influence people’s lives and living conditions simulta- neously – power orders based on gender, ethnicity, nationality, sexuality, class and skin colour [63]. At the end of the 1970s, the holistic – also known as the ecological – model was developed to explain child abuse. WHO and others have applied the model both to violence in general and to men’s violence against women (Figure 9) [2]. The model represents an attempt to combine theories and explanatory models that operate on different levels. It is based on the premise that many factors work together and that no single factor can explain either the prevalence of partner violence in different societies or different contexts, or variations in the prevalence of this vio- lence [64]. For example, violence can increase in periods of high unemployment due to individual stress, lack of social control or and reduced support to families [65]. Community norms permissive of violence also lead to violence becoming more com- mon [24]. Although it is important that society is able to help individuals, for example by protecting and supporting vulnerable women and by providing treatment to men who use violence, a structural understanding of violence makes it easier to work preventively [66]. Gender-related violence in ‘gender equal’ Sweden Sweden has often been ranked among the world’s most egalitarian societies [67]. In light of this, the question may be asked why Sweden’s successful ini- tiatives in the gender equality domain have largely failed to reduce the high levels of violence. International observers take the view that structural initiatives such as those taken in Scandinavia are needed to combat violence but that they are not suf- ficient [68]. Several studies have shown that women in the Nordic countries report that their previous relation- ships were considerably more violent than their cur- rent ones. The authors of the report Captured Queen (Slagen Dam) have interpreted these findings to mean that only after a woman has left a relation- ship and is away from the violence that she can describe her experiences. Admitting that one is liv- ing in a violent relationship is not easy, a difficulty • Norms that • Stressfull social • Inability to • Experience of IndividualStructure Society Relationship sanction men's authority over women. • Acceptance of violence as means of resolving conflicts. relations. • Relations with others whose norms legitimse violence. • Isolation of women and the family. y manage relationships. • Marital conflict. • The man takes control and makes the decisions in the family. p violence in the family during childhood and adolescence. • Lack of care during childhood and adolescence • Masculinity is associated with dominance, honor, or agression. • Rigid gender roles . • Individual-psychological factors. • Alcohol abuse. Figure 9. The holistic model. Examples of factors which increase the risk of violence in partner relationships. The model was first described by Heise [64]. The original WHO model employed the concepts ‘social’, ‘community’, ‘relationship’ and ‘individual’ [2, 18]. at Mittuniversitetet on December 28, 2012sjp.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://sjp.sagepub.com/ 240 K. Leander et al. compounded by the prevailing Swedish gender equality norms. These norms put pressure on women to interpret their ongoing relationship in terms of equality [20]. On the other hand, the find- ings can be interpreted as a sign of increased gender equality, which among other things has improved women’s opportunities to break away from violent relationships [69, 70]. The role of alcohol in partner violence Alcohol plays a complex role in partner violence. Although US studies found that the men and women involved were both sober in the majority of cases of violence against a partner [71–73], there was a risk that the violence would have been more serious if the man had been drinking alcohol [74]. Unlike men with no alcohol problems, men who had sought treatment for alcohol problems were found to be at greater risk of using violence on days when they had consumed alcohol [75]. According to the US studies, women are at considerably higher risk of being subjected to vio- lence if they live with men who have alcohol or drug problems [72]. The risk also increases in socially dis- advantaged environments, where alcohol and/or drug abuse are also more common. However, it is difficult to determine whether partner violence is a result of alcohol or drug abuse, of social marginalisation, or of a combination of the two [76, 77]. In a Swedish interview study carried out among women with alcohol or drug abuse problems, several respondents indicated that a contributing cause of their abuse was that they had been exposed to violence by a man close to them [77]. This raises the question of what is cause and what is effect in studies where a link has been found between violence and alcohol abuse. With regard to violence in partner relationships, studies have shown that alcohol plays a larger role in situational violence than in controlling violence [20, Violence against women in Sweden: a historical perspective Acceptance of men’s violence against women has varied throughout the course of history. In the 13th cen- tury, abduction – the act of taking a wife by force – was prohibited. Nevertheless, old provincial laws permit- ted married men to use “reasonable corporal punishment of wives”. However husbands were expected to observe certain limits, such as preferably not beating their wives in public, killing them, or striking them with large implements. In certain cases, women enjoyed legal protection against violence, although this was often in their capacity as men’s chattels. Early laws against rape were usually applied to protect engaged or married women from other men. It was not until the introduction of the penal code of 1864 that “corporal punishment of wives” was redefined as punishable, non-aggravated “assault in a private place”, and thereby criminalised. However, the public prosecutor could not initiate legal proceedings unless the victim herself reported the crime. This form of violence was therefore termed “accusatory crime”. It was not until the early 1980s that most cases of domestic violence and rape were prosecuted in the courts. From historically having permitted many forms of private violence, the authority to exercise violence has gradually been transferred to the state, to the military and to the police. The official view of violence against women has changed substantially in recent decades. A number of examples of legislative changes are set out below: 1965 Rape within marriage was criminalised. 1982 Violence against women, including assaults not classified as aggravated and taking place in private, became a publicly prosecutable offence. People other than the victim could also report the crime and the public prosecutor was authorised to initiate proceedings, even without the victim’s consent. 1984 Rape and other sex crimes were made publicly prosecutable offences; the definition of rape was broadened to include other acts besides intercourse, to cover homosexual assaults and to make the act gender-neutral. 1998 The crime of “gross violation of a woman’s integrity” was introduced into the Penal Code. 1999 Purchasing of sexual services was criminalised. 2003 The Restraining Orders Act was broadened to include joint homes. 2005 Sexual acts with a person in a “helpless state”, for example as a result of intoxication were made punishable as rape to a greater extent than previously. at Mittuniversitetet on December 28, 2012sjp.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://sjp.sagepub.com/ Violence 241 78]. For the most part, alcohol consumption appears to increase the risk that violence will be triggered and that it will have serious consequences. From a popu- lation standpoint, there are other factors that deter- mine whether or not violence will occur. If the population as a whole were to stop drinking alcohol entirely, men’s violence against women would not cease, although its prevalence would probably dimin- ish along with the number of people who suffer seri- ous injuries [79]. No studies show any clear links between alcohol and violence in relationships characterised by mod- erate alcohol consumption, but of course there is a sliding scale from moderate consumption to risk con- sumption to alcohol abuse. The fact that alcohol may be used as a means of avoiding responsibility, means that it may be accorded a more important role in partner violence than it actually has. Other drugs and medications can also heighten the risk of violence in partner relationships. Children who experience violence in the family Violence against women affects many children; according to one estimate, roughly 10 per cent of all children have experienced violence in the home and 5 per cent have experienced it frequently [20, 78]. These children are often referred to as “children who witness violence”, a somewhat questionable term. “Children who experience violence” better captures what children witness, as the psychological and emo- tional assaults to which the mother is subjected are also something that the children constantly live with [80]. Furthermore, research has shown that if a mother is beaten by her partner, her children are often beaten as well. According to one research review, this occurs in 30–60 per cent of cases, while another review estimates that 45–70 per cent of the children of mothers who are assaulted are also sub- jected to violence [81, 82]. The children of women who are subjected to vio- lence often have the same symptoms as children who are treated badly for other reasons. Some children have no symptoms at all, and age can play a role in determining whether the symptoms become visible and the way in which they manifest. Small children tend to develop physical symptoms, whereas older children often develop one or more specific symp- toms, such as eating disorders or self-harming behav- iour. Other factors are the child’s proximity to the violence, how severe it is, the frequency with which it occurs, and whether or not there are other adults who are able to protect and support the child [83]. Studies have also shown that girls and boys react in different ways: among other things girls often tend to become withdrawn while boys have a greater ten- dency to act out. Children may be affected by serious health prob- lems, such as asthma, eczema, stomach aches, diffi- culty sleeping, headaches, eating disorders, as well as prolonged mental health problems such as anxiety, self-destructive behaviour, aggression, difficulty relating to others and difficulty concentrating [84]. Other symptoms may include fears and phobias, sui- cidal behaviour, tics, bed-wetting and low self- esteem. Studies have also shown that these children often have difficulty in school, and perform more poorly in tests that measure language ability, motor function and cognitive ability. There are frequent instances of children who have lived with threats and violence in the family over long periods of time and thus suffered repeated traumas. As a result, some have developed post-traumatic stress syndrome (PTSD) [84]. As adults, these children run a greater risk of being assaulted, or of assaulting others. They also exhibit higher levels of alcohol consumption in their teenage years, and girls expose themselves to greater sexual risks [85]. Violence against children In Sweden, all corporal punishment or other abusive treatment of children is prohibited under the Children and Parents Code. In 1966, the paragraph which allowed parents to use corporal punishment on their children as part of the child-rearing process, i.e. for educational and disciplinary purposes, was excised. An express prohibition was subsequently introduced in 1979, and Sweden thereby became the first country in the world to ban corporal punishment of children. In 2004, the Council of Europe’s parlia- mentary assembly approved a recommendation to prohibit physical violence against children in the Council’s 45 member states, and declared that cor- poral punishment of children was contrary to both the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Council of Europe’s Social Charter. In 2006, the UN presented a report on violence against children recommending a total ban on the use of physical and psychological violence against children, including corporal punishment. To date, however, only a score of countries in the world have banned corporal pun- ishment of children. According to WHO estimates, some 57,000 chil- dren worldwide (0–14 years of age) died as a result of violence in 2000, and small children (0–4 years of age) were twice as likely to die as a result of violence compared with older children (5–14 years of age) [2]. In Sweden, an average of 4 children (0–14 years at Mittuniversitetet on December 28, 2012sjp.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://sjp.sagepub.com/ 242 K. Leander et al. of age) died each year as a result of assault in 2004– 2006 (Figure 2), and 100 children were hospitalised annually. International comparisons show that corporal punishment of children is significantly less common in Sweden than in other countries. The incidence of corporal punishment has declined in tandem with the increasingly negative attitude to corporal punish- ment of children. According to available data, approximately half of all children in the 1970s were physically punished at some point. In the 1980s, however, the proportion had dropped to about a third, and by the 1990s the figure had fallen to approximately 20 per cent. Presumably, it is mainly lighter and moderately severe forms of physical pun- ishment that are less frequent in Sweden than in other countries. More serious forms of corporal pun- ishment probably continue to occur in Sweden to the same extent as in other Nordic countries. Swedish studies from 2000 indicate that between 4 and 7 per cent of all children have at some point been struck with an object of some kind, of which 1–2 per cent have been struck frequently [86]. Younger children continue to be physically punished to a greater extent than older children and there is no evidence that the proportion of children who are punished has declined further in the 2000s [87]. Chapter 2, Children’s Health, contains an additional section on violence against children. Cases of child abuse are rarely prosecuted and few victims receive treatment for the traumas they have undergone. This is shown by a follow-up study of all the police reports of assaults on children conducted in one police district in 1986–1996 [88]. Only 25 of the 126 reports led to prosecution, although there were documented injuries in half the cases. Furthermore, only 6 of the 126 children had received professional therapy. The findings were the same in a special follow-up study conducted in Östergötland County of all reports of child abuse submitted by municipal social services committees in 2000 [89]. Of the 867 reports received, 148 resulted in a police report, of which only 20 resulted in prosecution. Violence against the elderly The scale and consequences of violence against the elderly are such that it can justly be considered a public health problem [90–92]. According to a Swedish study from 2000, an estimated 16 per cent of all elderly women and 13 per cent of all elderly men over the age of 65 had been subjected to vio- lence in some form [91]. Despite this finding, vio- lence against the elderly remains largely unresearched [93, 94]. Internationally, estimates of the proportion of elderly people who have been exposed to violence and assaults range from 1–4 per cent in Norway, Australia, Canada and the US, to 7–8 per cent in Finland [91], and as much as 20 per cent in France [95]. However, since the studies applied different definitions, a comparison of their findings, and thus of the countries concerned, has proved difficult. Violence against the elderly differs from violence in other groups of adults due to the vulnerability and state of dependency of many elderly people. In con- trast to children, whose vulnerability may somewhat resemble that of the elderly, the latter are a very het- erogeneous group in terms of their dependency and care needs. This has given rise to some disagreement concerning the kinds of incident to be subsumed under the term ‘violence against the elderly’ and whether the group should be limited to include only those elderly people who require care and attention. Narrower definitions of violence against the elderly could for example exclude neglect and substandard care, unintentional or random incidents, and inci- dents occurring outside the care context. The broader definition encompassing all forms of violence and assault committed against people over the age of 65 is usually applied in Sweden and the Nordic coun- tries [94]. Research on violence against the elderly often focuses on five different types of violence: neglect, psychological violence, physical violence, sexual violence and financial violence. A distinction is often made between violence that takes place in the home and violence which occurs in an institution. It is difficult to diagnose violence and assaults against the elderly if the latter are themselves unable or unwilling to report their experiences. Injuries among the elderly are often construed as age-related: elderly people may fall more easily due to impaired balance; their skin and skeleton become more brittle and fragile, and bruises occur more easily. An esti- mated 70 per cent of all identified cases of violence against the elderly have been reported by witnesses or caregivers [93]. In 1999, the law on mandatory reporting mistreatment within the organised health care system (Lex Sarah) was amended so that care staff are now duty bound to report irregularities and unsatisfactory conditions in the care of the elderly and functionally impaired to the relevant inspection agency (Chapter 14 of the Social Services Act) [95]. However the act only applies to unsatisfactory condi- tions in connection with professional care provision and does not cover violence in the home committed by family members. At the beginning of the 1990s, the Swedish National Board of Health and Welfare conducted a study among staff in the home care services, at care centres, emergency wards and day centres, and at Mittuniversitetet on December 28, 2012sjp.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://sjp.sagepub.com/ Violence 243 among chief guardians [90]. Among other things, the study found that elderly women are exposed to vio- lence more often than elderly men. Women with physical or mental functional impairments and elderly people with few social contacts are particu- larly vulnerable. In most cases, the perpetrator was a male family member. Physical assaults and psycho- logical abuse were equally common; various forms of violence and assault often occurred at the same time. Three typical cases, or risk situations, became appar- ent: (1) assaults that occur as a result of a strained care situation; (2) long-standing family problems, for example an addicted or mentally ill child who moves in with the elderly person; and (3) prolonged, sys- tematic abuse of a woman continuing into old age. In 2000, a study was carried out among people between the age of 65 and 80 in the municipality of Umeå [91]. The findings showed no significant dif- ference in the percentages of women and men who had been exposed to violence at some time – 16 and 13 per cent respectively. On the other hand, it was found that women were subjected to more recurrent and serious violence than men. Functional impair- ment and old age also heightened the risk of violence and abuse of elderly women, but not of elderly men. In three out of four cases, the perpetrator was a man, and more than half the women had been subjected to violence by a current or former partner. Three quar- ters of the women and 40 per cent of the men who had been subjected to violence had never sought help. The women victims were worse off than their male counterparts; they had poorer health, more often suffered from psychosomatic and mental symp- toms, used more medication and were more often traumatised by earlier violence that had occurred before the age of 65. Elderly men who had been sub- jected to repeated violence drank to the point of intoxication more often than others but it is unclear whether this was a consequence or a cause of the vio- lence to which they had been subjected. Honour-related violence Honour-related threats and violence have attracted increasing attention in recent years. The term is employed both in Sweden and internationally to denote threats and violence committed in the name of ‘honour’. There is no single recognised definition of honour-related violence. However, according to a UN report, this form of violence is characterised by the fact that it is encouraged within the wider com- munity as part of a pattern of structural and institu- tionalised oppression [96]. Thus violence is used as a means of controlling individuals, particularly women and girls, in societies where the concept of honour includes the exercise of control over women’s sexual- ity [97]. This type of violence can be viewed as a con- nected series of events in which control and restrictions on freedom turn into increasingly abusive acts involving violence, assault and ultimately hon- our killings [98]. Although honour-related violence is usually directed at girls and young women, the UN, among others, points out that LGBT people and heterosexual boys and men can also end up as victims. They may of course be subjected to violence or forced into marriages themselves, but they may also be coerced into keeping watch over female rela- tives or, in the case of younger men or boys, into committing crimes on behalf of the family on the assumption that they will be given milder punish- ments due to their age [98]. It is difficult to form a picture of the scale of hon- our-related violence in Sweden, particularly since it is so difficult to define. When Sweden’s County Administrative Boards compiled all the cases of hon- our-related violence known to Swedish authorities and organisations in 2004, they found a total of 1,500–2,000 cases [99]. Girl and women victims of honour-related violence were found in all of Sweden’s counties. Schools and voluntary organisations had closest contact with these girls, followed by the social services and youth clinics. As the figures represent known cases only, they are probably a gross underestimate. Honour-related violence was the special focus of a study of the perceived freedom of upper secondary school pupils in determining their own lives [73]. A key question was whether the pupils were worried about not being able to choose their life partners themselves. Approximately 5 per cent of the girls and 3 per cent of the boys in the 2nd year of upper secondary school (aged 17) expressed such a concern. Approximately 20 per cent of these ‘worried girls’ also stated that their free- dom to make choices on issues relating to their day-to- day lives was very or fairly restricted. Approximately 60 per cent had been subjected to abusive treatment, threats and violence on at least one occasion. Nearly half the boys who were worried about not being able to choose their own life partners had also been subjected to abusive treatment, threats and/or violence. Young people of foreign background were over-represented in this group of ‘worried’ boys and girls. In 2003–2007, the government earmarked SEK 180 million for initiatives to combat honour-related violence, including preventive programmes and sup- port for sheltered housing [98]. Sheltered housing for people who had been subjected to honour-related threats and violence was examined in one follow-up study, with mixed results [100]. A third of the inter- viewees had been subjected to new threats after at Mittuniversitetet on December 28, 2012sjp.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://sjp.sagepub.com/ 244 K. Leander et al. seeking protection, but most felt less threatened than before. When they arrived at the shelters, many of them had health issues related to the violence they had been exposed to. One conclusion of the study was that sheltered housing and the associated inter- ventions were in most cases sufficient to prevent young people from being exposed to further violence and oppression during the year covered by the fol- low-up study. Nevertheless, their levels of mental suffering was still significant at the time of the follow- up, and it was determined that the young people needed more long-term help [101, 102]. Trends in violence This section addresses changes in the prevalence of violence over time on the basis of the statistical sources given at the beginning of this chapter. However, the number of unreported cases is considerable; moreo- ver, it is probably subject to change over time, which makes it difficult to draw definite conclusions about changes in the real prevalence of violence. Hospitalisation Significantly more men and boys than women and girls are hospitalised for injuries resulting from assaults by another person (Figure 10). The proportion of adult women (over the age of 15) hospitalised following an assault has remained relatively constant over the past 20 years. The number of hospitalisations among girls under the age of 15 has remained fairly steady at 5 per 100,000. Among men and boys, injuries from assaults requiring inpatient treatment have declined somewhat since the end of the 1980s. However, this figure has fluctuated considerably among males. Lethal violence Lethal violence has declined since the beginning of the 1990s. According to the Swedish National Board of Health and Welfare Cause of Death Register, the number of girls aged 0–14 and women aged 15+ who were killed each year as a result of “assault by another person” has been relatively constant at approximately 4 girls and 32 women since the begin- ning of the 1970s. The proportion of girls and women killed by violence has thus declined somewhat as the population has grown during the period (Figure 11). The percentage of adult men killed as a result of violence rose between 1976–1978 and 1989–1991 from 1.8 per 100,000 inhabitants to 2.3 per 100,000 inhabitants (a total of 58 and 78 male victims respec- tively). Since then, the proportion of men killed by violence has fallen to below the 1970s level. The number of boys who die as a result of assault has remained unchanged since the end of the 1970s, at roughly three boys per annum. 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 1987 93 99 05 0–14 years Number per 100,000 Women 2010 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 1987 93 99 05 15+ years Number per 100,000 Men 2010 Figure 10. Hospitalisation as a result of assault in 1987–2010. Number of people per 100,000 inhabitants who received inpatient hospital treatment following an assault* at some time during the year. Girls and boys aged 0–14, and women and men aged 15+, 1987–2010**. * ICD10 code: X85–Y09. ** In 1997 there was a change in the classification. Corrections have been made for lapses in the reporting of external causes of injury in the Swedish National Patient Register on the assumption that the lapse was uniformly distributed across all injury diagnoses. Source: Swedish National Patient Register, Swedish National Board of Health and Welfare. at Mittuniversitetet on December 28, 2012sjp.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://sjp.sagepub.com/ Violence 245 Approximately 16 women die each year as a result of violence in a partner relationship. Approximately three men per year are also killed by a partner. Thus women are killed by a partner four to five times as often as men [103]. The number of women in Sweden killed by a partner has declined since the 1970s, when it stood at around 23 per year. According to BRÅ, this can be explained in part by social changes, increased protection for women and by the fact that women have become more financially independent. Number of young people subjected to violence and threats no longer on the increase Statistics Sweden’s ULF surveys have shown that peo- ple in all age groups are more frequently exposed to threats or violence today than in the 1980s, with the exception of elderly people aged 65–84 (Figure 12). In recent years, however, this trend has halted, and among the youngest adults (16–24 years) the number of people exposed to threats and violence has actually declined. Statistics Sweden’s interview survey also enables observers to determine where people have been sub- jected to violence or serious threats (Figure 13). Among women, violence or serious threats at work have shown the highest increase and are now more common than violence or threats at home or in a public place. The level of violence in the home rose among women at the beginning of the 1990s but remained stable thereafter. The prevalence of vio- lence in public places has stayed relatively constant. Public places figure most prominently in men’s reported experiences of violence or serious threats. Violence in public places is also referred to as street violence. While the percentage of people subjected to violence in 2005 stood at the same level as in the early 1980s, this proportion has both risen and fallen in the interim. Violence and serious threats at work are less common among men than among women. Increasing numbers of assaults reported to the police The number of police reports of assault has risen sig- nificantly since the 1980s (Figure 14) [104]. In 2007, 300 crimes of assault per 100,000 women aged 15 or older were reported to the police, compared to 100 in 1981. The number of assaults reported by men in the same period increased from almost 200 to 500 per 100,000 men. Although cases of assault reported to the police are less common among children than adults, the former have also increased in number. In 1981, 2 cases of assault per 100,000 children aged 0–6 were reported to the police. By 2007, the figure had risen to 17. In the 7–14 age group, the number of cases per 100,000 rose from 9 to 88 over the same period. Assaults against younger and older children are usually committed indoors, generally by an acquaintance. This is also the category of reported assaults that seen the biggest increase, with a ten- fold rise between 1981 and 2007 (Figure 15). 0 1 2 3 1976 80 84 88 92 96 2000 04 08 0–14 years Number per 100,000 Women 0 1 2 3 1976 80 84 88 92 96 2000 04 08 15+ years Number per 100,000 Men Figure 11. Cases of death resulting from assault in 1976–2007. Number of people per 100,000 inhabitants who died as a result of assault*. Girls and boys aged 0–14, and women and men aged 15+, for the period 1976–2007**. * ICD10 code: X85–Y09. **Three-years moving average. Source: Cause of Death Register, Swedish National Board of Health and Welfare. at Mittuniversitetet on December 28, 2012sjp.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://sjp.sagepub.com/ 246 K. Leander et al. More sex crimes reported to the police A growing number of sex crimes are also being reported to the police (Figure 16), mainly sexual molestation and rapes. In 2005, the definition of rape was broadened to include cases in which the “victim is in a powerless state”, due for example to drunkenness or unconsciousness. Such incidents previously often came under the heading of sexual coercion or exploitation and the number of crimes registered under these other categories has therefore decreased since the law was changed. The rise in the number of rapes was accompanied by a change in the structure of reported crimes, according to a study by BRÅ of reported rapes of people aged 15 or over in the period 1995–2006 [16]. The victims were on average younger than the perpetrators, and the age gap increased during the period under study. While the median age of the perpetrators fell from 32 to 30, the median age of the 0 5 10 15 20 25 1979 1984 1989 1994 1999 2004 16–24 25–44 Number per 100,000 Women 0 5 10 15 20 25 1979 1984 1989 1994 1999 2004 45–64 65–84 years Number per 100,000 Men Figure 12. People in various age groups exposed to violence or serious threats, 1979–2005. Proportion (per cent) of people who were subjected to violence or serious threats in the previous 12 months. Women and men in various age groups, 1979–2005*. * Three-year moving averages. Source: Survey of Living Conditions (ULF), Statistics Sweden. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1982/83 1990/91 1998/99 In their own or in another person’s home Per cent Women 04/05 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1982/83 1990/91 1998/99 Public place In the workplace Per cent Men 04/05 Figure 13. Violence or serious threats by location. Proportion of people who had been exposed to violence or serious threats in the home, in public places or at work in the previous 12 months. Women and men aged 16–84, 1982/1983–2004/2005. Source: Survey of Living Conditions (ULF), Statistics Sweden. at Mittuniversitetet on December 28, 2012sjp.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://sjp.sagepub.com/ Violence 247 victims dropped from 27 to 24. The increase recorded in recent years has mainly been in the number of rapes involving lower levels of violence. In 2006, however, violence was used against the victim in at least 56 per cent of the cases studied, and vic- tims had documented injuries in 32 per cent of the cases. Rapes involving multiple perpetrators increased sig- nificantly between the years 1995 and 2006, from an estimated 100 plus to around 550 cases per year (Figure 17) [16]. In 2006, these incidents accounted for 18 per cent of all reported rapes against persons aged 15 or over. The number of rapes occurring in places of public entertainment has also risen significantly. BRÅ believes that this trend is partly due to the fact that more people are reporting rapes owing to lower public tolerance of sexual abuse, and partly to changes in the “opportunity structure”: people have access to more entertainment venues, drink more alcohol and use the internet to a greater extent than previously. 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 1981 85 89 93 97 01 05 2009 0–6 yrs 7–14 yrs Number per 100,000 Children 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 1981 85 89 93 97 01 05 2009 Women 15+ yrs Men 15+ yrs Number per 100,000 Adults Figure 14. Crimes of assault reported to the police in 1981–2009. Number of cases of assault (including aggravated assault) per 100,000 reported to the police in 1981–2009 by age and gender. Note dif- ferent axis scales for children and adults. Source: National Council for Crime Prevention (BRÅ). 0 5 10 15 20 25 1980 85 90 95 2000 05 2010 Acquaintance, indoors Acquaintance, outdoors Children 0–6 years Number per 100,000 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 1980 85 90 95 2000 05 2010 Non-acquaintance, indoors Non-acquaintance, outdoors Children 7-14 years Number per 100,000 Figure 15. Child abuse cases reported to the police, 1981–2009. Number of cases of assault (including aggravated assault) per 100,000, in which the perpetrator was known/not known to the victim, and the assault occurred indoors/outdoors. Children aged 0–6* and 7–14, 1981–2009. Note different axis scales for younger and older children. *Among children aged 0-6 years, fewer than 1 per 100 000 were not acquainted with the perpetrator (not shown in the figure). Source: National Council for Crime Prevention (BRÅ) [5]. at Mittuniversitetet on December 28, 2012sjp.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://sjp.sagepub.com/ 248 K. Leander et al. The number of reported rapes of children under the age of 15 has also increased significantly, from 100 reports in 1975 to close to 2000 reports in 2009, an increase from 1 per 100,000 to 20 per 100,000 children (Figure 18). In 2007, child rape accounted for 27 per cent of all completed rapes. However, the definition of rape as it applies to chil- dren under the age of 15 has been expanded consider- ably during the period, most recently in 2005. Until 2005, rape against both children and adults was defined identically by the same section of the Penal Code. 0 20 40 60 80 1975 80 85 90 95 2000 05 2010 Rape, incl. aggravated Sexual coercion, exploitation, etc Sexual molestation (not incl. exposure) Exposure Other sex crimes Number per 100,000 Figure 16. Sex crimes reported to the police. Number of sex crimes reported to the police per 100,000, by type of crime, 1975–2009. Source: National Council for Crime Prevention (BRÅ) [5]. 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 Stranger- rape Multiple perpe- trators Enterta- inment- related In close relation- ships 1995 2000 2004 2006 Number Figure 17. Types of rape. Estimated number* of reported rapes of people aged 15 years or over, by type and year, 1995, 2000, 2004, and 2006. * From a review of a sample of police reports. Source: Hradilova Selin, 2008 [16]. 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 Of children under 15 Of people 15+ Number per 100,000 Figure 18. Completed rapes reported to the police. Number of completed rapes of children under the age of 15 and of people 15 years or older reported to the police, per 100,000, 1975–2009. Source: National Council for Crime Prevention (BRÅ) [5]. 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 Against policemen Against security guards Against another person Number per 100,000 Figure 19. Reported incidents of violence against public servants. Number of cases of violence against a public servant reported to the police per 100,000 inhabitants, by type of public servant and year, 1975–2009. Source: National Council for Crime Prevention (BRÅ). at Mittuniversitetet on December 28, 2012sjp.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://sjp.sagepub.com/ Violence 249 However, the new sex crime legislation that came into effect in 2005 introduced a new offence “rape of a child”, whereby any act of sexual intercourse or equiva- lent with a child under the age of 15, including oral sex and penetration with fingers or other objects, is defined as rape, irrespective of any other circumstances such as the presence or absence of threats or force, the condi- tion of the victim (powerless or otherwise), or whom the sexual act was initiated by. The increase in the number of registered rapes against children under the age of 15 has been particularly marked since the new legislation came into force. In 2007, rapes of children represented 34 per cent of all completed rapes. Increase in workplace violence With regard to threats and violence at work, consid- erable variation exists among occupational groups. The Swedish Work Environment Authority estimates that approximately 14 per cent of the working age population, i.e. more than half a million people each year, are exposed to violence or threats in the work- place [105]. Most of those affected today are women, who account for nearly three-quarters of all reported cases. According to Statistics Sweden’s ULF surveys, women have been more exposed than men in this respect since the beginning of the 1990s. However, violence and threats at work have become more com- mon among both women and men [12]. Approximately 4,600 cases of violence against a public servant were reported in 2007, i.e. double the number reported in the mid-1970s. Reported crimes of violence against the police have declined since the 1980s, with the exception of a temporary upturn during disturbances in connection with the EU sum- mit in Gothenburg in 2001. In other occupational groups, the number of reported offences has increased. Has crime actually increased? The total number of violent offences reported to the police per 100,000 inhabitants has quadrupled since 1975 (Figure 20). As the sex of the victim is not recorded for all categories of violent crime included in the statistics, Figure 20 shows the overall trend in violent crime for women and men (and children). Almost 80 per cent of reported violent offences involve assault. In 2009, 930 cases of assault were reported per 100,000 inhabitants, compared with 260 cases per 100,000 inhabitants in 1975. However, assault is not the only type of violent crime which has increased since 1975 (Figure 21). The crime “gross violation of a woman’s integrity” was introduced into the Penal Code in 1998. It refers 400 600 800 1,000 1,200 Number per 100,000 0 200 1975 85 95 2005 Robbery, incl. aggravated Violence against public servant Gross violation of integrity Gross violation of a woman’s integrity Rape, incl. aggravated Assault, incl. aggravated Figure 20. Violent crimes reported to the police. Number of violent crimes* reported to the police per 100,000 inhabitants, by type of crime, 1975–2009. *Reported cases of attempted murder and lethal violence is are few in number and are not shown here. Source: National Council for Crime Prevention (BRÅ) [5]. 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 1975 80 85 90 95 2000 05 10 Rape, incl. aggravated Gross violation of a woman’s integrity Gross violation of integrity Violence against public servant Robbery, incl. aggravated Lethal violence Attempted murder Number per 100,000 Figure 21. Violent crimes, excluding assault, reported to the police. Number of violent crimes, excluding assault, reported to the police per 100,000 inhabitants, by type of crime, 1975–2009. Source: National Council for Crime Prevention (BRÅ) [5]. at Mittuniversitetet on December 28, 2012sjp.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://sjp.sagepub.com/ 250 K. Leander et al. to repeated or systematic violations of women’s integ- rity, including assault, threats, unlawful coercion, deprivation of liberty, domestic trespass, and sexual coercion, where the perpetrator is a man with whom the woman has, or has had, an intimate relationship. The number of reported crimes classified in this way has nearly tripled since 1999; in 2009 about thirty cases per 100,000 inhabitants were reported to the police. The closely related crime category “gross violation of integrity” can be applied to similar forms of violence in other types of relationships, for exam- ple when the victim is a man, a child or other close relative. Fourteen such cases per 100,000 inhabitants were reported in 2007. In the same year, rapes and violations of a woman’s integrity together accounted for 9 per cent of all violent crimes reported to the police (irrespective of the victim’s gender). This can be compared with the crime of robbery, which also accounted for 9 per cent. Violence and threats of violence have thus become more common both according to the crime statistics and what people have reported in various surveys. However, it is by no means certain that the significant rise in the number of police reports and growing evi- dence from interview surveys necessarily add up to a correspondingly large rise in the actual number of violent incidents. The willingness to report incidents may have been due to diminished public tolerance of violent crimes. Since the number of unreported cases is large, trends are significantly affected by how many crimes are detected and how many are reported. BRÅ has conducted a series of special studies of crime trends, taking account of changes over time in people’s willingness to report different types of crime. BRÅ concluded on the basis of these studies that street violence, i.e. offences defined as “assault out- doors, where the victim and the perpetrator are not acquainted with each other”, have increased since the beginning of the 1980s [106]. The increase in the number of rapes may be partly due to the fact that the legal definition of rape has been gradually broadened. The most recent amendment to the law, enacted in April 2005, was followed by a very considerable increase in the number of recorded cases. Although the increase is probably due in part to this broader definition and to greater willingness to report crimes, BRÅ notes that an increase in the actual num- ber of rape offences is also likely [16]. Crime statistics show a marked increase in violence in society. However, this is not reflected in the statis- tics on the proportion of people who have suffered serious physical injuries as a result of violence. In the past ten years, the number of deaths from violence has declined among women and men, and hospital statis- tics show that the proportion of girls, boys and women receiving treatment has remained relatively unchanged, although it has risen among men. On the other hand, a study of inpatients in Stockholm County showed that 67 per cent more people sought treat- ment as a result of sexual assaults in 2004 compared with 1997 [107]. The statistics do not provide a com- plete picture of violence in intimate relationships; this type of violence is probably considerably more wide- spread than the statistics indicate. According to the WHO, violence in intimate relationships is a public health problem. This also applies to Sweden. Notes 1. 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work_sdcwqgctfjemrfim555ol576mq	----	37 Zločini iz mržnje Ekspanzija mržnje: osnovna obeležja masovnih zločina mržnje MileNa triPković* Osnovni cilj ovog rada je da skicira „masovni zločin mržnje“, pojavu koja se nalazi na raskršću zločina mržnje i masovnog ubistva. Konstrukcija ovog pojma nam može pomoći da bolje razumemo fenomen, jer razjašnjava određene karakteristike zločina mržnje koje do sada nisu primećene ili su zanemarene. Osnovni argument koji se oslanja na tri takva slučaja u periodu 1989-2011 je da su masovni zločini mržnje, koji nastaju kombinovanjem elemenata masovnih ubistava i zločina mržnje, daleko ozbiljnija pojava od pojedinačnih fenomena koji ga konstituišu. Iako sami po sebi važni, takvi nalazi imaju dalji cilj preispitivanja i osporavanja ideja koje imamo o zločinima mržnje, kao i merama borbe protiv njih. Ključne reči: zločini mržnje, masovni zločini mržnje, viktimizacija, masovno ubistvo. Uvod Nakon što je 22. jula 2011. godine Anders Breivik izvršio napad na zgradu norveške Vlade u Oslu, a potom i na kamp podmlatka Laburističke stranke na ostrvu Utøya, jasno se mogao uočiti problem sa kojim su se susreli masovni mediji i stručnjaci pri pokušaju da definišu i terminološki odrede ovaj akt. Iako su teške posledice i visok stepen viktimizacije jasno ukazivali na učinioca sa izraženim predrasudama, nazivajući delo terorizmom, političkim deliktom, ideološki motivisanim masovnim ubistvom, kao i drugim poznatim devijantnim formama, stručnjaci su propustili da uoče i definišu osnovne konture teorijski novog oblika devijacije – masovnih zločina mržnje. TEMIDA Decembar 2011, str. 37-54 ISSN: 1450-6637 DOI: 10.2298/TEM1104037T Pregledni rad * Mr Milena Tripković je istraživačica na European University Institute (EUI) u Firenci (Italija). E-mail: milena.tripkovic@eui.eu Milena Tripković 38 Svrha ovog rada je da ukaže na razlike između definicije (klasičnog) zločina mržnje i onoga što autorka naziva masovnim zločinima mržnje. Pri tome, cilj rada nije samo da definiše masovni zločin mržnje, već i da ukaže na njegovu izraženiju društvenu opasnost koja je posledica više okolnosti karakterističnih za ovu pojavu. Osnovni argument od koga autorka polazi je da masovni zločin mržnje predstavlja složen kriminološki fenomen, koji nastaje spajanjem i modifikacijom elemenata masovnih ubistava i zločina mržnje. Pri tome, objedinjavanjem ove dve devijantne pojave, masovni zločin mržnje prerasta u ozbiljniju i opasniju pojavu od oba pojedinačna ponašanja koja ga konstituišu. Naglašena opasnost ovog delinkventnog fenomena prevashodno potiče od ugroženosti potencijalnih žrtava i njihove nemogućnosti da delo anticipiraju i shodno tome se zaštite. Iz navedenog proizilazi osnovna ideja ovog rada – masovni zločini mržnje bi morali da se označe kao specifičan oblik devijantnog ponašanja što bi povratno trebalo da ima odraza na poimanje njihove opasnosti, prevenciju i sankcionisanje. Kako rad predstavlja tek prvi korak u razjašnjavanju ovog fenomena, daleko veća pažnja će biti posvećena definisanju njegovog pojma nego implikacijama koje proizilaze iz te definicije, što svakako može biti predmet daljih istraživanja. Rad ima sledeću sistematiku i sadržinu. U prvom delu će biti predstavljena saznanja o osnovnim karakteristikama „klasičnog“ zločina mržnje. Ukratko će biti prikazana obeležja ovih dela, njihove podvrste, odlike učinilaca i žrtava, kao i uslovi i uzroci koji pogoduju ili kauzalno utiču na izvršenje dela. Nakon toga, pažnja će biti posvećena definisanju i određivanju osnovnih karakteristika masovnih zločina mržnje, pri čemu će se zaključci uglavnom zasnivati na tri slučaja koje autorka smatra eklatantnim primerima ovog fenomena: pored pomenutog norveškog slučaja, radi se o zločinima koje su izvršili Marc Lépine u Kanadi 1989. godine i Colin Ferguson u SAD 1993. godine. U poslednjem delu rada će biti ukazano na ona specifična obeležja koja ovakva dela čine društveno opasnijim, kao i na posledice koje bi fiksiranje masovnog zločina mržnje, kao novog kriminološkog fenomena, moralo da ima na percepciju ovih dela i eventualnu društvenu reakciju. Na ovom mestu neophodno je podvući da će osnovni argument rada, u skladu sa prostornim ograničenjima, biti izložen, nakon veoma ograničene empirijske analize, što predstavlja podstrek da se pojam masovnog zločina mržnje dalje istražuje i razrađuje. Temida 39 Karakteristike „klasičnih“ zločina mržnje1 Korišćenje termina „zločin mržnje“ postalo je u poslednjoj deceniji uobičajeno za označavanje raznovrsnih ponašanja kojima se manifestuje netrpeljivost, netolerancija i diskriminacija. Iako je termin pre svega rezervisan za one postupke koji su istovremeno dovoljno ozbiljni i društveno štetni da budu pravno inkriminisani, u širem (sociološkom) smislu pod njime se podrazumevaju i druge pojave koje u svojoj osnovi imaju stereotipna shvatanja učinioca prema društvenoj grupi kojoj sam ne pripada. U suštinskom smislu, zločini mržnje su „akti motivisani mržnjom zasnovanom na predrasudama njihovog vinovnika prema društvenoj grupi kojoj pripada žrtva“ (Pavlović, 2008). Sudeći po definiciji, svaki delikt mržnje ima tri konstitutivna elementa: protivpravni akt (različiti oblici i stepeni ozbiljnosti pravno sankcionisanih ponašanja), motiv mržnje kao dominantni razlog za izvršenje dela i pripadnost žrtve određenoj društvenoj grupi prema kojoj je mržnja učinioca uperena. Većina definicija koje se mogu pronaći u literaturi sadrži ove elemente te se oni mogu smatrati nespornim, iako pojedini autorki sugerišu da bi pojava definisana na ovaj način mogla da nosi drugačije ime (Perry, 2005: 129-135; Stanko, 2001: 318-329). Napred izložena definicija, sa jedne strane nedvosmisleno ukazuje na značaj psihičkih karakteristika učinioca za izvršenje dela, dok sa druge naglašava značaj društvene grupe kao stvarne žrtve krivičnog dela. Kombinovanjem ova dva elementa dolazi se do nešto jasnije slike o tome ko je (i kakav je) učinilac ovog delikta i ko je pravi objekat viktimizacije. Više nego kod drugih delikata, ličnost i individualne karakteristike žrtve su od sekundarnog značaja, pa tako učinilac žrtvu u veoma malom broju slučajeva poznaje, pri čemu ga za izvršenje delikta opredeljuje visok stepen sigurnosti da žrtva pripada društvenoj grupi prema kojoj gaji negativna osećanja. Dakle, lična veza između učinioca i žrtve, koja je u visokom procentu prisutna kod drugih ličnih delikata, izostaje u slučaju zločina mržnje i ovo predstavlja jednu od najbitnijih odlika ove devijantne pojave. Upravo zbog navedenog razloga se delikti mržnje često smatraju „zločinima poruke“. Iako se neposredno vrše prema individualno određenim žrtvama, njihova svrha je da posredno pošalju poruku društvenoj grupi 1 Epitet „klasični“ treba, sa jedne strane, da označi da se radi o opšteprihvaćenoj, tradicionalnoj definiciji zločina mržnje, dok, sa druge strane, služi za razgraničenje ovog fenomena od konstrukcije „masovnog“ zločina mržnje. Milena Tripković 40 kojoj žrtva pripada i drugim grupama koje se sa tom grupom identifikuju (ili bi mogle da se identifikuju). Žrtva je u tom smislu „bezlična“ pošto samo simboliše sopstvenu grupu, dok putem nje učinilac šalje poruku svim ostalim članovima grupe. U odnosu na „redovnu“ viktimizaciju, zločine mržnje tako odlikuje dalekosežnost, jer posledice dela prevazilaze individualno određenu žrtvu i njeno okruženje (porodicu, prijatelje itd.) i dopiru do najudaljenijih delova društva. Tako Iganski smatra da se posledice dela šire od neposredne žrtve u vidu koncentričnih krugova, preko zajednice neposredne žrtve u susedstvu, zajednice neposredne žrtve van susedstva, ostalih zajednica koje su česta meta napada, do svih onih ljudi koji bi se sa žrtvom mogli identifikovati kao ljudska bića (Iganski, 2001). Na taj način, potencijalno svaki član društvene zajednice, koji sebe i žrtvu smatra jednakim članovima društva, može biti posredna žrtva zločina mržnje, jer se ovim deliktima suštinski napadaju osnovni principi liberalno-demokratskih društava, kao što su jednakost, autonomija, dignitet itd. Tako određene posledice dela i krug žrtava čine zločine mržnje jednom od najozbiljnih devijantnih pojava u viktimološkom smislu. Ne sporeći ovako određenu osnovnu i zajedničku crtu svih zločina mržnje, nužno je istovremeno ukazati na činjenicu da su oni fenomenološki veoma raznovrsna ponašanja. Bogato empirijsko iskustvo u proučavanju individualnih slučajeva ovog delikta navelo je pojedine autore da klasifikuju zločine mržnje na osnovu njihovih uzroka i pojavnih oblika. Tako Levin i McDevitt dele zločine mržnje na četiri podvrste: zločine mržnje iz zabave, „odbrambene“ zločine mržnje, „misionarske“ zločine mržnje i „osvetničke“ zločine mržnje (Levin, McDevitt, 2002: 67-98). Zločini mržnje iz zabave (thrill-seeking hate crimes) predstavljaju najlakši oblik delikta, čiji su vinovnici mlade osobe (često i maloletnici). U krivičnopravnom smislu, najčešće se radi o lakšim imovinskim deliktima i delima lakšeg fizičkog nasilja. Stereotipni stavovi ovakvih lica nisu u potpunosti formirani, te oni dela najčešće vrše u grupi, kako bi dobili potvrdu i podršku drugih učesnika, pogotovo ako su ovi stariji, „iskusniji“ delinkventi. Dela takođe karakteriše loša organizacija, spontanost i haotičnost, dok je izbor žrtava gotovo potpuno slučajan. Kako predrasude ovakvih učinilaca nisu izražene, a pri tom se radi o mladim i psihički nepotpuno razvijenim osobama, smatra se da je izricanje čak i veoma blagih sankcija podobno da spreči povrat. Kada se radi o „odbrambenim“ zločinima mržnje (defensive hate crimes) predrasude učinioca i njegov odnos prema delu su daleko ozbiljniji. Ključna Temida 41 karakteristika ove podvrste zločina mržnje je osećanje ugroženosti njihovog vinovnika i utisak da društvena grupa prema kojoj gaji osećanja mržnje nelegitimno prisvaja resurse koji pripadaju njemu i njegovoj grupi (to je „napad“ od koga se učinilac „brani“ – ne čudi stoga da su česte žrtve ovog oblika imigranti). U skladu sa tim, dela su bolje planirana sa ciljem da nanesu više štete, dok su učinioci stariji, ozbiljniji i delo najčešće čine samostalno. U pitanju su i dalje imovinski i delikti ličnog nasilja, ali znatno jačeg intenziteta, te, iako blage kazne mogu biti neprimerene, i dalje ima osnova da se veruje u mogućnost resocijalizacije. Veoma specifičan oblik predstavljaju „misionarski“ zločini mržnje (mission hate crimes). Najveću razliku u odnosu na prethodne dve kategorije predstavlja ličnost učinioca, kao i vrste dela koje nastaju kao rezultat njegovih stereotipnih stavova. Vinovnici ovih zločina su osobe sa izraženo iskrivljenom slikom stvarnosti i prisutnim patološkim problemima. Događaje koji ih okružuju tumače jednostrano, preuveličavajući probleme koji nastaju kao posledica suživota različitih društvenih grupa. Kao posledicu takvog stava, oni sami sebe šalju u „misiju“ kako bi rešili nastale probleme, pri čemu delo može dobiti čak veoma ozbiljne obrise. Strogo kažnjavanje je neminovno, iako ono u ovom slučaju može služiti isključivo represiji, pošto je verovatnoća da će doći do resocijalizacije gotovo nikakva. Naposletku, „osvetnički“ zločini mržnje (retaliation hate crimes) se od navedenih podvrsta razlikuju po tome što predstavljaju čin osvete za prethodni (umišljeni ili stvarno izvršeni) zločin mržnje. Nužna pretpostavka za izvršenje ovog akta je, prema tome, ranije izvršeni zločin mržnje od strane pripadnika društvene grupe čiji izvršilac nije član. Prema svom cilju, kao i obeležjima učinilaca, ova podvrsta je najsličnija „odbrambenim“ zločinima mržnje. Ulazeći dalje u etiologiju zločina mržnje, posebno važnu temu predstavljaju ličnost i psihološke osobine vinovnika ovih dela. Kao što je već pomenuto, pojavni oblici akata mržnje se međusobno znatno razlikuju, a ovo je u velikoj meri posledica odnosa učinioca prema delu i dominantnih faktora koji ga opredeljuju na izvršenje akta. Jedna od najbitnijih razlika odnosi se na pitanje da li su izvršioci postupali samostalno ili pod uticajem, odnosno kao deo, grupe koja promoviše ili širi mržnju, jer ovo umnogome predodređuje karakteristike delikta koji će nastupiti (Pavlović, 2008). Ipak, ukoliko se ostave po strani retki izuzetci, može se konstatovati da je profil učinioca zločina mržnje veoma jednoobrazan. Istraživanja vršena u Nemačkoj i SAD su pokazala da je učinilac zločina mržnje najčešće osoba starosti od 18-30 godina Milena Tripković 42 sa specifičnom porodičnom situacijom lišenom roditeljske ljubavi ili osoba vaspitana u striktnoj, autoritarnoj atmosferi (Kelly, Maghan, 1998: 42). Nadalje, izvršioci u velikom broju potiču iz porodica sa prisutnim poremećajima kao što su nasilje, alkoholizam i problemi finansijske prirode (Ezekiel, 2002: 57-59). Kao posledica ovakve porodične patologije javljaju se osećanja odbačenosti, izgubljenosti i izrazito pesimistični doživljaji okoline. Saznanja do kojih se došlo empirijskim istraživanjima potvrđuju seriju teorijskih pretpostavki o genezi netolerantne ličnosti. Od mnogobrojnih pristupa ovom problemu izdvaja se socijalno-psihološka analiza kojoj je najveći doprinos dao Gordon Allport. U knjizi The Nature of Prejudice, Allport trasira put nastanka netolerantnih ideja kao proizvod dugog niza činilaca koji nastaju u međuuticaju društvenog i individualnog (Allport, 1979). U delu koje je napisano daleko pre nego što su kriminolozi skovali termin „zločini mržnje“ (knjiga je prvi put objavljena 1954. godine) i koje se empirijski oslanjalo na američki rasizam i zločine počinjene u nacističkoj Nemačkoj, Allport daje tumačenje nastanka stereotipa, predrasuda i mržnje. Ukratko, on polazi od „normalnosti“ identifikacije sa sopstvenom grupom – individua je pre svega socijalno biće čiji se psihički svet (pred)određuje i formira u interakciji sa okruženjem. Društvene grupe kojima pojedinac ne pripada su tako prirodna međa za određivanje mesta sopstvene grupe. Od ovog „normalnog“ stava, koji je karakterističan za svaku individuu, pojedinci mogu da postanu netolerantne ličnosti isključivo ukoliko je spoj unutrašnjih i spoljašnih okolnosti takav da „gura“ ličnost u pravcu razvoja netolerantnih stavova, što se pre svega dešava pod uticajem porodice, škole, zajednice itd. Složeni proces koji je Allport uočio zapravo je logično objašnjenje prirodnih procesa koji nastaju u međuuticaju pojedinca koji traži svoje mesto u društvu i društva (ili segmenata društva – društvenih grupa) koje nameće određene obrasce ponašanja kako bi pojedince držalo na okupu. Naposletku, zločine mržnje, kao što je to već ranije pomenuto, karakterišu i određene viktimološke specifičnosti. Iz ranije navedenih karakteristika viktimizacije, gde se kao stvarna žrtva zločina mržnje javlja društvena grupa kojoj žrtva pripada, proizilazi niz problema koji se ne javljaju kod drugih oblika kriminaliteta. Individualna žrtva, iako je nad njom izvršen delikt, nije u mogućnosti da taj akt, kao žrtve velikog broja drugih krivičnih dela, racionalizuje i time načini prvi korak ka prevazilaženju psihičkih posledica koje je delo na nju ostavilo. Znajući da je žrtvom postala zbog nepromenljivih odlika sopstvenog identiteta koji je čine „vidljivom“ (ovo je posebno naglašeno Temida 43 kod rasne pripadnosti), ona nema mogućnosti da spreči dalju viktimizaciju, jer ne postoji način putem koga bi se mogla zaštititi od netolerantnih akata. Polazeći od konstatacije da su zločini mržnje zapravo „zločini poruke“, a žrtve „bezlične“ – slučajno izabrani objekti koji bi takvu „poruku“ mogli da prenesu ostalim članovima svoje grupe – dolazi se do zaključka da efekti viktimizacije moraju biti veoma ozbiljni. Dva dodatna problema proizlaze iz ove činjenice. Prvo, istraživanja su pokazala da, u velikom broju slučajeva, nakon izvršenja delikta žrtva počinje da se povlači, preispituje i podvrgava kritici sopstveni identitet (makar onaj deo identiteta koji je uslovio viktimizaciju). Povrh svih „redovnih“ psihičkih, emocionalnih i fizičkih posledica viktimizacije, žrtve zločina mržnje počinju dodatno da se samookrivljuju i gube samopoštovanje (Crocker, 1993: 492-493; Simons, 2001: 241-242). Ove okolnosti se, makar delom, mogu dovesti u vezu sa činjenicom da se delikti mržnje najčešće vrše prema pripadnicima manjinskih grupa, koje su i inače marginalizovane, te njihov grupni identitet može biti u senci grupe koja je u većini. Drugo, marginalizovanost dalje pogoduje pojavama visoke tamne brojke i iskustvima sekundarne viktimizacije. Iako je nemoguće utvrditi kolika je tamna brojka zločina mržnje, pojedini autori tvrde da je znatna, što navodno proističe iz nepoverenja koje pripadnici manjina mogu gajiti prema državnima organima, pa stoga dela ne prijavljuju (Levin, 1999: 16). U tom kontekstu se javljaju i iskustva „sekundarne viktimizacije“ – kada se žrtve zločina mržnje odvaže da delo prijave, nailaze na nepoverenje i neodobravanje, što je delom uzrokovano problemima prilikom utvrđivanja da se u konkretnom slučaju radi o zločinu mržnje, ali velikim delom determinisano stereotipnim stavovima prisutnim u datom društvu. Upravo iz ovog razloga pojedini autori sugerišu da je jedan od najadekvatnijih načina borbe protiv ovog oblika devijacije neka vrsta afirmativne akcije prilikom zapošljavanja pripadnika manjina u organe gonjenja (Perry, 2001: 233-234). Između masovnog ubistva i zločina mržnje – masovni zločin mržnje Kako bi se utvrdilo da postoji pojava „masovnih zločina mržnje“, koja se suštinski razlikuje od napred skiciranog fenomena, neophodno je vratiti se na ranije izloženu definiciju (klasičnog) zločina mržnje i razmotriti da li bi se ona morala modifikovati ne bi li bila podobna da uključi i ovu pojavu. Ukoliko Milena Tripković 44 je to slučaj, može se smatrati da je „masovni zločin mržnje“ specifična pojava koja, iako deli većinu karakteristika klasičnog zločina mržnje, ipak poseduje određeni stepen samostalnosti. Pre nego što se upustimo u ovakva razmatranja, bilo bi korisno dati nekoliko primera za koje bi se tendenciozno moglo reći da predstavljaju masovne zločine mržnje. Prvi od tih slučaja se dogodio u Montrealu (Kanada) 1989. godine, kada je 25-ogodišnji Marc Lépine u École Polytechnique ubio 14 žena, a ranio još 13 osoba oba pola, da bi nakon izvršenog delikta počinio samoubistvo. Sudeći po pismu koje je pre ubistva sastavio, a koje je nakon nekoliko dana dospelo u javnost, kao i po komentarima upućenim žrtvama tokom izvršenja delikta, Lépine je bio opsednut mržnjom prema ženama, a posebno feministkinjama. Namera da ubije isključivo žene bila je sprovedena u delo odvajanjem žena od muškaraca koji su se u tom trenutku našli u učionici. Žrtve muškog pola bile su slučajne ili su kažnjene zbog pokušaja da zaštite žene. Bez realnog razloga, Lépine je žene učinio objektom svoje mržnje – one su u njegovoj iskrivljenoj svesti bile odgovorne za to što nije primljen na fakultet, što nije mogao da nađe zaposlenje i za nebrojeno mnogo drugih problema koji su ga opterećivali. Kasnije analize su utvrdile da je Lépine bio psihički veoma labilna ličnost. Dete iz mešovitog braka Alžirca i Kanađanke, počeo je da mrzi deo svog (od oca nasleđenog) identiteta nakon razvoda roditelja i proživljavanja traumatičnih iskustava pretrpljenog fizičkog i psihičkog nasilja nad njim i majkom. Mržnja prema ocu je sa godinama rasla, te je sticanjem punoletstva on promenio ime, brišući tako i poslednju vezu sa roditeljem koga je prezreo. Iako je, paradoksalno, celog života bio naklonjen majci, koja mu je pružala emotivnu i finansijsku podršku, mizoginistički stavovi njegovog oca su na kraju prevladali. Mesecima je pripremao napad, štedeći novac za nabavku oružja, pažljivo osmišljavajući svaki korak da bi na kraju sproveo masakr nezapamćen u kanadskoj istoriji. Pet godina kasnije, u Njujorku je izvršen sličan zločin. Colin Ferguson, tada star 35 godina, ubio je šest, a ranio devetnaest ljudi u vagonu lokalne Long Island linije. Bez ikakvog povoda, kada se voz zaustavio na stanici, Ferguson je izvadio pištolj i počeo da puca, da bi nakon nekog vremena bio savladan od nekolicine putnika. Ferguson, Afroamerikanac, koji je rođen u bogatoj porodici na Jamajci, emigrirao je, nakon smrti oba roditelja, u SAD. Ubrzo nakon dolaska, pritisnut nemogućnošću nalaženja zaposlenja i navodnim rasizmom koji ga je okruživao, kao i propalim brakom, on sve jasnije počinje da izražava rasističke stavove prema belcima, promovišući „crnu“ revoluciju Temida 45 i zalažući se za mere radikalnog odvajanja dve grupe. Ovakvi stavovi su ga u više navrata koštali zaposlenja, uslovili isključenje sa fakulteta, kao i socijalnu izolaciju. Zločinu koji je počinio prethodio je čitav niz neuspeha i frustracija koji su od Fergusona načinili paranoidnu, iskompleksiranu osobu koja je za sve svoje probleme isključivo okrivljavala pripadnike bele rase. Svoj unutrašnji konflikt naposletku je razrešio ubistvom šestoro nevinih ljudi, pripadnika rase koju je godinama mrzeo. Prilikom hapšenja, kod njega su pronađene beleške u kojima je naveo da delo čini zbog američke državne politike koja favorizuje belce na štetu crnaca, kao i zbog privatnih sukoba koje je tokom godina imao sa mnogobrojnim institucijama i pojedincima. Tokom suđenja, više puta se postavljalo pitanje Fergusonove psihičke kompetentnosti i, iako je formalno proglašen uračunljivim i osuđen na 315 godina zatvora, njegovi akti govore u prilog postojanja uzroka patološke prirode. Naposletku, sećanja su još sveža na akt masovnog ubistva koje je 2011. godine izvršio Anders Breivik. Mladi Norvežanin, koji je u dva odvojena napada ubio 77 ljudi, bio je, kao i vinovnici prethodnih dela, motivisan nekontrolisanom mržnjom prema grupama, po njemu, odgovornim za neuspehe i probleme u kojima se norveško društvo navodno nalazi. Objekat njegove mržnje bila je Laburistička stranka, norveška partija koja je svojim liberalnim stavom prema različitostima i poštovanjem ideje multikulturalnosti, uzrokovala temeljne promene u demografiji Norveške. U mnogo puta analiziranom manifestu, koji je sačinio pre ubistva, nabrajaju se različite grupe prema kojima je gajio predrasude – levičari, muslimani, feministkinje, marksisti, imigranti, pripadnici drugih rasa. Kao ni u prethodna dva slučaja, ni Breivik nije imao potpuno stabilnu porodičnu situaciju – roditelji su mu se razveli veoma rano, a sa ocem je pred punoletstvo izgubio blizak kontakt. Prema sopstvenom priznanju, Breivik je svoje napade planirao gotovo deset godina, pažljivo i polako kupujući oružje i pripremajući eksploziv kojim će kasnije napasti zgradu Vlade u Oslu. Iako suđenje za ovo delo još uvek nije okončano, prve psihijatrijske procene govore u prilog toga da se, kao i u prethodna dva slučaja, radi o psihopatskoj, egocentričnoj ličnosti sa mogućim paranoidnim smetnjama. Način na koji je sistematski, hladnokrvno i proračunato ubio desetine mladih na ostrvu Utøya, od kojih su neki imali jedva 14 godina, čini njegovo delo jednim od najmonstruoznijih zločina u istoriji. Imaju li tri navedena slučaja dovoljno sličnosti da bi se mogli svrstati pod isti kriminalni pojam i radi li se u ovom slučaju o zločinu mržnje? Ne sasvim očigledno. Na prvi pogled, sva tri slučaja su eklatantni primeri masovnog Milena Tripković 46 ubistva. Svi elementi definicije po kojoj je masovno ubistvo akt simultanog, istovremenog ubistva više osoba su u prethodna tri slučaja ispunjeni (Holmes, Holmes, 2001: 54; Levin, 2008: 107; Duwe, 2004: 734). Iako postoje izvesna neslaganja u pogledu minimalnog broja žrtava, kao i gornjoj vremenskoj granici tokom koga se incidenti moraju odigrati, autori su jedinstveni u stavu da akti moraju biti jedinstveni i kontinuirani (bez „perioda hlađenja“ koji je karakterističan za serijska ubistva) i pri tome deo jedinstvenog umišljaja učinioca. Zločini koje su počinili Lépine, Ferguson i Breivik su vremenski i teritorijalno ograničeni, pažljivo pripremljeni, a rezultovali su smrću više osoba, te u ovom smislu sasvim sigurno zaslužuju da budu kvalifikovani kao masovna ubistva. Ovo nije jedina potvrda da su delikti u pitanju masovna ubistva. U svim navedenim slučajevima, učinioci su postupali samostalno, tajno i brižljivo osmišljavajući svoj plan. U skladu sa tipologijom koju su sačinili Holmes i Holmes, dati primeri predstavljaju podvrstu masovnog ubice – tzv. „pseudokomandosa“, čoveka psihički opsednutog oružjem, ratom i idejama anihilacije svih onih koji su odgovorni za individualne probleme učinioca ili šire društvene probleme (Holmes, Holmes, 2001: 75-76). Nadalje, za učinioca izvršenje delikta ima efekat katarze, ono dovodi do balansa u njegovoj unutrašnjoj ravnoteži i naizgled razrešava interpersonalne probleme koji ga prevashodno motivišu na izvršenje dela. Upravo zbog toga učinioci nakon delikta mogu delovati „prazno“ i počiniti suicid (slučaj Lépine) ili delovati nezainteresovano i distancirano (kako su svedoci opisali Fergusona i Breivika). Ovo proističe iz činjenice da je njihova misija dovršena, unutrašnji mir ponovo uspostavljen, a želja za osvetom konzumirana. Iako se o psihičkom stanju učinilaca teško može govoriti sa velikim stepenom sigurnosti, ipak se može pretpostaviti da su u pitanju emotivno labilne, agresivne osobe, sa nerealnim doživljajima stvarnosti, izvitoperenim stavovima o svetu koji ih okružuje i paranoidnim doživljajima. Iako se ne mora nužno raditi o težim patološkim poremećajima, sasvim je sigurno da kod ovih delikata veliku ulogu igraju frustracije, depresija i paranoidni poremećaji ličnosti. Takođe, dela nemaju lični karakter, jer učinilac ne poznaje žrtve, ali one za njega moraju simbolizovati sopstvenu grupu, te određen stepen sigurnosti u pogledu njihove grupne pripadnosti mora postojati. Iako je kod pojedinih vrsta masovnih ubistava odnos između učinioca i žrtve veoma blizak (npr. lica koja ubiju više članova sopstvene porodice), ovo je veoma retko, jer masovne ubice uglavnom biraju „odredive“ a ne „određene“ žrtve. Iako umišljaj učinioca ne obuhvata tačno Temida 47 određenu žrtvu, izborom adekvatnog mesta ubica povećava verovatnoću da će naći tip žrtve koji traži – žene u učionicama (Lépine), belce u javnom transportu (Ferguson), laburiste u laburističkom kampu (Breivik). Na osnovu izloženog može se sa velikom sigurnošću konstatovati da su tri navedena primera masovna ubistva, što je, uostalom, upravo onako kako su ta dela definisana od strane stručnjaka i percipirana u javnosti. Ipak, problem koji se javlja kod masovnih ubistava je u tome što mogu biti počinjena iz različitih motiva, sa različitim razlozima i ciljevima. Kako je izuzetno formalna, definicija je na neki način „prazna“ i ostavlja dovoljno prostora da bude popunjena u sadržinskom smislu. Zbog toga je potpuno opravdano postaviti pitanje da li se u navedenim slučajevima istovremeno radi i o zločinima mržnje? I nadalje, poseduju li ovi delikti neki specifičan element koji modifikuje osnovnu definiciju zločina mržnje i time pruža dovoljno argumenata da se opravda konstrukcija „masovnog zločina mržnje“? Ovde se moramo vratiti na napred izloženu definiciju zločina mržnje i proveriti mogu li se naša tri slučaja u nju uklopiti. Podsećanja radi, tri elementa definicije su: protivpravni akt, mržnja kao motiv učinioca i pripadnost žrtve (žrtava) društvenoj grupi prema kojoj učinilac gaji mržnju. Prvi kriterijum nije teško zadovoljiti – kako smo konstatovali da se u svim slučajevima radi o ubistvima i to višestrukim (Lépine je ubio 14, Ferguson 6, a Breivik 77 ljudi) protivpravnost akta nije potrebno posebno dokazivati. Ni činjenicu da je drugi kriterijum zadovoljen nije potrebno podrobno objašnjavati. Dok će mnogi učinioci zločina mržnje nakon izvršenog delikta dokazivati svoju nevinost (i time negirati da su počinili akt netolerancije), to nije slučaj sa masovnim ubicama. Iako Lépine nije bio u prilici da se o tome izjašnjava, Ferguson i Breivik nisu krili svoje stereotipne stavove nakon hapšenja (iako je Ferguson, kako bi bio proglašen neuračunljivim, jedno vreme pokušavao da aludira da delo nije učinio on već neka druga osoba unutar njega). Postojanje pisanih materijala (oproštajnog pisma, beleški i manifesta) pronađenih u sva tri slučaja dalje potvrđuje da su svi učinioci bili opterećeni stereotipima i predrasudama prema pripadnicima društvenih grupa koje su viktimizirali – ženama, pripadnicima druge rase i političkim neistomišljenicima. Tako dolazimo i do trećeg kriterijuma – pripadnosti žrtava omraženoj društvenoj grupi. Sve žrtve koje je ubio Lépine bile su žene, kao i većina povređenih. Pokoji muškarac povređen je slučajno ili zato što je pokušao da pomogne ili zaštiti neku ženu. Sve žrtve Fergusona bili su belci, dok je verovatnoću da će doći do viktimizacije nekog ko bi se eventualno slagao sa njegovim netolerantnim stavovima Breivik Milena Tripković 48 sveo na najmanju moguću meru izabravši kao lokaciju svog napada izolovano ostrvo na kom se nalazio kamp podmlatka stranke koju je mrzeo. Može se, dakle, zaključiti da tri prikazana slučaja istovremeno predstavljaju masovna ubistva i zločine mržnje, jer sadrže sve fundamentalne elemente i jednog i drugog koncepta.2 Ipak, kada se detaljnije ispita sadržina ovih akata, ispada da se ne radi samo o kumulaciji dve pojave, već da se njihovim spajanjem dolazi do fenomena koji je kvalitativno drugačiji od obe pojave koje ga sačinjavaju. Element po kome se masovni zločini mržnje razlikuju od većine klasičnih je prisustvo patološke mržnje, kvalitativno drugog tipa mržnje u odnosu na onu koja se javlja kod klasičnih zločina, te bi se masovni zločini mržnje mogli definisati kao akti motivisani patološkom mržnjom zasnovanom na predrasudama njihovog vinovnika prema društvenoj grupi kojoj pripada žrtva. Ovaj naizgled minimalan dodatak definiciji klasičnog zločina mržnje u sebi sadrži sve specifičnosti masovnog oblika mržnje, koje u velikoj meri modifikuju naše shvatanje ovog fenomena i navode nas na preispitivanje stavova koje u pogledu ovih delikata imamo (o čemu će više biti reči u sledećem delu). Od izuzetnog značaja je napomenuti da termin „masovno“ kod masovnih zločina mržnje ne implicira nužno postojanje više žrtava, već zapravo ukazuje na prisustvo, figurativno rečeno, „masovne mržnje“. Korišćenje reči „masovno“ ima svrhu da ukaže na prisustvo jednog bitnog elementa masovnog ubistva, ali to nije višestrukost žrtava, već patologija prisutna kod učinioca. Po prirodi stvari, masovni zločin mržnje će najčešće za posledicu imati smrt više lica, ali on može postojati i u slučaju samo jedne žrtve, ako je umišljaj učinioca bio uperen na izazivanje teže posledice od one koja je nastupila. Takođe, „klasični“ zločin mržnje može postojati i kada je oštećeno više od jednog lica. Ta činjenica neće klasičan zločin mržnje pretvoriti u masovni, ukoliko motiv učinioca nije imao patološke elemente. Prema tome, višestruke žrtve su samo jedna od odlika masovnog zločina mržnje, ali ne i differentia specifica koje ovaj tip delikta razdvaja od „klasičnog“ zločina mržnje. Iako se ovako konstruisanom fenomenu mogu uputiti zamerke sa stanovišta krivičnog prava (gde svrstati i kako označiti ovako određeno delo), prigovori ove prirode ne stoje kada se vrši kriminološka analiza čiji je cilj da ukaže na specifičnosti 2 Izabrani primeri naravno nisu jedini slučajevi masovnih zločina mržnje. Drugi takvi slučajevi su ubistva koja su počinili Patrick Purdy (ubistvo petoro dece, imigranata iz jugoistočne Azije 1989. u Klivlendu), Charles Roberts (ubistvo petoro amiške dece 2006. u Pensilvaniji), Richard Baumhammers (ubistvo pet Jevreja odnosno osoba koje je smatrao Jevrejima 2000. u Pensilvaniji) i mnogi drugi. Temida 49 pojavnih oblika određenih delikata, a ne nužno da ovakve definicije budu pretočene u pravnu normu.3 Šta čini „patološku mržnju“ i zbog čega je upravo ovaj element suština definicije masovnog zločina mržnje? Najpre treba naglasiti da patološka mržnja ne znači nužno postojanje psihopatoloških poremećaja kod učinioca. Kao što naši primeri pokazuju, ni kod jednog od učinilaca nije konstatovano duševno oboljenje, iako postoje indikacije u smislu postojanja makar blažih psihičkih smetnji. Prema tome, patološka mržnja objašnjava sveukupno duševno stanje učinioca koji, usled postojanja sveprožimajućeg, kompulsivnog osećaja mržnje koji potpuno konzumira njegovu psihu, nije u stanju da vodi normalan život. Patološka mržnja onemogućava kompartmentalizaciju ličnosti, gde pojedinac zadržava mogućnost obavljanja redovnih aktivnosti, dok je samo delom prepušten težnjama za realizacijom svojih intolerantnih stavova. U slučaju patološke mržnje, obavljanje normalnih životnih aktivnosti lagano prestaje, a zamenjuje ih kompulsivna mržnja. Patološka mržnja se može uočiti u svim elementima ovih akata. Mržnja predstavlja centralnu preokupaciju učinioca – većinu vremena on razmišlja, piše i interesuje se samo za objekte svoje mržnje. U svakoj temi i svakom problemu, učinilac uspeva da nađe krivicu omražene društvene grupe. Predrasude ovakvih učinilaca su izuzetno jake, a posebno jer ne nailaze na prepreke – bilo bi gotovo nemoguće racionalnim razlozima ubediti potencijalnog masovnog ubicu iz mržnje da delo ne čini. Takođe, stereotipni stavovi nisu nepoznanica za okolinu učinioca – naprotiv, porodica i prijatelji često naknadno ukazuju na „znake upozorenja“ koji su se javljali pre izvršenja dela. Najočigledniji primer jačine predrasuda ovakvih učinilaca je upravo činjenica da u ovom slučaju zločini mržnje prestaju da budu isključivo „zločini poruke“ kao što je to slučaj kod klasičnih zločina mržnje, jer im cilj nije da upozore i stave do znanja omraženoj grupi šta im se može desiti, već je cilj fizička eliminacija što većeg broja pripadnika omražene društvene grupe. To svakako ne znači da pri vršenju dela učinilac nije svestan posledica koje će delo imati na lica koja nije u mogućnosti da fizički eliminiše, već da je u odnosu na klasične zločine mržnje učinilac daleko više fokusiran na stvarne, 3 Svakako, ne treba zaboraviti da je zločin mržnje generativan pojam pod koji može da se podvede svako drugo krivično delo ukoliko ispunjava dodatne uslove. Ipak, rad se ne bavi krivičnopravnim klasifikacijama, već ukazivanjem na specifičnosti masovnog zločina mržnje kao kriminološkog fenomena sa svojim specifičnostima, koje se ne bi mogle potpuno objasniti ukoliko bi se ovaj delikt isključivo smatrao zločinom mržnje. Milena Tripković 50 a ne pretpostavljenje posledice svog dela. Naposletku, patologija mržnje se može uočiti i u izboru sredstava izvršenja dela, koja su uvek takva da mogu za kratko vreme da oduzmu velik broj života, kao i po bespoštednom lišavanju života vulnerabilnih žrtava, kao što su žene, deca i drugi. Implikacije konstrukcije masovnog zločina mržnje Definisanje novog kriminalnog fenomena ne bi trebalo da bude samo misaona vežba i teorijska konstrukcija. Ukoliko bi se zadržali na ovom koraku, teško bi mogli objasniti čemu teorijsko promišljanje služi. Zbog toga je neophodno makar ukratko ukazati na praktične implikacije koje bi ovako koncipirani pojam mogao da ima. Jedan od načina na koji se o ovome može razmišljati je pitanje šta nam novo o zločinima mržnje otkriva identifikacija „masovnog zločina mržnje“, a što nam ranije nije bilo poznato? Svrstavanjem tri obrađena slučaja pod pojam zločina mržnje dolazi se do zaključka da zločini mržnje mogu, za razliku od onoga što se obično smatra, biti veoma ozbiljna krivična dela. Na početku rada je ukazano da pojavni oblici ovog tipa delinkvencije variraju od izuzetno lakih do teških. Ipak, o ovim deliktima se najčešće ne misli kao o veoma teškim krivičnim delima, što višestruko ubistvo sasvim sigurno jeste. Kada dela koje su počinile ove ubice nazovemo pravim imenom, shvatamo da je raspon težine i ozbiljnosti ovih delikata daleko širi nego što se to obično smatra. Prvo saznanje je, dakle, da zločini mržnje mogu biti izuzetno ozbiljni delikti. Ovo saznanje bi organima krivičnog gonjenja trebalo da bude smernica pri utvrđivanju stvarnih motiva izvršenog krivičnog dela i njegove tačne pravne kvalifikacije. Sledeće što saznajemo o zločinima mržnje je da se oni vrše prema daleko raznovrsnijim društvenim grupama nego što se to obično misli. U kriminologiji i krivičnom pravu se i dalje diskutuje o tome koje društvene grupe „zaslužuju“ da budu obuhvaćene pojmom zločina mržnje. Dok je kriminologija naklonjena široj definiciji, krivičnim pravom se najčešće štiti manji broj grupa – to su najčešće grupe formirane po rasnom, nacionalnom (etničkom) i verskom kriterijumu. Opravdanost zaštite ovih grupa može se argumentovati na različite načine. One su zaštićene međunarodnim dokumentima, mnogobrojni istorijski sukobi su bili uzrokovani upravo ovakvim razlikama, statistički podaci pokazuju da su upravo grupe formirane po ovim kriterijumima najčešće žrtve ličnih delikata i ovo su grupe sa najjačim osećajem zajedništva pošto predstavljaju Temida 51 bazične društvene grupe (Pavlović, 2008: 108). Dakle, moglo bi se tvrditi da je zaštita grupa formiranih po ostalim kriterijumima izuzetno sporna. Kada se, međutim, ukaže na zločine počinjene u Kanadi i Norveškoj, postavlja se pitanje ima li i dalje smisla ograničavati pravnu zaštitu samo na „tradicionalne“ grupe, kada se društveni razvoj odvija na način koji uslovljava razvoj mržnje i prema drugim društvenim grupama, u konkretnim slučajevima ženama i političkim neistomišljenicima? Drugi zaključak koji možemo izvući iz prethodne analize je da nam konstrukcija „masovnog zločina mržnje“ pomaže da identifikujemo veći broj društvenih grupa (odnosno osnova na kojima su ove grupe organizovane) prema kojima se zločini mržnje mogu učiniti. Logična posledica ovog saznanja bilo bi preispitivanje adekvatnosti krivičnopravne zaštite koja u većini zemalja obuhvata samo „tradicionalne“ grupe. Naposletku, najozbiljniji problem predstavlja činjenica da je masovne zločine mržnje gotovo nemoguće sprečiti. Kako je ranije naglašeno, ovi akti su u daleko manjoj meri „zločini poruke“ nego što je to slučaj sa klasičnim aktima, manifestacija su namere učinioca da oduzme što je veći broj života. Poredeći ovo sa posledicama „klasičnih“ zločina mržnje lako se dolazi do zaključka da su aspekti viktimizacije daleko ozbiljniji, jer, sa jedne strane, delo uvek rezultuje smrću ili ozbiljnom povredom žrtve, dok, sa druge strane, žrtva nije u stanju da delo anticipira i od njega se zaštiti. Kako se radi o učiniocima kod kojih je prisutna patološka mržnja, ne može se očekivati da bi bilo kakve mere edukacije ili prevencije mogle dati rezultate. Poslednji zaključak do koga se dolazi je da su masovni zločini mržnje akti koje je gotovo nemoguće sprečiti, a imajući u vidu da se ne radi o „zločinima poruke“, već delima koja se vrše prema većem broju žrtava, njihove posledice su izuzetno teške. * * * Smisao rada bio je da ukaže na specifičnosti zločina mržnje koji se čine iz razloga patološke mržnje i u skladu sa tim uzrokuju teške posledice. Uzimajući u obzir činjenicu da navedeni primeri pokrivaju vremenski period od preko dvadeset godina, može se zaključiti da se ne radi o novoj pojavi, već da specifičnosti njenih elemenata nisu ranije uočene. Konstrukcija masovnog zločina mržnje pomaže nam da pravilno uočimo razmere, oblike i težinu koje ovi akti mogu da imaju, što bi moralo da utiče na naš doživljaj ovih delikata i njihovo pravno regulisanje. Dalja istraživanja su neophodna kako bi se razjasnilo treba li na ove akte reagovati drugačijim Milena Tripković 52 merama nego što je to slučaj sa „klasičnim“ zločinima mržnje i kako najbolje uobličiti takvu reakciju. Literatura Allport, G. (1979) The Nature of Prejudice. Cambridge, MA: Perseus Books. Crocker, L. (1993) Hate Crime Statutes: Just? Constitutional? Wise? Annual Survey of American Law, 4, str. 485-507. Duwe, G. (2004) The Patterns and Prevalence of Mass Murder in Twentieth-Century America. Justice Quarterly, 4, str. 729-761. Ezekiel, R. (2002) An Ethnographer Looks at Neo-Nazi and Klan Groups. American Behavioral Scientist, 1, str. 51-71. Holmes, R., Holmes, S. (2001) Murder in America. Thousand Oaks: Sage. Iganski, P. (2001) Hate Crimes Hurt More. American Behavioral Scientist, 4, str. 626-638. Kelly, R., Maghan, J. (1998) Hate Crime: The Global Politics of Polarization. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press. Levin, B. (1999) Hate Crimes: Worse by Definition. Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice, 1, str. 6-21. Levin, J. (2008) Serial Killers and Sadistic Murderers – Up Close and Personal. New York: Perseus. Levin, J., McDevitt, J. (2002) Hate Crimes Revisited: America’s War on those who are Different. Boulder: Westview Press. Pavlović, M. (2008) Kriminološki i krivičnopravni problemi zločina mržnje. Neobjavljena magistarska teza, Novi Sad: Pravni fakultet. Perry, B. (2001) In the Name of Hate. New York: Routledge. Perry, B. (2005) A Crime by any other Name: the Semantics of „Hate“. Journal of Hate Studies, 1, str. 121-135. Simons, K. (2001) On Equality, Bias Crimes and Just Deserts. Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, 1, str. 237-267. Stanko, E. (2001) Re-Conceptualizing the Policing of Hatred: Confessions and Worrying Dilemmas of a Consultant. Law and Critique, 3, str. 309-329. Temida 53 MileNa triPković Expansion of hate: essential features of mass hate crimes The main purpose of the article is to advance the notion of ‘mass hate crimes’, a phenomenon that is to be located at the junction of hate crime and mass murder. The construction of such a notion can help us understand the phenomenon more clearly, as it elucidates some of the features of hate crimes that have not been noticed so far or have been overlooked. The main argument being made based on the examination of three such cases in the period 1989-2011, is that mass hate crimes, being at the same time mass murders and hate crimes, are in fact a graver phenomenon than both crimes that comprise it. Though important, such findings may have an even further goal of revisiting and contesting our ideas about hate crimes and the measures we employ to fight them. Keywords: hate crimes, mass hate crimes, victimization, mass murder. 
work_sdqwq2zm3nhubfg3qjttvqmule	----	Nor Jnl Ling 41.2, 183–203 C© Nordic Association of Linguists 2018 doi:10.1017/S0332586518000148 Nick, I. M. 2018. In the wake of hate: A mixed-method analysis of anonymous threatening communications sent during the 2016 US presidential election. Nordic Journal of Linguistics 41(2), 183–203. In the wake of hate: A mixed-method analysis of anonymous threatening communications sent during the 2016 US presidential election I. M. Nick On January 20, 2017, Republican candidate Donald J. Trump was sworn in as the 45th President of the United States. The run-up to this inauguration was marked by unusually hostile political rhetoric. For many, this linguistic divisiveness was fodder for the post-election surge in physical and verbal aggression. Using a mixed-method approach that combines actuarial and speech act assessment, this study examines 30 Anonymous Threatening Communications sent during the US presidential election for the presence and prevalence of (para)linguistic features associated with verbal and physical threat. The article argues for more forensic linguistic research into mainstream producers and consumers of hate-filled political rhetoric. Keywords: Anonymous Threatening Communications, forensic linguistics, hate speech, political rhetoric, risk assessment I. M. Nick, Germanic Society for Forensic Linguistics (GSFL), 24977 Flensburg, Germany. mavi.yaz@web.de 1. GENERAL INTRODUCTION According to the Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention (2017), hate crime can be defined as a criminal act in which ‘a person is victimised [in reaction to] their real or perceived ethnic background, race, skin colour or nationality, religious belief, sexual orientation or transgender identity or expression, or for being perceived as representing such a group of people’ (paragraph 3). Using this definition, this crime type encompasses a broad spectrum of biases over a wide variety of offenses. Despite this heterogeneity, one antecedent that hate crimes often share is Anonymous Threat Communication (ATC). As the name implies, ATCs refer to written or verbal messages ‘where knowledge of personal, historical, or clinical factors of the sender is not available’ (Glasgow & Schouten 2014:41). Consequently, hate-crime threat assessment commonly involves ATC analysis. Though by no means fool-proof, such analysis has been shown to provide useful evidence for predicting and minimizing the risk of inappropriate approach behaviors, Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:23, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0332586518000148 mailto:mavi.yaz@web.de https://www.cambridge.org/core 184 I . M . N I C K including physical violence (Calhoun 1998, Borum et al. 1999, Fein & Vossekuil 1999, Baumgartner, Scalora & Plank 2001, Calhoun & Weston 2003, Napier & Mardigan 2003, Scalora, Baumgartner & Plank 2003). To date, ATC research has identified a number of linguistic features (e.g. thematic content, stylistic format, grammatical construction) and paralinguistic factors (e.g. mode, sophistication, and location of ATC delivery, the relationship between the ATC sender and receiver) with varying degrees of predictive value (Smith & Shuy 2002, Fitzgerald 2005, Schoeneman-Morris et al. 2007, Smith 2008, Schoeneman et al. 2011, Meloy et al. 2012, Hancock, Woodworth & Porter 2013, O’Toole & Smith 2014, Simons & Tunkel 2014). Within the US, these findings have been used by law enforcement agencies such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Behavioral Analysis Unit to develop consistent, transparent, empirically-based procedures for ATC assessment (Miron & Douglas 1979, Fitzgerald 2005, Simons & Tunkel 2014). Explained briefly, this actuarial approach involves systematic empirical evaluation across a pre-determined set of features shown to have both statistical and criminological significance. Through international interagency cooperation, this approach has also been effectively adopted and adapted by European law enforcement and intelligence agencies to assist in the global fight against threatening communication. One of the challenges of this work is determining what precisely constitutes a verbal threat. Instinctually, most people would contend that threatening is somehow fundamentally different than predicting, promising, warning, insulting, or defaming; and most courts of law would agree. It is for this reason that some of these verbal acts are routinely considered to be lawful and may even enjoy constitutional protections, while others are regularly deemed unlawful and unprotected. Just where exactly the essential differences lie between threatening and non-threatening speech has proven notoriously difficult to discern, even for legal experts (Solan & Tiersma 2005; Shuy 2008, 2010; Walton 2014; Berk-Seligson & Seligson 2016). This difficulty is exemplified in the following two constructed utterances: (1) Keisha, if you move into this neighborhood, I will see to it that you wake up tomorrow to a cross-burning on your front lawn! (2) If you move here, you might wake up to a nasty surprise! Example (1) contains many of the characteristics that have been identified as typifying threatening utterances: (i) the addressor expresses personal intent to commit a future negative action [Y] against the addressee; and (ii) the commission of this negative action is made contingent upon the addressee’s failure to comply with the addressor’s directive [X] (Fraser 1975, 1998; Storey 1995; Gales 2015, 2011). The ATC in (1) can therefore be said to be not only directive, but also coercive: yet another hallmark of threatening utterances (Glukhov & Martynova 2015). The bare argument structure of (1) is also prototypical of a verbal threat: [If you (don’t) X, I will Y] (Salguiero 2010, Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:23, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use. https://www.cambridge.org/core A N O N Y M O U S T H R E AT E N I N G C O M M U N I C AT I O N S 185 Gales 2011). Example (1) also possesses many ancillary properties of threatening utterances: (i) the intention to do harm is explicitly, directly, and unequivocally expressed; and (ii) the time, place, manner, and target of the harmful action are clearly specified (Fraser 1998). By comparison, example (2) lacks many of these features. For instance, (2) does not make any overt mention of the addressor or any future harmful action he/she will undertake. Instead, it simply portends an unspecified negative event which might befall the addressee as a possible consequence of his/her own actions. If one were to take (2) on face-value alone, an equally convincing case could potentially be made for arguing that it is not a malicious threat at all but rather a neutral prediction or even a well-intended warning. Linguistic research informed by speech act theory has offered great assistance in helping to resolve such classificatory ambiguities (Shuy 1993, Storey 1995, Fraser 1998, Walton 2000, Salguiero 2010, Gales 2015, Berk- Seligson & Seligson 2016). According to this work, the key to drawing the lines of demarcation is to examine not only the words contained in the utterance (locution), but also their collective communicative intention (illocution) and consequences (perlocution). Using this logic, (2) may be classified as a threatening speech act, if its perlocutionary effect is intimidating to the addressee; if so, it can be reasonably deduced that the addressor’s intention in making the utterance (i.e. the illocutionary point) is to harm rather than to protect (Verbrugge et al. 2005, Salguiero 2010). Of course, not everyone who makes a threatening utterance has the desire, capability, commitment, and/or opportunity to follow it up with an act of physical violence. This fact does not, however, nullify the existence of the previous verbal threat. Instead, the threat is simply said to be ‘infelicitous’, ‘insincere’, ‘breached’, or ‘vitiated’, but a threat nonetheless (Austin 1955:16). Thus, as Solan & Tiersma (2005:204) remind, ‘to make a threat, the speaker does not actually have to be sincere, but need only appear sincere’ [italics in the original]. Modern-day research into impolite or conflictive speech acts reveals that speakers routinely employ linguistic strategies to amplify the illocutionary and perlocutionary force of their face-threatening utterances (Locher 2004, 2006; Bousfeld & Locher 2008; Culpeper 2009, 2016; Katz 2015; Muschalik 2018). Consider the following two utterances (where (1) above is repeated as (3)): (3) Keisha, if you move into this neighborhood, I will see to it that you wake up tomorrow to a cross-burning on your front lawn! (= (1)) (4) Hey NIGGER! If you move into this neighborhood, I will see to it that you wake up tomorrow to a cross-burning on your goddamn front lawn, you stupid fucking BLACK BITCH! Go back to AFRICA! In example (4), the illocutionary force of the conditional threat displayed by example (3) is significantly increased – or in the words of Culpeper (2009) ‘boosted’ – through Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:23, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use. https://www.cambridge.org/core 186 I . M . N I C K the use of profanity, blasphemy, and dysphemistic references to the target’s known or presumed gender and ethnoracial identity. Further amplification of the deterrent perlocution is achieved by framing the argument structure [If you X, I will Y] with the personalized negative vocatives Hey NIGGER and the personalized negative assertion you stupid fucking BLACK BITCH followed by the mutually-reinforcing directive dismissal Go back to AFRICA!. Of course, the mere presence of particular words or phrases cannot automatically be taken as unequivocal evidence that a particular speech act is a threat. After all, what is considered to be serious, insulting, or injurious in one speech community or communicative situation may be viewed as humorous, complimentary, or affectionate in another (Culpeper 2008, Warner & Hirshberg 2012). The analysis of speech acts must therefore take into consideration the surrounding discursive environment. Importantly, in post-modern approaches to speech act analysis, this ‘environment’ refers not only to the larger textual narrative in which the questioned utterance appears. It also includes the historical, sociocultural, and interpersonal context in which the communication took place (Locher 2006, Culpeper 2008, van der Bom & Mills 2015, Berk-Seligson & Seligson 2016). Going back to example (4), within a US American context, the impoliteness triggers NIGGER, BLACK BITCH and Go back to AFRICA! – particularly in combination with the proposition of a public cross- burning – carry strong, if not entirely inseparable, associations with domestic terror organizations like the Ku Klux Klan (KKK). Assuming that both the message sender and receiver were cognizant of this history, the illocutionary and perlocutionary force of example (4) would be affected. Change the context to Great Britain, Australia, or India, and the illocution and perlocution of the utterance may shift as well, although the locution remains the same. In the following section, the specific social, political, and historical context of the ATCs examined in this study is presented. In line with the abovementioned post-modern discursive investigations of impolite speech acts, this detailed information is provided to facilitate the extrapolation of ‘the emergent and situated meanings’ of the ATCs and the extraordinary conditions that precipitated them (Culpeper 2011). 2. HATE-FILLED POLITICAL RHETORIC, ATCS, AND THE USA In recent years, scholarly attention has increasingly focused upon the analysis of ATCs produced by members of extremist groups (Miller 2008, Pennebaker 2011, Meloy 2014, Schuurman 2015, Chiluwa 2016). Part of the reason for this focus has been the alarming incidence of deadly critical and major incidents perpetrated by offenders inspired in whole or in part by the incendiary rhetoric of charismatic leaders of underground extremist organizations (e.g. the American Nazi Party, Confederate Hammerskins, the KKK). In such cases, the offenders often see themselves as ‘foot Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:23, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use. https://www.cambridge.org/core A N O N Y M O U S T H R E AT E N I N G C O M M U N I C AT I O N S 187 soldiers’ in an invisible war (Cacialli 2010, Meloy et al. 2015). This blind allegiance may not only be given to revered figure-heads of clandestine terrorist organizations. The political leaders of legal, well-established, governmental institutions may also serve as the object of toxic identification, especially when they resort to hate-filled, populist, rhetorical strategies common to extremist organizations. It is the recognition of this potentially lethal development that has led many to raise the warning flag in response to the increasing frequency and severity of inflammatory rhetoric used by mainstream politicians. For many European observers, the pinnacle of incendiary political speech is the United States. Without doubt, personalized attacks against political opponents have a long, rather ignominious history (Chernow 2017). However, even by US American standards, the acceptable limits of combative political rhetoric were breached during the 2016 presidential election. For many, the crescendo of this political pugilism was reached in the final race between Democratic candidate Hillary Rodham Clinton and Republican Party newcomer, Donald J. Trump. In September 2016, for example, Hillary Clinton described many of Trump supporters as a ‘basket of deplorables’ made up of people with racist, sexist, homophobic, xenophobic, and Islamophobic attitudes (Reilly 2016: paragraph 1). For his own part, the then presidential candidate Trump also made numerous, highly controversial, deeply divisive remarks disparaging ethnoracial and religious minorities, women, immigrants, and members of the LGBT community (Cohen 2017, Silva 2018). Although causality is notoriously difficult to establish, the candidates’ verbal animosities seemed to serve as powerful kindling for politically-motivated violence (Dickerson 2016). A particularly disturbing case in point occurred on June 14, 2017, when 66- year-old, dyed-in-the-wool Democrat, James Hodgkinson, opened fire during a congressional baseball game in Washington, D.C., critically injuring a police officer and several Republican lawmakers (Britt 2017, Person 2017, Reuters 2017). Just two months later, in Charlottesville, Virginia, James Fields, a 20-year-old, self- avowed white nationalist, plowed his car into anti-nazi demonstrators, injuring 19 and killing one: 32-year-old civil rights activist, Heather Heyer (ABC News 2017). Although on opposite sides of the political spectrum, both lone-assailants had much in common: pre-existing mental health issues, an obsessive fixation with inflammatory political rhetoric, toxic identification with a mainstream party, and a history of threatening communications (Shear, Goldman & Cochrane 2017, Sheth 2017). These highly publicized acts of US domestic terrorism were viewed with considerable concern by Europeans with an eye to their own elections, their worry being that the unusually aggressive rhetorical style of the 2016 US presidential race could detrimentally affect the comportment of European politicians and their societies at-large (Aalberg et al. 2017). Such worries are not unfounded. Aside from the danger that overly acrimonious rhetoric by politicians may help to legitimize intolerance Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:23, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use. https://www.cambridge.org/core 188 I . M . N I C K within mainstream society, there is also the risk that it may catalyze future acts of verbal and physical violence (European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights 2016). As Anderson-Nathe & Gharabaghi (2017:3) state: The language and ideas presented by the newly elected or imposed leaderships in many jurisdictions around the world are those of violence. When we accept pronouncement that some amongst us are to be feared, to be rejected, to be excluded and to be watched, we are promoting not safety and well-being but violence and cultural disintegration. Despite these dangers, psycholinguistic research into politically-motivated threatening communications has traditionally concerned itself with the potential risk private citizens pose to political leaders (e.g. Calhoun 1998, 2001; Borum et al. 1999; Baumgartner et al. 2001; Scalora et al. 2002; Meloy, Sheridan & Hoffmann 2008; Chauvin 2011; Meloy 2014; Hoffmann, Meloy & Sheridan 2014). By contrast, the potential impact of high-ranking politicians’ aggressive rhetoric on the threatening communications produced by private citizens has been relatively overlooked. The purpose of this investigation is to help address this oversight. 3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY For the current small-scale mixed-method investigation, an original corpus of 30 English-language ATCs were compiled from an internet search of hate crimes reported in the United States during the final run-up to the 2016 US presidential election. To be included in the corpus, each anonymous exemplar had to have been received by the target(s) during November 2016, and be the subject of investigation for possible violation of a hate-crime criminal code. The selected letters were then manually digitalized and transcribed. Any and all errors in grammar, punctuation, and spelling identified in the original ATC texts were retained. After the transcription process, the letters were coded for statistical analyses. This analysis had three foci: (i) the format (e.g. hand-written vs. typed), formatting (e.g. typed, italics, bolding, underlining), and thematic content of the ATC; (ii) the transmission characteristics of the ATC; and (iii) the characteristics of the ATC recipient and ATC sender. Each letter was evaluated to determine the presence or absence of 24 linguistic and paralinguistic factors identified in the scientific literature and by law enforcement agencies as being potentially significant markers of ‘problematic approach behavior’ as it is formally called in threat analysis literature (Scalora et al. 2003, Cacialli 2010, Schoeneman et al. 2011, Meloy 2014). A complete list of these variables is presented in the appendix. The results of the dichotomous coding were then used for chi-square analyses to determine which features, if any, reached the level of statistical significance. In addition to the quantitative analyses, Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:23, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use. https://www.cambridge.org/core A N O N Y M O U S T H R E AT E N I N G C O M M U N I C AT I O N S 189 the investigation also involved a detailed qualitative examination of threatening speech acts identified in the corpus. The varying linguistic form and function of these face-threatening performatives are illustrated with 10 sample excerpts from the corpus. As with every investigation, this methodological design is not free of limitations. The comparatively small sample-size and scope, for example, necessarily limit the statistical power of the analyses and the generalizability of the findings. The use of a single researcher to assess the material may also have introduced unwanted subjectivity. Nevertheless, as will be demonstrated here, the combination of the quantitative approach developed by the FBI with the qualitative approach pioneered by speech acts theorists still yields many useful insights. 4. FINDINGS The ATCs were randomly identified in and collected from 15 different states. In alphabetical order, the states represented in the corpus with the number of ATCs recovered within them is as follows: California (2), Florida (2), Georgia (2), Illinois (1), Iowa (2), Massachusetts (3), Michigan (1), Missouri (1), Nevada (1), New York (2), North Carolina (2), Texas (5), Washington (3), West Virginia (1), and Wisconsin (1). While all of the major regions of the continental US were represented, the South and the Midwest were particularly prevalent. Accounting for 16.13% of the corpus, Texas contributed the largest share of ATCs recovered for this investigation. The bulk of the communications (56.67%) were reported between the 15th and the 18th of November. Of the ATCs in the corpus, 73.33% made explicit mention of the 2016 US presidential election and/or one of the leading candidates. The most commonly occurring proper noun in the corpus was Trump (e.g. Go TRUMP!, TRUMP COUNTRY!, Trump won!). References to the election were not always this direct, however. Sometimes, they were simple declarations that would only make sense within the post-election context (e.g. We won!). With regard to the ATC-recipients’ identities, four different minority groups were attacked: (i) racial, ethnic, or national (13.33%); (ii) religious (20.00%); (iii) sexual orientation/gender (40.00%); and (iv) mixed (26.67%), where more than one of the aforementioned characteristics seemed to have been targeted. For example, in one instance, a family of Muslim immigrants from the Sudan was sent an ATC. In this case, it was impossible to discern whether the object of the ATC-sender’s negative attention was the family’s immigrant status, religion, or both. Overall, however, there seems to have been a good deal of overlap between the hatred expressed for Muslims and foreigners. A closer examination of the ATCs expressing hatred towards a racial, Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:23, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use. https://www.cambridge.org/core 190 I . M . N I C K ethnic, or national heritage revealed that 75.00% were anti-immigrant. Moreover, in the subset of ATCs with utterances explicitly attacking a religious grouping, 66.67% were anti-Islamic and 33.33% were anti-Semitic. It is important to note that in 33.33% of all the cases examined, the ATC targets were not identical to the ATC recipients. In one instance, for example, the same message was sent to all of the residents of a major apartment complex without regard for the individual demographic identities. An extract from this ATC is displayed below: (5) PLEASE DO NOT SELL OR RENT YOUR HOMES TO THEM [Muslims, Indians, Blacks, and Jews] WE ARE EVERYWHERE AND WATCHING EVERY MOVE In the first line of extract (5), an explicit direct request is made. According to some theorists, the realization of the request via an imperative as opposed to the more indirect communicative alternative of an interrogative (e.g. Can/Could/Would you please not sell or rent . . . ) ‘already constitutes a significant breach of Anglo- American politeness norms’ (Searle 1979, Brown & Levinson 1987, Leech 1990). The use of the conventionalized politeness marker PLEASE does little to soften this effect. This initial face-threatening illocutionary act then receives immediate reinforcement in the following line. Note the aspect, tense, and mood utilized in the double declarative: the omnipresence of the message-sender is underscored by the simple present indicative which is used for expressing a constant state of being or a natural law. Along with that, the simple continuous is used for indicating that an action – in this case surveillance – is currently taking place. The cumulative perlocutionary effect is coercion and threat. The fact that the message recipients are asked for compliance does not change this effect. What is key here is that an attempt is made to secure compliance through duress (Trosborg 1995). As in the example above, in 76.67% of the cases examined, the ATCs had been hand-delivered rather than mailed via the postal service or electronic means. An examination of the locations where these ATCs had been discovered revealed that the majority (43.3%) had been delivered to the ATC recipients’ homes. Accounting for 26.67% of the sample, the second most common delivery site was the recipients’ cars. This location was followed closely by the recipients’ place of work (23.33%). Finally, 1.3% of the ATCs were left at the recipients’ place of worship. The chi-square tests revealed no significant differences in the delivery locations. Overall, the ATCs were exceedingly short communications, with the average page length and number of words 1.10 and 61.27, respectively. The shortest communication contained only four words and the longest 1,099 words. In 66.67% of Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:23, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use. https://www.cambridge.org/core A N O N Y M O U S T H R E AT E N I N G C O M M U N I C AT I O N S 191 cases, the ACTs were handwritten messages scrawled on scraps of paper. A little less than one-third (30.30%) were prepared using a computer and just over one-quarter (26.67%) contained symbols, imagery, or drawings. The most common image was the swastika. In keeping with the ‘letter-genre’, 60.00% opened with some form of salutation. However, in contrast to non-threatening written communications, these openers were more often than not pejorative (e.g. Hey Faggot, Hey Dumbass, Hey Looser, Hey). In the three instances where the standard formulaic Dear was employed, it was immediately followed by an insult (e.g. Dear Nigga (As you like to say)). Thus, from the very first line of text, the ATC recipients were confronted with verbal aggression. This combative stance was further reflected in the fact that 16.67% of the messages depicted the target as non-human (e.g. vermin, trash, a disease). However, generally speaking, the message writers preferred profanity over injurious metonymy. In 59.90% of the ATCs, at least one instance of obscenity was utilized. The selection of vulgarities targeted four aspects of identity: sexual orientation, gender, religion, and ethnoracial identity/association (e.g. bitch, dike, faggot, hymie, nigger, nigger-lover). Aside from their surface face-threatening function, these negative vocatives were commonly used to magnify the underlying perlocutionary function of the ATCs’ primary illocutionary point (PIP). The obscenities accordingly appeared in one of three syntactic positions: (i) integrated within the PIP (25.00%); (ii) framing the PIP, immediately before and/or afterwards (43.75%); and (iii) both within and around the PIP (31.25%). Examples of each appear below: (6) FAggoTs GeT OuT! (7) Get out of our neighborhood NOW FAGGOTS!! (8) HEY FAGGOT We won, so you better WATCH YOURE bACK. YOU’RE dAys ARE NUMbERd. YOU Will SEE you COCK SUCKER In extract (6), the directive illocutionary act of ordering gays to leave the country is heightened by the use of the pejorative faggots at the head of the utterance. In (7), the same illocutionary act is performed; however, the perlocutionary boost appears after the directive, in the subsequent line. Extract (8) is a bit more complex. Here, a mutually-reinforcing syntactic chain of three idiomatic expressions with complementary denotative meanings is used. According to the Merriam-Webster Dictionary, the first phrase is used to tell someone to be attentive or vigilant. The second is used to say someone will ‘die, fail, or end soon’. Finally, the third is a variant of ‘just (you) wait and see’ and is used to communicate that ‘one is sure that something will happen’. Collectively, this illocutionary chain is meant to warn the Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:23, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use. https://www.cambridge.org/core 192 I . M . N I C K target of imminent though non-descript harm. This warning does not appear to serve a benevolent purpose, though, given that it is syntactically framed by face-threatening derogatory references to the target’s sexual orientation (i.e. FAGGOT and COCK SUCKER). The perlocutionary effect is therefore more likely to be intimidatory than protective. As reported above, not all of the ATCs relied on obscenity to bolster their menacing effect. Take, for example, the following excerpt: (9) WE ARE NAHZIIS!!! AND NOW THAT TRUMP IS PRESIDENT WE CAN KILL YOU!!! This text utilizes the aforementioned prototypical argument structure [If you X, then I will Y] with one key difference. The condition upon which threatened negative action will take place is not predicated upon the target’s future compliance with a demand made by the ATC sender. Instead, the condition has already been fulfilled by an event beyond the target’s individual control (i.e. the result of the presidential election). It is upon this basis that the declaration is made: We can kill you!!! The choice in modality is critical here. Had the message utilized the future indicative (i.e. ‘We will kill you!!!’), a far higher degree of speaker intention and volition would have been communicated. By using the modal auxiliary can, ability and permissibility are emphasized instead. In other words, now that there has been a change in government and Donald Trump has been elected president, the speaker and those of his/her ilk (i.e. WE) are now free to kill the target of the message. Note here that the explicit predicate kill is used rather than an indirect figure of speech that merely hints at a potential physical threat to life. This lexical choice lends more credence to the inference that the intended illocutionary point is to intimidate. Of course, one could argue that the purpose of the utterance was not to frighten but to forewarn. What undermines this alternative interpretation is the preceding three-word predicate nominative construction (WE ARE NAHZIIS!!!). In this concise statement, the ATC sender proclaims membership in a modern-day, violent, right- wing extremist group in the United States that takes its inspiration from the National Socialists of Europe, who, after the political ascendancy of Adolf Hitler were allowed to kill millions. By historical extension, the threatening perlocutionary effect of the utterance now . . . we can kill you!!! is effectively bolstered. The ATC from which this text was extracted was not alone in making historical allusions to National Socialism. In the following excerpt taken from a different ATC, the same linguistic boosting strategy is used: (10) You muslims are a vile and filthy people. Your mothers are whores and your fathers are dogs. You are evil. But, your day of reckoning has arrived. There’s a new Sherriff in town - - President Donald Trump. He’s going to cleanse America and make it Shine again. And, he’s going to start with you muslims. Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:23, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use. https://www.cambridge.org/core A N O N Y M O U S T H R E AT E N I N G C O M M U N I C AT I O N S 193 He’s going to do to you muslims what Hitler did to the jews. You muslims would be wise to pack your bags and get out of Dodge After a series of personalized negative assertions about the target’s family and religious heritage, the ATC goes on to ‘recite the circumstances under which the transaction is to be effected’ (Austin 1955:7). As before, the condition for the portended negative event is described as already having been met by Donald Trump’s election. The US American idiom ‘There’s a new Sheriff in town’ harkens back to Hollywood Westerns in which righteous town citizens are terrorized by a gang of outlaws while corrupt officials turn a blind eye. The turning point comes when a new sheriff, typically an outsider, arrives in Dodge, the quintessential US American wild West town. The newcomer then single-handedly restores law and order. In (9), the then political outsider Donald Trump is cast in this role as savior: hence the Biblical allusion to the ‘day of reckoning’. However, in (10), the new justice forecast is not one of peace and tranquility. The protagonist is instead presented as CLEANSING America of Muslims who are depicted as vile and filthy. Since the introduction of the euphemism ‘ethnic cleansing’ during the Balkans Wars, this predicate is strongly associated with genocide. This connotation is immediately reinforced with the two predictions: (i) he’s [Trump is] going to start with you muslims; and (ii) He’s going to do to you muslims what Hitler did to the jews. Once again, tense, aspect, and modality are key here: the use of the future indicative present progressive is commonly used in US American English to express personal purpose, aim, or intention (Alexander 1989), and in this case, that express intention is the repeat annihilation of a religious minority. As Austin reminds, the use of the third person singular as opposed to first person singular in the agentive role does not automatically undermine the performative nature of the utterance – threat in this case. The action of the performer must not, Austin cautions, be ‘wrongly cast into a purely grammatical mould’ (Austin 1955:60). Following this logic, Donald Trump is a passepartout for the politically like-minded, including the ATC sender. It is against this exposition that the final act of advising the target to get out of Dodge must be analyzed. The final locution operates similarly to the familiar coercive conditional threat [You had better (not) X, or else Y]. When [Y] involves the sender taking actions that will result in the receiver’s murder, the perlocutionary effect is not one of advisement but threat. Here again, much can be learned about the speech act by attending to the embedded sociocultural and historical references. In the ATC corpus, 20.00% explicitly mentioned National Socialism. The other equally common reference was US American Slavery. An excellent example is found in (11): (11) Now that our man TRUMP is elected and republicans own both the senate and the house – time to organize tar & feather VIGILANTE SQUADS and go Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:23, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use. https://www.cambridge.org/core 194 I . M . N I C K arrest & torture those deviant university leaders spouting off all this Diversity Garbage. The beginning of (11) is familiar: the condition upon which the menacing augury is predicated is said to have been fulfilled by the election results. The message then proclaims that the time has come for retribution. The agent of this action, the VIGILANTE SQUADS, is pre- and post-modified by the adjectival and verbal couplets tar & feather and arrest & torture. This syntactic mirroring helps to build a historical bridge between the past and the present calls to arms. In the US American Reconstruction Era (c. 1863–1877), for example, the KKK used tar-and-feathering in its lynching rituals to punish individuals deemed to have trespassed the lines of racial segregation (Harris 1995). The targets of this vigilantism were carefully selected to maximize public warnings against challenging the ideology of White Supremacy (Russell-Brown 2009). In much the same way, the grammatical and political object singled out for vigilantism in extract (11) are also community leaders: academicians. More specifically, the designated targets are those deviant university leaders who are progressively spreading or spouting off Diversity Garbage. The ATC from which (11) was excerpted was randomly distributed across a US university campus. The meaning intended and taken no doubt shifted with the recipient. For like-minded readers on campus, the illocutionary act performed by the triple imperative to organize, arrest, and torture may have been a command to take action. The accompanying perlocutionary effect may then have been one of persuading, convincing, or inciting. For receivers who either identified as or sympathized with the projected targets, the very same locution may have a different perlocutionary effect: intimidation and threat. Thus, as stated before, the interpretation of the speech act depends upon the relationship of the message sender and recipient. Across the entire corpus, an examination of those ATCs containing some form of linguistic threat (be it direct, veiled, specified, or unspecified) revealed that 93.33% had been articulated without linguistic equivocation or hesitation. This finding was highly significant (�² (1) = 22.54, p � .001). Nevertheless, only 10.00% contained details which would tend to indicate that the threat made was feasible or imminent. This set of findings might relate to the next. Despite the fact that 69.97% of the ATCs had been deposited on the recipients’ private property, only 43.33% of the cases showed clear evidence of a prior relationship or contact between the sender and the receiver. In one such case, the ATC sender revealed that he/she had once been an admiring high school student of the recipient and was deeply disappointed by the recipient’s anti-Trump postings. This identity cue was a-typical for the corpus, however. As a general rule, prior sender–receiver contacts were indirectly (and most probably inadvertently) revealed. For example, occasionally ATCs contained private Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:23, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use. https://www.cambridge.org/core A N O N Y M O U S T H R E AT E N I N G C O M M U N I C AT I O N S 195 information about the recipient that could only have been known by someone in his/her immediate social circle (e.g. intimate details about the recipient’s private routine or use of a private nickname). However, as a group, the ATCs contained very little detailed information about the recipients. Even basic information such as the ATC-target’s personal name was statistically significant in its absence (�² (1) = 10.8, p � .05). These results are congruent with the finding that a statistically significant minority of the ATCs made mention of an interpersonal motivation for the communication (e.g. financial recompense (13.33%), revenge (6.67%), or obvious personal fixation on the specific ATC recipient (6.67%)). Instead, the primary motivation for selecting the ATC receiver seemed to have been the ATC-senders’ desire to vent their hatred towards a particular group. Be that as it may, relatively few of the ATCs warned of a future contact (30.00%) or gave concrete evidence of preparation for a future violent act (6.67%). Both of these features were statistically significant in their absence: (�² (1) = 22.54, p � .001) and (�² (1) = 4.8, p � .05), respectively. After issuing the intended threat(s) or insult(s), most of the ATCs (63.33%) abruptly ended. An examination of those ATCs that did include closings yielded one final interesting finding: 26.67% were signed as if the ATC had been composed by a large group (e.g. America!, Trump Country, Trump Nation, and The World). This hyperbolic autonymy seems to have served the double purpose of simultaneously inflating the relational power of the ATC senders while minimizing that of their targets. 5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS In the past, it has proven extremely difficult to obtain large stores of authentic written material from forensic cases involving threat (e.g. extortion, blackmail, ransom, kidnapping, stalking, etc.; Nini 2017). The compilation of large-scale forensic corpora with millions of words has been consequently thwarted. However, with the rapid proliferation of electronically transmitted messages via social media and the internet (e.g. Twitter, Facebook, and Instagram), it is now at least theoretically possible to compile large collections of ATCs. As Spitzberg & Gawron (2016:58) explain, ‘the larger the corpora, the more stable the results are likely to be, and the greater the opportunity to examine unique discriminating features of different types of threats’. Once important ethical and legal questions surrounding ownership, authorization, and use have been resolved, such corpora could be used for mixed-method multivariate metalinguistic analyses. Expanding on the current investigation, for example, such studies could be conceivably used for the identification, classification, and interpretation of potentially threatening linguistic utterances made by private citizens in response to politicians’ postings (e.g. Presidential Tweets). However, Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:23, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use. https://www.cambridge.org/core 196 I . M . N I C K even in small-scale corpus-driven investigations such as the one presented here, it is possible to learn much about how language can instill feelings of anxiety and dread. As Glasgow & Schouten (2014:44) remind, ‘the very act of sending an argumentative or hostile communication’ in and of itself ‘represents a breach of normative behavior and suggests that the sender may have difficult controlling hostile impulses and maintaining appropriate boundaries’. Aside from the risk connoted by this overarching transgression, several of the paralinguistic and linguistic features found in the ATCs could be interpreted as potentially important risk indicators for future inappropriate, potentially dangerous, behavior. For example, the fact that the majority of ATCs were left at the target’s private property (e.g. home residence or car) may well indicate a disconcerting level of risk-taking behavior on the part of the ATC sender (Simon & Tunkel 2014). In addition, the unequivocal use of offensive language (e.g. name-calling, insults, and threats) to belittle, intimidate, threaten, chastise, humiliate, injure, and shame the ATC recipients may indicate a troubling level of hostility. This tendency is not without importance, when one considers that verbal and physical aggression have been found to correlate (Straus 1979, Linaker & Busche-Iversen 1995, Hillbrand 2000, Scalora et al. 2003, McNiel & Binder 2006, Gidycz, Warkentin & Orchowski 2007). Seen together, these features could reasonably be interpreted as potential warning signals of future violence. However, the ATC analysis also revealed several potential contra-indicators of future physical aggression (e.g. the relative absence of concrete planning, threat feasibility, and skill level) (Calhoun 1998, 2001, Fitzgerald 2005). Moreover, the fact that so many of the ATCs appeared to resort to rather obvious forms of linguistic staging (e.g. suggesting that the ATC had been written by the entire US nation or even the world itself) could be interpreted as the ATC-senders’ attempt to lend strength and credibility to the communicative force behind their messages (Simons & Tunkel 2014). Another finding which might be interpreted as risk mitigatory was the fact that the majority of the ATCs were conspicuously short, handwritten, notes that appeared to have been hurriedly scribbled on scraps of paper and quickly deposited in easily accessible public locations. By contrast, lengthy, carefully prepared, typewritten letters that had been placed in hard-to-access intimate spaces (e.g. the recipient’s bedroom, the glove compartment of the recipient’s car) were comparatively rare. This finding is important in view of the fact that detail-rich, lengthy communications with specific demands have been found to be more commonly written by people who not only threatened, but also engaged in subsequent problematic approach behaviors (e.g. Schoeneman et al. 2011). Finally, the frequent use of profane and derogatory language in the ATCs may also be a risk mitigatory sign. Contrary to popular belief, the use of abusive language has not consistently been shown to be significant predictor of future inappropriate approach behaviors (Baumgartner et al. 2001, Scalora Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:23, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use. https://www.cambridge.org/core A N O N Y M O U S T H R E AT E N I N G C O M M U N I C AT I O N S 197 et al. 2003, Schoeneman et al. 2011, Gales 2015). In fact, empirical evidence from large-scale investigations of threatening communication indicates that a polite tone is actually associated with future acts of violence (Dietz et al. 1991, Smith 2008). Based on this overall constellation of linguistic and situational features, the quantitative analysis of the ATCs seemed to indicate a relatively low level of risk for imminent physical violence. This does not mean to negate or in any way diminish, however, the psychological damage these verbal acts may well have done to their primary targets. Therein lies one of the major conceptual advantages of applying speech act theory to ATC analysis: it highlights the equal importance of analyzing what was said, what was meant, and what was the result (Strawson 1964). The context-sensitive examination of all three aspects can enrich traditional actuarial approaches to ATC analysis. This mixed-method approach might facilitate more accurate risk estimates for future physical violence and encourage more sensitive assessments of the present- day psychosocial harm done by ATCs. This is an important point. Even if an ATC does not culminate in direct contact, the trauma of this communicative act alone can produce long-lasting and deep-seated pain, fear, suspicion, resentment, and anger in the recipient (Craig-Henderson & Sloan 2003). What is more, the negative effects may extend far beyond the original target. The injury and offense may be felt by a host of secondary victims who identify as and/or with the primary target. This dynamic can help to (re)ignite inter-group tensions which can, in turn, catalyze more acts of aggression. This negative potential is, of course, not restricted to the politically embattled US. Even within Nordic countries that have long prided themselves on their comparatively cordial tradition of political discourse, some Scandinavian observers have warned that mainstream politicians have increasingly adopted rhetorical methods once associated with extremism, be it to the left or the right (Schierup & Ålund 2011, Hellström, Nilsson & Stolz 2012, Sakki & Pettersson 2015, Juul Christiansen 2016, Nedergaard & Wivel 2018). As Fryklund (2013:275) observes, these changes in Nordic political rhetoric have been accompanied by a return of populism ‘both as an empirical reality and as an important research topic’. While the presidential election is over in the US, the general elections in many Nordic nations are right around the corner (Sweden: 2018, Denmark: 2019, Finland: 2019, Iceland: 2020). This timing provides an excellent opportunity for conducting analogous forensic linguistic research within Scandinavia. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The author would like to express her gratitude to Dr. T. Karoli Christensen. Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:23, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use. https://www.cambridge.org/core 198 I . M . N I C K APPENDIX Presence Absence Feature n (%) n (%) 1. ATC hand-delivered∗∗ 24 (80.00) 6 (20.00) 2. Target mentioned by name∗∗ 6 (20.00) 24 (80.00) 3. Single author∗ 22 (73.33) 8 (26.67) 4. Mention made of the 2016 US presidential election∗ 22 (73.33) 8 (26.67) 5. Concrete signs of preparation for violent act∗∗∗ 2 (6.67) 28 (93.33) 6. Skill evident in carrying out threat∗∗∗ 3 (10.00) 27 (90.00) 7. Single target∗∗ 7 (23.33) 23 (76.67) 8. Violent linguistic imagery∗∗ 7 (23.33) 23 (76.67) 9. Financial motive∗∗ 4 (13.33) 26 (86.67) 10. Attempt to make the target take action∗∗∗ 2 (6.67) 28 (93.33) 11. Revenge expressed as a motive∗∗∗ 2 (6.67) 28 (93.33) 12. Fixation on the targeted recipient∗∗∗ 2 (6.67) 28 (93.33) 13. Target dehumanized (e.g. described as trash, vermin, or a disease)∗∗ 5 (16.67) 25 (83.33) 14. Threat of future contact∗ 9 (30.00) 21 (70.00) 15. Equivocation∗∗∗ 2 (6.67) 28 (93.33) 16. Capitalization (n.s.) 12 (40.00) 18 (60.00) 17. Underlining∗∗∗ 5 (16.67) 25 (83.33) 18. Closing (n.s.) 11 (36.67) 19 (63.33) 19. Salutation (n.s.) 18 (60.00) 12 (40.00) 20. graphic symbols or illustrations∗∗ 7 (23.33) 23 (76.67) 21. 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Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:23, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use. http://www.newsweek.com/trumps-full-list-racist-comments-about-immigrants-muslims-and-others-779061 http://www.newsweek.com/trumps-full-list-racist-comments-about-immigrants-muslims-and-others-779061 https://www.bra.se/bra-in-english/home/crime-and-statistics/hate-crime.html https://www.bra.se/bra-in-english/home/crime-and-statistics/hate-crime.html http://www.aclweb.org/anthology/W12-2103 http://www.aclweb.org/anthology/W12-2103 https://www.cambridge.org/core 1. GENERAL INTRODUCTION 2. HATE-FILLED POLITICAL RHETORIC, ATCS, AND THE USA 3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 4. FINDINGS 5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS APPENDIX REFERENCES 
work_se5t2y7gsjbbtd2lugs6tqp6im	----	1709 Homicide of Lesbians, Gays, Bisexuals, Travestis, Transexuals, and Transgender people (LGBT) in Brazil: a Spatial Analysis Abstract Violence against LGBT people has always been present in our society. Brazil is the country with the highest number of lethal cri- mes against LGBT people in the world. The aim of this study was to describe the characteristics of homicides of LGBT people in Brazil using spatial analysis. The LGBT homicide rate was used to fa- cilitate the visualization of the geographical dis- tribution of homicides. Public thoroughfares and the victim’s home were the most common places of occurrence. The most commonly used methods for killing male homosexuals and transgender pe- ople were cold weapons and firearms, respectively; however, homicides frequently involved beatings, suffocation, and other cruelties. The large majo- rity of victims were aged between 20 and 49 years and typically white or brown. The North, Northe- ast and Central-West regions, precisely the regions with the lowest HDI,presented LGBT homicide rates above the national rate.LGBT homicides are typically hate crimes and constitute a serious pu- blic health problem because they affect young peo- ple, particularly transgender people. This problem needs to be addressed by the government, starting with the criminalization of homophobia and the subsequent formulation of public policies to redu- ce hate crimes and promote respect for diversity. Key words Homicides, LGBT people, Spatial analysis Wallace Góes Mendes (https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7852-7334) 1 Cosme Marcelo Furtado Passos da Silva (https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7789-1671) 1 DOI: 10.1590/1413-81232020255.33672019 1 Programa de Pós- Graduação em Epidemiologia em Saúde Pública, Escola Nacional de Saúde Pública Sérgio Arouca, Fiocruz. R. Leopoldo Bulhões 1480, Manguinhos. 21041-210 Rio de Janeiro RJ Brasil. wgmendes@uea.edu.br A r T ic L e 1 7 1 0 M en d es W G , S il va C M F P introduction Deaths resulting from intentional violence and aggression have increased among external causes of death in Brazil and the country now has the highest absolute number of homicides in the world1,2, making this problem a serious public health concern3,4. This type of violence can be understood as a complex phenomenon that has a major impact on life expectancy, since it gener- ally affects young people, blacks, and low-income people from developing countries5-7. According to the report “World Health Sta- tistics 2019”,published by the World Health Organization, there were an estimated 477,000 deaths globally due to homicides in 20168. Brazil accounted for around12.8%9 of this total, repre- senting the seventh largest homicide rate in the Americas8. Brazil’s Atlas of Violence 2019 reported that there were 65,602 homicides in 2017, which is equivalent to a homicide rate of 31.6 per100,000 population. Over half of the victims (54.5%) were young people aged between 15 and 29 years, 91.8% were men, 77% were killed using guns, and 75.5% were black and typically lived in the North and Northeast regions9. According to Transgender Europe (TGEU), there were 2,609 murders of transgender people across 71 different countries between 2008 and 2017, with Brazil accounting for the largest num- ber of deaths10. The Atlas of Violence 2019features a section dedicated to violence against theLGBT popula- tion between 2011 and 2017, based on data from Disque 100 (Dial 100 human rights hotline) and the national notifiable diseases information sys- tem (SINAN). Disque 100recorded 1,720 com- plaints of human rights violations against LGBT people in 2017, 193 of which were of murders, 23 attempted murders, and 423 bodily injuries. The number of reported cases of violence against ho- mosexuals/bisexuals recorded in the SINAN in 2016 was 6,800. Physical violence accounted for over half of these complaints; however, violations also included psychological violence and torture9. According to the NGO the Grupo Gay da Ba- hia (GGB), Brazil is the country with the highest number of lethal crimes against LGBT people in the world, followed by Mexico and the United States11-13. In 2018, the GGB recorded420 violent deaths among LGBT people in Brazil, which is equivalent to one murder every 20 hours12. The aim of the present study is to show the characteristics of LGBT homicides committed in Brazil between 2002 and 2016 using spatial anal- ysis. It is important to note that the discussion of the social and political aspects of homopho- bia is beyond the scope of this study. The study is restricted to the analysis of homicides recorded by the GGB that were not necessarily related to homophobia, given that it is difficult to prove the motive due to the lack of information on the cir- cumstances surrounding these crimes. Materials and methods Since the number of LGBT homicides in the offi- cial data published in the Atlas of Violence 2019 is underreported, it was necessary to think of a viable alternative approach9. The most workable approach was to use the data produced by the GGB, which has been recording LGBT homicides and suicides, including those motivated by ho- mophobia, since 198012-14. It is important to stress that international institutions like the TGEU, International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association (ILGA), and the United Na- tions, as well as the Brazilian press, frequently use data from GGB reports and their website10,15,16. The Ministry of Human Rights produced a report at the end of 2018 ratifying GGB data and estimating that 8,027 LGBT people were mur- dered in the country between 1963 and 2018 be- cause of their sexual orientation or gender iden- tity17. The GGB documented more than 5,000 murders of LGBT people up to 2018, using data based on news stories, internet research, and in- formation provided by LGBT activists12. To minimize underreporting, the homicides recorded during the study period were checked through exhaustive internet searches with the help of a researcher from the GGB, resulting in corrections, alterations, and the addition of com- plementary information. A conservative estimate suggests that for each recorded LGBT homicide two homicides go unrecorded18”archive_loca- tion”:”743043412; 201026602”,”abstract”:”This article analyzes one of the gravest consequences of discrimination against homosexuals: hate crimes (or homophobic murders; however, it is believed that this number may be even higher in Brazil19. Since the use of rates is common in spatial analysis, the main variable of interest was “LGBT homicide rate”. We calculated the LGBT homicide rate in towns and cities with more than100,000 inhabitants as from 2002. Standardized rates were not calculated due to lack of available in- formation. https://pt.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grupo_Gay_da_Bahia https://pt.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grupo_Gay_da_Bahia 1 7 1 1 C iên cia & Saú d e C o letiva, 2 5 (5 ):1 7 0 9 -1 7 2 2 , 2 0 2 0 Since information on LGBT homicide rates do not exist in Brazil, we chose an appropriate parameter to enable comparisons of rates across municipalities and states. Quartile statistics were chosen for the states and the Human Develop- ment Index (HDI) – the most widely used social indicator in the world – for capitals and other municipalities20. Underreporting bias was minimized by grouping cases into five-year periods. The homi- cide rate per 100,000 population was therefore calculated by dividing the 15-year study period into three five-year periods (2002 to 2006, 2007 to 2011,and 2012 to 2016) in order to make the results more robust, comparable, and represen- tative and to facilitate spatial visualization. Thus, the LGBT homicide rate was calculated based on the sum of homicides in each five-year period (the numerator) divided by 10% of the Brazil- ian population (the denominator) in the central years of the five-year periods (2004, 2009, and 2014). It is worth highlighting that studies con- firming the proportion of LGBT in Brazil do not exist and that 10% is a conservative estimate21-23. Studies from other countries have shown that, on average, 10% of the population are LGBT. A study conducted by the University of California in 2006 in the US’ 13 largest cities concluded that 8.1% of the population declared themselves as LGBT24. Another study conducted by Rutgers Nis- so Groep in the Netherlands in 2009 showed that 10% of men and 11% of women reported feeling sexually attracted to someone of the same sex25. A survey undertaken by the global public opinion and data company YouGov estimated that 11%of the population of England were LGBT26, while a study carried out in Italy by Istituto Nazionale di Statistica reported that 6.7% of the population declared that they had had sex with a person of the same sex27. Homicide rates were visualized using a spa- tial analysis technique developed by Cliff28. Since there is no pre-established classification for ho- micide rates29, maps were created using quartiles. The calculation of the rates and mapping were performed using R 3.5.3 and QGIS 3.4.5, respec- tively. Spatial dependence was measured using Mo- ran’s I30 to determine the presence of spatial auto- correlation of LGBT homicide rates in the three periods, using a significance level of 0.0531. Some studies32,33 have highlighted the need to perform hypothesis testing, where the null hypothesis (H 0 ) states that there is no spatial dependence. The index ranges from -1 to +1, where values close to zero indicate that there is no spatial au- tocorrelation and positive and negative values indicate the presence of spatial dependence be- tween locations. After testing different matrices, we used a distance between the centroids of the states of greater than 2,500 kilometers for the spatial proximity matrix adopted because this was the configuration that was shown to be most significant (p-value ≤ 0.05) for hypothesis testing. Kernel maps were created to identify spatial patterns of homicide rates across regions. The maps were plotted using interpolation methods, showing the point intensity of the phenomenon across the study area at a scale of 1:2,000, thus providing a general overview of the intensity of LGBT homicide rates across Brazil34. Finally, this ecological study analyzed data for the period 2002 to 2016 – the most recent available data – in order to achieve more reliable results, thus bringing our estimations as close to reality as possible. results The findings show that there were 3,100 LGBT homicides in Brazil between 2002 and 2016, as shown in Table 1. To aid understanding of the re- sults, gender identity and sexual orientation were separated into three groups: homosexual (in- cluding bisexuals), transgender (including inter- sexuals, transexuals, cross-dressers, and “traves- tis”), and other (including lesbians, heterosexuals wrongly taken to be homosexuals, and “T-lovers”, who are lovers/admirers of transgender people and travestis). Over half the sample (59.3%) were homosexual, 35.6% were transgender, and 5.1% were other. Over half of homosexual homicides were committed in small towns and cities (51.5% compared to 48.5% in state capitals). Almost half of the homicides were committed in the victim’s home (47.5%), 36% used cold weapons, and 49.2% involved 2 to 5blows or shots. Over half the victims were white (51.7%), 26.2% were aged between 30 and 39 years, and 44.4% were professionals with higher education, teachers, or business people. Almost half of the perpetrators were aged between 20 and 29 years (47.2%) and 48.6% were sex professionals. Over half of transgender homicides occurred in small towns and cities (52.8% compared to 47.2% in state capitals), 76.8% were committed in public thoroughfares, 49.8% used firearms, and 57.1% involved 2 to 5 blows or shots. Almost 1 7 1 2 M en d es W G , S il va C M F P Table 1. Characteristics of crimes and the victims and identified perpetrators of LGBT homicides in Brazil between 2002 and 2016. Variables Homicide Gender identity/Sexual Orientation Homosexual Transgender Other* Total N % N % N % N % Region State capital 891 48.5 522 47.2 73 46.5 1486 47.9 Smaller town/city 947 51.5 583 52.8 84 53.5 1614 52.1 Total 1838 100.0 1105 100.0 157 100.0 3100 100.0 Place of occurence Home 791 47.5 170 17.3 49 33.6 1010 36.1 Public thoroughfare 740 44.4 756 76.8 77 52.7 1573 56.2 Private establishment 128 7.7 58 5.9 20 13.7 206 7.4 Public establishment 8 0.5 - - - - 8 0.3 Total 1667 100.0 984 100.0 146 100.0 2797 100.0 Type of weapon or method Cold weapon 626 36.0 241 23.6 58 38.2 925 31.7 Firearm 431 24.8 509 49.8 63 41.4 1003 34.4 Beating 327 18.8 147 14.4 20 13.2 494 16.9 Suffocation 243 14.0 66 6.5 6 3.9 315 10.8 Other** 114 6.5 59 5.8 5 3.3 178 6.1 Total 1741 100.0 1022 100.0 152 100.0 2915 100.0 Number of blows or shots 1 22 7.4 21 10.2 6 15.8 49 9.1 2 to 5 146 49.2 117 57.1 23 60.5 286 53.0 6 to 10 52 17.5 32 15.6 6 15.8 90 16.7 > 10 77 25.9 35 17.1 3 7.9 115 21.3 Total 297 100.0 205 100.0 38 100.0 540 100.0 Victim's age group (years) < 15 12 0.8 8 1.1 2 1.4 22 0.9 15 to 19 105 6.6 97 13.0 22 15.7 224 9.1 20 to 29 382 24.2 369 49.5 58 41.4 809 32.8 30 to 39 414 26.2 200 26.8 34 24.3 648 26.3 40 to 49 372 23.6 66 8.8 14 10.0 452 18.3 50 to 59 184 11.7 4 0.5 8 5.7 196 8.0 > 59 110 7.0 2 0.3 2 1.4 114 4.6 Total 1579 100.0 746 100.0 140 100.0 2465 100.0 Victim's race or skin color Branca 297 51.7 202 54.6 29 50.9 528 52.7 Parda 235 40.9 138 37.3 23 40.4 396 39.6 Preta 42 7.3 30 8.1 5 8.8 77 7.7 Total 574 100.0 370 100.0 57 100.0 1001 100.0 Victim's profession Professional with higher education, teacher or business person 477 44.4 16 3.6 14 31.8 507 32.4 General services/self- employed 336 31.3 62 14.0 16 36.4 414 26.5 Sex professional 22 2.0 353 79.5 - - 375 24.0 Student, retired, or unemployed 111 10.3 5 1.1 11 25.0 127 8.1 Priest/religious affiliation 65 6.0 3 0.7 - - 68 4.4 Professional with 2º education 46 4.3 3 0.7 - - 49 3.1 Military member 15 1.4 - - 3 6.8 18 1.2 LGBT military member 3 0.3 2 0.5 - - 5 0.3 Total 1075 100.0 444 100.0 44 100.0 1563 100.0 it continues 1 7 1 3 C iên cia & Saú d e C o letiva, 2 5 (5 ):1 7 0 9 -1 7 2 2 , 2 0 2 0 half of the victims (49.5%) were aged between 20 and 29 years, 54.6% were white, and 79.5% were sex professionals. Half of the identified perpetra- tors were aged between 20 and 29 years (50.6%) and around two-thirds (69.6%) were military members. Overall, over half the crimes (52.1%) were committed in small towns and cities, 56.2% in public thoroughfares, 34.4% used firearms, and 53% involved 2 to 5 blows or shots. Over half (52.7%) of the victims were white, 32.8% were aged between 20 to 29 years, and 32.4% were professionals with higher education, teachers, or business people. Almost half of the identified perpetrators were aged between 20 to 29 years (46.3%) and sex professionals (43.7%). It is important to note that there was limited information on perpetrators, primarily due to the underreporting of these crimes. This hap- pens due to the inefficiency of the Brazil’s crim- inal justice system, leading to a lack of effective measures to address homophobia12,13. States Figure 1 shows that seven states showed ho- micide rates above the 3º quartile in the period 2002 to 2006 (4.36: Amazonas, Mato Grosso do Sul, Goiás, Rio Grande do Norte, Paraíba, and Pernambuco), six during the period 2007 to 2011 (8.60: Rondônia, Mato Grosso do Sul, Paraí- ba, Pernambuco, Alagoas, and Sergipe), and six in the period 2012 to 2016(14.26: Amazonas, Rondônia, Mato Grosso do Sul, Paraíba, Alagoas, and Sergipe). The states of Paraíba and Mato Grosso do Sul showed homicide rates above the 3º quartile in all three periods, Amazonas, Rondônia, Pernam- buco, Alagoas, and Sergipe in two periods, and Rio Grande do Norte and Goiás in one period. Towns and cities The rise in LGBT homicides in Brazil be- comes all the more evident when we observe the Variables Homicide Gender identity/Sexual Orientation Homosexual Transgender Other* Total N % N % N % N % Perpetrator’s age group (years) < 15 4 1.2 - - 2 1.4 6 1.1 15 to 19 118 35.2 18 21.2 22 15.7 158 28.2 20 to 29 158 47.2 43 50.6 58 41.4 259 46.3 30 to 39 38 11.3 8 9.4 34 24.3 80 14.3 40 to 49 14 4.2 11 12.9 14 10.0 39 7.0 50 to 59 1 0.3 4 4.7 8 5.7 13 2.3 > 59 2 0.6 1 1.2 2 1.4 5 0.9 Total 335 100.0 85 100.0 140 100.0 560 100.0 Perpetrator’s profesion Sex professional 36 48.6 6 26.1 3 50.0 45 43.7 Military member 13 17.6 16 69.6 2 33.3 31 30.1 Student, retired, or unemployed 12 16.2 - - 1 16.7 13 12.6 Professional (higher education) 7 9.5 - - - - 7 6.8 General services/self- employed 6 8.1 1 4.3 - - 7 6.8 Total 74 100.0 23 100.0 6 100.0 103 100.0 Notes: *Includes lesbians, heterosexuals wrongly taken to be homosexuals, and “T-lovers” (lovers/admirers of transgender people and travestis). ** Other includes clubbing, stoning, decapitation, running over, impalement, drowning, poisoning, and torture. Table 1. Characteristics of crimes and the victims and identified perpetrators of LGBT homicides in Brazil between 2002 and 2016. 1 7 1 4 M en d es W G , S il va C M F P Figure 1. Spatial evolution of homicide rates by state between 2002 and 2016. Homicide rate from 2002 to 2006 Homicide rate from 2007 to 2011 Homicide rate from 2012 to 2016 1 7 1 5 C iên cia & Saú d e C o letiva, 2 5 (5 ):1 7 0 9 -1 7 2 2 , 2 0 2 0 spatial evolution of homicide rates across munic- ipalities in the period 2002 to 2016. The number of towns and cities that recorded LGBT homi- cides increased from 158 in the period 2002and 2006 (2.84% of all towns and cities), to 310 in the period 2006 to 2011 (5.57% of all towns and cit- ies), and 558 in the period 2011 to 2016 (10.02% of all towns and cities). State capitals Florianópolis was used for comparison pur- poses because it is the state capital with the high- est HDI35. For the period 2002 to 2016, fifteen capitals showed homicide rates above that of Flo- rianópolis (12.09 homicides per 100,000 popula- tion): João Pessoa (44.25), Palmas (31.51), Recife (27.03), Manaus (24.39), Porto Velho (24.07), Cuiabá (23.76), Maceió (23.33), Natal (23.28), Teresina (22.04), Goiânia (20.22), Aracaju (17.26), Vitória (16.39), Campo Grande (16.21), Salvador (15.65), and Curitiba (12.70), as shown in Figure 2. The capitals with the greatest positive varia- tion between the periods 2002 to 2006 and2007 to 2011 were Maceió (797.25%), Aracajú (442.50%), and Brasília (337.70). Those with the greatest negative variation were Florianópo- lis (-59.37%), Goiânia (-52.43%), and Manaus (-45.04%). The capitals with the greatest posi- tive variation between the periods 2007 to 2011 and2012 to 2016 were Porto Alegre (241.36%), Manaus (223.74%), and São Paulo (156.26%). Those with the greatest negative variation were Vitória (-59.59%), Maceió (-38.73%), and São Luís (-35.13%). Municipalities (non-capital towns and cities) Pouso Alegre in the State of Minas Gerais was used for comparison purposes because it had the highest HDI among the 26towns and cities that showed the most significant numbers of cases35. Eighteen of these municipalities showed an av- erage homicide rate above that of Pouso Alegre for the period 2002 to 2016 (12.51 homicides per 100,000 population): Caruaru, Pernambuco (23.3); Uberaba, Minas Gerais (21.0); Itabuna, Bahia (20.5); Simões Filho, Bahia (20.3); Ron- donópolis, Mato Grosso (19,3); Cabo de Santo Agostinho, Pernambuco (17.6); Várzea Grande, Mato Grosso (16.8); Paulo Afonso, Bahia (15.6); Olinda, Pernambuco (15.4); Vitória de Santo Antão, Pernambuco (15.2); Lauro de Freitas, Bahia (14.1); Teixeira de Freitas, Bahia (13.9); Camaragibe, Pernambuco (13.7); Araguaína, Tocantins (13.5); Arapiraca, Alagoas (13.5); Camaçari, Bahia (13.2); Feira de Santana, Bahia (13.1), and Porto Seguro, Bahia (12.8). The municipalities with the greatest posi- tive variation between the periods 2002 to 2006 and2007 to 2011 were Simões Filho (440.62%), Uberaba (364.10%), and Camaragibe (201.09%). Those with the greatest negative variation were Jaboatão dos Guararapes, Pernambuco (-8.39%); Dourados, Mato Gross do Sul (-5.24%), and Pau- lo Afonso (-4.81%). The municipalities with the greatest positive variation between the periods 2007 to 2011 and2012 to 2016 were Dourados (351.35%); Várzea Grande (306.42%); and Nova Iguaçu, Rio de Janeiro (145.27). Those with the greatest negative variation were Simões Filho (-100.00%); Olinda, Pernambuco (-65.94%), and Paulo Afonso (-54.91%). Spatial dependence Initially we applied Moran’s I using munic- ipalities as the unit of analysis. However, since approximately 90% of municipalities showed homicide rates equal to zero, it was necessary to group areas by state in order to satisfy the as- sumptions of the coefficient. Thus, although it is unusual to group areas by state, we applied Mo- ran’s I to three five-year periods (2002 to 2006, 2007 to 2011,and2012 to 2016). It is important to note that three states were discarded for the peri- od 2002 to 2006 because they showed homicide rates equal to zero. Moran’s I was significant for the three peri- ods, thus providing enough evidence at the 5% level of significance to reject the null hypothesis (Ho) of absence of spatial autocorrelation and confirm that there was positive spatial autocor- relation for homicide rates across states in the three periods, concluding that there is no way of confirming that LGBT homicides occurred independently across states. Thus, these findings should not be interpreted in isolation as if these homicides were a social phenomenon specific to each particular state. To provide an overview of the growth in ho- micide rates across Brazil, we created kernel maps for each period using quartiles, where the darker the area the higher the rate. The maps show that higher homicide rates tend to be concentrated in and around metropolitan areas (Figure 3). 1 7 1 6 M en d es W G , S il va C M F P Figura 2. Evolução espacial das taxas de homicídios por municípios brasileiros de 2002 a 2016. Homicide rate from 2002 to 2006 Homicide rate from 2007 to 2011 Homicide rate from 2012 to 2016 Municipalities Rate = 0 Rate > 0 Municipalities Rate = 0 Rate > 0 Municipalities Rate = 0 Rate > 0 1 7 1 7 C iên cia & Saú d e C o letiva, 2 5 (5 ):1 7 0 9 -1 7 2 2 , 2 0 2 0 Discussion This study is pioneering in so far as it presents more robust information about LGBT homi- cides in Brazil. The number of homicides in the country has increased steadily over the study pe- riod due to a lack of policies to combat violence against LGBT people12,14. Although the criminal- ization of homophobia alone will not resolve this problem, a recent law specifically addressing such discrimination is a first step forward in reducing violence against thisgroup11,13,18. Our findings therefore shed much needed light on a little known reality often ignored by the government and policymakers. One of the key findings of the study is that homicide rates were similar between capitals and smaller towns and cities, which has not been described by other studies. Furthermore, homicides occur predominantly in public thor- oughfares14,18,36-42 and in the victims’ home14,18,36-44 and the most common methods of killing were firearms, cold weapons, beating, and suffoca- tion14,18,36-41,43,45-47. The crimes also tended to in- volve more than one blow or shot, suggesting that they are hate crimes14,41,43,44,47. With regard to victims, male homosexuals and transgender people were the most affected38,43 and the most vulnerable age group was 20 to 49 years12,36,38-40,46, showing that transgender victims are typically younger45,48. Victims were typically white12,37,41,43-45,48 or brown43,45,48 and the majority were professionals with higher education, teach- ers, or business people12,36,38,40.The large majori- ty of identified perpetrators were aged under 30 years37,40-44,47 and sex professionals36,38, military members, or studants36-40. The spatial analysis shows that the states with homicide rates above the third quartile were lo- cated in the North, Northeast, and Center-West regions1,49,50. A comparison with homicide rates among the general population during the peri- od 2006 to 2016 shows the same pattern, with the exception of the State of Pernambuco, where rates decreased (-10.2%), and Rio Grande do Sul, where rate increased (58.0%)1. Eight of the fifteen capitals that had homicide rates above that of Florianópolis are on the list of the 50 most violent cities in the world: João Pessoa, Recife, Manaus, Maceió, Natal, Teresina, Aracaju, and Salvador51. The capitals Fortaleza, Belém, and Macapá are also on this list, but do not feature among the 15 most violent capitals for LGBT people. Eight of the fifteen capitals that had homicide rates above that of Florianópolis are on the list of the 50 most violent cities in the world: João Pessoa, Recife, Manaus, Maceió, Natal, Teresina, Aracaju, and Salvador51. The capitals Fortaleza, Belém, and Macapá are also on this list, but do not feature among the 15 most violent capitals for LGBT people. Of the 18 municipalities that showed an av- erage homicide rate for the period 2002 to 2016 above that of Pouso Alegre, only Feira de Santana appears on the list of the 50 most violent cities in the world51. The findings of the Moran’s I tests confirmed the presence of positive spatial autocorrelation for each of the three periods, which means that the findings should not be interpreted in isola- tion, since LGBT violence is a social and political phenomenon and serious public health problem. The kernel maps show that higher homicide rates tend to be concentrated in and around metro- politan areas, following the pattern of homicide rates in the general population reported by the Atlas of Violence 20199,52. The number of LGBT homicides in Brazil has increased steadily over the study period, from 158 between 2002 and 2006 to 558 in the period 2012 to 2016, representing an increase of 253%, whereas the number of homicides among the general population rose from 245,835 to 292.103 in the same period, representing an increase of 18.82%. This means that the number of LGBT homicides has increased 13 times more than the number of homicides among the general popu- lation53. It is important to highlight that LGBT homicide rates do not show a seasonal pattern, varying by month, year, region, and city and fail- ing to show a dominant pattern over the years12,14. Young people are most affected by this type of crime because of their vulnerability9,50,54. For decades Brazilian LGBT movement shave been pushing for the criminalization of homophobia or “LGBTphobia”11. However, it was only recently that the Supreme Court voted to put homopho- bia on an equal footing with racism55. Given the complexity of this issue, this action alone is not enough to solve this public health problem, but constitutes an important step forward in drawing increased public attention to homophobia. We believe that, despite resorting to non-offi- cial data sources, this study achieved its objective, bringing to light valuable new information. To our knowledge, this research is the first compre- hensive study of this problem in the world, pro- viding greater visibility to such a common crime in this country. It is important to highlight that the data provided by the GGB was revised and corrected where necessary. 1 7 1 8 M en d es W G , S il va C M F P Figure 3. Kernel maps of homicide rates across Brazil between 2002 and 2016. Homicide rate from 2002 to 2006 Homicide rate from 2007 to 2011 Homicide rate from 2012 to 2016 1 7 1 9 C iên cia & Saú d e C o letiva, 2 5 (5 ):1 7 0 9 -1 7 2 2 , 2 0 2 0 It is important to stress that LGBT homicide, regardless of whether or not it is motivated by homophobia, is a public health problem and gross and systematic violation of human rights. The aim of this study was to draw greater pub- lic attention to the number and characteristics of these crimes and their victims and perpetra- tors. Further research is needed into non-lethal crimes against LGBT people and suicide among this group, including specific studies focusing on marginalized groups overlooked by the gov- ernment and society such as transgender people. In a country witnessing rising violence and hate crime against this population, the expansion of research into this problem is much needed and has much to contribute to tackling homophobia by bringing different points of view and new in- formation. collaborations WG Mendes: Data collection, tabulation, de- scriptive and spatial analysis. Writing the text and standardizing the rules according to the maga- zine. CMFP Silva: Text revision and suggestion of significant parts. 1 7 2 0 M en d es W G , S il va C M F P references 1. Cerqueira D, Lima RS, Bueno S, Neme C, Ferreira H, Coelho D, Alves PP, Pinheiro M, Astolfi R, Marques D, Reis M, Merian F. Atlas da Violência 2018 [Inter- net]. 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work_semyhw6sy5appdocwwe5veffqy	----	S2054425119000128jxx 1..7 POLICY AND SYSTEMS COMMENTARY What should global mental health do about violent extremism? S. Weine* and S. Kansal College of Medicine, University of Illinois, Chicago, IL, USA Global Mental Health (2019), 6, e14, page 1 of 7. doi:10.1017/gmh.2019.12 To prevent radicalization to violence and to rehabilitate returned foreign terrorist fighters, new programs which go by the name of ‘preventing and countering violent extremism’ are being implemented globally, including in low- and mid- dle-income countries. In some of these countries, global mental health strategies are also being implemented so as to deliver mental health care or psychosocial support to individuals and populations in need. This commentary addresses what global mental health should considering doing about violent extremism. Global mental health should be open to addressing the challenges of violent extremism but should do so based upon existing mental health and pub- lic health values, practices, and evidence. Global mental health could help by critically appraising preventing and coun- tering violent extremism practices and by working with multidisciplinary stakeholders to develop new evidence-based and best practice models that are rooted in civil society ownership, community collaboration, broader prevention pro- graming, and non-securitized approaches. Received 9 September 2018; Revised 14 March 2019; Accepted 19 June 2019 Key word: Violent extremism. Introduction Global mental health (GMH) strategies are being imple- mented in many low- and middle-income countries so as to deliver mental health care or psychosocial support to those in need who have not had access to such ser- vices. At the same time, to address current public safety priorities, such as preventing radicalization to violence and rehabilitating returned foreign terrorist fighters, new programs which go by the name of ‘preventing and countering violent extremism’ (P/CVE) are also being implemented in some of those same countries. P/CVE is often organized by national security agen- cies or law enforcement, but is unique in how it enlists other government agencies and civil society, including mental health professionals and educators, in efforts to diminish violent extremism and terrorism. For example, law enforcement officers may be expected to refer indi- viduals considered at risk for violence to mental health professionals or clergy. Teachers may be expected to identify and refer their students who exhibit violent rad- ical ideas or threaten violence. Mental health profes- sionals may be expected to assess whether a person is at-risk for committing an act of violence and to provide treatment which prevents violence. However, to date these new expectations are not yet supported by adequate scientific evidence and best practices. In this commentary, we follow the lead of international development organizations by including ’preventing violent extremism’ so as to delineate an approach which is intended to be less securitized, more community- oriented, and more focused on preventing a broad range of negative outcomes, then its more security driven predecessor, ‘countering violent extremism’. * Address for correspondence: S. Weine, University of Illinois, College of Medicine, Chicago, IL, USA. (Email: smweine@uic.edu) © The Author(s) 2019. This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. global mental health https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/gmh.2019.12 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:22, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at mailto:smweine@uic.edu https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/gmh.2019.12 https://www.cambridge.org/core Even with this reframing, questions are still being asked as to whether low- and middle-income countries should commit precious mental health resources to P/CVE, given the scope of the need for mental health care, the limitations of mental health resources, and concerns regarding the lack of evidence of effective- ness, and the risks of over-securitization posed by P/CVE. The purpose of this paper is to better understand whether, and possibly how, GMH should be con- cerned with violent extremism and interact with P/CVE. We argue that GMH should be open to addres- sing the challenge of P/CVE in low- and middle-income countries, but that even this reframing of P/CVE is not enough to overcome the limitations and burdens associated with these programs. Rather, even further reframing is necessary, to which GMH could possibly contribute. Global mental health The field of GMH aims to address mental health chal- lenges amidst socio-economic adversity and social suf- fering. It addresses specific challenges such as integrating mental health screening, diagnosis, and care into primary care, providing affordable and effect- ive community-based care, strengthening mental health training of all healthcare personnel, and pro- moting the value of mental health. The GMH focus is largely on low- and middle-income countries, where these difficulties are often highly prevalent and where existing mental health resources and infrastruc- ture are often low (Becker & Kleinman, 2013). Indeed, GMH research initiatives, like the Grand Challenges in Global Mental Health Initiative and the Movement for Global Mental Health have led to better characterization of mental health needs in low- and middle-income countries, more effective intervention approaches that can work in these countries, reduced stigma regarding care of the mentally ill, development of mental health prevention and promotion strategies, and an increased mental health research capacity (Collins et al., 2011). Particular areas of ongoing con- cern involve the physical and mental health care of children, defining the earliest identifiable clinical stages of illness, and reducing the long-term negative impact of poverty and trauma on brain development. Task sharing, one of the key strategies for GMH, is used for overall mental health promotion and to address gaps in mental health services in the face of inadequate mental health resources. It involves train- ing laypersons and mid-level professionals so they can help provide mental health services. Task sharing has been used to address common mental disorders such as depression and anxiety, the impact of social adversity, as well as medical problems such as HIV/ AIDS (Petersen et al., 2011; Ledikwe et al., 2013). For example, task sharing involving lay counselors helped to reduce stigma regarding HIV and to increase the utilization of medical services (Ledikwe et al., 2013). Preventing and countering violent extremism P/CVE emphasizes working collaboratively with communities so as to empower them to address the underlying causes of violent extremism and to prevent terrorist attacks before they occur. Unlike counter- terrorism, which is driven primarily by law enforce- ment, P/CVE can involve a wide range of government agencies and civil society actors, including mental health professionals, educators, youth advocates, clergy, community organizers, public health profes- sionals, and job coaches, among others. It can incorpor- ate promoting social cohesion and building community resilience (Weine & Ahmed, 2012; Ellis & Abdi, 2017). CVE and PVE as policy frameworks were articulated in documents by the White House (White House, 2011) and the U.N. (Report of the Secretary-General, 2015), and have been subject to sev- eral recent reviews (Romaniuk, 2015; GAO, 2017; Rosand et al., 2018). In March 2015, the White House Summit on CVE devoted one entire day to global CVE, and foreign ministers and civil society participants from 60 nations attended. President Obama spoke of creating paths for ‘opportunity, justice, and dignity’ (Obama, 2015) so that one is not tempted to throw their life away to vio- lent acts. He stated, ‘our campaign to prevent people around the world being radicalized to violence is ultimately a battle for hearts and minds’ (Obama, 2015). The foreign ministers signed a statement which called for ‘community-based strategies’ and this mobilized resources and support for the develop- ment of new CVE initiatives in many countries includ- ing low- and middle-income countries. Despite the change in White House administration, P/CVE remains active in global spaces (Iroegbu, 2017; Rosand, 2017). P/CVE activities are highly embedded in international organizations, law enforcement agen- cies, donor governments, development agencies, and non-governmental organizations. Over the past several years, P/CVE initiatives have spread to many low- and middle-income countries, through the U.S. State Department, the European Union, the Global Counterterrorism Forum, the Hedayah Center, the Strong City Network, the Global Community and Engagement Fund, and more recently through devel- opment agencies such as the U.N. Development Program and the World Bank (Department of State, 2016; UNDP, 2016; Global Counterterrorism Forum, global mental health https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/gmh.2019.12 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:22, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/gmh.2019.12 https://www.cambridge.org/core 2017; Hedayah Center, 2017; Regional Capacity, 2017; Rosand, 2017). Consequently, P/CVE programing is making its way into some of the same low- and middle-income countries as the GMH movement, enabling potential collaboration. The spectrum of P/CVE activities increasingly fol- lows the public health model of primary, secondary, and tertiary prevention (Bhui et al., 2012; Weine et al., 2016). Primary prevention targets the whole commu- nity through activities that aim to shift cultural norms, enhance social cohesion, or improve access to services. Secondary prevention focuses on identifying and providing early intervention services for those pre- senting at a higher risk to act violently. Tertiary pre- vention activities focus on rehabilitation and reintegration of those who have already committed an act of violence or some crime related to terrorism (Dean & Kessels, 2018). Mental health professionals can play key roles at each of these levels. They can develop, implement, and/or evaluate prevention, intervention, and rehabili- tation and reintegration programs. Mental health pro- fessionals can assess and possibly treat persons at risk for violence (Weine et al., 2017). Their standard professional practices for assessment, diagnosis, and therapeutic management can be valuable, even more so if supplemented by training in specialized practices such as threat assessment (Meloy & Hoffman, 2014). Current practices in P/CVE emphasize developing multi-agency/multi-disciplinary referral mechanisms to include violent extremism alongside multiple other issues addressed, such as other types of violence, other crises, and suicide (Kozmelj, 2017). The implementation of P/CVE has not been without challenges, including in the United States and UK. P/CVE has yet to establish an evidence-base of effective programs, or agreed upon outcome metrics, despite substantial funding (Holmer et al., 2018). In the United States, many community advocates and civil libertarians have opposed CVE as a hurtful program of government surveillance on Muslim communities (Brennan Center for Justice, 2017). In the UK, where the government’s Prevent program (which includes Channel) entails reporting responsibilities for National Health Service physicians, some psychiatrists have challenged the policies on the basis of the harm they could do to the patient–physician relationship and the lack of an adequate evidence base (Hurlow et al., 2016; James & Hurlow, 2016; McGarry, 2016; Summerfield, 2016; Dom et al., 2018). On the other hand, some local pilot initiatives that are being currently implemented in the United States and abroad deliberately move away from P/CVE fram- ing. Rather, they focus on community-led approaches to building individual and community resilience, promoting youth development, improving access to mental health services and reducing involvement in all forms of violence (Rosand et al., 2018). These appear to be getting better responses from communities and professionals and could indicate more promising future directions. There is also a growing body of research on the factors that contribute to violent extremism, such as deficits in local governance (Rosand et al., 2018), which could help increase the likelihood that future programs are designed to address the identified drivers of violent extremism. Comparing global mental health and preventing and countering violent extremism Despite the intent for civil society to play a leading role in P/CVE programs, P/CVE has often been led by law enforcement and governmental agencies. In the United States, P/CVE has been more based upon criminal just- ice practice, than on public health or mental health, although this has been changing in recent years (Weine et al., 2016). Like in GMH, the hope for P/CVE globally has been to involve a broad spectrum of civil society actors, such as clergy, educators, youth advocates, and mental health professionals. Unlike GMH, the key documents in P/CVE are more focused on articulating a broad policy or practice agenda then on implementable prevention program packages. Far more research has been conducted in GMH than P/CVE, including program evaluation, in part because these programs have been around longer, and because the scientific approaches to evaluating them are more developed. In the United States, P/CVE has had difficulty estab- lishing community buy-in for its programing, and is opposed by some advocates who assert that P/CVE is inherently stigmatizing and is surveillance by other means (Brennan Center for Justice, 2017). GMH has been much more successful in establishing community connections (Patel et al., 2011), whereas in the United States, P/CVE struggles to make community inroads. P/CVE may able to attract resources that GMH can- not typically access, and yet, some civil society organi- zations in high-income countries have decided not to seek or accept government funding (Wang, 2017). More so than in Western countries, P/CVE in low- and middle-income countries in the Global South tends to be more focused on community-based primary prevention activities – often led by internationally- funded civil society groups – that don’t involve the police and aren’t dealing with secondary prevention. This is likely due to greater lack of trust between police (and government more broadly) and communities, more limited capacities of government, and fewer men- tal health and other resources required to develop and global mental health https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/gmh.2019.12 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:22, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/gmh.2019.12 https://www.cambridge.org/core sustain secondary prevention programs (Rosand & Winterbotham, 2018). With these distinctions in mind, we want to consider a number of possible ways in which GMH and P/CVE may interact, both positively and negatively. How can preventing and countering violent extremism and global mental health positively converge? Positive convergence occurs when strengths and prac- tices combine in ways that contribute to more positive outcomes. Potential areas of positive convergence between P/CVE and GMH may involve increasing access to mental health resources, preventing violence, combating stigma, and leveraging successful GMH strategies. Both GMH and P/CVE are concerned with providing mental health resources to those who need them but lack access. P/CVE is focused on reaching those commu- nities/individuals who are most at risk of becoming radicalized to violence, but need not have already com- mitted crimes or become violent. GMH has focused on bringing mental health resources to persons in need and who lack resources. P/CVE initiatives could make men- tal health resources available and accessible to sub- populations of interest, such as through community- based referral mechanisms. This could include utilizing task sharing and/or clinical approaches. Both GMH and P/CVE are concerned with violence prevention. GMH has been more focused on interper- sonal violence, including child maltreatment, youth violence, intimate partner and sexual violence, and elder abuse as well as the impact of war and conflict on civilians, especially refugees, internally displaced persons, and asylum seekers (de Jong, 2006). P/CVE is often focused on ideologically inspired violence; however, there is ongoing debate as to whether this is too narrow (Weine et al., 2016). Both GMH and P/ CVE could widen the focus to targeted violence (vio- lence where a known or knowable attacker selects a specific target prior to attack), hate crimes, and inter- personal violence, which would align with the violence prevention agenda of public health (Christoffel & Gallagher, 2006). As mentioned earlier, in the public health field of injury prevention, there is a growing body of violence prevention theory, evidence, and practice models, which both P/CVE and GMH could leverage (Bhui et al., 2012; Weine et al., 2016). Both P/CVE and GMH share concerns with combat- ing stigma. GMH has had an ongoing commitment to diminishing the stigma toward people with mental ill- ness and toward seeking treatment. P/CVE has been criticized for causing stigmatization by singling out communities or individuals for heightened risk of violent extremism who do not consider themselves to be at risk. In response, P/CVE initiatives have taken steps to avoid focusing on single faith communities, and to instead focus on any persons or communities where there is demonstrable heightened risk. They have also strived to address not only violent extremism but also targeted violence and hate crimes. P/CVE needs to take further steps to challenge stigma in impacted populations through building knowledge, changing attitudes, improving practices, and strength- ening community collaboration. P/CVE could leverage successful GMH strategies especially regarding partnership, engagement, and task sharing. GMH has had far more experience and success in forming sustainable partnerships than P/CVE. P/CVE struggles to overcome a fundamental challenge: because P/CVE is often seen as a political and security issue, it is difficult to build partnerships with non-law enforcement professionals, including with mental health. GMH has had far more experience with building and evaluating programs, including how to engage hard to reach popu- lations, how to develop partnerships, how to promote program sustainability, how to build evidence for effect- ive interventions, and how to stand united with survi- vors, family members, formers, and providers. P/CVE could embrace task sharing approaches to mental health, particularly in communities where there are concerns about risk for radicalization to vio- lence. These programs do not necessarily have to be focused on radicalization; they could be what is referred to as P/CVE relevant, without being P/CVE specific. In other words, instead of emphasizing the uniqueness of P/CVE, they could bring P/CVE closer to existing GMH concerns regarding social determinants, psychosocial services, and the everyday needs of families, schools, and communities (e.g. strengthening social cohesion). What are possible points of negative convergence of countering violent extremism and global mental health? Negative convergence occurs when risks and practices combine in ways that contribute to more negative out- comes. Potential areas of negative convergence between P/CVE and GMH may involve failure to launch, rush to judgment, exacerbating stigma, over- securitized relationship, and lack of capacity. Failure to launch can occur when mental health pro- fessionals, including those in the GMH community, simply do not acknowledge violent extremism or hate-motivated violence as any kind of priority or rele- vant problem for them to address. They may see it as today’s fashion for getting funds, and not as connect- ing with their core obligations and priorities. For global mental health https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/gmh.2019.12 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:22, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/gmh.2019.12 https://www.cambridge.org/core example, as noted above, in the UK, several questioned whether mental health professionals should be involved in P/CVE, which they regarded as ‘political’ and potentially compromising professional ethics (McGarry, 2016). With so much on GMH’s plate already, violent extremism can easily be pushed aside. Yet, although violent extremist acts may be rela- tively infrequent, the effects are devastating, and should not be neglected. It is also worth noting that if GMH professionals do not get specialized training in P/CVE, then there is no real possibility of positive convergence between the fields. Rush to judgment, on the other hand, can occur around prematurely deciding upon the role of mental illness as a ‘cause’ of violent extremism, or over-relying upon unsound and discredited theories, such as radicalization theory. This could lead to activities that are not adequately justified or are mis-focused, or even discriminatory. Indeed, research has not yet demonstrated a clear associ- ation between mental health and violent extremism (Corner & Gill, 2015). Overreaching can lead to pushback. Exacerbating stigma is an oft mentioned issue, and refers to how associating individuals, families, or com- munities with terrorism can mark them with disgrace and infamy. Mental illness and mental health treatment are also highly stigmatized in low- and middle-income countries (Weine et al., 2017). Thus, highlighting an additional association between mental illness and violent extremism, or violence of any kind, could further exacerbate stigma for individuals, families, or communities, and in turn work against whatever progress has been made in getting people in low- and middle-income countries to accept mental health services. Over-securitized relationships refer to concerns that involvement in P/CVE could lead to damaging the trust held by patients and their families and communi- ties in practitioners, service organization, or the mental health professions. The worry is that P/CVE could detract from the trust which necessarily underlies the mental health professional’s standing in relation to the individuals, families, and communities they serve. Moreover, governments could misuse P/CVE to target opposition groups or detain human rights activists. Lack of capacity means that P/CVE programs cannot expect mental health service organizations to carry additional burdens without ensuring that they have the organizational capacity to do so, which is in part resource dependent. A possible path forward for violence prevention Many low- and middle-income countries face serious persistent problems with violence of several types, including but certainly not limited to, violent extrem- ism and hate-motivated violence. These have major negative impacts on public safety and public mental health and physical health. Preventing these types of violence cannot be achieved by law enforcement alone, and must involve broader civil society approaches, including public health strategies, which would include mental health. The urgency of the threats demands that something be done, even though there is not yet adequate scien- tific evidence about the causes of violence or effective prevention practices or programs. However, efforts to prevent violence should not cause additional harm or make matters worse, which unfortunately can occur when policies or programs are driven by fear. Over the past decade, GMH has established core commitments to utilizing evidence-based practices, addressing the treatment gap, combating stigma, and building local capacity, but has not yet achieved much with regard to violence prevention. P/CVE, which is an even more recent field, has little to no evidence-based practices, has been trying to make inroads with mental health professionals, and has been accused of increasing stigma to individuals and communities. This could mean that GMH could be in a position to help P/CVE evolve into a field with greater scientific legitimacy and community accept- ance. In doing so, GMH could also enhance its own capacity for violence prevention. GMH could best assist P/CVE by building on its aforementioned core commitments. This should entail strengthening civil society leadership of programs (including but not limited to mental health profes- sional leadership), strengthening community collabor- ation, and building evidence of effective programs. It should also assist P/CVE in moving away from focus on a single faith and instead be based upon legitimate evidence of current threats. More than that, any new initiatives should not only avoid security terminology but should not be bound by current P/CVE frame- works. The goal of new initiatives should be to address a broader range of perceived threats to communities and individuals. Initiatives should also draw upon a range of strategies including building individual and community resilience, promoting youth development, and reducing involvement in all forms of violence. They should seek to add mental health resources to communities, which could also help to mitigate com- munity concerns. Given the concerns about discrimination and stig- matization, all activities should not intentionally or unintentionally give in to bias or discrimination against any community. Rather, a core value and prac- tice should be to actively oppose discrimination and to stand up for the civil rights and liberties of patients, global mental health https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/gmh.2019.12 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:22, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/gmh.2019.12 https://www.cambridge.org/core families, and communities. This could be done, for example, through strict protocols for the sharing of information gathered through clinical contacts or com- munity engagement. Similarly, programs must take care to not compromise the ethics or standards of pro- fessional practice, even for public safety. Violence prevention is probably best not presented as a stand-alone program or activity. Instead, initia- tives should seek to integrate violence prevention with existing public health and mental health pro- grams and priorities. Also, initiatives should not plan for new violence prevention programs involving men- tal health professionals or psychosocial workers with- out ensuring that service organizations have adequate capacity to carry them out on top of their other obligations. Instead, it is best make sure that pro- grams have the capacity to be impactful and sustainable. Lastly, additional research is needed to address many key questions concerning P/CVE and targeted violence prevention, which would also include ques- tions pertaining to GMH. One set of questions pertains to the possible overlap between mental health pro- blems and violent radicalization or other forms of tar- geted violence, such as: Are mental illness and personality disorders associated with a higher risk of being radicalized to a terrorist ideology? A second set of questions pertains to the key roles played by inti- mates and trusted gatekeepers in mitigating the path- ways to violent and hateful ideologies, as well as other forms of targeted violence: What factors would facilitate or impede them from reporting to law enforcement or other helpers when someone they know could be a danger to others? A third set of ques- tions pertain to risk assessment: Can we develop tools which can be used by community practitioners and that can reliably assess a person’s risk for targeted violence? Last but not least, a fourth set of questions pertains to the evaluation of programs for primary, secondary, or tertiary prevention: What programs and practices effectively diminish individual and com- munity risks for targeted violence? 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Introduction Global mental health Preventing and countering violent extremism Comparing global mental health and preventing and countering violent extremism How can preventing and countering violent extremism and global mental health positively converge? What are possible points of negative convergence of countering violent extremism and global mental health? A possible path forward for violence prevention Conclusion References 
work_sg37ywhvfffuhlgg6j5tad7ntu	----	Community (Dis)Organization and Racially Motivated Crime Community (Dis)Organization and Racially Motivated Crime Author(s): Christopher J. Lyons Source: American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 113, No. 3 (November 2007), pp. 815-863 Published by: The University of Chicago Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/521846 . Accessed: 02/04/2015 21:41 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. . The University of Chicago Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to American Journal of Sociology. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded from 128.95.71.159 on Thu, 2 Apr 2015 21:41:18 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=ucpress http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/521846?origin=JSTOR-pdf http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp AJS Volume 113 Number 3 (November 2007): 815–63 815 � 2007 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved. 0002-9602/2007/11303-0006$10.00 Community (Dis)Organization and Racially Motivated Crime1 Christopher J. Lyons University of New Mexico This article examines the relationship between community structural conditions and racially motivated crimes against blacks and whites. Drawing on six years of police reports, census data, and survey data of Chicago communities, the study evaluates alternative hypotheses about the social organization of racial hate crime derived from social disorganization, resource competition, and defended communities perspectives. Multivariate analyses controlling for spatial autocor- relation reveal that antiblack hate crimes, in contrast to general forms of crime, are more likely in relatively organized communities with high levels of informal social control. Conversely, antiwhite incidents appear more numerous in traditionally disorganized com- munities, especially those characterized by residential instability. Acts of violence and discrimination motivated by racial animus are “in- terwoven with the fabric of our culture” (Newton and Newton 1991, p. ix). In the United States alone, history abounds with examples of racial and ethnic violence, from the well-known extremes of slavery and lynch- ing of African-Americans, to the genocide of Native Americans, to more mundane yet pervasive forms of discrimination and harassment. Given the indelible marks of interracial violence on our history, and on our current conceptions of racial and ethnic identity, social scientists have sought for centuries to understand the nature of intergroup conflict. Interest in the study of intergroup criminal victimization has grown 1 A dissertation fellowship from the Harry Frank Guggenheim Foundation supported this research. I thank Ross L. Matsueda, Becky Pettit, Stew Tolnay, Bob Crutchfield, and the AJS reviewers for helpful suggestions. I also thank the Chicago Police De- partment, the Chicago Commission on Human Relations, and the Project on Human Development in Chicago Neighborhoods for sharing data. An earlier version of this article was presented at the 2005 American Sociological Association meetings in Phil- adelphia. Direct correspondence to Christopher J. Lyons, Department of Sociology, MSC 05 3080, 1 University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, New Mexico 87131-0001. E-mail: clyons@unm.edu This content downloaded from 128.95.71.159 on Thu, 2 Apr 2015 21:41:18 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp American Journal of Sociology 816 with the emergence of hate crime as a new criminal category (Green, McFalls, and Smith 2001). Modern hate crime policy represents an attempt to engage the legal system in combating criminal acts motivated by prej- udice (Grattet, Jenness, and Curry 1998; Levin 2002). Since the appear- ance of hate crime legislation in the early 1980s (Grattet et al. 1998), hate crimes are now widely understood as criminal offenses motivated at least partially by offender prejudice against the victim’s putative group mem- bership (FBI 1999a). As a legal concept, then, hate crime distinguishes between crime motivated by bias and otherwise similar crime. We know little about the spatial distribution of racially motivated crime, especially compared to other forms of crime. For instance, what are the characteristics of communities that facilitate racial hate crime? Beginning with the seminal work of Coleman (1988), sociologists have argued that social capital facilitates various forms of instrumental action—including community social organization against crime (Sampson, Morenoff, and Earls 1999). Yet social capital may also have a “darker side” insofar as it can be appropriated for other, perhaps illegal actions, such as subversive behavior or the exclusion of racial outsiders (Coleman 1988; Portes 1998; Putnam 2000; Sampson 1999). Although criminologists have long invoked the concept of social disorganization to explain why communities low in economic and social capital have higher crime rates, it is unclear how community organization explains the special case of crime motivated by racial animus. Are racial hate crimes the product of socially disorganized communities low in economic and social capital? Or are racially motivated crimes more likely in communities with substantial resources to exclude outsiders? Given the impact of hate crimes on communities, questions related to community-level variation are particularly pertinent. Proponents of hate crime legislation argue that hate crimes are symbolic crimes that target whole communities as well as individual victims. Often the particular victim matters less to the offender than the victim’s social categorization (Berk, Boyd, and Hamner 1992; Levin and McDevitt 1993). Thus, an attack against one individual may have a “ripple effect” that reverberates to the wider community. Even relatively minor acts, in terms of penal law, can raise levels of fear and mistrust between groups and communities, exacerbating already tense relations between racial groups and elevating the potential for retaliation (Craig 1999; Martin 1995; Wisconsin v. Mitch- ell 1993). Indeed, some city departments have focused on the community context in the hopes of alleviating conflicts before they escalate into larger problems. To intervene successfully at the community level, we need to understand the community factors that lead to variation in hate crimes. The paucity of research on the spatial distribution of hate crime par- tially reflects concerns about the reliability of hate crime data. As Black This content downloaded from 128.95.71.159 on Thu, 2 Apr 2015 21:41:18 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp Racially Motivated Crime 817 (1983, p. 40) suggested over two decades ago, moralistic crimes of “col- lective liability” such as racially motivated hate crime may “receive a degree of immunity from the law.” As with all official crime data, hate crime data represent only those incidents that come to the attention of the police department. Many argue that hate crime victims may be re- luctant to report incidents to the police out of fear of secondary victim- ization, humiliation, or the ambivalence of the police or the larger com- munity (McDevitt et al. 2000; Herek and Berrill 1992; Comstock 1991; Perry 2001). Recent victimization research, however, suggests the opposite: victims may be more likely to report hate crimes than nonbias crimes, possibly because hate crimes are perceived as more serious (Statistics Canada 1999). Even if potential incidents are more likely to come to the attention of the police, an unknown quantity of “true” hate crimes may not be classified as such by authorities, as some incidents do not provide necessary detail to meet classification criteria. Additional concerns about the reliability of official data stem from different reporting and classifi- cation standards across jurisdictions (Nolan, Akiyama, and Berhanu 2002; McDevitt et al. 2000). This latter issue in particular renders problematic analyses of the spatial distribution of hate crimes across agencies, counties, states, and countries. Perhaps for these reasons, research has tended to focus on important concerns other than etiology, including the political emergence of hate crime as a social problem (e.g., Jacobs and Potter 1998; Jenness and Broad 1997; Jenness and Grattet 2001), the diffusion and institutionalization of hate crime laws (e.g., Grattet et al. 1998; Phillips and Grattet 2000; Sav- elsberg and King 2005), the social production of hate crime statistics (Martin 1995; Boyd, Berk, and Hamner 1996), and hate crime reporting as an indicator of social movement success (McVeigh, Welch, and Bjar- nason 2003). With the exception of Green, Strolovitch, and Wong’s 1998 study of hate crimes in New York City, questions related to the antecedents of hate-motivated behavior remain relatively unexplored. This article attempts to address this gap by exploring the characteristics of communities that explain variation in hate crime. In doing so, it joins a long tradition of “Chicago-style” research (Sampson 2002b) by focusing on the role of community social organization in shaping crime—in this case, racially motivated crime in Chicago. By focusing on hate crime variation within a single jurisdiction (Chicago), the study circumvents some of the concerns of reporting bias, particularly those related to mea- surement inconsistencies across agencies. As others have argued (Green et al. 1998), reporting biases should be relatively similar across commu- nities because data are collected by a single department with an estab- lished tradition of hate crime reporting. Although focusing on community- level variation may not eliminate fundamental concerns about decisions This content downloaded from 128.95.71.159 on Thu, 2 Apr 2015 21:41:18 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp American Journal of Sociology 818 to report or classify hate crimes (Boyd, Berk, and Hamner 1996), it may present our most reliable insight into the spatial patterning of racially motivated crime. This study explores the extent to which ecological theories of crime and interracial conflict explain the distribution of hate crime against blacks and whites. Despite evidence that antiwhite hate crimes are the most frequently reported category of hate crime after antiblack incidents (FBI 1999a; Strom 2001), researchers have rarely examined antiminority and antimajority victimization together. Three general perspectives on crime and interracial conflict offer divergent expectations about the relationship between racial hate crime and the economic and social capital of com- munities. Assuming that hate crime is similar to crime generally, social disorganization theory predicts more hate crimes in disadvantaged areas with low levels of social capital. Traditional resource competition theories specify that hate crimes are most likely when competition between racial groups increases, especially during economic downturns when resources are scarce. In contrast, a defended community perspective implies that interracial antagonism is most likely in economically and socially orga- nized communities able to use these resources to exclude racial outsiders. I explore each of these perspectives further below. Then, drawing on six years of Chicago police records, census data, and survey data on social cohesion and informal social control in Chicago communities, I evaluate their implications for the community-level correlates of antiblack and antiwhite hate crime. THE ECOLOGY OF INTERRACIAL CONFLICT Social Disorganization The most prominent explanation for community-level variation in general crime focuses on the deterioration of community social controls brought about by certain structural conditions. In their pioneering study of urban communities, Shaw and McKay (1942) argued that ecological features, such as economic status, residential mobility, and racial heterogeneity, influenced delinquency rates largely indirectly by upsetting community social organization. Later revised by Kornhauser (1974) and others (e.g., Bursik 1988; Sampson and Groves 1989), Shaw and McKay’s concept of social disorganization has come to refer to a condition of weak controls in which communities are unable to achieve collective goals, such as low crime rates. According to Kornhauser (1978, pp. 64–65), the most impor- tant determinant of social organization is economic status, since poorer communities have fewer resources to combat crime. To a lesser extent, population mobility and racial heterogeneity also impede a community’s This content downloaded from 128.95.71.159 on Thu, 2 Apr 2015 21:41:18 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp Racially Motivated Crime 819 ability to mobilize effectively against crime. A rich research tradition generally affirms the ecological correlation between these structural fea- tures and a variety of criminal outcomes, including juvenile delinquency, homicide, and violent crime. Applying a disorganization perspective to explain racial hate crime assumes that the antecedents of hate crime are therefore similar to those of other types of crime. That is, as with crime in general, economic dep- rivation, along with racial heterogeneity and residential instability, should influence both antiblack and antiwhite hate crime indirectly through com- munity controls. Communities facing economic downturns and other so- cial changes may be unable to exercise control over the dislocated, who may act on their impulses and racial prejudices. In addition, formal re- sources may also be important for combating racially motivated crime. Impoverished communities may experience more racial hate crime partly because they are less able to invest in social programs for police designed to promote tolerance or directly prevent hate crimes (van Dyke, Soule, and Widom 2001, p. 40). Whether hate crimes are the result of informal social control, however, cannot easily be resolved by ecological analyses based on census data alone. Investigation into the potential mechanisms that intervene between structural conditions and hate crime requires attention to informal insti- tutional processes at the community level, such as social cohesion and trust and norms of informal social control. Informed by a “systemic” or network model of community organization, recent elaborations of social disorganization theory have begun to assess more directly the informal social control mechanisms implied by social disorganization theory. The systemic model elaborated by Kasarda and Janowitz (1974) conceives of the community as a complex network of social relationships, ranging from close friendship and kinship ties to more diffuse associations with others and with institutions. A network conception of community directs atten- tion to the constraining and enabling potential of “social relations among persons and the structural connections among positions” within a given ecological unit (Sampson 1999, p. 255). In other words, the systemic model focuses on social capital, or the structures of relationships among people that facilitate action (Coleman 1988; Sampson et al 1999). Sampson and colleagues (Morenoff, Sampson, and Raudenbush 2001; Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls 1997) conceptualize “collective efficacy” as a key component of community social capital that mediates between ecological conditions and crime. Generated from surveys of residents’ perceptions of their communities, collective efficacy consists of two un- derlying constructs: (1) social cohesion and trust and (2) norms of informal social control in relation to widely held goals of public safety and crime prevention. Thus defined, efficacious neighborhoods are cohesive neigh- This content downloaded from 128.95.71.159 on Thu, 2 Apr 2015 21:41:18 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp American Journal of Sociology 820 borhoods characterized by expectations for informal surveillance, espe- cially of youths, and intervention in problems leading to the control of potential criminal elements. In numerous studies, Sampson and colleagues demonstrate that collective efficacy works to prevent delinquency, vio- lence, and property crime. In addition, collective efficacy largely mediates the effect of macrostructural features, as social disorganization theory would predict. Collective efficacy is oriented toward crime and safety in general (Samp- son 2002a, p. 101) and is not necessarily meant to explain interracial conflict. The question remains, however, whether the pursuit of social goods such as public safety facilitates the control of interracial conflict as well. If hate crimes are etiologically similar to other forms of crime, areas high in social cohesion/trust and informal social control should be able to prevent hate crime just as they are able to prevent other types of crime. Because youths are more likely than those of most other age groups to be victims and offenders of hate crime (Strom 2001), close supervision of youths may discourage potential hate crime incidents. In much the same manner that German families with sufficient social capital are able to prevent children from engaging in antiforeigner violence (Hagan, Mer- kens, and Boehnke 1995), communities with substantial cohesion and informal social control may be able to regulate youths’ behavior, dis- suading them from similarly racist hate crimes. In sum, social disorganization theory predicts more hate crime in ec- onomically disadvantaged and residentially unstable communities. Fur- thermore, communities with high levels of social cohesion and norms of informal social control with respect to crime in general should exhibit lower amounts of racially motivated crime (see table 1). Resource Competition Rather than focusing on the deterioration of social controls, competition theories predict that racial conflicts covary with the degree of intergroup competition for limited resources in a shared environment (Olzak 1990; Soule and van Dyke 1999; van Dyke et al. 2001). Because groups occupy different positions or “niches” in the environment, competition for scarce resources renders group identities and boundaries salient, increasing the likelihood that individuals will align their actions with the interests of their ethnic group (Olzak 1992). In modern economies, labor markets are often segmented by race and ethnicity. Therefore, niches often do not overlap, and groups may not directly compete for the same occupations. During stable niche conditions such as these, interracial competition and resultant intergroup conflict are minimized. But when conditions of equi- librium are disrupted during times of economic contraction, niches begin This content downloaded from 128.95.71.159 on Thu, 2 Apr 2015 21:41:18 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp Racially Motivated Crime 821 TABLE 1 Theoretical Perspectives and Hypothesized Direction of Relationships with Racial Hate Crimes Theoretical Perspective Economic Disadvantage Social Cohesion/ Informal Social Control Social disorganization . . . . . . . . . . � � Resource competition . . . . . . . . . . Black unemployment: � antiwhite White unemployment: � antiblack NA Defended communities . . . . . . . . . � � to overlap, and direct competition for resources increases. When groups perceive their share of resources to be threatened, ethnic and/or racial conflict ensues. According to Bonacich (1972), this material competition explains all forms of antagonism between ethnic groups, ranging from outgroup vi- olence to institutional discrimination. It is partly through antagonism that more powerful groups are able to maintain their position vis-à-vis other groups (Olzak 1992). For example, Tolnay and Beck (1995, p. 59) interpret the connection between lynching and economic downturns as evidence that “whites attacked when they believed that blacks were threatening their privileged access to . . . society’s scarce resources.” Likewise, Jenness and Grattet (1996) suggest that during times of economic recession, racial hate crimes may be a strategy for the white middle class to eliminate minority group threat. This theory is consistent with a frustration-ag- gression thesis at the microlevel (Hovland and Sears 1940), which connects macroeconomic downturns to psychological strain that motivates indi- viduals to aggress against vulnerable social groups. Evidence from eth- nographic research suggests that offenders do lash out at scapegoats whom they perceive as responsible for their economic displacement. Some hate crime offenders blame their economic insecurity or job instability on af- firmative action policies that increase competition with minorities (Pin- derhughes 1993). The literature on economic competition has focused primarily on an- timinority (and particularly antiblack) victimization by whites. Whether similar mechanisms apply to crimes targeted at majority members, such as antiwhite hate crime committed by blacks, remains to be seen. Whites may be more likely to mobilize against blacks for economic reasons be- cause of racist ideals of entitlement. However, research on related forms of black-on-white victimization, such as interracial homicide, suggests that This content downloaded from 128.95.71.159 on Thu, 2 Apr 2015 21:41:18 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp American Journal of Sociology 822 economic stressors may also motivate blacks to attack whites (Blackwell 1990; Jacobs and Wood 1999). Thus, like social disorganization theory, traditional resource competi- tion theory predicts negative associations between racial hate crime and community economic status, though for different reasons. However, com- petition theories imply that race-specific economic status captures the strain felt by a particular group more directly than overall (race-neutral) economic status. Therefore, the theory predicts that antiblack incidents should be most prominent in areas of lower white economic status, whereas antiwhite crimes should be more likely where blacks face poorer economic prospects (see table 1). Although much research reveals a direct relationship between economic recession and various forms of interracial conflict such as lynching (Olzak 1992; Soule 1992; Tolnay and Beck 1995) and black church arson (Soule and van Dyke 1999), some recent studies suggest that the relationship between economic conditions and hate crime may be more complex. In a monthly time series analysis of hate crime in New York City, Green, Glaser, and Rich (1998) find no association between hate crime and eco- nomic recession. In another study, Green, Strolovitch, and Wong (1998) report no relationship between antiblack crimes and race-specific em- ployment conditions once controlling for racial composition. Green and colleagues, however, caution that economic conditions may still be im- portant indirect determinants of hate crime. They suggest, for instance, that “the relationship between economic discontent and intergroup ag- gression may hinge . . . on the ways in which political leaders and or- ganizations frame and mobilize such grievances” (Green, Glaser, and Rich 1998, p. 89).2 Defended Communities A variant of traditional competition theories, the defended communities perspective focuses less on competition for jobs than on the defense of valued community identities. The defended community perspective is in- formed by the ethnographic work of Suttles (1972) and others (e.g., De Sena 1990; Rieder 1985) on the social construction of urban communities. 2 Based on their analysis of antiminority hate crime patterns in New York City and a reanalysis of lynching data, Green, Glaser, and Rich (1998) conclude that the con- nection between economic conditions and racially motivated crime is “elusive.” Caution is warranted, however, when comparing the patterns of contemporary hate crime with post Civil War–era lynching of African-Americans. The historical contexts and mean- ings of these crimes differ in important ways, and they also refer to different criminal actions. In contrast to lynching, contemporary hate crimes include a variety of be- haviors ranging from criminal harassment to more serious physical assault. This content downloaded from 128.95.71.159 on Thu, 2 Apr 2015 21:41:18 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp Racially Motivated Crime 823 According to Suttles (1972), the defended neighborhood occurs when some residents take action against a perceived threat to community identity. Although defensive posturing may take many forms, racially motivated crime is one means, albeit extreme, for “defending” a valued community image and way of life from the threat posed by racial outsiders. Suttles (1972, p. 58) suggests that defensive identity maintenance is often (al- though not only) triggered by fears of racial invasion from adjacent com- munities. In one of the few quantitative community-level analyses of hate crime to date, Green, Strolovitch, and Wong (1998) find support for this hypothesis. Specifically, they report that hate crimes against racial mi- norities in New York City are most common in traditionally white com- munities experiencing recent in-migration of racial outsiders. Such com- munities may be motivated to victimize racial minorities to defend identities based on racial (white) homogeneity from the threat posed by racial invasion. Beyond racial composition and change, the defended communities per- spective implicates other factors that may affect interracial tensions. In this article, I focus specifically on the model’s implications for the rela- tionship between racial hate crime and the economic and social capital of communities, net of racial demographics. Whereas social disorgani- zation and resource competition perspectives predict the same ecological correlation between economic status and racial hate crime, a defended community perspective implies the opposite: racial hate crimes will be more numerous in economically prosperous and collectively efficacious areas. First, under the assumption that racial outsiders pose more of a threat to affluent communities whose identities are based on ideals of homogeneity and economic stability, communities with greater economic capital may be more likely to resort to racial exclusion to preserve com- munity boundaries. Economic resources constitute an important part of the symbolic identity of the community that is perceived worthy of pro- tection. In addition, economic capital may provide resources for com- munities to exclude others and maintain boundaries.3 Second, the defended community model suggests that hate crimes are more likely in internally organized communities with high levels of social 3 McVeigh et al. (2003) offer a competing explanation in their analysis of hate crime reports in counties across the United States. They find that per capita income is positively related to reported hate crimes and ague that “relatively prosperous counties have more resources that could be directed toward the enforcement of hate crime laws” (McVeigh et al. 2003, p. 855). I discuss this alternative “reporting” hypothesis in the conclusion. McVeigh and colleagues, however, focus on a measure that aggregates different kinds of hate crime (not only racial hate crime). Furthermore, for the purposes of the current study, it is unclear whether resources for hate crime reporting vary appreciably at the community level within a single jurisdiction. This content downloaded from 128.95.71.159 on Thu, 2 Apr 2015 21:41:18 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp American Journal of Sociology 824 cohesion and norms of informal social control. In some cases defensive hate crimes may be initiated with the perceived support of the larger community (Pinderhughes 1993; Suttles 1972, p. 201). If so, racial hate crimes would “not represent internal social disorganization but organized responses to perceived external threats” (Heitgard and Bursik 1987, p. 786). To the extent that hate crimes are the outcome of collective action, they may be more likely in communities with substantial social cohesion/ trust and norms of informal social control. Social closure and trust, for instance, provide the capacity to defend against perceived threats posed by outgroups (Portes 1998; Waldinger 1995). Indeed, as Suttles (1972, p. 35) notes, defended communities “generally call for some level of concerted action and thus a certain degree of cohesion.” Furthermore, communities organized in favor of goals of public safety and order, as indicated by prevailing norms of informal social control of crime, may create a climate conducive to interracial hate crime. Goals of public safety and order are often informed by widespread racial stereo- types, and the association of minority status with disorder may lead to the scrutiny of racial outsiders—even among those who are not explicitly racist. In a recent study, Sampson and Raudenbush (2004) find that racial composition influences the level of perceived disorder in Chicago neigh- borhoods, above and beyond the effect of actual or “objective” disorder. Specifically, residents of all races perceive more disorder in communities with higher proportions of minority populations, even after controlling for observable conditions. Sampson and Raudenbush (2004) suggest that racial stereotypes linking minorities to crime and poverty are powerful determinants of perceived disorder (see also Quillian and Pager 2001). Given widespread racial stereotypes, communities with strong norms of informal social control of crime may be particularly likely to equate safety and order with whiteness, and fear and declining order with minority status. Taken to their logical, albeit extreme end, racialized notions of order and safety suggest that the exclusion of racial outgroups may be perceived by some to be in concert with the control of crime in general. Thus, while norms of informal social control may hinder conventional crime, they may mix with racial stereotypes to increase the likelihood of hate crime against minorities. Social cohesion and informal social control may facilitate hate crime especially in communities whose identities are rooted in racial homoge- neity. In racially homogeneous contexts, social cohesion and informal so- cial control may take the form of “bonding” (as opposed to “bridging”) social capital (Putnam 2000), which encourages exclusive rather than in- terdependent identities. Although bonding social capital can be positive for communities by encouraging solidarity (as in the case of ethnic enclaves [Portes 1998]), it “may also create strong out-group antagonism” and po- This content downloaded from 128.95.71.159 on Thu, 2 Apr 2015 21:41:18 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp Racially Motivated Crime 825 tentially produce negative externalities (Putnam 2000, p. 23). Of course, not all ethnically homogenous communities may employ social capital to keep outgroups at bay. Following the defended communities model, we would expect most hate crime to occur where (1) the incentive to protect identities rooted in racial homogeneity from the threat of racial invasion (Green, Strolovitch, and Wong 1998) coexists with (2) the social resources needed to exclude outsiders. Social cohesion and informal social control may be leveraged for hate crime particularly (or perhaps exclusively) in racially homogenous communities that are threatened by racial invasion, perhaps in the form of recent in-migration of racial outgroups. The defended communities perspective conceives racial hate crimes as both phenomenologically and etiologically distinct from other types of crime. Therefore, the perspective is consistent with the idea that differ- ential social organization—that is, the degree to which a community is organized for or against crime—depends on the nature or type of crime (Sutherland 1947; Matsueda 1988). For example, as implied above, it may be possible for a community to have low rates of conventional crime while experiencing relatively high rates of racial hate crime. In fact, it may be that the same structural conditions that facilitate the control of crime in general work in the opposite direction for racially motivated crime. In particular, relatively affluent, organized communities with high levels of social cohesion and informal social control may be simultaneously orga- nized against general crime and in favor of racial hate crime. At one extreme, this could mean that some communities actively band together to exclude unwanted newcomers. In this case, social cohesion and norms of informal social control enable a community to organize for hate crime. However, examples of large segments of a community banding together against outgroups, although certainly not unheard of, are prob- ably rare. Most hate crimes more likely result from individuals acting without the expressed consent of the community at large. These individ- uals nonetheless may perceive outgroups in certain communities to be out of place and may attack with the perception of support or ambivalence. A positive relationship between hate crime and norms of informal social control in particular would suggest that emphasis on the surveillance of criminal elements may, ironically, lead to intolerance of diversity and the attenuation of controls against racist victimization. Organization against general crime may not necessarily imply concomitant respect for diversity and individual rights (Sampson 1999, 2002a). This perspective therefore emphasizes the potential “dangers” of various forms of social capital (Coleman 1988; Portes 1998; Putnam 2000; Samp- son 1999). As a resource for collective action, social capital may be em- ployed for “positive” as well as “negative” ends. From the point of view of the actor, social capital is always positive insofar as it is goal oriented. This content downloaded from 128.95.71.159 on Thu, 2 Apr 2015 21:41:18 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp American Journal of Sociology 826 That is, social capital facilitates desired action. From the standpoint of others, however, the actions facilitated by social capital may engender undesired consequences. In sum, the defended communities perspective predicts fewer hate crimes in economically disadvantaged communities and more racial hate crimes in communities with high levels of social cohesion and informal social control, in contrast to social disorganization and resource compe- tition theories. Table 1 summarizes the hypothesized relationships between community characteristics and racial hate crime for each of the three perspectives. DATA Dependent Variables: Hate Crimes in Chicago I assess these perspectives using antiblack and antiwhite hate crime in- cidents reported to the Chicago Police Department (CPD) from 1997 to 2002.4 The CPD began collecting hate crime reports in 1986.5 Since then, procedures for reporting and classifying hate crimes have been formalized within the police department. As mentioned earlier, police reports at the community level likely provide the most reliable data to explore the spatial patterning of hate crime. Nevertheless, given the limitations inherent in the reporting and classification of hate crime data (e.g., Boyd et al. 1996), it is possible that some of the patterns presented below reflect different reporting mechanisms rather than the racially motivated behavior. I ad- dress these issues further in the conclusion. The Municipal Code of Chicago defines hate crimes as criminal acts that are committed because of “a specific demographic characteristic of the victim” (CPD 2005, p. 4). Once a potential incident is reported to or detected by an officer, CPD guidelines require a preliminary investigation which entails “obtaining witness statements and writing a thorough report including evidence of bias such as racial slurs, written statements, or gestures made by the offender prior to the incident” (CPD 2005, p. 30). In addition to these factors, preliminary assessments of bias motive gen- erally hinge on the perceptions of the victim(s), the context in which the crime takes place (e.g., an ongoing pattern of harassment), and the absence 4 Incident-level data prior to 1997 were not made available by the CPD. Furthermore, data prior to 1997 cannot be reliably aggregated to community areas because maps are unavailable (see below). 5 Although other advocacy groups in Chicago collect hate crime reports on particular constituencies (e.g., Horizons Community Services collects reports on antigay and lesbian violence), the police department remains the only organization that system- atically collects data on racially motivated crime. This content downloaded from 128.95.71.159 on Thu, 2 Apr 2015 21:41:18 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp Racially Motivated Crime 827 of other motives (e.g., material gain) (CPD 2005; Green, Strolovitch, and Wong 1998, p. 380; Martin 1995). Following guidelines established by the FBI, for an incident to be reported as a hate crime, there must be “suf- ficient objective facts . . . to lead a reasonable and prudent person to conclude that the offender’s actions were motivated, in whole or in part, by bias” (FBI 1999b, pp. 4–6; quoted in Iganski 2002, p. 5). Incidents that meet initial screening criteria are classified as motivated by antiwhite or antiblack bias by Civil Rights Unit investigators. Once a preliminary hate motive is ascertained, each reported incident is investigated further to determine whether sufficient evidence exists to charge the offender with the additional felony charge of hate crime. As part of their follow-up investigations, the Civil Rights Unit eventually classifies the bias component of each incident as “bonafide,” “undeter- mined,” or “unfounded.” Of all racial hate crimes reported between 1997 and 2002, about 25% did not meet standards for hate crime classification (unfounded), 25% did not provide information necessary to determine the veracity of a bias component (undetermined), and the remaining 50% were found to be bonafide hate crimes. The results presented below in- clude only those bonafide incidents verified by the CPD, although sen- sitivity analyses reported in appendix B reveal very similar patterns for all reported incidents regardless of follow-up classification. The final data set pools six years of reported racially motivated hate crimes, resulting in a total of 380 antiblack incidents, 175 of which are deemed bonafide, and 185 antiwhite incidents, 101 of which are classified as bonafide. Incidents motivated by animus toward other racial groups (e.g., Latinos, Asians) are too few to analyze reliably. As table 2 reveals, the criminal content of reported hate crimes varies from less serious prop- erty damage to more serious aggravated assault, though well over half of all reports are for violent (antiperson) crimes. Compared to total reported incidents, bonafide incidents tend to involve a greater percentage of an- tiperson crimes and fewer criminal harassment crimes. For both antiblack and antiwhite hate crimes, results do not change substantively from those reported below if data are restricted to violent incidents (see app. B). It should be noted that the CPD does not include murder under the potential list of hate crimes. Table 2 also lists the known race of hate crime offenders as reported by the victim. In the vast majority of cases, antiblack and antiwhite hate crimes in Chicago are interracial incidents: whites are by far the most likely perpetrators of antiblack crime, and blacks are the typical perpe- trators of antiwhite incidents. In about 13% of antiwhite incidents and 22% of antiblack incidents, however, the race of the offender is unknown. Offender race is more likely to be unknown in offenses where offender- victim contact does not occur directly, as in telephone harassment or This content downloaded from 128.95.71.159 on Thu, 2 Apr 2015 21:41:18 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp American Journal of Sociology 828 TABLE 2 Antiwhite and Antiblack Incidents: Crime Type, Offender Race, and Descriptives, 1997–2002 White Victim Black Victim Total Reported Bonafide Total Reported Bonafide No. of incidents . . . . . . . . . 185 101 380 175 Type of crime (%): Assault . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35.2 23.8 30.0 26.2 Battery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32.2 53.8 24.6 33.5 Property . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13.6 12.5 23.0 27.0 Threat/harassment . . . 12.3 2.5 18.8 9.7 Robbery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.7 5.0 1.7 0.5 Burglary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.9 2.5 1.0 1.2 Arson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.9 0.0 0.6 1.9 Other . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.4 0.0 0.2 0.4 Offender race (%): Black . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77.6 83.1 1.7 0.5 White . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.5 3.5 72.1 75.7 Asian . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 1.0 1.9 Unknown . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16.0 13.4 25.1 21.9 Descriptives: Meana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4 1.3 4.9 2.2 SDa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5 1.6 5.7 3.1 Rangea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0–11 0–8 0–25 0–15 Rate:b . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Meana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.0 0.5 2.0 0.8 SDa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.0 0.6 2.8 1.3 Rangea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0–5.3 0–3.1 0–14.6 0–6.8 a Across 77 community areas. b Rates represent the average incidence per 10,000 individuals on 2000 census population estimates. vandalism. I conducted additional analyses to investigate the sensitivity of results to the race of offender. These analyses (not shown, available upon request) reveal that results are robust regardless of offender race. Excluding incidents with nonwhite or unknown offenders for antiblack incidents and excluding cases with nonblack and/or unknown offenders for antiwhite incidents does not substantively alter the findings. The anal- yses presented below do not distinguish between offender races. Geographic unit of analysis.—This study seeks to examine the spatial variation of antiblack and antiwhite hate crime across Chicago com- munities. The smallest level of aggregation for hate crime incidents pro- vided by the CPD is the police beat, an area typically larger than the census tract. There are 279 police beats in Chicago (compared to 865 census tracts), which correspond to 25 larger police districts. However, because census data were not available at the police beat level (police beats do not directly match up with census tracts), each incident was This content downloaded from 128.95.71.159 on Thu, 2 Apr 2015 21:41:18 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp Racially Motivated Crime 829 mapped instead to one of Chicago’s 77 traditional community areas. Com- munity areas in Chicago correspond to census tracts, and aggregating census tract data to community area level is fairly straightforward. The community areas were first outlined in the late 1920s by researchers at the University of Chicago to delineate areas of reasonable ecological in- tegrity. The areas are generally recognized as discernable communities by local residents as well as by “administrative agencies and local institutions concerned with service delivery” (Sampson 1999, p. 248). Although Chi- cago community areas (average population near 40,000) are admittedly larger and more heterogeneous than local neighborhoods, they are sub- stantially smaller units than those used in previous community-level re- search on hate crime (i.e., Green, Strolovitch, and Wong 1998). Mapping incidents to community areas poses some hurdles. Incident data had to be reorganized using alternative mapping techniques. Maps of community area and police beat boundaries revealed that over 60% of police beats are contained completely within the boundaries of com- munity areas. The rest of the police beats fall into more than one com- munity area. For those incidents in police beats that cross community area boundaries, maps published by the police department showing the general location of incidents within each beat were overlaid with com- munity area maps to determine the community area location of each incident. About 97% of incidents were easily assigned community areas based on these maps. Decisions for the remaining 3% of cases were based on “closer calls” (e.g., the incident fell near the borders of two community areas).6 The bottom of table 2 presents some basic descriptives of incidents aggregated to Chicago’s 77 community areas. Figures 1 and 2 illustrate this variation across communities visually, mapping the distribution of antiblack and antiwhite hate crime rates by community racial composi- tion. Despite six years of data, some communities report no antiblack or antiwhite incidents.7 Additional dependent variables.—The study also compares the corre- 6 To maintain the confidentiality of individuals involved in hate crimes, the CPD did not make available exact locations (e.g., street addresses) of the hate crime incidents. 7 The data are geo-coded to the location where the incident occurred and do not provide information on victim or offender residence. Research on hate crime incidents indicate that at least one-third of hate crime incidents occur near the victim’s home (Strom 2001) and suggest that hate crimes may be more likely to occur near the victim’s home than nonbias crimes (McDevitt et al. 2001). Even if hate crime victims are victimized outside the community in which they reside, ecological theories emphasize criminogenic factors in the environment in which the hate crimes occur. The lack of geographical information on offender residence, however, may be more consequential, especially if offenders cross community boundaries to seek out particular kinds of victims. This content downloaded from 128.95.71.159 on Thu, 2 Apr 2015 21:41:18 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp American Journal of Sociology 830 Fig. 1.—Antiblack hate crime rate by %white 1990, Chicago 1997–2002 lates of racially motivated crime to other crimes known to the police. Specifically, rates of overall crime and violent crime (homicide, rape, rob- bery, and aggravated assault) are constructed from the CPD’s annual reports of index crimes. In 1998, the department began to report index crime totals by community area. Rates for each community area are cal- culated based on the average incidence of each offense between 1998 and 2002 divided by the community area population in 2000. Independent Variables Census data.—To explore the ecological correlates of antiblack and an- tiwhite hate crime, tract-level census data are aggregated to Chicago com- munity areas. The 1990 and 2000 census data provide information on total population, racial/ethnic composition (%Hispanic and non-Hispanic white and black), overall economic status, race-specific economic status, economic inequality, and population mobility (see table 3). The models This content downloaded from 128.95.71.159 on Thu, 2 Apr 2015 21:41:18 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp Racially Motivated Crime 831 Fig. 2.—Antiwhite hate crime rate by %black 1990, Chicago 1997–2002 for hate crime presented below use 1990 census data because these mea- sures are causally prior to hate crime reports. Results do not change substantively if 2000 census measures are used instead. An index con- centration at extremes or “ICE” (Massey 2001) measures economic in- equality, or the concentration of family poverty versus affluence, and may range from �1 (extreme poverty) to �1 (extreme affluence) (Morenoff et al. 2001, p. 529). Social cohesion and informal social control.—Data on social cohesion and the informal dynamics of social control are taken from the Community Survey of the Project on Human Development in Chicago Neighborhoods (PHDCN). Conducted in 1995, the survey asked 8,782 Chicago residents questions about their neighborhoods. Following Sampson et al. (1997), a social cohesion and trust scale consists of five items asking how strongly respondents agreed that (1) “People around here are willing to help their neighbors”; (2) “This is a close-knit neighborhood”; (3) “People in this neighborhood can be trusted”; (4) “People in this neighborhood generally This content downloaded from 128.95.71.159 on Thu, 2 Apr 2015 21:41:18 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp TABLE 3 List of Community Area Measures Measure Description Census measures (1990 and 2000): Total population Total no. of all persons Racial/ethnic composition Percentage of all persons Hispanic, per- centage non-Hispanic black, percentage non-Hispanic white Change in percentage black/ white Percentage black/white 2000 minus per- centage black/white 1990 Unemployment Percentage of the civilian labor force ages 16 and over who are unemployed Race-specific unemployment Percentage of the black, white, and His- panic civilian labor force ages 16 and over who are unemployed Poverty Percentage all persons below poverty line Index of concentration at ex- tremes (ICE) No. of affluent families (income above $50k) minus the no. of impoverished families, divided by the total no. of families Public assistance Percentage of all families receiving public assistance Single mothers Percentage of families with single mothers (with own children under 18) Renter vs. owner occupancy Percentage of occupied housing units owned vs. rented Moved in last five years Percentage of population ages five and over who have moved in the five years prior to census date PHDCN measures (1995): Social cohesion/trust Scaled from five items: (1) “People around here are willing to help their neighbors”; (2) “This is a close-knit neighborhood”; (3) “People in this neighborhood can be trusted”; (4) “People in this neighbor- hood generally don’t get along” (reverse coded); and (5) “People in this neighbor- hood do not share the same values” (re- verse coded). Informal social control Scaled from five items: (1) youths were skipping school and hanging out on a local street corner; (2) youths were de- facing a local building with graffiti; (3) youths were showing disrespect to an adult; (4) a fight broke out in front of their house; or (5) the fire station closest to home was threatened with closure. This content downloaded from 128.95.71.159 on Thu, 2 Apr 2015 21:41:18 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp Racially Motivated Crime 833 don’t get along” (reverse coded); and (5) “People in this neighborhood do not share the same values” (reverse coded). A scale for informal social control is constructed by combining five items that tap the likelihood that neighbors could be counted on to intervene if: (1) youths were skipping school and hanging out on a local street corner; (2) youths were defacing a local building with graffiti; (3) youths were showing disrespect to an adult; (4) a fight broke out in front of their house; or (5) the fire station closest to home was threatened with closure. Together, the informal control and social cohesion scales capture “the linkage of mutual trust and the willingness to intervene for the common good” (Sampson 2002a, p. 103), or what Sampson et al. (1997) call collective efficacy.8 The community survey data were originally aggregated to 343 “neigh- borhood clusters” (NCs), which are contiguous groupings of Chicago’s 865 census tracts. NCs are designed to be “relatively homogenous . . . with respect to distributions of racial-ethnic mix, SES, housing density, and family structure” (Morenoff et al. 2001, p. 526). Although the majority of the NCs fit completely within a single community, 16 of 343 NCs cross into more than one community area. I employ the following strategy for reorganizing the survey data to the community level. First, to address potential biases in the community-level survey, I employ a two-level random intercept model to estimate scores for informal social control and social cohesion for each neighborhood cluster. This two-level model adjusts for relevant respondent character- istics: race-ethnicity, gender, SES, age, marital status, home ownership, number of years living in the neighborhood, and number of residential moves in the last five years (Sampson et al. 1997).9 Next, I determine the proportion of a community area’s population represented by each NC. For the 16 NCs that straddle communities, I estimate the proportion of the community area population represented by the cluster tracts that fall within the community area boundary. I then weight each cluster’s con- tribution to a community area’s social cohesion and social control scores by multiplying each cluster’s hierarchical linear model–adjusted score by 8 In additional analyses, I also explored a measure of the density of local social ties. The measure of ties is based on the combined average of two questions concerning the number of relatives reported to live in the respondent’s neighborhood (coded 1, 1–2, 3–5, 6–9, 10 or more) (Morenoff et al. 2001). Considered with informal social control and social cohesion, however, social ties are not significantly related to hate crime; therefore, this variable is not included in models discussed below. 9 As the items in the social cohesion and informal social control scales are subject to missing values, scales are constructed based on the average value of completed items per individual. When aggregated to the NC level, the minimum number of completed responses to an item is 8 (maximum is 62), with an average number of completed responses to an item ranging from 21 to 24. This content downloaded from 128.95.71.159 on Thu, 2 Apr 2015 21:41:18 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp American Journal of Sociology 834 the proportion of the community area population represented by the cluster. Formally, this aggregation procedure can be expressed as: CE p CE # P ,�ca nc nc where CEnc represents the HLM-adjusted score for NCi, which falls at least partially within the community area boundary, and P is the pro- portion of the community area (CA) population represented by the NC tracts that fall within the community area boundaries, for each NC within the community area. NEGATIVE BINOMIAL MODELS AND SPATIAL DEPENDENCE The principal outcomes of the study, antiblack and antiwhite hate crimes, are nonnegative count variables. Event count data typically approximate a Poisson distribution: large counts toward zero and a tail that skews in the positive direction. However, Poisson regression presupposes the sta- tistical independence of events, an assumption that might be violated if hate crimes in one community lead to retaliatory crimes in another (Green, Strolovitch, and Wong 1998, p. 384). The Poisson model also assumes equidispersion, or that the mean equals the variance. As table 2 suggests, the unconditional means and variances for antiblack and antiwhite in- cidents are in fact overdispersed. A negative binomial variant of the Pois- son model that allows for overdispersion is more appropriate given these conditions. For the multivariate analyses presented below examining ra- cial hate crimes, I estimate negative binomial models using community area incident counts pooled over seven years. The number of observations in these analyses is equal to the number of community areas (Np77). All models of general crime rates are estimated in ordinary least squares.10 I also control for the possibility of spatial clustering or dependence in the hate crime data. Even after controlling for the structural features of community areas, spatial dependence may be particularly likely for a number of reasons. First, the difficulty in identifying “communities” spa- tially means that we may introduce error when defining communities as aggregates of census tracts (Morenoff et al. 2001). Second, hate crimes may be spatially linked in important ways. For example, hate crimes in one community may lead to retaliatory hate crimes in neighboring com- 10 For comparative purposes, I estimated models for hate crime rates using a Tobit specification to correct for left censoring. Overall, the Tobit models reveal patterns similar to the negative binomial count models presented below (results available upon request). This content downloaded from 128.95.71.159 on Thu, 2 Apr 2015 21:41:18 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp Racially Motivated Crime 835 munities. Failing at least to control for spatial autocorrelation could bias estimates for key independent variables (Anselin 1988; Baller et al. 2001). Using GeoDa software (Bruch and Mare 2006), I include in the hate crime models spatial lag variables (Baller et al. 2001) that essentially represent the average antiblack and antiwhite count in contiguous com- munities. I use a first order contiguity spatial weight matrix that identifies contiguous communities that share common boundaries (often referred to as queen contiguity). Formally, the spatial lag can be expressed as: w s , (1)� ij j j where wij is an element of spatial weights matrix (row standardized), and sj is the count of antiblack or antiwhite incidents of each community’s neighbor as defined by the weights matrix (Anselin 1988, 1995; Baller and Richardson 2002). In the multivariate models that follow, I incorporate a spatial lag term to assess the independent effects of spatial proximity on community levels of racially motivated crime.11 RESULTS Before moving to multivariate models, table 4 presents bivariate corre- lations between measures of key community characteristics and rates of racial hate crime and general crime. The associations between economic characteristics and antiblack incidents run counter to expectations based on economic competition or social disorganization. In fact, in sharp con- trast to conventional crimes, antiblack incidents are correlated positively with %white (see also fig. 1) and community affluence (note the positive sign for ICE) and associated negatively with traditional indicators of disadvantage. Furthermore, antiblack hate crimes are associated posi- tively with community social cohesion and informal social control. Con- versely, correlations with antiwhite incidents seldom reach statistical sig- nificance. An important exception is that antiwhite incidents correlate positively with both total and violent crime rates. In contrast to correlations with hate crime, table 4 confirms the well- 11 Spatial dependence can be accounted for using either a spatial lag or a spatial error model (Baller et al. 2001). There are a number of reasons for preferring the spatial lag to the spatial error specification. The error model is actually nested within the spatial lag model (Baller et al. 2001, p. 566). Furthermore, if the “real” specification of the dependence is a spatial lag, then not including the lag term would bias coeffi- cients. In contrast, if the spatial dependence is due to the clustering of unmeasured variables (spatial error), then failing to control for the error dependence would result in larger standard errors but unbiased coefficients (less efficiency). Therefore, I opt for the more conservative choice and specify a spatial lag model. This content downloaded from 128.95.71.159 on Thu, 2 Apr 2015 21:41:18 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp American Journal of Sociology 836 TABLE 4 Bivariate Correlations with Hate Crime and General Crime Rages Antiwhite Antiblack Total Crime Violent Crime Antiwhite rate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.00 .71** .41* .22* Antiblack rate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .71** 1.00 .21 �.05 Population . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . �.23** �.20* �.15 �.14 %black . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16 �.13 .40** .82** %white . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .01 .25** �.27** �.72** %Hispanic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . �.28** �.11 �.31** �.37** Unemployment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .04 �.24** .31** .83** Black unemployment . . . . . . . . .12 �.09 .48** .84** White unemployment . . . . . . . . .02 �.16 .15 .47** Poverty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .07 �.21* .39** .84** Public assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . .08 �.21* .33** .87** Single mothers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .02 �.25* .27** .81** Owners (vs. renters) . . . . . . . . . .12 .26** �.36** �.54** Mobility (past five years) . . . . �.08 �.14 .24** �.12 ICE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .07 .28** �.22* �.78** Collective efficacy . . . . . . . . . . . . .08 .35** �.30** �.60** Informal social control . . . . . . .19 .41** �.21* �.50** Social cohesion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .01 .27** �.32** �.60** Note.—Pearson correlations for rates; community areas.N p 77 * P!.10. ** P!.05. documented positive associations between violent and overall crime and typical indicators of community disorganization (economic disadvantage and residential mobility) and negative associations with collective efficacy. This preliminary look suggests that the ecological correlates of racial hate crime, especially antiblack hate crime, differ from those of crime in general. Social disorganization theory suggests that two primary underlying con- structs—concentrated disadvantage and residential mobility—contribute to a community’s ability to control crime. Guided by previous research (e.g., Morenoff et al. 2001), principal component analyses were performed on a set of measures thought to represent these constructs: percentage of individuals in a community living in poverty, percentage of families re- ceiving public assistance, unemployment rates, percentage of single- mother families, percentage of housing units owned (vs. rented), and the percentage who have moved within five years of the census date. The results of the principal components analysis, presented in table 5, confirm these two factors. For the multivariate analyses that follow, disadvantage is factored with- out %black. Given the centrality of racial composition to theories of in- This content downloaded from 128.95.71.159 on Thu, 2 Apr 2015 21:41:18 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp Racially Motivated Crime 837 TABLE 5 Principal Component Analysis: Chicago Census, 1990 Components Disadvantage Residential Stability Eigenvalue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.17 1.45 %variance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69.57 24.10 Loadings: Single mother . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .95 .23 Unemployed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .94 .20 Poverty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .98 �.07 Public assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . .97 .16 Mobility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .05 �.96 Owner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . �.70 .63 terracial conflict, it is important to try to disentangle the effects of race from economic conditions and other community characteristics.12 I consider next multivariate models examining the relationship between racial hate crimes and community characteristics.13 Looking first at an- tiblack crimes in table 6, model 2 verifies the negative association between community disadvantage and antiblack incidents, net of spatial proximity and log population. Residential mobility is not significant in any model, nor is there evidence that antiblack crimes are more likely in areas of high white unemployment (model 3). The effect of economic disadvantage holds when controlling for race-specific economic conditions but is not robust to racial composition (%white and %Hispanic in model 4, and %black and %Hispanic in model 5). When the ICE index is substituted for concentrated disadvantage, substantive conclusions remain the same: antiblack hate crime reports are most likely in relatively affluent com- 12 Given moderate correlations between racial composition, disadvantage, informal social control, and social cohesion (see app. A), collinearity is a potential concern in the analyses below. Diagnostics, however, reveal little evidence of collinearity: no VIF score is above 3, except disadvantage, which has a VIF score of 4.1. 13 As one reviewer noted, a key concern in the analyses that follow is the lack of a suitable lagged measure of interracial crime or hate crime. Measures of interracial crimes at the community level were unavailable, and interracial homicides, while available, are too rare at the community level to provide a reliable control. Instead, in additional analyses (results available upon request), I examined the relationship between 1997–2002 hate crimes and key predictors controlling for 1989 hate crimes obtained from the Chicago Commission on Human Relations. On the whole, controlling for 1989 hate crime incidents produces remarkably similar patterns to those reported below. The exceptions are for antiwhite hate crimes only. After controlling for antiwhite incidents in 1989, the effects of residential stability are attenuated, although still in the directions presented in table 8. This content downloaded from 128.95.71.159 on Thu, 2 Apr 2015 21:41:18 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp 838 T A B L E 6 N e g a t iv e B in o m ia l R e g r e ss io n s: C o m m u n it y C h a r a c t e r is t ic s a n d “B o n a fi d e ” A n t ib l a c k H a t e C r im e s, 1 9 9 7 -2 0 0 2 M o d el 1 M o d el 2 M o d el 3 M o d el 4 M o d el 5 M o d el 6 M o d el 7 M o d el 8 M o d el 9 M o d el 1 0 M o d el 1 1 C o n st a n t .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. � 4 .0 1 * � 6 .3 6 * * � 6 .2 9 * * � 6 .3 8 * * � 5 .6 4 * * � 1 4 .7 8 * * * � 1 1 .1 5 * * � 1 0 .1 1 * * � 1 1 .1 0 * * � 1 0 .1 8 * * � 1 2 .6 7 * * (2 .3 2 ) (2 .3 9 ) (2 .3 9 ) (2 .6 6 ) (2 .6 0 ) (3 .7 1 ) (4 .0 5 ) (4 .1 2 ) (4 .7 6 ) (4 .7 9 ) (5 .7 5 ) L n p o p u la ti o n 1 9 9 0 .. .. .. . .4 6 * * .6 7 * * .6 7 * * .6 0 * * .6 7 * * .8 8 * * .6 7 * * .7 0 * * .6 8 * * .7 5 * * .7 8 * * (. 2 2 ) (. 2 3 ) (. 2 3 ) (. 2 5 ) (. 2 6 ) (. 2 5 ) (. 2 6 ) (. 2 6 ) (. 2 6 ) (. 2 6 ) (. 2 4 ) S p a ti a l p ro x im it y .. .. .. .. . .6 7 * * .3 1 .3 0 .2 5 .2 6 .2 4 .2 0 .2 2 .1 9 .2 1 � .1 5 (. 3 4 ) (. 3 1 ) (. 3 1 ) (. 3 0 ) (. 3 0 ) (. 3 2 ) (. 2 9 ) (. 2 9 ) (. 2 9 ) (. 2 9 ) (. 2 8 ) D is a d v a n ta g e .. .. .. .. .. .. . � .6 5 * * * � .6 0 * * � .2 2 � .0 5 .0 3 .1 9 .1 7 (. 1 8 ) (. 2 0 ) (. 3 4 ) (. 3 2 ) (. 3 7 ) (. 3 7 ) (. 3 5 ) S ta b il it y .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .1 1 .1 3 .1 7 .2 4 .0 3 .1 1 .1 6 (. 1 5 ) (. 1 5 ) (. 1 5 ) (. 1 6 ) (. 1 8 ) (. 1 8 ) (. 1 7 ) W h it e u n em p lo y m en t .. .. . � .0 2 (. 0 2 ) % w h it e 1 9 9 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .0 1 3 .0 1 * .0 1 3 .0 3 (. 0 1 ) (. 0 0 6 ) (. 0 1 ) (. 0 6 ) % b la ck 1 9 9 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. � .0 1 8 * * � .0 1 * * � .0 1 8 * * (. 0 1 ) (. 0 0 6 ) (. 0 1 ) % H is p a n ic 1 9 9 0 .. .. .. .. .. .0 1 � .0 0 7 .0 1 � .0 0 2 � .0 1 2 � .0 0 5 .0 2 * * (. 0 1 ) (. 0 1 ) (. 0 1 ) (. 0 1 ) (. 0 1 ) (. 0 1 ) (. 0 1 ) In fo rm a l so ci a l co n tr o l .. .. 1 .5 0 * * 1 .3 4 * * 1 .3 5 * * 1 .3 1 * * 1 .2 9 * * 1 .4 8 * * (. 6 0 ) (. 5 9 ) (. 5 8 ) (. 6 7 ) (. 6 6 ) (. 9 0 ) S o ci a l co h es io n .. .. .. .. .. . � .2 2 � .2 3 � .2 6 � .2 4 � .2 6 � .4 3 (. 4 7 ) (. 5 6 ) (. 5 3 ) (. 5 9 ) (. 5 7 ) (. 5 0 ) This content downloaded from 128.95.71.159 on Thu, 2 Apr 2015 21:41:18 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp 839 % ch a n g e in b la ck p o p u la - ti o n , 1 9 9 0 – 2 0 0 0 .. .. .. .. . � .5 2 (. 4 4 ) In fo rm a l so ci a l co n tr o l # % w h it e .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . � .0 0 2 (. 0 2 ) In fo rm a l so ci a l co n tr o l # % ch a n g e in b la ck p o p u - la ti o n .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . .1 4 (. 1 3 ) % w h it e 1 9 9 0 # % ch a n g e in b la ck p o p u la ti o n .. .. . � .0 2 * (. 0 1 ) In fo rm a l so ci a l co n tr o l # % w h it e # % ch a n g e in b la ck .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . .0 0 5 * * (. 0 0 2 ) O v er d is p er si o n .. .. .. .. .. .. 1 .2 3 .8 7 .8 7 .8 0 .7 6 .8 4 .7 1 .7 0 .7 1 .6 7 .3 1 (3 1 .0 0 ) (. 2 5 ) (. 2 5 ) (. 2 4 ) (. 2 3 ) (. 2 5 ) (. 2 3 ) (. 2 2 ) (. 2 3 ) (. 2 2 ) (� .1 6 ) L o g li k el ih o o d .. .. .. .. .. .. 1 4 6 .1 7 1 3 9 .1 0 � 1 3 8 .8 7 1 3 7 .7 3 � 1 3 6 .4 6 � 1 3 9 .2 7 � 1 3 6 .1 9 � 1 3 5 .2 1 � 3 6 .1 7 � 1 3 4 .9 0 � 1 2 6 .2 3 N o t e .— N p 7 7 C h ic a g o co m m u n it y a re a s; u n st a n d a rd iz ed co ef fi ci en ts ; S E s a re in p a re n th es es . * P ! .1 0 . * * P ! .0 5 . * * * P ! .0 0 1 . This content downloaded from 128.95.71.159 on Thu, 2 Apr 2015 21:41:18 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp American Journal of Sociology 840 munities, yet the effects of economic conditions are attenuated net of racial composition (results not shown). Models 6–11 consider the relationship between antiblack hate crime and social cohesion and norms of informal social control. Controlling for log population and spatial proximity, model 6 shows a large and positive effect of informal social control on antiblack incidents and a negative and nonsignificant effect of social cohesion. The positive association between informal controls and antiblack hate crimes is robust to controls for racial composition (models 7 and 8) as well as economic disadvantage and res- idential stability (models 9 and 10). Interestingly, the coefficient for com- munity social cohesion is opposite that for informal social control, but never reaches traditional levels of significance.14 Thus, norms of informal social control, rather than social cohesion, economic conditions, or racial composition, facilitate hate crimes against blacks. These results generally provide support for a defended community thesis. Net of other charac- teristics, communities with heightened norms of informal surveillance have more antiblack hate crime. I also explore whether the effects of social cohesion and informal social control vary across various community characteristics, such as racial com- position and change. In racially integrated communities, social capital may be more likely to bridge racial divides. Under these conditions, in- formal social control and social cohesion may promote tolerance and dis- courage racially motivated conflict. Alternatively, in relatively homoge- nous white communities or those that are proximate to black communities, social cohesion and informal social control may facilitate exclusive iden- tities that encourage antagonism toward racial minorities (Putnam 2000). White homogeneity may interact with social cohesion and/or informal social control, especially in communities facing the threat of racial in- vasion. The positive effect of informal social control in models 9 and 10 may therefore hold only for specific communities with particular identities based on racial homogeneity. Although no interactions are detected for social cohesion, model 11 presents evidence of a three-way interaction between informal social con- trol, %white 1990, and change in proportion black between 1990 and 2000. This interaction is meant to capture communities whose identities may be rooted especially in racial homogeneity: traditionally white commu- nities experiencing the threat of racial invasion (Green et al 1998). As 14 A single collective efficacy scale that combines informal control and social cohesion is positive and significant in early models but is not robust to racial composition or economic conditions. It appears that combining the components of collective efficacy into one scale masks countervailing effects of informal social control and social cohesion on antiblack hate crime at the community level. This content downloaded from 128.95.71.159 on Thu, 2 Apr 2015 21:41:18 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp Racially Motivated Crime 841 TABLE 7 Predicted Antiblack Hate Crime, Chicago Communities, 1997–2002 White Communities (85% White) Nonwhite Communities (10% White) Threata No Threatb Threata No Threatb High informal social con- trol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34.7 3.9 3.1 2.1 Low informal social con- trol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 .9 .1 .3 Note.—See table 6, model 11. Except for %white, informal social control, and change in %black, all variables held at mean values. High informal social control: 1 SD above mean; low informal social control: 1 SD below mean. a Black in-migration 15%. b Black in-migration 0%. model 11 reveals, even in the presence of all lower-level two-way inter- actions, the three-way interaction is positive and significant: the effect of informal social control on antiblack hate crime increases in racially ho- mogenous white communities that are experiencing recent in-migration of black newcomers. Table 7 presents predicted values for antiblack hate crimes based on the interactions between informal social control, %white, and the rate at which racial homogeneity is threatened by black in-migration. The table illustrates two important findings. First, antiblack hate crimes are more likely in white communities, and especially white communities with sub- stantial levels of informal social control. Second, the effect of informal social control is far greatest, however, in those white communities facing the threat of racial invasion (upper left cell). Consistent with a defended communities perspective, the confluence of ability (informal social control) and incentive (threat to racial homogeneity) produces the greatest risk of racially motivated crime. Interestingly, however, even in communities that are not ethnically homogenous and/or undergoing the threat of racial invasion, the effect of informal social control on hate crime is positive.15 Models of community characteristics and antiwhite hate crime, pre- sented in table 8, reveal different patterns than for antiblack incidents. When the sample includes all communities in Chicago (model 2), con- centrated disadvantage and residential mobility do not appear to affect antiwhite hate crimes. These results, however, do not consider the poten- 15 I also test a similar three-way interaction between informal social control, %white, and proximity to black communities (measured by a spatial lag for %black 1990). This interaction is also positive, indicating that the effect of informal social control on antiblack hate crime is heightened in white communities that are spatially proximate to black communities. This content downloaded from 128.95.71.159 on Thu, 2 Apr 2015 21:41:18 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp 842 T A B L E 8 N e g a t iv e B in o m ia l R e g r e ss io n s: C o m m u n it y C h a r a c t e r is t ic s a n d “B o n a fi d e ” A n t iw h it e H a t e C r im e , 1 9 9 7 – 2 0 0 2 A l l C h ic a g o a E x c l u d in g O u t l ie r sb M o d el 1 M o d el 2 M o d el 2 M o d el 3 M o d el 4 M o d el 5 M o d el 6 M o d el 7 M o d el 8 M o d el 9 M o d el 1 0 C o n st a n t .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. � 6 .1 2 * * � 5 .3 4 * * � 5 .8 2 * * � 5 .8 5 � 6 .2 4 * * � 5 .9 7 * * � 2 .3 1 � 3 .9 5 � 3 .6 3 � 7 .8 3 * * � 5 .5 9 * (1 .8 4 ) (1 .8 7 ) (1 .8 3 ) (1 .8 4 ) (1 .8 9 ) (1 .9 7 ) (2 .6 8 ) (2 .9 6 ) (3 .1 7 ) (3 .7 7 ) (3 .1 3 ) L n p o p u la ti o n 1 9 9 0 .. .. .. . .6 4 * * * .5 6 * * .5 9 * * .5 9 .6 4 * * .6 3 * * .5 8 * * .6 8 * * * .6 6 * * * .6 9 * * .6 9 * * (. 1 8 ) (. 1 8 ) (. 1 7 ) (. 1 7 ) (. 1 9 ) (. 1 8 ) (. 1 8 ) (. 1 9 ) (. 1 9 ) (. 2 0 ) (. 2 0 ) S p a ti a l p ro x im it y .. .. .. .. . .6 9 * * .7 3 * * .5 7 * * .5 8 .5 4 * * .5 3 * * .5 9 * * .4 6 * * .4 9 * * .4 6 * .4 5 * (. 2 2 ) (. 2 4 ) (. 2 4 ) (. 2 4 ) (. 2 4 ) (. 2 4 ) (. 2 1 ) (. 2 3 ) (. 2 4 ) (. 2 4 ) (. 2 4 ) E co n o m ic d is a d v a n ta g e .. . .1 3 .3 0 * * .2 9 .2 6 .2 0 .3 3 .2 8 (. 1 2 ) (. 1 2 ) (. 1 4 ) (. 2 1 ) (. 2 1 ) (. 2 5 ) (. 2 5 ) R es id en ti a l st a b il it y .. .. .. . � .1 5 � .2 6 * * � .2 5 � .2 6 * * � .2 7 * * � .2 8 * * � .3 0 * * (. 1 2 ) (. 1 2 ) (. 1 2 ) (. 1 3 ) (. 1 3 ) (. 1 3 ) (. 1 4 ) B la ck u n em p lo y m en t 1 9 9 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .0 1 (. 0 1 ) % b la ck 1 9 9 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .0 0 1 .0 0 2 .0 0 4 (. 0 1 ) (. 0 0 ) (. 0 1 ) % w h it e 1 9 9 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. � .0 0 3 � .0 0 5 � .0 1 (. 0 0 5 ) (. 0 1 ) (. 0 1 ) This content downloaded from 128.95.71.159 on Thu, 2 Apr 2015 21:41:18 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp 843 % H is p a n ic 1 9 9 0 .. .. .. .. .. � .0 0 4 � .0 0 5 � .0 0 7 � .0 0 5 .0 0 0 � .0 0 4 (. 0 1 ) (. 0 1 ) (. 0 1 ) (. 0 1 ) (. 0 1 ) (. 0 1 ) In fo rm a l so ci a l co n tr o l .. .. � 1 .1 0 * � 1 .1 1 * � 1 .1 0 * � .5 4 � .5 6 (. 5 8 ) (. 5 8 ) (. 5 8 ) (. 6 1 ) (. 6 1 ) S o ci a l co h es io n .. .. .. .. .. .. .1 8 .4 4 .3 0 .7 7 .8 5 (. 4 0 ) (. 5 0 ) (. 5 0 ) (. 5 1 ) (. 5 2 ) O v er d is p er si o n .. .. .. .. .. .. .3 6 .3 4 .2 4 .2 4 .2 3 .2 4 .2 4 .2 1 .2 1 .1 8 .1 8 (. 1 6 ) (. 1 6 ) (. 1 4 ) (. 1 4 ) (. 1 4 ) (. 1 4 ) (. 1 5 ) (. 1 4 ) (. 1 5 ) (. 1 3 ) (. 1 3 ) L o g li k el ih o o d .. .. .. .. .. .. � 1 3 0 .3 9 � 1 2 9 .0 5 � 1 1 6 .6 8 � 1 1 6 .6 7 � 1 1 6 .3 1 � 1 1 6 .2 1 � 1 1 8 .8 2 � 1 1 7 .6 3 � 1 1 7 .9 1 � 1 1 5 .1 3 � 1 1 4 .8 0 N o t e .— U n st a n d a rd iz ed co ef fi ci en ts ; S E s a re in p a re n th es es . a N p 7 7 C h ic a g o co m m u n it y a re a s. b N p 7 4 C h ic a g o co m m u n it y a re a s. * P ! .1 0 . * * P ! .0 5 . * * * P ! .0 0 1 . This content downloaded from 128.95.71.159 on Thu, 2 Apr 2015 21:41:18 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp American Journal of Sociology 844 tial influences of statistical outliers. Although no outliers were detected for antiblack hate crimes, interior analyses reveal three communities in the southwest corner of Chicago that unduly influence the patterns for antiwhite incidents. These three communities have unusually high levels of antiwhite hate crime given their relative affluence and racial (white) homogeneity.16 Once these outliers are omitted, both concentrated dis- advantage (positive) and residential stability (negative) are significantly related to antiwhite hate crimes. It appears that antiwhite incidents in the vast majority of Chicago are more likely in traditionally economically disadvantaged communities with high rates of population turnover. Only in the relatively affluent southwest corner of the city do antiwhite incidents follow a different pattern. Although thorough explanation for these dif- ferent patterns in the southwest warrants qualitative exploration beyond the scope of the present study, I address potential reasons in the conclusion. In models excluding the southwest corner, the effects of disadvantage hold after considering black unemployment, which is not significant (model 3), but is not robust to controls for racial composition (models 4 and 5). However, consistent with a systemic model of social organization, residential stability remains a significant and negative predictor of anti- white incidents net of racial composition or race-specific economic conditions. Models 6–10 explore the effects of cohesion and informal social control on antiwhite hate crime. In contrast to antiblack incidents, the coefficient for informal social control is negative and marginally significant in model 6. According to social disorganization theory, this would suggest that informal social control works to prevent antiwhite incidents just as it prevents general forms of crime, at least in sections of Chicago other than the southwest corner. The effect is robust to controls for racial composition (models 7 and 8), but not economic disadvantage or residential stability (models 9 and 10). In models 9 and 10, the only significant predictor of antiwhite incidents, other than log population and spatial proximity, is residential stability. Like conventional crime in general, antiwhite inci- dents are more likely in relatively unstable communities with frequent population turnover. I also explored whether the effects of social cohesion and informal social control vary by racial composition and/or the degree of threat posed to racial homogeneity in the form of changes in the white population. Unlike the models for antiblack hate crimes, there is no evidence that racial composition or the rate of increase in the white population proportion 16 Outlier analyses include examination of residuals, leverage, dfits, and Cook’s dis- tance. The three communities in the southwest corner of Chicago have dfits and Cook’s distance scores two to three times above recommended cut-off values. This content downloaded from 128.95.71.159 on Thu, 2 Apr 2015 21:41:18 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp T A B L E 9 O L S R e g r e ss io n M o d e l s: C o m m u n it y E c o n o m ic a n d S o c ia l C a p it a l a n d G e n e r a l C r im e R a t e s, 1 9 9 8 – 2 0 0 2 T o t a l C r im e V io l e n t C r im e M o d el 1 M o d el 2 M o d el 3 M o d el 4 M o d el 5 M o d el 1 M o d el 2 M o d el 3 M o d el 4 M o d el 5 C o n st a n t .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . 7 9 7 .8 2 5 1 7 .3 7 * * * 1 ,6 6 9 .6 9 1 ,5 4 3 .4 4 � 1 ,0 8 0 .9 5 1 8 3 .6 2 * * * 1 2 3 .1 2 * * * 7 9 0 .9 9 4 0 5 .6 5 * � 9 4 .9 8 (5 8 .6 5 ) (1 5 4 .5 6 ) (7 2 9 .6 6 ) (9 5 6 .9 7 ) (1 1 9 7 .4 9 ) (8 .5 0 ) (2 1 .5 5 ) (1 4 2 .4 7 ) (1 4 1 .3 9 ) (1 7 4 .5 9 ) S p a ti a l p ro x im it y .. .. .. .. . 1 9 9 .4 0 * 1 2 1 .4 1 2 6 1 .6 2 * 1 7 1 .4 5 7 7 .8 4 3 0 .8 0 * * 1 4 .8 6 9 5 .2 5 * * * 3 8 .8 9 * 8 .6 9 (1 1 3 .2 4 ) (1 0 7 .4 9 ) (1 1 0 .7 2 ) (1 1 4 .7 6 ) (1 1 0 .4 5 ) (1 5 .0 9 ) (1 3 .5 5 ) (1 7 .6 5 ) (1 5 .0 7 ) (1 4 .4 6 ) D is a d v a n ta g e .. .. .. .. .. .. . 1 4 7 .5 2 * � 6 8 .7 2 5 .6 8 1 1 7 .6 4 * * * 7 7 .9 3 * * * 8 7 .5 8 * * * (6 8 .9 2 ) (9 9 .5 7 ) (1 1 5 .8 6 ) (1 1 .1 2 ) (1 3 .4 9 ) (1 6 .2 5 ) R es id en ti a l st a b il it y .. .. .. � 1 5 6 .6 5 * � 2 3 7 .0 4 * * * � 2 8 9 .1 8 * * * 7 .8 3 � 7 .7 5 � 1 5 .0 4 (5 9 .2 0 ) (5 9 .6 4 ) (7 0 .9 9 ) (8 .7 4 ) (8 .2 2 ) (1 0 .0 5 ) % b la ck .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . 7 .3 8 * 2 .3 8 8 .1 5 * * * 1 .4 5 * * * 2 .2 3 * 1 .6 8 * * * (2 .6 8 ) (2 .3 7 ) (2 .8 7 ) (. 3 6 ) (. 3 6 ) (. 4 1 ) % H is p a n ic .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . � 1 .3 5 � 4 .7 5 .4 0 .0 1 .2 0 .4 2 (3 .4 3 ) (4 .1 4 ) (3 .9 8 ) (. 4 7 ) (. 6 1 ) (. 5 6 ) In fo rm a l so ci a l co n tr o l .. . 3 3 .1 3 2 4 .0 5 2 6 7 .0 1 � 6 6 .4 5 � 5 8 .7 7 2 6 .9 8 (2 9 0 .5 8 ) (2 8 3 .6 4 ) (2 9 6 .3 1 ) (5 5 .8 3 ) (4 2 .5 8 ) (4 2 .2 7 ) S o ci a l co h es io n .. .. .. .. .. .. � 2 7 0 .7 3 * � 2 3 4 .6 4 � 4 2 .3 0 � 9 9 .0 7 * � 2 9 .1 7 2 7 .6 4 (1 6 8 .4 0 ) (2 2 1 .6 2 ) (2 1 5 .2 9 ) (3 8 .5 1 ) (3 1 .1 4 ) (3 0 .2 8 ) A d ju st ed R 2 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . .2 1 .3 2 .1 3 .1 9 .3 3 .7 3 .8 2 .5 3 .7 5 .8 2 N o t e .— N p 7 7 co m m u n it y a re a s; u n st a n d a rd iz ed co ef fi ci en ts ; S E s a re in p a re n th es es . * P ! .1 0 . * * P ! .0 5 . * * * P ! .0 0 1 . This content downloaded from 128.95.71.159 on Thu, 2 Apr 2015 21:41:18 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp American Journal of Sociology 846 between 1990 and 2000 condition the influence of informal social control or social cohesion on antiwhite hate crime (results not shown). Tables 6 and 8 also test for spatial clustering in antiblack and antiwhite hate crimes. There is little evidence of spatial lag effects for antiblack incidents net of key structural variables. As revealed in table 6, any spatial clustering in antiblack hate crimes appears to be explained by the clus- tering of economic conditions, social capital, or racial composition across communities. In contrast, the structural conditions considered in table 8 do not completely explain the clustering of antiwhite incidents. Although the spatial lag effect is attenuated after controlling for economic conditions and residential stability, the coefficient remains significant and positive. The lag effect also persists after controlling for social cohesion and in- formal social control. These results suggest diffusion or contagion pro- cesses for antiwhite hate crimes: hate crimes against whites in one com- munity may lead to similar crimes in neighboring communities. How do these ecological patterns for racial hate crime compare with those for crime in general? The patterns for total and violent crime rates, presented in table 9, validate what previous social disorganization re- search has demonstrated: disadvantage, residential instability, and %black are strongly associated with conventional crime rates, with disadvantage and %black stronger predictors of violent crime and residential instability a stronger predictor of total crime. Social cohesion, but not informal social control, is negatively related to crime rates, yet this effect is not robust to other structural variables at this level of aggregation. The patterns for conventional crime (especially total crime) are somewhat similar to those for antiwhite incidents in the majority of Chicago (excluding the southwest corner). Both total crime and antiwhite hate crime occur in relatively ecologically disorganized communities characterized by residential insta- bility. In contrast, antiblack incidents appear etiologically distinct and are most numerous in more traditionally “organized” communities character- ized by norms of informal social control. Although the OLS models for crime rates consider different years (1998–2002) than the negative bino- mial regressions for hate crimes (1997–2002), restricting hate crime models to 1998–2002 incidents produces very similar results. CONCLUSIONS Drawing on police records, census data, and Chicago community survey data, this article provides new insight into the etiology of racially moti- vated crime at the community level. Multivariate analyses of antiblack and antiwhite hate crimes reveal a number of important findings. First, antiblack hate crimes are most numerous in relatively organized com- This content downloaded from 128.95.71.159 on Thu, 2 Apr 2015 21:41:18 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp Racially Motivated Crime 847 munities with higher levels of informal social control, and especially in internally organized white communities undergoing the threat of racial invasion. Antiblack incidents are also more common in economically af- fluent communities, although the effect of economic conditions is not robust to racial composition and norms of informal social control. As much research has shown, communities rich in economic resources and dynamics of informal social control are able to manage forms of unwanted conventional crime and secure public goods such as safety. However, such communities appear simultaneously organized in favor of antiblack crimes. The correlates of antiblack hate crimes are distinguishable from those of crime in general. That is, crimes motivated by animus against blacks appear to be distinct phenomena, and theories traditionally em- ployed to explain the spatial organization of general crime must be revised to explain the special case of antiblack hate crime. Although researchers have tended to focus on the positive consequences of social capital for communities, some have conceded that social resources can be used for purposes that may be considered “antisocial” by some (Portes 1998; Putnam 2000; Sampson 1999, 2002a; see also Thomson 2005). This study provides empirical support for such concerns. The positive effect of a particular form of social capital, informal social control, on antiblack hate crimes warns of the potentially negative consequences of collectively pursuing safety and public order without concomitant toler- ance for racial diversity and individual rights. Racial stereotypes linking minorities—and especially blacks—to social ills such as disorder, violence, and poverty are widespread. Even members of white communities who are not “explicitly” racist may view the presence of blacks as a sign of decline and impending disorder (Sampson and Raudenbush 2004). Com- munities with heightened norms of informal social control that are mo- tivated to maintain safe and orderly ways of life may also be disposed to monitor the racial composition within their borders. In the name of or- ganizing against crime and disorder, these communities may run the risk of alienating certain groups and encouraging defensive (and dangerous) sentiments. The defended communities thesis assumes that communities are mo- tivated to protect valued identities from threats posed by outside elements. Insofar as blacks represent symbolic threats to the identities of certain communities, racially motivated crime may be a means for maintaining lines of class and color. Indeed, informal social control of general crime is more strongly related to antiblack hate crime in relatively homogenous communities that are undergoing changes in racial composition. That is, in communities that may be particularly motivated to maintain bound- aries in the face of external threats, informal social control appears to facilitate defensive posturing. However, the results indicate that informal This content downloaded from 128.95.71.159 on Thu, 2 Apr 2015 21:41:18 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp American Journal of Sociology 848 social control operates across a wider range of communities. The positive effect of informal social control on antiblack hate crime persists even among those communities not facing prospects of in-migration of racial outgoups. The results indicate that the antecedents of antiwhite and antiblack crimes differ in important ways. In contrast to antiblack hate crime, an- tiwhite hate crimes are somewhat more likely in disadvantaged com- munities, especially those with higher levels of residential instability. Ac- cording to a systemic model of social organization, residential mobility disrupts the social relations that enable organization against crime. Thus, like other forms of crime, antiwhite hate crimes appear to be a product of social disorganization brought about by population turnover. The dif- ferent patterns for antiblack and antiwhite hate crime underscore the importance of disaggregating hate crimes by bias motivation. Although scholars often disregard bias motivation and consider hate crimes as an aggregate category, this study suggests that antiwhite and antiblack crimes may be etiologically distinct and should be analyzed separately. The different patterns for antiblack and antiwhite hate crime warrant additional research. One set of potential explanations for these differences focuses on the degree to which general criminal propensity versus animus directly motivates antiblack versus antiwhite offenders. Offenders of de- fensive antiblack crimes may be more likely to display motives consistent with a specialization model (Messner, McHugh, and Felson 2004) whereby offenders “specialize” in hate crime and do not engage in other types of crime. Such offenders are distinguished more by racial prejudice than general criminal propensity. Defensive hate crimes may involve special- ized offenders because these incidents serve particular, future-oriented functions: restricting the spatial movement of racial outsiders or protecting against threats to a valued community (and collective) identity. This im- plies that racial territoriality and animus induced by social change are a direct cause of antiblack hate crimes. In contrast, the patterns for anti- white hate crimes are more similar to the patterns for conventional types of crime. This may suggest that offenders of antiwhite hate crime may be more criminally versatile than antiblack offenders. That is, they may be motivated by a variety of criminal goals, especially those for financial gain. In many urban environments, blacks disproportionately live in struc- turally disadvantaged communities where motivations for crime are en- demic (Sampson and Wilson 1995), and Chicago is no exception. This reasoning does not necessarily mean that antiwhite offenders are less prejudiced than antiblack offenders, or vice versa. However, in the case of antiwhite hate crimes, other criminal motives brought about by struc- tural conditions or stable criminal propensities may complicate the re- lationship between racial prejudice and behavior. Of course, such con- This content downloaded from 128.95.71.159 on Thu, 2 Apr 2015 21:41:18 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp Racially Motivated Crime 849 clusions about the differences between antiblack and antiwhite hate crime remain speculative and await additional research on the ecology of racially motivated crime. The models for antiwhite hate crimes are complicated by the presence of communities in Chicago that appear to follow divergent patterns. What explains these deviant cases in the southwest corner of Chicago? Although a full explanation is beyond the scope of the present study, a number of possibilities merit further investigation. First, antiwhite incidents in these communities could be retaliatory—that is, made in response to antiblack incidents. The anomalous communities have higher-than-average rates of antiblack hate crime, although they are well predicted by the defended community model. In fact, these areas appear prime examples of relatively organized communities defending against a perceived threat posed by blacks. If blacks victimize whites in retaliation to antiblack incidents, then the relationship between antiwhite incidents and community eco- nomic and social capital may be indirect. These factors increase the like- lihood of antiblack incidents, which may increase the likelihood that blacks will retaliate. Second, Perry (2002, p. 73) has suggested that whites may be more willing than minorities to report racially motivated crimes or more readily define acts as an affront to their privileged racial status. Although this argument has not been subject to empirical test, it is consistent with research showing whites’ greater trust and confidence in the police com- pared to minorities (e.g., Weitzer and Tuch 2005). It is also possible that the reporting of antiwhite crime in some communities is a strategy for identity maintenance—another resource for defending the color line from perceived threats to valued identities. In addition to these possibilities, the collective memory of blacks and whites might influence hate crime rates in Chicago’s southwest. Both whites and blacks may be more sensitive to potentially racially motivated conflict given the history of tension in Chicago’s southwest dating back to Civil Rights protests and KKK gatherings (Berlet 2001). This historical framework may also help explain why this relatively stable and affluent section of the city reports unusually high numbers of antiwhite hate crime. These speculative explanations require more extensive investigation. This study explored the extent to which theoretical perspectives on the etiology of interracial crime explain the spatial distribution of officially reported hate crimes. Although the patterns for antiblack hate crimes are supportive of the defended communities perspective, definitive tests must be able to rule out alternative explanations for the positive association between antiblack incidents and community economic and social capital. One competing explanation concerns the issue of reporting versus the actual commission of hate crimes. Specifically, relatively affluent and col- This content downloaded from 128.95.71.159 on Thu, 2 Apr 2015 21:41:18 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp American Journal of Sociology 850 lectively efficacious communities may be more disposed than less “orga- nized” communities to report antiblack crimes when they do occur. In an analysis of hate crime reporting across U.S. counties, McVeigh et al. (2003) argue that counties with higher per capita income have higher numbers of reported hate crimes because they have more resources to encourage enforcement of hate crime laws. Although McVeigh et al. (2003) focus on a larger unit of analysis (counties vs. communities) and aggregate all hate crimes into one outcome, this line of reasoning counters a defended com- munities perspective. Likewise, it could be argued that the components of collective efficacy work to encourage the reporting of hate crimes by fostering trust and other informal mechanisms that support victims. Browning (2002), for instance, finds that women feel more comfortable disclosing domestic disturbances to neighbors and authorities if they reside in collectively efficacious neighborhoods (although overall, collective ef- ficacy is negatively related to neighborhood levels of domestic violence). Social cohesion and trust and norms of informal social control may also encourage reporting of crimes by improving relationships between citizens and formal agents of control. Attempts at increasing neighborhood efficacy through community policing emphasize that “citizen calls to the police . . . are one form of social control from the bottom up” (Sampson 2002a, p. 103). The reporting argument implies that efficacious or relatively affluent communities are more sensitive to antiblack hate crimes and encourage victims or witnesses to report incidents to authorities. In communities with fewer economic resources and norms of informal social control and less cohesion, the facility of reporting incidents may be impeded. However, reporting bias is typically inversely related to incident seriousness (Myers 1980; Skogan 1984). That is, serious crimes involving threat of or actual bodily harm are more likely reported than “less serious” crimes. If so, we might expect the reporting benefits of economic and social capital to be greatest for incidents that might, in other contexts, go unreported, such as incidents not involving bodily harm. The data provide some opportunity to assess this hypothesis by ex- ploring whether the effects of community characteristics vary by incident seriousness. Dividing antiblack hate crime counts into violent (antiperson) crimes and nonviolent (primarily property) crimes, supplementary anal- yses reveal little support for the reporting hypothesis. For antiblack in- cidents, informal social control is positively related to both violent inci- dents and nonviolent incidents, and tests for differences in the magnitude of effects across models (Clogg, Petkova, and Haritou 1995) reveal no evidence that informal social control is more strongly related to less serious antiblack incidents. The same results hold for economic disadvantage, This content downloaded from 128.95.71.159 on Thu, 2 Apr 2015 21:41:18 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp Racially Motivated Crime 851 which is negatively related to both categories of antiblack hate crime (results available upon request). These additional analyses do not provide definitive tests of whether community characteristics facilitate the commission versus the reporting of antiblack hate crime, nor do they address the discretion involved in defining incidents as racially motivated (see Boyd et al. 1996). Nonetheless, they do lend further credibility to the defended communities model. Fur- thermore, if social and economic resources facilitate the reporting of an- tiblack hate crime, one might expect them also to affect the reporting of antiwhite hate crime in similar ways. Yet, for antiwhite hate crime, in- formal social controls produce fewer reports. In the absence of reliable victimization data that allows more rigorous analysis of reporting behav- ior, the defended community perspective remains a theoretically compel- ling explanation for the social organization of antiminority hate crime. Finally, the current study examined hate crimes across relatively large and heterogeneous community areas, and the mechanisms of collective organization may operate more appropriately at the neighborhood level. Although original tests of the defended community thesis (Green, Stro- lovitch, and Wong 1998) focused on substantially larger units (average population near 130,000), future work should endeavor to explore the patterns for antiblack and antiwhite hate crimes at smaller levels of geo- graphical analysis. This article represents an initial step forward in our understanding of the newly redefined but long-standing social problem of racially motivated crime. The topic of social organization and crime has long occupied so- ciologists interested in explaining the spatial variation of crime, though it has been unclear how these theories can be applied to the specific case of crimes motivated by racial animus. This study indicates that disor- ganization may well explain reported hate crimes against whites, but antiblack hate crimes are not the product of traditionally crime-ridden communities. In contrast, in the process of collectively organizing for valued community ideals such as safety and order, communities may simultaneously encourage, either explicitly or implicitly, antiblack incidents. This content downloaded from 128.95.71.159 on Thu, 2 Apr 2015 21:41:18 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp A P P E N D IX A T A B L E A 1 B iv a r ia t e C o r r e l a t io n s 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 0 1 1 1 2 1 . A n ti b la ck ra te .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 1 .0 0 2 . A n ti w h it e ra te .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .7 1 * * * 1 .0 0 3 . C ri m e ra te (1 9 9 8 – 2 0 0 2 ) .. .. .. . .2 1 * .4 1 * * 1 .0 0 4 . V io le n t cr im e ra te .. .. .. .. .. .. . � .0 5 .2 2 * * .6 1 * * * 1 .0 0 5 . L o g p o p u la ti o n 1 9 9 0 .. .. .. .. .. � .2 6 * * � .2 5 * * � .1 9 * � .0 8 1 .0 0 6 . % w h it e 1 9 9 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .2 4 * * � .0 4 � .3 5 * * � .7 9 * * * � .0 5 1 .0 0 7 . % b la ck 1 9 9 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. � .1 5 .1 4 .4 4 * * .8 3 * * * � .1 2 � .8 6 * * * 1 .0 0 8 . % H is p a n ic 1 9 9 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. � .1 1 � .2 3 * * � .2 4 * * � .2 5 * * .3 3 � .0 1 � .4 7 * * * 1 .0 0 9 . A n ti b la ck sp a ti a l la g .. .. .. .. .. .1 2 .0 0 � .0 3 � .1 1 .1 5 .2 0 * * � .1 6 .0 1 1 .0 0 1 0 . A n ti w h it e sp a ti a l la g .. .. .. .. .0 8 .1 5 .1 3 .2 7 * * .1 4 � .1 9 * .2 0 * � .0 4 .6 8 * * * 1 .0 0 1 1 . U n em p lo y m en t .. .. .. .. .. .. .. � .2 0 * .0 6 .3 6 * * .8 7 * * * � .1 2 � .7 9 * .7 8 * * * � .1 6 � .1 3 .2 4 * * 1 .0 0 1 2 . B la ck u n em p lo y m en t .. .. .. .. � .0 5 .1 2 .1 8 .3 7 * * .0 6 � .3 3 * * .2 7 * * � .0 3 � .1 1 � .0 5 .4 6 * * * 1 .0 0 1 3 . W h it e u n em p lo y m en t .. .. .. .. � .1 8 .0 6 .0 4 .3 0 * * � .0 4 � .2 8 * * .2 4 * * .0 2 � .1 1 .0 0 .3 2 * * .1 3 1 4 . P o v er ty .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. � .2 1 * .0 7 .3 9 * * .8 4 * * * � .0 2 � .7 9 * * * .7 0 * * * � .0 5 � .1 6 .1 8 .9 3 * * * .4 9 * * * 1 5 . P u b li c a ss is ta n ce .. .. .. .. .. .. . � .2 1 * .0 8 .3 3 * * .8 7 * * * � .1 1 � .8 0 * * * .8 0 * * * � .2 0 * � .1 5 .1 9 .9 5 * * * .4 3 * * 1 6 . S in g le m o th er s .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . � .2 1 * .0 5 .3 5 * * .8 3 * * * � .0 7 � .8 0 * * * .7 9 * * * � .1 5 � .1 3 .2 5 * * .9 5 * * * .4 5 * * * 1 7 . O w n er (v s. re n te r) .. .. .. .. .. . .2 6 * * .1 2 � .3 6 * * � .5 4 * * * � .2 3 * * .5 3 * * * � .3 3 * * � .1 6 .1 5 � .0 2 � .5 6 * * * � .4 1 * * 1 8 . M o b il it y in p a st fi v e y ea rs .. . � .1 4 � .0 8 .2 4 * * � .1 2 .2 9 * * .2 0 * � .3 1 * * .1 9 * .0 0 � .1 1 � .1 7 .0 4 1 9 . D is a d v a n ta g e .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. � .2 5 * * .0 3 .3 6 * * .8 6 * * * � .0 1 � .8 1 * * * .7 6 * * * � .1 1 � .1 5 .2 0 * .9 4 * * * .4 5 * * * 2 0 . R es id en ti a l st a b il it y .. .. .. .. .. .1 1 .0 6 � .2 8 * * .0 5 � .2 9 * * � .1 3 .2 3 * * � .1 6 .0 2 .1 1 .1 3 � .0 7 2 1 . IC E .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . .2 8 * * .0 7 � .2 2 * * � .7 8 * * * � .0 4 .7 9 * * * � .6 2 * * * � .8 9 * * * .1 6 � .1 2 .1 6 � .1 9 2 2 . C o ll ec ti v e ef fi ca cy .. .. .. .. .. . .3 5 * * .0 9 � .3 0 * * � .6 0 * * * � .2 7 * * .7 1 * * * � .5 1 * * * � .6 9 * * * .1 7 � .1 9 .1 7 � .0 1 2 3 . In fo rm a l so ci a l co n tr o l .. .. .. . .4 1 * * .1 9 � .2 1 * � .5 0 * * * � .2 5 * * .5 7 * * * � .4 0 * * � .5 8 * * * .1 4 � .1 8 .1 4 .0 1 2 4 . S o ci a l co h es io n .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .2 7 * * .0 1 � .3 2 * * � .6 0 * * * � .2 6 * * .7 2 * * * � .5 3 * * � .6 9 * * * .1 7 � .1 8 .1 7 � .0 2 This content downloaded from 128.95.71.159 on Thu, 2 Apr 2015 21:41:18 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp T A B L E A 1 (C o n ti n u ed ) 1 3 1 4 1 5 1 6 1 7 1 8 1 9 2 0 2 1 2 2 2 3 2 4 1 . A n ti b la ck ra te .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 2 . A n ti w h it e ra te .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 3 . C ri m e ra te (1 9 9 8 – 2 0 0 2 ) .. .. .. . 4 . V io le n t cr im e ra te .. .. .. .. .. .. . 5 . L o g p o p u la ti o n 1 9 9 0 .. .. .. .. .. 6 . % w h it e 1 9 9 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 7 . % b la ck 1 9 9 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 8 . % H is p a n ic 1 9 9 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 9 . A n ti b la ck sp a ti a l la g .. .. .. .. .. 1 0 . A n ti w h it e sp a ti a l la g .. .. .. .. 1 1 . U n em p lo y m en t .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 1 2 . B la ck u n em p lo y m en t .. .. .. .. 1 3 . W h it e u n em p lo y m en t .. .. .. .. 1 .0 0 1 4 . P o v er ty .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .2 9 * * 1 .0 0 1 5 . P u b li c a ss is ta n ce .. .. .. .. .. .. . .3 5 * * .9 4 * * * 1 .0 0 1 6 . S in g le m o th er s .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . .3 0 * * .9 2 * * * .9 3 * * * 1 .0 0 1 7 . O w n er (v s. re n te r) .. .. .. .. .. . � .1 4 � .7 4 * * * � .5 5 * * * � .5 8 * * * 1 .0 0 1 8 . M o b il it y in p a st fi v e y ea rs .. . � .1 1 .0 3 � .1 9 � .1 6 � .5 7 * * * 1 .0 0 1 9 . D is a d v a n ta g e .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .3 1 * * .9 8 * * * .9 7 * * * .9 5 * * * � .7 0 * * * � .0 4 1 .0 0 2 0 . R es id en ti a l st a b il it y .. .. .. .. .. .1 2 � .0 7 .1 6 .1 0 .6 3 * * * � .9 7 * * * .0 0 1 .0 0 2 1 . IC E .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . � .8 7 * * * � .4 4 * * � .3 1 * * � .9 4 * * * .6 9 * * * .0 5 � .9 3 * * * � .0 4 1 .0 0 2 2 . C o ll ec ti v e ef fi ca cy .. .. .. .. .. . � .6 7 * * * � .4 0 * * � .3 3 * * � .7 7 * * * .7 3 * * * � .2 6 * * � .7 5 * * * .3 0 * * * .7 2 * * * 1 .0 0 2 3 . In fo rm a l so ci a l co n tr o l .. .. .. . � .5 6 * * * � .3 4 * * � .3 4 * * � .6 7 * * * .7 0 * * * � .3 5 * * * � .6 5 * * * .3 6 * * * .6 6 * * * .9 0 * * * 1 .0 0 2 4 . S o ci a l co h es io n .. .. .. .. .. .. .. � .6 7 * * * � .3 9 * * * � .2 9 * * � .7 6 * * * .6 7 * * * � .1 8 � .7 4 * * * .2 3 * * * .6 9 * * * .9 6 * * * .7 4 * * * 1 .0 0 N o t e .— P ea rs o n co rr el a ti o n s; ce n su s d a ta fr o m th e 1 9 9 0 S F 3 ; N p 7 7 co m m u n it y a re a s. * P ! .1 0 . * * P ! .0 5 . * * * P ! .0 0 1 . This content downloaded from 128.95.71.159 on Thu, 2 Apr 2015 21:41:18 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp A P P E N D IX B T A B L E B 1 N e g a t iv e B in o m ia l R e g r e ss io n s: C o m m u n it y E c o n o m ic a n d S o c ia l C a p it a l a n d A n t ib l a c k H a t e C r im e s (A ll R ep o rt ed In ci d en ts ), 1 9 9 7 – 2 0 0 2 M o d el 1 M o d el 2 M o d el 3 M o d el 4 M o d el 5 M o d el 6 M o d el 7 M o d el 8 M o d el 9 M o d el 1 0 M o d el 1 1 C o n st a n t .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. � 4 .3 6 * * � 5 .2 8 * * � 5 .2 9 * * � 4 .8 1 * * * � 4 .5 6 * * � 1 1 .9 9 * * � .8 .5 8 * * � 7 .8 3 * * � 7 .9 9 * * � 7 .6 2 * * � 5 .0 5 (1 .7 3 ) (1 .7 0 ) (1 .6 9 ) (1 .8 6 ) (1 .8 5 ) (2 .6 4 ) (2 .8 2 ) (2 .9 3 ) (3 .2 9 ) (3 .3 9 ) (4 .1 1 ) L n p o p u la ti o n 1 9 9 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .5 7 * * .6 4 * * .6 6 * * .5 8 * * .5 9 * * .8 5 * * .6 7 * * .6 9 * * .6 4 * * * .6 5 * * * .5 7 * * * (. 1 7 ) (. 1 6 ) (. 1 6 ) (. 1 8 ) (. 1 8 ) (. 1 7 ) (. 1 8 ) (. 1 8 ) (. 1 8 ) (. 1 8 ) (. 1 7 ) S p a ti a l p ro x im it y .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .5 6 * * .2 8 .2 6 .2 8 .2 8 .3 1 .2 5 .2 7 .2 6 .2 6 .0 1 (. 2 6 ) (. 2 2 ) (. 2 3 ) (. 2 2 ) (. 2 2 ) (. 2 5 ) (. 2 2 ) (. 2 2 ) (. 2 1 ) (. 2 1 ) (. 1 9 ) D is a d v a n ta g e .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. � .6 0 * * � .5 4 * * � .5 2 * * � .4 9 * * � .3 6 � .3 4 � .4 2 (. 1 3 ) (. 1 4 ) (. 2 5 ) (. 2 4 ) (. 2 6 ) (. 2 6 ) (. 2 7 ) S ta b il it y .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . � .0 5 � .0 3 � .0 4 � .0 3 � .1 2 � .1 1 � .1 1 (. 1 0 ) (. 1 1 ) (. 1 1 ) (. 1 1 ) (. 1 3 ) (. 1 4 ) (. 1 2 ) W h it e u n em p lo y m en t .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. � .0 2 (. 0 2 ) % w h it e 1 9 9 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .0 0 3 .0 1 * * .0 0 4 � .0 1 (. 0 1 ) (. 0 0 4 ) (. 0 1 ) (. 0 4 ) % b la ck 1 9 9 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. � .0 0 4 � .0 1 * * � .0 0 4 (. 0 1 ) (. 0 0 4 ) (. 0 1 ) % H is p a n ic 1 9 9 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . .0 1 .0 0 2 .0 1 .0 0 3 .0 0 6 .0 0 2 .0 1 (. 0 1 ) (. 0 1 ) (. 0 1 ) (. 0 1 ) (. 0 1 ) (. 0 1 ) (. 0 1 ) In fo rm a l so ci a l co n tr o l .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 1 .3 4 * * 1 .1 5 * * 1 .1 7 * * 1 .1 2 * * 1 .1 1 * * .7 0 * * (. 4 7 ) (. 4 6 ) (. 4 5 ) (. 5 4 ) (. 5 4 ) (. 8 6 ) S o ci a l co h es io n .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. � .0 5 � .4 8 � .4 4 � .4 3 � .4 3 � .5 3 (. 3 7 ) (. 4 1 ) (. 4 0 ) (. 4 4 ) (. 4 3 ) (. 3 7 ) This content downloaded from 128.95.71.159 on Thu, 2 Apr 2015 21:41:18 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp T A B L E B 1 (C o n ti n u ed ) M o d el 1 M o d el 2 M o d el 3 M o d el 4 M o d el 5 M o d el 6 M o d el 7 M o d el 8 M o d el 9 M o d el 1 0 M o d el 1 1 % ch a n g e in b la ck p o p u la ti o n , 1 9 9 0 – 2 0 0 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. � .5 7 * (. 3 2 ) In fo rm a l so ci a l co n tr o l # % w h it e .. . .0 0 5 (. 0 1 ) In fo rm a l so ci a l co n tr o l # % ch a n g e in b la ck p o p u la ti o n .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . .1 8 * (. 1 0 ) % w h it e 1 9 9 0 # % ch a n g e in b la ck p o p u la ti o n .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. � .0 1 2 * (. 0 0 7 ) In fo rm a l so ci a l co n tr o l # % w h it e # % ch a n g e in b la ck .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . .0 0 3 * * (. 0 0 1 6 ) O v er d is p er si o n .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .7 8 .5 5 .5 4 .5 3 .5 4 .6 0 .5 0 .5 0 .4 8 .4 8 .2 6 (. 1 7 ) (. 1 3 ) (. 1 3 ) (. 1 3 ) (. 1 3 ) (. 1 4 ) (. 1 3 ) (. 1 3 ) (. 1 2 ) (. 1 2 ) (. 0 9 ) L o g li k el ih o o d .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . � 1 9 8 .6 7 1 8 8 .7 8 � 1 8 7 .8 5 � 1 8 8 .3 6 � 1 8 8 .2 7 � 1 9 1 .8 6 � 1 8 7 .5 7 � 1 8 6 .2 8 � 1 8 6 .1 4 � 1 8 6 .0 6 � 1 7 6 .4 0 N o t e .— N p 7 7 C h ic a g o co m m u n it y a re a s; u n st a n d a rd iz ed co ef fi ci en ts ; S E s in p a re n th es es . * P ! .1 0 . * * P ! .0 5 . * * * P ! .0 0 1 . This content downloaded from 128.95.71.159 on Thu, 2 Apr 2015 21:41:18 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp T A B L E B 2 N e g a t iv e B in o m ia l R e g r e ss io n s: C o m m u n it y C h a r a c t e r is t ic s a n d A n t iw h it e H a t e C r im e (A ll R ep o rt ed In ci d en ts ), 1 9 9 7 -2 0 0 2 A l l C h ic a g o a E x c l u d in g O u t l ie r sb M o d el 1 M o d el 2 M o d el 2 M o d el 3 M o d el 4 M o d el 5 M o d el 6 M o d el 7 M o d el 8 M o d el 9 M o d el 1 0 C o n st a n t .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . � 4 .4 2 * * � 4 .2 2 * * � 4 .7 2 * * � 4 .7 6 * * � 5 .0 1 * * � 4 .2 1 * * � 2 .8 6 � 4 .0 3 � 4 .2 9 � 6 .1 7 * � 5 .5 9 * (1 .6 2 ) (1 .6 8 ) (1 .5 7 ) (1 .5 7 ) (1 .6 1 ) (1 .6 5 ) (2 .3 7 ) (2 .7 5 ) (2 .6 0 ) (3 .2 2 ) (3 .1 3 ) L n p o p u la ti o n 1 9 9 0 .. .. .. .. .. .5 0 * * .4 8 * * .5 2 * * .5 2 * * .5 1 * * .5 1 * * .5 1 * * .5 6 * * .5 8 * * .5 4 * * .5 4 * * (. 1 6 ) (. 1 6 ) (. 1 5 ) (. 1 5 ) (. 1 6 ) (. 1 6 ) (. 1 6 ) (. 1 6 ) (. 1 6 ) (. 1 7 ) (. 1 6 ) S p a ti a l p ro x im it y .. .. .. .. .. .. .5 6 * * .5 8 * * .5 0 * * .5 1 * * .4 7 * * .4 8 * * .5 2 * * .4 4 * * .4 2 * * .4 5 * * .4 4 * * (. 2 1 ) (. 2 2 ) (. 2 1 ) (. 2 1 ) (. 2 1 ) (. 2 1 ) (. 2 0 ) (. 2 1 ) (. 2 1 ) (. 2 2 ) (. 2 2 ) E co n o m ic d is a d v a n ta g e .. .. .. .0 1 .1 9 * .1 8 � .0 1 � .0 8 .0 4 � .0 1 (. 1 1 ) (. 1 1 ) (. 1 2 ) (. 1 8 ) (. 1 9 ) (. 2 2 ) (. 2 2 ) R es id en ti a l st a b il it y .. .. .. .. .. � .0 5 � .1 8 * � .1 8 * � .2 3 * * � 2 4 * * � .2 6 * * � .2 7 * * (. 1 1 ) (. 1 1 ) (. 1 1 ) (. 1 1 ) (. 1 1 ) (. 1 3 ) (. 1 2 ) B la ck u n em p lo y m en t 1 9 9 0 .. . .0 0 3 (. 0 1 ) % w h it e 1 9 9 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . � .0 1 * � .0 1 � .0 1 (. 0 0 6 ) (. 0 1 ) (. 0 1 ) % b la ck 1 9 9 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . .0 1 .0 0 3 .0 1 (. 0 1 ) (. 0 0 ) (. 0 1 ) % H is p a n ic 1 9 9 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. . .0 0 3 � .0 0 4 -. 0 0 1 � .0 0 4 .0 0 4 � .0 0 3 (. 0 1 ) (. 0 1 ) (. 0 1 ) (. 0 1 ) (. 0 1 ) (. 0 1 ) In fo rm a l so ci a l co n tr o l .. .. .. . � .8 8 * � .8 0 � .8 0 .4 1 .3 2 (. 5 2 ) (. 5 2 ) (. 5 2 ) (. 5 5 ) (. 5 5 ) S o ci a l co h es io n .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . � .2 7 � .1 4 � .0 1 .1 7 .2 7 (. 3 7 ) (. 4 3 ) (. 4 4 ) (. 4 6 ) (. 4 6 ) O v er d is p er si o n .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . .3 6 .3 6 .2 0 .2 0 .1 9 .1 9 .2 3 .2 1 .2 1 .1 9 .1 8 (. 1 4 ) (. 1 4 ) (. 1 1 ) (. 1 1 ) (. 1 1 ) (. 1 1 ) (. 1 2 ) (. 1 2 ) (. 1 2 ) (. 1 1 ) (. 1 1 ) L o g li k el ih o o d .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . � 1 4 7 .8 6 � 1 4 7 .7 6 � 1 3 0 .9 6 � 1 3 0 .9 2 � 1 2 9 .9 7 5 1 2 9 .3 1 � 1 3 2 .5 7 � 1 3 1 .9 9 � 1 3 1 .6 1 � 1 2 9 .8 7 � 1 2 9 .1 0 6 N o t e .— U n st a n d a rd iz ed co ef fi ci en ts ; S E s in p a re n th es es . a N p 7 7 C h ic a g o co m m u n it y a re a s. b N p 7 4 C h ic a g o co m m u n it y a re a s. * P ! .1 0 . * * P ! .0 5 . * * * P ! .0 0 1 . This content downloaded from 128.95.71.159 on Thu, 2 Apr 2015 21:41:18 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp T A B L E B 3 N e g a t iv e B in o m ia l R e g r e ss io n s: C o m m u n it y C h a r a c t e r is t ic s a n d “B o n a fi d e ” V io l e n t A n t ib l a c k H a t e C r im e s, 1 9 9 7 – 2 0 0 2 M o d el 1 M o d el 2 M o d el 3 M o d el 4 M o d el 5 M o d el 6 M o d el 7 M o d el 8 M o d el 9 M o d el 1 0 M o d el 1 1 C o n st a n t .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. � 4 .7 9 * * � 6 .9 3 * * � 6 .8 5 * * � 6 .5 1 * * � 6 .1 8 * * � 1 3 .7 1 * * * � 1 0 .0 2 � 8 .9 5 * * � 8 .1 9 * � 7 .2 8 � 1 1 .9 5 * * (2 .1 9 ) (2 .3 5 ) (2 .3 5 ) (2 .5 4 ) (2 .4 8 ) (3 .6 7 ) (3 .8 9 ) (3 .9 3 ) (4 .4 3 ) (4 .4 6 ) (5 .8 1 ) L n p o p u la ti o n 1 9 9 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .5 2 * * .7 1 * * .7 1 * * .6 2 * * .6 9 * * .8 6 * * * .6 4 * * .6 8 * * .6 2 * * .6 9 * * .6 6 * * (. 2 1 ) (. 2 2 ) (. 2 2 ) (. 2 4 ) (. 2 5 ) (. 2 4 ) (. 2 5 ) (. 2 4 ) (. 2 5 ) (. 2 5 ) (. 2 4 ) S p a ti a l p ro x im it y .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .7 3 * * .3 7 .3 6 .3 6 .3 6 .3 9 .3 3 .3 6 .3 5 .3 6 � .0 4 .3 3 (. 2 9 ) (. 2 9 ) (. 2 8 ) (. 2 8 ) (. 3 2 ) (. 2 8 ) (. 2 8 ) (. 2 8 ) (. 2 7 ) (. 2 6 ) D is a d v a n ta g e .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. � 6 9 * * * � .6 5 * * � .4 4 � .1 9 � .3 2 � .1 3 � .0 1 (. 1 8 ) (. 2 0 ) (. 3 5 ) (. 3 3 ) (. 3 7 ) (. 3 6 ) (. 3 6 ) S ta b il it y .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . .0 8 .0 9 .1 2 .1 9 .0 5 .1 4 .2 4 (. 1 4 ) (. 1 4 ) (. 1 4 ) (. 1 5 ) (. 1 7 ) (. 1 8 ) (. 1 6 ) W h it e u n em p lo y m en t .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. � .0 1 (. 0 2 ) % w h it e 1 9 9 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .0 0 8 .0 1 * * .0 1 .0 8 (. 0 1 ) (. 0 1 ) (. 0 1 ) (. 0 6 ) % b la ck 1 9 9 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. � .0 1 5 * � .0 2 * * � .0 2 * * (. 0 1 ) (. 0 1 ) (. 0 1 ) % H is p a n ic 1 9 9 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . .0 1 � .0 3 3 .0 1 3 * * � .0 0 2 .0 1 1 � .0 0 4 .0 2 * * (. 0 1 ) (. 0 1 ) (. 0 1 ) (. 0 1 ) (. 0 1 ) (. 0 1 ) (. 0 1 ) In fo rm a l so ci a l co n tr o l .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 1 .3 3 * * 1 .2 1 * * 1 .2 1 * * .9 8 * .9 6 * 1 .9 1 * (. 6 1 ) (. 5 8 ) (. 5 7 ) (. 5 8 ) (. 5 9 ) (1 .0 8 ) S o ci a l co h es io n .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .1 2 � .3 9 � .4 1 � .5 1 � .5 7 � .6 9 (. 4 7 ) (. 5 3 ) (. 5 1 ) (. 5 6 ) (. 5 5 ) (. 4 9 ) This content downloaded from 128.95.71.159 on Thu, 2 Apr 2015 21:41:18 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp T A B L E B 3 (C o n ti n u ed ) M o d el 1 M o d el 2 M o d el 3 M o d el 4 M o d el 5 M o d el 6 M o d el 7 M o d el 8 M o d el 9 M o d el 1 0 M o d el 1 1 % ch a n g e in b la ck p o p u la ti o n , 1 9 9 0 – 2 0 0 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. � .1 0 (. 5 7 ) In fo rm a l so ci a l co n tr o l # % w h it e .. . � .0 2 (. 0 2 ) In fo rm a l so ci a l co n tr o l # % ch a n g e in b la ck p o p u la ti o n .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . .0 3 (. 1 7 ) % w h it e 1 9 9 0 # % ch a n g e in b la ck p o p u la ti o n .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. � .0 3 * * (. 0 1 ) In fo rm a l so ci a l co n tr o l # % w h it e # % ch a n g e in b la ck .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . .0 1 * * (. 0 0 3 ) O v er d is p er si o n .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 1 .0 4 .6 5 .6 6 .6 0 .5 8 .7 7 .5 5 .5 7 .5 3 .5 6 .2 2 (. 3 0 ) (. 2 4 ) (. 2 4 ) (. 2 3 ) (. 2 2 ) (. 2 6 ) (. 2 1 ) (. 2 2 ) (. 2 1 ) (. 2 2 ) (. 1 6 ) L o g li k el ih o o d .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . � 1 3 7 .3 3 � 1 3 0 .3 3 � 1 2 9 .8 6 � 1 2 8 .7 8 � 1 2 7 .4 � 1 3 2 .6 1 � 1 2 6 .6 2 � 1 2 8 .0 8 � 1 2 6 .2 6 � 1 2 7 .6 7 � 1 1 9 .2 3 N o t e .— N p 7 7 C h ic a g o co m m u n it y a re a s; u n st a n d a rd iz ed co ef fi ci en ts ; S E s in p a re n th es es . * P ! .1 0 . * * P ! .0 5 . * * * P ! .0 0 1 . This content downloaded from 128.95.71.159 on Thu, 2 Apr 2015 21:41:18 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp T A B L E B 4 N e g a t iv e B in o m ia l R e g r e ss io n s: C o m m u n it y C h a r a c t e r is t ic s a n d “B o n a fi d e ” V io l e n t A n t iw h it e H a t e C r im e , 1 9 9 7 – 2 0 0 2 A l l C h ic a g o a E x c l u d in g O u t l ie r sb M o d el 1 M o d el 2 M o d el 2 M o d el 3 M o d el 4 M o d el 5 M o d el 6 M o d el 7 M o d el 8 M o d el 9 M o d el 1 0 C o n st a n t .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . � 4 .5 7 * * � 3 .7 5 * � 4 .0 0 * � 3 .9 6 * � 4 .0 1 * � 3 .5 4 1 .1 9 � .4 6 � .2 3 � 3 .6 1 � 3 .9 8 (2 .1 0 ) (2 .1 0 ) (2 .1 1 ) (2 .1 2 ) (2 .1 9 ) (2 .2 7 ) (3 .0 6 ) (3 .4 0 ) (3 .7 0 ) (4 .1 5 ) (4 .3 0 ) L n p o p u la ti o n 1 9 9 0 .. .. .. .. .. .4 6 * * .3 7 * .3 8 * .3 9 * .3 7 * .3 6 * .3 3 * .3 9 * .3 8 * .3 8 * .3 8 * (. 2 0 ) (. 2 0 ) (. 2 0 ) (. 2 0 ) (. 2 2 ) (. 2 2 ) (. 2 0 ) (. 2 1 ) (. 2 1 ) (. 2 2 ) (. 2 2 ) S p a ti a l p ro x im it y .. .. .. .. .. .. .7 0 * * .7 1 * * .5 6 * .5 6 * .5 5 * .5 5 * .6 2 * * .5 0 * .5 3 * .5 0 * .5 0 * (. 2 7 ) (. 2 8 ) (. 2 9 ) (. 2 9 ) (. 3 0 ) (. 3 0 ) (. 2 6 ) (. 2 8 ) (. 2 9 ) (. 3 0 ) (. 3 0 ) E co n o m ic d is a d v a n ta g e .. .. .. .2 4 * .3 8 * * .3 9 * * .3 0 .2 3 .2 5 .3 0 (. 1 4 ) (. 1 5 ) (. 1 7 ) (. 2 6 ) (. 2 6 ) (. 2 9 ) (. 2 9 ) R es id en ti a l st a b il it y .. .. .. .. .. � .1 6 � .2 6 * � .2 6 * � .2 8 * � .2 9 * � .3 0 * � .2 9 * (. 1 4 ) (. 1 5 ) (. 1 5 ) (. 1 6 ) (. 1 6 ) (. 1 7 ) (. 1 7 ) B la ck u n em p lo y m en t 1 9 9 0 .. . � .0 0 2 (. 0 1 ) % w h it e 1 9 9 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . .0 0 3 .0 0 3 .0 1 (. 0 1 ) (. 0 1 ) (. 0 1 ) % b la ck 1 9 9 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . � .0 0 6 � .0 0 6 � .0 1 (. 0 0 8 ) (. 0 1 ) (. 0 1 ) % H is p a n ic 1 9 9 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. . .0 0 3 .0 0 0 � .0 0 3 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 5 (. 0 1 ) (. 0 1 ) (. 0 1 ) (. 0 1 ) (. 0 1 ) (. 0 1 ) In fo rm a l so ci a l co n tr o l .. .. .. . � 1 .2 3 * � 1 .2 2 * � 1 .2 2 * � .7 2 � .7 0 (. 7 0 ) (. 7 0 ) (. 7 0 ) (. 7 4 ) (. 7 4 ) S o ci a l co h es io n .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . � .0 3 .2 9 .1 6 .7 2 .6 3 (. 4 9 ) (. 6 0 ) (. 6 0 ) (. 6 2 ) (. 6 2 ) O v er d is p er si o n .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . .5 0 .4 4 .3 9 .3 9 .3 9 .3 9 .3 9 .3 5 .3 6 .3 2 .3 2 (. 2 5 ) (. 2 4 ) (. 2 4 ) (. 2 4 ) (. 2 4 ) (. 2 4 ) (. 2 5 ) (. 2 4 ) (. 2 4 ) (. 2 3 ) (. 2 3 ) L o g li k el ih o o d .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . � 1 1 3 .5 0 � 1 1 1 .3 9 � 1 0 2 .4 5 � 1 0 2 .4 4 � 1 0 2 .3 7 � 1 0 2 .2 1 � 1 0 3 .7 0 � 1 0 3 .1 7 � 1 0 3 .4 2 � 1 0 1 .6 5 � 1 0 1 .3 5 N o t e .— U n st a n d a rd iz ed co ef fi ci en ts ; S E s in p a re n th es es . a N p 7 7 C h ic a g o co m m u n it y a re a s. b N p 7 4 C h ic a g o co m m u n it y a re a s. * P ! .1 0 . * * P ! .0 5 . * * * P ! .0 0 1 . 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work_sg4uinwkjjhundnubyar3ss72y	----	Drivers to Violent Extremism in South Eastern Europe – the North Macedonian Context Güney Doğu Avrupa’da Şiddet İçeren Aşırılığa İten Güçler – Kuzey Makedonya Bağlamı Besa ARİFİ1 1Assoc. Prof., South East European University, Tetovë, Republic of Macedonia ORCID: B.A. 0000-0001-5611-5358 Ceza Hukuku ve Kriminoloji Dergisi-Journal of Penal Law and Criminology 2019; 7(1):27-51 ISSN: 2148-6646 / E-ISSN: 2602-3911 DOI: 10.26650/JPLC2019-0011 Research Article / Araştırma Makalesi http://jplc.istanbul.edu.tr Corresponding author: Besa Arifi, E-mail: b.arifi@seeu.edu.mk Citation: Arifi B, ‘Drivers to Violent Extremism in South Eastern Europe – the North Macedonian Context’ (2019) 7(1) Ceza Hukuku ve Kriminoloji Dergisi-Journal of Penal Law and Criminology, 27. ABSTRACT The Balkans are usually unjustly overlooked when discussing terrorism and violent extremism in the world today. Although not a region where many terrorist incidents occur, the Balkans are the main ‘suppliers’ of Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTF-s) who fight in the Middle East. International statistics rank Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Albania as the biggest sources of FTF-s as per capita of state population. North Macedonia is a part of this reality. This article aims to analyse the drivers to violent extremism in this region. It will try to establish that weak state institutions as well as failure to deal with hate crimes, marginalization and discrimination contribute decisively in the rates of FTF-s coming from this region. It will correlate with the poverty, lack of perspective for the youth, and poor educational systems as a separate category of drivers, as well as try to explain the importance of the conflict history as a very important driver to violent extremism. Most of the Balkan countries updated their legislation criminalizing any kind of involvement with foreign armies; however, not all of them have developed comprehensive and transparent strategies for implementation of Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) and Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE) policies. The article will provide recommendations for developing such strategies. Keywords: Violent extremism, Drivers, South Eastern Europe, Macedonia ÖZ Bugün dünyada terörizm ve şiddet içeren radikalizm tartışılırken Balkanlar genellikle hakettiği ilgiyi görememektedir. Pek çok terör olayının yaşandığı bir yer olmasa da, Balkanlar Orta Doğu’da savaşan Yabancı Terörist Savaşçılarının (FTF) geldikleri bölge itibariyle önemli konumunda bulunmaktadır. İstatistiklere göre uluslararası sıralamada, Kosova, Bosna- Hersek ve Arnavutluk’u kişi başına düşen en büyük FTF kaynağı olarak yer almaktadırlar. Kuzey Makedonya Cumhuriyeti de bu gerçeğin dışında değildir. Bu makale, bölgedeki şiddet içeren radikalizme neden olan itici güçleri incelemeyi amaçlamaktadır. Devlet kurumlarının etkisizleşmesinin yanı sıra nefret suçlarıyla başa çıkmama, ötekileştirme ve ayrımcılığın bu bölgeden gelen FTF’lerin oranlarıyla alakalı olduğunu ve belirleyici bir katkıda bulunduğunu öngörmekteyim. Bunun yanında şiddet içeren radikalizm yoksulluk, genç nüfusun gelecekten ümitli olmayışı, ve ayrı bir kategori olarak başarısız eğitim sistemleriyle ilgili olduğunu ve şiddet içeren çatışma tarihinin radikalleşme için çok önemli bir itici güç olduğunu açıklamaya çalışacağım. Balkan ülkelerinin çoğu, vatandaşlarının yabancı devletlerin ordusuna katılımının her türlüsünü suç olarak niteleyenyasal düzenlemeyi güncelledi ancak, şiddet içeren radikalizmle mücadele ve radikalizmi önleme politikalarının uygulanması için kapsamlı ve şeffaf stratejileri henüz geliştirmedi. Makale, bu tür stratejilerin geliştirilmesi için öneriler sunmayı amaçlamaktadır. Anahtar Kelimeler: Şiddet aşırılıkçılık-radikalleşme, İtici güçler, Güneydoğu Avrupa, Makedonya Submitted: 28.02.2019 • Revision Requested: 08.05.2019 • Last Revision Received: 15.05.2019 • Accepted: 28.05.2019 Published Online: 13.06.2019 https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5611-5358 Ceza Hukuku ve Kriminoloji Dergisi-Journal of Penal Law and Criminology 2019; 7(1):27-51 28 1. Introduction Terrorism and violent extremism are global problems that affect all countries, sparing no victims. The damage done to different societies by persons who are involved in recruiting mostly young people to violent extremist movements and luring them to conflict zones is very large and serious. It is even more so in countries where the population is small and where the problems of migration and brain-drain are a threat to the existence of the state itself. Therefore, radicalization, violent extremism and terrorism should be studied carefully and treated seriously by state institutions, religious communities, civil society organization (CSO-s), the media and other stakeholders. Counter-terrorism strategies usually involve exclusively the institutions of intelligence and interior affairs of a state. However, dealing with radicalization, identifying and preventing violent extremism involves many other stake holders apart from the state institutions, thus their voices need to be heard when decisions and strategies on Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) are reached. The Western Balkan countries are tackled with the problem of radicalization and violent extremism in many ways. The number of Foreign Terrorist Fighters coming from these countries cannot be ignored. In 2015 the Soufan Group has found that: ‘At least 875 fighters have travelled to Syria from the Balkans, with fighters coming from at least seven different countries in the region. Almost 800 of these fighters come from just four countries—Albania, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Macedonia—all located in the western Balkans.’ (The Soufan Group, 2015, p.17). The difference of ideologies of radicalization is also to be taken into consideration. Foreign fighters coming from this region are involved in different conflict zones depending on the radicalizing ideology. Therefore, dealing with this problem in the Western Balkan region requires a serious undertaking involving many institutions and also regional and international assistance. North Macedonia has had different approaches to the problem of violent extremism through the past years. It has mostly treated terrorism and violent extremism under the same standards without creating any separate strategies and methods of intervention. Under these circumstances, the International Community has made important efforts to raise awareness about the seriousness of the problem and the importance of tackling it properly referring to the sensitivity of the issue. The OSCE Mission to Skopje, The United States Embassy in Skopje and USAID, the British Embassy and other international organizations and representatives have provided Besa ARİFİ / Drivers to Violent Extremism in South Eastern Europe – the North Macedonian Context 29 important assistance to local institutions, Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), religious communities and academia aiming to conduct research about this problem or develop strategies and policies for dealing with it. In February 2018, the newly established National Committee for Countering Violent Extremism and Counter-Terrorism (NCCVECT) and the Office of the National Coordinator for CVE and CT (NCoCVECT), with the support of the USAID involved into developing two new strategies: The National Strategy for CT and The National Strategy for CVE. In this regard, the OSCE Mission to Skopje and the British Embassy in Skopje, through the logistical support of the National Youth Council of Macedonia organized two round table discussions (in Skopje and in Tetovo) with different stake-holders aiming to discuss the forms of identification of radicalization and violent extremism, as well as the forms of preventing it through different programs involving different state institutions and CSO-s. For the first time in history North Macedonia has established separate Strategies for Counter Terrorism (CT) and Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) as well as separate action plans for their implementation. The findings of this research article are based on desk research as well as on the recommendations that derived from the previously mentioned round tables which served as an input to the development of the strategies and action plans. 2. Defining Radicalization, Radicalism, Violent Extremism, Political Violence and Terrorism A distinction should be made between the terms ‘radicalization’ and ‘violent extremism’. Although there is no universally accepted definition in academia or government (Schmid, 2013, p. 5), a general understanding of these concepts deriving from theoretical and empirical research is already established. Schmid in his paper “Radicalization, De-radicalization and Counter-radicalization” offers comprehensive understanding and support to the thesis that radicalization and violent extremism are not the same concepts as well as that not all forms of radicalization lead to use of violence and extremism. He offers a re-conceptualized definition on ‘radicalisation’ and describes it as: ‘An individual or collective (group) process whereby, usually in a situation of political polarization, normal practices of dialogue, compromise and tolerance between political actors and groups with diverging interests are abandoned by Ceza Hukuku ve Kriminoloji Dergisi-Journal of Penal Law and Criminology 2019; 7(1):27-51 30 one or both sides in a conflict dyad in favour of a growing commitment to engage in confrontational tactics of conflict-waging. These can include either (i) the use of (non-violent) pressure and coercion, (ii) various forms of political violence other than terrorism or (iii) acts of violent extremism in the form of terrorism and war crimes (Schmid, 2013, p. 17).’ Schmid explains that radicals are not per se violent and while they might share certain characteristics (e.g. alienation from the state, anger over a country’s foreign policy, feelings of discrimination) with (violent) extremists, there are also important differences (such as the willingness to engage in critical thinking). According to this author, it does not follow that a radical attitude must result in violent behaviour (Schmid, 2013, p. 8). On the other hand, the same author characterizes violent extremists as political actors who tend to disregard the rule of law and reject pluralism in society, and strive to create a homogeneous society based on rigid, dogmatic ideological tenets; emphasizing that they seek to make society conformist by suppressing all opposition and subjugating minorities. That distinguishes them from mere radicals who accept diversity and believe in the power of reason rather than dogma. Always according to Schmid, in the context of democratic societies, (violent) extremist groups, movements and parties tend to have a political program that contains many of the following elements: 1. Anti-constitutional, anti-democratic, anti-pluralist, authoritarian; 2. Fanatical, intolerant, non-compromising, single-minded black-or-white thinkers; 3. Rejecting the rule of law while adhering to an ends-justify-means philosophy; 4. Aiming to realize their goals by any means, including, when the opportunity offers itself, the use of massive political violence against opponents. This is a very important observation which is crucial to the way how Countering Violent Extremism needs to be developed, having in mind that de-radicalizing a violent extremist is a much more serious and difficult task in comparison to de- radicalizing a radical. Schmid emphasizes that it makes sense to distinguish between (open-minded) radicals and (closed-mind) extremists (Schmid, 2013, p. 10). This distinction is also important for another reason. Violent extremism and terrorism are nowadays most of the time directly linked to Islamist Violent Extremism. Besa ARİFİ / Drivers to Violent Extremism in South Eastern Europe – the North Macedonian Context 31 However, it should be clearly stated that violent extremism is related not only to the radicalized interpretation of one religion (since it also appears in other religions thus not only in Islam, as well as in armed conflicts that involve non-Muslims: thus, there are FTF-s who fight in Syria and Iraq (Igric, 2016) and in the Ukraine Beslin & Ignjatijevic, 2017)), as well as other radical political ideologies of far-right or far-left movements. What is important for these developments is that as Schmid observes, extremists in power tend towards totalitarianism. He cites Jeffrey Bale who noted that: ‘[…] despite their seemingly absolute rejection of Western values and their claims to be purely Islamic in inspiration, several Islamist leaders and thinkers were strongly influenced by and indeed borrowed considerably from modern Western political ideologies and movements such as nationalism, communism and fascism, in particular their techniques of organization (the establishment of front groups and parallel hierarchies), propaganda, ideological indoctrination and mass mobilization (Schmid, 2013, p. 9-10).’ Thus, it is important to establish that all forms of violent extremism in history and those that are relevant today have common characteristics which relate to the use of ideology and propaganda to achieve indoctrination and mass mobilization. Furthermore, it is important to distinguish between terrorism and other forms of political violence. As Schmid indicates, ‘We should also acknowledge that there are certain forms of violent resistance to political oppression that, while illegal under national law, are accepted by international humanitarian law (Schmid, 2013, p. 13).’ On the other hand, terrorism, as well as torture, war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide belong to a special category of violence that cannot be justified under any circumstance. The European Union’s Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism of 2002 defines terrorism as: ‘Criminal offences against persons and property that, given their nature or context, may seriously damage a country or international organization where committed with the aim of: seriously intimidating a population; or unduly compelling a Government or international organization to perform or abstain from performing any act; or seriously destabilizing or destroying the fundamental political, economic or social structure of a country or an international organization (European Union, 2002)’. Ceza Hukuku ve Kriminoloji Dergisi-Journal of Penal Law and Criminology 2019; 7(1):27-51 32 The concept of radicalization as a source of confusion is also analyzed by Sedgwick (2010), whereas Borum (2011) has offered a review of conceptual models and empirical research on radicalization into violent extremism. Thus, it is important to distinguish between the terms radicalization, violent extremism, political violence and terrorism. As Schmid indicates: ‘The relationship between radicalism, radicalization and terrorism is a complex one. John Horgan has noted correctly that ‘the relationship between radicalization and terrorism is poorly understood’ – ‘[n]ot every radical becomes a terrorist’ and ‘[n]ot every terrorist holds radical views’ (Schmid, 2013, p. 17).’ Making these distinctions is crucial to developing effective CVE tools. 3. Defining Drivers to Violent Extremism The USAID has developed a Summary of Factors Affecting Violent Extremism (regarding mostly the Islamist type of Violent Extremism) and has divided these factors into three major groups (USAID, 2009): I. Enabling environment factors II. Pull factors III. Push factors Under Enabling Environment Factors the USAID has identified the following: 1) Weak states with ineffective security services and problems in implementing rule of law; 2) Existence of poorly governed or ungoverned areas inside the state; 3) State support of violent extremist groups; and 4) Pro-active religious agendas where “Pro-active,” refers to groups that are pressing cultural demands on others. Under Pull Factors the USAID has identified the following: 1) Existence of VE groups with a compelling narrative and attractive objectives; 2) Existence of radical institutions or venues (mosques, madrasas) which may be uncontrolled by the state; Besa ARİFİ / Drivers to Violent Extremism in South Eastern Europe – the North Macedonian Context 33 3) Social networks and group dynamics which play a critical role in radicalization and recruitment. Individuals may drift into VE groups with friends or as a result of the influence of relatives, neighbors or a charismatic local preacher; 4) Provision of services (responding to unmet expectations and needs) and 5) Greed or the prolife ration of illegal economic activities. USAID has identified three groups of Push Factors: socioeconomic, political and cultural drivers: Under Socioeconomic Drivers the USAID enumerates: 1) Social exclusion and marginality; 2) Societal discrimination and 3) Frustrated expectations and relative deprivation; Under Political Drivers the USAID enumerates: 1) Denial of political rights and civil liberties; 2) Harsh government repression and gross violations of human rights; 3) Foreign occupation; 4) Political and/or military encroachment; 5) Endemic corruption and impunity for well-connected elites; 6) Local conflicts; 7) Discredited governments and missing or co-opted legal oppositions; 8) Intimidation or coercion by VE groups and 9) Perception that the international system is fundamentally unfair and hostile to Muslim societies and peoples. Under Cultural Drivers the USAID enumerates: 1) Islam under siege: A strong correlation exists between VE success and the perception that the West is attacking Islam and Muslims. 2) Broader cultural threats: Population may perceive a broader cultural threat – to traditions, customs, values and sense of collective/individual honor & dignity. This represent an inclusive system of depicting drivers to violent extremism which occur in many parts of the world and can be applicable not only to Islamist type of violent extremism. Ceza Hukuku ve Kriminoloji Dergisi-Journal of Penal Law and Criminology 2019; 7(1):27-51 34 When the SEE region is analyzed, Perry (2016), indicates that in South East Europe, with the exception of Turkey, violent extremism is primarily viewed through the prism the threat of the ISIL/Daesh. Other forms of extremism, such as domestic right-wing extremism, are noted as a secondary concern, if acknowledged at all. Perry and other authors note that small countries like Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Albania provide for a large number per capita of FTFs that when compared to the rate of other states, clearly indicates the seriousness of the problem in this region. In regard to the question why these small countries have become so deeply involved in violent extremism and what exactly lures these mainly young persons to the battlefields in Syria and Iraq, it is important to emphasize the following findings. Shtuni (2015) indicates the following factors that contribute to involvement in violent extremism: - history of violent mainly ethnic conflicts with sharp religious undertones, - lack of economic development and very high unemployment rates, - weak institutions, - persistent ethnic tensions and - lingering territorial disputes. Other authors such as Kursani (2015), indicate the importance of integration in the community as well as the problem of marginalization of rural areas through lack of investments by the central government. Moreover, he tackles the problem of the weak educational system which does not meet the requirements of the market, therefore, the gained knowledge shows to be unuseful for the graduated students who also show a high drop off rate in schools (Kursani, 2015, p. 10). It is very important to indicate marginalization of ethnic and religious minorities as a driver to violent extremism. This is mostly evident in Republic of North Macedonia and other countries such as Bosnia and Herzegovina that experience difficult issues in regard to discrimination and marginalization of ethnic and religious groups. Severe forms of discrimination and bias attacks towards the marginalized group can develop in hate crimes. Most of the countries in the region, North Macedonia in particular, have experienced yet another important problem of highly politicized state institutions that have shown strong elements of discriminatory operation, which makes the marginalized groups feel intimidated and not trusting towards them (Selimi & Stojkovski, 2016). Many men and women who join terrorist Besa ARİFİ / Drivers to Violent Extremism in South Eastern Europe – the North Macedonian Context 35 groups in the Middle East or elsewhere are in search for Utopia. As Shabani and Kadri (2018) indicate, it is understandable that a person living in a state that functions with policies of double standards may become disappointed on the weak and not functioning institutions, hence prone to extremist preaching which has also been available directly in communities, filling the gaps left empty by corrupt religious and political leaders (Shabani & Kadri, 2018). If the importance and availability of online preaching and spreading of propaganda is added, it becomes evident that a person who has nothing to lose can become lured to such a ‘religious idealism’. However, one must also have in mind that there are also exceptional cases where persons who do not experience any kind of violence, intimidation, marginalization or poverty, still become involved in violent extremism. Thus the deep impact of online propaganda needs to be seriously considered and reflected by effective counter-narratives. 4. Defining Countering Terrorism, Countering Violent Extremism and Prevention of Violent Extremism There are many different definitions of Countering Violent Extremism and Preventing Violent Extremism. As Davis (2018) indicates, sometimes the terms are used interchangeably, and sometimes CVE is directed more to counter-narratives, identifying and deterring those at risk or even already radicalized, while PVE goes further back to lay foundations for building resilience to extremism across a wide spectrum of people. PVE is sometimes seen as the ‘softer’ side of counter-terrorism (CT), involving non- traditional security actors such as teachers, social workers, community leaders, youth and women in addition to the traditional CT actors such as policymakers, senior government officials, police officers and intelligence officials (Davies, 2018, p.4). Zeiger and Ali combine CVE and PVE in their definition of CVE as: ‘... programs and policies for countering and preventing radicalization and recruitment into violent extremism and terrorism as part of an overall counter- terrorism strategy and framework. This definition is inclusive of strategic, non- coercive counterterrorism programs and policies including those involving education and broad-based community engagement; more targeted narrative/ messaging programs and counter-recruitment strategies; disengagement and targeted intervention programs for individuals engaging in radicalization; as well as de-radicalization, disengagement and rehabilitation programs for former violent extremist offenders (Zeiger & Aly, 2015, p.2)’. Ceza Hukuku ve Kriminoloji Dergisi-Journal of Penal Law and Criminology 2019; 7(1):27-51 36 These authors explain that traditional counter-terrorism focuses on the denial of opportunities for terrorist activity by disrupting recognized terrorist groups. PVE, by contrast, aims to get to the root of violent extremism by challenging the ‘push’ and ‘pull factors’ that can lead to radicalization and violence. It aims to prevent the recruitment of individuals into violent extremist groups by providing positive alternatives to engagement or reengagement in violent extremism (Zeiger & Aly, 2015, p.2). Therefore, the Strategies for CT and CVE in North Macedonia need to establish distinctive measures that refer to Counter Terrorism (which are to be implemented by state officials and intelligence services), Countering Violent Extremism (developing counter-narratives to VE) as well as establishing a comprehensive system of soft measures of Preventing Violent Extremism through a broad-based community engagement. 5. Institutions and Stakeholders involved in CT, CVE and PVE in North Macedonia The Republic of North Macedonia (RNM) shares most of the problems with the remaining Balkan countries in regard to violent extremism. Hence, the high rates of unemployment, poverty, evident discrepancy of urban and rural areas, the weak and politicized state institutions, a weak and often changed educational system which has been concentrated on quantitative rather than qualitative approaches, extremist preaching and parallel religious communities, exposure to online propaganda, etc. all contribute to the threat of becoming involved in violent extremism. Moreover, there is very few conducted research in regard to this issue, hence, very few empirical data that would suggest qualitative and comprehensive information in this regard. Moreover, the security and intelligence state institutions should consider sharing of unclassified information with citizens, hence informing them and raising the awareness on the accurate situation with CVE in RNM (Bogdanovski, 2014, p.8). On the other hand, an important issue in regard to RNM is the fact that state institutions have misused their competences in the past to disguise unrelated incidents as terrorism, therefore, the lack of trust towards these institutions is evident. An important development in regard to CVE in RNM was the criminalization of the participation in foreign armies in order to prevent and punish the citizens of this country to join the ISIL, the minimal sentence being 5 years imprisonment (Criminal Besa ARİFİ / Drivers to Violent Extremism in South Eastern Europe – the North Macedonian Context 37 Code of RM, Article 322-a). In this regard two major cases of arrest and conviction of Islamist radicals who consequently pleaded guilty are known as the operations called “Cell 1” and “Cell 2”. Unfortunately, the mere incrimination of fighting in foreign armies or by any means helping their cause will not address the complete problem of radicalization and violent extremism, therefore, it is very important that national strategies are developed in consultation with the civil sector and the researchers to produce a comprehensive system of de-radicalization and prevention of violent extremism. In this regard, developing a rehabilitation and re-socialization program is crucial in order to prevent both recidivism and further radicalization in prisons. In this regard, the state institutions in RNM should consider developing mechanisms of trust and confidence with citizens, since violent extremism is best prevented through working closely with communities. In this regard, state institutions should once and for all detach from using the threat of violent extremism as a means to justify the arbitrary state control and overruling of checks and balances mechanisms or even the annulment of rule of law, as this has often occurred in the past. In the Round-Table Discussions in Skopje and Tetovo representatives from the National Committee for CVE and CT were present. An important note of the National Coordinator for CVE and CT (NCoCVECT) was that Violent Extremism and Terrorism are not only security problems, rather, they represent wider sociological problems. The NCoCVECT indicated that a priority to this state institution is to establish inter- institutional and international cooperation in regard to CVE, PVE and CT. Until recently, there were no separate programs or strategies on CT and CVE in RNM. The position of National Coordinator for CT was established in 2014 whereas the first Strategy for Counter-Terrorism was adopted in 2011, however, as the current NCoCVECT indicated, the strategy was never effectively implemented since the action plan and other tools of implementation were not adopted by the government. Therefore, the Establishment of the National Committee for CVE and CT is a major step forward. The NCCVECT was established on July 2017. The Committee is responsible directly to the Prime Minister, whereas functionally it operates within the General Secretariat of the Government of RM. The committee is constituted by 22+22 representatives of state institutions. Two separate Strategies were developed, one for CT and the other for CVE. The National Coordinator has two Deputies, respectively, one for CVE and one for CVE. Ceza Hukuku ve Kriminoloji Dergisi-Journal of Penal Law and Criminology 2019; 7(1):27-51 38 The aim of the Strategies according to the NCoCVECT is to: 1) Distinguish between prevention and repression of extremism 2) Develop and strengthen the coordination between the state institutions represented in the NCCVECT. 3) Develop the Strategies on CVE and CT and the Action Plans in parallel 4) Establishing a good coordination in the international, regional, national and local level The strategic priorities of the NCCVECT include: 1) PREVENT flows of FTF and militants and root causes of radicalization and extremism 2) PROTECT the people, their property, key and critical infrastructure from all threats, that are clear and present as well as potential and growing 3) PURSUE threats of VE and T at their root in safe havens and where ever they pose clear danger to people and infrastructure 4) RESPOND actively, aggressively, but always in ways that are transparent and consistent to the rule of law (EU refers to spirit of solidarity, to manage and minimise the consequences of a terrorist attack, by improving capabilities to deal with the aftermath, the coordination of the response and the needs of victims) When it comes to developing strategic aims in regard to CVE and PVE, it is important to take into consideration that the involvement of non-state actors is crucial. Soft measures of PVE can only be implemented successfully through an essential and constant cooperation between the state institutions, education workers (teachers, professors and academics), the religious communities, representatives of youth and women, CSO-s and the media. Representatives from all these important stakeholders were present in both Round-Table Discussions. Their findings and recommendations will be presented in the following subtitles. 6. Discussion of the results The following findings were presented at the end of the Round-Table Discussions in Skopje and Tetovo. 6.1. Findings regarding the theoretical approach on radicalization and VE Radicalization should be perceived as a process in which a marginalized group tents Besa ARİFİ / Drivers to Violent Extremism in South Eastern Europe – the North Macedonian Context 39 to express their attitude in a way which gradually becomes aggressive. Radicalization can take many forms, and not always is identified as something negative. There are forms of radicalization which can be healthy for the development of the society. However, some forms of radicalization can lead to Violent Extremism (VE). VE is a point in that process when the group decides that the use of violence to achieve certain goals is legitimate and acceptable. That is the point when the use of violence becomes perceived as a normal and natural reaction to the sources of radicalization in the first place. Violent extremists use ideologically motivated violence. The ideology can be political (extreme rightest or leftist political views), religious (where the misinterpretation of religions becomes essential) or driven by a certain campaign (such as protection off the environment, animal rights, etc.). Therefore, the general condemnation of violence is a very important task to be perceived by all society stake-holders. 6.2. Findings regarding Push and pull factors Push factors are conditions of the person or situations in their life that push them away from mainstream society and cause them to be more susceptible to radicalization whereas pull factors draw the individual towards the acceptance of violent extremism with positive incentives. If the push and pull factors are identified on time, chances of de-radicalization are better. Research shows that more than 60% of the process of radicalization can be turned back and the person can be de-radicalized and rehabilitated. 6.3. Push and pull factors in the North Macedonian context When dealing with CVE and PVE in North Macedonia, the local context of push and pull factors needs to be taken into consideration. Numerous push factors can be identified in the country. The echo of the surrounding armed conflicts in the 1990ties was deeply felt in Macedonia, furthermore, there have been persons who actively participated in the conflicts related to the disintegration of the former Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia. Moreover, the country had a conflict of its own in 2001 and not all persons who participated in it managed to become integrated in the society afterwards. The existence of conflict-situations makes separations in society more vivid and therefore, the de-humanization of Ceza Hukuku ve Kriminoloji Dergisi-Journal of Penal Law and Criminology 2019; 7(1):27-51 40 potential victims is easier. The country and the citizens have suffered from continuous non-functional rule of law and lack of good governance which makes the struggle against terrorism particularly difficult. The country has also a history and still a reality of ethnic, national religious discrimination. Groups of people feel politically or socio- economically marginalized. Other push factors that can be identified in the country include: searching for identity or difficulties in combining two different identities (usually the struggle is between the national and religious identity or the ethnic and national identity), difficult or destructive family relations, searching for purpose, as well as a will to make a difference. The factors that pull persons from North Macedonia to join violent extremist groups include: a sense of belonging, a sense of purpose, significance, respect or status in the group, feeling of power and control, community and friendship, clear rule of life to adhere to, security, attractive ideological arguments, confidence that one stands for good and fights evil. The persons involved in extremist groups usually do so because the group offers them an organized and effective entity with clear rules that function in practice, a sense of solidarity, belonging, purpose, significance and respect. These are usually things they lack in their everyday life in the country where they encounter many of the push factors enumerated above. 6.4. Challenges perceived in regard to CVE in North Macedonia One of the main challenges in regard to the approach towards CVE in RNM is related to the manner how the profile of a terrorist is usually perceived. The stereotypization of the profile of the terrorist as a young man, from a rural background, with a beard, most often represents a serious impediment to correctly define a terrorist and distinguish such behaviour from practicing religion or participating in a certain ideology movement. The round-table discussions revealed that psychologists also feel challenged and are unsure if they have an authority to deal with the primary and high school students that might show signs of radicalization. There isn’t a roadmap for profiling a violent extremist nor is there a set of mechanisms for the process of reaction once the profiling has been completed. Another important challenge is the lack of or very limited credible research within the local communities in order to determine the contributing factors towards radicalization of the community. Besa ARİFİ / Drivers to Violent Extremism in South Eastern Europe – the North Macedonian Context 41 Furthermore, one of the main problems is the islamization of terrorism which contributes in the radical structures to use such narratives to create divisions in the society and further radicalize the members of the Muslim community. Profiling of the terrorist with a race, religion, ethnic group makes that group more susceptible to radicalization. The radicalization in prison also consists an important challenge in dealing with VE. The re-socialization and re-integration of prisoners is a general challenge for the penitentiary system in Macedonia, and because re-socialization programs do not work properly, it becomes very challenging to organize de-radicalization programs in prison. The imprisoned persons share their radical view with the inmates, especially given that they possess communication devices such as telephones that can be used for further recruitment. No clear de-radicalization re-integration programs exist for the prisoners that have been involved in foreign wars. 6.5. Identification of future steps Strengthening rule of law institutions is crucial to establishing effective institutions that will deal with CVE and PVE. For the citizens to have trust in state institutions they need to have proof that they provide service and protection to all citizens equally. Developing a culture of dialogue between state institutions and society is therefore crucial. Thus, state institutions must promote and guarantee human rights and acceptance of diversity. They must take effective and prominent measures against discrimination and develop mechanisms of peaceful resolution of conflicts. The state institutions involved in CVE need to be locally present especially in areas tackled with more VE cases. When police and security actions need to take place, it is crucial that these state institutions take care about human rights and building trust with the local community. A close cooperation of the state institutions with CSO-s who work in this field is therefore very needed. A special emphasis should be given to CSO-s that involve actively women and children in the process of identifying signs of radicalization and later also in the process of de-radicalization. CSO-s can be very helpful in developing and implementing campaigns of raising awareness on VE. It should be clear that there is not an only way to deal with VE, therefore the entire society must be included. The use of a holistic approach towards CVE is crucial. Ceza Hukuku ve Kriminoloji Dergisi-Journal of Penal Law and Criminology 2019; 7(1):27-51 42 7. Recommendations The following recommendations ca be drawn from the desk research and the results of the Round-Table Discussions held in Skopje and Tetovo. 7.1. Definitions It is important to distinguish clearly between radicalization, violent extremism, political violence and terrorism. Research shows that not all forms of radicalization lead to violent extremism, however, radicalization is a strong root to the VE phenomenon. The moment when a radical movement becomes supportive of use of violence must be perceived as a crucial point of radicalization. In regard to violent extremism it is important to distinguish between ideologies behind it, it can be religion, it can be nationalism, it can be a certain social attitude. A holistic approach towards defining violent extremism tends to include all forms of extremism that use violence regardless of their nature. In the Balkans and in Macedonia, religious and nationalistic and extremism are more common, however, it must be kept in mind that other forms of extremism exist, such as left-wing or right wing political extremism, environmental extremism, etc. When violent extremism is analysed, it is important to make a distinction between forms of radicalization since not all forms of radicalization are bad. Being radical in relation to an issue does not mean that one becomes automatically a violent extremist or a terrorist. There are major social movements that have become radical in part of their history, however their results have been in general positive. It is the use of violence that usually makes the distinction between acceptable and non-acceptable undertakings. Therefore, the use of violence should be closely tackled in CVE and PVE approaches. Sometimes there are social narratives that tent to create the attitude that violence is acceptable in certain occasions. It is very dangerous when the society itself builds a narrative that certain forms of violence are acceptable. Therefore, a general condemnation of violence as a narrative should be developed and supported. 7.2. Rule of Law North Macedonia as well as other countries in the region often have found that establishing effective rule of law is a major challenge. Establishing accountability for crimes committed regardless of the status of their perpetrator is an essential part of Besa ARİFİ / Drivers to Violent Extremism in South Eastern Europe – the North Macedonian Context 43 rule of law. North Macedonia has struggled for long to establish effective accountability, especially when it comes to crimes committed by persons of power. Lack of accountability provides security to perpetrators of crimes that they will not be held responsible for wrongdoing. In that way, lack of accountability makes countering violent extremism additionally difficult as it empowers extremists to come back as heroes in the communities. Violent extremism flourishes in areas where inequality, discrimination and hate crimes are not effectively dealt with. Serious efforts are needed to decrease inequality and discrimination in society. Persons, communities and groups of people should feel safe in their state and should be able to trust the institutions and the rule of law. The dissatisfaction in the treatment of the communities that are minority, particularly the Roma community, has the potential of bringing the community to the danger of being involved in radicalized groups. Hate speech and hate crimes should be addressed properly by state institutions. Failure to address them properly decreases the trust in these institutions and contributes to the marginalization of persons, communities and groups. Macedonia still struggles to establish an effective system of prosecuting hate crimes. The incriminations found in the Criminal Code of RM in this regard are still not effectively implemented in reality, thus, there is not yet a court verdict that punishes hate crimes, nor is there a system of identifying these crimes in the police and prosecution authorities. This situation contributes to the marginalization of groups and communities and further decreases their trust towards the state institutions. 7.3. Police and security institutions It is important to build an intimate cooperation between the state institutions: first of all, between the police officers and local communities. The most important goal for this cooperation should not be gathering of information, it should be building trust and partnership. Proportional representation of communities in police forces is a very important step to build the trust towards the police. Good practices have developed in this regard after the Ohrid Framework Agreement and trust towards the police has been ameliorated in regard to ethnic communities. Barriers of inter-institutional communication and coordination in regard to violent extremism need to be overcome. Good coordination between prosecuting authorities Ceza Hukuku ve Kriminoloji Dergisi-Journal of Penal Law and Criminology 2019; 7(1):27-51 44 as well as between the police and other CVE and CPE authorities is crucial for early identification of signs of extremism and for effective prevention and countering of VE. 7.4. Prevention vs. repression Prevention of VE has lately gained in importance in regard to establishing strategies and action plans of CVE. Taking the CVE from repression to prevention is a major step forward that needs to continue developing in the future. However, for the moment the criminal law is repressive and the sentences imposed in the CCRM are draconic in regard to cases of violent extremism. Forms of intervention prior to opening an investigation and prosecution should be considered in the future amendments of the law in order to stimulate and motivate the radicalized persons who have withdrawn from extremism in early stages to become an important part of prevention and de-radicalization policies. Developing such policies of de- radicalization is crucial to the overall success of CVE and PVE. 7.5. Re-socialization, rehabilitation and reintegration Re-socialization, rehabilitation and reintegration of radicalized persons and participants in extremist groups remains a major challenge in North Macedonia having in mind the poor conditions in penitentiary institutions and the lack of effective re-socialization programs. Radicalization in prisons continues to be a major problem in North Macedonia. Therefore, it is crucial that the penitentiary institution distinguishes between recruiters and recruits, and develops separate re-socialization policies for both categories. Training of the staff that works with re-socialization of this part of prison population is essential for the success of programs of de-radicalization. While in prison, persons convicted for crimes related to VE have the right to practice faith. This is essentially their only encounter with the religious clerks. It is not sufficient to allow prisoners to practice their faith only, but the religious communities need to be involved in the process of de-radicalization. For an effective re-socialization project, the religious clerics should be allowed to have access to prisons as to have more contacts with such persons. Spaces of worship within prisons should be opened in consultation with the IRC in order not to allow such spaces to be misused in further radicalization of the inmates or be in service of radical groups outside of the prison. Besa ARİFİ / Drivers to Violent Extremism in South Eastern Europe – the North Macedonian Context 45 The Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, social affairs officers as well as probation officers also require special trainings to develop de-radicalization programs aimed as post-penal assistance for the incarcerated persons released on probation or released after end of sentence. 7.6. Local Community Units Local Community Units can play a major role in identifying cases of radicalization and extremism. For this purpose, the government should work on revitalizing Local Community Units since they can play an important role in CVE. Local centres for prevention of crime have been established in 2008 by municipalities, however, most of them are dysfunctional since there are no financial means for their maintenance. They should become functional and furthermore, a good coordination between the Local Community Units, Centres for Crime Prevention, police officials, schools, local religious communities and local CSOs should be developed. 7.7. Education High school teachers and managers of high schools need to be trained for identifying early signs of radicalization in high schools. The most important signs of radicalization become evident in high schools. However, the raising of awareness for CVE should not only be focused on high schools (secondary schools), it should also include primary schools, since intervening only in high schools could be a belated intervention for the problem. There is need to strengthen education and training of teachers as well as social affairs officers in order for them to identify early signs of radicalization through investing in programs for their continuous training and support. The family and the preschool age children should be involved in the education against violence. Curriculums that will informs students on the terminology and the process of radicalization should be introduced in schools and universities. Schools and universities should consider the development of critical thinking as a preventive measure for a young person to be able to identify the consequences of extremist views and have more critical approach towards any content or information they encounter. Radicalization and involvement in extremist groups often develops among young people who have a lot of spare time. Most of young people in North Macedonia are not involved in many extra-curricular activities in their schools. Therefore, they Ceza Hukuku ve Kriminoloji Dergisi-Journal of Penal Law and Criminology 2019; 7(1):27-51 46 spend a lot of time on the internet and social networks that can lead to their involvement in extremist groups. This is why developing extra-curricular activities with students is essential. Investing in the education of parents is also essential, because they have a big impact on the development of their children’s attitude. The state and the society need to invest in creating role models and heroes, sport activities, cultural, artistic activities, etc. through developing comprehensive and sustainable models of active use of the spare time of the students. Parents should be educated in order to apply parenting control and other monitoring mechanisms to the use of internet by children. 7.8. Parents/Women/Children Working in the triangle parent-student-teacher is crucial to the implementation of CVE and PVE programmes. It is also important that religious clerks, the police officers and CSOs are also included in that pedagogical triangle. A general perception of professionals who work with the young population shows that children and young people show signs of accumulated aggression. Forms of dealing with it should be developed and institutionalized in educational programmes. Women have a very important role in identifying early signs of radicalization. Therefore, it is crucial that programmes that have created good practices such as the project Mothers’ School to further be developed and continue to raise awareness of women and mothers in regard to early signs of radicalization. A form of that development could be the creation of counselling institutions that would develop programs of support for the families and a better coordination between the parents and the teachers. 7.9. Building dialogue and understanding between different communities It is important to build an integrated society as opposed to ethnical division. Knowing and trusting each other helps prevent the spread of violent extremism. It is important to build a culture of accepting diversity as an advantage, not as a handicap, through developing critical thinking in schools, as well as a culture of debate and acceptance of different opinions and disagreements among each other. Disagreements should not regularly lead people to conflicts. Such aims can be fulfilled by investing in programs of integrated studies where the students can get to know the diversity around them. The political will to make Besa ARİFİ / Drivers to Violent Extremism in South Eastern Europe – the North Macedonian Context 47 dealing with diversity a priority issue is essential, and it can be developed through investing in making the integrated studies an essential part of the educative curriculum. 7.10. Religious communities An online platform of communication and joint messages from different religious communities should be created. All religions that are practiced in North Macedonia have many common aspects that should be enhanced through spreading messages of proactive unity rather than separation. Representatives of religious communities have complained that dubious financing of certain organizations has been continuously ignored by the state institutions. Better control of the finances of charity organizations and an institutionalized communication between the religious communities and the state institutions is needed. There is a need for coordination and cooperation between the Islamic Religious Community and the relevant state institutions as to prevent certain radical groups to create parallel structures to those of the IRC (mosques, schools, kindergartens). When a community has issues with radicalization, it is of utmost importance that the community deals with the topic and solves the issue, for the benefit of the community itself. Hiding the problem and considering it as something remote to the community does not help dealing with it. Therefore, the community should involve proactively into finding ways to help the CVE and PVE programs. The role of the Committee for Inter-Religious Relations is crucial and it should be taken very seriously. The Committee has been passive and counter-productive until now. The reforming of the Preacher’s Glossary should be supported. The most prevalent online presence of Islam is the radicalized interpretation of it. Therefore, there is immanent need to develop a better counter-narrative system as an answer to the radicalized version of Islam most commonly preached on internet. The role of the IRC in creating such counter narratives is crucial, thus preventing such narratives to be used in recruiting, radicalizing and sending young people in foreign wars. 7.11. Raising awareness, media, social networks Brainwashing is the cornerstone of extremist radicalization. Lack of education and the financial factor play major roles in the recruitment process. Therefore, the state should invest in a serious campaign on raising awareness about violent extremism as a general social problem. It should also invest in developing a comprehensive counter-narrative Ceza Hukuku ve Kriminoloji Dergisi-Journal of Penal Law and Criminology 2019; 7(1):27-51 48 system. At the moment, only the extremist narrative is present in the social media and the internet. It is good to involve also CSO-s in the process of raising awareness. The state needs to also deal more effectively with hate speech. Use of hate speech and incitement of violence in social media should be carefully followed and effectively prosecuted by the eligible institutions (public prosecution and anti-discrimination bodies). 7.12. Role of CSO-s: Reorganization and inclusion of the informal local communities would help in the prevention of the radicalization by providing local responses and information. Strengthen the human capacities within CSOs, there is a lack of expertise in the field of prevention of radicalization. State institutions should work towards funding the work of the CSOs at least partially as to allow for proper development of the civil sector. Community centres should be opened in every community, alternative spaces for the community members to spend time together and to feel more as part of the community. The lack of social activities both for young people and for others is a major problem in the country. Besides the activities offered by the CSOs there are no activities for young people to be involved with. If institutions do not find mechanisms that would accumulate the energy of the students towards more beneficial activities, they can be easily become a target of radical groups. The CSOs can be more helpful within the framework of developing soft measures of CVE and PVE. Without the support from the other factors such as CSOs, religious communities, local communities, and every group that is outside of the state apparatus, there cannot be viable and effective results in the fight against violent extremism and terrorism. 7.13. Specific issues for the RNM Strategies for CVE and CT: The strategy should use a holistic approach in regard to CVE and present it as a general problem. All forms of appearance of violent extremism should be addressed as well as the motivation and ideology behind them. Extremism in the context of Macedonia has appeared in several forms, often misused from the government by labelling one group as extremist. The Strategy should consider establishing Local coordinators for CVE who will work with the Local Units and the Local Centres for Prevention. The strategy should also develop a platform on counter-narratives in social networks. Besa ARİFİ / Drivers to Violent Extremism in South Eastern Europe – the North Macedonian Context 49 Effective supervision of the implementation of the strategy should be planned and implemented. Its implementation has to be supervised by international actors. Effective state budgeting on CT and CVE issues should be established. Good practices from other states should be included. Neighbouring states such as Kosovo have achieved great accomplishment in regard to CVE and PVE strategies. A good regional cooperation and coordination would be very helpful in this regard. Composition of the National Committee on CT and CVE should reflect the ethnic- religious and gender composition of the country. The National Committee should include within its membership other actors such as the civil sector and the religious groups, not only state institutions. The roles and responsibilities of the ministries and institutions that are part of the National Committee should be clearly divided so that each and everyone knows what should be done. 8. Conclusion This paper has aimed to analyse the concept of radicalisation, violent extremism and terrorism. It has offered a research analysis of these concepts based on a literature review and findings of authors who have developed theoretical definitions. On the other hand, this article has thoroughly analysed the data gathered from the empirical analysis of the push and pull factors offered in two round table discussions held in Skopje and Tetovo, in Republic of North Macedonia. 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Washington: United States Institute of Peace. Vidino, L. (2009). Europe’s New Security Dilemma. The Washington Quarterly , 32 (4), 61-75 . Zeiger, S., & Aly, A. (2015). Countering VIolent Extremism: Developing an evidence-base for policy and practice. Perth, WA, Australia: Hedayah and Curtin University. 
work_sgsagwpjozfq5nyfaqy7vinj7m	----	IP16_Supp01_abstracts.indd IP Safety 2010 abstracts Injury Prevention 2010;16(Suppl 1):A1–A289A18 0066 COMMUNITY SAFETY THROUGH PARTNERSHIP TASKING M Mccall*, D Hayes Correspondence: Fife Community Safety Partnership, first floor North Wing Kingdom House Saltire Centre Glenrothes, KY6 2AQ, UK 10.1136/ip.2010.029215.66 Partner Agencies Include Fife Community Safety Partnership Fife Police Fire Service RSL’s Victim Support Fife NHS Fife Fife Council Education/Social Work Service Environmental Services Housing and Local Services. The establishment of the Safer Neighbourhoods Tasking Group and the adoption of a multi-agency tasking approach, involving key local services, combined with effective com- munity engagement has led to greatly improved community perceptions and begun to address the links between antisocial behaviour and longer term problems of health inequalities and community cohesion. Monthly meetings use a tasking approach, based on the police National Intelligence Model, to gather and manage informa- tion and make informed and effective decisions. Community and partnership intelligence is key to the tasking process. A tactical assessment document is produced contain- ing data from all partner agencies. Allocated tasks cover a range of issues, including youth disor- der, under age drinking, noise nuisance, neighbour nuisance, secondary fi res and hate crime. The partnership tasking model encourages a move away from business as usual by providing effective joint approaches and early interventions to reduce the risk of problems escalating and by providing support to victims and offenders. Outcomes Vandalism offences – 30% reduction Secondary fi res – 23% reduction IP16_Supp01_abstracts.indd 18IP16_Supp01_abstracts.indd 18 12/16/2010 5:24:33 PM12/16/2010 5:24:33 PM o n A p ril 5 , 2 0 2 1 b y g u e st. P ro te cte d b y co p yrig h t. h ttp ://in ju ryp re ve n tio n .b m j.co m / In j P re v: first p u b lish e d a s 1 0 .1 1 3 6 /ip .2 0 1 0 .0 2 9 2 1 5 .6 6 o n 1 M a rch 2 0 1 1 . D o w n lo a d e d fro m http://injuryprevention.bmj.com/ IP Safety 2010 abstracts Injury Prevention 2010;16(Suppl 1):A1–A289 A19 Street disorder – 26% reduction Antisocial behaviour (ASB) offences – 9% reduction ASB incidents – 30% reduction Noise nuisance incidents – 43% reduction Public Perception Rubbish and litter (down 38%) Graffi ti and vandalism (down 35%) Assaults/attacks (down 33%) Young people hanging about (down 33%) Work is now underway to roll out the approach to other areas in Fife. IP16_Supp01_abstracts.indd 19IP16_Supp01_abstracts.indd 19 12/16/2010 5:24:33 PM12/16/2010 5:24:33 PM o n A p ril 5 , 2 0 2 1 b y g u e st. P ro te cte d b y co p yrig h t. h ttp ://in ju ryp re ve n tio n .b m j.co m / In j P re v: first p u b lish e d a s 1 0 .1 1 3 6 /ip .2 0 1 0 .0 2 9 2 1 5 .6 6 o n 1 M a rch 2 0 1 1 . D o w n lo a d e d fro m http://injuryprevention.bmj.com/ 
work_shfcuxwdbnhovbqwc2fwuhxkxy	----	‘Cuts are not a viable option’ Kapka, A. (2016). ‘Cuts are not a viable option’: The British Board of Film Classification, Hate Crime and Censorship for Adults in the Digital Age. Journal of British Cinema and Television , 14(1), 77-97. Published in: Journal of British Cinema and Television Document Version: Peer reviewed version Queen's University Belfast - Research Portal: Link to publication record in Queen's University Belfast Research Portal Publisher rights © 2017 Edinburgh University Press. This work is made available online in accordance with the publisher’s policies. General rights Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Queen's University Belfast Research Portal is retained by the author(s) and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights. Take down policy The Research Portal is Queen's institutional repository that provides access to Queen's research output. Every effort has been made to ensure that content in the Research Portal does not infringe any person's rights, or applicable UK laws. If you discover content in the Research Portal that you believe breaches copyright or violates any law, please contact openaccess@qub.ac.uk. Download date:06. Apr. 2021 https://pure.qub.ac.uk/en/publications/cuts-are-not-a-viable-option(ffc30c0e-1cda-40c3-ae5d-f4d15ac67ea0).html 1 ‘Cuts are not a viable option’: the British Board of Film Classification, Hate Crime and Censorship for Adults in the Digital Age Alexandra Kapka Abstract: In March 2015 the British Board of Film Classification (BBFC) refused to classify James Cullen Bressack’s independent film, Hate Crime (2012). This was the Board’s first explicit rejection of a film since 2011, and undermines their attempts to portray themselves as increasingly lenient, in favour of free choice for adults, and open about their processes. This case is of particular interest as the film was to be distributed solely via an online video-on- demand platform. Hate Crime has the dubious honour of being the first film to be refused an eighteen certificate under revised regulations pertaining to the streamed internet distribution of feature films in the UK. Furthermore, this case raises questions about genre boundaries, and about the definition and prioritisation of art cinema within UK institutions. This article engages with the BBFC’s refusal to classify Hate Crime in the light of this particular distribution context. Focusing on media industry, genre and gender studies, the article explores whether or not the BBFC’s decision can be justified, and further, what the consequences of this certification refusal might be in the current media landscape. It suggests that the BBFC’s approach might be out of kilter with the digital world, and in this case, demonstrates a misunderstanding of genre conventions and an unequivocal bias in favour of art-house cinema. 2 Keywords: Streamed internet distribution; censorship; Video-on-demand; BBFC; extreme cinema. In December 2012, the British Board of Film Classification (BBFC) published an updated policy response with regard to the depiction of sexual and sadistic violence (SSV) in film (BBFC 2012). Informed by conclusions drawn from research carried out by Ipsos MORI earlier the same year, this publication, later integrated into the BBFC’s revised guidelines (BBFC 2014a), cemented the arrival of what would turn out to be an increasingly censorial approach to SSV on screen. Despite this clearly evident tightening of the regulations, the BBFC claims to have spent much of Director David Cooke’s tenure softening the interpretation and application of their guidelines (Pett 2014), citing zero outright rejections since 2011, when The Bunny Game (2011) was declined a certificate for DVD distribution, as evidence of increasing leniency. However, in March 2015 the BBFC quietly refused to classify James Cullen Bressack’s Hate Crime (2012). This contemporary, found footage, home invasion-style film tells the story of a Jewish family who are sitting down for dinner in celebration of the youngest child’s birthday, when their home is invaded by three neo-Nazi thugs (named One, Two and Three) high on methamphetamine, and hell-bent on causing chaos and trauma. The film is a 74 minute imagining of an extreme hate crime filmed in point-of-view (POV) shots using a handheld DSLR, and written, directed and scripted by American independent film- maker Bressack. Thoughout the film, the Jewish family are variously subjected to verbal abuse, physical harassment, beating, eyeball gouging, rape, murder and forced incest. Hate Crime is a particularly interesting case for a number of reasons. Firstly, the film represents the BBFC’s only outright rejection of a film in four years. This calls into question the BBFC’s projected image of themselves as increasingly lenient, in favour of free choice for adults, and open about their processes (despite a twenty year embargo on their 3 paperwork). Secondly, the film was to be distributed solely via online streaming. Hate Crime is the first refusal of a certificate for a fictional film under revised regulations pertaining to the world of streamed internet distribution, as will be elaborated below. Thirdly, the film raises questions about genre boundaries and about the definition and prioritisation of art cinema in UK institutions. This article engages with the BBFC’s refusal to classify Hate Crime in the light of its particular distribution circumstances. Focusing on media industry and genre studies, I will explore whether or not the BBFC made a justifiable decision with regard to Hate Crime, and further, the effect that this certificate refusal had on the digital media landscape. The article suggests that the BBFC is not only out of step with the digital world, but also fundamentally misunderstands certain genre conventions. Hate Crime was voluntarily submitted to the BBFC for certification by TheHorrorShow.TV prior to its scheduled release on the platform as part of a season of films co-hosted with Nerdly.co.uk. TheHorrorShow.TV is a video-on-demand (VOD) platform and blog dedicated to horror cinema. The site was established in October 2014, and is registered to an address in London, entailing that it is bound by UK law. TheHorrorShow.TV use their blog to review films and report genre-related news. The site originally included a sparsely populated forum and standard hyperlinks to various social media, but these were removed in early 2016. The objective of TheHorrorShow.TV is to create an online community where horror fans are able to gather and to access easily both their favourite classics and newer, underground horror films, as well as to keep up to date with the latest horror film news. At the time of the ‘Nerdly Presents’ season, the VOD space offered around 250 titles. Modes of consumption offered by the site are multifaceted and complicated. All films are available for streaming on a pay-as-you-go basis, certain are available as download-to-own for a one-off payment, and many (but not all) are available for unlimited streaming through a monthly subscription service, which cost £2.99 per month at the time of ‘Nerdly Presents’. The site http://www.nerdly.co.uk/ 4 also offers a number of films free via either download-to-own or one-off streaming (Night of the Living Dead (1968) being one such title). The service is still in its infancy and is specialised in terms of its potential audience composition. Films are listed in loose sub-genre categories including: Asian, Bargain, British, Cult and Classic, New, Psychological, Sexy and Erotic, Slasher and Gory, and Zombie. Additionally the site also offers collections such as ‘Starburst’s Top 10’, ‘Grimmfest Recommended’ and, of particular relevence to this article, ‘Nerdly presents’. Nerdly.co.uk is also a UK-registered website, run by Phil Wheat, who previously owned, and wrote content for, Blogomatic3000.com (now redirecting to Nerdly.co.uk). The site has a wider focus than TheHorrorShow.TV and specialises in news, reviews and interviews orientated around content that might be broadly classified as ‘nerdy’ or ‘cult’. The site straddles the boundary between fanblog/fanzine and legitimate industry news resource. It focuses on a variety of platforms including TV, cinema, comics, games, books, graphic novels and wrestling. Nerdly.co.uk has been registered since November 2012, but content dates back to October 2010 on account of the transfer of material from Blogomatic3000.com. Nerdly.co.uk launched a new initiative, ‘Nerdly Presents’, in May 2015. This collaboration between Nerdly.co.uk and TheHorrorShow.TV saw Nerdly.co.uk take on the role of pseudo- marketer/distributor in an attempt to bring underground, low-budget or independently produced horror to the UK market. Hate Crime was the film chosen by Nerdly.co.uk to launch the venture. This case is so remarkable precisely because TheHorrorShow.TV is an exclusively online and UK-based VOD platform. Under UK legislation amended in December 2014, all on-demand programme services (ODPS) which are operated from within the UK and which stream ‘television-like’ programming (not user-generated content such as that commonly found on YouTube) are regulated by the Authority for Television on Demand (ATVOD) and 5 are required to adhere to BBFC classification standards.1 That is to say, they are not permitted to stream content which has already been refused certification by the ‘video works authority’designated by the 1984 Video Recordings Act (VRA), namely the BBFC, or, crucially, any material whose nature is such that it is reasonable to expect that, if the material were contained in a video work submitted to the video works authority for a classification certificate, the video works authority would determine for those purposes that the video work was not suitable for a classification certificate to be issued in respect of it. (ATVOD, BBFC et al. 2014) However, this is in itself problematic given that the BBFC Guidelines governing the various classifification certificates can be interpreted in many subjective ways. It is important to note there is no stipulation here that all content hosted by VOD platforms operated from within the UK must legally be certified by the BBFC, only that any content previously refused certification may not be made available, along with any material that might be refused certification were it to be submitted. Thus content not certified by the BBFC may be provided legally, but that the editorial decision concerning what may or may not be streamed has to be informed by due consideration of the BBFC guidelines, and thus of the VRA. TheHorrorShow.TV and Nerdly.co.uk were thereforethus not legally required to submit Hate Crime for classification. The BBFC released the following press statement regarding their rejection of the film: Hate Crime focuses on the terrorisation, mutilation, physical and sexual abuse and murder of the members of a Jewish family by the Neo Nazi thugs who invade their home. The physical and sexual abuse and violence are accompanied by constant strong verbal racist abuse. Little context is provided for the violence 6 beyond an on screen statement at the end of the film that the two attackers who escaped were subsequently apprehended and that the one surviving family member was released from captivity. We have considered the attempt at the end to position the film as against hate-crime, but find it so unconvincing that it only makes matters worse. The BBFC’s Guidelines on violence state that ‘Any depiction of sadistic or sexual violence which is likely to pose a harm risk will be subject to intervention through classification, cuts or even, as a last resort, refusal to classify. We may refuse to classify content which makes sexual or sadistic violence look appealing or acceptable ... or invites viewer complicity in sexual violence or other harmful violent activities. We are also unlikely to classify content which is so demeaning or degrading to human dignity (for example, it consists of strong abuse, torture or death without any significant mitigating factors) that it may pose a harm risk.’ It is the Board’s carefully considered conclusion that the unremitting manner in which Hate Crime focuses on physical and sexual abuse, aggravated by racist invective, means that to issue a classification to this work, even if confined to adults, would be inconsistent with the Board’s Guidelines, would risk potential harm, and would be unacceptable to broad public opinion. Of course, the Board will always seek to deal with such concerns by means of cuts or other modifications when this is a feasible option. However, under the heading of ‘Refusal to classify’ our Guidelines state that ‘As a last resort, the BBFC may refuse to classify a work, in line with the objective of preventing non-trivial harm risks to potential viewers and, through their behaviour, to society. We may do so, for example, where a central concept of the work is unacceptable, such as a sustained focus on sexual or sadistic violence. Before refusing classification we 7 will consider whether the problems could be adequately addressed through intervention such as cuts.’ The Board considered whether its concerns could be dealt with through cuts. However, given the fact that unacceptable content runs throughout the work, cuts are not a viable option in this case and the work is therefore refused a classification. (BBFC, quoted in Wheat 2015) In order to unpack the statement quoted above and explore the BBFC’s reasons for rejecting this film, I will address four specific areas. These are genre and context; viewer complicity and identification; art cinema versus popular cinema, and the BBFC’s inconsistent approach in this area; and Hate Crime’s narrowcast distribution strategy. The article will elaborate the ways in which the BBFC’s approach is out of kilter with the digital world, and demonstrate their misunderstanding of genre conventions and their bias towards art-house cinema. Genre and context The BBFC asserts that ‘little context is provided for the violence’ in Hate Crime, except an ‘on screen statement at the end of the film that the two attackers who escaped were subsequently apprehended’. This statement reflects a failure to understand found-footage horror films, a core characteristic of which is their status as ‘stumbled-upon’. In this context, David Bordwell (2012) prefers the term ‘discovered footage’, highlighting the fact that found-footage actually derives from the avant-garde tradition of re-purposing existing footage in order to create new artwork. Instead ‘the “found” of the contemporary found footage subgenre pertains to plot (footage is discovered)’ (Heller-Nicholas 2014: 14). Whilst the term ‘discovered footage’ might work more clearly to define films such as Hate Crime or, for example, The Blair Witch Project (1999), the enduring and regular usage of the term ‘found- 8 footage’ in mainstream discourse has arguably redefined its meaning and allowed it to function as a shorthand which shapes viewer expectations. In order for found-footage horror to work effectively, it must intrinsically lack context beyond that which may be elucidated by an external narrative structure, or by the inclusion of introductory and/or concluding expositional text. A lack of explanation for the existence of the footage is often used as a device to create suspense. Films feature either minimal editing (as in The Blair Witch Project), are presented as edited by those now in possession of the footage, or are otherwise linked by an overarching external storyline (as in V/H/S (2012), where on-screen characters literally find the footage that constitutes the individual horror stories told within the main narrative). Stories are typically relayed via a recording device controlled by one or more of the characters within the film, or else via webcam or CCTV footage. Found-footage horror is characterised by either shaky camerawork or by fixed camerawork with a limited view, naturalistic acting, and a lack of non-diegetic sound, all of which lend a sense of verisimilitude. The sub-genre lends itself well to low-budget production as it requires very little film-making equipment. Alexandra Heller-Nicholas’ work considers the origins of found-footage cinema and traces its genealogy as a horror sub-genre as far back as 1980 and the release of Cannibal Holocaust. Heller-Nicholas argues that the modern day surge in popularity of found-footage horror is broadly defined as having begun with The Blair Witch Project in 1999 before being temporarily sidelined by the emergence of torture porn (2014: 4). Found-footage horror continued to be explored and refined in the interim through less successful productions such as Book of Shadows: Blair Witch 2 (2000) and The Collingswood Story (2002). Heller- Nicholas credits the rise of YouTube and the amateur media aesthetic for the appearance of [Rec] (2007) and Cloverfield (2008), which paved the way for the phenomenally successful release of Paranormal Activity (2007) in 2009 (ibid.). This resulted in a flood of widely 9 released found-footage horror films. Mainstreaming of the sub-genre saw ‘the threat that a found footage horror film may present actual events that occurred in the real world … eroded through the increasing ubiquity and subsequent familiarity of its codes and conventions’ (Heller-Nicholas ibid.: 14). The codes and conventions of modern found-footage horror, then, have a well- developed foundation, and as a film regulatory body it is not unreasonable to expect the BBFC to be familiar with these. In fact, the very nature of horror, with its tendency to retell the same ‘age old and already worldwide’ stories in marginally differing formats (Clover 1992: 212) means that it is heavily convention-bound and loaded with anticipation. The narrowcast distribution strategy for Hate Crime suggests that this film’s target audience would have a specialist knowledge of horror. Audiences rarely arrive at a horror film without a set of expectations derived from the conventions of the genre and their interaction with horror begins long before a film starts: ‘Horror’s system of sympathies transcends and preexists any given example. Patrons of a slasher film or a rape-revenge film know more or less what to expect well before the film rolls’ (ibid.: 9). This is also true of found-footage horror, which combines recognised genre tropes with established sub-generic codes and conventions familiar to the audience before they view the film. Hate Crime works with these codes and conventions to set a context for the film that reflects that of actual hate crime. Motivation for hate crime is usually societal or individual bigotry, and an intolerance of difference. Hate crimes tend to be emotionally driven and ‘manifest evidence of prejudice based on race, religion, sexual orientation or ethnicity’ (McDevitt et al. 2002: 303). In incidences of hate crime, ‘there appear to be no gains for the assailant: there is no attempt to take money or other personal items, and there is [often] no prior relationship between the victim and offender’ (ibid.: 304). Hate crime is understood as 10 symbolic violence, an attack on a small number of people that functions as a threat to a much larger group. The context of Bressack’s film, a home invasion motivated by hatred, is made clear by both the film’s title and the early dialogue. The opening scene establishes that it is set in a family home. Within the first 30 seconds we know that the family is Jewish - through reference to Hanukkah and Passover – and that the camera is being operated by the father of the family: ‘Dad come on’, ‘Dad stop it’, ‘Why are you filming this, you’re annoying me’. The fact that the family is Jewish is later effectively contrasted with the extreme anti-Semitic language used by the home invaders. The script quite crudely signifies that this is an intrusion motivated by anti-Semitism, and sets the scene for the ensuing cat and mouse game. The BBFC argues that Hate Crime lacks contextual justification for the ‘relentless’ sexual and sadistic violence (SSV) portrayed on screen. This claim hinges on their misunderstanding of found-footage horror, and on a barely concealed belief that the narrative is a tenuous foundational premise constructed to facilitate an indulgent foray into SSV-led shock cinema. By contrast, I would argue that the script makes clearly evident the attackers’ motive and the reason for the existence of the footage. Hate crime is horrific, unexpected, symbolic violence, which is in fact the precise context in which Bressack, himself a Jew and a victim of hate crime (Hunter 2012), sets his film. Furthermore, the impact of found-footage lies within its tendency to play with contextualisation. By doing so, ‘found-footage horror seeks … to create a space where spectators can enjoy having their boundaries pushed, where our confidence that we know where the lines between fact and fiction lie, are directly challenged’ (Heller-Nicholas 2014: 4). In the same way that a hate crime is sudden and unexpected, so the attack within the film happens to the characters with no forewarning, and the film ‘happens’ to the audience in the same fashion. The codes and conventions adopted by Hate Crime allow the viewer to engage safely with the action, to participate in the ordeal 11 alongside the characters, and to investigate the logical extremes of such a horrific act, testing and reaffirming boundaries and beliefs within an ultimately safe space. Despite the inclusion of end titles, the BBFC maintain that Hate Crime still does not provide enough context to mitigate the on-screen violence and sexual violence. They state that whilst examining the film, they had considered Bressack’s ‘attempt at the end to position the film as against hate-crime’, but they then add that they ‘find it so unconvincing that it only makes matters worse’. However, this judgement surely demands elaboration in order to clarify the motivation behind this rejection, otherwise it is little more than a personal opinion. The context of the film could have been made even more immediately obvious had the Board insisted that the film be re-edited so as to include a selection of the end titles at the beginning. Their apparent failure to consider this as a viable option suggests there may have been more at stake for the organisation than just a problem with context. Viewer complicity and audience identification Within the first paragraph of the BBFC statement lies the suggestion that the audience may be confused about which character(s) they are meant to identify or sympathise with, and that thus they may conclude that the film is pro-hate crime. Further to this, threaded carefully throughout the wording about SSV and risk of harm is the suggestion that the film might invite ‘viewer complicity in sexual violence or other harmful violent activities’. For the BBFC, ‘the underlying rationale [of ex-BBFC Director, James Ferman’s policy on sexual and sadistic violence] – that “irresponsible” depictions of rape and sexual assault could cause harm by adversely affecting viewers’ attitudes – remains a fundamental concern today’ (Cooke 2015: 405). That is to say, the BBFC continues to believe that ‘irresponsibly’ to show sexual assault is directly equivalent to encouraging it. BBFC 12 guidelines are constituted on the basis that if a film portrays rape as an enjoyable enough experience for the rapist, it may encourage a ‘vulnerable’ young male viewer to replicate the scene. Similarly, the BBFC harbours concerns that if the female being sexually assaulted appears to enjoy, or begins to enjoy, the experience, this may perpetuate the rape myth: that rape is not always unwanted. Whilst Hate Crime does include three different sexual assaults, there is no positive endorsement of rape, and the representations of rape are substantially less graphic than in films such as I Spit on Your Grave (1978, 2010), The Last House on the Left (1972, 2009), Srpski Film/A Serbian Film (2010) and Irréversible (2002), all previously certified by this organisation, albeit in cut form in certain cases. However, the argument about endorsement has two aspects to it. As mentioned above, the BBFC was concerned that the film may pose a harm risk if it resulted in a change in viewer attitude – the anxiety being that portraying rape as desirable or fun for the victim and/or the perpetrator will instil such beliefs in ‘vulnerable’ young males. The Board also suggests that this may happen due to the way in which a viewer is ‘invited to participate’ in this film through the extensive use of POV camerawork. There are two scenes which the BBFC may have considered particularly problematic in this respect. The first sees the character Three pick up the camera whilst raping the mother of the family and point it at the back of her head. The detail of the penetration in this scene is not shown but is implied through screams, and the rape is confirmed through this movement of the camera into his POV. The camera then moves unsteadily in and out of POV for around 80 seconds. The majority of the footage is of the top of the back of the mother’s head (the rape takes place from behind, over a pool table) and is largely too jerky to enable clear focus for longer than a few seconds at a time. The prolonged nature and intense volume of the scene make it physically uncomfortable to watch, though largely not on account of the actual content. The second scene is a lengthy one featuring One and the Ddaughter locked in the 13 bathroom. In this scene One forces the daughter to strip, and then uses the hand-held camera to track over the girl’s body in a leering fashion. The camera shows his POV and the commentary provocatively includes references to her status as a high school student. This scene is protracted, relatively realistic, and plays with notions of voyeurism. Bressack successfully renders the girl’s distress and fear, and concludes the scene with an implied, off- screen, sexual assault. But the use of such techniques does not set Hate Crime apart from other films in in the genre. There are plenty of examples of voyeuristic cameras in rape- revenge and other types of horror films. In the 2009 remake of The Last House on the Left – a film which was notably passed uncut by the Board ( BBFC 2009), Claire Henry points out that in the lead up to the victim’s rape, the camera work and editing fragment her body, thus objectifying her, and the camera ‘voyeuristically roves up and down her body, lingering on her naked flesh’ (2014: 34). It is important to note the camerawork here does not employ POV shots. As do many film critics, the BBFC operates under the misconception that POV camerawork always directly implicates the audience in the onscreen crime, perhaps giving them the idea that they might enjoy the crime portrayed. In reality, however, viewer identification is far more complex and fluid than this simple assumption allows, especially in relation to horror. POV is often used to ‘heighten spectatorial anxiety and discomfort’ (Projansky 2001: 216). Texts that ‘provide the spectator with an attacker’s point of view do not necessarily equate the spectator with the villain’ (ibid., emphasis in original), instead they often force them to focus more clearly on the victim. The concept of identification in cinema has produced a voluminous amount of theorisation. Clover suggests that most theorists distinguish between a ‘primary identification (with the camera, wherever it may be and whatever it may be up to) and secondary identification (with the character of empathetic choice)’ (1992: 8), both of which are in flux. Characters compete within the narrative to 14 connect with the viewer, and the camera is able to move through and embody different positions. Though POV is widely considered the most personal camera position, it does not always effectively situate the viewer within the mind of a character. The formulaic nature of horror means that ‘it is important to remember that in a large, or gross, or deep-structural sense, the “identifications” of horror are already in place’ (ibid.: 10). The camera may play with the terms, but it does not set them. The camerawork in Hate Crime may force the audience to see through the eyes of a rapist, but it does not (and arguably cannot) force them to identify favourably with him. Instead, throughout the film, this technique places the audience in a variety of uncomfortable positions in order to initiate reflection. Ultimately though, found-footage convention dictates that this family are victims and that the three attackers are villains. The Ddaughter also embodies a hybrid of the rape-revenge victim-hero (when she kills her rapist), and the slasher’s final girl (when she survives against the odds), as is confirmed by the closing titles. The BBFC also labours under the assumption that audience identification is binary and gender defined, a theory evolved from an outdated mode of film analysis which suggests that the camera’s gaze is always male, and always sadistic (for example, Mulvey 1975). Underlying much research conducted for the BBFC, and implicit in its own policies, seems to be the idea that female audience members will only ever be horrified by (and probably choose not to watch) male-on-female sexual violence, and that male audience members will automatically identify with the male character on screen in such a situation. Thus if there is only the rapist and the victim on the screen, male audience members must identify with the rapist. This problem is magnified for the BBFC by the use of POV camera work. But they appear to fail to take into account Clover’s point that ‘male viewers are quite prepared to identify not just with screen females, but with screen females in the horror-film world, screen females in fear and pain’ (1992: 5). Clover highlights empirical evidence that the majority of 15 horror film audiences are male, and yet the majority of horror victim-heroes are female. Under these circumstances it is nonsensical to assume that all male viewers identify with all male characters/aggressors at all times. Men are equally able to process the story and feel through the female victim-hero. Clover’s theory is supported by Annette Hill’s qualitative study, Shocking Entertainment (1997), which demonstrates that women refuse to identify with a rape victim where another positive character is available (male or female). Both male and female identification are shown to shift to different characters throughout a film, depending not just on narrative but also on personal experience. What such findings demand is a deeper, more nuanced understanding of the complexities presented by real audiences’ use of, and identification with, SSV media, in a variety of situations. Martin Barker attempted to achieve this when commissioned by the BBFC to investigate the responses of ‘naturally occurring’ audiences to sexual and sadistic violence in the 2007 study, Audiences and Receptions of Sexual Violence in Contemporary Cinema. However, the BBFC failed to apply any of Barker’s findings to their own policy, citing the limited demographic of research participants as a primary reason for not doing so. Their unwillingness to accept these findings as anything other than ‘interesting’ (in a press release available in Barker 2007) suggests that the organisation has difficulty with, and thus is disinclined to implement, research findings which run counter to their long-held normative assumptions about gender, violence and audience interaction. Whilst I would argue against cutting either of these scenes in the light of a deeper understanding of both POV and the found-footage genre, both could have been disarmed with one or two well-timed edits and/or adjustments to the soundtrack. Neither one of these scenes, taken in isolation, warrants outright rejection of the film, especially given the BBFC’s treatment of similar subjects depicted in other films. Thus vViewer complicity was not an issue for the BBFC in either version of Michael Haneke’s controversial art-house film, Funny 16 Games (1997, 2007), both of which were passed uncut. Whilst neither film is of the found- footage genre, during both of them the main characters speak to the camera, and wink at the viewer – as if the spectator might be in on, and/or enjoying, the ‘game’ at hand. Furthermore, the BBFC has also passed, albeit cut by 15 minutes, a more extreme example of SSV than Hate Crime in Scrapbook (2000). Unacceptable content Having gone into some detail in the early part of the press release, in order to justify the rejection of Hate Crime, the final paragraph makes a case for the rejection of any film. This rationale is founded upon a claim that ‘a central concept of the work is unacceptable, such as a sustained focus on sexual or sadistic violence’. But this raises the question: unacceptable to whom? Simply to the Board? Or to ‘broad public opinion’ as conceived by the Board? Or both? The BBFC has attempted to assess public opinion on numerous occasions since 2000 (see for example: Goldstone Perl Research et al. 2010; Cumberbatch 2011; Goldstone Perl Research et al. 2009; BBFC 2014b). Such research, properly conducted, might begin to make linkages between representative audience samples and censorial decision-making. However, as both Emma Pett (2014) and Martin Barker (2016) have argued, the composition of the focus groups used by the BBFC has been problematic, relying disproportionately on the opinions of parents. The research methodologies deployed in order to gather evidence upon which to base classification policies and guidelines are also, in some cases, designed and guided by the BBFC, opening up the Board to the potential criticism that it has designed research in order to elicit the findings which it desires. One of the outcomes of this body of research has been the evolution of what Barker (2016: 123-4) calls a new, twenty-first century ‘figure of the audience’. These are ‘young men with little life experience’ Formatted: Indent: First line: 1.27 cm 17 (IpsosMediaCT 2012, quoted in ibid.: 121) who, the BBFC claims, are most likely to be negatively influenced by sexually and/or sadistically violent media. Drawing attention to such groups ‘powerfully gives the impression of explaining, while at the same time circumventing the need for evidence’ of harm (ibid.: 123). Furthermore, the way in which much BBFC research is designed suggests that such a group has been configured in advance. Thus research comes to reinforce already existing practices of what Stanley Cohen calls ‘common sense censorship’ (2002: xvii) based on the taken-for-granted moral unacceptability of exploring sexual and / or sadistic violence in film. Creating an environment in which violence and/or sexual violence in the media is automatically viewed as always and definitely harmful, at least to certain ‘vulnerable’ people, and then, through their actions, to society at large, is a good example of how such censorship works. Films such as Hate Crime and The Bunny Game seem to trouble the BBFC precisely because they refuse to follow ‘accepted’ templates for portraying SSV. Elements such as POV, found-footage, documentary aesthetics, and most problematically, a lack of punishment for the perpetrators of the violence, render the ‘message’ of a film oblique and hard to decipher. This kind of thing always worries censors, and the problem here is compounded by the Board’s refusal, noted above, to consider young male viewers as active and adaptable participants in such a filmic experience and to recognise their own desire to protect women from such young men. Clover argues that ‘assaultive gazing in horror is by and large the minority position and … the real investment of the genre is in the reactive or introjective position, figured as both painful and feminine’ (1992: 211). However, both the BBFC, and most film critics, continue to focus on the allegedly sadistic nature of the male spectator, highlighting the sadistic camera in film. Instead, Clover argues, we should appreciate the potential masochism of the male audience member. 18 Remarking on male sadism within a film is usually intended to align the speaker with feminism (for example, the BBFC insisting that through its actions it seeks to protect women), but it actually seeks to ‘naturalize sadistic violence as a fixture of masculinity’ (ibid.: 226). Always to align the male viewer with a sadistic gaze is not only to misinterpret the complex and nuanced ways in which male spectators engage with horror, but it is also part of a wider naturalisation that sees men as only and always patriarchal and abusive (Hooks 2004). It leaves no room for the admittance of alternative readings and acknowledgment of (the potential for) alternative masculinities which would be damaging to the patriarchal social order. As Clover argues, our society’s ‘cultural stake in male sadism in all its forms is such that we cannot afford to see otherwise, even when, as in horror, the “otherwise” is the main point’ (1992: 191), a remark which could well be applied to the manner in which the BBFC treats certain horror films. Marketing and Hate Crime The rejection of Hate Crime by the BBFC led to a certain amount of interesting commentary by both Nerdly.co.uk and TheHorrorShow.TV, as well as from further afield. Given that TheHorrorShow.TV had an inherent interest in both the success, and the legality, of its UK- hosted platform, it was forced to adhere to the BBFC’s ban on the film. This did not stop Nerdly.co.uk issuing a statement filled with overtly anti-censorship sentiments, and eventually using the extra press coverage generated to promote To Jennifer (2013), its replacement opening release for ‘Nerdly Presents’. The response from Nerdly.co.uk included a statement made by Bressack himself, justifying Hate Crime as follows: ‘As a Jewish man, and a victim of anti-Semitic hate, I made a horror film that depicts the very thing that haunts my dreams. As an artist I wanted to tell a story to remind us that we live in a dangerous world; a world where racial violence is on the rise (quoted in Wheat 2015). 19 A parallel can be drawn here between the ways in which the imagery in both Hate Crime and A Serbian Film plays with the boundaries of acceptability in horror cinema (for a discussion of the latter film see Kimber 2014). The directors of both films claim to take a moral and political stance through their films, using extreme concepts to illustrate their respective experiences. In a similar way to Bressack’s explanation of his film, Srđjan Spasojević claimed that A Serbian Film reflected the tumultuous political history of Serbia, and depicted ‘the monolithic power of leaders who hypnotise you to do things you don’t want to do’. To mitigate the extensive SSV in the film, Spasojević suggested, ‘you have to feel the violence to know what it’s about’ (FilmBiz 2010). So why did the BBFC certify a film like A Serbian Film (albeit with significant cuts) and not Hate Crime? The difference seems to be that BBFC did not consider Hate Crime to be convincingly politically motivated, as they did with A Serbian Film (BBFC nd). However, I would suggest that their primary problem with Hate Crime is the film’s ‘quality’ (and therefore its target audience), and only secondarily its content. Under the directorship of David Cooke, BBFC policy relating to SSV moved away from the previous ‘eroticise and endorse’ test that characterised the Ferman era. Instead, SSV is judged by a set of aggravating and mitigating factors, but the decision-making process remains problematic. The basic principle behind the application of the new SSV guidelines is that what is shown must be justified by the context of the film as whole. For example, violent sexual assault may be shown in more detail in order to portray the motivation behind a resultant revenge killing but perhaps in less detail in the case of an incidental rape that does not form an integral part of the narrative. Rejections by the BBFC since 2000 suggest that this is possible (at its most extreme) only in art cinema. Hate Crime is a low-budget and, arguably, low-quality film. The paucity of the budget (Seanofthedead 2014; Roberts 2015) is clearly evident in the production values. The film was funded, produced and distributed worldwide by Psykik Junky Pictures, a production company 20 owned by James Cullen Bressack and his co-writer/business partner, Jarret Cohen. Bressack is known for his ‘underground’ horror (Extreme Horror Cinema 2013): for example To Jennifer was filmed, edited and distributed on an iPhone 5. His work is pigeonholed with other ‘trash’ horror/exploitation/cult films (for example August Underground (2001)). On the other hand, the subject matter of A Serbian Film seems to have elevated it, for the BBFC, from such a lowly generic categorisation and into the art cinema/‘new extremism’ canon. Thus, for example, the Board explained that: ‘Recognising that the film was intended as a political allegory which intended - and needed - to shock as part of its overall thesis, the BBFC attempted to construct the cuts carefully so that the message of the film, as well as the meaning of each individual scene, would be preserved’ ( BBFC nd). This meant that they felt able to classify the film at ‘18’, albeit with cuts, despite the contentious subject matter. A certain pattern can be seen across the rejections made since 2004. Murder-Set- Pieces (2004), NF713 (2009), Gurotesku/Grotesque (2009), The Human Centipede II: Full Sequence (2011)2 and The Bunny Game all emanate from either the USA, the UK or Japan, and were refused certification for any form of UK distribution. Many other controversial films with a focus on sexual or sadistic violence that were classified and released in the same time period (such as Irréversible, Funny Games, Martyrs (2008) and À Ma Soeur/Fat Girl (2001)) are all European. Hate Crime is both low-budget and American. What thus appears to be an art cinema bias within BBFC practice reflects the wider art-house vs popular cinema disparity within film distribution, film criticism and film studies. Beyond Europe itself, European cinema is most commonly characterised as art cinema (Liehm and Liehm 1980; Jäckel 2003; De Valck 2007; Iordanova et al. 2010; Imre 2012). Such cinema benefits from an elevated status and preferential distribution, and has been repeatedly allowed to test, transgress, and at times reaffirm, the boundaries of what UK audiences find acceptable, in a way that popular and niche genre cinema has not. This is largely due to the way in which the 21 BBFC conceive of the audiences for different kinds of cinema. Art cinema is perceived to be less accessible, and therefore less attractive, to those ‘young males with little life experience’ than popular or underground horror might be. Despite, as Clover notes, the traffic between low and high horror films being such that it is unnatural to separate them (see also Betz 2013), lower cinematic forms are assumed to ‘play by definition to male sadistic tastes’ (Clover 1992: 225-6). Regardless of institutional restrictions, a notable result of BBFC decisions to cut or reject a film is the publicity thereby generated. Hate Crime certainly fits this pattern. Admittedly, the film did not attract the attention of the same number of mainstream outlets as did A Serbian Film or The Human Centipede II, probably due to the fact that the intended distribution platform was a VOD website and not a cinema or DVD release. Similarly, the subject matter of Hate Crime is not perceived to be as controversial as that of A Serbian Film which proved particularly problematic by including children in a context of rape and sexual violence. However, the ban on Hate Crime did feature in The Huffington Post (Thompson 2015) and Screen Daily (Sandwell 2015). Alongside this, the rejection was picked up by a large number of online outlets, including numerous specialist film blogs and e-zines that direct traffic to TheHorrorShow.TV (for example, Day (2015); Melon Farmers (2015); Rüdiger (2015); and Williams (2015)). In The Huffington Post, Simon Thompson criticised Bressack’s film, in an article headed: ‘Hate Crime: Why the Censors are Right to Ban the Anti-Semitic Horror’, despite admitting to not having seen it. His main issue with the film was that such crimes ‘DO happen in the real world and they ARE horrifying so why enact them as if they were real events for entertainment?’ (2015 – emphasis in original). But having not viewed the film, Thompson failed to grasp the point that its sole purpose is not entertainment. He went on to 22 state that he does believe that ‘we [adults] can make our own choices’ about what we watch, and should not be told what we can and cannot view. But he then contradicts himself when he states that ‘there are, and have to be, exceptions to that rule’. He continues: ‘There are people that will watch this and enjoy this – they will watch it because they want to see a family being raped, branded, brutalized as entertainment, as fun. It might excite them. It might incite them. And that terrifies me more than any film ever could’. Such views do indeed seem to statement echo the sentiments of many of the interviewees who have taken part in BBFC research (Ipsos MediaCT 2012), particularly those who argued that although a particular film might be safe for them to watch, it would not be so for others. Whilst TheHorrorShow.TV stated in their press release that they were disappointed by the BBFC’s decision, they made it clear that they would adhere to the ban. However, they also highlighted the availability of the film on DVD on Amazon.com, and the film is also available to purchase and stream in the UK through Amazon’s ‘Instant Video’ service. Other publications chose to focus on the ban by promoting the widespread availability of the film online via both streaming and peer-to-peer file-sharing. This does rather suggest that if the film had not been rejected by the BBFC, it would not have gained as much publicity. Indeed, fieldwork carried out amongst horror film fans saw ten percent of respondents discuss Hate Crime voluntarily in their answers.3 During 31 email-mediated interviews, two respondents answered the question: ‘Have you ever discovered/watched a film because you heard through the media that it had been cut or banned?’ by reference to the film: participant 200 stated: ‘Yes. I watched Hate Crime because I heard it was cut for being anti-Semitic but that's just the plot of the film it didn't encourage anti-Semitism and it was a rather rubbish film on top of that’. Similarly, participant 90 said: ‘Yes. I’ve watched several video nasties and the most recent banned film which was Hate Crime for being anti-Semitic. It is not anti-Semitic as it does not premote [sic] the behaviour at all it shows it quite grotesque and horrible’. And 23 participant 24 argued that ‘Hate Crime wouldn't be half as well known as it is were it not for the BBFC banning it in recent years’. This is the crux of the issue with film classification in the digital age. As I have previously noted in relation to A Serbian Film, the notoriety of an adverse BBFC decision can actually benefit a film (Kapka 2014). Thanks to new forms of distribution, the BBFC cannot prevent those that want to see a film from doing so. Instead, a BBFC ban serves as a marketing tool: a badge of honour. Having a film banned is no longer the financial disaster that it was in the 1980s. The Nerdly.co.uk film website, in conjunction with TheHorrorShow.TV, streamed Bressack’s films, and they used this ban to attract fans across the web. The attention drawn to Bressack by the Hate Crime ban thus served as bonus publicity for an otherwise niche film-maker. And without the BBFC, Hate Crime would probably, at best, have flown under the radar, and, at worst, flopped. Furthermore, in this case, the BBFC arguably over-reached their jurisdiction. This is their first rejection, under new legislation intended to control pornography, of a film meant only for online distribution. But the film is not pornographic – at least in the accepted legal sense of the word. It can still be streamed legally into the UK as long as the content provider’s website is not hosted within the borders of this country (although it would be surprising if the government does not seek to close this loophole in the future). But in this case, the decision goes beyond pushing a minority audience to niche torrrenting opportunities: thanks to what could be seen as a shrewd marketing strategy by Nerdly.co.uk (in submitting the film for classification in the first place), and a ban by the BBFC which many consider ill-conceived, Hate Crime has become the focus of media debate and now academic discussion. 24 1. ATVOD began operations in 2010, but in January 2016 its responsibilities were absorbed by Ofcom. 2. This film has been variously classified as American or European depending on the context in which it is being discussed. The film was shot in the UK, directed by Tom Six, who is Dutch, and produced by Six Entertainment Company, although it is often referred to as American.. 3. 201 participants were recruited via a short in-person or online survey at the horror film festivals Frightfest, Abertoir, and the Leeds International Film Festival ‘Fanomenon’ event, and through online horror film fan forums and Facebook groups. Of these, controlled for UK residency, 102 participants left email addresses signalling consent to participate in qualitative email-mediated interviews. Of the email interviews sought, 31 people responded and engaged in in-depth discussion regarding film censorship, ‘extreme’ horror films and the digital distribution of horror. Notes 25 References Authority for Television on Demand, British Board of Film Classification and Ofcom (2014), Memorandum of Understanding between ATVOD, the BBFC and Ofcom, London: ATVOD, available at http://www.atvod.co.uk/uploads/files/MoU_between_ATVOD_Ofcom_and_BBFC.pdf, (accessed 9 May 2015). Barker, M. (2007), Audiences and Receptions of Sexual Violence in Contemporary Cinema, London: BBFC, available at http://www.bbfc.co.uk/sites/default/files/attachments/Audiences%20and%20Receptions%20o f%20Sexual%20Violence%20in%20Contemporary%20Cinema_0.pdf (accessed 9 December 2014). Barker, M. (2016), ‘‘Knowledge-U-like’: the British Board of Film Classification and its research’, Journal of British Cinema and Television, 13:1, pp 121-40. Barrett, J. (nd), ‘More than just a game: breaking the rules in The Bunny Game’, Cine Excess, available at http://www.cine-excess.co.uk/more-than-just-a-game.html (accessed 9 May 2015). Betz, M. (2013), ‘High and low and in between’, Screen, 54:4, pp. 495-513. Bordwell, D. (2012), ‘Return to paranormalcy’, 13 November, available at http://www.davidbordwell.net/blog/2012/11/13/return-to-paranormalcy/ (accessed 27 July 2015). British Board of Film Classification (2014a), The Guidelines, London: British Board of Film Classification. British Board of Film Classification (2014b), BBFC Guidelines 2014: Research Report, London: British Board of Film Classification, available at http://www.bbfc.co.uk/sites/default/files/attachments/2014%20Guidelines%20Research.pdf (accessed 9 May 2015). British Board of Film Classification (2012), Sexual and Sadistic Violence: Response of the BBFC to Public Attitudes and Concerns, London: BBFC, available at http://www.bbfc.co.uk/sites/default/files/attachments/BBFC%20sexual%20and%20sadistic% 20violence%20policy%20response%20December%202012.pdf (accessed 9 May 2015). 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(2014), ‘A new media landscape? The BBFC, extreme cinema as cult, and technological change’, New Review of Film and Television Studies, 13:1, pp. 83-9. Projansky, S. (2001), Watching Rape: Film and Television in Postfeminist Culture, New York: New York University Press. Roberts, H.A. (2015), ‘Hate Crime: A modern day video nasty!’, Hayley’s Horror Reviews, 6 March, available at https://mshayleyr1989.wordpress.com/2015/03/06/hate-crime-a-modern- day-video-nasty/ (accessed 9 May 2015). Rüdiger (2015), ‘Hate Crime - BBFC denies classification’, Movie-censorship.com, 5h March, available at http://www.movie-censorship.com/news.php?ID=8675 (accessed 28 May 2016). Sandwell, I. (2015), ‘BBFC bans Hate Crime’, Screen Daily, 3 March, available at http://www.screendaily.com/news/bbfc-bans-hate-crime/5083818.article (accessed 9 May 2015). Seanofthedead (2014), ‘Film review: Hate Crime (2013)’, HorrorNews.Net, 27 April, available at http://horrornews.net/84461/film-review-hate-crime-2013/ (accessed 9 May 2015). Slay, Michael (2015), ‘Jewish director’s horror movie about evil, meth-crazed neo-nazis torturing an innocent jew family gets banned in the UK’, The Daily Stormer, 12 March, available at http://vnnforum.com/showthread.php?t=248983 (accessed 9 May 2015). Thompson, S. (2015), ‘Hate Crime: Why censors are right to ban the anti-Semitic horror’, The Huffington Post, 4 March, available at http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/simon- thompson/hate-crime-why-censors-ar_b_6799332.html (accessed 9 May 2015). Wheat, P. (2015), ‘James Cullen Bressack’s Hate Crime banned by the BBFC’, Nerdly, 2 March, available at http://www.nerdly.co.uk/2015/03/02/james-cullen-bressacks-hate-crime- banned-by-the-bbfc/ (accessed 9 May 2015). Williams, M. P. (2015) ‘Horror film Hate Crime banned by BBFC’, Yahoo Movies, 4 March, available at https://uk.movies.yahoo.com/hate-crime-banned-by-bbfc-112651089569.html, (accessed 28 July 2016). Alexandra Kapka is a PhD candidate at Queen’s University Belfast where she is researching ‘extreme’ horror cinema, UK film classification and censorship, and digital distribution. Her work has been published in Frames Cinema Journal and Alphaville: Journal of Film and Screen Media. Formatted Formatted: Font: 12 pt https://mshayleyr1989.wordpress.com/2015/03/06/hate-crime-a-modern-day-video-nasty/ https://mshayleyr1989.wordpress.com/2015/03/06/hate-crime-a-modern-day-video-nasty/ http://www.movie-censorship.com/news.php?ID=8675 http://www.screendaily.com/news/bbfc-bans-hate-crime/5083818.article http://horrornews.net/84461/film-review-hate-crime-2013/ http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/simon-thompson/hate-crime-why-censors-ar_b_6799332.html http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/simon-thompson/hate-crime-why-censors-ar_b_6799332.html http://www.nerdly.co.uk/2015/03/02/james-cullen-bressacks-hate-crime-banned-by-the-bbfc/ http://www.nerdly.co.uk/2015/03/02/james-cullen-bressacks-hate-crime-banned-by-the-bbfc/ https://uk.movies.yahoo.com/hate-crime-banned-by-bbfc-112651089569.html ‘Cuts are not a viable option’: the British Board of Film Classification, Hate Crime and Censorship for Adults in the Digital Age Alexandra Kapka Abstract: In March 2015 the British Board of Film Classification (BBFC) refused to classify James Cullen Bressack’s independent film, Hate Crime (2012). This was the Board’s first explicit rejection of a film since 2011, and undermines their attempts to portray... Keywords: Streamed internet distribution; censorship; Video-on-demand; BBFC; extreme cinema. In order to unpack the statement quoted above and explore the BBFC’s reasons for rejecting this film, I will address four specific areas. These are genre and context; viewer complicity and identification; art cinema versus popular cinema, and the... References 
work_siiidsyc5rhr3pcngyhaxv4dpi	----	hanes machin november 2012 0 Hate Crime in the Wake of Terror Attacks: Evidence From 7/7 and 9/11 Emma Hanes* and Stephen Machin** November 2012 * Department of Economics, University College London ** Department of Economics, University College London and Centre for Economic Performance, London School of Economics Abstract This paper asks a straightforward question - what happened to racially motivated hate crimes in the wake of the 7/7 terror attack that hit London in July 2005 and the 9/11 terror attack that hit the US in September 2001. There is anecdotal and statistical evidence of an increase in bias-motivated crimes since the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the US, but no quantitative research that has accurately pinned down the magnitudes of any hate crime increase that ensued. The study provides a unique estimate of the magnitude and duration of the effects of 7/7 and 9/11 on hate crime using data from four police force areas in England with sizable Asian/Arab populations. We find significant increases in hate crimes against Asians and Arabs that occurred almost immediately in the wake of both terror attacks and which lasted for a prolonged period. Moreover, hate crimes against Asians and Arabs do not return back to their pre-attack levels, showing a permanent increase in the wake of the attacks. We argue that this demonstrates a strong link between terror attacks and increases in hate crime and hypothesise that attitudinal changes from media coverage act as an underlying driver. JEL Classifications: K42. Keywords: Hate crimes; Terror attacks. Acknowledgements We acknowledge helpful comments and suggestions from Mirko Draca and from participants in a CEP seminar, the NBER Summer Workshop Economics of Crime session and at the 4th Annual IZA Meeting on the Economics of Risky Behaviors in Istanbul. 1 1. Introduction A small, but growing, literature has studied empirical issues surrounding the economic and social effects of terrorism. Attempts have been made to quantify the effects of terrorism on a number of outcomes, including GDP (Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003; Bloom, 2009), financial markets (Chen and Siems, 2004), social attitudes or well-being (Bozzoli and Mueller, 2009; Frey, Luechinger and Stutzer, 2004), birth weight (Eskenai, et al, 2007; Lauderdale, 2006; Smits et al., 2006) and mental health (Metcalfe, Powdthavee and Dolan, 2011). Perhaps surprisingly, the evidence seems to suggest that the total effect on GDP and financial markets of a single terrorist incident is relatively short-lived, while the effects on well-being and health are large and persistent. In this paper, we explore a different question, what happened to racially motivated hate crimes in the wake of the 7/7 terror attack that hit London in July 2005 and the 9/11 terror attack that hit the US in September 2001. This is an interesting outcome to study if, for whatever reason, terror attacks alter individuals' perceptions of other groups in society. The paper empirically models the impact of terror attacks on hate crimes, in a setting with a credible research design where focus is placed on the impact on a particular sub-group of society. To do so, we investigate what happened to hate crime against Asians and Arabs in four regions of England after the 9/11 attack in the US in 2001 and the 7/7 attacks that hit London in 2005. Whilst there is anecdotal and descriptive evidence of an increase in hate crimes against Muslims since the 9/11 terrorist attacks (which we review below), we are not aware of much quantitative research that tries to accurately pin down the impact of terror attacks on the incidence of hate crimes.1 This is what we offer in this paper, where 1 There is a small amount of related work in sociology. Disha, Cavenish and King (2011) look at FBI data on hate crime in the US before and after 9/11. Deloughery, King and Asal (2012) study the direction of 2 we analyse rich monthly data before and after the terror attacks in four English police force areas with a significantly sized Asian/Arab (predominantly Muslim) population. We quantify the increased number of hate crimes against UK Muslims that occurred as a result of both the 9/11 attacks and the 7/7 bombings, using data that sub- divides hate crimes by victim ethnicity. Thus, we can study hate crimes against Asians and Arabs before and after the attacks, and generate estimates by using hate crimes against Blacks and Whites as control groups. One clear advantage of studying hate crimes as recorded by the English police is that they are explicitly defined and quantifiable. This therefore facilitates accurate study of time trends in a way which is not possible with the kind of opinion survey attitudinal data, self-reported well-being or newspaper coverage that have been more commonly studied in the terrorism literature. Moreover, hate crimes have greater implications – there is a direct cost to the victim, which may not be the case with attitudinal changes. To preview our main findings, we report sizable increases in hate crimes against Asians and Arabs - of the order of 20 to 30 percent - that occurred almost immediately in the wake of the two terror attacks. Moreover, the increase persisted and lasted for a prolonged period. In the case of the 7/7 attacks, where we have better data to estimate duration effects, increases remained on the margins of statistical significance for more than two years after the attacks and remained around 10 percent higher than the pre- attack levels, suggesting a permanent increase as a result of the terrorist attack. The structure of the rest of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we consider some theoretical background motivation of our questions of interest and discuss relevant existing evidence. In Section 3, we describe the data we use and offer some initial causation between hate crime offences and terrorism, arguing strongly that hate crimes occur in response to terror attacks, but that there is no evidence of causation in the other direction where hate crimes would act as a precursor to terrorist activity. 3 descriptive analysis. Section 4 explains the modelling approach and presents statistical estimates of the impact of the 9/11 and 7/7 terror attacks on hate crime. Section 5 concludes. 2. Theoretical Background and Existing Evidence Hate Crimes in the Economics of Crime Becker's seminal (1968) paper was the first to consider crime in an economic framework of rational behaviour. According to his theory, agents maximise utility by comparing the benefits of crime with the costs, where costs are the time and effort required plus the expected cost of deterrence efforts (i.e. cost of a police fine or incarceration multiplied by the probability of detection and prosecution). Thus, Becker considers crime as a simple cost-benefit choice, and the model generates clear empirical predictions about incentive and deterrence effects on crime. In the original Becker model, harm or loss to the individual is considered an externality, essentially an unintentional side effect of the offender's actions. In the case of a hate crime, however, it has been suggested that loss to the victim is the intention of the crime (Gale, Heath, and Ressler, 2002; Craig, 2002). As well as causing harm to the victim, a hate crime is often intended to convey a message to the wider group to which the victim belongs (or is perceived to belong). Gale et al. (2002) thus extend the individual economics of crime model to a setting where a person’s utility function can contain a function of another person’s utility. They argue that one can understand racist acts and racial bigotry using this model. An individual sorts the world into groups of people, choosing to ‘like’ and ‘dislike’ these groups according to various characteristics. Thus, we can imagine that 4 the individual may choose to commit a hate crime in the case where the utility gained from seeing the ‘disliked’ person hurt outweighs the cost of effort plus expected loss from being caught and punished.2 An alternative, related, model of hate crime has been developed by Medoff (1999). His model proposes that an individual gains utility from two sources; hate crimes and all other goods. The crucial assumption is that, while other goods can be purchased on the market, hate crimes must be 'created' using personal time and resources, and are therefore a more time-intensive consumption activity. As a result, an event which causes the individual to value his or her time more highly (for example, an increase in wages) results in substitution away from hate crime activities and towards market goods. In both of these approaches, hate crimes can be viewed as a consumption good that generates utility, but at the same time incurs some kind of cost. In this setting, hate crimes could be driven by factors that alter preferences, for example if the propensity to commit hate crimes is affected by some kind of shock. One can ask what kinds of shocks may occur that could make an individual choose to dislike a hated group more or less at different times? At the micro level, this may be about personal experiences, education, culture and environmental changes. At the macro level, however, we might expect the biggest driver to be current affairs. So in the specific context of the hate crimes we study, namely those targeting Muslims, news events which some individuals may interpret as showing Muslims in an unfavourable light could be expected to increase the incidence of hate crime. We could plausibly consider the 9/11 and 7/7 terrorist attacks we study as featuring an extreme form of this media exposure. 2 This, of course, bears similarities to another area of Becker's (1957) work, namely that on tastes for discrimination. In this sense, as with the case of employers, workers or consumers having a taste for discrimination, one could think of individuals having a taste for hate crimes. 5 Hate Crimes in a Behavioural Approach So far, we discussed hate crimes within the economist's rational decision-making framework. When an individual decides to commit a hate crime, they do so because the expected utility from the action is positive. An alternative view is offered by contributions from behavioural economics. Particularly relevant are those areas which try to understand why agents make seemingly irrational decisions, even once factors such as limited information and limited decision-making time have been taken into account. It seems reasonable to think of hate crimes in this context in that, whilst the prospective gains from acquisitive crime are self-evident, the potential 'gains' from committing a pure act of violence against others are less clear (unless people have a taste for discrimination of this sort, though ultimately this is a theoretical proposition that is hard to test in practice). An alternative perspective might consider a hate crime to be an action of passion or emotion – where feelings of anger and rage dominate the individual's rational decision-making process. This is the assertion of Gordon and Arian (2001) who claim that “when one feels very threatened, the decision-making process is dominated by emotion rather than logic or rational considerations” (Gordon and Arion, 2001, page 197).3 Indeed, unlike other types of violent crime, hate crimes tend to be committed by groups of people rather than individuals (see Craig, 2002). This suggests there may be some element of group interaction, such as peer pressure or removal of social barriers, which causes individuals to commit hate crimes only when in groups. The concept of 'herding' is well known to economists, in particular in relation to financial markets. For example, economists explain the formation of stock market bubbles as being caused by 3 Gordon and Arion (2001) try to demonstrate this point using opinion poll data from Israel and America. The basic finding from the Israeli survey is that the more threatened by Palestinians the respondents feel, the less likely they are to support the establishment of a Palestinian state. 6 investors valuing assets according to how they believe others to value assets rather than based on private valuations. This kind of group behaviour can lead to seemingly irrational choices and can cause instability in financial markets (Baddeley, 2010). In the context of hate crime, we can imagine that group mentality has the power to overcome social taboos or persuade individuals to commit acts they would not otherwise have considered in order to impress the group. Escalation may occur when group members second guess the value that other members place on committing hate crimes. How do these notions connect to terror attacks? It is evident that a terrorist attack can trigger sharp changes in behaviour, which may not be rational responses (see Viscusi and Zeckhauser, 2003, or Sunstein, 2003). However, the supposedly irrational 'certainty premia' phenomenon is accounted for in a rational framework developed by Becker and Rubinstein (2009). They argue that, when considering shock mass-fear type events, the standard state-dependent utility model is not sufficient. In fact the model they develop assumes that a negative utility shock occurs only in a 'bad' state (like when the terrorist attack occurs), and not in good states. Thus, there are both rational and behavioural arguments that have been proposed to explain why hate crimes occur. In terms of empirical analysis, testing the distinction between the rational and behavioural arguments is not within the scope of this study (and it is indeed difficult to even start to begin thinking how this might be done). Instead, the focus in what follows will be on empirically pinning down the effect of the 9/11 and 7/7 attacks on subsequent patterns of hate crime incidence. Existing Evidence Linking Hate Crimes and Terrorist Attacks Quite a lot of descriptive evidence exists on whether terror attacks induce increases in hate crime. In the US it seems that the 9/11 terrorist attack caused an 7 increase in the number of hate crimes against Muslims, Arabs, and those perceived to be Middle Eastern.4 Consider the FBI annual statistics on hate crimes reported in Table 1 for the period 1997 to 2008. Prior to 2001, incidents of anti-Islamic crime were in the magnitude of 20-30 incidents per annum. This figure jumps from 28 incidents in 2000 to 481 in 2001, and then remains steady in the 100-150 range per annum thereafter. The total number of hate crimes committed (including racial, ethnic, sexual orientation and disability bias motivated crimes) remained approximately static during these ten years. Meanwhile, anti-Islamic crimes as a proportion of all hate crimes dramatically increased over this period. These FBI numbers convey the magnitude of the backlash against Muslims, but do not give any idea of the time-scale of the crimes within the year 2001 (as the figures are published annually). Since 9/11 occurred three quarters of the way through 2001, and the number of anti-Muslim hate crimes in the following year was significantly lower, it seems likely that the three months after the attacks were times of intense anti- Muslim violence. Other sources confirm this impression. Firstly, a report by the ADC (American- Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee) counts 700 violent attacks on US Muslims in the nine weeks following 9/11; they report that “the intensity of the backlash, especially in terms of hate crimes and discrimination, was at its peak in the first six months following the attacks, and particularly during the first nine weeks” (Ibish and Stewart, 2003, page 15). Secondly, Swahn, Mahendra, and Paulozzi (2003) conducted a survey of newspaper reports during the period 1st September 2001 - 11th October 2001. They found evidence of 100 incidents of hate crimes against Middle Easterners in the United 4 There is also some evidence that Sikhs were targeted, since the wearing of the turban was confused with the Arab headdress worn by Osama-bin-Laden and members of Al-Qaeda (Sheridan and Gillett, 2005). 8 States, of which just one occurred in the ten days between 1st September and 11th September (the “baseline”). Of the remaining 99, 77 occurred in the period ten days after 9/11. Incident types ranged from assault and intimidation to murder and attempted murder. Although this survey is not a rigorous scientific study (the baseline period is so short, and may be subject to seasonal variation), it does support the hypothesis of a relatively short and intense 'shock period'. What is more, this study gives direct evidence that the perpetrators of these hate crimes were motivated by the terrorist event: “the perpetrators in at least 30 of the incidents specifically mentioned the September 11 terrorist attacks, or accused the victims of being terrorists” (Swahn, Mahendra, and Paulozzi, 2003, page 188). Furthermore, there is some evidence to suggest that the effects of the 9/11 terrorist attacks was not limited to the United States. Surveys of Muslims in both the UK and Australia find a significant increase in experiences of hate crime post 9/11. In the UK, Sheridan and Gillett (2005) surveyed 398 respondents from various religious groups in Leicester and Stoke-on-Trent during the period October to December 2001. They estimate regressions to predict an aggregated 'change score' (showing change in experience of hate crimes since 9/11) and find that both Muslims and Hindus report increases post 9/11 (with a much larger effect for Muslims), while the other religious groups report small decreases. A similar, but smaller scale, study conducted in 2003 surveyed 186 Australian Muslims and Christians (Poynting and Noble, 2004) and found similar results, with Muslims being far more likely to report an increase in experiences of racism since September 11th than Christians. Thus there is survey evidence that the 9/11 terrorist attacks were immediately followed by a dramatic rise in the incidence of hate crimes against American Muslims, 9 with a peak lasting for around 2-3 months, and with the effects persisting for perhaps years afterwards. Other than the survey evidence already discussed, there exists little evidence of the experiences of British Muslims following 9/11. Even scarcer is evidence on the effect of 7/7, which we would presume likely to have caused similar effects to 9/11. Our empirical work will study the impact of both attacks. Evidence on the relationship between hate crimes and economic variables There is a serious shortage of convincing statistical evidence in this area. Gale et al. (2002) and Medoff (1999) do present tests of their theories which offer contrasting views on the role of economic factors on hate crimes. In the Gale et al model, relative well-being is important, meaning that an individual is particularly concerned with the hated group's situation relative to her own. Thus, if the hated group becomes comparatively better off in economic terms, they gain more utility from committing hate crimes against them. The authors test this theory using a panel of US states. They construct a fixed effects model using the hate crime rate as a dependent variable, and income per capita, the black/white income ratio, unemployment rate and relative sizes of minority populations as independent variables. Although few of these variables are found to be significant in the model, they do find that the black/white income variable is significant and supports the envy hypothesis – the higher are black wages relative to white wages, the higher are rates of hate crime against blacks. Moreover, the same model applied to all other crimes results in an oppositely signed coefficient on black/white income. Medoff (1999) tests his theory by estimating a cross-sectional state level model for the level of hate crimes as a function of the wage rate, average education level, unemployment rate and the proportion of the population aged 15-19 (since this age 10 group are likely to have the lowest value of time). The market wage is indeed found to have a significant negative relationship with wage, and unemployment a positive relationship – in states where citizens are more likely to be employed and earn more on average, the incidence of hate crime is lower. The findings of both these statistical analyses should, however, be considered with caution. It seems likely that in a cross-sectional empirical analysis such as this, results may be biased by omitted variables. Higher average wages may be correlated with omitted variables such as greater police presence and security (since wealthier states can afford to invest more in these) or with cultural differences; better paid and educated individuals may be more tolerant of other cultures. Since Medoff does not include the size of minority population in each state, this may cause bias. Ethnic minorities earn on average less than the majority population (Lindley, 2002) and so the negative association with wages may be due to the higher proportion of minorities in some states. More members of minority groups means both lower average wages and also more opportunities for individuals to perpetrate hate crimes. Gould and Klor (2012) consider an interesting dimension of possible longer run responses to hate crime increases induced by terror attacks. They study fertility and assimilation rates of immigrants from Muslim countries in the US post 9/11 and present some evidence that immigrants in US states that experienced sharper increases in hate crimes had higher probabilities of marrying in their own ethnic group, lower female employment and higher fertility. Thus, they argue that the terrorist attack of 9/11 induced a withdrawal back into communities by US muslims, thereby slowing down patterns of assimilation. 11 The other relevant piece of statistical work (that we are aware of) is Krueger and Pischke's (1997) examination of hate crimes in post-unification Germany (together with extensions of this work by Falk et al, 2011, and related work on extremism by Siedler, 2006). Their initial model finds a relationship between economic conditions and hate crimes, but once a dummy for East/West Germany has been added, and the model has been adjusted for censoring at zero (since a negative number of hate crimes is not possible) using a Tobit specification, the effect of unemployment disappears entirely. Krueger and Pischke conclude that it is the major social and attitudinal differences between East and West Germany that drive hate crimes, and that poor economic conditions are not a driver in and of themselves. 3. Data and Descriptive Analysis Data Data requirements to study the impact of terror attacks on hate crimes are very stringent. First of all, we need data on hate crimes measured in a consistent manner. We also need information on the ethnicity or religiosity of hate crime victims. Fortunately, for our purposes, data collected on hate crimes and on the victims of hate crimes by police forces in England is of very good quality owing to stringent definitional guidelines that police forces need to follow (see the Appendix on the nature of crime recording practices in England).5 Second, hate crime data at a high frequency (at least monthly) is required for us to carry out our empirical analysis of what happens to hate crimes before and after the 9/11 and 7/7 terror attacks. 5 The classification of hate crimes we use in data obtained from police forces in England seems to be collected on a much more systematic basis than the US data used in the research of Disha, Cavenish and King (2011), Deloughery, King and Asal (2012) and Gould and Klor (2012). 12 Data on monthly numbers of hate crimes broken down by ethnicity of victim is not publicly available. We therefore obtained such data by direct application to police forces through a freedom of information (FOI) request.6 We submitted FOI requests to four police force areas (PFAs) in England - the Metropolitan Police Services (MPS) in London, the West Midlands, Leicestershire and West Yorkshire. These were chosen for two main reasons. Firstly, because all four have a sizeable Muslim population, and thus hate crimes against Muslims are likely to occur relatively frequently, and secondly because the 7/7 attacks occurred in London, and so a comparison of London versus non- London areas was sought (the MPS covers all of central London, with the exception of City of London; the other three areas are independent of London (although, of course, the 7/7 bombers were from West Yorkshire). We obtained monthly data from all four police forces, with information being supplied to us on the major offence category and ethnicity for both victims and offenders of all crimes listed as racially motivated.7 For Leicestershire, London and the West Midlands we have data before and after both 9/11 and 7/7, and for West Yorkshire only for before and after 7/7. Significant crime recording changes occurred in April 2002 (see the Appendix for more detail) and this constrains us in our ability to look at before/after changes in 6 In the UK, a freedom of information request can be undertaken under the auspices of the 2001 Freedom of Information act. This gives individuals the right to ask any public body for all the information they have on a particular subject and, unless there is a good reason not to, the organization is required to supply the requested information. 7 Several caveats were attached to the data, describing recording changes, relevant events and sources of inaccuracy. Indeed, it is important to bear in mind that the data used in this study was not collected with our research purpose in mind, as expressed in the following words from West Midlands police force: “Every effort is made to ensure that the figures presented are accurate and complete. However, it is important to note that these data have been extracted from large disparate administrative data systems used by forces for police purposes. The detail collected to respond specifically to your request is subject to the inaccuracies inherent in any large scale recording system. As a consequence, care should be taken to ensure data collection processes and their inevitable limitations are taken into account when interpreting those data.” 13 hate crime associated with the two terror attacks. In fact, it means the feasible time series we can study differ around the window of the two attacks. We can do a much better job on having consistent data before and after 7/7 and so our main focus is placed on studying what happened to hate crimes in response to this terror attack. We thus study the 7/7 attacks first and then look at 9/11 effects using a shorter time series that stops when the recording changes occurred in April 2002. The actual periods studied are as follows: 7/7 attack – January 2003 to December 2007; 9/11 attack – April 2000 to March 2002. Hate Crimes by Ethnicity There is a distinction between racial and religious discrimination, although often the two co-occur. While it is clear that the 9/11 and 7/7 terrorist attacks triggered animosity towards Western Muslims, research from the US (discussed previously) has found that it is not just Muslims who were targeted – hate crimes were also carried out on Middle Easterners and Arabs who were not practising Muslims, and Sikhs, who were mistaken for Muslims. The vast majority of Britain's Muslim population are South Asian, most of whom originate from Pakistan, Bangladesh and India. The Pakistani and Bangladeshi populations are almost entirely Muslim, while the Indian population sub-divides into Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs. Thus the UK Muslim population is almost entirely contained within the ethnic category 'South Asian'. People in this category may be the victim of either racial or religious discrimination. In some cases, religious discrimination may be misplaced – individuals may be discriminated against because they are mistaken for being Muslims, or because of some kind of statistical profiling 14 (i.e. discriminators target South Asians because they are the ethnic group most likely to contain Muslims). Since religious data was unavailable, we use ethnicity to define our main groups of interest. Ethnicity categories used in crime statistics differ from one police force to the next, and so some aggregation was required in order to standardise the figures from the different sources. The following six broad categories were created: Asian/Arab, White, Black, Oriental, Unknown, Other. The latter three contain small numbers and so are generally dismissed from analysis. We thus consider the impact of the terror attacks on Asian/Arab hate crimes and use hate crimes against Whites and Blacks as control groups when we formulate our statistical models. Descriptive Analysis The vast majority of hate crimes involve violence against the person. Table 2 shows the major offence categories (excluding sexual offences) of all hate crimes against Asians/Arabs between January 1998 and March 2010 from our FOI request to the Metropolitan Police Service. Over three quarters (77 percent) were classified as violence against the person, and a further 18 percent involved criminal damage. Figure 1 plots the monthly time series of hate crimes by ethnic group and police force area for the time window for which we study the 7/7 attacks (January 2003 to December 2007). There are several interesting features of the overall patterns. First, whilst the monthly time series do jump around, all four graphs show a discernible spike up in the Arab/Asian hate crime series in the month of July 2005, suggesting an immediate impact. Second, eyeballing the graphs is suggestive of the notion that the time series patterns of hate crimes before the 7/7 bombings for all three ethnic groups look similar (this is considered formally in more detail below). 15 There are also two police force area specific observations that are relevant: i) In the West Midlands there is a large peak caused by the Birmingham race riots in October 2005, which were sparked by the alleged rape of a Black girl by a group of South Asian men. This event seems to have been completely unrelated to the terrorist attacks that occurred three months previously. ii) The pre-recording change data for West Yorkshire was not good enough to study the 9/11 attacks for this police force area. Also, they introduced a True Vision third party recording scheme was launched in June 2005, just one month before 7/7. We deal with these two data issues in our empirical models below by including specific variables to control for any data jumps from these. An analogous set of charts for a shorter time window around the 9/11 attacks (April 2000 to March 2002) is given in Figure 2. The chart this time covers only three police force areas excluding West Yorkshire. Whilst the length of the post-attack time period is constrained by the recording changes of April 2002, the Figure does seem to show a blip up in hate crimes against Asians/Arab 9/11 and higher relative levels (despite subsequent falls) compared to the White and Black hate crimes. We scrutinise these patterns in more detail in the statistical models in the next Section of the paper. 4. Modelling Approach and Statistical Results Basic Approach We begin the statistical analysis by developing and empirical model that permits us to study the question of how the 7/7 and 9/11 terror attacks impacted upon hate crime. We ask what happened to hate crime against Asians and Arabs before and after the terror attacks relative to hate crime against two other ethnic groups (Blacks and Whites). 16 Because crime is seasonally highly persistent8, and we use monthly data across years, we express our model in twelve month differences (thereby differencing out area and month fixed effects from a levels model). We operationalise our estimator in terms of the following equation determining twelve month changes in hate crimes against Asians and Arabs HA in area j in month m in year t: A W W B B 12 jmt 12 jmt 12 jmt mt t jmtH = δ H +δ H + θA + τ + ε∆ ∆ ∆ (1) where HW denotes hate crimes against Whites, HB denotes hate crimes against Blacks, τt is a set of year dummies, εjmt is an error term and the main variable of interest Amt is a dummy variable equal to one in months where the terror attack occurred (or for a window comprising several post-attack months - see below) and zero otherwise. ∆12 is a twelve month differencing operator. The inclusion of the two other hate crime variables (for Whites W and Blacks B) enables us to ascertain the impact of terror attacks on the Asian and Arab group relative to these groups. Thus, in (1) the attack coefficient θ estimates whether Asian/Arab hate crimes differentially increased when the terror attacks occurred and, when Amt is defined to cover a longer post-attack duration, how they evolved subsequently in the wake of terror attacks. Pre-Attack Trends A prerequisite for this estimator to yield unbiased estimates is that pre-attack trends of hate crimes against the treatment group (Asians/Arabs) are no different to trends in hate crimes against the comparison groups (Whites and Blacks). A glance back to Figures 1 and 2 makes it graphically clear how this operates in practice, as the 8 See Hird and Ruparel (2007) on the seasonality of crime or Draca, Machin and Witt (2011) who difference weekly crime data across years, among others. 17 Asian/Arab, White and Black hate crime trends do seem to show strong similarities in pre-attack periods. This formally tested for the 7/7 attacks in Table 3. The upper Panel of the Table considers pre-attack trends in twelve month differenced hate crimes for all four areas pooled for hate crimes against Asians/Arabs (in specification (1)), Whites (in (2)) and Blacks (in (3)). In specification (4) we condition the Asian/Arab hate crimes on the control group crimes. The lower panel reports the same specifications where we also allow for area-specific trends. The estimated coefficients on the trend variables in both Panels show there to be no differential pre-attack trends between Asian/Arab hate crimes and those against Whites and Blacks. Thus, the common trends assumption required for our estimator to be valid is upheld. Estimates of the 7/7 Impact Table 4 shows estimates of equation (1) for the 7/7 study time period. There are four Panels in the Table, where each gives a 7/7 impact over different durations. Panel A shows the immediate impact via a dummy variable defined for the 7/7 month only. Panels B to D further refine the dummy variable definition to cover a wider post-attack window (Panels B, C and D respectively refine the dummy variables to cover three, six and twelve months post-attack). Results from three specifications are included in each Panel. The first includes only the 7/7 dummy in the twelve month differenced model (which also contains year dummies). The second includes the twelve month differenced White and Black hate crime variables. The third additionally conditions on the total crime rate, again differenced across months in adjacent years. All the specifications are population 18 weighted and report Newey-West standard errors (with lag t-12 owing to the twelve month differencing). Consider first the immediate impact results in Panel A of Table 4. Specification (1) produces a 0.33 coefficient on the 7/7 dummy, showing a significant spike up of around one third in hate crimes against Asians/Arabs in the attack month.9 Specification (2) shows the estimate that conditions out the White and Black hate crimes, and the estimated coefficient remains strongly significant, but falls to 0.23. The estimated coefficients on the White and Black hate crime variables are positive and significant, showing the need to control for them and the fact that they covary positively over time with the Asian/Arab hate crime variable. The third specification adds in the total crime rate, which itself attracts a positive coefficient (which is significant at the 10 percent level, with a p-value of 0.09), but barely changes the estimated 7/7 impact. In this specification hate crimes against Asians/Arabs rose by 22 percent in the attack month. Panel B considers impact in the three months following the terror attacks. The estimated impact comes down, but remains strong and significant at 16 percent in the full model. The window is further widened in Panels C and D where the effects again fall but remain significant. The magnitudes are 7.2 percent after six months and 8.5 percent after twelve. The results of Table 4 show a strong impact of 7/7 on hate crimes against Asians and Arabs. The immediate impact is largest, but the effect persists even twelve months after the attack occurred. Four specific estimates were chosen to be reported. We can, however, estimate an impact for every month sequentially to study the duration of 9 We report t-12 Newey-West standard errors since we study monthly time series data. However, we have seasonally differences the data relative to the same month in adjacent years, so may need to consider a longer lag length. Reassuringly, use of lag t-24 standard errors did not alter results by much. For example, the estimated standard error for the column (1) Panel A 7/7 coefficient was 0.063 for the t-24 specification (as compared to 0.071 for t-12). 19 impact in more detail. Estimated coefficients (and associated 95 percent confidence intervals) from carrying out this sequential modelling exercise are given in Figure 3, which reports estimates for up to 29 months after the 7/7 attacks. The estimates reproduce the large immediate impact at 22 percent in July 2005, which falls to 5 percent if the window is defined as four months after the attack. After that it stabilises in the range of 5 to 10 percent higher, all the way to the end of the sample (the 29 month estimate is up to December 2007 and therefore compares the whole post-attack period to the whole pre-attack period). The estimates are mostly significantly different from zero, though sometimes just drop beneath the 5 percent statistical significance level. In fact for the 25 estimates from 5 months out to 29 months out, 11 are significant at the 5 percent level, and 14 just drop. If a more conservative 10 percent significance level were used, 17 out of 25 are significant. The results in Table 4 and Figure 3 are very supportive of the idea that 7/7 caused a strong immediate increase in hate crimes against Asians and Arabs, and that whilst the scale of the increase tempered off through time, they remained around 5 to 10 percent higher than the pre-attack levels. Thus there seems to have been a permanent impact of increasing hate crimes against Asians and Arabs that occurred in the wake of the 7/7 bombings. Consideration of Economic Factors Some of the small body of empirical work on hate crimes (e.g. Gale et al., 2002; Medoff, 1999; Krueger and Pischke, 1997) have considered a role for economic outcomes to influence hate crime. We look at this in Table 5 by adding economic variables (taken from the British Crime Survey at monthly frequency for the four police force areas) to the most detailed Table 4 specification. The three economic variables 20 considered are log(income), the proportion of the population with no educational qualifications and the proportion in work. Each of these attracts an insignificant coefficient in all four specifications reported. Thus, differential economic conditions do not seem to be key predictors of hate crimes against Asians and Arabs. Moreover, the 7/7 impact is almost entirely unaffected by the inclusion of these economic factors. The increase in hate crimes against Asians and Arabs that occurred, and persisted, after 7/7 is not due to economic conditions worsening after the attacks occurred. Separate Estimates by Police Force Area In Table 6 we report separate estimates of the 7/7 impact, at the different chosen post-attack durations, by police force area. There are at least two reasons for doing this. First, as highlighted above, there are certain police force area specific data issues of relevance. Second, we wish to explore possible heterogeneities in the magnitude and duration of impact across areas. The Table confirms there to be some variation. In terms of immediate impact, there is a significant impact in London (of 22 percent impact on Log(Asian/Arab hate crimes)), Leicestershire (of 30 percent) and West Yorkshire (of 42 percent). The West Midlands impact is not significant. It does, however, become significant if we consider a three month period after the attack, as is the case in all four areas. The rate of decay of these effects differs by area with, interestingly, there being no impact remaining in London twelve months after the terror attacks, but the effects still persisting strongly in the other three police force areas. Estimates of the 9/11 Impact We have also estimated versions of equation (1) for the impact of 9/11. However, we should say that this analysis is much more limited than for the study of the 21 7/7 impact. There are several dimensions to this. First, as noted above, we only have usable data for three police force areas. Second, we are not able to define a symmetric time series window around the attack as we did with the 7/7 analysis. This is because we have to stop due to the recording practice change that occurred in April 2002. One consequence of this is that we cannot look for longer run impacts; we can only look as far as six months after the terror attack. Third, we do not have data on the overall crime rate in the police force areas as we only have that on a consistent basis at monthly frequency after the recording practice change. Fourth, because we only have two years’ data, we can difference across months in the years but are not able to calculate Newey- West standard errors with full lag length t-12 and have to instead use a t-1 structure instead. The results are reported in Table 7. The Table is structured in a comparable way to the 7/7 results, though we can only look at shorter duration effects. The column (1) results show a strong immediate impact effect from 9/11. Hate crimes against Asians and Arabs rose by 28 percent in September 2001. This effect dampens down by three months after the attacks to 22 percent, and falls further to 11 percent after six months. Figure 4 shows estimates for every month post-attack duration as with the earlier 7/7 analysis. Whilst it is only possible to study a shorter duration, a rather similar pattern emerges, with a strong positive initial impact which dies down but appears to settle at a higher level than the pre-attack period. Out of seven estimated coefficients, five are significant at the 5 percent level, and all are significant at a 10 percent level of significance. 22 5. Conclusions Despite the importance of the subject, credible statistical evidence on the impact of terror attacks on hate crime is hard to come by. In this paper we look at the impact of the 7/7 and 9/11 terrorist attacks on hate crimes against Asians and Arabs in four police force areas of the UK. We estimate a strong immediate impact on Asian/Arab hate crimes from both terror attacks, find that the effects of both persist and that hate crimes move to a permanently higher post-attack level. The highly similar pattern of results from the separate study of the respective impacts of 7/7 and 9/11 on hate crime in four areas with sizable Asian/Arab populations is highly suggestive that a causal impact of terror attacks on hate crime is identified from the empirical approach implemented in the paper. These findings add to the literature on the economic and social effects of terror attacks. They show, in line with some of the theoretical discussion in the early part of the paper, that in terms of individuals the cost of terror attacks is not just limited to the victims of the attacks. The fact that hate crimes perpetrated against Asians and Arabs significantly rose in the wake of 9/11 and 7/7 points to an additional social cost of terrorist activity. If attitudes towards groups like British Muslims are altered by attacks and by media coverage of attacks then these findings certainly fit with the proposition of 'attitudinal shocks', where a driver of hate crimes is the level of hatred or bigotry about a particular group in society, which may well be influenced by media coverage of attacks. In this setting, such shifts in underlying bigotry from attitudinal change following events like terrorist attacks seem more important as determinants of hate crime incidence than do socio-economic factors. 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Hosking (2003) National Crime Recording Standards (NCRS): An Analysis of the Impact on Recorded Crime; Part Two: Impact on Individual Police Forces, Home Office Online report 32/03. Smits, L., L. Krabbendam, R. de Bie, G. Essed, and J. van Os (2006) Lower Birth Weight of Dutch Neonates who were in Utero at the Time of the 9/11 Attacks, Journal of Psychosomatic Research, 61, 715-717. Sunstein, C. (2003) Terrorism and Probability Neglect, Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 26, 121-136. Swahn, M., R. Mahendra and L. Paulozzi (2003) Violent Attacks on Middle Easterners in the United States During the Month Following the September 11, 2001 Terrorist Attacks, Injury Prevention, 9, 187-189. Viscusi, K. And R. Zeckhauser (2003) Sacrificing Civil Liberties to Reduce Terrorism Risks, Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 26, 99-120. 27 Figure 1: Trends in Hate Crimes by Ethnicity of Victim, Four Police Force Areas, January 2003 to December 2007 1 0 0 2 0 0 3 0 0 4 0 0 5 0 0 6 0 0 7 0 0 8 0 0 H a te C ri m e s Jan-03 7/7 Dec-07 Month Asian/Arab White Black London 0 1 0 0 2 0 0 3 0 0 H a te C ri m e s Jan-03 7/7 Dec-07 Month Asian/Arab White Black West Midlands 0 1 0 0 H a te C ri m e s Jan-03 7/7 Dec-07 Month Asian/Arab White Black Leicestershire 0 1 0 0 2 0 0 H a te C ri m e s Jan-03 7/7 Dec-07 Month Asian/Arab White Black West Yorkshire 28 Figure 2: Trends in Hate Crimes by Ethnicity of Victim, Three Police Force Areas, April 2000 to March 2002 1 0 0 2 0 0 3 0 0 4 0 0 5 0 0 6 0 0 7 0 0 8 0 0 H a te C ri m e s Apr-00 9/11 Mar-02 Month Asian/Arab White Black London 0 1 0 0 2 0 0 3 0 0 H a te C ri m e s Apr-00 9/11 Mar-02 Month Asian/Arab White Black West Midlands 0 1 0 0 H a te C ri m e s Apr-00 9/11 Mar-02 Month Asian/Arab White Black Leicestershire 29 Figure 3: 7/7 Impact - Time Varying Coefficients With Effects Up to December 2007 -. 1 -. 0 5 0 .0 5 .1 .1 5 .2 .2 5 .3 .3 5 E st im a te d C o e ff ic ie n t a n d 9 5 % C I 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 Months Since 7/7 Notes: Estimated coefficient and 95% confidence interval from the column (3) specification in Table 4. 30 Figure 4: 9/11 Impact - Time Varying Coefficients With Effects Up to March 2002 0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 E st im a te d C o e ff ic ie n t a n d C I 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 Months Since 9/11 Notes: Estimated coefficient and 95% confidence interval from the Panel A specification in Table 7. 31 Table 1: US Hate Crime Statistics Year Total Hate Crimes Reported Offenders' Reported Motivations Religious Bias Anti-Islamic 1997 8049 1385 28 1998 7755 1390 21 1999 7876 1411 32 2000 8063 1472 28 2001 9730 1828 481 2002 7462 1426 155 2003 7489 1343 149 2004 7649 1374 156 2005 7163 1227 128 2006 7722 1462 156 2007 7624 1400 115 2008 7783 1519 105 Notes: From the Anti-Defamation League's Washington Office based upon FBI information (www.adl.org). 32 Table 2: Major Offence Categories For Hate Crimes Committed Against Asians/Arabs in London (January 1998 to March 2010) Offence Category Total Hate Crimes Reported Percentage Violence against the person 45078 76.9 Criminal damage 10605 18.1 Robbery 908 1.5 Theft and handling 872 1.5 Other notifiable offences 821 1.4 Burglary 240 0.4 Fraud or forgery 66 0.1 Sexual offences censored censored Total 58590 100 Notes: From Metropolitan Police Service records supplied in freedom of information request. 33 Table 3: Pre-7/7 Trends in Hate Crimes Against Asians/Arabs, Whites and Blacks (January 2003 to June 2005) Log(Asian/Arab Hate Crimes) Log(White Hate Crimes) Log(Black Hate Crimes) Log(Asian/Arab Hate Crimes) (1) (2) (3) (4) A. Four Areas Pooled Trend -0.001 (0.008) -0.003 (0.007) -0.008 (0.010) 0.002 (0.005) Log(White Hate Crimes) 0.373 (0.113) Log(Black Hate Crimes) 0.103 (0.071) B. Area Specific Trends Trend X London -0.002 (0.003) -0.003 (0.006) -0.010 (0.006) 0.001 (0.004) Trend X West Midlands -0.001 (0.003) -0.004 (0.006) -0.008 (0.005) 0.001 (0.004) Trend X Leicestershire 0.001 (0.003) -0.001 (0.006) -0.006 (0.006) -0.000 (0.004) Trend X West Yorkshire 0.003 (0.003) -0.001 (0.006) -0.003 (0.006) 0.004 (0.003) Log(White Hate Crimes) 0.373 (0.113) Log(Black Hate Crimes) 0.103 (0.071) Notes: All models estimated on monthly data across four police force areas from January 2003 to June 2005; Population weighted; Seasonally differenced across the same months in adjacent years; Newey West standard errors (lag t-12) in parentheses. 34 Table 4: Hate Crimes Against Asians/Arabs and the 7/7 Terror Attacks (January 2003 to December 2007) Log(Asian/Arab Hate Crimes) (1) (2) (3) A. Month of Terror Attack 7/7 .330 (.071) .231 (.053) .221 (.055) Log(White Hate Crimes) .397 (.058) .379 (.054) Log(Black Hate Crimes) .287 (.069) .288 (.064) Log(Total Crime) .415 (.240) B. 3 Months From Terror Attack 7/7 .180 (.050) .171 (.033) .158 (.036) Log(White Hate Crimes) .411 (.058) .394 (.054) Log(Black Hate Crimes) .288 (.067) .289 (.064) Log(Total Crime) .370 (.242) C. 6 Months From Terror Attack 7/7 .030 (.080) .090 (.036) .072 (.038) Log(White Hate Crimes) .419 (.059) .398 (.055) Log(Black Hate Crimes) .296 (.068) .296 (.065) Log(Total Crime) .386 (.248) D. 12 Months From Terror Attack 7/7 .070 (.074) .095 (.041) .085 (.042) Log(White Hate Crimes) .430 (.060) .411 (.055) Log(Black Hate Crimes) .283 (.067) .285 (.064) Log(Total Crime) .366 (.246) Notes: All models estimated on monthly data across four police force areas from January 2003 to December 2007; Population weighted; Seasonally differenced across the same months in adjacent years; Newey West standard errors (lag t-12) in parentheses; Year dummies, a dummy for the Birmingham race riot in October 2005 and for the introduction of the True Vision recording scheme in West Yorkshire from June 2005 onwards are included in all specifications. 35 Table 5: Consideration of Economic Factors Log(Asian/Arab Hate Crimes) (1) (2) (3) (4) Month of Terror Attack 3 Months From Terror Attack 6 Months From Terror Attack 12 Months From Terror Attack 7/7 0.225 (0.056) 0.165 (0.037) 0.082 (0.039) 0.098 (0.044) Log(White Hate Crimes) 0.375 (0.056) 0.391 (0.057) 0.371 (0.052) 0.410 (0.059) Log(Black Hate Crimes) 0.278 (0.066) 0.278 (0.067) 0.286 (0.067) 0.270 (0.066) Log(Total Crime) 0.437 (0.264) 0.395 (0.265) 0.405 (0.271) 0.375 (0.270) Log(Income) 0.073 (0.121) 0.073 (0.119) 0.085 (0.119) 0.101 (0.114) Proportion No Qualifications -0.119 (0.163) -0.123 (0.167) -0.103 (0.178) -0.170 (0.188) Proportion in Employment -0.255 (0.221) -0.293 (0.219) -0.288 (0.212) -0.310 (0.214) Notes: As for Table 4. Monthly data on Income, No Qualifications and Employment by police force area and month from the British Crime Survey. See the Appendix for more detail. 36 Table 6: Separate 7/7 Impact Estimates by Police Force Area Log(Asian/Arab Hate Crimes) (1) (2) (3) (4) Month of Terror Attack 3 Months From Terror Attack 6 Months From Terror Attack 12 Months From Terror Attack 7/7 X London 0.217 (0.019) 0.151 (0.025) 0.048 (0.042) 0.021 (0.031) 7/7 X West Midlands 0.043 (0.051) 0.072 (0.036) 0.156 (0.052) 0.170 (0.041) 7/7 X Leicestershire 0.299 (0.022) 0.268 (0.022) 0.101 (0.044) 0.177 (0.046) 7/7 X West Yorkshire 0.416 (0.046) 0.239 (0.057) 0.051 (0.083) 0.187 (0.080) Log(White Hate Crimes) 0.375 (0.054) 0.387 (0.055) 0.394 (0.057) 0.378 (0.059) Log(Black Hate Crimes) 0.291 (0.067) 0.290 (0.068) 0.288 (0.067) 0.250 (0.065) Log(Total Crime) 0.417 (0.243) 0.378 (0.248) 0.383 (0.256) 0.353 (0.257) Notes: As for Table 4. 37 Table 7: Hate Crimes Against Asians/Arabs and the 9/11 Terror Attacks (April 2000 to March 2002) Log(Asian/Arab Hate Crimes) (1) (2) (3) Month of Terror Attack 3 Months From Terror Attack 6 Months From Terror Attack 9/11 0.280 (0.082) 0.223 (0.066) 0.109 (0.070) Log(White Hate Crimes) 0.399 (0.107) 0.357 (0.092) 0.386 (0.102) Log(Black Hate Crimes) -0.060 (0.099) -0.108 (0.099) -0.041 (0.015) Notes: All models estimated on monthly data across three police force areas from April 2000 to March 2002; Population weighted; Seasonally differenced across the same months in adjacent years; Newey West standard errors (lag t-1) in parentheses; Year dummies are included in all specifications. 38 Appendix Changes in Recording Practices The crime data we obtained from four police force areas in a Freedom of Information request sent in the Summer of 2010 are potentially subject to various recording changes that occurred both locally and nationally. There were two important national changes in crime recording during the time period of study (Berman, 2008). These affect the start and end dates of our study periods and mean that we are forced to carry out our 9/11 and 7/7 analyses for different time periods. The two changes are: i) The first was a change to Home Office counting rules which occurred in 1998/1999. New crime types were recorded in crime statistics for the first time; minor criminal damage was recorded where before it had not been, and there was a shift towards counting one crime per victim, rather than per offender. The result was a significant increase in the number of crimes recorded. The change affected different crime types and areas differently. Drug offences and violent crime saw the greatest increases as a result of the new counting rules. All of the police forces, with the exception of the MPS, warned that data prior to February 2000 either lacked accuracy or was different due to changes in Home Office counting rules. For this reason, we begin any potential analysis in the financial year beginning April 2000. ii) The second major change was this introduction of the National Crime Recording Standard (NCRS) in April 2002. The purpose of this was to standardise crime recording practices across police forces to allow between-force comparisons and to generate a better estimate of the national crime level. The purpose of the NCRS was also to move towards victim-focused crime recording, with 'victimless crimes' not being recorded under the new guidelines. The total impact of the NCRS is estimated to be approximately a 10% increase in crime in 2002/3 over the pre-NCRS level. However, different offence categories were affected differently – the greatest increase was in violence against the person, which is estimated to have increased by 23% nationally after introduction of the NCRS (Berman, 2008). The majority of hate crime falls into this category (as shown in Tables 2 of the paper - 77% of hate crimes are 'violence against the person', compared with 19% of all crime), and so the effects of the NCRS on hate crime are likely to be significant. Analysis of the effects of the NCRS on individual police-forces can be found in Simmons, Legg and Hosking (2003). Leicestershire adopted the NCRS in April 2002, but also adopted a Centralised Crime Recording Bureau in August 2002. An increase in the number of crimes recorded, especially violent crimes, has been noted since the introduction of the NCRS, but the size of the effect cannot be untangled from the effect of the recording change which occurred several months later. The MPS also adopted the NCRS in April 2002. It estimates the effect on all crime for the financial year 2002/3 to be approximately 12%, and 20% for violence against the person. The West Midlands adopted the NCRS in January 1999, along with the revised Home Office counting rules and so there is no change in trend for 2002/3. Owing to the introduction of the NCRS we stop our analysis of 9/11 in March 2002. Our 7/7 analysis runs from January 2003 to December 2007 and so is unaffected. 39 In terms of local changes in recording practices, West Yorkshire adopted the NCRS in February 2002 and experienced the largest effect, with an estimated 47% NCRS impact on violence against the person for the year 2002/3. In addition, to the national recording changes, West Yorkshire also implemented some regional recording and reporting changes during the period studied. These were documented in the FOI response as follows: 1) 1999: The MacPherson Report introduced a new definition of what constituted a racist crime/incident. 2) 2000: policing divisions in West Yorkshire appointed hate crime co-ordinators 3) December 2003: Introduction of a Vulnerable & Intimidated Victim Database (VIVID) to record and monitor incidents of domestic violence, hate and child abuse 4) June 2005: West Yorkshire Police signed up to the True Vision third party recording scheme for hate crimes. As a result we excluded West Yorkshire from the 9/11 analysis study period. British Crime Survey Data For the 7/7 analysis study period we matched in data by month and police force area from the British Crime Surveys (of 2002/3, 2003/4, 2004/5, 2006/7 an 2007/8) on income, the proportion with no educational qualifications and the proportion in work. British Crime Survey data is used here (rather than, for example, Labour Force Survey data) as sample sizes are large at around 45,000 individuals per year and there is an area variable (not available in other surveys) which perfectly matches police force areas. 
work_sjy4tacbw5e3hfxztpdzyros6e	----	Reluctant educators and self‐advocates: Older trans adults’ experiences of health‐care services and practitioners in seeking gender‐affirming services Willis, P., Dobbs, C., Elizabeth, E., Raithby, M., & Bishop, J-A. (2020). Reluctant educators and self-advocates: older trans adults’ experiences of healthcare services and practitioners in seeking gender affirming services. Health Expectations. https://doi.org/10.1111/hex.13104 Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record License (if available): CC BY Link to published version (if available): 10.1111/hex.13104 Link to publication record in Explore Bristol Research PDF-document This is the final published version of the article (version of record). It first appeared online via Wiley at https://doi.org/10.1111/hex.13104 . Please refer to any applicable terms of use of the publisher. University of Bristol - Explore Bristol Research General rights This document is made available in accordance with publisher policies. Please cite only the published version using the reference above. Full terms of use are available: http://www.bristol.ac.uk/red/research-policy/pure/user-guides/ebr-terms/ https://doi.org/10.1111/hex.13104 https://doi.org/10.1111/hex.13104 https://research-information.bris.ac.uk/en/publications/061fa2ae-3786-4e0a-80ec-c3e72bf8afb2 https://research-information.bris.ac.uk/en/publications/061fa2ae-3786-4e0a-80ec-c3e72bf8afb2 Health Expectations. 2020;00:1–10. | 1wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/hex Received: 10 January 2020 | Revised: 23 June 2020 | Accepted: 25 June 2020 DOI: 10.1111/hex.13104 O R I G I N A L R E S E A R C H P A P E R Reluctant educators and self-advocates: Older trans adults’ experiences of health-care services and practitioners in seeking gender-affirming services Paul Willis PhD1 | Christine Dobbs PhD2 | Elizabeth Evans PhD2 | Michele Raithby PhD, MSc2 | Jenny-Anne Bishop BSc (Hons)3 This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. © 2020 The Authors Health Expectations published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd 1School for Policy Studies, University of Bristol, Bristol, UK 2Centre for Innovative Ageing, College of Human and Health Sciences, Swansea University, Swansea, UK 3Unique Transgender Network North Wales, Wales, UK Correspondence Paul Willis, School for Policy Studies, University of Bristol, Bristol, UK. Email: paul.willis@bristol.ac.uk Funding information This study was funded by a research grant from the Dunhill Medical Trust (Grant No. R416/0515), 2016-2018. Abstract Background: Trans-identifying individuals experience unique barriers and challenges in negotiating health-care systems due to the cisnormative attitudes and practices which obstruct the receipt of trans-inclusive care. To date, there has been little ex- ploration of older trans consumers’ experiences of contemporary health-care ser- vices when seeking to transition medically in later life. Objectives: Qualitative findings are presented from a study of trans ageing and trans- related health and social care needs in Wales, UK (2016-18). The objectives are to (1) examine supportive and obstructive points of interaction with health-care profes- sionals, and (2) identify key learning messages for improving trans-related health care from the perspectives of trans-identifying adults in later life. Design: Trans-identifying participants self-selected to take part in two interviews—a life-history interview and a semi-structured interview. Interview data were analysed thematically using the framework method approach. Setting and participants: This paper focuses on the accounts of 19 participants (50- 74 years of age) who identified as trans and were seeking to transition medically in mid- to later life. Results: Findings indicate how older trans patients are positioned as reluctant edu- cators for GPs in primary care settings and illustrate the transphobic practices and cisnormative assumptions encountered across health-care interactions and systems that impede their journey of transitioning in later life. Discussion and conclusions: Messages from this study speak to the importance of improving professionals’ knowledge of gender identity diversity across the life course and making changes at a systemic level in redressing cisnormative assumptions and systems that reinforce inequities on the basis of gender identity. K E Y W O R D S ageing, equality, gender, gender identity, general practitioners, health care, older age, trans, transgender, trans-related health care www.wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/hex mailto: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9774-0130 http://orcid.org/0000-0002-4320-6709 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ mailto:paul.willis@bristol.ac.uk http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1111%2Fhex.13104&domain=pdf&date_stamp=2020-07-16 2 | WILLIS et aL. 1 | I N T R O D U C T I O N The views and experiences of health-care consumers are paramount to improving the quality and provision of health-care services, with grow- ing awareness of the importance of co-creation with consumer groups in delivering good services.1-3 This paper focuses on a consumer group whose unique life accounts have received little recognition in health- care research—the experiences of older trans-identifying1 adults ac- cessing trans-related health-care services. We present qualitative findings from a study of trans ageing and care needs in Wales (2016- 18) and examine trans adults’ (50-74 years of age) accounts of their interactions with health-care professionals as part of their journey of gender transitioning. ‘Transitioning’ refers to the processes trans in- dividuals undertake in changing their presentation and expression to align with their gender identity. This may involve social transitions (eg dressing and self-presentation) and/or medical transitions through ac- cessing gender-affirming treatments (eg prescribed hormones or sur- gical treatments).4 For many, this is a life-long journey. In the United Kingdom (UK), a 2016 Parliamentary Committee noted that the National Health Service (NHS) was letting down trans individuals, and there was considerable evidence of discriminatory practice ‘in breach of the Equality Act’ (p. 35).5 In England and Wales, the Equality Act 2010 promotes non-discriminatory services, inclusive of health-care services. Trans-identifying individuals are protected under the charac- teristic of ‘gender reassignment’ (s. 7(1)). UK and European survey findings indicate hostile climates to- wards trans citizens as they experience victimization, hate crime and hostility because of their gender identity.6-8 Living in a hostile environment impacts on the confidence of trans citizens in being visible and ‘out’ to others. From the 2018 UK Government survey of 100 000 + LGBT respondents, more than half of trans respon- dents (59% trans women; 56% trans men) reported they avoided expressing their gender identity.9 Epidemiological data show that as a minority group, they are substantially affected by adverse health outcomes, including mental health and substance misuse.10 For adults 50 + years of age, a US survey of LGB (and trans) adults found that trans respondents were at significantly higher risk of poor phys- ical health, disability, depressive symptomatology and perceived stress compared with cisgender peers (ie individuals whose gender identity configures with the sex assigned to them at birth).11 Health-care services are not immune from the hostile envi- ronments in which they are located. Reported structural and in- terpersonal barriers in health-care settings include being placed in inappropriate hospital wards and not having access to suitable bathrooms,12 encountering abusive treatment from medical staff, improper use of gender pronouns, binary gender language recorded on documents13,14 and patients not receiving the care required as they do not fit into a binary gender model, that is male/female.15 Anti-trans attitudes can lead to more severe outcomes such as the denial of trans-specific treatments.16 Negative experiences of services in earlier life will impact det- rimentally on current perceptions of providers and diminish older trans patients’ trust and confidence.15 In the UK, over a third (38%) of trans-identifying respondents in the National LGBT Survey reported negative experiences of general health-care services.9 Amongst re- spondents accessing gender identity clinics (GICs), 80% reported accessing had not been easy with 68% indicating waiting lists were too long. Other UK surveys of trans respondents tell a more nuanced story with reports of insulting language from health-care profession- als, including general practitioners (GPs), and GPs being unwilling to support with trans-related health care.12,17,18 Anecdotal accounts suggest recurring problems with GPs as gatekeepers to GICs and a wider lack of knowledge about referral pathways and treatments5 alongside reluctance from GPs and practice managers to take part in trans-related research.5 There is a gap in current research conveying clinicians’, including GPs’, views on current treatment pathways and options for older adults. For trans individuals seeking to transition medically, GICs are ter- tiary services that provide access to gender-affirming treatments and surgeries in the UK.4 Access to these services hinges on the receipt of a diagnosis of ‘gender dysphoria’, as listed in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5).16,19 To obtain treat- ments, trans individuals are required to conform to medical expecta- tions of appropriate binary gendered behaviour and presentation; to present in a gender-ambiguous way risks denial of treatment.20 Within biomedical discourse, this diagnostic label positions ‘trans’ as a condi- tion to be ‘fixed or resolved’ (p. 9).16 More recently, the World Health Organization has reclassified the term ‘dysphoria’ as ‘gender incongru- ence’ and removed this diagnosis from being listed as a mental disor- der.21 It remains to be seen whether this attempt to de-pathologize trans identities trickles down to inform clinicians’ understanding. The knowledge gaps of gatekeepers and long waiting lists are two major obstacles to accessing GICs. Waiting times for GICs are re- portedly the longest of any specialist service in the UK.4 A UK study of 74 trans individuals (50 + years) accessing a GIC over a 30-month period found that the majority of service users were trans women, 50% had sourced hormone treatments via the Internet, and 28% had obtained this treatment without medical advice.22 At the same time, patients taking cross-sex hormones were significantly less anxious and reported higher levels of self-esteem than those who did not. This supports other tentative conclusions that the receipt of hormone treatment can reduce some indicators of psycho-social distress and anxiety disorders.23,24 In this paper, our objectives are (1) to examine supportive and obstructive points of interaction with health-care professionals, and (2) to identify key learning messages for improving trans-related health care from the perspectives of trans-identifying adults in later life. Our research question is, ‘What are the experiences of trans-identifying older adults in accessing and receiving health-care services on their journey of transitioning medically?’ 2 | K E Y C O N C E P T S There are several key concepts underpinning this study. The term ‘transphobia’ signifies expressions and attitudes of aversion and | 3WILLIS et aL. hostility towards trans individuals and people who are gender non-conforming,25 manifesting in the form of microaggressions, such as the intentional misgendering of another person, to overtly hostile acts such as physical violence.4 Transphobic beliefs are underpinned by cisgenderist ideology. Cisgenderism is the domi- nant cultural belief that individuals who self-define their gender are perceived to be socially inferior or lacking validity compared to those whose sex assigned at birth matches their gender iden- tity.26,27 The distinction drawn between cisgender people (or non-transgender) and trans individuals is a form of cisgenderism that excludes people who identify with more than one gender or identify outside the binary divide between male and female.27 Everyday examples of cisgenderism at a service level include re- fusal to recognize a patient's gender identity or, at an institutional level, imposing medical or legal requirements that trans citizens must meet to be recognized fully. To counterbalance the problem-saturated health narrative at- tached to trans identities, Reisner et al10 champion a gender affir- mation model of public health. This model validates an individual's gender identity across four dimensions: social (eg recognition by name); psychological (eg self-perceptions and self-identity); medi- cal (eg access to treatments); and legal (eg procedures for changing names). These authors acknowledge that this model has less ap- plicability to people who identify outside the male/female binary. However, it does provide a foundation for reforming service delivery towards a more trans-inclusive approach.10 From a gender affirma- tive perspective, older trans adults who are dependent on others for care and support may need assistance with a range of everyday decisions and actions, including how to express their gender identity in person and on formal documentation, adhering to hormone pre- scriptions and how to access treatments, inclusive of post-surgical procedures and daily care.27 3 | M E T H O D S Twenty-two (22) trans-identifying individuals participated in two interviews each, leading to a total of 43 interviews (one person participated in one interview only). A purposive sampling ap- proach was adopted for interview recruitment. Advertisements for participation were circulated through trans community groups, online forums and social networks, identified through the project's Critical Reference Group. The project team also participated in local trans and LGBT pride-related events over a 12-month period to advertise the study. Participants were self-selecting. Criteria for participation were as follows: (i) identifying as trans or gender non-conforming; (ii) residing in Wales; and (iii) 50 + years of age. Two men resided in England at the time of interview; they were included as the majority of interviews were with women (15) and the accounts of men who had transitioned were missing. The mini- mum age of participation reflected the policy approach in Wales in which citizens are deemed to be eligible for accessing some ser- vices for older adults from 50 + years. Ethical approval was obtained through the Host University—the College of Human and Health Sciences Research Ethics Committee. Potential interviewees received an information sheet, and informed consent was obtained prior to the first interview. Recalling expe- riences of living in cisnormative environments can evoke a range of emotional responses, including distress, and ways of supporting participants were carefully considered. Participants were debriefed after each interview and received a follow-up phone call from the re- search officer between the two interviews. At the end of the first in- terview, participants were provided with a debrief sheet listing local support services and helplines for additional support. If needed, participants could be referred to a BACP-registered counsellor (who identified as trans) for additional support. To enhance participant au- tonomy, participants were sent electronic copies of their transcripts and given a set time period to review and edit details if they wished prior to analysis. In this paper, we concentrate on the accounts of 19 partici- pants who were transitioning through medical means—the other three participants identified as genderqueer or crossdressers and were not seeking to transition. We selected these 19 participants because of their first-hand experience of accessing trans-related health care, including local GPs, mental health professionals and GICs. The first interview was unstructured and followed a life-his- tory format. During these interviews, participants shared their life story, which included key turning points of seeking professional support and making first contact with primary services, includ- ing GPs. The second interview was semi-structured and included questions on topics identified in the literature including social network membership; experiences (recent and past) and expec- tations of health and social care services and professionals; and three wishes for change. Participants expanded on their current or most recent experiences of accessing trans-related health care and associated issues and concerns. Interviews ran between 1.5 and 3 hours each, and most occurred in participants’ homes, at their invitation. Interviews were audio-recorded, transcribed and analysed using the framework approach. This approach is one method of qualitative data management and analysis applied in social policy and health-care research.28 We followed the step-by-step guid- ance produced by NatCEN.29 The first stage is building a thematic framework: four team members conducted an independent cod- ing exercise on six participants’ transcripts to identify manifest themes. Team members met to share and compare initial codes and agree the thematic categories and sub-categories to be ap- plied to all data. The thirteen categories are listed in Table 1. The agreed framework was created in NVivo (qualitative software pro- gram), and participants’ transcripts were assigned a case number and key attributes. The next stage was coding data: transcripts were coded by two team members using the framework catego- ries. This was followed by summarizing data within NVivo: codes (or ‘nodes’ in NVivo) were charted across the framework by sum- marizing the relevant, coded data per category and indicating il- lustrative quotes. The final stage was interpreting the data: we 4 | WILLIS et aL. T A B L E 1 Categories and sub-categories created for the framework of data analysis Categories Sub-categories 1. About me 1.1 Social and familial background 1.2 Pets 1.3 Trans self-definitions 1.4 Current relationships—partner 1.5 Current relationships—family 1.6 Current relationships—friends 1.5 Who provides support in current life 1.6 Other 2. Becoming me 2.1. Barriers in later life 2.2. Facilitators in later life 2.3 Opposite-gender relationships 2.4 Social pressures 2.5 Accessing hormones 2.6 Life philosophy and beliefs 2.7 No social reference points (historic) 2.8 Other 3. Coming out as trans 3.1 Attitudes and reactions from family members 3.2 Attitudes and reactions from non- family members 3.3 Hiding trans self from others 3.4 Too risky to be out 3.5 Other 4. Care experiences, concerns and expectations 4.1 Care—dementia 4.2 Care—expectations in later life 4.3 GIC—positive experiences 4.4 GIC—negative experiences 4.5 Experiences with GP—negative 4.6 Experiences with GP—positive 4.7 Hospital staff—negative experiences 4.8 Seeking medical care—extreme measures 4.9 Medical care—historic 4.10 Mental health staff—experiences of 4.11 Health-care system—negative experiences 4.12 Other 5. Dressing and presenting as me 5.1 Dressing as ‘me’ 5.2 Dressing in secrecy 5.3 Perceptions of other trans individuals 5.4 Other 6. First encounters 6.1 First encounter with the idea of trans 6.2 First encounters with trans groups/ communities 6.3 Other (Continues) Categories Sub-categories 7. Growing older 7.1 Growing older—barriers 7.2 Growing older—discussion with significant others 7.3 Growing older—financial 7.4 Growing older—health 7.5 Responses to David Bowie quotation: ‘ageing as an extraordinary experience where you become the person you always should have been’ 7.6 Comparisons—younger versus older 7.7 Regrets in later life 7.8 Other 8. Mental health and well-being 8.1 Mental health isolation and/or depression 8.2 Mental health self-harm 8.3 Mental health-suicidal thoughts and actions 8.4 Internal struggle and external battle 8.5 Feeling shame in childhood and adolescence 8.6 Feeling shame in adulthood 8.7 Other 9. Challenges and barriers: childhood and adolescence 9.1 Expectations attached to gender assigned at birth 9.2 Physical health poor 9.3 Puberty—impact 9.4 Abuse and neglect in childhood and/ or adolescence 9.5 Other challenging experiences 9.6 Other 10. Sexuality 10.1 Sexuality—adolescence 10.2 Sexuality—adulthood 10.3 Intersection of sexual/gender identity 10.4 Other 11. Social media 11. Social media usage—purpose and platforms 12. Hate crime, discrimination, transphobia 12.1 Being outed 12.2 Misgendering 12.3 Discrimination and harassment at work 12.4 Discrimination and harassment— other experiences 12.5 Hate crime 12.6 Identifying safe spaces 12.7 Other 13. Three wishes question What three things would you wish to change in current health and social care services for older trans people? T A B L E 1 (Continued) (Continues) | 5WILLIS et aL. applied a thematic method by which categories were selectively coded with two team members checking that summaries adhered to charted data. From the summaries, core themes were generated that conveyed collective, more explanatory accounts of partici- pants’ individual experiences. Table 2 summarizes participants’ key characteristics. The major- ity were reliant on public-funded health care (free through the NHS). Four participants had privately funded gender-affirming treatments but still needed to access local public services. Below, we focus on experiences of health-care services within the last 10 years for currency. Extracts are presented using participant-selected pseudonyms. 4 | R E S U LT S We report three core themes. Some of the findings reflect identi- fied problems with the current system of referral for trans patients in Wales. Through its devolved powers, the Welsh Government ad- ministers its own public health-care services, which have resulted in different pathways for accessing GICs compared to pathways in England or Scotland. At the time of the study, the Welsh protocol involved referring all Welsh-residing patients to a GIC in England via a mental health assessor in Wales acting as a local gatekeeper. This gatekeeper determined whether individuals were ‘gender dysphoric’. During the course of this study, the established pathway to access- ing GICs has been under review, with a new gender identity ser- vice recently launched to provide trans-related health care closer to home for citizens living in Wales.30 Under the new service, launched September 2019, patients are now directly referred by their GP or another appropriate health professional to the Welsh Gender Service Clinic. 4.1 | General practitioners as inconsistent allies The most prominent theme was the wide variation in knowledge lev- els amongst GPs about trans people's needs, available treatments and referral pathways to the GIC. Unsurprisingly, increasing trans- related knowledge of GPs was the most frequently expressed ‘wish’ when identifying recommendations for change to services. 4.1.1 | Trans patients as reluctant educators Gaps in GPs’ knowledge generated frustration for participants who often felt that the onus was on them to find out information to inform their GP about what should be done or to push for treatments or referrals to the GIC. Participants were reluctant educators for their GPs, for example bringing information to their GP about which hor- mones to prescribe or clinical services to refer to for assessments. Reflecting on their first conversations with GPs about their gender identity, several participants described mixed responses. Some GPs appeared like ‘rabbits in headlights’, while others expressed uncer- tainty on how to proceed. Enduring an extended wait for follow-up was a common theme: First time I ever went in there [GP clinic], I just said I’d got these overwhelming feelings I want to be a woman … I’ve had it all my life … I’m fifty-odd now and it’s not going away … I really feel now I’ve got to go for it. And the first thing she said is, ‘What do I do about that, then?’ ‘I don’t know,’ I said […] I’d seen all this stuff about [clinic in England], so I said to her, ‘I don’t know what to say, really. You’re the expert”, kind of thing. ‘I do know there’s this clinic in [….]. Is there any chance at being referred to them?’ And she was all a bit, ‘Oh well, I suppose I can write to them. I don’t know’. I never heard anything for about two or three months. (Sophie, 58) Several participants who had decided to commence transitioning medically in their 40s and 50s were worried about getting older and ‘losing time’ on their journey as they did not have ‘years and years to wait’. For the majority of participants who were transitioning, this de- cision had been made over a long period of time, sometimes several decades, adding to their sense of anticipation. Participants perceived GPs as failing to educate themselves about trans patients’ needs in the way they would for other health problems, such as cancer. The lack of knowledge about gender-affirming treatments and GICs can manifest as an unwillingness to investigate further and generate further delays. Knowledge gaps persisted for participants who were seeking continuing health care post-surgery. Sophia (a different participant to Sophie) had received private surgical treatment overseas in 2004 but needed to access her local GP for advice on switching prescribed hormones: The doctor said to me, ‘Well, I may look into it for you, but I can’t promise anything’, and I said, ‘Well, okay, do you mind if I look into it, and then I come back to you with a name or a suggestion’, or, and he said, ‘Okay, yes. I’m open to that’. (Sophia, 53) Prescribing hormone treatment and monitoring hormone levels were seen as being relatively straightforward care for GPs to provide. However, it was thought that some GPs did not know how to do this and were anxious about prescribing, preferring to rely on endocrinolo- gists, of whom there are few in Wales. Moreover, GPs were sometimes ignorant about care and funding entitlements available through the NHS for treatments and surgery. The onus was on trans patients to educate and to push for treatments: I started to masculinise quite quickly. So I thought well, okay, I better go and try and get my surgery now. So I went to the doctor and I said, ‘Do you know how I go about funding?’ And they said, ‘don’t 6 | WILLIS et aL. know’. That was it … and there was a silence after, and I thought they’re going to say now, ‘But I’ll find out for you’, or, ‘I know of somebody who might know’, but no, nothing. They didn’t want to know. (Richard, 63) Asking ‘pertinent questions’ based on information obtained through the Internet was one strategy for putting pressure on GPs to acquire more information. In this context, the trans individu- al's superior knowledge signifies a subtle shift in power from the doctor to the patient, which sits more comfortably with some GPs than others. 4.1.2 | Supportive and affirming responses Some GPs were described as ‘highly supportive’ in the level of care provided. Three participants shared affirmative responses from their GPs when presenting as themselves: My GP, she’s been really supportive, and has gen- uinely you know, been there for me … The first time I went as Barbara she looked at me and went, ‘Amazing…,Where is that person who sat there is his, in his Barbour jacket, with his, sort of chin in his boots?’ (Barbara, 69) One participant, James, had developed deep mistrust for health- care professionals based on a history of health complications arising from genital surgeries received in the 1970s and 1990s. However, a more recent GP experience had regained his trust and confidence through her consistent care and support for him. For others, a lack of knowledge about trans-related health care was not always a barrier to receiving good care: [GP had not] heard of anyone transgender before, … but again she found out a lot of things for me. I told her that… I needed to transition and explained my situation to her… She was very supportive from the word go. (Gabriella, 56) Others described examples of GPs being supportive through en- suring access to funding for treatments, being perceived to be doing more than they needed to and delivering on promised information and referrals. 4.2 | Discriminatory and negative responses from health-care professionals and services A small group of participants relayed experiences of discrimina- tory responses from health-care professionals, including GPs, dis- trict nurses and general practice staff. After an initial consultation, Claire's GP had insisted that she pay for her own hormone prescrip- tions (prescriptions are free in Wales): She [GP] said to me, ‘Well, I don’t agree with the NHS paying for medication of this sort for people like you’. I was really taken aback by that… she totally cut my legs from under me. With a very meek voice, I said, ‘I’m willing to pay for them’. ‘Right,’ she says, ‘If you’re willing to pay for them’ (Claire, 67) This encounter reveals a GP’s decision making on personal, moral grounds, rather than professional, ethically informed grounds. Several participants had encountered hostile responses when accessing pri- mary care services: After the operation [genital reconstruction surgery] I had to go back to my surgery and that’s when the nurse in the surgery started to be really difficult with me… Well, when she found out I’d gone to [GIC] she was really upset. (Richard, 63) Examples of cisgenderism included participants being misgendered by their GP and reception staff, for example being referred to as ‘he’ N = 22 Age range 50-74 years 50-59 years (10) 60-69 years (11) 70 + years (1) Ethnic background White—born in the UK (20) White—born outside the UK (2) Current residencea Rural area (town, village or hamlet/ isolated dwelling) (10) Urban area (city or suburb) (12) Transitioning (socially and/or medically) Trans women (15) Trans men (4) Not seeking to transition/non-gender conforming (3) (eg identifying as a crossdresser)—not included in the below findings. aTwo participants lived in England at the time of interviews. T A B L E 2 Key characteristics of interview participants | 7WILLIS et aL. rather than ‘she’ in public reception areas. Other participants observed a distinct change in their GP’s attitude after ‘coming out’ as trans, such as being told to wait outside, while notes were read or presenting as cold in manner. However, these encounters were the exception rather than the norm. In terms of organizational practice and record-keep- ing, some individuals noted examples of misgendering in medical doc- uments and correspondence, for example receiving correspondence addressed to them by the name assigned to them at birth (a form of ‘deadnaming’). 4.3 | Uncertainty and delay in the health- care system Collective concern was expressed about the Welsh system for re- ferral to a GIC in England (current at the time of interviews) as an ‘extra step to take in comparison to England’. When reflecting on their journeys to access gender-affirming treatments, participants described themselves in a liminal space—always waiting in anticipa- tion for the next point of contact and continually uncertain about their future. Progression through the health-care system was per- ceived as a constant struggle with bureaucracy, compounded by low levels of knowledge about trans-related health care amongst local professionals, including GPs and mental health practitioners. 4.3.1 | Delays and difficulties at the local level There were variations in how quickly participants progressed through assessments and referrals via their local health board, indicating inconsistent procedures and timelines across boards. Some participants viewed themselves as ‘lucky’ as progression had been relatively smooth, while others described it as a ‘test’ they had to pass in order to be referred to a GIC or as a constant ‘fight for everything’ with clinicians. One repeated frustration was the reliance on local mental health gatekeepers to be able to progress to the GIC and the lengthy delays that ensued, varying between six and 18 months. Rebecca (53) experienced significant hurdles in convincing a mental health clinician she was a) transgender and b) not suicidal: And I know what the criteria is to be accepted for surgery and everything, but he [practitioner] did turn around to say to me, ‘Well, you don’t look like you’re suicidal or anything like that’ and I said, ‘You’re an ed- ucated guy, I’m an educated person, why do I need to be suicidal to want to transition?’ Rebecca's account illustrates the power struggle present between the patient and practitioner where Rebecca is struggling to fit in the correct clinical boxes to be able to proceed with a GIC referral (ac- cording to the practitioner's current understanding). When appoint- ments were cancelled repeatedly or referrals did not progress, some participants had ‘to make a fuss’ to ensure these problems were re- solved. It was a common view that it was up to the individual to keep pushing against the system in order to receive referrals and access treatments and to know how to ask the ‘right questions’ to be able to move forward. In many instances, this meant relying on the knowledge of trans peers. Peer knowledge was invaluable whether it be through contact with other trans individuals in the local community or through information accessed via Internet-based communities. 4.3.2 | Challenges and pressures when accessing GICs Once referred to the GIC, participants described long waiting peri- ods for appointments and frequent cancellations, further delaying treatment progression. For participants residing in Wales, having to deal with only one GIC results in a backlog, which led to increased waiting times to gain access. Frustrations with the system backlog led to a small number of participants with the financial means to con- sider private treatment. However, not everyone could afford this, as voiced by two participants who lived on low incomes generated from part-time employment and social security. The current system of accessing the GIC over the Welsh-English border required lengthy travel and was deemed highly expensive for participants and for significant others providing emotional sup- port. Many of the negative experiences recounted by participants revolved around long waiting times for appointments and frequent cancellations, sometimes on the day of the appointment (after trav- elling to the GIC) or the week before. The ‘impersonal’ approach of long waiting times coupled with repeated appointment cancellations extended to further waits for GIC staff to communicate with partic- ipants’ GP back home. Two people described waiting for over three months for letters to their GPs prescribing treatments. Several participants reflected on the encouragement from GIC staff to change formally their names as part of a ‘real life test’ in order to progress to treatments. Some experienced this requirement as a positive step in their journey. Others were questioned by GIC staff about their choices, such as their chosen name: I had changed my name … I have always been known as [chosen name]. So, when I did the deed poll, I changed my first name to […] and, at [GIC], I got massive grief … that it wasn’t a feminine enough name. (Diane, 67) The power relationship between a GIC and its patients can result in people feeling that they have to be cautious about how they pres- ent, how they convey expected gender norms in actions and dress, and what they say. Two participants discussed the need to be hypervigilant when sharing personal information in case this worked against them, such as being identified as not meeting clinical criteria, that is not being ‘trans enough’. A small group spoke positively about the GIC they had accessed, describing their interactions with staff as an ‘enjoyable experience’, 8 | WILLIS et aL. a relatively quick progression of referrals and treatment, and ‘superb’ support. One person pointed to a ‘broken system’ that created prob- lems such as long waiting lists, rather than a reflection of the perfor- mance of the clinicians within the service. When reflecting on what changes should be made to current provision, many participants envisioned a local cluster of integrated support through primary care services and believed that citizens in Wales should be cared for directly by GPs in local primary care services who have a more informed understanding of trans-related health care. 5 | D I S C U S S I O N In 2016, the UK Women and Equalities Committee identified signifi- cant systemic problems in delivering good standards of care to trans individuals accessing trans-related health care, including knowledge levels and experiences of discriminatory treatment. The Committee pointed to GPs as one group lacking understanding of key areas including referral pathways to GICs and the prescribing of hor- mone treatment. In many ways, our findings echo these concerns. Participants’ reflections on pathways to accessing gender-affirming treatments over the last ten years convey fractious and sometimes hostile relationships with GPs and other health-care profession- als, limited trans-specific knowledge from clinical gatekeepers and repeated delays and hurdles in moving forward in their journey of transitioning. Alongside these concerns, there are some supportive interactions where participants receive gender-affirming and highly validating responses in a timely manner. Our findings bring acute attention to the psychological and emo- tional stressors trans adults in mid- to later life-experience when navigating health-care services, including experiences of overt transphobia and discriminatory treatment. This encompasses clini- cal pressures to conform to gender stereotypes, despite movement away from ‘real life tests’ by GIC services to more person-centred approaches to supporting trans patients to transition socially on their own terms.4 For adults transitioning in their 50s and 60s, there is an underlying, chronological imperative of ‘running out of time’ to complete this life-changing journey. Pearce discusses how trans lives within health-care systems are marked by uncertainty and anticipa- tion; there are elements of this present in our findings as participants recounted the cloud of uncertainty that enveloped their journey of seeking to transition medically.16 These findings chime with survey data reported by others in the UK12,17 and the concerns raised by older adults in other European nations.15 Trans adults in the current study occupy the role of reluctant educators of GPs while relying on information gleaned from the Internet or through social connections with other trans individuals and groups. Other authors have brought attention to the different ‘practices of care’ exercised across trans groups and networks20 and the role of community organizing for trans individuals living in a cisnorma- tive social environment.31 Valderas argues that ‘recognising the im- portance of communities’ (p. 10) and the social groupings patients belong to is an integral strategy to enhancing patient engagement in the delivery of primary health care.32 A key recommendation from our study is the need for increased resourcing and support of local trans groups and networks by local, devolved and central govern- ments. These groups often operate voluntarily without funding and are precariously placed in terms of providing on-going support for individuals with limited social networks. While the findings indicate a range of challenging and cisnorma- tive interactions with professionals, the determination of individual participants to question, inform and assert their recognition and rights needs to be acknowledged. This sometimes required ques- tioning medical expertise and was not in keeping with the more pas- sive connotations of the patient role. The strength and resilience of older trans adults to question and challenge professionals and assert their care needs may wane in later years if their general well-being is compromised by age-related declines in physical and mental health. Literature on the intersection between ageing, gender identity and dementia reinforces this.33,34 Another implication is the need for in- dependent advocacy for trans individuals in later life if their care and support needs increase. Being a self-advocate is a mentally and emotionally exhausting role, particularly after a lifetime accumula- tion of encounters with cisgendered assumptions and transphobic views and behaviours. Within the third theme, there is promise that the current sys- tem will improve at a local level in terms of specialist health-care services for trans citizens in Wales. There is a different kind of an- ticipation in participants’ accounts for a much-improved service for future generations of trans individuals accessing these services. This aligns with current changes to NHS Wales services, following the recently launched Welsh Gender Team where individual patients will be able to access some specialist services.30 Alongside this, the Royal College of General Practitioners has called for a whole-sys- tem approach to improving services for UK trans patients35. The current findings testify to the significance of enhancing local provid- ers’ knowledge of GIC pathways and gender-affirming treatments, inclusive of GPs, and to provide timely services in recognition of the years of anticipation older trans individuals have experienced over decades. We would add to this the importance of introducing com- pulsory learning sessions on gender identity and diversity across the life course within pre- and post-qualifying training and education for health-care professionals, of which some e-learning materials cur- rently exist within generic ‘equality and diversity’ modules online. 5.1 | Limitations to the study Our findings are generated from a small non-representative sam- ple, and participants were self-selecting. This may have attracted a higher proportion of participants with negative experiences. Missing from the sample are the voices of trans individuals from black and minority ethnic (BAME) backgrounds; the findings do not account for inequalities compounded by the social intersections between old age, ethnicity and gender identity. For example, findings from the recent UK Government survey of LGBT people show older trans | 9WILLIS et aL. respondents (65 + years) were more likely to have experienced or been offered conversion therapy (20%) than younger respondents, with a higher number of BAME respondents (28%) reporting this.9 In this paper, we focused on those seeking to transition socially and medically and we cannot speak to the experiences of older indi- viduals who are gender non-conforming (eg identify as non-binary). Separate research is warranted into their experiences of health- care services that are heavily gendered. Likewise, more research is needed into trans experiences of high-quality integrated care and the key differences between those who self-fund and those who rely on public services. 6 | C O N C L U S I O N Messages from this study speak to the importance of improving health-care professionals’ knowledge of gender identity diversity across the life course and making changes at a systemic level in re- dressing cisnormative systems and practices. At a community level, trans consumers and groups could be supported to be actively in- volved in monitoring and evaluating the practices of local GP ser- vices in parallel with the whole-system approach flagged above by the Royal College. Service audits by LGB&T consumers have been co-produced and applied in social care settings36; there is scope to expand this model to the community auditing of primary care ser- vices by older trans individuals who bring expertise by experience from having accessed trans-related health care. At a systemic level, the adoption of a gender affirmative model of health-care delivery,10 coupled with an age-friendly approach, is critical to building more accessible, responsive and supportive services that are co-produced with trans groups and networks and include integrated support with social care and third sector support services. These initiatives re- quire endorsement and resourcing from NHS bodies and their re- spective governments to ensure commitment from GPs and other health-care professionals. Finally, more attention is needed on the perspectives of GPs and other clinicians on this topic to glean a deeper understanding of the individual, contextual and organiza- tional factors that hinder practitioners from providing more gender- affirming health care. A C K N O W L E D G E M E N T S The authors gratefully acknowledge all the individuals who took part in this study and shared their experiences. The study was hosted by the Centre for Innovative Ageing at Swansea University, UK. C O N F L I C T O F I N T E R E S T All authors have no conflicts of interest to declare. D ATA AVA I L A B I L I T Y S TAT E M E N T Research data are not shared. O R C I D Paul Willis https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9774-0130 Christine Dobbs http://orcid.org/0000-0002-4320-6709 1 For the purpose of this paper, we follow the definition of trans pro- vided by Burns37 in her historical account of ‘Trans Britain’: an adjec- tive ‘to describe anyone whose gender identity and/or presentation does not align stereotypically with the gender assigned them at birth’. (p. xvii) ‘Trans’ is a broad umbrella term ‘which encompasses all more specific words for gender non-conformity including (but not limited to) transsexual people, non-binary or genderqueer people and those who cross-dress’ (p. xvii). R E F E R E N C E S 1. Lee D-H. A model for designing healthcare service based on the patient experience. Inter J Healthcare Manag. 2019;12(3):180-188. 2. Redley B, McTier L, Botti M, et al. Patient participation in inpatient ward rounds on acute inpatient medical wards: A descriptive study. BMJ Qual Saf. 2019;28(1):15-23. 3. Bergerum C, Thor J, Josefsson K, Wolmesjo M. How might patient involvement in healthcare quality improvement efforts work—A re- alist literature review. Health Expect. 2019;22(5):952-964. 4. Vincent B. Transgender Health: a practitioner’s guide to binary and non-binary trans patient care. London: Jessica Kingsley Publishers; 2018. https://www.jkp.com/uk/trans gende r-healt h-1.html 5. House of Commons Women and Equality Committee. Transgender Equality, First Report of Session 2015–16. London, House of Commons. https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201516/cm- select/cmwomeq/390/390.pdf. Published 2016. Accessed 2nd August 2019. 6. Bachmann CL, Gooch B. LGBT in Britain: Hate Crime and Discrimination. Stonewall, London. https://www.stonewall.org. uk/system/files/lgbt_in_britain_hate_crime.pdf Published 2017. Accessed 2nd August 2019. 7. European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights FRA. Being trans in the European Union: comparative analysis of EU LGBT survey data. Vienna: European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights FRA. https://fra.europa.eu/en/publication/2014/being-trans-eu-com- parative-analysis-eu-lgbt-survey-data Published 2014. Accessed 1st December 2019. 8. UK Home Office. Hate crime, England and Wales. 2018/19 (No. 2419). UK Government. https://www.gov.uk/government/statis- tics/hate-crime-england-and-wales-2018-to-2019 Published 2019. Accessed 21st October 2019. 9. UK Government. National LGBT Survey: Research Report. https:// www.gov.uk/government/publications/national-lgbt-survey-sum- mary-report. Published 2018. Accessed 1st February 2019. 10. Reisner SL, Poteat T, Keatley JA, et al. Global health bur- den and needs of transgender populations: A review. Lancet. 2016;388(10042):412-436. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140 -6736 (16)00684 -X 11. Fredriksen-Goldsen KI, Cook-Daniels L, Kim HJ, et al. Physical and mental health of transgender older adults: An at-risk and under- served population. Gerontologist. 2014;54(3):488-500. 12. Whittle S, Turner L, Al-Alami M. Engendered Penalties: Transgender and Transsexual People’s Experiences of Inequality and Discrimination, London: The Equalities Review. https://www. ilga-europe.org/sites/default/files/trans_country_report_-_engen- deredpenalties.pdf. Published 2007. Accessed 1st November 2019. 13. Porter KE, Brennan-Ing M, Chang SC, et al. Providing competent and affirming services for transgender and gender nonconforming older adults. Clinical Gerontologist. 2016;39(5):366-388. 14. Shires DA, Jaffee K. Factors associated with health care discrimina- tion experiences among a national sample of female-to-male trans- gender individuals. Health Soc Work. 2015;40(2):131-141. https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9774-0130 https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9774-0130 http://orcid.org/0000-0002-4320-6709 https://www.jkp.com/uk/transgender-health-1.html https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(16)00684-X https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(16)00684-X 10 | WILLIS et aL. 15. Siverskog A. “They Just Don’t Have a Clue”: Transgender aging and implications for social work. J Gerontol Soc Work. 2014;57(2–4):386-406. 16. Pearce R. Understanding trans health: discourse, power and possibility. Bristol: Policy Press; 2018. https://policy.brist oluni versi typre ss.co. uk/under stand ing-trans -health 17. McNeil J, Bailey L, Ellis S, Morton J, Regan M. Trans Mental Health Study 2012. Scottish Transgender Alliance, Edinburgh. https:// www.gires.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/trans_mh_study. pdf Published 2012. Accessed 2nd August 2019. 18. Bishop JA. “Trans* Patients’ Experiences of their GP Surgery – Annual Survey 2013”. TransForum & Building Health Partnerships, Greater Manchester. Published 2013. Accessed 12th March 2017. ht t p://lgbt .foun dation/p olic y-re se arch/building-he alt hpar t- nerships/learning-from-the-programme-a-best-practice-guide/ conducting-a-gp-/health-service-experience-survey/ 19. American Psychiatric Association. Diagnostic and statistical man- ual of mental disorders (DSM-5), 5th edn. Arlington, VA: American Psychiatric Association; 2013. 20. Hines S. Transgendering care: Practices of care within transgender communities. Critical Social Policy. 2007;27(4):462-486. 21. World Health Organisation. ‘WHO/Europe brief – transgender health in the context of ICD-11’. http://www.euro.who.int/en/ health-topics/health-determinants/gender/gender-definitions/ whoeurope-brief-transgender-health-in-the-contex t-of-icd-11 Published 2019. Accessed 6th January 2019. 22. Bouman WP, Claes L, Marshall E, et al. Socio-demographic variables, clinical features and the role of pre-assessment cross-sex hormones in older trans people. Journal of Sexual Medicine. 2016;13(4):711-719. 23. Costa R, Colizzi M. The effect of cross-sex hormonal treatment on gender dysphoria individuals’ mental health: a systematic review. Neuropsychiatr Dis Treat. 2016;12:1953-1966. 24. Bouman WP, Claes L, Brewin N, et al. Transgender and anxiety: a comparative study between transgender people and the general population. International Journal of Transgenderism. 2017;18(1):16-26. 25. Hill DB, Willoughby BLB. The development and validation of the Genderism and Transphobia Scale. Sex Roles. 2005;53(7):531-544. 26. Ansara YG. Cisgenderism in medical settings: challenging structural violence through collaborative partnerships. In: Rivers I & Ward R, eds. Out of the ordinary: Representations of LGBT lives. Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Publishing; 2012:102-122. 27. Ansara YG. Challenging cisgenderism in the ageing and aged care sector: Meeting the needs of older people of trans and/or non-bi- nary experience. Australasian J Ageing. 2015;34(S2):14-18. 28. Gale NK, Heath G, Cameron E, Rashid S, Redwood S. Using the framework method for the analysis of qualitative data in multi-dis- ciplinary health research. BMC Med Res Methodol. 2013;13:117. 29. NatCen Social Research. Framework in NVivo11: a step-by-step guide. London: NatCEN; 2018. 30. NHS Wales, ‘New Welsh Gender Service announced’. NHS Wales. ht tp://w w w.genderidentit y.wales.nhs.uk /adult-gender-identi- ty-service. Published 2019. Accessed online 21st October 2019. 31. Fabbre V, Siverskog A. Transgender ageing: community resistance and well-being in the lifecourse. In: King A, Almack K, & Jones RL, eds. Intersections of ageing, gender and sexualities: Multidis- ciplinary international perspectives. Bristol: Policy Press; 2019: 47-62. 32. Valderas JM. Patient engagement. Technical series on Safer Primary Care. Geneva: Department of Service Delivery and Safety. World Health Organisation. https://apps.who.int/iris/ bitstream/handle/10665/252269/9789241511629-eng.pdf;jses- sionid= 00197801649A973719D92E7CCE0608F1?sequence=1. Published 2016. Accessed 1st October 2019. 33. Hunter C, Bishop J-A, Westwood S. The complexity of trans*/gen- der identities. In: Westwood IS, Price E, eds. Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Trans* Individuals Living with Dementia: concepts, practice and rights. London: Routledge; 2016:124-137. 34. Witten TM. When my past returns: loss of self and personhood – dementia and the trans-person. In: Westwood S, Price E, eds. Lesbian, gay, bisexual and trans* individuals living with dementia: Theoretical, practical and rights-based perspectives. New York, NY: Routledge; 2016:110-123. 35. Royal College of General Practitioners. RCGP calls for whole-sys- tem approach to improving NHS care for trans patients. https:// www.rcgp.org.uk/about-us/news/2019/june/rcgp-calls-for-whole- system-approach-to-improving-nhs-care-for-trans-patients.aspx. Published 2019. Accessed 25th June 2019. 36. Willis P, Almack K, Hafford-Letchfield T, Simpson P, Billings B, Mall N. 2018, Turning the co-production corner: methodological re- flections from an action research project to promote LGBT inclu- sion in care homes for older people. Inter J Environ Res Pub Health. 2018;15(4):695. 37. Burns C. Trans britain: Our journey from the shadows. London: Unbound; 2018. https://unbou nd.com/books/ trans -brita in/ How to cite this article: Willis P, Dobbs C, Evans E, Raithby M, Bishop J-A. Reluctant educators and self-advocates: Older trans adults’ experiences of health-care services and practitioners in seeking gender-affirming services. Health Expect. 2020;00:1–10. https://doi.org/10.1111/hex.13104 https://policy.bristoluniversitypress.co.uk/understanding-trans-health https://policy.bristoluniversitypress.co.uk/understanding-trans-health https://unbound.com/books/trans-britain/ https://doi.org/10.1111/hex.13104 
work_sko3wliolfgjffsbq7dxmlytc4	----	http://rac.sagepub.com/ Race & Class http://rac.sagepub.com/content/53/3/30 The online version of this article can be found at: DOI: 10.1177/0306396811425984 2012 53: 30Race Class Liz Fekete The Muslim conspiracy theory and the Oslo massacre Published by: http://www.sagepublications.com On behalf of: Institute of Race Relations can be found at:Race & ClassAdditional services and information for http://rac.sagepub.com/cgi/alertsEmail Alerts: http://rac.sagepub.com/subscriptionsSubscriptions: http://www.sagepub.com/journalsReprints.navReprints: http://www.sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.navPermissions: http://rac.sagepub.com/content/53/3/30.refs.htmlCitations: What is This? - Dec 15, 2011Version of Record >> at HBK - Hochschule fur Bildende on December 19, 2011rac.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://rac.sagepub.com/ http://rac.sagepub.com/content/53/3/30 http://www.sagepublications.com http://www.irr.org.uk http://rac.sagepub.com/cgi/alerts http://rac.sagepub.com/subscriptions http://www.sagepub.com/journalsReprints.nav http://www.sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav http://rac.sagepub.com/content/53/3/30.refs.html http://rac.sagepub.com/content/53/3/30.full.pdf http://online.sagepub.com/site/sphelp/vorhelp.xhtml http://rac.sagepub.com/ SAGE Los Angeles, London, New Delhi, Singapore, Washington DC Race & Class Copyright © 2011 Institute of Race Relations, 53(3) 30 –47 10.1177/0306396811425984 http://rac.sagepub.com The Muslim conspiracy theory and the Oslo massacre LIZ FEKETE Abstract: Anders Behring Breivik, perpetrator of the Norwegian massacre, was motivated by a belief in a Muslim conspiracy to take over Europe. Extreme and aberrant his actions were, but, explains the author, elements of this conspiracy theory are held and circulated in Europe today across a broad political spectrum, with internet-focused counter-jihadist activists at one end and neoconservative and cultural conservative columnists, commentators and politicians at the other. The political fallout from the circulation of these ideas ranges from test cases over free speech in the courts to agitation on the ground from defence leagues, anti- minaret campaigners and stop Islamisation groups. Although the conspiracy draws on older forms of racism, it also incorporates new frameworks: the clash of civilisations, Islamofascism, the new anti-Semitism and Eurabia. This Muslim conspiracy bears many of the hallmarks of the ‘Jewish conspiracy theory’, yet, ironically, its adherents, some of whom were formerly linked to anti-Semitic traditions, have now, because of their fear of Islam and Arab countries, become staunch defenders of Israel and Zionism. Keywords: Breivik, clash of civilisations, Eurabia, freedom of speech, Geert Wilders, Islamofascism, Muslim conspiracy, new anti-Semitism, Oslo massacre In a closed court hearing on 25 July 2011, 32-year-old Anders Behring Breivik admitted killing seventy-seven people on 22 July in two successive attacks in and around the Norwegian capital – the first on government buildings in central Oslo, Liz Fekete is executive director of the Institute of Race Relations and author of A Suitable Enemy: rac- ism, migration and Islamophobia in Europe (Pluto, 2009). 425984RAC53310.1177/0306396811425984FeketeRace & Class at HBK - Hochschule fur Bildende on December 19, 2011rac.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://rac.sagepub.com/ Fekete: The Muslim conspiracy theory 31 the second on the tiny island of Utøya, 38km from Oslo. But he denied criminal responsibility on the basis that the shooting spree on the Norwegian Labour party summer youth camp, which claimed sixty-nine lives, was necessary to wipe out the next generation of Labour party leaders in order to stop the further disintegration of Nordic culture from the mass immigration of Muslims and kick-start a revolu- tion to halt the spread of Islam. Even before his court appearance, political analysts and anti-fascist monitors had been investigating Breivik’s motives, sifting through numerous online postings and, crucially, analysing his 1,500-page manifesto writ- ten in English under the pseudonym Andrew Berwick.1 Entitled 2083: a European declaration of independence, he had sent it out to 1,003 counter-jihadist and far-right extremists across Europe ninety minutes before he embarked on his killing spree. This article identifies the various elements in the Islamic conspiracy theory that Breivik drew on, its discursive frameworks, its key shapers and followers. The extreme-right politicians, counter-jihadists and other political commentators that Breivik cites in 2083 have been anxious to distance themselves from his actions and establish that they do not support violence. They describe him as a loner, a violent psychopath and a freakish aberration. But the myths that Muslims, sup- ported by liberals, cultural relativists and Marxists, are out to Islamicise Europe and that there is a conspiracy to impose multiculturalism on the continent and destroy western civilisation are peddled each day on the internet, in extreme-right, counter-jihadist and neo-Nazi circles. I also examine certain intellectual currents within neoconservatism and cultural conservatism. For, although these intellectual currents do not support the notion of a deliberate conspiracy to Islamicise Europe, they are often used by conspiracy theorists to underline the righteousness of their beliefs and actions. Shaping a conspiracy Breivik started out as a member of Norway’s anti-immigrant Progress party.2 Today, seriously embarrassed by the publication of various videos and photo- graphs believed to be from around 2002, which show Breivik at parties with a number of individuals who are now senior politicians in the party, it appears to have bethought itself and promises that its approach in future election campaigns will be more thoughtful.3 We know that Breivik soon became disillusioned with the Progress party because it was not radical enough. He became a member of the Nazi web forum Nordisk (Nordic), which has more than 22,000 (mainly Scandinavian) members. In his manifesto, he claimed to have adopted the phi- losophy of the Vienna School of Crusader Nationalism, praising the Stop Islamisation movements of Europe and the US and counter-jihadist websites such as Atlas Shrugs (run by Pamela Geller), Jihad Watch (run by Robert Spencer, whom Breivik cites sixty-four times) and the Gates of Vienna (whose operator goes under the pseudonym Baron Bodissey). Breivik also claimed to be greatly inspired by the defence leagues springing up across Europe. He supported the at HBK - Hochschule fur Bildende on December 19, 2011rac.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://rac.sagepub.com/ 32 Race & Class 53(3) Norwegian Defence League and seemed particularly keen on the English Defence League (EDL), which was funded by Christian fundamentalist millionaire Alan Lake,4 who, following the murders, wrote on his 4Freedoms website that Breivik, ‘did this attack to protest against the way that Islam is taking over large parts of Europe. By attacking the leftist politicians that are enabling this, the chickens have actually come home to roost.’5 As the Guardian’s online religious editor Andrew Brown has pointed out, counter- jihadist websites promote a ‘rolling cauldron of stories from all over the world to illustrate the treachery and violence of Muslims, and the criminal weakness of liber- als’.6 They also provide ammunition for neo-Nazis and violent ultrapatriotic defence leagues (such as the EDL), which, in turn, run thousands of websites. (In Germany alone, far-right groups run some 1,000 websites and thirty-eight online radio sta- tions.7) The views promoted by counter-jihadists and neo-Nazis are also nourished by movements such as Stop Islamisation of Europe (SIOE) and Stop Islamization of America (SIOA), run by Pamela Geller and Robert Spencer, which bears the motto ‘Racism is the lowest form of human stupidity, but Islamophobia is the height of common sense’. Breivik declared himself in favour of the Stop Islamisation move- ments and also mentioned in positive terms the True Finns (several of whose members were sent the manifesto by Breivik), the British National Party (BNP) and, in Germany, the National Democratic party, the Deutsche Volksunion and the Republikaner. (Tanguy Veys, a Vlaams Belang MP, was also sent a copy of the manifesto.) The leader of the Dutch Freedom party, Geert Wilders, was cited in Breivik’s manifesto on thirty occasions. He commented that Wilders was a possible ally, although Wilders would ‘have to condemn us’ (at the point of violence), ‘which is fine. It is after all essential that they protect their reputational shields.’ Breivik’s manifesto was signed AB Justiciar Knight Commander, cell 8 Knights Templar Europe. Throughout the document and in numerous online postings (where he used the pseudonym Sigurd Jorsalfar, a reference to the twelfth-century King of Norway), Breivik revealed his obsessions with the Crusades, the sup- posed threat to Christian Europe posed by Muslim immigrants and mainstream political leaders and the desire to see not only the deportation of all Muslims from Europe, but also from ‘the West Bank and the Gaza Strip’. He described himself as a supporter of ‘pro-Zionism/Israeli nationalism’, and one of his key intellectual influences was Bat Ye’or, who first coined the term Eurabia and identified the threat of ‘Dhimmitude’ or western subjection to Islam. Several neoconservative political commentators and thinktanks also draw, to varying degrees, on the notion of Eurabia, as do the Christian evangelical Pax Europa, which is behind many anti-mosque campaigns.8 One of its German founders, René Stadtkewitz, has launched the Freedom party in Berlin to contest the September 2011 elections and to provoke an ‘uprising’ by people across Europe against ‘growing Islamic influence’.9 In a 2008 study of counter-jihadism for the Royal United Services Institute, Toby Archer described it as a spectrum: at HBK - Hochschule fur Bildende on December 19, 2011rac.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://rac.sagepub.com/ Fekete: The Muslim conspiracy theory 33 At one end are the shrillest voices, with their dystopian fantasies of mayhem and civil war enveloping Europe as the continent becomes incorporated into a new Caliphate. They resemble the writers of the American neo-fascist militia movement, forever waiting for the beginning of the race-war and the chance to fight the “New World Order.” At the other end of the scale are mainstream writers and politicians whose views are not dissimilar.10 Breivik’s views, as outlined in his manifesto, resemble those of the American neo- fascist Militia movement, only with culture and religion replaced by race. He, too, predicted a European civil war in three stages, ending in 2083 with the execution of ‘cultural Marxists’ and the deportation of all Muslims. But, whereas Breivik saw himself as a political soldier in a revolution against Muslims, multiculturalism and civilisational decline, most counter-jihadists, while sharing much of Breivik’s discursive frameworks and vocabulary, stop short of advocating violence as a means of achieving their goals. At the other end of the spectrum are political commentators who write from a neoconservative or culturally conservative perspective. They do not directly sup- port the idea that there is a deliberate conspiracy theory to Islamicise Europe and impose multiculturalism and they certainly do not advocate violence. Rather, they warn that through omission, through naivety, through an unwillingness to act or even recognise the dangers ahead, liberal elites leave Europe vulnerable to Islamisation. These commentators include, in the UK, Conservative education minister Michael Gove (author of Celsius 7/7), Douglas Murray (director of the Centre for Social Cohesion, associate director of the Henry Jackson Society and author of Neoconservativism: why we need it), the Christian Zionist, Baroness Caroline Cox (former education adviser to Margaret Thatcher), Melanie Phillips (columnist at the Daily Mail, formerly of the Spectator and author of Londonistan: how Britain has created a terror state within); and, in Germany, the philosopher and cynic Henryk M. Broder (writer at Der Spiegel, Die Welt and author of Hurrah We Capitulate: on the desire to cave in). For such neoconservative writers, combating Islamisation is also part of their duty, as intellectuals, to combat the kind of civilisational decline and sapping of the European creative spirit that the German writer and philosopher Oswald Spengler identified as the key threat to western civilisation in his 1918 text The Decline of the West. These neoconservatives also share the counter-jihadists’ and extreme Right’s fascination with Israel as a muscular nation, uncorrupted by European decadence (that is, cultural relativism and hatred of its colonial past) and, thus, best placed to defend civilisational values in the face of the Islamic onslaught. Indeed, the extreme Right, which is uniting today under the banner of the International Freedom Alliance, has issued the Jerusalem Declaration11 in support of more settlements in the West Bank and greater commitment to Israel as ‘the centre of the fight against Muslims’, on the basis that, ‘if Jerusalem falls, Athens, Rome, Amsterdam and Nashville will fall’.12 An ardent defence of Israel is also very much part of the DNA at HBK - Hochschule fur Bildende on December 19, 2011rac.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://rac.sagepub.com/ 34 Race & Class 53(3) of neoconservative commentators such as Douglas Murray, Baroness Cox, Melanie Phillips and Henryk M. Broder. ‘There is no economic blockade [in Gaza]’, declares Douglas Murray, adding that ‘[if] Gaza is a prison camp it’s the only one in the world with luxury shopping malls’ and ‘Olympic style swimming pools’.13 Melanie Phillips, meanwhile, sees nothing wrong with settlement-building in the West Bank on the grounds that the settlements ‘are built on land to which [Israel] is legally and morally entitled’.14 The essence of the conspiracy The first aspect of the ‘theory’ that Breivik draws upon is that Islam is a backward, warlike and criminal religion and that Muslims, through sheer force of numbers and back-door attempts to introduce Sharia, are bent on Islamising Europe. Under such reasoning, Islam the religion and political Islam are collapsed, and the history of the Crusades is served up as a horror story warning of the conquest to come. The most fanatical of those who fall for the conspiracy theory seriously believe that the circumstances today are exactly the same as during the Crusades, only, at that time, Christian Europe was under threat from war and occupation, whereas today the threat comes from the Muslim demographic and rising Muslim birth rates. Thus, in a footnote to 2083, Breivik explained the significance of the date 2083, which is 400 years since the last siege of Vienna by the Turks. He then went on to quote Henryk M. Broder, who wrote that: ‘After the defeats of Poitiers (732) and Vienna (1683), the Europeans are now defeated with the weapons of demography.’15 In postings on the Norwegian internet site Dokument.no,16 Breivik wrote: Show me a country where Muslims have lived at peace with non-Muslims with- out waging Jihad against the Kaffir (dhimmitude, systematic slaughter or demo- graphic warfare)? Can you please give me ONE single example where Muslims have been successfully assimilated? How many thousands of Europeans must die, how many hundreds of European women must be raped, millions robbed and bullied before you realise that multiculturalism and Islam cannot work?17 The anti-mosque and anti-minaret campaigns that have mushroomed in the last five years in every European country often quote the threat posed by the Muslim demographic and the innate desire of an aggressive ‘sect’ to impose a criminal religion. They argue that, if all Muslims are political Islamists out to Islamicise Europe and introduce the kind of Sharia law practised in the tribal areas of Afghanistan, then all signs of visible Islam (mosques, minarets, veils) must be banned. For instance, the Swiss People’s Party (SVP) deputy Oskar Freysinger, secretary of the Stop the Minarets movement in Switzerland, describes minarets as a ‘symbol of political and aggressive Islam … a symbol of Islamic law’. And extreme- right election propaganda across much of the European continent over the last year has replicated the SVP poster in favour of a ban on minarets, which depicted a at HBK - Hochschule fur Bildende on December 19, 2011rac.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://rac.sagepub.com/ Fekete: The Muslim conspiracy theory 35 woman wearing a burka against a background of a Swiss flag upon which several minarets resembling missiles were depicted. By linking any sign of being Muslim to a homogeneous and repressive force that is said to be global Islam, the extreme Right portrays Islam as a political and criminal ideology that, in the name of security, must be cordoned off from the body politic. Geert Wilders and his supporters argue that there is an Islamic essence, at odds with modernity, at the heart of which lies the Qur’an. As all Muslims believe that the Qur’an is the literal word of God and will not accept that the Qur’an is open to human interpretation in order to apply it in different times and places, all Muslims are fundamentalists. The only good Muslim is an ex-Muslim, according to this way of thinking.18 The idea that the Islamic religion immediately transmogrifies into something criminal and dangerous to a country runs right across the spectrum. Hence, the mayoral candidate for Silvio Berlusconi’s centre-right party in the recent Milan election opposed the creation of a mosque in central Milan on the grounds that it would ‘create a centre of attraction for Islamic groups from all over Italy who would then become uncontrollable’.19 And British neoconservative Douglas Murray of the Centre for Social Cohesion, speaking at a debate in Athens (sponsored by the British Council and Intelligence Squared) on whether the creation of an official mosque would be a good thing, argued against the motion on the grounds that the history of Muslim migration to the UK had meant that all negative things associated with Islam had landed on London’s doorstep.20 (Sadly, there is no central mosque in Athens, and Muslims, forced to pray in makeshift prayer rooms, have been subjected to a number of arson attacks by neo-Nazi sympathisers.) But those who see an Islamic conspiracy sew up the issue so that Muslims can never win. They suggest that Muslims, who do not signal their Muslimness (for example, by wearing religious clothing), are merely posing as modern, progressive and westernised. They are, in fact, camouflaged, and this makes them the more dangerous. (Interestingly, Jean-Marie Le Pen made much the same point when refusing to support the ban on the hijab on the grounds that it made it that much easier to identify Muslims.) The accusation repeated time and time again by anti- mosque campaigners is of ‘hidden intentions’ or ‘double speak’. Hence, Valentin Kusák of the AntiMešita movement in the Czech Republic region of Hradec Králové states that: ‘Muslims are lying to us about their intentions, after all, that is what the Koran orders them to do in relationships with “infidels”.’21 (Another typical example of this genre of argument is the book Brother Tariq: the doublespeak of Tariq Ramadan by Catherine Fourest, with a foreword by Denis MacShane.) It should be noted that the idea of being in camouflage – changing appearance to blend in – was a key aspect of the Jewish conspiracy theory. Defiling the Qur’an and the Prophet Implicit in the criminalising of the religion is the essentialising of Islam. It is depicted as the same across centuries, backward and barbaric since the time of the Prophet, at HBK - Hochschule fur Bildende on December 19, 2011rac.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://rac.sagepub.com/ 36 Race & Class 53(3) unable and unwilling to adapt to different historical and cultural settings. The concrete and the real are discarded in favour of sweeping statements and assaults on fundamentalists (there is no allowance for any other Islamic interpretation), who aim to introduce Taliban-style Islam to Europe. It is, thus, inevitable that Islamophobes will seek to ban not just mosques and minarets, but the Qur’an itself. For people like Geert Wilders, it contains the same totalitarian power and hate- ful message as Mein Kampf; indeed, it is Wilders more than anyone else who has pieced together the various parts of the Islamophobic jigsaw into one simple and easily understandable anti-Muslim message. His seventeen-minute film Fitna, made in 2008, was widely shown on the internet. (It was also shown in 2009 at the House of Lords at a meeting hosted by Baroness Cox and Lord Pearson of Rannoch, chair of the United Kingdom Independence party.) In much the same way as Joseph Goebbels’ The Eternal Jew sent subliminal messages to Germans about the threat posed by Jews through the juxtaposition of images, Fitna juxtaposes images of September 11 and other terrorist acts with verses from the Qur’an in order to get across Wilders’ message that it is no different from Mein Kampf. Neo-Nazis and members of groups like the EDL translate such a message into simplistic acts of vandalism and hate against mosques. In Styria, Austria, for instance, graffiti 30m long and 1m high was painted on the outside wall of the Mariazell Basilica in Volkingen, stating that the ‘Koran is the bible of the devil’ and ‘the devil appears on the horizon’. But Wilders’ message also has purchase with neoconservative commentators, for whom he is a brave iconic figure. In call- ing for such solidarity, they (advertently or inadvertently) play up to a Muslim conspiracy theory. Although they do not imply that there is a European-wide plot by politicians, judges and the media – in cahoots with Muslims – to censor and condemn all those, including Wilders, who criticise Islam, they do imply that liberal elites, through their weakness and misguided liberalism, aid Islamisation through upholding incitement or hate crime laws, for instance. Thus, when Wilders appeared in an Amsterdam court room on charges of incitement to hatred, Douglas Murray wrote an urgent SOS to Telegraph readers, warning them that: ‘The trial has unpar- alleled significance for the future of Europe’, for, ‘it is not just about whether our culture will survive, but whether we are even allowed to state the fact that it is being threatened.’22 And the University of Leiden doctoral student and current darling of conservative forums, Thierry Baudet, wrote in the Trouw newspaper that there had been years of intolerance of any criticism of Islam, with sworn opponents of Islam condemned for expressing their views. He concluded by ask- ing rhetorically whether Wilders was not now Europe’s Voltaire.23 Then there is the abuse of the Prophet himself and, therefore, of all his followers. As the argument goes, the Prophet Muhammad took a 9-year-old wife; therefore, the Prophet was a paedophile. As the Prophet was a paedophile and all Muslims follow the Prophet, all Muslims are paedophiles. In the UK, the BNP and the EDL make much of the Muslim paedophile theme. A BNP petition is entitled, ‘Take Action Against Muslim Grooming – NOW’, while the EDL states on its website that most child sex offenders are Muslim because Muslim men take their at HBK - Hochschule fur Bildende on December 19, 2011rac.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://rac.sagepub.com/ Fekete: The Muslim conspiracy theory 37 inspiration from the Prophet Muhammad who was a serial murderer, torturer and rapist. ‘The UK has a significant problem with Muslim paedophiles who prey upon English girls and contemptuously abuse them’, the EDL states, adding that this ‘stems directly from the example of their violent paedophile prophet Mohammed’. In an interview with a Lancashire EDL member posted on YouTube, a barely coherent supporter warns that ‘Islamic rape camps’ are being established across Lancashire, once again echoing Breivik’s injunction, ‘how many hundreds of European women must be raped … before you realise that multiculturalism and Islam cannot work?’ It’s not so easy now, following Breivik’s actions, to dismiss such views as simply ignorant and harmless. Today, such ideas are in danger of travelling from the far Right to the mainstream, thanks to intervention by the extreme Right and those conservatives, liberals and dogmatic secularists who believe that an absolute right to free speech frees them to mock and abuse Muslims without fear of prosecution.24 Murray’s Telegraph columns and his numerous public speeches are peppered with references to the stupidity of his opponents. Ridiculing an advertising campaign on a Muslim website aimed at promoting the message that Islam is a peaceful reli- gion, Murray tells Telegraph readers that: The site is well worth a visit. It’s ‘Who was Muhammad?’ section is particularly delicious. There are sections on Mohammed ‘the orphan’, Mohammed ‘the shepherd’ and Mohammed ‘the husband’. There are, sadly, no sections on Mohammed ‘the war criminal’ or Mohammed ‘the close friend of a little girl’.25 But Murray is only one of many radical European conservatives and other freedom of speech absolutists who believe that ‘Muslims of Europe have let down Europe’. The way to rectify this is for every Muslim to accept that ‘you have no right in this society not to be offended … you have no right to have more … hate crime laws, or hate speech laws just to defend Islam’ because ‘a society in which even your deepest feelings can be trodden upon is the only society worth living in.’26 Geert Wilders led the way in testing anti-incitement laws and, through evading conviction, success- fully established his right to say exactly what he wanted. Following his acquittal, in July 2011, on charges of inciting hatred and discrimination, he told the press that it was sometimes necessary to be coarse and denigrating in public debate.27 Another right-winger to court prosecution was Elisabeth Sabaditsch-Wolff, an Austrian lec- turer and member of Pax Europa, who was fined for inciting hatred and ‘vilification of religious theories’ after comments she made in 2009 in Vienna at a meeting hosted by the extreme-right Freedom party.28 There she described the Qur’an as ‘evil’ and implied that the Prophet was a paedophile. The next to court prosecution was Lars Hedegaard, author of Muhammad’s Girls: violence, murder and rape in the house of Islam, Chairman of the Danish Free Press Society and a board member of the International Free Press Society. (Other board members include Geert Wilders, Eurabia-ist Bat Ye’or and counter-jihadist Robert Spencer.) In a December 2009 interview, Hedegaard, then a member of the Danish People’s Party,29 commented that Muslims ‘rape their at HBK - Hochschule fur Bildende on December 19, 2011rac.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://rac.sagepub.com/ 38 Race & Class 53(3) own children. It is heard of all the time. Girls in Muslim families are raped by their uncles, their cousins or their fathers.’ He also stated that: ‘Whenever it is prudent for a Muslim to hide his true intentions by lying or making a false oath in his own or in Islam’s service, then it is OK to do it.’30 Another Danish People’s Party politi- cian, Jesper Langbale, leapt to Hedegaard’s defence and was also prosecuted (and fined, after the lifting of his parliamentary immunity) for saying that: ‘Muslims kill their daughters over crimes of honour and then turn a blind eye while they are raped by their uncles.’31 These extreme-right campaigners intend to push the boundary of incitement laws in the hope that, if individuals successfully defend themselves against prosecu- tion (as Wilders recently did), freedom of speech will emerge as the absolute freedom under which all other freedoms will be subsumed. But, as A. Sivanandan has warned, ‘absolute freedom can lead to absolutism. Hitler used freedom of speech and the democratic process to end democracy. The fascist parties of Europe today have the same strategy.’32 There is a thin line between legitimate, robust, but offensive criticism and illegal racial or religious incitement – a line of which people like Hedegaard and Wilders appear to be aware. But the neoconservatives and the free speech absolutists, appar- ently without compunction, egg them on. For it is they who elevate an issue or story from basic provocation to, on the one hand, the ‘noble’ cause of free speech, or, on the other hand, the patriotic duty of public intellectuals to stem civilisational decline. As Douglas Murray puts it: ‘Europe can only save itself, if it unambiguously stands up for its values and rediscovers absolutism in defence of these values.’33 In the name of freedom of expression, the extreme Right seeks to wrongfoot the offended, provoke them into a ‘violence of the violated’,34 which can then be used to justify a further clampdown on civil liberties.35 In this, it is aided by neoconservatives’ contempt for liberalism. It’s hard to see anything noble in Hedegaard’s claim that Muslim men rape their children, but, true to form, Spectator columnist Melanie Phillips rushes to the side of a persecuted ‘campaigner for freedom of speech’ who is being burned at the ‘legal stake for heresy’ by the ‘Danish thought police’, while progres- sives, in cahoots with radical Islamists, are ‘either helping pile up the faggots for their fire or looking the other way’.36 In this way, speaking out provocatively is presented as the work of brave members of the intelligentsia, whose commitment to freedom stands in direct contrast to the wishy-washy behaviour of weak liberals and cultural relativists who practise the ‘self-censorship’ that emerges from fear of Islam. Themselves deploying a writing style that is both aggressive and confrontational, these ‘brave’ intellectuals warn us repeatedly that intolerance and aggression are, in fact, associ- ated with Islam.37 Meanwhile, prosecutions of Wilders and Hedegaard are presented as evidence of a totalitarian system wherein a triumvirate of the political, law and order and media classes is appeasing Islamofascists, or, as Elisabeth Sabaditsch-Wolff, describing her prosecution in Austria, put it: ‘The political process is more effective than the methods of the Nazis, the fascists or the Communists because it is carried out smoothly and peacefully. No need for the concentration camps, the gulags, the mass graves or the bullet in the neck in the middle of the night.’38 at HBK - Hochschule fur Bildende on December 19, 2011rac.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://rac.sagepub.com/ Fekete: The Muslim conspiracy theory 39 The underpinning of the conspiracy The conspiracy theory that Muslims are out to Islamicise Europe utilises relatively recent concepts and discourses of the ‘clash of civilisations’, ‘Islamofascism’, a ‘new anti-Semitism’ and ‘Eurabia’. But such concepts, in the UK at least, have been grafted onto the anti-anti-racism and anti-cultural relativism frameworks that were estab- lished and normalised by the Thatcherite New Right during the 1980s, just as a crude and virulent anti-Arab racism also emerged in the popular press after the oil price hike of the 1970s, followed by local events such as the Iranian embassy siege (1980), the killing of WPC Fletcher outside the Libyan embassy (1984), the Rushdie affair (1989) and the first Gulf war (1991). From the late 1980s, and especially after the Rushdie affair, anti-Arab vitriol was to morph into an overtly anti-Muslim racism. Breivik’s manifesto was replete with attacks on the utopian self-destructive fantasy of multiculturalism, which holds that all cultures are equal and would, in Breivik’s words, lead to the ‘entire loss of our civilisations’ unless ‘destroyed and swept into the dustbin of absurdity where it belongs’. Such views are very familiar to a UK audience. It was essentially during the Thatcher government, from 1979 onwards, that key rightwing philosopher-thinkers and ideologically bound think- tanks, to which ministers were linked, began to embrace and promote a new racism based not on biological superiority, but on the dangers of cultural difference.39 Concepts such as the clash of civilisations had their roots in the kinds of critiques being mounted against ‘cultural relativism’ and the downplaying of British values by a host of rightwing thinkers, collectively described as the New Right.40 Some of the same New Right figures are active today in defence of the freedom to denounce Islam. For example, Baroness Cox, co-author of the anti-communist Rape of Reason against teaching at the Polytechnic of North London in 1975, adviser on education to Margaret Thatcher and the Daily Mail, introducer of a clause on Christian education into the Education Reform Bill, has written and campaigned extensively on behalf of Christian minorities worldwide. It was she who was responsible, in February 2009, for inviting Wilders to show his controversial film Fitna in the House of Lords. If Paul Johnson, one of Thatcher’s closest advisers, was a key columnist on the Daily Mail and Spectator in the 1980s, now it is his son, Daniel, who carries the family’s rightist flag as editor of the Social Affairs Unit’s magazine Standpoint.41 It is worth noting that outlets such as the Spectator, the Sun, the Daily Mail, the Express, the Telegraph and the Times, which gave prominence to New Right thinking in the earlier period, are those providing space to writers who buy into key aspects of the conspiracy theory, particularly the notion of Eurabia. Yet the fact that, as has been indicated, an explicit anti-Arab and anti-Muslim racism was being constructed in the UK, particularly by papers like the Sun for some twenty years, has been largely overlooked by experts researching the rise of counter-jihadist networks and defence leagues today. In the UK, for example, where the EDL (formed in 2009) has targeted the events of tiny extremist Muslim organ- isations (such as that led by media-hungry fanatics like Anjem Choudary), it has become de rigueur for commentators to divorce its emergence from the history of at HBK - Hochschule fur Bildende on December 19, 2011rac.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://rac.sagepub.com/ 40 Race & Class 53(3) racism and fascism in the UK. Instead, its rise is attributed solely to ‘cumulative extremism’ (Islamist extremism sparking off a retaliatory extremism). Such a view is not just ahistorical, but provides a very partial context for understanding the appeal of such groups. For, the EDL is a pro-war, ultrapatriotic party, the extremism of which has also been shaped by a generalised populist anti-Arab racism. And now, after eleven years of foreign policy interventions in Muslim/Arab states and successive anti-terrorist laws, there is a much wider popular culture of nationalism and jingoism, with the role of ‘our troops’ uncritically glorified in the press, on TV and at sporting events. Clash of civilisations It was, of course, September 11 and the ‘war on terror’ that led, at the level of ideas and discourse, to the creation of ‘new’ frameworks that essentialise Islam and demonise Muslims. First, the ‘clash of civilisations’ thesis. Counter-jihadists start from a belief in a hierarchy of civilisations, with western European civilisation on the top. They draw on the clash of civilisations thesis, which is associated with a group of American academics (including Bernard Lewis and Samuel Huntington), who, from the 1990s onwards, wrote a series of essays in support of American and Israeli foreign policy goals in the Middle East.42 Bernard Lewis – who went on to develop the ‘new anti-Semitism’ thesis (see below) – used the term ‘Muslim rage’ to denote the supposedly essentialist elements of the modern Arab psyche. Using pseudo-psychology as political analysis, Lewis suggested that the backwardness of Arab culture and economy was leading to feelings of enmity and rage directed at American, Israeli and European targets. Lewis’s essay ‘The roots of Muslim rage’ was then taken up by Samuel Huntington, who, in a seminal piece in Foreign Affairs (summer 1993), argued that, with the cold war over, world politics had entered a new phase in which the fundamental source of conflict was not primarily ideological or economic, but cultural, with ‘the principal conflicts of global politics’ occurring between nations and groups from different civilisations. Within this, Huntington gave primary focus to the clash between Islam and the West, conclud- ing that the fault lines between civilisations would be the battle lines of the future. Later, in ‘Who are we? The challenges to America’s national identity’, Huntington warned that ‘America’s Christian, Anglocentric’ identity was threatened by the ‘Mexicanization’ of the population, arguing that ‘the mixing of races and hence culture’ represented ‘the road to national degeneration’.43 Huntington’s essay on national identity echoed the fears of the earlier racial hygienists that interracial marriage would lead to poor racial stock. But Huntington and Lewis also re-established the old binaries of Orient vs Occident, East vs West, them vs us, whereby vast geographical, cultural and political expanses are reduced to two imagined cultural regions. There is no complexity in Huntington’s and Lewis’s vision, and it is not difficult to see, embedded within their frameworks, a continuation of the old colonial mentality in which the rational and individualistic culture of ‘the West’ is treated as ‘an exception in the history of mankind’ at the at HBK - Hochschule fur Bildende on December 19, 2011rac.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://rac.sagepub.com/ Fekete: The Muslim conspiracy theory 41 same time as ‘Islam is treated as a pariah in the history of religions, just as Europe and the West did so well in the past with Judaism’.44 Some centre-right European political leaders have embraced the clash of civili- sations theme, notably the Italian prime minister Silvio Berlusconi and the current Danish interior minister Søren Krarup, who described the invasion of Iraq in 2003 as resulting from the ‘opposition between Christianity and Islam, between the West and Islam’. Krarup has also compared the fight against Islam with the fight against Nazism in Germany in the 1930s.45 Islamofascism A second, similarly lazy concept doing the rounds is the idea that one can contract fascism and Islamic extremism into one idea.46 The proponents of Islamofascism build on Bernard Lewis’s notion of Muslim rage to locate Islamism as a ‘cult of murderous violence that exalts death and destruction and despises the life of the mind’. Whereas some (but by no means all) proponents of the Islamofascist thesis do draw a distinction between Islamism and Islam, thus insulating the Islamofascism discourse ‘from straightforward charges of Islamophobia’,47 others conflate the terms or link them together structurally. In the hands of the extreme Right and of Christian evangelicals, however, the Islamofascist thesis can become a direct assault on followers of Islam, described by Geert Wilders as a ‘totalitarian ideology rather than a religion’ and by Pax Europa as a ‘fascistoid ideology’. Scottish writer Malise Ruthven was one of the first to use the Islamofascism argument in an essay in the Independent on 8 September 1990, in which he drew an analogy between the ideological characteristics of specific Islamist movements from the turn of the twenty-first century onwards and a broad range of European fascist movements of the early twentieth century. The notion that the fight against Islamism was equivalent to the fight against fascism was then popularised by US president George W. Bush – another evangelical Christian – who described the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq as ‘just’ wars in the same way as the second world war had been a ‘just war’ against fascism. In 2008, the US Department of Homeland Security dropped the ‘Islamic fascist’ term, stating also that pejorative terms like Islamofascism should be avoided as they were tending to confuse the ‘war on terror’ with the ‘war on Islam’.48 Nevertheless, neoconservatives like Douglas Murray and journalists like Nick Cohen (Observer), Martin Bright (Jewish Chronicle) and Andrew Gilligan (Daily Telegraph) continue to use the misleading term, as do Christopher Hitchens and Glenn Beck (Fox TV) in the US and, in Europe, Bernard-Henri Lévy, Michael Onfray and André Glucksmann. Because Islamofascism’s proponents confuse political Islam with Islam as a reli- gion, they go on to suggest that, in the fight against the religion – transformed in their minds into a totalitarian political system – one must stand up for Israel, as Israel lies at the epicentre of the fight to defend western civilisation. (Israeli methods of maintaining control in the Occupied Territories are applauded, with the Israelis at HBK - Hochschule fur Bildende on December 19, 2011rac.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://rac.sagepub.com/ 42 Race & Class 53(3) seen as demonstrating civilisational pride and vigour.) To defend Israel, therefore, is to prevent the spread of Islamofascism. It is through the idea of Islamofascism that the extreme Right has gained other- wise unlikely allies: dogmatic secularists and identity-bound feminists. Both groups have strong feelings against religion and are sometimes open to simplistic and ahistorical arguments. In Belgium, the journalist Claude Demelenne (editor of Le Journal de Mardi), the Liberal MP Alain Destexhe (Mouvement Réformateur) and the feminist Nadia Geerts want to extend the fight against Islamofascists to incor- porate the Left’s ‘Islamo-gauchistes’. Thus, those who oppose the war in Iraq, defend Palestinian rights or campaign against anti-terror laws are portrayed as leftwing sympathisers of radical Islam who should be subjected to an equivalent of the German Berufsverbot (which blacklisted communists and kept them from employ- ment in government service). New anti-Semitism Alongside Islamofascism sits the idea of a new anti-Semitism emanating from hostility to Zionism (and Israel) from within the Left and the Arab world. Some of the cruder French-speaking proponents of the new anti-Semitism thesis, like Claude Demelenne in Belgium or Alain Finkielkraut in France, then project this new anti- Semitism thesis onto the deprived banlieues of France and inner areas of Brussels. Finkielkraut is author of the 2003 text Au nom de l’autre: réflexions sur l’antisemitisme qui vient, published by Gallimard. A frequent theme of his writings is the anti- Semitism of second- and third-generation North African youth, creating the impres- sion that they are the sole carriers of anti-Semitism, thus obscuring the fact that anti-Semitism is a problem for the whole of society. He goes on to link anti-Israeli, anti-American attitudes to the idea of a ‘reverse racism’ – presenting the majority French white community as the true victims of the racism, arguing that ‘Francophobia is spreading like Judeophobia, and cannot be differentiated from it’.49 Bernard Lewis’s 1986 book Semites and Anti-Semites provides scholarly backing for the notion that widespread hatred of Jews in the Arab world predated 1948 and the creation of the state of Israel. It demonises Arab nationalism by asserting that the anti-Zionism that developed in the Arab world at the time of the creation of the state of Israel grew out of an earlier anti-Semitism. He treats anti-Zionism in the Arab world (intensified by the humiliation of Israeli military victories) as though it were a continuation of the anti-Semitism of the Nazis which led to the Holocaust. (Prior to this, the French philosopher Pierre-André Taguieff had also connected ‘la nouvelle judéophobie’ in the Arab-Muslim world to the 1967 Six-Day war and gone further by linking anti-Semitism to anti-racism and anti-nationalism.) Fortunately, there is now a growing body of scholarly work that critiques the ‘new anti-Semitism thesis’ and the work of Taguieff and Lewis for distorting the recent history of the Middle East.50 The destructive impact of the thesis on European scholarship of contemporary anti-Semitism has been noted by Antony Lerman, a former director of the Institute for Jewish Policy Research. He points out that as the at HBK - Hochschule fur Bildende on December 19, 2011rac.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://rac.sagepub.com/ Fekete: The Muslim conspiracy theory 43 new anti-Semitism thesis has emerged, scholarly research on contemporary anti- Semitism has become ‘virtually non-existent’, ensuring that no material basis upon which to fight anti-Semitism can be created.51 It is a point that is very pertinent to IRR’s current research on the rise of far-right violence across Europe. We find that extreme-right anti-Semitism is increasing, particularly in Hungary and Poland, but also in Greece and some parts of eastern Germany. This is in part because a gener- alised discourse about ‘enemy aliens’ is triggering off the classic anti-Semitism of the far Right, resulting in attacks on synagogues and Jewish cultural centres. Meanwhile, and somewhat ironically, some members of extreme-right organisa- tions with a history of classic anti-Semitism act today as though they were the sole legitimate defenders of Israel! By doing so, they try not only to erase their contro- versial history, but also to win over new constituencies. These include Europe’s Jewish communities, whom they seek to include in their campaigns against mosques and minarets, and their call to stop immigration from the Muslim world on the grounds that ‘millions of Muslims, including Arabs, who immigrated to Europe’ bring with them ‘their hatred of Israel in particular and of Jews in general’.52 Both neoconservative political commentator Broder in Germany and populist Wilders in the Netherlands have specific messages for Jewish audiences, even though their tones differ. Broder argues for an end to Muslim immigration to Germany and supports Thilo Sarrazin’s thesis outlined in Deutschland schafft sich ab (Germany abolishes itself) that a once great nation is now at risk of descending into idiocy, as immigrants (i.e. Turks) are genetically of lower intelligence and have higher fertility rates. But he speaks in classic Spenglerian terms, describing Europe as a doomed continent and implying that the fight is already lost.53 Wilders, on the other hand, exhorts his audience to be ‘warriors for good’, ‘let us no longer be afraid’ to heed the ‘battle cry’ and ‘wake up … Islam is at your gate’. And he encourages young Jews to identify themselves as the victims of Muslims whom, he claims, are over- running the streets of Amsterdam, unleashing hate crimes that force ‘Jews to emi- grate’. ‘But I say: Jews must not leave: violent Muslims must leave.’54 Eurabia In several web postings, Breivik proclaimed his belief in Eurabia. The Eurabia-ist framework, which was analysed in depth in Race & Class by the journalist Matt Carr,55 embraces the conspiracy theory that Muslims are out to Islamicise Europe and is, hence, much admired by counter-jihadists. Giselle Littman (who writes under the pseudonym Bat Ye’or or Daughter of the Nile) argued in Eurabia: the Euro-Arab Axis56 that a secret project existed between European politicians and the Arab world for the ‘Islamisation of Europe’, the purpose of which was to destroy America and Israel, with Europe a doomed continent on the brink of cultural extinc- tion in the face of a relentless and co-ordinated campaign of domination by Muslims to transform it into an Islamic colony called Eurabia. In this colony, Europeans would be turned into the slaves of Muslims and forced into a state of subjection – in accordance with the ‘dhimmi’ or treaty enforced on the ‘Peoples of the Book’ during at HBK - Hochschule fur Bildende on December 19, 2011rac.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://rac.sagepub.com/ 44 Race & Class 53(3) the Islamic caliphate. ‘What first began as an outlandish conspiracy theory has since become a dangerous Islamophobic fantasy which has moved ever closer towards mainstream respectability’, states Matt Carr. The fact that elements of the Eurabia concept have been adopted by mainstream writers such as Melanie Phillips, Douglas Murray, Mark Steyn and Niall Ferguson in the UK and, in other European countries, by Hirsi Ali, Alain Finkielkraut, Bernard-Henri Lévy, Henryk M. Broder and the late Oriana Fallaci is a cause for concern. The Eurabia theory, in the hands of Geert Wilders, continues the view, articulated in 1968 by Enoch Powell in his ‘Rivers of blood’ speech, that aggressive minorities are out to dominate the majority. Hence, Wilders warns of Islamisation via conquest, and conquest through immigration. In many ways, the descriptions of Eurabia parallel classic criticisms of Jews within anti-Semitism – ironic given that the four frameworks identified here are tied up with unqualified support for the state of Israel, the last line of defence against Islamisation. The parallels with anti-Semitism are underlined forcefully by Matt Carr, who points out that Jews in Victorian Britain were thought to harbour a secret ambi- tion to subvert, dominate and possess. Carr also points out that, ‘the fear of cultural and racial extinction has a long pedigree in European history’, traceable back to the ‘racial Darwinism of the nineteenth century, and articulated by writers such as Count Joseph-Arthur de Gobineau, who argued that only races that maintained their racial purity would survive’ – only, today, the Eurabia-ists substitute culture and civilisation for race. References Special thanks to Sibille Merz for research on Germany and Naba Al-Ahi for information on the Netherlands. 1 ‘Anders Behring Breivik was in contact with the EDL’, Searchlight press release, 25 July 2011; see also ‘Far-right terror attacks in Norway’, Searchlight (no. 434, August 2011). Other articles analys- ing Breivik’s views that I have drawn on include Andrew Brown, ‘Breivik is not a Christian but anti-Islam’, Guardian (24 July 2011); Matt Carr, ‘Far right blames BBC for ignoring Breivik’s beliefs’, Fire Post Online (3 August 2011); and Paisley Dodds, ‘European far-right membership rises thanks to global power of social media’, Associated Press (19 July 2011). Following the massacre, the ICARE News Service provided an invaluable compilation of key stories in the European mainstream press and that of NGOs, analysing the connections between Breivik and extremists in their respective countries. 2 The Norwegian daily Aftenposten states that Breivik was a paid-up member of the Progress Party from 1999–2004, holding membership of its youth section from 1997–2007 and chairing a local branch from 2002–2004. See Mikael Ekman, ‘Terror suspect was member of Nazi web forum’, Searchlight (no. 434, August 2011). 3 Views and News from Norway (8 August 2011). 4 For background on the EDL and Alan Lake, see Nigel Copsey, ‘The English Defence League: challenging our country and our values of social inclusion, fairness and equality’, Faith Matters (October 2010). 5 As cited by Unite Against Fascism, available at: http://uaf.org.uk/2011/07/edl-funder-alan- lake-calls-norway-massacre-chickens-come-home-to-roost. 6 This is how the Guardian’s online religious affairs editor described Robert Spencer’s Jihad Watch. See Andrew Brown, ‘The poison behind the Ground Zero mosque furore’, Guardian, Comment Is Free (18 August 2010). at HBK - Hochschule fur Bildende on December 19, 2011rac.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://rac.sagepub.com/ Fekete: The Muslim conspiracy theory 45 7 Dodds, op. cit. 8 See Claudia Mende, ‘Anti-Islamic movements in Germany: “Islamophobic” – and proud of it’, American Muslim (16 April 2010). 9 As quoted in the National (7 February 2011). René Stadtkewitz, a founder of Pax Europa, was expelled from the Christian Democrat Union’s parliamentary group in Berlin (and now sits as an independent) after he invited Geert Wilders to speak at a conference on Islam. In October 2010, Stadtkewitz founded the Freedom party, inviting Wilders and Eliezer Cohen, a former member of the Israeli Knesset for the Yisrael Beiteinu party, to address its founding conference in Stuttgart. Previously, Stadtkewitz had been the leader of a protest movement against the building of a mosque in the Pankow district of Berlin. The Freedom party has since founded a district branch in Hamburg and a regional chapter in Bavaria, where fifty-four members of the Christian Social Union (CSU) helped form the new group. The CSU in Munich put out a press release stating that if the founders of the Freedom party in Munich did not leave the CSU vol- untarily, they would be forcibly expelled. The press release was also critical of Pax Europa as well as Politically Incorrect (Neues Deutschland, 6 June 2011). 10 Toby Archer, ‘Countering the counter-jihad’, RUSI Monitor (September 2008). 11 The Swiss-based European Freedom Alliance thinktank officially arranged the delegation to Israel of the extreme-right activists who launched the Jerusalem Declaration. According to Spiegel Online (1 June 2011), the delegation’s Israeli contact was Ariel Shomer, the head of the cabinet of former president Ezer Weizman. Adar Primor, writing in Haaretz (12 December 2010), noted that some of the European parties invited to Israel had strong anti-Semitic roots and that they had come to Israel ‘after trading in their Jewish demon-enemy for the Muslim criminal-immigrant model’. Radio Netherlands Worldwide (5 December 2010) reported that Wilders had a ‘long and good meeting’ in a ‘friendly atmosphere’ with the Israeli foreign minister Avigdor Lieberman, and went on to give a speech in Tel Aviv on the subject of Jordan, ‘the only Palestinian state that will ever be’. 12 This is one of Geert Wilders’ favourite refrains. In a speech in Tel Aviv, he said, ‘Jews need to settle Judea and Samaria [the ancient Hebrew name for the West Bank]. Without Judea and Samaria, Israel cannot protect Jerusalem’; see New York Times (22 December 2010). 13 See Murray’s comments on Sunday Morning Live with Susanna Reid, BBC (1 August 2010), available at: www.youtube.com/watch?v+kWNNSUT1 Nqk. 14 Melanie Phillips, ‘Armchair barbarism’, Spectator (13 March 2010), available at: http://www. spectator.co.uk/melaniephillips/6779100/armchair-barbarism.thtml. Phillips wrote her blog, which referred to the ‘moral depravity’ of Arab ‘savages’, after an Israeli family was killed in the West Bank Israeli settlement of Itamar near Nablus. 15 The citation from Broder and its significance to Breivik’s manifesto was pointed out by Christian Bommarius, ‘Breivik und Broder’, Frankfurter Rundschau (28 July 2011). 16 Hans Rustad, the site editor at Dokument.no, has been anxious to distance himself from Breivik and downplay his activities on the site. But, according to Anne Jensen, Dokument.no, which presents itself as culturally conservative and concerned about multiculturalism, has led increasing agitation against the red-green government, campaigning in recent months against the ‘cultural Marxist’ Labour party and its leftwing coalition partners, the Socialist Left party, accusing them of being ‘traitors’ who should be removed from power and brought before a court for allowing immigration and tolerating asylum seekers; Anne Jensen, ‘“Cultural conservative” terror in Norway: the background’, Searchlight (no. 434, August 2011). 17 As cited by Andrew Brown, op. cit. 18 A good critique of this closed circuit of thought can be found in Rudolph Peters, ‘“A dangerous book”: Dutch public intellectuals and the Koran’, European University Institute Working Papers (RSCAS No. 2006/39). 19 Kronos International (23 May 2011). 20 Intelligence Squared debate, ‘Only good can come out of building a mosque in Athens’, available at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qXE7BP0C4VA. at HBK - Hochschule fur Bildende on December 19, 2011rac.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://rac.sagepub.com/ 46 Race & Class 53(3) 21 Prague Post (27 July 2011). 22 Douglas Murray, ‘Geert Wilders: on trial for telling the truth’, Telegraph Online (28 January 2010). 23 See Thierry Baudet, ‘Geert Wilders, a Voltaire for our times?’, Trouw (27 June 2011). 24 In his Pim Fortuyn Memorial Lecture, ‘What are we to do about Islam?’ (February 2006), Murray argued that, ‘conditions for Muslims must be made harder across the board’. 25 Douglas Murray, ‘Mohammed believed in women’s rights, says poster campaign: oh, really’, Telegraph Online (8 June 2010). 26 Transcript of complete recording of Intelligence Squared debate, ‘Europe is failing its Muslims’, Cadogan Hall, London (23 February 2010), available at: http://www.intelligencesquared. com/__data/assets/pdf_file/0005/63986/Intelligence-Squared-Debate-Transcript-Europe-is- failing-its-Muslims.pdf. 27 Dutch News (23 June 2011). 28 In December 2010, Elisabeth Sabaditsch-Wolff spoke on behalf of Pax Europa and ACT for America at the Alliance of the European Freedom and National Parties Conference in Tel Aviv, declaring that ‘Israel is an oasis of civilization in a desert of barbarism’; see ‘Elisabeth Sabaditsch- Wolff speaks up for Israel’, Jewish Chronicle (10 December 2010). 29 Hedegaard resigned from the Danish People’s Party as a result of the prosecution, claiming he did not want to bring the party into disrepute. He made the comments during an interview with a blogger, which was subsequently published on the blog www.snaphanen.dk. According to Peter Hervik, Lars Hedegaard has been an active participant in the news media for many years. In August 2002, he co-authored a commentary with Daniel Pipes entitled ‘Something rotten in Denmark’, in which they sought to construct urban myths, such as that Muslims make up only 4 per cent of the population, but the majority of the country’s convicted rapists and that Denmark’s small Jewish community was living in constant fear of Muslim violence; see Peter Hervik, The Annoying Difference: the emergence of neonationalism, neoracism and populism in the post-1989 world (Oxford, Berghahn Books, 2011). 30 As cited by Migration News Sheet (June 2011) and Copenhagen Post Online (3 May 2011). 31 Copenhagen Post Online (9 June 2010). 32 A. Sivanandan, ‘Freedom of speech is not an absolute’, Race & Class (Vol. 48, no. 1, July– September 2006). 33 Murray, ‘What are we to do about Islam?’, op. cit. 34 The term is Sivanandan’s. 35 David Edgar, ‘Shouting fire: art, religion and the right to be offended’, Race & Class (Vol. 48, no. 2, October–December 2006). 36 Melanie Phillips, ‘The Danish witch-hunt against the truth-tellers’, Spectator (11 January 2011). 37 Their lack of self-awareness about their own aggression is a point made by Peters, op. cit. 38 Speech made in Paris at the December 2010 Against the Islamisation of Europe conference organ- ised by the fascist Bloc Identitaire and the leftist Secular Response; cited in ‘When the Islamisation conference applauded Michael Onfray’, Les Indigènes de la République (6 January 2010). 39 See Martin Barker, The New Racism (London, Junction Books, 1981). At the end of the 1980s, the IRR published ‘Racism and the press in Thatcher’s Britain’, in which Nancy Murray and Chris Searle showed how a coterie of Conservative thinktanks and like-minded voices in the media were spearheading a New Right attack on cultural pluralism and anti-racism (London, IRR, 1989). 40 See, for example, Anthony Flew, Caroline Cox, Roger Scruton et al. in Frank Palmer, ed., Anti- racism: an assault on education and value (London, Sherwood Press, 1986). 41 A critique of Standpoint and the Social Affairs Unit is provided by Arun Kundnani, ‘How are think- tanks shaping the political agenda on Muslims in Britain?’, IRR News Service (2 September 2008). 42 See Markha Valenta, ‘The success of Islamophobia’, available at: www.opendemocracy.net/ markha-valenta/success-of-islamophobia. 43 Samuel Huntington, Who Are We? The challenges to America’s national identity (New York, Simon & Schuster, 2004). at HBK - Hochschule fur Bildende on December 19, 2011rac.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://rac.sagepub.com/ Fekete: The Muslim conspiracy theory 47 44 Sami Zemni, ‘The shaping of Islam and Islamophobia in Belgium’, Race & Class (Vol. 53, no. 1, July–September 2011). 45 Cited by Peters, op. cit. 46 I draw heavily here on Arun Kundnani, ‘Islamism and the roots of Liberal rage’, Race & Class (Vol. 50, no. 2, October–December 2008). Kundnani’s piece also provides important insights into the other frameworks I have outlined. For a thorough overview of Conservative thinktanks, see Tom Mills, Tom Griffin and David Miller, ‘The Cold war on British Muslims’, Spinwatch, available at: http://www.spinwatch.org/images/The%20Cold%20War %20on%20British%20Muslims.pdf; see also Tony Judt, ‘Bush’s useful idiots’, London Review of Books (Vol. 28, no. 18, 21 September 2006). 47 Kundnani, op. cit. 48 Valenta, op. cit. 49 Nouvelobs.com (2 April 2005). 50 See, for example, Gilbert Achcar, The Arabs and the Holocaust: the Arab-Israeli war on narratives (London, Picador, April 2011), which exposes the revisionist nature of the work of Bernard Lewis and others. He concludes that: ‘Anyone of good faith is capable of distinguishing between Arab silence about – or even outrageously offensive references to – the Holocaust motivated by anti- Zionism and Holocaust denial motivated by anti-Semitism.’ Brian Klug, Senior Research Fellow in Philosophy at St Benet’s Hall, Oxford, finds that the conflation of anti-Zionism with anti- Semitism defines legitimate criticism of Israel too narrowly and demonisation too broadly, trivi- alising the meaning of anti-Semitism and exploiting it to silence debate; see Klug, ‘The myth of the new anti-Semitism’, Nation (2 February 2004). 51 Antony Lerman, ‘Jews attacking Jews’, Haaretz (12 September 2008). 52 The words are those of Jack Fischel, former Chair of History at Millersville University of Pennysylvania; see Fischel, ‘The new anti-Semitism’, Virginia Quarterly Review (summer 2005). 53 ‘The Last Days of Europe’, a lecture in Maastricht by German journalist and writer Henryk Broder (14 March 2007). 54 Speech by Geert Wilders, Cornerstone Church, Nashville, Tennessee (12 May 2011), available at: http://www.aina.org/news/2011051914958.htm. 55 Matt Carr, ‘You are now entering Eurabia’, Race & Class (Vol. 48, no. 1, July–September 2006). 56 Bat Ye’or, Eurabia: the Euro-Arab axis (Madison, NJ, Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 2005). at HBK - Hochschule fur Bildende on December 19, 2011rac.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://rac.sagepub.com/ 
work_skzcvpky55bqtaasdgyzzlto2i	----	HOW IDEOLOGY HAS HINDERED SOCIOLOGICAL INSIGHT 1 How Ideology Has Hindered Sociological Insight Chris C. Martin* Department of Sociology, Emory University, Atlanta, GA, USA *chris.martin.e@gmail.com Acknowledgments: I thank John Boli and Christian Smith for their comments on earlier drafts. Version Notes: The final publication is available at link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12108- 015-9263-z HOW IDEOLOGY HAS HINDERED SOCIOLOGICAL INSIGHT 2 Abstract American sociology has consistently leaned toward the political Left. This ideological skew hinders sociological insight in three ways. First, the scope of research projects is constrained: sociologists are discouraged from touching on taboo topics and ideologically unpalatable facts. Second, the data used in sociological research have been limited. Sociologists neglect data that portray conservatives positively and liberals negatively. Data are also truncated to hide facts that subvert a liberal narrative. Third, the empathic understanding of non-liberal ideologies is inhibited. Sociologists sometimes develop the erroneous belief that they understand alternative ideologies, and they fail to explore non-liberal ways of framing sociological knowledge. Some counterarguments may be raised against these theses, and I address such counterarguments. Keywords sociology of knowledge, sociology of ideas, American sociology, ideology, methodology HOW IDEOLOGY HAS HINDERED SOCIOLOGICAL INSIGHT 3 Sociology is a discipline that has historically leaned toward liberalism and progressivism, and it continues to do so today. In the United States, all academic departments tend to contain more Democrats than Republicans, but this skew is most pronounced in sociology (Cardiff and Klein 2005). According to some historians, this imbalance occurred in the 1960s when liberals took over academic sociology (Calhoun and VanAntwerpen 2007), but others have pointed to the even older link between sociology and social work in the United States (Lengermann and Niebrugge 2007). At least one historian of sociological knowledge has claimed that American sociology was, during its foundational era, entirely practiced by non-academic social activists (Turner 2013). In this respect, American sociology was not that different from European sociology, whose nominal founder Auguste Comte simultaneously created a social-science discipline and advocated a social doctrine. This leftward tilt has now been institutionalized: prominent sociologists including a president of the American Sociological Association have advocated for public sociology, a form of sociological research focusing on activist solutions to social problems and concerns in the public sphere (Burawoy 2002; Gans 2002). Admittedly, a few sociologists have turned away from a problem-centered approach, and exhorted their colleagues to practice sociology in a spirit of camaraderie and joy (Jeffries 2014). 1 Others have published research on positive topics, including altruism and flourishing (Jeffries 2014; Smith 2015). Yet the discipline as a whole has retained a pessimistic leftward tilt, which compresses the range of acceptable scholarship, and constrains sociological insight. Problems pertaining to ideological skew can be classified into at least two types: First, there is the discrimination experienced by sociologists who are outside the ideological mainstream. Sociologists who are ideological outliers and sociologists who proffer a non- HOW IDEOLOGY HAS HINDERED SOCIOLOGICAL INSIGHT 4 ideological sociology have noted that their status makes them feel marginalized within the professional community itself (Deflem 2005; Yancey 2011; Smith 2014). One social psychologist recently used the format of Peggy McIntosh’s (1990) essay on White Privilege to catalog the ways liberals were privileged in his academic experience: liberals do not have to worry about their political candidates being mocked, they do not have to worry about tainting their graduate students’ reputations, they do not have to worry about whether a manuscript rejection represents an ideological decision instead of a scientific judgment, and so on (Jussim 2012a). Second, there are the problems in the narrowness of sociological research. This problem demands more attention because such narrowness becomes reflected in the sociological literature, much of which becomes canonical for future generations of sociologists. Absent such attention, there are downstream consequences for the progress of sociological science. This topic has been partially addressed before (Haidt 2011; Yancey 2011), but I cast the spotlight on some overlooked issues. Because my focus is American sociology, the ideologies in my scope are liberalism, conservatism, and libertarianism. My narrow use of “ideology” stems from the pragmatic scope of this essay, and not from inattention to scholarship. Although no perfect definition of ideology exists, an ideology typically represents an institutionalized vigilance for transgressions of certain values. Often, ideologues are also vigilant to opportunities for moral progress, but taboos retain primacy. Feminism is an ideology vigilant to unjust treatment of women, environmentalism is an ideology vigilant to ecological harm, fascism is an ideology vigilant to disruptions of “proper” political and economic hierarchy, and so on. HOW IDEOLOGY HAS HINDERED SOCIOLOGICAL INSIGHT 5 Liberalism is dominant in sociology, so I focus on its attendant problems. Conservatism and libertarianism, though distinct, are not differentiated here, but in an ideal world sociology would draw scholars from both conservative and libertarian traditions. Readers should note “conservatism” here denotes the eponymous American political movement. All groups have some conservative aspects, inasmuch as they believe that some things are worth preserving. EXPLANATION, FALSIFICATION, AND THE NEED FOR IDEOLOGICAL DIVERSITY The goals of science are explanation, control, and prediction (Strevens 2006). Explanation has primacy among these three goals because people learn how to control and predict phenomena by relying on explanation. To explain a phenomenon, one needs to thoroughly chart the mechanisms that mediate between causes and effects (Salmon 1984). An explanation fails if it posits magical action, or action from a distance, because such causation fails to elucidate the mechanism between the cause and effect (Salmon 1984; see also Hedström and Swedberg 1996). A complete explanation must be precise and valid, enabling one to extrapolate what happens when any switch in the mechanism is tripped. An observer should know how, when, and where to find the corresponding evidence. As a result of this connection between theory completeness on one hand and precision and validity on the other, one can put theories to the test by finding instances where a theory’s predictions are imprecise or invalid. Such instances falsify the theory (Popper 1963). Falsification is difficult, because people often test hypotheses by replicating existing results instead of applying strong tests of disconfirmation (Koslowski 2013; Mynatt, Doherty, and Tweney 1978). As a result, people are likely to find consonant evidence. Countering this tendency demands that one bring together researchers from diverse backgrounds, which increases the chances of finding a researcher who already knows of a HOW IDEOLOGY HAS HINDERED SOCIOLOGICAL INSIGHT 6 falsifying instance. The problem with homogenous teams is their members fall prey to a confirmation bias: They typically seek, interpret and recall evidence in ways that bolster their current stance (Oswald and Grosjean 2004). In scholarly work, three types of narrowness ensue: limitations on scope, limitations on evidence, and limitations on empathic understanding. I. LIMITATIONS ON THE SCOPE OF RESEARCH PROJECTS Because ideologies develop around shared concerns, ideologically similar people have similar morals and similar taboos (Fiske and Tetlock 1997; Tetlock et al. 2000). For instance, among American conservatives, it is taboo to suggest that taxes should be raised for any reason. To wit, a recent entire slate of Republican candidates was given the hypothetical scenario where each dollar in tax increases was matched by ten dollars in spending cuts, and they uniformly opposed the idea of a tax increase, a move that is indicative of a taboo (see Haidt and Movius 2012). Likewise, among very liberal Americans, it is taboo to use statistical base rates when the rights of a protected group are at risk (Tetlock et al. 2000). This means that liberals forbid accurate stereotyping if an undesirable attribute gets attached to a canonically victimized target. For instance, liberals support the idea that people should incur higher premiums for home insurance in neighborhoods where homes are likely to be damaged by fires or other disasters, and lower premiums in neighborhoods where homes are relatively safe. In such scenarios, the home insurance rate is based on the base rate of risk in the surrounding neighborhood. However, if the base rate of risk is correlated with the presence of protected minority groups, such that the high- risk neighborhoods are predominantly African-American, liberals reverse their stance, morally condemning the idea of attending to neighborhood risk (Fiske and Tetlock 1997). They seek moral cleansing if they discover they have accidentally implemented such a policy. HOW IDEOLOGY HAS HINDERED SOCIOLOGICAL INSIGHT 7 Among the taboos in the social sciences are the ideas that “victims” are sometimes blameworthy, that sexes and races biologically differ from one another, that social beliefs are inborn rather than constructed, and that stereotypes sometimes match average group attributes (Haidt 2011; see also Felson 2001; Jussim 2012b; Pinker 2002). (By “stereotype,” I mean any belief about a person based on social-group membership, and I do not limit its usage to inaccurate and invidious beliefs.) What holders of these taboos share is a concern with self- determination and individual dignity (cf. Smith 2014). A person’s biological nature and conferred social status are construed as oppressive chains from which the individual should be liberated. Such chains are an affront to the dignity of the individual and his or her right to self- determination. This is indeed a laudable moral platform, since people do benefit from perceived autonomy (Ryan and Deci 2000). Nevertheless, a sociological claim may increase perceived autonomy and still be factually untrue. Although self-determination and an independent construal of self predominate in the West, they are more strongly found in Western liberals than Western conservatives (Talhelm et al. 2015). In addition, Western liberals are particularly concerned with the welfare of protected groups (Graham et al. 2013). As a result, liberals are wary of research that seems to deny self- determination to members of protected groups. Consider the politicization of stereotyping, which is now a mainstay of social research. Stereotype research arose from a concern with prejudice against immigrants (e.g., Allport 1954). However, as it expanded to encompass beliefs about all groups, stereotypes were treated as undesirable and assumed to be factually wrong. This was the case even though one could, for instance, empirically check whether a stereotype about income differences between groups X and Y matches the actual median income difference between those HOW IDEOLOGY HAS HINDERED SOCIOLOGICAL INSIGHT 8 groups (e.g., Martin and Nezlek 2014). The assumption of stereotype inaccuracy is appealing when individual self-determination is sacrosanct. Consider what happens when members of an interdependent, collectivist group are positively stereotyped. In a recent study, social psychologists examined whether blatant positive stereotypes are deemed offensive in both independent and interdependent cultural groups (Siy and Cheryan 2013). As the researchers hypothesized, the inclusion of positive stereotypes in a written passage caused Asian-Americans to rate it more negatively than they otherwise would have rated it. However, the inclusion of the positive stereotype did not trigger an identical reaction among Asians in East Asia. Their average rating was lower but not significantly different from their baseline rating. As this study shows, one reason stereotypes offend people is not that they contain some inherently moral badness, but rather that they threaten self- determination. Stereotypes are also considered problematic because of stereotype threat and self- fulfilling prophecies, even though the strength of these effects has been exaggerated (Jussim 2012b). In addition, it is conventionally immoral to spout falsehoods, so if generalizations about groups are accurate (on average), one has to the weigh the tradeoff between unfairness and dishonesty. Because of these problems, stereotype accuracy has been considered a taboo topic, and only a small number of researchers have investigated if stereotypes are accurate (e.g., Jussim 2012b). Much of this research has shown that stereotypes are indeed accurate (on average), particularly in direction. These findings contradict the assertion by some scholars that stereotypes primarily arise from intergroup envy or scorn (e.g., Fiske 2010). Rather, they develop from valid observations of the social world. Far from being the foolish mistake-makers HOW IDEOLOGY HAS HINDERED SOCIOLOGICAL INSIGHT 9 that social psychologists have made them out to be (Baumeister 2010), humans are mostly perceptive observers. Were it not for the taboo against accuracy research, this scientific discovery might have occurred earlier. The taboo on stereotypes is part of an encompassing taboo that discourages challenges to free human will. Sociologists tend to ignore or criticize social research that brings in human evolution (Cole 2001), genes (Shiao et al. 2012), geography (Langlois 2008) and memes (Black 2000), preferring to continually recycle a meso-level set of factors: solidarity, intergroup rivalry, racism, sexism, and classism. Understandably, some of this avoidance is well deserved—early sociobiological research was questionable (see Laland and Brown 2011). However, sociologists overestimate the variance that their traditional factors explain (Cole 2001; Roberts et al. 2007). The political resistance to non-traditional factors seems to derive from the motivation to center attention on individuals and groups, and confer autonomy upon them. There is one exception: A sociologist is allowed to demonstrate that people are moved by large causal forces, if that sociologist also shows that these causal forces are socially constructed, and can be nullified to obtain a fair outcome. In some cases, the Herculean effort required to actually nullify these forces suggests a Utopian vision rather than a practical one, but nevertheless, the central point stands. Thus, Bourdieu (1977) focuses on how individuals are implicitly manipulated by social forces, and associates these forces with inequality and violence. He also suggests that these social forces arise from arbitrary social constructions, and he encourages their unveiling. In addition to setting the stage for social activism, Bourdieu provisions individuals with some control. Social cognition research has re-examined Bourdieu’s axioms about the effect of social circles on individuals, reaching the conclusion that Bourdieu overestimates individual efficacy (Vaughan 2002). HOW IDEOLOGY HAS HINDERED SOCIOLOGICAL INSIGHT 10 The sociology of inequality may also have been stunted by the marginalization of morally unpalatable causes. Newer research on epigenetics, which focuses on how genes change during a single lifespan, reveals that famines sometimes become encoded into peripheral genetic code, such that children and grandchildren of the affected people display a subconscious biological awareness of impending stress (Carey 2012). For instance, researchers have examined the downstream effect of the Dutch Hunger Winter, a period during the Second World War in which the Nazi fuel and food blockage of the Netherlands caused a famine in which tens of thousands perished. Pregnant women who were in the first trimester during the Hunger Winter gave birth to children who became obese as adults; and when these children gave birth to another generation, the grandchildren tended to be overweight too (Veenendaal et al. 2013). A similar trans- generational phenomenon has been documented in the male line among residents of Överkalix in Northern Sweden, a region that experienced food shortages in the late 19 th and early 20 th centuries (Pembrey et al. 2005). These epigenetic studies show how inequality can arise from the joint action of very large causal forces, like a world war, and very small causal mechanisms like peripheral coding on genes. Individual attributes, such as race, class, and gender, may explain some of the variance as well, and they may interact with the epigenetic factor, but they cannot be solely used to elucidate these cross-generational phenomena. It should be noted that epigenetic research has primarily revealed nutritional effects thus far, and I refer to epigenetics to illustrate a point, but I discourage over-generalizations (see Albert 2010). Clearly, it is discomfiting for individualists to accept that they are simultaneously controlled by microscopic alleles, megalithic geographic factors, and interactions between the two. Despite scientific evidence that falsifies self-determination, a belief in the self may be morally necessary to preserve responsible behavior, and scientific evidence cannot adjudicate HOW IDEOLOGY HAS HINDERED SOCIOLOGICAL INSIGHT 11 such moral questions in their entirety. However, we now have evidence of being controlled by forces that sociologists habitually ignore, and one might wonder if we would have found these phenomena earlier if sociologists had been open to these levels of analysis sooner. II. LIMITATIONS ON DATA USED IN RESEARCH PROJECTS In my experience, liberals often justify their superiority by noting that liberals have consistently been on the correct side of political struggles. There are numerous cases in the living memory of most adults where liberals supported a position that we now deem moral—the civil rights struggle and the feminist movement come to mind. Yet these examples come to mind because they occurred recently. In fact, many participants in these movements are still alive and politically active. The distant past reveals at least two cases of conservatives being on the right side of an issue. The first case is the eugenics movement, which was ideologically part of the late-19 th and early-20 th -century progressive movement (Freeden 1979). The members of this movement, which included the statisticians Francis Galton and his student Carl Pearson, believed that most individual differences resulted from genetic variance, and they sought to modify the population in order to remove undesirable traits from lineages. Given their presumption of genetic potency, they concluded that environmental interventions had a paltry impact, and that genetic interventions were in order. Given their apparent potential to reduce inequality, eugenics was supported by progressives during this era. Because eugenics later became associated with Nazism, its early history was forgotten. The second case is opposition to Communism. Although Communism is now universally acknowledged as an inhumane, totalitarian system, Western intellectuals supported Stalin even after his crimes against humanity were revealed (Folsom 1994; Kutulas 1990, 1995). Because HOW IDEOLOGY HAS HINDERED SOCIOLOGICAL INSIGHT 12 liberals and progressives eventually became anti-Stalinist, Joseph McCarthy now looms as the biggest American problem of the Stalinist era, and progressive dissociate American progressivism from a political movement that was as deadly as Nazism. Contemporary liberals are obviously not blameworthy for historical events, but the neglect of progressive Stalinism creates a sanitized narrative, where only conservative projects seem problematic (Hollander 2013; see also Brandt et al. 2014). There are also cases where the incorrect predictions of prominent conservatives are held to the light, whereas the incorrect predictions made by prominent Leftists are hidden. For instance, most sociologists likely remember U.S. Vice President Richard Cheney’s prediction that American soldiers would be treated as liberators in Iraq, or the prediction of several economists that austerity policies would benefit Europe. These predictions have received much ridicule on the Left. However, people on the Left are unlikely to know about Marx’s prediction that Communist dictators would resemble managers of workers’ co-operative societies, who refrained from abusing their authority (Marx 1986:297). Admittedly, this prediction is found in Marx’s notes on Bakunin, not one of Marx’s best-known writings. Nevertheless, despite the voluminous literature on Marx, this prediction is missing in all of Marx’s major biographies (e.g., Berlin 1978; McLellan 2006; Sperber 2013; Wheen 1999). This is not to say that sociological critiques of Marx are absent, which would be fantastically uninformed, but rather that Marx still receives unusually high regard relative to conservatives who have made failed predictions. Given these oversights in retrospective and prospective manners, it is apparent that inconvenient evidence can be collectively forgotten. A similar problem occurs when data are truncated to bolster a liberal paradigm. The “White privilege” paradigm is an instructive case. The term “White privilege” refers to the fact HOW IDEOLOGY HAS HINDERED SOCIOLOGICAL INSIGHT 13 that life is cumulatively easier for Whites than African-Americans in the U.S. For instance, whites can more easily fraternize with members of the same race, they can more easily find attractive and affordable housing, they can evade suspicion from store clerks, and they can be assured that a police officer who pulls them over is not engaging in racial profiling (McIntosh 1990). These observations come from Peggy McIntosh’s (1990) essay on White privilege, a mainstay in sociology reading lists. 2 The essay has attained canonical status, and the term “White privilege” has entered the sociological vocabulary (Harman 2010; Silva and Forman 2000; Solomona et al. 2005). Its usage is much less common in Europe, but American sociologists take an inquisitorial stance against those who find fault with the construct (Solomona et al. 2005). Undoubtedly, McIntosh’s observations merit attention—there are certain privileges associated with being in the majority. Nevertheless, there are two significant problems with McIntosh’s article and the ensuing construct. First, by neglecting non-Black minorities and referring to White privilege, McIntosh suggests that Whites are advantaged relative to all other groups. Second, by forgoing any caveats, McIntosh implies that Whites have it better on every sociological dimension. These two problems may serve the interests of antiracists engaged in “partisan sociology” (Niemonen 2010) but most sociologists should be troubled. Consider McIntosh’s claim about housing affordability—”If I should need to move, I can be pretty sure of renting or purchasing housing in an area which I can afford and in which I would want to live” (1990:97). This statement correctly implies that whites are better off than Blacks, but incorrectly implies that Whites are better off than everyone else. Asians outrank Whites in median income: the median White-Asian difference in household income is $10,000 (DeNavas-Walt, Proctor, and Smith 2012). If one counts Jews as a distinct ethnic group, and also HOW IDEOLOGY HAS HINDERED SOCIOLOGICAL INSIGHT 14 breaks down Asians into regional subcategories, Whites fare worse. The top–down ranking becomes Jewish, Indian, Filipino, Japanese, White, Vietnamese, Korean, Hispanic, and Black (Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life 2008; Pew Research Center 2013). The fact that Whites are not first, that they lag a full $10,000 behind Asians, and that this gap has existed for at least 30 years constitutes, in Weberian terms, an “inconvenient fact” for proponents of the White privilege paradigm (Sakamoto, Goyette, and Kim 2009; Sakamoto, Takei, and Woo 2012). Furthermore, the average American seems unaware that Asians surpass whites in income, and those who rate whites as highly privileged make the most egregious underestimation of Asian income (Martin and Nezlek 2014). Other examples of inconvenient facts abound. Blacks (and Asians) have better mental health than Whites, an effect labeled the Black–White paradox (Keyes 2009). Hispanics have better physical health and lower mortality than Whites, an effect known as the Hispanic paradox (Markides and Eschbach 2005). And Asians have a higher average education level than Whites (Sakamoto et al. 2009), an effect which is as yet unnamed. The use of “paradox” rather than “falsification” for these effects is telling, given that a robust theory should have no paradoxes. In other cases, no clear ranking can be made. Although Asians have the highest median household income, Whites have the highest median net worth (Kochhar, Taylor, and Fry 2011). Black men are perceived as both highly attractive and highly dangerous (Lewis 2011; Sadler et al. 2012). And Blacks have the highest risk of being a victim of a hate crime, but Blacks also commit hate crimes at the highest per capita rate (Chorba 2001; Rubenstein 2003). Meanwhile, Jews and Asians and are almost exclusively victims rather than perpetrators of hate crimes (Chorba 2001; Rubenstein 2003), which seems to put them at bottom of a racial hierarchy, but HOW IDEOLOGY HAS HINDERED SOCIOLOGICAL INSIGHT 15 their education and income put them at the top of the racial hierarchy. Selective elimination of data constitutes data censoring—the relevant primary data are readily available. III. LIMITED EMPATHIC UNDERSTANDING OF OTHER IDEOLOGIES What makes the anthropocentric sciences unique is that the attempt to study humans is both helped and hindered by the fact that scholars are overly familiar with human experience. We are helped by the human ability to be empathic. We are hindered by the fact that our empathy often derives from heuristics rather than real evidence. One way to overcome this hindrance is by forgoing heuristic thinking, and becoming acquainted with people whose beliefs and attitudes are distant from our own. Conversely, misunderstandings worsen when we indulge in epistemic egocentrism, the “tendency to evaluate others as though they shared our privileged information and concerns” (Nagel, Juan, and Mar 2013:3). Psychological evidence shows that children outgrow the tendency to be grossly egocentric in this fashion, but people still exhibit an egocentric bias as adults. For instance, we may know that a newcomer is ignorant of a relevant fact that we know, but we still expect that newcomer to behave in a manner consistent with that ignorance (Birch 2005; Birch and Bloom 2007; Royzman, Cassidy, and Baron 2003). 3 Thus, our empathy (or verstehen potential) is somewhat limited. Imagine a set containing all possible beliefs. Each of us holds a subset of those beliefs, and when two subsets overlap, empathy can arise. However, I will likely make two paradoxical assumptions when I interact with you: I will assume that what is unique to my belief subset is also known by you, and will assume that what is unique to your subset is known by me. Fortunately, we can minimize this error by eliciting evidence, a task that is important for sociologists who seek empathetic understanding. Yet sociologists who know this to be true, and who rightly try to understand, say, unfamiliar religious beliefs, often overlook deeply held ideological beliefs. HOW IDEOLOGY HAS HINDERED SOCIOLOGICAL INSIGHT 16 Consider a study by Thomas Frank (2004) of voting behavior and political affiliation in Kansas, entitled “What’s the Matter with Kansas?” The title comes from his finding that Kansans typically vote against their economic interest. This assertion is probably sound (but see Bartels 2006; Frank 2008). Yet to assume that something is the matter with Kansas, Frank makes this additional assumption: economic interests should be primary driver of voting behavior. Frank elevates economic interests because that is the criterion that makes sense to him. Beliefs about religion and culture may outweigh economic concerns for many, so this egocentric assumption is unjustified. In the field of political and moral psychology, scholars have found that liberals and conservatives misunderstand each other. In one study, participants were asked to complete a moral questionnaire, and then were asked how people of the opposite ideological persuasion would answer. From these ratings, the investigators could compute the subjective moral distance between a participant’s ideology and the (apparent) opposing ideology (Graham, Nosek, and Haidt 2012). The moral dimensions measured in this study were harm, fairness, group loyalty, authority, and purity. Loyalty is one of the factors that conservatives as opposed to liberals value highly, and liberals seem aware of this. Thus, in this study conservatives rated liberals as low on this factor, while liberals rated conservatives high on this factor. However, in both cases the ratings of the “other” overshot the accurate values: liberals believed that conservatives were obsessed with authority, while conservatives believed that liberals disdained authority. These results betray a certain kind of egocentrism. If a liberal uses himself or herself as a reference point, thus framing morality egocentrically, he or she will assume a conservative holds moral positions that are diametrically opposite his or her own, thus rating conservatives as far more different than they actually are. Indeed, this problem was more pronounced among liberals: some HOW IDEOLOGY HAS HINDERED SOCIOLOGICAL INSIGHT 17 liberals considered conservatives to be people who actually preferred harming people over caring for them. This assumptive understanding without true understanding is also found in the sociological and social psychological literature. Several scholars have chosen to define conservatives as people who have a preference for the status quo and a willingness to tolerate inequality (e.g., Benforado and Hanson 2012). However, conservatives may not think in terms of the status quo, and the purported evidence that conservatives directly prefer the status quo may be specious. Conservatives have great respect for authority, and their respect for the status quo likely derives from their respect for the social norms that prior generations have created, not respect for the status quo itself. Their ostensible preference for the status quo is an epiphenomenon, egocentrically described as the opposite of what liberals prefer, which is a change in the status quo. Similarly, there is little evidence that conservatives are indifferent to inequality, but rather that they prefer goods and services be withheld from people who haven’t earned them (Haidt 2013). One must engage in mind reading to infer that they are troubled by inequality and then tolerate it. This choice of vocabulary—“status quo” and “tolerate”—can also be interpreted as a liberally biased framing. To frame a discourse is to order verbal elements, choose a particular vocabulary, and employ certain metaphors when one talks about something. When people examine information and reach subsequent conclusions, it is often the case that they are not only persuaded by the information but also by the framing of the information. For instance, there are two ways to frame the cure to an epidemic that will kill 600 people (Tversky and Kahneman 1981). First, one could say that if program A is adopted, 200 people will saved, and if program B is adopted there is a 1/3 rd chance that 600 people will be saved and 2/3 rd chance that no one will HOW IDEOLOGY HAS HINDERED SOCIOLOGICAL INSIGHT 18 be saved. Second, one could say that if program A is adopted, 400 people will die, and if program B is adopted there is a 1/3 rd chance that no one will die, and a 2/3 rd chance that all 600 will die. Both of these framings describe the same information, but the first frame elicits support for program A while the second frame elicits support for program B. The first scenario associates program A with a definite gain, while the second associated program A with a definite loss. Framing can sometimes be undone with elaboration of information that was elided (Magen, Dweck, and Gross 2008). Framing also entails using concrete metaphors to denote abstractions. In fact, much of our so-called abstract thinking is grounded in metaphors that we idiomatically learn. For example, we metaphorically treat ourselves as containers, and speak of being filled with joy when we feel joyful, emptying our sorrow when we express all our sorrow, and contain our emotions when we remain silent about them (Lakoff and Johnson 2008). Framing is endemic to sociological language. Sociologists speak of constraints, as though people were physically fenced in; they speak of social controls, as though some entity manipulated people; and they speak of social structure, as though people could be located inside a physical edifice. These linguistic devices are useful, but being metaphors, they also have limitations—primarily, they suggest that we have a precise, deterministic understanding of social phenomena, even though our understanding is currently vague and probabilistic. In addition, these metaphors are emotionally loaded. Constraints are opposed to freedom, and freedom is good. Social control is opposed to autonomy, and autonomy is good. Social structure is opposed to self-determination, and self-determination is good. Constraints and social control immediately evoke negative emotions, because both liberals and conservatives desire their opposites. HOW IDEOLOGY HAS HINDERED SOCIOLOGICAL INSIGHT 19 Referring solely to existing social arrangements as constraints or social-control mechanisms, however, leads to a liberal bias. Would another type of framing be possible? What if we described society as comprehensible (constrained) rather than overwhelming (unconstrained), as shaped (structured) rather than formless (unstructured), as predictable (with social control) rather than volatile (without social control), and as ordered (hierarchical) rather than anarchic (equal)? Such a metaphorical schema is just as pragmatic as the schema we currently use. Yet this schema is unlikely to gain traction, because it highlights the functional rather than the dysfunctional. The choice of “status quo” as the term to denote social problems is also self-flattering. There are many elements of the status quo that American liberals support: the Bill of Rights, the democratic elections held to elect governing bodies, the provision of public libraries and schools, and the subsidized healthcare provided to the poor and elderly. When the term “status quo” appears, it only denotes elements of the status quo that trouble the author. Yet anyone can name some elements of the status quo they find problematic. Does this mean everyone is against the status quo? It seems more likely that saying one is against the “status quo” is a form of self- labeling that frames oneself as positive agent of change. Not surprisingly, members of the right- wing Tea Party also claim to be against the status quo (NBC News 2010) COUNTERARGUMENTS AND RESPONSES Many arguments could be raised in favor of the argument that conservatives would hinder the progress of sociological science. First, one might argue that liberals on average have abilities and temperaments that are suited for scientific insight and progress. For instance, one could point out that liberals are more intelligent than conservatives. Indeed, some evidence has accumulated in the past decade showing this average IQ difference (Hodson and Busseri 2012; HOW IDEOLOGY HAS HINDERED SOCIOLOGICAL INSIGHT 20 see also Kanazawa 2010). However, these studies merely show a mean difference. Given variability about the mean, these studies do not indicate that there are no qualified conservatives. A similar argument is that liberals score higher than conservatives on openness to experience, a personality trait ascribed to people who show curiosity about their environment (Carney et al. 2008). Such an orientation toward the external world naturally fits the scientific disposition. This argument not only fails for the statistical reason noted above, but also because the correlation between openness to experience and liberalism is fairly weak. Instead of focusing on psychological traits, one could focus on psychological biases to make another counterargument, namely, that cognitive biases are not strong enough to distort sociological scholarship. Although social psychologists have made a cottage industry out of bias spotting, a number of critics have noted that cognitive biases tend to be weak (Jussim 2012b; see also Krueger and Funder 2004). However, two issues I have discussed—data censoring and marginalization of taboo topics—have less to do with biased inferences than the absence of information altogether. Opponents may also ponder if non-ideological discourse is possible. As Mannheim (1936) noted, thoughts do not sprout independently but rather grow from ideological soil. Thus, one can claim that every scholar is an ideologue, a political move that portrays scholars as lacking epistemic humility and cognitive complexity (see Merton 1973; Weber 1946). Alternatively, one can abjure loyalty to a single ideology just as one can abjure loyalty to a single sociological theory. Such a catholic approach was proposed by Sorokin (1965:836), who noted a problem with the over-extension of any single sociological theory (italics Sorokin’s): HOW IDEOLOGY HAS HINDERED SOCIOLOGICAL INSIGHT 21 [The] disadvantage, fallacy, and danger [of sociological theories] consists in imperialistic extension of the main propositions of each analytical or fact-finding theory over different realities or over the total sociocultural reality and in a lack of integration, reconciliation and mutual complementation of the heterogeneous and discordant analytical and fact- finding theories into one integral theory that gives a sound knowledge of not one but of all the basic aspects of the total sociocultural universe, and thus a fuller knowledge of the whole sociocultural reality. Sorokin referred to his approach as integral approach. A similar integral approach is possible in the realm of American political ideology (e.g., Haidt 2013:319–366). Opponents could claim that political conservatism is an immoral or amoral ideology, that conservative principles cannot be reconciled with the goals of social improvement, and that many conservatives base their arguments on fictitious data. These accusations are certainly true to some extent, but immorality often lies in the eyes of the beholder. Moreover, conservatives and liberals share the goals of minimizing harm, maximizing care, and increasing fairness (Graham et al. 2013); and liberals have also been caught with fictitious or selective data (e.g., Sommers 1994). One might also argue that excessive political diversity can lead to the kind of acrimony that impedes scientific progress. This objection would hold weight, but for the example of all the disciplines that have both more ideological diversity and more solidarity than sociology. Christian Smith (2003:82) has summarized the “liberal progress narrative” that permeates the academic Left: HOW IDEOLOGY HAS HINDERED SOCIOLOGICAL INSIGHT 22 Once upon a time, the vast majority of human persons suffered in societies that were unjust, unhealthy, repressive and oppressive.... But the noble human aspiration for autonomy, equality, and prosperity struggled mightily against the forces of misery and oppression, and eventually succeeded.... [Yet] there is much work to be done to dismantle the powerful vestiges of inequality, exploitation, and repression. Even though this narrative contains claims that may be truer than the claims underlying the conservative narrative, these claims are both selective and simplistic. To sustain a political movement, simple narratives are desirable because one cannot expect ordinary citizens to understand sociological subtleties. This is not because they lack intelligence, but because they lack interest. However, sociology is too sophisticated for such a narrative. Fidelity to any narrative entails a lack of skepticism—final conclusions have already been reached. This attitude is fatal to science. CONCLUSION A former president of the International Sociological Association argued that scholarly disciplines combine three phenomena: a shared understanding of the intellectual boundaries of the field, an institutional structure that defines roles, and a cultural community that defines values and norms (Wallerstein 1999). One of sociology’s shared norms is that social conflict is always present. Perhaps this has engendered a problem-focused view in sociology, one that inhibits a conservative appreciation of arenas where conflict is minimal. This problem-focused view leads sociological studies to flow into social activism, a merger which is problematic unless all participants share the same prospective moral ideals. This problem seems to have been resolved, albeit unintentionally, by the homogenization of the HOW IDEOLOGY HAS HINDERED SOCIOLOGICAL INSIGHT 23 discipline. To undo this problem, one avenue for future sociologists to take is to abjure public sociology, thus removing morals from sociology. Indeed, some sociologists have made a persuasive case against public sociology for this reason (Deflem 2005). I would argue for another more inclusive option, namely, to make sociology public by ensuring that people from every major ideology are represented in sociological work. Such diversity cannot be achieved immediately, but sociologists can certainly begin by creating policies to attract ideological outsiders to the field. Such policies would not only connect a larger segment of the public to the science of sociology, but they would also attenuate ideological bias and accelerate sociological science. 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Karl Marx: A Life. New York: W. W. Norton & Co. Yancey, George A. 2011. Compromising Scholarship: Religious and Political Bias in American Higher Education. Waco, TX: Baylor University Press. HOW IDEOLOGY HAS HINDERED SOCIOLOGICAL INSIGHT 32 Endnotes 1 In the field of personality psychology, reinforcement sensitivity theory posits that three systems underlie human emotions. The behavioral activation system (BAS) handles appetitive reactions, the fight–flight–freeze system (FFFS) handles aversive reactions, and the behavioral inhibition system (BIS) handles ambiguity. The experiences mostly closely associated with the respective systems are fear, joy, and anxiety. One reason that some people have different emotional dispositions is that they have different levels of baseline activation in these systems. Happy people have relatively greater activity in their behavioral activation systems, although their other systems are activated when appropriate. Depressed people have relatively little activity in their behavioral activation system. Sufferers of anxiety disorders have relatively high activity in their behavioral inhibition system. In my experience, academic disciplines contain similar systems with a unique profile in each discipline. Political science, economics, and history are happy. Psychology once suffered from anxiety, but it recovered. Sociology has been suffering from a prolonged episode of anxiety, and labors under the illusion that the ending of anxiety is synonymous with the beginning of joy. 2 For examples of such syllabi, see: www.asanet.org/images/members/docs/pdf/teaching/RESection5Jorgenson.pdf sites.clas.ufl.edu/soccrim/files/SYG-2000-2894-syllabus-Schnable.pdf www.deanza.edu/distance/syllabi/soc1_12m.pdf howdy.tamu.edu/Inside/HR2504/PDFs/SYL_201331_13215.pdf www2.humboldt.edu/sociology/syllabi/Soc%20F2013/Soc%20316%20-%20Gender%20Society%20- %20L%20Cortez-Regan%20-%20Fall%202013.pdf sociology.colorado.edu/sites/default/files/syllabi/2011Fall/SOCY4131-Harrison.pdf tilt.colostate.edu/files/eportfolios/7/File32-Mar-16-2008-11-59-59-AM.pdf soc.utah.edu/courses/Syllabi/Spring%202012/Martinez_3041.001_Rock&Roll_Spring%202012.pdf HOW IDEOLOGY HAS HINDERED SOCIOLOGICAL INSIGHT 33 3 Epistemic egocentrism can often be found in moral philosophy, where philosophers expect people to behave as though they are cognizant of unknowns. Consider this illogical claim by the moral philosopher Peter Singer (2013): “The man or woman who wears a $30,000 watch or buys similar luxury goods, like a $12,000 handbag . . . is saying; “I am either extraordinarily ignorant, or just plain selfish. If I were not ignorant, I would know that children are dying from diarrhea or malaria, because they lack safe drinking water, or mosquito nets, and obviously what I have spent on this watch or handbag would have been enough to help several of them survive; but I care so little about them that I would rather spend my money on something that I wear for ostentation alone.” 
work_slyoqwp4hnfjdjczw72mpfb4nu	----	Queer Contestations and the Future of a ‘Queer’ Criminology University of Arkansas, Fayetteville From the SelectedWorks of Jordan Woods 2014 Queer Contestations and the Future of a ‘Queer’ Criminology Jordan Woods, University of Arkansas, Fayetteville Available at: https://works.bepress.com/jordan-woods/17/ http://www.uark.edu https://works.bepress.com/jordan-woods/ https://works.bepress.com/jordan-woods/17/ Queer Contestations and the Future of a Critical ‘‘Queer’’ Criminology Jordan Blair Woods Published online: 12 December 2013 � Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013 Abstract It is intuitive to include critical criminologists in early conversations about ‘‘queering’’ criminology given that the paradigms and methods of critical criminology can be employed to challenge subordination and inequality in its several dimensions. The first part (and main focus) of this article problematizes this intuition, which is easy to accept at face value, by reflecting backwards and explaining how early influential critical crimi- nological views perpetuated damaging stereotypes and representations of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer (LGBTQ) people as sexual deviants. The second part reflects forward, and discusses the difficulties of carving a space in the discipline for critical queer perspectives. Drawing on critical and critical race theories, this article advocates a relational, intersectional approach to conceptualize sexual orientation and gender identity in criminological theory and research. This approach considers the con- nections among sexual orientation or gender identity and other differences (e.g., race, ethnicity, nationality, religion, class, gender, etc.) without assuming or attaching fixed meanings to those differences. Introduction LGBTQ populations have been stigmatized and ignored in several ways since the inception of the field of criminology (Groombridge 1999; Woods 2014a, b). Changing the crimi- nological treatment of LGBTQ populations—and sexual orientation and gender identity issues more broadly—invites and requires new conversations, frameworks, and approa- ches. This contemplative article addresses how critical criminologists in particular might answer this call. J. B. Woods (&) Williams Institute, UCLA School of Law, 405 Hilgard Avenue, Box 951476, Los Angeles, CA 90095, USA e-mail: jw567@cam.ac.uk J. B. Woods Institute of Criminology, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, UK 123 Crit Crim (2014) 22:5–19 DOI 10.1007/s10612-013-9222-3 The first part (and main focus) of this article identifies and discusses two reasons why embracing critical criminology and relying on critical methods to answer this call are not so straightforward. First, the potential for critical methods to challenge orthodox assumptions about the world around us, and to identify and to challenge injustice, makes critical criminology an attractive space to engender change with respect to how crimi- nologists approach both sexual orientation or gender identity concepts and LGBTQ pop- ulations. As the article will explain, however, critical criminologists have had a historical role in perpetuating damaging representations of LGBTQ people as sexual deviants. These early deviant conceptualizations were reflections of the dominant societal and cultural meanings attached to sexual orientation and gender identity concepts at the time. It is much less common for critical criminologists to depict LGBTQ people in this fashion today. Many critical criminologists, though, continue to make heterosexist assumptions about relationship and family arrangements, and to ignore sexual orientation and gender identity differences in their theories and research. This criticism applies not only to critical criminology, but also to the biological, psychological, and sociological schools of criminology. Nevertheless, the fact that critical criminologists are not the lone culprits in this regard does not mean that their discussions of sexual orientation and gender identity should be protected from critical analysis. In fact, the tenets of critical crimi- nology suggest that critical criminologists would be more inviting and receptive to such criticism. Second, identifying the missteps of the criminological past prompts the question of how queer criminologists might move forward. This question is complicated because LGBTQ advocates and scholars—especially outside the discipline—make different, and arguably conflicting, assumptions about the nature of sexual orientation and gender identity. Some advocate an identity-based approach, which assumes that existing cate- gories of sexual orientation and gender identity (e.g., ‘‘gay,’’ ‘‘lesbian,’’ ‘‘bisexual,’’ and ‘‘transgender’’) correspond to collective identities. Others advocate a deconstructive approach, which seeks to disrupt fixed or stabilized notions of sexual orientation and gender identity. I have argued elsewhere that as a newly developing subfield, ‘‘queer criminology’’ should leave room for research under both approaches, given that they each address a need for greater criminological engagement with sexual orientation and gender identity (Woods 2014b). Nevertheless, some have disagreed with this position, advocating either one approach or the other given the drawbacks of those respective approaches (see e.g., Ball 2014). Although one article cannot address the range of issues arising from the tension between identity-based and deconstructive approaches to sexual orientation and gender identity, the second part of this article draws on critical theory (Minow 1990)—and critical race theory in particular (Crenshaw 1991)—to discuss the risks of taking either approach too far in criminological theory and research. Against this backdrop, it argues for an intersectional approach that frames sexual orientation and gender identity through a lens of relational difference. This relational approach does not view sexual orientation or gender identity in isolation, but rather considers how these differences intersect with other differences (e.g., race, nationality, religion, class, and age, among others) to shape people’s experiences of policing, criminal offending, victimization, desistance from crime, and their interactions with the criminal justice and penal systems more generally. It also recognizes that sexual orientation and gender identity differences are imbued with meanings that tangibly influence people’s lives, without relying on fixed notions of identity to assume that those differences either have universal meanings or create universal experiences in crimino- logical contexts. 6 J. B. Woods 123 The Historical Stigmatization and Current Neglect of LGBTQ Populations The historical treatment of LGBTQ populations and sexual orientation and gender identity in Western criminology can be explained through a concept I call the homosexual deviancy thesis, summarized as follows: Prior to the 1970s, LGBTQ people in Western societies were often labeled as criminals, psychopaths, sinners, and perverts (Sarbin 1996). At its core, the homosexual deviancy thesis argues that criminologists facilitated and reinforced these deviant misconceptions of LGBTQ people—intentionally in some cases, and, unintentionally in others (Woods 2014a). The homosexual deviancy thesis has two elements: the deviance-centered element and the invisibility element. The deviance-centered element argues that criminological dis- cussions of sexual orientation, gender identity, and LGBTQ populations contained the degrading characterizations of LGBTQ people described above until about the 1970s. Although some criminologists disagreed with those characterizations, the discipline pri- marily engaged with sexual orientation and gender identity only insofar as determining whether non-heterosexual conduct or identities, or gender non-conforming behaviors and identities, were forms of deviance themselves. The invisibility element argues that dis- cussions of sexual orientation, gender identity, and LGBTQ populations virtually disappear from criminological theory and research after the 1970s—when sodomy laws largely lost force in Western countries, and especially the United States, through repeal or lack of enforcement (Eskridge 2008). Studies of hate crime, bullying, and intimate partner vio- lence are noteworthy exceptions (Woods 2014b). As a result of LGBTQ people’s historical distortion and more recent omission from criminological theory and research, there is little understanding of how sexual orientation and gender identity differences might relate to criminal offending, desistence, policing, and victimization (beyond bias crime and intimate partner violence to a lesser extent) (see generally Peterson and Panfil 2014). As explained below, evidence supporting both elements appears in early and more recent critical criminological perspectives. At the onset, I acknowledge that critics might allege that I am cherry-picking examples to illustrate these themes, and advancing specific readings of criminological works that are open to interpretation. It is impossible to discuss every critical perspective and potential interpretation of a work in one short contemplative piece. I underscore here, though, that the examples discussed below are widely recognized as influential critical perspectives that shaped future theories and research. The Homo(sexual) Deviant: Early Critical Criminological Perspectives As interactionism came to the fore in sociological studies of deviance during the 1950s and 1960s, early critical criminologists started examining homosexuality (a concept that was then viewed to encompass gender non-conformity) as a social, as opposed to an individual pathological, problem (Rubin 2002). Researchers justified this shift based on a perceived growth of urban neighborhoods with visible LGBTQ populations that sprung from new settlement patterns after World War II (Bérubé 1990). Studies of homosexuality, from a social vantage point, posed new questions about the role of environment and subcultures in facilitating homosexuality. As a consequence of framing homosexuality as a perceived form of (social) sexual deviance, most early critical criminologists did not consider sexual orientation or gender identity as non-deviant differences comparable to other differences such as race, ethnicity, and class, among others. In turn, few early critical criminologists conceptualized homophobia and transphobia—concepts that challenge the stigmatization of LGBTQ populations as sexual deviants on the sole basis of their sexual orientations and Queer Contestations 7 123 gender identities—as structural-social conditions that might facilitate criminal offending or victimization (see MacKinnon 1979). Examples from the societal reaction and labeling tradition illustrate how the sexual deviance framework shaped discussions of LGBTQ populations in early critical crimino- logical perspectives. These theories—which examine how societies come to define certain behaviors and people as deviant—were created mostly by U.S.-based scholars when interactionism dominated sociological explanations of deviance in the 1950s and 1960s (Becker 1963; Lemert 1951; Tannenbaum 1938). At the time, a heavy social stigma attached to homosexuality, as illustrated by the crackdowns and surge in police harassment at LGBTQ bars and establishments (Woods 2009), as well as the increased enforcement of U.S. sodomy laws against LGBTQ people and especially gay men (Eskridge 2008). The writings of Lemert and Becker—two popular theorists from the societal reaction and labeling tradition—showcase the representations of LGBTQ people as sexual deviants. Lemert (1951) developed the influential concepts of primary and secondary deviance. He defined ‘‘primary deviance’’ as relatively infrequent criminal acts that did not influence how the actors viewed themselves or how society viewed the actors, and defined ‘‘secondary deviance’’ as criminal acts that could not be detached from how the actors viewed themselves or how society viewed the actors. He contended that a series of primary deviant acts followed by a series of increasingly negative societal reactions could cause primary deviance to shift to secondary deviance. During this process, society came to define the actors as deviant; the actors came to view themselves similarly, and then acted in accordance with that label. Lemert used homosexuality as an example to discuss how having a stigmatized social status can open up channels for particular social benefits: This makes it important to examine more closely the ways in which a deviant status or role gives access to rewards and satisfaction. If effective stigmatization imposes penalties and circumscribes access to conventional means of life satisfactions, it may also provide new means to ends sought. Thus becoming an admitted homosexual (‘‘coming out’’) may endanger one’s livelihood or his professional career, but it also absolves the individual from failure to assume the heavy responsibilities of marriage and parenthood, and it is a ready way of fending painful involvements in hetero- sexual affairs (1972:74–75). Here, Lemert recognized the deviant status assigned to homosexuals at the time, but also framed obstacles to same-sex marriage and parenthood as possible social rewards. On the one hand, Lemert’s characterization reflects how notions of same-sex marriage and LGBTQ parents were outside the realm of social possibility when he articulated his views. It also reflects the then-prevailing monolithic conception of ‘‘homosexual’’ identity that excluded other LGBTQ identity statuses. On the other hand, his characterization raises concerns given that many LGBTQ people might have had children prior to ‘‘coming out’’ in a heterosexual relationship, and in a hostile social climate, were forced to choose between being openly LGBTQ and maintaining their parental ties. For those individuals, ‘‘coming out’’ did not ‘‘absolve’’ them of parenthood; rather, sacrificing parenthood was an opportunity cost (as opposed to a reward) for being openly LGBTQ. I recognize that it is unfair to criticize Lemert too harshly for not focusing on these aspects given his surrounding cultural and social environment, which he acknowledged stigmatized LGBTQ people. Nevertheless, given LGBTQ political and social gains since Lemert’s time, reflecting on this passage today illustrates the important point that early critical criminologists defined the possible social experiences of LGBTQ people (marriage and parenthood, for example) in terms of sexual deviance. 8 J. B. Woods 123 Resonating with the interactionist tradition, Lemert also used homosexuality as an example to support his view that group associations had a central role in sustaining specific forms of deviance. He stated that ‘‘groups become instrumentally important in those forms of deviance which require for their systematic or continued activation goods and services provided by others through organized relationships’’ (1951:73). He further underscored homosexuality, ‘‘although practicable through seducing normals, generally requires pat- terns of similar inclinations’’ (1951:37). Although Lemert did not discuss homosexual subcultures in depth, he explicitly characterized homosexuality as a type of deviance sustained through associations of people with similarly deviant sexual preferences. The role of ‘‘homosexual subcultures’’ in facilitating homosexual deviance is a recur- ring theme in Becker’s (1963) Outsiders. At many points, Becker used homosexuality as an example to apply interactionist principles to define deviance as a societal creation. He explained that the homosexual ‘‘makes deviance as a way of life’’ and ‘‘organizes his identity around a pattern of deviant behavior’’ (1963:30). Becker also relied on homo- sexuality to support his main argument that being labeled as deviant produced a self- fulfilling prophecy by setting into motion social processes that excluded individuals from conventional spheres of society: For example, being a homosexual may not affect one’s ability to do office work, but to be known as a homosexual in an office may make it impossible to continue working there…In such cases, the individual finds it difficult to conform to other rules which he had no intention or desire to break, and perforce finds himself deviant in these areas as well. The homosexual who is deprived of a ‘‘respectable’’ job by the discovery of his deviance may drift into unconventional, marginal occupations where it does not make so much difference (1963:34). As indicated in the above passage, Becker also considered the ways that homosexuals became deviant in other aspects of their lives as a consequence of being labeled as deviants by society for being homosexual. But the starting point and the heart of his analysis focused on the homosexual as a deviant identity. Becker’s labeling theory stressed the function of peer groups in influencing deviance. He hypothesized that the norms of peer groups could function to slow down or halt movement towards deviance. To illustrate this point, Becker relied on Reiss’ (1951) popular sociological study of ‘‘peers’’ and ‘‘queers’’ to argue that the norms of hustler peer groups ‘‘immunized’’ members ‘‘against increasing deviance’’ (1951:36). In this discus- sion, Becker again described homosexuality as a form of sexual deviance, describing hustlers’ ability to separate their sexual identities from homosexual acts as a mechanism that prevented them from continuing to a ‘‘kind of sexual deviancy’’ (1951:36). Becker also used homosexuality as an example to demonstrate the opposite point that norms within peer associations could facilitate deviance. He stated that membership in a deviant sub- culture ‘‘solidifie[d] a deviant identity’’ and that ‘‘a set of perspectives and understandings about what the world is like and how to deal with it, and a set of routine activities based on those perspectives’’ emerged from deviant subcultures (1963:38). Becker argued that the homosexual community developed their own historical, legal, and psychological justifi- cations for their deviant activities: Moving into an organized deviant group has several consequences for the career of the deviant. First of all, deviant groups tend, more than deviant individuals, to be pushed into rationalizing their position. At an extreme, they develop a very com- plicated historical, legal, and psychological justification for their deviant activity. Queer Contestations 9 123 The homosexual community is a good case. Magazines and books by homosexuals and for homosexuals include historical articles about famous homosexuals in history. They contain articles on the biology and physiology of sex, designed to show that homosexuality is a ‘‘normal’’ sexual response. Taken together, this material provides a working philosophy for the active homosexual, explaining to him why he is the way he is, that other people have also been that way, and why it is all right for him to be that way’’ (Becker 1963:38). This ‘‘working philosophy’’ of the homosexual facilitated and sustained patterns of homosexual deviance: Most deviant groups have a self-justifying rationale (or ‘‘ideology’’), although sel- dom is it as well worked out as that of the homosexual. While such rationales do operate, as pointed out earlier, to neutralize the conventional attitudes that deviants may still find in themselves toward their own behavior, they also perform another function. They furnish the individual with reasons that appear sound for continuing the line of activity he has begun. A person who quiets his own doubts by adopting the rationale moves into a more principled and consistent kind of deviance than was possible for him before adopting it (Becker 1963:38-39). Here, Becker was primarily evaluating how deviance functioned and shaped the behaviors and worldviews of its targets. At the same time, his analysis arguably perpetuates a view that treats organized attempts for LGBTQ recognition, acceptance, and equality as manifestations of extreme deviance, as opposed to justified attempts to eliminate marginalization on the basis of a difference that shaped people’s lives and society refused to respect. By so doing, LGBTQ populations bear a stigma of sexual deviance no matter what—even in their attempts to eliminate unjust marginalization for being LGBTQ. Although the passages above are open to interpretation, the fundamental point that I want to stress is that they demonstrate how early critical criminological discussions of LGBTQ populations—and ‘‘homosexuals’’ in particular—took place through the lens of sexual deviance. Although these early critical criminologists did not necessarily intend to stigmatize LGBTQ people, their inability to engage in critical discourse outside the sexual deviancy framework illustrates that their early critical perspectives rely on out- dated ways of thinking about sexuality and gender identity that are damaging to LGBTQ people today. Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity as Irrelevant to Social Structure Early critical criminological perspectives also rarely conceptualized homophobia or transphobia as structural conditions that might facilitate criminal offending or victimiza- tion outside of sex-crime contexts. At least two factors contributed to this macro-level neglect. First, because homosexuality was widely viewed as a form of sexual deviance, few early critical criminologists recognized sexual orientation or gender identity as non-deviant differences that were relevant to the organization of society. Second, the Classical social theories of Durkheim, Weber, and Marx—which influenced many early and recent critical criminological theories—neglected sexuality and gender more broadly (Seidman 1996). Radical (Marxist) theories of crime—which explain crime in terms of the inequitable distribution of political and economic power in capitalist societies (Lynch et al. 2000)— offer salient examples of early critical criminological perspectives that did not recognize sexual orientation or gender identity as relevant features to the social structure. Radical 10 J. B. Woods 123 criminological theories became popular during the 1960s and 1970s, when a wave of social justice movements (e.g., the U.S. Civil Rights Movement, the anti-Vietnam war protests, university revolts, and the women’s liberation movement, and the Stonewall Riots) shaped political and social climates, especially in the United States (Lynch et al. 2000; Platt 1974). Quinney was one of the first criminologists to develop a radical theory of crime in the counterculture movements of the 1960s and 1970s. Before advancing his radical theory, however, Quinney (1970) advanced a social conflict theory of crime that viewed the content and enforcement of the criminal law as products of political power. He discussed homosexuality at a few points in his social conflict theory and characterized homosexuality as a form of sexual deviance in each case. Quinney relied on prior sociological studies within the social learning and labeling traditions to argue that the ‘‘homosexual’’ was a learned social role. He further relied on this body of research to explain how homosexuals adapted to the stigma attached to their deviant social statuses (Quinney 1970:260). He acknowledged the evolving favorable legal and police attitudes towards homosexuality in the United States and England, but stressed that they did not necessarily reflect changes in public opinion. Quinney largely omitted discussions of homosexuality in advancing his later radical theory of crime, after abandoning his social conflict perspective (1974a, b, 1977). Relying primarily on Marxism, Quinney viewed the criminal law as the centerpiece of the existing economic and social order because it enabled the state to use force and coercion to protect the interests of the ruling class. In his view, the interests of the ruling class framed law enforcement and crime control, which functioned to defy any resistance to the status quo from members of the non-ruling class. He advocated replacing capitalism with socialism to eliminate inequalities that capitalism created and sustained. In his radical scholarship, Quinney mentioned homosexuality only in passing when discussing laws that had been mostly repealed and targeted particular conduct (homo- sexuality, gambling, prostitution, and abortion) (1977:158; 1974:190). Consistent with the homosexual deviancy thesis, the lens of sexual deviance framed these discussions. In turn, Quinney’s radical theory did not consider the relationship between capitalist production, sexual culture, and criminality. It also did not consider how sexual orientation or gender identity differences intersected with class struggles, or how replacing capitalism with socialism affected existing assumptions about sexuality and gender in the social order. Although these questions invite future detailed discussion, the important point is that the differences between Quinney’s discussions of homosexuality in his social conflict theory and his radical theory lend support to the macro-level neglect of sexual orientation or gender identity differences in early critical criminological perspectives. The writings of Chambliss provide additional support for this view. Chambliss (1964) popular essay, ‘‘A Sociological Analysis of the Law of Vargrancy,’’ traced the develop- ment and enforcement of vagrancy laws from the fourteenth century in England, to the twentieth century in England and the United States. He argued that vagrancy laws first appeared in fourteenth-century England to help landowners after the Black Death elimi- nated a considerable segment of the English labor force, and to pressure available laborers to accept low-wage work. In his view, the purpose of vagrancy laws shifted in the sixteenth century from requiring labor to controlling criminal activity and regulating ‘‘rogue’’ populations. Vagrancy laws maintained a similar purpose in twentieth-century England and the United States, focusing on the ‘‘arrest and confinement of the ‘down and outers’ who inhabit[ed] certain sections of our larger cities’’ (Chambliss 1964:75). Their controlling function was ‘‘a reflection of society’s perception of a continuing need to control some of its ‘suspicious’ or ‘undesirable’ members’’ (1964:75). Queer Contestations 11 123 Chambliss’ analysis of vagrancy laws omitted consideration of their enforcement against sexual and gender minorities. Several scholars, though, have documented the application and expansion of vagrancy laws in nineteenth- and twentieth-century England and the United States against gay men, lesbians, cross-dressers, and other gender non- conforming people (Adler 1989; Cocks 2003; Eskridge 2008; Weeks 1977). The exclusion of this discussion from Chambliss’ analysis is noteworthy because it raises questions about whether vagrancy statutes functioned exclusively as tools to further the interests of the economic ruling classes in nineteenth- and twentieth-century England and the United States. Adler (1989), for instance, documented the development of vagrancy laws in St. Louis, Missouri during the nineteenth century Civil War Era. He found that merchants did not successfully exploit criminal codes in order to boost capital during this period. Rather, by the beginning of the Civil War, vagrancy statutes ‘‘served as instruments to protect residents from moral threats,’’ including homosexual and gender non-conforming behav- iors (1989:222). Local newspapers reported stories of law enforcement relying on vagrancy laws to arrest John Burns, ‘‘a suspected homosexual,’’ and Susan Bale, ‘‘a young woman who preferred to dress in men’s clothing’’ (1989:222). From these accounts, Adler con- cluded that ‘‘local culture—not the narrow economic needs of the elite—defined the application of vagrancy laws in St. Louis’’ during this period (Adler 1989:221). Adler may have overemphasized the cultural dimensions of enforcing vagrancy laws against LGBTQ populations. Consistent with Chambliss’ position, this enforcement also might have had an economic dimension. The aftermath of the Civil War devastated many local economies in the United States, and a need for people to move from their families to make ends meet disrupted traditional family structures (Ransom and Sutch 2001; Rose 1992). In this context, vagrancy laws against sexual and gender minorities might have served as a means to defend traditional family structures that were the primary unit of economic production for many individuals before the Civil War. But regardless of whether vagrancy laws had an economic or cultural purpose, the critical point is that sexual ori- entation and gender identity had a bearing on the wider and historical functions of vagrancy laws. Chambliss later explicitly adopted Marxism to articulate nine basic tenets of the function of criminal law (Chambliss 1975). In presenting and discussing these tenets, Chambliss also omitted considerations of sexual orientation and gender identity. This omission raises questions, which are never answered in his work, about how sexual ori- entation and gender identity relate to the etiology of crime and criminal law production in capitalist and non-capitalist societies. In the copious body of Chambliss’ radical writings, the issue of homosexuality arises almost exclusively in the context of ‘‘victimless crimes.’’ These discussions show the influence that the criminal stigma attached to homosexuality had on the treatment of LGBTQ people within his writings. Chambliss acknowledged this stigma in the 1988 treatise, Exploring Criminology, in which he explained that the criminal stigma attached to homosexuality was not the mere product of legislative acts, but was also reinforced by decisions of the United States Judiciary (1988:51). Even though Chambliss did not assert that homosexuals were sexual deviants in this work, his discussions focused on the debate over the criminalization of homosexuality. In short, the examples above illustrate that early critical criminologists omitted con- siderations of homophobia and transphobia in their attempts to theorize macro-level factors in the social structure that might facilitate crime. Arguably, this omission is additional evidence that early critical criminologists refused or did not have the conceptual tools to engage with LGBTQ populations without relying on notions of sexual deviance. 12 J. B. Woods 123 The Invisible Offenders: More Recent Critical Criminological Perspectives LGBTQ populations are much less commonly portrayed as sexual deviants in more recent critical criminological perspectives that have developed after interactionism lost force in the 1970s. It is difficult to characterize this as progress, though, because there have been very few discussions of sexual orientation and gender identity overall. Generally, discussions of sexual orientation and gender identity in more recent critical criminological perspectives have taken three forms. First, some critical criminologists have referenced the declining popularity of criminal laws targeting homosexual acts as an example of societal disagreement over the definition of crime (e.g., Braithwaite 1989). Although these discussions do not characterize homosexuality as a form of deviance per se, their scope is limited to the issue of whether homosexuality is a type of sexual deviance. Second, critical criminologists have discussed the problem of bias crimes motivated by sexual orientation, and gender identity to a lesser extent (e.g., Messerschmidt 1993; Perry 2001; Stanko 1990). Although these discussions demonstrate how conceptualizing sexual orientation and gender identity as differences can improve knowledge of LGBTQ people’s experiences of crime, their scope is limited to a narrow area of victimology. Third, some critical perspectives (especially feminist and cultural criminologists) have articulated a need to integrate queer perspectives and deconstruct a heterosexist social order that facilitates the subordination of LGBTQ people (e.g., Ferrell and Sanders 1995; Mess- erschmidt 1986). These calls acknowledge the relevance of sexual orientation and gender identity to societal organization, but criminologists have yet to comprehensively integrate those differences into a criminological theory. Therefore, although critical criminologists have provided these insightful first steps, they have yet to offer a broader conceptual framework to explain how sexual orientation and gender identity may relate to: (1) the criminal victimization of LGBTQ people on a broader scale than hate crime, or (2) the reasons why LGBTQ people to engage in criminal offending or desist from crime. These criticisms are not intended to undercut the value that critical criminological research on hate crime victimization has and continues to offer. Critical criminologists have stressed the importance of listening to marginalized groups in order to learn about the realities of how they experience crime (Young 1986). Hate crime is an unfortunate reality that many LGBTQ individuals and communities face. This type of victimization, however, is only one piece of the puzzle. The lack of criminological engagement with LGBTQ offenders outside the lens of sexual deviance is especially problematic. In many respects, the status of LGBTQ offenders in the field has shifted from the ‘‘sexual deviants’’ to the ‘‘invisible offenders.’’ Criminologists’ lack of focus on LGBTQ offenders is perplexing given that prison scholars and scholars in other disciplines have drawn attention to the presence of LGBTQ inmates inside of prison walls and the unjust social conditions that lead to their incarceration (e.g., Dolovich 2012; Gehi and Arkles 2007; Robinson 2011). Although these scholars have documented that LGBTQ people—especially low-income and LGBTQ people of color— are behind bars, criminologists to date have paid very little attention to how they got there. Moreover, new critical-criminological conversations about LGBTQ offenders are warranted in light of recent developments in the subfield that attempt to deconstruct heterosexist gender structures, but appear to focus on heterosexual subjects to do so. For instance, a new trend in feminist criminology emerged in the 1990s that focuses on the role of men and their performance of masculinity in offending (Collier 1998; Messerschmidt 1993). As Messerschmidt (1993) explains, this enterprise focuses on ‘‘men as men and boys as boys’’ (p. 14). Although this area of criminology has provided meaningful insight Queer Contestations 13 123 into how gender norms are socially constructed, it has largely focused on deconstructing the ‘‘heterosexual male’’ offender. In so doing, the enterprise has yet to further the understanding of how gender norms may lead LGBTQ people—and LGBTQ men in particular—to commit or to desist from crime. It also provides little insight into how other differences—including race, ethnicity, class, etc.—intersect with sexual orientation and gender identity to shape the causes and experiences of crime. In short, focusing on LGBTQ offenders is just as an important piece of the puzzle as anti-LGBTQ victimization for at least three reasons. First, stemming from her research on gay-identified gang members, Panfil (2013) rightfully argues that the criminological neglect of LGBTQ offending is connected to the broader denial of LGBTQ people’s agency in the field of criminology. Second, because of a lack of emphasis on LGBTQ offending, the dominant existing narrative of the ‘‘gay offender’’ is a ‘‘sexual offender’’ (especially the ‘‘child molester’’). This narrative is rooted in the male-focused and outdated sexual deviance framework. Although criminologists have paid very little attention to transgender and gender non-conforming people, a parallel, misguided narrative exists of the ‘‘transgender offender’’ as a ‘‘sex worker.’’ Accordingly, there is a need for counter- narratives and better representations of the nuanced ways in which sexual orientation and gender identity might influence a broad spectrum of criminal involvement. Without them, ill-founded stereotypes will continue to thrive and to shape criminological perceptions of LGBTQ populations. Third, turning a blind eye to LGBTQ offenders discounts a central part of the conse- quences of homophobia and transphobia in criminal justice contexts. Many LGBTQ people are excluded and face pervasive discrimination in vital spheres of daily life, including housing, employment, marriage, family, religion, public accommodation, medical care, and education. These struggles can take different forms when considering how sexual orientation and gender identity intersect with other differences, such as race, ethnicity, class, age, and religion. Restricting criminological considerations of homophobia and transphobia to victimization ignores the reality that those structural conditions may shape unjust policing practices, influence LGBTQ populations to resort to breaking the law in some instances (e.g., ‘‘survival crimes’’), or unfairly influence societal determinations of criminal guilt. In turn, the criminological neglect of LGBTQ offenders insulates any of their behaviors possibly rooted in homophobia or transphobia from investigation, and therefore, inhibits developing criminological interventions for addressing them. Moving Forward The analysis above demonstrates the need for new critical criminological frameworks to address LGBTQ populations, and, sexual orientation and gender identity more broadly. This section articulates some of the difficulties surrounding how critical criminologists may go about advancing the field in this regard, and broadly sketches one particular approach that has promise. One obstacle to creating a queer criminology stems from contesting definitions over the term ‘‘queer’’ itself. Although community advocates and scholars disagree over its precise meaning, the term ‘‘queer’’ has been generally used in two ways outside the discipline. First, ‘‘queer’’ has been used as an umbrella term to describe persons who assume an array of defined sexual orientation and gender identity categories, including ‘‘gay,’’ lesbian,’’ ‘‘bisexual,’’ and ‘‘transgender’’ (Jagose 1996). Second, the term ‘‘queer’’ has been used challenge rigid identity categories with respect to sex, gender, and sexuality (e.g., man/ 14 J. B. Woods 123 woman, gay/straight). Under this second approach, ‘‘queer’’ has also been used to chal- lenge the stability of concepts, methods, and assumptions of conventional social science research (Plummer 2005). The tension between these contesting definitions of ‘‘queer’’ poses a potential catch-22 situation if either the identity-based or deconstructive approach is taken too far. On the one hand, if queer criminology accepts the first meaning of the term ‘‘queer,’’ then it risks being void of critical introspection. Queer criminology may draw attention to the exclusion of LGBTQ populations within criminological research, but also marginalize individuals with non-normative sexual orientations and gender identities who do not identify with, or fit within, accepted definitions of experiences of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender. On the other hand, if queer criminology accepts the second meaning of the term ‘‘queer,’’ then it risks diluting identity categories to the extent that it may discount the experiences of people who identify with, and experience marginalization on the basis of, differences that mold those categories. The following examples illustrate that the risks of taking either the identity-based or deconstructive approach to its extreme are not merely hypothetical. With respect to taking the identity-based approach too far, consider the historical and continuing trend in crim- inological theory and research to associate ‘‘gay identity’’ with ‘‘homosexual subcultures.’’ Some of these discussions took place between the 1950s and 1970s when sociologists became concerned with the social aspects of homosexuality and, in turn, investigated homosexual subcultures and ‘‘gay spaces’’ (e.g., bars, neighborhoods, cruising spaces, etc.). The previous analysis of Becker’s Outsiders demonstrates this point. Akers’ (1973) social learning theory provides another example. Akers argued that social learning drove individuals to move away from heterosexual behavior toward a stable pattern of ‘‘deviant’’ sexuality. In making this argument, he referenced a study that identified four alleged phases of ‘‘becoming a homosexual’’—the final phase entailed exposure to ‘‘gay’’ sub- cultures (Steele 1967:9–10). Based on these assumed stages, Akers argued that homosexual subcultures provided a mechanism of reinforcement for homosexuals to continue engaging in homosexual behaviors. Such discussions advanced an essentialized view that there was one set pattern of becoming a homosexual, and that people were not ‘‘full’’ homosexuals until they immersed themselves in homosexual subcultures. Discussions of homosexual subcultures in more recent critical criminological per- spectives do not define gay identity through homosexual subcultures as strongly as past perspectives did. There is still an emphasis on subculture, though, when LGBTQ popu- lations are discussed. Ferrell and Sanders (1995:318), for instance, posit that ‘‘we need a cultural criminology that can understand the criminal worlds of lesbians and gays… Largely in response to their social marginalization and criminalization, members of gay and lesbian subcultures have developed elaborately stylish codes of personal conduct and presentation of self.’’ Young (1999:90) argues that ‘‘the concept of subculture allows us to gain insight into the nature of diversity in late modernity.’’ He criticizes the tendency for late-modern societies to essentialize identities, arguing that difference in late modernity is ‘‘related to subculture’’ (1999:91). In his view, ‘‘[m]ale homosexuality is cast… as gay culture’’ in the multiculturalism of late modernity (1999:99). Of course, ‘‘gay’’ subcultures exist and are an important part of the social experiences of some LGBTQ individuals (Frederick 2013). Criminologists, however, perpetuate a narrow view of what it means to be LGBTQ by categorically connecting LGBTQ people’s experiences of crime to these subcultures. Many LGBTQ people do not belong to ‘‘gay’’ subcultures, and many LGBTQ people deliberately distance themselves from those sub- cultures for different reasons. For instance, ‘‘gay’’ subcultures did not, and still do not, Queer Contestations 15 123 provide a sense of community for all LGBTQ people, and have been criticized for dis- criminating against queer women, transgender and other gender-variant people, persons of color, the poor, and other marginalized groups (Bowleg et al. 2003; Boykin 1996; Hemphill 1991; Icard 1986; Loiacano 1989; Mays et al. 1993; Moore 2001). In light of these criticisms, advancing rigid definitions or meanings attached to ‘‘gay’’ identity (e.g., as belonging to a ‘‘gay’’ subculture) risks neglecting the criminologically-relevant expe- riences of a diversity of LGBTQ people. Conversely, to illustrate the potential harms of taking the deconstructive approach too far, consider the recent heightened public discussion in the United States about the suicides of LGBTQ youth motivated by school bullying. In 2010, media coverage of suicides of LGBTQ youth who were bullied by their peers increased dramatically (Paceley and Flynn 2012). This coverage drew attention to the struggles of being an LGBTQ youth, especially in educational settings. Some sources, though, recognized that bullying motivated the suicides, but omitted any mention that the victims were bullied because of prejudice against their sexual orientation or gender identity (e.g., Dee 2012). Some commentators framed the bullying issue as a universal problem for all teens, not just ‘‘gay’’ teens (e.g., Carlson 2010)—and other sources reported statements from school administrators making similar characterizations (e.g., Des Moines Register 2012). Arguably, some commentators who were more hostile to LGBTQ youth used this generalization tactic to deflect the public’s attention away from bullying that was rooted specifically in homophobia or transphobia. The LGBTQ youth suicide example poses a potential dilemma for queer criminologists who might advocate for deconstructive approaches at their extreme, which would call for dismantling categorized notions of sexual orientation and gender identity differences. Minow (1990:40) argues that ‘‘refusing to acknowledge… differences may make them continue to matter in a world constructed with some groups but not others in mind.’’ Based on this view, if queer criminologists focus exclusively on dismantling any held notions of sexual orientation or gender identity differences, then the inevitable tradeoff is a lack of focus on the criminologically-relevant struggles that LGBTQ people currently face because of homophobia or transphobia rooted in those differences. In identifying these risks of taking the identity-based or deconstructive approaches too far, I do not intend to undermine emerging criminological perspectives regarding sexual orientation or gender identity that clearly fall under one approach but do not take that approach to its extreme. At the same time, warning against these risks at the extreme is a meaningful exercise because it is fairly easy to advance ‘‘queer’’ criminological frame- works that either: (1) perpetuate exclusive and essentialized meanings of sexual orientation or gender identity, or (2) deconstruct to the point that they are difficult to apply in crim- inological research or too distanced from the real-world and criminologically-relevant experiences of LGBTQ people on the ground. One promising approach (of likely many) is to recognize sexual orientation and gender identity differences as relational concepts. This approach would not assume or attach particular meanings to criminological subjects on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity, but rather prioritize the perspective and voices of criminological subjects in determining the potential connections between sexual orientation or gender identity dif- ferences and crime. In some instances, this approach might require embracing existing sexual and gender categories to capture and convey the criminological experiences of individuals within particular LGBTQ communities. As Minow (1990:78) observes, how- ever, ‘‘[d]iscovering that difference arises in relationships and in contexts that are them- selves mutable introduces new angles of vision, new possibilities for change.’’ In this 16 J. B. Woods 123 regard, queer theories provide important insight into the margins of those categories, and call attention to which individuals are and are not excluded by them. People’s social experiences are not only shaped by sexual orientation and gender identity differences, but also are molded by a host of other differences including race, ethnicity, religion, class, and age, among others. Viewing sexual orientation and gender identity as relational, historically-situated, concepts facilitates understandings of how these differences intersect with other differences to shape experiences of crime. Critical race scholarship—and Crenshaw’s (1991) theory of intersectionality in particular—offer useful frameworks to explain how the intersection of multiple differences can engender varying experiences of discrimination, marginalization, and violence. Crenshaw (1991:1242) argues that ‘‘[t]he problem with identity politics is not that it fails to transcend difference, as some critics charge, but rather the opposite—that it frequently conflates or ignores intragroup differ- ences.’’ Crenshaw (1991:1244) further explains that ‘‘the experiences Black women face are not subsumed within the traditional boundaries of race or gender discrimination as these boundaries are currently understood, and that the intersection of racism and sexism factors into Black women’s lives in ways that cannot be captured wholly by looking at the race or gender dimensions of those experiences separately.’’ Recognizing intersectional angles avoids the pitfall of overlooking the potential multi-dimensionality of LGBTQ people’s experiences of marginalization by looking at sexual orientation or gender identity differences in a vacuum in criminological theory and research (see also, Meyer 2013). The push for intersectional frameworks that include sexual orientation and gender identity differences presented here is in tension with some recent critical criminological perspectives that problematize an alleged trend to overemphasize difference and identity in today’s world. For instance, Young (2011, 2007, 1999) argues that late modernity is marked by ‘‘ontological insecurity’’ and a ‘‘crisis of identity’’ that arises from the crossing and blurring of economic, cultural, social, spatial, and moral boundaries. He contends that one late-modern solution to this crisis is to draw lines and boundaries by emphasizing features, and using identity politics to demonize others through the essentialization of difference. Although Young provides insight into how differences may function in certain ways in late modern society, it is important not to quickly dismiss projects to elucidate and to rectify the criminological mistreatment of LGBTQ populations as part of this late- modern trend. The long history of the enforcement of anti-sodomy laws and police harassment of LGBTQ populations illustrates that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity is not simply late-modern societal experience. Conclusion Critical criminological theories and methods have great promise to advance the treatment of LGBTQ populations, and sexual orientation and gender identity issues, in the field. That being said, a key aspect of brainstorming and creating new critical ‘‘queer’’ criminological frameworks is to account for how those advancements relate to what critical criminologists have said previously about sexuality and gender identity. This article has documented some missteps and outdated ways of thinking about LGBTQ issues in the history of critical criminology, and advanced one of many possible directions to avoid these early pitfalls as we go forward towards a critical ‘‘queer’’ criminology. 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Queer Contestations 19 123 http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10612-013-9227-y University of Arkansas, Fayetteville From the SelectedWorks of Jordan Woods 2014 Queer Contestations and the Future of a ‘Queer’ Criminology Queer Contestations and the Future of a Critical ‘‘Queer’’ Criminology Abstract Introduction The Historical Stigmatization and Current Neglect of LGBTQ Populations The Homo(sexual) Deviant: Early Critical Criminological Perspectives Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity as Irrelevant to Social Structure The Invisible Offenders: More Recent Critical Criminological Perspectives Moving Forward Conclusion Acknowledgments References 
work_sodridocyfb2vpfjl7ciqtwwee	----	TF_Template_Word_Windows_2013 ‘The Language Is Disgusting And They Refer To My Disability’: The Cyberharassment Of Disabled People Zhraa A. Alhaboby, Haider M. al-Khateeb, James Barnes, Emma Short University of Bedfordshire, UK Corresponding author: Dr. Zhraa A. Alhaboby , Institute for Health Research (IHR) and the National Centre for Cyberstalking Research (NCCR), University of Bedfordshire, UK Email: Zhraa.Alhaboby@beds.ac.uk Abstract: Disabled people face hostility and harassment in their sociocultural environment. The use of electronic-communications creates an online context that further reshape this discrimination. We explored the experiences of 19 disabled victims of cyberharassment. Five themes emerged from the study: disability and health consequences, family involvement, misrepresentation of self, perceived complexity, and lack of awareness and expertise. Cyberharassment incidents against disabled people were influenced by the pre-existing impairment, perceived hate-targeting, and perpetrators faking disability to get closer to victims online. Our findings highlight a growing issue requiring action and proper support. Keywords: online harassment; cyberstalking; cyberbullying; chronic conditions; disability hate crime; victimisation Introduction The UK Equality Act 2010 constructs disability as a ‘physical or mental impairment and the impairment has a substantial and long-term adverse effect on his or her ability to carry out normal day-to-day activities’ (EA 2010, p.7). A total of 11 million individuals meet this definition in the UK (ODI 2014). Whilst these figures are useful, the definition of disabled as synonymous with impairment has been challenged. While we do not deny the effects of illness or impairment, we agree with reframed views that construct disability as the responses to difference. We adopt this logic/terminology in our article. We know that in an ‘offline’ context, disabled people are more likely to face harassment and hate than their non-disabled counterparts (Emerson and Roulstone 2014). This victimisation was linked with having a health condition (Dixon 2006, Blake et al. 2012), stigma (Emmerson and Roulstone, 2014) or adopting a different lifestyle than peers (Sentenac et al. 2011). The traditional view is that greater hate and harassment are due to disabled peoples’ vulnerability. Recent reworking suggests non- disabled people may expose disabled people to vulnerable acts and situations. This could explain the results from a recent UK-based survey exploring the motivation of mailto:Zhraa.Alhaboby@beds.ac.uk offenders in disability hate crimes, where 87.2% self-defined disabled persons experienced a hate crime or incident. Reported motivations ranged between hate, jealousy, stigma, stereotypes (of life not worth living) and accusations of fraud in cases of invisible impairments (Quarmby 2015). These perceived motivations reflected a prejudice created by linking disability benefits with impairments. Advancements in digital technology and the Internet have created an ‘online’ context for these vulnerable situations facilitated by digital communication channels, virtual environments and anonymity of offenders. This has exposed disabled people to online offences (Wells and Mitchell 2014). Fortunately, internet hate crimes including disability-related incidents are gaining more recognition (IHC 2015), with an encouragement to report them to authorities such as the Police. Cyberharassment is an umbrella term covering these anti-social offences, it is defined as intimidating unwanted contact via electronic means (e.g. the Internet) that triggers fear and distress (Dreßing et al. 2014, Maple et al. 2012). Research on cyberharassment is rapidly growing with little attention given to the lived-experience of people affected; the few qualitative studies on cyberharassment did not focus on disabled people. Thus, little is known on how disabled people experienced, perceived and reacted to cyberharassment and whether it differs from the experiences by non-disabled victims. In this article we provide further evidence to the limitation in current literature by exploring the experiences of cyberharassment against disabled people and the impact it has on them. Methodology This study forms part of the ECHO-2 (Electronic Communication Harassment Observation) project carried out by the National Centre for Cyberstalking Research (NCCR). A self-administered online survey was employed. The link was shared online via social media and victim support websites such as Network for Surviving Stalking (NSS) from 2011 to 2014. Among 115 respondents, 19 (16.5%) participants identified themselves as a disabled person. The findings reported in this paper focus on this group. Their age ranged between 19 and 63 years (mean = 39.1, SD = 12.3) and 17 (89.5%) were from a white ethnic background. All of the 19 participants identified themselves as victims of cyberharassment, their experiences (100%) were accompanied by distress and 17 (89.5%) had fear. They have experienced between 1 and 100 harassing incidents (median= 3, IQR 11) and 13 cases were ongoing. Furthermore, 15 (78.9%) experienced psychological trauma and 6 (31.6%) stated they were physically harmed. Findings Five overarching themes emerged, two of these described the impact of cyberharassment: disability role and health consequences, and family involvement. The remaining three described the nature of the incidents: misrepresentation of self, perceived complexity, and lack of awareness and expertise. Disability role and health consequences Participants linked cyberharassment to disability in two ways. Firstly, some participants believed the cyberharassment they experienced was directly related to disability. ‘The language is disgusting and they refer to my disability’ Participant F Secondly, as expressed by most participant, disability has aggravated the impact of cyberharassment on wellbeing, which included distress, anxiety, mood disturbances, deterioration of existing health condition, and suicidal attempts. ‘I do not think many people realise how bad harassment can affect you psychologically, especially if it has been going on for some time …’ Participant H ‘ …. I am bipolar so all this (and it’s still going on) has affected me deeply to the point of suicide’ Participant P Family involvement Secondary victims of cyberharassment were identified from the responses. This took two forms, the first involved the targeting of family members directly, and the second was the negative effects of witnessing the harassment of someone close to them. Some participants expressed fear, guilt and helplessness especially when speaking of the violation or misuse of their children’s photos or accounts by offenders. ‘This group has posted 2 pictures of my child on this page, they have also posted a picture of my driver’s license […] I fear for my child’s safety’ Participant Q Another form of family involvement is the support and action to end the harassment. ‘The harassment became apparent to my friends and family when I fell ill and they became my carers. They took action to stop it by contacting my harasser directly’ Participant I Misrepresentation of self Fraud, deception and manipulation were terms frequently used by participants. Accounts of this nature included communications with individuals who claimed to be disabled or used false names to get closer and obtain more information from victims, or to keep their identities hidden. ‘… I caught him posting threatening comments under a false name on the guest book of my website, shortly before he had told me that there was someone out to get me ...’ Participant R Other participants suggested that harassers were interfering with support channels by providing false information or pretending to be the victims. Perceived complexity This was a recurrent theme reported by participants, the complexity was expressed to be related to the offence itself and the accessibility of legal remedies. Perceived complexity related to law emerged from reports where incidents were at international level, and in responses about the confusion in dealing with incidents under the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 or the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 when attempts were made to access instrumental support. ‘Police were ill informed and actually saw it as a diversity issue about disability. I had to fight them to act under the protection from harassment act 1997 - and in interviewing others affected, there was gross disability discrimination’ Participant A Most participants considered cyberharassment as sophisticated means of victimisation and having distinct patterns of activity. Some of them described offenders as clever and beating the legal system. Lack of awareness and expertise The majority of participants perceived a lack of awareness, education and/or training when they asked for help or support from victim support groups, police, or healthcare professionals. ‘… this crime needs a dedicated unit staffed by officers who truly understand how devious and clever offenders are …’ Participant G However, some participants stated that the National Stalking Helpline was more victim oriented when offering help. The perceived lack of expertise went beyond instrumental support to public awareness about the impact of cyber abuse. Some participants requested experts to be utilised in the field to inform the channels of support. Discussion Themes emerged were generally comparable to the impact of cyber- victimisation on non-disabled people (Sheridan and Grant 2007) but there were differences in perceptions underlying them. Negative consequences of cyber- victimisation experienced by disabled people are consistent with the documented impact on the wellbeing of non-disabled victims (Dreßing et al. 2014, Hensler-McGinnis 2008, al-Khateeb et al. 2015). Furthermore, this study shows the impact was exacerbated by two vulnerability factors. Firstly, the presence of an existing impairment and subsequent health deterioration in some cases. Secondly, the perceived online disability-based targeting. These findings are supported by previous research which identifies the ‘offline’ hate incidents against disabled people (Emerson and Roulstone 2014). Misrepresentation of self is one of the tactics used by some offenders (Sheridan and Blaauw 2004). In our findings, perpetrators pretended to have a disability to manipulate victims and create a vulnerable situation. Another way of involvement in the victims’ social network was through targeting individuals close to the victim, which is one of the approaches in cyber offences (Sheridan and Grant 2007). These actions include spreading false information and threats online by the perpetrator, which consequently increases the social isolation of the victim (Maple et al. 2012). International cross-boundary harassment has increased the complexity of some cases which is consistent with those experienced by non-disabled people (Kamphuis et al. 2005, Sheridan and Grant 2007). Precisely, the struggle to find the most appropriate legal remedy adds to the complexity of the victims’ accounts. Within the UK there are a number of legislative acts to respond to cyberharassment such as the Protection from Harassment Act 1997, Malicious Communications 1988, Communications Act 2003, Crime and Disorder Act 1998 and Equality Act 2010 (CPS 2016). When the victim is seen disabled, the harassment could also be addressed under the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 (DDA 1995), Equality Act 2010 or Communications Act 2003, section 127 for disability hate crime (CPS 2016). This could bring subjectivity to the assessment of cases and reinforces the need to develop more adequate responses to cyberharassment based on the objective assessment of the offence itself. It could be concluded that victimisation of disabled people has reached higher levels of concern, vulnerable situations are more easily created with the continuous emerging of electronic communications. Despite some similarities with studies focusing on non-disabled cyber-victims, differences were present in the impact and experiences of cyberharassment namely linking disability with impairment, prejudice and the use of the disability to coerce victims into closer contact. The complexity of the legal remedies and additional acts available in this area increased the challenges in supporting victims and managing responses. These differences could be highlighted to pay special attention to address disablism and vulnerability in online context. References al-Khateeb, H., Z. A. Alhaboby, J. Barnes, A. Brown, R. Brown, P. Cobley, J. Gilbert, N. McNamara, E. Short, and M. Shukla. 2015. "A practical guide to coping with cyberstalking." Blake, J. J., E. M. Lund, Q. Zhou, O.-m. Kwok, and M. R. Benz. 2012. "National prevalence rates of bully victimization among students with disabilities in the United States." School Psychology Quarterly no. 27 (4):210-222. doi: 10.1037/spq0000008. CPS. Impact and Dynamics of Stalking and Harassment 2016 [cited 2-2-2016. Available from http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/s_to_u/stalking_and_harassment/#a05a. DDA. 1995. Disability Discrimination Act 1995. Dixon, R. 2006. "A framework for managing bullying that involves students who are deaf or hearing impaired." Deafness & Education International no. 8 (1):11-32. doi: 10.1002/dei.16. Dreßing, H., J. Bailer, A. Anders, H. Wagner, and C. Gallas. 2014. "Cyberstalking in a large sample of social network users: prevalence, characteristics, and impact upon victims." Cyberpsychology, Behavior, and Social Networking no. 17 (2):61-67. EA. 2010. Guidance on matters to be taken into account in determining questions relating to the definition of disability. In Equality Act 2010. Emerson, E., and A. Roulstone. 2014. "Developing an Evidence Base for Violent and Disablist Hate Crime in Britain: Findings From the Life Opportunities Survey." Journal of Interpersonal Violence. doi: 10.1177/0886260514534524. Hensler-McGinnis, N. F. 2008. Cyberstalking victimization: Impact and coping responses in a national university sample: ProQuest. IHC. Internet Hate Crime 2015 [cited 18-9-2015. Available from http://www.report- it.org.uk/reporting_internet_hate_crime. Kamphuis, J. H., G. M. Galeazzi, L. De Fazio, P. M. Emmelkamp, F. Farnham, A. Groenen, D. James, and G. Vervaeke. 2005. "Stalking—perceptions and attitudes amongst helping professions. An EU cross‐national comparison." Clinical psychology & psychotherapy no. 12 (3):215-225. Maple, C., E. Short, A. Brown, C. Bryden, and M. Salter. 2012. "Cyberstalking in the UK: Analysis and Recommendations." International Journal of Distributed Systems and Technologies (IJDST) no. 3 (4):34-51. http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/s_to_u/stalking_and_harassment/#a05a http://www.report-it.org.uk/reporting_internet_hate_crime http://www.report-it.org.uk/reporting_internet_hate_crime ODI. 2014. Disability prevalence estimates Office for Disability Issues. Quarmby, K. Disability hate crime motivation survey – results 2015 [cited 28-9-2015. Available from https://katharinequarmby.wordpress.com/. Sentenac, M., A. Gavin, C. Arnaud, M. Molcho, E. Godeau, and S. N. Gabhainn. 2011. "Victims of bullying among students with a disability or chronic illness and their peers: a cross-national study between Ireland and France." Journal of Adolescent Health no. 48 (5):461-466. Sheridan, L. P., and E. Blaauw. 2004. "Characteristics of false stalking reports." Criminal justice and behavior no. 31 (1):55-72. Sheridan, L. P., and T. Grant. 2007. "Is cyberstalking different?" Psychology, Crime & Law no. 13 (6):627-640. Wells, M., and K. J. Mitchell. 2014. "Patterns of Internet use and risk of online victimization for youth with and without disabilities." The Journal of Special Education no. 48 (3):204-213. doi: 10.1177/0022466913479141. How to cite this article? Zhraa A. Alhaboby, Haider M. al-Khateeb, James Barnes & Emma Short (2016) ‘The language is disgusting and they refer to my disability’: the cyberharassment of disabled people, Disability & Society, 31:8, 1138-1143, DOI: 10.1080/09687599.2016.1235313 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09687599.2016.1235313 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09687599.2016.1235313 
work_soths4b5zbc43itz7l62lfn3ii	----	colleagues’ analysis of the fossil specimen stands out is in their use of wide-ranging digi- tal reconstruction that corrects distortions of the fossil’s shape, and estimates missing parts. These digital methods are readily available and offer unique opportunities for research. However, many more shapes can be morphed and matched this way than would be possi- ble with conventional methods, and care is needed to generate only the most realistic options. It is therefore essential that any digi- tal reconstruction is carried out with detailed, first-hand knowledge of the original fossil, including how it is preserved and distorted. This point is particularly relevant with respect to the forward-projecting cheekbones of the newly discovered fossil. After reconstruction, this area looks smoothed, with hardly any sign of the original bone surface. One prominent aspect of MRD where the reconstruction could be improved is the front of the upper jaw. Here, digital processing resulted in a less accurate rep- resentation of what the characteristic, strongly projecting subnasal area would have looked like before the fossil was broken. MRD is a great addition to the fossil record of human evolution. Its discovery will substantially affect our thinking on the ori- gin of the genus Australopithecus specifically, and on the evolutionary family tree of early hominins more broadly. This work demon- strates the importance that a single fossil can have in palaeontology, something we should remember when we get puzzled looks and sighs from our colleagues in the experimen- tal biosciences regarding excitement about a sample size of n = 1. ■ Fred Spoor is at the Centre for Human Evolution Research, Natural History Museum, London SW7 5BD, UK, in the Department of Human Evolution, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology, Leipzig, Germany, and in the Department of Anthropology, University College London, UK. e-mail: f.spoor@nhm.ac.uk 1. Wood, B. & Harrison, T. Nature 470, 347–352 (2011). 2. Kimbel, W. H. in Handbook of Paleoanthropology: Vol III: Phylogeny of Hominids (eds Henke, W. & Tattersall, I.) 2071–2105 (Springer, 2015). 3. Haile-Selassie, Y., Melillo, S. M., Vazzana, A., Benazzi, S. & Ryan T. M. Nature 573, 214–219 (2019). 4. Saylor, B. Z. et al. Nature 573, 220–224 (2019). 5. Kimbel, W. H., Johanson, D. C. & Rak, Y. Nature 368, 449–451 (1994). 6. Mongle, C. S., Strait, D. S. & Grine, F. E. J. Hum. Evol. 131, 28–39 (2019). 7. Zollikofer, C. P. et al. Nature 434, 755–759 (2005). 8. Walker, A., Leakey, R. E., Harris, J. M. & Brown, F. H. Nature 322, 517–522 (1986). 9. Kimbel, W. H. et al. J. Hum. Evol. 51, 134–152 (2006). 10. Spoor, F. Nature 521, 432–433 (2015). This article was published online on 28 August 2019. J A S O N T . B U R K E Atomic clocks are currently the gold standard of timekeeping. These devices measure time on the basis of transitions between two states of an atom. On pages 238 and 243, respectively, Masuda et al.1 and Seiferle et al.2 report progress towards a clock that instead uses transitions between two states of an atomic nucleus. Such a nuclear clock could outperform existing atomic timekeepers, and have applications in both fundamental and applied physics. Humans have been trying to measure the passage of time for thousands of years. From the sundial, to the hourglass, to the pocket watch, we have continually tried to improve our ability to quantify and standardize time. In the early 1900s, scientists struggled to define time consistently, and put forth vari- ous standards to help synchronize humanity. What was missing was a natural reference point that could be used, regardless of its loca- tion on Earth. We needed to define what a second truly meant: something fundamental that remains accurate and precise across all space, for all millennia. Scientists realized that the properties of atomic transitions are independent of loca- tion in space or time. This recognition led to the idea of using a known transition between two atomic states as a means to define time. If a standardized second could be defined as a specific and agreed-on number of atomic transitions, time could b e quantif ied. Researchers set out to do this in the 1930s, and by the end of the 1940s the world had its first atomic clock3. Over the past 70 years, atomic clocks have been continually improved and currently have a precision4 of about 1 part in 1018. But what if we could do better than these devices? What if we could make a clock that was 100,000 times smaller, was less susceptible to its environment and possibly had a precision of 1 part in 1019? An atomic nucleus, which is about 100,000 times smaller than an atom, could provide such a device5. Since 2003, researchers around the world have been trying to make a nuclear clock using the nucleus of a thorium-229 atom6. This nucleus, unlike all others that are known, has an excited state (called an isomeric state) that is only a few electronvolts (eV) in energy above its ground state7. As a result, the tran- sition between these two states is accessible using specialized lasers. The problem is that the exact energy of the isomeric state is cur- rently unknown. Masuda et al. and Seiferle et al. have made progress towards under- standing the exact character of the tho- rium-229 isomeric transition, by carrying out experiments that extend previous work7. In Masuda and colleagues’ experiment, a high-intensity X-ray beam was passed through a pair of silicon crystals that nar- rowed the energy range of the X-rays to 0.1 eV. These X-rays were then used to irra- diate a thorium-229 nucleus that was in the ground state (Fig. 1). The nucleus transi- tioned to a second excited state that has an energy much higher than that of the isomeric state. The narrow X-ray energy range allowed the authors to determine the exact energy of M E T R O L O G Y One tick closer to a nuclear clock Clocks that are based on the nucleus of a single thorium atom could be more precise than existing timekeepers. Such clocks have not yet been realized, but two experiments provide keys steps towards this goal. See Letters p.238 & p.243 Energy Second excited state Decay X-ray Electron Internal conversion X-ray excitation 29.19 keV 8.28 eV 0 eV Isomeric state Ground state Figure 1 | Low-energy states and transitions of the thorium-229 nucleus. Masuda et al.1 report a technique to produce nuclei of thorium-229 atoms in an excited state called an isomeric state. The authors irradiated a thorium-229 nucleus in the ground state with X-rays, which caused the nucleus to transition to a second excited state that has an energy of 29.19 keV (eV; electronvolts). The nucleus then decayed to the isomeric state. Seiferle et al.2 observed a process known as internal conversion, in which a thorium-229 nucleus in the isomeric state decayed to the ground state and the neutral atom emitted an electron. By studying the energy of emitted electrons, the authors estimated the energy of the isomeric state to be about 8.28 eV. These two studies could lead to ultraprecise clocks that are based on thorium-229 nuclei. 2 0 2 | N A T U R E | V O L 5 7 3 | 1 2 S E P T E M B E R 2 0 1 9 NEWS & VIEWSRESEARCH © 2019 Springer Nature Limited. All rights reserved. © 2019 Springer Nature Limited. All rights reserved. N O E M I D E R Z S Y How does the online hate ecosystem persist on social-media platforms, and what measures can be taken to effectively reduce its presence? On page 261, Johnson et al.1 address these questions in a captivating report on the behaviour of online hate communities that reside on multiple social-media platforms. The authors shed light on the structure and dynamics of online hate groups and, informed by the results, propose four policies to reduce hate content on online social media. We live in an age of high social inter- connectedness, whereby opinions shared in one geographical region do not remain spatially localized, but can spread rapidly around the globe thanks to online social media. The high speed of such diffusion poses problems for those policing hate speech, and creates opportunities for nefarious organiza- tions to share their messages and expand their recruiting efforts globally. When the policing of social media is inefficient, the online eco- system can become a powerful radicalizing instrument2. Understanding the mechanisms that govern hate-community dynamics is thus crucial to proposing effective measures to combat such organizations in this online battleground. Johnson et al. examined the dynamics of hate clusters on two social-media platforms, Facebook and VKontakte, over a period of a few months. Clusters were defined as online pages or groups that organized individuals who shared similar views, interests or declared purposes, into communities. These pages and groups on social-media platforms contain links to other clusters with similar content that users can join. Through these links, the authors established the network connections between clusters, and could track how members of one cluster also joined other clusters. Two clusters (groups or pages) were considered connected if they contained links to one another. The authors’ approach had the advantage of not requiring individual-level information about users who are members of clusters. Johnson et al. show that online hate groups are organized in highly resilient clusters. The users in these clusters are not geographically localized, but are globally interconnected by ‘highways’ that facilitate the spread of online hate across different countries, conti- nents and languages. When these clusters are attacked — for example, when hate groups are removed by social-media platform adminis- trators (Fig. 1) — the clusters rapidly rewire and repair themselves, and strong bonds are made between clusters, formed by users shared between them, analogous to covalent chemi- cal bonds. In some cases, two or more small clusters can even merge to form a large cluster, in a process the authors liken to the fusion of two atomic nuclei. Using their mathematical model, the authors demonstrated that banning hate content on a single platform aggravates online hate ecosystems and promotes the creation of clusters that are not detectable by platform policing (which the authors call ‘dark pools’), where hate content can thrive unchecked. O n l i n e s o c i a l - m e d i a pl at for ms are challenging to regulate, and policymakers have struggled to suggest practicable ways of reducing hate online. Efforts to ban and remove hate-related content have proved ineffective3,4. Over the past few years, the incidence of reports of hate speech online has been rising5, indicating that the battle against the diffusion of hateful content is being lost, an unsettling direction for the well-being and safety of our society. Furthermore, exposure to and engagement with online hate on social media has been suggested to promote offline aggression6, with some perpetrators of violent hate crimes reported to have engaged with such content7. Previous studies (for example, ref. 8) have considered hate groups as individual net- works, or considered the interconnected clusters together as one global network. In their fresh approach, Johnson and colleagues studied the interconnected structure of a community of hate clusters as a ‘network of networks’9–11, in which clusters are networks that are inter connected by highways. More- over, they propose four policies for effective intervention that are informed by the mecha- nisms their study revealed govern the structure and dynamics of the online-hate ecosystem. Currently, social-media companies must decide which content to ban, but often have to contend with overwhelming volumes of content and various legal and regulatory S O C I A L S C I E N C E The dynamics of online hate An analysis of the dynamics of online hate groups on social-media platforms reveals why current methods to ban hate content are ineffective, and provides the basis for four potential strategies to combat online hate. See Letter p.261 this second excited state: 29.19 keV. Finally, the nucleus decayed directly to the isomeric state. The approach of Masuda et al. could enable this state to be produced more effi- ciently than was previously possible. In Seiferle and colleagues’ experiment, a beam of thorium-229 ions was generated from the natural decay of uranium-233 ions. About 2% of the thorium ions were in the iso- meric state. These ions were then neutralized to allow them to decay to the ground state through a process called internal conversion. In this process, a nuclear decay that would typically produce a γ-ray instead causes the neutral atom to emit an electron (Fig. 1). However, internal conversion is complicated, because the electron can originate from many different energy levels in the neutral atom. To observe the ejected electrons from internal conversion, Seiferle and co-workers used a magnetic field to bend the trajec- tory of these particles towards an electron detector. They applied an electric field to the electrons until the voltage associated with this field was large enough to stop the electrons. The final voltage was equal to the initial energy of the electrons. Seiferle et al. then used a theoretical model to interpret the electron energy spectrum, which is the first energy spectrum observed from the decay products of the isomeric state. Their analysis indicated that the energy of the isomeric state is 8.28 ± 0.17 eV. Although the ultimate and groundbreaking goal of directly observing the thorium-229 isomeric transition remains elusive, sub- stantial progress continues to be made. The results of Masuda et al. and Seiferle et al. are key steps forward. Hopefully, the observation is not too far off, as teams of scientists race to make the world’s first nuclear clock, which would offer unprecedented precision. This finding would enable a whole host of experi- ments and discoveries in the decades to fol- low. For instance, a nuclear clock could have applications in dark-matter research8 and in the observation of possible variations in the fundamental constants of physics9. ■ Jason T. Burke is in the Nuclear and Particle Physics Group, Nuclear and Chemical Sciences Division, Physical and Life Sciences Directorate, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, California 94550, USA. e-mail: burke26@llnl.gov 1. Masuda, T. et al. Nature 573, 238–242 (2019). 2. Seiferle, B. et al. Nature 573, 243–246 (2019). 3. Lyons, H. Instruments 22, 133–135 (1949). 4. Brewer, S. M. et al. Phys. Rev. Lett. 123, 033201 (2019). 5. Campbell, C. J. et al. Phys. Rev. Lett. 108, 120802 (2012). 6. Peik, E. & Tamm, C. Europhys. Lett. 61, 181–186 (2003). 7. Beck, B. R. et al. Phys. Rev. Lett. 98, 142501 (2007). 8. Derevianko, A. & Pospelov, M. Nature Phys. 10, 933–936 (2014). 9. Flambaum, V. V. Phys. Rev. Lett. 97, 092502 (2006). 1 2 S E P T E M B E R 2 0 1 9 | V O L 5 7 3 | N A T U R E | 2 0 3 NEWS & VIEWS RESEARCH © 2019 Springer Nature Limited. All rights reserved. © 2019 Springer Nature Limited. All rights reserved. 
work_sowhvj5uibgjjeh5nyxoy7ldbe	----	ABS306047.qxd http://abs.sagepub.com American Behavioral Scientist DOI: 10.1177/0002764207306047 2007; 51; 149 American Behavioral Scientist Erik Bleich Britain, Germany, and France Hate Crime Policy in Western Europe: Responding to Racist Violence in http://abs.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/51/2/149 The online version of this article can be found at: Published by: http://www.sagepublications.com can be found at:American Behavioral Scientist Additional services and information for http://abs.sagepub.com/cgi/alerts Email Alerts: http://abs.sagepub.com/subscriptions Subscriptions: http://www.sagepub.com/journalsReprints.navReprints: http://www.sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.navPermissions: http://abs.sagepub.com/cgi/content/refs/51/2/149 Citations at MIDDLEBURY COLLEGE LIBRARY on February 5, 2010 http://abs.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://abs.sagepub.com/cgi/alerts http://abs.sagepub.com/subscriptions http://www.sagepub.com/journalsReprints.nav http://www.sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav http://abs.sagepub.com/cgi/content/refs/51/2/149 http://abs.sagepub.com 149 American Behavioral Scientist Volume 51 Number 2 October 2007 149-165 © 2007 Sage Publications 10.1177/0002764207306047 http://abs.sagepub.com hosted at http://online.sagepub.com Hate Crime Policy in Western Europe Responding to Racist Violence in Britain, Germany, and France Erik Bleich Middlebury College, Middlebury, Vermont In recent years, the British, German, and French states have increasingly turned their attention to the problem of racist violence. Yet in spite of their common participation in the European Union, each country has pursued a distinctive path in response to such hate crimes. Britain has focused primarily on policing and on the judicial process for prosecuting racially aggravated offenses, Germany has devoted substantial resources to civil society groups dedicated to countering right-wing extremism, and France has taken high-profile symbolic actions and has begun adapting its educational policies to address racist violence. This article argues that developing effective policies depends on learning best practices from other states but that it also requires being responsive to the concerns of domestic actors who face specific problems and who suggest possible solutions. Keywords: hate crime; policy making; racism; violence; Europe Violence against ethnic minorities is nothing new in Europe. Countries across thecontinent have long been sites of racist vandalism, assaults, and even murders. For much of the postwar era, these acts were deemed abhorrent but not especially meaningful. In spite of occasional public protests and media attention, they gener- ated no more concern than other serious crimes. When the criminal justice system processed these incidents, it invoked only the laws and policies established to han- dle “normal” crime. Legally and politically speaking, racist violence was considered absolutely ordinary. All this has changed in the past two decades. Spurred by mounting public and political attention to racist violence, and partly inspired by policy lessons from the United States, Western European countries are increasingly treating racist attacks as a moral outrage that must be reckoned with through targeted laws and policies. Racist violence is viewed as a threat to social cohesion, because it affects not only an individual victim but also members of the victim’s group and society as a whole. It is viewed as a force that can divide a nation. Racist violence has become, in short, extraordinary. at MIDDLEBURY COLLEGE LIBRARY on February 5, 2010 http://abs.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://abs.sagepub.com 150 American Behavioral Scientist The British, German, and French states have recently stepped up their actions against racist violence, defined as violence against persons or property motivated by racism, ethnocentrism, religious intolerance, or xenophobia. Yet in spite of making policies in the context of an ever closer European Union, the three countries have not coordinated their actions in this area. There are significant policy similarities across the countries but equally meaningful differences. In relative terms, Britain has focused more of its energies on reforming the police and the judicial process for prosecuting racially aggravated offenses, Germany has delegated power and resources to civil society groups for developing programs against right-wing activities, and France has taken high-profile symbolic actions and has begun adapting its educational policies to address racist violence. This article assesses how these three important European countries have responded to racist violence in recent years by tracing the fundamental axes of policy in Britain, Germany, and France, respectively. Beyond describing the developments in each country, it is also vital to understand how useful different policy approaches have been. The concluding section therefore discusses policy effectiveness. It demon- strates that statistics on racist violence are insufficient means of measuring success. This article argues that policies must be judged on the basis of how societal groups perceive them and therefore on the extent to which they foster national cohesion. Great Britain: Cops and Courts By the early 1960s, more than a million ethnic minority immigrants had arrived and settled in Britain. According to the latest census figures, 9.9% of the population of England and Wales self-identifies as an ethnic minority.1 During the course of the last half of the 20th century, minorities have often borne the brunt of private dis- crimination and public hostility. Researchers have chronicled the most egregious cases of racist violence in the country, some of which date back to the interwar period (Bowling, 1998; Witte, 1996). In spite of periodic beatings, murders, and interethnic riots, it was not until the 1980s that the British state turned its attention to the specific issue of racist violence (Virdee, 1995). In 1981, a group called the Joint Committee Against Racialism (JCAR)2 presented a report to the Home Office citing more than 1,000 examples of racist violence in the country (Bowling, 1998, p. 51). In response, the Home Office launched its own investigation, which resulted in the Conservative Home Secretary’s concluding that racially motivated attacks were “wicked crimes” that were “more common than we had supposed” (as cited in Bowling, 1998, p. 58). As racist violence arrived on the government agenda, the police became a focal point for discussions. This was quite natural in the context of the era, as the spring and summer of 1981 saw serious rioting in several British cities, including London, Liverpool, and Birmingham. Most of the riots involved conflicts between residents at MIDDLEBURY COLLEGE LIBRARY on February 5, 2010 http://abs.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://abs.sagepub.com of down-and-out areas with high percentages of ethnic minorities (such as Brixton, Toxteth, and Handsworth) and the police, seen by many to be heavy-handed and even racist. The police were also roundly criticized for their perceived inaction in tracking down perpetrators of racist acts. One particularly pointed incident revolved around a fire in the New Cross section of South London in which 13 Black youths died. Neighborhood residents were convinced the fire was the result of a racist attack. The police denied this was the case. In March 1981, 15,000 people marched in protest against the police failure to track down those responsible for the fire (Witte, 1996, pp. 58-59). Rebuke also came from more official quarters. A 1983 report commissioned by London’s Metropolitan Police and published by the esteemed Policy Studies Institute characterized many in the force as “bigoted, racist, sexist, bored, dishonest and often drunk” (as cited in Sked & Cook, 1990, p. 353). The government com- mission looking into the causes of the 1981 riots focused substantial attention on the police, making a host of recommendations for reform (Scarman, 1982). From the earliest days, therefore, debates about racist violence have centered around the police, embroiling them in what Benjamin Bowling (1998, chap. 4) has called a “crisis of legitimacy.” As a result, the police developed policy responses on three levels: They significantly changed the way they count and categorize racist incidents, they developed schemes for sharing the burden of racist attacks with other public authorities, and they expanded the resources they devote to violent racism. In response to the disturbances of the early 1980s, the police instituted a more for- mal method of counting racist incidents. Although identifying racist incidents may appear to be a dry exercise in bureaucratic categorization, in fact it is heavily politi- cized. What is counted and how the statistics have been gathered are regarded as sig- nals of whether the state takes the problem of racism seriously. Of the three countries surveyed here, Britain’s “racist incident” is the most expansive category, definitively defined in the late 1990s as “any incident which is perceived to be racist by the victim or any other person” (Macpherson of Cluny, 1999, p. 328). Its broad charac- ter means that any event that appears to be racist to any person—whether the victim, a police officer, or just one witness—is counted, whether it is a crime or not. The result is a very high tally of incidents, which in the year 1999-2000 for England and Wales reached 47,814 (Great Britain Home Office, 2000, p. 49). The Home Office also takes note of surveys that estimate that the true number of racist incidents (i.e., both reported and not reported to the police) was approximately 280,000 in 1999 (Great Britain Home Office, 2000, p. 49). These are truly ambitious and maximal definitions that reflect the pressure put on the police to recognize violent racism. These pressures quickly encouraged the police to share the burden of combating violent racism with other British agencies. Although Bowling (1998) describes this as a conscious strategy of blame avoidance, national oversight groups such as the Home Affairs Committee and the Inter-Departmental Racial Attacks Group argue that such a multiagency approach is far more effective than one that focuses solely Bleich / Hate Crime Policy in Western Europe 151 at MIDDLEBURY COLLEGE LIBRARY on February 5, 2010 http://abs.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://abs.sagepub.com on the police. Many localities have thus established forums in which members of the police meet regularly with municipal politicians, officials from housing agencies, voluntary organization members, and others to discuss strategies for dealing with concrete problems of racist violence in the community (Bowling, 1998; Witte, 1996). The multiagency approach is not a silver bullet, but by involving a number of actors, it can serve to keep racist violence on the local agenda and can facilitate cre- ative solutions such as moving victims from one public housing unit to another or instituting new criminal penalties for activities outside the current scope of law enforcement. The third main axis of police initiatives involved building the force’s capacity for responding to racism. In the wake of the events of the early 1980s, the police took on a number of new tasks and consciously elevated antiracism on their agenda. Alongside the more vigorous collection of statistics, they assigned officers the duty of following up with victims of violent racism. Police forces issued public policy statements on themes of racism, and London’s Metropolitan Police Service (aka the Met or MPS) claimed that racial attacks were one of its top priority areas (Bowling, 1998, pp. 111-112). These steps were soon revealed to be window dressing, how- ever, when the police hopelessly bungled the investigation into the 1993 murder of a Black teenager. In spite of widespread public knowledge of the identities of the White youths accused of killing Stephen Lawrence, the police were unable to bring the perpetrators to justice. In 1997, the full spotlight of a parliamentary inquiry was turned on the case, and the conclusion of the Macpherson inquiry was that “there is no doubt whatsoever but that the first MPS investigation was palpably flawed and deserves severe criticism”; the authors of the inquiry also wrote that “the impact of incompetence and racism, and the aura of corruption or collusion have been the subject of much evidence and debate” (Macpherson of Cluny, 1999, p. 4). As part of its coming to grips with these issues, the MPS greatly expanded its race relations unit. When the Stephen Lawrence inquiry was under way, the Met made racial crime a police priority and established the Racial and Violent Crime Task Force. In the wake of three nail bombings in 1999—one of which targeted a gay pub in Soho—the task force was renamed the Diversity Directorate and was dedicated to overseeing 32 borough-based community safety units that deal with hate crime and domestic violence on the local level (MPS, 2003). The Diversity Directorate employs approximately 200 police officers specialized in hate crimes issues. The police force looks for evidence relevant to “cold cases,” it undertakes statistical research on where hate crimes are most likely, it has developed its family liaison program to keep victims abreast of police investigations, and it maintains strategic contacts with leaders from different minority communities to discuss potential problems.3 Most police forces outside of London have also developed guidelines and significant programs to deal with racism. The Association of Chief of Police Officers (of England, Wales, and Northern Ireland) has taken the lead on this front by developing a 127-page hate crime manual.4 152 American Behavioral Scientist at MIDDLEBURY COLLEGE LIBRARY on February 5, 2010 http://abs.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://abs.sagepub.com Although some frontline British police officers may still be racists or foot drag- gers, national and local forces have come a long way from their first tentative steps in the early 1980s. Alongside its focus on cops, Britain has also emphasized action in courts. Though not the first country in Europe to pass laws against racist violence, Britain has been among the most aggressive in doing so. In 1998, the Crime and Disorder Act estab- lished nine new “racially aggravated offences” and created a statutory duty to increase the penalty for any crime if there is evidence of racial aggravation. These changes have been characterized as “a major shift in the state response to violence and harassment of minorities in the United Kingdom” (Malik, 1999, p. 409), as they go well beyond what was previously on the books in the country and more closely mirror hate crime laws in U.S. states (Jenness & Grattet, 2001; Lawrence, 1999). According to this type of law, the racist motivation renders the underlying offense much more serious and thus requires the perpetrator to be punished at a higher level. Hate crime laws serve both expressive and instrumental functions (Burney & Rose, 2002, p. 107). They signal to society that racist violence is an intolerable evil. At the same time, the stiffer penalties may discourage perpetrators from racial aggression or at least may punish more severely those that commit it. Although there has been a heated debate in the United States about the effectiveness of such laws (Jacobs & Potter, 1998; Jenness & Grattet, 2001), it appears that in Britain, the laws have proven enforceable. Notwithstanding significant criticisms about some aspects of the law, a Home Office study on racist offenses found that “legislation is acknowledged by practitioners in all agencies to ‘concentrate the mind’ on the issue” (Burney & Rose, 2002, p. 108). Moreover, Crown Prosecution Service data reveal the increasing frequency with which racially aggravated offense charges have been brought and convictions or guilty pleas obtained. In the 1st year the law was in force, there were 2,651 charges prosecuted, of which 2,078 resulted in find- ings of guilt. In each subsequent year, these numbers have increased, with the most recent data available revealing 6,200 charges prosecuted in 2004-2005,5 with guilt found in 5,229 cases, or an astounding 84%.6 These statistics demonstrate that the law can be a practical tool for police and prosecutors, even if an emphasis on cops and courts is not the only avenue open to states grappling with problems of racist violence. Germany: Grants for the Grassroots Ethnic diversity in Germany today is largely a product of postwar immigration. Yet Germany’s particular history means that in the public imagination and in state policies, anti-Semitism remains extremely important to debates about racism. For the first few decades after the war, the bulk of national laws and policies against racism were designed to prevent a resurgence of anti-Semitic sentiment and actions. Bleich / Hate Crime Policy in Western Europe 153 at MIDDLEBURY COLLEGE LIBRARY on February 5, 2010 http://abs.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://abs.sagepub.com As rigorous as these steps may have been, they did not specifically target violent racism. In fact, this topic did not emerge as a coherent field of action until the early 1990s. Shortly after reunification, there were serious attacks against minorities in a number of German cities. One of the earliest incidents to capture headlines was the 1992 burning of an asylum seekers’ hostel in Rostock, in part because the police stood by and waited for the anti-immigrant crowd to recede before moving in (Human Rights Watch/Helsinki, 1995, pp. 39-41). At first, many commentators assumed that the tensions were primarily about immigration and economic compe- tition and not about racist violence. However, during the next 2 years, the number of attacks multiplied, and the targets became more diverse. In late 1992, two buildings housing long-term Turkish residents were firebombed in Mölln, a town outside Hamburg, leaving three dead. In May 1993, five Turkish residents were killed in another firebombing in the city of Solingen, near Cologne. And on the eve of Passover 1994, arsonists burned down the synagogue in Lübeck, newly rebuilt after being destroyed during Kristallnacht in 1938 (Human Rights Watch/Helsinki, 1995). The early 1990s was not only a time of more brutal racist attacks, it was also a time of more numerous acts of violent racism. According to data gathered by Germany’s Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution, right-wing violence in Germany shot up from fewer than 200 acts per year in 1990 to more than 800 in 1991 and to more than 1,300 in both 1992 and 1993. Between 1994 and 1998, the numbers dropped to between 600 and 800 incidents per year (Watts, 2001, p. 601). Of these acts, the majority were classified as “antiforeigner” (Watts, 2001, p. 603), the German equivalent of “racist.”7 Naturally, such a resurgence of far-right activi- ties focused worldwide scrutiny on Germany and ratcheted up the pressure on the government to “do something” about racist violence. The initial reaction of the ruling Christian Democrats was to tighten Germany’s laws on asylum, in the hopes that fewer ethnic minority immigrants would mean less ire directed at minorities already in the country (Ireland, 1997). The German state also undertook several initiatives designed specifically to tamp down racist violence. As in Britain, Germany adapted its policing, prosecutorial, and information- gathering strategies. In Saxony, the state set up a special police unit designed to counteract right-wing or xenophobic violence. The so-called Soko Rex8 unit keeps tabs on rightist groups and takes over investigations of purported racist vio- lence. It has received plaudits from independent observers for its effectiveness (Human Rights Watch/Helsinki, 1995, pp. 55-56; Ireland, 1997, p. 561). Local prosecutors, by contrast, came under fire for their handling of many cases in which they were seen to “undercharge” perpetrators given the crimes committed. This prompted federal prosecutors to step in and take over cases on the grounds that right-wing extremism implied a threat to the federal constitution (Human Rights Watch/Helsinki, 1995, pp. 58-60). Judges have also imposed increasingly heavy sentences, obviating the oft-heard criticism that they were “blind in the right eye” 154 American Behavioral Scientist at MIDDLEBURY COLLEGE LIBRARY on February 5, 2010 http://abs.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://abs.sagepub.com (Erb, 1997, p. 219). In addition, in an effort to gather better information on hate crimes, in 2001, Germany standardized a new national definition of “politically motivated crime,” which is any offense “directed against a person on account of their political opinion, nationality, ethnic origin, race, color, religion, ideology, origin, sexual orientation, disability, appearance or social status” (Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, 2003, p. 22). On the face of it, it sounds as if Germany has been as active as Britain in the realms of policing and judicial reforms. Yet this is not the case. In spite of evidence of police passivity and even brutality in Germany (Human Rights Watch/Helsinki, 1995; Ireland, 1997), the police have never come under the prolonged scrutiny of politicians or the public, and the reforms in the police have been piecemeal com- pared to those in Britain. The Soko Rex units are not federally mandated and oper- ate only in some states. There has been no systematic attempt to root out racism within the police. On the legal front, although perpetrators of racist crimes are now likely to be prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law, there is no pressure from within Germany to pass a hate crimes law. The infrequent attempts to raise the issue of legal reform have been summarily rebuffed.9 In short, it has not been in the realms of policing and courts that Germany has been most active in combating racist violence. The federal government has, however, been innovative in another realm. It has gone much further than other countries to support local projects designed to deter potential perpetrators and to support victims of racist violence. During the spike in attacks of 1992, the Kohl government launched the Action Program Against Aggression and Violence (AgAG), which targeted young people susceptible to com- mitting antiminority violence. The logic was that many youths, especially in the for- mer East Germany, had little hope for productive futures and thus were potential recruits to the cause of violent xenophobia. The AgAG program ran through the end of 1996 and involved more than 100 long-term projects in approximately 30 cities supported by 20 million deutsche marks per year. The funds went to support youth centers, to organize sporting events or trips, and to facilitate discussions about poten- tial future employment.10 Targeting potential perpetrators of racist violence met with debatable success. According to several sources, the programs made some positive impact.11 Yet the AgAG tactics were also sharply criticized for being too sympathetic to the perpetra- tors and even for providing right-wing youths with locales for recruiting others to their cause.12 By the late 1990s and early 2000s, the strategies of NGOs and politi- cal leaders had shifted away from an exclusive focus on potential perpetrators, but an emphasis on funding grassroots and local initiatives remained intact. In the summer of 2000, two more acts of violent racism made national headlines and sparked another wave of state programs. In June, Alberto Adriano was beaten into a coma by three right-wing youths in the Dessau city park. He died 3 days later of his injuries. Just longer than a month after that, a bombing in a train station in Düsseldorf wounded 10 people, 6 of whom were Jewish immigrants, adding to the Bleich / Hate Crime Policy in Western Europe 155 at MIDDLEBURY COLLEGE LIBRARY on February 5, 2010 http://abs.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://abs.sagepub.com national soul searching over racist violence. If racist violence had faded from public consciousness in the late 1990s, it was immediately back on the agenda in the slow news summer of 2000. Chancellor Schröder responded to the acts by making a whis- tle stop tour of the country decrying racism. There were calls for “civil courage” and for an “uprising of the decent,”13 accompanied by a flurry of civil society–oriented initiatives. By 2001, the German government had announced that it planned to dedicate more than 200 million Euros to four programs to be funded through 2006. These programs are designed to draw together diverse groups into networks against right-wing extrem- ism, to foster political education and democratic culture, to provide advice to victims and others dealing with right-wing extremism and violence, and to promote acceptance of diversity in the workplace. By late 2002, more than 3,700 individual projects had been supported under the auspices of these programs, and projections indicated that by 2006, upwards of 10,000 initiatives would be funded (Roth, 2003, p. 18). Funding civil society has become a staple of the German response to racist vio- lence. There has been, however, a significant shift in the German paradigm for deal- ing with these issues. Activists and policy makers have turned away from a central focus on potential perpetrators. Instead, the emphasis has shifted toward building a general political culture of tolerance, coupled with providing advice to victims and others coping with acts of violent racism. This strategy has earned praise from researchers and activists (Roth, 2003; Wendel, 2003). Yet there has also been criti- cism of the government for not going far enough. Because the federal government provides only seed money for local civil society projects, it is progressively reduc- ing its funding as 2006 approaches. States and cities must increasingly allocate their own funds to prolong support for these initiatives, something that these cash- strapped governing bodies are unlikely to do for long. Without government support, some grassroots projects may be able to limp along, but many will wither and die. Thus, although Germany has taken the lead in supporting civil society initiatives against violent racism, the longevity of such programs is uncertain. France: Symbolism and Socialization Like Britain and Germany, France has a long history of ethnic diversity. This pluralism is the result of European immigration during the 19th and early to mid- 20th centuries and of postwar migrants from North Africa, sub-Saharan Africa, Turkey, South and Southeast Asia, and virtually all other points of the globe. Racial violence has flared up periodically during this entire era. There were anti-Belgian and anti-Italian mobilizations in the 19th and early 20th centuries (Noiriel, 1988, pp. 257-262), a police-led attack on Algerian demonstrators in 1961 (Jelen, 2002; Levine, 1985), and a grim series of violent acts against people and property in the 1970s and early 1980s that included murders, serious woundings, and destruction of property (Benoît, 1980, pp. 362-372; Witte, 1996, pp. 85-95). 156 American Behavioral Scientist at MIDDLEBURY COLLEGE LIBRARY on February 5, 2010 http://abs.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://abs.sagepub.com France was one of the earliest countries in Europe to pass comprehensive antiracism legislation. Its 1972 law targeted incitement to racial hatred, outlawed racial discrimination, and permitted the state to ban racist groups (Bleich, 2003, chap. 5). It did not, however, specifically address issues of racist violence. Attacks such as the 1971 murder of Djellali Ben Ali prompted public outrage and inspired high-profile figures such as Sartre, Foucault, and Genet to march alongside thou- sands of protesters (Benoît, 1980, pp. 273-274). But they did not prompt any specific concrete actions such as police reforms or a hate crimes law. In the aftermath of the 1990 Carpentras cemetery desecration, politicians marched against racism and aired Alain Resnais’s Holocaust film Night and Fog on national television but took no sig- nificant policy action.14 In fact, the French state came to the issue of racist violence much later than its neighbors. If Britain began taking serious steps in the early 1980s and Germany in the early 1990s, France started to coordinate state measures only in the early 2000s. Official statistics suggest an explanation for France’s late entry into this policy sphere. The number of violent racist and anti-Semitic acts fell from an annual aver- age of 76 between 1992 and 1994 to 35 between 1995 and 1999.15 Then suddenly, in late 2000, there was a surge in violent racism, directed in particular at the Jewish community.16 In October of that year alone, there were 102 acts of anti-Semitic vio- lence in France (Commission Nationale Consultative des Droits de l’Homme, 2003, p. 516), including Molotov cocktails thrown at synagogues, stones hurled at Jewish schoolchildren, and vandalism of Jewish day care centers (Union des Etudiants Juifs de France and SOS Racisme, 2002, pp. 35-64). These actions shocked the Jewish community. They did not, however, spark a response from the French state. The gov- ernment in power at the time viewed the violence as a reaction to the second intifada in the Middle East, which began on September 28, 2000.17 It was thought that because the perpetrators were largely disaffected Muslim youths who were them- selves from a disadvantaged (and numerous) community, it would be difficult to con- demn them for both moral and political reasons (Taguieff, 2002, pp. 174, 196). Jewish groups in France were upset at the casual treatment by the government and began to collect their own statistics on anti-Semitic acts. From late 2000 through early 2002, they catalogued far more incidents of anti-Semitism than the state counted and repeatedly made the case for government action (Union des Etudiants Juifs de France and SOS Racisme, 2002).18 In April 2002, the government began to respond. Following increased Israeli military action in the Palestinian territories in late March, there was another round of anti-Semitic violence in France, with more attacks on synagogues and Jewish school buses and swastikas spray-painted on tombstones in Jewish cemeteries (“French Jews Call,” 2002). That month there were 118 acts of anti-Semitic violence in France (Commission Nationale Consultative des Droits de l’Homme, 2003, p. 516). These prompted international media attention and strong condemnation by organizations such as the World Jewish Congress (“Jews Warn,” 2002). The timing of the actions coincided with the run-up to presidential and parliamentary elections, adding pressure for politicians to act decisively. Bleich / Hate Crime Policy in Western Europe 157 at MIDDLEBURY COLLEGE LIBRARY on February 5, 2010 http://abs.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://abs.sagepub.com Since 2002, France has taken a variety of steps to combat violent racism and anti-Semitism. A number of these actions have been concretely designed to limit racist attacks. Approximately 1,200 police officers and 15 million euros have been dedicated to security for “sensitive sites” in France, such as synagogues and other Jewish institutions, but also mosques.19 The police also plan “shock operations” on public bus lines where there have been complaints of anti-Semitic harassment. One insider at the Ministry of Interior proclaimed, “It will quickly stop once we have busted two or three jerks [connards] for insulting young Jewish kids” (“Le Gouvernement Promet,” 2004). The Ministry of the Interior also altered the way it collects its official statistics (having adopted the Jewish community’s more expan- sive standard for categorizing incidents)20 and argues that the police have been increasingly rigorous in investigating suspects connected with racist crimes, citing 111 interrogations in 2003.21 Many French initiatives, however, seem designed more for symbolic ends and for public relations than for practical effect. The most prominent example is the 2003 “Lellouche law,” a stand-alone hate crimes law that enhances penalties for violent crimes motivated by racism.22 Although this law may prove an important tool in France’s policy repertoire, it is just as likely to gather dust in the penal code. The legislation was first proposed in August 2002 by the Deputy Pierre Lellouche, was resubmitted to parliament in November 2002, and was fast-tracked through the legislative process with very little debate or revision. The National Assembly unanimously approved the bill in December, as did the Senate in January 2003. The bill became law in early February 2003. President Chirac and Prime Minister Raffarin publicized these efforts in meetings with Jewish groups at home and abroad in an effort to deflect criticism of France (“Jacques Chirac Rassure,” 2003; also Discours du Premier Ministre, 2003). Yet as of the end of 2003, there was only a handful of cases in the system that invoked the law, and there had been no convictions.23 These facts contrast sharply with those surround- ing Britain’s 1998 Crime and Disorder Act, for which the civil service engaged in extensive preparatory work, the parliament actively debated the bill’s provisions, and enforcement officials generated more than 2,500 charges for racially aggra- vated offenses in the law’s 1st year on the books. Another example of France’s emphasis on symbolism is its institutionalized inter- ministerial committee on racism and anti-Semitism formed after a fire at the Merkaz Hatorah Jewish school in the Paris suburb of Gagny in November 2003. President Chirac’s immediate response was that “an attack on a Jew is an attack against France,” which prompted Theo Klein, a former head of the Representative Council of Jewish Institutions of France (CRIF), to criticize the government for defining the firebombing as anti-Semitic without conclusive proof (“Attacks by Arabs,” 2003). A brief story in Le Monde summarized the situation: 158 American Behavioral Scientist at MIDDLEBURY COLLEGE LIBRARY on February 5, 2010 http://abs.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://abs.sagepub.com The President of the Republic wants to show his firmness and the will of the government to react in response to the growth in France of a racist and anti-Semitic climate. . . . Statistics indicate, however, a drop in anti-Semitic acts. (“Jacques Chirac Mobilise ,” 2003) Although critics view them as superficial, such symbolic acts can have tangible and positive implications. Passing the Lellouche law and forming the interministerial committee reaffirm the French state’s commitment to equality and fraternity and reassure vulnerable groups in society. In addition to the concrete and the symbolic acts, there is a category of policy ini- tiatives in France that combines both elements by aiming to socialize actors to oppose racist violence. On one level, the government circulars and manuals distrib- uted to police and prosecutors24 not only explain the laws and policies to key play- ers but also sensitize frontline officers, their bosses, and the legal establishment to themes of racism. Of course, the effect of these written words is likely to be uneven, and the impact will fade over time without periodic reminders. On a more innovative front, France has sponsored several initiatives in schools to socialize children to oppose racism and racist violence. Whereas Germany has cho- sen to fund local governments and nongovernmental organizations to develop programs for school-age children, France has gone directly into schools with a man- date for national change. Part of the impetus for these measures came from the pub- lication in September 2002 of the book Les Territoires Perdus de la République: Antisémitisme, Racisme et Sexisme en Milieu Scolaire (The Lost Territories of the Republic: Anti-Semitism, Racism, and Sexism in Schools; Brenner, 2002) which was widely cited in National Assembly documents and in speeches by the Prime Minister.25 The book opens with a scene of two Jewish girls facing 40 minutes of anti-Semitic “hell” from their classmates in a Paris high school, with one of the girls forced at the end of a series of insults and physical violence to get down on her knees and ask for “forgiveness for being Jewish” (Brenner, 2002, p. 13). In October 2002, France sponsored a Council of Europe initiative to create a Holocaust memorial day.26 French schools will participate in this program on the 27th of January, the anniversary of the liberation of Auschwitz.27 In February 2003, the state announced an action plan of 10 measures, among them the creation of a group in each educational area (rectorat) responsible for tracking racist and anti- Semitic incidents and the development of a guidebook for teachers explaining how to respond to such acts. In the tough words of then Minister of Youth, Education, and Research Luc Ferry, “It is important to intervene over the smallest incident, even ver- bal, and to let nothing go without punishing or explaining.”28 State representatives are also meeting with textbook editors to remind them to be vigilant about their pub- lications after two works were pulled from the shelves following criticism of their content (“Le Gouvernement Promet,” 2004). Such symbolic acts and attempts at socialization have thus formed the core of France’s policy strategy with regard to racist violence. Bleich / Hate Crime Policy in Western Europe 159 at MIDDLEBURY COLLEGE LIBRARY on February 5, 2010 http://abs.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://abs.sagepub.com Conclusions: What Is Effective Policy? Britain, Germany, and France have all turned their attention to racist violence dur- ing the past two decades, developing a host of policies in response to the issue. There are similarities across the three countries, yet there are also many important differ- ences. Broadly speaking, states have choices to make about how much they use repressive policies aimed at preserving public order versus instructive policies aimed at promoting tolerance and liberal democratic values. They also must decide what role the state as compared to civil society will play in leading the charge against racist violence. Although each has instituted a wide variety of policies, the three countries differ in their relative approaches, as illustrated in Table 1. Britain has emphasized state-led repressive measures by focusing on cops and courts, Germany has gone furthest in the direction of civil society–led instructive measures through grants to the grass roots, and more than other countries, France’s policies of sym- bolism and socialization have accented state-led instructive measures. Which of these strategies is most effective? One way to answer this question is to examine national statistics on racist violence in each country. In theory, comparative data from the three countries would reveal which has the fewest racial attacks. In theory, it would also be possible to examine changes over time within each country to judge the impact of specific policies. In practice, however, existing statistics do not allow these kinds of comparisons. The three countries’ measures of racist vio- lence differ substantially, rendering any cross-national comparison meaningless. That Britain tallied 47,814 “racist incidents” in the same year that France counted 30 “racist and xenophobic actions”29 does not mean that racist violence is 1,594 times worse in Britain than in France. Several factors make it difficult to compare statistics even within one country. In Britain, for example, the year before the state recorded 47,814 racist incidents, it cat- alogued a mere 23,049 (Burney & Rose, 2002, pp. 132-133). What explains this dis- crepancy? It was not because of a sudden outbreak of racism. Its likely causes were a new, broader definition of racist incidents and increased reporting and recording of incidents by victims and state authorities. In recent years, Germany and France have 160 American Behavioral Scientist Table 1 Relative Policy Emphasis of Britain, Germany, and France With Respect to Racist Violence Policy Goal Repression Instruction Central Actor State Britain France Society Germany at MIDDLEBURY COLLEGE LIBRARY on February 5, 2010 http://abs.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://abs.sagepub.com also altered their official definitions of racism to capture more types of complaints, and their publics and civil servants are likely to become increasingly sensitized to racist violence. These types of changes will undoubtedly affect their annual statis- tics. A jump in the recorded number of acts may therefore actually indicate positive changes instead of mounting racist violence. Naturally, definitions of racist violence will stabilize, and—with some ebbs and flows—so will public and official readiness to report and record incidents. At that time, the statistics will become much more useful reference points within each coun- try. But they will never be excellent gauges of racist violence. As many activists themselves agree, it is impossible to stamp out all acts of racism, so focusing on sta- tistics and trying to bring the numbers down to zero is a red herring. Moreover, the numbers of acts in any given time period can fluctuate for unpredictable reasons. During the 1st month of the second intifada, France learned that international events can spark a rash of domestic violence that is not easily controllable. In addition, once one incident captures national headlines, copycat crimes may follow. These vagaries mean that although the statistics are not meaningless, they are a partial measure at best when trying to understand policy effectiveness. Even if these statistical problems did not exist, a focus on the numbers would still be too narrow. Of course, every concerned citizen hopes that racial attacks will decline rather than increase. But policies against racist violence are not like policies against generic crime, where the most important measures of success are figures such as homicide rates or the percentage of cases successfully cleared. Racist vio- lence is a problem of public order, like normal crime, but it is also a problem of social cohesion. This means that the sentiments of victim groups and society as a whole are extremely important measures of policy effectiveness. Do targeted groups feel like they are included and respected by the state, or do they feel isolated and vul- nerable? Do citizens of the country feel united, or do they feel divided by race, eth- nicity, religion, or national origin? “Doing something” about racist violence is as much about promoting social cohe- sion as it is about preserving public order. Not just any action will accomplish these goals. Restricting immigration flows is a “blame the victim” strategy that states have often used in response to racist violence (Witte, 1996). Politicians’ words without corresponding deeds may also disillusion victims. But once the state begins to develop policies to deal with serious problems such as racism in the police force, right-wing extremism, or attacks on synagogues, the precise actions it takes may be less important than the fact that the state has responded to targeted communities’ concerns. The laws, policies, and money that back up political rhetoric may or may not stem further acts of racial violence. But they do serve as symbols of the state’s willingness to put its money (or time, or monopoly of legitimate use of force) where its mouth is. In this sense, all policies are symbolic as well as pragmatic. As sym- bols, the policies are effective if they reassure societal groups. This prevents recrim- inations and intergroup tensions and thus promotes social cohesion. Bleich / Hate Crime Policy in Western Europe 161 at MIDDLEBURY COLLEGE LIBRARY on February 5, 2010 http://abs.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://abs.sagepub.com Ultimately, policy effectiveness depends on many factors. There are some com- mon strategies for reducing racist violence, such as stepping up patrols of sensitive sites and encouraging police, prosecutors, judges, and juries to be tough on crime. Policies to promote social cohesion, however, come in many shapes and sizes, as the variety of options pursued by Britain, Germany, and France demonstrate. Each coun- try’s policies has thus far met with mixed reviews. Most commentators agree that much has changed during the past few years, yet most also agree that each state’s commitment to eradicating racist violence is not as strong as it could be. Developing nationally effective policies thus depends on learning from other states about the pragmatic steps a country can take. It also depends on responding to domestic actors who articulate concerns about specific problems and suggest possible solutions. Obeying this rule of thumb will go a long way toward limiting the impact of racist violence and toward promoting national cohesion. Notes 1. This figure includes 1.2% of the population that self-identify as Irish, because ethnic Irish have been found to suffer significant racial discrimination and disadvantage. See the Commission for Racial Equality at http://www.cre.gov.uk/media/nr_arch/2003/nr030213.html. 2. The Joint Committee Against Racialism was launched in the late 1970s and included members from all major parties and from leading nongovernmental organizations. 3. Interview with the Metropolitan Police Service, December 18, 2003. 4. Available online at http://www.acpo.police.uk/policies/website_copy_race_hate_crime_manual_v3.doc. 5. April 1, 2004, through March 31, 2005. 6. See the Crown Prosecution Service’s Racist Incident Monitoring Annual Report, 2004-2005 (p. 11), available online at http://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/docs/rims04-05.pdf. 7. The four categories of acts according to the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution are antiforeigner, anti-Semitic, against political opponents, and other (Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, 2003, p. 28; Watts, 2001, p. 603). 8. Soko-Rex is short for Sonderkommission Rechtsextremismus, or Special Commission on Right- Wing Extremism. As one interviewee pointed out, Rex is a play on words, sounding like rechts (right) but spelled like the popular name for a police dog. 9. Interviews with activists and political advisors, Berlin, December 2003 and April 2004. 10. For more information about the Action Program Against Aggression and Violence program, see the summaries by the Christlich Demokratische Union (www.cdu.de/politik-a-z/jugend/kap52.htm), the Landesinstitut für Schule und Medien Brandenburg (www.lisum.brandenburg.de/toleranz/ handeln/ 22_kri_ra.html), and the Fachhochschule Potsdam (http://www.fh-potsdam.de/~Sozwes/projekte/steffan/ eustreetex_syn/synopse_agag.pdf). 11. See Note 10. 12. Interviews with German antiracist activists Julia Plessing and Kay Wendel, November through December 2003. 13. An “Aufstand der Anständigen.” 14. The state did pass a penal code reform in 1994 that created a specific penalty for racist desecra- tion of cemeteries or cadavers. This provision is little known and seldom used, however, and generated only seven convictions from the time of its inception through 2001 (Commission Nationale Consultative des Droits de l’Homme, 2000, 2003). 162 American Behavioral Scientist at MIDDLEBURY COLLEGE LIBRARY on February 5, 2010 http://abs.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://abs.sagepub.com 15. Statistics compiled from data available in Commission National Consultative des Droits de l’Homme (2003, pp. 505, 515). 16. Throughout the 1990s, Jews had not been the primary targets of racism in France. 17. Interviews at Union of French Jewish Students and Ministry of Justice, December 2003. See also Commission Nationale Consultative des Droits de l’Homme (2003, p. 51). 18. Also, interviews with the Representative Council of Jewish Institutions of France (CRIF) and with Sammy Ghozlan, December 2003. 19. See the extensive information on anti-Semitism issues in France on the Consulate General of New York’s Web site at http://www.consulfrance-newyork.org.fr/actualite/laune/antisemiracismf.htm; also “Le Gouvernement Promet” (2004). 20. Interviews with CRIF and at the Ministry of Interior, December 2003. 21. See Note 20. 22. The technical phrasing enhances penalties for a specified list of serious infractions “because of the belonging or non-belonging, real or supposed, of victims in a determined religion, ethnic group, nation, or race” (Law No. 2003-88, February 3, 2003). 23. Interview at Ministry of Justice, December 2003. 24. “Le Gouvernement Promet” (2004); interview at the ministries of justice and interior, December 2003; CRIM-AP No. 00-1500.A 13 A4; Commission Nationale Consultative des Droits de l’Homme (2003, p. 62). 25. Assemblée Nationale, 12th Legislature, Document No. 452; “Discours du Premier Ministre” (2003). 26. See the Council of Europe press release available at http://press.coe.int/cp/2002/508a(2002).htm. 27. See the Council of Europe Web site at http://www.coe.int/T/E/Com/Files/Events/2002-10-Shoah/ news_pointpresse.asp#TopOfPage. 28. As cited on the web page of the French Ministry of National Education, http://www.education .gouv.fr/cid323/contre-les-derives-communautaristes-reaffirmer-les-principes-de-la-laicite-republicaine .html, accessed July 23, 2007. 29. Data in Britain were gathered between April 1999 and March 2000 inclusive; data for France are for the calendar year 2000 (Commission Nationale Consultative des Droits de l’Homme, 2003, p. 505). References Attacks by Arabs on Jews in France revive old fears. (2003, December 3). The New York Times. Available from LexisNexis. Benoît, J. (1980). Dossier E . . . comme Esclaves [Dossier S . . . for slaves]. Paris: Editions Alain Moreau. Bleich, E. (2003). Race politics in Britain and France: Ideas and policymaking since the 1960s. New York: Cambridge University Press. Bowling, B. (1998). Violent racism: Victimization, policing and social context. Oxford, UK: Clarendon. Brenner, E. (2002). Les territoires perdus de la République: Antisémitisme, racisme et sexisme en milieu scolaire [The lost territories of the republic: Anti-Semitism, racism, and sexism in schools]. Paris: Mille et Une Nuits. Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz. (2003). Annual report of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution: 2002. Berlin: Bundesministerium des Innern. Burney, E., & Rose, G. (2002). Racist offences: How is the law working? The implementation of the legislation on racially aggravated offences in the Crime and Disorder Act 1998. London: Home Office Research, Development, and Statistics Directorate. Commission Nationale Consultative des Droits de l’Homme. (2000). 1999. La lutte contre le racisme et la xénophobie: Discriminations et droits de l’homme [1999. The fight against racism and xenophobia: Discrimination and human rights]. Paris: La Documentation Française. Bleich / Hate Crime Policy in Western Europe 163 at MIDDLEBURY COLLEGE LIBRARY on February 5, 2010 http://abs.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://abs.sagepub.com Commission Nationale Consultative des Droits de l’Homme. (2003). 2002. La lutte contre le racisme et la xénophobie: Rapport d’activité [2002. The fight against racism and xenophobia: Report of activities]. Paris: La Documentation Française. Discours du Premier Ministre, Jean-Pierre Raffarin pour le 60ème anniversaire du CRIF [Speech of Prime Minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin for the 60th anniversary of the CRIF]. (2003). Retrieved July 10, 2007, from http://www.col.fr/article-292.html Erb, R. (1997). Public responses to antisemitism and right-wing extremism. In H. Kurthen, W. Bergmann, & R. Erb (Eds.), Antisemitism and xenophobia in Germany after unification (pp. 211-223). New York: Oxford University Press. 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(2002). 17 Octobre 1961–17 Octobre 2001: Une commémoration ambiguë [An ambiguous commemoration]. French Politics, Culture, and Society, 20, 30-43. Jenness, V., & Grattet, R. (2001). Making hate a crime: From social movement to law enforcement. New York: Russell Sage. Jews warn of rising anti-Semitism. (2002, April 23). BBC News. Retrieved July 10, 2007, from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/1946851.stm Lawrence, F. M. (1999). Punishing hate: Bias crimes under American law. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Le gouvernement promet une “détermination sans faille” contre l’antisémitisme [The government promises “unfailing determination” against anti-Semitism]. (2004, January 28). Le Monde. Available from LexisNexis. Levine, M. (1985). Les Ratonnades d’Octobre: Un Meurtre Collectif à Paris en 1961 [The October beatings: A collective murder in Paris in 1961]. Paris: Editions Ramsay. Macpherson of Cluny, W., Sir. (1999). The Stephen Lawrence inquiry report. London: Stationary Office. Malik, M. (1999). “Racist crime”: Racially aggravated offences in the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 Part II. Modern Law Review, 62, 409-424. Metropolitan Police Service. (2003). The Understanding and Responding to Hate Crime (URHC) Project. London: Metropolitan Police Service. Noiriel, G. (1988). Le creuset français: Histoire de l’Immigration XIXe-XXe siècle [The French melting pot: History of immigration in the 19th and 20th centuries]. Paris: Seuil. Roth, R. (2003). Bürgernetzwerke gegen Rechts: Evaluierung von Aktionsprogrammen und Maßnahmen gegen Rechtsextremismus und Fremdenfeindlichkeit [Citizen network against the Right: Evaluation of action programs and measures against Right-extremism and xenophobia]. Bonn: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. Scarman, Lord. (1982). The Scarman report: The Brixton Disorders 10-12 April 1981. London: Penguin. Sked, A., & Cook, C. (1990). Post-war Britain: A political history. London: Penguin. Taguieff, P.-A. (2002). La nouvelle judéophobie [The new anti-Semitism]. Paris: Mille et Une Nuits. Union des Etudiants Juifs de France and SOS Racisme. (2002). Les antifeujs: Le livre blanc des violences antisémites en France depuis septembre 2000 [The “anti-Jews”: The white book of anti- Semitic violence in France since September 2000]. Paris: Calmann-Lévy. 164 American Behavioral Scientist at MIDDLEBURY COLLEGE LIBRARY on February 5, 2010 http://abs.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://abs.sagepub.com Virdee, S. (1995). Racial violence and harassment. London: Policy Studies Institute. Watts, M. (2001). Aggressive youth cultures and hate crime: Skinheads and xenophobic youth in Germany. American Behavioral Scientist, 45, 600-615. Wendel, K. (2003). Opfererfahrungen von Migranten und Flüchtlingen in Brandenburg [Migrant and refugee victim experiences in Brandenburg]. Journal für Konflikt- und Gewaltforschung, 1, 70-87. Witte, R. (1996). Racist violence and the state: A comparative analysis of Britain, France and the Netherlands. London: Longman. Erik Bleich is an associate professor of political science at Middlebury College in Vermont. His interests lie in the fields of immigration, integration, multiculturalism, race, ethnicity, religion, and policy making in Western Europe. He has published articles on these topics in Comparative Politics, Comparative Political Studies, Theory and Society, Policy Studies, International Migration, and French Politics, Culture, and Society and is the author of Race Politics in Britain and France: Ideas and Policymaking since the 1960s (Cambridge University Press, 2003). His current research focuses on the effects of racial and religious violence—primarily associated with immigrants and their descendants—in generating policy change in Western Europe. He has also been an invited speaker at the Runnymede Trust’s national Preventing Racist Violence conference in Britain and has written op-ed articles for newspapers such as The Guardian and European Voice. 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work_ssc2dvk36bbtbnxxjip57r5o5a	----	1113 Ори ги нал ни на уч ни рад 177.82:343.235 doi:10.5937/zrpfns52-19108 Др Дар ко Т. Ди мов ски, ван ред ни про фе сор Уни вер зи тет у Ни шу Прав ни фа кул тет у Ни шу dar ko @pra fak.ni.ac.rs Др Ми о ми ра П. Ко стић, ре дов ни про фе сор Уни вер зи тет у Ни шу Прав ни фа кул тет у Ни шу ko sticm@pra fak.ni .ac .rs ДО КА ЗИ ВА ЊЕ ЗЛО ЧИ НА МР ЖЊЕ* Са же так: На по чет ку ра да ау то ри су на гла си ли да је за ко но да вац у Ре пу бли ци Ср би ји но ве ла ци јом Кри вич ног за ко ни ка 2012. го ди не увео члан 54а чи ме је мо тив мр жње про пи сао као оба ве зну оте жа ва ју ћу окол ност. Иа ко је од до но ше ња овог чла на про шло не ко ли ко го ди на, до са да ни у јед ном слу- ча ју ни је до шло до ње го ве при ме не. Сто га су ау то ри по себ ну па жњу по све- ти ли са гле да ва њу свих про бле ма у до ка зи ва њу зло чи на мр жње. Нај пре су на ве ли, сход но ти по ло ги ји ко ју је из ра дио Фе де рал ни ис тра жни би ро, окол- но сти ко је тре ба да ука жу на по сто ја ње зло чи на мр жње. На ред ни део ра да је по све ћан те шко ћа ма у до ка зи ва њу мр жње као мо ти ва из вр ше ња кри вич ног де ла. Ка ко до ка зи ва ње зло чи на мр жње зах те ва уса гла шен рад ор га на уну- тра шњих по сло ва, јав ног ту жи о ца и су да, ау то ри су, у сле де ћем де лу ра да ана ли зи ра ли уло гу сва ког од на ве де них ор га на у до ка зи ва њу зло чи на мр жње. Кључ не ре чи: зло чин мр жње, до ка зи ва ње, по те шко ће, уло га над ле жних ор га на. УВОД Број не др жа ве ши ром све та по че ле су нор ма тив но да уре ђу ју зло чин мр жње ше зде се тих и се дам де се тих го ди на про шло га ве ка. На и ме, уо ча ва се * Овај рад пред ста вља ре зул тат те о риј ског ис тра жи ва ња на про јек ту „За шти та људ ских и ма њин ских пра ва у европ ском прав ном про сто ру“ (бр. про јек та 179046), ко ји фи нан си ра Ми ни стар ство про све те, на у ке и тех но ло шки раз вој Ре пу бли ке Ср би је. 1114 Др Дар ко Т. Ди мов ски, Др Ми о ми ра П. Ко стић, До ка зи ва ње зло чи на мр жње (стр. 1113–1129) не ко ли ко на чи на ин кри ми на ци је зло чи на мр жње. Јед на од ин кри ми на ци ја зло- чи на мр жње огле да се у ње го вом ре гу ли са њу као по себ ног кри вич ног де ла, док се дру га оте ло тво ру је у то ме да се чи ње ни ца да је кри вич но де ло из вр ше но из мо ти ва мр жње узи ма као оба ве зна оте жа ва ју ћа окол ност ко ја је про пи са на у оп штем де лу кри вич ног за ко на или са мо код по је ди них кри вич них де ла. Ре пу бли ка Ср би је је, пра те ћи тен ден ци ју у во де ћим зе мља ма кри вич- но прав не ми сли, ин кри ми ни са ла мо тив мр жње као по себ но оте жа ва ју ћу окол ност при ли ком од ме ра ва ња ви си не ка зне. Но ве ла ци јом Кри вич ног за ко- ни ка из 2012. го ди не до дат је члан 54а ко јим је про пи са на по себ на окол ност за од ме ра ва ње ка зне за кри вич но де ло учи ње но из мр жње. На и ме, у по ме ну том чла ну пред ви ђе но је да ако је кри вич но де ло учи ње но из мр жње због при пад- но сти ра си и ве ро и спо ве сти, на ци о нал не или ет нич ке при пад но сти, по ла, сек- су ал не ори јен та ци је или род ног иден ти те та дру гог ли ца, ту окол ност суд ће це ни ти као оте жа ва ју ћу окол ност, осим ако она ни је про пи са на као обе леж је кри вич ног де ла. Да ља ана ли за ука зу је на по се бан зна чај у ра ду су до ва при ли- ком до ка зи ва ња из вр ше ња кри вич ног де ла иза зи ва ња на ци о нал не, ра сне и вер ске мр жње и не тр пе љи во сти из чл. 317. ст. 2. Кри вич ног за ко ни ка у од но су на угр о жа ва ње си гур но сти, ко је пред ста вља ква ли фи ка тор ну окол ност код овог кри вич ног де ла, у сми слу угр о жа ва ња си гур но сти па сив ног су бјек та.1 Иа ко је од уво ђе ња од ред бе 54а у Кри вич ни за ко ник Ре пу бли ке Ср би је про шло не ко ли ко го ди на, до са да ни у јед ном слу ча ју ни је до шло до ње не при- ме не. Раз ло ге тре ба тра жи ти у то ме да су ди је ни су ус пе ле да пре по зна ју, у ко јим слу ча је ви ма је мо гу ће при ме ни ти од ред бу 54а Кри вич ног за ко ни ка, тј. да је кри вич но де ло учи ње но из мо ти ва мр жње, иа ко је та квих слу ча је ва би ло. Ујед- но, као раз лог мо же се ја ви ти чи ње ни ца да прак ти ча ри не зна ју шта се под ра- зу ме ва под пој мом „мр жња“, јер је то за ко но да вац про пу стио да уре ди у де лу ве за ном за зна че ње из ра за упо тре бље них при ли ком ин кри ми на ци ја по је ди них де ла. Услед то га се по ја вио и про блем до ка зи ва ња тог мо ти ва у кри вич ном по- ступ ку. Сто га ће ау то ри у на став ку ра да по себ ну па жњу по све ти ти про бле ми ма до ка зи ва ња зло чи на мр жње, ка ко би при бли жи ли мо гу ће на чи не до ка зи ва ња овог об ли ка кри ми на ли те та на си ља ту жи о ци ма и су ди ја ма, што би на кра ју до при не ло при ме ни од ред бе 54а Кри вич ног за ко ни ка Ре пу бли ке Ср би је. ДО КА ЗИ ВА ЊЕ МР ЖЊЕ За зло чин мр жње се упо тре бља ва и тер мин „зло чин по чи њен из пред- ра су де“. Да би се до шло до осу ђу ју ће пре су де, за кри вич но де ло учи ње но из 1 Ви ше о то ме вид. Све тла на Ми јо вић, „Кри вич но де ло угр о жа ва ња си гур но сти и ње- го ва обе леж ја (члан 138. Кри вич ног за ко ни ка)“, Збо р ник ра до ва Прав ног фа кул те та у Но вом Са ду, 1/2017, 260. Зборник радова Правног факултета у Новом Саду, 3/2018 1115 мр жње, нео п ход но је да ту жи лац пред су дом до ка же по сто ја ње мр жње као мо ти ва из вр ше ња од ре ђе ног кри вич ног де ла. Дру гим ре чи ма, нео п ход но је да ту жи лац до ка же да је кри вич но де ло из вр ше но са од ре ђе ном на ме ром, јер ни је сва ко кри вич но де ло учи ње но пре ма, при ме ра ра ди, при пад ни ку ет нич ке или сек су ал не ма њи не, зло чин мр жње. До ка зи ва ње мо ти ва мр жње, без прет ход ног при зна ња окри вље ног, да је кри вич но де ло из вр шио услед ова кве мо ти ва ци је, мо же да пред ста вља по себ ну те шко ћу за ту жи о ца. Сто га је по треб но за рад до ка зи ва ња мр жње као мо ти ва из вр ше ња кри- вич ног де ла ко ри сти ти се по сто ја њем од ре ђе них окол но сти ко је ука зу ју на при су ство по ме ну тог мо ти ва. Нај и сцрп ни ју ли сту окол но сти, на осно ву ко јих је мо гу ће утвр ђи ва ти по сто ја ње мр жње и пред ра су де пре ма при пад ни- ку од ре ђе не гру пе, раз вио је Фе де рал ни ис тра жни би ро (ФБИ). На и ме, ФБИ је раз вио соп стве ну прак су, на осно ву ко је је мо гу ће на ћи чи ње ни це за до- ка зи ва ње по сто ја ња зло чи на мр жње. Пр ва окол ност, пре ма ФБИ, ко ја мо же ука за ти на мр жњу као мо тив из вр ше ња кри вич ног де ла, је при пад ност из вр- ши о ца и жр тве раз ли чи тим ра са ма, ре ли гиј ским уве ре њи ма, сек су ал ној ори- јен та ци ји, ет нич ком по ре клу, ро ду и по лу. Ујед но, као чи ње ни ца ко ја мо же ука за ти на мр жњу, се ја вља и окол ност да жр тва има од ре ђе ни фи зич ки, или пси хич ки хен ди кеп. Дру га окол ност се огле да у го во ру, пи са њу, или ге сти- ку ла ци ји, у ко ји ма је мо гу ће уви де ти по сто ја ње мр жње и пред ра су де пре ма не ком дру гом ли цу. Исто та ко, по сто ја ње мр жње се мо же оте ло тво ри ти и у цр та њу сим бо ла, или гра фи та, на ме сту из вр ше ња кри вич ног де ла, ко ји се по ве зу ју са мр жњом. Но ше ње од ре ђе не оде ће од стра не из вр ши о ца кри вич ног де ла, та ко ђе, мо же ука за ти да је мр жња мо тив из вр ше ња кри вич ног де ла. На ред на окол ност, ко ја се мо же по ве за ти са мр жњом као мо ти вом из вр ше ња кри вич ног де ла, је си ту а ци ја да је кри вич но де ла из вр ше но у су сед ству, у ко јем је жр тва при пад ник не ке гру пе, ко ја је у ма њи ни, у да том под руч ју. Жи вот не окол но сти мо гу усло ви ти да при пад ник од ре ђе не ма њин ске гру пе по се ти под руч је, ко је је од ра ни је по зна то по зло чи ни мам мр жње, те на кра- ју том при ли ком он по ста не жр тва овог об ли ка кри ми на ли те та на си ља. У слу ча ју да се не ко ли ко зло чи на мр жње из вр ши на ис тој ло ка ци ји, при че му су жр тве овог до га ђа ја исте ра се, ре ли гиј ског уве ре ња, фи зич ког или пси хич- ког хен ди ке па, сек су ал не ор јен та ци је, по ла или ро да, мо же пред ста вља ти окол ност ко ја ука зу је да је и кон крет но кри вич но де ло из вр ше но са истим мо ти вом. Уко ли ко од го ва ра ју ћи део ло кал не за јед ни це сма тра да је од ре ђе- но кри вич но де ло из вр ше но услед мр жње, то нам, та ко ђе, мо же ука за ти да мр жњу тре ба узе ти у раз ма тра ње као мо тив из вр ше ња кри вич ног де ла.2 Зло чи ни мр жње су че сто усме ре ни пре ма осо ба ма, ко ја су ан га жо ва на у од ре ђе ним ак тив но сти ма (не вла дин сек тор, или ан га жо ва ње за по бољ ша ње 2 Ha te Cri me Da ta Col lec tion Gu i de li nes And Tra i ning Ma nual, 2015, 6-7. 1116 Др Дар ко Т. Ди мов ски, Др Ми о ми ра П. Ко стић, До ка зи ва ње зло чи на мр жње (стр. 1113–1129) по ло жа ја ма њин ских гру па при др жав ним ор га ни ма), за тим ко ја су по ве за не са ма њин ским обе леж јем, те они мо гу због тог свог ан га жо ва ња по ста ти жр тве кри вич ног де ла услед мр жње пре ма њи ма. Окол ност да је кри вич но де ло из вр ше но за вре ме пра зни ка, или да ту ма од по себ ног зна ча ја за од ре- ђе ну гру пу, мо же ја сно ука за ти да је мо тив из вр ше ња кри вич ног де ла мр жња пре ма при пад ни ци ма гру пе. Из вр ши о ци зло чи на мр жње су че сто по врат ни ци, те нам ова окол ност мо же по слу жи ти као чи ње ни ца за до ка зи ва ње да је од ре- ђе но кри вич но де ло по чи ње но из мр жње. У од ре ђе ним слу ча је ви ма кри вич но де ло мо же би ти из вр ше но од стра не гру пе љу ди, ко ја под сти че на си ља. Ме ђу од ре ђе ним гру па ма (ет нич ким, ре ли гиј ским и дру гим) мо же по сто ја ти исто- риј ска не тр пе љи вост, што нам мо же ука за ти да је у слу ча ју из вр ше ња кри- вич ног де ла, ме ђу при пад ни ци ма ових гру па мо тив мр жње основ ни по кре- тач на си ља. По след ња окол ност, ко ја по ти по ло ги ји, ко ју је из ра дио ФБИ, мо же ути ца ти на то да од ре ђе но ли це по ста не жр тва зло чи на мр жње, огле да се у чи ње ни ци да жр тва, иа ко са ма ни је при пад ник од ре ђе не гру пе, али је укљу чен у рад на уна пре ђе њу по ло жа ја од ре ђе не гру пе љу ди, мо же по ве ћа ти шан су да бу де жр тва зло чи на мр жње.3 Осим већ на ве де них окол но сти, прак са је раз ви ла од ре ђе не окол но сти, ко је мо гу до при не ти лак шем до ка зи ва њу мр жње, од но сно пред ра су да, при ли- ком из вр ше ња кри вич ног де ла. Јед на од тих окол но сти је члан ство окри вље- ног у гру пи, ко ја га ји мр жњу пре ма од ре ђе ној ску пи ни љу ди. Дру га окол ност се огле да у то ме да окри вље ни по се ду је ли те ра ту ру, или сим бо ле, по ве за не са екс тре ми змом. Те то ва же на те лу са мо ти ви ма мр жње су још јед на окол ност, по ве за на са по сто ја њем мр жње код окри вље ног. То ком кри вич ног по ступ ка се мо же до го ди ти да окри ви ље ни ис ка же ра си стич ке увре де, што је, не сум- њи во, окол ност ко ја ука зу је на по сто ја ње мр жње код окри вље ног.4 Да би чи та о ци бо ље раз у ме ли на ве де не окол но сти, ко је тре ба да до при- не су утвр ђи ва њу мр жње као мо ти ва из вр ше ња кри вич ног де ла, да ће мо је дан при мер. На и ме, ли це оп ту же но за иза зи ва ње оп ште опа сно сти под ме та њем по жа ра у џа ми ји, мо же би ти осу ђе но за зло чин мр жње уко ли ко је прет ход но да ва ло из ја ве пу не пред ра су да пре ма при пад ни ци ма ислам ске ве ро и спо ве- сти. Још је дан при мер зло чи на мр жње је ве зан за па ље ње џа ми је у Ни шу 17. мар та 2004. го ди не од стра не де се так мла ди ћа срп ске на ци о нал но сти. Као по вод за ова кав чин, они су, то ком су ђе ња, на ве ли по гр ом Ср ба у мар тов ском на си љу од стра не Ал ба на ца на Ко со ву и Ме то хи ји. Одр жа ва ње тзв. Па ра де по но са у Бе о гра ду сва ке го ди не у сеп тем бру је че сто пра ће но на си љем пре- ма при пад ни ци ма сек су ал них ма њи на, што пред ста вља при мер из вр ше них кри вич них де ла из мо ти ва мр жње. 3 Ibid 4 Re tri e ved 30, Sep tem ber 2016 from http://www.cri mi nal de fen se lawyer.com /re so ur ces/ ho w-pro se cu tors-pro ve-ha te-cri mes.html Зборник радова Правног факултета у Новом Саду, 3/2018 1117 ТЕ ШКО ЋЕ У ДО КА ЗИ ВА ЊУ ЗЛО ЧИ НА МР ЖЊЕ Зло чин мр жње је у од ре ђе ним си ту а ци ја ма, и по ред по сто ја ња очи глед- них до ка за да је кри вич но де ло учи ње но из мр жње, те шко до ка за ти, јер и са ми јав ни ту жи о ци и су ди је су оп те ре ће ни пред ра су да ма пре ма при пад ни- ци ма од ре ђе них ма њи на. Ис тра жи ва ња, спро ве де на у Сје ди ње ним Аме рич- ким Др жа ва ма су по ка за ла да су адво ка ти оште ће них ви ше пу та ука зи ва ли да јав ни ту жи о ци у од ре ђе ним ре ги о ни ма из бе га ва ју да по диг ну оп ту жни це за кри вич на де ла по чи ње ња из мо ти ва мр жње. Као при мер за та кво по на ша- ње јав них ту жи о ца на во ди се до га ђај, у ко јем је смрт но стра дао аме рич ки ти неј џер мек сич ког по ре кла, у Пен сил ва ни ји. Пре тра гич ног до га ђа ја до шло је до увре да на на ци о нал ној осно ви од стра не два ма ло лет ни ка, ко ји су ка сни- је иза зва ли смрт Мек си кан ца. Ло кал на по ли ци ја, у са рад њи јав ним ту жи о цем, је при кри ва ла до ка зе, што је ре зул ти ра ло ти ме да се не по диг не оп ту жни ца за уби ство. До по ди за ња оп ту жни це је до шло тек на кон што су са ве зни ту- жи о ци пре у зе ли цео слу чај.5 На ред на окол ност, ко ја мо же ути ца ти на те шко ће при ли ком до ка зи ва ња мр жње, је по тре ба да се по сто ја ње на ве де них окол но сти, на осно ву ко јих се до ка зу је мр жња као мо тив из вр ше ња кри вич ног де ла, не узи ма ју као a pri o ri до каз за по сто ја ње истог, без прет ход ног са гле да ва ња свих окол но сти да тог слу ча ја. Дру гим ре чи ма, нео п ход но је сва ки слу чај, за ко ји се сум ња да је из вр шен из мр жње, про це ни ти по на о соб. Из ово га про ис ти че да пра во суд ни ор га ни мо ра ју би ти на ро чи то опре зни при ли ком утвр ђи ва ња чи ње ни ца, јер је мо гу ће да по сто ји низ на ве де них окол но сти. што пра во суд не ор га не до- во ди у за блу ду, а да се ипак не ра ди о зло чи ну мр жње. На и ме, мо гу ће је да је из вр ши лац, пре не го што је из вр шио кри вич но де ло, уз ви ки вао ра си стич- ке из ја ве, али да су у кон крен том кри вич ном де лу и из вр ши лац и жр тва исте ра се, што ау то мат ски зна чи да не по сто ји зло чин мр жње.6 До за блу де код пра во суд них ор га на мо же до ћи и услед тзв. фин ги ра них до ка за. Мо гу ће је да су из вр ши о ци на ме сту, на ко јем је по чи ње но кри вич но де ло, оста ви ли до ка зе ка ко би до ве ли у за блу ду пра во суд не ор га не. Као при- мер за ову на шу тврд њу мо же мо на ве сти си ту а ци ју да уче ни ци не ке вер ске шко ле сво јим ван дал ским по на ша њем уни ште имо ви ну шко ле, с ци љем да бу ду из ба че ни из шко ле, ка ко не би ви ше по ха ђа ли на ста ву. Из на ве де ног при ме ра мо же мо ви де ти да се ово кри вич но де ло не мо же ква ли фи ко ва ти као зло чин мр жње. По ред то га што пра во суд ни ор га ни мо гу би ти у за блу ди, у за блу ди мо гу би ти и из вр ши о ци кри вич ног де ла. Мо гу ће је да, на при мер, из вр ши лац кри вич ног де ла бу де у за блу ди у по гле ду ин ва ли ди те та, ра сне, 5 Ibid 6 Ha te Cri me Da ta Col lec tion Gu i de li nes And Tra i ning Ma nual, 2015, 7 1118 Др Дар ко Т. Ди мов ски, Др Ми о ми ра П. Ко стић, До ка зи ва ње зло чи на мр жње (стр. 1113–1129) сек су ал не, ре ли гиј ске, ет нич ке, пол не, или род не при пад но сти жр тве, што не зна чи да не ма зло чи на мр жње, али мо же да пред ста вља те шко ћу при ли- ком ње го вог до ка зи ва ња. На и ме, до вољ но је на ве сти као при мер слу чај у ко јем је је дан му шка рац, или же на хе те ро сек су ал не ори јен та ци је, по се ћи вао/ ла ноћ не клу бо ве за при пад ни ке хо мо сек су ал не ори јен та ци је, те том при- ли ком бу де на пад нут од стра не ти неј џе ра, ко ји су у по гре шном уве ре њу да се ра ди о хо мо сек су ал цу.7 Страх од иден ти фи ка ци је, та ко ђе, мо же оте жа ти ква ли фи ко ва ње од ре- ђе ног кри вич ног де ла зло чи ном мр жње. На и ме, у слу ча ју да је кри вич но де ло из вр ше но пре ма хо мо сек су ал цу због мр жње упе ре не пре ма ње му, а он при ли ком во ђе ња раз го во ра са при пад ни ци ма по ли ци је не же ли да от кри је сво ју сек су ал ну ори јен та ци ју, про сто је не мо гу ће спо зна ти да се ра ди о зло- чи ну мр жње.8 Не до ста так по ве ре ња из ме ђу пра во суд них ор га на, са јед не стра не, и при пад ни ка ма њи на, са дру ге стра не, мо же пред ста вља ти ве ли ки про блем у про це су и ра њу зло чи на мр жње. На и ме, при пад ни ци од ре ђе них ет нич ких, ра сних, или ре ли гиј ских гру па, мо гли су то ком исто ри је да има ју не га тив на ис ку ства са пра во суд ним ор га ни ма, што се огле да у то ме да су при пад ни ци ових гру па ра ни је при ја вљи ва ли зло чи не мр жње, из вр ше не пре ма њи ма, ор га ни ма уну тра шњих по сло ва, као о пра во суд ним ор га ни ма, али да је ре- ак ци је др жа ве из о ста ла. По ла зе ћи од овог не га тив ног ис ку ства не мо гу ће је за оче ки ва ти да при пад ни ци ових ма њи на бу ду ко о пе ра тив ни при ли ком из вр ше ња на ред ног зло чи на мр жње, што оте жа ва ис тра гу на са мом по чет ку.9 Ис тра гу мо же, по ред већ на ве де них окол но сти, да оте жа ва и тзв. се кун- дар на вик ти ми за ци ја. На и ме, ње ним по сто ја њем по ло жај оште ће ног, од но сно вик ти мо ло шким реч ни ком ре че но, по ло жај жр тве, је по гор шан, услед не а де- кват не ре ак ци је над ле жних ор га на, и/или не а де кват не ре ак ци је ње го вих су се да. Дру гим ре чи ма, по ред то га што су жр тве пре тр пе ле тзв. при мар ну вик ти ми за ци ју, не а де кват ном ре ак ци јом, или по гре шном ре ак ци јом пра во- суд них ор га на и су се да, до ла зи до по о штра ва ња при мар не вик ти ми за ци је. Ово ме су, на ро чи то, из ло же не осо бе по себ них пси хо фи зич ких ка рак те ри- сти ка и при ро де из вр ше ног кри вич ног де ла, што жр тве зло чи на мр жње сва ка ко је су. Уме сто да жр тва ма зло чи на мр жње над ле жни ор га ни при ла зе са по себ ном па жњом, они услед не по сто ја ња обу ке, или не по сто ја ња аде кват- не обу ке, то ра де без до вољ ног са гле да ва ња спе ци фич ног по ло жа ја жр тве, чи ме се у крај њем слу ча ју ства ра не по ве ре ње.10 7 Ibid 8 Pro se cu ting ha te cri mes – a Prac ti cal gu i de, 2014, 52 9 Ibid 10 Ibid Зборник радова Правног факултета у Новом Саду, 3/2018 1119 Кри ми но ло шка ис тра жи ва ња су по ка за ла да се у број ним зло чи ни ма мр жње као из вр ши о ци ја вља ју су се ди жр та ва, као и да се зло чи ни мр жње, не рет ко, из вр ша ва ју у ма лим за јед ни ца ма. Због ова квих по ка за те ља из вр ше- них зло чи на мр жње с пра вом се по ста вља пи та ње без бед но сти жр та ва зло- чи на мр жње у бу дућ но сти, јер је из вр ши о ци ма по зна то где жр тве жи ве, што мо же оте жа ти про це су и ра ње овог об ли ка кри ми на ли те та на си ља. Без бед ност жр тве мо же на ро чи то би ти угро же на уко ли ко је зло чин мр жње из вр шен од стра не гру пе по је ди на ца. Ова ква си ту а ци ја на ме ће по тре бу да јав ни ту жи о ци зах те ва ју за шти ту све до ка, као и све до че ње жр тве на глав ном пре тре су пу тем ви део лин ка. Нео бе збе ђи ва ње ових ме ра, а зна ју ћи да без све до че ња жр тве не по сто ји че сто до вољ но до ка за за до но ше ње осу ђу ју ће пре су де, ука зу је нам на зна чај за шти те све до ка. Сто га је нео п ход но да јав ни ту жи лац, на вре ме, са- гле да по тре бу при ме не ових ме ра, ка ко би пре све га обез бе дио без бед ност жр тве, али и ка ко би обез бе дио све до че ње жр тве на глав ном пре тре су.11 Сле де ћа окол ност, ко ја мо же ути ца ти на утвр ђи ва ње чи ње ни ца, ко је ука зу ју да се од ре ђе но кри вич но де ло мо же оква ли фи ко ва ти као зло чин мр жње, је ажур ност у укуп ном са гле да ва њу чи ње ни ца. Мо гу ће је да пр во- бит но не ко кри вич но де ло бу де оква ли фи ка но као зло чин мр жње, али да про на ла же њем но вих до ка за бу де утвр ђе но да оно не пред ста вља зло чин мр жње. Сто га је нео п ход но промпт но оба ве сти ти све уче сни ке у кри вич ном по ступ ку о но во от кри ве ним чи ње ни ца ма, ка ко би оне на пра ви на чин би ле са гле да не. Мо гу ћа је и обрат на си ту а ци ја, да кри вич но де ло не бу де при ја- вље но као зло чин мр жње, али да се то ком кри вич ног по ступ ка уста но ви по сто ја ње мр жње и пред ра су де, као мо ти ва из вр ше ња кри вич ног де ла.12 По след ња окол ност ко ја мо же ути ца ти на те шко ће при ли ком утвр ђи- ва ња, да ли јед но кри вич но де ло пред ста вља зло чин мр жње, је по сто ја ње два, или ви ше мо ти ва. На и ме, по ред очи глед них зло чи на мр жње, по сто је кри вич на де ла код ко јих ни је очи глед но, да ли је оно из вр ше но из мр жње, јер по сто ји не ко ли ко мо ти ва, ко ји су усло ви ли из вр ше ње кри вич но де ла. Ова на ша тврд ња по ти че из ра зних кри ми но ло шких ис тра жи ва ња, ко ја су по ка за ла да зло чи ни мр жње у број ним слу ча је ви ма има ју ви шет сру ку мо- ти ва ци ју. Та ко је код мно гих по је ди на ца њи хо во по на ша ње де тер ми ни са но не ким си ту а ци о ним окол но сти ма, че сто у јед на кој, или чак у ве ћој сна зи од њи хо вог ста ва пре ма не кој гру пи. Та ко је, на при мер, кри ми но ло шка сту ди- ја спро ве де на то ком 2004. го ди не у Ман че сте ру (Ве ли ка Бри та ни ја) по ка за- ла да су се ра си сти кри ми нал но по на ша ли, не са мо због ути ца ја њи хо вих пред ра су да пре ма од ре ђе ним ра сним гру па ма, већ да код њих де лу ју и не ки дру ги мо ти ви. 11 Ibid., 53. 12 Ha te Cri me Da ta Col lec tion Gu i de li nes And Tra i ning Ma nual, 2015, 8. 1120 Др Дар ко Т. Ди мов ски, Др Ми о ми ра П. Ко стић, До ка зи ва ње зло чи на мр жње (стр. 1113–1129) Као при мер за по сто ја ње ви ше стру ких мо ти ва мо же мо на ве сти слу чај, ко ји се де сио у Сје ди ње ним Аме рич ким Др жа ва ма. Ју ла 2006. го ди не де си ло се уби ство Му ха ме да Пар ва и за (Mo ham mad Par va iz) од стра не шест ти неј- џе ра, ко ји су том при ли ком уз ви ки ва ли ра си стич ке па ро ле. Уби ство је би ло ре зул тат осве те због до га ђа ја, ко ји се до го дио не ко ли ко сед ми ца ра ни је. Пар- ва из, ина че так си ста, је та да пре ве зао не ко ли ко чла но ва азиј ске кри ми нал не бан де на об ра чун са ри вал ском бан дом, што је био глав ни раз лог за из вр ше- ње уби ства. Јав ни ту жи лац је на гла сио да, иа ко је ово уби ство пр вен стве но мо ти ви са но же љом за осве том, био је при су тан и мо тив мр жње пре ма так- си сти, ко ји је био дру гог ет нич ког по ре кла (био је из Па ки ста на). Кри вич ни по сту пак је био за вр шен до но ше њем осу ђу ју ће пре су де за ра сно мо ти ви са но уби ство пре ма че тво ри ци ти неј џе ра, док су дво ји ца осу ђе на за на сил нич ко по на ша ње. На осно ву овог слу ча ја мо гу ће је уви де ти по те шко ће при ли ком утвр ђи ва ња, да ли јед но кри вич но де ло тре ба сма тра ти зло чи ном мр жње, или не.13 Прак са су до ва у Сје ди ње ним Аме рич ким Др жа ва ма је та ква да би се од ре ђе но кри вич но де ло оква ли фи ко ва ло као зло чин мр жње, уко ли ко по- сто ји ви ше мо ти ва ње го вог из вр ше ња, нео п ход но је да мр жња пред ста вља зна ча јан фак тор (мо тив). Слу ча јан ра си стич ки го вор не мо же се сма тра ти до вољ ним за ква ли фи ко ва ње не ког кри вич ног де ла зло чи ном мр жње. За раз ли ку од Сје ди ње них Аме рич ких Др жа ва, у дру гим зе мља ма се зах те ва да мр жња, као мо тив из вр ше ња кри вич ног де ла, не бу де на ни воу зна чај ног фак то ра, већ да до стиг не је дан сте пен у укуп ном ути ца ју на из вр ше ње кри вич- ног де ла, а то је до ми нан тан мо тив. Упра во овај услов оте жа ва за да так јав ног ту жи о ца при ли ком до ка зи ва ња, јер је ве о ма те шко из ме ри ти од нос из ме ђу ви ше мо ти ва код јед ног кри вич ног де ла, а ка мо ли уста но ви ти да је мр жња до ми нант на у од но су на оста ле мо ти ве. Сто га је бо ље за кон ско ре ше ње у Сје ди ње ним Аме рич ким Др жа ва ма. Ипак, не ке зе мље, по пут Ка на де, не ма ју је дин ствен на чин по сту па ња у ова квим си ту а ци ја ма. На и ме, по сто ја ње више мо ти ва, ме ђу ко ји ма је је дан мр жња, се у Ка на ди сво ди на кла си фи ка ци ју од стра не раз ли чи тих по ли циј ских упра ва. Та ко, на при мер, нај ве ћа по ли- циј ска упра ва у др жа ви, у То рон ту, да би не ко кри вич но де ло оква ли фи ко- ва ла као зло чин мр жње, тра жи да је оно ис кљу чи во за сно ва но на мр жњи, док дру ге по ли циј ске упра ве зах те ва ју да кри вич но де ло бу де у це ли ни, или де ли мич но за сно ва но на мр жњи.14 Ка ко би се из бе гле ова кве си ту а ци је, нео п ход но је за кон ски од ре ди ти на чин по сту па ња по ли ци је и пра во суд них ор га на. Бел ги ја, на при мер, у чла ну 377бис Кри вич ног за ко ни ка зах те ва да је дан од мо ти ва из вр ше ња 13 Ha te Cri me Laws A Prac ti cal Gu i de, 2009, 53-54 14 Ibid., 54. Зборник радова Правног факултета у Новом Саду, 3/2018 1121 кри вич ног де ла бу де мр жња, пре зир, или не при ја тељ ство пре ма осо би због ње них ка рак те ри сти ка, ка ко би се по ве ћа ла за пре ће на ка зна за тво ра. Члан 146 За ко на о кри вич ном пра во су ђу Ве ли ке Бри та ни је про пи су је мо гућ ност по о штра ва ња ка зне у слу ча ју да је кри вич но де ло упе ре но пре ма осо би зног ње ње сек су ал не ори јен та ци је, или ин ва ли ди те та у це ли ни, или де ли мич но мо ти ви са но не при ја тељ ством пре ма да тој осо би. Ујед но, пред ви ђе но је да је не бит но, да ли је не при ја тељ ство од стра не из вр ши о ца за сно ва но на не кој дру гој осо би ни, ко ја ни је спо ме ну та у прет ход ном чла ну. Ре ше ње Кри вич ног за ко ни ка Ка ли фор ни је та ко ђе по бу ђу је па жњу прав них струч ња ка. На и ме, у чла но ви ма 422.55 и 422.56 је про пи са но да зло чин мр жње под ра зу ме ва да је из вр ше но у це ли ни, или де ли мич но, због јед не, или ви ше ствар них, или прет по ста вље них за шти ће них ка рак те ри сти ка жр тве. Из оваквког за кон ског ре ше ња про из и ла зи за кљу чак да је по треб но да мр жња мо ра да по сто ји као мо тив из вр ше ња кри вич ног де ла, да би се мо гло оква ли фи ко ва ти као зло чин мр жње, али је мо гу ће и по сто ја ње и не ки дру гих мо ти ва. Дру гим ре чи ма, по треб но је да мр жња бу де зна ча јан фак тор, али не и глав ни.15 Срп ски за- ко но да вац, за раз ли ку од на ве де них при ме ра, ни је узео у об зир мо гућ ност по сто ја ња ова кве си ту а ци је. При ме на чла на 54а Кри вич ног за ко ни ка од стра не пра во суд них ор га на ће не ми нов но на мет ну ти си ту а ци ју ка ко да се по сту пи при ли ком по сто ја ња ви ше стру ких мо ти ва из вр ше ња кри вич ног де ла, ме ђу ко ји ма је је дан мр жња. Сто га је нео п ход но из вр ши ти до пу ну за- кон ског ре ше ња зло чи на мр жње у сме ру ре гу ли са ња усло ва за по сто ја ње зло чи на мрж ње, у слу ча ју ви ше стру ких мо ти ва, од ко јих је је дан мр жња. РАД ОР ГА НА УНУ ТРА ШЊИХ ПО СЛО ВА НА ОТ КРИ ВА ЊУ ЗЛО ЧИ НА МР ЖЊЕ Основ до ка зи ва ња зло чи на мр жње је пре по зна ва ње и раз у ме ва ње за- јед нич ког ис ку ства у по гле ду дис кри ми на ци је, са ко јом су се су о чи ле мно- го број не за јед ни це у др жа ва ма ши ром све та. Иа ко по сто је зло чи ни мр жње, ко ји су свој стве ни број ним зе мља ма, мо гу ће је на ћи и не ке спе ци фич не зло- чи не мр жње, упра во на осно ву со ци јал не и исто риј ске ком по мен те у јед ној ло кал ној за јед ни ци.16 Сто га је ве ли ка од го вор ност за пре по зна ва ње зло чи- на мр жње на ор га ни ма уну тра шњих по сло ва, јер ка сни је во ђе ње ис тра ге, од стра не јав ног ту жи о ца, мо же би ти оте жа но упра во због то га што је про пу- ште но да се у том пр вом за хва ту от кри је мо тив мр жње. На осно ву ово га до ла зи мо до за кључ ка да је пр ви ко рак за пре по зна ва ње зло чи на мр жње 15 Ibid., 55. 16 Pro se cu ting ha te cri mes – a Prac ti cal gu i de, 2014, 75 1122 Др Дар ко Т. Ди мов ски, Др Ми о ми ра П. Ко стић, До ка зи ва ње зло чи на мр жње (стр. 1113–1129) обу ка по ли циј ских слу жбе ни ка. Ор га ни за ци ја за европ ску без бед ност и са рад- њу (ОЕБС) је по ве ри ла Кан це ла ри ји за де мо крат ске ин сти ту ци је и људ ска пра ва (Of fi ce for De moc ra tic In sti tu ti ons and Hu man Rights ) спро во ђе ње по себ- ног про гра ма обу ке по ли циј ских слу жбе ни ка под на зи вом Tra i ning Aga inst Ha te Cri me for Law En for ce ment (TA HCLE). Осно ве TA HCLE про гра ма мо же- мо са гле да ти кроз при зму не ко ли ко ци ље ва. На и ме, је дан од ци ље ва обу ке по ли циј ских слу жбе ни ка је и раз у ме ва ње осно ва, кон тек ста и по себ них ка рак те ри сти ка зло чи на мр жње, што тре ба да до при не се, као на ред ном ци љу овог про гра ма, спро во ђе њу де ло твор не ис тра ге и кри вич ног го ње ња кри вич- них де ла, ко ја су из вр ше на са мо ти вом мр жње. Ујед но, обу ка ор га на уну тра- шњих по сло ва тре ба да ре зул ти ра бо љем по зна ва њу нор ма тив ног окви ра, ко ји се од но си на зло чин мр жње. Из град ња кон струк тив них ве за са мар ги на- ли зо ва ним и угро же ним дру штве ним гру па ма је на ред ни циљ обу ке ор га на уну тра шњих по сло ва у окви ру про гра ма TA HCLE. Без са рад ње гра ђа на са ор га ни ма уну тра шњег ре да је не мо гу ће ра ди ти на от кри ва њу и спре ча ва њу зло чи на мр жње, те је и то је дан о ци ље ва TA HCLE про гра ма. По след њи циљ Про гра ма је обез бе ђи ва ње да прак са по ли ци је слу жи за за шти ту и про мо- ци ју људ ских пра ва, као и за не ди скри ми на ци ју.17 Ор га ни уну тра шњих по сло ва Ре пу бли ке Ср би је за са да ни су про шли ни ка кву обу ку у ве зи зло чи на мр жње, те је не мо гу ће од њих оче ки ва ти да у пред ис тра жном по ступ ку и у са мој ис тра зи бу ду до вољ но ком пе тент ни, ка ко би над ле жном јав ном ту жи о цу скре ну ли па жњу на по сто ја ње мр жње, као мо ти ва из вр ше ња кри вич ног де ла. Сто га се на ме ће за кљу чак да бор ба за до- ка зи ва ње зло чи на мр жње тре ба да кре не још од пр вог кон так та ор га на уну- тра шњих по сло ва са кри вич ним де лом, ко је се мо же оква ли фи ко ва ти као зло чин мр жње, јер би се са мо на тај на чин бга го вре ме но при ку пи ли до ка зи о по сто ја њу зло чи на мр жње. Да би се до сти гао тај ни во пр о фе си о нал но сти нео п ход но је ра ди ти на еду ка ци ји при пад ни ка по ли ци је, при ме ном прин ци па уста но вље них у окви ру про гра ма TA HCLE, ка ко би мо гли да ра за зна ју, да ли је јед но кри вич но де ло из вр ше но из мо ти ва мр жње, што би се по сти гло не са мо те о риј ском еду ка ци јом о овом об ли ку кри ми на ли те та на си ља, већ и ана ли зом слу ча је ва из ино стра не прак се. УЛО ГА ЈАВ НОГ ТУ ЖИ О ЦА У ДО КА ЗИ ВА ЊУ ЗЛО ЧИ НА МР ЖЊЕ По ла зе ћи од за кон ског ре ше ња да јав ни ту жи алц ру ко во ди пред ис тра жним по ступ ком, као и да спро во ди ис тра гу, ње го ва уло га у от кри ва њу зло чи на 17 Tra i ning aga inst ha te cri mes for law en for ce ment pro gram me de scrip tion, 2. Зборник радова Правног факултета у Новом Саду, 3/2018 1123 мр жње је ве ли ка. На и ме, ње го ва уло га се огле да у то ме да, чим са зна да је из вр ше но кри вич но де ло ко је мо же да се свр ста у зло чин мр жње, тре ба да да на лог при пад ни ци ма ор га на уну тра шњих по сло ва да сво јим ра дом про ве ре, да ли се кон крет но кри вич но де ло мо же сма тра ти зло чи ном мр жње. Ујед но, на глав ном пре тре су је неп ход но да јав ни ту жи лац до ка же да је кон крет но кри вич но де ло из вр ше но због мр жње пре ма од ре ђе ном ли цу. Ка ко зло чи ни мр жње пред ста вља ју тзв. зло чи не по ру ке, ње го ви из вр ши о ци оста вља ју ин- ди ци је да су кри вич но де ло из вр ши ли услед мр жње пре ма од ре ђе ном ли цу, што зах те ва да ове ин ди ци је тре ба про на ћи, не са мо на ме сту из вр ше ња кри- вич ног де ла, већ и у ме сту пре би ва ли шта или бо ра ви шта, ме сту со ци ја ли за ци- је са осо ба ма слич них ста во ва и схва та ња, и не ким дру гим ме сти ма. Прак са је по ка за ла да се јав ни ту жи о ци у до ка зи ва њу зло чи на мр жње че сто осла ња ју на прет ход не из ја ве из вр ши о ца, или на ње го во при зна ње да је реч о зло чи ну мр жње. У не до стат ку из ја ва и при зна ња окри вље ног је нео п ход но да јав ни ту жи лац у са рад њи са при пад ни ци ма по ли ци је от кри је ин ди ци је да је кри- вич но де ло из вр ше но због мо ти ва мр жње. У то ме се огле да зна чај ин ди ци ја у фор ми ра њу тзв. њи хо вог лан ца ра ди до ка зи ва ња мо ти ва мр жње при ли ком из вр ше ња кон крет ног кри вич ног де ла.18 Већ смо на гла си ли да се зло чи ном мр жње же ли по сла ти од ре ђе на по ру- ка, због че га ње го ви из вр ши о ци же ле да дру га ли ца зна ју мо ти ве из вр ше ња кри вич ног де ла. По ред то га што из вр ши о ци мо гу упу ти ти увре дљи ве по ру ке жр тви кри вич ног де ла, као и то да мо гу да ис пи шу увре дљи ве по ру ке у ви ду гра фи та на ме сту из вр ше ња кри вич ног де ла, они мо гу, ујед но, и да се по хва- ле о из вр ше ном кри вич ном де лу чла но ви ма сво је по ро ди це, при ја те љи ма, или чак и јав но сти. Сто га је уло га јав ног ту жи о ца да от кри је ко ме и ка да се из вр ши лац зло чи на мр жње по хва лио о из вр ше њу и мо ти ви ма кон крет ног кри вич ног де ла. Нео п ход но је про на ћи ме ста на ко ји ма је из вр ши лац био пре и на кон из вр ше ња кри вич ног де ла. От кри ва ње по тен ци јал них све до ка, ко ји су чу ли при зна ње окри вље ног не по сред но на кон из вр ше ног кри вич ног де ла, има ве ћу сна гу од при зна ња учи ње ног по сле од ре ђе ног вре ме на. Ипак, не тре ба уна пред сма тра ти да при зна ње окри вље ног на кон од ре ђе ног вре ме- на има сла бу до ка зну сна гу, јер је мо гу ће да оно пред ста вља основ за да ље тра же ње до ка за о мр жњи, као мо ти ву из вр ше ња кри вич ног де ла, при ме ном не ких дру гих кри ми на ли стич ких так ти ка и ме то да. Као при мер за из ја ве окри вље них пре из вр ше ња зло чи на мр жње мо же мо на ве сти слу чај, ко ји се де сио то ком 2006. го ди не у Укра ји ни. На и ме, две осо- бе под ини ци ја ли ма С. и К. су пи ли ал ко хол на пи ћа са дво ји цом ма ло лет- ни ка, при че му се из ме ђу њих по вео раз го вор о штет но сти, ко ју су њи хо вој зе мљи на не ли ми гран ти из Афри ке, јер су они, пре ма схва та њу Укра ји на ца, 18 Pro se cu ting ha te cri mes – a Prac ti cal gu i de, 2014, 56. 1124 Др Дар ко Т. Ди мов ски, Др Ми о ми ра П. Ко стић, До ка зи ва ње зло чи на мр жње (стр. 1113–1129) иле гал но ушли у зе мљу и узе ли им по сло ве, из гра ди ли сек та шке цр кве уз ди ло ва ње пси хо ак тив них суп стан ци. То ком раз го во ра је дан од ма ло лет ни ка је при ме тио ка ко ули цом ко ра ча Афри ка нац, што је про пра тио ре че ни цом: „По гле дај те, ено га цр нац.“ На кон то га су сва че тво ри ца по тр ча ли ка црн цу и на пра ви ли му за се ду. Ње го во пре би ја ње пр ви је за по чео по је ди нац са ини- ци ја ли ма С. уз ко ри шће ње но жа, на кон че га су се оста ли при кљу чи ли. Осо ба С. је убо ла Афри кан ца че ти ри пу та у ле ђа, што је ре зул ти ра ло смрт ним ис хо дом. Је дан од све до ка је у кри вич ном по ступ ку све до чио да је по ку шао да га за- у ста ви, али се том при ли ком осо ба С. за пи та ла, „за што он по ку ша ва да ме за у ста ви, ка да ја бра ним Укра ји ну?“. По сле хап ше ња су сва че тво ри ца при- зна ли да су зло чин из вр ши ли због мр жње пре ма Афри кан ци ма. Ка сни је је осо ба С. по ри ца ла да је кри вич но де ло из вр ше но из ра сне мр жње, док је осо- ба К. ис та кла да уби ство из вр ше но због мр жње, али је твр дио да оно ни је ре- зул тат пред ра су де пре ма црн ци ма, већ лич ног ис ку ства. Ме ђу тим, је дан од ма ло лет ни ка је по твр дио са др жи ну раз го во ра, во ђе ног пре из вр ше ња кри вич- ног де ла, у ко јем је ис так ну та мр жња пре ма црн ци ма. Окри вље ни С. је осу ђе на за уби ство на је да на ест го ди на за тво ра, при че му је при ли ком од ме ра ва ња ка зне узет у об зир и мо тив мр жње. Суд се, при ли ком раз ма тра ња до ка зног ма те ри ја ла, осло нио на раз го вор во ђен пре из вр ше ња кри вич ног де ла, ка ко је то би ло обра зло же но у пре су ди, ра ди пот кре пљи ва ња ста ва да је кри вич- но де ло из вр ше но из мр жње. Дру гим ре чи ма, све до че ње јед ног од ма ло лет- ни ка о са мом раз го во ру пре на па да на Афри кан ца је био ја сан по ка за тељ њи- хо ве мо ти ва ци је. Иа ко је је дан од окри вље них, под ини ци ја лом К., ис ти цао да је ње го во по на ша ње ре зул тат лич ног ис ку ства, а не мр жње, он ни је разу- мео да ње го во по на ша ње, у су шти ни мр жња и пред ра су да.19 При ме ри из прак се су та кви да су пра во суд ни ор га ни у свом ра ду на и- ла зи ли и на слу ча је ве ка да је зло чин мр жње сни мљен од стра не учи ни о ца, ка ко би сни мак био по ка зан при ја те љи ма, или по ста вљен на ин тер не ту. На овај на чин јав ном ту жи о цу је олак ша но до ка зи ва ње мо ти ва мр жње, јер се на сним ци ма ја сно ви ди, због то га што учи ни о ци, то ком из вр ше ње кри вич ног де ла да ју ко мен та ре пу не мр жње, што от кри ва мо тив зло чи на. Рад јав ног ту жи о ца на до ка зи ва њу зло чи на мр жње мо же би ти оте жан, уко ли ко не по сто је до ка зи у ви ду при зна ња, или из ја ве све до ка. Ме ђу тим, и у да тим окол но сти ма се до ка зи ва ње зло чи на мр жње сза сни ва на по сред- ним до ка зи ма, ко ји се са сто је у чи ње ни ца ма ве за ним за жи вот окри вље ног. У де лу ра да ве за ним за до ка зи ва ње зло чи на мр жње, на ве ли смо ис црп ну ли сту окол но сти, ко је мо гу по слу жи ти за до ка зи ва ње мр жње, као мо ти ва из вр ше ња од ре ђе ног кри вич ног де ла, те се у овом де лу ра да не ће мо по но во ба ви ти тим окол но сти ма, већ ће мо на ве сти при мер из прак се ра ди лак шег са гле да ва ња тих окол но сти. 19 Ibid., 57-59. Зборник радова Правног факултета у Новом Саду, 3/2018 1125 Као при мер на ве шће мо слу чај ко ји се до го дио 19. апри ла 2009. го ди не, ка да су нео на ци сти ба ци ли Мо ло то вље ве кок те ле на ку ћу у ко јој је жи ве ло де вет чла но ва ром ске по ро ди це у гра ди ћу у Че шкој по име ну Вик тов, при че му је по вре ђе но тро је чла но ве ове по ро ди це. Нај ве ћи сте пен по вре да је има ло одој че, код ко јег је пре ко 80% те ла би ло за хва ће но ва тр ом, што је узро ко ва ло опе ко ти не дру гог и тре ћег сте пе на. Че тво ри ца нео на ци ста је ок то бра на ред не го ди не осу ђе но за по ку шај уби ства на ра сној осно ви на ка зне за тво ра пре ко 20 го ди на.20 То ком ис тра ге, је дан од све до ка је ка зао да је у но ћи на па да чуо те ле фон ски раз го вор де вој ке јед ног од из вр ши о ца овог кри вич ног де ла, као и раз го вор де вој ке са сво јим при ја те љи ма. Са др жај раз- го во ра је био да мо мак ове де вој ке иде да се об ра чу на са Ци га ни ма. На осно- ву ове ин фор ма ци је на па да чи су иден ти фи ко ва ни и ухап ше ни, али је све док од био да да је до дат не ин фор ма ци је, пла ше ћи се за свој жи вот због мо гу ће осве те. Ујед но, ова ин фор ма ци ја је по мо гла ор га ни ма уну тра шњих по сло ва да на осно ву да љег опе ра тив ног ра да, пу тем при слу шки ва ња њи хо вих ме- ђу соб них раз го во ра, са зна ју да су сва че тво ри ца на па да ча чла но ви нео на ци- стич ке гру пе, при че му су при ли ком пре тре са њи хо вих ста но ва од стра не по ли ци је про на ђе ни ча со пи си и ли те ра ту ра пу ни ра си стич ких ста во ва. Од- бра на тро ји це окри вље них се са сто ја ла у то ме да ни су зна ли да се у ку ћи на ла зе при пад ни ци ром ске по пу ла ци је и да им ни је би ла на ме ра њи ма да на шко де, док се че твр ти бра нио ћу та њем. Јав ни ту жи лац је твр дио да је кри- вич но де ло из вр ше но ка ко би се ода ла по шта да ну ро ђе ња во ђе на ци стич ке Не мач ке, Адол фу Хи тле ру. Адво кат јед ног од окри вље них је за сни вао од бра- ну на тврд њи да ње гов кли јент ни је ни ка да био члан нео на ци стич ке гру пе, као и да је ту жи ла штво по гре шно оква ли фи ко ва ло слу чај и да уме сто по ку- ша ја уби ства ви ше ли ца на ра сној осно ви, кри вич но де ло тре ба да бу де пре- ква ли фи ко ва но као на но ше ње те шке те ле сне по вре де. Ујед но, од бра на је по- ку ша ла да до во ђе њем све до ка, ко ји су све до чи ли о до брим од но си ма са школ- ским дру го ви ма, при пад ни ци ма ром ске по пу ла ци је то ком шко ло ва ња, по ка- же да ни је по сто ја ла ра сна мо ти ва ци ја при ли ком из вр ше ња кри вич ног де ла.21 Из при ка за ног опи са слу ча ја мо же мо до ћи до за кључ ка ко је су би ле кључ не ства ри у до ка зи ва њу мр жње, као мо ти ва из вр ше ња кри вич ног де ла. Иа ко из ја ва све до ка о раз го во ру јед ног од учи ни о ца са сво јом де вој ком ни је би ла до вољ на за до ка зи ва ње мр жње, ова из ја ва све до ка је пред ста вља ла раз лог да суд одо бри при слу шки ва ње те ле фон ских раз го во ра све че тво ри це осум њи че них, што је по мо гло у по ди за њу оп ту жни це про тив њих. Осим то га, до шло је до пре тре са ста но ва све че тво ри це осум њи че них, што је ре зул- ти ра ло ти ме да се про на ђу ча со пи си и ли те ра ту ра са на ци стич ким са др жа јем. 20 Hu man Rights of Ro ma and Tra vel lers in Eu ro pe, 2013, 53. 21 Pro se cu ting ha te cri mes – a Prac ti cal gu i de, 2014, 61-63. 1126 Др Дар ко Т. Ди мов ски, Др Ми о ми ра П. Ко стић, До ка зи ва ње зло чи на мр жње (стр. 1113–1129) Укуп ност до ка за, као и ни чим ис про во ци ран бри та лан на пад на ром ску по ро ди цу, пред ста вљао је ла нац ин ди ци ја, чи ме је до ка за на мр жња као мо тив из вр ше ња овог кри вич ног де ла. Још јед на од ду жно сти јав ног ту жи о ца у до ка зи ва њу зло чи на мр жње је пред ста вља ње су ду сте пе на на но ше них по вре да оште ће ног (жр тве), од стра не из вр ши о ца зло чи на мр жње. Сто га је нео п ход но да се ме ди цин ска до ку мен та- ци ја бла го вре ме но до ста ви су ду. Жр тве зло чи на мр жње че сто, услед стра ха од се кун дар не вик ти ми за ци је, ни су вољ не да са ра ђу ју са кли нич ким цен- три ма, у ко ји ма се од ви ја ју пре гле ди сте пе на на не ше них по вре да. Из ово га про из и ла зи по ве ћан сте пен од го вор но сти јав ног ту жи о ца, ко ја се о са сто ји у омо гу ћа ва њу са рад ње кли нич ких цен та ра и ор га ни за ци ја ци вил ног дру- штва, јер жр тве зло чи на мр жње че сто ви ше ве ру ју пред став ни ци ма не вла- ди них ор га ни за ци ја. Ова са рад ња тре ба да бу де ус по ста вље на на ро чи то у слу ча ју не по сто ја ња фи зич ких по вре да. већ са мо пси хич ких по сле ди ца, јер ор га ни за ци је ци вил ног сек то ра су че сто снаб де ве ни струч ња ци ма, ко ји се бри ну о осна жи ва њу жр та ва. Иа ко се на пр ви по глед мо же ре ћи да ово не пред ста вља бит ну ка ри ку у до ка зи ва њу зло чи на мр жње, са ова квим ста вом тре ба би ти на ро чи то опре зан, јер јав ни ту жи о ци мо ра ју да на глав ном пре- тре су пред ста ве не са мо фи зич ке, већ и пси хич ке по сле ди це из вр ше ног кри- вич ног де ла, ка ко би лак се до ка за ли по сто ја ње зло чи на мр жње. У од ре ђе ним слу ча је ви ма је мо гу ће да не по сто је пси хич ке по сле ди це из вр ше ног зло чи на мр жње, али је и да ље нео п ход но да јав ни ту жи лац по ка же не га тив ни ути цај пред ра су да и мр жње на са му жр тву. То се мо же до ка за ти по зи ва њем жр тве за све до ка, ка ко би са ма пред ста ви ла соп стве на ис ку ства у ве зи зло чи на мр жње.22 У том слу ча ју тре ба при ме ни ти аде кват не ме ре за за шти ту све до ка. УЛО ГА СУ ДА У УТВР ЂИ ВА ЊУ ПО СТО ЈА ЊА ЗЛО ЧИ НА МР ЖЊЕ Про ме ном кри вич ног про це сног за ко но дав ства 2011. го ди не, уло га су да је знат но сма ње ња у по ступ ку пред ла га ња и из во ђе ња до ка за. На и ме, у чла ну 15 став 4 За ко ни ка о кри вич ном по ступ ку (у да љем тек сту ЗКП) је про пи са но да суд има са мо суп си ди јар но и из у зет но овла шће ње да без пред ло га стра на ка, бра ни о ца и оште ће ног из во ди до ка зе, чи ме је ње гов ма не вар ски про стор до ста су жен у слу ча је ви ма ко ји су ком пли ко ва ни, а зло чин мр жње то очи глед но је- сте.23 Дру гим ре чи ма, на стран ка ма, бра ни о цу и оште ће ном је пред ла га ње до ка за, те да у слу ча ју њи хо ве не ак тив но сти, суд мо же из во ди ти до ка зе, при 22 Ibid., 63. 23 За ко ник о кри вич ном по ступ ку, „Сл. гла сник РС“, бр. 72/2011, 101/2011, 121/2012, 32/2013, 45/2013 и 55/2014 Зборник радова Правног факултета у Новом Саду, 3/2018 1127 че му су ди је у прак си из бе га ва ју да при ме њу ју ову од ред бу. До ово га мо же до- ћи уко ли ко су из ве де ни до ка зи про тив реч ни, или не ја сни и да је то нео п ход но да би се пред мет до ка зи ва ња све стра но рас пра вио, тако да суд мо же да ти на лог стран ци да пред ло жи до пун ске до ка зе, или из у зет но сам од ре ди ти да се та кви до ка зи из ве ду. Сто га је, сход но за кон ским од ред ба ма, део од го вор но сти за до- ка зи ва ње мр жње као мо ти ва из вр ше ња кри вич ног де ла, и на су ду. Осим уло ге су да у по гле ду пред ла га ња и из во ђе ња до ка за, у ве зи зло- чи на мр жње, ње го ва ду жност се огле да и у од ме ра ва њу ка зне, при ме ном чла на 54а Кри вич ног за ко ни ка. Пре не го што суд узме мр жњу као оба ве зну оте жа ва ју ћу окол ност, мо ра да при ме ни оп шта пра ви ла о од ме ра ва њу ви си- не ка зне. Са раз ло гом се по ста вља пи та ње, на ко ји на чин тре ба це ни ти мр- жњу као мо тив из вр ше ња кри вич ног де ла, у од но су на дру ге окол но сти, ко је ути чу на ви си ну ка зне. На и ме, мо гу ћа су два ре ше ња. Јед но се са сто ји у то ме да суд пр во од ме ри ви си ну ка зне на осно ву окол но сти из чла на 54 КЗ, а да на кон то га од ме ри мр жњу, као по себ ну оте жа ва ју ћу окол ност, по ве ћа ва- ју ћи већ од ре ђе ну ви си ну ка зне за мр жњу као оте жа ва ју ћу окол ност. Дру га оп ци ја се огле да у то ме да мр жњу суд узме као би ло ко ју дру гу окол ност у укуп ном од ме ра ва њу ви си не ка зне. На ред на функ ци ја су да у по гле ду кри вич них де ла, из вр ше них из мо ти ва мр жње, се огле да у то ме да суд тре ба да те жи оства ри ва њу ге не рал не и спе- ци јал не пре вен ци је. На и ме, нео п ход но је во ди ти ра чу на да из ре че на ка зна тре ба исто вре ме но да оства ри и спе ци јал ну и ге не рал ну пре вен ци ју, те да суд мо ра да, по ред то га што тре ба да од вра ти учи ни о ца зло чи на мр жње од вр ше- ња но вих кри вич них де ла, да по ша ље по ру ку свим по тен ци јал ним из вр ши о- ци ма овог об ли ка кри ми на ли те та на си ља да ће би ти нај стро жи је ка жње ни за сво је дру штве но не при хва тљи во по на ша ње.24 Над ле жни суд мо ра да, на аде- ква тан на чин, обра зло жи сво ју од лу ку, на ро чи то у по гле ду мр жње, као оба- ве зне оте жа ва ју ће окол но сти. У су прот ном по сто ји јед на од бит них по вре да од ре да ба кри вич ног по ступ ка, услед ко је до ла зи до уки да ња пре су де. Због то га по себ ну па жњу при ли ком обра зла га ња ви си не ка зне тре ба по све ти ти мр жњи, као су бјек тив ној оте жа ва ју ћој окол но сти, у сми слу да се из пре су де мо же ви де ти у че му се са сто ји мр жња као мо тив из вр ше ња кон крет ног кри- вич ног де ла, те на осно ву то га да ти об ја шње ње о по ве ћа ну из ре че не ка зне. ЗА КЉУ ЧАК До ка зи ва ње зло чи на мр жње је ком плек сно, јер до но ше ње осу ђу ју ће пре- су де зах те ва си нер ги ју у ра ду ор га на уну тра шњих по сло ва, јав ног ту жи о ца 24 Ал мер Ма ље вић, Ср ђан Ву јо вић, Во дич за про це су и ра ње кри вич них дје ла по чи ње них из мр жње у Бо сни и Хер це го ви ни, Ана ли ти ка, Са ра је во, 2013, 65. 1128 Др Дар ко Т. Ди мов ски, Др Ми о ми ра П. Ко стић, До ка зи ва ње зло чи на мр жње (стр. 1113–1129) и су да, ка ко би се от кри ло по сто ја ње мр жње, као мо ти ва из вр ше ња кри вич ног де ла, ка ко би се оно до ка за ло и ка ко би се, на аде ква тан на чин це ни ло, при- ли ком од ме ра ва ња ка зне из вр ши о цу кри вич ног де ла. Ау то ри су у ре ду те жи- ли да пред ста ве окол но сти, ко је сво јим по сто ја њем тре ба да до при не су лак шем до ка зи ва њу мр жње. Ујед но, те окол но сти тре ба да пред ста вља ју оно чи ме ор га ни уну тра шњих по сло ва и јав ни ту жи лац тре ба да се ру ко во де у по ступ- ку от кри ва ња по сто ја ња мр жње, јер про ве ром по сто ја ња тих окол но сти до- ла зи до лак шег до ка зи ва ња по сто ја ња мр жње, као мо ти ва из вр ше ња кон крет- ног кри вич ног де ла. У пред ис тра жном по ступ ку, као и у ис тра зи, не ми нов но до ла зи до од ре ђе них те шко ћа у от кри ва ње мр жње. Ка ко је дат при каз по тен- ци јал них те шко ћа, бла го вре ме ним упо зна ва њем по ли ци је и јав ног ту жи о ца са њи ма до ла зи до де ло твор ни јег ра да у про це си у ра њу зло чи на мр жње. От кри ва ње зло чи на мр жње зах те ва, пре све га, бла го вре ме но уо ча ва ње од стра не ор га на уну тра шњих по сло ва, да код кон крет ног кри вич ног де ла мо тив из вр ше ња је сте мр жња. Дру гим ре чи ма, ка ко ор га ни уну тра шњих по сло ва оства ру ју пр ви кон такт са жр твом из вр ше ног кри вич ног де ла, и то вр ло че сто на ли цу ме ста, они тре ба да на сто је да бла го вре ме ним пре по зна- ва њем еле ме на та зло чи на мр жње обез бе де по себ не окол но сти, ко је би ка- сни је до при не ле лак шем до ка зи ва њу. Тре ба на гла си ти и фи ло зоф ску ко но та ци ју зло чи на мр жња. Мно го број на пи та ња, чак и пра во на от пор, као из вор но при род но пра во, ка ко се то раз- ма тра у спи си ма Џо на Ло ка, мо же у до тич ном слу ча ју из вр ше ног кри вич ног де ла пред ста вља ти пред мет ве шта че ња. Уко ли ко се из вр ши лац по зи ва на сво ју по бу ну про тив не прав де, а у осно ви је мр жња пре ма жр тви, да ли се та да мо же та кав по сту пак ква ли фи ко ва ти као де ло про тив др жа ве, или са мо не ког од ре ђе ног по је дин ца.25 Ово ва жно пи та ње сва ка ко спа да у до мен суд- ске од лу ке о ква ли фи ка ци ји де ла. Ипак, до ка зи ва ње мр жње, као мо ти ва из вр ше ња кри вич ног де ла, је не- мо гу ће без са рад ње са јав ним ту жи о цем, као ор га ном ко ји ру ко во ди ис тра гом и на ко јем је пре зен то ва ње и из во ђе ње су ду свих до ка за. Ау то ри су у ра ду пред ста ви ли по тен ци јал не до ка зе, са при ме ри ма, ко ји тре ба да олак ша ју јав- ним ту жи о ци ма рад на про це су и ра њу зло чи на мр жње. Над ле жни суд, као кључ ни ор ган за утвр ђи ва ње и ка жња ва ње зло чи на мр жње, има оба ве зе пред- у зи ма ња од ре ђе них рад њи. На и ме, суд мо ра, по ред од ме ра ва ња ви си не ка зне, при ме ном чла на 54а КЗ, да оства ри ге не рал ну и спе ци јал ну пре вен ци ју, што зах те ва од го ва ра ју ће обра зло же ње суд ске пре су де ка ко у жал бе ном по ступ ку да та суд ска од лу ка не би би ла уки ну та и вра ће на на по нов но од лу чи ва ње. Ујед но, мо гу ћа је ак тив ност су да при ли ком из во ђе ња до ка за, ка ко би се от- кло ни ле про тив реч но сти и не ја сно ће из ме ђу из ве де них до ка за. 25 Ви ше о то ме вид. Или ја Јо ва нов, „Џон Лок и пра во на от пор“, Збо р ник ра до ва Прав- ног фа кул те та у Но вом Са ду, 3/2015, 1400. Зборник радова Правног факултета у Новом Саду, 3/2018 1129 Dar ko T. Di mov ski, Ph.D., As so ci a te Pro fes sor Uni ver sity of Niš Fa culty of Law Niš dar ko @pra fak.ni.ac.rs Mi o mi ra P. Ko stić, Ph.D., Full Pro fes sor Uni ver sity of Niš Fa culty of Law Niš ko sticm@pra fak.ni .ac .rs Pro ving of Ha te Cri mes Ab stract: At the be gin ning, the aut hors ha ve po in ted out that the le gi sla tor in the Re pu blic of Ser bia Re vi sion of the Cri mi nal Co de in 2012 in tro du ced ar tic le 54a, in which is the mo ti ve of ha tred pre scri bed as a man da tory ag gra va ting cir- cum stan ce. Alt ho ugh from the adop tion of this ar tic le past few years ago it has not been ap pli ca ble in any ca se un til now. The re fo re, the aut hors ha ve paid spe cial at ten tion to re vi e wing all the pro blems in pro ving a ha te cri me. First, they ha ve sta ted, ac cor ding to the typo logy de ve lo ped by the Fe de ral Bu re au of In ve sti ga tion, the cir cum stan ces which need to po int to the exi sten ce of ha te cri mes. The next part is de di ca ted to the dif fi cul ti es in pro ving ha tred as the mo ti ve of the cri me. As pro of of ha te cri me re qu i res har mo ni zed work of in ter nal af fa irs bo di es, the pu blic pro se cu tor and the co u rt, the aut hors of the for thco ming ha ve ela bo ra ted the ro le of each of the se or gans in pro ving a ha te cri me. Keywords: ha te cri me, pro ving, dif fi cul ti es, the ro le of the com pe tent aut ho- ri ti es. Да тум при је ма ра да: 08.10.2018. 
work_sxszlbb44zdzjbja3uevmnchzy	----	Collective reflection in practice: an ethnographic study of Swedish police training http://www.diva-portal.org This is the published version of a paper published in Reflective Practice. Citation for the original published paper (version of record): Rantatalo, O., Karp, S. (2016) Collective reflection in practice: an ethnographic study of Swedish police training. Reflective Practice, 17(6): 708-723 https://doi.org/10.1080/14623943.2016.1206881 Access to the published version may require subscription. N.B. When citing this work, cite the original published paper. Permanent link to this version: http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-124131 Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=crep20 Download by: [78.68.115.173] Date: 14 January 2017, At: 22:57 Reflective Practice International and Multidisciplinary Perspectives ISSN: 1462-3943 (Print) 1470-1103 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/crep20 Collective reflection in practice: an ethnographic study of Swedish police training Oscar Rantatalo & Staffan Karp To cite this article: Oscar Rantatalo & Staffan Karp (2016) Collective reflection in practice: an ethnographic study of Swedish police training, Reflective Practice, 17:6, 708-723, DOI: 10.1080/14623943.2016.1206881 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14623943.2016.1206881 © 2016 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group Published online: 20 Jul 2016. Submit your article to this journal Article views: 373 View related articles View Crossmark data http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=crep20 http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/crep20 http://www.tandfonline.com/action/showCitFormats?doi=10.1080/14623943.2016.1206881 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14623943.2016.1206881 http://www.tandfonline.com/action/authorSubmission?journalCode=crep20&show=instructions http://www.tandfonline.com/action/authorSubmission?journalCode=crep20&show=instructions http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/mlt/10.1080/14623943.2016.1206881 http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/mlt/10.1080/14623943.2016.1206881 http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1080/14623943.2016.1206881&domain=pdf&date_stamp=2016-07-20 http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1080/14623943.2016.1206881&domain=pdf&date_stamp=2016-07-20 Reflective PRactice, 2016 vOl. 17, NO. 6, 708–723 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14623943.2016.1206881 Collective reflection in practice: an ethnographic study of Swedish police training Oscar Rantataloa  and Staffan Karpb  aPolice education Unit, Umeå University, Umeå, Sweden; bDepartment of education, Umeå University, Umeå, Sweden ABSTRACT Although reflection has been viewed as an individual process, increased attention has been given to how reflective processes are socially anchored. The present article contributes to this knowledge through an examination of how collective reflection is enacted in the context of police education. The article is based on a one-year ethnographic study of police recruits undergoing training, and the main sources of data collection were participant observations and field interviews. The data were inductively analysed, and a model that differentiates amongst ‘specular’, ‘dialogic’ and ‘polyphonic’ reflection processes is presented. The findings suggest that collective reflection involving multiple individuals adds complexity to reflective processes and that these processes may take on more diverse forms than has been acknowledged, as previous research has mainly focused on dialogic collective reflection. The implications of these findings, such as how increased complexity may counteract the benefits of collective reflection, are also discussed. The benefits of reflection and reflective practice in professional, organizational and adult edu- cational contexts are well-documented. However, research regarding reflection has been crit- icized because the majority of studies have employed cognitively oriented perspectives on reflection, conceptualizing it as an individual ‘inward’ process (Reynolds & Vince, 2004; Segall & Gaudelli, 2007). In the studies that conceptualize reflection as a social or collective endeavour, reflection has been discussed from different theoretical perspectives, ranging from everyday common-sense assertions that reflection is social because it takes place in social settings, to more elaborate and theoretically infused descriptions of reflection, mainly from socio-cultural and practice-based perspectives (Collin & Karsenti, 2011; Høyrup & Elkjaer, 2006). In a review, Høyrup and Elkjaer (2006) conclude that one of the most common ways to understand collective reflection is through an individualized perspective, wherein reflection is described as a cognitive individual learning process but one that takes place in social settings. As discussed by Boud, Cressey, and Docherty (2006), the role of social relations in reflection becomes fully instrumental from this perspective because the input of others mainly serves to trigger individual cognitive processes. Contrasting an individual perspective, © 2016 the author(s). Published by informa UK limited, trading as taylor & francis Group. this is an Open access article distributed under the terms of the creative commons attribution-Noncommercial-NoDerivatives license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, and is not altered, transformed, or built upon in any way. KEYWORDS Reflection; reflective practice; collective reflection; police training; vocational education; policing ARTICLE HISTORY Received 3 March 2016 accepted 13 June 2016 CONTACT Oscar Rantatalo oscar.rantatalo@umu.se OPEN ACCESS http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ mailto:oscar.rantatalo@umu.se REflECTIVE PRACTICE 709 Høyrup and Elkjaer (2006) define the social relations perspective on reflection in terms of a practice-based perspective in which reflective processes are embedded in social contexts. The authors state that ‘individual agency is embodied in social structures and that social structures operate through individuals’ (Høyrup & Elkjaer, 2006, p. 29). from this perspective, reflection can be described as a situated practice of collectively making sense of ongoing events through activities such as vision sharing, experimentation and assumption breaking (van Woerkom, Nijhof, & Nieuwenhuis, 2002). Although these contributions provide theoretical insights and concept development regarding socially oriented reflection, there is currently a need for explorative empirical research that aims to operationalize in what ways reflection can be examined and understood as social or collective. The present paper aims to build on the current research on this subject by making two main contributions: first, we add to the knowledge regarding collective reflection by pre- senting an empirically grounded model that describes different types and processes of social reflection; second, the paper discusses what implications and possibilities a collectively oriented conceptualization of reflection may have for further research. The empirical basis for the study consists of ethnographic observations of a group of Swedish police students throughout their first year of police education. The case is well-suited for the purposes of this paper, because policing is an occupational practice that is highly dependent on the ability of individual officers to have a reflexive mind set to ‘balance legit- imate yet conflicting values and rights’ and to make fair decisions quickly under often difficult circumstances (Marenin, 2004, p. 108). Developing reflexive police officers has also been a dominant ideal in the contemporary police educational discourse in Sweden and in other countries, and basic training is currently heavily impacted by the problem-based learning (PBl) philosophy, wherein students consistently work in groups that regularly face open- ended problems associated with the police profession (lauritz & Hansson, 2013; Vander Kooi & Palmer, 2014). Thus, police education is viewed as a professional educational context that is largely group-based and in which field training and theory need to be interwoven. As such, it provides a case with the potential to provide insights into how episodes of collective reflection are formed in practice. Collective reflection To explore how social contexts operate in reflective processes, Dyke (2006), in a review of reflection theory, discusses how collective reflection can be conceptualized on different levels, such as micro day-to-day perspectives and macro-oriented social perspectives. from a micro day-to-day perspective, reflection can be described as spurred by an individual’s engagement and social interactions with others that expose the individual to ‘difference’ (Dyke, 2006). Through communicative discourse and dialogue, reflection based on experi- ences with others enables individuals to disentangle themselves ‘from their biographies, their social world, past experience and the impact of representations on these experiences’ (Dyke, 2006, p. 118). This emphasis on communication and dialogue to foster collective reflection is mirrored in Raelin (2001), who, using the concept of ‘dialogic practice’, discusses how individuals are confronted with themselves as they are exposed to alternative interpre- tations of social reality through the input of others. In addition, Ohlsson (2013) describes how dialogue and communicative discourse shape collective reflection because these enable 710 O. RANTATAlO AND S. KARP groups of individuals to construct shared understandings and notice conflicting ideas. Connecting reflection to the notion of depth, and specifically the concepts of single- and double-loop learning, Ohlsson (2013) introduces the concept of ‘collective reflection loops’ as a way to describe how collaborative reflection can be of double-loop nature, directed at a premise level of assumptions, as it is spurred by the individual’s exposure to alternative interpretations of social reality. Central to these accounts of collective reflection, is the notion of how social relations and communicative action provides access to difference, conflicting ideas and alternative conceptualizations. This focus on difference is also present in the sen- semaking perspectives of reflection, such as the framework presented by Bjerlöv and Docherty (2006). Drawing on Piaget, the authors provide a detailed framework of collective reflection that takes place through iterative processes of differentiation (in which individuals collectively engage to distance themselves from individual subjectivity), decentration (in which the recognition of diverse experiences enables the collective to make sense of a multitude of possible perspectives) and perceptual (re)formulations (in which perspectives are shifted). As with other frameworks of social reflection, the authors highlight dialogue as incremental for these processes because communicative actions make diverse experiences available as triggers and frameworks for sensemaking. In addition to micro day-to-day frameworks of collective reflection, Dyke’s (2006) review also describes how social reflection can be conceptualized from organizational and culturally oriented perspectives, in which the role of social structures and cultural contexts is high- lighted as the input for reflection (see also, Boud & Walker, 1998). from this perspective, reflective processes tend to be viewed as collective in the sense that broader social, political and cultural assumptions are embodied in micro practice (Høyrup & Elkjaer, 2006; Reynolds, 1999; Reynolds & Vince, 2004). Moreover, the emphasis on contexts and structures that facilitate processes of collective reflection has been a reoccurring subject of examination in organizational research, where one central question has been how firms can ‘organize reflec- tion’ (see Jordan, 2010; Reynolds & Vince, 2004). In other words, this research revolves around how organizations can work to create and uphold institutionalized arrangements that foster collective reflection (Jordan, 2010). Keevers and Treleaven’s (2011) study of reflective prac- tices in a community centre provides one example of an empirical study with this focus. The authors identify multiple forms of reflexive practices (anticipatory, deliberative, organizing and critical) that allow different viewpoints and different types of learning and activities in practice. Interestingly, the authors also highlight temporal phases of reflection as important. Much in line with van Manen’s (1995) notion of anticipatory reflection, Keevers and Treleaven (2011) describe processes of collective reflection that are future-oriented, as opposed to retrospective reflection involving past experiences. The authors also highlight how antici- patory reflection, which is characterized by brief moments of ‘stop and think’ in the midst of practising, are important to consider in organizing. Collective reflection, as viewed from this perspective, can be concluded to hold an eman- cipatory potential because it provides opportunities to make visible social and cultural premises of a particular context that are often taken for granted. As such, the process of reflection can be conceptualized as collective because it involves more than one individual, but the premises for reflection can also be viewed as inherently collective because they are permeated by cultural historical meaning (Reynolds & Vince, 2004). Collin and Karsenti’s (2011) socio-cultural framework on reflection provides an example that highlights this con- nection. Building on Vygotsky’s (1962) socio-cognitive theory of semiotic mediation, the REflECTIVE PRACTICE 711 authors present a model of interactional reflective practice that conceptualizes collective reflection as being sparked by action, mediated by communication and taking place at both the interpersonal and intrapersonal (interacting) level, where social and cultural norms and premises in addition to social interactions form reflective processes. In addition to sociological, cultural and educational accounts of collective reflection that focus upon conceptual development, a number of psychologically oriented studies of col- lective reflection have aimed to operationalize how social reflection plays out in practice on an observable level. for instance, Schippers, Den Hartog, and Koopman (2007), building on West’s (2000) work, identify two dimensions of collective ‘team-reflection’ in activities directed towards the evaluation of learning and activities directed at discussions of group processes. Behaviours connected to evaluation of learning are, among other things, discus- sions about different trajectories towards goal achievement and incorporation of different perspectives into the considerations of team learning. Behaviours related to the discussion of team processes are, among other things, exemplified by after-action review of team activities – that is, team revision of objectives and discussions regarding efficiency in prob- lem-solving (see also, Schippers, West, & Dawson, 2015). A similar framework is presented by van Woerkom and Croon (2008), who drew on Mezirow’s (1998) concept of critical reflec- tion and sought to develop a model to identify accompanied behaviours and activities. The authors define critical reflective work behaviours as ‘connected activities carried out indi- vidually or in interaction with others’ and discussed constructs such as opinion sharing, openness, feedback, challenging of group think, experimentation and career awareness as behaviours related to critical reflection (van Woerkom & Croon, 2008, p. 318). In summary, different approaches to collective reflection can be placed on a continuum ranging from individualized perspectives (in which social reflection mainly involves instru- mental aid in reflecting) to behavioural and psychological frameworks (which mainly focus on the establishment of measurable constructs and the operationalization of theory) and social relations perspectives (in which collective reflection involves the co-construction of meaning). This indicates that social or collective reflection may showcase different degrees of complexity in terms of interaction patterns and how social space is regulated. This con- clusion dovetails with research regarding collaborative learning and group work, in which different approaches to the regulation of social space in groups have been conceptualized. for instance, Volet and colleagues (Volet, Summers, & Thurman, 2009; Volet, Vauras, & Salonen, 2009) described coordination and regulation of interactions in social learning and distinguished between ‘other regulation’ and ‘shared regulation’ of social space. The previous discussion is descriptive of situations that are ‘momentarily unequal’ (Volet, Summers, & Thurman, 2009, p. 129), in which one or a few social agents within a group take on a more active role, thereby rendering the others more passive. Conversely, ‘shared regulation’ refers to the joint activity of framing and sensemaking in which several members of a group interact simultaneously. Drawing on our review, we conclude that similar interaction patterns can be anticipated to occur in collective reflection processes. Based on the review, it can also be concluded that previous conceptualizations of collective reflection have defined reflection on different levels, in regards to not only depth but also its context. Mezirow (1990, 2000) conceptualized depth in reflection processes when demarcat- ing differences amongst content, process and premise (presupposition) reflection. In short, content reflection regards the ingredients of experiences, the immediate events, as experi- enced and acted upon by an individual or a group. Process reflection entails turning the 712 O. RANTATAlO AND S. KARP attention to the subject itself and the process via which the individuals think, feel, act or learn. Premise reflection entails assessments of the foundation of one’s outlook on the world, such as the assumptions and axioms of thinking. Although Mezirow did not explicitly discuss col- lective reflection, this division has had an impact on conceptualizations of collective reflection (see van Woerkom & Croon, 2008). finally, it can also be concluded that different conceptu- alizations range from situated perspectives to cultural perspectives on social context. In sit- uated perspectives, the notion of sociality tends to be defined in terms of ‘here and now’ interactions between individuals in the immediate social environment, whereas macro- oriented perspectives on collective reflection emphasize the importance of culturally estab- lished meanings or organizational arrangements as baseline inputs for reflection. Overall, the review indicates that an emerging body of literature on collective reflection has conceptualized these processes from a number of different angles. However, there is currently a need for more empirical research that holds potential to assess theoretical claims and to extend our knowledge about why and how collective reflective processes are enacted in practice. The present article aims to contribute to the understanding of collective reflection by exploring how collective reflection processes can be characterized as they are naturalis- tically enacted in practice. With these questions as a basis, this paper sets out to construct an empirically grounded model that describes different types and processes of collective reflection relative to each other. Methods and materials The data for this study were collected using ethnographical participant observations (Spradley, 1980) and field interviews, in which the authors followed a group of Swedish police recruits (PRs) from admission into the police academy training programme and throughout their first year of police training. In total, 38 occasions of observations, 23 informal field interviews and two focus-group interviews with students in base groups constitute the empirical material of the study. The field interviews and focus groups were conducted in direct connection to observations. In addition, a number of documents with instructions, schedules and syllabi functioned as secondary data that provided a contextual understand- ing for both the observations and the interviews. fieldwork served to capture and provide rich descriptions of the social practices of collective reflection that recruits come in contact with during the progress of police training. Previous observation studies have indicated difficulties in ‘seeing’ and interpreting the in-the-moment reflection that is embedded in actions (Keevers & Treleaven, 2011). However, as this study targeted collective reflection, this problem could be overcome because collective reflection by definition involves social interactions and as such has both a performative and an observable component. Because we also complemented observations with interviews, specific observed episodes could be followed up on with an immediate connection to the observations. With a sample consisting of PRs, the setting of the study was a police education pro- gramme in Sweden. As previously mentioned, this setting is influenced by the PBl method- ology, something which means that open-ended assignments are commonplace and that students work collaboratively with assignments in groups during a large portion of their training. In this specific case, the authors followed a subclass (N = 25) within a larger class of PRs (N = 75). Within the observed subclass, students were further divided into four base groups, and of these groups, the authors focused especially upon one (N = 5). The base REflECTIVE PRACTICE 713 groups and subclasses were selected by the teachers at the start of the education pro- gramme, and the groups were coherent throughout the first year, which enabled repeated observations of specific groups of students within the larger class of PRs. The sample of observations was made to target a variety of educational settings and content within police training, ranging from recruits’ experiences with theoretical lectures and seminars to practical scenario training and exercises. A common denominator in many of the observations was a focus upon educational courses, in which experience was followed up in some respect and in which students had opportunities to work in groups. field notes were used to log and outline turns of events during the observations, and these were com- piled into more extensive narratives in direct connection with the observed events (Wolfinger, 2002). In addition, notes were also kept on the structure and alignment of the observed educational settings. Table 1 provides an overview of the data collection process. The collection and analysis of data was conducted simultaneously and had been inspired by grounded theory techniques. Data analysis was performed through the computer-assisted Table 1. fieldwork undertaken. Term 1 observed context Interviews Observed activity course intro course introduction ‘police in society’ law intro course introduction law law lecture criminal law lecture conflict management training field interview Practically exercising techniques law seminar field interview Seminars criminal law Mental preparation Seminars on feedback and related concepts Preliminary investigative methods field interview course introduction Preliminary investigative methods Group tutoring – theoretical case Group processes field interview Self-directed group development exercises Preliminary investigative methods Group tutoring Preliminary investigative methods Group tutoring Preliminary investigative methods Group tutoring Preliminary investigative methods field interview Group tutoring Preliminary investigative methods Prep. and conducting oral presentations Preliminary investigative methods focus group int. Group tutoring and focus group (6 students) Preliminary investigative methods field interview Prep. and conducting oral presentations Term 2 observed context Interviews Observed activity Group processes field interview Seminars Order and security Seminars case ‘corner Shop Burglary’ field interviews Practical exercises (crime scene investigation, etc.) case ‘corner Shop burglary’ Group tutoring Basic police tactical training field interview Practically scenario training field training follow-ups 1 field interview Seminars field training follow-ups 2 field interview Seminars case ‘corner shop burglary’ field interview interrogation exercise 1 case ‘corner shop burglary’ Group tutoring follow-up on interrogation exercise 1 case ‘corner shop burglary’ focus group int. interrogation exercise 2 focus group interview Student group (6 students) case ‘corner shop burglary’ Group tutoring follow-up on interrogation exercise 2 case ‘corner shop burglary’ field interview Scenarios: house warrant, apprehension, interrogation Weapons and tactics training field interview arms training, shooting with fX in scenarios case ‘corner shop burglary’ field interview Seminars: oral presentations and case conclusion case ‘hate crime’ field interview interrogation exercises Mental preparation field interview follow-up seminars reflections on weapons training case ‘hate crime’ field interview Group tutoring, follow-up on interrogation exercises case ‘hate crime’ interrogation exercise 2 case ‘hate crime’ field interview Group tutoring, follow-up on interrogation exercises conflict management training field interview Practically training self-defence techniques conflict management training field interview Practically training self-defence techniques crowd control and arrests Scenario training crowd control and arrests field interview Seminars based on experiences from scenarios 714 O. RANTATAlO AND S. KARP qualitative data analysis software package Nvivo10, and the data were analysed in three main steps following the recommendations for compiling data structures in qualitative research (Gioia, Corley, & Hamilton, 2013). In detail, this meant that the authors first con- structed codes out of the empirical observation notes. Similar to open-coding procedures, codes were descriptive of observed courses of events or informants’ narrated experiences. In the construction of the codes, the objective was to formulate them to closely match the perceived courses of events in observations and field interviews (i.e. the codes were inform- ant-centred). In the second phase of analysis, the codes were analysed in relation to each other to identify emergent ‘second-order’ themes with the potential to inform the theory on reflection (i.e. theory-centred categories). Categories were assessed in regard to overlap and coherence. With the codes and categories as a basis, the third step of analysis sought to group the second-order themes into theoretical ‘aggregate dimensions’, which can be defined as overarching theoretical narratives with explanatory power (Gioia et al., 2013). The results of these three analytical steps are visualized in a data structure (see figure 1) that was used as an analytical device and a graphical representation of how theoretical inferences are drawn from empirical findings. Figure 1.  Data structure. REflECTIVE PRACTICE 715 Findings Collective reflection at police basic training was a recurring feature of the recruits’ day-to-day activities in group work. As an overview, collective reflection was based on the interplay and tensions between collective reflection in more formalized settings and informal micro- sequences of collective reflection between formal activities. In figure 1, the main features of collective reflection as observed in this study are described on three aggregated levels. The figure describes first-order concepts and material practices of collective reflection, sec- ond-order themes that arrange a number of first-order codes, and aggregated theoretical dimensions of collective reflection. This way of working with ethnographic observational data on several levels of abstraction enabled us to analyse various exemplified practices of collective reflection in terms of six types of activities and three main types of collective reflective processes, namely, ‘polyphony’, ‘dialogic’ and ‘specular’ reflection. This conceptu- alization is aimed to promote theoretical contributions in regards to the question of how reflection can be seen as socially and collectively enacted in various settings and practices. In the following sections, we provide in-depth descriptions of each form of collective reflec- tive process. The findings section then concludes with an analysis of common denominators and differences between the types of collective reflection. Polyphonic reflection Social reflection characterized by polyphony can be described as relatively informal collective reflection that was exhibited in situ without an apparent goal orientation. Here, we use the notion of polyphony with inspiration from Cunliffe and Coupland (2012) and Cunliffe (2004), defining it as a process in which competing narratives of group members interplay in a fluid and multivoiced manner. With these characteristics, this type of reflection was observed in micro-sequences involving several actors voicing their views and discussing various subjects in a rather unstructured manner. One type of polyphonic collective reflection entailed col- lective brainstorming, which was showcased when the PRs engaged in exploration of new knowledge. This type of reflection was often proactively oriented, reflecting before some- thing was about to happen and trying to anticipate courses of events. A specific example of this process was when recruits collectively constructed narratives describing the group’s interpretation of some subject. These narratives were often voiced interchangeably, with recruits building cumulatively on each other’s statements, underscoring and helping each other towards a common interpretation. Another example of polyphonic collective reflection was when groups were monitoring common processes. This type of reflective process was mainly directed at the group and its social relations and learning trajectory rather than issues or matters outside the group. Examples of collective reflection directed at the group were assessments of the group’s progress, narrowing down and deciding on collective standpoints, navigating the groups progress through process-oriented questions such as ‘Where are we now?’ finally, a third polyphonic reflective process entailed sensemaking of puzzling matters. As with descriptions of sensemaking (cf. Weick, 1995), the significant features of this process were how collectives addressed equivocality and tensions related to situations characterized by messiness and ill-defined problems. In response to such situations, we frequently observed how groups discussed problems and made associations in a quite disorganized manner, using this conversation as a map to make sense of what had just occurred. This seemed to 716 O. RANTATAlO AND S. KARP be a resource for the group, as an ongoing conversation functioned to propel solutions and sometimes unexpected interpretations and insights that emanated from an ambiguous situation. An illustrative example of collective sensemaking around a puzzling matter that involved five individuals (including the researcher) was a discussion that broke out after an interrogation exercise that was conducted. This exercise was performed as part of a case in which a burglary was investigated by the recruits on a group level. In this setting, the students discuss with each other and with the researcher in a relatively unstructured manner and come to reflect on some of their assumptions about the case in question. More specifically, regarding the whereabouts of one of the suspects (Alfred): PR1: These interrogations, they are so hard to plan because, really, there is no way to know. I didn’t know anything beforehand, so my only choice was to be ready for whatever… PR2: I would have to say that I agree, it is… PR1: [interrupting, continuing the reasoning] … Still, it was pretty nice to know in advance what we needed to find out from this person. PR2: …It is really hard to plan an interrogation. Remember the last one? We knew nothing about that one. for this one, I felt we had some previous knowledge. We knew that he could have seen something, or we could suppose that there would be a logical timeline to his observations. The last time [we interrogated someone], we did not even know who it was, what type of person it was. Researcher: No? PR1: [directed at PR2 and PR3]: I guess for you guys it was even more difficult to know where to begin in your interrogation – how to plan it. PR3, PR4: Yes [nodding]. PR1: for this particular interrogation, I guess it was more about corroborating stuff that we already knew about … but on the other hand, of course, we can’t really think like that and use beliefs as a point of departure. Come to think about it, even if we believe it, we don’t actually know if the witness saw Alfred. PR2: That’s true. PR4: …So, we can’t really know if Alfred was there at all [whether the person was seen at the crime scene]. PR1, PR2, PR3, and PR4 start laughing and talking simultaneously as this insight dawns upon them: It might not even be Alfred who was there to begin with! This example illustrates making sense of a puzzling matter that took place in a micro-se- quence and was non-goal-oriented. Rather, the example showcases how everyday discussion as part of an ongoing conversation leads to recruits unlocking and thinking about some of their assumptions regarding the subjects of the conversation. This entails a social building of knowledge in which different perspectives and past experiences are put in relation to each other by a number of actors who take part in verbalization of their experiences. Dialogic reflection A number of observations regarded dialogically structured reflection. This type of collective reflective process took on two main forms in validating understandings and guided sequenced REflECTIVE PRACTICE 717 reflection. In regards to the former, validating understandings were mainly observed in episodes where group members were testing interpretations against each other in a rela- tively structured back-and-forth form of reasoning. This type of peer-to-peer sharing of experiences and interpretations was interpreted by the observers as a process via which group members linked and assessed outlooks and views in a cumulative manner. These types of reflective processes were regularly focused upon concrete shared experiences and could be described as a form of verbal experimentation with several participants. Another general form of dialogic collective reflective process were episodes in which the dialogue was moderated, guided or facilitated by someone within the immediate social situation of the group. This type of dialogic reflection differed from the previously described validation dialogues in regards to how reflection was socially regulated. The most commonly occurring guided sequences of collective reflection that were observed within the material consisted of reflective dialogues between PRs and police officers serving in the capacity as police teachers. These dialogues often took place in the form of tutoring or conversations relating directly to some aspect of course content within the police basic training pro- gramme. Police teachers often engaged in more or less consciously designed techniques to encourage reflection and exploration in students’ thinking in groups, such as the use of rounds or more articulated group exercises, such as ‘happened, felt, learned’ or ‘rear-view mirror’. Another, less-structured but nonetheless guided, form of collective dialogic reflection would be when teachers engaged in the open-ended questioning of students in groups (i.e. ‘Socratic questioning’). The dynamic between student groups and these teachers was of a dual nature. On the one hand, teachers often gave micro-cues regarding how to think and how to reason in these social episodes. As such, guided dialogic reflection is a constrained process that, to a certain degree, is impacted by the asymmetrical power relations in the social context (such as that between student and teachers; see Cunliffe, Cunliffe, 2002). On the other hand, however, the involvement of teachers or role models with anchoring in practice also functioned to problematize group interpretations and solutions to problems. As such, these dialogues, in a way, created ‘mysteries’ and affordances for reflection. One such example can be illustrated with an episode of group work (five PRs) with a police teacher (PT) present in the room sitting listening to the group discussion and fostering the devel- opment of the discussion through open-ended questions. In the excerpts, the group works with a case that actualizes a number of laws regulations and legal interpretations. ...After a while, PT breaks his silence with a question to the group: what does the process look like when a prosecutor brings charges to a suspect? This question directs the attention of the PRs who, with some guidance, start looking for the answer in the law book. A discussion breaks out around the table with the PRs trying out various interpretations and ways to describe the process of bringing charges. After a while, PT continues: ‘Ok, so what is the definition of a plaintiff?’ He adds that issues such as this might get the recruits ‘to feel confused’ [thereby affirming PRs feelings of ‘being lost’]. The PRs incorporate the question of plaintiffs in their discussion, bouncing ideas and questions regarding both plaintiffs and suspects back and forth, trying out different ways forward. In the discussion, other issues surface: ‘would this qualify as a crime scene investigation or a house search?’ …PT [getting questions from PRs] is avoiding direct responses saying things like ‘that would be one way to see it,’ later adding, ‘are there any alternatives?’ These non-answers seem to be confusing the PRs, provoking them to find alternate ways of viewing the case. 718 O. RANTATAlO AND S. KARP As the excerpt presented above indicates, the police teacher in the example guided the discussion through micro-cues about what was important in this case (i.e. defining the plain- tiff, defining the process) without giving direct answers to these issues but rather to create mysteries and questions that encourage the PRs to discuss and reflect on their interpretations with each other, trying out several different understandings of a particular issue. Specular reflection A third main type of collective reflection, conceptualized here as ‘specular reflection’, entailed episodes in which individuals were engaging in reflection in a performative manner, such as verbally reflecting through monologues or storytelling in front of an audience of peers who primarily listened. This type of reflective process was the most individualized version of collective reflection observed in the material. However, it is defined as a collective process rather than an individual process because the collective within the setting functioned as co-producers and counterparts who impacted the reflective process, even though the role of the listeners was largely passive and non-verbally engaging. As such, this form of collective reflective is evidence of an instrumental role of ‘the other’ in collective reflection (see Boud et al., 2006). Typical examples of performative enactment of reflection include experi- ence-based seminars and follow-ups, wherein PRs discussed their takes on various experi- ences in front of their peers. These situations were often structured by a teacher, but they would not qualify as dialogic in the same way as guided sequenced collective reflection. Instead, specular reflection was, to a greater extent, based on monologues and storylines of individual PRs that were ‘performed’ in front of others. One illustrative example of this type of reflection is from a follow-up regarding the PRs’ first contacts with the policing pro- fession through field training. In this particular example, PRs in groups of five to seven indi- viduals recapitulate and narrate their experiences for each other: A female PR tells the others about her experience of an incident concerning the death of an individual who had collapsed at home, likely due to cardiac arrest. The daughter of the deceased had contacted the police after she found her parent dead. The PR says that she had had no previous experience with death and did not know how she would react to the situation. At the same time, she wanted to find this out about herself, so upon arrival, she took the chance to help her fellow officers with the deceased individual. Her thoughts when doing this were that the corpse itself was not in any way horrible. ‘There was no odour and only a little nosebleed, but it was a weird experience.’ Upon leaving the apartment, the PR met the neighbouring family, who were unpacking groceries from their car. As the event took place on a friday afternoon, the PR made the interpretation that they were preparing for their weekend and their friday dinner. The PR says that she reflected upon the absurdity of this. To her, the situation was surreal: ‘life is going on in parallel everywhere. I know that there is a dead person lying up there on the floor, but they [the neighbours] will be in the apartment below, making dinner and preparing for the weekend, never knowing anything about what happened.’ In this episode of storytelling, the PR outlined both the events of the situation and reflections in the form of her feelings and thoughts about the unfolding event. In the situation in which this was shared, the mood in the room was that the group members (the other present PRs) listened with attention but without interrupting or actively participating in the story. The role of the others in this and in similar observations was that of an audience of peers who were largely passive, listening and interacting non-verbally through micro-cues, such as nodding or small signs of recognition with the individual engaging and sharing her reflec- tions verbally with a group of peers. REflECTIVE PRACTICE 719 An emergent model of collective reflection In the findings presented above, the differences between different forms of collective reflec- tive processes were emphasized. However, looking at these processes in light of each other, an emergent model for collective reflection processes can be extracted. Drawing on the previously presented review of collective reflection, we now turn to the endeavour of differ- entiating forms of collective reflection based on the notions of ‘depth’ and ‘interaction level’. In regards to depth, we draw on Mezirow’s (1990, 2000) concepts of content, process and premise (presupposition) reflection. In regards to interactions, we draw on the works of Volet, Summers, and Thurman (2009) and Volet, Vauras, and Salonen (2009) to distinguish between ‘other regulation’ and ‘shared regulation’ of social space in groups. When grouping the empirically identified forms of collective reflection on these dimensions, some important relationships become apparent (see figure 2). As is visible in figure 2, we define polyphonic collective reflection as being characterized by a high degree of interactions and a content orientation. As evidenced by our findings, polyphonic processes of reflection were primarily based on micro-sequences and unstruc- tured spontaneous ‘polylogue’. Thus, with several actors contributing and keeping the reflec- tive process open, this reflective process depends on co-regulation in group interactions, that is, the joint activity of framing and sensemaking, in which several members of a group simultaneously interact with each other. furthermore, based on our observational data, we can conclude that these processes were often content-oriented, in the sense of being focused upon issues in the immediate proximity to the group rather than focused upon group pro- cesses or the premises of thinking (cf. Mezirow, 1990). In this regard, this type of reflective process has similarities with the notion of brief moments of ‘stop and think’ in the midst of situated activities, as described by Keevers and Treleaven (2011). Examples showcased in our findings include drawing inferences about the nature of a variety of subjects, such as the above-exemplified difficulties of conducting interrogations, or the whereabouts of certain suspects in a case that the PRs were working on. In relation to polyphonic collective reflection processes, dialogic reflection can be plotted into an intermediate position (see figure 2). These processes tended to be more structured in regards to social rules, with clearly defined turns being taken in conversations. Moreover, Figure 2.  types of collective reflection. 720 O. RANTATAlO AND S. KARP these processes were sometimes guided by an external party (e.g. an instructor, a supervisor or a dedicated group member) and, as such, were characterized by power asymmetries that could constrain the process (Cunliffe, 2002). On the other hand, guided collective reflective processes also offered possibilities for increased depth and were observed to be both con- tent- and process-oriented, depending on the direction of the dialogue and the active involvement of a facilitator. This result is supported by the conclusions of Burchell and Dyson (2005), who described ‘loosely structured’ group reflections as promising because the loose structure combines possibilities for experimentation and open-ended discussions with themes, prompts or questions that vouch for depth. finally, specular reflection can be positioned as a reflective process characterized by low levels of complexity but a high degree of potential depth. In regards to complexity, these reflective processes were regularly characterized by monologues and, as such, were framed by a clear social agreement regarding the interaction order in the situation (i.e. who speaks and who listens). As such, specular reflection often provided the subject with space and time available to reason with oneself in front of others, thus making the social space of reflections individually regulated. This reduces the complexity of the situation because fewer individuals are involved in describing courses of events and providing reactions and interpretations of such events. Conversely, following Mezirow’s division between content, process and premise reflection, specular reflection was one of the rare processes by which PRs in the study engaged in premise reflection, discussing the basis of their own knowledge or their outlooks on societal matters. Our interpretation of this occurrence is that social situations in which subjects in front of others (active listeners) are given an opportunity to reason under relatively ample time conditions provide good opportunities for retrospectively making sense of one’s own and the collective’s experiences. In this sense, our findings dovetail with Raelin’s (2001) notion of speak- ing and disclosing as important facilitators of collective reflection as speaking entails ‘articu- lating a collective voice from within oneself’ (Raelin, 2001, p. 26). In short, reduced complexity of the social situation may be a material condition that supports depth in reflection. Conclusions Although reflection has attracted considerable interest within the research literature on vocational and professional learning, a hitherto overlooked area within this field of research has been the question of how social contexts and interactional relationships between actors in practice involve the process of reflection (Dyke, 2006). This article adds knowledge by providing a model that is descriptive of how collective reflection processes can be under- stood as practically anchored. The presented model challenges some widely held notions about collective reflection. One such aspect regards how collective reflection can be under- stood in terms of depth. In this regard, the current research regarding collective reflection indicates that this type of reflective process has great potential for in-depth ‘double loop’ reflections directed at the processes and premises of thinking because collective reflection exposes subjects to a wider base of experiences and involves mutual resources in reflection processes (see Dyke, 2006; Høyrup & Elkjaer, 2006; Ohlsson, 2013). Consistent with this lit- erature, our findings suggest that access to a wide base of collective experiences can function as an important resource for reflection. However, complementing previous thinking on the subject, the empirical findings of this study also indicate that the incorporation of a wide experience base adds complexity to the collective reflective process, and this complexity REflECTIVE PRACTICE 721 causes the potential synergies in terms of depth in social reflection to rarely occur. As evi- denced by our findings, the involvement of multiple actors as co-creators of reflective pro- cesses was associated with content reflection rather than process and premise reflection. Premise reflection was rarely observed, and when subjects engaged in collective reflection of this type, it was in more individualized settings. further, our results also add knowledge to the question of what activities are associated with collective reflection. Previous research has emphasized reflective dialogue as a key activity propelling and channelling collective reflection (Bound, 2010; Gray, 2007). In regards to dialogue, our findings support the notion raised by Cunliffe (2002) that although dialogic exchanges of views are common in manifestations of collective reflection, learning through collective reflection can, on a practical level, be characterized as a messier and more unstruc- tured process than the metaphor of ‘dialogue’ suggests. Cunliffe (2002) discusses this concept in terms of ‘making connections’. This way of framing the subject has similarities with our findings that collective reflection may be much less structured than has previously been acknowledged, as we observed collective reflection characterized by ‘polylogue’. On the other hand, a number of observations also highlight the importance of an instrumental role of the ‘other’ as a listener in ‘monologist’ collective reflection. These findings enhance our understanding of the previously under-conceptualized col- lective dimensions of reflection and might provide a basis for research that could further explore how collective reflective processes are manifested in practice and how certain behav- iours and social settings foster and connect to collective reflection. Funding This work was supported by the Swedish Research Council for Health, Working life and Welfare [grant number 2014-1980]. Notes on contributors Oscar Rantatalo, PhD, is a senior lecturer at the Unit of Police Education, Umeå University, Sweden. His research interests include areas such as police education and organizational sensemaking in a context of policing. Staffan Karp, PhD, is an associate professor in Pedagogy at the Department of Education at Umeå University in Sweden. His main research interest is learning processes in police education and police practice in relation to societal change. 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(2013). lära är livet – att vara polis i en föränderlig värld. [learning is life – to be a police officer in a changing world] In N. Eklund & l. landström (Eds.), Polisen - verksamhet och arbete [The police – operations and work] (1st ed., pp. 66–83). Malmö: liber. Marenin, O. (2004). Police Training for democracy. Police Practice and Research: An International Journal, 5, 107–123. doi:10.1080/156142604200190261. Mezirow, J. (1990). How critical reflection triggers transformative learning. Fostering Critical Reflection in Adulthood, 4(2), 1–18. Retrieved from http://184.182.233.150/rid=1lW06D9V6-26428MK-1Z64/ Mezirow’s chapter, How Critical Refletion Triggers Tl.pdf Mezirow, J. (1998). On critical reflection. Adult Education Quarterly, 48, 185–198. doi:10.1177/074171369804800305. Mezirow, J. (2000). Learning as transformation: critical perspectives on a theory in progress. San fransisco, CA: Jossey-Bass. NVivo (10.0) [Computer software]. http://www.qsrinternational.com/product Ohlsson, J. (2013). Team learning: Collective reflection processes in teacher teams. Journal of Workplace Learning, 25, 296–309. doi:10.1108/JWl-feb-2012-0011. Raelin, J. A. (2001). Public reflection as the basis of learning. Management Learning, 32, 11–30. Reynolds, M. & Vince, R. (2004). Organizing reflection. Aldershot: Ashgate. Reynolds, P. M. (1999). Critical reflection and management education: rehabilitating less hierarchical approaches. Journal of Management Education, 23, 537–553. doi:10.1177/105256299902300506. Schippers, M. C., Den Hartog, D. N., & Koopman, P. l. (2007). Reflexivity in teams: A measure and correlates. Applied Psychology, 56, 189–211. doi:10.1111/j.1464-0597.2006.00250.x. Schippers, M. C., West, M. A., & Dawson, J. f. (2015). Team reflexivity and innovation: The moderating role of team context. Journal of Management, 41, 769–788. doi:10.1177/0149206312441210. Segall, A. & Gaudelli, W. (2007). Reflecting socially on social issues in a social studies methods course. Teaching Education, 18, 77–92. doi:10.1080/10476210601151599. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03075079812331380384 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09650790500200280 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14623943.2011.590346 http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1052562904264440 http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0018726711424321 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02601370500510728 http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1094428112452151 http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1350507607083204 http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1350507609357388 http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1350507610391592 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/156142604200190261 http://184.182.233.150/rid=1LW06D9V6-26428MK-1Z64/Mezirow’s http://184.182.233.150/rid=1LW06D9V6-26428MK-1Z64/Mezirow’s http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/074171369804800305 http://www.qsrinternational.com/product http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/JWL-Feb-2012-0011 http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/105256299902300506 http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1464-0597.2006.00250.x http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0149206312441210 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10476210601151599 REflECTIVE PRACTICE 723 Spradley, J. P. (1980). Participant observation. New York, NY: Holt, Rinehart and Winston. Vander Kooi, G. P. & Palmer, l. B. (2014). Problem-based learning for police academy students: Comparison of those receiving such instruction with those in traditional programs. Journal of Criminal Justice Education, 25, 175–195. doi:10.1080/10511253.2014.882368. van Manen, M. (1995). On the epistemology of reflective practice. Teachers and Teaching: Theory and Practice, 1, 33–50. doi:10.1080/1354060950010104. van Woerkom, M. & Croon, M. (2008). Operationalising critically reflective work behaviour. Personnel Review, 37, 317–331. doi:10.1108/00483480810862297. van Woerkom, M., Nijhof, W. J., & Nieuwenhuis, l. f. M. (2002). Critical reflective working behaviour: a survey research. Journal of European Industrial Training, 26, 375–383. doi:10.1108/03090590210444955. Volet, S., Summers, M., & Thurman, J. (2009). High-level co-regulation in collaborative learning: How does it emerge and how is it sustained? Learning and Instruction, 19, 128–143. doi:10.1016/j. learninstruc.2008.03.001. Volet, S., Vauras, M., & Salonen, P. (2009). Self- and social regulation in learning contexts: An integrative perspective. Educational Psychologist, 44, 215–226. doi:10.1080/00461520903213584. Vygotsky, l. S. (1962). Thought and language. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Weick, K. E. (1995). Sensemaking in organizations. Thousand Oaks, CA.: Sage. West, M. A. (2000). Reflexivity, revolution and innovation in work teams. In M. M. Beyerlein, D. A. Johnson, & S. T. Beyerlein (Eds.), Product development teams (pp. 1–29). Stanford, CA: Jai Press. Wolfinger, N. H. (2002). On writing fieldnotes: Collection strategies and background expectancies. Qualitative Research, 2, 85–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10511253.2014.882368 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1354060950010104 http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/00483480810862297 http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/03090590210444955 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.learninstruc.2008.03.001 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.learninstruc.2008.03.001 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00461520903213584 Abstract Collective reflection Methods and materials Findings Polyphonic reflection Dialogic reflection Specular reflection An emergent model of collective reflection Conclusions Funding Notes on contributors References 
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work_syacdacm5zcmlfqza7w2lbmgxq	----	AJur 51(2010)3.indb 1216-2574 / USD 20.00 © 2010 Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest ACTA JURIDICA HUNGARICA 51, No 3, pp. 187–197 (2010) DOI: 10.1556/AJur.51.2010.3.2 ILJA RICHARD PAVONE* Italian Experiences in Combating Hate Crimes and Hate Speech in Light of Recent Violence by and Against Roma** Abstract. This paper provides an overview of national efforts to combat racism, xenophobia and intolerance in the italian legal framework. It looks specifi cally at Law n. 94/2009 on public security and its compliance with European and international legal standards. Specifi cally, the study is devoted to the key issue of the different treatment of Roma and Sinti in Italy due to their legal status. Keywods: xenophobia; racism; human rights; Roma; Sinti; Law n. 94/2009 on public security; European law; international law 1. Introduction Public opinion regarding the presence of immigrants in the country has recently been fed with media reports on atrocious crimes committed by foreigners, exacerbating feelings of insecurity, fear, and even xenophobia among Italians.1 Recently, Italy registered several episodes of xenophobia and racism: in January 2010 a racist attack on African migrant workers in the Southern region of Calabria by local gangs brought to the surface the Italian society tensions that had been simmering for some time. It’s an issue of strict actuality because Italy has one of the fastest growing immigrant populations in Europe, with immigrants now reaching about 7 percent of the population.2 The EU Special Barometer of July 2009 reported that Italy scored some of the lowest results among the EU member States, as regards “the level of comfort with person from different ethnic origin as a neighbour and especially as regards the comfort with Roma neighbour”. Another special country-based survey of the same EU institution reported a higher than the EU average (76% and 62% respectively) percentage of interviewees in Italy who thought that discrimination on the basis of ethnic origin was “very or fairly widespread”. Apart the issue of racial discrimination and xenophobia against immigrants, there is the problem of Roma and Sinti in Italy.3 Usually known as Gypsies (a misnomer, derived * Researcher of International Law, Institute for International Legal Studies, Italian National Research Council, www.isgi.cnr.it. E-mail: ilja.pavone@isgi.cnr.it ** This paper was presented at the Conference organized by the Hungarian Academy of Science on “Current Issues regarding Xenophobia and Intolerance”, held on 13 November 2009 in Budapest. 1 See Beutin, R. et al.: Reassessing the Link between Public Perception and Migration Policy. European Journal of Migration and Law, 9 (2007) 4, 389–418. 2 See Caritas Europe: Annual Activity Report Edition, 2009. 3 In this paper we will use the term Roma and Sinti–instead of “nomads” as these people are often quoted in italian documents–in line with UN and OSCE language. The terms “Roma” and “Sinti” are authentic proper names meaning “person”. Those of eastern European descent are called “Roma” and those of central European origin are referred to as “Sinti”. On the other hand, the foreign term “gypsy” is regarded by most minority members as discriminatory. For further reading see Fraser, 188 ILJA RICHARD PAVONE from an early legend about Egyptian origins) defy the conventional defi nition of a population: they have no nation-state, speak different languages, belong to many religions and comprise a mosaic of socially and culturally divergent groups separated by strict rules of endogamy. Their total amount is 150,000. They include (i) Italian citizens, as well as citizens of both (ii) EU and (iii) non-EU countries. Groups of Roma and Sinti migrated to Italy during different periods, beginning in the 14th century. In the 1980s and 1990s, the confl icts in the former Yugoslavia caused Roma to fl ee to other countries, including Italy. In the 1990s and the fi rst decade of this century, a large number of Roma arrived from the States of Central and Eastern Europe. The most recent infl ux of Roma and Sinti communities has come mainly from Romania: these movements intensifi ed since Romania joined the EU in 2007.4 In the Italian legislation, nomads are not considered as a minority group and their legal status differs: after Romania’s accession to the EU in January 2007, the Romanian Roma became EU citizens and gained the right to free movement within the European Union, while Roma from Western Balkans are non-EU nationals. Many of them have no documents providing their identity or places of origin rendering them de facto stateless (with particular negative consequences for children). They are technically subject to Italian immigration legislation.5 Although they do not have a large presence in Italy, Romanian Roma migrants have attracted considerable public attention and negative media coverage, due to growing prejudice and the link between Roma and Sinti migrants, criminality and threats to public security. In November 2007, the murder of an Italian woman, by a Romanian Roma, was highly publicized on the Italian media and let to a series of attacks on Roma, culminating in a mob burning down a Roma settlement in Ponticelli (in the suburbs of Naples) in May 2008 after a young Roma woman living in the settlement was accused of kidnapping a baby from a local couple. The Italian government responded to these events introducing a number of measures affecting specifi cally the Roma and Sinti population in Italy. 2. The Italian response to violence committed by Roma Since May 2008, a number of government decisions have been issued concerning the Roma and Sinti communities, or “nomads”, as they are commonly referred to in Italy. The Prime Minister issued a decree declaring a “state of emergency” in relation to settlements of A. M.: The Gypsies. Oxford, 1995; Hancock, I.: Gypsy History in Germany and Neighbouring Lands: A Chronology Leading to the Holocaust and Beyond. In Crowe, D. M.–Kolsti, J. (eds): The Gypsies of Eastern Europe. Armonk (NY), 1991; Kalaydjieva, L. et al.: A newly discovered founder population: the Roma/Gypsies. Bioessays, 27 (2005) 10, 1084–1094; Liegeois, J. P.: Roma/Gypsies: A European Minority. London, 1995. 4 See Ban, C.: Economic Transnationalism and its Ambiguities: The Case of Romanian Migration to Italy. International Migration, September 2009. 5 The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD), after examining the periodical report submitted by Italy according to Art. 9 of the UN Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination of 1965, warned the Italian institutions that they must recognise the Roma as an offi cial minority and adopt policies aimed at addressing their needs. The CERD “recalling its general recommendation Nº 27 on discrimination against Roma, recommends that the State Party adopt and implement a comprehensive national policy as well as legislation regarding Roma and Sinti with a view to recognizing them as a national minority and protecting and promoting their languages and culture” (para. 12). 189ITALIAN EXPERIENCES IN COMBATING HATE CRIMES AND HATE SPEECH “nomad” communities in some regions6 (measure based on Law n. 225/1992 which deals with emergency situations arising from severe natural disasters7) and three “ordinances” introducing special and exceptional measures concerning “nomad settlements” in the some regions. The state of emergency lasted until 31 May 2009. Following this decree, the prime minister issued on 30 May 2008 three ‘ordinances’ introducing special and exceptional measures concerning ‘nomad settlements’ in the regions of Campania, Lazio and Lombardia and which appointed the prefects of Rome, Milan and Naples as ‘delegated commissioners’ with powers to carry out ‘all the interventions needed to overcome the state of emergency’ in relation to Roma and Sinti settlements in those regions.8 Their specifi c powers include the monitoring of formal and informal camps, identifi cation and census of the people, including minors, who are present there, the expulsion and removal of persons with irregular status, measures aimed at clearing “camps for nomads” and evicting their inhabitants; as well as the opening of new “camps for nomads”. The government stated that the Ordinances were adopted in order to speed up the administrative procedures, including agreements to build new camps as well as to identify the due additional economic resources from within the State’s Budget, in order to grant ad hoc reception measures, build new structures and improve those already existing. The Ordinances also entail specifi c support measures to promote the integration of people in the settlements through comprehensive projects having an integrated nature aimed at facilitating the school enrolment and the search for employment. Following the issuing of the ordinances, the authorities initiated a census including the collection and use of personal data of nomads (fi ngerprints of minors).9 These measures were justifi ed as being necessary to provide support to individuals in camps and to prevent further degradation of their living conditions, as well as to identify people involved in criminal activities. With regard to minors involved in begging and stealing, the stated aim was to identify them and those forcing them into criminal activities. Once such data are collected, the plan was to dismantle criminal networks, put a stop to exploitation of children, assist children with their school registration, and provide them with adequate health care. Harsh criticisms to these policies adopted and implemented by the Italian Government have 6 Italy, Decree of the President of the Council of Ministers (21/05/2008). “Dichiarazione dello stato di emergenza in relazione agli insediamenti di comunità nomadi nel territorio delle regioni Campania, Lazio e Lombardia” [Decree of the President of the Council of Ministers of 21 May 2008. Declaration of a state of emergency in relation to settlements of nomad communities in the territory of the regions of Campania, Lazio and Lombardia]. Published in the Offi cial Gazette No 122 of 26 May 2009. 7 Law no. 225 of 24 February 1992, “Institution of the National service of the civil protection”. 8 ‘Disposizioni urgenti di protezione civile per fronteggiare lo stato di emergenza in relazione agli insediamenti di comunità nomadi nel territorio della regione Lazio, della regione Lombardia e della regione Campania’ [Urgent provisions of civil protection in order to face the state of emergency in relation to settlements of nomad communities for the regions of Campania] (Ordinance No. 3678). 9 The special Commissioners are allowed to derogate from a number of laws concerning a wide spectrum of issues affecting constitutional prerogatives, for instance the right to be informed when subjected to administrative procedures such as photographing, fi ngerprinting or the gathering of anthropometric data. 190 ILJA RICHARD PAVONE been made at European level.10 In particular, some scholars argued a violation of Article 6 paragraph 1 of the Council of Europe’s Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data,11 which states: “Personal data revealing racial origin, political opinions or religious or other beliefs, as well as personal data concerning health or sexual life, may not be processed automatically unless domestic law provides appropriate safeguards. The same shall apply to personal data relating to criminal convictions.” The Ordinances would not provide the “appropriate safeguards” requested by the Framework Convention. On 17 July 2008, the Ministry of Interior issued specifi c guidelines concerning the application of the orders on “emergency” concerning nomads’camps. The aim of these guidelines is to end the situation of degradation and make conditions liveable for those Roma and Sinti communities living in authorized or illegal settlements by providing humanitarian assistance, improving their access to health care, education and social assistance (with particular emphasis to children and schooling). The Police conducted forced evictions and dismantling of several illegal camps that caused high rates of criminality in the surrounding areas. The Major of Rome, in accordance with the Plan for Nomads issued in 2009 (relocation of many camps realized by settling the people concerned into “authorized villages”12) proceeded on 15 February 2010 to the defi nitive closure of the Nomad Camp Casilino 900. 3. The Italian Legal Framework The principle of non-discrimination is one of the main pillars of the Italian Constitution (Art. 3) upon which the domestic legislative system is based and enforced, particularly by the domestic Courts.13 The presence of this article in the Constitution gives equality and 10 Offi ce for Democratic Institution and Human Rights, High Commissioner on National Minorities, Assessment of the human rights situation of Roma and Sinti in Italy, Report of fact-fi nding mission to Milan, Naples and Rome on 20–26 July 2008, 7. 11 CETS No.: 108. The Convention was opened for signature in Strasbourg on 28 January 1981 and entered into force on 1 October 1985. Italy ratifi ed the Convention with Law 21 febbraio 1989, n. 98, published in the Offi cial Gazzette n. 066 SUPPL.ORD. of 20 March 1989. 12 Vitale, T.: Politique des évictions. Une approche pragmatique. In: Cantelli, F.–Pattaroni, L.– Roca, M.–Stavo-Debauge, J. (sous la direction de): Sensibilités pragmatiques. Enquêter sur l’action publique. Bruxelles, 2009, 71–92. 13 The principle of equality and non-discrimination is included in all human rights treaties and declarations. Non-discrimination is both a human right of its own and a constitutive element of all human rights. Non-discrimination rules are to be found at international, supranational (EU) and national level. The United Nations (UN), which was created in the aftermath of the horrors of racism, fascism and National Socialism, has since its very beginning placed the battle against discrimination in the forefront of its human rights activities. Indeed, one of the purposes of the UN, as they are enunciated in the UN Charter, is to promote and encourage the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all “without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion”. By now, the principle of non-discrimination has undoubtedly acquired the status of a fundamental rule of international human rights law. It has been expressly included in most international human rights documents and is implicitly embedded in almost all individual human rights provisions, which are usually worded in universal language, such as “everyone has the right to education” or “no one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile”. It is widely held that the principle of non- discrimination is a principle of customary international law and, at least as regards discrimination on 191ITALIAN EXPERIENCES IN COMBATING HATE CRIMES AND HATE SPEECH non-discrimination principles the status of paramount values. Moreover Art. 3 provides a benchmark against which subsequent national and regional laws and regulations can be evaluated when the suspicion of discriminatory provisions exists. In this fi eld, the action of judges is important, as on the basis of this national legislation has to be interpreted and can even be declared unconstitutional and disapplied. The Criminal Code of Italy contains provisions that expressly enable the racist or other bias motives of the offender to be taken into account by the courts as an aggravating circumstance when sentencing. In particular, Section 3(1)(b) of Law 654/1975, as amended by Section 3 of the Law 205/1993 (which defi nes racial discrimination as both a crime in itself and as an aggravating factor in other criminal acts) introduces a general aggravating circumstance for all offences committed with a view to discrimination on racial, ethnic, national or religious ground or in order to help organizations with such purposes. The Italian legal framework against racial discrimination has been reinforced by Legislative Decree No. 215 of 9 July 2003 which foreseen the creation of the National Offi ce Against Racial Discrimination (UNAR). UNAR was established by Decree of the President of Council of Ministers (PCM) of 11 December 2003,14 in accordance with Art. 13 of Council Directive 2000/43/EC enshrining the principle of equal treatment of all people regardless of their race or ethnic origin.15 UNAR carries out in an autonomous and independent way activity of promotion against any form of racism and intolerance. In particular, it provides judicial assistance, it carries out inquiries and it disseminates informations and knowledge on this topic. UNAR promoted the establishment of Agreement Protocols with lawyers’ associations available to offer pro-bono juridical assistance to alleged victims of racial or ethnic discrimination. Very important in this context is the adoption of Law n. 101 of 6 June 2008 which provides for an explicit shift of the burden of proof from the complainant to the respondent (in civil and administrative law) in cases of “prima facie discrimination”. 4. Law n. 94/2009 on Public Security Recently, Law N° 94 of 15 July 2009 titled “Regulations about public security”, presents considerable amendments in matters concerning immigration.16 The most important amendment is the introduction of the new crime of “illegal entry and sojourn in the territory of the State” (Article 1, subpara. 16), entrusted to the competence of the Justice of Peace, which punishes the behaviour of a foreigner who enters or remains in the State, infringing the basis of sex, race and ethnic origin, that it also has a status of jus cogens. See Fredman, S.: Human Rights Transformed: Positive Rights and Positive Duties. Oxford, 2008, 175–180; Janis, M. W.: International Law. New York, 2009, 65–67. 14 Italy / Decreto del Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri (11.12.2003). 15 Council Directive 2000/43/EC implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin–June, 29th 2000. O.J. L 180, 19 July 2000, 22–26. Article 19 of the Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, as amended in Lisbon, provides: “Without prejudice to the provisions of this treaty and within the limits of the powers conferred by it upon the Community, the Council, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the European Parliament, may take appropriate action to combat discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation”. 16 Published in the Offi cial Journal (Gazzetta Uffi ciale) no. 170, on 24 July 2009. 192 ILJA RICHARD PAVONE the regulations of the consolidating legislation on immigration and Law N° 68/2007 (regarding short-term stays) with a fi ne.17 The offence is accompanied by a series of additional sanctions: expulsion, discontinuance of the crime once the “irregular” foreigner is outside Italian territory, the possibility of expelling the “illegal immigrant” even when there is no authorisation. The legal measures contained in this Law with other laws approved by the Italian Government and Parliament in 2008, becomes part of a whole “Security Package”, that is, a group of provisions addressing security concerns and issues with a variety of different legal means. In particular, the provisions of Law no. 94 affect several laws already in effect, amending– among others–the Criminal Code, the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Highway Code, the Immigration Law. Adoption of Law no. 94/2009 represents a comprehensive legal action based on the necessity to deal with relevant–and quite heterogeneous–social issues, furthering protection for the weakest members of society–women and children–the fi ght against illegal immigration. The Law was supported by 157 votes in favour and 124 against and it was particularly opposed by left-wing parties within the Parliament and heavily criticized by the legal doctrine and the public opinion, due to its alleged discriminatory and racial contents.18 Among the most important rules introduced by Law no. 94/2009, are worth noting, at the outset, some legal measures against illegal immigrants in the Italian territory whose rationale would lie in the enhancement of the fi ght against illegal immigration. The most relevant measure has been the introduction in the Italian Criminal Code of a provision making illegal immigration a crime. Indeed, Art. 1, s.16, lett. a) of Law no. 94/2009 amended Art. 10 bis of Legislative Decree 286/1998 (Immigration Law), qualifying as a penal offence–punished with a fi ne from 5 000 to 10 000 Euros–the entrance and stay in the State territory of a foreign national, performed in violation of the Italian Immigration Law’s provisions on lawful entry and stay requirements. This provision is the most criticized of the whole Law and the Italian Constitutional Court has been already called upon to judge on its constitutionality. Indeed, as of today the Tribunals of Pescara, Torino, Bologna, Agrigento and Trento have challenged the Law before the Constitutional Court claiming a contrast with Art. 10 Cost.–affi rming that International Law principles are recognized in the Italian legal system,–since International Law provides that illegal entrance in a State must be subject to administrative sanctions and not criminal ones; with Art. 3 Const.–the equality clause, implying also a principle of reasonableness of the State action–, since Law no. 94/2009 would lack any legal justifi cation, in light of the fact that in the Italian legal system Criminal sanctions must be used only as extrema ratio; as far as the equality principle is concerned, the Law would also introduce an unreasonable difference between the treatment of illegal immigrants and of those already living in Italy; with Art. 2 Const., which establishes that Italy must guarantee fundamental human rights. The newly introduced Art. 61, s.1, num. 11bis of the Italian Criminal Code (introduced by Art. 1, s.1, Law no. 94 and applicable to all crimes in the Criminal Code) provides that a sentence will be increased in case a crime is committed by an illegal immigrant on the 17 For a comment on this Law, see Hammarberg, T.: It is wrong to criminalize migration. European Journal of Migration and Law, 11 (2009) 4, 383–385. 18 For an analysis of the reasons of the outcomes of the Italian mechanisms of immigration controls see Finotelli, C.–Sciortino, G.: The Importance of Being Southern: The Making of Policies of Immigration Control in Italy. European Journal of Migration and Law, 11 (2009) 2, 119–138. 193ITALIAN EXPERIENCES IN COMBATING HATE CRIMES AND HATE SPEECH Italian soil. This rule applies only with regard to extra EU citizen and stateless people. Other restrictive regulations are provided for those foreigners who want to get married in Italy: indeed, the original formulation of Art. 116 of the Italian Civil Code, titled “Marriage with a foreigner within the State”, requested that the foreigner, who wanted to get married in Italy–irrespective of getting married with an Italian citizen or a foreign national–had to show to the Italian public offi cer for the registry and marriage offi ce, that no legal obstacles to the marriage were present, and that all other documents and requirements requested also to Italian citizens were present (e.g. publication of the banns). The new text of Art. 116 of the Civil Code, as modifi ed by Art. 1 s.15 of Law no. 94/2009, obliges a foreigner who wants to get married in Italy to both show that no legal obstacles are present, and to provide for a certifi cation demonstrating the legitimacy of his/her presence in the national territory. Moreover, foreign and stateless spouses, applying for Italian citizenship, must show presence on the Italian territory for a period of at least 2 years (by way of difference with the six months’ residence period formerly required) after the marriage. Citizenship will be granted only if the marriage is still valid and the couple is not separated. More restrictive regulations has been set out for special crimes directly affecting a natural person and in particular those affecting women and children. Among the most relevant, it is worth citing the provision qualifying as a crime (and no longer as a mere “offence”) the employment of children for begging, and punishing it with a three years’ imprisonment. The conviction for this crime, as well as the one for crimes of enslavement, female genital mutilation or sexual assault committed by a parent or by the legal curator, brings with it the automatic loss and the perpetual disqualifi cation from guardianship. The purpose of these provisions is to enhance children’s protection (in particular Roma and Sinti minors) and answer the increasing social concern deriving from crimes committed in schools. The means chosen to answer these concerns are the increase of punishment, provided mainly with the introduction of a common aggravating circumstance (Art. 61, s.1, n. 11ter of the Italian Criminal Code), applicable to those committing a crime against a minor near or inside schools or other educational institutions. The same aggravating circumstance applies also for group sexual assault crimes committed near a school against an adult. 5. Compliance of Italy with Human Rights Standards Italy is a party to the following international treaties that prohibit racial and ethnic discrimination and set standards for the treatment of aliens, refugees and asylum seekers: the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD), the International Convention on the Rights of Children (CRC) and the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (“1951 Refugee Convention”). Italy is not a party to the United Nations Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (CMW), the European Convention on Nationality and the United Nations 1964 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, the three key instruments that protect the rights of migrants and stateless persons. The CMW, adopted by the UN General Assembly with resolution 45/158 of 18 December 1990 and in force since 1 July 2003, points out that “the human problems involved in migration are even more serious in the case of irregular migration” (Preamble). It therefore encourages “appropriate action… in order to prevent and eliminate clandestine 194 ILJA RICHARD PAVONE movements and traffi cking in migrant workers” (ib.). It is worth noting that the measures it deems should be taken, within the jurisdiction of each State concerned, are not directed to irregular migrants, but to those who cause the phenomenon. It in fact calls for “appropriate measures against the dissemination of misleading information relating to emigration and immigration” and the imposition of “effective sanctions on persons, groups or entities which use violence, threats or intimidation against migrant workers or members of their families in an irregular situation” (Art. 68). It instead urges signatories to assure the protection of the fundamental human rights of irregular migrants (Preamble). Indeed, it affi rms that “every migrant worker and every member of his or her family shall have the right to recognition everywhere as a person before the law” (Art. 24) and that appropriate measures should be taken “to ensure that migrant workers are not deprived of any rights … by reason of any irregularity in their stay or employment”.19 The new Italian law, on the contrary, has tightened the norms related to the irregular status of foreigners, and has transformed irregular migration into a criminal offence instead of the administrative breach that it used to be. This change has signifi cant repercussions in the concrete life of the migrant and his family. To start with, it will be diffi cult for the irregular migrant to fi nd lodging, since whoever rents an apartment to people in his condition runs the risk of imprisonment. It will be diffi cult if not impossible for him to send remittances back home through money transfer services, since this requires the presentation of a regular permit to stay in the country. This is a serious concern for the welfare of the families who have stayed behind in the home country and also deprives their countries of origin of that income that their poor economies badly need. Law n. 94 does not seem to be “family-friendly”. Since all legal acts regarding the civil status requires the presentation of a regular permit to stay, an irregular migrant cannot be registered as a parent of a child who may even have a legal status in Italy. The child will therefore have to be identifi ed as one with unknown parent. At regional level, Italy is also a party to the Council of Europe’s Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR)20 and the European Social Charter, whose 19 For an overview on the implementation of the Convention see Abimourched, R.–Martin, S.: Migrant Rights: International Law and National Action. International Migration, 47 (2009) 5, 115– 138. 20 The European Court of Human Rights has recently developed its jurisprudence related to racial discrimination in highly signifi cant ways. The Court has rightly been applauded for abandoning its requirement that racial discrimination be proved “beyond reasonable doubt” and for endorsing the concept of indirect discrimination, allowing it, in the last fi ve years, to begin to fi nd states from “Eastern Europe” in violation of the Convention for having discriminated against especially Roma applicants. While welcome, these new developments should not detract from the need to continue asking diffi cult questions, including the following: why has it taken decades for the Court to start fi nding a violation of Article 14 on grounds of race? Why are cases, such as Menson v. United Kingdom concerning the slow reaction of the police in investigating the lethal attack of a black man, not found admissible? Can we expect the Court, created in a region which largely built itself upon colonialism, to generate mechanisms fi t to tackle racism? In the past, judges themselves have provided the most virulent critique of the Court’s inability to tackle racism. Migrants still remain to benefi t from their progressive stance in relation to Article 14 claims based on grounds of race. See Dembour, M.-B.: Still Silencing the Racism Suffered by Migrants. The Limits of Current Developments under Article 14 ECHR. European Journal of Migration and Law, 11 (2009) 3, 221–234. 195ITALIAN EXPERIENCES IN COMBATING HATE CRIMES AND HATE SPEECH preamble establishes the principle of non-discrimination and whose Art. 19 sets out obligations for the equal treatment of migrant workers. At European level, Chapter III of the EU Charter on Human Rights (included in the Lisbon Treaty, entered into force on 1 December 2009) is devoted entirely to equality. Italy is likewise bound by European Union Directives, in particular European Union Council Directive 2000/43/EC implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin (the “Racial Equality Directive”) and European Union Council Directive 2004/38/EC on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of European Union Member States (the “Freedom of Movement Directive”).21 The Directive sets out common standards and procedures in the Member States for returning irregularly staying third country nationals (the Returns Directive). While its impact in terms of harmonising national legal frameworks can be questioned, from the Member States’ point of view the agreed standards will underpin their common efforts at removing a higher number of irregular immigrants. From the point of view of immigrants, it will mean longer pre-removal detention periods and a ban on re-entering legally the Union’s territory for the foreseeable future.22 The Emergency Measures, described above in paragraph 2, according to some scholars, have led directly to the impermissible discriminatory treatment of Roma and Sinti by: (a) defi ning the very presence of the Roma and Sinti (called ‘Nomadi’ in the Emergency Measures) as grounds for a state of emergency, creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading environment; (b) directly discriminating against Roma and Sinti by mandating a compulsory census on the basis of their accommodation in camps for nomads created by the government; (c) allowing the creation of an ethnic database of Roma and Sinti without adequate safeguards; (d) allowing unlawful searches of the homes of Roma and Sinti; and (e) permitting destruction of Roma and Sinti settlements and effective evictions without provision for adequate alternate housing.23 As part of the Emergency Measures, the Italian government has conducted an offi cial census of Roma and Sinti, which has included a collection of fi ngerprints, photographs, information on ethnic background and religion, and other personal data. This ethnicity- specifi c census is in direct violation of ICCPR Art. 17 (guaranteeing the right to respect for family life), as well as ICCPR Art. 26 (the right to non-discrimination). Documentation carried out by non-governmental organizations indicate that many Roma and Sinti felt coerced into complying with this census, either because they felt they did not have any other choice, or because police and NGO census takers provided false information about the nature and purpose of the census to Roma and Sinti living in the camps. 21 For an overview of EU migration and non-discrimination policy see Peers, S.: Key Legislative Developments on Migration in the European Union. European Journal of Migration and Law, 9 (2007) 4, 451–456. 22 See Baldaccini, A.: The Return and Removal of Irregular Migrants under EU Law: An Analysis of the Returns Directive. European Journal of Migration and Law, 11 (2009) 1, 1–17; Acosta, D.: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly in EU Migration Law: Is the European Parliament Becoming Bad and Ugly? (The Adoption of Directive 2008/15: The Returns Directive). European Journal of Migration and Law, 11 (2009) 1, 19–39. 23 See e.g.: Discrimination against Roma in Italy worries UN rights experts. UN press release, <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=27373&Cr=Human> 196 ILJA RICHARD PAVONE There are documented cases in which both Italian and non-Italian Roma and Sinti were subjected to the census under explicitly forceful and intimidating circumstances. For example, in the semiformal Camp Tor di Quinto-Baiardo and the formal Camp Tor de Cenci in Rome, where part of the census was conducted in July 2008, offi cials were reportedly aggressive and violent toward residents, including searching residents’ homes using dogs and without a court order. The Italian government has not made clear what it will do with the sensitive information, including fi ngerprints and information on minors, collected in the database. In the course of implementation of the Emergency Measures, Roma and Sinti communities were subjected to unlawful searches. A number of their settlements were destroyed without advance notice, consultation, or respect for due process of law. The authorities have carried out evictions without providing assurances of adequate alternative accommodations. Several such raids took place in Milan and Turin in 2007. These forced evictions without remedy are in direct violation of Articles 2 and 17 of the ICCPR as well as Art. 11 of the ICESCR. 6. Conclusions Building equal opportunities for Roma and Sinti minorities requires the establishment of human living conditions. National governments must make clear their political will and support for the promotion of these minorities through the implementation of adequate infrastructure projects. The United Nations and other institutions, such as the European Union, must also make a considerable contribution to such programmes. Members of the minority and their own organizations should be included, from the planning to the implementation of an infrastructure for such projects, to a far greater extent than has thus far been the case. Only if we systematically resist racism and discrimination will majority and minority groups be able to coexist peacefully, with equal rights in all countries of the world. Certainly, States have the right to control their borders and make sure that it is not a porous entry for criminals, who may also take advantage of the misery and desperate conditions of would-be immigrants. However, justice and solidarity are not antonyms, they come hand in hand, just like public security and welcome. National common good, in any case, has to be considered in the context of the universal common good. As seen in previous paragraphs, Roma and Sinti contribute to create an atmosphere of insecurity among citizens living in the suburbs of cities like Rome, Milan and Naples. As such, States have a duty to take effective measures to guarantee public security of their citizens. National counter-crime strategies should, above all, seek to prevent acts of violence, robberies, prosecute those responsible for such criminal acts, and promote and protect human rights and the rule of law. While the complexity and magnitude of the challenges facing States and others in their efforts to balance public security issues and human rights can be signifi cant, international human rights law is fl exible enough to address them effectively. Effective public security measures and the protection of human rights are complementary and mutually reinforcing objectives which must be pursued together as part of States’ duty to protect individuals within their jurisdiction. At the outset, it is important to highlight that the vast majority of counter-crime measures are adopted on the basis of ordinary legislation. In a limited set of exceptional national circumstances, some restrictions on the enjoyment of certain human 197ITALIAN EXPERIENCES IN COMBATING HATE CRIMES AND HATE SPEECH rights may be permissible.24 These challenges are not insurmountable. States can effectively meet their obligations under international law by using the fl exibilities built into the international human rights law framework. Human rights law allows for limitations on certain rights and, in a very limited set of exceptional circumstances, for derogations from certain human rights provisions. These two types of restrictions are specifi cally conceived to provide States with the necessary fl exibility to deal with exceptional circumstances, while at the same time–provided a number of conditions are fulfi lled–complying with their obligations under international human rights law. 24 See, Human Rights Committee, general comment N° 31, para. 6, and Siracusa Principles on the limitation and derogation of provisions in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (E/CN.4/1985/4, annex). << /ASCII85EncodePages false /AllowTransparency false /AutoPositionEPSFiles true /AutoRotatePages /None /Binding /Left /CalGrayProfile (Dot Gain 20%) /CalRGBProfile (sRGB IEC61966-2.1) /CalCMYKProfile (U.S. Web Coated \050SWOP\051 v2) /sRGBProfile (sRGB IEC61966-2.1) /CannotEmbedFontPolicy /Error /CompatibilityLevel 1.4 /CompressObjects /Tags /CompressPages true /ConvertImagesToIndexed true /PassThroughJPEGImages true /CreateJobTicket false /DefaultRenderingIntent /Default 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work_t3j4ipow6jaddmpjfsl2uem3x4	----	wp-p1m-38.ebi.ac.uk Params is empty 404 sys_1000 exception wp-p1m-38.ebi.ac.uk no 218643558 Params is empty 218643558 exception Params is empty 2021/04/06-02:18:21 if (typeof jQuery === "undefined") document.write('[script type="text/javascript" src="/corehtml/pmc/jig/1.14.8/js/jig.min.js"][/script]'.replace(/\[/g,String.fromCharCode(60)).replace(/\]/g,String.fromCharCode(62))); // // // window.name="mainwindow"; .pmc-wm {background:transparent repeat-y top left;background-image:url(/corehtml/pmc/pmcgifs/wm-nobrand.png);background-size: auto, contain} .print-view{display:block} Page not available Reason: The web page address (URL) that you used may be incorrect. Message ID: 218643558 (wp-p1m-38.ebi.ac.uk) Time: 2021/04/06 02:18:21 If you need further help, please send an email to PMC. Include the information from the box above in your message. Otherwise, click on one of the following links to continue using PMC: Search the complete PMC archive. Browse the contents of a specific journal in PMC. Find a specific article by its citation (journal, date, volume, first page, author or article title). http://europepmc.org/abstract/MED/ 
work_t7lr2ir73zfybnquwon7juvoxa	----	ST84-85-08_Puar.indd Social Text 84–85, Vol. 23, Nos. 3–4, Fall–Winter 2005. © 2005 by Duke University Press. Queer Times, Queer Assemblages Jasbir K. PuarThese are queer times indeed. The war on terror is an assemblage hooked into an array of enduring modernist paradigms (civilizing teleologies, ori- entalisms, xenophobia, militarization, border anxieties) and postmodern- ist eruptions (suicide bombers, biometric surveillance strategies, emergent corporealities, counterterrorism gone overboard). With its emphases on bodies, desires, pleasures, tactility, rhythms, echoes, textures, deaths, morbidity, torture, pain, sensation, and punishment, our necropolitical present-future deems it imperative to rearticulate what queer theory and studies of sexuality have to say about the metatheories and the “real- politiks” of Empire, often understood, as Joan Scott observes, as “the real business of politics.”1 Queer times require even queerer modalities of thought, analysis, creativity, and expression in order to elaborate on nationalist, patriotic, and terrorist formations and their intertwined forms of racialized perverse sexualities and gender dysphorias. What about the war on terrorism, and its attendant assemblages of racism, national- ism, patriotism, and terrorism, is already profoundly queer? Through an examination of queerness in various terrorist corporealities, I contend that queernesses proliferate even, or especially, as they remain denied or unacknowledged. I take up these types of inquiries not only to argue that discourses of counterterrorism are intrinsically gendered, raced, sexualized, and nationalized but also to demonstrate the production of normative patriot bodies that cohere against and through queer terror- ist corporealities. In the speculative, exploratory endeavor that follows, I foreground three manifestations of this imbrication. One, I examine discourses of queerness where problematic conceptualizations of queer corporealities, especially via Muslim sexualities, are reproduced in the service of discourses of U.S. exceptionalisms. Two, I rearticulate a ter- rorist body, in this case the suicide bomber, as a queer assemblage that resists queerness-as-sexual-identity (or anti-identity) —in other words, intersectional and identitarian paradigms—in favor of spatial, temporal, and corporeal convergences, implosions, and rearrangements. Queer- ness as an assemblage moves away from excavation work, deprivileges a binary opposition between queer and not-queer subjects, and, instead of ST84-85-08_Puar.indd 121 10/19/05 2:35:09 PM 122 Jasbir K. Puar retaining queerness exclusively as dissenting, resistant, and alternative (all of which queerness importantly is and does), it underscores contin- gency and complicity with dominant formations. Finally, I argue that a focus on queerness as assemblage enables attention to ontology in tandem with epistemology, affect in conjunction with representational economies, within which bodies, such as the turbaned Sikh terrorist, interpenetrate, swirl together, and transmit affects to each other. Through affect and ontology, the turbaned Sikh terrorist in particular, I argue, as a queer assemblage, is reshaping the terrain of South Asian queer diasporas. Queer Narratives of U.S. Exceptionalism As a critique, “queer liberalism” notes an unsettling but not entirely unexpected reconciliation of the radical convictions of queerness as a post-structuralist anti- and transidentity critique with the liberal demands of national subject formation. We can map out a couple of different yet overlapping genealogies of queer liberal subjects. The first is the rise of the queer consumer-citizen, hailed with force in the late 1980s and early 1990s, fueled by the fantasy of enormous disposable incomes for unbur- dened-by-kinship gays and lesbians. The second genealogy, of the queer liberal subject before the law, culminates with the 2003 decriminalizing of sodomy through Lawrence and Garner v. Texas. While both consumptive and juridical lineages reflect heavily on the status of the nation, I argue that one very concise way queer liberalism is inhabited is through stag- ings of U.S. nationalism via a praxis of sexual othering that unwittingly exceptionalizes the identities of U.S. queernesses vis-à-vis Islamopho- bic constructions of sexuality in the Middle East. This is not a critique of the racisms and other constitutive exclusions of conservative lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, and questioning (LGBTQ) discourses. Rather, I am taking issue with queer theorizing that, despite (and perhaps because of ) a commitment to an intersectional analytic, fails to inter- rogate the epistemological will to knowledge that invariably reproduces the disciplinary interests of the U.S. nation-state. Forms of U.S. sexual exceptionalism from purportedly progressive spaces have historically sur- faced through feminist constructions of “third world” women; what we have now, however, is the production of a sexual exceptionalism through normative as well as nonnormative (queer) bodies. That is, queerness is proffered as a sexually exceptional form of American national sexuality through a rhetoric of sexual modernization that is simultaneously able to castigate the other as homophobic and perverse, and construct the impe- rialist center as “tolerant” but sexually, racially, and gendered normal. ST84-85-08_Puar.indd 122 10/19/05 2:35:09 PM Queer Times, Queer Assemblages 123 Queerness colludes with U.S. exceptionalisms embedded in nationalist foreign policy via the articulation and production of whiteness as a queer norm and the tacit acceptance of U.S. imperialist expansion. For example, national LGBTQ organizations such as the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force (NGLTF) and the Human Rights Commission (HRC) have been far more preoccupied with gay marriage and gays in the military than the war on terrorism or even the “homosexual sex” torture scandal at Abu Ghraib.2 In fact, Mubarak Dahir suggests that some organizations have actually harnessed the oppression of LGBTQ Arabs to justify the war, and calls on gays and lesbians who support the war in Iraq to “stop using the guise of caring about the plight of gay Arabs to rationalize their support.”3 For Queer Left organizing not to center people of color borders dangerously on eliding a critique of the racist, imperialist war, or conversely reenacting forms of colonial and multiculturalist fetishisms, for example, in relation to queer Filipino war resister Stephen Funk, who has become the poster queer for LGBTQ antiwar sloganeering. Are LGBTQ com- munities addressing the war on terrorism as a “gay issue”?4 If so, are they articulating a politics of race, empire, and globalization? The most explicit production of this queer exceptionalism can be found in numerous instances of the responsive commentary to the Abu Ghraib “sexual torture scandal.” The Abu Ghraib saga demonstrates that sexuality is at once absolutely crucial to the production of the geopolitics of American exceptionalism, and despite this critical role, or perhaps because of it, it is an undertheorized, underrated, and often avoided aspect of the debate on the war on terror. Very shortly after the first release of the photos in May 2004, the descriptions of the torture cathected within the specter of “homosexual acts,” prompting a flurry of interviews with queer theorists, organizational press releases from LGBTQ associations, and articles within the gay press, all of which, incredibly enough, demon- strated no hesitations about speaking knowledgeably of “Muslim sexual- ity.” In the gay press, the Abu Ghraib photos were hailed as “evidence of rampant homophobia in the armed forces,”5 with scarce mention of the linked processes of racism and sexism. Even more troubling was the rea- son given for the particular efficacy of the torture: the taboo, outlawed, banned, disavowed status of homosexuality in Iraq and the Middle East, complemented by an aversion to nudity, male-on-male contact, and sexual modesty with the rarely seen opposite sex. It is exactly this unsophisti- cated notion of Arab/Muslim/Islamic (does it matter which one?) cultural difference that military intelligence capitalized on to create what they believed to be a culturally specific “effective” matrix of torture techniques. What we have here, then, is the paralleling of the Pentagon’s strategies, which used among other materials an anthropology study, The Arab Mind, The most explicit production of this queer exceptionalism can be found in numerous instances of the responsive commentary to the Abu Ghraib “sexual torture scandal.” ST84-85-08_Puar.indd 123 10/19/05 2:35:10 PM 124 Jasbir K. Puar and the discourses that emanate from progressive queers. For example, Faisal Alam, founder and director of the international Muslim lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, intersex, queer, and questioning (LGBTIQ) organization Al-Fatiha, states that “sexual humiliation is perhaps the worst form of torture for any Muslim.” The press release from Al-Fatiha continues: “Islam places a high emphasis on modesty and sexual privacy. Iraq, much like the rest of the Arab world, places great importance on notions of masculinity. Forcing men to masturbate in front of each other and to mock same-sex acts or homosexual sex, is perverse and sadistic, in the eyes of many Muslims.” In another interview Alam reiterates the focus on the violation of proper gender norms, maintaining that the torture is an “affront to their masculinity.”6 I take issue with Al-Fatiha’s statements, as they along with many other statements relied on an orientalist notion of “Muslim sexuality” that fore- grounded sexual repression and upheld versions of normative masculin- ity—that is, the feminized passivo positioning is naturalized as humiliating, producing a muscular nationalism of sorts. In displays of solidarity, Al- Fatiha’s comments were uncritically embraced by various queer sectors: the Center for Lesbian and Gay Studies newsletter used them to authenticate its perspective through that of the native informant, while the gay press endlessly reproduced the appropriate masculinity and sexual conservatism lines. I want to underscore the complex dance of positionality that Muslim and Arab groups such as Al-Fatiha must perform in these times, whereby a defense of “Muslim sexuality” through the lens of culture is easily co-opted into racist agendas.7 Given their place at the crossroads of queerness and Arabness, Al-Fatiha was, and still is, under the most duress to authenticate orientalist paradigms of Muslim sexuality, thus reproducing narratives of U.S. sexual exceptionalism. Reinforcing a homogenous notion of Muslim sexual repression vis-à-vis homosexuality and the notion of “modesty” works to resituate the United States, in contrast, as a place free of such sexual constraints. For Al-Fatiha to have elaborated on the issues of Islam and sexuality more complexly would have not only missed the orientalist resonance so eagerly awaited by the mass media—that is, there is almost no way to get media attention unless this resonance is met—it would have also considerably endangered a population already navigating the perni- cious racist effects of the Patriot Act: surveillance, deportations, detentions, registrations, preemptive migrations, and departures. Thus Al-Fatiha’s performance of a particular allegiance with American sexual exceptional- ism is the result of a demand, not a suggestion. The proliferation of diverse U.S. subjects, such as the Muslim American, and their epistemological conditions of existence, are mandates of homeland security. The point to be argued is not how to qualify the status of homosexu- ST84-85-08_Puar.indd 124 10/19/05 2:35:10 PM Queer Times, Queer Assemblages 125 ality across the broad historical and geographic, not to mention religious, regional, class, national, and political variances, of the Middle East (a term I hesitate to use, given its area studies implications). We must consider instead how the production of “homosexuality as taboo” is situated within the history of encounter with the Western gaze. The Orient, once con- ceived in Foucault’s ars erotica and Said’s deconstructive work as the place of original release, unfettered sin, and acts with no attendant identities or consequences, now symbolizes the space of repression and perversion, and the site of freedom has been relocated to Western identity. For example, the queer theorist Patrick Moore, author of Beyond Shame: Reclaiming the Abandoned History of Radical Gay Sex, opines: Because “gay” implies an identity and a culture, in addition to describing a sexual act, it is difficult for a gay man in the West to completely understand the level of disgrace endured by the Iraqi prisoners. But in the Arab world, the humiliating techniques now on display are particularly effective because of Islam’s troubled relationship with homosexuality. This is not to say that sex between men does not occur in Islamic society—the shame lies in the gay identity rather than the act itself. As long as a man does not accept the supposedly female (passive) role in sex with another man, there is no shame in the behavior. Reports indicate that the prisoners were not only physically abused but also accused of actually being homosexuals, which is a far greater degradation to them.8 The act to identity telos spun out by Moore delineates the West as the space of identity (disregarding the confusion of act-identity relations at the heart of U.S. homosexualities), while the Arab world is relegated, apparently because of “Islam’s troubled relationship to homosexuality,” to the back- ward realm of acts. The presence of gay- and lesbian-identified Muslims in the “Arab world” is inconceivable. Given the lack of any evidence that being called a homosexual is much more degrading than being tortured, Moore’s rationalization reads as an orientalist projection that conveys much more about the constraints and imaginaries of identity in the “West” than anything else. Furthermore, in the uncritical face-value acceptance of the notion of Islamic sexual repression, we see the trenchant replay of what Foucault termed the “repressive hypothesis”: the notion that a lack of discussion or openness about sexuality reflects a repressive, censorship- driven apparatus of deflated sexual desire.9 While in Said’s Orientalism the illicit sex found in the Orient was sought out in order to liberate the Occident from its own performance of the repressive hypothesis, in the case of Abu Ghraib, conversely, it is the repression of the Arab prisoners that is highlighted in order to efface the rampant hypersexual excesses of the U.S. prison guards. ST84-85-08_Puar.indd 125 10/19/05 2:35:11 PM 126 Jasbir K. Puar Given the unbridled homophobia, racism, and misogyny demonstrated by the U.S. guards, it is indeed ironic, yet predictable, that the United States nonetheless emerges exceptionally, as more tolerant of homosexual- ity (and less tainted by misogyny and fundamentalism) than the repressed, modest, nudity-shy “Middle East.” We have a clear view of the perfor- mative privileges of Foucault’s “speaker’s benefit”: those who are able to articulate sexual knowledge (especially of oneself, but in this case, also of others) then appear to be freed, through the act of speech, from the space of repression.10 Through the insistent and frantic manufacturing of “homosexuality” and “Muslim” as mutually exclusive discrete categories, queerness colludes with the delineation of exceptional U.S. sexual norms, produced against the intolerable forms of the sexualities of “terrorist” bod- ies. Furthermore, queer exceptionalism works to suture U.S. nationalism through the perpetual fissuring of race from sexuality—the race of the (presumptively sexually repressed, perverse, or both) terrorist and the sexuality of the national (presumptively white, gender normative) queer: the two dare not converge. Terrorist Corporealities José Esteban Muñoz’s writing on the “terrorist drag” of the Los Ange- les–based performance artist Vaginal Davis harks back to another politi- cal era—bizarrely as if it were long ago, although in measured time we are talking about the mid-1990s—when the notion of the terrorist had a trenchant but distant quality to it.11 Muñoz argues that Davis’s drag per- formances, encompassing “cross-sex, cross-race minstrelsy,” is terrorist on two levels. Aesthetically, Davis rejects glamour-girl feminine drag in favor of “ground level guerrilla representational strategies” such as white supremacist militiamen and black welfare queen hookers, what Muñoz calls “the nation’s most dangerous citizens.” This alludes to the second plane of meaning, the reenactment of the “nation’s internal terrors around race, gender, and sexuality.” It is imperative in a post-9/11 climate of counterterrorism to note that guerrillas and terrorists have vastly different racial valences, the former bringing to mind the phantasmic landscapes of Central and South America, while the latter, the enduring legacy of orientalist imaginaries. In the context of these geographies it is notable that Davis as the white militiaman astutely brings terrorism home— to Oklahoma City, in fact—and in doing so dislodges, at least momen- tarily, this orientalist legacy. Muñoz’s description of this terrorist drag points to the historical con- ST84-85-08_Puar.indd 126 10/19/05 2:35:11 PM Queer Times, Queer Assemblages 127 vergences between queers and terror—homosexuals have been the traitors to the nation, figures of espionage and double agents, associated with Com- munists during the McCarthy era, and, as with suicide bombers, bring on and desire death (both are figured as always already dying, although for homosexuals it is through the AIDS pandemic). More recent exhortations place gay marriage as “the worst form of terrorism” and gay couples as “domestic terrorists.”12 Clearly, one can already ask, what is terrorist about the queer? But the more salient and urgent question is what is queer about the terrorist? And what is queer about terrorist corporealities? The depic- tions of masculinity most rapidly disseminated and globalized through the war on terrorism are terrorist masculinities: failed and perverse, these emasculated bodies always have femininity as their reference point of mal- function and are metonymically tied to all sorts of pathologies of the mind and body—homosexuality, incest, pedophilia, madness, and disease. We see, for example, the queer physicality of terrorist monsters haunting the U.S. State Department counterterrorism Web site.13 With the unfurling, viruslike, explosive mass of the terrorist network, tentacles ever regenerat- ing despite efforts to truncate them, the terrorist is concurrently an unfath- omable, unknowable, and hysterical monstrosity, and yet one that only the exceptional capacities of U.S. intelligence and security systems can quell. This unknowable monstrosity is not a casual bystander or parasite; the nation assimilates this effusive discomfort with the unknowability of these bodies, thus affectively producing new normativities and exceptionalisms through the cataloging of unknowables. It is not, then, that we must engage in the practice of excavating the queer terrorist or queering the terrorist; rather, queerness is always already installed in the project of naming the terrorist; the terrorist does not appear as such without the concurrent entrance of perversion, deviance, deformity. The strategy of encouraging subjects of study to appear in all their queernesses, rather than primar- ily to queer the subjects of study, provides a subject-driven temporality in tandem with a method-driven temporality. Playing on this difference, between the subject being queered versus queerness already existing within the subject (and thus dissipating the subject as such) allows for both the temporality of being and the temporality of always becoming. As there is no entity, no identity to queer, rather queerness coming forth at us from all directions, screaming its defiance, suggests to me a move from intersectionality to assemblage. The Deleuzian assemblage, as a series of dispersed but mutually implicated networks, draws together enunciation and dissolution, causality and effect. As opposed to an inter- sectional model of identity, which presumes components—race, class, gender, sexuality, nation, age, religion—are separable analytics and can Homosexuals have been the traitors to the nation, figures of espionage and double agents, associated with Communists during the McCarthy era, and, as with suicide bombers, bring on and desire death. ST84-85-08_Puar.indd 127 10/19/05 2:35:12 PM 128 Jasbir K. Puar be thus disassembled, an assemblage is more attuned to interwoven forces that merge and dissipate time, space, and body against linearity, coher- ency, and permanency. Intersectionality demands the knowing, naming, and thus stabilizing of identity across space and time, generating narra- tives of progress that deny the fictive and performative of identification: you become an identity, yes, but also timelessness works to consolidate the fiction of a seamless stable identity in every space. As a tool of diversity management, and a mantra of liberal multiculturalism, intersectionality colludes with the disciplinary apparatus of the state—census, demogra- phy, racial profiling, surveillance—in that “difference” is encased within a structural container that simply wishes the messiness of identity into a formulaic grid. Displacing queerness as an identity or modality that is visibly, audibly, legibly, or tangibly evident, assemblages allow us to attune to intensities, emotions, energies, affectivities, textures as they inhabit events, spatiality, and corporealities. Intersectionality privileges naming, visuality, epistemology, representation, and meaning, while assemblage underscores feeling, tactility, ontology, affect, and information. Most important, given the heightened death-machine aspect of nationalism in our contemporary political terrain—a heightened sensorial and anatomical domination described by Achille Mbembe as “necropolitics”—assem- blages work against narratives of U.S. exceptionalism that secure empire, challenging the fixity of racial and sexual taxonomies that inform practices of state surveillance and control, and befuddling the “us versus them” of the war on terror. For while intersectionality and its underpinnings—an unrelenting epistemological will to truth—presupposes identity and thus disavows futurity, assemblage, in its debt to ontology and its espousal of what cannot be known, seen, or heard, or has yet to be known, seen, or heard, allows for becoming/s beyond being/s.14 Queer assemblages appear in Mbembe’s devastating and brilliant meditation on the necropolitics of our current infinite war positioning. Mbembe argues for a shift from biopower to necropolitics (the subjugation of life to the power of death), noting that the historical basis of sovereignty that is reliant on a notion of (Western) political rationality begs for a more accurate framing: that of life and death.15 He asks, “What place is given to life, death, and the human body (especially the wounded or slain body)?” Mbembe attends to the informational productivity of the (Palestinian) suicide bomber. In pondering the queer modalities of this kind of terror- ist, one notes a pastiche of oddities: a body machined together through metal and flesh, an assemblage of the organic and the inorganic; a death not of the self or of the other, but both simultaneously; self-annihilation as the ultimate form of resistance and self-preservation. This body forces a reconciliation of opposites through their inevitable collapse—a perverse ST84-85-08_Puar.indd 128 10/19/05 2:35:12 PM Queer Times, Queer Assemblages 129 habitation of contradiction. As a figure in the midst of always already dying even as it is in the midst of becoming, like the homosexual afflicted with HIV, the suicide bomber sutures his or her status as sexually perverse.16 Mbembe also points to the queer becomings of a suicide bomber—a cor- poreal experiential of “ballistics.” The dynamite strapped onto the body of a suicide bomber is not merely an appendage; the “intimacy” of weapon with body reorients the assumed spatial integrity (coherence and concrete- ness) and individuality of the body that is the mandate of intersectional identities: instead we have the body-weapon. The ontological affect of the body renders it a newly becoming body, queerly: The candidate for martyrdom transforms his or her body into a mask that hides the soon-to-be-detonated weapon. Unlike the tank or the missile that is clearly visible, the weapon carried in the shape of the body is invisible. Thus concealed, it forms part of the body. It is so intimately part of the body that at the time of its detonation it annihilates the body of its bearer, who carries with it the bodies of others when it does not reduce them to pieces. The body does not simply conceal a weapon. The body is transformed into a weapon, not in a metaphorical sense but in a truly ballistic sense.17 Temporal narratives of progression are upturned as death and becoming fuse into one: as one’s body dies, one’s body becomes the mask, the weapon, the suicide bomber, not before. Not only does the ballistic body come into being without the aid of visual cues marking its transformation, it also “carries with it the bodies of others.” Its own penetrative energy sends shards of metal and torn flesh spinning off into the ether. The body- weapon does not play as metaphor, or in the realm of meaning and epis- temology, but rather forces us ontologically anew to ask: what kinds of information does the ballistic body impart? These bodies, being in the midst of becoming, blur the insides and the outsides, infecting trans- formation through sensation, echoing knowledge via reverberation and vibration. The echo is a queer temporality; in the relay of affective infor- mation between and amid beings, the sequence of reflection, repetition, resound, and return (but with a difference, as in mimicry), and brings forth waves of the future breaking into the present. Gayatri Spivak, pre- scient in drawing our attention to the multivalent textuality of suicide in “Can the Subaltern Speak?” reminds us in her latest ruminations that suicide terrorism, as a relay of affective information, is a modality of expression and communication for the subaltern: Suicidal resistance is a message inscribed on the body when no other means will get through. It is both execution and mourning, for both self and other. For you die with me for the same cause, no matter which side you are on. As a figure in the midst of always already dying even as it is in the midst of becoming, like the homosexual afflicted with HIV, the suicide bomber sutures his or her status as sexually perverse. ST84-85-08_Puar.indd 129 10/19/05 2:35:13 PM 130 Jasbir K. Puar Because no matter who you are, there are no designated killees in suicide bombing. No matter what side you are on, because I cannot talk to you, you won’t respond to me, with the implication that there is no dishonor in such shared and innocent death.18 We have the proposal that there are no sides, and that the sides are forever shifting, crumpling, and multiplying, disappearing and reappear- ing—unable to satisfactorily delineate between here and there. The spatial collapse of sides is due to the queer temporal interruption of the suicide bomber, projectiles spewing every which way. As a queer assemblage—dis- tinct from the “queering” of an entity or identity—race and sexuality are denaturalized through the impermanence, the transience of the suicide bomber; the fleeting identity replayed backward through its dissolution. This dissolution of self into other/s and other/s into self not only effaces the absolute mark of self and other/s in the war on terror, it produces a systemic challenge to the entire order of Manichaean rationality that organizes the rubric of good versus evil. Delivering “a message inscribed on the body when no other means will get through,” suicide bombers do not transcend or claim the rational or accept the demarcation of the irrational. Rather, they foreground the flawed temporal, spatial, and ontological presumptions on which such distinctions flourish. The body of Mbembe’s suicide bomber is still, however, a male one and, in that universalized masculinity, ontologically pure regardless of location, history, and context. Whereas, for Mbembe, sexuality—as the dissolution of bodily boundaries—is elaborated through the ballistic event of death, for female suicide bombers, sexuality is always announced in advance: the petite manicured hands, mystical beauty (“beauty mixed with violence”), and features of her face and body are commented on in a manner not requisite for male suicide bombers; the political import of the female suicide bomber’s actions are gendered out or into delusions about her purported irrational emotional and mental distress.19 Female suicide bombers disrupt the prosaic proposition that terrorism is bred directly of patriarchy and that women are intrinsically manifesting peace. This rationale is reinscribed, however, when observers proclaim that women cast out of or shunned by traditional compositions of gender and sexual- ity (often accused of being lesbians) are most likely predisposed toward violence. These discursive and bodily identity markers reflect the enduring capacities of intersectionality—we cannot leave it completely behind—but also its limitations. Mbembe and Spivak each articulate, implicitly, how queerness is constitutive of the suicide bomber: delinked from sexual identity to signal instead temporal, spatial, and corporeal schisms, queerness is installed within as a prerequisite for the body to function symbolically, pedagogi- ST84-85-08_Puar.indd 130 10/19/05 2:35:14 PM Queer Times, Queer Assemblages 131 cally, and performatively as it does. The dispersion of the boundaries of bodies forces a completely chaotic challenge to normative conventions of gender, sexuality, and race, disobeying normative conventions of “appro- priate” bodily practices and the sanctity of the able body. Here then is a possible rereading of these terrorist bodies, typically understood as cul- turally, ethnically, and religiously nationalist, fundamentalist, patriarchal, and, often even homophobic, as queer corporealities. The political import of this queer rereading should not be underestimated: in the upheaval of the “with us or against us” rhetoric of the war on terror, queer praxis of assemblage allows for a scrambling of sides that is illegible to state practices of surveillance, control, banishment, and extermination. These nonex- ceptional, terrorist bodies are nonheteronormative, if we consider nation and citizenship to be implicit in the privilege of heteronormativity, as we should. Following from Cathy Cohen’s argument that heteronormativity is as much about (white) racial and (middle- to upper-) class privilege as it is about sexual identities, identifications, and acts,20 the (American imperialist) nation also figures as an important axis of psychic and material identification, repeatedly casting these bodies into the spotlight of sexual perversity. Through the reclamation of the nation’s perverse beings across homo-hetero divides, the tenor of queerness is intrinsically antinational- ist. In attending to affective corporeal queernesses, ones that foreground normativizing and resistant bodily practices beyond sex, gender, and sexual object choice, queerness is expanded as a field, a vector, a terrain, one that must consistently, not sporadically, account for nationalism and race within its purview, as well as insistently disentangle the relations between queer representation and queer affectivity. What does this rereading and rearticulation do to Cohen’s already expansive notion of queer coalitional politics? What types of affiliative networks could be imagined and spawned if we embrace the already queer mechanics and assemblages—threats to nation, to race, to sanctioned bodily practices—of terrorist bodies? Affective Queerness These bodies are old, no doubt, but their queernesses are suggested by the intense anxieties they provoke; they trouble the nation’s perimeters, from within and also from the outside, and appear to be rife with, as well as generative of, fear and danger. Why, in the name of a secular state, ban the use of head scarves for Muslim women in France, with allusions to the next targets: turbans and beards?21 What kinds of monstrous bod- ies are visualized when daily the papers are plastered with turbaned al- Qaeda operatives? Why scream, “Take that turban off, you fucking ter- ST84-85-08_Puar.indd 131 10/19/05 2:35:14 PM 132 Jasbir K. Puar rorist”?22 What is lost, gained, and retained in the act of shaving Saddam Hussein’s beard off just hours after his purported capture? (See also the picture “Saddam’s Queer Eye Makeover” and “Queer Eye for Saddam,” aka “Queer Eye for the Hopeless Guy.”)23 Who is appeased through the motions of shaving the facial and head hair of prisoners before they are taken to Guantánamo Bay? These bodies are not only being commanded to the restoration of the properly visible. (The name of the detention site, Camp X-Ray, suggests in itself a profound yearning for the transparency of these bodies, the capacity to see through them and render them known, taciturn, disembodied.) In the act of removing Hussein’s battered, over- grown beard, Hussein’s monstrosity is renewed. We do not recognize in him the decrepit, worn, tired man found in a hole, a man whose capture has more symbolic than material utility and entails the erasure of decades of U.S. imperialist violence in the “Middle East.” But do not look too closely at his eyes, for his familiarity may be lost. And it is the reterritori- alization of the body that must be performed through the ritual of cutting and shaving hair, the prodding medical examinations, the prayer quarters proximate to arrows pointing to Mecca, and other forms of apparently “humane” incarceration tactics that supplement those of torture. The “detained body” is thus a machination of ceremonial scrutiny and sheer domination. Terrorist look-alike bodies may allude to the illegible and incom- mensurable affect of queerness—bodies that are in some sense machined together, remarkable beyond identity, visuality, and visibility, to the realms of affect and ontology, the tactile and the sensorial. Brian Massumi con- cisely pinpoints the effect of affect: “The primacy of the affective is marked by a gap between content and effect: it would appear that the strength or duration of an image’s effect is not logically connected to the content in any straightforward way. This is not to say there is no connection and no logic.”24 Beyond what the body looks like, then, this is also about what the queer body feels like, for the embodied and for the spectator. Reworking Michael Taussig’s notion of “tactile knowing,”25 May Joseph eloquently asserts, For cultures whose forms of social knowledge have been fragmented and mutated by multiple experiences of conquest and cultural contact . . . tactile practices are difficult to read and contain multiple meanings. Such exchanges are frequently informal events intrinsic to everyday life through which cultural knowledge gets cited, transmitted or re-appropriated. The senses acquire texture.26 As that which “immerses the senses beyond the structuring logic of vision and dislodges memory as the fascia of history,”27 tactile knowledges install ST84-85-08_Puar.indd 132 10/19/05 2:35:15 PM Queer Times, Queer Assemblages 133 normativizing traces of danger, fear, and melancholia into the bodies of racialized terrorist look-alikes. The turban, for example, is not merely an appendage to the body. It is always in the state of becoming, the becom- ing of a turbaned body, the turban becoming part of the body. The head scarf, similarly (along with the burka and the hijab, often decried as masks), has become a perverse fetish object—a point of fixation—a kind of centripetal force, a strange attractor through which the density of anxi- ety accrues and accumulates. For the wearer, the rituals and sensations attached to these parts of the body—the smells during the weekly starch- ing of the linens, the stretching of yards of coarse fabric to induce some softening, the wrapping and pinning of the turban into place—these are experiences in the midst of becoming qualitatively different than before. Through queerly affective and tactile realms, the Sikh pagri, or turban, is acquiring the inscriptions of a (terrorist) masculinity, much in the way that veiling has been read as indicative of an other femininity. The turbaned man, no longer merely the mark of a durable and misguided tradition, a resistant antiassimilationist (albeit patriarchal) stance, now inhabits the space and history of monstrosity, that which can never become civilized. The turban is not only imbued with the nationalist, religious, and cultural symbolics of the other. The turban both reveals and hides the terrorist. Despite the taxonomies of turbans, their specific regional and locational genealogies, their placement in time and space, their singularity and their multiplicity, the turban as monolith profoundly troubles and disturbs the nation and its notions of security. Since 9/11, Sikh men wearing turbans, and mistaken for kin of Osama bin Laden, have been disproportionately affected by backlash racist hate crimes targeting Muslims and other South Asians. As a sign of guilt and also the potential redemption of that guilt, the elusive, dubious character of the turbaned man or woman could drive the onlooker crazy. It is not for nothing that in one hate crime incident after another, turbans are clawed at viciously, and hair is pulled, occa- sionally even cut off. The intimacy of such violence cannot be overstated. The attack functions as a double emasculation: the disrobing is an insult to the (usually) male representative (Sikh or Muslim) of the community, while the removal of hair entails submission by and to normative patriotic masculinities. The turban insinuates the constant sliding between that which can be disciplined and that which must be outlawed. Sometimes death ensues. In relation to Sikhs, misnamed “Hindoo” during the first migrations of Sikhs to the Northwest and California in the early 1900s and now mis- taken as Muslim, the hypothesis of mistaken identity as the main causal factor for post-9/11 hate crimes has been embraced by conservative and progressive factions alike. The Bush administration and progressive Sikh Through queerly affective and tactile realms, the Sikh pagri, or turban, is acquiring the inscriptions of a (terrorist) masculinity, much in the way that veiling has been read as indicative of an other femininity. ST84-85-08_Puar.indd 133 10/19/05 2:35:15 PM 134 Jasbir K. Puar advocacy groups have promoted education as the primary vehicle through which to ameliorate this situation. The notion of mistaken identity relies on multiple premises: that the viewer is open to and willing to discern the visual differences between Sikh turbans and Muslim turbans; that the ide- als of multiculturalism as promulgated by liberal education acknowledges that differences within difference matter. The focus on mistaken identity favors the visual experience of the turban over its affective experience, one that hails historical formations of orientalism and elicits fear, loathing, and disgust. Tactile economies reassert ontological rather than epistemological knowing and highlight touch, texture, sensation, smell, feeling, and affect over what is assumed to be legible through the visible. Furthermore, the turban wearer, usually male, bears the typically female burden of safe- guarding and transmitting culture and of symbolizing the purity of nation. But this does not automatically or only feminize him; instead, the fusion of hair, oil, cloth, skin, the organic with the nonorganic, renders the turban a queer part of the body. It is this assemblage of visuality, affect, feminized position, and bodily nonorganicity that accounts for its queer figuration in the execution of a hate crime. This queer assemblage of the turbaned terrorist speaks to the prolific fertilization and crosshatching of terrorist corporealities amid queer South Asian diasporas, bodies that must be reclaimed as queer. South Asian queer diasporas may mimic forms of (U.S.) model minority exceptionalism that posit queerness as an exemplary or libratory site devoid of national- ist impulses, an exceptionalism that narrates queerness as emulating the highest transgressive potential of diaspora. But the tensions—and over- laps—between the now-fetishized desi drag queen and the turbaned or otherwise Sikh or Muslim terrorist temper this exceptionalism. Brian Keith Axel, in his ground-clearing essay “The Diasporic Imaginary,” poses two radical modifications to the study of diaspora as it has been conceived in anthropology, cultural studies, and interdisciplinary forums. Referencing his study of Sikh diasporas, he argues that “rather than conceiving of the homeland as something that creates the diaspora, it may be more produc- tive to consider the diaspora as something that creates the homeland.”28 Axel is gesturing beyond the material locational pragmatics of the myth of return, the economic and symbolic importance of the NRI (nonresi- dent Indian), Khalistan and Hindutva nationalist movements funded by disaporic money, or the modalities of homeland that are re-created in the diaspora. The homeland, he proposes, “must be understood as an affective and temporal process rather than a place.”29 But if not the fact of place, what impels a diasporic sensibility or collectivity? In situating “different bodies or corporeal images and historical forma- tions of sexuality, gender and violence” as deeply and equally constitutive ST84-85-08_Puar.indd 134 10/19/05 2:35:16 PM Queer Times, Queer Assemblages 135 of the diasporic imaginary as the place of the homeland, Axel’s formulation can be productively reworked to further queer the habitus of nation and its geographic coordinates. The notion of queer diaspora retools diaspora to account for connectivity beyond or different from sharing a common ancestral homeland.30 That is, to shift away from origin for a moment allows other forms of diasporic affiliative and cathartic entities, for Axel (and also Mbembe) primarily that of bodies and the traumas that haunt them, to show their affiliative powers. Furthermore, an unsettling of the site of origin, that is, nation as one of the two binding terms of diaspora, de facto punctures the homeland-to-diaspora telos and wrenches ancestral progression out of the automatic purview of diaspora, allowing for queer narratives of kinship, belonging, and home. The sensation of place is thus one of manifold intensities cathected through distance. The diaspora, then, for Axel, is not represented only as a demographic, a geographic place, or primarily through history, memory, or even trauma. It is cohered through sensation, vibrations, echoes, speed, feedback loops, and recursive folds and feelings, coalescing through corporealities, affectivities, and, I would add, multiple and contingent temporalities: not through an identity but an assemblage. The corporeal images in question for Axel are the tortured bodies, not unlike those of Abu Ghraib, of Sikh male Amritdharies, those caught in civil unrest in Punjab in the mid-1980s to early 1990s and arbitrarily incarcerated by the Indian government. Again we have the appearance of the turbaned Sikh male. Axel details the mechanics of the torture: Often the first act is to cast off the detainee’s turban. . . . For many victims, the displacement of the turban, along with the use of the hair to tie the victim down, is one of the deepest gestures of dishonor (beizatti). But after surrender and dishonor are enacted on the head, focus shifts to the genitals and anus, which become the objects of taunts and violation.31 Collectively, the turban, genitals, and anus take on the force of the phal- lus: the sexual shaming begins with the nakedness of the head and use of the otherwise pride-engendering hair to subjugate, then continues on to the habitual objects of sex. In particular, torture of the anus seeks to simulate anal sex and, thus, arouse the specter of homosexuality. The turbaned male body, now the tortured deturbaned body, is effectively rendered religiously impotent and unable to repeat its threat to national boundaries: National-normative sexuality provides the sanctioned heterosexual means for reproducing the nation’s community, whereas antinational sexuality interrupts and threatens that community. Torture casts national-normative The turbaned male body, now the tortured deturbaned body, is effectively rendered religiously impotent and unable to repeat its threat to national boundaries. ST84-85-08_Puar.indd 135 10/19/05 2:35:17 PM 136 Jasbir K. Puar sexuality as a fundamental modality of citizen production in relation to an antinational sexuality that postulates sex as a “cause” of not only sexual experience but also of subversive behavior and extraterritorial desire (“now you can’t be married, you can’t produce any more terrorists”).32 Sexual violence, not place, is the dominant constitutive factor of Axel’s diasporic imaginary. This violence is performative in that queerness of the body is confirmed on several fronts: first, there is the queer inver- sion of reproductive capacity to the male terrorist body, away from the normative focus on women as reproducers of nation and culture; sec- ond, the body is symbolically stripped of its reproductive capacities, pro- pelled into the queer realm of an antinational sexuality; temporality is re-planed because the assumption of normative familial kinship forms as engendered by generational continuity is ruptured. But, third, in line with the queer figuration of the turbaned Sikh body, this body already appears as queer, and thus the torture performs, in the citational sense, the very queer assemblage that instantiates it. The assemblage is pos- sible not through the identity markers that encapsulate this body—Sikh, male, turbaned, heterosexual but perverse—but, rather, the temporal and spatial reorderings that the body reiterates as it is tortured. There is the doubling of time and space as the body is simultaneously refashioned for normative (Indian) national aesthetics yet cast from the nation as its reproductive capacity is castrated. Spatially situated both within and out- side nation, temporally always becoming both national and its antithesis, the assemblage is momentary, fleeting even, and gives way to normative identity markers even in the midst of its newly becoming state. It is this shift from national and regional origin to corporeal affec- tivity—from South Asia as unifying homeland to the assemblage of the monster-terrorist-fag33—in South Asia and in the diasporas, as they work together, that dislodges identity-based notions of queerness, thus prob- lematizing queer diasporic exceptionalisms but also motivating their expo- nential fortification and proliferation in the first place. Queer occupa- tion of the turbaned Sikh male and other terrorist assemblages not only counters sexual exceptionalisms by reclaiming perversion—the nonex- ceptional—within the gaze of national security. In the comingling of queer monstrosity and queer modernity, it also creatively, powerfully, and unexpectedly scrambles the terrain of the political within organizing and intellectual projects. These terrorist assemblages, a cacophony of infor- mational flows, energetic intensities, bodies, and practices that undermine coherent identity and even queer anti-identity narratives, bypass entirely the Foucauldian “act to identity” continuum that informs much global LGBTIQ organizing, a continuum that privileges the pole of identity as the ST84-85-08_Puar.indd 136 10/19/05 2:35:17 PM Queer Times, Queer Assemblages 137 evolved form of Western modernity. Yet reclaiming the nonexceptional is only partially the point, for assemblages allow for complicities of privilege and the production of new normativities even as they cannot anticipate spaces and moments of resistance. Opening up to the fantastical wonders of futurity is the most powerful of political and critical strategies, whether it be through assemblage or to something as yet unknown, perhaps even forever unknowable. Notes Many thanks to Patricia Clough for her inspirational thinking on affect and assem- blages, to Julie Rajan for her research assistance, and to Amit Rai, Katherine Sugg, David Eng, and Kelly Coogan for their feedback on earlier drafts. In memory of my brother, Sandeep. 1. Joan Scott, “Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis,” in Gender and the Politics of History (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), 28–52. 2. In an article titled “Highlighting the Q in Iraq” (“Letters from Camp Rehoboth,” 18 October 2002, www.camprehoboth.com/issue10_18_02/capitalletters .htm), Hastings Wyman argues that “for gay groups such as HRC, NGLTF, and others to take a position on a major issue that affects gay people no differently from the rest of society ultimately divides our community, dilutes our resources, and risks undermining our standing with the public.” 3. Mubarak Dahir, “Stop Using Gay ‘Liberation’ as a War Guise,” Windy City Times, 23 April 2003. Noting that the “forces that are supposedly emanci- pating our downtrodden GLBT brethren are themselves hyper-homophobic,” Dahir asks, “How can anyone seriously argue that the United States military is an instrument for glbt liberation?” According to Dahir, “gay hawks” have pointed out the oppressiveness toward homosexuality of regimes in Syria and Iraq while conveniently forgetting those in Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Claiming that the lives of gays and lesbians in Iraq will change very little regardless of the ousting of Hus- sein, Dahir writes: “The final and perhaps most personally infuriating aspect of the hypocrisy around the argument that we are invading foreign countries in the interest of freeing gay people is the way we treat gay Arabs and gay Muslims here in the United States.” 4. On gay issue versus not-gay issue organizing, see Michael Bronski, “Gay Goes Mainstream,” Boston Phoenix, 16 –23 January 2003, www.bostonphoenix .com/boston/news_features/other_stories/documents/ 02653048.htm. 5. Joe Crea, “Gay Sex Used to Humiliate Iraqis,” Washington Blade, 7 May 2004. 6. Ibid. 7. Andrew Sullivan, “Daily Dish,” www.andrewsullivan.com (accessed 4 May 2004). 8. Patrick Moore, “Gay Sexuality,” Newsday, 7 May 2004. 9. In the face of the centrality of Foucault’s History of Sexuality to the field of queer studies, it is somewhat baffling that some queer theorists have accepted ST84-85-08_Puar.indd 137 10/19/05 2:35:18 PM 138 Jasbir K. Puar at face value the discourse of Islamic sexual repression. That is not to imply that Foucault’s work should be transparently applied to other cultural and historical contexts, especially as he himself perpetuates a pernicious form of orientalism in his formulation of the ars erotica. Rather, Foucault’s insights deserve evaluation as a methodological hypothesis about discourse. 10. But are the acts specifically and only referential of gay sex (and here, gay means sex between men)? Certainly this rendition evades a conversation about what exactly constitutes the distinction between gay sex and straight sex, and also presumes some static normativity about gender roles as well. Amnesty Interna- tional is among the few that did not mention homosexuality, homosexual acts, or same-sex sexuality in its press release condemning the torture. See “USA: Pattern of Brutality and Cruelty—War Crimes at Abu Ghraib,” web.amnesty.org/library/ index/ENGAMR510772004. 11. José Esteban Muñoz, Disidentifications: Queers of Color and the Performance of Politics (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), 108. 12. “Bauer Compares Vermont Gay Rights Decision to Terrorism,” 27 December 1999, www.cnn.com/1999/ALLPOLITICS/storeis/12/27/campaign .wrap/Concerned Women of America (accessed 2 April 2003; this site is no longer available). 13. See usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/terror/. For a detailed analysis of this Web site, see Jasbir K. Puar and Amit S. Rai, “The Remaking of a Model Minority: Perverse Projectiles under the Spectre of (Counter)Terrorism,” Social Text, no. 80 (2004): 75–104. 14. This is not to disavow or minimize the important interventions that inter- sectional theorizing makes possible and continues to stage, or the feminist critical spaces that gave rise to intersectional analyses. 15. Achille Mbembe, “Necropolitics,” Public Culture 15 (2003): 11– 40. 16. Judith Butler, in “Sexual Inversions,” writes: “The male homosexual is figured time and time again as one whose desire is somehow structured by death, either as the desire to die, or as one whose desire is inherently punishable by death” (Butler, “Sexual Inversions,” in Discourses of Sexuality: From Aristotle to AIDS, ed. Donna Stanon [Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1992], 83). 17. Mbembe, “Necropolitics,” 36. 18. Gayatri Spivak, “Class and Culture in Diaspora” (conference keynote address, “Translating Class, Altering Hospitality,” Leeds University, England, June 2002). 19. Sudha Ramachandran, “Women Suicide Bombers Defy Israel,” Asia Times, 25 October 2003, www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/EJ25Ak02.html; www.guardian.co.uk/israel/Story/ 0,2763,428563,00.html. 20. Cathy J. Cohen, “Punks, Bulldaggers, and Welfare Queens: The Radical Potential of Queer Politics?” GLQ 3 (1997): 437– 65. 21. Times of India, 23 January 2004. 22. From Targeting the Turban: Sikh Americans and the Aversion Spiral after September 11 (2002), a documentary about hate crimes against Sikh Americans since 9/11, directed by Valarie Kaur Brar. 23. See politicalhumor.about.com/library/images/blsaddamqueereye.htm. 24. Brian Massumi, Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation (Dur- ham, NC: Duke University Press, 2002), 24. 25. Michael Taussig, Mimesis and Alterity (New York: Routledge, 1993). ST84-85-08_Puar.indd 138 10/19/05 2:35:18 PM Queer Times, Queer Assemblages 139 26. May Joseph, “Old Routes, Mnemonic Traces,” UTS Review 6, no. 2 (2000): 46. 27. Ibid. 28. Brian Keith Axel, “The Diasporic Imaginary,” Public Culture 14 (2002): 426. 29. Ibid. 30. Ibid. 31. Ibid., 420. 32. Cynthia Keppley Mahmood, Fighting for Faith and Nation: Dialogues With Sikh Militants (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1996), 40, quoted in Axel, “The Diasporic Imaginary,” 420. 33. See Jasbir K. Puar and Amit Rai, “Monster-Terrorist-Fag: The War on Terrorism and the Production of Docile Patriots,” Social Text, no. 72 (2002): 117– 48. ST84-85-08_Puar.indd 139 10/19/05 2:35:19 PM ST84-85-08_Puar.indd 140 10/19/05 2:35:19 PM 
work_t4i5twskonetvaniguivztyviu	----	MAGISTERARBEIT / MASTER’S THESIS Titel der Magisterarbeit / Title of the Master‘s Thesis „Freedom of expression and hate speech in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights and in the practice of social media“ verfasst von / submitted by Darya Novatorova, BA angestrebter akademischer Grad / in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Magistra der Philosophie (Mag.phil.) Wien, 2019 / Vienna 2019 Studienkennzahl lt. Studienblatt / degree programme code as it appears on the student record sheet: UA 066 841 Studienrichtung lt. Studienblatt / degree programme as it appears on the student record sheet: Magisterstudium Publizistik-u. Kommunikationswissenschaft Betreut von / Supervisor: Univ.-Prof. Dr. Katharine Sarikakis 2 Table of contents 1. Introduction………………………………………………………………………..4 2. Theoretical background …………………………………………………………...8 2.1. Freedom of expression………………………………………………………...8 2.2. Defining hate speech…………………………………..….………………….10 2.3. Hate speech and hate crimes……………………………………………...….14 2.4. Hate speech: contextual typology……………………………………………16 2.5. Other categorisations of hate speech…………………………………………22 2.6. Philosophical and practical reasons to ban hate speech……………………...25 2.7. International legal base for freedom of expression and hate speech’ regulation...........................................................................................................................28 2.8. Combating hate speech: minimal and extensive regulation approaches……..29 2.9. European and American approaches towards hate speech………………...…33 2.10. Online hate speech: general overview……………………………….……..35 2.11. Alternative ways to combat hate speech…………………………….……...37 3. Research questions and methodology…………………………...………………40 4. European Court of Human Rights’ approach towards hate speech……………...45 4.1. Definition and types of hate speech according to the ECtHR………………..45 4.2. ECtHR’s algorithm of establishing hate speech……………………………..48 4.3. Overview of ECtHR’s hate speech practice in 1976-2012…………………..50 4.4. ECtHR’s case law concerning hate speech in 2012-2019................................57 4.4.1. Political, racial, ethnic hate speech …………………………………...58 4.4.2. Religious hate speech………………………………………………….68 4.4.3. Hate speech based on sexual orientation……………………………....71 4.4.4. Online hate speech cases in the practice of the ECtHR.........................74 4.5. Summary of the ECtHR’s practice concerning hate speech……………..…..79 3 5. Social media and online hate speech…………………...……………………..…85 5.1. Hate speech definitions in social media’s guidances.……………….….…...86 5.2. Regulation of hate speech on social media………………………….………93 5.3. Alternative ways of combating online hate speech: attempts of automatic regulation………………………………………………………………………………...96 5.4. Other initiatives to counteract online hate speech………………………….97 6. Conclusion…………….……………………………………………………….…99 Table 1. Argumentation of the ECtHR in selected hate speech-related cases 1976-2012………………………………………………………………………...55 Table 2. Argumentation of the ECtHR in selected hate speech-related cases 2012-2019………………………………………………………………….………80 Table 3. Hate speech definitions by Facebook, YouTube and Twitter……………...92 7. References…………………………………………………………………….....107 8. Abstract……………………………………………………………………….…122 9. Zusammenfassung…………………………………………………………….....123 4 1. Introduction The collision between freedom of expression and hate speech is one of the most essential problems of the modern media law. On the one hand, freedom of expression is a fundamental human right and one of the main conditions for the existence of a truly democratic society. In the western countries intellectuals have emphasized this fact starting with the Modern history. After the Second World War the right for freedom of expression was repeatedly reiterated and secured in the major Conventions and Declarations of the 20th century, including the European Convention on Human Rights (1950). In the 21st century freedom of expression remains a crucial and an absolute component of human freedom and the bravest of us continue to fight for it all over the world. Hate speech, on the other hand, is a destructive and offensive content – words, images or videos – that aims to encourage hatred and discrimination in the society. While rapid development of the Internet and new media, without doubt, has considerably contributed to the realization of freedom of expression worldwide, it has also facilitated the dissemination of hate speech, making it a global issue of our time. The key question is how to establish control over the latest, without violating the former: who and how determines, what hate speech is and how to combat it? Do different concerned parties – in particular, traditional courts and social media – have equal approaches towards hate speech and if not, how do they differ? What are the ways for combating hate speech that 5 social media have already developed, are they effective and what other alternatives could be employed? These are the underlying research questions of the current thesis. As the European Court of Human Rights has acknowledged, no universally accepted definition of hate speech exists in modern media law, which, of course, further complicates combating this harmful phenomena (ECtHR, Factsheet hate speech, 2019). To our knowledge, one of the most precise definition of hate speech was given by Council of Europe who in 1997 defined it as “all forms of expression which spread, incite, promote or justify racial hatred, xenophobia, anti-Semitism or other forms of hatred based on intolerance, including: intolerance expressed by aggressive nationalism and ethnocentrism, discrimination and hostility against minorities, migrants and people of immigrant origin” (Recommendation No. R 97(20), Appendix). As will be demonstrated later, by no means this definition is the only one or universally accepted. Though it must be emphasized that already in this definition of Council of Europe it is possible to establish two necessary components that together constitute hate speech: (1) promotion/justification/dissemination of hatred based on (2) one of the many possible causes, whether it is nationality, ethnicity, migrant origin or affiliation with a minority group of any kind. Two further “causes” that for some reasons were not included in the definition of Council of Europe in 1997, are gender and religion. In fact, gendered hate speech and hate speech based on religious beliefs are a widespread issue of Internet era and will be discussed later in the first part of the study. 6 In an attempt to answer the research questions specified in the respective paragraph and taking into account the significance of the European Court of Human Rights for the European Convention on Human Rights1 and, in general, for the European law practice, it was decided to focus in the present thesis on the recent case law of the European Court of Human Rights related to hate speech and to compare the Court’s approach with such of the major social media – namely, Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube. The choice of these social media was dictated by their evident popularity, wide spreading in the society and influence over people’s lives. After the theoretical overview of the related issues in the first part of the study, in order to determine how the European Court of Human Rights separates protected speech that can “offend, shock or disturb” and hate speech that needs to be forbidden, a content analysis of the selected Court’s cases was conducted in the second part of the thesis. The Court’s definition of hate speech and proposed typology are also provided in this part of the study. Accordingly, the third part of the thesis is dedicated to the practice of the above mentioned social media. Their current policies regarding hate speech, as well as the respective guidance for the users are analysed. Attempts of combating hate speech in the alternative ways are discussed in the paragraphs 5.3-5.4. 1 The European Court of Human Rights was established in 1959 for protecting the fundamental human rights enshrined in the Convention. See: http://www.echr.coe.int/Pages/home.aspx?p=basictexts&c=#n1359128122487_pointer http://www.echr.coe.int/Pages/home.aspx?p=basictexts&c=#n1359128122487_pointer 7 Finally, key observations regarding the comparison between European Court of Human Rights’ approach towards hate speech and that of the social media are provided in the Conclusion. 8 2. Theoretical background 2.1. Freedom of expression There is no need to prove what essential role freedom of expression plays in any democratic society: it is its keystone and an indispensable condition. The right for freedom of expression is regarded as one of the most significant human rights in many countries, especially – in the states-members of the Council of Europe2 whose main normative act – the European Convention on Human Rights – proclaims and guarantees freedom of expression in the well-known Article 10. According to this Article, freedom of expression consists of two principal parts: (1) freedom to hold opinions and (2) to receive or to share information. Significantly, in the second part of the same Article 10 it is emphasised that freedom of expression is not absolute and may go hand in hand with responsibilities. The latest – possible restrictions – must be “prescribed by law” in the interest of a democratic society, protecting various concepts, but among others – public safety, order, health and morals, and even “the reputation or rights of others” (European Convention on Human Rights, Art. 10.2). Thus, it is evident, that the European Convention on Human Rights codifies freedom of expression while at the same time acknowledging its possible limits and leaving sufficient legal space for the prohibition of hate speech. 2 Current countries-members of the Council of Europe can be found here http://www.coe.int/en/web/portal/47-members-states http://www.coe.int/en/web/portal/47-members-states 9 The debates around freedom of expression versus hate speech mainly circles around one issue: how to maintain diversity of thoughts and views, while at the same time preserving dignity of all groups of citizens (Maitra, McGowan, 2018, p.305). The second part of the Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights – important and indispensable as it is – is very broad and therefore has caused many questions and interpretations by courts, as well as became an object of analysis for generations of media law researches (among many others, Korn, 2014; Holoubek, Kassai, Traimer, 2014). Provided by the Convention list of conditions, when the restrictions of freedom of expression are necessary in a democratic society, makes it impossible for the courts to use the Article 10.2 automatically. On the contrary, in each case courts have to consider all the circumstances and the details. To make things even more complicated, when discussing freedom of expression in addition to the Convention it is necessary to take into account the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights. In the famous and historical case Handyside v. United Kingdom, 1976, the Court has stated that not only that information should be free that is considered inoffensive or indifferent, but also any ideas that can “offend, shock or disturb” any particular group of people (Handyside v. United Kingdom, 1976, par. 49). The Court motived it by “pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness” that are the pillars for any democratic society (ibid). For decades, this statement about the information and ideas that can “offend, shock or disturb” was a keystone of all modern media law practice. It establishes the broad 10 understanding of freedom of expression and also implies tolerance for some speech as a price for living in “a democratic society”. As was summarized by McGonagle, democracy, too, has “rough edges” and “tough talk” should be regarded as a part of public debate (2013, p.5). At the same time, the decision in Handyside v. United Kingdom does not abolish or contradict the second part of the Article 10 quoted earlier: there is still information that must be restricted when prescribed by law and “in the interests of a democratic society”. In particular, it concerns hate speech. 2.2. Defining hate speech As was mentioned in the Introduction, there is no universally accepted definition of the term “hate speech” (ECtHR, Factsheet hate speech, 2019). In fact, hate speech definitions vary by country, jurisdictions and particular type of law (D'Souza, Griffin, et al, 2019, p.943). One of the definitions that were found during the current research was provided by the European Union Agency for fundamental rights (FRA) which defines hate speech as “the incitement and encouragement of hatred” as well as “discrimination or hostility towards an individual” based on prejudice connected with any particular characteristic, whether it is “sexual orientation or gender identity” (Hate Speech and Hate Crimes Against LGBT Persons). 11 In comparison to the definition of hate speech given by the Council of Europe and quoted in the Introduction, the definition of the European Union Agency for fundamental rights can be regarded as incomplete, as it clearly excludes racial hate speech, or hate speech based on nationality, ethnicity, migrant origin etc. On the other hand, it is worse noticing the presence of the same two components that were highlighted in the definition of the Council of Europe: (1) encouragement of hatred (2) based on one or another characteristic of a victim. Unfortunately, in practice defining hate speech is not that straightforward. As was observed by Parekh, in different countries different speech is considered to be hate speech (Parekh, 2012, p.40). In some instances this speech expresses certain views, but does not call for actions; in another the speech under consideration is abusive but not threatening; in some situations the speaker expresses dislike of a certain group of people, but not hatred, and wishes no harm (ibid). Parekh emphasizes that this confusion is a direct result of the tendency to summarize under the concept of “hate speech” all kinds of uncivil or hurtful speech (ibid). Parekh claims that it is more reasonable to define hate speech as incitement of hatred against a group of people, based on their nationality, sexual orientation, religion, gender, etc. In other words, the researcher supports the definition proposed by the Council of Europe and quoted in the Introduction. However, according to him, the concept of hate speech consists primary of three, not two components: 12 (1) It is directed against concrete individual or group of people based on a particular feature; (2) It stigmatizes this individual or group of people by prescribing them highly undesirable qualities and (3) It utilises these negative qualities to make this individual or group “a legitimate object of hostility” (Parekh, 2012, p. 41). Hate speech does not necessarily results in violence and must not necessarily be expressed with offensive of abusive language (ibid). Gelber and McNamara also admit that, whereas the term “hate speech” is widely used, it does not have a single meaning (2016, p.324). For their own study they adopted the three- component definition of Parekh. Richardson-Self, while reiterating the fact that there is no one accepted definition of hate speech among scholars, underlines that it is speech that a) is hostile and b)silences, humiliates, threatens or discriminates and c) targets group of people based on common traits, such as race, religion beliefs, disability, sexual orientation or gender (2017, p.256). Hate speech per se in an oppressive act, argues Richardson-Self (ibid, p.257). Yong, too, defines hate speech as speech that attacks people based on their particular characters, whether it is race, nationality, gender, sexual orientation, religion believes or any other identity marker (2011, p.386). Yet, the researcher shares the view that the term “hate speech” is “unsatisfactory” (ibid). Yong debates that different kinds of speech are 13 understood under this term and that appropriate response to them should differ from case to case (ibid). Moreover, providing a definition to hate speech in practice becomes even more difficult in the countries which experience great social tensions or had especially troubled historical past. For example, hate speech is a relatively new term in South Africa, where racism and discrimination until recently were institutionalized in the apartheid policy (Davids, 2018, p.297). It is worth noticing that now hate speech is criminalized in the country, but nevertheless it experiences a significant increase in both hate speech and hate crimes (ibid). Finally, there is a view among some scholars that to create one final definition to hate speech is difficult or even not possible because hate speech is a continuum (D'Souza, Griffin, et al, 2019, p.958). Whereas in this case the researchers initially concluded it in relation to gendered hate speech, the idea of hate speech as continuum or spectrum (McGonagle, 2013, p.4) seems to reflect the nature of this phenomenon. In particular, it could explain not only the problem of definition, but also different approaches and debates regarding hate speech regulation. Nevertheless, despite the lack of one single definition, it is possible to observe certain similarities in the proposed ones. To sum it up, we propose to understand under hate speech, utterances that (1) encourage hatred (2) towards individuals or groups of people (3) based on various particular group characteristics (4) which are stigmatized and (5) are 14 employed to legitimize hostility. Furthermore, hate speech (6) may be understood as a continuum that (7) does not necessarily result in violence, but (8) silences, discriminates and threatens targeted individuals or groups. 2.3. Hate speech and hate crimes Scholars often acknowledge that hate speech involves incitement of hatred (D'Souza, Griffin, et al, 2019, p.945), and thus the concept of “hate speech” is sometimes misunderstood as a synonym to the notion of “hate crime”. Whereas these concepts are related, it is significant for the purpose of the current thesis to underline the difference between them. Hate crimes can be regarded as violent manifestations of intolerance (OSCE, 2009, p.11) that usually have an impact not only on the victim, but also on the whole group to which the victim belongs. From other crimes hate crimes can be distinguished by bias motive. It is important to understand that hate crime can be manifested as an intimidation, threats, assaults, murder or similar criminal offence (ibid, p.16). The bias motive and criminal offence which have occurred are two principal features of the hate crimes. It means that a perpetrator selects a victim not randomly, but on the basis of his or her belonging to a special group. Thus, the key issue is what the victim 15 represents, and not who he or she is. (ibid, p.17). Race, language, religion, gender and similar aspects are possible examples of basis of the hate crimes (ibid, p.9). On the other hand, hate speech will still be penalized in some countries even if no criminal base offence have occurred, but only speech that promotes hatred or insults certain group of people (ibid, p.25). For example, if someone violates a person’s or nation’s honor or dignity, it will be hate speech, but not a hate crime. In other words, the term “hate crime” is used for acts, whereas the concept of “hate speech” is related to discriminatory views/speech (ibid, p.17). Thus, specific content – words, images, videos – can be regarded as a principal future of hate speech, but not that of hate crime. At the same time, hate speech can easily lead to hate crime. For instance, Davids argues that this is what happens in Charlottesville in August 2017 when a rally of supremacists and nationalists evolved into violence (2018, p. 298). On the other side of the globe, in Australia gendered hate speech fuels gender-based violence, which is a view of government bodies and some scholars (D'Souza, Griffin, et al., 2019, p.940). Yet, there is a notable absence of laws regulating gendered hate speech in the country (ibid). OSCE believes that legislation is only a part of the possible answer to the problem of hate crimes (OSCE, 2009, p.11). In order to combat hate crimes, there is a need in a comprehensive national programs which should also include education, special training, accurate data collecting, etc. (ibid, p.12). On the other hand, there are extreme variations 16 between hate speech laws in different countries, which can be explained by different constitutional and even philosophical approaches (ibid, p.26). 2.4. Hate speech: contextual typology Whereas one universally accepted typology of hate speech does not exist, it is possible to establish such contextually based on the most common themes that are to be found in hate speech examples, namely: 1) Hate speech based on nationality, race or ethnicity, including hate speech against people with migrant origin and incitement to genocide Racist hate speech exists in all parts of the world and constitutes a critical challenge for human rights (UN, General Recommendation 35, 2013, p.10). Racist hate speech does not necessarily equals to explicitly racial comments but may use indirect language (ibid, p.3). Among others, common targeted groups of this type of hate speech are indigenous peoples and people with migrant background including refugees and migrant workers (ibid, p.2). Davids debates that racist hate speech not only results in violence, but also leads to discrimination of a particular group of people (2018, p.298). According to Maitra and McGowan, regulation of racist hate speech should not involve any concerns related to freedom of speech (2010, p.370). In turn, while discussing 17 approaches towards racist hate speech and its qualification as an offence punishable by law, UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination proposed to take into account several contextual factors, such as - content and form of a particular commentary (for instance, whether it is provocative or not); - existent economic, political and social climate (whether there is already a discrimination against a targeted group or not); - potential influence of the speaker and his/her audience; - potential reach of hate speech; - the objectives of it (UN, General Recommendation 35, 2013, p.5). Although Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination introduced this contextualization to the racist hate speech only, analysis of contextual factors might be useful for approaching other types of hate speech as well. 2) Political hate speech, including anti-Semitist speeches or Holocaust denial Political expression and hate speech related to political issues should enjoy different legal protection, but in practice it is often difficult to distinguish between them, claims McGonagle (2013, p.19). In case of ambiguity, the researcher proposes to analyse not only the content of the speech itself, but also its form, context, position of a speaker in a 18 society and aim of speech (ibid). For instance, a clear separation should be made between speech that aims at contributing to public debate and speech that incites hatred (ibid). Understandably, freedom of political expression should be protected in a democratic society. However, this freedom is not absolute, emphasises McGonagle, but involves responsibilities for the speaker (ibid, p.20). As will be demonstrated in the second part of this thesis, protecting political expressions while simultaneously prohibiting political hate speech is a difficult challenge even for the European Court on Human Rights. This collision between political expression and political hate speech may become even more acute online (ibid). From the legal perspective, instances of Holocaust denial are a more clear issue. European Court of Human Rights determined in the case Garaudy v. France that the mere questioning of the Holocaust constitute an incitement to hatred against Jews and as such, contradicts the values of the Convention (2003, par. 23). 3) Hate speech based on religious beliefs or lack of such One could assume that religious hate speech involves discrimination based on religious believes, but Bonotti emphasises that the relation between hate speech and religion is not that straightforward (2017, p.259). Firstly, there is hate speech directed against religious minorities. Secondly, there are religious people who attempt to justify their hate speech 19 against particular groups of people based on, for instance, their sexual orientation, with an argument of religious freedom (ibid). In fact, they utilize hate speech as a means of propaganda of their faith (ibid, p.272). In this case, maintains Bonotti, religious believers spreading hate speech must be treated as any other citizens (ibid). The argument about religious freedom cannot be taken into account because there are other ways to spread their religious message, as well as express their disapproval of other people’s lifestyles (ibid). 4) Gendered hate speech Analysis of gendered hate speech is rare, argues Richardson-Self who believes that separate study of this kind of hate speech is required (2017, p.257). Interestingly enough, the researcher makes a distinction among (a) misogynistic speech that she considers to be hate speech, and (b) oppressive sexist speech that in her opinion does not amount to hate speech, but can be, nevertheless, violent (ibid). On the other hand, speaking about misogynistic speech versus sexist speech, D'Souza, Griffin, et al. defend their choice of the term “gendered hate speech”, emphasizing that it is an ongoing construction of gender that involves using gendered norms for attacks on people or groups of people (2019, p.955). Yet, D'Souza, Griffin, et al. agree that language maintains stereotypes that exist in society about gender, and thus gendered hate speech can be regarded as a means of 20 spreading misogynist hostility in order to support patriarchal structures in a society (ibid, p.967). Explaining the difference between misogynistic speech and oppressive sexist speech, Richardson-Self clarifies that misogyny involves hostility against women, whereas sexism is an instrument of reinforcement or justification of patriarchy (2017, p.261). Speech that belittles or patronizing women – for instance, calling grown women “girls” – can be regarded as morally unaccepted and sexist, though it is not hate speech (ibid, p.262). On the other hand, misogynistic hate speech usually contains direct hatred towards women which often manifests itself through rape-threats or comments (ibid, p.265). In contrast to other types of hate speech, misogynistic utterances usually target not a single group – that is, not all women – but only women who do not comply with patriarchal standards. Richardson-Self calls this phenomena “intradivisional speech” (ibid, p.267). Yet, this kind of speech should still be regarded as hate speech as it degrades and dehumanizes targeted people as much as any other type of hate speech (ibid, p.268). Other scholars maintain that gendered hate speech must be analyzed in socio-political context where it enforces patriarchal structures and norms (D'Souza, Griffin, et al, 2019, p.940). Gendered hate speech is inextricably connected with traditional gender boundaries which results in women being target of it, for instance, for voicing their ideas 21 or participating in society’s life (ibid, p. 956). Nevertheless, whereas women and girls are much more likely to become victims of gendered hate speech, it should be noted that it is not necessarily directed at females only: men, too, can become victims of it if they do not comply with traditional roles (ibid). Interestingly enough, some scholars further distinguish so-called “conservative” definition of gendered hate speech and “progressive” one (ibid, p. 958). They argue that the former focuses on protecting public order, whereas the latest – on protecting the victims (ibid). In other words, supporters of the “conservative” view on gendered hate speech prohibit it because it may cause criminal actions, whereas supporters of the “progressive” view simply ban gendered hate speech because of its harm to targeted individuals (ibid, p.959). 5) Hate speech based on sexual orientation European Court of Human Rights first recognised homophobic hate speech in 2012, in the case Vejdeland & Others v. Sweden (McGonagle, 2013, p.12). The Court did not provide a full definition to it, but stated that homophobic hate speech is directed against a person of group of people based on their sexual oritnation (Vejdeland & Others v. Sweden, 2012, par.42). The Court debated that despite widespread of homophobic hate speech, there were no established standards for approaching the problem in 2012 (ibid). 22 As it is often the case with hate speech, the boundaries between hate speech based on sexual orientation and gendered hate speech can be blurred. Thus, lesbians are often attacked on both grounds simultaneously which supports the assumption that hate speech is employed to control gendered boundaries and behaviour (D'Souza, Griffin, et al, 2019, p.955). Overall trend however is that homosexual or bisexual people are more likely to become targets of hate speech involving death or rape threats than their heterosexual contemporaries (ibid, p.957). 2.5. Other categorisations of hate speech Of course, it is necessary to underline that contextual categorisation presented above is not absolute. As will be demonstrated in the case law analysis later, quite often these categories intermingle and hate speech instance may be attributed to more than one of them. An alternative typology of hate speech can be based not on the content of speech itself, but on the way it is disseminated. The first category of hate speech then would be “face- to-face encounters”, the second – generally circulated hate speech (Gelber, McNamara, 2016, p.325). Whereas the distinction between these two types of hate speech is not always obvious, regulation of the second is much more controversial than the latest (ibid, 23 p. 325). Yet, based on the interviews with people, targeted by hate speech, scholars Gelber and McNamara concluded that these two mentioned types were not experienced different by victims, whether by “seriousness” or by “harmfulness” (ibid, p. 336). Finally, yet another completely different categorisation of hate speech was given by Yong who distinguished four different categories (2011, p.386): 1) “Targeted vilification”, or speech that has a main intention to intimidate, to wound or to insult targeted individuals or groups (ibid, p.394). Targeted hate speech may occur either through face-to-face encounters or without any direct contact, but its main characteristic is that it is “narrowly directed” at the victims (ibid). This category of hate speech, according to the researcher, should not be covered by the principle of free speech as it is hard to imagine that expressing hostility or contempt can lead to personal development of the speaker or correspond to any other interests that are supported by the principle of free speech (ibid, p.395); 2) “Diffuse vilification” that is covered by this principle but must not be protected (ibid, p.386, p.396). Yong understands under this category hate speech that attempts to intimidate, insult or wound, but is not directed at particular individuals or groups of people and is addressed to a wide audience of potentially sympathetic listeners – for example, speeches during Nazi marches (ibid). Yong argues that this kind of speech constitutes somewhat “greater degree of free speech interests” than targeted vilification, but contextually significance of such speech is usually low because the main aim of 24 diffuse vilification is to intimidate, not to disseminate any ideas (ibid, p.397). In other words, it is a low-value speech and its regulation is necessary for prevention of intimidation (ibid, p.398); 3) “Political advocacy”, or speech that propagates exclusionary or eliminationist policies and that, too, argues Yong, is covered by the principle of free speech, but must not be protected (ibid, p.386). It must be emphasized that under “exclusionary policy” Yong understands “exclusion from full citizenship” of particular groups of people based on race or religion believes, and under “eliminationist policies” – “ethnic cleansing” or “forced repatriation” of these groups (ibid, p.398). As such political advocacy can result in enactment of these principles, Yong claims that this kind of hate speech, too, must be unprotected by free speech doctrine (ibid); 4) Other instances of speech that presents “adverse judgements” about a particular group of people based on their race or religion. According to the researcher, this category of speech must be protected by the principle of free speech even despite its potential harm (ibid, p.386, p.401). Explaining his position, Yong claims that this kind of speech is assertions or opinions and thus it can be answered through counterarguments (ibid). In other words, Yong suggests that speech that is either uncovered (1) or unprotected (2- 3) is “regulable” and may be regulated (ibid, p.388). 25 2.6. Philosophical and practical reasons to ban hate speech Before providing an overview of legal base for hate speech regulation, it is necessary to determine why hate speech must be regulated. Whereas this issue seems to be straightforward – hate speech unlawfully threatens targeted people or groups of people and violets their dignity – scholars argue that the consequences of hate speech are much more diverse and long-term, and eventually can affect the whole society. Thus, Parekh emphasized that hate speech is harmful for public debate, as it negatively affects communities’ moral sensibility and distorts mutual respect in society (2012, p.44). Hate speech creates the environment of hostility and fear and intimidates the target group so that these people find themselves unable to participate in public life (ibid). Of course, simultaneously it affects personal lives of targeted people as they feel themselves humiliated and discriminated against (ibid). Similar position support Gelber and McNamara, who underline that hate speech can be regarded as “an existential attack” on a person’s dignity and its negative effects are long- term and enduring (2016, p.325). Researchers argue that two types of harms of hate speech are usually distinguished: 1) constitutive, or harm resulted from saying hate speech per se, and 2) consequential, or harm that can be a result of hate speech (ibid). For instance, hate speech can lead to negative stereotypes and create an environment where there stereotypes are normalized (ibid). 26 While contacting interviews with the people in Australia, targeted by hate speech, Gelber and McNamara observed that they acknowledge being hurt, upset and frightened (ibid, p.328, p.333). In a number of cases interviewers reported that fear prevented them expressing themselves or to act against hate speech (ibid, p.333). Even silence and withdrawal from social life was mentioned by interviewers as a means to avoid hate speech (ibid, p.334), which eventually supports the view of Parekh regarding the exclusion of targeted groups from social life. Similar ideas were expressed by Davids who argues that racist hate speech results in exclusion (2018, p.298). The scholar emphasizes that peaceful coexistence of people in a society is not possible in a climate of hate speech (ibid, p.306). Finally, D'Souza, Griffin, et al. acknowledge that one specific type of hate speech – namely, gendered hate speech – indirectly contribute to perpetuating gender-based violence (2019, p.963). Yet not everyone agrees with the idea that hate speech must be banned. American scholar Baker, who defines himself as a supporter of “almost absolute protection” of freedom of speech (2012, p. 57), provides two arguments why prohibition of hate speech is not an ultimate solution of the problem. Firstly, he argues that prohibition will not effectively reduce potential harm of such speech (ibid, p.72). Secondly, he believes that such measures will, on the contrary, aggravate the existent problems in society without properly addressing them (ibid). 27 Baker claims that direct response and open criticism of, for instance, racist views, can be more effective than prohibition of hate speech (ibid). Law regulation, on the other hand, can cause hate speech to “go underground” so that the real extent of the issue not be evident (ibid, p.73). Moreover, Baker believes that prohibition may enrage people of groups of people who support racist views, thus encouraging them to act (ibid). Conflicts within a society must be approached as political, not “violent struggle” (ibid, p.74). Politicians must address underling origins of racism and not hate speech that results from it (ibid). While Baker’s arguments evidently have some basis, one could retort that there is hate speech that cannot be answered in public debate, simply because it is motivated by pure hatred of troubled individuals and thus is not reasonable or logical arguments to be discussed in a dialogue. Furthermore, as was discussed above, there are various types of hate speech and it seems that the existence in a society of xenophobia, religious disagreements, misogyny and other forms of tensions does not need proof in the form of hate speech. However, open criticism, mentioned by Baker, as well as general condemnation of hate speech by the society, seem to be essential in combating this hurtful phenomena, especially in the internet era, where hate speech resistance cannot completely depend upon law enforcement. Being an American scholar, Baker represents “permissive” American approach which will be discussed below and which differs from the European perspective that is the primary focus of the current thesis. 28 2.7. International legal base for freedom of expression and hate speech’ regulation Dealing with freedom of expression and hate speech and its regulation, it is necessary to establish the general European legal base of the question. Freedom of expression as a standard was first prescribed in 1948, in the Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Two years later the European Convention on Human Rights, main normative act of the Council of Europe, guaranteed freedom of expression in the quoted above Article 10 and listed possible restrictions to it in the second part the same Article. In 1966, Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights reiterated freedom of expression and everyone’s right to hold opinions without interference. At the same time, Article 20 of the Covenant proclaimed that “any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law” (International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966, Article 19-20). Similar approach can be found in the Article 4 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1965) which disapprove propaganda and organizations that advocate for superiority based on ethnicity or skin colour, or justify discrimination or racial hatred (International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Article 4). However, practical interpretation of these 29 Conventions differs from state to state (OSCE, Preventing and responding to hate crimes, 2009, p.54). Additionally, incitement to genocide that is also amount to hate speech (McGonagle, 2013, p.6) is forbidden by the Article 3 of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide which entered into force in 1951. 2.8. Combating hate speech: minimal and extensive regulation approaches The widespread of hate speech has become a global issue due to the Internet and modern technologies. As mentioned in the Introduction, this issue, can be divided into two parts: hate speech’s impact on the society and individuals, its contribution to the hate crimes and violation of human rights that is causes, and, on the other hand, the possible consequences of the hate speech’s regulations to the freedom of expression. According to the former OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media Miklós Haraszti, the general trend is to extend regulation of hate speech, rather than balancing it by “more reasoned speech” (Haraszti, 2012, p.xiii). The same view supports Bhikhu Parekh, who claims that exact forms of expression that are prohibited vary from country to country, but universal trend is observable even for the past few decades (Parekh, 2012, p.37). With regard to hate speech’s regulation, there are two possible approaches: the first one is a so-called “minimal regulation approach” and the second – “an extensive regulation”. 30 The idea of the minimal regulation approach is based on the assumption that actual instigations to actual hate crimes must be criminalized, whereas simply offensive speech should be handled by dialogue in the press, courts, ethics organizations (Haraszti, 2012, xiii). Defenders of free expression often argue that, regardless of the disseminated content, freedom of speech will ultimately benefit the whole society (Downs, Cowan, 2012, p.1354). Respectively, proponents of the extensive regulation approach propose new speech bans into national criminal codes (Haraszti, 2012, xiii). Already in 2012 Haraszti underlined that extensive regulation approach may put at risk “the very existence of an international human rights standards for handling hate speech” (ibid). The real consequences of such an approach in practice can be visible when analyzing the situation with freedom of speech in the post-soviet countries, where war on terror was twisted into “a fight against ”extremism”, a vague term that quickly “expanded to encompass almost all forms of political dissent” (Richter, 2012, p.290). It is necessary to underline the word “vague” in this quotation: for instance, vague and too broad definition of the term “extremism” in Russian and other post-soviet countries’ law has given the officials a possibility to “stifle debate in the media of issues of increasing public interest – such as the motivations underlying insurgency” (ibid, p.305). In other words, post-soviet authorities use anti-extremist laws to suppress and to control any possible political opponents, but they are not the only ones. Similar strategy is employed in other parts of the world, for example, in South Africa, where the same vagueness of the national laws against hate speech concerns scholars who believe it can 31 be used against any unpopular, critical or politically unwanted speech (Davids, 2018, p.298). To summarize this view, it is a lack of clear and concrete definition of extremism, which was and is misused by the authoritarian governments for the restricting of freedom of expression. Taking into account the lack of a concrete definition of hate speech in international law, it is possible to assume that hate speech regulation may also be misused by other governments or political parties in their interests. This danger is even more evident if we consider that, as will be demonstrated below, social media to a certain extent replaced traditional courts while taking their own decision as to what information to permit and what to prohibit. Of course, opponents of this view believe that freedom of expression is used in defense of hate speech. For instance, Hate Speech International3 – an initiative that is dedicated to combating extremism and supporting journalists that cover this topic – estimates that whereas hate speech leads to political violence, “a liberal paradox” is created by supporters of freedom of expression who insist on its protection (Hate Speech International, Political backdrop). This view is also supported by Parekh who argues that freedom of speech protects arguments, ideas and opinions, whereas hate speech weakens democracy by spreading irrational fears and creating a sense of insecurity among its 3 Hate Speech International monitors hate speech, as well as hate crimes and extremism worldwide, thus being a very useful tool for researchers in this area. 32 victims (2012, p. 48). Maitra and McGowan, too, underline that harm caused by hate speech excludes it from any protection under free speech principle (2010, p.364). Prominent communication scholar Peter Molnar attempted to find a compromise between the two views. According to Molnar, the debate between proponents of minimal and extensive regulation approach is based on lack of information and generalization that result in misunderstanding (2012, p. 183). Molnar argues that supporters of freedom of expression do not sacrifice everything for the sake of this freedom, but rather have different opinions as to what is the most effective response to hate speech (ibid, p.184). Molnar himself considers art and education “in the broadest sense”, as well as an application of the “imminent danger test” to be the best response to hate speech in truly democratic countries (ibid, p.185). This test is based not on the content, but rather on the context of hate speech and even on the social environment: if a certain expression constitutes “a clear and present danger of violent action”, it must be prohibited (ibid, p 197). If, however, no imminent threat of violence can be assumed, prejudice and hatred are better to counteract with cultural activities, not law enforcement, claims Molnar (ibid). 33 2.9. European and American approaches towards hate speech Some scholars believe that support of minimal and extensive regulation may be explained by historical background, providing as example different legal approaches in European countries and in the USA. In particular, the difference between European and American approaches is evident when it concerns racist hate speech (Bleich, 2014, p.284). Discussing this difference, Greene argues that European approach towards hate speech regulation is based on the idea that laws must protect minorities from democracy that went wrong (2012, p.92). On the contrary, American approach assumes that democracy required that all voices must be heard and self-expression should not be limited (ibid). As a result, there is “restrictive” European policy towards hate speech, and “permissive” American (ibid, p.94). According to the Supreme Court of the USA, American Constitution prevents adaptation of laws that are required by both Article 4 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination and Article 20 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, discussed earlier (ibid, p.95). In both cases the Conventions were ratified in the USA with some reservations. Abrams, too, notices that there is a constitutional protection of hate speech in the USA, which is ultimately based on the famous First Amendment (2012, p.116). Abrams argues that hate speech prohibition would be a restriction based on the content, which is strictly against the principles of the First Amendment (ibid, p.118). The same idea is supported 34 by Bleich, who argues that in the USA it is almost impossible to convict someone of racist hate speech, unless this speech leads to “immediate violence” or is a direct threat ( 2016, p.284). Explaining the difference between European and American approach, Abrams suggests that different historical background – European experience with Holocaust and Nazi versus American history – can lead to different decisions regarding hate speech regulation (2012, p.119). The same view shares Schauer who underlines that Holocaust denial is regarded unlawful in Austria, Germany, France and some other European and non-European countries, but not in the USA where such prohibition would contradict freedom of speech (2012, p.130). In France, however, laws against Holocaust denial, as well as laws against racist hate speech, are used as a legal base against expressed hostility (Suk, 2012, p.148). Some historical background of discrepancy between European and American approaches is given by Bleich who believes the two positions started to evolve differently in 1960th (2016, p.284). According to the researcher, after the European Court on Human Rights was established in 1959 to enforce the Convention, it obtained an ultimate authority in Europe for drawing the line between freedom of expression and hate speech (ibid). In the USA such power since 1920th belonged to the Supreme Court. However, Bleich stops here, noticing that there is no theoretically plausible explanation of the difference between European and American approaches – only various hypotheses (ibid, p.285). 35 For example, Bleich mentions different “institutional strength of the courts”, variations in political cultures, divergent legal base for protection of freedom of expression, generally diverse jurisprudence systems and even contrasting interpretations of legal texts made by individual judges (ibid). At the same time Bleich emphasized that also European and American approaches towards freedom of expression and hate speech are “analytically distinct”, nevertheless they do not exclude each other (ibid, p.286). Interesting idea related to the American approach towards hate speech regulation is expressed by Downs and Cowan who argue that free-speech defenders in the USA acknowledge harm of certain speech, such as Holocaust denial or Nazi’s views, but yet consider freedom of expression to be more important (2012, p.1354). Downs and Cowan observe that it is easy to defend someone with whom you agree, but not so – to defend your opponent’s right to speak (ibid). This being said, researchers remind that hate speech can be harmful and humiliating to individuals, once again underlining the complex issue of finding a balance between freedom of speech and hate speech regulation (ibid). 2.10 . Online hate speech: general overview While providing unprecedented opportunities for communication and spread of knowledge, Internet facilitated “multi-directional” communication between its users (McGonagle, 2013, p.28). Lack of barriers that existed in traditional institutionalized 36 media increased opportunities to participate in public discourse, but also simplified dissemination of hate speech (ibid). This observation is supported by the Council of Europe that called Internet “a turbo accelerator” of hate speech” (Council of Europe, 2013, p.1). According to Council of Europe, there are two principal reasons for this phenomenon: wide access, as well as anonymity which excludes responsibility that should accompany freedom of expression (ibid). One could argue that anonymity also has its advantages when it comes to political debates, but indeed, the Internet gave rise to additional instruments for dissemination of hate speech. Nowadays online hate speech can be found not only on the websites, but is more common in the social media where this problem has different perspective and could potentially lead to grave consequences due to real names and personal information, which people often provide about themselves. A special aspect of online hate speech is difficulty of combating it due to the speed of dissemination, as well as lack of training on the technical issues which sometimes prevent quick investigation and identification who is responsible for dissemination of hate speech (OSCE, Preventing and responding to hate crimes, 2009, p.56). McGonagle debates that other complication for online hate speech regulation is jurisdictional issue as different countries have different laws regarding hate speech which, in turn, influence policies of internet-providers (2013, p.30). The researcher claims that websites that disseminate hate 37 speech are purposely being hosted in countries with “favorable jurisdiction” for hate speech (ibid, p.29). During the last decade various social media encountered hate speech on their portals and determined to (or were made to) address this issue in their guidelines and rules for users. Their policies, along with those of the internet-providers, are not unified as well as their automatic algorithms of content adjustment are not fully transparent. Being private actors, their involvement in online speech regulation could potentially lead to censorship, rightly warns McGonagle (2013, p.30). Yet the regulation of online hate speech is de-facto left to these private social media. Their related policies will be analyzed in detail in the third part of the thesis. 2.11. Alternative ways to combat hate speech Not only Molnar, but other scholars and organizations believe that apart from minimal or extensive regulation discussed above, there are other, secondary activities that can contribute to combating hate speech. Possible list of these activities is given in the resource guide for NGOs “Preventing and responding to hate crimes” prepared by the OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights in 2009. OSCE acknowledges that there is a strong connection between hate crimes and hate speech and propose following ways to counteract the latest: 38 - raise awareness about the problem; - monitor the hate content and advocate for the removal of hate speech from the Internet; - conduct education activities, more precisely – education of the problem of cyberhate for teachers, students, parents, law enforcement; - denounce and challenge the arguments or claims, hold politicians and public figures accountable before public opinion; - and, finally, take legal actions if hate speech «crosses the threshold into crime» (OSCE, Preventing and responding to hate crimes, 2009, p.53-56). Similar idea about a need of alternative responses to hate speech was expressed in General Recommendation No. 35 of the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, titled “Combating racist hate speech” (2013). In particular, this Recommendation underlines a necessity of educational, information and cultural strategies for combating hate speech (2013, p.9). In turn, Council of Europe, too, implements a number of strategies to combat hate speech. Among others, Council of Europe proposes to deny legal protection to hate speech, provide access to the means of expression to minorities and advocate for an intercultural dialogue (McGonagle, 2013, p.8). In must be noticed that measures proposed by OSCE, UN and Council of Europe should be regarded as a complex activity. One could assume, however, that these and other 39 possible measures should be viewed as additional and cannot fully substitute law intervention because it reduces hate speech, sends a powerful message and prevents hostility against targeted individuals or groups of people (Parekh, 2012, p.46). Finally, in the academic literature on hate speech exists an opinion, that yet another way – or additional way – to combat hate speech is to provide a voice to the groups targeted with hate speech (Gelber, McNamara, 2016, p.326). Whereas this hardly can be regarded as the only needed measure, it could definitely influence the debate around hate speech, inform society’s perception of it and, eventually, provide some support to the victims. 40 3. Research questions and methodology As was briefly outlined in the Introduction, the main research question of this thesis can be formulated as “What is understood under hate speech in a court’s practice and in the practice of social media: do these parties have equal approaches towards hate speech and if not, what differences can be observed?” Additionally, several sub questions were formulated that are supposed to deepen an understanding of hate speech phenomena and illuminate possible discrepancy between courts’ approach and that of the social media: 1) What arguments does a court use to determine what is hate speech and what is offensive speech that nevertheless must be protected for the sake of freedom of expression? 2) What types of hate speech can be found in a court’s practice? 3) How do major social media define hate speech? 4) How do major social media attempt to combat hate speech? 5) Are these methods effective and sufficient or not? 6) What alternatives ways to combat hate speech are already exist or are being developed? 7) How does social media’s practice regarding hate speech correspond to that of a court? 8) Do social media de facto replace a judge when controlling online hate speech? 9) What implications it could potentially have for freedom of expression? 41 As the scope of the thesis did not permit us to analyse case law of a number of courts, it was chosen to focus on the practice of only one court, namely, the European Court of Human Rights, established in 1959. The choice of this particular court is based on its significance for the European law practice and for the European Convention on Human Rights which norms it is supposed to protect, including freedom of expression, guaranteed by Article 10 of the Convention. The practice of the European Court of Human Rights related to hate speech is analyzed and compared with guidances and actions of the major social media, such as Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube that were selected due to their popularity and widespread in society’s life. Thus, according to the portal of web-statistic Statista.com, in April 2019 Facebook had an active monthly audience of 2 320 millions of users, YouTube – 1 900 millions, and Twitter – 330 millions (see: Statista, Most popular social media worldwide). Policies of a number of other popular social media were excluded from the research for various reasons. For instance, WhatsApp was excluded as a messenger, Instagram – as a portal, primary orientated on visual communication, Chinese social media platforms such as me WeChat, QQ, QZone and Sina Weibo were not analysed due to the linguistic inaccessibility. The main method used in the current thesis was qualitative content analysis that is based on text interpretation (Mayring, 2000, p.1). It must be noted that content analysis as a research method has a long history in social sciences. It was defined as a systematic technique that involves compressing texts into content categories already by Berelson in 42 1952. Holsti in 1969 described content analysis as a research technique that “objectively and systematically” determines particular characteristics of a text (1969, p.14). Krippendorff already in 1980 established that content analysis involves collecting a set of texts, systematic reading of them, noticing consistent features and making assumptions about their meaning (p.3). These systematic inferences are supposed to answer the research questions of the study (ibid, p.25). Stemler, too, emphasized that content analysis relies on categorization of data and coding (2001, p.3), with Weber earlier explaining that under a category is understood a group with “similar meaning or connotations” (Weber, 1990, p.37). At the same time, qualitative approach aims at understanding of a particular phenomena (Vaismoradi, Turunen, 2013, p. 398). Qualitative content analysis suggests that material should be analyzed gradually and by dividing it into analytical units (Mayring, 2000, p.3). The same idea was expressed by Sparker who suggested dividing content into small units for a description (2005). Content analysis is applied by legal scholars, too, who conduct a content analysis of legal texts and judicial opinions for scientific understanding of the law as such (Hall &Wright, 2008, p.64). In fact, one of the first content analysis of the legal practice was conducted by political scientist Fred Kort in 1957 who recorded and categorized facts from a number of judgments in an attempt to predict results of similar cases (ibid, p.67). Other scientists soon began to use content analysis of the judicial opinions in order to 43 understand judicial behavior (ibid, p.68). In the 1990 content analysis of legal practice became widespread among legal scholars in the USA (ibid, p.70). Hall and Wright underline that content analysis can provide different information to the legal researches. For example, it may be useful for counting court results (ibid, p.85) or evaluating legal doctrine (ibid, p.87). They further theorize that exploration of legal doctrine consists of understanding of judicial reasoning (ibid, p.87), conducting normative legal analysis (ibid, p.88) or studying the landscape of case law (ibid, p.90). Although this thesis cannot be regarded as a legal study, in the second part of it we attempt content analysis of case law with a primary purpose to understand the reasoning of the European Court of Human Rights regarding hate speech and with a secondary purpose to compose an overview of recent practice of the Court regarding this issue. In other words, content analysis conducted in the current thesis was based on two primary sources: 1. Selected case law of the European Court of Human Rights that was found in the online database of the court4. Selection of the judgments for the detailed analysis was based on time frame (2012-2019), as it is the same period when social media began to develop their own policies regarding hate speech, as well as on their significance and overall input to the understanding of the Court’s approach towards hate speech. Significance was established by comparison of various secondary literature where these cases where 4 The database of the European Court of Human Rights can be found here: http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/ http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/ 44 repeatedly mentioned by legal scholars (among others: McGonagle, 2013; Bleich, 2013; Sottiaux, 2011; Tulkens, 2012; Buyse, 2014). . As categorization is a central part of the qualitative content analysis (Mayring, 2000, p.3), an attempt to categorize the judgments was made based on the theoretical background discussed in paragraph 2.4. 2. Guidances, codes, community standards, official statements of the three social media platforms (Facebook, YouTube and Twitter) that were outlined and compared in the third part of the thesis. Additionally, online initiatives against hate speech were discussed in the paragraph 5.4 Observations regarding the comparison were presented in the Conclusion section. 45 4. European Court of Human Rights’ approach towards hate speech 4.1. Definition and types of hate speech according to the European Court of Human Rights Although the limits of freedom of expression were already discussed in the famous Handyside v. the United Kingdom case in 1976, the term “hate speech” was not included in the Convention and first appeared in four judgments of the Court in 1999, namely in Sürek v. Turkey (No. 1, par. 62); Sürek & Özdemir v. Turkey (par.63); Sürek v. Turkey (No. 4, par. 60) and Erdogdu & Ince v. Turkey (par. 54) (McGonagle, 2013, p.11). Interestingly enough, in none of these four judgments does the Court provide a definition to hate speech. Instead, once again stressing responsibilities that come together with the right to freedom of expression, in three of four of these judgments the Court uses the same wording and warns media to be especially careful when publishing views of organizations that proclaim violence against the State as media should not become a mean “of dissemination of hate speech” (Erdogdu & Ince v. Turkey, 1999, par. 54). However in the fourth of these cases – Sürek v. Turkey, 1999 – the Court went further and decided that whereas some information may lawfully “offend, shock or disturb”, it the case Sürek v. Turke the commentary in question was “hate speech and glorification of violence” (see: Sürek v. Turke, 1999, par.62). Thus the Court established that there is a new type of speech – expression that goes beyond the protection given to the offensive 46 speech protected in Handyside v. the United Kingdom decision (McGonagle, 2013, p.12). It is also worth noticing that in all these four cases the Court connected hate speech with “glorification of violence”. Nevertheless, European Court of Human Rights did not provide a definition to hate speech – neither in 1999 not later. Without a definition, case law of the Court is the main source which is explored by scholars who attempt to analyse the Court’s approach towards hate speech (McGonagle, 2013, p.12). While doing it, some of them underlined that it is important not to expand the term “hate speech” indefinitely (Tulkens, 2012, p.295). It should be noticed that European Court of Human Rights itself distinguishes a much broader number of hate speech categories than was discussed in the theoretical part of this thesis. In 2019 the Court published a Factsheet on hate speech where a significant number of hate speech’s types with examples of the respective most typical cases were listed (ECtHR, Factsheet hate speech, 2019, p.2-8): - Ethnic hate (Pavel Ivanov v. Russia, 2007); - Incitement to violence, support of terrorist activity (Roj TV A/S v. Denmark, 2018); - Negationism and revisionism (mentioned earlier Garaudy v. France, 2003, also M’Bala M’Bala v. France, 2015); - Racial hate (Glimmerveen and Haqenbeek v. the Netherlands, 1979); - Religious hate speech (Norwood v. the United Kingdom, 2004); 47 - Speech that constitutes “Threat to the democratic order” (among others - Schimanek v. Austria, 2000); - Speech that constitutes “Apology of violence and incitement to hostility” (discussed above Sürek (no.1) v. Turkey, 1999, also Gündüz v. Turkey, 2003); - Hate speech in “Circulating homophobic leaflets” (mentioned above Vejdeland v. Others v. Sweden, 2012); - Speech that condones terrorism (Leroy v. France, 2008, also Stomakhin v. Russia, 2018); - Speech that condones war crimes (Lehideux and Isorni v. France, 1998); - Speech that denigrates national identity (Dink v. Turkey, 2010); - Speech that amounts to extremism (Ibragim Ibragimov and Others v. Russia, 2018); - Displaying symbolic with “controversial historical connotation” (Fáber v. Hungary, 2012); - Speech that incites ethnic hatred (Balsytė-Lideikienė v. Lithuania, 2008); - Speech that incites national hatred (Hösl-Daum and Others v. Poland, 2014); - Speech that incites racial discrimination or hatred (among others: Féret v. Belgium, 2009, Le Pen v. France, 2010, Perinçek v. Switzerland, 2015, Šimunić v. Croatia, 2019); - Speech that incites religious intolerance (Erbakan v. Turkey, 2006); - Speech that insults states officials (Stern Taulats and Roura Capellera v. Spain, 2018); - Hate speech that is primary disseminated in the Internet (among others: Delfi AS v. Estonia, 2015, Pihl v. Sweden, 2017, Nix v. Germany, 2018, etc.). 48 Whereas this typology seems to be overwhelmingly detailed and not completely clear (for instance, the difference between ethnic hate and speech that incites ethnic hatred seems to be very blurred, as well as the difference between religious hate speech and speech that incites religious intolerance), it provides a full typological overview of the cases of the European Court of Human Rights that concern with information that the Court itself qualifies as hate speech. One could argue that it underlines the idea that it is not possible to provide a single finite definition to hate speech which instead should be better regarded as an open spectrum of speeches. 4.2. ECtHR’s algorithm of establishing hate speech European Court of Human Rights has repeatedly reiterated that there is an obligation to draw a line between expressing views (including such that can “offend, shock or disturb”) and distributing information that represents incitement to extremism or any other form of hate speech (ECtHR, Factsheet hate speech, 2019, p.1). The Court proposes achieving this by applying two principal legal norms: Articles 10 and 17 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Article 17 – “Prohibition of abuse of rights” is to be applied when commentary in question attempt to destroy the fundamental values of the Convention, Article 10 – in all the other cases (ECtHR, Factsheet hate speech, 2019, p.1). For example, the limitations of the Article 10 must be applied when the commentary in question threatens public safety, health or the reputation or rights of others, etc. (ibid). 49 Nevertheless, this algorithm remains too vague to solve the collision of freedom of expression and hate speech in practice. Quite often it is not so easy to determine, for instance, whether a message represents someone’s views on national security or territorial integrity or contains approval of terrorist’s attacks. Is an article an example of journalist’s provocation or the violation of the rights of others, do we need to protect moral in this or that case or do we need to protect the information, which shocks and disturbs, etc. As was briefly mentioned in paragraph 2.1 of this thesis, the Court itself developed a classic test that is supposed to determine whether Article 10 was violated and that is codified in Article 10.2 of the Convention. Firstly, any interference with freedom of expression must be prescribed by law (European Convention on Human Rights, 1950, Art.10.2). Secondly, any restrictions of freedom of expression must have a “legitimate aim” – among others, prevent disorder and crimes or protect the reputation or rights of other people. Thirdly, these restrictions must be “necessary in a democratic society” (ibid). As emphasized by McGonagle, within these rules states-members of the Council of Europe may regulate freedom of expression themselves which explains why there is no consensus among different jurisdictions regarding what content, how and how much must be regulated (McGonagle, 2013, p.9). It must be emphasized that the European Court of Human Rights does not replace national authorities in its decisions, but rather reviews their judgments for correspondence with the Convention’s values (ibid). In other words, the Court’s mission is to review national interpretation of the Convention (ibid). 50 4.3. Overview of ECtHR’s hate speech practice in 1976-2012 Whereas the scope of this thesis does not allow us to conduct a thorough full-scale study of all the judgments related to hate speech regulation in the 60-year old history of the European Court of Human Rights, analysis of the recent case law requires at least a brief overview of selected historical and most influential judgments that formed modern Court’s approach towards hate speech regulation. The general line is that the Court seeks harmonization of freedom of expression with protection of other human rights which involves protection from hate propaganda (Sottiaux, 2011, p.42). The famous case Handyside v. United Kingdom, discussed above, took place in 1976 and is usually debated and quoted in any scholarly publication as an earliest example of the Court’s approach towards hate speech regulation. In fact, the Court itself quotes Handyside v. United Kingdom in its Factsheet and in countless hate speech judgments (ECtHR, Factsheet hate speech, 2019, p.1). Still in the early period of its existence the Court ruled in the case Glimmerveen and Hagenbeek v. the Netherlands, 1979, that distribution of leaflets by far right political leaders in which they appealed to “our white people” and claimed to remove all foreign workers, constituted a form of racial discrimination (Glimmerveen and Hagenbeek v. the Netherlands, 1979, par.4). Bleich noted that Glimmerveen and Hagenbeek asserted that their leaflets were protected by freedom of speech provisions of the Convention, but the Court quoted Article 17 discussed above and dismissed their claims (2013, p.292). 51 Another case that happened before the Court introduced the term “hate speech” in 1999, was Jersild v. Denmark, 1994, in which a Danish journalist Jersild was convicted for spreading racist statements in the interview with right-wing group that he had conducted. This case is significant because it established a need for a journalistic responsibility when dealing with extremists views: the journalist in this case was convicted mainly because he failed to contradict his interviewees or distance himself from their racist statements (McGonagle, 2013, p.13). The analysis of the scholarly literature indicates that the number of hate speech cases appears to increase in the 2000th. After the four judgments in 1999 that introduced the term “hate speech” in connection with “glorification of violence” (see par. 4.1), a series of important rulings took place one by one. The judgment in Garaudy v. France, 2003, established Holocaust denial as unlawful and incitement to hatred against Jews, although in one of the previous cases the Court ruled that generally Article 10 of the Convention protects debate about unsettled historical events and public figures about whom different opinions may exist (Lehideux and Isorni v. France, 1998, par. 45). The case Gündüz v. Turkey, 2003, introduced debate about religious hate speech in the practice of the European Court of Human Rights. In this case the Court overturned Turkish courts’ decision that discussions on Islam and secularism constituted incitement to hatred based on religion. Instead, European Court of Human Rights ruled that defending religious beliefs without incitement to violence does not amount to hate speech 52 (Gündüz v. Turkey, 2003, par.51). In other words, the Court underlined incitement to violence as a necessary component of hate speech. The Court reiterated its position a year later in the case Norwood v. United Kingdom, 2004, which concerned a member of a British far right party who displayed out of a window of his apartment a poster with Twin Towers if flames, accompanying by the call to eliminate Islam from Britain in order to protect its people (Norwood v. United Kingdom, 2004, par. 2). The Court decided that this fact amounted to a public attack on Muslims in the United Kingdom and so a conviction of Norwood by British courts did not constitute a breach of the Article 10 (ibid, par.4). It is worth noticing that the term “hate speech” did not appear in this decision even five years after its introduction in the Court’s practice. According to Tulkens, the essence of today’s position of the Court was expressed in the case Erbakan v. Turkey, 2006 (2012, p.279). In this case the Court evaluated decisions of Turkish courts that convicted a future Turkish Prime Minister Erbakan for inciting hatred in his political speech in which he discussed differences between religions and races. The European Court of Human Rights concluded that, as speech in question did not create imminent danger, the penalty imposed by the national courts would have negative consequences for the political debate in the country. Thus, the Court underlined negative consequences as important factor in establishing hate speech. Simultaneously, the Court reiterated that in democratic society it may be necessary to prevent dissemination of 53 expressions that incite or justify hatred on the grounds of intolerance (Erbakan v. Turkey, par. 56). Another significant case related to ethnic hate speech is Pavel Ivanov v. Russia, 2007, in which the Court convicted Russian journalist Ivanov in spreading hatred via his newspaper. In this case the speech in question was series of anti-Semitic publications in which Ivanov accused the entire ethnic group of Jews in all Russian problems, and called for their exclusion from social life (Pavel Ivanov v. Russia, 2007, The Facts). The Court had no doubts that this sort of speech constituted a violation of the underlying values of the Convention (ibid, The Law, par.1). However, in this judgment the Court did not use the term “hate speech” but referred to Ivanov’s publications as “incitement of ethnic, racial and religious hatred” (ibid, the Facts). This underlines the fact that the use of the term “hate speech” is not unanimous, and in 2007 the judges still preferred to use more general terminology. Incitement to racial hatred was further explored in the judgements Soulas and Others v. France, 2008 and Féret v. Belgium, 2009. In both these cases the speech – a published book and leaflets respectively – was directed against immigrants and incited hatred and violence against them. In the first case, the author of the book in question went so far as to propagate an “ethnic war” (Soulas and Others v. France, The Facts). In the second, a chairman of a political party Féret called to stop “Islamification of Belgium” (Féret v. Belgium, 2009, par.9). In both cases the European Court of Human Rights supported the 54 national courts and reiterated that conviction of the applicants was in the interest of order in the society. Finally, two more case that must be mentioned in this very brief overview of the European Court of Human Rights’ practice in the period 1976-2012 and related to hate speech, are the cases Le Pen v. France, 2010 and Dink v. Turkey, 2010. The first of them is usually quoted together with the Féret v. Belgium, 2009, because of the similar nature. Thus, the applicant in this case was a prominent French politician Le Pen whom French courts found guilty in incitement of hatred and discrimination against Muslims in France for his far-right statements in an interview. The European Court of Human Rights upheld the decisions of the national courts, confirming that political comments that presented a whole religious community as a national threat are likely to result in “rejection and hostility” against these people (Le Pen v. France, 2010, The Law, par.1). On the contrary, the case Dink v. Turkey, 2010 represents a situation where the state – Turkey – condemned a journalist Firat Dink for his articles on the identity of Turkish people of Armenian origin. A year later, the journalist was killed. The relatives brought the case to the European Court which concluded that there was no “pressing social need” to find the journalist guilty by national courts because the articles did not incite violence or revolt and were not disrespectful or insulting (Dink v. Turkey, 2010, par.136). The journalist was merely expressing his opinions on the issue of public interest (ibid, par.135). It must be noted that additionally the Court highlighted the fact that authorities failed to protect the journalist (ibid, par.91). 55 To sum it up, the argumentation of the Court in the discussed judgments is presented in the following Table 1: Table 1. Argumentation of the ECtHR in selected hate speech-related cases 1976-2012 Judgement Argumentation in support of the utterance in question being hate speech Argumentation in support of the utterance in question being protected speech (not hate speech) 1. Handyside v. United Kingdom, 1976 Ideas that can “offend, shock or disturb” must be free in the interests of “pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness” (par.49) 2. Glimmerveen and Hagenbeek v. the Netherlands, 1979 Political leaflets with appeal to remove all foreign workers, constituted a form of racial discrimination (par.4) 3. Jersild v. Denmark, 1994 Journalist convicted because he failed to contradict his interviewees or distance himself from their racist statements 4. Lehideux and Isorni v. France, 1988 Generally, the Convention protects debate about unsettled historical events and public figures about whom different opinions may exist (par.45) 5-8. Sürek & Özdemir v. Turkey, 1999, Sürek v. Turkey, 1999 (No. 4), Erdogdu & Ince v. Turkey, 1999 Sürek v. Turkey, 1999 First use of the term “hate speech” by ECtHR, no definition is given, but responsibilities are highlighted: media should not become a mean “of dissemination of hate speech” (Erdogdu & Ince v. Turkey, 1999, par. 54). The Court established a connection between hate speech and “glorification of violence” (Sürek v. Turke, 1999, par.62) 56 9. Garaudy v. France, 2003 Holocaust denial is unlawful and constitutes incitement to hatred against Jews (par.45) 9. Gündüz v. Turkey, 2003 Defending religious believes without incitement to violence does not amount to hate speech (par.51) 10. Norwood v. United Kingdom, 2004 Call to eliminate Islam from Britain amounted to a public attack on Muslims in the United Kingdom (par.4) 11. Erbakan v. Turkey, 2006 Because speech in question did not create imminent danger, the penalty imposed by the national courts would have negative consequences for the political debate (par.56) 12. Pavel Ivanov v. Russia, 2007 Accusation of the entire ethnic group and call for Jews to be excluded from social life constituted a violation of the underlying values of the Convention and incitement of ethnic hatred (The Law, par.1) 13. Soulas and Others v. France, 2008 Propaganda of an “ethnic war” is incitement to hatred 14. Féret v. Belgium, 2009 Distributing leaflets with appeal to stop “Islamification of Belgium” is incitement to hatred (par.9) 15. Le Pen v. France, 2010. Political comments that present a whole religious community as a national threat are likely to result in “rejection and hostility” against these people and therefore, conviction of the speaker is relevant and sufficient (The Law, par.1) 16. Dink v. Turkey, 2010 There was no “pressing social need” to find the journalist guilty by national courts because the articles did not incite violence or revolt, were not disrespectful or insulting and the journalist was 57 expressing his opinions on the issue of public interest (par.135-136) In the next paragraph more detailed analysis of the arguments provided in the judgments passed by the European Court of Human Rights in 2012-2019 – already after the widespread of social media – will be provided. 4.4. ECtHR’s case law concerning hate speech in 2012-2019 Despite the typology found in the Factsheet hate speech of the European Court of Human Rights and discussed above, we propose to categories the analysis by content of the cases, as it was done by Tulkens who distinguished only four categories of hate speech: glorification of violence, religious intolerance, racial hate speech and sexual orientation hate speech (2012). In this paragraph following fifteen judgments of the European Court of Human Rights from the period 2012-2019 will be analyzed in details: - Political/racial//ethnic hate speech (Aksu v. Turkey, 2012; Öner and Türk v. Turkey, 2015; Balázs v. Hungary 2015; Perinçek v. Switzerland, 2015; Király and Dömötör v. Hungary, 2017); 58 - Religious hate speech (Raelien Suisse v Switzerland, 2012; Belkacem v. Belgium, 2017); - Sexual orientation hate speech (Vejdeland and Others v. Sweden, 2012; Identoba and Others v. Georgia, 2015; M.C. and A.C. v. Romania, 2016); - Online hate speech (Delfi AS v. Estonia, 2015; Magyar Tartalomszolgáltatók Egyesülete and Index.hu Zrt v. Hungary, 2016; Pihl v. Sweden, 2017; Smajić v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2018; Savva Terentyev v. Russia, 2018 ). The results of this analysis will be presented in Table 2 in paragraph 4.5. 4.4.1. Political, racial, ethnic hate speech Aksu v. Turkey, 2012 As was mentioned in the chapter 4.1 of the present paper, the European Court of Human Rights distinguishes, among others, political, racial, national and anti-constitutional hate speech. However, as will be evident from the detailed analysis of the judgments, this separation is not always clear and in some cases, is very blurred. That is why, for the purpose of the present thesis, it was decided to combine the next five judgments in one category, namely, political, racial and ethnic hate speech. 59 The first of the five judgments to be discussed in this category is the case of Aksu v. Turkey, 2012 where the alleged hate speech was contained in the book “The Gypsies of Turkey” written by the Associate Professor Ali Rafet Özkan and published by the Turkish Ministry of Culture. The book in question was a research about people of Roma origin in which the author describes the ethnic and cultural features of the respective nation. Among other things, the author claimed that people of Roma origin “were engaged in illegal activities” and lived as “thieves, pickpockets, swindlers, robbers, usurers, beggars, drug dealers, prostitutes and brothel keepers” (Aksu v. Turkey, 2012, par.14). These particular remarks attracted the attention of the applicant of Roma origin and he filled the complaint in 2002, claiming that the passages were insulting and humiliating. The national courts in long and complicated proceedings found no proof that such remarks constitute an attack on the applicant or the other people of Roma origin. In a separate but related case, the same applicant claimed that several entries in the new published Turkish dictionary contained discriminatory and insulting information about the Roma people. For instance, the applicant especially mentioned such entries as “Gypsy tent’: a dirty and poor place” and ‘Becoming a Gypsy’: displaying miserly behavior” (ibid, par.28). Several national courts dismissed the complaint on the ground that the entries reflect historical and sociological reality and were not meant to insult a particular ethnic group. The case came to the European Court of Human Rights that investigated the complaint and found a need for balance between the applicant’s rights and public interest in 60 freedom of expression. Restating, that freedom of expression is one of the most essential foundations of a democracy, the Court reminded about the information that can “offend, shock or disturb” and that was protected in the case Handyside v. the United Kingdom, 1976. The Court then proceeded with the reminder that freedom of expression may be subject to the exceptions described in the second part of the Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, but the necessity of such restrictions must be established “convincingly” (ibid, par.64). Once again, the Court underlined that the analysis of the passages from the book in question must be conducted in the context of the whole book, including the research method used by the author who contacted the members of the Roma community, as well as the police and relevant authorities (ibid, par.20). Furthermore, the author claimed that he lived with the Roma community and observed their lifestyle from the scientific point of view (ibid, par.11). Additionally, the European Court stated that the applicant had an opportunity to review his case before two different levels of national jurisdiction and the Ministry of Culture windrowed the remaining copies of the book. Taking it all into account, the Court concluded that the necessary balance between the rights of the Roma community and freedom of expression was found, even considering the vulnerable position of the Roma people in the country. According to the court, the government should do more to battle the negative stereotypes about the Roma community, but in the present case the Turkish authorities did not misuse their power and did not violate anybody’s rights. The 61 expressions used in the book are part of a spoken daily Turkish, as much as the dictionary’s entries from the second part of the case. The entries must have been labeled as “insulting”, but an absence of this note was not enough to constitute a violation. It is necessary to emphasize that once again the court considered the context around particular words and phrases, and mentioned both the case of Handyside v. the United Kingdom, 1976 and the European Convention on Human Rights while establishing a balance between offensive speech and freedom of expression. Öner and Türk v. Turkey, 2015 Another case that was considered to be an example of alleged political and racial hate speech also originated in Turkey. The applicants in the Öner and Türk v. Turkey, 2015, attended public celebrations and made speeches about Kurdish people. Among others, the applicants talked about the civilians killed by the security forces in Cizre, Nusaybin and Şırnak, the poisoning of the Kurdish leader and claimed that the authorities did not supported democratization and did not solve the Kurdish problem (Öner and Türk v. Turkey, 2015, par.6). Shortly after the event, the public prosecutor charged the applicants with terrorist propaganda; the national court found them guilty and sentenced them to one year and eight month of imprisonment. Though the sentence was eventually suspended, the 62 applicants filed a complaint to the European Court of Human Rights, claiming that their right for freedom of expression guaranteed to them by Article 10 of the Convention was violated. The applicants emphasized that in their speech they spoke about the necessity to find peaceful methods to solve the Kurdish problem, did not advocate any kind of violence and did not called upon people to commit any kind of illegal actions (ibid, par.19). After reviewing the case, the European Court concluded that there was an interference with the applicants’ rights to freedom of expression and it was not necessary in a democratic society. From the Court’s perspective, the speech in question constituted a critical assessment of the authorities and did not contained terrorist propaganda. Moreover, the Court specifically mentioned that the applicant’s speech did not “encourage violence, armed resistance or an uprising” (ibid, par.24) and did not incited violence by “by instilling a deep-seated and irrational hatred against identifiable persons” – and thus was not hate speech (ibid). Interestingly enough, this judgment is one of the very few instances where the European Court of Human Rights specifically mentioned the term “hate speech”, adding to it a significant characteristic. Thus, from this judgment it is possible to assume that the Court understands under hate speech a speech that is capable of inciting violence by appealing to the irrational hatred against a person or a group of people. 63 Additionally, the case Öner and Türk v. Turkey, 2015 is a good example of blurring of the categories of political and ethnic hate speech or alleged hate speech as the initial speech of the applicants was about the Kurdish problem and their discrimination in the society, as well as about the authorities’ policy towards this issue. Balázs v. Hungary 2015 The case Balázs v. Hungary 2015, can also be classified as a political or ethnic hate speech case. In it, the applicant of Roma origin and his girlfriend were leaving a club when three men approached and started to insult them with “Dirty gypsy, do you need a cigarette? Here is money!” (par.10). The situation developed in a fight that was concluded by the police arrival. Subsequently, the national courts failed to establish a link between the insult with national hatred and the fight, and the case came into the European Court. The Court concluded that the state has an obligation to establish any possible racist motive and ethnic hatred behind the attack. Even though proving racial motivation could be difficult, the national courts should have taken into account that people of Roma origin are especially vulnerable in the Hungarian society and require an additional protection (ibid, par.53). Moreover, the Court underlined that any racist verbal abuse is highly relevant in cases involving ethnic minorities (ibid, par.61). When only the victim’s characteristic is 64 involved, the attack can be classified as hate crimes even if the motives were mixed (ibid, par.70). Therefore, concludes the court, the state clearly violated the rights of the applicant by not conducting a thorough investigation (ibid, par.75). While relevant for the present paper, it is necessary to mention that in the case Balázs v. Hungary 2015 the term “hate speech” was not used as such in the court’s assessment part of the judgment, but was substituted by the phrase “racist verbal abuse” which in the present case can be regarded as a synonym. Regarding the typology, the case Balázs v. Hungary 2015 provides an example of ethnic hate speech. Perinçek v. Switzerland, 2015 Finally, the last selected case found for the category of political, racial and ethnic hate speech is the case Perinçek v. Switzerland, 2015. In this case the applicant was a doctor of law and a chairman of the Turkish Workers’ Party who in 2005 took part in a various press conferences where he publicly denied the genocide of the Armenian people by the Ottoman Empire in 1915. In one of his speeches, he claimed that “the allegations of the ‘Armenian genocide’ are an international lie” and that the Kurdish and the Armenian problem “did not even exist” (Perinçek v. Switzerland, 2015, par.13). After the conferences the Switzerland-Armenia Association filed a complaint against the applicant and the Lausanne District Police Court found the applicant guilty of racial 65 discrimination as the Armenian genocide was a proven fact (ibid, par.186). After the appeal in the national courts, the case came to the European Court of Human Rights where the applicant claimed that the courts breached his freedom of expression. In 2013 a Chamber of the Court found a violation of Article 10 of the Convention, but at the Government’s request the case came to the Grand Chamber of the Court which analyzed, among others, whether the speech in question can be regarded as hate speech by comparing it to the similar cases such as, among others, Gündüz v. Turkey, 2003 and Erbakan v. Turkey, 2006. After this analysis, the Court concluded that the national courts failed to establish a social need or necessity of the applicant’s conviction in a democratic society, as the authorities overstepped their power and suppressed a debate with huge public interest (ibid, par. 241). The mere denial of Armenian genocide is insufficient to be qualified as an incitement of hatred towards a particular nation and, accordingly, the applicant had the right for open discussion of the issue even if it is sensitive and may be offensive, as it is a fundamental aspect of freedom of expression (ibid, The Court’s assesment). Once again it is necessary to emphasize that the Court did not only analyzed the particular words or speech, but regarded it in a broader context of the historical and political situation. Moreover, the Court focused on whether the speech in question had a public interest and whether a conviction of the speaker was necessary in a democratic society – two more crucial questions that can be used in establishing whether particular 66 content constitutes hate speech or not. From this perspective, the difference between the case Király and Dömötör v. Hungary, 2017 analyzed below and the cases Perinçek v. Switzerland, 2015 and Öner and Türk v. Turkey, 2015 is especially evident. Király and Dömötör v. Hungary, 2017 Finally, the fifth case to be analyzed in this category is Király and Dömötör v. Hungary that was passed in January 2017. In this case the applicants – two Hungarians of Roma origin – complained that the state failed to protect them during the anti-Roma demonstration that has taken place in 2012. This demonstration was organized by the far- right groups who described it on their websites as “against Roma criminality” (Király and Dömötör v. Hungary, 2017, par.7). During the events the leaders of the far-rights groups called Roma “not “normal”, and claimed that Roma criminality was “omnipresent” in Hungary and that this ethnic group brought “only destruction, devastation and fear” (ibid, par.10). On this ground, the leaders called the participants to “sweep out the “rubbish” from the country” and stated that the Hungarians had rights to use all possible means to achieve this purpose (ibid). The applicants who were in the neighborhood during the demonstration heard these and other speeches and later submitted a complaint to the national courts. According to the applicants, the police and eventually the state failed to protect them from the racist 67 threats. The Hungarian courts, however, concluded that the police acted professionally and had no legal basis to stop the demonstration (ibid, par.15). The European Court of Human Rights did not question the actions of the Hungarian police, but concentrated mainly on the intimidating speeches that the applicants were exposed to due to their ethnicity. While the Hungarian courts did not investigate this part on the ground that the statements made during the march were not included in the initial complaint, the European Court of Human Rights reminded about the discrimination of Roma minority in the country and repeated examples of hate speech and even hate- motivated killings (ibid, par.40). According to the European Court of Human Rights, harassment motivated by racism with no physical violence was still a crime and a violation of the applicants’ rights. The Court especially underlined a tense political situation in the country (ibid, par.73) and acknowledged that in all similar cases the outcome depended on the various factors as the Court’s approach to the cases with an alleged hate speech was “highly context-specific” (ibid. par.74). In other words, the Court did not analyze particular phrases or words that were said during the far-right demonstration, but rather the whole situation of hatred and threat that was created. The context appears to be more significant for the Court than the precise utterances. In the case Király and Dömötör v. Hungary, 2017 the European Court concluded that national courts failed to investigate the context of the speeches and, by 68 establishing that the statements were hateful and abusive, but did not exited any violence, eventually failed to protect the rights of the applicants. 4.4.2. Religious hate speech Raelien Suisse v Switzerland, 2012 Two of the selected recent judgments of the European Court of Human Rights could be classified as religious hate speech: Raelien Suisse v Switzerland, 2012 and Belkacem v. Belgium, 2017. In the first of these cases the applicant was an association of the Raelian Movement that was registered in 1977 with an aim to make first contacts with extraterrestrials and establishing good contacts with them (Raelien Suisse v Switzerland, 2012, par.10). In 2001 the organization requested the authorization from the police to conduct a poster campaign during which a poster “The Message from Extraterrestrials” was supposed to be demonstrated (ibid, par.14). It was expected that together with the contact details of the organization the phrase “Science at last replaces religion” would have been written on the poster (ibid). The authorities, however, refused to grant permission to the event, citing the previous national courts’ decisions that the movement was engaged in the activities against the public order (ibid, par.15). The national court once again stated that the Raelian Movement could not have a religious freedom because it was regarded as “a dangerous 69 sect” as it has advocated, among other things, for the human cloning and “geniocracy” (ibid, par, 16). After national courts in Switzerland upholded this decision, the case went to the European Court that reiterated the importance of establishing the nature of the speech (ibid, par.61). It was clear that the poster wanted to draw attention of the public to the movement with a religious connotation and did not contribute to the political debate in Switzerland, thus being closer to the commercial advertisement than to the political speech, which gives authorities more freedom (ibid, par.62). After establishing that fact, the Court underlined that different states may have reasons to impose restrictions in such issues (ibid, par.63). In the present case the Court found a prohibition of the poster demonstration to be a reasonable restriction in order to protect health, morals and the rights of others in the society (ibid, par.72). Moreover, the Court found the position of the authorities to be in balance, as they did not banned the whole association or its website and even without the poster campaign it had other means to disseminate its ideas and express its beliefs (par.73). Accordingly, the decision of the police to deny the permission was relevant and proportional and answered the need of the society and, therefore, there was no violation of Article 10 (par.76). It is important to emphasize that the official judgment of the Court was complemented by the dissenting opinion of one of the judges who wrote, among others, that the speech in question – in particular the phrase “Science at last replaces religion” did not constitute 70 religious hate speech and did not denigrate any religion (ibid, Scientific atheism). The judge then mentioned the Article 10 of the Convention and his belief that it prohibits the state to play a role of a watchman and to prescribe what is right or wrong (ibid). Accordingly, the judge concluded that ban of the poster did not correspond to the social need in his opinion (ibid). While analyzing this case, it is necessary to notice that the Court once again examined the speech in a broader context, namely, the nature of the organization and its beliefs, as well as the purpose of the speech in question. That is similar to the Court’s approach in the cases with alleged political and national hate speech where it also took into account whether the speech was made with a purpose to incite hatred and intolerance, or in order to trigger public debate. Belkacem v. Belgium, 2017 Another selected case – Belkacem v. Belgium, 2017 – represents a more typical example of religious hate speech than the previous case. In this case the applicant was convicted by Belgian courts for incitement to hatred in his YouTube videos where he called on his audience, among other things, to fight with non-Muslims and “teach them a lesson” (Belkacem v. Belgium, 2017, par.8). In the European Court the applicant claimed to merely express his opinion and exercise his freedom of expression. 71 The Court, however, unanimously and “without any doubts” concluded that the applicant disseminated hateful content and sought to incite violence against all non-Muslims which is clearly against the values of the Convention (ibid, par.33). Additionally, the Court highlighted that defending Sharia while advocating for violence can amount to hate speech and that states have an obligation to contradict “religious fundamentalism” (ibid, par.34). 4.4.3. Hate speech based on sexual orientation Vejdeland and Others v. Sweden, 2012 As was briefly mentioned in the theoretical part of this thesis, the case Vejdeland and Others v. Sweden, 2012 was the case where the European Court of Human Rights recognised homophobic hate speech for the first time (McGonagle, 2013, p.12). The applicants in this case distributed leaflets in a school in which they claimed that homosexuality was a “deviant sexual proclivity” responsible for HIV and AIDS and destructive for a society (Vejdeland and Others v. Sweden, 2012, par.8). In their defence the applicants claimed that they merely wanted to start a debate (ibid, par.10). The European Court, however, concluded that even of these statements did not propagate hateful acts as such, they were still serious allegations that reinforced prejudices (ibid, par.54). The Court reiterated that discrimination based on sexual orientation should be 72 considered as serious as discrimination on the ground of race, sex, colour or origin (ibid, par.42). Therefore, national courts did not violate Article 10 by convincing the applicant. Identoba and Others v. Georgia, 2015 Another case of the European Court that concerns sexual orientation hate speech is Identoba and Others v. Georgia, 2015. In this case the complaint was filed by 14 people and a non-governmental organization set up to promote and protect the rights of LGBT people. According to the applicants, in May 2012 during a peaceful demonstration for the International day against Homophobia they were insulted and threatened by the counter- demonstration of members of a religious group (Identoba and Others v. Georgia, 2015, par.10). In particular, the applicants were accused of being “seek”, “immoral” and “perverts” and on this ground the participants of the religious demonstration stated that they “should be burnt to death” and “crushed” (ibid, par.13 and par.15). The threats were followed by the attacks and some of the applicants suffered physical trauma (ibid, par.18) National authorities failed to investigate the case properly and the case came to the European Court which concluded that the applicants clearly became the target of hate speech and aggressive actions (ibid, par.70). The whole situation contained an intense anxiety, with a homophobic bias as an additional factor (ibid). 73 The domestic authorities, however, failed to investigate the homophobic motives of the event and did not determine homophobic hate speech (par.77). In its conclusion, the Court once again stated that the applicants were left in anxiety and fear by violence which “consisted mostly of hate speech and serious threats” (ibid, par.70) and thus there was a clear violation of the applicants’ rights. M.C. and A.C. v. Romania, 2016 In a similar case - M.C. and A.C. v. Romania, 2016 - hate speech again was addressed towards the participants of the LGBT-rally, but this time in Bucharest. After the event, the applicants were physically attacked by a group of six young men and a woman who were shouting “You poofs go to the Netherlands!” (M.C. and A.C. v. Romania, 2016, par.9). Similar to the previous case, Romanian authorities failed to protect the rights of the applicants. The European court of human rights found that the authorities did not investigate homophobic motives behind the attack especially giving that the speech in question was “clearly homophobic” hate speech (ibid, par.124). In other words, in both Identoba and Others v. Georgia, 2015 and M.C. and A.C. v. Romania, 2016 the European Court had little doubt about the nature of the speech and concluded it to be sexual orientation hate speech on the ground of the context, on one side, and taking into account the whole situation and the following attacks, on the other. 74 4.4.4. Online hate speech cases in the practice of the ECtHR Delfi AS v. Estonia, 2015 Five of the selected cases could be classified as online hate speech. Chronologically first of them – Delfi AS v. Estonia, 2015. The applicant of this case was a company that owned the largest news portal in Estonia which publishes up to 330 news per day both in Estonian and Russian (Delfi AS v. Estonia, 2015, par.11). In 2006 one of the articles published by the news portal attracted the attention of the readers and consequently received 185 comments (ibid, par.17). Approximately twenty of them contained personal threats and offensive language against a person mentioned in the article (ibid). For instance, among the comments were “bloody shitheads”, “go and drown yourself”, “a good man lives a long time, a shitty man a day or two”, etc. (ibid, par.18). The lawyers of the concerned person filled a lawsuit and at the same day the news portal deleted the offensive comments (ibid, par.19). The national court, however, decided that as the news portal reserved the right to delete inappropriate comments, it has taken insufficient measures to protect the rights of others (ibid, par.26). Moreover, the national court of appeal reiterated that the news portal was not a technical intermediary, but a “provider of content services”and therefore had respective obligations (ibid, par.29). 75 Disagreed with the decisions of the national juridical system, the Delfi Company brought the case to the European Court of Human Rights that eventually shared the position of the national courts. Thus, the European Court emphasized that, whereas it acknowledges how beneficial Internet can be for freedom of expression, it must be taken into account that all kinds of unlawful speech, including hate speech, can be easily disseminated online (ibid, par.110). Therefore, it is important to find a balance between freedom of expression, on one the hand, and prohibiting unlawful speech that constitutes a violation of personality rights and other underlying values of the Convention (ibid). According to the Court, Internet news portals have “duties and responsibilities” when their users disseminate unlawful speech through their sites (ibid, par.113). Taking into account that the applicant owned one of the biggest news portals in Estonia, the nature of some comments on the portal was known before the present case (ibid, par.117) As was established by the Supreme Court of Estonia and reiterated by the European court, the comments in question constitute hate speech and speech that “directly advocated violence” (ibid). That is why the automatic filter-system used by the portal to filter the instances of hate speech was insufficient and failed to prevent the violation of the rights of others (ibid, par.156). Based on these considerations and taking into account the nature of the comments, the Court upheld the decision of the national courts and concluded that there was no violation of Article 10 of the Convention in convicting the news portal. 76 Magyar Tartalomszolgáltatók Egyesülete and Index.hu Zrt v. Hungary, 2016 The second case concerned with online hate speech is Magyar Tartalomszolgáltatók Egyesülete and Index.hu Zrt v. Hungary, 2016. The case involves a self-regulatory body of Hungarian Internet content providers and a major news portal of Hungary who were the applicants of the case. In 2010, when both applicants allowed users’ comments of their portals without premoderation, the applicants published an article that illustrated their opinion about two real estate websites (Magyar Tartalomszolgáltatók Egyesülete and Index.hu Zrt v. Hungary, 2016, par.11). The article attracted the attention of the audience and among the comments were phrases like “They have talked about these two rubbish real estate websites a thousand times already” and “Is this not that Benkő-Sándor-sort-of sly, rubbish, mug company again?” (ibid, par.12). The company-owner of the websites filled a lawsuit, accusing the applicants that their opinion and the users’ comments were false and had a negative influence on their reputation (ibid, par.15). The applicants removed users’ comments, but the national courts still found them guilty in infringing the websites’ company-owner’ reputation (ibid, par.17). When the case came to the European Court of Human Rights, it compared it to the case Delfi AS v. Estonia, 2015. However, the court concluded the Hungarian case was 77 different: after the analysis of the speech, the court found that the users’ comments were “offensive and vulgar”, but not unlawful and did not amount to hate speech (ibid, par.64). Once again, the court underlined the necessity to find a balance between the rights of all concerned parties. If the users’ comments constitute hate speech, the state may impose liability upon news portals. But the present case did not involve such context and therefore the court concluded that there had been a violation of the rights of the applicants (ibid, par.91). Pihl v. Sweden, 2017 In a similar case, the applicant was a subject of an online defamation, namely, of an accusation of being a member if a Nazi party (Pihl v. Sweden, 2017, par.3). The applicant replied online that this information was wrong and the administration of the blog in question deleted the previous entry (ibid, par.6). Still, the applicant claimed that national courts refused to hold the administration of the web-site liable and did not protect his reputation (ibid, par.15). The European Court, however, declared that in this case a balance between freedom of expression and applicant’s rights was found by national courts as the defamatory post was quickly removed and an apology issued (ibid, par.29 and 30). Additionally, the Court 78 highlighted that although offensive, the post did not incite violence and did not amount to hate speech against the applicant (ibid, par.37). Smajić v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2018 The applicant of this case was convicted for posting online statements in which he described military actions that might be undertaken by Bosnians against Serb villages in the event of a new war and expressed insults against Serbs (Smajić v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2018, par.5). The applicant claimed to discuss a matter of public interest (ibid, par.29). The European Court unanimously rejected these allegations, stating that conviction of the applicant was prescribed by law for the protection of the rights of others (ibid, par.32). Furthermore, the Court underlined that, while hypothetical, the applicant’s statement related to a very sensitive subject in Bosnian society and so national courts had sufficient reasons to convict him (ibid, par.39). Savva Terentyev v. Russia, 2018 The case Savva Terentyev v. Russia, 2018 can probably be regarded as a classic example of “Handyside v. United Kingdom rule” which states that certain expressions may 79 “offend, shock or disturb”, but must, nevertheless, remain free in the interests of “pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness” (Handyside v. United Kingdom, 1976, par.49). In this case an applicant posted remarks about Russian police, calling them “faithful dogs” and making other insulting remarks about them (Savva Terentyev v. Russia, 2018, par.10). While acknowledging that the applicant’s comments were expressed in an offensive form, the Court unanimously concluded that they did not incite hatred (ibid, par.84). The comments in question were “an emotional reaction” of the applicant to the abusive actions of the police and did not provoke any violence (ibid). Therefore, the Court stated the criminal conviction of the applicant for a sentence of one year’s imprisonment was disproportionate and not justified by “pressing social need” (ibid, par.86). 4.5. Summary of the ECtHR’s practice concerning hate speech To summarize the analysis of the case law of the European Court, it is necessary to emphasize certain criteria that the Court employs in order to determine whether the speech in question is hate speech or not and what judgment to pass. Those criteria are: 1) Nature of the speech: whether it is capable of inciting violence or hatred or not; 2) Purpose of the speech: whether it is aiming at inciting hatred or not; 80 3) Significance of the speech: whether it has public interest and contributes to the public debate or not; 3) Context of the speech: whether there are tensions that accompany the speech in question or not; 4) Necessity of convincing the speech and the speaker in the democratic society; 5) Whether a balance between freedom of expression and rights of others was taken into account by the national courts, or not. Further arguments of the European Court from the analyzed cases are summarized in Table 2 below. Table 2. Argumentation of the ECtHR in selected hate speech-related cases 2012-2019 Judgement Argumentation in support of the utterance in question being hate speech Argumentation in support of the utterance in question being protected speech (not hate speech) 1. Aksu v. Turkey, 2012 A need for balance between the applicant’s rights and public interest in freedom of expression is underlined. Necessity of restrictions of freedom of information must be established “convincingly” (par.64). The Court reiterates the importance of the context and concludes that balance between the rights of the Roma community and freedom of expression was found. 2. Öner and Türk The Court mentions the term 81 v. Turkey, 2015 “hate speech”, adding that it is capable of inciting violence by appealing to the irrational hatred against a person or a group of people (par.24). The Court concludes that the speech in question was not hate speech, but critical assessment of the authorities that did not contained terrorist propaganda and did not encourage violence (par.24) 3. Balázs v. Hungary 2015 State has an obligation to establish any possible racist motive and ethnic hatred behind the attack (par.53). Any racist verbal abuse is highly relevant in cases involving ethnic minorities (par.61). 4. Perinçek v. Switzerland, 2015 Public statements that concern a matter of public interest must have higher protection under Article 10 of the Convention par. (197). The conviction of the speaker was not necessary in a democratic society (par.158). The statement in question did not call for hatred or intolerance and the context lacked tensions, therefore the speech of the applicant must have been protected by the Article 10. 82 5. Király and Dömötör v. Hungary, 2017 The Court emphasized the importance of the context and states that cases with an alleged hate speech are “highly context- specific” (par.74). 6. Raelien Suisse v Switzerland, 2012 It is important to determine the type of speech and its purposes. Speech with commercial purposes – such as commercial advertisement – should have less protection by the Article 10 than political debate (par.62). It is important to search for relevant and proportional restrictions to speech that raises concerns (par.75).In this case, the decision of the national courts to ban the poster was relevant (par.76). 7. Belkacem v. Belgium, 2017 Advocating for religious fundamentalism while calling for violence can amount to hate speech (par.34). States have an obligation to prohibit it (ibid). General attack on people based on their religious beliefs or lack of such is incompatible with the values of the Convention and cannot be protected by the Article 10 (par.33). 8. Vejdeland and Others v. Sweden, 2012 Even if certain statements do not propagate hateful acts as such but are serious allegations that reinforce prejudices, they might be prohibited (par.54 and 55). Discrimination based on sexual orientation should be considered as serious as discrimination on the ground of race, sex, colour or origin (par.42) 83 9. Identoba and Others v. Georgia, 2015 Homophobic motives must be investigated in hate speech and subsequent threats. The context of the situation must be taken into account. 10. M.C. and A.C. v. Romania, 2016 Authorities must investigate homophobic motives. The context and, if applicable, the following attacks must be taken into account. 11. Delfi AS v. Estonia, 2015 The Court acknowledges that Internet can be beneficial for freedom of expression, while at the same time enabling dissemination of unlawful speech, including hate speech. Therefore, a balance between freedom of expression and prohibiting unlawful speech must be found. Internet news portals have “duties and responsibilities” when their users disseminate unlawful speech through their sites (ibid, par.113) In this case, automatic filter- system used by the portal to filter the instances of hate speech was insufficient and failed to prevent the violation of the rights of others (ibid, par.156). 12. Magyar Tartalomszolgáltatók Egyesülete and Index.hu Zrt v. Hungary, 2016 Analysis of the speech itself must be conducted. “Offensive and vulgar” comments do not necessarily amount to hate speech (par.64). 84 13. Pihl v. Sweden, 2017 Although offensive, the comment in question did not incite to violence and did not amount to hate speech (par.37). National court found a balance between freedom of expression and protection of the applicant’s rights as the comment was quickly removed and an apology issued (par.29 and 30). 14. Smajić v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2018 Conviction of the applicant was prescribed by law for the protection of the rights of others (par.32). Even hypothetical statements might be prohibited, taking into account the context – in this case, sensitive subject of ethnic relations between Bosnians and Serbs (par.39). 15. Savva Terentyev v. Russia, 2018 Insulting and offensive remarks might still be protected by the Article 10, provided that they do not incite hatred or violence (par.69). Criminal conviction is disproportionate for offensive speech without incitement to hatred (par.86). 85 5. Social media and online hate speech As was illustrated by the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights, disputes related to the alleged hate speech online have already reached the courts. It is reasonable to assume, however, that the vast majority of hate speech incidents that have happened or are happening in the Internet never reaches courts or any other similar institution. So what are the ways to combat hate speech online, in particular, in major social media? Are they effective and how do they correspond to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights? Who decides what hate speech on the Internet is? These and other questions are discussed in this chapter through the analysis of the guidances and practise of the major social media – Facebook, Google (YouTube) and Twitter. As was noticed in one of the recent studies on fake news – another topic of current interest, also closely connected to the freedom of expression – social media in western countries enjoy not being held responsible for the content that their users publish on the platforms (Niklewicz, K., 2017, p.29). According to the author of this study, this is a result of a mutual desire of the US and the EU to protect industry without full understanding of the potential of these new media (ibid). In other words, this legal vacuum creates a situation when social media themselves are able to decide what content they want to prohibit or restrict and how they want to do it. 86 When it comes to the online hate speech regulation, it was decided to analyse community standards, guidances, users’ rules and even official statements as a primary source of information regarding the positions of the respective social media. 5.1. Hate speech definitions in social media’s guidances Hate speech in Facebook The primary source for Facebook’s hate speech policy is Facebook Community Standards that describe the policy and rules of this social media. Among others, in the Facebook Community Standards sections like “Violence and Criminal behaviour” and “Objectionable content” can be found. Interestingly enough, hate speech is assigned to the latter, whereas the former discusses issues such as violence, promoting crime, dangerous organizations etc. (see: Facebook Community Standards). Hate speech, on the other hand, is placed among “adult nudity/sexual activity” and “violence and graphic content” (ibid). This might be regarded as confusing, giving that hate speech is isolated by Facebook in a separate category from criminal activity and violence, even though it can be closely related issues. In the Facebook Community Standards it is stated that the social media understands under hate speech a content that directly attacks people based on specific characteristics such as race, nationality, religion, sex, gender, sexual orientation etc. (Facebook Community 87 Standards, section Hate speech). It is evident that this definition closely corresponds to the definitions of hate speech discussed in the chapter 2.2 of the present thesis. Moreover, Facebook’s list is even broader and includes additional categories. In a separate section of the social media’s help centre - Tools for addressing abuse – Facebook encourages its users to use special tools that were implemented to avoid abusive content. For example, Facebook advices to unfriend or block a person who sent an offensive message, use privacy settings and report the abuse and abuser (Facebook, Tools for addressing abuse). Report link is provided near the content on Facebook, which makes this procedure relatively easy to use. Finally, in an additional statement, Facebook’s VP of Global Public Policy Marne Levine claims that Facebook prohibits content that is harmful – such as anything that can result in real violence in the real world or anything that emotionally distresses an individual – but allows controversial or offensive content (Levine, 2013). Whereas this seems to be in accordance with the Article 10 and with the case law of the European Court discussed above, it is not clear how exactly Facebook’s content moderators separate offensive content from the content that distresses its users. In reality, this boundary is so blurred that even the European Court quite often takes its decisions not unanimously, but with a number of dissenting opinions. How the social media can promise to distinguish one from another, remains an open question. 88 In fact, the responses to this statement clearly indicate that in practice the rules and policy of the social media do not function that smoothly as promised. Thus, the statement by Marne Levine was published in 2013 and subsequently has received more than 2,400 comments. Many users criticize Facebook for its policy and actions regarding hate speech and demonstrate alleged mistakes and passive approach towards the reports of abusive content (see commentaries in Levine, 2013). Whereas it is not possible to prove all the users’ claims and published links, content analysis of the comments clearly indicates that Facebook’s approach does not fully solve the problem of hate speech on this platform. This is also evident from the two studies conducted by German Ministry of Justice in 2016 and 2017. In 2016, the study of Facebook’s practice regarding hate speech regulation has shown that only 46% of flagged criminal content was deleted by the social media, out of which 42% – during the promised 24 hours (Löschung rechtswidriger Hassbeiträge bei Facebook, 2016). On the other hand, when the rest was later reported via direct email at the Facebook support team, 84% of criminal content was deleted, 48% - during the first 24 hours (ibid). In 2017 the results of the same study were even more alarming: only 39% of flagged criminal content was deleted by Facebook, 33% – during the first 24 hours (Löschung rechtswidriger Hassbeiträge bei Facebook, 2017). After the remaining hate speech was reported via email, 88 percent of criminal content was deleted, 76 percent – within 24 hours (ibid). 89 That is why organizations such as the International Auschwitz Committee expressed their frustration and dissatisfaction with the practice of Facebook regarding hate speech. The Committee in particular stated that Facebook displays signs of arrogance towards this problem and thus contributes “to poisoning the social climate” especially in Germany, but also in the world in general (Deutsche Welle, 2016). Hate speech in YouTube (Google) One of the most popular platforms in the Internet – YouTube – also frequently encounters hate speech published by its users. YouTube, which belongs to the Google Company, has its own policy regarding this issue. Thus, in the Policy center of the site a specific section “Hate speech policy” can be found. In this section YouTube defines hate speech as content that promotes violence or incite hatred against groups or individuals based on such characteristics as race, ethnicity, religion, disability, age, gender, sexual orientation or veteran status (YouTube, Policies, safety, and reporting). These categories can be compared to the ones described by Facebook: whereas there are some minor differences, such as mentioning of the veteran status by YouTube, in general the definitions may be considered similar. YouTube, too, proposes its users several possibilities to combat hate speech on the platform: block the user, flag the video, file an abuse report in case numerous violation by the same user are found or report a violation of the local laws. Both flagging and https://support.google.com/youtube/topic/2676378?hl=en&ref_topic=6151248 https://support.google.com/youtube/topic/2676378?hl=en&ref_topic=6151248 90 reporting tool are easily acceptable and convenient to use (YouTube, Report inappropriate content). . However, another study conducted by the German Ministry of Justice estimated that in 2016 YouTube deleted only 10% of the flagged content (Löschung rechtswidriger Hassbeiträge bei Facebook, YouTube und Twitter, 2016). Direct report by a user with so- called privileged account (possible only on YouTube and Twitter, but not on Facebook) has led to the removing of another 35% of the criminal content (ibid). Finally, after direct report of abuse content via email, YouTube deleted 53% of such content, leaving only 2% online (ibid). The results were better in a similar study in 2017. YouTube has significantly improved its response towards flagged content and deleted 90% percent of it (Löschung rechtswidriger Hassbeiträge bei Facebook, YouTube und Twitter, 2017). After a direct email to the support center, the remaining 10% of criminal content were also removed from the platform. Hate speech in Twitter In its turn, Twitter has its own rules that describe content boundaries and limitations connected to the abusive behaviour. Twitter does not use the term “hate speech”, but mentions hateful conduct alongside with violent threats, harassment, multiple account abuse, self-harm impersonation, etc. (Twitter rules) 91 Twitter’s rules define hateful conduct as promotion of violence against people based on race, ethnical or national origin, sexual orientation, gender, religion, age, disability or disease – with a slight difference, the same categories that were mentioned in the Facebook Community Standards (Twitter Rules). Thus, it is possible to conclude that although there is no universally accepted definition of hate speech in the normative acts, all three platforms that are analysed in the present thesis define hate speech or hateful conduct via similar definitions. Nevertheless, the study commissioned by the German Ministry of Justice, quoted above, estimates that in 2016 Twitter deleted only 1% of flagged criminal content (Löschung rechtswidriger Hassbeiträge bei Facebook, YouTube und Twitter, 2016). Another 75% were removed after direct report by user with a privilege account. Finally, 6% were deleted after contact via email to the support center, leaving 18% of reported criminal content online (ibid). According to a similar study in 2017, Twitter did not improve its practice regarding flagged criminal content: only 1% was removed (Löschung rechtswidriger Hassbeiträge bei Facebook, YouTube und Twitter, 2017). However, direct report and contact via email to the support center proved to be more effective: eventually, 100% of the criminal content were deleted by Twitter (ibid). 92 To sum it up, definitions of hate speech in three major social media are presented in Table 3: Table 3. Hate speech definitions by Facebook, YouTube and Twitter Facebook Content that directly attacks people based on specific characteristics such as race, nationality, religion, sex, gender, sexual orientation, disability, etc. Attempts at “humor or satire” that might be perceived as “threat or attack” are allowed. (Facebook Community Standards, section Hate speech). YouTube (Google) Content that promotes violence or incites hatred against groups or individuals based on such characteristics as race, ethnicity, religion, disability, age, gender, sexual orientation or veteran status (YouTube, Policies, safety, and reporting). Twitter No mentioning of the term “hate speech”, but hateful conduct that is defined as “promotion of violence” against people based on race, ethnical or national origin, sexual orientation, gender, religion, age, disability or disease (Twitter rules). https://support.google.com/youtube/topic/2676378?hl=en&ref_topic=6151248 93 5.2. Regulation of hate speech on social media Social media employ three main strategies in regulating hate speech on the platforms: use of automatic regulation5, reports submitted by users and content moderation that is done by its content-reviewers (Laub, 2019). At the end of 2018 Facebook alone employed 15 000 content-reviewers who moderate content in more than 50 languages (Facebook Newsroom, 2018). Already in 2015 three major technological companies – Facebook, Google and Twitter - stated that they were going to delete hate speech from their platforms within 24 hours (Reuters, 2015). This decision was taken amid the so-called refugee crisis in 2015, as an additional measure to combat rising online racism. Just a year later, in 2016 the European Commission issued a Code of Conduct on countering illegal online hate speech (European Commission, 2016). It is a voluntary code that demands to remove the majority of hate speech within 24 hours, while defining hate speech as a conduct that is “publicly inciting to violence or hatred” towards groups or individual members of a group that is distinguished by special characteristics such as race, religious beliefs, nationality or ethnicity” (ibid). Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and Microsoft all signed the Code of Conduct in May 2016 (European Commission, 2017). In 2017, European Commission published a subsequent 5 Artificial intelligence will be discussed below in paragraph 5.3. 94 press-release in which it underlined an important progress in combating hate speech online. However, challenges remain significant: according to the European Commission’s data, in 2016-2017 IT companies - removed hateful content only in 59% reported cases; - reviewed 51% of the reported hateful content within 24 hours (ibid). Finally, in the fourth review of the implementation of the Code of Conduct, published in 2019, European Commission concluded that hateful content flagged by users - was deleted by IT companies in 72% of cases, - was reviewed within 24 hours on average in 89% of cases (European Commission, 2019, p.1). Altogether, during a period of 6 weeks in November-December 2018 the IT companies that signed the Code of Conduct6 received 4392 notifications of the hateful content from the countries-members of the EU (ibid). According to the Commission’s review, deletion of the content by IT companies depends on its nature: content that advocates for violence against specific groups of people was removed in 85,5% of the cases, whereas the defamatory speech and images were deleted only in 58,5% of the cases (ibid, p.3). The most common types of hate speech were hate speech based on nationality (including speech against migrants), hate speech based on 6 Apart from the above mentioned Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and Microsoft, Instagram (279) and Google+ have joined the Code of Conduct in 2018 (European Commission, 2019, p.2). 95 sexual orientation and hate speech based on religious believes, specifically – anti-Muslim speech (ibid, p.5). Independently from the European Commission and taking into account that percentage of removal of the flagging content was disproportionately weak in 2016-2017, in June 2017 German Parliament has voted to adopt a Social Networks Enforcement Law that is supposed to make social media more accountable for the content posted by their users. This law requires social media to pay up to 50 million euros in case they fail to remove hate speech from their platforms. Similar propositions can be heard in France and Great Britain (Toor, 2017). Whereas this measure may be seen as a resolute and strong attempt to combat hate speech in the major social media, some organizations expressed their concerns regarding the effect of this law on the freedom of speech in Germany. For instance, David Kaye, UN Special Rapporteur to the High Commissioner for Human Rights, noticed that the German law gives private firms too much responsibility to police freedom of expression (McGoogan, 2017). According to Kaye, legislation, capable of limiting free speech, must be applied by an independent body (ibid). Some other experts expressed their concerns regarding this measure. Mirko Hohmann, a Project Manager at the Global Public Policy Institute (GPPi) claimed that such a law will make social media companies delete content “excessively”, after they facing fines of up to 50 million euros (McGoogan, 2017). This may lead to errors and removal of lawful http://www.bmjv.de/SharedDocs/Gesetzgebungsverfahren/Dokumente/RegE_NetzDG.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=2 http://www.gppi.net/issue-areas/data-technology-politics/ 96 content as a precaution (ibid). Whereas the influence of the German law on hate speech and freedom of speech is still to be examined, there are other ways to combat hateful content online. 5.3. Alternative ways of combating online hate speech: attempts of automatic regulation In recent years a new approach towards online hate speech regulation has been developed – namely, automatic regulation of such content. Artificial intelligence means that hate speech is being regarded from the point of view of computer science. In 2018-2019 this approach is still a relatively new field and available tools for automatic hate speech regulation are scarce, among other things – due to lack of systematic data (Fortuna, Nunes, 2018, p.3). But the number of articles on automatic hate speech regulation from computer science and engineering is rising in recent years, which indicates that technologies are being developed (ibid, p.22). Algorithms for detecting hate speech are based on text mining and machine learning technologies that attempt to classify hate speech (ibid, p.16). Interestingly enough, researchers from the computer science emphasize that one of the problems in conducting this classification is low level of agreement regarding hate speech classification “by humans” (ibid, p.25). 97 While acknowledging that automatic regulation of hate speech remains an open issue, some researchers report positive results of binary classification “hate speech-not hate speech” (Del Vigna et al, 2017, p.94). Taking into account the huge amount of user- generated content, computer scientists underline that human moderators are not capable of monitoring major social media, and thus automatic regulation has a great potential for the future (ibid). As was mentioned above, Facebook, YouTube and Twitter all employ automatic content regulation that to a certain extent concerns hate speech, but the availability of data regarding this regulation, its accuracy, objectivity and further consequences of such approach remain an issue for another study. In the current thesis it is important to notice that currently social media also rely on human moderators who apply the rules specified in the guidances inconsistently (Tobin et al, 2017). Facebook seems to acknowledge this problem, with Vice President of the company Justin Osofsky saying to journalists “we must do better” (ibid). At the same time, in 2019 Mark Zuckerberg called for a “global regulation” that could establish content and data standards (Laub, 2019). 5.4. Other initiatives to counteract online hate speech Finally, one more approach related to online hate speech regulation must be mentioned – initiatives, independent from governments or social media. Most prominent examples of such initiatives is “Hate Speech International”. https://www.propublica.org/people/ariana-tobin 98 “Hate Speech International” is an independent network of journalists who conduct cooperative and international research on extremism and hate speech online and offline. The initiative was founded by a Norwegian journalists Kjetil Stormark and Øyvind Strømmen and received grants from Norwegian Freedom of Expression Foundation (Fritt Ord) and Ministry of Foreign Affairs. “Hate Speech International”, however, operates independently and aims at displaying radicalization and extremist networks (Hate Speech International, About). For this purpose “Hate Speech International” regularly conducts related studies and publishes them on their website. “Hate Speech International” is not the only initiative to combat hate speech that can be found online. For instance, similar aims – to monitor, to report, to educate about hate speech and policies and tools against it – had a project “No hate speech youth campaign” that was conducted by the Council of Europe in 2012-2017, as well as presently active Italian project eMore and pan European project MANDOLA, funded by Rights, Equality and Citizenship (REC) Programme of the European Commission. of the European Union. 99 6. Conclusion In the present thesis the collision between freedom of expression and hate speech has been explored from two different perspectives: the one of the European Court of Human Rights, established in 1959, and the one of the three major social media platforms, developed during the last decade. In particular, case law of the Court related to hate speech has been analysed, as well as community standards and users’ rules of Facebook, YouTube and Twitter. Several conclusions have been made during analysis of the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. The most important of them were: 1) European Court of Human Rights does not provide a single definite definition to the term “hate speech”, preferring to leave it open in order to approach each case on an individual basis. This attitude very much corresponds to the general lack of a single definition of the term “hate speech”, as was observed during the review of scientific literature. Existent definitions, discussed in the paragraph 2.2., permitted to construct following broad and flexible hate speech definition for the purposes of the present thesis: we propose to understand under hate speech, utterances that (1) encourage hatred (2) towards individuals or groups of people (3) based on various particular characteristics (4) which are stigmatized and (5) are employed to legitimize hostility. Furthermore, hate speech (6) may be understood as a continuum that (7) does not necessarily result in violence, but (8) silences, discriminates and threatens targeted individuals or groups; 100 2) The term “hate speech” was not included in the European Convention on Human Rights. European Court of Human Rights first used this term in four judgments, passed in 1999, namely in Sürek v. Turkey (No. 1, par. 62); Sürek & Özdemir v. Turkey (par.63); Sürek v. Turkey (No. 4, par. 60) and Erdogdu & Ince v. Turkey (par. 54). Without providing an exact definition of the term, in the fourth of these cases the Court stressed that whereas some information may lawfully “offend, shock or disturb”, it the case Sürek v. Turke the utterance in question was “hate speech and glorification of violence” ( Sürek v. Turke, 1999, par.62). In other words, the Court emphasized the fact that there is a new type of speech – expression that goes beyond the protection given to the offensive speech by the judgment in Handyside v. the United Kingdom, 1976, and specifically underlines violence as a necessary component of it. Yet, even after the introduction of the term “hate speech” in its practice, the Court quite often omits it and uses instead various synonymous phrases; 3) In 2019 the Court published an updated version of its Factsheet hate speech where it provides a typology of cases related to hate speech. This typology seems to be unnecessary detailed and not completely straightforward, yet it provides a full overview of the case law that concerns with information that the Court itself qualifies as hate speech. One could assume that such approach stresses an idea that it is not possible to provide a single finite definition to hate speech which instead should be regarded as an open spectrum of speech, even if some experts emphasize a need not to expand the term “hate speech” indefinitely (Tulkens, 2012, p.295); 101 4) Without a definition, case law of the Court remains the main source for scholars to analyse the Court’s approach towards hate speech. The analysis of the case law, indeed, illustrates how the Court determines whether the speech in question is hate speech or not. Thus, the Court seems to employ several criteria on a case to case basis: a) Nature of the speech; b) Purpose of the speech (incitement of hatred, violence, and fear as opposite to starting public debate; c) Significance of the speech (presence or absence of public interest); d) Context of the speech; e) Necessity of convincing the speech and the speaker in a democratic society; f) Presence of a balance between freedom of expression and rights of others in decisions made by the national courts. 5) Additionally, following argumentation of the Court was found in the analysed judgments from the period 2012-2019: a) There should be a balance between the protection of individual rights and public interest in freedom of expression (Aksu v. Turkey, 2012); b) Necessity of restrictions of freedom of information must be established “convincingly” (ibid, par.64); c) Hate speech is connected by the Court to inciting violence by “appealing to the irrational hatred against a person or a group of people” (Öner and Türk v. Turkey, 2015, par.24); 102 d) Critical assessment of the authorities without incitement to violence does not constitute hate speech (ibid); e) Racist verbal abuse is highly relevant in cases involving ethnic minorities and states have an obligation to establish possible racist motive behinds attacks (Balázs v. Hungary 2015, par.53); f) Public statements that concern a matter of public interest must have higher protection under the Article 10 (Perinçek v. Switzerland, 2015, par. 197); g) On the contrary, speech with commercial purposes – such as commercial advertisement – should have less protection by the Article 10 than political debate (Raelien Suisse v Switzerland, 2012, par.62); h) Religious fundamentalism coupled with incitement to violence amounts to hate speech, as much as attack on people based on their religious beliefs (Belkacem v. Belgium, 2017, par.34); i) Even if certain statements do not propagate hatred but are allegations that reinforce prejudices, they might be prohibited (Vejdeland and Others v. Sweden, 2012, 54); k) Discrimination based on sexual orientation should be considered as serious as discrimination on the ground of race, sex, colour or origin (Vejdeland and Others v. Sweden, 2012, par.42). Homophobic motives must be investigated (Identoba and Others v. Georgia, 2015). l) Internet news portals have “duties and responsibilities” when their users disseminate unlawful speech through their sites (Delfi AS v. Estonia, 2015, par.113); m) Even hypothetical statements might be prohibited, taking into account the context (Smajić v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2018, par.39); 103 n) Criminal conviction is disproportionate for offensive speech without incitement to hatred (Savva Terentyev v. Russia, 2018, par.86). At the same time, subsequent analysis of the social media’s approach towards hate speech provided the following observations: 6) Taking into account an amount of user-generated content, it is possible to assume that the majority of hate speech incidents now happens online and never reaches courts. Three major social media – Facebook, YouTube (Google), Twitter – all have developed community standards and users’ rules where they define hate speech and prohibit it on its platforms. Whereas there are some minor differences between the definitions of hate speech by these companies, it is possible to acknowledge that they are more or less identical. The problem lies in the implementation of these rules; 7) For instance, Facebook claims to distinguish “offensive content” from the content that “distresses its users”. This is a daunting task even for the European Court that quite often takes its decisions not unanimously, but with a number of dissenting opinions. How exactly and how accurately social media approach this issue, remains an open question. More transparency from social media is needed in order to investigate this issue; 8) Several studies conducted by German Ministry of Justice and by the European Commission in recent years indicated that social media failed to remove 100% of content flagged as hate speech, although this statistic improves year after year; 104 9) In western countries, social media are not being held responsible for the content published by their users. That means that social media themselves decide what contact they want to prohibit or restrict. Yet, there is a tendency in the opposite direction. In 2016 the European Commission issued a Code of Conduct on countering illegal online hate speech that was signed by Facebook, YouTube (Google), Twitter, among others. Simultaneously, in June 2017 German Parliament has voted to adopt a Social Networks Enforcement Law that declares social media responsible for illegal hateful content on their platforms; 10) This law has been criticised by experts who believe that it gives too much responsibility to police freedom of expression to the private companies. Among others, this concern was expressed by UN Special Rapporteur to the High Commissioner for Human Rights David Kaye who urged instead to organise an independent body for online content regulation. Interestingly enough, Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg recently called for a “global regulation” of content and data, too (Laub, 2019); 11) Eventually, at the present moment online hate speech regulation lies with social media that employ three strategies: automatic regulation, users’ reports and content moderation done by human reviewers. In 2018 Facebook alone employed 15 000 content- reviewers. These people, de-facto, serve as new judges in a new court. Their qualification for this task and consistency with established practice, such as, for instance, the practice of the European Court of Human Rights, are highly questionable; http://www.bmjv.de/SharedDocs/Gesetzgebungsverfahren/Dokumente/RegE_NetzDG.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=2 http://www.bmjv.de/SharedDocs/Gesetzgebungsverfahren/Dokumente/RegE_NetzDG.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=2 105 12) Meanwhile, a new approach towards online hate speech regulation is being developed by computer scientists who believe that human moderators cannot monitor major social media due to the amount of user-generated content. Automatic content regulation is based on text mining and machine learning technologies that attempt to classify hate speech. Whereas automatic regulation might result in decreasing of online hate speech, it is reasonable to assume that application of this technology will create new threats and new restrictions for freedom of expression. In reality, it means that society is going to substitute already not sufficiently qualified human moderators with self-educated automatic technologies that will decide for us what content is allowed for humans and what it judges necessary to prohibit; 13) Overall, this recent popularity of extensive regulation approach seems to indicate that human civilisation failed to take its hatred under control. Instead of promoting alternative measures – such as improving education, rising awareness about the problem, increasing tolerance and intercultural dialogue, providing voice to the victims of hate speech – society came to a conclusion that prohibition and automatic recognition will conclusively solve the problem, as if removal of online hate speech will at the same time remove hatred from the offline communities. 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Retrieved from: https://ec.europa.eu/info/files/factsheet-4th-monitoring-round-code- conduct_en http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/hrpolicy/other_committees/dh-lgbt_docs/CM_Rec(97)20_en.pdf http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/hrpolicy/other_committees/dh-lgbt_docs/CM_Rec(97)20_en.pdf https://rm.coe.int/16800c170e https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf%23page=9 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-1937_en.htm http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-1471_en.htm https://ec.europa.eu/info/files/factsheet-4th-monitoring-round-code-conduct_en https://ec.europa.eu/info/files/factsheet-4th-monitoring-round-code-conduct_en 114 European Court of Human Rights (2019). Factsheet hate speech. Retrieved from: http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/FS_hate_speech_ENG.pdf International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. (1965). 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Poland, 2014 116 Ibragim Ibragimov and Others v. Russia, 2018 Identoba and Others v. Georgia, 2015 Ivanov v. Russia, 2007 Jersild v. Denmark, 1994 Király and Dömötör v. Hungary, 2017 Lehideux and Isorni v. France, 1998 Le Pen v. France, 2010 Leroy v. France, 2008 Magyar Tartalomszolgáltatók Egyesülete and Index.hu Zrt v. Hungary, 2016 M’Bala M’Bala v. France, 2015 M.C. and A.C. v. Romania, 2016 Nix v. Germany, 2018 Norwood v. United Kingdom, 2004 Öner and Türk v. Turkey, 2015 Pavel Ivanov v. Russia, 2007 Perinçek v. Switzerland, 2015 Pihl v. Sweden, 2017 Raelien Suisse v Switzerland, 2012 Roj TV A/S v. Denmark, 2018 Schimanek v. Austria, 2000 Šimunić v. Croatia, 2019 Smajić v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2018 Soulas and Others v. France, 2008 117 Stern Taulats and Roura Capellera v. Spain, 2018 Stomakhin v. Russia, 2018 Sürek v. Turkey (No. 1), 1999 Sürek & Özdemir v. Turkey, 1999 Sürek v. Turkey (No. 4), 1999 Vejdeland & others v. Sweden, 2012 Web-Resources European Union Agency for fundamental rights, Hate Speech and Hate Crimes Against LGBT Persons. Access via: http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/1226-Factsheet-homophobia-hate- speech-crime_EN.pdf Facebook Community Standards. Access via: https://www.facebook.com/communitystandards Facebook Newsroom. (2018). Facts About Content Review on Facebook. Access via: https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2018/12/content-review-facts/ Facebook. Tools for Addressing Abuse. Access via: https://www.facebook.com/help/tools http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/1226-Factsheet-homophobia-hate-speech-crime_EN.pdf http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/1226-Factsheet-homophobia-hate-speech-crime_EN.pdf https://www.facebook.com/communitystandards https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2018/12/content-review-facts/ https://www.facebook.com/help/tools 118 Hate Speech International. Access via: https://www.hate-speech.org/about/political-backdrop/ Hate speech Monitor. Access via: https://www.hate-speech.org/hatespeech-monitor/ Löschung rechtswidriger Hassbeiträge bei Facebook, 2016. Access via: http://www.fair-im- netz.de/WebS/NHS/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/09262016_Testergebnisse_Facebook.pd f?__blob=publicationFile&v=2 Löschung rechtswidriger Hassbeiträge bei Facebook, 2017. Access via: http://www.fair-im- netz.de/WebS/NHS/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/03142017_Recherchebericht_Facebook. pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=3 Löschung rechtswidriger Hassbeiträge bei Facebook, YouTube und Twitter, 2016. Access via: https://www.bmjv.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/Artikel/09262016_Testergebnisse_jug endschutz_net_Hasskriminalitaet.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=1 Löschung rechtswidriger Hassbeiträge bei Facebook, YouTube und Twitter, 2017. 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Access via: http://mandola-project.eu/ No hate speech youth campaign. Access via: https://www.coe.int/en/web/no-hate-campaign Project eMore. Access via: https://www.emoreproject.eu/ Statista. Most popular social networks worldwide as of April 2019. Access via: https://www.statista.com/statistics/272014/global-social-networks-ranked-by-number-of- users/ Twitter Rules. Access via: https://support.twitter.com/articles/18311 YouTube, Policies, safety, and reporting. Access via: https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/2801939?hl=en YouTube, Report inappropriate content. 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Retrieved from http://www.dw.com/en/international-auschwitz-committee-accuses-facebook-of-arrogant- approach-to-hate-speech/a-36787344 Laub, Z. (2019). Hate Speech on Social Media: Global Comparisons.Council on foregn relations. Retrieved from: https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/hate-speech-social-media- global-comparisons Levine, M. (2013). Controversial, Harmful and Hateful Speech on Facebook. Retrieved from: https://www.facebook.com/notes/facebook-safety/controversial-harmful-and- hateful-speech-on-facebook/574430655911054 McGoogan, C. (2017). Germany to fine Facebook and YouTube €50m if they fail to delete hate speech. Retrieved from: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/2017/06/30/germany-fine-facebook-youtube- 50m-fail-delete-hate-speech/ Reuters. (2015). Facebook, Google, Twitter agree to delete hate speech in 24 hours. Retrieved from: http://www.reuters.com/article/us-germany-internet- idUSKBN0TY27R20151215 http://www.dw.com/en/international-auschwitz-committee-accuses-facebook-of-arrogant-approach-to-hate-speech/a-36787344 http://www.dw.com/en/international-auschwitz-committee-accuses-facebook-of-arrogant-approach-to-hate-speech/a-36787344 https://www.cfr.org/bio/zachary-laub https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/hate-speech-social-media-global-comparisons https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/hate-speech-social-media-global-comparisons https://www.facebook.com/notes/facebook-safety/controversial-harmful-and-hateful-speech-on-facebook/574430655911054 https://www.facebook.com/notes/facebook-safety/controversial-harmful-and-hateful-speech-on-facebook/574430655911054 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/2017/06/30/germany-fine-facebook-youtube-50m-fail-delete-hate-speech/ http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/2017/06/30/germany-fine-facebook-youtube-50m-fail-delete-hate-speech/ http://www.reuters.com/article/us-germany-internet-idUSKBN0TY27R20151215 http://www.reuters.com/article/us-germany-internet-idUSKBN0TY27R20151215 121 Tobin, A,, Varner, M, Angwin, J. (2017). Facebook’s Uneven Enforcement of Hate Speech Rules Allows Vile Posts to Stay Up. Pro Publica. Retrieved from: https://www.propublica.org/article/facebook-enforcement-hate-speech-rules-mistakes Toor, A. (2017). Germany wants to fine Facebook over hate speech, raising fears of censorship. Retrieved from: https://www.theverge.com/2017/6/23/15852048/germany-hate-speech-facebook-twitter- fine-censorship https://www.propublica.org/people/ariana-tobin https://www.propublica.org/people/madeleine-varner https://www.propublica.org/people/julia-angwin https://www.propublica.org/article/facebook-enforcement-hate-speech-rules-mistakes https://www.theverge.com/2017/6/23/15852048/germany-hate-speech-facebook-twitter-fine-censorship https://www.theverge.com/2017/6/23/15852048/germany-hate-speech-facebook-twitter-fine-censorship 122 8. Abstract One of the most essential problems of modern media law is the collision between freedom of expression and hate speech. Rapid development of the Internet and social media have greatly contributed to the realization of freedom of expression worldwide, but at the same time increased dissemination of hate speech. In the new media environment, establishing control over hate speech while simultaneously protecting freedom of expression became a global issue. This thesis attempts at looking at this problem from two different perspectives: from the position of the European Court of Human Rights which has a long history of passing judgments in cases related to hate speech, and from the point of view of the major social media which in the last decade have developed their own rules and measures regarding this issue. In order to establish how the European Court of Human Rights decides whether the speech in question is hate speech or not, more than 30 judgments of the Court are analyzed in detail. The most significant arguments from the judgments are summarised in two tables. The Court’s approach is then compared with the one of the social media that attempt to combat hate speech with the help of human moderators and automatic filtering systems. A number of observations resulted from this comparison are provided in the conclusion. 123 Keywords: freedom of expression, hate speech, European Court of Human Rights, case law, social media 9. Zusammenfassung Eines der größten Probleme des modernen Medienrechts ist die Kollision von Meinungsfreiheit und Hassrede. Die rasche Entwicklung des Internets und der sozialen Medien hat weltweit zur Verwirklichung der Meinungsfreiheit beigetragen, gleichzeitig hat sie aber die Verbreitung von Hassreden verstärkt. In der neuen Medienlandschaft wurde die Kontrolle über Hassreden bei gleichzeitigem Schutz der Meinungsfreiheit zu einem globalen Thema. Diese Masterarbeit versucht dieses Problem aus zwei verschiedenen Perspektiven zu betrachten: aus der Position des Europäischen Gerichtshofs für Menschenrechte, der seit langem die Fälle im Zusammenhang mit Hassrede beurteilt, und aus der Sicht der wichtigsten sozialen Medien, die im letzten Jahrzehnt ihre eigenen Regeln und Maßnahmen zu diesem Thema entwickelt haben. Um festzustellen, wie der Europäische Gerichtshof für Menschenrechte entscheidet, ob es sich um eine Hassrede handelt oder nicht, werden mehr als 30 Urteile des Gerichtshofs im Detail analysiert. Die wichtigsten Argumente aus den Urteilen sind in zwei Tabellen zusammengefasst. 124 Der Ansatz des Gerichtshofs wird dann mit dem der sozialen Medien, die Hassreden mit Hilfe von Moderatoren und automatischen Filtersystemen zu bekämpfen versuchen, verglichen. Die Beobachtungen, die sich aus diesem Vergleich ergeben, werden in der Schlussfolgerung präsentiert. Suchbegriffe: Meinungsfreiheit, Hassrede, Europäischer Gerichtshof für Menschenrechte, Rechtsprechung, soziale Medien 
work_ssi2dfwgzjdbrmdgytwoolbaua	----	Anti-Muslim Backlash and Changing Political Ideologies. The Consequences of Perceived Threat from Islamist Terrorism Dissertation zur Erlangung des Doktorgrades der Naturwissenschaften (Dr. rer. nat.) dem Fachbereich Psychologie der Philipps-Universität Marburg vorgelegt von Dipl.-Sozialwiss. Stefan Thörner aus Lich Marburg/Lahn im April 2014 Diese Arbeit wurde gefördert durch ein Promotionsstipendium des DFG-Graduiertenkollegs „Gruppenbezogene Menschenfeindlichkeit“ (GRK 884) an den Universitäten Marburg und Bielefeld. Anti-Muslim Backlash and Changing Political Ideologies. The Consequences of Perceived Threat from Islamist Terrorism Dipl.-Sozialwiss. Stefan Thörner Am Fachbereich Psychologie der Philipps-Universität Marburg (Hochschulkennziffer 1080) am 15.04.2014 als Dissertation eingereicht. Erstgutachter: Prof. Dr. Ulrich Wagner (Philipps-Universität Marburg) Zweitgutachter: Prof. Dr. Peter Schmidt (Justus-Liebig-Universität Gießen) Tag der mündlichen Prüfung (Disputation): 30.06.2014 Table of Contents 1. Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 1 1.1 Historical Background ..................................................................................................... 3 1.2 Theoretical Background ................................................................................................... 4 1.2.1 Terrorist Threat ......................................................................................................... 4 1.2.2 The Psychology of Terrorism ................................................................................... 5 1.2.3 Integrated Threat Theory (ITT) ................................................................................ 6 1.2.4 Terror Management Theory (TMT) .......................................................................... 8 1.3 The Present Research ....................................................................................................... 9 1.3.1 Manuscript #1 ........................................................................................................... 9 1.3.2 Manuscript #2 ......................................................................................................... 11 1.3.3 Manuscript #3 ......................................................................................................... 12 1.4 References ...................................................................................................................... 16 Manuscript #1: Terrorist Threat, Prejudice, and Anti-Muslim Backlash. A Cross-National Poll Review for a Decade of Terrorism ................................................................................................................ 21 Manuscript #2: What comes first: threat or prejudice? Perceived terrorist threat and the derogation of Muslims in Germany................................................................................................................ 74 Manuscript #3: Conservative Shift or Ideological Intensification? The Impact of the 2004 Madrid Bombings on Germany ............................................................................................................................ 102 2. Final Discussion ................................................................................................................ 123 2.1 Perceived Terrorist Threat and Anti-Muslim Backlash ............................................... 123 2.2 Perceived Terrorist Threat and Changing Political Ideologies .................................... 126 2.3 Anti-Muslim Backlash and Ideological Intensification – A Contradiction? ............... 128 3. Outlook.............................................................................................................................. 130 3.1 References .................................................................................................................... 133 Zusammenfassung.................................................................................................................. 137 Danksagung............................................................................................................................ 142 Angaben zur Person ............................................................................................................... 143 Erklärung des Autors ............................................................................................................. 144 Introduction 1 1. Introduction Undoubtedly, for the so called Western World, the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 (9/11), were among the most important events in the first decade of the 21st century1. In the style of many speeches held by politicians on 9/11 and thereafter, Thomas Birkland (2004) titled a research paper “The World Changed Today” (p. 179). In fact, the world changed in various aspects: The US and allies went to the “war on terror” against the Taliban in Afghanistan and against the Saddam-Regime in Iraq (e.g., Stone & Rizova, 2007). Furthermore, security measures and intelligence service activities were increased up to a level of total surveillance, which has just recently been discovered by the public (e.g., Gellman & Soltani, 2014). At least some of these measures were applied to regain security for the US and its citizens – an aspect massively under threat by the attacks. The terrorists of 9/11 proved awareness of psychological mechanisms and mass media functioning (Breckenridge & Zimbardo, 2007; Shurkin, 2007). With this knowledge, they were highly successful in spreading terror. Besides the rather small group of directly affected individuals, they reached and – more importantly – affected millions of people who followed the events via TV in the US and around the world (Carey, 2003; Oswald, 2005; Reuband, 2010). Opinion polls in the US and Europe found that the attacks and their broadcasting induced a state of perceived threat and insecurity (European Commission, 2002; Huddy, Khatib, & Capelos, 2002; Smith, Rasinski, & Toce, 2001; Traugott et al., 2002). Ahern, Galea, Resnick, and Vlahov (2004) emphasize how strong individuals have been indirectly affected. They showed that the probability of facing post-traumatic stress disorder symptoms increased with the duration of TV consumption in the week after 9/11 (see also Marshall et al., 2007). To sum up, for the Western World a new, pervasive threat was initiated on September 11, 2001. 1 This work is written from a Western perspective. Thus, whenever I write about ‘citizens’, ‘people’, and ‘individuals’ in an unspecific manner, I refer to individuals from the so called Western World. Introduction 2 This threat was kept alive or reactivated by several more Islamist terrorist attacks, failed or foiled trials, terror warnings, and other terror related events (Nacos, Bloch-Elkon, & Shapiro, 2007). Even today, – more than ten years later – the perception of terrorist threat has not yet disappeared fully. Importantly, it can be re-triggered rapidly by a new event. Therefore, I aim to further our knowledge about the phenomenon of perceived terrorist threat and its social psychological and societal consequences. I will investigate the consequences of terrorism for Muslims living in Western countries as well as the changes of political ideologies2 in response to a terrorist attack. In the social scientific research field of intergroup relations, threat plays a pivotal role. Threat in various forms (e.g., realistic, symbolic, collective, individual) is known to increase prejudice against outgroups (Stephan & Stephan, 2000; for an overview and meta-analysis, see Riek, Mania, & Gaertner, 2006). The strongest effect can be expected against the group which is allegedly the source of threat/s (LeVine & Campbell, 1972). Thus, in case of Islamist terrorism, a derogation of Muslims is expected. I will evaluate this assumption in Manuscripts #1 and #2. Especially in Manuscript #1, I aim to answer the research question whether the post 9/11 anti-Muslim backlash can be explained by a social-psychological threat-prejudice-discrimination model (for an overview of research questions, see Table 1 at the end of this chapter). Additionally, I will evaluate whether this model holds true for other major and minor terrorist events in different countries over a time-span from 2001 to 2011. The research of Manuscript #2 is concerned with the antecedence of terrorist threat and prejudice. I will test competing theories about the temporal association of terrorist threat and anti-Muslim prejudice in Germany. Thus I will answer the question whether terrorist threat produces prejudice or whether the expression of existing prejudice is legitimated by terrorist 2 The working definition of the term “ideology” for this thesis is that individuals possess a core belief system (e.g., conservatism) that is shared with a group and gives meaning to political thinking and behavior (for an overview, see Jost, 2006). Introduction 3 threat. This is especially important due to the fact that the majority of immigrants in Germany have been Muslims long before 9/11. Besides its’ hypothesized enhancement of anti-Muslim prejudice, perceived terrorist threat is also supposed to have an influence on political ideologies. The following sums up the theorized mechanism: perceived terrorist threat increases the salience of one’s own death (called mortality salience; Landau et al., 2004). Mortality salience increases the desire of being part of a meaningful community sharing a worldview which outlasts one’s own death (Castano & Dechesne, 2005). Therefore, a major terrorist attack is assumed to lead to worldview defense, meaning that prior ideologies (e.g., political ideologies) are amplified (Pyszczynski, Solomon, & Greenberg, 2003)3. In Manuscript #3, I will test this hypothesis against an alternative which postulates that all individuals generally become more conservative after a terrorist attack (Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003). In the following I present a short overview of the historical context and provide an introduction to the psychology of terrorism. I continue with the two most relevant theories for this thesis and previous research where these theories were applied in context of terrorism. Then, I expand on the present research, by sketching the aims of the three manuscripts this thesis is built upon. 1.1 Historical Background Preceding last decade’s Islamist terrorism in the Western World, there has been a long- lasting latent conflict mainly between the US and the people of the Islamic World. A possible explanation for this conflict is described by McCauley (2007): the Western world supports 3 For worldview defense in context of political ideologies, Huddy & Feldman (2011) introduced the term “ideological intensification”. Introduction 4 governments of Islamic countries which, however, suppress their own citizens. This, amongst other factors, may have induced Islamist terrorism by fundamentalist groups deriving from suppressed people. Yet, the history of this conflict and the multiple causes of last decades’ terrorism are much more complex (for an overview, see Halliday, 2002). On September 11, 2001 (9/11), Al-Qaeda terrorists hijacked four airplanes. Two of them hit the World Trade Center (WTC) in New York City, the third one the Pentagon in Arlington and the fourth one crashed on a field near Pittsburgh. All passengers died, together with hundreds of people in the WTC and the Pentagon. Altogether, about three thousand people lost their life and around six thousand were injured due to the immediate attacks on 9/11 (Li, Kelley, & Kennedy, 2003; Woods, 2011). Since 9/11, Islamist terrorism or its countermovement, “the war on terror”, have been on the agenda in Western countries (for an overview, see Manuscript #1). To mention only a few events: in 2003 the so called “coalition of the willing” went to war against the regime in Iraq. A year later, Islamist terrorists killed 191 commuters in the morning of March 11, 2004 in Madrid, Spain. On July 7, 2005, 52 people died in another horrific attack on public transport vehicles, in London, UK. The second half of the decade was characterized by failed or foiled attacks and the ongoing wars. For some people a decade of terrorism ended with the assassination of Osama bin Laden in May 2011 (Gollwitzer et al., 2014). In fact, the perception of terrorist threat has diminished – after a peak in response to bin Laden’s assassination – in the last years (Manuscript #1). However, it can be reactivated rapidly. 1.2 Theoretical Background 1.2.1 Terrorist Threat Fritsche, Jonas, and Kessler (2011) define threat as the individual’s expectation that something aversive is going to happen, especially if this coincides with a sense of losing Introduction 5 control. Stephan and Renfro (2002) locate threat on a cognitive level: “From our perspective, threat is a cognitive appraisal and fear is a common emotional response to this appraisal.” (p. 197) Last decades’ Islamist terrorism threatened many individuals to expect and fear further attacks. This threat about future attacks can be further differentiated. Scholars distinguish between collective and individual threat (e.g., Stephan & Renfro, 2002). In the context of terrorism, the wording collective and personal threat is common (Huddy, Feldman, Capelos, & Provost, 2002): Collective terrorist threat is often operationalized as perceiving danger for one’s own country or one’s superior ingroup. If individuals perceive (physical) danger for themselves, this is interpreted as personal threat. This differentiation is useful because collective and personal threat can have different consequences on psychological variables like authoritarianism (Asbrock & Fritsche, 2013). 1.2.2 The Psychology of Terrorism Commonly, terrorists aim to induce political changes with their attacks4 (Abrahms, 2006). Not the attacks themselves, but threat in large parts of the population as psychological consequence forces target governments to react (Friedland & Merari, 1985). To spread threat, terrorists often try to kill as many people as possible. This is to gain maximum attention and to create the impression that everyone could fall victim. Another aspect is the choice of target cities and buildings or traffic systems. In case of 9/11, national symbols were targeted (WTC, Pentagon) to humiliate the US and to emphasize their vulnerability. By doing so, terrorists proved a vast knowledge of psychological mechanisms (Breckenridge & Zimbardo, 2007; Huddy, Feldman, & Cassese, 2009). 4 In case of 9/11 however, there is no final clarity about the concrete political aims of the attackers (McCauley, 2007) Introduction 6 Furthermore, choosing cities like New York, Madrid and London as targets ensured that camera teams would be on scene within minutes and broadcast their pictures around the world (Carey, 2003; Shurkin, 2007). This proved again terrorists’ ability to spread threat on a large scale because especially the live coverage of the happenings in New York City on September 11, 2001, was highly traumatizing and threatening to television viewers (Marshall et al., 2007). To sum up, last decades’ Islamist terrorists knew how to receive attention and how to convey terror and threat into every household in the US and beyond. The psychological consequences of terrorist threat are multifarious (for overviews, see Morgan, Wisneski, & Skitka, 2011; Woods, 2011). The crucial one for this work is the prejudice- and discrimination- increasing function of terrorist threat and its impact on political ideologies. Two theories seem especially appropriate to consider in these contexts: first, Integrated Threat Theory (ITT; Stephan & Stephan, 2000), and second Terror5 Management Theory (TMT; Greenberg et al., 1990). 1.2.3 Integrated Threat Theory (ITT) ITT is an integration of threat accounts (Stephan & Stephan, 2000). It derives from the hypothesis, included in many classic studies of intergroup relations, that threat creates prejudice (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950; Allport, 1979/1954; Blumer, 1958; LeVine & Campbell, 1972; Sherif, 1966). ITT considers realistic threat, symbolic threat, intergroup anxiety and negative stereotyping to explain the occurrence of prejudice (Stephan & Renfro, 2002). Importantly, the mere perception of threat is the crucial condition for prejudice to occur. 5 “Terror“ describes a state of threat and is not equivalent with terrorism. Thus, TMT is a more general theory that focuses not specifically on terrorism. German translation of “terror” = ”Schrecken, Entsetzen”. Introduction 7 Realistic threats, as formulated in Sherif’s (1966) realistic group conflict theory, are those resulting from competition for scarce resources between groups (see also Blumer, 1958). Because this definition is relatively narrow, Stephan and Stephan (2000) enlarged the concept of realistic threat to any threat posed to the wellbeing of the whole group or its members (see also Stephan & Renfro, 2002; Stephan, Renfro, & Davis, 2008). Terrorist attacks fulfill this concept. If the source of threat can be traced to a specific group it will cause hostility to that group (LeVine & Campbell, 1972; see also Allport, 1979/1954; Glick, 2002, 2005). Thus, the occurrence of terrorist threat should lead to an increase in prejudice, especially against Muslims. Several studies combined perceived terrorist threat with ITT. Huddy et al. (2005) found in a large post 9/11 survey that individuals who felt threatened supported the invasion of Afghanistan and the discrimination of Muslims in terms of surveillance and special airport security checks and restrictions on visas, amongst other anti-terrorism policies. Doosje et al. (2009) analyzed a cross-sectional mixed European survey which covered the perception of terrorist threat, anti-Muslim prejudice and discriminatory intentions. The authors were able to show that all these variables are interrelated, supporting the ITT view. In the same way, Oswald (2005) demonstrated that perceived terrorist threat was associated with anti-Arab6 prejudice and discriminatory intention. The fact that the terrorists have been Muslims seems having a general skepticism against that group and its members induced (Yum & Schenck-hamlin, 2005). Muslims suddenly posed a perceived threat although only a few individuals of that group were actual terrorists (Cesari, 2004; Welch, 2006). A limiting factor of earlier research is its selectivity for specific attacks (mainly 9/11) and single countries (mainly the US) which restricts external validity of the results. To 6 In the US, the term “Arabs” is used to describe individuals mainly from Middle Eastern descent. The majority of Arabs are of Muslim faith (Shaheen, 2003). Introduction 8 overcome this shortcoming, I include an overview paper about perceived terrorist threat, anti- Muslim prejudice and discrimination in several countries, covering a full decade of terrorist attacks and terror related events (Manuscript #1). Another shortcoming of previous research is that most studies are cross-sectional which allows no conclusions about the direction of causality for the portrayed variables. Therefore, in Manuscript #2 I will test whether the theorized temporal sequence of ITT is superior over alternative causations. 1.2.4 Terror Management Theory (TMT) The theory connecting terrorist threat with changes in political ideology is called TMT (Pyszczynski et al., 2003). The basic idea behind TMT is that humans are aware of their mortality but refuse to accept their transience (Becker, 1997/1973). Contemplating one’s death, which TMT researchers call mortality salience, induces a state of threat (Greenberg et al., 1990). Individuals oppose that threat by strengthening their worldview (e.g., political ideology)7 and their group affiliation. Belonging to a larger entity means being part of something lasting longer than oneself which creates a sense of immortality (Castano & Dechesne, 2005; Castano, Yzerbyt, & Paladino, 2004). Of course, this is a symbolic form of immortality but it can buffer the threat of mortality salience (Greenberg, Solomon, & Pyszczynski, 1997). Previous Research connecting TMT with terrorism showed impressively that triggering thoughts about 9/11 experimentally increased participants’ level of mortality salience (Landau et al., 2004). Thus, terrorist attacks can indeed pose an existential threat. As mentioned above, according to TMT, individuals react with worldview defense if their mortality is salient. Therefore, Pyszczynski and colleagues (2003) hypothesized that terrorist 7 Worldview defense can be captured on various dimensions (for an overview, see Solomon, Greenberg, and Pyszczynski, 2004). Introduction 9 attacks also lead to worldview defense. In a later study, Pyszczynski et al. (2006) found that college students in a mortality salience condition showed on mean level higher support for extreme military interventions by American forces although they would cause thousands of civilian victims. As expected, this was moderated by respondents’ political ideology, supporting the worldview defense hypothesis. Only conservatives increased in support for the military intervention. Thus, individuals’ political ideology may influence reactions to mortality salience. This, however, is the topic of controversial debate, on which Manuscript #3 will focus (see Burke, Kosloff, & Landau, 2013; Jost, 2006). Previous research on TMT in context of terrorism is mainly experimental laboratory research. Thus, it has high internal validity but is not able to capture the complexity of real world terrorism. To overcome this shortcoming, natural quasi-experiments with real world terrorism could further our knowledge about the consequences of terrorist attacks on individuals’ worldviews. Echebarria-Echabe and Fernàndez-Guede (2006) provide such a design on the Madrid Bombings in 2004. However, they use independent pre-post attack samples. Therefore, in Manuscript #3 I will provide an analysis of a pre-post Madrid Bombing panel dataset, to reveal intraindividual change in worldviews (political ideology) in response to a real world terrorist attack. 1.3 The Present Research 1.3.1 Manuscript #1 Thörner, S., Schmidt, P., & Gosen, S. (2014, submitted). Terrorist Threat, Prejudice, and Anti-Muslim Backlash. A Cross-National Poll Review for a Decade of Terrorism. Point of departure for Manuscript #1 was the observation that a wave of violent backlash against Muslims occurred in the US after 9/11 (e.g., Ibish, 2003). The arising Introduction 10 research question is therefore whether this macro phenomenon can be explained by a social- psychological threat-prejudice-discrimination model (for an overview of research questions and major theoretical constructs in this thesis, see Table 1). I will derive such a model from ITT and research connecting prejudice with discrimination (for an overview, see Dovidio & Gaertner, 1986; for meta-analyses, see Schütz & Six, 1996; Talaska, Fiske, & Chaiken, 2008). To investigate the generality of the model, I will apply this model to different countries and different major and minor terrorist attacks and terror related events. One further aspect under scrutiny is the strength and sustainability of spillover effects from terror related events in one country to others countries. To answer the research questions, I review polls and reports about perceived terrorist threat, anti-Muslim prejudice and discrimination for the US, Spain, UK, and Germany for a period from 2000 to 20128 (for an overview of research designs, data and methods, see Table 2 at the end of this chapter). Most of that data is only available as mean scores and not as individual level data. Furthermore, the datasets available on individual level do not comprise all variables under research here. Therefore, I create timelines of mean scores for perceived terrorist threat, anti-Muslim prejudice and discrimination. With this data, no test of causality is possible. The model is supported if threat, prejudice and discrimination increase in response to a terror related event. Thus, I theorize a micro-level mechanism which can only be observed on macro-level with the available data. To connect both levels, I refer to Coleman’s (Coleman, 1986, 1987) micro-macro theory and model. Where individual data or at least distribution measures are available, I will test for mean differences within time series (e.g., time series of anti-Muslim prejudice9 in the US). For Germany, one available dataset allows for working with latent means. In this case, I apply 8 The events considered happened between 2001 and 2011. Therefore, I used the term “a decade of terrorism”. However, the data captures a somewhat longer period: 2000 to 2012. 9 During my dissertation I discovered the controversy about the term “Islamophobia” (e.g., Imhoff and Recker, 2012). Therefore, I switched to the term “anti-Muslim prejudice”. However, Manuscript #1 comprehends the word Islamophobia. Introduction 11 Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) and measurement invariance testing (Meredith, 1993). Measurement invariance is a statistical procedure which checks whether the meaning of a factor remains the same over time which is a condition for latent mean testing. Depending on the results, I aim to derive marginal conditions for the functioning of the model between events and between countries. This has far-reaching practical implications, because it allows to develop intervention strategies which could be used to decrease the probability of anti-Muslim backlash after a terror related event. 1.3.2 Manuscript #2 Thörner, S. & Kauff, M. (2014, submitted). What comes first: threat or prejudice? Perceived terrorist threat and the derogation of Muslims in Germany. Whereas the data in Manuscript #1 allows for a macro-level perspective on the connection of perceived terrorist threat and derogation of Muslims, Manuscript #2 tests this connection on micro-level. In this manuscript, my focus is on the specific situation in Germany where Muslims have been the largest immigrant group for decades and prejudice against immigrants existed long before 9/11 occurred (e.g., Jonker, 2005). Thus, from a modern prejudice perspective (e.g., Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986; see also Crandall & Eshleman, 2003) it is conceivable, that terrorist threat is used as a legitimation strategy to express existing prejudice (Allen, 2004). The opponent hypothesis derived from ITT is that threat produces prejudice. The specific research question is therefore, whether perceived terrorist threat releases existing prejudice, produces new prejudice, or if both mechanisms occur simultaneously. To test these hypotheses against each other, I conducted a two wave online-panel with N = 88 respondents that participated in both panel waves. The panel consists mainly of Introduction 12 young, highly educated individuals. I test the hypotheses against each other by applying latent variable cross-lagged modeling (Jöreskog, 1979). Working with latent variables goes along with higher reliabilities of connections between variables due to consideration of measurement error on factor level (Kline, 2011). Furthermore, latent variable modeling allows for invariance testing of measurement models, which is a central assumption in working with panel data (Little, Preacher, Selig, & Card, 2007). Cross-lagged models are suited to reveal the antecedence of variables, questioning which variable predicts the other over time under consideration of autocorrelations within constructs (Finkel, 1995). An additional aim of this manuscript is to explore whether perceived collective and personal terrorist threat create differential effects on anti-Muslim prejudice and discrimination. This is because previous research revealed rather contrary results about differential effects (Asbrock & Fritsche, 2013; Huddy et al., 2002). Understanding the causal antecedence between perceived terrorist threat and derogation of Muslims is important because it allows the development of appropriate intervention strategies to diminish prejudice and discrimination. 1.3.3 Manuscript #3 Thörner, S. (2014, submitted). Conservative Shift or Ideological Intensification? The Impact of the 2004 Madrid Bombings on Germany. As mentioned above, in Manuscript #3 I consider the consequences of perceived terrorist threat from a somewhat different angle as in the first two manuscripts. The dependent variable under research is change in political ideology. Like in Manuscript #2 I test two competing hypotheses against each other. The first hypothesis is derived from Jost and colleagues’ research on conservatism as motivated social cognition (Jost et al., 2003). Introduction 13 The authors suggest that threat, including mortality salience, leads to a conservative shift in terms of political ideologies. This means that all individuals become more conservative when confronted with existential threat. TMT researchers, however, argue that mortality salience leads to worldview defense (ideological intensification), meaning that previous ideologies are strengthened (Pyszczynski et al., 2003). Thus, the research question of this manuscript is whether a terrorist attack leads to a conservative shift or to ideological intensification. To answer that research question, I reanalyze a representative German panel dataset which was conducted a year prior and a few weeks after the terrorist attacks on Madrid in March 2004. I apply a design suggested by Castano et al. (2011) to this data. Here, I consider the political self-positioning at t1 to explain the intraindividual change in a proxy measure of conservatism. I do this firstly in the same manner as Castano and colleagues and calculate residual change scores. Second, I apply an elaborated change score procedure from the family of longitudinal latent variable models (McArdle, 2009) called latent true change modeling (Steyer, Eid, & Schwenkmezger, 1997). Introduction 14 Table 1. Overview of research questions and major theoretical constructs. Manuscript Research Question Major Theoretical Constructs #1 Terrorist Threat, Prejudice, and Anti-Muslim Backlash. A Cross-Country Poll Review for a Decade of Terrorism. Can the 9/11 anti- Muslim backlash in the US be explained by a threat-prejudice- discrimination account? Time series of terrorist events, perceived terrorist threat, Islamophobia, discrimination How strong and sustainable are spillover effects on other countries? Does such a model hold true for the attacks on Spain and the UK? What are the marginal conditions of backlash? #2 What comes first: threat or prejudice? Perceived terrorist threat and the derogation of Muslims in Germany Does perceived terrorist threat lead to the derogation of Muslims, is terrorist threat used as a legitimation of expressing existing prejudice against Muslims or is a hybrid of this two models appropriate? Perceived collective terrorist threat, perceived personal terrorist threat, prejudice against Muslims, discriminatory intentions against Muslims Are there differential effects for personal and collective terrorist threat? #3 Conservative Shift or Ideological Intensification? The Impact of the Madrid Bombings in 2004 on Germany. Did the Madrid Bombing lead to a conservative shift or to ideological intensification in Germany? Time (pre & post terrorist attack), authoritarianism (proxy of conservatism), prejudice Is the change in conservatism after a terrorist attack dependent on the political self- categorization at t1? Introduction 15 Table 2. Overview of research designs, data and methods of data analysis. Manuscript Research Design Data Method #1 Terrorist Threat, Prejudice and Anti-Muslim Backlash. A Cross-Country Poll Review for a Decade of Terrorism. Poll review, time series Multiple general population samples time series (cross- national) ANOVA, confirmatory factor analysis, multiple group invariance testing, latent mean comparisons #2 What comes first: threat or prejudice? Perceived terrorist threat and the derogation of Muslims in Germany Two-wave panel Online panel Confirmatory factor analysis, longitudinal invariance testing, latent autoregressive cross-lagged structural equation modeling #3 Conservative Shift or Ideological Intensification? The Impact of the Madrid Bombings in 2004 on Germany. Natural experiment (Panel including a terrorist attack) General population panel Change scores, confirmatory factor analysis, longitudinal invariance testing, latent true change modeling Introduction 16 1.4 References Abrahms, M. (2006). Why Terrorism Does Not Work. International Security, 31(2), 42–78. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/4137516 Adorno, T. W., Frenkel-Brunswik, E., Levinson, D., & Sanford, N. (1950). 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A Cross- National Poll Review for a Decade of Terrorism Stefan Thörner Philipps-University Marburg, Germany Peter Schmidt Justus-Liebig-University Gießen, Germany and National Research University Higher School of Economics, Moscow, Russia Stefanie Gosen Philipps-University Marburg, Germany Submission date: March 19, 2014 Under review in Journal of Social and Political Psychology Manuscript #1 22 Abstract After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11), many Muslims in the US became victims of a wave of backlash hate crime including arson attacks on mosques, violent discrimination and even murders. Based on social psychological threat theories, we derived a model hypothesizing that terrorist threat leads to prejudice and discrimination of Muslims. We applied this model to those three Western countries which faced major terrorist attacks in the last decade (US, Spain, UK) and one yet unaffected country (Germany). We reviewed various data sources, mainly opinion polls, covering the years 2000 to 2012, to assess the impact of major terrorist attacks and minor terrorist events on threat perceptions and scapegoating of Muslims. Results showed that the 9/11 attacks led to international spillover effects with increasing threat perceptions and derogation of Muslims in all focus countries. The attacks on the UK in 2005 induced a substantial increase in Islamophobia in all European countries considered. Nevertheless, the global pattern of results indicated that the predictions of the model were subject to marginal conditions on country level. We discuss those marginal conditions that inhibit or facilitate scapegoating of Muslims and gather promising strategies to avoid backlash in case of further terrorist attacks. Keywords: 9/11, Backlash, Poll Review, Terrorism, Threat, Islamophobia, Discrimination Manuscript #1 23 “Some Muslims blew up the Twin Towers. […] You are kidding me. […] No, I’m not kidding you. You Muslims blew up the Twin Towers.”(Barkdull et al., 2011, p. 144) The consequences of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 (9/11), were devastating and wide-reaching for US citizens as well as the international community. Sharing the attackers’ religion, the effect on Muslims of the Western World was immense on an entirely different level, when the association of Islam and Terrorism was made (Allen & Nielsen, 2002; Barkdull et al., 2011; Doosje, Zebel, Scheermeijer, & Mathyi, 2007; Sheridan, 2006). The outgroup ‘Muslims’ became an easy target as scapegoats for the attacks. An increase in hate crimes against Muslims in the US of about 1,600% was registered in 2001 (FBI, 1998-2011). This backlash included arson attacks against mosques, violent assaults, and climaxed in several murders (Ibish, 2003; Kaplan, 2006). A number of consequences of last decades’ Islamist terrorism for Western societies are well researched (see Morgan, Wisneski, & Skitka 2011 and Woods 2011 for an overview in social sciences). The psychological fields of interest included posttraumatic stress (e.g., Galea et al., 2002; Laugharne, Janca, & Widiger, 2007; Marshall et al., 2007; Rubin et al., 2007), developments in political attitudes concerning support for war, increased security and anti- terror measures and support for President Bush (e.g., Huddy & Feldman, 2011; Huddy, Feldman, Taber, & Lahav, 2005; Landau et al., 2004), the role of the mass media (e.g., Birkland, 2004; Carey, 2003), and the media’s impact on perceived threat and prejudice (Das, Bushman, Bezemer, Kerkhof, & Vermeulen, 2009; Nacos, Bloch-Elkon, & Shapiro, 2007). Although some substantial research (Oswald, 2005) and documentation about anti-Muslim Manuscript #1 24 backlash (Ibish, 2003; Kaplan, 2006; Panagopoulos, 2006) is available, no overview about attitude and behavior changes towards Muslims in Western societies is accessible. We want to close this gap with this poll review. Terrorism is a form of communication aiming to create a climate of threat by randomly attacking civilians (Weimann, 2008). Terrorists make use of people’s vulnerability and mass media’s distribution of violence to spread threat (Breckenridge & Zimbardo, 2007; Nacos et al., 2007; Shurkin, 2007). The role of threat is well researched and is expressed for example in Integrated Threat Theory (ITT; Stephan & Renfro, 2002; Stephan & Stephan, 2000): it leads to ingroup favoritism and increased prejudice in general (Riek, Mania, & Gaertner, 2006). The threat occurring in mainstream society through Islamist terrorism and its broadcasting may thus create or deepen existing prejudices against Muslims (Das et al., 2009). Furthermore, as theorized by Stephan & Renfro (2002) ‘prejudice’ is also predictor of the behavior ‘discrimination’ (Dovidio, Brigham, Johnson, & Gaertner, 1996; Schütz & Six, 1996; Talaska, Fiske, & Chaiken, 2008). The violent backlash against Muslims after 9/11 may thus be the product of the described threat-prejudice-discrimination process (Oswald, 2005). Manuscript #1 25 Figure 1. Perceived threats in the EU before and after 9/11 40% 45% 50% 55% 60% 65% 70% 75% 80% 85% 90% N o v e m b e r- 0 0 Ja n u a ry -0 1 M a rc h -0 1 M a y -0 1 Ju ly -0 1 S e p te m b e r- 0 1 N o v e m b e r- 0 1 Ja n u a ry -0 2 M a rc h -0 2 M a y -0 2 Ju ly -0 2 S e p te m b e r- 0 2 N o v e m b e r- 0 2 Ja n u a ry -0 3 M a rc h -0 3 B e in g a fr a id o f Terrorism Spread of nuclear, bacteriological or chemical weapons of mass destruction World War Nuclear conflict in Europe Conventional war in Europe 9/11 Note. Data source: Eurobarometer (54, 56-59). Cross-sectional, EU (15) averaged, adult population data. Question Wording: Here is a list of things that some people say they are afraid of. For each of these, please tell me if, personally, you are afraid of it, or not? Figure 1 shows the development of EU-citizens’ fear of terrorism and war. The clear- cut peak in October 2001 emphasizes that Europeans also felt a massive threat from the new phenomenon of international Islamist terrorism. Thus, the questions arises whether 9/11 initiated the above theorized process in the US and likewise in European countries and whether this effect can also be found for other terror related events. Therefore, our main research question is whether we can find parallel fluctuations on aggregate mean level over time in perceived terrorist threat, anti-Muslim prejudice and (violent) discrimination across different countries and different major Islamist terrorist attacks and minor terrorist related events. We focused on the major terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11) in the United States of America (US), March 11, 2004 (11-M) in Spain, July 7, 2005 (7/7) in the United Kingdom (UK) and several minor terror related events. In addition to the target countries US, Manuscript #1 26 Spain and UK, Germany was chosen to evaluate the effects on a country that faced no major attack yet. This paper reexamines and reviews various public opinion polls, scientific polls, official- and NGO-reports, and several studies from the US and Europe. We provide a number of time series, covering the years 2000 to 2012. These time series enable us to analyze the strength of impact and its longevity, which often has to remain unconsidered in experimental and cross-sectional research. Major Islamist Terror-Attacks. Although the US has previously been victim of different forms of terrorism, the attacks on September 11, 2001 (9/11) were unique in their magnitude. Four airplanes were hijacked by Al-Qaeda terrorists. Two planes crashed into the World Trade Center (WTC) in New York City, one into the Pentagon in Arlington and another one crashed on a field near Pittsburgh. Approximately three thousand people were killed on that day (Li, Kelley, & Kennedy, 2003; Woods, 2011). A second major attack in the Western World targeted Madrid, the capital of Spain. Ten bomb blasts in four commuter trains left 191 people dead and 2051 injured on March 11, 2004 (11-M). A third major Islamist terror-attack hit London on July 7, 2005 (7/7). Four suicide bombers attacked three underground trains and a double-decker bus. In total, 52 civilians were killed and more than 700 were injured. Theory Overview Scapegoating of Minorities. When the Black Death broke out in Europe in the 14th century, Jews were suspected of poisoning food and drinking water. The fact that Jews also died from the plague did not convince the majority to stop victimizing Jews as the scapegoats: Across Western Europe, Black Death pogroms against Jews took place (Cohn, 2007). This can be explained by a general need to envision a collective enemy. Often, this is a preformed Manuscript #1 27 group that can be held responsible. Becker, Wagner, & Christ (2011) demonstrate this phenomenon as a consequence of the 2008 worldwide economic crisis. They show that threat, elicited by the crisis, is related to ethnic prejudice when respondents believe immigrants are the cause, and prejudice against Jews when respondents believe bankers and speculators to be the cause. Likewise Allport (1979/1954) explains the choice of a group as “the scapegoats” by contemporary circumstances (see also Glick, 2002, 2005). Consequently, current events and problems of the majority need to be considered. On September 11, 2001, pictures of Palestinians who allegedly celebrated the death of thousands of Americans were broadcasted all over the world (FoxNews.com, 2001). Fueled with the knowledge of the terrorists being Muslims, these pictures deepened the negative image of citizens with Islamic faith in general. Thus, Muslims became the scapegoats of the attacks (Cesari, 2004; Welch, 2006). Terrorist Attacks, their Broadcasting and Perceived Threat. The broadcasting of the 9/11 disaster was unique in its international broadcasting. Already seven minutes after the first tower was targeted, the media broadcasted live pictures in Germany (Reuband, 2010). Pictures of help-seeking people on the floors above the impact and falling bodies were made public. The whole world followed this horrifying situation via television. When the first tower collapsed, viewers realized that hundreds of people were dying that very minute. The news of the attack spread rapidly. For both, the US and Germany, data suggests that two hours after the first attack, 90% of respondents in flash polls had heard about the catastrophe (Carey, 2003; Reuband, 2010). No media templates existed for such a happening as 9/11 (Hoskins, 2006). Media templates are attempts to classify the current incident in context of previous events. Neither the media nor the citizens had means of comparison for 9/11, rescaling their experience of evilness. Especially the post-attack insecurity was unparalleled. Major concerns were: “Are there more attacks to come? Was it only the beginning of a war against the US or even against Manuscript #1 28 the whole Western World? Are we facing a World War? Do terrorists have weapons of mass destruction?” (see also Figure 1 for Europe). Consequently, the attacks and their broadcasting caused a climate of insecurity, fear and threat (Huddy, Feldman, Lahav, & Taber, 2003; Nacos et al., 2007). The impact of TV broadcasting in these days can be grasped by the fact that the exposure rate to television news in the week after 9/11 proofed to be a predictor of experiencing posttraumatic stress disorder (Ahern, Galea, Resnick, & Vlahov, 2004). However, not only posttraumatic stress can be the consequence of terrorist news reports, also increased prejudice against outgroups can occur (Das et al., 2009). Threat, Prejudice, and Discrimination. “One of the most pervasive and powerful effects of threat is to increase intolerance, prejudice, ethnocentrism, and xenophobia, regardless of whether threat is defined as a widely acknowledged external force or a subjective, perceived state.” (Huddy et al., 2005, p. 594) Several theories are built on the idea of intergroup threat creating hostility and bias between groups (see Riek et al. 2006 for a meta-analysis). Realistic group conflict theory (RCT; Sherif & Sherif, 1969) is one of the first theories to consider intergroup threat as a predictor for intergroup conflict (see also (Blumer, 1958). RCT focuses on the competition between groups concerning scarce resources. If a dominant ingroup feels that a subordinate outgroup increases its demands, the ingroup reacts with a devaluation of the outgroup in terms of negative attitudes. Stephan and Stephan (2000) incorporated several threats into their integrated threat theory (ITT). This theory considers realistic and symbolic threat and stereotypes to explain the emergence of prejudices (see also Stephan & Renfro, 2002). In ITT realistic threat is understood as any threat to the welfare of the group or its members (Stephan & Stephan, 2000, p. 25). This broader definition also covers the threat imposed by terrorism. Furthermore, Islamist terrorism increases the salience of differences between Western and Manuscript #1 29 Islamic cultures which produces symbolic threat. Additionally, Muslims suffer from the negative portrayal in mass media in Western countries, which leads to a socialization of negative stereotypes in the autochthonous majority (Jaspal & Cinnirella, 2010; Shaheen, 2003). In addition to the well-established link between threat and prejudice, we refer to the link between the attitude ‘prejudice’ and the behavior ‘discrimination’ (see Schütz & Six, 1996; Talaska et al., 2008, for meta-analyses; Dovidio et al., 1996). Pereira, Vala and Costa- Lopes (2010) find threat to mediate the link between prejudice and discrimination. They conclude that threat is a legitimation and justification to discriminate others (see also Pereira, Vala, & Leyens, 2009). In the same way, Wagner and Christ (2007) show that prejudice is an important determinant of readiness of violence and that this effect is mediated and moderated by anger and fear. Figure 2. Theoretical macro-micro model. Discr. Acts Isla mo- phobia Perceived Threa t Macro Level Micro Level Terrorist Event Mea n Perceived Threa t Mea n Isla mo- phobia Sum of Discr. Acts Ma ss Media Note. This model is not tested in this study. The focus lies on the outcome measures on the macro level (mean perceived threat, mean Islamophobia, and sum of discriminatory acts). In summary, as the backlash showed, the outgroup ‘Muslims’ became the scapegoats after 9/11 because of their similarity to the attackers. In Figure 2, we conceptualized a simplified heuristic model showing the assumed relations. On the macro level threat was Manuscript #1 30 spread via nonpareil broadcasting of the attacks. What followed was a situation of general insecurity. Prevailing psychological theorizing on micro level suggests that threat, prejudice and discrimination are intertwined, with threat being the cause and prejudice and discrimination the consequences. These assumed changes on individual level should cause a measurable effect on aggregate mean (macro) level (see Coleman, 1986, 1987 for a micro- macro theory and model). In the four studies of this paper, we listed the terrorist events of each country, analyzed the available, independent, aggregate level time series of terrorist threat, Islamophobia (prejudice) and discrimination, and checked whether the occurring patterns fit our heuristic model. However, a strict test of the model was not realizable with the available data. Study 1: United States The US faced several terrorist attacks before 9/11. For instance, in early 1993 a car bomb exploded in the underground garage of the WTC. Six people were killed that day. In April 1995, autochthonous terrorists destroyed the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma and left 168 people dead. However, the attacks of 9/11 were unprecedented in their magnitude. Our time series start in the year 2000. The events considered as threat-trigger are in chronological order: 9/11 (September 2001), the intrusion into Iraq (March 2003), the Madrid Bombings 11-M (March 2004), the London attacks 7/7 (July 2005) and the assassination of Osama Bin-Laden (May 2011). Referring to our heuristic model, we assume these events and their broadcasting to increase terrorist threat, anti-Muslim prejudice and violent discrimination of Muslims, at least temporarily. Manuscript #1 31 Table 1. Data Time Series US Dimension Data Source Time Span Used (Measurement Points) Kind of Data Applicable Analysis Threat: USA Today/ Gallup Personal Threat Apr. 2000 – Aug. 2011 (40) quantitative descriptive USA Today/ Gallup Collective Threat Sept. 2001 – Aug. 2011 (29) quantitative descriptive Islamophobia: Princeton Survey Research Associates (PSRA) Aug. 2000 – June 2003 (5) quantitative ANOVA The PEW Forum on Religion and Public Life (PEW) Mar. 2004 – Mar. 2011 (7) quantitative ANOVA Discriminatory Acts: Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Annual sum 1998-2011 (12) quantitative descriptive Data and Methods. Table 1 gives an overview about the data used to create the time series figures for the US. In some cases there is data available earlier conducted than the year 2000, which is not considered here for reasons of space. This is the case for terrorist threat monitoring, where Gallup and USA Today started to investigate concerns for terrorism in the population after the terrorist attacks on the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma in April 1995 (USA Today/Gallup Poll, 2011): “Now, thinking for a moment about terrorism, how worried are you that you or someone in your family will become a victim of terrorism - very worried, somewhat worried, not too worried, or not worried at all?” This question covers personal terrorist threat. The data includes also the aspect of collective terrorist threat which is the degree of agreement to the question “how likely is it that there will be acts of terrorism in the United States over the next several weeks - very likely, somewhat likely, not too likely, or not at all likely?” Sample sizes are N≈1000 each. For both questions Gallup provides the distributions of these four categories. Thus, we were able to calculate means. The scale ranged from 1 to 4 and was recoded to transform high threat perceptions into high scores. We correlated collective and personal threat time series to see whether they show the same developmental pattern. Only aggregate scores for polls conducted on approximately the Manuscript #1 32 same dates were considered for this analysis. This resulted in N=20 simultaneous measurement points that could be correlated over time. The time series correlate with r=.549, p<.01. We conclude personal and collective terrorist threat to be sufficiently equal on aggregate level over time. Thus, we refer in the results part to ‘threat’ only and do not differentiate between personal and collective threat (but see Asbrock & Fritsche, 2013; Huddy, Feldman, Capelos, & Provost, 2002, for studies differentiating personal and collective terrorist threat on individual level). Princeton Survey Research Associates (PSRA) provide data on the unfavorability of Muslim-Americans (see Panagopoulos, 2006). Their question wording is: “Is your overall opinion of Muslim Americans, very favorable, mostly favorable, unfavorable, or very unfavorable?” Five measurement points are available, starting in August 2000, thus providing a pre-9/11 measure. The last data point is in March 2003. The Ns range from 2799 to 1500 (average N = 2069). Data is weighed to be representative for the national adult population. Since the distributions of the data are available we were able to compute means and confidence intervals and apply variance analyses with Bonferroni post-hoc tests. The PEW Global Attitudes Project asks for the favorability of religious groups in several countries including the US (PEW Global Attitudes Project, 2004-2011; PEW Global Attitudes Project, 2008). For the US-American, adult population, cross-sectional probability samples were drawn starting in 2004 with an approximate N of 1000. Data was either representative for the 18+ adult population or weighed to be representative. The question wording was: “Please tell me if you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable or very unfavorable opinion of Muslims.” Raw data was provided on the PEW homepage (www.pewglobal.org/category/datasets) which enabled us to compute variance analyses with Bonferroni post-hoc tests. http://www.pewglobal.org/category/datasets Manuscript #1 33 Due to different question wording in the PSRA data (target group: Muslim Americans) and PEW data (target group: Muslims), the timelines are not comparable in terms of their absolute level. Hence, we test for mean differences within the PSRA times series and within PEW time series but do not compare the level of agreement between PSRA and PEW data. The “Hate Crime Statistics” of the FBI, which also records Anti-Islamic hate crimes (FBI, 1998-2011), provides a valuable database for discrimination occurrence. ‘Hate Crime’ is defined here as “criminal offense against a person or property motivated in whole or in part by an offender’s bias against a race, religion, disability, ethnic origin or sexual orientation.” (FBI, 2013) From this data we created a time series. A limiting factor is that only aggregate data per year is provided. Thus, no short-term fluctuations are observable. Further data is provided by NGOs: the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee (Ibish, 2003; Ibish, 2008) and the Human Rights Watch (2002). For all data throughout this paper, cross correlations between the independent time series of threat, prejudice and discrimination but also time series modeling (e.g., Box, Jenkins, & Reinsel, 2008) were inappropriate analysis methods because of different times of conduction and varying time lags. Results Threat. Figure 3 shows the time series of personal and collective threat as well as the unfavorability of Muslims and Muslim-Americans, respectively. The pre-post 9/11 comparison revealed a massive shift towards a threatening climate. Also, the intrusion into Iraq led to an increase in threat. No polls were available for the immediate phase after 11-M and the four months after. The increase in threat in response to 7/7 was also consistent with our model. Since then the measurement points have been scarce with the last peak in the direct aftermath of the assassination of Bin-Laden. 34 Figure 3. Time series of terrorist threat and Islamophobia in the US 1,70 1,90 2,10 2,30 2,50 2,70 2,90 3,10 3,30 Ja n u a ry A p ri l Ju ly O c to b e r Ja n u a ry A p ri l Ju ly O c to b e r Ja n u a ry A p ri l Ju ly O c to b e r Ja n u a ry A p ri l Ju ly O c to b e r Ja n u a ry A p ri l Ju ly O c to b e r Ja n u a ry A p ri l Ju ly O c to b e r Ja n u a ry A p ri l Ju ly O c to b e r Ja n u a ry A p ri l Ju ly O c to b e r Ja n u a ry A p ri l Ju ly O c to b e r Ja n u a ry A p ri l Ju ly O c to b e r Ja n u a ry A p ri l Ju ly O c to b e r Ja n u a ry A p ri l Ju ly O c to b e r 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 A g r e e m e n t USA Toda y/Ga llup: Collective Threa t USA Toda y/Ga llup: Persona l Threa t PSRA: Isla mophobia (Muslim America ns) PEW: Isla mophobia (Muslims) Iraq War 11-M Spain 7/7 UK 9/11 US Assassination of Bin-Laden Note. Data source: Gallup time series of terrorist threat and PSRA & PEW unfavorability of Muslims. Cross-sectional, adult population data. Gaps in threat data of more than one year are not connected with lines. Manuscript #1 35 Prejudice. We tested whether changes in prejudice were in line with the fluctuations in threat. Two PSRA pre-9/11 measures of unfavorability of Muslim Americans were available. Both were on a higher level than the first post-9/11 measure in November 2001. Thus, contrary to the development of threat, Islamophobia decreased in response to 9/11 (March-01 vs. November-01; p<.001). In February 2002, however, the score increased to the pre-9/11 level again (November-01 vs. February-02; p<.001). No fluctuation can be seen in response to the intrusion into Iraq (February-02 vs. March-03; p>.05) although threat was increased. The PEW data starting point in 2004 shows the highest level of unfavorability in that time series. Since 11-M is not covered in terms of threat monitoring, we had no assumption about the development of Islamophobia in the post 11-M measure 2005. We found prejudice decreased (February-04 vs. April-05; p<.001) followed by a small but insignificant increase in the year after 7/7 (April-05 vs. April-06; p>.05). After that point, prejudice remained mainly stable until 2011. Figure 4. Number of registered anti-Islamic hate crimes in the US 1998-2011 Note. Data source: FBI hate crime statistics (FBI, 1998-2011) Manuscript #1 36 Discrimination. The third variable in our model supposedly affected by the attacks is discrimination. We plotted the number of Anti-Islamic hate crimes and their standard deviation to Figure 4 in order to visualize deviations. Anti-Islamic hate crimes were isolated cases prior to 9/11. In 2001 a massive increase in anti-Islamic hate crimes occurred compared to 2000. Although we could not find the supposed increase in prejudice, a clear-cut increase in violent discrimination took place. More than five hundred cases were registered for 2001 in the FBI database. Human Rights Watch stated: "Over the past twenty years backlash hate crimes against Arabs and Muslims in the United States have become predictable, triggered by conflict in the Middle East and acts of terrorism associated with Arabs or Muslims. The hate crimes that followed the September 11 attacks nonetheless were unique in their severity and extent." (Human Rights Watch, 2002, p. 3) The American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee reported on more than 700 violent incidents targeting Arab Americans, Arabs, Muslims and those who were perceived to belong to these groups in the first nine weeks after 9/11. More than a hundred attacks against mosques and even four murders were registered; seven more murders of Muslims are suspected to be directly related to the attacks (Ibish, 2003). In 2002, the number of incidents decreased to a lower but still increased level, compared to the years prior. Interestingly, the score remained on that level without any substantial deviations. This is the reason why we do not discuss these minor deviations for the following terrorist events separately. We conclude that only 9/11 led to an increase in hate crimes. These results were emphasized by the fact that no report mentions a further violent backlash in the US in response to another terrorist event. Summary and Discussion. We theorized a model in which perceived terrorist threat, anti-Muslim prejudice and discrimination should increase in response to terror related events. We found perceived terrorist threat reaching its peak after 9/11. However, anti-Muslim Manuscript #1 37 prejudice did not follow the pattern of threat. Even an opposite effect as theorized was measured in response to 9/11. We believe the significant decrease in unfavorability to be a short- to mid-term consequence of President Bush’s speech on September 20, 2001 where he called for differentiation: "The enemy of America is not our many Muslim friends. It is not our many Arab friends. Our enemy is a radical network of terrorists and every government that supports them." (CNN, 2001). A PEW report reveals that after the speech, the strongest shift towards favorability was seen amongst conservative republicans (PEW Research Center, 2001). Whereas in March only 35% conservatives republicans had a favorable image of Muslim-Americans, in November 64% (+29%) positioned themselves that way. That Bush’s speech led to a short- to mid-term effect was further supported by the fact that aggregated unfavorability returned to a significantly higher level in February 2002. In terms of violent discrimination, 9/11 led to a massive backlash against Muslims and people who looked similar (Kaplan, 2006). The pattern of increased threat, decreased prejudice and increased discrimination does not fit our model. We refer to this pattern in our general discussion. The Iraq invasion had no impact on prejudice, although threat perceptions increased. Discrimination was not elevated in that year. This can be explained by the fact that the US was not directly threatened at that point but was attacking another country. Thus, the situation was not as emotional as the victim role after 9/11. The terrorist attacks on Spain did not affect Americans as much, either. Prejudice, measured with a large gap, shows a significant decrease in 2005, almost a year after 11-M. The fact that the poll institutions did not survey terrorist threat after 11-M is already an indication for the modest public interest in the happenings in Spain. Accordingly, no increase in discrimination was registered. Since the link between the US and UK is stronger than between the US and Spain, the 7/7 consequences were polled and revealed a local peak in threat. The pre-post 7/7 measure of prejudice showed indeed a modest increase, which however, reached no significance. Manuscript #1 38 Furthermore, the FBI hate crime statistics showed a level of anti-Muslim crime below the average. Thus, again no violent backlash was observed. Study 2: Spain Spain was the first European country subjected to a massive Islamist terrorist attack. One has to consider, however, the existence of an active separatist terror organization in Spain (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) = Basque Fatherland and Liberty). Consequently, terrorist threat cannot always be allocated to Islamist terror. In March 2003, the ‘Coalition of the Willing’, including Spain, marched into Iraq. In fall 2010, a terror warning for central Europe, mainly France, the UK and Germany was issued by officials (Der Spiegel, 2010; Tisdall, 2010). Since terror warnings have not been as common as in the US, we assume the warning to have triggered perceived terrorist threat. Further expected threat triggers were 9/11 (Sept. 2001), 11-M (Mar. 2004), 7/7 (July 2005) and the assassination of Bin-Laden (May 2011). Table 2. Data Time Series Spain Dimension Data Source Time Span Used (Measurement Points) Kind of Data Applicable Analysis Threat: Eurobarometer Threat Old Nov. 2000 – Apr. 2003 (5) quantitative descriptive Eurobarometer Threat New Apr. 2003 – Nov. 2012 (20) quantitative descriptive Islamophobia: Echabarria-Echabe & Fernández-Guede 2006 Feb. 2004 – Mar. 2004 (2) quantitative narrative The PEW Forum on Religion and Public Life (PEW) May. 2005 – Mar. 2011 (6) quantitative ANOVA Discriminatory Acts: European Monitoring Center on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC) Sept. 2001 – Dec. 2001 July 2005 – Sept. 2005 qualitative narrative Manuscript #1 39 Data. Since 1973, the European Commission has ordered public opinion reports. The so called Eurobarometer is conducted two times per year (European Commission, 1995-2012) and consists of approximately one thousand face-to-face interviews with a representative 15+ aged sample of each country of the EU. Among standard questions, there is also space for situation specific questions like current fears and problems. Two time series were created from Eurobarometer Interactive Search System data (European Commission, 2013): first, data about Europeans’ fear of terrorism, spread of weapons of mass destruction, a world war, a nuclear or conventional conflict in Europe (see Figure 1 for EU level results), reaching from 2000 to 2003 (labeled ‘threat old’), thus covering 9/11; second, the well-known Gallup question “what is the most important problem facing the nation” with the possible answer ‘terrorism’ (labeled ‘threat new’). The data concerning this question is available from 2003 until 2012 and hence covers 11-M and 7/7. Both aspects serve as proxies for terrorist threat. The Eurobarometer no. 61 provides particularly important data because the time of data conduction includes 11-M. However, only 73 respondents were surveyed after the attack (vs. 927 before). We nevertheless provide results for both groups (pre & post) because they do not differ systematically in terms of socio demographics which means that also the post-sample is representative (Perrin & Smolek, 2009). Generally, we had to transform Eurobarometer data linearly to fit it to our 1 to 4 scale. Threat ‘new’ and ‘old’ are not comparable in terms of mean level. As for the US (Study 1), Islamophobia is covered by PEW data that measures the unfavorability of Muslims (PEW Global Attitudes Project, 2004-2011; PEW Global Attitudes Project, 2008). They only deviate from the US data in terms of smaller sample sizes. Number of observations range from 750 to 1000 (average N = 831; for further information and question wording see the PEW data description in Study 1). Monitoring of unfavorability of Muslims started in Spain in 2005, the year after 11-M. Thus, no pre-post attack comparisons Manuscript #1 40 can be made for Spain with PEW data. However, Echebarria-Echabe and Fernández-Guede (2006) provide a pre-post 11-M design with Islamophobia as a dependent variable. The European Monitoring Centre for Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC; since 2007 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights; FRA) recognized the seriousness of the 9/11 attacks in terms of consequences for Muslims in Europe. Therefore, it ordered reports from its Racism and Xenophobia Network (RAXEN), mainly built upon nongovernmental organizations (Allen & Nielsen, 2002; EUMC, 2001). A similar study is available for the impact of the 7/7 attacks on Muslim communities (EUMC, 2005). Due to different definitions of hate crimes in the EU member states and a resistance to collect data about religious identity is gathering official racist or hate crime data a difficult undertaking in the EU (see e.g., EUMC, 2006). Existing data is not specific for religion, except for anti-Semitic incidents (FRA - European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2012) and some time series are not reliable due to changes in data collection. Only qualitative data is provided by several NGOs applying their own standards on discrimination and hate crimes (e.g., Human Rights Watch, 2005). As a consequence of the different definitions of hate crime and the unsystematic data collection in the EU countries, no national hate crime or discrimination time series could be generated. Manuscript #1 41 Results Figure 5. Time series of terrorist threat and Islamophobia in Spain Note. Data source: Eurobarometer threat measures and PEW unfavorability of Muslims measures. Cross-sectional, adult population data. Threat. Figure 5 shows the time series of old and new terrorist threat and of unfavorability of Muslims. Congruent with our hypothesis, an increase in threat was observed after 9/11. This increase does not seem to be a short-term effect since the score remained on a higher level until the last measurement point of ‘old threat’ in April 2003. The intrusion into Iraq led to no change in threat. In consequence of 11-M, threat peaked but was decreased again in October 2004. Since then, the scores have been on a lower level, unaffected by 7/7. Apart from an increase in May 2007, the threat level decreased until 2010. No effect in response to the EU terror-warning was measured while there was a small increase after the assassination of Bin-Laden. Manuscript #1 42 Prejudice. No systematic Islamophobia monitoring can be found in Spain before 2005, thus we could not test for the impact of 9/11 and the intrusion into Iraq. This was also the case for the attack on Spain, 11-M. However, Echebarria-Echabe and Fernández-Guede (2007) coincidentally tested a new Islamophobia scale shortly before the attacks. By replicating the sample after 11-M, they created a natural quasi-experiment and showed a significantly increased score for Islamophobia post 11-M (Echebarria-Echabe & Fernández- Guede, 2006). Representative PEW measures did not start until 2005. We expected to find an increased level in the post 11-M year, followed by a declining trend, especially because this was the developmental pattern of threat. In contrast to this expectation, the value peaked in 2006 (April-05 vs. April-06; p < .001). A declining trend started afterwards, discontinued by a negligible increase in 2011 after the EU terror warning (April-10 vs. March-11; p > .05). Discrimination. Due to the lack of systematic data, only qualitative results gathered from reports can be presented here. The EUMC Summary Report on Islamophobia in the EU after 11 September 2001 (Allen & Nielsen, 2002) reveals an increase in prejudice and discrimination, mostly lacking concrete numbers. Allen and Nielsen (2002) reported attacks on mosques, Muslims and even one murder, whereas a direct link to 9/11 is unclear. Thus, the impact of 9/11, in terms of discrimination of Muslims in Spain, remains vague. Since threat and prejudice (Echebarria-Echabe & Fernández-Guede, 2006) increased after 11-M, we expected to find an anti-Muslim backlash. In fact, a EUMC report (2006, pp. 71–72) reveals several violent acts on persons and property (but see Human Rights Watch, 2005). The magnitude of the backlash, however, was not comparable to that of 9/11 in the US. Several minor attacks took place, but serious crimes, mostly committed by Neo-Nazis, were also registered. Whereas threat decreased and prejudice increased after 7/7, no hints of anti- Muslim backlash can be found. Manuscript #1 43 Summary and Discussion. We applied our heuristic model to Spain, facing not only the first Islamist terror attack on European ground but also the danger of an autochthonous terror organization. In terms of terrorist threat, we find an increase after 9/11, as expected. In concordance with our model qualitative reports indicate increases in prejudice and discrimination against Muslims. In contrast to the immediate backlash in the US, the reported increases in prejudice and discrimination in Spain were registered with some delay. The first EUMC report (2001), covering the period from September 11 to late November 2001, shows no anti-Islamic reactions. The summary report of May 2002, however, states an increase in prejudice and discrimination (Allen & Nielsen, 2002). Even one murder is believed to be a backlash hate crime of 9/11. Threat peaked after 11-M. In terms of prejudice, we have to rely on the finding of Echebarria-Echabe and Fernández-Guede (2006) who report not only an increase in Islamophobia but also in anti-Semitism and general authoritarian tendencies. This suggests a general devaluation of outgroups in response to the attacks. However, their small and unrepresentative sample renders a limiting factor. Spain remained unaffected by 7/7 in terms of threat. However, a contrary development for prejudice was observed. The first measure after 7/7, in April 2006, reveals a significantly increased level of Islamophobia (April-05 vs. April-06; p < .001). An increase in hate crimes could not be found in this context. Study 3: United Kingdom The UK, United States’ closest ally in the war against terror became the third target of a major Islamist terror attack in July 2005 (7/7). Furthermore, the UK faced another serious terror attempt in August 2006, when Islamist terrorists tried to smuggle explosives into ten Manuscript #1 44 planes in London. The Police was able to avert this plan and arrest the terrorists (BBC News, 2006). Nevertheless, we assume this foiled attack induced threat in the still traumatized country. Chronologically, we suppose 9/11 (Sept. 2001), the intrusion into Iraq (March 2003), 11-M (March 2004), 7/7 (July 2005), the Airline terror plot (Aug. 2006), the EU terror warning (Oct. 2010) and the assassination of Bin-Laden (May 2011) to have triggered perceived threat and subsequently anti-Muslim prejudice and discrimination in the UK. Table 3. Data Time Series UK Dimension Data Source Time Span Used (Measurement Points) Kind of Data Applicable Analysis Threat: Eurobarometer Threat Old Nov. 2000 – Apr. 2003 (5) quantitative descriptive Eurobarometer Threat New Apr. 2003 – Nov. 2012 (20) quantitative descriptive Islamophobia: The PEW Forum on Religion and Public Life (PEW) Mar. 2004 – Mar. 2011 (7) quantitative ANOVA Discriminatory Acts: European Monitoring Center on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC) Sept. 2001 – Dec. 2001 July 2005 – Sept. 2005 qualitative narrative London Metropolitan Police (MET) Jun. 2005 – Sept. 2005 (13) quantitative descriptive Data. For the UK, mainly the same database was used as for Spain. Threat old and new was extracted from Eurobarometer data. The main difference to Spanish threat data from Eurobarometer is, that no pre-post comparison of 11-M is possible with the UK data because the post sample differs in terms of sociodemographics from the pre-sample, meaning that the post-sample is not representative. Anti-Muslim prejudice data was derived from PEW data (see chapter Data in Study 2 for question wording and further information). The number of cases in PEW surveys ranged Manuscript #1 45 from 500 to 1000 (average N = 773; see Chapter Data in Study 1 for question wording and further information). Since no national anti-Muslim hate crime statistic is available, we make our case here with (faith) hate crime data provided by London Metropolitan Police (EUMC, 2005). Their definition of hate crime and faith crime is as follows: “Hate crime incidents are crime reports that have been flagged as faith, race, anti-Semitic, anti-Islamic and homophobic crimes. Faith crimes are a count of crime reports flagged specifically as faith hate.” (EUMC, 2005, p. 13) This data shows results only for the larger London area. We used data from end of June 2005 up to end of September 2005 to show the immediate dynamics after 7/7. Since the faith hate crime data is not specific for religion no time series for Islamophobic faith crimes can be extracted. Results Figure 6. Time series of terrorist threat and Islamophobia in the UK Note. Data source: Eurobarometer threat measures and PEW unfavorability of Muslims measures. Cross-sectional, adult population data. Manuscript #1 46 Threat. We found 9/11 leading to a peak in perceived threat. The intrusion into Iraq, however, resulted in no increase. Threat new did not cover the immediate 11-M dynamics. However, the first measure after the attack in October 2004 reveals a slightly increased score. The attack on the UK led to another peak measured in October 2005, followed by a phase of relaxation. The above mentioned airline terror plot increased threat perceptions again. Since then, threat has been decreasing, which was only interrupted by the EU terror warning and the assassination of Bin-Laden. Thus, we find almost all our expectations concerning threat confirmed. Prejudice. No systematic Islamophobia monitoring for the UK was found concerning a period before 2004. Thus, a description of the immediate 9/11 dynamics was not available. For 11-M, pre and post data was available, which showed a small decrease (February-04 vs. April-05; p>.05) instead of the expected increase in the post measure. The next pre-post consideration, with 7/7 as trigger showed a significant increase (April-05 vs. April-06; p<.05). Since then only minor fluctuations below the threshold of significance occurred. The level, however, remained constantly increased compared to 2005. Discrimination. For the UK, there is no hate crime statistic for the whole time span that includes data for specific religious target groups. Referring to the post 9/11 EUMC report (EUMC, 2001), the British media reported an increased number of attacks against Muslims in the aftermath of 9/11 without presenting concrete numbers. The incidents comprehended violence against persons and property including firebomb and arson attacks against mosques, violent assault, spat on and verbal abuse, mainly targeting on easily identifiable Muslims – women who wore the hijab. Manuscript #1 47 Figure 7. Number of hate crimes and faith hate crimes in the London area before and after 7/7 Note. Data source: EUMC report (2005) on the impact of 7/7 on Muslim communities in the EU. Period June-September 2005. Anti-Muslim discrimination in consequence of 11-M has not been documented for the UK. However, there was a sharp increase of hate crimes in London following 7/7, similar to the 9/11 backlash (EUMC, 2005). Figure 7 shows the increase in (faith) hate crimes. Fifteen faith hate crimes were registered in the week prior to 7/7, 68 in the week of the happenings followed by 92 in the week after. The same development can be seen for general hate crimes where a peak of more than five hundred incidents was registered in the week after the attacks. It took about six weeks until the number of incidents fell back to a pre-7/7 level. The time series of faith hate crimes and hate crimes in Figure 7 correlate with r=.877, p<.001. Not only for the London area but also for other parts of the country, NGOs reported an increased hostility against Muslims and those appearing as such (e.g., Sikh people; Allen, 2004; EUMC, 2005). Summary and Discussion. We applied our heuristic model to the closest ally of the US in the war against terror, the UK. The 9/11 attacks also led to an expected peak in threat in Manuscript #1 48 the UK. No statement based on quantitative Islamophobia and discrimination monitoring could be made concerning 9/11 but sufficient evidence for a backlash was gathered by the EUMC (Allen & Nielsen, 2002). Muslims, especially women wearing the hijab, became victim to assault and verbal abuse. Arson attacks against mosques were registered as well. No appropriate data was available to describe the situation of threat in the UK after 11- M. No consequences in prejudice were measured after 11-M. Data concerning discriminatory acts are not available and there were no hints for a violent backlash at all. The attack on the UK itself, however, initiated a full confirmation of our model. Not only threat but also prejudice and discriminatory acts increased substantially in the post-7/7 measures. Interestingly, faith hate crimes and general hate crimes correlate almost perfectly (r=.877, p<.001) in the time series covered in Figure 7. Thus, not only hate crimes against Muslims but also against other outgroups increased dramatically in this period. The airline terror plot, as well as the EU terror warning and the assassination of Bin- Laden led to an increased threat level but no consequences in prejudice and discrimination were registered. The threat, prejudice, discrimination connection seems to be subject to marginal conditions in these complex real world scenarios. We enlarge on these conditions, which facilitate the occurrence of a violent backlash, in our general discussion. Study 4: Germany Germany is the only researched country in this paper that has not yet been target of a major terrorist attack. However, also Germany faced two incidences that showed its vulnerability to terrorism. On July 31 in 2006, two men of Middle Eastern origin attempted an attack on trains in Cologne, one of Germany’s largest cities. They deposited suitcases containing bombs, which failed to detonate. The second incident happened in September Manuscript #1 49 2007, when a whole terror-cell was arrested while planning attacks and building bombs (Kulish, 2009). In addition, for Germany we assume the major events 9/11 (September 2001), 11-M (March 2004), 7/7 (July 2005), the EU terror warning (October 2010) and the assassination of Bin-Laden (May 2011) to have triggered threat. Table 4. Data Time Series Germany Dimension Data Source Time Span Used (Measurement Points) Kind of Data Applicable Analysis Threat: Eurobarometer Threat Old Nov. 2000 – Apr. 2003 (5) quantitative descriptive Eurobarometer Threat New Apr. 2003 – Nov. 2012 (20) quantitative descriptive Politbarometer Most Important Problem - Terrorism Jan. 2001 – Dec. 2010 (120; monthly averages) quantitative descriptive Politbarometer Sept. 2001 – Nov. 2010 (18) quantitative descriptive Allensbach Dec. 2001 – Sept. 2009 (12) quantitative descriptive R+V Insurance July 2001 – July 2012 (13) quantitative descriptive Islamophobia: Group Focused Enmity (GFE) Apr. 2003 – June 2011 quantitative latent means The PEW Forum on Religion and Public Life (PEW) Mar. 2004 – Mar. 2011 (7) quantitative ANOVA Discriminatory Acts: European Monitoring Center on Racism and Xenophobia(EUMC) Sept. 2001 – Dec. 2001 July 2005 – Sept. 2005 qualitative narrative Data and Methods. As table 4 shows, a larger database was available for Germany compared to the former countries. Beyond more aggregate level data, also individual data was accessible. Like for Spain and the UK, threat was extracted from Eurobarometer data (see chapter Data in Study 2 for question wording and further information) but also from additional data sources described below. As it was the case for the UK, no pre-post data conducted shortly before 11-M was available in the Eurobarometer. Manuscript #1 50 Anti-Muslim prejudice was measured, like in the other focus countries, by PEW data (see chapter Data in Study 1 for question wording and further information). The number of cases in PEW surveys ranged from 500 to 1001 (average N=772). Furthermore another data source for Islamophobia was available, which is described below. No national anti-Muslim hate crime statistic exists. Therefore, we had to rely on qualitative NGO reports again (Allen & Nielsen, 2002; EUMC, 2005). The additional time series of threat was created from data by the institute for public opinion research Allensbach (Institut für Demoskopie Allensbach, 2001a; 2001b; 2004; 2006; Köcher, 2009), the Forschungsgruppe Wahlen/ZDF Politbarometer (Forschungsgruppe Wahlen, 2000-2010; data provided by GESIS Central Archive Cologne) and the "Fears of Germans Survey" by the R+V Insurance (Roemstedt, 2011, 2012). With the exception of the R+V insurance survey, the data was produced for newspapers and television news, and is in most cases available as aggregated percent values only. The R+V insurance has a time series of annual repeated cross-sections, which was conducted face-to-face with representative samples of 14+ aged Germans with N≈2500 respondents. Respondents rated several items on a 7-point Likert scale. The item wording was: “Please tell me how threatening the following scenarios are for you personally.” The terror item is: “...that terrorist unions commit attacks.” The scores 5, 6 and 7 are interpreted as "high threat". The surveys were always conducted from mid-June to mid-July and not in response to events. The only exception was an additional survey in 2005, conducted because of 7/7. In Figure 8, for reasons of feasibility we placed the scores of the annual survey to June 2005 (instead of July) and the post 7/7 poll to July 2005. ZDF Politbarometer also provides representative samples of the adult German population which are conducted via computer assisted telephone interviews (CATI). The samples consist mostly of N≈1000 respondents or more seldom of N≈500 respondents. Item Manuscript #1 51 wording examples are “Do you worry about similar terrorist attacks to occur in Germany as seen in the US?“ or „During the previous week, terror attacks occurred in Madrid. Do you worry that there will be terrorist attacks in Germany in the near future?“. Allensbach data consists of representative samples (N ≥ 2000) of the 16+ adult population. Question wording was “Are you afraid of terrorist attacks to occur in Germany in the near future?”. The additional Islamophobia time series was created out of adult population data from the project “Group Focused Enmity in Germany” (GFE; Zick et al., 2008). The measure for anti-Muslim sentiments is based on two items of the annual cross-sections from 2003 to 2011. Each cross-section builds upon approximately 2000 respondents (average N = 1953). The first item is “with so many Muslims in Germany, one feels increasingly like a stranger in one’s own country”, the second one reads “immigration to Germany should be forbidden for Muslims.” To ensure the invariance of this measure over time, multiple group confirmatory factor analyses were conducted (see e.g., Brown, 2006, pp. 266–304) via the Software Mplus 6 (Muthén & Muthén, 2012). The robust maximum-likelihood-estimation was used to correct for any deviations from normality in the data. Missing values are considered via Full- Information-Likelihood-Estimation (FIML; Arbuckle, 1996). Partial scalar invariance was reached, resulting in a good model fit (χ²=8.554, df=8, p=.381, CFI=1.00, RMSEA=.006, SRMR=.014). Thus, the factor structure, factor loadings and intercepts are sufficiently equal in order to compare latent means over time (Byrne, Shavelson, & Muthén, 1989). One specialty when comparing latent means over time is that the mean of t1 is set to zero as a reference point. To transform the data back to the original scale (1 to 4), we added the manifest level of Islamophobia t1 to all measurement points. This transformation is practicable since comparisons are only made within the time series and not between them. 52 Figure 8. Time series of terrorist threat in Germany 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% N o v e m b e r F e b ru a ry M a y A u g u st N o v e m b e r F e b ru a ry M a y A u g u st N o v e m b e r F e b ru a ry M a y A u g u st N o v e m b e r F e b ru a ry M a y A u g u st N o v e m b e r F e b ru a ry M a y A u g u st N o v e m b e r F e b ru a ry M a y A u g u st N o v e m b e r F e b ru a ry M a y A u g u st N o v e m b e r F e b ru a ry M a y A u g u st N o v e m b e r F e b ru a ry M a y A u g u st N o v e m b e r F e b ru a ry M a y A u g u st N o v e m b e r F e b ru a ry M a y A u g u st N o v e m b e r F e b ru a ry M a y A u g u st N o v e m b e r 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 A g r e e m e n t Euroba rometer: Terrorist Threa t Old Politba rometer: Terrorist Threa t R+V Insura nce: Terrorist Threa t Allensba ch: Terrorist Threa t Politba rometer: Most importa nt Problem - Terrorism Euroba rometer: Terrorist Threa t New 9/11 11-M 7/7 Cologne Bomb Plot Sauerland Terror Cell EU Terror Warning Assass. Bin- Laden Note. Cross-sectional, adult population data. Gaps of more than one year are not connected. 53 Results Threat. Figure 8 shows an increase in all available threat measures in response to 9/11. Almost 40% of Politbarometer respondents believed terrorism to be the most important issue facing the country in October 2001 and more than 65% expected terrorist attacks to occur in Germany, too. Except for the annual R+V survey which showed an increasing trend until 2003, the threat level measured by other institutes subsided in the months after the attacks. The Madrid Bombings, 11-M, led to a clear-cut increase in threat perceptions in Allensbach data. The Politbarometer most important issue-question reveals a local peak. No increase at all was seen in the Politbarometer terrorist threat measure. Again, somewhat differing results are found for 7/7. Whereas R+V and Allensbach data revealed an increase, only negligible change happened in Euro- and Politbarometer data. The first terror bomb plot to Germany itself, in Cologne, led to an increase in all threat measures. Once again, Euro- and Politbarometer indicated an increase when the Sauerland terror cell was arrested while planning attacks and building bombs. Since then, Politbarometer and Allensbach did not gather data about terrorist threat on a regular basis. Eurobarometer data showed a sharp increase in threat in response to the EU terror warning and a slightly delayed decrease in the relaxation phase due to Bin-Laden’s assassination. Thus, although not every measure detected every event, all events induced increased measurable threat perceptions in one or more of the available time series. Manuscript #1 54 Figure 9. Time series of Islamophobia in Germany 1,70 1,90 2,10 2,30 2,50 2,70 2,90 A p ri l- 0 3 N o v e m b e r- 0 3 F e b ru a ry -0 4 M a rc h -0 4 A p ri l- 0 4 O c to b e r- 0 4 A p ri l- 0 5 Ju n e -0 5 O c to b e r- 0 5 A p ri l- 0 6 M a y -0 6 S e p te m b e r- 0 6 M a y -0 7 Ju n e -0 7 O c to b e r- 0 7 M a rc h -0 8 A p ri l- 0 8 Ju n e -0 8 O c to b e r- 0 8 M a y -0 9 Ju n e -0 9 N o v e m b e r- 0 9 A p ri l- 1 0 Ju n e -1 0 N o v e m b e r- 1 0 M a rc h -1 1 M a y -1 1 Ju n e -1 1 A g re e m e n t PEW: Unfa vora bility of Muslims GFE: Isla mophobia 11-M 7/7 Cologne Bomb Plot Sauerland Terror Cell EU Terror Warning Assass. Bin- Laden Note. Data source: PEW unfavorability of Muslims measures and GFE Islamophobia measures. Cross-sectional, adult population data. Prejudice. Given that Islamophobia monitoring started in Germany in 2003 (GFE) and 2004 (PEW), respectively, no data covers 9/11. There was only one poll in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 that asked for the direct connection of terrorism to Muslims, which showed that 19% of the respondents reported to be more skeptical against Muslims since the attacks (Der Spiegel, 2001). Pre-Post 11-M comparisons revealed no significant increase in prejudice (GFE: April- 03 vs. April-04; p>.05; PEW: February-04 vs. April-05; p>.05). A significant increase, however, was documented in PEW data post-7/7 (April-05 vs. April-06; p<.05). The same trend was seen in GFE data but without reaching significance (June-05 vs. May-06; p>.05). Since then, in both time series a slightly decreasing trend was observed until 2009. In 2010 Manuscript #1 55 the values increased again but independently from the events considered. The last possible pre-post comparisons included the EU terror warning (GFE, PEW) and the assassination of Bin-Laden (GFE). In PEW data almost no movement was observed in that time span (April- 10 vs. March-11; p>.05). Again, no increase but even a decrease of prejudice was measured in GFE data (June-10 vs. June-11; p<.001). Discrimination. Low levels of physical assault were reported for Germany after 9/11 (EUMC, 2001). Nevertheless, verbal insults and even attacks like spitting on Muslims and tearing down the hijab occurred but no statistics were available for these mistreatments. Allen and Nielsen (2002) identified Muslim women and children to be the most prevalent targets. After 11-M and 7/7 no incidents of backlash in Germany were registered (EUMC, 2005). The only crime in Germany associating discrimination with terrorism was a murder in Dresden in 2009, where Marwa El Sherbini was stabbed to death in a courtroom (Martinez, 2009). Out of hatred against Muslims, a man killed this Muslim woman and called her “a terrorist”. In 2011, a case of three right-wing terrorists gained attention; they had murdered ten people since 2000, nine of which had immigrant background (Pidd, 2011). The murders never occurred in direct response to Islamist terror attacks and their motive was considered to be xenophobia and not revenge for Islamist terror. Summary and Discussion. We applied our heuristic model to Germany, which faced no attack yet but was shown to be vulnerable to terrorism as well. We find only partial confirmation for our model. A clear-cut peak in threat was measured in response to 9/11 but the supposed increase in Islamophobia cannot be confirmed since no data was available. Only hints but no statistics were available for an increase in discriminatory acts against Muslims. These cases comprehended no major assaults. 11-M led in most of our measures to an increase in threat but not in prejudice and discrimination. Not only increased threat but also a significant increase in prejudice was measured in response to 7/7. Significance, however, was Manuscript #1 56 reached only in one of our two Islamophobia data sets (PEW). Nevertheless, the other data set (GFE) showed the same pattern. Indications for a backlash after 7/7 were not registered. The cologne bomb plot and the arrest of the Sauerland terror cell left people threatened but did not induce a backlash in terms of anti-Muslim prejudice and discrimination. The same was true for the EU terror warning and Bin-Laden’s death. The fact that Germany was only indirectly affected by major terrorist attacks and that attempted terror attacks on Germany were unsuccessful or foiled, probably inhibited an escalation in prejudice and discrimination. Summary Table Table 5 documents the results of our poll review. In classified order, the reactions in threat, Islamophobia and discrimination are presented for each country. Threat is the most volatile of the three. Islamophobia and discrimination measures were influenced by major terrorist attacks only, not by minor events. 57 Table 5. Summary of Results Event: 9/11 Intrusion in Iraq 11-M 7/7 Cologne Bomb Plot London Airline Terror Plot Sauer- land Terror Cell Arrested EU Terror Warning Assass- ination of Bin- Laden Year: 2001 2003 2004 2005 2006 2006 2007 2010 2011 US Threat + + / + + Islamophobia - 0 0 0 / Discriminatory Acts + 0 0 0 0 Spain Threat + 0 + - 0 + Islamophobia / / nat-exp + + 0 / Discriminatory Acts qual. (+) / qual. (+) / / / UK Threat + 0 + + + + + Islamophobia / / 0 + 0 0 / Discriminatory Acts qual. + / / + / / / Germany Threat + + + + + + 0 Islamophobia / 0 + 0 0 0 - Discriminatory Acts qual. (+) 0 0 / / / / Note. + = increase, (+) = minor increase, - = decrease, 0 = unaffected, / = not measured, nat-exp. = pre-post natural experiment, qual. = qualitative report, empty cell = not relevant for that country. Manuscript #1 58 General Discussion In this paper we tried to explain the massive violent backlash against Muslims in the US after 9/11 from a social psychological perspective. We created a model based on media research (Nacos et al., 2007) and integrated threat theory (Stephan & Renfro, 2002; Stephan & Stephan, 2000). The full heuristic model (Figure 2) implies that, on the micro level, Islamophobia and discriminatory acts against Muslims were the consequence of perceived terrorist threat. Threat itself, on the micro level, is the product of a threatening climate induced by major terrorist attacks and their media broadcasting on the macro level. Since 9/11 led to a shift towards perceived terrorist threat in Europe as well, we applied the model to a cross-country poll-review focusing on the US, Spain, the UK and Germany. For all countries we considered the major terrorist attacks 9/11, 11-M and 7/7. In addition, we looked at country specific terror related events. One general finding is that prejudice and discrimination increase in response to threat only if an event reaches the magnitude of a major terrorist attack. Therefore, we discuss our model only for the major terrorist events 9/11, 11-M and 7/7. Our expectation that the unprecedented increase in discriminatory acts in the US after 9/11 was a product of increased prejudice mean level cannot be confirmed with our data. However, the measurement of prejudice in the aftermath of 9/11 was obviously influenced by President Bush’s call for differentiation. Other researchers find in their pre-post 9/11 studies hints of a shift towards authoritarian tendencies in the aftermath phase (Nagoshi, Terrell, & Nagoshi, 2007; Nail & McGregor, 2009). Unfortunately, none of these pre-post 9/11 studies included Islamophobia as a dependent variable. Nevertheless, the authoritarian tendencies they found commonly appear together with increased devaluation of outgroups (e.g., Altemeyer, 1998; Duckitt, 2001). Further indications for increased prejudice are found in Panagopoulos’ (2006) poll review. He shows indications for increased subtle prejudice Manuscript #1 59 against Muslims in general and Arabs in particular. This subtle prejudice manifested itself in substantial agreement to questions containing the demand to treat Muslims differently and to put them under special surveillance. As expected, we find massive spillover effects of 9/11 in terms of threat on Spain, the UK and Germany. The reason for the worldwide impact of 9/11 is that no media templates existed for such a happening (Hoskins, 2006). Media templates are attempts to classify the current incident in context of previous events. Neither the media nor the citizens had means of comparison for 9/11, rescaling their experience of evilness. Thus, 9/11 created a benchmark of terrorist threat. Unfortunately, no systematic measurement of Islamophobia is available for that time in our European focus countries. Nevertheless, some studies give at least hints for an increase in prejudicial tendencies. For instance, Echebarria-Echabe and Fernández-Guede (2007) developed their new Islamophobia scale in response to increased prejudice against Muslims after 9/11. However, they do not provide evidence for the claim that Islamophobia was increased in general since 9/11. In the UK, the same increase in Islamophobia is claimed but again no systematic measurement is available (Allen, 2004; Poynting & Mason, 2007). For Germany, some pre-post 9/11 data sets were analyzed by Brosig & Brähler (2002) that find social distance against Muslims but also against Jews to be increased. An analysis of the German Socio-Economic Panel 2001 reveals an increase in negativity towards immigration and a decrease in concerns over xenophobic hostility in German society (Schüller, 2012). According to Smith and colleagues (2001), the primary reaction to the 9/11 attacks was anger in 73% of the respondents in New York and 65% of the respondents across the United States (see also Back, Kufner, & Egloff, 2010). Since most of the hate crimes against Muslims, especially the severe ones, were committed in the very days after 9/11, it seems plausible that the backlash was a product of immediate arousal. Furthermore, Ibish (2003) reports that bigots may have seen their chance to abuse the state of emergency in order to Manuscript #1 60 scapegoat Muslims. This hints at a legitimating role of threat in the prejudice discrimination relation as suggested by Pereira et al. (2010) and Wagner & Christ 2007; see also Dasgupta, DeSteno, Williams, & Hunsinger, 2009). Thus, it is not clear whether terrorist threat produced prejudice which in turn led to discrimination or whether prejudiced individuals used threat as legitimation to express their sentiments and aggression. Morgan and colleagues (2011) conclude that punishing supposed ethnic ingroup members of the attackers is a form of displaced aggression (for a review, see Marcus- Newhall, Pedersen, Carlson, & Miller, 2000) where the need to punish proxies is especially high when the original attacker (Osama Bin-Laden) went unpunished (see also Goldberg, Lerner, & Tetlock, 1999). Interestingly, violent anti-Muslim backlash after 9/11 was reported across all focus countries. These hate crimes reached an alarming level in terms of severity, especially in the UK. Our model proves to be true for 11-M in Spain. Threat increased when prejudice and discrimination increased as well, although the violent backlash was minor. For 7/7 in the UK, we find our full model supported. Since the backlashes vary enormously in their extent, the question occurs which marginal conditions on country level facilitate or impede such a rebound effect? First of all, the probability of a backlash is, of course, higher in the country where the attack occurred. Second, the main media stereotype of ‘a Muslim’ is relevant. Whereas in the US and the UK the stereotype of a Muslim is characterized by fanaticism and terrorism, the stereotype of Muslims in Spain and Germany is mainly that of a labor immigrant (Jaspal & Cinnirella, 2010; Poole & Richardson, 2006; Shaheen, 1997, 2003). Connected to this, the third aspect is the similarity of a country’s Muslim population to the main media stereotype. We believe that if Muslims are visible as such and stereotyped as ‘terrorists’, the probability of scapegoating increases. Sheridan and Gillett (2005) find in a UK post 9/11 foreigner sample that 68% of Muslims who became hate crime victims describe Manuscript #1 61 themselves as visible members of their religious groups. Their self-descriptive degree of visibility was significantly higher than that of Jews and Hindus. Visibility is often connected to specific symbols. In a shooter bias paradigm, Unkelbach and colleagues could show a higher frequency of gunfires against a man wearing a turban compared to the same man without a turban (Unkelbach, Forgas, & Denson, 2008). In line with this finding is that Muslim women who wore the hijab were the most common victim to hate crimes in Europe after 9/11 (Allen & Nielsen, 2002). In the US and the UK, Sikh men became repeatedly hate crime victims since their traditional costume is somewhat similar to Arab men’s traditional dress (Kaplan, 2006). The fourth important aspect is the elite reaction to attacks. An immediate call for differentiation by leading politicians and clerics can inhibit or at least limit the strength of backlash. In the US, this call for differentiation was announced ten days after the attacks. Since most of the severe attacks against Muslims and Mosques happened in the very days after 9/11, we assume an earlier intervention by President Bush could have relaxed the situation (see also Kaplan, 2006). However, even though the elite reaction in the UK was exemplary and harsh punishment for backlash crimes was announced (EUMC, 2005), violence against Muslims after 7/7 could not be prevented. This can be explained by the massive Islamophobic tension in the UK that lately surfaced again, after two Muslims committed manslaughter to a British soldier in London (Obeidallah, 2013). When we write about the numbers of hate crimes one has to consider that hate crimes in police reports are only the tip of the iceberg. A representative poll among Muslims in the greater London area revealed that only 11% of racist attacks in the aftermath of 7/7 have been reported to the police (see EUMC, 2005, p. 15). Thus, the actual number of backlash hate crimes is likely to be much higher. Manuscript #1 62 Limitations and Future Research. Some limitations of our poll review need to be considered. Since this is a poll review, we deal with independent time series. Hence, we monitor our dependent variables in different data sets and on aggregate level. Thus, causality cannot be proven but only theorized. Not all data presented come from continuous monitoring projects. This lack in systematic and continuous data emphasizes the importance of prejudice monitoring. Based on such data researchers can figure out which minorities are endangered and politics can intervene. Several time series were conducted as response to 9/11. Hence, pre 9/11 data on our variables are rare. Consequently, especially in the case of Islamophobia, we cannot be sure that 9/11 led to an uncovered increase in Spain, the UK and Germany. The possibility that the little movement in Islamophobia in our data is due to a constantly increased level since 9/11 cannot be excluded. However, the fact that the level of Islamophobia in the US, where pre- and post-data are available, is not constantly increased speaks against this argument. Another issue is our use of the aggregate mean level, especially because there is an ongoing debate (e.g., Burke, Kosloff, & Landau, 2013; Huddy & Feldman, 2011) about the effects of terrorist threat on political ideologies (ideological intensification vs. conservative shift) which is also connected to the devaluation of foreigners. Whereas Jost and colleagues (2007; 2003) suggest a collective conservative shift in response to terrorist threat, Pyszczynski, Solomon and Greenberg (2003) argue that an intensification in preexisting individual ideologies (also left-wing) occurs which would lead to an attenuation or nullification of effects on aggregate level. However, Greenberg and Jonas (2003) argue that in most capitalist nations the left-wing ideology is not as prominent as the right-wing ideology. Thus, even if a polarization happens in response to threat, the right-wing shift would be observed on aggregate level due to a higher quantity of right-wingers in society. To add to the aforementioned debate and to avoid that aggregate level limitation, future research needs to Manuscript #1 63 consider intraindividual change to get insights into the process of terrorist-threat imposed attitude change. Furthermore, not all considered time-series fulfill scientific conditions of data gathering. Especially media related poll-institutions tend to adapt question wording to current events which challenges the equivalence of questions over time that is needed to build reliable time series. Furthermore, media related poll-institutions ask more often about issues whenever they are on the current agenda. This leads to differing time lags. The general problem of different time lags and non-simultaneous data points inhibited the use of advanced time series modeling. Another aspect future research needs to clarify is the question of causality between terrorist threat and outgroup derogation. In this paper we focused on the ITT perspective that threat produces prejudices (e.g., Stephan & Stephan, 2000). However, also an alternative model is conceivable: prejudiced individuals take the chance to express their prejudices, because terrorist threat legitimizes such an expression. This latter explanation is in accordance with modern racism theories (e.g., aversive racism; Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986) Conclusion and Implications. Even though our poll review reveals derogation and violence, we want to stress that by understanding the psychological processes and the temporal trajectory of backlash we create knowledge that can help to prevent threat to be transformed into prejudice and discrimination. Although, solving the primary conflict leading to Islamist terror attacks would be preferable, we can offer suggestions for a kind of symptomatic treatment (prevent backlash) when the conflict becomes salient again in shape of a new attack. Manuscript #1 64 The easiest and most immediate step to stop the cycle of threat, prejudice, and discrimination is a call for differentiation by political elites. If people understand that attacks are a cruelty of some fanatics and that they do not have backing in the Muslim community, backlash can be lessened. However, right-wing radicals will always use the immediate state of emergency in the aftermath of attacks to discriminate minorities. Therefore, another step is to avoid the upcoming of such a state of emergency where people believe laws were repealed. Furthermore, practices in contemporary media should be challenged (Poole, 2002; Poole & Richardson, 2006; Richardson, 2009/2004; Shaheen, 2003). Especially since the need for a story led to the worldwide broadcasting of celebrating Muslims in response to 9/11 (FoxNews.com, 2001) which however, was proven to be old video material enriched with an artificial scene created by journalists who paid those Muslims for celebrating (Erdmann, 2001; Snow & Taylor, 2006). A more balanced and differentiating reporting about terrorism and Islam as, for instance, delivered by the newspaper El Pais in Spain (see Allen & Nielsen, 2002), could reduce scapegoating. Finally, everyone should invest in good minority-majority relations since this would be an important first step to prevent individuals from radicalization which is probably the best way to diminish the problem of terrorism. Manuscript #1 65 Acknowledgements The authors thank Britta Sommer (Institut für Demoskopie Allensbach) and Brigitte Römstedt (R+V Insurance) for the provision of data. Moreover, we are thankful for consultation and provision of data from Evelyn Brislinger, Monika Langhans, Sophia Katz, Insa Bechert (GESIS, Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences). Furthermore, we thank Ulrich Wagner, Frank Asbrock, Jan Weber and the members of the graduate school ‘Group-Focused Enmity’ for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article. Funding This research was conducted in the context of the Graduiertenkolleg (research training group) “Group Focused Enmity” located at the Universities of Marburg and Bielefeld, Germany, funded by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (Graduiertenkolleg 884). The research of Peter Schmidt was supported by the basic research program of the State Research University Higher School of Economics (HSE) in Moscow. Manuscript #1 66 References Ahern, J., Galea, S., Resnick, H., & Vlahov, D. (2004). Television Images and Probable Posttraumatic Stress Disorder After September 11. 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Gollwitzer (Eds.), Emotions and aggressive behavior (pp. 133–148). Toronto: Hogrefe & Huber. Weimann, G. (2008). The Psychology of Mass-Mediated Terrorism. American Behavioral Scientist, 52(1), 69–86 Welch, M. (2006). Scapegoats of September 11th: Hate crimes & state crimes in the war on terror. New Brunswick, N.J: Rutgers University Press. Woods, J. (2011). The 9/11 effect: Toward a social science of the terrorist threat. The Social Science Journal, 48(1), 213–233 Zick, A., Wolf, C., Küpper, B., Davidov, E., Schmidt, P., & Heitmeyer, W. (2008). The Syndrome of Group-Focused Enmity: The Interrelation of Prejudices Tested with Multiple Cross-Sectional and Panel Data. Journal of Social Issues, 64(2), 363–383 74 Manuscript #2: What comes first: threat or prejudice? Perceived terrorist threat and the derogation of Muslims in Germany Stefan Thörner Philipps-University Marburg, Germany Mathias Kauff Philipps-University Marburg, Germany Submission date: April 11, 2014 Under Review in Ethnic and Racial Studies Manuscript #2 75 Abstract Prejudice against Muslim immigrants in the Western world has existed long before 9/11. However, since then Muslims face more blatant devaluation, discrimination, and violence in the US and several European countries. This is also true for Germany, where the largest population of foreigners is of Muslim faith. According to modern racism theories (e.g., aversive racism) the autochthonous population could utilize perceived terrorist threat as a legitimation to express already existing prejudices. On the other hand, contemporary threat theories (e.g., Integrated Threat Theory; ITT) argue that threat produces prejudice. Thus, the question is what comes first – threat or prejudice? We apply this question to perceived terrorist threat and the devaluation of Muslims in Germany. Indications for causal antecedence are derived from a panel with two time points (N=88), analyzed with latent variable cross-lagged models. Results indicate that terrorist threat produces prejudice and discriminatory intentions against Muslims, thus supporting the ITT view. We discuss theoretical and practical implications of our results. Keywords: Germany, terrorism, threat, aversive racism, anti-Muslim prejudice, Islamophobia, cross-lagged model Manuscript #2 76 Introduction More than ten years ago three planes crashed into the World Trade Center in New York City and the Pentagon in Arlington. Not only the United States (US), but also large parts of the so called Western world were shocked and affected by this historic incident (e.g., Stone and Rizova 2007). Following 9/11, individuals’ subjective perception of terrorist threat1 was frequently triggered by both minor incidents, such as attempted terrorist plots in Germany2, and two major attacks on Spain and the United Kingdom (UK). Especially shocking for Germany was the fact that Mohammed Atta, the head of the 9/11 terror cell, and other attackers lived and studied in Hamburg, Germany, until 2000 (Jonker 2005). In consequence, a fair amount of Germans raised their general scepticism against Muslims (Der Spiegel 2001)3. Although a small circle of radical fundamentalists led the attacks, the blame was partially assigned to Muslims in general (Doosje et al. 2007). In the aftermath of the major terrorist attacks of the last decade, Muslims and citizens appearing as such experienced devaluation, discrimination, and violence especially in the target countries but also beyond (Allen and Nielsen 2002; Kaplan 2006). Although a higher occurrence of terrorist threat seems to be related to an increased devaluation of Muslims, it is unclear how threat and devaluation are related over time. Two alternative models and a hybrid of both are considered as explanations: first, contemporary threat theories (e.g., Stephan and Stephan 2000) argue that prejudice develops in consequence of perceived threat. Ingroup bias and outgroup derogation occur as defence mechanisms when individuals feel personally or collectively threatened (Stephan, Renfro, and Davis 2008). Second, other theorists (e.g., Gaertner and Dovidio 1986) suggest that threat could be used as a legitimation 1 The perception of ‘terrorist threat’ is primarily an intraindividual state of perceiving oneself or one’s country in danger. This concept is not equivalent to an objective state of terror alarm. 2 On July 31, 2006, two Islamist terrorists placed bombs in trains in Cologne, Germany. However, the bombs failed to detonate. Furthermore, an Islamist terror cell was arrested in September 2007 while planning attacks. 3 19 per cent affirmed the question “Do you feel more skeptical about Muslims since the attacks in the US”. NFO-Infratest poll (N≈1000) commissioned by Der Spiegel. Manuscript #2 77 to express existing prejudice. According to this line of theory, individuals feel a strong social norm to hide their prejudices and thus search for situations in which expressing their bias feels adequate. This seems true if outgroups can be observed while misbehaving (e.g., committing terrorist attacks). This kind of theorizing is worth of consideration for Germany, because most immigrants to Germany are of Muslim faith (e.g., Cesari 2011), prejudice against immigrants existed already before 9/11 (e.g., Pettigrew 1998), and there is a strong general social norm to not express prejudice openly, particularly due to Germany’s Nazi history (e.g., Heyder, Iser, and Schmidt 2005). The third possible explanation is a hybrid form of the former two mechanisms, which is a bidirectional causal relation between threat and prejudice. Previous studies analyzing the relation of perceived terrorist threat, anti-Muslim prejudice, and discriminatory intentions (Doosje et al. 2009; Oswald 2005) adopted the predominant view that threat creates prejudice. However, most of these studies are cross- sectional and thus cannot ensure whether their theoretical account is appropriate. Therefore, we investigated which theoretical perspective applies to the case of perceived terrorist threat and the derogation of Muslims in Germany. Instead of implementing a cross-sectional design, we used longitudinal data, which have the advantage of indicating the causal antecedence of the constructs under research (Finkel 1995). We used latent variable analysis, which considers measurement error leading to more reliable relations between variables (Kline 2011). By applying cross-lagged models, we simultaneously test whether the devaluation of Muslims goes back to perceived terrorist threat, whether terrorist threat is the consequence (legitimation) of prejudice, or whether a hybrid model is most appropriate4. 4 For a conceptually similar study but in the context of general group threat, see Schlueter, Schmidt, and Wagner (2008). Manuscript #2 78 Theoretical background Terrorist threat. Threat can be defined as the expectation of something aversive to happen (Fritsche, Jonas, and Kessler 2011; see also Stephan and Renfro 2002). Fritsche et al. (2011) describe terrorist threat as a ‘double threat’ because it can be perceived on group level (collective threat) and on individual level (personal threat; see also Huddy et al. 2002): terrorists attack national symbols to humiliate their target nations and they kill civilians to emphasize that everyone could become victim. The primary weapon of terrorists to reach their political goals is to spread threat (e.g., Huddy, Feldman, and Cassese 2009). Regarding this, Breckenridge and Zimbardo (2007) stated: ‘Terrorists appear to have a keen, intuitive appreciation of psychological mechanisms that spread the effects of terror well beyond their primary victims and amplify the perception of risk and vulnerability far out of proportion to reasonable probabilities.’ (p. 116) Islam and terrorism. Nowadays, in Western countries ‘terrorism’ is by default interpreted as ‘Islamist terrorism’ (Allen 2004). This emphasizes the close association that is made between terrorism and Islam in general. An indicator of this subjective close connection was the spontaneous biased accuse of Islamists as perpetrators when in July 2011 an autochthonous Norwegian terrorist committed a bomb plot in Oslo (Sehgal 2011; see also Rytter and Holm Pedersen 2013). A high portion of individuals in Europe imputes a sympathy with terrorists to Muslims (for an overview, see Zick, Küpper, and Hövermann 2011). For Germany, Leibold and Kühnel (2006) revealed in a representative survey from 20055 that over 60 per cent of respondents ‘agreed’ or ‘rather agreed’ with the statements: ‘Islamist terrorists enjoy backing of Muslims’ and ‘Islamist terrorists are adored as heroes by many Muslims’. Thus, the majority of Germans believes that Muslims endorse Islamic terrorism. The resulting question 5 The period of data gathering was Mai until June 2005. Thus, the data conduction was finished before the London Bombing (7/7) occurred. Manuscript #2 79 is whether Muslims are perceived as a real threat to Germany and its citizens or whether this new facet of the stereotype of Muslims (terrorism) is used as legitimation to express already existing prejudice. Previous research. Several cross-sectional studies found terrorist threat and derogation of Muslims to be connected. For instance, Oswald (2005) tried to capture various correlates of anti-Arab reactions after 9/11. She discovered that perceived terrorist threat was significantly connected to prejudicial and discriminatory reactions towards Arabs. Doosje and colleagues (2009) analyzed a mixed European survey that included items about perceived terrorist threat, perceived Muslims’ support for terrorism, anti-Muslim prejudice and approval to discrimination of Muslims. The authors showed that perceived terrorist threat was connected to anti-Muslim prejudice and approval of discrimination. In the context of the Madrid Bombings in 2004, Echebarria-Echabe and Fernández- Guede (2006) delivered unique insights. They conducted a survey to test their scale of anti- Arab prejudice coincidentally shortly before the attacks happened. Afterwards, they decided to repeat the survey with a similar sample. Prejudice against Arabs was significantly higher in the post sample compared to the pre sample. However, the mechanism underlying this increase in prejudice remains unclear. To our knowledge, the only panel analysis in the context of terror and outgroup derogation was conducted by Skitka, Bauman, and Mullen (2004). They analyzed a panel dataset which was conducted in September 2001 (t1) and January 2002 (t2). T1 comprised measures of anger and fear and t2 captured, among others, perceived threat, outgroup derogation, and political tolerance. The authors showed that fear and threat were significantly associated with outgroup derogation and political intolerance. However, because this study did not measure the constructs under research at both times, the possibility to derive causal antecedence is limited (Finkel 1995). Manuscript #2 80 Experimental research revealed that increased salience of terror led to increased prejudice (Das et al. 2009). However, a simple threat manipulation6 does not reveal whether individuals increase in prejudice or whether the expression of existing prejudice increases. In summary, several studies assume threat to produce prejudice without validating this assumption. To our knowledge, there is no study that provides appropriate data for testing the causal direction of terrorist threat and the derogation of Muslims’. Competing models. Previous research and the observable anti-Muslim backlash following major terrorist attacks allow for the conclusion that terrorist threat is associated with prejudice and discrimination. However, the temporal sequence of perceived terrorist threat and outgroup derogation is unclear. Three models are available explaining this phenomenon: first, threat produces prejudice, second, prejudice is legitimated by threat, or third, both mechanisms occur simultaneously. Threat model. Terrorism can induce collective and personal threat (e.g., Huddy et al. 2002; Fritsche, Jonas, and Kessler 2011). Both aspects are related to prejudice against ‘others’. On an intergroup level, there is a long history of threat theories showing that threat is connected to prejudice (Blumer 1958; Sherif and Sherif 1969; Quillian 1995). More recently, Stephan and Stephan (2000) formulated an Integrated Threat Theory (ITT) which includes not only several forms of threat on an intergroup level but also on an individual level (see also Stephan and Renfro 2002; Stephan, Renfro, and Davis 2008). According to ITT, exclusionary attitudes, discriminatory intentions and behaviour are the consequence of the perceived presence of an outgroup that is connected to negative consequences for oneself or ones ingroup (Stephan and Renfro 2002).Threat in general is supposed to induce ingroup bias and outgroup derogation, while threat stemming from one specific group increases hostility especially towards that group (LeVine and Campbell 1972). If Muslims are perceived as 6 In this specific case a mortality salience manipulation. Manuscript #2 81 being connected to terrorism, they will pose a threat to Germans’ and their country, which should in turn produce prejudice against Muslims. Legitimation model7. Allen (2004) argued that the upcoming of Islamist terrorism legitimized the expression of long-cherished prejudice against Muslims: ‘[...] 9/11 has made Islamophobia more acceptable, which has enabled its expressions, inferences, and manifestations to locate a newer and possibly more prevalent societal resonance and acceptability.’ (p. 2) This argumentation is in line with newer prejudice theories (Gaertner and Dovidio 1986; McConahay 1986). They argue that prejudice exists in individuals but is hidden by social norms and personal egalitarian beliefs unless there is a justification (e.g., terrorist attack) to express it8 (see also Crandall and Eshleman 2003). Hybrid model. Since both models are plausible, a combination of both mechanisms is also conceivable (Wilson 2001). Thus, derogation of Muslims would on the one hand be produced by perceived terrorist threat whereas on the other hand perceived terrorist threat would be used as a legitimation of earlier derogation of Muslims. Such an effect could be the result of either intraindividual bidirectional causality between terrorist threat and prejudice or contrary effects in subpopulations of the sample. The German context History of immigration. In the 1960s Germany arranged the so called ‘Gastarbeiterprogramm’, a cooperation with Turkey, Italy, Morocco, and Yugoslavia enabling migration of guest workers from these countries to Germany (Herbert 2001). Because the workers were assumed to leave when their work force was no longer needed, no integration measures were initiated (Cesari 2011). However, those who worked in Germany 7 See Schlueter et al. (2008) for a somewhat different conceptualization of such a model. 8 This process may be conscious or unconscious. Either, individuals consciously increase their scores of perceived terrorist threat to legitimate prejudice or they increase in threat perception unconsciously. A full discussion of conscious and unconscious processes, however, would be beyond the scope of this paper. Manuscript #2 82 for more than five years were offered the opportunity to stay infinitely (Castles 1986). Many guest workers - especially from Turkey - took this chance and initiated reunions with their families in Germany. In consequence, already in the 1970s, 1.5 million Turkish immigrants lived in Germany. This development was considered undesirable among many autochthonous Germans (Jonker 2005), which became more imminent in the 70s during the oil crisis and in the 90s because of a huge debate about asylum seekers (Kurthen, Bergmann, and Erb 1997; Lubbers and Scheepers 2001). In 1990, over 30 per cent of autochthonous Germans in the general social survey agreed with the statement that guest workers should be sent back to their native countries if jobs get scarce (Bergmann 1997, 30). Thus, rejection and prejudice against guest workers existed long before 9/11. Today’s demographics and media image of Muslims. Today, around four million people (about five per cent of Germany’s population) are of Islamic faith. Turks are the largest immigrant group (about 70 per cent). The remaining 30 per cent root from South Eastern Europe, the Middle East and North Africa (Archick et al. 2011). Due to the lack of integration measures in the first guest worker generation, Muslims still face a higher risk of being unemployed, poor, and low-educated (Archick et al. 2011). The picture of Islam in the German media is mostly negative and associated with immigration issues, radicalization, fundamentalism, and terrorism (Hafez and Richter 2007). Media reports about Turks in particular cover negative aspects of immigration like high unemployment, crime rates, and the lack of acculturation (Halm 2013). In the past twenty years, largely negatively biased debates about immigration, radicalization, the building of mosques, wearing the hijab, honour killings, and pretended foreign infiltration took place (e.g., Sarrazin 2010). Manuscript #2 83 The present research This study aims at answering the question which of the three theorized models, threat model, legitimation model or hybrid model is most appropriate for the situation in Germany, where Muslims have been the largest immigrant group for almost half a century. Therefore, we apply latent variable cross-lagged modelling to a panel dataset gathered in Germany in 2011. We measured perceived terrorist threat and derogation of Muslims twofold. This is because, as mentioned above, terrorist threat can be perceived on a collective and a personal level (e.g., Huddy et al. 2002) and derogation of Muslims can happen on attitudinal and behavioural level (e.g., Doosje et al. 2009). Whether collective and personal threat create differential effects is left open for exploration since earlier studies delivered contradictory results (Asbrock and Fritsche 2013; Huddy et al. 2005). To capture outgroup derogation of Muslims twofold, the panel included items that should measure prejudice and discriminatory intentions. Thus, we enlarge on Doosje and colleagues’ (2009) work showing terrorist threat to be connected to discriminatory intentions against Muslims. Regarding the context of the survey, it is important to state that two events happened close to the field period of this study. First, the German minister of internal affairs released an official terror warning for Germany two month before the field period began (Der Spiegel 2010). Second, Bin-Laden was assassinated between t1 and t2. Thus, terrorism was on the agenda of mass media when this study was conducted, meaning it is likely that all participants were aware of the events. The mean score of participants’ perceived terrorist threat remained stable across t1 and t29. 9 Means: collective terrorist threat t1=3.18, t2=3.33, ΔM=.15 (p>.05); personal terrorist threat t1=2.15, t2=2.20, ΔM=.05 (p>.05). Manuscript #2 84 Figure 1. Theoretical autoregressive model with potential cross-lagged paths Hypotheses. Figure 1 translates the theories above into a testable model. It shows a cross-lagged model with the theorized potential cross-lagged paths. If path ‘a’ reached significance, the threat model – threat creates devaluation – would be supported. A significant path ‘b’ would speak for a legitimation model – prejudices are legitimated by threat. A hybrid model would be supported if both paths (a & b) reach significance. Methods Statistical procedure. Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) and Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) were used. The application of these procedures, especially if combined, is highly advantageous since measurement error is considered and modelled separately, leading to highly reliable estimates of relationships between constructs (Kline 2011). We deployed a robust maximum likelihood estimator in the software Mplus 7 (Muthén and Muthén 2012). This estimator corrects standard errors for non-normality of the data but also corrects chi-square and model fit. Hence, an adaptation of the chi-square difference test for nested model comparisons is needed (Satorra and Bentler 2001). Missing data were handled via Full Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML) estimation (Arbuckle 1996). However, since the panel attrition was large, only those who participated in both waves are considered for longitudinal analysis. Manuscript #2 85 The specific longitudinal data modelling technique used is called autoregressive cross-lagged structural equation analysis (Jöreskog 1979). This model contains two or more variables with at least two measurement points (see Figure 1 for an example). The time ordering, meaning the independent variable being conducted before the dependent variable, is one of the central conditions to draw causal inferences from non-experimental data (Finkel 1995). In a two-wave (t1 & t2), two variables example (Figure 1), both t2 variables are regressed on itself (autoregression) at t1 and the second variable at t1 (cross-lagged effects a & b). If some of the variance left in a t2 variable, after controlling for its autoregression, is explained by the second variable at t1, can this be interpreted as a causal link. However, the claim of causality depends on the assumption that the effect is not produced by a third variable (Finkel 1995). Sample. T1 measurement was conducted in January 2011. The invitation to participate in the online questionnaire was distributed via university email lists and social networks. The sample was split10. The relevant split for this study included N=755 cases. Because of insufficient data and migration background of participants, 193 cases had to be excluded, leaving a net sample of Nt1=562. The sample consisted of 59 per cent females, the average age was 28 years (SD=9.29) and the average education 7.22 (SD=.649), on a 1=‘no school-leaving qualifications” up to 8=‘university degree” scale, indicating a very high educational level. At the end of the questionnaire, respondents had the possibility to leave their email address for being invited to participate in a second wave of that questionnaire and to create a unique, anonymous code that enabled us to merge t1 and t2 data later on. 267 participants (35.3 per cent) provided their email addresses. 10 The survey included also several other research projects than the current one. Manuscript #2 86 In June 2011, we invited the respondents via email to fill out the t2 questionnaire. The response rate was rather low with 40.3 per cent, leaving an N of 98 cases that answered t2. After excluding participants with migration background, a net sample of Nt2=88 remained. A logistic regression, including socio-demographics and the constructs relevant for this paper11 revealed that only age influenced the probability of participating in the second wave significantly. With increasing age, the probability of participating increased slightly (odds ratio = 1.025, p < .05, CI95 = 1.003/1.047). However, this is not an issue since later third variable analyses in the cross-lagged models of terrorist threat and Muslims’ derogation revealed no effects of age. Measures. Collective and personal terrorist threat were measured by two items each. The items were created by ourselves or partially derived from Frindte and Haußecker (2010, 136). Collective terrorist threat was measured with the items: ‘Terror will find its way into Germany’ and ‘I think it is just a matter of time before Germany also becomes a scene of massive terrorist attacks’. Personal terrorist threat was measured by the agreement to the following statements: ‘I personally feel threatened by terrorist attacks” and ‘I am scared of terrorist attacks here in Germany’. The items measuring derogation of Muslims were derived from Leibold and Kühnel (2006, 142–44). We were careful in choosing items that do not trigger an association between terrorist threat and anti-Muslim prejudice. The items designated to measure anti-Muslim prejudice were: ‘Because of the many Muslims here, I sometimes feel like a stranger in my own country’, ‘Muslims should not be allowed to immigrate to Germany’ and ‘The many mosques in Germany show that here, too, Islam strives to extend its clout’. Discriminatory intention against Muslims was operationalized by three items: ‘I would just as well enrol my child in a school where a 11 Sociodemographics: age, gender, education; Other constructs: perceived personal & collective terrorist threat, derogation of Muslims. Manuscript #2 87 Muslim woman teaches wearing a headscarf”, ‘I would have problems to move to an area where many Muslims live’ and ‘I will only vote for those parties that are against further immigration of Muslims’ (for a study using a similar operationalization of discriminatory intention see Doosje et al. 2009). All items were answered on a 1 = ‘fully agree’ to 7 = ‘fully disagree’ scale. Most of the items had to be recoded so that high scores consistently depict high threat, prejudice, or discriminatory intention. Results Personal and collective terrorist threat. Collective and personal terrorist threat are assumed to be distinct constructs, which was examined via CFA. A two factor model (χ²corrected=3.835, df=1, p=.0502, CFI=.997, RMSEA=.069, SRMR=.009) fit the data clearly better than a one factor solution (χ²corrected=44.207, df=2, p=.00, CFI=.939, RMSEA=.187, SRMR=.043; for model fit recommendations see Schermelleh-Engel, Mosbrugger, and Müller 2003). Although the two factor solution is more appropriate, the high correlation between collective and personal threat (r=.809, p<.001) is highly probable to induce multicollinearity issues in terms of unreliable estimates (Grewal, Cote, and Baumgartner 2004). Therefore, we analyzed the effects of personal and collective terrorist threat separately. Anti-Muslim prejudice and discriminatory intention. Since we wanted to analyze the connection of terrorist threat with prejudice and also with discriminatory intention, we tested whether prejudice and discrimination are separable factors in our data. This proved to be untrue. The significant chi-square of the two factor solution (χ²corrected=28.762, df=8, p=.00, CFI=.984, RMSEA=.068, SRMR=.02) indicated an insufficient fit. The two factors correlated with r=.989 (p<.001). This almost perfect correlation clearly spoke for a one factor Manuscript #2 88 solution. Hence, we decided to proceed with a conglomerate factor of prejudice and discriminatory intention12. This factor accounts for the finding that respondents did not distinguish between prejudicial attitudes and discriminatory intentions. In the process of forming this factor, one item13 had to be excluded due to causing various modification indices in the model. The final factor consisted of five items and reached a very good model fit (χ²corrected=4.539, df=5, p=.47, CFI=1.00, RMSEA=.00, SRMR=.012). Table 1. Latent Means, Reliability, Correlations of Latent Factors at t1 Construct Latent Mean (SD) 1 2 3 1. Collective terrorist threat 3.416 (1.577) α = .762 inter-item r=.626 .809*** .555*** 2. Personal terrorist threat 2.264 (1.415) α= .820 inter-item r=.736 .389*** 3. Prej. & discr. Intention against Muslims 2.857 (1.948) α = .813 Note. Collective and personal terrorist threat are measured with two items each. Therefore, inter-item correlations are presented in addition to Cronbach’s Alpha coefficient. Modelfit of the simultaneous confirmatory factor analysis: χ²(corrected)=28.504, df=24, p=.24, CFI=.997, RMSEA=.019, SRMR=.021. Table 1 shows the latent means, internal consistencies, and factor correlations of collective terrorist threat, personal terrorist threat, and prejudice & discriminatory intentions against Muslims at t1. Cronbach’s alpha coefficients and inter-item correlations indicated satisfactory reliability of the factors. Latent means and correlations are based on a simultaneous CFA. Personal and collective terrorist threat were substantially correlated with 12 We refer to this single factor measure as ‘prejudice & discriminatory intention’. 13 ‘Muslims should not be allowed to immigrate to Germany”. Manuscript #2 89 the factor prejudice & discriminatory intentions. The effect size of collective threat was somewhat higher than that of personal threat. Longitudinal analysis. As a precondition of longitudinal structure and mean modelling, the measurement model needs to remain invariant over time (Byrne, Shavelson, and Muthén 1989). All models reached scalar invariance (e.g., equal structure, factor loadings, intercepts): Collective terrorist threat (χ²corrected=4.415, df=4, p=.35, CFI=.998, RMSEA=.036, SRMR=.032), personal terrorist threat (χ²corrected=6.468, df=4, p=.17, CFI=.985, RMSEA=.084, SRMR=.053), and prejudice & discriminatory intention against Muslims (χ²corrected=43.553, df=33, p=.10, CFI=.977, RMSEA=.057, SRMR=.054). Hence, the condition to compare structural paths and also latent means is fulfilled (Byrne, Shavelson, and Muthén 1989). Cross-lagged models. We calculated separate models for collective and personal terrorist threat due to collinearity issues14. Figure 2. Cross-lagged model with collective terrorist threat Note. Measurement Models not shown. Standardized robust maximum likelihood coefficients. Modelfit: χ²(corrected) = 91.15, df = 76, p = .11, CFI =.975, RMSEA = .051, SRMR = .063. 14 The attempt to calculate a cross-lagged model including simultaneously collective and personal threat as well as the factor prejudice & discriminatory intention failed, as assumed, due to collinearity issues. Resulting regression weights and standard errors showed strong signs of unreliability. Manuscript #2 90 Figure 2 shows the cross-lagged model of collective terrorist threat and anti-Muslim prejudice & discrimination. The autocorrelations of both factors were fairly high suggesting a rather low amount of change over time. As the threat model hypothesized, only the cross- lagged path from collective terrorist threat to anti-Muslim prejudice and discriminatory intention reached significance (β=.187, p<.05). Hence, perceiving collective terrorist threat at t1 predicts being prejudiced at t2. Alternative hypotheses are not supported. Figure 3. Cross-lagged model with personal terrorist threat Note. Measurement Models not shown. Standardized robust maximum likelihood coefficients. Modelfit: χ²(corrected) = 84.955, df = 71, p = .2118, CFI =.984, RMSEA = .042, SRMR = .076. Identical testing for personal terrorist threat (Figure 3) revealed congruent results. Personal terrorist threat was also antecedent to anti-Muslim prejudice and discrimination. Since no differential effects of personal and collective threat occurred, we created a second order factor of terrorist threat. Due to the rather small sample size, we aimed at reducing the complexity of the model and therefore decided to create composite measures (so called parcels; see Little et al. 2002) of collective and personal terrorist threat. They were then used as indicators for the higher-level terrorist threat factor. Next we tested whether Manuscript #2 91 longitudinal invariance was given, which proved to be true (scalar invariance: χ²corrected=2.648, df=4, p=.62, CFI=1.00, RMSEA=.00, SRMR=.031). Figure 4. Cross-lagged model with terrorist threat (second order) Note. Measurement Models not shown Standardized robust maximum likelihood coefficients. Modelfit: χ²(corrected) = 93.640, df = 74, p = .613, CFI =.969, RMSEA = .059, SRMR = .07. Figure 4 shows that the model with the parcelled second order factor of terrorist threat replicates the finding that terrorist threat is antecedent to prejudice and discriminatory intention. To reduce the probability of a third-variable effect we included the control variables gender, age, and education into the model. The cross-lagged effects remained robust against those controls but the model fit became worse (χ²corrected=121.138, df=88, p=.011, CFI=.95, RMSEA=.07, SRMR=.063). None of the control variables had a significant influence on the dependent variables at t2. In summary, the threat model hypothesis that terrorist threat is antecedent to prejudice & discriminatory intention against Muslims is supported for collective and personal terrorist threat separately and for a parcelled second order factor of terrorist threat. No indications for a legitimation model or a hybrid model were found. Manuscript #2 92 Discussion In this research, we aimed at clarifying the temporal antecedence of perceived terrorist threat and derogation of Muslims in the German context. In addition, we were interested in the role of the subcomponents of terrorist threat (personal and collective) and derogation of Muslims (prejudice and discriminatory intention). In a first step we studied the cross-sectional relations of these variables and figured out that terrorist threat and Muslims’ derogation are substantially correlated. For testing the longitudinal antecedence, we derived three testable models from theory. The threat model hypothesis, saying that terrorist threat is causally antecedent to prejudice & discriminatory intention, was supported. No support for the legitimation model – meaning that terrorist threat is used as legitimation for expressing existing prejudice – was found, although it seemed to be a conceivable model for the specific situation in Germany. The theorized hybrid model was not supported either. Thus, anti- Muslim prejudice and the intention to discriminate Muslims in Germany are at least partially driven by the relatively new phenomenon of perceived terrorist threat. We conclude that terrorist threat is primarily perceived as a real threat, triggering outgroup derogation as a defence mechanism. In this study, personal and collective terrorist threat had no differential effects on derogation of Muslims. Huddy and colleagues (2005), however, reported an association of anti-Arab policy preferences only for collective threat, not for personal threat15. Asbrock and Fritsche (2013) showed in an experimental study that personal, but not collective threat was connected with ethnocentric reactions. In another context, Pettigrew, Christ, Wagner, and Stellmacher (2007) found that the effect of personal threat on prejudice was fully mediated by collective threat. Those diverse results clearly indicate that more research needs to be done to clarify structure and effects of terrorist threat. 15 Personal threat is called ‘anxiety’ in their study but the factor includes items that are similar or same to those capturing personal terrorist threat. Manuscript #2 93 Limitations and future research. We acknowledge several shortcomings of this study. Our sample consisted mainly of highly educated young respondents, which could limit the generalizability of our findings. Future research should therefore try to replicate our findings in representative samples. Another improvement could be reached by conducting more than two measurement waves, which would also allow for testing longitudinal mediation. Longitudinal data are clearly better suited to reveal causal relations of constructs than cross-sectional data. However, one of the conditions to test causal directions of relationships within a longitudinal model is that a possible third-variable effect can be excluded (Finkel 1995). This condition can never be guaranteed due to the infinite number of third variables. It can only be minimized by considering theoretically relevant variables. The amount of third variables was rather limited in this study. Future studies should either consider more third variables or make use of experimental designs to substantiate our finding of terrorist threat being the cause for the devaluation of Muslims. Another shortcoming is that prejudice and discriminatory intention are not discriminant in this study as for instance hypothesized by the theory of planned behaviour (Ajzen and Fishbein 1977). This could be the consequence of the question wording for discriminatory intentions against Muslims, which may have been too similar to attitude items. To legitimate the claim that our results are also valid for discriminatory intention we calculated another cross-lagged model, using terrorist threat and the strongest behavioural intention item ‘I will only vote for those parties that are against further immigration of Manuscript #2 94 Muslims’. Only the cross-lagged path from terrorist threat to anti-Muslim immigration voting reached significance16, supporting our claim. Furthermore, future research should deal with the change in quality of stereotypes. The assumption is that the stereotypes of Muslims have changed vastly in response to 9/11. Such a phenomenon was observed for Americans’ stereotypes of Japanese, when Japan attacked Pearl Harbor in World War II (Seago 1947). Implications. Because terrorist threat is antecedent of Muslims’ derogation, the perception of threat needs to be reduced (e.g., Breckenridge and Zimbardo 2007). Sunstein (2003, 121) stated: ‘When strong emotions are involved, people tend to focus on the badness of the outcome, rather than on the probability that the outcome will occur.’ Therefore, it is one approach to educate citizens about the low probability of becoming a victim of a terrorist attack. This, however, is a difficult undertaking, especially in the aftermath of an attack. A different approach is to inform people about the causes of Islamist terrorism which enables them making sense out of the negative experience (Fischer et al. 2011). Fischer and colleagues experimentally manipulated terrorist threat and the provision of background information about terrorists’ motives. If meaning was provided in the high threat condition, participants felt less threatened. Jonas and Fritsche (2013) suggest to strengthen cultural environments (subjectively meaningful groups, volunteer organizations) since they can buffer threat. Fischer and colleagues (2006) argue in the same manner that intrinsic religiousness decreases threat perceptions. They showed that experimentally induced terrorist threat affected only non- religious individuals’ mood. This effect was mediated by self-efficacy. In addition to reducing and buffering the perception of threat, the association of ‘Muslims’ and ‘terrorism’ needs to be diminished. This aim can only be reached if mass 16 Beta=.164, p<.05; Model fit: χ²(corrected)=6.327, df=8, p=.6106, CFI=1.00, RMSEA=.00, SRMR=.029. Full model results upon request. Manuscript #2 95 media stops presenting Muslims primarily in the context of fanaticism and terrorism (e.g., Shaheen 2003). Furthermore, opinion leaders need to emphasize the inadmissibility of the existing association between Muslims and terrorism (Allen 2004). 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The Impact of the 2004 Madrid Bombings on Germany Stefan Thörner Philipps-University Marburg, Germany Submission date: February 19, 2014 Under review in Political Psychology Manuscript #3 103 Abstract This research contributes to the debate whether real world terrorist threat leads to a conservative shift (conservative shift hypothesis) or to an intensification of preexisting political ideologies (ideological intensification hypothesis). I applied a research design suggested by Castano et al. (2011; Study 1) to a representative panel data set (t1=April 2003; t2=April 2004) that contained the Madrid Bombings of March 2004. The analysis of residual and latent true change scores reveals that change in authoritarian submission, one facet of right-wing authoritarianism, and prejudice, depend on political self-placement at t1. No mean shift at all occurs but leftists get less authoritarian and less prejudiced whereas centrists and rightists increase in these attitudes. These results support the ideological intensification hypothesis. However, they show also that centrists – the largest group of Germans – are getting more conservative after an attack. Thus, ideological intensification does occur, whereas there is also a high potential for a conservative shift on mean level. Keywords: Madrid Bombings, terrorism, conservative shift, worldview defense, latent true change modeling Manuscript #3 104 Introduction. After the attacks on the US in September 2001 (9/11) a shock went through the Western World. Facilitated by the mass media, terrorists succeeded in spreading a climate of threat by increasing the salience of death (Breckenridge & Zimbardo, 2007). Shortly after the attacks, pollsters measured an increase of threat perceptions even in countries other than the US (e.g., European Commission, 2002; Noelle-Neumann, 2002). The same spillover effect was observed in Germany when on March 11, 2004, several train- bombings occurred in Spain’s capital, Madrid, leaving 191 dead and more than two thousand injured. In consequence, a month after the attack, 57% of respondents were afraid of possible terrorist attacks in Germany, compared to only 29% in January 2004 (e.g., IFD Allensbach, 2004, see also Forschungsgruppe Wahlen, 2004a, 2004b). Terrorist threats like these trigger individuals to contemplate their death (Das, Bushman, Bezemer, Kerkhof, & Vermeulen, 2009; Landau et al., 2004) causing a possible shift in their political ideological beliefs. This research note analyzes how a major terrorist attack affects ideological beliefs within individuals. Several scholars hypothesize a conservative shift to occur after a major terrorist attack (e.g., Bonanno & Jost, 2006). Examining whether the entire society makes a shift to the right after a geographically close, major terrorist attack does not only make a contribution to an ongoing scientific debate. It is particularly important since especially right-wing ideologies are highly connected to the devaluation of minorities (e.g., Altemeyer, 1998) which can lead, in the context of terrorism, to pro-war and anti-immigrant attitudes (Huddy, Feldman, Taber, & Lahav, 2005) or even backlash hate crimes, as seen in the US after 9/11 (e.g., Kaplan, 2006). In this paper I connect to a debate occurring between Conservatism as Motivated Social Cognition (MSC) researchers (e.g., Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003) and Terror Management Theory (TMT) advocates (e.g., Greenberg, et al., 1990). Whereas Jost and colleagues (Bonanno & Jost, 2006; Jost et al., 2003) suggest a collective conservative shift to Manuscript #3 105 occur after a major terrorist attack, Pyszczynski, Solomon and Greenberg (2003) argue that the existential threat imposed by terrorism intensifies preexisting ideologies on the individual level which can lead to a nullification of effects on the aggregate level (see also Huddy & Feldman, 2011). Until now, only a few studies have examined changes in ideological beliefs in response to major terrorist attacks. Furthermore, this is only done for countries that faced an attack themselves (Echebarria-Echabe & Fernández-Guede, 2006; Nagoshi, Terrell, & Nagoshi, 2007; Nail & McGregor, 2009). I extend the existing literature by building on previous experimental research (Castano et al., 2011) applied to a real-world event that increases death-salience. Several aspects of this paper need to be emphasized. In terms of content, conservatism and prejudice are examined. I use a large scale representative panel data set where the second wave of conduction occurred a month after the Madrid Bombings. Furthermore, results of the initial analysis are replicated and confirmed by using an elaborated longitudinal latent variable approach. Theory and Previous Research. Conservatism. The idea that conservatism as a political ideology is better suited to deal with threat and uncertainty goes back to Adorno and colleagues (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950, p. 2). This thought was recently refined in Jost and colleagues’ motivated social cognition model of conservatism where they proposed that “conservatism […] serves to reduce fear, anxiety, and uncertainty; to avoid change, disruption, and ambiguity” (Jost et al., 2003, p. 340). In their theory, the authors stress that conservatism is not a personality variable only but includes also dynamic aspects, especially when it comes to contextual threat. They assume contextual threat leading to cognitive simplicity, appearing as conservative black and white thinking. Thus, conservatism is suggested to be a strategy to Manuscript #3 106 deal with threat. The expected outcome of broadly perceived external threat, e.g., induced by a major terrorist attack, should be a conservative shift (Bonanno & Jost, 2006; Nail & McGregor, 2009). Adorno and colleagues’ as well as Jost and colleagues’ work has been sharply criticized for their suggestion that conservatism is individuals’ universal solution in dealing with threat and uncertainty (Eysenck, 1999/1954; Greenberg & Jonas, 2003). The major criticism is, in a nutshell, that liberal or left-wing political orientations can serve the same purposes in coping with threat and uncertainty as conservatism does. An external, threatening event could consequently lead to ideological intensification on both sides, which could nullify each other out on mean level. This view is also shared by most scholars of terror management theory. Terror Management Theory (TMT) is a threat theory coping with the existential fear to die, also called mortality salience. TMT goes back to the observation that every living creature has a will to survive but only humans are aware of the finiteness of life (Becker, 1997/1973). This knowledge is highly threatening. Being part of a meaningful shared reality with homogenous ideologies can then be an anxiety buffer. After contemplating their own death, people increase their faith in their worldview (Greenberg et al., 1990), which means an intensification of preexisting political ideologies (Greenberg, Simon, Pyszczynski, Solomon, & Chatel, 1992). In the following, I refer to the worldview defense view as ideological intensification hypothesis (see Huddy & Feldman, 2011). Previous Research. The conservative shift vs. the ideological intensification debate produced a plethora of studies (see Burke, Kosloff, & Landau, 2013, for a meta-analysis). For instance, Jost and colleagues (2007) showed in three cross-sectional, correlational studies that death anxiety contributes to conservatism only; the authors could not show support for alternative models like the ideological intensification hypothesis. On the other hand Manuscript #3 107 McGregor and colleagues (1998) showed experimentally that mortality salience led to a derogation and even aggression against people with opposed political ideologies. This aggression was expressed in form of the allocation of vile hot sauce which was significantly higher for people having an opposite ideology. The list of studies supporting each side could be further prolonged. However, even the above mentioned meta-analysis by Burke et al. (2013) delivered no clear-cut support for one of the hypotheses. The authors gathered 31 experimental studies where participants in the experimental conditions contemplated their own death. The dependent measures included, among others, support for conservative leaders, use of military force, and conservative policies and attitudes. Although the average effect size of the ideological intensification hypothesis was larger (r=.35), compared to conservative shift (r=.22), they did not differ significantly. The controversy of conservative shift versus ideological intensification was empirically conducted primarily on the basis of studies focusing on mortality salience in general. Only a few papers examined in the first place the impact of terrorist attacks on political ideologies (Bonanno & Jost, 2006; Huddy & Feldman, 2011; Nail & McGregor, 2009). Some more studies (Echebarria-Echabe & Fernández-Guede, 2006; Fischer, Greitemeyer, Kastenmüller, Frey, & Oßwald, 2007; Nagoshi et al., 2007) measured Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA; Altemeyer, 1998) as dependent variable, which is often used as a proxy for conservatism (e.g., Castano et al., 2011; Jost, Fitzsimons, & Kay, 2004), were conducted coincidentally before, after, or while an attack happened. For instance, Nail and McGregor (2009) found in independent samples, one conducted pre 9/11, the other post 9/11, that the attitudes in the post sample were more pro Bush and pro increasing military spending. Echebarria-Echabe and Fernandez-Guede (2006) present the same design with the Madrid Bombings enclosed. They find RWA and several prejudice measures increased in the post-attack sample. Most of the results of studies conducted in the context of terror can be interpreted as showing a Manuscript #3 108 conservative shift. Only Huddy and Feldman (2011) interpret their analysis of the 2000 vs. 2002 US General Social Survey as counterargument for a conservative shift since they found no indications for increased conservatism in 2002. However, with their cross-sectional data, they can only show that no sustainable conservative shift occurred. They cannot support the ideological intensification hypothesis. Therefore, within subject designs are needed to uncover the process of ideological intensification. Castano et al. (2011; Study 1 & 2) run experiments with liberal undergraduates to see how their ideological beliefs change when they are confronted with death thoughts. Participants first had to position themselves politically on a liberal to conservative scale. The few that positioned themselves as center or right were excluded from the analysis and the remaining respondents filled in a RWA measure as a proxy for conservatism. Then they were allocated to either the experimental condition where they answered questions about their own death (mortality salience) or the control condition. Afterwards all participants were asked to fill in the RWA scale again because the data was allegedly lost by a computer error. The data analysis was done with the residuals of t2 regressed on t1, meaning the change of RWA between the time points. Respondents in the mortality salience condition had a negative sum of residuals which implies that their RWA scores decreased over time. Furthermore, this score was significantly lower in the treatment condition compared to the control condition, which indicates that the respondents became more liberal due to the mortality salience manipulation. In a conceptual replication with specific policies being surveyed, Castano et al. showed that participants (only liberals again) in the mortality salience condition displayed less support for conservative policies compared to the control condition. I extend the literature by applying Castano et al.’s (2011) within-subject panel design (but without control condition) to a large scale, representative panel data set where the post measure was conducted soon after one of the major terrorist attacks of the last decade. This is Manuscript #3 109 unique, since previous research on terrorist attacks as natural experiments had to face several shortcomings in data quality or timing. Either they were convenient samples or consisted entirely of students (Echebarria-Echabe & Fernández-Guede, 2006; Fischer et al., 2007; Nagoshi et al., 2007; Nail & McGregor, 2009) or, if representative surveys were available, scholars had to accept cross-sectional designs and large gaps between the measurement points and the event (e.g., Huddy & Feldman, 2011; Kam & Kinder, 2007). The Present Research Conservative Shift vs. Ideological Intensification. In the present research, I examined whether the Madrid Bombings led to a conservative shift or ideological intensification in Germany. Like Castano et al. (2011) I use RWA as a proxy for conservatism (see also Jost et al., 2003, 2004). Furthermore, this analysis is enlarged upon prejudice, in order to explore whether terrorist threat manifests itself in the devaluation of foreigners. In terms of data analysis, I first applied T-tests to look for a mean shift in RWA. Second, I calculated and analyzed residuals as change scores. Third, to check for the robustness of the findings of step 2, I applied Latent True Change (LTC) modeling, which creates difference scores that are free of measurement error. Since the dataset comprehends not only left-wingers, as was the case in Castano et al.’s (2011) data, I categorized respondents across their political self-positioning at t1 (left, center, right). A conservative shift would express itself in a significantly increased sample mean of RWA over time (H1). The ideological intensification hypothesis would be supported if no mean shift occurs and left-wingers residual scores are negative and right-wingers are positive (H2). Data. Data from the project ‘Group Focused Enmity in Germany’ (GFE; Zick et al., 2008) were used. Sample size was Nt1 = 1140 in 2003, and Nt2 = 804 (70% of the 2003 Manuscript #3 110 sample) in 2004. Panel mortality was unsystematic (Christ, 2006). Data conduction took place from mid-April until mid-June via computer-assisted telephone interviews. The oversampling of the smaller eastern part of Germany is corrected via weighing. After weighing, the sample is representative for the 16 years and older German autochthonous society. Measures. Respondents positioned themselves on a left (1) to right (5) scale, which is comparable to the American liberal to conservative dimension. For reasons of simplicity, the 1 to 5 scale was condensed to 1=left, 2=center, 3=right1. The dataset comprised two aspects of RWA (Altemeyer, 1998) measured by two items each: authoritarian submission, which is the unconditional subordination to ingroup authorities (“One of the most important attitudes that someone should have is obedience and respect for superiors”; “We should be grateful for leading heads who tell us what to do”); and authoritarian aggression, which reflects the need to punish those deviating from ingroup norms (“Crime should be punished more harshly”; “To keep order, one should take more rigorous action against outsiders and trouble makers”). Prejudice was measured by two items: “There are too many foreigners living in Germany” and “When jobs get scarce, the foreigners living in Germany should be sent (back) home”. The response scale reached from 1 = ‘fully agree’ to 4 = ‘fully disagree’. Procedure. Respondents participated in a panel study in April 2003 and April 2004 that included questions about various topics. The attacks on Madrid happened in March 2004 and were still salient when t2 was conducted (e.g., IFD Allensbach, 2004). The panel comprised the three constructs introduced above. Except the fact that in a natural experiment no control group is available, the existing data enabled me to replicate the design of study 1 from Castano et al.’s (2011) paper. At t1, participants positioned themselves politically and 1 Left (1) and rather left (2) were summarized as left. Center (3) remained center. Rather right (4) and right (5) were summarized as right. Manuscript #3 111 responded to RWA and prejudice items. At t2, shortly after the bombing, participants again responded to RWA and prejudice items. Results A Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) of RWA revealed that a two-factor solution (χ²corrected=2.158, df =1, p =.14, CFI=.999, RMSEA=.031, SRMR=.007) is clearly preferable over one factor (χ²corrected=128.842, df=2, p=.00, CFI=.859, RMSEA=.232, SRMR=.065). Thus, authoritarian aggression (t1: α=.778, r=.641; t2 α=.779, r=.639) and authoritarian submission (t1: α=671, r=.507; t2: α=.714, r=.557) are analyzed separately in further steps (referred to as RWAAggr and RWASubm). The prejudice scale reached satisfactory reliability (t1: α=.774, r=.635; t2: α=.768, r=.628). Figure 1. Distribution of left-right self-positioning Figure 1 shows the distribution of the political self-positioning. More than half of the respondents (59%) considered themselves to be centrist, 28.4% said they were left-wing and only 12.6% said they were right-wing. Manuscript #3 112 First, T-tests were calculated to estimate overall mean change in authoritarianism. No such change was found for RWASubm (ΔM=-.004, t(810)=-.212, p > .05) and RWAAggr (ΔM=.022, t(806)=1.117, p > .05). The same was true for prejudice (ΔM=-.027, t(808)=- 1.337, p > .05). This speaks against a conservative shift (H1). Figure 2. Longitudinal change in authoritarian submission Note. The figure shows only the middle section of the y-axis. The full range of residual scores is -2.53 to 1.73. Post-hoc tests with Bonferroni correction. **p<.01, ***p<.001. Next I calculated change scores (unstandardized residuals) by running t2 on t1 regressions for each factor. Figure 2 shows the residual means for the left, center, and right. As predicted by the ideological intensification hypothesis, leftists decreased in RWASubm, whereas rightists increased, F(2, 799)=8.843, p<.001. Centrists showed almost the same effect as rightists did. This pattern speaks for an ideological intensification in authoritarian submission (H2). Manuscript #3 113 Figure 3. Longitudinal change in authoritarian aggression Note. The figure shows only the middle section of the y-axis. The full range of residual scores is -2.26 to 1.46. No significant differences found. A similar pattern occurred for RWAAggr (see Figure 3) but without reaching significance, F(2, 795)=1.362, p>.05. Thus, ideological intensification did not apply to both aspects of RWA. RWAAggr was therefore not included in further analysis. Prejudice showed the same pattern as RWASubm and reached significance, F(2, 796)=5.442, p<.01. Since the results in both RWASubm and prejudice were not different for centrists and rightists, further analysis considered only two categories of political self- placement (left vs. center-right). To check the robustness of these findings, I applied a more elaborated procedure in dealing with longitudinal differences, called Latent True Change (LTC) modeling (McArdle & Hamagami, 2001; Steyer, Eid, & Schwenkmezger, 1997). The model estimation was done with the software Mplus 7 (Muthén & Muthén, 2012) using a robust maximum likelihood Manuscript #3 114 estimator. Missing values were considered via Full-Information-Likelihood-Estimation (FIML; Arbuckle, 1996). The basis of the model is a time-invariant latent factor. Invariance means that the measurement model remains stable across time (Meredith, 1993). Therefore, a simultaneous confirmatory factor analysis with the two measurement points of the same factor is run. Autocorrelations of measurement errors are modeled as indicator specific error factors (Eid, Schneider, & Schwenkmezger, 1999). The well-fitting factors of authoritarian submission (χ²corrected=2.354, df=4, p=.67, CFI=1.00, RMSEA=.00, SRMR=.009) and prejudice (χ²corrected=1.307, df=4, p=.86, CFI=1.00, RMSEA=.00, SRMR=.014) reached strict scalar invariance which is the best of three possible stages of invariance. In a next step, a simple restatement of the model creates the latent true change factor. The t2 variable is perfectly regressed on the t1 variable and the LTC factor. Thereby, the intraindividual variance as well as the mean vector of change are redirected into the LTC factor. The mean of the LTC factor is the latent mean difference between t1 and t2 and the variance is the intraindividual latent change. Figure 4. Latent true change model of RWASubm predicted by political ideology Note. Y-variable standardized robust maximum likelihood estimator. Modelfit: χ²corrected=3.758, df=6, p=.71, CFI=1.00, RMSEA=.00, SRMR=.01. Manuscript #3 115 Figure 5. Latent true change model of prejudice predicted by political ideology Note. Y-variable standardized robust maximum likelihood estimator. Modelfit: χ²corrected=5.25, df=6, p=.51, CFI=1.00, RMSEA=.00, SRMR=.012 The mean difference of RWASubm between t1 and t2 was ΔM=.00, p>.05. The significant variance of the change factor (σ²=.178; p<.001) indicated that there was intraindividual movement over time. Figure 4 shows the LTC model with the left vs. center- right dummy included. The correlation between RWASubm at t1 and the ideological dummy variable (r=.276, p<.001) indicated that the initial level of RWASubm and political self- placement are positively connected. The structural path of RWASubm t1 on its LTC factor (β=- .281, p<.001) indicated that high initial values are connected to less change, which is pretty common in such models. Finally, the dummy variable had a significant effect on the LTC of RWASubm (β=.152, p<.01) 2. This can be interpreted as a moderation effect, meaning political self-placement moderated the direction of change in RWASubm. When holding the effect of RWASubm t1 constant, the latent mean for leftists is -.100 and for center-rightists .044 with the difference (b=.144, p < .01) being significant. Exactly the same model description held for 2 Mplus offers the possibility to standardize dependent variables only for cases in which dummy variables are used as independent variables. Beta is the standardized change in y if the dummy changes from 0 to 1 (see Muthén and Muthén, 2012, pp. 721–724). Manuscript #3 116 the LTC of prejudice (Figure 5). No shift in mean (ΔM = .036, p > .05) but significant variance over time (σ² = .178; p < .001), which is partly explained by the political self- placement dummy (β=.131, p < .01). The latent mean for leftists is -.095 and for rightists .036 with b=.131, p<.05. Thus, the application of measurement error free LTC modeling strongly supported former findings. Discussion In this research I contributed to the debate whether a major terrorist attack leads to a conservative shift or ideological intensification. I applied the research design of Castano and colleagues (2011; Study 1) to a large scale representative German panel dataset that included the Madrid Bombings in between the two measurement occasions. Castano et al. found in their exclusively liberal sample that those exposed to mortality salience decreased in authoritarianism. This result could be replicated in this study. Furthermore, this study shows that right-wingers and also centrists develop in the opposed direction compared to leftists, leaving the sample mean stable. Thus, this effect can only be captured with longitudinal and experimental designs but remains unnoticed in all large scale, cross-sectional surveys (e.g., Huddy & Feldman, 2011). The fact that rightists and centrist show a similar development is highly interesting because, consequently, the group of those becoming more conservative after an attack is much larger than the group of those becoming less conservative. This fits Greenberg and Jonas’ (2003) idea that today’s capitalist states have much more right-wing than left-wing potential. According to the authors, this increases the probability that an ideological intensification remains unnoticed and a conservative shift is measured instead, simply due to the numerical superiority of center-rightists. Although the group of center-rightists is much Manuscript #3 117 larger in this representative German sample, the sample mean remains stable. This is because the effect in leftists is stronger than in center-rightists. It is somewhat astonishing that no effects in change of authoritarian aggression could be measured since other researchers found a strong link of terrorist threat and the need to punish others (e.g., Fischer et al., 2007). Researchers should in general check the factorial structure of RWA and look for differential effects of the RWA components (see Duckitt & Bizumic, 2013)3. Nevertheless, the effect in authoritarian submission is perfectly plausible. Whereas center-rightists may wish to have a strong leader in a situation of crisis, leftists may worry about the abuse of the increased power that political leaders have in these periods. Limitations The possibility that the intraindividual change over time is due to other events or developments in that period cannot be fully excluded. Anyhow, with 11-M being the first major Islamist terrorist attack close to Germany and with terrorist threat measures showing increased scores during the time of conduction (Forschungsgruppe Wahlen, 2004a, 2004b; IFD Allensbach, 2004), it seems highly plausible that the attacks caused the systematic variance revealed in this paper. Like Castano et al., 2011, this paper faces the critique that RWA is not a perfect measurement of conservatism (e.g., Crowson, Thoma, & Hestevold, 2005). We acknowledge this shortcoming but point to the fact that this is a secondary analysis of an available dataset. Moreover, additional research needs to be done to figure out how the effect looks like immediately after an attack, how long-lasting such an effect is and if it generalizes across 3 In terms of data analysis, processing RWA as a single factor (in opposite to the results of the CFA) would have shown a significant effect from political self-placement to the change in RWA. This effect however, was driven only by authoritarian submission as the subsequent separate analysis showed. Manuscript #3 118 countries. Furthermore the question comes up whether the same pattern would occur if the focus country itself was hit by a major attack. Conclusion Three conclusions can be drawn from the present study. First, the results of Castano et al., 2011 hold even true in a large scale, representative panel data set. This means that 11-M led to an ideological intensification instead of a conservative shift in Germany. 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Methods of Psychological Research Online, 2(1), 21– 33. Zick, A., Wolf, C., Küpper, B., Davidov, E., Schmidt, P., & Heitmeyer, W. (2008). The Syndrome of Group-Focused Enmity: The Interrelation of Prejudices Tested with Multiple Cross-Sectional and Panel Data. Journal of Social Issues, 64(2), 363–383 2. Final Discussion 123 2. Final Discussion As outlined in the introduction, a new threat to Western countries and their citizens arose with 9/11. With their terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center towers and the Pentagon, Islamist terrorists killed thousands of people and destroyed landmarks of Western capitalism and power. By doing so, they conveyed terror far beyond those directly affected by the attacks (Breckenridge & Zimbardo, 2007). The new threat posed by Islamist terrorism had far reaching consequences for politics (e.g., Huddy, Feldman, & Weber, 2007) but also for individuals’ psychological health (Ahern, Galea, Resnick, & Vlahov, 2004; Marshall et al., 2007). The present research aimed at shedding light onto further consequences of Islamist terrorism and the resulting threat: first, consequences for intergroup relations between Western majority societies and Muslim immigrants (Manuscripts #1 and #2) and second, changes in political ideologies in response to a major terrorist attack (Manuscript #3). In the following section, I discuss theoretical, empirical, and methodological advances as well as the potential for practical interventions following from the results. Thereafter, I give an outlook on future research. 2.1 Perceived Terrorist Threat and Anti-Muslim Backlash (Manuscripts #1 & #2) In this research, my co-authors and I were able to show that perceived terrorist threat on a micro level leads to derogation of Muslims (Manuscript #2). Furthermore, this micro-level process can become an anti-Muslim backlash on a macro level, if specific marginal conditions are given (Manuscript #1). In the first manuscript, we theorized a model from Integrated Threat Theory (ITT; Stephan & Stephan, 2000) and research connecting prejudice with discrimination (e.g., Talaska, Fiske, & Chaiken, 2008). However, that model was not testable with the available data. Therefore, we tested in Manuscript #2 the connection of perceived terrorist threat and derogation of Muslims on a micro-level. In addition to simply testing the 2. Final Discussion 124 connection of those two variables, we delivered evidence for the causal antecedence of perceived terrorist threat to derogation of Muslims. The finding from that study that perceived terrorist threat predicts anti-Muslim prejudice is in line with ITT. It furthermore supports Levine and Campbell’s (1972) assumption that the hostility of the majority is directed to the perceived source of threat, which is also concordant with several scapegoating approaches (Allport, 1979/1954; Glick, 2002, 2005). The aforementioned test of causal antecedence of perceived terrorist threat and derogation of Muslims is unique, to our knowledge. Several studies (Das, Bushman, Bezemer, Kerkhof, & Vermeulen, 2009; Doosje, Zimmermann, Küpper, Zick, & Meertens, 2009; Oswald, 2005) adopted the view that perceived terrorist threat produces prejudice against Muslims but none of them validated that assumption. Ibish (2003) assumed that the 9/11 backlash was an expression of existing prejudice. In the same way, Allen (2004) argued that Islamist terrorism is used as justification to express existing prejudice (for a theoretical account, see Crandall & Eshleman, 2003; Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986). Das et al. (2009) showed that an experimental terrorist threat manipulation led to increased prejudice. However, this design was not able to answer the question if individuals really increased in prejudice or if only the expression of existing prejudice increased. We closed this gap by applying latent variable cross-lagged models (Jöreskog, 1979) to that research question (Manuscript #2). The results clearly indicate that perceived terrorist threat produces prejudice and discriminatory intention against Muslims. An answer to that research question was especially important because it allows to develop appropriate intervention strategies. In Manuscript #2, some promising strategies are discussed to diminish the perception of terrorist threat. In a nutshell, individuals need to be aware about the low probability of becoming a victim (Breckenridge & Zimbardo, 2007; Sunstein, 2003), they should learn more about the motives of terrorists (Fischer, Postmes, Koeppl, Conway, & Fredriksson, 2011), and they 2. Final Discussion 125 should be embedded in subjectively meaningful groups because this can buffer threat (Jonas & Fritsche, 2013). A shared implication from Manuscript #1 and #2 is the demand that mass media needs to stop associating Muslims with terrorism (Poole & Richardson, 2006; Richardson, 2009/2004; Shaheen, 2003). In Manuscript #1, we derived this implication from the assessment that the probability of threat becoming prejudice and discrimination is higher in countries where Muslims are mainly presented in the context of terrorism in mass media. Another implication of Manuscript #1 is that a call for differentiation between peaceful living Muslims and terrorists by political and religious elites can prevent backlash. However, in case of 9/11 in the US, Presidents Bush’s call for differentiation led to decreased prejudice against Muslims but did not prevent violence against them. One reason for this fact is that Bush made his call for differentiation ten days after 9/11 and most of the violent discrimination against Muslims happened already in the very days after 9/11. When the attacks on the UK occurred on July 7, 2005 (7/7), an immediate call for differentiation could not prevent an increase in prejudice and discrimination (EUMC, 2005). Thus, in case of 7/7 in the UK our theorized model fit the data insofar as threat, prejudice and discrimination increased. A similar pattern with only slight increases in reported discriminatory acts was found for the Madrid Bombings on March 11, 2004 (11-M) in Spain. Hence, the macro development of perceived terrorist threat, anti-Muslim prejudice and discrimination after a major attack can be predicted by a social psychological micro level model if several marginal conditions are fulfilled. For all minor events considered in Manuscript #1 only increases in threat but no consequences in prejudice and discrimination were recorded. Additional interesting findings are that 9/11 led to increases in discrimination against Muslims across all focus countries in terms of spillover effects (Allen & Nielsen, 2002) and that 7/7 led to increases in anti-Muslim prejudice in all European focus countries. 2. Final Discussion 126 Time series analyses (e.g., ARIMA; Box, Jenkins, & Reinsel, 2008) were not applicable to the data in Manuscript #1 mainly due to the irregularity of conduction. Furthermore, using stochastic differential equations (e.g., Reinecke, Schmidt, & Weick, 2005) was also not possible with this kind of data. Only one of the repeated cross-section time series provided two items measuring anti-Muslim prejudice. We used this surplus in data quality and tested the invariance of the measurement (Byrne, Shavelson, & Muthén, 1989; Meredith, 1993). By doing so, we determined that the meaning of anti-Muslim prejudice remained stable in Germany between 2003 and 2011. Thus, neither 11-M, 7/7, nor any other terror related event changed the factor structure of anti-Muslim prejudice. To our knowledge, there is no other study showing measurement invariance of anti-Muslim prejudice over such a time span. However, it would have been highly interesting to have a latent measurement of anti-Muslim prejudice in Germany pre and post 9/11. If this had been the case, we would have been able to evaluate whether the mean and/or the full measurement model changed due to 9/11. However, to our knowledge, no such data set exists. 2.2 Perceived Terrorist Threat and Changing Political Ideologies (Manuscript #3) By choosing New York, Madrid, and London as target cities, last decade’s terrorists ensured not only that many people fell victim but also that camera teams were at the scene within minutes (Shurkin, 2007). The pictures of falling bodies and the crashing towers as happened on 9/11 were repeated in news media in an uncountable amount. Also the pictures of shredded trains and body bags after 11-M, as well as the exploded bus in London, were frequently circulated in the months after the attacks. Therefore, it is not astonishing that terrorist attacks have the power to increase the salience of mortality in general which in turn leads individuals to contemplate their own death (Landau et al., 2004). When individuals contemplate their death, scholars of Terror Management Theory (TMT) hypothesize that worldview defense occurs. In context of worldview defense on 2. Final Discussion 127 political ideologies (e.g., conservatism), Huddy and Feldman (2011) introduced the term ideological intensification. Ideological intensification means that individuals increase their conviction of their political view. Pyszczynski, Solomon, and Greenberg (2003) hypothesized worldview defense to occur also in context of major terrorist attacks. That is what I found in German data, for a period when the Madrid Bombing occurred: leftists became less conservative and centrists and rightists more conservative. With this finding, I make a contribution to an ongoing debate about the appropriateness of two competing theories: On the one hand, there is TMT with the ideological intensification hypothesis (Castano et al., 2011; Pyszczynski et al., 2006; Pyszczynski et al., 2003), on the other hand, conservatism as motivated social cognition theory (Jost et al., 2007; Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003) whose advocates argue that threat, especially mortality salience, leads to a conservative shift. A conservative shift means that all individuals react with conservatism to existential threat. Recently, Burke, Kosloff, and Landau (2013) delivered a meta-analysis on this debate. The authors analyzed more than thirty experiments. However, the meta-analysis delivered no clear cut result about the superiority of one perspective over the other. Therefore, the results of Manuscript #3 are an important contribution to the research field because they are built on a large, representative panel dataset that covers a major terrorist attack. This increases external validity of the worldview defense hypothesis. On the other hand, this goes along with limitations of internal validity. However, the fact that the post-attack data was conducted only a few weeks after 11-M, when perceived terrorist threat was still increased, downgrades that limitation. A similar study covering a real world terrorist event is available by Echebarria-Echabe and Fernández-Guede (2006). However, they have only non-representative, independent pre- post samples which allows no insights into the intraindividual process of ideology change. In terms of methodology, Manuscript #3 is to my knowledge the first one in that specific research field and in general one of the very rare manuscripts that applied latent true change 2. Final Discussion 128 modeling (McArdle, 2009; Steyer, Eid, & Schwenkmezger, 1997). This method produces measurement error free change scores and is therefore highly advantageous compared to other change and difference scores. 2.3 Anti-Muslim Backlash and Ideological Intensification – A Contradiction? An additional finding in Manuscript #3 was that prejudice (xenophobia) changed in the same ideology intensifying way as authoritarian submission did. Those on the left became less prejudiced whereas centrist and rightists increased in prejudice. On mean level, prejudice remained stable. With these results in mind, the question arises whether the same pattern would have been observable if the variable under scrutiny was anti-Muslim and not general prejudice. On the one hand, this makes sense as general prejudice and anti-Muslim prejudice share substantial variance, at least when measured in Germany (see Zick et al., 2008). On the other hand, according to Levine and Campbell (1972) it is probable that the reaction to the specifically threatening group is different than to unspecific foreigners (see also Fritsche, Jonas, & Kessler, 2011; Sides & Gross, 2013). Thus, one has to ask whether leftists defend primarily the Western World or their political ideology if a terrorist attack occurs. In this line, Jonas and Fritsche (2013) point to the flexibility of the worldviews defended, depending on the activated ingroup identity. Most of the research in the area of worldview defense (ideological intensification) showed that worldview defense occurred against individuals of the national ingroup with a contrary political ideology (Castano et al., 2011; Greenberg, Simon, Pyszczynski, Solomon, & Chatel, 1992; McGregor et al., 1998) and not against ethnic outgroup members (but see Das et al., 2009; for an overview, see Greenberg & Kosloff, 2008). The question is therefore whether a terrorist attack activates the ingroup identity 2. Final Discussion 129 “German” 1 which would lead to worldview defense against “Muslims” or if one’s own political ideology is activated. The latter would lead to worldview defense against national ingroup members with a different political ideology. A third possibility is that both processes happen but in a sequential order. First, the ingroup “Germans” is activated and with decreasing emotionality one’s own political ideology gains attention. However, this is rather speculative which emphasizes the need for future research on worldview defense when it comes to real world terror. Finally, considering the large potential of centrists and rightistis due to their mere quantitative superiority, it is conceivable that anti-Muslim prejudice increases on mean level, even if leftists would decrease in prejudice (see Greenberg & Jonas, 2003). The discussion shows that anti-Muslim backlash and ideological intensification are not necessarily contradictory. 1 Also the ingroup „Westerners“ could be activated if an attack hits an allied country. When 9/11 occurred, the German parliamentary leader of the Social Democratic Party said: “today, we are all Americans” (Freeman, 2001) which emphasizes that the definition of the ingroup depends on situations. 3. Outlook 130 3. Outlook The attacks on 9/11 gained as much attention in the research community as they did in news media. Thousands of research papers from various disciplines are dedicated to the attacks that shocked the so called Western World. In this research, my co-authors and I demonstrated that perceived terrorist threat has far reaching consequences for a) Muslims in Western countries and b) for changes in political ideologies. These results make a valuable contribution to contemporary research on perceived terrorist threat. However, further research may provide new perspectives on the topic and cover the shortcomings of the present studies. An assumption throughout the thesis was that the quality of the Western stereotype of Muslims changed with 9/11. I argued that the facet “terrorist” was strengthened (e.g., US) or added (e.g., Germany) which made Muslims more threatening than before the attacks. To my knowledge, there is no such pre-post comparison for 9/11 (for a close approach, see Kalkan, Layman, & Uslaner, 2009). Seago (1947) delivers such a comparison for the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 (see also Meenes, 1943). This study used the Katz and Braly’s (1935) method of ascertaining national and racial stereotypes. Study participants received a list of 84 adjectives and had to allocate them to national groups. Seago (1947) revealed that the stereotypes versus Japanese changed dramatically in a negative direction after the attacks. From a modern stereotype content view, Sides and Gross (2013) demonstrated that Muslims in the US are perceived as violent and untrustworthy. Furthermore, they found that individuals who see Muslims in that way also rather support several aspects of the war on terror. Thus, there are hints for an integration of violent concepts into the stereotype of Muslims but there is no clear cut indication that this is caused by terrorist attacks. Therefore, further research should answer the question if stereotypes against Muslims are the same in terrorist threat and non-threat periods and how this affects attitudes and behavior towards 3. Outlook 131 Muslims. One method to answer that question is continuous and frequent terrorist threat and Muslim stereotype monitoring. Such a dataset would also be appropriate to examine the impact of the mass media on perceived threat, as theorized in Manuscript #1. Moreover, insights into the process of specific activation of facets of the stereotype of Muslims by terrorist threat could be reached by running experiments. Terrorist threat could be experimentally manipulated and stereotype content then analyzed as outcome measure. Personality attributes that favor the perception of terrorist threat remained largely unconsidered in this thesis due to a different research focus. Huddy et al. (2005) provide an overview of predictors of terrorist threat. Gender (female) and authoritarianism are related to higher threat perceptions, whereas higher education reduces the perception of terrorist threat. In Manuscript #1, I derived a model from theory that predicted perceived terrorist threat becomes anti-Muslim prejudice, and prejudice then becomes discrimination. However, I could not validate this assumption: in Manuscript #1 the data was not appropriate for such an analysis and in Manuscript #2, anti-Muslim prejudice and discrimination happened to be indistinct constructs. Therefore, further research should clarify this mediation, ideally by means of experimental terrorist threat manipulations and the measurement of real discriminatory behavior in the laboratory. In such a research design, the search for moderators of the assumed threat-prejudice-discrimination mediation should also be included. To get closer to the discussed mechanism of ideological intensification in case of anti- Muslim prejudice (see chapter 2.3), I would suggest a two-stage research plan. First, the underlying processes need to be examined as thoroughly as possible in laboratory experimental research (for an overview, see Jonas & Fritsche, 2013). One of the crucial questions to answer is if worldview defense in response to terrorism differs depending on the activated ingroup identity (e.g., German vs. leftist). The second stage should then monitor individuals (political) ideologies and the relevant variables derived from stage one at regular 3. Outlook 132 intervals (e.g., monthly)1. Such a panel design would enable researchers to study fluctuations of the constructs under research in a real world context. It would also allow to evaluate the above conceived idea of sequentiality, that individuals first defend their larger ingroup (e.g. country) and afterwards their political ideology. In terms of methodology, such a design would allow to analyze the data with elaborated methods from the family of longitudinal latent variable modeling (McArdle, 2009) and stochastic differential equations (Reinecke et al., 2005). Finally, I hope that the manuscripts of this thesis reach practitioners who develop more specific intervention programs to minimize the perception of terrorist threat and its consequences. Furthermore, I appeal to the mass media to start presenting Muslims not only in negative contexts but as peaceful members of today’s multicultural Western societies. The association of Muslims with terrorism needs to be cut. What gives me hope is the fact that the attacks on the Boston Marathon in April 2013 did not lead to an anti-Muslim backlash. It seems as political and religious leaders learned from past mistakes and are now well prepared to react immediately in case of a new attack to avoid backlash. 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The Journal of Politics, 71(03), 847. doi:10.1017/S0022381609090756 Katz, D., & Braly, K. W. (1935). Racial prejudice and racial stereotypes. The Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 30(2), 175–193. doi:10.1037/h0059800 Landau, M. J., Solomon, S., Greenberg, J., Cohen, F., Pyszczynski, T. A., Arndt, J., … (2004). Deliver us from Evil: The Effects of Mortality Salience and Reminders of 9/11 on Support for President George W. Bush. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 30(9), 1136–1150. doi:10.1177/0146167204267988 LeVine, R. A., & Campbell, D. T. (1972). Ethnocentrism: theories of conflict, ethnic attitudes, and group behavior. New York: Wiley. Marshall, R. D., Bryant, R. A., Amsel, L., Suh, E. J., Cook, J. M., & Neria, Y. (2007). The psychology of ongoing threat: Relative risk appraisal, the September 11 attacks, and terrorism-related fears. American Psychologist, 62(4), 304–316. doi:10.1037/0003- 066X.62.4.304 McArdle, J. J. (2009). Latent Variable Modeling of Differences and Changes with Longitudinal Data. Annual Review of Psychology, 60(1), 577–605. doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.60.110707.163612 McGregor, H. A., Lieberman, J. D., Greenberg, J., Solomon, S., Arndt, J., Simon, L., & Pyszczynski, T. (1998). Terror management and aggression: Evidence that mortality salience motivates aggression against worldview-threatening others. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 74(3), 590–605. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.74.3.590 Meenes, M. (1943). A Comparison of Racial Stereotypes of 1935 and 1942. The Journal of Social Psychology, 17(2), 327–336. doi:10.1080/00224545.1943.9712287 Meredith, W. (1993). Measurement invariance, factor analysis and factorial invariance. Psychometrika, 58(4), 525–543. doi:10.1007/BF02294825 Oswald, D. L. (2005). Understanding Anti-Arab Reactions Post-9/11: The Role of Threats, Social Categories, and Personal Ideologies. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 35(9), 1775–1799. doi:10.1111/j.1559-1816.2005.tb02195.x Poole, E., & Richardson, J. E. (2006). Muslims and the news media. London, New York: I.B. Tauris. Pyszczynski, T., Abdollahi, A., Solomon, S., Greenberg, J., Florette, C., & Weise, D. R. (2006). Mortality Salience, Martyrdom, and Military Might: The Great Satan Versus the 3. Outlook 136 Axis of Evil. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 32(4), 525–537. doi:10.1177/0146167205282157 Pyszczynski, T., Solomon, S., & Greenberg, J. (2003). In the Wake of 9/11: The Psychology of Terror. Washington, DC, US: American Psychological Association. Reinecke, J., Schmidt, P., & Weick, S. (2005). Dynamic Modeling with Structural Equations and Stochastic Differential Equations: Applications with the German Socio-economic Panel. Quality & Quantity, 39(4), 483–506. doi:10.1007/s11135-005-0239-x Richardson, J. E. (2009/2004). (Mis)representing Islam: The racism and rhetoric of British broadsheet newspapers. Discourse approaches to politics, society, and culture: Vol. 9. Amsterdam, Philadelphia, PA: John Benjamins Pub. Seago, D. W. (1947). Stereotypes: Before Pearl Harbor and After. The Journal of Psychology, 23(1), 55–63. doi:10.1080/00223980.1947.9917320 Shaheen, J. G. (2003). Reel Bad Arabs: How Hollywood Vilifies a People. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 588(1), 171–193. doi:10.1177/0002716203588001011 Shurkin, J. N. (2007). Terrorism and the Media. In B. M. Bongar, L. M. Brown, L. E. Beutler, J. N. Breckenridge, & P. G. Zimbardo (Eds.), Psychology of terrorism (pp. 81–86). Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press. Sides, J., & Gross, K. (2013). Stereotypes of Muslims and Support for the War on Terror. The Journal of Politics, 75(3), 583–598. doi:10.1017/S0022381613000388 Stephan, W. G., & Stephan, C. W. (2000). An integrated threat theory of prejudice. In S. Oskamp (Ed.), Reducing prejudice and discrimination (pp. 23–45). Mahwah, N.J: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. Steyer, R., Eid, M., & Schwenkmezger, P. (1997). Modeling True Intraindividual Change: True Change as a Latent Variable. Methods of Psychological Research Online, 2(1), 21– 33. Sunstein, C. R. (2003). Terrorism and Probability Neglect. In W. K. Viscusi (Ed.), The Risks of Terrorism (pp. 23–38). Boston, MA: Springer US. Talaska, C. A., Fiske, S. T., & Chaiken, S. (2008). Legitimating Racial Discrimination: Emotions, Not Beliefs, Best Predict Discrimination in a Meta-Analysis. Tourangeau, R., Rips, L. J., & Rasinski, K. A. (2000). The psychology of survey response. Cambridge, U.K. ;, New York: Cambridge university press. Zick, A., Wolf, C., Küpper, B., Davidov, E., Schmidt, P., & Heitmeyer, W. (2008). The Syndrome of Group-Focused Enmity: The Interrelation of Prejudices Tested with Multiple Cross-Sectional and Panel Data. Journal of Social Issues, 64(2), 363–383. doi:10.1111/j.1540-4560.2008.00566.x Zusammenfassung 137 Zusammenfassung Am 11. September 2001 veränderte sich die Welt, als die Großmacht USA von islamistischen Terroristen attackiert wurde. Mehr als 3000 Menschen starben durch die Attacken und mehrere Wahrzeichen amerikanischer Macht wurden zerstört. Diese Ereignisse versetzten Millionen von Menschen in der sogenannten westlichen Welt in Angst und Schrecken, was dazu führte, dass Islamistischer Terrorismus plötzlich eine ernstzunehmende Bedrohung darstellte. Viele Menschen in den USA und weiten Teilen Europas befürchteten, dass ihr Land aber auch sie selber Opfer von Terroranschlägen werden könnten. Bedingt durch immer neue Anschläge oder Anschlagsversuche, ist dieses Bedrohungsgefühl bis heute, mehr als ein Jahrzehnt später, nicht wieder komplett verschwunden. Daher widme ich mich in meiner hier vorliegenden Dissertation dem Phänomen der wahrgenommenen Terrorbedrohung und den resultierenden Konsequenzen. Konkret befasse ich mich einerseits mit den Konsequenzen des Terrors für die in westlichen Ländern lebenden Muslime und andererseits mit den Änderungen politischer Ideologien infolge von Anschlägen. Bedrohungen, gleich ob realistischer oder symbolischer Art, sind im Kontext von Intergruppenbeziehungen dafür bekannt, Vorurteile und Diskriminierung gegenüber Fremdgruppen zu verstärken (z.B. Integrated Threat Theory; Stephan & Stephan, 2000). Am stärksten richtet sich ein solcher Effekt der Mehrheitsbevölkerung gegenüber der Minderheit, von der die vermeintliche Bedrohung ausgeht (LeVine & Campbell, 1972). Islamistische Terroranschläge müssten dementsprechend zur Abwertung von Muslimen führen. Die Manuskripte #1 und #2 beschäftigen sich mit dieser Annahme. Wahrgenommene Terrorbedrohung kann dazu führen, dass bei Personen Gedanken über den eigenen Tod salient werden (Landau et al., 2004). Die Salienz des eigenen Todes weckt den Wunsch, Teil einer Gemeinschaft und einer Weltanschauung zu sein, welche das eigene Ableben überdauert (Terror Management Theory; Greenberg, Pyszczynski, Solomon, Zusammenfassung 138 Rosenblatt, & et al, 1990). Aus diesem Grund wird vermutet, dass Terroranschläge dazu führen, dass Individuen ihre Weltanschauung stärker vertreten (Pyszczynski, Solomon, & Greenberg, 2003). Mit dieser Hypothese befasst sich Manuskript #3. Die Ausgangsbeobachtung für Manuskript #1 war, dass es nach den Anschlägen vom 11. September 2001 zu einer Welle von Hassverbrechen gegen Muslime in den USA kam. Die abgeleitete Forschungsfrage war daher, ob diese Hassverbrechen mit einem sozialpsychologischen Modell erklärt werden können, welches postuliert, dass wahrgenommene Terrorbedrohung zu Vorurteilen und Vorurteile wiederum zu Diskriminierung führen. Um die externe Validität des Modells zu prüfen, wurde es auf verschiedene Länder (USA, Spanien, UK, Deutschland) und verschiedene Terroranschläge (New York, Madrid, London etc.) angewendet. Die Datengrundlage bildete eine groß angelegte Recherche von Meinungsumfragen und Berichten zu den drei genannten Komponenten des Modells für einen Zeitraum von 2000 bis ca. 2012. Für jedes Land wurde also überprüft, ob nach einem Terroranschlag die wahrgenommene Terrorbedrohung, sowie Vorurteile und Diskriminierung gegenüber Muslimen messbar anstiegen. Die Allgemeingültigkeit des Models konnte nicht gezeigt werden. Dies geht auf die vielen Kontextfaktoren in den einzelnen Ländern zurück. Einige dieser Faktoren werden im Hinblick darauf diskutiert, wie der Teufelskreis von wahrgenommener Terrorbedrohung und Gewalt gegen Muslimen durchbrochen werden kann. Während die Datenlage in Manuskript #1 eine Makro-Perspektive auf die Verknüpfung von wahrgenommener Terrorbedrohung und Abwertung von Muslimen bot, wurde der postulierte Zusammenhang in Manuskript #2 auf Mikro-Ebene überprüft. Dieses Manuskript ging der Frage nach, ob wahrgenommene Terrorbedrohung tatsächlich Vorurteile produziert oder ob wahrgenommene Terrorbedrohung lediglich als Legitimation zur Äußerung bestehender Vorurteile genutzt wird. Auch eine Kombination der beiden Wirkrichtungen wurde in Erwägung gezogen. Die Datengrundlage stellte eine Panelstudie mit N = 88 Zusammenfassung 139 autochthonen Deutschen dar. Die Daten wurden mit latenten, kreuzverzögerten Modellen (Cross-Lagged Modellen; Jöreskog, 1979) analysiert, um die zeitliche Abfolge des Prozesses bestimmen zu können. Die Ergebnisse zeigten, dass die wahrgenommene Terrorbedrohung Vorurteile über die Zeit vorhersagt. Dementsprechend sind Vorurteile gegenüber Muslimen ein Produkt von wahrgenommener Terrorbedrohung, wie es in der Integrated Threat Theory postuliert wird (Stephan, Renfro, & Davis, 2008). Folglich gilt es Bedrohungsgefühle zu reduzieren und die (mediengemachte) Verknüpfung zwischen Islam und Terrorismus zu schwächen. Manuskript #3 befasste sich mit der Auswirkung der Anschläge von Madrid (März 2004) auf politische Ideologien in Deutschland. Wie oben bereits angedeutet, wurde die Hypothese getestet, ob sich Individuen nach einem Anschlag in ihrer politischen Ideologie – einem Aspekt ihrer Weltsicht – verstärken (Castano et al., 2011). Die alternative Hypothese lautete, dass alle Individuen gleichermaßen auf Terroranschläge reagieren und konservativer werden (Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003). Ein für die deutsche Bevölkerung (16+) repräsentativer Paneldatensatz, der ein Jahr vor und wenige Wochen nach den Anschlägen erhoben wurde, bildete die Datengrundlage. Die Analysen, die unter anderem mit Latent Change Modellen (Steyer, Eid, & Schwenkmezger, 1997) durchgeführt wurden, zeigten, dass Menschen die sich zu t1 als politisch links einordneten nach den Anschlägen (t2) noch weniger konservativ wurden. Individuen, die sich hingegen zu t1 in der politischen Mitte oder rechts davon verorteten, wurden konservativer zu t2. Das gleiche Muster fand sich auch für Fremdenfeindlichkeit. Diese Ergebnisse bestätigten die Vorhersage der Terror Management Theory (Pyszczynski et al., 2003). Ein praxisrelevante Tatsache bei diesem Befund war, dass das quantitative Potential für einen konservativen Schwung weit höher ist, da die Gruppe der sich politisch in der Mitte oder rechts Einordnenden weit größer war, als die Gruppe derjenigen, die sich links verorteten. Zusammenfassung 140 Zusammengenommen weisen die Befunde der drei Manuskripte auf die weitreichenden Folgen von wahrgenommener Terrorbedrohung hin. Vor allem aber bietet das tiefere Verständnis der beschriebenen Phänomene die Möglichkeit effektive Handlungsstrategien abzuleiten, damit friedlebende Muslime in Zukunft nicht mehr die Sündenböcke für die Taten weniger Terroristen werden. Zusammenfassung 141 Literatur Castano, E., Leidner, B., Bonacossa, A., Nikkah, J., Perrulli, R., Spencer, B., & Humphrey, N. (2011). Ideology, Fear of Death, and Death Anxiety. Political Psychology, 32(4), 601–621. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9221.2011.00822.x Greenberg, J., Pyszczynski, T., Solomon, S., Rosenblatt, A., & et al. (1990). Evidence for terror management theory II: The effects of mortality salience on reactions to those who threaten or bolster the cultural worldview. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 58(2), 308–318. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.58.2.308 Jöreskog, K. G. (1979). Statistical estimation of structural models in longitudinal development investigations. In J. R. Nesselroade & P. B. Baltes (Eds.), Longitudinal research in the study of behavior and development (pp. 303–352). New York: Academic Press. Jost, J. T., Glaser, J., Kruglanski, A. W., & Sulloway, F. J. (2003). Political conservatism as motivated social cognition. Psychological Bulletin, 129(3), 339–375. doi:10.1037/0033- 2909.129.3.339 Landau, M. J., Solomon, S., Greenberg, J., Cohen, F., Pyszczynski, T. A., Arndt, J., … (2004). Deliver us from Evil: The Effects of Mortality Salience and Reminders of 9/11 on Support for President George W. Bush. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 30(9), 1136–1150. doi:10.1177/0146167204267988 LeVine, R. A., & Campbell, D. T. (1972). Ethnocentrism: theories of conflict, ethnic attitudes, and group behavior. New York: Wiley. Pyszczynski, T., Solomon, S., & Greenberg, J. (2003). In the Wake of 9/11: The Psychology of Terror. Washington, DC, US: American Psychological Association. Stephan, W. G., Renfro, C. L., & Davis, M. D. (2008). The Role of Threat in Integroup Relations. In U. Wagner, L. R. Tropp, G. Finchilescu, & C. Tredoux (Eds.), Social issues and interventions. Improving intergroup relations. Building on the legacy of Thomas F. Pettigrew (pp. 55–72). Malden, MA, Oxford: Blackwell Pub. Stephan, W. G., & Stephan, C. W. (2000). An integrated threat theory of prejudice. In S. Oskamp (Ed.), Reducing prejudice and discrimination (pp. 23–45). Mahwah, N.J: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. Steyer, R., Eid, M., & Schwenkmezger, P. (1997). Modeling True Intraindividual Change: True Change as a Latent Variable. Methods of Psychological Research Online, 2(1), 21– 33. Danksagung 142 Danksagung Mein besonderer Dank gilt meinem Anleiter Prof. Dr. Uli Wagner, der mir zuverlässig mit seiner Expertise und seiner immensen Erfahrung unterstützend zur Seite stand. Besonderer Dank gilt auch meinem Zweitgutachter, Prof. Dr. Peter Schmidt, der vor allem meine methodologisch-wissenschaftliche Ausrichtung entscheidend geprägt und diese Dissertation von Anbeginn begleitet hat. Danken möchte ich auch den Mitgliedern des Graduiertenkollegs „Gruppenbezogene Menschenfeindlichkeit“ für die gegenseitige Unterstützung und den regen Austausch in dem anfangs unüberschaubaren Prozess des Promovierens. Vor allem aber auch für die vielen tollen Momente auf Summer-Schools oder internationalen Konferenzen. Insbesondere mit meiner langjährigen Kommilitonin und guten Freundin Stefanie Gosen habe ich viele interessante Länder und Städte bereist. Das war eine tolle Zeit die ich nicht missen möchte. Außerdem möchte ich der Arbeitseinheit Sozialpsychologie für die gute Unterstützung danken, die ich genieße, seitdem ich in die „Zentrale“ gezogen bin. Ich habe die tolle Arbeitsatmosphäre, den regen Gedankenaustausch und das gemeinsame Mittagessen sehr zu schätzen gelernt. Besonderer Dank gilt den beiden Post-Docs Mathias Kauff und Frank Asbrock, die für die schnelle Rückfrage zwischendurch immer ein offenes Ohr und meistens auch eine Antwort parat hatten. Danke auch an die Hilfskräfte für das Anfertigen von Grafiken und das Korrekturlesen von Texten. Auch meinen „Büro-Insassen“ Christoph Butenschön und Sarina Schäfer möchte ich für die tolle gemeinsame Zeit und für die geteilte Vorliebe für schlechte Wortwitze danken. Mein persönlicher Dank gilt schließlich meiner Familie und meinen Freunden, auf deren Unterstützung und Zuspruch ich durchgehend zählen konnte. Insbesondere möchte ich auch Ann-Sophie - der Frau in meinem Leben - danken, die mich stets unterstützte und motivierte, besonders wenn die Arbeit kräftezehrend war und endlos erschien. Danke dafür! Platzhalterseite “Angaben zur Person” 143 Erklärung des Autors 144 Erklärung des Autors Ich versichere, dass ich meine Dissertation „Anti-Muslim Backlash and Changing Political Ideologies. The Consequences of Perceived Threat from Islamist Terrorism“ selbstständig, ohne unerlaubte Hilfe angefertigt habe und mich dabei keiner anderen als der von mir ausdrücklich bezeichneten Quellen und Hilfen bedient habe. Die Dissertation wurde in der jetzigen oder einer ähnlichen Form noch bei keiner anderen Hochschule eingereicht und hat noch keinen Prüfungszwecken gedient. ________________ ________________ (Ort / Datum) Stefan Thörner 
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work_tgt5ez4lpjde5cb6lnhefoxnqm	----	Aug16_Brown_46_OA.indd 275 The Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence August 2016 The “Who?” Question in the Hate Speech Debate: Part 1: Consistency, Practical, and Formal Approaches Alexander Brown This is the first part of a two-part article addressing the “Who?” question in the hate speech debate. This question is about which characteristics, social identities or statuses should or should not be treated as protected characteristics within a body of laws banning incitement to hatred. To put this into a UK context, the 1965 Race Relations Act1 introduced for the first time an offence of stirring up racial hatred. The scope of this offence was later clarified by the Public Order Act 19862 in which “racial hatred” was defined as “hatred against a group of persons defined by reference to colour, race, nationality (including citizenship) or ethnic or national origins” (s 17). Twenty years later the Racial and Religious Hatred Act 20063 added a new offence of stirring up religious hatred. The Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 20084 extended this body of law still further to create an- other new offence of stirring up hatred on grounds of sexual orientation. In re- cent years the government has also given some consideration to the proposal of extending a third time to cover disability and transgender identity. By contrast, it has given little, if any, serious consideration to creating an offence of stirring up hatred on grounds of age. So what characteristics should be covered? Clearly the answer to this question cannot be—because it is circular—that governmental authorities should include within the scope of incitement to hatred laws protected characteristics, where the definition of protected characteristics is simply charac- teristics that should be protected by incitement to hatred laws. In order to answer the “Who?” question in a rational and non-circular way we must first ask a more fundamental or meta-level question: what is the right approach to answering the “Who?” question? Or, more specifically, what moral and practical considerations are relevant to specifying the proper scope of incitement to hatred laws? Across the two parts of the article I shall outline and critically appraise five different broad approaches to specification. Part 1 deals with consistency speci- fication, which highlights norms of consistency both within incitement to hatred I would like to thank the journal’s anonymous reviewer for very useful suggestions. I am also extremely grateful to the participants of a workshop on hate speech sponsored by the Society for Applied Philosophy held at Senate House, London in November 2015, as well as to the audience of a panel on hate speech to which I contributed at the International Network for Hate Studies Biennial Conference, University of Limerick, May 2016. Also, I am indebted to Matteo Bonotti and Mary Hourihan for their insightful comments on earlier drafts and to CJLJ student editor Aileen Simon for splendid copyediting. 1. (UK), c 71 [1965 Race Relations Act]. 2. (UK), c 64 [Public Order Act 1986]. 3. (UK), c 1 [Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006]. 4. (UK), c 4 [Criminal Justice and Immigration Act]. Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence XXIX No.2 August 2016, 275-320 doi: 10.1017/cjlj.2016.13 © Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence 2016. This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted reuse, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. Aug16_Brown_46_OA.indd 275 7/23/18 3:47 PM available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/cjlj.2016.13 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:33, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/cjlj.2016.13 https://www.cambridge.org/core 276 Brown law itself and in relation to other laws, practical specification, which focuses on the ostensible goals or apparent aims of incitement to hatred laws, and formal specification, which looks at the formal qualities of the characteristics them- selves and to the different forms of people’s relationships with those character- istics. And Part 2 considers functional specification, which concentrates on the underlying or real functions, purposes or objectives of incitement to hatred laws, and democratic specification, which appeals to democratic procedures as well as to democratic values, norms and principles that speak to the proper scope of incitement to hatred laws. Along the way I shall also critically assess a range of substantive arguments about which particular characteristics should or should not be covered by incitement to hatred laws given the aforementioned approach- es. My main conclusion shall be that each of the approaches has its strengths and weaknesses and that, partly because of this, no single approach is adequate by itself as a tool for specifying the proper scope of incitement to hatred laws, but also, by the same token, no approach should be ruled out entirely. Instead, the best strategy is one that combines together all five approaches in reasonable ways given the law, the characteristic and the context. I. Hate speech laws and protected characteristics I want to begin by clarifying the nature of the “Who?” question. There are numer- ous characteristics, social identities or statuses that either currently are or con- ceivably could be brought under the scope of hate speech laws.5 These include: · age (e.g., Canada,6 South Africa,7 Tasmania (Australia),8 YouTube9); · age performance or ways of performing age such as acting young or old; · citizenship status, if distinguished from nationality (e.g., England and Wales (UK),10 Northern Ireland (UK)11); · criminal record, when not already included under social status; · disability including both mental and physical disability (e.g., Canada,12 5. I use the term ‘hate speech laws’ in a deliberately broad way to include any laws/regulations/ codes that directly or indirectly restrict uses of hate speech where this can encompass instanc- es of human rights law, criminal law, anti-discrimination law, civil law, media and Internet regulations, the codes of practice of media and Internet companies, and the codes of conduct of businesses, organisations and institutions, including university anti-harassment policies or campus speech codes. 6. Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, ss 318(4), 319, as amended by An Act to Amend the Criminal Code (Hate Propaganda), RSC 2004, c C-14 [Criminal Code]. 7. Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 2000 (S Afr), No 4 of 2000, ss 1(1), 10(1) [Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 2000]. 8. Anti-Discrimination Act 1998 (Tas), s 16(b) [Anti-Discrimination Act 1998]. 9. YouTube Community Guidelines, Hateful Content, online: www.youtube.com/yt/policyand- safety/en-GB/communityguidelines.html. 10. Public Order Act 1986, supra note 2 at ss 17-29. 11. The Public Order (Northern Ireland) Order 1987, SI 1987/463 (NI 7), ss 8-13 [The Public Order (Northern Ireland) Order 1987]. 12. Criminal Code, supra note 6 at ss 318(4), 319. Aug16_Brown_46_OA.indd 276 7/23/18 3:47 PM available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/cjlj.2016.13 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:33, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/cjlj.2016.13 https://www.cambridge.org/core The “Who?” Question in the Hate Speech Debate: Part 1 277 Finland,13 France,14 Hong Kong,15 the Netherlands,16 Northern Ireland (UK),17 South Africa,18 Tasmania (Australia)19); · education, when not already included under social status; · employment status, such as employed or unemployed; · ethnicity including cultural heritage, ancestry or descent, physical appearance, homeland, origin (e.g., Australia,20 Australian Capital Territory (Australia),21 Canada,22 Chile,23 Connecticut (US),24 Croatia,25 Denmark,26 England and Wales (UK),27 Finland,28 France,29 the Netherlands,30 Massachusetts (US)31, New South Wales (Australia),32 New Zealand,33 Northern Ireland (UK),34 Queensland (Australia),35 Republic of Ireland,36 Russia,37 South Africa,38 Tasmania (Australia),39 Western Australia (Australia)40); · gender such as man, woman, male, female, or sex such as cisgender, transgen- der, cissexual, transsexual, third gender, bigender, pangender, agender, in- tersex, third sex (e.g., Australian Capital Territory (Australia),41 Canada,42 13. The Criminal Code of Finland, 2011/511, c 11, s 10 [The Criminal Code of Finland]. 14. Loi du 29 juillet 1881 sur la liberté de la presse, JO, 29 July 1881, arts 24, 32, 33, as amended by Loi n°72-546 du 1 juillet 1972 relative à la lutte contre le racisme, JO, 1 July 1972; Loi n°2004-1486 du 30 décembre 2005 portant création de la haute autorité de lutte contre les discriminations et pour l’égalité, JO, 30 December 2004; Loi n°2012-954 du 6 août 2012 relative au harcèlement sexuel, JO, 6 August 2012 [Law on the Freedom of the Press]. 15. Disability Discrimination Ordinance, c 487, s 46. 16. Penal Code (Netherlands), 3 March 1881, arts 137c and 137d [Penal Code (Netherlands)]. 17. The Public Order (Northern Ireland) Order 1987, supra note 11 at ss 8-13. 18. Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 2000, supra note 7 at ss 1(1), 10(1). 19. Anti-Discrimination Act 1998, supra note 8 at ss 16(k), 19(b). 20. Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth), s 18C(1) [Racial Discrimination Act 1975]. 21. Discrimination Act 1991 (ACT), s 66(1)(a), 67(1)(d)(i) [Discrimination Act 1991]. 22. Criminal Code, supra note 6 at ss 318(4), 319. 23. Statute on Freedom of Opinion and Information and the Performance of Journalism, 4 June 2001, art 31 [Statute on Freedom of Opinion and Information and the Performance of Journalism]. 24. Connecticut General Statutes, Conn Stat, c 939, § 53-57 [Connecticut General Statutes]. 25. Criminal Code, 110/1997, art 174(3) [Criminal Code (Croatia)]. 26. Penal Code, 871/2014, s 266(b)(1) [Penal Code (Denmark)]. 27. Public Order Act 1986, supra note 2 at ss 17-29. 28. The Criminal Code of Finland, supra note 13 at c 11, s 10. 29. Law on the Freedom of the Press, supra note 14 at arts 24, 32, 33. 30. Penal Code (Netherlands), supra note 16 at arts 137c, 137d. 31. Massachusetts General Laws, Mass Stat, c 272, § 98C [Massachusetts General Laws]. 32. Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW), ss 20B-20D [Anti-Discrimination Act 1977]. 33. Human Rights Act 1993 (NZ) 1993/82, arts 61, 131 [Human Rights Act 1993]. 34. The Public Order (Northern Ireland) Order 1987, supra note 11 at ss 8-13. 35. Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld), s 124A(1), 131A(1) [Anti-Discrimination Act 1991]. 36. Prohibition of Incitement to Hatred Act, 1989 (Ireland), 1989/19, ss 1-12 [Prohibition of Incitement to Hatred Act, 1989]. 37. The Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, 1996/63, art 282.1 [The Criminal Code of the Russian Federation]. 38. Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 2000, supra note 7 at ss 1(1), 10(1). 39. Anti-Discrimination Act 1998, supra note 8 at ss 16(a), 19(a). 40. Criminal Code Act 1913 (WA), ss 76-80H [Criminal Code Act 1913]. 41. Discrimination Act 1991, supra note 21 at ss 66(1)(c), 67(1)(d)(iii). 42. Criminal Code, supra note 6 at ss 318(4), 319. Aug16_Brown_46_OA.indd 277 7/23/18 3:47 PM available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/cjlj.2016.13 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:33, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/cjlj.2016.13 https://www.cambridge.org/core 278 Brown Chile,43 France,44 the Netherlands,45 New South Wales (Australia),46 Queensland (Australia),47 South Africa,48 Tasmania (Australia)49); · gender performance or ways of performing gender identity such as be- ing masculine, effeminate, metrosexual, when not already included under gender; · HIV/AIDS status (e.g., Australian Capital Territory (Australia),50 New South Wales (Australia)51); · immigration status, when not already included under citizenship status and nationality; · language including language status, mother-tongue and language accent identity, if not included under ethnicity (e.g., South Africa52); · marital status including relationship status, when not already included un- der social status (e.g., South Africa,53 Tasmania (Australia)54); · medical status including serious disease, when not already included under HIV/AIDS status (e.g., Facebook55); · nationality or legal relationship to a state, when not already included un- der ethnicity (e.g., Australia,56 Australian Capital Territory (Australia),57 Canada,58 Chile,59 Connecticut (US),60 Croatia,61 Denmark,62 England and Wales (UK),63 Finland,64 France,65 the Netherlands,66 Massachusetts (US)67, 43. Statute on Freedom of Opinion and Information and the Performance of Journalism, supra note 23 at art 31. 44. Law on the Freedom of the Press, supra note 14 at arts 24, 32, 33. 45. Penal Code (Netherlands), supra note 16 at art 137d. 46. Anti-Discrimination Act 1977, supra note 32 at ss 38R-38T. 47. Anti-Discrimination Act 1991, supra note 35 at ss 124A(1), 131A(1). 48. Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 2000, supra note 7 at ss 1(1), 10(1). 49. Anti-Discrimination Act 1998, supra note 8 at ss 16(ea)(eb). 50. Discrimination Act 1991, supra note 21 at ss 65, 66(1)(d), 67(1)(d)(iv). 51. Anti-Discrimination Act 1977, supra note 32 at ss 49ZXA-49ZXC. 52. Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 2000, supra note 7 at ss 1(1), 10(1). 53. Ibid. 54. Anti-Discrimination Act 1998, supra note 8 at ss 16(f)(fa). 55. Facebook Community Standards, Encouraging Respectful Behaviour, Hate Speech, on- line: www.facebook.com/communitystandards#. Accord Facebook Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, s 3.7, online: www.facebook.com/legal/terms. 56. Racial Discrimination Act 1975, supra note 20 at s 18C(1). 57. Discrimination Act 1991, supra note 21 at ss 66(1)(a), 67(1)(d)(i). 58. Criminal Code, supra note 6 at ss 318(4), 319. 59. Statute on Freedom of Opinion and Information and the Performance of Journalism, supra note 23 at art 31. 60. Connecticut General Statutes, supra 24 at c 939, § 53-57. 61. Criminal Code (Croatia), supra note 25 at art 174(3). 62. Penal Code (Denmark), supra note 26 at s 266(b)(1). 63. Public Order Act 1986, supra note 2 at ss 17-29. 64. The Criminal Code of Finland, supra note 13 at c 11, s 10. 65. Law on the Freedom of the Press, supra note 14 at arts 24, 32, 33. 66. Penal Code (Netherlands), supra note 16 at arts 137c, 137d. 67. Massachusetts General Laws, supra note 31 at c 272, § 98C. Aug16_Brown_46_OA.indd 278 7/23/18 3:47 PM available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/cjlj.2016.13 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:33, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/cjlj.2016.13 https://www.cambridge.org/core The “Who?” Question in the Hate Speech Debate: Part 1 279 New South Wales (Australia),68 New Zealand,69 Northern Ireland (UK),70 Queensland (Australia),71 Republic of Ireland,72 Russia,73 South Africa,74 Tasmania (Australia),75 Western Australia (Australia)76); · parental status (e.g., Tasmania (Australia)77); · personality traits or types; · physical appearance such as body weight, skin tone, hair colour, facial con- figuration and other bodily features, when not already included under race or ethnicity; · political beliefs, activities, or affiliations (e.g., Australia,78 the Council of the European Union,79 Penn State University80); · pregnancy, when not already included under parental status (e.g., Penn State University,81 South Africa,82 Tasmania (Australia)83) or, even more specifically, breastfeeding activity (e.g., Tasmania (Australia)84); · profession such as banker, politician, lawyer, or tax collector, when not already included under social status or veteran status; · race including colour and other aspects of physical appearance (e.g., Australia,85 Australian Capital Territory (Australia),86 Canada,87 Chile,88 Connecticut (US),89 Croatia,90 Denmark,91 England and Wales (UK),92 68. Anti-Discrimination Act 1977, supra note 32 at ss 20B-20D. 69. Human Rights Act 1993, supra note 33 at arts 61, 131. 70. The Public Order (Northern Ireland) Order 1987, supra note 11 at ss 8-13. 71. Anti-Discrimination Act 1991, supra note 35 at ss 124A(1), 131A(1). 72. Prohibition of Incitement to Hatred Act, 1989, supra note 36 at ss 1-12. 73. The Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, supra note 37 at art 282(1). 74. Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 2000, supra note 7 at ss 1(1), 10(1). 75. Anti-Discrimination Act 1998, supra note 8 at ss 16(a), 19(a). 76. Criminal Code Act 1913, supra note 40 at ss 76-80H. 77. Anti-Discrimination Act 1998, supra note 8 at s 16(i). 78. Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth), ss 80.2A, 80.2B. 79. EC, Council of the European Union Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA of 28 November 2008 on combating certain forms and expressions of racism and xenophobia by means of criminal law [2008] OJ, L 328/55 at para 10 [Council of the European Union Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA]. 80. University Policy Manual, University Park: Pennsylvania State University, policy AD85 [University Policy Manual]. 81. Ibid. 82. Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 2000, supra note 7 at ss 1(1), 10(1). 83. Anti-Discrimination Act 1998, supra note 8 at s 16(g). 84. Ibid at s 16(h). 85. Racial Discrimination Act 1975, supra note 20 at s 18C(1). 86. Discrimination Act 1991, supra note 21 at ss 66(1)(a), 67(1)(d)(i). 87. Criminal Code, supra note 6 at ss 318(4), 319. 88. Statute on Freedom of Opinion and Information and the Performance of Journalism, supra note 23 at art 31. 89. Connecticut General Statutes, supra note 24 at c 939, § 53-57. 90. Criminal Code (Croatia), supra note 25 at art 174(3). 91. Penal Code (Denmark), supra note 26 at s 266(b)(1). 92. Public Order Act 1986, supra note 2 at ss 17-29. Aug16_Brown_46_OA.indd 279 7/23/18 3:47 PM available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/cjlj.2016.13 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:33, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/cjlj.2016.13 https://www.cambridge.org/core 280 Brown Finland,93 France,94 the Netherlands,95 Massachusetts (US)96, New South Wales (Australia),97 New Zealand,98 Northern Ireland (UK),99 Queensland (Australia),100 Republic of Ireland,101 Russia,102 South Africa,103 Tasmania (Australia),104 Western Australia (Australia)105); · regional identity including sub-national regional identity and trans-nation- al regional identity, when not already included under nationality; · religion including religious beliefs, practices, or affiliations as well as lack thereof (e.g., Canada,106 Chile,107 Connecticut (US),108 Croatia,109 Denmark,110 gland and Wales (UK),111 Finland,112 France,113 the Netherlands,114 Massachusetts (US),115 Northern Ireland (UK),116 Queensland (Australia),117 Republic of Ireland,118 Russia,119 South Africa,120 Tasmania (Australia)121); · sexual orientation (e.g., Australian Capital Territory (Australia),122 Canada,123 Croatia,124 Denmark,125 England and Wales (UK),126 Finland,127 France,128 the 93. The Criminal Code of Finland, supra note 13 at c 11, s 10. 94. Law on the Freedom of the Press, supra note 14 at arts 24, 32, 33. 95. Penal Code (Netherlands), supra note 16 at arts 137c, 137d. 96. Massachusetts General Laws, supra note 31 at c 272, § 98C. 97. Anti-Discrimination Act 1977, supra note 32 at ss 20B-20D. 98. Human Rights Act 1993, supra note 33 at arts 61, 131. 99. The Public Order (Northern Ireland) Order 1987, supra note 11 at ss 8-13. 100. Anti-Discrimination Act 1991, supra note 35 at ss 124A(1), 131A(1). 101. Prohibition of Incitement to Hatred Act, 1989, supra note 36 at ss 1-12. 102. The Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, supra note 37 at art 282(1). 103. Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 2000, supra note 7 at ss 1(1), 10(1). 104. Anti-Discrimination Act 1998, supra note 8 at ss 16(a), 19(a). 105. Criminal Code Act 1913, supra note 40 at ss 76-80H. 106. Criminal Code, supra note 6 at ss 318(4), 319. 107. Statute on Freedom of Opinion and Information and the Performance of Journalism, supra note 23 at art 31. 108. Connecticut General Statutes, supra note 24 at § 53-57. 109. Criminal Code (Croatia), supra note 25 at art 174(3). 110. Penal Code (Netherlands), supra note 26 at s 266(b)(1). 111. Public Order Act 1986, supra note 2 at ss 29A-29N. 112. The Criminal Code of Finland, supra note 13 at c 11, s 10. 113. Law on the Freedom of the Press, supra note 14 at arts 24, 32, 33. 114. Penal Code (Netherlands), supra note 16 at art 137c, 137d. 115. Massachusetts General Laws, supra note 31 at c 272, § 98C. 116. The Public Order (Northern Ireland) Order 1987, supra note 11 at ss 8-13. 117. Anti-Discrimination Act 1991, supra note 35 at ss 124A(1), 131A(1). 118. Prohibition of Incitement to Hatred Act, 1989, supra note 36 at ss 1-12. 119. The Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, supra note 37 at art 282(1). 120. Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 2000, supra note 7 at ss 1(1), 10(1). 121. Anti-Discrimination Act 1998, supra note 8 at s 19(d). 122. Discrimination Act 1991, supra note 21 at ss 66(1)(b), 67(1)(d)(ii). 123. Criminal Code, supra note 6 at ss 318(4), 319. 124. Criminal Code (Croatia), supra note 25 at art 174(3). 125. Penal Code (Denmark), supra note 26 at s 266(b)(1). 126. Public Order Act 1986, supra note 2 at ss 29AB, 29JA, as amended by the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act (UK), 2008, c4; Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013 (UK), c 30. 127. The Criminal Code of Finland, supra note 13 at c 11, s 10. 128. Law on the Freedom of the Press, supra note 14 at arts 24, 32, 33. Aug16_Brown_46_OA.indd 280 7/23/18 3:47 PM available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/cjlj.2016.13 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:33, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/cjlj.2016.13 https://www.cambridge.org/core The “Who?” Question in the Hate Speech Debate: Part 1 281 Netherlands,129 New South Wales (Australia),130 Northern Ireland (UK),131 Queensland (Australia),132 South Africa,133 Tasmania (Australia)134); · sexual preference such as preference for particular sex acts or practices, when not already included under sexual orientation; · social status including social origin and class (e.g., the Council of the European Union,135 South Africa136); · traveller community, when not already included under race or ethnicity (e.g., Republic of Ireland137); · war record including veteran status (e.g., Northern Arizona University (US),138 Penn State University (US),139 University of Oregon (US)140) or pacifist status. This is, of course, a very diverse list—diverse both in the types of characteristics and in the types of hate speech law. As far as the characteristics are concerned, we have: · affective states or patterns thereof (e.g., sexual orientation, sexual preference); · affiliations relating to communities, cultures, social groups or families (e.g., citizenship, ethnicity, language, marital status, nationality, parental status, regional identity, religion); · attitudinal dispositions, beliefs or ways of thinking (e.g., political, religious); · biological, genotypic, physiological, or physical(-phenotypic) attributes (e.g., medical status, race, sex); · conduct, (phenotypic-)behaviour, performance or ways of living (e.g., age performance, education, employment status, gender performance, marital status, profession, religion, traveller community, war record). This diversity will be particularly relevant when we come to consider the third approach to specifying the proper scope of incitement to hatred laws, what I call 129. Penal Code (Netherlands), supra note 16 at arts 137c, 137d. 130. Anti-Discrimination Act 1977, supra note 32 at ss 49ZS, 49ZT, 49ZTA. 131. The Public Order (Northern Ireland) Order 1987, supra note 11 at ss 8-13. 132. Anti-Discrimination Act 1991, supra note 35 at ss 124A(1), 131A(1). 133. Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 2000, supra note 7 at ss 1(1), 10(1). 134. Anti-Discrimination Act 1998, supra note 8 at ss 16(c)(d), 19(c). 135. Council of the European Union Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA, supra note 80 at para 10. 136. Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 2000, supra note 7 at ss 1(1), 10(1). 137. Prohibition of Incitement to Hatred Act, 1989, supra note 36 at ss 1-12. 138. Safe Working and Learning Environment Policy: The Northern Arizona University Policy Regarding Discrimination, Harassment, and Other Inappropriate Behaviours, Flagstaff: Northern Arizona University, ss II.C.2. 139. University Policy Manual, supra note 80 at policy AD85. 140. Student Code of Conduct, Eugene: University of Oregon, ss II.16.b, V.3.f. Aug16_Brown_46_OA.indd 281 7/23/18 3:47 PM available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/cjlj.2016.13 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:33, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/cjlj.2016.13 https://www.cambridge.org/core 282 Brown the formal approach, because it appeals to intuitions about the formal qualities of characteristics and about the form of people’s relationships to their characteristics. In terms of the diversity of hate speech laws, we have: · laws that proscribe group defamation based on protected characteristics; · laws that regulate negative stereotyping and stigmatization based on pro- tected characteristics; · laws that disallow using insults, slurs, or derogatory epithets against, dis- seminating ideas based on the inferiority of, or using any words, signs, or symbols that are deeply insulting or offensive to, members of groups or classes of persons based on protected characteristics; · laws that ban stirring up, inciting, or promoting feelings of hatred or hos- tility toward or among members of groups or classes of persons based on protected characteristics; · laws that prohibit speech or other expressive conduct concerning members of groups or classes of persons identified by protected characteristics when it is a threat to public order; · laws that penalise denying, grossly trivialising, approving, justifying, condon- ing, or glorifying acts of mass cruelty, violence, or genocide perpetrated against members of groups or classes of persons based on protected characteristics; · laws that constrain speech or other expressive conduct directed at members of groups or classes of persons identified by protected characteristics when it constitutes the enactment of a dignitary crime or tort; · laws that forbid speech or other expressive conduct when it amounts to conduct that violates or interferes with people’s exercise of civil or human rights based on protected characteristics; · laws that interdict speech or other expressive conduct that constitutes a hate crime based on protected characteristics; · laws that restrict speech or other expressive conduct aimed at members of groups or classes of persons identified by protected characteristics via time, place, and manner restrictions.141 I do not have space here to discuss each of the different types of hate speech law nor particular instances thereof. The focus of the study will be stirring up hatred offences in the UK. It may be that different conclusions follow if the focus is shifted to other types of hate speech law. To put the same point a little more for- mally, it may be that when thinking about a hate speech law of type X it would be correct to consider inclusion of characteristics c1, c2 and c3 but not c4, c5 and c6, whereas when reflecting on hate speech law of type Y it might be fitting to include characteristics c4, c5 and c6 but not c1, c2 and c3, because of morally relevant differences between X and Y. I shall return to, and try to defend, this generalisation in the conclusion at the end of Part 2. 141. Alexander Brown, Hate Speech Law: A Philosophical Examination (New York: Routledge, 2015) at ch 2 [Brown]. Aug16_Brown_46_OA.indd 282 7/23/18 3:47 PM available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/cjlj.2016.13 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:33, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/cjlj.2016.13 https://www.cambridge.org/core The “Who?” Question in the Hate Speech Debate: Part 1 283 Before discussing the first of five approaches to specification, I first need to distinguish between two motives for addressing the “Who?” question and to clar- ify which of the two informs this investigation. One motive is deep scepticism about the moral justification for, and practical usefulness of, hate speech law including incitement to hatred law. Here the “Who?” question is intended or de- signed to create a slippery slope or adverse consequences argument against any such legislation by adding more and more protected characteristics to the list so as to make all hate speech laws seem unpalatable.142 A second motive stems from a belief that current incitement to hatred legislation in the UK has developed over time in a piecemeal, reactive, politicised, and in many ways illogical and incoherent manner, and a desire to (re-)theorise the proper scope of such laws in a way that is far more comprehensive, systematic and analytical. This motive is open-minded over whether or not hate speech laws can be warranted all things considered. It is about seeking correct answers to both the “Who?” question and the more general warrant question without prejudging either. This article pro- ceeds under the second motive. II. Consistency specification The first approach to specifying the proper scope of incitement to hatred laws emphasises norms of consistency. Consistency is a familiar and essential feature of the rule of law, of course. In the area of sentencing, if two people have broken the law in similar ways, then consistency requires that they should expect to re- ceive similar punishments from judges. This is the principle of treating like cases alike (and unalike cases unalike). But consistency is also important in the area of the enactment of criminal laws, where similar conduct should have similar status as criminal or not criminal. So, if two examples of conduct are similar in that they are both incitement to hatred albeit one is incitement to hatred on grounds of characteristic c1 and the other is incitement to hatred on grounds of c2, then prima facie consistency requires that both examples of conduct should be dealt with in similar ways by the criminal law. This is the principle of treating like conduct alike (and unalike conduct unalike). Then again, perhaps what matters is not only similarity in the treatment of similar cases and conduct but also similarity in the treatment of similar groups; which is to say, similar groups should receive similar protection in law. According to Alon Harel, for example, “treating the victims of racist speech more favorably than victims of sexist, homophobic, or other forms of abhor- rent speech is itself a form of discrimination”.143 So, if two similar groups of people are subject to similar forms of incitement to hatred, then consistency requires that they should enjoy similar legal protections or lack thereof. This is 142. See, e.g., Eric Heinze, “Cumulative Jurisprudence and Hate Speech: Sexual Orientation and Analogies to Disability, Age, and Obesity” in Ivan Hare & James Weinstein, eds, Extreme Speech and Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) 265 [Heinze]. 143. Alon Harel, “Bigotry, Pornography, and the First Amendment: A Theory of Unprotected Speech” (1992) 65:4 S Cal L Rev 1887 at 1906. Aug16_Brown_46_OA.indd 283 7/23/18 3:47 PM available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/cjlj.2016.13 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:33, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/cjlj.2016.13 https://www.cambridge.org/core 284 Brown the principle of treating like groups alike (and unalike groups unalike) or the principle of parity for short. However, consistency in the treatment of similar cases, conduct and groups are not the only relevant forms of consistency. Consider as well consistency in the way that lawmakers, for example, handle reasons or rationales for including some characteristics and not others under the scope of given hate speech laws. Some of these reasons are practical, some formal, some functional, and some re- late to democratic values. But what really matters is that when lawmakers invoke and apply these reasons they do so in a consistent manner, rather than in highly politicised or even haphazard ways. The principle of parity demands equal treat- ment of similar groups, whereas what I am talking about now relates more to equity in the treatment of groups, meaning that groups have a right to expect that reasons or rationales will be applied in consistent ways. Thus, if two types of conduct are similar in that they are both forms of incitement to hatred but one type of conduct is incitement to hatred on grounds of characteristic c1 and the other is incitement to hatred on grounds of c2, and if the principled reasons for banning incitement to hatred on grounds of c1 would also apply mutatis mutan- dis to incitement to hatred on grounds of c2, then consistency requires banning both types of conduct qua forms of incitement to hatred, absent other relevant and equally compelling reasons for banning one and not the other. I shall call this the principle of treating like reasons alike (and unalike reasons unalike) or the principle of higher-order consistency for short.144 Keeping in mind these basic forms of consistency, let us now consider some concrete arguments about the proper scope of incitement to hatred laws in the UK. They have to do with anomalies or inconsistencies within anti-discrimina- tion law, criminal law, incitement to hatred laws, and constitutional law. Starting with anti-discrimination law, the Equality Act 2010145 makes it unlawful in England and Wales to discriminate against persons based on certain “protected characteristics”, namely, age, disability, gender reassignment, race, religion or belief, sex, sexual orientation. At the same time, however, it is currently unlawful to stir up hatred only on the basis of three of these characteristics: race, religion, sexual orientation. This raises a question of consistency between incitement to hatred laws and extant anti-discrimination law.146 As Ivan Hare puts it, if Parliament has considered that individuals and groups should be protected from suffering detriment in relation to employment and other social goods on the grounds of gender and age, why should they not also enjoy the equal protection of the criminal law in relation to discriminatory incitement to hatred against them?147 144. Of course, if there are morally relevant reasons to treat similar conduct differently, then the principle of higher-order consistency may justify setting aside the principle of treating like conduct alike. Likewise, if there are morally relevant reasons to treat similar groups differ- ently, then the principle of higher-order consistency may justify setting aside the principle of parity. 145. (UK), c 15, part 2 [Equality Act 2010]. 146. See, e.g., Heinze, supra note 142. 147. Ivan Hare, “Free Speech and Incitement to Hatred on Grounds of Disability and Transgender Identity: The Law Commission’s Proposals” (2015) 3 Pub L 385 at 391 [Hare, “Free Speech”]. Aug16_Brown_46_OA.indd 284 7/23/18 3:47 PM available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/cjlj.2016.13 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:33, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/cjlj.2016.13 https://www.cambridge.org/core The “Who?” Question in the Hate Speech Debate: Part 1 285 In fact, such inconsistency is neither necessary nor unavoidable. In South Africa, for example, hate speech laws have been developed in concert with, and even written into, anti-discrimination legislation, thus ensuring that the wide scope of prohibitions of discrimination (in terms of the range and number of protected characteristics) is matched exactly by the wide scope of prohibitions of hate speech.148 Now it might be objected at this stage that there is a relevant difference be- tween discrimination and hate speech: namely, whereas discrimination is an act, hate speech is speech. But the difference disappears as soon as one recognises that using words or behaviour to stir up hatred is itself a type of act and that some forms of discrimination are enacted to a large extent through speech or other expressive behaviour. So, for example, ss 26 and 27 of the Equality Act 2010149 in England and Wales make it unlawful to harass or victimise persons based on protected characteristics including when this harassment or victimisation takes the form of speech or other expressive conduct.150 Turning to inconsistencies within criminal law, ss 145 and 146 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003151 are hate crime provisions giving magistrates and judges in England and Wales powers to determine if criminal acts were made more “seri- ous” or “aggravated” by hostility toward victims based on the characteristics of race, religion, disability, sexual orientation or transgender identity. Now s 146 relates specifically to disability, sexual orientation and transgender identity, and could apply inter alia to various public order and harassment offences that are typically enacted through speech or other expressive conduct.152 Consider the offences of causing fear or provocation of violence (s 4), intentional harassment, alarm or distress (s 4A), and harassment, alarm or distress (s 5) under the Public Order Act 1986,153 as well as the offence of harassment (ss 1 and 2) under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997.154 But if hostility toward victims based on their disability or transgender identity can be aggravating factors in the case of someone using, say, threatening, abusive or insulting words with intent to cause 148. Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 2000, supra note 7 at ss 1(1), 10(1). 149. Supra note 145. 150. The inconsistency is not limited to England and Wales. Consider, in Tasmania, Australia, the Anti-Discrimination Act 1998, supra note 8. On the one hand, ss 16 and 17(1) set outs a generalised offence of harassment based on conduct which offends, humiliates, intimidates, insults or ridicules another person, the scope of which is extremely broad and encompasses (a) race, (b) age, (c) sexual orientation, (d) lawful sexual activity, (e) gender, (ea) gender identity, (eb) intersex, (f) marital status, (fa) relationship status, (g) pregnancy, (h) breastfeeding, (i) pa- rental status, (j) family responsibilities, and (k) disability. On the other hand, s 19 provides an offence of inciting hatred towards, serious contempt for, or severe ridicule of, another person or group of persons, the scope of which is much narrower and encompasses only (a) the race of the person or any member of the group, (b) any disability of the person or any member of the group, (c) the sexual orientation or lawful sexual activity of the person or any member of the group, and (d) the religious belief or affiliation or religious activity of the person or any member of the group. I thank Luke McNamara for alerting me to this example. 151. (UK), c 44, as amended by the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 (UK), c 10, s 65. 152. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 141 at 35-38. 153. Supra note 2, as amended by the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 (UK), c 33. 154. (UK), c 40. Aug16_Brown_46_OA.indd 285 7/23/18 3:47 PM available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/cjlj.2016.13 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:33, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/cjlj.2016.13 https://www.cambridge.org/core 286 Brown harassment, alarm or distress (s 4A), then why should stirring up hatred offences not include stirring up hatred on grounds of disability or transgender identity? It scarcely seems sufficient merely to point out that these are separate regimes or schemes of law since that only invites the following question: why should they be considered separately or regarded differently when it comes to specifying the proper scope of such laws?155 Next, consider inconsistencies within incitement to hatred laws themselves. When the 1965 Race Relations Act156 introduced for the first time the stirring up racial hatred offence it was well recognised that there are groups in society whose categorisation as a race could be open to doubt. Yet the concern was to ensure parity of treatment for different groups. What if the law protected newly arrived immigrants from the Caribbean, for example, but not Jews? And so, speaking in the House of Commons in 1965, the then Home Secretary, Frank Soskice MP, opined, “I would have thought a person of Jewish faith, if not regarded as caught by the word ‘racial’ would undoubtedly be caught by the word ‘ethnic’, but if not caught by the word ‘ethnic’ would certainly be caught by the scope of the word ‘national’, as certainly having a national origin.”157 The controversies have persisted however. For one thing, if immigrants arriving from the Caribbean are protected by the stirring up racial hatred offence (as defined by s 17 of the Public Order Act 1986158) on grounds of their colour or race, then what about people against whom hatred might also be stirred up not ostensibly because of their colour or race but on grounds of their immigration status as being economic mi- grants, illegal immigrants, so-called bogus asylum seekers, failed asylum seek- ers, genuine asylum seekers, or even refugees? Are they to be included under the technical term “race” on grounds of their nationality or citizenship?159 For another thing, because Jews have been covered under the legislation as a racial or ethnic group, courts in England and Wales have on occasions convicted Muslim activists and clerics for inciting racial hatred against Jews—for example, R. v. Iftikhar Ali160 and R. v. El-Faisal.161 However, ironically, the courts have not re- garded Muslims as belonging to racial, ethnic or national groups for the purposes of interpreting the stirring up racial hatred offence—a view consistent with a leading case in the field of anti-discrimination law, Nyazi v. Rymans Ltd.162 And 155. Cf Law Commission, Hate Crime: Should The Current Offences Be Extended? (Paper No 348) (London: The Stationery Office, 2014) at paras 7.12-7.18 [Law Commission]; Chara Bakalis, “Legislating Against Hatred: The Law Commission’s Report on Hate Crime” (2015) V:3 Crim L Rev 192 at 205-06 [Bakalis]. 156. Supra note 1. 157. UK, HC, House of Commons Debates, vol 711, cols 932-933 (3 May 1965). 158. Supra note 2. 159. Interestingly, in the case of racially aggravated crimes or hate crimes, the courts in R v Rogers [2007] UKHL 8, [2007] 2 AC 62 and Attorney General’s Reference (No 4 of 2004) R v D [2005] EWCA Crim 889, [2005] 1 WLR 2810 (CA) did interpret the words ‘bloody foreigner’ and ‘immigrant doctor’ as relating to a race for the purposes of the offence. 160. (2002) No. T2001/0599, Southwark Crim Ct, May 3 (involving the prosecution of a member of the group al-Muhajiroun for distributing leaflets likely to stir up racial hatred against Jews). 161. (2003) No. T20027343, Central Crim Ct, March 7 (involving the prosecution of a Muslim cleric for several public order offences including using threatening, abusive or insulting words or behavior with intent to stir up racial hatred against Jews). 162. (10 May 1988) EAT 86. Aug16_Brown_46_OA.indd 286 7/23/18 3:47 PM available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/cjlj.2016.13 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:33, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/cjlj.2016.13 https://www.cambridge.org/core The “Who?” Question in the Hate Speech Debate: Part 1 287 so, a rabbi could not be convicted for stirring up racial hatred against Muslims. Perhaps not surprisingly, then, various Muslim groups and politicians argued on grounds of parity (treating like groups alike) for extending existing incite- ment to hatred laws so that they covered Muslims. In 2005, for example, the office of the then Home Secretary, Charles Clarke MP, allegedly wrote to several mosques to explain “[w]e cannot see why it is right to have protection in law for Jews and Sikhs, but wrong to extend it to other communities like the Muslim community.”163 Following on the heals of the Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006,164 which introduced the stirring up religious hatred offence and effectively extended pro- tection to Muslims, yet further anomalies were identified in the treatment of other groups. Thus, in 2007 Chris Bryant MP declared that it was high time to introduce an offence of stirring up hatred on grounds of sexual orientation in order to “overcome anomalies” in the relevant laws.165 Likewise, in 2011 the Equality and Human Rights Commission defended the creation of a new offence of stirring up hatred on grounds of disability for the sake of “parity”.166 More recently, a significant number of the individuals and stakeholder organisations who took part in the Law Commission’s consultation exercise allied to its re- port Hate Crime: Should the Current Offences be Extended?167 argued for the creation of new stirring up hatred offences for both disability and transgender identity also on the basis of parity.168 The Commission itself ultimately did not recommend this extension for mainly practical reasons, which I intend to dis- cuss in the next section. However, in 2015 the House of Commons Women and Equalities Committee also heard evidence from a number of expert witnesses on the need for parity of protection for people with transgender identities.169 Pace the Law Commission, the Women and Equalities Committee recommended that “[t]he Government should introduce new hate crime legislation which extends the existing provisions on … stirring up hatred so that they apply to all protected characteristics, as defined for the purposes of the Equality Act 2010.”170 Although much more could be said about these particular arguments, here I am interested in critically evaluating consistency as a general approach to speci- fying the proper scope of incitement to hatred laws. One potential weakness in the current approach is that the principles of consistency may underdetermine single best solutions to inconsistency. Consider parity in the treatment of groups and a situation in which one group enjoys protection via an existing stirring up hatred offence, whereas another, similar group does not enjoy such protection. 163. Blank version of Clarke’s letter, online: www.civitas.org.uk/archive/pdf/ClarkeLetter.pdf. 164. Supra note 3. 165. UK, HC, House of Commons Debates, vol 464, col 59 (8 October 2007). 166. Hidden in Plain Sight (London: Equality and Human Rights Commission, 2011) at 154, online: www.equalityhumanrights.com/sites/default/files/documents/disabilityfi/ehrc_hidden_in_ plain_sight_3.pdf [Equality and Human Rights Commission]. 167. Supra note 155. 168. Supra note 155 at paras 7.12 and 7.17. 169. UK, Transgender Equality, First Report of Session 2015-16 (London: The Stationery Office, 2016) at paras 269-272. 170. Ibid at para 275. Aug16_Brown_46_OA.indd 287 7/23/18 3:47 PM available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/cjlj.2016.13 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:33, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/cjlj.2016.13 https://www.cambridge.org/core 288 Brown There are two main ways to achieve parity in this situation. The first is to expand the existing stirring up hatred offence or else create a new stirring up hatred of- fence so as to protect the group that is as yet unprotected. This involves a kind of levelling up of protection: members of a group are said to have a prima fa- cie right to the same high level of protection that other groups already enjoy. A second way is to revise or repeal the existing stirring up hatred offence without introducing any new offence. This involves a kind of levelling down of protec- tion: groups who currently enjoy protections are said to have no right to a level of protection that other groups do not enjoy. The problem is that the principle of parity does not in itself dictate which of these two strategies is best. In terms of parity alone, either is acceptable. This means that the argument for the levelling up strategy over the levelling down strategy is dependent not merely on the prin- ciple of parity but also on treating the existing offence as given or as having a sound or generally accepted rationale. In other words, in the absence of a gener- ally accepted rationale for the existing offence the argument would probably not be made for expanding it or creating a new offence like it. Conversely, the argu- ment for the levelling down strategy over the levelling up strategy is dependent not merely on the principle of parity but also on questioning the rationale for the existing offence. Hence, it is partly because the rationale for the existing offence no longer commands widespread acceptance that the case for retrenchment is being made. The upshot is that consistency is only one of a number of principled considerations that are likely to be needed in order to determine the proper scope of incitement to hatred laws. By way of illustration of this problem, consider once again the case of in- citement to hatred against Muslims. Up until 2006 it could have been an of- fence to use threatening, abusive or insulting words with the intention or likeli- hood of stirring up hatred against Jews defined as an ethnic group—including words identifying or picking out Jews as an ethnic group partly on the basis of their religious beliefs—but not an offence to use threatening, abusive or insulting words with the intention or likelihood of stirring up hatred against Muslims defined as an ethnic group—including words identifying or picking out Muslims as an ethnic group partly on the basis of their religious beliefs.171 Now it would be incorrect to say that prior to 2006 Muslims enjoyed no legal protections against hate speech whatsoever. In England and Wales the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) already had the power to prosecute someone who used Islamophobic hate speech in the process of committing a religiously ag- gravated public order or harassment offence under ss 31 and 32 of the Crime 171. This anomaly was coupled with the fact that at the time Christians but not Muslims also enjoyed protection of their religious beliefs through the UK’s blasphemy laws (which were not repealed until the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008, supra note 4). Thus, in the words of Tariq Modood, “Muslims in particular feel that they suffer a double discrimina- tion: they do not enjoy the legal protection favoured on the majority religion; and, not being a racial group, they are not recognised as a group protected by the incitement to racial ha- tred offence.” Tariq Modood, “Muslims, Incitement to Hatred and the Law” in John Horton, ed, Liberalism, Multiculturalism and Toleration (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1993) 139 at 147 [Modood, “Incitement”]. Aug16_Brown_46_OA.indd 288 7/23/18 3:47 PM available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/cjlj.2016.13 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:33, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/cjlj.2016.13 https://www.cambridge.org/core The “Who?” Question in the Hate Speech Debate: Part 1 289 and Disorder Act 1998.172 Nevertheless, before 2006 Jews but not Muslims were protected under the stirring up racial hatred offence. This inconsistency mat- tered even more because the maximum custodial sentence for the stirring up racial hatred offence—an offence that was inapplicable to Islamophobic hate speech—was higher than for comparable religiously aggravated public order of- fences—offences that were applicable to Islamophobic hate speech. So, for ex- ample, at that time the maximum custodial sentence for the offence of displaying writing, say, which is threatening, abusive or insulting and is intended or likely under the circumstances to stir up racial hatred—such as against Jews—was seven years under s 18(1) of the Public Order Act 1986.173 Yet the maximum custodial sentence for the discreet religiously aggravated offence of displaying writing, say, which is threatening, abusive or insulting and with the intention of causing harassment, alarm or distress—such as to Muslims—was just two years under s 31(1)(b) of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998.174 The anomaly was further exacerbated by the fact that s 9 of the Public Order (Northern Ireland) Order 1987175 made it an offence in Northern Ireland (under direct rule from Great Britain) to stir up hatred on grounds of religious belief. So Muslims in Northern Ireland enjoyed protections not afforded to Muslims in other parts of the UK. Consequently, some scholars insisted that England and Wales needed the same stirring up religious hatred offence that existed in Northern Ireland.176 But herein lies the problem with the current approach. Put simply, the argu- ment for a new stirring up religious hatred offence is underdetermined by the principle of parity. For, it would have been feasible to remove the inconsistency by adopting any one of the following courses of action: (i) legislate a new stir- ring up religious hatred offence; (ii) repeal the existing stirring up racial hatred offence; (iii) revise the existing stirring up racial hatred offence so as to explic- itly name Muslims along with Jews as racial or ethnic groups, or else direct judges to change their working definitions of race and ethnicity so as to include Muslims along with Jews as racial and/or ethnic groups for the purposes of interpreting the offence; (iv) revise the existing stirring up racial hatred offence so as to explicitly exclude both Jews and Muslims as racial or ethnic groups, or else direct judges to revise their working definitions of race and ethnicity so as 172. (UK), c 37, as amended by the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 (UK), c 24 [Crime and Disorder Act 1998]. For example, in R v Norwood (2002) (December 13 2002) Oswestry Mag Ct, Mark Anthony Norwood was convicted of a religiously aggravated offence of displaying “any writing, sign or other visible representation which is threatening, abusive or insulting, within the hearing or sight of a person likely to be caused harassment, alarm or distress thereby” under s 5(1)(b) of the Public Order Act 1986, supra note 2, aggravated in the manner that ‘the offence is motivated (wholly or partly) by hostility towards members of a racial or religious group based on their membership of that group’ under ss 28(1)(b) and s 31(1)(c) of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, supra note 172. Norwood had displayed a large poster in the window of his first-floor flat depicting the Twin Towers in flames, with a caption containing the words “Islam out of Britain—Protect the British People” and a symbol of the crescent and star in a prohibition sign. Norwood subsequently lost appeals in Norwood v DPP [2003] EWHC 1564 (Admin) and Norwood v United Kingdom (2005) 40 EHRR 11. 173. Supra note 2. 174. Supra note 172. 175. Supra note 11. 176. See, e.g., Modood, “Incitement”, supra note 171 at 142. Aug16_Brown_46_OA.indd 289 7/23/18 3:47 PM available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/cjlj.2016.13 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:33, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/cjlj.2016.13 https://www.cambridge.org/core 290 Brown to exclude both Jews and Muslims as racial or ethnic groups for the purposes of interpreting the offence. At this juncture one could, of course, try to make an appeal to the principle of higher-order consistency in the enactment of criminal law, which speaks to consistency in the application of legislative rationales. One possible rationale for banning incitement to racial hatred is that certain kinds of racist hate speech can contribute to a climate of hatred and fear. Applying this same rationale to the case of Muslims could justify course of action (i) based on a parallel concern that stirring up hatred against Muslims can contribute to a climate of hatred characterised in part by an increased likelihood of acts of discrimination and violence against Muslims, as well as an increased fear among Muslims of acts of discrimination and violence.177 However, this argument for creating a new stirring up religious hatred offence is also underdetermined by the principle of higher-order consistency in the enactment of criminal law. This is because appealing to the principle of higher-order consistency and the aforementioned rationale would also justify course of action (iii).178 Appealing to the principle of higher-order consistency does not by itself determine one course of action as being better than another if either represents the consistent application of legislative rationales. Indeed, the equivalent suitability of (iii) is all the more apparent given the development of Modood’s own thinking on Islamophobic hate speech in the wake of the Danish cartoons controversy.179 Modood pre- sented the Danish cartoons—or two of the cartoons180—not as pure expressions of religious Islamophobia but as instances of quasi-racist Islamophobia, a type of racism that comes close to ethnophobia.181 As he explains, “[i]t is true that ‘Muslim’ is not a (putative) biological category in the same way as ‘black’ or ‘south Asian’, aka ‘Paki’, or Chinese. But nor was ‘Jew’ once: a long, non-linear history of racialization turned a faith group into a ‘race’.”182 This explanation prompts the following question. If public expressions of Islamophobia amount to quasi-racism, and if the operative rationale for banning incitement to hatred is to tackle speech that contributes to a climate of hatred, then why not argue for the assimilation of Muslims into incitement to racial hatred provisions as opposed to creating a new stirring up religious hatred offence?183 The key point 177. Cf ibid at 146; Raymond Chow, “Inciting Hatred or Merely Engaging in Religious Debate? The Need for Religious Vilification Laws” (2005) 30:3 Alternative LJ 120 at 120. 178. See, e.g., Shabbir Akhtar, “Is Freedom Holy to Liberals? Some Remarks on the Purpose of Law” in Free Speech: Report of a Seminar, Discussion Papers 2 (London: Commission for Racial Equality, 1990) at 24 [Akhtar]; JUSTICE, Written Submission to the Select Committee on Religious Offences in England and Wales, August 2002, online: www.parliament.the-sta- tionery-office.co.uk/pa/ld200203/ldselect/ldrelof/95/95w47.htm. Precisely this course of ac- tion was also advocated by Tony Baldry MP in the House of Commons in 2001. See UK, HC, House of Commons Debates, vol 375, col 35 (19 November 2001). 179. Tariq Modood, “Obstacles to Multicultural Integration” in “The Danish Cartoon Affair: Free Speech, Racism Islamism, and Integration” (2006) 44:5 Int’l Migration 51 [Modood, “Obstacles”]. 180. Ibid at 54. 181. Ibid at 55-56. 182. Ibid at 56. A similar point was made in 2001 by Lord Desai in a House of Lords Debate. See UK, HL, House of Lords Debates, vol 629, col 246 (27 November 2001). 183. Cf Modood, supra note 179 at 52. Aug16_Brown_46_OA.indd 290 7/23/18 3:47 PM available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/cjlj.2016.13 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:33, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/cjlj.2016.13 https://www.cambridge.org/core The “Who?” Question in the Hate Speech Debate: Part 1 291 here is that additional rationales must be adduced as determinative reasons for choosing course of action (i) over (iii).184 The inconsistencies did not end once the Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006185 came into effect, adding the stirring up religious hatred offence. The cur- rent body of legislation contains seemingly arbitrary differences in the thresholds for prosecution for the different offences. Part 3 of the Public Order Act 1986186 covers incitement to racial hatred and the test remains a person who uses “threat- ening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour” and “(a) he intends thereby to stir up racial hatred, or (b) having regard to all the circumstances racial hatred is likely to be stirred up thereby”. By contrast, Part 3A of the Public Order Act 1986187 covers incitement to religious hatred and the test is “a person who uses threatening words or behaviour” and “he intends thereby to stir up religious ha- tred”. Therefore, so long as courts continue to deal with cases of incitement to hatred against Jews under Part 3 (incitement to racial hatred) and cases of incite- ment to hatred against Muslims under Part 3A (incitement to religious hatred), then in theory it is easier for prosecutors to secure convictions in cases of incite- ment to hatred against Jews than it is to secure convictions in cases of incitement to hatred against Muslims. The anomaly did not go unnoticed by members of parliament. Paul Goggins MP, for example, argued that if we cannot have the anomaly of it being an offence to stir up hatred against Jews and Sikhs (qua ra- cial groups) but not an offence to stir up hatred against Muslims and Christians (qua religious groups), then, by the same token, “we cannot have different rules [or thresholds] for Jews and Sikhs than for Muslims and Christians.”188 Once again, however, appealing to the principle of parity does not lead to a single cor- rect way of resolving inconsistency. For, it would have been feasible to remove the inconsistency by adopting either of the following two courses of action: (v) define the new stirring up religious hatred offence with the same lower threshold for conviction as the existing stirring up racial hatred offence; (vi) revise the 184. One practical rationale for favouring (i) over (iii) might be that a new stirring up religious ha- tred offence is needed not so much for cases where prosecutors and courts reasonably believe that a speaker is stirring up hatred against Muslims as a racial or ethnic group but for cases in which the speaker is picking out, and stirring up hatred against, Muslims on the basis of their religious beliefs very specifically. It might be more difficult to build a successful prosecution against such a speaker if stirring up hatred against Muslims is assimilated into the existing stirring up racial hatred offence. No doubt some forms of Islamophobia in the UK are forms of quasi-racism (based on false generalisations about the shared race or skin colour of Muslims) or ethnophobia (based on false generalisations about the shared heritage, culture, language, customs, and so on of Muslims, including but not limited to religious beliefs specifically). But since 9/11 and 7/7 it is possible to discern strains of distinctly religious Islamophobia, often fuelled by a stream of negative stereotypes and pejorative characterisations of Muslims in the media and on the Internet which draw simplistic, misleading and false connections between the Muslim faith and acts of terrorism or the barbaric treatment of women and girls. And so if there are genuine cases of speakers stirring up hatred against Muslims identified either exclusively or predominantly in terms of religious beliefs, this may be grounds for creating a separate stirring up religious hatred offence. 185. Supra note 3. 186. Supra note 2. 187. Ibid, as amended by the Racial and Religious Hatred Act, supra note 3. 188. UK, HC, House of Commons Public Bill Committee Debates, Racial and Religious Hatred Bill in Standing Committee E, Session 2005-06, 2nd sitting, col 72 (29 June 2005) [Standing Committee E]. Aug16_Brown_46_OA.indd 291 7/23/18 3:47 PM available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/cjlj.2016.13 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:33, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/cjlj.2016.13 https://www.cambridge.org/core 292 Brown existing stirring up racial hatred offence so that it has the same higher threshold for conviction as the new stirring up religious hatred offence.189 Would it help to make an appeal to the principle of higher-order consistency? What would the consistent application of reasons look like? Suppose part of the underlying function or purpose of incitement to hatred law is to combat the creation of climates of hatred and fear, and this applies equally to race and religion. And sup- pose this principled reason suggests that generally speaking we should prefer lower prosecution thresholds to higher prosecution thresholds. Based on this we now do appear to have a consistency-based reason to favour (v) over (vi). However, there remains incompleteness in the consistency specification precisely at the point at which the principle of higher-order consistency is introduced. The incompleteness consists in the fact that this principle tells us to treat like reasons alike; it does not tell us what those reasons should be. And so we must inevitably, I think, appeal to other approaches, such as the functional approach, in order to obtain the sorts of reasons that can be utilised by or fed into the principle of higher-order consistency. Without the other approaches, there would be nothing to go on. There is one final area in which inconsistencies may emerge that will serve to highlight this incompleteness. The area is constitutional law and, in particular, the constitutional principle that governments must secure the basic rights and freedoms of all citizens such that it must not deny the protection of law to any citizens. It may be possible to interpret this principle as flowing from or serving the more abstract principle of parity (treating like groups alike).190 What is more, it has seemed to some writers axiomatic to say that the principle of equal protec- tion requires governments to extend any protections afforded to some groups who are the subject of harmful hate speech to other similar groups who are the subject of similarly harmful hate speech.191 How do these ideas relate to the situa- tion of hate speech law in the UK? The Human Rights Act 1998192 sets out the ba- sic rights and freedoms of all citizens in the UK and it does so by giving further effect to the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR).193 Now it might 189. Some people might argue that the inconsistency is inconsequential on practical grounds so long as the numbers of successful prosecutions for both the stirring up racial hatred offence and the stirring up religious hatred offence remain very small, despite the differential thresh- olds. Then again, we cannot be absolutely certain what the prosecution rate would be for the stirring up religious hatred offence if the threshold were lower. Moreover, the inconsistency could remain important, despite low prosecution rates, if it sends out an unintended and un- welcome message to Muslims that the government takes combating Islamophobic hate speech less seriously than combating anti-Semitic hate speech. 190. See, e.g., Robin West, Progressive Constitutionalism: Reconstructing the Fourteenth Amendment (Durham: Duke University Press, 1994) at 67. 191. See, e.g., Marie-France Major, “Sexual-Orientation Hate Propaganda: Time to Regroup” (1996) 11:1 CJLS 221 at 228 n 27 [Major]. Cf Catharine MacKinnon, Sexual Harassment of Working Women: A Case of Sex Discrimination (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979) at 6; Charles R Lawrence III et al, “Introduction” in Mari Matsuda et al, eds, Words That Wound: Critical Race Theory, Assaultive Speech, and the First Amendment (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993) at 9; Richard Delgado, “Two Ways to Think About Race: Reflections on the Id, the Ego, and Other Reformist Theories of Equal Protection” (2001) 89:7 Geo LJ 2279 at 2289- 90. These writers are primarily interested in the US Fourteenth Amendment equal protection clause. 192. (UK), c 42. 193. Council of Europe, European Court of Human Rights, Texts Adopted (1950) [ECHR]. Aug16_Brown_46_OA.indd 292 7/23/18 3:47 PM available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/cjlj.2016.13 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:33, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/cjlj.2016.13 https://www.cambridge.org/core The “Who?” Question in the Hate Speech Debate: Part 1 293 be argued that appealing to art 14 of the ECHR could justify an extension of the UK’s existing incitement to hatred laws to other groups when combined with art 10(2) of the ECHR. To explain, art 14 makes it clear that “[t]he enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured with- out discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status”.194 And art 10(2) states that the exercise of the right to freedom of expression protected under art 10(1) may be restricted by laws that “are necessary in a democratic society”.195 Therefore, if art 10(2) can be interpreted as implying that hate speech laws are necessary in a demo- cratic society to secure the rights and freedoms of those groups who are subject to it, then art 14 seems to imply that this securing should be done for all citizens or “without discrimination on any ground”.196 How are these arguments incom- plete? Put simply, these are not freestanding arguments but instead piggy-back on arguments about the conditions under which it would or would not amount to discrimination to draw distinctions between the different characteristics listed in art 14. Some such arguments may have to do with the underlying function or pur- pose of incitement to hatred laws. After all, if the function of incitement to hatred laws strongly implies that characteristics c1, c2, and c3 should be protected but not other characteristics c4, c5 and c6, then it would not be unfair discrimination for incitement to hatred laws to protect groups of people with characteristics c1, c2, and c3 only. In other words, it is hard to know what the relevant discrimina- tory grounds are in relation to the scope of incitement to hatred laws unless we know something of the function of such laws. III. Practical specification A second approach to specifying the proper scope of incitement to hatred laws focuses on the ostensible goals or apparent aims of such laws and then attempts to solve the problem of specification in a practical way based on the relevant goals or aims. It usually asks questions of the following form, “If the ostensible goal or apparent aim of hate speech law is X, then what would have to be the case in order for that goal or aim to apply not merely to characteristics c1, c2 and c3 but also to c4, c5 and c6?” So, for example, one ostensible goal of incitement to hatred law might be to deter acts of incitement to hatred. Another could be more simply to punish people who engage in incitement to hatred. Notice, how- ever, that, in contrast to functional specification, an approach that concentrates solely on ostensible goals may ignore the underlying or real functions, purposes or objectives of incitement to hatred laws and as such may provide a limited or incomplete justification for the very existence of such laws. If one ostensible goal of incitement to hatred laws is to deter words or behav- iour that amount to stirring up hatred, then a basic practical requirement of any 194. Ibid. 195. Ibid. 196. Ibid. Aug16_Brown_46_OA.indd 293 7/23/18 3:47 PM available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/cjlj.2016.13 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:33, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/cjlj.2016.13 https://www.cambridge.org/core 294 Brown extension of such law to cover more groups must be that members of these other groups are in fact (or are likely to be) the object of words or behaviour that stirs up hatred against them. It will not suffice merely to point to the existence of at least some instances of hate speech against members of these groups; this is be- cause not all hate speech is incitement to hatred. Thus, if one is very specifically arguing for an extension of incitement to hatred laws to cover sexual orientation, for example, it is not enough to show that instances of homophobic hate speech can be found in the media and other areas of public life.197 And if one wanted to push for an extension to cover people with disabilities, it is not enough to flag up evidence of cyber-bullying of people with disabilities198 or the existence of websites proclaiming hatred of “retards”, “spastics” and “cripples”199 or the fact that negative media portrayals of people with disabilities may have increased off the back of the austerity policies pursued by the UK coalition government after 2010 or even that many people with disabilities in the UK have reported an in- crease in their own personal experience of direct, face-to-face verbal harassment and hostility potentially as a result of negative media portrayals of people with disabilities.200 Likewise, if one wanted to justify an extension of existing incite- ment to hatred laws to also cover body weight and age, it would not be enough to refer to studies showing that “almost three quarters of overweight women [in the UK] have received derogatory remarks regarding their weight”201 or to point to surveys revealing that 41% of respondents in the UK say they have experienced ageism in the form of subtle prejudice or lack of respect.202 Instead, it would be necessary to show that actual instances of the various forms of hate speech that currently surround sexual orientation, disability, body weight and age have in fact reached the level of, or qualify as, stirring up hatred on a par with other forms of stirring up hatred that are already criminalised.203 In 2007 the parliamentary committee examining the Criminal Justice and Immigration Bill204 received expert witness evidence from the Chief Executive of Stonewall, Ben Summerskill, on the question of introducing a new offence of 197. See, e.g., Ellen Faulkner, “Homophobic Hate Propaganda in Canada” (2006) 5:1 J Hate Stud 63 at 70-72. 198. See, e.g., Equality and Human Rights Commission, supra note 166 at 154. 199. See, e.g., Mark Sherry, Disability Hate Crime: Does Anyone Really Hate Disabled People? (Farnham: Ashgate, 2010) at 29. 200. See, e.g., UK, Disability Rights UK, Press Portrayal of Disabled People: A Rise in Hostility Fuelled By Austerity? (London: Disability Rights UK, 2012), online: www.disabilityrightsuk. org/sites/default/files/pdf/disabilitypresscoverage.pdf. 201. See, e.g., UK, All Party Parliamentary Group on Body Image, Reflections on Body Image (London: HMSO, 2012) at 61, online: www.ncb.org.uk/media/861233/appg_body_image_fi- nal.pdf. 202. See, e.g., UK, European Social Survey, Experiences and Expressions of Ageism: Topline Results (UK) from Round 4 of the European Social Survey by D Abrams & HJ Swift (London: Centre for Comparative Social Surveys, 2012) at 5, online: www.europeansocialsurvey.org/ docs/findings/ESS4_gb_toplines_experiences_and_expressions_of_ageism.pdf. 203. Cf Ian Cram, “Hate Speech and Disabled People: Some Comparative Constitutional Thoughts” in Anna Lawson & Caroline Gooding, eds, Disability Rights in Europe: From Theory to Practice (Oxford: Hart, 2005) 64 at 79; Kay Goodall, “Challenging Hate Speech: Incitement to Hatred on Grounds of Sexual Orientation in England, Wales and Northern Ireland” (2009) 13:2-3 Int’l JHR 211 at 218. 204. Bill 16, 2007-2008 sess, 2008. Aug16_Brown_46_OA.indd 294 7/23/18 3:47 PM available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/cjlj.2016.13 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:33, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/cjlj.2016.13 https://www.cambridge.org/core The “Who?” Question in the Hate Speech Debate: Part 1 295 stirring up hatred on grounds of sexual orientation. He addressed the aforemen- tioned practical issue head-on. We are anxious that, although there is protection around racial and religious hatred, there is no such protection for gay people, and we are mindful that there has been an increase in the incidence in recent years of what seem to us to be very obvi- ous examples of incitement to hatred that would not otherwise be caught by the criminal law. One key area is in the creation and distribution of what is quite often reggae music.205 In the end the government concluded that introducing a new offence of stirring up hatred on grounds of sexual orientation was an appropriate response to an actual problem. Writing to the Joint Committee On Human Rights at the end of 2007, the then Minster of State for Justice, David Hanson MP, put the position thusly. The Government considers that a compelling case can be made that there is a pressing social need because of the evidence of hatred against homosexual people being stirred up by, amongst others, some extreme political groups and song lyr- ics, and of widespread violence, bullying and discrimination against homosexual people.206 By contrast, when a year later in 2008 the same Minister was asked by the same Joint Committee to set forth the government’s view on the merits of creating a new offence of stirring up hatred on grounds of transgender identity he stated the following. We endorse the Committee’s concern that legislation should be firmly based on evidence. The Government has been in contact with a number of groups and individu- als representing transgender people, including Press for Change, Gender Trust, FTM network, Gender Identity Research and Education Society, GALOP and the Beaumont Trust. We have heard some eloquent and specific examples of the dif- ficulties which some transgender people may face. Like the Committee, the Government has considerable sympathy for the views expressed by transgender organisations and we want to minimise the difficulties faced by many transgender people. But the evidence we have suggests that most of the incidents described are already criminal, and should be dealt with by existing criminal law. Incitement to commit a crime (as opposed to stirring up hatred) is already a criminal offence. One case of disparaging song lyrics was cited as evi- dence, the Government believes that although distasteful they would be unlikely to be considered threatening to transgender people as a group. In summary, we have not seen any compelling evidence of words, behaviour or material which are threatening and intended to stir up hatred against transgender people as a group.207 205. UK, HC, General Committee Debates, col 74 (16 October 2007). 206. David Hanson, Letter to the Joint Committee on Human Rights, 25 November 2007, at para 6, online: www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt200708/jtselect/jtrights/37/3710.htm. 207. David Hanson, Letter to the Joint Committee on Human Rights, 12 March 2008, online: www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt200708/jtselect/jtrights/81/8118.htm. Aug16_Brown_46_OA.indd 295 7/23/18 3:47 PM available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/cjlj.2016.13 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:33, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/cjlj.2016.13 https://www.cambridge.org/core 296 Brown What might “compelling evidence” look like? Presumably it would have to be not only methodologically robust but also comprehensive in nature. Specifically, perhaps it might include data from large-scale quantitative discourse analyses of media and Internet content, as well as reliable statistics based on large-scale gathering and recording of reported incidents of incitement to hatred. At any rate, in 2010 the government reaffirmed its position that there was insufficient evidence that hatred was being stirred up against people with transgender identi- ties to justify creating a new offence, and also insufficient evidence in relation to the stirring up of hatred against people with disabilities.208 Nevertheless, I believe that it is more difficult to draw policy conclusions from this putative evidence gap than one might at first assume. On the one hand, let us just imagine for the sake of argument (and almost certainly contrary to fact) that compelling evidence does exist and what it shows is that the extent of incite- ment to hatred relating to disability and transgender identity in the media and on the Internet is very small both in absolute terms and relative to race, religion and sexual orientation, as well as that there are few reported incidents of incitement to hatred relating to disability and transgender identity and once again fewer than for race, religion and sexual orientation. It would not necessarily follow from this evidence (if it existed) that the creation of new stirring up hatred offences for disability and transgender identity are unwarranted. In terms of incitement to hatred in the media and on the Internet, it may be that the “pressing social need” requirement is different for people with disabilities and people with transgender identities (people who may feel particularly vulnerable or socially excluded), and so a lower extent may be sufficient to warrant intervention. In terms of report- ing, it may be that people with disabilities and people with transgender identities (again people who may feel particularly vulnerable or socially excluded), as well as the wider population (people who may not be used to looking out for or even recognising incitement to hatred against people with disabilities and people with transgender identities), are simply not yet reporting incidents at the same rate as for other forms of incitement to hatred, and this could be for various reasons other than that there are fewer incidents to report.209 What seems far more likely, on the other hand, is that there is currently a lack of methodologically robust and comprehensive evidence one way or the other. Now it is certainly true that non-governmental organisations (NGOs) like 208. UK, Criminal Law Policy Unit, Circular 2010/05: Offences of Stirring up Hatred on the Grounds of Sexual Orientation (London: Ministry of Justice, 2010) at para 20 [Circular 2010/05]. 209. Of course, there are also some general problems with under-reporting of incitement to hatred that cut across its different forms. One is that people, including those who are the objects of incitement to hatred and also those who oppose it, are too scared or too disempowered to re- port incidents, which might itself be one aspect of the climate of fear created by hate speech. Another is that the stirring up of hatred is something that is done primarily within or among hate groups and would-be members of hate groups or like-minded people, particularly on the Internet but also in meetings and gatherings in person. And so, the people who are most likely to make complaints, such as people who are members of the groups against whom hatred is being stirred up or people who are outspoken critics of hate speech, may not be exposed to this speech. And so it goes unreported. Aug16_Brown_46_OA.indd 296 7/23/18 3:47 PM available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/cjlj.2016.13 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:33, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/cjlj.2016.13 https://www.cambridge.org/core The “Who?” Question in the Hate Speech Debate: Part 1 297 Disability Rights UK do from time to time commission research into negative media portrayals of people with disabilities and that NGOs like True Vision do gather and record self-reports of transphobic hate incidents, to give just two ex- amples. But because these evidence-gathering practices are not coordinated by governmental authorities, and because each NGO focuses (or is seen to focus) on particular groups at particular times, and does so with limited resources, and does not seek to pinpoint incitement to hatred specifically, the evidence gen- erated is patchy and unsystematic. At present governmental agencies do not regularly commission large-scale quantitative discourse analyses looking into the true extent of incitement to hatred on grounds of disability or transgender identity in the media and on the Internet. Nor do they engage in large-scale gath- ering and recording of reported incidents of incitement to hatred on grounds of disability or transgender identity, albeit the Home Office does capture reported incidents relating to existing stirring up hatred offences covering race, religion and sexual orientation within its recorded crime figures under the public order offences category.210 But does this mean, therefore, that creating new stirring up hatred offences for disability and transgender identity cannot be warranted? Again not necessarily. For one thing, it would be hard to understand the logic of a decision to refrain from creating new stirring up hatred offences whilst leaving the existing offences in place rather than removing the existing offences if there is a paucity of evidence to call upon for any of the characteristics in question. For another thing, the paucity of evidence might reflect a lack of institutional impetus and political will on the part of governmental agencies. And there may be various reasons for this. One malign reason could be that lack of research is symptom- atic of precisely the sort of attitudes that can sow the seeds of hate speech itself, namely, lack of concern for, empathy toward or solidarity with people with dis- abilities and people with transgender identities. A more benign reason is simply that the issues around incitement to hatred towards such people are relatively new to the agenda of civil servants, politicians, policymakers, and media profes- sionals, if not to stakeholders, campaigners and academics.211 Moreover, in a time of departmental budget cuts in the UK the resources available to the Home Office and Ministry of Justice to investigate possible extensions of the law may be limited, not to mention the fact that parliamentary time to discuss and push through necessary provisions is at a premium. As an illustration of these practical issues, consider the fact that as of June 2016 the UK government has still yet to respond officially to the Law Commission’s 2014 report on extending hate crime legislation including the stirring up hatred offences to cover additional groups. Let us take it as read, therefore, that governmental authorities should take on the responsibility for creating or obtaining methodologically robust and 210. It is worth noting that the European Commission Against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI), of which the UK is a member, has recently adopted General Policy Recommendation No. 15 on Combating Hate Speech, Texts Adopted (2015), recommendation 3 of which calls on govern- ments to gather, record and publicly disseminate data on reported cases of incitement to hatred, online: www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/ecri/activities/GPR/EN/Recommendation_N15/REC- 15-2016-015-ENG.pdf. 211. Cf Hare, “Free Speech”, supra note 147 at 391. Aug16_Brown_46_OA.indd 297 7/23/18 3:47 PM available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/cjlj.2016.13 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:33, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/cjlj.2016.13 https://www.cambridge.org/core 298 Brown comprehensive evidence. Then again, what should legislators do in the meantime whilst they wait for compelling evidence to come in? One strategy is to hold off creating any new stirring up hatred offences until the results are in. This is pre- cisely the view of the Joint Committee on Human Rights.212 The problem with this approach, however, is that some groups may continue to be the objects of incite- ment to hatred whilst they wait for governmental authorities to create or obtain compelling evidence, weigh it, draft an action plan, consult with stakeholders, and finally attempt to get legislation passed through both Houses of Parliament. It goes without saying that there is unlikely to be a similar hiatus among hate speakers during this potentially lengthy period. Indeed, members of groups who are subject to incitement to hatred and who want the government to create new of- fences may find themselves in the perverse position of welcoming a spike in hate speech against them, so that it can be picked up by researchers. A second strategy is for legislators to go ahead and create new stirring up hatred offences based on suspicions or anecdotal reports in lieu of methodologi- cally robust and comprehensive evidence. What, if anything, can be said on be- half of this strategy? It seems to me that some rationales are better than others. One is that creating new offences could give people the confidence they need to report incidents and this in turn will enable government authorities to build up a more reliable picture of the phenomena in question. Yet an obvious objec- tion here is that the rationale proposes to create new offences in order to gain some certainty on the existence of phenomena whose existence is in fact a pre- condition for introducing the new offences in the first place.213 Nonetheless, a second rationale is based on the old adage that “there is no smoke without fire”. This could mean two things. First, that if people are raising suspicions about or offering anecdotal reports of certain phenomena, the chances are that the phenomena do exist, even if nobody yet knows for certain. Of course, it might be countered that the people raising suspicions or offering anecdotal reports are biased or have a vested interest or are simply unreliable witnesses because of their own traumatic experiences. But what if their concerns are supported by a second application of the adage? Suppose we know for certain that members of groups who are the objects of incitement to hatred are also typically subject to discrimination or violence and that there is some reciprocal connection between stirring up hatred and the discrimination or violence. In which case, if we also know for certain that members of a given group are subject to discrimination or violence, this may lend additional credence to the suspicions or anecdotal reports of incitement to hatred against them. A third, related rationale is a con- scious adoption of a certain form of the precautionary principle. In the absence of methodologically robust and comprehensive evidence of the existence of in- citement to hatred against particular groups in society but mindful of the fact that this sort of hate speech can have significant harmful effects, especially for 212. UK, Joint Committee On Human Rights Fifteenth Report, Conclusions and Recommendations, 25 March 2008 at para 13, online: www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt200708/jtselect/ jtrights/81/8110.htm. 213. Cf Law Commission, supra note 155 at paras 7.139-7.142 and 7.145. Aug16_Brown_46_OA.indd 298 7/23/18 3:47 PM available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/cjlj.2016.13 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:33, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/cjlj.2016.13 https://www.cambridge.org/core The “Who?” Question in the Hate Speech Debate: Part 1 299 members of those groups but also for society as a whole, a perfectly rational course of action for government authorities to take is to not merely commence gathering the evidence but also to take substantive precautions against the risk of significant harmful effects. This could be done through an extension of the relevant legislation whilst they wait for that evidence to come in and during which time the burden of proof is shifted toward those people who advocate non-extension on the grounds that there is no problem.214 Let us now turn to consider another ostensible goal of incitement to hatred law: namely, to punish wrongdoers, that is, people who stir up hatred against vulnerable groups in society. Now it might seem fair to suppose that a practi- cal requirement of law with this sort of ostensible goal is that it can be applied to prosecutable cases and that the CPS has a reasonable prospect of securing successful convictions. If the elements that make up existing offences together create a high threshold for prosecution, then creating new offences to cover yet more characteristics but based on the elements of the existing offences, could become a pointless exercise (it might be argued) in the event that few, if any, actual cases involving those newly protected characteristics are prosecutable. In 2014, for example, the Law Commission argued that it would be futile to cre- ate new offences of stirring up hatred on grounds of disability and transgender identity because, based on the elements of the existing stirring up hatred offences relating to religion and sexual orientation (i.e., intent, use of threatening words or behaviour), the threshold required for successful prosecution would be so high that there would be small numbers of prosecutable cases and vanishingly small numbers of actual successful prosecutions.215 However, I believe that there is a significant weakness in this line of argu- ment and that this weakness is a good illustration of why it would be wrong to rely exclusively upon a practical specification of the proper scope of incitement to hatred laws. If the reason not to create new offences for additional character- istics is the lack of prosecutable cases, which itself reflects the high threshold for prosecution, then surely this reason could also equally support some very different conclusions about how we should proceed.216 For instance, it might be argued that the best solution is not to refrain from creating new offences but instead to adjust the basic elements of the new offences to create a lower threshold. Perhaps this could be done by matching the basic elements of any new stirring up hatred offences relating to disability and transgender identity not to the existing stirring up hatred offences relating to religion and sexual orientation, which have relatively high thresholds for conviction (i.e., intent, threatening words or behaviour), but instead to the stirring up racial hatred of- fence, which has a relatively low threshold for conviction (i.e., intent or likeli- hood, threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour). Of course, it might be countered at this stage that even the lower threshold for incitement to racial 214. Cf Brown, supra note 141 at 247. 215. Law Commission, supra note 155 at paras 1.70, 7.120, 7.125-7.138. 216. Cf Bakalis, supra note 155 at 204-05. Aug16_Brown_46_OA.indd 299 7/23/18 3:47 PM available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/cjlj.2016.13 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:33, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/cjlj.2016.13 https://www.cambridge.org/core 300 Brown hatred has not led to a significantly higher number of successful prosecutions. But this response only invites the following question. If the Law Commission concluded that low prosecution rates are a valid reason to refrain from creating new stirring up hatred offences covering additional characteristics, why did it not also conclude that low prosecution rates are a valid reason to repeal existing stirring up hatred offences? The answer must surely be that there may be power- ful rationales for the existing offences that are neither undermined nor trumped by the issue of thresholds for prosecution and the extent of prosecutable cases. One such rationale might be the symbolic function of incitement to hatred law, to which I shall return in Part 2. And if this is true, it seems reasonable to con- sider whether or not the same or similar powerful rationale(s) might also apply to the new offences. My point here is that arguments for and against the creation of new stir- ring up hatred offences cannot rely solely on practical considerations relating to thresholds for prosecution. After all, if authorities declared that they were going to lower the threshold for the new offences to ensure that legal profes- sionals have plenty of prosecutable offences to work with, so that introducing the new offences is not a pointless exercise, members of the public might rea- sonably respond that it is not enough for new offences to create prosecutable offences; they must serve some underlying function or purpose. For example, if one wanted to justify the erection of a sign in a field that reads “People who throw stones at this sign will be prosecuted” it would not be enough to comment on how many prosecutable cases and successful prosecutions would be likely to occur. One would need to supply a good reason for creating the offence in the first place. Likewise, in order to justify enacting new stirring up hatred offences it is not enough to make arguments about what threshold would be needed in order to sustain a certain number of prosecutable cases and successful prosecu- tions. Instead, one would need to make more fundamental arguments about the underlying or real function or purpose of incitement to hatred laws, and one would also need to recognise that these functional arguments might be relevant to determining the thresholds. I plan to explore the functional approach in detail in Part 2, but for now I can offer one brief illustration. One possible functional argument might sup- port the creation of new stirring up hatred offences for disability and transgen- der identity but with lower prosecution thresholds because of the expressive or symbolic value of having these offences on the books with lower thresholds. A lower threshold for prosecution sends out a message that the government is genuinely interested in combating this speech because, for example, it has bona fide concern that people with disabilities and transgender identities should not face a climate of hatred and fear (to which the stirring up of hatred contributes). Of course, if this argument is accepted, then there may also be reasons of parity to adopt lower thresholds for all the stirring up hatred offences. What is more, there could be another functional argument for this lowering of thresholds for all the stirring up hatred offence once again couched in terms of expressive or symbolic value: namely, it sends out a message that the government has no Aug16_Brown_46_OA.indd 300 7/23/18 3:47 PM available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/cjlj.2016.13 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:33, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/cjlj.2016.13 https://www.cambridge.org/core The “Who?” Question in the Hate Speech Debate: Part 1 301 greater or lesser concern for people with disabilities or transgender identities than for other groups in society; that there is no suggestion of a pecking order of sociolegal status among different groups based upon a hierarchy of prosecution thresholds. At any rate, it seems clear to me that these or other functional argu- ments, as well as consistency and democratic arguments, have just as important a role to play as purely practical considerations. That being said, some people might try to argue that characteristics such as religion, say, are less deserving of protection because of the formal qualities of these characteristics and because of people’s relationship with them. So, it is to this other type of argument that I shall turn next. IV. Formal specification A third approach to specifying the proper scope of incitement to hatred laws appeals to intuitions about the formal qualities of characteristics and about the forms of people’s relationships with their characteristics. These intuitions may lead us to suppose that some characteristics are deserving of, or appropriate ob- jects of, legal protections whilst others are undeserving of, or inappropriate ob- jects of, legal protections. Various formal distinctions have been drawn in the context of both public and academic debate on the “Who?” question. In what follows I shall submit five such distinctions to critical scrutiny. A. Immutable versus changeable characteristics One potentially relevant distinction is between immutable characteristics, that is, characteristics that are unchanging over time and that remain with the individual throughout his or her lifetime, and changeable characteristics, as in, character- istics that do change over time and that do not therefore always remain with the individual. During a House of Commons debate on the Racial and Religious Hatred Bill, for example, the then Shadow Attorney General, Dominic Grieve MP, argued that religion is a less eligible or fitting candidate for protection under incitement to hatred laws partly because “race is immutable”.217 In a similar vein, Kay Goodall contends that “[r]ace, for most people, most of the time, is indeed clear and fixed”, whereas “[r]eligious affiliation, in contrast, is often less easily discerned by others and is not immutable (even if it is rare that people face an open choice in which faith to adopt).”218 The alleged moral significance of im- mutability seems to rest largely in the thought that if it is literally impossible to change one’s race, say, then it is all the more important that something is done to prevent the stirring up of racial hatred, because a person simply cannot evade the hatred by changing his or her race. Religion, by contrast, can be changed and so people can avoid incitement to hatred (so the thought goes). 217. Standing Committee E, supra note 188 at col 72. 218. Kay Goodall, “Incitement to Religious Hatred: All Talk and No Substance?” (2007) 70:1 Mod L Rev 89 at 97 [Goodall]. Aug16_Brown_46_OA.indd 301 7/23/18 3:47 PM available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/cjlj.2016.13 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:33, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/cjlj.2016.13 https://www.cambridge.org/core 302 Brown What might this distinction suggest about other characteristics besides race and religion? Marie-France Major maintains that if groups of people identified by their race or ethnicity are owed protection under incitement to hatred laws because race and ethnicity are immutable characteristics—because “it is diffi- cult, if not impossible, to contract out of one’s race or one’s ethnic origin”219— then it is at least arguable that the same can, and should, be said of sexual orientation.220 On this view, even if sexual orientation is constituted by affective states or patterns thereof, it still can be immutable. Thus, if having homosexual desires is not something that is subject to change over time, whether by an act of will on the part of the individual or by medical interventions like electric shock treatment or simply by “growing out of it”, then it ought to be treated as a protected characteristic.221 On closer reflection, however, it is by no means obvious that even race is al- ways and strictly immutable. After all, if—and admittedly this is a big if—race is defined purely by skin colour, then the idea of literal immutability is undermined by the practice among some ethnic minorities, often women, of using natural and artificial cosmetics to lighten skin (often at great economic expense as well as risk to dermatological well-being). It may be possible, for example, for someone to make a kind of transition from being a member of a “black race” defined by skin colour into being a member of a “brown race” also defined by skin colour. This could either weaken the claim that race is appropriately protected under incitement to hatred law or, more plausibly, demonstrate the error of thinking that immutability is relevant. Race is not the only problematic characteristic. Consider gender identity. If immutability is a necessary condition for a charac- teristic being eligible for protection under incitement to hatred laws, and if we want to say that gender identity ought to be protected, then we might be forced to say that gender identity is immutable. Yet this flies in the face of the transitioning experiences of many people with transgender identities—such as people who change their gender presentation from male to female or female to male in order to better fit their internal sense of who they really are. Talk of immutability might even constitute a form of misrecognition.222 If the distinction between immutable and changeable characteristics fails to divide characteristics in ways that seem intuitive, then perhaps we need a better distinction. B. Chosen versus unchosen characteristics Another possibility is the distinction between chosen and unchosen charac- teristics. The are two ways of understanding this distinction. The first is as a backward-looking distinction between characteristics that are the products of choices made by the people who possess them and characteristics that result 219. Major, supra note 191 at 229-30. 220. Ibid at 229 n 33. 221. Ibid. 222. Cf Martha T Zingo, Sex/Gender Outsiders, Hate Speech and Freedom of Expression: Can They Say That About Me? (Westport: Praeger, 1998) at 61 [Zingo]. Aug16_Brown_46_OA.indd 302 7/23/18 3:47 PM available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/cjlj.2016.13 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:33, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/cjlj.2016.13 https://www.cambridge.org/core The “Who?” Question in the Hate Speech Debate: Part 1 303 from something other than the choices made by the people who possess them. The second is a forward-looking distinction between characteristics that people did not choose to possess but can now choose to rid themselves of and character- istics that people did not choose to possess and are unable to rid themselves of. The difference between these two forms of the distinction will become relevant below. But either way, the alleged moral significance of the present distinction seems to reside largely in the notion that other things being equal what happens to people including whether and how they should be protected by governmental authorities should depend on the choices they make. So how does this alternative distinction play out for characteristics like race and religion, for example? In 2002 the British Humanist Association argued against the creation of a new stirring up religious hatred offence partly on the grounds that “[r]eligions, unlike race, can be chosen or put aside”.223 In a similar vein, Hare argued that, [w]hatever advances have been made in defining race as a social (as opposed to a purely biological) construct, it remains the case that for the vast majority who live in liberal democracies, religious adherence is a matter of choice rather than birth and the law does not usually provide the protection of the criminal law for vilifica- tion based upon the life choices of its citizens.224 Likewise, it has been suggested that the scope of hate speech laws in general should be “confined to racial groups, with a clear exclusion of political or social groups with voluntary membership” on the basis that “the racial group’s unique feature is the nonvoluntary nature of membership”.225 But just how compelling is this distinction? Not very in my opinion. It does not take much to realise that few, if any, characteristics are entirely the product of people’s choices or entirely the product of things other than people’s choices. Instead, the aetiology of most characteristics is a combination of choices and other things that are not choices.226 To see this we need only reflect on two 223. British Humanist Association, Final (Third) Submission to the Select Committee on Religious Offences: Legislation on Incitement of Religious Hatred, 4 December 2002, at para 6, online: https://humanism.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/BHA-Submission-on-Religious-Offences-3.pdf. 224. Ivan Hare, “Crosses, Crescents and Sacred Cows: Criminalising Incitement to Religious Hatred” (2006) Pub L 521 at 534. 225. David Kretzmer, “Freedom of Speech and Racism” (1987) 8:3 Cardozo L Rev 445 at 467. 226. It might be objected here that all characteristics are entirely unchosen because all the char- acteristics which are most relevant to the question of the proper scope of incitement to hatred laws are socially constructed, meaning, amongst other things, that their content and bounda- ries are not somehow inevitable or determined by natural facts but are constructed by social groups, with particular perspectives or ways of looking at the world and particular reasons for regarding certain categories as significant. See Ian Hacking, The Social Construction of What? (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999). Moreover, since no individual chooses that a given set of physical qualities will become and remain a socially significant category— because a given set of physical qualities being socially significant is determined at the social or intersubjective level—in that sense no individual chooses to possess a socially significant characteristic. No individual chooses, in that sense, to be Afro-Caribbean or black rather Anglo-Saxon or white, disabled rather than able-bodied, transgender rather than cisgender, of example, because no individual chooses that these will become and remain socially signifi- cant categories. Aug16_Brown_46_OA.indd 303 7/23/18 3:47 PM available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/cjlj.2016.13 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:33, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/cjlj.2016.13 https://www.cambridge.org/core 304 Brown questions. First, are there any characteristics, statuses or identities which peo- ple come to possess entirely as a consequence of their own choices? Second, are there any characteristics, statuses or identities the elements of which peo- ple come to possess entirely as result of things other than their own choices? Starting with the first question, consider the examples of obesity, immigration status, sex or gender identity, and permanently disabling injury. Perhaps for some obese people their body weight reflects to a very significant extent life- style choices. This aspect of obesity puts it in the category of conduct or pheno- typic behaviour—a category which, at first glance, appears to be about personal choice. But for many other obese people their overeating and lack of exercise can be symptoms of stress, anxiety or depressive disorders which they have not chosen. In other cases obesity itself can be explained by rare genetic conditions such as Prader-Willi syndrome or underlying medical conditions such as hypo- thyroidism. Furthermore, one can say of virtually all obese people that they do not choose the genetically inherited body builds which can make it harder for them to control their weight. This is obesity as a biological or genotypic attri- bute. Turning to affiliations, perhaps there are some economic migrants, illegal immigrants, so-called bogus asylum seekers, failed asylum seekers, genuine asylum seekers, or even refugees who decide where to migrate or where to seek asylum. But many others do not. Moreover, few, if any, are personally respon- sible for the push factors that cause them to leave the countries of their birth, not least extreme poverty, persecution, civil wars or natural disasters. In the case of physical phenotypic attributes like sex, it is true that some people elect to un- dergo sex reassignment surgery and hormone therapy. And in terms of conduct or behavioural phenotypes like gender performance, clearly some young people do decide to take on the presentation of masculine or feminine traits other than the traits society expects of them. But people who elect to undergo surgery and hormone therapy do not choose to suffer the bad luck of being born in the “wrong” body, do not choose to have missed out on the seminal life experience of going through puberty in the “right” body and, insofar as diagnoses of gender dysphoria are appropriate, do not choose to suffer from this disorder. Likewise, people, including children and adults, who “decide” to take on masculine or feminine traits which confound social expectations, do not choose to be born with the feeling that their real gender identity does not align with the one as- signed to them, and certainly do not choose to be born into societies that have such expectations of them. With regards to physical disability, if someone opts to take part in a dangerous sport or pastime, when there is absolutely no require- ment to do so, and then suffers some form of permanently disabling injury, then maybe it can be said that the injury was caused by his or her choices. Yet no disabled person, whatever the proximate cause of his or her disability, chooses to live in a society which is structured in such a way as to make physical impair- ments disabling. Or take religion as something which implicates the categories of affilia- tion, belief and conduct. The vast majority of adult believers are exposed to religious beliefs as children through their families as well as through religious Aug16_Brown_46_OA.indd 304 7/23/18 3:47 PM available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/cjlj.2016.13 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:33, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/cjlj.2016.13 https://www.cambridge.org/core The “Who?” Question in the Hate Speech Debate: Part 1 305 organisations and institutions. Indeed, in many cases religious believers remain in touch with these agents of socialisation throughout their adult lives.227 So even if people choose their religions, they do not choose the socialisation that influ- ences the choices they make. Indeed, the more one reflects on the nature of re- ligious socialisation the harder it may be to place race and religion on opposite sides of the distinction between unchosen and chosen characteristics. As Goodall puts it, “it is rare that people face an open choice in which faith to adopt”.228 Now in theory even people who do not choose to be born into a religious way of life can choose whether or not to give up, put aside, escape or exit their religion. But it would be foolish to ignore the practical difficulties that religionists face in giv- ing up their religious identities—difficulties that they do not choose but which nevertheless shape the choices they make. One set of difficulties have to do with exiting a religious community. Within some Muslim communities in the UK, for example, if someone turns away from Islam he or she cannot become a secular person, he or she is a takfir (apostate), with everything this implies about his or her standing in a religious community. In the words of the House of Lords Select Committee on Religious Offences, “there are communities in the UK where it is inconceivable that anyone could change their professed religion and continue to live within the community concerned.”229 The point is that insofar as reli- gious identity is tied to community membership and community membership is itself key to accessing family life, housing, occupation, friendship, affiliation, leisure, and so on, expecting people to give up their religious identity could be considered an unreasonable expectation given the spiritual, psychological, fa- milial, material, and economic burdens of exit. Perhaps a liberal society should work much harder to ensure that people do have viable options to exit religious communities.230 But in the meantime, lack of reasonable options to exit surely undermines the idea that religion is chosen in the forward-looking sense. In addition, even if someone did choose to give up his or her Muslim religious beliefs, it is quite possible that he or she will nevertheless remain a “Muslim” in the eyes of some people, most notably in the eyes of people who intend to stir up hatred against Muslims and the audience in which hatred is being stirred up. The point is that when people pick out, and intend to stir up hatred against, Muslims, sometimes (although not always) this is more about Muslim ethnic identity in general than Muslim religious beliefs very specifically. Putting it another way, the difference between highly religious Muslims and secular Muslims might be lost on certain types of hate speakers and their audiences.231 This reflects the 227. See, e.g., Darren E Sherkat, “Religious Socialization: Sources of Influence and Influences of Agency” in Michele Dillon, ed, Handbook of the Sociology of Religion (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 228. Goodall, supra note 218 at 97. 229. UK, First Report (London: The Stationery Office, 2012) at c 8, para 100, online: www.par- liament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/ld200203/ldselect/ldrelof/95/9501.htm. 230. Brian Barry, Culture and Equality: An Egalitarian Critique of Multiculturalism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001). 231. Cf Modood, “Obstacles”, supra note 179 at 56. The same point was made in 2001 by Gerald Kaufman during a debate in the House of Commons. See UK, HC, House of Commons Debates, vol 375, col 683-684 (26 November 2001). Aug16_Brown_46_OA.indd 305 7/23/18 3:47 PM available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/cjlj.2016.13 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:33, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/cjlj.2016.13 https://www.cambridge.org/core 306 Brown deeper point that “[v]ery rarely can individuals choose the identity in terms of which they are perceived by others”.232 In that specific sense “human identities are primarily ascriptive, not elective”.233 How far could these sorts of argument be taken? I am inclined to think that most of what I have just said about the difficulties faced by religionists in choosing to give up or change their faith applies equally to people considering whether or not to give up or change their political beliefs. Consider an adult who spent much of her youth in and around the Women’s Peace Camp at Greenham Common and who continues to be affiliated with both feminist and environmen- tal political organisations and communities. Both the influence of socialisation on the development of her political beliefs and the difficulties she might face in exiting this culture and way of life may also challenge or undermine the as- sumption that her political beliefs are chosen, in either the backward-looking or forward-looking ways. If so, then surely it makes as much sense or would be equally appropriate under the present distinction for governmental authorities to protect people from incitement to hatred on grounds of political affiliation as it does to protect them from incitement to religious hatred. Let us now turn to our second question: are there any characteristics, statuses or identities the elements of which individuals come to possess entirely as result of things other than their own choices? Race is an obvious candidate; assuming, that is, one believes it is a genotypic attribute, a geographic phenotype or else a socially imposed category. But sticking with the example of religion for just a little longer, maybe there is something special about religious beliefs which vindicates their status as unchosen. As Peter Jones puts it, “‘choosing to believe’ implies an optionality of a sort that is not normally a part of the believing process [for some types of beliefs].”234 For example, “it is not … open to me to choose to believe that the square on the hypotenuse is not equal to the sum of the squares of the two other sides of a right-angled triangle”.235 Likewise, “[s]ome believers would protest that their religious beliefs are so manifestly true to themselves, even if not to others, that they have no choice but to believe.”236 Putting it an- other way, beliefs dawn on believers; believers do not dawn on beliefs. Take an evangelic Christian coming to the belief that the Bible is God’s inspired word to humanity or the belief that the life, death and resurrection of Jesus is the only true source of salvation and forgiveness of sins. He may be convinced that the pos- session of these beliefs is something that happens to him rather than being done by him. Then again, this subjective or personalised understanding of religious belief formation may not be entirely accurate and may underestimate the agency involved. For, it simply cannot be the case that believers are entirely uninvolved in the transformation of beliefs. After all, this process cannot happen without them; the beliefs are their beliefs. Perhaps it is true to say that someone who is 232. John Gray, Two Faces of Liberalism (Cambridge: Polity, 2000) at 121 [Gray]. 233. Ibid. 234. Peter Jones, “Bearing the Consequences of Belief” (1994) 2:1 J Pol Philosophy 24 at 32 [Jones, “Consequences”]. 235. Ibid. 236. Ibid. Aug16_Brown_46_OA.indd 306 7/23/18 3:47 PM available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/cjlj.2016.13 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:33, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/cjlj.2016.13 https://www.cambridge.org/core The “Who?” Question in the Hate Speech Debate: Part 1 307 inquisitive about evangelical Christianity, say, cannot choose how many visits to church he or she will be required to make in order for those visits to induce in him or her certain beliefs, but he or she can elect to kick-start the mechanism of belief formation, such as by joining a religious group. In other words, it may be possible for someone to start experimenting with evangelical Christianity even if he or she was socialised as a secularist. If so, then, as Jones puts it, “[b]eliefs cannot therefore be regarded as fixed features of people which have been irreme- diably implanted in their heads by circumstances.”237 But what of racial identity? Could it ever make sense to say that someone has chosen his or her racial identity? I think that it could. To see how consider the case of Rachel Dolezal, a regional president for the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) in the US, who despite being born to two white parents chose to perform the identity of being mixed race and persisted in that performance everyday for several years. This case of racial identity per- formance challenges the idea that racial identity is only ever ascribed as opposed to achieved.238 And it serves to illustrate Judith Butler’s claim that “performativ- ity is not a singular act, but a repetition and a ritual, which achieves its effects through its naturalization in the context of a body, understood, in part, as a cul- turally sustained temporal duration.”239 Perhaps it also serves to show that racial identity performance can be chosen in one sense. For, one could say that the various ways in which Dolezal’s physical appearance was subject to her control and the ways in which she was able to organise her professional life around her physical appearance amounted to her choosing to perform her preferred racial identity as mixed race.240 Of course, it may well be that after a time her perfor- mance became automatic or habit as opposed to conscious choice. Indeed, the fact that performing the identity of a mixed race person became second-nature to her no doubt helped to make her identity seem even more “natural” (that is, believable) to other people. Even so, it does seem as though a choice was made to begin the performance and on some level it may be that other later choices are made to not cease the performance. To re-cap, I have tried to argue that many, if not all, of the characteristics rel- evant to the “Who?” question are both to some extent or in some sense chosen and to some extent or in some sense unchosen. Why does this matter? Because it poses a dilemma for legislators. They may be more inclined to create new stir- ring up hatred offences if the characteristic is toward the unchosen end of the spectrum and more inclined not to do so if the characteristic is toward the chosen end of the spectrum. But what should they do in the hard cases that fall in the middle? Decisions taken here could seem very arbitrary. For example, in 2010 the government made clear that the offence of stirring up hatred on grounds of sexual orientation “covers only groups of people who are gay, lesbian, bisexual, 237. Peter Jones, “Beliefs and Identities” in John Horton & Susan Mendus, eds, Toleration, Identity, and Difference (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999) at 70. 238. Cf Ralph Linton, The Study of Man: An Introduction (New York: D Appleton and Co, 1936). 239. Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity, 2nd ed (London: Routledge, 1999) at xiv-xv. 240. Cf Judith Butler, Undoing Gender (London: Routledge, 2004) at 214. Aug16_Brown_46_OA.indd 307 7/23/18 3:47 PM available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/cjlj.2016.13 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:33, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/cjlj.2016.13 https://www.cambridge.org/core 308 Brown or heterosexual” and does not extend to sexual preferences, such as “a preference for particular sexual acts or practices”.241 Yet it may be that sexual preference is not that much nearer to the chosen end of the spectrum than sexual orientation. Come to that, assuming this spectrum does matter, what should governmental authorities do about people who stir up hatred against persons on grounds of their sexual orientation defined not in terms of the gender of the objects of sexual desire but in terms of the age of the objects of sexual desire?242 No doubt there are many other cases in which characteristics occupy similar positions along the spectrum with only fine margins separating them. So in the end the drawing of non-arbitrary lines may rest on other functional considerations of the sort to be discussed in Part 2. I also think it is important not to blindly accept the moral significance of the distinction between chosen and unchosen characteristics without further critical examination. Now it might be thought that someone has less grounds to com- plain about being the subject of incitement to hatred if it can be shown that his or her possession of the targeted characteristic was the result of his or her choices in a backward-looking sense. In other words: “You made your bed, now you can lie in it.” But it is very far from obvious that choices about characteristics can or should attract this sort of outcome responsibility. Even if someone did make a voluntary choice against a background of equal opportunity to join the armed services and fight in a war, for example, it is not as though he or she also chose to become a member of a group of people who may be subject to incitement to hatred with impunity. This does not seem to be part of the choice that he or she made, especially if either he or she could not have reasonably foreseen this out- come or this is not in itself a reasonable outcome.243 One should be similarly cautious about the alleged moral significance of choice in the forward-looking sense. Maybe the idea is that so long as people are free to change a given characteristic from this point onwards, then it is accept- able for governmental authorities not to ban incitement to hatred based on that characteristic. In theory a Muslim living in a society where the stirring up of ha- tred against Muslims is widespread could choose to become a secularist or even a Christian (so the argument goes) and thereby evade the social evils of this sort of hate speech. In other words: “Given how difficult the government finds it to prevent religious hate speech, you are best placed to get yourself out of the situ- ation in which you now find yourself.” Yet this is an odd way of thinking about the choice that religionists face. Unless and until exit becomes a costless option, there is a sense in which religionists are in a lose-lose situation. Keep one’s re- ligion and retain one’s place within the religious community but continue to be subject to incitement to hatred or else forsake one’s religious beliefs and exit the 241. Circular 2010/05, supra note 208 at para 7. 242. This issue was addressed in B [2013] EWCA Crim 291 reported in (2013) 1 Archbold Rev at 4. 243. The fact that someone who chooses to join the armed forces and fight in a war might face calls to justify his or her choice or criticism of the choice made could well be another matter; that is to say, this might indeed be part of his or her choice, as well as either a foreseeable or not inherently unreasonable outcome. Aug16_Brown_46_OA.indd 308 7/23/18 3:47 PM available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/cjlj.2016.13 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:33, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/cjlj.2016.13 https://www.cambridge.org/core The “Who?” Question in the Hate Speech Debate: Part 1 309 religious community at great cost. Similarly high costs might be associated with the other option of exiting the society altogether. The absence of reasonable op- tions is hardly a fitting basis for responsibility-attracting choices. Besides, even if someone could choose to change his or her religious beliefs without any cost, how could this excuse otherwise unacceptable forms of treatment? As Jones puts it, “[e]ven if some feature of a person is a product of that person’s choice, it does not follow that others are justified in treating that person any old how in respect of that choice.”244 To say that choosing to keep one’s religion is a way of forfeit- ing a right not to be the subject of incitement to religious hatred is like saying that women who choose to wear revealing clothes do not deserve legal protection against sexual harassment. The argument almost treats incitement to religious hatred not as wrongdoing but instead as partly the consequence of religious be- lievers’ choices. But the opposite is the case. Incitement to religious hatred is a form of wrongdoing whereas being religious is permissible conduct; which is to say, being religious is not akin to contributory negligence. C. Constitutive versus peripheral characteristics Yet another potentially relevant distinction is between characteristics that are inte- gral and characteristics that are peripheral features of people’s subjective personal identities. This is primarily a matter of how the individual regards a given char- acteristic: of whether he or she is satisfied with the fact that he or she possesses the characteristic or instead regards it with regret or frustration; of whether he or she accepts or adopts it as a central part of who he or she really is or else sees it as merely peripheral to his or her personal identity or even as something alien or external.245 In terms of the proper scope of incitement to hatred laws, the sugges- tion is that in order to be eligible for or worthy of protection under such laws a characteristic, social identity or status must be the sort of thing that is an integral feature of the subjective personal identities of the people who posses it. Which characteristics fit the bill? Religion would appear to be an obvious can- didate. After all, clearly there are people who regard their religious beliefs, reli- gious practices, religious experiences, religious institutional affiliations, religious heritage, religious language, religious history, and so on, not simply as character- istics or socially significant attributes but as core constituents of their subjective personal identities, meaning that their own sense of themselves as people is insep- arable from their sense of themselves as religious people.246 The putative moral significance of the present distinction perhaps lies in the idea that although it may not be good to have other people stir up hatred against characteristics, social iden- tities or statuses that are merely peripheral or incidental to one’s self image, it is especially bad to have other people stir up hatred against characteristics that go to the heart of who one is or who one takes oneself to be. 244. “Consequences”, supra note 234 at 32. 245. Cf Bhikhu Parekh, A New Politics of Identity: Political Principles for an Interdependent World (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008) at 15-19 [Parekh, “New Politics”]. 246. See, e.g., Akhtar, supra note 178 at 20. Aug16_Brown_46_OA.indd 309 7/23/18 3:47 PM available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/cjlj.2016.13 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:33, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/cjlj.2016.13 https://www.cambridge.org/core 310 Brown I have mentioned religion but it seems plausible that many characteristics can be constitutive of subjective personal identity including race, ethnicity, nationali- ty, religion, sexual orientation, and gender identity.247 I would only add that many other characteristics that are potential candidates for protection under incitement to hatred laws might also be central to one’s self-image including, for instance, age, personality traits, employment status and profession, education, language, political beliefs, activities and affiliations, and regional identity. This is true inso- far as people identify with their age and character traits, for instance, in the sense that they view these things not as external encumbrances to regret but as aspects of identity to take ownership of or even embrace. Moreover, the issue of whether or not characteristics can be constitutive of identity does not appear to depend on whether or not they are immutable. A person’s age is obviously subject to change over time, meaning that even if a person can choose to slow down certain signs of ageing through medical interventions (if he or she is sufficiently wealthy) and can choose to perform his or her age in some ways rather than others (such as by acting younger or older than he or she really is), a person is unable to stop him or herself from getting older merely through an act of will, other than through suicide, of course. Character traits can also change over time as people get older, not only change in an individual’s absolute level of character traits over time but also sometimes a change in an individual’s level of character traits relative to other individuals. But it does not follow from this temporal-sensitivity that age and character traits cannot be constitutive of subjective personal identity. Indeed, even subjective personal identity, in the sense of what an individual identifies with or accepts as part of his or her identity, is not static but evolves over time as an individual gains different life experiences or finds him or herself in different social roles and social environments or contexts. Although I am focusing here on the scope of incitement to hatred laws specifi- cally, it is still interesting to note that, according to Bhikhu Parekh, someone’s characteristic should not be eligible for protection under group defamation laws unless the characteristic is “at least partially constitutive of their identity, such that an attack on it damages their sense of their self-worth and demeans them in others’ eyes”.248 More intriguingly, Parekh suggests that “in most societies there is a broad consensus that religion, nationality, culture and so forth shape 247. See, e.g., “Note: A Communitarian Defense of Group Libel Laws” (1988) 101:3 Harv L Rev 682 at 693 n 74; Major, supra note 191 at 230. Cf Zingo, supra note 222 at 61. 248. Bhikhu Parekh, Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and Political Theory, Second Edition (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2006) at 316 [Parekh, “Rethinking”]. The clause “at least partially constitutive of their identity” is a reminder that for most people subjective per- sonal identity is pluralistic, complex, multifaceted, and therefore constituted from more than one characteristic. For example, Parekh argues that for most Muslims their identity is “by and large” (i.e., chiefly or to a large extent) defined “in religionational terms”. Bhikhu Parekh, “Feeling at Home: Some Reflections on Muslims in Europe” (2009) 8 Harv Middle East & Islamic Rev 51 at 52 [Parekh, “Feeling”]. For such people, the vast majority of people in fact, no single characteristic is the key or defining characteristic (save for perhaps the very fact of plurality). Parekh, “Feeling”, supra note 248 at 80. See also Parekh, “Rethinking”, supra note 248 at 148-51; Parekh, “New Politics”, supra note 245 at 24. Cf Philip Pullman, “Against ‘Identity’” in Lisa Appignanesi, ed, Free Expression is No Offence (London: Penguin Books, 2005) at 108-09. Aug16_Brown_46_OA.indd 310 7/23/18 3:47 PM available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/cjlj.2016.13 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:33, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/cjlj.2016.13 https://www.cambridge.org/core The “Who?” Question in the Hate Speech Debate: Part 1 311 and provide meaning to the lives of individuals in a way that being a Rotarian, a Californian, or a middle-class professional does not.”249 But it is unclear why a true Californian could not regard his regional, sub-national identity as partially constitutive of his subjective personal identity in much the same way that a pa- triot might regard his national identity as partially constitutive of his subjective personal identity. The same might be said for profession, education and even political beliefs, activities and affiliations. In the UK, as in many countries, there are die hard football supporters who would certainly regard their identity as fans of a particular club as partially constitutive of their personal identity. Indeed, when the tabloid newspaper The Sun published a front page piece about the Hillsborough football stadium disaster in April 1989 which included, amongst other things, the words “drunken Liverpool fans viciously attacked rescue work- ers as they tried to revive victims”,250 many people were incensed by what they understood to be a form of group defamation. Even though there are some impor- tant differences between group defamation laws and incitements to hatred laws, there is also a way of seeing both types of hate speech law as serving the function of providing security to citizens, whether it be a sense of security in one’s equal sociolegal status or a feeling of security in not being at risk of discrimination or violence.251 At any rate, it may not be as outlandish as it could first appear to think that various sorts of characteristics could be considered partially constitu- tive of identity and because of this more eligible for protection under incitement to hatred laws. Consider people from Liverpool for whom being a true Scouser or Liverpudlian is an integral feature of their sense of self and who might benefit from laws banning people from stirring up hatred against Scousers in Football stadiums and other public places.252 Or even people who work in the financial services sector for whom their profession is an integral part of who they are and who might benefit from laws banning people from stirring up hatred against bankers during anti-capitalist protests and in other similar contexts.253 Nevertheless, there are, as I see it, at least two major issues with the present distinction between constitutive and peripheral characteristics. First, part of the 249. Parekh, “Rethinking”, supra note 248 at 316. 250. “The Truth” (19 April 1989). 251. Cf Brown, supra note 141 at chs 2-5. 252. Any new stirring up hatred offence that covered regional identity or even associative identity would be in addition to any general public order offences that can be, and have been, used to combat anti-Liverpool speech (not qua hate speech but as speech that caused harassment, alarm or distress, say). For example, in May 2016 a man allegedly sat in the garden of a pub in Worcester wearing a T-shirt with the printed words “Hillsborough. God’s way of helping Rentokil.” He was arrested by police on suspicion that with intent he had displayed writing which was threatening, abusive, or insulting and caused harassment, alarm or distress (s 4A of the Public Order Act 1986, supra note 2). Loulla-Mae Eleftheriou-Smith, “Man Thrown Out of Worcester Pub for Offensive T-Shirt Carrying Hillsborough Slur” Independent (30 May 2015), online: www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/man-thrown-out-of-worcester- pub-for-offensive-t-shirt-carrying-hillsborough-slur-a7056471.html. 253. In Italy during the 19th and 20th centuries people could be, and many people were, convicted under Art 247 of the Criminal Code of 1889 and then Art 415 of the Criminal Code of 1930 for the public order offence of ‘incitement of hatred between the social classes’, including in relation to speech concerning capitalists defined as a social class. See also David Riesman, “Democracy and Defamation: Control of Group Libel” (1942) 42:5 Colum L Rev 727 at 744-45. Aug16_Brown_46_OA.indd 311 7/23/18 3:47 PM available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/cjlj.2016.13 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:33, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/cjlj.2016.13 https://www.cambridge.org/core 312 Brown strength of the distinction is that it takes personal identity to be a subjective phenomenon, a matter of how people define themselves. But at the same time this is also its weakness. Treating personal identity as a subjective phenomenon makes the distinction less useful as a basis for thinking about the proper scope of incitement to hatred laws. In order to be workable such laws tend to cover characteristics that are specified at the group as opposed to individual level. Yet the distinction between constitutive and peripheral characteristics will play out differently for different individuals. For some people a given characteristic or social identity might be integral to their subjective personal identity,254 whereas others might see the very same characteristic “as external” to their identity.255 To give an example, for some people religion is “the sole basis of their identity”,256 for others it is not the sole basis but the ‘primary’ basis of their identity,257 but for yet others it is entirely peripheral or even alien to their identity, something that is an unwelcome burden hindering their lives and is to be set aside or ignored as far as possible. Think of people who look upon their religion as a purely instru- mental characteristic or “role they play”258 or even people who are converts to secularism and who sincerely wish they did not carry around feelings of religious guilt because those feelings are “just not them”. Religious identity is certainly not unique in regard to this heterogeneity. For some people their gender identity, such as being female or a woman, is a constitutive characteristic. This might be as true for cisgender females or women as for transgender females or women, who have had to make a transition. But for some people their gender identity is not something they are even if it is something that does shape their experiences and actions. They may go so far as to say that their lives are oriented around certain objects, such as the body, customs and norms, language, and clothes,259 but they might not go so far as to say that these things are central to their identity. What precisely is the problem here (it might be asked)? Why not simply make gener- alisations based on whether a given characteristic is constitutive or peripheral for most of the people who possess it? Put simply, because it may be inappropriate to make generalisations about characteristics as either constitutive or peripheral to personal identity—generalisations that are then used for deciding the scope of incitement to hatred laws—when the subjective personal identities of some in- dividuals confound those generalisations. This may be ignoring the separateness of persons. The key point here is that under the proposed regime some individu- als might be forced to live in a society in which people are legally permitted to stir up hatred against them on grounds of a characteristic they possess simply because the majority of people who also possess the characteristic view it as peripheral, despite the fact that for the individuals concerned it is a constitutive characteristic and in their eyes worthy of protection. Just as importantly, some 254. Parekh, “New Politics”, supra note 245 at 18-19. 255. Ibid at 21. 256. Parekh, “Feeling”, supra note 248 at 78. 257. Pullman, supra note 248 at 110. 258. Parekh, “Feeling”, supra note 245 at 21. 259. Cf Iris Marion Young, Intersecting Voices: Dilemmas of Gender, Political Philosophy, and Polity (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997) at ch 1. Aug16_Brown_46_OA.indd 312 7/23/18 3:47 PM available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/cjlj.2016.13 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:33, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/cjlj.2016.13 https://www.cambridge.org/core The “Who?” Question in the Hate Speech Debate: Part 1 313 individuals might be forced to live in a society in which people are banned from stirring up hatred against them on grounds of a characteristic they possess merely because the majority of people who also possess the characteristic see it as inte- gral to their subjective identities, even though for the individuals concerned it is a peripheral characteristic and perhaps in their eyes unworthy of protection. Such individuals might even deeply regret the fact that so much is made of this char- acteristic: from their point of view it is an insignificant feature of their personal identity that they would rather not be judged on, even if that judgement takes the form of entitlement to legal protection from hate speech. Second, as with the distinction between chosen and unchosen characteristics, the moral significance of the distinction between constitutive and peripheral characteristics vis-à-vis the proper scope of incitement to hatred laws cannot be merely assumed but must be defended or proven. But it seems to me quite a leap to go from the plausible claim that it is especially bad to have other people stir up hatred against oneself based on characteristics that go to the heart of who one takes oneself to be to the further claim that this is a necessary condition for war- ranting the legal suppression of this sort of speech. Or turning it the other way around, why is it any less bad to have other people stir up hatred against char- acteristics that are peripheral to one’s subjective personal identity? In the case of laws that prohibit group defamation this may indeed make sense. It may well be the case that defamatory remarks about constitutive as opposed to peripheral characteristics are more likely to damage people’s sense of self-worth. But here we are talking about incitement to hatred laws, where the social evils relate to things such as an increased risk of discrimination or violence, or the legitimate fear of these things. Such evils are equally bad whether they target constitutive or peripheral characteristics surely. D. Internal life versus external life characteristics Perhaps the proper scope of hate speech laws may also have something to do with whether a given characteristic belongs to internal life or external life. Internal life is a complex notion. It certainly has to do with inner thoughts, feelings, beliefs, desires, and even understandings of the meaning of life and of the type of people it is good to be. But it may also include practices, observance and rituals of a personal nature, even if they are performed physically. Religious beliefs, for example, belong to the domain of internal life, as do personal religious practices and rituals. External life, by contrast, has to do with outward appearances, and with how people are presented to, and interact with, other people. It also includes more communal practices and rituals. Skin colour, race, ethnicity, nationality, and citizenship all fit squarely within the domain of external life. External life can also include shared religious heritage, language, and history, as well as col- lective observance of religious rules, and forms of affiliation with religious insti- tutions, like places of worship, and other religious organisations. Now internal life is obviously not independent of, immune from, external life, just as people’s internal life can influence the way their external lives unfold. But the two are not Aug16_Brown_46_OA.indd 313 7/23/18 3:47 PM available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/cjlj.2016.13 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:33, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/cjlj.2016.13 https://www.cambridge.org/core 314 Brown one and the same thing, despite their interaction. Perhaps the moral significance of the distinction between internal life and external life rests in the special im- portance of internal life as compared to external life. Internal life is of special importance (some people might think) in virtue of being closer to what makes us truly human or because it furnishes us with greater and more long-lasting happi- ness or contentment. Based on this distinction it might be argued that aspects of internal life are more worthy of legal protection under incitement to hatred laws than aspects of external life. This distinction challenges the conventional wisdom that criminal- ising incitement to racial hatred is more appropriate than criminalising incite- ment to religious hatred. If protecting inner life is more fitting than protecting outer life, then conventional wisdom is turned on its head. Specifically, the pres- ent distinction would seem to suggest that banning the stirring up of hatred on grounds of religious beliefs is to honour and protect the special importance of internal life, whereas to protect people from incitement to racial hatred is to unwittingly fall into the trap of valorising the world of appearances. People who engage in racist hate speech often focus on skin colour, and they do so for all the wrong reasons—they fetishise mere appearance. But to ban this sort of speech is to unconsciously reproduce rather than challenge the mistaken belief that skin colour is of special importance and to implicitly legitimise the hate speaker’s excessive or irrational concern with skin colour. “If the state is taking so much trouble to get me to stop talking about people’s skin colour it must be because skin colour matters very deeply,” a racist hate speaker might conclude. In fact, the distinction between internal life and external life might not merely separate race and religion; it could also separate different dimensions of reli- gious life.260 Internal or inner spiritual life has to do with people’s own personal religious beliefs, sentiments, practices, and rituals, with their relationship with their own religiosity and ultimately their relationship with God. In the case of Muslims, for example, inner spiritual life includes faith or belief in the six ar- ticles of faith (iman) but also piousness or consciousness of God (taqwa) and submission to God (al-Silm) through the performance of five rituals (shahadah, salat, zakah, ramadan, hajj). Of course, not all features of inner spiritual life take place in the mind or even in the privacy of one’s own home: performance of reli- gious practices and rituals will often take place among or alongside other believ- ers. Nevertheless, external spiritual life is more directly and explicitly associated with people’s relationship with other believers and with the trappings of what might be called social religiosity. Sticking with the example of Muslims, external spiritual life might involve, amongst other things, affiliation with a mosque or other Muslim organisation and participating in social action with other members in the fulfilment of that mosque’s or that organisation’s understanding of Islamic ideals. The distinction between inner spiritual life and external spiritual life need not be thought of as a hard and fast or sharp distinction. After all, religious be- liefs which are tied to revealed religion and to religious texts and stories, such 260. I take inspiration here from a conversation with Mohammed Aziz. Aug16_Brown_46_OA.indd 314 7/23/18 3:47 PM available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/cjlj.2016.13 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:33, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/cjlj.2016.13 https://www.cambridge.org/core The “Who?” Question in the Hate Speech Debate: Part 1 315 as the Qur’an and the Hadith, are themselves the sorts of beliefs that are formu- lated and maintained by groups of people acting in collaboration both within and across generations, and are constitutive of religion as shared or intersubjective culture. So even if beliefs are part of inner spiritual life, the practice of formulat- ing and maintaining those beliefs is part of external spiritual life. Nevertheless, let us suppose for the sake of argument that inner spiritual life and external spir- itual life are distinguishable even if sometimes overlapping dimensions of peo- ple’s religiosity. Taking inspiration from this distinction, some people might think that inner spiritual life is a more fitting candidate for protection under incitement to ha- tred laws than external spiritual life. After all, there is a long tradition in many countries of treating inner spiritual life as something of special importance and therefore worthy of special protection, as exemplified by the protection of the right to freedom of conscience. And so a case could be made for banning incitement to hatred based on religious beliefs and personal religious rituals and practices but not for banning incitement to hatred based on membership of or affiliation to a place of worship or religious organisation and support for or adherence to the culture and traditions of a place of worship or religious or- ganisation.261 It is worth pausing here to reflect on the fact that in England and Wales s 29A of the Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006262 defines “religious hatred” as “hatred against a group of persons defined by reference to religious belief or lack of religious belief”. Likewise, s 28 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998263 defines a “religious group” as “a group of persons defined by ref- erence to religious belief or lack of religious belief”. So here the criterion of membership of the protected group is having a certain sort of belief. As Simon Thompson points out,264 these laws make for an interesting comparison with s 74 of the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 2003265 (outlining offences aggravat- ed by religious prejudice) which defines membership or perceived membership of a “religious group” in terms of “(a) religious belief or lack of religious be- lief; (b) membership of or adherence to a church or religious organisation; (c) support for the culture and traditions of a church or religious organisation; or (d) participation in activities associated with such a culture or such traditions”. Drawing on the above distinction between inner spiritual life and external spir- itual life might be one way to justify the relatively narrow way that religion is defined by hate speech laws in England and Wales, namely, that it is protecting inner spiritual life but not outer spiritual life. 261. Note that someone can be convicted of stirring up religious hatred even if the hatred was not directed at particular persons, so the fact that a hate speaker might not know about the inner life of particular persons is not relevant to the application of the offence. What matters is that the stirring up is against a group of people defined by their religious beliefs as opposed to particular members of that group. 262. Supra note 3. 263. Supra note 172. 264. Simon Thompson, “Freedom of Expression and Hatred of Religion” (2012) 12:2 Ethnicities 215 at 218. 265. ASP 2003, c 7. Aug16_Brown_46_OA.indd 315 7/23/18 3:47 PM available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/cjlj.2016.13 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:33, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/cjlj.2016.13 https://www.cambridge.org/core 316 Brown No doubt there is much that could be said both for and against this version of the formal approach. But I shall limit myself here to making two observations. First, although it might be relatively straightforward to apply the general distinc- tion between internal life and external to some characteristics, such as religion, it may be much harder to map the distinction onto other relevant characteris- tics. For example, it is a conundrum whether incitement to hatred on grounds of sexual orientation counts as the protection of internal life or external life. Thus, Part 3A of the Public Order Act 1986266 also bans stirring up hatred on grounds of sexual orientation, but s 29AB defines “hatred on the grounds of sexual ori- entation” simply as “hatred against a group of persons defined by reference to sexual orientation (whether towards persons of the same sex, the opposite sex or both)”.267 This offers no real guidance as to the nature of sexual orientation qua inner life or outer life. This makes it challenging to use the current distinction as a tool for evaluating existing laws, although it could provide an impetus for authorities, most notably the judiciary, to clarify further the nature of given pro- tected characteristics. Second, from the mere fact that a characteristic is part of inner life and from the mere fact that inner life holds a special value or importance, it does not au- tomatically follow that the characteristic is worthy of occupying the position of a protected characteristic within a body of incitement to hatred laws. It is cer- tainly the case that in liberal societies the special value or importance of inner life, including inner spiritual life, has traditionally been accepted as a basis for negative protections against religious persecution including coercive religious conversion. In non-liberal as well as some liberal societies it has also been taken as a basis for positive protections of religious beliefs including blasphemy laws. But there is much less consensus around the appropriateness of this move. And there is also no consensus around looking upon the special value or importance of inner life including inner spiritual life as a basis for positive protections of religious believers themselves: no consensus around laws against outraging re- ligious feeling and no consensus around laws banning incitement to religious hatred. In the end, I think, accepting the special value or importance of inner life will not be a decisive factor in terms of warranting legal protections. On the con- trary, other arguments, such as having to do with consistency and functionality, as well as democracy, will need to be adduced if a compelling case is to be made for protecting inner life within a regime of incitement to hatred laws. E. Characteristics we all share versus characteristics we do not all share Finally, consider a formal approach that rejects or discounts certain characteris- tics as appropriately covered under incitement to hatred laws if they are charac- teristics whose different sub-characteristics all, or nearly all, citizens will come to possess during the course of their lives. Age is the odd one out (it might be 266. Supra note 2, as amended by the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008, supra note 4. 267. Ibid. Aug16_Brown_46_OA.indd 316 7/23/18 3:47 PM available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/cjlj.2016.13 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:33, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/cjlj.2016.13 https://www.cambridge.org/core The “Who?” Question in the Hate Speech Debate: Part 1 317 thought) because it is the only characteristic such that, generally speaking, every- body, or nearly everybody, will come to pass through its different stages over the course of their lives. In the vast majority of cases a man is unlikely to become a woman at some stage in his life, a heterosexual is unlikely to become a homosex- ual, a white person a black person, a Christian a Muslim, then Hindu, Buddhist, Sikh, and Jew. By contrast, it is normally the case (premature death aside) that someone will start as a baby, become a child, then teenager, then young adult, middle-aged adult, and finally elderly adult. This fluidity (so the thought contin- ues) is unconducive to the normal in-group versus out-group dynamics out of which motivations to engage in hate speech grow. Typically a white person will remain as such throughout his or her entire life, leaving plenty of time to build a sense of in-group identity and perhaps also room in which to develop feelings of fear, resentment, competition, contempt and hatred toward out-group members, safe in the knowledge that he will never be a member of the out-group. But a young adult will have a finite time in which to develop a sense of being a young person before he or she is a young adult no more, and even in that time there will be a lingering awareness that being a young adult will soon give way to being a middle-aged adult and then an elderly adult. Faced with this certainty, devoting time to building up a substantive in-group identity and devoting psychological effort to developing feelings of fear, resentment, competition, and even contempt and hatred toward out-group members would be a fool’s errand. This is not to say that members of one age group typically do have empathy with and sympa- thy for the perspectives and experiences of members of other age groups. This is patently not the case. Rather, it is to say that a person’s awareness of his or her inexorable movement across age groups over time may be enough to deter deficits in empathy and sympathy from breaking out into hate speech.268 These facts (so the thought concludes) explains not merely why we are unlikely to find significant levels of incitement to age hatred but also why it would be inappropri- ate to legislate against such incitement to hatred even where it does exist. On closer examination, however, age might not be different or special enough to make it inappropriately covered under incitement to hatred laws after all. For one thing, although it may be true that age is special in that people pass through its different stages, it is also true that people only ever pass in one direction, young to old. Older people will never be young again and this may once again leave space in which motivations to engage in hate speech might grow even if large numbers of older people do have children and friends who are younger peo- ple. It is certainly not inconceivable that older people could feel enough solidari- ty with their own age-based in-groups combined with sufficient fear, anxiety and frustration toward younger people—perhaps based on a perception (true or false) that younger people have a sense of entitlement and are fixated on personal gain over the good of society—as to furnish older people with the motivation to stir up hatred against younger people. For another thing, population demographics 268. Cf Jacqueline Taylor, “Humean Humanity Versus Hate” in Jennifer Welchman, eds, The Practice of Virtue: Classic And Contemporary Readings in Virtue Ethics (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2006); Brown, supra note 141 at 132-37. Aug16_Brown_46_OA.indd 317 7/23/18 3:47 PM available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/cjlj.2016.13 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:33, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/cjlj.2016.13 https://www.cambridge.org/core 318 Brown and wealth distribution account for some important differences between different age groups. The fact is that older people make up a growing percentage of the population and may be economically better-off than younger people. So it is not inconceivable that younger people could feel enough solidarity with their own age-based in-groups combined with sufficient resentment toward older people— perhaps based on a perception (true or false) that older people are holding onto jobs too long and are economically lucky—as to furnish younger people with the motivation to stir up hatred against older people. Furthermore, the fact that ordi- narily people will come to possess every sub-characteristic over time is certainly not idiosyncratic to age. For, a great deal of what can be said about age in this regard can also be said about disability. This is, to some extent, the point behind using the terms “temporarily able-bodied” or “temporarily non-disabled” rather than “able-bodied”. To use the former terms is to acknowledge the following facts that are an inevitable part of human life: as infants and small children everybody lacks the basic functioning of most adults; toward the end of their lives most people will lack at least some, sometimes many, and in some cases all, of the basic functioning of most adults; and as adults we are only ever one event away from lacking some or all of the basic functioning of most adults. Yet we are not so naive as to assume that this sort of fluidity makes it impossible to imagine able-bodied people stirring up hatred against people with disabilities and vice versa. And when it does happen we are unlikely, I think, to claim somehow that the relevant charac- teristic is undeserving of protection, or inappropriately covered, under incitement to hatred laws merely because of the fact of fluidity. But maybe age is just a bad example of the current line of thought. Consider instead the case of personality traits. Hate speech typically singles out partic- ular persons or particular groups of persons on the basis of their possession of given characteristics or at least a perception of their possession of given characteristics. It is in that sense concerned with subsets of the population. But what is different or special (it might be thought) about personality traits—such as “the big five” personality traits (openness, conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, and neuroticism)269—is that they are to a greater or lesser extent possessed by everyone in society. And so for any form of hate speech to get off the ground the hate speaker must first identify certain personality types in which these big five personality traits are combined together in particular ways. The problem is that identifying clear and discernable character types based on particular concatenations of these big five personality traits is notoriously dif- ficult. Even when people take these tests they do not present as falling into easily identifiable and obvious personality types. No doubt we could decide to identify personality types according to which personality traits people possess in most abundance.270 But that is by no means the only identification that could be made. The possibilities are almost endless. So perhaps this would make it 269. Lewis R Goldberg, “The Structure of Phenotypic Personality Traits” (1993) 48:1 Am Psychologist 26. 270. Cf Hans Jurgen Eysenck, Dimensions of Personality (London: Kegan Paul, Trench Trubner & Co, 1947). Aug16_Brown_46_OA.indd 318 7/23/18 3:47 PM available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/cjlj.2016.13 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:33, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/cjlj.2016.13 https://www.cambridge.org/core The “Who?” Question in the Hate Speech Debate: Part 1 319 inappropriate or misguided to include such a characteristic within a body of incitement to hatred laws (it might be thought). Nevertheless, it strikes me as being uncertain at best that these facts about the scalar nature of personality traits could in themselves demonstrate that we should not ban incitement to hatred based on personality types, as distinct from other forms of incitement to hatred concerning which binary distinctions might be pos- sible. After all, many forms of racist hate speech are predicated upon racists iden- tifying racial types based on particular concatenations of physical characteristics that admit of degrees. Here also the hate speaker is relying on the drawing of dis- tinctions or demarcation lines that are to a greater or lesser extent arbitrary. Just as personality trait variations between demarcated personality types tend to be gradual or matters of degree, so biological variations between demarcated racial groups tend to be piecemeal.271 But this fact has not stopped racist hate speakers from drawing lines. And it has not stopped legislators from finding it appropriate or fitting to legislate against incitement to racial hatred. This is because legisla- tors have been able to draw on various other types of considerations in support of the legislation. This fact serves to underscore a more general conclusion I wish to draw from this section. I have now examined the merits of several versions of the formal approach to specifying the proper scope of incitement to hatred laws. Although I have identified weaknesses in these versions—having to do with their intuitive appeal and how they have been applied to particular characteristics—I do not take myself to have demonstrated that they should play no role in specifying the proper scope of incitement to hatred laws, much less that no version of the for- mal approach could have a role to play. Instead, my aim is to show that although the proper scope of incitement to hatred laws may well depend on some morally relevant distinctions between the formal features of the protected characteris- tics in question, it cannot depend exclusively on these formal considerations. I shall now give a brief illustration of this point, one that also segues into Part 2. Suppose for the sake of argument that part of the underlying or real function or purpose of incitement to hatred laws is to combat some of the social evils as- sociated with climates of hatred and fear (to which incitement to hatred contrib- utes), such as increased risks of discrimination or violence against people who possess the targeted characteristics, as well as legitimate feelings of insecurity among those people. It seems to me that having reflected on this functional con- sideration, formal distinctions between characteristics might start to look less determinative of the proper scope of incitement to hatred law. So, for example, speech that stirs up religious hatred seems not more or less likely to contribute to a climate of hatred and fear (with associated social evils) than speech that stirs up racial hatred. And arguably this consideration matters at least as much as the suggestion that religious identity is chosen in a way that racial identity is not. Or, to give another example, speech that stirs up hatred on the grounds of religious beliefs seems no more or less likely to contribute to a climate of hatred 271. SOY Keita et al (2004) “Conceptualizing Human Variation” 36:11s Nature Genetics 17. Aug16_Brown_46_OA.indd 319 7/23/18 3:47 PM available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/cjlj.2016.13 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:33, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/cjlj.2016.13 https://www.cambridge.org/core 320 Brown and fear than speech that stirs up hatred on grounds of religious affiliations. And surely this matters every bit as much as the idea that we should work harder to protect inner spiritual life than outer spiritual life given the special importance of the former. In Part 1 of this article I have outlined and critically appraised consistency, practical and formal approaches to specifying the proper scope of incitement to hatred laws. In Part 2 I do the same for functional and democratic approaches. I shall also try to draw some conclusions about the implications and relative importance of these different approaches, and to offer some observations about how they might be knitted together. I will end by discussing the potential ap- plicability of my general approach to answering the “Who?” question to other types of hate speech law. Aug16_Brown_46_OA.indd 320 7/23/18 3:47 PM available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/cjlj.2016.13 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Carnegie Mellon University, on 06 Apr 2021 at 01:18:33, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms https://doi.org/10.1017/cjlj.2016.13 https://www.cambridge.org/core 
work_thfmptbqtzhrvas4jgyfbscx34	----	Intersections and Foundations: Lesbian, gay and bisexual equalities initiatives in UK Sexuality, Space, and Intersectionality: The case of lesbian, gay and bisexual equalities initiatives in UK local government Monro, S (2010) Sociology, 44(5). ABSTRACT The notion of intersectionality has been the subject of uncertainty, with debates taking place as to whether intersectionality studies should focus on the interstices between social characteristics, or should encompass approaches that interrogate the structuring effects of specific social forces. This paper contributes to these debates, by exploring intersectionality in relation to lesbian, gay and bisexual (LGB) equalities initiatives in UK local government. The paper demonstrates the importance of two social categories, sexuality and the spatial, in structuring LGB equalities work. By siting analysis partially at the institutional level, it also reveals the way in which an individualising approach to intersectionality studies, which focuses only on the interstices, is problematic. The paper therefore provides an argument for an intersectionality studies that incorporates category-based analysis, whilst retaining a concern with the interstices between foundational categories. KEY WORDS Bisexual/gay/equality/lesbian/local government/sexuality/space/Wales ‘…it is not at all clear whether intersectionality should be limited to understanding individual experiences, to theorizing identity, or whether it should be taken as a property of social structures and cultural discourses’ (Davis, 2009: 68). The last forty years have seen major transformations in the theorisation of sexuality, with wide-ranging implications for the fields of social theory and policy. Intersectionality theory has emerged during this period, as a means of addressing the complex ways in which social characteristics are routed through each other. The origins and development of intersectionality theory has been well documented by authors such as Brah and Pheonix (2004), Walby (2007), Nash (2008), Shields (2008), and Grabham et al. (2009). Intersectionality theory contributes to our understandings of sexuality in that it can be used to bridge two seemingly disparate approaches to understanding of sexuality: those that take a foundational approach, framing sexuality and gender – or other forces, such as the material – as fundamental to the ways in which individual and social identities are shaped, and those that seek to deconstruct foundational categories (Davis, 2009). Intersectionality studies have focused primarily on gender, class, and race; where included, sexuality is often placed in a marginal position (see Crenshaw, 1997, Shields, 2008, Hurtado and Sinha, 2008). There have been some exceptions, including Beckett’s (2004) study of the operation of heterosexuality in the lives of lesbian and disabled women, and Fish’s (2008) research on LGBT identities and health care. The concept of intersectionality has been the subject of confusion (Davis, 2009), and there have been controversies around whether intersectionality should be seen as a crossroads (Crenshaw, 1991), as axis of difference (Yuval-Davis, 2006) or as a dynamic process (Staunaes, 2003, cited in Davis 2009:68). There are tensions within the field of intersectionality studies, relating to broader debates within sexuality studies and feminisms, concerning whether to pursue category-based analysis or to develop analysis along a range of foundational axis (see Walby, 2007, and Weldon, 2008). Concerns have also been raised that intersectionality analysis has led to a problematic focus on the individual, identity, and representation (Conaghan, 2009). As Valentine states, ‘the contemporary focus within the social sciences on the fluidity of identity categories and the complexity of intersections risks losing sight of the fact that within particular spaces there are dominant spatial orderings that produce moments of exclusion for particular groups’ (2007: 19). Following Crenshaw (1991), conventional approaches to intersectionality focus on the place where more than one force of inequality is operating. However, subsequent authors have developed other interpretations, for instance, McCall’s (2005) intracategorical, anticategorical and intercategorical forms of intersectional analysis, and Walby’s (2007) separation of multiple inequalities into different approaches, which tend to fall into either systems-oriented approaches or postmodernist, deconstructive and identity-focused ones. This paper was suggested by the work of these authors, building in particular on McCall’s intercategorical approach, which interrogates relations of inequality between whole groups, and manages the complexity of this by reducing analysis to one or two inter-group relations at a time (McCall 2005: 61). This paper seeks to explore a key debate concerning the remit of intersectionality theory, between the conventional approaches, and those who argue instead for attention to specific social categories and forces, which may be seen as foundational. In order to explore this debate, the paper examines the operation of two structuring forces within the context of LGB equalities initiatives in UK local government: sexuality and spatiality. The category of sexuality is shown to be important in shaping the lives of LGB people and the work of the local authorities which interface with them. The category of the spatial was selected because empirical findings indicate that the spatial dimension is key to the structuring of sexualities at a local level; the level at which local authorities interface with the population. The paper draws on scholarship in the field of geographies of sexuality i , the trajectory of which is well rehearsed by authors such as Collins (2004), and Brown et al. (2007). The focus of the paper is narrowed in that it looks at LGB equalities, and transgender (T) is not included ii ; transgender is discussed elsewhere (see for example Monro 2005, Hines, 2007, and Monro and Richardson 2010). The paper begins by providing an overview of the literature and the contemporary situation regarding local government sexualities equalities initiatives, noting the major recent policy changes, and then summarising the types of work that are taking place and the ways in which local authorities do – or do not – deal with intersectionality. In doing so it develops understanding of sexuality as a foundational category, and addresses the intersectional nature of sexuality, within the context of UK local government. The paper then brings in a second category via an exploration of spatiality, focusing on the lives of the LGB people whom local authorities represent. I conclude by arguing for an intersectionality studies that interrogates social categories as well as their interstices, as illustrated by my use of data regarding LGB equalities work in local government, where spatiality forms one aspect of the complex and situated structuring of sexualities. The empirical content of the paper is based on anonymised findings from a large ESRC funded study of local authorities in Northern Ireland, Wales, and Northern and Southern England iii . We utilised a participative action research approach (McNiff, 1998), specifically Action Learning Sets, which met four times in each region (a total of 16 meetings, with members representing different local authorities, community organisations and partner agencies from across the regions). We also tracked the development and implementation of sexualities equalities policies in four local authorities which were purposively sampled to represent authorities of different types, levels of performance, political colours, activity concerning equalities, and levels of deprivation. We did fieldwork with strategic level and frontline local authority officers (focusing on 2 different service areas for each authority), and their partners in statutory sector and voluntary/community sector agencies (total 37 interviews). A further strand of the methodology consisted of interviews with key national stakeholders across the three countries (15 interviews), and a final strand comprised of 5 interviews with local authority Members (councillors). This paper is based on data from North East England and Wales, including 2 Action Learning Sets, 18 interviews in case study localities, and interviews with 10 national stakeholder representatives iv . The data is used primarily as evidence for the argument that category-based, as well as interstice-based, approaches to intersectional analysis are necessary. Sexualities Equalities in Local Government There is a small but growing body of work concerning sexuality and equality and diversity initiatives in local government. A number of writers, including Carabine (1995, 1996a,b), Cooper (1994, 1997), and Tobin (1990), focus on developments in the 1980s and early 1990s. This era saw the development of lesbian and gay equalities work amongst some left wing local authorities, and a subsequent right wing backlash which led to the introduction of s 28 v , and the collapse of most sexuality equalities initiatives. The next phase of sexuality equalities work, which was brought in by a politically more heterogeneous tranche of local authorities in the 1990s, was quite different in many ways, with a shift taking place towards programmes addressing homophobic violence, and a decline in overtly political affirmations of gay identity, as well as some areas of work such as AIDS initiatives (Cooper and Monro 2004, see also Carabine and Monro 2004 and Monro 2006, 2007). The most recent body of work is just emerging (Monro and Richardson 2010, and Richardson and Monro forthcoming). Fieldwork was conducted at a time when the field of UK lesbian, gay, and bisexual (LGB) equalities work was undergoing a period of rapid change, fuelled by the introduction of a range of new legislation, including the Adoption and Children Act 2002, the Civil Partnerships Act 2004, and the Equality Regulations (Sexual Orientation) 2007 vi . A tranche of policy directives and implementation mechanisms were being developed in tandem with statutory drivers. LGB equalities initiatives were further affected by the recently introduced Commission for Equality and Human Rights, as well as the Single Equality Bill vii . Overall, the research findings indicated that LGB equalities work has become a normalised aspect of the local authority service provision remit to a degree, alongside other strands of equalities (race, gender, disability, age, faith, and Welsh language in Wales), partially as a result of the legislative drivers. However, although LGB equalities work is established in some authorities, provision is patchy, and sexualities equalities initiatives remain marginalised in relation to other equalities strands. The larger metropolitan, unitary and borough councils are generally more active concerning LGB equalities work, but some of the rural councils are also proactive in this field. The research findings showed that there are debates amongst local authority actors about the extent to which LGB service users have sexualities-specific interests or needs, as opposed to interests/needs that are shared with the rest of the population. This issue is of importance to discussions about intersectionality, in explorations of the extent to which sexuality is examined as a category within the local authority context. Areas of local authority provision that are of key importance to LGB people revolve around hate crime and bullying, especially homophobic and biphobic bullying of children and staff in schools. Health and social care are areas of concern, including for example awareness of the needs of older people in same-sex relationships. Housing is another key area, including same-sex partner provision, and provision for people made homeless due to homophobic abuse. Culture and leisure are also of importance, including the licensing of lesbian and gay venues, support for Pride and Mardi Gras events, and library provision. An intersectional analysis of sexualities equalities initiatives in local government will be concerned with the discursive and cultural construction of LGB issues in local government. Within local authorities and their statutory partners, sexualities equalities work is associated with the private sphere, and with a lack of visibility as compared to strands associated with people who may have more physically evident characteristics. The research findings indicate that sexualities equalities work is particularly subject to affective issues such as nervousness and embarrassment, as well as normative judgements around notions of choice, legitimacy, and worthiness, so that for instance disability related issues are likely to be seen as more worthy of support than sexualities equalities issues. The supposedly private nature of sexuality issues has a number of impacts in the local authority context, including ongoing difficulties with carrying out monitoring concerning employee and service user sexual orientation. Although the research demonstrated that there are specific attributes associated with local authority LGB equality initiatives, it also revealed the wide variation across local authorities regarding the discursive formation of sexualities equalities work, as well as the ways in which such formations played out in terms of policy and practice. Local authorities differed considerably in terms of institutional norms concerning sexualities equalities; embedded pro-equalities cultures were present in some, whereas others had cultures of homophobic banter and active resistance to sexualities equalities work. Overt homophobia was evidenced in some cases, for instance a female equalities officer in a Welsh authority described how ‘I have had red lines through reports, where I’ve used the terminology ‘lesbian, gay, bisexual’; she was told to replace this with the term ‘different communities’. Homophobia impacted directly in service provision in certain ways, for instance many local authorities place firewalls on their computers, preventing members of the public (and in some cases, officers) from accessing information regarding LGB services and support groups, as shown by the following quote, provided by a female Welsh bisexual community representative: ‘A lot of library services block searches that include the words, lesbian, gay or bisexual, and it’s a blanket block because it assumes that they’re all spam or porn. So people who are generally looking for support or advice or help can’t actually find those services if they don’t have their computer at home, and that quite often is these people who need it most, because they’re likely to be the most economically deprived’ The particular positioning of local authorities, as accountable to their local electorate, also interfaces with LGB concerns in a distinct way as compared to other statutory bodies. Councillors are highly sensitive to pressure from their local communities, who can be actively homophobic and who can exercise homophobic as well as pro- equality views via the mechanisms of local democracy. To summarise, the field of local authority sexualities equalities work has emerged alongside, although often marginal to, other areas of equalities work such as race and disability. Whilst it has become normalised to a degree, it is patchy across different authorities, with evidence of homophobic cultures within some local authorities, as well as proactive LGB equalities work. Sexuality can be considered to be an important structuring force within the context of local government service provision, because the LGB population that local authorities serve have some sexuality-specific interests and needs, sexuality equalities is constructed as having particular affective and political sensitivities, and homophobia may be institutionalised in some local authorities in ways that other forms of prejudice are not. Local government and intersectionality regarding sexualities equalities In the 1980s, a small number of local authorities began doing lesbian and gay equalities work, taking what could be seen as an intersectional approach to equalities (see Cooper 1994) although there were significant omissions regarding bisexuality. Historically, the term ‘intersectionality’ was not generally used by local authorities, and this absence has continued. The notion of ‘intersectionality’ does however have currency amongst national players, one of whom said that: ‘I don’t think they [the local authorities] have reached the stage where they are talking about intersectionality much, and I think the strands-specific approach is pretty, still pretty strong - or they jump right up to generic - local authorities that have been doing work in this area for a long time are maybe doing well, but there is little discussion of the particular issues faced by, for example, someone who is gay and Sikh. We use the term multiple disadvantage, not intersectionality’ (national stakeholder) Despite the absence of intersectionality rhetoric in local government, the research findings evidenced a substantial shift towards an intersectional approach to equalities work, with the development of integrated frameworks for conducting work on the different equalities strands in tandem having been introduced over the last few years viii , as well as the establishment of the Commission for Equalities and Human Rights, which takes an intersectional approach at a national level. These integrated frameworks, which deal with the different equalities strands in conjunction, are being used to manage equalities work more strategically, as well as to make it more politically palatable. For instance: ‘The more innovative public sector organisations have worked out that it is easier to take a multi-strand to equality than a single-strand approach – it is quicker and politically it plays well, it allows people to be more imaginative in thinking about the links – for example local Pride festivals which incorporate family friendly initiatives’ (national stakeholder) The implementation of intersectional approaches to sexualities equalities work in local government is achieved via impact assessments, as well as briefings to service directorates, and professional trainings associated with specific service areas (such as social work). Impact assessments involve examining service plans and policies to ensure that the needs and interests of marginalised social groups are taken into account, for instance a male officer in Wales said that: ‘there’s nearly 300 impact assessments there… we look at the seven strands of equality ix in an impact assessment so part of the, one question on the impact assessment is “how have the needs of the lesbian, gay, and bisexual communities of [town] been considered and embedded into the policy?’ Front line staff work to the service plans and policies, routinely taking approaches that can be seen as intersectional; in other words, they attempt to be aware of the different facets of identity that service users have. The research provided evidence that intersectional approaches to training are also being taken, for example one officer in Wales described the way in which she carries out a generic equalities training with staff in which there is discussion about the social construction of identity, with attention being paid to sexual diversity, and that ‘we try and get people to understand that we don’t just have one label, we are a cocktail of many different things’. The development of integrated approaches to service provision is not a panacea in which LGB people will have their interests respected and recognised alongside those of a host of other service users. There are indications from the research findings that integrated approaches may lose some of the more marginalised interests. The focus of service provision is necessarily on those perceived to be in most need, and whilst this will include some sections of the LGB population, it does not always address the interests of others. The following quote illustrates the ways that intersections between aging, ability, ill health and sexuality are dealt with by local authority actors, as well as the way in which such approaches can inadvertently construct notions of a universal, possibly heterosexual, citizen, masking the specificities of LGB identities: ‘we don’t provide services because people are lesbian or gay or bisexual because there is a criteria under the government’s social care or community care designations, what we do is we provide all services…all of it is open to people who meet the criteria, if they are LGB and elderly and frail, or if they’re LGB and disabled, if they are LGB and learning difficulties then they will get those services’ (male local authority officer, North East) Alternative approaches to service provision combine targeted and integrated approaches, for instance a local authority officer described the way in which a young person who has been made homeless because they came out to their parents might not then feel comfortable talking to an apparently heterosexual housing worker about being gay, necessitating some LGB-specific provision. The development of integrated equalities work in local authorities is related to the debates in intersectionality studies about category-based versus interstice-related approaches, demonstrating the way in which local authorities are attempting to deal with multiple social characteristics, as well as potential difficulties with intersectional approaches. Developments concerning the equalities strands also foreground the difficulties associated with applying intersectionality to group levels, both in conceptual terms and in service planning and delivery terms. Analysis of the interstices is relatively easy at the level of individual service user, but harder at the group level, where people have diverse intersectional identities. Grouping people risks erasing difference, but is nevertheless necessary if policies are to be formulated and implemented. The concerns outlined in the literature, about the potentially individualising nature of intersectionality theory (Grabham et al., 2009), are arguably justified unless group, category-based approaches are also taken; partially foundational approaches are the only way in which analysis at the institutional level can be achieved. The Spatial The role of space in structuring LGB people’s lives, and thus in shaping the policies and practices of the local authorities that service them, was strongly evident. The findings substantiated the assertion that ‘sexuality – its regulation, norms, institutions, pleasures and desires – cannot be understood without understanding the spaces through which it is constituted, practised, and lived’ (Brown et al., 2007: 4). The importance of space is reflected in the literature, with respect to for instance working class lesbians and spatiality; Taylor (2007), for example, found that a combination of low income and spatial barriers formed major impediments to some working class lesbians accessing lesbian-friendly spaces. This section of the paper considers the spatial structuring of LGB equalities work in local government along two related axis; urban/rural, and spatially organised communities and cultures. The experiences of LGB people living in particular localities are key to understanding local government initiatives, given the commitment to community engagement that is part of local government modernisation, following the Local Government Act (2000). As I have noted above, the paper refers to developments in geographies of sexuality, including research concerning rural and small town sexualities (Bell and Valentine (1995), and Little, (2003)). The paper also speaks to the ‘undesirable others’ discussed by Casey (2007) in his examination of an urban commercial gay scene; Casey found that processes of exclusion of lesbians and gay men who are older, disabled, female, poor, or supposedly unattractive operate to construct the boundaries of urban gay spaces. Local authorities, in their focus on service provision, include such ‘unwanted’ people squarely within their remit, whilst also having responsibility for planning and licensing for the commercial gay areas within their localities. Findings across the North East of England, and Wales showed a tendency for LGB communities, and local authority LGB equalities initiatives, to be concentrated in urban areas, with further differentiations being apparent across various cities. For instance the North Eastern Action Learning Set raised the issue of Newcastle having an active gay scene, in comparison to Durham, with a greater awareness concerning LGB issues in Newcastle, and a trend for gay people – as well as others – to go into Newcastle from the surrounding areas for socialising. This section of the paper focuses on findings from Wales, as a means of addressing the relative absence of scholarship on rural areas and small towns, however, it is important to note, firstly, that Welsh cities have active LGB scenes, and, secondly, that the interviews with national stakeholders indicated that some of the issues concerning rural and small town cultures are mirrored in England. The Welsh case study and Action Learning Set indicated that the geographical dispersal of the Welsh population and attendant difficulties with communication and travel emerged as a major – in some instances a predominant – factor in the way that LGB people’s lives are structured and the local authority work that may (or may not) be taking place concerning LGB equalities within Wales. A number of Welsh contributors from the case study (both officers and community members) talked about the difficulties that LGB people have accessing LGB social spaces, due to geographical barriers. The spatial characteristics of the country also pose a barrier to community organisation, with the lesbian Welsh LGB community organisation representative discussing the obstacles to conducting community consultations in mid Wales: ‘it is very difficult because mid Wales is very spread out, and has a lot of mountains in between major towns’. The way in which social forces are routed through each other to forge marginalised subject positions was very apparent when examining findings concerning LGB people in Wales. Many of the contributors to the research discussed the ways in which Welsh LGB people are socially excluded when they live in rural areas and are young, older, cannot drive or do not have access to private transport, or access to the internet, or are ill or disabled. For instance a lesbian officer in the case study local authority described the way in which a rural young man came out to his parents, who stopped him going to the gay venue in his local town, so that ‘his support network was cut off completely, em, then he will end up with mental health issues…everybody knew about it but nobody could do anything about it’. Discussion of illness and disability is beyond the remit of this paper, but the following quote, provided by a gay Welsh man, provides an indication of the ways in which illness and disability, as well as other factors, may impact on Welsh LBG people’s lives: ‘You have those who are probably on Sickness Benefit, live in a flat, so economically they’re not well off, you know they can’t afford, they don’t have transport, so they may feel very lonely and isolated and excluded because they don’t have the resources by which to access these places, and then you have some that, em, like me, em, are not particularly scene-orientated, so I don’t particularly like going to places like Manchester and there are a lot of people like me.’ This contributor’s assertion that there are a lot of LGB people who are not oriented towards the urban gay scene was echoed by a lesbian housing worker based in Wales, who talked about the way in which one of her lesbian clients had moved to Manchester, had ‘hated it’ and had returned. Such findings lead into discussions concerning the role of community and space, which is the subject of the next section. Community and prejudice The research findings indicated the importance of the social and cultural patterning of different spaces in shaping LGB people’s lives. Prejudice against LGB people appeared to be heightened in rural or small town localities, with a number of both Welsh and English contributors making comparisons between these localities and large cities, where there is more diversity generally; this finding reflects the work of queer geographers such as Bell and Valentine (1995) and Binnie (2004). There was a considerable amount of evidence for overt homophobia in rural and small town Wales, including hate crime, for instance a community member said that the first stall ever dealing with LGB issues at a national Welsh cultural event was smeared with excrement. The Welsh Action Learning Set, which included representatives from a range of southern and mid Welsh authorities as well as two LGB community representatives, raised issues concerning the importance of local communities, and the church, in rural and small town settings in Wales, and the ways in which the heterosexism constrains the lives of LGB people who live in these localities. For instance, there was discussion of the way in which indigenous homophobia means that bisexual people feel pressurised to stay closeted and to get into heterosexual relationships x . A number of contributors to the research discussed the way in which the geographical dispersal of people, into small, close-knit communities, entails a lack of understanding of diversity. For instance: ‘…it can be a row of just a few old mining cottages, and you, it’s difficult to be different, to be the one, it’s difficult to be black in those areas, it’s difficult to be disabled and those are considered to be things that you can’t help, you know, but, you know, to be gay, I mean, “just be considered as being weird and you’re outside the norm of what we can deal with here, therefore you need to go”, if you’re being shunned you’re not being shunned as an individual, it will have an impact on your parents, your family and others (Welsh female local authority officer) These findings complement work by authors such as Moran and Skeggs (2004) on sexuality and violence, as well as work by Valentine, who, in her case study of a deaf lesbian’s life, discusses the way that dominant groups construct and occupy specific spaces (home, work, the community) such that ‘they develop hegemonic cultures through which power operates to systematically define ways of being, and to mark out those who are in place and out of place’ (2007: 18). It appears that in rural and small town Wales, heteronormative cultures predominate, strongly shaping and constraining sexual identities in intersection with spatial forces. Such power dynamics were apparent in the small town setting in which the case study authority was located. This town was described by both community members and local authority officers as having a ‘laddish’, macho, and homophobic culture. A male local authority officer described the way in which: Contributor: ‘To be out late at night, on a Saturday night, and to be identified as being gay, or to be suspected of being gay, because it’s a very powerful insult here’ Interviewer: ‘Yeah’. Contributor: ‘And it’s not just a throwaway comment, people will get into a fight.’ One of the gay male community members reported instances of violence against gay men, and said that ‘fear is prevalent here, it really is among the gay community, and I think the bisexual community feel it more because, em, you’ve got the gay community on one side that’s hostile towards them and you’ve the straight community…they’ve got prejudices on both sides really’. The young gay male contributors initially stated that there was little homophobia in their locality, but then described high levels of homophobic bullying in their (Catholic) school, including death threats. Prejudice was structured in particular ways in this locality, with homophobic violence and displays of machismo serving to performatively shape heteronormative space (see Brown et al., 2007). Perceived effeminacy and gay masculinities were utilised in marginalising ways, with gender as well as sexuality playing a central role in two ways: gay men appeared more visible and active in their communities than lesbians or bisexual women, and violence against men who transgressed sexual and gender norms seemed especially virulent. Although there is clear evidence for the spatial structuring of prejudice in rural and small town Wales, and for the operation of heterosexist regulatory and normative forces, it is important to point out that there were also some counter-indications. As one national stakeholder said: ‘you cannot assume that people will be narrow-minded, some are welcoming to everyone’. The findings indicated that there is a paradox concerning communities that are perhaps rather parochial, but are also experienced as a source of support for those (LGB) people who are part of them; a number of contributors discussed the inclusion of lesbian and gay people where these are local, although this inclusion appeared dependent on keeping their sexual identity fairly closeted. Overall, findings demonstrated the importance of the spatial in shaping the cultures of the communities which local authorities represent. Geographical factors played a key role in shaping the lives of LGB people, and spatially-structured intersectional marginalisation was noticeable with respect to the LGB population. Cultures of homophobia and heterosexism were evident in the Welsh rural and small town locations where the research was conducted, but there were also some indications that spatially defined (primarily heterosexual) communities could be supportive of local LGB people. Conclusion This paper has sought to clarify the remit of intersectionality studies, in particular the debate concerning whether intersectionality studies should focus on the interstices between social categories, or rather focus on interrogating particular social categories. It has done this by demonstrating that attention to the category of space is important in understanding the structuring of sexualities, within the context of UK local authority sexualities equalities work. The paper sites its examination of the debate concerning intersections and categories partially at the institutional level, via its exploration of local authority equalities initiatives. Whilst the notion of intersectionality is absent from local authority discourse, strategies have been developed within the realm of sexualities equalities policy making and practice in order to deal with the tensions between category- specific and interstice-oriented approaches to equalities. The strategies that are employed include equality policies that address different equality strands in tandem, recognising what is often termed ‘multiple disadvantage’, the use of impact assessments that assess intersectional disadvantages amongst service users, and trainings that encourage service providers to analyse identity complexity. These strategies enable large institutions to address complexity at the group level, rather than at the level of the individual subject sited at the intersection of particular social forces. However, it seems that local authorities tend to focus on individual equality strands, and that addressing multiple or intersecting strands takes work to a level of complexity which can be challenging, especially given the resource constraints that authorities face. This tendency illustrates the difficulties associated with intersectionality in the arena of local government policy making and practice. Analysis of the interstices between social characteristics is relatively straightforward at the level of the individual, but once group level conceptualisation is undertaken a category-based approach is required to a degree. The importance of specific categories in structuring social life does not render a focus on the interstices between them (a focus that has more usually been associated with intersectionality theory) defunct. As Weldon (2008) states, it is possible to think of social characteristics xi as having some independent effects and some intersectional effects. In this paper I argue for an approach that combines interstice-based analysis with an examination of particular social categories, in this case sexuality and the spatial. Attention to specific categories, which can in some cases be seen as foundational, is important both as a means of achieving depth of analysis and as a way of developing intersectionality theory into something that can be applied at the institutional level. Attention to the interstices is also crucial, because it enables sensitivity to other social characteristics, such as the material, ability, faith and age. In this paper, the marginalising effects of poverty, disability, and youth were pronounced when viewed in intersection with LGB identities and spatial barriers. The paper concludes that a focus purely on foundational analysis, without concurrent sensitivity to the ways in which social forces are routed through each other, is insufficient in understanding the social construction of sexuality. References Beckett, C. (2004) ‘Crossing the Border: Locating Heterosexuality as a Boundary for Lesbian and Disabled Women’ Journal of International Women’s Studies, 5(3): 44-52. 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(2008) ‘The Structure of Intersectionality: A Comparative Politics of Gender’, Politics and Gender 2: 235-248. White, J.A. (2007) ‘The Hollow and the Ghetto: Space, Race, and the Politics of Poverty’ Politics and Gender, 3(2): 271-280. Yuval-Davis, N. (2006) ‘’Intersectionality and Feminist Politics’, European Journal of Women’s Studies 13(3): 193-210. i As well as other fields. ii Except of course where trans people are also LGB. iii ESRC grant no. RES-062-23-0577 ‘Organisational Change, Resistance and Democracy: Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender Equalities Initiatives in Local Government. I would like to thank the Principal Investigator, Professor Diane Richardson, and the two Research Associates who worked on the project: Dr Michaela Fay, who conducted the research in the North East, and Dr. Ann McNulty, who undertook the research in the South of England and Northern Ireland as well as data analysis and writing. We wish to extend thanks to the contributors and our advisory group members for their input to the project. iv The data that was available at the time of writing. v Section 28 of the Local Government Act (1998, since repealed), determined that Local Authorities could not intentionally promote, via published material or teaching, same-sex relationships or homosexuality as a ‘pretended family relationship’. vi The Adoption and Children Act (2002) allows unmarried couples (including same-sex couples) to apply for joint adoption of children. The Gender Recognition Act (2004) provides improved levels of legal recognition for transsexual people. The Civil Partnerships Act (2004) provides a number of rights for registered same-sex couples. The Equality Regulations (Sexual Orientation) 2007 bans employment discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation (see www.stonewall.org.uk, www.pfc.org.uk, both accessed 18.08.2009). vii The Equality Bill was before Parliament at the time of writing but was passed in April 2010. viii These are the Equality Standard in England, which has been replaced by the Equality Framework for Local Government (I&DeA 2009), and the Equalities Improvement Framework for Wales, see http://www.wlga.gov.uk/english/equality-improvement-framework-for-wales/ (accessed 10.08.2009). ix Race, gender, disability, age, faith, sexual orientation and Welsh language. x Although bisexuals are also more easily able to strategically assimilate and to pass as heterosexual than lesbians and gay men. xi Weldon focuses on gender, race and class. http://www.stonewall.org.uk/ http://www.pfc.org.uk/ http://www.wlga.gov.uk/english/equality-improvement-framework-for-wales/ 
work_thpws5tjizgg7hmdx6pgq7ugrq	----	Muslims, Racism and Violence After the Paris Attacks This is a repository copy of Muslims, Racism and Violence After the Paris Attacks. White Rose Research Online URL for this paper: http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/94261/ Version: Accepted Version Article: Britton, J. (2015) Muslims, Racism and Violence After the Paris Attacks. Sociological Research Online, 20 (3). 1. ISSN 1360-7804 https://doi.org/10.5153/sro.3736 eprints@whiterose.ac.uk https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/ Reuse Unless indicated otherwise, fulltext items are protected by copyright with all rights reserved. The copyright exception in section 29 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 allows the making of a single copy solely for the purpose of non-commercial research or private study within the limits of fair dealing. The publisher or other rights-holder may allow further reproduction and re-use of this version - refer to the White Rose Research Online record for this item. Where records identify the publisher as the copyright holder, users can verify any specific terms of use on the publisher’s website. Takedown If you consider content in White Rose Research Online to be in breach of UK law, please notify us by emailing eprints@whiterose.ac.uk including the URL of the record and the reason for the withdrawal request. mailto:eprints@whiterose.ac.uk https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/ Charlie Hebdo special issue Muslims, racism and violence after the Paris attacks ABSTRACT The aim of this short article is to consider ways in which violence, and the threat of it, is integral to the lived experience of Muslims. The article reflects on how violence is intrinsic to forms of racism and explores how it features in the study of racism as it relates to Muslims. In doing so, it briefly examines similarities between forms of racialisation experienced by Muslims and Jews and draws attention to how, in the wake of the Paris attacks, resulting fear and insecurity shape the routine, day-to-day lives of both Jewish and Muslim people. The article focuses on the multi-faceted ways in which experiencing violence is a key component of Muslims’ everyday lives, in contrast to dominant narratives characterising Muslims as perpetrators of violence. It argues that exploring the threat and experience of violence, and its effects, is an important part of sociological endeavour to understand and explain the position of Muslims in European societies. (160 words) KEYWORDS: Muslims, racism, violence, Islamophobia, anti-Semitism, Charlie Hebdo, Paris attacks Aside from the emergence of ‘Je suis Charlie’ as a rallying call in support of Charlie Hebdo and its commitment to promoting and protecting freedom of speech, a key response to the Paris attacks was the drawing of media and public attention to how violence, and the threat of it, continues to shape the lived experience of European Jews. The murder of a police officer close to a Jewish school in the district of Montrouge and the subsequent murder of four Jewish people at the Hyper Cacher kosher supermarket led to an increase in security in France and other European countries to protect Jewish schools and places of worship from anti-Semitic attacks. The 70th anniversary of the liberation of Auschwitz, three weeks later, provided a timely, enduring reminder of how violence is integral to forms of racism, as is the fear and insecurity engendered as a result. The overall aim of this short article is to draw attention to how the reported increase in fear and insecurity among Jewish people as a consequence of the attacks is, in key respects, shared by Muslims, whilst providing a reminder that fear and insecurity is part of the routine, lived experience of both groups. This aim is, on the face of it, anomalous given that the Paris attacks were perpetrated by individuals claiming to be acting in the name of Islam and included extreme acts of physical violence towards members of another religious minority group, the Jewish community. Shortly after the Paris attacks, two Muslim relatives of mine were threatened at knife point and robbed as they were preparing to close their shop, a small business that they run together. Although they sustained only minor physical injuries, the emotional harm to them and their children, who witnessed the robbery, has been considerable and is likely to be long-lasting. Together, the robbery and the Paris attacks prompted me to reflect on, first, the different ways in which violence, and the threat of it, is integral to the lived experience of European Muslims and, second, the infrequency with which Muslims are portrayed as victims of violence. The article reflects these two concerns with a focus on how violence features in the study of racism as it relates to Muslims. It draws attention to the importance of placing the threat and experience of violence, and its effects, at the centre of sociological endeavour to understand and explain the position of Muslims in European societies and, in doing so, to consider how violence features in Muslims’ everyday, lived experience. Violence, Racism and Islamophobia The study of violence has been largely absent from sociological theory, even though violence is embedded in the social fabric in multiple ways (Ray 2011:2). Despite this absence, it is recognised that violence is integral to racism and takes two distinctive, yet inextricably inter-related forms. To briefly summarise, the first, symbolic violence, is the outcome of what Stuart Hall (1997) called a ‘racialised regime of representation’ that operates to fix and naturalise a range of characteristics and reduce people to a few essentialised, disparaging features. The second, physical violence, incorporates a range of social action, from abuse and harassment to coercion and assault, that threatens physical and/or mental health and well-being. Although the two can be considered distinct for analytical purposes, one is implicated in the other and both are clearly instrumental to the operation of power relations that underpins forms of racism (Hall 1997). Sociologists studying racism maintain a central focus on the exercise of symbolic violence in order to explain what racism is and how ideas about different, apparently discrete groups of people operate to exclude, marginalise and oppress (e.g. Bulmer and Solomos 1999; Goldberg 1990; Miles and Brown 2003,). A key task of theorists of racism is therefore to explain how symbolic violence produces forms of racialised knowledge about different groups and how this knowledge then relates to physical violence. With respect to Muslims, the task for theorists of racism is challenging because, unlike anti-Jewish narratives, anti-Muslim narratives are less straightforwardly viewed as having a racial point of reference (Goldberg 2006; Meer and Noorani 2008). Despite this, attention has been drawn to how cultural signifiers operate to homogenise and naturalise both Muslims and Jews and how this inter-twining of the cultural with the racial is particularly prevalent in contemporary Europe (Lentin and Titley 2011; Meer and Noorani 2008; Meer 2013). Likewise, since the late 1990s, the development of the concept of Islamophobia has been at the forefront of efforts to explain and account for forms of symbolic and physical violence towards Muslims (Halliday 1999; Allen 2010; Sayyid and Vakil 2010). Whilst it has contributed to critical reflection on the position of Muslim in European societies, perhaps inevitably, there remains a lack of consensus about what it is and how useful it is as a tool for understanding and challenging anti- Muslim sentiment (Sayyid and Vakil 2010). Leaving aside these debates, there have also been calls for the concept of racialisation to be extended to include Islamophobia, resulting in the constituting of Muslims as a distinct racialised group (Murji and Solomos 2005; Meer and Modood 2009; Meer 2013). This serves to promote understanding that, in the current social and political context, there is no simple separation between forms of violence towards Islam as a faith and forms of violence towards Muslims as a group of people. It also highlights a key similarity between anti-Semitism and Islamophobia in that each operates to turn people who identify with or are identified by their religion into dangerous racialised ‘others’ (Klug 2003; Lentin and Titley 2011). Symbolic violence after the Paris attacks One consequence of the Paris attacks has been to reinvigorate dominant narratives of Muslims as disloyal and dangerous citizens, challenging national laws and values and threatening peace and security. This is to be expected given that Muslims are said to face a ‘hegemonic bloc of hostility’ that is derived from a wide range of sources, including the state and media (Werbner 2005). Together these sources operate to sustain a symbolic order that places Muslims, as a group, in direct, inevitable opposition to the liberal freedoms and values of secular European societies (Fekete 2004, 2009; Kundnani 2007; Modood 1990). The operation of symbolic violence, fundamental to racism, occurs as a result of unequal relationships of power that enable and legitimise representation of Muslims in these ways. It is one example illustrating how many of the different modalities of violence, whether individual or collective, are not necessarily criminal. Symbolic violence is evident in the coercive attention and criticism directed towards Muslims as a whole, who are held accountable for the actions of a few. This was shown to be the case following other terrorist attacks, including 9 September 2001, and it was again evident following the attacks in Paris (Spalek 2002). Claiming ‘Je suis Charlie’ became almost obligatory following the attacks, requiring people generally, and Muslims specifically, to choose between being for the magazine or for the terrorists (Ali 2015). This served to silence dissenting voices of both Muslims and non-Muslims who, for example, took issue with the dominant argument that people have an absolute right to insult whoever they wish. Similarly, The Muslim Council of Britain criticised a letter from the government’s communities secretary asking Muslim leaders to explain and demonstrate how faith in Islam can be part of British identity (Deardon 2015). Although arguably a well-intentioned intervention, the letter served to reinforce dominant understanding of Muslims as a homogenous, problematic group who do not straightforwardly share the values of the rest of ‘us’. The UKIP leader Nigel Farage’s much criticised remarks that a ‘fifth column’ in European society was responsible for the attacks, and similar comments regarding the apparent problem of the encroachment of Sharia law, constitute Muslims as a significant internal threat, which negate the reality of the position of Muslims as a marginalised group (Holehouse 2015). These are high profile examples from public figures, yet the operation of symbolic violence suggests that they are indicative of post-attack social commentary on what is to be done about the apparent entrenched ‘problem’ of Muslims in European societies. They contribute to an immediate social and political context which reinforces and extends the marking of Muslims as a distinct, dangerous group. Muslims as victims of hate crime Studies of domestic violence highlight how violence is bound up with everyday life in complex ways (Ray 2011:3). Likewise, racist violence underscores how violence permeates the everyday, although it rarely conforms to the dominant image of hate crime due to the complex motivation driving it (Ray, Smith and Wastell 2004). Hate crime is one indicator of how physical violence, and the threat of it, is central to forms of racism and is defined as ‘any criminal offence which is perceived by the victim or any other person to be motivated by hostility or prejudice towards someone based on a personal characteristic’ (Creese and Lader,2014:4). With regards to Muslims’ experiences of hate crime, it is telling that a Home Office report showed a 5 per cent increase in overall hate crime in England and Wales between 2012/13 and 2013/14 and concluded that this was likely to be due to the increase in the number of racially and religiously aggravated offences in the immediate period following the murder of the soldier Lee Rigby in May 2013 (Creese and Lader 2014:7). The Metropolitan Police reported an increase in Islamophobic hate crime in the wake of the murder and a 45 per cent increase in religious hate crime in the same period overall (Creese and Lader 2014:9). It is reasonable to suggest that the Paris attacks may result in a similar increase. In addition, the number and range of incidents recorded by the Tell MAMA project, a public service for measuring and monitoring ant-Muslim attacks, also provide evidence of how physical violence is part of the everyday lived experience of Muslims in Britain (<tellmamauk.org>). In February 2015, shortly after the Paris attacks, three Muslim students were murdered in the US as a result of what police said was a dispute over http://tellmamauk.org/ parking. The response on social media drew attention to the ambiguity and ambivalence inherent in labelling any criminal offence a hate crime (Katz 2015). Leaving aside arguments for and against designating this particular case a hate crime, it provided a reminder, in the wake of the Paris attacks, that hate crime towards Muslims is likely to be under-recorded and can be misrepresented. Criticism on social media focused on the lack of coverage of the murders by mainstream media, drawing attention to how a racialised double standard appears to come into play when Muslims are victims, rather than perpetrators, of crime. Cases of hate crime involving Muslims who are killed by non-Muslims are thought to be less newsworthy than those involving non-Muslims who are killed by Muslims, leading to the conclusion that Muslim lives are seen as of less value. A comparable example in the UK is that of Mohammed Saleem, an elderly Muslim man who was stabbed and killed in an attack that was motivated by racial hatred as he walked home from evening prayers at his local mosque. The man convicted of his murder had also planted three bombs outside of local mosques (Dodd 2013). The attack took place less than a month before the murder of Lee Rigby and, in comparison, received relatively little media attention. There are important differences between the two cases and, whilst it is essential not to overstate similarities, comparisons drawn between them again raised questions about the relative perceived value of Muslim lives and the apparent lack of attention drawn to violence experienced by Muslims. The production of racialised knowledge helps to explain why Muslims lives are seen to lack value because it presupposes and constitutes power relations so that dominant representations of Muslims as problematic and dangerous defenders of a backward religion remain unchallenged (Foucault 1977). Principal representations of Muslims as perpetrators of violence are not easily reconciled with examples of Muslims as victims and, as a result, the loss of Muslim lives is less likely to attract public attention and sympathy. The notable exception is when Muslims are victims of violence perpetrated by other Muslims. Dominant representations are neatly reinforced by violence carried out by Muslims and the symbiotic relationship between symbolic and physical violence is evident because physical violence towards Muslims is readily justified and legitimised. Muslims and the wider everyday threat and experience of violence Beyond violence categorised as hate crime, it is relevant to reflect on ways in which the fear and experience of violence shapes the more general everyday lives of Muslims. I was recently involved in developing a research project with community engagement officers and representatives of community groups in Rotherham, a town that has been the focus of sustained media and public attention due to a child sexual exploitation scandal involving local Pakistani Muslim men. As a result, it has also been the focus of sustained activity by Far Right groups (Faith Matters 2014). I collected emails and notes from meetings that document the impact of the scandal on local Muslims in relation to the everyday threat and experience of violence. As is to be expected, this includes direct experiences of harassment and abuse in the street, incidents that can be categorised as hate crime. Yet what is particularly striking is how local Muslims report feeling unsafe and insecure in their local neighbourhood, to the extent that they have adopted avoidance and management strategies, involving changing their everyday practices, and those of their children. This provides a small, yet revealing, indication of how fear and insecurity arising from the threat of violence affects and shapes routine, lived experience. Apart from immediate contextual factors, the likelihood of experiencing forms of violence is dependent on a range of inter-related factors, such as socio- economic circumstances, age and gender, as well as ethnicity and religion. To consider another example in which the intersectionality of these various factors is relevant, in Britain, Muslims are concentrated in some of the most deprived wards and experience multiple forms of deprivation (Peach 2006:649-50). Research evidence has shown that Muslims also experience particularly harsh disadvantage in the labour market (Platt 2005; Khattab 2009; Khattab et al. 2011).The extent to which Muslims experience this disadvantage varies according to ethnic background, with Pakistanis and Bangladeshis, numerically the largest group of Muslims in Britain, the most disadvantaged (Platt 2005; Khattab 2009; Khattab et al. 2011). The reasons for this are complex and, whilst there is no room to consider them here, it is pertinent to reflect on the forms of employment and self-employment that are a consequence of and response to labour market disadvantage. The type of resulting labour market activity that some Muslims engage in includes owning and/or working in small businesses, such as take-aways, restaurants and local convenience stores, as well as other forms of self-employment, such as taxi driving and market trading. This kind of employment activity increases the risk of exposure to hate crime and other forms of violence due to risks related to direct interaction with members of the general public, usually outside of more affluent, better-policed retail and leisure centres and as part of the night time economy. My relatives’ experience of violence is an example here as is my memory of a research project that I carried out some years ago in which I learned of Muslim taxi drivers who had a warning system in place to come to each other’s assistance in the event of violence from passengers. Whether such violence can be categorised as hate crime or not, these examples suggest that the precarious labour market situation experienced by Muslims results in labour market activity that increases exposure to violence in everyday working life. It is another small, pertinent example of how violence impacts on Muslims’ everyday life in multi-faceted ways. Concluding thoughts The attacks in Paris drew media and public attention to how violence, and the threat of it, continues to shape the lived experience of European Jews, whilst there was little attention paid to how the threat and experience of violence, and its effects, is also part of the everyday, lived experience of European Muslims. This article has reflected on the operation of symbolic and physical violence, with respect to Muslims, both in the wake of the Paris attacks and more generally. In doing so, it has shown how violence is related to the overall position of Muslims in European societies, particularly but not solely as a racialised group. It has focused on a small number of, mainly UK-focused, examples from the everyday lives of Muslims in order to highlight how the threat and experience of violence is encountered on a mundane, routine basis. One notable omission is that the article has not examined forms of violence perpetrated by the state. These are usually portrayed as legitimate in relation to national concerns regarding security and defence and have considerable, far-reaching consequences in terms of engendering fear and insecurity among Muslims and are, understandably, a sustained focused of attention (e.g. Fekete 2004, 2009; Kapoor 2013; Kundnani 2007). Another omission is the activities of Far Right groups. Both are crucial to providing a comprehensive picture of Muslims’ experiences of violence. Paying attention to symbolic and physical forms of violence, and the close, dynamic relationship between them, is essential in understanding the position of Muslims in European societies. It is imperative that theorists continue to focus on the operation of symbolic violence in order to explain and understand widespread anti-Muslim sentiment, and this endeavour can be enhanced by the findings of empirical research that interrogates how different modalities of violence impact on the everyday, routine lives of Muslims. 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PEACH, C (2006) ‘Muslims in the 2001 Census if England and Wales: Gender and Economic Disadvantage’, Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol. 29, No. 4, p629-55. PLATT, L (2005) Migration and Social Mobility: The Life Chances of Britain’s Minority Ethnic Communities, Bristol: The Policy Press. RAY, L (2011) Violence and Society, London: Sage Publications Ltd. RAY, L, Smith, D and Wastell, L (2004) ‘Shame, Rage and Racist Violence’, British Journal of Criminology, Vol. 44, p.350-368. SAYYID, S and VAKIL, A.K (eds) (2010) Thinking Through Islamophobia: Global Perspectives, London: Hurst and Company. SPALEK, B (2002) ‘Hate Crimes Against British Muslims in the Aftermath of September 11 th’, Criminal Justice Matters, Vol. 48, No. 1, p.20-2. WERBNER, P (2005), ‘Islamophobia: incitement to religious hatred – legislating for a new fear?’ Anthropology Today, Vol. 21, No. 1, p.5-9. 
work_tik6chftyzaj3nog4seqam7eha	----	HATE CRIME DOC V7_Layout 1 A Snapshot of Disability Hate Crime in Lancashire 2010 HATE CRIME DOC V7_Layout 1 23/03/2011 13:08 Page 2 4 - Acknowledgements 5 - Executive Summary 6 – Recommendations 8 - Introduction 9 - Aims and Objectives 10 - Methodology 11 - Do you know what disability hate crime is? 13 - What crime do you fear? 15 - What crime have you experienced? 21 - Who are you afraid of and who has committed crime against you? 23 - What are your experiences of reporting crime? 27 - Have you changed the way you behave because of crime or the fear of crime? 31 - Are you aware of any support you can get through the court process? What would help? 33 - Sample 35 - Conclusions 36 - Contacts C O N T E N T S HATE CRIME DOC V7_Layout 1 23/03/2011 13:08 Page 3 Acknowledgements The authors of this report would like to thank all the people who contributed to this project, including all those who gave their time generously to attend the focus groups, completed questionnaires and attended the action-planning event. We would also like to thank those organisations and centres that assisted us with arranging the focus groups, distributed the questionnaire and supported the action planning event with their views and expertise. We would finally like to acknowledge the support, encouragement and commitment offered by CPS Lancashire, Lancashire Constabulary and Lancashire County Council. A C K N O W L E D G E M E N T S HATE CRIME DOC V7_Layout 1 23/03/2011 13:08 Page 4 E X E C U T IV E S U M M A R Y Executive Summary CPS Lancashire, Lancashire Constabulary and Lancashire County Council agreed to work in partnership to better understand Disability Hate Crime in the county. This report is the culmination of this work and serves as a ‘snapshot’ of Disability Hate Crime in the county. It canvassed people’s opinions on their understanding of Disability Hate Crime, the crime they fear and have experienced, the perpetrators who committed these crimes and incidents, the changes in behaviour as a result of the fear and experience of crime and the knowledge of support services. The report reflects national research and is a call to action for all agencies that have a responsibility to tackle hate crime. Summary Findings Knowledge of disability hate crime The people who took part in the research had very little knowledge of Disability Hate Crime, many having never heard this terminology before. Fear of crime Nearly two thirds of people who took part in the questionnaire indicated that they felt frightened or feared that they would be targeted because they have a disability. Experience of crime Nearly half of the people questioned said that they had actually experienced crime and they felt that they had been targeted because they had a disability. Almost a third reported that they had been the victim of a crime or incident in the last six months and that fear and experience of crime was greatest ‘in the street’ followed by ‘at home’. The incidents and crimes are taking the form of verbal attacks, including threats and intimidation in a third of cases. Perpetrators of incidents and crimes Half of respondents were frightened of people between 16 and 24 years old and strangers and groups of strangers were the perpetrators of crimes. Experience of reporting crime Nearly half of people questioned had told their family and friends that they were frightened or had been attacked. A number of the focus group respondents suggested that the service they received from the police on reporting a crime could be improved. Changes in behaviour as a result of fear and experience of crime. A tenth of people who responded to the questionnaire suggested that they had moved house as a result of fear alone and avoiding places was a common reaction to fear of crime. Of those that had been a victim of crime, a third avoided specific places and a fifth had changed their routine in some way. Knowledge of support The knowledge of the role of CPS Witness Care Units, Victim Support and the police in supporting victims of hate crime was very limited. Participants also knew very little about Special Measures and the circumstances in which these can be employed. 5 HATE CRIME DOC V7_Layout 1 23/03/2011 13:08 Page 5 R E C O M M E N D A T IO N S 6 1. A joint communication and education strategy should be agreed between agencies targeted at Deaf and disabled people to increase awareness of Disability Hate Crime and how to report it. 2. A joint communication and education strategy should be agreed between agencies targeted at agency staff to increase awareness of Disability Hate Crime and how to facilitate reporting it. 3. A joint communication and education strategy should be agreed between agencies targeted at young people to increase awareness of Disability Hate Crime, its impact on people and how to report it. 4. A joint communication and education strategy should be agreed between agencies targeted at tenants of social landlords to increase awareness of Disability Hate Crime, its impact on people and how to report it. 5. All agencies should proactively promote good news stories and successful prosecutions. 6. Anonymous methods of reporting and third party reporting should be expanded. 7. The accessibility of current reporting systems should be reviewed and improved, including simplifying current electronic systems to make them more user friendly. 8. Local authority officers should be trained in identifying Disability Hate Crime at an early stage and encouraged to work in partnership with other agencies to tackle it. 9. All agencies should adopt a pro-active approach to all instances of Disability Hate Crime. 10.Agencies should approach the issue of Disability Hate Crime from a rights-based angle. 11.Agencies should endeavour to report all incidents, with identities of victims omitted if requested, in order to contribute to an intelligence picture of hotspots for Disability Hate Crime. 12.Agencies should endeavour to ensure that each victim is treated as an individual and early interventions are provided as appropriate. 13.Relevant agencies should review the letters sent out to Deaf and disabled victims and witnesses. They should involve Deaf and disabled people and the organisations that support them to develop more accessible communication. 14.Relevant agencies should engage with Deaf and disabled people more effectively to ensure that the role of the Crown Prosecution Service, Witness Care Units and special measures are more widely understood. Recommendations HATE CRIME DOC V7_Layout 1 23/03/2011 13:08 Page 6 ...the criminal justice system has failed to support disabled people to recognise and report hate crimes... 7 IN T R O D U C T IO N HATE CRIME DOC V7_Layout 1 23/03/2011 13:08 Page 7 IN T R O D U C T IO N The profile of Disability Hate Crime has been raised in recent times in a number of reports produced by charities, the Disability Rights Commission (DRC) and the Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC). These reports have highlighted the many barriers that Deaf and disabled people encounter when accessing justice. The reports make clear that there is more that can be done by criminal justice agencies, local authorities, charities and other partners to improve access to justice for Deaf and disabled people. ‘Getting Away with Murder’, a report by Scope, Disability Now magazine and the UK Disabled People’s Council, summarised the current situation as follows … “So far, the criminal justice system has failed to support disabled people to recognise and report hate crimes, and failed to investigate, prosecute and sentence such crimes for what they are.” The agenda has prompted a number of agencies to look carefully at their treatment and support of disabled people in cases where they may be victims of crime. In October 2008 the then Director of Public Prosecutions, Sir Ken Macdonald QC, described the situation… “I am on record as saying that it is my sense that Disability Hate Crime is very widespread. I have said that it is my view that at the lower end of the spectrum there is a vast amount not being picked up. I have also expressed the view that the more serious Disability Hate Crimes are not always being prosecuted as they should be. This is a scar on the conscience of criminal justice. And all bodies and all institutions involved in the delivery of justice, including my own, share the responsibility.” It is clear that the efforts of the CJS alone will not effectively combat this problem and it is vital that local authorities, housing providers and disabled people’s organisations all contribute to tackling Disability Hate Crime. The importance of this combined approach and the success of any work undertaken was summarised in ‘Getting Away with Murder’… “To prevent, rather than simply punish Disability Hate Crime, disabled people and their allies need to come together with Government, police, prosecutors, judges and journalists, to pro-actively tackle this crisis of justice. It is only by working together, at a community level as well as nationally, that we will be able to tackle the disablist attitudes and practices that so often lay the foundations for hate crime. Until we do this, Disability Hate Crimes will remain unrecognised and unchallenged, and some of its perpetrators will continue to, literally, get away with murder.” In October 2008 the National Disabled Police Association held a two-day conference at Aintree Racecourse on Disability Hate Crime. As a result of attending this conference Lancashire Constabulary, Lancashire County Council and CPS Lancashire agreed that more work was needed at a local level in terms of Disability Hate Crime and our responses to Disability Hate Crime and agreed to embark on the following project in partnership. 8 Introduction HATE CRIME DOC V7_Layout 1 23/03/2011 13:08 Page 8 A IM S A N D O B JE C T IV E S Aims and Objectives Aims: • To establish a baseline of evidence of Disability Hate Crime in Lancashire. • To obtain a better understanding of the issues that Deaf and disabled people experience when reporting crime, giving evidence and recovering from the experience of hate crime and hate incidents. • To raise the profile and awareness of Disability Hate Crime amongst agencies and Deaf and disabled communities across Lancashire, contributing to an increase in the number of cases of disability hate crime reported and prosecuted. • To contribute to an improvement in the services available to support people to report crime, give evidence and get on with their lives after being a victim of a hate crime or hate incident. Objectives: • To produce a Disability Hate Crime report detailing the experiences of Disability Hate Crime by people in Lancashire. • To increase the knowledge of the barriers to justice Deaf and disabled people face in Lancashire. • To establish strong links between Lancashire Constabulary, Lancashire County Council and CPS Lancashire. • To build strong links with organisations supporting Deaf and disabled people in Lancashire. • To increase the knowledge of how the CJS operates by the Deaf and disability communities of Lancashire. • To increase confidence in how seriously the partners take Disability Hate Crime. • To increase the knowledge of Deaf and disabled communities in how to report Disability Hate Crime. 9 HATE CRIME DOC V7_Layout 1 23/03/2011 13:08 Page 9 M E T H O D O L O G Y The project consisted of nine focus groups and a questionnaire distributed to over 60 different Deaf and disabled peoples’ organisations. The focus groups covered a breadth of geographic locations and a range of organisations that support Deaf people and people with different disabilities. The focus groups were made up of… • 4 Mixed impairment groups. • 1 Visually Impaired Group. • 1 Deaf Group. • 1 Learning Disability Group. • 2 Mental Health Groups. The focus group facilitators posed a structured set of questions to each group. The responses were explored and recorded for later analysis. The questionnaire was distributed to a range of groups across the county, again canvassing the views of people with a range of disabilities and Deaf people. The results were then collated and analysed. The responses from the focus groups and the results of the questionnaire form the broad themes outlined in this report. The main findings of the report were then presented to a range of stakeholders at an action-planning event where actions and recommendations were canvassed and incorporated into this report. 10 Methodology HATE CRIME DOC V7_Layout 1 23/03/2011 13:08 Page 10 D O Y O U K N O W W H A T D IS A B IL IT Y H A T E C R IM E I S ? Do you know what Disability Hate Crime is? Through the questionnaire and focus groups we were keen to understand how familiar people were with the concept of hate crime. We wanted to better understand what they thought it was, where they had heard about it and if a lack of understanding was contributing to a lack of identification and reporting. The current ACPO and CPS policy definition of disability hate crime is as follows… “A hate crime is any criminal offence which is perceived, by the victim or any other person, to be motivated by hostility or prejudice based on a person’s disability or perceived disability.” A hate incident is defined as… “Any non-crime incident which is perceived by the victim or any other person, to be motivated by hostility or prejudice based on a person’s disability or perceived disability.” In April 2005 the law was changed by section 146 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. This section did not create any new offences, it imposed on courts a duty to increase the sentence for any offence where there is evidence that it was aggravated by hostility based on a person’s disability or presumed disability. Section 146 Criminal Justice Act 2003 applies to offences committed in either of the following circumstances: “At the time of committing the offence or immediately before or after doing so, the offender demonstrated towards the victim of the offence hostility based on a disability or presumed disability of the victim”. OR “The offence was motivated (wholly or partly) by hostility towards persons who have a disability or a particular disability.” The concept of Disability Hate Crime and the understanding by all disability communities and indeed by agencies, of exactly what ‘Disability Hate Crime’ is, was an area we were keen to explore in the focus groups. We began by asking the participants whether they were aware of Disability Hate Crime and asked what they thought it was and if participants had heard of it. The level of awareness of what Disability Hate Crime is varied between groups and between members within groups. Rather than being familiar with the concept itself most participants took a guess at what the phrase might mean. Typical responses included … “I’ve never heard of that terminology before and I have no idea, I can guess what it might mean but I have no idea” Focus Group 2 Participant. “Is that when a person’s going for a job, and the like, employer, discriminates against ‘em?” Focus Group 3 Participant. “No idea. Bullying? Discrimination? Racism? These sorts of things?” Focus Group 5 Participant. “Is it hate crime in terms of discriminating against disabled people and picking them out and picking on them to commit crime while they’re in the street and sort of following them and thinking I have more of a chance of getting them because they are disabled.” Focus Group 2 Participant It became very clear during the focus groups that the term itself was not one that participants were familiar with or could relate to. The words used and concept itself was commented on by more than one participant… 11 HATE CRIME DOC V7_Layout 1 23/03/2011 13:08 Page 11 “Just to say, the thing specifically about Disability Hate Crime, I think it’s a strange phrase people aren’t used to and I think people are becoming more aware through things in the news of race hate crime and homophobic crime, but somehow, hate crime is a strong phrase and it’s not one that people think of when something happens to themselves...people just tend to put things down as that’s the sort of thing that happens...” Focus Group 7 Participant This confusion has been recognised in research carried out by the Equality and Human Rights Commission and Scope… “The terminology around targeted violence and hostility is ill-defined, and terms such as ‘ violence’, ‘harassment’ and ‘abuse’ are often used interchangeably. The issues are described and understood differently by different agencies and by disabled people. There is particular confusion over the language of ‘hate crimes’ and this can compromise effective response and intervention.” “…the term ‘hate crime’ creates barriers to understanding. The prevailing attitude towards disability hate crime remains that of disbelief – disabled people are vulnerable and pitiable, perhaps, but not hate-worthy. However, hate, which is defined as intense aversion or hostility, can be motivated by many things, including the belief that someone is inferior or less valuable than you. It may be harder to understand the motivation for someone’s hatred in relation to Disability Hate Crimes but the level of violence, the contempt for people’s lives and the often sustained nature of the crimes detailed in this report can leave little doubt that hate is a factor.” This uncertainty and unfamiliarity by Deaf and disabled people and agencies of what Disability Hate Crime is, is clearly a barrier to effective recognition and reporting of this phenomenon. This is important because any effort made to increase recognition and reporting should start from the point that this terminology is misunderstood and efforts should be made to explain what it is by giving examples of Disability Hate Crime. The ambiguity and uncertainty felt by participants around the term ‘Disability Hate Crime’ is important when considering the responses received to the questionnaire which used the term throughout. In the Focus Groups a number of participants at the beginning stated that they did not think that they had been a victim of Disability Hate Crime. However, on further exploration it transpired that most people did in fact have some experience of Disability Hate Crime. RECOMMENDATIONS: 1. A joint communication strategy should be agreed between agencies targeted at deaf and disabled people to increase awareness of Disability Hate Crime and how to report it. The key messages should include the fact that victims don’t have to put up with this treatment and that there are a number of different ways of tackling this issue. 2. A joint communication strategy should be agreed between agencies targeted at agency staff to increase awareness of Disability Hate Crime and how to facilitate reporting it. The key messages should include the responsibility all agencies have in tackling and recognising Disability Hate Crime and supporting people in reporting and taking action. D O Y O U K N O W W H A T D ISA B IL IT Y H A T E C R IM E IS ? 12 HATE CRIME DOC V7_Layout 1 23/03/2011 13:08 Page 12 W H A T C R IM E D O Y O U F E A R ? What crime do you fear? As part of the research we were keen to understand the types of crime that Deaf and disabled people feared as well as what their experience was of crime. The questionnaire asked “Have you ever felt frightened or feared you would be targeted because you have a disability?” 37% of respondents indicated that they did not feel that they would be targeted and 3% responded that they did not know. The responses to the questionnaire indicate that 60% of respondents had felt frightened or feared they would be targeted because they have a disability. This confirms anecdotal evidence that the fear of being targeted is high amongst Deaf and disabled people in Lancashire. This impacts on all aspects of living and this is borne out by subsequent responses in the questionnaire, the focus groups and the wider research. The focus groups were asked if they felt frightened or feared being targeted because they are Deaf or have a disability. Responses included… “Every time I go in [shopping centre], I am frightened you know...unless I’m with somebody.” Focus Group 4 Participant. “When you go to the supermarket till, and you’re in a chair, you’ve got to put your key, your pin number in, and everybody’s above you; they can see what you’re doing and you’re wary aren’t you? .... and you feel threatened. Small things can be very big issues.” Focus Group 4 Participant. The fear of targeted crime and incidents was a common theme that ran throughout the focus groups and mirrored the responses given in the questionnaire. It was very clear that the participants were living with fear as part of their everyday lives. One question focused on the frequency of people’s fear of crime rather than their experience. 22% said that they feared being a victim of crime or incident once a week or more, 24% feared being a victim of crime or incident once a month or more. 18% said that they feared being the victim of a crime or incident once or more in a six month period. The responses indicate that 46% of the respondents feared they would be victims of a crime or incident at least once a month or more. This is an incredibly high number of people that are living in fear. The remaining 36% was made up of respondents entering never/more often on the questionnaire forms. The views expressed in the focus groups suggested that the fear of being a victim of a crime or incident was something that people learned to live with as part of their everyday lives. RECOMMENDATIONS: 3. All agencies should pro-actively promote good news stories and successful prosecutions. 13 HATE CRIME DOC V7_Layout 1 23/03/2011 13:08 Page 13 W H A T C R IM E D O Y O U F E A R ? 14 HATE CRIME DOC V7_Layout 1 23/03/2011 13:08 Page 14 W H A T C R IM E H A V E Y O U E X P E R IE N C E D ? What crime have you experienced? Actual, real life experience of crime was an area that it was important to cover as part of the research and this was addressed in both the questionnaire and the focus groups. Identifying how often people experienced crime, the locations in which crime was experienced and how people were frightened or attacked are key pieces of information when developing strategies to better support Deaf and disabled people through the experience of Disability Hate Crime. The questionnaire asked “Do you feel that you have ever been subjected to a crime or an incident because of your disability?” 46% said that they hadn’t and 7% responded that they weren’t sure. Nearly half the respondents, 47%, said that they felt they had been subjected to a crime or incident because of their disability. This is confirmation from the participants that they felt that they had been specifically targeted because they were Deaf or disabled. It is important to note that this is based on perception rather than a factual knowledge that the incident was motivated by the disability. However, in order for a crime to be investigated as a Disability Hate Crime, perception by the victim or any other person is all that is required. When discussing their experiences of being subjected to crimes and incidents because of their disabilities the focus group participants made the following comments… “I’ve been told that I’m no good, I’ve even been threatened to take my wheelchair…I’ve been shot at and I’ve been burgled five times…” Focus Group 1 Participant. “People will come into our gardens…and the adults will think they have the right to.” Focus Group 1 Participant. “I’ve had a problem with gangs of children, well the younger people mainly, and I’ve also had trouble with some grown-ups sometimes being quite aggressive because you’ve nearly hit them with your white stick, which is quite a problem when you use a white cane. And I’ve also had abuse you know, thrown at me, you know, name calling, so I’ll either avoid going that way or I’ll always go with a friend on certain routes.” Focus Group 2 Participant. “I had my scooter pinched, by lads, young lads, I had my scooter pinched, I informed the police, the police caught ‘em, these lads were living in the next road to me, and I was frightened if they came around at night, ‘cos I’m on my own. I was frightened they would come around at night but everybody says ‘No they won’t, no they won’t’ but I don’t know, I still don’t go out at night, when I go home from here I lock my door.” Focus Group 3 Participant. “Yes, I’ve been verbally abused. I’ve been physically attacked and I’ve been robbed.” Focus Group 4 Participant. “A couple of years ago, we were supporting a guy who, every time he went out, in this certain area, the young lads there would take his cane off him and then sell it back to him, and he had no choice but to give them the money because he couldn’t go anywhere without the cane. And as a result of that he then became socially isolated because he wouldn’t go out.” Focus Group 2 Participant. In one of the focus groups a participant indicated that they had been harassed while using their scooter, another reported having dog dirt smeared across her window because of her mental health issues, one focus group member reported that she had felt intimidated into taking out loans from a doorstep loan company. Name calling was reported as extremely common in all the focus groups. Some focus group members reported being targeted on the days when they collect their benefits, with people knocking on their doors and demanding money from them. 15 HATE CRIME DOC V7_Layout 1 23/03/2011 13:08 Page 15 W H A T C R IM E H A V E Y O U E X P E R IE N C E D ? “I’ve seen children picking on somebody worse than me, bullying them and that, taking money off them and their phone and things like that.” Focus Group 9 Participant. “...in the holidays, when the kids were off school, instead of going up the rec’ to play football, they play football in me garden, they squashed the neighbour’s climbers, kicked football at the windows ... I kept the front door open because it were a nice day... and then the kids sort of came in my house, sat there watching the telly...” Focus Group 4 Participant. What was particularly striking and common to all of the focus groups was the acceptance of this type of behaviour as part of everyday life. This has been reported in the Equality and Human Rights Commission research... “…disabled people are frequently unaware of their rights. As mentioned previously, negative attitudes and low expectations by wider society (and the extent to which these may have been internalised by disabled people themselves) can lead both disabled and non-disabled people to treat some incidences of targeted violence and hostility as part of the everyday.” The focus group responses and the data collected from the questionnaires demonstrates that fear of being a victim of a crime or incident is high for Deaf and disabled people in Lancashire. This part of the questionnaire focused on people’s experience of crime or incidents. 14% said that they had been the victim of a crime or incident once a week or more. 8 % said they had been the victim of a crime or incident once a month or more. 29% said that they have been the victim of a crime or incident once or more than once in a six month period. 49% recorded ‘other’ – responses included a mixture of people writing ‘never’ on the forms with others detailing events which occurred more than six months ago and some many years ago. Overall this would suggest that 51% of the respondents had been the victim of a crime or incident at least once in the last six months. This question only asked about crimes or incidents, not specifically Disability Hate Crime. This high level of being exposed to crime and incidents reflects Scope’s research… 16 HATE CRIME DOC V7_Layout 1 23/03/2011 13:08 Page 16 W H A T C R IM E H A V E Y O U E X P E R IE N C E D ? Hate crime against disabled people appears to be common and widespread. Disabled people are more likely to be victims of crime, and disabled women more likely to be victims of domestic violence, than non-disabled people. However, lack of national comprehensive data on the prevalence and the nature of Disability Hate Crime means the true extent of the problem remains hidden.” The frequency of attacks appears to be lower than that of one piece of research conducted in Scotland but it still represents a large proportion of Deaf and disabled people in Lancashire. “For many disabled people hate crime is a feature of their day-to-day life. One in five respondents suffered an attack once a week or more often, with women (26% - 10 respondents) and under 44 year olds (37% - 13 respondents) most vulnerable to frequent attacks. Many people felt that it was something that they had to live with on account of their disability.” The frequency of being a victim of crime or incident was high when considering the responses to the questionnaire and the views expressed in the focus groups. This is of particular concern as the number of Disability Hate Crime incidents reported to the police and prosecuted as such is very low and represents an area for further work. This survey question did not distinguish between ‘frightened’ and ‘attacked’ and this represents a wide spectrum of experiences. ‘In the street’ was by far the largest category selected in this part of the questionnaire with 27% of the respondents selecting this. The next highest category selected is ‘at home’ with 14% of respondents selecting this option. Shops, pubs/cafes and public transport each attracted 11% of responses and this illustrates the fear that Deaf and disabled people experience when simply getting on with their day-to-day lives. 17 HATE CRIME DOC V7_Layout 1 23/03/2011 13:08 Page 17 W H A T C R IM E H A V E Y O U E X P E R IE N C E D ? 18 HATE CRIME DOC V7_Layout 1 23/03/2011 13:08 Page 18 W H A T C R IM E H A V E Y O U E X P E R IE N C E D ? The local research is supported by national research conducted by the Equality And Human Rights Commission in terms of identifying the venues of attacks and fear. “A number of hotspots, where targeted violence and hostility tends to occur, are identified, namely: on the street; in and around home-based settings (particularly in relation to social housing but also including private accommodation); in institutional settings; in schools, colleges and at work, and on public transport. The types of targeted violence and hostility enacted in different settings vary, and can impact on different groups of disabled people.” The local research demonstrates that everyday public spaces are a source of fear and venue for experience of attacks for Deaf and disabled people in Lancashire. This results in people structuring how they live their lives in order to avoid these places and is an unacceptable limit on their liberty. The highest category of crime or incident selected in this part of the survey was verbal attacks including intimidation with 32% of respondents. Street harassment was the second highest category with 19% of respondents selecting this description. 12% reported having property/vehicles damaged or stolen, 11% reported having been spat at or had things thrown at them, 9% had something stolen with 8% reporting that they had been physically attacked. The findings of the report produced by the Disability Rights Commission and Capability Scotland were very similar to the Lancashire research… “The research shows that disabled people are most likely to be attacked verbally, such as being taunted, called names or intimidated. Over a third of disabled respondents who have been frightened or attacked are likely to have suffered physical attacks and/or harassment in the street. This high level of verbal and physical attack was confirmed by carers: over 80% of carers said that the person they cared for had been verbally attacked and nearly 40% had been physically 19 HATE CRIME DOC V7_Layout 1 23/03/2011 13:08 Page 19 W H A T C R IM E H A V E Y O U E X P E R IE N C E D ? 20 attacked.” The Equality And Human Rights Commission research identified eight key types of incident, physical incidents, verbal incidents, sexual incidents, targeted anti-social behaviour, damage to property/theft, school bullying, incidents perpetrated by statutory agency staff and cyber bullying. The research also indicated there were some severe incidents but there was also a lot of low-level incidents which may not be picked up but have the potential to escalate. This potential was highlighted in the research carried out by Scope… “Incidents of Disability Hate Crime often stem from low-level harassment; name calling, intimidation and vandalism frequently escalate into more serious crimes.” During the discussions in the focus groups it was common for people to refer to anti-social behaviour. On further exploration of the circumstances it would transpire that people were describing quite serious offences and labelling them with the term ‘anti-social behaviour’. Coupled with the view that agencies do not tackle anti-social behaviour effectively people were choosing not to report these crimes and incidents. This may also contribute to the low level of reporting of Disability Hate Crime across Lancashire. In ‘Getting Away with Murder’ Scope recommend… “A system of early warning and rapid reaction, developed with disabled people and their organisations that can combat low-level harassment is key to preventing such incidents developing into more serious forms of hate crime, and to enabling disabled people to live independent lives without fear.” RECOMMENDATIONS: 5. All agencies should pro-actively promote good news stories and successful prosecutions. HATE CRIME DOC V7_Layout 1 23/03/2011 13:08 Page 20 W H O A R E Y O U A F R A ID O F A N D W H O H A S C O M M IT T E D C R IM E A G A IN ST Y O U ? 21 Identifying the perpetrators of crime against Deaf and disabled people and finding out who people feared was an important aspect of the research. The questionnaire asked “What do you think is the average age of the people that frighten you the most?” This question focused on the age of the people whom the respondents are most in fear of. The responses to this question appear to reflect the age of perpetrators of incidents and crimes detailed below. This breaks down as 27% being frightened of people under the age of 16 and 51% being frightened of those between 16 and 24. 16% of respondents were afraid of people between 25 and 44 and 6% of respondents were afraid of people between 45 and 64 years old. When asked to estimate the age of the perpetrators of crimes and incidents 50% of the respondents selected the 16-24 category, 23% estimated that perpetrators were under 16. 16% responded between 25 and 44, 10% between 45 and 64 and 1% over the age of 65. The 24 and under age groups were raised as a concern in every focus group as a source of considerable anxiety for Deaf and disabled people in Lancashire. “You know, we’ve got lots of people, really, the biggest problem is groups of young people, you know, and if it’s getting late 10, 11 o’clock, you know, it’s like, who do you report it to? By the time you report it the group have gone anyway. And they don’t always hang around in exactly the same place, so, you know, the police should be going out and checking to make sure that there aren’t young groups around. Obviously, if it’s something really serious then we would report it, but, you know, if you’re reporting groups of kids, and they do move around and they’re not always in the same place. People are apprehensive about going out, taking the dog for a walk or whatever because there are kids around.” Focus Group 4 Participant. Who are you afraid of and who has committed crime against you? HATE CRIME DOC V7_Layout 1 23/03/2011 13:09 Page 21 W H O A R E Y O U A F R A ID O F A N D W H O H A S C O M M IT T E D C R IM E A G A IN ST Y O U ? 22 The education of young people was a frequently raised issue in the focus groups. The participants felt that ignorance of the experience of life as a Deaf or disabled person contributed to the crime and incidents directed at these communities. There was a strong feeling that if better education on disability issues was provided, fewer crimes would be committed against Deaf and disabled people. The questionnaire asked “Has somebody you know committed Disability Hate Crime against you?” This question focused on whether respondents actually knew the person who committed a disability hate crime against them. The survey results indicate that 18% of the respondents did actually know the person who committed the crime against them, 75% did not and 7% preferred not to say. This question focused on the identity of the perpetrator of the Disability Hate Crime. 24% of people who committed the crime were strangers and 29% of perpetrators were identified as groups of strangers. The third highest category is that of neighbours, 18% of people responding indicated that their neighbours had committed a Disability Hate Crime against them. The research carried out by the Disability Rights Commission highlighted a similar experience by Deaf and disabled people in Scotland… “Strangers, either individually or in groups, are most likely to be responsible for the attacks, but one in five disabled respondents have experienced an attack by a friend or colleague and the same proportion have been frightened or attacked by a teacher or carer.” In Lancashire it is clear that people below 24 years old who are strangers are the primary source of fear and perpetrators of Disability Hate Crime. RECOMMENDATIONS: 3. A joint communication and education strategy should be agreed between agencies targeted at young people to increase awareness of Disability Hate Crime, its impact on people and how to report it. 4. A joint communication and education strategy should be agreed between agencies targeted at tenants of social landlords to increase awareness of Disability Hate Crime, its impact on people and how to report it. HATE CRIME DOC V7_Layout 1 23/03/2011 13:09 Page 22 Understanding the experience of Deaf and disabled people when reporting crime is vital to understanding the barriers to reporting and developing effective responses. The questionnaire asked “How confident are you that you can get help to stop someone frightening or attacking you?” 27% of the respondents were very confident and 23% were quite confident that they could get help to stop someone frightening or attacking them. 25% responded that they were not very confident that they could get help, 19% were not confident and 6% expressed no opinion. It’s important to note that all the respondents to the questionnaire were engaged with services, charitable organisations or support groups and their contact with these organisations may have contributed to the respondents’ confidence in getting help. 49% of respondents had told their family or friends that they were frightened or had been attacked. 12% of the respondents indicated that they had told nobody – this is of great concern as the degree of harm to the person is difficult to ascertain. Carers and key workers are key people in the reporting process; 17% of respondents told either a carer or a key worker about being frightened or attacked. The importance of the relationship with professionals and the role they can play in identifying and supporting people who are victims of Disability Hate Crime was highlighted in the research conducted by Scope… “The culture of adult protection often means that professionals do not recognise incidents of hate crime as crimes and attempt to deal with them in- house rather than referring them to the police. This has an impact on the number of crimes, including hate crimes, against disabled people that are What are your experiences of reporting crime? W H A T A R E Y O U R E X P E R IE N C E S O F R E P O R T IN G C R IM E ? 23 HATE CRIME DOC V7_Layout 1 23/03/2011 13:09 Page 23 W H A T A R E Y O U R E X P E R IE N C E S O F R E P O R T IN G C R IM E ? reported to the police. More fundamentally it fails to acknowledge that the individual has been the victim of a crime and should be entitled to appropriate redress through the criminal justice system, using euphemistic terms such as abuse and bullying to describe what are in fact crimes against disabled people.” The report recommends… “Social care professionals should undertake training on how to recognise the early warning signs of disability hate crime and work with disabled people, police and other local agencies to tackle it. The role of social care professionals in pioneering work on preventing domestic violence provides a useful model.” The questionnaire asked “If you were ever subjected to a crime or any sort of abuse, would you report it to the police, or ignore it?” The respondents indicated that 76% of them would report it, 10% would ignore it and 14% were unsure of what they would do. This high level of confidence in reporting the incident to the police is positive but is at odds with the focus group responses. The majority of respondents from the focus groups who said they wouldn’t report it to the police had had what they considered to be very poor responses when they had reported in the past. This was identified as a major barrier to reporting… “[Name] has gangs of 20 plus congregating in front of her house and they’re throwing things at her windows. She’s reported that to the police and the police have asked her to come to meetings, like, for their area but their meetings are always in an evening... And she doesn’t feel as though, she feels threatened if she went to go out...” Focus Group 1 Participant. “You feel you’re wasting your time, basically, you really do. It’s one thing to report it it’s another thing for something to be taken up about it and you’re just fobbed off. We aren’t important, we’re disabled, it’s as simple as that, they don’t say it, but when you get no response or excuses, what do you do?” Focus Group 4 Participant. 24 HATE CRIME DOC V7_Layout 1 23/03/2011 13:09 Page 24 W H A T A R E Y O U R E X P E R IE N C E S O F R E P O R T IN G C R IM E ? “There’s no use ... write, keep a diary, write down the times that they do these things, but, I can’t write, because of arthritis and a visual impairment...it’s a waste of time, still they don’t do anything about it.” Focus Group 1 Participant. “... attacked me up in the car park. Nobody did anything, the crowd just let it happen and but for the manager and my friends who were around me, they were able to protect me, I was slapped across the face and allsorts you know, it shook me. I wouldn’t go up there for a long time. I shouldn’t have to put up with that. I honestly shouldn’t have to put up with that. And I mean, when ... ‘What did you do to provoke it? What did you say’ I’m sat in a wheelchair. That’s the first response you get is, what did you do to offend them? Not, what they’ve said to you, it’s what you’ve said, it’s like it’s your fault from start to finish...and you get frustrated and you think to yourself, where do I go? There is nowhere for us to complain because we’re essentially a minority that is ignored. The only place we can come and feel safe and secure is places like this...” Focus Group 4 Participant. The bureaucracy involved with reporting and the practical difficulties that paperwork and reporting by telephone can pose for many disabled people was also raised as a barrier to reporting… “Yes, all the reports you have to fill out, all the reports. Because I can’t do it, all the paperwork.” Focus Group 3 Participant. “I think that’s the difficulty there, because, anything to report it, the forms themselves are quite often badly worded or difficult to understand ... they could be simplified.” Focus Group 3 Participant. “What tends to happen is that people that, people that have had strokes and people quite often with MS or whatever, their speech is rather slurred and people’s impression of that person is that they’re inebriated and they’re not inebriated it’s because they have that disability...They are people who are discriminated against. ..You try to give an opinion over the phone or whatever and you’re slurring your words people tend to think that...” Focus Group 3 Participant. “I know they say some hearing people criticise Deaf people, but, it’s usually, I mean you people can stand up for yourself, but one problem is, er, you know if I think there’s a problem, is how would I communicate with the police to report an incident? Could I text you or? You know, if I’d been discriminated against in some way, and I need to get hold of the police quickly, I can’t make a telephone call, I’ve gotta wait to ask a hearing friend so it’s time, time constraints, it’s very difficult.” Focus Group 5 Participant. “I’ve tried that actually, they gave me the text number, I’ve texted it but it takes two hours for the police to come so, they don’t come straight away, so I’ve actually used it because I’ve had a few problems with my ex, I’ve texted this number and they never come straight away, two or three hours before they’ve arrived.” Focus Group 5 Participant. “Police were not helpful, suggested I stay in to prevent it happening. This is an infringement on my liberty. I think more should be done to raise awareness of disability and take away their fear of disability.” Questionnaire Response. Some focus group members reported detecting a change in tone from officers once they had made the officer aware that they had mental health issues and some group members reported that they did feel that police officers could be patronising. The fear of reprisals was raised at every focus group and it became clear that this is a major barrier to people reporting… “You can be quite vulnerable by reporting things, we reported somebody for breaking in a car in a driveway ... and the police came, they found one of these lads had a knife...I had a phone call about four or five weeks later asking could they bring these two young men into our house to talk about what had happened. Now, they had already broke into our car to steal things, I didn’t feel comfortable inviting them into my house. Especially when they live just around the corner from me...I’d have been happy in a neutral place but not in my home.” Focus Group 1 Participant. “I haven’t reported it for the past two weeks because I’m frightened of the consequences I might face...they’re too near me ...needles have been put in my bin and the police think I’m on drugs...” Focus Group 1 Participant. 25 HATE CRIME DOC V7_Layout 1 23/03/2011 13:09 Page 25 W H A T A R E Y O U R E X P E R IE N C E S O F R E P O R T IN G C R IM E ? “Going back to youths and groups, I mean, I know you know that that is an issue and if you do report it to the police, but the concern then is that they know where you live, you know, that group know where you live so what happens the because you can have damage, you know, they can put your windows through, they can do all sorts of things and they can threaten, be threatening, so sometimes, what would you suggest? You know, sometimes it’s better to do nothing, but then it might make it worse if you do report it, then there can be recriminations.” Focus Group 7 Participant. There were good examples of how the police had responded well and the victims were satisfied with the outcomes and efforts that the police are making to support disabled people more effectively… “… It’s nice that they’ve got new police officers who sign in place and I think that’s really good, but, in general the police need to be more aware as well.” Focus Group 7 Participant. “I had problems with them up at the school at one stage, I told the PCSO that there’s a lot of people who gives me a lot of stick ... it’s quietened off, the PCSO had a quiet word....it was very good.” Focus Group 3 Participant. “...we have a meeting, PACT meeting and I always go to that ...and you find that very good because, you’ve got, you’re face-to-face with police officers, and erm, community officers, and also the general people, so you can, things like kids hanging around, even dog fouling, which is a particular problem for disabled people, because there’s nothing worse than having your wheelchair or scooter covered in dog dirt and they do help.” Focus Group 3 Participant. The respondents had a number of suggestions for what might improve the response of the police… “Can I just ask, at any police station, if a crime is committed is there a specific police officer who can deal with that? Would it be channelled to a particular division or part of? ... Somebody who will have a deep understanding of that, we all understand what it’s like to commit a crime against a visually impaired or physically disabled person, but unless you’re in that position yourself or very close to it I sometimes think that goes over your head a little. That you’re not quite as sympathetic because of your lack of understanding. What I’m saying is that if there was a department or officer within that particular place, that he might have that understanding and be more sympathetic and be able to proceed a lot more quickly because he knows what he’s looking for.” Focus Group 2 Participant. The difficulties experienced by Deaf and disabled people with reporting have been discussed in the Equality And Human Rights Commission research and the research carried out by Mind… “We identified a number of barriers to reporting and recording, particularly in relation to the police. These are physical, procedural and attitudinal barriers that can discourage disabled people from reporting. The cumulative impact of these barriers may lead disabled people to feel that they are not being taken seriously or, worse, being treated as if they are in the wrong.” “Poor relationships between people with mental distress and the police were the most frequently cited barrier to justice for victims with mental health problems. 57 per cent of all respondents had been in contact with the police in the last two years. People with mental distress are far more likely to come into contact with the police as the victim of crime than to be detained under the Mental Health Act with police involvement or to be arrested for a crime. People cited interaction with the police under Mental Health Act powers as a reason to fear and distrust the police” The experience of reporting in Lancashire is mixed with good examples in places. The overall view of the focus groups was not positive however and this was in relation to a number of different aspects of the reporting process. RECOMMENDATIONS: 6. Anonymous methods of reporting and third party reporting centres should be expanded. 7. The accessibility of current reporting systems should be reviewed and improved, including simplifying current electronic systems to make them more user friendly. 8. Local authority officers should be trained in identifying Disability Hate Crime at an early stage and encouraged to work in partnership with other agencies to tackle it. 26 HATE CRIME DOC V7_Layout 1 23/03/2011 13:09 Page 26 H A V E Y O U C H A N G E D T H E W A Y Y O U B E H A V E B E C A U S E O F C R IM E O R T H E F E A R O F C R IM E ? Have you changed the way you behave because of crime or the fear of crime? Employing avoidance strategies and structuring lives around crime was something that has been highlighted in the wider research on Disability Hate Crime. Understanding people’s experience in Lancashire formed a large part of the research. The questionnaire asked “Have you ever done any of the following to stop someone frightening you?” This question concerns what people have done to stop being frightened of others – the respondents did not have to have been a victim of a crime or incident and this distinguishes it from the following question. The results are concerning. Fear motivated 10% of respondents to move, 44% had avoided places, 2% had changed jobs and 27% had changed their routine. 17% responded that they had done something else to stop someone frightening them although this was undefined. Again this suggests that avoidance strategies are being employed rather than dealing with the people causing the fear. The questionnaire also asked “If you have been a victim of a hate crime or incident, have you ever done any of the following to make you feel safer?” The results for this question are also very concerning – this response is linked with the earlier question of whether people had actually experienced a hate crime or incident – the result for those indicating a positive response was 47%. 13% of respondents to this question had moved home, 36% had avoided going to certain places and 22% had changed their routines in some way. This suggests that those that have been victims of hate crime or incidents had made substantial changes in their lives as a result. These responses suggest that when an incident or crime occurs, avoidance strategies are adopted and have a continuing impact on the victim. 27 HATE CRIME DOC V7_Layout 1 23/03/2011 13:09 Page 27 H A V E Y O U C H A N G E D T H E W A Y Y O U B E H A V E B E C A U S E O F C R IM E O R T H E F E A R O F C R IM E ? 28 Typical focus group responses include… “I daren’t even go the front door...there’s only me in the flat and they know it...they can see the lights on so they know...I’m an easy target.” Focus Group 1 Participant. “Good question that, change of route because it’s something I’ve done several times...” Focus Group 2 Participant. “I sleep with a knife under my pillow...I sleep with it under my pillow so I can get it quick...if they get in they won’t be getting out...” Focus Group 1 Participant. “It’s interesting that when I mentioned to someone that I was coming here tonight and what we were talking about, they immediately said, oh yeah, ‘cause I was talking this week to a group of young adults, who live locally, adults with learning difficulties, who would love to be able to go to [a nightclub] but they tried it a couple of times and always get picked on and end up getting into trouble. But they’ve not reported it, they just stopped going.” Focus Group 7 Participant. “…I’ve walked through groups of lads, I use a symbol stick, I don’t have it open, I don’t use it to walk, it’s a symbol stick, but what I’ll do is I’ll hide the symbol stick, and I’ll just walk straight on.” Focus Group 2 Participant. “[Name] is thinking of moving out of a purpose built bungalow back into high rise flats, where, and she felt safer in a high rise flat...” Focus Group 1 Participant. “If I see a group of lads, or group of young people, I’d rather cross the road, just in case, you know, I mean, sometimes, because I’ve got no side vision, if I bump in to them and all that...because I’m so vulnerable, I’d rather cross the road because I wouldn’t be able to defend myself.” Focus Group 2 Participant. This response to dealing with Disability Hate Crime was recognised in the Disability Rights Commission research… HATE CRIME DOC V7_Layout 1 23/03/2011 13:09 Page 28 H A V E Y O U C H A N G E D T H E W A Y Y O U B E H A V E B E C A U S E O F C R IM E O R T H E F E A R O F C R IM E ? 29 This response to dealing with Disability Hate Crime was recognised in the Disability Rights Commission research… “The impact of hate crimes on disabled respondents is such that, around three quarters had made significant changes to their lives to avoid being frightened or attacked. Forty-seven percent now avoided going to certain places and 38% have changed their routine. One in four (25%) said that they had to move from their home.” 35% of respondents indicated that they avoided going out after 10pm and 27% responded that they avoided going out between 6pm and 10pm. 7% avoided going out between 3pm and 6pm. 25% avoided going out between 12am and 7am – this is probably when most respondents are asleep. These responses clearly indicate that people’s freedoms are being curtailed – in order to feel safe respondents are limiting when they leave their homes. The questionnaire asked “Are there certain days that you avoid going out?”. The respondents indicated that 16% avoided going out on Friday mornings and 22% and 20% avoided going out on Saturday and Sunday mornings respectively. Respondents indicated that 21% avoided going out Friday afternoons/evenings and 22% and 17% respectively avoided going out on Saturday and Sunday afternoons/evenings. There is a definite trend towards people avoiding going out on Fridays, Saturdays and Sundays. The reluctance to go out on these days may correlate with the times when people below age 24 are more likely to be off school/college/work. This structuring life to avoid harm was highlighted in Scope’s report… HATE CRIME DOC V7_Layout 1 23/03/2011 13:09 Page 29 H A V E Y O U C H A N G E D T H E W A Y Y O U B E H A V E B E C A U S E O F C R IM E O R T H E F E A R O F C R IM E ? 30 “The fact that disabled people are often asked to adjust their lives, (such as being asked to move, stay in, or avoid certain areas), shows that public bodies are not taking their duties (under the Disability Discrimination Act and specifically the Disability Equality Duty) to promote disabled people’s equality seriously enough. Imposing effective curfews on victims of crime, rather than targeting the perpetrators, is simply not acceptable.” The wider impact of this response is documented in the research conducted by the Equality And Human Rights Commission and this holds true for Lancashire… “Responses by disabled people to their experience of targeted violence and hostility can have an adverse impact on themselves. Their actions may be perceived to be perpetrating anti-social behaviour, and may also aggravate targeted violence and hostility against themselves. Issues of dependency and the lack of viable alternatives can further constrain the ability of disabled people taking actions to improve their lives.” “The impact of targeted violence and hostility is not confined merely to those disabled people who have suffered from direct acts and can extend to other disabled people. Family members of disabled people can also be subjected to targeted violence and hostility. The impact is more pervasive than the statistics on the prevalence of such incidents suggests.” RECOMMENDATIONS: 9. All agencies should adopt a pro-active approach to all instances of Disability Hate Crime. 10. Agencies should approach the issue of Disability Hate Crime from a rights-based angle. 11. Agencies should endeavour to report all incidents, with identities of victims omitted if requested in order to contribute to an intelligence picture of hotspots for Disability Hate Crime. HATE CRIME DOC V7_Layout 1 23/03/2011 13:09 Page 30 A R E Y O U A W A R E O F A N Y S U P P O R T Y O U C A N G E T T H R O U G H T H E C O U R T P R O C E S S ? W H A T W O U L D H E L P ? Are you aware of any support you can get through the court process? What would help? The impact of Disability Hate Crime on the lives of Deaf and disabled people is clearly huge. The research was keen to explore if people in Lancashire were aware of the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS), if they were aware of the support Witness Care Units and Victim Support can provide and if there was any role for other partners in supporting victims. The questionnaire asked if respondents were aware of who the Crown Prosecution Service was; 72% indicated that they knew who the CPS was while 28% did not. This was explored further with the focus groups where knowledge of the functions of the CPS was limited. The focus groups were not aware of the support provided by CPS and Police Witness Care Officers and the help that they can provide. Special Measures applications to the court in appropriate cases were not an option that many participants were familiar with. When the work of the Witness Care Units was discussed and the circumstances in which special measures may be granted were carefully explained, participants agreed that this contributed to improved confidence in reporting. This is important because ignorance of the support available can be a barrier to reporting. “I think some of the people that I support; they need things explaining just what’s going to happen, talking it through with them, finding out what they want to do about it, meeting somebody perhaps informally before they go to court….” Focus Group 1 Participant. “If I reported a crime, I would like to deal with the same person all the time. Because, so you don’t have to go through it all again explaining it, plus, as you say, it’s quite traumatic it does take you longer to get over it and if you could talk to the same person they would come to understand that...” Focus Group 2 Participant. The issue of the accessibility of the information provided by Witness Care Units was raised in one focus group… “The thing about the Courts, the procedure, I mean, you get a letter don’t you, the level of the English for Deaf people is totally inaccessible. I mean you haven’t got a clue what they’re saying, you don’t know about the procedures or what’s going to happen, what you’ve got to do, it’s very, very difficult for Deaf people. It’s just the level of English; quite often you just get discarded really.” Focus Group 2 Participant. The issue of wider support for people to recover from being a victim of crime was discussed in the focus groups and a potential role for the Council in providing support and confidence building was raised… “Then if because of the psychological effects, because it could have been long term and they’ve never reported it, it could be 12 months down the line and their emotions are, you know, what support would there be from Lancashire County Council, what would your team do then? … Where would we refer to then? Would it be social services?” Focus Group 2 Participant. The training of wider professionals in the Criminal Justice System was raised as a concern and a potential barrier to reporting… 31 HATE CRIME DOC V7_Layout 1 23/03/2011 13:09 Page 31 A R E Y O U A W A R E O F A N Y S U P P O R T Y O U C A N G E T T H R O U G H T H E C O U R T P R O C E S S ? W H A T W O U L D H E L P ? 32 “Sorry, I might be going slightly off the point but talking about courts, crown courts, magistrates, whatever it might be, what about the judge themselves? Are they experienced in disability issues? Have they got any awareness? Or are they completely, you know, and they just look at the crime, and say guilty / not guilty, or do they have any actual awareness themselves? And also, what about the jury? Because, you know, if there’s a jury involved, you know, do they have an awareness?” Focus Group 7 Participant. Mind’s research commented on the lack of knowledge of support and the effect this had on reporting… “…one in five respondents to our survey did not report a crime because they were not offered the support they needed to make a complaint or they didn’t know where to go to ask for support.” RECOMMENDATIONS: 12. Agencies should endeavour to ensure that each victim is treated as an individual, and early interventions are provided as appropriate. 13. Relevant agencies should review the letters sent out to Deaf and disabled victims and witnesses. They should involve Deaf and disabled people and the organisations that support them to develop more accessible letters. 14. Relevant agencies should engage with Deaf and disabled people more effectively to ensure that the role of the CPS, witness care and special measures are more widely understood. HATE CRIME DOC V7_Layout 1 23/03/2011 13:09 Page 32 SA M P L E Sample An equality and diversity monitoring form was included with the questionnaires. The respondents were made up of 46% male and 54% female. In terms of age the profile of respondents was as follows. The largest number of respondents was aged over 60 with 33% of people belonging to this category; this was followed by the 50-59 and 40-49 categories with 24% and 23% respectively. It is quite clear that the number of respondents below these age categories represented far fewer people. This may be for a number of reasons but it may suggest that lower numbers of people in these age groups interact with the Disabled People’s Organisations (DPOs) and resource centres we approached. This will have a major effect on the possibility of third party reporting for these groups and the knowledge by victims and witnesses of the support that is available. This is particularly important when considering “bullying” etc in schools. The interaction of age and disablist discrimination would provide an interesting and valuable research field. The profile for respondents in terms of ethnic/cultural/racial origin is as follows. The respondents to the questionnaire were predominantly of the White British category. The percentage of respondents that were of BME backgrounds was smaller than that of the county as a whole. The low response rate from BME people may be due to a number of factors but this could suggest that lower numbers of BME people in these age groups interact with the DPOs and resource centres we approached. Language could also be a barrier as the questionnaire was distributed in English. This will have had an impact on the accessibility of the document to members of Lancashire’s communities. Interaction with DPOs and resource centres will also have a major impact on the possibility of third party reporting by these groups and the knowledge of support available by victims and witnesses. The dynamics between race hate and Disability Hate Crime would benefit from further research. The respondents to the questionnaire defined themselves as belonging to the following religions, faiths or beliefs. Three quarters of the respondents defined themselves as Christian with 20% of the respondents stating that they had no religion or preferring not to say. In the context of the county as a whole it would appear that there is a significant under representation of people belonging to the Muslim faith but there is also under representation, indeed no representation in some cases, from all the other faiths. This factor is important because, again, it may indicate that the level of engagement with the DPOs and resource centres may be lower among the non-Christian faith groups. This has implications for the reporting options available to these sections of our communities and their knowledge of the support mechanisms provided by agencies. Religious Hate Crime and Disability Hate Crime and the interplay between these two would benefit from investigation. Further research into the experiences of people from non-Christian faiths would be helpful. The sexual orientation of respondents was stated as follows. There is under representation in the sample of people defining as Gay, Lesbian or Bisexual with only 2% of people defining under these categories. This compares with national estimates of between 5-7% of the population defining as LGB. There were a significant number of responses which preferred not to state their sexual orientation at 18%. The low response rate may reflect that LGB people do not engage with DPOs and resource centres. Alternatively, it may suggest that LGB people do not wish to declare their sexual orientation – the 18% of people who responded ‘Prefer Not to Say’ may support this conclusion. The interaction between homophobic and Disability Hate Crime is of interest and further research with Deaf and disabled LGB people would be useful. The respondents indicated that they identified as having the following disabilities or impairments. Physical disabilities were identified by 54% of respondents, sensory impairments by 16%, mental health issues by 8% and learning disabilities by 13% of people responding to the survey. 33 HATE CRIME DOC V7_Layout 1 23/03/2011 13:09 Page 33 SA M P L E It should be noted that some people will have ticked more than one box in this part of the questionnaire and will have experience of multiple impairments. This is an area that requires further research to determine how the experience of people with single disabilities contrasts with those who define as having multiple disabilities. When asked about their gender identity the responses were as follows. The respondents indicated that 95% of them were of the same gender identity as that assigned to them at birth, with 2% indicating that it was not and 3% preferring not to say. 24% of respondents indicated that they lived and worked in the gender role opposite to that assigned at birth with 69% indicating that they didn’t and 7% preferring not to say. Having spoken to the organisation that suggested the wording for this question it has transpired that similar responses have been reported from other organisations and this should be treated as an anomalous result. 34 HATE CRIME DOC V7_Layout 1 23/03/2011 13:09 Page 34 The emerging picture is one of Deaf and disabled people fearing being a victim of crime once a month or more and experiencing crime or incidents at least once in the last six months. Nearly half believe they have been targeted because of their disability. On the street and at home are the places where crime is experienced and feared the most. Verbal attacks and harassment in the street are the incidents and crimes most commonly experienced. Strangers and groups of strangers below the age of 24 are committing the crimes and incidents. Family, friends and key workers are the people most likely to be told of attacks and the fear of crime. The response from the police when reporting has been poor and this has acted as a disincentive to further reporting. Awareness of the support available should a report be made is very low. Deaf and disabled people avoid places and change their routine to stop feeling frightened. Even more avoid places and change their routine if they have been a victim. Going out at on Fridays and at weekends is avoided. Newsletters and talks are the favoured method of communication to increase knowledge of Disability Hate Crime and the support available. The findings broadly reflect those of national research and serve as a local picture of Disability Hate Crime in Lancashire. The recommendations included in this report are intended as a starting point in achieving justice for disabled people in the county. Conclusions C O N C L U S IO N S 35 HATE CRIME DOC V7_Layout 1 23/03/2011 13:09 Page 35 36 In an emergency you should always dial 0845 1 25 35 45 0800 555 111 Crimestoppers is a charity that you can report a crime or information about a crime to anonymously. To report a hate incident or hate crime online and for further information about Disability Hate Crime please visit our websites: www.lancashire.police.uk www.cps.gov.uk www.lancashire.gov.uk In an emergency you should always dial 999 C O N T A C T S Contacts To report a hate incident or hate crime: www.saferlancashire.co.uk HATE CRIME DOC V7_Layout 1 23/03/2011 13:09 Page 36 HATE CRIME DOC V7_Layout 1 23/03/2011 13:08 Page 1 
work_tkapqug3czakzofsgz2p4q7aje	----	I N T R O D U C T I O N Introduction to the Special Issue on Queer/ing Criminology: New Directions and Frameworks Matthew Ball • Carrie L. Buist • Jordan Blair Woods Published online: 24 December 2013 � Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013 Over twenty years ago, sexuality studies and queer theory arrived on the academic and political scenes of the global North and asserted themselves as forces to be reckoned with. It has been almost as long since criminologists made initial calls for criminology to confront these new challenges. Yet, to date, the response to these calls within criminology has been limited at best. While a body of research that considers the criminal justice experiences of queer communities is slowly growing, the field still lacks a sense of itself and what it might be. The recent publication of Dana Petersen and Vanessa R. Panfil’s monumental Handbook of LGBT Communities, Crime, and Justice (2014) is a sign that things are slowly changing. Nevertheless, there has yet to be a sustained conversation about the theoretical development of ‘‘queer criminology.’’ This special issue seeks to address this oversight by exploring how critical criminolo- gies might be able to assist in increasing criminological engagement with lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer (LGBTQ) communities, and the panoply of concepts utilized when exploring sexual orientation and gender identity. Critical criminologies hold out a lot of hope for those seeking to address the social and criminal injustices experienced by marginalized communities, including LGBTQ communities. Thus, critical criminology seems to be a natural starting point for queer/ing criminology, even if, as some of the authors here would suggest, existing conceptual frameworks within this broad umbrella might need to be updated, or new ones developed. M. Ball School of Justice, Queensland University of Technology, GPO Box 2434, Brisbane 4001, Australia e-mail: mj.ball@qut.edu.au M. Ball Centre for Sex, Gender and Sexualities, Durham University, Durham, UK C. L. Buist Department of Sociology and Criminology, University of North Carolina Wilmington, 601 South College Road, Wilmington, NC 28403, USA J. B. Woods (&) UCLA School of Law, 405 Hilgard Ave., Box 951476, Los Angeles, CA 90095, USA 123 Crit Crim (2014) 22:1–4 DOI 10.1007/s10612-013-9231-2 So, what is queer criminology? While some of the following articles flesh this out in more detail than others, we would like to offer our own initial reflections on what it might mean. Queer criminology is a diverse array of criminology-related researches, critiques, methodologies, perspectives, and reflections. These projects might engage in some way with the slippery notion of ‘‘queer,’’ focus on how people experience or perform sexuality and gender (with particular attention to those whose lives fall outside of what is considered to be ‘‘normative’’), or challenge other normative orderings and the criminological methods that support and perpetuate them. These studies might also include empirical projects that chart the experiences of queer populations within criminal justice institutions. Most often, these studies would lead to critiques of mainstream criminology, further theoretical reflection, and political projects that seek to address injustice and inequality. Granted, this is a very expansive definition, and open to further refinement. But it is one that is appropriate in the present context, and canvasses the diverse contributions that are assembled in this special issue. This special issue opens with two contributions that ask direct questions about the connections between critical criminology and queer criminology, and articulate two pos- sible directions for future queer criminological scholarship. The first, by Jordan Blair Woods, provides a systematic critique of the way in which early and more recent critical criminologies have engaged with LGBTQ people and related concepts, pointing out the significant oversights in these bodies of work. Building on this critique, Matthew Ball points out that despite the significant connections between critical criminology and queer criminology, these connections are not necessarily to be taken for granted, due to the many different ways in which the term ‘‘queer’’ can be used. Both Woods and Ball then chart new directions for queer criminology in order to address these oversights, and craft specific approaches that adequately account for queers in the context of these disciplines. Woods suggests a ‘‘queer realism’’ that treads a path between identity-based perspectives and deconstructive approaches, while Ball suggests a queer criminology that takes queer as a position informed by a notion of critique as the ‘‘art of not being governed.’’ The con- tribution by Carrie L. Buist and Codie Stone, which follows these opening articles, demonstrates the clear need for queer criminological analyses. Buist and Stone recount the experiences of transgender victims and offenders in the criminal justice system in the United States, highlighting its numerous failures and the points at which injustice is perpetuated, particularly through the policing of gender binaries. It serves as a stark reminder that the concerns of transgender communities are central to queer criminology, and that queer struggles for justice are incomplete if transgender communities continue to have the experiences that Buist and Stone report. The next four contributions offer detailed queer analyses of key issues facing specific communities or groups. In so doing, they enrich the debates within their specific fields of criminology, and continue the necessary empirical task of charting the interactions that queer communities have with the justice system. Building on Buist and Stone’s article, Barbara Perry and D. Ryan Dyck’s contribution offers an insight into hate crime as experienced by transgender women in Canada. They point out the ways in which hate crimes are used to maintain gender norms, resulting in what the authors term ‘‘hyper vigilance’’ on the part of trans women, who live constantly under the threat of violence and must police their own behavior as a result. This situation is only compounded—and indeed normalized—by the absence of an effective language through which these experiences might be articulated and validated. Continuing with the theme of personal safety, Bianca Fileborn’s contribution explores LGBTQ young people in Australia and their experiences of personal safety and unwanted sexual attention, particularly in entertainment venues. 2 M. Ball et al. 123 Fileborn charts the connections between violence, identity, and space, pointing out the ways in which supposedly ‘‘safe’’ spaces can in fact be ‘‘unsafe.’’ Angela Dwyer’s con- tribution also considers the experiences of LGBTQ young people in Australia, but with a focus on the experiences that they have with police. Dwyer is particularly interested in the complex ways that the notion of ‘‘risk’’ plays out in the policing of this group, highlighting the complex ways that risk is embodied by LGBTQ young people, making them visible in particular ways, and ultimately demonstrating that particular kinds of queer visibility can have differential impacts on the ways in which they are policed. While the contributions of Fileborn and Dwyer do not only focus on the victimization of members of queer com- munities, but also their offending behavior, Vanessa R. Panfil’s contribution explicitly focuses on their offending. In particular, through ethnographic and participatory research, Panfil brings to light the experiences of gay male gang members in the United States, and the ways in which they negotiate masculinity, sexuality, and their participation in violence. Panfil also offers some important reflections about the dangers of undertaking research into queer offending, and whether such research might in fact work against the broader goals of achieving better justice for queer communities. Panfil’s closing reflections on what kinds of research ought to be undertaken by queer criminologists returns us, in the final three contributions to this special issue, to the the- oretical and empirical development of queer criminology. These articles critique the the- oretical approaches, empirical objects, or assumptions of criminological work in their respective areas, and balance the broad conceptual and theoretical articles that open this issue with more detailed analyses. Doug Meyer’s contribution offers a critique of hate crime laws that is attuned to the way in which they simultaneously protect some people from violence while also expanding the modes of social control that reproduce and intensify inequalities. Against the backdrop of the United States and its extraordinarily high incarceration rates, Meyer’s article forces us to reconsider the implementation and expansion of hate crime legislation as a tool for achieving protection and justice for queer communities, especially if it reinforces the very source of injustice for others. Extending this kind of queer critique of the state, Cara Gledhill highlights the ways in which the state enforces the hegemony of heterosexuality and binary conceptions of gender. In the tra- dition of many other critical criminologies, Gledhill asks us to consider whether it might be useful to consider the state’s role here as a form of state crime, and thereby hold the state responsible for the forms of violence, injustice, and exclusion (not to mention the various rights abuses) produced by its institutionalization of heterosexuality and gender binaries. The concluding article in this special issue turns the attention of queer criminologists towards a specific school of critical criminological thought—cultural criminology. Brian Jay Frederick’s contribution suggests that explanations for transgressive behavior as pro- posed within cultural criminology, which see transgression as a product of the social exclusion of particular groups, cannot adequately account for different forms of trans- gression among gay men, because of the increasing inclusion of gay men within social institutions across the West. Instead, Frederick suggests that we might better understand these kinds of transgressive behavior as a response to new forms of homonormativity among gay men. This, along with each of the previous contributions to this special issue, is a clear example of the ways in which we must expand or reformulate the common assumptions within criminological schools of thought if criminology is to most effectively speak to queer communities and concerns. While the articles in this special issue illustrate the diversity of intellectual endeavors that might constitute queer criminology, they do not exhaust all of its possibilities, or all of the questions that ought to be asked of it. One important limitation of these contributions is New Directions and Frameworks 3 123 the lack of discussions outside of the ‘‘global North,’’ and issues of relevance to Indigenous peoples within the ‘‘global North.’’ While there is an international flavor to these contri- butions—including work from Australia, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Canada—and many of these works recognize the importance of intersectional under- standings of race, nationality, gender, class, and sexuality among others—these discussions primarily focus on ‘‘Northern’’ concerns and contexts (much like a lot of queer theorizing in other disciplines, we might add). Therefore, we view this special issue as a beginning point and underscore the necessity that future work in queer criminology confronts this limitation, and, opens itself up to critical reflections that chart the connections or tensions between, for example, queer/ed criminologies and counter-colonial criminologies. If nothing else, this critique suggests that the project of queer/ing criminology is always unfinished and must remain an open space in which such diversity of perspectives, methods, critiques, and reflections can flourish. Queer criminology can speak to a number of people and communities. It can take us down multiple paths, and it can remain an open space of intellectual and political contestation. And, like all critical criminologies, it can, and indeed should, remain engaged in a constant struggle to achieve justice, eliminate inequality, and challenge subordination. The guest editors thank David Kauzlarich and the rest of the journal’s editorial board for supporting this special issue. 4 M. Ball et al. 123 Introduction to the Special Issue on Queer/ing Criminology: New Directions and Frameworks 
work_tngife2sdnfynp347bzxc2t5sa	----	This is the author's manuscript of the work published in final edited form as: Daniel, J. L., Fyall, R., & Benenson, J. (2019). Talking about antisemitism in MPA classrooms and beyond. Journal of Public Affairs Education, 1–23. https://doi.org/10.1080/15236803.2019.1646581 Talking about antisemitism in MPA classrooms and beyond Jamie Levine Daniel, IUPUI Rachel Fyall, University of Washington Jodi Benenson, University of Nebraska-Omaha Forthcoming at Journal of Public Affairs Education Introduction ...[A]n ethic of public administration asks us (administrators and citizens) to look squarely at our past experiences, acknowledge past tragedies, commit ourselves to inclusive solidarity with historical outsiders, and recognize possible goods that we might pursue as we move forward. (Alexander & Stivers, 2010, p. 592) On October 27, 2018, a gunman killed eleven people attending Shabbat services in the Tree of Life synagogue in Pittsburgh, PA. For many—both Jews and non-Jews— this tragedy served as a wake-up call about the persistence of antisemitism0F1 in the United States today. For those who have been paying close attention, this incident added to increasing evidence that the cycle of antisemitism is taking another spin, with antisemitic sentiment intensifying worldwide (CST, 2019; Simon & Schaler, 2007). For us—three Jewish professors in schools of public policy, public administration, and public affairs—the Tree of Life shooting prompted a deep dive into our own identities as well as our obligations and opportunities to ensure that rising generations of public servants are able to recognize and combat antisemitism whenever they encounter it. 1 Antisemitism or anti-Semitism? Most American English dictionaries and spell-checkers hyphenate the term. However, the word “antisemitism” was invented for the purpose of adding a more scientific or modern frame to “hatred of Jews” (Lebovic 2018). In contrast, “Semitic” refers to a subgroup of northeast African and Middle Eastern languages that include, among others, Hebrew, Arabic, Amharic, and Tigrinya (Philogos, 2012). When hyphenated, anti-Semitism could be interpreted as referring to groups of people who speak these languages, rather than a specific hatred toward Jews. To preserve the original intent, “Antisemitism should be read as a unified term so that the meaning of the generic term for modern Jew-hatred is clear” (Lebovic, 2018). Therefore, we use the spelling antisemitism here unless directly quoting or citing a source that uses the hyphenated form. https://doi.org/10.1080/15236803.2019.1646581 2 Given our commitment to incorporating social equity, inclusion, and anti-racism into our courses, we are grateful for the theories, strategies, and examples provided by our colleagues that help frame and facilitate our classroom discussions on race and equity (e.g., Lopez-Littleton & Blessett, 2015; Starke, Heckler, & Mackey, 2018). We discovered we were shockingly unprepared when faced with the question, “If I want to talk about antisemitism in my classroom, what should I say?” We have now spent months thinking through this question, and we offer this article as a first take on the answer. We hope and intend for this article to serve as a resource for the public affairs1F2 community so our colleagues can feel prepared and empowered to address antisemitism in their classrooms. Our goal is to provide tools and language others can use to engage with this complicated topic of antisemitism. We also seek to fulfill the pedagogical imperative of engaging with challenging topics inside public affairs classrooms (Love, Gaynor, & Blessett, 2016), recognizing the importance of critical theory and critical pedagogy in the pursuit of social justice. Our motivation stems from our own emerging consciousness as individuals experiencing both privilege and oppression, depending on the context (Collins, 1990; Freire, 2000). We weave a more personal narrative based on our own experiences throughout the article, giving voice to some of the process and emotions we experience in this space and amplifying our message by mixing the personal with the generalizable (hooks, 2009). Our whole professional lives, we had never considered bringing our Jewishness into the classroom. We never hid our identities, but being Jewish seemed irrelevant to our teaching goals and responsibilities. Of course, we nervously track news about 2 We use the term public affairs as an inclusive reference that encompasses public administration, public management, and public policy. 3 antisemitism (on our campuses, in our cities, worldwide), but this is not a topic we discussed with others, especially those at work. Public affairs research and MPA curricula have rarely addressed contemporary antisemitism. Other than this article, the word “antisemitism”2F3 appears only once in all JPAE archives, where it is used within an example of the challenge of identifying diversity-related content in syllabi (Ryan, 2012). Moreover, antisemitism appears a total of 10 times in other top public administration and nonprofit journals, specifically Public Administration Review, Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, and Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly. Of the limited mentions of antisemitism within the literature in our field, many focus on the Holocaust, discussing antisemitism exclusively in historical terms. For a striking example, within the index of Adams & Balfour’s Unmasking Administrative Evil (2015), the entry for antisemitism reads, “Antisemitism. See Holocaust and public affairs” (p. 217). Looking beyond our field, discussions of antisemitism are also rare in higher education pedagogy and the scholarship of teaching and learning. Neither the International Journal for the Scholarship of Teaching & Learning nor Teaching, Learning, & Inquiry have a single mention of antisemitism. The Journal of the Scholarship of Teaching and Learning mentions antisemitism only once, when giving background information about a film (Greene et al., 2014). The field of multicultural education has also largely overlooked Jews and Jewish experiences (including antisemitism). As one scholar recounts, “No real discussion of Jews is present, in any capacity, in several prominent books in the field of multicultural education” (Rubin, 2017, p. 132). While a multitude of resources focus on teaching about the Holocaust, 3 We also searched for “anti-Semitism” and related words. 4 the primary evidence of antisemitism pedagogy at universities is within courses specifically focused on this topic (often taught in Jewish studies programs). We met with a librarian; we assigned a research assistant to do literature searches; we asked our friends in other fields. The absence of research on how to teach about antisemitism feels like gaslighting. Is this not a pressing issue? Does anyone else notice its absence? Why hasn’t someone else already done this work? We argue that there are at least three reasons why introducing conversations about antisemitism within an MPA classroom supports and enhances our field’s values and commitment to improving governance through education: 1) to create an awareness of the pitfalls of technical rationality; 2) to foster cultural competency among the next generation of leaders working in the diverse public and nonprofit sectors; and 3) to promote trust in institutions and ethical approaches for accessing power. These reasons reflect NASPAA’s universal required competencies related to leading and managing in public governance, contributing to the policy process, critically thinking/solving problems/making decisions, applying a public service perspective, and interacting with both a diverse workforce and citizenry, as well as the specific cultural competency skills outlined by Lopez-Littleton and Blessett (2015). Technical rationality is what Adams & Balfour (2015) identify as a focus on efficiency, or the right way to do things. Taken to its extreme, technical rationality can result in “administrative evil” (Adams, 2011; Adams & Balfour, 2015). Adams (2011) suggests that “the common characteristic of administrative evil is that people can engage in acts of evil without being aware that they are doing anything at all wrong” (p. 227). This dehumanization through technical expertise heralded the Holocaust—the most lethal act of antisemitism (and other hatred) in the past century. This administrative evil also manifested in other policy initiatives like Japanese internment, 5 the Stanford Prison and Milgram Experiments, and the Tuskegee Syphilis Study. According to Starke, Heckler, and Mackey (2018), “it is necessary for public educators to problematize technical rationality, color-blindness, and the whiteness that reinforces these epistemologies” (p. 478). Building cultural competencies is one way to counteract extreme technical rationality. These competencies are essential for preparing public and nonprofit leaders for 21st century service (Carrizales, 2010; Haupt, Kapucu, & Hu, 2017). Cultural competency reflects an understanding of how cultural characteristics can “create cross- cultural misunderstandings” as well as how diversity can “contribute to the effectiveness of an organization” (Borrego & Johnson, 2012, p. 7). Public and nonprofit managers have to manage diverse, multicultural organizations that service diverse, multicultural populations. Cultural competency often focuses on “the Black-White binary,” overlooking other aspects of population diversity such as gender diversity, ethnic background, sexual orientation, and religion (Lopez-Littleton & Blessett, 2015, p. 558). Including these additional complexities in cultural competency curricula helps counteract racism alongside other forms of bias, such as antisemitism. In addition to fostering cultural competency, teaching about antisemitism in public administration classrooms also promotes trust in institutions and ethical approaches for accessing power. As we discuss further below, a classic theme in antisemitism is that coordinated, covert Jewish power is omnipresent, working against the shared public values of transparency, fairness, and equal opportunity (“Anti- Semitism”, 2010). Framing Jews as behind-the-scenes puppeteers with outsized power undercuts public trust in institutions (including government) and their defined channels of authority. In this way, a belief in (or inability to recognize) antisemitism undermines the ability of Jewish students to access power without being subject to extra scrutiny, 6 the ability of non-Jewish students to elevate powerful institutions as transparent and trustworthy, and influences the ability of both to elevate Jewish employers and leaders. What if we haven’t convinced you? Raising this issue makes us vulnerable, but there’s a greater risk that staying silent allows for a thousand missed opportunities to combat antisemitism across our collective spheres of influence. What should we say when we talk about antisemitism? What should we teach our MPA students? U.S. history includes policies that discriminate against Jews (e.g., restrictions on property ownership, quotas on immigration and public university enrollment), but leading with these policies misses the complexity of antisemitism. Jews were (and are) discriminated against, but they are not disproportionately represented among the poor.3 F4 And herein lies the unique liability of the Jews—our seemingly magical capacity to gain more power and influence than we rightfully deserve (Ward, 2017). Given the history of antisemitism and its current prevalence, this article serves as a primer for background and ideas that facilitate conversations on antisemitism within MPA classrooms. We start with a brief overview of Jewish identity and demographics. We follow by defining antisemitism and contextualizing antisemitism on college campuses. We then offer classroom approaches as well as institutional and personal actions that can be used to teach about and address antisemitism. Who are Jews? Jewish literacy—an understanding of Judaism, Jewish history, and the Jewish community—is an important tool for combating antisemitism (Price & Silverman, 4 Given the inter-correlations between educational attainment, race, and religion, it is challenging to identify a unique relationship between religion and wealth. According to the Pew Research 2014 Religious Landscape Study, Jews, Hindus, and Episcopalians live in households with incomes of at least $100,000 at the greatest rates (44%, 36%, and 35%, respectively), and these groups also have high levels of educational attainment (Masci, 2016). 7 2019). Without adequate Jewish literacy, conversations about Jews and antisemitism risk reinforcing antisemitic stereotypes and further marginalizing Jewish students, faculty, and staff. To promote basic Jewish literacy, we present identity and demographic background in this section. Jews identify as such through religion, culture, ancestry, ethnicity, and/or race. The worldwide Jewish population numbers approximately 14 million people, representing about 0.2% of the world’s population (Pew Research Center, 2012). Approximately 80% of the world’s Jews live in the United States (U.S.) and Israel. Israel is the only nation in the world with a majority of Jews (~95% of the population). The U.S. Jewish population is 7.2 million people, 4.2 million of whom are adults (~1.8% of the total U.S. adult population). For historical context, surveys from the 1950s-1960s regularly found 3-4% of American adults identifying their religion as Jewish (Lipka, 2013). The current Jewish population skews older, female, educated, and Democratic (“American Jewish Population Project Current Estimates”, n.d.). Approximately 26% are over 65 years old, compared to 19% of the general U.S. population, and female (53% women). Over 58% are college graduates, including 29% with postgraduate degrees (general population: 29% college graduates, including 10% with postgraduate degrees). In addition, all but 4% live in urban or suburban areas, with 43% of the Jewish population concentrated in the Northeast (Pew Research Center, 2013). According to the Steinhardt Social Research Institute’s American Jewish Population Project 2015, more than 1 in 10 U.S. Jewish adults identify as non-White. Be’chol Lashon, the research arm of the Institute for Jewish & Community Research, estimates that approximately 600,000 Jews in America have some Sephardic (Spanish or Iberian) heritage in addition to the 10% who identify as Black, Asian, Latino, or 8 mixed-race. Taken together, they estimate that at least 20% of the Jewish population includes Jews by ancestry, adoption, and/or marriage who are African, African American, Latino (Hispanic), Asian, Native American, Sephardic, Mizrahi (descended from Middle Eastern Jewish communities) and/or mixed race (“Counting Jews of Color in the United States,” n.d.). We have each struggled with reconciling being White and being Jewish, whether it is in checking off a demographic box, or discussing what is commonly thought to be White history in the U.S. Are we White? In our lived experiences in the U.S. context, we generally benefit from White privilege. Yet when we talk about race in the U.S. context, we often feel that identifying as “White” seems to undermine our Jewishness. But when we travel—to Europe, to Egypt, to parts of the U.S. where many people have never met a Jew—we feel like we’re “passing.” We wonder if we’re “passing.” We don’t want to put ourselves in danger by revealing our Jewishness. Defining antisemitism “We are fighting an enemy that is different from us. Not open, but hiding; not straightforward but crafty; not honest but base; not national but international; does not believe in working but speculates with money; does not have its own homeland but feels it owns the whole world.” -- Viktor Orban, Prime Minister of Hungary, on George Soros (As quoted by Shaun Walker in The Guardian on March 15, 2018) Recognizing and addressing antisemitism requires familiarity with the basic beliefs and tropes that constitute antisemitism. While a large body of academic and popular literature delves into antisemitism, this section offers a colloquial overview of antisemitism, grounded primarily in recent gray literature and popular writings. Appendix A offers additional recommended readings on contemporary antisemitism. At its core, antisemitism is hatred of or prejudice toward Jews (“Anti-Semitism”, 2010; Beller, 2015; USHMM, n.d.). As Marcus (2015, p.14) describes in greater detail, 9 antisemitism is “a set of negative attitudes, ideologies, and practices directed at Jews as Jews, individually or collectively, based upon and sustained by repetitive and potentially self-fulfilling latent structure of hostile erroneous beliefs and assumptions that flow from the application of double standards toward Jews as a collectivity, manifested culturally in myth, ideology, folklore, and imagery, and urging various forms of restriction, exclusion, and suppression.” Antisemitism is similar to other forms of hate and prejudice, but key differences lie in the perceptions of power and ability. As Vox’s Coaston (2018) writes, [W]hile anti-black racism or white supremacy revolve around on the (wrong) idea that black people or nonwhites are inferior, anti-Semitism, as practiced by many of its adherents today from a number of political and social backgrounds, is based on the idea that Jewish people have too much power, or even that Jewish people are secretly in charge—of the government, of culture, of the world in its entirety. (Coaston, 2018) Antisemitism, sometimes referred to as “the longest hatred” (USHMM, n.d.; Wistrich, 1992), dates back thousands of years. While the specific language and accusations associated with antisemitism evolve over time, common themes or “tropes” unite this particular form of hate. Historically, antisemitic messages centered around two types of images and tropes: dehumanization and stereotypes. Dehumanization images portray Jews as demons, blood drinkers, and/or vermin. Stereotypes include Jews as rich money grubbers who control the banks, media, and any given country’s government. According to Kirschen (2010), taken together, these categories portray Jews as “rich, ugly, demonic, powerful and enemies of the social order” (p. 436). After a few decades (i.e., post-Holocaust) where open expressions of antisemitism were considered problematic, Kirschen’s third category emerged: moral inversion. In this expression, “Jews are portrayed as the perpetrators rather than the 10 victims. In this case, Jews are essentially depicted as Nazis” (p. 436). The taboos that formerly held such animus in check weakened and, in some circles, fell altogether. Charges about Jewish “control” of the media, international finance, and political power, which not long ago were considered unacceptable in mainstream society, are now openly expressed (Rosenfeld, 2015, p. 3). The Orban quote at the beginning of this section is one example of this open expression, using antisemitic imagery to (mis)characterize George Soros, a Hungarian-American Jewish Holocaust survivor and prominent philanthropist. One antisemitic stereotype manifests in the belief of a “hidden conspiracy of Jews that is ceaselessly working to overturn all natural laws and settled social arrangements in furtherance of their own malignant ends” (Newhouse, 2018). In fact, as Kirschen (2010) explains, “By proclaiming the existence of a powerful, secretive, demonic enemy, [movements] build a shared hatred as a unifying force for recruitment of adherents” (p. 6). Antisemites believe that Jews cannot be trusted or loyal to their countries. We feel powerless in our attempts to counter the myth of the secretive, untrustworthy Jew. Because of this myth, Jewish voices are not seen as credible when we call out antisemitism. We need help from our allies. Demonization and stereotyping are often visible on the political right. In September 2018, a campaign mailer sent on behalf of the Republican candidate for Connecticut State Senate portrayed his Jewish opponent “clutching a fistful of money” (Vigdor & Beals, 2018). President Donald Trump himself accused George Soros of funding protests against then-Supreme Court nominee (now current Associate Justice) Brett Kavanaugh (Trump, 2018). In fact, a 2018 article in Fast Company provides a timeline of many of the conspiracy theories tied to George Soros. According to sources 11 such as Slovakian president Jan Slota, Malaysian prime minister Mahathir bin Mohamad, Russian president Vladimir Putin, and media pundits such as Bill O’Reilly, Glenn Beck and Rush Limbaugh, and Tomi Lahren, Soros is responsible for or has funded everything from coups d’etat across the world to currency crises to Colin Kaepernick (Baram, 2018). Common language here includes references to “globalists” and myths about Jewish conspiracies, and is often used by white nationalists and neo- Nazis. On the political left, antisemitism often presents itself through rhetoric as a form of moral inversion. Writers in both Jewish and mainstream outlets (Pildis, 2018a, 2019; Pagano, 2018; Schmidt, 2019; Stockman, 2018) have written extensively about conflicts surrounding antisemitism in the Women’s March, including a failure to include Jewish women in its original Unity Principles and an ongoing association with open antisemite Louis Farrakhan. People carrying Jewish pride flags have been kicked out of pride marches in Chicago and New York City (Greenblatt, 2017). Great Britain’s Labour Party, long representing the political left, recently saw the resignation of nine sitting Members of Parliament over accusations of antisemitism as institutionalized within the party (Sabbagh, 2019). As Pildis (2018b) argues, “The far right has blood on its hands, but the left is not innocent. The social justice movement has failed us repeatedly over the past two years”. A note on Zionism, anti-Zionism, and antisemitism Antisemitism often co-occurs with conversations about Israel and Zionism. “Zionist is an incredibly loaded word. For some it means the belief that Israel has a right to exist. For others it signifies supporting the oppression of the Palestinian people” (Schuffman, 2019). Criticisms about specific Israeli policies, actions, or political leaders are not antisemitic. Similarly, defenses of Palestinians are not inherently antisemitic 12 (Loucaides, 2019). These critiques have the potential to become antisemitic when they generalize to all Jews or hold all Jews responsible for the actions of the State of Israel, what Kirschen (2010) would consider an example of the moral inversion trope. Criticism of Israel also becomes antisemitic when the existence of the State of Israel is framed as inherently racist, denying Jewish people the right to self- determination. Deborah E. Lipstadt, a scholar of Jewish history, notes that applying double-standards to Israel is often key to identifying critiques that veer into antisemitism: “Many anti-Israel advocates contend that the fact that Israel is a country with an established state religion renders it archaic, and this justifies its dissolution. They are strangely silent on the validity of the nondemocratic Islamic theocracies in the same neighborhood. And the fact that Great Britain, Denmark, Greece, and Monaco have official state religions doesn’t seem to bother them, either.” (Lipstadt as quoted in Chotiner, 2019) Similarly, equating Israel to European colonization denies a connection between Jews and the Middle East that is foundational to Jewish history and identity (Jacobs, 2018). Antisemitism in the U.S., on campus, and in the classroom While the fatal shooting in Pittsburgh spurred/reignited conversations around antisemitism in the United States, displays of antisemitism have plagued the United States for decades, including on college campuses. Each year, the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) conducts an annual Audit of Anti-Semitic Incidents, and the most recent audit found that there were 1,986 antisemitic incidents reported across the United States in 2017. These reports include physical attacks, vandalism, and attacks on Jewish institutions. This number was a 57% increase from 2016, with incidents taking place in every state across the country (Anti-Defamation League, 2018). Hate crime data from 13 the Federal Bureau of Investigation (2018) also confirm these increases. The ADL also found that in 2017 there were 1,015 incidents of harassment, including 163 bomb threats against Jewish institutions, up 41 percent from 2016; 952 incidents of vandalism, up 86 percent from 2016; 19 physical assaults, down 47 percent from 2016. The ADL notes that the rise was in part due to a significant increase in incidents in schools and within higher education institutions, which nearly doubled. College and university campuses saw a total of 204 incidents in 2017, compared to 108 in 2016. American schools and colleges/universities saw an 89% increase in anti- Semitic acts in 2017 (Anti-Defamation League, 2018). A variety of antisemitic incidents have been reported on college campuses. Some of these activities are correlated with the increasing level of activism on college campuses as part of the anti-Israel Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) movement, but the most common reports are those of swastikas drawn on buildings, bullying, and assault (Anti-Defamation League, 2018; AMCHA Initiative, 2017; Bauer- Wolf, 2018). A study by Kosmin and Keysar (2015) finds that over half of Jewish students in the sample experienced or witnessed antisemitism. Saxe, Sasson, Wright, and Hecht (2015) found that about one-third of Jewish students have been harassed (verbally or physically) because they were Jewish. Wright, Shain, Hecht, and Saxe (2017), however, find that hearing hostile remarks toward Israel was more prevalent than exposure to antisemitic statements. Students experiencing antisemitism on campus largely see other students as the source, rather than faculty or institutions (Koren, Saxe, & Fleisch, 2016). Yet, the ways in which a university responds to major antisemitic incidents (on- or off-campus) are important for all students, faculty, and staff. The script goes more or less like this: An incident occurs. The public is shocked and saddened. The university president (and/or 14 school dean) sends out an email blast condemning such terrible acts and expressing support for the victims and their community, often concluding with a statement of solidarity and a promise to work toward preventing such ills in the future. Most often, no further action is taken. The act of a response letter from leadership as a kind of organizational ritual (Meyer & Rowan, 1977), signaling the aspired values of the institution and its leadership. The ritual of a public response offers important symbolic support. This, of course, assumes that a university administration has a policy in place to deal with such conflict. Thus, in the hours and days following an antisemitic act, we silently wonder: Does this “count” as a focusing event? Will it be worthy of a public response from our institutional leaders? In the wake of the August 2017 “Unite the Right” rally in Charlottesville, VA—a rally during which self-proclaimed neo-Nazis chanted “Jews will not replace us!”—we held our breaths for the response. Our university leaders did respond, condemning hatred and racism, but the word “antisemitism” and specific references to Jews were noticeably (painfully) absent. In addition to blatantly antisemitic incidents of the kinds described above, departments and universities often send unintentional signals of closed or unwelcome spaces. For faculty members, scheduling the first week of classes, required exam dates, or faculty meetings on Jewish holidays (and those of other, non-Christian religions) makes being a full citizen of the department impossible. Sponsoring community-wide events on these days prevents these events from being truly open to the full community. These scheduling patterns also send signals to Jewish students that campus may not be welcoming. We are so tired of bringing up the Jewish calendar every year. We feel like 15 people hear us and think, “There she goes with the Jewish stuff again,” pigeonholing us as one-issue women and potentially devaluing other contributions we are making to the department. The MPA classroom: What can we do? MPA classrooms likely include Jewish students, students with Jewish family members, and/or antisemites. The 2015 update of the Anti-Defamation League’s global survey of antisemitism estimates that 10% of American adults harbor antisemitic attitudes (Anti-Defamation League, 2015). Depending on university location and student recruitment patterns, MPA students may not have any basic knowledge about Judaism or antisemitism. Given the prevalence and endurance of antisemitism in the U.S. and worldwide, along with the aims and ambitions of public affairs education, discussions about antisemitism deserve a place in MPA classrooms. Discussions of antisemitism must be rooted in social justice approaches to education, which are standpoints and scholarly traditions that actively address the dynamics of oppression, privilege, and isms, recognizing that society is the product of historically-rooted, institutionally sanctioned stratification along socially constructed groups (Cochran-Smith, 2004). To educate through a social justice lens in MPA classrooms, we must guide students in critical self- reflection of antisemitism and its implications, analysis of the mechanisms of oppression, and the ability to challenge these hierarchies, which reflect the aims of critiquing technical rationality, building cultural competencies, and promoting trust in and access to public and nonprofit institutions. Drawing from our own classroom experiences, review of our course syllabi, and consultations with colleagues, this section offers suggestions for how to incorporate conversations about antisemitism into public affairs course content. We start with an example of how we broached the topic, then 16 offer course-specific suggestions, and conclude with suggestions for general talking points and instructor preparation. Beginning the conversation. Following the Tree of Life Synagogue shooting, we posted some optional readings on antisemitism on our class webpage (Appendix A lists some possible readings), and we gave the students the option to dedicate some time in class to discuss this issue. Many voiced a preference for class time, even if they had not prioritized the readings, offering comments like, “I have not learned a lot about [antisemitism] or discussed it outside of its context in the Holocaust” and “I have never had the opportunity to discuss antisemitism in a classroom setting.” Our Jewish students also appreciated the opportunity to make space for this discussion: “As someone who is Jewish but has only infrequently felt direct impacts of antisemitism, I often feel unclear of how to relate antisemitism to broader discussions of racism in the American context.” We began one mini-lecture on antisemitism with an overview of demographics: How many Jews are there worldwide? In the U.S.? In Israel? How does one even count who is Jewish? (The Pew Research Center’s “Jewish Population Calculator” is an insightful tool.) What does it mean to be a Jew anyway—is it religion? Culture? Ancestry? Race? Displaying the demographics offers an easy foray into the topic, as many students recognize the mismatch between the numerical minority status of Jews worldwide, and the outsized visibility of and rhetoric around Jews (and Israel). After establishing this basic Jewish literacy, we then articulated the basic tropes of antisemitism. Recommendations for specific courses. While a one-off conversation about antisemitism could be appropriate for any public affairs course, we also need to consider the social justice competencies around antisemitism that could be developed in specific courses through activities, exercises, discussions, and assignments. These 17 suggestions reflect NASPAA’s universal required competencies, and include: describing the concept of diversity as well as the diversity of individuals and populations in a community or network, facilitating communication among individuals/groups/organizations, leading and managing in public governance, thinking critically/solving problems/making decisions, and articulating a public service perspective. Table 1 presents a sample list of courses documenting how addressing antisemitism may be embedded within public affairs education, including Lopez- Littleton and Blessett’s (2015) more specific cultural competencies, and we discuss these examples below. [Table 1 about here] In public management courses, one way to incorporate discussions of antisemitism is to include Schneider and Ingram’s 1993 article on social construction of target populations. Revisiting their Figure 1 (Schneider & Ingram, 1993, p. 336), antisemitism can be discussed as a framing of Jews as “Contenders,” which contrasts with the biased frames often used to characterize People of Color as “Dependents” or “Deviants.” This framing connects antisemitism both to course material on the policy process and discussions on racism in public policy and administration. Doing so helps uncover the stereotypes, prejudices, and policy design targeting Jewish people and People of Color, highlighting the important role social constructions play in influencing the policy agenda, the selection of policy tools, and the legitimization of policy choices. Furthermore, classes that incorporate social construction and critical theory can look at who is shaping the conversations around antisemitism. As Schraub (2019) notes, “The nation is having a conversation about Jews virtually impervious to the input of 18 Jews themselves.” Without input from the community experiencing the phenomenon, attempts to address it appear to “use anti-Semitism for political purposes while further marginalizing the Jewish community” (Schraub 2019). Nonprofit classes often include content related to fundraising, altruism, and community mobilizations—all of which offer a useful lens for relating to the range of responses in the wake of a tragedy. For example, in the aftermath of the Pittsburgh shooting, we linked McChesney’s (1995) work about charity and Islam (which had coincidentally been assigned for that day) with Melendez’s (2018) Daily Beast article about Muslim fundraising for victims of the shooting. The site of the massacre within a house of worship also connects with religious institutions as an important foundation of civil society and the nonprofit sector, both in the U.S. and internationally. Courses focused on policy analysis, the policy process, and the U.S. government could focus on lawmakers’ attempts to intervene in response to antisemitism. In 2017, the U.S. House Committee on the Judiciary held a hearing on antisemitism on college campuses, and recommended that the U.S. Department of Education (DOE) adopt a “clearer definition of what constitutes harassment toward Jewish students, to ensure that future investigations into anti-Semitic acts are easier to conduct” (Rockenbach, Selznick, & Mayhew, 2018). In addition, the Anti-Semitism Awareness Act, introduced in 2016, would have instructed the DOE to rely on the State Department’s definition of antisemitism. The bill passed in the Senate but not the House in 2016, creating debate with some opponents arguing that the State Department’s definition would “chill free speech on at universities” (Bauer-Wolf, 2017).4 F5 These situations could be turned into case studies or other pedagogical materials to engage conversation and debate. 5 According to Bauer-Wolf (2017), the State Department’s definition includes “demonizing Israel as an example of antisemitism, and opponents felt this would suppress opposition to the actions of the Israeli state among both students and professors.” For more information and a take from The Alliance for Academic Freedom, see Nelson et al. (2018). 19 Students in policy evaluation courses can be introduced to antisemitism when discussing culturally responsive evaluation. Culturally responsive evaluation is a framework for centering evaluation in culture (Frierson, Hood, Hughes, & Thomas, 2010; Hood, Hopson, & Kirkhart, 2015), and recognizes that culturally defined values and beliefs lie at the heart of any evaluative effort. Taking this holistic evaluation approach to focus on groups that have been historically marginalized can invite conversations about antisemitism and other concepts when discussing ways to bring balance and equity into the evaluation process. In human resource management courses, students could be exposed to successful human resource models that incorporate understanding of what antisemitism may look like in a work environment. This will allow students to consider, for instance, what policies might need to be put in place when a Jewish employee requests a day off to observe a Jewish holiday, or what should be done when antisemitic behaviors, actions, or beliefs are present in an organization. Employees in the public and nonprofit sectors must be aware that antisemitic individuals may be present in the workplace, and should therefore be vigilant in treating any antisemitic message or act the same as any other unlawful harassment in the workplace. Exposing students to these examples and providing suggestions for action will provide students with the competencies to create and manage processes to improve organizational performance. Research methods or quantitative-focused classes might consider discussing antisemitism in the context of data, expanding on the challenges mentioned earlier related to demographics. The tracking of hate crimes offers another link between policy- relevant data and antisemitism. In the absence of a clear connection with course material, personal reflection is always an option. Instructors who do not identify as Jewish can discuss their own experiences of learning about or witnessing antisemitism. 20 Inviting a Jewish colleague or public or nonprofit practitioner as a guest speaker on antisemitism is always an option. General course content. This section so far has focused on intentional incorporation of antisemitism into MPA curricula. However, anyone who refers to or expects students to discuss current events should have some talking points prepared for when the subject arises. Processing antisemitic events through a frame focused on critiquing technical rationality, building cultural competence, and building ethical, accessible public and nonprofit institutions highlights the impact of antisemitism on the very work in which our students are engaged. In addition, America’s relationship with Israel is often in the news. Being prepared to differentiate between policy critiques that are connected to specific political actions and stereotypical antisemitic tropes models the cultural competence we hope to engender in our students. In facilitating or introducing conversations about Israel, it is helpful to start with a clear statement acknowledging both the value of critique and the risk of antisemitism.5F6 In the case that student comments venture into potentially antisemitic territory, hypothetically swapping “Israel” with another nation or “Israelis” with a different marginalized community can be illuminating. Students may resist the framing of “Israelis” as marginalized, particularly in politically liberal settings, but this provides an opportunity for unpacking the “matrix of domination” wherein Israeli Jews can be simultaneously privileged and oppressed (Collins, 1990). A challenge in higher education is to prepare the next generation of MPA instructors to teach in a way that demonstrates a commitment to diversity and inclusion 6 For example, “During our discussion, I ask that you please keep in mind the unique status of Israel as the only nation with a Jewish majority population. While specific criticisms of the Israeli government and its policies are appropriate and valid, broad generalizations about Israel and Israelis risk perpetuating antisemitism.” 21 and to accept ownership of their own implicit biases around antisemitism. Conversations on implicit bias should be incorporated into teaching workshops for students, and these conversations should be supplemented with resources such as Harvard’s Implicit Association Test (IAT) and other relevant readings/exercises. Findings from the Interfaith Diversity Experiences and Attitudes Longitudinal Study (2018) suggests that interventions within higher education institutions can contribute to shifts in attitudes about Jews. Mayhew et al. (2018) find that appreciative attitudes toward Jews varied by students’ perceptions of structural, psychological, and behavioral climate dimensions related to worldview. The authors also find that educational experiences that invite informal experiences interacting with diverse peers, self-reflection on one’s assumptions, and interfaith engagement with students of other beliefs contribute to students’ appreciation of Jews. Self-reflective activities also provide space for revealing identities (like being Jewish or sexual identity), where students otherwise might not consider these identities relevant to the discussion. The authors also recommend providing campuses with resources and support, which may serve as a campus-wide signal that Jews and Judaism are valued and important. Like all of our teaching, it is difficult to know what sticks for students, though sometimes we have the opportunity to hear it directly from them, as one student relayed in an end-of-semester closing comment: As a fellow Jewish woman, I would like to say thank you for the discussion you led on antisemitism. Although it is a hard topic for me, I feel that there is so much value in acknowledging this sort of hatred that exists in our world today. I appreciate you speaking from your own experience. Specifically, hearing your thoughts on how antisemitism still exists in left-wing politics resonated with me. 22 Unfortunately, I have recently heard so much discussion on the Israel-Palestine dispute that has anti-Semitic undertones. I never knew what to make of the way these discussions made me feel being that I don't necessarily agree with Israel's political decisions. However, hearing you speak on the subject really helped me to have a better understanding of why these discussions often rub me the wrong way. I just wanted to say thank you for that. I know that is not an easy thing to talk about, but it means a lot to me and I'm sure it meant a lot to other students in the class as well. Beyond the classroom and towards a more inclusive future Outside of the classroom setting, departments and institutions can build in practices that signal cultural competence and engender trust, such as creating a departmental policy for religious accommodations. For example, departments with shared calendars or where coordinators email professors with important dates (university closures, exam schedules, etc.), including Jewish (and other) holidays students may observe can create awareness for faculty that leads to more inclusive course-planning. This type of course planning can help remove administrative burdens for Jewish students and create welcoming classroom environments. See Appendix B for an example of such language. Individual actions by colleagues and students – particularly after antisemitic incidents – are also important, and help Jewish members of the department feel acknowledged and valued. Simple emails or check-ins with Jewish colleagues and students communicate welcome allyship. “You and your family have been in my thoughts. If I can do anything to make you feel even a little safer, please let me know.” “I’m not sure what to say, but I wanted to write.” “I’ve been thinking of you during these last few days of anti-Semitic horror.” 23 “How are you holding up? It’s been a tough week.” “I just wanted to check in to see if you’re okay.” However, as a field, we have more work to do when it comes to preparing students to identify and address antisemitism. This framing (critiquing technical rationality, cultural competency, trust) made us feel comfortable discussing antisemitism with our students. For the first time, it was not only about us or our own personal experiences and biases, but also about systemic change towards a more inclusive (and less hateful) future. We must continue to conduct research on the implications of including important conversations about antisemitism in public affairs. We must also create resources such as case studies, databases, and journal articles so that educators will be equipped to teach antisemitism in the classroom. Doing so will allow us to understand what impact, if any, these conversations have on students, faculty, and communities. We can also conduct research both within our classrooms and across our field on the attitudes and/or knowledge bases of students, faculty, and public administrators on topics related to antisemitism to better understand the support and resources that might be needed in classrooms. A better understanding of institutional and departmental needs related to equity and inclusion will strengthen our classroom toolkits to engage on complex topics like antisemitism. In addition, this topic would benefit from additional critical theory analysis to highlight the root causes and manifestations of discriminations and injustices and why they matter to public administration, as well as antisemitism’s broader connections to other targeted forms of discrimination. We set out to provide a resource for engaging with the complicated topic of antisemitism, and hope this article prepares and empowers our colleagues to do so. Thank you. We are grateful to have you as colleagues and allies. 24 25 References Adams, G. B. (2011). The problem of administrative evil in a culture of technical rationality. Public Integrity, 13(3), 275-285. Adams, G. B., & Balfour, D. L. (2015). Unmasking Administrative Evil (4th Edition). Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe. Alexander, J., & Stivers, C. (2010). An Ethic of Race for Public Administration. Administrative Theory & Praxis, 32(4), 578–597. AMCHA Initiative (2017). Antisemitism: At the Epicenter of Campus Intolerance. 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(1993). Social construction of target populations: Implications for politics and policy. American political science review, 87(2), 334-347. Schraub, D. (2019, Feb. 13). When the right and left fight over anti-Semitism, Jews are caught in the middle. Jewish Telegraphic Agency. Retrieved from https://www.jta.org/2019/02/13/opinion/when-the-right-and-left-fight-over-anti- semitism-jews-are-caught-in-the-middle (Accessed April 16, 2019). Schuffman, S. (2019, January 17). Manny’s is a perfect business for The Mission. San Francisco Examiner. Retrieved from http://www.sfexaminer.com/mannys- perfect-business-mission/. Simon, R. J. and Schaler, J. A. (2007). Anti-Semitism the World Over in the Twenty- first Century. Current Psychology, 26(3-4), 152-182. Starke, A. M., Heckler, N., & Mackey, J. (2018). Administrative racism: Public administration education and race. Journal of Public Affairs Education, 24(4), 469-489. Stockman, F. (2018, December 23). Women’s March roiled by accusations of anti- Semitism. The New York Times. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/23/us/womens-march-anti-semitism.html (Accessed April 15, 2019). Trump, Donald J. [realDonaldTrump]. (2018, October 5). The very rude elevator screamers are paid professionals only looking to make Senators look bad. Don’t fall for it! Also, look at all of the professionally made identical signs. Paid for by Soros and others. These are not signs made in the basement from love! #Troublemakers. Retrieved from https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump United States Holocaust Memorial Museum [USHMM]. (n.d.). “Antisemitism: The longest hatred.” Retrieved from https://www.ushmm.org/confront- antisemitism/antisemitism-the-longest-hatred (Accessed January 29, 2019). U.S. House Committee on The Judiciary. (2017). Hearing examining anti-Semitism on college campuses. Retrieved from https://judiciary.house.gov/hearing/examining-anti-semitism-college-campuses. Vigdor, N. and Beals, S.R. (2018, October 30). Republican campaign mailer fuels anti- Semitism complaints in state senate race. Hartford Courant. Retrieved from https://www.courant.com/politics/hc-pol-anti-semitic-mailer-20181030- story.html. Walker, S. (2018, March 15). Hungarian leader says Europe is now 'under invasion' by migrants. The Guardian. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/mar/15/hungarian-leader-says-europe- is-now-under-invasion-by-migrants. Ward, E. K. (2017). Skin in the game: How antisemitism animates White Nationalism. The Public Eye: Political Research Associates, Challenging the Right, Advancing Social Justice, 1-8. Wistrich, R. S. (1992). Anti-Semitism: The Longest Hatred. London: Pantheon. Wright, G., Shain, M., Hecht, S., & Saxe, L. (2017). The limits of hostility: Students report on anti-Semitism and anti-Israel sentiment at four US universities. Brandeis University Steinhardt Social Research Institute. 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Course-specific suggestions for addressing antisemitism Course Topic Lesson Objective(s) Assignments and/or Activities Cultural Competencies Public management Antisemitism or Jews in the context of social construction of target populations Current events, critical theory, case studies • Incorporates strategies for interacting with persons from diverse backgrounds • Recognizes the ways diversity influences policies, programs, and services Nonprofit management Fundraising Community mobilization in response to antisemitism Current events, critical theory, case studies, readings on historical and religious giving motivations; philanthropy roadmap • Incorporates strategies for interacting with persons from diverse backgrounds • Recognizes the ways diversity influences policies, programs, and services Public policy Differential policy impacts in diverse communities Policy responses to antisemitism Case studies with differential impact on Jewish populations and discuss implications for Jews in particular; analysis of policy responses to antisemitic events and hate crimes • Recognizes the ways diversity influences policies, programs, and services • Supports diverse perspectives in developing, implementing, and evaluating policies, programs, and services that affect the health of a community • Conveys data and information to professionals and the public using a variety of approaches Evaluation Culturally responsive evaluation Use an equity toolkit as a model to evaluate differential impacts of programs on Jews • Recognizes the ways diversity influences policies, programs, and services • Supports diverse perspectives in developing, implementing, and evaluating policies, programs, and services that affect the health of a community • Conveys data and information to professionals and the public using a variety of approaches • Develops new and/or evaluates existing social equity indicators, tools, and measurements Human resources Antisemitism in a work environment; diversity initiatives Draft sample HR policies with inclusive language • Incorporates strategies for interacting with persons from diverse backgrounds • Recognizes the ways diversity influences policies, programs, and services Research methods Antisemitism in the context of data, interviewing Interrogate demographic data on race and religion given the complexity of Jewish identity; use data to examine trends in antisemitism; discuss how correlations among variables such as religion, education, and wealth can facilitate stereotyping and prejudice • Incorporates strategies for interacting with persons from diverse backgrounds • Conveys data and information to professionals and the public using a variety of approaches • Develops new and/or evaluates existing social equity indicators, tools, and measurements 31 Appendix A: Online Only Select Recommended Resources Related to Antisemitism Resources for Background and Class Assignments/Activities Green, E. (2019, May 25). Measles can be contained. Anti-Semitism cannot. The Atlantic. Retrieved from https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2019/05/orthodox-jews-face-anti- semitism-after-measles-outbreak/590311/. Jacobs, J. (2018, May 18). How to tell when criticism of Israel is actually anti- Semitism. The Washington Post. Retrieved from https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/how-to-tell-when-criticism-of-israel- is-actually-anti-semitism/2018/05/17/cb58bf10-59eb-11e8-b656- a5f8c2a9295d_story.html. (Accessed April 15, 2019). Jews for Racial & Economic Justice (2017). Understanding Anti-Semitism: An Offering to our Movement. Retrieved from: https://jfrej.org/wp- content/uploads/2017/11/JFREJ-Understanding-Antisemitism-November-2017- 1.pdf Schraub, D. (2019, Feb. 13). When the right and left fight over anti-Semitism, Jews are caught in the middle. Jewish Telegraphic Agency. Retrieved from https://www.jta.org/2019/02/13/opinion/when-the-right-and-left-fight-over-anti- semitism-jews-are-caught-in-the-middle (Accessed April 16, 2019). UNESCO. Addressing anti-semitism through education: Guidelines for policymakers. Retrieved from https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000263702. Ward, E. K. (2017). Skin in the game: How antisemitism animates White Nationalism. The Public Eye: Political Research Associates, Challenging the Right, Advancing Social Justice, 1-8. Institutions/Organizations ● Cohen Center for Modern Jewish Studies: https://www.brandeis.edu/cmjs/ ● Steinhardt Social Research Institute: https://www.brandeis.edu/ssri/ ● Hadassah-Brandeis Institute: https://www.brandeis.edu/hbi/index.html ● Institute for the Study of Contemporary anti-Semitism: https://isca.indiana.edu/index.html ● Mandel Center for Studies in Jewish Education: https://www.brandeis.edu/mandel/ Additional Resources ● Anti-Defamation League: https://www.adl.org ● Calendar of major Jewish holidays: https://www.myjewishlearning.com/article/calendar-of-major-jewish-holidays/ ● Hillel on campus: https://www.hillel.org ● Federal Bureau of Investigation Hate Crime Statistics: https://ucr.fbi.gov/hate- crime/2017 ● Jews for Racial and Economic Justice: https://www.jfrej.org https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2019/05/orthodox-jews-face-anti-semitism-after-measles-outbreak/590311/ https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2019/05/orthodox-jews-face-anti-semitism-after-measles-outbreak/590311/ https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/how-to-tell-when-criticism-of-israel-is-actually-anti-semitism/2018/05/17/cb58bf10-59eb-11e8-b656-a5f8c2a9295d_story.html?utm_term=.01b3db8b2544 https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/how-to-tell-when-criticism-of-israel-is-actually-anti-semitism/2018/05/17/cb58bf10-59eb-11e8-b656-a5f8c2a9295d_story.html?utm_term=.01b3db8b2544 https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/how-to-tell-when-criticism-of-israel-is-actually-anti-semitism/2018/05/17/cb58bf10-59eb-11e8-b656-a5f8c2a9295d_story.html?utm_term=.01b3db8b2544 https://jfrej.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/JFREJ-Understanding-Antisemitism-November-2017-1.pdf https://jfrej.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/JFREJ-Understanding-Antisemitism-November-2017-1.pdf https://jfrej.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/JFREJ-Understanding-Antisemitism-November-2017-1.pdf https://www.jta.org/2019/02/13/opinion/when-the-right-and-left-fight-over-anti-semitism-jews-are-caught-in-the-middle https://www.jta.org/2019/02/13/opinion/when-the-right-and-left-fight-over-anti-semitism-jews-are-caught-in-the-middle https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000263702 https://www.brandeis.edu/cmjs/ https://www.brandeis.edu/ssri/ https://www.brandeis.edu/hbi/index.html https://isca.indiana.edu/index.html https://www.brandeis.edu/mandel/ https://www.adl.org/ https://www.myjewishlearning.com/article/calendar-of-major-jewish-holidays/ https://www.hillel.org/ https://ucr.fbi.gov/hate-crime/2017 https://ucr.fbi.gov/hate-crime/2017 https://www.jfrej.org/ 32 Appendix B: Online Only Sample Language and Spreadsheet for Religious Accommodations Email from Dean: Hi everyone, I hope this email finds you all enjoying a bit less hectic schedule now that summer is here. As part of our goal of avoiding scheduling that causes individuals to have to choose between religious observances and work or school obligations, XX has put together the following list of holidays that we are aware of over the next year. Please consider these dates when making plans for events/ meetings etc. As you may know, it is challenging to identify an “exhaustive” list so if you are aware of other observances we should add, please don’t hesitate to contact [contact person]. I also welcome any feedback, questions or concerns with the process. We hope this helps advance our efforts to have a “welcoming campus, welcoming classroom, welcoming workplace”. Thanks to [contact person] and several others who provided sage advice on where to locate the information compiled here. 33 Introduction The MPA classroom: What can we do? References 
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work_tqbmakamrvczneogrye45owtqa	----	The Relationship Between Gun Ownership and Firearm Homicide Rates in the United States, 19812010 The Relationship Between Gun Ownership and Firearm Homicide Rates in the United States, 1981–2010 Michael Siegel, MD, MPH, Craig S. Ross, MBA, and Charles King III, JD, PhD The December 14, 2012, tragic shooting of 20 children and 7 adults in Newtown, Connecticut, brought the issue of controlling firearm-related mortality to the forefront.1---5 The National Rifle Association responded by calling for armed guards and teachers in all schools.6 Hundreds of teachers have flocked to gun-training classes, motivated by the contention that increasing the presence of guns can reduce firearm- related deaths.7 Firearms are responsible for more than 31000 deaths and an estimated 74 000 nonfatal injuries among US residents each year,8 most of which are violence related. Understanding the relationship between the prevalence of gun ownership (and therefore the availability of guns) and firearm-related mortality is critical to guiding decisions regarding recently proposed measures to address firearm violence. Several lines of research have explored the relationship between firearm prevalence and homicide rates.9 Studies have shown that in- dividual gun ownership is related to an in- creased risk of being a homicide victim.10---12 These studies are limited because they only examine the individual risks or benefits of gun ownership. They cannot be used to assess whether the prevalence of gun ownership in the population affects overall homicide rates.9 Ecological studies have correlated higher levels of gun ownership rates in the United States with higher national rates of homicide than are experienced in other countries.13---19 Although these studies suggest a relationship between gun ownership and homicide, they are severely limited because of inadequate adjustment for confounding factors.9 Examination of variation in homicide rates between cities, regions, or states within the United States in relation to differences in gun ownership provides a stronger line of research. A few studies have used a time-series design to investigate the relationship between firearm ownership and homicide over a period of years, either analyzing changes over time within cities or states20---23 or examining changes over time across states.24---29 Several studies used cross-sectional analyses to detect a positive relationship between the prevalence of gun ownership at the neighborhood,30 county,31,32 regional,31,33---36 or state level32,34---45 and homicide rates, with control for differences in factors associated with homicide (e.g., urbani- zation, race/ethnicity, unemployment, poverty, crime, and alcohol use). Most data used in these studies represented only a cross-section in time; only 4 contained panel data over multiple years. Sorenson and Berk used data from1972 to 1993,23 Bordura examined data for 1973 to 1981,31 Miller et al. published 3 analyses of panel data from 1988 to 1997,34---36 and Cook and Ludwig used panel data for 1980 to 1999.32 None of the existing panel studies examined data more recent than 1999.32 Studies analyzing data over long periods are valuable because they assess the effects of variation in gun availability not only between states but within states over time. Although we are aware of no multiyear studies of interstate variation in gun ownership and homicide rates since 1999, national data from the General Social Survey show that the prevalence of household gun ownership has decreased by approximately 12% since then.46 This presents an opportunity not only to bring the existing literature up to date, but also to investigate temporal changes in gun ownership to explore its potential relationship with changes in ho- micide rates, within and between states. An- nual, state-specific homicide data are readily available from as early as 1981 and as recently as 2010.8 During this period, the prevalence of gun ownership decreased by about 36%.46 Thus, it is feasible and useful to study the relationship between gun availability and homicide across states over the entire period 1981 to 2010. We expanded on previous work by incor- porating the most recent data, analyzing data over 3 decades, and controlling for an exten- sive panel of annual, state-specific factors that might confound the association between gun ownership and firearm homicide rates. We Objectives. We examined the relationship between levels of household firearm ownership, as measured directly and by a proxy—the percentage of suicides committed with a firearm—and age-adjusted firearm homicide rates at the state level. Methods. We conducted a negative binomial regression analysis of panel data from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s Web-Based Injury Statistics Query and Reporting Systems database on gun ownership and firearm homicide rates across all 50 states during 1981 to 2010. We determined fixed effects for year, accounted for clustering within states with generalized estimat- ing equations, and controlled for potential state-level confounders. Results. Gun ownership was a significant predictor of firearm homicide rates (incidence rate ratio = 1.009; 95% confidence interval = 1.004, 1.014). This model indicated that for each percentage point increase in gun ownership, the firearm homicide rate increased by 0.9%. Conclusions. We observed a robust correlation between higher levels of gun ownership and higher firearm homicide rates. Although we could not determine causation, we found that states with higher rates of gun ownership had disproportionately large numbers of deaths from firearm-related homicides. (Am J Public Health. Published online ahead of print September 12, 2013: e1–e8. doi:10.2105/AJPH.2013.301409) RESEARCH AND PRACTICE Published online ahead of print September 12, 2013 | American Journal of Public Health Siegel et al. | Peer Reviewed | Research and Practice | e1 examined the relationship between gun own- ership and age-adjusted firearm homicide rates across all 50 states during the 30-year period 1981 through 2010, with adjustment for age, gender, race/ethnicity, urbanization, poverty, unemployment, income, education, income inequality, divorce rate, alcohol use, violent crime rate, nonviolent crime rate, hate crime rate, number of hunting licenses, age-adjusted nonfirearm homicide rate, incarceration rate, and suicide rate. To the best of our knowledge, this was the most comprehensive study to date, both in number of years in the analysis and breadth of control variables. METHODS We assembled a panel of annual data for 1981 to 2010 for each of the 50 states. We modeled the adjusted firearm homicide rate in a given year for a given state as a function of the gun ownership level in that state during that year, with adjustment for factors that could confound the association. We used a negative binomial regression model, entering fixed ef- fects for each year. We accounted for clustering of observations among states with a general- ized estimating equation (GEE) approach. Variables and Data Sources The outcome variable was the age-adjusted firearm homicide rate, obtained from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s Web-Based Injury Statistics Query and Reporting Systems database.8 Although death classification changed from the 9th to the 10th revision of the International Classification of Diseases47,48 during the study period, a comparability analysis showed no significant differences in the classification for either suicide or homicide.49 The main predictor variable was the preva- lence of household firearm ownership. Because no annual survey assessed the level of house- hold firearm ownership in all 50 states during the entire study period, we used a well- established proxy: the percentage of suicides committed with a firearm (firearm suicides divided by all suicides, or FS/S). This measure has been extensively validated in the litera- ture13,14,32,37,44,50---54 and has been determined to be the best proxy available of many that have been tested.50 The ratio of firearm suicides to all suicides has been shown to correlate highly with survey measures of household firearm ownership,13,14,32,36,50---54 including state-specific measures of firearm ownership,36,50 and has been used extensively as a proxy for state-specific gun availability in previous studies.32,34---37,39,43,44,54---56 In 2001, 2002, and 2004, the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System surveys mea- sured the prevalence of household gun own- ership in all 50 states. We found the correlation between our proxy measure, FS/S, and the surveillance system estimates for the 50 states for 2001, 2002, and 2004 to be 0.80. We controlled for the following factors, which have been identified in previous litera- ture29,32,34---37,41---45,54,56,57 as being related to homicide rates: proportion of young adults (aged 15---29 years),8 proportion of young males (aged 15---29 years),8 proportion of Blacks,8 proportion of Hispanics,58 level of urbanization,59 educational attainment,60 poverty status,61 unemployment,62 median household income,63 income inequality (the Gini ratio),64 per capita alcohol consumption,65 nonhomicide violent crime rate (aggravated assault, robbery, and forcible rape),66 nonvio- lent (property) crime rate (burglary, larceny--- theft, and motor vehicle theft),66 hate crime rate,67 prevalence of hunting licenses,68 and divorce rate.69 To account for regional differ- ences, we controlled for US Census region.70 In addition, to capture unspecified factors that may be associated with firearm homicide rates, we controlled for the annual, age-adjusted rate of nonfirearm homicides in each state.8 We also controlled for state-specific incarceration rates71 and suicide rates.8 The definitions and sources of these data are provided in Table 1. Where values of a variable in some years were missing or unavailable, we interpolated data from surrounding years or extrapolated from the 2 closest years. All interpolations and extrapolations were linear. We did not, how- ever, impute values for the outcome variable. State-level mortality data obtained through the Web-Based Injury Statistics Query and Reporting Systems for 2008 to 2010 are subject to a stringent censoring threshold not applied for earlier years in the study period, and results are not reported if fewer than 10 homicide deaths occurred. This resulted in a total of 13 missing data points for the outcome variable during the final 3 years of the study period. We excluded these data points; therefore, our data set had a total of 1487 observations. Model and Statistical Analysis Because the outcome variable—the age-adjusted firearm homicide rate—was skewed rather than normally distributed, and because overdispersion was present in the data (the variance greater than the mean), we modeled this outcome with a negative binomial model, following the approach taken in pre- vious studies.34---36,41,55,57,72,73 Estimation of the overdispersion parameter confirmed our choice of a negative binomial model over a Poisson model,74 following Miller et al.34 Clustering in our data could have arisen in 2 ways: by year (30 levels) and by state (50 levels). We entered year as a fixed effect in the regression model. This allowed us to control for any national, secular changes that could affect firearm homicide rates. To account for clustering of observations among states, we used a GEE approach.75 This procedure ac- counts for correlation of data within state clusters, avoiding a type 1 error that would be introduced if this correlation were ignored.76 We used an exchangeable (compound sym- metry) working correlation matrix to model the correlation among observations within states. We used robust variance estimators (the Huber---White sandwich estimator of variance) to produce consistent point estimates75,77 and SEs75,77,78 even if the working correlation matrix was misspecified. Our approach fol- lowed that of Miller et al., who used a GEE approach to account for clustering by region in their study of the impact of gun ownership on suicide rates.55 Because our primary aim was to examine the relationship between gun prevalence and ho- micide rates, with adjustment for all identified potential confounding variables, we first ran a full model that incorporated all variables, regardless of their contribution to the model. To develop a final, more parsimonious mod- el, we first entered all variables found to be significant in bivariate analyses (we used a Wald test at a significance level of .10) into 1 model. We then deleted variables found not to be significant in the presence of the other variables, assessing the significance of each RESEARCH AND PRACTICE e2 | Research and Practice | Peer Reviewed | Siegel et al. American Journal of Public Health | Published online ahead of print September 12, 2013 TABLE 1—Variables and Data Sources in Study of Gun Ownership and Firearm Homicide Rates: United States, 1981–2010 Variable Definition Source Notes Firearm homicides Rate/100 000 population, adjusted to 2000 age distribution WISQARS8 Missing data for NH 2008–2010; ND 2008–2010; VT 2008–2010; WY 2008, 2010; HI 2010; SD 2010 Prevalence of gun ownership Proportion of suicides committed with a firearm WISQARS8 Complete panel seriesa Age Percentage of population aged 15–29 y WISQARS8 Complete panel seriesa Gender Percentage of population aged 15–29 y who are male WISQARS8 Complete panel seriesa Race/ethnicity Black Percentage of Blacks in population WISQARS8 Complete panel seriesa Hispanic Percentage of Hispanics in population US Census Bureau58 Complete panel seriesa Poverty Percentage of population living in poverty US Census Bureau61 Complete panel seriesa Unemployment Percentage unemployed among civilian labor force, aged ‡ 16 y US Bureau of Labor Statistics62 Complete panel seriesa Household income Median household income (in 2010 dollars) US Bureau of the Census63 Data extrapolated for 1981–1983 Educational attainment Percentage of adults aged ‡ 25 y with college degree (‡ bachelor’s) US Census Bureau60 Data interpolated for 1981–1988 and 1992 Income inequality Gini coefficient US Census Bureau64 Data interpolated for 1981–1988, 1990–1998, 2000–2005; variable rescaled in final model to ease interpretation of parameter estimate Urbanization Percentage of population living in urbanized area or urban cluster US Census Bureau59 Data interpolated for 1991–1999 and 2001–2009; data extrapolated for 1981–1989 because 1980 Census definition of urban was different Alcohol Per capita alcohol consumption among persons aged ‡ 14 y National Institute of Alcoholism and Alcohol Abuse65 Complete panel seriesa Violent crime Rates of aggravated assault, robbery, and forcible rape/100 000 population Federal Bureau of Investigation66 Complete panel seriesa; variable rescaled in final model to ease interpretation of parameter estimate Nonviolent crime Rate of property crime (burglary, larceny–theft, and motor vehicle theft)/100 000 population Federal Bureau of Investigation66 Complete panel seriesa; variable rescaled in final model to ease interpretation of parameter estimate Hate crime Rate of hate crimes against persons/1 000 000 population Federal Bureau of Investigation67 Data available for 1995–2010; data from 1995 used for 1981–1994 Divorce Rate/1000 population National Center for Health Statistics69; US Census Bureau59 Data interpolated for 1986 in all states, interpolated for many years for CA, GA, HI, IN, LA, and MN Hunting licenses Proportion of population aged ‡ 15 y licensed US Fish and Wildlife Service68 Complete panel seriesa Region Census region US Census Bureau70 Complete panel seriesa Nonfirearm homicides Rate/100 000 population, adjusted to 2000 age distribution WISQARS8 Missing data for NH 2008–2010; ND 2008–2010; VT 2008–2010; WY 2008, 2010; HI 2010; SD 2010 Incarceration Prisoners with sentence of > 1 y/100 000 population Bureau of Justice Statistics71 Data interpolated for 1981, 1982, and 1992 Suicide No./100 000 population WISQARS8 Complete panel seriesa Note. WISQARS = Web-Based Injury Statistics Query and Reporting Systems. aAll 50 states, 1981–2010. RESEARCH AND PRACTICE Published online ahead of print September 12, 2013 | American Journal of Public Health Siegel et al. | Peer Reviewed | Research and Practice | e3 variable with a Wald test at a significance level of .05. Finally, we added each of the ex- cluded variables into the model, 1 at a time, to assess whether it became significant when included in a model with the other variables. We included fixed effects for year and clustering by state in all models. As a check on the robustness of the results, we also ran a negative binomial model with fixed effects for both year and state. Because of the large number of variables in this model, we reported only the statistically significant pre- dictors in this version of the final model. We conducted all analyses with the XTNBREG and NBREG procedures in Stata version 12 (StataCorp LP, College Station, TX). RESULTS Over the 30-year study period, the mean estimated percentage of gun ownership (mea- sured by the FS/S proxy) ranged from a low of 25.8% in Hawaii to a high of 76.8% in Mississippi, with an average over all states of 57.7% (Appendix A, available as a supplement to the online version of this article at http:// www.ajph.org). Among the 50 states, the aver- age percentage of gun ownership (measured by the FS/S proxy) decreased from 60.6% in 1981 to 51.7% in 2010. By decade, this percentage declined from 60.6% in 1981 to 1990 to 59.6% in 1991 to 2000 to 52.8% in 2001 to 2010. Over the study period, the mean age- adjusted firearm homicide rate ranged from a low of 0.9 per 100 000 population in New Hampshire to a high of 10.8 per 100 000 in Louisiana, with an average over all states of 4.0 per 100 000 (Appendix A). Among the 50 states, the average firearm homicide rate de- creased from 5.2 per 100 000 in 1981 to 3.5 per 100 000 in 2010. By decade, this rate was 4.2 per 100 000 in 1981 to 1990, 4.3 per 100 000 in 1991 to 2000, and 3.4 per 100 000 in 2001 to 2010. In a bivariate analysis (a GEE negative binomial model with year fixed effects and accounting for clustering by state, but with- out any other predictor variables besides gun ownership), the gun ownership proxy was a significant predictor of firearm homicide rates (incidence rate ratio [IRR] = 1.011; 95% confidence interval [CI] = 1.005, 1.018). The final GEE negative binomial model revealed 6 significant predictors of firearm homicide rates: gun ownership proxy (IRR = 1.009; 95% CI = 1.004, 1.014), percentage Black, income inequality, violent crime rate, nonviolent crime rate, and incarceration rate (Table 2). This model indicates that for each 1 percentage point increase in the gun ownership proxy, the firearm homicide rate increased by 0.9%. In the final model, rerun with standardized predictor variables to ease interpretation of results, the IRR for the gun ownership proxy was 1.129 (95% CI = 1.061, 1.201), indicat- ing that for each 1-SD increase in the gun ownership proxy, the firearm homicide rate increased by 12.9% (Table 3). After we controlled for all the measured potential confounding variables, rather than just those found significant in the final model, the gun ownership proxy was still a significant pre- dictor of firearm homicide rates (IRR = 1.008; 95% CI = 1.004, 1.012; Table 4). This result did not change after we excluded the 6 states with missing data for homicide rates in 1 or more years. When we restricted the analysis to 2001, 2002, and 2004 (years for which the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System directly measured household gun ownership in all 50 states), the magnitude of the IRR esti- mated with the proxy measure (FS/S) was similar to that estimated with the survey mea- sure of state-specific household gun ownership, but it was not statistically significant. The IRR associated with gun ownership also remained the same when we executed the full model with PROC GENMOD in SAS version 9.1 (SAS Institute, Cary, NC) rather than the XTNBREG procedure in Stata. We also found little change in the results when we omitted all variables with 1 or more interpolated or extrapolated values from the analysis. When we lagged the gun ownership proxy by 1 year, it remained a significant predictor of firearm homicide rates (IRR = 1.009; 95% CI = 1.005, 1.013; Table 4). When we lagged the gun ownership proxy by 2 years, its effect was attenuated, although still positive and significant (IRR = 1.005; 95% CI = 1.001, 1.009). We found little change in the magnitude or significance of the parameter estimate for the gun ownership proxy variable when we in- troduced linear and quadratic time variables into the analysis to model temporal changes in homicide rates or when the data were weighted by the square root of state population (Table 4). Use of a Poisson rather than a nega- tive binomial model did not alter the results. In a negative binomial model with both year and state fixed effects, the gun ownership proxy TABLE 2—Results of Final Model for Significant Predictors of Age-Adjusted Firearm Homicide Rate: United States, 1981–2010 Variable IRR (95% CI) P Interpretation Gun ownership 1.009 (1.004, 1.014) .001 For each 1 percentage point increase in proportion of household gun ownership, firearm homicide rate increased by 0.9% Percentage Black 1.052 (1.037, 1.068) .001 For each 1 percentage point increase in proportion of Black population, firearm homicide rate increased by 5.2% Gini coefficient 1.046 (1.003, 1.092) .037 For each 0.01 increase in Gini coefficient, firearm homicide rate increased by 4.6% Violent crime rate 1.048 (1.010, 1.087) .013 For each increase of 1/1000 in violent crime rate, firearm homicide rate increased by 4.8% Nonviolent crime rate 1.008 (1.003, 1.013) .002 For each increase of 1/1000 in nonviolent crime rate, firearm homicide rate increased by 0.8% Incarceration rate 0.995 (0.991, 0.999) .027 For each increase of 1/10 000 in incarceration rate, firearm homicide rate decreased by 0.5% Note. CI = confidence interval; IRR = incidence rate ratio. Final model incorporated only variables whose parameter estimates were significant at the P < .05 level. Model included fixed effects for year and adjustment for clustering within states. RESEARCH AND PRACTICE e4 | Research and Practice | Peer Reviewed | Siegel et al. American Journal of Public Health | Published online ahead of print September 12, 2013 http://www.ajph.org http://www.ajph.org remained a significant predictor of firearm homicide rates (IRR = 1.010; 95% CI = 1.001, 1.019). Percentage Black and violent crime rate were also significant predictors of firearm homicide in this model (data not shown). To investigate whether our proxy measure of gun ownership also predicted non---firearm- related homicides, we repeated the analyses with the age-adjusted nonfirearm homicide rate as the outcome variable. The gun ownership proxy was not a significant predictor of non- firearm homicide rates in either the full (IRR = 1.001; 95% CI = 0.998, 1.005; P = .52) or final (IRR = 0.999; 95% CI = 0.996, 1.003; P = .78) models (data not shown). To address the potential problem of serial autocorrelation, we ran a set of 30 year-specific negative binomial regressions. Because of the small number of data points, we ran parsimo- nious models with only a few predictors. Starting with our final model, we included only covariates that were significant predictors of homicide rates in at least 2 of the year-specific regressions (percentage Black, income in- equality, violent crime rate, and gun ownership proxy). The gun ownership proxy was statisti- cally significant in 26 of the 30 year-specific models, with an IRR in these 30 regressions ranging from 1.009 to 1.022. DISCUSSION To the best of our knowledge, ours is the most up-to-date and comprehensive analysis of the relationship between firearm ownership and gun-related homicide rates among the 50 states. Our study encompassed a 30-year period, with data through 2010, and accounted for 18 possible confounders of the relationship between gun ownership and firearm homicide. We found a robust relationship between higher levels of gun ownership and higher firearm homicide rates that was not explained by any of these potential confounders and TABLE 4—Effects of Gun Ownership Level on Age-Adjusted Firearm Homicide Rate: United States, 1981–2010 Gun Ownership Level IRR (95% CI) P Current gun ownership Full modela 1.008 (1.004, 1.012) .001 Excluding states with missing datab 1.009 (1.005, 1.014) .001 Restricted to years 2001, 2002, and 2004c 1.023 (1.014, 1.032) .001 Survey measure of gun ownership used instead of proxy measure (years 2001, 2002, and 2004 only)d 1.016 (0.997, 1.036) .1 Full model executed in SASe 1.009 (1.004, 1.014) .001 Variables with interpolated or extrapolated values omitted from analysisf 1.009 (1.005, 1.014) .001 Control for temporal trends in homicide rates (linear and quadratic terms for time included in model) 1.010 (1.005, 1.014) .001 Individual data points weighted by square root of state population 1.011 (1.005, 1.017) .001 Poisson model instead of negative binomial model 1.008 (1.004, 1.013) .001 Gun ownership in previous years Lagged 1 y 1.009 (1.005, 1.013) .001 Lagged 2 y 1.005 (1.001, 1.009) .024 Note. CI = confidence interval; IRR = incidence rate ratio. aIncluded fixed effects for year, adjustment for clustering within states, and controls for percentage young (aged 15–29 y), percentage young males, percentage Black, percentage Hispanic, poverty, unemployment, household income, educational attainment, income inequality, level of urbanization, alcohol consumption, violent crime rate, nonviolent crime rate, hate crime rate, divorce rate, hunting licenses, region, age-adjusted nonfirearm homicide rate, incarceration rate, and suicide rate. bExcluded data from states with missing data for age-adjusted firearm homicide rate in any year: New Hampshire, North Dakota, Vermont, Wyoming, Hawaii, and South Dakota. cYears for which Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS) data on household gun ownership were available. dMain predictor variable was proportion of households with guns according to BRFSS in 2001, 2002, and 2004; proxy measure (firearm suicides divided by all suicides) was not used in this model. eModel run with PROC GENMOD in SAS version 9.1 (SAS Institute, Cary, NC), with empirical SEs. fVariables with interpolated or extrapolated values were household income, educational attainment, income inequality, level of urbanization, hate crime rate, divorce rate, and incarceration rate. TABLE 3—Results of Final Model for Significant Predictors of Age-Adjusted Firearm Homicide Rate, Using Standardized Predictor Variables: United States, 1981–2010 Variable IRR (95% CI) P Interpretation Gun ownership 1.129 (1.061, 1.201) .001 For each 1-SD increase in proportion of household gun ownership, firearm homicide rate increased by 12.9% Percentage Black 1.828 (1.536, 2.176) .001 For each 1-SD increase in proportion of black population, firearm homicide rate increased by 82.8% Gini coefficient 1.129 (1.007, 1.266) .037 For each 1-SD increase in Gini coefficient, firearm homicide rate increased by 12.9% Violent crime rate 1.154 (1.031, 1.291) .013 For each 1-SD increase in violent crime rate, firearm homicide rate increased by 15.4% Nonviolent crime rate 1.100 (1.036, 1.168) .002 For each 1-SD increase in nonviolent crime rate, firearm homicide rate increased by 10.0% Incarceration rate 0.928 (0.868, 0.992) .027 For each 1-SD increase in incarceration rate, firearm homicide rate decreased by 7.8%. Note. CI = confidence interval; IRR = incidence rate ratio. Final model incorporated only variables whose parameter estimates were significant at the P < .05 level. Model included fixed effects for year and adjustment for clustering within states. RESEARCH AND PRACTICE Published online ahead of print September 12, 2013 | American Journal of Public Health Siegel et al. | Peer Reviewed | Research and Practice | e5 was not sensitive to model specification. Our work expanded on previous studies not only by analyzing more recent data, but also by adjusting for clustering by year and state and controlling for factors, such as the rate of nonfirearm homicides, that likely capture unspecified variables that may be associated with both gun ownership levels and firearm homicide rates. The correlation of gun ownership with fire- arm homicide rates was substantial. Results from our model showed that a 1-SD difference in the gun ownership proxy measure, FS/S, was associated with a 12.9% difference in firearm homicide rates. All other factors being equal, our model would predict that if the FS/S in Mississippi were 57.7% (the average for all states) instead of 76.8% (the highest of all states), its firearm homicide rate would be 17% lower. Because of our use of a proxy measure for gun ownership, we could not conclude that the magnitude of the association between actual household gun ownership rates and homicide rates was the same. However, in a model that incorporated only survey-derived measures of household gun ownership (for 2001, 2002, and 2004), we found that each 1-SD difference in gun ownership was associated with a 24.9% difference in firearm homicide rates. Our results were consistent with, but gener- ally lower than, previous estimates of the effect of gun ownership on homicide rates. We were able to replicate Miller et al.’s study by restricting our analysis to 1988 to 1997 and controlling for the same variables as they did. We obtained an IRR of 1.36 (95% CI = 1.20, 1.54) for the gun ownership proxy; their result was 1.41 (95% CI = 1.27, 1.57).34 After adjusting for clustering by state with GEEs, incorporating year fixed effects, and including additional significant predictors, we obtained an IRR of 1.17 (95% CI = 1.11, 1.24). Limitations We used a proxy measure of firearm own- ership that did not perfectly correlate with survey-derived measures and was therefore not ideal. We have 2 reasons for believing that the observed relationship between gun own- ership and homicide rates was not an artifact of the use of this proxy measure. First, when we restricted the analysis to 2001, 2002, and 2004 and relied on a survey measure of gun ownership, the parameter estimate for gun ownership was similar to (but higher than) that obtained with the proxy measure. Second, the observed relationship between the proxy measure of gun ownership and homicide rates was specific to firearm homicides. We detected no significant relationship between gun ownership and nonfirearm homicide rates. We conducted an ecological study with large aggregates (states) representing the units of analysis. This introduced the possibility that an unknown confounder could explain the ob- served relationship. For this to occur, a putative confounder would have to be strongly corre- lated with both gun ownership and firearm homicide rates, but not highly correlated with any of the other variables we measured. Because of the number of predictor variables we incorporated in our analysis, this seems unlikely. The likelihood was lessened further by our failure to find a significant relationship between gun ownership and nonfirearm homicide rates. Nevertheless, the possibility remains that an omitted variable confounded the observed relationship. A reverse causal association was also pos- sible. For example, increases in firearm homi- cide rates could have led to efforts by state residents to acquire guns, thus increasing gun ownership levels.9,25,29,32,34---36,41,79,80 We addressed this question with a lagged variable and found that gun ownership, lagged by either 1 or 2 years, was still a significant predictor of firearm homicide rates. This is consistent with, but does not prove, the hypothesis that changes in gun ownership rates affect subse- quent firearm homicide rates. It is not possible in a panel study such as ours to determine causality. Furthermore, although this was a panel study, the variation occurred mainly in the cross section, because the differences in firearm homicide across states were greater than the changes over time. Conclusions Our study substantially advances previous work by analyzing recent data, examining the longest and most comprehensive panel of state-specific data to date, and accounting for year and state clustering and for a wide range of potential confounders. We found a robust relationship between gun ownership and firearm homicide rates, a finding that held whether firearm ownership was assessed through a proxy or a survey measure, whether state clustering was accounted for by GEEs or by fixed effects, and whether or not gun ownership was lagged, by up to 2 years. The observed relationship was specific to firearm- related homicide. Although we could not determine causation, we found that states with higher levels of gun ownership had disproportionately large numbers of deaths from firearm-related homicides. j About the Authors Michael Siegel is with the Department of Community Health Sciences, Boston University School of Public Health, Boston, MA. Craig S. Ross is with Virtual Media Resources, Natick, MA. Charles King III is with Greylock McKinnon Associates, Cambridge, and Pleiades Consulting Group, Lincoln, MA. Correspondence should be sent to Michael Siegel, MD, MPH, Department of Community Health Sciences, Boston University School of Public Health, 801 Massachusetts Ave, 3rd Floor, Boston, MA 02118 (e-mail: mbsiegel@bu. edu). Reprints can be ordered at http://www.ajph.org by clicking the “Reprints” link. This article was accepted April 17, 2013. Contributors M. Siegel obtained and analyzed the data. All authors conceptualized and designed the study, interpreted the results, wrote the article, and critically reviewed and commented on the article. Human Participant Protection Institutional review board approval was not needed for this study because secondary data sources were used. References 1. Kellermann AL, Rivara FP. Silencing the science on gun research. JAMA. 2013;309(6):549---550. 2. Mozaffarian D, Hemenway D, Ludwig DS. 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work_tsc7ybx2g5b2hiudx2p6624nyu	----	Scientific Language, Journals and Careers Scientific Language, Journals and Careers Lawrence T. Nichols1 Published online: 15 November 2016 # Springer Science+Business Media New York 2016 In this issue we present a diverse mix of papers that address both epistemology and professional practice. The epistemological questions deal mainly with the language of sociology as a field of organized learning or a social science. The professional issues concern the role and influence of academic journals, as well as personal career choices regarding how to do sociology, that is, how to translate the discipline into personal practice. Two articles link to our most recent issue on the state of journals in sociology. Charles Crothers adds an international dimension to that discussion by delineating the role of the journal, New Zealand Sociology in creating a national sociology in his native land. Jennifer Platt, meanwhile, touches on the issue of the so-called Btop three^ US journals in the field during her discussion of the professional networks and publishing patterns of the twenty most recent presidents of the American Sociological Association. Platt’s analysis engages issues raised by Stephen Turner in his recent book, American Sociology, especially alleged self-perpetuating elites that impact the production of knowledge and control important rewards within the discipline. Monte Bute also deals with professional paths, in an autobiographical account of a highly unlikely career. Some readers will recall Jesse Wozniak’s recent advocacy of Bgonzo^ sociology with its admonition of taking risks to produce knowledge and insight. Bute, however, goes further and, by his own admission seems to have often been poised on the edge of self-destruction. And yet he always prevailed and became more committed to a sociological vocation or lifestyle blending education, research and activism. Christian Smith has made a major contribution to this issue through his work in organizing a mini-symposium on the concept of Bculture^ in contemporary sociology. The starting point of the conversation is his own critique of what he regards as the Binchoate^ (or perhaps one might say Banomic^) situation of cultural discourse. Four papers, by Lynn Spillman, Douglas Porpora, Andrea Voyer and Monika Krause Am Soc (2016) 47:383–387 DOI 10.1007/s12108-016-9333-x * Lawrence T. Nichols lnichol2@wvu.edu 1 Department of Sociology and Anthropology, West Virginia University, 307 Knapp Hall, PO Box 6326, Morgantown, WV 26506-6326, USA http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1007/s12108-016-9333-x&domain=pdf respond to Smith’s argument, some mostly concurring and others taking a different stance. I am always pleased when we can bring out such symposia, as I was urged to do, years ago, by my first editorial Bboss,^ Irving Louis Horowitz when Transaction Publishers produced this journal. And so a word of special thanks is due to all these participants. The concept of culture has long been a matter of personal interest, and so, with apologies, I would like to offer a brief sketch of how the field has changed, re culture, since the time of my early training. As an undergraduate at Saint Louis University in the late 1960s, my mentor was Clement S. Mihanovich who professed a type of sociology rooted in the Bformal^ approach of Georg Simmel and Leopold von Wiese. At its core, for Mihanovich, sociology was the study of processes of association and dissociation, that is, as he put it, Bwhy groups form and why groups break up^—a distinctive task not performed by any other academic field. A la Simmel, for him interaction was Bform^ (e.g., the process of competition) and culture merely Bcontent^ (e.g., sports or politics). Meanwhile, what Gary Alan Fine has termed the Bsecond Chicago school^ was also going strong, and I was exposed to some of its thinking on social psychology by department chair Thomas McPartland (of the BIowa School^ of symbolic interaction) and on deviance and social control by Steven Vago. This approach also had deep roots in Bformal^ sociology, as manifested in the early translations of Simmel by Albion Small, first editor of the American Journal of Sociology and, more famously, in the influential textbook, An Introduction to the Science of Sociology by Robert Park and Ernest Burgess. Edwin Sutherland’s criminological theory of Bdifferential association^ (taught at Saint Louis by Dr. Marie Matthews) and Erving Goffman’s Bpresentation of self in everyday life^ can likewise be considered processes of sociation in Simmel’s sense. However, the Chicago approach also arose out of American pragmatism and its focus on mind and behavior, most famously of course in George Herbert Mead’s Mind, Self and Society and Herbert Blumer’s Bsymbolic interaction^ that emerged from it. This was accompanied by a focus on attitudes, especially as developed by W. I. Thomas from the time of his early interest in folk psychology and the allegedly universal Bfour wishes,^ and articulated as Bvalues and attitudes^ in the landmark Polish Peasant in Europe and America with Florian Znaniecki. In the 1928 book, The Child in America, Thomas and Dorothy Swaine Thomas presented the famous principle that if people define situations as real, they are real in their consequences. This became the basis of the Blabeling^ approach of the Bsecond Chicago school^ that I encountered, via Vago, in the works of Howard S. Becker, Edwin Lemert and Kai Erikson. The same themes pervaded the Bconstructionist^ model of the mid to late 1970s, as articulated by Malcolm Spector and John Kitsuse, Joel Best, Joseph Gusfield, Donileen Loseke, Peter Ibarra and others. All of this I found very interesting, but, as can be seen, none of it was grounded in the idea of culture. At the time of my socialization into the discipline, functional analysis or structural- functionalism remained influential, though its aura was fading. Indeed, this perspective was not really taught at Saint Louis University, and I would suggest that claims about its hegemony should be approached cautiously. Talcott Parsons at Harvard, and Robert K. Merton at Columbia, were regarded as functionalism’s major figures, and there was even a conflict variant, articulated by Lewis Coser who had trained at Columbia, and by Ralf Dahrendorf. Parsons, always interested in the division of labor among academic 384 Am Soc (2016) 47:383–387 fields, located sociology within the realm of Bthe sciences of action^ (following Max Weber’s usage re Baction^ as meaningful behavior), all of which examined three interpenetrating systems of action. In this model, sociology focused on the social system, anthropology on the cultural system, and psychology on the personality system. So culture was present in the Parsonsian approach (which had roots in the anthropology of Bronislaw Malinowski, A. R. Radcliffe Brown, Margaret Mead and Ruth Benedict, as well as Clyde and Florence Kluckhohn’s Bculture and personality^), but it was subordinate to interaction in institutionalized roles—at least for sociologists. I was not much exposed to conflict sociology during my undergraduate and M.A. studies, except in Mihanovich’s graduate course on European social theorists. However, by the mid-1970s, when I moved to Boston College for doctoral work, the conflict perspective had become widely influential and was on its way to even greater domi- nance. At present, for practical purposes, the official stance of the American Sociolog- ical Association and its regional counterparts may arguably be described as democratic socialism, which tends to approach sociology as Bthe field of inequality studies.^ Decades ago, in the wake of the African-American civil rights movement, the anti- Vietnam War movement and race-based unrest and violence in US cities, sociologists began producing a conflict paradigm rooted largely in C. Wright Mills’s Bpower elite^ model and neo-Marxism. Jack Roach and others called for a Bradical sociology,^ and a conflict-oriented journal, The Insurgent Sociologist was launched. Richard Quinney, Michael Burawoy and others published on capitalism and political economy and a new, Bcritical^ criminology arose from the works of Ian Taylor, Paul Walton and Jock Young. Theda Scopol produced a Marxist-oriented theory of states and revolutions. There was also a renewed interest in the Frankfurt School of Theodor Adorno, Max Horkheimer and Herbert Marcuse that blended conflict theory with psychoanalysis, and later, via Jurgen Habermas, with communicative action. Meanwhile, Paolo Frere’s Pedagogy of the Oppressed also became popular. These themes were soon adopted in early feminist writings, such as Dorothy Smith’s Feminism and Marxism, and in feminist revisionist histories such as Mary Jo Deegan’s Jane Addams and the Men of the Chicago School, and The Women Founders, by Patricia Madoo Lengermann and Gillian Niebrugge. They later appeared in the black feminist works of Patricia Hill Collins that framed race, class and gender as intersecting systems of oppression. In the Marxist and neo-Marxist approach, however, Bculture^ was not a key concept. The central focus, rather, was on processes of domination and resistance, with revolution as an ideal. Marx, famously, had asserted that Bmaterial factors,^ especially the economic relations of production, were the driving forces of history, not Bideal factors^ such as the components of culture. In recent years, this has been articulated by former ASA president Joe Feagin, Vera Herman and Kimberly Ducey as Bliberation sociology.^ Given this background and intellectual context, it is perhaps surprising that I became interested in culture. The main reason for this intellectual shift was my reading of Pitirim A. Sorokin’s major work, Social and Cultural Dynamics (1937–1941), an epic in four volumes, each of which was nearly a thousand pages long. Sorokin began by posing the issue of the integration of cultural elements and fluctuations of major systems of culture over historical epochs, including periods of emergence, dominance, decline and disintegration. The first volume presented an historical sociology of art, something entirely absent from my training. I found myself wondering, BYou can do this in sociology?^ (Europeans, of course, would not have been surprised.) Sorokin Am Soc (2016) 47:383–387 385 favored the term Bsociocultural,^ which was not widely used in contemporary US discourse. Dynamics seemed to contain everything I had encountered in other ap- proaches: formal processes of association and dissociation; conflict, cooperation and adaptation; stability and change; social psychology. Sorokin called his approach Bintegral,^ or holistic. And Bculture^ held a place of honor in that paradigm. Sorokin did not allege that culture was always good, nor that it always emerged from cooperation. Indeed, he was very clear that particular systems of culture were often imposed against the wishes of those subjected to them. His view of long-term change was dialectical— not so much in the Hegelian-Marxist-Germanic sense of the clash of opposites as in the more Eastern or Asiatic-Confucian sense of the complementarity of opposites. Before Immanuel Wallerstein developed his Bworld systems theory,^ Sorokin was already Bglobal,^ calling for a broadly international integral culture that blended the strengths of East and West. At Harvard he had bewildered undergraduates read Arnold Toynbee’s massive Study of History that covered the rise and fall of numerous civilizations over many centuries, and he lectured on comparable works by Oswald Spengler, Nikolai Danilevsky and Nikolai Berdyaev—all largely unknown in US sociology. Why I was so moved by Sorokin’s approach when the great majority of others in the field were not (and of course most were not exposed to it) is, at least for me, an interesting question. Part of the answer may be that Sorokin’s integralism is in some respects very much in accord with the approach I learned in the Catholic world, most fully epitomized in Thomas Aquinas’s Summa Theologica that recognizes diverse channels of knowledge or revelation, including the sensory, the intellectual and the spiritual. The Catholic world was also hierarchical (with ordained clergy at the pinna- cle) and it accepted the legitimacy of hierarchies (though not all), while also teaching the principle of subsidiarity (i.e., relative autonomy of various levels). This may have influenced me against embracing the notion of class warfare or total equality as a moral absolute. Also, while the church featured social justice teachings (e.g., support for workers and labor unions), it strongly opposed state socialism, especially the militant atheist variety in the Soviet Union. Such catechetics probably also influenced my viewpoint. Whatever the reasons, I was drawn to integralism rather than to what seemed the more limited, and more negativistic, perspective of conflict theory. Sorokin himself acknowledged that his formulation of integralism was but a Bcreative variation^ on an ancient theme, one that had been manifested in Eastern traditions (Hinduism, Buddhism), as well as in Aristotle, Aquinas and many others over the centuries. I have become an advocate of integralism, and I continue to believe that it can do much to heal divisions within sociology (especially what I have termed an Benemies mentality^) and provide a direction for the further development of the field. One particular way, as Sorokin also urged, would be to concentrate more on positive and pro-social phenomena, such as altruism and solidarity and morality (the foci of a recently created section of ASA). We could develop a sociology of love and, going beyond what Sorokin said, though he implied it, do sociology Bwith love.^ I am pleased that other colleagues, including Vincent Jeffries, Ed Tiryakian, Jay Weinstein, Samuel Oliner, Matthew Lee, Stephen Post, and Lissa Yogan have provided creative leadership in this effort. Meanwhile, others such as Inge Bell and Janine Schipper have promoted the complementary project of a BBuddhist sociology^ that is based on the ideal of compassion. For, with all respect to justice, which many sociologists and sociology departments seem to believe is the guiding value of the field, and which in Catholic 386 Am Soc (2016) 47:383–387 teaching is among the primary virtues, love remains our greatest ideal. Its virtual absence in sociology (beginning with the vocabulary of introductory textbooks) is sad, and also ironic, given the celebration of love in Auguste Comte’s foundational writings. Hate crime, inequality, oppression, violence against women, racism, sexism, homophobia, ageism, ableism, white privilege, etc., are staples in contemporary socio- logical curricula. But love-centered courses such as Matthew Lee’s at the University of Akron or Samuel Oliner’s at Humboldt state, remain rare. Why not study the sociology of friendship, reconciliation and forgiveness, peace making, philanthropy, volunteer- ism, ethical business practice or communitarian relations along the lines of Amitai Etzioni’s work? And why not develop, as Vincent Jeffries has advocated, a Bsociology of the good^? At some point, there must be a dialectical balance. In closing, let me express the hope that readers will enjoy this issue of our journal and find it nurturing. I celebrate the Breturn of culture^ to our field and our vocabulary. Indeed, it has become a major event and the recently established section of ASA on culture has quickly grown into one of the largest. There are now culture journals as well as Bhandbooks,^ and scholars such as Jeffrey Alexander have become prominent due to work in this area. We can expect this trend, this Bcultural turn^ to continue. Sorokin, who saw himself as a pathfinder, would very likely feel vindicated. Am Soc (2016) 47:383–387 387 Scientific Language, Journals and Careers 
work_tle5ds4sjrh4rn6cvbq3whtdv4	----	This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 United States License. This journal is published by the University Library System of the University of Pittsburgh as part of its D-Scribe Digital Publishing Program, and is cosponsored by the University of Pittsburgh Press. Volume 13 (2016) | ISSN 1932-1821 (print) 1932-1996 (online) DOI 10.5195/taxreview.2016.47 | http://taxreview.law.pitt.edu THE HATE EXCLUSION: MORAL TAX EQUITY FOR DAMAGES RECEIVED ON ACCOUNT OF RACE, SEX, OR SEXUAL ORIENTATION DISCRIMINATION Bobby L. Dexter Pitt Tax Review | ISSN 1932-1821 (print) 1932-1996 (online) DOI 10.5195/taxreview.2016.47 | http://taxreview.law.pitt.edu 197 THE HATE EXCLUSION: MORAL TAX EQUITY FOR DAMAGES RECEIVED ON ACCOUNT OF RACE, SEX, OR SEXUAL ORIENTATION DISCRIMINATION Bobby L. Dexter* Abstract Scholars on both sides of the reparations literature divide commonly contemplate some form of federal monetary outlay. At the same time, given both the absence of such an outlay and the dire prognosis that such largesse is forthcoming, tax scholars rarely contribute to traditional reparations literature. With this Article, Professor Dexter introduces the notion that reparations take the form of narrowly-tailored federal tax expenditures. Such an approach, he argues, presents fertile ground for the resolution of longstanding differences in the reparations debate. In addition to highlighting the various political and administrative merits of a tax expenditure approach to reparations, he argues that allowing the exclusion of damages received on account of specific forms of discrimination—even if suffered at the hands of a private actor—would offer immediate and precisely-targeted reparational relief not only to those suffering the modern day impact of slavery and race discrimination under federal imprimatur but also to those impacted by the United States’ well-documented history of hostility with respect to women and sexual minorities. Readily acknowledging that considerable progress has been made (often via the firm and necessarily-persistent hand of federal mandate), Professor Dexter presents current day-to-day events (including the conduct of certain law enforcement personnel and specific public officials openly hostile to marriage equality) as evidence of a lingering yet defiant, federally-sculpted, * Professor of Law, Chapman University Dale E. Fowler School of Law. I would like to extend my sincere thanks to Chapman University for its financial support not only during the production of this Article but also in connection with its presentation at various venues. Thanks are also in order for helpful commentary offered by members of the Chapman Law faculty, participants at the Third National People of Color Legal Scholarship Conference, and those attending annual meetings of the Law & Society Association and the Southeastern Association of Law Schools. If, notwithstanding the wise counsel of my commentators, errors persist, I claim them as my own. 1 9 8 | P i t t s b u r g h T a x R e v i e w | V o l . 1 3 2 0 1 6 Pitt Tax Review | ISSN 1932-1821 (print) 1932-1996 (online) DOI 10.5195/taxreview.2016.47 | http://taxreview.law.pitt.edu federally-nourished national psyche. The narrow tailoring of relief and the moral force of the unclean hands theory of exclusion, he reasons, neutralizes arguments advanced in traditional reparations literature regarding excessive act, wrongdoer, and victim attenuation. V o l . 1 3 2 0 1 6 | H a t e E x c l u s i o n | 1 9 9 Pitt Tax Review | ISSN 1932-1821 (print) 1932-1996 (online) DOI 10.5195/taxreview.2016.47 | http://taxreview.law.pitt.edu INTRODUCTION “The evil that men do, lives after them . . . .” Frederick Douglass1 “He has endeavored, in every way that he could to destroy her confidence in her own powers, to lessen her self-respect, and to make her willing to lead a dependent and abject life.” Elizabeth Cady Stanton2 “It takes no compromising to give people their rights. It takes no money to respect the individual. . . . It takes no survey to remove repression.” Harvey Milk3 Aggressively seeking to hasten the end of the Civil War and thereby preserve the Union,4 President Abraham Lincoln issued the Emancipation Proclamation on January 1, 1863. Given that the proclamation applied only to specific states and regions then in rebellion against the United States, slavery was not abolished throughout the country until the requisite number of states ratified the Thirteenth Amendment on December 6, 1865. Only in June of 2009, almost 150 years later, did the United States Senate formally apologize for the institution of slavery,5 yet in doing so, it carefully noted 1 Frederick Douglass, Address Commemorating Independence Day in Rochester, NY (July 5, 1852), in 501 MUST-KNOW SPEECHES 274–75 (Octopus Publishing Group Ltd. 2009) (quoting WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TRAGEDY OF JULIUS CAESAR act 3, sc. 2). 2 Elizabeth C. Stanton, Address at the First Women’s Rights Convention in Seneca Falls, NY (July 1848), in 501 MUST-KNOW SPEECHES 248–49 (Octopus Publishing Group Ltd. 2009). 3 Harvey Milk, Concession Speech in San Francisco, CA (1973), in THE MAYOR OF CASTRO STREET: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF HARVEY MILK 76 (St. Martin’s Griffin 1988). 4 President Abraham Lincoln stated the following: “My paramount objective in this struggle is to save the Union, and is not either to save or to destroy slavery.” See ROGER MATUZ, THE PRESIDENTS FACT BOOK 261 (2004). 5 A Senate Concurrent Resolution issued in 2009 provides, in pertinent part, as follows: Whereas the system of slavery and the visceral racism against people of African descent upon which it depended became enmeshed in the social fabric of the United States . . . . Whereas African-Americans continue to suffer from the consequences of slavery and Jim Crow laws—long after both systems were formally abolished—through enormous damage and loss, both tangible and intangible, including the loss of human dignity and liberty . . . . The Congress—(A) acknowledges the fundamental injustice, cruelty, brutality, and inhumanity of slavery and Jim Crow laws; 2 0 0 | P i t t s b u r g h T a x R e v i e w | V o l . 1 3 2 0 1 6 Pitt Tax Review | ISSN 1932-1821 (print) 1932-1996 (online) DOI 10.5195/taxreview.2016.47 | http://taxreview.law.pitt.edu that its apology was neither authorization nor support for any claim against the United States nor a settlement of any claim against the United States.6 The Senate’s act, however egregiously belated, was an important symbolic step, yet if Uncle Sam has visions of crossing the finish line of meaningful reparational justice, he best gear up for a grueling triathlon. The United States cannot help but display the filthy paws of participatory guilt with respect to slavery and subsequent decades of oppression and rank race discrimination. Disturbingly true as well is the fact that the government’s historical hands are not entirely clean with respect to discrimination on the basis of sex, and the soiling lingers stubbornly with respect to sexual orientation discrimination; to date, no federal law prohibits discrimination in employment (or in various other contexts) on the basis of sexual orientation. Scholars have long lamented the harms flowing from sex and sexual orientation discrimination at the behest of the federal government and individual states, but the discontent has never matured into specific demands for traditional reparations. No wonder. Even in the wake of numerous demands and voluminous scholarly commentary with respect to reparations for slavery and Jim Crow laws, there exists little room for realistic optimism with respect to direct reparation payments. Courts have been (B) apologizes to African-Americans on behalf of the people of the United States, for the wrongs committed against them and their ancestors who suffered under slavery and Jim Crow laws; S. Con. Res. 26, 111th Cong. (2009) [hereinafter Apology]. To date, the U.S. House of Representatives has not passed this resolution. 6 Id. V o l . 1 3 2 0 1 6 | H a t e E x c l u s i o n | 2 0 1 Pitt Tax Review | ISSN 1932-1821 (print) 1932-1996 (online) DOI 10.5195/taxreview.2016.47 | http://taxreview.law.pitt.edu dismissive,7 Congress has proven consistently resistant,8 and wholly aside from the objections of segments of the population,9 some perceive intractable issues of causation/attenuation with respect to allowing any remedial measure to be visited on those they see as latter-day innocents.10 This Article offers up a decidedly novel possibility by introducing the federal income tax arena as fertile ground for the resolution of longstanding differences in the reparations debate. Both sides of the reparations literature divide have persistently contemplated some form of overt federal outlay, but neither side has seriously considered the tax expenditure route as a viable alternative. Rather than broach the politically flammable subject of direct reparations payments, Congress could instead use the federal income tax system to provide reparation-based exclusions for specific discrete and insular minorities who have secured damages, by final litigation victory or settlement, because they suffered legally redressable discrimination (i.e., the 7 See Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1111 (9th Cir. 1995) (concluding that reparations for slavery and discrimination are the province of Congress and not the courts). The plaintiff sought reparations of $100,000,000 “for forced, ancestral indoctrination into a foreign society; kidnapping of ancestors from Africa; forced labor; breakup of families; removal of traditional values; deprivations of freedom; and imposition of oppression, intimidation, miseducation and lack of information about various aspects of their indigenous character.” Id. at 1106. Reparations plaintiffs may also face issues of standing. See Eric J. Miller, Representing the Race: Standing to Sue in Reparations Lawsuits, 20 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 91, 92 (2004) (noting that the standing model requires some continuing relationship between victim, perpetrator, and harm and that if “the relation is to survive the absence of the original victim, there must be some harm that is transmitted from victim to victim across generations”). He goes on to question the intergenerational transmission of injury by mere biological relation. Id. at 95. 8 See Kaimipono D. Wenger, Causation and Attenuation in the Slavery Reparations Debate, 40 U.S.F. L. REV. 279, 280 (2006) (noting the difficulty the reparations cause had in Congress and in various courts). 9 The burden of traditional reparations would fall on descendants of perpetrators as well as the descendants of non-perpetrators. Id. at 297 n.80. Accordingly, there is overwhelming opposition of whites to traditional reparations. Id. at 280 n.3. 10 According to some commentators, victim, wrongdoer, and act attenuation present hurdles in establishing causation in a traditional reparations context. Id. at 280–82. Traditional wrongdoer attenuation arguments rest on the notion that current citizens/governments bear insufficient nexus to slave- holders to justify imposition of liability on present-day citizens/governments. Id. at 296–97 & n.80. This attenuation problem was avoided in Holocaust litigation because the focus was on existing governments and corporate entities. Id. at 303. I do not buy the distinction. American citizens routinely celebrate the nation’s centennials, bicentennials, and the like, apparently rejoicing ecstatically and with great fanfare (and fireworks) the fact that the United States of the eighteenth century set up by the so-called Founding Fathers has endured for centuries. To this day, the National Archives houses, protects, and preserves the nation’s formative documents, which are from the eighteenth century. 2 0 2 | P i t t s b u r g h T a x R e v i e w | V o l . 1 3 2 0 1 6 Pitt Tax Review | ISSN 1932-1821 (print) 1932-1996 (online) DOI 10.5195/taxreview.2016.47 | http://taxreview.law.pitt.edu “unclean hands theory of exclusion”). Section 104(a)(2) of the Code currently allows taxpayers to exclude non-punitive damages from their gross income, so long as those damages were awarded on account of physical injury or physical sickness. Thus, damages awarded as a result of race-, sex-, or sexual orientation-based discrimination do not qualify for the exclusion. Accordingly, Uncle Sam must wait patiently for taxes on the amount awarded, but in due course, he may confidently present and demand his piece of the action. I argue that even when a private actor bears a healthy measure of direct responsibility for discriminating, history clarifies that the private actor does not stand wholly alone at the scaffold of guilt.11 Consider the case of race discrimination. From its inception, the United States set the stage for centuries of overt oppression and discrimination by readily accommodating, protecting, and enforcing slavery by constitutional mandate. To worsen matters, for decades after the abolition of slavery, the federal government fully endorsed and participated in racial discrimination and failed to wield its power to halt the horror of lynching. In his seminal work on reparations for African-Americans, the eminent tax scholar, Professor Boris Bittker, articulated a consistent viewpoint, noting the following: As a working hypothesis . . . , I am prepared to accept the theory that statutes, ordinances, and other official actions have been the predominant source of the racial discrimination that has blighted our public and private life. If accepted, this premise is a justification for publicly financed reparations to the victims of discrimination, even though some of the damage may stem from “private” behavior that might have occurred in the absence of official encouragement or even in violation of official prohibitions.12 Likewise, the United States, directly or indirectly, played a substantial role in the historical subordination of women and the persistent direction of hostility towards sexual minorities.13 Thus, the United States created and enabled the perpetuation of a national psyche in which various forms of discrimination and subjugation were either consciously required or passively 11 See Avital Mentovich & John T. Jost, The Ideological “Id”? System Justification and the Unconscious Perpetuation of Inequality, 40 CONN. L. REV. 1095 (2008). 12 BORIS I. BITTKER, THE CASE FOR BLACK REPARATIONS 25–26 (2003). 13 Kendall Thomas, Beyond the Privacy Principle, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1431, 1435 (1992) (arguing that “homosexual sodomy statutes work to legitimize homophobic violence and thus violate the right to be free from state-legitimated violence at the hands of private and public actors”). Professor Thomas explains that those attacking gays and lesbians do so under color/cover of state law. Id. at 1491. V o l . 1 3 2 0 1 6 | H a t e E x c l u s i o n | 2 0 3 Pitt Tax Review | ISSN 1932-1821 (print) 1932-1996 (online) DOI 10.5195/taxreview.2016.47 | http://taxreview.law.pitt.edu validated.14 Although corrective measures exist with respect to race, sex, and (as of late) sexual orientation discrimination, empirical evidence amply demonstrates that substantial inequities persist, and a healthy part of the blame for that persistence rests squarely on the shoulders of the United States. Thus, for federal income tax purposes, a powerful, coercive, and discriminating federal hand in the matter fully justifies the reparational exclusion of damages awarded on account of race, sex, or sexual orientation discrimination. Part I of this Article provides basic information concerning the exclusion of certain litigation/settlement damages from a taxpayer’s gross income under § 104(a)(2) of the Code. Part I also highlights relatively recent amendments limiting the scope of the exclusion and devotes some attention to related scholarly commentary before going on to lay out the merits of (and challenges presented by) the damage exclusion proposal vis-à-vis traditional reparations payments. Focusing pointedly on African-Americans, women, and sexual minorities, Parts II, III, and IV serve largely to set forth the extensive harms inflicted (or permitted) by the United States over time, the corrective measures, if any, that have been effected, and the evidence which indicates that the corrective measures have fallen far short of eradicating the negative impact of the original harm. Part V presents a summary and final conclusions. I. BACKGROUND Section 104(a)(2) of the Code generally provides that taxpayers may exclude from the gross income the amount of damages received (by suit or agreement) on account of personal physical injuries or physical sickness.15 The exclusion does not apply to punitive damages,16 and barring the 14 Apology, supra note 5 (stating that “the system of slavery and the visceral racism against people of African descent upon which it depended became enmeshed in the social fabric of the United States”) (emphasis added). 15 I.R.C § 104(a)(2). Note that to the extent amounts are attributable to deductions allowed under § 213 for a prior taxable year, the exclusion under § 104 does not apply. Id. 16 Id. For an exception relating to specific wrongful death actions, see I.R.C. § 104(c). 2 0 4 | P i t t s b u r g h T a x R e v i e w | V o l . 1 3 2 0 1 6 Pitt Tax Review | ISSN 1932-1821 (print) 1932-1996 (online) DOI 10.5195/taxreview.2016.47 | http://taxreview.law.pitt.edu application of circumstantial exception,17 the exclusion does not apply to amounts rewarded for emotional distress.18 Prior to its amendment in the Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, § 104(a)(2) was available as authority for excluding damages awarded/received in various discrimination lawsuits.19 Since that time, scholars have argued that various classes of damages merit tax exclusion. Some reason that emotional distress damages do not, in fact, constitute “income,”20 others argue that restorations of human capital (whether physical or mental) merit exclusion,21 and yet others argue that the physical/non-physical distinction is simply unwarranted.22 Indeed, one commentator goes so far as to argue that because of the impact on those receiving damages after suffering dignitary torts, the 1996 amendments reflect “unconscious judicial and legislative discrimination.”23 Rather than arguing that discrimination damages are the virtual equivalent of physical injury/sickness damages (or wholly beyond the realm of “income”), the unclean hands theory of exclusion simply points an accusing finger at the United States, recruits the damaging force of unassailable historical fact, and calls for an amendment to the Code. At the same time, the exclusion approach borrows from the moral force of current reparations literature while arguably circumventing a number of the problems associated with direct reparation payment requests. Prior scholars have discussed potential use of the Code to effect reparational justice in connection with direct payments. Professors 17 I.R.C. § 104(a). The Code provides that emotional distress does not constitute a physical injury or physical sickness but contains a carve-out with respect to damage amounts received as compensation for medical care attributable to emotional distress. Id. (flush language). 18 Id. Amounts paid for emotional distress attributable to physical injury or physical sickness are excludable under § 104(a)(2). Treas. Reg. § 1.104-1(c)(1). 19 Mark J. Wolff, Sex, Race, and Age: Double Discrimination in Torts and Taxes, 78 WASH. U. L.Q. 1341, 1343–44 (2000). 20 Laura A. Quigley, Reparations Rights Tax Relief Restores Human Rights As a Civil Right in Tax Tort Reform, 40 VAL. U. L. REV. 41, 42 (2005). 21 Frank J. Doti, Personal Injury Income Tax Exclusion: An Analysis and Update, 75 DENV. U. L. REV. 61, 63 (1997) (arguing that the exclusion under § 104(a)(2) should be limited to injury to original human capital (i.e., a sound body and a sound mind)). 22 Wolff, supra note 19, at 1454–64 (arguing the equivalence of physical and non-physical injuries). 23 Id. at 1347. V o l . 1 3 2 0 1 6 | H a t e E x c l u s i o n | 2 0 5 Pitt Tax Review | ISSN 1932-1821 (print) 1932-1996 (online) DOI 10.5195/taxreview.2016.47 | http://taxreview.law.pitt.edu Waterhouse and Smith conclude that § 104(a)(2), in its current form, would not support exclusion of a direct reparation payment, given that such a payment would not compensate for physical injury or physical sickness24 and might be deemed non-excludable as punitive.25 They also note, of course, that Congress could simply provide for the exclusion of direct reparations payments from gross income.26 Such an act would have strong atonement force27and substantively parallel the treatment of Japanese internees and Holocaust victims receiving reparations.28 In the aftermath of the forced relocation and internment of Japanese-Americans during World War II, there was a congressional apology, a public education fund foundation was created, and compensation of $20,000 was paid to each survivor.29 Regarding Holocaust-related reparations and the like, current non-Code tax law provides that a taxpayer’s gross income does not include certain excludable restitution payments received by victims (or the heirs of victims) who suffered persecution on the basis of race, religion, physical or mental disability, or sexual orientation at the hands of Nazi Germany, an Axis regime, or any other Nazi-controlled/allied country.30 24 Carlton Waterhouse & Andre Smith, No Reparation without Taxation: Applying the Internal Revenue Code to the Concept of Reparations for Slavery and Segregation 29 (FIU Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 08-28), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1547326 (last visited Apr. 20, 2010). 25 Id. at 32. 26 Id. at 19. 27 Id. at 31; see also Harold S. Peckron, Reparation Payments—An Exclusion Revisited, 34 U.S.F. L. REV. 705, 711–12 n.46 (2000) (noting that the Service has previously embraced a moral theory of exclusion with respect to certain reparation payments from sovereign governments because the income “constitutes reimbursement for the deprivation of a civil or personal right”). Peckron also notes that the exclusion for personal physical injuries and physical sickness reflects Congressional intent to incorporate social policy into governing statutory provisions. Id. at 707. 28 Peckron, supra note 27, at 707; see also Waterhouse & Smith, supra note 24, at 31. 29 BITTKER, supra note 12, at xv. 30 See generally Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107- 16, § 803, 115 Stat. 38, 149–50. Different motivations gave rise to the horrors of slavery on the one hand and the horrors of the Holocaust on the other. See Andrew Bell-Fialkoff, A Brief History of Ethnic Cleansing, 72 FOREIGN AFF. 110, 111 (1993) (noting that the removal of Africans from their homeland for use as slaves was not “ethnic cleansing” as commonly understood because the desire was to import a slave population to a region rather than to expel that population from a region). These differing motivations do not, however, dictate or support differential treatment of actual reparation payments or reparational tax exclusions. 2 0 6 | P i t t s b u r g h T a x R e v i e w | V o l . 1 3 2 0 1 6 Pitt Tax Review | ISSN 1932-1821 (print) 1932-1996 (online) DOI 10.5195/taxreview.2016.47 | http://taxreview.law.pitt.edu The unclean hands theory of exclusion seeks comparable atonement, but directs the point of revenue impact to the aforementioned tax exclusion for specific discrimination damages which, far from being as speculative as an award of reparations, are regularly awarded in fact. At the same time, the theory broadens the eligibility base in recognition of the fact that several distinct groups qualify for the form of relief contemplated. In each victim arena, the United States bears the guilt of prior invidious (or at least conscious) discrimination, and failure to allow exclusion of the relevant damages would permit the United States to collect revenue rooted, to some extent, in its own historical (or ongoing) wrongdoing.31 Such a reality would be one step worse than merely allowing the United States to escape penalty. Various federal courts see no harm in forcing a private party paying damages to “gross up” the amount paid to offset the negative tax impact of a lump sum payment (relative to a stream of small amounts over time).32 Does it not make a healthy amount of sense for the United States to forego revenue in this context because the United States, itself, had a coercive hand in creating the society in which a private actor ultimately carried out the discrimination? The unclean hands theory of exclusion champions that notion and, at the same time, effectively addresses many of the concerns regularly voiced in direct payment reparations literature. In this case, there exists a clear relationship between the original wrongdoer (the United States) and the original victim (the person suffering present-day discrimination), just as Professors Posner and Vermeule insist that there must be.33 Additionally, it is the wrongdoer itself foregoing revenue 31 BITTKER, supra note 12, at 124 (“[A] federal program of black reparations . . . would be intended as compensation for a century of state and federal violations of the equal-protection clause.”). 32 See Eshelman v. Agere Sys., Inc., 554 F.3d 426, 442 (3d Cir. 2009) (holding that the lower court could “award a prevailing employee an additional sum of money to compensate for the increased tax burden a back pay award may create” because such an award “will, in the appropriate case, help to make a victim whole”); Sears v. Atchison, Topeka, & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 749 F.2d 1451, 1456 (10th Cir. 1984) (holding that the lower court did not abuse its discretion when it “included a tax component in the back pay award to compensate class members for their additional tax liability as a result of receiving over seventeen years of back pay in one lump sum”). But see Dashnaw v. Peña, 12 F.3d 1112, 1116 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (concluding that the aggrieved party was not entitled to a gross-up in his award to account for the tax impact of receiving back pay in a lump sum because the court knew of “no authority for such relief”). 33 See Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Reparations for Slavery and Other Historical Injustices, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 689, 698 (2003) (stating that “[r]eparations claims thus involve three relationships: (1) the relationship between the original wrongdoer and the original victim; (2) the relationship between the original wrongdoer and the possible payer of reparations; and (3) the relationship between the original V o l . 1 3 2 0 1 6 | H a t e E x c l u s i o n | 2 0 7 Pitt Tax Review | ISSN 1932-1821 (print) 1932-1996 (online) DOI 10.5195/taxreview.2016.47 | http://taxreview.law.pitt.edu (i.e., the equivalent of direct payment in the opinion of some),34 and the victim and the ultimate beneficiary are one and the same. Thus, there are no clear issues with respect to the wrongful act, wrongdoer, or victim attenuation.35 One commentator noted the following in discussing traditional reparations: [T]he present-day plaintiffs must demonstrate a present-day injury, although that injury is attributable to the manner in which their ancestors were treated.36 * * * [T]he sorts of legally relevant injuries are harms suffered by individuals that are attributable to the ongoing effects of slavery. Such harms are relatively easy to identify. They include all the continuing and pernicious social indignities that structure race relations in America. They are in part traceable to the institution of slavery and the racial stigmas and stereotypes it created, enforced, and yet perpetuates. Many of these stigmas and stereotypes have an oppressive impact upon African Americans today. Accordingly, as far as the relational structure of standing is concerned, the institution of slavery may be important only insofar as it exists as a continuing cause of present-day harms, and irrelevant until particularized into concrete relations between individuals or groups.37 Although some might object to requiring that the United States suffer loss as a result of a private actor’s conduct, I argue that to an overwhelming extent, the United States is the original wrongdoer. It protected a nefarious institution in its formative documents, and thereby directly authorized the subjugation and oppression of a specific group. Simultaneously, it created a public mindset in which the default setting was subjugation and oppression of the group, the vast majority of which are physically identifiable. Thus, even when a private actor is involved, a successful present-day plaintiff does, indeed, suffer a present-day injury attributable to how the United States victim and the possible claimant or beneficiary of reparations. The claimant must show that each relationship is of the proper type.”). 34 See Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government Policy: A Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARV. L. REV. 705, 706 (1970) (noting the similarity between various tax incentives and direct government expenditures (or similar items)). 35 See Wenger, supra note 8, at 282 (noting that attenuation arguments can be generally categorized as victim attenuation, wrongdoer attenuation, and act attenuation). 36 Miller, supra note 7, at 96 n.17. 37 Id. at 97. 2 0 8 | P i t t s b u r g h T a x R e v i e w | V o l . 1 3 2 0 1 6 Pitt Tax Review | ISSN 1932-1821 (print) 1932-1996 (online) DOI 10.5195/taxreview.2016.47 | http://taxreview.law.pitt.edu treated the plaintiff’s ancestors and their progeny. Further, there is support from the traditional reparations literature for broadening rather than narrowing the blanket of responsibility in this context because of participation in particularly noxious collective behavior38 or participating in behavior that was a substantial factor leading to the specific harm.39 In this connection, I would argue that ratification of a Constitution protecting slavery qualifies,40 as do sex- and orientation-based discrimination. The unclean hands theory of exclusion also solves the problem of victim identification, which plagues the traditional reparations approach. Notes one commentator, Descendants will not have a problem establishing that they are the proper recipient of a remedy—if they can first establish a harm done to them. But the descendant- based theory suffers from the difficult question of establishing harm—how are modern slave descendants harmed by slavery? Ultimately, [ancestor-based and descendant-based theories depend] on the resolution of the same difficult questions of causation, such as how slaves can be connected to modern claimants.41 Given the unclean hands theory’s focus on presently-inflicted harm as the result of a chronically-oppressive, federally-constructed social milieu, the difficulty of establishing a causative link between specific harms to ancestors and a modern claimant simply evaporates. One might argue that lingering institutional racism is weak support for making payments to large segments of the population (some of whom may not have been affected by the phenomenon). Yet, one can more readily justify relief with respect to proven 38 Wenger, supra note 8, at 310–11 (suggesting that, inter alia, group liability might be one means of overcoming attenuation problems where individual actors acted similarly (despite the specter of harm) or participated in a particularly noxious behavior). 39 Id. at 311–12 (suggesting that, inter alia, a court might circumvent attenuation problems by applying a “substantial factor” test (i.e., “allowing liability in cases where a defendant’s actions were a substantial factor leading to the plaintiff’s harm”)). 40 Cf. Wenger, supra note 8, at 325 (reasoning that market share liability under an unjust enrichment theory of reparations is appropriate because “all defendants contributed to the formation of the nationwide system of enslavement”). 41 Id. at 286; see also Miller, supra note 7, at 91 (pointing out that identification of the proper recipient and the proper form of compensation are problems that have to be addressed in the reparations context). V o l . 1 3 2 0 1 6 | H a t e E x c l u s i o n | 2 0 9 Pitt Tax Review | ISSN 1932-1821 (print) 1932-1996 (online) DOI 10.5195/taxreview.2016.47 | http://taxreview.law.pitt.edu incidents of redressable harm,42 especially when the proposal on the table merely ensures that the reparative relief touches all perpetrators (including the United States) and not merely the final actor; as was recently acknowledged with respect to race,43 the final actor has been influenced by the larger societal backdrop, and the same is true with respect to sex and sexual orientation. Such an approach should have the added merit of being perceived as neither inherently overinclusive nor inherently underinclusive.44 In addition to the various problems the unclean hands theory of exclusion avoids, it also has the benefit of being more politically palatable than a direct reparations payment and substantially more amenable to attractive packaging (i.e., as a modest, logical change in the tax law (applicable to a wide range of individuals) that reflects a partial return to that prior law). Those benefits notwithstanding, some may feel that reparational relief for slavery and discrimination should have a far broader base,45 that 42 Cf. McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987) (holding that institutional racism in the courts cannot justify overturning a conviction and that racism has to be established as that cause of a specific conviction). 43 Apology, supra note 5 (stating that “the system of slavery and the visceral racism against people of African descent upon which it depended became enmeshed in the social fabric of the United States”). 44 These problems plague the traditional reparations mechanism. One commentator notes the following: The “traditional” reparations suit appears to present a gap in the relationship between plaintiff, defendant, and harm. Such suits seek some form of “public welfare” relief. The proposed remedy is some type of payout that will address the needs of those African Americans who are “bottom stuck,” in the words of one of the leading reparations advocates, Professor Charles Ogletree. Thus, the redress sought is under-inclusive, in that it excludes a large portion of the individuals entitled to receive relief (rich former [sic] descendants of slaves). It is also over-inclusive to the extent that it includes with the public welfare programs those who are not descendants of African American slaves and who, therefore, have no right to receive compensation from the defendants. Miller, supra note 7, at 94 (footnote omitted). Note that a given damage recipient’s exclusion flows from harm inflicted by the United States which may be visited on any number of individuals, regardless of whether they happen, for example, to be a descendant of African slaves or merely happen to look like such a descendant. 45 Joe R. Feagin, Documenting the Costs of Slavery, Segregation, and Contemporary Racism: Why Reparations Are in Order for African Americans, 20 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 49, 74–75 (2004) (suggesting that reparations take the form of collective compensation rather than individual compensation, given that the harm was inflicted broadly and the solution should focus on group rehabilitation over time); Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., excerpt from All Deliberate Speed: “Addressing the Racial Divide: Reparations,” 20 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 115, 133–34 (2004) (concluding that to the extent reparations are paid, they 2 1 0 | P i t t s b u r g h T a x R e v i e w | V o l . 1 3 2 0 1 6 Pitt Tax Review | ISSN 1932-1821 (print) 1932-1996 (online) DOI 10.5195/taxreview.2016.47 | http://taxreview.law.pitt.edu corrective measures have already been taken (which have proven effective), and that reparational relief of any form has no logical end point. These problems present wholly aside from issues of revenue loss and constitutionality. These issues are certainly ripe for discussion, and some are more capable of effective resolution than others. At the same time, the gravity of historical harms inflicted and the persistence of negative ramifications present a compelling case for some form of reparational relief. Today. II. RACE46 A. Historical Harms 1. Formative Document Accommodations of Slavery Although the Declaration of Independence opens by announcing the equality of all men and the like, it is not long before the document sets forth a string of complaints directed at the reigning British monarch. Among the complaints in the original draft was the following attack on slavery: “Determined to keep open a market where men should be bought and sold, [the Christian King of Great Britain] has prostituted his negative for suppressing every legislative attempt to prohibit or restrain this execrable commerce.”47 To appease South Carolina and Georgia, however, this should not be paid in the form of a check to individual citizens but instead be placed in a trust fund and used to benefit those who have not managed to attain the American Dream (i.e., the “bottom stuck”)); Carlton Waterhouse, The Good, The Bad, and The Ugly: Moral Agency and the Role of Victims in Reparations Programs, 31 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 257 (2009) (arguing that victims should have a key role in the design and implementation of reparations programs and articulating the merits of an institution-based approach to reparations). Of course, there are those who feel that no direct payments should be made. The danger with any outside assistance—whether public or private, monetary or in-kind— is that it invites a focus on doing things to people and for people. Efforts directed at accomplishing what people can only do for themselves run the risk of engendering passivity and distracting from the needed emphasis on self-help. Because others’ contributions can never substitute for victims’ doing their part, private interventions, like public ones, are often doomed to disappointment and failure. AMY L. WAX, RACE, WRONGS, AND REMEDIES: GROUP JUSTICE IN THE 21ST CENTURY 130 (2009). 46 Given the extraordinarily voluminous history of African-Americans in the United States, this section of the Article borrows heavily from CHARLES M. CHRISTIAN, BLACK SAGA: THE AFRICAN AMERICAN EXPERIENCE (1995). 47 Id. at 52. V o l . 1 3 2 0 1 6 | H a t e E x c l u s i o n | 2 1 1 Pitt Tax Review | ISSN 1932-1821 (print) 1932-1996 (online) DOI 10.5195/taxreview.2016.47 | http://taxreview.law.pitt.edu language was taken out.48 Thus, even before the drafting of the Constitution, the founding fathers saw fit to accommodate the institution of slavery, even though several colonies had taken steps to abolish it.49 Odd as it may seem in retrospect, the colony of Georgia initially barred slaves.50 However, with white settlers failing at almost every effort to turn a profit and migrating colonists from South Carolina aggressively seeking repeal of the prohibition, the notion of using slave labor in Georgia gained gradual acceptance; with the repeal of the act prohibiting slavery, thousands of blacks were brought in.51 While many states were taking steps to abolish slavery before, during, and after the drafting of the Constitution, other states were, at the same time, taking steps to augment and enforce the institution by migrating indentured servants to slave status52 and prohibiting manumission (to reduce or eliminate the free black population in a given state).53 Of course, several states were 48 Id. 49 See id. at 53. 50 Id. at 34. 51 Id. at 39–40. 52 Africans sold from a Dutch ship (a man-of-war) at Jamestown, Virginia in 1619 were probably indentured servants. Id. at 6–7. For some time, blacks surviving their indenture ultimately became part of society (buying property, voting, etc.); things changed as the slave trade picked up and became immensely profitable. Id. at 6–8. Various steps were taken at different times to strip blacks of indentured servitude status and migrate them to a condition of perpetual servitude. To enforce and maintain the status of slaves as slaves, the English colonies ultimately embraced a fairly uniform set of rules governing the institution (i.e., the slave codes). South Carolina’s code (which became the model adopted by other colonies) provided, inter alia, the following: Baptism in the Christian faith does not alter the status of the slave. Slaves are forbidden to leave the owner’s property without written permission, unless accompanied by a white person. Any person enticing a slave to run away and any slave attempting to leave the province receives the death penalty as punishment. No owner shall be punished if a slave dies under punishment; intentional killing of a slave shall cost the owner a fifty-pound fine. Id. at 27–28. Slave Codes grew more restrictive after Nat Turner’s rebellion in August of 1831. Id. at 108– 09. 53 Id. at 88. Georgia enacted legislation to prohibit manumission. Id. In fact, one court, rejecting a trust that would have resulted in the emancipation of slaves, regarded slavery as a “Divine decree” and 2 1 2 | P i t t s b u r g h T a x R e v i e w | V o l . 1 3 2 0 1 6 Pitt Tax Review | ISSN 1932-1821 (print) 1932-1996 (online) DOI 10.5195/taxreview.2016.47 | http://taxreview.law.pitt.edu heavily dependent on slaves because certain crops were labor-intensive.54 Slaves were regarded as “money-making machines,”55 and it remains likely that certain families can trace their wealth to the exploitation of slave labor; this reality also suggests that prevailing economic inequalities (including pronounced severity in certain demographics) have some of their deepest roots in the gross economic exploitation that was slavery.56 Shakespeare’s truth bears repeating: “The evil that men do lives after them.”57 The Constitution itself accomplished a great deal with respect to slavery. In addition to giving states with substantial slave populations a boost in the House of Representatives58 (and in the electoral college),59 the Constitution formally extended the legal slave trade for twenty years, providing, in pertinent part, as follows: The Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the States now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the Year one thousand eight hundred and eight, but a Tax or duty may be imposed on such Importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each Person.60 Thus, although the United States took aim at slavery from the beginning, the Constitution’s sunset did more than merely extend the institution for two attempts at emancipation a “fight against the Almighty.” Alfred L. Brophy, What Should Inheritance Law Be? Reparations and Intergenerational Wealth Transfers, 20 LAW & LITERATURE 197, 204–05 (2008) (citing Am. Colonization Soc’y v. Gartrell, 23 Ga. 448, 464–65 (1897)). 54 CHRISTIAN, supra note 46, at 4–5. Given that tobacco was particularly important in certain American colonies and required considerable labor, the importing of slaves increased. Id. at 8. 55 Id. at 6. 56 Id. at 24. 57 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TRAGEDY OF JULIUS CAESAR act 3, sc. 2. 58 The Constitution provides, in pertinent part, as follows: Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which may be included within this Union, according to their respective Numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole Number of free Persons, including those bound to service for a Term of Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other Persons. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3, amended by U.S. CONST. amends. 14, § 2, 16. 59 Id. at art. II, § 1. 60 Id. at art. I, § 9, cl. 1. V o l . 1 3 2 0 1 6 | H a t e E x c l u s i o n | 2 1 3 Pitt Tax Review | ISSN 1932-1821 (print) 1932-1996 (online) DOI 10.5195/taxreview.2016.47 | http://taxreview.law.pitt.edu decades61 for the sake of creating the Union. By extending the slave trade for twenty years, the Constitution also extended the horrors of the Middle Passage62 and the brutality of the breaking-in process.63 By putting no sunset on slavery itself, it also gave a green light to the regular abuses of everyday slavery. Various slave narratives dictated during the 1930s (often recorded in and faithfully preserved in the original dialect) paint a very ugly picture of the times. Although slaves were often sent to the fields at a very early age (even if only to carry water for the adults),64 their early lives were ordinarily spent in domestic quarters65 alongside those charged with domestic tasks.66 The relative youth and innocence of the children notwithstanding, they did not always enjoy proper care and nourishment; neglect was not uncommon.67 As 61 Even though Congress abolished the importation of slaves on March 2, 1807 (effective January 1, 1808), lax enforcement allowed illegal importation to continue. CHRISTIAN, supra note 46, at 80–81. In fact, “[t]rade in African slaves continued until the Civil War . . . . The profits and thus the motive for the business remained extremely high, and a relatively brisk illegal trade continued . . . .” Id. at 170. It is also true that the slave trade ban resulted in a shift, in some sectors, from agriculture to slave breeding, given the soaring need for slave labor in certain states. Id. at 103–05. The internal slave trade was robust and profitable. Id. at 148. 62 Id. at 12 (“It is estimated that between 15 and 20% of the slaves [aboard a ship] died en route to the colonies, mostly from diseases associated with overcrowding, spoiled and poisoned food, contaminated water, starvation and thirst, and suicide. Others were thrown overboard, shot, or beaten to death for various reasons.”). 63 Id. at 15. 64 I WAS A SLAVE: TRUE LIFE STORIES DICTATED BY FORMER AMERICAN SLAVES IN THE 1930’S, BOOK 5: THE LIVES OF SLAVE CHILDREN 35 (Donna Wyant Howell, compil. American Legacy Books, 1st rev. ed., 1st prtg. 1998) [hereinafter I WAS A SLAVE (BOOK 5)] (commentary of Campbell Armstrong) (“I wasn’t doin’ nothin’ but totin’ water. I toted water for a whole year when I was a boy about eight years old. I was the water boy for the field hands. Later I worked out in the fields myself.” (dialect preserved)). 65 Id. at 23–24 (commentary of Josie Brown) (“When us little, dey hab to keep us in de house ’cause de bald eagle pick up chillen jus’ like de hawk pick up chicken. Dey was lots a catamoun’ [mountain cats in Texas = cougars] and bears and deer in de woods. Us never ’lowed play ‘lone in de woods.” (dialect preserved)). 66 I WAS A SLAVE (BOOK 5), supra note 64 (commentary of Adeline Grey) (“My Ma used to belong to ole man Dave Warner. I remember how she used to wash, an’ iron, an’ cook for de white folks durin’ slavery time.” (dialect preserved)). Id. at 15 (commentary of Fannie Griffin) (“I was de youngest slave, so Missy Grace, dat’s Massa Joe’s wife, keep me in de house most of de time to cook and keep de house cleaned up. I milked de cow and worked in de garden, too.” (dialect preserved)). 67 I WAS A SLAVE (Book 5), supra note 64, at 24 (commentary of Hilliard Yellerday) (“Some owners gave their slaves the same kind of food served on their own tables and allowed the slaves the same 2 1 4 | P i t t s b u r g h T a x R e v i e w | V o l . 1 3 2 0 1 6 Pitt Tax Review | ISSN 1932-1821 (print) 1932-1996 (online) DOI 10.5195/taxreview.2016.47 | http://taxreview.law.pitt.edu they approached their teenage years, slaves were transitioned to field labor.68 Throughout their lives, work started at sunrise and continued to sunset under generally oppressive conditions (i.e., constant threat of whippings).69 Even old slaves could be whipped for failing to work hard enough. As one individual recounted, “I ‘member one time dey strops [whipped with a leather strap] old Beans what’s so old he can’t work good no more. In de mornin’, dey find him hangin’ from a tree back of de quarters. He done hang himself to ’scape he mis’ry!” [dialect preserved].70 Whippings, of course, were a constant threat for any type of misconduct. One former slave commentator noted as follows: My master was named Tom Ashbie, a meaner man was never born in Virginia— brutal, wicked and hard. He always carried a cowhide [whip] with him. If he saw anyone doing something that did not suit his taste, he would have the slave tied to a tree, man or woman, and then would cowhide the victim until he got tired, or sometimes the slave would faint.71 privileges enjoyed by their own children. Other masters fed their slave children from troughs made very much like those from which the hogs of the plantation were fed.”); see also id. at 15 (commentary of Bud Jones) (“I growed up in the house of Old Master. He had a big, log house. I slep’ in a little side room built on the Big House. I had a carpet on the floor to sleep on and one to cover up with. It was a fine, good enough bed in warm weather, but I used to near freeze to death when it was cold.” (dialect preserved)). 68 I WAS A SLAVE: TRUE LIFE STORIES TOLD BY FORMER AMERICAN SLAVES IN THE 1930’S, CHAPTER 2: THE LIVES OF SLAVE MEN 13 (Donna Wyant Howell, compil. American Legacy Books, 4th prtg. 1997) [hereinafter I WAS A SLAVE (CHAPTER 2)] (commentary of Simon Gallman) (“I was about twelve years old when dey made me go to de field to work. Befo’ dat and after dat, too, I worked around de barn and took care of de stock” (dialect preserved)). 69 Id. at 14 (commentary of Silas Jackson) (“They were awakened by blowing of the horn before sunrise by the overseer, started work at sunrise and worked all day to sundown, with not time to go to the cabin for dinner [lunch]. You carried your dinner with you. The slaves were driven at top speed and whipped at the snap of the finger by the overseers.”); see also I WAS A SLAVE (BOOK 5), supra note 64, at 19 (commentary of Anna Miller) (“Marster Loyed makes [made] us work from day-light to dark in de fiel’s and make cloth at night.” (dialect preserved)). 70 I WAS A SLAVE: TRUE LIFE STORIES TOLD BY FORMER AMERICAN SLAVES IN THE 1930’S, CHAPTER 1: DESCRIPTIONS OF PLANTATION LIFE 42 (Donna Wyant Howell, compil. American Legacy Books, 6th prtg. 1997) [hereinafter I WAS A SLAVE (CHAPTER 1)] (commentary of Adeline Marshall). 71 Id. at 31 (commentary of Silas Jackson). Some professionals believe that specific forms of corporal punishment inflicted on African-American children have their roots in the treatment of slaves. See Michael E. Dyson, Punishment or Child Abuse?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2014, at A33 (pointing out that in the opinion of two black psychiatrists, the beating of African-American children by their parents is a practice rooted in slavery (i.e., the need to instill fear of and obedience with respect to whites)). V o l . 1 3 2 0 1 6 | H a t e E x c l u s i o n | 2 1 5 Pitt Tax Review | ISSN 1932-1821 (print) 1932-1996 (online) DOI 10.5195/taxreview.2016.47 | http://taxreview.law.pitt.edu Of course, any form of disobedience or refusal to surrender could result in severe punishment. One former slave told of the following: De worst whuppin’ I’s ever see am given to Clarinda. She hit de Marster over de head wid a hoe. I’s tell yous why she hit de Marster. ’Twas ’cause him tries to interfere [sexually] wid her an’ she tries to stop him. She am put on de log an’ given 500 lashes. [dialect preserved]72 In addition to being required to surrender to their master’s sexual advances, slave women were also part of forced breeding with male slaves of the master’s choosing.73 According to one commentator, such breeding was rigidly selective. He noted, “A lot of de slaveowners had certain strong healthy slave men to serve [service] de slave women. Generally, dey give one man four women an’ dat man better not have nuttin’ to do wid de udder women an’ de women better not have nuttin’ to do wid udder men.” [dialect preserved].74 If a breeding female slave was to be sold, her fertility/productivity was often touted so as to draw as high a price for her as possible;75 such women might also be valuable as wet nurses76 or midwives (i.e., hired out to others to produce skilled labor revenue for the master).77 72 I WAS A SLAVE (CHAPTER 2), supra note 68, at 35 (commentary of John Finnely). 73 I WAS A SLAVE: TRUE LIFE STORIES TOLD BY FORMER AMERICAN SLAVES IN THE 1930’S, CHAPTER 4: THE BREEDING OF SLAVES 9 (Donna Wyant Howell, compil. American Legacy Books, 4th prtg. 1997) [hereinafter I WAS A SLAVE (CHAPTER 4)] (commentary of Sarah Ford) (“She [my mother] say de white folks don’t let de slaves what works in de field marry none. Dey jus’ puts a man and breedin’ woman together like mules. Iffen the woman don’t like the man, it don’t make no diff’rence. She better go or dey gives her a hidin’ [a whipping with a bullwhip which would cut into her bare back].” (dialect preserved)). 74 Id. at 11 (commentary of Jacob Manson). 75 I WAS A SLAVE (BOOK 5), supra note 64, at 36 (commentary of Fannie Moore) (“Den sometime dey take ’em an’ sell ’em on de block. De breed [breeding] woman always bring mo’ money den de res’, ebben de men. When dey put her on de block, dey put all her chillun aroun’ her to show fo’ks how fas’ she can hab chillun.” (dialect preserved)). 76 Id. at 27 (commentary of Jeff Calhoun) (“My massa had 15 chillun and my mamma suckled every one of dem, ’cause his wife was no good to give milk.” (dialect preserved)). 77 Id. at 28 (commentary of Mildred Graves) (“You know in dem days, dey didn’t have many doctors. Well, I was always good when it come to de sick, so dat was mostly my job. I was also what you call a midwife, too. Whenever any o’ de white folks ’roun’ Hanover [Virginia] was goin’ to have babies, dey always got word to Mr. Tinsley dat dey want to hire me fer dat time. Sho’, he let me go. ’Twas money fer him, you know. He would give me only a few cents, but dat was kinda good o’ him to do dat.” (dialect preserved)). 2 1 6 | P i t t s b u r g h T a x R e v i e w | V o l . 1 3 2 0 1 6 Pitt Tax Review | ISSN 1932-1821 (print) 1932-1996 (online) DOI 10.5195/taxreview.2016.47 | http://taxreview.law.pitt.edu The regular abuses of slavery have long given rise to abolitionist sentiment. Indeed, George Mason, so offended by the accommodation of slavery (though a lifelong slaveholder himself), refused to sign the Constitution78 and made it clear that he would prefer that the southern states not be admitted to the Union unless they agreed to stop slavery.79 Adoption of George Mason’s position might very well have spared the country its Civil War, but to the extent the founding fathers opted to accommodate the slave states at all, they could have used the constitutional provision for adding new states80 to ban the extension of the institution to states not in existence at the time of the Constitution’s ratification, especially in light of the following provision requiring the return of fugitive slaves: No Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the Laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or Regulation therein, be discharged from such Service or Labour, but shall be delivered up on Claim of the Party to whom such Service or Labour may be due.81 And, as if ensuring the existence of a healthy slave trade and the return of any fugitives was not enough, the Constitution itself prohibited any amendment (before 1808), which would affect the twenty-year sunset provision.82 Further, it should be emphasized, at this juncture, that the Constitution itself ensured that the slave trade could be a source of federal tax revenue.83 2. Congressional Accommodation and Enforcement of Slavery Notwithstanding the existence of various constitutional provisions, Congress repeatedly took steps that ultimately resulted in the expansion and active enforcement of slavery. By resolution of March 23, 1790, Congress left the question of slavery up to the individual states and thereby clarified that it could not interfere with the emancipation of slaves or the treatment of 78 CHRISTIAN, supra note 46, at 53. 79 Id. at 60. 80 See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1. 81 Id. at art. IV, § 2, cl. 3. 82 Id. at art. V. 83 Id. at art. I, § 9, cl. 1. V o l . 1 3 2 0 1 6 | H a t e E x c l u s i o n | 2 1 7 Pitt Tax Review | ISSN 1932-1821 (print) 1932-1996 (online) DOI 10.5195/taxreview.2016.47 | http://taxreview.law.pitt.edu any of them.84 Wholly aside from announcing an official laissez-faire policy with respect to the inhumane treatment of slaves,85 this act set the stage for the Civil War and various notable slave-state/free-state compromises (e.g., the Missouri Compromise of 1820).86 Congress was also particularly fond of enacting and enforcing Fugitive Slave Acts. On February 12, 1793, Congress passed the Fugitive Slave Act,87 which criminalized harboring fugitive slaves (or any act interfering with the slave’s capture or arrest) and thereby gave teeth to Article IV, § 2 of the Constitution.88 With the Fugitive Slave Act (Compromise) of 1850, the federal government took jurisdiction over runaway slaves and their return.89 The gesture was not legislative busywork. Although abolitionists and their supporters would occasionally purchase the 84 CHRISTIAN, supra note 46, at 68. The Calhoun Resolutions passed the Senate in 1838, essentially affirming the legality of slavery and triumphing the notion that states alone had the right to control the domestic institution of slavery. Id. at 125. 85 One slave, apparently by letter to his former master, stated the following: You may perhaps think hard of us for running away from slavery, but as to myself, I have but one apology to make, which is this: I have only to regret that I did not start at an earlier period. . . . To be compelled to stand by and see you whip and slash my wife without mercy when I could afford her no protection, not even by offering myself to suffer the lash in her place, was more than I felt it to be the duty of a slave husband to endure, while the way was open to Canada. My infant child was also frequently flogged by Mrs. Gatewood, for crying, until its skin was bruised literally purple. This kind of treatment was what drove me from home and family to seek a better home for them. CHRISTIAN, supra note 46, at 151 (quoting HENRY W. BIBB, NARRATIVE OF THE LIFE AND ADVENTURE OF HENRY BIBB, AN AMERICAN SLAVE IN 1849, at 177 (1849)). 86 On March 3, 1820, Congress adopted the Missouri Compromise which allowed the entry of Missouri as a slave state and Maine as a free state; the southern politicians conditioned Maine’s admission on Missouri’s admission. Id. at 90. On May 26, 1854, Congress passed the Kansas-Nebraska Act (allowing “popular sovereignty” (i.e., settlers choose whether to be a slave state or a free state)). By doing so, Congress repealed the Missouri Compromise of 1820 (prohibiting slavery north of the southern border of the state of Missouri with the exception of Missouri itself) and thereby opened the northern territories to slavery. Id. at 159. There was a further Congressional Resolution in 1860 which provided, in pertinent part, that “[s]lavery is lawful in all territories under the Constitution; neither Congress nor a local legislature can abolish it there; the federal government is in duty bound to protect slave owners as well as the holders of other forms of property in the territories . . . .” Id. at 182. 87 Id. at 71. 88 Id. 89 Id. at 149. 2 1 8 | P i t t s b u r g h T a x R e v i e w | V o l . 1 3 2 0 1 6 Pitt Tax Review | ISSN 1932-1821 (print) 1932-1996 (online) DOI 10.5195/taxreview.2016.47 | http://taxreview.law.pitt.edu freedom of a fugitive slave90 or storm jails/courthouses to rescue them,91 federal and state officials were known to incur substantial expense in protecting slaves from rescue and taking active steps to assure their return to their master.92 The case of Anthony Burns is particularly noteworthy. Thousands of federal troops were used to thwart mob violence, President Pierce told federal officials to spare no expense in enforcing the Fugitive Slave Law, and an entire regiment (and most of the Boston police force) was called on to escort the slave to a waiting ship for return to his master.93 3. Other Harms Although there is much pre-emancipation history with which to condemn the United States in the Constitution, in the halls of Congress, and in the United States Supreme Court,94 the nation’s post-emancipation conduct is disturbing in many respects, such as the failure to aggressively counter de facto slavery via sharecropping.95 The convict lease system96 was also problematic. The convict-lease system was used as a means of accomplishing “legalized” slavery. Tennessee law, for example, authorized the arrest of individuals for “vagrancy,” and forced labor became a ready means of having someone pay off the fine attending the charge of vagrancy.97 90 See id. at 133. 91 Id. at 152. 92 See id. (discussing the return of a 17-year-old black male to his master who had traveled from Georgia to Boston to retrieve him). 93 Id. at 157. 94 See, e.g., Scott v. Sanford (Dred Scott), 60 U.S. 393 (1857) (holding that blacks were not citizens of the United States and that Congress could not prohibit slavery in the territories); see also CHRISTIAN, supra note 46, at 163–64 (providing additional background information on Dred Scott). 95 See CHRISTIAN, supra note 46, at 215. Evidence indicates that sharecropping simply replaced slavery. Id. Further, migration to greener pastures could not be counted on as a readily-available option. Blacks seeking to migrate away to better conditions might face a blockade. See id. at 255 (discussing a terrorist white mob’s blockade of the Mississippi River to prevent black migration and thereby forcibly retain a cheap labor supply). 96 See id. at 257. For a discussion of the convict lease system, see Scott W. Howe, Slavery as Punishment: Original Public Meaning, Cruel and Unusual Punishment, and the Neglected Clause in the Thirteenth Amendment, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 983, 1008–19 (2009) (discussing the convict lease system circa 1865 as a disturbing reflection of the original public meaning of slavery as used in the Thirteenth Amendment). 97 Id. at 248. V o l . 1 3 2 0 1 6 | H a t e E x c l u s i o n | 2 1 9 Pitt Tax Review | ISSN 1932-1821 (print) 1932-1996 (online) DOI 10.5195/taxreview.2016.47 | http://taxreview.law.pitt.edu White planters profited immensely98 and so did States; by leasing convicts, the State of Georgia made approximately $355,000.99 An investigation initiated by a federal judge concluded that “a widespread pattern of peonage existed, involving the collaboration of wealthy landowners, local constables, justices of the peace, and plantation overseers.”100 Ranking high on the list of the deplorable acts at the federal level is the judicial branch’s endorsement of the separate but equal doctrine in Plessy v. Ferguson101 which branded the notion of racial difference and the propriety of official segregation onto the national psyche for several generations by placing a federal imprimatur on the entire Jim Crow edifice;102 state legislatures readily took larger steps in effecting official segregation. In 1912, “[t]he Virginia legislature gave its cities the right to designate neighborhoods as Black or [W]hite, thereby approving residential segregation of races.”103 In 1914, “[t]he Louisiana legislature passed a law requiring segregated amusement activities. Specifically, it required separate entrances, exits, and ticket windows, twenty-five feet apart, at recreational facilities.”104 In 1915, “[t]he Oklahoma legislature authorized segregation of telephone booths by requiring telephone companies to provide separate booths for ‘whites and colored patrons.’”105 The list goes on, and yet, official segregation was not the worst of it. Arguably, the federal government’s most spectacular post- emancipation failure was its flaccid and lethargic response to lynching. In the wake of the Civil War, certain white southerners resorted to terrorism and other tactics to oppress and exploit blacks106 or alleviate 98 Id. at 283. 99 Id. at 288. 100 Id. at 293. 101 163 U.S. 537 (1896). “The decision allowed racism to be institutionalized and marked the beginning of Jim Crow laws and acceptance of overt racist behavior.” CHRISTIAN, supra note 46, at 282. 102 Despite ratification of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments, Tennessee passed the first Jim Crow law segregating public transportation in 1875. See CHRISTIAN, supra note 46, at 248. 103 Id. at 305. 104 Id. at 307. 105 Id. at 308. 106 Feagin, supra note 45, at 54. 2 2 0 | P i t t s b u r g h T a x R e v i e w | V o l . 1 3 2 0 1 6 Pitt Tax Review | ISSN 1932-1821 (print) 1932-1996 (online) DOI 10.5195/taxreview.2016.47 | http://taxreview.law.pitt.edu displaced aggression.107 As the following data indicate, lynchings were common: Lynching in the United States 1882–1950108 Period Avg. # of Lynchings Per Year Total of Period 1882–1900 150.4 2,857.6 1901–10 84.6 846 1911–20 60.6 606 1921–30 27.5 275 1931–40 11.4 114 1941–50 3 30 Total 4,728.6 The first anti-lynching bill introduced in Congress (by George White of North Carolina) was supported but never brought to a vote.109 In 1921, southern Democrats in the U.S. House of Representatives filibustered an anti- lynching bill introduced by L.C. Dyer.110 Although the House passed the bill in 1922, a southern filibuster in the Senate defeated it, even though the bill called for mild punishment.111 Specifically, it called for the fining of local law officials for allowing it to happen because in many instances, the lynchings occurred after mobs descended on jails to retrieve prisoners.112 In fact, one of the worst race riots in American history occurred in the Greenwood district of Tulsa, Oklahoma due to the fear that a young black man being held in custody would be lynched for assaulting (i.e., accidentally 107 See DOUGLAS P. CROWNE, PERSONALITY THEORY 319 (2007) (There “was an inverse relation between cotton prices in the southern US and lynchings of blacks during a forty-two-year period from 1882 to 1930. The poorer the year’s cotton prices, the greater the number of lynchings, a statistic that reflected a violent aggression displaced from a remote and untouchable target to a helpless and innocent minority.”). 108 CHRISTIAN, supra note 46, at 262. 109 Id. at 289. 110 Id. at 325. 111 Id. at 331. 112 Id. V o l . 1 3 2 0 1 6 | H a t e E x c l u s i o n | 2 2 1 Pitt Tax Review | ISSN 1932-1821 (print) 1932-1996 (online) DOI 10.5195/taxreview.2016.47 | http://taxreview.law.pitt.edu stepping on the foot of) a white female elevator operator.113 A noted psychologist confirms not only that the mob mentality, which would allow such events to happen, is fueled over time, but also that gradual discrimination has a clear hand in the matter: Violence is always an outgrowth of milder states of mind. * * * In cases where violence breaks out we can be fairly certain that the following steps have prepared the way. (1) There has been a long period of categorical prejudgment. The victim group has long been typed. People have begun to lose the power to think of the members of an out-group as individuals. (2) There has been a long period of verbal complaint against the victimized minority. The habits of suspicion and blaming have become firmly rooted. (3) There has been growing discrimination . . . . * * * (8) Some precipitating incident occurs. What previously might have been passed over as a trivial provocation now causes an explosion.114 Thousands of human lives were snuffed out by frenzied mobs over pleas of innocence, despite prayers for mercy, and without due process of law while southern congressmen filibustered over the imposition of fines. Of course, the federal government’s slow response to lynching was only one of the more egregious instances of federal foot-dragging. In addition to allowing the doctrine of separate but equal to stand as the law of the land for several decades (i.e., 1896–1954),115 Congress stood idle (for some amount of time) 113 Eddie Faye Gates, The Oklahoma Commission to Study the Tulsa Race Riot of 1921, 20 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 83 (2004); see also Alfred L. Brophy, Norms, Law, and Reparations: The Case of the Ku Klux Klan in 1920s Oklahoma, 20 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 17 (2004) (exploring the domination of the State of Oklahoma by the Ku Klux Klan in the 1920s). 114 GORDON W. ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE 57–58 (1954). 115 See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 2 2 2 | P i t t s b u r g h T a x R e v i e w | V o l . 1 3 2 0 1 6 Pitt Tax Review | ISSN 1932-1821 (print) 1932-1996 (online) DOI 10.5195/taxreview.2016.47 | http://taxreview.law.pitt.edu in the face of educational inequalities,116 the disfranchisement of blacks,117 restrictive covenants,118 and human testing.119 The United States’ shameful history notwithstanding, one cannot dismiss the reality that the country we live in today is far better, in many respects, than the country as it existed in centuries past. The United States, however, can lay claim to only part of the credit; thousands have shed blood and given their lives for this “more perfect Union.” To the extent, however, that the conduct of the United States is under examination, credit must be granted, to the extent due, for steps taken in the right direction. B. Remedial Measures 1. Attempts to Prevent Proliferation of Slavery Although the Constitution itself contained many provisions protecting the slave trade and the institution of slavery, slave importing was eventually banned in 1808.120 Further, on March 3, 1819, Congress enacted the Anti- Slave Trade Act to prevent smuggling of slaves,121 and illegal slave trading became punishable by death as an act of piracy.122 With respect to the domestic slavery, steps were taken, at least early on, to prevent its proliferation. The Ordinance of 1787 barred the extension of slavery (except as punishment for criminal conduct) to the Northwest Territory (i.e., regions 116 Opponents defeated an 1882 bill to equalize educational opportunities for whites and blacks, citing fears with respect to race mixing and federal involvement in schools. CHRISTIAN, supra note 46, at 261. Much later in the post-Brown era, we see the United States Supreme Court embracing a “go slow” approach with respect to school desegregation. Id. at 390. 117 Immediately after the Civil War, southern states took aggressive steps to restrict or eliminate black voting, including the introduction of poll taxes. Id. at 257–58. The states also used literacy tests and grandfather clauses. Id. at 274–75. 118 See, e.g., Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323, 329 (1926) (noting that “it is our duty to decline jurisdiction”). 119 From 1932–72, the U.S. Public Health Service used 300 black men (in Alabama) as guinea pigs in a syphilis experiment. CHRISTIAN, supra note 46, at 458–59. 120 Id. at 81. 121 Id. at 89. 122 Id. at 90. V o l . 1 3 2 0 1 6 | H a t e E x c l u s i o n | 2 2 3 Pitt Tax Review | ISSN 1932-1821 (print) 1932-1996 (online) DOI 10.5195/taxreview.2016.47 | http://taxreview.law.pitt.edu northwest of the Ohio River),123 although its enforcement was somewhat erratic.124 Likewise, some effort was made, per the Wilmot Proviso, to prohibit slavery in territory acquired from Mexico after the Mexican War. As was noted above, however, these efforts were later rendered nugatory by congressional resolutions, which left the question of slavery to the individual states. 2. Constitutional Amendments and Civil Rights Legislation Though many would argue that the Civil War was not a war fought to eradicate slavery, the question of slavery had given rise to enormous national strife. Its limits notwithstanding, the Emancipation Proclamation served effectively as slavery’s death warrant, the Thirteenth Amendment125 finished the job, and the Fourteenth126 and Fifteenth127 Amendments put blacks on the path to full citizenship, complete with all its rights, protections, and privileges. As history amply demonstrates, however, the journey has been a long and difficult one. For example, with respect to voting, terroristic efforts to prevent blacks from voting prompted Congress to pass the first Enforcement Act on May 31, 1870.128 Ku Klux Klan activities made it 123 Id. at 62–63. 124 See id. at 78 (discussing the importation of slaves purchased elsewhere into Indiana for a period of indentured servitude). 125 The Thirteenth Amendment provides, in pertinent part, as follows: “Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1. 126 The Fourteenth Amendment provides, in pertinent part, as follows: All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 127 The Fifteenth Amendment provides, in pertinent part, as follows: “The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.” U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1. 128 CHRISTIAN, supra note 46, at 235. 2 2 4 | P i t t s b u r g h T a x R e v i e w | V o l . 1 3 2 0 1 6 Pitt Tax Review | ISSN 1932-1821 (print) 1932-1996 (online) DOI 10.5195/taxreview.2016.47 | http://taxreview.law.pitt.edu necessary for Congress to pass a second Enforcement Act129 and a third Enforcement Act130 in 1871. Sadly, the pattern is a familiar one. Congress may have passed and secured the ratification of the post-war amendments, but undoing the sins of its past makes for backbreaking penance. Accordingly, it has been necessary over the years for Congress to pass multiple civil rights acts.131 With respect to voting, for example, Congress had to wage battle after battle, despite the ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment approximately 100 years earlier (e.g., the Civil Rights Act of 1957, the Voting Rights Act of 1960, the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and the Voting Rights Act of 1975). The significance of each piece of civil rights legislation cannot be minimized even slightly, but the laws (dealing with various rights and privileges) also have to be understood in the aggregate. They represent a persistent struggle to navigate the national conscience and steer it in the right direction, but this is to be expected of a captain substantially responsible for the original, erroneous course heading. 3. Judicial Activity If any branch of the federal government merits praise for the post- Emancipation reconstruction of the American conscience with respect to race, it is the judicial branch. Although the United States Supreme Court has been active in many arenas of significance,132 surely many would agree that 129 Id. at 238 (putting federal officers/courts in charge of voter registration and voting with respect to congressional elections). 130 Id. (defining Klan conspiracy as “rebellion against the United States . . . .”). 131 Congress passed the Civil Rights Bill of 1866 (giving blacks certain basic rights of citizenship (e.g., contract, hold property, testify in court) after securing passage over President Andrew Johnson’s veto), the Civil Rights Act in 1875 (prohibiting discrimination in public accommodations), the Civil Rights Act of 1957 (deeming it illegal to disfranchise blacks and prohibiting interference with the right to vote), the Civil Rights Act of 1960 (enhancing protections for blacks seeking to exercise their right to vote), the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (addressing discrimination in employment and places of public accommodation), the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (requiring that certain states with history of depriving blacks of the right to vote submit any voting procedure changes to the U.S. attorney), the Civil Rights Act of 1968 (Fair Housing Act) (prohibiting discrimination in the renting and sale of apartments and housing), the Voting Rights Act of 1975 (eliminating literacy requirements for voting), and the Civil Rights Restoration Act (requiring that institutions receiving federal funds comply with civil rights statutes (after securing passage over President Ronald Reagan’s veto)). CHRISTIAN, supra note 46, at 216, 248, 399, 405, 420, 440–41, 463, 468, 512. 132 The U.S. Supreme Court has taken steps (or, in fact, managed) to eradicate discrimination with respect to jury duty service, election primaries, marriage, employment tests, affirmative action, minority set-asides, and jury selection. Id. at 264, 340, 437, 456, 477, 484, 505, 508, 536; see also Guinn v. United V o l . 1 3 2 0 1 6 | H a t e E x c l u s i o n | 2 2 5 Pitt Tax Review | ISSN 1932-1821 (print) 1932-1996 (online) DOI 10.5195/taxreview.2016.47 | http://taxreview.law.pitt.edu the pillars of its jurisprudence take the form of its desegregation mandates. The Court eliminated residential districting by race,133 discrimination in places of public accommodation,134 and segregation on interstate bus travel.135 By those acts, the court made it possible for blacks to do things as simple as purchase and eat a sandwich at a public lunch counter or travel without being refused access to hotel accommodations and restrooms. Those were major accomplishments achieved after considerable private pain and in the wake of truly heroic, non-violent private action, but it was with the desegregation of public schools in Brown v. Board of Education136 that the Court took its first bold step towards ensuring equality of educational opportunity for all. Despite considerable delay137 and occasionally violent138 and overwhelming public resistance139 (including vows of “segregation now, States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915) (holding that grandfather clauses are unconstitutional); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (prohibiting the imposition of the death penalty without guiding standards for the jury); United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987) (ordering state trooper promotion parity in the State of Alabama (one black for each white) to make up for prior discrimination); Bakke v. Regents of the University of California, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (striking down a quota system but allowing consideration of race as one of many admissions factors). 133 Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917) (holding that statutes requiring that blacks live in certain residential areas were unconstitutional); see also CHRISTIAN, supra note 46, at 310 (providing additional information on Buchanan v. Warley). The Court also held in Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940), “that it was illegal for whites to bar African Americans from white neighborhoods.” CHRISTIAN, supra note 46, at 362. 134 The Court upheld public accommodations provision of Civil Rights Act of 1964 in Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964). Christian, supra note 46, at 423. The Court also held in District of Columbia v. John R. Thompson Co., Inc., 346 U.S. 100 (1953), that racial discrimination in restaurants in D.C. was illegal. CHRISTIAN, supra note 46, at 389. 135 CHRISTIAN, supra note 46, at 275, 393. 136 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 137 The U.S. Supreme Court, in Alexander v. Holmes, rejected the Nixon administration’s appeals for delays and held that the “all deliberate speed” desegregation rationale for operating a segregated school system was unconstitutional. CHRISTIAN, supra note 46, at 445. 138 Integration efforts often sparked mob violence. Id. at 396. There were, of course, multiple displays of resistance, including defiance of busing plans ordered by the federal government. Id. at 449. On November 13, 1960, “the [Louisiana] legislature acted to prevent integration and took control of [New Orleans’s] schools, fired the school superintendent, and ordered all schools closed on November 14.” Id. at 406. Segregation academies also sprang up in response to desegregation mandates. Id. at 447. 139 The Justice Department sued the State of Georgia for refusing to desegregate its schools, marking the first time the federal government sued an entire state for failing to desegregate. Id. at 445. 2 2 6 | P i t t s b u r g h T a x R e v i e w | V o l . 1 3 2 0 1 6 Pitt Tax Review | ISSN 1932-1821 (print) 1932-1996 (online) DOI 10.5195/taxreview.2016.47 | http://taxreview.law.pitt.edu segregation tomorrow, segregation forever”),140 the Supreme Court’s mandates were ultimately enforced. President Eisenhower ordered federal troops and National Guardsmen to Little Rock, Arkansas to force the integration of Central High School,141 and President Kennedy sent in thousands of federal troops to quell racial violence in the wake of James Meredith’s enrollment at the University of Mississippi.142 The executive branch, it should be noted, also deserves credit for dismantling discrimination by federal contractors143 and desegregating the military. Although President Truman signed Executive Order 9981 in 1948, calling for an end to discrimination in the armed forces “as rapidly as possible,”144 the military segregation mandate was strong enough to persist during World War II. Noted one commentator, “Despite a growing chorus of protests by Black citizens, outraged at the idea of fighting bigotry abroad while it was tolerated at home, the military continued to insist on segregating African-American service-men into all-Black units. Even blood supplies for saving the lives of the wounded were kept separate.”145 Indeed, military segregation stretches back even further than World War II, apparently depending on prevailing exigencies. In July of 1775, George Washington stopped blacks from serving in the Continental Army in 1775.146 Thereafter, the British offered freedom to slaves willing to assist them.147 Washington soon rescinded the prior order and allowed free blacks to serve in the Continental Army, and Service units were integrated.148 By 1798, 140 Id. at 416 (quoting George Wallace, former governor of Alabama). 141 Id. at 395. 142 Id. at 412–13. 143 JOAN HOFF, LAW, GENDER, AND INJUSTICE: A LEGAL HISTORY OF U.S. WOMEN 395 (1991) (“Executive Order No. 11246 prohibited employment discrimination by federal contractors on the same grounds as Title VII, except sex was not included.”). 144 CHRISTIAN, supra note 46, at 378. Even after the inefficiencies of segregation were noted, racism persisted in the segregation of on- and off-post housing and other facilities. Id. at 387–88. 145 THE WAR: A KEN BURNS FILM, EPISODE ONE: “A NECESSARY WAR” (PBS Home Video 2007). 146 CHRISTIAN, supra note 46, at 49. 147 Id. at 49–50. 148 Id. at 53. V o l . 1 3 2 0 1 6 | H a t e E x c l u s i o n | 2 2 7 Pitt Tax Review | ISSN 1932-1821 (print) 1932-1996 (online) DOI 10.5195/taxreview.2016.47 | http://taxreview.law.pitt.edu however, blacks were not allowed to serve in the Navy or the Marines,149 and as of 1820, “Negroes and Mulattoes” could not enlist in the Army.150 Interestingly, the course of human events has resulted in an African- American holding the position of Commander-in-Chief, and that reality surely would shock George Washington and the other founding fathers of the nation if they were able to perceive it. Moreover, in addition to historic achievements in the political arena, African-Americans have made considerable and unprecedented advancement in a host of arenas. In business, for example, Kenneth Chenault served as President and Chief Operating Officer of American Express Company before taking the helm as Chief Executive Officer and Chairman of that company. Likewise, Marvin Ellison became the first African-American to be named CEO of J.C. Penney.151 These successes notwithstanding, diversity issues, even in the business arena, abound.152 Lamenting the scarcity of African-Americans in the tech industry, one commentator noted that “the low number of African-American tech workers is particularly acute, worse than even the dearth of women and Hispanics in the industry.”).153 Fortunately, some businesses in the industry have been proactive in addressing racial and other disparities.154 C. Persistence of Negative Impact As history itself makes clear, the United States is guilty of many sins with respect to African slaves and their descendants. At the same time, much 149 Id. at 74. 150 Id. at 90. 151 Hadley Malcolm, J.C. Penney up as it names Home Depot exec CEO, USA TODAY, Oct. 13, 2014, http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2014/10/13/jc-penney-marvin-ellison-ceo/ 17182891/. 152 See Jessica Guynn, Diversity Gets Googled, USA TODAY, May 7, 2015, at 1B (indicating that as of January 2014, Google’s work force was 70% male and 30% female while also being 61% white, 3% Hispanic, and 2% black); see also Jessica Guynn, Next for Microsoft: Diversity, USA TODAY, Dec. 4, 2014, at B1 (discussing a recent Microsoft shareholder meeting and Jesse Jackson’s exhortation that Microsoft enhance diversity in its leadership and work force). 153 Patricia L. Brown, Playing Catch-Up, Tech Courts Blacks, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2015, at B1 & B3. 154 See Guynn, supra note 152, at 1B (discussing Google’s investment in diversity initiatives to attract more women and minorities). 2 2 8 | P i t t s b u r g h T a x R e v i e w | V o l . 1 3 2 0 1 6 Pitt Tax Review | ISSN 1932-1821 (print) 1932-1996 (online) DOI 10.5195/taxreview.2016.47 | http://taxreview.law.pitt.edu remedial work has been done at the federal level with respect to issues of race, yet there remains a real question as to whether those acts alone do (or even can) compensate for the train of egregious abuses suffered by blacks. Although one commentator author readily acknowledges that “the overwhelming consensus is that current racial inequalities are the result of historical oppression,”155 she concludes her work by emphasizing that “[s]ocial science evidence shows that dysfunctional behaviors and the inadequate development of human capital, not discrimination, are now the most important factors holding blacks back. * * * The future of black America is now in its own hands.”156 With respect to the latter sentiments, I respectfully dissent. The Senate Apology of June 2009 itself acknowledges not only that “visceral racism . . . became enmeshed in the social fabric of the United States”157 but also “that African-Americans continue to suffer from the consequences of slavery and Jim Crow laws . . . through enormous damage and loss.”158 Although Congress is silent on the matter, one commentator highlights the concomitant benefits enjoyed by whites: Over several centuries, most whites, as individuals and families, have benefitted handsomely from anti-black oppression and the transmission of ill-gotten wealth and privilege from one generation to the next. Today, the relative prosperity, long life expectancies, and high standard of living of white Americans are significantly rooted in centuries of exploitation and impoverishment of African Americans and other Americans of color.159 White privilege is ubiquitous and imbedded even where most whites cannot see it; it is the foundation of this society. It began in early white gains from slavery and has persisted under legal segregation and contemporary racism. Acceptance 155 WAX, supra note 45, at 292; see also Wenger, supra note 8, at 292 (quoting one commentator who stated that “the shortcomings of Blacks, individually or as a group, are responsible for any present injury.”). 156 WAX, supra note 45, at 140. 157 Apology, supra note 5. 158 Id.; see also Feagin, supra note 45, at 53 (noting that harms to African-Americans did not end with slavery and that post-emancipation discrimination was damaging (as is current discrimination)). 159 Feagin, supra note 45, at 50. V o l . 1 3 2 0 1 6 | H a t e E x c l u s i o n | 2 2 9 Pitt Tax Review | ISSN 1932-1821 (print) 1932-1996 (online) DOI 10.5195/taxreview.2016.47 | http://taxreview.law.pitt.edu of this system of white privileges and black disadvantages as normal has conferred advantages for whites now across some fifteen generations.160 While African-Americans certainly cannot claim improper treatment in the wake of poor individual choices,161 time and history reveal that racism and discrimination have enduring force. With a decidedly federal push from the outset, both have momentum, which has proven difficult, in many spheres, to stop. Consider a central root of modern-day educational disparities. There were numerous measures directed at preventing the education of slaves, among others. In 1824, Virginia made teaching a free black to read or write an offense drawing a $50 fine and two months imprisonment,162 and in 1829, Georgia prohibited the education of slaves or free blacks.163 Plessy v. Ferguson164 legalized across-the-board racial segregation, but even 25 years after Brown v. Board of Education,165 the U.S. Civil Rights Commission reported that school segregation was still widespread.166 Wholly aside from the education context, inequalities abound in unemployment,167 credit 160 Id. at 51–52. 161 See WILLIAM H. COSBY, JR. & ALVIN F. POUSSAINT, M.D., COME ON, PEOPLE: ON THE PATH FROM VICTIMS TO VICTORS 6 (2007) (noting that “too many of our sons deserve to be [in the prison system]”). 162 CHRISTIAN, supra note 46, at 94. 163 Id. at 97. Other states soon followed suit. See id. 164 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 165 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 166 CHRISTIAN, supra note 46, at 477. 167 Black unemployment was disproportionately high as of 1971. Id. at 454. 2 3 0 | P i t t s b u r g h T a x R e v i e w | V o l . 1 3 2 0 1 6 Pitt Tax Review | ISSN 1932-1821 (print) 1932-1996 (online) DOI 10.5195/taxreview.2016.47 | http://taxreview.law.pitt.edu access,168 housing,169 neighborhood treatment,170 and health.171 Employment discrimination is not uncommon,172 regardless of educational level.173 Further, hate crime statistics confirm that in 2012, 48.5% of hate crime victims were targeted on the basis of race,174 and of this group, 66.2% were victims of anti-black bias, and 22% were victims of anti-white bias.175 Even when convicted as perpetrators of crimes generally, African-Americans suffer disproportionately with respect to imprisonment.176 Yet, in one 168 Toyota Motor Corporation recently entered into a $21.9 million settlement with federal regulators regarding alleged overcharging of minority buyers on their auto loans. Yuka Hayashi, Toyota Unit Enters $21.9 Million Settlement over Alleged Auto Loan Racial Bias, WALL ST. J., Feb. 2, 2016, http://wsj.com/articles/toyota-unit-enters-21-9m-settlement-over-alleged-auto-loan-racial-bias- 1454455788. In 1980, Amoco made settlement payment for alleged violation of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (using zip codes to deny credit). CHRISTIAN, supra note 46, at 483. 169 See CHRISTIAN, supra note 46, at 550 (discussing a report of the Federal Reserve on lending discrimination). Shawmut Mortgage Co. paid $960,000 to settle federal charges of race discrimination in making loans. Id. at 565. 170 See id. at 528, 547 (pointing to evidence indicating that toxic waste sites tend to be located where racial minorities live). 171 See id. at 481 (discussing a CDC report issued in 1980, “Being Black in America,” which indicated that racial discrimination caused various ills (e.g., higher mortality rates, lower incomes)). A study with similar findings was conducted at Johns Hopkins University (revealing hypertension to be associated with stress of racism, poverty, etc. and not genes). See id. at 536. 172 Those required to pay substantial sums as a result of prior discrimination include AT&T, The New York Times, the Los Angeles Police Department, and Honda. CHRISTIAN, supra note 46, at 463, 485, 486, 515. 173 U.S. Civil Rights Commission “found job bias ‘virtually everywhere, at every age level, at every educational level, at every skill level.’” CHRISTIAN, supra note 46, at 497. In addition to overt discrimination, some commentators contend that the work (i.e. various acts) performed by workplace “outsiders” to counteract negative stereotypes is a form of employment discrimination. See Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Symposium: Discrimination and Inequality Emerging Issues Working Identity, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1259, 1262 (2000). 174 Hate Crime Statistics, 2012, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (FBI), http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ ucr/hate-crime/2012/topic-pages/victims/victims_final (last visited July 8, 2016) [hereinafter Hate Crime Statistics]. 175 Id. 176 One commentator noted the following: African Americans constitute 13% of the general population, but nearly half of the record- high prison population. The0020imprisonment rate for Latino males is almost triple the rate for white males; black men are locked up at nearly seven times the rate of their white counterparts. The differentials in drug punishment are even larger: of every 100,000 black Americans, 359 are imprisoned on drug charges; the analogous figure for whites is 28. . . . V o l . 1 3 2 0 1 6 | H a t e E x c l u s i o n | 2 3 1 Pitt Tax Review | ISSN 1932-1821 (print) 1932-1996 (online) DOI 10.5195/taxreview.2016.47 | http://taxreview.law.pitt.edu relatively recent and infamous case involving an Hispanic perpetrator and an African-American victim, conviction itself was evaded. After racially- profiling, shooting, and killing Trayvon Martin (an unarmed seventeen-year- old youth), George Zimmerman was acquitted of second-degree murder by a jury in Florida.177 Regarding the profiling done by bona fide police officers, the empirical evidence is alarming. Commentators note that racial profiling “is publicly disavowed but remains widely practiced.”178 They go on to note the following: In New York City, a program called stop and frisk, which Mayor Bloomberg credits with major crime reductions, allowed police to temporarily detain and search 685,724 people in 2011 without clear evidence of a crime. In a city that is 44% white, more than 90% of those stopped were minorities.179 Worsening matters is the recent spate of what many in the nation consider instances of outright police brutality and senseless murder of African- Americans. Although Officer Michael Slager was charged with murder after the privately videotaped180 shooting and killing of Walter Scott, an unarmed African-American,181 deplorable and arguably illegal police treatment of African-Americans often goes unpunished. Officer Darren Wilson shot and killed Michael Brown, an African-American, but after a federal investigation, no criminal charges were filed;182 the resulting public outrage and protest Those data suggest a justice system hard-wired for punitive racism. The truth is more complex. William J. Stuntz, Unequal Justice, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1969, 1970–71 (2008) (footnote omitted). The author goes on to argue that racial disparities in punishment arose not from official racism but from the de-localization of control with respect to criminal justice outcomes. Id. at 1972–73. 177 See Michael Scherer et al., After Trayvon, TIME (July 29, 2013), at 28, 30. 178 Id. at 33. 179 Id. at 33–34 (emphasis added). 180 For commentary regarding the use of cameras by citizens and the police, see Matt Apuzzo & Timothy Williams, Citizens’ Videos Raise Questions on Police Claims, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2015, at A1, A17 (discussing the impact of videotaping of police by citizens and the issues surrounding the use of body-cameras and other video recording technology by police officers). 181 Frances Robles & Alan Blinder, A Stark Image of a Shooting Carries Impact, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2015, at A1, A16. 182 Kevin Johnson & Yamiche Alcindor, Probe Finds Insufficient Evidence to Charge Darren Wilson, USA TODAY, Jan. 22, 2015, at 1A. 2 3 2 | P i t t s b u r g h T a x R e v i e w | V o l . 1 3 2 0 1 6 Pitt Tax Review | ISSN 1932-1821 (print) 1932-1996 (online) DOI 10.5195/taxreview.2016.47 | http://taxreview.law.pitt.edu prompted what some consider a disproportionate police response.183 Accosted by police officers, Eric Garner famously pleaded, “I can’t breathe,”184 and even though the chokehold used by the police officer to subdue him was prohibited by the New York Police Department,185 the offending officer was not charged in Mr. Garner’s death.186 At this juncture, fundamental change is needed in the national mindset at both individual and societal levels. Commentators wisely emphasize the following: One sign that Lawrence’s analysis of racism and discrimination is socially and psychologically apt is the fact that he sees racism as a problem at two interrelated levels of analysis. First, racism is an individually based phenomenon that expresses a personal set of beliefs and behaviors. From this perspective, racism resides in the mind of the individual and manifests itself behaviorally as discrimination. Individuals, in other words, are the carriers and, ultimately, the perpetrators of racism. The eradication of discrimination, it follows, can be achieved only by changing the belief systems of individuals who hold prejudicial attitudes. Second, Lawrence’s analysis acknowledged that these individual outbreaks of racism are always linked to a broader societal (and therefore ideological) context. He noted, for example, that for members of his generation: ‘We were all victims of our culture’s racism. We had all grown up on Little Black Sambo and Amos and Andy.’ On this conception, racial inequality is a manifestation of something larger, a commonly held belief system that is part of the collective cultural repertoire. In this sense, our racial attitudes are almost inevitably grounded in aspects of the social system, and one nefarious consequence of these attitudes is that, more often than not, they tend to (both consciously and unconsciously) perpetuate the very social system that created the disparities in the first place.187 183 See Kevin Johnson, DOJ: Lack of Leadership Plagued Ferguson Response, USA TODAY, Sept. 4, 2015, at 3A (highlight the belief of the Department of Justice that the use of military-style vehicles and weapons (as well as canine teams for crowd control) was inappropriate). 184 See J. David Goodman & Al Baker, New York Officer Won’t Be Charged in Chokehold Case, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2015, at A1. 185 See Melanie Eversley & Mike James, Outrage After No Charges for NYC Cop, USA TODAY, Dec. 4, 2014, at A1. 186 Goodman & Baker, supra note 184, at A1 (reporting that Officer Daniel Pantaleo would not be charged in connection with the death of Eric Garner). 187 Avital Mentovich & John T. Jost, The Ideological “Id”? System Justification and the Unconscious Perpetuation of Inequality, 40 CONN. L. REV. 1095, 1099 (2008). V o l . 1 3 2 0 1 6 | H a t e E x c l u s i o n | 2 3 3 Pitt Tax Review | ISSN 1932-1821 (print) 1932-1996 (online) DOI 10.5195/taxreview.2016.47 | http://taxreview.law.pitt.edu As a nation, we continue to struggle daily with issues of race, and there are many indicators that we are not on the right path and that the stage is set to get worse. Just recently, it was discovered that the citizens of Flint, Michigan (a very poor, majority African-American city) were consuming water with unacceptably high levels of lead, resulting in lead poisoning.188 One commentator argues that the incident “was a racial crime. If it were happening in another country, we’d call it an ethnic cleansing.”189 It’s no surprise that evolution may have wired us to like those who are similar to us and to assign complex meaning to things like skin color,190 but if some commentators are to be believed, our prejudices and stereotypes may regularly be fed by popular media and the like.191 In fact, regarding popular media, recurring issues of race continue to surface. To the considerable ire of many, the most recent slate of Academy Award acting nominees includes no persons of color;192 the situation was no better during the prior year (during which the hashtag “#oscarssowhite” came to life).193 If one can readily assume that prejudices and stereotypes can be enhanced by popular media, then consider how profound and intractable the effect of segregation and discrimination sanctioned by (or, indeed, practiced by) the federal 188 See Josh Sanburn, The Toxic Tap, TIME (Feb. 1, 2016), at 32, 34. 189 Michael Moore, This is a Racial Crime, TIME (Feb. 1, 2016), at 39. 190 See JEFFREY KLUGER, Race and the Raging Brain, in YOUR BRAIN: A USER’S GUIDE 90, 90 (2009) (suggesting that humans evolved in such a way that “[w]e’re wired to like people who look like us” and that “we have a complex brain that allows us to assign complex meanings to [skin] colors. White skin is good, brown skin is worse, and black skin is worst of all—unless, of course, you’re black or brown, in which case things run the other way.”); see also Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1493–94 (2005) (noting that various social cognition studies “demonstrate[] that most of us have implicit biases in the form of negative beliefs (stereotypes) and attitudes (prejudice) against racial minorities.”). 191 See Kang, supra note 190, at 1554 (arguing that when we do something like watch the evening news, we may unwittingly take in information which will ultimately alter our perceptions with respect to race). These encounters may fundamentally alter the way we perceive various racial interactions. See also Russell K. Robinson, Perceptual Segregation, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1101 (2008) (arguing that “perceptual segregation” exists because, according to empirical evidence, a reasonable minority might perceive discrimination under a given factual scenario when a reasonable non-minority (with the same facts) might not). 192 See Eliza Berman, The Unbearable Whiteness of the Oscar Nominations, TIME (Feb. 1, 2016), at 53. She also points out that “[a]ccording to a 2012 study by the Los Angeles Times, Academy membership is 94% white and 77% male.” 193 Id. 2 3 4 | P i t t s b u r g h T a x R e v i e w | V o l . 1 3 2 0 1 6 Pitt Tax Review | ISSN 1932-1821 (print) 1932-1996 (online) DOI 10.5195/taxreview.2016.47 | http://taxreview.law.pitt.edu government can be. One can certainly make the rational argument corrective federal measures should have just as much psychological force as the prior bad acts. I would argue that such actions are akin to unringing a psychological bell and that in any event, it is far harder (and takes far more time) to correct a long-established psychosocial message than to amend an existing statute. Such is particularly the case when the corrective measures themselves suffer challenges.194 As corrective and palliative measures go, embracing the unclean hands theory of exclusion is a very small first step in the right direction. Indeed, it is exceedingly little to ask in light of the harms suffered at the hands of the United States and those individuals it so profoundly influenced over time (and continues to influence). At the same time, the approach effectively renders identical wrongdoer and financial punishment as well as victim and financial beneficiary. III. SEX195 A. Historical Harms Relative to the considerable debate and strife surrounding the pre- Emancipation treatment of blacks, women received little federal attention before the ratification of the Constitution. Although as early as 1777, states had taken steps to prevent women from voting,196 the Constitution itself was ratified in gender-neutral terms.197 Abigail Adams, in a letter to her husband, warned that “[i]f particular care and attention is not paid to the ladies [in the 194 CHRISTIAN, supra note 46, at 489 (noting the Justice Department’s backing away from use of mandatory busing and racial quotas). Id. at 531 (noting that the Senate and the House passed the Civil Rights Bill of 1990, that it was vetoed by George H.W. Bush (criticizing it as a “quota” bill), and that the Senate failed to override the veto by a single vote). Id. at 564 (referring to a study which indicated that indicates that racial isolation is increasing). 195 Many of the authorities referenced in this Part were collected in and drawn from HOFF, supra note 143, and Timeline of Legal History of Women in the United States, NAT’L WOMEN’S HISTORY PROJECT, http://www.nwhp.org/resources/womens-rights-movement/detailed-timeline/ (last visited Feb. 12, 2016) [hereinafter Timeline]. 196 Timeline, supra note 195. 197 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2 (stating that “No Person shall be a Representative who shall not have attained to the age of twenty five Years . . . .”). V o l . 1 3 2 0 1 6 | H a t e E x c l u s i o n | 2 3 5 Pitt Tax Review | ISSN 1932-1821 (print) 1932-1996 (online) DOI 10.5195/taxreview.2016.47 | http://taxreview.law.pitt.edu Constitution], we are determined to foment a rebellion, and will not hold ourselves bound by any laws in which we have no voice or representation,”198 but her protestations were presumably met with guffaws if nothing else.199 In much the same way that references to “three fifths of all other Persons”200 and “the Importation of such Persons”201 are packed with unstated meaning with respect to blacks, the same can be said with respect to references to each “Person”202 destined to be a Representative or Senator; it was simply understood at the time, with no need of verbal clarification, that women need not apply. The ratification of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, however, made gender discrimination constitutionally explicit. The Fourteenth Amendment made clear reference to the consequences of interfering with the voting rights of “male inhabitants,”203 and the Fifteenth Amendment prohibited the denial or abridgment of the right to vote on the basis of “race, color, or previous condition of servitude” but made no mention of sex.204 Soon after the ratification of these amendments, the United States Supreme Court swung into action and thereby endorsed and enforced the prevailing paternalistic order of society.205 During eighteenth and nineteenth century America, women could not vote, hold office, or serve on juries, and they were excluded from most 198 EVE CARY & KATHLEEN W. PERATIS, WOMAN AND THE LAW 1–2 (1977). 199 Id. at 2. 200 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3. 201 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1. 202 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 3. 203 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2; see also Ruth B. Ginsburg, Gender and the Constitution, 44 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 3 (1975) (noting that the Constitution used “male” for the first time in the 14th Amendment, causing some concern that its guarantees would have, at best, limited application to women). 204 U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1. 205 See Pauli Murray & Mary O. Eastwood, Jane Crow and the Law: Sex Discrimination and Title VII, 34 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 232, 234 (1965) (noting that “the similarity of [racial inequalities and gender inequalities] was not accidental, but originated in the paternalistic order of society”). 2 3 6 | P i t t s b u r g h T a x R e v i e w | V o l . 1 3 2 0 1 6 Pitt Tax Review | ISSN 1932-1821 (print) 1932-1996 (online) DOI 10.5195/taxreview.2016.47 | http://taxreview.law.pitt.edu educational institutions and professions.206 In Bradwell v. Illinois,207 for example, the Court held that the State of Illinois could lawfully bar women from the practice of law because the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment did not govern or guarantee the right of a person to conduct a specific trade or business.208 For paternalistic emphasis, Justice Bradley famously indicated that a woman’s role in society was to be subservient to men and to attend to matters of the home.209 Not long thereafter, in Strauder v. West Virginia,210 the Court noted in dicta that women could be excluded from serving on juries without running afoul of the Constitution because, according to traditional rationale, they were needed to perform the more important task of tending to the home and the family.211 Paired comfortably and logically with prevailing notions of romantic paternalism was the well-entrenched reality of coverture. Under that system, on marriage, a woman’s legal identity was subsumed by that of her husband, thereby depriving her of the ability, among other things, to enter contracts, make wills, or own property (e.g., money).212 Women were also vulnerable to sexual subjugation by their husbands (i.e., forced sexual intercourse) because the definition of rape excluded husbands and wives;213 in the event of divorce, custody of any children was automatically granted to the husband.214 In the realm of voting, established notions of paternalism were also present. Some politicians and judges apparently feared that giving women 206 See SUPREME COURT DECISIONS AND WOMEN’S RIGHTS 1 (Clare Cushman ed., 2011) [hereinafter WOMEN’S RIGHTS] (discussing the notion of “romantic paternalism”). The author notes that a number of the U.S. Supreme Court decisions cited were first noted as part of this textual collection. 207 83 U.S. 130 (1873). 208 See WOMEN’S RIGHTS, supra note 206, at 2–4. 209 Id. at 6 (highlighting a concurring opinion in Bradwell v. Illinois in which the Justice Bradley “defined in the most paternalistic terms a woman’s role in society as one that should be subservient to men, relegated to the home”). 210 100 U.S. 303, 310 (1880). 211 See WOMEN’S RIGHTS, supra note 206, at 27. 212 Id. at 1. 213 Id. 214 Id. at 1–2. V o l . 1 3 2 0 1 6 | H a t e E x c l u s i o n | 2 3 7 Pitt Tax Review | ISSN 1932-1821 (print) 1932-1996 (online) DOI 10.5195/taxreview.2016.47 | http://taxreview.law.pitt.edu the right to vote would somehow harm the family.215 Other perspectives were even more offensive. Noted one commentator, “Opposition to women’s suffrage was fierce and vociferous. Anti-suffrage groups claimed that women, by nature, were incapable of making political decisions and would not know how to choose a candidate or cast a ballot.”216 Although various states enfranchised women in the late 1800s (e.g., Wyoming, Colorado, Utah, and Idaho), progress in other states (e.g., Washington, California, Arizona, Kansas, Oregon, Montana, Nevada, and New York) was slower. The U.S. Supreme Court’s official position was reflected in Minor v. Happersett,217 which held that the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment did not guarantee women the right to vote. Of course, after a hard-fought battle for women’s suffrage, women secured the right to vote with the ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment in 1920,218 but that event clearly did not mark the end of their struggle. Poll taxes were often used to discourage women from voting before such taxes were effectively dispatched by the ratification of the 24th Amendment in 1964.219 Over time, notions of romantic paternalism began to wither away, but progress was halting and occasionally irrational. In Muller v. Oregon,220 the Court, emphasizing the differences between the sexes, upheld an Oregon law which limited a woman’s work day to ten hours, even though the practical reality was that such protective laws could also harm women by resulting in their displacement by men and by limiting the women’s employment choices (and thus their ability to compete for and assume certain lucrative positions).221 Under Michigan law, women could serve as bartenders, but 215 WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DISHONORABLE PASSIONS: SODOMY LAWS IN AMERICA, 1861- 2003, at 25–26 (Viking 2008) [hereinafter DISHONORABLE PASSIONS]. 216 See WOMEN’S RIGHTS, supra note 206, at 14. 217 88 U.S. 162 (1875). 218 See WOMEN’S RIGHTS, supra note 206, at 15. Note that Mississippi did not ratify the Nineteenth Amendment until 1984. Richard Adams, The 19th Amendment That Gave Women the Right to Vote, 90 Years On, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 18, 2010), http://www.theguardian.com/world/richard-adams-blog/ 2010/aug/18/19th-amendment-women-right-to-vote-90-years. 219 See WOMEN’S RIGHTS, supra note 206, at 16. 220 208 U.S. 412 (1908). 221 Id. 2 3 8 | P i t t s b u r g h T a x R e v i e w | V o l . 1 3 2 0 1 6 Pitt Tax Review | ISSN 1932-1821 (print) 1932-1996 (online) DOI 10.5195/taxreview.2016.47 | http://taxreview.law.pitt.edu under Goesaert v. Cleary,222 this was the case only if they were the wife or daughter of the male owner. And although women began to serve on juries, a given jurisdiction might require that they register in order to be called; the Court upheld a Florida law imposing such a requirement in Hoyt v. Florida.223 Fortunately, in modern times, current law does not draw many of the aforementioned unnecessary distinctions between men and women.224 Even in the military context, women have been allowed entry into the service academies since the 1970s,225 and they now serve in some combat roles. That reality is a far cry from prior policies which excluded women from military service altogether226 or required that women serve only in certain roles (e.g., nurses, clerks, etc.) or only in all-woman, non-combat units.227 It is also true that even though considerable progress has been made, the United States bears considerable responsibility for foot-dragging, and there remains a great deal to be done. B. Remedial Measures Effectively capturing the longstanding dissonant treatment of women and their fundamental rights, one commentator noted the following: When the United States was founded, the law made married women the subjects and servants of their husbands. He was the head and master of his wife and children under both common law rules imported from England and civil-law rules from France and Spain. While women were citizens, their subordinate status in the family could not be reconciled with equal and full citizenship rights.228 The past century has borne witness to remarkable changes with respect to the treatment of women. In addition to considerable progress at the state level, all three branches of the federal government have been active in the effort. 222 335 U.S. 464 (1948). 223 368 U.S. 57 (1961). 224 To get a sense of the extraordinary number of state laws, circa 1950, treating men and women inequitably, see Note, Sex, Discrimination, and the Constitution, 2 STAN. L. REV. 691 (1950). 225 See WOMEN’S RIGHTS, supra note 206, at 86. 226 See id. at 96. 227 See id. at 96–97. 228 Id. at 68. V o l . 1 3 2 0 1 6 | H a t e E x c l u s i o n | 2 3 9 Pitt Tax Review | ISSN 1932-1821 (print) 1932-1996 (online) DOI 10.5195/taxreview.2016.47 | http://taxreview.law.pitt.edu 1. Judicial Activity Although the U.S. Supreme Court and other federal courts have some degree of guilt to bear with respect to prior discriminatory decisions,229 their work on balance has been considerably remedial and beneficial to the causes of women. The jurisprudence ranges in its diversity from jury duty,230 benefits,231 and property rights232 to business community participation,233 affirmative action,234 education,235 and participation in athletic programs.236 Perhaps the most notable developments in the Court’s women’s rights jurisprudence, however, are (i) the establishment of an intermediate level of scrutiny for the use of gender-based classifications; and (ii) the generally active protection of women in the arenas of privacy and employment. Given the reality of certain biological differences between men and women, courts are not obligated to treat men and women in precisely the 229 See, e.g., Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961) (upholding a Florida law which did not allow the calling of women for jury duty unless they registered for such); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948) (upholding a Michigan statute allowing women to be waitresses but not bartenders (except wives and daughters of the bar owner)); Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277 (1937) (upholding a statute which appeared to give women a financial incentive to fail to register to vote); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (limiting the number of hours per day a woman could work because she was a woman). 230 See, e.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994) (holding that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits discrimination in the jury selection context on the basis of sex); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975) (banning laws limiting jury duty on the basis of gender); Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261 (1947) (holding that women are just as qualified as men to serve on juries); Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187 (1946) (holding that a law excluding women from jury service in federal cases runs afoul of Sixth Amendment guarantees because such a law results in a jury pool that is not a fair cross-section of the community). 231 See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (striking down regulation which deprived women of the dependents’ benefits enjoyed by men). 232 See, e.g., Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455 (1981) (striking down law naming husband as “head and master” and allowing him unilateral control of joint property). 233 See, e.g., Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984) (holding that sex discrimination by certain business organizations is unconstitutional and thereby opening many previously all-male organizations to women). 234 See, e.g., Metro Broad. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990) (holding that affirmative action programs aimed at minority ownership of broadcast licenses were constitutional as benign race-conscious measures and restating its support of Fullilove v. Klutznick and its endorsement of set-aside programs). 235 See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (holding that VMI’s male-only admissions policy violated the Fourteenth Amendment). But see, e.g., Mississippi Univ. for Women v. 2 4 0 | P i t t s b u r g h T a x R e v i e w | V o l . 1 3 2 0 1 6 Pitt Tax Review | ISSN 1932-1821 (print) 1932-1996 (online) DOI 10.5195/taxreview.2016.47 | http://taxreview.law.pitt.edu same manner in all circumstances. There remains the risk, however, that a given statute or ordinance will seek to discriminate against women for invidious reasons but cite inherent biological differences as justification. The governing intermediate level of scrutiny helps courts differentiate legitimate gender classifications from illegitimate and illegal gender discrimination. Arriving at the intermediate level of scrutiny, however, took at least three Supreme Court opinions, and it may well be the case that a fourth has altered the landscape. In Reed v. Reed,237 the U.S. Supreme Court struck down a state law that discriminated against women by preferring fathers over mothers when both sought appointment as administrator over a given person’s estate. The Court concluded that such legislation violated the Equal Protection Clause, but it did so by applying so-called rational basis scrutiny under which legislation must only be rationally related to some legitimate governmental objective. Moving completely to the other end of the spectrum, the Court (via plurality opinion) applied strict scrutiny in Frontiero v. Richardson238 to invalidate a U.S. Air Force policy that discriminated against women by automatically providing certain benefits to servicemen upon their marriage but offering those same benefits to servicewomen upon their marriage only after they satisfied an entitlement standard.239 Justifying its approach, the Court reasoned as follows: Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982) (holding that School of Nursing’s policy of denying men admission violated the Equal Protection Clause). 236 See, e.g., Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 893–94 (1st Cir. 1993) (discussing Title IX’s gender discrimination prohibitions in the context of collegiate athletics). 237 404 U.S. 71 (1971). For a brief discussion of this case, see WOMEN’S RIGHTS, supra note 206, at 41–44. 238 411 U.S. 677 (1973). 239 Id. Interestingly enough, it used to be the case that Social Security survivors’ benefits were not equally available. If a man died, his wife and children automatically received the benefit, but if a woman died, her husband was not entitled to the benefit, notwithstanding the fact that the wife had paid Social Security taxes in the same manner as male workers. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 643–44 (1975). The U.S. Supreme Court held that such discrimination was unconstitutional. Id. at 653; see also Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977) (declaring unconstitutional a policy under which the survivors’ benefits of a deceased husband were payable to his widow, but where such benefits of a deceased wife were payable only if the widower was receiving at least half of his support from his deceased wife). For a more detailed discussion of Frontiero v. Richardson, Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, and Califano v. Goldfarb, see WOMEN’S RIGHTS, supra note 206, at 44–49, 70–79. V o l . 1 3 2 0 1 6 | H a t e E x c l u s i o n | 2 4 1 Pitt Tax Review | ISSN 1932-1821 (print) 1932-1996 (online) DOI 10.5195/taxreview.2016.47 | http://taxreview.law.pitt.edu There can be no doubt that our Nation has had a long and unfortunate history of sex discrimination. Traditionally, such discrimination was rationalized by an attitude of “romantic paternalism” which, in practical effect, put women not on a pedestal, but in a cage. Indeed, this paternalistic attitude became . . . firmly rooted in our national consciousness . . . .240 The Court arrived at the classic intermediate scrutiny standard for gender discrimination cases with its decision in Craig v. Boren,241 under which a measure will survive only if it is “substantially-related” to an “important” governmental objective. That standard held for decades, yet there is room to argue that in United States v. Virginia,242 the Court moved closer to strict scrutiny in gender discrimination cases by requiring that discriminatory measures have “exceedingly persuasive justification” in order to survive constitutional muster.243 In the privacy arena, to the extent fundamental rights are at issue, strict judicial scrutiny is the order of the day. To the credit of the judicial branch, the U.S. Supreme Court has soaring precedent here, benefiting men as well as women. In Griswold v. Connecticut,244 the Court struck down a law banning prescription of birth control pills for married couples and soon followed up with Eisenstadt v. Baird245 in which it held that privacy included an unmarried couple’s right to use birth control. Various U.S. Supreme Court decisions essentially protect a woman’s right to choose in the abortion context,246 but they are all the unmistakable progeny of the landmark, Roe v. Wade.247 The Court confirmed in that decision that a woman has the 240 Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 684. 241 429 U.S. 190 (1976). 242 518 U.S. 515 (1996). 243 See id. at 524 (citing Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982)). 244 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 245 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 246 See, e.g., Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502 (1990) (holding that state law requiring one-parent notification was constitutional); Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990) (holding two-parent notification law constitutional so long as judicial hearing was available in lieu of parental consent); Thornburgh v. Am. College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986) (striking down law viewed as discouraging abortions and risking the lives of women needing late-term abortions). 247 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 2 4 2 | P i t t s b u r g h T a x R e v i e w | V o l . 1 3 2 0 1 6 Pitt Tax Review | ISSN 1932-1821 (print) 1932-1996 (online) DOI 10.5195/taxreview.2016.47 | http://taxreview.law.pitt.edu constitutional right to terminate an early pregnancy as a matter of personal privacy. The Court’s employment arena jurisprudence protecting women is voluminous, and an exhaustive review of that body of precedent is beyond the scope of this Article. It bears noting, however, that the Court has been an active participant in eliminating long-entrenched workplace barriers whether relating to basic labor restrictions,248 pregnancy and maternity leave,249 child rearing,250 retirement benefits,251 compensation,252 promotions,253 workplace discrimination,254 affirmative action,255 hostile work environments,256 and 248 See, e.g., Weeks v. S. Bell, 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969) (defeating restrictive labor laws and thereby opening the door for women to previously all-male jobs). 249 See, e.g., California Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987) (requiring that pregnant women be granted unpaid maternity leave); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974) (holding that forced maternity leave, where women were deemed unable to work while pregnant, is illegal). 250 See, e.g., Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971) (banning the practice of not hiring women with pre-school age children). 251 See, e.g., Los Angeles Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978) (prohibiting sex discrimination in retirement benefit contribution requirements). 252 See, e.g., County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161 (1981) (acknowledging the validity of the comparable worth theory). The ruling confirms that Title VII claims need not be restricted to comparable worth claims and may be based solely on sex discrimination. 253 See, e.g., Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69 (1984) (involving a successful Title VII claim brought by a woman at a large law firm who was fired after the firm decided not to invite her to become a partner). Years later in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989), the plaintiff’s admission to the partnership was delayed, and she was told, in essence, to walk, talk, and dress in a more feminine manner and to give due regard to the wearing of make-up, the styling of her hair, and the wearing of jewelry. After subsequent proceedings, she prevailed. See id. 254 See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (holding that in some alleged instances of intentional discrimination, the employer must establish the existence of legitimate grounds for not hiring or promoting someone); North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512 (1982) (holding that Title IX bars sex discrimination with respect to employees as well as with respect to students); Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677 (1979) (holding that a private right of action was available under Title VI and Title IX for those alleging discrimination by an educational institution). 255 See, e.g., Johnson v. Santa Clara Cty., 480 U.S. 616 (1987) (allowing the consideration of gender in employment decisions even in the absence of proven historical discrimination if manifest imbalances exist). 256 See, e.g., Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 73 (1986) (holding that “a claim of ‘hostile environment’ sex discrimination is actionable under Title VII.”). V o l . 1 3 2 0 1 6 | H a t e E x c l u s i o n | 2 4 3 Pitt Tax Review | ISSN 1932-1821 (print) 1932-1996 (online) DOI 10.5195/taxreview.2016.47 | http://taxreview.law.pitt.edu sexual harassment.257 2. Congressional and Executive Activity The U.S. Supreme Court’s jurisprudence relating to specific issues regarding women reflects considerable variety, yet when viewed holistically, congressional and executive action in this arena tends to focus on ensuring that women are paid fairly for the work they do and eradicating sex-based discrimination in specific contexts. Thus, the Fair Labor Standards Act ensured that women were protected by minimum wage laws,258 and later the Equal Pay Act directed that equitable wages be paid to men and women doing the same work. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (hereinafter Title VII) is, of course, central, given that it prohibits discrimination in employment on the basis of sex259 or various other specific traits/classifications260 and created the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.261 Indeed, it was only after passage of Title VII that legislation limiting women’s work hours, work times, and their ability to engage in bartending, mining, and jobs requiring heavy lifting were successfully challenged as discriminatory and not protective.262 Other significant legislation addresses sex discrimination by educational institutions receiving federal funds,263 credit access,264 pregnancy 257 See, e.g., Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993) (allowing the assertion of a sex harassment claim, even in the absence of proven psychological injury). 258 See WOMEN’S RIGHTS, supra note 206, at 21 (noting that the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 established a national minimum wage for all workers and mandated the payment of overtime for work in excess of eight hours in a given day). 259 For a discussion of the rather fortuitous manner in which discrimination on the basis of sex was added to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, see WOMEN’S RIGHTS, supra note 206, at 119. 260 See HOFF, supra note 143, at 236. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 covers three different types of employment discrimination: “disparate treatment,” facial,” and “discriminatory impact.” See WOMEN’S RIGHTS, supra note 206, at 120–21. Depending on the prevailing facts and circumstances, the employment practice may be deemed to violate Title VII. See id. 261 See WOMEN’S RIGHTS, supra note 206, at 119. 262 See id. at 21. 263 See generally Title IX, Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2006). 264 See generally Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (1976) (prohibiting discrimination against women in the extension of credit). 2 4 4 | P i t t s b u r g h T a x R e v i e w | V o l . 1 3 2 0 1 6 Pitt Tax Review | ISSN 1932-1821 (print) 1932-1996 (online) DOI 10.5195/taxreview.2016.47 | http://taxreview.law.pitt.edu discrimination,265 retirement,266 child support,267 gender equity in education,268 and violence against women.269 To its credit, Congress also passed the Equal Rights Amendment in 1972 and sent it to the states for ratification,270 but the amendment failed to secure the necessary state approvals. Executive orders have, at least, prohibited gender discrimination with respect to government contracts over a certain dollar amount,271 and federal agencies have been required to establish and maintain affirmative action programs.272 Executive appointments have also put a number of women on the federal bench, including U.S. Supreme Court Justices Sandra Day O’Connor, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sonia Maria Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan.273 C. Persistence of Negative Impact As recently proposed, the Equal Rights Amendment speaks in basic and clear terms: Section 1. Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex. Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article. 265 See generally Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2006) (banning employment discrimination against pregnant women). 266 See generally Retirement Equity Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-397, 98 Stat. 1426. 267 See generally Child Support Enforcement Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-378, 98 Stat. 1305. 268 See generally Gender Equity in Education Amendment of 1993, S. 1465, 103d Cong. (1993). 269 See generally Violence Against Women Act of 2000, H.R. REP. NO. 106-891 (2000) (providing various protections and resources for raped, battered, and abused women). 270 See HOFF, supra note 143, at 397. 271 Executive Order 11246 failed to prohibit sex discrimination, but this oversight was later corrected by Executive Order 11375. See HOFF, supra note 143, at 395–96. 272 See id. at 396. 273 See Sanford Levinson, Supreme Court of the United States, 18 WORLD BOOK ENCYCLOPEDIA 998, 1000 (World Book 2013). V o l . 1 3 2 0 1 6 | H a t e E x c l u s i o n | 2 4 5 Pitt Tax Review | ISSN 1932-1821 (print) 1932-1996 (online) DOI 10.5195/taxreview.2016.47 | http://taxreview.law.pitt.edu Section 3. This amendment shall take effect two years after the date of ratification.274 Although much progress has been made with respect to the equal treatment of women, the nation has yet to make a firm constitutional commitment to the equal treatment of women. In fact, it has affirmatively refused to do so. Twice. In 1972, Congress passed the Equal Rights Amendment, but it failed to secure ratification by the states, even after the ratification deadline was extended. When the amendment was introduced in Congress again in 1983, it failed to secure a two-thirds vote in the House of Representatives. Both failures are deeply perplexing given ready congressional approval of laws prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sex. Perhaps they reflect the fact that certain segments of society (or at least those in certain geographic areas) refuse to acknowledge the fundamental equality of men and women. No logical explanation exists for such a mindset, but several facts are beyond conjecture. With the ratification of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, the United States made gender discrimination a part of its formative documents, and longstanding U.S. Supreme Court precedent from the era stamped a federal imprimatur on notions of romantic paternalism. Accordingly, its hands are manifestly unclean with respect to the status of women in this society. Women regularly encounter discrimination in the workplace. In fact, several household name companies have paid millions of dollars because of their historical treatment of women and minorities. Mitsubishi paid eight million dollars to settle an EEOC suit alleging sexual harassment in 1998, CBS agreed to pay eight million dollars to settle sex discrimination suit brought on behalf of 200 women in 2000, and after a litigation battle, the State Department was found guilty of sex discrimination in 1989. Thus, even after substantial federal activity both in the courts and via legislation, women still suffer discrimination and mistreatment in the workplace. Those challenges aside, women have also suffered judicial setbacks along with various victories achieved. 274 H.R.J. Res. 208, 92d Cong. (1971); S.J. Res. 8, 92d Cong. (1971). 2 4 6 | P i t t s b u r g h T a x R e v i e w | V o l . 1 3 2 0 1 6 Pitt Tax Review | ISSN 1932-1821 (print) 1932-1996 (online) DOI 10.5195/taxreview.2016.47 | http://taxreview.law.pitt.edu With respect to abortion rights, Beal v. Doe275 held that state funds need not be used to fund abortions, Harris v. McRae276 exempted medically necessary abortions from Medicaid coverage, and Webster v. Reproductive Health Services277 allowed states to refuse the use of public funds for abortions, including the use of public hospitals. Setbacks have also been experienced in other cases.278 Although one cannot maintain that the United States’ treatment of women parallels the treatment of blacks, it remains true that the United States, per the face of the Constitution itself, is responsible for overt sex discrimination. Accordingly, it shoulders some measure of blame for a national mindset under which women continue to suffer discrimination. Without question, remedial measures have substantially advanced the wheels of progress. The elimination of workplace barriers has allowed women to rise to leadership positions in business; Abigail Johnson, to take a single example, was recently made Chief Executive Officer of Fidelity Investments, making her, at the time, the “wealthiest and most powerful woman in finance.”279 Opening the political arena to women has made former Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton a truly formidable candidate for President of the United States.280 These successes notwithstanding, time has yet to undo considerable historical damage. Embracing the unclean hands theory of 275 432 U.S. 438 (1977). 276 448 U.S. 297 (1980). 277 492 U.S. 490 (1989). 278 See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (holding that minority set- aside ordinance was unconstitutional); Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989) (reversing Griggs and thereby requiring that the burden of proof fall on employees with respect to whether testing having a disparate impact on minorities or women is a business necessity); Wimberly v. Labor and Indus. Dep’t, 479 U.S. 511 (1987) (ruling against woman requesting unemployment benefits after not receiving her old job back after maternity leave); Personnel Admin. of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979) (upholding preference for veterans in civil-service jobs, despite historical limit on women in the military); Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (holding that state program denying pregnancy-related disability benefits was constitutional); EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1264 (N.D. Ill. 1986), aff’d, 839 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1988) (holding that apparent disparities with respect to rank and salary (men v. women) were not the result of gender discrimination by Sears). 279 John Waggoner, Abby Takes Charge at Fidelity, USA TODAY, Oct. 14, 2014, at 1B. 280 See Joe Klein, Do You See Her Now?, TIME (Feb. 15, 2016), at 26. As this Article goes to press, Secretary Clinton is the presumptive Democratic nominee for President of the United States. See http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/07/politics/hillary-clinton-presidential-race.html?_r=0. V o l . 1 3 2 0 1 6 | H a t e E x c l u s i o n | 2 4 7 Pitt Tax Review | ISSN 1932-1821 (print) 1932-1996 (online) DOI 10.5195/taxreview.2016.47 | http://taxreview.law.pitt.edu exclusion is, once again, a very small price to pay for prior and ongoing harms regularly visited upon women here in the United States. IV. SEXUAL ORIENTATION281 A. Historical Harms 1. Harms Flowing from the Several States and the District of Columbia In his ongoing attempt to weaken the Catholic Church by usurping ecclesiastical court authority and jurisdiction over “sins against God,” Henry VIII made the “detestable and abominable Vice of Buggery” a capital offense against the English state in 1533.282 The crime soon appeared in handbooks for justices of the peace in England and remained a part of the legal framework for hundreds of years.283 The laws in colonial America naturally reflected substantial English influence if not wholesale adoption of identical provisions. Thus, for example, a handbook written for Virginia justices of the peace provided, in pertinent part, as follows: Buggery is a detestable and abominable Sin, Among Christians not to be named, committed by carnal Knowledge, against the Ordinances of the Creator, and Order of Nature, by Mankind with Mankind, or with Brute Beast, or with Womankind with Brute Beast. 3 Inst. 58. By the Statute of 25, Hen. VIII. Chap. 6, Buggery committed with Mankind, or Beast, is made Felony without Benefit of Clergy [punishable by death on the first offense] . . . .284 Interestingly enough, both the English and the colonial Virginians considered homosexual conduct rare in their respective spheres but, for some bewildering reason, considered it common in Italy.285 Indeed, with the rise of homosexual conduct in eighteenth century England, blame was assigned to 281 This section of the paper draws generously from a list of historical sources referenced in WALTER L. WILLIAMS & YOLANDA RETTER, GAY AND LESBIAN RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES (2003). 282 See Robert Oaks, Perceptions of Homosexuality by Justices of the Peace in Colonial Virginia, 5 J. HOMOSEXUALITY (SPECIAL ISSUE) 36 (1980). 283 See id. at 36–37. 284 See id. at 37. 285 See id. at 38. 2 4 8 | P i t t s b u r g h T a x R e v i e w | V o l . 1 3 2 0 1 6 Pitt Tax Review | ISSN 1932-1821 (print) 1932-1996 (online) DOI 10.5195/taxreview.2016.47 | http://taxreview.law.pitt.edu “the drinking of tea and the pernicious influence of Italian opera.”286 The apparent rarity of homosexual conduct in the colonies notwithstanding, the Laws of Yale College (circa 1787) opted to err on the side of explicit warning with respect to certain forms of student sexual conduct and dress, among other things. The rules provided, in pertinent part, as follows: If any Scholar fhall be guilty of Blafphemy, Curfing, Robbery, Fornication, Forgery, or any fuch atrocious Crime, he fhall be immediately expelled.287 * * * If any Scholar fhall be guilty of a profane Oath or Vow, of profaning the Name, Word, or Ordinances of God; of contemptuous refractory Carriage towards his Superiors; of Fighting, Striking, Quarreling, Challenging, turbulent Words or Behaviour, Drunkennnefs, Lafcivioufnefs, wearing Womens’ Apparel, Fraud, Injuftice, Idlenefs, Lying, Defamation, or any fuch like Crime, he fhall be punifhed by Fine, Admonition, Ruftication, or even Expulfion, as the Nature and Circumftances of the Crime may require.288 Although the laws in colonial America provided harsh (though rarely- enforced)289 punishment for “buggery,” “sodomy,” the “crime against nature,” and the like, these terms were not well-defined as an initial matter.290 In the mid-seventeenth century, the colony of New Haven “prohibited under pain of death men lying with men, women lying with women, masturbation, and any other ‘carnal knowledge,’”291 but it was only in the late 1800s that sodomy was defined in many jurisdictions to include fellatio, even though oral sex was not originally classified as sodomy.292 Gradually and somewhat haphazardly, the parameters of prohibited conduct in the form of “sodomy” and the like became more discernable, and although sodomy would eventually be transitioned to a non-capital offense, it would take decades 286 Id. 287 MARTIN GRIFFIN, THE UNCOMMONPLACE BOOK OF MARTIN GRIFFIN 6 (1988) (quoting the LAWS OF YALE COLLEGE, 1787); see generally GEORGE W. PIERSON, YALE: A SHORT HISTORY 41 (2d ed. 1976), available at http://www.library.yale.edu/mssa/YHO/Piersons/collegeSystem.html. 288 GRIFFIN, supra note 287, at 6. 289 See DISHONORABLE PASSIONS, supra note 215, at 18. 290 See id. at 16 (stating that “[f]rom colonial days up until the nineteenth century, American law decreed sodomy, buggery, or ‘the crime against nature’ a capital crime.”). 291 Id. at 18. 292 See id. at 50. V o l . 1 3 2 0 1 6 | H a t e E x c l u s i o n | 2 4 9 Pitt Tax Review | ISSN 1932-1821 (print) 1932-1996 (online) DOI 10.5195/taxreview.2016.47 | http://taxreview.law.pitt.edu before sodomy itself was decriminalized. Before then, criminal sanction, barbaric treatment,293 and severe punishment at the behest of the several states and the federal government remained the order of the day. Sodomy became a crime in the District of Columbia per congressional mandate with the passage of the Miller Act in 1948,294 and as of 1951, consensual sodomy was punishable in the United States by up to twenty years in prison in most states and over twenty years in at least ten.295 California, in fact, took the step of amending its habitual offender law to include sodomy, making it possible for an individual to receive an automatic life sentence for a second offense.296 As time passed, aggressive policing and discouraging of homosexual conduct continued. In 1953, for example, Congress decided to go a step further by amending the indecent exposure law of the District of Columbia to criminalize any “‘obscene or indecent’ exposure, sexual proposal, or act anywhere in the District,” thus making it possible to prosecute both private homosexual acts as well as private solicitation of homosexual conduct.297 The Miller Act also allowed the civil commitment of so-called “sexual psychopaths” even without a criminal conviction or charge,298 although it was customary (elsewhere) to require civil commitment of such individuals only if they were convicted of sexual offenses (occasionally, but not always, limited to offenses against children).299 Beyond criminal sanction and civil commitment, there were efforts, in essence, to effect penalty for the mere status of being homosexual. In the 1950s and 1960s, there were state-level measures to effect the removal of public school teachers, public school professors, and college students 293 In the early 1900s, California law provided for the sterilization of those exhibiting moral or sexual perversion, and by 1930, roughly 7,000 individuals had suffered sterilization, including many prostitutes and homosexuals. See id. at 55. 294 Note also that under The Miller Act, “a single act of sodomy could lead to ten years in prison, twenty years if an adult committed the crime with a minor (under age sixteen.”). Id. at 91. 295 See id. at 93. 296 See id. at 91. 297 See id. at 94. 298 Id. at 95. 299 See id. at 94–95. 2 5 0 | P i t t s b u r g h T a x R e v i e w | V o l . 1 3 2 0 1 6 Pitt Tax Review | ISSN 1932-1821 (print) 1932-1996 (online) DOI 10.5195/taxreview.2016.47 | http://taxreview.law.pitt.edu because of their homosexuality,300 and any number of professionals stood to lose their licenses to practice and/or be disciplined for “gross immorality” if they were convicted of a “crime involving moral turpitude.”301 To attempt and secure enforcement of these measures, any number of aggressive tactics were employed during this era. “Vice” or “Morals” squads were often used to flush out and punish homosexuals by the use of police stakeouts of homosexual hangouts, the use of decoys/sting operations to prompt sexual solicitation, and police raids of gay/lesbian establishments.302 2. Harms Flowing from the Federal Government Although historically the states played a significant role in the regulation and punishment of homosexual conduct, the policies, practices, and edicts of each branch of the federal government worked hand in hand with those of the several states, the clear and common goal being the suppression of homosexual conduct and the harsh punishment of those actually participating in it or demonstrating the proclivity to do so. Relative to its regular pronouncements regarding race, and sex, the U.S. Supreme Court has had (until very recently) little occasion to address issues touching directly on sexual orientation, but the Court has certainly not been silent. In the late 1980s, the Court confirmed the constitutionality of a Georgia statute criminalizing consensual homosexual sodomy in Bowers v. Hardwick,303 and only a few years later, with its decision in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale,304 the Court allowed the exclusion of an avowed homosexual on First Amendment grounds. Years later when the issue of gay marriage reached the Court, it opted for delay and deliberate speed by refusing, for the moment at least, to do anything.305 Though there are those who would certainly like to ban gay marriage explicitly at the highest possible level, Congress has yet to amend the Constitution so as to incorporate any language, which specifically 300 See id. at 103–04. 301 See id. at 104. 302 See id. at 96–97. 303 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 304 530 U.S. 640 (2000). 305 See Richard Wolf, High Court Steps Aside, USA TODAY, Oct. 7, 2014, at A1 (reporting the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision to allow rulings from lower courts striking down same-sex marriage bans to stand rather than issuing any ruling). V o l . 1 3 2 0 1 6 | H a t e E x c l u s i o n | 2 5 1 Pitt Tax Review | ISSN 1932-1821 (print) 1932-1996 (online) DOI 10.5195/taxreview.2016.47 | http://taxreview.law.pitt.edu touches on the issue of sexual orientation. Congress has, however, taken steps which unmistakably soil the hands of the United States with sexual orientation discrimination. In 1996, the Senate voted on a bill which would have banned discrimination in the workplace on the basis of sexual orientation.306 By a single vote, the bill failed to pass.307 Other legislation, with a decidedly heterosexist slant, managed, however, to make it through, namely the Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”), which restricted the definition of “marriage” to a union of one man and one woman.308 Accordingly a host of privileges and conveniences enjoyed by opposite-sex married couples309 were expressly denied to those in same-sex unions. With DOMA alone, the United States re-identified itself as a stalwart enemy of equality on the sexual orientation front. History reveals that the federal government’s negative treatment of homosexuals extends far beyond the matrimonial context310 and well pre-dates the passage of DOMA. By executive order, President Eisenhower required that government workers guilty of “sexual perversion” be fired.311 In fact, it has been noted that the Eisenhower Administration was relatively more anti-homosexual that the predecessor administration and his executive order was, at least 306 See WILLIAMS & RETTER, supra note 281, at xlii; see also Margaret M. Russell, Lesbian, Gay and Bisexual Rights and “The Civil Rights Agenda,” 1 AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y REP. 33 (1994) (discussing the Employment Non-Discrimination Act). 307 See WILLIAMS & RETTER, supra note 281, at xlii. 308 Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996). 309 See generally Anthony C. Infanti, Inequitable Administration: Documenting Family for Tax Purposes, 22 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 329 (2011) (highlighting the fact that a host of endemic privileges along a host of axes including race, ethnicity, marital status, sexual orientation, and class have influenced Code-based and administrative provisions to the notable detriment of those outside the endemic privilege groups); see also Anthony C. Infanti, Special Concerns of Lesbian and Gay Couples, in AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, THE ABA PRACTICAL GUIDE TO ESTATE PLANNING 417 (Jay A. Soled ed., 2011) (highlighting the need for lesbian and gay couples to plan their estates and other affairs because laws governing intestate succession and other critical matters (e.g., health care decision-making) often fail to protect (or may be hostile to) the interests of those not in heterosexual unions). 310 See Anthony C. Infanti, Bringing Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity into the Tax Classroom, 59 J. LEGAL. EDUC. 3 (2009) (discussing various areas in which the tax laws discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation). 311 See WILLIAMS & RETTER, supra note 281, at xxxvii. 2 5 2 | P i t t s b u r g h T a x R e v i e w | V o l . 1 3 2 0 1 6 Pitt Tax Review | ISSN 1932-1821 (print) 1932-1996 (online) DOI 10.5195/taxreview.2016.47 | http://taxreview.law.pitt.edu ostensibly, part of the so-called federal loyalty-security program.312 During the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s, the federal government sought to identify and investigate homosexuals in order that they be excluded from civil and military government service or terminated from such service.313 One commentator noted that although Communists were the supposed targets of heightened sensitivity/hostility during the McCarthy era, the real and ultimate victims were homosexuals.314 From January of 1947 to April of 1950, there was administrative investigation of 192 cases of “sexual perversion” in civil government; most victims were fired or resigned.315 The program was aggressive and comprehensive. In 1954, the U.S. Post Office confiscated ONE Magazine deeming it to be “obscene, lewd, lascivious and filthy,”316 although in the end, the U.S. Post Office was sued and lost.317 Even before the issuance of Eisenhower’s executive order, military regulations issued in 1943 barred service by homosexuals.318 The dire need for manpower during World War II was not enough to relax the rule.319 Army doctors examined approximately eighteen million draft registrants, and rejected some five and half million on medical, dental, or moral grounds (i.e., because they failed to respond properly to the question “Do you like girls?”)320 After the war, the military purges continued with over 3,200 discharges from 1947–50321 and between 2,000 and 5,000 persons form 312 See DISHONORABLE PASSIONS, supra note 215, at 102. 313 See id. at 100–02. 314 See id. at 102. 315 Id. at 100. 316 See DISHONORABLE PASSIONS, supra note 215, at 26 (noting that the Comstock Act of 1873 made it illegal to send obscene material through the federal mail). 317 See WILLIAMS & RETTER, supra note 281, at xxxviii; see also Tony Mauro, High Court’s First Gay-Issues Ruling, NAT’L L.J. (Dec. 1, 2014) (discussing One Inc. v. Olesen, a case in which the U.S. Supreme Court held that a Los Angeles-based magazine did not constitute “obscenity” and should be delivered by the U.S. Post Office). 318 See WILLIAMS & RETTER, supra note 281, at xxxvii. 319 See UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DEFENSE FORCE MANAGEMENT: DOD’S POLICY ON HOMOSEXUALITY 2 (1992) [hereinafter DOD POLICY] (indicating that since the beginning of World War II, the United States military had formal policies prohibiting homosexuals from serving). 320 THE WAR: EPISODE ONE: “A NECESSARY WAR” (PBS Home Video 2007). 321 See DISHONORABLE PASSIONS, supra note 215, at 100. V o l . 1 3 2 0 1 6 | H a t e E x c l u s i o n | 2 5 3 Pitt Tax Review | ISSN 1932-1821 (print) 1932-1996 (online) DOI 10.5195/taxreview.2016.47 | http://taxreview.law.pitt.edu 1950–65.322 Anecdotally, at least one serviceman established that he was inducted into the Army in 1967 even though he truthfully noted that he had homosexual tendencies.323 He was of the belief, however, that he was allowed to enlist, despite his avowed homosexual tendencies, because he was black and would likely be a Vietnam War fatality.324 Situational anomalies aside, during fiscal years 1980–90, the military separated approximately 17,000 individuals under the category “homosexuality,”325 and “[n]o determination that their behavior had adversely affected the ability of the military services to perform their missions was required.”326 For the military, mere homosexual status was enough to merit exclusion, notwithstanding exemplary service records327 and veteran status.328 Department of Defense directives provided as follows: Homosexuality is incompatible with military service. The presence in the military environment of persons who engage in homosexual conduct or who, by their statements, demonstrate a propensity to engage in homosexual conduct, seriously impairs the accomplishment of the military mission. The presence of such members adversely affects the ability of the Military Services to maintain discipline, good order, and morale; to foster mutual trust and confidence among servicemembers [sic]; to ensure the integrity of the system of rank and command; to facilitate assignment and worldwide deployment of service members who frequently must live and work under close conditions affording minimal privacy; 322 See id. at 101. 323 William N. Eskridge, Jr., Gaylegal Narratives, 46 STAN. L. REV. 607, 611 (1994) [hereinafter Gaylegal Narratives]. 324 See id. at 618. 325 See DOD POLICY, supra note 319, at 4. 326 Id. Note further that several federal courts held the DOD’s exclusionary policy to be constitutional as rationally related to some legitimate governmental interest without requiring that the DOD provide scientific evidence that its policy was legitimate. See id. at 28. See also Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388, reh’g den., 746 F.2d 1579 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (applying a rational basis standard of review with respect to asserted constitutional claims and noting that common sense and experience negated the need for scientific proof to establish the legitimacy of state interests). 327 See id. at 16–17 (indicating that approximately 17,000 service men and women had been discharged for “homosexuality” between fiscal years 1980 and 1990 and citing specific examples of those discharged despite exemplary service records). 328 See id. 2 5 4 | P i t t s b u r g h T a x R e v i e w | V o l . 1 3 2 0 1 6 Pitt Tax Review | ISSN 1932-1821 (print) 1932-1996 (online) DOI 10.5195/taxreview.2016.47 | http://taxreview.law.pitt.edu to recruit and retain members of the Military Services; to maintain public acceptability of military service; and to prevent breaches of security.329 Those in the psychiatric and psychological professions considered the DOD’s policy to be “factually unsupported, unfair, and counterproductive.”330 What is more, the government’s own investigation confirms this view. In 1957, the Navy commissioned a study to investigate military homosexuality.331 The work product, the Crittenden Report, found no sound basis for barring homosexuals from military service.332 Not surprisingly, the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff eventually found themselves backing away from security-based justifications in testimony before the House Budget Committee in the early 1990s, but they continued to press the need for the policy “to maintain good order and discipline.”333 The rationale was thin. Even though police officers and firemen need rigid adherence to protocol, discipline, and the like, a number of police and fire departments had adopted policies prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination without adverse consequence since the 1970s.334 As it turns out, having gays and lesbians in the military was not disruptive (i.e., did not destroy unit cohesion and morale); rather, it was the military’s exclusionary policy that caused disruption.335 Similar “disruption” arguments were advanced in an effort to prevent racial integration of the armed forces, even though President Truman’s military desegregation mandate proceeded without incident.336 It only worsens matters in the military exclusion context to note that as of 1992, the approximate cost of recruiting and training a new service member to replace one discharged on the basis of homosexuality was $28,226 for each enlisted troop and $120,772 329 Id. at 11. 330 Id. at 3. 331 See WILLIAMS & RETTER, supra note 281, at xxxviii. 332 See id. 333 DOD POLICY, supra note 319, at 5. 334 See id. at 6. 335 See Gaylegal Narratives, supra note 323, at 616. 336 See id. at 619 n.57. V o l . 1 3 2 0 1 6 | H a t e E x c l u s i o n | 2 5 5 Pitt Tax Review | ISSN 1932-1821 (print) 1932-1996 (online) DOI 10.5195/taxreview.2016.47 | http://taxreview.law.pitt.edu for each officer.337 These financial realities and aggregate statistics aside, it is critically important to bear in mind and appreciate the gross injustice visited on the lives of each of these dedicated public servants and the courage they summoned to fight back. Leonard P. Matlovich, a former Technical Sergeant in the Air Force, admitted his sexual orientation and the fact that he had engaged in homosexual activity.338 Although he was a twelve-year veteran who had served three tours of duty in Vietnam339 and was the recipient of a Bronze Star and a Purple Heart, he was administratively processed for separation from the Air Force after his revelations.340 Subsequently, Matlovich was honorably discharged, although he waged a legal battle to avoid separation.341 The litigation ended after Matlovich and the Air Force agreed to a court- approved settlement.342 Perry Watkins, a former Staff Sergeant in the Army, was completely candid about his homosexuality from the very start of his military career.343 In fact, he reenlisted three times and served tours of duty in both Vietnam and Korea.344 Although he was consistently rated an outstanding soldier, he eventually faced discharge under regulations mandating the separation of all homosexuals.345 Time and again, the federal courts ruled in his favor, noting that Watkins’ candor regarding his sexual orientation estopped the government from relying on its mandatory discharge regulations.346 Ultimately, the U.S. Supreme Court denied the Army’s petition for review, 337 See DOD POLICY, supra note 319, at 4. 338 See id. at 46. 339 See The Sexes: The Sergeant v. The Air Force, TIME (Sept. 8, 1975), at 34 (noting that Sergeant Matlovich had served three tours of duty in Vietnam). 340 See DOD POLICY, supra note 319, at 46. 341 See id. 342 See id. 343 See id. at 47. 344 See id. 345 See id. 346 See id. at 47–48. 2 5 6 | P i t t s b u r g h T a x R e v i e w | V o l . 1 3 2 0 1 6 Pitt Tax Review | ISSN 1932-1821 (print) 1932-1996 (online) DOI 10.5195/taxreview.2016.47 | http://taxreview.law.pitt.edu and Watkins retired after having been promoted to the rank of sergeant first class and receiving appropriate monetary compensation.347 Joseph C. Steffan, a former midshipman, was only a few weeks from graduating first in his class at the U.S. Naval Academy when he was administratively processed for separation due to his admission that he was a homosexual. Although he resigned with an honorable discharge, he challenged the Department of Defense’s policy in court and sought reinstatement, his Bachelor of Science degree, and commission as an ensign. Steffan refused to answer deposition questions concerning his participation in homosexual activities while at the Academy, prompting several procedural battles. Steffan managed to secure several legal victories, but ultimately, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit (sitting en banc) concluded that the military’s ban was constitutional and thus that Steffan’s expulsion from the Naval Academy was justifiable.348 Over time, the government’s outright ban on gays in the military morphed into the infamous “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy, but even that measure brought about thousands of dismissals,349 and it was only during the Obama Administration that the military’s ban on gays terminated. But the federal government’s prior acts, whether from the executive, legislative, or judicial branch, played a major role in shaping public attitudes. In the same way that collective action sought to preserve the ability to discriminate on the basis of race in prior years,350 collective anti-gay measures are as common today as they were in the recent past. Colorado’s [Constitutional] 347 See id. at 48. 348 See Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 349 Over 10,000 service members have been dismissed under the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy. See Gregg Zoroya, Top Military Officer Backs Repeal of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” USA TODAY, Feb. 3, 2010, at 6A (indicating that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff opposes the policy because it forces service members to lie). 350 See Russell, supra note 306, at 56 (discussing California’s Proposition Fourteen, which would have had the effect of repealing relevant state prohibitions and permitting racial discrimination in housing); see also id. at 57 (“Proposition 14 accorded state support and ratification to private biases such that racial discriminators could now invoke the mantle of constitutional authority—and not simply private choice—in support of their biased decision-making.”). The U.S. Supreme Court invalidated Proposition Fourteen in Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967). The Court later emphasized that “[p]rivate biases may be outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect.” Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984). V o l . 1 3 2 0 1 6 | H a t e E x c l u s i o n | 2 5 7 Pitt Tax Review | ISSN 1932-1821 (print) 1932-1996 (online) DOI 10.5195/taxreview.2016.47 | http://taxreview.law.pitt.edu Amendment Two is a well-known example. Prior to the passage of Amendment Two by voters, the State of Colorado and various cities within the jurisdiction had adopted a host of measures prohibiting discrimination (in various contexts) on the basis of sexual orientation.351 By referendum, Colorado voters approved Amendment Two, which effectively repealed existing anti-discrimination laws and measures protecting lesbians, gays, and bisexuals and prohibited the future adoption of such protections.352 Colorado was not the only jurisdiction in which analogous repeal efforts took root,353 but voters in at least some other jurisdictions rejected the attempt;354 even the efforts in Colorado were stymied. A Colorado state trial court entered a permanent injunction against Amendment Two because the approved amendment violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by depriving lesbians, gays, and bisexuals from participating in the political process.355 In recent years, the collective action battleground shifted to the same-sex marriage arena. In California, voters approved Proposition Eight, briefly restricting the definition of marriage to one man and one woman. With the establishment of same-sex marriage as a fundamental right in Obergefell v. Hodges,356 Proposition Eight and similar measures, statutes, etc. were swept aside, but in some circles, that development merely heightened the fervor for enactment of religious liberty measures.357 351 See Russell, supra note 306, at 42. 352 See id. at 33–34. 353 See Judith M. Hedgpeth, Employment Discrimination Law and the Rights of Gay Persons, 5 J. HOMOSEXUALITY (SPECIAL ISSUE) 68 (1980) (noting the passage of local ordinances protecting the employment, housing, and public accommodations rights of homosexuals and the attempts in various jurisdictions to repeal various protections). 354 See Russell, supra note 306, at 46 (indicating that Oregon Measure Nine was defeated). 355 See id. at 33–34. 356 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 357 See generally Aaron G. Sheinin & Kristina Torres, ‘Religious Liberty’ Bills Gain Momentum in Georgia, ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION (Feb. 9, 2016), http://www.myajc.com/news/news/state- regional-govt-politics/religious-liberty-bills-gain-momentum-in-georgia/nqMct/. 2 5 8 | P i t t s b u r g h T a x R e v i e w | V o l . 1 3 2 0 1 6 Pitt Tax Review | ISSN 1932-1821 (print) 1932-1996 (online) DOI 10.5195/taxreview.2016.47 | http://taxreview.law.pitt.edu B. Remedial Measures Progress with respect to the treatment of sexual minorities has been made on several fronts over time, albeit somewhat gradually in most instances. Remedial measures rarely, however, self-generate. Instead, change frequently starts with one or a few individuals whose personal experiences358 often lead to and can ultimately have a profound impact on the evolution of prevailing public policy and law. Scholars have noted and discussed multiple strategies for effecting change. In his seminal work on the importance and impact of personal gaylegal narratives, Professor Eskridge discusses several approaches to modifying opinions and bringing about lasting change, including conservative pragmatism and prophetic pragmatism.359 He emphasizes that gaylegal narratives have value, even in a conservative pragmatist framework (i.e., persuasive yet accommodating), because they provide information useful in contradicting preconceived notions, in evaluating policies on the basis of concrete cases, and in exposing parallel fallacies.360 He goes on to note that in a prophetic pragmatist framework (i.e., persuasive yet non-accommodating), gaylegal narratives have value in that they seek to modify opinion in a more aggressive manner relative to (accommodating) conservative pragmatism.361 Ultimately, however, he gives full endorsement to a social constructionist approach whereby one employs defiance and agitation as a means of attaining lasting change. Gaylegal narratives, he reasons, may be most useful in that context because the personal narratives help galvanize those harmed by socially constructed dividing practices.362 Describing law as a “redescription” of a just and protective Constitution, he notes the value of the gaylegal narrative as follows: “The more people for whom these stories resonate, and the more intensely and openly they express their feelings, the greater the chance that a minority redescription will displace what the majority had previously considered to be law.”363 Logically, it would appear that a social constructionist approach would enjoy an enhanced likelihood of success if those agitating for change could 358 See Gaylegal Narratives, supra note 323, at 609–10 (lamenting the virtual disregard of gaylegal narratives by Professors Farber and Sherry in their discussion and analysis of “outsider” scholarship). 359 See Gaylegal Narratives, supra note 323, at 610–11. 360 See id. at 614–17. V o l . 1 3 2 0 1 6 | H a t e E x c l u s i o n | 2 5 9 Pitt Tax Review | ISSN 1932-1821 (print) 1932-1996 (online) DOI 10.5195/taxreview.2016.47 | http://taxreview.law.pitt.edu easily draw substantive parallels between what they seek and what others have (often successfully) sought in the past by employing such tactics. But it is not always easy to attempt to travel the same road. At the advent of the struggle for gay rights, there was debate over whether the struggle for rights with respect to sexual minorities should be included in the larger struggle for civil rights;364 some were hostile to the notion of gay rights as civil rights because sexual orientation was viewed not a matter of immutable status but conduct or behavior (and thus rightly subject to social opprobrium).365 Indeed, attempts to analogize race and sexual orientation in a civil rights struggle context gave rise to animosity and “controversy bordering on enmity,”366 due, at least in part, to the fear that arguments attempting to analogize race and sexual orientation would ultimately lead to diminished attention to race discrimination.367 The adamant refusal of others to categorize gay rights as civil and human rights at that juncture caused lesbians, gays, and bisexuals to suffer daily and grievously.368 Proponents of collective anti-gay measures (like Colorado’s Amendment Two) touted the non-comparability argument to advance their agenda.369 Even in the face of difficulty and very real personal risk, conscious agitation is usually a necessary first step in effecting lasting change. The pains and frustrations of private experience mount and mix quietly along with the courage to defy an infuriating status quo, like a flammable gas seeping into an atmosphere heavy and rich with volatile elements. Then comes the spark. A woman, long excluded by law from the voting polls, seethes in fury and finally decides to put her foot down and stake her claim to what she 361 See id. at 626. 362 See id. at 635. 363 Id. at 641. 364 See Russell, supra note 306, at 36. 365 See id. at 39. The same arguments, of course, were made by proponents of collective anti-gay measures. See id. at 45. 366 See id. at 37. 367 See id. at 39. 368 See id. at 40. 369 See id. at 45. 2 6 0 | P i t t s b u r g h T a x R e v i e w | V o l . 1 3 2 0 1 6 Pitt Tax Review | ISSN 1932-1821 (print) 1932-1996 (online) DOI 10.5195/taxreview.2016.47 | http://taxreview.law.pitt.edu knows is her fundamental right. A black woman in Montgomery, Alabama pays her bus fare, disembarks, walks to the rear entrance, and eventually takes her seat in the “black passenger section.” Having been ordered to give up that seat to accommodate a white man, she refuses to allow the assault to her dignity. In that instant, she decides that she will not accept yet another dose of racial oppression. A gay man seeks out a space he and like-minded consenting adults have managed to carve out for themselves. The police descend in yet another pointless raid,370 but what the police do not realize at the outset is that the accumulation of physical batteries, extortions, and psychological assaults they have dispensed have reached critical and explosive mass. In a blinding flash of personal redemption, the man decides that he will no longer quietly part with his personal dignity. He will not surrender his basic human right to be left alone as he pursues personal happiness. Many years and many hard-fought battles later, positive change with respect to the treatment of sexual minorities has come at the private, local, state, and federal levels. In 1981, Wisconsin became the first of many states to pass a “comprehensive gay rights law,”371 and shortly thereafter in 1984, the U.S. Conference of Mayors passed a resolution calling for an end to antigay discrimination. More recently, the changes have been swift and often shocking. ■ A relatively recent poll of citizens found that 55% indicated support of same-sex marriage, 36% voiced opposition, and 9% were not sure.372 Only two years later, the U.S. Supreme Court established same-sex marriage as a fundamental right. ■ Companies have begun to offer domestic partner benefits and taking steps to counteract the federal government’s tax treatment of such benefits.373 370 Such raids on gay establishments were common in the mid-20th century. See DISHONORABLE PASSIONS, supra note 215, at 96–97 (discussing the aggressive effort in the 1940s and 1950s (via vice or morals squads) to flesh out and punish homosexuals by the use of police stakeouts of homosexual hangouts, the use of decoys/sting operations to prompt sexual solicitation, and police raids of gay/lesbian establishments). 371 See WILLIAMS & RETTER, supra note 281, at xl. 372 Id. 373 See Scott Jaschik, ‘Grossing Up’: Equity or Bias?, INSIDE HIGHER ED. (Jan. 29, 2010), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2010/0129/syracuse (discussing Syracuse University’s plan to V o l . 1 3 2 0 1 6 | H a t e E x c l u s i o n | 2 6 1 Pitt Tax Review | ISSN 1932-1821 (print) 1932-1996 (online) DOI 10.5195/taxreview.2016.47 | http://taxreview.law.pitt.edu ■ Even at a time when it was counter to national organization policy, a gay Eagle Scout was hired to work at a summer camp;374 the change in national policy itself came only a few months later.375 ■ To the astonishment of many, the Catholic Church recently announced enhanced tolerance with respect to gays,376 “calling for the [Catholic] church to welcome and accept gay people, unmarried couples and those who have divorced, as well as the children of these less traditional families.”377 ■ In 2014, it was decided that gay groups could march in New York City’s St. Patrick’s Day parade.378 Although the pace of change has quickened in recent years, it remains true that there were decades of stasis. With the decriminalization of consensual private sodomy in the Model Penal Code by the American Law Institute in the mid-1950s,379 change was afoot. In 1961, Illinois repealed its consensual sodomy law by adopting the new Model Penal Code, and interestingly enough, the work on human sexuality by noted sexologist Alfred Kinsey proved influential.380 Perhaps the more eyebrow-raising influence was the routine tendency of corrupt Chicago police officers to harass homosexuals and demand payoffs from them in exchange for leaving them alone and thereby relieving them (temporarily at least) of the threat of gross up the pay of employees whose domestic partners enjoy health insurance benefits under the university’s plan). 374 See James Barron, With Hire, Scouts Affiliate in City Defies Ban on Gays, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 2015, at A17. 375 See Todd Leopold, Boy Scouts Change Policy on Gay Leaders, CNN.COM (July 28, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/07/27/us/boy-scouts-gay-leaders-feat/. 376 See Eric J. Lyman, Church Expresses New Acceptance of Gays, Divorce, USA TODAY, Oct. 14, 2014, at A1 (reporting the astonishing reality of the Catholic church’s enhanced tolerance with respect to gays and divorce). 377 Elisabetta Povoledo & Laurie Goodstein, At the Vatican, A Shift in Tone Toward Gays, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2014, at A1 (reporting the issuance of a document released by a synod). 378 See John Bacon, Gay Group OK’d for St. Paddy’s Day Parade, USA TODAY, Sept. 4, 2014, at 3A (reporting that gay groups would no longer be banned from participating in the New York City’s St. Patrick’s Day parade). 379 See DISHONORABLE PASSIONS, supra note 215, at 121–24 (discussing the various considerations and arguments which ultimately resulted in the decriminalization of consensual private sodomy in the Model Penal Code by the American Law Institute in the mid-1950s). 380 See id. at 125. 2 6 2 | P i t t s b u r g h T a x R e v i e w | V o l . 1 3 2 0 1 6 Pitt Tax Review | ISSN 1932-1821 (print) 1932-1996 (online) DOI 10.5195/taxreview.2016.47 | http://taxreview.law.pitt.edu criminal prosecution and all the ramifications that could flow from arrest, indictment, and/or conviction.381 Although there is no record of corrupt officers extorting homosexuals in Hartford or nearby cities, Connecticut became the second state to decriminalize consensual private sodomy, and several other states followed. As of January 1, 1979, approximately fourteen states treated consensual sodomy as a felony whereas approximately 22 did not criminalize consensual sodomy.382 In updating their criminal law statutes, states would often decriminalize other sex acts (e.g., fornication, cohabitation, etc.) and maintain the criminality of other acts (e.g., adultery or abortion) as a means of generating support for the larger legislative effort or sending a message regarding morality.383 Progress regarding sodomy statutes was gradual, but truly national change would come only later with the intervention of the federal judiciary, although the other branches of the federal government managed to attempt or bring about meaningful progress. Although legislators have introduced bills in Congress which would ban sexual orientation discrimination more broadly, those bills have not passed.384 So, Congress may be dragging its feet in the employment and public accommodations context, but at the least, there is some minimal cognizance of the need to give due regard to the plight of specific discrete and insular minorities. Congress can be credited with enacting the Hate Crimes Act in 1990;385 the collection of hate crime data is now a federal mandate.386 At the executive level, President Clinton attempted to lift the ban on gays serving in the military, but compromised with the “Don’t Ask, Don’t 381 See id. 382 See id. at 202. 383 See id. at 161–62. 384 See Lana Birbrair, Beyond Obergefell: What’s Next?, HARV. L. BULL., Fall 2015, at 32, 33. For example, the Employment Non-Discrimination Act has been repeatedly presented in Congress since 1994 and has yet to achieve passage. Id. 385 See WILLIAMS & RETTER, supra note 281, at xli. 386 See FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, HATE CRIME DATA COLLECTION GUIDELINES AND TRAINING MANUAL 1.3.1 (2015). V o l . 1 3 2 0 1 6 | H a t e E x c l u s i o n | 2 6 3 Pitt Tax Review | ISSN 1932-1821 (print) 1932-1996 (online) DOI 10.5195/taxreview.2016.47 | http://taxreview.law.pitt.edu Tell” policy.387 After calls from senior military officials to scrap the policy,388 President Obama was finally able to have it repealed. Indeed, after hemming, hawing, and soul-searching, the President eventually endorsed gay marriage. Thereafter, the U.S. Supreme Court moved the nation forward by several giant leaps. As federal remedial measures go, gay and lesbians have scored a series of judicial victories in recent years. Expressly overruling Bowers v. Hardwick,389 the Supreme Court struck down a Texas law criminalizing specific same-sex intimate conduct with its decision in Lawrence v. Texas.390 And only a few years later, the Court handed down its pivotal and landmark decision in United States v. Windsor,391 which held that Section Three of DOMA (defining “marriage” solely as a union of one man and one woman) could not survive constitutional muster because it violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Given the clear opportunity to rule on same- sex marriage itself, the Court first opted for silence. In 2014, it allowed rulings from lower courts striking down same-sex marriage bans to stand rather than issuing any ruling of its own.392 Finally, in 2015, the Court issued yet another gay rights landmark, Obergefell v. Hodges,393 ruling that same- sex marriage was a fundamental right. C. Persistence of Negative Impact The executive and judicial branches of the federal government deserve credit for gradually bringing about meaningful, corrective change to equalize the treatment of sexual minorities, but Congress continues to resist the larger effort. For example, the Employment Non-Discrimination Act (which would 387 See WILLIAMS & RETTER, supra note 281, at xli. 388 At the time, President Obama felt that the “Don’t ask, Don’t tell policy” should change, but some military leaders felt that immediate change would be premature. See Military Chiefs Want Time to Lift “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” USA TODAY, Feb. 24, 2010, at 5A; see also Zoroya, supra note 349, at 6A. 389 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 390 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 391 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 392 See Wolf, supra note 305, at 1A. 393 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 2 6 4 | P i t t s b u r g h T a x R e v i e w | V o l . 1 3 2 0 1 6 Pitt Tax Review | ISSN 1932-1821 (print) 1932-1996 (online) DOI 10.5195/taxreview.2016.47 | http://taxreview.law.pitt.edu prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in the employment context) has been repeatedly presented in Congress since 1994 and has yet to achieve passage,394 and unlike the same-sex marriage or consensual private sodomy contexts, there is no protective federal case law of general applicability.395 Although there are some state and local protections against sexual orientation discrimination in employment, their applicability depends ultimately on the identity of the employer (public vs. private) and the employment location.396 There is very limited room for optimism. One commentator notes that the EEOC believes that Title VII protects transgender, gay, and bisexual employees against public and private discrimination because discrimination on such grounds constitutes sex discrimination.397 She notes, however, that courts resist extending Title VII protections398 and tend to emphasize the need for sweeping legislation to protect individuals from discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and 394 See Birbrair, supra note 384, at 33; see also Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Rights Bill Sought for Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender Americans, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2014, at A16 (highlighting the need for comprehensive national anti-discrimination legislation that would protect lesbians, gays, bisexuals, and the transgendered from discrimination in “employment, housing, education, public accommodations, jury service, and lending”). The Employment Non-Discrimination Act (“ENDA”) was originally introduced in Congress by Bella Abzug and Edward I. Koch. See Stolberg, supra. 395 See Hedgpeth, supra note 353, at 68 (lamenting the fact that neither federal cases nor federal laws extend the right of equal employment opportunity to workers known or suspected of being homosexual). Note, however, that federal employees may enjoy some protection. See id. at 69 (discussing Norton v. Macy, 417 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969)), which held that a qualified and competent employee could not be discharged from federal employment solely because the individual was homosexual). Not all courts follow the Norton decision. See id. (stating that “[c]ourts rejecting Norton have acted on the unacknowledged assumption that homosexuality is equivalent to unfitness and have seen no need to prove any relationship between the capabilities of the individual and the agency’s reason for disqualification.”). Other courts adhere to Norton’s spirit. See id. (discussing Society for Individual Rights v. Hampton, 63 F.R.D. 399 (N.D. Cal. 1973), aff’d, 528 F.2d 905 (9th Cir. 1975), which generally enjoined the Civil Service Commission from excluding homosexuals solely on that basis or on the reasoning that employing homosexuals would give rise to public contempt for the Commission). 396 See ANTHONY C. INFANTI, EVERYDAY LAW FOR GAYS AND LESBIANS AND THOSE WHO CARE ABOUT THEM 108 (2007). 397 See Birbrair, supra note 384, at 33; see also INFANTI, supra note 396, at 111–12 (discussing Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, 523 U.S. 75 (1998), in which a man was able to assert a successful Title VII claim of sexual harassment by other men). 398 Another commentator’s view is consistent. See INFANTI, supra note 396, at 111–12 (noting that a Title VII claim must establish discrimination because of “sex” (i.e., gender) and that lesbians and gay men may have difficulty establishing that they were discriminated again on the basis of sex rather than sexual orientation). V o l . 1 3 2 0 1 6 | H a t e E x c l u s i o n | 2 6 5 Pitt Tax Review | ISSN 1932-1821 (print) 1932-1996 (online) DOI 10.5195/taxreview.2016.47 | http://taxreview.law.pitt.edu gender identity.399 Even on the heels of substantial progress, the specter of overt or latent hostility looms large, even for some of the nation’s most capable employee or job candidates.400 Lamenting prevailing realities in the 1980s, the following commentary remains true (in certain contexts) today: While considerable progress has been achieved in this emerging struggle for constitutional guarantees, administrative and judicial protection for the employment opportunities of homosexual persons is generally sporadic and unreliable. Although modern research and practical experience show such opprobrium to be unwarranted and even detrimental to society, discriminatory treatment of the employment rights of gay people is still evident and still the major trend in case law.401 There is every indication that resistance to change in employment and other contexts will take the form of religious liberty claims. Noted one commentator, “Religious accommodation and the balancing of First Amendment rights with principles of nondiscrimination pose two of the greatest challenges for the LGBT community.”402 Thus, barring substantial change in the composition of Congress, the federal legislative outlook is bleak; a bill to be introduced in Congress by Senator Jeff Merkley (prohibiting discrimination against the LGBT community in employment, housing, and public accommodations)403 would not likely secure passage 399 See Birbrair, supra note 384, at 33; see also Katy Steinmetz, After the Altar, TIME (Jan. 5, 2015), at 73 (noting that no federal law prohibits discrimination that would allow the use of sexual orientation as the grounds for firing someone, refusing to serve them, or refusing to rent property to them); Stolberg, supra note 394 (discussing the need for and likely difficulties associated with national legislation protecting lesbians, gays, bisexuals, and the transgendered from discrimination). Recent media reports indicate that issues regarding the treatment and accommodation of transgendered individuals, especially the matter of permissible public restroom use, have moved to the forefront. See Michael Scherer, Battle of the Bathroom, TIME (May 30, 2016), at 30. 400 See Birbrair, supra note 384, at 39 (recounting the hostility a Harvard Law School student faced, apparently as a result of listing membership in the Committee on Gay & Lesbian Legal Issues (COGLLI) as an extracurricular activity). 401 Hedgpeth, supra note 353, at 77; see also INFANTI, supra note 396, at 108 (noting that no generally applicable federal law prohibits discrimination in employment on the basis of sexual orientation). 402 Id. at 34. She also notes the belief of Professor Robert George that “the bigger battles in the coming years are likely to involve the tension between LGBT and religious rights.” Id. at 36. 403 See generally INFANTI, supra note 396, at 27 (noting that although no federal law prohibits discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in public accommodations, several states and the District of Columbia have enacted protective measures). Similarly, no federal law prohibits discrimination in 2 6 6 | P i t t s b u r g h T a x R e v i e w | V o l . 1 3 2 0 1 6 Pitt Tax Review | ISSN 1932-1821 (print) 1932-1996 (online) DOI 10.5195/taxreview.2016.47 | http://taxreview.law.pitt.edu because Republicans would fear potential impingement on the religious freedom of others.404 Yet and still, some federal action will likely be necessary, given that states will respond differently to evolving changes. At least some states have taken renewed interest in religious liberty legislation, but they have generally been willing to bring forth amendments clarifying that religious freedom laws are not to be understood as authority to discriminate against sexual minorities.405 Then again, there are the spot fires of defiance. Even if the federal government itself no longer discriminates overtly on the basis of sexual orientation and its administrative agencies are willing to read federal law broadly, the government’s policies, laws, and decisions of the not-so-distant past have roots firmly planted in the collective conscience of the American citizenry. Thus, notwithstanding gay-friendly decisions from the United States Supreme Court (reflecting some degree of favorable evolution of the larger American psyche), defiance couched in terms of religious liberty and accommodation show no signs of abating.406 In the immediate wake of the Obergefell decision extending the right to marry to gays and lesbians, Kim Davis, the Clerk of Rowan County, Kentucky, famously defied (on religious grounds) a court order to issue marriage licenses to gay couples and was jailed for being in contempt of court.407 Ultimately, U.S. District Judge David Bunning promised to lift the contempt charge against Davis if deputies in the office of the county clerk issued housing on the basis of sexual orientation, although several jurisdictions do prohibit such discrimination. See id. at 120. 404 See Steinmetz, supra note 399, at 76. 405 See Kevin Trager & Alyse Eady, Revised Measure Also Becomes Law in Arkansas, USA TODAY, Apr. 3, 2015, at 5A (“Arkansas governor signed a new religious freedom bill Thursday aimed at quelling criticism that its actions are targeting LGTB constituents for discrimination.”). Some in the state were concerned that unless amended, religious freedom laws could be used by private businesses to defend discrimination against gays and lesbians seeking services in connection with a same-sex marriage. See id. Similar concerns surfaced in other jurisdictions. See Tony Cook, Tom LoBianco & Doug Stanglin, Indiana Lawmakers Agree to Amend ‘Religious Freedom’ Law, USA TODAY, Apr. 3, 2015, at 5A (noting that Indiana had recently amended its Religious Freedom Restoration Act to clarify that the law was not meant to allow businesses to discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity). 406 See Birbrair, supra note 384, at 36 (noting the belief of Professor Robert George that “the bigger battles in the coming years are likely to involve the tension between LGBT and religious rights”). 407 See Alan Blinder & Tamar Lewin, Clerk Chooses Jail over Deal on Gay Unions, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2015, at A1. V o l . 1 3 2 0 1 6 | H a t e E x c l u s i o n | 2 6 7 Pitt Tax Review | ISSN 1932-1821 (print) 1932-1996 (online) DOI 10.5195/taxreview.2016.47 | http://taxreview.law.pitt.edu marriage licenses to gay couples seeking to wed,408 but sadly enough, public official defiance of progressive U.S. Supreme Court mandates is not uncommon; Kim Davis’ conduct parallels Governor George Wallace’s attempt to prevent the racial integration of the University of Alabama.409 The federal government may well be able to point to longstanding enforcement of its edicts against discrimination on various grounds, but the fact that Congress, at precisely the same time, refuses to prohibit sexual orientation discrimination in certain contexts highlights the disparity of treatment, which again, fosters and perpetuates a sense of federally- acknowledged difference. Even if one is charitable enough to chalk up Congress’ inactivity as mere hesitation and the judicial branch’s halting steps as rational restraint, the biased mind can easily interpret such hesitation/restraint as confirmation of the validity of the biased mindset or even implicit sanctioning of differential treatment and violence.410 In 2012, 19.2% of hate crime victims were targeted on the basis of sexual orientation.411 Of this group, 53.9% were victims of anti-male homosexual bias, and 12.7% were victims of anti-female homosexual bias.412 More recently, in the infamous Orlando Massacre of June 2016, a lone gunman killed 49 and injured over 50 at a gay nightclub in the worst mass shooting in United States history.413 Can it be successfully maintained that the United 408 See Mike Wynn & Chris Kenning, Ky. Officials Willing to Issue Licenses, USA TODAY, Sept. 4, 2015, at 3A. 409 See Blinder & Lewin, supra note 407, at A13. 410 See Gaylegal Narratives, supra note 323, at 639. “Professor Kendall Thomas suggests that the most lawless features of Hardwick are its explicit authorization for state police to commit violence against us and its implicit authorization for private individuals to do the same.” Id. 411 See Hate Crime Statistics, supra note 174. 412 See id. 413 See Lizette Alvarez & Richard Pérez-Peña, Praising ISIS, Gunman Attacks Gay Nightclub Leaving [49 Victims] Dead in Worst Shooting on U.S. Soil, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 2016, at A1; see also Michelle Tauber et al., Unspeakable Horror, Unending Heartbreak, PEOPLE (June 27, 2016), at 40 (discussing the shooting which occurred at Pulse nightclub in Orlando on so-called Latin Night); Michael Scherer, Why Did They Die?, TIME (June 27, 2016), at 31. One commentator placed this horrific event in historical context, noting the following: The scope of the violence is unprecedented, but the fact is not: Past incidents liked the burning of New Orleans’ UpStairs Lounge, which killed 32 in June 1973, have only emphasized the importance of strongholds where gay people could socialize freely. The 2 6 8 | P i t t s b u r g h T a x R e v i e w | V o l . 1 3 2 0 1 6 Pitt Tax Review | ISSN 1932-1821 (print) 1932-1996 (online) DOI 10.5195/taxreview.2016.47 | http://taxreview.law.pitt.edu States has no role in such private violence? Or are its hands decidedly unclean? The federal government’s long history of discrimination against gays and lesbians and its long-belated response to sodomy statute challenges lends credence to the following perspective: In assessing the constitutionality of these laws, I would argue that violence against gays and lesbians perpetrated by other citizens represents the states’ constructive delegation of governmental power to these citizens. As a constitutional matter, the covert, unofficial character of this violence does not render it any less problematic than open, official attacks against gay men and lesbians. To state the point in slightly different terms, the fact that homophobic violence occurs within the context of “private” relations by no means implies that such violence is without “public” origins or consequence. The apparently private character of homophobic violence should not blind us to the reality of the state power that enables and underwrites it.414 * * * Turning to the question of the judicial role, we see that the Eighth Amendment may thus be interpreted as empowering constitutional courts to invalidate homosexual sodomy statutes on the grounds that the actual, concrete effect of these laws is to legitimize the lawless infliction of homophobic violence.415 Troubling though it may be, violence against gays, lesbians, bisexuals, and the transgendered is only one of many alarming and disturbing problems. Sexual minorities continue to be at higher risk of self-inflicted harm, as was exemplified recently by the tragic death of Leelah Alcorn, a distraught transgendered youth who committed suicide by stepping into the path of an oncoming tractor-trailer after explaining in a note that “religious therapists had tried to convert her back to being a boy.”416 police raid on New York City’s Stonewall Inn in June 1969 helped crystallize the challenges gay people faced—out of which came a movement. The incremental fight toward equality began at the bar. Daniel D’Addario, The Gay Bar as Safe Space Has Been Shattered, TIME (June 27, 2016), at 38. 414 Thomas, supra note 13, at 1481–82. 415 Id. at 1487. 416 See Michael D. Shear, Obama to Ask for “Repairing” of Gays to End, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2015, at A1. President Obama plans to call for an end to psychiatric therapies seeking to “repair” gays, lesbians, and transgender youth. See id. Note also that California, New Jersey, and the District of Columbia ban the offering of various sexual activity/identity-related conversion therapies to minors. See id. at A18. V o l . 1 3 2 0 1 6 | H a t e E x c l u s i o n | 2 6 9 Pitt Tax Review | ISSN 1932-1821 (print) 1932-1996 (online) DOI 10.5195/taxreview.2016.47 | http://taxreview.law.pitt.edu The situation may well get worse for any number of different reasons, at least one of which is the federal government’s failure to treat sexual orientation discrimination the same way it treats other forms of discrimination. Consider also the views of one commentator who argues that members of the public may mentally incorporate information which confirms stereotypes and encourages prejudice simply by passively taking in public media.417 Regarding gay men, he notes that the TV show Queer Eye for the Straight Guy may have a positive impact on gay men in terms of decreasing hate crimes (apparently because the show humanizes gay men or, at least, makes gay men more likeable) but “if the goal is to break through glass ceilings and walls for gay men pursuing professions seen as aggressively masculine, then the show may be a net negative.”418 He also notes that characters may “gay it up”419 for entertainment value, by which he apparently means that the characters act in a manner that is effeminate. Of course, some forms of media capitalize on portraying gay men as effeminate.420 Moreover, when the public media portrays gays and lesbians as vehicles of comic relief and ridicule, it is able to do so because of the historical treatment of sexual minorities. At the same time, it subtly characterizes the ridicule and targeting of sexual minorities as acceptable. The social programming is thorough and apparently instilled at an early age. One commentator discussed an incident during which several elementary-school-aged boys called another boy’s father a “faggot” merely because the father had gone on a business trip to San Francisco.421 The commentator went on to note that notwithstanding their ignorance with respect to sexual activity in general and the realities of homosexual preferences/activities, children of even elementary school age have already absorbed sufficient social programming not only to attack on the basis of sexual orientation but also to appeal to such attacks when seeking to maximize potency.422 What can be expected to happen when the boys grow 417 See Kang, supra note 190, at 1553–54. 418 Id. at 1569. 419 Id. 420 See, e.g., BORAT (Universal Studios 2009); see also GENTLEMEN’S Q., July 2009, cover (featuring Sacha Baron Cohen in the nude and adopting an effeminate posture). 421 See INFANTI, supra note 396, at 52–53. 422 See id. 2 7 0 | P i t t s b u r g h T a x R e v i e w | V o l . 1 3 2 0 1 6 Pitt Tax Review | ISSN 1932-1821 (print) 1932-1996 (online) DOI 10.5195/taxreview.2016.47 | http://taxreview.law.pitt.edu up? Recent positive legal developments notwithstanding (or perhaps in overt opposition to them), the following commentary may ring true for some time: “Pervasive antigay hostility in American society has the effect of dehumanizing lesbians and gay men. It paints a target upon each of us and creates an atmosphere in which violence can be inflicted upon us with little fear of legal repercussions.”423 These potential realities notwithstanding, it is important to acknowledge the gradual increase of balanced portrayals of gays, lesbians, and those in the transgender community. Six Feet Under424 portrayed a gay funeral home director and a gay police officer, neither with noticeably effeminate mannerisms, and a feature-length film garnering considerable critical praise, Brokeback Mountain,425 portrayed quintessentially masculine gay and/or bisexual cowboys. Netflix offers both Empire,426 a series featuring a gay, African-American rapper and Orange is the New Black,427 a series featuring a wide range of lesbian characters and a transgendered African-American. Caitlyn Jenner, who transitioned from male (Bruce Jenner) to female, made the cover of Vanity Fair. With various states and cities banning discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and federal law extending same-sex marriage rights to gays and lesbians, the strong likelihood is that damage awards on the basis of sexual orientation discrimination will be obtained in the future, at least in those jurisdictions with adequate legal protections in various contexts and citizens defiant enough to ignore the law. The federal government’s exclusionary grace may never extend to those receiving such damages, but in the face of the government’s overt discriminatory practices, fairness dictates that the government do some form of penance for its past acts. Again, allowing an exclusion for a successful litigant in this context is a modest gesture relative to the harms suffered by those who can justifiably claim victimization by private parties as well as by an overwhelmingly coercive public actor. 423 Id. at 44–45. 424 SIX FEET UNDER (HBO Home Video 2001–05). 425 BROKEBACK MOUNTAIN (Universal Studios 2005). 426 EMPIRE (20th Century Fox 2015). 427 ORANGE IS THE NEW BLACK (Lionsgate Television (2013–15)). V o l . 1 3 2 0 1 6 | H a t e E x c l u s i o n | 2 7 1 Pitt Tax Review | ISSN 1932-1821 (print) 1932-1996 (online) DOI 10.5195/taxreview.2016.47 | http://taxreview.law.pitt.edu V. CONCLUSION At least one commentator is of the belief that those participating in slavery might well be excused for doing so because under federal law in existence at the time, the conduct was not illegal. Others readily acknowledge the horrors of slavery but point to present day realities (e.g., the King Holiday and Barack Obama’s rise to the Presidency) as proof that the nation has, indeed, overcome its past. Hard statistics confirm, however, that African- Americans and women continue to suffer disproportionately from prejudice, discrimination, and targeted violence. Gays and lesbians suffer in the same manner and remain the only group currently neglected by the federal government with respect to invidious discrimination in employment and public accommodations. History (and current practice) clarify that the federal government has unclean hands in the arenas of race, sex, and sexual orientation. Indeed, the federal government had constitutional authority to take in revenue in connection with the legal slave trade,428 and individual states lined their coffers with profits from the illegal slave trade. Does it not make a healthy amount of logical sense for Congress to force the United States to do penance by foregoing revenue? Even with its race-, sex-, and sexual orientation-conscious focus, reparational exclusion of discrimination damages offers narrowly-tailored relief that, properly-targeted, is necessarily conscious of race, sex, or sexual orientation and serves the compelling governmental interest in effecting reparational justice. Professor Bittker offers a concurring opinion. He notes, “If the Court extends its tolerance of school board action [to effect desegregation] to legislative efforts to foster a successful pluralistic society, it might well hold that a program of black reparations was within the discretionary authority of the people’s representatives.”429 However unlikely that proponents will see it come to pass, direct reparation payment is warranted with respect to each form of oppression. The unclean hands theory of exclusion avoids many of the issues associated with direct payment reparations and manages to reward current victims for current harms while forcing the United States to shoulder its fair share of the burden. The federal government is guilty of many discriminatory sins to date and is far from ready to sit down at the table in the company of righteousness. An exclusion for discrimination damages at least 428 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9. 429 BITTKER, supra note 12, at 122. 2 7 2 | P i t t s b u r g h T a x R e v i e w | V o l . 1 3 2 0 1 6 Pitt Tax Review | ISSN 1932-1821 (print) 1932-1996 (online) DOI 10.5195/taxreview.2016.47 | http://taxreview.law.pitt.edu acknowledges that the United States is willing to start the process of cleaning its hands of its soiled history. << /ASCII85EncodePages false /AllowTransparency false /AutoPositionEPSFiles true /AutoRotatePages /None /Binding /Left /CalGrayProfile (Dot Gain 20%) /CalRGBProfile (sRGB IEC61966-2.1) /CalCMYKProfile (U.S. Web Coated \050SWOP\051 v2) /sRGBProfile (sRGB IEC61966-2.1) /CannotEmbedFontPolicy /Error /CompatibilityLevel 1.4 /CompressObjects /Tags /CompressPages true /ConvertImagesToIndexed true /PassThroughJPEGImages true /CreateJobTicket false /DefaultRenderingIntent /Default /DetectBlends true /DetectCurves 0.0000 /ColorConversionStrategy /CMYK /DoThumbnails false /EmbedAllFonts true /EmbedOpenType false /ParseICCProfilesInComments true 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work_ttuzsaqklfdfzddmwxn7e5fr6a	----	451-470_GPI_095400.indd www.ssoar.info Seeing Through Their Eyes: When Majority Group Members Take Collective Action on Behalf of an Outgroup Mallett, Robyn K.; Huntsinger, Jeffrey R.; Sinclair, Stacey; Swim, Janet K. Postprint / Postprint Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with: www.peerproject.eu Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation: Mallett, R. K., Huntsinger, J. R., Sinclair, S., & Swim, J. K. (2008). Seeing Through Their Eyes: When Majority Group Members Take Collective Action on Behalf of an Outgroup. Group Processes & Intergroup Relations, 11(4), 451-470. https://doi.org/10.1177/1368430208095400 Nutzungsbedingungen: Dieser Text wird unter dem "PEER Licence Agreement zur Verfügung" gestellt. 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Diese Version ist zitierbar unter / This version is citable under: https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-228734 http://www.ssoar.info https://doi.org/10.1177/1368430208095400 http://www.peerproject.eu http://www.peerproject.eu https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-228734 Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 2008 Vol 11(4) 451–470 Seeing Through Their Eyes: When Majority Group Members Take Collective Action on Behalf of an Outgroup Robyn K. Mallett and Jeffrey R. Huntsinger Loyola University Chicago Stacey Sinclair The University of Virginia Janet K. Swim The Pennsylvania State University We examined majority group members’ collective action on behalf of a minority group, focusing on the role of outgroup perspective taking and group-based guilt. As expected, outgroup perspective taking was positively associated with heterosexuals’ collective action in response to hate crimes against non-heterosexuals and Whites’ action in response to hate crimes against Blacks (Studies 1 and 2). This association was partially mediated by group-based guilt (Studies 2 and 3). We also examined the role of group-based anger; although it directly related to collective action, it did not mediate the association between perspective taking and collective action. Finally, we manipulated outgroup perspective taking to demonstrate its causal role in the subsequent outcomes (Study 3). keywords collective action, group-based anger, hate crime, identity, outgroup perspective taking, White guilt Author’s note Address correspondence to Robyn K. Mallett, Department of Psychology, Loyola University Chicago, 6525 N. Sheridan R., Chicago, IL 60626, USA [email: rmallett@luc.edu] Copyright © 2008 SAGE Publications (Los Angeles, London, New Delhi and Singapore) 11:4; 451–470; DOI: 10.1177/1368430208095400 Collective action can be a powerful force for social change. Women’s right to vote, African American’s civil liberties, and lesbian, gay and bisexual’s growing equality are all the result of social movements. Nearly all research on participation in collective action has focused on predicting when individuals join groups that directly benefi t themselves. For example, research has examined women’s participation in feminist groups (Liss, Crawford, & Popp, 2004), elderly individuals’ participation in advocacy groups for the aged such as the Gray Panthers (Klandermans, 2002), and African Americans’ participation in civil rights groups (McAdam, 1982). Yet people can participate in collective Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 11(4) 452 action on behalf of groups they do not belong to. For example, Whites participated in the civil rights movement for Blacks, men participated in organizations to fi ght sexism against women, and heterosexuals participate in action through Gay–Straight Alliances and Gay, Lesbian, and Straight Education networks (Arsenault, 2006; Miceli, 2005). Because taking action on behalf of an outgroup is likely driven by reasons other than self-interest or own-group interest, existing research examining collective action that directly benefi ts the ingroup might not generalize to this phenomenon. The present research tests a model that explains majority group members’ participation in collective action that benefi ts minority group members. Specifi cally, in the context of actual hate crimes, we examine how outgroup perspective taking and group-based guilt relate to heterosexuals’ (Study 1) and Whites’ (Study 2–3) participation in collective action on behalf of non-heterosexuals and Blacks, respectively. We also explore the role of ingroup identifi cation and group-based anger in this process. The majority of research on collective action has focused on factors that motivate disadvantaged group members to work toward change. For example, Taylor and McKirnan’s (1984) fi ve- stage model of intergroup relations describes changes in the relationship between advantaged and disadvantaged group members that spark the desire for social change. A shift occurs between stages 1 and 2 such that disadvantaged group members no longer perceive group differences as legitimate. The transition from stages 2 to 3 involves an increased focus on individual achieve- ment and social mobility. If disadvantaged group members with high status try to gain acceptance into the advantaged group but are rejected, they may progress to stage 4 and attempt to raise the status of the entire disadvantaged group. Stage 5 results in a competitive style of intergroup rela- tions. This model assumes that majority group members perceive the status difference as legiti- mate; however, a subset of majority group mem- bers may progress through this model in a manner similar to members of a disadvantaged group. Collaboration between majority and minority group members can result in collective action that may produce signifi cant social change for at least two reasons. First, the majority group mem- ber presence can be helpful because members of the majority often have more power than mem- bers of a disadvantaged minority (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; H. J. Smith & Tyler, 1996). Second, collective action by majority group members may be more persuasive than collective action by minority group members. Research on inter- personal confrontation of discrimination shows that majority group members are more persuasive to the ingroup than are minority group members because majority group members are not per- ceived as direct benefi ciaries of their action (Czopp & Monteith, 2003; Jones, 1976). Thus, majority group members can send a powerful and persuasive message to other majority group members when they take action on behalf of a minority outgroup. Yet it is easy for majority group members to not take action to ensure the rights of other groups. After all, collective action requires time and energy, and can be perceived as offering little in the way of personal gain—especially when the benefi ts are for members of a different group. Additionally, majority group members usually do not personally experience the same types of negative events that trigger collective action in disadvantaged minority group members. Among the disadvantaged, triggers of collective action might range from critical incidents such as the assassination of a political leader or failure to pass equal rights legislation, to myriad smaller disadvantages that accumulate until they reach a tipping point (Taylor & McKirnan, 1984; Wright & Tropp, 2002). Once triggered, dis- parate treatment is no longer tolerable, and dis- advantaged group members work to fi ght for change on behalf of the ingroup as a whole. Because majority group members are usually not personally affected by such trigger events, a different process is needed to explain their participation in collective action on behalf of the disadvantaged outgroup. Given the importance of majority group mem- bers’ participation in collective action on behalf of minority group members and the dearth of research examining this phenomenon, we sought to propose an account of why this may 453 Mallett et al. outgroup perspective taking and collective action occur. Drawing upon research on perspective taking, emotion, and helping behavior at the individual level, we expect outgroup perspective taking and group-based guilt to work in con- cert to explain outgroup helping behavior (i.e. collective action). Specifi cally, we expect that taking the perspective of an outgroup will lead majority group members to experience group- based guilt and participate in collective action on behalf of that outgroup. Later we describe the empirical basis for each proposed link. Perspective taking and collective action There are at least two reasons to expect per- spective taking will lead to action on behalf of an outgroup. First, existing research suggests that taking the perspective of an outgroup member increases positive evaluations of that individual and the group more generally (Batson et al., 1997; Dovidio et al., 2004; Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000; Vescio, Sechrist, & Paolucci, 2003). It is reasonable to expect that people are more likely to engage in collective action on behalf of liked, as opposed to disliked, groups. Second, and per- haps more importantly, perspective taking at the individual level is a key antecedent of helping others (Batson, 1998; Underwood & Moore, 1982). For example, participants who took the perspective of a recently orphaned fellow student volunteered more time to help the student than participants who did not take her perspective (Coke, Batson, & McDavis, 1978). Although not yet empirically tested, a similar association may also exist at the group level, whereby taking the outgroup perspective increases the likelihood of helping the outgroup by participating in collective action that benefi ts them. Group-based guilt and collective action Group-based emotions, especially guilt, may also directly lead to collective action and be a means by which outgroup perspective tak- ing indirectly leads to action. According to perspectives including intergroup emotions theory (E. R. Smith, 1993), emotions may be experienced at both the individual and group level (Branscombe, Doosje, & McGarty, 2002). At the individual level, guilt results when an individual accepts personal responsibility for an action or inaction that results in the suffering of another (Estrada-Hollenbeck & Heatherton, 1998). At the group level, one need not accept personal responsibility but the ingroup must be seen as responsible for mistreating another group, the mistreatment must have produced an existing disparity, and efforts to repair the damage must be seen as possible in order for group-based guilt to arise (Branscombe et al., 2002; Mallett & Swim, 2004). Research at both the individual and group levels reveals that specifi c emotions correspond to unique behav- ioral responses; feelings of guilt tend to motivate reparation (Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, & Manstead, 1998; Frijda, 1988; Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000). For example, White Americans’ feeling of group-based guilt for harming African Americans is associated with support for affi rmative action policies (Iyer, Leach, & Crosby, 2003; Swim & Miller, 1999) and for opposition to future aggression against the outgroup (Maitner, Mackie, & Smith, 2006). In addition to supporting reparative policies and suppressing future aggression, we expect that group-based guilt might also prompt ma- jority group members to spend time and energy taking action on behalf of the outgroup. Outgroup perspective taking should also indirectly lead to participation in collective action via feelings of group-based guilt. At the individual level, perspective taking is associated with feelings of guilt (Leith & Baumeister, 1998). At the group level, majority group members who take an outgroup’s perspective may begin to understand the outgroup’s suffering, and perhaps consider the role that the majority group plays in harming the minority group (Zebel, Doosje, & Spears, 2008. Perceiving ingroup responsibility and outgroup suffering may produce feelings of group-based guilt (Branscombe et al., 2002; Mallett & Swim, 2007). If group-based guilt occurs, it could be suffi cient to motivate major- ity group members to alleviate guilt by engaging in reparative action on behalf of minority group members (Doosje et al., 1998; Swim & Miller, 1999). Therefore, we expect that feelings of Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 11(4) 454 group-based guilt will mediate the association between outgroup perspective taking and par- ticipation in collective action. We may fi nd only partial, rather than full, mediation because guilt tends to be experienced at a moderate level (Swim & Miller, 1999) and because guilt may not be the only emotion associated with outgroup perspective taking. Later we discuss the possibility that group-based anger might also occur. The possible role of ingroup identifi cation In addition to testing our proposed model we explore the role of ingroup identifi cation in the aforementioned process. In a series of studies Zebel et al. (2008) asked Dutch participants to imagine themselves as slaves or not and then evaluate scenarios about the Dutch slave trade. Imagining themselves as slaves was positively associated with reports of group-based guilt, but only among participants with low levels of Dutch identifi cation. Moreover, guilt was related to support for a government apology, though unrelated to fi nancial compensation. Although Zebel et al.’s work did not study collective action and found mixed support for attempts to repair intergroup relations, it does provide initial support for the role of perspective taking in ma- jority group members’ feelings of group-based guilt. Their research also suggests the possibil- ity that high and low identifi ed members of a group might show differences in the experience of group-based guilt if encouraged to take the perspective of an outgroup. Based on these preliminary fi ndings, it is pos- sible that taking the outgroup perspective might initiate guilt, and subsequently collective action, more for some people than others. Specifi cally, as also proposed by Zebel et al. (2008), the effects of outgroup perspective taking on group-based guilt and collective action may depend upon the extent to which majority group members are identifi ed with their ingroup. Engaging in outgroup perspective taking may entail nega- tive thinking about the ingroup. People who are highly identifi ed with the ingroup resist threats to the positive image of the ingroup, and tend to report feeling little group-based guilt (Doosje, et al., 1998). Consequently, the degree to which one is identifi ed with the ingroup may moderate the infl uence of perspective taking on feelings of group-based guilt (Zebel et al., 2008) and participation in collective action. Our research goes beyond that of Zebel et al. in four ways. First, we examine responses to contemporary intergroup confl ict as opposed to past wrongdoing. Considering examples of current confl ict might inspire greater feelings of group-based guilt compared with thinking about past transgressions (Branscombe et al., 2002) and greater feelings of guilt might in- spire effortful behavior such as participation in collective action. Second, we evaluate out- group perspective taking by examining the way people naturally interpret events (Studies 1 and 2) and by instructing participants to take the outgroup’s perspective (Study 3). We might fi nd that the same model holds for spontaneous and deliberate perspective taking. Alternatively, deliberate perspective taking might prompt a more defensive mindset than spontaneous perspective taking and thus make ingroup identifi cation more relevant to the process. Third, we examine actual behavior in response to discrimination rather than support for a government apology that may not personally affect outgroup members. Fourth, although Zebel et al.’s data are consistent with a mediation model, they do not test mediation. We test a full model of associations between outgroup per- spective taking, group-based guilt, and par- ticipation in collective action, thereby increasing understanding of majority group members’ motivation to act on behalf of an outgroup. The possible role of group-based anger We also explore the possibility that group- based anger infl uences collective action on behalf of an outgroup. It is diffi cult to make clear predictions regarding the role of group-based anger because there is considerably less research on group-based anger than group-based guilt. However, we know that at the individual level, anger results from determining that an external agent is responsible for a transgression against oneself or another party (Lazarus, 1991). At the 455 Mallett et al. outgroup perspective taking and collective action group level, feelings of anger elicit a desire to confront, oppose or argue against the agent (an individual or group) who is responsible for a blameworthy action (Devos, Silver, Mackie, & Smith, 2002; Frijda, 1986; Iyer, Schmader, & Lickel, 2007; Mackie et al., 2000). Research shows that Germans experienced anger when they perceived that their government had mis- treated a disadvantaged outgroup (Montada & Schneider, 1989) and that group-based anger predicted collective action on behalf of the ingroup (van Zomeren, Spears, Fischer, & Leach, 2004). Indeed, Leach, Snider, and Iyer (2002) hypothesize that group-based anger might be a more powerful predictor of collective action than group-based guilt. Yet there is reason to question the ability of group-based anger to motivate action on behalf of an outgroup, especially in comparison with group-based guilt. The extent to which group- based anger and group-based guilt motivate action likely differs because of the typical target of each emotion. Anger tends to direct action against the perpetrating agent rather than on behalf of the harmed group. Therefore, if collective action is construed as a way to repair damaged intergroup relationships rather than as a way to punish the blameworthy party, anger might not motivate collective action as strongly as guilt, or at all. Further, group-based guilt is a refl ective emotion and group-based anger is a reactive emotion (Baumeister, Reis, & Delespaul, 1995; Leach, Iyer, & Pedersen, 2006; Ortony, Clore, & Collins, 1988). Refl ective emotions might be more likely to motivate action on behalf of another group, whereas reactive emo- tions might be more likely to motivate action against a particular group. Given the divergent perspectives on the power of group-based anger and guilt to predict collective action on behalf of an outgroup, we simultaneously examine group- based guilt and anger to determine their relative power to predict collective action. We also test whether outgroup perspective taking indirectly leads to participation in collec- tive action via feelings of group-based anger. Finlay and Stephan (2000) found that when Whites took the perspective of an African American who expressed anger about discrimination, they reported feeling angry. At the group level, majority group members who take an outgroup’s perspective may consider the role that an exter- nal agent, such as the government or university administration, plays in harming the minority group. Perceiving outgroup suffering along with attributing responsibility to a university administration may produce feelings of anger (Leach et al., 2002). If outgroup perspective taking and group-based anger are each directly related to participation in collective action, then feelings of group-based anger might also mediate the relationship between perspective taking and action. Overview of studies Three studies tested a preliminary model of the role of outgroup perspective taking and group-based guilt in majority group members’ participation in collective action on behalf of an outgroup. In Study 1, we examined the prediction that spontaneously taking the outgroup perspective was directly related to participation in collective action on behalf of that group. Study 2 replicated the direct effect of perspective taking on action, tested the direct effect of group-based guilt on collective action, and tested whether feelings of group-based guilt mediated the relationship between perspective taking and action. Finally, in order to resolve ambiguity regarding the direction of the effects demonstrated, in Study 3 we manipulated perspective taking, thereby demonstrating its causal role in the subsequent processes. In add- ition, in each study we explored whether ingroup identifi cation moderated the positive effects of outgroup perspective taking on willingness to participate in collective action. We also tested the direct and indirect role of group-based anger in collective action on behalf of an outgroup (Studies 1, 2). In all three studies, participants considered actual instances of hate crimes that targeted non- heterosexuals (Study 1) and Blacks (Studies 2 and 3) in their university community—a surprisingly pervasive problem given advances in civil rights that have occurred over the years (Herek, Cogan, & Gillis, 2002). Unlike past Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 11(4) 456 research that typically examines policy support or, at most, self-reported willingness to engage in collective action, in the fi rst two studies we analyze self-reports of actual participation in collective action. Study 1 The main purpose of this study was to test a central prediction of our model; that out- group perspective taking would be related to participation in collective action on behalf of that group. We examined this question within the context of an incident of intergroup confl ict that occurred on a college campus. Lesbian, gay, and bisexual (LGB) student leaders received emails and phone calls that threat- ened their lives. In response, some students engaged in collective action to protest the attacks and demand social change from the administration. The administration responded to the collective student effort by pledging to enact university policies to improve intergroup relations on campus for LGB students. Thus, this incident provided an opportunity to study actual participation in collective action rather than support for apology or other indirect meas- ures of attempts at social change. The secondary purpose of the study was to explore the role of ingroup identifi cation and group-based anger in this process. Because past research has found that ingroup identifi cation moderates the infl uence of deliberate perspec- tive taking (Zebel et al., 2008), in the present study we also examined how it was related to spontaneous perspective taking. Further, we examined whether feelings of group-based anger were directly related to collective action. Method Par ticipants We gave 275 heterosexual participants (146 female, 118 male, 11 did not report gender) course credit for the present study. Participants indicated their sexual orientation in response to an item that read, ‘On the following scale, chose the step that best describes your own sexual orientation,’: 1, exclusively heterosexual; 2, predominantly heterosexual, incidentally homosexual; 3, equally heterosexual and homosexual; 4 predominantly homosexual, but more than incidentally heterosexual; 5, predominantly homosexual, incidentally heterosexual; and 6, exclusively homosexual. Participants who chose the number 1 were included in the ana- lysis (137 female, 109 male, 6 did not report gender). Materials and procedure All measures were completed on the Internet.1 Participants fi rst completed an 18-item measure of heterosexual identification (Swim & Mallett, 2005, see Appendix for a list of items) so we could test whether ingroup identifi cation moderated the infl uence of perspective taking on collective action. Items were answered using a scale from 1, not at all to 7, very much (M = 4.27, SD = .76). We averaged participants’ responses to these items to form a measure of ingroup identifi cation (α = .80). Participants then read a summary of events surrounding a hate crime against LGB students, along with the following instructions based on McPherson and Janoff-Bulman’s (2000) study of perspective taking: Now that you have been thinking about the events that led to the current LGB climate on campus, we would like to know more about your personal reactions to this situation. Please describe in your own words your thoughts and feelings about the (1) incidents that occurred, (2) the way in which the students responded, and fi nally (3) how the administration reacted. Unlike other research that measures dispos- itional perspective taking (Davis, Conklin, Smith, & Luce, 1997) or intentionally manipulates per- spective taking by asking participants to put themselves in the shoes of a character in a scenario (Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000), we assessed the number of times that participants spontaneously took the perspective of LGB students in their written response to the hate crime and its surrounding events. We fi rst divided each written response into coding units that refl ected thought or phrase breaks (M = 6.32, SD = 2.93 for the number of written statements; see McPherson & Janoff-Bulman, 2000 for more detail). Then, two trained research assistants determined whether or not each unit of the 457 Mallett et al. outgroup perspective taking and collective action participant’s writing took the perspective of the LGB students and expressed understanding of the consequences of the hate crime for targets of discrimination. An example of taking the LGB students’ perspective is, “I understand how the death threats interrupted LGB students’ life on campus, it must have been really upset- ting.” We averaged the coders ratings’ of the total number of times the participant took the perspective of LGB students in their written responses to obtain a measure of outgroup perspective taking (M = .92, SD = .93; intraclass correlation coeffi cient = .89). We were also interested in whether feelings of group-based anger might be directly related to collective action, so we coded the spontaneous written responses for the amount of anger ex- pressed at the university administration. Ratings of anger expression ranged from 0, not at all to 4, very much (M = .48, SD = .68; intraclass correlation coeffi cient = .93). We believe that this provides a somewhat indirect measure of expressions of anger at a blameworthy agent, in this case, the university administration. Heterosexual participants then answered yes or no to fi ve questions that represented vari- ous types of collective action that they might have taken on behalf of LGB students in re- sponse to the hate crime (“I attended meetings of LGB groups;” “I attended ALLIES Straight But Not Narrow Program;” “I attended a lecture or presentation by an LGB person or gay rights activist;” “I attended the rally on September 14, 2002;” “I attended the conference on Septem- ber 13–15, 2002”). These activities were aimed at formulating a plan for the university to respond to hate crimes and therefore serve as a measure of collective action on behalf of an outgroup. We summed the ‘yes’ answers to each of the fi ve behaviors for each participant and divided the sum by fi ve to create an average score for par- ticipation in collective action.2 Observed scores on the collective action item ranged from 0 to 4 (M = .15, SD = .09). Results and discussion We calculated the correlation between all variables included in the Study 1 analyses. Correlations ranged from non-signifi cant to moderate, and were in the expected direction (see Table 1, above the diagonal). We conducted two transformations on the data before estimating the remaining analyses. First, we centered the variables. Second, the dis- tribution of participation in collective action was slightly positively skewed. We used a square root transformation to correct the positive skew prior to the reported analyses. Results for the untransformed variable are nearly identical to those for the transformed variable; this is true for Studies 1 and 2. Perspective taking We expected outgroup per- spective taking to be related to heterosexuals’ participation in collective action on behalf of non-heterosexuals. To examine this prediction, we regressed collective action on outgroup perspective taking. Because some research has found gender differences in helping behavior (Batson, 1998), we included gender as a covariate in all analyses.3 As predicted, perspective taking and collective action were positively related, Table 1. Correlations between the variables used in Studies 1 and 2. Correlations above the diagonal represent Study 1 and correlations below the diagonal represent Study 2 Ingroup identifi cation Outgroup perspective taking Group-based anger Group-based guilt Collective action Ingroup identifi cation — –.13* –.01 — .10 Outgroup perspective taking –.09 — .14* — .24*** Group-based anger .02 .05 — — .18** Group-based guilt –.19*** .34*** .08 — — Collective action –.05 .20*** .15* .18** — *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001. Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 11(4) 458 β = .26, t(217) = 3.89, p < .001. As heterosexuals’ spontaneous reports of outgroup perspective taking increased, reports of participation in activ- ities to improve the status of non-heterosexuals increased. To our knowledge, this is the fi rst empirical demonstration that outgroup per- spective taking is related to collective action on behalf of an outgroup. In fact, we found no studies that assessed the association between perspective taking and any type of collective action. We then examined whether ingroup iden- tifi cation moderated the relationship between perspective taking and participation in collec- tive action. In the fi rst step of the analysis, we regressed collective action on participant gender, ingroup identifi cation, and perspective taking. This step was signifi cant, R 2 = .10, F(2, 220) = 7.59, p < .001. Specifi cally, we found an association between identification and participation in collective action, β = .24, t(220) = 3.59, p < .001. As identifi cation with heterosexuals increased, so did action on behalf of non-heterosexuals. The fi nding is somewhat surprising because ingroup identifi cation, particularly for high status group members, might be expected to lead to minimizing rather than acknowledging the struggles faced by outgroup members. A positive association between identifi cation and collec- tive action could be unique to group member- ships such as sexual orientation because the majority of heterosexuals rarely consider what it means to be heterosexual. Those who have thought about their sexual orientation might represent a different type of heterosexual, one who thinks about the impact of sexual orientation on life more generally, and one who is therefore more likely to help the outgroup. In the second step, we added the product of identifi cation and perspective taking to the model. This step was not signifi cant, R 2 = .09, F(2, 220) = 6.47, p = ns; identifi cation did not moderate the effect of spontaneous perspective taking on collective action, β = .11, t(220) = 1.70, p = ns. In other words, identifi cation with the ingroup did not increase or decrease the asso- ciation between spontaneous outgroup per- spective taking and participation in collective action.4 Of course, this lack of association may also be a function of the unique meaning associated with individuals who identify with heterosexuals. It is also possible that spontan- eous perspective taking differs from deliberate perspective taking in the extent to which it prompts defense of the ingroup. Group-based anger We also examined whether the amount of anger expressed at the admin- istration was directly related to collective action. We regressed participation in collective action on gender and the amount of anger expressed at the university administration. We found an association between anger at the administra- tion and collective action, β = .18, t(220) = 2.70, p = .007. As heterosexuals’ expressions of anger at the university administration increased, so did reports of participating in activities to improve the status of non-heterosexuals. We next investigated whether group-based anger mediated the relationship between out- group perspective taking and collective action. We followed Baron and Kenny’s (1986) recom- mendations for testing mediation, which involves four steps. Again, we included gender as a covariate in the analyses. First, the pre- dictor (perspective taking) was related to the mediator (anger at the administration), β = .15, t(220) = 2.23, p = .03. Second, as reported earlier, the predictor (perspective taking) was related to the dependent variable (collective action). Controlling for the predictor, the mediator was related to collective action, β = .14, t(220) = 2.18, p = .03. Controlling for the mediator, the pre- dictor was related to collective action, β = .24, t(220) = 3.59, p < .001. However, the indirect effect (Sobel, 1982) of perspective taking on collective action was not signifi cant (z = .32, p = ns). Therefore, anger at the university administration did not partially mediate the relationship between spontaneous outgroup perspective taking and collective action. In sum, the results of Study 1 suggest that, con- sistent with our proposed model, outgroup per- spective taking is related to prosocial behavior at the group level; stepping into the shoes of an outgroup is directly related to collective action 459 Mallett et al. outgroup perspective taking and collective action to aid that group. Additional analyses showed that anger at the administration for their response to the hate crime was also related to collective action on behalf of non-heterosexuals. However, group-based anger did not mediate the association between outgroup perspective taking and collective action. Finally, ingroup identifi cation did not moderate the relationship between spontaneous perspective taking and collective action. Study 2 In Study 1, we established that spontaneous out- group perspective taking is related to majority group members’ collective action on behalf of minority group members. In Study 2, we tested the principal route through which we expected perspective taking to infl uence participation in collective action. Specifi cally, we assessed the associations between outgroup perspective taking, group-based guilt, and collective action on behalf of an outgroup. As in Study 1, we explored these questions within the context of an actual incident of intergroup confl ict that occurred on a college campus. In this instance, African American student leaders were the targets of intimidation and death threats. Students responded by engaging in collective action to demand resolution from the administration. The administration countered by drafting a proposal to enact university policies that would improve intergroup relations on campus, especially for minority group members. We expected to fi nd (i) a positive association between outgroup perspective taking and White’s participation in collective action on behalf of Blacks, (ii) a positive association between White guilt and collective action, and (iii) that group-based guilt at least partially mediated the relationship between outgroup perspective taking and col- lective action. As in Study 1, we also explored the roles of ingroup identifi cation and group-based anger in this process. Based on the results of Study 1, we do not expect ingroup identification to moderate the relationship between spontan- eous perspective taking and collective action. Also based on Study 1, we suspect that group- based anger will be directly related to collective action but not mediate the association between perspective taking and action, with or without the inclusion of group-based guilt. Method Participants For the hate crime targeting Blacks, students enrolled in an introductory psychology course (183 females, 142 males) completed all measures in large group testing sessions. Students of several ethnic/racial backgrounds participated in the study, but only members of the majority group, Whites (139 females, 110 males), are included in the analysis. Materials and procedure Participants first reported the extent to which they identifi ed with Whites using 18 items (Swim & Mallett, 2005; see Appendix). Items were answered using a scale from 1, not at all to 7, very much (M = 4.34, SD = .76). We averaged participants’ responses to these items to form a measure of ingroup identifi cation (α = .85). Next, Whites were presented with a summary of events surrounding a hate crime against Blacks, read the same instructions based on McPherson and Janoff-Bulman’s (2000) study of perspective taking, and wrote the same type of response in terms of their reactions to the events. Trained coders used the same coding scheme to assess the number of times that Whites took the perspective of Black students. We averaged the coders’ ratings of the frequency of perspective taking; inter-rater reliability for the coding was good (intraclass correlation coeffi cient = .92, M = 2.72, SD = 1.58). As in Study 1, we used the same procedure to code the written responses for the amount of anger expressed at the university administration. Ratings of anger expressed in the essay ranged from 0, not at all to 4, ver y much (M = .60, SD = .85; intraclass correlation coeffi cient = .93). Participants then completed the fi ve-item White guilt scale (Swim & Miller, 1999), composed of items like ‘I feel guilty about the past and present social inequality of Black Americans Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 11(4) 460 (i.e. slavery, poverty).’ Items were answered on a scale from 1, not at all guilty to 7, very guilty (α = .87, M = 3.42, SD = 1.48). Finally, White participants indicated whether they participated in eight types of collective action to benefit Blacks. Items included, ‘I attempted to/succeeded at rushing the fi eld at the Blue and White game;’ ‘I attended the rally held by students, at 9:00 pm at the HUB on April 21st;’ ‘I attended the NO HATE AT PENN STATE rally at Old Main on April 24th at 4:00 pm;’ ‘I spent the night at the HUB as part of the Village;’ ‘I visited the Village, at the HUB;’ ‘I wrote letters to the editors of the Daily Collegian, Centre Daily Times, or any other newspaper or news organization (regardless of whether they were published);’ ‘I attended the rally on September 14, 2001;’ ‘I attended the conference on September 14–16, 2001.’ Participants answered yes or no for all items. Again, all actions were aimed at improving the state of intergroup relations for Black students. Therefore for Whites, this serves as a measure of collective action on behalf of an outgroup. We summed the ‘yes’ responses for each partici- pant and divided the sum by eight to produce an average score for participation in collective action. Observed scores for collective action ranged from 0 to 8 (M = .17, SD = .15). Results We calculated the correlations between all variables used in Study 2. As in Study 1, correl- ations ranged from non-signifi cant to moder- ate, and were in the direction expected by past research (see Table 1, below the diagonal). As in Study 1, we conducted two transform- ations on the data before estimating the remain- ing analyses. First, we centered the variables. Second, we again found that the measure of collective action was slightly positively skewed so we performed a square root transformation before conducting the analyses. Perspective taking To determine whether outgroup perspective taking was directly related to participation in collective action, we regressed participation in collective action on outgroup perspective taking, controlling for gender. We found the predicted relationship between perspective taking and collective action, β = .17, t(228) = 2.54, p = .01. As in Study 1, as spontaneous outgroup perspective taking increased, so did reports of participation in collective action. To determine whether ingroup identifi cation moderated this relation, in step 1 we regressed collective action on participant gender, ingroup identifi cation, and perspective taking. Unlike Study 1, this step was not signifi cant, R 2 = .07, F(2, 228) = 5.71, p = ns. Ingroup identifi cation was not directly related to collective action, β = –.06, p = ns. This result lends further sup- port to the speculation that there might be something unique about identifi cation with a sexual orientation group as opposed to a racial or gender group. We added the product of identification and perspective taking in step 2. As in Study 1, this step was not significant, R 2 = .07, F(2, 228) = 5.71, p = ns. Ingroup identification did not moderate the relationship between spontaneous perspective taking and collective action, β = –.04, p = ns.5 Group-based guilt We continued testing the proposed model by determining whether feelings of group-based guilt were directly related to participation in collective action by regressing participation in collective action on White guilt, controlling for gender. As expected, White guilt and collective action were positively related, β = .18, p < .01. As reports of White guilt increased, so did participation in collective action. Mediation In addition to predicting that per- spective taking and group-based guilt would directly relate to collective action on behalf of an outgroup, our model suggests that group- based guilt would at least partially mediate the relationship between perspective taking and action. To examine this prediction, we followed Baron and Kenny’s (1986) recommendations for testing mediation. Table 2 shows the results of this analysis. As expected, feelings of White guilt partially mediated the relationship between spontaneous outgroup perspective taking and 461 Mallett et al. outgroup perspective taking and collective action participation in collective action. The indirect effect (Sobel, 1982) of perspective taking on collective action was significant (z = –2.05, p < .05). Thus, when majority group members took the perspective of the minority group, they felt group-based guilt and were motivated to take action on behalf of the outgroup. Group-based anger In light of an emerging interest in group-based anger, we also explored whether anger was directly or indirectly related to participation in collective action on behalf of an outgroup by regressing participation in collective action on participant gender and expressions of anger directed at the university administration. As in Study 1, anger at the uni- versity administration was directly related to collective action, β = .13, p < .05. Given that anger at the administration was related to collective action, we also examined whether anger mediated the association between perspective taking and action. As in Study 1, we included gender as a covariate in these analyses. Perspective taking was not related to feelings of anger at the administration, β = .06, p = ns. Since the fi rst step of mediation was not met, we did not continue to test for mediation. Finally, we examined whether feelings of group-based guilt continued to mediate when feelings of anger at the administration were in the equation. We regressed collective action on participant gender, outgroup perspective taking, group-based guilt, and group-based anger at the administration. The path from perspective taking to action remained signifi cant, β = .14, p < .05. The path from group-based guilt to collective action, controlling for anger and perspective taking, remained signifi cant, β = .13, p = .05. The path from group-based anger to collective action, controlling for guilt and perspective taking also remained signifi cant, β = .14, p < .05. The indirect effect (Sobel, 1982) of perspective taking on collective action through group-based guilt was signifi cant (z = 1.97, p < .05). Therefore feelings of group-based guilt continued to partially mediate between perspective taking and action, even when group-based anger was simultaneously entered as a predictor of col- lective action. Discussion Garnering additional support for our model, we found that perspective taking and group- based guilt worked separately and in concert to infl uence collective action on behalf of an out- group. That is, as perspective taking and feelings of White guilt increased so did participation in collective action. Moreover, White guilt mediated the relationship between outgroup perspec- tive taking and action, further supporting our Table 2. White guilt mediates the association between perspective taking and participation in collective action in Study 2 Perspective taking → White guilt → Collective action Unstandardized beta Standard error Standardized beta t p Step 1: Perspective taking → White Guilt R2: .15, F = 22.95 .28 .06 .30 5.08 .0001 Step 2: Perspective taking → Collective action R 2: .07, F = 8.15 [R 2: .05, F = 5.72] .07 .06 .17 2.41 .02 Step 3: White guilt, controlling for Perspective taking → Collective action R 2: .05, F = 5.92 [R 2: .05, F = 5.92] .11 .05 .13 1.95 .05 Step 4: Perspective taking, controlling for White guilt → Collective action R 2: .05, F = 5.91 [R 2: .05, F = 5.91] .06 .03 .15 2.24 .03 Sobel = 1.99, p = .047 Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 11(4) 462 proposed model. Also, as in Study 1, although group-based anger was related to collective action, it did not mediate the association between perspective taking and action and did not affect the ability of guilt to explain participation in collective action. Although our theoretically preferred model depicts White guilt as the mediator between per- spective taking and participation in collective action, other causal orders are possible. For example, perspective taking may mediate the relationship between White guilt and collective action, or collective action may cause perspec- tive taking, which could then produce feelings of group-based guilt. Tests of these two models indicated that they were viable alternatives to our theoretically preferred model. Thus, the strength of our fi rst two studies is that they compellingly demonstrate the associations between outgroup perspective taking, feelings of group-based guilt and participation in col- lective action in a real world setting. Yet the cor- relational nature of the studies leaves us unable to specify whether our model accurately accounts for collective action on behalf of outgroups. Because we believe that perspective taking causes feelings of group-based guilt and existing theory supports group-based guilt as a medi- ator between perspective taking and collec- tive action, in Study 3 we manipulate perspective taking in order to test the causal nature of the associations. Since feelings of guilt consistently played a more signifi cant role than feelings of anger in our studies, we refrain from examining group-based anger in Study 3. Study 3 In Study 3, we extend the present research in three ways. First, and most importantly, we mani- pulate perspective taking to demonstrate its causal role in producing feelings of group- based guilt and willingness to engage in collec- tive action. We expect that asking Whites to take Blacks’ perspective will cause feelings of White guilt and increase willingness to act on behalf of Blacks. Second, as also proposed by Zebel et al. (2008), we again examine whether ingroup identifi cation interacts with perspective taking to predict willingness to engage in collective action. Although we did not fi nd that perspective taking and ingroup identifi cation interacted to predict group-based guilt or collective action in Studies 1 and 2, we suspect this might be due to the fact that we measured the degree to which participants spontaneously took the outgroup’s perspective rather than deliberately manipulating perspective taking. If encourag- ing people to take the outgroup perspective provides the necessary psychological kick to initiate actions to protect the positive image and status of the ingroup, then we might fi nd that ingroup identifi cation moderates the effect of deliberate perspective taking on group-based guilt and willingness to engage in collective action. If this is the case, then consistent with Zebel et al. (2008) we expect that when led to take the outgroup perspective, White’s willingness to engage in collective action should increase to the extent that being White is unimport- ant to them (i.e. they lack identifi cation with Whites). When not led to take the outgroup perspective, this relation should be absent. Third, replicating Study 2, we test whether group-based guilt mediates the association between perspective taking and collective action. Validation of each prediction provides greater confi dence regarding the veracity of our model of majority group member’s collective action on behalf of a minority outgroup. Because feelings of group-based anger did not mediate the relationship between perspective taking and action in Studies 1 or 2, we no longer con- sider anger. Method Par ticipants Forty-seven White students participated in the study in exchange for course credit. Materials and procedure Participants were presented with a summary of hate crimes and acts of aggression that recently targeted Black students. Following Vescio et al. (2003), half of the participants read instructions to take the perspective of the targeted group while they read the summary: 463 Mallett et al. outgroup perspective taking and collective action When reading about the incidents, pay careful attention to the content of the material, but try to step into the shoes of the African American student(s). Try to feel the full impact that the incident had on the student and imagine how he/she feels as a result. The other half of the participants read instruc- tions to remain objective as they read the summary: When reading about the incidents, pay careful attention to the content of the material, but take an objective perspective. Try not to get caught up in how the people involved feel about the experience described or how it affected his/her life. Then, all participants completed the fi ve-item White guilt scale (α = .88, M = 3.39, SD = 1.34; Swim & Miller, 1999) and reported the likelihood that they would engage in four types of collective action on behalf of African Americans on campus (Volunteer to put up fl iers on grounds inform- ing students of what has happened on grounds; Volunteer to hand out black ribbons at the next home football game; Obtain signatures for a University Judiciary Committee referendum to create specifi c and severe punishment guidelines for judicial offenses motivated by hatred based on race or ethnicity; Help to organize an event to show support of targets of discrimination). Each item was evaluated on a scale from 1, strongly disagree to 7, strongly agree. We averaged the items to form a composite measure of intention to engage in collective action (α = .78, M = 4.01, SD = .128). Finally, participants reported the extent to which they identifi ed with Whites using 18 items (Swim & Mallett, 2005; see Appendix for items). We averaged participants’ responses to form a composite measure of ingroup identifi cation (α = .86, M = 4.19, SD = .74).6 Results and discussion Perspective taking As in Studies 1 and 2, we standardized all variables before conducting the analyses. We began by testing the association between outgroup perspective taking and willingness to engage in collective action. If deliberately encouraging participants to take an outgroup’s perspective prompts identity maintenance processes, then we should fi nd that ingroup identifi cation moderates the effect of outgroup perspective taking such that perspective taking causes willingness to engage in action to increase as the importance of being White and therefore defending the ingroup decreases. In the control condition (no perspective taking), we did not expect White identifi cation to infl uence willingness to act. We tested whether perspective taking and identifi cation with Whites interacted to predict willingness to engage in collective action on behalf of Blacks by regressing collective action on participant gender, ingroup identifi cation, and perspective taking in step 1, and the product of identifi cation and perspective taking in step 2. Perspective taking was coded 1 = perspective taking and –1 = no perspective taking/control. Consistent with predictions, the change be- tween step 1 and step 2 was signifi cant, R 2 = .14, F(4, 46) = 2.39, p < .05. Perspective taking and ingroup identifi cation interacted to predict willingness to engage in collective action, β = –.46 (.20), p = .03. When Whites were asked to deliberately take Blacks’ perspective, as White identifi cation and perhaps concern for protecting the image of their ingroup decreased, willingness to engage in collective action increased, β = –.80 (.34), p = .025. In contrast, in the control condition (no perspective taking), White identifi cation did not infl uence willingness to engage in collective action, β = .12 (.24), p = ns. Therefore, deliberately taking the outgroup perspective was necessary for Whites to be willing to act on behalf of Blacks, but it was more effective when Whites placed less value on their group membership.7 Group-based guilt We continued testing the proposed model by determining whether feelings of group-based guilt were directly related to willingness to participate in collective action by regressing willingness to act on White guilt, controlling for gender. As expected, White guilt and collective action were positively related, β = .36 (.13), p = .01. As reports of White guilt increased, so did willingness to participate in collective action. Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 11(4) 464 Mediation analyses Given that ingroup iden- tifi cation moderated the effects of perspective taking on White guilt and collective action, a conceptual replication of Study 2 entails con- ducting a mediated moderation analyses (Muller, Judd, & Yzerbyt, 2005) to determine whether the experience of group-based guilt mediated the association between the perspective taking by White identifi cation interaction and wil- lingness to engage in collective action, control- ling for gender. According to Muller et al. (2005), mediated moderation can occur when: (i) the perspective taking by group identifi cation interaction predicts group-based guilt (the mediator) and group-based guilt predicts the dependent variable (willingness to engage in collective action), or (ii) group identifi cation predicts group-based guilt and the group-based guilt by perspective taking interaction predicts the dependent variable, or both. Note that both the main effect and the interaction within the fi rst or second part of the model described earlier must be met for mediated moderation to occur, and that only one of the two patterns described earlier are necessary to demonstrate mediated moderation. As illustrated in Table 3, in step 1, the per- spective taking by group identifi cation interaction signifi cantly predicted willingness to engage in collective action. In step 2, the interaction sig- nifi cantly predicted the experience of group- based guilt. Finally, as required to meet the conditions of mediated moderation, in step 3 when group-based guilt and the guilt by per- spective taking interaction were included, the perspective taking by group identifi cation interaction no longer predicted willingness to engage in collective action. However, the experience of group-based guilt did signifi cantly predict willingness to engage in collective action. A Sobel test confi rmed the indirect effect was signifi cant. Thus, mediated moderation was successfully demonstrated as condition ‘i’ discussed earlier was met. Taking Blacks’ perspective caused feelings of White guilt that increased as White identifi cation decreased. Feelings of White guilt then increased willingness to take action on behalf of Blacks.8 When not led to take the outgroup perspective, the subsequent relations were absent. Given that both the proposed mediator, group-based guilt, and the outcome variable, willingness to engage in collective action, were measured, it is useful to examine the reverse mediator–outcome pathway. Results of the re- verse mediator–outcome analysis revealed that Table 3. White guilt mediates the association between the perspective taking by White identifi cation interaction and willingness to participate in collective action (Study 3). Paths key to demonstrating mediated moderation are given in bold Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 (Criterion collective action) (Criterion mediator) (Criterion collective action) Group-based guilt Predictor b (SE) p b (SE) p b (SE) p Perspective-taking (PT) –.26 (.19) .19 –.39 (.18) .04 –.05 (.20) .81 Identifi cation (ID) –.34 (.21) .11 –.09 (.20) .65 –.14 (.23) .55 PT × ID –.46 (.21) .03 –.74 (.20) < .0005 –.138 (.23) .56 Mediator Guilt .54 (.22) .02 Mediator × PT Sobel test: z = –2.05, p < .05 Guilt × PT .29 (.22) .18 465 Mallett et al. outgroup perspective taking and collective action in step 2, although intent to engage in collective action was a signifi cant predictor of group-based guilt, β = .39 (.18), p = .03, the direct effect of the interaction remained signifi cant, β = –.57 (.20), p = .008. Moreover, a Sobel test confi rmed that the indirect effect was not signifi cant (z = –1.54, p = ns). This analysis provides strong support for our preferred theoretical model, demonstrat- ing that feelings of group-based guilt partially mediate the relationship between the product of perspective taking and ingroup identifi cation and willingness to participate in collective action on behalf of an outgroup. General discussion Past research has rarely considered factors that motivate majority group members to take collective action on behalf of minority group members, but investigating such factors is im- portant and useful because of majority group members’ unique ability to produce social change. We tested an initial model explaining majority group members’ participation in collective action and found that outgroup per- spective taking and the experience of group- based guilt were key antecedents of actions that helped an outgroup. Results consistently supported our predictions. We established that among heterosexuals and Whites, outgroup perspective taking was posi- tively related to participation in collective action on behalf of the outgroup (Studies 1 and 2). We also found support for the link between White guilt and both willingness to engage, and actual participation, in collective action (Studies 2 and 3). Moreover, we demonstrated the effi cacy of the full model by showing that White guilt partially mediated the association between perspective taking and both willingness to par- ticipate and actual participation in collective action on behalf of the outgroup (Studies 2 and 3). In addition to testing our main predictions, we also furthered understanding of the role of ingroup identifi cation in collective action on behalf of the outgroup. Exploratory analyses revealed that when we examined the effect of deliberately taking the outgroup perspective, outgroup perspective taking predicted feelings of group-based guilt and willingness to engage in collective action on behalf of the outgroup (Study 3). However, similar to the results of Zebel et al. (2004), the positive effect of deliberate per- spective taking was most pronounced for those individuals who placed less value on being White. Specifi cally, when Whites took Blacks’ perspec- tive, this caused feelings of White guilt that increased as White identifi cation, and perhaps concern for defending the ingroup, decreased (Study 3). White guilt then increased willingness to take action on behalf of Blacks; mediation did not occur when White participants did not take the perspective of Blacks. By contrast, when we examined spontaneous perspective taking (Studies 1 and 2), ingroup identifi cation did not alter the affect of outgroup perspective taking on group-based guilt or collective action. We suspect that this occurred because deliberately encouraging outgroup perspective taking trig- gered identity maintenance processes among high but not low identifi ed group members. For example, Doosje et al. (1998) found that people with high ingroup identifi cation were resistant to threats to the positive image of the ingroup and reported less guilt than those who with low ingroup identifi cation. By comparison, spontaneous outgroup perspective taking might not have made participants’ group membership as salient and therefore may have failed to initiate the same type of identity maintenance processes. Finally, although some research suggests that group-based anger may also infl uence partici- pation in collective action, we found that group- based anger played a limited role in initiating the form of collective action investigated in the current research. Although reports of group- based anger at the university administration were directly related to participation in collec- tive action (Studies 1 and 2), anger did not mediate the association between outgroup perspective taking and collective action. Perspec- tive taking might not have related to the experi- ence of group-based anger in Study 2 because it is unnecessary to see the world through the outgroup’s eyes in order to appraise an action committed by another as blameworthy. In Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 11(4) 466 comparison, perspective taking is a necessary component of the experience of group-based guilt because seeing the world through the eyes of the outgroup contributes to one’s understand- ing and appreciation of the harm done to the outgroup, which increases feelings of group- based guilt that, in turn, lead to participation in collective action. Importantly, feelings of group-based guilt continued to mediate the relationship between perspective taking and action even when feelings of group-based anger were included as a predic- tor of collective action. This might have oc- curred because feelings of guilt motivate people to repair damaged intergroup relations—the likely goal of collective action on behalf of an outgroup—whereas feelings of anger motiv- ate people to confront or act against the perpetrator of a blameworthy action. It would be interesting in the future to examine whether the relative strength of group-based guilt and anger in predicting collective action vary as a function of how collective action is character- ized. For example, group-based guilt might be more predictive of collective action that is characterized as a means of helping the minority outgroup, whereas group-based anger might be more predictive of collective action that is characterized as a means of rising up against the unjust aggressor. It might also be worthwhile to consider the extent to which majority group members feel connected to the targeted minority group and therefore experience a dual identification. According to Gaertner and Dovidio’s Common Ingroup Identity Model (Gaertner, Dovidio, Anastasio, Bachman, & Rust, 1993), intergroup relations are often the most positive when majority and minority group members become aware of a shared superordinate group membership (e.g. we are all students at the same university). Recategorizing groups in this way improves intergroup attitudes and potentially facilitates positive intergroup contact by encouraging equal status, cooperation, and interpersonal interaction (Gaertner, Rust, Dovidio, Bachman, & Anastasio, 1996). Taking the outgroup per- spective could create a similar mindset if major- ity group members see the world through the eyes of a minority group member. Being less identifi ed with the majority ingroup might fur- ther enable people to see the self as part of a shared superordinate group because they are not particularly motivated to protect the status of the ingroup. In sum, we provided support for an initial model of collective action on behalf an outgroup as well as examined the relevance of ingroup identifi cation and group-based anger. Future research could build upon our model by examining the possibility that other group-based emotions might further explain participation in collective action. Recent research suggests that group-based feelings of shame (Lickel, Schmader, & Barquissau, 2004) might have interesting implications. For example, group- based shame may manifest in distancing from ingroup members who caused the events or distancing from situations that remind people of the inequality (Lickel et al., 2004). If people distance from situations related to inequity, then shame might actually inhibit collective action. Future research could simultaneously assess other group-based emotions such as anger, shame and guilt to determine the unique power of each of these emotions to predict collective action taken on behalf of an outgroup, and to examine the extent to which each emotion serves to mediate the relationship between perspective taking and collective action. Because of their larger numbers and greater relative power within society (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; H. J. Smith & Tyler, 1996), majority group members play a key role in enacting social change on a broad scale. Our research represents an important step in understanding why majority group members participate in collective action on behalf of minority groups. Taking the minority group perspective inspires collective action in majority group members because of feelings of group-based guilt. Moreover, the impact of deliberate outgroup perspective taking on guilt and action increases as ingroup identifi cation decreases, suggesting the possibility that different factors may increase guilt and action depending on ingroup identifi cation. By seeing through the eyes of minority group members, majority group members can be inspired to take action 467 Mallett et al. outgroup perspective taking and collective action in alliance with the minority group, which could perhaps reduce existing inequality more so than minority group members acting alone. Notes 1. Participants completed several measures of attitudes, beliefs, and perceptions of the incidents for a different study. We unsuccessfully attempted to measure feelings of heterosexual guilt. Item analysis showed that the only reverse-scored item was positively correlated with the other items, suggesting that participants might not have understood the construct (α = .61). 2. It is possible to conceptualize collective action as dichotomous rather than continuous (i.e. whether participants took action or not). A logistic regression showed that, again, perspective taking was positively associated with participation in collective action, β = .69, p < .001. Heterosexuals that took non-heterosexuals’ perspective were more likely to take collective action than those who did not. In both Studies 1 and 2, we also conducted logistic regression analyses for all analyses reported that used the participation in collective action dependent variable; the results were the same as those for the continuous variable. 3. In both Studies 1 and 2, we tested whether gender moderated the relationship between perspective taking, identifi cation, anger, or guilt and participation in collective action; it did not. 4. It is interesting to note that, using the same analytic procedure as we did for collective action, identifi cation did not moderate the degree to which perspective taking was related to anger, β = .22, t(219) = .61, p = ns. 5. Again, we tested whether identifi cation moderated the infl uence of perspective taking on group-based guilt and anger by using the same two-step analytic strategy that we used for collective action. We did not fi nd an interaction for guilt, β = –.47, t(236) = –1.36, p = ns, or anger at the administration, B = –.26, t(236) = –.74, p = ns. 6. An independent means t-test shows that identifi cation did not differ by perspective taking condition, t(45) = 1.52, p = ns. Whites who took Blacks’ perspective did not report different levels of White identifi cation than Whites who did not take Blacks’ perspective. 7. We expected the same pattern for group-based guilt and conducted the same regression analysis to examine our prediction. As expected, perspective taking and ingroup identifi cation interacted to predict group-based guilt, β = –.74 (.20), p < .001. When Whites were asked to take Blacks’ perspective, group-based guilt increased as White identifi cation decreased, β = –.83 (.30), p = .008. Therefore, given the lack of interaction between identity and perspective taking in Studies 1 and 2 and the presence of the interaction in Study 3, it appears that there is a critical distinction between spontaneous and deliberate outgroup perspective taking. Identifi cation maintenance processes are only triggered when people are asked to deliberately take the outgroup perspective. 8. Some readers might argue that we could have tested for mediated moderation by separately conducting mediation analyses within the perspective taking and control conditions (or conversely within the low and high ingroup identifi cation conditions). However, Muller et al. (2005) argue that is an inappropriate way of examining mediated moderation and that the full model we tested in Table 2 is appropriate. Nevertheless, to clarify the pattern of results, we tested mediation for the perspective taking condition and the control condition. We found that guilt mediated between identifi cation and action in the perspective taking condition, but not in the control condition. Therefore, it seems that perspective taking provides the necessary kick to produce guilt and collective action. References Arsenault, R. (2006). Freedom riders: 1961 and the struggle for racial justice (Pivotal Moments in American History). New York: Oxford University Press. Baron, R. M., & Kenny, D. A. (1986). 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J. Smith (Eds.), Relative deprivation: Specifi cation, development, and integration (pp. 200–236). New York: Cambridge University Press. Zebel, S., Doosje, B., & Spears, R. (in press, 2008). How perspective-taking helps and hinders group-based guilt as function of group identifi cation. Group Processes & Intergroup Relations. Paper received 17 November 2006; revised version accepted 31 April 2008. Biographical notes robyn k. mallett is an assistant professor of psychology at Loyola University Chicago. Her research focuses on topics related to intergroup relations and social justice. She is currently investigating ways to optimize intergroup contact and minimize the consequences of discrimination. jeffrey r. huntsinger is a lecturer at Loyola University Chicago. His research focuses on motivational and affective infl uences on cognition. He is currently exploring how affect shapes automatic processing. stacey sinclair is currently an associate professor of psychology at the Princeton University. She is interested in how interpersonal interactions, and the beliefs we attribute to others, shape our beliefs, feelings and actions—particularly those beliefs relevant to stereotyping and prejudice. janet k. swim is a professor of psychology at the Pennsylvania State University. Currently, she is examining topics such as accuracy in judgments about who is prejudiced and meta-perceptions of prejudice, the role of goals in coping with discrimination, and barriers to and facilitation of pro-environmental behaviors. Appendix Identifi cation items Whites [Heterosexuals] have much to be proud of these days. I think that I am very different from most Whites [Heterosexuals]. I have spent time trying to fi nd out more about White [Heterosexual] culture, such as the history of Whites [Heterosexuals] in America. I d o n ’t h a v e a l o t i n c o m m o n w i t h W h i t e s [Heterosexuals]. I have diffi culty identifying with the culture of White Americans [Heterosexuals]. I really have not spent much time trying to learn more about the culture of Whites [Heterosexuals], such as their history and traditions. I am very concerned about the problems Whites [Heterosexuals] have in today’s society. When electing public officials, I would vote for candidates who I know consider issues that affect White Americans [Heterosexuals]. I feel an attachment to Whites [Heterosexuals]as a group. I seek out information about the culture of Whites [Heterosexuals] When I meet a White person [Heterosexual], I feel like I will have a lot in common with him or her. I think a lot about how White people’s [Hetero- sexuals] lives will be affected by their ethnic group membership. I feel little sense of commitment to White people [Heterosexuals] even those who are close friends. I think I have much in common with Whites [Heterosexuals]. I have learned a lot about the history and tradition of Whites [Heterosexuals]. I don’t actively seek out news and information on issues affecting Whites [Heterosexuals] in America. I feel that it is important to keep up with issues that are important to Whites [Heterosexuals]in America. I’m aware of the types of daily events Whites [Heterosexuals] tend to experience these days. 
work_tuzgikmtpfcctjygi4xjf45v4i	----	Social contagion of ethnic hostility Social contagion of ethnic hostility Michal Bauera,b,1, Jana Cahlíkovác, Julie Chytilováa,b, and Tomáš Želinskýb,d aCERGE-EI, A joint workplace of Charles University and the Economics Institute of the Czech Academy of Sciences, 111 21 Prague, Czech Republic; bInstitute of Economic Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University, 110 00 Prague, Czech Republic; cMax Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance, 80539 Munich, Germany; and dFaculty of Economics, Technical University of Košice, 040 01 Košice, Slovakia Edited by George A. Akerlof, University of California, Berkeley, CA, and approved March 30, 2018 (received for review November 22, 2017) Interethnic conflicts often escalate rapidly. Why does the behavior of masses easily change from cooperation to aggression? This paper provides an experimental test of whether ethnic hostility is contagious. Using incentivized tasks, we measured willingness to sacrifice one’s own resources to harm others among adolescents from a region with a history of animosities toward the Roma peo- ple, the largest ethnic minority in Europe. To identify the influence of peers, subjects made choices after observing either destructive or peaceful behavior of peers in the same task. We found that susceptibility to follow destructive behavior more than doubled when harm was targeted against Roma rather than against coeth- nics. When peers were peaceful, subjects did not discriminate. We observed very similar patterns in a norms-elicitation experiment: destructive behavior toward Roma was not generally rated as more socially appropriate than when directed at coethnics, but the ratings were more sensitive to social contexts. The findings may illuminate why ethnic hostilities can spread quickly, even in societies with few visible signs of interethnic hatred. ethnic conflict | discrimination | hostile behavior | contagion | peer effects Intergroup conflict remains one of the most pressing problemsfacing human society because it can give rise to civil wars, ethnic cleansing, and discrimination. Many violent conflicts es- calate quickly and are characterized by relatively sudden changes in the behavior of masses, from cooperating with individuals across ethnic lines to taking an active part in ethnic aggression (1–6). However, it remains unclear what triggers this change in willingness to cause harm. Here, we explore the influence of peers and provide a study that investigates experimentally whether intergroup hostility is contagious. The aim was to cap- ture the following situation in a controlled environment: Imag- ine a person living in a community in which other people sud- denly start doing harm to members of a different ethnic group. Will this change in social environment make the person more hostile toward outsiders as well, thus causing harmful behavior to spread? Our work is motivated by evidence suggesting that individuals within own social network may drive the diffusion of hostility toward other ethnic groups and nationalities. In Germany, the rise of the Nazi movement was much faster in areas with a high density of civic associations (7). During the Rwandan genocide, “hate-radio” fueled participation in violence not only in villages with radio access, but its influence was magnified via spillover effects into neighboring villages (6). In terms of policy, concerns about the spreading of ethnic hostility, and thus greater social costs, are embedded in the legal codes of many countries, which impose greater penalties for racially or ethnically mo- tivated crimes. Despite the importance of this issue, causal evi- dence is still lacking on whether hostile attitudes and behav- iors spread more easily when they target outgroup instead of ingroup members. Social scientists have long studied the prevalence of intergroup discrimination by measuring how behavior in experimental tasks is affected by the identity of a counterpart. These efforts have been, in large part, motivated by conceptual work describing how narrow group identities may cement ingroup cooperation but also create a fertile ground for intergroup hostility (8–10). A unifying feature of the existing experiments has been the focus on individuals making anonymous decisions when isolated from others, largely abstracting from the influence of people from own social network, and thus leaving open the question how social context can activate discrimination. Studies which employ real-world groups often find evidence that natural group attributes, including ethnicity, influence be- havior in experiments. Punishers have been found to protect ingroup members in a study focusing on indigenous tribes in Papua New Guinea (11). Male subjects in Israeli-Jewish society were found to systematically discriminate based on ethnicity in the Trust game (12), and exogenous allocation of individuals to real-life social groups in the Swiss Army led to increased co- operation rates among ingroup members in the Prisoner’s Dilemma game (13). At the same time, little evidence of dis- crimination based on shared language was detected among ad- olescents in Italy (14). Also, a large-scale study from Kenya, a setting with a recent history of interethnic violence, found no evidence of coethnic bias (15), suggesting that intergroup dis- crimination among natural groups may not necessarily manifest in everyday decisions but may be triggered by situational factors. Another approach is to create social categories in the labo- ratory (16) by dividing participants based on an irrelevant char- acteristic, such as preference for artwork. The groups lack social content, but the experimenter has more control over the identity formation process. Starting with the classical experiments of Tajfel et al. (16), studies using such “minimal groups” mostly find that people placed in groups favor income allocations to mem- bers of own group (16–19). A study focusing on a wide range of tasks that pit self-interest against the welfare of others showed that shared group identity increases altruistic sharing and re- duces punishment of norm violators (17). Nevertheless, recent experiments have documented substantial heterogeneity in the Significance We provide experimental evidence on peer effects and show that behavior that harms members of a different ethnic group is twice as contagious as behavior that harms coethnics. The findings may help to explain why ethnic hostilities can spread quickly (even in societies with few visible signs of interethnic hatred) and why many countries have adopted hate crime laws, and illustrate the need to study not only the existence of discrimination, but also the stability of attitudes and behaviors toward outgroup members. Author contributions: M.B., J. Cahlíková, J. Chytilová, and T.Ž. designed research, per- formed research, analyzed data, and wrote the paper. The authors declare no conflict of interest. This article is a PNAS Direct Submission. This open access article is distributed under Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial- NoDerivatives License 4.0 (CC BY-NC-ND). Data deposition: The data and statistical code allowing replication of reported figures and tables are available at Harvard Dataverse (doi:10.7910/DVN/G651WB). 1To whom correspondence should be addressed. Email: bauer@cerge-ei.cz. This article contains supporting information online at www.pnas.org/lookup/suppl/doi:10. 1073/pnas.1720317115/-/DCSupplemental. Published online April 23, 2018. www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.1720317115 PNAS | May 8, 2018 | vol. 115 | no. 19 | 4881–4886 EC O N O M IC SC IE N C ES D o w n lo a d e d a t C a rn e g ie M e llo n U n iv e rs ity o n A p ri l 5 , 2 0 2 1 http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1073/pnas.1720317115&domain=pdf https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://dx.doi.org/10.7910/DVN/G651WB mailto:bauer@cerge-ei.cz http://www.pnas.org/lookup/suppl/doi:10.1073/pnas.1720317115/-/DCSupplemental http://www.pnas.org/lookup/suppl/doi:10.1073/pnas.1720317115/-/DCSupplemental www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.1720317115 extent of intergroup discrimination, suggesting that it may be driven by a minority of individuals (20). The unique element of our experiment is the manipulation of social context, which allowed us to center the attention on dy- namics of ethnic hostility caused by social influences. We tested the hypothesis that susceptibility to follow peers becomes mag- nified when harm is done to ethnic outgroup members compared with coethnics. Put differently, we estimated the extent of dis- crimination in “normal” circumstances (i.e., in a decision situa- tion similar to previous studies) and then explored whether the prevalence of intergroup discrimination increases when an in- dividual happens to observe hostility of peers. We also tested one potential mechanism: that social norms regulating destructive behavior toward outgroup members are more fragile and con- tingent on social context. In particular, we estimated how be- ing allocated into an environment with hostile peers influences individual willingness to pay to harm others in an incentivized task (study 1) and how it affects perceptions about whether a harmful choice constitutes a normatively right way to behave (study 2). The focus on peer influence relates our work to experiments which demonstrate that people often follow what others are doing. Building on the work of Asch (21) that documents high levels of conformity in people’s (mis)judgements, researchers have shown that peers also affect the prevalence of prosocial (22) as well as unethical behaviors, including littering and cheating on examinations (23, 24). Because this evidence indicates that people may have a general tendency to conform, to cleanly identify the contagion of group-based hostility, we compared the spreading of hostile behavior toward outgroup members and toward coethnics. Our sample consists of adolescents from a majority population (the Slavic ethnolinguistic group) in Eastern Slovakia. We study behavior toward Roma people (also known as Gypsies), the largest ethnic minority group in Europe. Since World War II, when Roma were targets of similar policies and persecution as Jews, there has not been any systematic violent conflict involving Roma. Nevertheless, the frequency of anti-Roma violence has been increasing in the last decade, especially in Central and Eastern Europe, making this region an apt natural setting for studying factors which facilitate the spread of hostility against a dissimilar ethnic group. Study 1 Study 1 (n = 327) was implemented in 2013 in 13 schools (SI Appendix, Fig. S1), allowing us to study the influence of real-life peers. We administered a Joy of Destruction game, a money- burning task designed to identify hostile behavior (25, 26). Two players received an endowment of V2 each and simultaneously chose whether to pay V0.20 to reduce their counterpart’s income by V1 or to keep the payoffs unchanged. Since the interaction is one-shot and anonymous and the destruction is costly for the de- cision maker, selfishness cannot justify destruction. We denoted the choice to reduce the other’s payoff as hostile or destructive. To measure discrimination, we implemented a SAME condi- tion, in which an anonymous counterpart was a coethnic, and an OTHER condition, in which a counterpart was a member of the Roma minority. Specifically, subjects were provided a list of 20 typical majority or Roma names of potential counterparts from an unspecified distant school in Eastern Slovakia, chosen to reliably signal ethnicity. To uncover the dynamics of hostility and estimate the susceptibility to follow peers, subjects were matched with two classmates and all three sequentially made the decision whether to destroy the resources of a counterpart from the same name list. Given that the matching of peers and the order of choices were randomly determined, this design allowed us to identify the influence of peers among those who made their choice second or third and thus observed either hostile peers (DESTRUCTIVE PEER) or nonhostile peers (PEACEFUL PEER) before making their own decision. SI Appendix, Table S1 shows that the observable characteristics of subjects who made choices in DESTRUCTIVE PEER and PEACEFUL PEER conditions are statistically indistinguishable, indicating that the allocation to social environment was indeed exogenous. The greater the influence of being in an environment with hostile peers on individual hostility, the greater the extent of spreading of hostile behavior. Ultimately, we aimed to explore interaction effects—that is, whether hostile peers are more influential in OTHER than in SAME. The decision environment in our field laboratories aimed to mimic real-life situations in which hostility may spread within cohesive social groups. We studied the influence of peers in a context where the three matched individuals knew each other well, directly observed each other’s decision, and faced a com- mon fate in the sense that one of the three individual decisions was randomly chosen to be payoff relevant for all three matched peers. Therefore, the estimated influence of peers on choices may capture multiple channels: subjects may follow peers be- cause they learn about the prevailing social norm, update their beliefs about the characteristics of counterparts, or take into account peer preferences. Details about the setting and the ex- perimental design are provided in Materials and Methods and SI Appendix. We found that peers were influential in shaping individual willingness to destroy. Strikingly, the influence more than dou- bled when the choices impacted Roma (Fig. 1A and Fig. S2). We started by analyzing the choices of individuals who observed one peer before making their own decision. When the subjects ob- served a peaceful peer, the prevalence of destructive choices in OTHER was 19%. When the preceding player was destructive, the prevalence sharply increased to 77% (SI Appendix, Table S2). This difference is large in magnitude and highly significant sta- tistically (χ2 test, P < 0.001). Peers also affected behavior in SAME, but to a lesser extent: The prevalence of destructive behavior increased from 23% when a peer was nondestructive to 51% when he was destructive (P = 0.01). In a regression anal- ysis, we found a strong positive interaction effect between DESTRUCTIVE PEER and OTHER on the likelihood of choos- ing a destructive action (Table 1; P = 0.02). As a result, discrimi- nation against the ethnic minority arose when participants observed classmates’ hostility, and the gap is large in magnitude (26 per- centage points, P = 0.03). In contrast, when participants observed peaceful peers, we found virtually no differences in behavior across OTHER and SAME conditions (P = 0.62). Similar patterns emerge for subjects who observed the choices of two peers. We compared the behavior of individuals who observed destructive behavior of both classmates vs. individuals who did not (those who observed one or both classmates being peaceful). The difference is 70 percentage points (88% vs. 18%, respectively; P < 0.001) in OTHER, and 38 percentage points (67% vs. 29%, respectively; P < 0.001) in SAME. The difference in the estimated influence of destructive peer behavior is statis- tically significant across conditions (OTHER*DESTRUCTIVE PEER; Table 1; P = 0.04). Interestingly, observing one de- structive and one peaceful peer is not enough to trigger ethnic discrimination (SI Appendix, Table S3). Lastly, we pooled the choices of subjects who observed one or two peers and found that the interaction effect of observing destructive peers and OTHER (“Second and third decision makers” column in Table 1) is again large and statistically significant (35 percentage points, P = 0.001). Further results reported in SI Appendix show that the main pattern is robust. The findings hold across different locations in Eastern Slovakia; are robust to using alternative estimators, controlling for various design features and school fixed effects; and are not driven by a lack of understanding or by 4882 | www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.1720317115 Bauer et al. D o w n lo a d e d a t C a rn e g ie M e llo n U n iv e rs ity o n A p ri l 5 , 2 0 2 1 http://www.pnas.org/lookup/suppl/doi:10.1073/pnas.1720317115/-/DCSupplemental http://www.pnas.org/lookup/suppl/doi:10.1073/pnas.1720317115/-/DCSupplemental http://www.pnas.org/lookup/suppl/doi:10.1073/pnas.1720317115/-/DCSupplemental http://www.pnas.org/lookup/suppl/doi:10.1073/pnas.1720317115/-/DCSupplemental http://www.pnas.org/lookup/suppl/doi:10.1073/pnas.1720317115/-/DCSupplemental http://www.pnas.org/lookup/suppl/doi:10.1073/pnas.1720317115/-/DCSupplemental http://www.pnas.org/lookup/suppl/doi:10.1073/pnas.1720317115/-/DCSupplemental http://www.pnas.org/lookup/suppl/doi:10.1073/pnas.1720317115/-/DCSupplemental www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.1720317115 individuals from families with low socioeconomic status (SI Ap- pendix, Tables S4 and S5). Next, we explored whether the greater influence of peers in OTHER is due to a greater susceptibility to follow destructive peer behavior, peaceful behavior, or both (i.e., general con- formism). To analyze this (Fig. 1B and SI Appendix, Table S6), we used (as the benchmark) the choices of subjects who decided first among the three matched classmates and thus did not ob- serve peer behavior before own choice (NO PEER). Relative to the NO PEER condition, subjects in the PEACEFUL PEER condition were less likely to be destructive, and the magnitude of this effect is very similar in SAME and OTHER conditions. In contrast, susceptibility to follow destructive peer behavior was strong in OTHER, while we found virtually no effect in SAME. The interaction effect is large in magnitude and highly significant statistically (Table 1, P < 0.01). These results, as well as addi- tional evidence described in SI Appendix, reveal that the greater influence of peers in OTHER originates in greater readiness to follow unambiguously hostile peers, but not in differences in following peaceful or cooperative peers (SI Appendix, Tables S6– S8). It is also noteworthy that in NO PEER, the prevalence of destruction is very similar in SAME and OTHER. Put differ- ently, subjects do not discriminate unless they happen to be in an environment with hostile peers (SI Appendix, Table S9). Study 2 In study 2, we focused on one plausible mechanism that could explain the observed pattern of the spreading of destruction: whether individual perceptions of social norms are more fragile in OTHER than in SAME. The study was conducted in 2016 among adolescents (n = 204) from the same region. We implemented a coordination game (22, 27), which elicits per- ceived social (in)appropriateness of destructive behavior. The participants were described the Joy of Destruction game imple- mented in study 1 in four situations: the destructive choice was made either in SAME or in OTHER, and it was made either without observing peers (NO PEER) or after observing a de- structive peer (DESTRUCTIVE PEER). Instead of making own choices, subjects rated the social appropriateness of a destructive choice on a six-point scale. In task 1, as in previous work (27), subjects were incentivized to match the modal response provided by others (from their school) rating the same choice environ- ment. In addition, we implemented task 2, in which subjects were incentivized to estimate the rating in task 1 of 10 randomly se- lected subjects from their school. The data from task 2 provided information about the distribution of appropriateness ratings at an individual level, which helped us to assess whether individuals believed there was a social norm. Note that coordination on an action does not necessarily measure social norms, since coordination games have multiple equilibria and subjects may coordinate in ways that have nothing to do with norms. This elicitation method yields a representation of a social norm if there is general social agreement that some actions are (in)appropriate, constituting the social norm, and if such shared perceptions create a focal point which can help subjects to match others’ responses. To gauge whether the participants believed a social norm existed, we first analyzed overall distributions of ratings in the NO PEER condition (SI Appendix, Table S10). The ratings in both tasks follow a positively skewed mound-shaped distribution, with a single peak reaching “quite socially inappropriate” (in one case, there is a second mode at a neighboring option, “somewhat socially inappropriate”). However, the peaks are not very high. The modal rating was chosen by 27 to 32% of the participants. Nevertheless, a destructive choice is rated as socially in- appropriate (very, quite, or somewhat) in the majority of cases (75 to 83%). When looking at individual-level distributions of ratings from task 2, we also found that in most cases, they have a single mode (65%) or two modes represented by two neighbor- ing options (21%). Overall, these patterns indicate that most participants believed there was a social norm that the destructive choice is socially inappropriate, but the judgements varied about the precise ex- tent of inappropriateness. Therefore, we used two measures of social norms in the analysis: rating of the appropriateness of the destructive choice on a six-point scale and a binary variable in- dicating whether the destructive choice was rated as socially appropriate or socially inappropriate. The results reinforce the findings from study 1 (Table 2 and SI Appendix, Table S11). When evaluating behavior in an environ- ment without hostile peers, the appropriateness ratings are similar in OTHER and in SAME; if anything, subjects perceived harming in OTHER as more inappropriate than in SAME. Im- portantly, however, in OTHER, the destructive action becomes perceived as less socially inappropriate when it follows peer behavior, whereas the normative judgments are quite stable in SAME (SI Appendix, Table S11). In task 1, an environment with hostile peers made destructive behavior 11 percentage points more likely to be rated as socially appropriate in OTHER (P < 0.01), A B Fig. 1. Susceptibility to follow destructive behavior of peers magnifies when harm targets Roma instead of coethnics. The figure displays the dif- ference (Diff.) in the prevalence of destructive choices in the Joy of De- struction game (JDG) between (b/w) DESTRUCTIVE PEER and PEACEFUL PEER (A), and between DESTRUCTIVE PEER and NO PEER (B). DESTRUCTIVE PEER indicates that all peers (one or two), whose choices a subject observed be- fore making own decision, made a destructive choice. PEACEFUL PEER in- dicates that a decision maker observed at least one nondestructive peer before deciding. NO PEER indicates the choice was made by a first decision maker who did not observe anyone’s choice before deciding. OTHER indi- cates that the experimental counterpart was a member of a different ethnic group (Roma), and SAME indicates that she/he was a coethnic. Bars indicate mean ± SEM. Bauer et al. PNAS | May 8, 2018 | vol. 115 | no. 19 | 4883 EC O N O M IC SC IE N C ES D o w n lo a d e d a t C a rn e g ie M e llo n U n iv e rs ity o n A p ri l 5 , 2 0 2 1 http://www.pnas.org/lookup/suppl/doi:10.1073/pnas.1720317115/-/DCSupplemental http://www.pnas.org/lookup/suppl/doi:10.1073/pnas.1720317115/-/DCSupplemental http://www.pnas.org/lookup/suppl/doi:10.1073/pnas.1720317115/-/DCSupplemental http://www.pnas.org/lookup/suppl/doi:10.1073/pnas.1720317115/-/DCSupplemental http://www.pnas.org/lookup/suppl/doi:10.1073/pnas.1720317115/-/DCSupplemental http://www.pnas.org/lookup/suppl/doi:10.1073/pnas.1720317115/-/DCSupplemental http://www.pnas.org/lookup/suppl/doi:10.1073/pnas.1720317115/-/DCSupplemental http://www.pnas.org/lookup/suppl/doi:10.1073/pnas.1720317115/-/DCSupplemental http://www.pnas.org/lookup/suppl/doi:10.1073/pnas.1720317115/-/DCSupplemental http://www.pnas.org/lookup/suppl/doi:10.1073/pnas.1720317115/-/DCSupplemental http://www.pnas.org/lookup/suppl/doi:10.1073/pnas.1720317115/-/DCSupplemental while the shift was only 5 percentage points in SAME (P = 0.24). In task 2, the differences were 8 percentage points in OTHER (P < 0.001) and 4 percentage points in SAME (P = 0.01). The results are qualitatively similar when we use the measure of appropriateness rating on a scale. Consequently, destructive choices become perceived as less socially inappropriate in OTHER compared with SAME when made after a hostile peer, although for some of the measures, the difference is not statistically significant. Lastly, in a regression analysis (Table 2), we tested whether the sensitivity to social context is significantly higher in OTHER than in SAME. We found that there is a positive interaction effect between OTHER and DESTRUCTIVE PEER on per- ceived appropriateness of destructive behavior measured on a scale (P = 0.07 for task 1 and P = 0.02 for task 2), as well as on the probability that a destructive choice is rated as appropriate (P = 0.16 for task 1 and P = 0.04 for task 2). The results do not change or, if anything, they become stronger when we restrict the sample to subjects who were more likely to believe a social norm existed, in the sense that their distribution of ratings in task 2 had a single mode or two modes represented by two neighboring options (SI Appendix, Table S12). Discussion Our findings provide reasons for optimism and caution at the same time. On the optimistic side, subjects do not discriminate when making choices in an environment in which peers are peaceful, which is an encouraging finding in light of the wide- spread concern about the pervasive nature of ethnic discrimi- nation. On the pessimistic side, however, hostile behavior toward Roma is much more socially contagious than toward coethnics, in line with the view that contextual features may magnify or attenuate biases against outgroup members (19, 28–30). This experiment raises as many questions as it answers. Below, we discuss limitations of our findings and offer some directions for future research. First, this paper studies behavior toward one ethnic group (Roma) among Slavic adolescents in one country. Clearly, more research is needed to explore whether our findings generalize to other settings, especially those with more salient interethnic conflicts. Second, several plausible mechanisms can explain, in princi- ple, the documented differential response to observing peers when the hostile action harms a member of the Roma minority compared with a coethnic. We provide suggestive evidence supporting the interpretation that peer behavior influences perceptions of social norms regulating hostile behavior toward Roma. However, subjects could also take peers’ preferences more into account when the counterpart was Roma, perhaps because of concerns about future out-of-laboratory punishment for not conforming to peer behavior. An interesting open ques- tion is whether patterns of spreading of hostility would be similar in an environment in which the subjects receive information about the choices of anonymous individuals from own ethnic group, instead of directly observing peers with whom they share common fate and with whom they will interact in the future, as in our experiment. Our findings may also be affected by participant’s personal experiences. Ethnic groups often live segregated, as is the case in the setting we study, and interact relatively less frequently with individuals across ethnic lines, potentially leading to less knowledge about the outgroup members, or greater uncertainty about the attitudes of peers toward outgroup members. In such an environment, subjects could learn more from the actions of their peers toward outgroup members than from the same ac- tions toward ingroup members, leading to a differential behav- ioral response. In line with this mechanism, our analysis of beliefs about the behavior of counterparts suggests that subjects held greater suspicion about hostility of Roma (SI Appendix). Future experiments could explore whether our findings also hold in settings in which people live in communities that are more ethnically mixed. Or, researchers could use a similar design to study behavior in minimal groups created in a laboratory, building on refs. 16 and 17, thus eliminating the role of beliefs caused by out-of-laboratory experiences. Ideally, one could le- verage the relative advantages of both approaches by studying natural as well as minimal groups within a single sample (20) to assess whether the susceptibility to follow hostile behavior tar- geting outgroup members is a deep, generalizable response. Taken at face value, our findings can shed light on several important phenomena and can have policy implications. First, they may illuminate why the ethnic hostilities of masses can spread quickly, even in societies in which there are few visible signs of systematic interethnic hatred (2, 3). Second, they may help to explain why “entrepreneurs of hatred” (i.e., individuals who Table 1. The influence of peers on hostile behavior (study 1) Condition Destructive choice in the Joy of Destruction gamea Second and third decision makers Second decision makers Third decision makers OTHER*DESTRUCTIVE PEER 0.35*** 0.32** 0.32** [0.00] [0.02] [0.04] OTHERb −0.08 −0.04 −0.11 [0.19] [0.66] [0.19] DESTRUCTIVE PEERc 0.29*** 0.28** 0.37*** [0.00] [0.01] [0.00] No. of observations 294 146 148 DESTRUCTIVE PEER in OTHER 0.64*** 0.60*** 0.70*** [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] We controlled for gender and school grade. SEs are robust. Because interaction effects cannot be readily interpreted in Probit models, we used the ordinary least-squares estimator in this table, and report the robustness of the results to using the Probit estimator in SI Appendix, Table S4. P values appear in brackets. aThe dependent variable is equal to +1 if a subject chose the destructive option in the Joy of Destruction game. bOTHER indicates that the experimental counterpart was a member of a different ethnic group (Roma), rather than a coethnic. cDESTRUCTIVE PEER indicates that all peers (one or two), whose choices a subject observed before making own decision, made a destructive choice. ***P < 0.01. **P < 0.05. 4884 | www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.1720317115 Bauer et al. D o w n lo a d e d a t C a rn e g ie M e llo n U n iv e rs ity o n A p ri l 5 , 2 0 2 1 http://www.pnas.org/lookup/suppl/doi:10.1073/pnas.1720317115/-/DCSupplemental http://www.pnas.org/lookup/suppl/doi:10.1073/pnas.1720317115/-/DCSupplemental http://www.pnas.org/lookup/suppl/doi:10.1073/pnas.1720317115/-/DCSupplemental www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.1720317115 may benefit from causing social unrest and conflict)—perhaps aware of the inflammability of ethnic hostility—often choose mi- nority groups as targets of their aggressive political campaigns. Third, since ethnic hostility has larger social costs that go beyond the immediate victim by potentially threatening social cohesion, the results can help to explain why many societies have found it desirable to institute hate crime laws. Last, our results suggest that although the readiness to be hostile may be quite latent and thus harmless in peaceful times, it may gain importance when ten- sions arise. Thus, early diagnoses seem of vital importance when fighting ethnic hostility. Materials and Methods Study 1. Sample selection. Study 1 was conducted in Eastern Slovakia in 13 schools in villages and small towns attended predominantly by majority students but located within 5 km from a Roma neighborhood or settlement. The sample consists of 327 majority-ethnicity adolescents, aged 13 to 15 y. Experimental tasks. In the Joy of Destruction game, two players received V2 each and simultaneously chose whether to pay V0.20 to reduce their counterpart’s income by V1 or to keep the payoffs as they were. Participants first made the choice without knowing what the other player did. Sub- sequently, they were also asked to state their beliefs about the decision of the counterpart (using hypothetical questions) and, using the strategy method, to make two conditional decisions—for both possible actions of the counterpart. Subjects also participated in the Prisoner’s Dilemma game, described in SI Appendix. Manipulation 1: Identity of the counterpart. In the SAME condition, the coun- terpart came from the majority group (i.e., was a coethnic), whereas in the OTHER condition, the counterpart was Roma. The two conditions were implemented “within-subject”, in a random order. In both conditions, the counterpart was unknown to the decision maker and came from an un- specified distant school in Eastern Slovakia. To signal ethnicity, we revealed the list of 20 names of potential counterparts (10 male and 10 female names). In SAME, the list contained typical majority names (e.g., Macejko, Poláková) and in OTHER, it contained typical Roma names (e.g., Horváth, Pačanová). To mitigate the experimenter-demand effect that can arise if subjects realize that the aim of the research is to study discrimination, we followed the approach of studies that provided subjects information about the name which strongly signals a given group attribute (12, 31). Nevertheless, such an indirect way of signaling a group attribute may lead to a conservative estimate of discrimination, as compared with using more salient signals, such as direct information about a group attribute (32) or personal contact (33). The names were actual names of students who made choices in the same tasks at the beginning of the data collection. The name lists were read aloud by the experimenter and included on the top of all answer sheets. Manipulation 2: The social context of the decision. Subjects were randomly matched with two other peers from their class and sequentially made the same decision in a randomly determined order. The matching and the order remained the same for both tasks and across SAME and OTHER. Each indi- vidual decision was observed by the other two peers, and all subjects knew this a priori. No communication was allowed. Subjects in the DESTRUCTIVE PEER condition observed one peer who was destructive or two peers who were both destructive, while subjects in PEACEFUL PEER observed one peer who was nondestructive or two peers, one or both of whom were nondestructive. Subjects in NO PEER made their decisions first among the three matched peers. In addition, subjects in the INDIVIDUAL condition decided in isolation, without being observed by classmates and with no information regarding their classmates’ choices (see SI Appendix for analysis). The social context of the decision was thus manipulated “between-subject” and orthogonally to the manipulation of coun-terpart’s ethnicity. Payoffs. In each identity condition (SAME or OTHER), one choice was randomly selected to be payoff relevant. Subjects received rewards in the form of credit to order items from an experimental store, which contained 48 items, ranging from snacks and drinks to stationery. In the conditions in which subjects were matched with two peers, one of the three individual decisions was randomly chosen to be payoff relevant for all three matched peers. Each subject’s payoff was further determined by the choice of an experimental counter- part—that is, a randomly selected person from the name list (SAME or OTHER). For each counterpart from the name lists, only a choice of one subject from the first two schools was consequential for the payoff. Study 2. Sample selection. Social norms were elicited among a different sample of subjects (n = 204) who were in the same age range and came from the same area as the participants in study 1. The data collection took place in three schools. Experimental tasks. The participants were first described the Joy of Destruction game, using the original instructions. Each subject was asked to rate the social appropriateness of a destructive choice on the following scale (converted into Table 2. The influence of peers on the perceptions of social norms (study 2) Condition Rating of appropriateness of destructive choices in the Joy of Destruction gamea Destructive choices rated as appropriate (binary)b All subjects All subjects All estimates Estimates of the modal rating (task 1) Estimates of ratings of 10 other subjects (task 2) All estimates Estimates of the modal rating (task 1) Estimates of ratings of 10 other subjects (task 2) OTHER*DESTRUCTIVE PEER 0.07** 0.10* 0.07** 0.04** 0.06 0.04** [0.01] [0.07] [0.02] [0.03] [0.16] [0.04] OTHERc −0.03** −0.04 −0.03* −0.02* −0.03 −0.02 [0.05] [0.26] [0.05] [0.10] [0.26] [0.11] DESTRUCTIVE PEERd 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.04* 0.05 0.03* [0.29] [1.00] [0.23] [0.07] [0.14] [0.07] No. of observations 8,806 816 7,990 8,806 816 7,990 DESTRUCTIVE PEER in OTHER 0.10*** 0.10** 0.10*** 0.08*** 0.11*** 0.08*** [0.00] [0.03] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] We controlled for gender and school grade. SEs are clustered on a subject level. Ordinary least-squares; P values appear in brackets. aThe dependent variable is the appropriateness rating of destructive choice in the Joy of Destruction game ranging from −1 (very socially inappropriate) to +1 (very socially appropriate). bThe dependent variable is equal to +1 if subjects rated a destructive choice as socially appropriate (somewhat, quite, or very). cOTHER indicates that the experimental counterpart was a member of a different ethnic group (Roma), rather than a coethnic. dDESTRUCTIVE PEER indicates that the destructive choice was made after observing a destructive peer instead of in isolation. ***P < 0.01. **P < 0.05. *P < 0.1. Bauer et al. PNAS | May 8, 2018 | vol. 115 | no. 19 | 4885 EC O N O M IC SC IE N C ES D o w n lo a d e d a t C a rn e g ie M e llo n U n iv e rs ity o n A p ri l 5 , 2 0 2 1 http://www.pnas.org/lookup/suppl/doi:10.1073/pnas.1720317115/-/DCSupplemental http://www.pnas.org/lookup/suppl/doi:10.1073/pnas.1720317115/-/DCSupplemental numerical scores for the analysis): “very socially inappropriate” (−1), “quite socially inappropriate” (−0.6), “somewhat socially inappropriate” (−0.2), “somewhat socially appropriate” (0.2), “quite socially appropriate (0.6), or “very socially appropriate” (+1). In task 1, subjects estimated the modal appropriateness rating of other subjects in their school. In task 2, they es- timated the appropriateness rating in task 1 of 10 randomly selected sub- jects from their school. Subjects were paid according to either task 1 (they received V2.00 if their response matched the modal response in their school) or task 2 (they received V0.40 per each correct guess out of 10). Experimental manipulations. Subjects rated the social appropriateness of a de- structive choice in four situations: the destructive choice was made either in SAME or in OTHER and it was made either in isolation from others without observing a peer (NO PEER) or after observing a destructive peer (DESTRUCTIVE PEER). One randomly chosen situation was payoff relevant. Further information on the methods and the full experimental protocol for study 1 and study 2 are provided in SI Appendix. Research approval. The experiments were approved by the Director of the Institute of Economic Studies at Charles University and by the Dean of the Faculty of Economics, Technical University of Košice. Since the participants were adolescents, they could not provide informed consent themselves. Detailed information about the experiments was provided to the head- masters of all participating schools who gave their approval. In all cases, they also decided that this data collection satisfied the conditions of general in- formed consent regulating participation in research-related data collections, signed by the parents at the beginning of the school year, and thus decided not to seek additional parental consent for this particular data collection. Participation was voluntary and the subjects could leave at any time. All students decided to complete the tasks. Data and code availability. The data and statistical code allowing replication of reported figures and tables are available at Harvard Dataverse (doi:10.7910/ DVN/G651WB). ACKNOWLEDGMENTS. The data collection was funded by the Czech Science Foundation Grant P402/12/G130. Further support was provided by the Czech Science Foundation Grant 17-13869S (to M.B. and J. Chytilová) and the Slo- vak Research and Development Agency Grant APVV-0125-12 (to T.Ž.). 1. Esteban J-M, Ray D (2008) On the salience of ethnic conflict. Am Econ Rev 98: 2185–2202. 2. 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D o w n lo a d e d a t C a rn e g ie M e llo n U n iv e rs ity o n A p ri l 5 , 2 0 2 1 http://www.pnas.org/lookup/suppl/doi:10.1073/pnas.1720317115/-/DCSupplemental http://dx.doi.org/10.7910/DVN/G651WB http://dx.doi.org/10.7910/DVN/G651WB https://sites.duke.edu/rachelkranton/files/2016/09/Moderators-of-Intergroup-Discrimination.pdf https://sites.duke.edu/rachelkranton/files/2016/09/Moderators-of-Intergroup-Discrimination.pdf https://sites.duke.edu/rachelkranton/files/2018/03/groupnotgroupy-march2018final.pdf https://sites.duke.edu/rachelkranton/files/2018/03/groupnotgroupy-march2018final.pdf www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.1720317115 
work_tvr6ng56nvgobnowp2vsrk6hum	----	| 453 PRAVNI ZAPISI, God. X, br. 2 (2019) UDK 342.724(=214.58) © 2019 Pravni fakultet Univerziteta Union doi:10.5937/pravzap0–22012 PREGLEDNI NAUČNI ČLANAK Prof. dr Darko Dimovski* Doc. dr Zdravko Grujić** Prof. dr Miomira Kostić*** ROMI KAO ŽRTVE ZLOČINA MRŽNJE: SAVREMENI KONTEKST SLUČAJ ITALIJE Apstrakt: Zločini mržnje predstavljaju specifičan oblik kriminalnog ponašanja kod kojih mržnja prema određenim grupama predstavlja osnovni motiv njihovog izvrše- nja, odnosno kod kojih predrasuda izvršioca o pripadnosti žrtve određenom kolekti- vitetu i mržnja prema pripadnicima tog kolektiviteta predstavljaju osnov za vršenje inkriminisanog ponašanja (zločina). Proučavanje istorijskog i savremenog konteksta položaja žrtava zločina mržnje nesporno ukazuje na postojanje grupa čiji su inten- zitet viktimiziranosti i vulnerabilnosti izraženiji, a među njima posebno se ističu pripadnici romske populacije. Na početku rada data je društvena i politička poza- dina fenomena zločina mržnje prema Romima, dok je centralni deo rada posvećen analizi položaja Roma žrtava zločina mržnje u današnjoj Evropi – kroz primer sa- vremene Italije. Kroz tekst, autori su prezentovali i načine državne reakcije, kao i reakciju Evropske unije, drugih međunarodnih institucija i organizacija na stanje u Italiji. Na kraju rada, data je analiza uspešnosti mera integracije. Ključne reči: Romi, žrtve, zločini mržnje, viktimološki aspekt. . Uvod Ljudska istorija prožeta je dešavanjima koja bismo modernim rečni- kom nazvali zločini mržnje. Ovakvi zločini ostavili su posledice ne samo po žrtve tih ponašanja već su oblikovali i istoriju pojedinih država. Do- * Vanredni profesor, Pravni fakultet Univerziteta u Nišu e-mail: darko@prafak.ni.ac.rs ** Docent, Pravni fakultet Univerziteta u Prištini sa privremenim sedištem u Kosovskoj Mitrovici e-mail: zdravko.grujic@pr.ac.rs *** Redovni profesor, Pravni fakultet Univerziteta u Nišu e-mail: kosticm@prafak.ni.ac.rs Ovaj rad predstavlja rezultat teorijskog istraživanja na projektu „Zaštita ljudskih i ma- njinskih prava u evropskom pravnom prostoru“ (br. projekta 179046), koji finansira Ministarstvo prosvete, nauke i tehnološkog razvoja Republike Srbije. PRAVNI ZAPISI • Godina X • br. 2 • str. 453–471 454 | voljno je spomenuti progon pripadnika novoosnovane hrišćanske vere od strane Rimljana, zločine prema domorodačkom stanovništvu prilikom ko- lonizacije Amerike, zločine nad Jermenima od strane Turaka, aparthejd u Južnoafričkoj Republici, zločine prema Afroamerikancima itd. Savremena iskustva i empirijska istraživanja ukazuju na posebnu vulnerabilnost odre- đenih naroda (npr. Roma i Jevreja), odnosno manjinskih etničkih zajedni- ca (na teritoriji naseljenoj većinskom etničkom zajednicom), manjinskih verskih zajednica u okruženju dominantne religije (npr. hriščana u mu- slimanskim državama, pripadnika islamske veroispovesti u evropskim dr- žavama ili SAD), pripadnika LGBT ili drugih specifičnih manjinskih ko- lektiviteta u zajednici, određenih grupa korisnika sajber prostora, prema kojima se učestalije vrše zločini motivisani mržnjom. Imajući u vidu navedeno, ovaj rad je posvećen Romima kao specifič- nom kolektivitetu čiji pripadnici su, posmatrano kroz istorijsku prizmu, a i u moderno doba, često žrtve zločina mržnje upravo zbog pripadnosti specifičnom etnosu (urođena viktimogena predispozija) i mržnje koja po- stoji (ili se izaziva) prema Romima kao pripadnicima drugačijeg kolekti- viteta. Utvrđivanje stepena viktimizacije Roma, kroz prizmu događaja u savremenoj Italiji, pretežno u periodu od 2006. godine i uz osvrt na naj- novije događaje, predstavlja argument u prilog osnovnoj tezi da zločini mržnje prema Romima predstavljaju poseban problem koji se pojavljuje u mnogim savremenim krivičnopravnim sistemima. Drugim rečima, analiziranje fenomena zločina mržnje čije su žrtve Romi kao kolektivitet zahteva specifičan pristup, u našem slučaju – anali- zu položaja, viktimiziranosti i društvene reakcije na zločine mržnje čije su žrtve Romi u savremenoj Italiji, kako bi se kroz italijanski primer potvr- dila neophodnost promene načina reagovanja na viktimizaciju Roma kao žrtava zločina mržnje na širem geografskom prostoru i prema manjinskim kolektivitetima na globalnom nivou. . Društvena i politika pozadina zloina mržnje prema Romima u Italiji Društveni položaj Roma u Italiji najbolje se može sagledati na osnovu stope nezaposlenosti. Naime, prema istraživanju sprovedenom od strane Agencije Evropske unije za osnovna prava (European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights) tokom 2011. godine na nivou jedanaest država čla- nica EU (Italija, Češka, Francuska, Grčka, Mađarska, Poljska, Portugalija, Rumunija, Slovačka i Španija) ustanovljeno je da je stopa nezaposleno- sti Roma tri puta viša u odnosu na stopu nezaposlenosti neromskog sta- novništva. Stopa nezaposlenosti Roma u Italiji iznosi preko 30%, što je Darko Dimovski, Zdravko Grujić, Miomira Kostić, Romi kao žrtve zločina mržnje | 455 manje u odnosu na stopu nezaposlenosti Roma u Portugaliji (53%), ali i više u odnosu na stopu nezaposlenosti Roma u Grčkoj ili Francuskoj (oko 25%).1 Ujedno, istraživanjem se došlo do rezultata da je veliki procenat pripadnika romske populacije diskriminisan kada traži posao. Tako se, na primer, 66% pripadnika romske populacije izjasnilo da je diskriminisano, što je posle Češke (74%) i Grčke (68%) najveći procenat diskriminacije u odnosu na ostale zemlje iz istraživanja.2 Ulaskom Rumunije u Evropsku uniju 1. januara 2007. godine, svi njeni građani su stekli pravo na slobodu kretanja u državama Evropske unije, te je veliki broj Roma, državljana Rumunije, emigrirao u Italiju.3 Povećanje obima kriminaliteta tokom 2006. i 2007. godine u Italiji mnogi nacionalni i lokalni politički lideri objašnjavali su činjenicom nekontroli- sanog ulaska emigranata u Italiju, za koje su isticali da su krivi za poveća- nje broja izvršenih krivičnih dela.4 Najveći broj migranata su bili pripad- nici upravo romske populacije iz Rumunije. Predrasude prema Romima su se povećale usled neodgovarajuće retorike političara, što je ugrozilo ne samo novopridošle Rome već i pripadnike ove manjine koji su italijanski državljani. Osoba koja se najviše isticala u debatama protiv Roma je ta- dašnji prefekt Rima Karlo Moska, u čijim govorima je bilo moguće čuti izjave poput – neophodnosti zauzimanja tvrdog stava prema ovim zveri- ma, mislivši pri tome na Rome. Gradonačelnik Rima Valter Veltroni imao je slične stavove i smatrao je da je Rim pre dolaska Roma iz Rumunije bio najbezbedniji grad na svetu, te da su Romi doprineli znatnom porastu stope kriminaliteta.5 Kako bi rešili problem sve većeg porasta kriminaliteta, političari su želeli da rasture privremena naselja u kojima žive Romi, uz njihovu de- portaciju. Stoga su gradonačelnici Rima i Milana maja 2007. godine pot- pisali tzv. Bezbednosne pakete (Security Pacts) koji su predviđali prinudno 1 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2014, Roma survey – Data in fo- cus Poverty and employment: the situation of Roma in 11 EU Member States, Luxem- bourg, Publications Office of the European Union, p. 22. 2 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2014, p. 28. 3 Procenjuje se da u Italiji živi između 120.000 i 150.000 Roma od čega oko 60% čine italijanski državljani, dok preostalih 40% čine pripadnici romske populacije koji su migrirali sa područja Balkana, i sve većim brojem Roma koji su migrirali iz Rumuni- je. Vid.: Council of Europe, European Commission against Racism and Intolerance, Third Report on Italy adopted on 16 December 2005, Strasbourg, 2016, p. 23, f. 39. (https://rm.coe.int/third-report-on-italy/16808b5831, 12.11.2019). 4 Trend opadanja stope kriminaliteta karakterističan je za Italiju od 1995. godine, sa izuzetkom 1998, 2006, 2007. i 2011. godine. Italy Crime Rate & Statistics 1995–2019, (https://www.macrotrends.net/countries/ITA/italy/ crime-rate-statistics, 12.11.2019). 5 Violence against Roma, Human Rights First, New York, 2008, pp. 5–6, (https://www. humanrightsfirst.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/fd-080924-roma-web.pdf, 4.8.2017). PRAVNI ZAPISI • Godina X • br. 2 • str. 453–471 456 | iseljenje 10.000 Roma.6 Ovakav čin imao je za rezultat uništavanje rom- skih naselja uz primenu sile, bez prethodnog upozorenja, bilo kakve kom- penzacije i obezbeđivanja alternativnog smeštaja. Neprijateljska atmosfera dovodi do nasilja prema Romima oktobra 2007. godine, a kao povod se ističe ubistvo 47-godišnje žene, navodno od strane rumunskog migranta romskog porekla.7 Kao odgovor na ovaj zločin predsednik Italije je 1. no- vembra 2007. godine potpisao uredbu na osnovu koje je moguće sprovesti sumarno proterivanje iz razloga javne bezbednosti.8 Ova uredba, očigled- no suprotna Direktivi Evropske komisije 2004/38/EZ o pravu građana EU i njihovih porodica da se slobodno kreću i borave u EU,9 bila je direktno uperena prema Romima. Za samo dve nedelje posle njenog donošenja, proterano je 117 pripadnika romske nacionalnosti. . Pojedinani sluajevi ispoljavanja zloina mržnje i državna reakcija Navedeno postupanje vlasti, u kontekstu društvene i političke po- zadine, dovelo je do brojnih primera ispoljavanja zločina mržnje prema Romima, sa neadekvatnom državnom reakcijom. Romi su bili prisilja- vani da napuste svoja naselja, ne samo zbog ponašanja svojih sugrađa- na već zbog politike same države, što sve svedoči o sistematskoj politici netrpeljivosti prema Romima. Jedan od brojnih zločina mržnje prema Romima dogodio se novembra 2007. godine, pri čemu je napad pokre- nut kao reakcija na ubistvo, navodno izvršeno od strane Roma. Tada su ozbiljno povređena tri Roma od strane osam napadača uz upotrebu me- talnih šipki i noževa. Već narednog dana je drugo privremeno naselje bilo razrušeno od strane gradske uprave.10 Tako je, na primer, i u Ponti- 6 Security Pacts iz 2007. godine podrazumevao je potpisivanje sporazuma između Mi- nistarstva unutrašnjih poslova i lokalnih samouprava u cilju povećanja stepena bez- bednosti u gradskim sredinama (do 2009. zaključen je 51 sporazum). Calaresu, M., Tebaldi, M., 2015, Local security policies and protection of territory: an analysis of the Italian experience (2007–2009), City, Territory and Architecture, December, 2:1, (https://doi.org/10.1186/s40410–014–0017-y, 12.11.2019). 7 Violence against Roma, Human Rights First, New York, 2008, pp. 5–6. 8 True Europeans: The Roma and the Creation of a European Identity (http://cdn. nycitynewsservice.com/blogs.dir/549/files/2013/04/True-Europeans-The-Roma-and- the-Creation-of-a-European-Identity.pdf, 5.8.2017). 9 Directive 2004/38/EC of the EP and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, Official Journal of the European Communities L 158/77. 10 Violence against Roma, 2008, pp. 5–6. Darko Dimovski, Zdravko Grujić, Miomira Kostić, Romi kao žrtve zločina mržnje | 457 čeli izvršen napad Molotovljevim koktelima na romski kamp, pri čemu je naselje u potpunosti uništeno.11 Maja 2008. godine, novoizabrani ministar unutrašnjih poslova Ro- berto Maroni istakao je da će svi romski kampovi biti iseljeni. Istog dana bačen je Molotovljev koktel na romski kamp Via Novari u blizini Milana, a dva dana kasnije desio se sličan napad u regionu Napulja. Većina od 800 Roma je napustila kamp nakon ovog napada, a narednog dana je po- novljen napad na isti kamp radi proterivanja preostalih Roma. Sve ovo se dešavalo u prisustvu građana koji su svemu aplaudirali i policije koja nije reagovala. Ministar unutrašnjih poslova je opravdao napade na Rome re- čima da se to događa zbog toga što „Cigani kradu bebe ili čine seksualne delikte“.12 Slična opravdanja za izvršene zločine mržnje imao je Umberto Bosi, član Vlade i predsednik esktremističke partije Severna liga, koji je smatrao da građani rade samo ono što država treba da radi.13 Novi parlamentarni izbori primorali su Silvija Berluskonija i njegove koalicione partnere da predstave u toku izborne kampanje tzv. bezbedno- sni paket. Ovaj paket je obuhvatao plan za uklanjane romskih kampova, imenovanje posebnih komesara u čijoj je nadležnosti bavljenje problemi- ma Roma u Rimu, Napulju i Milanu i sumarnu deportaciju Roma koji ne mogu dokazati da imaju posao ili prihode iznad određenog iznosa.14 Tomas Hamarberg, komesar Saveta Evrope za ljudska prava, kritikovao je Berluskonijev plan, istakavši pri tome da hapšenja treba da budu uprav- ljena prema kriminalcima, a ne prema migrantima, posebno Romima.15 Ujedno, ispravno je zaključio da se ne može cela romska zajednica u Italiji smatrati odgovornom za krivična dela koja su počinjena od strane nekoli- cine Roma.16 Bez obzira na kritike, italijanska vlada je 21. maja 2008. godi- ne izdala dekret na osnovu kojeg je proglasila vanredno stanje na period od godinu dana u odnosu na nomadska naselja u regionima Kampanija, Lacio 11 Sustainable Policies for Roma and Sinti Integration: Final Report, Organization for Cooperation and Security in Europe, 2008, Vienna, p. 4, (http://www.osce.org/docu- ments/odihr/2008/, 9.8.2017). 12 Respect a right to protest, (http://www.crin.org/en/docs/SECURITYALAITALIANA. pdf, 6.8.2017). 13 Italy’s right targets Gypsies, migrants (http://articles.latimes.com/2008/may/24/ world/fg-right24, 6.8.2017). 14 Italy’s right targets Gypsies, migrants. 15 Garbage and Immigrants, Berlusconi Pulls out the Mop (http://www.spiegel.de/inter- national/europe/garbage-and-immigrants-berlusconi-pulls-out-the-mop-a-554760. html, 7.8.2017). 16 Europe’s Shame, (http://www.tol.org/client/article/19815-europes-shame.html, 7.8.2017). PRAVNI ZAPISI • Godina X • br. 2 • str. 453–471 458 | i Lombardija.17 Kao pravni osnov za donošenje ovog dekreta, koji je poznat pod nazivom Nomad Emergency ili Security Package, poslužio je zakonski tekst iz 1992. godine koji daje pravo vladi da proglasi vanredno stanje u slučaju prirodnih katastrofa ili drugih događaja za koje je neophodno, zbog njihovog intenziteta i obima, koristiti vanrednu moć i sredstva. Ujedno, došlo je do inkriminacije novog krivičnog dela pod nazivom ilegalni ulazak i ostanak na teritoriji države koje se kažnjava novčanom kaznom od 5.000 do 10.000 evra. Ovo krivično delo može biti izvršeno samo od strane osoba koje nemaju italijansko državljanstvo i za njega je predviđen sumarni postupak.18 Premijer Italije Silvio Berluskoni je 30. maja 2008. godine imenovao prefekte za Rim, Milano i Napulj sa ovlašćenjima da realiziju mere potreb- ne za prevazilaženje vanrednog stanja. Mere su se ogledale u koracima za identifikaciju stanovnika romskih kampova, čak i uzimanjem otisaka prstiju, njihovim iseljenjem i deportacijom iz pomenutih kampova.19 O opštem stavu stanovništva o ovom pitanju svedoči i jedna anketa koja je pokazala da je 70% Italijana želelo da Romi i drugi nepoželjni emigranti budu proterani iz zemlje. Ujedno, popularnost političara koji su zastupa- li politiku deportacije Roma je porasla. Tadašnji premijer Berluskoni je, kako su pokazala istraživanja, imao popularnost od 50%, dok je ministar unutrašnjih poslova Roberto Maroni uživao poverenje 60% ispitanika. Gradonačelnik Rima Alemano za svoju politiku deportacije Roma van grada dobio je mnogo pohvala.20 Nivo mržnje prema Romima se može iskazati i činjenicom da su neki roditelji vodili svoju decu, starosti između 9 i 11 godina, da učestvuju u napadima na romske kampove u mestu San Đuzepe Bosko. Deca u ovom mestu su u školi dobila zadatak da napišu esej ili nacrtaju kako su se ose- ćala u vezi sa progonom Roma, od kojih su mnoga opisala ili nacrtala podmetanje požara. Italijanska policija je 6. juna 2008. godine ušla u romski kamp Via Impastato kako bi fotografisala lične karte žitelja. Svrha cele operacije je 17 Assessment of the human rights situation of Roma and Sinti in Italy, Office for De- mocratic Institutions and Human Rights, Warsaw, 2009, p. 6. (http://www.osce.org/ odihr/36374?download=true, 7.8.2017). 18 Glavni pretres počinjao je u roku od 15 dana, pri čemu je okrivljeni mogao da traži do- datnih sedam dana za pripremu odbrane. U slučaju da je određen pritvor, postojala je još veća potreba za sumarnošću, te je suđenje počinjalo odmah, a optuženi nisu imali više od 48 sati za pripremu. Italy – Briefing to the UN Committee on the eliminati- on of racial discrimination, Amnesty International, London, 2012. pp. 20–22, (http:// www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cerd/ docs/ngos/AI_Italy_CERD80.pdf, 19.8.2017). 19 Assessment of the human rights situation of Roma and Sinti in Italy. 20 Scicluna, H., 2008, The Life and Death of Roma and Sinti in Italy: A Modern Trage- dy, Roma Rights Journal, 2, p. 21. Darko Dimovski, Zdravko Grujić, Miomira Kostić, Romi kao žrtve zločina mržnje | 459 očigledno bila stvaranje etničke baze podataka, jer su lični podaci već bili prikupljeni prilikom vađenja ličnih karata. Ova akcija je podsetila neke pripadnike Roma, koji su preživeli slično ponašanje italijanskih vlasti za vreme Musolinija, na sve užase iz Drugog svetskog rata.21 Pored rasističke politike italijanske vlade, nastavili su se zločini mr- žnje prema Romima. Naredni napad se vezuje za davljenje dveju romskih devojaka početkom jula 2008. godine na plaži u Napulju. Očigledno je bilo da nisu krenule na kupanje, jer su izvađene iz mora potpuno obučene. Ravnodušnost italijanske javnosti ogledala se u tome da su tela devojaka ostavljena na plaži, pri čemu su se ostali posetioci plaže mirno sunčali i odmarali pored dveju mrtvih Romkinja. Napadi Molotovljem kokteli- ma nastavljeni su tokom septembra, kada je romski kamp blizu Padove spaljen, pri čemu su živote izgubile dve osobe.22 Za sva izvršena krivična dela, koja se mogu kvalifikovati kao zločin mržnje, nije uhapšen nijedan osumnjičeni, dok su se dešavale bizarne situacije da žrtve ovog oblika kri- minaliteta nasilja budu lišene slobode.23 Ministarstvo unutrašnjih poslova nastavilo je da prednjači u rešavanju tzv. „ciganskog pitanja“, pa je zajedno sa prefektima Rima, Napulja i Mila- na, predstavnicima Ministarstva obrazovanja i prvim čovekom UNICEF-a za Italiju, 2008. godine, odlučeno da se u roku od mesec dana reše pita- nja nelegalnih romskih kampova, školovanja romske dece i zapošljavanja Roma. Međutim, umesto iznalaženja adekvatnog smeštaja, rimski zvanič- nici su insistirali da smeštaj za iseljene Rome bude udaljen od naseljenih oblasti, sa policijskim službenicima na ulazu i kamerama kako bi se pratila dešavanja unutar naselja. Dozvola za boravište u novom naselju bi se iz- davala pojedinačno i trajala bi tri godine, nakon čega bi i dalje postojala mogućnost da dato lice postane beskućnik ukoliko ne reguliše svoj status.24 . Reakcija Evropske unije, drugih meunarodnih institucija i organizacija na stanje u Italiji Težnja italijanskih vlasti da uzme otiske prstiju svim Romima, kako bi navodno utvrdila njihov broj, dovela je do reakcije nadležnih organa Evropske unije, ali su reakcije zvaničnika Evropske unije bile vrlo disku- tabilne. Evropski komesar za pravo i ljudske slobode Franko Fratini, po- 21 Ohrabren uspehom ove policijske akcije, ministar unutrašnjih poslova Maroni je pla- nirao uzimanje otisaka prstiju svim pripadnicima romske populacije bez obzira na godine starosti. Scicluna, H., 2008, p. 23. 22 Scicluna, H., 2008, pp. 25–26. 23 Scicluna, H., 2008. 24 Scicluna, H., 2008, p. 28. PRAVNI ZAPISI • Godina X • br. 2 • str. 453–471 460 | reklom Italijan, 2007. godine dao je izjavu koja ima dodirnih tačaka sa cinizmom: „Ono što se mora uraditi je veoma jednostavno,“ istakao je Fratini. „Treba ući u romske kampove, na primer u Rimu, i pitati Rome od čega žive. Ukoliko ne znaju da objasne od čega žive, treba ih deportovati nazad u Rumuniju. Upravo tako funkcionišu direktive Evropske unije.“25 Evropski parlament je istog dana osudio mere preduzete od strane Italije koje se tiču Roma, sa pozivom da se prestane sa praksom uzimanja otisaka od pripadnika Roma bez obzira na godine starosti. Bilo je jasno da su naročito bila ugrožena prava romske dece, jer su ovim putem deca eti- ketirana kao kriminalci, pri čemu su se te aktivnosti italijanskih zvanični- ka navodno preduzimale u ime njihove zaštite.26 Ujedno, Vladimir Spid- la, komesar Evropske unije za unutrašnje poslove, u svom govoru pred Evropskim parlamentom istakao je da Romi moraju da imaju iste slobode i prava kao svi drugi. Kako su građani Evropske unije, oni ne smeju biti diskriminisani.27 Na mere italijanske vlade reagovale su i druge međunarodne insti- tucije, poput Službe za demokratske institucije i ljudska prava (Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights – ODIHR) Organizacije za evropsku bezbednost i saradnju. Direktor ODIHR-a Kristijan Strohal je u svom saopštenju istakao da razume frustraciju italijanskih vlasti u pogle- du visoke stope kriminaliteta, ali da to ne treba da služi kao izgovor za sti- gmatizaciju Roma i drugih emigranata jer „ona dovodi da porasta tenzija i do povećavanja mogućnosti za izvršenje krivičnih dela“.28 Međunarodna organizacija Amnesty International kritikovala je re- šenja predviđena Bezbednosnim paketom i predložila ukidanje krivičnog dela „ilegalni ulazak i ostanak na teritoriji države“, kao i obavezu poka- zivanja dozvole za boravak kada se prijavljuje rođenje deteta u matičnu knjigu rođenih i obavezu agencija za transfer novca da prijavljuju ilegalne migrante.29 Da Savet Evrope ne odobrava put kojim je krenula Italija, bilo je ja- sno na osnovu memoranduma koji je sastavio Tomas Hamarberg nakon 25 „To je tako jednostavno i bezbedno. S druge strane, Rumunija ne može odbiti njihov povratak, jer kao članici Evropske unije, to je njena obaveza”. Scicluna, H., Op. cit., p. 16. 26 Evropski parlament je, istovremeno, zaključio da je izjava Franka Fratinija u suprot- nosti sa duhom Direktive Evropske komisije 2004/38/EZ o pravu građana EU i njiho- vih porodica da se slobodno kreću i borave u EU. Scicluna, H., 2008, p. 16. 27 Scicluna, H., 2008, p. 21. 28 OSCE human rights body concerned about anti-Roma violence in Italy (http://www. osce.org/odihr/49716, 8.8. 2017). 29 Italy – Briefing to the UN Committee on the elimination of racial discrimination, Amnesty International, London, 2012, pp. 22–24, (http://www2.ohchr.org/english/ bodies/cerd/docs/ngos/AI_Italy_CERD80.pdf, 19.8.2017). Darko Dimovski, Zdravko Grujić, Miomira Kostić, Romi kao žrtve zločina mržnje | 461 posete Italiji. Komesar je, između ostalog, istakao da je prinudno iseljenje iz romskih kampova moguće vršiti samo ukoliko je pre toga obezbeđen odgovarajući smeštaj.30 Uputstvo ministra unutrašnjih poslova po kojem je neophodno uzeti otiske prstiju svim osobama starijim od 14 godina, koje žive u nomadskim kampovima,31 izazvalo je novi talas reakcija međunarodnih organizacija. Ovog puta reagovao je Vinčenco Spadafora, predsednik UNICEF-a za Ita- liju, koji je povukao paralelu sa potezima nemačke vlade iz 1926. godi- ne kada je stvorena obaveza uzimanja otisaka prstiju i fotografisanja svih Roma, uključujući i decu stariju od šest meseci.32 Istovremeno je reagovao i generalni sekretar Saveta Evrope Teri Devis, koji je izneo svoju zabrinu- tost da pojedini članovi Vlade Italije iznose diskutabilne predloge, iako je Italija jedna od osnivača Saveta Evrope.33 Evropski parlament je bio primoran da reaguje novom Rezolucijom o prostoru i sigurnosti od 10. jula 2008. godine u kojoj je osudio uzimanje otisaka prstiju Roma kao direktnu diskriminaciju baziranu na etničkom i rasnom poreklu. Ujedno, naloženo je Evropskoj komisiji da proveri da li italijanska vlada krši pravne tekovine Evropske unije.34 Žak Baro, potpredsednik Evropske komisije i komesar za pravo, slo- bodu i bezbednost, 2008. godine je dao izjavu u kojoj je doveo u sum- nju saglasnost Bezbednosnog paketa sa pravom Evropske unije jer je kao osnov za proterivanje Roma primenjena odredba Bezbednosnog paketa po kojoj svi oni bez sopstvenih prihoda ili sa kriminalnim dosijeom, bez obzira na to što su građani država Evropske unije, mogu biti proterani. Pr- 30 Italijanska vlada je na Memorandum neadekvatno reagovala, na osnovu čega se mo- glo zaključiti da ona ne može ili ne želi da razume greške u politici prema Romima jer, iako niko ne spori da je potrebno regulisati problem krađa, prosjačenja i ilegalnih kampova, nije ponudila alternativno rešenje za politiku koja je doživela brojne kritike od strane relevantnih domaćih i stranih organizacija koje se bave ljudskim pravima. Memorandum by Thomas Hammarberg Commissioner for Human Rights of the Co- uncil of Europe, 2008, (http://rm.coe.int/16806db88f, 12.8.2017). 31 Deprez, G., 2008, Annex I and Annex II: the Draft Report of the LIBE Delegation to Italy on September 18th and 19th (‘nomad camps’ emergency), European Parliament, London, p. 7. (http://www.statewatch.org/news/2008/nov/ep-libe-visit-to-italy- annexes.pdf, 13.8.2017). 32 Council of Europe Blasts Italy over Roma Fingerprinting, Euractiv, 2008, (http:// www.euractiv.com/en/mobility/council-europe-blasts-italy-roma-fingerprinting/ar- ticle-173775?Ref=RSS, 13.8.2017). 33 Ferreira, N., Kostakopoulou, D., Bradshaw, J., Gola, S., 2016, The Human Face of the European Union: Are EU Law and Policy Humane Enough?, Cambridge, Cambrigde University Press, p. 210. 34 Stewart, M., Rovid, M., 2011, Multi-Disciplinary Approaches to Romany Studies, Bu- dapest, Central European University Press, p. 211. PRAVNI ZAPISI • Godina X • br. 2 • str. 453–471 462 | vobitno je za ilegalne migrante bila predviđena kazna zatvora od šest me- seci do četiri godine, pri čemu njhova imovina može biti konfiskovana.35 Evropska komisija protiv rasizma i netolerancije (ECRI), kao jedin- stveno telo Saveta Evrope za monitoring ljudskih prava specijalizovano za pitanja koja se odnose na borbu protiv rasizma, diskriminacije, ksenofo- bije, antisemitizma i netolerancije u Evropi, obavila je pet ciklusa monito- ringa stanja u Italiji, o čemu je sačinila i predstavila izveštaje. U Trećem izveštaju o Italiji, koji je usvojen 16. decembra 2005. go- dine, ECRI konstatuje da je i nakon preporuka iz prethodnog izveštaja „upotreba rasističkog i ksenofobičnog diskursa u politici intenzivirala je i ciljana je prema građanima koji nisu iz zemalja članica EU – Romima i muslimanima. Pripadnici ovih grupa doživljavaju predrasude i diskri- minaciju u širokom spektru oblasti. Imigracioni zakoni učinili su njihov položaj još nesigurnijim, a primena zakona, posebno u pogledu imigra- nata bez pravnog statusa, dovela je do izloženosti tih lica većem riziku od kršenja ljudskih prava.“ U preporukama se, između ostalog, Italija poziva da uspostavi „sveobuhvatnu politiku na nacionalnom nivou za rešavanje situacije marginalizacije i diskriminacije romskog stanovništva i da u tom cilju uspostavi i efikasan koordinacioni mehanizam na nacionalnom ni- vou [...] da dugoročni cilj stambene politike bude uklanjanje ‘nomadskih kampova’ [...] da se omogući izdavanje pasoša i dozvola boravka Romi- ma [...] omogući redovno školovanje romske dece [...] da hitno preduzme mere za poboljšanje položaja Roma u drugim oblastima, uključujući zapo- šljavanje, zdravstvo, odnose sa policijom [...] da omogući pristup pravdi i uklanja predrasude o Romima.“36 U Izveštaju ECRI o stanju u Italiji nakon četvrtog ciklusa monitorin- ga iz 2011. godine konstatuje se napredak u mnogim oblastima i navo- di se, između ostalog, da je „antidiskriminaciono zakonodavstvo ojača- no i da vlasti ulažu napore u poboljšanju rada na prikupljanju podataka u pogledu rasističkih dela, da je Nacionalna kancelarija za borbu protiv diskriminacije (UNAR – Ufficio Nazionale Antidiscriminazioni Razziali) značajno proširila svoje aktivnosti i time poništila brojne diskriminacione mere koje su primenjivali organi javne vlasti, da su novinari usvojili Ko- deks („Rimska povelja“) sa ciljem da se što objektivnije medijski tretiraju 35 Brisel je smatrao da pravo EU ne predviđa nepostojanje dohotka, odnosno postoja- nje kriminalnog dosijea kao osnova za proterivanje osoba iz jedne u drugu državu Evropske unije, te je, pod pritiskom EU, Italija uklonila odredbu iz svog bezbedno- snog paketa u vezi sa osnovima za proterivanje. Videti: Italy risks legal battle over expulsion of EU citizens (https://euobserver.com/justice/26797, 17.8.2017). 36 Council of Europe, European Commission against Racism and Intolerance, Third Report on Italy, pp. 4, 25. Darko Dimovski, Zdravko Grujić, Miomira Kostić, Romi kao žrtve zločina mržnje | 463 pitanja koja se tiču azilanata, izbeglica, žrtava trgovine ljudima i migrana- ta, da su usvojeni zakoni koji su usmereni na sprečavanje rasno motivisa- nih i nasilnih radnji na sportskim događajima i da predviđaju pooštrene kazne za takva dela“. Međutim, istovremeno, u Izveštaju se navodi da raste zabrinutost po mnogim pitanjima. Tako se naglašava da je „paralelno sa pooštravanjem kazni za krivična dela izvršena iz mržnje, usvojena restrik- tivna definicija ovih dela, čime se umanjio opseg zakona, tako da mali broj žrtava rasističkih dela ili žrtava rasne diskriminacije podnosi prija- ve, zbog čega se odredbe krivičnog zakona protiv rasizma i diskriminacije retko primenjuju u praksi.“ Upotreba rasističkog i ksenofobičnog diskursa u politici raste i targetira crnce, Afrikance, muslimane, Rome, Rumune, azilante i migrante, prati akte nasilja nad tim grupama, podstiče se rasna diskriminacija, ksenofobija i rasizam kod stanovništva i uglavnom se daje legitimitet ovim pojavama [...] senzacionalistički medijski sadržaji i dalje se pojavljuju u medijima i mnoge internet stranice sadrže poruke o rasnoj mržnji, pa čak i podsticanju na rasističko nasilje. U izveštaju se navodi i da „većina Roma doživljava ozbiljnu marginalizaciju i diskriminaciju, bilo da se radi o pristupu stanovanju ili drugim socijalnim pravima kao što su obrazovanje, zapošljavanje ili zdravstvo. Opšta klima u vezi sa Romima je snažno negativna: predrasude koje postoje prema njima ponekad se odra- žavaju ili pojačavaju stavovima političara ili sprovođenjem njihove politi- ke. ’Hitne’ mere preduzete u kontekstu ’bezbednosnog pakta’ koje ciljaju Rome ili ’nomade’ korišćene su na diskriminatorski način.“ U Izveštaju se, između ostalog, vlastima Italije preporučuje da procene efikasnost važećih odredaba krivičnog zakona protiv podsticanja na mržnju i da ih pooštre i da usvoje dodatne odredbe građanskih zakona protiv rasne diskrimi- nacije, kao i da intenziviraju svoje napore da informišu žrtve o važećim odredbama i da sprovedu obuke uključene u sistem krivičnog pravosuđa o potrebi stroge primene zakonskih odredaba.37 ECRI u Izveštaju o Italiji nakon petog ciklusa monitoringa iz 2016. godine38 konstatuje da postoji napredak po određenim pitanjima, kao što su usvajanje nacrta zakona o ratifikaciji, Protokola br. 12 uz Evrop- sku konvenciju o ljudskim pravima i dodatnog protokola uz Konvenciju o kompjuterskom kriminalitetu, propisivanje oštrijih kazni za negiranje Holokausta, uvođenje homofobije kao okolnosti koja se uzima u obzir prilikom odmeravanja kazni, procesuiranje govora mržnje, usvajanje no- 37 ECRI Report on Italy (Fourth monitoring cycle), adopted on 6 December 2011, Strasbourg 2012, pp. 5–6, (https://rm.coe.int/fourth-report-on-italy/16808b5834, 12.11.2019). 38 ECRI Report on Italy (Fifth Monitoring cycle), adopted on 18 March 2015, Strasbourg 2016, (https://rm.coe.int/fifth-report-on-italy/16808b5837, 12.11.2019). PRAVNI ZAPISI • Godina X • br. 2 • str. 453–471 464 | vog akcionog plana protiv rasizma, ksenofobije i netolerancije, kao i osni- vanje Opservatorije za zaštitu od diskriminatorskih dela (OSCAD), kao praktične mere za olakšavanje prijavljivanja zločina mržnje i komunika- cije između policije i žrtava ovih zločina. Međutim, u brojnim pitanjima ponovo se izražava zabrinutost. Tako se navodi da zakonodavstvo i dalje ne kriminalizuje diskriminaciju po osnovu boje ili jezika, da propisane ka- zne nisu uvek efikasan, proporcionalan i odvraćajući odgovor na krivična dela koja podrazumevaju rasizam i rasnu diskriminaciju. Konstatuje se da rad UNAR-a nije zasnovan na principu nezavisnosti i, u stvarnosti, nema adekvatnu moć u suprotstavljanju rasizmu i ksenofobiji, kao i da vlasti ne prikupljaju podatke o govoru mržnje i drugim incidentima i delima pove- zanim sa mržnjom na sistematski i koherentan način. Posebno se ističe da se kasni sa primenom Nacionalne strategije za integraciju Roma iz 2012. godine i da se nastavlja sa prinudnim iseljavanjem Roma iz nelegalnih na- selja, u određenim slučajevima čak i bez rešavanja pitanja njihovog bu- dućeg smeštaja. U izveštaju se vlastima Italije preporučuje, između osta- log, da procene efikasnost odredaba za suzbijanje širenja rasističkih ideja i podsticanje na vršenje diskriminatorskih zločina motivisanih mržnjom i propišu kazne koje bi bile efikasne, srazmerne i odvraćajuće, kao i da inkriminišu javne uvrede i klevete ili pretnje osobi ili grupama ljudi na osnovu njihove rase, boje, jezika, vere, nacionalnog ili etničkog porekla. Takođe se navodi da, zarad integracije Roma, treba završiti „prikupljanje statističkih podataka u svim oblastima kako bi se mogao uspostaviti pri- oritet za implementaciju Nacionalne strategije za integraciju Roma i iz- vršiti prilagođavanje ciljeva koje treba postići, kompletirati uspostavljanje regionalnih radnih grupa, kao i izdvajanja posebnih sredstava za izvršenje, koordinaciju, praćenje i evaluaciju Strategije“, kao i da se problem držav- ljanstva reši tako što će vlasti „doneti novi zakon ili reformisati postojeći Zakon o pristupu državljanstvu, tako da se ne može desiti da bilo koje dete rođeno u Italiji bude dete bez državljanstva.“ . Analiza uspešnosti mera intergacije – realno stanje i promene u normativnoj sferi O uspešnosti mera za integraciju, kritika i preporuka Evropske ko- misije protiv rasizma i netolerancije Saveta Evrope, preporuka i izveštaja Evropske unije i drugih značajnih međunarodnih organizacija i institucija povodom položaja Roma u Italiji, može se konstatovati da postoji nesklad između promena u normativnoj sferi i realnog stanja, odnosno stepena viktimiziranosti romske populacije zločinima mržnje. Darko Dimovski, Zdravko Grujić, Miomira Kostić, Romi kao žrtve zločina mržnje | 465 Naime, ukoliko se analizira broj prijavljenih zločina mržnje čije su žrtve bili Romi od 2006. godine, uz sve nedostatke metodoloških postu- paka za prikupljanje i prikazivanje ovih podataka i pretpostavljenu veli- ku tamnu brojku, nesporan je trend rasta. Osim 2010. godine, u kojoj se konstatuje pad broja prijavljenih dela, kada je bilo 56 krivičnih dela u čijoj osnovi je predrasuda, u odnosu na 2009. godinu, tokom koje su izvršena 134 zločina mržnje, trend porasta je evidentan. Tako je već 2011. godine bilo izvršeno 68 zločina mržnje, dok je naredne godine taj broj iznosio 71. Drastičan porast broja izvršenih ovih krivičnih dela zabeležen je 2013. godine kada je bilo 472 zločina mržnje. Broj ovih zločina tokom 2014. go- dine iznosio je 596, pri čemu je 2015. godine zabeležen blagi pad na 555. Analizom podataka o motivaciji možemo uočiti da je najveći broj zločina mržnje upravljen prema Romima. U 2015. godini, od prijavljenih 555 zlo- čina, 369 je bilo usmereno prema Romima i drugim migrantima.39 Analiza najnovijih podataka o zločinima mržnje, koje je prikupila po- licija, pokazuje da je broj prijavljenih dela poslednjih godina u značajnom porastu.40 Tako je od 2009. do 2012. godine prijavljivano oko 100 zločina godišnje, dok je 2017. godine prijavljeno 1.048 zločina mržnje, odnosno desetostruko više. Istovremeno, podaci za 2017. godinu ukazuju na to da su prema motivaciji zločini mržnje najčešće vršeni iz rasizma i ksenofobije (828), a da se znatno ređe javljaju prema osobama sa invaliditetom (157) ili zbog predrasuda o polu ili seksualnoj orijentaciji (63).41 Ukoliko položaj Roma posmatramo kroz prizmu normativnih reše- nja i reakcije državnih organa, može se konstatovati da je situacija rela- tivno poboljšana. Tako je npr., postupajući po žalbi podnetoj od strane Evropskog centra za prava Roma i romskih porodica, Državni savet uki- nuo dekret Nomad Emergency 2011. godine,42 dok je u postupku pred Upravnim sudom u Laciju doneta odluka kojom je delimično poništen Dekret u delu koji se odnosi na identifikaciju svih prisutnih u nomad- skim kampovima putem uzimanja otisaka prstiju i fotografisanja bez obzira na njihov uzrast i pravni status. Ujedno, poništene su i odredbe 39 Hate Crime Reporting: Italy (http://hatecrime.osce.org/italy, 19.8.2017). 40 Number of hate crimes recorded by the police in Italy from 2014 to 2018 (https:// www.statista.com/statistics/659157/hate-crimes-recorded-by-the-police-italy/ 11.3.2019). 41 Number of hate crimes recorded by the police in Italy in 2018, by bias motivation (https://www.statista.com/statistics/660637/hate-crimes-recorded-by-the-police- italy-by-bias-motivation/, 11.3.2019). 42 Italy – Briefing to the UN Committee on the elimination of racial discrimination, Amnesty International, London, 2012, pp. 7–8, (http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bo- dies/cerd/docs/ngos/AI_Italy_CERD80.pdf, 19.8.2017). PRAVNI ZAPISI • Godina X • br. 2 • str. 453–471 466 | kojima se krše sloboda kretanja i pravo na rad pripadnika romske popu- lacije iz nomadskih kampova.43 U drugostepenoj odluci Državni savet je potvrdio da je identifikacija putem uzimanja otisaka prstiju i fotografisanja moguća samo u slučaju da je lice osumnjičeno za izvršenje krivičnog dela, ukoliko se neko lice sma- tra opasnim, kao i za one koji ne žele ili ne mogu da dokažu svoj identitet. Takođe, potvrđena je odluka prvostepenog suda u tezi da se Dekretom krše sloboda kretanja i pravo na rad pripadnika romske populacije, jer se njima ograničava pristup kampu, mogućnost poseta osobama koje žive u nomadskom naselju, te se nalaže obaveza potpisivanja pravila o unutra- šnjem redu u kampu, kao i obaveza pohađanja određenih kurseva.44 Kancelarija za demokratske institucije i ljudska prava OEBS-a raspo- laže istim podacima, a dodatno navodi da su u toku 2017. godine odredbe Krivičnog zakonika o zločinima mržnje izmenjene i dopunjene kako bi odgovarale zahtevima zakona EU. Takođe, pri Ministarstvu pravde osno- vana je radna grupa „Stalni odbor za borbu protiv zločina mržnje i govora mržnje“, sa širokim učešćem civilnog društva, kako bi pružila savete o po- trebnim merama za rešavanje ovog problema. Fokus OEBS-a je tokom 2017. godine bio na Opservatoriji za sigur- nost protiv akata diskriminacije unutar Ministarstva unutrašnjih poslova Italije, koja je osnovana radi olakšavanja prijavljivanja i evidentiranja zlo- čina iz mržnje. Opservatorija je od načelnika policije dobila zadatak da usredsredi svoj rad na sprovođenje komunikacione kampanje za spreča- vanje zločina mržnje i nastavak obuke o zločinima mržnje za nacionalnu policiju.45 Prema podacima Agencije za osnovna prava Evropske unije za 2016. godinu, u Italiji, skoro svi ispitanici su istakli da su Romi i Sinti grupe koje su najviše izložene javnom podsticanju na neprijateljstva.46 U istom izvoru navodi se i anonimna izjava jednog italijanskog sudije i citiraju se njegove reči: „Postoje žrtve prve klase i žrtve druge klase: dok se zločini protiv Jevreja ne bi tolerisali, postoji neka vrsta konsenzusa za zločine pro- tiv cigana” (originalno: gypsies). 43 Međutim, Državni savet nije utvrdio diskriminišuće postupanje prema Romima. Italy – Briefing to the UN Committee on the elimination of racial discrimination, 2012, pp. 8–9. 44 Italy – Briefing to the UN Committee on the elimination of racial discrimination, 2012. 45 Hate Crime Reporting: Italy (http://hatecrime.osce.org/italy?year=2017, 11.3.2019). 46 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, Ensuring justice for hate crime vic- tims – professional perspectives, 2016, p. 21. Darko Dimovski, Zdravko Grujić, Miomira Kostić, Romi kao žrtve zločina mržnje | 467 5.1. SLUČAJ LA KONTINASA Zaključci do kojih je došao sud u predmetu koji je u javnosti poznat kao La Kontinasa (La Continassa) od posebne su važnosti za razumeva- nje fenomena koji u radu analiziramo. Naime, slučaj se vezuje za događaj iz 2011. godine, kada je razjarena masa ljudi, želeći da se osveti Romima za navodno izvršeno silovanje, podmetnula požar u romskom kampu u predgrađu italijanskog grada Torina. Osuđujuća presuda protiv izvršilaca ovog zločina mržnje suštinski je bitna iz dva razloga. Prvo, ova sudska odluka predstavlja prvu osuđu- juću presudu za zločin mržnje prema Romima. Sud je u presudi uzeo u obzir mržnju kao otežavajuću okolnost, dokazujući je rasističkim uvre- dama, rasističkim zlostavljanjem i pretnjama nasiljem prema Romima, i to na osnovu Zakona br. 205/93 kojim se predviđa obavezna otežavajuća okolnost za zločin izvršen iz rasne, verske, nacionalne ili etničke mržnje prema žrtvi.47 Druga značajna činjenica jeste ta da je u presudi naglašeno da je do konkretnog zločina došlo zbog nedovoljnog angažovanja pripadnika poli- cijskih snaga da spreče jedno ovakvo krivično delo, iako su i ranije posto- jale pretnje i napadi na Rome koji žive u tom naselju. Na ovaj način je pokrenuto i pitanje odgovornosti organa reda u od- nosu na pojavu i (ponovno) izvršenje zločina mržnje, jer oni predstav- ljaju prvi branik u zaštiti prava (ugroženih) manjina. Neaktivnost, kao i neodgovarajuća reakcija organa vlasti značajno utiču na odgovor lokalne zajednice i razumevanje konteksta zločina mržnje. Razlog neaktivnosti i neodgovarajuće reakcije organa vlasti treba tražiti i u institucionalnom ra- sizmu, predrasudama i diskriminaciji. Neuspeh u vođenju istrage i dono- šenju osuđujuće presude za zločine mržnje jasno je ukazao na postojanje predrasuda i kod pripadnika policije, ali i kod javnog tužioca i sudije.48 . Zakljuak U radu su predstavljeni događaji i primeri diskriminacije i zločina mržnje čije su žrtve Romi u današnoj Italiji, koji ne samo da upućuju na stepen viktimiziranosti romske populacije (i drugih marginalizovanih ko- lektiviteta) u savremenom društvu, već ukazuju na obim kršenja osnovnih ljudskih prava i sloboda manjinskih zajednica, na predrasude, negativan 47 Mancino Law, (https://www.legislationline.org/documents/id/19322, 25.8.2018). 48 Combating hate crime against Roma in the Courts (http://www.errc.org/blog/comba- ting-hate-crime-against-roma-in-the-courts/93 25.8.2017). PRAVNI ZAPISI • Godina X • br. 2 • str. 453–471 468 | odnos, nespremnost i neadekvatnost državne reakcije na zločine izvršene iz mržnje ili predrasuda. Kako bi se ukazalo na vremensko trajanje analiziranog problema, na početku rada je prikazana društvena i politička pozadina kasnije navede- nih slučajeva ispoljavanja zločina mržnje prema Romima, a zatim i sami slučajevi, reakcije međunarodnih institucija i organizacija, kao i analiza sprovedenih mera od strane državnih vlasti. Počev od ubistava, ekstre- mnog nasilja, iseljavanja, uskraćivanja prava na školovanje ili zdravstvene usluge ili izdavanja ličnih dokumenata do govora mržnje, u radu je uka- zano da su svi navedeni slučajevi povezani sa predrasudama, mržnjom i diskriminacijom prema Romima. Analiza dostupnih podataka o zločinima mržnje, uz kriticizam zbog načina prikupljanja i prikazivanja podataka, pokazuje da je broj ovih zlo- čina u konstantnom porastu. U protekloj dekadi broj je udesetostručen, a gotovo sigurno je mnogostruko veći jer je tamna brojka kriminaliteta kod ove vrste kriminalnog ponašanja jako visoka. Iako je Italija, kao država članica EU, posredno zbog kritika različitih međunarodnih organizacija i institucija, preduzela niz pozitivnih koraka u suzbijanju diskriminacije i zločina mržnje prema Romima i drugim ma- njinskim kolektivitetima, kao što su izmene u normativnoj sferi – usvaja- nje antidiskriminacionih zakona i izmene krivičnog zakonodavstva, do- nošenje Nacionalne strategije za integraciju Roma, osnivanje Nacionalne kancelarije za borbu protiv diskriminacije, Opservatorije za zaštitu od dis- kriminatorskih dela ili Stalnog odbora za borbu protiv zločina mržnje i govora mržnje Ministarstva pravde – realno stanje u društvu ne pokazuje da su navedene mere proizvele pozitivan efekat. Naprotiv. Negativan stav opšte javnosti prema marginalizovanim grupama, po- sebno Romima, muslimanima ili migrantima, predstavlja jedan od osnov- nih katalizatora zločina mržnje prema manjinskim kolektivitetima. Takav stav konsekventan je medijskom izveštavanju o tim „kriminalizovanim grupama“ koje ugrožavaju bezbednost stanovništva, ali, pre svega, rasi- stičkom i ksenofobičnom diskursu u javnoj politici koji targetira pripad- nike marginalizovanih grupa. Širenje predrasuda, podsticanje rasne dis- kriminacije, ksenofobije i rasizma kod stanovništva, prate akti nasilja nad vulnerabilnim grupama, čemu se, populističkim nastupima u medijskom prostoru, daje legitimitet i pronalazi opravdanost. Zbog toga će, između ostalog, pitanje stvarne zaštite Roma i pripadnika drugih manjinskih gru- pa u Italiji još dugo biti otvoreno. Predstavljanje položaja Roma kao žrtava zločina mržnje u savreme- noj Italiji autori su iskoristili kao paradigmatičan primer neadekvatnosti državne reakcije u suočavanju sa rastućim problemom porasta zločina mr- Darko Dimovski, Zdravko Grujić, Miomira Kostić, Romi kao žrtve zločina mržnje | 469 žnje ne samo prema Romima već i prema drugim pripadnicima ugroženjih manjinskih grupa. Ova okolnost se ne odnosi samo na Italiju već i na sve ostale države u kojima se ne ostvaruje adekvatan nivo zaštite ljudskih prava i sloboda ugroženih manjinskih kolektiviteta, zagarantovanih nacionalnim zakonodavstvom i brojnim međunarodnim izvorima u ovoj oblasti. Literatura 1. Assessment of the human rights situation of Roma and Sinti in Italy, Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, 2009, Warsaw, (http://www.osce.org/ odihr/ 36374?download=true, 7.8.2017). 2. Calaresu, M., Tebaldi, M., 2015, Local security policies and protection of terri- tory: an analysis of the Italian experience (2007–2009), City, Territory and Archi- tecture, December, 2:1, (https://doi.org/10.1186/s40410–014–0017-y 12.11.2019). 3. Combating hate crime against Roma in the Courts (http://www.errc.org/blog/ combating-hate-crime-against-roma-in-the-courts/93, 25.7.2017). 4. Council of Europe, European Commission against Racism and Intolerance, Third Report on Italy adopted on 16 December 2005, Strasbourg, 2016, p. 23, f. 39. (https://rm.coe.int/third-report-on-italy/16808b5831, 12.11.2019). 5. Council of Europe Blasts Italy over Roma Fingerprinting, Euractiv, 2008, (http:// www.euractiv.com/en/mobility/council-europe-blasts-italy-roma-fingerprinting/ article-173775?Ref=RSS; 13.7.2017). 6. Deprez, G., 2008, Annex I and Annex II: the Draft Report of the LIBE Delegation to Italy on September 18th and 19th (‘nomad camps’ emergency), European Parlia- ment, London, (http://www.statewatch.org/news/2008/nov/ep-libe-visit-to-italy- annexes.pdf 13.7.2017). 7. Directive 2004/38/EC of the EP and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely wit- hin the territory of the Member States amending Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 and repealing Directives 64/221/EEC, 68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 93/96/EEC, Official Jour- nal of the European Communities L 158/77. 8. ECRI Report on Italy – forth monitoring cycle, adopted on 6 Decembre 2011, Strasbourg 2012, pp. 5–6, (https://rm.coe.int/fourth-report-on-italy/16808b5834, 12.11.2019). 9. ECRI Report on Italy (Fifth Monitoring cycle), adopted on 18 March 2015, Strasbourg 2016, (https://rm.coe.int/fifth-report-on-italy/16808b5837, 12.11.2019). 10. Europe’s Shame (http://www.tol.org/client/article/19815-europes-shame.html, 7.7.2017). 11. European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2014, Roma survey – Data in focus Poverty and employment: the situation of Roma in 11 EU Member States, Luxembourg, Publications Office of the European Union. 12. European Union Agency for Fundamental Rigths: Ensuring justice for hate crime victims – professional perspectives, 2016. PRAVNI ZAPISI • Godina X • br. 2 • str. 453–471 470 | 13. Ferreira, N., Kostakopoulou, D., Bradshaw, J., Gola, S., 2016, The Human Face of the European Union: Are EU Law and Policy Humane Enough?, Cambridge, Cam- brigde University Press,. 14. Garbage and Immigrants, Berlusconi Pulls out the Mop (http://www.spiegel.de/ international/europe/serious-concern-about-xenophobia-council-of-europe-lam- basts-italy-for-xenophobic-environment-a-569080.html, 15.7.2017). 15. Hate Crime Reporting: Italy (http://hatecrime.osce.org/italy, 19.7. 2017). 16. Hate Crime Reporting: Italy (http://hatecrime.osce.org/italy?year=2017, 9.3.2019). 17. Italy – Briefing to the UN Committee on the elimination of racial discrimina- tion, Amnesty International, London, 2012. pp. 20–22. (http://www2.ohchr.org/ english/ bodies/cerd/docs/ngos/AI_Italy_CERD80.pdf; 19.7.2017). 18. Italy Crime Rate & Statistics 1995–2019, (https://www.macrotrends.net/ countri- es/ITA/italy/crime-rate-statistics, 15.8.2019). 19. Italy risks legal battle over expulsion of EU citizens (https://euobserver.com/justi- ce/26797, 17.7.2017). 20. Italy’s right targets Gypsies, migrants (http://articles.latimes.com/2008/may/24/ world/fg-right24, 6.7.2017). 21. Mancino Law, (https://www.legislationline.org/documents/id/19322, 25.8.2018). 22. Memorandum by Thomas Hammarberg Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe, 2008 (from: http://rm.coe.int/16806db88f, 12.7.2017). 23. Number of hate crimes recorded by the police in Italy from 2014 to 2018 (https:// www.statista.com/statistics/659157/hate-crimes-recorded-by-the-police-italy/, 11.3.2019). 24. Number of hate crimes recorded by the police in Italy in 2018, by bias motivation (https://www.statista.com/statistics/660637/hate-crimes-recorded-by-the-police- italy-by-bias-motivation/ 11.3 2019). 25. OSCE human rights body concerned about anti-Roma violence in Italy (http:// www.osce.org/odihr/49716, 8.7.2017). 26. Respect a right to protest (http://www.crin.org/en/docs/SECURITYALAITALIA- NA.pdf, 6.7.2017). 27. Scicluna, H., 2008, The Life and Death of Roma and Sinti in Italy: A Modern Tragedy, Roma Rights Journal, 2. 28. Stewart, M., Rovid, M., 2011, Multi-Disciplinary Approaches to Romany Studies, Budapest, Central European University Press. 29. Sustainable Policies for Roma and Sinti Integration: Final Report, Organization for Cooperation and Security in Europe, Vienna, 2008, (http://www.osce.org/ documents/odihr/2008/ 9.8.2017). 30. True Europeans: The Roma and the Creation of a European Identity (http://cdn. nycitynewsservice.com/blogs.dir/549/files/2013/04/True-Europeans-The-Roma- and-the-Creation-of-a-European-Identity.pdf, 5.7.2017). 31. Violence against Roma, Human Rights First, New York, 2008, (https://www.hu- manrightsfirst.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/fd-080924-roma-web.pdf, 4.7.2017). Darko Dimovski, Zdravko Grujić, Miomira Kostić, Romi kao žrtve zločina mržnje | 471 ROMA AS VICTIMS OF HATE CRIMES: CONTEMPORARY CONTEXT (THE CASE OF ITALY) Darko Dimovski Zdravko Grujić Miomira Kostić SUMMARY Hate crimes are a specific form of criminal behavior in which hate towards certain groups is the main motive for their execution, that is, in which the perpetrator’s prejudice of the victim’s affiliation to certain col- lectivity and hatred towards members of the same are the basis for com- mitting incriminated behavior (crimes). The study of the contemporary context of the position of victims of hate crimes indisputably points to the existence of different groups whose intensity of victimization and vulnerability is more pronounced, among which the Roma population is particularly distinguished. Therefore, this paper is dedicated to the Roma, analyzing their position as victims of hate crimes (starting from a general negative attitude and various forms of discrimination against members of this population to attempts to systematically destroy the Roma) while the central part of the work is dedicated to the Roma as victims of hate crimes in today’s Europe – through the example of modern Italy. Key words: Roma, victims, hate crimes, victimological aspect. Dostavljeno Uredništvu: 6. maja 2019. godine Prihvaćeno za objavljivanje: 28. novembra 2019. godine 
work_tw5qz4snjvckhczutl6wmhahfu	----	www.msvu.ca/atlantisAtlantis 38.2, 2017 157 Marcy Cook Is a writer of short stories, articles, and comics. She’s also a transgender advocate and diversity advisor. When not randomly slapping words together, she’s a semi-professional cat wrangler with an insatia- ble lust for Lego, a sci-fi geek, comic book fan, and avid reader. Her work has appeared in The Mary Sue, Pan- els, Fresh Romance, and more. Follow her on Twitter: @ marcyjcook. Abstract This article demonstrates the different ways men and women are treated online and the consequences of coming under social media attack. Through numerous examples and personal experience from the unique per- spective of a transgender woman who has experienced the Internet as a man and a woman. Résumé Cet article démontre les différentes façons dont les hommes et les femmes sont traités en ligne et les conséquences des attaques subies dans les médias sociaux. Il le fait au travers de nombreux exemples et d’expériences personnelles, selon la perspective unique d’une femme transgenre qui a fait l’expérience de l’Internet en tant qu’homme et en tant que femme. We were on a weekend away and I was walk- ing hand in hand on a beach with my spouse when my phone twittered at me, then again, and again. When I finally found my phone in my bag, I was already dread- ing what would be on the screen as nothing positive was likely to elicit this flurry of tweets. My fear was confirmed as I looked at the screen and realised that an article I’d written had been picked up by a men’s rights group and my Twitter feed was filled with homophobia, misogyny, and transmisogyny. My gender is central to who I am; as a transgen- der woman, I’ve spent so much of my life fighting for it. Transgender people who transition from across the gender spectrum have more insight on the social im- pact of gender than cisgender people do, as our lived experience shows us how society interacts with gender presentation. Many transgender people don’t adhere to normative gender roles, but those who do have experi- ence vital to understanding how gender is lived in so- ciety. In my case, I transitioned from assigned male at birth to living life as a woman. The difference in how I was treated before and after transitioning is what I refer to as social whiplash. How the world interacts with you depends on the gender you present to it. When you change that pre- sentation, everything shifts and transgender people are assumed to be magically able to understand and navi- gate the societal impacts of these changes. We can’t, of course. This is the social whiplash of changing some- thing so fundamental as how society as a whole per- ceives you. We have to go through a period of flounder- ing while we learn how to interact with the world from our new position. It’s incredibly difficult and affects ev- ery aspect of our lives. When I shattered society’s perceptions and pre- sented as the real me, an openly bisexual transgender woman, I realised I was no longer a member of the shoal. Watching them swim away, suddenly I was in a much smaller group eyed hungrily by predators. In these situations, re-learning how to interact online can The Difference a Gender Makes www.msvu.ca/atlantisAtlantis 38.2, 2017 158 very literally be a case of life and death. Once my ap- pearance became central to how men judged me, per- ceiving me and my views circumspect and dismissable due to my gender, I found that my online safety moved from something I’d never had to consider to my main priority. How I was able to use the Internet had changed; what I did, said, and presented all had a different conse- quence with higher stakes. The Internet is an amphitheatre of the grotesque where perceived anonymity, if not actual anonymity, turns otherwise merely obnoxious boys and men into something highly toxic and dangerous. Minorities have to face this toxicity without fail and without choice. When people assumed I was a heteronormative male, I could do anything online and never worry too much about the consequences. Uploading my photo was something I could do on a whim; correcting or critiqu- ing a man was never a problem. I was viewed as part of the majority, unknowingly swimming safe within the shoal. Social media has become an abuse enabler that enhances the emotions of its users through the forma- tion of opinion bubbles. Anyone disagreeing with the groupthink within the bubble is open to attack. This behaviour creates an echo chamber feedback loop that reinforces and amplifies the groupthink, regardless of facts or social decency. An example of this is the 2016 United States election: Donald Trump’s supporter base used emotion to process information with no regard for facts. Fuelled by Twitter’s famed inability to police its product, the bigots on Twitter grew loud and danger- ous. As a woman, my views no longer held the same weight they used to—a shift that many transgender women have experienced. It can work the other way too; after neurobiologist Ben Barres transitioned to male, he discovered some surprising reactions to his work, as shown in his interview published in the Wash- ington Post (Vedantam 2006). After a presentation and a discussion, he heard another scientist remark: “Ben Barnes gave a great seminar today, but then his work is much better than his sister’s.” Ben does not have a sis- ter; the other scientist was talking about Ben before he transitioned. Ben’s skills as a scientist hadn’t changed, but his gender presentation had become male, which in turn shifted the perception of his work. A study by Corinne Moss-Racusin et al. (2012) published in Pro- ceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the Unit- ed States of America (PNAS ) produced similar results. The study sent out duplicate resumes to potential em- ployers and only changed the gender of the name (Car- roll 2012). The resume that had a feminine name on it always scored lower than the masculine one. Society suffers from an inherent cultural bias where men are seen as inherently more valuable than women. This is also shown by the rise of the online phenomenon of mansplaining, which I only experi- enced after my transition. Suddenly, men thought that I couldn’t possibly be an expert on any subject and, re- gardless of their level of knowledge compared to mine, I needed them to explain the topic to me. I experienced other changes in behaviour too: if I expressed anger, it was more readily dismissed and deemed infantile, or joked about as ‘that time of the month,’ even though I don’t have a period and never will. It was as though I had discarded my perceived value in society alongside my masculinity. Outspoken women, and especially transgender women, have become targets online and these attacks can have life changing consequences. A number of women have been doxed (meaning their personal de- tails are released online, usually including an address) for speaking out in favour of feminism or against on- line abuse, even for voicing an opinion about a movie or video game. Sexual and physical threats follow and frequently include death threats. In May 2017, a Cana- dian transgender cartoonist, Sophie Labelle, was forced to leave her home after she was doxed during an attack fuelled by transmisogyny, for no reason other than she draws an online comic about a transgender girl (Colley 2017). The severity of abuse increases with intersec- tions and those who are at the most risk of online and physical abuse are transgender women of colour. Other common types of abuse faced by transgender women include cissexism, homophobia, ableism, and fatphobia. The transphobia towards transgender women in partic- ular is remarkable because of what it says about patri- archal culture. Transgender women who have rejected masculinity bring into question the perceived value of manhood. Some men take this rejection of masculinity as a slight against it, and their fragile masculinity leads them to become abusive. I’ve experienced attacks in response to my on- www.msvu.ca/atlantisAtlantis 38.2, 2017 159 line articles and it’s shocking how often abuse from men is peppered with threats; I had a half hour hate video made about me, which Google has steadfastly refused to remove from YouTube. When you’re a cisgender het- eronormative white male, putting your opinion online is a simple matter, done without thought because the odds of suffering from society’s perception of you are slight. When you’re a woman, particularly a woman from a minority, to be outspoken online is an act of re- bellion and bravery. I went through a period of four years when I never used a picture of myself online due to the fear of being attacked online or in person. I only broke this rule when I started raising money to help cover my surgery costs here in Canada. I became more careful with what I said online, yet no matter what I say, my words are policed. It is a truism for all transgender people online that having an audience means anything you say can be analysed and used against you. It remains the case that many police forces are ignorant in dealing with online hate crime. Laws are frequently fragmented or just not enforced, leading to an investigation rate of just 9% of online hate crimes re- ported in the UK in 2016 (Laville 2016). No recent data is available for Canada. I was on a committee whose goals included fostering better relations between the police and the LGBTQ2 community and I asked how our local police would respond to swatting (which is a fake call to emergency services to get the police to arrive at your house with guns drawn). My local police had never heard of the term and seemed very confused as to why I’d be worried about this. Social media companies need to start enforcing the terms of service we all sign up to; Facebook, Twitter and Google have pretty strict guidelines against sexu- al or gender based abuse, but they are rarely (if ever) enforced. I’ve reported many instances of abuse across all three social media behemoths and almost never suc- ceeded in getting explicit abuse removed from the In- ternet. It seems that only in the most blatant cases of abuse is action taken, and this is usually when the abuse targets a celebrity and the news media get involved. The most privileged group of men, white heter- onormative cis-men, need to speak out against online abuse against women wherever they see it. Online bros are perpetuating abuse and rape culture and it has to stop. Women are the most frequent victims of online abuse and it’s women who are leading the pushback against it. It may seem a gargantuan task, but remem- ber that King Kong was tamed by Fay Ray, a woman who achieved what men couldn’t do; women change the world. References Carroll, Sean. 2012. “Scientists, Your Gender Bias Is Showing.” Discover, September 19. http://blogs.discov- ermagazine.com/cosmicvariance/2012/09/19/scien- tists-your-gender-bias-is-showing/#.WdfuChNSzfA. Colley, Sherri Borden. 2017. “Threats Force Cancella- tion of Trans Cartoonist’s Halifax Book Launch.” CBC, May 19. http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/nova-scotia/ transgender-cartoonist-sophie-labelle-hate-death- threats-book-launch-1.4123683. Laville, Sandra. 2016. “Online Sbuse: ‘Existing Laws Too Fragmented and Don’t Serve Victims.’” The Guardian, March 4. https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/ mar/04/online-abuse-existing-laws-too-fragmented- and-dont-serve-victims-says-police-chief. Moss-Racusin, Corinne A., John F. Dovidio, Victoria L. Brescoll, Mark J. Graham, and Jo Handelsman. 2012. “Science Faculty’s Subtle Gender Biases Favor Male Stu- dents.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America (PNAS) 109 (41): 16474– 16479. doi: 10.1073/pnas.1211286109. Vedantam, Shankar. 2006. “Male Scientist Writes of Life as Female Scientist.” Washington Post, July 13. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/arti- cle/2006/07/12/AR2006071201883.html. 
work_tw7isogpg5cwpikm734uhikm6i	----	WORLD VIEW India’s white list of respectable journals should fend off trash scholarship p.7 KILLER CATS Feral felines are dining out on Australia’s fauna p.9 SPACE NASA to send Dragonfly drone to hop across Saturn’s largest moon p.10 In 2022, St Petersburg will welcome the world’s largest and most prestigious event in mathematics. But among the thousands of delegates at the next International Congress of Mathematicians (ICM) will be some who might find Russia less welcoming. Mathematicians from sexual or gender minorities (LGBT+) might think twice about going to a country where they could be arrested for advocating equal rights, and where hate crimes and discrimination against members of their communities are reported to be rising. Last week marked the 50th anniversary of the Stonewall uprising in New York City, which catalysed a global movement to decriminalize same-sex relationships and gain rights and recognition for people across the LGBT+ spectrum. There is a long way to go, but many countries now have laws that specifically protect some of those rights. Some research leaders, however, have been slow to champion minority groups — although that is starting to change, partly thanks to community activism. Pride in STEM, just one of the latest grass-roots-led campaigns for a higher profile and better rights for LGBT+ scientists, now has the support of many prominent scientific organizations worldwide, including the American Association for the Advancement of Science and the biomedical research charity Wellcome. On 5 July, they and other campaign groups will celebrate the second International Day of LGBTQ+ People in Science, Technology, Engineering, and Maths, and Nature is proud to add its support to this important movement. This progress, however, has also exposed the scale of the challenge. In a survey of LGBT+ physical scientists in the United Kingdom published last week by a consortium of science academies, 28% of those polled had considered leaving their workplace because of an un welcoming climate or outright discrimination (see page 16). A 2016 survey from the United States had similar findings. The situation is much worse elsewhere. In 70 countries, sexual acts between people of the same sex remain criminalized; in 12, they can be punished by death. Most governments still deny trans people the right to legally change their name and gender. And in countries where same-sex sexual acts are legal, as in Russia, being open about sexuality or gender expression can lead to harassment and exclusion. LGBT+ sci- entists in those countries struggle every day, and many risk their lives. The solutions are neither obvious nor easy. Even for scientists in countries with inclusive laws, international travel and collaborations are career essentials. Where they bring risks, employers should mini- mize them, but the ultimate choices should remain with individuals. At the same time, employers should put in place measures to mitigate career penalties for researchers who decide that it is safer not to travel to a country where they could be at risk. Establishing how to do this needs work, and this is where research- ers, academies and funders can and should do more. Employers should, for example, develop best practices in collaboration with their LGBT+ staff and, if needed, with charities such as Stonewall in the United Kingdom and Campus Pride in the United States. The situation for researchers in countries with more discriminatory laws is harder and more complex to navigate, but here, too, individuals and institutions in countries with inclusive laws can have an important role. The consortium that published last week’s survey — the United Kingdom’s Institute of Physics, Royal Astronomical Society and Royal Society of Chemistry — is one group that can move things on for scien- tists who live and work in countries where there are fewer protections. The group’s report, Exploring the Workplace for LGBT+ Physical Scientists, recommends that employers support international LGBT+ staff and students who have come out while in countries such as the United Kingdom, and who will return to countries where the laws are less inclusive (see go.nature.com/2xgcjaw). In addition to this, the academies could propose that their counterparts in other countries do the same, through their shared membership of the Interacademy Partnership, an international network of science academies. Similarly, science funders should increase support for charities such as Scholars at Risk, based in New York City, and the Council for At-Risk Academics (CARA) in London. These organizations provide a lifeline for research- ers who are compelled to leave dangerous or potentially life-threatening situations in their countries of origin. In recent weeks, for exam- ple, CARA has been able to resettle an LGBT+ scientist whose family in her country of origin was forcing her into marriage with a man. Organizers of conferences such as the ICM also have an opportunity to strengthen laws and conventions, and a duty to do so when they set up events in partnership with institutions in countries where laws or social conventions leave LGBT+ communities vulnerable. A petition from mathematicians outside Russia to boycott the congress, in part because of the country’s discriminatory environment, is gaining sig- natures. A decision to host in an LGBT+ hostile country should never be taken lightly and, at a minimum, ICM organizers should take this as an opportunity to work with local hosts to adopt inclusive terms and conditions — as they would with a local organizing partner anywhere in the world — so that all delegates are welcomed. Ultimately, however, lasting change to societal attitudes will need more than contract amendments and new laws. In science, as in life, there can be no outsiders. Moreover, evidence abounds that research, scholarship and innovation advance when there are no borders. Researchers can discover and invent when they can be themselves. Living in fear or not being able to show their true selves harms individuals. Keeping people from doing their best science, or exclud- ing them, harms everyone. Researchers everywhere should support the International Day of LGBTQ+ People in Science, Technology, Engineering, and Maths, and research organizations should continue to lobby their governments for more inclusive lawmaking. Nature, too, has much more to do to promote equality for all marginalized groups. Scientists should never be made to feel that hiding their sexual or gender orientation is the solution. ■ “Keeping people from doing their best science, or excluding them, harms everyone.” Proud to support Pride in STEM Nature strongly backs this year’s International Day of LGBTQ+ People in Science, Technology, Engineering, and Maths, and urges the whole research community to boost equal rights. 4 J U L Y 2 0 1 9 | V O L 5 7 1 | N A T U R E | 5 THIS WEEK EDITORIALS © 2019 Springer Nature Limited. All rights reserved. 
work_typfb3rrnzdybh7uinjjf2fwvm	----	Ancient Asia Home About Log in | Register Part of Ancient Asia Journal Management System Ancient Asia is the official continuous publication journal of the Society of South Asian Archaeology (SOSAA). The scope of the Ancient Asia is vast - from the Stone Age to modern times, including archaeology, history, anthropology, art, architecture, numismatics, iconography, ethnography and also various scientific aspects including archaeobotany and archaeozoology, including theoretical and methodological issues. Most popular articles (last 3 months) Most recent articles(view all articles) Terms and Conditions | Privacy Policy Ubiquity Press © 2021 This website is operated by Ubiquity Press Limited, a company registered in England and Wales with Company Number 06677886. Registered office: Ubiquity Press Ltd, Unit 2N, 6 Osborn Street, London, E1 6TD, United Kingdom 
work_u4b3och225e3nmwerwevm2r5se	----	This may be the author’s version of a work that was submitted/accepted for publication in the following source: Dwyer, Angela, Ball, Matthew, & Barker, Emma (2015) Policing LGBTIQ people in rural spaces: emerging issues and future con- cerns. Rural Society, 24(3), pp. 227-243. This file was downloaded from: https://eprints.qut.edu.au/90890/ c© Consult author(s) regarding copyright matters This work is covered by copyright. Unless the document is being made available under a Creative Commons Licence, you must assume that re-use is limited to personal use and that permission from the copyright owner must be obtained for all other uses. If the docu- ment is available under a Creative Commons License (or other specified license) then refer to the Licence for details of permitted re-use. It is a condition of access that users recog- nise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights. If you believe that this work infringes copyright please provide details by email to qut.copyright@qut.edu.au Notice: Please note that this document may not be the Version of Record (i.e. published version) of the work. Author manuscript versions (as Sub- mitted for peer review or as Accepted for publication after peer review) can be identified by an absence of publisher branding and/or typeset appear- ance. If there is any doubt, please refer to the published source. https://doi.org/10.1080/10371656.2015.1099264 https://eprints.qut.edu.au/view/person/Dwyer,_Angela.html https://eprints.qut.edu.au/view/person/Ball,_Matthew.html https://eprints.qut.edu.au/view/person/Barker,_Emma.html https://eprints.qut.edu.au/90890/ https://doi.org/10.1080/10371656.2015.1099264 POLICING LGBTIQ PEOPLE IN RURAL SPACES: EMERGING ISSUES AND FUTURE CONCERNS Authors: Dr. Angela Dwyer*, Dr. Matthew Ball, and Emma Barker Contact details: * Corresponding author: Dr. Angela Dwyer, Senior Lecturer & Undergraduate Director, School of Justice, Faculty of Law, Queensland University of Technology, GPO Box 2434, Brisbane, QLD 4001, Australia, email: ae.dwyer@qut.edu.au Dr. Matthew Ball, Senior Lecturer & HDR Coordinator, School of Justice, Faculty of Law Queensland University of Technology, Brisbane, QLD 4001, Australia, email: mj.ball@qut.edu.au Emma Barker, Senior Research Assistant, School of Justice, Faculty of Law, Queensland University of Technology, GPO Box 2434, Brisbane, QLD 4001, Australia, email: emma.barker@connect.qut.edu.au KEYWORDS LGBT; police; rurality; remote; queer criminology; rural criminology ABSTRACT This article argues identifying as lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, intersex, queer, and/or questioning (LGBTIQ) in rural spaces can produce specific types of policing experiences. While some literature examines the experiences of LGBTIQ people with police, very little has focused on how rurality explicitly shapes these experiences. This is significant considering research highlights how rurality can be connected to pronounced experiences of homophobia and transphobia. The article highlights examples from three research projects that explored: LGBTIQ young people’s interactions with police; LGBTI peoples’ interactions with police liaison services; and LGBTIQ-identifying police officers. The examples demonstrate the need for further research to examine how policing happens with rural LGBTIQ people to ensure more accountable policing policies and practice, and to highlight the complexities of localised, rural policing contexts that can both support and marginalise LGBTIQ people. INTRODUCTION In recent times, people who identify as lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, intersex, queer, and/or questioning (LGBTIQ – this acronym is commonly used in research as a broader ‘catch all’ term that incorporates a range of other categories, such as genderqueer, pansexual, asexual, and questioning – Bartkowiak-Theron & Asquith 2012) have been the focus of research relating to policing (Dwyer, 2011; Himmelstein & Bruckner, 2011). This focus is timely given the growing sub-field of ‘queer criminology’ research on LGBTIQ experiences of criminal justice (Ball 2014; Panfil 2014; Woods 2014), and considering the historically victimising and violent police-LGBTIQ relationships especially in two forms. Some accounts show LGBTIQ people have been victimised by a member of the public and police do not respond, or indeed further victimise them (Dodge, 1993). Other accounts suggest police specifically target LGBTIQ people for violence and victimisation (Comstock, 1991). Even gay- and lesbian-identifying police officers report experiencing discrimination from other police (Colvin, 2012). However, to date, the focus of research has been informed by an implicit assumption: that these issues are urban. Similar to the Anglo-centric (Crichlow, 2004) focus of queer criminology, the urban focus appears accidental rather than deliberate, for instance emerging out of the methodological difficulties presented by connecting with LGBTIQ people in rural areas, given they are hidden in these locations due to homophobia, “the fear or hatred of homosexual people” (Flood and Hamilton, 2008, p. 16) and transphobia, similar fear, hatred, and prejudices, but directed towards transgender people (Chakraborti & Garland 2009, p. 56- 57). Social science research, for instance, shows that LGBTIQ people in rural areas can experience similar discrimination in their everyday lives as urban LGBTIQ people, but being in rural spaces intensifies this (Gottschalk & Newton, 2009). Even so, it is clear the focus on LGBTIQ people and policing has come to be thought about largely as an urban issue. This article argues we need to trouble this urban-centric focus in research on police- LGBTIQ relationships. It makes a case for thinking outside urban centres to elaborate the more complex relations that may emerge between LGBTIQ people and police in rural areas. The article first engages with three key bodies of literature, exploring: how policing happens in rural contexts broadly; specific experiences of LGBTIQ people in rural spaces; and how policing happens with LGBTIQ people in urban areas. This research highlights a need to focus within both queer criminology and rural criminology on how rurality shapes LGBTIQ- police relationships. The article then elaborates snippets of interview data from three urbanised studies of LGBTIQ-policing relationships that also indicate the need for a rural turn in research about policing LGBTIQ people. While the focus in these studies was urbanised policing experiences of LGBTIQ people, and only passing references were made about rural issues, these snippets of data nevertheless reinforce the need to shift research in this direction. The article concludes by making two interrelated calls on the basis of these discussions. It calls for a ‘queer turn’ within rural criminological research, at the same time as a ‘rural turn’ within queer criminological research (Hogg & Carrington, 2006; Carrington, Donnermeyer & DeKeseredy, 2014; Ball, 2014; Peterson & Panfil, 2014). Only such ‘turns’ can be effective in elaborating most fully the intersecting issues in the rural lives of LGBTIQ people and their experiences of policing. LITERATURE REVIEW Why focus on LGBTIQ and policing in rural contexts? As detailed below, there are three key bodies of literature highlighting the increasing importance of focusing on this area. First, research on rural policing shows issues specific only to a rural setting, including police racism emerging as a result of social diversification of rural spaces. Second, research with LGBTIQ people in rural contexts indicates how LGBTIQ people living in rural spaces may experience complex discriminations, something suggestive of the need for rural police to have specialised knowledge. Third, research examining LGBTIQ-police relationships suggests we need to investigate these issues further in rural settings. Policing in rural contexts Research around policing in rural contexts largely reflects concerns related to how to police effectively with few police and across expansive territories. For instance, research into public attitudes about police in rural areas has shown some community members are concerned about police capacity to respond to emergencies in smaller communities. In 2004, Mawby conducted a survey in rural England to measure the attitudes of residents towards police and crime within their community. Mawby (2004) found almost 80% of respondents felt there were not enough police and many felt police were inaccessible due to restricted police station opening hours and a lack of local substations. Ironically, people in rural areas can interpret this as a lack of policing and a lack of police availability, amounting to feeling unsafe and unsupported by police, even though research suggests they can have closer relationships with local police. Despite the perceived inaccessibility of rural police, it is evident rural police can share closer personal relationships with the public than in urban settings. Police in rural areas have reported higher levels of job satisfaction since moving from the city, and many feel enjoyment interacting with local communities (Jobes, 2003). Jobes (2003) suggests effective rural policing relies heavily on community involvement and, as a result, community policing is more popular in rural contexts, especially given its focus on problem solving rather than law enforcement (Weisheit, Wells, & Falcone, 1994). Although beneficial in rural contexts, police having close ties with rural communities may lead to issues like role conflict, with officers feeling torn between their responsibility as a law enforcer and their responsibility as a community member (Jobes, 2003). Further, because police are more visible in rural communities and citizens know police by name, community members may have higher expectations of police (Weisheit et al., 1994). In addition to operational and attitudinal policing issues, the overall conservatism of rural environments can make policing difficult for people, particularly when acknowledging and respecting social diversity (Morant & Edwards, 2011). Racism, for instance, can occur more in rural areas because ethnic minority groups in rural locations are feared as people different from the community majority (Garland & Chakraborti, 2007). Police need to be aware of marginalisation of ethnic minority groups in rural environments and the importance of responding appropriately (Garland & Chakraborti, 2007), especially since Indigenous peoples in Western colonised nations can be subject to considerable discrimination from police in the first instance (Cunneen, 2001). Although complicated enough, adding LGBTIQ status hints at potential concerns when considering policing Indigenous people in rural contexts. Rural areas are known for being more homophobic than urban areas (Flood & Hamilton, 2008; Eldridge, Mack & Swank, 2006). Although research on police-LGBTIQ relationships in rural contexts is yet to be done, general research about LGBTIQ peoples’ experiences in rural settings indicates key concerns. LGBTIQ people and rurality Sociological literature around the experiences of rural LGBTIQ people suggests rural areas can be homophobic and value traditional heteronormative gender roles, conservatism, religiosity, and family structures, which may make it difficult for gender diverse individuals to feel accepted (Barefoot Rickard, Smalley & Warren, 2014). Interviews conducted by Yarbrough (2003) found that two of eight lesbian, gay, and bisexual young adults living in a rural community felt a sense of isolation, and another five felt there was a lack of likeminded individuals to share their feelings with. Studies in the United States have suggested young people in rural areas may experience more negative outcomes at school when coming out to their peers (Kosciw, Palmer & Kull, 2014). Australian research reflects similar concerns, with one study of over 3000 LGBTIQ students suggesting LGBTIQ young people in rural areas experienced an increased risk of homophobic bullying and violence (Jones, 2015). Another Australian study of same-sex attracted and gender questioning young people found those in rural and remote areas experienced different rates of self-harm and attempted suicides, connected to the isolation, discrimination, and lack of appropriate support they experienced (Hillier et al., 2010). Further, LGBTIQ parents living in outer metropolitan, regional, or rural areas of Australia and New Zealand have reported less social connectedness to their community, including LGBTIQ communities, than those living in urban areas (Power et al., 2014). In 2009, Gottschalk and Newton found that Australian rural gay men and lesbians reported similar discrimination to those in urban environments, but the rural environment intensified this discrimination due to a lack of anonymity. Contrastingly, interviews with 527 LGBTIQ individuals living in nonmetropolitan areas in the United States indicated that individuals enjoyed the close relationships, high quality of life, and involvement with LGBTIQ social networks in their communities (Oswald & Culton, 2003). Living as LGBTIQ people in rural contexts can be positive and negative, but most studies indicate negative experiences are more common, something also highlighted LGBTIQ health research. While we are yet to determine if urban LGBTIQ people fare better than rural LGBTIQ people (Fisher, Irwin & Coleman, 2014; Wienke & Hill, 2013), there are unique challenges to health care in rural contexts. Qualitative research by Williams, Bowen and Horvath (2005) suggests men who have sex with men (MSM) in rural environments are aware of hostility and wary of violence towards them because of their sexuality. These feelings mean MSM in rural areas often felt uncomfortable speaking about HIV or arranging HIV tests with medical practitioners because they fear disclosing their sexual preferences (Williams et al., 2005). MSM were found to be more comfortable speaking about their sexuality on the internet, a medium perhaps more viable for creating HIV prevention programs with these men in rural areas (Williams et al., 2005). These issues could make LGBTIQ people not access police when they have been victimised, something further highlighted in mental health research. Living in rural environments may negatively influence the mental health of LGBTIQ people. Research shows that despite having a similar incidence of lifetime suicide attempts to those in urban areas, transgender persons from rural areas scored significantly poorer on mental health measures (Horvath, Lantaffi, Swinburne-Romine & Bockting, 2014). In 2006, Willging, Salvador and Kano found LGBTIQ people were reluctant to access formal support for mental health issues due to beliefs that mental illness was a sign of weakness and financial considerations (Willging, Salvador & Kano, 2006). Mental health services were also avoided because of a lack of LGBTIQ community services and a fear of anti-LGBTIQ bias, with a number of participants instead seeking help from informal sources (Willging et al., 2006). In a study comparing treatment attitudes of urban and rural drug/alcohol treatment providers, Eliason and Hughes (2004) found urban counsellors reported more education about LGBTIQ issues, and working with more LGBTIQ individuals in the past year, than rural treatment providers. This is concerning given that mental health practitioners would be a key place where LGBTIQ people might seek support as victims in their local communities. We are yet to understand if LGBTIQ people would access police in these circumstances, although recent research on their policing experiences in urban environments suggests they may not. LGBTIQ people and policing LGBTIQ status can produce differential policing experiences in urban environments. International research indicates that LGBTIQ individuals are often subject to hate crimes in the community (Hillier, Turner, & Mitchell, 2005), something identified as a key risk factor for serious negative outcomes in LGBTIQ individuals, including sucidality (Duncan & Hatzenbuehler, 2014). However, LGBTI people are reluctant to report hate crimes to police because of previous unsatisfactory policing experiences and a resultant lack of trust, and because they fear homophobia from officers themselves (Hall, 2011). Some studies have found one-quarter of respondents felt they had been victimised or discriminated against by police (Williams & Robinson, 2004). These fears also apply to LGBTIQ-identifying police officers, with LGBTIQ- identifying police encountering discrimination and harassment from other police in past research (Colvin, 2012). New studies indicate (Jones, 2015; Jones & Williams, 2015) circumstances have improved at least for lesbian-, gay-, and bisexual-identifying police in contexts where police professionalization and protective legislation are in place. Even so, 17% of officers in the most recent study (Jones, 2015) reported experiencing workplace discrimination. This suggests additional reforms are needed, even for LGBTIQ-identifying police, if policing experiences are to improve. It seems pertinent to consider these issues in rural contexts, given these studies were urban and did not elaborate the experiences of LGBTIQ identifying police in rural areas. Over-policing of LGBTIQ communities may also influence negative police-LGBTIQ relationships. Young LGBTIQ people interviewed by Dwyer (2011) reported feeling targeted by police for looking visibly queer. Participants noted being approached by police for being offensive to public decency when displaying intimacy with a same-sex partner in public (Dwyer, 2011). Further, research suggests LGBTIQ people may more often experience substance abuse (Noell & Ochs, 2001) or homelessness, both of which could attract police attention (Corliss, Goodenow, Nichols & Austin, 2011). They have been found to be subject to more police stops as a result (Himmelstein & Bruckner, 2011). Even when LGBTIQ people are not engaging in risky behaviours, some feel police assume they are because of generalisations based on their physical appearance (Dwyer, 2014b). Police have done work to build relationships with LGBTIQ communities in recent times (Tomsen, 2009). Even so, given that queer criminologies more broadly are still only developing, we know relatively little about the policing experiences of LGBTIQ people, and we know even less about the specific link between LGBTIQ status and rural policing environments. This does not mean, however, that insights broadly relating to these concerns have not emerged in urban-focused studies about police-LGBTIQ relationships. The following section engages with snippets of interview data from research projects about policing LGBTIQ people in urban settings that include reflections on these experiences within rural settings. It does so to highlight the salience of these experiences, and to underscore the need for further research. RESEARCH METHODS The authors of this article have been involved in multiple research projects elaborating the experiences of LGBTIQ people (details below), but given that LGBTIQ people are a ‘hard to reach’ group (Jones & Newburn, 2001), the focus of these projects has always been the most accessible populations: urban. Nevertheless, there were moments where participants reflected on how policing LGBTIQ people differed in rural contexts. The interview snippets were drawn from three research projects in Queensland and New South Wales, Australia. The first project interviewed 35 LGBTIQ young people (aged 16 to 25 years) and seven LGBTIQ youth service provider staff about LGBTIQ young peoples’ experiences of policing (2008-2009). Participants were recruited from two LGBT youth service providers in Brisbane, Queensland. Ethical clearance was obtained from the Human Research Ethics Committee at the Queensland University of Technology (QUT). Due to the lack of support for LGBTIQ young people in schools (Jones, 2015), most interviews were conducted with young people accessing a major LGBT youth service for diverse, marginalized young LGBTIQ people needing support. Interviews explored their knowledge of police generally, their opinions of police, what they knew about their rights with police, before moving into detailed questions about their interactions with police and the outcomes of these interactions. The interview data is therefore specific to this localized context. All data was audio recorded and transcribed using participant-nominated pseudonyms. Further detail about the project methodology, and how the data was coded and analyzed according to a theoretical framework, is outlined in Dwyer (2014b). The second project surveyed LGBTIQ people about their experiences with LGBTI (police organisations often leave off the ‘Q’) police liaison officers (PLO – sometimes referred to as Gay and Lesbian Liaison Officers (GLLOs)) in Queensland (QLD), New South Wales (NSW), and Western Australia (WA). Ethical clearance was obtained from the Human Research Ethics Committee at the QUT and all three police organizations, and the project underwent administrative ethical review with two other participating universities and four LGBTIQ community organizations marketing the project. An online questionnaire was completed with LGBTIQ people about their experiences with police liaison officers and follow up interviews were undertaken with LGBTIQ respondents that expressed interest at the end of the questionnaire, and with PLOs who expressed interest to an email sent out by LGBTI police liaison program coordinators (2013-2014). Interviews with LGBTIQ people focused on their opinions of police, their overall experiences of police, and, where relevant, their experiences with police liaison officers. All interview data was audio recorded and transcribed using pseudonyms. Further detail about the project methodology, and how the data was coded and analyzed, is outlined in Dwyer et al. (forthcoming). The third project interviewed lesbian and gay police officers who had previously served with the Queensland Police Service (2009-2010). Participants were approached through advertisements in local queer newspapers and radio announcements. Ethical clearance was obtained from the Human Research Ethics Committee at the QUT. The key focus of these interviews was their experiences of being lesbian or gay in the Queensland Police Service, whether these experiences could be characterised as positive or negative, and what the outcomes of these experiences were. Participants were interviewed using either one- on-one face-to-face or telephone interviews, and a series of email exchanges with the researchers. All data was audio recorded and transcribed using pseudonyms. Further detail about the project methodology, and how the data was coded and analyzed, is outlined in Hayes and Dwyer (2011). All these projects sought to interview LGBTIQ people living in rural areas, but were relatively unsuccessful with this endeavour. However, some police liaison officers interviewed for the second project had experiences of policing in rural communities. Although the following snippets are by no means exhaustive (and really amount to ‘passing mentions’ in the data), they have been organised into key themes across the projects to highlight key issues suggesting a focus on policing LGBTIQ people in rural areas is needed in future research. Acknowledging how these projects were undertaken at different times, utilising slightly different methodologies, and targeting different groups, they are discussed together, but are not intended to offer a representative view of rural areas discussed, nor reflect the experiences of all subpopulations in those areas. Policing LGBTIQ people in rural contexts is just different The key theme across all three projects, and all pools of participants, was that policing LGBTIQ people in rural contexts was specifically different to urban policing. For the participants, how it was specifically different was not necessarily always elaborated, with broader comments around how there are massive differences between [police] stations, city stations and country stations (Male, Police Liaison Officer (herein PLO), 1, NSW). However, some respondents did suggest a few key differences. A key difference noted was how police liaison officers were not distributed across geographic areas (as they are in Queensland and other Australian state and territory police services that have LGBTI police liaison programs), and were instead organised as a small unit of people working out of Brisbane. One liaison officer noted how support to regional areas would have to be by telephone…the concern for me is you would lose that face to face…most of their work would be remote because they just couldn't reach except by telephone (Male, PLO, 1, QLD). A related concern was although LGBTIQ people were not particularly numerous in rural areas (Female, PLO, 1, NSW), there were nonetheless very few police trained to understand LGBTIQ issues over huge rural territories. Some community members suggested this was not an issue provided these areas had enough trained liaison officers in each region (Male, Gay, 1, QLD), but others felt this was concerning, with one young person emphasising the difficulties living in rural Australia by saying we didn’t have police in the town itself like the cop shop was an hour and a half away (Transgender, Female-to-Male, Xavier, 22). Too few officers working across large territories, loss of face-to-face service delivery, and distance to police stations from rural communities are all concerns raised in existing research about policing in rural contexts (Mawby, 2004). Another key issue, which emerged in interviews with young LGBTIQ people, was homophobia experienced in rural areas, and how this led those young people to relocate to urban areas. As one participant noted, the city tends to be a haven for people who have been kicked out of home or have been in shelters (Lesbian, Female, Romeo, 18). Pinky spoke about his experiences in rural Western Australia being worse because it's a huge strong Catholic community over there, very strict, very isolated. I was bullied because of my homosexuality (Male, Gay, Pinky, 18). Sarah (Transgender, Male to Female, 17) noted how relatives in regional Queensland were not very good with the whole gay thing because they were brought up in Rockhampton, which is a very closed minded, small area. Other young people had very problematic experiences with police: One cop up in Toowoomba hit me three times in the gut…I was yelling about something and I wouldn’t give the CIB any information because it was mates that decided to do something stupid. They had dogs searching for us and everything and they pretty much picked us up and threw us in the back of the paddy wagon…they didn’t even tell us a reason why…Then they took us to the police station and the CIB there, I wouldn’t give him any information and he hit me three times in the gut (Male, Bisexual, No Name, 19). Interestingly, No Name later states in the interview: I don’t blame the cops for being a little bit aggressive...I wasn’t aggressive to the cops in Toowoomba, they were aggressive against me because I knew something and they wanted it out of me (Male, Bisexual, No Name, 19). Police violence directed at young LGBTIQ people in rural areas is clearly unacceptable, and has been documented to some extent in other research about LGBT young people (Dwyer, 2011). Experiences like these, combined with homophobia experienced in rural communities, indicates strongly the need to examine these issues further, especially if we are to better understand if police harassment and rough treatment of this person was motivated by sexuality and/or gender diversity. Young people’s comments differed somewhat from concerns raised by police liaison officers who spoke more about operational problems that rural areas produced for policing. For example, these officers suggested that police services were not using regional LGBTI police liaison officers they had in the most productive ways. A female LGBTI police liaison officer from New South Wales suggested there were too many LGBTI police liaison officers in regional areas of New South Wales: there are a lot of GLLOS regional, out in those areas and I think it’s just that needs are different. You just don’t probably need to have as many in Dubbo as you do in Surrey Hills (Female, Police Liaison Officer, 1, NSW). Other LGBTI police liaison officers supported these comments noting how LGBTI issues in city areas are more of a focus than country areas (Male, Police Liaison Officer, 2, NSW) and the region overall was described as city centric: I think geography has a lot to do with it as well. In NSW obviously you can become a bit city centric so obviously that’s how this organisation works, that the headquarters are in the city so that is obviously where those people would be based. In my opinion a lot of the work in the city has been done, there is still more we can do of course but it is regional areas that we need to be working really hard on (Male, Police Liaison Officer, 2, NSW). With such a focus on the city areas, this respondent suggests police support for LGBTIQ people in rural areas is neglected as an area of concern. One instance of data in the project on LGBTI police liaison officers diverged from examples above in that the rural context shaped positive police experiences. A lesbian female living in remote far north Queensland elaborates on not being able to access police liaison officers at all in metropolitan areas, and then having more support and more positive experiences with Aboriginal liaison officers in the remote area in which she now lived. She talked about how she would not have been living and working in that remote region had she not had to pay off significant legal debts resulting from ongoing legal battles with members of her family that were homophobic and abusive towards her (Female, Lesbian, 3, QLD). She elaborates her frustration with multiple unsuccessful attempts to speak with a LGBTI police liaison officer about these issues in a metropolitan area. She then talks about how the Aboriginal liaison officers in the remote community she had moved to were very supportive, although they could not change her circumstances (as the case she wanted support with had already been decided in court). Although she was unhappy with her experience of not being able to contact a LGBTI police liaison officer when she needed one, she notes that her experiences with police in rural areas were more positive. A young person noted similar experiences, saying that when he was in the outback or whatever you want to call it and I talked to some police officers there, they were really cool (Male, Gay, Damien, 18). Although existing research about policing in rural settings suggests community members may have higher expectations of police (Weisheit et al., 1994), we cannot assume these higher expectations are not being met and experiences will be necessarily unsatisfactory. Importantly, though, it does show we need further empirical research to elaborate these experiences in detail. These comments, and those above, suggest broadly that there are many complex ways rural policing experiences may be different for LGBTIQ people, as the discussion about relocation and mobility of police officers below also suggests. Relocation of rural officers impacts on availability of police who know LGBTI issues A key issue to emerge out of the three projects was the idea of rural placement, reallocation, and relocation of police officers. Importantly, none of these issues have been raised in existing literature to date. Participants discuss how officers in rural areas can be well-trained and have productive relationships with people in rural communities, but when they are reallocated upon completion of rural service, these communities lose this local knowledge and support. For instance, one gay male talked about how there was a well-trained and supportive LGBTI police liaison officer in far north Queensland. However, since that person relocated: …that leaves someone there to be replaced. So it would be difficult because people move around in the police. And then you have to retrain. Like I said earlier when people start the force they should have the training so they know it from the outset…it’s easier for them all to have a better and deeper understanding of it all (Gay, Male, 1, QLD). These themes were mirrored in interviews with LGBTI police liaison officers. A female program coordinator in Western Australia discussed how there were less LGBTI police liaison officers in regional areas because some of the positions have been, shall we say, reallocated to other duties. These comments suggest that losing the knowledge, and possibly institutional memory, with LGBTI police liaison officers may be a key issue in policing LGBTIQ people in rural areas. Discussions around relocation and rural placement differed significantly in only one instance, and this instance emerged during discussions about the historical experiences of former gay and lesbian police officers in Queensland. In this project, one lesbian female former officer talked at length about how the investigation into lesbians in the Queensland Police Service, launched in 1977, caused her to be outed as a lesbian and she was forced by senior police officials to transfer and relocate permanently to a remote area in Queensland. Her long-term female partner, also a police officer at the time, was forced to transfer and relocate to a similarly remote area, but to a region more than seven hours away from where she was stationed. She notes that officers in the new remote station had been forewarned about her and they knew all about me. She concluded that his [officer in charge] brief was to try and get me to resign, so he made life fairly difficult for me and it was very hard (Lesbian, Female, Former QLD Police Officer). It is clear that historically, rural transfers have been invoked as a form of punishment for lesbian officers. The combination of rurality with ongoing homophobia from police she worked with, in this example, demonstrates the need to investigate further if these practices still persist, and to assess their ongoing impact. Although these experiences happened ‘in the past’, historical policing practices can have long term, wide reaching impacts upon LGBTIQ people (Dwyer, 2014a). This is particularly important considering other comments from different interviews suggest the effectiveness of rural policing experiences of LGBTIQ people may be shaped significantly by these contexts. Effectiveness of policing LGBTIQ people in rural areas depends on outreach Many interview comments with police liaison officers and LGBTIQ people noted that the effectiveness of police in rural areas varied significantly. A Queensland gay male noted how, even though they had a lot of LGBTI police liaison officers in north Queensland at one point, the general mobility and turnover of rural police officers meant these officers did not stay long term. If these officers do not stay in one place for long enough, the effectiveness of LGBTI police liaison officers can be eroded. The notion that a rural area loses knowledgeable police does not appear to be widely discussed in existing empirical research, and may well be an issue specific to officers with specialised knowledge, as existing studies focus instead on concerns around the lack of availability of officers generally (Mawby, 2004). Interestingly, a female police liaison officer from Western Australia noted the flip side of this, saying that although rural LGBTI police liaison officers can do great work connecting with these communities long term, they can also become too settled in those areas and the line between social and work responsibilities can be blurred. These issues have been raised in existing research about policing rural environments, with role conflict being raised as a key problem (Jobes, 2003). Participants also reflected on how policing effectiveness with LGBTIQ people depended on the level of outreach work that police did with rural communities. They suggested that if police were not known well in rural communities, LGBTIQ people would not access support when they needed it. A gay male notes that to build effective relationships between LGBTIQ people and police, police in regional areas need: …to have police participation in community events like Sydney and Melbourne have, and for that to take place across Queensland in all the regions. There are community events happening across the state in Cairns in Townsville and other things, and to have the police taking part in those (Male, Gay, 1, QLD). Comments by LGBTI police liaison officers also reflected these concerns, saying the focus of police liaison officer work in rural areas is networking: I live in Victoria and work in NSW so on a border town...So all up 126,000 square kilometres. So it’s big and there is a gay community but nowhere near the number in the city...So like out here I have been involved in some stuff in Victoria like going to social meetings, gay lesbian social groups, both in the capacity as a GLLO and on duty. Had a few dealings with legal groups in Broken Hill, did a lot of gay fact sheets (Female, PLO, 1, NSW). To police LGBTIQ people effectively in rural areas, the key focus needs to be on networking and getting to know people, which is different to supporting urban LGBTIQ people where there is a myriad of different things that you can be involved in (Female, PLO, 1, NSW) without necessarily being involved in lots of community engagement work. These themes have been raised in existing studies about policing rural areas (Jobes, 2003), but this presents specific concerns about policing LGBTIQ people, because many LGBTIQ people avoid police completely (Berman & Robinson, 2010; Dwyer, 2011). Comments made by LGBTI police liaison officers reflected that rural settings did significantly impact on how they balanced their workloads and how they engaged with LGBTIQ people in their communities. For example, one officer noted that that’s hard for me because you could sit back and no one would know to ask for your help…as a GLLO in the city and depending on your work location, you can have a lot more calls for service (Female, PLO, 1, NSW). Others reflected similar concerns: It varies a lot. In areas like Surrey Hills, New Town, Sydney CBD, they have a number of GLLOS per station and they get together and they are really passionate about the role, and because they have the community there is always something to do. Whereas somewhere out towards the suburbs or even country towns, I’m not too sure what their workload is like. I know for me here it is very difficult to do much because the community for the large part is not there (Male, PLO, 3, NSW). I suppose in Roma I probably only did one or two jobs while I was there in three years. So if they’re not getting called on and used that much then... I mean and that was two jobs with me being proactive, whereas the ones in all the other places, if they just stick a poster up in the front of the station and that’s it and they’re not actually engaging (Male, PLO, 4, QLD). This suggests rural contexts differentiate in terms of calls for service. If there is outreach work being done in these contexts, it does not necessarily amount to officers having more calls for service. The officer in the second quote above added that he was later stationed in a city area and had many calls for service using the same proactive approach he adopted in the regional area, even though when he left that area it all got shit-canned basically (Male, PLO, 4, QLD). In rural areas it seems that, even if a liaison officer is being proactive, this does not equate to LGBTIQ people requesting support with issues they are experiencing. Even more frustratingly, the proactive approaches built up in regional areas can fall away entirely when a proactive officer is relocated. These concerns contrast with existing research showing high levels of job satisfaction amongst rural police (Jobes, 2003) as these officers raise a number of concerns they believe impact on effective policing in rural environments, as well as influencing overall satisfaction with their police role. Clearly these issues would also shape whether or not a LGBTIQ person sought support from a rural police officer, something also considerably influenced by homophobia generally. LGBTIQ people in rural areas fear homophobic police responses A final theme emerging multiple times in interview responses of participants across the projects was police homophobia in rural areas. Police homophobia has been documented in multiple studies of policing with LGBTIQ people (Berman & Robinson, 2010; Dwyer, 2011; Williams & Robinson, 2004). Concerns over police homophobia emerged in discussions with police officers who experienced homophobia from other officers working in rural stations (discussed above). However, the more common concern with policing LGBTIQ people in rural locations was homophobia that LGBTIQ community members experienced from rural communities, and how this influenced their willingness to seek police support. One police liaison officer suggested in relation to homophobic hate crime that you do hear stories about stuff happening in the regions (Male, PLO, 5, QLD). Participants were most commonly concerned with how LGBTIQ people were reluctant to ask for support from police due to fears about police homophobia. As one gay male noted: Unfortunately people don’t report stuff to the police. Like it might be a bashing but they don’t take it further because they have their own fears about their sexuality so they don’t go to the next step of having the incident dealt with. And that does happen especially in the smaller regions (Male, Gay, 1, QLD). This participant notes further how gay men in the closet or away from the mainstream are much more at risk of violence or infection, and they can be harder to reach especially in the small country towns. He suggests these should be focus areas for rural LGBTI police liaison officers, as the fear of police homophobia can cause people not to seek support. Police officers interviewed also suggested that fear of police homophobia was a key issue, but noted it was the overall awareness of how widespread homophobia can be in rural areas that shaped personal policing responses to situations involving LGBTIQ people. For instance, when working in city areas, in situations where one officer recognised that domestic violence was happening between two same-sex partners, the officer would not hesitate to ask questions about this: I’d walk into a place straight away and go ‘Oh okay, this is DV, these people are together’. My partner wouldn’t have a clue (Female, PLO, 2, QLD), but then added quickly I can’t see it happening in the rural areas. Although this officer stopped short of saying her concerns about homophobia in rural areas would prevent her from asking further questions about whether or not someone was LGBTIQ, it is clear she thought that in rural spaces, doing this would be uncomfortable. These are considerable issues to overcome as, even though police organisations have worked hard to improve relationships with LGBTIQ people, we are yet to document how homophobia from rural communities impacts LGBTIQ people’s decisions to access police support. More importantly, we are also yet to explore how rural homophobia shapes everyday policing practices of individual officers. DISCUSSION Where to from here? The brief insights drawn from these studies of LGBTIQ people both being policed and policing in rural areas reveal unique challenges that must be addressed to ensure policing is just, equitable, and effective. Clearly, rural spaces are difficult spaces for police to manage to ensure the equitable delivery of policing services to LGBTIQ people. There are resourcing and personnel concerns (common issues with rural policing) which impact in specific ways for these groups (Jobes, 2003). The frequent turnover of police, as well as the reallocation of already stretched resources impact on all policing in rural areas (Mawby, 2004), but their effects may be keenly felt in police-LGBTIQ relations. The examples of police liaison programs above demonstrate this. While liaison programs may be the dominant urban model for police-community engagement, the larger size of rural commands, relative lack of resources to address unique challenges, fewer liaison officers, and lower population of sexuality and gender diverse people in rural areas all combine to impact on the delivery of liaison – not to mention broader – policing services (Dwyer et al., forthcoming). Officers clearly find it difficult to develop and maintain a connection to LGBTIQ communities and establish a trusting relationship with them, something necessary for a greater uptake of liaison (and more general police) services and to ensure the reporting of homophobic and transphobic hate crime in rural areas. As a result of these challenges, it has become incumbent on individual officers in rural areas to increase their outreach to, and networking with, LGBTIQ people in their community. They take on this task in addition to normal duties as a police officer – something undoubtedly more difficult in large rural territories where there are few 'feet on the ground', and a limited presence of LGBTIQ community groups. The turnover of such officers does not contribute to the long-term viability of these initiatives, and reduces the institutional memory necessary for successfully embedded liaison services. As such, the glimpses of policing in rural areas afforded by the data above suggests not only the need for further research, but also to rethink more taken for granted methods for police engagement with LGBTI people. We are yet to know if restricted opening hours of police stations, for instance, impacts specifically on the policing needs of LGBTIQ people (Mawby, 2004). While participants said nothing specific about transphobia, the data does demonstrate how rural areas represent homophobic spaces (Barefoot Rickard, Smalley & Warren, 2014). Whether this is because research participants had direct personal experiences of homophobia in these spaces, or they held this view because of what they heard from others, it remains that these spaces are considered dangerous for LGBTIQ people, and this impacts on their interactions with police, just as it impacts on the schooling experiences of LGBTIQ young people coming out (Kosciw, Palmer & Kull, 2014). Concerningly, police themselves have used this view of rural areas to punish a lesbian officer by explicitly transferring her to a rural area knowing it was homophobic, as a punishment for being lesbian and hoping she would leave the police. While this incident was historical, it nevertheless reinforces a view of rural spaces as homophobic, which may serve as a barrier in the interactions between LGBTIQ people and police, even if LGBTIQ people feel more supported by community organisations (Oswald & Culton, 2003). None of these findings are particularly unexpected, given the extant literature in related fields that we have surveyed here. Some findings are extensions of themes previously identified in research, which already note how diverse groups encounter unique challenges in rural areas (Garland & Chakraborti, 2007), that there are problems with service provision in those areas (Morant & Edwards, 2011; Weisheit et al. 1994), that homophobia and transphobia exist (Hillier et al., 2010), and that police relations with LGBTIQ people are complex (Dwyer, 2011). However, the brief data in this article point to the necessity of exploring in further detail the experiences of LGBTIQ people policing and being policed in rural areas. Ensuring emerging queer criminologies recognise rural contexts in such research, and that future rural criminology recognises the unique rural experiences of LGBTIQ people, are important steps. 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work_ubjej7yhp5dkbcj6ejeh5b5hjq	----	Reviewing the evidence of hate Lessons from a project under the Home Office Crime Reduction Programme E L I Z A B E T H A . S TA N K O The Metropolitan Police and Royal Holloway, University of London, UK Abstract This article outlines the lessons from one of the projects from the Home Office Crime Reduction Programme, which focused on hate crime and domestic violence. Funded near the end of the initiative, the project differed from many of the interventions. Rather than proposing to test an intervention to see ‘what worked’, it set out to produce the evidence upon which decisions about intervention could be made. Led by a senior academic criminologist (Stanko), housed within the largest police service in the UK – the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) – the project had sponsorship from influential members of the uniformed management team. The project further employed a team of social science researchers – some of whom had worked within the MPS and others who had no experience of working inside the police organization – to work on transforming routine police crime records into evidence to inform policy and strategy. The article argues that the project achieved its aims: police crime records can and do provide evidence sufficiently robust for the driving policy, strategy and police practice. Key Words Crime Reduction Programme • domestic violence • evidence-based policy • hate crime 277 Criminal Justice © 2004 SAGE Publications London, Thousand Oaks and New Delhi. www.sagepublications.com 1466–8025; Vol: 4(3): 277–286 DOI: 10.1177/1466802504048466 www.sagepublications.com Introduction I was a recipient of one of the Home Office’s Crime Reduction Programme (CRP) grants in partnership with the Metropolitan Police (MPS) in late 2000. The project proposal set out a programme of work that enabled the MPS to identify the information on hate crime they held in their own data systems. Analysis of this data created a problem profile1 of hate crime2 and domestic violence in London as it was recorded by the MPS. This analysis became the basis for creating new strategies, in particular for the policing of domestic violence and its links to the prevention of domestic homi- cides. For me, this project was a prototype, an experiment in the use of routinely collected police data for the purposes of social science analysis that drives strategic thinking and policy. As a university professor and director of the ESRC3 Violence Research Programme (VRP), I managed the project in its first 14 months, joining the Prime Minister’s Office of Public Services Reform to work on public sector innovation. In September 2003 I returned to the MPS to put into practice across the whole of the organiza- tion the results of the work that I began in 2001. My reflections here draw on what I learned especially from the Home Office Crime Reduction Project. I add additional insight gained as a knowledgeable insider in government – that is, I learned first hand the way in which evidence is balanced with political imperatives to reduce crime. But I will not be registering the same levels of frustration as many of my colleagues who have contributed to this collection of articles. My experience is much different. I draw upon the lessons from the Home Office project on a daily basis in my role as Senior Advisor for Strategic Analysis in the MPS. Evidence-based advice can be generated from the rich source of data available within the police service. Such information informs policy, strat- egy and police practice. Moreover, creatively designed, such information now forms the basis for innovative performance management, informed by criminological insight. The idea for the project arose from discussions between the Diversity Directorate (MPS) and myself in early 2000. One of the many lessons flowing out of the ESRC VRP was that evidence about violence was held in many public sector organizations. Little of this information was analysed for the purposes of setting out the way in which an organization confronted violence. Much of the data was held in client records or files, whose purpose was biased towards the need to record what was relevant to the audit trail for the organizations. Names, events, locations, relationships, circumstances and so forth are, however, critical elements of knowing what the problem is that requires support, intervention and advice. I simply asked for the data held by the MPS to be supplied to meetings set up to discuss strategy and policy around hate crime and domestic violence. The problem was made clear at the first meeting. The information that was presented to the meeting as ‘data’ was a series of numbers, broken down by Criminal Justice 4(3)278 borough, but with no analysis. The MPS was hosting a high profile, international conference on domestic violence in October 2000. For that conference, I designed and implemented the first ‘Day to Count’ for domestic violence across all UK police service, alongside three other key providers of support to victims of domestic violence (Stanko, 2001). This project’s funding was announced immediately prior to my presentation of the findings of the day count to the international audience.4 Knowing more about hate crime: a methodology for asking better questions The project began with a simple premise. Too often crime prevention programmes take for granted the problem of crime. Geographic analysis of crime in local areas or counts of crime classifications are presumed to tell a story about a problem. The information offered by those who contact the police for help and recorded by the police as criminal incidents is an invaluable source of information. The MPS crime recording system in- cludes information on the victim, offender, description of the event, location, time of day and many other pieces of data. People’s experiences of intimidation, threat and bodily harm tell us a great deal about the way social relations, social privilege and social power converge in a request for help from a public body, such as the police. Understanding why people use the police – and why they might not – is a critical tool for strategic thinking about the problems coming to police attention. Public services are now expected to take a proactive approach to solving the public problems brought to their attention. Health services manage the inequities of sickness and death day in and day out. So too the education system not only teaches students, but also manages the learning environ- ments of a wide diversity of ‘learners’. The diversity of those receiving health and education benefits make the delivery of these services dependent on better information about ‘who uses these services’, and where the gaps in provision are. In many ways, information about police service provision is much cruder and less developed than other public sectors such as health and education. The promise of improvement in policing is underpinned by the adoption across the country of the National Intelligence Model, an evidence-based approach to setting priorities, devising appropriate tactics to reduce crime problems, which draw on intelligence, enforcement and crime prevention as the trilogy of good practice for better policing services. Initially, the project team met the same scepticism about data on violence that earlier ESRC studies had encountered (Lee and Stanko, 2003). By and large, there was an acceptance that violence is often hidden and, therefore, police information – the argument was – would only present a partial picture of domestic violence and hate crime in London. While this observation is largely true about violence in general, the project set out to Stanko: Reviewing the evidence of hate 279 change current police strategy and policy through an informed picture of what the police are currently recording as the problem of hate crime and domestic violence through the reports of victims. Violence is reported, day in and day out. Official police crime reports were not being explored for clues to what kind of action (or inaction) leads to successful or helpful interventions. Official police crime records were not being used to paint a picture of what kind of hate crime and domestic violence was coming to the attention of the police. Acutely aware that not all domestic and hate crimes are reported to the police, this project began with setting out to grasp what the MPS knows about the hate crime and domestic violence it records. As such, police documentation became a rich repository of the public’s need for protection against private and public violence. We began to interrogate crime data to tell us about the circumstances that led to people contacting the police. We explored why, when and where violence happened. The MPS crime records hold robust data on: • Profiles of victims who contact the police (age, race, gender and so forth); • Profiles of offenders (single, two or more, age, race); • Profiles of places where offences occur; • Profiles of what happened and the range of crime classifications used to record such incidents; • Whether and what type of weapons are involved; • Repeat victimization/seriousness of incidents; • Whether an arrest resulted; • Post-arrest decisions and criminal justice outcomes (although these are not always routinely recorded). The CRP project set out to understand the nature of hate crime and domestic violence through knowledge about its victims, the nature of the victimization, the dimensions of offending behaviours, and its variation across local areas (boroughs). This understanding could be used to shed light on the current capacity of the MPS Community Safety Units (CSU), located in each of its 32 boroughs. The CSUs had responsibility for the follow up response to victims of hate crime and domestic violence across the MPS. Assessments of the training needs, resources and other support would then be informed by an analysis of the nature of the problem as presented by Londoners to the MPS. The MPS could then consider whether it is responding appropriately to the needs of users who do contact them; monitor the changes in the patterns of need; and explore whether they have the appropriate resources in place to provide the most efficient and effective assistance. In effect, the project was setting up the evidence to create the capacity in the MPS to ground their policy and strategy. The project developed a number of methodologies to examine common themes and patterns in the crime data. These included: • A quantitative analysis of the MPS ‘flagged’ offences for domestic violence and hate crime;5 Criminal Justice 4(3)280 • An in-depth qualitative analysis of events occurring over a random 24-hour time period (‘Snapshot Day’) to provide context and richness to the overall patterns identified in the quantitative analysis; • Qualitative analysis of the ‘more’ serious incidents (such as domestic sexual assaults, GBH, ABH and homicides), to explore the commonalties and differences in the patterns of ‘seriousness’ to inform assessments of the dangerousness of offenders and the risk of lethal danger. Hate crime – in the way in which the MPS approaches the problem – includes several different things. It involves a variety of criminal and anti- social behaviour – ranging from serious personal attacks, criminal damage, graffiti and other abusive acts. There is an assumption that racist violence, faith violence, and homophobic violence seem to have similar motivation. Many presume that distance, dissimilarity, and unfamiliarity motivates hatred. In terms of racist and homophobic violence, people call the MPS most often about the behaviour of their neighbours, business associates and other acquaintances. The kinds of incidents that come to police attention – be they threat, attack and abuse – are the kinds of encounters that are often difficult to avoid. People live and work, day in and day out, within the contexts of threat and danger. In some respects, homophobic and racist violence overlaps with domestic violence because of the common ground of familiarity between the victim and the offender. Domestic violence has many different patterns – proximity and familiarity provides the over- arching context. Gender, intimacy, power, sometimes mixed problems associated with mental health, substance abuse, financial difficulties and cultural factors, combine to require people to reach out for assistance in ‘private matters’. The findings about the routine nature of so much of the racist and homophobic violence in London demonstrated that intervention strategies that addressed the actions of neighbours and school children are likely to reach many of the problems of abuse people bring to police attention. Such strategies should lead to considerations about the use of police resources and those of the communities within which violence is challenged or thrives. We also discovered an important pattern while analysing the reporting of domestic sexual assault. While few of those who reported these incidents ever saw their assailants prosecuted, we uncovered the clues to acute and potentially lethal danger. Domestic sexual assault became a crime classification that held a critical key to intervention in the prevention of homicide.6 Problems lodged in familiarity: the challenge of crime prevention The CRP project enabled us to focus on the problem of hate crime and domestic violence in London. Responding to racist violence, homophobic violence and domestic violence are regular features of policing duties in the Stanko: Reviewing the evidence of hate 281 MPS. In 2003–4, over 105,000 reported incidents were recorded for domestic violence, nearly 15,000 incidents of racist violence, and over 1500 for homophobic violence. There is still no guarantee of consistency in applying the label ‘domestic’, ‘race’ and ‘homophobic’ violence to police crime recording. We must treat the above as an undercount. For broad- brush analyses – and for the purposes of evidence-led policy – I suggest that these data are capable of providing robust pictures of the kinds of hate crime and domestic violence people face in London. Three years following the launch of the project, the MPS data on hate crime and domestic violence suggest the following high level findings: • Recorded numbers of murder, rape, GBH and ABH have increased by 2 per cent over the past year; • The rise in other forms of recorded violence shows the influence of police willingness to record hate crime and domestic violence or are led by police activity (such as the increase in the number of people charged for carrying offensive weapons); • One in three recorded common assaults are domestic violence; one in four of all violence is domestic violence. According to the British Crime Survey (for the years 2002–3), the MPS has the second lowest reported violent crime level in England. However, more violence – as a crime type – is recorded by the MPS than all but one other police region in England. Evidence does not in itself frame strategic police responses but it does facilitate the framing of arguments for changes in policy and practice. As a result of our project, the detailed analysis of incidents of domestic violence challenged the MPS strategy and drove it in an innovative direction. The CRP project developed a methodology to link up routine police responses – more intensive intervention in some incidents coming to police attention – aimed to the prevention of lethal violence in domestic violence. The process was labour intensive, largely due to the cumbersome way in which information is divided among separate data systems. Intelligence, crime reports, national information systems on offenders and so forth are held in discrete databases (although we are currently working on a project that enables these to be joined up, at the time of writing such systems are not available). One of the project’s analysts7 scrutinized five databases to explore what the MPS ‘knows’ about domestic violence sexual assailants. The findings showed that almost half of the offenders had criminal records, ranging from sale of illegal drugs, burglary or robbery. Some of the assailants had convictions for sexual assaults to other women (including women who were not known to them). There were suspects named or wanted in murder inquiries. Using her skills as a behaviour analyst, the analyst judged one in 12 offenders (out of a pool of 175 offenders) as being very high risk and potentially very dangerous. Her analysis also told us about the women who reported domestic sexual assault. Nearly half of them were already separated or separating from the offender at the time Criminal Justice 4(3)282 of the assault. A handful of the women were pregnant at the time. Children were present in over one in five of the sexual assaults, with one in 20 witnessing the offence. The project paved the way for a more robust response in the MPS to potentially lethal domestic violence. It demonstrated through laborious analysis the possible ways to connect offenders’ heightened dangerousness and victim safety. Police intelligence systems are not yet capable of auto- matic alerts on dangerous offenders.8 Yet the police response to domestic sexual assault and other serious assaults in a domestic violence context is capable of providing more proactive intervention. Of the 175 domestic assaults reviewed, in 101 there was evidence that victims had reported domestic violence previously to police. The results of homicide reviews of domestic violence however suggests that police action alone will not be sufficient to put into action all the support necessary to prevent homicides. However, we do know that police are a critical part of the public sector provision of help. The project was never far away from the local politics of the provision of policing in London. Diversity at its core, the MPS is clearly now embracing policing in a lively, heterogeneous city. The politics of the debates around the intersection of policing ‘hate’ and domestic violence take place ‘in real time’, in public and with tricky and murky assumptions on all sides about how to actualize the aspirations for policing a safer London and prevent hate crime and domestic violence. As part of manag- ing the acute political context of policing, the MPS engages with permanent advisory groups for all three of the above issues. Such advisory groups sharpen the police understanding of ‘hidden’ aspects of these forms of offences. The dialogue about appropriate policing strategies is never end- ing; events and incidents of victimization frame policy and media scrutiny. Information is critical to keeping these debates informed. The provision of information has challenged the way a number of key stakeholders view the problem of hate crime, domestic violence and policing in London. For example, the finding that much of homophobic violence reported to the MPS was the outcome of neighbour disputes and harassment by local young people led to great debate in the Advisory Group. This finding, reproduced by other analysis of later data, under- scores the importance of sharing data with crime prevention partners. MPS strategy and practice is now informed by evidence on the way people use the MPS for assistance. Crime solving and intelligence gathering is also informed by knowing that victims who report racist and homophobic violence to police are most likely to be threatened by ‘locals’ – neighbours and school children are the commonest offenders for these forms of violence. Links with schools and dispute mediation projects are critical as part of any crime prevention efforts to reduce racist and homophobic violence. The CRP project demonstrates that multi-agency partnerships are ultimately the most comprehensive means of providing the broadest inter- vention strategies possible. It is virtually impossible to challenge hate crime Stanko: Reviewing the evidence of hate 283 and domestic violence without the participation of health, education, housing and social services. These public sector bodies, however, are not seamless providers addressing people’s needs. The MPS information con- tinues to be challenged by the need to know more: the gaps in good public protection against hate crime and domestic violence must be able to be sensitive to analysis that shows the different needs of vulnerable groups. For this we are often hampered, due to the limitations of the crime recording system. Performance management, crime analysis and accountability to change The Home Office CRP should be judged on whether it has made a difference – from crime reduction to the kinds of service people receive from the police. The routine capture of information does not in itself guarantee that the practice of or policy in policing changes as a result. Challenging police practice requires strategic thinking and motivation to improve police performance in the delivery of policing services to the public. Today’s discourse within the Home Office in 2004 is that of crime reduction and the targeting of prolific offenders and offending. The impact of the Treasury’s Public Service Agreements over the past five years is to move away from a debate about ‘what works’ to a debate about ‘deliver- ing’ what works. What is missing from the CRP is a framework for monitoring a sustained change in police performance. The Police Perform- ance Assessment Framework (PPAF) monitors changes in overall numbers and rates of some forms of crime. PPAF does not have any way of exploring the detail of what is driving the change. Police services are expected to capture good practice, and compare its own practice with those police services that are achieving best results in the reduction of crime. We know that, for instance, burglary is declining across the country. But on a day-to- day basis, we have no way of examining – in a robust and routine way – what is contributing to this decline to encourage best practice. Can we answer the question: are the burglars changing or is it the crime of burglary itself no longer a viable way of acquiring money for many offenders? It may be that the market for stolen goods has changed (most household goods are more affordable); household protection may have improved (with double glazing and lever locks); and the offenders may be choosing other ways of acquiring money illegally (robbery and shop theft might be less risky). We must be able to harness our own information to evidence crime reduction, and what drives reduction in order to embrace continuous improvement in policing services. The CRP project set out an approach to facilitate the linking of crime analysis with performance management. The approach devised for the hate crime and domestic project can be used across all crime types on a regular Criminal Justice 4(3)284 basis. The MPS explores its crime records to see if the MPS is making an impact on the victimization of vulnerable groups, for example. If we know that victims of serious hate crime and domestic violence are often and repeatedly victims, the MPS can document whether these repeat victims continue to ask for police assistance. Further, police data can examine whether those who ask for police assistance can be better supported, helped or provided with competent, sympathetic advice. The MPS can challenge why official knowledge about violence is not often translated into action that supports, helps or creates policy to reduce violence. From my experience of working on the ‘inside’, police managers need information that enables the best guidance towards tactics that challenge the way crime happens. Problem-oriented policing has been around for nearly three decades. What has changed in these decades is our capability to analyse large sets of data. This opens the opportunity to ask better questions and use the recorded information we have available as the result of routine use of public services by the public. Conclusion In many respects, my experience as a recipient of a CRP grant has been a positive one. Perhaps it is because it began as a true partnership with the police, albeit one that successfully challenged and continues to challenge the everyday practices of policing. Perhaps because as a civilian and an academic expert in my field, I raised questions and broke through barriers those ‘inside’ the police service could not. I was able to direct questions, search and interrogate the evidence, and challenge current practice. Al- though there are many parts of the MPS that have not yet benefited from this project directly, there are signs that business as usual is beginning to change across the board. Colleagues speak of ‘evidence’ and the need for ‘data’ to inform their policies and strategies to fulfil the expectations that police strategy be informed through the National Intelligence Model. Notes 1 Under the National Intelligence Model, a problem profile describes an analysis of a problem facing policing. The information enables the police to design strategy to address the problem that is led by evidence. The National Intelligence Model is being adopted across the police service in England and Wales. 2 Hate crime in London included racist and faith motivated violence as well as homophobic violence. 3 Economic and Social Research Council, the largest funder of social science research in the UK, sponsored the Violence Research Programme from 1997 to 2002. Stanko: Reviewing the evidence of hate 285 4 This project is one of those ‘windows of opportunity’ in its timing, particularly in respect to the growing recognition of domestic violence as a major crime problem. 5 The MPS identifies, through flagging, domestic violence and hate crime in particular, so that it can be recognized as a ‘special’ kind of violence or other crime type. 6 See Stanko et al. (2003) 7 Laura Richards is now leading the MPS Homicide Prevention Unit, folding this methodology across 13 different types of homicide. 8 See the findings of the Bichard Inquiry, published June 2004. References Lee, R.M. and E.A. Stanko (eds) (2003) Researching Violence. London: Routledge. Stanko, E.A. (2001) ‘The Day to Count: Reflections on a Methodology to Raise Awareness About the Impact of Domestic Violence in the UK’, Criminal Justice 1(2): 215–26. Stanko, E.A., V. Kielinger, S. Paterson, L. Richards, D. Crisp and L. Marsland (2003) ‘Grounded Crime Prevention: Responding to and Understanding Hate Crime’, in H. Kury and J. Obergfell-Fuchs (eds) Crime Prevention: New Approaches, pp. 123–52. Mainz: Weisser Ring. ELIZABETH A. STANKO has joined the Metropolitan Police, London, as its Senior Advisor for Strategic Analysis after over 25 years of university life. As an academic, she has contributed to rethinking domestic and other violence in order to change social policy and police practice. Formerly the Director of the ESRC Violence Research Programme, she is still affiliated with Royal Holloway, University of London, UK. Criminal Justice 4(3)286 
work_ucwxdgxsbfgkra3kb7u7h5uzpa	----	Arabs and Muslims in the Media after 9/11: Representational Strategies for a “Postrace” Era Evelyn Alsultany American Quarterly, Volume 65, Number 1, March 2013, pp. 161-169 (Article) Published by The Johns Hopkins University Press DOI: 10.1353/aq.2013.0008 For additional information about this article Access provided by University of Michigan @ Ann Arbor (21 Oct 2013 10:05 GMT) http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/aq/summary/v065/65.1.alsultany.html http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/aq/summary/v065/65.1.alsultany.html | 161 Arabs, Muslims, and “Post-race” Representations after 9/11 ©2013 The American Studies Association Arabs and Muslims in the Media after 9/11: Representational Strategies for a “Postrace” Era Evelyn Alsultany A fter 9/11 a strange thing happened: there was an increase in sym- pathetic portrayals of Arabs and Muslims on US television. If a TV drama or Hollywood film represented an Arab or Muslim as a terror- ist, then the story line usually included a “positive” representation of an Arab or Muslim to offset the negative depiction. Dozens of TV dramas portrayed Arab and Muslim Americans as the unjust target of hate crimes or as patriotic US citizens. President George W. Bush was sure to distinguish between Arab and Muslim “friends” and “enemies,” stating “the enemy of America is not our many Muslim friends; it is not our many Arab friends. Our enemy is a radical network of terrorists, and every government that supports them.”1 News reporters interviewed Arab and Muslim Americans, seemingly eager to include their perspectives on the terrorist attacks, careful to point out their experiences with hate crimes. Yet at the same time that sympathetic portrayals of Arab and Muslim Americans proliferated on US commercial television in the weeks, months, and years after 9/11, hate crimes, workplace discrimination, bias incidents, and airline discrimination targeting Arab and Muslim Americans increased exponentially. According to the FBI, hate crimes against Arabs and Muslims multiplied by 1,600 percent from 2000 to 2001.2 In just the first weeks and months after 9/11, the Council on American-Islamic Relations, the American- Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, and other organizations documented hundreds of violent incidents experienced by Arab and Muslim Americans and people mistaken for Arabs or Muslims, including several murders. Dozens of airline passengers perceived to be Arab or Muslim were removed from flights. Hundreds of Arab and Muslim Americans reported discrimination at work, receiving hate mail, and physical assaults, and their property, mosques, and community centers vandalized or set on fire.3 In the decade after 9/11, such discriminatory acts have persisted. | 162 American Quarterly In addition to individual citizens taking the law into their own hands, the US government passed legislation that targeted Arabs and Muslims (both inside and outside the United States) and legalized the suspension of constitutional rights.4 The government’s overt propaganda of war was palatable to many citizens on edge and regarded with suspicion by others as the government passed the USA PATRIOT Act, initiated war in Afghanistan and later in Iraq, and explained the terrorist attacks to the public by stating “they hate us for our freedom.” Given that Arabs and Muslims have been stereotyped for over a century, given that 9/11 was such an opportune moment for further stereotyping, given that the US government passed domestic and foreign policies that compromised the civil and human rights of Arabs and Muslims, and given that demonizing the enemy during times of war has been commonplace, why would sympathetic portrayals appear during such a fraught moment? As overt war propaganda has become increasingly transparent and ineffective over the decades since World War II and the Cold War, the production and circulation of “positive” representations of the “enemy” have become essential to projecting the United States as benevolent, especially in its declaration of war and passage of racist policies. Positive representations of Arabs and Muslims have helped form a new kind of racism, one that projects antiracism and multiculturalism on the surface but simultaneously produces the logics and affects necessary to legitimize racist policies and practices.5 It is no longer the case that the other is explicitly demonized to justify war or injustice. Now the other is portrayed sympathetically in order to project the United States as an enlightened country that has entered a postrace era. The representational mode that has become standard since 9/11 seeks to balance a negative representation with a positive one, what I refer to as “simpli- fied complex representations.” These are strategies used by television producers, writers, and directors to give the impression that the representations they are producing are complex, yet they do so in a simplified way. These predictable strategies can be relied on if the plot involves an Arab or Muslim terrorist, but are a new standard alternative to (and seem a great improvement on) the stock ethnic villains of the past. I argue that simplified complex representa- tions are the representational mode of the so-called postrace era, signifying a new standard of racial representations. These representations often challenge or complicate earlier stereotypes yet contribute to a multicultural or postrace illusion. Simplified complex representations have taken numerous forms in TV dramas and news reporting, some of which I outline here to highlight the various mechanisms through which positive imagery of Arabs and Muslims | 163 Arabs, Muslims, and “Post-race” Representations after 9/11 can operate to justify discrimination, mistreatment, and war against Arabs and Muslims. Simplified Complex Representations in TV Dramas Watching dozens of television shows between 2001 and 2009, it becomes evident that writers have increasingly created “positive” Arab and Muslim characters to show that they are sensitive to negative stereotyping. Such positive representations have taken several forms, such as a patriotic Arab or Muslim American, an Arab or Muslim who is willing to help the United States fight terrorism, or an innocent Arab or Muslim American who is the victim of post- 9/11 hate crimes. If an Arab/Muslim terrorist is represented in the story line of a TV drama or film, then a “positive” representation of an Arab, Muslim, Arab American, or Muslim American is typically included, seemingly to subvert the stereotype of the terrorist. Examples of patriotic Arab or Muslim American characters who assist the US government in its fight against terrorism, either as a government agent or civilian, include Mohammad “Mo” Hassain, an Arab American Muslim character who is part of the USA Homeland Security Force on the show Threat Matrix, and Nadia Yassir, a dedicated member of the Counter Terrorist Unit on season 6 of 24.6 In Sleeper Cell the “good” Muslim is the lead African American character, Darwyn Al-Sayeed, an undercover FBI agent who proclaims to his colleagues that terrorists have nothing to do with his faith and cautions them not to confuse the two.7 This strategy challenges the notion that Arabs and Muslims are not American and/or un-American. Judging from the numbers of these patriots, it appears that writers have embraced this strategy as the most direct method to counteract potential charges of stereotyping. Multiple stories appeared on TV dramas with Arab or Muslim Americans as the unjust targets of hate—as victims of violence and harassment. The viewer is nearly always positioned to sympathize with their plight. In an episode of The Practice, the government detains an innocent Arab American without due process or explanation and an attorney steps in to defend his rights.8 On another episode of The Practice, an Arab American man is barred from being a passenger on an airplane, and it is debated in court whether airlines have the right to discriminate in a post-9/11 world in which Arab and Muslim identities are considered a security threat.9 This emphasis on victimization and sympathy challenges long-standing representations of Arabs and Muslims as terrorists that have inspired a lack of sympathy and even a sense of celebration when the Arab or Muslim character is killed.10 | 164 American Quarterly However, many of these sympathetic portrayals of Arabs and Muslims do the ideological work of justifying discriminatory policies. For example, a TV drama that portrays an Arab American as the unjust victim of post-9/11 dis- crimination often appears in a story line that concludes that it is unfortunate but inevitable that Arabs and Muslims will have to deal with discrimination because of the exceptional national security crisis. So, on the one hand, we have unusually sympathetic portrayals of Arabs and Muslims on network tele- vision. And on the other, the image often appears in a narrative that justifies discrimination against them. Furthermore, the inclusion of positive representa- tions of Arabs and Muslims come in limited forms: patriotic Americans and victimized Americans. In addition to Arab and Muslim patriots and victims, TV dramas use nu- merous devices to circumvent the charge of stereotyping, including flipping the enemy and fictionalizing the country of the enemy. “Flipping the enemy” involves leading the viewer to believe that Muslim terrorists are plotting to destroy the United States, and then revealing that those Muslims are merely pawns or a front for Euro-American or European terrorists. The enemy’s iden- tity is thus flipped: viewers discover that the terrorist is not Arab, or they find that the Arab or Muslim terrorist is part of a larger network of international terrorists. During season 2 of 24, Counter Terrorism Unit agent Jack Bauer spends the first half of the season tracking down a Middle Eastern terrorist cell, ultimately subverting a nuclear attack. In the second half of the season, we discover that European and Euro-American businessmen are behind the attack, goading the United States to declare a war on the Middle East in or- der to benefit from the increase in oil prices.11 By including multiple terrorist identities, this strategy seeks to challenge the idea that terrorism is an Arab or Muslim monopoly. It has become increasingly common for the country of the terrorist characters in television dramas to go unnamed. This strategy rests on the assumption that leaving the nationality of the villain blank eliminates potential offensiveness; if no particular country or ethnicity is named, then there is less reason for any particular group to be offended by the portrayal. In season 4 of 24, the terrorist family is from an unnamed Middle Eastern country. They are possibly from Turkey, but where exactly is never stated; it is, we assume, intentionally left ambiguous.12 In The West Wing, the fictional country “Qumar” is a source of terrorist plots; in season 8 of 24, it is “Kamistan.” Fictionalizing the country of the terrorist can give a show more latitude in creating salacious story lines that might be criticized if identified with an actual country. | 165 Arabs, Muslims, and “Post-race” Representations after 9/11 Despite the shift away from the more blatant stereotypes of previous decades, Arab and Muslim identities are still understood and evaluated primarily in rela- tion to terrorism. This binary focus, in turn, overpowers the strategies described above. Though some television writers and producers might desire to create innovative shows, devoid of stereotypes, such efforts are overwhelmed by the sheer momentum of the current representational scheme. Representations of Arab and Muslim identities in contexts that have nothing to do with terrorism remain strikingly unusual in American commercial media.13 Simplified Complex Representations in News Reporting Versions of simplified complex representations that commonly appear in news reporting include the use of disclaimers and native informants, often found in stories about oppressed Muslim women. An examination of representations of Arab and Muslim women in the commercial news media after 9/11 reveals an overwhelming number of stories about the oppression of Muslim women. Within a year after 9/11, headlines often read as follows: “Lifting the Veil,” “Free to Choose,” “Unveiling Freedom,” “Under the Veil,” “Beneath the Veil,” and “Unveiled Threat.”14 Journalists promised to take viewers “behind the veil” to reveal a secret, hidden, mysterious world that would shed light on why Arabs/Muslims are terrorists. The oppression of women is framed as providing insight, a vital clue, into why terrorism occurs. What is revealed “behind the veil”? An assault of evidence is then presented, testifying to the oppressive and backward nature of Islam, especially when it comes to women. Story after story chronicles Muslim women dying in “honor killings”; facing female genital mutilation; being beaten on the streets of Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia for violating the dress code; sentenced to death for adultery and be- ing buried alive in the ground or stoned to death; beaten for disobeying their husbands; raped by male family members; and being unable to get a divorce or child custody rights.15 A November 2001 article in Time magazine, “The Women of Islam,” by Lisa Beyer, is one example of how journalists use simplified complex repre- sentational strategies while advancing a monolithic image of Islam as brutal, violent, and oppressive.16 The article’s subtitle reads: “The Taliban perfected subjugation. But nowhere in the Muslim world are women treated as equals.” The article begins with a few concessions, stating that the prophet Muhammad was a feminist who improved the status of women in the seventh century. The author also writes: | 166 American Quarterly While it is impossible, given their diversity, to paint one picture of women living under Islam today, it is clear that the religion has been used in most Muslim countries not to liberate but to entrench inequality. The Taliban, with its fanatical subjugation of the female sex, occupies an extreme, but it nevertheless belongs on a continuum that includes, not so far down the line, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Pakistan and the relatively moderate states of Egypt and Jordan. Where Muslims have afforded women the greatest degree of equality—in Turkey—they have done so by overthrowing Islamic precepts in favor of secular rule. As Riffat Hassan, professor of religious studies at the University of Louisville, puts it, “The way Islam has been practiced in most Muslim societies for centuries has left millions of Muslim women with battered bodies, minds and souls.”17 Journalists often begin with a disclaimer—“It is impossible to capture the diversity of the Muslim world,” or “These are not Islamic practices”—before presenting an onslaught of evidence to prove the brutality of Islam. The disclaimer signals that the journalist is aware of the diversity of Muslim lived experiences and is making an effort to present a semblance of sensitivity and awareness. While lip service is paid to diversity and complexity, the vast major- ity of evidence supports the opposite idea. In addition to using disclaimers to signal that the news media do not intend to contribute to a monolithic portrait of Islam, and selectively including and excluding particular aspects of the context to understand the oppressed Mus- lim woman, another important simplified complex representational strategy is the use of native informants. This is evident in how the above quote by the Islamic feminist scholar Riffat Hassan is used. Several Muslim women, includ- ing Nonie Darwish, Wafa Sultan, and Ayaan Hirsi Ali, have made successful careers as women who have defected from Islam and become spokespersons for its inherent backwardness. While the oppressed Muslim woman narrative has cross-ideological appeal and has been taken up as a cause by both the Right and the Left, these native informants collaborate with right-wing agendas that aim not only to help oppressed women but also to denounce Islam entirely. Darwish, an Egyptian, is the founder of Arabs for Israel, the director of Former Muslims United, and the author of two books arguing that Islam is a retro- grade religion.18 Sultan, a Syrian, claims that Islam promotes violence; she is the author of a book titled A God Who Hates.19 Hirsi Ali, a Somali, embraced atheism after 9/11; she has written numerous books in which she argues that Islam is incompatible with democracy.20 In a guest appearance on CNN’s Anderson Cooper 360, Hirsi Ali commented on a case in which a woman in Saudi Arabia was raped and punished with two hundred lashes. In response to a question about what life is like for women in Saudi Arabia, Hirsi Ali said: | 167 Arabs, Muslims, and “Post-race” Representations after 9/11 For all women, the reality is stay in the house unless you have a pressing need to go outside. If you have a pressing need to go out you must wear the veil. If you marry, your husband can say three times, “I divorce you,” and you are divorced. The other way around is not possible. The problem of child brides in Saudi Arabia is as common as drinking espresso coffee in Italy. It is because the Prophet Muhammad married a nine-year-old girl, every man in Saudi Arabia feels that he can marry a minor or he can marry off his daughter who is underage. You will be stoned, flogged if you commit or give the impression that you may have committed adultery. It is not nice being a woman in Saudi Arabia.21 Hirsi Ali’s insider status authenticates her narrative. Moustafa Bayoumi argues that these Muslim women commentators are modern-day neo-orientalists who narrate stories about Islam for Western consumption. The stories they tell are about Islam as a system of tyranny that defeats human liberty and the subsequent need to either renounce or drastically reform Islam to be more like Christianity, Judaism, or even atheism.22 These female native informants are a version of the “good Muslim” who confirms to Western viewers that Islam poses a threat to women and to the West. Sunaina Maira writes, “By definition, ‘good’ Muslims are public Muslims who can offer first-person testimonials, in the mode of the native informant, about the oppression of women in Islam, . . . and the hatred, racism, and anti-Semitism of Arabs and Muslims. These Mus- lim spokespersons are the darlings of the Right-wing and mainstream media, publish widely distributed books, and have slick websites.”23 While there are male Muslim spokespersons, it is the women specifically who authenticate a Western feminist narrative about Islam. These female spokespersons are often regarded and praised by the news media as “moderate Muslims.”24 My point here is not that we should not feel outrage at human rights abuses and injustice. Rather, my point is that pity for the oppressed Muslim woman has been strategically used to advance US imperialism. This highly mediated evocation of outrage for the plight of the oppressed Muslim woman inspires support of US interventions in Arab and Muslim countries. It is no coincidence that inspiring outrage at the impact of US foreign policies—from sanctions in Iraq that killed approximately five hundred thousand children to the ongo- ing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan that have killed over one hundred thousand civilians to the detention of hundreds of Muslims at Guantánamo Bay prison without being charged—is not part of the regular news cycle. Sympathy for Muslim women operates to justify withholding sympathy for Muslim men because they presumably deserve to be in Guantánamo or Abu Ghraib. Arab and Muslim victims emerge as particularly important to simplified complex representations because they allow viewers to feel for “the enemy.” The growth of this affect in turn comes to symbolize multicultural progress. | 168 American Quarterly Rather than demonize all Arabs and Muslims, having sympathy for some of them reflects an enlightened culture that can distinguish between the “good” and “bad” ones. The continued support of US empire after 9/11 has been made possible partly through the use of disclaimers, native informants, and other simplified complex representations that signal that the United States has achieved a postrace society that no longer discriminates. Notes 1. George W. Bush, “Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People,” September 20, 2001, www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920–8.html. 2. See, for example, American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, “Report on Hate Crimes and Discrimination against Arab Americans: The Post-September 11 Backlash” (Washington, DC: American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee Research Institute, 2003), www.adc.org/hatecrimes/ pdf/2003_report_web.pdf. 3. Ibid. 4. For a summary of government initiatives after 9/11, see Anny Bakalian and Mehdi Bozorgmehr, Backlash 9/11: Middle Eastern and Muslim Americans Respond (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009), 253–65. 5. I am building here on arguments made, for example, in the following: Howard Winant, The New Politics of Race: Globalism, Difference, Justice (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2004); Jodi Melamed, “The Spirit of Neoliberalism: From Racial Liberalism to Neoliberal Multiculturalism,” Social Text, no. 89 (2006): 1–24; and Eduardo Bonilla-Silva, Racism without Racists: Color-Blind Racism and the Persistence of Racial Inequality in the United States, 2nd ed. (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2006). 6. Threat Matrix, ABC, September 18, 2003–January 29, 2004; 24, FOX, season 6, January 14–May 21, 2007. 7. “Al-Fatiha,” Sleeper Cell, Showtime, season 1, episode 1, December 4, 2005. 8. “Inter Arma Silent Leges,” The Practice, ABC, season 6, episode 9, December 9, 2001. 9. “Bad to Worse,” The Practice, ABC, season 7, episode 8, December 1, 2002. 10. For more on the history of representations of Arabs, see Jack G. Shaheen, Reel Bad Arabs: How Hol- lywood Vilifies a People (Northampton, MA: Interlink Publishing Group, 2001). 11. “Day 2,” 24, FOX, October 28, 2002–May 20, 2003. 12. “Day 4: 7am–8am,” 24, FOX, January 9, 2005. 13. Even post-9/11 films with positive representation of Arabs and Muslim characters, such as The Visi- tor (2007) and Sorry, Haters (2005), are framed in the context of 9/11. Little Mosque on the Prairie (2007–2012), a sitcom televised by the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, has not crossed over into the United States. Three sitcoms have been a departure from the 9/11 context: Whoopi! (NBC, 2003–4); Aliens in America (CW, 2007–8); and Community (NBC, 2009–present). 14. “Lifting the Veil,” CNN Newsnight, November 20, 2001; “Free to Choose,” “Unveiling Freedom,” CNN Newsnight, December 3, 2001; “Under the Veil,” ABC, Nightline, October 26, 2006; Anna Mulrine, “Unveiled Threat: The Taliban Is Relentless in Its Oppression of Afghan Women,” U.S. News & World Report, October 15, 2001, 32–34; Richard Lacayo, “Lifting the Veil,” Time, December 3, 2001, 34–49; and “Beneath the Veil,” CNN Newsnight, September 13, 2002. 15. See, for example, Richard Lacayo, Hannah Beech, Hannah Bloch, Matthew Forney, Terry McCar- thy, Jeff Chu, Jeffrey Ressner, Alex Perry, Tim McGirk, and John F. Dickerson, “About Face,” Time, December 3, 2001, www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1001344,00.html; and David Van Biema, Marguerite Michaels, and Nadia Mustafa, “Islam: In the U.S.: Freer, But Not Friedan,” Time, December 3, 2001, www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1001348,00.html#ixzz0r2vh2irx. | 169 Arabs, Muslims, and “Post-race” Representations after 9/11 16. Lisa Beyer, “The Women of Islam,” Time, November 25, 2001, www.time.com/time/world/ar- ticle/0,8599,185647,00.html. 17. Ibid. 18. Nonie Darwish, Now They Call Me Infidel: Why I Renounced Jihad for America, Israel, and the War on Terror (New York: Sentinel HC, 2006); and Darwish, Cruel and Usual Punishment: The Terrifying Global Implications of Islamic Law (Nashville, TN: Thomas Nelson, 2008). 19. Wafa Sultan, A God Who Hates (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2009). 20. Ayaan Hirsi Ali, Infidel (New York: Free Press, 2007). 21. “Crime and Punishment/Saudi Arabian Rape Case/Ali Interview,” Anderson Cooper 360, CNN, November 29, 2007. 22. Moustafa Bayoumi, “The God That Failed: The Neo-Orientalism of Today’s Muslim Commentators,” in Islamophobia/Islamophilia: Beyond the Politics of Enemy and Friend, ed. Andrew Shryock (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010), 79–93. 23. Sunaina Maira, “‘Good’ and ‘Bad’ Muslim Citizens: Feminists, Terrorists, and U.S. Orientalisms,” Feminist Studies 35.3 (2009): 631–56. 24. Ibid. 
work_uej6ojyj55bl7edwalou362iim	----	jech-2019-213712 1..2 Commentary in response to ‘characterising the risk of homicide in a population-based cohort’ (O’Neill et al, 2019) Susitha Wanigaratne ,1,2,3 Farah N Mawani ,3,4 Patricia O’Campo,3,5 Donald C Cole,5 Sureya Ibrahim,6 Carles Muntaner5,7,8 We are social epidemiologists and commu- nity advocates focused on addressing social determinants of health inequities. While we appreciate O’Neill et al’s effort to link multiple provincial-level adminis- trative data sets to examine homicide vic- timisation by immigration status in Ontario, Canada, we have concerns about the framing and interpretation of findings and their potential impact on immigrants and refugees.1 FRAMING AND APPROACH While O’Neill et al’s data and sample size are strengths, the attention to the context of being an immigrant to Canada, theore- tical framework and motivation for exam- ining immigrants in relation to homicide victimisation are not fully developed. O’Neill et al do not acknowledge having done any community engagement which is critical and ethical2 given the long history of exclusion, exploitation, racism and dis- crimination, and the current global climate of increasing criminalisation of migrants. Meaningful community engagement offers important context; helps shape the research purpose, questions, approach, interpretation and recommendations; and can reduce the potential for harm. Though criminalisation of migration under security pretexts is an infringement of international law,3 and contradicts evi- dence that immigration is related to a reduction in crime,4 many high-income countries, including Canada, are framing harmful immigration policy (eg, restricting entry, detaining immigrants) as an urgent need to protect against threats of safety and security,4 5 disproportionately target- ing racialised and Muslim immigrants and refugees. Within this policy context, along with political rhetoric to generate support for it, hate crimes are at record highs in Canada, with approximately 85% of these crimes motivated by racism and ethnic or religious discrimination.6 Not only does this paper fail to consider this context, the statements that immi- grant communities are ‘predisposed to violence’ without evidence to support this claim; the conflation of perpetrating and dying by homicide, by alternating between the use of ‘homicide’ and ‘homi- cide victimisation’; and the suggestion that ‘cultural views on gender’ increase risk of violence and homicide victimisa- tion against immigrant women, are parti- cularly harmful. RESULTS AND INTERPRETATION The authors’ emphasis on the increased risk of homicide victimisation of female and male refugees compared to long-term resi- dents is misleading given that these results are not statistically significant. The authors argue that the findings are important regard- less of significance, because of large effect sizes. But for many researchers, effect sizes of 1.31 and 1.23, respectively, would be considered small to medium and would lead to a much more cautious interpretation. The authors’ interpretation that non- refugee immigrants have a lower risk of homicide victimisation because Canada’s immigration policies select for highly edu- cated and healthy immigrants reflects pro- blems with the theory informing this research, since homicide victimisation is not within the control of an individual. Social epidemiology was founded on the need to theorise political, economic and cul- tural context over and above individual characteristics.7 A concerning omission is that there is no mention of the potential for hate crimes6 to be at least partially respon- sible for homicide victimisation among refu- gees and immigrants. Additionally, in the text, it is left unclear how a refugee’s history of ‘violence, trauma and torture’ and ‘depression and psychosocial illness’ are linked to homicide victimisation. Such unsupported statements omit essential con- sideration that Canadian neighbourhoods are heterogeneous combinations of refugees, non-refugees and long-term residents and that violence occurs within a social context which includes racism, xenophobia and Islamophobia.8 With the study’s low counts of homi- cide victimisations among refugees (31 among females and 89 among males over 20 years), 90% of all homicide victi- misations in the same time period occur- ring among long-term residents (table 1 of paper), and no clear data pointing to specific factors to intervene upon, we argue that this potential in excess homi- cide victimisation does not warrant tar- geted homicide prevention strategies, as the authors suggest. Broader prevention strategies targeting the entire population (eg, a national ban on handguns and assault weapons,9 10 implementing Canada’s Anti-Racism Strategy8) may be more beneficial in reducing homicide victimisation. POTENTIAL IMPACT We are concerned that the paper’s framing, approach and interpretation could nega- tively impact immigrant and refugee com- munities targeted by significant racism, anti-immigrant sentiment and Islamophobia at policy, practice, commu- nity and individual levels.6 11 Community engagement from the start, and compre- hensive multi-level, multistage social deter- minants of immigrant health framework,11 could have prevented misinterpretations of the findings and this potential for harm. It could have also shifted the approach from a deficit- to an asset-based one that recog- nises the leadership and impacts of women who founded groups such as Mothers for Peace12 and Mending a Crack in the Sky.13 These groups combat the stigmatisation of mothers and families that have lost children to violence; support mothers and families 1Child Health Evaluative Sciences, Hospital for Sick Children, Toronto, Canada 2Institute for Clinical Evaluative Sciences, Toronto, Canada 3MAP Centre for Urban Health Solutions, Unity Health Toronto, Toronto, Canada 4Faculty of Environmental Studies, York University, Toronto, Canada 5Dalla Lana School of Public Health, University of Toronto, Toronto, Canada 6Mothers for Peace, TD Centre of Learning & Development Regent Park, Toronto, Canada 7Bloomberg Faculty of Nursing, University of Toronto, Toronto, Canada 8Department of Mental Health, Johns Hopkins University Bloomberg School of Public Health, Baltimore, USA Correspondence to Susitha Wanigaratne, Child Health Evaluative Sciences, The Hospital for Sick Children, Toronto, Canada; susitha.wanigaratne@ sickkids.ca and Farah Mawani, MAP Centre for Urban Health Solutions, Toronto, Canada; farah.mawani@unityhealth.to SW and FNM are co-principal authors. Wanigaratne S, et al. J Epidemiol Community Health August 2020 Vol 0 No 00 1 Commentary o n A p ril 5 , 2 0 2 1 b y g u e st. P ro te cte d b y co p yrig h t. h ttp ://je ch .b m j.co m / J E p id e m io l C o m m u n ity H e a lth : first p u b lish e d a s 1 0 .1 1 3 6 /je ch -2 0 1 9 -2 1 3 7 1 2 o n 9 S e p te m b e r 2 0 2 0 . D o w n lo a d e d fro m http://orcid.org/0000-0003-0840-9006 http://orcid.org/0000-0003-4817-5099 mailto:susitha.wanigaratne@sickkids.ca mailto:susitha.wanigaratne@sickkids.ca mailto:susitha.wanigaratne@sickkids.ca http://jech.bmj.com/ experiencing ongoing trauma due to vio- lence; and advocate for policy and pro- gramme change to reduce poverty, violence and homicide for all people in Canada, a more inclusive public health approach. Twitter Farah Mawani @farah_way. Contributors SW and FNM conceived the commentary and contributed equally to the development of the initial draft. SW, FNM, PO, DCC, SI and CM edited, critically reviewed and approved the final content of the commentary. Funding The authors have not declared a specific grant for this research from any funding agency in the public, commercial or not-for-profit sectors. Competing interests None declared. Patient consent for publication Not required. Provenance and peer review Not commissioned; internally peer reviewed. Open access This is an open access article distributed in accordance with the Creative Commons Attribution Non Commercial (CC BY-NC 4.0) license, which permits others to distribute, remix, adapt, build upon this work non-commercially, and license their derivative works on different terms, provided the original work is properly cited, appropriate credit is given, any changes made indicated, and the use is non- commercial. See: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/ by-nc/4.0/. © Author(s) (or their employer(s)) 2020. Re-use permitted under CC BY-NC. No commercial re-use. See rights and permissions. Published by BMJ. To cite Wanigaratne S, et al. J Epidemiol Community Health 2020;0:1–2. ► http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/jech-2019-213249 J Epidemiol Community Health 2020;0:1–2. doi:10.1136/jech-2019-213712 ORCID iDs Susitha Wanigaratne http://orcid.org/0000-0003-0840- 9006 Farah N Mawani http://orcid.org/0000-0003-4817- 5099 REFERENCES 1 O’Neill M, Buajitti E, Donnelly PD, et al. Characterising risk of homicide in a population-based cohort. J Epidemiol Community Health 2019. 2 Flicker S, Travers R, Guta A, et al. Ethical dilemmas in community-based participatory research: recommen- dations for institutional review boards. J Urban Health 2007;84:478–93. 3 Ammar W. Migration and health: human rights in the era of populism. Lancet 2018;392:2526–8. 4 Ousey GC, Kubrin CE. Immigration and crime: assessing a contentious issue. Annu Rev Criminol 2018;1:63–84. 5 The Guardian. Sri Lankan Tamil refugees spark racism row in Canada. 2010. Available https://www.theguar dian.com/world/2010/sep/07/canada-tamil-refugees- racism-debate (accessed 15 Dec 2019) 6 Statistics Canada. Infographic: police-reported hate crime in Canada, 2017. 2018. Available https:// www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/pub/11-627-m/11-627- m2018051-eng.htm (accessed 16 Dec 2019) 7 Marmot MG. Improvement of social environment to improve health. Lancet 1998;351:57–60. 8 Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada. Building a foundation for change: Canada’s anti-racism strategy 2019–2022. 2019. Available https://www.canada.ca/en/ canadian-heritage/campaigns/anti-racism-engagement /anti-racism-strategy.html (accessed 17 Dec 2019) 9 Beattie S, David J-D, Roy JHomicide in Canada, 2017. 2018. Available https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/ pub/85-002-x/2018001/article/54980-eng.htm (accessed 16 Dec 2019) 10 Toronto Medical Officer of Health. Community violence in Toronto: a public health approach. 2019. Available http://app.toronto.ca/tmmis/viewAgendaItemHistory. do?item=2019.HL11.1# 11 Mawani FN. Conceptualization, measurement and association of underemployment to mental health inequities between immigrant and Canadian-born labour force participants. 2018. Available https:// tspace.library.utoronto.ca/handle/1807/89809 (accessed 19 Dec 2019) 12 Globe Staff. Gun violence in Toronto: a primer on this summer’s shootings and how politicians are responding. Globe Mail. 2018. Available https:// www.theglobeandmail.com/canada/toronto/article- toronto-gun-violence-gangs-police-explainer/ (accessed 17 Dec 2019) 13 Gillis W. Mending a crack in the sky. Tor. Star. 2019. Available https://www.thestar.com/amp/news/gta/2019/ 12/13/the-left-somalia-for-toronto-then-their-sons-were- killed-in-canada-these-west-end-mothers-say-theyre-now -not-scared-of-anything.html (accessed 17 Dec 2019) 2 Wanigaratne S, et al. 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work_uffsbhlhz5ejznr76a5npdts3y	----	Cyberhate on Social Media in the aftermath of Woolwich: A Case Study in Computational Criminology and Big Data © The Author 2015. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Centre for Crime and Justice Studies (ISTD). This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/), which permits unrestricted reuse, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. CYBERHATE ON SOCIAL MEDIA IN THE AFTERMATH OF WOOLWICH: A CASE STUDY IN COMPUTATIONAL CRIMINOLOGY AND BIG DATA Matthew L. Williams* and Pete Burnap This paper presents the first criminological analysis of an online social reaction to a crime event of national significance, in particular the detection and propagation of cyberhate on social media following a terrorist attack. We take the Woolwich, London terrorist attack in 2013 as our event of interest and draw on Cohen’s process of warning, impact, inventory and reaction to delineate a sequence of incidents that come to constitute a series of deviant responses following the attack. This paper adds to contemporary debates in criminology and the study of hate crime in three ways: (1) it provides the first analysis of the escalation, duration, diffusion and de-escalation of cyberhate in social media following a terrorist event; (2) it applies Cohen’s work on action, reaction and amplification and the role of the traditional media to the online context and (3) it introduces and provides a case study in ‘computational criminology’. Keywords: cyberhate, hate crime, social media, computational criminology, big data Introduction Recent research has shown that the prevalence and severity of offline crimes with a prej- udicial component are influenced in the short term by singular or clusters of events. In particular, terrorist acts have been found to function as antecedent ‘trigger’ events that ‘validate’ prejudicial sentiments and tensions, opening up a space for the spread of hostile beliefs and the mobilization of action as a result of the desire for retribution in the targeted group. This can manifest in the amplification or escalation of devi- ance towards groups that share similar characteristics to the perceived terrorist per- petrators. A focus on events has allowed researchers to study the escalation, duration, diffusion and de-escalation of offline hate crimes (Legewie 2013; Hanes and Machin 2014; King and Sutton 2014). While the evidence from these studies is compelling, they say little about the ebb and flow of contemporary forms of hate that manifest online. Despite cyberhate being evident from the birth of the domestic Internet (initially with the launch of the Stormfront website in 19951), it has only recently become identified as a social problem that requires addressing. The prominence of the problem is linked to the recognition that contemporary online spaces, such as social media platforms (e.g. Twitter), now represent a socio-technical assemblage that creates a new public sphere enabling digital citizenship through which key aspects of civil society are played out (Mossberger et al. 2008). The former UK Justice Secretary Chris Grayling announced *Matthew L. Williams, Social Data Science Lab, School of Social Sciences, Cardiff University, King Edward VII Avenue, Cardiff CF10 3WT, UK; WilliamsM7@cf.ac.uk; Matthew L. Williams  is a Reader in Computational Criminology at the Social Data Science Lab, School of Social Sciences, Cardiff University. Pete Burnap is a Lecturer in Computer Science at the Social Data Science Lab, School of Computer Science and Informatics, Cardiff University. 1 Stormfront existed in bulletin board format in the early 1990s before being reformed as a website. doi:10.1093/bjc/azv059 BRIT. J. CRIMINOL. (2016) 56, 211–238 Advance Access publication 25 June 2015 211 by guest on February 8, 2016 http://bjc.oxfordjournals.org/ D ow nloaded from mailto:WilliamsM7@cf.ac.uk?subject= http://bjc.oxfordjournals.org/ plans in 2014 to amend the Criminal Justice and Courts Bill to increase the maximum sentence for online abusive and hateful content from 6 to 24 months. Despite this rec- ognition, almost all the evidence on the manifestation and prevalence of cyberhate is anecdotal. No research to date has empirically studied the propagation of cyberhate; the escalation, duration, diffusion and de-escalation of hate speech on computer networks. This paper presents an analysis of cyberhate in social media networks following a ‘trig- ger’ event. Open and widely accessible social media technologies, such as Twitter, are increasingly being used by citizens on a global scale to publish content in reaction to real- world events. The rapid uptake of these technologies has resulted in a massive distributed ‘social sensor net’ that affords criminologists with the opportunity to identify, monitor and trace social reactions to events to the second in real time. The diffusion of informa- tion in these networks following events can manifest itself in a number of ways, ranging from support of social resilience through calls for assistance and advice (Morell et  al. 2011) to the socially disruptive, through the production and contagion of misinformation and antagonistic and prejudiced commentary (Williams et al. 2013; Burnap et al. 2014). We take the murder of Lee Rigby in the terrorist attack in Woolwich, London in 2013 as our event of interest to study the manifestation, prevalence and propagation of cyberhate. We draw on Cohen’s (1972) notion of action, reaction and amplification by applying the process of warning, impact, inventory and reaction to delineate a sequence of incidents that come to constitute a series of deviant social responses following the Woolwich terror attack. A computational criminological treatment of this process is possible through the collection and analysis of social media communications that are more voluminous and rapidly and continuously produced than newspaper headlines, interviews or surveys. Like Cohen, we advance the argument that the social response to an event is partly responsible for deepening its impact or causing new events through the cyclical process of action, reaction and amplification and postulate that social media reactions have the potential to act as a ‘force amplifier’ in contemporary forms of social response. This paper adds to contemporary debates in criminology and the study of hate in three distinct ways: (1) it provides the first analysis of the escalation, duration, diffusion and de-escalation of cyberhate in social media following a trigger event; (2) it applies Cohen’s work on action, reaction and amplification and the role of the traditional media to the online social media context and (3) it introduces and provides a case study in ‘computational criminology’ using Big Social Data. At the time of writing, this paper represents the first criminological analysis of an online social reaction to a major crime event, in particular the detection and propagation of cyberhate on social media following a terrorist attack. The manifestation and harms of cyberhate Cyberhate2 has manifested in online communications in various contexts since the Internet became popular among the general population in the mid-1990s (Williams 2006; Wall and Williams 2007). Defining cyberhate (in particular hate speech) is com- plex given cultural and linguistic variations. However, legal scholars have focussed on the expressive value of language in their attempts to classify hateful speech. The 2 The practice of ‘trolling’ (the targeting of defamatory and antagonistic messages towards users of social media) has received press attention of late. We avoid using the term in this paper as it can encapsulate broader forms of online abuse not restricted to victims with minority or protected characteristics. WILLIAMS AND BURNAP 212 by guest on February 8, 2016 http://bjc.oxfordjournals.org/ D ow nloaded from http://bjc.oxfordjournals.org/ definition adopted in this study emanates from Greenawalt (1989) who states that any analysis of the law in regard to hate speech offline has to consider the extent to which this language has expressive value. He considers four criteria that might make such expressions criminal: (1) that they might provoke a response of violence; (2) that they may deeply wound those at whom the speech is directed; (3) that such speech causes offence to those that hear it and (4) that slurs and epithets have a degrading effect on social relationships within any one community. Several of these conditions are encap- sulated within UK provisions including the Public Order Act of 1986, the Malicious Communications Act 1988, the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 and the Crime and Disorder Act 1998. The application of these laws and others that criminalize incite- ment on the basis of religion and sexual orientation3 to the online context is relatively non-contentious as evidenced by several recent high profile social media cyberhate cases (see next section). Despite these provisions, for over a decade much cyberhate that manifested online (pre- social media) met with little criminal justice response in the United Kingdom. Further afield, in countries like the United States, cyberhate continues largely unchallenged by law enforcement due to freedom of speech protections. Levin (2002) studied how US right-wing groups promoted their goals on the web largely unchallenged by law enforce- ment, concluding that the online medium has been useful to hatemongers because it is economic, far reaching and protected by the First Amendment. Perry and Olsson (2009) found that the web created a new common space that fostered a ‘collective identity’ for previously fractured hate groups, strengthening their domestic presence in counties such as the United States, Germany and Sweden. They warn a ‘global racist subculture’ could emerge if cyberhate is left unchallenged. Eichhorn (2001) focuses on how the online environment opens up the possibility for a more immediate and radical recontextualiza- tion of hate speech, while also highlighting its affordances for more effective modes of response, such as vigilantism and counter-speech. Leets (2001) in a study of the impacts of hate-related web pages found that respondents perceived the content of these sites as having an indirect but insidious threat, while Oksanen et al. (2014) show how 67 per cent of 15- to 18-year olds in their study had been exposed to hate material on Facebook and YouTube, with 21 per cent becoming victims of such material. This final study evidences how the rise of social media platforms has been accompanied by an exponential increase in cyberhate (see also Williams and Wall 2013). Conceptual Framework Antecedent or ‘trigger’ events and social media reactions Historically criminologists have been preoccupied with where crimes take place. An abundance of research, particularly in the United States, focuses upon the spatial clus- tering of crimes in so-called hotspots, where reportedly over half of recorded crimes occur (Braga et  al. 2012). Fewer studies have taken as their focus when crimes occur. Arguably, this is a result of a lack of fine-grained data on the temporal dimension of crime. Given the problems associated with interviewer recall, retrospective victimi- zation surveys understandably neglect to ask detailed questions on the times crimes occurred. Police-recorded crime data may not accurately reflect the time of occurrence 3 Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2008 and the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008. CY BERHATE ON SOCIAL MEDIA IN THE AFTERMATH OF WOOLWICH 213 by guest on February 8, 2016 http://bjc.oxfordjournals.org/ D ow nloaded from http://bjc.oxfordjournals.org/ and are impoverished due to low reporting levels of hate crime (Williams and Tregidga 2014). It is also rare for researchers to gain access to such fine-grained data. Given this lack of data, and where they do exist difficulties of access, there is limited research on singular or clusters of events and their influence on the prevalence of hate crimes in the short term. Of what research exists, the focus has been upon acts of terrorism. On a European scale, Legewie (2013) established a significant association between anti- immigrant sentiment and the Bali terrorist bombing using Eurobarometer data. The usability of this data set to establish this correlation was dependent upon chance, as the terrorist event occurred during fieldwork, allowing a pre–post intervention design. King and Sutton (2014) found an association between terrorist acts and a rise in hate crime incidents in the United States. Convincingly, they show that following the 9/11 terrorist attack law enforcement agencies recorded 481 hate crimes with a specific anti- Islamic motive, with 58 per cent of these occurring within two weeks of the attack (4 per cent of the at-risk period of 12 months). In the United Kingdom, Hanes and Machin (2014) found significant increases in hate crimes reported to the police in London fol- lowing 9/11 and 7/7. These latter two studies were reliant upon police-recorded hate crime data, and both sets of authors acknowledge the significant problems of non- reporting and lack of temporal granularity. The first two studies found that a sharp de-escalation was evident following the spike in hate crimes following the trigger event, indicating that event-specific motivated hate has a ‘half-life’. These authors conclude hate crimes cluster in time and tend to increase, sometimes dramatically, in the after- math of antecedent ‘trigger’ or galvanizing events, such as terrorist acts. They postulate that hate crimes are communicative acts, often provoked by events that incite a desire for retribution in the targeted group, towards the group that share similar characteris- tics to the perpetrators. A focus on the temporal dimension of hate crimes allows for a study of their esca- lation, duration, diffusion and de-escalation following trigger events. However, as noted previously, there are limitations in offline data: (1) low temporal granularity; (2) issues with under reporting in official police data (particularly in the case of hate crimes) and (3) the retrospective nature of reporting and problems with witness and victim recall. Forms of naturally occurring online data, such as social media com- munications, while noisy and unstructured, lend themselves to temporal analysis. This is primarily due to the time-stamps that accompany all items of online social media communication. Further, researchers have argued that users of social media act like a distributed sensor network, often identifying events before the authorities and traditional media (Sakaki et  al. 2010). Furthermore, users of social media are more likely to express emotional content due to phenomena such as deindividuation (Williams 2006). Therefore, we argue that following trigger events, such as terrorists acts, social media users are often first publish a reaction, and given there are now over 2.5 billion users of social media (Smith 2014), these online communications provide rapid (to the second) insight into social reaction on an unprecedented scale. Indeed, there is evidence to support this argument in the recent high profile prosecution of social media users who posted negative emotive reactions following various events. For example, in 2012, Liam Stacey was sentenced to 56  days in prison for posting racist comments on Twitter after footballer’s cardiac arrest and Daniel Thomas was arrested after a homophobic message was sent to Olympic diver Tom Daley. In 2014, Isabella Sorley, John Nimmo and Peter Nunn were jailed for abusing feminist campaigner WILLIAMS AND BURNAP 214 by guest on February 8, 2016 http://bjc.oxfordjournals.org/ D ow nloaded from http://bjc.oxfordjournals.org/ Caroline Criado-Perez and MP Stella Creasy, and Declan McCuish was jailed for a year for tweeting racist comments about two Rangers Football Club players. In relation to the Woolwich terrorist attack, seven social media users were arrested after posting messages that were suspected of inciting racial or religious hatred (BBC 2013). While these examples of ‘extreme’ cyberhate are relatively rare, tens of thousands of other users posted less extreme hateful content in relation to these events, creating a dataset that can be subject to criminological inspection. What is particularly unique about social media communications, when compared to more traditional interviews or sur- vey methods, is that the user posts can be endorsed and spread by other users (in the case of Twitter ‘retweeted’), creating an information flow or propagation network that can be studied. For example, researchers can use such networks to identify what infor- mation or sentiment is being endorsed and propagated by users, and which users have the most or least influence in the spread of such messages. This locomotive, extensive and linked dimension of social media data allows criminologists to study the fine- grained (i.e. seconds instead of days, months or years) escalation, duration, diffusion and de-escalation of social reaction following events, often far in advance of research using conventional curated or administrative data. These data therefore afford us with the possibility of computationally reconfiguring classic criminological theory. For example, in the study of action, reaction and amplifica- tion, Cohen (1972) outlined a process of warning, impact, inventory and reaction to delin- eate a sequence of incidents that come to constitute a deviant event or series of events. A computational criminological approach to this process is possible through the collec- tion and analysis of social media communications that are more voluminous and rapidly and continuously produced than newspaper headlines, interviews or surveys. If, as Cohen suggests, the social response to an event is partly responsible for deepening its impact or causing new events through the cyclical process of action, reaction and amplification, then social media reactions have the potential to act as a force amplifier. The dynamics and features of this amplifier effect are directly observable in real time (down to the sec- ond) given the digital traces left behind by new ‘online publics’. The initial transmission (in the case of Twitter, an original tweet) and subsequent diffusion (a retweet, considered an endorsement)4 of a social media reaction can be used to gauge a ‘warning stage’— tensions and sentiments expressed ‘based on conditions out of which danger may arise’ (1972: 22). Here, we may take as an example the general state of insecurity concerning the terrorist threat to the United Kingdom that may foster social media communications around potential associated risks. Following, the ‘impact stage’ ‘during which the disas- ter strikes and the immediate unorganised response to the death, injury and destruction takes place’ (in our example, the killing of Lee Rigby in Woolwich in 2013), social media communications are likely to spike, and further again in the ‘inventory stage’ ‘during which those exposed to the disaster begin to form a preliminary picture of what has happened and of their own condition’. Original tweeters (and their retweeters) in these stages struggle to comprehend and clarify the impact, drawing comparisons with similar events in the past and making spurious links with potential perpetrator groups and pos- sible motives. It is important to note that tweeters include individual citizens, groups and organizations; and media, government and police communications play a significant part in these stages, either appealing for information or attempting to shape reactions (e.g. 4 Unless altered by the retweeter to convey their alternative view-point, then considered a modified retweet. CY BERHATE ON SOCIAL MEDIA IN THE AFTERMATH OF WOOLWICH 215 by guest on February 8, 2016 http://bjc.oxfordjournals.org/ D ow nloaded from http://bjc.oxfordjournals.org/ dispelling or fuelling rumours and speculation). During the ‘reaction stage’, where the ‘images in the inventory [are] crystallized into more organised opinions and attitudes’ social media communications focus less upon the event itself and more upon the wider implications and the ‘issues’—domestic security, war in the Middle East and so on. Social media communications also reveal the extent to which ‘online publics’ become sensitized to individuals and groups associated with the event or implicated by it. This sensitization may represent itself as expressions in tweets of the overestimation of an increased risk of deviance and calls for an escalation of social control. Finally, a point of clear impor- tance to this current paper, the social media reaction may affect the nature, extent and development of deviant activity from spectators, especially during the impact phase. In particular, contagion fuelled by ‘rumours and the milling process’ (1972: 19) in online social networks ‘validate’ sentiments and tensions, opening up a space for the galvaniz- ing and spread of hostile beliefs and the mobilization of action as a result of the desire for retribution in the targeted group, manifesting in the escalation of deviance towards groups that share similar characteristics to the perceived perpetrators. In this study, we examine the emergence and propagation of cyberhate following the Woolwich terror attack using part of Cohen’s framework: impact, inventory and early reaction. We focus upon the Twitter social media network (see Data and Methods for the rationale) and analyse approximately half a million tweets two weeks following the event. We take as our focus cyberhate, and not offline hate crimes and incidents, which previ- ous research and initial evidence show increased following the attack (see Feldman and Littler 2014; Hanes and Machin 2014). At the time of writing, this paper represents the first criminological analysis of an online social reaction to a major crime event, in particular the detection and propagation of cyberhate on social media following a terrorist attack. Hypotheses H1: The Woolwich terrorist attack will act as an antecedent trigger event for the publication of cyber- hate on the Twitter social media network. By examining the presence of cyberhate tied to the Woolwich event using a bespoke hate speech supervised machine classifier (see Burnap and Williams 2015), this first hypothesis extends the work of Legewie (2013), King and Sutton (2014) and Hanes and Machin (2014) that evidences offline hate incidents and crimes increase following a ter- rorist antecedent ‘trigger’ event as they operate to galvanize tensions and sentiments against the suspected perpetrators and groups associated with them. H2: Agent Type will be significantly predictive of the production of cyberhate. The second hypothesis tests whether the type of tweeter (media, police, political, far right political) is predictive of the production of cyberhate. We make no assumptions about the direction of associations due to a lack of previous research. H3: The number of news headlines relating to the event will be positively associated with the produc- tion of cyberhate. If, as Cohen suggests, the traditional media play a role in ‘setting the agenda’, ‘transmitting the images’ and ‘claims making’ following deviant events of national interest, we antici- pate a positive correlation between the number of news headlines and the production WILLIAMS AND BURNAP 216 by guest on February 8, 2016 http://bjc.oxfordjournals.org/ D ow nloaded from http://bjc.oxfordjournals.org/ of a deviant social reaction to the perpetrators and those that share similar individual characteristics (ethnicity, religion, etc.). H4: Cyberhate will propagate in size during the impact stage, will begin to abate during the inventory stage and will die out in the reaction stage following the attack. H5: Cyberhate will survive over time during the impact stage, will begin to abate during the inventory stage and will die out in the reaction stage following the attack. The fourth and fifth hypotheses examine a propagation dimension by postulating cyberhate will spread as a result of contagion via ‘rumours and the milling process’ (Cohen 1972: 19) facilitated by the act of retweeting. Two propagation dimensions are tested: size and survivability over time. In particular, they test whether the diffusion of cyberhate is con- fined to Cohen’s impact and inventory stages. During the impact stage, social media com- munications are likely to spike where online publics struggle to comprehend and clarify the impact, drawing comparisons with similar events in the past and making spurious links with potential perpetrator groups and possible motives, opening up a space for the germination of hate. During the inventory and reaction stages, details emerge of the victim, perpetra- tor and motive via official channels (media, police, government), and discussion moves on from the actors to issues, opening up a space for the countering of rumour and hate. These hypotheses also test whether the ‘half-life’ found in offline hate incident patterns following antecedent events also applies to cyberhate (Legewie 2013; King and Sutton 2014). H6: Tweets emanating from particular Agents will be significantly predictive of information flow size and survival. The final hypothesis tests whether the type of tweeter is predictive of the spread of non-cyberhate-related information following the event. Little is currently known about the relative influence of actors in social media networks on the flow of information following terrorist events. Therefore, this hypothesis tests the assumption that informa- tion emanating from some agents will spread significantly more in terms of size and survival, compared to other agents. Data and Methods Big ‘social’ data and computational criminology The exponential growth and uptake of social media and the availability of vast amounts of information from these networks as interactional data to researchers has created a funda- mental methodological and technical challenge for social science. The collection, analysis and representation of data for this study required collaboration with computer scientists to deal with the six Vs of Big Data: volume, variety, velocity, veracity, virtue and value (see Burnap et al. 2014; 2015; Williams et al. 2013). The authors consisting of a criminologist and a com- puter scientist developed an interdisciplinary methodology, dubbed computational criminology, that has its roots in computational social science (Edwards et al. 2013). Savage and Burrows (2007) argue that corporate giants such as Facebook, Google and Twitter have been using advanced computing to mine and interpret naturally occurring social data for half a decade. Until recently, social scientists in academia have been left behind, in an ‘empirical crisis’, lack- ing the access, infrastructure and skills to marshal these data. This paper is one of the first to report on the analysis of social media data using advanced computing techniques to answer a classic criminological question on social reactions to criminal events of national interest. CY BERHATE ON SOCIAL MEDIA IN THE AFTERMATH OF WOOLWICH 217 by guest on February 8, 2016 http://bjc.oxfordjournals.org/ D ow nloaded from http://bjc.oxfordjournals.org/ Data The data collection period spanned a month following the terrorist event in Woolwich. Data were derived from the Twitter social media network. This network differs from others such as Facebook, in that it is public and the data are freely accessible by researchers. Twitter also has an open friendship network (non-reciprocal linking between users means that the followed are not required to follow their followers) resulting in a digital ‘public agora’ that promotes the free exchange of opinions and ideas. As a result, Twitter has become the primary space for online citizens to pub- licly express their reaction to events of national significance. A  hashtag convention has emerged among Twitter users that allows tweets to be tagged to a topic that is searchable. The term ‘trending’ is used to describe hashtags that become popular within the tweet-stream, indicating a peak or pulse in discussion usually surrounding an event. Data were collected via the Twitter streaming Application Programming Interface based on a manual inspection of the highest trending keyword following the event (i.e. ‘Woolwich’), the most common strategy in the field of information dif- fusion online (Yang and Counts 2010). This strategy produces robust samples due to the interactive nature of keywords and hashtags, where followers of events on Twitter actively seek out the most popular, or trending topics/hashtags in order to identify relevant information and subsequently add to the flow by replicating the keyword or hashtag in their posts. This selection procedure generates a census of tweets con- taining the most common keyword, and hence a large sample of all tweets about the event in question. An examination of web search trends using the ‘Woolwich’ keyword to query the Google Trends service indicated that an issue attention cycle around this event (the duration within which public attention to this event rises and falls away) spanned 15  days. This time window also maps onto the combined dura- tions of Cohen’s (1972) warning, impact and early reaction phases in our data set (see frequency distribution in Figure  4). This became the analysis sampling time frame for our study, during which we collected N = 427,330 tweets. The sample was subject to data preprocessing and recoding using high performance computational infra- structure prior to modelling. Given our sampling technique ensured the collection of all tweets containing the most popular term surrounding the event for 15 days, we are confident that the sample is representative of non-trivial information flows on Twitter. Information propagation models Dependent measures We took the frequency of retweets of an original tweet surrounding the event as a size of information flow-dependent measure, and the duration between the first and last retweet as a survival of information flow-dependent measure. In terms of size, the number of retweets is a measure of public interest and endorsement of the information, while survival (or duration) is a measure of persistence of interest over time. This is consistent with previ- ous work on modelling information diffusion in social networks (Yang and Counts 2010) (see Table 1). Independent measures Table 1 provides descriptive statistics of the independent measures that were input into the models. Several Content Factors were incorporated, including the sentiment expressed WILLIAMS AND BURNAP 218 by guest on February 8, 2016 http://bjc.oxfordjournals.org/ D ow nloaded from http://bjc.oxfordjournals.org/ (using the established Sentistrength tool, Thelwall et  al. 2010), the expression of hate- ful terms (see cyberhate models below) and the presence of hashtags and URLs (both of which improve discoverability and information sharing, Yang and Counts 2010). Social Factors of Twitter users were input, including type of tweeter (police, media, etc.), number of followers and total number of previous tweets. Frequencies of news stories that were published each day that included the term ‘Woolwich’ in the headline and Google Search Trends for the same keyword were both entered as External Factors. Based on previous research, we identified several Control Factors (time of day and day of week) that have been shown to influence the propagation of information flows in social media (Zarrella 2009). Cyberhate model Dependent measure We entered cyberhate as a dependent measure in a third model to examine the fea- tures that enabled and inhibited hateful information flows (see Table  1). We built a Table 1 Descriptive statistics (N = 210,807) Variables Coding Sample M SD Dependent variables Size (retweets) Range: 0–4,079 0.39 11.92 Survival (seconds) Range: 0–1,295,876 2,399.80 27,416.34 Extremity of cyberhate 0 = none; 1 = moderate; 2 = extreme 0.01 0.10 Independent variables Content factors Sentiment −1 = negative; 0 = neutral; 1 = positive −0.59 0.66 Hashtag 0 = no; 1 = yes 0.33 0.47 URL 0 = no; 1 = yes 0.61 0.49 Social factors News Agent 0 = no; 1 = yes 0.05 0.22 Police Agent 0 = no; 1 = yes 0.01 0.02 Political Agent 0 = no; 1 = yes 0.01 0.03 Far Right Political Agent 0 = no; 1 = yes 0.01 0.06 Other Agent 0 = no; 1 = yes 0.94 0.23 Followers Range: 0–8,820,174 6,030.70 109,986.8 Tweet Count Range: 0–942,149 18,236.98 41,417.64 External factors Press Headlines Range: 102–565 350.66 132.26 Google Searches Range: 1–100 32.39 35.50 Control factors Commute Morning 0 = no; 1 = yes 0.11 0.31 Work 0 = no; 1 = yes 0.30 0.50 Commute Evening 0 = no; 1 = yes 0.17 0.39 Evening 0 = no; 1 = yes 0.25 0.43 Night 0 = no; 1 = yes 0.16 0.37 Sunday 0 = no; 1 = yes 0.14 0.35 Monday 0 = no; 1 = yes 0.10 0.30 Tuesday 0 = no; 1 = yes 0.08 0.27 Wednesday 0 = no; 1 = yes 0.06 0.23 Thursday 0 = no; 1 = yes 0.23 0.42 Friday 0 = no; 1 = yes 0.24 0.43 Saturday 0 = no; 1 = yes 0.15 0.36 Reduction in N due to removal of retweets, leaving only original tweets. CY BERHATE ON SOCIAL MEDIA IN THE AFTERMATH OF WOOLWICH 219 by guest on February 8, 2016 http://bjc.oxfordjournals.org/ D ow nloaded from http://bjc.oxfordjournals.org/ computational supervised machine classifier to learn the features of hateful tweets towards Black Minority Ethnic (BME) and religious groups following the event, allow- ing us to distinguish these from more general tweets. The overall precision of the classifier was 0.77, well in excess of the recommended 0.70 for scientific research (van Rijsbergen 1979). The cyberhate variable entered into the models was coded as 0 = no cyberhate; 1 = moderate cyberhate; 2 = extreme cyberhate (see Appendix and Burnap and Williams 2015 for more detail on the reliability of the classifier5). Methods of estimation Information propagation size model A zero-inflated negative binomial model was used to fit to the data. This modelling strat- egy is appropriate where the dependent is skewed and over dispersed, and where there may be an excessive amount of zeros (91 per cent of the tweets had a zero count for retweets). Information propagation survival model The second dependent—survival—was a measure of the lifetime of an information flow. Our interest was to model the factors that affect the survival of information flows following the terrorist event through the impact, inventory and early reaction phases (Cohen 1972). For example, does expressing hateful content increase or decrease the lifetime of an information flow beyond Cohen’s initial impact and inventory phases? This question can be posed as one of hazards to survival, thus we adopted Cox’s propor- tional hazards model (Cox 1972). As the study was bounded by a 15-day data analysis window, we were mindful that some information flows may survive the study period. Based on previous research, tweets that were posted within 48 hours of the curtailment of data analysis were right-censored6 (i.e. the last retweet may not have occurred and we assume the information flow to still be active or ‘alive’). Cyberhate model As the cyberhate-dependent variable is best described as ordinal, we adopted a general- ized ordered logit model. This model is not bound by the proportional odds assump- tion that was violated by our data. All independent variables were subject to exploration and all outliers were removed prior to analysis to ensure the robustness of all models.7 Given the sample size, when inter- preting the relevance of the various coefficients, we should not be over reliant on tests of statistical significance. Therefore, we have used odds ratios and calculated the incidence rate ratio (IRR) as measures of the magnitude of associations. The IRR is derived by the exponentiation of the negative binomial regression coefficients, allowing for the interpre- tation of retweet incidence rates (as opposed to logs of expected retweet counts). 5 Direct link to the open access article: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/poi3.85/epdf. 6 http://www.sysomos.com/insidetwitter/engagement/. 7 The distribution of the extremity of cyberhate-dependent variable showed lower categories were more likely than higher. While there is no assumption of normality with ordered logistic regression, the proportional odds assumption must be met. As the data did not meet this assumption, we opted for a generalized ordered logit model as an alternative. For robustness, the extremity of cyberhate dependent was transformed into a binary variable (no hate/hate) and logistic regression was run. Broadly similar results were found to the generalized ordered logit model providing a degree of confidence in our model choice and results. In addition to these checks, we used the ‘robust’ command in Stata to obtain robust standard errors mitigating against potential data distribution problems. WILLIAMS AND BURNAP 220 by guest on February 8, 2016 http://bjc.oxfordjournals.org/ D ow nloaded from http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/poi3.85/epdf http://www.sysomos.com/insidetwitter/engagement/ http://bjc.oxfordjournals.org/ Results Data visualization Given the uniqueness of the data set, we used the Collaborative Online Social Media Observatory (COSMOS) platform for initial visualization (Williams et al. 2011; Burnap et  al. 2014). Figures 1–3 provide snapshots of the COSMOS Dashboard showing geo- graphic and temporal distributions of Twitter communications in the 15-day analy- sis window. As the content of tweets is not directly quotable in academic research,8 the COSMOS platform allows for the visualization of tweet content in the form of a WordCloud that presents an aggregate overview of the thousands of posts, while main- taining the anonymity and confidentiality of users (see Williams et  al. 2013).9 In the first hour of data collection (Figure 1), we can identify a relatively sparse geographic distribution of Twitter traffic across the United Kingdom (far left) and London (centre bottom). This is not unusual given that approximately 1 per cent of Twitter users enable their geo-location (Sloan et al. 2013; 2015). Nevertheless, the relative distribution over time allows us to monitor the spread of social reaction. The WordCloud (centre top) is based on the full Twitter sample in the first hour of analysis (10,080 original tweets), not just geo-located data. Therefore, this summary of content provides a window on the thousands of original commutations being sent during the initial reaction on social media, where size of word represents frequency of use in this period. The content in this early stage reflects the act (‘attack’, ‘killing’, ‘murder’, ‘london’), speculation as to the perpetrators’ nationalities (‘nigerian’) religious backgrounds and possible motiva- tion (‘islam’, ‘muslim’, ‘religion’) and is devoid of any details on the victim apart from possibly gender (‘man’). The focus on the perpetrator was likely fuelled by the YouTube video of the attacker that was uploaded within minutes of the event. Of particular sali- ence to this paper is the presence of the terms ‘edl’ and ‘hate’. A closer inspection shows that the former term was being used to discuss the English Defence League’s (EDL) various activities, mostly in a negative tone (e.g. criticism of a speech made by Tommy Robinson about Woolwich, and the rejection of an EDL donation to the charity Help for Heroes), while the latter term was being used in counter-hate speech tweets (e.g. shame on the EDL and British National Party (BNP) for spreading hate), as opposed to hateful tweets. Given the relatively low number of hateful tweets compared to the overall volume of communications (see below), no racist or religious slurs appear in the WordCloud. This initial hour of the study window, characterized by a lack of firm details and a degree of speculation, is akin to Cohen’s (1972: 22) impact stage in which citizens display an ‘unorganised response to the death, injury and destruction’. Figure 2 is a snapshot of the first four days in the study window. What is immediately apparent is the geo-tagged communications are more voluminous and widespread across the United Kingdom, with concentration in line with population density (Sloan et  al. 2013). London emerges as a hotspot for communications around the event, in particular 8 Twitter Terms of Service forbid the anonymization of tweet content (screen-name must always accompany tweet content), meaning that ethically, informed consent should be sought from each tweeter to quote their post in research outputs. However, this is impractical given the number of posts generated and the difficulty in establishing contact (a direct private message can only be sent on Twitter if both parties follow each other). Therefore, it is not ethical to directly quote tweets that identify indi- viduals without prior consent. 9 Tweets from public organizations, such as government departments and police services, are deemed quotable as no indi- vidual can be identified. CY BERHATE ON SOCIAL MEDIA IN THE AFTERMATH OF WOOLWICH 221 by guest on February 8, 2016 http://bjc.oxfordjournals.org/ D ow nloaded from http://bjc.oxfordjournals.org/ Fi g . 1 W o ol w ic h i m p ac t st ag e— C O SM O S vi su al iz at io n o f T w it te r tr af fi c d u ri n g th e fi rs t h ou r o f co ll ec ti on ( le ft t o r ig h t: g eo -lo ca te d t w ee ts in U n it ed K in gd o m a n d L on d on , W or d C lo u d o f tw ee t co n te n t an d f re q u en cy o f tw ee ts i n t h e 15 -d ay c ol le ct io n w in d ow ). WILLIAMS AND BURNAP 222 by guest on February 8, 2016 http://bjc.oxfordjournals.org/ D ow nloaded from http://bjc.oxfordjournals.org/ the Woolwich region. The WordCloud (133,275 original tweets) shows the content of com- munications has shifted from disorganized speculation to specific details on the identity of the victim (‘lee’, ‘rigby’, ‘drummer’), a perpetrator (‘michael’, ‘adebolajo’) and the pro- gress of the case (‘arrested’). This more organized form of communication resonates with Cohen’s inventory stage, where the mass media begin to play a central role, communicat- ing to citizens the ‘preliminary picture’ of the event. However, in our case, it is worthy of note that the identity of both perpetrators was broadcast on Twitter hours ahead of conventional media. Figure 3 is a snapshot of the final three days of the study window. The geo-tagged communications plots represent the full 15 days and the cumulative volume of data now allows us to plot a more complete picture of the national social response, where we can observe dense clusters around London, the Midlands and Manchester (Lee Rigby’s family home). The WordCloud (11,399 original tweets) shows Twitter communications have shifted from the specific details (victim, perpetrator, case status) onto boarder issues linked to the event (‘british’, ‘muslims’, ‘islam’, ‘religion’, ‘terrorism’, ‘media’, ‘edl’, ‘cam- eron’). This shift was possibly influenced by widespread media converge of the speeches made by David Cameron and Tony Blair in the latter stages of the study window. Cameron’s mention of the EDL in his speech (Cabinet Office 2013) is partly responsible for their pres- ence in the WordCloud, while the presence of ‘terrorism’ for the first time is likely due to the use of the term in conjunction with radicalization and Islam in the speech by Tony Blair (Thompson 2013). This shift towards the broader issues related to the event is akin to Cohen’s reaction stage, where the images emerging in the inventory are ‘crystallized into more organised opinions and attitudes’. The potential influence of the media in ‘transmit- ting the images’ and ‘setting the agenda’ (Cohen 2002: xxiii) throughout these various stages is investigated later in the paper. In the following sections, we scope in from this ‘10,000 foot view’ of the data by modelling the specific enablers and inhibiters of hateful and non-hateful information propagation following the event. Cyberhate model Of the 210,807 original tweets posted about the terrorist event in the 15 days follow- ing, 1,878 tweets (1 per cent) were identified by the validated supervised machine classifier (Burnap and Williams 2015) as containing BME or religious hate-related terms at the moderate (e.g. ‘send them home’, ‘deport them’, etc.) or extreme (e.g. ‘niggers’, ‘muslim scum’) level. This shows that event-specific cyberhate targeted towards the perpetrators and BME and religious groups associated with them was present in social media communications following the Woolwich terrorist attack, supporting the first hypothesis (H1).10 The targeted nature of the cyberhate (e.g. containing the term Woolwich) demonstrates that the attack acted as an antecedent trigger event, galva- nizing tensions and sentiments against groups that shared similar characteristics to the suspected perpetrators. This is the first evidence to suggest spikes in hate crimes and incidents following such events are not confided to offline settings (Legewie 2013; Hanes and Machin 2014; King and Sutton 2014). Table  2 details the results of the 10 As we did not collect data before the event (as the schedules of terrorists are not made public knowledge), we cannot verify that this amount of cyberhate is an increase on the pre-event condition Twitter data could be purchased from a vendor (e.g. GNIP or DataSift) in an attempt to verify this hypothesis. However, the deletion of cyberhate tweets from this data set by perpetrators themselves and by Twitter as a result of complaints made by victims, means these purchased data sets are inaccurate reflections of the social media response to events. Our data set was not subject to deletions of this kind as we collected in real time. CY BERHATE ON SOCIAL MEDIA IN THE AFTERMATH OF WOOLWICH 223 by guest on February 8, 2016 http://bjc.oxfordjournals.org/ D ow nloaded from http://bjc.oxfordjournals.org/ Fi g . 2 W o ol w ic h i n ve n to ry s ta ge — C O SM O S vi su al iz at io n o f T w it te r tr af fi c d u ri n g th e fi rs t fo u r d ay s o f co ll ec ti on ( le ft t o r ig h t: g eo -lo ca te d tw ee ts i n U n it ed K in gd o m a n d L on d on , W or d C lo u d o f tw ee t co n te n t an d f re q u en cy o f tw ee ts i n t h e 15 -d ay c ol le ct io n w in d ow ). WILLIAMS AND BURNAP 224 by guest on February 8, 2016 http://bjc.oxfordjournals.org/ D ow nloaded from http://bjc.oxfordjournals.org/ Fi g . 3 W o ol w ic h r ea ct io n s ta ge — C O SM O S vi su al iz at io n o f T w it te r tr af fi c d u ri n g th e fi n al t h re e d ay s o f co ll ec ti on ( le ft t o r ig h t: g eo -lo ca te d tw ee ts i n U n it ed K in gd o m a n d L on d on , W or d C lo u d o f tw ee t co n te n t an d f re q u en cy o f tw ee ts i n t h e 15 -d ay c ol le ct io n w in d ow ). CY BERHATE ON SOCIAL MEDIA IN THE AFTERMATH OF WOOLWICH 225 by guest on February 8, 2016 http://bjc.oxfordjournals.org/ D ow nloaded from http://bjc.oxfordjournals.org/ generalized ordered logit model predicting production and extremity of cyberhate. Other Agent was entered as a reference category given their volume in the data set (94 per cent) and their proclivity to produce cyberhate (these agents produced 95 per cent of the cyberhate in the data set). The majority of Twitter users in this cat- egory were members of the ‘digital public’. Of the alternative agents identified in the data set, only Far Right Political Agents emerged as significantly associated with the production of cyberhate, supporting hypothesis H2. Political organizations (e.g. BNP, EDL) and party members made up the minority of these agents, with more general far right identifying groups and individuals making up the majority. Proportionally, compared to Other Agents, the odds of producing cyberhate on Twitter were three times larger for these agents following the terrorist event. A closer inspection of the tweets produced by these agents reveals that it was the more general far right identify- ing groups and individuals who produced cyberhate and mostly at a moderate level (e.g. ‘send them home’). The odds for including hashtags were higher for cyberhate Table 2 Generalized ordered logit regression predicting production and extremity of cyberhate Coef. SE OR Content factors Sentiment 0.139 0.032 1.149 Hashtag 0.688* 0.048 1.990 URL −0.893* 0.049 0.409 Social factors News Agent 0.134 0.112 1.144 Police Agent −3.479 0.34 0.000 Political Agent 0.009 0.337 1.009 Far Right Political Agent 1.333* 0.458 3.793 Ref: Other Agent Tweet Count −0.007 0.038 0.993 External factors Press Headlines 0.003* 0.000 1.003 Google Searches −0.007 0.002 0.993 Control factors Commute Morning 0.597* 0.093 1.817 Work 0.321* 0.081 1.378 Commute Evening 0.041 0.097 1.041 Evening 0.516* 0.083 1.675 Ref: Night Sunday −0.409* 0.120 0.664 Monday 0.054 0.116 1.056 Tuesday 0.222 0.121 1.248 Thursday −0.190 0.146 0.827 Friday −0.983* 0.150 0.374 Saturday −0.058 0.112 0.944 Ref: Wednesday (day of attack) Model fit Log likelihood −10,823 Chi-square 945.46 Sig. 0.00 Pseudo R2 0.04 Na 210,807 aReduction due to removal of retweets, leaving only original tweets. *p < 0.01. WILLIAMS AND BURNAP 226 by guest on February 8, 2016 http://bjc.oxfordjournals.org/ D ow nloaded from http://bjc.oxfordjournals.org/ tweets, while they were lower for containing URLs. This may suggest those wishing to promote hateful content online and sensitize others to minority groups in society via contagion use hashtags to enhance the discoverability of their content. Conversely, URLs are possibly less common in hateful tweets given linked content (most often a popular media source) is unlikely to corroborate racist opinion and biased speculative rumours. The positive association between a rise in news headlines about the event and cyberhate tweets evidences the link (albeit relatively weak) between old and new media, supporting hypothesis H3. The odds of the production of extreme cyberhate increased by a magnitude of 1.3 for every 100 additional news headlines produced. During early stages following the event (e.g. impact and inventory), tweeters may be fuelled by coverage in the press who have a role in ‘setting the agenda’ and ‘transmit- ting the images’ (Cohen 2002: xxiii), especially those who wish to spread hate, biased rumours and speculation. Information propagation size model Table  3 reports the results from the information propagation size model. The most novel and salient finding was that tweets containing cyberhate were negatively asso- ciated with the size of information flows emanating from the Woolwich terrorist event. None of these tweets were statistically likely to form large information flows following the event. Tweets containing hate terms were 45 per cent less likely to be retweeted as compared to tweets not containing such content (IRR 0.55). Figure  4 shows that original and retweeted cyberhate peaked during the early stages following the event (impact stage) and sharply declined over the four days following (inventory stage), providing evidence in support of hypothesis H4.11 Given that terrorist events have been shown to increase levels of anti-immigrant sentiment (Legewie 2013) and hate crimes and incidents offline (Hanes and Machin 2014; King and Sutton 2014), it is surprising to find a lack of cyberhate propagation in terms of size following the Woolwich attack. In line with this finding, we found that positive sentiment increased the retweet IRR by a factor of 1.38. Therefore, tweets containing positive words and phrases (e.g. ‘warm wishes to the family of Lee Rigby’, ‘brave family’, ‘respect for armed forces’, etc.) as opposed to negative words or phrases were 38 per cent more likely to form large information flows. Finally, type of agent emerged as significant, further supporting hypothesis H6. Compared to the reference category Other Agent, tweets emanating from News Agents were more likely to be retweeted by a factor of 4.3, providing evidence to support the notion that traditional media messages maintain their role in ‘setting the agenda’ and ‘transmitting the images’ (Cohen 2002: xxiii) in the age of social media. Police Agents were also more likely to be retweeted by a factor of 5.7. The first finding is novel and shows for the first time that Twitter users propagate police tweets following terrorist events in the United Kingdom. It is evident that users are sharing police requests for information (e.g. metpoliceuk: ‘We are appealing for anyone who may have wit- nessed the incident in #Woolwich to contact us via the Anti-Terrorist Hotline’), case updates (e.g. metpoliceuk: ‘Two men aged 22 and 28 arrested on suspicion of murder 11 The peak in moderate cyberhate six days into the study window is associated with the EDL march in London. CY BERHATE ON SOCIAL MEDIA IN THE AFTERMATH OF WOOLWICH 227 by guest on February 8, 2016 http://bjc.oxfordjournals.org/ D ow nloaded from http://bjc.oxfordjournals.org/ remain in hospital in a stable condition #woolwich’) and general commentary (e.g. PoliceFedICC: ‘EDL marches on Newcastle as attacks on Muslims increase tenfold in the wake of Woolwich machete attack’).12 Evidence from the United States sug- gests this pattern of Twitter user behaviour was also evident following the Boston Marathon terrorist attack (Davis et  al. 2014). The finding that Far Right Political Agents were the least likely to have content retweeted is consistent with the previous finding in relation to cyberhate. Table 3 Zero-inflated negative binomial regression predicting counts of retweets (size model) Coef. SE IRR Content factors Cyberhate −0.604** 0.017 1.721 Sentiment 0.322** 0.018 1.380 Hashtag 0.217** 0.025 1.242 URL 0.438** 0.026 1.551 Social factors News Agent 1.460** 0.044 4.304 Police Agent 1.742** 0.408 5.708 Political Agent 0.670** 0.150 1.954 Far Right Political Agent 0.632* 0.327 1.882 Ref: Other Agent Tweet Count −0.215** 0.00 1.000 External factors Press Headlines 0.000* 0.000 1.000 Google Searches 0.005** 0.001 1.005 Control factors TimeLagRT5 0.000** 0.000 1.000 Commute Morning 0.030 0.048 1.030 Work 0.014 0.038 1.015 Commute Evening 0.074 0.045 1.077 Evening −0.010 0.040 0.990 Ref: Night Sunday −0.133** 0.041 0.875 Monday −0.302** 0.047 0.739 Tuesday −0.344** 0.051 0.709 Thursday −0.365** 0.044 0.733 Friday −0.311** 0.044 0.733 Saturday −0.122** 0.052 0.853 Ref: Wednesday (day of attack) Binomial model (Inflation/Excess Zeros) Number of Followers −0.899** 0.017 Constant 4.586 0.063 Model fit Log likelihood −92,196.36 Chi-square 2,594.57 Sig. p = 0.00 LRT for alpha = 0 p = 0.00 Vuong Z = 45.00, p = 0.00 Na 210,807 aReduction due to removal of retweets, leaving only original tweets. *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01. 12 Usernames and text reproduced here as the tweet accounts belong to public organizations, i.e. the Metropolitan Police and the Police Federation. WILLIAMS AND BURNAP 228 by guest on February 8, 2016 http://bjc.oxfordjournals.org/ D ow nloaded from http://bjc.oxfordjournals.org/ Survival model A positive estimate in the Cox regression model (Table 4) is interpreted as increasing hazards to survival and therefore reduces the duration of the information flow. In support of hypothesis H5, cyberhate is negatively associated with long-lasting infor- mation flows, emerging as having the highest positive hazard ratio (1.19) of the vari- ables of interest. Supporting hypothesis H6, News Agents emerged as significantly negatively associated with hazards to survival, indicating tweets from such agents were likely to last longer in the study period. Counter intuitively, Far Right Political Agents emerged as having the second highest negative hazard ratio, after Police Agents, indicating that information flows emanating from these types of agents were likely to outlast those emanating from other agents at some point in the 15-day analysis window. To better aid interpretation, we used Kaplan–Meier (KM) survival estimation to plot the survival functions of cyberhate and Agent Type. Figure 5 illus- trates the comparative survival rates of cyberhate information flows, showing that flows containing extreme BME or religious hate terms die out rapidly, between 20 and 24 hours following the event. Tweets containing moderate BME or religious hate terms last a little longer, between 36 and 42 hours before dying out. Tweets contain- ing no cyberhate show a longer survival curve. This evidence confirms that extreme cyberhate was propagated in social media networks following this event in the imme- diate impact stage, which was then replaced with the propagation of moderate cyber- hate in the inventory stage, and finally little or no propagation of cyberhate in the early reaction phase (Cohen 1972). This sharp de-escalation resonates with the work Fig. 4 Frequency of cyberhate during the analysis window. CY BERHATE ON SOCIAL MEDIA IN THE AFTERMATH OF WOOLWICH 229 by guest on February 8, 2016 http://bjc.oxfordjournals.org/ D ow nloaded from http://bjc.oxfordjournals.org/ of Legewie (2013) and King and Sutton (2014) who postulate that the increase in offline anti-immigration sentiment and hate crimes and incidents following terror- ist events has a half-life. It seems likely that this offline pattern is replicated online in social media networks. Figure  6 represents the KM survival estimates plot for Agent Type. It is evident that information flows emanating from Far Right Political Agents outlast all other agent types up to 36 –42 hours after the event, at which point they lose ground to News Agents, whose information flows last the longest (excus- ing Other Agent). The survivability of tweets emanating from Police Agents in the first 24 -hour window and their subsequent demise at around 36 hours is a novel and policy-relevant finding. Why the Far Right and Police are so dominant in terms of information flow survival in the early stages of the reaction to this terrorist event is explored further in the next section. Table 4 Cox regression predicting hazards to tweet survival (survival model) Coef. SE Hazard ratio Content factors Cyberhate 0.171** 0.073 1.186 Sentiment −0.041** 0.011 0.960 Hashtag −0.049** 0.016 0.952 URL −0.437** 0.017 0.646 Social factors Number of Followers 0.000** 0.000 1.000 News Agent −0.082** 0.030 0.922 Police Agent −0.572* 0.268 0.565 Political Agent −0.112 0.088 0.894 Far Right Political Agent −0.417** 0.148 0.659 Ref: Other Agent Tweet Count 0.062** 0.013 1.064 External factors Press Headlines 0.001** 0.000 1.001 Google Searches −0.001* 0.001 0.999 Control factors TimeLagRT5 0.000** 0.000 1.000 Commute Morning 0.163** 0.032 1.117 Work 0.210** 0.025 1.233 Commute Evening 0.252** 0.029 1.287 Evening 0.201** 0.027 1.105 Ref: Night Sunday 0.252** 0.045 1.287 Monday 0.216** 0.048 1.242 Tuesday 0.060 0.050 1.062 Thursday 0.213** 0.055 1.237 Friday 0.056 0.052 1.057 Saturday 0.099* 0.045 1.105 Ref: Wednesday (day of attack) Model fit Log likelihood −152,650.40 Chi-square 1,473.47 Sig. p = 0.00 Na 210,807 aReduction due to removal of retweets, leaving only original tweets. *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01. WILLIAMS AND BURNAP 230 by guest on February 8, 2016 http://bjc.oxfordjournals.org/ D ow nloaded from http://bjc.oxfordjournals.org/ Fi g . 5 S u rv iv al o f T w it te r in fo rm at io n fl ow s b y cy b er h at e co n te n t. Fi g . 6 S u rv iv al o f T w it te r in fo rm at io n fl ow s b y tw ee te r ty p e. CY BERHATE ON SOCIAL MEDIA IN THE AFTERMATH OF WOOLWICH 231 by guest on February 8, 2016 http://bjc.oxfordjournals.org/ D ow nloaded from http://bjc.oxfordjournals.org/ Discussion In this paper, we evidenced how a fine-grained temporal analysis of locomotive social media data, supported by computational criminological methods, can reveal how an antecedent trigger terrorist event is related to an observable public social media reac- tion. We interpreted these social media communications via an application of Cohen’s four-stage process of action and reaction. In support of hypotheses H1 and H2, via our bespoke hate speech supervised machine classifier (see Burnap and Williams 2015), we found evidence of cyberhate originating from individual Twitter users, in particu- lar those identifying with right wing political groups, that was directly related to the trigger event. The correlation between the prevalence of far right political groups and individuals within social media networks and the production of cyberhate in the early stages post event, while unsurprising, is a novel empirical finding. These findings extend work that shows terrorists events result in a spike in offline hate crimes and incidents, by demonstrating cyberhate also spiked in the immediate aftermath of the Woolwich attack (Legewie 2013; Hanes and Machin 2014; King and Sutton 2014). The rapid spike in racial and religious cyberhate in the immediate aftermath of Woolwich is not sur- prising. In the second edition of moral panics, Cohen (1987) introduced the notion of ‘symbols of trouble’, and in the third edition, Cohen (2002) outlined clusters of social identity that he considered predictable symbols, including ethnic and religious minori- ties. He shows through socio-linguistic analysis that the press conflates these minorities with violence. Therefore, we might argue immigration, race and religion have become a warning sign for the real, much deeper threat of terrorism. The fanning of the flames on social media by individuals identifying with right-wing political groups, bolstered by traditional press coverage (we saw the correlation of news headlines and cyberhate in our model), further promotes these spurious connections and the propagation of cyberhate. The religious and racial dimension of the targeted cyberhate is potentially problematic if we are to assume, as Cohen did, that the social response to events is partly responsible for deepening its impact or causing new events through the cyclical process of action, reaction and amplification. Given the force-amplifier effect of social media and the role it may play in solidifying the crowd and validating sentiments and tensions, opening up a potential space for the galvanizing and spread of hostile beliefs, we next explored its possible contagion effect fuelled by ‘rumours and the milling pro- cess’ (1972: 19). Having established that cyberhate did emerge in social media in response to the Woolwich event, we set out to investigate if it propagated via hypotheses H4 and H5. Our size and survival models allowed us to determine the escalation, duration, diffu- sion and de-escalation of cyberhate and non-cyberhate information flows during the impact, inventory and reaction stages following the terrorist trigger event. Our analy- sis revealed that while information flows containing cyberhate peaked in the impact stage following the event, a sharp decline was evident during the inventory stage. Our size and survival models confirmed that information flows containing cyberhate were significantly less likely to grow large and survive for long periods during the study win- dow. These results lend support to the notion that terrorist events act as triggers for the production of cyberhate, possibly facilitated by ‘rumours and the milling processs’ (Cohen 1972: 19) that characterize the impact stage and that this type of event-specific cyberhate is relatively short term and conditional upon certain factors. The ‘half-life’ of WILLIAMS AND BURNAP 232 by guest on February 8, 2016 http://bjc.oxfordjournals.org/ D ow nloaded from http://bjc.oxfordjournals.org/ cyberhate mirrors research into offline event-related hate crimes and incidents (Legewie 2013; King and Sutton 2014). Perhaps the more salient of the conditional factors is the correlation between offline newspaper headlines and the propagation of informa- tion shown in all three models, supporting hypothesis H3. The number of newspaper headlines was predictive of the production of cyberhate, evidencing that tweeters post- ing hateful content may be fuelled by coverage in the press in the early impact stage, lending support to Cohen’s argument above. Number of headlines was also predictive of the size of information flow, while News Agent type was predictive of survival of information flow (outlasting all but Other Agent in the analysis window). This study is the first to evidence the prima facie plausible relationship between new and old media in the context of social reactions to criminal events, and it lends support to the classic criminological notion that old media retains a significant role in ‘setting the agenda’ and ‘transmitting the images’ (Cohen 2002: xxiii) following crisis situations. The dominance of actor type in all three models warrants further attention, particu- larly the ways in which information flows from these actors shape social reaction online. Despite the positive correlation between the number of press headlines and cyberhate in the early impact phase, we might postulate that the dominance of the traditional media effect in the inventory and reaction phases, as shown in the Model 3 and the KM on Agent Type estimation (Figure 6), is partly responsible for the reduction of cyberhate beyond the impact stage, counteracting its association with the production of cyberhate in the impact stage. It is clear from the WordCloud in Figure 6 that the two media stories on the Cameron and Blair speeches dominated Twitter activity during the latter stages of the study window, moving information flows onto wider contextual issues, in keeping with Cohen’s reaction phase. It is therefore plausible that traditional media narratives in the inventory stage shape the preliminary picture of what has happened, closing down the possible spaces for the contagion of hateful and antagonistic sentiment fuelled by the unorganized response to death, speculation and rumour indicative of the impact stage. However, it is important to note that the media alone cannot be responsible for the reduction in cyberhate and that other agents are likely to play a part. In particular, information flows emanating from Police Agents within the first 24 hours of the study window showed high survival rates, above News Agents. As shown earlier, a portion of these police information flows contained case updates, helping dispel rumour and spec- ulation. Social media affords Police Agents with a direct line of communication with citizens, bypassing the usual mass media filter—opening up possibilities to influence public opinion around events (Williams et al. 2013). However, the dominance of tradi- tional media and police information flows during the impact and early inventory stage was accompanied by small (in terms of size as determined by retweeting volume) but sus- tained information flows emanating from far right political groups and individuals. The small but sustained nature of these flows indicates that there is limited endorsement of these twitter narratives, but where there is support it emanates from core group who seek out each other’s messages over time. Therefore, contagion of cyberhate informa- tion flows is contained and unlikely to spread widely beyond such groups. Furthermore, preliminary analysis not covered here evidences the presence of counter-cyberhate speech following the terrorist event. These narratives from Twitter users either directly or indirectly challenge cyberhate. It remains to be seen if such self-regulation in social CY BERHATE ON SOCIAL MEDIA IN THE AFTERMATH OF WOOLWICH 233 by guest on February 8, 2016 http://bjc.oxfordjournals.org/ D ow nloaded from http://bjc.oxfordjournals.org/ media networks represents a form of responsibilization that can lighten the burden of policing the ‘cyber-streets’ (Williams et al. 2013; Giannasi 2014). Conclusion The connection between events and the production and propagation of cyberhate is mostly anecdotal. The rapid uptake of social media has resulted in a massive distributed social sensor net that affords criminologists with the opportunity to identify, monitor and trace social reactions to events to the second in real time. This unprecedented level of detail in data affords hate crime researchers with the ability to detect cyberhate in the aftermath of antecedent trigger events, such as the Woolwich terror attack much more rapidly than is achievable with conven- tional data. In this paper, we have shown the temporal variation in cyberhate that relates to concepts at the core of much criminological theory, such as the esca- lation, duration, diffusion and de-escalation of crime. If, as Cohen suggests, the social response to events is partly responsible for deepening its impact or causing new events through the cyclical process of action, reaction and amplification, then social media has the potential to act as a force amplifier. With respect to escala- tion, we showed how social media opens up a new digital ‘public agora’ for the mass production, consumption and spread of social reaction in relation to trigger events. Part of this event triggered ‘amplified’ social reaction is deviant in nature, and this study showed for the first time that the production of cyberhate is evident within the first few hours following the terrorist event. Drawing on Cohen’s pro- cess of action, reaction and amplification, we identified this period as the ‘impact stage’, characterized by the unorganized response to death, rumour and specula- tion. These characteristics, accompanied by a ‘terrestrial’ paced police response to dispel speculation, open up a space for the initial production of unfettered preju- dice and hate towards groups that are assumed to share similar characteristics with the suspected perpetrators. Our study of diffusion and duration evidenced that the spread of cyberhate was inhibited beyond the impact stage, with any sustenance likely due to the actions of a core group of far right political actors in the social media network. As in research into the temporal dimension of offline hate crime (Legewie 2013; K ing and Sutton 2014), it was apparent that cyberhate also had a ‘half-life’, evidenced by the rapid de-escalation post impact, and a near absence in the reaction stage. We postulated that dominance of traditional media and police information flows during the inventory and reaction stages, during which specula- tion gives way to facts about the case and finally to a focus on the wider issues, may be partly responsible for this half-life of cyberhate in social media networks. We also found initial evidence of counter-cyberhate speech in the data set, suggesting a form of responsibilization. However, confirming either of these postulations was beyond the scope of the data and this paper and future research should seek to explore these potential relationships further. If such causal associations do exists then the relationship between the media and the public during the course of reac- tions to events may be more variable than previously theorized. WILLIAMS AND BURNAP 234 by guest on February 8, 2016 http://bjc.oxfordjournals.org/ D ow nloaded from http://bjc.oxfordjournals.org/ Given the recent criminal justice response to cyberhate and incitement cases, our findings have several potential operational and policy implications. First, the ability to observe a large portion of the population13 in near real time via social media networks provides those responsible for ensuring the safety of the public a new window onto mass social reactions. Evidence from this paper shows that deviant reactions, in the form of cyberhate in our case, can form part of a social reaction in relation to a trigger event. Therefore, these technologies may act as early warning systems for the amplification of deviance beyond the event itself. Second, the ‘half-life’ of cyberhate and its rapid de-escalation following the first 24 hours of the antecedent event suggests practitioners need to focus their interventions within this impact stage to increase the rate of de- escalation further. Third, the dominance of traditional media and police information flows in social media indicates these are likely effective channels for the countering of rumour, speculation and hate. We end this paper with a methodological note. The majority of those currently under 20  years of age in the Western world were ‘born digital’ and will not recall a time without access to the Internet. Combined with the migration of the ‘born ana- logue’ generation onto the Internet, fuelled by the rise of social media, we have seen the exponential growth of online spaces for the mass sharing of opinions and senti- ments, many of them characterized by volatility and a lack of regulation. These online spaces represent a socio-technical assemblage that creates a new public sphere ena- bling digital citizenship (Mossberger 2008) through which aspects of civil society are played out. No study of contemporary society can ignore this dimension of social life. Social media presents researchers with a rich new form of data from which criminolo- gists, assisted by computational methods, can extract meaningful insights into con- temporary social processes at unprecedented scale and speed. How we marshal these new forms of data is a key challenge for the social sciences. ‘Computational criminol- ogy’ may remain on the fringes of our discipline for some time yet, but we believe it is now worth considering the addition of ‘computer science’ to the list of disciplines with which criminology liaises to address contemporary forms of crime such as cyberhate. Funding This work was supported by the Economic and Social Research Council and Google Data Analytics Research Grant: ‘Hate Speech and Social Media: Understanding Users, Networks and Information Flows’ (grant number: ES/K008013/1) and the ESRC National Centre for Research Methods Grant: ‘Social Media and Prediction: Crime Sensing, Data Integration and Statistical Modeling’ (grant number: 512589112). References BBC (2013), Woolwich Murder Sparks Anti-Muslim Backlash, available online at http:// www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-22664835. Braga, A., Papachristos, A. and Hureau, D. (2012), Hot Spots Policing Effects on Crime. Campbell Systematic Reviews. 13 At the last count there were 15 million Twitter accounts in the United Kingdom (Rose 2014). 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(2014), ‘Hate Crime in the Wake of Terror Attacks: Evidence from 7/7 and 9/11’, Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice, 30: 247–67. King, R. D. and Sutton, G. M. (2014), ‘High Times for Hate Crimes: Explaining the Temporal Clustering of Hate Motivated Offending’, Criminology, 51: 871–94. Leets, L. (2001), ‘Responses to Internet Hate Sites: Is Speech Too Free in Cyberspace?’, Communication Law and Policy, 6: 287–317. Legewie, J. (2013), ‘Terrorist Events and Attitudes Toward Immigrants: A  Natural Experiment’, American Journal of Sociology, 118: 1199–245. Levin, B. (2002), ‘Cyberhate: A  Legal and Historical Analysis of Extremists’ Use of Computer Networks in America’, American Behavioral Scientist, 45: 958–88. Marneffe, M., MacCartney, B. and Manning, C. D. (2006), ‘Generating Typed Dependency Parses FromPhrase Structure Parses’, paper presented at the International Conference on Language Resources and Evaluation (LREC), 24–26 May, Genoa, Italy. WILLIAMS AND BURNAP 236 by guest on February 8, 2016 http://bjc.oxfordjournals.org/ D ow nloaded from https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/european-council-and-woolwich-prime-ministers-statement https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/european-council-and-woolwich-prime-ministers-statement http://bjc.oxfordjournals.org/ Morell, G., Scott, S., McNeish, D. and Webster, S. (2011), The August Riots in England. NatCen. Mossberger, K., Tolbert, C. J. and McNeal, R. S. (2008), Digital Citizenship: The Internet, Society and Participation. MIT Press. Oksanen, A., Hawdon, J., Holkeri, E., Nasi, M. and Rasanen, P. (2014), ‘Exposure to Online Hate among Young Social Media Users’, in M. Nicole Warehime, ed., Soul of Society: A Focus on the Lives of Children & Youth, 253–73. Emerald. Perry, B. and Olsson, P. (2009), ‘Cyberhate: The Globalisation of Hate’, Information & Communications Technology Law, 18: 185–99. Rose, K. (2014), The UK Social Media Landscape for 2014, available online at http://www. rosemcgrory.co.uk/2014/01/06/uk-social-media-statistics-for-2014/. Sakaki, T., Okazaki, M. and Matsuo, Y. (2010), ‘Earthquake Shakes Twitter Users: Real- Time Event Detection by Social Sensors’, in Proceedings of the 19th International Conference on World Wide Web, 851–60. ACM Press. Savage, M. and Burrows, R. (2007), ‘The Coming Crisis of Empirical Sociology’, Sociology, 41: 885–99. Sloan, L., Morgan, J., Burnap, P. and Williams, M. L. (2015), ‘Who Tweets? Deriving the Demographic Characteristics of Age, Occupation and Social Class from Twitter User Meta- Data’, PLoS One, available online at http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/ journal.pone.0115545. Sloan, L., Morgan, J., Williams, M. L., Housley, W., Edwards, A., Burnap, P. and Rana, O. (2013), ‘Knowing the Tweeters: Deriving Sociologically Relevant Demographics from Twitter’, Sociological Research Online, 18: 7. Smith, D. (2014), How Many People Use the Top Social Media? Digital Market Ramblings, available online at http://expandedramblings.com/index.php/r esource-how-many-peo- ple-use-the-top-soci al-media/. Accessed 14 August 2014. Thelwall, M., Buckley, K., Paltogou, G., Cai, D. and Kappas, A. (2010), ‘Sentiment Strength Detection in Short Informal Text, Journal of the American Society for Information Science and Technology, 61: 2544–58. Thompson, D. (2013), ‘There’s a Problem within Islam, Says Tony Blair. He Should Know. He Helped Create It’, Telegraph, 3 June 2015, available online at http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/ damianthompson/100219806/theres-a-problem-within-islam-says-tony-blair-he-should-know- he-helped-create-it/. van Rijsbergen, C. J. (1979), Information Retrieval, 2nd edn. Butterworth. Wall, D. S. and Williams, M. (2007), ‘Policing Diversity in the Digital Age: Maintaining Order in Virtual Communities’, Criminology and Criminal Justice, 7: 391–415. Williams, M. (2006), Virtually Criminal: Crime, Deviance and Regulation Online. Routledge. Williams, M. L., Burnap, P., Rana, O. F., Edwards, A., Housley, W. and Avis, N. (2011), ‘Digital Social Research, Tension Indicators and Safer Communities: Introducing the Cardiff Online Social Media Observatory (COSMOS)’. ESRC Digital Social Research Programme. Williams, M. L., Edwards, A., Housley, W., Burnap, P., Rana, O., Avis, N., Morgan, J. and Sloan, L. (2013), ‘Policing Cyber-Neighbourhoods: Tension Monitoring and Social Media Networks’, Policing and Society, 23: 461–81. Williams, M. L. and Tregidga, J. (2014), ‘Hate Crime Victimisation in Wales: Psychological and Physical Impacts across Seven Hate Crime Victim-Types’, British Journal of Criminology, 54: 946–67. CY BERHATE ON SOCIAL MEDIA IN THE AFTERMATH OF WOOLWICH 237 by guest on February 8, 2016 http://bjc.oxfordjournals.org/ D ow nloaded from http://www.rosemcgrory.co.uk/2014/01/06/uk-social-media-statistics-for-2014/ http://www.rosemcgrory.co.uk/2014/01/06/uk-social-media-statistics-for-2014/ http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/damianthompson/100219806/theres-a-problem-within-islam-says-tony-blair-he-should-know-he-helped-create-it/ http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/damianthompson/100219806/theres-a-problem-within-islam-says-tony-blair-he-should-know-he-helped-create-it/ http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/damianthompson/100219806/theres-a-problem-within-islam-says-tony-blair-he-should-know-he-helped-create-it/ http://bjc.oxfordjournals.org/ ——. (2013), ‘Cybercrime’, in C. Hale, K. Hayward, A. Wahidin and E. Wincup, eds, Criminology, 3rd edn. Oxford University Press. Yang, J. and Counts, S. (2010), ‘Predicting the Speed, Scale, and Range of Information Diffusion in Twitter’, International Conference on Weblogs and Social Media (ICWSM). Zarrella, D. (2009), The Science of Retweets, available online at http://danzarrella.com/ science-of-retweets.pdf. Appendix: Computational Methods Used to Derive the Extremity of Cyberhate Variable To classify the extremity of cyberhate from the collected Twitter data, we built a super- vised machine learning classifier in the Weka tool to distinguish between hateful and/ or antagonistic responses with a focus on race, ethnicity, religion and more general responses, following the event. To validate the machine classifier, we established a gold standard data set of human coded annotations. We sampled 2,000 tweets to be human coded and coders were provided with each tweet and the question: ‘is this text offen- sive or antagonistic in terms of race ethnicity or religion?’ They were presented with a ternary set of classes—yes, no, undecided. We utilized the CrowdFlower online service that allows for Human Intelligence Tasks, such as coding text into classes, to be distrib- uted over multiple workers. We implemented the Stanford Lexical Parser (Marneffe et al. 2006), along with a context-free lexical parsing model, to extract typed depend- encies within the tweet text. Typed dependencies provide a representation of syntactic grammatical relationships in a sentence (or tweet in this case) that can be used as features for classification. A  ten-fold cross-validation approach was used to train and test the supervised machine learning method. It functions by iteratively training the classifier with features from 90 per cent of the human coded data set and classifying the remaining 10 per cent as ‘unseen’ data, based on the features evident in the cases it has encountered in the training data. Validation results suggested that overall the most efficient features for classifying cyberhate were n-gram typed dependencies combined with n-gram hateful and antagonistic terms. In fact, the hateful terms alone achieved the same precision performance but had a lower performance for recall. The number of false negative results (missed instances of cyber hate) was 7 per cent higher when using hateful terms alone. This is an interesting result as it provides evidence to suggest that human annotators identify hateful or antagonistic content on Twitter that does not necessarily contain hateful or antagonistic terms and requires a more nuanced representation of what is deemed cyber hate when aiming to classify tweets. For further details on the machine classification results and a full evaluation of the process, please see the open access article here: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/poi3.85/ epdf. WILLIAMS AND BURNAP 238 by guest on February 8, 2016 http://bjc.oxfordjournals.org/ D ow nloaded from http://danzarrella.com/science-of-retweets.pdf http://danzarrella.com/science-of-retweets.pdf http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/poi3.85/epdf http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/poi3.85/epdf http://bjc.oxfordjournals.org/ 
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work_uigxwjwa7jdi3k2mryqjo2xuq4	----	Middlesex University Research Repository An open access repository of Middlesex University research http://eprints.mdx.ac.uk Hafford-Letchfield, Trish ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0105-0678, Cocker, Christine, Ryan, Peter and Melonowska, Justyna (2016) Rights through alliances: findings from a European project tackling homophobic and transphobic bullying in schools through the engagement of families and young people. British Journal of Social Work, 46 (8) . pp. 2338-2356. ISSN 0045-3102 [Article] (doi:10.1093/bjsw/bcw104) Final accepted version (with author’s formatting) This version is available at: http://eprints.mdx.ac.uk/20537/ Copyright: Middlesex University Research Repository makes the University’s research available electronically. Copyright and moral rights to this work are retained by the author and/or other copyright owners unless otherwise stated. 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See also repository copyright: re-use policy: http://eprints.mdx.ac.uk/policies.html#copy http://eprints.mdx.ac.uk http://eprints.mdx.ac.uk/20537/ mailto:eprints@mdx.ac.uk http://eprints.mdx.ac.uk/policies.html#copy 1 p.hafford-letchfield@mdx.ac.uk Title: Rights through alliances; Findings from a European project tackling homophobic and transphobic bullying in schools through the engagement of families and young people (Authors’ final submitted version): Authors: Trish Hafford-Letchfield, Middlesex University UK; Christine Cocker, University of East Anglia, UK; Peter Ryan, Middlesex University, UK; Justyna Melonowska, Akademia Pedagogiki Specjalnej, Poland British Journal of Social Work (2016) doi: 10.1093/bjsw/bcw104. First published online: September 15, 2016. http://bjsw.oxfordjournals.org.ezproxy.mdx.ac.uk/content/early/2016/09/11/ bjsw.bcw104.abstract Abstract: This paper draws on findings from a European project ‘Rights through alliances: Innovating and networking both within homes and schools’ (RAINBOW-HAS) conducted 2013-2015. It built collaboration between six European Union countries to analyse and improve the rights of children and youth regarding sexual orientation and gender identity in educational settings. The main focus of discussion derives from a secondary discourse analysis following thematic analyses of the qualitative interviews undertaken with a range of different families, schools and community associations across these European countries, which provide a snapshot of contemporary practice. We discuss the relative silence of social work in challenging homophobic and transphobic bullying, given their potential in promoting family and young people’s engagement. Keywords: http://bjsw.oxfordjournals.org.ezproxy.mdx.ac.uk/content/early/2016/09/11/bjsw.bcw104.abstract http://bjsw.oxfordjournals.org.ezproxy.mdx.ac.uk/content/early/2016/09/11/bjsw.bcw104.abstract 2 p.hafford-letchfield@mdx.ac.uk Discourse analysis, education, Europe, family intervention, homophobic bullying, LGBT parenting, schools. Introduction Discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation is prohibited both by article 13 of the Treaty of the European Union (2012) and European Charter of Fundamental Rights (2000) alongside equality legislation and national constitutions established by Europe’s individual member states. Two reports published by the Council of Europe (ILGA-Europe, 2015) and internationally (Amnesty International, 2014), have sought to raise the profile of challenges for persons belonging to the lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) community. The idea that Europe enshrines fundamental values crucial to LGBT rights bears witness to the success of its many social movements so that the LGBT agenda in the EU is no longer a marginalised issue. However, a significant gap remains between the legislation and institutions in the EU member states and the actual conditions and circumstances of LGBT individuals and their communities on the ground (ILGA-Europe, 2015) with a lack of robust, comparable data on the respect, protection and fulfilment of the fundamental rights of LGBT persons in relation to discrimination and hate crime. This paper discusses outcomes of the European project ‘Rights through Alliances: Innovating and Networking Both Within Homes And Schools’, (thereafter referred to as ‘RAINBOW-HAS’), conducted between 2013-2015. RAINBOW-HAS was co-funded by the Fundamental Rights and Citizenship Programme of the EU. Collaboration between participating institutions specifically: Ararteko (ES) (Project co-ordinator): Akademia Pedagogiki Specjalnej Marii Grzegorzewskiej (PL), Associació de Famílies Lesbianes i Gais de Catalunya (ES), Comune di Milano (IT), ECIP Foundation (BG), Farapi (ES), 3 p.hafford-letchfield@mdx.ac.uk Jekino Educatie vzw (BE), Middlesex University Higher Education Corporation (UK), Synergia (IT) (Project partners): COC Amsterdam (NL), Gemeente Amsterdam (NL), LSVD (DE), Centro di Iniziativa Gay Onlus (IT), University of East Anglia (UK) (Project associates) were located across six European Union countries, (Bulgaria, Belgium, Italy, Poland, Spain and the UK) investigated homophobic bullying across schools in five of these countries (not Belgium) and examined sexual orientation and gender identity in educational settings. Research indicates that homophobic, transphobic and heteronormative bullying within education has severe consequences for children and young people’s safety and wellbeing (Smith et al, 2014; Tippett et al, 2010). Education, and schools in particular, are known to make a difference (Birkett et al., 2009). There is however a relative silence from social work on this issue (Cocker and Hafford-Letchfield, 2010; Mishna et al, 2009) despite the potential role it plays in the provision of proper, safe and supportive spaces for children, young people and their families and carers (Guasp, 2010). Freedom from discrimination and harm is essential to be able to learn, develop and flourish (Rivers, 2001; Adams et al, 2004; DePalma and Atkinson, 2009; Monk, 2009). Schools are also potentially influential institutions in combating humiliating stereotypes or the perpetuation of prejudice fostering social exclusion, discrimination, or the denial of human dignity (Adam et al, 2014). Whilst anti- bullying intervention programmes have been implemented in the last three decades on a large scale in Europe (Farrington and Ttofi, 2010) and internationally (UNESCO, 2012), little cross national learning has occurred. Non-targeted anti-bullying interventions in schools for LGBT children and youth may also be hampered by deficits in a nation’s broader context for homophobia, heterosexism and heteronormativity (Walton, 2006) and impacts on all children, not just those experiencing it. There is more to learn from 4 p.hafford-letchfield@mdx.ac.uk research into the multifaceted nature of bullying in the education environment, for example, the roles played by teachers, parents and carers, social workers and other children and how different types of bullying are conceptualised and acted on. RAINBOW-HAS looked at how its participating countries responded to these diverse issues and provided opportunities for cross-fertilisation of ideas within a context where there are different legislation and policies, institutions, cultures as well as socio-economic and political differences. Whilst each participating country had a different starting point, there were many commonalities. Good practice was not just associated with advanced development but in finding ways to tackle issues within countries that are geographically and culturally varied. Alongside building a transnational community, RAINBOW-HAS brought important concepts from Europe into the individual domestic contexts through its direct engagement with young people and their families. This paper firstly outlines the range of diverse activities within the overall project, before reporting on the broader context in which lesbian and gay parents in particular, discussed their children’s experiences of bullying. We focus on how their accounts dealt with a heteronormative and gender neutral social/political context. Given that homophobic and transphobic bullying has become a legitimate object of social concern within civil society RAINBOW-HAS asked critical questions about bullying from young people and their carers own perspectives. These are important for social workers not generally situated in educational environments, but working with those affected. By placing bullying that takes place at school within a broader political and cultural context, these perspectives help to conceptualise bullying within education 5 p.hafford-letchfield@mdx.ac.uk primarily as a discourse as opposed to simply harm (see Monk, 2009). The main focus of discussion emerges from a discursive analysis of the themes from qualitative interviews undertaken with a range of different families, schools and community associations in order to provide a snapshot of contemporary practice across the European context. Through this approach, we identified discourses used to address homophobia. We conclude by reflecting on what social work can learn from these discourses, given the relative silence of the profession about the effects of homophobia in public sector services and its own role in countenancing this. European Context The EU for Fundamental Rights (ILGA-2015) survey data on hate crime and discrimination against LGBT persons in all EU Member States and Croatia, with 93,000 respondents, is the largest and most comprehensive survey of its kind to date. It demonstrated a recurrent high incidence of homophobic and transphobic violence (6%) across the region and reflects a European-wide ongoing trend. Under-reporting of these issues, together with impunity for perpetrators, remains a chronic impediment to effective prevention of homophobia and transphobia. LGBT people were asked about experience of discrimination, violence, verbal abuse or hate speech on the grounds of their sexual orientation or gender identity. 19 % of respondents experienced harassment believed to be partly or entirely based on LGBT identities with Trans people experiencing an average of 37% discrimination (ILGA-Europe, 2015). For LGBT young people completing the survey, respondents (18-24yrs) were most likely to identify widespread discrimination based on sexual orientation in their country of residence and were less likely to be ‘out’ to ‘most’ or ‘all’ in 6 p.hafford-letchfield@mdx.ac.uk their personal and professional lives. In the previous EU survey (EU-FRA, 2014, p36); secondary schools were the least tolerant environments, with 67 % of all respondents disguising being LGBT during their schooling before the age of 18. Boys especially opted for complete secrecy. Almost 72% of gay men and 73% of bisexual men reported being never out to anyone at school. The youngest respondents were most likely to avoid being out at home for fear of being assaulted, threatened or harassed and to suffer from discrimination and violence. Eighteen to 24-year olds were twice as likely as those aged 40 to 54, and three times as likely as those 55+, to have experienced violence in the year before the survey. Simultaneously, the number of European countries with LGBT marriage equality is increasing (11 countries in 2015). In most of these countries, parenting rights enjoyed by heterosexual families, such as maternity and paternity leave and pay, now include lesbian and gay families. However, some countries in Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia, possibly influenced by Russia’s homophobic policies, have introduced more restrictive measures in their national constitutions and legislation. Croatia, Hungary, Slovakia, Poland, and Macedonia have all passed laws restricting marriage as the union solely between woman and man , making marriage equality very unlikely in the near future (glaad.org). With regards to bullying, in 2015, the UN General Assembly’s Third Committee adopted its first ever resolution (UN, 2015). Although explicit references to homo- transphobia were stripped out during negotiations, it makes reference to bullying related to discrimination and stereotyping, and highlights greater risk for vulnerable groups. A significant ‘UN Special Representative on Violence against Children’ report on the causes and effects of bullying reports was 7 p.hafford-letchfield@mdx.ac.uk commissioned in 2016 and at the time of writing is yet to report (See: srsg.violenceagainstchildren.org). . Most of the literature and theorists on sexuality politics, particularly within social work come from reformist traditions (Brown and Cocker, 2011). Homophobia and transphobia remain marginalised areas within social work research, education and professional practice (Dunk-West et al, 2009; Cocker and Hafford-Letchfield, 2010). Discourses on sexualities and gender politics in families have attracted a level of academic debate and theorising of lesbian, gay and queer parenting which is not yet mainstream (Hicks, 2011; Weeks, 2001). These have asserted changing family forms as relationship ‘innovators’ but often in a hostile environment. Coming from a social constructionist position, Weeks (2001) concept of identity, familial and social relationships (‘families of choice’) contributed significantly to debates internationally. Hicks’s (2011) research engages with narratives and practices concerning lesbian and gay parenting within everyday contexts and theorised how concepts and social categories are produced and put to use, e.g., kinship, family, race, gender, sexuality, lesbian, gay. Those arguing against assimilative positions have critiqued the emulation of heterosexuality and mainstream ways of living which buy into the ideology of the family as the organizing logic of intimate and social life (see Bell and Binnie, 2000). Similarly, significant studies of lesbian and gay parenting (Patterson 2005; Golombok 2007) including adoption and fostering over the last two decades (Skeates and Jabri 1988; Hicks, 2011; Brown 2011; Cocker 2011; Mellish et al., 2013) have drawn attention to the outcomes for children growing up in different families and 8 p.hafford-letchfield@mdx.ac.uk how this has made a significant difference to European culture and society in conceptualising families. Within compulsory education, there are substantial issues regarding LGBT invisibility, McDermott (2010) captured evidence on the disadvantages experienced by young people in particular, homophobic bullying, mental health issues, rejection from family and friends and increased risk of homelessness. The extent and impact of this disadvantage constitutes a major evidence gap in being able to identify the role of sexual and gender identities as predictors of health, social and economic outcomes for children and young people and in targeting health or education interventions and equipping social workers for such roles. McDermott (2010) highlighted links between homophobic and transphobic bullying in schools since bullying is sparked by expressing behaviours seen as breaking gender norms as well as sexual orientation and by addressing homophobic bullying in schools, he suggests, may help in challenging transphobic bullying. Study Design The RAINBOW-HAS project was commissioned as a result of initiatives promoted by the UN Human Rights Committee Yogyakarta Principles (see Amnesty International resolutions 17/19 (2011) and 27/32 (2014)) and the United Nations international consultation to address homophobic bullying in educational institutions (UNESCO, 2012). A qualitative design facilitated an in- depth understanding of the research topics. In the initial stages a detailed biblio-sitography was produced documenting each participating country’s specific legislative; policy and political context. Each biblio-sitography facilitated a cross comparison of benchmarked themes emerging from specific research studies and thematic synthesis of their findings alongside any surveys 9 p.hafford-letchfield@mdx.ac.uk already undertaken. The biblio-sitography highlighted sources of current guidance and support issued by key organisations proactive in the sector. The methodology for the subsequent empirical work (see Arateko, 2015 for the full report) involved qualitative in-depth semi structured interviews with families including lesbian, gay, bisexual, heterosexual parents and carers. We explored their perspectives of homo-transphobic bullying and experiences of engagement in school communities; undertook case studies of children and young people who had experienced homophobic or transphobic bullying gathered from interviews with key informants; reviewed relevant family associations and networks involved in countering LGBT bullying; and conducted focus groups with stakeholders (teachers, principals, educational psychologists, social workers and advocacy organisations) to discuss and respond to the findings from the in-depth interviews with parents and children as described above. Ethical approval was granted in each participating country via the lead partner’s own governance structure. The interviews of families and the gathering of case studies followed loosely structured interviews using a template developed by the steering group of Principal Investigators in each country. Research questions were based on guidance notes provided by this European-wide steering group. In particular, we were interested in:  The nature of problems experienced by families within schools and the strategies they had devised to overcome these problems.  The presence and impact of family/school alliances on finding solutions.  The feasibility of developing, piloting and evaluating family based interventions together with schools and their communities in combating homo-transphobic bullying. 10 p.hafford-letchfield@mdx.ac.uk There were challenges in terms of using country specific terminology. This led to discussion about definitions and use of terms at regular partner meetings between the participating research teams, including how and when particular terms were used by each country during the research and to ensure that this did not compromise the integrity of data. An example was the use of the term ‘homosexual’ in some East European countries which has since been rejected in the UK. This reflects how language is a living thing with changing usage over time and with progress (ILGA, 2016). Snowball sampling was used to access interviewees and case studies through personal contacts, parents’ associations in schools, associations of relatives of LGBT young people, and lesbian and gay community associations. Purposive sampling helped achieve cultural and geographical variability. No team in any of the participating countries were successful in accessing any transgender families or children. The ‘T’ was kept in our report of findings rather than excluding it as whilst some of the issues for the trans community will be different and merit separate investigation, some conclusions were drawn from the research overall that remain applicable to the trans community. Bullying on the basis of perceived sexual orientation or gender identity is a specific type of bullying and is often defined as homophobic bullying. However it is not only LGBT youth who experience homophobic and transphobic bullying, but also learners who are perceived as not conforming to existing gender norms and stereotypes even if they do not identify as lesbian, gay, bisexual or transgender. As such homophobic and transphobic bullying both constitute a form of gender-based violence and should be considered together. Table 1 provides an overview of the overall sample achieved. Table 1: Characteristics of sample for RAINBOW-HAS qualitative data 11 p.hafford-letchfield@mdx.ac.uk Country Qualitative interviews with LGB parents/carers Qualitative interviews with heterosexual parents/carers Case studies of children and young people who experienced bullying Focus Groups Interviews with relevant organisations and associations Bulgaria 3 7 4 3 (n=40) 3 Italy 4 11 6 1 (n=17) 3 Poland 8 2 5 1 (n=14) 2 Spain 5 5 5 3 (n=28) 3 UK 7 7 5 2 (n=75) 4 Totals 27 32 25 10 (n=174) 15 Data was subject to thematic analysis (Braun and Clarke, 2004) and the detailed findings for each country were reported separately (see Arateko, 2015). Discourse Analysis 12 p.hafford-letchfield@mdx.ac.uk The remainder of this paper reports on a discourse analysis drawing on a synthesis of these themes and findings which, whilst providing only a snapshot of contemporary practice across the European context, generated some interesting cross comparative and discursive analysis. Drawing on Fairclough’s work (1989), the intersecting and combination of categories within the thematic data enabled the identification of patterns of everyday talk and practices that legitimize power and serve to reinforce or challenge views across those ‘speaking’ about family and school life in relation to LGBT issues. Given the amount of data generated and the complexity of narratives present within and between each country’s samples, analysis of the data across all these sources presented challenges. For example, identifying themes, the absence of information about the historical and political context of each country limited the comparability of experience between countries. Discourse analysis has enabled us to transcend these divisions, providing an opportunity to explore similarities in experiences regardless of inter and intra country variations. The three key discourses that emerged from the data were based on binary categories: firstly the notion of the ‘insider/outsider’ in school communities’, including whose voices are dominant or subverted in this environment; secondly, narratives about blame and survival in relation to bullying behaviour and experiences; and thirdly, the ‘problematisation vs ordinariness of LGBT families’ in a heteronormative world. Insider/outsider discourses in school communities Many of the factors which contributed to how homo-transphobic bullying was conceptualised, understood and responded to were based on relational dynamics between school personnel and the families in their local communities. This was determined by social, religious and cultural influences 13 p.hafford-letchfield@mdx.ac.uk on the perceived role of these two institutions; the family and school. These determined who was responsible for related issues such as sex and relationship education; what they expected from each other (‘the rules’) and the flexibility and mode of communication between them. For example in Bulgaria and Poland, strong taboos regarding sexual orientation, homosexuality, and sexuality caused difficulties for parents and teachers to even speak about such issues, enveloped by the historical, political and social taboos on communication around sexuality and differences. In Bulgaria, heterosexual adults and children felt unprepared and uncomfortable in discussing what they thought were sensitive issues resulting in silences or heavy disguise when referring to issues of sexual or gender identities. Both parents and teachers identified a lack of personal experience and practical tools to bring the topic of sexuality out into the open. This was reinforced by mass culture and a lack of community support, given that NGO and LGBTI associations tend to organise informally and establish small, closed communities, not easily accessible. The Polish heterosexual parents interviewed spoke firmly against compulsory sex education in schools. They wanted control over timing and content and were anxious about introducing the issue of ‘homosexuality’ which they feared might impact on their child’s ‘choices’ later on around sexual identity. In Spain, families exerted a strong utilitarian view of formal education where curricular is geared towards career orientated learning. Same-sex parents however looked to schools for wider socialisation regarding values for living and working together and to enhance mutual respect. Whilst sex and relationship education is delegated to schools, it does not routinely involve sexual diversity and LGB families sought to influence this. Spanish family- school relationships tended to be individualised and focused on sharing 14 p.hafford-letchfield@mdx.ac.uk information on children’s academic results. Here too, the sexuality taboo permeates relationships between families and schools, where participants referred to avoidance on both sides in making any explicit references to sexuality or sexual orientation, including a reluctance to intervene where bullying occurs. This individualised approach mitigated against any development of active parent-teacher associations, thus preventing parental engagement and involvement. Again, culturally a lack of involvement stems from the fact that affective-sexual diversity and gender identity are considered private and personal topics not directly related to the concerns of most ‘normal’ families. LGB families then tended to isolate themselves or try to fit in and adhere to heteronormative expectations. The clear distinction between private and public life in Spain contributed to this insider/outsider approach, with the exception of Trans issues, which are more visible thus forcing families to explain and tackle it publically. Discourses on homosexuality in Italy have also remained particularly difficult despite progress on other forms of discrimination such as race and disability. Parents believed that there was more justification for a public dialogue in these areas. In general, families interviewed felt that sexuality and relationship topics were still taboo, but unlike Bulgaria and Spain, they delegated these conversations to the school. Lesbian and gay parents however talked about the need to broach the topic earlier to pre-empt inevitable questions that may arise from their own children’s comparisons of their situations with other children at school. In the UK, all the lesbian and gay families interviewed had thought a lot about issues for their child(ren) in relation to school integration. All had significant social capital (they owned their own homes and were in working households) 15 p.hafford-letchfield@mdx.ac.uk which influenced where their child went to school. This social capital was also present in the LGB samples from other countries which perhaps reflect the limitations of the snowball sampling method used. However, even so, all UK lesbian and gay families spoke of at least one issue within the school environment that made the family’s composite difference more noticeable. Their experiences were one of having to constantly ‘come out’ to a class teacher, to other children and their parents and they developed their own strategies to ensure that their children’s educational experiences were as good as possible. This included: explaining to the teacher about their families as early as possible; making a conscious decision to be active in the school (in parent teacher organisations; as school Governors; and being present in the playground before and after school). For children in secondary school, protective factors such as different types of alliances formed between themselves and other young people. Having structures in place, being confident about a school’s legislative responsibilities regarding equality and being able to assert their rights whilst relying on good dialogue with people in the community, were all seen as critical. It appeared that parents viewed their role as managing the integration of their children into their community, including the school community. LGB families face different expectations in this role, with questions always being asked about their family structure, form and creation, unlike heterosexual families. These different discourses for LGB parents in this study meant they had to manage this, most often from the position as an ‘outsider’. Silence about sexuality issues within the school community appeared to be consciously used as a way of avoiding conflict or dealing directly with issues of discrimination. Capitalising on the rich experience that LGB families have in dealing with adversity however gave some indication of the resilience of these families, as 16 p.hafford-letchfield@mdx.ac.uk all LGB families in all countries included in our sample whilst describing experiences of adversity, minimised these. In a bid to move from ‘outsider’ to ‘insider’, some LGB parents had become involved in the school’s management in order to make changes to accommodate a wider range of diversity from families within the school community. Blame and survival narratives Lesbian and gay families in particular have occupied a number of positions within public discourses over the past forty years. The historical narrative is one of ‘blame’, where they were blamed for ‘immoral behaviour’, which somehow subverted children (Richardson 1981). In the 1980s, at the point where researchers began investigating the effect on children of having two mothers, the narrative was one of ‘survival’ – being ‘as good as’, and not damaging children’s development. A number of themes emerged from the data around responsibility, accountability and tensions that showed how homo-transphobic bullying was conceptualised and responded to across the countries involved. LGB families in Poland for example were highly critical of Polish teachers, seen as too conventional, traditional and unconscientious about issues to do with sexuality. They explicitly did not want teachers to be responsible for instruction in this area as they felt teachers lacked credibility and sensitivity. Given the religious context, they were generally afraid of ‘coming out’ in terms of the potential ‘burden’ on their child. They perceived that teachers were not really interested, and as one parent put it: “why tell someone who doesn’t care”? There were significant differences between the experiences of LGB parents and families living in cities and rural areas in Poland. Homophobic verbal abuse was commonplace and children with LGB parents tended to hide 17 p.hafford-letchfield@mdx.ac.uk their situation. Parents and students reported that teachers were helpless when witnessing homophobia, and did not know how to react or have the language to respond and in some instances, they were afraid of the bully themselves. Training was seen as an essential tool for teachers, particularly as they tended to convey their own personal views and opinions on LGBT issues freely. The Polish field work team found that whilst on the one hand homophobia was not common, when it did occur, staff were not at all equipped to deal with it leading to high risk situations for young people. High levels of homophobia were perceived as associated with ‘teachers’ incompetence’. In Spain, teachers lacked information on how to handle situations with children from LGBT families and agreed that they needed training but were also seen by LGB parents not to use resources that were available. Sex and relationship education programmes in Spanish schools do not generally address diverse relationships and families but are more focused on reproduction. The general feeling from LGB parents was that outside of the child’s academic performance gave no cause to interfere. LGB parents looked to teachers to legitimise diverse sexual orientations because of their authority and daily closeness to children, thus expected to include these discussions in their everyday teaching. LGB parents felt that their differences were dealt with passively and again they were active in ensuring tolerance of their presence by engaging with the school community. Like UK parents, they had to constantly ‘come out’, talk to teachers and explain their situation. LGB parents described themselves as ‘the drivers’ within education by providing talks, books and posters and also as active educators, not only to their own children but also towards other children, parents and teachers on sexual diversity issues. 18 p.hafford-letchfield@mdx.ac.uk Homo-transphobic bullying was mostly perceived as an issue which involved verbally offensive expressions. Italian interviewees felt that proactive actions and responses were the responsibility of individual teachers or head teachers, given that there were no protocols or ministerial directives to follow. Similarly, teachers’ reactions to homo-transphobic bullying were seen as involving denial or indifference and sometimes delegated to a third external party such as a support service. Some examples were given where teachers joined in the mockery, rather than taking a stand against the bullying. Those families interviewed in Bulgaria noted increasing violence within schools. Teachers blamed the parents for this behaviour. Examples of name calling, mocking and isolation from peer groups were not recognized as forms of bullying – but seen as natural part of growing up, and that ‘real’ bullying involved physical violence. The Bulgarian research team surmised that the reasons for this increase in violence was complex and related to the ex-Soviet culture that underpins their society, going beyond homophobia/transphobia. Both parents and teachers in Bulgaria and Spain did not attribute responsibility to children for using offensive words, which they could not understand or mean, thus making this too difficult to explain or educate against. In summary, there was much blame but little shared responsibility between schools and families and often the aggressor rather than the victim of bullying received most attention. In Spain, situations of abuse were described as being a normal part of growing up and a natural rejection of difference. Culturally, the family in Spain is a deeply conservative institution rooted in heteronormative gender patterns; this was seen as both a hostile environment for LGBT persons as well as supportive. Some families interviewed, whose children had experienced 19 p.hafford-letchfield@mdx.ac.uk homophobic bullying, also expected their child to stand up to conflict and make more effort at integration. Physical or emotional weakness was identified as a factor that could bring about bullying. Likewise being different can be reinforced by strong social pressure to maintain gender roles and heteronormative patterns which underestimates the risk of homophobic bullying that children might experience when not conforming to gender or hetero norms. LGB parents were more attuned to this, being aware of potential rejection or discrimination against their children. In the UK, less blame narratives were discovered within the interviews, as both parents and teachers were more aware of their rights and responsibilities. However, policies were recognised as limited and most of the emphasis was on the school culture and its response to all forms of bullying. A multi-agency response was seen essential for vulnerable children. Parents expected staff to respond to any bullying reported to them and assessed the impact of teachers own values and prejudices on the quality of response. Similarly staff were all expected to have basic skills in responding appropriately to children experiencing bullying behaviour and this included being child focussed rather than procedurally oriented. Problematisation vs. ordinariness of LGBT families With the recent landmark legislative changes in a number of the European countries included in this study, the previous discourse of ‘blame/survival’ has now changed from ‘problematisation’ to one of being ‘ordinary’, where LGB families can move beyond reductionist narratives and be recognised for their strengths and their contributions to their local communities, including schools. These bely many challenges ahead. For too long LGB’s negotiation and use of public community spaces, such as schools, hospitals and working environments, 20 p.hafford-letchfield@mdx.ac.uk have not been discrimination free. This history has meant that they have developed skills in marrying the public and private aspects of their lives. We were interested in examining how this took place in the everyday lives of the families that took part in the study. We also wanted to explore the external factors that influenced the way in which LGB families were integrated into their communities. This discourse contained the most inter-country variance, and differences in terms of where countries were positioned on a continuum of either problematizing or accepting LGBT citizens as equal members of communities. These differences centred on whether or not individual countries had a legal framework that acknowledged the rights of LGBT individuals and families as identical to heterosexual individuals and families. Polish heterosexual families indicated their general support for LGBT families and were keen to support legal rights including adoption. UK parents thought that education services needed to develop more complexity in their thinking and management of equalities issues and difficulties, which included LGBT issues. A number of LGB parents interviewed said that their sexuality was not the most important thing with regards to their children or schooling and it was important that the school’s culture was one which demonstrated confidence in dealing with all kinds of diversity, not just LGBT. This was a better marker of how the culture of the school fostered a sense of ‘belonging’ within their community, which consciously welcomed conversations about equality rather than closing them down. For those schools who had successfully negotiated a broader equality position within their communities (and some of these journeys were not without conflict for staff and families), there was a wider benefit to other areas of school life, including for other families positioned outside of a non-nuclear structure. In these schools, this broader equalities position also benefitted how 21 p.hafford-letchfield@mdx.ac.uk different types of bullying were conceptualised and acted on, including an appreciation of the multifaceted nature of bullying in the education environment, which placed homo-transphobic bullying into a broader political and social context. These schools and teachers understood that homophobic bullying wasn’t about necessarily being gay or lesbian; schools reported that homophobic bullying was not solely targeted at LGBT students. Some of the case studies examined as part of this study concerned students who did not identify as lesbian or gay. This is not to minimise the effects of such bullying practices on LGBT students, rather to position homophobic bullying within a wider context that then becomes the concern of all educators because it can potentially affect any student. For those countries with equalities legislation that included protections for LGBT citizens, intervention is routinized or normalised because LGBT families are considered on the same basis as everyone else. There are challenges; however, as legislation does not stop discrimination occurring, as can be seen in UK history through the example of its equality legislation (Cocker and Hafford-Letchfield, 2010). In summary, the findings from this study highlighted that anti-discriminatory legislation per se represents a significant stepping stone with wide ranging difference where it is not underpinning hate crimes. Discussion Given the discourses identified and discussed here, Europe provides a ‘practice’ (Foucault, 1980) for putting key concepts about homophobic and transphobic bullying in motion. We looked at how these issues in Europe are discursively practiced in relation to their different national settings. As well as building a transnational community, RAINBOW-HAS brought important concepts from Europe about the wider issues facing LGBT families into the domestic contexts. 22 p.hafford-letchfield@mdx.ac.uk Rupp, (2014) talks about the dynamic of ‘practicing’ Europe on the ground, from above, from inside and outside institutional settings and in both reformist and radical forms of organising in relation to LGBT activism. Placing bullying in a broader political and cultural context assists thinking about it primarily as a discourse as opposed to simply a harm (see Monk, 2009). Enquiring into the speakability or acceptability of focusing solely on homophobic and transphobic bullying within a broader bullying agenda makes discourse a key plank for challenging bullying in schools. Looking at the transnational and national sphere is useful to conceptualise a new institutionalized dimension; that of the openness to sexual diversity as a quintessential feature of Western Societies. There are challenges in studying homophobic and transphobic bullying including the dangers of homogenising LGBT families and their issues to a single social category (Valentine et al, 2010). The RAINBOW-HAS research team faced methodological and ethical dilemmas, such as accessing potential interviewees or gaining consent, which can become more complex and significant when the research involves work with a 'vulnerable' group of children or youth or in a unsupported context. We recognised that working with self-identified lesbian and gay young people is particularly sensitive because of the specific laws which frame (or until recently have framed) homosexuality and because of the way in which children are popularly constructed as asexual or innocent. The complexity of this topic and its reliance on transnational grassroots solidarities as well as conceptualising meaning, practice and identity within the context of the research area highlights an understudied movement and its ties to European integration. One of the undervalued outcomes of the study was in its support of solidarity and Europeanisation of LGBT combatting of homophobic bullying across the 23 p.hafford-letchfield@mdx.ac.uk nine organisations involved and the families and institutions that they worked with. Another downside was the study’s potential to reinforce an ‘East’, ‘West’ European dichotomy, and binary thinking structures which frame differences as being due to more liberal, democratic or modern thinking in the West. This was evident in the distinct differences between the UK and other participating countries given its advances in LGBT legislation and policies and as a more secular society. It has been argued that the EU lacks specific mechanisms to enforce human rights norms, let alone bring about reforms, and as new countries join, they will continue to lag behind in providing the full spectrum of human rights to LGBT people (Csaky, 2016). As seen in the narratives, there is also a conservative-religious component as well as economic hardship experienced by many of the region’s citizens which feeds antigay rhetoric. Symbolic matters often come to the fore when populist politicians need scapegoats, and emotionally charged topics, such as the rights of LGBT people, which can be used to distract attention from official mismanagement and difficult structural reforms. Bullying is a serious problem for young LGBT people; however, when it comes to children in LGB households the issue is not so clear cut. There is a need to consider the broader context in which LGB parents discuss their children’s experiences of bullying. Their accounts were found to be discursively and rhetorically designed to deal with a heterosexist social/political context. LGB parents face a dilemma of stake and accountability: reports of ‘no bullying’ risk being heard as implausible given the prevalence of the bullying theme; at the same time, reports of bullying are equally if not more risky, raising the possibility of charges of bad parenting as it is used to undermine LGB parenting. 24 p.hafford-letchfield@mdx.ac.uk Clarke et al (2004) explore the detail of the parents’ accounts of bullying to illustrate how they are designed to negotiate this web of accountability, and argue for the importance for critical social psychology of analysing the talk of socially/politically marginalized groups. Enquiring into the speakability of homophobic bullying raises the question as to what happens and what is enabled when this discourse becomes the key plank for challenging homophobia in schools (Monk 2009). Monk also suggests the reading of contemporary debates about homophobic bullying as a ‘history of the present’, and this perspective can be applied here. Indeed, homophobic bullying is a particularly rich site for this form of political meaning-making, located as it is at the intersection of discourses of education and childhood. Monk and Hendrick (2003) remind us that education can be perceived as a key tool for unlocking individual potential and for creating a fairer society and features within debates from liberal and progressive political paradigms. Conclusion and implications for social work RAINBOW-HAS sought to analyse and improve the situation surrounding the rights of children and young people with regard to sexual orientation and gender identity in the educational community in the broadest sense. The project focused on educational institutions, teaching staff and family associations of all types in an effort to create an educational environment open to sexual diversity from childhood, an environment that protects against any form of discrimination or harassment on the grounds of sexual orientation or gender identity, i.e., homophobic or transphobic behaviours. The project facilitated an international meeting of Ministers of Education at UNESCO to catalyse responses by Member States to homophobic and 25 p.hafford-letchfield@mdx.ac.uk transphobic bullying in educational institutions to stimulate a policy statement and to launch the report on the status of homophobic and transphobic violence in education. The report produced reviewed the evidence gathered by the project on the scale and nature of the problem and took stock of progress made in the response. It confirmed within its limited parameters that discrimination and concealment of sexual orientation are prevalent throughout every age, gender and geographical category. Twenty-two good practices were identified by the RAINBOW-HAS project (see Arateko, 2015), five of which involved a formal evaluation of a piloted intervention which was led by young people and families in partnership with school to combat bullying, particularly homophobic and transphobic bullying. This paper focused on a discourse analysis across RAINBOW-HAS findings and suggests that besides legal and institutional change, there is a need for much closer collaboration, communication and engagement across those working with situations involving homophobic/transphobic bullying. There is an urgent need to actively create meaningful networks which engage families and their children from all backgrounds to share the responsibility of protecting rights, taking on commitments, handling bullying, promoting support programmes and generating positive cultures and conditions and reliable mechanisms for children and families at risk. At the time of writing, social work has yet to tangibly enter these debates with significance. Social work has an intimate relationship with ‘the family’ since many aspects of practice are concerned with family life and problems and exerts powerful claims about its interventions (Hicks, 2011). Social work has much less to do with mainstream education even though research evidence suggests that bullying involving homophobic and transphobic abuse is itself 26 p.hafford-letchfield@mdx.ac.uk mainstream (Mishna et al, 2009). Combined with social work’s relative silence on LGBT issues within its equality, diversity and human rights concerns (Cocker and Hafford-Letchfield, 2010) we suggest that there are implications for social work to respond in new and different ways, particularly given its role in service integration and systemic approaches to promoting children’s wellbeing. Strategies to address bullying require interventions at various levels within the system. This includes the need for deconstruction of traditional or dominant accounts of family life, which supports the increased visibility of sexuality within all institutions and acknowledges the complexity of managing identities. It also requires a transfer of power from professionals to service users and their communities so they can take more control and exercise choice in the way services support them to live their lives and an appreciation of the values, connections and desires that bind LGBT social networks together so that there are parallel supports in legal, policy and service developments. Starting with looking at our own professional education, we need to move away from fixed identities towards engaging with the more complex, multiple and fluid identities of LGBT people, reflecting their individuality and their social and economic context. Acknowledgments Rainbow-Has was co-funded by the European Union’s Fundamental Rights and Citizenship programme. The authors thank the partner membership organisations and especially all of the parents, carers, families, schools and young people and their advocates who participated in this research and who made it possible. 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work_ujc5lucxvbgjdeogftaxipidmu	----	Brexit, Race and Migration Kathy Burrell, Peter Hopkins, Arshad Isakjee, Colin Lorne, Caroline Nagel, Robin Finlay, Anoop Nayak, Matthew C Benwell, Raksha Pande, Michael Richardson, Katherine Botterill and Ben Rogaly Department of Geography and Planning, School of Environmental Sciences, University of Liverpool, Liverpool, UK k.burrell@liverpool.ac.uk School of Geography, Politics and Sociology, Newcastle University, England, UK NE1 7RU peter.hopkins@ncl.ac.uk Department of Geography and Planning, School of Environmental Sciences, University of Liverpool, Liverpool, UK a.isakjee@liverpool.ac.uk Manchester Business School, University of Manchester, Manchester colin.lorne@manchester.ac.uk Department of Geography, University of South Carolina, Columbia, SC 29208 cnagel@mailbox.sc.edu School of Geography, Politics and Sociology, Newcastle University, England, UK NE1 7RU contact author robin.finlay@ncl.ac.uk School of Geographical and Earth Sciences, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, UK Katherine.botterill@glasgow.ac.uk Department of Geography and Planning, School of Environmental Sciences, University of Liverpool, Liverpool, UK k.burrell@liverpool.ac.uk Department of Geography, University of Sussex, Brighton BN1 9SJ b.rogaly@sussex.ac.uk Abstract This timely series of interventions scrutinises the centrality of race and migration to the 2016 Brexit campaign, vote and its aftermath. It brings together five individual pieces, with an accompanying introduction, which interrogate different facets of how race, migration and Brexit interconnect: an examination of the so called 'left behinds' and the fundamental intersections between geography, race and class at the heart of Brexit motivations and contexts; an exploration of arguably parallel and similarly complex developments in the US with the rise of populism and support for Donald Trump; an analysis of the role of whiteness in the experiences of East European nationals in the UK in the face of increased anti-foreigner sentiment and uncertainty about future status; a discussion of intergenerational differences in outlooks on race and immigration and the sidelining of different people and places in Brexit debates; and a studied critique of prevailing tropes about Brexit which create divisive classed and raced categories and seek to oversimplify broader understandings of race, class and migration. Taken together these articles, all arguing for the need to eschew easy answers and superficial narratives, offer important and opportune insights into what Brexit tells us about race and migration in contemporary UK. Keywords: Brexit, race, migration, class, place mailto:k.burrell@liverpool.ac.uk mailto:peter.hopkins@ncl.ac.uk mailto:a.isakjee@liverpool.ac.uk mailto:colin.lorne@manchester.ac.uk mailto:cnagel@mailbox.sc.edu mailto:Katherine.botterill@glasgow.ac.uk mailto:k.burrell@liverpool.ac.uk mailto:b.rogaly@sussex.ac.uk Introduction: Brexit, Race and Migration Kathy Burrell* and Peter Hopkins** *Department of Geography and Planning, School of Environmental Sciences, University of Liverpool, Liverpool, UK k.burrell@liverpool.ac.uk **School of Geography, Politics and Sociology, Newcastle University, England, UK NE1 7RU peter.hopkins@ncl.ac.uk This series of five scholarly interventions, developed from a panel of the same title convened at the AAG in Boston in 2017, consider Brexit in the context of race and migration in the UK. For researchers of race and migration Brexit has come to mark a pivotal point in the UK's identity and practice as a multicultural country. The questions it has provoked have been pressing and extensive, emotive and often contentious. Has the Brexit vote heralded a new era in the mainstreaming of anti-immigrant populist sentiment and discourse, or does it constitute a revisitation of, or evolution in, earlier (post)colonial uncertainties and prejudices? And what about economics and the state? Does the Brexit vote signal a wider breakdown in the established post-war social contract and a logical response to deindustrialisation, portentous of the last throes of the 'experiment' of globalisation and the movement of bodies, as well as capital, in late modernity? Or is it something more sinister, the hijacking of a democratic system by an increasingly narrow set of interests and influences, using race and class as playthings in a deeper power struggle? The rush to find answers to these questions has become compelling, and we hope to contribute here to some of these debates and reflections. Using race and immigration as an explicit prism, our five interventions locate race and migration as central to the Brexit referendum campaign, result and aftermath. For these authors, race is implicated through the colonial invocations and nostalgias of Brexit discourses, and most fundamentally, played out in people's lives through steep rises in recorded hate crime and the creation of new racially stratified vulnerabilities. In this introduction, we highlight three points we feel these interventions highlight: first, the geographically specific intersections of race and class tied up with the Brexit campaign and vote and their consequences; second, the different temporalities at play which help us contextualise Brexit in a longer colonial chronology, as well as work through the particular pressures and racialised discourses which were circulating at the time; and third, the value in taking a step back and reflecting on how knowledge and understanding of Brexit is itself mediated, acknowledging the need to be alert to the privileging of some experiences and voices over others. Firstly then, these pieces underline the importance of intersectional, spatially anchored analysis in understanding the Brexit vote and its fallout; place, race and class, in particular, are central themes running through these essays, articulated in different ways and at different scales. Finlay et al, for example, confront head on the geographical relevance of what they term Brexit's 'geographical schisms'. In their piece they not only draw out, and problematise, the regional geographies of the vote, but also argue powerfully for the need to work through race and class intersections through the prism of place and through ethnographic work; this is a stark contrast to the kind of 'ageographical' binary discourses which have circulated about 'anywheres' and 'somewheres' which Rogaly critiques. The interventions from Nagel as well as Isakjee and Lorne illustrate the wider connection between the Brexit vote and the election of Donald Trump, suggesting an impetus which, while shaped mailto:k.burrell@liverpool.ac.uk mailto:peter.hopkins@ncl.ac.uk in local environments, also has a much broader resonance. For the UK, Isakjee and Lorne show that a wider analysis of Brexit cannot fully separate out race and class; this is not just a sop to a surface intersectionality, but a deeper acknowledgement that race and migration cannot be understood outside of class contexts, any more than a pretence can be maintained that class is not also tied to long established racialized structures. In writing about the US, Nagel exemplifies this perfectly, demonstrating how a fundamental interlocking of race and class is just as pertinent, but works differently in different historical and geographical contexts. While class and place are still important for understanding the appeal of the Trump presidency, for example, Nagel argues that allegiances to Trump are not based on any coherent class based politics. It is the suggestion here that race holds the key in this particular context that also invites further scrutiny about the evolving power, and nuances, of whiteness. This is an integral thread to the interventions. Finlay et al highlight the need to look beyond 'superdiversity' in the rush to make sense of the racial connotations of the Brexit vote, and take the experiences of less diverse, predominantly white places more seriously. This is something Botterill and Burrell focus on in their piece on Polish nationals in the UK. As they argue, meaningful discussions of race and Brexit necessitate a close interrogation of whiteness (see Bhambra, 2017), not just for the inherent whiteness of the colonial positioning that aspects of Brexit inhabits, but also because anti-EU sentiment presents a more complicated racial stratification than is sometimes acknowledged. As they show too, Eastern European whiteness in a Western European context carries with it further, emplaced, geopolitical racial connotations. The spatially structured intersections these pieces comment on are manifold; just as class intersects with race and migration, all the debates Brexit channels about place and belonging highlight the salience of youth and gender, as it is often working class people, younger people and women who suffer the most when it comes to the enactment of exclusionary politics such as austerity and right-wing populism. Second, these threads also show the importance of different temporalities weaving through these developments and debates. Several papers pick up on the contemporary sense of urgency around the rise of populism, and the critical timing of heightened awareness of the movement of people into and around Europe that the so-called 'refugee crisis' stirred, intersecting directly with the run up to the Brexit vote. There is a strong argument embedded in this collection that underscores the fact that Brexit discourse is not disconnected from wider racialised tropes and positionings but has been able to refract, and in some cases capitalise on, broader contemporaneous racial anxieties. It is interesting too that several papers highlight the same events and actions - the murder of MP Jo Cox, the specific imagery used in the UKIP leave campaign. While these create points of overlap between them, this in itself is significant; together these observations capture a sense of what was going on in that moment which is vital to acknowledge, document and work through. History matters here too. Rogaly asserts how important it is to remember that the 'crisis' that the prism of Brexit has created, and which now seems to overlay race and migration issues in the UK or indeed the US, does not present an unprecedented or unique anti-migration impetus. As Spencer (2002) shows, UK migration policy was inherently racialised long before the formal implementation of the 'hostile environment'. Panayi (1996) has catalogued the extensive history of racial violence that has plagued the UK, also highlighting how animosity has always been directed to a diversity of new, variably stratified migrants - Irish, Jewish, German, Caribbean, South Asian. In terms of race and migration, Brexit looks less of an anomaly when viewed through a longer historical lens. Geographically, too, as Nagel confirms, the UK's ongoing struggles to achieve any kind of post-racial utopia are hardly exceptional. This paper reminds us that commitments to liberal migration policies have been historically fluid, both strengthening and receding in different ways in different times. Caution is needed when assuming any notions of 'progress' in terms of race relations or attitudes to 'foreigners'; prevailing cultures are contextually contingent and can change in different directions. But just as there has been a resurgence in anti-immigrant sentiment, and a clear strengthening of whiteness as a tool of formal political power, this paper also reminds us of the strengths of the counter-currents, the progressive possibilities that emerge in the face of these struggles. What we can take from this is that Brexit analyses, and responses to heightened tensions surrounding race, need to resist the double lures of simplicity and parochialism. This is especially important at a time when anti-immigrant politics is exercising more transnational might, but also reminds us to be alert to more progressive currents too, wherever they may emerge. The final point is an overarching observation relating to 'voice' and who gets to speak, and be heard, about politics and about something as potentially seismic as Brexit. Our collection starts with Isakjee and Lorne investigating the 'left behind' and confronting early on the thorny issue of academic subjectivity and positionality. Did the Brexit vote catch 'academics' off guard - was Brexit 'bad news from nowhere'? Were we, as academics, too out of touch to have seen it coming? Even if we did not see this in our non-work lives, outside our supposed 'cosmopolitan ivory towers', did we not heed the warnings of all the research which has been stressing the resilience of anti-immigrant sentiment, and the fragility of multicultural encounters for meaningful and widespread anti-racism (Valentine, 2008; Clayton, 2008; Wilson, 2016; Burrell, 2016)? And if academics have had to work hard to face up to these questions, where does this leave the most publicly vocal commentators on Brexit? In the final intervention, Rogaly offers a forensic deconstruction of the arguments put forward by David Goodhart, a (white) man whose voice has been particularly prominent in framing debates about these 'anywheres' and 'somewheres', a labelling which draws people in opposition and posits categories which are unable to reflect and accommodate the complexity of contemporary British life. If understandings of Brexit are susceptible to such classed and racialised hijackings, then how do we make sure other voices are heard? In their piece, Finlay et al illustrate the unevenness at play in the production of knowledge about Brexit. They point out how some places appear to be over-researched, and others under-researched; not only is there an embedded geographic variability within the British political and economic landscape, but this is matched by a somewhat spatially patchy academic analysis and interest. This leaves some places unheard and others shouting out loud. And if entire places are lost, what about people? In their piece, Finlay et al signal the dearth of opportunity for young people, those who will be living through Brexit for the rest of their lives, to contribute to these political conversations and developments. So, if these discussions are about race and migration, at what point is the space opened up for a more pluriversal perspective to take shape? Botterill and Burrell, for example, foreground the experiences of Polish nationals in their piece, directing attention to the lived experience of being Eastern European in the UK just as debates about migration and the EU heat up. The turn to 'everyday Brexits' (Anderson and Wilson, 2017) is important here especially, but the wider point is that Brexit debates need to heed the decolonial shift inflecting the social science disciplines especially at the moment (for example Radcliffe, 2017; Noxolo, 2017). Who gets to talk about Brexit is an important political issue too. None of these terms or positions can be taken for granted. This is why Rogaly's piece is so powerful here, for the way it demolishes the kind of oversimplified, divisive arguments put forward by commentators such as Goodhart. Those who are able to use their voice to speak about Brexit then, carry a responsibility to do this in a way that resists the dumbing down and polarisation of political culture; nuance and complexity have become radical tools and need to be utilised at every turn. With this in mind, we present here a series of interventions which purposely tease out the complicated nature of Brexit and its many intersections with race and migration. Bad News from Nowhere: Race, Class and the ‘Left Behind’ Arshad Isakjee* and Colin Lorne** *Department of Geography and Planning, School of Environmental Sciences, University of Liverpool, Liverpool, UK a.isakjee@liverpool.ac.uk ** Manchester Business School, University of Manchester, Manchester colin.lorne@manchester.ac.uk Figure 1: ‘Breaking Point’ Poster - Family Advertising Ltd (2016) for the United Kingdom Independence Party The response to the Brexit vote among academics has, at times, felt uneasy. Immediately after the Brexit vote on June 12th 2016, on campuses and over the twittersphere, scholars began to process the unfolding political event, reacting personally, analytically and emotionally. Attempts at interpreting the referendum outcome coalesced into a tense mixture of surprise, uncertainty, inevitability, outrage and loss. The various reactions felt by colleagues in the academy perhaps reflected our own positionality as relatively privileged, somewhat mobile, socially liberal professionals, generally at a safer distance from the economic and political frustrations and ideologies that the Leave campaign had sought to exploit. In conversation, academics have uttered their concerns, even their disdain, for their fellow citizens who had chosen to vote for the UK to exit the European Union. The resurrection of nationalist political rhetoric was to continue beyond the Brexit vote, alienating many of us further; as if to add insult to injury the UK Prime Minister went on to declare that those who felt that they were citizens of the world, were in fact ‘citizens of nowhere’. In earnest, social scientists have begun to ask searching questions about the nature and causes of the political divides created by Brexit. The proposition of the ‘left behind’ has become particularly prevalent, the disaffection of whom it is thought contributed to the surprise referendum result. Echoed in the US after the election of Donald Trump, discourses have begun to emerge which position the ‘left behind’ as solely or primarily white working class communities. ‘White working classes’ are variously placed as being subject to political neglect in favour of minorities, as victims of austerity, or as retrograde protagonists of mailto:a.isakjee@liverpool.ac.uk mailto:colin.lorne@manchester.ac.uk xenophobia and racism. In each case, the identification of the ‘left behind’ is part of a racialised and politicised set of discourses, apportioning blame for the country’s broader political circumstances. Within the confines of this commentary, we set out how a place-based intersectional analysis is essential for examining notions of the ‘left behind’ associated with the Brexit vote. We raise the concern that academic scholarship attuned to subjectivities, identity politics and ‘difference’ is in danger of being positioned somehow as if is in opposition to, or at least obscuring, understandings of the crisis tendencies of capitalism and what this means in terms of changing economic relations and class struggle. For example, although the response to the financial and economic crisis of 2007/8 has led to an ‘enduring state of austerity’ (Jessop, 2017: 136), deeply entrenched racisms have also become apparent – but they have not simply escalated in tandem with poverty. Instead, racial abuse and violence, encountered both at street-level and online, rehearse all-too-familiar discriminations which emanate from longstanding and socially embedded suspicion of racialized ‘others’. Considered analysis has begun to trace social-spatial injustices, shaped by class, race and gender relations which have led to political and cultural alienation, with excellent accounts appearing within and beyond geography addressing such questions in relation to Brexit (Bachmann and Sidaway 2016, Virdee and McGeever 2017). While an appeal for an intersectional approach may seem an obvious position, however, it is important to reiterate that we share acertain discomfort towards analysis that negates race or class – or obscures their relevance entirely. Brexit is a race and class issue. ‘Left Behind’ Britain Economic relations are certainly necessary to understand conditions in which disillusion with politics has surfaced. UK society has been subject to a very particular set of neoliberal economic policies since the 1980s, setting it apart from the communitarian and social-democratic capitalist welfare regimes of continental states such as France and Germany (Esping-Andersen 1996). De-industrialisation in the UK has been shaped by these political choices: relatively secure manufacturing jobs have been in severe decline since the 1960s alongside the weakening bargaining power of trade unions. During this period, there too has been a changing composition of waged employment, with increasing numbers of women undertaking paid work. Although we must be cautious of narratives of epochal economic shifts, we can observe the challenges of technology-driven change, declining reserves of mineral wealth, stagnant wage growth, global competition and the changing composition of the labour market compounded by (particular) state subsidies being withdrawn. Between 1970 and 2010 manufacturing share of employment fell from 30% to 10% under Tory and Labour governments (Rowthorn and Coutts 2013). A buoyant service sector supported economic growth in this period, but the relatively secure, reasonably well- paid employment for semi-skilled and unskilled workers has not returned. The effects of these changes have been highly uneven geographically. Whereas towns and cities suffered from the loss of manufacturing jobs, well-paid service sector jobs have largely been concentrated in London, the South East and financial centres in larger British cities. Under successive governments, regional policy has privileged place-based regeneration over social policies (Crowley et al 2012). Declining towns and cities were encouraged to position themselves to compete for inward investment and market themselves to attract technological, creative and knowledge industries. For towns and cities without the critical mass to become cultural and technological hubs, such a strategy was hardly likely to both revive stuttering economies, and crucially, nor would it provide a fix for chronic unemployment and underemployment. Whilst the New Labour government for a period invested heavily in health and education, redistribution through welfare policy was modest (Chote et al 2010). Regressive austerity economics under coalition and Tory governments have since wiped out even those modest achievements, and the poorest local authorities have been dealt with the largest cuts in funding from national government (Hastings et al 2017). The net effect of these constrictions is heightened further still by the long-term crises in housing, which has witnessed a decline in social housing, decreasing home ownership coinciding with increasing private rental costs. Under these conditions, then, it is unsurprising that political disillusionment crystallising in the Brexit vote is sharpest outside London and cities in the South East, and were particularly pronounced in the North East of England, Wales and the counties and towns that lie on the edge of Birmingham’s city-region. The dynamics of unemployment and deprivation in areas traditionally seen as ‘peripheral’ can differ from similar socio-economic conditions in urban centres. Whilst housing costs may be relatively affordable, employment opportunities are fewer and wages for full-time jobs are substantially lower. Urban landscapes punctuated by closed factories and high street shops lie as symbols of past mass employment which have long since ceased. Following desperately stuttering regional policies since the turn of the century, the centres of political and industrial power seem further away. The flows of capital and people representing economic opportunity and dynamism, are not just metaphorically distant prospects, but literal ones too. Yet it would be a mistake to fetishise deprivation as belonging solely to outlying regions. House-price rises far above rates of inflation have hugely increased the cost of living even for middle-income earners in cities considered to be ‘thriving’. The possibilities of ‘social mobility’ have been reduced as home- ownership falls in response to increased rentier capitalism (see Christophers 2009). However, it would be dangerous indeed to uncritically accept the racialized discourse which draws these dynamics as uniquely affecting ‘white working class’ communities. Black and minority ethnic populations are demonstrably shown to have lower wages, higher unemployment, lower home-ownership and substantially less wealth than their white counterparts. In towns such as Stoke on Trent and Boston, despite the high vote to leave the EU and amidst strong support for the United Kingdom Independence Party, close to 20% of the population is made of ethnic minorities. 11% of the population of Boston in 2011 was from EU accession countries alone – deprivation affects these communities as much as white groups with British passports. Whilst policies of austerity have undoubtedly made life far harder for the poorest in society, it is rarely acknowledged that they have a disproportionate effect on minority communities, particularly minority women (Runnymede 2016). And yet somewhat perversely, anti-immigration sentiment in its most potent, racialised form was a key part of the political narrative of the Brexit Leave campaign. Eastern European workers were held responsible for declining wages for native Britons, despite economic evidence that questions the strength of any such effect - except on other immigrants (Manacorda et al 2012). Even as they were defended, debates about their legitimacy centred not on their rights as humans or citizens, but on their economic worth to the British state. Fear of refugees – Muslim and black others, coming to the UK was exploited and deliberately conflated with EU membership by Leave campaigners. The underlying xenophobia and racism of the elements of the Leave campaign was crystallised in the infamous Leave campaign poster showing lines of darker-skinned refugees, seemingly marching it is inferred, towards Europe or Britain, pushing country and continent to ‘Breaking Point’ (Figure 1). It is apparent, then, that a solely economic analysis of Brexit is insufficient in either explaining the vote or in the interpretation of disillusionment or what it means to feel ‘left behind’. To further cement this point, we must remember that despite the narratives of Brexit being driven by the poor, the lowest two social classes still accounted for less than a quarter of the total Brexit vote (Dorling 2016). Brexit politics is at least as much about identity. The calls to ‘leave Europe’ do not merely appeal to those feeling left behind economically, but they exploit feelings of cultural alienation and actively appeal to racist sentiments, too. This was clear before the Brexit vote took place, when the right-wing extremist Thomas Mair murdered the progressive Labour MP Jo Cox on the street outside her constituency office, shouting the far-right slogan ‘Britain First’. It was also clear after the Brexit vote, when police catalogued a sustained rise in hate-crime towards minority groups. The Home Office reported that in the month after the referendum, hate crimes rose by 41% over the same month in the previous year (BBC News 2016). Even in the eleven months after the vote, the increase is sustained, with police figures demonstrating that race and faith-based hate crimes have risen by 23% during that period (Bulman 2017). It is also worth noting here that specifically anti-Muslim hate crimes also spiked according to the Islamophobic hate crime reporting service Tell Mama (2016). Just as EU membership and issues of refugees fleeing Syria had been deliberately conflated by the Leave campaign, fears of Muslims arriving in Britain was routinely used as racist (and misplaced) justification for Brexit (Etehead 2016). The prospect of Turkey’s accession into the EU was also evoked by senior politicians such as Michael Gove playing into the Islamophobic narrative (Mason 2016). Similarly, the Remain and Leave campaigns both mobilised the issue of the Le Touquet treaty, which dictates border controls between Britain and France. The Remain campaign presented the possibility that British border controls would move from Calais in France to Dover in the UK, in the event of Brexit: the implication being that Brexit would lead to refugees and migrants arriving unhindered on British shores (see Davies et al 2017). If racism and Islamophobia are significant driving forces of Brexit, how do we then begin to understand what is meant by communities feeling ‘left behind’? As Virdee and McGeever (2017) note in their excellent recent piece on this subject, the ugly and violent forms of racism which accompanied Brexit exist alongside a breezy and vacuous nostalgia for Britain’s imperial past. Indeed, as Bhambra (2017) reminds us, the colonial imaginary has long been key to the very construction of Britishness itself. Contrary to the notion that the new politics is about closure as opposed to openness, those opposing EU membership were happy to extol the virtues of global connections and relationships – but only on ‘British’ terms, and in ‘British’ interests. Such sentiment was epitomised by the Secretary for International Trade Liam Fox, whose civil servants developed plans to compensate for Brexit by strengthening ties with Commonwealth States in the aftermath of the Brexit vote, with the intention of branding the strategy as ‘Empire 2.0’ (Coates 2017). However offensive this label, however unrealistic such expectations and divorced from rational policy, the politics of Brexit played here speaks to a spatial imaginary of Britain’s ‘lost greatness’. More than anything, a sense of loss (that can emanate from nostalgia) connects the elite imperial narrative of Britain’s declining historical global power and ‘leadership’ with the real material degradations of those suffering from the ravages of the neoliberal economy. For those who identify with this sense of loss, supporting Brexit becomes a symbolic act of challenging constructions of modernity itself. The political right readily exploits the underlying, societally embedded racisms to prevent disillusionment with capitalism from resulting in progressive action. Confronting Race, Class and Space The tensions between Marxist and postcolonial readings of society, and the related notion that class and race represent separate, even opposing frames of understanding inequality now span decades, as theorists sympathetic to either of these philosophical strands seek to (re)define contemporary progressive politics. Much has been written criticising post- structuralism for splintering class politics along lines of gender and race – but such a critique is misguided. Discriminations based on both are products of and sustained through the structuring of patriarchy and racial superiority, and these in turn are nested within and between structures of capitalism (see Bhattarchayya 2018). The multiple dimensions of Brexit we have discussed are a reminder that we must be cautious of assigning simplistic motivations and explanations of ‘populist’ or nationalist sentiment. Perhaps it is important to appreciate Linda McDowell’s (2008: 21) appeal for ‘scholarship that sees class through the lens of gender and race relations, that constructs class not as categorical positions but as active, ongoing and negotiable sets of practices that vary across time and space’. Yet analytical discourses must then walk the fine line of attentiveness towards the intersections of these dimensions, without retreating to the intellectual safety-net constructed by particular notions of perpetual spatial-temporal fluidities, multiplicities, super-diversities and assemblages – a theoretical retreat from the empirical challenge. After all, the success of activist movements such as #MeToo and Black Lives Matter has shown that society can respond positively to clear, unapologetic and unambiguous calls for justice on the basis of gender and race. The same can be true on the basis of class. Furthermore, in analysing Brexit, the relations with place are important for understanding how the dynamics of post-industrial declines and post-colonial futures intersect, to create inequalities in material terms as well as the sense of being ‘left behind’. These inequalities are spatially distinct in production and interpretation and as such require thorough empirical quantitative and qualitative research to determine where efforts to challenge the exclusionary discourses of racism, xenophobia and deprivation may be concentrated. We recognise that relational geographies of place and subjectivities run into different tensions with territorial understandings of inequality, population and the nation- state – yet these too are underpinned by the structures of race and class. Geographers, especially those in the UK, are increasing incentivised to pursue fashionably new theoretical ground to explain contemporary social phenomena. We suggest however that it is through maintaining the discipline’s strength of spatialising race and class inequalities and exploring the attendant intersections and experiences that will provide the most cogent analyses of Brexit – as well as practical avenues towards progressive responses. Populism, Immigration, and the Trump Phenomenon in the U.S. Caroline Nagel Department of Geography, University of South Carolina, Columbia, SC 29208 cnagel@mailbox.sc.edu Introduction The decision by British voters to leave the European Union came as a shock to many, despite Britain’s longstanding tendency to exempt itself from EU policies. The exit decision seemed almost like a fluke or an extraordinary act of impetuousness. But the singularity of the Brexit vote was called into question with the surprise victory of Donald Trump in the 2016 U.S. presidential election. Candidate Trump, who had aligned himself with the Brexiteers in a visit to Scotland in 2016, rallied many Americans with his open contempt for economic globalization and for the liberal-cosmopolitan elites who have provided ideological cover for it. Misogynistic, bombastic, and frequently incoherent, Trump appealed to aggrieved middle- class and working-class whites in America’s ‘heartland’—those rural and semi-rural counties where manufacturing jobs have been decimated by offshoring, outsourcing, and technological changes. This short essay explores the rise of right-wing populism in the U.S.—and especially the targeting of immigrants—as a point of comparison with the Brexit vote. The dynamics driving the Trump phenomenon have shaped U.S. politics for many decades: Trump has not singlehandedly created hostility and fear toward immigrants (or feminists, gays, inner-city black populations, etc.) so much as he has legitimized and amplified existing attitudes toward these groups. But while Trump’s electoral victory is perhaps not as shocking or incomprehensible as it is sometimes made out to be, it does signal a breakdown of the liberal consensus that has guided immigration policy since the 1960s. Socially liberal politicians and academics have responded with a strenuous defence of the country’s expansionary immigration system, invoking the cherished idea of America as a nation of immigrants. But in challenging contemporary manifestations of racist nationalism, I wish to argue, opponents of right-wing nationalism in the U.S. (and their British counterparts) should resist the temptation to defend immigrants in the terms of their economic value or their conformity to white, middle-class, norms. While perhaps useful at a tactical level, such arguments do little to challenge the iniquities of the post-War (neo)liberal order or to remedy the dislocations that have made right-wing populism an attractive option for many voters. Breaking the post-war liberal consensus At the core of the current swing toward right-wing populism in both Britain and the U.S. is a rejection of the post-World War II order characterized by intense marketization, economic integration, and relatively high levels of capital and labour mobility. In the U.S. context, Trump’s basic argument has been that post-War commitments to free trade and multilateralism have brought about America’s decline by undermining American workers and by entangling the U.S. in expensive wars. Trump has promised an ‘America First’ agenda that places national interests above the interests of allies, trade partners, and international institutions. Trump’s rejection of internationalism has been coupled with a relentless attack on liberal social values, and especially the ‘diversity talk’ that treats the recognition of differences as a public virtue. This denigration of liberal social norms and the reassertion of mailto:cnagel@mailbox.sc.edu narrower, racialized conceptions of America’s national character, has played well among older whites who have seen their social status diminish rapidly since the 1970s. These voters, as Hochschild (2016) observes, see a parade of undeserving minority groups ‘cutting in line’ ahead of them and gaming the system at the expense of ‘real’ Americans. As in Britain, immigrants and refugees figure prominently in narratives of national decline in the U.S. In his campaign speeches, Trump portrayed America a country overrun by foreign rapists, murderers, terrorists, and other miscreants who have crossed unhindered into U.S. territory. Chants of ‘build the wall’, a favourite at Trump campaign rallies, continue to animate the President’s public appearances, and the Trump administration has made the securitization of the U.S.-Mexico border a major priority. Trump has also rewarded his base with administrative actions targeting immigrants and refugees, including an executive order (entitled ‘Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States’, but referred to by opponents as the ‘Muslim Ban’) that imposed a 90-day suspension on the entry of people from 7 predominantly Muslim countries, and a 120-day suspension on all refugee resettlement. The Trump administration has also sought to crack down on ‘sanctuary cities’ that have refused to cooperate with federal immigration law-enforcement officials in detaining unauthorized immigrants. Trump’s shift away from the post-War liberal consensus on immigration is significant. For the past half-century, starting with the Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1965 (more commonly known as the Hart-Celler Act, after its main sponsors), the U.S. has pursued a highly expansionary legal immigration system (especially when compared with Britain). Hart-Celler was signed into law at the height of the Civil Rights movement, amidst concerns about America’s moral leadership in the world on issues of racial discrimination. The law abolished the national-origins quotas that had restricted immigration to the U.S. since the 1920s, eliminating race, religion, and place of origin as a basis for entry (King, 2009). It also created new priority categories based on skill and family relationships and ensured that the immediate relatives of legal immigrants would not subject to any numerical restrictions. As a result of this legislation, immigration increased steadily through the 1970s and 1980s and then dramatically after 1989, with green-card entries (the majority from Asia and Latin America) averaging nearly 1 million per year between 1990 and 2015. To be sure, commitment to this liberal immigration regime has waxed and waned over the years, with restrictionist sentiment bubbling to the surface with some frequency. For example, the 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA)—more commonly known as ‘welfare reform’— barred authorized immigrants from claiming federal welfare benefits for five years after entry and gave states authority to grant or to restrict access to benefits thereafter (at the time, only around 7 percent of immigrant-headed households were drawing federal cash benefits). Unauthorized immigrants have more frequently been the target of legislative action. The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRAIRA), also passed by Congress in 1996, expanded the list of deportable offenses, increased the use of detention and deportation, and created a mechanism to involve local law enforcement officials in federal immigrant enforcement duties (Coleman and Kocher, 2011). Still more punitive laws have been formulated in state legislatures. For instance, California voters in 1994 approved Proposition 187 (the ‘Save our State’ initiative), which barred undocumented immigrants from public education and medical care and that required public sector workers to check the citizenship status of students and patients. Similarly, in 2010 the Arizona legislature passed a bill, copied by many other states, requiring local law enforcement officers to determine the immigration status of those ‘suspected’ of being in the country illegally (known as ‘stop and show me your papers’ provision) and to detain individuals whose immigration status has not been verified. Most of these state-level laws have been challenged in the courts and either thrown out or modified. But they have important symbolic importance for their supporters, who frequently criticize the ineffectualness of the federal government’s immigration-control measures—an assumption belied by sharp rise in the number of deaths as unauthorized migrants take ever greater risks to cross an increasingly militarized U.S.-Mexico border (see Doty, 2011). Yet, despite such legislation aimed at intensifying immigrant insecurity, there has been no substantive change overall to the country’s liberal immigration system. Authorized immigration has continued apace, and, despite a surge of deportations during the Obama Administration, there has been no action taken to eject summarily the estimated 10-12 million unauthorized immigrants who reside in the U.S. Some scholars have explained this paradox (which appears to varying degrees in all liberal democracies) in terms of the increasing salience of human rights discourses, which emphasize the right to family reunification (the main entry route for authorized immigrants), and which make mass deportations of undocumented immigrants politically unpalatable (Joppke, 1998). There is, as well, the popular self-conception of the U.S. as a beacon of hope for the world’s oppressed and downtrodden masses. But the liberalism of the American immigration system, above all, has been enabled by business interests, whose demand for inexpensive, pliable labour (both skilled and unskilled, authorized and unauthorized) is seemingly limitless (Cornelius, 2005; in the EU context, see Favell and Hansen, 2002). An array of mutually-reinforcing attitudes, interests, and imaginaries, then, have buttressed expansionary immigration policies for the past several decades. This consensus, however, is fast unravelling. Since the summer of 2017, Trump has been increasingly vocal in supporting restrictions on family-based immigration, which in the past decade has generated around two-thirds of all legal immigrant entries. In his attacks on family-based immigration, Trump has raised the spectre of ‘chain migration’, especially from what he has colourfully described as ‘shithole countries’. Trump has claimed repeatedly, including in his January 2018 State of the Union address, that U.S. immigrant law permit immigrants to bring in ‘virtually unlimited numbers of distant relatives’, when, in fact, family immigration rules explicitly exclude aunts, uncles, cousins, and other non-immediate family members (immediate family members, moreover, often wait years to receive their visas due to caps on certain visa categories). The Trump Administration’s general plan is to halve legal immigration and to prioritize ‘people who are skilled, who want to work, who will contribute to our society, and who will love and respect our country’—characteristics that presumably do not apply to current immigrants (Trump, 2018). The President also announced the termination of the Deferred Action for Child Arrivals (DACA) program, an executive order implemented under the Obama administration to give temporary legal status to 800,000 unauthorized immigrants brought to the U.S. as children. What is remarkable about this situation is the apparent willingness of many Republicans to abandon pro-immigration business interests in favour of restrictionism. Since the early 2000s, when the Tea Party burst onto the scene, a hard-line anti-immigration stance has become an article of faith among conservative Republicans, who have tightened their grip on state legislatures, governorships, and Congress through electoral redistricting (Jacobson, 2013). Notably, it was the threat by several Republican state attorneys-general to sue the federal government over DACA that prompted Trump, after months of dithering, to terminate the program. So while anti-immigrant sentiment has been a salient feature of American politics for the past 50 years, current immigration politics reflect a meaningful change in the post-War liberal order. Today’s immigration debates, I would argue, more closely align with debates of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, when anti-immigrant voices prevailed upon Congress to enact national-origins quotas over the objections of U.S. industrial employers. At that time, restrictionist sentiment was motivated primarily by fears among political and intellectual elites of racial pollution and the weakening of America’s Anglo-Teutonic stock. This language of scientific racism and eugenics has largely disappeared from public discourse, but it is hard to miss the racial subtext of contemporary anti-immigration rhetoric, in which concerns about wage competition are grafted onto claims about immigrants’ non-assimilability into white, Christian America. The challenge ahead The breakdown of liberal consensus in the U.S. has brought to the surface social, political, and attitudinal differences that have been simmering for decades. Americans, like Britons, are deeply divided by conflicting perceptions of ‘reality’: Some see their country being strengthened by cultural diversity, technological change, and commitments to equality, minority rights, and non-discrimination. Others, in contrast, see their values denigrated, their status eroding, and their opportunities vanishing. Such differences at first glance seem to map onto class disparities, which have widened considerably since the 1970s as wages for most American workers have stagnated. The concentration of wealth in the U.S. today rivals that of the Gilded Age, a pattern reinforced by the propensity among the wealthy to hoard opportunity and privilege (Reeves, 2017). Yet the rise of Donald Trump has not signalled the emergence of a cohesive class-based politics committed to the redistribution of wealth. While support for Trump was especially pronounced in counties with relatively few college graduates and rising levels of deprivation and illness, the overwhelming majority of Trump voters were, in fact, middle- or upper-income people (Silver, 2016 ; Mutz, 2018). Far from rebelling against America’s economic elite in the 2016 election, Trump supporters have largely aligned themselves with a traditional Republican agenda of tax cuts, deregulation, and reductions in public services (most notably through the dismantling of the Affordable Care Act). In short, the major political fault lines in the U.S. today reflect messy configurations of class, racial status, education, and place-based experiences and outlooks. Such complexities can make it difficult to discern a political path forward to counter Trump’s brand of right-wing nationalism. This is not to say that there has been a shortage of ‘progressive’ political action since the election-- witness, for instance, the Women’s March on Washington, youth-based activism against gun violence, and displays of black solidarity among professional athletes. Some elements of the progressive political response to Trump, however, have been problematic and possibly counterproductive. The relentless mockery of the President on late- night television shows, for instance, while perhaps well deserved, often smacks of white liberal smugness and sanctimony. Equally problematic is the tendency of progressives, in defending the post-1965 immigration system, to act as cheerleaders for American capitalism and nationalism. Supporters of DACA, for instance, commonly assert the deservingness of young undocumented immigrants by depicting them as respectable taxpayers/workers, aspiring students, and budding civic leaders. Such depictions, while an important antidote to white-nationalist rhetoric about immigrants as ‘takers’, criminals, and subversives, upholds a benchmark of middle-class whiteness against which both citizens and non-citizens are measured (c.f. Gokariksel and Smith, 2017). What is left out is an honest discussion of the historical role that immigration has played in the segmentation of the labour force, the reproduction of labour-market inequalities, and the concentration of power and wealth in the U.S. (Waldinger and Lichter, 2003). Defenders of immigration commonly cite evidence that immigration has a net positive impact on the economy, but it is disingenuous to say that immigration is uniformly benefits all Americans. Like free-trade policies and technological changes, the benefits of immigration have tended to accrue to certain Americans— particularly to business owners, who have been able to reduce their wage bills, and to wealthier households, who enjoy greater access to inexpensive personal services. In the acrimonious political environment that exists today in both the U.S. and Britain, the possibility of a broad-based redistributive politics that acknowledges cultural grievances without legitimizing them seems remote. But history provides us with an example of a populist politics that bridged deep social divides while envisioning a more just and equitable political-economic system. I refer here to the radical Populist movement that took shape in the tumultuous years after the U.S. Civil War (1861-1865). The Populist movement was driven by white smallholders in the South, whose traditional economic autonomy was severely threatened in the late 19th century by banks, merchants, railroads, and large landowners. These farmers demanded that the federal government intervene in the financial system to stabilize crop prices and to protect farmers from debt. Intriguingly, in their fight for justice and political voice, white farmers allied themselves with black farmers, who faced a similar set of circumstances, compounded, of course, by intense racism. While this alliance was not entirely harmonious, Populist appeals to the equality of all working people regardless of colour appear to have been genuine. Populists, it should be noted, also provided an important platform for women, including the radical suffragette Mary Elizabeth Lease (for a fuller discussion, see Ayers, 1992). White Southern elites aligned with the Democratic Party mercilessly harassed radical Populists, accusing them of ‘socialism’ and using electoral fraud to undermine their gains. Most egregiously, white elites coerced (or paid) impoverished blacks to vote for the Democrats in state elections, causing white Populists to abandon their black allies and to revert to the anti-black racism that was the order of the day. By the late 1890s, white Democrats had successfully wrested control over Southern state legislatures, imposing poll taxes and literacy requirements that disenfranchised not only blacks but also poor rural whites. For the next half-century, the South followed a path of white supremacy, regressive labour policies, and one-party rule, languishing in poverty even as the U.S. became the world’s premier industrial power. This painful history serves as a pointed reminder of what is at stake in this moment of resurgent right-wing nationalism in the U.S. and Britain: in it, we see both the possibility of a transformative, anti-racist, coalitional politics, and the perils of not pursuing it. Race, Place and Young People in the Age of Brexit Robin Finlay, Anoop Nayak, Matthew C Benwell, Peter Hopkins, Raksha Pande and Michael Richardson School of Geography, Politics and Sociology, Newcastle University, England, UK NE1 7RU contact author robin.finlay@ncl.ac.uk On the morning of June 24th 2016, the British public awoke to the resounding news that the United Kingdom would no longer be part of the European Union (EU). Like the earthly movement of tectonic plates, the deep reverberations of this decision have yet to make themselves fully known. Nevertheless, the initial tremors of what is a seismic decision are already being felt. Following the Referendum, marked divisions around race, class, age and region have been made manifest. The generational divisions were especially stark, with a clear fracture in the way younger and older generations voted in the Referendum. Many polls indicated a majority of younger voters voted to remain in the EU, while a majority of older people voted to leave (Speed, 2016). Of further concern is that those under the age of 18 years were legally barred from participating in the Referendum, which meant younger generations were deprived of a voice (Ferguson, 2016). This has resulted in the opinions of many younger people going unheard, yet - rather paradoxically - they will become the generational inheritors and shapers of a post-Brexit nation. Therefore, what we want to put forward in this commentary is a compelling need to engage with the silenced voices and everyday experiences of younger and newer generations. Given the centrality of immigration – and its synonym race - in the Brexit debate, analysing young people’s attitudes to such issues is of especial importance. We need to ask, what are young people’s experiences and perceptions of immigration and diversity, and what forms of attachment and belonging do young people express? Moreover, we need to know much more about the experiences of young people from diverse backgrounds (gender, place, class, ethnicity, religion etc.), and to examine how intersecting identities and geographies shape youth opinions and experiences. To grapple with such issues in this commentary, we explore the overlapping ways in which age, place and social class have become central fault lines in the Brexit debate and can impact upon ideas of difference, particularly when it comes to attitudes to race and immigration. We begin by outlining how race came to take centre stage in the EU Referendum and its aftermath. Following this we identify how Brexit has come to expose a political schism between young people, middle-aged and older generations when it comes to their respective world views, and why there is compelling need to focus on the voices and experiences of young people. We then explore geographies of social class and location to argue that the analysis of place needs to be expanded to incorporate peripheral post-industrial areas and that class needs to be re-centred in race and migration research. The Spectre of Race In the build up to the EU Referendum media and academic commentators feverishly reported on the possibility of Brexit and the future direction of the UK. Although a diverse range of opinions regarding whether it was better for Britain to remain or leave the EU were garnered, xenophobic and anti-migrant narratives soon came to dominate public debate (Foster, 2016). From early ‘Go Home’ billboard vans previously trialled in London to urge ‘undocumented immigrants’ to leave the UK, to UKIP’s poster for leaving the EU (see figure 1), featuring a queue of mostly non-white bodies (possibly asylum-seekers rather than migrants from EU member states), it was evident that race and immigration were thoroughly intertwined in the debate. The residue of racism can also be traced in political rhetoric declaring immigration to be at ‘breaking point’, repeated phrases that ‘Britain is full’, and the mantra of ‘taking back control’ – discourses which symbolise a Referendum that had become highly toxic (Skey, 2016; Chu, 2016; Stewart and Mason, 2016). The idea of ‘taking back control’ was rapidly transposed from an initial agenda regarding UK independence from EU governance and supra-national policy, into a particular, and more myopic concern with domestic immigration and the policing of national borders. In many respects Brexit is an expression of the psycho-social condition Paul Gilroy (2004) depicts as ‘postcolonial melancholia’, where Britain’s un-mourned attachment to Empire is disavowed, coming back to haunt the postcolonial present through an imaginary set of privileges felt to be intrinsic to whiteness: being ‘first in the queue’ when it comes to accessing public housing stock, NHS treatment, school choice, employment opportunities, social security and welfare (see Who Cares about the White Working Class?, Runnymede Trust, 2009). Poignantly these imagined ‘white entitlements’ not only exclude newcomers, but fail to extend to second and third generation Black and Minority Ethnic youth. For Garner (2016) such racialized feelings and attachments are formative of what he regards as the ‘moral economy of whiteness’ that then becomes expressed in public discourse. When discharged in this way such discourses, feelings and affects give life to the fantasy of a ‘white nation’ (Hage, 1998). Bachmann and Sidaway (2016) point to the imperial geopolitics of Brexit and how nationalism and uneven development were key ingredients underpinning the vote to Leave. In a prescient paper they note how British politicians were complicit in enabling ‘Brussels bureaucrats’ to perform as a repository for anger and resentment about political disenfranchisement, economic inequalities and loss of empire. Here, Brexit appears a remedy to powerlessness, an opportunity to turn back the clock, to purge, cleanse, renew and regenerate the national body politic (Nayak, 2017). This entails wiping away the dirt that over time has come to accumulate and corrode the nation state – multiculturalism, minorities, Muslims and migrants being formative tropes in this narrative of geopolitical decline. As the social anthropologist Douglas (2002) imparts, what different societies tend to classify as ‘dirt’ is often arbitrary and symbolic, revealing more about their own rules and systematic order. Nevertheless, once put into a classificatory register, ‘Dirt offends against order’, to the extent that its eradication is seen as ‘a positive effort to organise the environment’ (p.7). This violent reordering crystallised in the murder of Labour MP Jo Cox in her West Yorkshire constituency, killed by Thomas Mair, a perpetrator with far-Right links, who shouted ‘Britain First’ as he fatally stabbed Cox. Mair’s proclamation parallels Trump’s election call, ‘America First’, which envisages a magical restoration of the ‘natural order’ where immigrants, new world powers and multicultural sympathies are put back firmly in their place. While Britain First is a far-Right party, beyond such extremism was to be found a broader national rise in racially and religiously aggravated violence in the immediate aftermath of the vote; demonstrating how race precedes and supersedes the Referendum as a dividing line in contemporary Britain. Young People and Generational Change In the context of a United Kingdom where the ‘remainders of race’ (Amin, 2010) remain evident, we now wish to highlight how young people’s voices have been neglected in the Brexit debate and the intergenerational differences that pattern the voting spectrum. The narratives and debates surrounding the Referendum overlooked the youth question with both ‘Remainers’ and ‘Leavers’ paying scant attention to the future plight of young people (Mcfarland and Owen, 2016; Spiro, 2016). According to journalist Zachary Spiro (2016) of the New Statesman the assumption that young people generally do not vote, resulted in their opinions being ignored and undervalued by both sides of the campaign. Moreover, unlike the 2014 Scottish Referendum (Hopkins, 2015), 16-17 year olds were denied the right to vote in the EU Referendum with little public debate or campaigning around age inclusion. That young people are the ones who will have to live with this decision for a lifetime, has led the Head of National Union of Students (NUS) Wales to label the omission of 16 and 17 year olds from the vote a ‘disgrace’ whereupon, ‘they were shut out of their own future on this occasion’ (Ferguson, 2016). As such, young people’s political and democratic rights as citizens to participate in one of the most important decisions in the UK’s recent history were denied. Since the Referendum results became clear, the prism of age has emerged as one of the most prominent axes whereby attitudes towards Brexit are differently refracted. A strong difference in opinion about the future direction of the UK is apparent, with young people overwhelmingly voting in favour of remaining and older people voting to leave. For example, a YouGov poll estimated that 75% of 18-24 year olds voted to remain, while 61% of 65+ year olds voted to leave (Speed, 2016). YouGov also conducted a poll with those 16-24 years and still found 72% were in favour of remaining. The tipping point around age-related responses seems to be around the mid-40s, where from that point onwards the majority of adults tended to vote ‘Leave’. Moreover, after the early prediction of a relatively low turnout of young voters, a more recent poll by the LSE has estimated that around 64% of 18-24 years voted in the Referendum (Helm, 2016). Therefore, the assumed lack of engagement in politics by young people did not appear to come to fruition, though it remains to be seen if the youth turnout was lower in more economically deprived regions. With this relatively high turnout of young voters, what has become apparent is a significant generational rupture, between young adults, the middle-aged and elderly (see figure 2). Compared to older generations, the political identity of the majority of younger people appears to be significantly more open to the EU and against isolationism (Banaji & Mejias, 2018). However, the subjugation of younger voices during the run up to the Referendum meant that debates about race, immigration and what it means to be British – issues central to the overarching debate – seldom included the perspectives of young people. As we have seen, a reactionary and nationalist discourse came to dominate the EU debate but its disregard for youth opinions has resulted in a partial and incomplete picture. The Wales Institute of Social and Economic Research, Data and Methods (2017) offers some ways forward here in their work exploring young people’s attitudes and responses to Brexit. They assert that the generational rupture is in part due to younger generations being ‘less likely to embrace traditional conceptions of national identity’, which, they argue, can result in a more open attitude to EU membership and cultural differences. This alludes to quite different interpretations being articulated when it comes to citizenship and belonging. Instead it hints at the development of evolving and differing relationships for younger generations where processes of globalisation, superdiverse living, convivial encounters and post-race thinking may engender different ways of living and being (Harries et al, 2016; Rosbrook-Thompson 2016). This potentially more porous, cosmopolitan and global attitude runs counter to nationalist discourses about citizenship and immigration augmented by the British government. ‘If you believe you’re a citizen of the world’, opined Prime Minister Theresa May, ‘you’re a citizen of nowhere’ (The Telegraph, 5 October, 2016). In contrast, many young people may assert transnational modes of diasporic belonging and engage in forms of ‘flexible citizenship’ (Hörschelmann and El Refaie, 2014; Ong, 1999), premised on multiple and diverse attachments to place. However, there is a danger here that young people are homogenously constructed as mobile, flexible and cosmopolitan, in ways that elide contrasting youth experiences – such as immobility and social exclusion – apparent in many locations around the UK (McDonald et al, 2005). Figure 2: Generational Differences (source: Lord Ashcroft Polls, reproduced by the BBC) In grappling with these multi-layered and multi-scaler complexities, we put forward the premise that a detailed engagement with young people’s lives is required if we are to advance a rigorous understanding of race and belonging in post-Brexit Britain. It is imperative here to consider the ‘happening’ of Brexit on the ground, and the habitual ways in which young people perform Brexit in conversations, feelings, affects and bodily dispositions that comprise what Anderson and Wilson (2017) term ‘everyday Brexits’. Given that young people will primarily be the ones who live through the deep societal changes as a result of the breach with Europe, the exclusion of young people’s voices, feelings and attachments is all the more problematic. We contend that a concerted focus on young people can inform us of how nationalism is lived and felt; the relationship between superdiverse forms of migration, settlement and practices of ‘commonplace diversity (Wessendorf, 2013); and the degree to which young people are global citizens, capable of engaging with transnational mobility and flexible market economies. Place and the Geography of Voting Patterns Our third point, following our interventions on young people and race, is more centrally to do with geography and the politics of place. In addition to social divisions, place is another significant divider in how people voted in the Referendum (Short, 2016). The vote exposed a country split between some urban areas and the Celtic nations on one hand, and much of rural England and Wales on the other. For example, London (59.9%), Scotland (62%) and Northern Ireland (55.8%) were the only regions that held a majority of remain voters. In the rest of the UK’s regions, the majority voted for Brexit, most noticeably in the North-East, Midlands and Yorkshire. The antipathy attributed to politicians and ‘Southern metropolitan elites’ exposed ‘a phantom border’ that ‘has always existed but long been glossed over’ (Veit and Sidaway, 2016: 49). These geographical schisms have resulted in commentators talking about ‘the political geography of a disunited kingdom’ (Short, 2016) and a country that is geographically ‘fractured and fractious’ (Pattie, 2016). In mapping these divides the notion of ‘left behind’ places has surfaced, as discussed by Authors C and D in this commentary, where the phrase refers to post-industrial areas with high levels of deprivation that voted to leave. This suggests divergent feelings concerning immigration and increasing ethnic diversity in different locales around the UK. The ‘new geographies of racism’ (Burnett, 2011) are exemplified in research conducted by the Institute of Race Relations, documenting a growing number of racist incidents occurring in places such as Stoke, Peterborough and Plymouth. Semi-rural places, decaying coastal towns and neglected post-industrial areas formative of these hotspots. Existing geographical research into such issues within Britain has almost been entirely located in large multi-ethnic cities. This includes a profusion of work on superdiversity in London (Neal et al., 2015), Leicester (Clayton, 2012) Bradford (Phillips et. al, 2014) and Birmingham (Wilson, 2014; 2015). With significant connections to Britain’s colonial past, these are urban spaces that have relatively long histories of migrant settlement, where multiculturalism is embedded into the urban fabric and part and parcel of the ‘thrown- togetherness’ of space (Massey, 2005). Consequently, knowledge that is framing important debates around the urban such as ‘superdiversity’ (Vertovec, 2007), encounters with strangers (Ahmed, 2000) and ‘conviviality’ (Gilroy, 2004) are primarily premised on experiences in larger multi-ethnic cities. While we would concur that these are highly important spaces to research, with a range of pressing issues related to race and migration, they are disproportionately targeted by social researchers (see for example Neal et al, 2016). The symmetry that connects research on diversity with particular multicultural urban locations can risk absenting other places. Notwithstanding some notable exceptions (Grillo, 2005; Ray and Reed, 2005; Kesten et al 2011; Rogaly and Qureshi, 2013), the symbolic pull of metropolitan spaces has seen ‘peripheral’ post-industrial places, coastal towns and semi-rural locations going comparatively overlooked. The geographical divergence of opinions exposed by the Brexit vote reveal how rural locations such as Boston in Lincolnshire and post-industrial cities such as Stoke on Trent in the ‘Potteries’ host amongst the highest percentage of people voting to leave. We would contend that it is precisely the histories and geographies of these more neglected areas where an impassioned leave vote is registered, that require most attention from scholars working in the fields of race, ethnicity and migration studies. Significantly, very little is known about young people’s perceptions and experiences of diversity in predominantly white, post- industrial cities and the impact that social class and austerity may have on young people in these localities. Although the EU Referendum results allude to a youth opinion that is pro-EU and more comfortable with diversity than older generations, there is a lack of understanding about how young people’s opinions vary or converge in different locations around the UK. We suggest that we should expand our geographical understandings of race and ethnicity beyond the multicultural metropolis to consider marginalised, mainly-white post-industrial locales, rural areas with migrant labour, and seaside towns serviced by Eastern Europeans amongst others. In these areas we need to examine the types of encounters and feelings young people display towards difference and diversity, and to understand the sense of belonging and attachments that are attributed at different spatial scales, such as the local neighbourhood, the city, the nation and the global. This will help to shed light on the degree to which young people from post-industrial cities develop convivial sensibilities or accrue more acute forms of parochialism and nationalism. Although social class has resurfaced in public debates in the aftermath of Brexit in the UK and Donald Trump’s election in the US (Khan and Shaheen, 2017), much academic work into superdiversity, passing encounters and conviviality has had surprisingly little to say regarding social class inequalities. As Goodwin and Heath (2016) acknowledge poverty, low- skills and lack of opportunity were pivotal to people voting to leave the EU, with education inequality a dominant factor. Their conclusion is a sobering one: ‘Groups in Britain who have been ‘‘left behind’’ by rapid economic change and feel cut adrift from the mainstream consensus were the most likely to support Brexit’ (para. 6). Above all this suggests a need for research to be more attentive to social class and the topographies of power shaping young lives. We need to ask how young people’s social class backgrounds are shaping their perceptions and experiences of belonging, diversity, immigration and nationhood. Moreover, the portrait is also more complex than any rudimentary categorisation may suggest. For example, Dorling (2016) has argued that the working class have been ‘unfairly blamed’ for the outcome of the EU Referendum, which he regards a consequence of rising inequality. Certainly there are numerous wards where electorates with lower educational qualifications produced low leave and high remain votes. While these wards are more exceptional, they also have high ethnic minority populations, including parts of Birmingham and Haringey in North London. As argued by Khan and Shaheen in a recent report on Race and Class by the Runnymede Trust (2017), (working) class identities are not the sole preserve of white people and class clearly impacts upon the lives and experiences of ethnic minorities and non-white populations in the UK. Bhambra (2017) supplements this debate, asserting that ethnic minorities in the UK disproportionately constitute the category of working class, but as a result of a ‘methodological whiteness’ in research, they are frequently erased from debates about class. Concluding remarks This critical intervention into the Brexit debate has sought to offer an engagement with emerging generations, race and place. We have argued that not only were young people marginalised from the vote, but they continue to remain side-lined in political discussions about the future. For example a recent anonymous poll undertaken with our Stage 1 Geography Undergraduate students at Newcastle University (October 2018, n=229 responses) asked a range of questions, including, ‘how would you vote in the EU Referendum if it was held today?’ Bearing in mind that most students were too young to participate in 2016, 84.3% voted to remain, with 7.9% preferring to leave and 7.9% expressing no opinion. While this is a very particular sample, in terms of their educational profiles, it is evident that many hold a clear opinion that continues to go unheard. In this short communication we have sought to illuminate some key structural patterns around age, class, race and place that may have gone overlooked, yet are fundamental to an understanding of the vote to leave. These structural divisions do not easily dissolve. In many parts of the UK the effects of low-paid labour, zero hours contracts, austerity measures and the shrinking of the welfare state have had a profound effect upon society. Much of this impacts acutely upon the future of young people. For example precarious labour, increased university fees, long-term debt, unaffordable housing for ‘generation rent’ and a diminishing public sector pension pot for an aging population are rapidly restructuring youth transitions into adulthood and sharpening inequality. We contend that the lack of attention given to youth experiences in marginal places needs to be redressed. Throughout we have emphasised how the ‘spectre of race’ continues to haunt the postcolonial present and is often made manifest in debates around ‘white rights’ and entitlements. At the same time it is worth considering the intertwining of race and place. The notion of ‘left-behind’ places, which has surfaced after the Referendum, can itself suggest that some localities are less developed, ‘backward’ and lacking a cosmopolitan, global aesthete. In a sophisticated critique of such power-laden tropes, Tomaney (2013: 658) has argued in defence of ‘parochialism’ seeking to ‘rescue local attachments and a sense of belonging from comopolites’, but in ways that are not necessarily reactionary or exclusive. A further way in which we might creatively rethink place outside of the familiar rubric of developed/underdeveloped, advanced/’left behind’, core/periphery, cosmopolitan/parochial is through considering the relational, contingent, co-production of place. This can be found in postcolonial work that seeks to ‘provincialize Europe’ (Charkrobarty, 2000), develop an interrelated ‘comparative urbanism’ (Robinson and Roy, 2016) and appreciate how the imaginative scripting of the ‘Orient’ was symbolically and materially essential to how Europe constructed its own sense of self (Said, 1978). Some of these postcolonial interventions are differently taken forward in Katz’s (2001) study of young lives in Sudan and New York. Here, Katz generatively deploys the notion of ‘counter-topography’ to connect seemingly disparate places and processes together, thereby demonstrating how ‘growing up global’ is about how global processes interact with the social and material facets of place. These are just some of the many ways in which policy makers and academics might rethink, rework and ultimately reconnect with people and places that have too often have gone marginalized or ignored. (In)visibility, privilege and the performance of whiteness in Brexit Britain: Polish migrants in Britain’s shifting migration regime Katherine Botterill* and Kathy Burrell** *School of Geographical and Earth Sciences, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, UK Katherine.botterill@glasgow.ac.uk **Department of Geography and Planning, School of Environmental Sciences, University of Liverpool, Liverpool, UK k.burrell@liverpool.ac.uk This intervention explores the experiences of Polish nationals in Britain in the context of the 2016 UK referendum on EU membership (Brexit vote) campaign and result. Using the testimonies of Polish nationals in Britain we reflect on how whiteness is lived and felt in circumstances of raised anti-immigrant sentiment, before connecting these experiences to wider discussions concerning mobility privilege and the broader structural racisms and legacies that shape the discourse and governance of migration. Ultimately, we show how the Polish case-study, in light of Brexit, illuminates the human, complex, often contradictory and always racialised contexts of Britain’s migration regime. Whiteness and Polish Nationals in the UK: The Limits of an 'Invisible' Identity and the Erosion of Privileged Status The Brexit vote, and the volume and nature of anti-Polish sentiment which preceded and followed it (Krupa, 2016), offers an important reminder that being white, even with all the privilege it does confer, can sometimes offer only limited protection against anti- immigrant agitation and migration regime insecurity. This raises new questions about how we might engage with the concept of whiteness. From its foundational roots in the work of W.B. DuBois (1935) Audre Lorde (1984) and bell hooks (1989), academic scholarship on whiteness has grown rapidly over the past 20-30 years and is now in its 'third wave' iteration (Twine and Gallagher, 2008; for further reviews see Fine et al., 1997; Nayak, 2007; Steyn and Conway, 2010; Garner, 2017). This body of work has advanced an understanding of whiteness as a structure, a discourse and a ‘problematic’ from which to analyse social relations (Garner, 2007:3). Whiteness, Linke, (1999) argues, is always constructed in relation to, and superior to, other identities, as an ever-present marker of perceived supremacy and domination. It is a space invader (Puwar, 2004; Kobayashi and Peake, 2000), an 'omnipresent' (McGuiness, 2000: 226) and ‘mythical norm’ (Lorde, 1984), yet invisible for those who ‘inhabit it’ (Ahmed, 2004; Jackson, 1998). There is a strong emphasis on the time-space contingency and malleable nature of whiteness (see Ignatiev, 1995; Roediger, 2005), suggesting a hierarchy of 'shades' of whiteness where the relational aspects of identity ensure that some groups are deemed to be whiter than others (Garner, 2007; McDowell, 2009). As Twine and Gallagher argue (2008, 7), academic understandings of whiteness have matured to the point that studies now explore the ‘nuanced and locally specific ways in which whiteness as a form of power is defined, deployed, performed, policed and reinvented’, and the relational, contextual and situational nature of white privilege, including that which is taken for granted, ignored or ‘perceived as a source of victimisation’ (ibid. 7). In their study of ‘White Americans’, for example, Warren and Twine (1997) argue that the boundaries of whiteness are expanding in the US as ‘non-black’ immigrant groups who self-position as white challenge the boundaries of ‘the colour line’. If this category of whiteness can be expanded in certain mailto:Katherine.botterill@glasgow.ac.uk mailto:k.burrell@liverpool.ac.uk situations, it can also be contracted; many immigrant groups in contemporary Europe are positioned as ‘not quite white’ through a range of discursive practices in public, media and politics. We argue that Polish migrant experiences in Brexit Britain offer an important prism through which to view the various (in)visibiliies and performativities of whiteness, and we discuss this here using testimonies from Polish nationals before and after the Brexit result. The specifically racialised position of Eastern Europeans in the UK has already been receiving attention. Fox et al. (2012) argue that ‘new Europeans’ from East-Central Europe (ECE) have become racialized subjects in the UK, but positioned as ‘inbetween’, on the one hand economically marginalised in the labour market, while on the other racially privileged through their white identity (see Parutis, 2011), and we can add to this legally privileged through their EU national status.1Garner (2018) sees the position of Eastern Europeans after the Brexit vote as one of hierarchy-in-progress, nominally racialized as white yet subject to exclusionary attacks. He makes a comparison with Roediger’s (1991) study of 18th and 19th Century European migrants in the USA to show their relational positioning in the complex social relations encountered through migration. For Eastern Europeans in the UK, these notions of hierarchies and 'inbetweenness' also force us to confront the postcolonial power dynamics within Europe vis-a-vis the relational positioning of north/west Europe and its 'backward', exotic eastern other (Buchowski, 2006; Burrell, 2011) - a perpetual trope in British culture, literature and film (Korte et al, 2010). Importantly, this is an othering which is anchored in geopolitical imaginaries as well as racialised, class intersectionalities. This resonated in an interview undertaken by (author B) with 'Julia', shortly after 2004: I feel like I am coming from a poor country. They are not very sympathetic, and they speak to you very loud, thinking that you don’t speak very good English. And people ask you if there are any polar bears in Poland, twice I have had this question, ‘is it true that there are polar bears in Poland?’ Yeah, in the zoo. It kind of puts you off meeting people because you have to explain, there are very few people who actually know something about Poland, have been to Poland. Similarly, in research with Italians in post-Brexit referendum UK, Mazilli and King (2017) found that some respondents placed themselves within a hierarchy of Europeanness, with Italians ahead of 'Slavs' and Turks'. If Poles sit in an 'inbetween' locus in the UK, these orientalist hierarchies are in play too - more 'western' than Commonwealth or Middle Eastern populations, but not as western as other, nearer, Europeans. These complex, sometimes shaky, constructed hierarchies challenge the assumed invisibility of white migrants in the UK. While Linke (1999:27) can argue that whiteness is 'disassociated from physicality', other studies have punctured the notion that European migrants in Britain automatically inhabit a certain invisibility 'on the ground' (Rzepnikowska, 2015). If, as Colic-Piesker (2005:622) argues, whiteness is also about ‘class, status, language and other features of the individual that can be discerned in social interaction’, then there are clearly many facets of daily life where European migrants' visibility is potentially elevated. It is here we can see, drawing on research undertaken with Polish nationals in Scotland (first author) in the aftermath of the Brexit vote, how particular white bodies are surfaced 1 Our aim here is not to re-centre whiteness or to conceal racism (cf. Bonnett, 2000). Similarly, we do not intend to reproduce essentialist categories nor place white experience at the centre of intellectual inquiry – it is our aim to make connections and find differences between processes of racialisation that take place within European migration regimes. and made visible in the context of political and legal uncertainty and anti-immigrant sentiment. Dorota has lived in Scotland for 12 years, and she and her Spanish husband, Pedro, have two children. Since we live here we have to take, I have to take buses more often…And I don’t like to talk to [my children] in Polish because this, I have, maybe it’s my, it’s my head again, but I have, sometimes I am being looked at…But certainly I, I think there was a few moments like that where I felt what previously [before the referendum] did not alert anyone to pay attention to me... misbehaviour of a child being, you know, talked to in a foreign language does evoke certain nodding, huffing, or you know like, rolling eyes and stuff. Since the Brexit vote Dorota does not recognise whiteness as a mask of protection and feels marginalised and marked as an outsider in her everyday interactions with others. She changes her behaviour on public transport, minimising her foreignness by not speaking Polish, a strategy to detach herself from the stigma associated with the Polish ‘migrant worker’ (cf. Ryan, 2010). Dorota’s husband, Pedro, also spoke about the ‘targeting’ of Polish nationals since the Brexit vote, compared to his own experience as a ‘less visible’ Spaniard. So, what is Dorota negotiating here that is an impact of Brexit? The intensification of anti-immigrant sentiment among a general public leading to heightened visibility as an outsider? The threat of being seen through the lens of migration silences Dorota, she minimises her difference, and is confronted with a kind of temporary ‘double consciousness’; of ‘looking at oneself through the eyes of others, of measuring one’s soul by the tape of a world that looks on in amused contempt and pity’ (DuBois, 1994:2). Helena moved to Scotland in 2006 and has recently become a British citizen. She explains here some of her conflicting emotions about Britain following the Brexit vote: I think it created this artificial kind of border…or limit between us and them. And I never felt it before and now I feel like I’m them and not, you know, us. …And I have an accent. Whenever I speak someone will hear that I’m a foreigner. I never felt ashamed of it or anything like that but now, you know, you open your mouth and you don’t know whether someone will react to it... I never thought that I’d have to do defend myself. The references to ‘us’ and ‘them’ shift as she explains her sense of abandonment, betrayal and disbelief - she had never before expected to defend herself from offensive comments as a white migrant in a predominantly white country (cf. McDowell, 2009; Cook, Dwyer and Waite, 2011). She feels angry at British people and politicians for rejecting her compliance and enthusiasm for making Britain her home, and is stung by the sudden shift in the politics of belonging towards new racialized hierarchies. Helena’s racial consciousness is at once raised and threatened as she realises she is an identifiable ‘migrant’, no longer protected by her white identity, signalling a loss of power (Frankenburg, 1993). These experiences are further encapsulated in Maria's testimony. Maria moved to Edinburgh in 2005, is single with one child. I was angry, I was anxious… I was quieter after Friday. In a weird way, you know, I felt like maybe I shouldn’t just talk because my accent is going to tell them that I am foreign… [I] never thought that a time would come when this type of racism, xenophobic comments would be acceptable again. Not only in the private life, in the public life. And that’s the scary bit. Here she talks about her anxiety and strategies of self-silencing after the vote. She expresses a feeling of paralysis and disbelief at the channeling of xenophobia towards her. Racism is a new experience that she hadn’t previously encountered in such potency and she feels a sense of outrage. Furthermore, we see the emergence of a new future orientated insecurity, unsettling the life she has built. Overcoming mobility binaries These experiences raise some difficult questions in the wider context of the Brexit vote and the racial, and racist, dynamics of Britain’s migration regime. It is impossible to consider the exposure of EU migrants to racism without simultaneously acknowledging the ongoing racism and discrimination experienced by the BAME population within this climate. It is equally difficult to think about the new more vulnerable status of EU migrants without acknowledging the struggles and uncertainties that the larger migrant population has been enduring whilst navigating Britain’s 'hostile environment', long before Brexit, something currently being exemplified by the Conservative government's treatment of the children of the 'Windrush generation'. However inflected the whiteness of Polish migrants has been, as Garner (2007: 66) points out, ‘not being white, and being black are two very different things’. Being part of the EU mobility regime, and being outside of it, have, similarly translated into starkly differentiated experiences. Emejulu (2016) argues strongly that there is a responsibility that comes with the new 'outrage' against racism against white EU nationals: "What does it mean that those who now are expressing ‘concern’ about a surge in xenophobia have previously had little to say about everyday and institutionalised racism and violence that people of colour experience? And that people of colour were not taken at our word, as others have been, about what we experience? It seems some people are only concerned with racism and xenophobia when their own privileged migration status is challenged." It has to be acknowledged that perhaps even more than being white, being an EU national has afforded Poles in the UK a legal privilege that, up to now, has shaped experiences of integration and arguably offered protection from some of the harshest aspects of being a migrant in the UK. It is also important to remember that however vitriolic anti-Polish sentiment has become, some of these migration-orientated Brexit discussions did not limit themselves to insinuations about Eastern European workers as wage depressing, resource draining eastern others. Sights were always set on the external borders of the EU, and, for example, the spectre of Turkish nationals coming to Britain in the event of further EU enlargement (see voteleave.uk campaign posters). The timing of the referendum campaign, which ran concurrently with heightened concern about the 'refugee crisis', also worked to underline the multifaceted nature of the desire to control borders - not only against 'co- Europeans', but also against refugees seeking safety in the UK having travelled into and across Europe. The scripting of the acceptable and non-acceptable (Ford, 2011), deserving and undeserving migrants (Dhaliwhal and Fokert, 2015) - or perhaps more accurately, the non- acceptable, and the even less acceptable migrants - in these campaigns elides the diverse experiences, subjectivities and positionalities of different mobile actors and ultimately distracts from addressing the structural and historical inequalities that set up these binaries in the first place. The Brexit vote may have partially reflected unease about ‘Eastern European migrant workers’, but as the other interventions here underline, it also held a mirror to, and amplified, wider and deeply entrenched, and often thinly disguised Islamophobic and racist, concerns about the EU's ability to keep these more othered others out - to disengage Britain from a Fortress Europe which was becoming too porous to those from beyond it. As Garner (2018) notes, formal political campaigns that script immigration and Islam as an antagonism to British culture reflect a mainstreaming of white supremacy, in that racist ideas and assumptions are increasingly part of mainstream discussions on politics. Final Thoughts We make three key points to conclude our discussion. First, that the experiences of Polish migrants after Brexit underline both the complexities of racial hierarchies and individual vulnerabilities in the face of geopolitical shifts and their aftermath. The fallout from the campaign and the haggling over the rights and status of EU nationals wreaks a fundamentally human cost - new insecurities, performances and visibilities, played out in day- to-day lives, through relationships, workplaces, public spaces and internalised anxieties. Being white does not offer immunity from this but the ‘walls of whiteness’ offer some shelter (cf. Ahmed, 2014). Putting these experiences into a wider context does not detract from this pain, and the enormity of the shift that many people are now feeling exposed to and lost within. But secondly, this wider context must be taken into view. The Brexit Leave campaign repeatedly used implied colonial discourses to set the UK up as a country apart; racial violence spiked in its aftermath; and non-EU migrants and refugees from all backgrounds and across Europe have been facing a migration regime increasingly designed to make them feel unwelcome, to hold them in limbo and to encourage their return. While some of this impetus is hardly limited to the UK context, this is what EU migrants in the UK now face - a new experience of re-bordering which will challenge all over again these assumptions of Europeanness, whiteness and belonging. In the 'outrage' that accompanies these journeys, it is imperative to find new solidarities with those who have already been, and continue to travel this path. Finally, we highlight the value of critical whiteness studies to analyse more broadly how Brexit, and its underlying anti-liberal populism, is shaping understanding of race, privilege and power. While we are mindful of perpetuating whiteness as a central referent in discussions of Brexit (see Bhambra, 2018), we can also see that using a critical whiteness lens to analyse contemporary international migration to Europe allows us to not only consider how racial boundaries are set and reshaped in different historical contexts (Twine and Gallagher, 2008: 7), but also expose the continued contradictions and 'inflections' of whiteness as a form of identity and a system of power. Brexit Writings and the War of Position over Migration, ‘Race’ and Class Ben Rogaly Department of Geography, University of Sussex, Brighton BN1 9SJ b.rogaly@sussex.ac.uk It has been rightly suggested that Brexit is not a single, one-off event but a process that exists on the surface in many arenas of everyday life. Part of this process is represented by writings on Brexit ‘or rather the vote to leave the EU’ as ‘a particular kind of thing’ that needs to be explained. One of the ‘many explanations’ is Brexit as ‘a revolt or protest on behalf of those “left behind” by forces of neoliberal globalisation’ (Anderson and Wilson, 2017, 2). This short essay critiques an influential example of the genre: David Goodhart’s (2017a) The Road to Somewhere: The Populist Revolt and the Future of Politics (henceforth TRS). Although presented as, among other things, an explanation of the outcome of the UK referendum on EU membership in 2016, the post-liberal, nationalist view espoused in TRS can be seen as part of a Gramscian ‘war of position’ (Forgacs, 1988, 431), an ideological play for hearts and minds (Jones et al, 2017, 75-78; Stephens, 2016). Goodhart presents his book as a robust study of social trends that need to be better understood by the ‘political class’ (TRS, 233). However, it does not take much of a critical eye to see it as a marshalling of arguments designed to persuade its readers of a particular politics. Six months after the triggering of Article 50 by the UK government, Goodhart deployed a summary of the book to support the position in ongoing debates over the form of Brexit that, in certain circumstances, ‘the vast majority of Brits could come together to make a success of that journey over the cliff edge’ (Goodhart, 2017b). The central contention of TRS is that there are two prevalent ideological perspectives in Britain, which Goodhart refers to as ‘Anywhere’ and ‘Somewhere’, and which map in approximate and complex ways onto two groups of people in society, to which he gives the corresponding labels, ‘Anywheres’ and ‘Somewheres’. While he attributes a range of views to each group, Goodhart’s central point is that Somewheres are unhappy with the pace and extent of ‘cultural change’ since the 1960s, in particular with the growing ethnic diversity of Britain, mass immigration, and the legacy of multicultural policies. Anywheres, on the other hand, are comfortable with such change because they are mostly university graduates, and, therefore, under the UK’s residential university system, much more likely to live away from the place they grew up in than Somewheres. ‘[M]y two tribes capture the reality of Britain’s central worldview divide’ (TRS, 23). The Brexit vote, as Goodhart would like his readers to understand it, was a ‘revolt’ by Somewhere people against the dominance of policies and social trends with which Anywheres are comfortable; he portrays it as Somewheres taking back a degree of relative power in the national polity. Goodhart does not pretend to be a Somewhere himself, defining himself as an Anywhere in terms of his lifestyle and the circles he mixes in. The latter come across as elite – for example, he describes an Oxford College dinner in 2011, where he sits between the then cabinet secretary and the Director-General of the BBC (TRS, 15). Moreover, Goodhart tells readers that he voted Remain in the 2016 Referendum, and mentions his association with Blue Labour (TRS, vii). There is an insidiousness in Goodhart’s self-presentation in TRS and in his presentations of the work in the media and elsewhere. He tries to sound reasonable and open-minded increasing the chances that the disproportionately white, male, public-school mailto:b.rogaly@sussex.ac.uk educated media colleagues who provide him a platform may see him as ‘one of us’ and all the more authoritative for it. Yet while Goodhart tries to use TRS to gain readers’ trust for a new common sense, his own racialised authoritarian paternalism is never far from the surface (see Mishra, 2017). With an air of regret for a lost past Goodhart argues that what he calls the British ‘traditional elite’ is ‘much less likely than in earlier generations to remain connected to Somewheres through land ownership, the church, the armed forces or as an employer’ (TRS, 4). Elsewhere he adds that ‘neither the affluent nor employers feel the same obligation towards ‘their’ working class that they once did’ (TRS, 6, emphasis added). Goodhart pays far too little attention to the common inheritance among all working class people of the devastation of de-industrialisation, and the fallout of the 2008 banking crisis (Khan and Shaheen, 2017). Instead he furthers divisive ideas about ‘central and eastern Europeans some of whom act like commuter immigrants and make no effort to mix while others are settling and integrating well’ (TRS, 130). Although elsewhere he acknowledges that integration is a two-way process, the breezy language of ‘act like’ and ‘make no effort’ seems to place the onus on recently arrived international migrants. Goodhart does not have it in for international migrants and minorities alone. He asserts that education and geographical mobility are the key divides in British society, attacking universities, academics and students, while acknowledging at the same time that approximately 50 per cent of young people now attend university – hardly an elite minority. Goodhart’s nationalist anti-immigration rhetoric and his dismissal of what he refers to as ‘globalist leftism’ (2017c) contain echoes of late nineteenth century battles over migration, ‘race’ and national identity in Britain to which I will return. First though it is important to look more closely at Goodhart’s use of ‘we’/ ‘us’. Goodhart is particularly concerned that those whom he sees as further removed in cultural terms from what he calls ‘the mainstream’ (2017, 131) should not receive equal treatment or status in the national polity. Although he does not define what ‘mainstream’ is in the UK context, he implies that nationals of eastern and central European EU countries are further removed from it than western and southern European ones, as are, not only international migrant people of colour from Africa and Asia, but, at some points in the book, their descendants too, regardless of their citizenship.2 This is especially shaky ground for Goodhart, given that he himself is the child of an immigrant (his mother moved to the UK from the US). The implication is that white citizens of the USA and their descendants give rise to few, if any, issues of ‘trust and familiarity’ attributed to the arrival of non-white people, especially people arriving from countries in the Global South. Citing Robert Putnam, Goodhart argues that trust and familiarity are reduced by high levels of immigration and ethnic diversity ‘especially when the people arriving come from places that are culturally distant; absorbing 100,000 Australians is very different to 100,000 Afghans’ (TRS, 22). Among other things this assumes that the Australians are ‘white’ and the area they are ‘absorbed’ into is mainly ‘white’ too. Such deeply problematic assumptions form part of what Emejulu (2016) has called the ‘hideous whiteness of Brexit’, that has been disguised in part by social scientists’ misidentification of leave voters as primarily ‘white working class’ (see Bhambra, 2017). 2 For example, on pages 128 (in the quoting of an ‘eloquent short parable’ by Franz Timmermans regarding the lack of ‘integration’ of the ‘children (and grandchildren)’ of ‘many migrants’), 131 (in the critique of writers who ‘give no special weight to the ethnic majority’) and 132 (in the apparent favouring of an arrangement of ‘neighbourhood demography so that people from the ethnic majority can retain a sense of ownership of the area’). The explicit concern in TRS with immigration to the UK from the global south portrays a hierarchical view towards humankind: ‘Newcomers, especially refugees and people from developing countries, often draw out more than they pay in at least in the period after arrival and do not always have the same sense of allegiance to a country’s norms or its national story – an indifference that was actively encouraged by first wave multiculturalism in the 1970s and 1980s. This makes many people feel uneasy’ (TRS, 121-2, emphasis added). Goodhart does not expand on or try to justify his assertion that newcomers ‘from developing countries’ are likely to be less committed to the ‘norms’ and ‘national story’ of the country they arrive in than people coming from other countries. Like the statement that this can make ‘many people feel uneasy’ this implicitly continues the theme of lending greater priority to white than black and minority ethnic citizens (see Bhambra, 2017). The problems with Goodhart’s national ‘we’ is revealed again later in TRS in a discussion on the response to a question in an IPSOS MORI poll in 2004 – that was commissioned alongside his well-known ‘Too diverse?’ piece – regarding whether people agreed that ‘other people seem to get unfair priority over you when it comes to public services and benefits’ (itself clearly a leading question). The question was followed by another regarding what ‘type of “other people”’. Asylum seekers and recent immigrants were ‘most likely’ to be named: Goodhart writes that ‘[asylum seekers and recent immigrants] are most obviously strangers to us, and we are less likely to identify with their position or be sure they will share our norms. But few people cited established minorities – implying that they were now regarded as part of the tapestry of the country’ (TRS, 122). Yet, if the latter sentence were true (setting aside the question of regarded by whom?), why single out certain groups of newcomers as ‘most obviously strangers to us’? The devil here is in the ‘us’ word. The reader learns more about Goodhart’s ‘us’ from how he discusses racisms in the UK. First, rather than accepting that there are different kinds of racism, he insists on a narrow definition. Secondly, even within this definition, he seems to want to explain rather than explicitly oppose it: ‘And even when racism is racism, when it does involve dislike of or contempt for a particular group, it is not just about skin colour or even religion as such, it is about what skin colour or distinctive dress represent in terms of different values or behaviours or traditions and the challenge they present to mainstream norms’ (TRS, 32). Again ‘mainstream’ is undefined but here it implies the privileging of a white British and Christian lens. It can be no surprise that the United Kingdom Independence Party is, for Goodhart, not a racist party but one ‘representing a grumpy and sometimes intolerant strand in the British public’ (TRS, 222). Goodhart’s treatment of Islam and Islamism is illustrative of the way he approaches racisms in the book. In a section on ‘integration’ that pushes a strongly assimilationist perspective, Goodhart turns to Muslims and, using the label ‘Islamism’, criticises ‘some younger Muslims’ for ‘combining piety with enjoyment of many of the freedoms of liberal British society’ (TRS, 130). This reads to me like a Somewhere ideology – and suggests that Somewhere-isms are seen by Goodhart as ok for non-Muslims but not so for Muslims. Islamism is used here as a weasel word to demonise Islam and Muslims just as it was in the 2000s by influential journalists Nick Cohen and Michael Gove3 (Rogaly and Taylor, 2011, 209- 210). Neither hate crimes committed against people judged by their appearance and/or location to be Muslim, nor widespread structural discrimination against Muslims seem to 3 Gove later became a prominent Leave campaigner and is, at the time of writing, a minister in the UK government. warrant direct attention by Goodhart. Instead, continuing the thread of identifying those who do or do not belong to the ‘mainstream’, Goodhart implicitly defines Muslims, and minorities more broadly, as outside it: ‘mainstream public opinion is… more wary of Muslims than other comparable minorities’, going on to justify this because of ‘greater daily segregation of Muslims, the unavoidable (sic) association with the jihadi violence of a small minority and the recent “grooming” scandals’, casting those speaking out against anti-Muslim racism as either whingeing, exaggerating or both in a ‘relentless narrative of Muslim victimhood and Islamophobia’ (TRS, 130).4 Anti-Muslim racism was evident to varying degrees in the campaigns for the UK to leave the European Union in 2016, though appeals to it were not necessarily direct: ‘while many believed the focus of the UKIP-inspired Brexiteer’s ire was mainly white Europeans from the mainland undercutting British workers, it was clear to many within that formation itself that breaking with the EU and “taking back control of our borders” also represented an important opportunity to limit the numbers of Muslims entering Britain, Muslims whose culture many of them believed was incompatible with being British’ (Virdee and McGeever, 2017, 6). Explicit racist imagery was nevertheless used, for example in the notorious campaign poster showing Nigel Farage pointing at a large number of people, mostly of colour, implicitly mostly Muslim, crossing the border between Macedonia and Slovenia in October 2015, with the headline ‘Breaking Point’, followed by the words: ‘we must break free of the EU and take back control of our borders’. Other Leave campaign leaders, such as Boris Johnson, attempted to distance themselves from the poster, but their high profile involvement and repeated mantra of ‘take back control’ gave a veneer of respectability to the strong presence of anti-Muslim and other racisms in the Leave campaign as a whole – anti- Muslim racism was also strongly present in the doomed Conservative Party campaign to have Zak Goldsmith elected Mayor of London the month before the referendum. As Virdee and McGeever (2017, 3) argue, ‘the current crisis in Brexit Britain has been so overdetermined by racism’ (including, but not only, anti-Muslim racism). In a recent book, Satnam Virdee (2014) makes a further, crucially important, intervention into historizing the relation between racism, racialization and class in Britain, and it is to that work, and the historical perspective it provides for understanding Brexit writings, that I will now turn. Racism in the form of white nationalism has a long history in the UK, one closely intertwined with the history of the country as a colonizer and with shifting postcolonial immigration laws, and modes of governance of racialised minorities (Bhambra, 2015; Hall, 2017). Virdee's Racism, Class and the Racialized Outsider establishes clear analytical links between colonialism and the construction of whiteness and national belonging in Britain. The book covers a two hundred year period and, contra the apparently unchanging identities of the older ‘white working class men’ that Goodhart identifies as ‘[o]ne core group of Somewheres’ (TRS, 3), offers an important reminder that the focus of racialized outsiderhood in Britain has shifted over this time, from Irish Catholics through much of the nineteenth century to Jewish immigrants – known as aliens – at the end of that century, and people of African and Asian heritage throughout (see Lentin, 2017). 5 Arranged chronologically, the book is especially helpful for its discussions of the mainstream political party responses to the arrival in the UK 4 See Warsi (2017) for an excellent critique of liberal commentators defining Muslims as outside the mainstream. 5 For a powerful illustration of the negotiated, contingent process of claiming whiteness in the US, see Kelley (2000). of Jewish people escaping racist pogroms in Tsarist Russia in the 1890s and early 1900s. It reproduces cartoons that could have been directly transplanted from the Leave campaign material used over one hundred years later. The cartoons warned of the dangers of immigration claiming Jewish ‘aliens’ were undercutting wages and taking the jobs of working class British citizens, just as Irish Catholic workers had been accused of doing in the 1830s (Virdee, 2014, 26). The debate over Jewish immigration led to the first legal restriction on immigration in Britain with the passing of the Aliens Act in 1905. It is particularly instructive to read of the debate among socialists at the time between those supporting a white nationalist perspective and those taking a non-racialised view of working class struggle and identity. Referring to the former, Virdee (2017a, 368) describes how ‘socialist nationalist support for Jewish workers attempting to organise themselves remained lukewarm at best’. The anti-semitism was barely restrained. Dockers’ leader Ben Tillett wrote in a letter to the London Evening News, for example that: ‘“Our leading statesmen do not care to offend the great banking houses or money kings… For heavens’ sake, give us back our own countrymen, and take from us your motley multitude”’ (Cohen, 1984, 28, cited by Virdee, 2017a, 368). Virdee quotes similar sentiments supporting the trope of a Jewish conspiracy behind imperialist wars expressed by Keir Hardie’s newspaper Labour Leader. ‘“Wherever there is trouble in Europe, wherever rumours of war circulate and men’s minds are distraught with fear and change and calamity, you may be sure that a hook-nosed Rothschild is at his games somewhere near the region of the disturbances”’ (Cohen, 1984, 20, cited by Virdee, 2017a, 369). Throughout his book, Virdee shows how ‘each time the boundaries of the nation were extended to include more members of the working class, this was accompanied and legitimized by a racialised nationalism that excluded more recent arrivals’ (2017b, 15). He also reveals how this was contested within the labour movement often by people whose heritage connected them to historical or contemporary experiences of racialization. Goodhart’s Brexit writing in TRS defines such people as outside the British ‘mainstream’. If the 2016 Leave campaign can be classified (using Gramsci’s application of military terms to politics) as a full frontal ‘war of manoeuvre’, TRS can logically be understood as engaging in a ‘war of position’. Like several other Brexit writings it forms part of ‘a phase of “revolution-reaction” or passive revolution… which follows upon a revolutionary offensive’. As part of a war of position TRS thus links to Gramsci’s notion of hegemony in the senses of ‘class alliances, “molecular” ideological and political work, consent’ (Forgacs, 1988, 431). Goodhart’s ‘mainstream’ has had enough of ethnic diversity, is ‘wary’ of Muslims (and is therefore not Muslim), and is more culturally ‘distant’ from some immigrants than others. Goodhart thus promotes not just a hegemony in terms of what he himself calls ‘national fellow citizen favouritism’ (2017a, 228), but a racialized hierarchy. His stated intention is to champion people he calls ‘Somewheres’, whom he has identified as being without influence over the direction of society. Yet through his definitions, his elisions and his silences, he furthers a divisive agenda, pitching his chosen ‘mainstream’ against racialized outsiders. As Roediger (2017a) has emphatically shown in the US, the idea promoted by Michaels (2006) and others that identity politics has weakened class solidarity badly misrepresents the historical record. The US context and the Trump presidency are of course distinct from the UK and the Brexit process. However, Trump’s election too has inevitably spawned its own discursive battles, with some writers as divisive and inaccurate as Goodhart in their deployment of the ethnicized category ‘white working class’ (see Roediger, 2017b for an excoriating critique of Joan C Williams’ book of this title). In spite of their elusiveness, 6 multi-ethnic solidarities among working-class people are the most effective route to redressing social, economic and political injustice for all workers. And, as Virdee has argued so convincingly, in British history it has often been racialized outsiders who have taken the lead. References Ahmed S (2004) Declarations of whiteness: the non-performativity of anti-racism. 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work_ujthxhtsnbatpnpgebj3aqiyk4	----	1 Terrorism and the Integration of Muslim Immigrants Ahmed Elsayed 1 and Andries de Grip 2 1 Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) 2 Maastricht University and IZA April 2015 Abstract We study the effect that a series of fundamentalist-Islamic terrorist attacks in Europe had on the integration of Muslim immigrants in the Netherlands. Using a difference-in-difference approach we show that shortly after the attacks, Muslim immigrants‟ perceived integration decreased significantly compared to that of non-Muslim immigrants with no evidence for the existence of a negative trend in the integration of Muslims prior to the attacks. Labour market outcomes of Muslims were not negatively affected by the attacks. However, their geographic segregation increased significantly. We show that while low-skilled Muslims became particularly more geographically segregated, it is the high-skilled Muslims whose perceived integration is affected most negatively due to the attacks. The latter could be explained by their higher expectations on integrating in the host country, whereas the increase in geographic segregation of low-skilled Muslims might have been a buffer that mitigated the effect of terrorism on their perceived integration. We finally show that low perceived integration is associated with the intention to permanently re-migrate to the country of origin. Keywords: Terrorism, integration, Muslim immigrants JEL Classification: F22, J15, R23, Z13 * Corresponding author at: Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Schaumburg-Lippe-Strasse 5-9, 53113 Bonn, Germany. Phone: +49 (228) 3894-161; Fax: +49 (228) 3894-510; E-Mail: elsayed@iza.org We acknowledge the comments and suggestions of Marion Collewet, Denis de Crombrugghe, Jan Feld, Maria Paula Gerardino, Olivier Marie, Jeffrey Nugent, Nicolas Salamanca, and Maria Zumbuehl, as well as participants of the Economic Research Forum (ERF) 19 th annual conference in Kuwait, the 2013 “Migration: Global Development, New Frontiers” conference at the University College London (UCL), the 16th IZA European Summer School in Labor Economics in Buch/Ammersee, Germany, the 26th European Association of Labour Economists (EALE) Conference in Ljubljana, Slovenia, the DUHR research seminar at Maastricht University, and the Brown Bag seminar at IZA, Bonn. The Netherlands Kinship Panel Study is funded by grant 480-10-009 from the Major Investments Fund of the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO), and by the Netherlands Interdisciplinary Demographic Institute (NIDI), Utrecht University, the University of Amsterdam and Tilburg University. mailto:elsayed@iza.org 2 1. Introduction An emerging body of economic literature deals with the impact of fundamentalist Islamic terrorism on the different outcomes of Muslim immigrants (e.g. Cornelissen and Jirjahn 2012; Gautier et al. 2009; Goel 2010; Hanes and Machin 2014; Johnstan and Lordan 2011; Kaushal et al. 2007; Shannon 2012). The literature shows increasing discrimination against Muslims as a result of terrorism (Gautier et al. 2009; Goel 2010; Hanes and Machin 2014), as well as negative impacts of this discrimination on Muslim immigrants‟ health (Johnston and Lordan 2011) and labour market outcomes (Dávila and Mora 2005; Kaushal et al. 2007). 1 However, there are few studies on the impact of fundamentalist Islamic terrorist attacks on the integration of Muslim immigrants in Western societies. This paper assesses the relationship between terrorism and the integration of Muslim immigrants, using subjective measures of integration. The paper investigates to what extent these subjective measures of integration could reveal more than objective measures such as labour market outcomes and geographic segregation, which are affected by various other determinants. For this purpose, we follow people before and after terrorist attacks using a unique panel dataset that oversampled immigrants in the Netherlands, with detailed information on their attitudes and feelings towards their host country. The dataset consists of two waves. The first wave was collected during the years 2002–2003, while the second wave was collected over the period 2006–2007. Between the two waves, Western Europe witnessed the first and most violent wave of Islamist terrorism since September 11, 2001 (Bakker 2006). This began with the Madrid bombings on the 11 th of March 2004, which were shown to have been directed by an Al Qaeda-affiliated group, killing 191 people and injuring 1,841. 2 The 1 The effects of terrorism on Muslim immigrants‟ labour market outcomes in the literature are, however, not clear-cut. While some studies find that terrorism negatively affects the labour market outcomes of Muslim immigrants (e.g. Dávila and Mora 2005; Kaushal et al. 2007), other studies find little or no evidence (e.g. Åslund and Rooth 2005; Braakmann 2010; Shannon 2012). Others find negative effects for particular groups of Muslims, such as the young (Rabby and Rodgers 2009, 2010) and low skilled (Cornelissen and Jirjahn 2012). 2 See http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/guides/457000/457031/html. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Al-Qaeda http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clandestine_cell_system http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/guides/457000/457031/html/ 3 wave ended with the London bombings on the 7 th of July 2005, which were committed by four Islamist suicide bombers, raised in the United Kingdom, leaving 52 people dead, as well as the four bombers, with over 700 injured. 3 In this period, the Netherlands was also heavily affected by this wave of radical Islamic terrorism when Theo van Gogh, a famous Dutch film director, TV interviewer, and writer, was murdered on the 2 nd of November 2004 by a young man of Moroccan origin who had recently converted to radical Islam. 4 This attack received enormous media attention and triggered nationwide outrage against Muslims (Gautier et al. 2009). In the weeks following the murder, there were several attacks on mosques and other Islamic institutions in the Netherlands (Gautier et al. 2009). The survey Leefsituatie Allochtone Stedelingen collected data on city dwellers of various ethnic minorities in the Netherlands directly after the murder of Theo van Gogh and asked their opinions on the murder‟s influence on the relationship between Muslims and non- Muslims. The great majority of the respondents, both native and foreign, reported that the murder had affected this relationship, and 20% of the respondents of Moroccan origin and 13% of the respondents of Turkish origin reported that their lives, as well as those of their families, had been affected by the murder (Gijsberts 2005). We analyse changes in Muslim immigrants‟ integration in the Netherlands relative to those for non-Muslim immigrants before and after the attacks, using subjective measures of integration for the same individuals. 5 We find that Muslim immigrants‟ integration into Dutch society declined much more than that of non-Muslim immigrants following the terrorist 3 Detailed coverage of the 2005 London attacks can be found at the BBC website at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/in_depth/uk/2005/london_explosions/default.stm. 4 With the exception of some terrorist conspiracies and threats, there were no high-profile terrorist attacks in Europe from 11 September 2001 to 10 March 2004 (Nesser 2008). According to the Global Terrorism Database (2012), the three attacks listed above were the most significant Islamic terrorism attacks in Europe. For extensive details on fundamentalist Islamic terrorism in Europe over this period, see Bakker (2006, pp. 3–4). 5 Traditional measures of integration (e.g. language use, importance of religion, attitudes towards intra-marriage) were not available in the two waves of data. However, given that the social integration process of foreign minorities can take generations, assessing changes in immigrants‟ integration over a short period of time would be difficult using these traditional measures of integration. Our measures represent the basis of the integration process and could therefore capture immigrants‟ integration potential. Georgiadis and Manning (2013) show that immigrants who are treated with respect and feel tolerated by natives are more likely to identify with the host country. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/in_depth/uk/2005/london_explosions/default.stm 4 attacks. This pattern is robust to the inclusion of a large set of controls, such as socio- demographics, employment status, share of the respondent‟s ethnic group in the municipality, and length of stay in the Netherlands. The pattern is also robust after controlling for selection bias. Since our data consist of only two waves, it is difficult to attribute the decline in the integration pattern of Muslims solely to discrimination associated with terrorism. Other factors might affect the speed at which different immigrant groups integrate. To check this possibility, we exploit the relatively long timeframe during which the data were collected in the first wave and use the timing of interviews to estimate whether a declining trend in the integration of Muslims, relative to non-Muslims, is already observed prior to the terrorist attacks. This analysis shows no evidence of a decline in Muslim immigrants‟ integration before the terrorist attacks, suggesting that it was the terrorist attacks that caused the change in the integration pattern of Muslim immigrants in the Netherlands. 6 To show the relevance of subjective measures in assessing the effect of terrorist attacks on the level of immigrant integration, we also estimate the effect of terrorist attacks on objective measures of immigrant integration: the labour market outcomes and geographic segregation of Muslim immigrants. Similar to other studies that find no strong evidence of negative labour market outcomes due to terrorism (e.g. Åslund and Rooth 2005; Braakmann 2010; Shannon 2012), we find that neither unemployment nor working hours are negatively affected by the attacks. However, we find that the geographic concentration of Muslim immigrants increased after the attacks. The latter is in line with the findings of Gautier et al. (2009) that housing prices in Amsterdam declined in neighbourhoods with a large share of 6 This, however, does not exclude the possibility that other events which took place between the two waves of the panel could have affected the strong decline in the integration of Muslims. Two major events could have played a role in this respect. First, in September 2004, Member of Parliament Geert Wilders formed a new political party – the Partij Voor de Vrijheid (PVV), or Party for Freedom – with strong opinions against Muslim immigrants. Second, in March 2006, a new immigration law was introduced with stricter requirements for immigrants coming into the country with the purpose of family reunification/formation, including a civic integration exam in Dutch. Given the data, we cannot disentangle the negative impact of the terrorist attacks from the impact of these two events. However, both events can clearly be placed in the context of the changing cultural climate against Muslim immigrants in the Netherlands. 5 Muslim immigrants after the murder of Theo van Gogh. 7 Our analyses on the heterogeneous effects of the terrorist attacks show that low-educated Muslims are affected slightly more negatively in terms of labour market outcomes and get more geographically segregated, while highly educated (as well as employed, language proficient, and less religious) Muslims are affected most negatively with respect to their perceived integration. Moreover, we find that perceived integration is negatively associated with migrants‟ intention to return to their native country. This emphasizes the economic relevance of perceived integration of migrants as it is the most productive immigrants who perceive the strongest decline in integration. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the literature. Section 3 describes the data and variables used in the paper. Section 4 explains the empirical strategy, reports the results of the data analyses, and describes the robustness checks. Finally, Section 5 summarises the findings and concludes the paper. 2. Related studies 2.1. Terrorism and discrimination The economic literature identifies two major types of discrimination: taste-based discrimination (Becker 1957) and statistical discrimination (Arrow 1973; Phelps 1972). Becker‟s theory of taste-based discrimination provides a plausible framework for our analysis. If members of the majority group are prejudiced against a minority group, the former will prefer not to interact with the latter (Cornelissen and Jirjahn 2012). Hence, as a consequence of the terrorist attacks, locals might have developed a (greater) distaste for Muslims, one that induces them to reduce their interaction with Muslims, ignore them, or commit hate crimes against them in the extreme case. This distaste increases the level of perceived discrimination by Muslim immigrants and decreases their integration within the host country. The concept of 7 Opposed to Gautier et al. (2009) who studied the effect of terrorism on Muslim immigrants at the neighbourhood level, we show changes in geographic segregation of Muslims using data at the individual level. One advantage of our approach is the ability to study heterogeneous treatment effects of the impact of terrorism on Muslim immigrants. 6 taste-based discrimination is closely related to in-group preference. Shayo and Zussman (2011) find evidence for this in-group preference bias by showing that Palestinian terrorist attacks in Israel have a significant impact on judicial in-group bias in small claims courts, where the assignment of a case to an Arab or Jewish judge is random. Recent studies exploit exogenous shifts in natives‟ ethnic preferences to study taste- based discrimination. Moser (2012) uses data from opera programs, census records on first names, and food purchases in the United States to show that World War I created a preference shock against German Americans. The author uses this shock to ethnic preferences to identify the effects of taste-based discrimination in the application for seats on the New York Stock Exchange: The war more than doubled the probability that German applicants would be rejected relative to Anglo-Saxons. In a similar vein, Michaels and Zhi (2010) find that deterioration in the attitudes of Americans towards the French in 2002–2003 due to different stances on the war on Iraq had a significantly negative effect on the trade volume between the two countries. Guryan and Charles (2013) show that loss of trust could be a “root cause” of discrimination. This loss of trust could explain the change in perceptions of the native population towards Muslims. Due to the salience of terrorist attacks, terrorism could have negatively affected mutual trust between natives and Muslim immigrants and therefore increased the perceived discrimination of Muslims; that is, the natives‟ perception that Muslim immigrants are dangerous and the Muslims‟ perception that natives are prejudiced against them could have been enhanced by the terrorist attacks. 8 8 In this case, statistical discrimination could be an additional mechanism to explain the change in attitudes towards Muslims. 7 2.2. Impact of terrorism on Muslim immigrants The exogeneity of terrorism has been exploited in the literature to study the impact of fundamentalist Islamic terrorist attacks on Muslim immigrants. For example, Kaushal et al. (2007) study the impact of September 11 on the labour market outcomes of Muslims in the United States and show that it was associated with a temporary 9–11% decline in earnings, though it did not significantly affect the employment and hours worked of Arab and Muslim men. However, Rabby and Rodgers (2009) find that the employment–population ratios and hours worked of young Muslim men in particular decreased significantly in the United States after September 11. Cornelissen and Jirjahn (2012) show that September 11 negatively affected the earnings of low-skilled Muslim workers in Germany, especially those employed in small and medium-sized firms. However, other studies do not find any impact of terrorism on the labour market outcomes of Muslims in Sweden (Åslund and Rooth 2005) or Canada (Shannon 2012). In the United Kingdom, the pattern is less clear-cut. While Braakmann (2010) finds no evidence of negative labour market outcomes for Muslims after September 11 and the July bombings, Rabby and Rodgers (2010) find a decrease in the employment of young Muslim men relative to non-Muslim immigrants after the July bombings and a weak association between September 11 and the employment of Muslim immigrants. The impact of terrorism on the health outcomes of Muslim immigrants has also been investigated. Johnston and Lordan (2011) find evidence of increased blood pressure, cholesterol levels, BMI, and self-assessed general health for Muslims relative to non-Muslims as a result of September 11. The underlying mechanism described in these studies is increased discrimination against Muslims due to the anger caused by terrorism. Gautier et al. (2009) show strong evidence of this discrimination by documenting a decline in housing prices in Amsterdam neighbourhoods with a large share of Turks and Moroccans following the 8 assassination of Theo van Gogh. 9 Furthermore, hate crimes against Asians and Arabs increased immediately in England after September 11 and the July bombings (Hanes and Machin 2014). The impact that large-scale fundamentalist Islamic terrorist attacks have on discrimination is not limited to the country in which the attacks take place. For example, Schüller (2012) shows that September 11 resulted in a significant increase in negative attitudes towards immigration and decreased concerns over xenophobic hostility among the native German population. While the integration of Muslim immigrants into Western societies has started to receive considerable attention in the economic literature (e.g. Arai et al. 2011; Battu and Zenou 2010; Bisin et al. 2008, 2011; Georgiadis and Manning 2011, 2013; Manning and Roy 2010), no studies have used a panel structure to estimate changes in the integration of Muslim immigrants over time and account for unobserved heterogeneity. Goel (2010) estimates changes in perceptions of discrimination among Muslims following September 11. The author uses a set of interviews conducted before and after September 11 to estimate how Muslim- looking immigrants to Australia perceive intolerance relative to other immigrants. She finds that Muslim-looking immigrants report higher intolerance and discrimination than other immigrants. 10 Gould and Klor (2015) exploit variations across U.S. states in the number of hate crimes against Muslims in the wake of September 11 and show that September 11 had long-term effects on intermarriage, fertility, female labour force participation, and English proficiency among Muslim immigrants. The authors argue that a major goal of terrorist attacks is to induce a backlash against Muslim immigrants to radicalize moderate supporters who live in the same country as the perpetrators. In addition to this strategic objective for 9 More general geographical implications of terrorism have been addressed by Gleaser and Shapiro (2002), who study the impact of terrorism on “urban form” and find a positive but weak effect of terrorism on cities such as Jerusalem and London. 10 Goel‟s (2010) results are based on a cross section of recently arrived immigrants (the second wave of a longitudinal survey of immigrants to Australia), making it difficult to account for unobserved immigrant heterogeneity. In addition, the measures used in that study are limited to binary perceptions of intolerance and discrimination in Australia. Our study differs in that it goes one step further, beyond perceptions of fair/unfair treatment, and assesses changes in immigrants‟ feeling at ease with natives and attitudes towards living in the host country. 9 terrorism, the literature discusses several other political objectives such as changing standpoints of governments (Kydd and Walter 2006), or switching political attitudes of locals leftwards (Gould and Klor 2010), in addition to economic objectives such as causing large movements of capital across countries (Abadie and Gardeazabal 2008). 2.3. Subjective versus objective measures of integration Labour market outcomes could provide objective measures for the integration of immigrants in host countries; however, they fail to measure discrimination in the highly regulated European markets (Åslund and Rooth 2005; Cornelissen and Jirjahn 2012). Furthermore, immigrants generally participate in networks of the same ethnic minority. Participation in these networks is usually associated with positive labour outcomes. Dustmann et al. (2009) show evidence of the existence and productivity of referral-based job search networks of ethnic minority workers. Casey and Dustmann (2010) show that immigrants who actively participate in ethnic networks are more likely to find jobs through informal referrals. This suggests that the identification of immigrants with their home country, as opposed to the host country, is positively associated with labour market outcomes. Countervailing mechanisms could explain why, overall, evidence of the impact of terrorism on the labour market outcomes of Muslims is mixed. The geographic segregation of migrant groups provides another objective measure of integration. The dislike of Muslims due to terrorist attacks could make natives move out of municipalities with high concentrations of Muslims, while Muslims could be more eager to move to such areas to obtain social support from being in a community of the same ethnic or religious background. Both scenarios will lead to higher levels of segregation of Muslim immigrants. Subjective measures of integration could potentially reveal more than objective outcomes. The perceived discrimination of Muslim immigrants could increase due to the http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2009.02336.x/full#b11 http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2009.02336.x/full#b11 10 terrorist attacks, even if they are not personally affected by this discrimination in objective (direct) ways. The rise in hate crimes against Muslims in the wake of the terrorist attacks could be a basis for increased perceived discrimination (Johnston and Lordan 2012). In addition, everyday discriminatory experiences (which arguably increase after the terrorist attacks) such as being stopped by the police, verbal attacks, or disrespectful treatment in public particularly increase the likelihood of one‟s perception of belonging to a discriminated minority (Brüß 2008). Georgiadis and Manning (2013) show that immigrants‟ feeling of disrespect and intolerance by natives has negative implications on their identifying with the host country. While the impact of terrorist attacks on objective outcomes is expected to be more pronounced for low-skilled immigrants (Cornelissen and Jirjahn 2012), discrimination is more likely to be perceived by highly skilled immigrants because of their high expectations of integration in the host country. Banerjee (2008) indeed finds that immigrants‟ perceived discrimination is not related to objective measures of income inequity. She shows that, in workplace settings, long-term immigrants and highly skilled immigrants perceive discrimination more than new immigrants and low-skilled immigrants because of their expectations of equitable treatment. The literature shows that perceived discrimination is negatively associated with both mental (Kessler et al. 1999) and physical health (Johnston and Lordan 2012) and has a negative impact on life satisfaction (Redman and Snape 2006). 3. Data and descriptive statistics The Netherlands Kinship Panel Study consists of two datasets. The first dataset covers the Dutch native population, while the second oversamples immigrants from the four largest immigrant groups in the Netherlands: Turks, Moroccans, Surinamese, and Dutch Antilleans. The data were collected from 13 Dutch cities in which at least half of the immigrant population lives (Dykstra et al. 2005; 2012). We use data from the second dataset, which 11 oversamples immigrants. The panel dataset consists of two waves. The first wave was collected between April 2002 and October 2003, while the second was collected between May 2006 and June 2007. 11 The dataset contains individual information about religion, age, ethnic group, employment status, marital status, year of immigration, whether or not the individual was born in the Netherlands, and so forth. Furthermore, we include information about the share of the individuals‟ own ethnic groups in the municipalities in which they live, drawn from Statistics Netherlands. 12 The dataset also includes information about immigrants‟ attitudes towards integration. The respondents were asked eight questions on the extent to which they agree with each of the following statements: (1) “In the Netherlands foreigners have excellent opportunities”; (2) “The Dutch are hostile to foreigners”; (3) “In the Netherlands your rights as a foreigner are respected”; (4) “The Dutch are hospitable to foreigners”; (5) “In the Netherlands people are indifferent to foreigners”; (6) “Foreigners are treated fairly in the Netherlands”; (7) “Foreigners face many restrictions in the Netherlands”; and (8) “The Dutch are open to foreign cultures”. The answers were given on a five-point scale, ranging from one („strongly disagree‟) to five („strongly agree‟). Respondents were also asked about their appreciation of living in the Netherlands – (9) “How do you like living in the Netherlands?” (with answers ranging from one, “very fine”, to five, “very annoying”) and their social experience with locals – (10) “Do you feel at ease in the company of Dutch people?” (with answers on a four- point scale, with one for “no, not at all”, two for “no, not really”, three for “yes, a little”, and four for “yes, very much so”). 13 11 The long period over which the data were collected is due to the difficulty in reaching the target groups (Dykstra et al. 2005, 2012). 12 See the Statistics Netherlands website: http://statline.cbs.nl/StatWeb/ 13 The first eight items are used in the sociological literature as a measure of perceived acceptance by the host country (Huijnk et al. 2012). The scale for items (2), (5), (7), and (9) is reversed so that the higher the value, the better the outcome in terms of integration. 12 Our sample consists of 1,085 observations for which we have full information on all integration attitudes, demographics, and religion. 14 Of this set, 476 observations are for Muslim immigrants (160 in the first wave and 316 in the second wave) and 609 observations are for non-Muslim immigrants (309 in the first wave and 300 in the second wave). For 432 individuals (152 Muslims and 280 non-Muslims), data exist in both waves of the panel. Table A1 in the Online Appendix provides an overview of the single items of integration, as well as the variables used in the study. The table shows that non-Muslim immigrants score significantly higher than Muslims in most of the integration items. In our sample, 56% of non-Muslims and 46% of Muslims are females. The share of second- generation respondents (i.e. those born in the Netherlands) is small (6% of the Muslims and 8% of the non-Muslims). This low share is due to the fact that the survey only includes individuals who are 18 years or older. Muslims are, on average, less educated than non- Muslims. In addition, they are less likely to have received education abroad or in the Netherlands than non-Muslims. While the majority of Muslims belong to the Turkish and Moroccan ethnic minorities, the majority of non-Muslims belong to the Surinamese and Dutch Antillean ethnic minorities. Geographic concentration in municipalities is higher for Muslim than for non-Muslim immigrants. Non-Muslims are more likely to be employed (63%) than Muslims (46%). In addition, a greater percentage of Muslims in our sample are married and have children. Figure 1 shows the changes in the level of integration for both Muslim and non-Muslim immigrants between the two waves of the study (the integration items are standardized for ease of comparison). The figure shows that, between the two waves, integration measures declined for both groups. However, the decrease is much more pronounced among Muslims than among non-Muslims. Table A2 in the Online Appendix summarises the changes and 14 Running the analysis without sample restrictions yields similar results. 13 shows the difference-in-difference estimates of the integration items. The difference-in- difference coefficients show that the decline was more significant for Muslims than for non- Muslims in five out of the 10 measures of integration, namely, excellent opportunities for foreigners, fair treatment of foreigners in the Netherlands, Netherlands is open to foreign cultures, feeling at ease with Dutch natives, and appreciation of living in the Netherlands. We use an integration index that is constructed by grouping the 10 individual items. 15 Following Kling et al. (2007), we estimate an index of the equally weighted averages of the z- scores of the 10 items. The z-scores are calculated by subtracting the control group (Non- Muslims) mean and dividing by the control group standard deviation. Therefore, for Non- Muslims in our sample, each item in the index has mean zero and standard deviation one. 16 4. Empirical model and analysis 4.1. Main analysis To identify the effect of the terrorist attacks in Western Europe on the integration of Muslim immigrants, we estimate the following equation: [ ] where is the integration level of immigrant i at time t, M is a dummy variable that takes the value one if the respondent is Muslim and the value zero if the respondent is non-Muslim, PA is a dummy variable that takes the value one if the observation is from the second wave of the study (after the terrorist attacks) and equals zero otherwise, the parameter for the interaction between M and PA is our measure of change in Muslims‟ integration compared to 15 This has the advantage of reducing the likelihood of type I error (that the result for any single item is due to chance), as well as type II error (the risk of low statistical power) (Clingingsmith et al. 2009). 16 An alternative approach is to compute the average effect size across items within the integration index, using seemingly unrelated regression for the 10 items to estimate the covariance of the effects and then calculating the mean effect size for the 10 items in a second step (Clingingsmith et al. 2009; Kling et al. 2004). Since we use a consistent number of observations across the 10 items of integration and there are no regression adjustments, the two approaches give identical results (Kling et al. 2007). Without a consistent number of observations, the results would remain very similar. The advantage of the average z-score index used in this paper is that it is much simpler to work with, especially when using panel data (Kling et al. 2007). 14 that of non-Muslims, is a set of controls, is an individual fixed effect that we assume to be uncorrelated with the timings of the terrorist attacks, and is a time-varying error term. We estimate both a fixed effects (FE) and a generalised least squares model with random effects (RE) clustered on personal identification. Table 1 shows the coefficients of the two models 17 . Column 1 shows the FE model estimates and Column 2 shows the RE model estimates after controlling for a large set of control variables: ethnic group, gender, dummies for marital status and employment status, whether or not the respondent was born in the Netherlands, length of stay in the Netherlands, length of stay in the Netherlands squared, education level, whether or not the respondent received education abroad, whether or not the respondent received education in the Netherlands, the municipality in which the immigrant lives, the share of the respondent‟s ethnic minority in the municipality, and the number of children. 18 The table shows that perceived integration of Muslim immigrants in the Netherlands decreased significantly after the terrorist attacks relative to non-Muslim immigrants. This can be seen in the interaction coefficients between Muslim and Post-attacks, which are negative and statistically significant in the two columns. 19 4.2. Selection bias We acknowledge the potential for selection bias due to panel attrition in the dataset; out of the 469 respondents for whom we have information on integration and background characteristics in the first wave, only 216 continued to appear in the second wave. It is reasonable to assume 17 In the regressions, the respondent‟s age is removed because of potential collinearity with length of stay in the Netherlands. However, adding the variable yields similar results. 18 Unconditional regressions with no control variable give similar results. In addition to the set of controls included in Table 1, we estimate a model that controls for the partner‟s birthplace, family income (available only in the first wave), fluency in Dutch, and speaking Dutch when communicating with their children (only available in the second wave). Although the number of observations declines sharply when these variables are included, the results are robust. We also estimate a RE model in which we control for pre-attack levels of all control variables as well as a model that controls for interaction between the survey wave and employment status, marital status, and education level to account for any possible differences between Muslims and non-Muslims in the changes of these variables over time. All these different model specifications yield similar results. 19 To account for the possibility that the decrease in integration is affected by a different pattern of extreme answers for the integration questions by Muslim and non-Muslim immigrants, we re-estimate the model after removing the extreme answers. The results remain unchanged. 15 that immigrants absent from the second wave of the sample would have reported lower integration than those who remained. Since Muslims‟ perceived integration would be affected by the terrorist attacks more than that of other immigrants, Muslims may also have been more likely to drop out of the study (or even leave the country). However, this panel attrition would lead to under-estimation of the decline in the integration of Muslim immigrants, accentuating the actual decrease in the integration pattern of Muslims. 20 To account for selection bias into the second wave, we replicate the analysis using a balanced sample made up of respondents for whom we have complete information in the two waves of the study. However, contemporaneous shocks could have affected participation in the second wave of the study. For example, as stated earlier, those most affected by the terrorist events may have been less likely to participate in the second wave of the survey (or may even have left the country). For this reason, even a balanced panel estimate may not truly reflect the actual change in Muslims‟ integration. To correct for this, we compute a Mills ratio using a selection variable that equals one if the individual is observed in the two waves of the study as our dependent variable in the selection equation. Table A3 in the Online Appendix shows the estimates from the selection equation as a function of all independent variables, as well as a dummy variable that takes the value one if the number of missing items in the respondents‟ answers to all the questions in the first wave is above the median and zero otherwise. 21 This variable is used to satisfy the exclusion restriction, which is possible since the likelihood that a respondent will be absent from the second wave should be correlated with the number of questions the respondent did not answer in the first wave. That is, immigrants who answered fewer questions in the first wave should be more likely to drop out in the second wave. However, 20 However, it could also be the case that non-respondents are busier than respondents and therefore do not show up in the second wave. In this case, the direction of the bias is difficult to determine a priori (Heffetz and Rabin 2013). 21 The median in the sample is 10 unanswered questions out of 97 asked in the first wave of the questionnaire. We re- estimated the analysis using the actual number of unanswered questions as an alternative to the dummy variable and found similar results. 16 the number of missing answers should not be correlated with the timing of the terrorist attacks. Table 2 shows the FE and RE model estimates from the balanced sample after accounting for the inversed Mills ratio and all the other relevant variables. The table shows results similar to those in Table 1. The coefficients of the inversed Mills ratio are not significant. This shows that selection bias does not drive our results. However, this assumes that the number of missing answers in the first wave of the study is the only (substantive) reason for presence in the second wave. To better capture the bias, an ideal experiment would be to randomly assign respondents to participation in the second wave of the study and test whether the estimated impacts (including attrition) are similar in the treatment group (participants) and the control group (non-participants), that is, whether the three-way interaction between a dummy variable for above-median missing answers in the first wave, a dummy variable for being a Muslim, and a dummy variable for the post-attacks is statistically insignificant. Table A4 in the Online Appendix shows that the three-way interaction term is not statistically significant, suggesting that there no evidence of observed selection bias in our analysis. 4.3. Possible trend prior to the terrorist attacks Since our analysis begins after the September 11 attacks, the effect we find may be biased. As indicated above, some studies show that September 11 was associated with labour market discrimination against certain minority groups and changed attitudes towards immigrants not only in the United States, but also in other Western countries (e.g. Cornelissen and Jirjahn 2012; Goel 2010; Schüller 2012). Since fundamentalist Islamist terrorism affects the integration of Muslim immigrants, it is likely that the perceived integration of Muslim immigrants had already been negatively affected by September 11 before our analysis started. However, the analysis above (Table 1) does not show strong evidence of differences in 17 integration between Muslims and non-Muslims before the wave of terrorist attacks in which we are interested. Furthermore, even if Muslims are less integrated, this would make our point stronger, since this underestimates our coefficients on the decrease in Muslims‟ integration. However, if a pattern of change in Muslim immigrants‟ integration began before the wave of terrorism of interest (i.e. before March 2004), this would imply that the change in Muslim immigrants‟ attitudes is not a result of the terrorist attacks but could, instead, be due to endogenous factors that affect the speed of integration differently for Muslim and non- Muslim immigrants. To account for the possibility that the negative trend in the integration pattern of Muslim immigrants pre-dates the terrorist attacks that hit Western Europe, we exploit the timing of interviews during the first wave of the dataset to analyse whether Muslims interviewed late in the first wave are less integrated than those interviewed earlier. If such a pattern is already observed before the terrorist attacks, it would be difficult to attribute the decline in the integration of Muslim immigrants to the terrorist attacks. Since the first wave of the data was collected over quite a long timeframe, a trend could be identified. Figure 2 shows the trends in the integration of Muslim and non-Muslim immigrants in the two waves of the study. The graph shows that during the first wave of the survey, the integration of Muslims was increasing relative to that of non-Muslims. This suggests no pre- trend in the relative decline in the integration of Muslims. 22 The figure also clearly shows a drop in the integration for the two groups of immigrants between the two waves. During the second wave, the integration level of non-Muslims was increasing, which does not hold for Muslim immigrants. Table A5 in the Online Appendix shows the coefficients for the regression of perceived integration on the times of the interviews, measured in year quarters, in the first 22 A regression of the times of the interviews on all variables of interest shows no significant differences between Muslim and non-Muslim immigrants in the times of the interviews. This suggests that the trend is not driven by a non-random pattern in collecting the data. 18 wave (Column 1) and the second wave of the study (Column 2). The table shows that, after all relevant information is controlled for, the increasing pattern of integration for Muslims during the first wave as shown in Figure 2 is not significant, while the decreasing pattern of integration for Muslims compared to non-Muslims during the second wave is significant. 23 This shows that the decline in Muslims‟ integration started in the 2004–2005 period of terrorist attacks. 4.4. Heterogeneous effects In this subsection, we study whether the attacks had a uniform impact across the entire group of Muslim immigrants or whether the impact varied across subgroups. We examine whether there is any heterogeneity in the decline of integration with respect to the pre-attacks covariates of gender, age, level of education, labour market status, language proficiency, and degree of religiosity. Table 3 shows the results of the FE and RE estimations from Table 1 for split samples by gender (Panel A), age (Panel B), education level (high vs. low education) (Panel C), labour market status (employed vs. unemployed) (Panel D), language proficiency (Panel E), and degree of religiosity (Panel F). 24 The table shows that the decrease in the integration of Muslims is more pronounced for males and young, highly educated, employed, fluent, as well as less religious Muslims. These findings show that particularly Muslim immigrants with high potential for integration are affected more negatively. This could be explained in light of their expectations of integration in the host country. These groups of Muslims are more likely to expect to be dealt with similarly to natives (Banerjee 2008). Deviations from this expectation due to perceived discrimination may lead them to feel unintegrated in the host country. Moreover, those who 23 The same pattern appears when we limit the analysis to individuals who participated in both panel waves. 24 We assess religiosity by the frequency the respondent reports for going to the mosque. We create a dummy variable for being religious that takes the value zero if the person hardly ever goes to the mosque and one if the respondent goes to the mosque frequently. We limit the analysis of this heterogeneity check to Muslims. Therefore, the coefficient for Post-attacks will capture the changes for less religious Muslims (Columns 1 and 3) and more religious Muslims (Columns 2 and 4). We also replicated the analysis while limiting the sample to men, because women (even the most religious) are less likely to go to the mosque than men are. The results do not change. 19 are employed are more likely to encounter harassments and perceive discrimination because they more often interact with natives than those who are not employed, while those who are fluent are more likely to understand any verbal attacks in streets and in the media of the host country and, therefore, are more likely to perceive discrimination. Furthermore, the decrease in integration is more pronounced for less religious Muslims who already have higher potential for integration in the host country compared to more religious Muslims. To check the possibility that selection bias into the second wave of the study could be driving these results, Table A6 in the Online Appendix shows the heterogeneous treatment effects for observations that appeared in the two waves of the study after accounting for the inversed Mills ratio as well as other relevant controls. Despite, the lower number of observations, the estimates are similar to those obtained from the whole sample. 4.5. Objective versus subjective measures of integration In this subsection, we estimate the effect of the terrorist attacks on the Muslim immigrants‟ objective outcomes of unemployment, working hours, as well as geographic concentration. 25 Table 4 shows the difference-in-difference estimations. Columns 1 and 2 show the RE and FE estimates for unemployment, respectively; Columns 3 and 4 show the RE and FE estimates for working hours, respectively; and Columns 5 and 6 show the RE and FE estimates for geographic concentration of immigrants, respectively. Similar to Åslund and Rooth (2005) and Braakman (2010), the table shows that the labour market outcomes of Muslim immigrants were not negatively affected by the terrorist attacks. As mentioned above, labour market regulations and networking within ethnic minorities are possible explanations for not finding any effect of the terrorist attacks on the labour market outcomes of Muslims (Cornelissen and Jirjahn 2012). 26 However, the table shows that the geographic concentration of Muslim immigrants relative to non-Muslim immigrants significantly increased over time. 25 We could not use wages here since our dataset does not contain a consistent measure of labour income across the two waves of the study. 26 Similar patterns appear when we compare the labour market outcomes of Muslim immigrants to those of natives. 20 The share of people with the same ethnic background increased by about 0.3 (0.2) percentage points for Muslims compared to non-Muslims after the attacks. Table A7 in the Online Appendix shows the heterogeneous treatment effects for labour market outcomes and geographic concentration. The effect of terrorist attacks seems to be more pronounced for low-educated Muslims who witnessed a relative increase in unemployment (significant only at the 10% level) as well as a significant increase in geographic concentration. The difference in the impact of terrorist attacks on geographic concentration between low-skilled and high-skilled Muslims could be due to the fact that low-educated immigrants who are more often unemployed are less constrained to move than highly educated immigrants who are more likely to be employed. Moreover, low-skilled migrants usually participate in ethnic networks and find jobs through informal referrals (Casey and Dustman 2010; Damm 2009; Edin et al. 2003). This suggests that low-skilled Muslims might compensate the negative effects of terrorist attacks on unemployment by grouping together. Furthermore, the increase in geographic concentration of low-skilled Muslims after the attacks could be a buffer that mitigates the effect of terrorism on their integration as they could obtain social support from being in a community of the same ethnic background. This could explain why low-skilled migrants do not perceive discrimination as much as the highly skilled do. 4.6. Economic relevance of subjective measures of integration Our findings show that terrorism has a negative effect on perceived integration of Muslim immigrants. To analyse the economic relevance of perceived integration, Table 5 shows the relationship between perceived integration and the intention to permanently return to the native country. 27 The table shows that perceived integration is negatively associated with the intention to permanently re-migrate to the country of origin. One standard deviation 27 Respondents in the second wave of the survey were asked “Do you plan to go back to your country of origin for good?” 18% of the respondents answered yes. 21 decline in perceived integration is associated with a 10% higher probability of intending to permanently leave the country. However, the objective measures of integration – unemployment and geographic concentration – are not significantly related to the intention to re-migrate to the country of origin. This result suggests that this subjective measure of integration may better predict re-migration than objective aspects of integration do. 5. Conclusion In this paper we use data from the Netherlands that oversample the four largest ethnic minorities in the country (Turks, Moroccans, Surinamese, and Dutch Antilleans) to analyse the integration patterns of Muslim and non-Muslim immigrants before and shortly after a violent wave of Islamist terrorist attacks hit Western Europe. The wave began with the Madrid bombings in March 2004 and extended to the London bombings in July 2005. The assassination of Theo van Gogh in Amsterdam by an Islamic fanatic of Moroccan origin took place in the middle of this wave, triggering nationwide outrage and increasing discrimination against Muslims in the Netherlands (Gautier et al. 2009). We show that Muslim immigrants‟ perceived integration declined much more after the terrorist attacks than did that of non-Muslim immigrants. This pattern holds after including a large set of control variables and accounting for selection bias, and is not driven by any existing negative trend in the integration of Muslim immigrants prior to the attacks. Our findings suggest that perceived integration could potentially reveal more than objective measures of integration. We find that unemployment and working hours of Muslims are not negatively affected by the attacks. However, the geographic segregation of Muslim immigrants increased after the attacks. Our analyses on the heterogeneous effects of the terrorist attacks show that while the highly educated are affected most negatively with respect to their perceived integration, the low-educated became more geographically segregated. The decline in perceived integration of the highly skilled Muslim migrants can be explained in 22 light of their higher expectations on integration in the host country compared to the low- skilled. Meanwhile, the increase in geographic segregation of low-skilled Muslims after the attacks could be a buffer that mitigated the effect of terrorism on their perceived integration as they could have obtained social support from being in a community of the same ethnic background. We further find that perceived integration is negatively associated with migrants‟ intention to return to their native country. 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Shayo, Moses, and Assaf Zussman (2011). “Judicial Ingroup Bias in the Shadow of Terrorism.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 26 (3): 1447-1484. 26 Figure 1: Changes in integration attitudes for Muslim and non-Muslim immigrants between the two panel waves. -. 8 -. 6 -. 4 -. 2 0 .2 C h a n g e s i n i n te g ra ti o n ( s td d e v u n it s ) Non-Muslims -. 8 -. 6 -. 4 -. 2 0 .2 Muslims Opportunities No hostility Rights respected Hospitality Indifference to foreigners Fair treatment No restrictions Openness to cultures Appreciation of living Feeling at ease 27 Figure 2: Trends in the integration of immigrants before and after the terrorist attacks. Note: The graph is based on an unbalanced panel of 448 observations before the attacks and 599 observations after the attacks. Time of interview is in year quarters. Q1= April-June 2002, Q2= July-Sep. 2002, Q3= Oct.- Dec. 2002, Q4=Jan.-March 2003, Q5=April-July 2003, Q6=June-Aug. 2006, Q7=Sep.-Nov. 2006, Q8= Dec. 2006-Feb. 2007, Q9=March 2007-May2007, The trend is similar when using a balanced sample of observations participating in the two waves of the study -. 4 -. 2 0 .2 P e rc e iv e d I n te g ra ti o n ( in s td d e v . u n it s ) Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Time of Interview Before the attacks -. 4 -. 2 0 .2 Q6 Q7 Q8 Q9 Time of interview After the attacks Non-Muslims Muslims 28 Table 1: Change in the Integration of Muslim and non-Muslim immigrants after terrorist attacks (unbalanced panel data). Perceived integration (1) (2) VARIABLES RE FE Muslim 0.173* (0.097) Post-attacks -0.167*** -0.283*** (0.048) (0.073) Muslim * Post-attacks -0.270*** -0.320*** (0.072) (0.110) Constant -0.221 0.081 (0.149) (0.519) Controls Yes Yes Observations 1,085 1,085 Number of individuals 869 869 Note: RE= Generalised least squares with random effects, FE= Fixed Effects. Perceived integration is measured by an index of the equally weighted averages of the z-scores (based on mean and standard deviation of non-Muslim group) of the 10 integration items. Muslim is a dummy variable for being Muslim, post-attacks takes the value one if the observation is from the second wave (after terrorist attacks), and zero otherwise. Controls include gender, employment status, education, marital status, ethnic group, number of children, a dummy for being born in the Netherlands, a dummy for having had education in the Netherlands, length of stay in the Netherlands, length of stay squared, share of migrants with the same ethnic background in the municipality, and regional dummies. Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 29 Table 2: Change in the Integration of Muslim and non-Muslim immigrants after terrorist attacks (balanced panel data). Perceived integration (1) (2) VARIABLES RE FE Muslim 0.034 (0.194) Post-attacks -0.213*** -0.283*** (0.061) (0.069) Muslim * Post-attacks -0.318*** -0.321*** (0.114) (0.113) Inverse Mill‟s ratio -0.067 -0.322 (0.160) (2.824) Constant -0.012 0.264 (0.315) (2.026) Controls Yes Yes Observations 432 432 Number of individuals 216 216 Note: RE= Generalised least squares with random effects, FE= Fixed Effects. Perceived integration is measured by an index of the equally weighted averages of the z-scores (based on mean and standard deviation of non-Muslim group) of the 10 integration items. Muslim is a dummy variable for being Muslim, post-attacks takes the value one if the observation is from the second wave (after terrorist attacks), and zero otherwise. Controls include gender, employment status, education, marital status, ethnic group, number of children, a dummy for being born in the Netherlands, a dummy for having had education in the Netherlands, length of stay in the Netherlands, length of stay squared, share of migrants with the same ethnic background in the municipality, and regional dummies. Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 30 Table 3: Change in the Integration of Muslim and non-Muslim immigrants after the terrorist attacks. Heterogeneity by gender, age ,education, labour market status, language proficiency, and religiosity. Perceived integration RE FE VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) A) Gender Men Women Men Women Muslim* Post-attacks -0.333*** -0.188* -0.338** -0.257 (0.101) (0.110) (0.152) (0.175) Observations 530 555 530 555 Number of Individuals 423 446 423 446 B) Age Below 40 Above 40 Below 40 Above 40 Muslim* Post-attacks -0.350*** -0.215** -0.389** -0.123 (0.102) (0.107) (0.174) (0.167) Observations 491 590 491 590 Number of Individuals 417 468 417 468 C) Education High Low High Low Muslim* Post-attacks -0.537*** -0.087 -0.682*** -0.119 (0.115) (0.101) (0.158) (0.155) Observations 429 481 429 481 Number of Individuals 328 366 328 366 D) Labour market status Employed Unemployed Employed Unemployed Muslim* Post-attacks -0.352*** -0.115 -0.433*** -0.026 (0.096) (0.112) (0.135) (0.163) Observations 594 488 594 488 Number of Individuals 466 400 466 400 E) Language proficiency Proficient Non-proficient Proficient Non-proficient Muslim* Post-attacks -0.305*** -0.330 -0.428*** 0.027 (0.084) (0.293) (0.116) (0.634) Observations 808 262 808 262 Number of Individuals 631 225 631 225 F) Religiosity Less religious More religious Less religious More religious Post-attacks -0.720*** -0.447*** -1.058*** -0.447*** (0.156) (0.074) (0.234) (0.074) Observations 126 345 126 345 Number of individuals 105 290 105 290 Note: Controls as in Table 1. Low education group is the group with elementary education, lower vocational, or lower secondary education. High education group is the group with intermediate vocational education, intermediate and upper general secondary, higher vocational education, or university education. Employed takes the value 1 if the individual was employed in the first wave, and 0 otherwise. Language proficiency is a dummy for being proficient in Dutch. Religiosity is a dummy variable that takes the value one if the Muslim respondent went to the mosque frequently, and 0 if the respondent hardly went to the mosque. For all variables of division, we use the pre-attacks level of the variable as a basis for the division. Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 31 Table 4: Terrorism and change in objective measures of integration. Unemployment Working hours Geographic concentration RE FE RE FE RE FE (1) (2) (3) (4) (3) (4) Muslim -0.047 -1.348 -0.001 (0.051) (1.677) (0.004) Post-attacks 0.003 -0.012 1.339* 0.989 0.001 0.001 (0.023) (0.034) (0.777) (1.061) (0.001) (0.001) Muslim *Post- attacks 0.001 0.061 -1.180 -1.072 0.003*** 0.002*** (0.036) (0.048) (1.227) (1.479) (0.001) (0.001) Constant 0.120 0.182 46.551*** 46.720*** 0.021*** 0.034*** (0.078) (0.234) (2.680) (4.356) (0.006) (0.003) Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Observations 1,085 1,085 580 580 1,085 1,085 Number of individuals 869 869 470 470 869 869 Note: RE= Generalised least squares with random effects, FE= Fixed Effects. Unemployment is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the respondent is unemployed, and 0 otherwise. Working hours refers to the actual working hours. Geographic concentration is the share of people with the same ethnic background in the municipality where the respondent lives. Controls include gender, employment status, education, marital status, ethnic group, number of children, a dummy for being born in the Netherlands, a dummy for having had education in the Netherlands, length of stay in the Netherlands, length of stay squared, and regional dummies. The working hours estimates are conditional on being employed. Replicating the analysis using a sample that included observations with zero working hours gives similar results. Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 32 Table 5: OLS regression for the relationship between perceived integration and intention to return to native country. (1) Variables Intention to return to native country Perceived Integration -0.096*** (0.026) Muslim -0.020 (0.080) Unemployed -0.075 (0.055) Female 0.011 (0.034) Born in NL -0.047 (0.067) Married -0.003 (0.049) Divorced 0.038 (0.053) Widowed -0.039 (0.090) Number of children 0.005 (0.010) Length of stay in NL 0.004 (0.005) Length of stay in NL (squared) -0.011 (0.010) Education in NL 0.017 (0.042) Educated -0.010 (0.038) Education abroad 0.021 (0.041) Turkish -0.055 (0.097) Moroccan -0.064 (0.104) Surinamese -0.073 (0.066) Geographic concentration -0.011 (0.009) Constant 0.404*** (0.127) Regional dummies Yes Observations 616 R-squared 0.135 Note: this regression is based on data from the second wave of the survey. Intention to return to native country is measured by a dummy variable the takes the value one if the respondent is planning to go back to the country of origin for good, and zero otherwise. Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.00 33 Online Appendix Table A1: Descriptive statistics. Variable Non-Muslim Muslim P value Integration items: Excellent opportunities for foreigners 3.11 3.04 0.318 No hostility against foreigners 3.45 3.21 0.000 Rights of foreigners are respected 3.36 3.25 0.062 Netherlands is hospitable to foreigners 3.45 3.07 0.000 People in the Netherlands are not indifferent to migrants 3.03 2.92 0.038 In the Netherlands fair treatment to foreigners 3.28 3.10 0.002 In the Netherlands foreigners are not restricted 3.21 2.68 0.000 The Netherlands is open to the foreign cultures 3.62 3.51 0.050 Feeling at ease with Dutch natives 3.51 3.14 0.000 Appreciation of living in the Netherlands 3.89 3.72 0.000 Demographic variables: Female 0.56 0.46 0.001 Age 42.66 42.24 0.585 Education (6 levels) 3.12 2.10 0.000 Education abroad 0.84 0.73 0.000 Education in the Netherlands 0.70 0.34 0.000 Born in the Netherlands 0.08 0.06 0.273 Length of stay in the Netherlands 22.22 21.32 0.145 Employment status: Employed 0.63 0.46 0.000 Unemployed 0.08 0.11 0.163 Housewife 0.09 0.20 0.000 Disabled 0.08 0.14 0.001 Student 0.06 0.03 0.027 Retired 0.07 0.07 0.971 Ethnic minority: Turkish 0.01 0.58 0.000 Moroccan 0.00 0.33 0.000 Surinamese 0.42 0.07 0.000 Dutch Antilleans 0.57 0.03 0.000 Share of ethnic group in municipality (geographic concentration) 0.04 0.05 0.000 Marital status: Never married 0.42 0.08 0.000 Married 0.30 0.77 0.000 Divorced 0.25 0.12 0.000 Widowed 0.04 0.03 0.844 Number of children 2.01 2.66 0.000 34 Table A2: Difference in difference estimates of integration items before and after the terrorist attacks. Variables Non-Muslims Muslims Diff in diff Before After Before After N=309 N=300 N=160 N=316 (1) Excellent opportunities for foreigners 3.24 2.98 3.60 2.76 -0.58*** (1.08) (1.16) (1.09) (1.18) (2) No hostility against foreigners 3.56 3.34 3.43 3.11 -0.1 (0.81) (0.97) (0.96) (0.94) (3) Rights of foreigners are respected 3.45 3.28 3.46 3.15 -0.14 (0.84) (0.98) (0.92) (1.06) (4) NL is hospitable to foreigners 3.59 3.31 3.36 2.93 -0.15 (0.91) (1.03) (0.94) (1.08) (5) People in NL are not indifferent to migrants 2.98 3.08 2.98 2.89 -0.19 (0.90) (0.90) (1.01) (0.91) (6) In NL fair treatment to foreigners 3.36 3.19 3.45 2.92 -0.37*** (0.88) (0.90) (0.86) (0.98) (7) In NL foreigners are not restricted 3.29 3.13 2.78 2.64 0.03 (0.97) (0.99) (1.07) (1.04) (8) The NL is open to the foreign cultures 3.67 3.57 3.76 3.38 -0.28** (0.85) (0.93) (0.82) (1.03) (9) Feeling at ease with Dutch natives 3.52 3.51 3.32 3.06 -0.25*** (0.60) (0.65) (0.72) (0.80) (10) Appreciation of living in the Netherlands 3.90 3.88 3.89 3.63 -0.23** (0.75) (0.72) (0.79) (0.93) Note: Diff in diff= (Muslim after - Muslim before) - (non-Muslim after – non-Muslim before). NL= the Netherlands. Standard deviations in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 35 Table A3: Probit estimations for selection bias. (1) VARIABLES Participates in the two waves Above-median missing answers -0.883*** (0.085) Muslim -0.156 (0.103) Unemployed -0.461*** (0.150) Housewife -0.083 (0.141) Disabled -0.015 (0.144) Student -0.464** (0.219) Retired -0.027 (0.190) Female -0.118 (0.092) Born in NL -0.005 (0.190) Married -0.311** (0.123) Divorced -0.106 (0.134) Widowed 0.273 (0.253) Number of children 0.062** (0.027) Length of stay in NL 0.021 (0.014) Length of stay in NL squared -0.039 (0.030) Educated 0.032 (0.027) Educated in NL -0.085 (0.107) Educated abroad -0.019 (0.117) Geographic concentration -0.021 (0.014) Observations 1,085 Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 36 Table A4: Change in the integration of Muslim and non-Muslim immigrants after terrorist attacks controlling for selection. Perceived integration (1) (2) VARIABLES RE FE Muslim 0.158 (0.101) Post-attacks -0.183*** -0.309*** (0.070) (0.085) Muslim *Post-attacks -0.338*** -0.363** (0.116) (0.145) Above-median missing answers -0.091 (0.062) Muslim *Above-median missing answers 0.027 (0.110) Post- attacks *Above-median missing answers 0.053 0.064 (0.093) (0.120) Muslim *Post-attacks*Above-median missing answers 0.098 0.098 (0.154) (0.221) Constant -0.186 0.404 (0.147) (0.389) Controls Yes Yes Observations 1,085 1,085 Number of individuals 869 869 Note: See Table 1. Above-median missing answers is a dummy variable that takes the value one if the number of questions left unanswered in the first wave is above the median, and zero otherwise. Controls include gender, employment status, education, marital status, number of children a dummy for being born in the Netherlands, having had education in the Netherlands, length of stay in the Netherlands, and length of stay squares, share of migrants with the same ethnic background in the municipality, dummy for municipalities, and ethnic minority. Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 37 Table A5: OLS estimates of trends in perceived integration before and after the attacks. Perceived integration (1) (2) VARIABLES Before After Muslim -0.223 0.861*** (0.214) (0.260) Time of interview (in quarters) -0.039 0.218*** (0.040) (0.046) Muslim* Time of interview (in quarters) 0.098 -0.251*** (0.061) (0.061) Constant 0.186 -1.501*** (0.255) (0.272) Controls Yes Yes Observations 448 599 R-squared 0.175 0.293 Note: Time of interview is measured in year quarters. The number of observations is slightly smaller as for 38 interviews we have no information on the timing. Controls include gender, employment status, education, marital status, ethnic group, number of children, a dummy for being born in the Netherlands, a dummy for having had education in the Netherlands, length of stay in the Netherlands, length of stay squared, share of migrants with the same ethnic background in the municipality, and regional dummies. Standard errors in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 38 Table A6: Change in the Integration of Muslim and non-Muslim immigrants after terrorist attacks. Heterogeneity by gender, age, education, labour market status, language proficiency, and religiosity (balanced sample) Perceived integration RE FE VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) A) Gender Men Women Men Women Muslim* Post-attacks -0.312* -0.302 -0.336** -0.261 (0.170) (0.186) (0.158) (0.178) Observations 214 218 214 218 Number of Individuals 107 109 107 109 B) Age Below 40 Above 40 Below 40 Above 40 Muslim* Post-attacks -0.360* -0.242 -0.343* -0.118 (0.188) (0.169) (0.185) (0.170) Observations 167 264 167 264 Number of Individuals 93 142 93 142 C) Education High Low High Low Muslim* Post-attacks -0.659*** -0.065 -0.697*** -0.144 (0.169) (0.155) (0.166) (0.156) Observations 202 230 202 230 Number of Individuals 101 115 101 115 D) Labour market status Employed Unemployed Employed Unemployed Muslim* Post-attacks -0.437*** -0.112 -0.433*** -0.026 (0.139) (0.195) (0.138) (0.167) Observations 256 176 256 176 Number of Individuals 128 88 128 88 E) Language proficiency Proficient Non-proficient Proficient Non-proficient Muslim* Post-attacks -0.415*** -0.291 -0.428*** 0.027 (0.113) (0.430) (0.116) (0.634) Observations 354 74 354 74 Number of Individuals 177 37 177 37 F) Religiosity Less religious More religious Less religious More religious Post-attacks -1.119*** -0.408*** -1.058*** -0.408*** (0.333) (0.117) (0.260) (0.117) Observations 42 110 42 110 Number of individuals 21 55 21 55 Note: See Table 3. Controls as in Table 3 in addition to inverse Mill‟s ratio. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 39 Table A7: Change in unemployment, working hours, and geographic concentration after the terrorist attacks. Heterogeneity by gender, age, and education, FE estimates. Variables Gender Age Education Male Female < 40 age >= 40 age Low educ. High educ. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Unemployment Muslim*Post-attacks 0.095 -0.048 0.033 0.047 0.153* 0.018 (0.065) (0.059) (0.061) (0.069) (0.083) (0.049) Observations 527 558 524 557 481 429 Number of individuals 423 450 448 442 366 328 Working hours Muslim*Post-attacks -1.263 -3.561 -2.123 -0.010 -1.721 -1.117 (1.884) (2.193) (3.302) (1.799) (1.953) (2.147) Observations 344 236 306 272 227 271 Number of individuals 277 194 265 223 178 210 Geographic concentration Muslim*Post-attacks 0.003* 0.003*** 0.001 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.001 (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) Observations 527 558 524 557 481 429 Number of individuals 423 450 448 442 366 328 Note: See Table 4. Controls as in Table 4. Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.00 
work_uk5xh2sfefcwngybazgsawqfoi	----	societies Article The Vulnerable Subject Stuart Waiton School of Business, Law and Social Sciences, Abertay University, Dundee DD1 1HG, UK; s.waiton@abertay.ac.uk Received: 13 August 2019; Accepted: 9 September 2019; Published: 17 September 2019 ���������� ������� Abstract: Academic freedom is formally supported but often challenged, through activities like no-platforming and through a sentiment of sensitivity and an understanding that ideas can be harmful. This development is discussed here as a reflection of the rise of the ‘vulnerable subject.’ This paper demonstrates the growing importance of vulnerability as the central human characteristic in (post) modern times and with reference to law and justice practices explains the ‘collapse of the harm principle.’ Developed through Frank Furedi’s theory of diminished subjectivity we will demonstrate the extent to which the vulnerable subject has been institutionalised and adopted as a new (fragmented) norm. Within the framework of diminished subjectivity, the inner logic of vulnerability has a spiralling dynamic—once adopted as a norm, the vulnerable subject’s answer to the question ‘vulnerable to what?’ constantly expands, drawing in ever more areas of life, behaviour, relationships as well as words and ideas into a regulatory framework. Concerns about overcriminalisation are understood here to be a product of this vulnerable subject, something that cannot be resolved at the level of law but must relate to the wider cultural and political sense of human progress and a defence of the robust liberal subject in society. Keywords: criminalisation; harm; law; criminal justice; freedom; risk; abuse; liberal; victim; vulnerability 1. Introduction Concerns about academic freedom and free speech on campus have resulted in reactions from the British government and from Barack Obama in the United States. There is talk of a ‘snowflake generation’ and growing questions about the apparent need for safe spaces or the need for university practices to incorporate an awareness of microaggression [1]. There are also calls from academics to be supported in areas of research regarding controversial topics like transgender rights [2]. Outside of universities, in both the UK and US there are similar concerns being raised about issues like hate crime and the potentially censorious developments within law and policing practices that limit speech and to some extent thought [3]. Critical responses to these developments relate, at times and at a ‘populist’ level, to the idea of ‘political correctness gone mad’ and there is a concern about identity-based activists enforcing their will on society and undermining once liberal institutions [4]. More generally and perhaps more usefully there have been discussions about what Tana Dineen has called the Manufacture of Victims, that help to situate these developments in a broader context, albeit, with a preponderance to once again see a different will at fault, that of psychologists or of what the psychology industry is doing to people, as Dineen’s subtitle asserts [5]. While at times useful and relevant, these critical voices tend to give too much weight to the role of activism and willing actors in creating a climate of regulation and limits. Aggressive victimhood is a reality but behind it lies the more difficult and fundamental problem not of the wrongheaded willing actor but the loss of will itself, something that is explained most usefully through the idea of diminished subjectivity [6] and what we will call the vulnerable subject. In this Baudrillardian [7] Societies 2019, 9, 66; doi:10.3390/soc9030066 www.mdpi.com/journal/societies http://www.mdpi.com/journal/societies http://www.mdpi.com http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/soc9030066 http://www.mdpi.com/journal/societies https://www.mdpi.com/2075-4698/9/3/66?type=check_update&version=2 Societies 2019, 9, 66 2 of 17 meets Bauman [8] nightmare, we find the black hole of the silent majority (or the loss of a public) meets the pilotless aeroplane (or the loss of a meaningful elite) in a perfect subjectless storm. The focus on identity politics can be useful but also misses the universal aspect of the vulnerable subject. Vulnerability is not only associated with the caricatured ‘vulnerable groups’ but has become a framework for the state and institutions to connect with the public in general. The aim of this paper is to examine the emergence and centrality of vulnerability as a core human characteristic in general and to unpick more specifically the emerging significance of vulnerability within the field of law and in criminal justice practices. We do this, firstly through an examination of the growing use of the term ‘vulnerability’ itself, in books. Then through a study of various areas and organisations where the term vulnerable, vulnerability and vulnerable groups, is used. And within this we focus on law and criminal justice organisations. Theories related to the idea of a culture of limits and the growth of risk management are adopted to make sense of these developments, with the idea of diminished subjectivity being central to how we interpret the growth of the idea of vulnerability as an essential human condition in the later part of the twentieth century and into the new millennium. There is a struggle within law between the historically robust legal subject and the new, fragile vulnerable subject that appears to be replacing it—a subject that has the tendency to accelerate the criminalizing process and to potentially undermine justice. Within legal theory itself there is a clear sense that aspects of justice are being warped or lost, in part because of the drive towards ever further criminalisation. There is also a sense of confusion about how to explain this development. Here we suggest that this can be best understood through the idea of the vulnerable subject, a fragile subject that, once incorporated into criminal justice processes, helps to undermine the classical liberal idea of the legal and crucially, robust, human subject. This confusion in legal theory is in part explained by the semi-conscious (rather than ideologically driven) transformation, over time, of many liberal categories that has resulted in not only their loss of meaning but in many categories coming to mean the opposite of what they once did. Talk of tolerance comes from the same people arguing for zero-tolerance policies, while the promotion of freedom becomes associated with the idea of freedom from fear or in other words with policing and the regulation of other people. Perhaps the most insightful legal theorist, Peter Ramsay, in his book The Insecurity State, has defined the modern legal framework as one predicated upon the idea of ‘vulnerable autonomy’ [9]. The prior and dominant term being that of vulnerability, something that in practice undermines the very essence of individual autonomy. His subtitle, Vulnerable Autonomy and the Right to Security in the Criminal Law, hints at another modern transformation in liberal categories, that of rights, a shift that sees rights increasingly developed by institutions as a form of protections rather than as the basis for individual freedom. 2. The Vulnerable Person Vulnerable: Adjective: exposed to the possibility of being attacked or harmed, either physically or emotionally. Synonyms: in danger, in peril, in jeopardy, at risk, endangered, unsafe, unprotected, ill protected, unguarded. In 2017, the BBC reported on a little known police database in Scotland that was breaching data protection laws. The Vulnerable Person Database or VPD had been set up in 2013 to provide a ‘holistic’ approach to adult and child protection and wellbeing. Within four years one in 13 Scots was on the list. Many on the list do not know they are on it or know that they have been defined as vulnerable. One such individual, John Naples-Campbell, despite having reported suffering ‘homophobic abuse’ shouted at him was ‘shocked’ to find that he was on the list, explaining to the BBC that, ‘I don’t see myself as a vulnerable person’ [10]. The database was set up in anticipation of the Child and Young Person Scotland Act 2014 that controversially included the creation of a ‘Named Person,’ what some called a ‘state guardian’ for Societies 2019, 9, 66 3 of 17 every child in Scotland. Under the Named Person scheme every child would have a state named individual to oversee their ‘wellbeing’ from birth (or before birth through the use of health visitors as the initially designated Named Person). The Named Person scheme has also been found guilty of breaching data protection laws by the UK Supreme Court and is currently being revised. Asked about the VPD, Detective Chief Inspector Conway explained that Police Scotland were acting legally in terms of their core purpose, of ‘improving safety and wellbeing.’ Legal expert, Professor Jim Murdoch, likewise explained to the BBC that it was a very positive sign because public authorities have a duty to protect the vulnerable. Who ‘the vulnerable’ are however is unclear. For Police Scotland, at least, the numbers of vulnerable Scots has been growing year on year. 3. The Rise and Rise of Vulnerability Using Google Ngrams (a search through Google looking at books from 1800 to 2000) we find that the use of the term ‘vulnerable’ remained fairly constant from 1800 until 1929 when it started to increase. The use of the term in books accelerated from the late 1960s and continues to rise1. It is worth noting that Google Ngrams is both useful and potentially problematic because simply through the use of the graphs that show frequency of word use, like the word ‘vulnerable,’ you get no sense of how these words are being used or what they relate to without studying the actual texts from which they came. It is possible for example that the use of the term vulnerable relates to something completely unrelated to what is being discussed here. Hopefully, further examples and evidence in the paper strongly suggests this is not the case. In this respect Ngrams is heavily interpretive and needs further work and different methods of analysis and understanding to be of use. This said, clear trends can be seen in the terms analysed below, with very similar patterns of word usage and growth of usage suggesting a clear and growing significance in the idea of human vulnerability. Looking at the term ‘vulnerable communities’ we find it is first used (within this data source) in an American research monograph discussing depressed areas in The Plantation South in 1935. However, this term was rarely used until 1970 when there was an exponential increase up to 1990 when we see a further accelerated use of the term (NB in 2015 Google had scanned 25 million books having estimated in 2010 that there were 130 million books worldwide). Between 1970 and the year 2000 there had been a 30 fold increase in the use of the term ‘vulnerable communities.’ See Figure 1. Searching the term ‘vulnerable groups’ (above) we find the odd use of the term but the first recorded document is in a journal, the National Negro Health News published by the Federal Security Agency U.S. Public Health Service in 1942 used for ‘guidance in planning and conducting the community health program’ [11]. In particular the term ‘vulnerable groups’ (with the accompanying speech marks) related to the need to improve the food supply for key sections of the black population, specifically ‘pregnant women, infants, school children (especially adolescents) workers in heavy industries and the poor, particularly those with large families.’ Again, the term was rarely used until the 1960s when it increased slightly, accelerating from 1970 and then again in the late 1980s. To give a sense of the increase of books that use the term ‘vulnerable groups,’ there were 136 times more uses of the term in Google books in 2000 as there was in 1960. 1 Google Ngrams is a database developed from a collection of books between 1500 and 2000 that allows a search for names or terms within these books. The calculation takes into account the volume of books at any one time so as to provide a map of the relative use of terms over time. Only when there are at least 40 books using the term in any one year does it appear in the graph. Note that Ngrams has been criticised for its lack of accuracy, in part due to its use of optical character recognition that can produce reading errors. Some of the books in Google Ngrams can be accessed via an Ngrams search, allowing for the texts themselves to be studied, thus allowing these terms to be situated and analysed in the context within which they were written. More than one term can be searched within the same graph, allowing a comparison between the use of terms and to demonstrate similarities in usage. For example, a search for vulnerable children and self esteem shows the greater use of the latter term but a very similar, indeed almost identical graph shape. For a discussion of the use of Ngrams as a research tool see https://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/5567/5535 (accessed on 29 August 2019). https://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/5567/5535 Societies 2019, 9, 66 4 of 17Societies 2019, 9, x FOR PEER REVIEW 4 of 18 Figure 1. Vulnerable Groups. Searching the term ‘vulnerable groups’ (above) we find the odd use of the term but the first recorded document is in a journal, the National Negro Health News published by the Federal Security Agency U.S. Public Health Service in 1942 used for ‘guidance in planning and conducting the community health program’ [11]. In particular the term ‘vulnerable groups’ (with the accompanying speech marks) related to the need to improve the food supply for key sections of the black population, specifically ‘pregnant women, infants, school children (especially adolescents) workers in heavy industries and the poor, particularly those with large families.’ Again, the term was rarely used until the 1960s when it increased slightly, accelerating from 1970 and then again in the late 1980s. To give a sense of the increase of books that use the term ‘vulnerable groups,’ there were 136 times more uses of the term in Google books in 2000 as there was in 1960. Based on these findings we can argue that the term ‘vulnerable’ is used far more today than at any other time in the last 200 years. The use of the term was constant throughout the nineteenth century and into the 1920s. We use the term thirteen times more than we did then. Until the 1930s and only very infrequently was the term used with reference to a particular group or community. From the 1970s this began to change and today a vast array of groups are labelled as being vulnerable simply by being part of a certain defined group. The idea of vulnerability is now used in relation to more issues and experiences, it has also become used to define or label, certain sections of society, in particular those sections of society that are understood to have suffered political oppression or other forms of inequality, as well as other groups who are incorporated into this politicised category, like the disabled [12]. More generally, studying the use of the term in these books and in other documents, policies and best practice guides we find that children, for example, have become discussed, relatively unquestioningly as vulnerable, as have the elderly, as have students. The term has historically related to economic conditions and ill-health and to environmental issues. Increasingly, as we will demonstrate, it relates to mental health matters, to abuse and to our fragility in relation to other people. Looking at the issue of poverty, it is noticeable that only specific sections of the poor were originally identified as being part of a vulnerable group, only certain black people who were poor but for example who were also part of a particular population in America and who were also part of a ‘large family.’ Today in comparison, living in poverty itself is assumed to mean you are vulnerable, where, for example in the discussion about vulnerable children we find this definition of poverty and vulnerability refers not to absolute poverty or food poverty, but, in the case of the UK Department of Health approach, four million vulnerable children are so labelled because they live in families with less than half the average household income [13]. Again, the question can be raised about the extent to which these individuals and families would consider Figure 1. Vulnerable Groups. Based on these findings we can argue that the term ‘vulnerable’ is used far more today than at any other time in the last 200 years. The use of the term was constant throughout the nineteenth century and into the 1920s. We use the term thirteen times more than we did then. Until the 1930s and only very infrequently was the term used with reference to a particular group or community. From the 1970s this began to change and today a vast array of groups are labelled as being vulnerable simply by being part of a certain defined group. The idea of vulnerability is now used in relation to more issues and experiences, it has also become used to define or label certain sections of society, in particular those sections of society that are understood to have suffered political oppression or other forms of inequality, as well as other groups who are incorporated into this politicised category, like the disabled [12]. More generally, studying the use of the term in these books and in other documents, policies and best practice guides we find that children, for example, have become discussed, relatively unquestioningly as vulnerable, as have the elderly, as have students. The term has historically related to economic conditions and ill-health and to environmental issues. Increasingly, as we will demonstrate, it relates to mental health matters, to abuse and to our fragility in relation to other people. Looking at the issue of poverty, it is noticeable that only specific sections of the poor were originally identified as being part of a vulnerable group, only certain black people who were poor but for example who were also part of a particular population in America and who were also part of a ‘large family.’ Today in comparison, living in poverty itself is assumed to mean you are vulnerable, where, for example in the discussion about vulnerable children we find this definition of poverty and vulnerability refers not to absolute poverty or food poverty, but, in the case of the UK Department of Health approach, four million vulnerable children are so labelled because they live in families with less than half the average household income [13]. Again, the question can be raised about the extent to which these individuals and families would consider themselves to be vulnerable that is, at risk, in jeopardy and so forth. And the extent to which vulnerability has become a label given to individuals and groups. 4. Institutionalising Vulnerability Demonstrating a growing interest and concern about the vulnerable, in the UK, we also see an increasing use of the terms vulnerable and vulnerable groups in the development of policy. For example, the Housing Act 1996 (Section 218A), the ‘vulnerable victim’ is defined as someone who experiences repeat victimisation from other people, like antisocial behaviour. The Metropolitan Police Service have developed a Vulnerability Assessment Framework which explains that vulnerability can Societies 2019, 9, 66 5 of 17 relate to vulnerable victims, witnesses, suspects or members of the public. The Safeguarding Vulnerable Groups Act was passed in 2006 and helped to further develop a criminal records check and database to assess people working with or volunteering to work with children and ‘vulnerable adults.’ Noticeably, criminal record checks had already been established to protect children (a designated vulnerable group themselves) and between 2002 and 2006 the number of people being checked had doubled and stood at ten million [14]. We also find ‘vulnerability’, in the government’s anti-terrorist Prevent Strategy, that impacts on many institutions, including universities who must be watchful regarding student extremism. Here, vulnerability is understood in terms of people who may adopt or be influenced by certain ideas [15]; rather than making subjective decisions themselves, they are being ‘radicalised.’ The Clergy have their own policy regarding vulnerability spelled out in their Safeguarding and Clergy Discipline Measure 2016. The Solicitors Regulatory Authority has guidance notes on ‘how to identify people who may be vulnerable’ and the ‘benefits of considering vulnerability’ helping those in the trade to become aware of the significance of vulnerability. Here we find the vulnerable include those on low incomes, who have a low level of literacy or have certain life experiences, like sufferings a bereavement [16]. At the level of international policies and practices the United Nations has a variety of documents, policies and practices explaining the importance of engaging with and supporting vulnerable groups and populations [17]. The Human Rights Act, an international convention to protect human rights that was incorporated into UK law in 1998 is also associated with the issue of vulnerability and the protection of the vulnerable. In their pamphlet on Eight reasons why the Human Rights Act makes the UK a better place, Amnesty International explained (point 2) that this act is ‘Protecting us at our most vulnerable.’ Points 3 and 4 discussed the protection of women from domestic violence and ‘making it safer to be gay’ [18]. Looking at the university sector we find that universities have a variety of policies regarding vulnerable students often based within ‘Student Wellbeing,’ with vulnerability relating to ‘academic, personal or practical issues.’ Some have their own email system for example, vulnerable-students@contacts.bham.ac.uk. The National Union of Students have a number of reports and initiatives that discuss vulnerability in a variety of contexts, including religious beliefs, crime, gambling, a living wage campaign, housing, fishing policies (that talks about vulnerable fish), drugs and educational funding. The report looking at the experience of students with faith and beliefs is called the Isolation and Vulnerability Report. Within the report we find 30 mentions of the term ‘vulnerable’ and 57 uses of the term ‘vulnerability.’ The opening paragraph of the report explains that, ‘This research presents the findings of a nationwide survey on students’ experiences of isolation and vulnerability, with a particular focus on how students of faith and belief experience instances of isolation or vulnerability on campus’ [19]. In 2018, the National Union of Students (NUS) announced a partnership with Gamban—an app that helps users block access to online gambling. Here the claim was made that one-in-eight undergraduates had missed lectures or seminars because of gambling. The report explained that, ‘Many of these students are amongst the most vulnerable—and gambling addiction can be both a cause of and trigger for further mental health issues’ [20]. More action was ‘desperately’ needed to protect students from betting companies who were ‘preying on student vulnerabilities.’ The meaning of vulnerability is often taken for granted rather than defined and the term appears to come with a moral dimension that demands action and support. Different organisations—health, social care, the police and so on, use the term in differing ways, with for example social care relating more to poverty compared to the police and their focus upon victims of crime. However, even within this context, how the police think about crime has been altered by their wider adoption of the idea of vulnerability and vulnerable groups. While within social care and services the idea of poverty, a once stand-alone issue, has itself become a vulnerability label, with another vulnerable group—the poor—being constructed around this more therapeutic understanding of the fragile self. In this respect Societies 2019, 9, 66 6 of 17 all of these organisations are helping to transform the way issues and individuals are understood and treated. This list of just a fraction of the discussions and policies related to vulnerable people and groups gives a flavour of the vast numbers of people and array of organisations engaging with the vulnerable. Understanding or being aware of vulnerability has become a form of good practice. For some organisations like the NUS, vulnerability appears to be something of a starting point when relating to and developing services for students or initiating campaigns. For the police, engaging with the wellbeing of vulnerable people has become a ‘core’ purpose. At a number of levels and within a number of institutions being aware of the vulnerable and developing practices to engage with the vulnerable subject has become their raison d’être. Issues of safety, safeguarding, protection and prevention and the support necessarily implied through the label of vulnerability gives a regulatory dimension to many of these practices and issues. To be aware, to engage with and to protect the vulnerable is to be good. 5. A Theory of the Vulnerable Subject The rise of vulnerability as a framework for understanding the nature of people can best be understood through the idea of diminished subjectivity. This concept, initially developed by sociologist Frank Furedi, carries two interconnected ideas—that of the diminished elite and of the diminished individual subject [6]. Related to both are discussions that developed in earlier decades of the twentieth century but came to fruition in the 1990s, discussions about the end or death of class, of politics, of left and right, of culture and of big ideas or metanarratives. Condensing these discussions, Furedi discussed the ‘loss of meaning,’ amongst the elite and indeed throughout Western society and its various institutions [21]. By the 1990s, socialism was ‘dead’ but as James Heartfield noted, without the left to oppose, the right appeared to implode [22], and, for Jacoby, this also meant that liberalism lost its backbone [23]. The confusion for many was the presumption that the end of the Cold War internationally and of the labour movement in the UK, there would be an inevitable rise of (Thatcherite) individualism. The reality, however, was far more dialectical and the collapse of a collective sentiment, organisations and interests (on both left and right) did not result in a confident sense of individualism and individual autonomy. As social beings, it turned out that the robust liberal individual was built upon a collective sense of meaning and existence. To his surprise and confusion, the modern day Robinson Crusoe, without a sense of nation, religion, class or human progress, soon found himself on the therapist’s couch [24]. Choosing his categories very carefully, Furedi argued that Western society had become individuated rather than individualised. Socialism was dead but liberal individualism was dying. The categories that helped to explain, inspire and frame much of life since the Enlightenment were being transformed, one of these was the very idea of the human subject—a subject that by 2018 would need a Gamban mobile app to help it not to gamble and miss lectures. This was a subject more prone to be done to than to be a doer—a subject at risk, rather than one that took risks—the vulnerable subject. 6. The Diminishing Subject At a certain, practical level, for almost two hundred years, the idea of the robust subject was taken for granted. The competence and capacity of the individual was and to a large extent still is the basis of modern living. Without the adherence to contracts - of work, education, marriage, sales, legal and so on, the world would come to a standstill [22]. David Garland’s first book discussing the nature of English prison life in the nineteenth century, illustrates well the classical expectation of the individual subject to accept their punishment rather than being reformed by others [25]. Despite the harshness this could entail there was a respect for THE individual, the rational ‘man’ who made choices and could live with the consequences. This was John Stuart Mill’s responsible person, responsible not in that all their actions were good ones but that when they were not they knew that they were responsible for them—there was no need for a Gamban app—indeed the very idea of one would be Societies 2019, 9, 66 7 of 17 seen as a degradation of what was the key to liberal society, your sense of personal capacity—your subjectivity [26]. Fast forward to the twentieth century and we find a beginning of the crisis of subjectivity in the discussion of ‘the crisis of man.’ “In the middle decades of the twentieth century, American intellectuals of manifold types, from disparate and even hostile groups, converged on a perception of danger. The world had entered a new crisis by 1933, the implications of which would echo for nearly three decades to follow—not just the crisis of the liberal state or capitalist economy generally and not only the imminent paroxysm of the political world system in world war. The threat was now to “man.” “Man” was in “crisis””. [27] As yet, something only embodied within a section of the intelligentsia, there was an intertwining collapsing sense of human progress, of Western civilization—a sense of the ‘end of history’ and ultimately with the very idea of individual human capacity. The promises and excitement of a rational, dynamic, heavenly world that was made by and helped to make the liberal subject, were being dashed on collapsing economies, class conflict, with war and with a loss of meaning, discussed in the work of Emile Durkheim and especially Max Weber. Mark Greif’s book about this crisis is focused upon literature and literary critics of the twentieth century. One such critic, Lionel Trilling summed up this sense of crisis in his discussion about the death of the novel. Unclear as to what had caused this apparent death, Trilling surmised that past writers like Shakespeare and Swift had often written about the depravity of human beings. But within a cultural climate that sensed a positive progression in society, these writings ‘could never prove their case against man’ and indeed, the very act of writing such magnificent works of fiction they actually enhanced this sense of human beauty and progress [27] (p. 106). For Trilling, the novel was of such importance because, as he argued, ‘the novel . . . has been, of all literary forms, the most devoted to the celebration and investigation of the human will,’ this will he believed was dying [27] (p. 106). The challenge laid down by Trilling, to rediscover America and the human subject, inspired the likes of Ernest Hemmingway to write his great novel Old Man and the Sea in 1952. Written as an attempt to rediscover or save the human subject, Hemmingway does a remarkable job in portraying the beauty of man in his struggle with a giant fish, but, Greif notes, he is only able to do this by stripping man from society, by portraying the man of maximum isolation—a Robinson Crusoe - in a basic struggle with nature. In many respects, Greif observes, this was not even the man of the mind but man as body [27] (p. 125). (Much as Mel Gibbon’s controversial attempt to celebrate the passion of the Christ, was drowned in the physicality rather than spirituality of Jesus’ death). Hemmingway’s attempt to rescue man was a brave one but in this tale of man against nature, Greif rightly notes, ‘this leaves the question of the rest of the world,’ of society, of ‘civilisation’ [27] (p. 125). At the end of the novel, Hemmingway generates a Christian allegory, as the man struggles to shore with his cross-like mast draped over his shoulders. Rather than man, it turns out, we had to turn once again to God for salvation. 7. The ‘Death’ of the Subject Fast forward again, this time to the early twenty first century and we find French philosopher Jean Baudrillard discussing The Spirit of Terrorism in which, in his usually abstract way, he explains that with 9/11, the terrorists did it, ‘but we wished for it’ [28]. In part, Baudrillard is explaining or perhaps expressing a more pervasive sense of Western self-loathing, one that the ‘Lost Generation’ of intellectuals had earlier grappled with. The crisis of ‘man’ had gone mainstream. For Furedi and writers like Christopher Lasch, Zaki Laïdi and István Mészáros, the Cold War is understood to have been the fragile ever crumbling foundation that kept liberalism on a life support system—the ‘free world’ appearing to have some sense of credibility and meaning in comparison Societies 2019, 9, 66 8 of 17 to what Ronald Reagan called the ‘evil empire.’ Once gone, however, the ‘West’ had to stand on its own two feet and soon found that the sins of the father were not only exposed but were all that could be seen. The ‘fiction’ of the rational, progressive, robust human subject, something that as Heartfield notes had developed in the critical writings of Michel Foucault and others, was all that could be seen—the liberal subject, the active ‘man,’ the robust individual, was the author of the Holocaust; the collective/class subject the creator of the gulags. More particularly, as Heartfield observed, the end of the cold war brought an end to the politics of left and right and to politics with meaning and substance. With no big ideas in politics we ended up with what he calls a process without a subject—a form of politics based on nothing more than the visionless management of the present—a kind of politics as HR—with little or no connection to a collective public or wider ideological basis of meaning and purpose. Politics no longer reflected the collective will of different sections of society but became a process expressed most clearly by its lack of an ‘ism’ and the empty numerical definition of the ‘third way’ [22] (p. 180). Interconnected with the ‘death’ of politics and what Philip Reiff called the impoverishment of Western culture was the crisis of ‘man’ in terms of both humanity and also the individual human subject [29]. Alongside the diminished collective will we find, not the individualised robust individual but the individuated vulnerable subject. A diminished, degraded and damaged subject that was constructed over time helped by a new type of activism and anti-Enlightenment intellectualism. Since the 1970s, Joel Best argues, American society has adopted a particular form of campaigning, specifically related to and developed through the idea of the victim [30]. All sides of politics he notes began to adopt this approach as a way to frame a winning argument—victims of crime being drawn against victims of welfare cuts, for example. Feminist ideas were seminal in this respect but were not alone in the new representation of groups as victims. From the perspective of diminished subjectivity, the victim is the logical creation of a society that is losing a positive sense of both collective and individual capacity. As politics and indeed society lose their relationship with an active public, society is itself increasingly experienced as something out there, not of our making, something that is being done to us not made by us. This operates at both an elite and individual level, developed through an elite that lacks ideas or a sense of direction, with a mass of people, a ‘silent majority’ [7] who fragment, becoming individuated and relatively powerless to forces in society they no longer understand. Studying the moral panic around ‘senseless violence’ in the Netherlands, in 2008, Willem Schinkel astutely observed that in cases of serious violence it has become rare for the perpetrator to become known, rather, it was the victim that captured the imagination. Rather than society cohering, developing a collective sense of us and them around a ‘folk devil,’ it was now simply left with a scar, a sense of meaninglessness, a story of victimhood and yet another example of being ‘done to’ [31]. It was the vulnerable subject that now engaged the public sensibility. Defining the period in the 1990s, Furedi called it the Culture of Fear. This was a culture, he argued that had a diminished sense of capacity, consequently, the energies of society rather than being used to change the world or to defend past gains were increasingly directed at ensuring everything is safe [6]—society was hunkering down. The anxious, directionless elite, unable to project into the future, engaged with the public sense of atomic fragility and a new form of governing developed attempting to do little more than ‘prevent harm.’ With few, if any, clear absolutes that could cohere society, safety became the new absolute, a prefix for everything from sex to play that meant it was good. In these anxious times, ideas, institutions and norms began to change, no longer predicated upon the assumption of the robust liberal subject but of the vulnerable diminished subject—one that needed to be protected from an ever growing array of experiences. A consciousness of risk developed, predicated in part on a loss of public trust but driven by an elite self-loathing and abandonment of Enlightenment ideals. Almost everything, Furedi argues, became interpreted through a framework of risk management, while relationships and interactions were newly seen through the prism of abuse [6]. Societies 2019, 9, 66 9 of 17 8. The Growth of Abuse “Abuse is a moralised concept that represents the functional equivalent of sin. The association of abuse with victimisation emerged as an idea in the 1970s and became a defining dimension of human experienced in the 1980s. Since that time abuse has become normalised to the point that it serves as the cultural exemplar of evil. The narrative of abuse has facilitated the formation of an ideology of evil through which a variety of problems are given meaning.” [32] Written in an easily accessible style, Furedi’s Culture of Fear is nevertheless vast in scope and follows the tradition of Christopher Lasch, who in his Culture of Narcissism: American Life in an Age of Diminished Expectations presented a similar picture of what he called a survivalist mentality [33]. For us, the usefulness of Furedi’s work in particular is the examination of ‘victimhood’ as a new identity and of the connected and growing concern with ‘abuse.’ For Furedi, a growing sense of and understanding of ‘risk’ developed in the 1980s often with reference to the environment [34] (in the ‘outside’ world) and was replicated by the growing preoccupation with ‘abuse’ or the ‘defilement’ of the individual (the inner world) [6] (p. 73). Abuse, in many respects, is the natural bedfellow of the vulnerable subject and, Furedi argues, it was normalised in the 1980s—the human (like the planet) as damaged goods—the human both degraded and degrading. Here we find a growing number of experiences explained through the idea of abuse, reflecting not the growth of harm but rather expressing the outlook of the new vulnerable subject. The abuse idea was helped by the focus upon it, from academics, policy makers and institutions, who discovered growing abuse or new forms of it. Using Ngrams, we find, for example, the term ‘homophobic abuse’ barely existed until 1979 when the use of the term rose exponentially. Clearly violence and ill treatment of gay people existed and arguably existed far more before this date but the idea of this ill-treatment being framed through or in terms of ‘abuse’ was yet to develop2. Similar findings can be found with the term ‘domestic abuse’ and also ‘elder abuse’ the use of which rises exponentially from the late 1970s, with the early idea of ‘child abuse’ developing from the late 1960s. For Furedi, there are a number of dimensions to this growth of ‘abuse’—the specific term abuse itself is important in terms of its connotations of defilement and contamination. Firstly, there is a tendency for academics and campaigners to search for or ‘discover’ abuse, both in the present and the past and within this a tendency to exaggerate the scale of it. This is assisted by a reinterpretation of experiences that would previously not have been thought about as abusive or at least not with the use of this particular term. At the most extreme, Furedi notes, we find sociological theory developing that problematises everyday activities and reinterprets them through the prism of abuse. With a profound sense of vulnerability more and more activities and experiences are reinterpreted and presented in theory as forms of violence. Feminists like Catharine MacKinnon for example found that the extreme act of rape is difficult to distinguish from sexual intercourse [6] (p. 82). Similarly, Furedi notes that the logic of this approach was becoming relatively mainstream within sociology, with Anthony Giddens for example describing the ‘clear’ link between rape and murder of women which, ‘often contains the same core elements as non-violent heterosexual encounters, the subduing and conquest of the sexual object’ [6] (p. 84). As Furedi notes, reducing actions to core elements means we can find the most unlikely links, like between eating and cannibalism. As such we find not a necessary rise in violence or harm but a tendency to discover this in many, even most forms of human relationships. A key problem being that it was no longer simply those on the right who were seeing humanity in this more degraded form but those associated with the left. 2 This can be partly explained due to the relatively modern term homophobia but a similar result is found for ‘homosexual abuse,’ the point being that the term abuse was becoming more important and significant. Societies 2019, 9, 66 10 of 17 As a result, there were few left to defend ‘man.’ Indeed, the very act of doing so could increasingly be interpreted as an act of abuse itself. Examining the growth of the ‘cycle of abuse’ theory, a theory that predicts that once abused you will similarly go on to abuse others, Furedi notes that more radical voices have adopted this understanding, something that when aired by conservatives in terms of a ‘cycle of poverty’ has always been dismissed as deterministic and reactionary [6] (p. 87). This way of understanding human experience, Furedi argues, is a new one. Victimhood appears to carry weight and often receives institutional recognition and support. At the very least the claim of victimhood seems difficult and at times impossible to question, despite its often subjective dimension. And it leaves scars. One aspect of the modern idea of abuse is that it is assumed to leave a lasting legacy. The legacy of abuse is also something that is understood to be carried on through future generations, almost genetically transferred, as ‘second generations of’ various forms of ‘abusive’ experiences emerge to claim the mantle of victimhood. A key dimension of this development is the emergence of the victim label and in particular the development of a victim identity. This Furedi traces back initially to criminologists and other policy experts in the late 1960s who began to use the language of victimhood to define people’s experiences—the point being that the sense of ‘victimhood’ can only emerge if society defines your experiences in this way. Rather than having experienced a crime, you become a ‘victim of crime’ [6] (p. 98). Victimhood is not simply a thing it is an interpretation and a labelling and one that was emerging at the time when a ‘survivalist’ mentality was developing both within individuals and more importantly within Western elites, academics and institutions. For us, the point of note or argument is to suggest that the rise of the victim and of ‘abuse’ emerged within a wider political and cultural climate, a culture of limits that lacked the intellectual and moral resources to carry society forward and consequently began to see the world through the prism of damage limitation. The natural subject for this time was not the robust, dynamic, risk taking liberal subject but the done to, at risk, vulnerable subject. A subject that was being increasingly ‘recognised,’ constructed and institutionalised through a new therapeutic etiquette and form of best practice. Consequently, groups in society, black people, women, homosexuals and also the working class, once seen as potential active allies in a political battle for change were reinterpreted as vulnerable victims. For Furedi, by the mid 1990s, a political climate had been created in which defending people from victimisation had ‘become everyone’s point of reference’ [6] (p. 103). Discussing the meaning of the term abuse, Furedi notes that its importance is that it ‘evokes the notion of moral pollution,’ of being invaded, ‘to the point that those who have been polluted will never be the same again,’ something that, ‘affect[s] the spirit, identity and emotional integrity of the person.’ The use of the term abuse, in the eighteenth and much of the nineteenth century was interpreted through the grammar of morality, carrying the connotation of pollution, often referring to the pollution of the self through, for example, the perceived degradation of the act of masturbation [32] (pp. 54–55). See Figure 2. Interpreting the above Ngrams graph of the term abuse, what I would suggest we are witnessing in 1800 is the use of the term abuse that is carried by the language of Christian morality. This more traditional form of meaning continued to make sense of experiences and continued to have meaning until around 1840 when the modern transformation of society, the development and centrality of science and a more secular and liberal outlook was becoming more significant. In this respect, the declining use of the term abuse for the next 130 years reflected the decline of Christian morality and the rise of the modern liberal subject. By around 1970 however, we see the rise and rise of the use of the term abuse, reflecting the decline of the liberal subject and the emergence of the vulnerable subject. This we would suggests can be understood as the formation of a new form of moralising about humanity as abusive and defiling (with the focus being less on self-abuse than the abuse of others [32]). Societies 2019, 9, 66 11 of 17 Just as the old Christian, moral language was losing its potential to limit individuals and society, a new etiquette or awareness of the harm of mankind broke onto the scene and became far more prevalent than the old moralisers of abuse ever did. It is within this context that a new master framework for engaging with the public developed around the idea of vulnerability and harm reduction. Societies 2019, 9, x FOR PEER REVIEW 11 of 18 experts in the late 1960s who began to use the language of victimhood to define people’s experiences—the point being that the sense of ‘victimhood’ can only emerge if society defines your experiences in this way. Rather than having experienced a crime, you become a ‘victim of crime’ [6] (p.98). Victimhood is not simply a thing it is an interpretation and a labelling and one that was emerging at the time when a ‘survivalist’ mentality was developing both within individuals and more importantly within Western elites, academics and institutions. For us, the point of note or argument is to suggest that the rise of the victim and of ‘abuse’ emerged within a wider political and cultural climate, a culture of limits that lacked the intellectual and moral resources to carry society forward and consequently began to see the world through the prism of damage limitation. The natural subject for this time was not the robust, dynamic, risk taking liberal subject but the done to, at risk, vulnerable subject. A subject that was being increasingly ‘recognised,’ constructed and institutionalised through a new therapeutic etiquette and form of best practice. Consequently, groups in society, black people, women, homosexuals and also the working class, once seen as potential active allies in a political battle for change were reinterpreted as vulnerable victims. For Furedi, by the mid 1990s, a political climate had been created in which defending people from victimization had ‘become everyone’s point of reference’ [6] (p.103). Discussing the meaning of the term abuse, Furedi notes that its importance is that it ‘evokes the notion of moral pollution,’ of being invaded, ‘to the point that those who have been polluted will never be the same again,’ something that, ‘affect[s] the spirit, identity and emotional integrity of the person.’ The use of the term abuse, in the eighteenth and much of the nineteenth century was interpreted through the grammar of morality, carrying the connotation of pollution, often referring to the pollution of the self through, for example, the perceived degradation of the act of masturbation [32] (pp.54-55). See Figure 2. Figure 2. Abuse. Interpreting the above Ngrams graph of the term abuse, what I would suggest we are witnessing in 1800 is the use of the term abuse that is carried by the language of Christian morality. This more traditional form of meaning continued to make sense of experiences and continued to have meaning until around 1840 when the modern transformation of society, the development and centrality of science and a more secular and liberal outlook was becoming more significant. In this respect, the declining use of the term abuse for the next 130 years reflected the decline of Christian morality and the rise of the modern liberal subject. By around 1970 however, we see the rise and rise of the use of the term abuse, reflecting the decline of the liberal subject and the emergence of the vulnerable subject. This we would suggests Figure 2. Abuse. 9. The Vulnerable Subject in Law “I consider that the striking of a fair balance between the demands of the general interest of the community (the community in this case being represented by weak and vulnerable people who claim that they are victims of anti-social behaviour which violates their rights) and the requirements of the protection of the defendant’s rights requires the scales to come down in favour of the protection of the community and of permitting the use of hearsay evidence in applications for anti-social behaviour orders.” [9] (p. 60) In attempting to look at the importance of the vulnerable subject in law, policing and the criminal justice system, the above quote from Lord Hutton in 2002, gives a sense of how things have changed. The flexibility allowed to the justice system when dealing with anti-social behaviour (as opposed to murder, for example) allows the growing centrality of vulnerability to be more overtly expressed. Here for example, we find Hutton describe ‘the community’ being engaged by the criminal justice system, as represented by ‘weak and vulnerable people.’ Below we will look at certain changes in law and to discussions within legal theory, particularly about the harm principle that in various ways help to illustrate the growing importance of the vulnerable subject. One such discussion relates to the problem of overcriminalisation, a process of proliferating and accelerating law making where an increasing array of experiences and behaviours are criminalised. The below quote from Andrew Ashworth gives a useful sense of this process and the accompanying concern by some legal theorists. “The number of offences in English criminal law continues to grow year by year. Politicians, pressure groups, journalists and others often express themselves as if the creation of a new criminal offence is the natural or the only appropriate response to a particular event or series of events giving rise to social concern . . . There is little sense that the decision to introduce a new offence should only be made after certain conditions have been satisfied, little sense that making conduct criminal is a step of considerable social significance . . . [F]rom any principled viewpoint there are important issues-of how the criminal law ought to be shaped, Societies 2019, 9, 66 12 of 17 of what its social significance should be, of when it should be used and when not-which are simply not being addressed in the majority of instances.” [35] Various explanations are found to explain these developments and the focus, understandably, is often on opportunistic politicians and their use of ‘penal populism.’ But penal populism, can itself be seen as another example of the diminished (moral and political) subject, a lost sense of the capacity to either change the individual or to change society without the use of force [36]. For this paper, the central importance of overcriminalisation can best be understood as a product of the emerging vulnerable subject that needs ever more protections from the ever-obliging (post) modern criminal justice system. 10. Unprincipled Harm By 1999, in his seminal paper, Bernard E. Harcourt was bemoaning what he called the Collapse of the Harm Principle. John Stuart Mill’s liberal principle had framed the limits for state interference in the lives of the individual. If there was no harm to another individual from a particular action, in the main, that action should not be regulated by law. This was a principle extended in the 1960s when liberal critics challenged the moralising aspect of laws against homosexuality, obscenity and prostitution—homosexuality harms no one and should, they argued, be decriminalised. The harm principle, in theory, acted as a limiting principle to the enforcement of morality and thus freed the liberal subject from moralistic legal regulation. By the 1970s, in legal theory and to some extent in society, the liberals appeared to have won, with, for example, the decriminalisation of homosexuality and legalisation of hard-core pornography. But then something changed. Conservatives and feminists like Catharine MacKinnon changed the rules of the game and began to use the harm principle to criminalise increasing forms of ‘abusive’ and damaging behaviour. There was a triumph of the universalisation of harm, as Harcourt puts it and many more things began to be defined as harmful. This did not mean that the moralists had won, rather, as Christopher Lasch argued, the moral right and their increasing reliance on ‘law and order’ reflected the collapse of moral ideas and arguments [37]. Now, the moralists dropped their morality and their moral arguments and instead of arguing that pornography or prostitution was morally wrong they simply argued that they were harmful. Rather than defending the moral subject, it was the vulnerable subject that became the heart (if not the soul) of their argument (and understanding). These arguments, in an increasing number of areas of life, held sway and more things began to be criminalised. Harm, Harcourt noted, has become the principle argument for state intervention, rather than a barrier to it—the harm principle (from a liberal perspective) is therefore dead. James Q Wilson, with his and George Kelling’s ‘broken windows’ theory helped to promote the idea that communities were vulnerable to a variety of nuisance behaviour that could bring down a neighbourhood and increase serious crime levels. Despite Wilson’s own moral background, he did not use moral arguments to criminalise public space, he talked about victims of crime and harm to defenceless and vulnerable communities. MacKinnon, likewise, adopted the harm argument—pornography was harmful for the women involved in making it, harmful to the women who were assaulted by men who used it and harmful to women in general who had their second class position in society reinforced. This, an argument that had not existed in the 1960s, Harcourt argues, emerged in the 1970s and once again transformed the idea of harm into an argument for regulation and criminalisation. This time, rather than the ‘community’ being represented as vulnerable, it was women who were victims and in need of protection. Conservatives and progressives, Harcourt concluded, are now making harm arguments. All sorts of harms that were previously seen as merely a nuisance are now seen as needing legal intervention. The focus today is no longer on whether certain actions cause harm, ‘it is about types of harm, the amount of harm and our willingness, as a society, to bear the harms’ [38]. Societies 2019, 9, 66 13 of 17 11. Managing Emotions Harcourt is unsure what to make of the collapse of the harm principle, trying in the end to suggest that this collapse may ‘ultimately be beneficial,’ something that ‘helps us realize that there is probably harm in most human activities’ [38] (p. 193). For the purpose of this paper, the conclusion is rather different and indeed the fact that Harcourt, in 1999, can end with this idea that most human activities probably cause harm is in itself something that could only make sense once the vulnerable subject had taken hold. Within the criminal justice systems of most Western nations, this elevated sense of harm has been reflected in a variety of legal and policing practices and policies that increasingly engage with the ‘vulnerable public’ [36] (p. 45). Indeed, within politics, alongside the concern about vulnerability, vulnerable groups and vulnerable communities the ‘victim of crime’ has become increasingly central, from the 1970s in the USA and particularly from the 1990s in the UK. These changes have themselves been reflected within criminology, for example, in Jonathan Simon’s ‘governing through crime’ thesis where he examines the centrality of the crime victim for not only crime agencies but for institutions across American society. Perhaps the most influential criminologist, David Garland, has similarly focused on what he calls a ‘culture of control’ in the UK and US, usefully identifying the victim of crime and indeed the victim more generally as a symbolic figure, ‘a more representative character, whose experience is taken to be common and collective, rather than individual and atypical’ [39]. With the vulnerable subject at the heart of this development, the spiralling dimension of harm discussed by Harcourt can be identified within new laws and practices where vulnerability is increasingly conceptualised in relation to not only physical but to mental and emotional harm. And the role of the state increasingly comes to be that of protecting the vulnerable. In Scotland, we can see this in a relatively early discussion about hate crime by the Association of Chief Police Officers in Scotland (ACPOS). Having rarely discussed crimes through the prism of hate, in 2004 a Working Group on Hate Crime was established and a guidance manual on hate crime was written in 2010. The manual is noticeably therapeutic in its language, with the forward explaining that, ‘all crime can produce post-traumatic stress (PTS) in victims,’ but adding that, ‘it is recognised that PTS lasts longer in victims of hate crime’ [40]. The additional trauma suffered by victims of hate crime is central to the argument presented in the document about why hate crime needs to be a priority for the Scottish police service. At one level, the document can also be seen as representing and promoting a cultural shift towards an understanding that all victims of crime should be seen as vulnerable but also that some people are more vulnerable than others. The report is particularly interesting in its use of evidence to prove the case that PTS can last for up to five years amongst victims of hate crime compared with other crimes. The one piece of evidence used to back up this claim is from America, relating to attacks on lesbian women and gay men. The vast majority of the attacks are clearly directed at the individuals due to their sexual orientation, some had, as the report explains, a surprising level of ‘physically and psychologically brutality’ [41]. The ‘brutal’ targeting of individuals for attack due to their sexual orientation can understandably have a significant impact upon an individual. However, moving from this one piece of research to then discuss all gay people as vulnerable and all hate crimes as doubly traumatising is problematic. The relatively unquestioned idea of ‘hate crime’ today is interesting given the historical development of the term and the strong evidence of the politicised and indeed moralised nature of the concept. Paul Coleman for example traces the origin of the idea (and more particularly the idea of hate speech) to the Soviet Union under Joseph Stalin and the desire to have the state determine correct and legally acceptable forms of speech, something that Western nations rejected at the time as illiberal and authoritarian [42]. In more recent times, the idea of ‘hate crime’ developed in the United States in the 1980s and, in part, due to their first amendment right to freedom of expression, it has also been strongly criticized as a basis for punishment [43]. In the UK, in relation to race and racism there have been various criticisms of the use of ‘hate crime’ laws and initiatives and indeed of the Societies 2019, 9, 66 14 of 17 presumed trauma created by these crimes or what are often non-crimes or incidents [44]. For Adrian Hart, a major concern is the policing of young people in schools by teachers, who it is assumed are harmed by unpleasant and sometimes simply ‘incorrect’ comments and words and recorded as being involved in hateful behaviour, even at nursery school age. Perhaps the most useful work examining the impact of hate crime legislation is that of James B. Jacobs and Kimberly Potter. Writing again about developments in America, they note that the majority of hate crimes are committed by teenagers. Many others involve poor young white and black (due to the colour-blind nature of hate crime legislation) young men involved in disputes or fights who shout an obscenity. Many of these incidents, they believe are questionable in terms of the definition of ‘hate.’ Their work also raises questions about the presumed and universal understanding of trauma experienced by those found guilty of so called ‘hate’ crimes [45]. Policing in the UK has moved away, somewhat, from a focus on property and physical violence and moved into new realms, of policing speech and of protecting people from emotional harm [35]. In Scotland, for example, a new law has been passed criminalising ‘coercive and controlling behaviour,’ types of behaviour that includes, ‘belittling’ and acting in a ‘demeaning’ way [46]. Discussing the growing concern with and the management of emotions, particularly in universities, Greg Lukianoff and Jonathan Haidt in their book The Coddling of the American Mind usefully examine the growing concept creep of the term trauma. Australian psychologist Nick Haslam, they note, has studied the changing use of terms like trauma, bullying and abuse and has noted that these concepts have both crept ‘downwards’ thus applying to less severe situations and also ‘outwards’ to incorporate new but conceptually related phenomena. Pre the 1980s the term trauma for example, was used in psychology to relate to physical trauma, like a brain injury. In the eighties ‘post-traumatic stress disorder’ became the first none physical trauma. This was understood to be caused by an ‘extraordinary and terrifying experience,’ ‘outside the range of usual human experience’ [47]. It was stressed in these early definitions that this was not based on a subjective standard but related to the most extreme of experiences like war, rape or torture. But by the early 2000, ‘the concept of “trauma” within parts of the therapeutic community had crept down so far that it included anything “experienced by an individual as physically or emotionally harmful”’ that had a lasting effect on their well-being [47] (p. 26). Key to this change for Haslam is the subjective dimension of this. For Lukianoff and Haidt, this is also of significance because individuals themselves, rather than just mental health professionals, started to think in these terms and use this concept of ‘trauma’ as a way to understand their experiences. 12. Some Thoughts and Conclusions about the Vulnerable Subject Books like that of Greg Lukianoff and Jonathan Haidt are usefully attempting to grapple with what we have described here as the rise of the vulnerable subject, a subject or, diminished subject that has become the increasingly dominant framework for institutional practices and approaches regarding the management and regulation of human interactions. The presumption of human autonomy and the presumption of human capacity necessarily continues but as Ramsay has argued, this is now understood to be a vulnerable autonomy, something that is normalised and arguably encouraged by political, legal and cultural expectations and beliefs about what makes us human and indeed of what makes us good. Awareness of ones and one another’s vulnerability has, to a large extent, become a new form of ‘morality’ or at least a form of etiquette that informs us about how we should relate to each other and indeed about how we should understand our experiences. To some extent this has also changed the nature of law and of policing. Within this context the presumption about the human condition is that we are vulnerable and that, as Harcourt reluctantly observed, we should recognise that perhaps all human interactions involve the possibility of harm. To be human, in this respect, is to be at risk. To be at risk means a transformation of the idea of freedom and in particular means a transformation in the relationship we have with Societies 2019, 9, 66 15 of 17 freedom and regulation, with the latter increasingly understood to be the basis of our individual or individuated freedom. As such, what we are witnessing is the construction of a new form of wellbeing state [48] and a presumption of the need to protect the vulnerable subject from an increasing array of harms that are understood to be potentially abusive, damaging and traumatising. This moves us away, as Michael Fitzpatrick has argued, from a relationship of the state with citizens, into a therapeutic relationship with clients or patients [49]. Rather than being citizens with wills and necessary freedoms we consequently move to a situation where people are conceptualized as in need of support, with their lives understood through the prism of risk management and support developed through the interventionist policies and practices all aimed to prevent harm to the vulnerable subject. Work on the diminished subject suggests that there is a strong relationship between the depth of meaning that exists in and about society and the robust nature of individuals themselves. This is not simply a matter of ideas but equally about the extent to which society is collective or fragmented; something that is itself tightly bound up with the weakness or strength of meaning that gives rise to comradeship, communities or indeed to dynamic political organisations. The argument here is that the declining sense of meaning generated by twentieth century society sporadically and then fundamentally gave rise to a diminished and degraded sense of humanity, opening the door to a new intellectual, cultural and then political elite with a diminished sense of human possibilities and a new culture of limits. This wider sense of limits encouraged a view of ‘man’ that was itself diminished, a vulnerable subject constantly at risk of harm. All activities, in both public and private and perhaps especially our relationships with one another come to be influenced by this dominant cultural form that helps to reinforce the idea of vulnerability3. This is a very different subject to the one promoted by J.S. Mill. As Harcourt noted, Mill’s harm principle was not a standalone principle, it was not a technocratic or legalistic outlook but one based on a far larger and enlightened vision of ‘man’ as a ‘progressive being,’ based on a belief in ‘human flourishing.’ As Lionel Trilling pointed out, Mill’s time of writing was still a time when the case against ‘man’ had yet to be proven. Indeed, the case for ‘man’ was significant, and, Mill’s vision of ‘man’ was of a ‘noble and beautiful object of contemplation,’ uplifted by ‘high thoughts and elevated feelings’ [26]. These ‘elevated’ ideas of humanity, ones that would have been central to the ethos of university life, sound pompous and otherworldly today—naïve, arrogant or perhaps even dangerously deluded—an outlook that could lead to ‘othering,’ domination, oppression and the abuse of power. One of Mill’s great liberal principles was that of tolerance—a perspective that encouraged the need for open debate, judgement and contestation of ideas and behaviours that were to be tolerated rather than regulated or criminalized—a basis for the belief in academic freedom and freedom of speech—indeed, a contestation of ideas was one of the ways in which humanity and individuals could elevate themselves. Today, like many other liberal principles, the meaning of tolerance has been transformed and now represents a demand that you withhold judgement and respect other people’s cultures and identities in case you cause offence. In many respects, tolerance is about an awareness of the potential harm that your words and ideas can have for the fragile feelings of the vulnerable subject [50]. The vulnerable subject is a more static subject, rather than a transforming one. One that has a more limited and fragile sense of self, that is threatened, rather than developed, by difficult experiences and indeed by difficult and challenging ideas. A diminished subject that experiences not only life but also 3 Almost every human activity comes with a risk but only recently has this sense of risk come to dominate and to often swamp the sense of possibility and potential of new developments and technologies. The internet, for example, is one area where we can see a growing tendency to treat this remarkable technology as problematic and dangerous, a new risk to be managed, demonstrated by the growing number of books written about online threats. See ‘Top ten books about the dangers of the web’. Available Online: https://www.theguardian.com/books/2016/mar/16/top-10-books-about-the-dangers-of-the-web. https://www.theguardian.com/books/2016/mar/16/top-10-books-about-the-dangers-of-the-web Societies 2019, 9, 66 16 of 17 knowledge as potentially harmful, abusive and traumatising, as something that needs to be restrained within our culture of limits. Funding: This research received no external funding. Conflicts of Interest: The authors declare no conflict of interest. References 1. Fox, C. I Find that Offensive; Biteback Publishing: London, UK, 2016. 2. The Times Newspaper. Available online: https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/stonewall-is-using-its-power- to-stifle-trans-debate-say-top-academics-dtswlcl0n (accessed on 26 July 2019). 3. Strossen, N. Hate: Why We Should Resist It with Free Speech Not Censorship; Oxford University Press: New York, NY, USA, 2018. 4. Davies, J.G. A New Inquisition; Civitas: London, UK, 2010. 5. Dineen, T. 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Introduction The Vulnerable Person The Rise and Rise of Vulnerability Institutionalising Vulnerability A Theory of the Vulnerable Subject The Diminishing Subject The ‘Death’ of the Subject The Growth of Abuse The Vulnerable Subject in Law Unprincipled Harm Managing Emotions Some Thoughts and Conclusions about the Vulnerable Subject References 
work_uly2u5feqbbark6nwnvwbgvzaq	----	Citation: Macdonald, Stephen, Donovan, Catherine and Clayton, John (2017) The disability bias: understanding the context of hate in comparison with other minority populations. Disability & Society, 32 (4). pp. 483-499. ISSN 0968-7599 Published by: Taylor & Francis URL: https://doi.org/10.1080/09687599.2017.1304206 <https://doi.org/10.1080/09687599.2017.1304206> This version was downloaded from Northumbria Research Link: http://nrl.northumbria.ac.uk/30337/ Northumbria University has developed Northumbria Research Link (NRL) to enable users to access the University’s research output. Copyright ©  and moral rights for items on NRL are retained by the individual author(s) and/or other copyright owners. Single copies of full items can be reproduced, displayed or performed, and given to third parties in any format or medium for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes without prior permission or charge, provided the authors, title and full bibliographic details are given, as well as a hyperlink and/or URL to the original metadata page. The content must not be changed in any way. Full items must not be sold commercially in any format or medium without formal permission of the copyright holder. The full policy is available online: http://nrl.northumbria.ac.uk/policies.html This document may differ from the final, published version of the research and has been made available online in accordance with publisher policies. To read and/or cite from the published version of the research, please visit the publisher’s website (a subscription may be required.) http://nrl.northumbria.ac.uk/policies.html The Disability Bias: Understanding the context of hate in comparison with other minority populations Dr Stephen. J. Macdonald, University of Sunderland; Professor Catherine Donavan, University of Sunderland; Dr John Clayton, Northumbria University Abstract During recent years ‘disability hate crime’ has become a major political and criminal justice concern due to a number of high-profile murders in the UK. The aim of this paper is to compare disability-motivated hate crimes with other hate crimes motivated by homophobic or racist bias. This study employs a quantitative methodology utilising data collected by ARCH hate crime recording system over a ten-year period (2005–2015). The data findings illustrate a number of variations concerning incidents reported by disabled people regarding violence and threatening behaviour, when compared with incidents motivated by race/faith or homophobic bias.  The aim of this research was to compare disability-motivated hate crimes with hate crimes motivated by homophobic or racist bias.  This study compared hate crime/incidents data collected over a ten year period in the north-east of England (2005–2015).  The study suggests that disability hate crime is underreported compared with other types of hate crime.  The data findings show a greater number of incidents reported by disabled people regarding violence and threatening behaviour. Introduction The aim of this paper is to compare disability-related hate crime/incidents with other forms of homophobic and race-related hate crime/incidents reported in the north-east of England. This study analyses the administrative records of ARCH, a third-party reporting system for hate incidents in the north-east, in order to produce a dataset which comprises ten years of longitudinal data documenting hate crime/incidents in the Tyne and Wear region from 2005 to 2015. Data was collected on five protected characteristics including disability, race, faith, transphobic and homophobic types of hate crime/incidence. This paper applies a quantitative methodology to compare and find similarities and differences between hate crime/incidents experienced by disabled people with those experienced by ethnic and sexual minority communities within the north-east. The paper employs a social model approach to conceptualise hate crime/incident trends experienced by disabled people (Roulstone et al. 2011); this commences by discussing hate crime as a constructed political and social policy category, with reference to the government’s protected characteristics, which include disability, race, faith and sexuality (Chakraborti and Garland 2015). With reference to disability, it is suggested in the literature that this form of hate crime is often hidden and underreported in official crime statistics, compared with the other protected characteristics (Thomas 2011; 2013; Creese et al. 2014). The findings in this study illustrate that threatening behaviour and physical attack is a problem for the disabled population when compared to the other protected characteristics. Furthermore, the findings reveal that a greater number of disabled people who reported hate crime/incidents directly to the police, expecting a criminal justice response, were less likely to have their case investigated or intelligence gathered when compared with incidents motivated by race. The analysis also illustrates key differences in the number of disability and race hate crimes/incidents in areas of deprivation compared with the sexual minority group. Although the study highlights that disability hate crime/incidents only account for 4% of reported hate incidents in the Tyne and Wear area, this paper suggests that this is due to underreporting rather than a genuine low level of disability hate incidents occurring during this time period (Sin et al. 2009; Sin 2013; Sherry 2010). The authors conclude by implying that inadequate partnerships have been developed between ARCH, third-sector disability organisations and criminal justice agencies in order to successfully respond to disability hate crime/incidents in the Tyne and Wear area. Hate crime, protected characteristics and hate crime reporting The concept of ‘hate crime’ has gained currency within social policy and academic literature over the last decade (Hall 2013; Chakraborti and Garland 2015). Hate crime became a prominent term used in criminology, criminal justice studies and victimology after a number of high-profile murders in England. The first was the murder of Stephen Lawrence in 1993, which was racially motivated. This was followed by the 1999 nail bomb attacks in London (Brixton, Soho and Brick Lane) which targeted people from ethnic and sexual minority communities (Chakraborti and Garland 2015). Further community tensions developed out of the 9/11 and 7/7 terrorist attacks in the United States and United Kingdom, leading to a backlash of racial and religiously motivated crimes targeting specific ethnic groups across Europe and the United States (Chakraborti and Garland 2015). Within England and Wales, because of the Macpherson report, legislation was passed in the form of the Crime and Disorder Act (1998), to protect certain minority communities which were considered at risk of targeted victimisation. The Crime and Disorder Act can be seen as a landmark piece of legislation in constructing the discourse of hate crime and developing particular practices that measured and responded to this ‘new’ form of victimisation. This Act specifically gave powers to courts so that judges could increase sentencing tariffs for perpetrators if it could be proven that a crime was motivated by hatred towards a minority group (Roulstone et al. 2011; Chakraborti and Garland 2015). This legislation was further expanded by the Anti-terrorism Crime and Security Act (2001), which incorporated religiously motivated crimes as an additional example of hate crime. Therefore, while early legislation made specific reference to race/faith, it was not until 2005, within the Criminal Justice Act (2003), that legislation was expanded to protect disabled and sexual minority groups from bias-motivated crimes. Under these Acts there are five legal categories of hate crime which are referenced to as ‘protected characteristics’. These protected characteristics identify five specific communities which are at risk of experiencing hate crime in England and Wales, consisting of bias crimes which are motivated by race, faith, homophobia, transphobia and disability (Hall 2013; Roulstone et al. 2011; Chakraborti and Garland 2015). With reference to disability in particular, since the Criminal Justice Act (2003), for any crimes where it can be proven that a perpetrator acted with intent or hostility towards a disabled person, the courts have the power to increase sentencing for the perpetrator within England and Wales (Macdonald 2015). Although hate crime legislation now defines disability as a protected characteristic, practices around prevention and victim support were originally developed to support people from ethnic or religious minority communities. Creese et al. (2014) illustrate that, when comparing statistics on disability hate crime with other protected characteristics, disability hate incidents seem far less common than other forms of hate- motivated criminality. Official figures on disability hate crime indicate that only 5% of hate crimes are motivated by hostility or bias towards disabled people (OCS 2015). If we compare this with ethnicity, where 82% of hate crimes are racially motivated (OCS 2015), this would suggest that either disabled people are at lower risk of hate crimes, or that disability hate crimes are underreported, or that it is a combination of both. The nature of hate crime When conceptualising the nature of hate crime incidents, it has been emphasised that hate crime legislation developed out of crimes which specifically targeted ethnic minority communities. This has led to a number of criminal justice assumptions about the nature of hate crime, as it is presumed that offenders will not be known to their victims (Thomas 2011; Chakraborti and Garland 2015; Macdonald 2015). However, this is not always the case for people that have experienced disability hate crime, as in many cases the perpetrator is known to the victim, often as an employed carer or family member (Shakespeare 2013). Whilst there are many similarities of experiences of hate crime and help-seeking across the protected characteristics it is only recently that research has focussed on the experiences of disabled people. Thomas (2011; 2013) highlights the complexities around disability hate crime. She emphasises that many disabled people become victims within their own home, through abusive care workers or groups of individuals who have befriended disabled people in order to exploit and victimise them. Thomas defines the concept of ‘mate crime’, where disabled people (particularly individuals with an intellectual impairment) are befriended then exploited and abused by particular perpetrators. She suggests that this form of hate crime is more similar to experiences of domestic violence than those of the traditional notion of hate crime; if this is correct, perpetrators of disability hate crimes could be viewed as ‘insiders’ rather than ‘outsiders’. Furthermore, because these perpetrators are frequently employed by the care system, and often develop the abusive and exploitative behaviour gradually, leading to systematic and long periods of victimisation within an individual's home, Thomas stresses that this form of hate crime is rarely reported and can be very difficult to detect (Thomas 2011; 2013). This emphasises a level of complexity around disability hate crime which is unique and different from other forms of hate crime experienced by other minority groups, and these differences help mask the actual extent of disability hate crime from criminal justice agencies, resulting in disabled people being excluded from official hate crime statistics. Disability and hate crime Similar to Thomas’s study, Sin (2013) proposes that, rather than disability hate crime being rare, the reality is that this form of hate crime goes unnoticed by criminal justice services. She suggests that disability hate crimes are underrepresented within official statistics because of underreporting rather than there truly being a lack of crimes specifically targeting disabled people. Sin discovered that disabled people generally did not report their experiences of crime to criminal justice agencies (Sin et al. 2009). She reveals that, although there is a low level of reported disability hate crime, 66% of people with intellectual impairments described experiencing some form of victimisation, and a further 90% reported experiencing general harassment, and 32% implied that they experienced harassment on a weekly basis (MENCAP 1999; Sin et al. 2009). As Sin (2013) implies, in order to have disability hate crime recorded and processed through the courts, evidence must be first gathered by the police. She suggests that many disabled people's experience of the police is extremely negative due to inferred attitudes of police officers along with inflexible policing and exclusive procedures. She goes on to suggest that police services are not adapted to the needs of specific disabled groups. Officers have been reported not to have taken notes or even interviewed persons with intellectual impairments as there is an assumption that those persons will not have the ability to effectively give evidence. She also reports officers being dismissive of disabled people, and insufficient training is offered in alternative ways of collecting evidence from particular disabled groups (Sin 2013). In conjunction with this, Balderston (2013) and Macdonald (2015) highlight similar barriers with reference to Victim Support, particularly around a lack of: understanding of disability; communication skills; and alternative packages of support tailored around disability. For the small number of disabled people whose victim status has been acknowledged by the police and Victim Support, similar disabling barriers have been identified by Gravell (2011) and Roulstone et al. (2011) with reference to the Crown Prosecution Service and Law Courts. Roulstone et al. (2011) imply that disabled people’s experiences are constructed differently from other minority groups. He suggests that disabled victims often have their status pathologised, as they are considered inherently vulnerable to criminality due to assumptions about the nature of their conditions. Roulstone et al. (2011) suggest that, because of this assumed inherent vulnerability, the actions of perpetrators are often explained in terms of exploitation rather than prejudice or hostility towards disabled people’s status itself. As Gravell (2011) indicates, although there is an obligation to support vulnerable witnesses, many disabled people feel that they have not received adequate support during their time in court. From this perspective, the reason why there are only a small number of disabled hate crime prosecutions, even in extreme cases of murder, would be because of this construction of vulnerability (Roulstone et al. 2011; Sherry 2010). Thus, the low level of reporting, recording and prosecution of disability hate crime can be explained as an indicator that criminal justice agencies, Victim Support, social welfare services and courts are ill-equipped to effectively support disabled victims who experience hate crime within the UK (Quarmby 2008; Sin 2009; Roulstone et al. 2011; Sherry 2010; Edwards 2014; Macdonald 2015). These studies seem to demonstrate that disabled people are underrepresented in official statistics rather than being at low risk of experiencing hate crime due to their minority status. Methodology This study quantitatively compares the similarities and differences between disability motivated hate crimes and other hate crimes motivated by homophobic or race bias. The data in this study was obtained through ARCH, an organisation that records and documents all forms of recorded hate incidents and hate crime from across Tyne and Wear within the five metropolitan boroughs consisting of Newcastle upon Tyne, Sunderland, Gateshead, North Tyneside and South Tyneside. ARCH is a third-party reporting system that works in partnership with organisations including the police, housing agencies, local councils, schools/colleges/universities, Victim Support, and other local third sector charities in the north-east of England. All hate crime incidents that are reported to Northumbria police are recorded by ARCH. This study had access to data from two of the five boroughs, collected over a ten year period from 2005 to 2015. Thus, the data analysed in this study was composed from the two cities, Newcastle upon Tyne and Sunderland, within this metropolitan county. A total population sample of reported hate crime/incidents (De Vaus 2002) was obtained through ARCH from the Newcastle upon Tyne and Sunderland populations. This project compares three distinct groups of participants who had experienced some form of hate crime/incidents. The first group comprised data on participants who had a range of impairments and who had experienced some form of disability hate crime/incident (n=156). The second group consisted of individuals (n=375) who had experienced some form of transphobic/homophobic hate crime/incidents. The largest group (n=3377) was people who had experienced forms of race/faith hate crime/incidents. These three groups were used as the independent variables in this study and consisted of a total population of 3908 cases. When analysing the data, descriptive statistics were used in the form of cross-tabulation tests to examine the frequency distribution of cases when examining the correlation between two or more variables. Two or more variable frequency distributions were analysed using a chi-square statistic (χ2) to discover whether variables (i.e. disability × hate crime/incidents × criminal justice response = increased/decreased chance of victimisation) are statistically independent on whether they are associated (De Vaus 2002). The data from this survey were subsequently analysed, and only data which were calculated to be of significance were used (P ≤ 0.05). The data were analysed using SPSS and Excel in the form of single variable analysis (univariate), and where data were calculated to be of significance (P ≤ 0.05) bivariate and multivariate analysis was applied (De Vaus 2002). In the data analysis, five significant themes (P ≤ 0.05) emerged in the bivariate data, which were: extent of disability hate crime/incidents; type of agency reporting hate crime/incidents; geographical location; type of offence; police responses to incidents. Although the authors are influenced by a critical realist philosophy regarding disability and impairment, this paper employs the social model of disability in respect of the data analysis (see Macdonald 2013). Hence the author applies the social model definition, which classifies ‘disability’ as disabling structural barriers and ‘impairment’ as biological/neurological variations (Oliver 2009). This paper is the second (XXX 2015) in a longitudinal study which has covered a ten-year period comparing disability hate crime/incidents with other forms of hate crimes targeting other communities, for example crimes targeting people from sexual minority and ethnic minority groups. Findings: protected characteristics and reporting trends for hate crime/incidents When comparing protected characteristics of hate crimes within the time period from 2005 to 2015, the data indicates that the vast majority of cases recorded, at 86% (n=3377), relate to race/faith hate incidents (see Figure 1). There is a significant drop, to 10% (n=375), when comparing this with sexual minority cases of hate incidents in the region. As we can see, the lowermost category, at 4% (n=156), refers to cases of disability hate incidents. Whilst Figure 1 clearly shows that race/faith groups are most at risk of hate crime, we must treat this analysis with caution as it might also reveal significant issues of underreporting of disability and sexual minority hate incidents within the region, as discussed earlier. Figure 1: Protected categories of hate crime/incidents – ARCH data There may be some evidence of underreporting of disability and sexual minority hate incidents when comparing ARCH data with existing data on hate crime nationally. If we refer to Figure 2, the ARCH data collected in Tyne and Wear is very similar to Official Crime Statistics (OCS) collected across England and Wales. When comparing hate crime/incidents between the OCS data with that of ARCH’s data, there is a direct match with reference to race, as both data sources reveal that the majority of cases, at 82%, were racially motivated. With reference to sexual minority incidents, again there are some striking similarities as OCS data indicates 12% of cases, compared with 10% in the ARCH data, were motivated by homophobic bias. With reference to disability hate incidents, further similarities are revealed as OCP data indicates that 5% of hate incidents were committed against disabled people, compared with ARCH at 4%. Figure 2: Protected characteristics of hate crime/incidents Although ARCH and OCS are similar, there is a substantial difference between these data sources and the Crime Survey for England and Wales (CSEW), the CSEW levels of victimisation being considerably higher for the disability group at 32%, which is an increase of 28% and 27% compared to the Arch and OCS data respectively. Racially motivated crimes dropped to 48% within the CSEW data findings compared to ARCH and OCS findings which were both at 82%. Interestingly, levels of sexual minority incidents were similar between all three data sources, ranging from 13% in the CSEW to 10% in the ARCH data. It should be noted that the CSEW is viewed as a more accurate representation of victimisation than the OCS (Maguire 2007). This is because the CSEW collects information from victims, so it includes crimes that are not officially reported in the OCS data, which only includes information solely recorded by the police and courts, and so arguably gives an incomplete picture as it excludes unreported crimes. The OCS data also does not include incidents that either may not be perceived as a criminal act, or 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% CSEW (2012-15) OCS (2014-15) Arch (2005-15) may not be criminal offences but still have a damaging effect on the victim (e.g. prolonged anti-social behaviours). The authors would have, therefore expected that the ARCH data would reflect reporting across the protected characteristics that was more in line with that of the CSEW. The fact that it does not may indicate that the ARCH data on disability is also incomplete, and lends support to the notion that it underrepresents disability hate crimes in the region due to underreporting. The reporting of hate crime incidents To explore whether ARCH data represented in Figures 1 and 2 indicate that disability hate crime is either uncommon or underreported, we must examine data in Figure 3. It should be noted that ARCH was originally established to build trust between communities, so that excluded groups would have confidence to report hate crime/incidents to local criminal justice authorities/agencies. Partnerships between third-party multi-agency reporting centres were central to the success of the ARCH system. Data in Figure 3 illustrate a range of ARCH’s multi-agency reporting centres where victims reported hate incidents, which included statutory, third-sector and private organisations. At the start of this research in 2013, ARCH had 120 partner organisations across the region. A significant relationship (P ≤ 0.00) emerged in the data analysis which indicated some similarities and differences between the three groups. In Figure 3, half of all hate incidents reported by the three groups were reported to criminal justice agencies, ranging from 51% of disabled victims, 50% of sexual minority victims and 49% of race/faith victims. The second most productive reporting agencies were housing services, with disability being the most prevalent category at 26%, indicating that over a quarter of victims reported disability hate incidents to their housing providers. This is compared with the 20% race/faith victims and 19% sexual minority victims. The third prevalent group was educational services, where again disabled victims were most likely to report an incident at 15%. This is compared with the race/faith community at 11% and the sexual minority community at 8%. Figure 3: Reporting Agencies1 This analysis indicates that all three victim groups were most likely to report crime/incidents to criminal justice agencies, followed by housing and educational services. Nevertheless, these findings also reveal that it is the disabled group who are most likely to use these reporting networks compared with the race/faith and sexual minority communities. Figure 3 also illustrates the role of specialised race/faith, sexual minority and disability support agencies in reporting hate crimes within the region. 1 The six categories in this graph represent reporting agencies that have particular specialisms. ‘Criminal Justice’ refers to agencies including the police, Victim Support, etc. ‘Education’ refers to schools, colleges and universities, etc. ‘General’ refers to organisations that do not specialise in a specific area relating to the five protected strands – this category predominantly consists of city councils’ local customer service centres. ‘Race/Faith Services’ refers to community services which support people from a range of race, faith or ethnic minority populations. ‘Housing’ refers to housing organisations such as local housing offices, housing associations, etc. ‘Sexual Minority Services’ refers to community projects which specialise in offering services for sexual minority groups such as Gay Advice Sunderland or MESMAC, etc. 11% of the race/faith communities reported hate incidents to specialist race/faith agencies, and likewise 11% of the sexual minority communities used specialised sexual minority agencies to report hate incidents. Unfortunately, with reference to specialist disability organisations, no disability support agency had actively reported a hate crime/incident within the Newcastle or Sunderland areas over a ten-year period. This could be partially explained because ARCH was originally established as an alternative reporting system to traditional criminal justice services, aimed at supporting ethnic minority populations in Newcastle upon Tyne. This was because many ethnic minority groups had lost trust with local criminal justice agencies in Tyne and Wear. Because of the Criminal Justice Act (2003), which expanded hate crime protected characteristics from race/faith to include disability and sexual minority victims in 2005, this transformed and expanded the remit of ARCH. Yet, even after 2005, there was not a single reported disability or sexual minority hate crime/incident recorded by ARCH until 2008. What this data might represent is that, although ARCH has had some success in developing partnerships and trust with ethnic minority community groups, this success has not been fully replicated within the north-east disability communities. Geographies of hate in Newcastle and Sunderland While the authors acknowledge that this data gives only a partial picture of disability hate crime, the data does allow some comparison between hate crime trends affecting the three groups from 2005 to 2015. The data analysis in Figure 4 examines whether a correlation exists between protected characteristics, hate crime/incidents and areas of deprivation, based on the ‘Indices of Multiple Deprivation’ (2010). The data seems to reveal a significant correlation (P ≤ 0.00) between disability hate crime/incidents and areas of deprivation. In the first four wards of the most deprived areas in Newcastle and Sunderland, hate incidents that targeted disabled people equated to 33% of all incidents. This is comparable with the race/faith community, where 35% of hate incidents relate to the first four wards of deprivation in Figure 4. This correlation does not relate to the sexual minority group though, as only 12% of hate incidents took place in these areas of deprivation. Interestingly, with reference to the sexual minority group, it was the Newcastle city centre, at 37%, where most incidents took place. Newcastle city centre was a less dangerous place for people from the race/faith and disability communities as only 7% of disability hate incidents and 9% of race incidents were reported to ARCH as having taken place there. As we can see from Figure 4, as wards become less deprived hate crime/incidents reduce, so this illustrates some level of correlation between areas of deprivation, disability and race incidents within the Tyne and Wear region. It should be noted that linking deprivation with forms of hate crime is somewhat problematic. This analysis does not suggest that certain working-class Tyne and Wear communities are more likely to engage in racist/disabling behaviours. The authors propose the reason why there are high levels of incidents in these areas, with reference to ethnicity and disability is due to changing levels of diversity living in close contact with each other, in comparison to wealthier areas in Tyne and Wear (see Clayton et al., 2016). This close contact is often underpinned by poverty, the withdrawal of jobs and services, and a climate of suspicion and marginalisation. Research by Gravell (2011) suggest that many disabled people, particularly those with learning disabilities or profound mental health problems, are often placed in areas of high deprivation, to save local authorities on rent costs. This is very similar to individuals who are seeking asylum. This data might reveal that, by housing large numbers of disabled people and individuals from diverse ethnic communities in areas which are already economically deprived, this seems to create community tensions and conflicts (O’Grady et al. 2004; Clayton 2012; Clayton, et al. 2016). Therefore, from a social model perspective, the data seems to show that social housing constructs disabling barriers which leaves individuals at risk of victimisation within the region (Thomas 2011). Figure 4: Links between areas of deprivation with forms of hate crime Types of hate When comparing the personal experiences of hate incidents that were reported to ARCH, a significant difference (P ≤ 0.00) appeared between the three groups in relation to types of victimisation. It should be noted that ARCH data varied from OCS because data was recorded equally on hate crimes and hate incidents. In ARCH’s data, incidents referred to the everyday experiences of hate, and these included incidents which may not be considered as crimes, such as verbal abuse or other aspects of anti-social behaviour. The data analysis in Figure 5 illustrates the type of hate crime/incidents that each of the groups reported over a ten-year period. Figure 5: Types of hate crime/incidents As we can see from Figure 5, there was some variation between the three groups and hate crime/incidents in this study. With reference to disability, this group reported experiencing the highest level, at 30%, of incidents relating to threatening and intimidating behaviours. This can be compared to lower levels of intimidation experienced by the sexual minority group, at 26%, and the race/faith group, at 24%. For the disabled group, the next uppermost level of hate incidents, at 28%, related to the experience of ‘abusive language’. When comparing the prevalence of abusive language with the other communities, this is comparable with the race/faith group, also at 28%. Yet it should be noted that it was the sexual minority group that reported the highest levels of abusive language compared with the other communities, at 43%. Interestingly, when comparing the data findings on physical violence, all three populations reported similar levels of violence, ranging from 11% to 15%. When examining ‘physical attacks’, the disability group, at 15%, was again comparable with the race/faith group, at 14%, as both groups reported similar levels of physical violence. The least likely group, at 11%, to experience physical attacks was the sexual minority group. Criminal damage was also a significant category for the disability group, at 10%, compared with the sexual minority group who reported this type of incident at 8%. However, it was the race/faith group that was most at risk of experiencing criminal damage, at 18%. Although there are some statistical similarities between these groups, there are also a number of slight differences. For disabled people, the data reveals that they were most likely to be subjected to threatening behaviours and intimidation, and slightly more prone to be the victim of physical violence. But, as Roulstone et al. (2011) argue, compared with the other protected characteristics it is this group that is far less likely to have these incidents recognised, due to prejudice or hostility towards their minority status by a court. Police response to hate Over recent years there have been growing concerns over disabling barriers within the criminal justice system (Roulstone et al. 2011; Gravell 2011; Balderston 2013; Sin 2013; Macdonald 2015). As Sin (2013) implies, one reason why hate crimes are underreported by disabled people is because of a lack of confidence in the criminal justice system. Both Gravell (2011) and Sin (2013) indicate problems within policing due to a lack of specific understanding, training and commitment by police forces nationally to successfully protect disabled people. On exploring how police respond to the three protected characteristics in this study, the data reveals some significant variations between groups (P ≤ 0.00). When investigating data on disability in Figure 6, 56% of disability hate incidents were reported directly to the police. This was slightly higher than the other two groups, as 50% and 42% of the sexual minority and race/faith groups respectively reported homophobic and race hate incidents directly to the police (see Figure 6). Although disability hate incidents were more likely to be reported directly to the police, the police were less likely to investigate these incidents, at 10% compared with the race/faith communities at 16%. Nevertheless, the police were least likely, at 9%, to investigate a hate incident when it targeted someone from the sexual minority group. Interestingly, the police were most prone to gather intelligence for race incidents in Newcastle and Sunderland, at 6%, compared with the sexual minority and disability groups at 4%. Figure 6: Police response rates2 With reference to the police’s ‘no’ response rates, the data shows that the police were less likely to respond to an incident, at 36%, if it related to the race/faith group or, at 37%, to the sexual minority group. This seems to indicate that the police were more likely to respond to the disability group as their ‘no response’ rate for disability hate crime/incidents dropped to 30%. However, this analysis needs to be treated with caution, as although this might seem that the police were more likely to respond to a disability hate incident, in reality a recorded ‘no’ by the police was because victims stated they did not want a criminal justice response. Hence, what this analysis suggests is that 70% of disabled people seemed to want a criminal justice response when reporting a hate crime/incident in this study. 2 The four categories in this graph represent police responses to hate crime/incidents. ‘Record/Information’ refers to disability hate incidents that were reported directly to the police; ‘Investigation’ refers to a further investigation by the police of a reported crime; ‘Intelligence’ refers to police gathering intelligence and further information where a hate crime/incident took place; ‘No’ refers to no police response to a hate crime/incident. Conclusion The aim of this article was to evaluate protected characteristics of hate crime in order to examine whether disabled people report hate crime/incidents in similar (see Clayton et al., 2016) or different ways to other protected groups. With reference to the type of hate crimes/incidents experienced by disabled people, the authors discovered a slight but important variation. This study reveals a significant relationship between deprivation and hate crime/incidents as there was an increase of disability hate incidents reported in areas with the highest levels of deprivation. With reference to experiences of victimisation, disabled people were most likely to report that they had been subjected to threatening behaviour, at 30% compared with the other groups at 24% and 26%. Disabled people were also most at risk of experiencing physical violence compared with the other protected characteristics, at 15%, although this only varied by 3%. The disabled group were also most likely to report incidents directly to criminal justice agencies (51%). This could reveal that disabled people were doing so to get a criminal justice response or because of a lack of alternative reporting options. Yet, when comparing police responses to disabled individuals, although they were most likely to have their hate incident logged by the police (56%), they were less likely to have their experience of hate investigated (10%), or intelligence collected (4%), compared with the race/faith protected characteristics. This paper also illustrates that, when comparing disability hate incidents with race or homophobic incidents, only 4% of cases were classified as disability hate crimes. As stated, this data can be interpreted in two ways: either firstly, that disabled people do not experience the same level of hate incidents compared to the other protected characteristics; or secondly, that disabled people are not reporting incidents of hate to ARCH or criminal justice agencies. Evidence in this study seems to suggest that it is the latter, as when comparing where individuals reported a crime/incident it became evident that there was reduced options for disabled people. For both the race/faith and sexual minority groups ARCH had established affiliations with community groups and agencies which specifically specialised in issues relating to ethnicity or sexuality. This was not the case in relation to disability, as no specialised disability organisation had identified or reported a hate incident to ARCH over a ten-year period. This seems to reveal that disabled people had reduced means of reporting hate crime/incidents within the Tyne and Wear area, as the concept of disability hate crime seems to be less visible compared to the other protected characteristics. In summary, when comparing disability hate incidents (n=156) with race incidents (n=3377), the data demonstrates that ARCH was successful in improving the reporting of hate incidents by ethnic minority groups over a ten-year period, but they were not able to mirror this success for disabled people within this study. Yet, ARCH had somewhat acknowledged this before this research commenced, as they had requested a systematic analysis of their data in order to improve the reporting of disability hate crime/incidents within the region. Unfortunately, as this project comes to an end, due to government local authority cutbacks, members of the ARCH team with specific expertise in hate crime, community engagement and partnership building have been made redundant. The aim of this study was to improve the effectiveness of ARCH, and although ARCH still exists as a recording system, the community engagement and partnership building aspect of ARCH, which was central to its success in targeting race hate incidents, no longer exists. It was hoped that this project would improve the reporting of hate crime/incidents for disabled people within the north-east of England, but unfortunately this no longer seems to be a priority for local or national government. Hopefully these findings might prompt representatives in the north-east to examine their current disability hate crime reporting arrangements and make much needed improvements. If this does not happen, then disabled people will continue to experience hidden forms of hate crime on a daily basis, and not have their voices heard or have access to the justice they deserve (Sin et al. 2009; Roulstone et al. 2011). If disabling barriers around reporting are not confronted by local government, which effectively allows disability hate crime to continue, this sends out a clear message to perpetrators about the social status of disabled people within the region (Quarmby 2008; Sherry 2010). References Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act (2001) London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office. Balderston, S. (2013) After Disablist Hate Crime. In A. Roulstone and H. Mason-Bish (Eds), Disability, Hate Crime and Violence, pp. 177–193. London: Routledge. Chakraborti, N. and Garland, J. (2015) Hate Crime (2nd Edn). London: Sage Clayton, J. 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work_umry5jxugndjhezkvto6kktnhm	----	[PDF] Community Interventions Concerning Homophobic Violence and Partner Violence Against Lesbians | Semantic Scholar Skip to search formSkip to main content> Semantic Scholar's Logo Search Sign InCreate Free Account You are currently offline. Some features of the site may not work correctly. DOI:10.1300/J155v07n04_08 Corpus ID: 7873711Community Interventions Concerning Homophobic Violence and Partner Violence Against Lesbians @article{Rose2003CommunityIC, title={Community Interventions Concerning Homophobic Violence and Partner Violence Against Lesbians}, author={S. Rose}, journal={Journal of Lesbian Studies}, year={2003}, volume={7}, pages={125 - 139} } S. Rose Published 2003 Psychology, Medicine Journal of Lesbian Studies SUMMARY Homophobic violence and same-sex domestic violence against lesbians are described in this paper based on survey research and hotline calls conducted by a community anti-violence project. A community survey of 229 lesbians indicated that during a one-year period, about fifteen percent had been the target of homophobic violence and twelve percent had been the victim of same-sex partner violence. Violence was defined as including assault with a weapon, physical assault, sexual assault… Expand View on Taylor & Francis myweb.fiu.edu Save to Library Create Alert Cite Launch Research Feed Share This Paper 29 CitationsHighly Influential Citations 4 Background Citations 9 Results Citations 1 View All Topics from this paper Domestic Violence Female Homosexuality Crime Act Hotlines Argipressin Flumazenil Stalking (behavior) Sodium Sea-Blue Histiocyte Syndrome Help-Seeking Behavior Tellurium HAVCR1 protein, human Description Physiological Sexual Disorders Basal Ganglia Diseases Respiratory Mechanics 29 Citations Citation Type Citation Type All Types Cites Results Cites Methods Cites Background Has PDF Publication Type Author More Filters More Filters Filters Sort by Relevance Sort by Most Influenced Papers Sort by Citation Count Sort by Recency Coming forward: the underreporting of heterosexist violence and same sex partner abuse in Victoria W. Leonard, A. Mitchell, M. Pitts, Sunil G. Patel Political Science 2008 46 PDF Save Alert Research Feed Intimate Violence Among Lesbian Couples B. A. Speziale, C. Ring Psychology 2006 10 Save Alert Research Feed Intimate Partner Violence in Self-Identified Lesbians L. Badenes-Ribera, Amparo Bonilla-Campos, Dolores Frias-Navarro, Gemma Pons-Salvador, Héctor Monterde-i-Bort Medicine Trauma, violence & abuse 2016 36 Highly Influenced View 4 excerpts, cites background Save Alert Research Feed Perceptions of and Experience With System Responses to Female Same-Sex Intimate Partner Violence Jeanne L. Alhusen, Marguerite B. Lucea, N. Glass Medicine Partner Abuse 2010 35 View 1 excerpt Save Alert Research Feed Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Communities’ Readiness for Intimate Partner Violence Prevention S. Turell, M. Herrmann, G. Hollander, C. Galletly Psychology 2012 28 PDF View 2 excerpts, cites background Save Alert Research Feed The Influence of Gender Role Stereotyping on Women's Experiences of Female Same-Sex Intimate Partner Violence Dena S. Hassouneh, N. Glass Medicine Violence against women 2008 107 Save Alert Research Feed Intimate Partner Violence in Self-identified Lesbians: a Meta-analysis of its Prevalence L. Badenes-Ribera, Dolores Frías-Navarro, Amparo Bonilla-Campos, Gemma Pons-Salvador, Héctor Monterde-i-Bort Psychology 2015 45 Save Alert Research Feed A systematic review on LGBTIQ Intimate Partner Violence from a Western perspective A. Workman, Tinashe Dune 2019 PDF View 2 excerpts, cites background Save Alert Research Feed Female Same-Sex Intimate Partner Violence The Influence of Gender Role Stereotyping on Women's Experiences of Dena Hassouneh, N. Glass Psychology 2012 4 Save Alert Research Feed Lessons from Examining Same-Sex Intimate Partner Violence Nancy L. Baker, Jessica D. Buick, Shari R. Kim, S. Moniz, Khristina L. Nava Psychology 2013 91 Save Alert Research Feed ... 1 2 3 ... References SHOWING 1-10 OF 16 REFERENCES SORT BYRelevance Most Influenced Papers Recency Anti-Gay Violence and Victimization in the United States Kevin T. Berrill Political Science 1990 363 View 2 excerpts, references background Save Alert Research Feed Victim Experiences in Hate Crimes Based on Sexual Orientation G. Herek, J. Cogan, J. R. Gillis Psychology 2002 306 PDF Save Alert Research Feed Victimization and Perpetration Rates of Violence in Gay and Lesbian Relationships: Gender Issues Explored L. Waldner-Haugrud, L. V. Gratch, B. Magruder Psychology, Medicine Violence and Victims 1997 152 PDF Save Alert Research Feed Psychological sequelae of hate-crime victimization among lesbian, gay, and bisexual adults. G. Herek, J. Gillis, J. Cogan Medicine, Psychology Journal of consulting and clinical psychology 1999 819 View 2 excerpts, references background Save Alert Research Feed Psychological Distress, Crime Features, and Help-Seeking Behaviors Related to Homophobic Bias Incidents S. Rose, M. Mechanic Psychology 2002 39 PDF View 1 excerpt, references background Save Alert Research Feed Knowledge About Heterosexual versus Lesbian Battering Among Lesbians Erin M. McLaughlin, Patricia D. Rozee Psychology 2001 42 View 1 excerpt, references background Save Alert Research Feed The Social Organization of Sexuality: Sexual Practices in the United States V. A. Sadock Medicine 1995 1,916 Save Alert Research Feed Laumann (E.O), Gagnon (J.H), Michael (R.T), Michaels (S) — The Social Organization of Sexuality. Sexual Practices in the United States; Michael (R.), Gagnon (J.), Laumann (E.), Kolata (G.) — Sex in America. A Definitive Survey A. Giami Sociology 1997 1,096 Save Alert Research Feed Anti-lesbian/gay violence in the United States in 2000 New York: Author. 2001 Decentering heterosexuality: Responses of feminist counselors to abuse in lesbian relationships Women and Therapy, 23, 59-72. 2001 ... 1 2 ... Related Papers Abstract Topics 29 Citations 16 References Related Papers Stay Connected With Semantic Scholar Sign Up About Semantic Scholar Semantic Scholar is a free, AI-powered research tool for scientific literature, based at the Allen Institute for AI. Learn More → Resources DatasetsSupp.aiAPIOpen Corpus Organization About UsResearchPublishing PartnersData Partners   FAQContact Proudly built by AI2 with the help of our Collaborators Terms of Service•Privacy Policy The Allen Institute for AI By clicking accept or continuing to use the site, you agree to the terms outlined in our Privacy Policy, Terms of Service, and Dataset License ACCEPT & CONTINUE 
work_upenlhh3ajas3o7p3eqvqsnpz4	----	A tale of targeted violence in Hashimpura: the Delhi High Court on recognition, relations and responses | SpringerLink Advertisement Search Log in Search SpringerLink Search Article Published: 19 May 2020 A tale of targeted violence in Hashimpura: the Delhi High Court on recognition, relations and responses Vandita Khanna1  Jindal Global Law Review volume 11, pages61–76(2020)Cite this article 187 Accesses Metrics details Abstract On 31 October 2018, Justice Dr S Muralidhar (then) at the Delhi High Court convicted 16 members of the Provincial Armed Constabulary (PAC) for, inter alia, the murder of 38 Muslim residents of Hashimpura, a neighbourhood in Meerut, Uttar Pradesh in the summer of 1987. In so doing, he described the events that unfolded in Hashimpura as the ‘targeted killing’ of ‘members of a particular minority community.’ The judicial recognition of targeted violence in contemporary Indian society forms the focus of the present article. The article contends that Muralidhar J’s reference to targeted violence paves way for the recognition of an important juridical concept that warrants further academic and legal engagement. By adopting a relational approach, I argue that the conceptual utility of the category of targeted violence lies in its ability to unmask the social relations that it implicates. Targeted violence is not aimed at individual actors, but social relations between perpetrators, individual victims and those who share the victims’ minority identity. Committed to the legal recognition of social experiences, I demonstrate how the category of targeted violence accurately reflects the experiences of and relations between different social actors. I further build a case for why and how legal and judicial responses to targeted violence ought to be informed and shaped by a recognition of its relational harms. This is a preview of subscription content, access via your institution. Access options Buy single article Instant access to the full article PDF. US$ 39.95 Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout. Subscribe to journal Immediate online access to all issues from 2019. Subscription will auto renew annually. US$ 79 Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout. Rent this article via DeepDyve. Learn more about Institutional subscriptions Notes 1.Zulfikar Nasir & Others v State of Uttar Pradesh & Others 2018 SCC Online Del 12153 [1.2]. See also Asghar Ali Engineer, ‘Meerut: The Nation’s Shame’ (1987) 22(25) Economic and Political Weekly 969; AG Noorani, ‘Amnesty Report on Meerut Killings’ (1987) 22(50) Economic and Political Weekly 2139; Asghar Ali Engineer, ‘Gian Prakash Committee Report on Meerut Riots’ (1988) 23(1) Economic and Political Weekly 30; K Balagopal, ‘Meerut 1987: Reflections on an Inquiry’ (1988) 23(16) Economic and Political Weekly 768. 2.Zulfikar Nasir & Others v State of Uttar Pradesh & Others (n 1) [1.3]. 3.ibid [1.2]. 4.ibid [1.8]. 5.Ibid. 6.The Prevention of Communal and Targeted Violence (Access to Justice and Reparations) Bill, 2011 attempted to introduce ‘targeted violence’ into our legal vocabulary. Section 3(c) of the Bill defined ‘communal and targeted violence’ as ‘any act or series of acts, whether spontaneous or planned, resulting in injury or harm to the person and or property, knowingly directed against any person by virtue of his or her membership of any group, which destroys the secular fabric of the nation’. However, the Bill was not passed by the Parliament. 7.For a critical account of the historiography of violence in India, see Gyanendra Pandey, ‘In Defense of the Fragment: Writing about Hindu-Muslim Riots in India Today’ (1992) 37 Representations 27. 8.Indian Penal Code, 1860, ss 146–148. For a critique of the judicial construction of the ‘communal riot’ see Pratiksha Baxi, ‘Adjudicating the Riot: Communal Violence, Crowds and Public Tranquility in India’ (2007) 3 Domains 70. 9.See M Mohsin Alam Bhat, ‘Mob, Murder, Motivation: The Emergence of Hate Crime Discourse in India (2020) 16(1) Socio-Legal Review (forthcoming) (on the emergence of the category of ‘hate crimes’ in comparison to concepts of ‘vigilantism’, ‘mob violence’, ‘communal violence’ and ‘lynching’). 10.In her written submissions in the case of Tushar Gandhi v Union of India and Ors., WP (Civ) No. 732 of 2017, Senior Advocate Indira Jaising referred to the lynching of Muslims and Dalits on the false suspicion of carrying cattle for slaughter or consumption of beef as ‘targeted violence’ (para 2). Notably, she defined ‘targeted violence’ as ‘violence with the motive of targeting a particular category of people based on race, sex, religion or caste’ (para 4). http://theleaflet.in/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/Written-submissions-by-Indira-Jaising-in-Lynching.pdf. Accessed 25 April 2020. 11.David Harvey, Social Justice and the City (University of Georgia Press, 2009) 13. 12.David Harvey, ‘Space as a Key Word’ in Noel Castree and Derek Gregory (eds) David Harvey: A Critical Reader (Wiley-Blackwell 2006). 13.Barbara Perry (ed), Hate and Bias Crime: A Reader (Routledge 2012) xv; see also Benjamin Bowling, ‘Racial Harassment and the Process of Victimisation’ (1993) 33(2) British Journal of Criminology 231, 238. 14.E.g. Barbara Perry, In the Name of Hate: Understanding Hate Crimes (Routledge, New York 2001); Nathan Hall et al (eds) The Routledge International Handbook on Hate Crime (Routledge, London and New York 2015). 15.OSCE ODIHR, Hate Crime Laws: A Practical Guide (9 March 2009). 16.Zulfikar Nasir & Others v State of Uttar Pradesh & Others (n 1) [85–100]. 17.ibid [78–84]. 18.ibid [109–111]. 19.This section draws heavily from Vibhuti Narain Rai’s visceral account of the incident in VN Rai, Hashimpura 22 May: The forgotten story of India’s biggest custodial killing (Penguin 2016); see also Harsh Mander, ‘Hashimpura: 31 years after custodial massacre of Muslims by men in uniform, justice is incomplete’, Scroll (2 Nov 2018). https://scroll.in/article/900594/hashimpura-31-years-after-custodial-massacre-of-muslims-by-men-in-uniform-justice-is-incomplete. Accessed 10 April 2020. 20.ibid. 21.Rai (n 19) 22. 22.Zulfikar Nasir & Others v State of Uttar Pradesh & Others (n 1) [28]. 23.ibid [29]. 24.ibid [30]. 25.ibid [32]. 26.ibid [42]. 27.ibid [50–52]. 28.ibid [72]. 29.ibid [102]. 30.ibid [104]. 31.ibid [1.1] (‘Around 36% of the population [of Meerut] are Muslims.’). 32.ibid (‘Many of them [Muslims in Meerut] earn meagre sums as artisans and labourers to keep themselves and their families going.’). 33.ibid [103]. 34.National Legal Services Authority v Union of India AIR 2014 SC 1863. 35.Navtej Singh Johar & Others v Union of India W. P. (Crl.) No. 76 of 2016. 36.Zulfikar Nasir & Others v State of Uttar Pradesh & Others (n 1) [114]. 37.ibid [113–114]. 38.ibid [114]. 39.ibid [111]. 40.ibid [1.9]. 41.ibid [105]. 42.ibid. 43.Notably, the judiciary has previously issued comprehensive guidelines for structural reform in cases of sexual violence. See e.g. Vishaka and Others v State of Rajasthan AIR 1997 SC 3011. 44.Zulfikar Nasir & Others v State of Uttar Pradesh & Others (n 1) [1.8, 101–102, 108]. 45.ibid [1.2]. 46.ibid [101]. 47.ibid. 48.The Preamble to the Indian Constitution assures, inter alia, ‘the dignity of the individual’. 49.Zulfikar Nasir & Others v State of Uttar Pradesh & Others (n 1) [101]. 50.ibid [6, 8, 18, 54]. 51.Helen Ahn Lim, ‘Beyond the immediate victim: Understanding hate crimes as message crimes’, in Paul Iganski (ed) Hate Crimes: The Consequences of Hate Crime (Praeger, Westport 2009) 107–122; Jack Levin and Jack McDevitt, Hate Crimes: The Rising Tide of Bigotry and Bloodshed (Plenum, New York 1993); see also ODIHR (n 15) 17. 52.Barbara Perry and Shahid Alvi, ‘“We are all vulnerable”: the in terrorem effects of hate crimes’ (2012) 18(1) International Review of Victimology 57, 65. 53.Iris M Young, ‘Five Faces of Oppression’ (1988) 19(4) Philosophical Forum 270; Elizabeth Stanko, ‘Reconceptualising the Policing of Hatred: Confessions and Worrying Dilemmas of a Consultant’ (2001) 12(3) Law and Critique 309. 54.Common Cause and Centre for the Study of Developing Societies, Status of Policing in India Report 2019: Police Adequacy and Working Conditions (2019). https://www.csds.in/uploads/custom_files/1566973059_Status_of_Policing_in_India_Report_2019_by_Common_Cause_and_CSDS.pdf. Accessed 10th April 2020; Zulfikar Nasir & Others v State of Uttar Pradesh & Others (n 1) [103]. 55.James Weinstein, ‘First Amendment challenges to hate crime legislation: Where’s the speech?’ (1992) 11(2) Criminal Justice Ethics 6. 56.E.g. Barbara Perry, ‘Exploring the community impacts of hate crime’, in Nathan Hall et al (eds) The Routledge International Handbook on Hate Crime (Routledge, London and New York 2015). 57.Monique Noelle, ‘The Ripple Effect of the Matthew Shepherd Murder: Impact on the Assumptive Worlds of Members of the Targeted Group’ (2002) 46(1) American Behavioural Scientist 27. 58.Perry and Alvi (n 52) 57. 59.Zulfikar Nasir & Others v State of Uttar Pradesh & Others (n 1) [103]. 60.Perry and Alvi (n 52) 67–68. 61.ibid 63. 62.Kenji Yoshino, Covering: The Hidden Assault on Our Civil Rights (Random House, New York 2006). 63.Perry (n 14) 10. 64.Iris M Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton University Press 1990); see also C Petrosino, ‘Connecting the Past to the Future: Hate Crime in America’, in Barbara Perry (ed), Hate and Bias Crime: A Reader (Routledge 2012) 10 (defining hate crimes within a power imbalance between racial and ethnic majorities and minorities). 65.Lu-in Wang, ‘Hate Crime and Everyday Discrimination: Influences of and on the Social Context’ (2002) 4(1) Rutgers Race & the Law Review 1. 66.Nancy Scheper-Hughes, ‘Small wars and invisible genocides’ (1996) 43(5) Social Science and Medicine 889. 67.Ministry of Minority Affairs, Government of India, Social, Economic and Educational Status of the Muslim Community of India: A Report (2006). http://www.minorityaffairs.gov.in/sites/default/files/sachar_comm.pdf. Accessed 25 April 2020; Zoya Hasan, ‘Muslims and the Politics of Discrimination in India’ in Zoya Hasan et al (eds), The Empire of Disgust: Prejudice, Discrimination, and Policy in India and the US (OUP 2018). 68.Jack McDevitt, Jack Levin, and Susan Bennett, ‘Hate Crime Offenders: An Expanded Typology’ (2002) 58(2) Journal of Social Studies 303; Paul Iganski, ‘Hate crimes hurt more’ (2001) 45(4) American Behavior Scientist 626. 69.Paul Iganski and Jack Levin, Hate Crime: A Global Perspective (Routledge, New York 2015); Paul Iganski and Abe Sweiry, ‘How ‘Hate’ Hurts Globally’, in Jennifer Schweppe and Mark Austin Walters (eds) The globalization of hate: internationalizing hate crime? (2016) 96. 70.Perry (n 14). 71.Constitution of India, 1950, art 21. 72.A spate of Indian judgments echo this. See e.g. Justice KS Puttaswamy (Retd) v Union of India (2017) 10 SCC 1 at [107, 157, 168] [Chandrachud J]. 73.e.g. See generally Jack Levin and Jack McDevitt, Hate Crimes Revisited: America’s War on Those who are Different (Westview Press 2002); Paul Iganski, Hate crime and the city (Bristol: The Policy Press 2008). 74.Hannah Mason-Bish, ‘Beyond the Silo: Rethinking hate crime and intersectionality’ in Nathan Hall et al (eds) The Routledge International Handbook on Hate Crime (Routledge, London and New York 2015). Author information Affiliations Research Fellow, Centre for Public Interest Law, Jindal Global Law School, O.P. Jindal Global University, Sonipat, India Vandita Khanna Authors Vandita KhannaView author publications You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar Corresponding author Correspondence to Vandita Khanna. Additional information Publisher's Note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Rights and permissions Reprints and Permissions About this article Cite this article Khanna, V. A tale of targeted violence in Hashimpura: the Delhi High Court on recognition, relations and responses. Jindal Global Law Review 11, 61–76 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s41020-020-00113-6 Download citation Published: 19 May 2020 Issue Date: April 2020 DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s41020-020-00113-6 Keywords Targeted violence Minority Hashimpura Relational harm Hate crime Access options Buy single article Instant access to the full article PDF. US$ 39.95 Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout. Subscribe to journal Immediate online access to all issues from 2019. Subscription will auto renew annually. US$ 79 Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout. Rent this article via DeepDyve. 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work_uryajbjrjjbona3swfl4zwnw5e	----	Against the Double Blackmail: Refugees, Terror and Other Troubles With the Neighbours by Slavoj Žižek (review) Against the Double Blackmail: Refugees, Terror and Other Troubles With the Neighbours by Slavoj Žižek (review) Jordan Cohen Human Rights Quarterly, Volume 40, Number 1, February 2018, pp. 225-229 (Review) Published by Johns Hopkins University Press DOI: For additional information about this article [ Access provided at 6 Apr 2021 02:18 GMT from Carnegie Mellon University ] https://doi.org/10.1353/hrq.2018.0009 https://muse.jhu.edu/article/685704 https://doi.org/10.1353/hrq.2018.0009 https://muse.jhu.edu/article/685704 2018 Book Reviews 225 McMahon’s American Exceptionalism Reconsidered is an eminently clear and concise volume that raises many impor- tant questions about American foreign policy—both what it is and what it could be. Scholars and students alike will learn a great deal from this book. Joe Renouard, Ph.D.* Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies * Joe Renouard is Resident Professor of Ameri- can Studies at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies in Nanjing, China. He specializes in history and diplomacy. His most recent book is Hu- man Rights in American Foreign Policy: From the 1960s to the Soviet Collapse (Penn Press, 2016). He has also contributed essays to The Los Angeles Times, The Diplomat, The National Interest, American Diplomacy, and several journals and edited collections. Slavoj Žižek, Against the Double Blackmail: Refugees, Terror and Other Troubles With the Neigh- bours (Melville House, Allen House 2016), ISBN 978–0–241–27884–0, 128 pages. Discussions in Western political circles regarding terrorism and travel bans demonstrate that refugees comprise an important part of contemporary political conversations. On one end, there are those that oppose freedom of movement due to security; whereas others argue that humanitarian priorities need to surpass security priorities in the face of the refugee crisis. Hegelian philosopher Slavoj Žižek seeks to craft a philosophical solution in his work, Against the Double Blackmail: Refugees, Terror and Other Troubles with the Neighbours.1 At points, this work lacks analytical nuance; yet, the book’s main contention regarding the problematic way refugees are discussed by all parts of the political spectrum in modern political, philosophical, and academic debates is of utmost impor- tance in current work on citizenship and statelessness. In this essay, Žižek initially wants to respond to those who argue for com- pletely open borders as a solution to the refugee crisis. He notes that the “greatest hypocrites” are those who claim moral superiority over others by advocating for an open-border “utopia.”2 In doing so, Žižek asserts that liberals are using refugees as a non-human tool to achieve their desired ends, which is the same criticism they make of those engaging in the security discourse. This discourse be- comes important when certain individu- als prioritize safety of their own nation over humanitarian crises. Political theorist Michael Dillon notes that the security discourse is when powerful elites turn humans into a “species of calculation.” Moreover, these elites then use this cal- culability to reduce individual freedom.3 Žižek’s point, on the contrary, is that many leftist critics of those on the political right also use refugees as mere tools of humanitarianism—rather than security—and thus are equally guilty of dehumanization.4 Overall, the thesis of Žižek’s work is that the only way to solve the refugee crisis is by attacking its root cause: global capitalism. 1. slAvoJ ŽiŽek, AgAinst tHe douBle BlAckmAil: reFugees, terror And otHer trouBles WitH tHe neigHBours (2016). 2. Id. at 9–11. 3. micHAel dillon, politics oF security: toWArds A politicAl pHilosopHy oF continentAl tHougHt 26 (1996). 4. ŽiŽek, AgAinst tHe douBle BlAckmAil, supra note 1, at 9–11. Vol. 40226 HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY This fits in with much of Žižek’s other work where he attempts to criticize the societal negatives presented by capital- ism.5 Additionally, he views culture as a significant variable in his work, and while he does not test it in the book it- self, it is an addressed bias in his earlier essays.6 Yet, regardless of one’s feelings concerning either of these two biases, it is important to examine the book given its own assumptions. Consequently, this review will begin by looking at the two core arguments presented by Žižek, and then it will examine three other theorists who have written on the same subject and place them in dialogue with Žižek. Finally, it will present two fundamental critiques followed by how the text could solve for those issues. The first contention made is that refu- gees from the Arab and African worlds are not “people like us,” and frankly, that should not matter. This stems from earlier work conducted by Žižek. For example, in Welcome to the Desert of the Real, he argues that the “clash of civilizations” is related to “global capitalism” and needs to be addressed globally, not locally.7 In his work on refugees, he notes, “while our Christian fundamentalists are more marginalized than those of the Muslim world . . . our liberal-secular critique of fundamentalism is also stained by falsity.”8 Žižek later extends this argu- ment by examining refugee integration into the West, specifically Germany, and posits that refugees may not want to be amalgamated in a different culture. That is, it is not just racist Westerners that prevent cultural understandings, but it is also indeed the refugees themselves. This analysis provides evidence for Žižek’s argument regarding the impracticality of open borders. Nonetheless, outside of basic solu- tions, Žižek contends that the aforemen- tioned degree of cultural clashing does not matter, and that all people should still have compassion for refugees. He notes this is not because refugees go un- counted—in fact, Žižek responds to Alain Badiou’s classification of migrants as “not counted” by positing that migrants are the most counted, as they themselves seek to be part of Western hegemonic identity9— but because as “decent people” it is our ethical duty to do so. Most importantly, Žižek argues that a refugee not being “people like us” is analytically meaningless, as “we our- selves are not ‘people like us.’” Using less jargon, Westerners have an idealized view of their society, and they view them- selves as separate from the global world. Consequently, this means that the duty to refugees is inherently an ethical one that requires critical self-reflection.10 The second core argument Žižek makes concerns solvency. Early in the book, he discusses Walter Benjamin’s concept of “divine violence.” This philo- sophical concept is a response to Carl Schmitt’s understanding of violence as a necessary means to a clear end. Benja- min, however, posits that violence can indeed be a means without an end. Žižek argues this is the case for the Ferguson, Missouri protests; and further is also ap- plicable to the contemporary stateless- ness crisis. Divine violence is neither 5. slAvoJ ŽiŽek, violence: six sideWAys reFlections 61–66 (2008). 6. Id. 7. slAvoJ ŽiŽek, Welcome to tHe desert oF tHe reAl: Five essAys on septemBer 11 And relAted dAtes 41–49 (2013). 8. ŽiŽek, AgAinst tHe douBle BlAckmAil, supra note 1, at 38. 9. Id. at 92–93. 10. Id. at 90. 2018 Book Reviews 227 sublime nor emancipating, it simply begets more violence, and therefore the only solution to the crisis is a change in the economic structures.11 In response to other theories, Žižek notes that the total right to free move- ment cannot exist because this will ex- clude the lower class people from ever escaping violence, and moreover, that a preaching of tolerance is not a solution because there will still be those who be- lieve refugees can return to a “Nativia.”12 Rather, the sole answer revolves around thinking about how to rid the world of the capitalist superstructure creating this crisis. By utilizing Giorgio Agamben’s argument that “thought is the courage of hopelessness,”13 Žižek argues that class and discourse analyses are the only way society can create a utopia free of the horrors that form the need to migrate. Specifically, any policy actions will be layered with problematic capitalistic intentions, and thus less impactful than a discourse which has the goal of ending capitalism. One area where Žižek’s book lacked was its engagement with other literature. Outside of brief forays with single works by Benjamin, Badiou, and Agamben, Žižek tends to avoid other philosophical texts and completely ignores competing theories. One set of literature that would have helped this text is that which deals with refugees as biopolitics and bare life. First, Agamben’s book Homo Sacer ad- dresses the issue of bare life and refugees. He posits that denial of rights to refugees, and in extreme cases infinite detention of such a class, results in dehumanization no different than the Nazi concentration camps, creating bare, unprotected life.14 Hannah Arendt’s text The Origins of Totalitarianism is perhaps the first work to examine the aforementioned relation- ship.15 In it, she posits that while refugees are one of the most vulnerable popula- tions in the world, the Nazi death camps were exceptional, as they did not want to dehumanize, but rather, remove the concept of humanity entirely.16 Thus, for Arendt, while the refugee is a troubling form of biopolitics, it is not—as Agamben notes—the ultimate form. Finally, Patricia Owens has furthered Arendt and written a critique of the Agambian sense of bare life. She argues that Agamben’s idea of bare life as the ultimate biopolitics is wrong because humans are not given inborn rights, but are provided rights by a state or institution.17 Therefore, in her case, Owens finds refugees to be an inherent, non-unique part of international relations that can only be addressed by solving power structures. These three works are important be- cause they look at refugees in relation to biopolitics and bare life, which, by not addressing it, provide a refutation to Žižek’s contention regarding the “counted” nature of refugees. That is, refugees become less than human and 11. Id. at 41–48. 12. Id. at 77–78. 13. Jordan Skinner, Thought is the Courage of Hopelessness: an Interview with Philosopher Giorgio Agamben, verso Blog (17 June 2014), available at https://www.versobooks. com/blogs/1612-thought-is-the-courage-of-hopelessness-an-interview-with-philosopher- giorgio-agamben. 14. giorgio AgAmBen, Homo sAcer: sovereign poWer And BAre liFe 173–75 (1998). See id. at 126–80 for Agamben’s entire conversations surrounding refugees. 15. HAnnAH Arendt, tHe origins oF totAlitAriAnism (1973). 16. Id. at 267–304. 17. Patricia Owens, Beyond “Bare Life”: Refugees and the “Right to Have Rights,” in reFugees in internAtionAl relAtions 133 (Alexander Betts & Gil Loescher eds., 2011). Vol. 40228 HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY more of a calculable problem. Thus the humanitarian nature of the situation is entirely forgotten. As noted previously, Žižek postulates that refugees want to be part of Western hegemonic identity, and thus are very much political life. Yet, by not addressing the more nuanced argu- ments of Agamben, Arendt, and Owens, Žižek leaves one of his important claims defenseless. This leads to the first important cri- tique of Žižek’s book. His argument is reliant on the concept of refugees as a secondary problem to that of capitalism, and thus he uses cultural and economic philosophy to substantiate his contention. However, if refugees are a symptom of biopolitics—as Agamben, Arendt, and Owens argue—the overall impact of the refugee plays just as much of a role in power structures as it does capitalism. More explicitly, if refugees are evidence of governments being able to control what lives are important, then the cur- rent crisis is something that must be ad- dressed as an individual issue, and not by refuting capitalism. If this is not done and the focus continues to be on fighting capitalism, then the “minor” crises will magnify to unsolvable degrees. The second critique deals with an issue of empirics. Žižek uses individual cases to frequently argue that, due to their religion and culture, Muslim refugees have issues assimilating into the West. This is important because it allows him to claim that open borders are an idea that will never practically work. Yet, statistics demonstrate a different reality. German government data demonstrates that in 2015 there was a 42 percent rise in hate crimes against refugees perpetrated by right-wing ideologues, and in 2016 there were ten attacks per day against refugees.18 Furthermore, in a 2013 analy- sis of 63,000 Swedish residents, Jerzi Sarnecki and his colleagues—professors at University of Stockholm’s school of criminology—found that 75 percent of the difference in foreign-born crime is accounted for by analyzing income and neighborhood, both indicators of poverty. Among the Swedish-born children of im- migrants, the crime rate falls in half (and is almost entirely concentrated in lesser property crimes) and is 100-percent at- tributable to class. Put simply, migrants are no more likely to commit crimes, including rape, than ethnic Swedes of the same family income.19 Thus, while Žižek’s argument about inclusion, wealth, and open borders is fair, his contention regarding it being unpractical is statisti- cally false. Even with these criticisms posited, however, Against the Double Blackmail raises crucial points for how we under- stand the current statelessness crisis. The first area where Žižek’s work improves political-philosophical argumentation is through his analysis of language. While the security discourse regarding refugees is surely problematic, the left’s usage of the stateless as a means to claim moral superiority is equally disturbing, as both cases exert noticeable power dynamics over the suffering. This is because parts of the humanitarian argument, where refugees are treated as numbers to claim moral superiority, dehumanizes the suf- 18. Data Shows Hate Crimes Against Refugees on Rise In Germany, voice oF AmericA neWs, 26 Feb. 2017, available at http://www.voanews.com/a/data-shows-hate-crimes-against- refugees-on-rise-in-germany/3740712.html. 19. Martin Hällsten, Ryszard Szulkin, & Jerzy Sarnecki, Crime as a Price of Inequality?: The Gap in Registered Crime between Childhood Immigrants, Children of Immigrants and Children of Native Swedes, 53 Brit. J. criminol. 456 (2013). 2018 Book Reviews 229 fering in a different yet nearly identical way as the security discourse. Thus, Žižek demonstrates that it is important to discuss refugees in the milieu of a global capitalistic problem and not in that of political debates. The second area where Žižek’s book shines is its insistence on contextualizing the refugee crisis. Via his use of Walter Benjamin’s theory of divine violence, Žižek asserts that without examining causal structures, debates on statelessness cannot effectively occur.20 Attempting to address the problem of the refugee without tackling its broader causes there- fore only serves to increasingly beget the problem. In levying this contention, Žižek attempts to provide a broad way of solving the dehumanization caused by statelessness. Žižek’s work, Against the Double Blackmail: Refugees, Terror and Other Troubles with the Neighbours, is cer- tainly imperfect. The text lacks analyti- cal nuance because it does not engage with the broader theoretical literature on statelessness, and it also focuses on individual stories instead of empirical trends. Nevertheless, by challenging his audience to criticize objectification of refugees in traditional discourses, as well as contextualizing the current crisis, Žižek hopes to move the world towards a solution for dehumanization of the stateless. Jordan Cohen* George Mason University * Jordan Cohen is a political science Ph.D. student at George Mason University. Addition- ally, he has an M.A. in Middle East and Islamic Studies from the same institution. His work has been featured at The National Interest and on the Middle East e-zine, Jadaliyya. Desapariciones: Usos Locales, Circulaciones Globales (Gabriel Gatti ed., Bogotá: Siglo del Hombre Editores, Universidad de los Andes, 2017) ISBN 978–958–665–427–2, 288 pages. Reading a book on disappearances feels like sinking into shifting sands. While trying to get a grip on some of the dark- est episodes of history, the reader is confronted with the fact that the present era keeps on generating new desapa- recidos on a daily basis. Together with the other authors of this edited volume entitled Desapariciones: Usos Locales, Circulaciones Globales (Disappearances: Local Uses, Global Circulations), Gabriel Gatti tries to make sense of a concept full of paradoxes and of the methodological and ontological problems that surround it. How do you represent absence? How do you mourn without a grave? How do you remember the unknown? How do you punish without proof? The specific purpose of this edited volume is to under- stand the rapid transnational circulation and transformation of a concept that was originally associated with a specific phe- nomenon that took place in a particular historical and geographical context: the Latin American detenidos-desaparecidos, or detained-disappeared, during the Cold War. Is it useful to compare the political prisoners that disappeared in the ESMA in Buenos Aires during the seventies and eighties with the twenty-first century North-African and Middle-Eastern refu- gees that drown in the Mediterranean Sea on their way to Europe, or the Mexican women that are being murdered in Ciu- dad Juarez? What are, if any, the common characteristics of the times, spaces, and 20. ŽiŽek, AgAinst tHe douBle BlAckmAil, supra note 1, at 41–48. 
work_usdje7rsr5e5xp7zpxzf7whx54	----	Microsoft Word - nrnTitel0916.doc econstor Make Your Publications Visible. A Service of zbw Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft Leibniz Information Centre for Economics Falk, Armin; Kuhn, Andreas; Zweimüller, Josef Working Paper Unemployment and Right-wing Extremist Crime NRN Working Paper, NRN: The Austrian Center for Labor Economics and the Analysis of the Welfare State, No. 0916 Provided in Cooperation with: NRN: The Austrian Center for Labor Economics and the Analysis of the Welfare State, Johannes Kepler University Linz Suggested Citation: Falk, Armin; Kuhn, Andreas; Zweimüller, Josef (2009) : Unemployment and Right-wing Extremist Crime, NRN Working Paper, NRN: The Austrian Center for Labor Economics and the Analysis of the Welfare State, No. 0916, Johannes Kepler University Linz, NRN - The Austrian Center for Labor Economics and the Analysis of the Welfare State, Linz This Version is available at: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/115025 Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. 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If the documents have been made available under an Open Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence. www.econstor.eu Supported by the Austrian Science Funds Unemployment and Right-wing Extremist Crime by Armin FALK, Andreas KUHN, Josef ZWEIMÜLLER Working Paper No. 0916 September 2009 The Austrian Center for Labor Economics and the Analysis of the Welfare State University of Zurich Institute for Empirical Research in Economics Mühlebachstrasse 86 8008 Zürich, Switzerland www.labornrn.at Corresponding author: zweim@iew.uzh.ch phone +41 (0)44 634 3724 Unemployment and Right-wing Extremist Crime Armin Falk, University of Bonn, CEPR, CESifo and IZA∗ Andreas Kuhn, University of Zurich and IZA Josef Zweimüller, University of Zurich, CEPR, CESifo and IZA September 2009 Abstract It is frequently argued that unemployment plays a crucial role for the occurrence of right- wing extremist crimes. We empirically test this hypothesis using data from Germany. We find that right-wing criminal activities occur more frequently when unemployment is high. The big difference in right-wing crime between East and West German states can mostly be attributed to differences in unemployment. This finding reinforces the importance of unemployment as an explanatory factor for right-wing crime and questions explanations based solely on the different socialization in former communist East Germany and the liberal West German states. JEL Classification: J15, J69, K42 Keywords: Hate crime, right-wing extremism, unemployment, cost of unemployment ∗We thank Johann Bacher, Gil Epstein, Simon Gächter, Rafael Lalive, and Rudolf Winter-Ebmer for helpful comments and suggestions. We are indebted to Alexander Flühmann and Andreas Steinhauer for excellent research assistance and helpful comments. Financial support by the Austrian Science Fund (National Research Network: “The Austrian Center for Labor Economics and the Analysis of the Welfare State”) is gratefully acknowledged. Address: Armin Falk, University of Bonn, Adenauerallee 24-42, D-53113 Bonn, armin.falk@uni- bonn.de. Andreas Kuhn, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, University of Zurich, Mühlebachstrasse 86, CH-8008 Zurich, kuhn@iew.uzh.ch. Josef Zweimüller, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, Uni- versity of Zurich, Mühlebachstrasse 86, CH-8008 Zurich, zweim@iew.uzh.ch. 1 1 Introduction Right-wing extremism is a serious problem in many societies. Germany, for example, has witnessed several fatal assaults against foreigners.1 While these assaults have received a lot of attention they are just the most severe examples of crimes with a racist, xenophobic, and/or antisemitic background (henceforth right-wing extremist crimes). For instance, more than 10,000 right-wing extremist crimes per year were officially registered in Germany during the period 1996 to 1999.2 More than 90 percent of these crimes were non-violent crimes, in particular propaganda offences. Among violent crimes, 65 percent of the cases were hate crimes against the foreign population. In the US, the FBI recorded about 8,000 right-wing extremist crimes per year between 1998 and 2002. Great Britain has witnessed a dramatic increase of this type of crime from 13,878 cases in 1998 to 54,370 cases in 2002 (Statistics on Race and the Criminal Justice System). Similar numbers are available for other OECD countries. While different classifications and legislations make a cross country comparison impossible, the numbers nonetheless demonstrate the severeness of the problem and the need for a better understanding of its causes. In Germany, the extent of right-wing extremist crimes is particularly problematic in East- ern states, the former communist German Democratic Republic (GDR). During 1996 to 1999, the indicence of right-wing extremist crimes was 50 percent higher in Eastern states as com- pared to the Western states. In this paper we analyze two competing hypotheses for why the incidence of right-wing crime is so much more pronounced in East Germany compared to West Germany. According to the first hypothesis, these differences exist because of the politically and educationally very different socialization between former communist East Germany and democratic West Germany. These political and historical differences and their different po- litical cultures show up in different preferences between East and West German citizens also after the German reunification (Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln, 2007). The political heritage of the GDR may have generated more hostile attitudes towards immigrants and groups with other ethnic origin. The second hypothesis stresses the particularly strong economic hardship in East Germany, characterized not least by a substantially higher unemployment rate than 1In September 1991, asylum seekers were attacked in their home in Hoyerswerda. Similarly, in Rostock- Lichtenhagen in August 1992, asylum seekers were attacked in pogrom-like riots. Lethal fire assaults were committed against Turkish foreigners in Mölln (November 1992) and Solingen (May 1993). 2By way of comparison, there were about 6.5 million reported offences in the year 1997 overall, of which about 12,000 had been classified as right-wing extremist crimes. Right-wing extremist crimes thus comprise only a small fraction of all registered crimes. 2 in the Western states. As an alternative explanation, higher unemployment in Eastern states may be a major cause for the occurrence of right-wing extremist crime. In this paper we try to discriminate these two explanations using crime statistics (“Polizeiliche Kriminalstatistik”) collected by the Federal Criminal Police Office (“Bundeskriminalamt”). The argument that unemployment may be an important driving force behind right-wing extremist sentiments is prominent among historians. Several studies have argued that the rise of the Nazis in Germany in the 1930s was decisively affected by the high unemployment rates (Fischer and Modigliani, 1978).3 This hypothesis is supported by an empirical analysis of voting behavior on the state level by Frey and Weck (1981).4 A possible explanation for this relation is offered by relative deprivation theory (Falter and Klein, 1994; Hofstadter, 1963; Lipset, 1963). According to this theory unemployment or the threat of becoming unemployed causes a loss in status and feel- ings of deprivation. As a consequence, people develop a preference for authoritarian leaders, an anti-foreigner ideology, and violent predispositions.5 Despite its intuitive appeal, however, previous emprical evidence on the relation between right-wing extremist crime, racist crime and/or crime against immigrants on the one side and unemployment on the other side is rather mixed (as we discuss below).6 In this study we explore the empirical relationship between unemployment and violent and non-violent right-wing crimes in Germany. We use these finding to better understand the sources of the higher incidence of right-wing extremist crimes in East Germany. Our main results are as follows. First, we find a significantly positive relation between state level unemployment and the incidence of right-wing extremist crimes. Importantly, this relation 3To illustrate: the unemployment rate was 14.4 percent in 1930, and the Nazi-party NSDAP (National Socialist German Labor Party) received 18.3 percent of the votes in the elections for the German Reichstag. In the elections of 1932, when unemployment had reached a level of 26.6 percent, 37.3 percent of the voters voted in favor of the NSDAP. Note, however, that the political environment in Germany at the onset of the great depression is hardly comparable to the current one. Hence a one-to-one comparison between now and then is clearly problematic. 4It should be noted that, even though increasing unemployment may have causally affected the increasing support for the Nazi party, this does not mean that the unemployed voted predominantely for the Nazis. In fact, as shown in an interesting recent paper by King et al. (2008), the unemployed voted disproportionately for the communist party. 5A related literature on subjective well being shows that unemployment significantly reduces subjective well- being (Clark and Oswald, 1994; Frey and Stutzer, 2002; Winkelmann and Winkelmann, 1998). Yang and Lester (1994) even show that the suicide rate of unemployed in the U.S. is significantly higher than the one of the employed. 6On a more general level, most studies do find a significant association between unemployment and non- violent forms of crime, but often no relation with violent forms of crime. See, inter alia, Raphael and Winter- Ebmer (2001) for the US, Carmichael and Ward (2001) for the UK, Fougère et al. (2009) for France, and Entorf and Spengler (2000) for Germany. See also Freeman (1999) for a more general discussion of the economic analysis of crime. 3 turns out to be robust to the inclusion of state fixed effects and state-specific time trends. Second, we find that a large fraction of the difference in right-wing extremist crimes between East and West Germany can be explained by the much higher unemployment rates in Eastern states. In particular, we estimate the impact of unemployment on right-wing crime separately for states with high and low incidence of unemployment and we find a very similar impact of unemployment on right-wing crime both in high-unemployment East German states and in high-unemployment West German states. In contrast, we do not find find any such relationship for low-unemployment states. Thus the relationship between unemployment and right-wing extremist crimes is not a particular East German phenomenon. Instead, our estimates point to the importance of non-linearities: the relationship between right-wing crimes and unemploy- ment becomes relevant only once a critical level of unemployment has been exceeded. We also study whether unemployment has differential impacts on violent and non-violent right-wing crimes. As laid out in more detail in the next section, these two categories comprise very dif- ferent types of crime. For non-violent crimes, all results are very similar to the ones obtained from analyzing the total incidence of crime, including the non-linearity in the impact of unem- ployment. On the other hand, we do not find a strong relationship between unemployment and violent crimes. A final interesting result shows that total unemployment predicts the incidence of right-wing crime better than youth unemployment. Prima facie this finding is surprising since right-wing criminals are typically young men between 15 and 25 years (Neubacher, 1998; Willems et al., 1993). One could therefore expect that youth unemployment affects these crim- inals more directly. However, unemployment may affect right-wing crime not (or not only) at the individual level. In other words, crimes are not necessarily committed by those who are actually unemployed and unemployment may thus affect right-wing crime in a more complex way. One possible interpretation is that high unemployment increases the fear of losing a job. This in turn may lower people’s willingness to support humanitarian values of tolerance and altruism. As a consequence, in a high-unemployment environment the normative pressure against right-wing criminals may eradicate. There are only few studies that support the hypothesis that current economic conditions, such as unemployment, have a signficant impact on crimes motivated by right-wing extrem- ist, anti-foreigner, or racist attitudes. One study that provides empirical support for such a relationship is Dustmann et al. (2004) who investigate the determinants of racial harass- ment in the UK. Using individual data with information on self-reported experience of racial 4 harassment, they find that minority individuals in high-unemployment neighborhoods are sig- nificantly more frequently harassed. They argue that this could either indicate “(...) that unemployment provokes greater hostility in the expression of negative attitudes or (...) it puts a pool of unemployed individuals into contact with others in circumstances where hos- tile outcomes can easily occur” (p.23). These results differ from those in Green et al. (1998) who study the determinants of crimes against non-whites (Asian, Latinos, and blacks) in New York City. They find that racially motivated crimes are most frequent in predominantly white areas and in areas that experienced strong in-migration of minorities. However, a higher local unemployment rate among whites does not affect the incidence of such crimes nor is there an interaction between high unemployment and high in-migration of minorities.7 To the best of our knowledge, the only study that empirically investigates the impact of unemployment on right-wing extremist crime in recent Germany is Krueger and Pischke (1997). They regress the incidence of anti-foreigner crimes in Germany on unemployment rates in the period between 1991 and 1993. Lacking official data they collected county-level crime data on these crimes based on newspaper reports. They report a significant relation between unemployment and crime incidents. This relation, however, becomes insignificant after controlling for the differences between East and West Germany. Several reasons may be responsible for why their result differs from ours: first, since they rely on newspaper data, the precision of measurement is potentially questionable. Second, they analyze violent crimes only. This is due to the fact that non-violent crimes are typically not reported in the newspapers. In our data, which comprises violent and non-violent crimes, the incidence of violent crimes as a fraction of all crimes is only about 6 percent in West Germany and about 9 percent in East Germany. Our sample comprises 44,403 crimes in absolute terms, whereas the one of Krueger and Pischke (1997) identified “only” 1,056 such crimes. Thus they analyze only a relatively small proportion of all committed right-wing extremist crimes. Moreover, as our results show, the association between violent crimes and unemployment is much weaker than for non-violent crimes. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section we present the data and some preliminary empirical evidence. We discuss our empirical strategy in section 3. In section 7See also Krueger and Malečková (2003) who investigate the link between poverty (or low education) and politically motivated violence and terrorist activities. Using data on public opinion polls conducted in the West Bank and Gaza Strip they find that support for violent attacks against Israeli targets does not decrease among those with higher education and higher living standards. 5 4 we present and discuss our empirical findings. Section 5 concludes. 2 Data and descriptive evidence To assess the role of unemployment on right-wing crime we use official crime statistics (“Polizei- liche Kriminalstatistik”). The data have been collected by the Federal Criminal Police Office (“Bundeskriminalamt”) and have not been analyzed previously. The data set uses information reported by the police departments in the various German states (“Länder”) on a monthly basis.8 The variable to be explained is the number of registered right-wing extremist crimes (REC) per 100,000 inhabitants. The Federal Criminal Police Office classifies right-wing ex- tremist criminal activities in “violent right-wing extremist crimes” and “non-violent right-wing extremist crimes”. The former include offenses such as murder and attempted murder, bomb and fire attacks, assault and battery, offenses against the laws relating to civil disorders and rioting. The latter include sedition, disruption of graveyard peace, threat/coercion, right-wing extremist propaganda, willful damage to property, and so on. While our empirical analysis be- low will concentrate on the role of unemployment as a determinant of total right-wing crimes, we will also look separately at the two subcategories of non-violent and violent right-wing crimes. The focus of our analysis is on the period from 1996 to 1999 for which consistent data are available.9 More than 10,000 right-wing extremist crimes per year were officially registered within this period, of which 93.2% were non-violent and 6.8% were violent right-wing crimes. Among non-violent RECs, 65% were right-wing propaganda delicts and “other” right-wing extremist activities, and 35% of all non-violent crimes were hate crimes against foreigners and crimes with anti-Semitic background. Among violent crimes, 65% of the cases were hate crimes against immigrants. Figure 1 8Official crime records are well known to be prone to measurement error (Skogan, 1974). The most obvious problem is reporting behavior of victims. It could also be that what is classified as a right-wing extremist criminal activity by the police varies across states and/or changes over time (e.g. as a consequence of increased media attention). This is potentially important in the German case because the police falls under state responsibility meaning that results may merely reflect state-differences in definitions and/or systematic changes in these definitions over time (see also footnote 9 below). 9There are two important breaks in the data. First, until the end of 1995, both the Federal Criminal Police Office as well as the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (“Bundesverfassungsschutz”) collected data on REC. From 1996 onwards, both offices registered only those offences as REC which were reported as such by the corresponding police authority of the involved state. Second, in an attempt to harmonize the assessment and reporting of politically motivated offences across the states, there has been a major change in the collection and registration of such crimes at the end of the 1990s. We therefore only analyze data from the period 1996 until 1999. 6 Panel (a) of Figure 1 reports the total number of registered right-wing extremist crimes per 100,000 inhabitants and the overall unemployment rate in Germany over the period 1996 to 1999. Over this period, the total REC rate averaged about 1.4 crimes per 100,000 residents and average total unemployment was about 12.7% in the same period. Panel (b) shows the absolute number of non-violent and violent criminal activities. The total number of RECs amounted to about 800 cases per month (1.4 cases per 100,000 residents) for non-violent RECs and about 60 cases per month (0.1 cases per 100,000 residents) for violent RECs. While both series show considerable fluctuations over time, none of them has a clear underlying trend within the observation period (note, however, that trending behavior of the unemployment rate may be an issue). Figure 2 Do the data suggest any systematic relationship between REC rates and unemployment rates? Figure 2 gives a first hint on this issue. In each panel, the vertical axis shows REC rates per 100,000 residents and the horizontal axis refers to the unemployment rate. Panel (a) pools all available month-state observations. This figure shows a clear positive correlation between the unemployment rate and total REC rates. Panel (b) shows the aggregate time- series relationship (i.e. each data point refers to the country-wide REC and unemployment rates of a particular month), while panel (c) aggregates over time and shows the differences in REC and unemployment rates across states. Overall, Figure 2 displays a very clear picture: Both time-series and cross-sectional variation indicate a clear positive relationship between the two variables of interest. Table 1 One issue that received considerable attention in the German public debate relates to the question whether right-wing criminal activities are primarily a problem of the “new states”, the East German states that formed the communist Democratic Republic of Germany. The issue here is to which extent the higher incidence of right-wing extremism in East Germany is rooted in historical and political post-WWII differences, and to which extent it is related to the weak economic performance and, in particular, to the high unemployment rates in the East. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics on East-West differences in unemployment and right-wing extremist crimes. In fact, East-West differences of right-wing extremist crimes are dramatic: over the period 1996-1999, the total monthly REC rate in the Eastern states amounted to 7 2.575 per 100,000 residents, almost three times as high as in the Western states (0.914 crimes per 100,000 residents). Furthermore, the fraction of violent crimes in total RECs was 9.2% in East Germany, almost 1.5 times higher than in the West. Table 1 also shows the difference in total unemployment and youth unemployment between the new and the old states. East-West differences are also dramatic along this dimension. The average unemployment rate in the Eastern states was 17.6%, which compares to 10.5% in Western states. Interestingly, with respect to youth unemployment, East and West German states do not differ that much. The mean youth unemployment rate of East German states over the observation period is 15.7%, compared to 12.2% in the West. 3 Empirical strategy The preceding evidence focuses exclusively on unconditional correlations between REC and unemployment rates. It is clear, however, that not only levels of unemployment but also other state-characteristics may play a potentially important role to explain the incidence of REC rates across states and time. Our empirical analysis focuses on two basic models. The first model pools all data and runs a simple regression of the following form: RECit = α + β · URit + xitγ + εit, (1) where RECit measures the number of right-wing crimes in state i in month t, URit is the overall unemployment rate, and xit is a vector of (potentially) time-variant state characteristics. The error term εit captures unobserved determinants of crime rates and measurement and/or classification errors. The coefficient β captures the impact of unemployment on crime and is of primary interest. In order to rule out any spurious correlation that results from fluctuations in that variable across seasons, we use the seasonally adjusted unemployment rate throughout. Finally, the vector of coefficients γ estimates the impact of other control variables on registered crime rates. Our second basic model controls for permanent differences in REC rates across states and for differences in REC trends across states. Accounting for such differences is potentially important in the German case. On the one hand, the data are generated by reporting of crimes to the police. Because the police in Germany is under state responsibility, observed REC differences may simply reflect state-differences in REC definitions or reporting and/or 8 systematic changes in definitions and reporting over time. On the other hand, there are many other differences across states in Germany, particularly between Eastern and Western states that could have led to differential trends in REC-rates between states. To account in a flexible way for such state-differences we estimate the following econcometric model: RECit = αi + β · URit + δit + δ′it 2 + �it (2) This model allows for time-invariant state fixed effects by estimating a set of state-specific intercepts αi. Moreover, it also adds state-specific quadratic time trends, captured by the two parameter vectors δi and δ′i. Note that model (2) does not acount for additional control variables because the variables contained in xit have actually only little variation within states. In other words, the effect of xit is essentially captured by state the fixed effects αi. The parameter β now captures the effect of changes in the unemployment rate on right-wing crimes within states. The error term �it accounts for both time-variant unobserved heterogeneity and measurement or classification errors. In comparison, model (2) offers two main advantages over model (1). First, it accounts for unobserved heterogeneity across states in a very flexible way. Second, it takes the potential trending of the unemployment rate (see figure 1) into account whereas model (1) neglects the longitudinal dimension in the data. Note that both models represent associations at the level of the state, while the structural model of interest is at the individual level. Therefore, both models are estimated by weighted least squares, using the population size of the states as weights.10 In order to take potential serial correlation of the error term into account – and Figure 1 suggests that serial correlation may indeed be an issue – we use standard errors that are clustered at the state-level throughout, allowing for arbitrary correlation of the regression errors within states.11 In the empirical analysis below, we also present some additional model specifications. First, we also estimate the model in differences, as Figure 1 suggests that unemployment might be characterized by high temporal persistence. Second, we also estimate several dynamic variants of the model 10Weighting by the population size of the states is very natural when working with data that represent state- specific averages (Wooldridge, 2008). However, the results do not hinge on using WLS instead of OLS (compare columns (1) and (2) of table A.1). 11Columns (4) to (6) of table A.1 present alternative ways of dealing with serially correlated errors. It turns out, however, that the exact way of dealing with this issue does not matter much. The model in the fourth column uses quarterly data instead of monthly data. Next, column (5) shows estimates from a model with AR(1) errors. Finally, we have re-estimated the baseline model by GMM. Clearly, using clustered standard errors may yield conservative standard errors (compare the standard errors across columns (2) to (6) of Table A.1, for example) and thus the reported standard errors are likely to provide an upper bound. 9 given in equation (2). Dynamic models not only provide an alternative way of dealing with serial correlation in the error term, they also allow us to test whether there is a lagged rather than an immediate impact of unemployment on REC rates. 4 Empirical results 4.1 The relationship between unemplyoment and REC Table 2 shows the impact of total unemployment on total REC rates under alternative spec- ifications in simple WLS regressions. The first column of Table 2 shows the unemployment coefficient from a regression that does neither include control variables, nor state fixed effects, nor any deterministic time trend. This coefficient indicates that an increase in the unemploy- ment rate by one percentage point significantly increases the number of total REC cases by 0.168 cases per 100,000 residents. Evaluated at sample averages, this implies an elasticity of total RECs with respect to unemployment of 1.61 (= (0.168 · 10.820)/1.127). The second column in Table 2 accounts for additional variables which may potentially affect right-wing extremist crime. We include economic and demographic variables such as per-capita income, education, the population share of young males and of foreigners, as well as urban and rural population shares. We further control for policy variables such as crime conviction rates and expenditures of regional governments for facilities and support of the young population, as well as expenditures for social welfare.12 The goodness-of-fit (adjusted R-squared) increases strongly, from 0.511 without these regressors to 0.669 once these regressors are included. Fur- thermore, the inclusion of these covariates decreases the point estimate of the unemployment rate considerably, but the coefficient is still highly significant and quantitatively important, with an implied elasticity at sample means of about 1.27 (= (0.132 · 10.820)/1.127). Table 2 The coefficients of the first two columns in Table 2 are based on pooled data, i.e. on our basic model given by equation (1). It is possible, however, that the unemployment coefficient is correlated with the error term as unobserved state-characteristics may affect both, unemploy- 12The full list of included control variables is as follows: Real per capita GDP, the fraction of the male population that is aged between 15 and 25, the population share of foreigners, the fraction of the population living in either small (less than 5,000 inhabitants) or large (more than 500,000 inhabitants) communities, the fraction of school leavers with either “Hauptschulabschluss”, “Realschulabschluss”, or “ Fachhochschulreife”, the probability of conviction (for violent and non-violent crimes separately), real youth welfare service spending per male inhabitant aged between 18 and 25, and real social welfare spending per capita. 10 ment and REC rates. Futhermore, it turns out that the included control variables have very little variation over time and most of their effect is identified from variation between states. Given the limited within-state variation in control variables, column (3) reports the results of the a fixed effects model that does not include additional control variables. These fixed-effects pick up variation in REC rates that arise from time-invariant state-characteristics, for example from differences in reporting behavior to the police. The resulting unemployment coefficient is equal to 0.159. Notice also that the simple fixed effects model performs better than the pooled model with covariates: the adjusted R-squared increases from 0.663 to 0.751. Column (4) extends this specification by additionally including state-specific quadratic time-trends. This specification yields an unemployed coefficient of 0.204. It also turns out that including time-trends is important in terms of the fraction of explained variance, the adjusted R-squared increases further to 0.805. The last two rows of Table 2 display the estimated (first-order) autocorrelation in the error term, using a simple regression-based test proposed in Wooldridge (2008). While the estimated coefficient is quite high in the pooled regressions, it drops strongly when fixed effects and state-specific time trends are included. In what follows, our empirical analysis concentrates on the specification of column (4). Table 3 Table 3 present the results from some additional model specifications (the first column redisplays our preferred model from Table 2). First, we estimate the relation between REC and unemployment in first differences, as unemployment may have quite some persistence (see Figure 1 again). However, column (2) shows that very similar estimates result independent of whether the model is estimated in differences or in levels (as long as time trends are in- cluded). The remaining six columns show several dynamic models, including either lags of the dependent variable or lags of the unemployment rate. More specifically, columns (4) to (6) test for a lagged impact of the dependent variable. It turns out that both 3-months and 6-months lags do not have an important impact but that the 12-months lag does, suggesting some seasonal pattern in REC rates (see Figure 1). This is underlined by the fact that the esti- mated first-order autocorrelation of the error term turns out to be insignificant in this specific model. Nonetheless, estimating such a dynamic specification does not change the size nor the statistical significance of the unemployment coefficient. Columns (7) to (9) add different lags of the unemployment rate. It appears that the relation between unemployment and right-wing crime is very immediate, as none of the lagged unemployment coefficients turns out to be sta- 11 tistically significant. Finally, including different lags of both the dependent variable and the unemployment rate at the same time yields qualitatively the same results, as shown in the final column. In sum, the additional results of Table 3 suggest that the impact of unemployment on right-wing extremist crimes is quite robust. Unemployment seems to have a signficantly positive and quantitatively important impact on right-wing extremist crimes. To get a sense of the quantitative importance of the estimates, let us calculate the effects on the total REC rate predicted by a one-standard-deviation increase in the unemployment rate, using the unemployment coefficient of the model shown in column (4) of Table 2 as benchmark. The overall standard deviation in observed unemployment rates amounts to 3.732. This implies that the impact on total REC rates predicted by such a change in the unemployment rate equals 0.761 (= 0.204 · 3.732). This compares to an observed standard deviation of total REC rates of 0.874. Hence we reach the conclusions that increasing the unemployment rate by one standard deviation predicts an increases on total REC rates equal to 87% of the standard deviation of REC rates observed in the data. In any event, this suggests a very close link between unemployment and REC rates. However, we also acknowledge that there remain some potential problems as regards identification and that we can not definitely settle the causality issue.13 4.2 Accounting for REC-differences between East and West Germany An important issue in the German public debate has been whether the higher incidence of right-wing extremism in East Germany is a phenomenon related to particular historical or political circumstances; or whether this is due to the worse economic conditions in East Ger- many, in particular with respect to unemployment. Individuals in East Germany grew up in a communist political system while West Germans experienced democracy and a social market economy. This political history and the associated differences in political cultures may have strongly affected the preferences and attitudes of individuals in the two regions even after the re-unification of the country (Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln, 2007). The absence of political participation under the communist regime may have led East Germans to distrust their own 13Specifically, the unemployment rate and the error term could be correlated for several distinct reasons. For example, it may be the case that law enforcement increases in states where unemployment increases which would induce correlation between the unemployment rate and the error term (one could also argue the other way around, however). We also note, however, that studies that instrument for the unemployment rate suggest that such effects may have only a minor impact; see Raphael and Winter-Ebmer (2001) or Fougère et al. (2009), for example. 12 government and undermined democratic and liberal thinking. This may well have made East Germans more receptive for extremist “ideologies” and activities. A second explanation em- phasizes the particular economic problems to which East Germans are exposed. The process of transition from a socialist to a market economy that has begun with the fall of the Iron Curtain and the German reunification of the early 1990s imposed particular hardship on many individuals in East Germany. As a result of job loss and unemployment, many individuals found themselves – at least in relative terms – as economic losers. Unemployment is associated with occupational downgrading, loss of human capital, and little hope for rapid and significant improvement. The particularly bad labor market conditions in East Germany may have gen- erated a social climate conducive to right-wing criminal activities. According to this view, the high unemployment rates in the East, rather than other specific circumstances not necessarily related to the labor market, explain the difference in the incidence of RECs between the old and the new states. In what follows we use the above results to shed light on this issue. We take as a benchmark the results from our preferred specification (as given in column (4) of Table 2). Assuming that this model is a reasonable description of the relation between REC and unemployment, we can decompose the observed REC-differences between East and West Germany into (i) a component that is due to differences in unemployment and (ii) a component that is due to other (observed and unobserved) differences between the two regions. In other words, we use our estimated coefficient for the following thought experiment: to which level would East German REC rates decrease, would unemployment rates in East-Germany go down to West-German levels? The East-West difference in total REC rates amounts to 1.741 (= 2.570 - 0.824) and the difference in average unemployment rates amounts to 8.062 percentage points (see Table 1). Using our benchmark estimates, the predicted reduction in REC rates would amount to 1.645 (= 0.204 · 8.062). In other words, about 64% of the observed REC-difference between East and West Germany can be attributed to differences in unemployment. Table 4 In Table 4 we analyze in more detail the origins of East-West differences in REC rates. For instance, it could be that RECs in East Germany react more strongly to changes in unemploy- ment than in West Germany. Alternatively, there could be non-linearities in the relationship between unemployment and crime. One explanation for such a non-linear relationship may be related to the enforcement of social norms. The hypothesis is that right-wing extremist crime 13 is an interactive process between right-wing extremist criminals and a majority of witnesses who fail to enforce social norms against racist and anti-foreigner violence. If a critical level of unemployment is reached, this willingness to enforce norms decreases disproportionately.14 To explore this hypothesis further, Table 4 proceeds in the following way (for comparison reasons, the first column repeats the unemployment coefficient of our baseline specification). First, in column (2), we introduce an interaction effect between a dummy variable indicating an Eastern state and the unemployment rate. This allows us to test for differences in the strength of the unemployment-REC relationship between the two regions. It turns out that the point estimate of the interaction effect is positive and quantitatively large – indicating that, indeed, the incidence of RECs in East Germany increases more strongly to a given change in the unemployment rate. However, the estimated effect is not statistically significant. We then proceed by checking whether there are non-linearities in the relationship between unemploy- ment and REC rates: at modest levels of unemployment, right-wing criminal activities may be low and almost unrelated to rates of unemployment but once a critical level of unemployment has been reached, a further increase in unemployment strongly increases right-wing criminal activities. In fact, Figure 2 suggests there may be non-linearities: it appears as if there is only a weak correlation at low unemployment levels but a strong one at higher levels. Column (3) of Table 4 therefore allows for differential effects of unemployment on right-wing extremist crime under high-unemployment and low-unemployment circumstances. To this end we include a dummy variable, 1(URit > URit), in the regression that takes the value 1 if unemployment in state i and month t is above the mean unemployment rate observed in the whole sample (equal to 10.82%). We then interact this dummy with the difference between the observed and the mean umployment rate. This spline-specification allows for a piecewise linear relationship between the unemployment rate and REC. In particular, we can test whether the relationship between unemployment and REC rates becomes stronger when unemployment exceeds its av- erage value. The estimates reported in Table 4 support the explanation based on a non-linear impact of unemployment on REC. When unemployment falls short of the average unemploy- ment, a one percentage point increase in the unemployment rate does hardly affect total REC rates (the corresponding point estimate is very small, -0.002, and does not reach statistical 14As an extreme example, we refer to the riots in the cities of Rostock and Hoyerswerda (in former East Germany in 1991, mentioned in footnote 1), where foreigners were collectively attacked for several consecutive days. Many residents who witnessed the riot did not only tolerate the violence, but actually supported it by clapping and yelling. 14 significance). In contrast, if unemployment is above average, a one percentage point increase in the unemployment rate increases REC rates by 0.249 (= 0.251 − 0.002). Finally, let us make a similar thought experiment as above but now using the estimates of column (3) of Table 4. Bringing down the Eastern unemployment rate down to the Western unemployment rate, which requires a reduction in unemployment of 6.682 percentage points to the average unemployment rate and further 1.38 percentage points to the Western rate, would lead to an estimated reduction in Eastern REC rates of 1.591 (= (17.502 − 10.820) · (−0.251 − 0.002) + 0.329 − (10.820 − 9.440) · (−0.002)) cases per 100,000 residents. In other words, the estimated effects column (3) of Table 4 suggests that the East-West gap in unemployment rates explains about 78% of the difference in REC in this hypothetical scenario. 4.3 Extensions Non-violent versus violent right-wing extremist crimes The preceding results all relate to the incidence of total right-wing extremist crimes, i.e. to both non-violent and violent crimes. As mentioned before, however, these two categories comprise very different types of crimes. A separate analysis is therefore quite important for a better understanding and an assessment of the costs of right-wing extremist crimes to society. Table 5 addresses this issue by showing respective results once REC rates are differentiated by non-violent and violent crimes. Table 5 The left panel of Table 5 shows estimates of the impact of unemployment on violent RECs and the right panel shows analogous estimates for non-violent RECs. First, notice that the estimated coefficient is smaller in absolute value in the violent REC regressions. This is due to the fact that violent crimes are less than 10% of all crimes.15 For violent crimes, the pooled model without co-variates shows a significant coefficient, which becomes insignificant once we control for state fixed effects and state-specific trends. Again it may be interesting to consider possible non-linearities as before for total crime rates. This is done in column (3) of Table 5. In contrast to overall crimes, violent crimes do not seem to be significantly affected by unemployment. While the corresponding point estimate indicates a steeper slope once 15Note, however, that in terms of severeness and damage a violent crime is much worse than a non-violent one. 15 unemployment exceeds the average unemployment rate (as indicated by the positive coefficient of the interaction term), this effect is not statistically significant. This result resembles the one obtained by Krueger and Pischke (1997), who report no significant impact of unemployment on predominantly violent right-wing extremist crimes for Germany in the early 1990s. With respect to non-violent RECs (the right panel of Table 5) the picture resembles very closely the one obtained for total REC rates. Columns (4) and (5) show that the coefficient on unemployment estimated from the pooled model without control variables is highly statistically significant, albeit somewhat smaller in size than in the total REC regressions. It becomes somewhat larger once we allow for state-fixed effects and state-specific time trends. Allowing for different unemployment coefficients for high- and low-unemployment environments yields essentially the same picture as in the total REC regressions: unemployment has a strong impact when unemployment is high but it does not affect REC-incidence at lower levels of unemployment. Youth unemployment versus total unemployment One could argue that a large pool of unemployed individuals implies a large pool of potential committers of right-wing extremist crimes. Provided that the experience of unemployment induces individuals to commit right-wing criminal activities, one would expect that youth unemployment – rather than total unemployment – is a better measure for the potential impact of unemployment on crime. To examine this hypothesis, we rerun some of the key regressions of Tables 2 and 4 with the youth unemployment rather than the total unemployment rate as the explanatory variable (see Table 6). In all other respects, the regressions are identical. Table 6 The first two columns in Table 6 report the unemployment coefficients for the basic model given by equation (2) and for the extended model that allows for differences in unemployment rates between high/low unemployment regions and East/West. A clear picture emerges from these results: the youth unemployment rate (YUR) does not have a significant impact on REC rates. All YUR-coefficients of Table 6 are insignificant. Allowing for heterogenous unemploy- ment effects yields a qualitatively similar picture as above. However, the youth unemployment coefficients are quantitatively much smaller and statistically insignificant. When we include the overall unemployment rate in addition to the youth unemployment rate, however, it turns out 16 that the overall unemployment rate remains highly significant and of quantitative magnitude comparable to the previous estimates while the youth unemployment rate remains statistically insignificant (the point estimate becomes even negative). As an alternative specification we included the youth unemployment rate relative to the overall unemployment as an indicator of the prevalence of youth unemployment problems. Again, it turns out that overall unem- ployment is the dominant variable whereas the ratio of youth unemployment relative to total unemployment is insignificant. Obviously, the relationship between unemployment and RECs is not a simple one. An explanation that rests upon the hypothesis that higher unemployment increases the pool of potential committers does not seem to be supported by the data. As committers of RECs are typically younger individuals, the above hypothesis is certainly not consistent with the weak/absent effect of youth unemployment on RECs reported in Table 5. We will come back to this issue in the final section. 5 Conclusions The above evidence on right-wing crime suggests a strong and systematic relationship between regional unemployment and the occurrence of right-wing activity. First, we find a significantly positive relation between state level unemployment and the incidence of right-wing extremist crimes. The relation remains significant once we control for state fixed effects and state-specific time trends and take serial correlation of the error term into account. Second, we find that the dramatic differences in right-wing extremist crimes between East and West Germany can be explained almost entirely by the gap in unemployment rates between the two regions. This conclusion is further strengthened by the result that the relationship between unemployment and right-wing extremist crime is non-linear. At low levels of unemployment, a one-percentage point increase in the unemployment rate has a very small and statistically insignificant effect on the incidence of right-wing extremist crimes. In contrast, at high levels of unemployment this relationship becomes very strong. This suggests that right-wing extremist activities may become particularly problematic once unemployment has reached some critical level. It is an interesting possibility that a non-linear relationship may be related to the enforcement of social norms. The hypothesis is that right-wing extremist crimes is an interactive process between active right-wing extremist criminals and passive witnesses (family, friends, society in general) who fail to enforce social norms against racist and anti-foreigner violence. When one’s 17 willingness to enforce norms is influenced by own unemployment experience (or the fear to lose the job) high unemployment leads these norms to erode. Moreover, when a critical mass of individuals who are unwilling to actively support the social norm exists, right-wing extrimists may be disproportionately encouraged to commit hate crimes. Our empirical analysis also reveals a differential impact of unemployment on violent and non-violent right-wing crimes, two categories that comprise of very different types of crimes. For non-violent crimes, our results are very similar to the ones obtained from analyzing the total incidence of crime, including the non-linearity in the impact of unemployment. In contrast, we do not find a strong relationship between unemployment and violent crime. A final interesting result shows that total unemployment predicts the incidence of right-wing crime better than youth unemployment. Prima facie this finding is surprising since right-wing criminals are typically young men between 15 and 25 years (Neubacher, 1998; Willems et al., 1993). In sum, our empirical evidence suggests a systematic effect of regional unemployment on right-wing extremist criminal activities. The estimated effect is statistically highly significant and quantitatively large. Notice, however, that our results do not (or not necessarily) imply that those who are actually unemployed are more likely to commit right-wing extremist crimes. This view is supported by our finding that - despite the fact that most crimes are committed by young men - youth unemployment has a much weaker effect on right-wing crimes than total unemployment. In our view high regional unemployment affects right-wing crime in a rather complex way, in particular it affects not only those who are currently unemployed. It seems very likely that living in a region with a high unemployment rate increases the fear of losing a job. This fear may negatively affect attitudes towards foreigners, creating a demand for scapegoats and lowering people’s willingness to enforce norms and to support humanitarian values of tolerance and altruism. As a consequence anti foreigner resentments develop and the normative pressure against committing right-wing crime eradicates.16 As an example, we refer to the riots in the cities of Rostock and Hoyerswerda (in former East Germany in 1991, mentioned in footnote 1), where foreigners were collectively attacked for several consecutive days. Many residents who witnessed the riot, did not only tolerate the violence but actually supported it by clapping and yelling. This example illustrates that right-wing crime is an interactive process. It requires not only psychopathic people who are 16Sampson et al. (1997) use a similar argument, namely that social cohesion among neighbors is linked to the incidence of violence. Their empirical analysis shows that different measures of social cohesion are indeed correlated with variation in violence. 18 ready to lay violent hands on others (and who need not necessarily be unemployed) but also the majority of witnesses who fail to enforce social norms against (anti-foreigner) violence. If high unemployment rates reduce this willingness to enforce norms, unemployment may therefore be associated with right-wing crime, even though the actual criminals are not unemployed.17 17In fact, the available evidence based on individual data lends no (or only weak) support to the hypothesis that unemployed individuals are more likely to engage in right-wing extremist activities. Wahl (2001, 2003), for example, concludes that there is only a weak indication that individual unemployment is a key factor for committing right-wing extremist crimes. Bacher (2001a,b) studies attitudes towards foreigners and Jews in Germany and finds that unemployment seems to activate and enforce existing latent anti-foreigner predisposi- tions. Fertig and Schmidt (2002) find only a small or insignificant impact of being unemployed or being afraid of losing a job on attitudes towards foreigners. Gang et al. (2002) identify the degree of competition in the labor market with immigrants as a major factor of negative attitudes towards immigrants, but they do not find any significant difference between employed and unemployed was detected. Bauer et al. (2000) find that being unemployed does not significantly change natives’ answers to the question whether immigration should be reduced. The evidence presented in Siedler (2006), however, suggests that young Germans are more likely to develop right-wing extremist and xenophobic attitudes if their parents experienced unemployment. 19 References Alesina, A. and Fuchs-Schündeln, N. (2007). 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Yang, B. and Lester, D. (1994). Crime and unemployment. Journal of Socio-Economics, 23(1-2), 215–22. 22 Table 1: Right-wing extremist crime and unemployment in East and West Germany, 1996-1999 West Germany East Germany Total Difference Total right-wing extremist crime (REC) rate 0.829 2.570 1.127 1.741 (0.381) (1.118) (0.874) (0.332) Violent crimes as fraction of total REC 0.057 0.087 0.062 0.030 (0.042) (0.061) (0.047) (0.019) Unemployment rate (UR) 9.440 17.502 10.820 8.061 (2.243) (1.758) (3.732) (0.946) Youth unemployment rate (YUR) 10.653 15.482 11.480 4.829 (3.277) (1.799) (3.572) (1.198) Number of observations 528 240 768 768 Notes: Total REC rate corresponds to the total registered rightist extremist crimes per 100,000 inhabitants. Youth unemployment rate refers to persons below age 25 only. The two unemployment rates are seasonally adjusted. All table entries are weighted by the population size of the states. Standard deviations (columns (1) to (3)) and standard errors (final column) in parentheses, respectively. Standard errors are in the last column are adjusted for clustering at the state level. 23 Table 2: Unemployment and RECs Dependent variable: REC Total Mean 1.127 Standard deviation 0.874 UR 0.168 0.132 0.159 0.204 (0.032)??? (0.045)?? (0.070)?? (0.079)?? Controls No Yes No No State fixed effects No No Yes Yes State-specific trends No No No Yes Constant −0.686 14.329 −1.165 −1.040 (0.327)? (5.363)?? (1.192) (1.140) Observations 768 768 768 768 R2 0.511 0.669 0.756 0.817 Adjusted R2 0.511 0.663 0.751 0.805 Coefficient on lagged �̂ 0.719 0.584 0.420 0.234 (0.026)??? (0.031)??? (0.034)??? (0.037)??? Notes: ?, ??, ??? denotes statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively. All regressions are estimated by WLS, using the population size of the states as weights. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses and are clustered at the state level. The full list of control variables is given in footnote 12. The coefficient on lagged �̂ is the estimated slope parameter from a regression of �̂it on �̂it−1. 24 T ab le 3: U n em p lo ym en t an d R E C s: A lt er n at iv e an d d yn am ic sp ec ifi ca ti on s D ep en d en t va ri ab le : R E C T ot al D 1. R E C T ot al R E C T ot al M ea n 1. 12 7 − 0. 00 1 1. 12 7 S ta n d ar d d ev ia ti on 0. 87 4 0. 45 9 0. 87 4 U R 0. 20 4 0. 24 1 0. 23 1 0. 19 5 0. 24 3 0. 22 7 0. 20 8 0. 16 9 (0 .0 79 )? ? (0 .0 75 )? ? ? (0 .0 67 )? ? ? (0 .0 90 )? ? (0 .0 67 )? ? ? (0 .0 68 )? ? ? (0 .0 83 )? ? (0 .0 71 )? ? D 1. U R 0. 29 1 (0 .0 94 )? ? ? L 3. R E C T ot al − 0. 05 5 − 0. 03 9 (0 .0 59 ) (0 .0 54 ) L 6. R E C T ot al − 0. 09 4 0. 00 7 (0 .0 66 ) (0 .0 49 ) L 12 .R E C T ot al 0. 25 9 0. 23 9 (0 .0 31 )? ? ? (0 .0 27 )? ? ? L 3. U R − 0. 01 2 0. 06 7 (0 .0 71 ) (0 .0 61 ) L 6. U R − 0. 06 8 − 0. 08 0 (0 .0 40 ) (0 .0 59 ) L 12 .U R 0. 08 5 0. 01 5 (0 .0 95 ) (0 .0 71 ) C on st an t − 1. 04 0 − 0. 00 3 − 1. 17 5 − 0. 63 1 0. 55 2 − 1. 15 3 0. 09 9 − 0. 32 4 2. 82 9 (1 .1 40 ) (0 .0 03 ) (1 .1 29 ) (0 .9 12 ) (1 .5 80 ) (1 .2 94 ) (1 .0 17 ) (1 .9 23 ) (1 .2 65 )? ? O b se rv at io n s 76 8 75 2 72 0 67 2 57 6 72 0 67 2 57 6 57 6 R 2 0. 81 7 0. 01 5 0. 83 1 0. 82 9 0. 87 0 0. 83 0 0. 82 8 0. 85 8 0. 87 0 A d ju st ed R 2 0. 80 5 0. 01 4 0. 81 9 0. 81 5 0. 85 7 0. 81 8 0. 81 4 0. 84 5 0. 85 6 C oe ffi ci en t on la gg ed �̂ 0. 23 4 − 0. 35 0 0. 25 3 0. 21 2 0. 04 9 0. 26 3 0. 22 5 0. 09 8 0. 05 0 (0 .0 37 )? ? ? (0 .0 35 )? ? ? (0 .0 38 )? ? ? (0 .0 40 )? ? ? (0 .0 43 ) (0 .0 39 )? ? ? (0 .0 40 )? ? ? (0 .0 44 )? ? (0 .0 41 ) N o te s: ? , ? ? , ? ? ? d e n o te s st a ti st ic a l si g n ifi c a n c e a t th e 1 0 % , 5 % , 1 % le v e l, re sp e c ti v e ly . R o b u st st a n d a rd e rr o rs in p a re n th e se s, c lu st e re d a t th e st a te le v e l. A ll m o d e ls a re e st im a te d b y p o p u la ti o n -w e ig h te d le a st sq u a re s a n d in c lu d e st a te fi x e d e ff e c ts a n d st a te -s p e c ifi c q u a d ra ti c ti m e -t re n d s. D 1 .R E C T o ta l a n d D 1 .U R d e n o te s fi rs t d iff e re n c e s o f R E C T o ta l a n d U R , re sp e c ti v e ly . L x .R E C T o ta l a n d L x .U R d e n o te s th e x -m o n th la g o f R E C T o ta l a n d U R , re sp e c ti v e ly . T h e c o e ffi c ie n t o n la g g e d �̂ is th e e st im a te d sl o p e p a ra m e te r fr o m a re g re ss io n o f �̂ i t o n �̂ i t − 1 . 25 Table 4: Unemployment and RECs: Non-linearities Dependent variable: REC Total Mean 1.127 Standard deviation 0.874 UR 0.204 0.127 (0.079)?? (0.163) UR · East 0.097 (0.186) (UR − UR) −0.002 (0.109) 1(UR > UR) −0.329 (0.069)??? (UR − UR) · 1(UR > UR) 0.251 (0.142)? Constant −1.040 −1.329 1.811 (1.140) (1.293) (0.170)??? Observations 768 768 768 R2 0.817 0.817 0.819 Adjusted R2 0.805 0.805 0.806 Coefficient on lagged �̂ 0.234 0.236 0.233 (0.037)??? (0.037)??? (0.037)??? Notes: ?, ??, ??? denotes statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively. All regressions are estimated by population-weighted least squares including state fixed effects, and state-specific quadratic time- trends. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the state level. UR corresponds to the average unemployment rate. 1(·) denotes the indi- cator function. The coefficient on lagged �̂ is the estimated slope parameter from a regression of �̂it on �̂it−1. 26 T ab le 5: U n em p lo ym en t an d n on -v io le nt /v io le nt R E C s D ep en d en t va ri ab le : V io le nt R E C N on -v io le nt R E C M ea n 0. 07 3 1. 05 4 S ta n d ar d d ev ia ti on 0. 08 3 0. 82 0 U R 0. 01 5 0. 00 8 0. 15 3 0. 19 6 (0 .0 02 )? ? ? (0 .0 05 ) (0 .0 32 )? ? ? (0 .0 78 )? ? (U R − U R ) 0. 00 6 − 0. 00 9 (0 .0 08 ) (0 .1 08 ) 1 (U R > U R ) − 0. 03 4 − 0. 29 4 (0 .0 05 )? ? ? (0 .0 68 )? ? ? (U R − U R ) ·1 (U R > U R ) 0. 00 2 0. 24 9 (0 .0 09 ) (0 .1 40 )? S ta te fi xe d eff ec ts N o Y es Y es N o Y es Y es S ta te -s p ec ifi c tr en d s N o Y es Y es N o Y es Y es C on st an t − 0. 08 9 0. 09 9 0. 23 5 − 0. 59 7 − 1. 13 8 1. 57 6 (0 .0 21 )? ? ? (0 .0 69 ) (0 .0 11 )? ? ? (0 .3 20 )? (1 .1 30 ) (0 .1 68 )? ? ? O b se rv at io n s 76 8 76 8 76 8 76 8 76 8 76 8 R 2 0. 44 8 0. 59 5 0. 59 5 0. 48 2 0. 81 6 0. 81 8 A d ju st ed R 2 0. 44 8 0. 56 8 0. 56 7 0. 48 1 0. 80 4 0. 80 6 C oe ffi ci en t on la gg ed �̂ 0. 27 3 0. 01 8 0. 01 9 0. 73 9 0. 24 4 0. 24 3 (0 .0 35 )? ? ? (0 .0 38 ) (0 .0 38 ) (0 .0 25 )? ? ? (0 .0 37 )? ? ? (0 .0 37 )? ? ? N o te s: ? , ? ? , ? ? ? d e n o te s st a ti st ic a l si g n ifi c a n c e a t th e 1 0 % , 5 % , 1 % le v e l, re sp e c ti v e ly . A ll re g re ss io n s a re e st im a te d b y p o p u la ti o n -w e ig h te d le a st sq u a re s. R o b u st st a n d a rd e rr o rs a re g iv e n in p a re n th e se s a n d a re c lu st e re d a t th e st a te le v e l. U R c o rr e sp o n d s to th e a v e ra g e u n e m p lo y m e n t ra te . 1 (· ) d e n o te s th e in d ic a to r fu n c ti o n . T h e c o e ffi c ie n t o n la g g e d �̂ is th e e st im a te d sl o p e p a ra m e te r fr o m a re g re ss io n o f �̂ i t o n �̂ i t − 1 . 27 T ab le 6: T ot al u n em p lo ym en t ve rs u s yo u th u n em p lo ym en t D ep en d en t va ri ab le : R E C T ot al M ea n 1. 12 7 S ta n d ar d d ev ia ti on 0. 87 4 U R 0. 20 4 0. 23 2 0. 19 8 (0 .0 79 )? ? (0 .0 84 )? ? (0 .0 82 )? ? Y U R 0. 05 5 − 0. 00 3 − 0. 03 9 (0 .0 46 ) (0 .0 37 ) (0 .0 33 ) Y U R ·E as t 0. 12 0 (0 .0 80 ) (Y U R − Y U R ) 0. 01 3 (0 .0 68 ) 1 (Y U R > Y U R ) 0. 03 2 (0 .1 16 ) 1 (Y U R − Y U R ) ·( Y U R > Y U R ) 0. 06 6 (0 .0 82 ) U R / Y U R 0. 46 6 (0 .4 27 ) C on st an t − 1. 04 0 1. 22 7 0. 45 7 1. 94 7 − 0. 94 8 − 1. 47 8 (1 .1 40 ) (0 .5 68 )? ? (0 .8 87 ) (0 .0 86 )? ? ? (1 .1 58 ) (1 .1 71 ) O b se rv at io n s 76 8 76 8 76 8 76 8 76 8 76 8 R 2 0. 81 7 0. 81 0 0. 81 1 0. 81 0 0. 81 7 0. 81 7 A d ju st ed R 2 0. 80 5 0. 79 7 0. 79 8 0. 79 7 0. 80 5 0. 80 5 C oe ffi ci en t on la gg ed �̂ 0. 23 4 0. 25 6 0. 25 6 0. 25 7 0. 23 2 0. 23 4 S ta n d ar d er ro r (0 .0 37 )? ? ? (0 .0 37 )? ? ? (0 .0 37 )? ? ? (0 .0 37 )? ? ? (0 .0 37 )? ? ? (0 .0 37 )? ? ? N o te s: ? , ? ? , ? ? ? d e n o te s st a ti st ic a l si g n ifi c a n c e a t th e 1 0 % , 5 % , 1 % le v e l, re sp e c ti v e ly . A ll re g re ss io n s a re e st im a te d b y p o p u la ti o n -w e ig h te d le a st sq u a re s in c lu d in g st a te fi x e d e ff e c ts a n d st a te -s p e c ifi c q u a d ra ti c ti m e -t re n d s. R o b u st st a n d a rd e rr o rs in p a re n th e se s, c lu st e re d a t th e st a te le v e l. Y U R c o rr e sp o n d s to th e a v e ra g e y o u th u n e m p lo y m e n t ra te . 1 (· ) d e n o te s th e in d ic a to r fu n c ti o n . T h e c o e ffi c ie n t o n la g g e d �̂ is th e e st im a te d sl o p e p a ra m e te r fr o m a re g re ss io n o f �̂ i t o n �̂ i t − 1 . 28 Figure 1: Right-wing extremist crimes and unemployment, Germany 01.1996-12.1999 1 1 1 2 1 3 1 4 1 5 1 6 1 7 (d e − se a so n e d ) U n e m p lo ym e n t ra te 0 .5 1 1 .5 2 T o ta l R E C c ri m e r a te Jan96 Jul96 Jan97 Jul97 Jan98 Jul98 Jan99 Jul99 Jan00 Right−wing extremist crimes per 100,000 residents (unweighted avg. by states) Unemplomyent rate (unweighted avg. by states) (a) Right-wing extremist crime rate and unemployment rate 0 2 0 0 4 0 0 6 0 0 8 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 N o n − vi o le n t cr im e s 0 5 0 1 0 0 1 5 0 2 0 0 V io le n t cr im e s Jan96 Jul96 Jan97 Jul97 Jan98 Jul98 Jan99 Jul99 Jan00 Violent REC crimes Non−violent REC crimes (b) Absolute number of violent and non-violent right-wing extremist crimes 29 Figure 2: Total right-wing extremist crime versus unemployment 0 2 4 6 T o ta l R E C r a te 5 10 15 20 25 Unemployment rate (a) Pooled data Jan96 Feb96 Mar96 Apr96 May96 Jun96 Jul96 Aug96 Sep96 Oct96 Nov96 Dec96 Jan97 Feb97 Mar97 Apr97 May97 Jun97 Jul97 Aug97 Sep97 Oct97 Nov97 Dec97 Jan98 Feb98 Mar98Apr98 May98 Jun98 Jul98 Aug98 Sep98 Oct98 Nov98 Dec98 Jan99 Feb99Mar99 Apr99 May99 Jun99 Jul99 Aug99 Sep99 Oct99 Nov99 Dec99 .5 1 1 .5 2 T o ta l R E C r a te 11.5 12 12.5 13 13.5 14 Unemployment rate (b) Longitudinal variation only BR BE BW BY HB HE HH MV NI NW RP SH SL SN ST TH 0 1 2 3 4 T o ta l R E C r a te 5 10 15 20 Unemployment rate (c) Cross-sectional variation only 30 Figure 3: Total right-wing extremist crime and unemployment, East versus West Germany 0 2 4 6 T o ta l R E C r a te 5 10 15 20 25 Unemployment rate (a) West Germany 0 2 4 6 T o ta l R E C r a te 5 10 15 20 25 Unemployment rate (b) East Germany 31 T ab le A .1 : A lt er n at iv e m od el sp ec ifi ca ti on s D ep en d en t va ri ab le : R E C T ot al M ea n 1. 12 7 S ta n d ar d d ev ia ti on 0. 87 4 M et h od O L S W L S W L S W L S A R (1 ) G M M W L S D at a fr eq u en cy M on th ly M on th ly M on th ly Q u ar te rl y M on th ly M on th ly M on th ly S ta n d ar d er ro rs C on ve nt io n al C on ve nt io n al R ob u st R ob u st S em i- ro b u st R ob u st R ob u st U R 0. 18 4 0. 20 4 0. 20 4 0. 21 5 0. 19 0 0. 20 4 0. 29 3 (0 .0 37 )? ? ? (0 .0 36 )? ? ? (0 .0 79 )? ? (0 .0 88 )? ? (0 .0 62 )? ? ? (0 .0 59 )? ? ? (0 .1 57 )? ∆ U R (= U R t − U R t− 1 2 ) − 0. 08 5 (0 .0 95 ) C on st an t − 0. 74 8 − 1. 04 0 − 1. 04 0 − 1. 08 6 − 0. 88 0 − 1. 04 0 − 0. 32 4 (0 .5 87 ) (0 .5 68 )? (1 .1 40 ) (1 .2 48 ) (0 .8 94 ) (0 .8 80 ) (1 .9 23 ) O b se rv at io n s 76 8 76 8 76 8 25 6 76 8 76 8 57 6 R 2 0. 78 4 0. 81 7 0. 81 7 0. 90 6 0. 69 2 0. 81 7 0. 85 8 A d ju st ed R 2 0. 76 9 0. 80 5 0. 80 5 0. 88 4 0. 67 2 0. 80 5 0. 84 5 C oe ffi ci en t on la gg ed �̂ 0. 23 5 0. 23 4 0. 23 4 − 0. 09 4 0. 23 5 0. 23 4 0. 09 8 (0 .0 37 )? ? ? (0 .0 37 )? ? ? (0 .0 37 )? ? ? (0 .0 72 ) (0 .0 37 )? ? ? (0 .0 37 )? ? ? (0 .0 44 )? ? N o te s: ? , ? ? , ? ? ? d e n o te s st a ti st ic a l si g n ifi c a n c e a t th e 1 0 % , 5 % , 1 % le v e l, re sp e c ti v e ly . A ll c o lu m n s in c lu d e st a te fi x e d e ff e c ts a n d a n d st a te -s p e c ifi c q u a d ra ti c ti m e -t re n d s. T h e c o e ffi c ie n t o n la g g e d �̂ is th e e st im a te d sl o p e p a ra m e te r fr o m a re g re ss io n o f �̂ i t o n �̂ i t − 1 . 32 
work_uu7n6klpv5c7diirva3bzmlpju	----	The Legal Implications and Remedies Concerning Revenge Porn and Fake Porn: A Common Law Perspective Vol.:(0123456789) Sexuality & Culture (2020) 24:2079–2097 https://doi.org/10.1007/s12119-020-09738-0 1 3 O R I G I N A L PA P E R The Legal Implications and Remedies Concerning Revenge Porn and Fake Porn: A Common Law Perspective Karolina Mania1 Published online: 9 May 2020 © The Author(s) 2020 Abstract Based on US and British regulations in force, this article offers an overview of leg- islation of two Common Law countries in the area of modern forms of law infringe- ments focusing on the notions of revenge porn and fake porn. The first part contains definitions and descriptions of the terms ‘revenge porn’ and ‘fake porn’, pointing out to the context of the relationship between the dynamic technological develop- ment and use of artificial intelligence on the one hand and the regulatory framework failing to meet the current needs on the other. Further, examination is conducted of US and British legislation in force divided into civil and criminal law, indicating legislative gaps as well as the inefficiency of the existing legal solutions and pre- senting a range of proposals of legislative changes. The considerations have been supplemented with the results of the author’s assessment of sociological and statis- tical research available in source literature carried thus far in the field in question. The following section is dedicated to a comparative assessment of American and British legal solutions based on selected, critical issues. The final parts of the arti- cle serve to postulate systemic changes in legislation and is a proposal to introduce out-of-court dispute settlement methods in legal disputes pertaining to the matters discussed herein, and to frame future research directions. Keywords Non-consensual pornography · Artificial intelligence · Law · Technology · Internet-based crime Introduction According to the authors of the book Leadership 2030 Georg Vielmetter and Yvonne Sell, one of the six ‘megatrends’ fundamentally changing the global economic and social environment is technological convergence understood as a technological * Karolina Mania karolina.mania@uj.edu.pl 1 Institute of Economics, Finance and Management, Faculty of Management and Social Communication, Jagiellonian University, Cracow, Poland http://orcid.org/0000-0001-9063-7563 http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1007/s12119-020-09738-0&domain=pdf 2080 K. Mania 1 3 revolution which is transforming our lives entirely, starting from economy, through production, medicine and nutrition, all the way to the legal environment (Vielmetter and Sell 2014). The dynamically progressing technological development enforces shorter legisla- tive procedures that lag behind the changing reality (Marchant 2017). Cyberspace and online activity stimulate the appearance of some fields of breaches of law absent to date which cannot be effectively tackled by the existing legal solutions (Lillie 2002). Hence the need to articulate postulates for legislative change in the fields of ineffective procedural solutions as well as search for alternative systemic ways to finalize such disputes (Walker 2017). Due to its specificity, the rapidly progressing technological development is bring- ing changes in the nature of law infringements (Moses 2007). Illegal human activ- ity in the analogue world is morphing and transforming into new forms unknown before (Weckstrom 2012; Rabinovich-Einy 2003). One example of such evolutions is the area of breaches of law related to non-consensual pornography (NCP), which this article is devoted to (Stokes 2014). Its multi-faceted nature manifests itself in the fact that NCP may have consequences in both civil and criminal law, yet what is more interesting from the perspective of this analysis, it make take place in both the analogue and digital worlds, based, in the latter, on digital mystification, actually hurting the personal rights of the injured party (the victim) (Suzor et al. 2016). This article aims at discussing two types of non-consensual pornography infringe- ments: revenge porn and fake porn, which do have common features although their respective objective scopes are different. The selection made for the purpose of my research covers exclusively legal solutions of two countries representing the system of common law in order to highlight similarities and differences between them. Fur- ther, narrowing down my research to two countries of the same legal system is moti- vated by the intention to conduct a thorough analysis of the legal solutions adopted by countries of the same legal system. This facilitates a search for similarities and analogies in systemic solutions as well as consolidate the knowledge acquired by discerning differences in either of the countries. Additionally, such knowledge can form a basis for shaping future research covering countries of the continental sys- tem, to eventually pinpoint disparities stemming from systemic differences between common law and continental law (Helmholz 1990). The essence of the subject in question relates to several aspects. Firstly, to the sta- tistically growing trend related to the number and frequency of such infringements, correlated with the huge availability of tools for committing them (Flynn et  al. 2019). Secondly, such breaches of law are of a specific nature, as they mainly target women and hurt many of their rights, including intellectual property or non-material ones, such as good name (Delfino 2019). Thirdly, the world’s evolution accelerated by technological development shows us new faces of old phenomena. The infringe- ments discussed here are a pictorial example of the changes going on before our very eyes while legal systems are seeking (with better or worse results) to meet the public’s expectations in terms of effective law enforcement (Pina et al. 2017). Research concerning revenge porn and fake porn carried out to date is mainly based on: analysis of results of quantitative and qualitative studies conducted in various contexts (e.g. sociological, forensic and psychological) (Bates 2016; Branch 2081 1 3 The Legal Implications and Remedies Concerning Revenge Porn… et al. 2017; O’Connor et al. 2018), analysis of the technical aspects of such infringe- ments (Huang 2015; Tariq et  al. 2018), analysis of current legal solutions nar- rowed down to selected countries (or even their parts, such as states) (Citron and Franks 2019), or assessment focusing on criminal law measures (Citron and Franks 2014). The approach offered here is a review of current solutions in two branches of law, civil and criminal, yet exclusively in countries of a single legal system, that of common law. My selection facilitates positing new directions of future research that would offer a complete law comparison review of both common- and civil-law countries. The reflections presented above have a bearing on the text structure division. In the following section, I describe the chosen research method, focusing on its justi- fication given the information sought and obtained (2. Methodology). In Part 3, I identify the phenomena discussed here starting from their definition and explanation of their vital practical aspects (3. Artificial intelligence in the world of pornogra- phy). In the fourth section, I analyze available legal measures in the US and British systems, divided into civil and criminal law (4. American and British perspectives on current legal solutions against revenge and fake porn). Part 5 discusses selected key (in my view) problematic aspects of the current solutions available in the US And the UK (5. Comparative assessment of American and British legal solutions— critical issues). Part 6 includes suggestions of changes and proposals that would make the system of justice more efficient, or take the burden off it by implementing out-of-court procedures (6. Alternative approach to new forms of law violations— causes and proposed legal solutions). Further on, I systematize potential directions of future research on the subject in question, the starting point being this text (7. Discussion and future work). The final eighth section includes the conclusions (8. Conclusions). Methodology Given its subject matter and scope, the paper is based mainly on analyzing the rel- evant legislation coupled with a vital aspect of comparative legal research work which is going to be theoretical and dogmatic legal in nature, accounting for the practical aspects finding their expression in terms of law application. The research began with collection and analysis of the existing American and British legal acts, legal reference works as well as, depending on their existence, court rulings concerning the subject matter of the field. The basic method was text analysis encompassing the principles of logic, and legal argumentation. As regards comparative legal studies, the analysis included comparison of civil and criminal, American and British legislation thus providing for reliable analysis of the changes in law confronted with dynamic technological progress. In this article, I discuss available civil- and criminal-law measures that can be applied in case of the phenomena in question in national legislation. Additionally, Part 5 includes the law comparison method for evaluating and highlighting key problematic aspects of the solutions applied in the United States of America and Great Britain. 2082 K. Mania 1 3 In order to obtain a complete picture, the author offered assessment of the actual functioning of legislation in practice on the basis of legal and sociological research conducted in a field to define advantages and disadvantages of exciting legal system. Artificial Intelligence in the World of Pornography Technological development and new areas where artificial intelligence can be used are beginning to make their presence felt ever more strongly in the world of ordinary citizens and their leisure activities (Wang et al. 2019).According to the report of the American non-profit organization Cyber Civil Right Initiative titled ‘2017 Nation- wide online study of non-consensual porn: results’, every eighth social media user has been a target of ‘non-consensual pornography’ (NCP).1 NCP includes such phe- nomena as ‘revenge porn’ and ‘fake porn’, acts of publicizing any unambiguously sexual image of a person in the form of photographs or films without their prior consent and without using some aspects of artificial intelligence, or using them (Attwood 2005). The first term has a longer history going back to the 1980s when the then print- only Hustler Magazine started publishing a section featuring a collection of nude photos of its female readers.2 Over a short period of time, it turned out that some were published without their consent, which constituted a privacy infringement and led to a series of lawsuits (civil and criminal).3 The phenomenon of fake porn, however, is a true challenge of the twenty-first century as a product of modern technologies (Poole 2015). Technical requirements for making a concocted pornographic film are surprisingly simple. One needs to obtain original film footage showing the image of a person (figure) as well as some photos or films with the face of the person to be feature in the first material (Hickey 2018). A machine learning algorithm will consolidate the face into a selected image using the face mapping technique, maintaining the proportions and figure’s spatial arrangement, and then replicate it for the benefit of successive video frames (Roffer 2016). The discussed notions of revenge porn and fake porn are not synonymous yet in practice they very often intertwine, which results from the many common feature they share: they mostly concern women and their dissemination mechanism is based on sharing content without the interested party’s consent and related to sexual activ- ity (Franks and Waldman 2018; Delfino 2019). Additionally, one can conclude that the original notion of revenge porn, penalized earlier as first, is the model for legal verdicts in cases fake porn (or deepfake) is not regulated in legislation currently in 1 A report of the American non-profit organization Civil Right Initiative titled ‘2017 Nationwide online study of non-consensual porn: results’ is available online at https ://www.cyber civil right s.org/wp-conte nt/ uploa ds/2017/06/CCRI-2017-Resea rch-Repor t.pdf. 2 Wood v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 736 F.2d 1084, 1086 (5th Cir. 1984). Ashby v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 802 F.2d 856, 857–58 (6th Cir. 1986). 3 Starting from the 1990s, a number of online portals have appeared in the US that publish NCP content, such as IsAnyoneUp.com, texxxan.com, or MyEx.com. https://www.cybercivilrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/CCRI-2017-Research-Report.pdf https://www.cybercivilrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/CCRI-2017-Research-Report.pdf 2083 1 3 The Legal Implications and Remedies Concerning Revenge Porn… force. Consequently, law applying bodies (courts) – in their evaluation of the legal consequences of law infringements—very frequently use provisions explicitly refer- ring to revenge porn, which also explains why they are considered together in this text (Citron and Franks 2014). Pornographic websites, i.e. Reddit or RedTube, feature numerous categories such as ‘deepfakes’ where fabricated material reigns supreme.4 A much-medialized case of ‘fake porn’ was the 2017 use of an image of the actress Gal Gadot playing in the US super-production ‘Wonder Woman’, which triggered a public debate about the issue (the actress Emma Watson being yet another victim).5 The video published online was made with a machine learning algorithm, using online material and an open-source code (Franks 2017a, b). The use of advanced computer programs to search for specific content online is no novelty, however. In 2011, Facebook announced its use of a Microsoft tech- nology calledPhotoDNA in order to detect materials published on the portal that exploited pornographic images of children.6 To further counteract such abuses, on 5 April 2017 Marc Zuckerberg announced that a new AI tool aimed at capturing por- nographic content using a facial recognition technology had been implemented on Facebook (and its related platforms Messenger and Instagram).7 Through a report- ing system, each portal user can report an alleged law infringement in the form of a published photo (intimate image), which can be suspected as published without con- sent of the interested party.8 A dedicated Facebook’s Community Operations team performs case-by-case assessment in compliance with the Community Standards adopted, responding by removing the incriminated material and possibly account deactivation. The system allows for appealing against the team’s decision (online), which has been described in detail in a document titled ‘Not Without My Consent. A guide to reporting and removing intimate images shared without your consent’.9 4 Before 2018, most fake porn content was published free of charge. There has been a noticeable change, however, in the form of a growing market for sale of such material over the Internet. See: https ://mothe rboar d.vice.com/en_us/artic le/7x799 b/selli ng-ai-gener ated-fake-porn-is-proba bly-a-good-way-to-get- sued. 5 Derek Hawkins, Reddit bans ‘deepfakes’ pornography using the faces of celebrities such as Taylor Swift and Gal Gadot—https ://www.washi ngton post.com/news/morni ng-mix/wp/2018/02/08/reddi t-bans- deepf akes-porno graph y-using -the-faces -of-celeb ritie s-like-taylo r-swift -and-gal-gadot /?utm_term=.8016b 5d1a8 74. 6 Jef Meisner, Facebook to Use Microsoft’s PhotoDNA Technology to Combat Child Exploitation— https ://blogs .micro soft.com/on-the-issue s/2011/05/19/faceb ook-to-use-micro softs -photo dna-techn ology -to-comba t-child -explo itati on/. 7 Dawid Ingram, Facebook built an internal database of ’revenge porn’ pictures to prevent repeat sharing—https ://www.busin essin sider .com/faceb ook-using -photo -match ing-softw are-to-fight -reven ge- porn-2017-4. 8 Facebook launching tools to tackle revenge porn—https ://www.thegu ardia n.com/techn ology /2017/ apr/05/faceb ook-tools -reven ge-porn. 9 Guide ‘Not Without My Consent. A guide to reporting and removing intimate images shared without your consent’—https ://fbnew sroom us.files .wordp ress.com/2017/03/not-witho ut-my-conse nt.pdf. https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/7x799b/selling-ai-generated-fake-porn-is-probably-a-good-way-to-get-sued https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/7x799b/selling-ai-generated-fake-porn-is-probably-a-good-way-to-get-sued https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/7x799b/selling-ai-generated-fake-porn-is-probably-a-good-way-to-get-sued https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2018/02/08/reddit-bans-deepfakes-pornography-using-the-faces-of-celebrities-like-taylor-swift-and-gal-gadot/?utm_term=.8016b5d1a874 https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2018/02/08/reddit-bans-deepfakes-pornography-using-the-faces-of-celebrities-like-taylor-swift-and-gal-gadot/?utm_term=.8016b5d1a874 https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2018/02/08/reddit-bans-deepfakes-pornography-using-the-faces-of-celebrities-like-taylor-swift-and-gal-gadot/?utm_term=.8016b5d1a874 https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2011/05/19/facebook-to-use-microsofts-photodna-technology-to-combat-child-exploitation/ https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2011/05/19/facebook-to-use-microsofts-photodna-technology-to-combat-child-exploitation/ https://www.businessinsider.com/facebook-using-photo-matching-software-to-fight-revenge-porn-2017-4 https://www.businessinsider.com/facebook-using-photo-matching-software-to-fight-revenge-porn-2017-4 https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/apr/05/facebook-tools-revenge-porn https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/apr/05/facebook-tools-revenge-porn https://fbnewsroomus.files.wordpress.com/2017/03/not-without-my-consent.pdf 2084 K. Mania 1 3 Furthermore, to prevent further content dissemination the team attempts to analyze material on Messenger and Instagram using photo-matching technologies.10 In October 2017, Pornhub announced its use of machine learning and face rec- ognition in order to detect over 10,000 porn stars whose movies were published by the portal, a tool for a more efficient search of favorite stars or categories.11 Artifi- cial intelligence does not need to be a source of law violations, though. In theory, it could be used to detect online piracy by identifying copyright-protected content like systems such as Content ID You Tube, where copyright owners can recognize and manage the content of the service. This article, however, discusses a negative phe- nomenon where AI is a tool for creating content whose publication without consent of those interested constitutes a breach of law (Shinn 2015). American and British Perspectives on Current Legal Solutions Against Revenge and Fake Porn Artificial intelligence and digital reality make us face new fields of law infringe- ments that did not exist just a few years back (Bates 2016). As the first cases of court disputes concerning revenge porn and fake porn were documented in the United States of America, it is worthwhile to analyze US legislation, supplementing that knowledge with British law, thus allowing us to pinpoint the current state of regula- tion in these two Common Law countries (Fung Chen Pen 2015). The legal protection of victims of the illegal activity in question (non-consensual pornography) is derived from the area of pornography regulations and sexual abuse imagery. Still, when trying to enforce the rights of those injured by technologically innovative variations that is fabricated digital content, the victims face some hurdles (Lageson et al. 2019).12 Potential breaches of law in the area in question include both civil matters (such as tort law, copyright law) and criminal ones (such as harassing behavior), from intellectual property rights, through right of privacy, defamation, bullying or mob- bing, a real threat to anyone caring about their image online and elsewhere (Dickson 2016). This article offers a systemic review of civil and criminal measures that can be applied in the case of the areas under discussion using selected national solu- tions. The selection is justified by the fact that in order to maintain the entirety of rights of victims of revenge porn and fake porn it is necessary to balance the protec- tion offered by either of both branches of law, allowing for removing incriminated 10 Niraj Chokshi, Facebook Announces New Ways to Prevent ‘Revenge Porn’—https ://www.nytim es.com/2017/04/05/us/faceb ook-reven ge-porn.html. 11 James Vincent, Pornhub is using machine learning to automatically tag its 5 million videos—https :// www.theve rge.com/2017/10/11/16459 646/pornh ub-machi ne-learn ing-ai-video -taggi ng. 12 According to studies by the American non-profit organization Cyber Civil Rights Initiative promot- ing social, technological and legal innovation in order to combat abuse and discrimination in the Inter- net, ‘93% reported significant emotional distress, while 82% reported suffering significant impairment in social, occupational, or other important areas of functioning.’. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/05/us/facebook-revenge-porn.html https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/05/us/facebook-revenge-porn.html https://www.theverge.com/2017/10/11/16459646/pornhub-machine-learning-ai-video-tagging https://www.theverge.com/2017/10/11/16459646/pornhub-machine-learning-ai-video-tagging 2085 1 3 The Legal Implications and Remedies Concerning Revenge Porn… content from the Internet, obtaining compensation and punishing the perpetrators as well as deterring their potential followers (LiCalzi 2017). American Perspective on Current Legal Solutions Against Revenge and Fake Porn American legal solutions do not give an unambiguous answer as regards counter- acting as well as responding to non-consensual pornography infringements, which leads to a high level of impunity of distributors of such content Volokh 2016). This section includes a systemic review of civil and criminal regulations that are (or potentially can be) used in the case of the breaches in question, with straight- forward references to the legislation of the State of New York. The former include liability in tort (tort law) embracing categories of inadmissible acts, i.e. intentional infliction of emotional distress, defamation and copyright infringement. The latter include regulations concerning voyeurism, harassment and hate crimes.13 Tort Law American state legislation offers a diversity of definitions of similar or identical legal terms. Analyzing New York state legislation currently in force, the concept of an inadmissible act consisting in an ‘intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), includes (jointly) the following elements: ‘(i) extreme and outrageous con- duct; (ii) intent to cause, or disregard of a substantial probability of causing, severe emotional distress; (iii) a causal connection between the conduct and injury; and (iv) severe emotional distress,’ where the presence of extreme and outrageous conduct is the most difficult part to prove in court.14 It is so partly because of the omnipresence of brazen images of half-naked women and men, particularly visible in mass media, which further blurs the already fuzzy conceptual boundaries (Gutterman 2017). Tort liability also covers ‘defamation’.15 The definition of this term refers to the aspect of ‘false statement’ (the image disseminated), which in the case of fake porn is not false, thus excluding a lawsuit against entities publishing the incriminated photographs (Batza 2017). Victims of fake porn face successive obstacles,for instance trying to seek com- pensation for the wrongdoing from Internet portal hosts (Potter and Potter 2001). In 1996, Congress introduced federal provisions of § 230 of the federal Communica- tions Decency Act excluding the legal liability of service providers for content pub- lished by users on their portals, treating them as passive participants of the online 13 All of the terms may have markedly different definitions and conceptual scopes depending on the con- tent of given state legislation. See: Vora A., Into the Shadows: Examining Judicial Language in Revenge Porn Cases, 18 Geo. J. Gender & L. 229 (2017). Theodore Z. Wyman, J.D., Litigation of Liability for Internet Posting of ‘Revenge Porn’, 147 Am. Jur. Trials 319 (Originally published in 2016). 14 Howell v. New York Post Co., 612 N.E.2d 699, 702 (N.Y. 1993). 15 In the state law of New York, the term ‘defamation’ covers: ‘the making of a false statement which tends to “expose the plaintiff to public contempt, ridicule, aversion or disgrace, or induce an evil opin- ion of him in the minds of right-thinking persons, and to deprive him of their friendly intercourse in society.”’(Foster v. Churchill, 665 N.E.2d 153, 157 (N.Y. 1996)). 2086 K. Mania 1 3 communication chain.16 Consequently, as the material published (photos) is not false and host websites enjoy legal protection under the legislation cited above, pursuance of claims based on the defamation tort is not an effective tool for the victims (Citron and Wittes 2017). Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (CDA) ensures impunity for Internet service providers in cases of publication by users – third par- ties. This solution allows for excluding the legal liability of Internet service provid- ers for illegal (without third party consent) publication of photographs or films on portals. Furthermore, they are not obliged to remove such content, or even respond to removal requests (Gerrie 2017). The scope of the said Act does not cover intel- lectual property breaches, so if a party holds copyright to the image, the takedown request must be executed pursuant to the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.17 As regards intellectual property rights, copyright protection covers exclusively cases of photos used for production (of fake porn, for instance) immortalizing the image of that person (e.g. a selfie) and having taken by the victim him-/herself and sent to the party making it public, pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012) and 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (2012) (Stroud 2014). This legal arrangement stems from the fact that state laws are limited by the federal Copyright Act of 1976, which acknowledges that cer- tain ‘pictorial, graphic … [and] motion pictures and other audiovisual works[]’ may be protected by copyright by the ‘authors of the work’. The existing regulations offer the victims copyright protection if they are themselves authors of the controversial content (photographs), that is in most reported cases (Carter 2017). This lets them then send a takedown notice to web portals requiring its removal (Cohen 2015). Moreover, law enforcement bodies themselves are authorized to prosecute website operators publishing controversial content for breaching legislation pertaining to pornographic sites, i.e. 18 U.S.C. § 2257 obliging them to keep records of names and age groups showing erotic content (Levendowski 2013).18 Consequently, the aforementioned Sect. 230 is not a tool protecting Internet ser- vice providers from copyright liability (Cohen 2017). It is then worth mentioning that US legislation currently in force does not rule on breaches involving the use of photos to which the victim is not rights holder. The regulations provide, however, for seeking liability of initial distributors including their torts of public disclosure of private information, or harm understood as non-material (intentional infliction of emotion distress) (Jackson 2017). In conclusion, civil law protection is not a sufficient tool for fighting the phe- nomena in question. First, it is difficult for the victims to identify the party initiating the publication of the incriminated content, and even if they have such knowledge, they lack measures to prove it. Secondly, most commonly the victims seek online removal of the contested content, which in this age of ‘sharing’ and unlimited pos- sibilities of free copying online may be impossible to attain. Thirdly, as the cost and 16 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2012), the federal Communications Decency Act: ‘[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider’. 17 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (2012). 18 18 U.S.C. § 2257 (2012). 2087 1 3 The Legal Implications and Remedies Concerning Revenge Porn… duration of court proceedings discourage the victims from enforcing their rights, they often give up on seeking justice in court. Fourthly, the fact that proceedings are open to the public leads to further victimization of persons who fall prey to media interest.19 And fifthly, as argued above, for those seeking justice in court the cata- logue of claims available is much limited. Criminal Law The two-tier legal system necessitates constant referencing of federal and state law.20 The former offers no regulations specific to the subject matter discussed here, while only selected states have decided to penalize it (Griffith 2016). They include New Jersey and California (Bustamante 2016; Sorensen 2017; Cooke 2017).21 The status quo exposes the weakness of the legal system which provides for a markedly dif- ferent treatment of the same factual circumstances, sometimes as an offense, some- times a crime (Najdowski 2017).22 Invoking New York state legislation yet again, protection offered by criminal law (just like in case of civil law) has a number of gaps, making it possible to avoid liability for voyeurism, harassment and hate crimes, as it is impossible to prove all the elements required for ascertaining the presence of a given offence. For instance, as regards voyeurism law, two such aspects are required:‘the act of unlawful surveil- lance’ and ‘unlawful dissemination of the images obtained from the surveillance’.23 The former includes exclusively images or video films obtained by the perpetrator without consent of the third party who has been recorded, which does not apply to the cases discussed here as the victims have typically taken the photos (films) them- selves or granted permission to have them published, thus automatically excluding the liability of the perpetrator of the act. In the context of (second-degree) harassment, the perpetrator can be held liable when ‘with [the] intent to harass, annoy or alarm another person … [h]e or she engages in a course of conduct or repeatedly commits acts which alarm or seri- ously annoy such other person and which serve no legitimate purpose.’24 Victims of revenge porn and fake porn find it hard to prove the perpetrator’s intent or repeated conduct, often boiling down to a one-time video publication, which is independ- ent of the technical possibility to replicate it online and making it available to other recipients (Marshak 2017). The most recent piece of New York state legislation in cases described herein, hate crime law also fails to ensure appropriate protection of the victims (Mason and Czapski 2017). Under the legislation, the perpetrator should have purposefully 20 A list of selected states with revenge porn laws: https ://www.cyber civil right s.org/reven ge-porn-laws/. 21 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14–9 (West 2014); CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(j)(4)(A) (West 2014). 22 E.g. Revenge porn is a Class D crime in Maine, and a third-degree crime in New Jersey. 23 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 250.45, 250.50, 250.55, 250.60. 24 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.26. 19 YouTube singer Chrissy Chambers wins revenge porn case—https ://www.bbc.com/news/techn ology -42720 869. https://www.cybercivilrights.org/revenge-porn-laws/ https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-42720869 https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-42720869 2088 K. Mania 1 3 selected the victim or have committed an act ‘in whole or in substantial part because of a belief or perception regarding the race, color, national origin, ancestry, gender, religion, religious practice, age, disability or sexual orientation of a person ….’25 Even if the victim were able to prove to have been the target with relation to one of the listed reasons, such circumstance is not defined in the statute via listed offenses, which excludes invoking it in court.26 Concluding, the absence of consistent definitions as well as significant discrep- ancies in legislative content and related state jurisprudence result in a low level of protection of the rights of victims of revenge porn and fake porn. An additional fac- tor weakening their protection under criminal law is the ongoing debate concerning the penalization of the phenomenon, possibly a valid First Amendment violation of free speech. As this has been analyzed on many occasions, also in the doctrine, this article is limited in that regard to listing several sources requiring more in-depth examination (Pollack 2017; Hamilton 2017; Keats and Franks 2014; Pollack 2017). British Perspective on Current Legal Solutions Against Revenge and Fake Porn On 12 April 2015, the provisions entered into force in the United Kingdom of Sect. 33 of the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015 covering in its scope the phe- nomenon of ‘revenge porn’ (Jennifer 2017). These regulations established a new criminal offense of disclosing private sexual photographs and films with intent to cause distress. The aspects necessary for classifying an offense as such are the lack of consent of the individual appearing in the photograph and film; and (b) the intent to cause that individual distress.27 Apart from the legislation cited above, revenge and fake porn victims may seek criminal liability under other laws, such as for the offense of blackmail as laid out in the Theft Act 1968, stalking the victim as set out in the Theft Act 1968 and amended by the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, sending communications with an intent to distress or cause anxiety to the recipient, as set out in the Malicious Communi- cations Act 1988, or unauthorized computer access as per the laws laid out in the Computer Misuse Act 1990. Just few years after the introduction of the new regulation, one must conclude that it is not perfect, letting those publishing such incriminated content avoid liabil- ity by arguing in favor of the absence of the required ‘intent to cause distress’, which may be successful for instance through proving that financial gains have been drawn from such unlawful actions.28 25 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 485.05. 26 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 485.05(1), (3). 27 Kleeman J., YouTube star wins damages in landmark UK ‘revenge porn’ case—https ://www.thegu ardia n.com/techn ology /2018/jan/17/youtu be-star-chris sy-chamb ers-wins-damag es-in-landm ark-uk-reven ge-porn-case. 28 Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015—https ://www.legis latio n.gov.uk/ukpga /2015/2/secti on/35/enact ed. https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/jan/17/youtube-star-chrissy-chambers-wins-damages-in-landmark-uk-revenge-porn-case https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/jan/17/youtube-star-chrissy-chambers-wins-damages-in-landmark-uk-revenge-porn-case https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/jan/17/youtube-star-chrissy-chambers-wins-damages-in-landmark-uk-revenge-porn-case https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2015/2/section/35/enacted https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2015/2/section/35/enacted 2089 1 3 The Legal Implications and Remedies Concerning Revenge Porn… As regards civil liability, victims can pursue a claim with relation to the misuse of private information and a breach of confidentiality, and their case can be treated as harassment or copyright infringement.29 Comparative Assessment of American and British Legal Solutions— Critical Issues Aware of the range of legal measures available in the systems of American and Brit- ish law concerning the notions examined here, I would like to share some observa- tions resulting from my comparative law analysis of these two national systems, but also a broad perspective allowing for an in-depth understanding of the phenomena, as well as finding the most effective legal measures, while critically assessing some aspects of the current state of legal play. As this text focuses mainly on American solutions, a vast majority of my comments will target legal practitioners operating under the US jurisdiction (McGlynn et al. 2017). Technological developments are changing the face of law infringements as we know them. The notion of revenge porn of yesterday is transforming into fake porn or deepfake (porn) today, superimposing new technological possibilities on old areas of breaches of law. This absence of a clear-cut terminological boundary requires an in-depth practical understanding of such notions as analysis of the available legal solutions shows that in cases of lack of provisions regulating the infringements in question law applying bodies, such as courts, resort to legal measures already exist- ing in legislation (Salter and Crofts 2015). Consequently, my analysis of the subject is rooted in the notion of revenge porn, which most frequently already occurs in selected jurisdictions laying foundations for legal assessment of new forms of law infringements that do not have conceptual equivalents in regulations yet do take place in practice, and so the basis for their effective penalization must be found (Franks 2015).30 Analysis of American legislation indicates clearly that despite numerous legal solutions pertaining to revenge porn (in such states as New York, California or Washington), no federal or state legislation currently penalizes the creation or dis- tribution of pornographic deepfakes (Delfino 2019), which by virtue of their online presence exist everywhere, regardless of state borders. Thus, when assessing the consequences of such infringements, legislation penalizing the related phenomenon of revenge porn is used (Kitchen 2015). Focusing now on the legislative limitations that can be observed in American law, as well as necessary improvements of procedures for injured parties and victims to exercise their rights, I would like to yet again refer to the division between civil- and 30 The countries that have adopted legislation pertaining directly to the notion of revenge porn are, among others, most US states, like New York, but also Great Britain, Germany or Israel. 29 In the context of the notion of fake porn, so using AI in the sphere of porn movies shared without con- sent of the interested party/parties, British law introduces neither special regulations nor the term itself in its legal lexicon, hence each case examined by court requires individual assessment of the status of the matter and interpretation of the legislation in force. 2090 K. Mania 1 3 criminal-law provisions. The former are based on assessment of the degree of dam- age and entail civil-law liability, which has numerous limitations, however. Firstly, civil proceedings are costly, discouraging lower-income citizens from launching a court action. Consequently, the available statistics on law infringements may not reveal complete data, being merely a reflection of the number of cases submitted with or reported to relevant institutions but not the real number of infringements. Secondly, the strong protection of the internet provider market existing in Ameri- can law makes the impression that the rights of entities covered by the immunity granted to third-party providers under CDA are strong enough so as not to be able to enforce the actual removal of problematic online content, and consequently weaken the injured parties’ motivation to act (Henry and Powell 2015). Due to the essence of the deterrent function of criminal law, markedly different from the remedial function of civil law, penalization of revenge porn (fake porn) really allows (would allow) for the effective discouragement of (potential) creators of illegal (illegally shared) content. Unambiguous and easy-to-interpret legislation facilitates the effective assertion of their rights for the victims and a serious weapon for enforcement authorities. My analysis of American legislation, which penalizes revenge porn at the state level, shows a number of mistakes made by the legisla- tors. The differences that exist between states in terms of legal framing the notion of revenge porn show how important it is to specify its constituent parts precisely.31 One of the most criticized is the condition of an intent, present in the state legisla- tion of California.32 Proving it is difficult, and after all the very fact of sharing (such sensitive) content without the victim’s consent should be sufficient to justify the per- petrator’s guilt. Likewise with the condition of the requirement to prove the damage incurred (present, for example, in the state law of California), which entails another risk of revealing intimate details of the injured party’s life in the courtroom (Powell and Henry 2017).33 The British perspective shows a different take on revenge porn, visible from the moment of its classification as a sexual offence in the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015. Firstly, the British solutions introduce a multitude of forms of infringe- ments that can be covered by the objective scope of revenge porn, including: a. the non-consensual sharing of any explicit film or photograph showing people engaged in a sexual activity, and b. the non-consensual sharing of any explicit film or pho- tograph showing an individual depicted in a sexual way or with their private parts exposed, where what is visible in the image would not be seen in public. The solution adopted requires that given material include both photos of a person in the course of a sexual activity and the state of full (or partial) nudity, which allows for a much broader use of the regulations when the content is disseminated without consent of the interested party, who (for instance) was fully dressed. These provisions ensure a much broader field of their application in the new reality of the infringements taking 31 The federal cyberstalking statute (18U.S.C.§2261A(2012)) and the California anti-stalking statute (CAL.PENALCODE§646.9(West2019)) include a particular requirement related to experiencing fear. 32 CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(j)(4) (West 2019). 33 CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(j)(4) (West 2019). 2091 1 3 The Legal Implications and Remedies Concerning Revenge Porn… place. However, just like in the case of US solutions, the fact that such regulations do not penalize fake porn (deepfake) and fail to protect one from information disclo- sure during court proceedings – a direct consequence of classifying revenge porn as a ‘communication crime’ and not introducing restrictions on trial participation for third parties – should be viewed critically (Hall and Hearn 2017). Alternative Approach to New Forms of Law Violations—Causes and Proposed Legal Solutions The first cases of revenge porn and fake porn were recorded in the USA (Lai 2016). As reasoned above, American (and British) legislation is not a perfect model for solutions that could be implemented directly by countries of other legal systems, e.g. European (Nolan-Haley 2012a, b). As in the case of fake porn breaches occur in the digital environment, it is worth considering whether tools of counteraction should not be applied also in the online world (Gabison 2016). The development of systemic solutions would help the vic- tims enforce their rights effectively (Drinnon 2017). It is vital to consider whether the most efficient remedy would be to implement in such cases alternative dispute resolution methods, with common use of electronic communication, the very place where breaches of law take place (Dickson 2016).34 The introduction of ADR sys- tems should be contemplated in the area of breaches related to revenge porn and fake porn primarily because of the space where they occur and their specific features (Nolan-Haley 2015). It seems that the issue should be considered from a global perspective, blur- ring the boundaries of national jurisdictions and problems with selecting applica- ble law.35 The victims should have access to a legal tool providing for a systemic, prompt and inexpensive resolution of disputes, without worrying about choice of law, excessive court fees and trial representation (Yanisky-Ravid and Mittelman 2016). Given the nature of the Internet and proliferation of illegal online activities, it would be worthwhile to initiate measures aimed at finding a remedy for the exist- ing legal issue, that is aiding to resolve disputes in the areas in question promptly and effectively while ensuring consistent levels of the victims’ protection (Franklin 2014). The proposed out-of-court arrangement could be based on the creation of a single agency (entity) competent to resolve grievances (requests, complaints) in the fields discussed here, accompanied by a system of agreements with national and foreign Internet or hosting service providers.36 Should an alternative conflict resolution be 34 Similar solutions have been adopted in New Zealand under Harmful Digital Communications Act 2015 (NZ). 35 Franks, Mary Anne, Drafting an Effective ‘Revenge Porn’ Law: A Guide for Legislators (August 17, 2015). Available at SSRN: https ://ssrn.com/abstr act=24688 23 or https ://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.24688 23. 36 The scope of competences of the proposed agency may be debated. An effective solution could be granting it authority to issue resolutions as regards takedown notices or impose financial penalties. https://ssrn.com/abstract=2468823 https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2468823 https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2468823 2092 K. Mania 1 3 impossible, a party could always turn to a common court (Rabinovich-Einy and Katsh 2017). Such solutions should offer a range of legal accommodations, i.e. the necessary introduction of regulations concerning the creation and cooperation of arbitration tribunals or other non-court institutions using arbitration (and mediation) and other parties to a given legal relationship (Nolan-Haley 2012a, b). It seems, however, that the application of alternative dispute settlement methods and their online equiva- lents as regards revenge porn and fake porn infringements would not only take the load off common courts but also facilitate more effective law enforcement, removal of content encroaching upon the rights of the victims from the Internet as well as improvement of its transparency (Sela 2017). Discussion and Future Work When pointing out to future trajectories of research on revenge porn and fake porn, the following issues need to be raised. Relevant US State legislation in force certainly begs the question whether it would be necessary to develop uniform penalization for the phenomenon discussed here, which can be an interesting field of the future research.37 Recording a grow- ing number of revenge and fake porn cases, it seems justified to consider such a solution, which would allow for more consistent legislation and court jurisprudence, acting as a deterrent of further online dissemination.38 Due to the existing doubts regarding valid First Amendment violations, it seems, however, that the very fact of penalization, and so changes exclusively in criminal law, does not constitute a com- prehensive solution (Salter and Crofts 2017). The remedy may be found in simulta- neous changes in civil law when implementing alternative (systemic) applications, which was discussed in the previous section of this article (Stipanowich 2017). The picture emerging from the analysis of the legal solutions of the two countries of the common-law system just begs for further law comparison research including continental law countries. In-depth analysis of particular national solutions is one thing, yet finding similarities and difference existing between entire systems visible in both civil and criminal law seems all the more interesting. However, no country enjoying a full autonomy in shaping its laws and ways to enforce infringed rights is an entirely separate entity, as evidenced, for instance, by the existence of similar institutions in particular countries, closely linked to the structure of the legal system of common or civil law. The out-of-court dispute settlement solutions mentioned in 37 According to a report of non-profit Cyber Civil Right Initiative titled 2017 Nationwide online study of non-consensual porn: results, ‘severe criminal penalties are the most effective deterrents. The most com- monly chosen prohibitive factor among participants to deter perpetrators was harsh criminal punishment (e.g. felony laws, imprisonment) with 60% choosing this option.’ The report is available at: https ://www. cyber civil right s.org/wp-conte nt/uploa ds/2017/06/CCRI-2017-Resea rch-Repor t.pdf. 38 A study on revenge porn from the Center for Innovative Public Health Research: Claire Landsbaum, 1 in 25 Americans Has Faced or Been Threatened with Revenge Porn, Study Finds, N.Y. MAG., https :// nymag .com/thecu t/2016/12/10-milli on-ameri cans-have-been-threa tened -with-reven ge-porn.html. https://www.cybercivilrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/CCRI-2017-Research-Report.pdf https://www.cybercivilrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/CCRI-2017-Research-Report.pdf https://nymag.com/thecut/2016/12/10-million-americans-have-been-threatened-with-revenge-porn.html https://nymag.com/thecut/2016/12/10-million-americans-have-been-threatened-with-revenge-porn.html 2093 1 3 The Legal Implications and Remedies Concerning Revenge Porn… Part 6 exemplify institutions strongly rooted and relatively often used in countries of the common-law system, and possibly useful in the field discussed here (Beyens and Lievens 2016). Finally, it is worth mentioning the evolution of the law infringements in ques- tion. The original phenomenon of revenge porn was met with a relatively common response of legislators across the world and was soon regulated in penal codes and acts of law passed by individual countries. However, as the legislative process is much slower than technological developments, successful penalization of revenge porn does not let anyone rest on their laurels. What is more, it should spark a dis- cussion on the conceptual capacity of the penalized phenomena whose successive variations emerge faster than legislation concerning them. The evolution mentioned above is happening before our very eyes indeed and the phenomenon of revenge porn, transformed into fake porn or deepfakes, is one of many examples of legisla- tion not matching reality, which seems to me equally interesting, belonging to the field situated between law, sociology, psychology and cultural studies (Hall and Hearn 2019). Conclusions The offences of revenge porn and fake porn discussed here show just how much technology overtakes legislation (Franks 2017a, b). A replacement of a porn actor’s face with an image of any person may entail a wave of breaches of law, not just in terms of intellectual property.39 Services publishing contentious content have tools in the form of their internal rules providing for removal of materials raising justi- fied objections. The Internet, however, never ‘forgets’ and deleting a file present on one website is no guarantee that it has not been copied and made available in some other.40 Trying to provide uniform protection in a global world of Internet users, one should identify arising areas of legal disputes as new fields that legal systems should manage quickly and effectively, containing their further dissemination. In the face of the weakness of the existing legislative solutions, their slow pace and not matching the technologically advancing reality we need to try to comprehensively maintain the transparency of the Internet, for instance by creating out-of-court procedures that facilitate meeting the needs of social justice. We associate ‘fake porn’ with using images of known persons, yet it may concern each of us. Fed with the selfie fad, the world of social media is a bank of data per- taining to the images of our faces. This, in turn, facilitates their free mapping and a technically simple replacement of one image with another by means of commonly 39 Cause of Action for Internet Posting of ‘Revenge Porn’, 72 Causes of Action 2d 537 (Originally pub- lished in 2016). 40 Sherisse Pham, Reddit bans fake porn that uses other people’s faces—https ://money .cnn. com/2018/02/08/techn ology /reddi t-deepf ake-porn-ai/index .html. https://money.cnn.com/2018/02/08/technology/reddit-deepfake-porn-ai/index.html https://money.cnn.com/2018/02/08/technology/reddit-deepfake-porn-ai/index.html 2094 K. Mania 1 3 available applications (e.g. FakeApp).41 Computer algorithms like Face2Face make it possible to modify video recordings using face tracking in real time, proving that already tomorrow it is possible to become a star of a film one has never played in.42 Compliance with Ethical Standards Conflict of interest I (the Author) have no conflict of interest. This article does not contain any studies with human participants or animals performed by any of the authors. Open Access This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Com- mons licence, and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this article are included in the article’s Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the article’s Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder. To view a copy of this licence, visit http://creat iveco mmons .org/licen ses/by/4.0/. References Attwood, F. (2005). 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The Legal Implications and Remedies Concerning Revenge Porn and Fake Porn: A Common Law Perspective Abstract Introduction Methodology Artificial Intelligence in the World of Pornography American and British Perspectives on Current Legal Solutions Against Revenge and Fake Porn American Perspective on Current Legal Solutions Against Revenge and Fake Porn Tort Law Criminal Law British Perspective on Current Legal Solutions Against Revenge and Fake Porn Comparative Assessment of American and British Legal Solutions—Critical Issues Alternative Approach to New Forms of Law Violations—Causes and Proposed Legal Solutions Discussion and Future Work Conclusions References 
work_uw2kasvi35colekztybbjut4sm	----	WordNet based Implicit Aspect Sentiment Analysis for Crime Identification from Twitter (IJACSA) International Journal of Advanced Computer Science and Applications, Vol. 9, No. 12, 2018 150 | P a g e www.ijacsa.thesai.org WordNet based Implicit Aspect Sentiment Analysis for Crime Identification from Twitter Hajar El Hannach 1 , Mohammed Benkhalifa 2 ANISSE research team, Computer science department Faculty of science, Mohammed V University Rabat, Morocco Abstract—Crime analysis has become an interesting field that deals with serious public safety issues recognized around the world. Today, investigating Twitter Sentiment Analysis (SA) is a continuing concern within this field. Aspect based SA, the process by which information can be extracted, analyzed and classified, is applied to tweet datasets for sentiment polarity classification to predict crimes. This paper addresses the aspect identification task involving implicit aspect implied by adjectives and verbs for crime tweets. The proposed hybrid model is based on WordNet semantic relations and Term-Weighting scheme, to enhance training data for (1) Crime Implicit Aspect sentences detection (IASD) and (2) Crime Implicit Aspect Identification (IAI). The performance is evaluated using three classifiers Multinomial Naïve Bayes, Support Vector Machine and Random Forest on three Twitter crime datasets. The obtained results demonstrate the effectiveness of WN synonym and definition relations and prove the importance of verbs in training data enhancement for crime IASD and IAI. Keywords—Implicit aspect based sentiment analysis; information retrieval; machine learning; supervised approaches; frequency model; WordNet; crime detection; hate crime twitter sentiment (HCTS) I. INTRODUCTION Sentiment Analysis (SA) has become one of the most active topics in information retrieval and text mining due to the large expansion of the World Wide Web. SA is the field of study that deals with automatic analysis of people‟s opinions, sentiments, appraisals, attitudes, and emotions toward entities and their attributes expressed in written text [1]. The entities can be products, services, organizations, individuals, events, or topics such as crimes. SA research has been mainly carried out at three levels of granularity: document, sentence or aspect level. Aspect level SA is the most fine-grained model, which extracts opinions expressed against different aspects/features of the entity. Classifying opinion text at the document level or at the sentence level as positive or negative is insufficient for most applications. These classifications do not tell what each opinion is about, that is, the target of opinion. Indeed, when a document or a sentence evaluates a single entity, it does not mean that this evaluation is true for all aspects of the entity [2]. For a more complete analysis, aspects need to be discovered before to determine whether the sentiment is positive, negative, or neutral about each aspect. To obtain this level of fine-grained results, Aspect-based Sentiment Analysis (ABSA) is applied [3]. This latter considers relations between the aspects of the object of the opinion and the document polarity (positive or negative feeling expressed in the opinion). An aspect is a concept on which the author expresses his/her opinion in the document. The aspects can be of two types: explicit aspects and implicit aspects. Explicit aspects correspond to specific terms that explicitly appear in the document. In contrast, an implicit aspect is not specified explicitly in the document. The implicit aspects (which can be indicated by adjectives, adverbs, verbs or phrasal verbs) are very important that they can convey the opinions and help in improving the performance of SA systems. Within the next few years, SA and more particularly IASA is set to become a promising approach for crime prediction [4]–[6]. Nowadays, IASA is applied for crime prevention systems such as neighborhood crime rating systems and safety of school platforms that are developed to support crime prevention and fear reducing. The Most challenging task in crime prediction area is identifying the set of committed crimes according to their types, locations and individuals, especially when this information is implicitly implied and not mentioned explicitly in data. In this scenario, Implicit Aspect based Sentiment Analysis (IASA) can be used to highlight the patterns of crimes. When applied to crime prediction, IASA operates in three steps: (1) implicit aspect sentences detection (IASD), (2) implicit aspect identification (IAI) and (3) sentiment classification. For crime datasets, Twitter is a defensible and logical source of data widely used in crime prevention and pattern detection approaches[7]–[9]. When gathering implicit aspect sentences from this popular social networking site, the main issue is the huge number of tweets returned with poor grammar and spelling, hashtags, URL, and irrelevant sentences. Thus, the construction of implicit aspect crime datasets requires preprocessing treatment and information retrieval techniques in order to classify relevant and irrelevant sentences. This process is known as “implicit aspect tweets or sentences detection”. After building crime datasets, Implicit Aspect Identification (IAI) is performed. IAI encompasses implicit aspect term (IAT) extraction and IAT aggregation. For each implicit aspect sentence, IAT extraction aims at extracting adjectives, verbs implying aspects. Afterward, extracted terms suggesting the same aspect are assembled into one implicit aspect in IAT aggregation. (IJACSA) International Journal of Advanced Computer Science and Applications, Vol. 9, No. 12, 2018 151 | P a g e www.ijacsa.thesai.org After the implicit aspect identification, sentiment classification can be applied to classify opinions, toward each aspect, into positive or negative classes. In this paper, the focus is made on Implicit aspect sentence detection and Implicit Aspect identification. A hybrid model, coupling WordNet Synonym and Definition semantic relations and Term Weighting scheme, is proposed for training data improvement to support both IASD and IAI steps. The proposed hybrid model is empirically evaluated using three classifiers Multinomial Naïve Bayes (MNB), Support Vector Machine (SVM) and Random Forest(RF) on three Twitter crime datasets. The study shows that our approach helps the three classifiers achieve good performance for IASD and IAI tasks. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, related works are reviewed. In section 3, the proposed hybrid model based approach is presented in details. In section 4, the experimental setting adopted is exposed. In section 5, obtained results are presented and discussed. Finally, conclusions and future work are presented. II. RELATED WORKS A considerable amount of works have been published in aspect based sentiment analysis [10], [11], while few have attempted to address the implicit aspect identification. The methods applied for this task are based on two major methods: lexical based and supervised learning approaches. Among the lexical based approaches, the semantic orientation methods are used to supports binary classification [12]. Dictionary based techniques are one of the most popular lexical approach used in this field. In [13], authors try a new approach based lexical method, Part of speech tagging, SentiWordNet and WordNet combined with a weighted model provided by Natural language processing NLP(weight assignment policies) in sentiment classification. Their results outperform the basic use of WEKA Naïve Bayes Classifier and prove the effectiveness and contribution of the lexical approach in opinion mining. Several studies investigating machine learning have been carried out on sentiment analysis. Machine learning algorithms have been used to solve the sentiment analysis as a regular text classification problem. In [14] performed a comparative study involving different machine learning algorithms. Naïve Bayes, Support Vector Machine and maximum-entropy-based classifiers are applied for sentiment polarity classification for movies reviews. Compared to the human generated baselines, the ML techniques achieve the better performances. Data representation is also among factors that impact ML performances. In [15], authors aim at investigating the effectiveness of vector representation for explicit aspect extraction. Their approach is hybrid based on Semantic Role Labelling, Conditional Random Fields and Structural Support Vector Machines (SVM-HMM). The evidence presented in their work suggests that the vector space approach support explicit aspect extraction and SA classification. Much of the current studies on SA pays particular attention to Twitter trends and opinions. A lot of research has been done in this field by researchers and scholars all around the world [16]–[18]. Sentiment analysis in tweets is done according to major steps, identifying opinion target, explicit or implicit aspect, and classifying the sentiment polarity of tweets. To perform Sentiment classification in twitter, most of the research applied the followed process: data collection, information retrieval and sentiment classification [19], [20]. For information retrieval, Term Frequency-Inverse Document Frequency (TF-IDF) is among the most popular technique used for text categorization and tweets selection [21]. This term weighting scheme is easy to compute, implement, and understand. However, its shortcoming is very well recognized. For imbalanced datasets, the TF-IDF need to be enhanced to allows better performances[22]. Sentiment analysis is fast becoming a key instrument in Crime prevention and data detection. In [4], authors elaborate a sentiment analysis approach based on lexicon methods and combined with kernel density estimation based on historical crime incidents to predict the time and location in which a specific crime will occur. Their approach provides a significant achievement comparing to the benchmark model. Others in [8], addressed the aspect-based sentiment analysis for crime tweets through the use of hybrid model. Based on Natural Language Processing techniques and SentiWordNet, the hybrid model detects the subjectivity of crime and then predicts the hate crime tweets polarity. III. PROPOSED FRAMEWORK The proposed study is motivated by considering WordNet extracted terms according to Synonym and Definition subsets for adjectives and verbs coupled with a new Term Weighting model to represent implicit aspects and improve training data. This motivation is driven by two curiosities: (1) How these WN extracted terms can be exploited and combined with their corpus adjectives and verbs to best represent implicit aspects and (2) How this combination can be made optimally informative to both tasks: implicit aspect crime sentence detection and implicit aspect identification. Fig. 1. Abstract Process of the Proposed Framework. (IJACSA) International Journal of Advanced Computer Science and Applications, Vol. 9, No. 12, 2018 152 | P a g e www.ijacsa.thesai.org The proposed approach is supported by a hybrid representation model. It operates in three phases according to the schema shown in Fig. 1. The first phase collects tweet datasets using the official Twitter Search API v1.1. The second phase proceeds into 2 steps: The preprocessing that prepares tweet datasets and the sentence relevancy classification that detects implicit aspect crime sentences. The third phase performs IAT extraction and IAT aggregation for crime implicit aspect identification. Before presenting the exhaustive outline of the proposed approach, the Hybrid Implicit Aspect representation model (as shown in Fig. 2) is explained in details in the following section. Fig. 2. Summary of the Proposed Hybrid Implicit Aspect Representation Model. A. Hybrid Implicit Aspect Representation Model To represent crime implicit aspects, our hybrid model proceeds in five steps. Steps 1, 2, and 3 deal with extracting implicit aspect terms for document representation whereas step 4 and 5 bring improvements to training data. Step 1 creates a list of extracted adjectives and verbs called terms . * + Where and denotes adjective and verb term respectively, and n represents the number of terms . To represent dataset documents, step 2 generates a document term vector from WN extracted terms vectors . The vectors are generated using the appropriate WN semantic relation subsets according to adjectives and verbs. Indeed, (as shown in (1)) are constructed from the best supportive subsets of WordNet semantic relations, empirically identified in [23]. In this latter work, five WN subsets are considered for adjectives and verbs:  Subset 1: S which contains all words extracted from synonym relation.  Subset 2: D containing all synonyms words and nouns appearing in phrases describing a given word from definition relation.  Subset 3: S ∩ D that contains words appearing in synonym and definition relations.  Subset 4: S-D, composed of words appearing in synonym relation and not in definition relation.  Subset 5: D-S, representing words appearing in definition relation and not in synonym relation. For , vectors are constructed from Subset 2 (D) containing synonyms and nouns appearing in description. For , vectors are generated from subset 5 (D-S) that is composed of nouns appearing in verb definition and not in synonym relation. ( ) (1) The document term vector representing a document j is generated as follows: ( (2) Where is the n-th WN related word extracted for Term and N denotes the number of terms and theirs WN extracted terms. After the term document vector generation, step 3 computes the document term vector frequency for each document j. TF is calculated for and their WN extracted terms . The term frequency is equal to the number of times term Ti occurs in document . ( ) (3) Where is the document term frequency of term . (IJACSA) International Journal of Advanced Computer Science and Applications, Vol. 9, No. 12, 2018 153 | P a g e www.ijacsa.thesai.org Instead of using Term Frequency-Inverse Document Frequency (TF-IDF) the hybrid model uses TF-ICF which brings class information from training data. ( ) ( ) . ( ) / (4) Where ( ) represents the number of times term occurs in documents , N denotes the number of documents, and ( ) stands for the number of documents in which term occurs at least once. In fact, TF-IDF, that computes term weighting scores regardless the class information of documents, can‟t effectively deal with crime datasets which are imbalanced. The next steps aim at including class category information from training data to provide the new term weighting ICF (inverse class frequency). This basically implies that the new ICF is class category specific and is computed using the class terms frequency vector (5) based on document term frequency vectors In step 4, the class terms frequency vector is generated. For each class , presents the number of times that term occurs in training data of class . The class term frequency is obtained from as follows: ∑ (5) Where is the class term frequency of class , and denotes the number of training document of and is the document frequency term for document j computed in (3). ( ) is defined as terms frequency matrix representing all vectors where stands for the number of classes and is the number of terms . Finally, in step 5, the ICF is computed for each term as follows: ( ) ( ∑ ) (6) Where α takes 0 if term does not appear in class , and 1 in otherwise. The new ICF boosts the importance of terms appearing only at one class and penalizes irrelevant terms. The final ( ) matrix is obtained by (7) Where the ( ) is the diagonal matrix of ICF. As mentioned earlier, our approach proceeds in three phases (shown in Fig.1) as follows: Phase 1: Twitter Data Collection The data collection is done from twitter through the use of the official Twitter Search API v1.1. The Twitter API allows real time access and extraction of tweets according to a specific query. With more than 50 requests, we create three crime different datasets. The two first datasets consider the major crime types (Homicide, Rape, Robbery, Assault, Kidnapping). whereas the third one is a Hate Crime Twitter sentiment (HCTS) dataset with different aspects of Hate Crime as racism, terrorism, religious tolerance… The obtained datasets contain two types of tweets: (1) irrelevant tweets which refer to contexts not related to crimes (i.e., movies, games ) or tweets without implicit aspects and (2) implicit aspect Crime tweets. Furthermore, certain tweets contain grammatical and spelling mistakes, abbreviations, URLs, sources of data, hashtags… These hurdles are addressed by the preprocessing step of the IASD phase to ensure better crime implicit aspect identification. Phase 2: Implicit Aspect Sentence Detection IASD phase, as shown in figure 3, consists of preprocessing and sentence relevancy classification process: 1) Preprocessing The first step of the preprocessing is the removal of noisy data. The process begins with the removal of URL, @usernames and #hashtags. Then, the Part of speech tagger (POS) is used to parse tweets to extract adjectives and verbs as they represent potential implicit aspect terms implying crimes. For the elongate extracted terms, with more than three following occurrence of the same letter, we applied the compression words process commonly used for tweets. It‟s used to obtain the right form of word acceptable by the WordNet dictionary. At last, the stop words are removed from tweet datasets. 2) Sentence relevancy classification Sentence Relevancy Classification, which encompasses two sub-steps, focuses on classifying relevant/irrelevant tweets in order to create an implicit aspect crime corpus from each dataset. The first sub-step preprocesses tweet datasets and uses the proposed hybrid model to enhance training data. The second sub-step employs the improved training data to build a classification model for crime implicit aspect sentences and then generate crime implicit aspect corpora. Fig. 3. Crime Implicit Aspect Sentences Detection using Hybrid Model. (IJACSA) International Journal of Advanced Computer Science and Applications, Vol. 9, No. 12, 2018 154 | P a g e www.ijacsa.thesai.org Fig. 4. Crime Implicit Aspect Identification using Hybrid Model. Phase 3: Crime implicit aspect identification As shown in Fig.4, the task aims at extracting crime implicit aspects from corpora prepared in phase 2. IAT extraction and aggregation are addressed using the two steps of the proposed hybrid model. In IAT Extraction, the Terms Extraction & Document Representation steps of the hybrid model are applied to extract potential implicit aspect implied by adjectives and verbs. Then, for each dataset document, the hybrid model provides the document term frequency vectors , which represents the contribution of adjectives and verbs and their WN extracted terms for a given document. In IAT aggregation, the Training data improvement steps of the hybrid model are applied using several W-Training data splits. These splits are obtained using weighting schema assigning different weights for adjectives and verbs. This weighting schema is used to evaluate the impact of using different proportions of adjectives and verbs on the improvement of training data for crime datasets. Each W- Training data split is computed by equation 9 as follows: *, - , -+ (8) , - IAT aggregation task aims at identifying the implicit aspect for each document. To this end, IAT aggregation uses weighting model that measures the document terms reliability according to a given implicit aspect (class). Thus, IAT aggregation computes term matrix frequency , that reflects the term‟s strength of representing a specific class. IV. EXPERIMENTS AND EVALUATION The experiments conducted to validate the proposed approach are presented in this section with the experimental design adopted, i.e. the pre-processing techniques utilized, classifies used, datasets chosen, the performance evaluation metrics used, and the results obtained based on those measures with the discussion. A. Experimental Setup 1) Preprocessing: After gathering data from Twitter by means of the Twitter API within data collection phase, the preprocessing is done. it applied filtering text techniques to obtain a clear text without irrelevant content. At last, the POS tagger is used for parsing data and extracting a list of adjectives and verbs used at sub-step 1 of Sentence Relevancy Classification process. 2) Classifiers used: Three supervised classifiers are used to validate the proposed approach: Multinomial Naïve Bayes (MNB), Support Vector Machine (SVM) and Random Forest (RF). Multinomial Naïve Bayes is the most variation of NB that is mostly used in text categorization and sentiment analysis [24]. MNB is a probabilistic model based on the Bayes theorem. It uses the joint probabilities of features and categories to estimate the probabilities of classes given a document and makes the assumption that features are conditionally independent of each other to make the computation of joint probabilities simple. In text categorization and sentiment analysis, Support Vector Machine is often considered as the best classifier providing the greatest performances for those tasks [25]. It‟s among the class of classifiers based on kernel substitution [26].In this work, the version Sequential Minimal Optimization (SMO) developed in [27] is used. Random Forest is a popular tree classifier based on many classification trees, used for text categorization and sentiment analysis for Twitter [19], [28]. The forest construction is the base step in this classification. Each individual tree is constructed based on two procedures proposed by [29]: (1) to create decision tree nodes, subspace of features is randomly chosen, then (2) to generate training data subsets for building individual trees, the classifier relies on bagging method and finally (3) to obtain the random forest classifier all individual trees created are combined. 3) Datasets: The proposed approach is assessed using crime datasets collected and prepared in this work. The three crime datasets are extracted from twitter with different size and aspects. The first crime dataset contains 2k tweets, of which 357 include implicit aspect sentences involving adjectives and verbs. The dataset covers the four major crime types namely, homicide, rape, robbery and aggravated assault. The second dataset considers more specific type of crime as shooting, kidnapping, vehicle theft, violent crime, rape and homicide. It contains more than 600 implicit aspect sentences extracted from 3k tweets. The hate crime dataset involves 6k tweets of which 648 include implicit aspect sentences and cover different predefined aspect racism, disability abuse, religious tolerance, terrorism and rape. 4) Evaluation measures: To evaluate the performance obtained after using the proposed approach, we use the standard metric F1-score which is commonly used to evaluate the classification task. F1, introduced by Van Rijsbergen [30] is the equally weighted average of recall and precision as (IJACSA) International Journal of Advanced Computer Science and Applications, Vol. 9, No. 12, 2018 155 | P a g e www.ijacsa.thesai.org stated in (9). The Recall is defined to be the ratio of correct assignments by the system divided by the total correct assignments. The Precision is the proportion of correct assignments by the system within the total number of the system‟s assignments. All experiments are carried out using Weka platform [31]. We use the 10 Fold cross validation to reduce the uncertainty of data split between training and test data. (9) B. Experimental Protocols Experiments aimed at evaluating the effectiveness of the proposed approach for Crime IASD and crime IAI. 1) Crime implicit aspect sentence detection IASD: Experiments have been conducted according to three points relating to performance of the three classifiers for Crime IASD: a) The use of TF-IDF versus TF-ICF for document representation The first point pertains to evaluating and comparing the impacts of using TF-IDF and TF-ICF on the performances for the classifiers for IASD. Two categories of experiments are defined:  TF-IDF (denoted baseline): it refers to the use of the three classifiers with hybrid model and without considering WordNet semantic relations. TF-IDF uses only the terms extracted from datasets and presents documents using the Term Frequency-Inverse Document Frequency vector model.  TF-ICF: it represents the use of the three classifiers with hybrid model and without considering WordNet semantic relations. TF-ICF uses only the terms extracted from datasets and presents documents using the Term Frequency-Inverse Class Frequency vector model. b) The integration of WordNet Synonym relations of adjectives and verbs in the document representation model The second point relates to the comparison of the impacts on the performances of the classifiers for IASD using TF-IDF and TF-ICF with the integration of WordNet synonym relations for adjectives and verbs. Synonyms are considered here due to their wide use in SA. Two types of experiments are defined:  TF-IDF+ Synonyms: it concerns the use of the three classifiers with the hybrid model using TF-IDF and integrating synonyms of adjectives and verbs.  TF-ICF+ Synonyms: it refers to using the three classifiers with the hybrid model using TF-ICF and integrating Synonyms of adjectives and verbs. c) The integration of the best WN subsets of adjectives and verbs in the document representation The third point is similar to the second point except here the integration of WordNet relations concerns the best WN subsets for adjectives and verbs. Two types of experiments are defined:  TF-IDF + Best-WN-subsets represents the use of the three classifiers with the hybrid model using TF-IDF and integrating the best WN subsets (subsets D and D-S for adjectives and verbs respectively).  TF-ICF + Best-WN-subsets represents the use of the three classifiers using TF-ICF and integrating the best WN subsets (subsets D and D-S for adjectives and verbs respectively). Experiments have been conducted according to two points that evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed approach for Crime implicit aspect sentence detection IASD and crime implicit aspect identification IAI. 2) Crime implicit aspect identification IAI: Experiments have been conducted according to two points relating to performance of the three classifiers for Crime IAI: a) The use of adjectives and verbs for training data enhancement The first point concerns the comparison of the impacts of adjectives and verbs on training data improvement. Experiments are done here using several W-Training data splits. These splits are obtained using weighting schema assigning different weights for adjectives and verbs. For each dataset, six testing datasets are prepared where each set combines adjectives and verbs with different weighting. These weightings are defined as follows: ( ) , ( ),( ), ( ), ( ) and ( ). Three experiments are defined: MNB, SVM and RF that respectively refers to MBN, SVM and RF classifier using hybrid model, W-training data and integrating the best WN subsets of adjectives and verbs. b) The Absence of WN terms of adjectives and verbs in the document representation The second point deals with the effects on classifiers performances of the absence of WN terms of adjectives and verbs in the hybrid model. Three experiments are defined: MNBNoWn, SVMNoWn and RFNoWn that respectively represents MNB, SVM and RF using the hybrid model with W-training data and without the best WN subsets of adjectives and verbs. C. Results and Discussion In this section, experiments results are presented according to the points mentioned in the experimental protocols section. 1) Crime implicit aspect sentence detection IASD: The three classifiers are assessed for crime Implicit aspect sentence detection using three crime datasets with varying sizes presented in table 1. Table 2 shows the performances with the Average Improvement Rates (AVG.Imp.R) of the three classifiers obtained from experiments related to the three points above mentioned in the experimental protocols for this phase. (IJACSA) International Journal of Advanced Computer Science and Applications, Vol. 9, No. 12, 2018 156 | P a g e www.ijacsa.thesai.org TABLE I. SIZE OF DATASETS Crime dataset 1 Crime dataset 2 Hate crime dataset Number of sentences 2k 3k 6k Number of implicit aspect sentences 357 641 648 Number of irrelevant sentences 1643 2359 5352 Number of Training data for implicit aspect 180 350 300 Number of Training data for implicit aspect 670 1500 3500 TABLE II. MNB, SVM AND RF FOR RELEVANT / IRRELEVANT CLASSIFICATION Crime dataset 1 Crime dataset 2 Hate crime dataset MNB SVM RF MNB SV M RF MNB SVM RF (1) 0.51 0.63 0.63 0.52 0.65 0.63 0.63 0.69 0.68 (2) 0.57 0.65 0.65 0.59 0.68 0.68 0.74 0.77 0.75 (1)/(2 ) 11.6 % 3.1% 3.1% 13.4 % 4.6 % 7.9 % 17.4 % 11.5 % 10.2 % (3) 0.71 0.68 0.68 0.69 0.71 0.69 0.76 0.78 0.78 (4) 0.74 0.71 0.71 0.74 0.74 0.72 0.74 0.78 0.78 (5) 0.78 0.71 0.71 0.74 0.73 0.73 0.80 0.81 0.80 (6) 0.83 0.88 0.87 0.79 0.80 0.79 0.82 0.89 0.87 (3)/(5 ) 9.8% 4.4% 4.4% 7.2% 2.8 % 5.7 % 5.2% 3.8% 2.5% (4)/(6 ) 12.1 % 23.9 % 22.5 % 6.7% 8.1 % 9.7 % 10.8 % 14.1 % 11.5 % (1) Baseline, (3) TF-IDF+Synonyms, (5) TF-IDF + Best WN Subsets (2) TF-ICF, (4) TF-ICF+Synonyms, (6) TF-ICF + Best WN Subsets (The proposed Hybrid Model) Firstly, it can be seen, from table 2, that the use of TF-ICF helps better the three classifiers deal with IASD than using TF-IDF for the three datasets. In fact, TF-IDF does need cope effectively with document representation for the three datasets because these latter are class imbalanced. Normally, terms with low TF-IDF are considered irrelevant terms since they appear in large part of documents. This is not definitely true for imbalanced datasets, because although these terms occur more often in one class than others they are relevant and important to distinguish between classes. On the contrary of TF-IDF, TF-ICF takes advantage of those unevenly distributed words by considering term contribution in class representation rather than document representation. Secondly, table 2 shows that the integration of WN synonyms helps the three classifiers improve their performances for IASD when using TF-IDF and TF-ICF. Moreover, the use of TF-ICF is proven to be consistently more helpful for the three classifiers than using TF-IDF even with the integration of WordNet synonyms. Thirdly, table 2 proves that the integration of the best WN subsets allows the three classifiers achieve their best performances for both TF-IDF and TF-ICF cases. Also, using TF-ICF is shown to help the three classifiers achieve better performances than using TF-IDF. In fact, the integration of WN semantic relations promotes training data vocabulary by creating a large set of relevant terms that support system to learn better from data. However, the selection of WN semantic relation is crucial. The integration of synonym relation allows classifiers to achieve better scores, yet, it induces more noisy terms than definition subsets. WN semantic relations for adjectives and verbs must be appropriately selected (subsets D for adjectives and subsets D-S for verbs) so that they can help the classifiers achieve their best performances for IASD. Fig. 5. F1-Performances of MNB, SVM and RF using Different W-Training Data Splits, with and without the best WN Subsets on CRIME CORPUS 1 for IAI Phase. (IJACSA) International Journal of Advanced Computer Science and Applications, Vol. 9, No. 12, 2018 157 | P a g e www.ijacsa.thesai.org Fig. 6. F1-Performances of MNB, SVM and RF using Different W-Training Data Splits, with and without the best WN Subsets on CRIME CORPUS 2 for IAI Phase. Fig. 7. F1-Performances of MNB, SVM and RF using Different W-Training Data Splits, with and without the best WN Subsets on HATE CRIME CORPUS for IAI Phase. 2) Crime implicit aspect identification IAI: Fig. 5, 6 and 7 show the performances of the three classifiers obtained from experiments pertaining to the two points already introduced in experimental protocols for this phase. For each testing data, X-axis denotes the different weights ( ) assigned to adjectives and verbs and Y-axis indicates F-1 performances. The number of adjectives and verbs of the three crime corpora is shown in table 3. TABLE III. NUMBER OF ADJECTIVES AND VERBS IMPLYING IMPLICIT ASPECT FOR EACH CRIME DATASET Crime dataset 1 Crime dataset 2 Hate crime dataset Number of sentences 357 641 648 Number of adjectives 406 841 773 Number of verbs 446 872 729 As shown from Fig. 5, 6 and 7, the use of different weights ( ) assigned to adjectives and verbs leads to variant F1- performances for MNB, SVM and RF. The case of training and test data involves adjectives only (test data with (x=1, y=0) and W-training with (1,0)) leads to the best performances for all classifiers. One unanticipated finding is that when considering only verbs for training (Wtraining with (0,1)), all classifiers are able to achieve considerable F1- performances that exceed 60% for implicit aspect identification implied by adjectives. In contrast, adjectives do not support verb identification (test data with (x=0, y=1)). In this test data case and for the three datasets, classifiers achieve their worst performances when verbs are completely absent in training data ( W-training with ( , )). For the same test data, the best F-1 scores are attained when considering only verbs for training (Wtraining with (0,1)). (IJACSA) International Journal of Advanced Computer Science and Applications, Vol. 9, No. 12, 2018 158 | P a g e www.ijacsa.thesai.org Using adjectives in training data supports IAI involving more adjectives than verbs (test data with (x=1, y=0) and (x=0.8, y=0.2)). Implicit aspect identification including verbs is known to be more challenging than adjective. Using only adjectives in training to predict implicit verbs does not support classifiers identifying the implicit aspect for crime datasets. However, using verbs for implicit aspect identification is more beneficial for classifiers. This can be explained by the fact that, verbs used to imply a crime aspect are more descriptive and useful than adjectives. In other words, for each crime aspect there are a number of verbs specifically used to imply this aspect, for example „to kill’, „to kidnap’ and ‘to steal’, each verb is used to imply a single type of crime which is ‘Homicide’, ‘Kidnapping’ and ‘Robbery’ respectively. However, as often happens, one adjective can be used to imply different crime aspects such as ‘blooded’, ‘atrocious’, „hostile’, ‘agonizing’, ‘cruel’ that can be used not only for ‘homicide’ but for ‘violent crime’ and ‘kidnapping’ as well. As a result, adjective extracted terms can represent more than one aspect. However, when considering more verbs for training than adjectives, the WN extracted terms are more descriptive and contain more reliable terms that better represent the implicit aspect which supports adjective and verb identification. For training and test data using a combination of adjectives and verbs, and for the same reasons explained above, the highest performance is achieved in general when considering training with more verbs than adjectives. Overall, for the three datasets, the best performing W-training is ( ). On the other hand, for each testing data of the three crime corpora, MNBNoWn, SVMNoWn and RFNoWn have the same behavior than MNB, SVM and RF, but the performances reached, without WN extracted terms for verbs and adjectives, are consistently lower. Considering more verbs than adjectives in training data supports implicit aspect identification for adjectives and verbs. While using more adjectives for learning conducts to better classifiers performances for test data involving only adjectives. However, the observed decrease in F1- performances can be attributed to the lack of WN extracted terms. Without WN, classifiers are not able to enlarge training vocabulary. This makes it extremely hard to identify adjectives and verbs appearing only twice in datasets. Even worse, it‟s completely impossible to identify terms appearing only once either in training or test set. The Absence of WN terms of adjectives and verbs severely penalizes performances of all classifiers for crime IAI. Hence, considering a weighted training data based on verbs and their WN extracted terms not only is required and undeniable but also improves the performance of the considered classifiers for implicit aspect identification for crimes. Finally, Fig. 8 presents the extracted implicit aspects of the three considered crime datasets using the proposed framework. V. CONCLUSION We presented a hybrid approach for training data improvement of MNB, SVM and RF classifiers to address Aspect Based Sentiment Analysis for Crime datasets. We conduct an empirical and analytical study at the level of: 1) The crime implicit aspect sentence Detection IASD phase, where experiments are conducted according to three points: (1) the use of TF-IDF versus TF-ICF for document representation (2) The integration of WordNet Synonym relations of adjectives and verbs in document representation model and (3) The integration of the best WN subsets of adjectives and verbs in document representation. 2) The crime implicit aspect identification IAI phase, where experiments are carried out according to two points: (1) The use of adjectives and verbs for training data enhancement and (2) The Absence of WN terms of adjectives and verbs in document representation. Fig. 8. Percentage of Implicit Aspects of Crime for the Three Crime Datasets. (IJACSA) International Journal of Advanced Computer Science and Applications, Vol. 9, No. 12, 2018 159 | P a g e www.ijacsa.thesai.org The major findings of the work include:  For the three imbalanced crime datasets, using TF-ICF is shown to help the three classifiers achieve better performances for IASD than using TF-IDF. This is true with and without the integration of WordNet terms.  Using the synonyms relations for adjectives and verbs are shown to support better classifiers for IASD phase.  Using an appropriately selected WN semantic relations for adjectives and verbs (Best WN subsets) improves training data for crime IASD and IAI and thus helps classifiers performing better for these two phases.  Comparing to adjectives, verbs and their WN extracted terms are empirically proven to be as the key element for training data enhancement that allows classifiers to be more performant for crime implicit aspect identification. 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work_uzlrgr4qnbclxh5soztwvovl4e	----	Perceptions of newsworthiness are contaminated by a political usefulness bias | Semantic Scholar Skip to search formSkip to main content> Semantic Scholar's Logo Search Sign InCreate Free Account You are currently offline. Some features of the site may not work correctly. DOI:10.1098/rsos.172239 Corpus ID: 52291216Perceptions of newsworthiness are contaminated by a political usefulness bias @article{Pashler2018PerceptionsON, title={Perceptions of newsworthiness are contaminated by a political usefulness bias}, author={H. Pashler and Gail L. Heriot}, journal={Royal Society Open Science}, year={2018}, volume={5} } H. Pashler, Gail L. Heriot Published 2018 Psychology, Medicine Royal Society Open Science Are people's perceptions of the newsworthiness of events biased by a tendency to rate as more important any news story that seems likely to lead others to share their own political attitudes? To assess this, we created six pairs of hypothetical news stories, each describing an event that seemed likely to encourage people to adopt attitudes on the opposite side of a particular controversial issue (e.g. affirmative action and gay marriage). In total, 569 subjects were asked to evaluate the… Expand View on Royal Society royalsocietypublishing.org Save to Library Create Alert Cite Launch Research Feed Share This Paper 1 CitationsBackground Citations 1 View All Figures, Tables, and Topics from this paper figure 1 table 1 figure 2 table 2 table 3 figure 3 figure 4 View All 7 Figures & Tables Attitude Occur (action) One Citation Citation Type Citation Type All Types Cites Results Cites Methods Cites Background Has PDF Publication Type Author More Filters More Filters Filters Sort by Relevance Sort by Most Influenced Papers Sort by Citation Count Sort by Recency Social Studies Teacher Perceptions of News Source Credibility Christopher H. Clark, Mardi Schmeichel, H. Garrett Sociology 2020 View 1 excerpt, cites background Save Alert Research Feed References SHOWING 1-10 OF 19 REFERENCES SORT BYRelevance Most Influenced Papers Recency Biased Assimilation of Sociopolitical Arguments: Evaluating the 1996 U.S. Presidential Debate G. Munro, P. Ditto, L. K. Lockhart, Angela Fagerlin, M. Gready, Elizabeth Peterson Psychology 2002 158 View 1 excerpt, references background Save Alert Research Feed Politically Motivated Reinforcement Seeking: Reframing the Selective Exposure Debate R. K. Garrett Psychology 2009 477 PDF View 1 excerpt, references results Save Alert Research Feed Partisan Bias in Message Selection: Media Gatekeeping of Party Press Releases Martin Haselmayer, M. Wagner, Thomas M Meyer Medicine, Sociology Political communication 2017 29 Save Alert Research Feed What is News? T. Harcup, D. O'Neill Sociology 2017 310 PDF Save Alert Research Feed Ideology, Motivated Reasoning, and Cognitive Reflection: An Experimental Study Dan Kahan Psychology 2012 158 View 1 excerpt, references background Save Alert Research Feed Political Parallelism in Media and Political Agenda-Setting Daphne J. van der Pas, Wouter van der Brug, Rens Vliegenthart Sociology 2017 12 PDF View 1 excerpt, references results Save Alert Research Feed MISPERCEPTIONS ABOUT PERCEPTUAL BIAS Alan Gerber and, D. Green 1999 270 View 1 excerpt, references results Save Alert Research Feed Giving Debiasing Away: Can Psychological Research on Correcting Cognitive Errors Promote Human Welfare? S. Lilienfeld, Rachel J. Ammirati, Kristin Landfield Psychology, Medicine Perspectives on psychological science : a journal of the Association for Psychological Science 2009 227 PDF View 1 excerpt, references background Save Alert Research Feed Who Fears the HPV Vaccine, Who Doesn’t, and Why? An Experimental Study of the Mechanisms of Cultural Cognition Dan Kahan, Donald Braman, G. Cohen, John Gastil, P. Slovic Psychology, Medicine Law and human behavior 2010 248 PDF Save Alert Research Feed US Social Welfare Policy: The Reagan Record and Legacy Johnson O'Connor Sociology 1998 28 PDF Save Alert Research Feed ... 1 2 ... Related Papers Abstract Figures, Tables, and Topics 1 Citations 19 References Related Papers Stay Connected With Semantic Scholar Sign Up About Semantic Scholar Semantic Scholar is a free, AI-powered research tool for scientific literature, based at the Allen Institute for AI. Learn More → Resources DatasetsSupp.aiAPIOpen Corpus Organization About UsResearchPublishing PartnersData Partners   FAQContact Proudly built by AI2 with the help of our Collaborators Terms of Service•Privacy Policy The Allen Institute for AI By clicking accept or continuing to use the site, you agree to the terms outlined in our Privacy Policy, Terms of Service, and Dataset License ACCEPT & CONTINUE 
work_uzun33er6ng73kepfztelnv5gi	----	Microsoft Word - Repository version.docx This is a pre-print version of the article published in Feminist Media Studies Vol.17, No.6 (December 2017). 1 Media Framing of Trolling and Online Abuse: Silencing Strategies, Symbolic Violence and Victim Blaming Dr Karen Lumsden and Dr Heather M. Morgan Corresponding author details Dr Karen Lumsden, Senior Lecturer in Sociology, Department of Social Sciences, Loughborough University, Loughborough, LE11 3TU, United Kingdom. Email K.Lumsden@lboro.ac.uk Tel: +44 (0) 1509 228372 Co-author details Dr Heather Morgan, Research Fellow, Health Sciences Unit, University of Aberdeen, 3rd Floor, Health Sciences Building, Foresterhill, Aberdeen, AB25 2ZD, United Kingdom. Email h.morgan@abdn.ac.uk Tel: +44 (0) 1224 438192 Abstract This article draws on British newspaper reports in order to demonstrate that trolling, and the media’s subsequent framing of trolling, involves “silencing strategies”. It is important to examine how trolling is discussed within the media to understand how it might frame public opinion, debate and action, and implicitly victim blame. The article presents findings on: the forms of (online) abuse and behaviours related to trolling in media reports, including rape threats, death threats and body shaming. It also explores the media portrayal of victims of trolling, and the advice given concerning how to respond to trolls. To comply with the message to women, which is propagated in media and popular discourses: “do not feed the This is a pre-print version of the article published in Feminist Media Studies Vol.17, No.6 (December 2017). 2 troll”, means that “symbolic violence” is exercised with the complicity of the victim(s) of trolling, which has broader implications. Keywords Framing, online abuse, rape, social media, trolling, victims Introduction This article focuses on the framing of trolling in British newspaper reports. Trolling is a form of gendered and “symbolic violence” (Pierre Bourdieu & Loic J. D. Wacquant 1992) as it is performed in relation to women and other minority groups on social media platforms such as Twitter, Instagram and Facebook (Lumsden and Morgan forthcoming). Media reports, public debate and academic research concerning the ‘dark side’ of the web have focused on the rise of online abuse including trolling (Whitney Phillips 2015), hate crime, Islamophobia (Imran Awan 2016), cyber-bulling, revenge porn, stalking, and sexting. However, the media’s framing of trolling and online abuse has been largely overlooked in academic studies. Jane (2014a: 532) argues that “extravagant invective, the sexualized threats of violence, and the recreational nastiness that have come to constitute a dominant tenor of Internet discourse”, should be a priority for academic analysis instead of being treated as a moral panic. She also points out that not reprinting examples of online abuse can undermine how academics understand the nature of trolling, as it is then deemed “unspeakable”. It is important to examine how trolling is discussed within the media to understand how it might frame public opinion, debate and action, and implicitly victim blame via “silencing strategies”. The tactics employed by trolls, including rape threats and death threats, can be viewed as examples of “silencing strategies”. “Silencing strategies” attempt to remove the individual This is a pre-print version of the article published in Feminist Media Studies Vol.17, No.6 (December 2017). 3 from participation in (online) public space (such as on social media sites), or dissuade them from engaging in further public debate (by responding to or challenging an offensive “tweet” on Twitter or photograph on Instagram). The media portrayal and framing of trolling can be said to reinforce these “silencing strategies”. For example, as we will show, the advice given to those who are victims of online abuse – “do not feed the troll” (for fear of provoking the troll further) – is a “silencing strategy”, for in doing so the victim is unable to challenge or resist abusive (i.e. sexist, racist or misogynist) language and attitudes. Underlying the trolling of visible and audible women is the deeply entrenched misogynistic idea of silencing women (Sarah Beresford 2015). “Silencing strategies” are reflected in the ways in which the media report on trolling, including: the reconstruction of the trolling event (such as rape threats, death threats, and body shaming); the representation of the (female) victim; and the advice given to victims on how they should respond to online abuse. To address our collective knowledge gap around media framing of trolling and online abuse, this article proceeds as follows. First, it reviews literature on trolling and gendered violence in online spaces. It then discusses media framing, the legitimization and normalization of violence and rape in media reports, and victim blaming. After outlining the relevance of Bourdieu’s (1990) concept of “symbolic violence” for understanding online abuse and the media framing of trolling, the discussion focuses on the methods utilised in an analysis of British press reports of trolling. Results are then presented which centre on the forms of (online) abuse and behaviours related to trolling in media reports, including rape threats, death threats and body shaming. The discussion also explores the media portrayal of victims of trolling, and the advice given to the public on how to respond to trolls (i.e. “do not feed the troll”). It is argued that trolling places victims in a powerless position and limits freedom of expression. The media framing reinforces this notion that women are (or should be) powerless, This is a pre-print version of the article published in Feminist Media Studies Vol.17, No.6 (December 2017). 4 devaluing and stigmatising them, and victim blames. The advice to women which is propagated in media and popular discourses: “do not feed the troll”, is a form of “symbolic violence” promoting victim complicity with online abuse. Review of the literature: trolling and gendered online abuse Studies of trolling have developed from concern with early internet users’ trolling of online forms and bulletin boards (also referred to as “flaming”), to the recent use of the term trolling to refer to abuse on social media sites, comments pages and blogs. Trolling differs from flaming “in that the goal of flame bait is to incite any and all readers, whereas the goal of a stereotypical troll is to draw in particularly naive or vulnerable readers” (Susan C. Herring et al. 2002: 372). Claire Hardaker (2010) claims that trolling consists of four interrelated characteristics: aggression, deception, disruption and success. Situational factors, including anonymity, have also been found to contribute to trolling interactions and behaviours (Myiah J. Hutchens et al. 2015). Analyses of online abuse also highlight the tension between “libertarian and communitarian values, in that harassment often arises in spaces known for their freedom, lack of censure, and experimental nature” (Herring et al. 2002: 374). Scholars have also studied trolling as a subcultural practice. In her work on Use Net News Groups, Judith S. Donarth (1999) focuses on the conditions which give rise to identity deception in online communities. Here, trolling is described as: “where you set your fishing lines in the water and then slowly go back and forth dragging the bait and hoping for a bite” (1999: 45). In a study of self-identifying “subcultural trolls” in the USA, Whitney Phillips (2015: 2) highlights trolling’s relationship to the wider media cultural landscape. Trolls engage in “media fuckery”, which is the “ability to turn the media against itself”. This is accomplished by amplifying or inventing a sensational news story (Phillips 2015: 4-5). This is a pre-print version of the article published in Feminist Media Studies Vol.17, No.6 (December 2017). 5 Trolling behaviour is also normalized by those doing the trolling – as play or as the lingua franca of particular platforms such as 4chan and Reddit (Phillips 2015). “Gendertrolling” is viewed as distinct from subcultural trolling, which attempts to disrupt or hijack online interactions (Karla Mantilla 2015). Gendertrolls have a motivation that is “more vicious, virulent, aggressive, threatening, pervasive, and enduring… gendertrolls take their cause seriously, so they are … able to rally others who share in their convictions… [and] are devoted to targeting the designated person” (Mantilla 2015: 11). New forms of media can therefore exacerbate issues surrounding sexual violence through the creation of digital spaces in which the perpetration and legitimization of sexual violence takes on new qualities. Online harassment is a means of excluding women’s voices from digital spaces, although it is argued that women have never been equal online (Jessica Megarry 2014). When a woman's behaviour is perceived to be deviant from the norms of submissive femininity, the online abuse received is also particularly reliant on the positioning women as sex objects (Megarry 2014). Rape and death threats are the most prominent forms of gendertrolling, targeted at women online. Rape threats which form part of the lingua franca of trolls are part of the wider re- emergence of “rape culture” within popular discourse in the past five years. “Rape culture” is: “a socio-cultural context in which an aggressive male sexuality is eroticized and seen as a ‘healthy’, ‘normal’, and ‘desired’ part of sexual relations” (Jessalyn M. Keller, Kaitlynn D. Mendes & Jessica Ringrose 2015: 5). It is: “A complex set of beliefs that encourage male sexual aggression and supports violence against women … condones physical and emotional terrorism against women and presents it as the norm …” (Emilie Buchwald, Pamela R. Fletcher & Martha Roth 2005: xi). This discourse has become normalized to the extent that This is a pre-print version of the article published in Feminist Media Studies Vol.17, No.6 (December 2017). 6 rape threats are now the modus operandi for individuals who want to critique female commentators (Jane 2014a). Online abuse both redeploys existing manifestations of rape culture and intensifies them due to the speed at which images and written communications can be shared online (Shaheen Shariff & Ashley DeMartini 2015). Sophie Sills et al. (2016) interviewed young people about their exposure and responses to rape culture on social media. Their participants were viewed as living within a “matrix of sexism” in which sexism, misogyny, and rape culture are a normalized part of everyday life. “Victim-shaming” and “slut-shaming” were viewed as commonplace (Sills et al. 2016: 7). Trolling is situated within the wider social and cultural context of the rise of “lad culture” where sexist and misogynistic language and treatment of women is lauded and admired by peers (openly and flagrantly displayed online in sites such as the ‘Lad Bible’, and racist and sexist trolling on social media sites). Trolling must be viewed within this context, as a means of silencing women’s voices online and their participation in virtual public space(s), resulting in the heteronormative masculinization of virtual space. Previous studies have highlighted a pattern to women's responses to abuse occurring in the offline context. James E. Gruber (1989) highlights four strategies of responding to abuse which include: avoidance, diffusion, negotiation, and confrontation. Research on sexual harassment in the workplace indicates that women’s responses tend to involve “non- assertiveness” towards their harassers (James E. Gruber & Michael D. Smith 2010). It is therefore also important to focus on how victims respond to their harassers online, how the media portray victims’ responses and what public advice is given on how to respond, in order to further explore how this is linked to gendered stereotypes of women as non-confrontational and silent. This is a pre-print version of the article published in Feminist Media Studies Vol.17, No.6 (December 2017). 7 Media framing The term “trolling” is now widely utilised by the media to describe the posting of offensive messages by an individual or group in addition to the more proactive, deliberate and organised hate campaigns engaged in by groups of individuals, in a pre-meditated manner. Trolling has “become a catch-all term for any number of negatively marked online behaviours” (Hardaker 2010: 224). However, the media framing of trolling and online abuse has been largely overlooked in academic studies. Media framing refers to the ways in which news stories are organized by “patterns of selection, emphasis, interpretation, and exclusion” (Caragee & Roefs cited in Nancy Worthington 2008: 4; see also Stephen D. Reese 2001; Todd Gitlin 2003; Robert Entman 2007). It is a means of identifying the hidden meanings in news stories, including which facts are included or left out (Carolyn M. Byerly 1999). As Robert Entman (1993: 52) argues, journalists “frame” by “select[ing] some aspects of a perceived reality and mak[ing] them more salient in a communicating text.” Frames can define and identify problems, make moral judgements and suggest solutions, while also serving to maintain power and the status quo (Barbara Barnett 2016; Entman 1993). Framing can shape public understanding and influence public policy (Barnett 2016). Frames also have symbolic power and use “myths, narratives and metaphors that resonate within the culture” (Hertog & McLeod cited in Anne Johnston et al. 2014: 422). Through their framing of women’s issues, the media provide ideological support for hegemonic power structures and reproduce dominant culture (Marian Meyers 1994; Zeynep Alat 2006). Therefore, we are interested in the extent to which it can be said to support and/or reproduce online discourses of trolling/abuse. Previous studies have demonstrated how violence against women is legitimized through the ways in which media reports focus on the positions of victims in terms of family, domesticity and gender norms (Deborah Jermyn This is a pre-print version of the article published in Feminist Media Studies Vol.17, No.6 (December 2017). 8 2001). Media framing of rape has the “potential to shape the societal perceptions of rape” (Stephanie Bonnes 2013: 210). In relation to media reports of sexual violence and rape in Turkey, Alat (2006: 301) notes how they adopted a “victim blaming” stance with women “accused of lying about consensual sex and calling it rape for revenge”. Michael Salter (2013) notes the ways in which victims of sexual violence and their supporters are developing online strategies for assessing and acting upon allegations of sexual violence. Despite these strategies, “the criminal justice system and ‘old media’ are underpinned by homo-social cultures and relations that can marginalise and disrupt the truth claims of … women” (2013: 238). Furthermore, media framing of women’s issues presents and reinforces traditional images of femininity where women are objectified and portrayed as passive and submissive (Laura Ashley & Beth Olson 1998; Diana B. Carlin & Kelly L. Winfrey 2009; Burnett 2016). It is therefore crucial we analyze how the old media frame victims’ stories of online abuse as a women’s issue. Bourdieu and symbolic violence Pierre Bourdieu (1998) and researchers close to him were interested in the social and political consequences of media process and were highly critical of its “symbolic power” (Nick Couldry 2003). The media, as a sphere of cultural production, can be analysed as: a single field, or a collection of fields, (each) with a distinctive pattern of prestige and status and its own values. Indeed … the media’s intermediate position between the cultural and economic poles of the wider cultural field gives them a particular interest as a field. (Couldry 2003: 657) This is a pre-print version of the article published in Feminist Media Studies Vol.17, No.6 (December 2017). 9 The “symbolic power” of the media can be understood as a power “of a self-fulfilling prophecy and is dependent on our unwitting complicity and legitimation” (Nick Crossley 2001: 318). Some concentrations of “symbolic power” are so strong that: “they dominate the whole social landscape; as a result, they seem so natural that they are misrecognized, and their underlying arbitrariness becomes difficult to see. In this way, symbolic power moves to … ‘a power of constructing social reality’” (Couldry 2003: 664). Therefore “symbolic power” in the media field (re)produces and legitimizes social categories and beliefs. In Bourdieu’s work, the concepts of “symbolic power” and “symbolic violence” are used interchangeably. Crossley (2001: 319) argues that if there is any difference in Bourdieu’s usage it is that “symbolic violence” is often used to refer to the way in which social agents “come to accept the categories and social systems which, in turn, are imposed on them – and whose power they unwittingly sanction.” However, he proposes that “symbolic power” is more appropriate here, and that we should instead understand “symbolic violence” as referring to instances in which “particular groups are systematically denied the degree of recognition enjoyed by others … instances where they are devalued or stigmatized” (Crossley 2001: 319, our emphasis). “Symbolic violence” helps to capture the “felt and/or lived suffering of those devalued, stigmatized or otherwise denied a basic level of recognition by their wider society” (ibid). To analyse the media framing of trolling, we draw on this utilisation of “symbolic violence”. For the sake of clarity, we utilise this term (instead of “symbolic power”), throughout the article, to refer to the ways that “symbolic violence” is enacted upon women (and minority groups) in media reports of trolling, resulting in their devaluing and/or stigmatization. Bourdieu’s work has relevance for feminism and analysis of gender relations. By drawing on This is a pre-print version of the article published in Feminist Media Studies Vol.17, No.6 (December 2017). 10 Bourdieu’s work, we can view “symbolic violence” as a process of social reproduction (Angela McRobbie 2004). Social inequalities (classed, racialized, and gendered) are “perpetuated as power relations directed towards [online] bodies and the ‘dispositions of individuals’” (McRobbie 2004: 103). It is violence which is “exercised upon a social agent with his or her complicity” (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992: 167). Examples of the exercise of “symbolic violence” include gender relations in which both men and women agree that women are weaker, less intelligent and unreliable. For Bourdieu, gender relations are the paradigm case of the operation of “symbolic violence” (McRobbie 2004). We argue that “symbolic violence” towards women in the digital realm encourages complicity, while reproducing and reinforcing established gender roles. This leaks into offline spaces including the ways in which the“old media” frame online abuse and victim blame. Method Qualitative document analysis (David L. Altheide 1987; 1996) was applied to 175 newspaper reports of trolling from British national newspapers including broadsheets and tabloids. In the UK, the distinction between the tabloid and broadsheet press is based on the size of the press, with broadsheets typically larger than tabloids, and in terms of the readership, with broadsheets aimed at “the educated and professional middle classes and tabloids concentrating on the working and lower middles classes” (Katy Day et al. 2004: 168). We recognised the need to make evident examples of trolling in the British press, and the construction of the (female) victim of trolling (Jane 2014a). Hence this article aims to open doors for future studies of media framing of online abuse. We wanted to explore how the media were utilising, framing and constructing trolling as a form of online abuse. Our initial research questions were: 1) what forms of (online) abuse and behaviours are related to trolling in media reports? 3) how do the media portray the victims of trolling? 4) how do the This is a pre-print version of the article published in Feminist Media Studies Vol.17, No.6 (December 2017). 11 media portray the offender (troll)? 5) how do the media frame the victim’s response to trolling? 6) what advice do the media communicate to the public on how to respond to trolling? 7) how do the media rationalise trolling on the part of the offender? 8) how do they report on the role of external agencies including the authorities and social media corporations? 9) how do the media report on the relationship between online abuse in the virtual world and its relationship to the offline world? Sampling A search for newspaper reports was conducted using LexisNexis with the keyword “trolling” and involved “saturation sampling”. Data saturation is normatively taken to mean that data should continue to be collected until nothing new is generated and there are no more emergent patterns in the data (Michelle O’Reilly & Nicola Parker 2012). The search included the headline of articles and covered UK national newspapers over a five-year period from 4 November 20101 to 8 October 2015. From 248 results, 175 articles were included for analysis after we removed duplicate articles and those which utilised trolling in non-social media contexts. We also removed reader opinion letters. We narrowed the search to the term trolling and did not use other synonymous terms as we were particularly interested in how the phenomenon of trolling and victims’ experiences of trolling, were framed, constructed, and reported in the mainstream press. An initial search for “troll” in the headline using the above dates recovered over 3000 results which needed to be reduced for analysis, hence the decision to focus on “trolling”. We recognise this as a limitation and therefore future studies would benefit by exploring the media framing of online abuse using synonymous terms. The majority of reports we analysed were classified under the “news” category, while a minority featured in the categories of “people”, “celebrity news”, “features”, “technology”, “front page”, “politics”, “science”, “life and art” and “comment and debate”. The majority of articles This is a pre-print version of the article published in Feminist Media Studies Vol.17, No.6 (December 2017). 12 focused on trolling in Britain (with the exception of a handful which focused on the trolling of celebrities in Australia and the USA). Analysis As noted above, we used qualitative analysis “to document and understand the communication of meaning, as well as to verify theoretical relationships” (Altheide 1987: 68). This is a distinctive form of analysis because of the reflexive and interactive nature of the investigator, concepts, data collection and analysis. With this interpretive approach, the idea is to allow for reflexivity, “while being systematic and analytic, but not rigid” (Altheide 1987: 68). We were interested in the substantive content of narratives and “discourses-in-practice” (Jaber F. Gubrium & James A. Holstein 2000). We allowed our initial research questions, categories and themes to guide the analysis, but others were also expected to emerge throughout the study (Altheide 1987). We utilised a matrix to analyse the media framing of trolling which included an inventory (i.e. publication, date, length, etc.) and content variables (i.e. actors involved, topics, events, setting, context, timeframe, etc.). We began by reviewing the articles in relation to our research questions, utilising the matrix for the inventory and content. We then viewed them to explore recurrent themes which emerged naturally from the data utilising axial and open coding (Altheide 1996). In this article, we are concerned with findings on: the forms of (online) abuse and behaviours related to trolling in media reports. We will also touch upon: the media portrayal of victims of trolling; and the advice which the media communicate to the public on how to respond to trolling. Results: the framing of trolling in the British media We focus on how trolling events were framed by the British media, and how they silenced and committed “symbolic violence” against the victims. Reports of trolling referred to This is a pre-print version of the article published in Feminist Media Studies Vol.17, No.6 (December 2017). 13 multiple forms of misogyny and sexism including violence, rape, death threats, and body shaming (for instance reference to appearance, body, weight and nudity). Table 1 highlights the number of reports which included these themes, and provides a breakdown of the percentages in tabloid and broadsheet newspapers. Theme Tabloid % Broadsheet % Total number Violence 71 29 45 Rape 64 36 44 Death 66 34 70 Body shaming (i.e. appearance, body, weight, nudity) 68 32 28 Table 1: Percentage of trolling reports in British national newspapers which featured the themes: ‘violence’, ‘death’, ‘rape’, and ‘body shaming’. n=175 There was a pattern in which reports of trolling featured more frequently in the tabloid press, reflecting a general focus on stories featuring celebrities and sports personalities. The broadsheet papers more frequently cited the experiences of politicians, business people, and high profile cases of public victims of trolling. Reports of trolling in tabloid and broadsheet papers more frequently referenced death threats, followed by rape threats. Reports would often focus on trolling which included a combination of these themes. This is a pre-print version of the article published in Feminist Media Studies Vol.17, No.6 (December 2017). 14 Rape and death threats Reports of trolling in both tabloid and broadsheet British media most frequently referred to violent acts, particularly rape and death threats, experienced by female victims in the public eye, such as politicians, television presenters, and musicians. These examples demonstrate the increasingly prevalent “rape culture” which incorporates aspects of popular misogyny, and entails anti-female violent expression via the threats of rape and death (or bodily harm) directed at women online. Expressions of aggressive male sexuality are eroticized in the online sphere (Keller, Mendes & Ringrose 2015) and in the press. These reports focused on the posting of visual images online. For instance, a report referred to the Australian DJ Alison Wonderland who: received the abuse alongside a photo of herself sitting on the ground with her legs apart … Instagram trolls said they wanted to “roofie” and “rape” her … Thousands of people had “liked” the photograph … before the first of the offenders commented: “Can we rape her or something please,” tagging the other with the Instagram handle … The second responded by looping in another follower, seemingly alleging him to say: “I would roofie her”.2 The media framing of the abuse as something which the DJ “received” portrays her as a willing and submissive participant in that she was the one who opted to post the photo, thus “opening herself up” to public scrutiny. This is indicative of implicit victim blaming in that the response is framed as a direct result of her actions. The description of the photo – “sitting on the ground with her legs apart” also suggests a typical portrayal of a submissive female, with her “legs spread” and who was thus “asking for it” – asking to be trolled. This demonstrates how the media framing of “rape threat trolling” focuses on the norm of This is a pre-print version of the article published in Feminist Media Studies Vol.17, No.6 (December 2017). 15 submissive femininity and is reliant on the positioning women as sex objects (Megarry 2014). Media reports of trolling normalize “rape culture” in the online sphere. In reports of “rape threat trolling”, gender has been intersected with race, for example in the case of the blogger and YouTuber Kat Blaque, who campaigns for equality and was subjected to a “torrent of racist and sexist insults” by a user called Kenneth: Kenneth called Kat a “dumb c***” and made a reference to black culture “tearing things down”. In one post, he makes a public rape threat, telling Kat: “I'd throw you on the bed and ravage you and you'd f****** love it”. In another … after claiming that he didn't make a rape accusation, he writes: “It’s alright. You'll get yours. Remember I'm a conservative, I like my guns.”3 The media are reinforcing the myth in relation to rape that women will “enjoy it” (“you'd f****** love it”). In response to the abuse she received, Kat posted a message to followers on her Facebook page. The media framing of her response – that the threat itself did not bother her, it was the people defending him that did – also points to the normalization of rape culture and rape threats in the mainstream media framing of trolling: Kenneth threatening to rape and kill me didnt bother me. Thats part of my daily existence. Having people rush to defend him however? That fucks with me so much. Im glad i never reported my rape. I couldn't handle this 6 years ago. I can hardly handle it now. Being told to take this shit lightly really messes with me. ‘What did you expect’ are words that ring in my head. The exact words i heard when i told my friends i was raped. This is why women remain silent. And the people defending This is a pre-print version of the article published in Feminist Media Studies Vol.17, No.6 (December 2017). 16 kenneth will never get that. So many people suffer in silence and i wrote about Kenneth because its one of the rare, small victories that we can have and so many people were part of it. [sic]4 The report likens the advice to “stay silent” regarding sexual violence against women in the offline context, to the advice received by women who receive online rape threats. The rhetoric employed individualizes the women, and also focuses on her body as an object and target for violence (Kirsti K. Cole 2015). Businesswoman Jo Bertram, boss of Uber car service UK, was also sent offensive tweets: Jo Bertram … has been bombarded with offensive tweets, including messages about rape, her appearance and the suggestion that she should be “run over” … Under his Twitter name “Arnold Circus”, Kaczorowski joined a conversation thread in which other cab drivers were discussing Uber’s “safety record for women passengers”. The previous tweeter had mentioned Bertram and asked: “Wonder what she must feel every time a woman is sexually assaulted in an Uber car?” Kaczorowski wrote: “Perhaps she gets a little tingle between her legs. U never know she may like it.” In another post he called Bertram a “ropey old bint”.5 This excerpt highlights the sexist and misogynist abuse directed at a woman who is viewed as “incompetent” by men in terms of her occupation and gender. Women who entered spaces typically deemed to be “man’s domain” were viewed as “doubly deviant”: deviant for being online and deviant for daring to enter into a male-dominated workplace. As Sandy Welsh (1999: 170) argues “sexual harassment is … about letting women know they are not welcome This is a pre-print version of the article published in Feminist Media Studies Vol.17, No.6 (December 2017). 17 in certain workplaces and that they are not respected members of the work group.” Sexual harassment is an attempt by men to maintain their dominance (Kimberly Fairchild & Laurie Rudman 2008). Often, it was women’s lives in the offline context which the media rationalised as a motive for the sending of death threats. This was the case for the British television presenter Sue Perkins who received abuse after rumours (later confirmed as untrue) spread that she would be taking over from Jeremy Clarkson as a presenter on the BBC’s Top Gear programme: Sue revealed to fans on her social media account earlier this week Top Gear fans had been “wishing me dead” after it was rumoured she was being lined up to take a leading role in the motoring show. She wrote: “[since] the utterly fabricated story about me & Top Gear, my timeline has been full of blokes wishing me dead … This morning someone suggested they’d like to see me burn to death.”6 The stereotype of women as “witches” is used alongside rape and/or death threats (the latter including threats of “burning to death”), as evident in the below trolling of the Labour Member of Parliament (MP) Stella Creasy and the feminist campaigner Caroline Criado- Perez, who campaigned for a woman to appear on a bank note (with the Bank of England later choosing to print Jane Austen). The troll in this instance was jailed for 18 weeks and had: retweeted a threatening message … which read: “You better watch your back, I’m going to rape you’re a**e at 8pm and put the video all over [the internet]” … In his next message he posted: “Best way to rape a witch, try and drown her first then just when she’s gagging for air that’s when you enter” … Later that evening he wrote: “If you can’t threaten to rape a celebrity, what is the point in having them?” … He called This is a pre-print version of the article published in Feminist Media Studies Vol.17, No.6 (December 2017). 18 the Labour MP an “evil witch” and wrote: “What’s the odds of [Criado] and Creasy snuggling and cuddling under a duvet checking their tweets and cackling like witches (rape me says Caroline).”7 As also noted above in relation to the blogger, Kat Blaque, in media reports of trolling there was a tendency to draw on examples of rape threats on social media which highlighted how the victim should/would “enjoy” the sexual act. Traces of the myth that rape is a sexual act which women can enjoy are easily found in sensational and titillating coverage of rape crimes and this extends to threats of rape online (Alat 2006). Body shaming Body shaming was a prominent form of trolling which the media focused on, linked to the posting of images on Instagram, and with victims receiving negative comments linked to their appearance, in addition to rape and death threats. The presence of the “male gaze” (Laura Mulvey 1975[1992]) is evident via both mainstream media and digital media scrutiny of the female body. Megarry (2014: 50) notes that offensive comments aimed at women online often “displayed a preoccupation with physical appearance and suggested that a woman’s worth and value lies in her sexual appeal to men.” In the example below, the musician Nicki Minaj was reported to have been “mocked for her appearance” on Instagram. However, the report silences the voice of the victim and engages in victim blaming, as it likens her response to the trolls as a form of “public shaming”, making implicit the underlying advice that she should have ignored or “not fed the trolls”. Her strategy of re-posting pictures of those trolling her involved the reversal of the “gaze” to give “fans a taste of their own medicine”: This is a pre-print version of the article published in Feminist Media Studies Vol.17, No.6 (December 2017). 19 Minaj has never been one to take verbal abuse lying down, and after a string of cruel comments about her appearance on her Instagram page the rapper decided to give fans a taste of their own medicine. She had been Instagramming pictures from her brother Jelani’s wedding, which she allegedly paid for in full, when someone made comments about her hair... Minaj retaliated by going onto the Instagram accounts of people who were rude to her and posting their selfies on her account to see how they liked being scrutinised…. But following complaints she was “bullying” people, Minaj took to Twitter to justify her actions, and hit out at the double standards she gets when she tries standing up for herself: Lol can I just be on my own page minding my business in peace? Lmao. When I post a pic of a person dissin me I’m a bully? Lol this world… - NICKI MINAJ (@NICKMINAJ) August, 23 2015.8 The assertive response of Minaj in the form of reposting her abusers’ own “selfies” is framed as a form of “bullying”. This highlights the societal expectations around how women should publicly respond to (online) abuse (i.e. adopt a submissive position). Minaj’s strategy goes against the grain of the atypical “non-assertive” responses that previous studies of responses to sexual abuse have highlighted (Gruber 1989). Jane (2014b) also argues in relation to “e- bile” that it is women who speak publicly about being targeted online who then receive more abuse. Women are deemed to be “inferior” and to function for the provision of “sexual gratification for men’” however they are then denigrated for this “self-same characterization” (Jane 2014b: 566). This is a pre-print version of the article published in Feminist Media Studies Vol.17, No.6 (December 2017). 20 Media reports also focused on the historian and academic Mary Beard, who described the abuse she received after she appeared on BBC’s Question Time debate programme: They discussed whether I needed rogering, and how I was an “ignorant ****” and a disgrace to Cambridge University and woman-kind. There were more “c” words and “f” words and “p” words than you could imagine … There were also comments about what an embarrassment she must be to her husband and two grown-up children, pictures of horribly hairy legs (supposedly hers), endless comments about her pubic hair (and more), and how she was “a vile, spiteful excuse for a woman who eats too much cabbage and has cheese straws for teeth.”9 The attacks on Mary Beard can be viewed as responses to her failure to adhere to those normative standards of feminine beauty and appearance which are expected from women who enter the world of media and public commentary. This online harassment involves the utilisation of stereotypical ideas of femininity in a derogatory manner as noted by Megarry (2014). Myths in media reports abounded with regards to victimisation of women because of their “careless behaviour” (Alat 2006) or that entering into the public spotlight brought with it a number of responsibilities and expectations, including accepting that this entailed the public’s right to critique television personalities and that women who make public media appearances must abide by the norms of feminine beauty. Discussion and conclusions This article drew on a qualitative content analysis of British media reports of trolling to demonstrate the ways in which the media frame online abuse and how they implicitly victim blame. It is argued that media reports of trolling adopt the use of “silencing strategies” which This is a pre-print version of the article published in Feminist Media Studies Vol.17, No.6 (December 2017). 21 can be viewed as a form of “symbolic violence” (Bourdieu 1990). Results were presented which centred on the forms of (online) harassment and behaviours related to trolling in media reports, including rape threats, death threats, and body shaming linked to norms of femininity. The discussion also explored the media framing of victims of trolling, and the advice given to the public on how to respond to trolls (i.e. “do not feed the troll”). Although extensive work in media studies over the last fifteen years has helped to bridge the conceptual divide between the real/material and virtual/immaterial, images of this divide still pervade old media press coverage. Media portrayals of trolling and rape threats have the potential to shape societal perceptions of rape (Bonnes 2013). Victim blaming was common in media reports with women accused of exaggerating or falsifying the impact of online rape threats (Alat 2006). The myth that women can/will enjoy rape or were “asking for it”, was also reflected in media framing of victims of online abuse. The old media are still “underpinned by homo-social cultures and relations that can marginalise and disrupt the truth claims of … women” (Salter 2013: 238). Therefore, there is a need for more social scientific research into media portrayals of online abuse, experiences of online abuse, and how social media is reshaping, but also replicating, traditional practices and discourses of violence, gender and communication. Media frames of trolling reinforce the normalization of online violence against women as an extension of or proxy for gendered violence (Rena Bivens 2015). As Jenny Kitzinger (2004: 14) argues media coverage can “decontextualize abuse, encourage racism, promote stereotypes of women (as virgins or whores), blame victims, and excuse assailants.” Media reports framed victims of online abuse as powerless and submissive in line with typical norms of femininity noted in previous studies of the media framing of women’s issues (Ashley & This is a pre-print version of the article published in Feminist Media Studies Vol.17, No.6 (December 2017). 22 Olson 1998; Burnett 2016). Women were viewed as sex objects and also portrayed as passive victims of online abuse. Social media sites, through their design and the anonymity they can afford users, rest power in the hands of the troll, while the victim is encouraged in media reports and public discourses on trolling to be complicit in the ways in which they respond to online abuse via the use of “silencing strategies”. However, to adhere to the message: “do not feed the troll”, means that “symbolic violence” is exercised with the complicity of the victim(s) of trolling (McRobbie 2004). The message to women using online spaces which is reflected in media reports can be summed up as similar to the age-old sexist adage: “if you can’t stand the heat, get out of the kitchen.” Victims are advised to remember that no harm is intended (i.e. it is only “banter”) and also not to provoke the troll further. These strategies do not address the issue of abuse, misogyny and sexism, but require women to be complicit in the exercise of “symbolic violence”. Bourdieu’s work is therefore useful for analysing how “social arrangement along gender lines takes shape within … media … by means of habitus adjustment to ensure conformity with the contemporary requirements” of the social media field/s (McRobbie 2004: 108). Both the old media and social media play a key role in (re)-forming and reinforcing social classifications and stereotypes. It is also problematic that trolling has become a catch-all term used by the old media to also refer to less sinister forms of debate or disagreement between various individuals/groups. This trivialises and disguises the extent and impact of online abuse as a form of “symbolic violence” towards women and other minority groups. Therefore, further work is required in feminist media studies which acknowledges the relationship between online abuse and the (gendered) frames and discourses of the traditional media. This is a pre-print version of the article published in Feminist Media Studies Vol.17, No.6 (December 2017). 23 References Alat, Zeynep. 2006. “News Coverage of Violence Against Women.” Feminist Media Studies 6 (3): 295-314. Altheide, L. David. 1987. “Ethnographic Content Analysis.” Qualitative Sociology 10 (1): 65- 77. Altheide, L. David. 1996. 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Lincoln, eds, Handbook of Qualitative Research, 2nd edn, London: Sage, pp. 487-508. Hardaker, Claire. 2010. “Trolling in Asynchronous Computer Mediated Communication: From User Discussions to Academic Definitions.” Journal of Politeness Research 6: 215-242. Herring, C. Susan, Kirk Job-Sluder, Rebecca Scheckler, and Sasha Barab. 2002. “Searching For Safety Online: Managing ‘Trolling’ in a Feminist Forum.” The Information Society 18: 371-384. Hutchens J. Myiah, Vincent J. Cicchirillo, and Jay D. Hmielowski. 2015. “How Could You Think That?!?!: Understanding Intentions to Engage in Political Flaming.” New Media & Society 17 (8): 1201-1219. Jane, A. Emma. 2014a. “‘You’re a Ugly, Whorish, Slut’.” Feminist Media Studies 14 (4): 531-546. Jane, A. Emma. 2014b. “‘Back to the Kitchen, Cunt’: Speaking the Unspeakable About Online Misogyny.” Continuum 28 (4): 558-570. 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Forthcoming. “Cyber-Trolling as Symbolic Violence: Deconstructing Gendered Abuse Online.” In Gender and Violence, Nancy Lombard, ed. Aldershot: Ashgate. Mantilla, Karla. 2015. Gendertrolling, Westport, Connecticut: Praeger. McRobbie, Angela. 2004. “Notes on ‘What Not to Wear’ and Post-Feminist Symbolic Violence.” Sociological Review 52 (2): 97-109. Megarry, Jessica. 2014. “Online Incivility or Sexual Harassment? Conceptualising Women’s Experiences in the Digital Age.” Women’s Studies International Forum 47: 46-55. Meyers, Marian. 1994. “News of Battering.” Journal of Communication 44 (2): 47-63. Mulvey, Laura. 1975[1992]. “Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema.” In: The Sexual Subject, New York: Routledge, pp. 22-34. O’Reilly, Michelle, and Nicola Parker. 2012. “‘Unsatisfactory Saturation’: A Critical Exploration of the Notion of Saturated Sample Sizes in Qualitative Research.” Qualitative Research 13 (2): 190-197. Phillips, Whitney. 2015. This is Why We Can’t Have Nice Things, Cambridge, MA: MIT This is a pre-print version of the article published in Feminist Media Studies Vol.17, No.6 (December 2017). 27 Press. Reese, Stephen D. 2001. “Prologue – Framing Public Life: A Bridging Model for Media Research.” In: Framing Public Life: Perspectives on Media and Our Understanding of the Social World, edited by Stephen D. Reese, Oscar H. Gandy, and August E. Grant, Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, pp. 7-31. Salter, Michael. 2013. “Justice and Revenge in Online Counter-Publics: Emerging Responses to Sexual Violence in the Age of Social Media.” Crime. Media, Culture 9 (3): 225-242. Shariff, Shaheen, and Ashley DeMartini. 2015. “Defining the Legal Lines: eGirls and Intimate Images.” In: Jane Bayley and Valerie Steeves, eds, eGirls, eCitizens, Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, pp. 281-306. Sills Sophie, Chelsea Pickens, Karishma Beach, Lloyd Jones, Octavia Calder-Dawe, Paulette Benton-Greig, and Nicola Gavey. 2016. “Rape Culture and Social Media: Young Critics and a Feminist Counterpublic.” Feminist Media Studies iFirst. DOI: 10.1080/14680777.2015.1137962 TG Daily. 2010. “Facebook Takes (Small) Step Against Tribute Page Trolls.” March 30, 2010. Accessed September 8, 2016. http://www.tgdaily.com/software-features/49166-facebook- takes-small-step-against-tribute-page-trolls Trolling: The Today Show Explores the Dark Side of the Internet. March 31, 2010. Accessed September 8, 2016. Welsh, Sandy. 1999. “Gender and Sexual Harassment.” Annual Review of Sociology 25 (1): 169-190. Worthington, Nancy. 2008. “Progress and Persistent Problems.” Feminist Media Studies 8 (1): 1-16. This is a pre-print version of the article published in Feminist Media Studies Vol.17, No.6 (December 2017). 28 Author biographies Karen Lumsden is Senior Lecturer in Sociology at Loughborough University. She is author of Boy Racer Culture (Routledge, 2013), co-editor of Reflexivity in Criminological Research (Palgrave Macmillan, 2014) and has published in a range of journals including Sociology, Qualitative Research, Sociological Research Online, Policing & Society and Mobilities. She is on the Editorial Board of Sociological Research Online. Research interests include policing, crime, youth culture and social media, with contributions to methodological debates on ethnography and reflexivity. Heather joined the Health Services Research Unit, University of Aberdeen in 2012. She is a Research Fellow with a multidisciplinary social science background and she contributes to the Delivery of Care programme. Heather specialises in research where technologies meet surveillance/monitoring, compliance/deviance and gender. Heather is currently exploring uses of health self-monitoring technologies (apps, wearables, etc.). Her previous work has looked at self-management of long-term health conditions, interventions for healthy behaviours in pregnancy, and gender in police CCTV. Notes 1 Although the concept of the troll was coined in the late 1980s in relation to trolling subcultures on Use Net forums (Donarth 1999), it was not until 2010 that political controversy and media attention turned to trolling on social media. In Australia and the USA attention centred on the trolling of adolescents who had committed suicide, and murder victims (i.e. the Today Show in 2010 reported on the trolling reaction to the death of three adolescent girls, while in Australia political outrage centred on the trolling of Facebook tribute pages set up for two murdered adolescents (TG Daily 2010)). In the UK, media and This is a pre-print version of the article published in Feminist Media Studies Vol.17, No.6 (December 2017). 29 political concern increased following a host of high profile trolling incidents related to Facebook tribute pages (i.e. Colm Cross was sentenced to 18 weeks in prison for targeting tribute pages including one set up for the celebrity Jade Goody, and another set up for deceased children (Ally Fogg 2010)). 2 Soldani, B. 2015. “‘You should always stand up for yourself.’ Australian DJ Alison Wonderland speaks out after Intragram trolls said they wanted to ‘roofie’ and ‘rape’ her.” Mail Online. October 8. 3 Bolton, D. 2015. “Blogger Kat Blaque tracked down her troll and got him fired.” Independent. September 30. 4 Bolton, D. 2015. “Blogger Kat Blaque tracked down her troll and got him fired;.” Independent. September 30, 2015. 5 Henry, R. 2015. “Uber boss victim of cabbie trolls.” The Sunday Times. July 5, 2015. 6 Thistlethwaite, F. 2015. “James May tells Top Gear fans trolling Sue Perkins to ‘kill themselves’ on Twitter.” Express. April 17. 7 Williams, A. 2014. “Twitter troll who threatened to rape Labour MP Stella Creasy in row over Jane Austen appearing on £10 notes is jailed for 18 weeks.” MailOnline. September 29. 8 Mandle, C. 2015. “Nicki Minaj tells trolls to stay off her Instagram after publicly shaming people for mocking her appearance.” Independent. August 25. 9 Fryer, J. 2013 “How I turned the tables on my trolls.” Mail Online. January 26. 
work_v267qdwisne2li2oh6uegq4w6a	----	Doing ‘dangerous’ autoethnography on Islamophobic victimization Irene Zempi, Nottingham Trent University, UK and Imran Awan, Birmingham City University, UK Abstract This article draws on our different experiences of employing autoethnography when researching Islamophobia, using two independent research projects. In particular, we reflect upon our experiences of Islamophobic victimization as a result of being ‘visibly’ Muslim in public spaces in the UK. We discuss our motivation for employing autoethnography and the role of our insider/outsider status in adopting the role of the Muslim ‘other’ in public spaces. Additionally, we consider the nature, extent and impact of Islamophobic victimization upon ourselves, and the coping mechanisms we employed to deal with it. The article concludes by reflecting upon the advantages, ethical challenges and limitations of using autoethnography when researching Islamophobic victimization. Keywords autoethnography, Islamophobia, insider/outsider, Muslims, victimization Introduction Autoethnography is a qualitative research method that uses the researcher’s personal experiences as primary data in order to describe, analyse and interpret the sociocultural meaning of such experiences (Chang, 2016). Autoethnography employs self-observation and reflexive investigation, for the purposes of understanding the researcher’s lived experiences and extending sociological understanding (Sparkes, 2000). As such, self-reflexivity and emotionality are at the core of autoethnography (Styhre and Tienari, 2014). However, despite recent accounts of the role of emotion in criminology and in research (see, for example, Liebling, 1999; Ferrell, 2006; Jewkes, 2011; Phillips and Earle, 2010), accounts of the self are usually absent in criminological research. In the words of Wakeman (2014: 705), ‘most criminologists do not like to talk about themselves and their feelings very much’. This has often been attributed to the ways in which the discipline is structured as a social science – requiring researchers to minimize their selves, ‘viewing self as a contaminant and attempting to transcend and deny it’ (Wall, 2006: 147). The positivism paradigm, which is typically seen as the scientific approach to research, promotes the objective measurement of social issues (Charmaz, 2006). According to Payne (2004), the terms and concepts used to demonstrate rigour in quantitative research (namely reliability, validity, representativeness, generalizability and objectivity) are problematic for qualitative research and specifically for (auto)ethnography. Founded on postmodern ideas, autoethnography rejects positivist notions of truth and validity. Rather, it focuses on the researcher’s experiences, feelings and emotions, and uses self-reflexivity to connect the ‘self’ with the ‘social’ (Campbell, 2016). Against this background, this article draws on our different experiences of employing autoethnography when researching Islamophobic victimization, using two independent research projects. In particular, we reflect upon our experiences of Islamophobic victimization as a result of being ‘visibly’ Muslim in public spaces in the UK. We discuss our motivation for employing autoethnography and the role of our insider/outsider status in adopting the role of the Muslim ‘other’ in public spaces. Additionally, we consider the nature, extent and impact of Islamophobic victimization upon ourselves, and the coping mechanisms we used to deal with it. The article concludes by reflecting upon the advantages and ethical and moral challenges, as well as the limitations, of using autoethnography when researching Islamophobic victimization. Understanding autoethnography In the 1970s, anthropologist Karl Heider first used the term ‘autoethnography’ to describe the way in which members of a culture could give accounts about their own experiences (Heider, 1975). David Hayano (1979) then used the term to refer to anthropological studies by individuals of their own culture. In this respect, autoethnography was narrowly defined as ‘insider ethnography’. Although Heider and Hayano brought autoethnography into the research lexicon, the traditional notions of ethnographic research endured on the basis that there was a separation between the researcher and the researched (Campbell, 2016). Propelled by a ‘crisis of representation’, social researchers in the 1980s began to ‘radically rethink’ the way that they conducted research; autoethnography emerged as a method which allowed research to be done on one’s self (Campbell, 2016: 96). More recently it has been argued that ‘the meanings and applications of autoethnography have evolved in a manner that makes precise definition difficult’ (Ellingson and Ellis, 2008: 449). Indeed, the exact definition of the concept of autoethnography is elusive. Nevertheless, the consensus view is that autoethnography relies on using and analysing the researcher’s own experiences. Typically, autoethnography ranges from studies in which the researcher’s experiences are explored alongside those of the participants, through to stories in which the researcher’s experiences become the actual focus of investigation (Ellis and Bochner, 2000). Denshire and Lee (2013) observe there are two main strands of autoethnography, ‘evocative’ and ‘analytic’ autoethnography. The evocative (also called ‘emotive’) approach foregrounds the researcher’s personal stories. In this respect, autoethnographers tend to focus more on the self rather than the social world (Denzin, 2006). In contrast, analytic autoethnography connects to ‘some broader set of social phenomena than those provided by the data themselves’ (Anderson, 2006: 387). The purpose of analytic autoethnography is not simply to document personal experiences and provide an insider’s perspective; rather, its purpose is to use empirical data in order to gain insight into some broader set of social phenomena than those provided by the data themselves (Wakeman, 2014). In other words, the goal is not just to capture emotional and evocative content but rather to develop a broad critical analysis of any given social phenomenon through it. This binary classification is useful as an initial way of making visible the variation in how autoethnographic writers integrate the strands of self and culture in their writing (Denshire and Lee, 2013). Correspondingly, the two independent research projects subscribe to the analytic approach, using our personal experiences as empirical data in order to gain insight into the role of Muslims’ visible religious identity in ‘triggering’ Islamophobia in public spaces. Before reflecting on our experiences of Islamophobic victimization as visible Muslims, it is first important to contextualize this discussion by offering an overview of the two research projects. Methods The findings in this article are based on two independent research projects that we are attempting to bring together in order to compare our experiences of researching Islamophobic victimization through autoethnography. Following terrorist attacks such as 9/11 in the USA and 7/7 in the UK, there has been much discussion about the growth of Islamophobia in the West (see, for example, Allen, 2010; Esposito and Kalin, 2011; Poynting and Mason, 2007; Sayyid and Vakil, 2011). However, this discussion has not been accompanied by as much empirical analysis of Islamophobic victimization as one might expect (Moosavi, 2014). Yet in recent years, qualitative research into the experiences of Muslim women who wear the niqab (face veil) has been conducted in five European countries: Belgium, Denmark, France, the Netherlands, and the UK (Brems, 2014). Indeed, the data from qualitative interviews in these five countries show very strong similarities, namely, harassment and abuse of veiled Muslim women by strangers in public places. For example, veiled Muslim women in the Netherlands reported regularly being confronted with people who scolded, insulted or spat at them (Moors, 2009, 2014). Some also mentioned being physically threatened, with cars attempting to hit them, people throwing things at them or trying to pull off the niqab (Moors, 2009, 2014). Echoing these experiences, veiled Muslim women in the UK and France described a stream of violent insults in public places including being violently pushed, spat on, and having their niqabs pulled off (Boutelja, 2011). Along similar lines, the research literature demonstrates the vulnerability of ‘visible’ Muslim men as victims of Islamophobia in public places (Abbas, 2004; Hopkins, 2007; Mac an Ghaill and Haywood, 2014). This article attempts to fill in a gap in the current literature discussing Islamophobia: the gap of using autoethnography to research Islamophobia. Irene’s research project examined veiled Muslim women’s experiences of Islamophobic victimization in public in the UK (Zempi, 2014). The study took the form of a qualitative study based on individual and focus group interviews with veiled Muslim women coupled with autoethnography whereby Irene wore the full veil for prolonged periods of time in public. The fieldwork took place in Leicester between 2011 and 2012. Specifically, the study was comprised of 60 individual and 20 focus group interviews with veiled Muslim women who had been victims of Islamophobia. Individual, in-depth interviews allow for ‘rich’ data to be collected with detailed descriptions (Hennink et al., 2011). This approach is especially valuable for researching sensitive issues that require confidentiality and a more intimate setting for data collection, and this is especially appropriate for ‘hard to access’ groups such as veiled Muslim women. Focus group interviews incorporate the strengths of qualitative research in terms of gathering ‘rich’ data whilst generating additional insights through group interactions (Curtis and Curtis, 2011). In the context of this particular piece of research, the focus group method afforded the possibility of open discussion amongst veiled Muslim women with similar or different experiences of Islamophobic victimization whilst, at the same time, highlighting collectively held beliefs and attitudes. As mentioned above, the study also included autoethnography whereby Irene wore the full veil – including jilbab (long dress), hijab (headscarf) and niqab (face veil) – for prolonged periods of time in public. However, it is important to point out that employing autoethnography was not part of Irene’s original research methodology. When Irene was initially developing her research project, her plan was to use individual and focus group interviews with veiled Muslim women. However, while she was doing the pilot interviews, some participants suggested that Irene should wear the veil in order to see for herself the level of abuse and hostility that veiled Muslim women suffered on a daily basis. By adopting their dress code, the aim was for Irene to become an ‘insider’ and thus feel part of their ‘reality’. Some participants actually insisted that Irene wear the veil in order to accurately interpret their stories and represent their ‘voices’ regarding the nature, extent, and impact of Islamophobic victimization. In light of this, Irene decided to wear the veil as part of her daily routine in public places in Leicester. This aspect of the research followed an open-ended process. The main research question was: ‘How does Irene’s perceived identity as a veiled Muslim woman render her vulnerable to Islamophobic victimization in public?’ Throughout the fieldwork, Irene kept a personal diary in order to write her reflections. Imran has been researching the nature, extent and impact of Islamophobia for the last decade. Although he is a Muslim, Imran’s religious identity is not visibly identifiable in terms of his appearance. For example, he does not have a beard and does not dress in traditional Islamic clothing. In 2015 Imran was interviewing some participants as part of a qualitative study on Islamophobia. All the participants in this study were ‘visibly’ identifiable Muslims. During the interviews, Imran’s status as a non-visible Muslim was challenged by one of the male participants, Mohammed. Mohammed had a beard and wore the Islamic cap as well as traditional Islamic clothing, and thus he could be perceived as a ‘visibly’ practising Muslim because of his appearance. Mohammed said to Imran: ‘Look Imran, you don’t dress as a Muslim, you simply don’t know how it feels like’. Although Imran has routinely suffered abuse online for researching Islamophobia, he has never experienced Islamophobic abuse in public, possibly because he is not identifiable as a Muslim. In light of this, Imran decided to employ autoethnography in order to research Islamophobia through adopting a ‘visibly’ identifiable Muslim identity in public spaces. In particular, Imran decided to grow a beard and wear the jubba (male Islamic dress) and Islamic cap as part of his daily routine in Birmingham, which is where he lives and works. The main research question was: ‘How does Imran’s perceived identity as a Muslim man render him vulnerable to Islamophobic victimization in public?’ The fieldwork took place between August and September 2015. Imran recorded his experiences, feelings and emotions in a personal diary. The various situations that we encountered because of our perceived Muslim identity resulted in being subjected to verbal abuse, harassment and potential physical attacks. Irene’s experiences ‘in the field’ Irene’s experiences of harassment and intimidation as a result of her perceived Muslim identity in public included name-calling, swearing, threats of physical violence and derogatory forms of humour. Underlying all these forms of verbal abuse was a clear sense of anti-Muslim hatred and hostility, which was made apparent through the language used by the perpetrators. For example, typical examples of the name-calling Irene experienced included ‘Muslim terrorist’, ‘suicide bomber’ and ‘You lot are terrorists’, which indicated the perpetrators’ perceptions of veiled Muslim women as a security or terrorist ‘threat’. Indeed, research demonstrates that ‘visible’ Muslims and veiled Muslim women in particular are often targeted because their abusers hold the view that all Muslims are terrorists or terrorist sympathizers (Allen et al., 2013; Githens-Mazer and Lambert, 2010). From this perspective, the veiled female body offers a visual representation of ‘radical Islam’. Additionally, Irene was subjected to swearing such as ‘Muslim whore’, ‘f******* bitch’, ‘f******* freak’, ‘Muslim scum’ and ‘Your religion is filth’. The comments and/or gestures perpetrators made were often threatening, as indicated in the following diary extracts: A group of white British men shouted at me ‘We will burn your f******* Quran. You Muslims kill Christians, so all of us Christians will come kill all of you Muslims. We want to teach your kind a lesson.’ I reckon they are EDL members because they are carrying EDL flags. I feel very intimidated and I am worried that they might be carrying a weapon. A skinhead man made knife gestures at me whilst I was walking on the street. I feel like a walking target. I fear for my life. I was minding my own business when a white male came close to me and started making explosion sounds at me. He asked me ‘how many people have you lot killed in the name of Islam?’ As these experiences demonstrate, the wearing of the veil carries connotations of gender inequality, religious extremism, lack of integration, and threats to ‘British/ Western ideals’ (Chakraborti and Zempi, 2012). The niqab is often referred to as the ‘icon of the intolerable difference’ between ‘us’ and ‘them’ (Scott, 2007: 5). Furthermore, there were incidents where the nature of the verbal abuse suggested Islamophobic, racist and xenophobic sentiments, as demonstrated in the following diary extracts: I was walking on the street today and a group of teenagers began mocking my niqab and swearing at me. They told me to ‘F*** off back to Afghanistan’ and one of them also shouted ‘EDL, EDL, EDL!’ I was on the bus going home and an elderly man moved seats as I sat next to him. When I got off the bus he told me ‘You’re not welcome here, go back to where you came from’. As the last quote indicates, Irene was targeted for being perceived as ‘different’ and ‘other’. Grillo and Shah (2012) point out that the wearing of the veil marks an unwelcome religious, cultural and racial presence. In the eyes of their abusers, veiled Muslim women are seen as immigrants who ‘don’t belong’ and thus ‘they are not welcome’ in the UK. This type of targeted hostility can be seen as a ‘message’ which is designed to tell the wider Muslim community that they are ‘unwelcome’ and ‘don’t belong’, thereby extending the impact of this victimization beyond the actual, immediate victim to instil fear in the whole of the targeted community (Chakraborti and Garland, 2009). In particular, Perry and Alvi (2012) note that the perpetrator is sending a ‘message’ to four distinct audiences. First, to the peer group, that needs to be assured that the perpetrator is ‘one of them’, typically a straight, white, Christian male. Secondly, to the victim, who needs to be punished for his or her inappropriate performance of identity. Thirdly, to the victim’s community, who need to learn that they too are vulnerable to the same fate, that they ‘don’t belong’ or ‘aren’t to be tolerated’, and finally, to the broader community, who are reminded of the appropriate alignment of ‘us’ and ‘them’. Furthermore, Irene was targeted for being white and visibly Muslim through wearing the veil, as the following quote indicates: I was targeted by two teenage boys as I was leaving the train station. One of them was very aggressive and intimidating, shouting ‘Whites are not meant to be Muslim’ and told his friend ‘Pull that thing off her face’. On one level, when a veiled Muslim woman is targeted the offender will not be certain of the ethnic identity of the victim; however, being white indicates that this person is likely to be a convert to Islam. From this perspective, white veiled Muslim women are routinely perceived as British converts and thus they are targeted for their decision to convert to Islam. In the eyes of their abusers, converts have supposedly betrayed the British/Western values and thus they are often called ‘traitors’. This discussion highlights the notion of ‘intersectionality’ of identities. Intersectionality can be understood as a nexus of identities that work together to render certain individuals as ‘ideal’ targets to attack (Yuval-Davis, 2011). This indicates that the targeted victimization of veiled Muslim women can be attributed to Islamophobic attitudes as well as to racist and xenophobic sentiments by virtue of the fact that these elements are often inextricably intertwined. In this regard Islamophobia, racism and xenophobia become mutually reinforcing phenomena, and hostility against veiled Muslim women should also be considered in the context of a more general climate of hostility towards ‘otherness’ (Zempi and Chakraborti, 2014). The extent and frequency of Islamophobic hostility that Irene experienced varied considerably. The most common locations to be targeted were in the ‘white’ areas in Leicester, whilst she rarely received any negative attention in the Muslim- dominated areas in Leicester. This demonstrates the significance of geography in rendering veiled Muslim women vulnerable to Islamophobic victimization. Similarly, throughout interviews and focus group discussions with veiled Muslim women in Irene’s (Zempi, 2014) study, participants highlighted that the level of abuse that they suffered depended upon whether they were in their local community or whether they left their ‘comfort zone’, sometimes taking the bus to go to less familiar areas that did not accommodate ‘difference’ and Muslim ‘otherness’ in particular. While in most cases verbal abuse was momentary when walking on the street, or while waiting for the bus, in other cases Irene was subjected to sustained periods of ‘low-level’ hostility, particularly when stuck within a confined space, such as on public transport or in a shop. ‘Low-level’ and everyday acts of hate and hostility have a ‘drip-drip’ effect that magnifies feelings of vulnerability; nevertheless, the cumulative harms of the more ‘ordinary’ everyday forms of Islamophobic hostility often go unacknowledged. In particular, unnecessary or persistent staring, dirty looks, being ignored and refused service were common examples of ‘low-level’, everyday hostility throughout Irene’s experiences as a veiled Muslim woman. Evidence shows that ‘low-level’ hate crime incidents form part of an ongoing process of hate crime victimization that is repeated over protracted periods of time, sometimes escalating into threatening and abusive behaviour and to physical violence (Walters et al., 2016). These often seemingly inconsequential incidents are not always captured by official statistics (police-recorded hate crime) or within victim surveys, which means that large data on hate crime do not necessarily capture the frequently routine nature of ‘low-level’ and everyday acts of hate and hostility (Walters et al., 2016). To this end, ‘low-level’ and everyday acts of hate and hostility remain ‘invisible’ in official statistics. The following accounts are taken from Irene’s research diary to illustrate examples of ‘low-level’, everyday hostility in terms of being ignored and refused service. I am in the fruit market in town and the stall owner refuses to serve me. I feel humiliated and ashamed. I am waiting in the queue to pay for an item in a shop. In front of me there is a white man who is served immediately. The person at the till seems to ignore me. I can’t help thinking ‘is it because I’m wearing the veil?’ I feel angry as I am a regular customer at this store but it seems that the moment I put on the veil, the quality of customer service changes from excellent to zero. Furthermore, physical attacks were much less common than verbal forms of abuse, with the exception of a passing car that threw eggs at Irene, as indicated in the following diary extract: I feel quite upset as a car drove past me and a white male threw eggs at me and then he shouted something about Muslims. I am so shocked that I did not manage to get the car’s number plate. Similarly, veiled Muslim women who took part in Irene’s (Zempi, 2014) study described incidents where people on the street or from moving cars had thrown eggs, stones, alcohol, water bombs, bottles, take-away food and rubbish at them. Moreover, several participants described suffering physical abuse such as having the veil removed, pushing, shoving, being beaten up and even incidents where passing vehicles had attempted to run them over. Nevertheless, Irene felt somewhat ‘lucky’ because, unlike some of these participants who had suffered more serious incidents of physical abuse, she had experienced mostly ‘low-level’ manifestations of Islamophobia. However, knowledge of these incidents heightened her concerns that verbal abuse could escalate into violent assault. Indeed, Irene was afraid that she could suffer similar experiences. Irene felt that she was equally vulnerable to physical abuse because of the visibility of her perceived Muslim identity, and thus she was scared for her safety in public. Similarly, experiences of Islamophobic victimization increased feelings of insecurity, vulnerability and anxiety amongst the veiled Muslim women who took part in Irene’s (Zempi, 2014) study. Bowling (2009) states that persistent victimization can undermine the security of actual and potential victims, and induce fear and anxiety. As a result, a common sensation cited by veiled Muslim women is that of panic attacks, worry, extreme anxiety and depression, which stems from the fear of having to endure future victimization. Indeed, verbal attacks coupled with the possibility of suffering physical attacks affected Irene emotionally, including feeling afraid, shocked and/or upset on particular occasions. Such feelings were particularly pronounced immediately after an incident, but they seemed to develop into longer-term anxieties. Irene gradually developed sleep problems and lost her appetite. Moreover, there were days when Irene felt reluctant to leave her house. She started to feel cautious, nervous, suspicious and distrustful of people that she encountered within public spaces. She gradually became more insular and wary of other people walking by on the street. The possibility of verbal and/or physical violence meant that Irene felt anxious, vulnerable and exposed when walking on the street or travelling on public transport. Eventually Irene became isolated and withdrawn. Hindelang (2009) points out that for an experience of victimization to occur, the prime actors – the offender and the victim – must have the occasion to intersect in time and space. Participants in Irene’s (Zempi, 2014) study argued that by removing themselves from the public space or by reducing the time spent in public places, they reduced the probability of experiencing victimization. They spoke of feeling safe by confining themselves to their home as much as possible, as this provided them with protection from being attacked in public. Many participants explained that they would only go out if it was deemed absolutely necessary. In this case the home was understood as a retreat from the hostility of the outside world and a key source of a personal sense of security (Magne, 2003). Clearly, employing autoethnography had emotional, psychological and physiological impacts upon Irene’s wellbeing. Denshire and Lee (2013: 224) state that ‘putting the self into the picture at all is challenging enough in this context, but putting the very notion of a self at risk opens up places of vulnerability’. However, at the time, Irene consciously downplayed the seriousness of the situation, and felt a strong need to portray herself as ‘OK’ to her colleagues, family and friends because she feared that she would be prevented from completing the autoethnographic part of the research. This also meant that Irene suffered in silence and received no support with experiencing this victimization. Nevertheless, as will be discussed later on, the value of potentially putting herself at risk was premised on the insights into the victimization of veiled Muslim women that autoethnography provided her with, which would not have been possible had she not worn the veil herself. Gaining ‘insider’ knowledge is something that Irene would not have learnt from the interviews alone, especially as a non-Muslim woman researching Islamophobia. Imran’s experiences ‘in the field’ Imran’s experiences of harassment and intimidation as a result of his visible Muslim identity in public spaces included name-calling, swearing and threats of physical violence. Specifically, persistent staring or being ignored, being sneered and sworn at, and called a ‘F***** terrorist’ were part of his daily experiences in public in Birmingham. Mythen et al.’s (2009) study investigated anti-Muslim hate crime towards young British Pakistanis in the north-west of England. Their study involved a series of four focus group sessions with 32 British Muslims. They state that: The degree of individual physical intimidation and harm endured by our respondents was sobering . . . this included physical attack, being spat on, verbal abuse, damage to property and having clothing forcibly torn or removed. We would point out that we do not anticipate that our sample is unique with regards to the degree of individual victimization suffered. (Mythen et al., 2009: 743) Correspondingly, in the following extract Imran recounts his first day in public as a ‘visible’ Muslim man: My first trip was to the city centre in Birmingham, something I often do without any problems as a non-identifiable Muslim man. Before leaving, I sprinkled some Islamic attar [perfume] on my jubba, wore my Islamic cap and caught the bus to the city centre. I sat down and began reading my newspaper. After a while, a group of teenage girls sat behind me and began laughing hysterically. One of them shouted: ‘Look, we have a YOU KNOW WHAT on the bus’ and then one of the other girls shouted: ‘Yes! We have a filthy terrorist on the bus.’ I confronted them by asking them ‘why did you say that?’ They said ‘Yes, so what if we said that? What are you gonna do about it?’ I remained silent. The bus was full with people but no one came to my defence. I wanted someone to stand up for me. I wanted someone to say that I am not a terrorist just because I have a beard. I sat back on my seat and kept counting each stop. When my stop arrived, I was just so relieved I could get off the bus. When I got home that evening I couldn’t stop thinking ‘Why me? I have not done anything wrong’. Cole and Maisuria (2007) argue that Muslims who are visibly identifiable are more likely to suffer abuse because of their appearance. They state that: ‘People who appear to be of Islamic faith (wearing a veil, sporting a beard, or even carrying a backpack) are immediately identified as potential terrorists’ (Cole and Maisuria, 2007: 104). The following quote is another extract from Imran’s diary, which demonstrates the perpetrators’ perception of Imran as a potential terrorist. Today I drove to another suburb of Birmingham. When I got there, I parked my car and went to a shop nearby to get a cold drink as it was a very hot day in the summer. As I was walking towards the shop, I heard a loud noise from a car and two men shouting out: ‘You terrorist scum’. I started walking faster and got into the shop. Fortunately, the two men did not follow me in the shop, but as I entered the shop, the customers just stopped and looked at me as if I was wearing a suicide vest. I felt a cold shiver run down my spine. I could not stay in the shop but I could not go outside either. I felt trapped. Additionally, Imran was perceived as ‘suspicious’ by staff in shops and was even followed around by security guards, as the following diary extract indicates: I was in the supermarket walking around looking to buy some food for my children. Whilst shopping, I noticed a security guard following me around, and then turning his face every time I looked back at him. At some point he came close to me and said: ‘We have had some thefts happen recently. I would like to have a quick chat with you’. I felt quite upset and said: ‘I’m sorry but you’ve got the wrong person. I have not stolen anything’. He replied: ‘I’m not accusing you of stealing but I’d like to have a quick chat with you’. I said ‘No, the reason you want to have a chat with me out of all the other people in this store is because I’m a Muslim’. He said: ‘No sir, it’s just part of our policy’. I felt humiliated, embarrassed and feeling as a second-class citizen. Because of his Asian background, Imran also suffered verbal abuse such as ‘P*** terrorist’, which indicated both Islamophobic and racist attitudes. This indicates that link between religion and race whereby Islamophobia is understood as a ‘new’ form of racism (Law, 2010). From this perspective, the victimization of Muslim men can be attributed to Islamophobic attitudes as well as to racist sentiments by virtue of the fact that these elements are often inextricably intertwined. In this regard Islamophobia and racism become mutually reinforcing phenomena. Modood (1997) identifies that Islamophobia is at the heart of contemporary British and European cultural racism. Bhikhu (2000: 60) observes that contemporary anti-Muslim racism is ‘one of the most serious forms of cultural hostility in modern Europe’. In this context, Islam is routinely portrayed as an external ‘threat’ to distinctly European norms and values. Similarly, Cole and Maisuria (2007) point out that Islamophobia is a product of racism and therefore racist abuse can also be viewed through the lens of Muslims being a ‘risky’ group. They state that, similar to other forms of racism, Islamophobia can be cultural, biological, or both. They note that: ‘The racist term, ‘‘Paki’’ co-exists with the racist term of abuse, ‘‘Bin Laden’’’ (Cole and Maisuria, 2007: 103). Accordingly, the following extracts from Imran’s diary demonstrate the link between racism and Islamophobia: I was walking down a busy street in Birmingham and two teenage girls walked past me and said amongst themselves: ‘Get THEM out of our country!’ I looked at them and said ‘Our country! This is my country too’. At that point, a group of young white males stood next to the girls and told them ‘Is this guy messing with you? You P*** scumbag’. For the first time in my entire life I was fearful for my life. I felt weak and a real sense of despair, agony, anxiety and helplessness. Today I used the train, I noticed a group of men on the platform looking in my direction and talking angrily. I got on the train and one of them brushed me aside and shouted at me ‘F****** watch where you are going’. I apologized despite not pushing him. I sat in my seat and carried on reading my book. I was then approached by one of them who said ‘Typical P***.’ I got up and sat on another seat and the other two men followed me. I stood for the rest of my journey as I was afraid that they might actually physically attack me. When I got off the train, these men began to swear and shout abuse towards me from inside the train. Imran portrayed himself as a ‘visible’ Muslim man in public spaces in Birmingham for four weeks, but he felt relieved when autoethnography was over. However, for those Muslims who are identifiable 24/7, experiencing Islamophobia is never over; rather, it is part and parcel of being visibly Muslim. Some of Imran’s friends, who are visibly identifiable Muslim, had warned him: ‘Imran, they will punch you and kick you and tell you ‘‘get out of our country, you don’t belong here’’’. In the length of time that Imran conducted this fieldwork, the impact of the abuse that he suffered was immense. As a result of these experiences, he felt embarrassed, humiliated, ‘not wanted’, and in some cases he started questioning whether he was really accepted in this country as a British Muslim. He also felt fearful, humiliated and emotionally bruised, despite not having been physically attacked. In some cases, he felt ‘guilty’ about his Muslim identity and its visibility. This sense of ‘guilt’ is demonstrated in the following extract: I was on the bus today, and the name-calling and abuse I got made me feel humiliated. I blame myself, somehow I feel it is my fault. Even though I have not done anything wrong, I feel like someone has just punched me in my stomach. I keep asking myself ‘Why? Why was I targeted and no one else on the bus? Why did they call me a ‘‘terrorist’’? Why did no one step in to help me?’ I look at myself in the mirror and think ‘should I just shave my beard and change my clothing?’ Maybe that would be easier as I would not have to suffer this abuse. Padela and Heisler (2010), whose study assessed the discrimination faced by Arab American Muslims after 9/11, found that victims demonstrated increased levels of psychological distress. In Imran’s case, writing down his feelings and experiences in the diary helped him to cope with it. However, he gradually became isolated and withdrawn; he even kept his distance from his family and friends. There were days that he would not enter into conversation with his family, and he would avoid having dinner with them or talking to them, as indicated in the extract below: As a family we always make time to eat dinner together and discuss our day but during the fieldwork I avoided speaking to my family. At dinner, I was not hungry and my wife kept asking me ‘are you ok? Has something happened today?’ Instead of using this opportunity to share my feelings, emotions and experiences, I just went upstairs and tried to go to sleep. I could not forget the faces and the voices of each individual who abused me, and this made me feel even more upset. I felt angry but the overwhelming response has been one of sadness, guilt, isolation and withdrawal. Birmingham is a diverse and multi-cultural city, and a place Imran is proud to call ‘home’, but his experiences of Islamophobic victimization challenged his sense of ‘belonging’. In hindsight, Imran felt that he should have reported these incidents to the police but, similar to most victims of hate crime, he felt that the police would not take it seriously. Githens-Mazer and Lambert (2010) found that most Muslim Londoners who had been victims of Islamophobic hate crimes since 9/11 did not report their experiences to the police. They state that: ‘While some of the more serious attacks of the kind we have illustrated have been reported to police, the overwhelming majority of Muslim victims of hate crimes appear not to have reported the incidents to police’ (Githens-Mazer and Lambert, 2010: 38). Advantages and limitations of doing autoethnography Using autoethnography in order to understand victimisation and specifically Islamophobia is hugely novel in criminological ethnography. A key question that arises is whether can we research victimisation through autoethnography. Our experiences show that doing autoethnography can be a ‘difficult path’. On the one hand, using autoethnography provided us with ‘insider’ knowledge of Islamophobic victimisation. Insider research refers to when the researcher conducts research with a group of which he or she is a member, based on characteristics such as religion, race/ethnicity, gender and sexual identity (Asselin, 2003; Kanuha, 2000). Insider research is considered to be from an emic perspective, as it involves the description of a phenomenon that is understood by the researcher who has also experienced it (Spiers, 2000). Being of an insider position is associated with various advantages, such as promoting a more balanced understanding of the research population and the transference of information from the participant to the researcher (Labaree, 2002). This can be particularly useful in research with groups that have been under-represented, oppressed or marginalised. At the same time, outsider researchers are accused of lacking understanding (Savvides et al., 2014). From this perspective, it is argued that outsiders cannot understand or represent accurately the experiences of their participants. This is a particularly salient topic when research is conducted with stigmatised, ‘other’ communities (Hayfield and Huxley, 2015). As mentioned earlier, Imran has been investigating Islamophobia for the last decade. Although he is Muslim, Imran has never experienced Islamophobic abuse in public, possibly because his Muslim identity is not ‘visible’. Therefore, although he could be perceived as an ‘insider’ based on his religion, he could also be seen as an ‘outsider’ on the basis of his non-visible Muslim identity. Indeed, Imran was criticised by one of his participants as lacking understanding because of his non- visible Muslim identity. For Irene, being an Orthodox Christian female researcher meant that she was perceived as an ‘outsider’ by her participants. Using autoethnography enabled us to see the world through the eyes of our participants; nevertheless, we were not fully insiders. Rather, autoethnography provided us with an ‘outsider within’ status which generated a distinctive standpoint vis-à-vis existing sociological paradigms (Hill Collins, 1986). Mohanty (2001) highlights the unique standpoint that the ‘outsider within status’ can generate. To this end, we developed a particular way of seeing reality. In the words of Hooks (1984: vii), ‘we looked from the outside and in from the inside outside … we understood both’. Hill Collins (1986) notes that despite the obstacles of being an outside within, researchers can benefit from this status. Hill Collins (1986) notes the ability of the ‘outsider within’ researcher to see patterns that maybe more difficult for those immersed in the situation to see. As ‘outsiders within’, we have enriched contemporary sociological discourse on Islamophobic victimisation (Mohanty, 2001). Correspondingly, our ‘outsider within’ status helped us to accurately interpret participants’ stories, and represent their ‘voices’ regarding the nature, extent, and impact of Islamophobic victimisation. Becoming ‘visible’ Muslim helped us to deepen our empathy and understanding of the targeted victimisation of ‘visible’ Muslim men and women in public spaces in the UK. Our goal was to see the world through someone else’s eyes, using ourselves and specifically our bodies, as a research instrument. That said, we do not argue that one needs to turn oneself into a victim and to experience victimhood, in order to write about it. We acknowledge that this would be both analytically and ethically problematic. Rather, our approach was a process of exploration, exploring an empirically still unknown territory: employing autoethnography to research Islamophobia. This approach highlights the ‘emotional labour’ that is required to make the connections between experiences and insight/knowledge. The term of ‘emotional labour’ was initially developed by Hochschild (1983), who explored the experiences of flight attendants and how they managed their emotions on a day-to-day basis on the job. Hochschild (2003: 7) argued that qualitative research often involves a form of ‘emotional labour’, a situation where one is required ‘to induce or suppress feeling in order to sustain the outward countenance that produces the proper state of mind in others’ (2003: 7). Hochschild (1983) referred to the ‘human costs’ of emotional labour, from ‘burnout’ to feeling ‘phony’, ‘guilt’ and ‘self blame’. It is clear from the data presented here that we both undertook a significant amount of emotion work. From the perspective of ‘emotional labour’, there were certain ‘costs’ involved in both studies. Feelings of emotional exhaustion and physical distress emerged because of the intimidation, abuse and hostility we experienced from members of the public. Thus doing autoethnography allowed us to experience many of the emotions that victims feel when they experience Islamophobia such as depression, sadness, fear, anxiety, suspicion, anger, helplessness and isolation. Dickson-Swift et al. (2009) note that qualitative researchers working with particularly traumatic material may be subject to a degree of vicarious traumatisation. Vicarious traumatisation can be defined as the process by which individuals listening to and working with the traumatic experiences of others begin to experience the effects of trauma themselves. Using Goffman’s (1959) work on social identities, we felt that our ‘virtual social identities’ (the way we were perceived by others) entirely eclipsed our ‘actual social identities’. This led us both to a loss of a sense of ‘self’, which prompted questions such as: who am I; what am I doing/have I done this for; what do I think about what is going on here; am I allowed to have opinions on the things I am observing; what is/was the point of this; and where do I fit in now? Moreover, doing autoethnography entailed certain ethical problems in both cases. As Campbell (2016: 100) notes, “the central maxim for the ethical researcher is ‘do no harm”. From this perspective, all researchers – regardless of whether they are using qualitative, quantitative or mixed methods – must take into consideration the effect their study will have on any human participants. In traditional research, one of the ways of countering any ethical issues is to obtain informed consent from the study participants. In autoethnographical studies, one might argue that informed consent in implicit, as the only participant is the researcher; however, for Sikes (2008) autoethnographical accounts put the researcher on ‘dodgy ground’. As Campbell (2016) points out, it is inevitable that other people will be (in)direct participants in autoethnographic research. It is not always possible to obtain consent from people when we do not know if and how they will be part of the story. She argues that it is not practically feasible to say to people that ‘I am an autoethnographer and I might write something which may or may not have a connection to you one day’ (Campbell, 2016: 103). In both our studies, although it was not possible to get their consent, we ensured complete anonymity for members of the public. Moreover, we did not engage in activities such as audio or video recording, which could have potentially revealed people’s identity. At the same time though, using autoethnography in the form of covert research entails additional ethical problems. During the process of autoethnography, we assumed a covert role and did not disclose to members of the public that we were researchers. Admittedly, using autoethnography in the form of covert research is perhaps ethically dubious due to there being a level of deception involved. We both developed feelings of emotional distress as a result of this. As Lofland and Lofland (1995) point out, researchers may feel uncomfortable if they deceive the people being observed when they do not totally reveal the true nature of their study. However, covert research can uncover phenomena that would otherwise remain inscrutable. We argue that assuming a covert role was essential to the success of our research projects. It is highly likely that people’s awareness of our status as researchers would influence how they treated us, which would potentially mask the true dimensions of public expressions of Islamophobic prejudice and hostility. Therefore, although there are important ethical questions here, the fact remains that in this instance, withholding our true identity was entirely ethically defensible. Finally, it is perhaps no coincidence that the nature, extent and impact of Islamophobic hostility that we experienced when doing autoethnography echoes visible Muslims’ experiences of Islamophobic victimisation. This shows that the themes we have identified as important when conducting autoethnography on Islamophobic victimisation resonate with themes that echo aspects of visible Muslims’ experiences of Islamophobic victimisation. That said, we are both of the view that it is not possible for ‘outsiders’, no matter how skilled in (auto)ethnographic technique, to ever fully grasp the experience of being visibly Muslim on the basis that they live in a context where they are vulnerable 24/7. Their experiences of Islamophobic victimisation will always be more authentic and the emotional, psychological and physical impacts will be exponentially more deeply felt. However, it is important to recognise that autoethnography provided us with a unique insight into visible Muslims’ vulnerability to Islamophobic victimisation in public. Through our projects, we were able to identify the role of the ‘visibility’ of our (perceived) Muslim identity in ‘triggering’ Islamophobic hostility in public spaces. For Irene, it is her non-Muslim background that makes her experiences so useful in terms of recognising the role of wearing the veil as a ‘trigger’ to Islamophobic attacks. Similarly, Imran would not have been abused had he not wore the jubba and grew a beard. The fact that we do not normally wear Islamic clothes allowed us to see the difference in people’s behaviour in public spaces, and expose the problem. Conclusion In this paper, we have reflected upon our personal experiences of undertaking autoethnography on Islamophobic victimisation. Despite our ‘outsider’ status (as an Orthodox Christian researcher for Irene and a non-visible Muslim researcher for Imran), we used autoethnography purposefully and tactically in order to research the experiences of victimised ‘others’. This approach is extremely novel in criminological ethnography. Purposeful attempts to research victimisation through autoethnography are literally unheard of. In light of the high emotional and physical demand of autoethnography, a key question that arises is whether can we research Islamophobic victimisation through autoethnography. Our experiences of doing autoethnography show that this research method can be a ‘difficult path’. On the one hand, using autoethnography allowed us to gain ‘insider’ knowledge. In this regard, gaining ‘insider’ knowledge contributed to the process of understanding visible Muslims’ experiences of Islamophobic victimisation in public. On the other hand, there were certain ‘costs’ involved. Using our own experiences as the vehicle, we illustrated the harmful effects of Islamophobic abuse such as emotional, psychological and physical impacts. Indeed, fieldwork evoked feelings of guilt, sadness and anger, leaving us upset and depressed. Moreover, there were ethical as well as moral issues involved such as putting ourselves at risk and doing covert research. 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work_v5o3ajsdqfgc7k3chydympkg2y	----	Understanding the vicarious trauma and emotional labour of criminological research https://doi.org/10.1177/2059799120926085 Creative Commons Non Commercial CC BY-NC: This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 License (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/) which permits non-commercial use, reproduction and distribution of the work without further permission provided the original work is attributed as specified on the SAGE and Open Access pages (https://us.sagepub.com/en-us/nam/open-access-at-sage). Methodological Innovations May-August 2020: 1–11 © The Author(s) 2020 Article reuse guidelines: sagepub.com/journals-permissions DOI: 10.1177/2059799120926085 journals.sagepub.com/home/mio Introduction Vicarious trauma (VT) is of growing interest to academics and practitioners, particularly as it relates to the work of vic- tim advocates, the helping professions and emergency ser- vices (Barrington and Shakespeare-Finch, 2013; Cohen and Collens, 2013; Pack, 2013). Emotional labour is also begin- ning to be discussed in a growing range of settings (see, for example, Fohring, 2020; Guerzoni, 2020; Jackson et al., 2013). In this article, we discuss the nature and impact of VT using two criminological research projects: one a qualitative project engaging with survivors of childhood sexual abuse, and the other, a quantitative analysis of police hate crime reports. We also discuss the emotional labour required of researchers seeking to enact trauma-informed practice and a witnessing stance in research (Kezelman and Stavropoulos, 2012; Reynolds, 2012). While VT is increasingly addressed in occupational health and safety procedures for workers dealing with trauma (such as social workers, policing and emergency services, and forensic psychologists) (Safe Work Australia, 2019), it remains the white elephant of academic research (Newman et al., 2006). Granted, universities and research centres are more cognisant of researcher safety; however, for the most part, this has not included addressing the VT experienced in undertaking research on topics that are permeated with trauma. This is of particular importance to criminologists, whose work – whether it is with Understanding the vicarious trauma and emotional labour of criminological research Rebecca J Moran1,2 and Nicole L Asquith3,4 Abstract The psychological cost of exposure to traumatic events is receiving greater recognition in recent years, especially in terms of its impact in helping professions and emergency services. However, the costs to researchers remain relatively unexplored. In this article, we will discuss the nature and impact of vicarious trauma using two criminological research projects as case studies: one a qualitative project engaging with survivors of childhood sexual abuse, and the other, a quantitative analysis of police hate crime reports. In addition to considering the trauma elicited in fieldwork such as interviews, we interrogate the costs imposed on researchers during the coding and analysing processes. We suggest that the cost is potentially greater when the researcher has a personal connection with the issues being researched, but that this personal experience also provides the researcher with important skills for responding to new or compounded trauma. The costs of engagement with trauma may be compensated by the productive outputs and impact on policy and practice that this type of research may elicit. Understanding the impact and costs of engaging with close analyses of trauma is critical in developing more robust and ethical research processes to ensure that this trauma is appropriately managed so as to avert the long-term damage this work can inflict on researchers and participants. Keywords Vicarious trauma, emotional labour, sexual abuse, hate crime, research methodology 1 University of New South Wales, Sydney, NSW, Australia 2 Curtin University, Bentley, WA, Australia 3 Western Sydney University, Penrith, NSW, Australia 4 Tasmanian Institute of Law Enforcement Studies, University of Tasmania, Hobart, TAS, Australia Corresponding author: Rebecca J Moran, School of Occupational Therapy, Social Work and Speech Pathology, Curtin University, Kent Street, Bentley, WA 6102, Australia. Email: rebecca.moran@curtin.edu.au 926085MIO0010.1177/2059799120926085Methodological InnovationsMoran and Asquith research-article2020 The Emotion and Emotional Labour of Criminological Researchers - Original Article https://uk.sagepub.com/en-gb/journals-permissions https://journals.sagepub.com/home/mio mailto:rebecca.moran@curtin.edu.au http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1177%2F2059799120926085&domain=pdf&date_stamp=2020-06-04 2 Methodological Innovations victims, witnesses, offenders or criminal justice practitioners – consistently requires bearing witness to trauma. In addition to considering the trauma elicited in fieldwork such as inter- views, we interrogate the costs imposed on researchers dur- ing the coding and analysing processes. We suggest that the cost is potentially greater when the researcher has a personal connection with the issues being researched, but that this personal experience also provides the researcher with impor- tant skills for meaning-making and developing vicarious resilience. Understanding the impact and costs of engaging with close analyses of trauma is critical in developing more robust and ethical research processes to ensure that this trauma is appropriately managed so as to avert the long-term damage this work can inflict on researchers. VT, emotional labour and reflexive research Pearlman and Caringi (2009: 202) define VT as ‘the negative transformation in the helper that results from empathic engagement with trauma survivors and their trauma material, combined with a commitment or responsibility to help them’. Similar to primary trauma, this transformation is often in the form of painful and distressing changes to a person’s core sys- tems of meaning, their relationships, their sense of hope and their measure of safety (Barrington and Shakespeare-Finch, 2013; Hunter and Schofield, 2006; Pack, 2013; Pearlman and Caringi, 2009). VT often manifests as intrusive thoughts and images, nightmares, overwhelming emotional responses and changes in belief systems and behaviour (Barrington and Shakespeare-Finch, 2013; Hunter and Schofield, 2006; Pack, 2013; Pearlman and Caringi, 2009). VT is considered by some to be an inevitable impact of exposure to trauma material and witnessing the suffering of trauma survivors (Barrington and Shakespeare-Finch, 2013; Pearlman and Caringi, 2009). While there is an over- lap between VT, post-traumatic stress disorder, compassion fatigue and burnout, the distinction lies in the nature of the exposure to trauma material (Silver et al., 2015). VT is identified as resulting from secondary exposure to trauma material, most often by hearing or reading trauma survi- vors’ descriptions of their experiences; an exposure which is undoubtedly present in criminological research. The authors consider VT as distinct from researcher’s experiences of abjection, as described by Thorneycroft (2020), and as extending beyond emotional labour in research discussed by Guerzoni (2020; see also Jackson et al., 2013). The impact of exposure to trauma material varies depend- ing on the amount, duration and type of exposure, as well as a person’s life history and current circumstances. Pack (2013) found that previous personal experiences of trauma may increase vulnerability to VT; however, the complex interactions between VT, vicarious resilience and personal growth mean that personal experience of trauma is not sim- ply a risk factor, but can also be an asset (see also Barrington and Shakespeare-Finch, 2013). MacRitchie and Leibowitz (2010) suggest that people exposed to trauma material make different meanings about it, influenced by their perception of the trauma survivor’s suffering and their own tempera- mental and biographical contextualisation. The idea that meaning is made from the unique and subjective position of each interpreter is also a key concept in research, particu- larly in reflexive qualitative research (Braun and Clarke, 2019). This is an idea that we will return to in the following case studies, reflecting on the particular type of emotional labour necessitated by intersections of VT, lived experience and reflexive research. For this purpose, we draw on aspects of emotional labour as defined by James (1989) and further elucidated by Hochschild (2012), Jewkes (2012) and Stayt (2009). In particular, we focus on the labour of emotion regulation and selective expression during empathic engage- ment with trauma material in the form of victimisation nar- ratives. In addition, we discuss the emotional labour demands and VT impacts of building genuinely empathic relation- ships with research participants (Fohring, 2020; Staden, 1998; Stayt, 2009). A key factor that requires emotional labour and influences the impact of VT is empathy (Barrington and Shakespeare- Finch, 2013; MacRitchie and Leibowitz, 2010; Woodby et al., 2011). Empathy facilitates authentic and effective engagement in therapeutic and research relationships, but can also amplify the effects of exposure to trauma material, as the hearer con- nects emotionally with the survivor’s story and emotional state. While relationships between research participants and researchers are different from therapeutic relationships, there are aspects of similarity: researchers often need to build rela- tionships of trust and connection with research participants in order to facilitate research processes (Dickson-Swift et al., 2008). Even in research that does not involve direct contact with participants, researchers can develop a deep empathic connection with data and the stories held in data (Jackson et al., 2013). Researchers are often drawn to research topics that are close to us, through direct personal experience, cul- tural association or other personally significant connections. Such connections can increase the meaningfulness of our work, but like empathy in therapeutic work may also increase the impacts of exposure to trauma material (Barrington and Shakespeare-Finch, 2013; Hunter and Schofield, 2006; MacRitchie and Leibowitz, 2010; Pack, 2013). Discussion of VT in criminological research is increasing, especially as it relates to frontline criminal justice staff. Spanning the full criminal justice process, research into the experiences of investigators and police officers (Atkinson- Tovar, 2003; Kunst et al., 2017), victim advocates (Slattery and Goodman, 2009), legal practitioners (Leclerc et al., 2020; Silver et al., 2015), juries (Lonergan et al., 2016; McQuiston et al., 2019) and rehabilitation, detention and correctional staff (Bosworth and Kellezi, 2017; Severson and Pettus -Davis, 2013) clearly identifies the impact VT can have on work in these fields. As noted above, VT is enhanced Moran and Asquith 3 when there is . . . a commitment or responsibility to help’ primary victims and survivors (Pearlman and Caringi, 2009: 202). Similarly, Stayt (2009) identifies that caring for people in times of distress requires considerable emotional labour and often causes emotional stress in care providers. Criminal justice practitioners are often drawn to this type of work pri- marily because of their desire to ‘help’ and to do something for their communities. And while many of these criminal jus- tice professions – in particular, policing – have recruitment strategies that sift out workers with a predisposition to nega- tive responses to trauma,1 the desire to help, combined with sustained, repeated exposure to others’ trauma, along with inadequate institutional responses to that trauma all but guar- antees that these criminal justice actors will experience VT at some point in their careers. The desire to help, and being successful in providing that help, may reduce the impact of VT on frontline staff. In this respect, the desire to help may be both a protective and harmful factor in VT, depending on the success achieved in providing that help. Just as criminal justice practitioners seek to help those who experience pri- mary trauma, the desire to help, to resolve and to find solu- tions informs why some scholars choose to engage in traumatic research. Aligned to this increasing interest in the impact of VT on criminal justice practitioners, is the identification of VT in criminological research (Fohring, 2020; Guerzoni, 2020). Dunn (1991) suggests that qualitative research must report not only on the researcher’s observations but also their expe- riences of undertaking that research. Dunn argues that docu- menting researcher’s experiences, including their reactions and responses to their participants and the information they collect, is critical as these factors may influence the analysis and interpretation of the data. During the interviews, in reviewing the recorded interviews, in coding and in data analysis, Dunn (1991) experienced VT symptoms in parallel to her participants. Her paper points to the critical need for researcher training and protective strategies for early career researchers, as well as those who have consistently engaged with traumatic research over their careers. The ini- tial engagement with VT affects researchers’ wellbeing, but if addressed appropriately, may be resolved with conven- tional methods such as debriefing. However, if there is sus- tained, repeated exposure that embeds the symptoms of VT in everyday life, this is less likely to be addressed or resol- ved by traditional methods such as peer-to-peer debriefing (Dunn, 1991). The formalised nature of engagement with people’s sto- ries through research creates a dynamic of witnessing, where stories are heard with a degree of status and significance, and reflected on in the context of broader social issues (Reynolds, 2012). The dialogic transaction that occurs between research- ers and research participants is unique: it is distinct from therapeutic relationships where dialogue is often framed as occurring between an expert helper and a person who needs help; and distinct from testimony in the criminal justice system, where victims are often treated with scepticism. Dialogue within research involves both surface and deep act- ing (Hochschild, 2012) and has the capacity to transform both/all parties involved, via the processes of witnessing and recognition (Benjamin, 2018; Oliver, 2001; Reynolds, 2012). While not discussed in the existing research, as documented in the second of our two case studies, a similar, disconnected witnessing occurs in secondary, quantitative data analysis. Testimony in the context of research participation can afford the participant status as an expert contributor to a pro- cess that is culturally and politically located, and is intended to lead to a meaningful outcome. In these moments, the researcher, and the research processes and outputs, function as ‘the third’, referred to by Benjamin (2018) as ‘a vantage point outside the two’ (p. 23). Benjamin (2018) argues that there is a transformative effect occurring in processes of wit- nessing and recognition, which utilise a third, shifting mean- ing-making beyond the conceptual limitations of ‘doer and done to’ (p. 24). For researchers dedicated to trauma-informed practice, and the facilitation of meaningful participant experiences, the potential for healing that lies in the act of witnessing becomes a compelling ethical (and moral) positioning. Trauma- informed practice guidelines (Kezelman and Stavropoulos, 2012) emphasise the importance of relational conditions that avoid re-traumatisation and that foster opportunities for heal- ing. Key priorities in trauma-informed practice are safety, trustworthiness and the clear communication of belief in vic- tim disclosures. Belief cannot be performed (surface acting); it must be authentic and embodied (deep acting) (Hochschild, 2012). Similarly, as Reynolds (2012) describes, justice-doing through witnessing demands that the witness be deeply pre- sent, leaning into the victim’s experiences and their personal and political meanings. Emotional labour in this context is complex and demanding; it is not simply a matter of perform- ing emotion and connection in the desired way (Hochschild, 2012). The witness must journey empathically (and therefore feel deeply) with the victim while paying careful attention to the authenticity and appropriateness of the emotional responses they allow themselves to show (James, 1989; Jewkes, 2012; Staden, 1998; Stayt, 2009). This kind of pres- ence, engagement with suffering and the emotional labour of witnessing cannot help but transform the witness (Sampson et al., 2008); however, whether the legacy of this work is VT or vicarious resilience depends on a variety of factors. The emotional impact on researchers from conducting research on distressing topics is well recognised in the meth- odology literature relating to qualitative research and pri- mary data (Sampson et al., 2008, 2010; Dickson-Swift et al., 2008; Jackson et al., 2013; Woodby et al., 2011). As Sampson et al. (2008) identified, the risk of emotional harm is ampli- fied when researchers value reflexivity and research relation- ships, and care deeply about participants’ interests, as is common in feminist, embodied methodologies. However, there is little recognition, in scholarly work or policy, of the 4 Methodological Innovations potential for emotional distress and VT in researchers work- ing with secondary data or quantitative methods (see Guerzoni, 2020). Jackson et al. (2013) describe the ways that researchers immersed in secondary data containing chil- dren’s accounts of abuse were haunted by their imaginings, hearing the children’s voices in their minds and picturing the abuse they were reading about. This challenges the assump- tion that secondary analysis does not create the interpersonal connections and emotional responses (Sampson et al., 2008) that MacRitchie and Leibowitz (2010) have identified as a causal factor in VT and secondary traumatic stress (STS). Compulsive rumination and imagining is both an indicator and a cause of VT (Pack, 2004). However, imagining is a natural step for an empathically engaged researcher, and VT training to discourage mentally replaying trauma material is rarely provided for researchers. In practice settings, a broad range of services are now investing in VT training, although many still do not have established protocols for VT prevention or treatment beyond generic employee assistance pathways and workplace mental health prevention programmes (see, for example, the Queensland Department of Child Safety, Youth and Women (QDCSYW), 2017, guidelines on VT). Recognition of VT as a risk factor in academic work is also variable. While many universities and their ethics committees address researcher wellbeing and safety in research training and ethics approval processes, again, this is often generic, without specific exam- ination of VT (Bloor et al., 2010; Jackson et al., 2013). Suggested strategies for managing VT include training and preparation, formal and informal debriefing, accessing super- vision, reducing the amount of exposure to trauma material and prioritising self-care (Barrington and Shakespeare-Finch, 2013; Pack, 2004, 2013; Pearlman and Caringi, 2009; QDCSYW, 2017; Severson and Pettus-Davis, 2013; Trippany et al., 2004). Interestingly, Pack (2004, 2013; see also Hunter and Schofield, 2006) found that social workers supporting sexual abuse victims were able to mitigate some VT impacts by adjusting their philosophical approaches to their work and their frameworks for understanding sexual violence, and by engaging in advocacy and activism work. The reparative effect of advocacy work makes sense if we consider that meaning- making and a sense of agency are central in both primary trauma and VT: ‘helping’ or doing something assists in restor- ing a hopeful and optimistic outlook, and a person’s sense of being able to effect change in the world (Brown, 2008; Herman, 2015; Hunter and Schofield, 2006; Pack, 2013). Dickson-Swift et al. (2008) note that researchers fre- quently use informal debriefing and peer support as a method for managing emotional distress, and raise concerns that while valuable, informal support from peers untrained in counselling may not always be sufficient or helpful. They suggest a number of strategies for managing the emotional risks of sensitive research, including specialist training, pro- fessional supervision and access to skilled counselling support. Furthermore, they argue that emotional risk is as important a consideration as physical risk, and that it is the responsibility of institutions, as employers, to adequately attend to this risk. In the context of sexual abuse counselling, Pack (2013) has argued that broader social discourses and workplace cultures that stigmatise and isolate victims and those supporting them increase the effects of VT. In contrast, creating cultures in which VT is openly discussed aids in the development of vicarious resilience. There is a small but per- sistent call for comparative efforts towards culture change in research institutions (Dickson-Swift et al., 2008; Jackson et al., 2013; Woodby et al., 2011). Vicarious resilience and post-traumatic growth are rela- tively new terms used to describe beneficial impacts of working with trauma, such as increased gratitude, growth in self-awareness and development of new skills useful in pro- fessional and personal contexts (Barrington and Shakespeare- Finch, 2013; Kunst et al., 2017; Pack, 2013). Such growth often occurs in the same domains that bear the damaging emotional, professional, existential, social/relational and spiritual impacts of VT (Barrington and Shakespeare-Finch, 2013; Pack, 2013). It is also important to acknowledge that, as researchers, many of us feel extraordinarily privileged to do the work that we do and recognise the sacredness of bear- ing witness to people’s suffering, survival, courage, healing and growth (Jackson et al., 2013). Reflecting on VT This reflexive article stems from ongoing discussions between the authors over the last 10 years. When we embarked on our first collaborative project in 2009, we felt alone in the task of coding and analysing traumatic material, and in the absence of formal institutional support, we relied on informal peer support from each other (Dickson-Swift et al., 2008). The choice of these two studies is therefore exploratory, purposive and intrinsic (Tellis, 1997). Our goals are simply to reflect on our experiences of engaging with trauma in research and identify the critical tipping points when VT and emotional labour arose in our research pro- cesses. Through this discussion, we hope to provide other scholars with signposts to the symptoms of VT and possible ways to address the inevitable VT and emotional labour involved in this type of scholarship. The research studies presented below share only the VT produced in undertaking this research. They are theoretically, methodologically and conceptually different. One is qualita- tive, the other quantitative. One is framed by psycho-social trauma theory, the other, the core principles of forensic lin- guistics. One was undertaken with primary data, the other secondary. Yet, despite these differences, they share the com- mon characteristic of generating VT in the researchers. Importantly, common to both is the involvement of both authors in each project. In the first, Rebecca was the primary Moran and Asquith 5 researcher and Nicole provided peer-to-peer support and informal supervision, and in the second, Nicole was primary researcher and Rebecca was her Research Assistant. In each study, we outline the projects and what was involved in pri- mary and secondary fieldwork and data analysis, with a par- ticular focus on the VT exposures, impacts, how we managed them, and the gaps in managing VT exposures and impacts. Qualitative child sexual abuse research Rebecca’s PhD research explores the experiences of adult survivors of child sexual abuse (CSA) who made submis- sions to the Australian Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse (2019). Data collection consisted of in-depth semi-structured interviews with 26 sur- vivors, with interviews then transcribed and analysed using reflexive thematic analysis (Braun and Clarke, 2019). While interviews did not include questions about participants’ experiences of abuse, many participants nonetheless shared information about abuse experiences, and all participants spoke at length about the devastating impacts of trauma and abuse. Rebecca has her own history of trauma and abuse, as do members of her family. A number of risk factors for VT are therefore present: prolonged and repeated exposure to trauma material and survivor distress, with potential exacer- bations due to previous experiences of trauma and close per- sonal connection to the research topic (Barrington and Shakespeare-Finch, 2013; MacRitchie and Leibowitz, 2010; Pack, 2013; Pearlman and Caringi, 2009). Rebecca also has experience working with trauma survi- vors in the community, teaches in social work and works as a trainer teaching on trauma-informed practice and VT in gov- ernment and community services. This experience is relevant as both an additional source of exposure to trauma material and an indicator of skill and experience in managing VT risk. Rebecca’s research training did not cover VT as a risk, and it was not a requirement for securing ethics approval. However, remembering the VT impacts of her master’s research and her work with Nicole on the hate crimes project (see Study 2 below), Rebecca did make plans for attending to the risk of VT, primarily through selection of research questions and a project design which (theoretically) would limit exposure to traumatic content. As described above, this plan did not entirely work, as participants shared abuse experiences with- out any prompting. Noting the early signs of VT, Rebecca outsourced some transcribing; again, in an effort to reduce the quantity and duration of exposure to trauma material, Rebecca also found ways to debrief informally with supervi- sors and peers. The VT impacts Rebecca encountered were, as MacRitchie and Leibowitz (2010) and Barrington and Shakespeare-Finch (2013) argued, often related to empathy, personal experience and perceptions of participant’s suffering. The most compel- ling example is the difficulty Rebecca had conducting, tran- scribing and coding an interview with a woman (we call her ‘Jasmine’) who described herself as having Dissociative Identity Disorder, and who ‘switched’ between parts many times during the video interview. Jasmine sometimes appeared masculine and aggressive, and at other times childlike and vul- nerable, requiring Rebecca to work hard emotionally in order to remain connected with Jasmine through these changing states. The abuse Jasmine has endured, and described in detail, was extreme, prolonged and horrifying. Witnessing Jasmine’s distress and engaging empathically with her experiences demand emotion regulation for self-preservation (Stayt, 2009), while the need to hold safe space for her required thoughtful communication of Rebecca’s own emotional responses (James, 1989; Jewkes, 2012; Stayt, 2009). While other partici- pants described comparable abuse experiences, Rebecca’s sense of relating to Jasmine, particularly with regard to the lasting emotional and existential impacts of her abuse experi- ences, made this interview data particularly traumatic to engage with and tested her emotion regulation skills. The nuances of empathy development are slippery and somewhat intangible; it is hard to say exactly what creates a stronger sense of connection with one participant over another. Nussbaum (2013) argues that one factor in the development of empathy is the conceivable idea that ‘this could have been me’. This idea certainly resonates for Rebecca when reflecting on her experiences with Jasmine, as does Lifton’s (2012) description of ‘survivor guilt’. However, Jasmine’s suffering is so clear and immediate in her presen- tation that some VT impacts would be likely for anyone wit- nessing her distress and hearing her story, regardless of personal connections or experiences. Jasmine is intelligent, humorous and very likable; perhaps this affection also increases the emotional impact of recognising her pain. The way Jasmine described her abuse experiences and their impacts elicited an immediate and lasting emotional response in Rebecca (Woodby et al., 2011). Jasmine often seemed to be pleading with Rebecca to help her make sense of these experi- ences – to help her understand and manage the existential trauma (Brown, 2008; Herman, 2015; Lifton, 2012) that comes from unrelenting exposure to the banality of evil (Arendt, 1963). Rebecca carried Jasmine’s bewilderment and grief away from the interview and added it to her own reser- voir of existential trauma. The scene from Jasmine’s story which still haunts Rebecca the most is two perpetrators of organised sexual abuse laugh- ing, while two children screamed in fear for their lives: per- petrators inducing terror as a joke, for their own entertainment. This is an imagining made more painful for Rebecca by her role as a mother to a young child, as well as her own memo- ries of childhood abuse and dehumanisation. Jasmine’s reliv- ing of this experience contained complex emotional currents: terror still raw; guilt over her own actions to survive; grief; and a childlike confusion that hints at an unspoken question: ‘why did they do this to us?’ As an emotionally engaged interviewer, Rebecca feels all of these with Jasmine, as well as noting her own connections to such feelings. 6 Methodological Innovations In addition, Jasmine’s vulnerability and distress enlists Rebecca as a helper of sorts; albeit, in the brief and some- what distanced context of a researcher–participant relation- ship, and a video interview. As in Pearlman and Caringi’s (2009: 202) definition, all the elements for VT are present: empathic engagement with trauma material and a sense of responsibility to somehow provide help. ‘Help’ in this instance can only be in the form of witnessing, understand- ing and validating Jasmine’s experience and suffering, all of which require emotional labour to regulate and express appropriately (Jewkes, 2012; Reynolds, 2012). As Woodby et al. (2011) observe, in transcription and coding there is even less opportunity to help – a powerlessness more diffi- cult to sit with when victim participants are still not beyond the reach of perpetrators. VT manifested for Rebecca in a number of ways through- out her engagement with Jasmine’s interview data. During the live interview, while Rebecca remained primarily focussed on Jasmine (her story and her emotional and psy- chological wellbeing), Rebecca’s distress level was fairly low. However, once the interview and follow-up support were complete, and Rebecca was left alone with the data, significant distress began to emerge. Facing the data for tran- scription and coding felt unbearable without the distraction of focussing on Jasmine’s wellbeing. For many weeks after the interview, and for days after any attempt to complete transcription or coding, Rebecca experienced intrusive thoughts, strong emotional responses (grief, shame, a sense of hopelessness and despair), insomnia and an urge to with- draw and isolate herself. Rebecca was reluctant to seek out support or to debrief with anyone, due to the desire for isolation and avoidance of other people, but also out of fear that talking to anyone about Jasmine’s experiences and the impact they were having on her would simply be spreading VT further; a kind of conta- gion. Instead, Rebecca utilised skills developed through sur- viving her own trauma experiences to navigate this distressing and isolating period and by managing her response to Jasmine’s story as she would any other resurgence of trauma impacts. This included allowing and reflecting on difficult feelings, being aware of temptation to revert to harmful cop- ing strategies and investing in activities to increase safety and wellbeing, such as exercise, meditation, journaling and time spent away from trauma material. Fortunately, Rebecca’s primary supervisor had, coincidentally, previously inter- viewed Jasmine and was familiar with her presentation and her abuse history, so Rebecca was eventually able to talk about the impact and work out a plan for transcribing and analysing this distressing interview. Rebecca still has not talked about the content of Jasmine’s interview, but has ben- efitted from the informal support of discussing the VT impacts with her supervisor and with Nicole. It took many months to complete transcription, working through small sections at a time, and some content was left un-transcribed and not included in analysis. It would not have been appropriate to outsource transcription in this instance: Jasmine had asked that some parts of her interview be kept private, and the likelihood of a significant VT impact on transcription service staff (who often do not have access to VT support) posed an unacceptable risk. The un-tran- scribed sections, while providing valuable contextual infor- mation, were not crucial to addressing the research questions, and Rebecca and her supervisor decided that it was best to summarise rather than transcribe these particularly graphic parts of Jasmine’s story. Rebecca experienced VT impacts from other aspects of her research too, but none so severe as those related to Jasmine’s interview. Over many months, the impacts eased, although, as Lifton (2012) reflects, the imprint of immersion in horror never really leaves us. However, when we can incorporate comprehension of horror into our worldview and still find ways to feel hope and happiness, the impacts of VT are no longer debilitating – particularly if we can find ways to make value and meaning from the experience (Brown, 2008; Herman, 2015; Lifton, 1975). Rebecca was able to build on the meaning-making work already done in her own trauma healing and in previous episodes of VT to assimilate this new horror fairly quickly; turning it from paralysing despair into compassion and determination. Quantitative hate crime research After working at the Lesbian and Gay Anti-Violence Project (AVP) in the 1990s as a Client Advocate for victims of hate crime, Nicole made the decision when she returned to post- graduate studies that she was no longer going to undertake primary research with victims, nor investigate hate crime experiences. Unknown to her at the time, these were adapta- tion and coping strategies (Hunter and Schofield, 2006). In their place, she pursued secondary research into the role of hate speech in hate crimes. This decision was not taken lightly. While there continues to be a dearth of research on the impact of hate crime on individuals and communities, the individual costs of undertaking this type of research are significant for both the researcher and the participant, especially when both share community and experiences of violence (Barrington and Shakespeare-Finch, 2013; Hunter and Schofield, 2006; MacRitchie and Leibowitz, 2010; Pack, 2013). At the time of embarking on postgraduate studies, Nicole was still managing the VT acquired during her term as a Client Advocate, during which limited psychological support was provided to workers. As part of her work at the AVP, she was required to complete a Report of Violence for each client and thus knew that secondary hate crime data existed, albeit held by a small number of community organisations and some policing organisations. It was from this insider knowl- edge that she developed her first major study into the role of verbal and textual hostility (aka, hate speech) in reported hate crime. Acknowledging the limits imposed in utilising existing data collected by others, for other purposes, she Moran and Asquith 7 sought to create a typology of hate speech reported by vic- tims to community and policing organisations. This was achieved through two separate, but related projects using Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA; Wodak, 2001). CDA is not a method, per se, but rather a methodology that deploys qualitative, quantitative and mixed-methods approaches to examine the individual, social and institutional contexts of text/speech. Her doctoral research analysed 1227 complaints of heter- osexist and antisemitic hate violence reported to the AVP, Executive Council of Australian Jewry (ECAJ) and the New South Wales Anti-Discrimination Board (ADB) between January 1995 and December 1999. The AVP was unique among these organisations in that their Report of Violence included a specific field to narrate the hate speech used dur- ing the incident, which enabled Nicole to avoid re-reading the whole case file. However, in these cases, as well as those reported to the ECAJ and the ADB, it was only in reading the full transcript of the case that the contextual factors (type of violence, place of incident, presence of witnesses/other vic- tims/bystanders) could be identified. The analysis of these data provided sufficient information to create the first typology of verbal and textual hostility in hate crime (Asquith, 2004, 2007). She then tested this typol- ogy using 99,727 cases reported to the London Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) between January 2003 and December 2007 (Asquith, 2013). Of these cases, 2 years of data (2003 and 2007), consisting of 27,164 cases, were analysed for the presence and type of verbal and textual hostility. While 20,756 (76%) of these cases included reports of racist, het- erosexist and faith-based hate speech, only 5584 cases (21%) reported that speech verbatim. This verbatim hate speech was not recorded in an indi- vidual field, and could only be identified by reading the abridged (250-character) narrative of the incident recorded by the police officer. These abridged narratives included a summary of the incidents, and in 21% of cases, the recording of the hate speech used in the incident. It was only in reading every one of the 27,164 abridged narratives that the hate speech and contextual factors could be identified. Knowing from experience that even secondary data analysis could elicit VT, Nicole sought funding to employ Research Assistants to undertake this initial coding of the data. Rebecca and another casual Research Assistant undertook the majority of the data coding for this second study into the role of hate speech in hate crime. The decision to delegate this difficult work to casual staff was instrumentalist and self-serving. Dispersing the workload of coding was a pre- ventive measure as it shared the VT between researchers and limited the exposure of any one person (Hunter and Schofield, 2006; Woodby et al., 2011). While the goal in utilising secondary data was to avoid the VT elicited in primary fieldwork (such as interviews), this was not achieved in either study. Apart from the generalised VT produced from reading the secondary narratives of victims’ experiences collated by these organisations, in her doctoral research, Nicole was re-reading all of the cases she was responsible for as the Client Advocate at the AVP. This analysis created a new layer of VT, as well as reminders of the initial VT produced at the time of reporting. Reading, reviewing and coding incidents of hate violence is traumatic whether it is a single incident or, as in the MPS research, 27,164 cases. For hate crime victims, some experi- ences are so impactful that they inform life decisions from that point on. From her experience as an advocate, Nicole also knows that what creates the conditions for ongoing trauma and behaviour modification is not necessarily the level of violence or physical harms caused. For some vic- tims, it can be simply the wrong thing said at a particular moment that undermines cherished ideals about human nature. Likewise, for coders, words wound (Matsuda, 1993). We procrastinate, and when forced to return to the task, we flinch away from the computer screen. We scan the narrative for any explicit sign (such as quotation marks) that verbatim text is recorded so as to avoid having to digest information that may not be useful to the study, such as detailed accounts of horrendous physical and sexual abuse that do not include verbatim hate speech. And yet still generalised anxiety and VT returns over and over again. Although a single narrative may cause harm, it is in the cumulative effect of 27,164 cases that we can begin to see to dangers of VT in research. Months of reviewing and coding violent data begins to seep into our worlds and colours even our most precious relationships. We need to debrief but do not want to share the trauma and its effects. So we debrief with each other, and in the process, embed the trauma in our shared knowledge. We talk of this, or that incident as if it is qualitatively different from all others, when in most cases, they are simply the outliers that we cannot forget. In the midst of her work on the MPS data set, Rebecca called Nicole just to talk – not debrief, as neither of us were cog- nisant of the necessity to do so, nor did either of us have the skills to do so at the time. Ten years later, we still remember the case that had hit both of us hardest that day. It was not extraordinary; there were only a few minor injuries. It was not a case that either of us, as White women, could imagine experiencing. Nor did it have any salience or link to the interpersonal trauma that both of us have experienced as children and adults. It was a case of a young Black man, who had been detained in a cage while his perpetrators called him a monkey and threw bananas at him. As with Woodby et al. (2011: 831), there was a deep level of ‘affec- tive permeability’ that came from sharing this trauma narra- tive, including the emotional labour involved in managing each other’s traumatic responses to that data, and Nicole’s responsibility as supervisor of Rebecca’s work. There was significant emotional labour deployed in the caring and empathy work required to address each other’s VT, as well as the labour required to ensure that as an employee Rebecca was supported in their work. It was the banality of the evil 8 Methodological Innovations we parsed (Arendt, 1963), we believe, that shaped – and continues to shape – our responses to the hatred we have coded. As noted in the existing literature on VT in research prac- tice, much attention is focussed on the rich, thick accounts of trauma collected in qualitative research. The two projects dis- cussed in this case study were primarily quantitative; numbers crunched rather than emotions reflexively coded and analysed. Yet, VT remains a lasting artefact of this work for both Nicole and Rebecca. The trauma may be reduced to numbers, but in order to crunch those numbers, the text must be coded, and in the process, the disembodied text of police reports is reimag- ined, gaps are filled and these stories are embedded in the eve- ryday in ways not dissimilar to that which occurs in coding primary qualitative data such as that collected by Rebecca. Witnessing, reflexivity and emotional labour in research VT is an ‘absent presence’ (Derrida, 1997) in criminological research. It permeates the work of criminal justice practition- ers and the victims, witnesses and offenders they assist; yet, it remains a hidden trauma largely unaddressed in academic research design, training and ethics protocols. While the Australian system for ethics approval has developed signifi- cantly, and now requires researchers to account for the harms caused to both participants and researchers, there is still a belief that secondary data analysis poses fewer risks than pri- mary fieldwork (Jackson et al., 2013). Furthermore, too often, secondary data analyses are still considered under the low- or no-risk protocol, especially if the data collected have already been de-identified. This leaves too much of the trauma of criminological research unattended and abrogates the respon- sibility for addressing VT to the individual researcher. As our research studies demonstrate, all that was available to us at the time was to design our research in ways that sought to reduce VT (unsuccessful in both cases) and to call on infor- mal supports when we found ourselves affected by VT. A critical factor in data coding is the nature of the ‘text’ to be analysed. In the studies we discuss in this article, the coded data come in two forms: thick, rich life-history inter- views with survivors of violence and detached, abbreviated narratives of reported hate crimes. While an assumption can easily be made that the former may elicit increased VT due to its extended and emotional engagement with traumatised participants (Jackson et al., 2013), we suggest that VT is also created by the dehumanising language of forensic investiga- tion. Reduced to policing terms, and with the trauma stripped of its context, police reports and coronial enquires are VT minefields. The reduction of life-changing events to the bare basic information required to complete the 250-character field of police incident reports affords no space for the trauma, and when read by others out of context – such as researchers in data coding – produces a sanitised account of the damage incurred in seeking justice. The disembodied text of police narratives, such as IC4 and VIW1,2 strips these accounts of the full context and leaves the coder with a blank slate on which to map the imagined back-story to each of these narratives. Our research philosophy is foregrounded by a commitment to trauma-informed practice, which means a commitment to doing research with survivors in a way that could be meaning- ful and rewarding for participants. The key to trauma-informed practice is relationships that prioritise safe and trustworthy connections, shared power, belief and recognition of the impacts of trauma (Kezelman and Stavropoulos, 2012). Obviously, this is easier to put in practice when conducting qualitative research; however, in a limited way, it can also frame how we engage with, code and analyse quantitative data, especially as it relates to the outcomes and implications of this research. As Reynolds (2012) describes, witnessing is, in itself, a form of justice-doing: witnessing someone’s story of trauma, while carrying an awareness of the historical and political context of their suffering, can be transformative for both parties, and may contribute to the development of post- traumatic growth (Cohen and Collens, 2013; Kunst et al., 2017). A witnessing stance extends into data analysis, as does trauma-informed practice, as it requires the researcher to hold an emotional connection to each participant throughout cod- ing, analysis and discussion. This does not mean shying away from rigorous analysis, but it does foster a reluctance to break up data unnecessarily or obscure participants’ voices. Braun and Clarke (2019; see also Jackson et al., 2013) argue for the importance of researcher reflexivity in qualita- tive research. Understanding the influence of our own experi- ences, values, meaning systems, aversions and vulnerabilities is essential in rigorous analysis – and this includes an aware- ness of what drives us to study a particular topic, and how our own experiences might blind us, or sharpen our focus. When VT is added to the mix, reflexivity becomes more difficult and urgent. A defining feature of trauma responses is a desire to avoid unbearable stimuli (Herman, 2015); and a key fea- ture of reflexivity is to look directly at what we are driven to avoid. This highlights the importance of attending to VT in research, as unaddressed VT can create a compelling reluc- tance to examine ourselves, or our data. Such blind spots undermine the researcher’s capacity for insightful analysis (Braun and Clarke, 2019; Jackson et al., 2013). As Woodby et al. (2011) describe, there is an expectation that researchers are skilled in emotional reflexivity and able to engage in the emotional labour of reflexive coding, yet practical training to develop these skills is rarely provided to researchers. Having discussed the difficulties, risks and costs of doing criminological research that is at times traumatic, the reasons we keep doing it and the value it holds for us need to be con- sidered. Lifton (1975) argues that ‘. . . the overall struggle of the survivor is to give form, significance, and meaning to the death immersion, in order to move forward in one’s postholo- caust existence’ (p. 182). Without claiming that ‘researcher’ and ‘survivor’ are interchangeable – although they are, at Moran and Asquith 9 times, overlapping identities – we suspect that something sim- ilar is true for researchers who chose to confront psychologi- cally challenging issues through their work. Once we know of an atrocity, it is difficult to suppress and ignore that knowl- edge. There is a point of no return, where you cannot un-know or un-see injustice; which leaves only the option of trying to create meaningful, valuable and significant insights from the unbearable. While a circular argument, we suggest that the VT that comes from research (and the trauma of lived experi- ences) becomes the source of the need for meaning-making, which in turn becomes the sustaining force in research; and, as we know, this is likely to cause more VT. As such, there is no escaping the probability of VT for those who engage with traumatic research. Instead, we need to consider strategies that both prevent and respond to VT in research, extending beyond the informal supports that are often the only available option. Pack (2013) identifies a related paradox, in that it is pre- cisely the processes of navigating VT that leads to vicarious resilience. Valuable meaning is created from trauma learning, which enriches our lives and builds personal and professional competencies. There is also meaning to be found in the bonds that develop through shared knowledge, and the relational skills researchers can develop through supporting each other. Increased knowledge of self is rewarding; as is the recogni- tion we can find in knowing that we have shared a profound, if painful, experience. As Newman et al. (2006) suggest, and as our experience has shown, there is some protection against VT to be found in peer support, and the development of work- ing cultures that acknowledge the significance of emotional responses in qualitative and quantitative research (see also Dickson-Swift et al., 2008; Pack, 2013; Woodby et al., 2011). In this way, we can extend the therapeutic value of witnessing and recognition beyond researcher–participant relationships to include our fellow researchers. However, as Dickson-Swift et al. (2008) identify, research institutions also have a role to play in responding to VT, through the provision of appropri- ate training and formalised support, and the facilitation of workplace cultures that openly recognise and discuss the emotional impacts of doing research. Conclusion Comprehending the senselessness of profound cruelty is existentially traumatic. Awareness of the pervasiveness and prevalence of abuse, combined with looking into the abyss and seeing the unbearable ordinariness of those who perpe- trate atrocities, exposes the world as dangerous and cruel without reason. Walking through shopping centres, driving to work or playing with your own child takes on a different quality when you are cognitively and emotionally preoccu- pied with everyday atrocities and their devastating impacts. And yet, we remain drawn to this work, and grateful for the learning – academic, personal and existential – we find in this space. We value the opportunities for meaning-making and growth found in engaging with trauma in this way, but remain concerned that VT is not currently well recognised as a health risk in research – particularly research using quanti- tative methods and secondary data – and that this lack of recognition creates isolation and stigma. We suggest that reflexivity in coding and analysing data is critical to both qualitative and quantitative research, and that without this deep engagement with our positionalities in rela- tion to our participants’ stories, the trauma imposed through this work is difficult to resolve. We also suggest that there is a bi-directional relationship between emotional labour and VT, in that the emotional labour required to undertake this work may exacerbate the VT experienced. However, not all emo- tional labour necessarily results in VT. VT arises only when there is a deep and extended engagement with trauma mate- rial, and that this VT requires emotional labour in order to manage the resulting effects (such as anxiety etc.). The case studies we have discussed here are not unique; similar meth- odologies and analytical frameworks are used throughout criminological research. As such, we hope our discussion of emotional labour and VT in collecting, coding and analysing traumatic material provides the necessary insights required to address VT in criminological research and assist in the devel- opment of a scholarly culture where the emotional challenges of research are openly discussed. Most of all, we hope that our transparent reflection on our experiences is of value to other researchers impacted by VT. Acknowledgements The authors would like to acknowledge the thousands of victims who have been compelled to tell their stories to us and to criminal justice agencies. It is their willingness to face their own trauma that enables us to engage with that trauma as criminologists. The authors would also like to thank Dr Jess Rodgers for their assistance in identifying relevant existing literature. Declaration of conflicting interests The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship and/or publication of this article. Funding The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship and/or publication of this article: Nicole’s research projects were funded by the University of Melbourne and University of Tasmania and were conducted after receiving ethics approval (DPH 6/2003 and H9962, respectively). Rebecca was funded to undertake her doctoral research by Western Sydney University and University of New South Wales, and research was conducted after receiving ethics approval (H12332). Notes 1. 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Woodby LL, Williams BR, Wittich AR, et al. (2011) Expanding the notion of researcher distress: The cumulative effects of cod- ing. Qualitative Health Research 21(6): 830–838. Author biographies Rebecca J Moran has a background in youth work, domestic vio- lence services, mental health, criminology research and training. She has specialised in trauma and recovery for many years, and has served as a trainer and consultant for government and non- government agencies in Australia and the United Kingdom. She currently works for Curtin University in teaching and research roles, as well as for the Blue Knot Foundation (National Centre of Excellence for Complex Trauma) as a trainer. Rebecca is com- pleting her PhD through Western Sydney University’s School of Social Sciences and Psychology. Her PhD project explores mean- ing-making and social action as part of recovery from child sex- ual abuse, with particular focus on the recent Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse. Rebecca also has a lived experience of trauma and recovery, and draws on a mix of professional and personal experience in all of her work. Nicole L Asquith is the Associate Professor of Policing and Criminal Justice at Western Sydney University, Co-Director of the Vulnerability, Resilience, and Policing Research Consortium and University Associate with the Tasmanian Institute of Law Enforcement Studies. Nicole’s research primarily focuses on the intersections between vulnerability and the criminal justice system, particularly in relation to hate crime, family violence and policing practices. She is currently undertaking a landmark ethnographic study into small town policing, along with four projects related to LGBTIQA+ people (CALD LGBTIQ+ People’s relationships to family, evaluation of the Tasmania Police LGBTI Liaison program, Flexi-schools as a safe place for LGBTIQ students and Sexual Health and Attitudes of Australian Prisoners). She is the co-editor of Policing Vulnerability (Federation Press) and Policing Encounters with Vulnerability (Palgrave), co-author of Diversity and Safety on Campus @ Western and author of Critical Policing Studies (forthcoming, Routledge). www.csyw.qld.gov.au/childsafety/child-safety-practice-manual/chapters/10-general/10-11-staff-safety-well-being/key-steps/5-implement-strategies-manage-stress-vicarious-trauma-critical-incident-stress www.csyw.qld.gov.au/childsafety/child-safety-practice-manual/chapters/10-general/10-11-staff-safety-well-being/key-steps/5-implement-strategies-manage-stress-vicarious-trauma-critical-incident-stress www.csyw.qld.gov.au/childsafety/child-safety-practice-manual/chapters/10-general/10-11-staff-safety-well-being/key-steps/5-implement-strategies-manage-stress-vicarious-trauma-critical-incident-stress www.csyw.qld.gov.au/childsafety/child-safety-practice-manual/chapters/10-general/10-11-staff-safety-well-being/key-steps/5-implement-strategies-manage-stress-vicarious-trauma-critical-incident-stress 
work_v7lgr7in3zbezp7xqgokel3lxy	----	“You Need to Be Sorted Out With a Knife”: The Attempted Online Silencing of Women and People of Muslim Faith Within Academia Social Media + Society October-December 2016: 1 –11 © The Author(s) 2016 Reprints and permissions: sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav DOI: 10.1177/2056305116678896 sms.sagepub.com Creative Commons Non Commercial CC-BY-NC: This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution- NonCommercial 3.0 License (http://www.creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/) which permits non-commercial use, reproduction and distribution of the work without further permission provided the original work is attributed as specified on the SAGE and Open Access pages (https://us.sagepub.com/en-us/nam/open-access-at-sage). Article Introduction Social media platforms have a significant global reach and audience, with social media sites such as Twitter having on average 350,000 tweets sent per minute and over 500 million tweets per day (Twitter, 2014). This growth and expansion of social media and the Internet, more broadly, has created many positive opportunities for people to communicate and engage in a manner not previously seen. The progressive development of social media tools is also affecting the cur- rent practices of academics (Mollett et al., 2011), including the development of specialist social networking sites, such as ResearchGate and Academia.edu. Boyer (1990) argues that the traditional dimension of scholarship has been expanded and now encourages public sharing and evaluation by others. From this perspective, social media is providing a public arena for academics to share knowledge, which is conse- quently transforming academic work and identity (Barbour & Marshall, 2012). However, considering the impact of social media both within and beyond the academic sphere, it has also acted as a double-edged sword by creating a virtual platform for people using online hate speech as a means to target people while simultaneously being able to hide their identity. In this article, we present two auto-ethnographic accounts of the abuse and vitriolic hate that UK-based academics researching oppressed groups, namely, women and individuals of Muslim faith, experienced online. We will explore how our membership to such groups, combined with our research within these areas, led us to experience exten- sive online hate, and we will consider the impact that this has had on our lives and academic identity. We will also consider the consequence of such hate beyond the academic commu- nity and explore the online abuse of women and people of Muslim faith more broadly. In doing so, this article makes an original contribution to knowledge through individual auto- ethnographic accounts of academics researching oppressed groups and as a result being victims of online trolling and hate. 678896 SMSXXX10.1177/2056305116678896Social Media + SocietyBarlow and Awan research-article2016 1Lancaster University, UK 2Birmingham City University, UK Corresponding Author: Charlotte Barlow, School of Law, Lancaster University, C18, Bowland North, Lancaster LA1 4YW, UK. Email: c.barlow@lancaster.ac.uk “You Need to Be Sorted Out With a Knife”: The Attempted Online Silencing of Women and People of Muslim Faith Within Academia Charlotte Barlow1 and Imran Awan2 Abstract Academics are increasingly expected to use social media to disseminate their work and knowledge to public audiences. Although this has various advantages, particularly for alternative forms of dissemination, the web can also be an unsafe space for typically oppressed or subordinated groups. This article presents two auto-ethnographic accounts of the abuse and hate academics researching oppressed groups, namely, women and people of Muslim faith, experienced online. In doing so, this article falls into four parts. The first section provides an overview of existing literature, particularly focusing on work which explores the violence and abuse of women and people of Muslim faith online. The second section considers the auto- ethnographic methodological approach adopted in this article. The third section provides the auto-ethnographic accounts of the author’s experiences of hate and abuse online. The final section locates these experiences within broader theoretical concepts, such as silencing, and considers possible implications of such online hate in both an academic context and beyond. Keywords online hate, Islamophobia, gender, violence against women & girls, academia mailto:c.barlow@lancaster.ac.uk 2 Social Media + Society Academia and Social Media Use The academic role is changing, with increasing commercial interests within higher education affecting professional iden- tities, presenting a shift toward alignment with corporate cul- ture (Billot, 2010; Donelan, 2016). Public engagement is increasingly centralized to the individual academic role, and the expectation is often that academics should connect with the public and communicate their research to wider audi- ences. The increasing focus on public engagement has also been emphasized in research evaluation mechanisms, such as the UK Research Excellence Framework (REF) 2014, with research impact beyond the academic community being a key criterion within this framework. Information and communication technologies (ICTs), in particular, have transformed professional and workplace activity within academia, with social media becoming a widely used communication and information-sharing tool (Chikoore et al., 2016). In this article, the term “social media tool” includes blogs, Twitter, social networking sites (such as Facebook), and media sharing sites (such as YouTube). Due to the significant number of academic authored blogs that are now available, and an increasing presence on Twitter, evi- dence suggests that some academics are embracing the use of these tools as avenues for increasing public engagement and creating an online presence (Donelan, 2016). Donelan (2016) explored academics use of social media and suggested that positive motivations for use included expansion of profes- sional networks, communicating research to wider audiences and self-development, highlighting the range of benefits that social media can have in a changing academic landscape. However, many academics surveyed and interviewed identi- fied the various institutional pressures associated with hav- ing an online presence, emphasizing the importance of social media use in particular (Donelan, 2016). Some of this pres- sure could arguably be tacit, for instance, an increasing num- ber of universities are creating social media guidance or training for academic staff. For example, the London School of Economics offers a guide for academics on how to use Twitter in university research and impact activities, high- lighting the pressures to incorporate this form of dissemina- tion into the research agenda (Mollett et al., 2011). Other issues identified with the use of social media for academics include a concern with receiving negative feedback or abuse online (Donelan, 2016). Phillips (2014) highlights the “dark side” of the impact agenda and discusses the ways in which academics with a high public profile may experience abuse online. She particularly highlights the gendered nature of this abuse, contextualizing such discussions within her own personal experiences of receiving hateful messages via social media and email communication. This highlights the ways in which abuse online often intersects will multiple forms of inequality and oppression, such as sexism, Islamophobia, racism, and homophobia, both within and beyond academia. Online Hate However, it is important to note that although the web can often be used as a way of exerting power and oppression, it can also be used to exercise voice. Castells (2012) argues that networks and social movements created online and the sense of togetherness that such movements can produce can be empowering to otherwise marginalized users. This has been evidenced on a global scale in recent hashtags con- nected to the themes of this article, such as #everydaysexism and #notinmyname. The former catalogs experiences of sex- ism experienced on a day-to-day basis and the latter dissoci- ates the acts of terrorism committed by Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) with the Islamic faith. Such examples high- light the different facets and uses of the web, which may not always be negative, hateful, and/or oppressive. However, this article argues that although the web offers the opportu- nity of building social movements and empowering users, it can also be used to produce and reinforce hate and abuse. Hate crime is not limited to physical attacks, but includes a wide range of potential crimes from offensive graffiti, dam- age to property, abusive and threatening messages, harass- ment, intimidation, and verbal abuse (Iganski, 2001; Perry, 2001). Cyber hate in particular can take many forms, such as abusive online material, which can lead to actual “real- world” violence, cyber violence, cyber stalking, and online harassment with the use of visual images, videos, and text. Cyberspace therefore becomes a virtual minefield where offenders or “trolls” specifically target people through online pre-meditated abuse (Perry & Olsson, 2009). Although there is no universally preferred definition of hate speech, some common elements emerge. Hate speech refers to an expres- sion that is abusive, insulting, intimidating, harassing, and incites violence or discrimination (Erjavec & Kovacic, 2012; Leets, 2002; Whillock & Slayden, 1995). It is directed to people on the basis of their race, ethnic origin, religion, gen- der, age, physical condition, sexual orientation, disability, and so forth (Chakraborti & Garland, 2015). The anonymity that computer-mediated communication, particularly via social media, offers gives a sense of impunity and can lead to a loss of self-awareness and lack of empathy. This allows people to escape their embodied selves, enabling the “screen” to act as a shield from the expectations and norms of behav- ior within their everyday world and environment (Turkle, 1995). With this in mind, anonymity and dissociation from the embodied self can often produce a fertile ground for hate, aggression, and conflict (Hardaker & McGlashan, 2016). However, the introduction of Facebook’s “real name” policy, requiring users to provide their actual identity (first and last names), suggests a change in approach to the possibility of anonymity on social media. Despite this, Facebook’s policy does allow nicknames to be used as a variation of one’s real name and it still remains relatively easy for someone to use a different name and register a fake Facebook account. Furthermore, other social media sites, such as Twitter, are yet Barlow and Awan 3 to implement a similar policy. With this in mind, privacy and isolation on the web continue to allow perpetrators to target and discriminate against specific groups, commonly referred to as trolling. A troll is someone who uses the Internet with the intention of targeting and “disrupting” people within the online environment and is often seen as “problematic or even criminals” (Shin, 2008, p. 2834). Shin (2008) argues that trolls are not defined by morality but understand how to behave online and offline. This is a distinctive feature of trolling, which requires a multitude of expressions of online hate that usually emerge from negative and often discrimina- tory discourse. Bishop (2014, p. 7) argues that trolls “show a darker, sinister and transgressive side of cyberspace in the form of abuse and vitriol (i.e., anonymous trolling).” The perceived invisibility often associated with online communi- cation encourages trolls and other users, more broadly, to engage in aggressive and violent behavior online, yet they are subsequently often able to hide from the consequences of criminal sanction (Hardaker & McGlashan, 2016). With this in mind, the web provides new opportunities for associated crimes to be committed, yet due to the ability to remain anonymous, much of this activity remains unmonitored and perpetrators are thus rarely held accountable. Existing research suggests that particular groups, based on race, reli- gion, gender, sexuality, and various other inequalities, are more likely to be targets of hate speech and/or trolling online. However, for the purpose and focus of this article, Islamophobia and violence against women online will be explored in further detail. Islamophobia in a Digital Age The issue of Islamophobia on social media was recently given prominence in the United Kingdom after the Home Affairs Select Committee in 2015 raised the issue before the Attorney General, Jeremy Wright, who stated that companies such as Twitter and Facebook needed to act upon the hate speech espoused via online platforms. Anti-Muslim hate crime falls under the category of religious hate crime, which is where it is perceived, by the victim or any other person, to be motivated by a hostility or prejudice based upon a per- son’s religion or perceived religion (Awan, 2014). In particu- lar, post Woolwich and the death of drummer Lee Rigby in the United Kingdom,1 evidence has shown that there has been an increase and rise in online and offline Islamophobia (Awan, 2014). In London alone, hate crimes against Muslims rose by 65%, according to the Metropolitan Police, and anti- Islam hate crimes have also increased from 344 to 570 since the murder of Lee Rigby (Home Office, 2014). Furthermore, the majority of incidents of anti-Muslim hate crime (74%) reported to the organization Tell MAMA (Measuring Anti- Muslim Attacks) are online (Feldman et al., 2013). Between May 2013 and February 2014, there were 734 reported cases of anti-Islamic abuse, and of these, 599 were incidents of online abuse and threats, while the others were “offline” attacks such as violence, threats, and assaults. Web-based hate crime can cause significant distress for the people tar- geted and the communities affected by it. Cyber hate attacks can increase community tensions and act in some cases as a motivator for online perpetrators wishing to commit such acts of violence in the real-world (Hall, 2013). Furthermore, Awan and Zempi (2015) argue that online incidents of anti- Muslim abuse can cause victims to feel isolated and emo- tionally distressed. The web has also been utilized by far-right groups, such as the English Defence League and Britain First, who have used the Internet to create a public presence and have been successful in using social media sites, such as Facebook and Twitter, as a platform to disseminate further online hate and intolerance toward people of Muslim faith. For example, Feldman et al. (2013) found that most of the online hate elic- ited toward people of Muslim faith was committed by indi- viduals with a link to far-right groups, specifically citing the English Defence League and the British National Party (BNP). It is too easy to engage in racist and/or religious hate crimes online, and many people take advantage of the ano- nymity to do so. Anti-Muslim abuse online has been found to intensify and increase following particular incidents as pre- viously discussed, such as the Rotherham abuse scandal in the United Kingdom, the beheading of journalists James Foley and Steven Sotloff and the humanitarian workers David Haines and Alan Henning by the Islamic State, the Woolwich attacks in 2013, and the terrorist attacks in Paris in 2015 (Awan, 2014). Indeed, after the attacks in Paris, the hashtag #KillAllMuslims was one of the key words trending in the United Kingdom on Twitter.2 Overall, most of this anti-Muslim hate speech hides behind a banner of English patriotism but is instead used to demonize, stereotype, and dehumanize Muslim communities (Awan & Zempi, 2015). Having explored Muslim hate online, the article will now explore how violence against women and girls has mani- fested itself in the online world. Violence Against Women and Girls Online Cultural tolerance toward violence against women now tran- scends the “offline” world through the use of computer- mediated communication. According to Banks (2001), “the internet is not creating new forms of crimes against women, but it is creating new ways and means for crimes to be perpe- trated” (p. 163). The Internet has become a space whereby misogyny can be perpetuated almost unquestioningly, mostly due to the anonymity that social media and the Internet, more broadly, are able to afford. As highlighted by Jane (2014: 532), “toxic and often markedly misogynist e-vile no longer oozes only in the darkest digestive folds of the cyberspace, but circulates freely through the entire body of the internet.” While it is acknowledged here that men also experience hate 4 Social Media + Society online, research suggests that women are more likely to be the target of hateful and violent discourse (Herring, 2002). Online abuse and hate toward women commonly include charges of unintelligence, hysteria, and ugliness, often com- bined with threats and/or fantasies of violent sex acts (Jane, 2014). Female targets are often dismissed as both unattract- ive man haters and/or hypersexual women, who are inviting sexual attention and attacks. Much of this online abuse is routed in wider patriarchal and misogynistic discourse related to women. There have been various high-profile examples of online hate, trolling, and violence against women, perhaps one of the most well-known cases in the United Kingdom being that of Caroline Criado-Perez.3 In 2013, she led a petition, which challenged the Bank of England’s decision to remove Elizabeth Fry from the £5 bank note and to replace it with Winston Churchill. The petition was successful, and in 2017, Jane Austen’s image will appear on the £10 note. Following this petition, she received a huge amount of abuse online, particularly via her Twitter account, including threats of mur- der. Although Criado-Perez’s case did lead to the prosecution of a number of perpetrators, many similar cases receive no legal redress. Hardaker and McGlashan (2016) argue that the lack of consequence in such cases is due to various factors, including, but not limited to, the various complications aris- ing from transnational jurisdiction, inadequate legislation (e.g., the United Kingdom’s Communications Act 2003), inadequate provision by the Internet service providers, and the sheer amount of abusive online behavior that would over- whelm the legal system if every qualifying case were prose- cuted. However, other scholars have argued that this lack of action is, at least to some extent, influenced by the wider societal normalization and dismissal of violence against women and girls (Jane, 2014). Another example of this type of abuse in the United Kingdom includes the case of Laurie Penny, who when writ- ing for the Independent (2011) describes becoming fearful of leaving her house after she received multiple electronic communications which contained rape and murder threats. This and many other examples offer evidence to support the contention that a great many women in the public sphere (including those whose public profile is relatively low) are subjected to high levels of online hostility and hate. Such discourse is becoming increasingly normalized, to the extent that threatening rape has become the modus operandi for those wishing to critique female commentators (Jane, 2014). In addition, female victims of online abuse suggest that this can have a long-term detrimental impact on their well-being, often leading to feelings of anxiety, sadness, vulnerability, and terror (Lewis-Hasteley, 2011). Increasingly, it has been suggested that women are censoring themselves online due to fear of backlash, with many commentators reporting feel- ing reluctant to speak freely and openly, thus denying the opportunity of free speech (Jane, 2014). Yvette Cooper, Labour member of parliament (MP), recently writing for The Guardian (2015) about online sexism, argues that this issue should be addressed and makes a number of recom- mendations. For example, she argues that there needs to be new guidelines and capacity for police and prosecutors to deal with violent threats and hate crime online, more sup- port and advice available for victims, and Internet service providers need to do more to prevent such abuse from hap- pening in the future. As demonstrated thus far, online hate, violence, and abuse are often directed to people for various reasons, including their religion and gender. However, very little existing research explores how such issues manifest themselves in academia, particularly those who speak out about issues con- nected to inequalities such as Islamophobia and sexism. Existing research suggests that it is not only high-profile individuals who are targets of trolling and online abuse; rather, any individual (particularly those belonging to a tradi- tionally oppressed group) is also likely to experience hate and violence, particularly when challenging the status quo or right wing ideology. Thus while social media can be a useful academic tool for knowledge exchange and public dissemi- nation, it is also a space which provides the opportunity for minority and underrepresented groups within the academic community to experience hate and violence. With this in mind, this article aims to reflect on the author’s personal experiences of online violence and hate, in response to speaking out against gender inequality or Islamophobia and consider the impact of this. The potential implications of such experiences to the wider academic community and beyond, particularly when using social media as a space to share opinions and work, will also be critically considered. Auto-ethnography as a Method for Exploring Hate and Abuse Online The reflections documented here adopt an auto-ethnographic approach, whereby the authors outline their personal experi- ences of online violence and hate, in response to speaking out against Islamophobia and gender inequality. Auto- ethnography is “a style of autobiographical writing” that explores “an individual’s unique life experiences in relation- ship to social and cultural institutions” (Custer, 2014, p. 1). Auto-ethnographies are “highly personalized accounts that draw upon the experience of the author/researcher for the purposes of extending sociological understanding” (Sparkes, 2000, p. 21). Laslett (1999) argues that it is the intersection of the personal and the societal that offers a new vantage point from which to make a unique contribution to social sci- ence. This method asks us to not only examine specific events or moments in our lives but also to consider how and why we think, act, and feel as we do about particular issues (Jones et al., 2013). With this in mind, to encapsulate the unique life experiences and personalized narratives of the authors, the auto-ethnographic accounts will be written in first person. Barlow and Awan 5 The emphasis on objectivity and scientific validity can lead to the questioning of the legitimacy of auto-ethnography within the dominant research culture (Wall, 2008). However, the assumption that objectivity is at all possible has been sol- idly contested, and classic norms of objectivity in the social sciences have been eroded (Harding, 1981, 1991). Any efforts to achieve objectivity in research are increasingly questioned from the outset because researchers always come with ideas that guide what they choose and how they choose to describe it (Wall, 2008). Thus, with this in mind, it is acknowledged here that the auto-ethnographic accounts pro- vided are not “objective” in the scientific sense, as the authors reflect on their personal experiences and thoughts, but they are used as a way of thinking about personal experi- ences within wider social, cultural, and political contexts (Holt, 2001; Sparkes, 1996). Therefore, the accounts dis- cussed here acknowledge that other people have their own stories, but it aims to consider how the experiences of the authors fit within the wider social context of online abuse and hate and the possible implications of this, particularly in terms of silencing the voices of oppressed groups, which will be considered later in the article. Auto-ethnographic Account 1 (Charlotte)—Gender Inequality and Misogyny I have a personal Facebook account and I use Twitter almost exclusively for professional/work-related purposes. However, within academia, the professional can often blend into the personal, particularly in terms of political views or beliefs regarding social and societal issues or problems. As a feminist academic, most of my work and research relates to gender in some way, and I am also passionate about gender equality and feminist issues in my personal life, beyond the context of the academic sphere. With this in mind, my use of Twitter is usu- ally a combination of an academic resource, for sharing and viewing research, work, or articles of interest, as well as a space to share my personal and/or political beliefs, particu- larly related to gender inequality. I have used Twitter since 2012, and it was not until recently that I started to experience online abuse, mostly in response to my feminist views. The first instance was on 8 July 2013, when I tweeted about the negative and offensive comments made about then Wimbledon champion, Marion Bartoli, by many Twitter users, suggesting that she was “ugly,” “disgusting,” and “unattractive.”4 I tweeted my despair at these comments targeting her. I tweeted the fol- lowing post: “utterly disgusting comments about #Bartoli. Another example that misogyny and sexism are not going anywhere” (tweeted 8 July 2013). Following this, I received a tweet from an anonymous Twitter user stating, “No-one cares. You just need a good raping to shut you up.” Upon reading this, I initially felt violated and vulnerable and the fact that I could not see any obvious indicating factors of the identity of the perpetrator (there was no photograph and a non-identifiable Twitter handle/name) added to my concerns. I thought about deleting my tweet, as I was concerned that I would receive further similar responses. However, my feel- ings of vulnerability quickly changed into anger. I felt incensed that somebody felt such a strong sense of entitle- ment to my body, but also my voice and opinion as a woman, to not only attempt to discredit and silence my views but also threaten me with sexual violence. So I decided not to delete the tweet and blocked and reported the perpetrator. Twitter sadly did not get back to me about this. This became a very familiar response to such abuse. In 2015, I started to develop my media profile as an aca- demic, and it was at this point when the abuse and violence online began to develop further. Following a Sky News inter- view, exploring the issues and consequences of blaming vic- tims of rape and sexual violence, I received a significant amount of abuse on Twitter, and some of the perpetrators openly highlighted their “hatred” for feminists (and in some cases, women more generally) in their Twitter biographies. Many of the comments focused on my appearance, such as “the slag is just angry because she will never be raped, she’s too ugly.” All of the abusive tweets that I received did not discuss or reflect on the comments I had made or the credi- bility of my arguments. Their anger was clearly directed at the fact that I was a woman, who had the audacity to speak about feminist issues and gender inequality in a public space or media forum. Such hateful language and focus on my physical appear- ance is a typical technique of perpetrators of online abuse toward women (Jane, 2014) and is hardly surprising when considered within the wider context of a patriarchal society, in which women are objectified and their merits are often based almost exclusively on their ability to satisfy the “male gaze.” Furthermore, the notion of “corrective” rape is a familiar finding in violence against women online research (Jane, 2014). This is a particularly violating technique used by perpetrators of online abuse, as it suggests not only a sense of entitlement to the female body but also that the male body is superior and able to “correct” and consequently silence the views of women who challenge the patriarchal status quo. Such techniques demonstrate the pervasive nature of misogyny in the discourse of perpetrators of online abuse toward women. Arguably, the more extreme example of abuse that I received on Twitter followed one of my tweets, sent on 2 November 2015, which questioned a news article, written by a well-known men’s rights activist, which suggested that men’s issues are neglected and that women are now afforded more privilege in the United Kingdom in comparison with men (Daubney, 2015). With a link to the article, I tweeted “complete lack of under- standing of male privilege- this article demonstrates why femi- nism is still so important” (tweeted 2 November 2015). The author then shared my response with his thousands of follow- ers, discrediting my view and comments. 6 Social Media + Society Needless to say, I was not expecting the response that I received. Within the space of 1 hr, I received over 100 tweets, most of which were abusive and violent comments from the author’s many followers. The pace and speed of the responses were overwhelming and pervasive. Comments included the following: “Bitch shut up- you deserve to die,” “you are insane- who needs women’s rights anyway,” “you deserve to be raped,” and “Perhaps we should pay a visit to my previous place of work?” (This tweet also had a number of other anon- ymous Twitter users included and was retweeted on four occasions). It was the latter tweet which I found particularly concerning, as the discussion of my previous workplace and the threat of “paying me a visit” due to my comments made this a more sinister issue. It is this type of threat which trans- forms the debate from an online issue to a potentially real- world threat. This was the first time when the type of abuse that I had received online changed my “real-world” behavior. For example, I made security staff aware of the issue at my place of work and I refused to walk around my university campus alone, particularly in the evening. I felt angry that I had to take such security measures simply for airing a femi- nist opinion, but these were precautions that I felt compelled to take due to potential safety issues. As a woman, I often feel very aware of the constant risk of violence that women face, both in public and in private space (Stanko, 1985), but this was particularly heightened for me in the days following this tweet, demonstrating the “real-world” impact of such online abuse. Nevertheless, I refused to be silenced by the barrage of tweets; therefore, I did not delete the tweet. I blocked abu- sive users and I reported particularly violent and threatening tweets. I found it particularly frustrating that following my reporting of the tweets and users, I received no response from Twitter. I will arguably never know what kind of conse- quences (if any) the users faced. It would have helped me to deal with this online abuse much better if I would have been informed of this by representatives of Twitter. Twitter and social media can be a useful activist platform for feminists, to share values and to expose misogyny or sexism. However, as an academic discussing these issues, I was disgusted, but sadly not surprised, to see that I was being silenced by misogynists who wanted to keep me quiet, perhaps out of fear of any challenges that my comments may pose to the status quo and patriarchal society more broadly. The section below will now explore the auto-ethnographic account of anti-Muslim abuse online. Auto-ethnographic Account 2 (Imran)—Anti-Muslim Hate Online In 2013, I created a Twitter account in order to engage with my students about my research and I also hoped to use this platform as a means to provide them with links to news sto- ries and other relevant material that would keep them engaged in the subject area. During this period, the Woolwich attack had occurred in May 2013, and earlier that month in April 2013, the death of Mohammed Saleem (a Muslim grandfather) in Birmingham had occurred.5 At this time and with little experience of using social media, I began tweeting my thoughts on both incidents and was also invited to write opinion pieces in international and national newspapers such as The Guardian, The Independent, The New Statesman, and Al-Jazeera. It was at this point that I began to receive spe- cific death threats, almost exclusively due to my background as a Muslim academic, my research exploring Islamophobia and the fact that I was raising these issues in a public forum. This started with the “comments section” of the various news articles I wrote, with posts stating that users wanted me “killed” and “hung” and such phrases were followed by spe- cific tweets asking me whether “I would like my family killed?” These comments were then used on far-right websites which targeted me with more specific death threats. For example, one comment posted included, “You need to be sorted out with a knife” as I was labeled a “troublemaker.” At the same time, I did not feel confident to call the police, pri- marily because I did not believe that they would take me seriously. Instead, I began to block and delete tweets in order to try and erase any online footprint that showed me in a negative light. Allen and Nielsen (2002) argue that following the events of 11 September 2001, there has been an increase in anti-Muslim sentiments across Europe. Specifically, they found that Muslims were frequently verbally abused and harassed. They argue that the key reason for this is because of the visual identity of being a Muslim. Interestingly, they found that the visual identifiable characteristic of a hijab or headscarf meant that Muslim women were more likely to be targeted. In my case, this was hate and abuse related to Islamophobia on the web and included one person writing down my home address and threatening to call me at work and follow me unless I stopped doing “this Islamophobic nonsense.” This made me feel extremely worried for both my own and my family’s safety. When I went home, I felt help- less and worried that my family would go online and see the threats being made against me. I was anxious that if they saw this, it would also make them feel threatened. Indeed, my nephew who is 12 years old was doing his homework about online safety and came across one of these sites which had been threatening me. Upon reading the article online, he came to see me looking very distressed and asked me “why do so many people hate you?” Moreover, during this period, I found myself feeling more and more isolated and in need of support. The comments, posts, and tweets had left me physically and mentally drained and my family eventually asked me to stop writing any opin- ion pieces, highlighting the secondary impact on my family. Throughout the comments and posts, the one common fea- ture that remained was the view that I was a “traitor,” an “apologist,” and as one user called me an “Islamo-fascist.” After the Woolwich attack, I took part in a study to examine Barlow and Awan 7 Islamophobia on Twitter, and due to the abuse that I had per- sonally experienced, I was particularly passionate about this. The research involved me collecting tweets with the use of the hashtag #Islam, #Woolwich, and #Muslim, and through a content analysis, I began to collect and analyze the data via NVivo. While examining the upsurge in anti-Muslim hostil- ity online, I also witnessed other people who have identified themselves as Muslims being targeted because of their faith. For example, in some cases, the following threats through Twitter had been made: “Lets burn a Mosque,” “F . . . Muzrats . . . Kill them,” and “Hate Paki’s . . . F . . . king Murderous scum.” Following the publication of my paper, I tweeted the headline “Muslims targeted in online Hate.” This was then retweeted by Katie Hopkins,6 and for the next 3 hrs, I was bombarded with messages on Twitter that ranged from abu- sive insults (“Muslim academic scumbag”) to actual threats and incitement of violence (“Find him & knock this c . . . t to the floor. HAHA!”). It was clear that such tweets had been used as an attempt to silence me because of the work I have been doing in attempting to combat Islamophobia. Research suggests that hate crime has a significant impact on victims, including loss of sleep, anxiety, and depression (Herek, Gillis, Cogan, & Glunt, 1997). In my case, the harm that I had suffered meant losing sleep at night, having to take specific medication to get to sleep, and also feeling anxious that at any moment someone could knock on my door and physically assault me. For the next 4 months, I continued receiving messages of abuse and hate, which made me feel like I couldn’t escape. Throughout this ordeal, my focus was on my family and making sure that they were protected from this. It was at this point that I took a break away from social media because I felt the damage to my family was too much. After a short period, I continued using my Twitter profile, mainly because I felt strongly that I would not allow the trolls to dictate or silence me because of my academic research and interest in fighting against Islamophobia. Discussion Although the topics which were discussed on social media were different for Imran and Charlotte and the techniques used by the perpetrators of online abuse differed slightly in terms of specific features (e.g., Charlotte received rape threats and Yusaf received death threats), the purpose and aim of such violent and abusive tweets and hate are arguably the same for both—the attempted silencing of their voices and perspectives. Both Charlotte’s and Imran’s tweets offered an alternative perspective to existing hetero-patriarchal, neo- liberal discourse, thus posing a challenge to the existing social order. The threats, name-calling, ridicule, dismissing of perspectives, and the all-encompassing pace and nature of the abuse both received were arguably an attempt to discredit both their critical academic voice, but more importantly here, their voice as a woman and a person of Muslim faith. With this in mind, although Imran and Charlotte were not silenced, as they both actively chose to continue to discuss similar issues on social media and they did not remove tweets which provoked the abuse discussed previously, it is the attempts at silencing and the possible reasons why this happened which are particularly important to consider here. McGowan (2013) suggests that an individual who is targeted by prejudice will be filtered, distorted, or completely silenced by the operation of the powerful image with which he or she is identified by others. With this in mind, using racist, xenophobic, and misogynistic language and trolling techniques, the online perpetrators were able to incite fear and prejudice toward both Imran and Charlotte, in an attempt to silence their perspectives. The silencing of subordinate voices is a common way that institutional power operates. Miller (2003) points out that a favorite theme of Foucault’s was the power of dominant dis- courses not only to impose fundamental assumptions and categories on how we perceive reality but also to ward off challenges to them while concealing exclusionary practices. Foucault (1981) claimed that silence is never outside of dis- course, and as argued by Ward and Winstanley (2003), “dis- courses authorize who can speak, what can be spoken about, how it is spoken about and what should be taken seriously; whilst simultaneously marginalizing and disqualifying other voices whose speech remains forbidden or derided” (p. 133). Thus, social power privileges some voices and simultane- ously excludes others. In relation to this article, a person whose voice is reduced to noise—such as a disturbing sound or a story not worth listening to—is socially and culturally silenced (Butler, 1997). Thus, the attempts by the perpetra- tors to threaten, ridicule, and discredit Imran’s and Charlotte’s voices into silence and the pace and speed with which such abuse gathered momentum highlight how such exclusionary linguistic practices are able to take place in both online and offline spheres, evidencing the all-encompassing nature of such silencing techniques. Furthermore, having a voice implies much more than being able to make meaningful sounds—it is the privilege of being respectfully and unbiasedly listened to when speaking and acting. Allowing individuals or groups to have a voice is to allow agency. On an individual level, having a voice is important to self-control and empowerment. On the other hand, silencing people by creating barriers against certain expressions is to obstruct agency and empowerment (Griffin, 1993). The abuse that Charlotte and Imran experienced online when attempting to speak openly about issues con- nected to Islamophobia and gender inequality highlights that their perspectives were not “respectfully” listened to on social media, which consequently attempted to deny their agency of free speech. Collectively, the suggestion that women, people of Muslim faith, and/or other oppressed groups should simply “try harder” to make their perspectives heard is not enough here, as the attempted silencing of such groups in both online 8 Social Media + Society and real-world spheres is intrinsically ingrained in the lan- guage and culture of Western society. Furthermore, although Imran and Charlotte speak on behalf of oppressed groups on both social media and in the “real world” via their research and also identify within such groups (Charlotte—woman, Imran—Islam), as educated individuals, their privileged position is recognized. With this in mind, their refusal to be silenced and their associated sense of empowerment should be considered within this context, which may not be able to be extended to other members of such groups who are not afforded such privilege. However, it is argued here that irre- spective of individual responses to the issue of online misog- yny or Islamophobia, the suppression and distortion of the speech of marginalized groups is a collective, cultural prob- lem that needs to be addressed. Efforts to challenge and defuse the power of negative attitudes toward marginalized groups in more privileged contexts, such as academia, are important not only because of the interests of this group but also due to the message that this extends beyond the acad- emy to wider society. Although this article highlights impor- tant issues within the academic community, it is arguably what this suggests about the abuse of women and people of Muslim faith more broadly, both within and beyond the aca- demic sphere, which has particular implications. In addition, it is argued here that all forms of online abuse should be acknowledged and addressed, ranging from the “low-level” name-calling to death or rape threats. There appears to be a growing tendency for online abuse to be tack- led only when it escalates to death threats or more usually, when the abuse transfers to the “real world,” such as stalking or physical violence (Herring, 2002; Jane, 2014). However, it is argued here that due to the increasingly endemic nature of the online abuse of women and people of Muslim faith, all types of such abuse need to be taken seriously. Kelly’s (1988) concept of a continuum is useful to consider here, as she argues that myriad forms of sexism women encounter every day through to the rape or murder of women by men should be viewed as a “continuum” of sexual violence. She suggests that the concept of a continuum enables women to make sense of their own experiences by showing how “typical” and “extreme” male behaviors shade into one another. This concept can be reapplied more broadly here, as considering the online abuse of marginalized groups as a “continuum” highlights how all forms of abusive behavior, whether “low level” or “more serious,” are all part of the same wider soci- etal problem of misogyny and Islamophobia. All types of abuse need to be exposed, including the unexamined presup- positions that structure these abusive practices, to demon- strate the harm they do in inhibiting the success of oppressed groups in society. A particularly disappointing similarity in the auto-ethno- graphic accounts is the lack of response and support provided by Twitter. Responses from social media companies, such as Twitter, in tackling both gender-based hate and Islamophobia, both within and beyond the academic sphere, has been slow. For example, although Twitter offers users an option of blocking, reporting, or muting someone, such measures lack focus toward proactively seeking to counter online hate speech. Twitter has been at the forefront of promoting ideals around counter-messaging, which is the process whereby users deflect hateful comments online and instead focus on positive counter-messaging. An example of how Twitter has used this is through the promotion of the hashtag “NotinMyName” campaign run by Muslim communities in response to ISIS terrorist attacks. However, counter-messag- ing does not tackle the cause of the issue and it allows the role and responsibility of Twitter to be minimized in attempt- ing to combat and prevent hate online. With this in mind, one of the suggestions we propose is that Twitter and other social media networks must directly tackle online hate, as well as specifically monitor gender- and religious-based hatred. It is important to monitor where and when the online hate is appearing and the interconnected links between such hate, as this can not only inform policy but also enable a better under- standing of the relationships forming online and the ways in which gender- and religious-based hate is promoted and rein- forced. It is noted here that this would be a time-consuming task, but such measures are needed to directly tackle the issue and prevent such hate from continuing in the future. In addition, further research development is needed, which could include survey analysis, focus groups, and interviews with victims of online gender-based hate and Islamophobia. This would enable a more nuanced under- standing of the impact of such crimes from the perspective of the victim, as well as providing the opportunity for victims to discuss and reflect on their experiences and the impact this has had on their lives, both online and offline. There are increasing quantitative data demonstrating that online anti- Muslim hate exists (Awan & Zempi, 2015), but this should also be extended to gender-based hate and qualitative analy- sis is needed for both groups to ascertain victim impact and experiences. Furthermore, we argue that a website could be developed for victims of hate crime online, which would provide an empowering, supportive, and “hate-free” online space. It is recognized here that such an online space should not be viewed as a solution to tackling hate online, as having a “designated hate-free zone” for women and people of Muslim faith does not tackle the endemic and systematic nature of hate online. However, such a space could be used to encourage people to share experiences, act as a collaborative hub for people who have suffered this form of abuse, and provide a platform for considering ways in which online hate can be prevented. Finally, this article argues that methods of reporting abuse online and the actions that Twitter and other social media companies take following the reporting of an incident of abuse need to be made much clearer. As outlined in the auto- ethnographic accounts, when both Charlotte and Imran reported incidents of hate and violence online, they both felt dissatisfied by Twitter’s lack of response and were not Barlow and Awan 9 informed of the actions taken by Twitter. Furthermore, Awan and Zempi (2015) argue that social media companies should make their systems of reporting hate crime more user friendly. In their study, a number of participants spoke about their anger and frustration at reporting online abuse that they had suffered. For example, in some cases, social media com- panies refused to take action because the abuse did not breach their specific community standards. We argue that Twitter could develop a specific section or button that includes reporting racism, bigotry, misogynistic abuse, hate speech, and prejudice. This would enable the specific targeting of users based on their religion or gender to be more closely monitored. We also argue that victims who do report hate online should be better informed of how their case is being dealt with by the social media company in question. At each stage of the process, victims should be notified of actions taken and be in a position to report further related/connected abuse in the future. This latter point is particularly significant to this article because as outlined in the auto-ethnographic accounts, individuals, such as academics, who speak out against gender-related or Islamophobic issues, particularly those who are also a member of the targeted group, often receive repeated hate online. However, such instances should not be viewed as being in isolation of each other and should be understood as being part of a wider societal issue of vio- lence against women and Islamophobia. With this in mind, social media companies, such as Twitter, should also monitor levels of abuse by profile, rather than individual cases, to better support victims who experience such abuse on a regu- lar, perhaps in some instances daily, basis. Conclusion It is recognized that the auto-ethnographic accounts provided in this article reflect the experiences and stories of two peo- ple and cannot be generalized to the wider population of which they represent. However, it is increasingly recognized that both women and Muslims are among those who are most likely to be the target of hate online (Awan & Zempi, 2015; Hardaker & McGlashan, 2016). With this in mind, Charlotte’s and Imran’s experiences arguably, at least to some extent, reflect the experiences of others, particularly those who pub- licly speak out against Islamophobia and misogyny online. Academics are increasingly expected to disseminate their research, thoughts, and knowledge in public and online spaces, such as via social media. However, this article high- lights that the web may be a less safe space for some academ- ics, particularly those who experience structural inequalities, such as being a woman or a person of Muslim faith. In principle, the web, particularly social media, offers a novel opportunity for different ways of knowledge exchange and alternative perspectives to be shared and discussed. However, the reality is often a very different experience, with the perspective of women and people of Muslim faith in particular being constantly silenced or minimized. Although this article discusses the online hate experienced by academ- ics on Twitter, online misogyny and Islamophobia should be viewed as a collective, cultural problem that needs to be addressed. Social media companies, such as Twitter, should recognize their role in the maintenance of Islamophobia and misogyny online. The lack of transparency of the reporting process to victims, the failure to take online hate seriously, and the lack of understanding of the endemic nature of Islamophobia and misogyny online evidenced by companies, such as Twitter, highlight that they should face higher levels of responsibility and accountability to tackle hate online and prevent this from happening in the future. As long as prejudi- cial views of women and people of Muslim faith go unchal- lenged both in online and offline contexts, they reinforce the silencing of their voices across our culture as a whole. Until such voices receive the same levels of respect as more domi- nant, privileged and normalized perspectives, both within academia and beyond, the chance that such perspectives will be fully effective and ‘heard’ is minimal. Declaration of Conflicting Interests The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article. Funding The author(s) received no financial support for the research, author- ship, and/or publication of this article. Notes 1. In May 2013, Drummer Lee Rigby was murdered in Woolwich, Southeast London. His attackers Michael Adebolajo and Michael Adebowale told bystanders that they had killed a sol- dier to avenge the death of Muslims killed by British armed forces. 2. BBC News (2015) #KillAllMuslims hashtag, http://www.bbc. co.uk/news/blogs-trending-30782357 3. Caroline Criado-Perez is a UK-based feminist journalist, author, and regular media commentator, particularly about issues connected to gender inequality and feminism. 4. Mario Bartoli defeated Sabine Lasicki at Wimbledon in 2013. In the build-up to this match, BBC Sports Presenter, John Inverdale stated on air, “Do you think Bartoli’s dad told her when she was little, ‘you’re never going to be a looker? You’ll never be a Sharapova, so you have to be scrappy and fight’.” Following this (possibly unrelated to such comments), Bartoli received extensive online abuse about her physical appearance and this made national news (e.g., The Guardian, 8 July). 5. In May 2013, Drummer Lee Rigby was murdered in an act of terrorism on the streets of Woolwich in southeast London. In April 2013, a Muslim grandfather named Mohammed Saleem was murdered in an act of terrorism by Pavlo Lapshyn in Birmingham. 6. 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Hate speech. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE. Author Biographies Dr Charlotte Barlow (PhD, University of Liverpool) is a Lecturer in Criminology at Lancaster University. Her research interests include female (co)offending, violence against women and girls, pathways into crime, and media representations of gender and crime. Charlotte has authored a number of articles in this field and her latest book, Coercion and Women Co-offenders: A Gendered Pathway Into Crime, is published by Policy Press. Dr Imran Awan is an Associate Professor in Criminology and Deputy Director of the Centre for Applied Criminology at Birmingham City University. His expertise lies in areas related to online Islamophobia, counter-terrorism, and hate crime. He has authored a number of books, articles, and papers in this field. Imran also acts as an independent advisor to the British Government on anti-Muslim hatred. 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work_v7upeluvxrhetgzgow7uf3b6iy	----	untitled What is Epistemological Violence in the Empirical Social Sciences? Thomas Teo* York University Abstract This article discusses the meaning of epistemological violence in the empirical social sciences. It is argued that the concept is closer to personal than to structural violence in that it has a subject, an object, and an action, even if the violence is indirect and nonphysical: the subject of violence is the researcher, the object is the Other, and the action is the interpretation of data that is presented as knowledge. Using a hypothetical example, the problem of interpretation in empirical research on the Other is discussed. Epistemological violence refers to the interpretation of social-scientific data on the Other and is produced when empirical data are interpreted as showing the inferiority of or problematizes the Other, even when data allow for equally viable alternative interpretations. Interpretations of inferiority or problematizations are understood as actions that have a negative impact on the Other. Because the interpretations of data emerge from an academic context and thus are presented as knowledge, they are defined as epistemologically violent actions. Problems, consequences, and practices surrounding this concept are discussed. Introduction Forty-one years ago, Galtung (1969) encouraged the conceptualization of ‘theoretically significant dimensions of violence that can lead thinking, research, and potentially, action, toward the most important problems’ (p. 168). Following this maxim, he developed the now famous distinction between personal and structural violence, arguing convincingly that structures such as social injustice can be understood as violence. The term epistemological violence (EV) that I discuss here is, however, closer to personal violence in that it has a subject, an object, and an action, even if the violence is indirect and nonphysical. I argue that in the empirical social sciences, the subject of violence is the researcher, the object is the Other, and the action is the interpretation of data that is presented as knowledge. A Hypothetical Example Once upon a time, a writer proposed that humanity should be divided into large-eared and small-eared people. The writer suggested that small-eared people do not listen, have lower musical ability, are deficient in the ability to empathize with others, and much more. Because they lack interpersonal skills, small-eared people are also responsible for cruelty and some of the greatest evils in world history. The government of the time endorsed the writer’s ideas and enacted laws that divided children, based on the new con- cept of earedness, into separate kindergartens and schools. As a consequence, the whole of society was divided into large- and small-eared classes, with separate education, health, and legal systems, and with separate housing and recreational spheres for each group. Later, and at the time when psychology became an independent discipline, researchers began to test hypotheses regarding earedness with empirical means. They found that Social and Personality Psychology Compass 4/5 (2010): 295–303, 10.1111/j.1751-9004.2010.00265.x ª 2010 The Author Journal Compilation ª 2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd several of the assumptions regarding earedness, although not all, had empirical support. More recently, evolutionary psychologists discussed the adaptive advantage of ear size; clinical psychologists used the concept as a broad diagnostic tool; psychologists of religion found that religious founders had disproportionately larger ears than their contemporaries; historians of psychology estimated the large-earedness of psychological pioneers using paintings, photographs, and ear descriptions; and debates as to whether Kant had larger ears than Descartes, or whether Kant’s large-earedness had been overestimated, took place among personality psychologists. Yet, some criticism of the concept also emerged: Methodologists argued that earedness must be adjusted for by height and gender and that the variable is continuous rather than discontinuous. Other critics argued that earedness is a social construct. However, defenders of the concept pointed out that empirical studies confirm the significance of earedness, that the variable is an excellent predictor of professional success, and that earedness demon- strates high correlations with many other psychological variables. They also pointed out that the average person knows that earedness has always existed and that to deny it would contradict common sense. To put critics to rest, a leading research team of psychologists provided a large-scale study and a meta-analysis of previous earedness studies. All results showed that there is a consistent difference between large-eared and small-eared individuals, and twin studies demonstrated that the trait is highly heritable. The psychologists interpreted the results in the following way: ‘Because the pattern of differences between large-eared and small-eared groups can be found in numerous studies and in this meta-analysis, we must conclude that the difference is an irrefutable fact. Earedness has a biologic correlate that can be measured objectively and reliably, and twin studies show that earedness is a highly heritable trait. Because the difference in empathy between small-eared people and large-eared people is inherited, it is reasonable to separate these two groups into different spheres of social life.’ Approaching Epistemological Violence One could challenge the original theory of earedness or the social construction of the concept, assess the motivations of researchers, understand the economic interests involved, or analyze the methodologies that were used – and all these actions would be legitimate. My argument is focused on the interpretation of data and the lack of hermeneutic awareness about what goes into an interpretation. I suggest that interpretations, as most often expressed in the discussion section of empirical articles, are a form of action, and if concrete interpretations have negative consequences for groups – even though alternative, equally plausible interpretations of the data are available – then a form of violence is committed. Because the interpretations are presented as knowledge, or because they emerge from science, they represent EV (see Teo, 2008). In this particular example, one could make the argument that the study of earedness itself is a form of EV. However, as introduced, the concept of EV is limited to the interpretation (discussion) part of an empirical article. This specific limitation on the hermeneutic part of discussion provides a framework for concrete analysis. In the example provided, there are at least two forms of EV in the interpretation part: (i) the interpreta- tion itself is a form of violence, for instance, because the concept of earedness is not challenged and (ii) the interpretation is violent because specific policy recommendations are made or accepted (i.e., regarding the separation of the two groups). Traditional psychologists will have fewer problems with the second kind of EV, because it reinforces 296 What is Epistemological Violence in the Empirical Social Sciences? ª 2010 The Author Social and Personality Psychology Compass 4/5 (2010): 295–303, 10.1111/j.1751-9004.2010.00265.x Journal Compilation ª 2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd the distinction between facts and decisions. However, the first form of EV might be more contentious among traditional psychologists because it requires an understanding of the historical and theoretical situatedness of a concept such as earedness, as well as an accep- tance of the idea that empirically validated research itself can have a negative impact on human groups (e.g., the interpretation that one group is by nature less empathic than another group can have a negative impact). Theoretical Justification of the Concept The term epistemic violence has been used by postcolonial researchers such as Spivak (1988) who applied the concept in a very general sense whenever the Other had been con- structed. I would like to introduce the concept to the empirical social sciences and iden- tify the very moment in which violence is produced. To do that, we begin with an analysis of the relationship between data and the interpretation (discussion) of data. Of course, one could locate the process earlier when hypotheses are developed and data are collected. Hypotheses can be violent, but such a qualification may depend on the inten- tions of the researcher whereas the interpretation of data is an action that can be assessed epistemologically and ethically. The relationship between data and interpretation of data has been the subject of numerous philosophical and psychological studies. The argument was originally developed in the context of the natural sciences: The physicist Pierre-Maurice-Marie Duhem (1861–1916) (1905 ⁄ 1954) suggested that experiments in physics contain observations of phenomena and theoretical interpretations that cannot be separated. In North America, the underdetermination of theory by data is often associated with Quine (1969). In psychology, the critical German psychologist Klaus Holzkamp (1964 ⁄ 1981) published a monograph on the problem. He argued that the theoretical interpretation of experimental results is not binding and there exist no criteria in experimental psychology for establish- ing particular theoretical interpretations as valid. Indeed, the book addresses an issue that has not been solved in the more than four decades since its publication. Holzkamp (1964 ⁄ 1981) labeled the ambiguous relationship between theory and experiment in psychology as the problem of representation, meaning the mode in which experimental propositions are representative (or not) of theoretical propositions. The problem arises because for any given experimental proposition, additional theoretical propositions can be supplemented through interpretation, and because each experimental proposition has infinite theoretical meanings. There exists no methodological principle that forces a researcher to interpret any given experimental proposition in a specific way. On the other hand, theoretical propositions allow for a variety of experimental designs so that both elements in this process demonstrate plural meanings. A set of data may be interpreted in many different ways. Usually data are interpreted within the original framework from which the empirical research was developed. However, this is not a necessity because data do not determine interpretations. If that were the case, psychologists would not need interpretations (discussions of empirical results) and we could end empirical research (quantitative or qualitative) with just the data. However, discussions or interpretations of data are often the most important part of a research article in the sense that they may be summarized in textbooks or conveyed to students, the mass media, and the public. Interpretations produce meaning within a theoretical framework. Empirical psychologists cannot operate without interpretations that are based on an understanding of the meaning of results. One problem arises when these interpretations (i.e., theoretical propositions What is Epistemological Violence in the Empirical Social Sciences? 297 ª 2010 The Author Social and Personality Psychology Compass 4/5 (2010): 295–303, 10.1111/j.1751-9004.2010.00265.x Journal Compilation ª 2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd derived from the empirical propositions) are presented as facts or knowledge. Yet, knowledge that is produced in empirical psychological studies contains empirical results and theoretical interpretations. These interpretations are not determined by data and require a hermeneutic process. For example, if one finds differences in IQ between racialized groups, which may be an empirical result, the interpretation that this difference is a result of genetic factors, is a theoretical interpretation that is not determined in any way by data showing empirical difference. ‘Knowledge’ About the Other and a Definition of Epistemological Violence Yet, if an empirical difference is interpreted as inferiority or problematizes the Other, whether this theorizing has epistemological or practical consequences, one should speak of a form of violence that is produced in ‘knowledge.’ In these cases, interpretations of data (and not data!) turn into epistemological violence. Epistemological violence is a practice that is executed in empirical articles and books in psychology, when theoretical interpretations regarding empirical results implicitly or explicitly construct the Other as inferior or prob- lematic, despite the fact that alternative interpretations, equally viable based on the data, are available. Interpretations of inferiority, or problematizations (see Teo, 2004), are never determined by empirical results; yet, they have a negative impact on the Other. Thus, interpretations are the actions of a subject against an object that one must label as violent. The epistemological part in this concept suggests that these theoretical interpretations are framed as knowledge about the Other when in reality they are interpretations regarding data. The term violence denotes that this ‘knowledge’ has a negative impact on the Other or that the theoretical interpretations are produced to the detriment of the Other. The negative impact can range from misrepresentations and distortions to a neglect of the voices of the Other, to propositions of inferiority, and to the recommendations of adverse practices or infringements concerning the Other. The term epistemological violence as it is used in the argument does not refer to the misuse of research in general but is specific to theoretical interpretations of empirical results that have negative connotations for the Other in a given community. The idea that Black individuals are intellectually inferior by nature (see Rushton, 1995) when expressed in an academic article has consequences for the Black reader or for non-Black readers who might construct the Black person as intellectually inferior, which might change their behavior or attitudes. A close look at this type of research shows that the theory (Blacks are intellectually inferior by nature) has never been tested directly but that empirical findings of difference are interpreted that way. I submit that such a theoretical proposition is violent in that it leads to harm. It should also be mentioned from the history of race studies that policies were changed because of the theoretical interpretations of researchers and psychologists (e.g., see Gould, 1996, on the US Immigra- tion Restriction Act). Because the harm is accomplished by researchers and is epistemologi- cal in nature, I use the term epistemological violence. This violence and damage is done under the authority of social science and knowledge. Epistemological-Ethical Aspects of the Concept The concept of epistemological violence is descriptive although it has clearly ethical connotations. The concept is not about political correctness but about scientific correct- ness. It is relatively easy to train individuals to identify epistemological violence in an article: they need to look at the problem of representation (do the empirical propositions 298 What is Epistemological Violence in the Empirical Social Sciences? ª 2010 The Author Social and Personality Psychology Compass 4/5 (2010): 295–303, 10.1111/j.1751-9004.2010.00265.x Journal Compilation ª 2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd allow one to test the theoretical propositions and do the theoretical propositions represent the empirical data?), the problem of underdetermination (do the empirical results determine the theoretical interpretations or are there are equally viable alternative theoretical interpretations?), and at the question of whether the Other is constructed as inferior or as problematic. At this point, it should be mentioned that progressive interpretations of differences regarding the Other may also be underdetermined by data. However, if the theoretical propositions do not construct the Other as inferior or problematic, then these theoretical propositions are not epistemologically violent. For example, to interpret the empirical difference, namely the underrepresentation of women faculty at elite universities in the United States, as indicating that women are less intelligent than men, is an epistemologi- cally violent interpretation of empirical data. To interpret the same difference of the same empirical study as indicating that women are oppressed at elite universities also should be identified as a problem of underdetermination and representation, but such a proposition would not be epistemologically violent to women. Because interpretations are actions, we can evaluate the concrete consequences of interpretations (see also Austin, 1975). If interpretations are beneficial to the Other, then they may still be underdetermined by the data, but they may not lead to harm. On the other hand, some actions have harmful consequences for the Other. In such cases, communities of the negatively constructed Other should be the source for establishing the criteria for harm. There exists collective violence (wars), individual violence (one person against another), and violence executed by scientists (epistemological violence). EV is likely to be asymmetrical: EV executed by scientists cannot be countered by public rejection because the name of science has a higher status than theoretical criticism expressed by a marginalized Other. At this point in reflection, one could raise the question of whether a theoretical interpretation that is epistemologically violent should also be considered a hate crime. Is epistemological violence the equivalent of an academic hate crime? I have suggested that the concept of EV is intended as descriptive rather than legal. If it were a legal matter, then, at least in parts of North America, one would have to begin with the distinction between a hate crime and hate speech. A hate crime involves a criminal act, whereas in hate speech, the speech itself is punished (see Gerstenfeld, 2004). Although the law distin- guishes between a conduct and an expression, this distinction is not completely clear from a philosophical (and a legal) perspective because expressing propositions in writing or through a presentation is a form of action. Still, I would emphasize that a theoretical interpretation of empirical results, as epistemologically violent as it may be, should not have the same legal status as lynching. If interpretations contain calls for action (e.g., Siemens, 1937, asking for the sterilization of the feeble-minded), then they may reach the same level, but such an assessment can often only be established a posteriori (in hindsight). I prefer to have this discussion developed in the social-scientific domain by pointing out the relationship between empirical research and theoretical propositions of interpretation, by discussing the history and its consequences for the construction of the Other, and by identifying epistemological violence committed by academics against the Other. Contexts of Reflection Theoretical propositions about the Other are very powerful in psychology because they appear to be based on empirical studies. The past successes and to a certain degree the current shaping of discourse on the Other can be attributed to psychologists’ accepted What is Epistemological Violence in the Empirical Social Sciences? 299 ª 2010 The Author Social and Personality Psychology Compass 4/5 (2010): 295–303, 10.1111/j.1751-9004.2010.00265.x Journal Compilation ª 2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd usage of mainstream empirical methods that are applied, for example, to the comparison of various racialized groups. Social, historical, philosophical, and political challenges to this type of research are quickly dismissed by the argument that critics do not use statisti- cal testing. An analysis of the context of discovery is seen as irrelevant to the actual results of experimental and empirical studies. Thus, I suggest that empirical research on the Other requires a three-pronged challenge: (i) An analysis of the context of discovery: this approach is focused on why researchers are interested in studying the Other. Critical reconstructions might look at underlying cultural, political, economic, and personal interests and might identify the social origins of hypotheses, concepts, and theories (see also Danziger, 1997; for an example, see Teo, 2009). (ii) An analysis of the context of justification: this approach refers to identifying selective sampling or selective data reporting, as well as the reliability, validity, and objectivity of the concepts and instruments used, or the presentation of correlation as causation, and so on. Studies in this tradition investigate the logic of research that, for exam- ple, has led to scientific racism. (iii) An analysis of the context of interpretation: here, one analyzes the relationship between theory, data and discussion and assesses the quality of the interpretation of data in psychological studies. One would also be interested in the consequences of interpretation. This hermeneutic perspective does not exclude the two former perspectives. On the contrary, all types of reconstructions complement each other and provide a better understanding of empirical research in the social sciences. For instance, a critical study would be focused on those socio-historical developments that led to an interest in studying IQ differences, the validity of the concept of IQ, and how an empirical finding of IQ differences is representative of a theory of inherited dif- ferences between racialized groups. In addition, one would look at how empirical findings of IQ differences are interpreted and at the consequences of interpretations of inherited differences on the Other, the public, or the academic discourse. An important part of such a program would not only be the deconstruction of the concepts of race or IQ but also an assessment of the relationship between empirical research and interpretations. Earlier I mentioned that ideas and hypotheses themselves could be labeled as violent. Indeed, it would not be difficult to identify violent hypotheses or ideas (‘do women enjoy being abused,’ ‘was there ever a Holocaust’). But hypotheses and ideas are not considered knowledge within the traditional logic of research; yet, the theoretical interpretation of empirical data is presented and understood as knowledge. Some research- ers enjoy pointing out that there should be no censorship on what hypotheses can be studied. Thus, a focus on and a critical analysis of violent hypotheses would soon be trapped in a debate over what research should be allowed. This would put critics quickly on the defensive. Yet, a focus on the theoretical interpretation of empirical data (knowl- edge) would put the onus on the researcher to justify his or her interpretations, whereas a critic would need to identify the issue of representation and underdetermination and point to the hermeneutic deficit within research on the Other. Hermeneutic Deficits and Responsibility of the Social Scientist Finally, I would like to consider the idea of epistemological responsibility (see also Code, 1987). Do researchers need to be conscious of the consequences of their interpretations on the Other? I would argue that they must consider the problem of the hermeneutic surplus of interpretations and the hermeneutic deficits of empirical research and that they must take into account the need to become self-reflective and, if possible, educated and trained in hermeneutics (the art of interpretation) and knowledgeable regarding the 300 What is Epistemological Violence in the Empirical Social Sciences? ª 2010 The Author Social and Personality Psychology Compass 4/5 (2010): 295–303, 10.1111/j.1751-9004.2010.00265.x Journal Compilation ª 2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd relationship between data and interpretation. Yet, social scientists who are experts in particular areas assume that they have a superior understanding of the events and objects in their area of research. That may be a self-misunderstanding. Instead, I recommend that besides studying the context of discovery and justification, researchers should become aware of the possible limitations of their own interpretations and should be particularly careful when interpreting differences between ‘us’ and the Other. Empirical psychologists turn a hermeneutic deficit (one interpretation among many possible) into a surplus (one interpretation is presented as knowledge). The hermeneutic surplus, the presentation of a particular interpretation as knowledge, imparts meaning to data and makes results understandable. Data are understood better than they would be if they were to present themselves. Interpretations have a hermeneutic function for the authors themselves, for peers, and for other readers. Most clearly the hermeneutic surplus is expressed in textbooks and in the mass media. Textbooks and mass media do not report detailed data but provide a hermeneutic summary of the results based on authors’ hermeneutic interpretation of the results. Sometimes, this is solely expressed in one sentence, as in the following: ‘Studies have shown that small-eared people are less empathic than large-eared people and earedness is highly heritable.’ Of course, it should be mentioned that presenting only the data and leaving out the discussion section in a scientific article would not remedy the situation because interpretations would be confined to laypersons’ interpretations of data. Given the political affordances of certain topics (Teo, 2005), we should not expect that this would lead to better interpretations. Indeed, the field would be left with a pandemonium of interpretations, or worse, interpretations that reflect ‘common sense’ ideologies of racism, classism, and sexism. The hermeneutic surplus goes hand in hand with the rhetoric of ‘facts.’ But facts or empirical knowledge, or even truth, contain data and interpretations. This is not understood sufficiently by scientists and psychologists. One could label this phenomenon as a self-misunderstanding of empirical psychology: Although it is clear that data and interpretations (discussions) are separated in a scientific article, authors often present their discussions as knowledge and facts. Historical examples demonstrate the meaning of a hermeneutic surplus more clearly because common sense interpretations or interpretations embedded within a Zeitgeist have shifted away from these historical interpretations, and the absurdity of the discussions is often clearly seen (e.g., the belief that Italians are by nature less intelligent than Northern Europeans). It appears to me that the discipline is lost when it comes to the interpretation of data. Interpretation is left to the hermeneutic competence of the individual researcher, who might not be aware of the role of understanding in interpretation and of his ⁄ her own hermeneutic deficits. In the context of scientific racism, sexism, and classism, I suggest that the methodological part is only secondarily responsible for biased research and that the larger part is a result of the hermeneutic deficit combined with the worldviews and ideologies of researchers. This hermeneutic deficit appears when the epistemological, the ontological, and indeed, the ethical meaning of studying group differences is not under- stood and when rules, criteria, and guidelines for valid interpretations are not provided by the discipline. Interpretations have an impact on people and they have practical and ethical conse- quences. If I were to choose an interpretation that suggests that it is in the nature of small-eared individuals to be less empathic than large-eared individuals – and this choice is made in the context of an existing social division – then consequences are implied. Opposing interpretations that suggest that small-eared people are actually superior in certain respects to large-eared people are also embedded in a hermeneutic structure that What is Epistemological Violence in the Empirical Social Sciences? 301 ª 2010 The Author Social and Personality Psychology Compass 4/5 (2010): 295–303, 10.1111/j.1751-9004.2010.00265.x Journal Compilation ª 2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd is not determined by data. Bad interpretations may occur on all sides. The denial of the impact of interpretations, a problem that is not understood in the empirical social sciences, can also be traced back to the idea of value-neutrality. But rather than spending time on defending something that is impossible, I recommend reflections on the implicit and often biased forms of intuition (Teo & Febbraro, 2003) that guide empirical research- ers. Short Biography Thomas Teo is Associate Professor in the History and Theory of Psychology Program at York University and current editor of the Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology, published by the Educational Publishing Foundation of the American Psychological Association. He has published historical and theoretical articles in Theory & Psychology, New Ideas in Psychology, Canadian Psychology, Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences, History of Psychology, Humanistic Psychologist, etc. His latest monograph The Critique of Psychology: From Kant to Postcolonial Theory was published in 2005 (Springer) and his latest co-edited book from 2009 Varieties of theoretical psychology: International philosophical and practical concerns (Captus) address the intersection of philosophy, metatheory, and psychol- ogy. Currently, he analyzes the historical and theoretical foundations of psychology based on critical-hermeneutic analyses, including the ontological, epistemological, and ethical challenges to psychology. He reconstructs the history of psychology as the history of the critique of psychology, the history of philosophical psychology, and the history and theory of scientific racism in psychology and the human sciences. He is Fellow of the Canadian Psychological Association and executive committee member in historical and theoretical divisions of various academic organizations. More information can be found on his website: http://www.yorku.ca/tteo. Endnote * Correspondence address: Thomas Teo, Department of Psychology, History and Theory of Psychology, York University, 4700 Keele Street, Toronto, Ontario, M3J 1P3, Canada. E-mail: tteo@yorku.ca. References Austin, J. L. (1975). How to do Things with Words. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Original work published 1962). Code, L. (1987). Epistemic Responsibility. Hanover, NH: University Press of New England. Danziger, K. (1997). Naming the Mind: How Psychology Found its Language. London, UK: Sage. Duhem, P. (1954). The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory (P. P. Wiener, Trans.). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. (Original work published 1905). Galtung, J. (1969). Violence, peace, and peace research. Journal of Peace Research, 6 (3), 167–191. Gerstenfeld, P. G. (2004). Hate Crimes: Causes, Controls, and Controversies. London: Sage. Gould, S. J. (1996). The Mismeasure of Man (revised and expanded). New York: Norton. Holzkamp, K. (1981). Theorie und Experiment in der Psychologie: Eine grundlagenkritische Untersuchung (Zweite, um ein Nachwort erweiterte Auflage) [Theory and experiment in psychology: A study critical of its foundations] (2nd edn.). Berlin: De Gruyter. (Original work published 1964). Quine, W. V. (1969). Ontological Relativity and Other Essays. New York: Columbia University Press. Rushton, J. P. (1995). Race, Evolution, and Behavior. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction. Siemens, H. W. (1937). Grundzüge der Vererbungslehre, Rassenhygiene, and Bevölkerungspolitik (Achte verbesserte Auflage) [Main features of heredity, eugenics, and population policy] (8th improved edn). München, Germany: Lehmanns Verlag. (First edition published in 1917). Spivak, G. C. (1988). Can the subaltern speak? In C. Nelson & L. Grossberg (Eds.), Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture (pp. 271–313). Urbana: University of Illinois Press. 302 What is Epistemological Violence in the Empirical Social Sciences? ª 2010 The Author Social and Personality Psychology Compass 4/5 (2010): 295–303, 10.1111/j.1751-9004.2010.00265.x Journal Compilation ª 2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd Teo, T. (2004). The historical problematization of ‘‘mixed race’’ in psychological and human-scientific discourses. In A. Winston (Ed.). Defining Difference: Race and Racism in the History of Psychology (pp. 79–108). Washington, DC: APA. Teo, T. (2005). The Critique of Psychology: From Kant to Postcolonial Theory. New York: Springer Verlag. Teo, T. (2008). From speculation to epistemological violence in psychology: A critical-hermeneutic reconstruction. Theory & Psychology, 18 (1), 47–67. Teo, T. (2009). Psychology without Caucasians. Canadian Psychology, 50 (2), 91–97. Teo, T., & Febbraro, A. (2003). Ethnocentrism as a form of intuition in psychology. Theory and Psychology, 13 (5), 673–694. What is Epistemological Violence in the Empirical Social Sciences? 303 ª 2010 The Author Social and Personality Psychology Compass 4/5 (2010): 295–303, 10.1111/j.1751-9004.2010.00265.x Journal Compilation ª 2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd 
work_vc5nhql4ijg6ljrd42bkldw77u	----	doi:10.1016/j.jvs.2006.08.035 SURGICAL ETHICS CHALLENGES James W. Jones, MD, PhD, MHA, Surgical Ethics Challenges Section Editor Corporate funding of professional foundations: just another black sheep? James W. Jones, MD, PhD, MHA, and Laurence B. McCullough, PhD, Houston, Texas Sir Winston: Madam, Would you sleep with me for 1 million Pounds? Unknown woman: Yes sir, I think I would. Sir Winston: Well, how about 1 Pound? Unknown woman: Winston! What sort of woman do you think I am? Sir Winston: Madam, that matter has already been solved. Now we’re just haggling over your price. As a member of the pharmacy and medical device committee at a leading hospital, you are part of a discussion considering whether or not varieties of cor- onary artery stents should be limited and if so which ones should be chosen. The hospital representative has endorsed a particular stent from a contractual cost basis. The cardiologist member strongly recommends a particular company’s product. His stated reasoning is that the recommended manufacturer contributes heavily to the Penumbral Heart and Vascular Founda- tion, which funds various local research projects. A number of local leading physician members are on the company’s suggested speaker panels and clinical advi- sory board. The cost of the stent recommended by the cardiologist member would be higher than using an- other product, but it is argued that the prestige of the medical staff and the institution would decline with a possible reduction in referrals. What should be done? A. Everyone has biases. Approve the recommendations of your cardiology colleague. B. Let the deciding factor be a poll of all the cardiologists practicing at your hospital. C. Demand that the cardiologist recuse herself and make the decision on the recommendations of cardiologist advisors who have no conflicts. From The Center for Medical Ethics and Health Policy, Baylor College of Medicine. Competition of interest: none. Correspondence: James W. Jones, MD, PhD, MHA, Center for Medical Ethics and Health Policy, Baylor College of Medicine, One Baylor Plaza, Houston TX 77030 (e-mail: jwjones@bcm.tmc.edu). J Vasc Surg 2006;44:1126-8 0741-5214/$32.00 Copyright © 2006 by The Society for Vascular Surgery. doi:10.1016/j.jvs.2006.08.035 1126 D. Conflicts aside, the product must be the best or your nationally known colleague would not be using it. Approve his recommendations. E. Report the matter to the ethics committee of your county medical society. These days, there seems to be a constant bombardment of dark social ills brought to light by the daily news, including family violence, hate crimes, public malfeasance, and corporate thievery. Whether this moral degeneracy is newly hatched or was conveniently ignored in the past, one can only hope the increased level of media awareness can lessen these immoralities. Physicians are hardly immune from the press finding sewage in their mainstreams, usually involving professional conflicts of interest.1-4 These profes- sional conflicts of interest always involve some medium of exchange, and the innovative ways some physicians appear willing to compromise professional integrity to supplement their already comfortable incomes constantly astonishes. Reed Abelson, one of America’s most talented medical sensationalists, reporting for the New York Times, pub- lished a recent article entitled, “Charities Tied to Doctors get Industry Gifts.”2 The article opens not with a deflect- able jab but with a solid right cross to the ethical snout of medicine, beginning with the story of a cardiologist report- ing at a conference in March this year that a $14,000 ultra-filtration device removed fluid better in heart failure patients than diuretics. Surprise! And a Ferrari accelerates faster than a Ford but to what avail? Although prominent researchers questioned the study’s conclusions, the pre- senting doctor remained adamant. “We believe these re- sults challenge current medical practice and recommenda- tions,” said Dr X, who predicted many patients might benefit.”2 Dr X did not disclose that the company making the device had donated $180,000 to a foundation she and 50 associates staffed, funded the study, and paid her a salary as a consultant, three conflictual, possibly ethical strikes. We do not deny that this therapy could eventually become the standard of care, but look at the implications if adopted. According to the National Center for Health Statistics, 1.09 million patients were discharged (not admitted) from hospi- tals in the United States with a diagnosis of heart failure in 2003,5 and because of an aging population, the number is JOURNAL OF VASCULAR SURGERY Volume 44, Number 5 Jones and McCullough 1127 higher today. If universally adopted then, the therapy would have added a $15.3 billion bloat to health care. A remark attributed to Everett Dirksen mocked well those who spend huge, “A billion here, a billion there, and pretty soon you’re talking real money.” The science and practice of the group, the foundation, and the data may well be legitimate, but there are quite a number of possible improprieties. Let us count the ways: personal influencing of the individual physician’s research; influencing the general group practice; an affront to legiti- mate charities such as foundations of major medical societ- ies and colleges; a questionable business practice of the medical company sponsors; a possible tax loophole when doing little to deserve special status; and last, but not at all least, a platform for disbursing conflicted information about medical practice. In previous articles we decried industries’ intrusions on medicine’s professionalism.6-9 Consider the least objec- tionable financial relationship, receiving seemingly insignif- icant gifts from medical companies.7 What difference can a free medical book, a nice pen or pencil, or dinner to discuss the latest drugs or devices make? It can cloud the physi- cian’s medical judgment; that’s what. It can make one choose a more expensive therapy without patient benefit, expand unsupported indications for therapies, or lead to the acceptance of the drug rep’s pitch as the last word without further study. Waud10 had the temerity to write that every kind of gift from the medical industry to physi- cians was a bribe, an inducement for doctors to buy instru- ments, contraptions, and medications that someone else finally gets billed for. This is known as baksheesh to anyone traveling in the mid-east, a word sharing its etymological root with nebbish, a descriptive insult of personal character that assumes allowing one’s moral behavior to be decided by bribes is cowardly. The next item on the list to trot out are the paid pseudo- consultancies and “marketing research” payments.9 “Some- where along the way, though, the medical manufacturers’ marketing departments shouldered their way into the process, and introduced the techniques of advertising and salesman- ship to what medical professionals had been led to believe was a relationship built on their scientific and clinical exper- tise. Though told otherwise, it was no longer just the doctor’s expert opinions and research programs that were sought, it was his influence as a sales broker for expensive products he ordered at his patients’ expense.” Industrial money, disguised as research support, can easily be slipped into the marketing department, as the subject of the New York Times exposé appears to have done.3 A paid medical consultant necessarily becomes the functional equivalent of a company employee, and companies, not surprisingly, expect their employees’ loyalty, the thorny rose of commer- cialization. But why bring the matter of physician/industrial con- flicts of interest forward once again? Because the formation of tax-free charitable foundations is the latest, perhaps greatest, conflict of interest blemish on professionalism yet devised. Payments to such foundations create possible con- flicts of interest, though not in the direct form that pay- ments to physicians as consultants or members of speakers’ bureaus do. Setting up such foundations is at risk for becoming a subterfuge conceived of by physicians, not industry, that could lead to the plethora of unethical be- haviors identified above, touching on every aspect of a physician’s professional life. In this scenario, the physician’s economic self-interest in the foundation is substantial if he is receiving research support from it. His relationship with the company in question is thus an indirect conflict of interest, but no less substantial as a result. Foundations can become legal vehicles for transferring industry money to physicians that flies beneath the moral radar by posing as a charitable undertaking. When receiving funds from a “foundation,” one may delude themselves into thinking that because of the intermediary there is no conflict, but only a psychosis would allow forgetting who funded the “foundation” and who could withdrawal future funding. There have been numerous examples of gross distor- tions when scientific objectivity has not been scrupulously maintained. To prevent this problem, academic health cen- ters have established conflict of interest policies, but these usually do not address indirect conflicts of interest that are created when payments are “laundered” to parties or enti- ties other than the investigator.11 The newly emerging forms of indirect conflicts of interest need to be disclosed to professional organizations and hospitals and responsibly managed so that they do not distort the decision-making processes of health care organizations. The syllogism for option A would read: All humans have biases and must make decisions regardless. All physi- cians are humans. Therefore, physicians must, because of their human nature, make biased decisions. This assumes that conflicts of interest are both unavoidable and also that they cannot be responsibly managed. The conflict of inter- est in this case is avoidable; other conflict-free cardiologists could be asked to advise the committee. Important institu- tional decisions should be made by individuals who are unbiased on the specific matter being discussed. Option B is what used to be done when cost-plus reimbursement was in vogue. Then the hospital adminis- trators spared no expense in having huge inventories of different types of prosthetic joints, heart valves, vascular grafts, and other supplies, but we live in a different world today. Provided there is no evidence-based clinical advan- tage of one therapy over another, cost merits consideration, being important enough to be mentioned first in the Amer- ican College of Surgeons Task Force on Professionalism’s recommendations.12 Science’s foundation is not democ- racy. It is unlikely that evidence-based consensus would be reached by taking a poll. In addition, taking a poll does not responsibly manage conflicts of interest; depending upon the conflicts of interest of those polled, associated politicking might lead to less effective management of conflicts of interest. Option D assumes that conflicts of interest are indi- rectly proportional to clinical competence when, in fact, “human nature” may make it just the opposite. The higher JOURNAL OF VASCULAR SURGERY November 20061128 Jones and McCullough one climbs in professional acclaim, the more infallible they may believe they are. The faulty reasoning of this option undermines it as a responsible strategy for managing con- flicts of interest. Option E is very premature. There is no evidence of the cardiologist behaving improperly. Anyone who serves on institutional advisory committees has the obligation to contribute their expertise and advice toward questions in their sphere of knowledge. Serious unmanaged conflicts of interest are morally wrong without proof of wrongdoing but are not censurable per se. Financial conflicts of interest disorder scientific objec- tivity and they abound.9 Some knowledgeable sociologists describe the current societal state as a “creed of greed,” and from the incessant trials of top level corporate crooks, doubt of this resides only with the most naive and unin- formed.13 Whatever, retention of medicine’s exalted pro- fessional status, inherited from physician’s collective efforts across the previous centuries, conflicts of interest need to be dealt with by more than simple disclosure, although even simple disclosure has been a repeated problem with authors at one of the most prestigious American journals.14 The editor of the Journal of the American Medical Association, Dr DeAngelis, publishes names of nondisclosing violators, when discovered, and notifies deans at their medical schools. But continued failures of authors to disclose have led criticisms of her efforts. Perhaps, a special journal for publishing conflicted data is needed with the articles avail- able for citing only after nonconflicted confirming articles are published. To protect the scientific and ethical integrity of the committee’s deliberations and recommendations and of the hospital’s purchasing practices and policies, the con- flicted cardiologist should not be allowed to participate in deliberations and recommendations. There is surely exper- tise in his specialty from colleagues without direct or indi- rect conflicts of interest. If no such expertise is available within the medical staff of the hospital, it should be ob- tained on a consultancy basis. Option C, rarely chosen in practice, is our selection. REFERENCES 1. Abelson R. Possible conflicts for doctors are seen on medical devices. NY Times (Print) 2005 Sep 22:A1, C6. 2. Abelson R. Charities tied to doctors get drug industry gifts. NY Times (Print) 2006 Jun 28:A1, C4. 3. Meier B. Implant program for heart device was a sales spur. NY Times (Print) 2005 Sep 27:A1, C4. 4. Bloche M. Physician, turn thyself in. New York Times. NY Times (Print) 2004 Jun 10:A27. 5. National Hospital Discharge Survey: 2003 Annual Summary with Di- agnosis and Procedure Data. Washington D.C.: US Department of Health and Human Services, Center for Disease Control and Preven- tion, 2006:Series 13, Number 160. 6. Jones JW. Ethics of rapid surgical technological advancement. Ann Thorac Surg 2000;69:676-7. 7. Jones JW, McCullough LB. Surgeon-industry relationships: ethically responsible management of conflicts of interest. J Vasc Surg 2002;35: 825-6. 8. Jones JW, McCullough LB, Richman BW. Ethics of patenting surgical procedures. J Vasc Surg 2003;37:235-6. 9. Jones JW, McCullough LB, Richman BW. Consultation or corruption? The ethics of signing on to the medical-industrial complex. J Vasc Surg 2006;43:192-5. 10. Waud DR. Pharmaceutical promotions—a free lunch? N Engl J Med 1992;327:351-3. 11. McCrary SV, Anderson CB, Jakovljevic J, Khan T, McCullough LB, Wray NP, et al. A national survey of policies on disclosure of conflicts of interest in biomedical research. N Engl J Med 2000;343:1621-6. 12. Barry L, Blair PG, Cosgrove EM, Cruess RL, Cruess SR, Eastman AB, et al. One year, and counting, after publication of our ACS “Code of Professional Conduct.” J Am Coll Surg 2004;199:736-40. 13. McLaughlin N. End the creed of greed. Actions, not words, are the only way to put an end to conflicts of interest, abuses. Mod Healthc 2006; 36:21. 14. McNeil D, Jr. Tough-talking journal editor faces accusations of le- niency. NY Times (Print) 2006 Aug 1:F1, F3. 
work_vcvqu7hpdzdwlnm3mlvoickh34	----	Microsoft Word - 24_1_NH.FrontPage.FINAL.doc New Horizons in Adult Education and Human Resource Development 71 Volume 24, Number 1, Winter 2010 King, K. P. (2010). A personal journey into gay marriage in a heteronormative society: Or…how many times do we have to get “married” in order to have our rights in the USA? [Perspectives on People]. New Horizons in Adult Education and Human Resource Development, 24(1), 71-77. http://education.fiu.edu/newhorizons PERSPECTIVES ON PEOPLE A Personal Journey into Gay Marriage in a Heteronormative Society: Or…How Many Times Do We Have to Get “Married” in Order to Have Our Rights in the USA? Kathleen P. King Professor of Education Graduate School of Education Fordham University Abstract: Understanding the continuing struggle for lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer (LGBTQ) equality can be difficult for people who have not experienced the issues firsthand. This brief article describes the journey of one woman and her female partner as they repeatedly seek to make their lifetime commitment legal in the USA. Readers will learn new dimensions of LGBTQ discrimination, which continue to endure even in 2009. Sometimes, through the journeys of others we can step back, reflect, and reconsider our perspectives. From medical care confrontations, to humiliation, medical benefits to excessive tax demands and fear of violence, you will realize afresh that the fight for equal rights is not over. This article offers my colleagues a chronicle of one person’s experience across the lines of heterosexual privilege to LGBTQ discrimination. The benefits of such an article are several at least: LGBTQ readers may experience a sense of validation in the disclosure of scenes, issues, concerns, and fears similar to their own. It may also provide those who are or would be allies with a deeper understanding and appreciation of the everyday lives of their LGBTQ colleagues, family members, and acquaintances. The article also serves as a firsthand account that may be used as a spring board for discussions about homophobia, LGBTQ rights, and more. My primary purpose in writing it, however, was in the hope that those who read it may consider the lives and journey shared and determine the part of the solution they can become as we move our world to a greater fullness of both equal human and civil rights. I have decided to share these intimate aspects of life and perspectives by invitation, as part of this theme issue on LGBTQ issues, and because of recurrent conversations with straight friends and colleagues who assume LGBTQ people have all civil rights and no longer experience discrimination. As heterosexual friends or colleagues innocently say to me, “But we live in an enlightened age!” My response is, “If you are heterosexual, yes it is enlightened, but not if you are an LGBTQ person, come live in my life for one week, or listen to these examples...” 72 Choices The journey of seeking to express your commitment publicly to the one you want to spend your life with is the dream of most young girls. For me, due to a twisted family life, it did not emerge until I was in my 20s. At that time, I saw the image better. I openly accepted that archetypal (and decidedly heterosexual) image when I made choices at the age of 25 to follow a traditional pathway of marriage to a caring man who was committed to the same life of service. Awakening When, through years of heart wrenching agony, at the age of 36 I recognized that decision would not work for me, I left the heterosexual marriage. Extreme hostility on many fronts met my decision. Someone stole from me the opportunity to tell my parents, as I was outed to them by others. First Time for Love When in 1997 I wanted to marry the woman whom I had asked to spend her life with me, I did not have the opportunity to invite my parents to our public ceremony, as they still had rejected my previously repressed sexual identity. Nonetheless, we celebrated our new life together with selected family and friends and had the only commitment ceremony available to us at the time (one with no civil recognition). One has to realize that herein lays a fundamental difference among committed LGBTQ relationships and heterosexual relationships: Heterosexual adults have the freedom to choose to marry or not; in most of the USA and many other countries homosexual adults are denied the right to marry. Second Time for Love and State Seven years later, in 2004, the State of New Jersey enacted domestic partnership (Department of Health and Senior Services, 2004; New Jersey Division of Pensions and Benefits, 2007). Therefore, my partner and I delayed my impending disc transplant a few days in order to be among the first declarations. We needed the security of medical rights, access, and property protection amidst a society and immediate family who could reject our existing legal arrangements in these areas. We also needed to protect one another from potential nasty family battles if one of us died. Neither of us had confidence in our expressed wishes being respected by some vocal and vigilant family members. Still Denied Rights The victory was modest at best; however, domestic partnership gave some protection but only 11 of the 1,138 rights of marriage (Demian, 2006). Yet, we were used to being so disenfranchised, so under-protected by legal support, that this was a point of victory in what had been 8 years of fighting to legalize our lifetime commitment to one another as spouses. Even 73 though the paperwork and laws still did not recognize us, our actions, our relationships, our commitments, were, to us, without question that of marriage. The denial of the federal government and state was frustrating to say the least. Having been on both sides of heterosexual privilege, I frequently confront drastic differences as well as the gross injustice of current laws, practices, and intolerance, locally, nationally, and internationally. Affection Hidden privilege is a daily source and reminder of inequality and danger for LGBTQ people. When I had been in a heterosexual marriage being kissed in public, holding hands, or sleeping in the same bed on vacation were unconscious actions and choices. Now, my same-sex partner and I always have to watch our surroundings and be aware of potential violence because of our obvious intimate connection. While many straight people interpret our close relationship as us being “sisters”, unfriendly constituencies could regard us as hate crime targets. Medical Rights When I underwent a disc transplant in 2004, we had recorded our New Jersey Domestic Partnership a few days prior. Yet the discrimination, abuse, and mistreatment in the hospital due to our same-sex relationship were unparalleled. Partially paralyzed at the time, I went into surgery for several hours. The doctor saw my partner right afterwards and said I had fared well. Yet the surgical waiting room staff ignored her for 4 more hours and denied her any news or access—as she watched family members of other patients come and go. No one else was at the hospital for me. There was no confusion about who should have had access. She explained our relationship and provided the documented paperwork. Meanwhile in recovery, they told me they had called my partner several times and she was not in the hospital. She had left me alone. When my partner found a customer service representative, she again demanded access; finally, this staff member led her to my bedside. She asked why I was not in a room if surgery was completed 4 hours prior. The answer: the nurse had not requested a room. Several more hours later, they moved me to a critical care burn unit as the only possible location. I heard screaming and crying of patients in great pain all night. The next day they would not let my partner meet me in the hospital. At the front desk, an extended argument continued, papers were exchanged, and access refused until reluctantly they looked up the discharges for the day. I had nightmares for some time following these episodes. These incidents were the types of terrors and confrontations we had worked so hard to avoid. Travel In considering vacations, holding hands on the beach or having an intimate dinner can be a matter of contention. We have to explain, and then sometimes argue with hotel staff, that we 74 want one bed, not two. While such situations might be comical in a movie, in real life they are frustrating at best, often humiliating, and potentially dangerous in homophobic cultures or establishments. Consider the results when such scenes play out in Trinidad, Tobago, Jamaica, or Nigeria where homosexuality is considered criminal activity and punishable by imprisonment for many years (Alexander, 1994; Meem, Gibson, & Alexander, 2010; Narayan, 2006). Traveling nationally and internationally, we keep paperwork that demonstrates medical power of attorney and our legal relationship in order to assure legal and medical access to one another. There are some states and countries that are well documented as being not only oppressive and discriminatory, but also tolerant of abuse and violence against lesbian and gay people. Indeed while laws punishing homosexual relationships among consenting adults may have recently been reversed in the Bahamas and some US states, the longstanding homophobia continues to fuel an openly hostile environment for LGBTQ people (Alexander, 1996; Meem et al., 2010). Because of some very bad encounters in the past, we have decided it is best usually to avoid those places in order to preserve our safety and support tourism in LGBTQ more friendly nations. Third Time for Love and State In December 2006, the State of New Jersey enacted the Civil Union Act (2006) as an option for same-sex couples and heterosexual couples in response to mandates of state courts (Associated Press, 2006). This device created a “separate but equal” accommodation for LGBTQ couples. We had our third ceremony by an interfaith minister and three people attended as we became a couple, supposedly equal to a heterosexual marriage, for the first time. We only hoped that the legal purposes and device that civil union was equal to marriage would be true. The glow would fade quickly. Civil Union has been misunderstood by hospitals and denied by insurers and employers among other organizations and agencies (Kelley, 2007; Meem et al., 2010). It is a close to a mockery; it repeats bitter lessons similar to the “separate but equal” intent of the Civil Rights Act more than 40 years ago. More Rights Denied Come tax season we learned that for two people we had to file five tax formats including a seemingly illegal federal format. Certainly, this was undue distress due to our sexual identity and the faulty civil union system. We each had to file New York State singly as New York would not recognize married status. We also each had to file Federal taxes separately as required by federal law. However, we also had to create a federal married tax return for the couple in order to calculate our tax responsibility as married in state of New Jersey for the couple, where we are required to file jointly. We do not mind the tax consequences; we grieve the illegal formats and assumptions, the mandate to create federal married formats as a basis or our state taxes when we are ineligible for 75 any benefits or legal recognition. There are no reciprocal death, social security, or tax benefits. There are no recognized medical benefits, and there is no protection under the Civil Rights Act. The courts interpret the federal Constitution to ignore entirely the rights of LGBTQ people. Aside from governmental policy, rights, and taxation, meanwhile we were denied and abused on several fronts across the years because of our relationship. At various times between 1995 and 2008, we were denied property insurance, car insurance, hotel accommodations, tuition remission, hospital access, and medical information. 2009--Where We Stand In 2009, the full legal rights of our relationship are still on hold. Thus far, in our experience, Civil Union only provides benefits when and if organizations and institutions choose to recognize it. Therefore, it has not actively provided protection. We are waiting for the current New Jersey governor to revise the Civil Union Act of 2006 to make it full marriage- LGBTQ groups have been promised it would be after the inauguration (Heininger, 2008). Ten months later, we are still waiting. We still pay medical and tuition costs out of our own pockets—without consideration of employer benefits and family rates available to heterosexual couples. We still need to correct and persuade doctors’ offices and hospitals when they do not recognize the legal status and rights (albeit limited) of our Civil Union, and we play roulette with the chance that we will have access to one another in a medical emergency. We have five tax forms to complete again this year; the tax process continues to discriminate with unfair burden because of our state legal status. On the federal level, it is much worse. The Civil Rights Act still does not represent LGBTQ people. The new U. S. President has made promises in this regard, but other constituencies are on the offensive and fighting hard to continue the denial of basic rights to LGBTQ people through deliberate and intentional mistruths and misrepresentations and the use of terrorist-like tactics in public organizations. For example, consider the recent attacks on academic freedom and free speech as Georgia legislators use thinly veiled budget excuses to raise support to promote hegemony and eliminate courses and professors related to human sexuality and Queer theory from public college and universities (Zoller, 2009). Currently my same-sex spouse (of 14 years) would not have access to my social security benefits if I were to become permanently disabled and unable to work or died, but my ex- husband (of 12 years) would. I expect we have hit the barriers especially hard the last few years because of my emergent disability and medical needs because therein lie some of the most hidden and yet difficult arenas for LGBTQ individuals and couples to navigate. Yet I could have not survived the physical and emotional struggles without my wife; she has been my advocate when I could no longer fight. Moreover, she and my sons have been the light to give me the desire to find solutions to cope, to develop a better quality of life and yes, to live on. 76 Conclusion After 14 years of my personal journey through changing sexual identity as a lesbian woman, I am taking a stand. However, all of us LGBTQ people need our Allies. All LGBTQ individuals and couples need our colleagues, friends, and families to take stand as well. Only as our government, organizations, neighbors, and families and people all around us see the example of straight and LGBTQ people together, saying this injustice has to be fixed—there is no difference in love; and the rights of the people are for ALL PEOPLE--will they take action. LGBTQ people need the voice of our Allies. We are advocates, but go unheard. Your voice will be heard because you are the conscience and voice of the nation. Begin conversing with your LGBTQ colleagues and friends: listen to our stories and ask about our struggles. It seems that straight people sometimes shy away from these conversations. However, I believe that if you approach it in a positive, empathetic way, LGBTQ people will be happy you care and will be willing to share. That is what Allies are for: to stand with one another. Whether you listen, write letters, stand on a picket line, or donate to a LGBTQ legal or support group, your support from greater understanding will help move the tide of public opinion and policy. References Associated Press. (2006, Dec. 21). NJ governor signs civil unions into law. MSNBC.com Retrieved March 13, 2009, from http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/16309688/ Alexander, M. J. (1994, Autumn). Not just (any) body can be a citizen: The politics of law, sexuality and postcoloniality in Trinidad, and Tobago and the Bahamas. Feminist Review, 48, 5-23. Alexander, M. J. (1996). Feminist geneaologies, colonial legacies, global movements. New York: Routledge. Demian. (2006). Domestic partnership act. Retrieved March 12, 2009, from http://www.buddybuddy.com/d-p-nj.html Department of Health and Senior Services. (2004). Domestic partnership. Retrieved March 12, 2009, from http://www.state.nj.us/health/vital/dp2.shtml Heininger, C. (2008, December 10). Corzine: NJ should establish same-sex marriage sooner rather than later. Star-Ledger. Retrieved March 10, 2009, from http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2008/12/corzine_nj_should_establish_sa.html Kelley, T. (2007, October 28). New Jersey Civil Union law has fallen short in its first year, commission is told. New York Times. Retrieved March 10, 2009, from http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/28/nyregion/28civil.html Meem, D. T., Gibson, M. A., & Alexander, J. F. (2010). Finding out. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Narayan, P. (2006). Somewhere over the rainbow: International human rights protections for sexual minorities in the new millennium. Boston University International Law Journal 24(20), 313-348. Retrieved March 16, 2009, from 77 http://web.bu.edu/law/central/jd/organizations/journals/international/volume24n2/docume nts/313-348.pdf New Jersey Division of Pensions and Benefits. (2007). Benefits under the Domestic Partnership Act. Retrieved March 12, 2009, from http://www.state.nj.us/treasury/pensions/fact71.htm The Civil Union Act of 2006, c. 103 No. 3787 2R. Retrieved November 18, 2009, from http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/2006/Bills/PL06/103_.HTM Zoller, M. (2009, February 19). Sex and the Georgia student. North Georgia Access.com. Retrieved March 16, 2009, from http://www.accessnorthga.com/detail.php?n=217941&c=11 
work_vda6vtg3v5gf3c4o26uw5kohzm	----	From High Visibility to High Vulnerability: Feminist, Postcolonial and Anti-Gentrification Activism at Risk EDITORIAL From High Visibility to High Vulnerability: Feminist, Postcolonial and Anti-Gentrification Activism at Risk Anastasia Denisova and Michaela O’Brien University of Westminster, UK Corresponding author: Anastasia Denisova (A.Denisova1@westminster.ac.uk) This editorial considers how this special issue on media and activism reflects or extends current debates in the field and how it explores the possibilities for pro- gressive activists around the world to use the media to resist the current rise of the extreme right alongside the disturbing and growing evidence of the techniques of fascism: populism, propaganda and fake news, hate speech and hate crimes. It follows Graham Meikle (2018) in defining ‘activism’ as ‘the widest range of attempts to effect [progressive] social or cultural change’ whilst its understanding of ‘the media’ includes a broad range of communication platforms, from traditional journalism to digital networks. The issue itself looks at macro- and meso-levels of activism with this editorial explaining how contributions reflect different critical and research approaches focusing variously on media as enabling activists to organise; the mediation of activism; and media as a tool through which activists can professionally deliver their strategic objectives. It calls for measures to make digital space a safer place for activists; to help activists own their narrative without constant risks of hijacking and abuse; and to celebrate the thriving strategies and tactics that bring together activists and the public who care. Keywords: media activism; journalism; public relations; social change; progressive; social media On 20 August 2018, a 15-year old girl decided not to attend school. Her reason was far from trivial – the looming climate crisis was risking the planet to the extent of changing land, air and water and damaging peoples’ lives. The name of the girl was Greta Thunberg, and her example of ‘school strike for the climate’ in front of the Swedish parliament was followed by hundreds of thousands of teenagers globally. They were abandoning classrooms to demand change from their governments and societies, galvanising 270 cities with their solidarity. Greta’s success did not happen in one day. Journalism outlets, political parties and numer- ous NGOs and international institutions have been warning the population about the climate Denisova, A., & O’Brien, M. (2019). From High Visibility to High Vulnerability: Feminist, Postcolonial and Anti-Gentrification Activism at Risk. Westminster Papers in Communication and Culture, 14(1), 94–98. DOI: https://doi.org/10.16997/wpcc.323 mailto:A.Denisova1@westminster.ac.uk https://doi.org/10.16997/wpcc.323 Denisova and O’Brien: From High Visibility to High Vulnerability95 crisis for decades. But the movement needed a symbol – and the quietly spoken Scandinavian girl with two symmetric braids was an emblem both strong and fragile that activism needed. Media activism is a long and laborious endeavour. The rise of digital media with its abun- dance of information, interconnectivity, visibility, channels of mobilisation and low threshold of participation creates communities not only for the progressive but for toxic forces too. This is why activism in the late 2010s to early 2020s needs to be both active and reactive, thought- ful yet loud enough so it does not get lost in internet storms. In these times when hijacking of terms and stories happens on a daily basis, activism also means constant narrative recreation and damage control. Some scholars call the internet a patriarchal structure (Megarry, 2018) and there are voices that demand gender equality of online space. The rallying cry of ‘We should all be feminists’ (Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie) is turning into ‘We should all be activists’ as new reports emerge concerning male bias in AI (Crawford, 2016; Adam, 2006; Leavy, 2018), sexist coding of digital voice assistants (West, Kraut and Ei Chew, 2019), the inherent inequality of AI-assisted recruitment processes (Dastin, 2018), and inequality of activism too. Female protesters and activists of colour face more challenges than others – due to the outbursts of toxic masculinity, racial abuse, cow- ardly anonymous online attacks and imbalance of visibility when it comes to hierarchy of influence. These issues are as virtual as they are real – and they need to be addressed to maintain liveable societies. As editors, we wanted to explore the possibilities for progressive activists around the world to use the media to resist the current rise of the extreme right along with disturbing and growing evidence of the techniques of fascism: populism, propaganda and fake news, hate speech and rise of hate crimes. We define ‘activism’ as ‘the widest range of attempts to effect [progressive] social or cultural change’ (Meikle, 2018: iii), while ‘the media’ includes a broad range of communication platforms, from traditional journalism to digital networks. This editorial aims to consider how the research articles published in this Westminster Papers in Communication and Culture special issue on media and activism reflect or extend current debates in the field. Media and activism is of interest to academics from a variety of disciplines. Sociologists examine the organisation of social movements, their mobilisation techniques and the role of collective identity in activism (Tilly and Tarrow, 2015). All of these aspects are enabled by media, and are being challenged and transformed by digital media (Bennett and Segerberg (2012), Kavada (2015). Media and communication academics also explore the mediation of activism, and the ways in which media enable activists to frame messages and share informa- tion, while also providing a space in which to create meaning (Meikle 2018). In the recent Routledge Companion to Media and Activism (2018), editor Professor Graham Meikle of the University of Westminster sets out the key themes of media and activism as: the role of the media in communicating political contention; activism and civil disobedience tactics and strategies; the affordances of digital communication technologies; and the role of creativity, self-expression and art in activism. Meanwhile public relations (PR) academics have only in the last decade started to research the use of the media by activists and activist organisations as actors with their own legitimacy; writing in the context of a largely corporate approach to public relations, where activists are routinely viewed solely as a threat to corporate success (Deegan 2001, Jaques 2014, Regester and Larkin 2008) to be managed by corporate PR professionals. Academics from the emerg- ing critical PR tradition have started to explore the communicative activities of activists to challenge power holders, create pressure for legislative or individual change and deliver strategic goals, and are re-evaluating the history and aims of the PR discipline as a result (Adi 2018, Demetrious 2013, L’Etang 2016, O’Brien 2018). Denisova and O’Brien: From High Visibility to High Vulnerability96 These different critical and research approaches focus variously on media as enabling activists to organise; the mediation of activism; and media as a tool through which activists can professionally deliver their strategic objectives. All these facets of the relationship between media and activism are explored in this special issue. This issue looks at macro- and meso-levels of activism. It explores the political opposition to journalist activism – the article by Tenford Chitanana and Bruce Mutsvairo reflects on the symbolic and real power of social media movements. As critical as it is hopeful, this piece zooms in on the digital-only campaign #ThisFlag against corruption and poor governance. This social media phenomenon brought people to the streets – becoming one of the first ever protest in Zimbabwe to be organised entirely online. This research provides the analysis of how exactly an online mobilisation brings organised activists and members of the public closer to each other. Another study on Zimbabwe by Khanyile Joseph Mlotshwa illuminates the inner complexities of what press freedom means for Zimbabwe; it demonstrates how the government and private media exchange rhetoric on anti-imperialism and neocolonialism. These discussions are timely and important in a wider context of decolonising and furthering postcolonial media studies. Whilst so many studies on media activism focus on the internet and social media in par- ticular, the Brazilian turn reminds us of the materiality of the medium of community radio. Thiago O. S. Noaves and Francisco Antunes Caminati emphasise that the ‘nomadic transmitter’ is used both as the symbol and the actual equipment to connect and empower people in Brazil’s remote areas. The decentralised, liberating radio waves are making a difference on a quiet, community level. Another example of ‘grounded’ activism takes place in Liverpool. Anthony Killick examines how gentrification of the city is taking a neoliberal turn, which comes at a cost to organic rejuvenation of the abandoned areas. While local galleries and businesses are about to be replaced by generic coffee shops and imposed art spaces, activists organise resistance at both a physical level and at the level of discourse. The alarm goes off about the capitalist appropria- tion of the word ‘creative’ (‘a very corporate and manufactured idea of what a creative place is’), instead of welcoming that raw, ‘lawless’, community-inspired creativity of Liverpool’s free spirits. The feminist collective in Mexico called themselves Las Morras and started filming cat- callers in the streets – the resulting videos achieved viral fame and even interest from the United Nations. This digital campaign was, at first sight, successful – it enabled the activists to collaborate on launching a phone-reporting service on harassment. Yet the price for that victory was the mountain of online abuse that the group received on social media, which forced to them to close their accounts. The insightful study by Stuart Davis and Melissa Santillana embraces the interplay of liberation and oppression, visibility and vulnerability of such online campaigns to gender power structures. This approach makes the study of Las Morras emblematic for digital feminism, not only in Latin America but across the world. Lastly, with studies reporting that WhatsApp is becoming heavily influential on the political opinions of many people – especially in developing countries – Sérgio Barbosa and Stefania Milan ask how to research this encrypted, closed network. Their solution grows out of the classic code of conduct of media sociologists and ethnographers, but also brings a necessary update to it. It removes a cluster of questions for WhatsApp researchers so that they can start work immediately, without wasting time on doubts. This methodological work responds to the urgent need of unlocking the benefits and harms of digital intimate networks. This issue looks at the symbols and sustainable strategies of activism, at framing and reframing – at agreeing on terms and following up with actions – and eventually at making activism more accessible and efficient. In these times when fascist and racist, misogynist and Denisova and O’Brien: From High Visibility to High Vulnerability97 nationalist narratives are so often revived from the 1930s, we need to adjust internet activism to protect both activists and the societies that they operate in. This special edition, firstly, calls for measures to make digital space a safer place for activists; secondly, to help them to own their narrative without constant risks of hijacking and abuse, and thirdly, to celebrate the thriving strategies and tactics that bring together activists and the public who care. Competing Interests The authors have no competing interests to declare. Author Information Anastasia Denisova is Lecturer in Journalism at CAMRI, University of Westminster. She had worked as a journalist in Russia for over a decade in the capacity of television news editor and reporter, magazine editor and columnist. Anastasia has published academic research on internet memes and politics, satirical microblogging and parody on Twitter, rap and politics on YouTube. In 2019, she released her monograph Internet Memes and Society: Social, Cultural and Political Contexts. Michaela O’Brien is Head of School, Westminster School of Media and Communications, University of Westminster and joint course leader of its Masters in Media, Campaigning and Social Change teaching also on the University of Westminster’s Masters in Public Relations. She is currently researching the historical development of framing in NGO campaign communications. References Adam, A. (2006). Artificial Knowing: Gender and the Thinking Machine. London: Routledge. Adi, A. (Ed.). (2018). Protest Public Relations: Communicating Dissent and Activism. Abingdon: Routledge. DOI: https://doi.org/10.4324/9781351173605 Bennett, W. L., & Segerberg, A. (2012). The logic of connective action: Digital media and the personalization of contentious politics. Information, Communication & Society, 15(5): 739–68. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/1369118X.2012.670661 Crawford, K. (2016). Artificial intelligence’s white guy problem. The New York Times, 25 June. Dastin, J. (2018). Amazon scraps secret AI recruiting tool that showed bias against women. Reuters.com, 10 October. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-amazon- com-jobs-automation-insight/amazon-scraps-secret-ai-recruiting-tool-that-showed-bias- against-women-idUSKCN1MK08G (last accessed July 2019). Deegan, D. (2001). Managing Activism: A Guide to Dealing with Activists and Pressure Groups. London: Kogan Page/CIPR. Demetrious, K. (2013). Public Relations, Activism and Social Change. New York: Routledge. DOI: https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203078440 Jaques, T. (2014). Issue Management. In R. Tench, & L. Yeomans (Eds.), Exploring Public Relations (3rd edn.), pp. 300–312. Harlow: Pearson Education. Kavada, A. (2015). Creating the collective: Social media, the Occupy Movement and its constitution as a collective actor. Information, Communication and Society, 18(8): 872–86. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/1369118X.2015.1043318 Leavy, S. (2018, May). Gender bias in artificial intelligence: The need for diversity and gender theory in machine learning. In Proceedings of the 1st International Workshop on Gender Equality in Software Engineering (pp. 14–16). New York: Association for Computing Machinery. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1145/3195570.3195580 https://www.crcpress.com/Internet-Memes-and-Society-Social-Cultural-and-Political-Contexts/Denisova/p/book/9781138602786 https://www.crcpress.com/Internet-Memes-and-Society-Social-Cultural-and-Political-Contexts/Denisova/p/book/9781138602786 https://www.westminster.ac.uk/journalism-digital-media-and-pr-courses/2019-20/september/full-time/media-campaigning-and-social-change-ma https://www.westminster.ac.uk/journalism-digital-media-and-pr-courses/2019-20/september/full-time/media-campaigning-and-social-change-ma https://www.westminster.ac.uk/journalism-digital-media-and-pr-courses/2019-20/september/full-time/public-relations-ma https://doi.org/10.4324/9781351173605 https://doi.org/10.1080/1369118X.2012.670661 http://Reuters.com https://www.reuters.com/article/us-amazon-com-jobs-automation-insight/amazon-scraps-secret-ai-recruiting-tool-that-showed-bias-against-women-idUSKCN1MK08G https://www.reuters.com/article/us-amazon-com-jobs-automation-insight/amazon-scraps-secret-ai-recruiting-tool-that-showed-bias-against-women-idUSKCN1MK08G https://www.reuters.com/article/us-amazon-com-jobs-automation-insight/amazon-scraps-secret-ai-recruiting-tool-that-showed-bias-against-women-idUSKCN1MK08G https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203078440 https://doi.org/10.1080/1369118X.2015.1043318 https://doi.org/10.1145/3195570.3195580 Denisova and O’Brien: From High Visibility to High Vulnerability98 L’Etang, J. (2016). History as a Source of Critique: Historicity and Knowledge, Societal Change, Activism and Movements. In Routledge Handbook of Critical Public Relations, J. L’Etang, D. McKie, & J. Xifra (eds.), pp. 28–40. Abingdon: Routledge. Megarry, J. (2018). Under the watchful eyes of men: Theorising the implications of male surveillance practices for feminist activism on social media. Feminist Media Studies, 18(6), 1070–1085. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/14680777.2017.1387584 Meikle, G. (Ed.) (2018). The Routledge Companion to Media and Activism. Abingdon: Routledge. DOI: https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315475059 O’Brien, M. (2018). Nonprofit Issues Management: A New Approach to Resist the Label of ‘Risk’. In N. Garsten, & I. Bruce (Eds.), Communicating Causes, Strategic Public Relations for the Non-Profit Sector (pp. 41–54). Abingdon: Routledge. Regester, M., & Larkin, J. (2008). Risk Issues and Crisis Management in Public Relations: A Casebook of Best Practice (4th edition). Kogan Page: London. Tilly, C., & Tarrow, S. (2015). Contentious Politics 2nd ed. New York: Oxford University Press. West, M., Kraut, R., & Ei Chew, H. (2019). I’d blush if I could: Closing gender divides in digital skills through education. Paris: Equals Global Partnership/UNESCO. How to cite this article: Denisova, A., & O’Brien, M. (2019). From High Visibility to High Vulnerability: Feminist, Postcolonial and Anti-Gentrification Activism at Risk. Westminster Papers in Communication and Culture, 14(1), 94–98. DOI: https://doi.org/10.16997/wpcc.323 Submitted: 09 August 2019 Accepted: 09 August 2019 Published: 03 September 2019 Copyright: © 2019 The Author(s). This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (CC-BY 4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited. See http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/. OPEN ACCESS Westminster Papers in Communication and Culture is a peer-reviewed open access journal published by University of Westminster Press https://doi.org/10.1080/14680777.2017.1387584 https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315475059 https://doi.org/10.16997/wpcc.323 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ Competing Interests Author Information References 
work_vflwsb3v3za75iar544ejok3lm	----	How and Why Education Counters Ideological Extremism in Finland religions Article How and Why Education Counters Ideological Extremism in Finland Pia-Maria Niemi 1,*, Saija Benjamin 1, Arniika Kuusisto 1,2,3 and Liam Gearon 3 1 Department of Educational Sciences, University of Helsinki, Siltavuorenpenger 3A, PO 9, 00014 Helsinki, Finland; saija.benjamin@helsinki.fi (S.B.); arniika.kuusisto@buv.su.se (A.K.) 2 Barn-och ungdomsvetenskapliga institutionen, Stockholm University, Frescati Hagväg 16b, 106 91 Stockholm, Sweden 3 Department of Education, University of Oxford, 15 Norham Gardens, Oxford OX2 6PY, UK; liam.gearon@education.ox.ac.uk * Correspondence: pia-maria.niemi@helsinki.fi Received: 29 November 2018; Accepted: 14 December 2018; Published: 18 December 2018 ����������������� Abstract: The intensification of radical and extremist thinking has become an international cause of concern and the fear related to terrorism has increased worldwide. Early 21st century public discourses have been correspondingly marked by hate speech and ideological propaganda spread from a variety of perspectives through the intensified presence of global social media networks. In many countries, governments have reacted to these perceived and actual threats by drafting policies and preventive programs and legal-security interventions to tackle radicalization, terrorism itself, as well as ideological extremism. Many of the current strategies point to the critical role of societal education. As a result, educational institutions have gained growing importance as platforms for different kinds of prevention protocols or counter-terrorism strategies. However, notably less attention has been paid on the consistencies of values between the aims of the educational strategies for preventing or countering ideological extremism and the core functions of education in fostering individual and societal well-being and growth. Using Finnish education as a case, this paper discusses the challenges and possibilities related to educational institutions as spaces for preventing violent extremism, with special regard to the religious and nationalistic ideologies that divert from those inherent in the national hegemony. This study highlights the need to plan counter-terrorism strategies in line with national educational policies through what we conceptualize as ‘institutional habitus’. Keywords: religion; security; nationalism; political violence 1. Introduction One of the key elements for maintaining social cohesion and integration within a nation is through schooling. The socialization of the individual with the community, such as a society, happens through various dimensions including the psychological sense of belonging, the practical dimension of adopting the codes of conduct, and the mindset needed to interpret symbols in a similar way than other group members (e.g., Habermas 1987). At the core of social integration and cohesion in the community is the individuals’ commitment to the core values of the community that separate a particular group from others and that also creates the foundation for the moral codes for behavior (e.g., Habermas 1987; Rogoff et al. 2007). However, the recent political and demographic developments related to immigration, expanding right-wing nationalism, and ideologically motivated attacks of terrorism have created severe societal tensions in many European countries. The increase of social polarization has created pressure for societies to enhance their inner cohesion. Related to these tensions Religions 2018, 9, 420; doi:10.3390/rel9120420 www.mdpi.com/journal/religions http://www.mdpi.com/journal/religions http://www.mdpi.com https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6085-576X http://www.mdpi.com/2077-1444/9/12/420?type=check_update&version=1 http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/rel9120420 http://www.mdpi.com/journal/religions Religions 2018, 9, 420 2 of 16 and developments the role of educational institutions has been promoted as central for ‘preventing’ and ‘countering’ extremist ideologies in various countries (e.g., Ghosh et al. 2017). Early 21st century public discourses have been correspondingly marked by hate speech and ideological propaganda spread from a variety of perspectives through the intensified presence of global social media networks. According to the European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-SAT) published by Europol (2018), altogether 33 religiously inspired attacks were carried out in 2017, leading to the death of 62 people (Europol 2018, p. 23). During the previous year, 2016, the number of attacks in Europe was smaller (13), however the number of casualties was higher (135) than the year before (Europol 2018, p. 23). The most recent attack took place on 12 December 2018 in a Christmas market in Strasbourg, France, and lead to the death of several people. Although these acts depict only a narrow image of the situation (Malkki and Sallamaa 2018), they have had a notable influence on the feeling of citizens’ safety across Europe (Europol 2018). These events have also created a situation in which terrorism is increasingly portrayed as a threat that has its origins in religious ideologies culminating to the rhetorics of Jihadism (Malkki and Sallamaa 2018), and where the role of religious convictions as motivators for violent attacks is easily either over- or underestimated. Alongside these developments the popularity of neo-nationalist right-wing parties has increased across Europe (Eger and Valdez 2014). However, it is also important to notice that the way these themes and tensions present themselves varies notably between countries. For example, Finland, throughout its history, has only had one case (in 2017) in which a terrorist attack has been claimed to be carried out in the name of the Islamic terrorist group of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). However, Finland has experienced various other forms of terrorism and violence, including two school shootings in 2007 and 2008, which were not founded on religious or nationalist ideologies (e.g., Malkki and Sallamaa 2018). This illustrates that although a global-level phenomenon, various forms of violent extremisms and the intertwined ideological polarizations also need to be examined and discussed in their local contexts. Although many countries have introduced educational prevention strategies especially concerning religious or nationalistic extremism (e.g., Ghosh et al. 2016), notably less consideration has been given to the ways in which these preventative aims are aligned with the core functions and objectives of the respective educational system (see also Davies 2009). For developing the discussion on how education may contribute to the prevention of violent extremism, we suggest that attention should not only be paid on the official curriculum content, but also on the core values and structures of the ‘hidden’ curricula (Jackson 1968) of educational systems. By hidden curriculum, we refer to the characteristics of education that are based on the prevailing societal values, dispositions, and social and behavioral expectations, but which often remain undisclosed and unquestioned. Hidden curriculum indicates ‘what is implicit and embedded in educational experiences in contrast with the formal statements about curricula and the surface features of educational interaction’ (Sambell and McDowell 1998, pp. 391–92). This paper presents a holistic approach for identifying some of the key challenges and possibilities for preventing violent extremism in the Finnish context of basic education. For providing a context for our discussion, we will start by providing a short overview of the current concerns related to educational prevention strategies internationally, before moving onto discussing the Finnish context in more detail. In our analysis of the Finnish context, we will pay special attention to the role of religion as a part of the discussions framing national cohesion and the concern for extremism. For discussing the ways in which the prevention of extremism can be approached from the perspective of the core educational functions, we will introduce the concept of institutional habitus that we will use to depict the core functions and objectives of the Finnish educational system. We conclude our paper with a discussion about the consistency of values depicted in the National Core Curriculum for Basic Education (Finnish National Agency for Education 2014, henceforth referred as FNAE) and the National Action Plan for Preventing Violent Radicalisation and Extremism in Finland (Ministry of the Interior 2016). Religions 2018, 9, 420 3 of 16 2. Addressing Violent Extremism in Education As the international literature reviews and policy analyses carried out, for example, by Ghosh et al. (2016), Gearon (2013), and Christmann (2012) bring forward, the way in which formal education can act as a supportive element against the attraction of violent ideologies has become an increasingly important aspect in educational policies in many countries across the world. However, the role given to education also takes many forms—depending on national setting—and it should not be assumed that all educational systems have similar objectives (e.g., Ghosh et al. 2016). Instead, educational systems differ notably, for example, in the ways in which they support the relationship between the individual and the society and how, for example, religions and worldviews are taken into account in the societal educational arenas and integrated or excluded from both content areas and educational practices—and, in connection to that, regarded as public or private issues. For example, the public education in Pakistan perceives religion as a public issue and has an intention to strengthen the Islamic identities of all students through the public education system (Ghosh et al. 2016, p. 20). In contrast, France has a strongly secular agenda where religion needs to be kept in the private sphere of life (e.g., Casanova 2009), whereas Finland emphasizes the freedom of religion as a starting point for both public and private practices (Finnish National Agency for Education 2014). Likewise, the impact and quality of education are dependent on factors such as the level of access to education, the training of teachers, and quality and availability of teaching materials. However, despite of the differences that underline the characters of public educational systems in different contexts, research suggests some common guidelines that education should focus on when aiming to prevent the attraction of violent ideologies and increasing social interaction within societies. These include, for example, the enhancement of young people’s resilience towards extremist ways of thinking by providing them with various types of content knowledge concerning international rights and agreements (e.g., Davies 2016), different worldviews and religions (e.g., Author, various dates), as well as by providing the young people with positive, inclusive experiences of the schools as a safe social place (e.g., Skovdal and Campbell 2015; Tucker et al. 2015). However, recent experiences have shown that implementation of educational prevention agendas is in many ways a complex task, as execution of their goals may take many forms (e.g., Ghosh et al. 2016) depending on the ethos and aims of national education. In some countries, educational strategies aiming to act as countering forces for violent extremism have come to bind the educators to monitor their students for possible signs of radicalization, as within the ‘Prevent’ program in the UK (Prevent 2015) or the ‘Prévenir pour protéger’ (PNPR) plan in France (PNPR 2018). These types of guidelines thus operate under the assumptions that radical or extremist thinking is linked with particular ideologies and background factors. For example, in the context of the British Prevent, the ideologies defined as harmful are the ones that oppose ‘fundamental British values’ (Gov. UK, Department of Education). However, previous studies have shown that the people taking part in ideologically motivated violent actions, come from a variety of socioeconomic and educational backgrounds (e.g., Sieckelinck et al. 2015) and it is usually not one but several background factors that together may increase the risk of violent actions (e.g., Hafez and Mullins 2015; King and Taylor 2011). Studies have also shown that the ways in which people start to lean towards violent extremism can take many forms (King and Taylor 2011; Wilner and Dubouloz 2010). Because of the contextual and colliding influences that background factors may have together contribute into, Hafez and Mullins (2015) suggest that radicalization should not even be referred to as a process but rather as a ‘puzzle’ (Hafez and Mullins 2015). However, this complexity of the phenomenon is often not visible or explicit in the prevention strategies implemented in schools. The strategies that are based on the profiling or monitoring pupils have been strongly critiqued for the ways in which they allow—and even enable—the making of hasty and false conclusions about individuals being ‘at risk’. In practice, these agendas have led to overreactions especially concerning the existence of radical Islam in British schools (e.g., Arthur 2015). This type of classification where some students are regarded as vulnerable because of their religion or any other single background factor is also problematic because it Religions 2018, 9, 420 4 of 16 may put constrains on the pedagogical possibilities for open and critical discussions and for addressing sensitive and controversial issues in classrooms (e.g., Sukarieh and Tannock 2015). Another key problem related to this approach concerns the oversimplification of the radicalization process and the social and psychological push and pull factors they may involve (Ghosh et al. 2017, see also Hafez and Mullins 2015). The importance of social belonging has been recognized in various psychological and educational studies as being central for the individual’s psychological well-being. However, due to the mixture or ‘hybridity’ (Davies 2009, p. 189) of coexisting social attachments and memberships people have in their lives, it is extremely difficult to identify, especially from the outside, what it means for an individual to part of a group. Likewise, various forms of social ties are created online making it possible that the social connections are not necessarily visible on the outside (Schuurman et al. 2017). According to previous studies, social networks—and the lack of them—play a crucial role both in the push and pull factors that attract people to support violent extremist ideologies and join these movements, but also in those cases where the actor has seemed to be working alone (e.g., Schuurman et al. 2017). These networks often take place online and, as Droogan et al. (2018) have brought forward, social media plays a central role in the ways in which terrorist organizations nowadays carry out their operations from recruitment to communication, both within their network and as regards the ways in which they aim to spread terror among the public. Contrary to the countries utilizing such educational agendas as those mentioned above, Finland does not have a distinct plan designed specifically for educational institutions. Still, there is a National Action Plan for the prevention of violent radicalism and extremism that defines education as one of the ‘key policy sectors’ for carrying out prevention include education (Ministry of the Interior 2016, p. 17). ‘Prevention’ is thus aimed to be carried out principally as a part of everyday schoolwork. There is, however, a notable lack of understanding about the ways in which the content of the National Action Plan should in fact be implemented and transformed into educational practices. Our study aims to contribute towards filling this gap, especially in terms of aiming to identify the ways in which the three fundamental functions of Finnish basic education address religious and nationalist identities, and the ways in which these relate to the internationally recognized need to ‘prevent violent extremism through education’. In order to contextualize our examination to the particular national setting, that of Finland, we will briefly present the topical issues concerning religious diversity and right-wing nationalism in the following. 3. The Secular–Lutheran Hegemony in Finland A central issue concerning social cohesion and prevention of violence in many countries relates to the approaches and support education provides on the formation of national identities and self-understanding. As a northern European country, Finland, like the other Nordic countries, has a strong connection to Christianity in its history and the church has traditionally played an important role also in the formation of the school system (e.g., Poulter et al. 2015). The role of Christianity was also central in the narratives used for creating a national ‘Finnish’ identity to differentiate the new nation from the others during the strives for independence in the early 1900. Similarly to all types of social communities, the collective identity defining a nation is based on shared understandings of symbolic representations, sense of belonging, and imaginaries that separate the group from other groups (see e.g., Anderson 2006; Hall 1997; Habermas 1987). In the Finnish context the linkage between Christianity, particularly Evangelic-Lutheranism as part of ‘Finnishness’ has created a hegemony that is still notable. Despite or the increase in secular values and plurality of other religious traditions in the society, a vast majority, around 71 percent, of Finnish people are members of the Evangelic–Lutheran church (Official Statistics Finland 2017). The number of people not belonging to any religious communities is around 26 percent and the number of people belonging to other religious communities is around 2.4 percent (Official Statistics Finland 2017). Whereas these numbers do not necessarily tell much about the ways in which people identify as being religious or nonreligious (see e.g., Day 2009) they Religions 2018, 9, 420 5 of 16 provide an example of the hegemonic position that Christianity has had, and still has, in being the main religious tradition in Finland. Issues related to religions are also central in the discourses of the nationalistic right-wing movements that exist in Finland. Many of these neo-nationalist, alt-right movements both in Finland and elsewhere oppose immigration and ‘nontraditional’ and ‘non-Western’ values (Eger and Valdez 2014) that often culminate in concerns over ‘Islamization’ of the country. Whereas it is important to recognize the fact that far right parties and white-supremacist movements have many types of orientations and reasons why people join them (Golder 2016; Suttmoeller et al. 2018), these movements typically share a vision of a group that is distinct, and a target of suppression by others (e.g., Atton 2006; Angouri and Wodak 2014). The definition of the ‘other’, the threat, is thus central in the pursues to ‘save’ or ‘preserve’ national identities and/or the economic stability of the nation from being overruled by ‘others’ (see e.g., Atton 2006). For example, Mäkinen (2017) brings forward that the discussions carried out by the Finnish far-right movements are based on a neoliberal vision of citizenship in which a person’s value is connected to their economic productivity. Thus the people, typically immigrants, who are not considered as economically productive, are regarded ‘disposable’: “Anti-immigration activism strives to exclude certain groups of people from the realm of respectable and recognized citizenship, and these groups are defined as outsiders specifically in relation to the ideal of neoliberal citizenship. As uselessness and moral deficiency are turned into cultural attributes, these attributes are simultaneously pushed as far away as possible from the anti-immigration activists themselves”. (Mäkinen 2017, p. 227) Similar types of othering have been suggested by Casanova (2009) in cases where religions and worldviews that have become increasingly regarded as a security threat. As Casanova (2009) brings forward, in the time of ‘political secularism’ religions are not only regarded as passé but they have become increasingly associated with violence. However, as Casanova (2009) also points out, the threat of violence is never associated with one’s ‘own’ tradition that in the European context has been Christian. Likewise, Miah (2017) has claimed that this idea and notion of othering is central also in discourses of terrorism where the root causes and actions related to terrorism are being distanced from the European self-understanding and blamed on someone else (see also Malkki and Sallamaa 2018). The popularity of right-wing extremism has been steadily growing in various European countries over the last few years (e.g., Eger and Valdez 2014). Whereas there is no single reason for this, the popularity of these movements is typically explained by the way they answer to various types of ‘grievances’ (Golder 2016). These grievances focus especially on the uncertainties related to declining economic stability, rupturing national cohesion, and needs to strengthen group identity through feelings of superiority, and these movements answer to these needs (Golder 2016). For gaining an overview of the topical themes in the Finnish context, we will shortly present the National Action Plan for Preventing violent extremism and, especially, on the role that the document gives to education. 4. National Action Plan in Finland Regarding the guidelines for preventing extremism within the Finland, the Finnish Ministry of the Interior has introduced a National Action Plan for the prevention of radicalism and extremism first in 2012 and a second plan in 2016. Regarding the second action plan, the annual report published in 2017 identified six main forms of social and political changes that have increased violent action in both in Finland and internationally. These are increased threat of attack, which refers to attacks by members of Daesh in Syria and within Europe; propaganda, fake news, and hate speech, which refers to the use of social media as a platform for spreading certain types of ideologies (e.g., jihadist propaganda) and for fragmenting social cohesion within societies; volume of hate crimes recorded by the police, which refers to the fact that the number of hate crimes is seen as a factor that may increase the risk of radical violence, as hate speech increases the sense of marginalization and victimization in its targets; number of people residing in the country illegally, which refers to the fact that people Religions 2018, 9, 420 6 of 16 living in poor and vulnerable situations can easily ‘participate in criminal action or be subjected to propaganda and recruitment urging them to join violent radicalization’; and violent far right, which refers to the increasing visibility of groups that strongly resist immigrants and Islam (p. 12) and may take part in violent actions, and networks, which links together people according to their motives, whether religious, national or something else (Ministry of the Interior 2017). The role of education in addressing all of the previously mentioned concerns is central and it extends from developing the young people’s multiliteracy skills to collaborations with the police (Ministry of the Interior 2017). The National Action Plan calls for the ‘increase competency, expertise, and awareness’ (p. 26) of radicalistic thinking but does not provide any specific instructions about the ways, in which this should be done. Unlike the prevention programs in many other countries (see e.g., Lynch 2013; Davies 2009), the Finnish agenda or report does not start by identifying a specific group that can be considered as vulnerable for adopting radical worldviews, but, instead, highlights the importance of students’ inclusion and well-being as main ways for preventing violent radicalization and extremism. It also suggests that the pathways leading to violent behavior could be separated from other forms of being disadvantaged. However, by saying that educators are not necessarily aware of the background factors and processes that can make students vulnerable for radicalism, the National Action Plan (Ministry of the Interior 2016) insinuates that radicalism is a process that is triggered by external inputs and concerns mainly “vulnerable” students: “While teachers do notice various signs of radicalization in adolescents, they do not always distinguish how the behavior or various problems may be associated with and make them vulnerable to radicalization. When it comes to the safety and security processes at schools and other educational institutions, it is also important to steer the operating culture towards pupil participation and well-being. Pupil and student welfare services along with case management and service coordination are also important means for breaking the radicalization process. Teachers are professionals in education and, as a part of the teaching process, they are able to improve pupils’ media literacy skills and discernment and thereby increase their understanding on how to influence decision-making in society through non-violent means”. (p. 17) From the statement above, it can be noticed that the core values that are taken as self-evident starting points for all education condemn the use of violence. However, instead of simply denying the use of violence, the report aims to highlight different ways for tackling with the underlying pathways and background features that may lead a person into a vulnerable state. The document views violent extremism as a phenomenon that may touch anyone in one form or another. Thus, the primary approach for tackling early signs of violent extremism in schools should not, according to the Action Plan, be based on denying certain thoughts and opinions or judging the people presenting them, but on finding ways that could better support the individual’s well-being and buffer against any harmful developments, such as social exclusion that might make the person vulnerable for various types of influences. In other parts of the document, the Action Plan also points out the complexity of background factors and processes that can be associated with radicalization (p. 12). The general guidelines focusing on the role of education are wide and, instead of providing practical suggestions for teachers, they highlight the need to provide training for teachers and other people working with young people. The report does not mention the contents that the teachers should be trained about, but merely suggests that “Developing competencies and professional skills is supported by information obtained from research” (p. 26). However, up to date educational research on radicalization and extremisms in the Finnish context is still extremely scarce in Finland. In order to provide the educators with necessary knowledge about the prevention of radicalization within education, it is not, however, enough to research only the themes that the National action plan has identified as threats. Instead, we claim that attention needs to be given also to the ways in which the Finnish educational system itself transmits values, customs, and various forms of capital (see Bourdieu 1986) and thus act as a space that enables or hinders the push and pull factors of violent Religions 2018, 9, 420 7 of 16 extremism from emerging. For providing a holistic understanding about how and why the role of public education in preventing violent extremism can be approached in the Finnish context, we will introduce the concept of institutional habitus next. 5. Institutional Habitus in Finland The definition of national education is not a tangible, clear-cut construction that remains static over time and place. Rather, it is an ideal, an imagined venture that is actively and continually created on the premises of several fundamental elements that are defined and executed differently in different parts of the world. Being malleable, its objectives and contents are typically adjusted in response to societal changes and needs. Education has always offered powerful means to perpetuate national hegemonies and agendas and to provide citizens with desired social, cultural, and symbolic capital (see e.g., Bourdieu 1986). By defining the values that public education is used to promote, education produces and reproduces an understanding of a social community and the individual’s role within that community. Thus, school systems are also one of the key actors that can renew or disrupt the social structures governing the ways in which individuals gain access to power within the society. As Bourdieu (1986) has brought forward, the capital people gain and consume in life is not only financial but also cultural, and social by nature. Whereas having a formal education may increase the individuals’ success in accessing economic capital, the process of education itself is important for providing the individual with cultural and social forms of capital. By social capital Bourdieu (1986) refers to social memberships that allow the individual to access the capital acquired and ‘owned’ by the collective group. Cultural capital, again, refers to the ways in which an individual is able to acquire access to the culture surrounding them both in the forms of thoughts and ideas as well as material objects (Bourdieu 1986). Therefore, in order to discuss and establish the role of education in the prevention of extremisms, it is necessary to understand the fundamental elements that define and delimit national education in each country. Taking Finland as an example, we will shortly describe the contextual specificities of national education next. The Finnish basic education consists of primary (7–12-year olds) and secondary (13–16-year olds) education. The education system is free and consists predominantly of public schools. Almost all children attend a public school, as the private school sector counts currently less than 90 institutions in Finland (Yksityiskoulujen Liitto ry 2018). All Finnish basic education institutions need to follow the National Core Curriculum for Basic Education that is published by the Finnish National Agency for Education (Finnish National Agency for Education 2014) and created in a collaborative process including teachers, educational experts, and policy-makers. The National Core Curriculum provides the foundation, the principles, and the broad outlines for local curricula, which are drafted separately in each municipality. This proceeding allows for local needs and perspectives to be taken into account in school education. According to the Finnish National Agency for Education (Finnish National Agency for Education 2014) the Finnish basic education has a mission to provide ‘equal opportunities for all citizens to high-quality education and training’ and emphasizes education’s role as ‘a key to competitiveness and well-being of the society’. To this end, Finnish national education has three main functions that are the pedagogical, societal, and cultural functions (Finnish National Agency for Education 2014). The pedagogical function of basic education is to offer students opportunities to develop their skills in versatile ways, and to strengthen students’ positive identity as individuals, learners, and community members. The societal function of basic education is to promote equality and justice and to help prevent inequality and exclusion. The cultural function of basic education is to foster cultural awareness and appreciation of cultural heritage and to support students with their own identity construction. Based on these functions, the Finnish Core Curriculum outlines different sets of individual strengths and social competences as well as awareness and openness to the outside world as the fundamental qualifications and objectives basic education is purported to promote. ‘Basic education is to support pupils’ growth towards humanity and ethically responsible membership of society and to provide them with the knowledge and skills Religions 2018, 9, 420 8 of 16 needed in life’ (Finnish National Agency for Education 2017). The Finnish education system is thus based on objectives that recognize education as a transformative force for both individual and societal developments. The pedagogical, societal, and cultural functions compose the foundation and dictate the purpose of national education in Finland. In order to discuss how these functions are translated within the basic education at institutional level, the concept of institutional habitus (Reay et al. 2001) is deployed. ‘Institution’ here refers to national education as the unit of analysis and an entity that encompasses the deeply embedded values, relational issues and priorities that inform practice and normalize particular knowledge and understandings within an educational realm (Jabal 2014; Benjamin and Alemanji 2017; Thomas 2002). Institutional habitus stems from three distinct, but intertwining elements, which are (1) the educational status, (2) the ethos, and (3) the organizational practices of education. First, the educational status refers to the contents of the national curriculum, which steer the overall direction and educational objectives of individual schools. Second, the ethos i.e., the cultural and expressive characteristics disclose the general ethos of national education that consists of the assumptions, attitudes and expected outcomes that are embedded in it. Third, the organizational practices indicate the broad organization of the schools including their approach to pedagogy and assessment. Together these three elements create a space, where certain types of identifications and experiences are encouraged and solicited, and certain values, language, conduct, and knowledge are regarded as legitimate and preferred. It is relevant to examine these elements on a national level, as they reveal the national hegemonies embedded in education and thus make explicit the hidden curriculum that governs alongside the official national curriculum (Jackson 1968). As discussed earlier, hidden curriculum is acknowledged as central in the socialization of pupils and in preparing them to be involved in the life of the societal public sphere. For identifying how the Finnish education system reflects and reproduces the core values that the society uses for supporting national cohesion, and how religions and worldviews are included in this process, we will address the three elements of educational status, the ethos, and organizational practices in the Finnish context next. 6. The Core Values and Hegemonies of Institutional Habitus in Finnish Education 6.1. Educational Status According to the National Core Curriculum (Finnish National Agency for Education 2014), Finnish basic education is grounded on the principle that all people, regardless of their ethnic origins, age, abilities, wealth or place of residence, must have equal access to free high-quality education. The core values of basic education highlight the principles of humanity, equality, and democracy. Each individual is considered as unique and worthy of respect: “Each pupil has the right to grow into his or her full potential as a human being and a member of society. To achieve this, the pupils need encouragement and individual support as well as experiences of being heard and valued in the school community. They also need to feel that the community cares about their learning and well-being. Equally important are experiences of participation and opportunities for working together with others to advance the functioning and welfare of the community”. (p. 26) The national curriculum formulates that in order to develop a positive identity, the pupils must be supported and guided in different domains of social capital (Finnish National Agency for Education 2014, pp. 13, 315). In Finland, the pupils are entitled and encouraged to learn about their cultural heritage and traditions and those of the others, including the right to develop their proficiency in their home language. Multilingualism is seen as normative in a plural society and as an asset to intercultural understanding enabling engaged citizenship and participation. As language is an essential element of identity, mother tongue lessons are provided for those children who speak another language than Finnish or Swedish at home. The national curriculum also acknowledges the role of religion as a part of identity. The knowledge of one’s own and other Religions 2018, 9, 420 9 of 16 religions is viewed as an important element in identity construction and central for understanding societal diversity and the dialogues around religions and worldviews, and their role in the history of mankind. By international standards, the educational status of the Finnish school system is thus special as it has a unique approach on religious and secular ethics education as part of the curricular content. In the following, we will briefly describe the outlines of religious education in Finland as it relates to the topic of this paper. Religious education, or its alternative, secular ethics education, are compulsory subjects in the national education in Finland and they are organized according to the religious denomination of the pupils (see e.g., Kallioniemi and Ubani 2016). As religious education has a long history in the Finnish school system and as the vast majority of the citizens have been members of the Evangelic–Lutheran church, RE lessons have been relatively easy to organize as part of the lesson pool equal to biology or mathematics, for example. However, the diversifying social fabric has challenged the status quo regarding the organization of RE lessons as currently schools need to offer religious education for any religious orientation that has a curriculum and that is approved by the National Agency for Education, in cases where there are a minimum of three students within the school district who belong to this religious community and want to have RE according to it. Currently there are 13 approved curricula for religious education in Finland, but not all of them are actively taught in schools. All RE curricula share the same main objectives of increasing the students’ knowledge of their ‘own’ religion, the religions in the world and the ethics of a good life. However, the actual study contents are different from one religion to another, and therefore students are divided into different learning groups during RE lessons. Notwithstanding, all teaching in RE is defined as nonconfessional and it is not allowed to carry out religious practices, such as praying, in these classes. The pupils who are not members of any religious communities, take part in secular ethics education that also has its own curriculum. New forms of organizing the teaching in more integrative and inclusive way have been developed over the recent years and the way in which religious and secular ethics education should be reorganized has been the topic of several debates in the Finnish public discourses (see Åhs et al. 2016). According to the general objectives of religious and secular ethics education, all pupils, regardless of their choice of RE, should thus gain a basic understanding about the major world religions and secular worldviews and the ability to act in a global world where they will encounter people with different beliefs (Finnish National Agency for Education 2014). However, in addition to the subject specific education, religions and worldviews are included in the general value basis and objectives of all basic education. The national curriculum emphasizes that fruitful collaboration with the pupils’ families is based on educators’ open-mindedness and respect of the different religions, beliefs and traditions present in the pupils’ families (p. 15). Likewise, the curriculum states that schools should act as learning communities where the students collaborate and learn about themselves and of the others by collaborating with people with different types of cultural backgrounds, religious orientations, home languages or worldviews (p. 16). The educational status of the Finnish system is thus strongly supportive of socialization that does not separate people according to their personal characteristics and affiliations but encourages societal engagement and the feelings of unity in diversity. It delineates the cultural, religious, and linguistic plurality of the individuals as a positive feature for the society. Nominally, the educational status supports the previously mentioned pedagogical, societal and cultural functions of education. However, the true possibilities for societal belongingness and cultural identity construction may be limited because of the powerful presence of the national secular Lutheran hegemony. For example, studies have shown that both educators and pupils show various attitudes regarding the ways in which the religious symbols or customs should be allowed to be represented in schools (Kuusisto et al. 2017) Also, the ways in which the curricular missions and objectives are understood by individual teachers and turned into pedagogical practices are not necessarily straightforward, as we will discuss further. Religions 2018, 9, 420 10 of 16 6.2. Educational Ethos and the Expressive Characteristics of Education The principles and objectives embedded in the educational status have a strong channeling and guiding influence for the educational ethos. Aligned with the curriculum, the ethos or the expressive characteristics of education comprise of expectations, conduct, attitudes, and assumptions (Reay et al. 2001), subtly conveying messages of ‘who we are’ (Cornbleth 2010, p. 281) and ‘what we want to achieve here’. McLaughlin (2005, pp. 311–12) argues that the ethos of education is an underlying entity that consists of various aspects of educational objectives and practices: “The influence of an ethos is seen in the shaping of human perceptions, attitudes, beliefs, dispositions and the like in a distinctive way, which is implicated in that which is (in some sense) established.” The ethos of a national school system can be thought of as the aspects of school culture and the value system, which are mediated by the organizational structures, processes, and the educational staff (Smith 2003). In the Finnish context, the National Core Curriculum for Basic Education (Finnish National Agency for Education 2014) defines the ‘Underlying values of basic education’ to include four main themes that are the respect for the uniqueness and value of each pupil ‘just as he or she is’ (p. 34), to support ‘the pupil’s growth as a human being who strives for truth, goodness, beauty, justice and peace’ (p. 35), to see ‘cultural diversity as a richness’ (p. 36), and to strive towards a ‘sustainable way of living’ (p. 37). This document that is guiding national education is thus built around the ethos of inclusion, recognizing the diversity of the present-day student body, including individuals with disabilities and different medical diagnosis and from various religious, ethnic, linguistic and cultural origins as a positive societal feature. However, the way this ethos is mediated to the pupils may take many forms. It is important to note that despite their efforts for equity and neutrality, education can never be neutral (e.g., Bergdahl and Langmann 2018). For example, the core values of the Finnish education system are founded on the idea of inclusion and equity that recognizes individual differences among the students and aims to respond to these by providing the students with various types of teaching and learning experiences. Examples of these are the previously described forms of language and worldview education that is adapted according to the individuals’ backgrounds. The core values thus aim to support all individuals’ access to the various of forms of capital within the society (Bourdieu 1986) and enhancing their membership within it. However, it is also important to note that the educational system does not have a relativist approach in which it would regard all systems of values as equally acceptable (see also Bergdahl and Langmann 2018). Following from this the teaching and learning content and activities taking place in basic education cannot be tolerant or endorsing towards any types of religious or secular ideologies or values that contradict with the core values of the curriculum (Finnish National Agency for Education 2017). Nevertheless this ethos of the Finnish education cannot be imposed by external rules but, in order to make value education meaningful, schools should be places that encourage critical thinking and voicing of various types of opinions and concerns that can then be subjected to critical examination (Finnish National Agency for Education 2014; see also Bergdahl and Langmann 2018). However, the ways in which these objectives are met in practice requires careful consideration starting from the fact that the teachers themselves are trained according to educational models that are always socially, politically, and historically grounded (Poulter et al. 2015), and this evidently impacts their constructions and perceptions of ‘ideal’ students (Smith 2003). There is thus always a risk that the national social fabric conditions one to see certain groups as the majority representing ‘the normal’ and some others as minority as if having ‘distinct’ identities and values (Poulter et al. 2015, see also De Oliveira Andreotti 2012) or as ‘vulnerable’ (Brunila and Rossi 2018). Bourdieu talks about ‘social order’, which is ‘progressively inscribed in people’s minds’ through systems like education that lead to an ‘unconscious acceptance of social differences and hierarchies’ and to ‘a sense of one’s place’ (Bourdieu 1986, p. 141). Thomas (2002, p. 433) argues that ‘a traditional institutional habitus assumes Religions 2018, 9, 420 11 of 16 that the habitus of the dominant group (i.e., white, male, middle class, able-bodied, etc.) is not only the correct habitus, but treats all students as if they possessed it, and this is reflected in teaching, learning and assessment strategies’. The ethos of education is also expressed through educational expectations schools have regarding their pupils. Teachers’ expectations of individuals who fall beyond the dominant group are often different from those reserved for the dominant group, and this has far-reaching impacts on the pupils’ self-worth as well as on their future orientations (Brunila et al. 2017). An example of this kind of inadvertent exclusion can be found in the Finnish education context that has been strongly influenced by ‘secular Lutheranism’ as part of the Finnish culture (Poulter et al. 2015). Apart from certain neighborhoods in the capital area, the ethos in the Finnish schools still considers the ‘dominant group’ to consist of white, secular Lutheran, middle-class, Finnish-speaking individuals who adhere to traditional Finnishness with its norms, values, and worldviews, as described earlier. The dominant tradition is visible, for example, in the cultural traditions celebrated within schools (Niemi et al. 2014). The identification of societal hegemonies embedded in the educational ethos is relevant for analyzing and developing educational practices, as we will discuss next. 6.3. Organisational Practices The ways in which the core values of education are transmitted into organizational practices varies greatly across countries. In Finland the educational autonomy is high and this becomes visible, for example, in the ways that the Finnish schools have very little standardized tests and there are no school inspections. This means that individual schools are trusted to design their institutional curricula—based on the national and local curricula—allowing for variation according to the local realities, dynamics, and requirements. Individual teachers have great pedagogical autonomy to decide about the methods of teaching and the use of textbooks and other materials. They may also make pedagogical decisions on how to prioritize the contents and objectives defined in the curricula (Finnish National Agency for Education 2017). Teachers are therefore in a central position translating the national agendas into pedagogical practices. The practices include, for example, the choices about the organization of teaching and learning situations, the methods of teaching, and forms of learning and assessment. All of these choices are also central for the ways in which the educational settings support or restrain the students’ sense of inclusion in the school community. This freedom that individual schools and teachers have in implementing the curricula thus also underlines the moral and ethical responsibility of each teacher to be sensitive and critical regarding the values and ideologies that are transmitted to the students as normative. Following the educational ethos, the organizational practices in Finnish schools are set to promote inclusion and well-being of all students but, as described previously, this bears a risk of teachers remaining blind to practices that are on one hand embracing and normalizing certain identities and worldviews and, on the other hand, ‘Othering’ towards others (Poulter et al. 2015, see also De Oliveira Andreotti 2012). The sensitivity and the abilities of critical thinking and perspective taking of individual teachers become especially central if any kinds of prevention strategies are to be implemented in the Finnish educational system. As the implementation of the National Action Plan for Preventing Violent Radicalisation and Extremism (Ministry of the Interior 2016) is to be done at the level of organizational practices of the institutions, more specifically within the classroom settings, it demarcates the teachers as fundamentally responsible for the national prevention duty. Contrary to many other countries (see e.g., Davies 2016; Ghosh et al. 2016), the current Action Plan does not present notable suggestions for educational practices, but it merely highlights some of the general objectives that are already stated in the national core curriculum for basic education. These include especially the need to support students’ media literacy skills and raising their awareness about different types of religions and ideologies in the world. Whereas the absence of clear guidelines is aligned with the institutional habitus of the Finnish education system that highlights trust and pedagogical freedom, it also makes it imperative for educators to be critical and observant of the implicit hegemonies delimiting the values, worldviews Religions 2018, 9, 420 12 of 16 and identities that are transmitted through education as normative and how these may contribute to the growing social polarization and the upsurge of extreme ideologies at any level of the society. These concern especially the ways in which the religious or national ‘others’ are addressed from the level of the core functions of national education, through the National Action Plan (Ministry of the Interior 2016), to the level of organizational practices in individual classrooms (see also Mäkinen 2017). However, as the National Action Plan currently remains a nonbinding political document its impact on the everyday pedagogical practices in educational institutions remains unknown. Further, according to our evaluation, the core prevention work does not seem to be aimed towards preventing extremism, but rather on the fostering of inclusion and well-being of all individuals within the school community, which the schools should be committed in doing in any case. 7. The Institutional Habitus of Counter-Extremism in Finnish Education In terms of the pedagogical, societal, and cultural functions of national education, we have identified that the institutional habitus of the Finnish National Action Plan (Ministry of the Interior 2016) and the National Core Curriculum for Basic Education (Finnish National Agency for Education 2014) bring forward convergent approaches related to the general ethos and the underlying objectives and values that education is purported to promote. At the core of both documents is the idea of providing the individual with knowledge about various ways of thinking, and experiences of participation and belonging as a pathway to constructive citizenship. Both documents are also strongly founded on the idea of supporting the experiences of social inclusion and avoiding exclusion. However, as our analysis of the institutional habitus of Finnish national education is brought forward, there are numerous ways and issues that may prevent an individual from feeling belongingness and, instead, expose them to feelings of otherness (see also Poulter et al. 2015). Despite the noble aims to respect and nurture the cultural and religious identities of each pupil within basic education, it is likely that in reality the powerful national hegemonies and the persistent ideal of Finnishness dictate and delimit the extent to which diversity is tolerated and fostered in the Finnish society. As we have concluded earlier, there are many issues related to ethics and power in the drafting of national strategies for preventing extremisms and radicalization. For example, regarding the Finnish National Action Plan (Ministry of the Interior 2016), it is noteworthy that despite the fact that Finland has experienced several violent attacks from the 1990s onwards, including school shootings (see Malkki and Sallamaa 2018), the publication timeline (first version published in 2012) of this plan coincides with an increased media attention on terrorism and extremist ideologies as well as with the growing intake of refugees and asylum seekers in Finland. Accordingly, majority of the threats mentioned in the document relate to jihadism, and issues related to illegal immigration are also emphasized. Thus, the document seems to highlight some forms or extremism as more urgent and threatening than the others; a national hegemony, in which a fear for the ‘other’ (see also Casanova 2009; Miah 2017) is predominantly stronger than the fear for, for example, nationalistic right-wing nationalistic movements. The concern, for example, over white-supremacy, was mentioned only under the categories of hate speech and hate crimes (Ministry of the Interior 2016), despite of the fact that right-wing nationalism has much longer roots and platforms in Finland than religious terrorism (e.g., Malkki and Sallamaa 2018; Mäkinen 2017). The ways in which these concerns and the underlying understandings about national and religious hegemonies are addressed in education is central the imaginaries about ‘us’ and ‘them’ are easily turn into hierarchical and exclusive categories such as ‘the Finns’ and ‘the immigrants’ or ‘Finnishness’ and ‘Islam’ where the value of the person is relative to one or several of their social labels (see also Mäkinen 2017). As the current version of the Finnish National Action Plan does not bind the schools to any specific procedures or actions, its value can be measured more in terms of a national statement than a preventive educational program. In the likely situation that Finland is to draft an official national strategy for preventing radicalization within education, the issues related to ethics and power need to be considered and analyzed carefully. One ethical point to consider is who has the legitimate authority and expertise to Religions 2018, 9, 420 13 of 16 design such strategies? We argue that if the liability of prevention of radicalization is laid on educational institutions, the strategies should be created in an interdisciplinary collaboration between experts from educational sciences, decision-makers, and school headmasters, also incorporating the perspectives of the young people to whom these strategies are aimed at. Individual teachers, limited by their personal resources, but bearing the final duty of the preventive practices, need to be offered adequate training and opportunities for professional development. The vague guidelines about the needed competencies promoted in the National Action Plan (Ministry of the Interior 2016) need to be translated into tangible pedagogical practices. As we have stated, the phenomena related to radicalization and extremisms are highly contexts-specific, so all training offered should be research-based and contextualized, including the terminology used to discuss the topics. As mere translation of existing documents from other contexts does not suffice, careful analysis and reflection of the Finnish educational institutional habitus and the hierarchies related to the depictions of nationality and religion should thus precede any such proceedings. 8. Conclusions Related to the prevention of violent extremism, education has been increasingly faced with simultaneous tasks to support the cohesion of the community in which it operates, as well as to empower the individual to act critically in that same community. As the elements underlying national education differ from one society to another, it is important to recognize the context-specific features before drafting any specific educational strategies for the prevention of extremism (see e.g., Ghosh et al. 2016). In this paper, we have taken a closer look at the institutional habitus of the educational system in Finland in regards to its role in preventing violent extremism. We have found analyzing the elements of institutional habitus to be a comprehensive way to describe the realities of national education at institutional level and to discuss the hegemonies that are embedded in it. An understanding of these dimensions is central when framing education as a context for preventing extremisms, as they depict the realities in which prevention is to take place. We argue that the understanding of the why and how about the ways in which national education could or should be harnessed to address ideological extremism is a significant national statement that conveys messages on the acceptability and legitimacy of particular values, identities, religions, and worldviews within the school and the wider society. It is not insignificant which ideologies are seen as a threat for the security or the cohesion of the nation, as this understanding contributes to the national ideological hegemonies and an inadvertent exclusion of some groups and individuals from the social sphere. Action plans and strategies for preventing extremism can, de facto, be considered as national ‘hidden curricula’ for socialization and nation-building that are strongly founded in feelings of belonginess and safety. Related to this it is also important to pay attention to the ways in which education produces its own self-understanding about its role regarding the prevention of violent extremism. To define whether the aim of education is to prevent and go against some orientations or to support and move towards some others is central when policies are turned into pedagogical practices. Author Contributions: Conceptualization, P.-M.N., S.B, A.K., and L.G.; Writing—original draft preparation, P.-M.N., S.B, A.K., and L.G.; Writing—review and editing, P.-M.N., S.B, A.K., and L.G. Funding: This article presents a part of the research project ‘Growing up radical? The role of educational institutions in guiding young people’s worldview construction’ funded by the Academy of Finland Grant No. 315860. The work is also supported by Alfred Kordelin’s Foundation that has granted a working grant to the first author in 2017. Conflicts of Interest: The authors declare no conflict of interest. References Åhs, Vesa, Saila Poulter, and Arto Kallioniemi. 2016. Encountering Worldviews: Pupil Perspectives on Integrative Worldview Education in a Finnish Secondary School Context. Religion & Education 43: 208–229. [CrossRef] Anderson, Benedict. 2006. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. 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Introduction Addressing Violent Extremism in Education The Secular–Lutheran Hegemony in Finland National Action Plan in Finland Institutional Habitus in Finland The Core Values and Hegemonies of Institutional Habitus in Finnish Education Educational Status Educational Ethos and the Expressive Characteristics of Education Organisational Practices The Institutional Habitus of Counter-Extremism in Finnish Education Conclusions References 
work_vicekiyytbfbff24vnoy3fi2ta	----	One person's journey at one school ÂŒ preventing transgender discrimination 18 Race Equality Teaching © IOE Press 2014 There were some people, only about three lads, who would deliberately call me my old name, even though they knew that I wanted to be called Robert. And they used to ask me really horrible questions like how big my dick was, and there was just nothing I could say back to that, so… (Young trans man) I was always on my own a lot, and just sort of yeah, something wasn’t right. I remember getting told [by a teacher] ‘you’d get less hassle if you were more normal.’ (Young genderqueer person quoted in McNamara and Stewart, 2007) In this article we present a case study of good practice. We show how a school can meet the public sector equality duty (PSED) to provide support for young people who are expressing gender variance or identifying as transgender or genderqueer. First, a semantic note. The term genderqueer describes someone who identifies their gender as other than ‘man’ or ‘woman’, or someone who identifies as neither, both, or some combination thereof. Some genderqueer people may identify as non-binary, a third gender or move between gender descriptions in a fluid way. Genderqueer can also be a political term which challenges the binary of gender and heteronormativity (see McNamara and Stewart, 2007, for a fuller discussion of semantics and terminology). In this article we identify common examples of practice in schools where discrimination on the basis of a young person’s gender identity occurs. These concrete examples enable a reflection on how procedures, policies and practices relating to the PSED, with specific regard to gender reassignment, can impact positively on young people’s individual experiences of being part of an institution’s community. The examples also seek to demonstrate the detrimental impact that poor practice, or a lack of support and intervention, can have on young people in school settings. The report Youth Chances Summary of First Findings: The experiences of LGBTQ young people in England states: We are very concerned about what we have found. The high levels of discrimination, abuse and mental health issues that young LGBTQ people face should be a wake-up call to all of us, whether we are involved in the day to day lives of young people as parents or carers, family members, teachers, youth workers, or we are shaping the responses and support young people can access as providers or commissioners of services or policymakers. Our young people are badly served. (Metro, 2014: 2) Gendered Intelligence is an organization that aims to increase the quality of trans people’s life experiences, especially those of young trans people. It works with young trans people across the UK through arts-based programmes, creative activities and one-to-one mentoring to explore identity, community and the wide range of factors that affect lived experiences. In addition Gendered Intelligence supports professionals who are looking for guidance and information with regards to trans issues. It delivers workshops in schools and other settings to engage young people creatively with the themes of gender identity and sexual orientation. One person’s journey at one school – preventing transgender discrimination Catherine McNamara and Jay Stewart Race Equality Teaching © IOE Press 2014 19 The law with regard to gender identity within schools The general equality duty sets out the equality matters that schools need to consider when making decisions that affect pupils or staff with different protected characteristics. Gender reassignment is a protected characteristic under the Equality Act 2010 and it protects those who propose to undergo, are undergoing or have undergone a process, or part of a process, of reassigning their sex by changing physiological or other attributes of sex. A person does not have to be under medical supervision to have the protected characteristic of gender reassignment and does not need to be over 18-years-old. Young people who identify as transgender frequently report that they face disadvantageous circumstances and discriminatory attitudes during their schooling. Things happen to them that are in breach of the law. To date, no case has yet been brought against a school for discrimination on the basis of gender identity or gender reassignment, although many instances of discrimination have been reported informally both internally to the school and externally to other organizations. It has been reported, for example, that: ■a young trans person was not allowed to participate in residential trips; instead, the school and the student decided it would be simpler for all if the student did not go ■teachers repeatedly fail to use the correct pronoun and name for a young person who has notified the school of their intention to transition ■a school limited a student’s timetable in an attempt to reduce the extent of their anxiety and negative experiences, rather than tackling the bullying behaviours causing them. These things constitute discrimination because of the young person’s gender identity. Most of the young people who are involved with Gendered Intelligence take the view that school- based learning related to gender is limited, conservative and heteronormative. Discussion about human biology could include a more complex range of gendered bodies than it currently does. The subjects of gender diversity and transgender identities could be included in the Personal, Social and Health Education curricula – but they are not. Consequently, negative behaviours such as bullying, harassment and discrimination arise. Young gender-variant people testify to withdrawing from the learning process because they feel their lived experiences are not reflected or represented within the curriculum and they are therefore marginalized in school. In a study carried out by Keogh and colleagues (2006), 75 per cent of the trans people who responded to the survey said they experienced problems at school. This is significantly higher than the lesbian, gay or bisexual (LGB) respondents (21 per cent). The problems reported included perceived harassment from teachers and students, being prohibited from using toilets, being expelled because of gender identity and a lack of trans protection policies in the school. Research carried out by Whittle et al. (2007) indicates that young trans people are suffering high levels of violence and abuse. Their research shows that many of the people working with young trans individuals – the teachers, school psychologists and social workers – have received no training in trans awareness and perpetuate negative attitudes and transphobia, possibly through their lack of confidence or awareness of how to think about and work with this group. Gender non-normativity in school settings Schools can be, though are not always, highly policed environments in terms of gender. There are general social ‘rules’ or norms relating to how a ‘man/ boy’ or a ‘woman/ girl’ should present themselves. Some would claim that gender expressions and presentations 20 Race Equality Teaching © IOE Press 2014 are becoming more diverse, that society is becoming more tolerant (Stonewall, 2012; Drake, 2013). Others argue that there is still a long way to go to reach a point where gender norms no longer constrain people. Our experience at Gendered Intelligence is that a school’s environment tends to actively enforce gender normativity through, for example, uniform specifications, hair length, gender- specific sports and so on. The Department for Education document, School Uniform: guidance for governing bodies, school leaders, school staff and local authorities (DfE, 2013) includes a section on human rights, equality and discrimination considerations, pointing out that a school’s uniform requirements must not put certain people at a disadvantage as a result of their connection with a protected characteristic. Most schools operate uniform policies that enable pupils to wear clothes they feel comfortable in, regardless of their gender identity, while also conforming to the school’s ethos of engendering a sense of belonging to that community, a sense of order etc. However, there can still be a culture within a school that fails to tackle inappropriate behaviour directed at, for example, a female student who is masculine-identified and chooses to wear trousers and a ‘masculine’ top and have a boyish haircut. The Crown Prosecution Service’s resource pack for schools on lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender hate crime (2014) offers activities and guidance for teachers. This is an educational resource aimed at tackling homophobic and transphobic bullying and hate crime among young people. One of the short films for use in a lesson on developing an inclusive classroom and a supportive peer group shows a young person who has disclosed a wish to transition from female to male and has returned to school after a break, appearing as male. The film shows the young person’s peers mocking him and questioning his gender identity, undermining his assertion that he is male and wishes to be referred to accordingly. This clip is not about school regulations on uniform, and it looks as though the student has been free to choose his uniform. What it emphasizes is the behaviours, showing how the culture of the peer group needs to be monitored and indicating that interventions are needed if people police each other’s gender expressions in ways that are discriminatory, hostile and offensive. In 2007, Gendered Intelligence was commissioned by the Anti-Bullying Alliance to carry out research into young transgender and genderqueer people’s experiences of bullying at school. A wide range of issues were covered during focus group conversations. One was about uniform, in which a young trans man said: At my school, the uniform for PE is the biggest challenge. It’s always, no matter what sport it is, it’s a hockey skirt. And I refuse to wear it so I went up to the teacher … and I said ‘I refuse to wear this, and I will refuse to do PE unless I get to wear the jogging trousers.’ So I got to do that and then my other teachers gave me a load of hassle ’cause I’ve been made fuss of. (McNamara and Stewart, 2007: 18) The barriers that exist for trans and genderqueer young people are not limited to school environments. Whatever the setting, we as professionals should be making interventions to prevent such experiences – these breaches of equality legislation – from happening. Positive intervention to meet the needs of a young trans person Staff at a school in Oxfordshire were working with a student in Year 8 who was planning to return after the summer break to Year 9 as female – her self-identified gender. They contacted Gendered Intelligence for advice and guidance via the assistant head teacher in charge of the lower school who was also the Key Stage 3 Co-ordinator. Race Equality Teaching © IOE Press 2014 21 Early on in the process of planning to support the transgender student, Jay Stewart, co- director of Gendered Intelligence, delivered a training session with the assistant head, the student’s head of year, the deputy special educational needs co-ordinator, the school nurse and another teacher who was due to become the tutor of an older trans student who had planned to join the sixth form the following September. The session focused on key terms such as transgender, transsexual, gender variant, genderqueer, masculinity and femininity, heteronormativity, and so on, to help staff develop their understanding of the issues around transgender. It also considered compliance with the law around gender reassignment, specifically the Equality Act 2010 and the Gender Recognition Act 2004. Conversation centred on what discrimination and harassment around gender identity could look like in a school, to enable the staff to think through some scenarios they wished to avoid arising. The group constructed a projected timeline for supporting students who wish to attend school in their self-identified gender. They considered what steps the school, parents and other people could take to best support the students. The school made a commitment to support the Year 8 student’s transition, ensuring a safe and supportive environment. After the training session, the staff began by drafting an action plan, meeting with the young person and her parents several times while she was still in Year 8 to share information and discuss anxieties and, chiefly, to plan together how to support her in sharing her trans status with the school. Before informing other students in the school of the student’s intention to transition, the assistant head informed all teaching staff about the decision in a staff meeting and followed this up with an email to all the staff, teaching and non-teaching. A decision was taken to support the student’s peer group friendships as a way of helping her with her transition. The assistant head and the head of year worked initially with a group of her friends in Year 8, before disclosing her trans status to everyone in the school. The idea was to create a safe network among the student’s friends by ensuring that they were aware that she would be transitioning from male to female and what that would mean at school. When the time came to think about informing the year group the assistant head and head of year planned a workshop for all the Year 8 students, delivered by tutors to their groups when the trans student was absent. The workshop introduced the students to what it means to be transgender, how a transgender person might feel, and how the school and each of its individuals can support the transgender student. The workshop drew on a statement written by the trans student titled ‘What does transgender mean?’ to discuss how she was feeling. In another activity, each student wrote down a question for the trans student to respond to and a message for her to read. At the end of the session, the head of year led an assembly for all of Year 8, pledging the school’s support for the trans student. At the end of the day, Year 8 was again called together for a second assembly, at which the trans student was present. She was accompanied to the front of the hall by her parents, brother and the assistant head. She replied to the main questions that had been posed by her peers in the morning’s workshop. The Year 8 students were clearly moved by her ability to communicate coherently and positively about her trans identity. The school emailed a letter to all of the Year 8 students’ parents to inform them fully and clearly about the student’s transition and the measures that had been put in place to support the process. It also gave relevant website addresses for anyone who wanted more information on transgender identities. 22 Race Equality Teaching © IOE Press 2014 With regard to practical arrangements for the student, it was agreed very early on by her, her parents and the school that she should be allowed to use private toilet cubicles usually reserved for staff. She felt more comfortable doing this, at least for the initial stages of coming out to the school. The longer-term plan would be for her to use the female toilets when she felt ready. Similar arrangements were in place for PE in that the student was allowed to change for PE in a private cubicle. From the start of Year 9, she attended girls’ PE lessons, and continued to change privately until she felt ready to use the female changing rooms. It is perhaps important to note that this was agreed with her as something she preferred, not a requirement by the school. Legally, a trans person must feel entitled to use the facilities of the gender they self-identify as. It would be discriminatory to require a trans student to use the toilets designated for people with disabilities. All the work with the student’s year group took place in the penultimate week of the school year. The idea was that any sensation and excitement would die down by the start of the next academic year. At the start of Year 9 the trans student came into school on an inset day to meet her new teachers so she would feel less anxious about facing everyone when she began the new school year. On the first day that the students came into school, all the tutors in Years 7 through 11 read out a notice to their tutor groups about the school’s commitment to protecting every student from harassment and discrimination on the first day of the new academic year. Conclusion Bullying behaviour towards someone who is expressing their gender differently to the norm is complex, and approaches to tackling it need to be specific and carefully planned so they make a real impact on the lives of trans people – or whoever the school is trying to help. It is clear that bullying related to gender expression affects many people, not just trans and genderqueer people. Ideas generated through the report by Gendered Intelligence (2007) on bullying and more recently in the Youth Chances survey stressed the importance of using clearly set out systems to report bullying in a safe way, and for those reports to be acted upon by staff who have a good understanding of gender diversity. In this article we have highlighted the specific actions taken by one school to support one of its students. There are many other strategies and approaches. One-to-one mentoring for young trans, non-binary and gender variant people in full-time education is increasing. All the mentors working at Gendered Intelligence are transgender identified and they can give a young person exploring their gender identity or coming out as trans or non-binary the opportunity to gain support and advocacy or to work together with them to ensure their learning environment is safe and productive. Matters such as undergoing a medical or social transition, can be discussed with a mentor, as well as looking at difficult and challenging aspects of living and studying as a transgender person. Mentoring is funded by the school, college or university and sometimes by the local authority. Experience to date indicates that a trans student is far more likely to complete their programme of study and thrive within a school environment if they have access to this kind of support, and the support of their staff and peers in the school. Equality of opportunity to make good academic progress can be advanced and enhanced for transgender students in specific and concrete ways. As practitioners, the Gendered Intelligence team want to provide spaces, projects and opportunities that can enable young people with a complex relationship to gender engage in creative arts practice – as they might at school – among a group of peers and facilitators who are not hostile, uninformed or ignorant but positive about gender diversity and constructive and Race Equality Teaching © IOE Press 2014 23 respectful towards each other’s differences. Gendered Intelligence wants also to support staff and students in school settings to make the school environment more trans-inclusive and better informed about gender diversity so they can make young people’s lived experiences more positive and enable schools to meet their legal duties to remove disadvantage and eliminate discrimination. References Crown Prosecution Service (2014) Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender Hate Crime Schools Project Resource Pack. Manchester: Crime Prosecution Service. Department for Education (2013) School Uniform: Guidance for governing bodies, school leaders, school staff and local authorities. London: DfE. Drake, M. (2013) ‘How LGBT adults see society and how the public sees them’. Research summary. Washington DC: Pew Research Center. Equality Act (2010) Online. www.legislation.gov.uk/ ukpga/2010/15/contents Gendered Intelligence and GALYIC (2007) A Guide for Young Trans People in the UK. Online. http:// webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/www.dh.gov. uk/en/Publicationsandstatistics/publications/ publicationspolicyandguidance/DH_074258 Keogh, P., Reid, D. and Weatherburn, P. (2006) Lambeth LGBT Matters: The needs and experiences of lesbians, gay men, bisexuals and trans men and women in Lambeth. Online. www.sigmaresearch.org.uk/files/ report2006c.pdf McNamara, C. and Stewart, J.(2007) Issues of Bullying Around Trans and Gender Variant Students in Schools, Colleges and Universities. Online. http://cdn0. genderedintelligence.co.uk/2012/11/17/17-43-56-trans_ youth_bullying_report1108.pdf METRO Youth Chances (2014) Youth Chances Summary of First Findings: The experiences of LGBTQ young people in England. London: METRO. Stonewall (2012) The School Report: The experiences of gay young people in Britain’s schools. London: Stonewall. Whittle, S., Turner, L. and Al-Alami, M. (2007) Engendered Penalties: Transgendered peoples experience of inequality and discrimination. Online. www.pfc.org.uk/pdf/engenderedpenalties.pdf http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ http://www.dh.gov.uk/en/Publicationsandstatistics/publications/ http://www.dh.gov.uk/en/Publicationsandstatistics/publications/ http://www.sigmaresearch.org.uk/files/report2006c.pdf http://www.sigmaresearch.org.uk/files/report2006c.pdf http://cdn0.genderedintelligence.co.uk/2012/11/17/17-43-56-trans_youth_bullying_report1108.pdf http://cdn0.genderedintelligence.co.uk/2012/11/17/17-43-56-trans_youth_bullying_report1108.pdf http://cdn0.genderedintelligence.co.uk/2012/11/17/17-43-56-trans_youth_bullying_report1108.pdf http://www.pfc.org.uk/pdf/engenderedpenalties.pdf 
work_vikdwrnpn5fovfazbbrqajocjq	----	Stalking in Cyberspace John M. Deirmenjian, MD The Internet has revolutionized communication on a global level while creating a medium for stalking. Cyberstalking has emerged as a new form of stalking behav- ior. While 10 states have passed laws against electronic harassment, there has been great debate about whether electronic stalking constitutes criminal behavior or whether a perpetrator is entitled First Amendment protection. In the psychiatric literature to date, there are no studies of cyberstalking. This article focuses on relevant cases of stalking on the Internet. Specific legal issues associated with cyberstalking, such as boundary laws and freedom of speech, are examined. The psychological profile of the cyberstalker, as well as methods of intervention, are discussed. The Internet is an international computer network that has pioneered a new me- dium for communication known as cyber- space. By the year 2000, it is estimated that 40 million people in the United States alone will be sending 60 billion electronic messages annually. ' Cyberspace law is developing as a mul- tidisciplinary specialty that encompasses all cases, statutes, and constitutional provisions that impact persons and institutions in cyberspace. The distinct components of cyberspace law include jurisdiction, free- dom of expression, intellectual property, privacy, safety, equity, and electronic ~ o m m e r c e . ~ Safety issues of cyberspace law include Dr. Deirmenjian is a Forensic Psychiatry Fellow in the Dept. of Psychiatry, Case Western Reserve University School of Medicine, Cleveland, OH, and a Rappeport Fellow of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law. This paper was presented at the 29th Annual Meeting of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law, New Orleans, LA, October 22, 1998. Address correspondence to: John M. Deirmenjian, MD, Forensic Psychiatry, University Hospitals, 11 100 Euclid Ave., Cleveland, OH 44106. E-mail: jdeirmen@ earthlink.net crimes such as cyberstalking. Other cy- berspace crimes such as computer hack- ing, child pornography, pedophilia, and hate crimes are often mistaken for cyber- stalking in the popular literature and the media. Cyberstalking refers to harassment on the Internet using various modes of trans- mission such as electronic mail (e-mail), chat rooms, newsgroups, mail exploders, and the World Wide Web. Cyberstalkers can obtain personal information about their victims, such as home addresses or phone numbers. After obtaining this per- sonal information, cyberstalkers then have the ability to meet their victims in person. CyberAngels, an affiliate of the Guardian Angels, offers an online de- scription of the stalking phenomenon on the Internet, which includes the follow- ing: malice, premeditation, repetition, distress, obsession, vendetta, no legiti- mate purpose, directed toward an individ- ual, disregarded warnings to stop, harass- ment, and threat.3 J Am Acad Psychiatry Law, Vol. 27, No. 3, 1999 407 Deirmenjian Four basic motivations for stalking on the Internet include sexual harassment, love obsession, hatelrevenge vendettas, and powerlego trips.4 This article will introduce cyberstalk- ing as a phenomenon and present specific cases of Internet harassment. Relevant Cases Stalking on the Internet. Case 1 Andrew Archambeau was charged with the misdemeanor of stalking a school teacher whom he had met on a video dating ~ e r v i c e . ~ After five days, the teacher realized that she was not inter- ested in pursuing a relationship. Archam- beau, however, persisted and sent her (the teacher) approximately 20 e-mail mes- sages. When the e-mails were traced to Archambeau, he responded that his "call- er ID" showed that someone from her area was ringing and hanging up and that he perceived it as her shy manner of ex- pressing interest. She denied the claim and went to the police after he left a message on her answering machine say- ing that he had watched her leaving work. He argued that pursuing his romantic in- terest via e-mail was nonthreatening, be- cause e-mail messages can be ignored by the recipient. However, Michigan's anti- stalking law prohibits nonconsensual con- tact via electronic communications.6 Archambeau pleaded no contest to the charges and was sentenced to a year's probation and ordered to undergo a psy- chiatric e ~ a l u a t i o n . ~ Case 2 Cynthia Armistead-Smathers of Georgia received obscene e-mails from the account of Richard ~ i l l ~ a r d . ' She then began receiving messages sent through an anonymous remailer (an on- line service that masks the sender's iden- tity). The messages included phrases, such as "You'd better watch your back," "Let's get it on bitch," and "I'm your worst nightmare." After Hillyard's Inter- net service provider canceled his account, Armistead-Smathers began receiving messages from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in Atlanta where Hillyard worked. She then received thou- sands of messages from men who had seen a posting of a nude woman (pre- sumed to be Arrnistead-Smathers), which listed her e-mail address and offered pros- titution during the Olympics. Out of fear, she moved three times that year, changed her phone number frequently, and began to carry a licensed concealed weapon. The police informed her that there was little they could do, until she received an anonymous message from someone say- ing that he had followed her 5-year-old daughter and her from the post office box to their home. Hillyard was charged with stalking and later acknowledged getting into an online argument with Arrnistead- Smathers but denied sending the messag- 0 es." Case 3 Jayne Hitchcock filed a $10 million lawsuit against the Woodside Lit- erary Agency (Woodside) of New York claiming defamation and harassment.' She had answered an e-mail advertise- ment posted by the agency. In its re- sponse, Woodside asked Hitchcock for a monetary fee and additional payments be- fore it would represent her. The up-front fees raised her suspicion because legiti- mate agents generally earn their money 408 J Am Acad Psychiatry Law, Vol. 27, No. 3, 1999 Stalking in Cyberspace after selling an author's work. So Hitch- cock (as well as other suspicious writers), through posting in Internet newsgroups, informed other writers about possible fraudulence. She claims that the company targeted her for retaliation, defaming her in its ads and subjecting her to a barrage of assaults. Among the incidents cited in Hitchcock's legal complaint: e-mail ac- counts used by Hitchcock, her literary agent, and her employer (the University of Maryland) were flooded with messages (mail bombing); and inflammatory mes- sages were posted in newsgroups under Hitchcock's name. A sexually oriented posting made under Hitchcock's name in- cluded her address and phone number, which led to a series of unusual phone calls, unsolicited magazine subscriptions, and at least one suspicious package that contained incense. Although Hitchcock contacted the local police and the FBI, it was unclear how the author could prove her allegations because no actual threat had been made against her. It would also prove difficult to track the tormentors who had altered their e-mail account in- formation to conceal their identity. The Jayne Hitchcock legal fund was estab- lished, and Jayne Hitchcock testified be- fore a Maryland subcomittee on behalf of a bill to punish instigators of e-mail ha- rassment in the state of ~ a r ~ l a n d . * . g Case 4 Robert and Teresa Maynard, who helped found Internet America, Dal- las's largest Internet access provider, dis- covered harassing messages posted on an Internet n e w ~ ~ r o u ~ . ' ~ Most of the mes- sages closed with the same poem: "Lord grant me the serenity to accept the things I cannot change.. . and the wisdom to hide the bodies of the people I had to kill." The messages ranged from claiming Teresa Maynard as being unfaithful to one message in which the harasser stated, "I have a .45." Kevin Massey, a 30-year- old computer consultant with a criminal record for burglary and weapons posses- sion, was identified as the harasser. Mas- sey claimed that he was responding to online attacks initiated by Maynard and his employers. However, Massey called himself "The Cyberstalker" and even lob- bied to be a guest on Howard Stem's radio show. Case 5 In the United States' first suc- cessful prosecution of a hate crime on the Internet, Richard Machado, a former stu- dent at the University of California, Ir- vine, was convicted of violating the civil rights of 59 mostly Asian students by sending threatening e-mail messages (signed "Asian hater").". l 2 His message stated, "I personally will make it my [life's work] to find and kill everyone [sic] of you personally. OK. That's how determined I am. Do you hear me?" He threatened to kill them if they did not withdraw their enrollment from school. Initially, a jury was deadlocked nine to three in favor of acquittal. After serving a year in jail and undergoing a second trial, he was fined $1,000 and was given one year of probation, which prohibited his use of the university computer laborato- ries. 1 0 , 1 I His attorney argued that the threat was a "classic flame" (online slang for an angry message that is more annoy- ing than harmful). However, many dis- turbed recipients of the e-mail message were prepared to arm themselves with pepper spray, became suspicious of J Am Acad Psychiatry Law, Vol. 27, No. 3, 1999 409 Deirmenjian strangers, and refused to go out alone in the dark. Case 6 Jake Baker, a student at the University of Michigan, was arrested by FBI agents on February 9, 1995 and charged with "transmitting threats across state lines" to a pseudonymous Arthur Gonda.I3 The charge came about after it was discovered that Baker had posted an erotic fantasy on the Internet in which he raped and tortured a character with the same name as one of Baker's real-life classmates. The charges were later re- vised to making a "threat to injure another person," but in the meantime Baker had been suspended from the university, and his story had made headlines around the world. Baker was eventually acquitted, in part because his story was determined to be self-expression and did not constitute a threat. Discussion Stalking is defined as the willful, ma- licious, and repeated following and ha- rassing of another person that threatens his or her safety.14 Meloy and Gothard'' report that stalkers (also known as obses- sional followers) are likely to be older, more intelligent, and better educated than other offenders with mental disorders. One federal study revealed that approxi- mately one million women and 370,000 men are stalked each year.I6 One of every 12 women claims to have been stalked at some point in her life. ~ e l o y ' ~ profiles the majority of stalkers as males who are likely to have prior criminal or Axis I mental disorders, such as drug or alcohol history, mood disorders, or schizophre- nia. Meloy and Gothard" found that 85 percent of their sample qualified for a personality disorder diagnosis, including antisocial, schizoid, borderline, avoidant, paranoid, and personality disorder not otherwise specified. They noted, how- ever, that in comparison with a random group of mentally disordered offenders, obsessional followers more frequently have a Cluster B diagnosis other than antisocial personality disorder. However, paranoid personality disorder (Cluster A) and dependent personality disorder (Clus- ter C) have also been identified. The psychological profile of the cyber- stalker reveals a sophisticated perpetrator (i.e., one who is computer literate and is often financially able to support subscrip- tions to online services). The typical cy- berstalker is the emotionally disturbed loner who seeks attention and compan- ionship in cyberspace and often becomes obsessed with someone he met in a chat room.'' After obtaining personal infor- mation about the acquaintance, the stalker may seek a close, often smothering rela- tionship. If spurned, the stalker launches a campaign of cyberspace harassment, which can extend from online to physical harass- ment if the stalker has obtained personal information about his victim. The stalker can experience sigmficant attachment is- sues and transference as a result of elec- tronic communication. The cyberstalker projects narcissistic linking fantasies upon victims, especially in the absence of sensory perceptions.I7 The pursuit by a cyberstalker tends to have an obsessional, angry nature, usually as a result of rejec- tion. In contrast, sexual predators have a sexualized, deceptive pursuit. l 9 Cyberstalking provides the perpetrator 41 0 J Am Acad Psychiatry Law, Vol. 27, No. 3, 1999 Stalking in Cyberspace with anonymity and the opportunity to conceal gender and identity and to use multiple anonymous remailers, as well as the ability to gain computer access in public domains. For example, Richard Hillyard used computers at his place of employment, which would make a direct link to him more difficult. Moreover, the lack of vocal intonation and facial expres- sion in electronic communication can af- fect the recipient's impression of the se- riousness of a threat. In cyberstalking, the evidence in proving a credible threat is based upon the interpretation of the writ- ten word. Exclamations, repetition of phrases, and the use of boldface print can provide clues regarding the seriousness and emotions of the sender. Electronic communication provides objective data, whereas harassment via the telephone and following are usually based upon subjec- tive reports by the victim or witnesses. The lack of social constraints connected with cyberstalking means that social anx- iety, which typically serves to inhibit aggressive behavior, is nonexistent.17 However, some people consider commu- nication on the Internet as safe, without social inhibitions, and protected against personal embarrassment or cornrnunica- ble diseases. While the Internet has been thought to provide a therapeutic outlet for anxieties that would otherwise be sup- pressed, others believe that fantasy can serve as a precursor to threat, such as in the Jake Baker case.13 Global communications on the Internet raise the issue of borders in cyberspace where there are no physical b~undaries.~' Cyberspace must be governed by a new set of rules. While protected by the First Amendment, activities in cyberspace must abide by state and federal legisla- tion. The absence of geographic borders in cyberspace makes the application of territorial legal doctrine difficult. On a global level, the issue of borders becomes even more convoluted. Even if a new set of laws were created for cyberspace, the enactment of such laws, often in foreign countries, would be nearly impossible. For example, it was impossible to find "Arthur Gonda," the Canadian recipient of Jake Baker's messages. It has been difficult enough for authorities to act upon threats of cyberstalking locally, much less on an international level. In addition, there may be a greater burden of proof imposed upon an accuser to prove that there is imminent danger or threat. However, illegal activities, such as the distribution of child pornography, may be easier to apprehend. If a certain behavior is legal in one country and not in another, it must be determined which laws apply. The evolution of the Internet has brought forth an ongoing debate on whether constitutional law, such as free- dom of speech, applies to the Internet, and if so, to what extent should the gov- ernment impose regulations on online ac- t i ~ i t i e s . ~ ' The free speech issues resulting from the development of the cyberspace medium include anonymity, accountabil- ity, defamation, discrimination, harass- ment, obscenity, and liability of online services and Internet service p r ~ v i d e r s . ~ The Communications Decency Act of 1996 made it a crime to make "indecent" or "patently offensive" material available to minors over the ~ n t e r n e t . ~ ~ ' 23 In June 1997, in a landmark ruling, the Supreme J Am Acad Psychiatry Law, Vol. 27, No. 3, 1999 41 1 Deirmenjian Court struck down the Communications Decency Act, ruling that constitutional free speech protections apply just as much to online systems as to books and newspaper^.^^ To date, only 10 of the 50 states (Ala- bama, Alaska, Arizona, Connecticut, Del- aware, Michigan, Maryland, Oklahoma, New York, and Wyoming) have enacted laws against computer harassment. While laws exist against telephone harassment where the motive is to annoy, threaten, or alarm another person, the difficulty with computer harassment lies in convincing local authorities that such cases are wor- thy of i n v e s t i g a t i ~ n . ~ ~ ? 26 Often, the diffi- culty appears to be that to merit the time and resources of the police, an imminent danger or threat must be present. Thus, the victim must provide proof or evidence that a crime has been committed. For example, in the Machado and Hillyard cases, it was the responsibility of the prosecution to prove the presence of a credible threat. It is clear in those two cases that the victims demonstrated fear for their safety to the extent that they altered their living circumstances and daily activities. In the Jovanovic case, the accused was not perceived to be a threat until the alleged encounter took place. Finally, Jake Baker was eventually ac- quitted because he was not found to be a credible threat. Some police departments are now forming threat assessment units specialized in cyberstalking to facilitate the investigation of these crimes. For ex- ample, in Will County, IL, a special In- ternet prosecution unit was formed for prosecuting all Internet-related crimes within the county. In addition, police of- ficers are being given specialized training to monitor Internet newsgroups for the purpose of apprehending cyberspace criminals. Will County has also made an extensive effort to educate the public about Internet crimes.26 Organizations such as Women Halting Online Abuse (WHOA) and CyberAngels have formed to educate the community about online harassment and to protect individuals from cyberstalkers. CyberAn- gels is a network of volunteer sleuths that watches the information superhighway and investigates more than 10,000 harass- ment complaints a year.27 CyberAngels, which started in June 1995, has more than 1,200 members in 32 countries, creating a global "neighborhood watch" for cyber- space.28 Its director, Colin "Gabriel" Hatcher reports that cyberstalkers can be violent, paranoid, often with poor social skills, malicious, and obsessed with the object of their hatred.3 CyberAngels distributes a pamphlet entitled "Cyberstalking and Internet On- line Harassment" that offers suggestions for preventing and dealing with cyber- stalkers. In the pamphlet, Hatcher advises the reader to choose online user names with care and to avoid feminine names, which will immediately draw people seeking targets. Instead, he suggests choosing gender-neutral names and ad- vises against giving out personal informa- tion such as home addresses, school names, workplaces, or phone numbers. He recommends ignoring online harass- ment at first notice to avoid a "flame war," following which further hate mail and other forms of electronic harassment can ensue. If harassment continues, he 41 2 J Am Acad Psychiatry Law, Vol. 27, No. 3, 1999 Stalking in Cyberspace suggests sending one polite written warn- ing without showing fear or anger or making threats. He also recommends log- ging all evidence from the start and sav- ing all relevant e-mail, which may be collected for evidence if stalking persists and the police are i n ~ o l v e d . ~ Conclusions A new form, of stalking has emerged, known as cyberstalking. To date, no stud- ies in the psychiatric literature have ex- amined cases of cyberstalking. In this ar- ticle, six cases of cyberstalking are presented. The psychological profile of the cyberstalker, in its rudimentary form, is discussed. In addition, controversial le- gal issues such as boundary laws and First Amendment rights are identified, sur- rounding the application of the Internet to existing laws. Finally, there is a brief look at current modes of intervention, ranging from community organizations to state laws. Cyberstalking currently remains an open area for future investigation. References Anna Bevilacqua, Electronic harassment (last modified May 2, 1997). (http://www.wings. buffalo.edu/complaw/complawpapers) Stuart Biegel, What is cyberspace law? (last modified June 9, 1999). The UCLA Online Institute for Cyberspace Law and Policy. (http:Nwww.gse.ucla.edu/iclp/institute.html) Gabriel Hatcher, What is cyberstalking? (http:Nwww.cyberangeIs.org) Gabriel Hatcher, Why do cyberstalkers stalk? (http://www.cyberangels.org) Lewis PH: Persistent e-mail: electronic stalk- ing or innocent courtship? New York Times, Sept 16, 1994, p B l 1 Mich.Comp. Laws 5 750.41 1h (1998) Associated Press: E-mail stalker sentencing likely will influence future cases. The Detroit News home page, Mar 23, 1996 8. Hendren J: Online harassment bill gains momentum. Los Angeles Times, May 25, 1997, p E4 9. McFadden RD: Suspect in New Jersey stran- gling was reportedly sex-case victim. New York Times. Oct 3, 1997, p A1 10. Whitelaw K: Fear and dread in cyberspace. U S . World & News Report, 121 (1 8):50, 1996 11. Hua T: Ex-student sentenced for hate e-mail. Los Angeles Times, May 5, 1998, p A24 12. Maharaj D: U.S. to retry man in hate e-mail case. Los Angeles Times, Dec 2, 1997, p A3 13. Heather Brooks-Szachta, U.S. v. Jake Baker: the role of unique features of electronic mail in a "true threat" analysis. (visited June 18, 1999) (http://www.libraries.Wayne.edu/-jlit- man/brooks.html) 14. Cal. Penal Code 5 646.9 (West 1999) 15. Meloy JR, Gothard S: Demographic and clin- ical comparison of obsessional followers and offenders with mental disorders. Am J Psy- chiatry 152:258 -63, 1995 16. Ackerman E: When obsession turns ominous. U.S. News & World Report, 123(20):43, 1997 17. Meloy JR: The Psychology of Stalking: Clin- ical and Forensic Perspectives. San Diego: Academic Press, 1998 18. Stephens G: Crime in cyberspace. Futurist 29(5):24-29, 1995 19. Meloy JR, personal communication. Oct 1998 20. David R. Johnson and David G. Post, Law and borders-the rise of law in cyberspace. 48 Stan L Rev 1367 (1996) 21. Sableman M: Responsibility on the net: home grown or imposed? St Louis Journalism Rev 26: 11, 1995 22. Communications Decency Act: 47 U.S.C. § 223 (1999) 23. Reuben R: The court logs on: decency act decision may change the nature of the Inter- net. Am Bar Assoc J 83:42, 1997 24. Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) 25. Reiter L: Stamp out e-mail harassment. The Record, May 5, 1998, p LO9 26. Ziembhca S: Will County focusing on internet criminals. Chicago Tribune, May 26, 1998, p 1 27. Fleming M: Stalking on net poses real danger. The Indianapolis Star, Nov 30, 1997, p B01 28. O'Connor C: Women battle online stalking; harassment threats in cyberspace seem to be increasing experts say. Dallas Morning News, Oct 12, 1996, p 1A J Am Acad Psychiatry Law, Vol. 27, No. 3, 1999 
work_vjbrupy67rbaxfmmn3ursxzvxy	----	Journal of Scientific Perspectives Volume 3, Supplement Issue 2019: 1st Understanding Violence Congress, pp. 29-38 E - ISSN: 2587-3008 URL: https://ratingacademy.com.tr/ojs/index.php/jsp DOİ: https://doi.org/10.26900/jsp.3.042 Research Article EXAMPLE OF GOOD PRACTICE OF VICTIM RIGHTS: COMPARISON OF STUDIES IN CANADA AND TURKEY Nil POLAT * University of British Columbia Department of Psychology, e-mail: nilipoli16@gmail.com ORCİD ID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0388-6500 Received: 04 November 2019; Accepted: 13 November 2019 ABSTRACT Victim rights is a concept that has been at the agenda in recent years. This issue, which first came as a sub-title of criminology, then came to life in many developed countries, including the United States and Canada, and important steps were taken about it. All cases of violence against children, including sexual abuse, especially against women and to support the needs of victims in cases of domestic violence, especially psychological, medical and legal aspects to be given to victims who have been assaulted in healing process is very important. Organizations in the developed countries are paying attention to this subject matter. In this study, the practices in Canada that have done important work on Victim Rights will be described as examples of good practice and the situation in our country will be evaluated in terms of Victim Rights by comparing them with the studies in Turkey. Keywords: Victim rights, Child monitoring centers, Help Lines Introduction The concept of victim is defined as someone who has been wronged. Victimization resulting from crime and unlawful acts is the subject of criminal law, while victimization resulting from contract constitutes the subject of private law. Although victims of crime come to mind first when they are called victims, many types of victims such as victims of honor killings, victims of natural disasters, victims of credit, victims of contract can be mentioned. Victim rights gained importance in the world after the 1980s. Our country has started to give the necessary importance to the victims of crime since the 2000s. (TBMM, 2014) https://www.ratingacademy.com.tr/site/ https://ratingacademy.com.tr/ojs/index.php/jsp https://ratingacademy.com.tr/ojs/index.php/jsp https://doi.org/10.26900/jsp.3.042 POLAT / Example of Good Practice of Victim Rights: Comparison of Studies in Canada and Turkey Journal of Scientific Perspectives, Volume:3, Supplement Issue 2019: 1st Understanding Violence Congress 30 The concept of victim in our legislation was first made in the supervision services regulation published in the Official Gazette No. 28578 dated March 5, 2013, which is a secondary regulation. (Ministry of Justice, Victim Rights Department) In paragraph (p) of the first paragraph of Article 4 of the regulation on definitions, the victim is defined as “the person who needs support due to the physical, emotional or material consequences of the crime committed against him or one of his family members in the first degree”. (Yönetmelik) “Dated 40/34 of 29 November 1985, In United Nations Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power” a victim is defined as: “because of actions that violate the criminal law in force in the member states; anybody who suffers a loss of fundamental rights as well as economic losses individually or collectively; physically, mentally, or emotionally”. (Decl. of basic principles- 20) In the Recommendation No. 8 of the Council of Europe Committee of Ministers on assistance to victims of crime, the victim is defined as “a real person who has suffered damage including physical or mental injury, emotional pain or economic loss due to acts and omissions resulting in a violation of the criminal law of a member state”. (dırect. 2012 european parl.- er.22) When the old criminal law period is examined, “Code of Hammurabi”, one of the most important regulations known as the sanctions for revenge, as well as the elimination of the victim's grievance was given importance, and also the provisions for compensation of the damages arising from the crime by the state if the perpetrator is not known. (Holstein 1990 ) In Criminal Procedure Law, all attention was focused on the defendant, which resulted in the disregard of the rights of the victim and the victim. In the period from the 1960s to the present day, the role of the victim, considered to be the neglected and forgotten side in criminal procedure, began to change. (Polat_Kriminoloji) In the evaluation of criminal laws, penalties for crimes have been the main focus and all work has been carried out on the subject matter over the years. However, in recent years it has come to be accepted by all that the concept of crime and criminality alone is not enough and that the victim must be studied.(strang 2002) Victims of crime are no longer the forgotten or neglected side of criminal proceedings. The fact that criminal prosecution systems are more victim-centred has essentially been achieved in two ways. The first is to give victims of crime the right to appearance in hearing, to express themselves and to take this into account during reaching a verdict process of the criminal trial; the second is to start providing programmes and services that compensate victims for their damages. (wemmers 2008) In this study, the practices in Canada that have taken very important steps on the rights of victims will be explained, and then the practices in Turkey will be given and the things to be done in our country will be evaluated in the light of the examples of good practices. Canada The Canadian Victim Rights Act came into force on July 23, 2015. It states that crime has a detrimental effect on victims and society, that victims of crime and their families deserve to be treated with kindness, compassion and respect, including respect for their dignity, that it is important to consider the rights of victims throughout the criminal justice system, that victims of crime have “rights guaranteed under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms”. (manikis 2015) POLAT / Example of Good Practice of Victim Rights: Comparison of Studies in Canada and Turkey Journal of Scientific Perspectives, Volume:3, Supplement Issue 2019: 1st Understanding Violence Congress 31 In Canada, a victim is referred to as a “person who has suffered physical or emotional harm, property damage or economic loss due to a crime”. Prominent victims' rights in Canada are the rights to obtain information, protection, participation and compensation. (Canadian resource center). 1. Right to information: The right to information is one of the most important rights. Especially when the victim has the right to information on the status of the crime against himself on the criminal justice system, their rights to be complaining about crime developing on any situation related to the status and results of the investigation and also has the right to obtain information about the steps that have arrived at the proceedings with. The right to information about the proceedings and proceedings to be held against the perpetrator in accordance with the Penal Code in the court in the following stages, especially in the case of investigations relating to the disclosure of the term and conditions of the prisoner's parole, and in the case of the absence of criminal responsibility is one of the most natural rights of the victim. (Mağdur Hakları Dairesi-Canada) 2. Right to protection: One of the most important issues for every victim who has been subjected to crime is that they can be protected and feel safe. It is one of the most important rights of the victim to demand that the security of the victim be ensured by the competent authorities, especially against the attacker. Ensuring privacy and confidentiality is also very important. He/She also has the right to request the protection of his identity and to request of witnesses to be listened to in criminal complaints. 3. Right to participate: It is very important that the victim be able to express his / her opinion and that this right is indispensable for the rights of the victim. Every victim has the right to inform the authorities in the criminal justice system of his or her opinion regarding acts affecting his or her rights and to demand that his or her views be taken into account. 4. Right to compensation: Every victim has the right to claim compensation from the perpetrator for the crime in court. It is observed that persons convicted of the crimes specified in the law have a responsibility for compensation against every victim who has suffered emotional distress or bodily harm because of the crime they have committed. In addition, in cases of domestic violence, the victim is entitled to compensation for physical, sexual or emotional abuse and violence that he or she has experienced. When we look at the implementation of these rights granted to the victim in Canadian law, it is seen that organizations of victim support offices are prominent. These victim support offices provide services specifically for victims of crimes such as domestic violence, sexual assault and hate crime, as well as children. (Canadian crime victim foundation) The offices of support for victims of crime have two primary tasks. The first of these is the provision of information, protection and support services to victims within the scope of the rights mentioned above. The second is to support the promotion of Victim Rights in all parts of society and to hold meetings and activities to ensure this. In particular, the main objective is to introduce the Victim/Witness Assistance Program (V/WAP). In these support offices, professionals, especially social workers, are employed, but they work in closely cooperation with non-governmental organizations. Employees in these offices and programs need to have knowledge of issues related to victims of crime, particularly in cases related to domestic violence, sexual assault and child POLAT / Example of Good Practice of Victim Rights: Comparison of Studies in Canada and Turkey Journal of Scientific Perspectives, Volume:3, Supplement Issue 2019: 1st Understanding Violence Congress 32 abuse, murder, death, and legislation governing court proceedings, protocols and procedures. They also need to be equipped with risk measurement and safety planning and trauma crisis management. There are 12 sub-offices focused on providing different target groups and different services. These offices are separated by their time, staff structure and services. The offices were formed as follows; 1. Victim Crisis Assistance Program (VCAO): It is available 24/7 in Ontario and there is also an Alo Distress Line. Its employees are of both staffed and volunteers. Early intervention is being carried out for victims at this centre. The working model of the center is to provide short-term support services to the victim, witness or victim's relatives by going to the crime scene with information from the police, as well as to direct them to relevant NGOs for long-term assistance.( Mağdur Hakları DAiresi- kanada) 2. Sexual Assault Centers (SACs): These centers provide services to victims of sexual assault over the age of 16. In this context, to accompany the victim to court, hospital or police station supportive peer counselling, sexual violence training for professionals and the public, legal advice, information and guidance services are provided, they also offer 24-hour Crisis Line. 3. The Internet Child Abuse Counselling Programme is a short-term counselling programme for children and young victims who have been abused through the internet and for family members affected by this crime. 4. Local Victim Services include a variety of culturally sensitive services offered by indigenous organisations and the First Nations, Inuit and Metis communities, adapted to meet the needs of Indigenous crime victims and their families. 5. Family Court Support Program (FCSWP) if victims of domestic violence are at risk of further violence, this program provides support services to the family court during the proceedings. It is aimed to make it easier for victims to understand the judicial process in the family court through support staff within the family court. It provides the services of informing family court support staff about the family court process and directing them to related NGOs, making security planning, including security planning related to participation in courts, and making needs assessment. 6. Partner Assault Intervention Program (PAR) for individuals who attack their partners, a 12-session Group Training/Guidance Program is provided by court order. A separate component of the programme provides victims with assistance in security planning, referral to community resources and information on the progress made by those who commit the crime. 7. Child Victim Witness Program (CVWP) This program is a program that works within the framework of Victim-Witness Assistance Program. Victim and witness children under the age of 18 are provided with support to reduce the trauma they have experienced during the court process. Information and support services are provided to children, ensuring that they are as little affected by the judicial process as possible. Under this program prepared by the children's court process and in order to introduce the process to them a booklet titled “What are you doing in the court?" was prepared. For the same purpose, child-friendly environments are tried to be created in court buildings. 8. Rapid Response Program for Victims (VQRP) This program provides emergency assistance to victims of violent crime for damages that cannot be covered from any source. The program will include: to ensure the safety of the victims to meet emergency expenditures, household repairs to be taken under the emergency law POLAT / Example of Good Practice of Victim Rights: Comparison of Studies in Canada and Turkey Journal of Scientific Perspectives, Volume:3, Supplement Issue 2019: 1st Understanding Violence Congress 33 immediately, safe housing options for those who have emergency accommodation / dining and diapers, personal care items, such as clothing, replacement of spectacles / contact lenses damaged or destroyed during a crime, paying the transportation fee for a family member who goes to identify the victim who died as a result of a murder or a victim seriously injured, the removal of hate crime graffiti from the property and / or vehicle with crime scene cleaning requiring special services, contribution to funeral expenses to help the family of the person who died as a result of a murder. 9. Fragile Victims and Their Families Fund (VVFF) This program aims to provide assistance to relatives of victims who have to come from other places to support the victim. In this context, victims of violence are also assisted. Financial assistance, mainly for travel costs, is being provided to ensure that the families of those who have died as a result of the murder are more able to participate in the judicial process. 10. Financial Assistance Program for the Families of Those who die as a Result of Murder (FAFHV) This program provides assistance up to $10,000 per murder to the eligible families and spouses/partners whose relatives die as a result of murder. 11. Criminal Injuries Compensation Board (CICB): It is an independent panel of judges established under the law on compensation to victims of crime. It assesses the payment of financial compensation to the victims of violent crimes and to the families of those who died as a result of the act. In this context, compensation can be paid to victims for pain and suffering, loss of income, treatment costs, funeral costs, and other costs associated with being a victim of crime. 12. Legal Aid Services for LGBTQ Clients: Client-oriented legal aid services are offered to LGBTQ individuals. Giving the client the assurance that his/her privacy will be protected is at the forefront of keeping his / her sexual orientation / identity confidential. The client or his conduct should not be prosecuted, his individuality should be respected. HIV-related issues should be addressed sensitively. TURKEY Victims ' rights were first raised in our country in 2005. The Criminal Procedure Code published that year included articles on victims' rights. (Code of Penal Procedure, 1929) One of the most striking tasks is the right to request a lawyer from the bar if the victim does not have a lawyer. This applies only in cases requiring sentences of more than 5 years and for sexual assault offences. (Code of Penal Procedure, 1929) Another notable practice for victims is the child monitoring centres (ÇİM), which became operational in 2010. In recent years, these centers have been implemented to provide a multidisciplinary approach to the escalating child abuse cases and to protect the child from trauma as much as possible. (UNDP Turkey, 2014) In Article 103 of the Turkish Penal Code No. 5237, “sexual abuse of children” and in Article 104, “sexual intercourse with a minor” crimes are regulated. The frequency of sexual abuse of children varies between 10-44%. But most of these incidents remain hidden, with only 5-10% occurring revealed. (Turkish Penal Code, 2004) Organizations called “Child Monitoring Center (ÇİM)” have been implemented in order to protect the sexually abused children from secondary abuse within the system. The purpose of the foundation of ÇİM is to prevent secondary trauma of the child who has been sexually abused, to reduce the effects of trauma on the child, to ensure that all judicial, medical and social procedures are performed in one center at a time, to determine risk by consulting with the family, to give counseling, to provide shelter, protection and nutrition needs of the child until a convenient environment is provided. Within the scope of activities to effectively combat POLAT / Example of Good Practice of Victim Rights: Comparison of Studies in Canada and Turkey Journal of Scientific Perspectives, Volume:3, Supplement Issue 2019: 1st Understanding Violence Congress 34 child abuse; “Child Monitoring Center” (ÇİM) was established to increase the protection of children against sexual assaults and minimize their harassment. (Poole,1998) Pediatricians, psychologists, psychological counselors, social workers, Child Development Specialists and nurses work in ÇİM; forensic specialists and child psychiatrists also provide counseling services. Forensic interview, Family interview, forensic examination and psychiatric evaluation procedures are carried out in ÇİM centers. Aiming to eliminate secondary attacking forensic interviews about the incident, receiving information from the children, fault detection or for clarification, each type of maltreatment the child faced with who witnessed to or suspected to be abused by preparing the rest of the report based on the received information and the record of the negotiations is the implementation of the organization.(Polat, 2007) Family meetings are about gathering information about the incident from the child and about family life and obtaining information about the child event-related response and in the attitudes of the solution evaluation, needs to identify appropriate institutions and organizations to be directed to, the family to be informed about the judicial process, keeping informed about operations carried out on the need to demonstrate the attitudes and behaviors to the child, meeting report and interviews are laid out.(Krahenbuhl, 2006) A forensic examination is the examination in which the entire body, including the genitals, is identified in detail, the necessary evidence and findings are collected, recorded when necessary and presented as a report. The victim child will be transported to ÇİM by a civilian team and a civilian vehicle without any interviews by law enforcement agencies. If the received statement has been done to ÇİM, the preliminary interview is obtained as a result of suspected child sexual abuse on the observation that in the direction of a psychiatric examination without forensic or any situations that require emergency response when the situation immediately reported to the Public Prosecutor on duty and the legal process will be started. Children admitted or brought to the center are welcomed by a trained nurse, psychologist, psychological counselor, child development or social worker, and they are taken to pre-interview in the waiting area arranged for the children to undergo the preparation process, and during this time, registration procedures are made urgently. The child's medical care during his / her stay in ÇİM is provided by the hospital to which ÇİM is affiliated, and the real needs are met by the provincial and District Organization of the Ministry of Family and Social Policies. When the child is in the centre, it is possible to have a relative with him so as not to violate the confidentiality of the investigation. Except for those who are suspected of abusing or abusing the child, family interviews are conducted by expert staff and necessary counselling and guidance services are provided to their family and relatives. In accordance with the orders and instructions of the public prosecutor, after the declaration of the victim child is taken, an external or internal body examination is performed on the body by obtaining the consent of the victim or his / her guardian in ÇİM as stipulated in the relevant legislation, samples are taken from his / her body, psychiatric examination is carried out and images of physical findings are recorded. The declaration of the victim child shall be taken in accordance with the relevant legislation by means of the public prosecutor, an expert who is employed in ÇİM and trained on this subject, in a mirrored room, by making audio and video recording. Maximum attention will be paid to the victim's privacy during this whole process. After the interviews and examinations are completed, all the information and documents obtained are made into a report POLAT / Example of Good Practice of Victim Rights: Comparison of Studies in Canada and Turkey Journal of Scientific Perspectives, Volume:3, Supplement Issue 2019: 1st Understanding Violence Congress 35 and sent to the attorney general of the Republic together with audio and video recordings. (Ministry of Health) It should be noted that this service provided for the abused child is a turning point for Turkey in terms of Victim Rights. But looking at the empty side of the cup, it appears that there has been no service to date to the very different fragile groups, such as women, the elderly, refugees, ethnic, LBGTQ groups, that we have seen on the Canadian application. In our country, which has a large floor area and a large population in the second dimension, the presence of only 4 victim service centers is also a problem in terms of not being able to take the service. In order to provide psychological, sociological and legal counselling services to the victims after the crime, to improve the rights of the victims in general and to remedy the harm of the victims, a victim rights law must be adopted in its own right. The Department of Victim Rights established under the Ministry of Justice carries out studies on the issue.( Ministry of Justice, Victim Rights Department ) In the second paragraph of Article 209 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it is arranged that the court may decide to read documents containing personal data belonging to the accused or the victim in a closed session if they explicitly request it. However, there is a lack of regulation regarding the retention of the victim's personal information from the accused. For this reason, there should be legal regulation regarding the withholding of the victim's personal information, especially address information, from the defendant. (Code of Penal Procedure, 1929) If the victim does not know the rights granted to him, it will not be possible for him to benefit from these rights and these rights will have no meaning. It is therefore of great importance that the victim is informed about her rights. These brochures should also be in Turkish and other languages. As the risk of similar crimes is higher than that of other individuals after the release of persons who commit sexual assault or sexual abuse, it would be appropriate to register them in a special register and make this register open to the administrators of institutions where schools and dormitories are collectively located and to law enforcement officials in that region. It is understood that statistical data has been obtained from the UYAP system since 2009, but since the UYAP system cannot obtain healthy data on the victims, statistical information about the victims of crime and those who have been harmed by crime cannot be presented. In our country, the lack of records regarding the number of suspects/defendants makes it difficult to determine the number of victims, as opposed to keeping records about the victims in a healthy way. For this reason, records regarding victims should be kept in a healthy manner in the UYAP system.( Ministry of Justice, Victim Rights Department) When reporting on victims in the media, it should be done in a way that does not harm the dignity and reputation of the victims and care should be taken to be sensitive to the victim. In this context, it is of great importance that the identity of the victim should be kept confidential and that the photographs and images should not be published. This is particularly important in sexual and violent crimes. The danger that the constant display of crimes committed against the victim in the media can make the crime commonplace and create insensitivity to the victim should not be forgotten. Mobese recordings, especially broadcast after the main news bulletin on television channels, cause the victim of bodily harm to experience the incident again and again and the psychology of the relatives of the victims to be affected badly if the victim dies. In order to eliminate these secondary grievances, legislation must be made to prevent the publication of mobese records, particularly those relating to crimes that bring bodily harm. POLAT / Example of Good Practice of Victim Rights: Comparison of Studies in Canada and Turkey Journal of Scientific Perspectives, Volume:3, Supplement Issue 2019: 1st Understanding Violence Congress 36 A “ Victim Hotline” should be established, which can be reached by victims in emergency situations and provides services only for victims. There should also be different practices and media channels where victims can be informed about their rights. The Directorate of Judicial Support and Victim Services, which supports vulnerable groups such as women, children and the elderly who are subjected to violence and sexual abuse, operates in Istanbul, Izmir, Adana and Samsun. These centres aim to provide information to criminal victims about judicial processes. It is also aimed to assess children and women who are victims of domestic violence who are monitored at a high level in crime. The Centers will provide professional support according to the needs of the victim through individual evaluation process, Family Support Plan and case management techniques. The draft law on the right of victims has been prepared as 35 articles and is awaiting enactment in Parliament. As a result, when we look at practices in countries such as Canada, it is seen that the individual is given all possible support and expertise in every case and every stage. In our country, the rights of victims, which are just beginning and pioneered by the Ministry of Justice, seem to be getting better every day. POLAT / Example of Good Practice of Victim Rights: Comparison of Studies in Canada and Turkey Journal of Scientific Perspectives, Volume:3, Supplement Issue 2019: 1st Understanding Violence Congress 37 REFERENCES Canadian Crime Victim Foundation : CCVF, www.ccuf.net Canadian Resource Centre for Victims of Crime https://crcvc.ca>for_victims>rights Code of Penal Procedure. (1929). Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power adopted by General Assembly resolution 40/34 of 29 November 1985 https://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/VictimsOfCrimeAndAbuseOfP ower.aspx Retrieved: 22.09.2019 -Directive 2012/29/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 establishing minimum standards on the rights, support and protection of victims of crime, and replacing Council Framework Decision 2001/220/JHA. https://eur- lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32012L0029 Retrieved 22.09.2019 Holstein, James A. ve Miller, Gale. (1990). Rethinking victimization: An interactional approach to victimology, Symbolic Interaction, 13 (1), s. 103-122 Krähenbühl, S. J. & Blades, M. (2006).The effect of interviewing techniques on young children's responses to questions. Child: Care, Health and Development, 32 (3), 321-331 -Ministry of Justice, Victim Rights Department, http://www.magdur.adalet.gov.tr/tarihce-0173 Date of Access: 22.09.2019 Ministry of Justice, Victim Rights Department, (2017). Canada Legal Aid and Victim System Report. http://magdur.adalet.gov.tr/kanada-adli-yardim-ve-magdur-sistemi-01508 Retrieved 22.09.2019 Manikis M. (2015) Imaginins the future of Victims’ Rights in Canadian A Comparative Perspective Ohio St. Journal Criminsl Law. Vol: 13-q pp:163-186 Poole, Debra A. ve Lamb, Michael E. Investigative interviews of children: A guide for helping professionals. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association,1998. Sokullu Akıncı, F. (1999). Viktimoloji (Mağdurbilim) 2. Basım. Beta Basım Yayın Dağıtım, İstanbul. Strang, Heather, “Repair or Revenge”, Victims and Restorative Justice. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002, s. 8-24. Polat, O. (2015), Kriminoloji ve Kriminalistik Üzerine Notlar, Seçkin Yayınları, Ankara Polat, O.(2007). Tüm Boyutlarıyla Çocuk İstismarı-2, Seçkin Yayınları, Ankara UNDP Turkey.( 2014) Strengthening of victims' rights and the services provided to victims in Turkey: towards effective implementation report Wemmers, Jo-Anne, “Victim Participation and Therapeutic Jurisprudence”, Victims and Offenders, 3 (2-3), 2008, s. 165-191. TBMM İnsan Hakları İnceleme Komisyonu, Mağdur Hakları İnceleme Raporu, 12/07/2014 Turk Penal Code. (2004). Retrieved December, 13, 2012. http://www.ccuf.net/ POLAT / Example of Good Practice of Victim Rights: Comparison of Studies in Canada and Turkey Journal of Scientific Perspectives, Volume:3, Supplement Issue 2019: 1st Understanding Violence Congress 38 
work_vljzucwtqjhkphk7yxe6ycu44y	----	EMERALD_SC_SC599347 148..154 Beyond empty promises? A reality check for hate crime scholarship and policy Neil Chakraborti and Stevie-Jade Hardy Abstract Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to highlight an urgent need for new and improved approaches to supporting hate crime victims and tackling hate crime perpetration in the light of escalating levels of hate crime and growing concerns over the effectiveness of existing interventions and support structures. Design/methodology/approach – The paper draws from the authors’ own extensive fieldwork conducted with more than 2,000 victims of hate crime over a series of recent studies. The research was designed to uncover lived experiences of hate crime, to understand the physical and emotional harms suffered by victims and their families, and to identify ways of improving the quality of support offered to victims. Findings – The findings illustrate that current responses to hate crime are hampered by a range of perceived challenges and barriers to justice which exacerbate the harms associated with hate crimes. This includes low levels of public awareness of relevant policies, laws and support services, a lack of meaningful engagement between professionals and marginalised communities and a failure to provide victim-centred criminal justice interventions. Practical implications – This paper includes a number of recommendations in relation to how scholars, policy makers and professionals can overcome the failings that have been identified, which includes prioritising engagement with diverse communities, improving awareness of hate crime and generating a more comprehensive evidence base on hate crime perpetration. Originality/value – These themes discussed within this paper are based upon the views and experiences of an extensive sample of hate crime victims, many of whom have never previously shared their stories with researchers, the police or any other support organisations. Keywords Diversity, Victims, Hate crime, Marginalization, Criminal justice policy, Targeted hostility Paper type Research paper Introduction In the months following the June 2016 EU referendum, the UK experienced an unprecedented surge in reports of hate crime. In excess of 14,000 hate crimes were recorded by police forces in England and Wales between July and September 2016, with three-quarters of forces reporting record levels of hate crime during that period (BBC News, 2017). Hate incidents have continued to escalate in the aftermath of recent terrorist attacks in Manchester and London, with evidence suggesting that “trigger” events of local, national and international significance can influence the prevalence and severity of hate incidents within cyberspace and the physical world (Awan and Zempi, 2017). This rise is rooted too within a wider, structural process whereby attacks against the “other” can feed off economic instability, political scaremongering and media stereotyping to the point where violence becomes a mechanism used to reinforce power dynamics between dominant and subordinate groups and to create cultures of fear within marginalised communities (Chakraborti and Garland, 2012; Perry, 2001). During the past two decades, a series of steps have been taken by law-makers, non-governmental organisations, activists and professionals within and beyond the criminal justice sector to develop improved responses to hate crime through the introduction of relevant legislation and evidence-based policy guidance. However, this paper reveals that those developments have been only partially effective in addressing real-life needs. Instead, the damage caused by hate crime can often be overlooked as a result of disconnects between state-level narratives and victims’ lived Received 13 June 2017 Accepted 11 July 2017 © Neil Chakraborti and Stevie-Jade Hardy. Published by Emerald Publishing Limited. This article is published under the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY 4.0) licence. Anyone may reproduce, distribute, translate and create derivative works of this article ( for both commercial and non-commercial purposes), subject to full attribution to the original publication and authors. The full terms of this licence may be seen at http://creativecommons. org/licences/by/4.0/legalcode This work was supported by the Economic and Social Research Council (grant number ES/J008109/1) and by funding awarded by the Equality and Human Rights Commission, and the Offices for the Police and Crime Commissioner in Hertfordshire and the West Midlands. Neil Chakraborti is a Professor in Criminology and Stevie-Jade Hardy is a Lecturer in Hate Studies, both at the Department of Criminology, University of Leicester, Leicester, UK. PAGE 148 j SAFER COMMUNITIES j VOL. 16 NO. 4 2017, pp. 148-154, Emerald Publishing Limited, ISSN 1757-8043 DOI 10.1108/SC-06-2017-0023 http://creativecommons.org/licences/by/4.0/legalcode http://creativecommons.org/licences/by/4.0/legalcode realities, and through a failure to translate empirical and policy progress beyond empty promises and into meaningful action for some of the most stigmatised and marginalised members of society. The paper draws from a series of recent studies conducted by the authors which uncovered the experiences and perceptions of an overall sample which consisted of more than 2,000 hate crime victims from a diverse range of backgrounds and which included victims who had been targeted on the basis of having multiple identity characteristics and on multiple occasions. The first of these studies – the Leicester Hate Crime Project – was a two-year piece of research funded by the Economic and Social Research Council. A total of 1,106 victims of hate crime aged 16 and over shared their experiences and perceptions through completion of online or hard copy surveys, while 374 victims took part in in-depth, semi-structured interviews. The profile of research participants was diverse in terms of their age, gender identity, ethnicity, religion, sexual orientation and disabilities, and included sizeable numbers of participants from “hidden” or emerging communities including members of recently arrived migrant groups, victims targeted because of their “different” modes of dress, appearance or lifestyle and people with learning disabilities and/or mental ill-health. The second study, funded by the Equality and Human Rights Commission, focused specifically on the experiences of 50 lesbian, gay, bisexual and transsexual (LGBT) victims of hate crime based in Leicester and Leicestershire. Again, the sample was made up of a diverse profile of ages, ethnicities and socio-economic backgrounds and included victims who described themselves as having a range of overlapping identity characteristics, such as being gay and Muslim, or being trans and physically disabled. The third study was commissioned by the Office for the Police and Crime Commissioner (OPCC) in Hertfordshire and was based on the perceptions and experiences of 1,652 actual and at-risk victims of hate crime through responses to online and hard copy questionnaire surveys (n ¼ 1,604) and in-depth interviews (n ¼ 81)[1]. This approach was mirrored within the final study referred to within this paper, which was conducted on behalf of the OPCC in the West Midlands. A diverse sample of 373 people took part in the West Midlands-based study through participation in an online or hard copy survey (n ¼ 360) or through an interview (n ¼ 45). Further details about each study, and their individual methodologies, findings and recommendations can be found elsewhere (Hardy and Chakraborti, 2017; 2016; Chakraborti and Hardy, 2015; Chakraborti et al., 2014). For the purposes of this paper, relevant analysis from each study is presented collectively to identify common failings in relation to meeting the needs of hate crime victims and facilitating access to justice. Before turning to this analysis, the paper first presents a necessarily brief outline of the policy framework in place to address hate crime domestically in order to offer context to the findings which follow. Signs of progress within the domains of hate crime scholarship and policy Many different definitions of hate crime can be found within the wider literature and almost all refer to a broader range of factors than hate alone to describe the motivation that lies behind the commission of a hate crime (see, inter alia, Chakraborti et al., 2014; Hall, 2013; Chakraborti and Garland, 2012; Perry, 2001). These academic contributions have used terms such as “targeted hostility”, “prejudice” and “bias” to highlight that the presence of “hate” itself is not central to the commission of a hate crime and have illustrated the relationship between structural hierarchies, institutionalised prejudices and acts of hate. They have shown that some hate crime victims can be targeted because they are seen as being especially vulnerable or “different” in the eyes of the perpetrator through the interplay of multiple identity characteristics, situational factors and prevailing social and economic conditions within different micro-spaces. These academic contributions have also highlighted the multiple layers of harm associated with hate offences which commonly include excessive physical violence and brutality, emotional damage, psychological scars and the escalation of social tensions (see also Iganski and Lagou, 2015; Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), 2009). Beyond the academic domain, notable efforts have been made to generate a consistent approach to hate crime policy formation within the UK. College of Policing (2014) guidance requires the police to record and investigate any hate incident perceived by the victim or any other person (such as a witness, a family member or a carer) as being motivated by hostility or prejudice towards any one of the five monitored strands of identity, namely, disability, race, religion, sexual orientation and transgender status. Most domestic hate crime policy is based around these five VOL. 16 NO. 4 2017 j SAFER COMMUNITIES j PAGE 149 strands, although the same guidance gives police forces the licence to think beyond those strands and, where appropriate, to record other forms of targeted hostility as hate crime in response to regional needs or priorities. This has enabled a number of forces to monitor other offences – including violence against alternative subcultures and sex workers, and more recently misogynistic harassment – as additional strands of hate crime within their local areas (Mason-Bish, 2016; Garland and Hodkinson, 2015; Campbell, 2014). These developments within the domains of policy and scholarship have been supported at the state level through the introduction of hate crime laws which allow for “enhanced” sentences to be imposed in relation to offences which have been aggravated by hostility towards the victim’s identity ( for a fuller review, see Law Commission, 2014), and by successive UK Government Action Plans (Home Office, 2016; HM Government, 2012) which are designed to reinforce the state’s commitment to tackling hate crime. The most recent of these, “Action Against Hate”, was published in the wake of the post-Brexit rise in recorded hate incidents across many parts of England and Wales (Home Office, 2016). However, while this Action Plan presents laudable aims in relation to prevention, reduction and support for victims, it fails to cover how these goals will be achieved and evaluated, or how the empirical evidence produced by academic research will be used to promote best practice (Walters and Brown, 2016). As such, and often despite the very best of intentions, academic research and policy can often have limited value to those directly affected by hate crime. Indeed, despite the growth of empirical contributions, a flurry of policy interventions and an apparent increase in state prioritisation, we are living in times where levels of hate crime have reached at an all-time high, where many victims are unwilling to report hate crime and where victim satisfaction with the handling of cases is lower for hate crime than it is for other crime types (see, inter alia, Corcoran et al., 2015; Chakraborti et al., 2014). With this backdrop in mind, the paper now draws from the authors’ own fieldwork to illustrate a set of perceived failings, challenges and barriers to justice which serve to undermine the effectiveness of existing interventions. Problems in relation to reporting and engagement Responses to hate crime are contingent on incidents being reported by the victim or any other person present. The importance of reporting in the context of generating effective prioritisation and service delivery is well documented (Chakraborti and Garland, 2015; HM Government, 2014) but the disparity between the number of police-recorded hate incidents, which in 2015-2016 was 62,528, and the corresponding Crime Survey for England and Wales (CSEW) figure of 222,000 (Corcoran and Smith, 2016) suggests that many cases go unreported. This was certainly a theme within our research. Within The Leicester Hate Crime Project, for instance, fewer than one in four participants had reported their experiences of hate crime to the police (24 per cent; n ¼ 265) and fewer still had shared their experiences with a teacher (4 per cent; n ¼ 47), victim support (3 per cent; n ¼ 31), their local authority (3 per cent; n ¼ 28) or a social care worker (2 per cent; n ¼ 20) (Chakraborti et al., 2014). Only 1 per cent of participants had contacted a community support organisation, such as an LGBT, disability or race equality network, while none had ever utilised any of the third-party reporting options available through local libraries or online, despite third-party reporting schemes being promoted within successive Government Hate Crime Action Plans (Home Office, 2016; HM Government, 2014). In order to improve hate crime reporting rates, policy makers and professionals need to improve their understanding of the different barriers that communities and groups encounter, and to develop solutions to overcome them. Within our studies, one of the most frequently cited barriers to reporting was a shared perception amongst all strands of hate crime victims that they would not be taken seriously. This tended to be expressed most commonly by those victims who had been subjected to “everyday” forms of targeted hostility, including name-calling and other forms of intimidatory behaviour. For example, in our most recent study, 76 per cent (n ¼ 240) of participants stated that they would be “unlikely” or “highly unlikely” to report being verbally abused to the police and 49 per cent (n ¼ 156) were “unlikely” or “highly unlikely” to report being harassed in person or online (Hardy and Chakraborti, 2017). Under-reporting has important implications for the uptake of support services. Within the context of hate crime, awareness of and access to support services is often dependent upon a victim being “signposted” to support by a public-sector agency. With so few hate crime victims coming PAGE 150 j SAFER COMMUNITIES j VOL. 16 NO. 4 2017 forward to report their experience to the police or to a non-governmental organisation, the concern is that the majority of victims are effectively being denied access to much needed support by virtue of not being aware of its existence. Our research evidence suggests that fewer than 10 per cent of hate crime victims have accessed a support service as a result of their victimisation, with a lack of awareness of these services emerging as a significant contributory factor to this low uptake (Hardy and Chakraborti, 2016, 2017). Knowledge of hate crime policy, legislation and support was found to be especially limited within those communities who are socially, economically and politically marginalised within society, including asylum seekers and refugees, people with learning difficulties and/or physical disabilities and/or mental ill-health and transgender people (Chakraborti et al., 2014). More worrying still, this problem is only likely to become more entrenched in the current climate of economic instability, and through the enforced spending cuts to services and staffing within the public sector, as illustrated by these observations from practitioners and victims shared within our studies: It seems to have got worse since the restructure. I personally don’t feel we’re doing very much at all for those victims […]. You can’t do meaningful engagement. Cuts to specialised services are only making groups more and more vulnerable to attacks. We’re finding that because all of the funding is so restricted now, and all of the councils have had to make their cutbacks, what people used to be able to access isn’t available anymore. What’s the point of reporting it? Nobody will pay attention to it, nobody will do anything about it. Increasingly, the time and resource that professionals have available to take part in meaningful engagement is diminishing, and this in turn has led to channels of communication with diverse, “hard to reach” communities becoming increasingly narrow and tokenistic. This is despite the fact that engagement with these communities forms a key theme within much of the policy guidance around hate crime (College of Policing, 2014; HM Government, 2014, 2012; ODIHR, 2009). With levels of hate crime escalating, and awareness of and confidence in the support provided by public-sector agencies deteriorating, it is imperative that scholars and professionals take meaningful steps to connect with those communities who are most vulnerable to targeted hostility and to develop more effective awareness-raising campaigns which are tailored to the needs and experiences of specific groups. Problems in relation to existing interventions Although prima facie improvements have been made within the domain of criminal justice which include greater consistency in the recording of hate incidents across police forces, the introduction of hate crime laws across all monitored strands and the publishing of strategies and guidance notes by criminal justice agencies across England and Wales (Walters and Brown, 2016; Crown Prosecution Service, 2016; College of Policing, 2014; Law Commission, 2014), evidence suggests that these developments have yet to generate significant benefits for hate crime victims. Findings from the CSEW indicate that victims of hate crime are far less satisfied with the response that they receive from criminal justice agencies when compared to other forms of crime, with 52 per cent of hate crime victims very or fairly satisfied compared with 73 per cent of victims of non-hate offences, and 35 per cent very dissatisfied with the police handling of their case compared to 14 per cent of victims of other forms of crime (Corcoran et al., 2015). This was confirmed within each of our studies where criticisms of the initial response tended to stem from a feeling of not being listened to, not being taken seriously and not being treated with an appropriate level of decency. Interviews revealed that problems encountered at the pre-reporting and initial response stages were compounded by what they perceived as a slow, intimidating and incomprehensible criminal justice system. We heard countless recollections of the difficulties that victims faced in relation to making sense of the complex, unfamiliar terminology used in reference to hate crime, of the relentless delays in waiting to receive any form of communication or follow-up, of the failure to keep victims informed on the progress of their case and of the lack of empathy shown by frontline practitioners working within the police service and other agencies including local authorities, housing associations and the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS). These factors exacerbate the harms associated with the original hate incident and cause added distress to victims, their families and wider communities. VOL. 16 NO. 4 2017 j SAFER COMMUNITIES j PAGE 151 The appropriateness of prevailing criminal justice responses which are broadly punitive in nature have also been called into question. Hall (2013), for instance, observes that prison has limited deterrent value to many hate crime offenders, that such environments are often breeding grounds for intolerance and hostility and that the overcrowded and constrained conditions within many prisons offer scant opportunity for the kind of rehabilitation required to truly address prejudicial beliefs. Moreover, our own studies indicate that a preoccupation with punitive responses is at odds with the needs and expectations of hate crime victims who, despite assumptions to the contrary, often favour alternative educational interventions and restorative approaches to conventional criminal justice outcomes (Hardy and Chakraborti, 2016; Chakraborti et al., 2014). In our most recent study, for example, fewer than half (44 per cent; n ¼ 131) of participants referred to longer prison sentences as their preferred response to hate crime. Instead, 82 per cent (n ¼ 246) called for greater use of tailored programmes of education within schools and local communities as a way of informing young people about positive aspects of diversity and the harms of hate crime, 55 per cent (n ¼ 167) wanted to see more use of community “payback” orders for hate crime perpetrators and 32 per cent (n ¼ 97) were in favour of more face-to-face supervised mediation between the victim and the offender (Hardy and Chakraborti, 2017). Crucially, those views were commonplace amongst victims of different types of violent and non-violent hate crime and from different communities, ages and backgrounds. Despite the extended use of such interventions in the context of other criminal offences, their use in the context of hate crime remains relatively limited. Walters and Brown (2016, p. 21), for instance, refer to the CPS policy against the use of conditional cautions for hate crime and the failure of the 2016 Government Hate Crime Action Plan to even mention restorative justice as evidence of the resistance amongst some statutory agencies to endorse restorative interventions. Equally, although the same Action Plan names a selection of education programmes to evidence its support for early interventions, it is difficult to see how these programmes can deliver sustained success within the context of the many other complex challenges within schools and in the absence of wider investment to take the pressure of delivery away from teaching staff ill-equipped to engage pupils on issues relating to hate crime. Such indifference not only undermines the aims enshrined within national and local strategies, guidance documents and Action Plans to deliver effective hate crime responses but also the importance attached to addressing the needs and expectations of the many thousands of hate crime victims who are failing to receive adequate support from existing criminal justice interventions. Preventative and rehabilitative interventions will only be effective when they are rooted in research evidence, and this reinforces the importance of learning from empirical research to generate a more comprehensive and sophisticated evidence base on hate crime perpetrators. Much of the academic undertaking within this field has focused upon the processes, forms and impacts of hate crime victimisation, with far less attention being paid to the motivations underpinning this form of perpetration. Crucially, once collected, this evidence needs to be shared amongst policy makers, practitioners, NGOs and other service providers who, collectively, will then be able to implement policies and programmes which are tailored to specific strands of hate crime, to different types of perpetrators and to pressure points within local areas. Conclusion This paper has identified a number of issues with current policy-level responses to hate crime which undermine their credibility in the eyes of victims. In particular, it has highlighted problems with levels of awareness and understanding amongst hate crime victims, with feelings of confidence in criminal justice agencies and partner organisations, with the uptake of support services and with the appropriateness and effectiveness of existing criminal justice interventions. All of these factors have the capacity to cause additional damage to the emotional and physical well-being of victims, and to reinforce the sense of powerlessness typically felt within groups who encounter targeted hostility as a routine feature of being “different”. This paper is not intended to overlook the good practice that is taking place across different sectors, or the professionalism of many practitioners across different sectors who work in increasingly pressured environments and remain committed to addressing problems associated PAGE 152 j SAFER COMMUNITIES j VOL. 16 NO. 4 2017 with hate crime. Rather, it is designed to offer honest reflection on the shortcomings which constrain the effectiveness of responses to hate crime and to identify ways in which we can begin to address these shortcomings. In the context of prevailing economic, political and social conditions which act as enabling factors for the denigration of “marginal” communities, and with levels of hate crime continuing to surge both within the UK and beyond, it is imperative that scholars, policy makers, professionals, communities and individual citizens embrace their collective responsibility to challenge all forms of prejudice and hatred and to provide support to those most in need. Note 1. A total of 33 research participants in the Hertfordshire-based study completed a questionnaire survey and also took part in an interview. References Awan, I. and Zempi, I. (2017), “‘I will blow your face off’ – virtual and physical world Anti-Muslim hate crime”, British Journal of Criminology, Vol. 57 No. 2, pp. 362-80. BBC News (2017), “Record hate crimes after EU referendum”, available at: www.bbc.co.uk/news/amp/ 38976087 (accessed 5 June 2017). Campbell, R. (2014), “Not getting away with it: linking hate crime and sex work in merseyside”, in Chakraborti, N. and Garland, J. (Eds), Responding to Hate Crime: The Case for Connecting Policy and Research, The Policy Press, Bristol, pp. 55-70. Chakraborti, N. and Garland, J. (2012), “Reconceptualising hate crime victimization through the lens of vulnerability and ‘difference’”, Theoretical Criminology, Vol. 16 No. 4, pp. 499-514. Chakraborti, N. and Garland, J. (2015), Hate Crime: Impacts, Causes and Consequences, 2nd ed., Sage, London. Chakraborti, N. and Hardy, S. (2015), LGB&T Hate Crime Reporting: Identifying Barriers and Solutions, Manchester, Equality and Human Rights Commission, London. Chakraborti, N., Garland, J. and Hardy, S. (2014), The Leicester Hate Crime Project: Findings and Conclusions, University of Leicester, Leicester. College of Policing (2014), Hate Crime Operational Guidance, College of Policing, Coventry. Corcoran, H. and Smith, K. (2016), Hate Crimes, England and Wales, 2015/16, Home Office, London. Corcoran, H., Lader, D. and Smith, K. (2015), Hate Crimes, England and Wales, 2014/15, Home Office, London. Crown Prosecution Service (2016), Hate Crime Report 2014-15 and 2015-16, Crown Prosecution Service, London. Garland, J. and Hodkinson, P. (2015), “Alternative subcultures and hate crime”, in Hall, N., Corb, A., Giannasi, P. and Grieve, J. (Eds), The Routledge International Handbook of Hate Crime, Routledge, London, pp. 226-36. Hall, N. (2013), Hate Crime, 2ne ed., Routledge, London. Hardy, S. and Chakraborti, N. (2016), “Healing the harms: identifying how best to support hate crime victims”, available at: http://hertscommissioner.org/fluidcms/files/files/pdf/Victims-Commissioning/Healing-the- Harms—Final-Report.pdf (accessed 1 May 2017). Hardy, S. and Chakraborti, N. (2017), A Postcode Lottery? Mapping Support Services for Hate Crime Victims, University of Leicester, Leicester. HM Government (2012), Challenge It, Report It, Stop It: The Government’s Plan to Tackle Hate Crime, HM Government, London. HM Government (2014), Challenge It, Report It, Stop It: Delivering the Government’s Hate Crime Action Plan, HM Government, London. Home Office (2016), Action Against Hate: The UK Government’s Plan for Tackling Hate Crime, Home Office, London. VOL. 16 NO. 4 2017 j SAFER COMMUNITIES j PAGE 153 www.bbc.co.uk/news/amp/38976087 www.bbc.co.uk/news/amp/38976087 http://hertscommissioner.org/fluidcms/files/files/pdf/Victims-Commissioning/Healing-the-Harms---Final-Report.pdf http://hertscommissioner.org/fluidcms/files/files/pdf/Victims-Commissioning/Healing-the-Harms---Final-Report.pdf Iganski, P. and Lagou, S. (2015), “The personal injuries of ‘hate crime’ ”, in Hall, N., Corb, A., Giannasi, P. and Grieve, J. (Eds), The Routledge International Handbook on Hate Crime, Routledge, London, pp. 34-46. Law Commission (2014), “Hate crime: should the current offences be extended?”, available at: www.gov.uk/ government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/316099/9781474104852_Web.pdf (accessed 2 June 2017). Mason-Bish, H. (2016), “‘Get yer tits out’: why misogynistic street harassment is a crime”, available at: www.internationalhatestudies.com/get-yer-tits-out-why-misogynistic-street-harassment-is-a-hate-crime/ (accessed 1 May 2017). Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) (2009), Hate Crime Laws: A Practical Guide, ODIHR, Warsaw. Perry, B. (2001), In the Name of Hate: Understanding Hate Crimes, Routledge, London. Walters, M. and Brown, R. (2016), Preventing Hate Crime: Emerging Practices and Recommendations for the Improved Management of Criminal Justice Interventions, University of Sussex, Brighton. Further reading Hardy, S. (2017), “Everyday Multiculturalism and ‘Hidden’ Hate”, Palgrave Macmillan, London. Corresponding author Neil Chakraborti can be contacted at: nac5@le.ac.uk For instructions on how to order reprints of this article, please visit our website: www.emeraldgrouppublishing.com/licensing/reprints.htm Or contact us for further details: permissions@emeraldinsight.com PAGE 154 j SAFER COMMUNITIES j VOL. 16 NO. 4 2017 www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/316099/9781474104852_Web.pdf www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/316099/9781474104852_Web.pdf www.internationalhatestudies.com/get-yer-tits-out-why-misogynistic-street-harassment-is-a-hate-crime/ 
work_vm3ve6rajbghbk36ddsgxdb4ba	----	The Imagination of the Other in a (Post-)Sectarian Society: Asylum Seekers and Refugees in the Divided City of Belfast The Imagination of the Other in a (Post-) Sectarian Society: Asylum Seekers and Refugees in the Divided City of Belfast Vieten, U. M., & Murphy, F. (2019). The Imagination of the Other in a (Post-) Sectarian Society: Asylum Seekers and Refugees in the Divided City of Belfast. Social Inclusion, 7(2). https://doi.org/10.17645/si.v7i2.1980 Published in: Social Inclusion Document Version: Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record Queen's University Belfast - Research Portal: Link to publication record in Queen's University Belfast Research Portal Publisher rights Copyright 2019 the authors. This is an open access article published under a Creative Commons Attribution License (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the author and source are cited. General rights Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Queen's University Belfast Research Portal is retained by the author(s) and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights. Take down policy The Research Portal is Queen's institutional repository that provides access to Queen's research output. Every effort has been made to ensure that content in the Research Portal does not infringe any person's rights, or applicable UK laws. If you discover content in the Research Portal that you believe breaches copyright or violates any law, please contact openaccess@qub.ac.uk. Download date:06. Apr. 2021 https://doi.org/10.17645/si.v7i2.1980 https://pure.qub.ac.uk/en/publications/the-imagination-of-the-other-in-a-post-sectarian-society-asylum-seekers-and-refugees-in-the-divided-city-of-belfast(7f2c364e-b0fa-40c6-b0a1-efa770099c59).html Social Inclusion (ISSN: 2183–2803) 2019, Volume 7, Issue 2, Pages 176–186 DOI: 10.17645/si.v7i2.1980 Article The Imagination of the Other in a (Post-)Sectarian Society: Asylum Seekers and Refugees in the Divided City of Belfast Ulrike M. Vieten and Fiona Murphy The Senator George J. Mitchell Institute for Global Peace, Security and Justice, Queen’s University Belfast, BT7 1NN, UK; E-Mails: u.vieten@qub.ac.uk (U.M.V.), f.murphy@qub.ac.uk (F.M.) * Corresponding author Submitted: 17 January 2019 | Accepted: 17 April 2019 | Published: 27 June 2019 Abstract This article explores the ways a salient sectarian community division in Northern Ireland frames the imagination of newcom- ers and the experiences of asylum seekers and refugees. We examine the dominant ethno-national Christian communities and how their actions define the social-spatial landscape and challenges of manoeuvring everyday life in Northern Ireland as an ‘Other’. We argue all newcomers are impacted to some degree by sectarianism in Northern Ireland, adding a further complexified layer to the everyday and institutional racism so prevalent in different parts of the UK and elsewhere. First, we discuss the triangle of nation, gender and ethnicity in the context of Northern Ireland. We do so in order to problema- tise that in a society where two adversarial communities exist the ‘Other’ is positioned differently to other more cohesive national societies. This complication impacts how the Other is imagined as the persistence of binary communities shapes the way local civil society engages vulnerable newcomers, e.g. in the instance of our research, asylum seekers and refugees. This is followed by an examination of the situation of asylum seekers and refugees in Northern Ireland. We do so by con- textualising the historical situation of newcomers and the socio-spatial landscape of the city of Belfast. In tandem with this, we discuss the role of NGO’s and civil support organisations in Belfast and contrast these views with the experiences of asylum seekers and refugees. This article is based on original empirical material from a study conducted in 2016 on the experiences of asylum seekers and refugees with living in Northern Ireland. Keywords asylum seekers; Belfast; ethnic identity; gender; imagination of the Other; nationalism; refugees; sectarian omni-presence Issue This article is part of the issue “The European Refugee Controversy: Civil Solidarity, Cultural Imaginaries and Political Change”, edited by Gert Verschraegen (University of Antwerp, Belgium) and Robin Vandevoordt (University of Oxford, UK/University of Antwerp, Belgium). © 2019 by the authors; licensee Cogitatio (Lisbon, Portugal). This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribu- tion 4.0 International License (CC BY). 1. Introduction In recent years, a heightened moral panic (Garland, 2008) has emerged with respect to the so called, ‘refugee crisis’, or as we suggest herein what is in fact, a ‘bor- der crisis,’ a term which indicates a failure of particu- lar nation states or supra-national organisations such as the EU to respond ethically to conflict and the mass- mobilisation of people from other regions. According to Yuval-Davis and Vieten ‘This crisis is at the heart of relationships between states and societies and to con- structions of subjectivity and thus needs to be seen as a doubly-related crisis of both governability and govern- mentality’ (2018, p. 70). Triggered by different layers of social, economic and political crises, the world has been confronted by a backlash to cosmopolitan and multicul- tural concepts of plural and diverse societies coupled with a rise of far-right extremist political parties in dif- ferent countries. One expression of this ideological shift to a far-right populist ‘politics of fear’ (Wodak, 2015) is a gendered moral panic in the form of blaming newly arrived male refugees for crime, and in particular, for Social Inclusion, 2019, Volume 7, Issue 2, Pages 176–186 176 the physical and sexual harassment of white, Christian women in European public spheres (Vieten, 2018). An- chored in the current wave of far-right populisms and the growth of extreme right parties this gendered con- troversy confronts us with the legacy of Orientalism (Said, 1978), mainstream anti-Muslim racism (Poynting & Mason, 2006; Vieten, 2016) and—as far as Europe is concerned—‘archives of European racisms’ (Vieten, 2011). As such, a number of critical questions, which in- form our reflection herein, need urgent answering, for example, how the ‘Other’ is imagined in different Eu- ropean societies and what that means for the percep- tion and welcoming of asylum seekers and refugees. Fur- ther, a key question is what kind of learnings can we glean from the situatedness and ideological dimension of (gendered) othering from various societies across Eu- rope? While continental Europe is mostly identified with Europe (or enmeshed with the European Union), a sim- ilar proxy exists when thinking of the United Kingdom (UK) of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. People might say the ‘UK’, but in fact what they have in mind is main- land Britain (Scotland, Wales and England). When we say ‘Ireland’, the average European lay person might think of another island, geographically (south and north), and thereby might find it difficult to comprehend that there is still a political space on the same island, ‘belonging’ to the UK: Northern Ireland. This has become particularly obvious during the Brexit crisis, with a clear lack of under- standing of the relationship of Northern Ireland to both the Republic of Ireland and Great Britain having become startingly evident. Despite its marginality, since 2016 Northern Ireland has newly been the subject of much discussion and de- bate in the UK, as well as received coverage by interna- tional and European media. Largely, this has to be un- derstood in the context of the UK/GB decision to leave the EU. Underpinned by the political party strategy of the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), the dominant loy- alist political party in Northern Ireland, has been in sup- port of the British Prime Minister, Teresa May’s, Tory– Conservative minority government in Westminster, since 2017. At the time of writing, the political future of the current Tory government is in turmoil. The decisive role of the DUP connects to the model of consociational- ism enshrined as political mandate in Northern Ireland since 1998. It is these complexities and the geographic focus of Northern Ireland that informs this piece. As people living in Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, we be- lieve that issues such as the rise of the far right, Brexit, and the ongoing legacies of the Northern Ireland con- flict impact asylum seekers and refugees’ everyday lives in Northern Ireland in quite distinctive ways. However, as social scientists living through and observing the in- tersecting crises of conflict, displacement and the rise of the far right, our aim in this article is to move beyond the moral panics surrounding such crises in order to critically examine how the particularities of Northern Ireland, es- pecially the issue of sectarianism, present very specific challenges for asylum seekers and refugees. We are also concerned with how narratives of post-conflict and rec- onciliation in Northern Ireland hamper deeper discus- sion of these issues with respect to all people living on the island of Ireland, established communities and new- comers alike. In the Northern Ireland context, questions with re- spect to the notion of difference and the situation of newcomers continually arise, specifically about the ways in which social and political divides anchored in sectarian mindsets impact newcomers to Northern Ire- land. Key questions exist regarding the imprint and the consequence of this differently anchored, extremely di- visive, imagination of community, which does not re- flect Anderson’s (1983) often cited notion of the ‘imag- ined community’. Additionally, this connects to how the meaning of gender, or intersectional positions, and the imagination of the Other, unfold in different ways. The research for this article took place in Belfast and Derry/Londonderry1 in 2016 and we draw on this empir- ical data for this article. Our research data was collected through a commissioned research tender for the Racial Equality Unit in Stormont (Office of the First and Deputy First Minister), Northern Ireland. A steering group com- prised of a number of charities and NGOs across North- ern Ireland oversaw the research process for the dura- tion of the project. This process of having regular meet- ings with an advisory board anchored in civil society provided revelatory insights into the challenges for this sector in Northern Ireland, but also generated conver- sations useful for our broader academic research. The project was largely qualitative with a short quantitative Northern Ireland wide survey targeting civil sector soci- ety whose scope was to feed into the development of a refugee integration strategy. Currently, Northern Ire- land is one of the only jurisdictions in the UK which does not have a refugee integration strategy (Murphy & Vieten, 2017), and has been without a regional de- volved government since January 2017. A refugee inte- gration strategy was drafted from our research report, but is, at the time of writing (March 2019), currently wait- ing to be implemented due to the political stalemate in Northern Ireland. Herein, we argue that all newcomers, apart from the established majority and minority communities are af- fected by an ideological sectarian divide. Given the par- ticular vulnerabilities of asylum seekers and refugees, es- pecially as dedicated asylum housing is often located in sectarian areas—we posit that the everyday lives of asy- lum seekers and refugees are deeply entangled with the vagaries of sectarianism and its associated politics. While living in legal and economic limbo asylum seekers de- pend on local institutional provisions, and everyday sec- tarian culture impacts on their lives, often in unforeseen ways. First, we review some conceptual debates on the 1 In the hegemonic language Derry is called Derry/Londonderry. Social Inclusion, 2019, Volume 7, Issue 2, Pages 176–186 177 notion of the Other, gender and the role of national imag- ination with respect to Northern Ireland. Then, we briefly talk about the spatial complexities of Belfast with respect to the sectarian divide, social divisions, and highlight the dearth of a holistic approach to combat race hate crimes. Third, we contextualise the phenomenon of immigration to Northern Ireland with a focus on migrants who have fled persecution and war in their countries of origin and illustrate how sectarianism and the imagination of the Other framing perspectives of everyday life in Belfast. In the fourth section, we present some of the findings of our research. We concentrate here on the views of service providers and activists of local NGOs supporting asylum seekers and refugees and contrast these views with the experiences of asylum seekers and refugees. We conclude with some precautious remarks on what that means to the temporary and situated ideological con- struction of the (gendered) Other, e.g. with respect to the situation of refugees in (Continental) Europe. 2. Imagining the Other: Ethnicity, Gender and ‘Nation’ in Northern Ireland In their important discussion on cosmopolitanism, Szerszynski and Urry (2002) also engage the concept of nationalism positing that ‘the system of nation states and national identities involved antagonism towards the “stranger”, especially those strangers deemed to have a different colour, creed or culture.’ (p. 462) Whereas mainstream and male theorists of nationalism and the modern nation state largely ignored the built-in ideolog- ical function of gender (see, for example, Gellner, 1983; Hobsbawm, 1992) feminist theorising (McClintock, 1995; Yuval-Davis, 1997, 2011) on the relationship between gender and nationalism has become more prominent since the 1990s. Yuval-Davis’ (1997) seminal2 text ‘Gen- der and Nation’ is pivotal to unpack these structures as her analysis helps to understand contemporary con- structions of gendered community boundaries in the West, in Europe and beyond. Yuval Davis argues that ‘the woman’ is primarily identified with particular ethno- national communities as motherhood carries the biolog- ical and symbolic representation of the nation and be- comes intertwined with a nation’s sense of morality and honour. While referring to the Algerian war of indepen- dence and the contested debates on the veil, then and now, Calhoun (1997, p. 113) contemplates ‘more gener- ally, it suggests reasons beyond simple patriarchy for the tendency of nationalist movements so commonly to af- firm masculinist practices rooted in traditional cultures (see also Chatterjee, 1994).’ Erel (2018) proposes that the gender conservative or even anti-gender rhetoric of the far right and mainstream right parties is blurred, and that social, cultural and national reproduction is bounded to the way gendered and ethnic relations are constructed, and how and why migrant families are po- sitioned as Others. If we agree with Erel (2018), who argues that ‘gender imagination of the nation have [sic] been instrumental in reconciling contradictory aspects of the nation’ (p. 174), what does this mean when applied to the context of Northern Ireland, where the legacy of the violent conflict, called the ‘Troubles’, posits two ad- versarial ethno-national religious communities, vis a vis other Others? Rooney (2006, 2007) and other feminist scholars (Hinds, 2014; Kennedy, Pierson, & Thomson, 2016; Ward, 2015) have analysed Northern Irelands’ conservative gender regime which they posit impacts all relevant public and semi-public spaces such as media, legisla- tion (justice), policy, academia and politics. According to Rooney (2007): The invisibility of women in conflict narratives and the absence of gender awareness in the transitional context is core to understanding how women’s day- to-day lives get left out of consideration in the con- text of negotiations. The precarious role of women in conflict discourses maintains the invisibility of gender regimes operating within conflict scenarios. This pre- carious role is vital to the sustenance of the narrative fiction that conflicts are gender-free. (p. 98) This ‘invisibility of gender regimes’ certainly impacts the perception of difference and otherness. As we argue here, ‘othering’, and the imagination of the Other, has to be analysed differently as there is another ‘Other’ his- torically constructed in the visibility of the ‘Other’ estab- lished ethnonational collective in Northern Ireland so- ciety. The ‘legacy’ of sectarian violent conflict and the appeasement politics of consociationalism, focusing on the two majority Christian ethno-national communities in Northern Ireland, in effect, means that there is lack of a cohesive understanding of one nation (Yuval-Davis & Vieten, 2018). Nevertheless, even without having a co- hesive narrative of a single nation, the (gendered) imagi- nation of community boundaries in Northern Ireland op- erates within a patriarchal frame policing female bod- ies according to the normative assumptions of the two intra-Christian ethno-national communities. Strict anti- abortion laws and an anti-gay marriage consensus3 in Northern Ireland (different to both Britain and the Re- public of Ireland) are expressions of a gender regime that assigns different expectations and social roles to men and women. Intertwined with the persistence of a sectarian split it seems therefore that gender is not placed at the heart of male and mainstream debates 2 Farris’ (2017) work addresses the pitfalls of contemporary liberal feminism supporting mainstream anti-Muslim politics and policy, in France and the Netherlands, for example. However, here we are discussing the symbolic positioning of ‘the woman’ as cultural boundary marker of a national imagi- nation, and as belonging to specific ethno-national communities, which is more relevant to the situation in Northern Ireland. 3 The anti-gay marriage and homophobic political landscape of Northern Ireland means that Puar’s (2007) focus on ‘homo-nationalism‘ referring to an ideological support of some members of gay communities for mainstream anti-Muslim discourses as it is growing in some countries is not the main angle of our debate as far as Northern Ireland is concerned. Social Inclusion, 2019, Volume 7, Issue 2, Pages 176–186 178 on sectarianism and consociationalism. In consequence, academia, policy and politics underestimate the ideolog- ical function of hegemonic masculinities and femininities in containing the status quo of the sectarian political- social landscape of Northern Ireland. This is the ideolog- ical frame that shapes the relationships of established communities and newcomers alike. 3. Northern Ireland and the Continuity of Sectarian Tension: The Landscape of Belfast The issue of sectarianism lingers long in the Northern Ireland imagination, as does the political appeasement constructed to comfort both ethno-national communi- ties, post-1998, which is called consociationalism (Garry, 2012; O’Leary, 2005). Both concepts might be of less interest abroad, but after the violent conflict called The Troubles4, in 1998, the Good Friday Agreement set- tled for a more peaceful outlook and cooperation be- tween the two dominant ethno-national communities, the Catholic Republicans, and the Protestant Unionists, the latter loyal to the UK/GB and wishing to keep this Union. As part of the 1998 Peace agreement, the citizen rights of Catholics were ameliorated, and with consoci- ationalism and anti-discrimination law institutionalised, Northern Ireland now strives to establish parity between the two communities. Interestingly, post-1998, Belfast saw a rise in ghetto-like homogenous neighbourhoods (Murtagh, 2011), as some ethno-national communities prefer to live amongst one another. This restructuring of the landscape, for example, in Belfast, created—either on purpose or as a side effect—highly sectarian local spaces across the city. O’Dowd and Komarova (2009, p. 7) note, ‘The longevity of communal territories and their boundaries, and of the struggles to control them, is tes- timony to enduring significance of sectarian territorial- ity in Belfast.’ Shirlow (2006) regards the social-spatial segregation of Belfast as an ongoing rupture to a nor- mal use of the city space for its urban citizens. In con- sequence, the urban environment is defined by histori- cally loaded group identities and so called ‘shared space’ is confined to inner city, mainly shopping miles and con- sumerist, areas. By drawing on the work of Bell (1990) and Boal (1996), Smyth and McKnight (2013, p. 307) de- scribe the signifiers of post-Troubles community conflict in everyday situations as follows: Many ordinary activities, such as standing at spe- cific bus-stops, using particular playgrounds or parks, wearing specific school uniforms, football shirts, re- membrance poppies or St Patrick’s Day colours, all carry the potential of low level [sic] hostility and conflict. Everyday encounters with sectarianism might occur in any local public space, and particularly in neighbour- hoods where family and social life takes place as Smyth and McKnight (2013) emphasise. These kind of everyday life encounters shape housing and livelihood in more so- cially deprived, working class areas in West and North Belfast. That means that the spatial confrontation with sectarian performance is classed and gendered and de- pendent on where, and how you move through the city. As indicated above ‘gender’ rather is absent in the North- ern Ireland public discourse when it comes to the po- litical business of sectarian parties and public debates on violence. As such, the classed gender of sectarian ac- tivities rarely is spelled out. A report in 2007 (cited in Montague & Shirlow, 2014) showed that sectarian divi- sions cost Northern Ireland £1.5 billion each year. Pre- dominantly, these costs are associated with the rituals of sectarian social identities (e.g. 13 July marches, 12 July bond fires) and with this an ongoing adversarial commu- nity organisation is creating immense economic, but also social costs for the public. Beyond the ‘cultural’ display of distinctive ethno- national community identities in local public spaces, e.g. flagging, July parades and bond fires, hate crime is an ongoing issue. Here, sectarian violence is understood as the violence enacted against members of the established two communities (e.g. Loyalist/Protestant and Republi- can/Catholic), e.g. focusing on ‘religious’ divisions. By contrast, race hate crime highlights a different quality of attacks on ‘newcomers’: all Others, equally black people, white or black EU citizens-migrants, refugees and asylum seekers might be victims of those attacks. Further, trav- ellers are mentioned in the Police Service of Northern Ireland (n.d.) reports as a separate ethnic group, outside of the two sectarian communities. These distinctions are problematic as they sub-divide groups that are affected by different forms of violence without looking at the broader picture of a sectarian omni-presence. There is very little research extant, to substantiate the links be- tween religiously segregated places and racism (McVeigh & Rolston, 2007; with respect to encounters of differ- ence, Piekut & Valentine, 2017). The media, however, has drawn a number of links between divided areas and an increase in racism. This means that newcomers, and this applies particularly to asylum seekers and refugees, are fearful about being housed in certain areas even with- out ever having visited them (Murphy & Vieten, 2017). But it also means that it is difficult to talk about these anxieties with service providers as long as sectarianism is not accepted as an everyday issue affecting all new- comers as much as established communities. Belfast carries the legacy of ‘The Troubles’ and its vi- olent conflict has distorted the urban landscape, making it seemingly ill-equipped to manage the arrival of larger 4 The hegemonic term ‘The Troubles’ could be also read as euphemism. Catholics were institutionally discriminated in Northern Ireland, and the violent conflict started after a peaceful demonstration for civil rights and the demand to end institutional discrimination of Catholics. Police attacked civilians, and thereafter, from 1969 on and for three decades, military police and para-militaristic attacks on people in Northern Ireland, Ireland, England and also Europe, defined the everyday life. Social Inclusion, 2019, Volume 7, Issue 2, Pages 176–186 179 scales of newcomers. The civil society and social fabric continue to be defined by the legacy of the violent con- flict and a politics that is centred on the appeasement of the two dominant ethno-national-religious communities whilst largely ignoring the place of gender in construct- ing community boundaries inside, and against Others. In the next section, we briefly contextualise immigration to Northern Ireland with a focus on migrants who have fled persecution and war in their countries of origin in the 20th and 21st Century. 4. Newcomers to Northern Ireland: EU Migrants and Asylum Seekers Though Northern Ireland largely appears as a white ho- mogenous society—there are long established ethno- national minority communities of Chinese (Delargy, 2007) and Indians (Delargy, 2008; Marger, 1989). Jews, for example settled in Belfast in the 1860s, and Northern Ireland has also welcomed boat people from Vietnam (see for details Murphy & Vieten, 2017). However, it is only since the Good Friday Agreement of 1998 that Northern Ireland is regarded as a more peaceful soci- ety (Brewer, 2010), and now attracts more immigrants (Malischewski, 2016). Recent years have seen a larger number of workers moving from the A8 countries (in par- ticular Poland), post-2004, based on EU citizen freedom rights (cross-border mobility), as well as a higher number of asylum seekers and refugees. Belfast hit the interna- tional media headlines in 2005, following several racist attacks on Roma in South Belfast. According to Russell (2016), a higher number of Roma—estimated are about 1000 living in Northern Ireland—settled in Belfast, e.g. particularly ‘in the Botanic Lower Ormeau areas of South Belfast’ (2016, p. 14). It is crucial therefore to recognise that Northern Ire- land is now a culturally more diverse region. The ongoing process of normalisation also means that since the 2000s asylum seekers consider staying in Northern Ireland. Through the Vulnerable Persons Relocation Scheme Syr- ian refugees have arrived as programme refugees to make a new life in Belfast and Derry. In 2018, there were approximately 700 asylum seekers living in North- ern Ireland (mostly residing in Belfast), with an average of 200–300 new applications per year. While this rep- resents less than 1 per cent of the overall UK figures, the accommodation of asylum seekers and refugees and the ‘integration’ of the latter, nonetheless poses chal- lenges for state policy, social institutions and employers in Northern Ireland, particularly given Northern Ireland’s status as a post-conflict/divided society. There is some research on the spatial dimensions of settlement for asy- lum seekers and refugees (Franklin, 2014). The areas in which asylum seekers and refugees are housed impact on access to employment and health, as well as broader social networks with the host community and other members of the asylum and refuge seeking community. The spatial complexities of Northern Ireland are com- pounded by its history. Belfast as a city with high levels of spatial segregation as indicated above can be a complex place for asylum seekers and refugees to live and settle in. Often asylum seekers and refugees are housed in lower quality housing in underprivileged areas with high levels of segregation. In the context of Belfast, where there are higher levels of National Asylum Support Service (NASS) accommodation, South Belfast has become somewhat of a hub for asylum seekers and refugees and also a num- ber of civil society sector organisations supporting them (see also Kerr, 2013). In summer 2018, a number of Syr- ian refugees—part of the VPR Scheme—spoke publicly about the alarming housing situation and racist attacks in Belfast (Morris, 2018). Though North and West Belfast of- ten are referred to when speaking about sectarian neigh- bourhoods it seems that South Belfast, too, hosts sectar- ian and racist pockets that are not welcoming to newcom- ers (Roma/EU migrants, and Syrian refugees). In what ways are asylum seekers and refugees affected by sectar- ianism and sectarian omni-presence and racist violence in Belfast? Do they feel as ‘the Other’ in Northern Ireland, and what do service providers do in order to make them feel more welcomed? In the remaining part of the article we introduce more details of the methodological approach, followed by a discussion some of the findings. 5. Researching Difference For this research, we conducted semi-structured inter- views with 48 asylum seekers and refugees from ten dif- ferent countries, including-Somalia, the Sudan, Kenya, China, Zimbabwe, Kazakhstan, Sri Lanka, Nigeria, Iran and Syria. Further we spoke to 50 members of the NGO/Charitable sector and service providers (health, ed- ucation, labour and housing) in Northern Ireland. Asylum seekers and refugees interviewed have lived in Northern Ireland from a period of three months—ten years (with two having achieved naturalisation; full citizenship). We interviewed both male and female asylum seekers and refugees and conducted a mix of single and mixed gen- der focus groups. The spread of interviews across different kinds of civil sector organisations—religious charities, volunteer groups, and NGOs and service providers working in dif- ferent spaces provided very clear and broad insights into the supports extant for asylum seekers and refugees. Our research approach was informed by the methodologi- cal construct of intersectionality as well as the author’s professional orientations as social scientists (a sociolo- gist and an anthropologist). We used the notion of in- tersectionality as a lens through which to analyse and document the life worlds of refugees and asylum seekers in Northern Ireland. We posit that the feminist concept of ‘intersectionality’ (Crenshaw, 1991; McCall, 2005; Vi- eten, 2008) provides a critical conceptual and method- ological toolbox through which to analyse a plurality of individual subjectivities whilst also shedding light on the Social Inclusion, 2019, Volume 7, Issue 2, Pages 176–186 180 structural order of social inequality. The most relevant analytical entry points for us as researchers were the overlapping social divisions which include: nationality, le- gal status, gender/sex, sexuality, class, religion, ethnic- ity/race; age and location. The two field sites were cho- sen for different reasons: Belfast is home to the largest number of asylum seekers and refugees in Northern Ire- land and is a city that continues to be highly segregated along religious and national lines with Protestant and Catholic communities often living in distinct areas in the city (McNulty, 2016). Belfast also has a larger number of voluntary sector organisations working with asylum seekers and refugees, and this facilitated contact with re- search participants. We also undertook some short field visits to Derry/Londonderry and Craigavon as there are a growing number of asylum seekers and refugees located there (McNulty, 2016). Derry/Londonderry, in terms of its proximity to the Republic of Ireland and the Irish bor- der, also provided some interesting data specifically re- lated to the challenges of living so close to a border. We used a process of grounded theory to analyse our inter- views and focus groups utilising both inductive and de- ductive techniques. Such a process permitted patterns of data to be identified through reading and re-reading of texts, allowing both descriptive and analytical accounts of asylum seekers and refugees lives in Northern Ireland to be developed. According to Malischewski (2013), who conducted a small-scale study in Northern Ireland (on asylum seekers and refugees), the perceived homogene- ity of groups poses one of the main challenges of this kind of research. She argues (2013, p. 6) that: The Northern Irish case presents a dramatic exam- ple of social division, one in which the question of ‘what’ refugees and asylum seekers are integrating into is particularly poignant. Indeed, though sectarian- ism plays an overarching role in dividing society, other factors such as age, gender, class, race, and ethnicity also contribute to social positioning and division. It is this argument of intersectional social divisions that inflected our study of the particular situation and experi- ences of asylum seekers and refugees in Northern Ireland in 2016. 6. Conversations with Civil Society A particular aspect of our original research was to exam- ine the role of civil sector society and state bodies in the support and integration of asylum seekers and refugees. Northern Ireland is home to a large body of NGOs and volunteer groups, some of this is a legacy of the conflict in Northern Ireland. State supports for asylum seekers and refugees are in line with broader supports in the UK, even though Northern Ireland remains outside of the broader system of dispersal. Beyond measuring the sta- tus quo of service delivery, our research went deeper, in terms of discussions with civil sector organisations and service providers on some of the very specific challenges that Northern Ireland, as a post-conflict society, presents for asylum seekers and refugees. Some of these discus- sions, were unsurprisingly, revealing of how issues of sectarianism impact on the perception of asylum seek- ers and refugees. While a number of our research par- ticipants spoke openly about this, others asked for their comments on this topic to be anonymized as they did not want to be identified in their workplace as someone openly discussing this particular issue. Invariably, in all of our interviews the issue of sectarianism arose, even though it was not one of our formal questions in our interview schedule. In some cases, it went as far as re- spondents denying the idea that Northern Ireland’s ex- perience of sectarianism was in anyway impactful on asy- lum seekers and refugees. With one NGO worker stating: I do not believe sectarianism impacts on asylum seek- ers and refugees. I’d like to see how Belfast compares to somewhere like Glasgow, which is also a sectarian city. Or even, how does it compare to the experience of asylum seekers and refugees living in an underpriv- ileged area of Dublin? No, I don’t think sectarianism is something that comes into play in asylum seekers and refugees’ experiences here in Belfast. (NGO Pro- fessional, 2016) As we show in this article and elsewhere (Murphy & Vieten, 2017), asylum seekers and refugees themselves frequently point to how the particularities of Northern Ireland as a post conflict, sectarian society impacts their everyday. What we call—‘the sectarian omnipresence’ shapes expectations of relationships, and possibilities to move safely through space. The everyday life experiences of asylum seekers and refugees are affected foremost when confronted with spatial segregation. It results in no-go areas, or as far as housing and neighbourhoods are concerned anxieties of asylum seekers and refugees of where to live, and at best stay in South Belfast, where most of the local ethnic networks are located, near Queen’s University Belfast. Given the pressure on the housing system, this is not always possible and so asylum seekers and refugees find themselves living right across the city. The reasons why newcomers, and particularly asylum seekers choose South Belfast are complex and related among others to this area being perceived as a ‘mixed’ neighbourhood, more multicultural-with different communities of stu- dents and visible internationals living near Queen’s Uni- versity and in the Botanic Quarter. This neighbourhood has become somewhat of a hub for asylum seekers and refugees and also a number of civil society sector organ- isations supporting them (see also Kerr, 2013). The assumption that it is difficult for visibly different refugees to settle in certain neighbourhoods is an idea perpetuated by host community members as much as by anyone else. As one female research participant articu- lates it: Social Inclusion, 2019, Volume 7, Issue 2, Pages 176–186 181 We had a friend actually who was saying who lived in north Belfast, his dad was really old. And he was say- ing to me if my area was okay for you, I would have given you my daddy’s house for the time being until you get a permanent home, which was very kind of him. But then he said people might not receive you around there so I don’t want to cause you problems. So he couldn’t give us that house. And also he had a landlord who had a nice apartment in north Belfast which was manageable. Their rent was reasonable. But I did not want to change the school. And then he said the colour might cause a problem when the children come back from school. The colour of the uni- form. (Sudanese refugee, L.) The projection of a sectarian threat (the sectarian omni- presence) is running through these lines. Our interview partner perceived North Belfast with its majority of sec- tarian Loyalists and as a white working-class neighbour- hood as being more adversarial towards asylum seekers than other neighbourhoods in Belfast. It might be strik- ing, too, that the meaning of ‘colour’ with respect to ‘uni- forms’ is introduced here as even more threatening than ‘colour’ of the skin as everyday racism. While anecdo- tal, what L says, in effect means that alternative sources of accommodation become unavailable due to sectarian- ism and racism. As a female black refugee, L’s testimony is echoed in other strands of our research. Living alone with her children as a single mother whilst facing the challenges of being housed in a sectarian area was an is- sue a number of our other female research participants pointed to. Our research highlighted that asylum seek- ers are subject to multiple, often indiscriminate house moves which creates further instability for their families. The intersecting positions with respect to gender/sex (fe- male), race (black), legal status (seeking asylum) and be- ing a parent (mother) shapes possibilities of movement and settlement, even if it is temporarily. The issue of walking through sectarian areas clad in a religious school uniform of the wrong orientation was flagged in a num- ber of our interviews by mothers fearful of what might happen to their children if deemed ‘Catholic’ in a loyal- ist area or vice versa, ‘Protestant’ in a republican area. A number of our research participants were in fact sin- gle mothers and therefore, subject to both the everyday structural violence of mothering alone in a conservative society as well as being forced to live in substandard asy- lum accommodation in sectarian and often, conflictual spaces. In Northern Ireland, and in line with other UK jurisdictions, accommodation is decentralised, and asy- lum seekers live in a variety of privately rented flats or in social housing. The Northern Ireland Housing Executive runs an extra funded program (Refugee Floating Support) to ease ‘the transition to a more permanent relation- ship to Northern Ireland’ (Murphy & Vieten, 2017). As accommodation for asylum seekers in Northern Ireland is funded through the NASS moving into accommodation is dependent on the stage of the asylum application. If granted refugee status people have to move out from provided accommodation during a 28-day period. But, what does this mean when trying to establish bonds with members of local communities? Another male research participant shared with us how sectarianism has impacted his ability to settle in Belfast: It does affect me because, especially because now for me, I have a child with an Irish woman…because she wouldn’t go to Protestant areas, which limits my movement with my daughter, to wherever I want to go and definitely, it affects me too much, because I used to and I stay in…a lot. Like if I go looking for a house now, she’s not happy because of where I’m going to take, do you know what I mean? (Kenyan Refugee, M.) When thinking of relationships that develop, or in M’s case, finding love, making a home and starting a family with a child, the effects of the sectarian omni-presence becomes an everyday issue. As soon as newcomers set- tle down and come to know individuals from ‘local’ set- tled communities they are all too often confronted with prominent ethno-national divisions. These testimonies, and there were more of them, largely stand in contrast to what service providers pre- sented to us. The claim that sectarianism does not make a place quite uniquely different or less tolerant was one that we met with frequently from civil sector profession- als over the course of our research. In the case of the NGO professional cited above, his broader denial of the role that sectarianism plays in shaping asylum seekers and refugees’ experiences of Northern Ireland also ex- tended into a gender blindness regarding the specific ex- periences of male and female refugees. When attempt- ing to unpick the problematics of his rather ideological stance, our conversations with him ended abruptly. This gender blindness emerged a number of times in differ- ent conversations with some of our (male and white) civil sector research participants. It was also very visible in issues pertaining to health and employment as well as child care provision. Many of our female asylum seeker and refugee research participants highlighted issues with the use of male interpreters (or in a number of cases, fa- thers and sons were asked to do this) during their inter- actions in hospitals. This is an issue we broached with a number of civil society groups, in some instances, only to be told that this had been addressed and dealt with a number of years ago. In practice, however, our research found that this was often not the case and women, in par- ticular, were being put into possible spaces of discomfort, even fear/risk with the inappropriate use of male inter- preters around female health issues. This blindness also extended into other spaces with educational or employ- ment training providers not always understanding the needs of women, in particular single mothers, around child care. This issue, however, is something which the Social Inclusion, 2019, Volume 7, Issue 2, Pages 176–186 182 civil sector groups we worked with were seeking to rem- edy to the best of their abilities. Questions of funding or a lack thereof continually blight the provision of such necessary elements of services for asylum seekers and refugees, and our research found that, it was female asy- lum seekers and refugees that are often most adversely impacted by such issues. Such intersections between sectarianism and gender blindness make for a complex picture for many of our re- search participants. While a number of our civil sector research participants were acutely aware of these chal- lenges, other interviewees argued that it was not sectari- anism but rather a deeply anchored, all pervasive culture of mistrust which impacted most the experience of asy- lum seekers and refugees in such communities: One of the main issues in these communities is that people are still afraid, years of not being able to trust nearby neighbours, it’s probably normal that people still have not learned how to trust one another or even newcomers. (Health Professional) In addition to the question of trust was the notion that Northern Ireland needs a better way of defining and operationalising the notion of integration-one which does not make invisible people’s presence rather instead, would work to embrace diverse values and ideals out- side of the parameters of the so-called ‘two community’ worldview: We have to respect people’s cultures, traditions, and their reasons to come here and we have to respect their languages. We don’t want them to become white Catholics or white Protestants. We want them to be what they are and recognise and value their con- tribution to our society. (Health sector professional) The service providers we spoke to, defined the idea in their own terms and language and then connected it to what they saw as the main issues for ‘integration’ in Northern Ireland. A recurring theme in our inter- views was the issue of what exactly asylum seekers and refugees were being asked to integrate into in Northern Ireland, especially given the ongoing challenge of sectar- ianism. One voluntary sector professional outlined the challenges as follows: There are still certain areas where they don’t have any respect for anybody who is of difference. They don’t even respect their own. So, like there is a big divide between Catholics and Protestants. Then on top of that they have other issues with migrant and refugee and the very well settled BME communities like In- dian, Chinese, Jewish, Pakistani community who have been here from 1940s and they’re very well settled. (Voluntary sector professional) Implicitly, however, this very clear boundary drawing is also responsible for positioning the ‘Other’ (all Others), as static and bounded, outside of the integration imagi- nary (if such a thing can be said to exist). Though the lo- cal conditions in Belfast and Derry/Londonderry are very distinctive (Murphy & Vieten, 2017), the overarching pic- ture was that the omnipresence of sectarianism and as- sociated social-spatial divisions frames a principal bound- ary between established communities and newcomers, e.g. asylum seekers and refugees. 7. Concluding Remarks The construction of difference, and therefore, pro- cesses of othering, are historically situated (Vieten, 2012; Vieten & Valentine, 2016) and have to be contextualised in terms of particular geo-political spaces. In this arti- cle, we have discussed the ways in which the Northern Ireland legacy of conflict and sectarianism continually im- prints public and political discourse (e.g. consociational- ism) and shapes everyday life, particularly that of asy- lum seekers and refugees. It is these striking linkages be- tween a culture of distrust and constructs of othering across space and time that we have found in our study. High levels of community and domestic violence, unem- ployment and poverty have created a legacy of mistrust that constitutes a driving force in generating suspicion of the Other. This intertwined with a layering of different kinds of invisibilities means the position of asylum seek- ers and refugees in Northern Ireland is highly precarious. While this is similar in other nation-states, in Northern Ireland this is a precarity heightened by sectarian divi- sions and gender blindness. For many of the female asy- lum seekers and refugees whom we interviewed this pre- carity is further compounded by a lack of understand- ing of their positionality-cultural, social and economic. Unlike other European countries, Northern Ireland hosts only a small numbers of asylum seekers and refugees, and as such, the gendered moral panic so visible in other nation-states has not become central to the main debate on asylum and refuge. Quite the opposite, for better or worse, the absence of gender in approaches to contem- porary policy and politics means that ‘the Muslim male Other’ has not received populist far-right attention, so far, however, race crime on Muslim groups has increased in Northern Ireland. As argued elsewhere (Yuval-Davis & Vieten, 2018) there is not (yet) an established imagina- tion of one cohesive and uniting political community that constructs itself against the Other. Sectarianism and the political framework of consociationalism (Angelov, 2004) shape how everyday life as well as policy and governance are organised in Northern Ireland (McGarry & O’Leary, 2006; see for a detailed critique Kennedy et. al., 2016). We do not know yet in what ways post-Brexit Northern Ireland might see a shift in this regard as an increase in ar- ticulations of xenophobia and social distress will further impact the perception of the ‘other’ e.g. the welcoming or rejection of asylum seekers and refugees in future. Social Inclusion, 2019, Volume 7, Issue 2, Pages 176–186 183 Acknowledgments We would like to thank the three independent external reviewers and the co-editors for their helpful advice, and all the detailed comments which greatly helped to evolve this piece. We would also like to thank the Racial Equality Unit at the Executive Office, Stormont, Northern Ireland for their funding of the research upon which this article is based. Further, we are very grateful to all interview partners for their trust, and to the RAs, who supported us in collecting the data in 2016, after all Tal Avrech and Jennifer Greenaway. Conflict of Interests The authors declare no conflict of interests. References Anderson, B. (1983). Imagined communities: Reflections on the origins and spread of nationalism. London: Verso. Angelov, D. (2004). Problems of consociationalism from the Netherlands to Macedonia. Balkanalysis. 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Social Inclusion, 2019, Volume 7, Issue 2, Pages 176–186 185 https://www.psni.police.uk/inside-psni/Statistics/hate-motivation-statistics https://www.psni.police.uk/inside-psni/Statistics/hate-motivation-statistics http://www.niassembly.gov.uk/globalassets/documents/raise/publications/2016-2021/2016/general/3916.pdf http://www.niassembly.gov.uk/globalassets/documents/raise/publications/2016-2021/2016/general/3916.pdf http://www.niassembly.gov.uk/globalassets/documents/raise/publications/2016-2021/2016/general/3916.pdf https://www.irishnews.com/news/northernirelandnews/2018/07/31/news/syrian-refugees-speak-of-housing-problems-and-racist-attacks-in-west-belfast-1395013 https://www.irishnews.com/news/northernirelandnews/2018/07/31/news/syrian-refugees-speak-of-housing-problems-and-racist-attacks-in-west-belfast-1395013 https://www.irishnews.com/news/northernirelandnews/2018/07/31/news/syrian-refugees-speak-of-housing-problems-and-racist-attacks-in-west-belfast-1395013 https://www.irishnews.com/news/northernirelandnews/2018/07/31/news/syrian-refugees-speak-of-housing-problems-and-racist-attacks-in-west-belfast-1395013 https://www.peterlang.com/view/title/36567 https://www.peterlang.com/view/title/36567 https://www.opendemocracy.net/5050/kate-ward/ending-humiliation-of-women-in-northern-ireland https://www.opendemocracy.net/5050/kate-ward/ending-humiliation-of-women-in-northern-ireland About the Authors Ulrike M. Vieten is a Sociologist and will be based as a Lecturer in the School of Social Sciences, Education and Social Work, Queen’s University Belfast, from July 2019. Her work focuses on situ- ated, constructed and shifting gendered, classed and racialised group boundaries in historical and contemporary perspectives. Ulrike’s research and publications span conceptual debates on cosmopoli- tanisms, far right populisms, racisms and gender in Europe as well as empirical and comparative stud- ies on visible minorities, loss, displacement and refugees. Countries of expertise include England and Northern Ireland, Germany, Austria, Poland, the Netherlands and Turkey. She is author of Gender and Cosmopolitanism in Europe (2012) and co-edited several books such as Cartographies of Differences (2016), and The Situated Politics of Belonging (2006). Fiona Murphy is an Anthropologist and Research Fellow in Queen’s University Belfast. She specialises in Indigenous politics and movements, refugees and mobility studies, and sustainability in Australia and Ireland. The key thematics in her work include trauma, memory, reconciliation, mobility and integration. She works extensively on the topic of asylum seekers and refugees in Ireland, the UK and Turkey. She is co-author of Integration in Ireland: The everyday life of African migrants (MUP, 2012). She has also written for Allegra: A Virtual Lab of Legal Anthropology Blog, Open Democracy, the Conversation, RTE Brainstorm and the Irish Times. Social Inclusion, 2019, Volume 7, Issue 2, Pages 176–186 186 Introduction Imagining the Other: Ethnicity, Gender and ‘Nation’ in Northern Ireland Northern Ireland and the Continuity of Sectarian Tension: The Landscape of Belfast Newcomers to Northern Ireland: EU Migrants and Asylum Seekers Researching Difference Conversations with Civil Society Concluding Remarks 
work_vmar6kzicjgjxkoyhht3izqsfi	----	European regulation of cross-border hate speech in cyberspace: The limits of legislation BANKS, James <http://orcid.org/0000-0002-1899-9057> Available from Sheffield Hallam University Research Archive (SHURA) at: http://shura.shu.ac.uk/6902/ This document is the author deposited version. You are advised to consult the publisher's version if you wish to cite from it. Published version BANKS, James (2011). European regulation of cross-border hate speech in cyberspace: The limits of legislation. European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice, 19 (1), 1-13. Copyright and re-use policy See http://shura.shu.ac.uk/information.html Sheffield Hallam University Research Archive http://shura.shu.ac.uk http://shura.shu.ac.uk/ http://shura.shu.ac.uk/information.html European Regulation of Cross-Border Hate Speech in Cyberspace: The Limits of Legislation James Banks * Department of Law, Criminology and Community Justice, Sheffield Hallam University, Sheffield, England. 1. Introduction As an egalitarian communications medium, the Internet has the ability to cross borders, destroy distance and break down real world barriers. 1 Globalised, decentralised and interactive, the computer network offers a technological landscape largely unfettered by governmental regulation, which could obstruct the free flow of knowledge, ideas and information. 2 However, the dramatic growth of the Internet has been accompanied by increased governance of content and behaviour by state, public and private actors. More recently, European states' criminalisation of the publication of hate propaganda has been followed by efforts to prosecute individuals for the dissemination of racist and xenophobic material online. 3 This paper examines the complexities of regulating hate speech on the Internet through legal frameworks. It demonstrates the limitations of unilateral national content legislation and the difficulties inherent in multilateral efforts to regulate the Internet. The paper highlights how the US's commitment to free speech has undermined European efforts to construct a truly international regulatory system. It is argued that a broad coalition of citizens, industry and government, employing technological, educational and legal frameworks, may offer the most effective approach through which to limit the effects of hate speech originating from outside of European borders. * James Banks is a Lecturer in Criminology and an Associate Researcher at the Hallam Centre for Community Justice, Sheffield Hallam University. Email: J.Banks@shu.ac.uk. 1 D. R. Johnson and D. Post, 'Law and Borders: The Rise of Law in Cyberspace', Stanford Law Review, 48 (1996), 1367-1402. 2 Ibid; J. R. Reidenberg, 'Governing Networks and Rule-making in Cyberspace', Emory Law Journal, 45 (1996), 911-929; J. T. Delacourt, 'The International Impact of Internet Regulation', Harvard International Law Journal, 38 (1997), 207-235. 3 Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bosnia, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, The Netherlands, Norway, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Sweden, Switzerland, The United Kingdom. 2. Hate Speech 2.1 Definitions Hate speech is a contested concept with states, academics and private companies providing varying definitions. For example, Coliver highlights how: ''Hate speech' and 'hate expression' refer to expression which is abusive, insulting, intimidating, harassing and/ or which incites to violence, hatred or discrimination…based on that person's identification with a group on such grounds as 'race, ethnicity, national origin or religion'.' 4 Weintraub-Reiter broadens this definition to include '[o]ffensive, racist, hate-laden speech that disparages racial, ethnic, religious or other discrete groups, including women, lesbians or homosexuals.' 5 What is evident is that the concept of 'hate speech' is constantly evolving: Traditionally it included any form of expression deemed offensive to any racial, religious, ethnic, or national group. In the 1980s some campus speech codes broadened it to include gender, age, sexual preference, marital status, physical capacity, and other categories. Human Rights Watch defines hate speech as 'any form of expression regarded as offensive to racial, ethnic and religious groups and other discrete minorities, and to women.' Rodney Smolla defines it as a 'generic term that has come to embrace the use of speech attacks based on race, ethnicity, religion and sexual orientation or preference.' Historically, hate speech has been referred to by several terms. In the late 1920s and early 1930s it was known as 'race hate.' Beginning in the 1940s it was generally called 'group libel', reflecting the specific legal question whether the law of libel should be expanded to cover groups as well as individuals. In the 1980s 'hate speech' and 'racist speech' became the most common terms. 6 Nevertheless, the vast majority of academic discussion of online hate speech has focused upon racist and xenophobic material. 7 For the purpose of this paper, discussion will focus on the regulation of racist and xenophobic online content. 4 S. Coliver, Striking a Balance: Hate Speech, Freedom of Expression and Non-discrimination (London: University of Essex press, 1992), 363. 5 R. Wentraub-Reiter, 'Note: Hate Speech over the Internet: A Traditional Constitutional Analysis or a New Cyber Constitution?, Boston Public Interest Law Journal, 8 (1998), 145. 6 S. Walker, Hate Speech: The History of an American Controversy (Nebraska, University of Nebraska, 1994). 7 I. Nemes, 'Regulating Hate Speech in Cyberspace: Issues of Desirability and Efficacy', Information and Communications Technology and Law, 11, no. 3 (2002), 193-220; F. Brennan, 'Legislating against Internet race hate', Information and Communications Technology and Law, 18, no 2. (2009), 123-153. 2.2. How much Hate? The anonymity, immediacy and global nature of the Internet have made it an ideal tool for extremists and hatemongers to promote hate. The globalisation of technology has been accompanied by an incremental rise in the number of online hate groups and hate related activities taking place in cyberspace. 8 With computers becoming less expensive, simpler to use and more readily available, the opportunity for bigots to utilise modern day technology to spread their propaganda has increased. 9 Inexpensive and unencumbered, the Internet has become the 'new frontier' 10 for spreading hate. With millions reached in seconds, the Internet offers a social network that enables previously diverse and fragmented groups to connect, engendering a collective identity and sense of community. Consequently, an online 'global racist subculture' 11 has replaced previously isolated and atomised members of far-right parties. 12 The peripatetic nature of hate sites makes accurate quantification extremely difficult. Nevertheless, attempts to quantify the problem suggest that the number of such sites is growing at an alarming rate. 13 White nationalist and former Ku Klux Klan member, Donald Black, launched the first extremist website, stormfront.org, in April 1995. Since then the number of hate sites has ballooned. Early attempts at quantification suggested that 'Hi-Tech Hate' was spreading rapidly. 14 Perry's first paper on the hate movement identified approximately 120 hate sites in existence by 1997, 15 whilst the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) estimated that the number of hate sites stood at around 250. 16 At the turn of the century, it was recorded that the number of hate sites had grown to around 400. 17 A decade later, the number of hate sites in existence is said to stand at a staggering 8,000. 18 8 B. Perry and P. Olsson, 'Cyberhate: The Globalization of Hate', Information and Communications Technology and Law, 18, no. 2 (2009), 185-199. 9 Anti-Defamation League, Hi-tech hate: Extremist use of the Internet (New York: ADL, 1997). 10 Anti-Defamation League, Combating Extremism in Cyberspace: The Legal Issues Affecting Internet Hate Speech (New York: ADL, 2000). 11 L. Back., M. Keith and J. Solomos, 'Racism on the Internet: Mapping neo-fascist subcultures in space', in Nation and Race, ed. J. Kaplan and T. Bjorgo (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1998), 73-101. 12 Perry and Olson, 'Cyberhate: the globalization of hate', 190. 13 Ibid; Simon Wiesenthal Center, Digital Terrorism and Hate 2.0 (Los Angeles: SWC, 2008). 14 Anti-Defamation League, Hi-tech hate: Extremist use of the Internet. 15 B. Perry, 'Defenders of the Faith: Hate Groups and Ideologies of Power', Patterns of Prejudice, 32, no.3 (1998), 32-54. 16 Anti-Defamation League, Hi-tech hate: Extremist use of the Internet. 17 B. Levin, 'Cyberhate: A Legal and Historical Analysis of Extremists' Use of Computer Networks in America', American Behavioural Scientist, 45, no.6 (2002), 958-988. 18 Simon Wiesenthal Center, Digital Terrorism and Hate 2.0. Racists and far-right extremist groups have also begun to utilise social networking sites such as Facebook and Myspace to spread their propaganda. 19 With over 200 million users, social networking sites offer extremists an important platform upon which to espouse their ideas and beliefs, educate others and mobilise for demonstrations and rallies. Unsurprisingly: 'As more and more people are going to MySpace, YouTube, and especially Facebook, the extremists...they're going to exactly the same neighbourhood'. 20 Websites, private message boards, listservs and email have also enabled extremists and hatemongers to propagate their rhetoric and strategies, recruit, organise and unify. Moreover, the protection afforded by the Internet means that 'a perpetrator of a threat or harassing speech need not be at the actual scene of the crime (or within 5,000 miles, for that matter) to prey on his or her victim.' 21 The rise in web-based hate speech, harassment, bullying and discrimination has mirrored the growth in online hate groups, with individuals targeted directly and indirectly through forums, blogs and emails. 22 Limited policing of hate speech online has enabled such activities to flourish as criminal justice agencies are unable or unwilling to dedicate time and money to investigate offences that are not a significant public priority. As such, the police will rarely respond to online hate speech unless a specific crime is reported. Nevertheless, despite such shortcomings, more and more nation states have sought to legislate against the publication of hate propaganda and hate speech online. 3. The Limits of European State Based Regulation Despite the geographic indeterminacy of the Internet, European states have sought to impose virtual borders onto cyberspace in order to regulate online hate speech. However, limited jurisdictional reach and conflict that has occurred when states have sought to enforce laws extraterritorially into other jurisdictions has stymied efforts to legislate against offensive material online. This may be considered unsurprising given that national laws on hate diverge so widely, as a consequence of countries unique historical, philosophical and constitutional 19 MailOnline, Facebook campaigners call for tougher controls on racist 'cyberhate' groups, available at http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1172799/Facebook-campaigners-tougher-controls-racist-cyberhate- groups.html (12 November 2009). 20 C. McCarthy, Hate speech on Facebook: How much is too much?, available at http://news.cnet.com/8301- 13577_3-10239926-36.html (14 February 2010). 21 J. E. Kapplan., M. P. Moss., M. L. Lieberman and S. Wessler, Investigating hate crimes on the Internet (Washington: Partners Against Hate, 2003). 22 Perry and Olson, 'Cyberhate: the globalization of hate', 190. traditions in relation to freedom of expression. 23 Most notably, the US First Amendment affords considerable protection to those espousing hate from American websites, in direct contrast with many other nations' approach to hate speech. 24 The shift towards nation states imposing geographical demarcations onto the virtual world and the difficulties inherent in European countries seeking to extend their jurisdiction extraterritorially, enforcing their content laws against material uploaded beyond national boundaries, is exemplified in the case of Yahoo!. In Yahoo!, Inc v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L'Antisemitisme, two French student organisations alleged that Yahoo! had violated Article R. 645-1 du Code Penal, by displaying Nazi memorabilia on its auction website, and sought to prosecute the Internet Service Provider (ISP) for contravening French law. Article R. 645-1 du Code Penal outlaws the wearing or public display of insignia, emblem or uniform of an organisation or individual responsible for crimes against humanity, as such behaviour is deemed to be a serious crime 'against the people, the state and public safety'. 25 As the content originated in the United States, where such conduct is protected by the First Amendment, Yahoo! argued that its actions lay beyond French territorial jurisdiction. Dismissing this claim, Judge Jean-Jacques Gomes ruled that Yahoo! were liable and should seek to "eliminate French citizens' access to any material on the Yahoo.com auction site that offers for sale any Nazi objects, relics, insignia, emblems, and flags." 26 Gomes applied an effects-based jurisdictional analysis, granting prescriptive jurisdiction and ruling that intentional transmission, in addition to the local impact of the visualisation of Nazi memorabilia, provided sufficient grounds for finding jurisdiction. Highlighting how geo- location technology, combined with a declaration of nationality from service users, could filter out up to 90 per cent of French citizens, Gomes ruled that Yahoo! apply such mechanisms in order to seek to reduce access to the sale of Nazi merchandise. Failure to comply with the court order within three months would result in Yahoo! becoming subject to a penalty of 100,000 francs per day. 23 C. Harris., J. Rowbotham, K. Stevenson, 'Truth, law and hate in the virtual marketplace of ideas: perspectives on the regulation of Internet content' Information and Communications Technology and Law, 18, no. 2 (2009), 155-184. 24 Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. 25 La Ligue Contre La Racisme et L'Antisemitisme (LICRA) and Union Des Etudiants Juifs De France (UEJF) v. Yahoo! Inc. and Yahoo France. English translation available at http://www.juriscom.net/txt/jurisfr/cti/yauctio ns20000522.htm (5 February 2010). 26 Ibid. In response, Yahoo! sought and received, from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, a judicial ruling that the enforcement of the French court's decision would breach the First Amendment of the Constitution. The US court declared that unless it could be demonstrated that such speech contains a direct, credible 'true' threat against an identifiable individual, organisation or institution; it meets the legal test for harassment; or it constitutes incitement to imminent lawless action likely to occur, it would be protected under the First Amendment. 27 District Judge Jeremy Fogel ruled that the enforcement of foreign judgement is founded upon a "comity of nations", 28 and that the court could not "enforce a foreign order that violates the protections of the United States Constitution by chilling protected speech that occurs simultaneously within our borders." 29 On appeal, the Ninth circuit ruled that as there was insufficient contact between La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L'Antisemitisme and L'Union des étudiants juifs de France and the forum state there was no basis for jurisdiction. 30 An alternative reason for issuing the declaratory judgement was made in an amici curiae brief to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit by the United States Chamber of Commerce and a number of industry associations. 31 It stated that Yahoo! was an American company that "provides Internet services in English, targeted at American citizens, from host computers located in the United States" and that the French court had no jurisdiction. The brief highlights how the Yahoo! website does not meet the requirement of the "minimum contacts" test for jurisdiction, which states that "the maintenance of a passive website does not, as a matter of law, demonstrate that the corporation has 'purposefully (albeit Electronically) directed his activity in a substantial way to the forum state.'". 32 The brief reiterated the United States District Court for the Northern District of California's judicial ruling that enforcement would have a chilling effect on free speech: "Faced with the fear of such prosecution, companies and individuals would inevitably feel pressured to remove 27 C. D. Van Blarcum, 'Internet Hate Speech: The European Framework and the Emerging American Haven', in Computer Crime, ed. I. Carr (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2009), 327-376. 28 Yahoo! Inc. V. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L'Antisemitisme, 169 F. Supp. 2d at 1192("The extent to which the United States, or any state, honours the judicial decrees of foreign nations is a matter of choice, governed by 'the comity of nations.'" (quoting Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163 (1895))). 29 Ibid. 30 Yahoo! Inc. V. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L'Antisemitisme, 379 F.3d 1120, 1123 (9th Cir. 2004). 31 Blarcum, Internet Hate Speech. 32 Brief Amici Curiae of Chamber of Commerce of the United States et al., Yahoo! Inc. V. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L'Antisemitisme, at 20 (9th Cir. 2002) (Case No. 01-17424) (quoting Cybersell, Inc v Cybesell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414, 418 (9th Cir. 1997)) (emphasis added by brief). material that might be unlawful in any jurisdiction, thus giving the most restrictive jurisdictions in the world de facto veto over the content available." 33 The cultural tension inherent in attempts to regulate online speech extraterritorially is exemplified in the case of Yahoo!. As Fagin recognises: 'The standoff between America's indirect unilateralism and the European response rooted in effects-based jurisdiction is unlikely to promote the overall collective good; instead we should favour the technical evolution of the medium as a collaborative enterprise.' 34 The failure of states to extend the reach of national laws beyond their borders means that hate speech which originates in one jurisdiction, but whose effects are felt elsewhere, continue to go unregulated. Hate crime offenders are, therefore, free to thwart the somewhat arbitrary assemblage of national laws and evade identification and prosecution. To address such failings, the Council of Europe have introduced a protocol aimed at harmonising national legal system's computer related offences in order to reach a common minimum standard of relevant offences and enable cooperation in the prosecution of those committing hate crimes in cyberspace. 35 Discussion now turns to examine this provision. 4. The Council of Europe's Convention on Cybercrime: Towards International Harmonisation? Formed in 1949, the Council of Europe has grown from ten founding members to forty-seven member states as of 2010. Charged with securing democracy and preventing human rights abuses, the Council promotes intergovernmental coordination and cooperation through the passage of treaties. However, treaties have no legal effect unless they are both signed and ratified by member countries. The Council of Europe's Convention on Cybercrime is the first multilateral compact that seeks to combat computer based crime by harmonising the national laws and investigatory techniques of European nations. Whilst non-European countries are prevented from membership of the Council, many have observer status and they are often invited to sign and ratify council treaties in order to broaden the scope and impact of provisions. The Convention on Cybercrime, which provides a multilateral framework for tackling a variety of Internet crimes, including child pornography, copyright infringement and fraud, has been 33 Ibid at 11. 34 M. Fagin, Regulating Speech Across Borders: Technology Vs. Values, available at http://www.mttlr.org/volnine/Fagin.pdf (5 February 2010). 35 Council of Europe, 'Additional Protocol to the Convention on Cybercrime, concerning the criminalisation of acts of racist and xenophobic nature committed through computer systems, CETS 189', available at http://conventions.coe.int/T reaty/EN/Treaties/html/189.htm (5 February 2010). both signed and ratified by the US. However, their signature was only secured after an Internet hate speech protocol, which was initially included in the original draft of the Convention, was removed because it was deemed inconsistent with their constitutional guarantees. Introducing a separate protocol to address hate speech online, the Council of Europe required signatories to criminalise acts of a racist and xenophobic nature committed through computer systems. Under the protocol: 'racist and xenophobic material' means any written material, any image or any other representation of ideas or theories, which advocates, promotes or incites hatred, discrimination or violence, against any individual or group of individuals, based on race, colour, descent or national or ethnic origin, as well as religion if used as a pretext for any of these factors. Alongside criminalisation of such material, the protocol extends the scope of the Convention's extradition provision to include those sought for Internet hate speech crimes. By the start of 2010, the Additional Protocol to the Convention on Cybercrime, had been signed by 32 member states and ratified by 15. 36 The US has, however, informed the Council that it will not be party to the protocol as it runs counter to the First Amendment of its Constitution. As most hate sites originate in the US, their commitment to indirect unilateralism is extremely problematic. The US has no bilateral extradition treaties with European countries and, therefore, no commitment to deliver defendants to be charged with committing hate speech offences. With European countries both unable to extradite American offenders for criminal prosecution and powerless to enforce civil judgements in American courts, the US offers a significant safe haven for those propagating hate. 37 Shutting down a web site in Europe doesn't necessary result in permanent censorship. Prosecuting Internet hate speech or closing a web site in one country may be futile if the individual can post from, or material can reappear on a web page hosted by, an Internet Service Provider in the US. 38 36 Council of Europe, 'Additional Protocol to the Convention on Cybercrime, concerning the criminalisation of acts of racist and xenophobic nature committed through computer systems, CETS 189, List of Signatories', available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=189&CM=8&DF=17/02/2006&CL=ENG (11 February 2010). 37 Blarcum, Internet Hate Speech. 38 C. Wolf, 'Hate speech on the Internet and the law', available at http:adl.org/osce/osce_legal_analysis.pdf (5 February 2010). Whilst the Additional Protocol is a laudatory endeavour, it is undoubtedly limited in its ability to bring together real differences in the ways in which states envisage hate speech and construct a legal framework through which hate based conduct may be reduced. The European Council's efforts to combat online hate speech are undermined by the US First Amendment which provides a safe haven for many of those propagating hate. With transference rather than prevention the likely outcome of increased legal regulation, cooperation and coordination amongst the European community, the law alone may not be the most appropriate mechanism through which to counteract hate speech online. 5. Beyond the Legal Regulation of Hate Speech in Cyberspace As Perry and Olsson correctly note: 'The law is not the only - or perhaps even the most effective - weapon available to counter cyberhate'. 39 As detailed above, the difficulties inherent in unilateral and multilateral legal regulation of the Internet limit European nation's effective governance of online hate. As such, recourse to technological regulation, at both user and server ends, alongside the education of web users, may be deemed a more effective approach through which to minimise both the transmission and reception of online hate speech. 5.1 Internet Service Provider Self-Regulation Internet Service Providers can play a central role in limiting Internet user's access to, and the effects of, harmful content. Codes of conduct or Terms of Service (TOS) agreements allow ISPs to screen hosted content and remove harmful or offensive material that breaches their policies. Consequently, ISPs are able to delete content, or cancel their service, if users fail to operate within TOS agreements. A number of ISPs have actively sought to regulate hate speech, remove offensive material from their servers and shut down extremist sites. For example, America Online deleted a neo-Nazi Website, the Nationalist Online, from its server for violating its terms of service agreement, which prohibits content that is racially or ethnically offensive. In the UK and Germany, ISPs have formed industry organisations, which have developed codes of conduct prohibiting hate speech. For example, the Code of Practice of the Internet Service Providers Association (ISPA) of the United Kingdom sets down clear guidelines for British ISPs that requires members to 'use their reasonable endeavours to ensure… services and 39 Perry and Olson, 'Cyberhate: the globalization of hate', 196. promotional material do not contain child abuse images or material inciting violence, cruelty or racial hatred.' 40 Voluntary codes of conduct, to which customers must consent, offer an important mechanism through which to regulate websites originating in the US as they circumvent the First Amendment. However, in the US there are no industry wide regulatory bodies and the vast majority of the many thousands of access providers do not regulate against hate speech per se. Many TOS agreements are extremely narrow in focus, so whilst libellous or defamatory speech is prohibited, they do not extend to those acts that fall within the First Amendment's free speech protections. Under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, ISPs cannot be held criminally responsible for the content of the sites they host. There is, therefore, little motivation for ISPs to self regulate. Moreover, as removal tends to be contingent on commerciality and cost, many ISPs do not have the desire or means through which to address harmful content. Consequently, as the vast majority of hate sites are hosted in the US, ISP based technological regulation has serious limitations for European nations. 5.2 Filtering Alternatively, European governments can seek to block extraterritorial websites that do not comply with their national laws. Spain are one country that have undertaken such an approach, passing legislation which authorises judges to shut down Spanish sites and block access to US based web pages that do not comply with national laws. 41 The implementation of geographic location technology can further enable both servers and states to control the flow of information on the Internet through the identification of users IP address, which can be used to both restrict access and filter out odious material. Private users can also employ software, such as firewalls, to filter out sites containing certain speech. Numerous commercial Internet filtering software packages are readily available and can easily be installed on computers. For example, in 1998, ADL introduced Hatefilter, a filtering software product that not only prevents access to websites that promote hate but also educates users about the nature of bigotry and why such sites should be rejected. 42 Similarly, Surfwatch blocks hate speech, alongside gambling sites and sexually 40 Code of Practice of the Internet Service Providers Association, 'ISPA Code of Practice', available at http://www.ispa.org.uk/about_us/page_16.html (11 February 2010). 41 J. Scheeres, 'Europeans Outlaw Net Hate Speech', available at http:www.wired.com/news/business/0,1367,56294,00html (9 February 2010). 42 Anti Defamation League, 'Hatefilter', available at www.adl.org/hate-patrol/main.html (11 February 2010). explicit content, whilst Bess and CyberPatrol also offer filters which bar access to anti- Semitic, racist, and other forms of hate speech. 5.3 Education Individual responses to online hate may only have a limited impact on access to online material but the responsibilisation of individual users can both promote a culture of intolerance towards online hate and contribute to efforts to 'reclaim' the web. 43 ADL, the Simon Wiesenthal Center and the Southern Poverty Law Center have undertaken a number of high profile educational campaigns that have sought to make the public aware of online hate and provide them with strategies through which to combat such materials. For example, ADL have authored a parents guide to hate on the Internet, 'Helping Your Child Safely Navigate the Information Superhighway', which encourages parents to help their children deal with online hate through discussion and education. 5.4 Monitoring Users can also play an important role in monitoring Internet content and alerting relevant authorities to incidents of cyberhate that may warrant law enforcement intervention. Hate speech hotlines have become an effective means through which citizens can alert ISPs to material that breaks their codes of conduct, or law enforcement agencies to sites or incidents of cyberhate which may warrant investigation and prosecution. Monitoring organisations, such as the ADL and Simon Wiesenthal Center, continue to work closely with ISPs in identifying and removing hate based websites and messages and materials that contravene TOS contracts. ADL also seek to highlight material that is harmful in content and have been particularly successful in providing the public with information concerning online hate materials. In 2004, Google responded to a ADL's concerns about access to anti-Semitic Website 'Jew Watch' by introducing an 'offensive search results' link that explains why some extremist websites appear in users search findings. More recently, YouTube has introduced an ADL authored guide on tackling hate speech in its Abuse and Safety Centre. 6. Conclusion The exponential growth of the Internet as a means of communication has been emulated by an increase in far-right and extremist web sites and hate based activity in cyberspace. The 43 J. Bailey, 'Strategic Alliances: The inter-related roles of citizens, industry and government in combating Internet hate, Canadian Issues, Spring (2006), 56-59. anonymity and mobility afforded by the Internet has made harassment and expressions of hate effortless in a landscape that is abstract and beyond the realms of traditional law enforcement. European states have sought to regulate the domain of the Internet through the conventional strategy of national law. However, the multi-jurisdictionality of the Internet has undermined their efforts to place geographical demarcations onto cyberspace. With unilateral attempts to regulate hate speech originating in foreign territories falling foul to jurisdictional and cultural conflict, the application of national law to foreign entities has serious limitations. Therefore, an international system governed by compacts and supranational decision making would appear to offer an appropriate means through which to obviate regulatory conflict between nation states. Yet, the Council of Europe's collaborative enterprise has been seriously undermined by the US's commitment to free speech. So whilst the US approach to regulation has become a minority view, its indirect unilateralism detracts from European efforts to construct a truly international regulatory system. The US, therefore, continue to provide a suitable safe haven for many of those transmitting hate. Unilateral and multilateral efforts to regulate online through criminal law alone will not be enough to reduce the effects of online hate. The episodic prosecution of individual web users is unlikely to deter others from posting hate speech online. Web sites that are closed in one jurisdiction may simply re-open in another thus remaining available to Internet users worldwide. Furthermore, the global nature of the Internet makes the total legal regulation of cyberspace impossible. Consequently, it is necessary to seek alternatives through which to both limit the publication of hate speech online and minimise the harm caused by such behaviour. By combining legal intervention with technological regulatory mechanisms – monitoring, IPS user agreements, user end software and hotlines – the harm caused by online hate can be diminished. Moreover, through the careful integration of law, technology, education and guidance, a reduction in the dissemination and impact of online hate speech can be achieved without adversely affecting the free flow of knowledge, ideas and information online. As Bailey neatly summarises, 'broad-based efforts involving strategic alliances among citizens, citizen coalitions, industry and government provide a strong foundation from which to engage in visible, publicly accountable action against cyberhate.' 44 For such an alliance to operate effectively, governments, businesses and citizenry must all engage in individual and collective solutions to minimising online hate speech. 44 Bailey, Strategic Alliances, 58. 
work_vmimxnf2nfe6pkx6vnvojexd5u	----	2nd World Conference on Technology, Innovation and Entrepreneurship (WCTIE-2017), V.5,p.368-371 Zenuni, at al. _____________________________________________________________________________________________________ DOI: 10.17261/Pressacademia.2017.612 368 PressAcademia Procedia 2nd World Conference on Technology, Innovation and Entrepreneurship May 12- 14, 2017, Istanbul, Turkey. Edited by Sefer Şener AUTOMATIC HATE SPEECH DETECTION IN ONLINE CONTENTS USING LATENT SEMANTIC ANALYSIS DOI: 10.17261/Pressacademia.2017.612 PAP-WCTIE-V.5-2017(50)-p.368-371 Xhemal Zenuni 1 , Jaumin Ajdari 2 , Florije Ismaili 3 , Bujar Raufi 4 1 South East European University. xh.zenuni@seeu.edu.mk 2 South East European University. j.ajdari@seeu.edu.mk 3 South East European University. f.ismaili@seeu.edu.mk 4 South East European University. b.raufi@seeu.edu.mk ABSTRACT Internet in general and social media in particular have greatly facilitated the communication, interaction and collaboration among people and different entities. As generally there is no censorship, these media sometimes are used to proliferate discourses that contain hateful messages targeting ethnic origin, religious or sexual groups, which potentially may degenerate to violent acts against individuals of such groups. Therefore, we explore the idea of building of automatic classifier that can be used for detection of hate speech in public Albanian language pages. A hate speech corpus for Albanian language is created, and then based on Support Vector Machine (SVM) approach, an automatic hate speech detection system is proposed. Such system can be used to detect and analyze hate speech in online contents over time and to enhance our knowledge on how they affect opinion creation in society. Keywords: Hate speech detection, text classification, support vector machines, NLP, Albanian language 1. INTRODUCTION The continous growth of social media and other Internet services, such as Facebook, Twitter, microblogging or Web services among others has greately facilitated the information exchange, interaction and collaboration among people and different entities. However, the widespread adoption of social media and other online services offers new opportunities to dissiminate hateful messages. Up to date, there is very little research and evidence how the diffusion of hate speech in online contents could trigger hate crimes, yet this potential is recently recognised. For example, Facebook and Twitter pledge to remove hate speech contents within 24 hours after they are reported (Kottasova, 2016). On the other side, EU despite its security and political situations, launched a “code of conduct” to establish public commitments for the biggest Internet companies that the valid hate speech contents will be removed and yet the right to freedom of expression will be preserved (Commision, 2016). In this context, automatic detection of abusive and hate speech in online contents becomes important topic and task. An automatic detection method could scan large amount of text, analyze and categorize it as hateful or not. The trends of hateful messages could not only be reported to relevant authorities, but it could provide a solid ground to researchers to understand how hateful messages in online contents affect the social processes. But as noted in (Thomas Davidson, 2017), effective automatic hate speech detection is challenging and very difficult task. The difficulties mostly come from the complexity of natural language processing. The ambiguity and language variability represents a real challenge to be solved. On the other hand, when building more complex and effective automatic machine learning text classifier, the training data becomes crucial. In this paper, we aim to develope a method to detect hate speech in public online contents in Albanian language, while also addressing the above mentioned challenges. We have collected data from public Facebook pages in Albanian language, and mailto:xh.zenuni@seeu.edu.mk mailto:j.ajdari@seeu.edu.mk mailto:f.ismaili@seeu.edu.mk mailto:b.raufi@seeu.edu.mk 2nd World Conference on Technology, Innovation and Entrepreneurship (WCTIE-2017), V.5,p.368-371 Zenuni, at al. _____________________________________________________________________________________________________ DOI: 10.17261/Pressacademia.2017.612 369 PressAcademia Procedia labeled them as hate speech or not. Than a classifier based on SVM (support vector machines) is trained to differentiate between these categories. To our best knowldge, the contribution in this paper is two-fold:  It represents the first attempt to create a hate speech corpus in Albanian language  We make the first attempts to create a hate speech text classifier for Albanian language based on supervised machine learning approach 2. LITERATURE REVIEW Bag-of-word approaches like in (Kwok & Wang, 2013) are simpler to implement, especially if the classifier is targeting racial hate of speech, but such approaches are insufficieent for accurate classification as it leads to high rates of false positives. Syntactic features have been explored in (Gitari, Zuping, Damien, & Long, 2015). The experimental results has shown improvements both on precision and recall when used semantic, hate and theme-based features. Chen (Chen, Zhu, Zhou, & Xu, 2012) utilize the profanties, obscenities and pejorative terms as features, weighted accordingly and produced a set of rules to model offensive content, which improved the precision on standard machine learning approaches. Leveraging morpho-syntactical features, sentiment polarity and word embedding lexicons, Vigna (Vigna, Cimino, Dell'Orlleta, Petrocchi, & Tesconi, 2017) proposed two hate speech classifiers for Italian language based on Support Vector Machines (SVM) and on Reccurent Neural Network named Long Short Term Memory. Other suppervised approaches to hate speech classification have been proposed as well. Neural language models have potential (Djuric, Zhou, & Morris, 2015), but in all cases the training set data is important. Moreover, the accuracy of hate speech classsifiers could be improved by non-linguistic features, like the gender, ethnicity or age of the author, but this information is often unreliabale or unavailable (Waseem & Hovy, 2016). 3. HATE SPEECH CORPUS To our best knowledge, there is no previous work on building a hate speech corpus for Albanian language. Therefore, during a period of time, we collected data from Facebook pages in Albanian language and prepared a hate speech corpus that could be used by a classifier. This section reports on data collection, annotatin phase, preprocessing and feature selection in data. 3.1. Data Collection We explored the Graph API (https://developers.facebook.com/docs/graph-api) provided from Facebook to reterieve and build a corpus of comments from two public pages that publish posts on variety of topics on different political and social events, and which we suspected to find a lot of comments contating hateful speeches. On the other side, we also looked forward posts that contained a significant number of comments. Table 1 summarizes the pages that where crawled and the number annotated posts and comments Table 1: Dataset Description and Annotations 3.2. Data Annotation Two annotators were asked to analyze the content of the crawled comments and to categorize them as hate or no hate. Overall, 4886 comments received two annotations, and as hate were considered only the comments that were categorized as such from both annotators. In total, 2764 comments were categorized as containing hateful content and on other comments either both annotators agreed that the message is not hateful or no concensus was reached. 3.3 Data Preprocesing In order to prepare the data for the supervides learning algorithm, several pre – processing steps were undertaken. First, the collected text was transformed to lowercase with the objective to improve syntactic matching. Then, extra white spaces, puncuation marks, digits and emoji were removed from the text as they were not considered important in the classifiction process. Finally, we removed from the text the words which we find redundant for text classification (such as conjuctions) and consequently reduced the size of document-term matrix. Facebook pages Annotated Post # of Commnets jetaoshqef 108 4737 tvklan 19 149 2nd World Conference on Technology, Innovation and Entrepreneurship (WCTIE-2017), V.5,p.368-371 Zenuni, at al. _____________________________________________________________________________________________________ DOI: 10.17261/Pressacademia.2017.612 370 PressAcademia Procedia 4. TEXT CLASSIFICATION MODEL We tested the Support Vector Machines (SVM) as supervised learning technique used for text classification. As algorithm it captures sparse and discrete features in text classification, which makes it good candidate in our case. On the other side, as noted in (Joachims, 1998) there are theoretical evidence that SVM is an extremely strong performer when having high dimensional input space, few irrelevant features and especilly when most of text classification problems are linerely separable. We implemented the approach in R System (http://www.rsystems.com/) based on RTextTool. RtextTool is an easy to use tool that can be used for end-to-end implementation by interfacing with existing pre-processing routines and machine learning algorithms. The supporting features include the process from document-term matrix creation, data pre – porcessing, training, classification, up to analytical reports which help users to understand the classification of the employed model. The speech corpus was divided in two parts. 4000 records were used as training set, and the rest of 886 records were used as testing set. And than based on this dataset, RTextTool functons were used to implement the text classification workflow. 5. FINDINGS AND DISCUSSIONS While there are many techniques to evaluate the performance of the algorithm, precission, recall and F-score are considered standard evaluation metrics in classification tasks. Accuracy measures In the context of the hate speech system, the accuracy tells what propotion of hate speech comments, are actually hate speech content. Recall tells what percentage of hate speech comments did the algorithm correctly classify, and F-score produces a weighted average of precision and recall. Table 2 reports the results for the conducted experiement. And the numbers were generated through create_analytics( ) function contained in RTextTool. Table 2: Evaluation of Classification Model 6. CONCLUSION This paper presents the first efforts in bulding an automated hate speech classifier for Albanian language texts. The first experiments show that binary classificaion based on Suport Vector Machines are a promising approach toward building an automated hate speech detection system for online text contents for Albanian language. We are encouraged by initial results, however for the hate classfier of Albanian language to achieve results comparable with similar approaches, it needs richer hate speech corpus and and to explore other language processing features of Albanian language, which for the time being are lacking. However, we believe this work represents the basis toward a building an automated system that could be used to track and monitor online content. As future work, we intend to extend the annotaed hate speech corpus from different Facebook sites and crawl more comments. This will make richer the current training set, which we believe it will consequently increase the evaluation metrics employed in standard classification tasks. Another important aspect will be to see how other similar supervised learning models will work under the same speech training set. REFERENCES Chen, Y., Zhu, S., Zhou, Y., & Xu, H. (2012). Detecting Offensive Language in Social Media to Protect Adolescent Online Safety. Proceedings of the Fourth ASE/IEEE International Conference on Social Computing. Amsterdam. Commision, E. (2016). CODE OF CONDUCT ON COUNTERING ILLEGAL HATE SPEECH ONLINE. Djuric, N., Zhou, J., & Morris, R. (2015). Hate Speech Detection with Comment Embeddings. Proceedings of the 24th International Conference on World Wide Web, (s. 29-30). Gitari, N., Zuping, Z., Damien, H., & Long, J. (2015). A Lexicon-based Approach for Hate Speech Detection. International Journal of Multimedia and Ubiquitous Engineering, 2015-230. (tarih yok). http://www.rsystems.com/. https://developers.facebook.com/docs/graph-api. (tarih yok). Classifier Precission Recall F-Score SVM .61 0.57 0.58 2nd World Conference on Technology, Innovation and Entrepreneurship (WCTIE-2017), V.5,p.368-371 Zenuni, at al. _____________________________________________________________________________________________________ DOI: 10.17261/Pressacademia.2017.612 371 PressAcademia Procedia Joachims, T. (1998). Text Categorization with Support Vector Machines: Learning with Many Relevant Features. European Conference on Machine Learning, (s. 137-142). Kottasova, I. (2016). Facebook and Twitter pledge to remove hate speech within 24 hours. http://money.cnn.com/2016/05/31/technology/hate-speech-facebook-twitter-eu/. Kwok, I., & Wang, Y. (2013). Locate the Hate: Detecting Tweets against Blacks. Proceedings of the Twenty-Seventh AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, (s. 1621-1622). Thomas Davidson, D. W. (2017). Automated Hate Speech Detection and the Problem of Offensive Language. In the Proceedings of ICWSM 2017. Vigna, D. V., Cimino, A., Dell'Orlleta, F., Petrocchi, M., & Tesconi, M. (2017). Hate Me, Hate Me Not: Hate Speech Detection on Facebook. ITASEC. Waseem, Z., & Hovy, D. (2016). Hateful symbols or hateful people? Predictive features for hate speech detection on Twitter. Proceedings of the 2016 Conference of the North American Chapter of the Association for Computational Linguistics: Human Language Technologies, (s. 88-93). 
work_vmxel6ixlbcjllcte5zmna4zpy	----	Rainbow warriors: Attacks and killings of LGBT activists in Honduras A YEAR AFTER RETURNING from exile, Honduran gay rights activist Donny Reyes still fears a murderous attack at any minute. “I’ve been imprisoned on many occasions. I’ve suffered torture and sexual violence be- cause of my activism, and I’ve survived many assassination attempts,” he said, in an inter- view with Index on Censorship. Activists in Honduras must contend with a constant barrage of threats and, often fatal, attacks. Reyes, the coordinator of the Hon- duran lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender advocacy group Arcoíris (Rainbow), had spent 10 months abroad for his own safety, but felt an obligation to return to the front- line of the fight against discrimination. “To be able to continue with my personal life and my work I have to be conscious that [death] could come at any moment,” he said. “The truth is it doesn’t worry me any- more. What worries me is that things won’t change.” Dozens of LGBT Hondurans are mur- dered each year, with few of the killers brought to justice, according to figures from respected Honduran NGO Cattrachas. Jour- nalists and activists who speak out are often attacked. One of these was Juan Carlos Cruz Andara who died after being stabbed 25 times by unknown assailants last June. Arcoíris reported 15 security incidents against its members during the second half of 2015, including surveillance, harassment, arbitrary detentions, assaults, robberies, theft, threats, sexual assault and even mur- der. Other LGBT activists have experienced forced evictions, fraudulent charges, defama- tion, enforced disappearances and restric- tions of right to assembly. The activists consulted by Index all said that the level of homophobic violence ex- ploded after the ousting of liberal President Manuel Zelaya in the military coup of 2009. The election of right-wing candidate Porfirio Lobo Sosa the following year coincided with the militarisation of Honduras, a rise in gang-related violence, and a clampdown on human rights. The records from Cattrachas show that on average two LGBT people were mur- dered each year in the country from 1994 to 2008. After the 2009 coup that rate rocketed to an average 31 murders per year, accord- ing to figures from Arcoíris. In early 2016 there were signs the situation was escalating further with the murder of Paola Barraza, a member of Arcoiris’s group, on 24 January. In reality though it is impossible to know precisely how many people have been killed because of their sexuality because the vast majority of cases remain unsolved. Erick Martínez Salgado, who volunteers with LGBT advocacy group Kukulcanhn, told Index that gay activists protested heav- ily against discrimination and the coup. ➔ Gay activists in Honduras are facing torture, prison and assassination. Duncan Tucker reports on the largely uninvestigated killings that are slipping under the radar of the rest of the world 45(01): 72/75 | DOI: 10.1177/0306422016643026 Rainbow warriors 4 5 . 0 1 72 INDEXONCENSORSHIP.ORG 0_45-1.indb 72 19/03/2016 17:44:45 http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1177%2F0306422016643026&domain=pdf&date_stamp=2016-04-05 From 1994 to 2008 an average of 2 LGBT people were murdered each year in Honduras.2 An average of 31 LGBT people per year have been killed between the 2009 coup and the end of 2015. Of the 235 murders of LGBT people since 1994, only 48 cases (20%) have gone to court.4 San Pedro Sula was the world’s most violent city in 2014, with 171.2 murders per 100,000 inhabitants.3 27 trans women were assassinated in Honduras between 2009 and 2012.5 Since the 2009 coup, murder rates in Honduras have soared, with LGBT people under specific threat. It is impossible to know precisely how many people have been killed because of their sexuality as most cases are never investigated. Sources: 1, 2, 4 cattrachas.org; 3 seguridadjusticiaypaz.org.mx; 5 redlactrans.org.ar By Ryan McChrystal HOMOPHOBIA IN HONDURAS 215 1 LGBT people murdered in Honduras between 2009 and 2015 37 deaths in 2015 alone 73 INDEXONCENSORSHIP.ORG 0_45-1.indb 73 19/03/2016 17:44:46 He believes the government came to view his group as a threat to the traditional social order and started targeting them to “send a message” to other protesters. One of the most prominent gay rights ac- tivists of the time, Walter Tróchez, was killed in a drive-by shooting in December 2009. Human rights groups noted that he had pre- viously been kidnapped, beaten and threat- ened for demonstrating against the coup and advocating for gay rights. Four years later, Tróchez’s friend and fellow gay rights activist Germán Mendoza was arrested and charged with his murder. Mendoza told Index he was held in de- plorable conditions and repeatedly tortured in a bid to make him plead guilty. Eventually he was released after proving his innocence last year. Mendoza believes he was arrested because the government wanted to use him “as a scapegoat to wash their hands of the responsibility” for Tróchez’s death, which re- mains unsolved. The Honduran government did not respond to requests for comment. Gang warfare was a massive contributor to Honduras status as the nation with the world’s highest murder rate in 2012, how- ever the gay community’s main concern is not gangs, but the state security forces. “The police constitute the primary perpe- trator of violations of the rights of the LGBT community,” the Coalition Against Impunity, an alliance of 29 Honduran NGOs, warned last year, citing alleged “police policy of fre- quent threats, arbitrary arrests, harassment, sexual abuse, discrimination, torture and ➔ C re d it: Jo rg e C a b re ra / R e u te rs ABOVE: Friends of Honduran gay rights activist Walter Tróchez, who was killed in a drive-by shooting, stage a candlelight vigil to mark the third anniversary of his death in Tegucigalpa, December 2012 4 5 . 0 1 74 INDEXONCENSORSHIP.ORG 0_45-1.indb 74 19/03/2016 17:44:47 cruel or degrading treatment”. As a result many vulnerable activists are reluctant to ask for protection, for fear that contact with the police would expose them to greater security risks or reprisals. The journalists who document homopho- bic violence in Honduras also risk their lives. Dina Meza, an independent investigative re- porter who has covered the issue extensively, was nominated for an Index on Censorship Freedom of Expression Award in 2014 for her journalism. Meza said the country’s mainstream media often portrays the LGBT community in a negative light. Meza, who launched the independent news site Pasos de Animal Grande last year to draw attention to the hardships facing the most vulnerable sectors of society, said reporters who cover violence against the LGBT community are also targeted. She said not only do journalists get physically assaul- ted by the security forces and expelled from public events, but they are also targets of government-led smear campaigns. “It’s extremely common here for them to link human rights defenders to drug traf- ficking and organised crime, in a bid to sow doubts in people’s minds about the work that we’re doing,” she explained. “If we speak out at an international level they say we’re trying to undermine Honduras, discou- rage investment and see the country burn.” Peter Tatchell, director of the London- based LGBT campaigning group the Peter Tatchell Foundation, called for the world to pay more attention to the killings. He said: “This extensive, shocking mob vio- lence against LGBT Hondurans is almost unreported in the rest of the world. The big international LGBT organisations tend to focus on better-known homophobic repres- sion in countries like Egypt, Russia, Iran and Uganda. What’s happening in Honduras is many times worse. Is this neglect because it is a tiny country with few resources and no geo-political weight? The UN, Organisation of American States and foreign aid providers need to do more to press the Honduran gov- ernment to crackdown on anti-LGBT hate crime and to educate the public on LGBT issues to combat prejudice.” Meza and the activists interviewed by Index also believe that Catholic and Evangel- ical Christian groups have become increas- ingly influential in Honduran society. Reyes from Arcoíris described the state, the church and the mainstream media as a triumvirate which has fuelled “impunity, fundamental- ism, machismo and misogyny” across the country, with disastrous consequences for the LGBT community. “At home and at school are the first two places where we’re attacked and discriminat- ed. We flee home at very young ages because the family is built on religious values. Our families punish us in a cruel manner and this has a terrible psychological impact,” Reyes said. “Our educational and employment opportunities are diminished every day. We can be sex workers or street vendors, or stay in the closet in the hope of getting a job, but if they find out about your sexual orientation you’ll almost certainly be fired.” Despite the risks he and his fellow activists face, Reyes said the drastic need for change is what gives them the strength to keep fight- ing discrimination: “We need a Honduras that’s free from violence and homophobia. We believe it’s our responsibility to fight for this so the next generation have a space to live in a better world.” Duncan Tucker is a journalist based in Mexico, who writes regularly for Index on Censorship We can be sex workers or street vendors or stay in the closet, but if they find out about your sexual orientation you’ll almost certainly be fired I N F O C U S 75 INDEXONCENSORSHIP.ORG 0_45-1.indb 75 19/03/2016 17:44:47 
work_vougdk662ncp3hy2ygameych7i	----	CSU Bakersfield Skip Navigation Links SITE UNAVAILABLE The resource you are trying to access is not currently available. The CSU is working diligently to ensure that all websites meet compliance with CSU Accessibility Standards. If you believe you have reached this page in error please submit a Web Services Request Form. « Back to Previous Page CSUB Home Page Search CSUB CSUB Home IT Governance Accessibility Maps Feedback © CSU Bakersfield, CA 93311 Adobe Reader | Microsoft Viewers 
work_vpf6c7q6arb7rpgwi6canjsnfy	----	MEDİAD Medya ve Din Araştırmaları Dergisi | Journal of Media and Religion Studies DERLEME MAKALE | REVIEW ARTICLE Aralık 2018, 1(2), 255-274 Geliş: 31.10.2018 | Kabul: 21.12.2018 | Yayın: 31.12.2018 The Possible Interconnectedness of Religious Populism, Stigmatization, Dehumanization and Hate Crimes and an Evaluation on Muslims in Russia Yusuf Fırıncı* Abstract Populist indoctrinations have been influencing peoples and shaping global and glocal policies for a very long time. But nowadays, the effects of populism increasingly play crucial roles in domestic policies and international relations. This research focuses on religious populism, stigmatization, dehumanization, hate crimes and violations of human rights. As a result of this research, it is suggested that there is possible interconnectedness between these phenomena. This possible interconnectedness increases the importance of these phenomena, since even the most basic violations of rights may result in creation of grave human right violations. It is reminded that religious populism indoctrinations may even lead to grave consequences like societal sterilization or crimes against humanity. Besides, the rights of Muslims living in Russia and some arguments about the contemporary conditions that they live in are examined. Finally, the importance of information and perception operations and related strategies emphasized. Keywords: Religious Populism, Stigmatization, Hate Crimes, Media Deceptions, Islamophobia Dini Populizm, Damgalama, İnsandışılaştırma ve Nefret Suçlarının Muhtemel Bağlantılılıkları ve Rusya’daki Müslümanlar Üzerine Bir Değerlendirme Öz Popülist telkinler çok uzun süredir halkları etkilemekte, küresel ve küresel-yerel politikaları şekillendirmektedir. Fakat günümüzde, popülizmin etkileri artan biçimde yerel politikalar ve uluslararası ilişkilerde önemli roller üstlenmektedir. Bu araştırma dini popülizm, damgalama, insandışılaştırma, nefret suçları ve insan hakları ihlallerine odaklanmaktadır. Bu araştırma sonucunda söz konusu fenomenler arasında muhtemel bağlantılılıklar olduğu önerilmektedir. Bu muhtemel bağlantılılık, söz konusu fenomenlerin önemini arttırmaktadır; çünkü en temel ihlaller dahi vahim insan hakları ihlallerine sebep olabilecektir. Dini popülizm öğretilerinin toplumsal arındırma veya insanlığa karşı işlenen suçlar gibi vahim sonuçlara yol açabileceği hatırlatılmıştır. Ayrıca, Rusya’da yaşayan Müslümanların hakları ve onların içinde yaşadıkları güncel şartlar hakkındaki çeşitli argümanlar incelenmiştir. Son olarak bilgi ve algı operasyonlarının önemi ve ilgili stratejiler vurgulanmıştır. Anahtar Kelimeler: Dini Popülizm, Damgalama, Nefret Suçları, Medya Yanıltmaları, İslamofobi * MSc. International and European Politics Alumnus, University of Edinburgh, e-mail: yusuffirinci@ed-alumni.net orcid.org/0000-0002-4364-0142 ATIF: Fırıncı, Y. (2018). The Possible Interconnectedness of Religious Populism, Stigmatization, Dehumanization and Hate Crimes and an Evaluation on Muslims in Russia. Medya ve Din Araştırmaları Dergisi (MEDİAD), 1(2), s. 255-274. https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4364-0142 M ED İA D 256 The Possible Interconnectedness of Religious Populism, Stigmatization, Dehumanization and Hate Crimes and an Evaluation on Muslims in Russia MEDİAD Journal of Media and Religion Studies Introduction In this research paper, the phenomenon of populism will be evaluated con- sidering the fact that populism, may lead to stigmatization, oppression, dehuman- ization and hate crimes. Consequently, religious populism may and possibly will consist of threats that may possibly cause violations of human rights. This research paper briefly argues that religious populism strategies actually includes some hidden potential hazards and these negative factors affect societies and groups in very negative ways. The negative adverse effects may be diverse as oppression, stigmatization, dehumanization, hate crimes and violation of human rights. After illustrating various populist practices implemented by various politi- cal or religious authorities, the other key concepts will be evaluated by using the views of relevant scholars. This research work is built upon utilization of various research methods within various study fields. One of the core concepts, populism, is related with strategic communications and political science. To understand the current func- tions of populism, especially religious populism, a literature search was conducted in the relevant databases. The scientific scholar opinions were combined with em- pirical evidence illustrations. After the evaluation of religious populism, the other key concepts; stigmatization, dehumanization and hate crimes have been reinter- preted to emphasize the connections. To generate a hypothesis about combining various notions and for the pur- pose of reinterpretation or interconnection, narrative literature review method is the generally preferred method to link together many studies on different top- ics (Baumeister and Leary, 1997). Literature review and narrative literature review together enable us to connect the root causes of various forms of human rights violations such as stigmatization, dehumanization or ethnic cleansing. It can be argued that the reviewed articles and some of illustrated narratives on human rights abuses may allow us to claim the connectedness of the phenomena. Popu- lism propaganda speeches or indoctrinations can also be defined as narratives, the narratives to emphasize ‘us’ and ‘them’. As a result of this research, an evidence based synthesis formulated arguing that the key concepts of these research are mostly interconnected. The argument that emphasizes the connections between religious populism, stigmatization, dehumanization and hate crimes will necessi- tate the suggestion of developing relevant preventive policies be designed by con- sidering this connectedness. Also, the interactions between the interconnected phenomena such as de- humanization and crimes against humanity will create a crucial perspective. This new perspective will lead us to evaluate the negative effects of relatively less im- portant violation of rights such as stigmatization, as grave as the effects of rela- tively more important violation of rights such as ethnic cleansing, because of the possible links or interconnectedness. Following the evaluation of reinterpreted connection between the key con- cepts, next step will be evaluation of the sociological status of Muslims living in Russia. The contemporary situation of these groups will be examined with the help of some reviews, empirical findings, historical and legal background information. Evaluations on Religious Populism, Stigmatization, Hate Crimes and Rights Populism was described as the antagonism between the people and the elite (Gidron and Bonikowski, 2013). Whereas, Kirk Hawkins (cited in Gidron and Bonikowski, 2013) argues that populism is a Manichaean discourse that assigns a binary moral dimension to political conflicts and Michal Kazin (cited in Gidron 257 M ED İA D MEDİAD Medya ve Din Araştırmaları Dergisi Yusuf FIRINCI and Bonikowski, 2013) defines American populism as the dichotomy between ‘us’ and ‘them’. Considering these evaluations, it can be argued that populism is a method or an instrument to shape perceptions on built understandings. The reason why populist practices are attractive to the politicians and leaders can be summarized as: “the populist practices arise from the failure of existing social and political institutions to confine and regulate political subjects within a relatively stable social order” (Carillo, 2018). Similarly, regarding populism and voter behaviour, Bart Bonikowski from Harvard University argues that, channelling social frustrations associated with rapid social change into deep resentments against immigrants and ethnic, racial, or religious minorities has proven to be profitable political strategy (Bonikowski, 2016). On the other hand, according to cultural backlash thesis, the “sup- port for populism will be especially strong among those holding traditional values and retro norms, including older generation and the less-educated groups left behind by progressive cultural tides” (Inglehart and Norris, 2016). Considering these arguments, it can be argued that instead of populist indoctrinations or populist propagandas, it is advisable to focus on real societal problems, raise awareness and improve education levels of groups and societies. More recently, populism practices evolved into various different forms of ‘us’ and ‘them’ constructions. Ernesto Laclau (cited in Gidron and Bonikowski, 2013) ac- knowledges this fact as; “the symbolic distinction between ‘us’ and ‘them’ that con- stitutes populist discourse is an instance of relational ‘empty signifiers’ that can take on varied content, depending on social context. These categories gain their meaning through a process of ‘identification’ (i.e., classification), whereby specific social groups are construed as ‘the people’ (us) and pitted against oppressive ‘others’ (them)” It can be argued that, populism instrumentalizes ‘us’ and ‘them’ antagonism to win the hearts of the target communities by manipulating understandings, percep- tions and cognitions of the masses in any subject that they need any necessity. Pop- ulism may also be interpreted as an easy way to distract, rather than answering the questions and demands of masses related to societal problems by using polarizations of ‘us’ and ‘them’ antagonisms. If we look from a different perspective, it can be argued that populism uses the victimization on one hand, and oppression on the other. In fact, oppression can be defined as “forcing something that is undesirable or harmful on a person or group; depriving a person or group of something that is needed, wanted, or helpful; or both. To be oppressive, it must also threaten or ruin a person’s mental or physical health, well-being, or coping ability” (Hanna et al. 2000). Thus, populism in general and reli- gious populism specifically is phenomena that can deprive peoples from their values or beliefs and that can damage the real victims’ mental or physical health. It can be argued that the utilization of victimization card can also be seen in the religious populism strategies. Archbishop Christodoulos, while being the head of the Holy Synod of the autocephalous Church of Greece and religious leader of the Greek Orthodox majority of the population, had been declaring that “the Greek people is al- ways the blessed people of God” and “the Church is not speaking a word of its own”, “it is transmitting the word of God” (cited in Stavrakakis, 2002). Accordingly, one of the religious populism strategies by this Greek Orthodox Church can be summarized as Taggard (2000) puts it: “Greek Church populism - becomes ‘hostile to a discourse of rights because, by definition, rights are tools of the embattled minority, while pop- ulism sees the majority as embattled and blames the excessive deference of the state to right claims of minorities for this injustice” (cited in Stavrakakis, 2002). Today, religious and racist populism is becoming more and more obvious and these masses have been feeling, acting and defining their identities according to the populist indoctrinations. There are studies emphasizing the crucial roles of media and elites in fuelling xenophobia (Fırıncı, 2017). One can try to understand the effects of M ED İA D 258 The Possible Interconnectedness of Religious Populism, Stigmatization, Dehumanization and Hate Crimes and an Evaluation on Muslims in Russia MEDİAD Journal of Media and Religion Studies populism on the social groups by using slave and slave holder psychology. Within a community subject to populist indoctrination, ‘us’ part of the community can be compared to slaveholder whereas ‘them’ part of the community can be compared to slaves. Solomon Northup, who had experienced slavery himself, illustrates the psychology of the slave-master as: “It is not the fault of the slaveholder that he is cruel, so much as it is the fault of the system under which he lives. He cannot withstand the influence of habit and associations that surround him. Taught from earliest childhood, by all that he sees and hears, that the rod is for the slave’s back, he will not be apt to change his opinions in maturer years” (Northup, cited in Hanna et al. 2000). Considering this perspective, it can be argued that it becomes very hard for the communities that had been subject to populist indoctrinations, to withstand the influence that surrounds them. Considering these evaluations it can be argued that populist indoctrinations may lead the ‘us’ part of the communities see the ‘them’ part of the communities as the slave-masters see the slaves. And when we incorporate religion in this rela- tionship we can understand religious oppression. For example prominent scholar Franz Fanon declared that religious oppression or forcing Christianity as seen in both Algeria boarding schools by French and in boarding schools for Native Amer- icans in North America was not an attempt at setting free the native people but oppressing peoples as similar as using DDT, which is used to destroy parasites on crops (Fanon cited in Hilton, 2011). On the other hand, populist indoctrination propaganda can be utilized to cover up the incapability and ineffectiveness of leaderships to control ‘us’ more easily. In this example, ‘us’ part of the community can be compared to controlled slaves. Considering this interpretation, propaganda tactics utilized before; like trying to convince slaves that slavery is preferable to freedom, revisionist history writing or enforcement of religious ideology can also be illustrated as the strate- gies that can be used to control populations (Hanna et al. 2000). These kinds of populist policies, propagandas, religious, racist indoctrinations must not be devel- oped to control global or glocal perceptions and communities. Furthermore, populist policies may result in serious adverse effects. As a re- sult of populist policies, communities may suffer from grave damages. Citing from Davenport, Nugent (2018) argues that “organizations under siege in a targeted re- pression environment defensively change the structure of their organization and demands of loyalty from members in a manner which can alienate moderates, fur- ther polarizing it from other groups”. Considering this fact, it can be argued that politicians must analyse the cost of polarization, feeding segregation and fuelling extremism that are the results of populist repression policies. One of the most extreme example of ‘us’ and ‘them’ polarization and hate campaign can be seen in Serbian violence strategy which targets Bosniak Muslims. During the Serbian assault to Bosniaks, “many rape camps were established with the specific intention of forcibly impregnating Muslim women with ‘Serbian seeds’ in an effort to replace the ethnic ‘other’” (Weitsman cited in Peltota, 2018). Soci- eties, peoples, groups have been subject to various populist ‘us’ and ‘them’ narra- tions, propagandas from media every day. These are in fact, extremely dangerous policies risking peaceful coexistences. It is an undeniable fact that the world today became more and more volatile and vulnerable to various kinds of conflicts and the perception of insecurity is wid- ening among various communities. Alston (2017) argues that populism is operated partly by horror and irritation which is mostly related with 9/11 security concerns that have blended into an actual or constructed fear and hatred of foreigners or 259 M ED İA D MEDİAD Medya ve Din Araştırmaları Dergisi Yusuf FIRINCI minorities. Consequently, the threat perceptions have dramatically increased in re- cent years and that brings the normalizations of the states of emergencies (Alston, 2017). It can be argued that the fear and rage have been instrumentalized to imple- ment various populism strategies and shape the cognitions of the masses. These recent developments that lead to the rise of populism have been sig- nificantly affecting the human rights perceptions. It can be argued that the populist indoctrinations recently challenged the human rights phenomenon by the acts of nationalistic, xenophobic and obviously hostile agendas (Alston, 2017). On the other hand, it can be argued that there is not a clear and specific position determined by advocates of human rights yet. But there is no ground to lose hope and surrender to what populism brings. Because it is not the era of losing hope on human rights and there is still need for human rights, it is time to re-evaluate innovative strategies considering the rise of populism (Alston, 2017). Currently, there are various expressions of populism around the world but for our research; it is the most interesting to investigate the relationship of populism with religion. Martin Carillo (2018) argues that “the linking of politics and religion is born through a subject that is very accepted today in academia, populism”. He also em- phasizes that “in Italy, as in Argentina, the mass media has begun to raise ideas about whether the Pope is a populist in the Catholic religion or whether his discourse has populist traits” (Carillo, 2018). Now, an example from Hungary will be evaluated to understand a different kind of populism and religion relation. The populism implementations in Hungary will be enlightening since this will allow us to see a recent example of religious populism. It is argued that, right-wing parties get political support and legitimacy from churches, the churches are appointed to operate educational, health and social care centres on government-funded budgets. Besides, politically well-received churches have been given official church status with all its advantages, but their politically less obedient counterparts have been stripped off it (Bozoki ve Adam, 2016). It can be argued this policy can be interpreted as, the politicians seem to suggest some kind of bribe to religious authorities to gain religious legitimacy for their actions. This strategy seems utterly unacceptable. The relationship between populism and religion is very complex in the case of Hungary. Bozoki and Adam illustrates their analysis regarding religious populism in Hungary as: “Radical right-wing populism employs a quasi-religious ideological construction through which it attempts at mobilizing a wider social spectrum: ethno-nationalism. This surrogate religion offers a politicized (nationalist and paganized) understanding of Christianity and elevates the concept of ethnically defined nation to a sacred status. Thus, religion is ‘nationalized’, and the universalism of Christianity is transformed to a particularistic, pagan vision in which faith appears to be not an individual but a tribal issue. ‘Nationalized Christianity’ also provides legitimacy for the ‘rationalized charis- matic rule’ of authoritarian leaders, who represent exceptional characteristics but are nevertheless popularly elected. This rule is illiberal and anti-democratic even though it relies on (often manipulated) elections and other forms of politically conditioned popular participation” (2016, p.116). The analysis can be interpreted as the misuse of religion and nationalism for gaining some political interests. These politicians are using sacred values of peoples but in return, they generally not contribute their societies as they declared. Besides, it is crucial to be alerted against surrogate religion. After this informative example, it is better to illustrate the religious populism in Europe. Ionut Apahideanu describes religious populism as: “a native Christian collec- M ED İA D 260 The Possible Interconnectedness of Religious Populism, Stigmatization, Dehumanization and Hate Crimes and an Evaluation on Muslims in Russia MEDİAD Journal of Media and Religion Studies tivity (nation or continental population), ‘invaded’ by Muslims, who are depicted holistically (Islam), antagonistically and normatively negative (as violent and retro- grade); explicatively it accuses the corruption of national or EU political elites, who are supposed to have encouraged or at least turned a blind eye on the infamous Muslim immigration; prescriptively, it advocates the restriction of religious rights for Muslims (from banning the construction of mosques to prohibiting specific re- ligious costumes such as female headscarves) and some kind of restoration and duly observance of Christian roots; analytically, massively building on Huntington’s book, it exploits passions and emotions, as suggested by the very word ‘phobia’; furthermore, it is profoundly antimodernist in that, as any type of (religious) pop- ulism, it rejects pluralism, minority rights and the very ‘defining trait of contempo- rary progressive thought’, i.e. ‘the right to be different’ – ethnically, linguistically, sexually, or in this specific case, religiously” (Apahideanu, 2014). It can be argued that this ideological indoctrination targets the basic human rights of Muslims. Con- sequently, it can also be argued that Huntington and similar scholars must be held responsible for their destructive indoctrinations. On the other hand, Andew Arato (2013) argues that it was wrong to assume that Machiavelli’s Prince was justification of dictatorship. We are not sure if this popular piece was written to legitimize dictatorship but this argument is inspir- ing. If we think in a similar perspective, is it acceptable to think that some global or glocal ‘academicians’ or ‘influencers’ indoctrinate popular ideologies to legit- imize their strategies and prepare societies for some global or glocal strategies? The real philosophers, the real academicians and the real influence leaders must be supported to overcome the challenges and to cure the wounds that the global populists caused. One more negative aspect about religion in societies, especially in Western societies is stigmatization. In fact, stigmatization culture or stigmatization policies, are the real obstacles challenging national cohesiveness, not the religious others. A research on the effects of religious stigma on Muslim minorities illustrates important findings. Jonas R. Kunst et al. (2012) emphasizes that; as experiences of religious stigmatization reinforce Norway and Germany Muslims’ perceived dis- crepancy between being a Muslim and being a member of their nations, they seem to be torn between their willingness to become integrated members of their na- tions and their wish to protect their religious affiliations. As the populist strategies fuel the stigmatization and following stigmatiza- tion, hate crimes against minorities becomes normal for the oppressors. A recent protest, by a small group in a small city illustrates a brief example. Recently, about 200 women have taken part in a rally in Newcastle UK, to highlight abuse and ha- rassment they say they face on public transport. Their complaints include; being regularly called a ‘terrorist’ by other passengers or various abuses on trains and being attacked in the street (BBC News, 2018). Historical experience allows us illustrate the negative effects that stigmati- zation may cause. For example the eugenics movement in America in early twenti- eth century and the efforts of several research groups and organizations, such as the Eugenics Research Association (ERA), the Eugenics Society of Northern Cali- fornia, and the Human Betterment Foundation (HBE) led to laws in several states criminalizing the reproduction of numerous groups of individuals (Hilton, 2011). Even Adolf Hitler credits the eugenics’ laws of several American states while aim- ing to create a ‘master race’ (Black cited in Hilton, 2011). Stigmatization may cause serious damage to societies, groups or states. These kinds of government policies or global policies supporting stigmatization must be prevented. To prevent religious stigmatization, politicians and strategists must fight against fear-mongering media campaigns and narrations against Muslims. Kunst 261 M ED İA D MEDİAD Medya ve Din Araştırmaları Dergisi Yusuf FIRINCI and his colleagues argue that “As fear causes avoidance, and avoidance prevents peo- ple from challenging their prejudgments and stereotypes, we consider political cam- paigns promoting contact between religious groups as a suitable and powerful tool to decrease religious intolerance” (Kunst at al, 2012). Thinking on religious populism, another negative aspect is dehumanization. “Treating groups monolithically - seeing people not as individuals but only as mem- bers of their (stereotyped) group - is a form of dehumanization” (Burrel and Barsalou, 2015). When a group of young men ransacked a prayer house near Moscow, beating badly the imam and shouting ‘there is no place for Muslims in Russia’, it can be argued that they were dehumanizing Muslim Russians (Myers, 2005). Similarly, when Slovak prime minister, Robert Fico, was telling that “Slovakia was no place for Muslims” (The Conversation, 2016), he was also dehumanizing Muslims. If we search for the role of dehumanization, some historical information will be inspiring. Hilton (2011) argues that “similar to the oppression in Algeria by the French, the indigenous Native Americans of North America were forced to endure countless massacres, attempts at cultural assimilation, dehumanization, sterilizations, and deni- als of nearly all rights and freedoms”. He further emphasises the role of dehumaniza- tion as: “…the genocidal actions against the Native American people were a result of dehumanization, for the guilt and shame normally accompanying these actions would be greatly reduced if the Native Americans were considered less than human” (Hilton, 2011). Considering these facts, it seems crucial to prevent and punish dehumanization practices in order to eliminate their populist and propagandist grave consequences. Religious populism, repression, stigmatization, dehumanization are affecting societies also by causing negative symptoms like increasing hate crimes. Hate crimes are “crimes that manifest evidence of prejudice based on race, gender and gender identity, [emphasis added] religion, disability, sexual orientation, or ethnicity, includ- ing where appropriate the crimes of murder, non-negligent manslaughter; forcible rape; aggravated assault, simple assault, intimidation; arson; and destruction, damage or vandalism of property” (Hate Crime Statistics Act, 2010). Governments, philoso- phers, scholars and most importantly the forces that control global and local media must fight against populism to prevent the rise of hate crimes. Similarly, hate speech is destructive. Hate speech is prohibited and criminalized by International Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination adopted in 1965, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights adopted in 1966 but politicians, leaders and media have been constructing hate speech cam- paigns. For example before and during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, “the media played a major role in supporting and inciting ethnic hatred and violence against Tutsi and moderate Hutu. Public and some private media were used in distilling hate, incit- ing violence and encouraging Hutu to kill their countrymen Tutsi. The hate propagan- da was accompanied by direct calls for the extermination of the Tutsi” (Timmermann cited in Mafeza, 2016). The question is who directs and controls global, local media networks and media policies. For Germany, we have some clue from a right-wing au- thor. Udo Ulfkotte’s book was titled ‘Corrupt journalists: How politicians, intelligence services and high finance control Germany’s mass media’ (Ulfkotte cited in Witte, 2017). Consequently, it can be suggested that there must be effective control mecha- nisms to control the forces or parties that control media. In conclusion of this chapter, it can be argued that the reinterpretation of the phenomena; religious populism, stigmatization, dehumanization, sterilization and hate crimes may allow us to construct a hypothesis that emphasize the link and con- nectedness of these phenomena. Religious populism may create genocides or it can just create some basic forms of dehumanization. Whereas stigmatization may create social sterilization policies or it can just create some basic forms of discriminations. But the core suggestion is raising awareness on the possible links, connectedness and grave consequences of these phenomena which mostly underestimated by contem- porary politicians and religious leaders. M ED İA D 262 The Possible Interconnectedness of Religious Populism, Stigmatization, Dehumanization and Hate Crimes and an Evaluation on Muslims in Russia MEDİAD Journal of Media and Religion Studies After evaluating the phenomena related with human rights, it is now time to turn our attention to brief evaluation of societal conditions of Muslims living in Russia. Brief Historical Background Information about Muslims in Russia Islam came to Russia in the seventh century. Followers of Prophet Muham- met (pbuh) came to Russia 22 years after he left earthly life. The Muslim communi- ty in Russia is now 25 million people strong and continues to grow. Most Muslims in the country live in the Moscow region and other major metropolitan areas such as St. Petersburg and Yekaterinburg, Grand Mufti of Russia Sheikh Rawil Gaynet- din has declared (Teslova, 2018). This brief research is partly about evaluating the policies regarding the Muslims living in one of the most powerful country in the world, Russia. The research question is whether the Muslims in Russia are subject to hu- man rights abuses or they have been equally treated citizens with dignity and equal rights as being one of the earliest communities of the Russian history. The paper will illustrate some evidences that can help to interpret the policies whether there is religious freedom or religious repression. To begin with, the argument stating that Russians see Muslims as the en- emy of Russian culture will be presented. According to Batunskij (2003, cited in Prazauskas); the Russians fought the Tatars in 1376, 1399, 1411, 1431 and this was the main reason why Muslims were increasingly regarded as principal enemies and described in negative terms in early Russian literature. Batunskij also argues that; during Tataro-Mongol rule, the Russians were not forced to adopt Islam, and even Russian Orthodox missionaries were allowed to spread their faith among the Golden Horde, while Russian principalities preserved a fairly wide autonomy but nevertheless, the Muslims were regarded, as the principal enemy of the ‘true’, i.e. Russian Orthodox faith. Similarly, Professor Paul Goble, a former CIA member and a professor at the Institute of World Politics argues that the Russian mythology about the Tartar yoke or the Mongol yoke is mostly a lie because it serves nationalist purposes, and when the Mongols conquered Russia, they were not Muslim yet. They were Nesto- rian Christians and Khazarite Jews (Goble, 2012). Whereas Algis Prazauskas (2005) argues that after Ivan the Terrible con- quered the khanates of Astrakhan and Kazan, he dealt harshly with the Muslim population. Kazan was virtually demolished, all mosques were destroyed, and Tar- tars were banned from the town. An archbishopric was founded in Kazan with the purpose of converting Tatars to the Russian Orthodox faith. Attitude towards Islam remained negative for a long time and Muslims were regularly subject to conversion efforts until the late 18th century. Unfortunately Soviet ideology imple- mented militant atheism, since mid-1920s mosques were destroyed, mullahs were forbidden to preach, and thousands of them were exiled or executed. 30,000 mosques were closed or destroyed, and 14,000 Islamic religious schools were closed (Arzt, 1998 cited in Prazauskas 2005). More recently, in 2009, an American briefing report for the American Gov- ernment’s Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe illustrated the plans of Russian government to be incredibly repressive toward Muslims. During the briefing, Professor Paul Goble, a former CIA member and a professor at the Institute of World Politics declared that; Mr. Rogozin— Russia’s Ambassador to NATO— “said that there needed to be an alliance between the Americans, the Europeans and the Russians against the threat from the South. And there was no question to what that threat was. It was Islam” (Goble, 2012). 263 M ED İA D MEDİAD Medya ve Din Araştırmaları Dergisi Yusuf FIRINCI On the other hand, a recent article from the Religious Board of Muslims of the Russian Federation illustrates a strategy for the Muslims in Russia. In this paper, Mukhetdinov (2016) argues that prominent Muslim scholars in Russia such as H. Faiz- khanov, Sh. Marjani and M. Bigiev and Ismail-bey Gasprinsky “understood that, firstly, more intimate cooperation was needed between Orthodox and Muslims in order to strengthen their shared Russian identity, and secondly, that Muslims needed to re- form their system of education in order to be competitive in the technological race”. It is not necessary to dig deeper on this issue, but Ismail-bey is actually known for his support to Pan-Türkism ideology. One can wonder what the roles of Orthodox Church in Russian state’s policies are. Russian Orthodox Church’s spokesperson illustrates the role of Christianity in the government. In 2015 Vsevolod Chaplin said: “Not well known or understood in the West, the Russian Orthodox Church has been Russia’s chief source of spiritual identity for most of its 1,000-year existence. Though it was nearly destroyed by the commu- nists, it has since rebounded sharply to become once again the Kremlin’s ideological bulwark” (Weir, 2015). To sum up this section, it can be argued that the relations between Russian pol- icies and Muslim communities and states have been going on for decades and the his- tory may be interpreted as soft power or sometimes bitter hard power interactions. Findings on Contemporary Rights of Russia Muslims Today, the constitution of the Russian Federation of 1993 guarantees that “free- dom of conscience and religion, including the right to profess individually or collec- tively any religion or not to profess any religion, and freely to choose, possess and disseminate religious and other convictions and act in accordance with them” and prohibits “all forms of limitations of human rights on social, racial, national, language or religious grounds” (Akhmetova, 2018). The Russian State legally guarantees the observance of the following rights of believers (Council of Muftis of Russia, 2018): • freedom to practice religion individually and collectively; • equality of religions before the law and the institutions of the state; • participation of representatives of religious organizations in the discussion of upcoming state decisions affecting the interests of believers; • freedom of religious activity, which includes: • free performance of collective and private religious rituals, and ceremonies, including holidays and in the month of Ramadan, • the creation of religious communities, organizations and centers, • ownership of religious objects, • free education of religion of children and adults, • the creation of scientific, educational and educational institutions and centers, • issue, export, import and distribution of religious literature, periodicals, video and audio products, and religious objects, preaching and educational work on the In- ternet, • free international contacts, free departure of Russian believers for religious training and pilgrimage, • charitable activities • providing conditions for healthy leisure of families of believers and children. M ED İA D 264 The Possible Interconnectedness of Religious Populism, Stigmatization, Dehumanization and Hate Crimes and an Evaluation on Muslims in Russia MEDİAD Journal of Media and Religion Studies To briefly sum up this section, it can be argued that the approach of modern Russian state about providing religious rights seems good on paper theoretically except one issue. Unfortunately, the document titled as “The Social Doctrine of Russian Muslims” illustrates the participation of Muslim Tatars to the combat operations against Muslim Turks which can be interpreted as a loyalty example. The participa- tion to the battles against Muslim Turks at Pleven, Lovcha and Mountain Dubynak are also mentioned (Council of Muftis of Russia, 2018). It can be argued that this part of the document can be interpreted as promotion of nationalism within a re- ligious doctrine. Some of the Arguments, Suggesting That There Have Been Violations of Muslim Rights Some of the interesting findings from a Norwegian-Danish-Swedish Chris- tian initiative’s recent Religious Freedom Survey can be listed as follows (Arnold, 2017): - Russian laws restricting freedom of religion and belief have increased, as have prosecutions of people exercising this freedom. - In North Caucasus, the authorities’ ‘counter-extremism’ strategy fuels local support for Islamists, resulting in a climate of fear in which freedom of religion and belief is severely limited. - The most serious type of freedom of religion and belief violation is the use of ‘counter-extremism’ measures against people and communities exercising this freedom. - Sharing beliefs is extremely hazardous and can result in assassination, par- ticularly of those belonging to ‘traditionally Muslim’ ethnicities. - In the North Caucasus republics the freedom of religion and belief situation is complicated by both the ongoing conflict in the region, and various repressive forms of Islam being imposed by both the insurgents and in Chechnya by Krem- lin-backed local authorities. On the other hand, UN Human Rights Committee declared that Russia should revise without undue delay the Federal Law on Combating Extremist Activity with a view to clarifying the vague and open-ended definition of “extremist activity”, ensuring that the definition requires an element of violence or hatred and estab- lishing clear and precise criteria on how materials may be classified as extremist. It should take all measures necessary to prevent the arbitrary use of the law and revise the Federal List of Extremist Materials (UN, 2015). A recent global trend is misusing authority by so-called anti-extremism measures. SOVA, Center for Information and Analysis, a Moscow based Russian non-profit organization conducts research work on such topics as nationalism, sec- ular society and political radicalism provides reports and loads of other documents about misuse of anti-extremism (SOVA, 2018). Recent Islamophobia report illustrates some findings about the recent dis- crimination regarding religious and cultural freedoms. Sorokin (2017) states: “since Russian media affiliated to the state often decry Islamophobia in Europe and por- tray it as a negative example, against the background of which the interreligious relations in Russia appear all in all harmonious, the rising controversy around the hijab thwarted this narrative. Leading political figures as well as grand muftis of the national Muslim spiritual boards remained strikingly inconspicuous. In 2013, President Putin rejected the hijab as not belonging to the tradition of Russian Mus- lims” (Sorokin, 2017). 265 M ED İA D MEDİAD Medya ve Din Araştırmaları Dergisi Yusuf FIRINCI Hijab has various definitions some of which can be used to define veil. Similar to modern politicians, it was the French back in time of colonialism, who followed a strategy against the use of veil for the cultural destruction of Algerians and to gain control of Algerian women, the ‘pivot’ of Algerian society (Fanon cited in Hilton, 2011). Whereas recently, a United Nations Committee of independent human rights experts from around the world, stated that French full-body veil ban violated women’s free- dom of religion. The experts declared that the state has not demonstrated how the full veil presents a thread itself for public security to justify this absolute ban (UN, 2018). On the other hand, Islamophobia Report also underlines the recent killings of Muslim imams. It is emphasized that to date; five assassinations of imams that took place in the Stavropol region between 2012 and 2016, have remained unresolved. Ac- cording to report, in 2016, Imam Ravil Kaybaliev was killed, continuing the tragic list of murders in the region. Kaybaliev was a fervent critic of the Yarov Bill (about con- trolling religious activities and anti-terror) , and the prohibition of the hijab by the Stavropol administration (Sorokin, 2017). There is another dimension of religious populism about Muslims. This can be interpreted as creating delusion to control Muslim masses. “Russia blessing Kadirov, is basically using Islam to legitimize his rule. If he cannot give them economic well-be- ing, he is giving them the biggest mosque in Europe” (Hunter, 2012) illustrates this argument. Also, Russian policies regarding the international conflict areas will suppose to affect Russian Muslims. Since most of the conflict areas that the West intervenes are Muslim populated areas, these coalition interventions affect Muslim populations in Russia at least emotionally. As a result, Russia must design careful strategies regard- ing its role in international arena. Professor Mark Katz (2010) argues as: “although Moscow has so far succeeded in keeping its policies toward the North Caucasus from becoming a rallying point uniting the broader Muslim world against Russia (like Sovi- et intervention in Afghanistan did in the 1980s), Moscow’s good relations with most Muslim governments and opposition movements will not necessarily prevent the rise of Islamic opposition inside Russia or the Muslim republics of the former USSR” (Katz, 2010). It can be argued that the Russian strategy regarding the Muslims inside and outside of Russia may affect the relations between the Russian governments with the Muslims. For example, “the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is the most volatile of the entire Caucasus region” (Hedenskog, Holmquist and Norberg, 2018). Russian support to a possible Armenian aggression or a possible Serbian aggression in Serbia-Koso- vo-Bosnia conflict may probably be unwelcomed by Russian Muslims. Some of The Recent Findings, That May Be Interpreted as Equality A recent Islamophobia report illustrates also some positive improvements re- garding the Islamophobia in Russia: “Strict law enforcement has equally, arguably to the expense of freedom of expression, reduced the margin of tolerance for critique against ‘traditional’ religions, including Islam. Openly racist, xenophobic or Islam- ophobic Internet sites have been blocked, and the media has become more cautious in reproducing xenophobic and Islamophobic stereotypes. On the other hand, Islamic communities that are not considered ‘traditional’ are stigmatized as extremist, and their members thrown under the bus of the justice system” (Sorokin, 2017). There are some statements of supreme Muslim officers supporting the Russian government. For example, in 2015, Talgat Tajuddin, the Supreme Mufti of Russia, pre- sented Russian president Putin his ideas on the accession of Israel and Syria to Russia to extend Russia to Mecca. He said: On the Day of National Unity, after representa- tives of traditional religions laid flowers and congratulated Vladimir Vladimirovich, I turned to him: with Israel, as with the Crimea, do? According to Tajuddin, who leads the portal Proufu.ru, Putin laughed and replied: Mufti-Khazrat, we will think. There’s M ED İA D 266 The Possible Interconnectedness of Religious Populism, Stigmatization, Dehumanization and Hate Crimes and an Evaluation on Muslims in Russia MEDİAD Journal of Media and Religion Studies no need to think here, you have to take it. Let Russia be up to Mecca. It is the will of Allah that people live together in friendship, love and harmony, said the muf- ti. Hall responded to his words with laughter and applause. (Lenta.ru, 2015). It is also important to see the international cooperation and education ac- tivities of Muslim leaders in Russia. According to a recent report; during the 3rd International Academic and Theological Conference ‘The Spiritual Silk Road Great Humanistic Traditions and Current Challenges’, the religious leader of Russian Muslims, Mufti Sheikh Ravil Gaynutdin, met the high-ranking Chinese delegation led by the Chairman of the Islamic Association of China (IAC), Hasan Fa Min and de- clared that Chinese and Russian Muslims are developing cooperation and carrying out a number of joint projects (Russia Mufties Council, 2018). Russian Muslims also co-organize projects like constructing greater Silk Road cooperation. Recently an international conference organized and scientific reports published. The coopera- tion project was focused on the Islamic factor in the integration processes of the Great Silk Road (Spiritual Board of Muslims in Russia, 2018e). On the other hand, recently Russian president declared his support for the improving Islamic education to the Muslims to fight against ‘destructive ideas’. The reason for this policy can be found in his words as: “even destructive ideas, can only be fought with the help of other ideas”. “The president vowed to sup- port Islamic religious education through partnerships with major state-backed uni- versities and research centres” (Aleyev, 2018). Similarly seeing that the Russian Muslims organise academic conferences and publishing academic theology journals illustrates good implementation exam- ples for equality. For example III International Scientific Theological Conference ‘The Spiritual Silk Road Great Humanistic Traditions and Challenges of Our Time’ was organised in cooperation with Kyrgyzstan Muslims (Spiritual Board of Mus- lims in Russia, 2018a). Also, the academic journal of Islam in the Modern World allows its readers getting information from various different perspectives regard- ing religion (Spiritual Board of Muslims in Russia, 2018b). Also, institutions pro- viding higher education on Islam can be helpful to the development of better un- derstanding of Islam. Moscow Islamic Institute provides theological education at university level (Spiritual Board of Muslims in Russia, 2018c). Interestingly, Muslims in Russia seem so strong that they can inspire the leaders of Muslim majority countries. For example, King of the Hashemite King- dom of Jordan, Abdullah II, during his visit to Moscow, said that the strong voice of the Russian moderate Islam is the hope for the world Ummah (Spiritual Board of Muslims in Russia, 2018d). Conclusion ...Ya know they murdered X, and tried to blame it on Islam ... (from the song: “Wake Up”, Rage Against the Machine, 1992) Prominent scholar Carl Schmitt argued in 1922 that “All significant concepts of the modern theory of the state are secularized theological concepts...” (Schmitt cited in Arato, 2013). Contemporary religious populism strategies, policies pro- voke us to think if western states have been returning to Christianization of gov- ernance by becoming more and more post-secular states. For example German state orders all government buildings to display a Christian cross (Khan, 2018). Russian President Putin declared that “Christianity is the root of Russian identity” (Valente, 2018). On the other hand, The Washington Post reported the blessings of assault rifles of Russian Armed Forces by Russian Orthodox priests with a title of “The Christian zeal behind Russia’s war in Syria” (Tharoor, 2015). Regarding the western civilization, the question may be if the post-secular, post-Enlightenment 267 M ED İA D MEDİAD Medya ve Din Araştırmaları Dergisi Yusuf FIRINCI arguments have increasingly been shaping religious populism strategies and have the western leaders and strategists been directing their social policies and international relations more and more according to religious populism? On the other hand, the global negative indoctrinations against Muslims are mostly transferred via global news companies, Hollywood movies, soap operas, biased scholars, politicians and other venues. It is argued that “neo-Orientalist dis- course deliberately wishes to impose some kind of distorted, ever hegemonic, and in- tersubjective constructs of Islam and the Muslim World” (Kerboua, 2017). The power of negative storytelling has been utilized for this purpose. This must be changed. Alex Kronemer and Daniel Tutt emphasize the power of positive storytelling and argue that “attitudes about Muslims and Islam will change fastest through heterogeneous rep- resentations in media, television, film and other venues” (cited in Burrel and Barsalou, 2015). Instead of populism, leaders, philosophers or politicians must develop policies to promote empathy to Muslims or any minority groups. Apathy must be prevented. As George Bernard Shaw puts it: “The worst sin toward our fellow creatures is not to hate them but to be indifferent toward them; that’s the essence of inhumanity.” (Adam Waytz, cited in Burrel and Barsalou, 2015). It can be argued that one of the most crucial aspects regarding religious popu- lism and hate campaigns may be being aware of media deception and false flag oper- ations that are utilized to shape perceptions and populist strategies. An example may be constructing anti-Muslim hate by taking positions designed to outrage wider com- munity while pretending to be Muslim. By mentioning false flag information campaign used during 2014 Sydney Lindt Café siege terror event, Andre Oboler emphasized that one of the approaches of anti-Muslim haters is “to pretend to be Muslim while engag- ing in explicit support for terrorism and violence” (Oboler, 2016). It can be argued that citizens all around the world must be aware of false flag operations, media disinforma- tion, deception, fear-mongering and hate campaigning strategies. On the other hand, it can be argued that, most of this phenomenological re- search aimed to illustrate the possible effects of religious populism. These effects will possibly create stigmatization at least. Various kinds of religious populism strategies may be spread via various information channels. Authorities must provide reliable in- formation sources within this era of information warfare. One of the core argument of this research may be the reinterpretation of the phenomena; religious populism, stigmatization, dehumanization, sterilization and hate crimes, which may allow us to construct a hypothesis that emphasize the link and connectedness of these phenomena. Religious populism may create genocides or it can just create some basic forms of dehumanization. Whereas stigmatization may cre- ate social sterilization policies or it can just create some basic forms of discriminations. But the core suggestion is raising awareness on the possible links, connectedness and grave consequences of these phenomena which are mostly underestimated by con- temporary politicians and religious leaders. On the other hand, the research provided a contemporary outlook of the Mus- lims living in Russia within a brief human rights perspective. The database searches and empirical evidences illustrate various interesting facts about religious populism or human rights regarding these societies. The history of interactions between Russian government and its Muslim communities may be interpreted as bitter hard power struggles or inclusive soft power policies. The interesting research findings provided by this research are presented to the readers’ interpretations. In conclusion, this research suggested the links and possible interconnected- ness of phenomena; religious populism, stigmatization, dehumanization and hate crimes. This argument will necessitate raising awareness on the crucial importance each of these phenomena and the suggestion of developing relevant preventive poli- M ED İA D 268 The Possible Interconnectedness of Religious Populism, Stigmatization, Dehumanization and Hate Crimes and an Evaluation on Muslims in Russia MEDİAD Journal of Media and Religion Studies cies, designed by considering this connectedness and the importance of strategic communication strategies. References Akhmetova, E. (2018). Managing Muslim Minorities in Russia. 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FILOZOFIJA I DRUŠTVO, 28(2), Available at: http://www.doiser- bia.nb.rs/img/doi/0353-5738/2017/0353-57381702231W.pdf 27.10.18 https://www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/muslim-community-in-russia-25-million-strong/1081608%2002.10.2018 https://www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/muslim-community-in-russia-25-million-strong/1081608%2002.10.2018 https://news.un.org/en/story/2018/10/1023872 https://news.un.org/en/story/2018/10/1023872 https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Europe/2015/1123/Is-Russia-s-intervention-in-Syria-a-holy-war-Russian-Orthodox-Church-yes https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Europe/2015/1123/Is-Russia-s-intervention-in-Syria-a-holy-war-Russian-Orthodox-Church-yes https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Europe/2015/1123/Is-Russia-s-intervention-in-Syria-a-holy-war-Russian-Orthodox-Church-yes Dini Populizm, Damgalama, İnsandışılaştırma ve Nefret Suçlarının Muhtemel Bağlantılılıkları ve Rusya’daki Müslümanlar Üzerine Bir Değerlendirme Yusuf FIRINCI Genişletilmiş Özet Ayrımcılık, ötekileştirme ve nefret suçları gibi insan hakları ihlallerinin insanlığın varoluşundan itibaren süregelmekte olduğu; ancak artan iletişim imkânları, gelişen stratejiler ve yoğunlaşan çatışmalarla artan göçler gibi nedenlerle çağımızda bu ihlalle- rin daha da fazla arttığı veya bu ihlallerin daha da fazla farkına varıldığı iddia edilebilir. Bu araştırma, daha önce literatürde genellikle ayrı ayrı araştırılan dini popülizm, ayrım- cılık, damgalama, baskı, insandışılaştırma, nefret suçları, toplumsal arındırma ve etnik temizlik gibi kavramları bir arada incelemektedir. Çalışmanın konusu olan popülizm, halk ve elitler arasındaki karşıtlık olarak tanımlanmaktayken Kirk Hawkins, populizmin siyasi çatışmalara ikili ahlaki boyut at- feden bir söylem biçimi olduğunu iddia eder. Kazin ise ‘biz’ ve ‘onlar’ arasındaki iki- ciliği Amerikan popülizmi olarak tanımlar. Popülizm çeşitli formlara evrimleşmiş olup Ernesto Laclau popülizmi oluşturan ‘biz’ ve ‘onlar’ söyleminin belirli bir anlamının ol- madığını, toplumsal şartlara bağlı olarak değişken muhtevalar içerebileceğini, bu ka- tegorileştirmenin ise çeşitli sınıflandırma ve tanılama süreçleriyle anlamlandırıldığını iddia etmiştir. Martin Carillo ise popülist uygulamaların siyasetçilerce sık başvurulan bir yöntem olmasını; siyasi öznelerin görece istikrarlı bir toplumsal düzende tutulma- ları ve tanzim edilmeleri konusunda mevcut toplumsal ve siyasi kurumların başarısız olmasına bağlar. Bu çalışmadaki veriler değerlendirildiğinde; popülizm uygulamalarıyla inşa edi- len çeşitli ‘biz’ ve ‘onlar’ karşıtlıklarıyla algı, anlayış, bilinç güdümlemeleri ile kitlerinin kalplerinin kazanılması amaçlanabildiği iddia edilebilir. Diğer taraftan ayrımcılık, ku- tuplaşma, ayrışma ve düşmanlaşmaya yol açabilir. Popülizm 11 Eylül saldırıları sonrası, Alston’un ifade ettiğine benzer şekilde korku, iritasyon, güvenlik kaygıları ile nefret ve yabancı düşmanlığı unsurlarını içerebilir. Carillo’nun da ifade ettiği üzere günümüzde din ve siyaset ilişkisi, popülizm için çok cazip ve kabul gören bir konudur. Ionut Apahideanu’nun Avrupadaki din popülizmi ile ilgili tespitleri din popüliz- mine gösterilen güncel rağbet hakkında özet bir bilgi sunabilir. Din popülizmi ile oluş- turulmaya çalışılan algı örnekleri olarak; yerli Hıristiyan topluluğunun Müslümanlarca ‘işgal’ edilmesi tasviri, İslam’ın düşmanca, saldırgan ve gerici olarak tasviri, Avrupa elit- lerinin Müslüman göçüne göz yummaları sebebiyle yozlaşmış oldukları tasviri, Müslü- manların dini haklarının kısıtlanması, camii inşalarının ve başörtüsünün yasaklanması talepleri gösterilebilir. Dini yaftalama veya damgalama ise diğer bir hak ihlali çeşididir. Örneğin Alman- ya ve Norveç’te Jonas Kunst ve meslektaşlarınca yapılan araştırma sonucunda; Müslü- man azınlıkların damgalama sonucu içerisinde yaşadıkları toplumun bir üyesi olmakla Müslüman olmak arasında, uyuşmazlık algısı içerisinde kaldıklarına değinilmiştir. Bri- tanya’da gerçekleştirilen bir eylemde ise Müslüman kadınlar toplum içinde kendilerine MEDİAD Medya ve Din Araştırmaları Dergisi | Journal of Media and Religion Studies M ED İA D 274 The Possible Interconnectedness of Religious Populism, Stigmatization, Dehumanization and Hate Crimes and an Evaluation on Muslims in Russia MEDİAD Journal of Media and Religion Studies müteakip zamanlarda ‘terörist’ şeklinde hitap edilmesi veya fiziksel saldırılarda bu- lunulmasına dikkat çekmeye çalışmıştır. Burada medyanın önemi ortaya çıkmaktadır. Korku tellallığı yapan medya, dini damgalamaya hizmet edebilmektedir. Kunst ve meslektaşlarının da belirttiği üzere korku, sakınma ve uzak durmaya yol açar, uzak durma ise kişilerin önyargı- lar ve klişelerle mücadelesini önler. Dini tahammülsüzlüğün azaltılması için farklı düşünce grupları arasında iletişimin özendirilmesi önerilir. Medya, uluslararası anlaşmalarda yasaklanmasına rağmen bazı durumlarda nefret söyleminin yayılmasında da rol oynar. Örneğin 1994 Ruanda soykırımında medya, etnik gruplar olan Tutsi’lerin yanı sıra ılımlı Hutu’lar karşıtı etnik nefret ve vahşeti destekleyip kışkırtmıştır. Burada sorulması gereken asıl soru medya ve iletişim kanallarını kimin yön- lendirdiği veya kontrol ettiği olabilir. Çünkü medya kanalları vasıtasıyla popülizm söylemleri, hedef kitlelerin algılarını ve perspektiflerini şekillendirebilir. Çalışmada ele alınan nefret suçları ise; ırk, cinsiyet, din gibi önyargılar temelinde gerçekleştirildiği belirlenen cinayet, tecavüz, kundaklama, eşya yağmalama ve vandallık gibi suçları ifade etmektedir. Çalışmada literatür araştırmasının yanı sıra anlatı araştırmasına da kısaca yer verilmiştir. Yapılan literatür taramasından edinilen bilimsel veriler dikkate alındığın- da araştırma konusu kavramlar arasında bağlantılılık olabileceği iddia edilmektedir. Örneğin dini popülizm sonucu etnik temizlik gibi çok vahim sonuçlar doğabileceği gibi görece daha hafif ihlal olarak nitelenebilecek ayrımcılık da doğabilir. Nefret suçlarının kökeninde damgalama olabileceği gibi popülist ‘biz’ ve ‘onlar’ anlatıları veya tarihsel damgalamalar da rol oynayabilir. Bu çalışmada; popülist söylemler, damgalayıcı tarih anlatımları ve insan hakları ihlal edilen mağdurların deneyim an- latılarına da kısaca yer verilmiştir. Bu veriler doğrultusunda literatürde daha ziya- de ayrı ayrı ele alınan ayrımcılık, dini popülizm, damgalama gibi yukarıda değinilen hususların, çeşitli seviye ve bağlamlarda karşılıklı etkileşimlerinin, bağlantılılıkları- nın ve hatta kimi zaman sebep-sonuç ilişkilerinin bulunduğu iddia edilmektedir. Bu bağlantılılık sebebiyle görece daha ağır bir hak ihlali olarak kabul edilebilecek etnik temizlik gibi bir suç, bu suçla bağlantılı sebep-sonuç ilişkisi içindeki görece daha ha- fif bir hak ihlali sayılabilecek insandışılaştırma, damgalama ve hatta dini popülizmi etnik temizlik kadar vahim bir suç yapabilecektir. Bu sebeple günümüzde iletişim araçları ve stratejileriyle yoğunlukla kullanımına şahit olunan en basit popülizm söylemleri, dini popülizm söylemleri, ayrımcılık ve damgalama gibi ihlallerin çok daha vahim etkileri olabileceği değerlendirilerek bu politikaların incelenip tedbir alınmasına çok daha fazla önem verilmesi gerektiği iddia edilebilir. Bu çalışmanın diğer bir amacı da Rusya’da yaşayan Müslümanlara yönelik hak ihlalleri iddialarının kısaca ele alınmasıdır. Bu amaçla tarihi sosyolojik temel ve arka plan araştırması, güncel yasal hak ve yükümlülüklerinin incelenmesi gerçek- leştirilmiştir. Hak ihlalleri olarak nitelenebilecek çeşitli verilerin yanı sıra, Rusya’daki Müslümanların eşit haklara sahip olduğuna delil oluşturabilecek çeşitli araştırma bulguları sunulmuştur. Anahtar Kelimeler: Dini Popülizm, Damgalama, Nefret Suçları, Medya Yanılt- maları, İslamofobi _GoBack _GoBack _GoBack _GoBack _GoBack _GoBack _GoBack _GoBack 
work_vqid6fpbyvcdxcjb74excgyyby	----	healthcare Editorial Examining Social Determinants of Health, Stigma, and COVID-19 Disparities Jocelyn Turner-Musa 1,2,* , Oluwatoyin Ajayi 2,3 and Layschel Kemp 1,2 1 Department of Psychology, Morgan State University, Baltimore, MD 21251, USA; lakem1@morgan.edu 2 ASCEND Center for Biomedical Research, Morgan State University, Baltimore, MD 21251, USA; oluwatoyin.ajayi@morgan.edu 3 School of Community Health and Policy, Morgan State University, Baltimore, MD 21251, USA * Correspondence: jocelyn.turnermusa@morgan.edu; Tel.: +1-443-885-3290 Received: 6 June 2020; Accepted: 9 June 2020; Published: 12 June 2020 ���������� ������� Abstract: There is growing attention to disparities in the incidence, prevalence, and mortality associated with COVID-19 (Coronavirus disease 2019) in racial/ethnic communities. The conditions leading to these disparities may be a function of social determinants of health and stigma linked to the disease. It is important to examine how these factors may be implicated in COVID-19 onset, treatment, and outcomes. A brief overview of these issues allows for a cursory examination of the role of social determinants of health and stigma in COVID-19. Consideration is given to how understanding COVID-19 in the context of social determinants and stigma may be included in interventions to mitigate its transmission within vulnerable populations. Keywords: health disparities; COVID-19; stigma; social determinants of health; race/ethnicity 1. Introduction The 2019 novel coronavirus (2019-nCoV), also known as SARS-Cov-2 (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2), is one of seven types of coronaviruses that infects humans, typically leading to serious upper respiratory problems causing COVID-19 disease. Transmission of the virus occurs through the air via coughing and sneezing, close personal contact with someone infected with the virus, and touching an object or surface contaminated with the virus [1]. The virus originated in Wuhan, China, where, in December 2019, a cluster of 27 cases of pneumonia of unknown etiology was observed [2,3]. The pneumonia cases were linked to a new strain of the coronavirus, which research suggests was found in infected animals and initially transmitted to humans in an open-air seafood/animal market in Wuhan, China [4]. Since December 2019, the illness has spread to 213 countries and territories and was declared a “Public Health Emergency of International Concern” in January 2020 and a pandemic by the World Health Organization in March 2020 [5]. As of 4 June 2020, there are 6,416,828 cases of COVID-19 worldwide and have been 382,867 deaths (Table 1) [6]. The countries with the highest prevalence and mortality rates are the United States with 1,823,220 cases and 106,051 deaths and Brazil with 555,383 cases and 31,199 deaths [7]. COVID-19 has an incubation period that varies from 2 days to 14 days and is characterized initially by flu-like symptoms but may further develop to severe coughs, shortness of breath, stomach pain, diarrhea, sore throat, loss of taste and smell, tiredness, muscle aches/pain, repeated shaking with chills, and fever. Severe symptomatology warrants hospitalization in some patients. To date, there is no cure or vaccine for the virus. Healthcare 2020, 8, 168; doi:10.3390/healthcare8020168 www.mdpi.com/journal/healthcare http://www.mdpi.com/journal/healthcare http://www.mdpi.com https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7045-898X http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/healthcare8020168 http://www.mdpi.com/journal/healthcare https://www.mdpi.com/2227-9032/8/2/168?type=check_update&version=2 Healthcare 2020, 8, 168 2 of 7 Table 1. Global Coronavirus Cases and Deaths 1. Regions/Areas 2 Cases Deaths Globally 6,194,533 376,320 Africa 108,121 2700 Americas 2,905,432 163,248 Eastern Mediterranean 536,148 12,999 Europe 2,175,941 182,416 South-East Asia 283,845 8000 Western Pacific 184,305 7044 1 Source: World Health Organization, COVID-19 Situation Report. 2 Americas: the continents of North and South America; Eastern Mediterranean: east of the Mediterranean Sea in Western Asia; South-East Asia: regions between the Indian Ocean and Pacific Sea; Western Pacific: countries in the Pacific, Oceania, and parts of Asia. Risk factors for COVID-19 include close contact with secretions from an infected person, chronic illness (e.g., asthma, hypertension, kidney disease, lung disease, diabetes), immunosuppression, being male, obesity, older age (60–65 years of age), heart disease, and living or working in nursing homes [3]. Recent statistics suggest disparities in the incidence, prevalence, and mortality rates in COVID-19 among certain populations. Many populations disproportionately affected by these risk factors are at increased risk for COVID-19. In the United States, Blacks, Hispanics/Latinx, and Native Americans are disproportionately impacted by COVID-19. For example, Blacks comprise 13% of the U.S. population and, according to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), account for 28% of COVID-19 cases and 33% of hospitalizations, whereas Hispanics/Latinx account for 18% of the U.S. population and 28% of COVID-19 cases [8]. Mortality rates for Blacks and Hispanics/Latinx are also higher [9]. While data for Native Americans are sparse, available data from the Indian Health Service show that in states with higher concentrations of Native Americans, there are disproportionate rates of infection and death [10–12]. Similar trends have been observed in other countries [13]. Data from the Office of National Statistics in the UK show that, when controlling for age in England and Wales, Blacks are 4.2 to 4.3 times more likely to die from a COVID-19-related death than Whites. These data also reveal that compared to Whites, Bangladeshis, Pakistanis, Indians, and those of mixed ethnicities are at increased risk of death from COVID-19 [13]. Social determinants underlying health conditions affecting these populations are believed to make them more vulnerable to the virus. These determinants include but are not limited to access to healthcare, economic insecurity, poor neighborhood and housing conditions, and availability of resources. For instance, patterns of social engagement and sense of security and well-being are affected by where people live. Availability of resources that enhance quality of life can also influence health outcomes. Additionally, stigma in the form of stereotyping and harassment directed toward groups may be associated with the spread of the virus. Pandemics such as COVID-19 create fear and anxiety, which can lead to social stigma toward certain groups, including people who have travelled abroad, people of Asian descent, or even service and healthcare providers. Stigma and discrimination that stems from it can occur when people associate COVID-19 with a nationality, even though not everyone in that nationality is at risk for the disease. Stigma can lead to social avoidance, denial of health care, and perhaps even violence. Understanding how social determinants of health and stigma contribute to the incidence, prevalence, treatment, and mortality associated with COVID-19 may aid in developing more effective interventions to mitigate the transmission of the disease. 2. Social Determinants of Health and COVID-19 Social determinants of health refer to “conditions in the places where people live, learn, work, and play that affect a wide range of health risks and outcomes” [14]. These conditions provide the context in which health occurs. COVID-19 is highly transmittable, and mitigation strategies include Healthcare 2020, 8, 168 3 of 7 following healthy hygiene practices, staying at home when sick, practicing physical distancing to lower the risk of disease transmission, and use of a cloth face covering when physical distancing cannot be maintained. When experiencing COVID-19 symptoms, accessibility of testing is also needed to reduce disease spread. Social determinants, such as access to health care, income inequality (e.g., low income wage workers), housing and neighborhood density, and cultural beliefs about testing, may influence COVID-19 incidence and health outcomes in vulnerable populations. 2.1. Access to Healthcare The World Health Organization (WHO) defines primary healthcare as “a whole-of-society approach to health and well-being centered on the needs and preferences of individuals, families, and communities.” [15]. Access to healthcare is a fundamental human right, but the strain that the COVID-19 pandemic places on healthcare systems affects primary care provision for many people. People who believe they are infected with the COVID-19 virus need to seek testing or immediate medical care. In the U.S., 30 million people do not have health insurance or a primary care provider, and, during the initial COVID-19 period, some testing sites required insurance and a referral from a medical provider [16–18]. Blacks and Hispanics/Latinx in the US are less likely to have access to hospitals and pharmacies and wait for days to get urgent care and prescriptions [18]. In some areas, there may be less available testing sites, such as in rural areas compared to larger metropolitan cities [19]. Inadequate access is also driven by a long-standing distrust of the health care system, language barriers, and financial implications associated with missing work to receive care [20]. 2.2. Housing and Neighborhood Density The physical structure of communities, such as proximity to resources like grocery stores, green space, the mix of businesses, amenities, and housing, affects the COVID-19 pandemic. High-density housing and group living quarters accelerate transmission of the coronavirus, disproportionately affecting older adults in nursing homes and people with compromised health in overcrowded communities. Blacks, relative to Whites, are more likely to live in neighborhoods with a lack of healthy food options, recreational facilities, safety, and lightning. Blacks are also more likely to live in densely populated areas, further increasing their contact with other people. Blacks represent about a quarter of public transit users, which may affect accessibility to testing sites. These neighborhood characteristics make it more challenging to maintain physical distancing and self-quarantine to curb COVID-19 transmission [21,22]. 2.3. Income Inequality According to United Nations data, 55% of the world’s population—four billion people—lack insurance or social assistance, and only about 20% of unemployed people are covered by unemployment benefits [23]. In the US, White workers earn 28 percent more than Black workers and 35 percent more than Hispanic/Latinx workers. Blacks and Hispanics/Latinx are also more likely to have service, transportation, and jobs in sales compared to Whites [24,25]. With COVID-19, members of minority groups may be at greater risk of infection as workers in essential industries who must continue to work despite the outbreaks in their communities or due to their economic situations. Workers without paid sick leave might be more likely to continue to work even when they are ill. This can increase workers’ exposure to other workers who may have COVID-19, or in turn, expose others to them. Gaps in health benefit coverage may also result in workers being forced to go to work when ill. Exacerbating this, job loss during the COVID-19 pandemic is higher for Blacks and Hispanics/Latinx [26]. Results from a recent PEW research survey reveal that Blacks and Hispanics/Latinx are less likely to have savings to cover living expenses for at least 3 months [27]. The related income loss increases the risk of poverty for workers and their families. Such data suggest that these workers and their families may not have access to needed healthcare or necessities, such as food, which may worsen health outcomes. Healthcare 2020, 8, 168 4 of 7 2.4. Cultural Beliefs Cultural beliefs and perceptions of causes of disease contribute to health behaviors. European nations and the United States have a history of racial bias in medical treatment and research, which in some instances, has led to mistrust of the medical system [28]. This mistrust can be associated with underutilization of health services, limited participation in clinical research studies, and reduction in organ and blood donation [29]. As with many new diseases, with the novel coronavirus, limited information about the disease and mitigation strategies to prevent transmission may intensify cultural beliefs about disease onset and treatment. For populations at risk for COVID-19, strongly held religious beliefs that God will protect them from disease may result in limited testing and non-compliance with social distancing as a mitigation strategy. Social cohesion and social gatherings are of great importance in many cultures. For example, weekly attendance of a religious service is high among many cultures around the world [30,31]. As a result, measures to impose social and physical distancing may be more challenging. These populations are also more likely to experience negative encounters with healthcare systems which reduces the likelihood they will seek testing for the virus or follow recommended treatment guidelines. 3. Stigma and COVID-19 Stigma in the context of health is “the negative association between a person or group of people who share certain characteristics and a specific disease” [32,33]. When a disease is novel and leads to severe symptoms or death, fear, anxiety, and limited knowledge about the disease may lead to stereotyping, discrimination, and labelling toward persons with the disease. Discriminatory behaviors, such as isolation, refusal to provide service, harassment, and bullying, may be experienced by the stigmatized group. Stigma may also affect individuals associated with those with the disease, such as caregivers, family members, those in the same community, or the same racial/ethnic group. Such behaviors may undermine strategies to mitigate the disease and can lead to not getting tested and not practicing healthy behaviors, such as wearing masks to avoid discrimination. In Africa, during the Ebola pandemic, stigmatization in the form of discrimination, prejudice, and social isolation that arose during the outbreak continued among those who survived [34]. Similarly, in COVID-19 cases in Africa, protective measures, such as wearing a mask, being tested, or the belief of coming into contact with an infected person, have led to people being ostracized, harassed, and isolated from others [35]. This includes healthcare workers, who also experience physical exhaustion and poor mental health outcomes as a function of stigma associated with treating COVID-19 cases [36]. For Asians and Asian Americans, there is an increase in hate crimes in the US due to the coronavirus global outbreak [37]. Since the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, Asians and people of Asian descent have been targets of threats, attacks, bullying and derogatory language in media reports and statements by politicians and on social media platforms where hate speech related to COVID-19 has spread. In the US, a coalition of Asian American groups received almost 1500 reports of incidents of racism, hate speech, discrimination and physical attacks against Asians and Asian Americans, fueling racism and xenophobia against Asians worldwide [38,39]. Prevention strategies, such as wearing a mask, have also led to concerns about racial profiling and harassment of Black American men by law enforcement [40]. Masks or face coverings such as bandanas, may be linked to crime and influence perceptions of criminal activity by Black men [41]. Data from the US Police Shooting Database show that unarmed Black Americans, compared to unarmed White Americans, are three times more likely to be shot by the police [42,43]. Such data underscore concerns by Blacks regarding the use of masks to mitigate COVID-19. Stigmatization may not only impede opportunities to reduce the spread of infection but may inadvertently increase disease transmission and mortality from it. Healthcare 2020, 8, 168 5 of 7 4. Conclusions In this overview, we address the possible role of social determinants of health and stigma on disparities associated with COVID-19. There are still many unanswered questions. To fully address disparities in COVID-19, greater attention must be paid to collection of data on race and ethnicity. This should also include socioeconomic data, residential status data (i.e., rural vs. urban), institutional racism data, and data on comorbidity at minimum [19,41,44]. As more information is acquired about this disease and antecedents associated with its transmission and mortality rates, strategies for better prevention and intervention may be developed. This is important given that there is currently no vaccine to prevent the onset of COVID-19. Author Contributions: Conceptualization, J.T.-M.; methodology, J.T.-M.; resources, J.T.-M., O.A., and L.K.; data curation, J.T.-M. and O.A.; writing—original draft preparation, J.T.-M.; writing—review and editing, J.T.-M., O.A., L.K.; supervision, J.T.-M. All authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript. Funding: This research received no external funding. Acknowledgments: Layschel Kemp received support from the National Institutes of Health NIGMS-BUILD TL4 GM118974. Conflicts of Interest: The authors declare no conflict of interest. References 1. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention: Coronavirus (COVID-19). Available online: https://www.cdc. gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/index.html (accessed on 27 April 2020). 2. World Health Organization. WHO timeline—COVID-19. Available online: https://www.who.int/news-room/ detail/27-04-2020-who-timeline---COVID-19 (accessed on 27 April 2020). 3. Coronavirus (2019-nCoV) (MedicineNet). 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This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/). http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0206595 http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/30485311 https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2020/05/20/world/social-issues-world/virus-stigma-sub-saharan-africa/#.XtK18TpKiUl https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2020/05/20/world/social-issues-world/virus-stigma-sub-saharan-africa/#.XtK18TpKiUl https://reliefweb.int/report/mali/misinformation-leads-increasing-COVID-19-stigma-sub-saharan-africa https://reliefweb.int/report/mali/misinformation-leads-increasing-COVID-19-stigma-sub-saharan-africa https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2020/05/20/coronavirus-hate-crimes-against-asian-americans-continue-rise/5212123002/ https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2020/05/20/coronavirus-hate-crimes-against-asian-americans-continue-rise/5212123002/ http://thenationshealth.aphapublications.org/content/50/3/10?rss=1 http://thenationshealth.aphapublications.org/content/50/3/10?rss=1 https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/05/12/COVID-19-fueling-anti-asian-racism-and-xenophobia-worldwide# https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/05/12/COVID-19-fueling-anti-asian-racism-and-xenophobia-worldwide# https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/14/us/coronavirus-masks-racism-african-americans.html https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/14/us/coronavirus-masks-racism-african-americans.html https://time.com/5821250/homemask-masks-racial-stereotypes/ https://time.com/5821250/homemask-masks-racial-stereotypes/ http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0141854 http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/26540108 http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s40615-020-00738-2 http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/32253746 http://dx.doi.org/10.1056/NEJMp2012910 http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/32374952 http://creativecommons.org/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/. Introduction Social Determinants of Health and COVID-19 Access to Healthcare Housing and Neighborhood Density Income Inequality Cultural Beliefs Stigma and COVID-19 Conclusions References 
work_vqrs7ssjgvdi5oi2cgpsn3ihei	----	ABS306052.qxd http://abs.sagepub.com Scientist American Behavioral DOI: 10.1177/0002764207306052 2007; 51; 205 American Behavioral Scientist Elizabeth Englander Is Bullying a Junior Hate Crime? Implications for Interventions http://abs.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/51/2/205 The online version of this article can be found at: Published by: http://www.sagepublications.com can be found at:American Behavioral Scientist Additional services and information for http://abs.sagepub.com/cgi/alerts Email Alerts: http://abs.sagepub.com/subscriptions Subscriptions: http://www.sagepub.com/journalsReprints.navReprints: http://www.sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.navPermissions: http://abs.sagepub.com/cgi/content/refs/51/2/205 SAGE Journals Online and HighWire Press platforms): (this article cites 9 articles hosted on the Citations © 2007 SAGE Publications. All rights reserved. Not for commercial use or unauthorized distribution. by on October 22, 2007 http://abs.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://abs.sagepub.com/cgi/alerts http://abs.sagepub.com/subscriptions http://www.sagepub.com/journalsReprints.nav http://www.sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav http://abs.sagepub.com/cgi/content/refs/51/2/205 http://abs.sagepub.com 205 American Behavioral Scientist Volume 51 Number 2 October 2007 205-212 © 2007 Sage Publications 10.1177/0002764207306052 http://abs.sagepub.com hosted at http://online.sagepub.com Is Bullying a Junior Hate Crime? Implications for Interventions Elizabeth Englander Bridgewater State College, Bridgewater, Massachusetts Hate crimes and bullying behaviors among children have similarities. Both often focus on “different” individuals as preferred targets, such as those from controversial groups (e.g., homosexuals). Thus, unequal power exists between a bully and his or her victim, and this dynamic precludes the use of equal-power interventions such as mediation. A second similarity is a lack of basic respect for all persons and the subsequent justifica- tion of violence against a particular person or group. A third similarity is the predomi- nance of these behaviors among young (juvenile) offenders. These similarities between hate crimes and bullying in children may inform bullying-prevention efforts. Programs need to reduce bullying behaviors by focusing on tolerance of differences, the promo- tion of positive attitudes toward diversity, and negative attitudes toward hate-based vic- timization of people who may be different from the mainstream. The Massachusetts Aggression Reduction Center’s Anti-Bullying Program provides a model for this approach. Keywords: bullying; hate; prejudice; bias; violence; aggression; abuse Under Massachusetts law, hate crimes are those crimes motivated by hatred against a person or group on the basis of race, religion, disability, color, ethnic/national origin or sexual orientation. Hate crimes can occur by a physical attack, intimidating or threat- ening behavior that puts a person in fear of immediate physical harm or damage to property, such as vandalism. —Office of Norfolk County District Attorney William Keating (n.d.) Is Bullying a Hate Crime? Targets of hate crimes are chosen specifically for harassment and violence because of their membership in a given group (such as an ethnicity or religion). The prejudice that characterizes hate crime offenders appears to focus on those who are “different” (American Psychological Association, 1998). In contrast, there are times when bullying is leveled against children without regard to their group status—a bully may choose a victim simply because he or she is available or momentarily vul- nerable (Naumann, 2001). In those cases, bullying does not appear to fit under the rubric of “hate crimes.” © 2007 SAGE Publications. All rights reserved. Not for commercial use or unauthorized distribution. by on October 22, 2007 http://abs.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://abs.sagepub.com 206 American Behavioral Scientist But it is noteworthy that the majority of the time, bullying appears to be a “junior” or “apprentice” version of adult hate crimes. Both bullying behaviors and hate crimes are predominantly committed by young individuals (Strom, 2001). A broad research literature confirms that most bullying behaviors by children focus primar- ily, if not exclusively, on children who have perceived differences (Naumann, 2001). One area of confusion may be the definition of the word differences, which is, after all, a relative term. What makes a particular child different, and from whom are they different? Do children target those who are different only from themselves? Is the “norm” against which children are compared schoolwide or society-wide? Do bul- lies target those who are different from a mainstream, media-fed conception of what and how people “ought” to be? Are all differences targeted equally, or do some place children at particularly high risk of being targeted by a bully? The strongest differences perceived by children may be differences from their immediate mainstream—that is, bullies may choose as preferred targets those children who are clearly different from the mainstream group of children in their school and who are identified with a socially controversial group (such as students who are self-identified as gay or lesbian). This characteristic clearly parallels juve- nile hate crimes, which also focus on those who are “different” and “unwelcome” (McDevitt, 1998, as cited in Mjoseth, 1998). Other targets for bullying may be children who are vulnerable or less able to defend themselves; certainly many researchers and authors have noted that children with special needs can be a strong focus group (Connors & Stalker, 2002). Generally speaking, any obvious differences seem to make children preferred targets, such as children of color in predominately White schools or children who wear very different clothing (such as religious garb) or who are from cultures other than mainstream middle-class America (Buchanan & Winzer, 2001). The selection of “obvious” targets mirrors hate crimes in that schoolyard bullies often victimize children with differences that society has already identified as contro- versial or even pejorative (e.g., Muslims or Jews, homosexuals, ethnic minority groups). Jack McDevitt has characterized hate crimes as “message crimes” (McDevitt, 1998), and like bullying, they are the polar opposite of welcoming messages. But although the majority of hate crimes focus on individuals from particular racial groups (American Psychological Association, 1998), bullying may paint with a broader brush. When it comes to bullying, less obviously different children may be targeted as well. For example, children who excel academically are targeted but at apparently lower rates, perhaps because their academic or ability differences are not always immediately apparent or salient (Schuler, 2002). Similarly, I would place children in different social circumstances in this latter group, such as children of divorced parents, children of socially deviant parents, and so on. Miami University’s (2001) policy states that “many individuals become targets of hateful acts because others are unable to accept differences based on race, gender, sexual orientation, religion, age, ethnicity or disability.” The bully, like the perpetrator © 2007 SAGE Publications. All rights reserved. Not for commercial use or unauthorized distribution. by on October 22, 2007 http://abs.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://abs.sagepub.com of a hate crime, is focusing on this “different” victim for a variety of reasons. First, bullies are less likely to encounter social disapproval or stigma if they focus their activities on a socially nonconforming individual. Second, their aim is to remind that individual of his or her differences and thus to reinforce their own, conforming their sense of belonging to the mainstream group. By reinforcing their own conformity and thus their own superiority by conforming, they reinforce a superior status to all conforming bystanders and help secure their noninterference, if not their active sup- port, of the bullying activities. That they terrorize or humiliate or degrade the victim may be secondary to their own desires to secure and upgrade their own social posi- tions. Or they may be psychologically troubled enough to enjoy the social humilia- tion of others (Englander, 2005a). A second characteristic that is consistent between bullying and hate crimes is the casual acceptance of language that would be offensive, and possibly prohibited, in most workplaces today. Among American middle-class adults in the 21st century, social mores have evolved sufficiently to make many uncomfortable with the verbal abuse of those who do not conform, provided that nonconformity takes certain acceptable forms (such as ethnicity, religion, and some social groups). Other types of nonconformity among Americans are still not tolerated because, for example, they may represent illegal or morally noxious behaviors (such as groups who support sex- ual activity between adults and children). Still, the correct response even to extremely deviant groups is generally perceived to be public debate or, in the case of illegal behaviors, judicial prosecution. Simply berating, humiliating, harassing, or abusing individuals is frowned on. These evolving social mores have resulted in socially unprecedented legislation in the United States; these new laws criminalize hate crimes, including some types of offensive speech (e.g., see the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act). Among children in the United States, however (and in western Europe, for that matter), these social mores have either changed, have never developed, or are not routinely applied to social behavior. Children growing up in 2005, half a century after the birth of the civil rights movement in the United States, typically view ver- bally berating or humiliating nonconforming peers as a “fact of life,” and parents likewise see their children’s use of offensive slurs as normative (National Education Association, 2003). A survey of teachers in 2004 found that offensive and insulting language is a daily, if not hourly, occurrence at many middle and high schools (Englander, 2005a). Many educators working in schools today who were reared on the appropriateness of social tolerance and diversity are appalled by their perception of rampant use of slurs and offensive language in teenage children (Englander, 2005a). A third critical characteristic of both bullying and hate crimes is a complete rejec- tion of the concept that broad civility and tolerance have positive social value. Far from modeling respectful and civil behaviors to all, children who bully seem to regard some children as legitimate targets. An interesting line of research suggests that chronically aggressive children may in fact be misinterpreting ambiguous social Englander / Is Bullying a Junior Hate Crime? 207 © 2007 SAGE Publications. All rights reserved. Not for commercial use or unauthorized distribution. by on October 22, 2007 http://abs.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://abs.sagepub.com cues as hostile attacks and thus may see their own bullying behaviors toward certain children as justifiable responses (and thus not as offensive; Dodge et al., 2003). Seen in this context, bullies might regard their bullying behaviors as self-defense rather than as uncivil or unjustified abuse of others (Englander, 2003). It may also be the case that the nationwide emphases on other issues have diluted public attention to this one, and we are seeing the results of such socialization neglect. In schools, certainly, recent years have seen a dramatically increased focus on academics and standardized testing—and with a limited number of hours and lim- ited resources, it is only natural that some other lessons have had to go unlearned. Parents, too, who have grown up assuming that all individuals are more tolerant than in past generations, may have found tolerance to be so obvious as to not necessitate deliberate teaching on this issue. The question is whether human beings have a marked tendency toward intolerance in the absence of deliberate teaching to the con- trary. Perhaps children are more inclined to develop such intolerance unless parents and schools make a concerted effort to ensure that they are taught otherwise. Clearly there are parallels between hate crimes and childhood bullying. What can these similarities tell us about effective approaches to reducing bullying behaviors between children? First, the issue of tolerance and respect needs to be an important part of any antibullying effort. Young children represent an opportunity. Education and aware- ness efforts can readily work positive effects on their behavior (as has happened with previous social campaigns, such as antismoking efforts). Along this vein, many bullying-prevention programs do include tolerance and respect among the curricu- lum goals covered. As an example, the No Bullying Program (Title & Leonard, n.d.) has as one of its major goals “Civility Rules.” Many other antibullying programs similarly include respect and tolerance as central themes (Naumann, 2001). A second lesson in bullying prevention that can be gleaned from society’s approach to hate crimes is the potential use of mediation, even peer mediation (in which mediators are other children), in attempting to resolve bullying episodes. Although the use of mediation within the criminal justice system has steadily gained in popularity, hate crimes have typically not been perceived as crimes well suited to mediation. Although bullying between children is rarely as violent as, say, the 1995 bombing of the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City (an action that resulted in no fewer than 168 innocent dead), bullying between children bears enough of the hallmarks of hate crimes to render mediation a controversial technique (at best). One reason that bullying is often regarded (like hate crimes) as unsuitable for mediation is the power differential that exists between bully and victim. This power differential is not always obvious or appreciated by adults, who may confuse bullying with conflict. Most bullying prevention programs in use today in schools in the United States are based on the principals originally authored by Daniel Olweus (1991, 1993). Out of Olweus’s basic research in Norway and the United States has emerged a plethora of programs, focusing on conflict resolution, bullying prevention, or both. 208 American Behavioral Scientist © 2007 SAGE Publications. All rights reserved. Not for commercial use or unauthorized distribution. by on October 22, 2007 http://abs.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://abs.sagepub.com One unfortunate side effect of this large and relatively new applied literature is a tendency to assume that bullying prevention and conflict resolution are in fact iden- tical goals. Research suggests otherwise (Tutty et al., 2002). Although one might include bullying incidents under the rubric “conflict,” it remains very important to appreciate the distinction and psychological differences between relatively equal- power conflicts between children and bullying behaviors, which are categorized by an unequal power structure and are therefore more abusive and victimizing in their nature. Educators in the United States today are encouraged to use mediation techniques in addressing student conflicts, particularly at the high school and middle school levels. Some teachers are incorporating conflict resolution and mediation and nego- tiation techniques into standard curriculum (Stevahn, 2004). Research has generally found a high level of satisfaction with peer mediation programs in school-based set- tings (Burrell, Zirbel, & Allen, 2003). Programs that include teacher training have often emphasized the role that teachers can take in using mediation and negotiation between children who are in conflict (Rubin, 2004). There has been a definitive trend toward training students and teachers to use mediation as the best method to resolve conflict in schools (Casella, 2000). The very real success of this trend, in general, discourages critical evaluation of the effectiveness of mediation and negotiation in different types of conflicts between students. However, researchers have discovered that several factors significantly inhibit the use of mediation in schools (Theberge & Karan, 2004). One such factor appears to be conflicts that involve bullying (Englander, 2005b; Theberge & Karan, 2004). Mediation and negotiation generally assume that two children in conflict possess relatively equal power, but bullying episodes are defined by their imbalance of power (Olweus, 1991). Theberge and Karan (2004) note that “power imbalances inhibit the use of mediation” (p. 287). This power imbalance renders mediation and negotiation often inappropriate for both the bully and the target. Although many educators have long approached conflict in children through the use of mediation and negotiation, discipline through limit setting may be the only effective means of encouraging children to cease bullying others. Although aggressive children may (in part) behave that way because of past exposure to inconsistent discipline, research suggests that firm limit setting is the primary means of changing aggres- sive behavior toward peers. Because of this, it is critical for educators to appreciate the distinctions between bullying and conflict and the appropriate programs to address each type of aggressive behavior. Summary and Conclusion Bullying prevention can learn from its association with hate crimes. In addition to antibullying education and techniques, preventative programs both need to teach Englander / Is Bullying a Junior Hate Crime? 209 © 2007 SAGE Publications. All rights reserved. Not for commercial use or unauthorized distribution. by on October 22, 2007 http://abs.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://abs.sagepub.com an appreciation and understanding of the unsuitability of unequal-power conflicts for mediation and should include a focus on tolerance and diversity. Such factors may be more important than equal-power conflict resolution skills, if the aim is to reduce bullying and abusive behaviors. Conflict resolution skills remain critical for coping with equal-power conflicts. At the Massachusetts Aggression Reduction Center (MARC) at Bridgewater State College, we have found that faculty, staff, administration, and parents are highly recep- tive to understanding the power inequalities inherent in bullying and how these inequalities must guide adult responses to bullying (http://www.bridgew.edu/marc). For example, in training teachers and administrators, we emphasize that adults should not expect victims to readily report on bullying, especially in the presence of a bully, because of their fear of retribution. We also teach adults to involve victims in discipline as little as possible, because such involvement is often highly intimi- dating for children and can be an actual deterrent to further reporting. As an example, bullies should not be asked to apologize to their victims; although such apologies may appear appropriate, they can serve as actual or perceived threats and may reinforce, for victims, the idea that telling adults “only makes it worse.” Young children are also highly receptive to messages about tolerance and respect, and our most interesting observation during the 1st year of the MARC program was the intense interest adolescents displayed regarding issues of respect and diversity. As part of our program in middle and high schools, we send trained college students to facilitate conversations about bullying behaviors teens are seeing in their own social groups. The college student–facilitators are a critical factor in this program, because teens typically have great respect and admiration for them, see them as high- status peers, and thus readily discuss with them the bullying they see in their own schools and among their own friends. We usually begin the conversation by asking students to describe the problems they are seeing in their own schools. Although we ask the students for their perceptions, in fact, our experiences have made us very aware of what the students are likely to report. Notably, in almost every school, teenagers begin by describing failures to tolerate and respect differences. They usu- ally do not use the terms hate crime or diversity, but this is in fact what they describe. The groups who are not tolerated vary somewhat from community to community, but they frequently involve students of other races, students who self-identify as gay or lesbian, students who are from lower social classes, and students who excel aca- demically or belong to “unpopular” groups or clubs at school. Perhaps bullying has flourished among children because of a lack of emphasis about the importance of tolerance and respect for diversity among adults, the inappro- priate use of mediation in bullying episodes, and/or a lack of understanding regarding the distinction between equal-power and unequal-power conflicts. If so, addressing such issues with adults and children can begin to dismantle the “apprenticeship” of hate crimes. 210 American Behavioral Scientist © 2007 SAGE Publications. All rights reserved. Not for commercial use or unauthorized distribution. by on October 22, 2007 http://abs.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://abs.sagepub.com References American Psychological Association. (1998). Hate crimes today: An age-old foe in modern dress. Washington, DC: Author. Buchanan, P., & Winzer, M. (2001). Bullying in schools: Children’s voices. International Journal of Special Education, 16(1), 67-69. Burrell, N., Zirbel, C., & Allen, M. (2003). Evaluating peer mediation outcomes in educational settings: A meta-analytic review. Conflict Resolution Quarterly, 21(1), 7-26. Casella, R. (2000). The benefits of peer mediation in the context of urban conflict and program status. Urban Education, 35(3), 324-355. Connors, C., & Stalker, K. (2002). Children’s experiences of disability: A positive outlook. Edinburgh: Scottish Executive Education Department. Retrieved November 16, 2005, from http://www. scotland.gov.uk/Resource/Doc/46951/0013975.pdf Dodge, K. A., Lansford, J. E., Salzer Burks, V., Bates, J. E., Pettit, G. S., Fontaine, R., et al. (2003). Peer rejection and social information-processing factors in the development of aggressive behavior prob- lems in children. Child Development, 74(2), 374-393. Englander, E. (2003). Understanding violence. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. Englander, E. (2005a, October). Spare the bully and spoil the school. Keynote presentation at the conference of the National Association of Social Workers, Worcester, MA. Englander, E. (2005b). When should you hesitate to mediate? Models of Respecting Everyone, 1(1), 2-4. Keating, W. (n.d.). Bullying, harassment, and violence. Retrieved November 20, 2005, from http://www .mass.gov/da/norfolk/bullying.html McDevitt, J. (1998). The Hate Crimes Prevention Act. Testimony before the House Judiciary Committee. Washington, DC. Miami University. (2001). No Hate Initiative. Retrieved July 21, 2005, from http://www.miami.muohio.edu/ documents_and_policies/nohate/ Mjoseth, J. (1998, January). Psychologists call for assault on hate crimes. American Psychological Association Monitor, p. 25. National Education Association. (2003). Parents’ role in bullying prevention and intervention. Retrieved November 10, 2005, from http://www.nea.org/schoolsafety/bullyingparentsrole.html Naumann, K. (2001). Briefing paper: Bullying. Little Rock, AR: School Violence Resource Center. Olweus, D. (1991). Bully/victim problems among schoolchildren: Basic facts and effects of a school- based intervention program. In D. Pepler & K. Rubin (Eds.), The development and treatment of child- hood aggression (pp. 411-448). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. Olweus, D. (1993). Bullying at school: What we know and what we can do. Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell. Rubin, R. (2004). Building a comprehensive discipline system and strengthening school climate. Reclaiming Children and Youth, 13(3), 162-169. Schuler, P. (2002). Teasing and gifted children. SENG Newsletter, 2(1), 3-4. Stevahn, L. (2004). Integrating conflict resolution training into the curriculum. Theory Into Practice, 43(1), 50-58. Strom, K. J. (2001). Hate crimes reported in CIBRS, 1997-99. Washington, DC: Bureau of Justice Statistics. Theberge, S., & Karan, O. (2004). Six factors inhibiting the use of peer mediation in a junior high school. Professional School Counseling, 7(4), 283-291. Title, B., & Leonard, L. S. (n.d.). Teaching peace. Retrieved November 16, 2005, from http://www .teachingpeace.org Tutty, L. M., Bradshaw, C., Thurston, W. E., Toy-Pries, D., Dewar, M. E., Tunstall, L., et al. (2002). School-based violence prevention programs: A resource manual. Retrieved September 25, 2005, from http://www.ucalgary.ca/resolve/violenceprevention/English/reviewprog/bullyintro.htm Englander / Is Bullying a Junior Hate Crime? 211 © 2007 SAGE Publications. All rights reserved. Not for commercial use or unauthorized distribution. by on October 22, 2007 http://abs.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://abs.sagepub.com Elizabeth Englander is a professor of psychology and the founder and director of the Massachusetts Aggression Reduction Center at Bridgewater State College, a center that delivers antiviolence and antibul- lying programs for the state of Massachusetts. She is a nationally recognized expert in the area of bully- ing, childhood causes of violence and aggression, child development, and characteristics of juvenile and adult violent offenders. She is the author of more than two dozen articles in journals and books and the author of Understanding Violence, a text in the field of child development, biological psychology, and violent criminal behavior, which was recently released in its third edition. 212 American Behavioral Scientist © 2007 SAGE Publications. All rights reserved. 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work_vseft6owjzaldjff47go6opmbu	----	Assessing the risk and prevalence of hate crime victimization in Western Europe Tilburg University Assessing the risk and prevalence of hate crime victimization in Western Europe van Kesteren, John Published in: International Review of Victimology DOI: 10.1177/0269758015627046 Publication date: 2016 Document Version Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record Link to publication Citation for published version (APA): van Kesteren, J. (2016). Assessing the risk and prevalence of hate crime victimization in Western Europe. 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Download date: 06. apr. 2021 https://doi.org/10.1177/0269758015627046 https://research.tilburguniversity.edu/en/publications/34ad4a37-071e-4dec-a3ae-98f138a86b51 https://doi.org/10.1177/0269758015627046 Article Assessing the risk and prevalence of hate crime victimization in Western Europe John Van Kesteren Tilburg University, The Netherlands Abstract This article presents results of multivariate and multi-level analyses of data on hate crime victi- mization from 14 Western European nations. Although the ethnic composition of immigrant communities shows considerable variation across the 14 countries, in all countries self-defined immigrants are disproportionately exposed to hate crimes. The level of hate crime prevalence is positively correlated with the size of the immigrant communities. The results of a loglinear analysis of individual risks of being victimized by hate crime show that young age and migrant status are the most important independent risk factors of hate crime victimization at the individual level. Other important risk factors are residence in a capital or other large city, low income and an outgoing lifestyle. These risk factors resemble those of victimization by common contact crimes. This result suggests that, although the motivations of offenders are different, the distribution of hate crime victimization at the individual level can to some extent be interpreted through general victimo- logical theories such as lifestyle-exposure theory. These analyses were replicated with a multi-level analysis including data at the macro level on the characteristics of 229 European regions. In this analysis, known criminogenic factors of contact crimes at the macro level, such as the proportion of young males, low income and low employment, are included in the models, besides the pro- portion of migrants among the inhabitants of the region. The results confirm the salience of the previously identified independent risk factors at the individual level. At the macro level, the relative size of migrant communities per region stands out as the most important factor explaining variance in hate crime prevalence. No independent relationships were found between the socio-economic or demographic characteristics of European regions and the extent of hate crime victimization. The latter results confirm findings of similar analyses of data from the USA. They suggest that in Western Europe hate crimes are driven by cultural tensions between traditional inhabitants and immigrants (community defense hypothesis), rather than by the strain experienced by the Corresponding author: John Van Kesteren, INTERVICT – Tilburg University, Warandalaan 2, 5037 AB Tilburg, The Netherlands. Email: john.v.kesteren@gmail.com International Review of Victimology 1–22 ª The Author(s) 2016 Reprints and permission: sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav DOI: 10.1177/0269758015627046 irv.sagepub.com at Tilburg University on February 23, 2016irv.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://www.sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav http://irv.sagepub.com http://irv.sagepub.com/ perpetrators (economic threat hypothesis). The unexpected finding that levels of educational attainment of European regions are associated with higher levels of hate crime victimization cannot be easily interpreted with either of the two hypotheses about the causes of hate crime victimi- zation. It is tentatively interpreted as a measurement artifact resulting from heightened sensitivity to various types of hate crime victimization among better-educated minority groups. Keywords Hate crime, migrants, victimization survey, risk factors, multi-level analysis, integrated threat theory Introduction In the twenty-first century, hate crimes have become a political concern in many parts of the world, including the USA, Canada, Australia and Europe (Chakraborti, 2012; European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC), 2005; European Union, 2007; Green et al., 2001; Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (HREOC), 2004 cited in Johnson, 2005). A hate crime is defined as ‘a criminal act which is motivated, at least in part, by the group affiliation of the victim’ (Gerstenfeld, 2004: 9). Distinct elements of the definition are that: � The act must be a criminal offence, regardless of the motivation of the offender; � It must have been committed, at least in part, out of prejudice or hatred towards the victim as representative of a specific social group. Hate crimes are – inter alia – directed at groups characterized by immigrant or ethnic status, race, religion, gender, sexual orientation, or disability. According to some authors, hate crimes are typically directed at marginalized groups and are meant, in the words of Perry, to reaffirm ‘the threatened (real or imagined) hegemony of the perpetrator’s group and the ‘appropriate’ subordi- nate identity of the victim’s group’ (Perry, 2001: 29, 2009). In connection with crimes targeted at the elderly, disabled persons, or subcultural minorities, this structural view of hate crimes has been critiqued. According to Garland, the harassment of such groups may be motivated by fear or hatred of difference rather than by supremacist feelings (Garland, 2010, 2012). Qualitative interviews with migrants have found that racially based threats and attacks have a negative impact on victims and their communities, resulting in an increase in fear, a growing sense of alienation, a distrust of authority and an eventual reluctance to engage with police (HREOC, 2004, cited in Johnson, 2005; Perry and Alvi, 2011). A topical manifestation of hate crimes is retaliatory attacks against members of Muslim communities in the aftermath of terrorist attacks by Muslim fundamentalists (Collins, 2007; Spalek, 2005). The social tensions emerging in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks in Brussels, Copenhagen, and Paris in recent years are a case in point. Data sources on hate crimes Data on the incidence of hate crimes can be retrieved from registrations of police forces, prosecutors and courts or bespoke agencies such as Complaint Boards for acts of discrimination, or from dedicated hotlines (Dauvergne and Brennan, 2011). Within the European Union, since 2000 the 2 International Review of Victimology at Tilburg University on February 23, 2016irv.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://irv.sagepub.com/ Federal Agency of Fundamental Rights (FRA) has promoted and coordinated the collection of such administrative statistics on hate crimes. According to the FRA’s reports, only a few EU member states have actually set up dedicated statistical systems to that end (FRA, 2009; Goodey, 2007). Even if such systems have been put in place, they cannot convey the full picture of hate crime. As is true for administrative crime statistics generally, statistics on the numbers of arrests or convictions for hate crimes represent just the tip of the iceberg (Aebi et al., 2014). In the case of hate crimes the problem of the dark numbers of crime is exacerbated by the complex nature of hate-motivated crimes and the often vulnerable position of the victims (Zaykowski, 2008). Victims belonging to minority groups may refrain from reporting out of shame, out of fear of retaliation from offenders, or out of fear of secondary victimization by the authorities. Recording agencies may not always fully under- stand which incidents qualify as hate crimes and should be recorded as such. In the United Kingdom, police forces recently changed their recording of hate crimes by adopting a new policy of accepting the victims’ perception of hate motivation at face value without requesting corroborating evidence. An alternative source of data on the incidence of hate crimes is sample surveys among the general population, or among segments of the population likely to be subjected to hate crimes. In the past 10–15 years, items on hate crime have been included in general victimization surveys. We will discuss the questions on hate crime incorporated in regularly executed national victimization surveys of the USA and the United Kingdom. 1 Questions on hate crime were also incorporated in a victimization survey executed in Canada in 1999. In 2005, questions on hate crimes were included in the International Crime Victims Survey (ICVS) conducted among the previous 15 members of the European Union (Western Europe) and Australia (Van Dijk et al., 2008). Within the European Union, dedicated surveys on discrimination and crime victimization— including hate crimes—were commissioned by the FRA (2009). The European Union Minorities and Victimization Survey (EU-MIDIS) was carried out in 2008 among samples from the largest ethnic minorities in urban areas. Obviously, a dedicated survey among minority groups gives more in-depth information on the amount and nature of hate-motivated crime than general victimization surveys. However, since the FRA surveys are conducted exclusively among the two or three most dominant minority groups within a country, the results are difficult to use for quantitative inter- national comparisons. In this article we will present results of a secondary analysis of the data on hate crime and immigrant status collected in the course of the ICVS sweeps of 2005 and 2010 in a selection of Western European countries. 2 Raw findings of the ICVS on hate crimes, including comparative prevalence rates per country, have previously been published (Van Dijk et al., 2008), but these have not been subjected to further analysis. Unlike most data on recorded crimes, the ICVS data can be analyzed at both the level of individuals and the level of countries or regions (Lynch, 1993, 2006). The ICVS 2005 data on hate crimes are based on samples of the general population of 15 European nations (n ¼ 28,000). Also coded were the NUTS2 regions where the respondents resided (n ¼ 229).3 The data allow analyses at both individual and collective levels and are therefore well suited for multi-level analyses. Before we introduce the theoretical framework for the analysis, we will discuss the manner in which the key concepts of hate crime and immigrant status were defined and oper- ationalized in the ICVS 2005 and in the other victimization surveys mentioned. Operationalizing hate crime victimization In the ICVS 2005, the question of hate crime victimization was phrased as a separate, additional question following the standard questions on possible victimization by various types of crime: Van Kesteren 3 at Tilburg University on February 23, 2016irv.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://irv.sagepub.com/ In the past 5 years, did you, or any member of your immediate family fall victim of a crime because, or partly because of your nationality, race or color, religious belief or sexual orientation? The question asks about experiences with any type of crime motivated by biases against nationality, race or color, religious belief, or sexual orientation, as perceived by the victim him-or herself. The respondents are not asked to specify the type of incident, nor asked about their reasons for assuming that the act was motivated by hatred. The item can be regarded as a victim-centered operationalization of hate crime in the sense that it counts any incidents as hate crimes which have been perceived by the victims as such. Contrary to what is done with experiences with personal crimes in the ICVS and most national victimization surveys, the item asks about perceived experiences of the respondents themselves, as well as about those of their immediate family. The national victimization surveys of England and Wales, Canada, and the USA, as well as the ICVS in Australia (2004) and the dedicated 2008 FRA survey among minorities (MIDIS), have adopted a different, more restrictive approach to the measurement of hate crimes. In these surveys the question on hate crime is a secondary, follow-up question put to those respondents who have reported to the interviewer an incident of victimization by a concrete criminal act. The British Crime Survey of 2005 and 2006, for example, asks people who report having been victims of any of the crimes listed in the standard questionnaire whether they thought that the crime reported on had been racially or religiously motivated. Later rounds of the survey also ask about possible other motivations grounded in biases against gender, sexual orientation, and disability (Lader et al., 2012). A similar approach was followed in the Canadian surveys of 1999 and 2002 (Silver et al., 2004). 4 Arguably, the British and Canadian approaches produce more precise data on hate crimes than the ICVS 2005, because the reported acts have in the first instance been assessed as specific criminal offences by the respondents and interviewers, regardless of the perpetrator’s motivations. This approach leaves no room for the reporting of incidents that respondents have subjectively experienced as hate crimes, but which may not qualify as such according to legal standards. On the downside, in this approach only those types of crime are covered which are listed in the standard questionnaire. Excluded are, for example, hate-motivated verbal attacks, such as racist, anti- Jewish, or anti-Islamic slurs or hate speech. The Australian survey of 2004, using the ICVS questionnaire, asked people who reported having been victims of assaults and threats: Do you feel you were assaulted or threatened because of your skin color, ethnicity, race or religion? The resulting data are limited to violent crimes as defined in the ICVS questionnaire and miss out on other types of crimes motivated by bias. In the USA the Hate Crimes Statistics Act of 2009 defines hate crimes as: Crimes that manifest evidence of prejudice based on race, gender, or gender identity, religion, dis- ability, sexual orientation or ethnicity. Like the British Crime Survey, the National Crime Victims Survey of the USA asks respondents reporting specific crimes whether these might have been motivated by the forms of prejudice mentioned in the legal definition just cited. However, for an incident to qualify as hate crime the NCVS requires corroborating evidence that hate motivation was present in the case, either because 4 International Review of Victimology at Tilburg University on February 23, 2016irv.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://irv.sagepub.com/ the offender used derogatory language or left hate symbols or because the police confirmed that a hate crime had taken place. The dedicated FRA survey among minorities has followed the model of the BCS. Respondents who have reported threats and assaults or serious harassment are asked whether the incident was in any way motivated because of their minority or immigrant status (racially motivated). The FRA researchers have explicitly not adopted the additional requirement of corroborating evidence used in the NCVS, following the argument that the victims’ perceptions of what happened to them should be accepted as sufficient grounds for qualifying the incident as hate crime (FRA, 2009). 5 The ICVS 2005 approach of measuring hate crimes is clearly the most all-encompassing, including as it does all types of incidents perceived as hate crimes by victims and also covering similar experiences of family members. 6 The BCS narrows down the measurement to incidents that have been reported by respondents as personal experiences with a limited number of offence types. The NCVS introduces the further restriction that the crimes experienced have manifestly been motivated by bias. The results on the incidence of hate crime bear out the differences in the scope of the definitions used. The ICVS 2005 survey, using the most comprehensive definition, showed a one-year prevalence victimization rate of 2.7% (n ¼ 28,000). The Crime Survey for England and Wales (CSEW) of 2013 reported a one-year prevalence rate of 0.5%. The reports on the NCVS do not publish comparable prevalence rates but publish incidence rates. The incidence rates of hate crimes in the USA of 0.1% for violent hate crime and 0.1% for property hate crime are, at any rate, much below the rates measured in the ICVS or British surveys. The restricted operationalization of hate crime victimization in the NCVS conforms to its legalistic approach (Van Dijk, 2015). From the outset the principal aim of the NCVS has been the measurement of the dark numbers of crime as a supplement to the statistics of officially recorded crimes in the Uniform Crime Reports (UCR). The questionnaire was designed to match, to the greatest extent possible, the legal categories of American criminal law. Results are expressed as estimated absolute numbers of legally defined types of crime, which are compared to the UCR statistics. In contrast, the more sociologically or victimologically oriented European victimization surveys seek to measure perceived victimization by crime, defined in colloquial rather than legal terms. In line with this victim-centered approach, the results are usually expressed in prevalence rates. Within this well-established European tradition of measuring victimization as perceived by victims, the case can be made that any perceived victimization by hate crime should indeed be counted as such and that the operationalization of the ICVS 2005, which includes all types of crimes, including offensive verbal attacks, comes closest to the real experiences of the public. The inclusion of possible experiences of family members also seems justifiable from this perspective. If respondents have heard about experiences with hate crimes from family members, this is likely to affect them personally. In fact, as has been observed by several experts, hate crimes must be seen as message crimes which, like terrorist acts, are meant not just to affect the primary victims but to have ripple effects on their families and wider social environment (McDonald and Hogue, 2007; Perry and Alvi, 2011). Empirical research has confirmed that minor incidents motivated by hate or prejudice can have a disproportionate negative impact on the well-being of the targeted groups and instill feelings of intimidation and fear (Collins, 2007; Perry and Alvi, 2011). In our view, the terroristic nature of hate crimes argues for comprehensive, victim-centered definitions, even at the risk that some of the reported incidents might not formally qualify as hate crimes under national legislation or jurisprudence. In the ICVS 2005 all respondents were asked whether they had experienced a crime motivated by bias, regardless of previously reported victimizations by specific crimes. Of those who Van Kesteren 5 at Tilburg University on February 23, 2016irv.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://irv.sagepub.com/ answered that they had been victimized by hate crimes, 33% had already mentioned victimization by one or more of the listed crimes. The comparable victimization rate of those not victimized by hate crime was 14%.7 This result suggests that a substantial part of the perceived hate crimes consists of specific types of crime, mainly contact crimes. Many of the other reported hate crimes will probably have been specific contact crimes experienced by family members or are incidents that the respondent or his/her family experienced as hate crimes but which may not qualify as one such crime according to the ICVS questionnaire. In the 2010 round of the ICVS, conducted in just five EU countries, the intermediary approach of the CSEW and FRA was adopted. Those respondents who had reported victimization by the three specific types of contact crime were subsequently asked whether the crime had been moti- vated by bias: Do you believe this crime happened because, or partly because of your nationality, race or color, religious belief, or sexual orientation? The prevalence rates of hate crime victimization according to the 2010 ICVS have not previously been published. A comparison with the results of the ICVS 2005 can illuminate the implications of the two different operationalizations for the measurement of hate crime in survey research. As expected, the prevalence rates in the 2010 surveys are lower than those from the 2005 survey. The average rate was 1.2%, compared to 2.8% in the 2005 ICVS (from 15 countries). In order to determine whether the different methodology has changed not just the level estimate but also the relative positions of individual countries, a comparison was made between the rates of individual countries as measured by the 2005 and 2010 rounds of the survey. Figure 1 shows the results. The comparison shows that prevalence rates were consistently the highest in both surveys in the UK, medium-high in The Netherlands and Denmark, and lowest in Germany and Sweden. 2010 ICVS 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 0 1 2 3 4 5 2005 EU-ICS United Kingdom Denmark Netherlands Germany Sweden Figure 1. Plot of one-year prevalence rates of victimization by hate crimes from the 2004/05 against the 2010 ICVS. 6 International Review of Victimology at Tilburg University on February 23, 2016irv.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://irv.sagepub.com/ Although the numbers are too small to test for statistical significance, the results show congruence between the relative positions on both measures of hate crime victimization. This result cross-validates the broad measure used in the 2005 survey. It suggests that the broad measure to a large extent reflects perceived experiences with specifically defined types of contact crime. It does not suggest that the 2005 measure largely reflects free-floating sentiments of discrimination or intimidation among overly sensitive minority groups that cannot be regarded as experiences with real hate crime. Defining and operationalization of immigrant status In order to determine immigrant status respondents to the ICVS were asked: Do you consider yourself or anyone in your family an immigrant in [country of residence]? Using the answers to this question, we regard the respondent as an immigrant if the respondent him/herself, his/her parents, or someone in the immediate family was born in another country. As with all other questions in the survey, we accept the answers that the respondents are able and willing to give. We excluded Luxembourg from our analysis because a very large proportion of the population (30%) originates from neighboring West European countries. The concept of immigrant status is different from the concept of minority group. In the FRA victimization survey among minority groups in the EU, minority groups were defined as groups sharing a marginalized status, making them vulnerable to hate crimes. Non-vulnerable minorities such as Swedes in Finland and the British living in Spain were excluded from the survey (FRA, 2009). Although minority as defined by the FRA does not equal immigrant, all sampled minority groups in the FRA survey turned out to be immigrants from other countries, with the exception of the Roma populations. The ICVS 2005 questionnaire does not provide information on minority status or on ethnicity, as is the case in the NCVS of the USA. The subpopulation of self-defined immigrants includes an unknown proportion of immigrants who do not share a marginalized status. Some members of Roma communities in Western Europe may self-define as immigrants, but they are unlikely to be included, considering the small sample sizes. The FRA MIDIS study provides useful information on the origins of minority communities in each of the 14 EU member states included in the ICVS 2005. Table 1 shows the percentage of the respondents in the ICVS that consider themselves immigrants and the main minority populations in each country according to the FRA/Raxen network. The overview shows that the immigrant communities of the 14 countries vary in size, within a range from 1.2% in Italy and 3.4% in Greece to 11.2% in Austria. The composition of the immigrant communities differs from country to country. For countries on the European continent, immigrants from Turkey and North Africa (from Morocco and Algeria) form the largest groups. This is not the case in Finland (immigration primarily from Russia), Ireland (from Central and Eastern Europe), Portugal (from Brazil), Sweden (from Iraq), Greece (from Albania, Roma), and the United Kingdom (from Central and Eastern Europe). Theoretical framework and analysis Throughout the history of victimization surveys, risk assessments at the individual level have mainly been informed by lifestyle-exposure theory (Hindelang et al., 1978) and related Van Kesteren 7 at Tilburg University on February 23, 2016irv.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://irv.sagepub.com/ victimological risk models (Fattah, 1991; Van Dijk and Steinmetz, 1980). The ICVS 2005 dataset allows a test as to whether the known risk factors of contact crimes are also predictive of hate crime victimization. The dataset also allows an examination of the independent role of immigrant status in exposure to such victimization. Although hate crimes are differently motivated, we see no a priori reason why their distribution among target populations could not be governed by similar factors as other personal crimes, such as, for example, lifestyle-related geographical or social proximity to potential offenders. From a methodological point of view, the measure of hate crimes used in victimization surveys does not fundamentally differ from those of other types of crime either. As discussed above, all measures of crimes in victimization surveys in the European tradition rely on respondents’ accounts of what happened to them. Thanks to the availability of data at both individual and aggregate levels-at country and NUTS2 levels—analyses of the ICVS datasets can potentially also shed light on the possible economic, social, or cultural root causes of hate crime prevalence. The analysis at macro level requires a theoretical framework about the social causes of such crimes. According to a social–psychological theoretical perspective, historically lynching and hate crimes are motivated by aggression caused by economic deprivation and redirected at vulnerable scapegoats (Hovland and Sears, 1940). A related, current perspective on hate crimes against immigrants sees such hate-motivated attacks as defensive responses from people who feel eco- nomically threatened by newcomers to local labor markets, known as the economic threat or resource competition hypothesis (Bonacich, 1999). According to an alternative, or supplementary, perspective, hate crimes should be understood as a defensive response of communities to the threat posed by immigrants to their way of life (Stephan et al., 1999). These two versions of the threat hypothesis mirror the alternative definitional frameworks of hate crimes as being motivated either by threats to existing power hierarchies or by a sheer hatred of otherness. Recent multivariate analyses of the social correlates of hate crime prevalence in the USA seem to lend support to the cultural rather than the economic threat hypothesis. In an analysis of data from New York, Stacey et al. (2011) found no relationship between economic problems in Table 1. Size of the immigrant population according to ICVS 2004/05 and origin of the main minority groups in 14 EU member states based on the EUMC Raxen network. Country Size of immigrant population Origin of minority group Country Size of immigrant population Origin of minority group Austria 11.2% Turkey – Former Yugoslavia Ireland 5.4% Central/Eastern Europe – Sub-Saharan Africa Belgium 9.2% North Africa – Turkey Italy 1.2% Albania – North Africa – Romania Denmark 9.2% Turkey – Somalia Netherlands 8.2% North Africa – Turkey – Suriname Finland 5.2% Russia – Somalia Portugal 10.9% Brazil – Sub-Saharan Africa France 10.8% North Africa – Sub-Saharan Africa Spain 4.5% North Africa – Romania – South America Germany 7.1% Turkey – Former Yugoslavia Sweden 9.2% Iraq – Somalia Greece 3.4% Albania – Roma* United Kingdom 4.5% Central/Eastern Europe * Roma are not always immigrants. 8 International Review of Victimology at Tilburg University on February 23, 2016irv.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://irv.sagepub.com/ neighborhoods and the extent of recorded hate crime incidents, and a strong relationship between a recent influx of Hispanics and such attacks. Lyons (2007), in an analysis of data from Chicago, found that hate crimes against blacks by whites are more prevalent in well-integrated than in disorganized white communities experiencing economic strain. In a time series analysis of hate crime in New York City, Green et al. (1998) found no association between hate crime and economic recession. In an analysis of data from USA counties on recorded hate crime, Sexton (2011) also found only partial support for the hypothesis that hate crime prevalence is driven by economic strain. Using the dataset of the European part of the ICVS 2005, we will first examine whether, and to what extent, the available set of demographic factors (including income level and educational attainment, as well as measures of an outgoing lifestyle, immigrant status, and religion) act as independent risk factors of victimization by hate crimes in Western Europe. To this end we conducted loglinear analyses at the individual level, using the measures of victimization by various types of common crimes and of hate crimes as separate dependent variables. The results will, as discussed, be interpreted within the framework of lifestyle-exposure theory and the above- mentioned Van Dijk et al. model. We will then repeat our analysis using a multi-level analysis, adding contextual variables at the level of European regions such as affluence, employment, education, and the proportion of immigrants per European region. Multi-level analyses (Bryk and Raudenbusch, 1992) are increasingly used in analyses of victimological data (Hardyns, 2010, 2012; Tseloni et al., 2010; Van Kesteren, 2014; Van Wilsem, 2003; Wilcox et al., 2003). With the multi-level analysis, we will examine whether the identified individual risk factors are partly or wholly based on composition effects at the level of European regions and search for possible interaction effects. In our multi-level analysis we will revisit the two competing theoretical per- spectives just mentioned, by looking at the relationships between both various socio-economic indicators and the proportion of immigrants, and the prevalence of hate crime victimization across European regions at the NUTS2 level. Description of the data at individual and regional levels The data used in the analysis were extracted from the integrated ICVS and EU-ICS database 2004/ 2005 (Van Kesteren, 2007). The descriptive statistics by country and region are based on all available cases in the database, including those with missing values on one or more variables, and have been weighted for age, gender and region (for details see Van Dijk et al., 2008). The loglinear and multi-level analyses are done on the selection of cases that do not have any missing values in the variables included in the models. In these analyses the data used have not been weighted. The EU-ICS database contains NUTS2 region codes for each case. NUTS2 are economic regions within the European Union of about 1,000,000 inhabitants each. The codes allow for aggregation of the individual data to the NUTS2 level. The statistical Office of the European Commission (Eurostat) provides varied information on the characteristics of each NUTS region. In the analyses, regional data on two variables have been included which were taken not from the ICVS datasets but from Eurostat. The ICVS 2005 questionnaire asks about experiences of victimization by 10 conventional crimes over a period of five years. Those who respond positively to any of the 10 questions are subsequently asked when these incidents happened (‘Was it this year, last year or before that?’). The response ‘last year (2004)’ is used as a dependent variable in the analyses. This one-year prevalence victimization rate expresses which percentages of respondents have been victimized by Van Kesteren 9 at Tilburg University on February 23, 2016irv.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://irv.sagepub.com/ one of the ten listed types of crime once or more in the course of 2004. The ten crimes are also grouped together into two categories, namely property crimes-theft of a car, theft from a car, theft of a motorcycle, theft of a bicycle, burglary, and attempted burglary-and the three contact crimes mentioned above. As explained, the prevalence rate of hate crimes is based on answers to a separate question. The following demographic data are used: age, gender, whether respondent is a young male aged 16–29, town size, income quartile, educational level, and frequency of outdoor visits in the evening. 8 The variables are recoded into two or three categories for the loglinear analysis. For the multi-level analysis, the raw data for age, town size, income, educational level, and going out have been recoded into z-scores to be interpreted at interval level. For use in the multi-level analysis, the following variables have been aggregated to NUTS2 level: percentage of immigrants; percentage of the population consisting of young men aged 16–29; average educational level (in years); and urbanization (the percentage of the population living in a city of 100,000 inhabitants or more). Two variables have been used in the multi-level analyses which were taken from the internet site of Eurostat, namely employment level in the region and gross domestic product per capita in the region. Results Victimization of the immigrant population On average, 2.8% of the West European population said they had been a victim of a hate crime in the course of 2004. Among the 15 ‘old’ member states of the EU, there is considerable variation in the extent of hate crime. The highest percentages are found in France, Denmark, Luxembourg, Belgium, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands (above 4%). Rates of hate crime below 2% are found in Finland, Italy, Portugal, Greece, and Austria (Van Dijk et al., 2008). The ICVS 2005 data on hate crime cover crimes committed in relation to nationality, race, ethnicity, sexual orientation, and religious belief of the victims. The data cannot be broken down for the various types of bias. The results of the British and USA surveys on hate crimes show that three quarters of all hate crimes are motivated by biases in relation to race, ethnicity, or religion (Creese and Lader, 2014; 9 Wilson, 2014). Within the Western European context, it can be expected that the immigrant population is more exposed to hate crime than non-immigrants. In the ICVS 2005, 8% of the population qualified for the broadly defined category of immigrants (respondent self-defined as immigrant and/or one of his/her parents or close family members). Countries with proportionally larger immigrant communities tend to show higher rates of hate crimes (r ¼ 0.46, n ¼ 14, p < 0.10). We have also looked at the hate crime victimization rates by country of migrants and non-immigrants (excluding Luxembourg). Figure 2 presents the results and shows 90% relia- bility intervals of the victimization rates. Due to low numbers, the margins of error are fairly high for the migrant rates per country. On average 10% of the immigrant population had been victims of hate crime in 2004, compared to 2% of non-immigrants.10 In all countries, hate crime victimization is higher among migrant populations, although in Italy and Finland this difference is not statistically significant. There is again considerable inter-country variation. Belgium, Spain, and Greece show the highest rates. Hate crime against immigrants is lowest in Italy, Portugal, and Finland. Since no data are available in the dataset about the origins of the migrant communities per country, it is not possible to explore which minorities are especially exposed to hate crimes and whether this can explain the variation. The EU-MIDIS survey has shown that Roma 10 International Review of Victimology at Tilburg University on February 23, 2016irv.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://irv.sagepub.com/ communities and immigrants from Sub-Saharan Africa are by far the most exposed. Accord- ing to the EU-MIDIS survey immigrants from North Africa and Turkey have medium expo- sure, and the least exposed are immigrants from Central and Eastern Europe, Russia, and the former Yugoslavia. As discussed, in most West European countries the primary immigrant groups are from North Africa or Turkey. This may explain the near-universal high prevalence rates of hate crime among immigrants across Western Europe. Considering the salience of various immigrant groups in different countries, presented in Figure 1, the medium-high prevalence in the United Kingdom and Ireland may reflect the preponderance of Central and Eastern Europeans among the immigrant communities in these countries. The relative low prevalence of hate crime in Finland and Portugal could reflect the preponderance of Russian and Brazilian immigrants respectively. The low rate among immigrants in Italy differs radi- cally from the high rates of hate crime experiences found in the EU-MIDIS study among North Africans and Albanians in Italy, and could be a statistical artifact due to the very low number of sampled immigrants. The analysis of victimization rates of those indicating a religious affiliation showed non- significant results. Respondents that practice a religion show similar victimization rates for hate crimes as those who do not. Within the immigrant communities, however, religion is positively related to victimization. Of the people with an immigrant status who are religious, 12% are victimized, compared to 9% of those who are not. This result indicates that religious immigrants in Western Europe, many of whom are Muslims, perceive themselves to be victimized by hate crimes more often than other immigrants. A further analysis was made of rates of victimization of immigrants by any of the ten types of common crimes included in the standard ICVS questionnaire. A total of 19% of the immigrants had been victimized by any crime once or more in 2004. Among religious immigrants this figure was 20%. The victimization rate of non-immigrants is significantly lower, regardless of religious status (15%). The differences are largest for contact crimes. These bivariate results suggest that Immigrant 30 20 10 0 Be lg iu m G re ec e Sp ai n Fr an ce U ni te d K in gd om D en m ar k N et he rla nd s Sw ed en G er m an y A us tri a Ire la nd Po rtu ga l Ita ly Fi nl an d Av er ag e Non Immigrant Errorbars indicate the 90% reliability internal Figure 2. Victimization by hate crime for immigrants and non-immigrants in 14 EU member states. Data from the ICVS 2004/05. Van Kesteren 11 at Tilburg University on February 23, 2016irv.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://irv.sagepub.com/ immigrant status enhances the risk of being criminally victimized by both hate crime and any of the 10 common crimes, especially, but not exclusively, contact crimes. The fact that immigrants are overrepresented among hate crime victims does not imply that most victims are immigrants. According to our data, 26.5% of all hate crime victims are migrants. This statistic shows that most hate crimes, including those motivated by racism and/or religious biases, are directed at non-immigrants. This finding is in line with findings on hate crime victi- mization from the USA and England and Wales which show that hate crimes are also directed at white persons. Results of multivariate analyses The bivariate finding that migrants are overrepresented among crime victims does not necessarily mean that migrant status by itself is an independent risk factor of such victimization. The over- representation could have been confounded by other risk factors, such as age or place of residence (Jansson, 2006). In previous analyses of risk factors of criminal victimization, loglinear analyses have been used to determine which demographic factors are associated with high or low risks, independent of other factors (Van Kesteren et al., 2000). The results of these analyses are expressed as odds ratios. An odds ratio is the odds of someone in a certain group (e.g. young age) being victimized by any crime, divided by the odds of someone in the base group with the lowest risk (age over 55). For this paper loglinear analyses have been done with overall victimization, property crime victimization, contact crime victimization, and hate crime victimization as dependent variables. As independent variables we included factors known to be associated with risks of criminal victimiza- tion (age, gender, city size, lifestyle, income, education, and marital status) as well as migrant status. Table 2 shows the results of the analyses. For victimization by hate crime, the two most important independent risk factors are young and medium age and migrant status. The third most important risk factor is living in a capital city. Also significantly associated with hate crime victimization are an outgoing lifestyle and low income and, somewhat surprisingly, high education. The risk profile for hate crime victimization is roughly similar to that for victimization by contact crimes. In the analysis of risk factors for contact crimes, the status of being single is statistically significant and income is not. Migrant status is not a risk factor of victimization by property crime. Income is positively related to property crime victimization, which reflects the ownership of more stealable goods (e.g. car ownership) among high-income groups. Results of a similar loglinear analysis with criminal victimization by contact crimes as the dependent variable and migrant status (born overseas) as an independent variable are available from Australia (Johnson, 2005). The loglinear analysis shows that being single, young, outgoing, and poor are the most important risk-enhancing factors. Migrant status is found to be unrelated to victimization risk. 11 Loglinear analyses from England and Wales with victimization by contact crimes confirm that young age and being single are strong risk-enhancing factors (Jansson, 2006). Ethnicity is not independently associated with hate crime victimization. 12 A comparison of NCVS data on hate crime victimization and on victimization by ordinary violent crime reveals that white people and those with higher levels of education are more strongly represented among hate crime victims than among victims of ordinary violence (Zaykowski, 2008). In the American context, hate crime victimization seems less concentrated among the black community than victimization by common 12 International Review of Victimology at Tilburg University on February 23, 2016irv.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://irv.sagepub.com/ violence. In Canada, visible ethnicity 13 is related to hate crime victimization in a bivariate analysis. Among visible minorities, hate crime victimization rates are 19 per 1,000 population of 15 years of age and older and 7 per 1,000 for non-visible minorities (Silver et al., 2004). Migrant status as such is not related to hate crime victimization in Canada. Unlike in Western Europe, many immigrants in Canada do belong to a non-visible minority. Visible minority immigrants are strongly over- represented among hate crime victims. 14 The EU-MIDIS survey of the FRA among minorities in EU countries reveals that victimization rates among minority groups are higher than among the general population in most but not all cases (FRA, 2009). 15 Of the victims from minority groups who reported victimization by violent crime, 50% said that the attacks had been racially motivated. In many respects the results of our loglinear analysis of victimization by contact crimes are similar to those found in Australia, England and Wales, Canada, and the USA. Almost universally, young people are more at risk of violent victimization. To our knowledge no other researchers have examined the independent risk factors of hate crime victimization using multivariate analyses. Young people are strongly overrepresented in our data on hate crime victimization. Our finding that migrant status is independently related to risks of violent victimization and hate crime differs from the results of national surveys in Australia, the UK, and the USA. 16 But similar results have been found in Canada and in the dedicated FRA surveys among EU member states. Our finding that migrant status is strongly related to Table 2. Results of four loglinear models including eight independent variables and four dependent variables. Data from the ICVS 2004/05 ICVS. Common crimes Perceived hate crime Base Ten crimes Contact crimes Property crimes Odds ratio Odds ratio Odds ratio Odds ratio Immigrant No Yes 1.23* 1.44* 1.06 3.28* Age 60þ 16–34 2.21* 2.07* 1.91* 4.75* 35–59 1.31* 1.40 1.10* 3.17* Gender Female Male 0.93* 0.85* 1.06* 0.89 Town size Rural (<10,000) Urban (not capital) 1.30* 1.28 1.18* 1.36* Capital city 2.09* 1.85* 1.89* 1.74* Income Below average Above average 1.15* 1.03 1.12* 0.70* Education Below average Above average 1.22* 1.21* 1.21* 1.18* Partner No Yes 0.94* 0.71* 1.16* 0.90 Going out Not often Often 1.15* 1.18* 1.13* 1.23* * Significant, p<0.05. Van Kesteren 13 at Tilburg University on February 23, 2016irv.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://irv.sagepub.com/ the risks of hate crime victimization is fully in line with the high proportion of violent victimization motivated by hate according to the dedicated FRA surveys among minority groups. The consistent results regarding age, city size, an outgoing lifestyle, and marital status can be explained by lifestyle-exposure theory. Young male singles find themselves more often in the proximity of potential offenders, for example in the night-time economy. The finding that these four factors and low economic status are independent risk factors of hate crime victimization suggests that hate crimes, like other crimes of violence in the public domain, are concentrated within the youth scene in poorer neighborhoods of capital cities and other large cities. The top position of migrant status as an independent risk factor for hate crime victimization confirms that migrants are prime targets of hate crimes in Western Europe. The importance of migrant status as a risk factor can be interpreted with the victimological, three-factorial risk model of Van Dijk and Steinmetz (1980). According to this model, victimization risks are determined not just by proximity to offenders due to residence or lifestyle and lack of protection against crime, but also by their economic or psycholo- gical attractiveness as targets of crime. The finding that being a migrant is a strong independent risk factor for hate crime suggests that in Western Europe immigrants are ‘attractive targets’ for hate crime. Our finding that hate crime victimization prevalence in Western Europe is especially high among religious immigrants suggests that anti-Islam sentiments are at play. 17 However, the result that people with high education are significantly more exposed to contact crimes as well as to hate crimes seems counterintuitive. This result brings to mind the finding of Zaykowski (2008) that people with more education are overrepresented among hate crime victims compared to victims of common violence. It raises the question of why better-educated people would attract more hate crimes than others. We will come back to this seemingly odd result in the discussion. Results of the multi-level risk analysis Finally, we carried out a multi-level analysis with hate crime victimization as a dependent variable. The multi-level analysis can be described as a logistic regression analysis with both individual and context variables. This analysis allows searching for possible composition or interaction effects at the level of the NUTS2 regions as defined by Eurostat. Data were available from a total of 229 European regions. Included in the analyses at the regional level were the size of the migrant community as well as the factors of age, gender, income level (Gross Domestic Product per Capita – GDPPC), and education at the collective level. Also included was the factor of unemployment as a proxy for scarcity in the local labor market. In previous multivariate analyses of regional variation in victimization rates for contact crimes, a composite factor expressing the presence of young males in difficult economic situations was found to be an important correlate of contact crimes (Van Dijk et al., 1990). We first looked at a simple model (model 0) with victimization by hate crime as the dependent variable (Table 3). This model does not have any explanatory variables. The variance of the constant is an indication of how many differences there are at regional level. Model 1 only has immigrant status and the number of immigrants in the regions as explanatory variables. Model 2 adds explanatory variables at the individual level. Model 3 adds variables at the regional level. Both immigrant status and the size of the immigrant population are statistically significant in Model 1. The variance of the constant is reduced from 0.59 to 0.21, a reduction of almost two thirds. Model 2 adds the explanatory variables at the individual level. The effect of educational level is not significant. The effects of age, gender, town size, and going out are as expected: young people, those living in a city, and those with an outgoing lifestyle are more often victims of hate 14 International Review of Victimology at Tilburg University on February 23, 2016irv.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://irv.sagepub.com/ crime. People with high incomes experience less hate crime. The variance at regional level is further reduced to 0.15 due to these individual-level variables. Model 3 adds explanatory variables at the regional level. After the individual variables, only the size of the immigrant population and the average educational level have significant effects. Inha- bitants of better-educated regions experience more hate crime. Model 4 shows the variables that are statistically significant. Immigrants, younger people, those living in a large city, those with an outgoing lifestyle, and those with low incomes experience more hate crime. More exposed are those residing in a region with a large immigrant population and a high average educational level. The final model has a residual variance of 0.12 out of the 0.59 from the base model. This means the model explains 78% of the total variance at the regional level. The results of Model 4 regarding the individual level confirm the main results of the loglinear analysis presented above. Young age, immigrant status, residing in a large city, and an outgoing lifestyle are risk factors for hate crime at the individual level. The associations at the individual level found in previous analyses of victimization data are apparently not based on composition effects at the regional level. No interaction effects with contextual factors at the regional level are Table 3. Results from four logistic multi-level models. Data from the ICVS 2004/05 ICVS and EuroStat. Model 0 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 u SD u SD u SD u SD u SD Victim of hate crime �3.54 0.084 * �4.1 0.118 * �3.99 0.140 * �5.83 0.878 * �5.84 0.635 * Individual level Immigrant status Yes (No ¼ base) 1.24 0.092 * 1.10 0.091 * 1.11 0.090 * 1.11 0.090 * Gender Male (Female ¼ base) 0.23 0.080 * 0.23 0.080 * 0.23 0.080 * Relative income High (Low ¼ base) �0.29 0.082 * �0.29 0.081 * �0.27 0.079 * Age (z-scores) �0.58 0.052 * �0.58 0.052 * �0.59 0.051 * Town size (z-scores) 0.19 0.071 * 0.15 0.071 * 0.18 0.070 * Going out (z-scores) 0.15 0.051 * 0.14 0.050 * 0.14 0.050 * Education (z-scores) 0.06 0.043 0.05 0.043 NUTS2 level Percentage immigrants 0.05 0.012 * 0.04 0.011 * 0.03 0.013 * 0.03 0.011 * Percentage young men 0.01 0.014 Average educational level 0.12 0.059 * 0.15 0.064 * GDPPC 0 0.002 Employment 0 0.009 Variance of the constant at region level 0.59 0.123 * 0.21 0.066 * 0.15 0.053 * 0.12 0.047 * 0.13 0.049 * * Significant, t-test, p<0.05. Van Kesteren 15 at Tilburg University on February 23, 2016irv.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://irv.sagepub.com/ found. However, educational attainment, a significant factor in the loglinear analysis, is not statistically significant in this model. This negative finding suggests that the association between this factor and hate crime victimization at the individual level is partly based on the fact that hate crimes are more prevalent in regions with higher educational levels. This finding is difficult to interpret, and we will return to this in the discussion. An important independent risk factor at the regional level is, first of all, the size of the migrant community. The strength of the bivariate relationship (r ¼ 0.30, n ¼ 229, p < 0.05) is graphically depicted in the scatter plot presented in Figure 3. The numbers of respondents per region are not equal. In Figure 3 the small grey bullet points refer to the 25% of regions with the lowest numbers of respondents and the larger black points to the 25% of the regions with the largest numbers. In computing the correlation coefficient, the larger regions have been given a greater weight. Examples of regions with high proportions of migrants and accordingly high prevalence of hate crime victimiza- tion are the capital cities Brussels, London, Paris, and Stockholm. Examples of European regions with few migrants and accordingly low prevalence of hate crime victimization are Dublin and Flemish Brabant (Belgium). Not associated with the prevalence of hate crime victimization in European regions are the factors GDPPC, unemployment, and proportion of young males. At the level of European regions, hate crime victimization appears to be unrelated to GDPCC, unemployment, and the proportion of young males in the population. Although the addition of more factors in Model 3 reduces the variance explained by the size of migrant communities, the known criminogenic factors (propor- tion of young, unemployed, or poor males) explain little or no variance in hate crime victimization prevalence. This result does not support theoretical perspectives on hate crime centered on the concepts of strain or economic deprivation according to the economic threat hypothesis. Instead, our results lend support to the hypothesis that hate crimes are propelled by negative feelings 25 20 15 10 5 0 0 5 10 15 20 Percentage immigrants pe rc en ta ge o f po pu la ti on v ic ti m o f ha te c ri m e 25 30 35 40 r = 0.30 N = 229 p < 0.05 Figure 3. Hate crime victimization prevalence by percentage of the population being immigrant in 229 NUTS2 regions from 14 EU member states. Data from the ICVS 2004/05 ICVS. 16 International Review of Victimology at Tilburg University on February 23, 2016irv.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://irv.sagepub.com/ towards newly arrived immigrants with a divergent cultural background independently from economic tensions, according to the community defense hypothesis. Discussion The results of our multi-level analysis of survey-based data on hate crime victimization in Western Europe show that risk factors at the individual level are young age, urban residence, and an outgoing lifestyle. The profile of the typical hate crime victim appears to be similar to the familiar one of the victim of common violent crime in the public domain. Hate crime victimization in Western Europe appears to be a special manifestation of the stranger-to-stranger violence among young urbanites in the nighttime economy. The results of the multi-level analysis confirm these results. The overexposure of young male urbanites can be explained by their proximity to potential perpetrators of hate crimes: other young males. These results can be readily interpreted within the framework of lifestyle-exposure theory (Hindelang et al., 1978; Van Dijk and Steinmetz, 1980). Unlike some studies in other parts of the world, but in line with the findings of targeted minority victimization surveys of the Federal Rights Agency (FRA, 2009), our survey shows that migrants are especially at risk. In the current situation in Western Europe, migrants trigger more hate- motivated crimes than other groups. The results of analyses of hate crime victimization at the individual level are consistent with the results of bivariate or multivariate analyses in the USA and Australia. The single outstanding exception is the overexposure of immigrants. In American and Australian studies, ethnicity or migrant status is not consistently associated with hate crime victimization. The latter result sug- gests that in Western Europe, intergroup tensions between first or second-generation migrants and traditional inhabitants are stronger than in some other places of the world. The multi-level results shed light on the possible macro causes of hate crimes against migrants in Western Europe. Economic indicators including GDPPC and unemployment are found to be unrelated to hate crime prevalence. This result refutes strain theories linking hate crimes to competition over scarce resources such as jobs or houses according to the economic threat hypoth- esis. Our results show independent relationships between migrant presence per region and hate crime prevalence. 18 This relationship is only slightly explained by the below-average economic situation in these regions. More hate crimes are committed in regions where migrants are more prevalent, independent of the socio-economic situation. These findings suggest that hate crime motivation originates from cultural conflict rather than from aggression induced by economic deprivation. In several studies on hate crimes done in the USA, relationships between economic strain and hate crime against migrants have been found to be weak or non-existent (Lyons, 2007). According to integrated threat theory (ITT; Stephan et al., 1999), ethnic prejudices are driven by economic threats, symbolic threats, intergroup anxiety, and stereotypes. Research has shown that negative opinions about Muslims among Dutch adolescents are unrelated to perceived economic competi- tion but strongly related to stereotypes and symbolic threats (González-Vallejo et al., 2008). Our own results show that within Western Europe, objective measures of economic pressure such as regional unemployment rates are unrelated to the prevalence of hate crimes. At the level of European regions, current ethnic tensions in Western Europe seem driven by perceived cultural threats which are independent of the state of regional economies. A limitation of our analysis is the focus on the aggregate level of NUTS2 regions. Future studies should replicate our analyses at the level of cities or neighborhoods where scare resources might be Van Kesteren 17 at Tilburg University on February 23, 2016irv.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://irv.sagepub.com/ a factor behind local ethnic tensions. Given that such tensions cannot explain hate crime preva- lence at the NUTS2 level, future research on hate crimes against migrants should preferably be informed by integrated threat theory and not focus on economic competition alone. More research is needed into the relationships between symbolic threats and cultural stereotypes and the com- mission of hate crimes against immigrants and other subgroups seen as different from the cultural mainstream. An obvious policy implication of our findings concerning the lack of any linkage between socio-economic deprivation and hate crime prevalence is that little scope is left for optimism that the problems of hate crime against migrants will automatically dwindle with rising employment levels or more economic prosperity. A policy theory centered on presumed economic root causes seems to offer limited guidance on how the problems of hate crimes can be effectively prevented or addressed. Finally, the positive association between levels of education and hate crime prevalence requires further examination. One possible interpretation is that people living in better-educated regions feel more under threat from migrant communities. This interpretation is at odds with research showing that ethnic prejudices are inversely related to levels of education at the individual level (Coenders and Scheepers, 2003). A positive association between educational attainment and violent crime victimization is not an unprecedented finding in victimological studies. Analyses of ICVS data at the country level have revealed that women in more egalitarian nations tend to report more rather than less victimization by sexual crimes (Kangaspunta, 2000; Van Dijk et al., 2008). A dedicated survey on violence against women in the European Union confirms that sexual and non-sexual violence against women is more common in countries where gender equality is most advanced, such as the Scandinavian countries, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands (FRA, 2014). The latter finding suggests that rates of victimization by violent acts against women reflect both the actual incidence of such violence and the sensitivity of respondents to such acts (Van Dijk, 2015). Similarly, the relationship between education and hate crime victimization at the regional level may reflect heightened sensitivities to bias-related crimes in regions with more highly educated people, including better-educated minority groups. Notes 1. The British Crime Survey, since 2012 renamed Crime Survey of England and Wales (CSEW), and the National Crime Victims Survey of the USA (NCVS). 2. The International Crime Victims Survey (ICVS) is a standardized survey conducted since 1988 in six rounds in over 80 different nations altogether (Van Dijk et al., 1990; Van Kesteren et al., 2014). In 2004/ 05 the ICVS was, with co-funding from the European Commission, undertaken among random samples of 2,000 respondents per country drawn from the general populations of 18 EU member states and was named the European Survey on Crime and Safety (EU-ICS). As before in the European component of the ICVS, the interviews were done through computer-assisted telephone interviewing. This paper is based on data from the 15 previous EU member states, except Luxembourg. In the sample from Luxembourg, 30% of the respondents defined themselves as immigrants. Since the majority of these immigrants will be nationals from Germany, France, and Belgium, their position cannot be compared with those of other immigrants in Western Europe who largely originate from Eastern Europe, former colonies, or North Africa. The data from Luxembourg have therefore been excluded from our analysis, as was the case in an analysis of data from the European Social Survey on immigrants and hate crime (Coenders et al., 2004). The methodology of the survey including the questionnaire was based on the ICVS, but some additions were made. For the first time in the ICVS, questions were also asked about immigrant status and whether 18 International Review of Victimology at Tilburg University on February 23, 2016irv.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://irv.sagepub.com/ the respondent or a member of the family had been a victim of a hate crime. The questionnaire also asked about demographic data such as age, gender, educational attainment, income, and religious beliefs. For detailed information about the methodology and results of the EU-ICS, we refer to the report with key findings (Van Dijk et al., 2007) and the ICVS website (http://www3.unil.ch/icvs/). 3. There are three levels of Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics which are used by Eurostat and other European Union bodies (NUTS). NUTS2 regions belong to the second level; they have roughly one million inhabitants each. 4. The Canadian 1999 General Social Survey asked respondents whether they felt they had been a victim of any of the following crimes: sexual assault, assault, break and enter, theft of personal property, theft of household property, motor vehicle/parts theft, and vandalism. The interviewer then asked those mention- ing victimizations: ‘In Canada hate crimes are legally defined as crimes motivated by the offender’s bias, prejudice or hatred based on the victim’s race, nationality or ethnic origin, language, color, religion, sex, age, mental or physical disability, sexual orientation or any other similar factor. Do you believe that any of the crimes committed against you in Canada in the past 5 years, or since you arrived in Canada, could be considered a hate crime?’ 5. The approach chosen by the FRA is in line with the policy of the British police to record all crimes as hate crime that are perceived by the reporting victims as such. 6. The ICVS 2005 item covers a broad range of different types of biases (nationality, race, color, religious belief, and sexual orientation). Both the BCS and the NCVS have over the years added new biases, such as those relating to gender and disability. 7. The differences between the victimization rates for common crimes between victims and non-victims of hate crimes were largest for sexual crimes (by a factor of 8.7), robberies (7.5), and threats and assaults (4.4). 8. Age: age is coded into 12 categories of five years, starting with 16–19 up to the highest category of 70þ; Gender: male and female; Town size: town size is coded in a variable with six categories; Income quartile: income is coded into four categories, asked about in two stages-Is the household income above or below the median value in a country, and is the income above or below the 25th or 75th percentile respectively; Educational level: number of years of formal education; Going out in the evening: five response categories, ranging from never to twice a week or more. 9. Of all hate crimes committed in England and Wales in 2013, 82% were qualified as race-hate crimes. 10. The European average is computed giving each country equal weight. Small countries therefore carry the same weight as large countries such as the UK, Germany, and France. 11. Among the booster sample of Middle East and Vietnamese inhabitants, immigrant status (born overseas) is in fact a risk-reducing factor. 12. Mixed ethnicity is associated with above-average risks of victimization by contact crime and hate crime in bivariate analyses (Jansson, 2006; Smith et al., 2012). However, multivariate analyses based on the 2005/06 BCS identify that for the key crime types, ethnicity is not independently associated with the risk of victimization (Jansson, 2006). 13. Visible minorities are in Canada defined by the Employment Equity Act as ‘persons, other than Abori- ginal peoples, who are non-Caucasian in race or non-white in color.’ 14. Unlike differences between visible minorities and not-visible minorities, there is no statistically signif- icant difference between rates of hate crime victimization between immigrants and the Canadian-born population (13 per 1,000 versus 15 per 1,000 population). However, if visible minority status is also taken into account, the findings indicate that visible minority immigrants (18 per 1,000 population) are more than twice as likely as immigrants who are members of a not-visible minority (8 per 1,000 population) to be victims of a hate crime. Van Kesteren 19 at Tilburg University on February 23, 2016irv.sagepub.comDownloaded from http://www3.unil.ch/icvs/ http://irv.sagepub.com/ 15. ‘Comparing the two surveys’ results on assault and threat shows that of the 34 minority groups surveyed in EU-MIDIS for those 18 EU member states for which the surveys can be compared, 21 recorded a higher victimisation rate for assault and threat than the majority population did’ (FRA, 2009). 16. International comparisons of the relationships between ethnicity/migrant status and hate crime victimiza- tion are complicated by differences in the meanings of ethnicity and the status of migrants between countries. 17. The assumption that anti-Islamic feelings are at play is confirmed by the results of the EU-MIDIS study showing that in Europe, hate crime victimization prevalence is highest among immigrants from Sub- Saharan Africa (Somalia), North Africa, and Turkey. 18. In order to prevent misunderstandings, we add that the emergence of migrant status at individual and collective levels as a predictive factor of hate crime does not imply that migrants can be blamed for their victimization, or that their numbers should be reduced to prevent hate crime. Such an interpretation would be equally as short-sighted as arguing for fewer vehicles or dwellings instead of for better protection against vehicle or household-related crimes. References Aebi MF, Akdeniz G, Barclay G, et al. (2014) European Sourcebook of Crime and Criminal Justice Statistics 2014, Fifth edition. Helsinki: HEUNI. Available at: http://hdl.handle.net/10807/61296 (accessed 19 August 2015). 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work_vsfkclz7fzfhxergaz24yfgvyq	----	Microsoft Word - 965 Production Final.docx 320 Peer-Reviewed Article © Journal of International Students Volume 10, Issue 2 (2020), pp. 320-338 ISSN: 2162-3104 (Print), 2166-3750 (Online) Doi: 10.32674/jis.v10i2.965 ojed.org/jis Muslim International Students in the United States: A Phenomenological Inquiry into the Experience of Identities Donna L. Anderson University of Montana, USA ABSTRACT This study explored how Muslim international students experience their religious, ethnic/racial, and gender identities prior to coming to the United States and as students in the midwestern United States using E. Kim’s (2012) International Student Identity model as a guiding framework. Three significant findings emerged from semi-structured interviews with 10 students who attended 4-year institutions in the midwestern United States: (a) religious difficulties of being Muslim and Islam as a flexible religion, (b) difficulties with racial constructs and ethnic stereotypes, and (c) gender difficulties of male/female interactions and perceptions of veiling. Based upon these findings, recommendations for higher education professionals, administrators, and policymakers are provided. Keywords: higher education, identity, international student identity model, Muslim international students, stereotypes, Trump effect Recent globalization and internationalization has led to an increase in student mobility worldwide (Altbach & Knight, 2007; Nuqul, 2015) and the number of international students studying in the United States continues to grow. Comprising 5.5% of the U.S. higher education enrollment, a record high 1,095,299 international students were enrolled in the U.S. during the 2018–2019 academic year, compared with 671,616 ten years prior (Institute for International Education [IIE], 2019). The number of Muslim international students in the United States, in particular, has grown considerably in recent years. In the 2013–2014 academic year, 240,826 student visas were issued to students from 45 predominantly Muslim countries to Journal of International Students 321 study in the United States (IIE, 2015). In 2014–2015 academic year, 284,420 student visas were issued to students from the same 45 predominantly Muslim countries to study in the United States, representing an 18.1% increase over 1 year (IIE, 2015). The Trump administration’s travel ban on individuals from six predominantly Muslim countries has called into question whether Muslim international students are truly welcome to study in the United States (Liptak, 2017). While international students from Muslim-majority countries, with the exception of Syria, are still able to apply for a student visa to study in the United States, anti-Muslim rhetoric and policies coming from the Trump administration has created an unwelcoming environment for Muslim international students and a chilling effect on international student recruitment (Fischer, 2017; Saul, 2018). For the purposes of this study, an international student is defined as an individual studying in the United States on a nonimmigrant, temporary visa that allows for academic study at the postsecondary level. A Muslim international student is defined in this study as an individual who practices Islam or identifies as Muslim, is studying at an institution of higher education in the United States on a nonimmigrant visa or a student visa, is not a citizen or permanent resident of the United States, and is not legally permitted to remain in the United States indefinitely (IIE, n.d.). Few studies have looked at Muslim international student identity experiences despite the increase in students from Muslim-majority countries in the United States in recent years (IIE, 2017). This study aimed to contribute to understanding how Muslim international students experience their religious, ethnic/racial, and gender identities and, in doing so, provide insights to higher education professionals to appropriately support Muslim international students in their campus communities. This study examined the following two research questions: 1. Prior to studying in the midwestern United States, how did Muslim international students experience their religious, ethnic/racial, and gender identities? 2. How do Muslim international students experience their religious, ethnic/racial, and gender identities as students in the midwestern United States? LITERATURE REVIEW Identity Experiences of International Students in the United States A significant body of literature exists on U.S. college student identity development; however, international student identity development has been largely ignored despite the growing presence of international students on U.S. campuses (Chickering, 1969; Cross, 1991; E. H. Erikson, 1959; Ferdman & Gallegos, 2001; Helms, 1990; Horse, 2001; J. Kim, 2001; Phinney, 1990; Rowe et al., 1994). In response to this gap, E. Kim (2012) proposed an International Student Identity (ISI) model as an alternative to single identity theoretical views. Kim’s model directly relates to this study of Muslim international students and how they experience their identities as students in the United States and was appropriate for use with this study. Journal of International Students 322 Muslim International Students’ Identity Experiences Muslim international students’ identity experiences are unique and different from their Muslim American peers (Tummala-Narra & Claudius, 2013). B. T. Erickson (2014) found international students experienced a shift in their Muslim or cultural identities when they went through the process of independence, exposure, questioning, and discernment. As a result of going through this process, most participants in the study grew stronger in their Muslim identity and experienced a weakened cultural identity. Schatz (2008) found increased security and surveillance measures on campus post-9/11, and emergence of anti-Muslim feelings among select student and staff groups as well as external constituents. Schatz’ postcolonial and poststructural look at the identity data indicated a concept of “U.S. and/vs. Them.” Tummala-Narra and Claudius (2013) gathered knowledge about cultural and religious identity development, adjustment to living in the United States, and availability of social support in the current sociopolitical climate in order to find culturally appropriate ways of assisting this population of students. Five major categories emerged from the study: “diverse views of the new cultural environment, social isolation, experiences of discrimination, religious identity, and protective factors in adjusting to living in the U.S.” (Tummala-Narra & Claudius, 2013, p. 138). Using the concept of Islamophobia and the Campus Climate Framework, Dimandja (2017) explored the racial/ethnic, religious, and gender experiences of these students and the impact of those experiences on their social and academic integration. Emerging themes included: classroom challenges related to linguistic abilities and others’ perceptions of their academic performance based on their racial identity; expression of their Muslim identity through the hijab and thobe resulting in exclusion and feelings of resistance; experiences of microaggressions, overt prejudice on campus, and hostility off campus due to their racial and religious identity; national political climate causing feelings of intimidation, marginalization, fear, and discrimination; and the need for religious and cultural integration. Several shared themes emerged from the studies by Schatz (2008), Tummala- Narra and Claudius (2013), and Dimandja (2017) on Muslim international students’ identity experiences. Participants in all three studies expressed feeling like a minority on their campus and being viewed as Other. Various forms of discrimination by gender, ethnicity, and religion were reported by participants (Dimandja, 2017; Schatz, 2008; Tummala-Narra & Claudius, 2013). Participants reported less discrimination related to Islamic beliefs and more related to being a visible minority (e.g. veiling, skin color, accent; Dimandja, 2017; Tummala-Narra & Claudius, 2013). Identity gaps (inconsistencies between self-perceptions and others’ perceptions of participants) were reported by some participants (Dimandja, 2017; Schatz, 2008; Tummala-Narra & Claudius, 2013). For example, some participants reported they wore the hijab to be perceived as a committed Muslim woman, but were instead perceived as being forced to wear the hijab by men or their families (Dimandja, 2017). Finally, some participants reported dynamic shifts in their identities as Muslim international students and a feeling of “becoming” versus “being” due to ongoing negotiation of their identities (Schatz, 2008; Tummala-Narra, 2013). Journal of International Students 323 Female Muslim International Students’ Gender Identity Experiences In the Western world the view of Muslim women is often of them being oppressed (Andrea, 2009; Gregory, 2014; Ozyurt, 2013). This assumption leads some to see study abroad in a Western culture as an opportunity for Muslim women to escape this imagined oppression and experience freedom. Recent studies show female Muslim international student experiences are more nuanced and complex than this dualistic thinking suggests. Gregory (2014) found participants engaged in religious strategies (e.g., wearing the hijab, praying) as a way of educating non-Muslims about Islam. Study participants engaged with clubs and organizations to counter negative stereotypes of Muslims. Key findings from Gregory’s study included: Muslim women “actively synthesize traditional gender norms from their countries with new identity formations” (p. 108); some Muslim women police others to ensure compliance with traditional gender expectations; some Muslim women “learn and apply American racial schemas within a context of constructing the U.S. as a racial and religious paradise” (p. 108); some Muslim women feel obligated to counter stereotypes about Muslims; some Muslim women maintain connections with home through daily prayer and wearing the hijab; some Muslim women engage in emotional work to make their circumstances more manageable; and some Muslim women embraced new identity formation in the United States (e.g., constructed future plans on professional and educational goals, engaged in activities prohibited in their home countries). Seven themes emerged from Lefdahl-Davis and Perron-McGovern’s (2015) study: (a) expectations versus reality about the United States—international students expected the United States to be more dangerous and unwelcoming than it turned out to be in reality, (b) acculturative stress, (c) cultural differences between Saudi Arabia and the United States, (d) experiences of discrimination and/or curiosity—wanting to dispel myths that they are oppressed, forced to cover, and unequal to men, (e) English language issues—English proficiency as a key factor for adjustment, (f) relationships and help-seeking behavior—stigmatized in Saudi culture, and (g) the experience of being a Saudi woman in the United States. Participants in Alruwaili’s (2017) study experienced their most salient identities as Saudi, female, Muslim, and student. Similar to the Lefdahl-Davis and Perron-McGovern (2015) study, some participants in the Alruwaili (2017) study reported becoming more independent after living in the United States. Female Muslim international students in Dimandja’s (2017) study who wore the hijab reported being subject to overt discrimination, being excluded from campus social life, and having a greater fear of being verbally or physically attacked. Other research on female Muslim international students indicated that wearing the hijab subjected students to experiences of discrimination, isolation, and othering (Ali, 2014; Lefdahl-Davis & Perron-McGovern, 2015; Tummala-Narra & Claudius, 2013). Trump Administration Anti-Muslim Rhetoric Beutel (2018) argued that words have impact and “[h]eated political rhetoric, especially derogatory language toward groups of people, can create all kinds of Journal of International Students 324 unintended consequences, including sometimes physical violence” (para. 1). Commentators and activists have asserted that President Trump’s rhetoric has emboldened others to commit hate crimes in the United States against minorities, including Muslims (Beutel, 2018). In 2015, then–presidential candidate Trump called for a ban on Muslims coming to the United States, proposed the creation of a registry for Muslims in the United States, and recommended the surveillance of mosques (Potok, 2017). Potok (2017) noted FBI reports showing anti-Muslim hate crimes increased by 67% in 2015, the highest number reported since 2001. A study by Müller and Schwarz (2018) found Trump’s tweets on topics of Islam were highly correlated with hate crimes targeting Muslims after the start of his presidential campaign in U.S. counties with high Twitter usage. The literature has not addressed how President Trump’s ban on Muslims has impacted international students who identify as Muslim and what connection, if any, exists between those impacted by the ban and Muslim international students in the United States. Theoretical Framework and Methodology E. Kim’s (2012) ISI model was used as a guiding framework to better understand how Muslim international students experience their identities at 4-year universities in the midwestern United States. Kim proposed a six-phase for the ISI model: (a) pre- exposure, (b) exposure, (c) enclosure, (d) emergence, (e) integration, and (f) internationalization. Table 1 describes each of the six phases of the model. Kim noted that students move through the stages at various rates and may be in more than one phase simultaneously. Table 1: International Student Identity Model (Kim, 2012) Phases of development Description Pre-exposure International students plan to study abroad with the intention of experiencing the U.S. educational system. Exposure International students arrive in the United States and discover their belief system diverges from the unfamiliar educational and cultural environment. During this phase, students begin developing an independent personality away from parental guidance. Enclosure International students withdraw from the outside environment in an attempt to adjust their academic performance. Emergence International students begin building social networks and engaging in extracurricular activities on- and off-campus. Journal of International Students 325 Phases of development Description Integration International students overcome major challenges, manage to restructure their identities, and resolve identity crises. Internationalization International students have an achieved identity created from their own belief system that acknowledges diversity and values individual differences in academic and cultural contexts. The phenomenological method of inquiry focuses on identifying and describing the subjective experiences of participants (Schwandt, 2015; Wertz, 2011). Phenomenological research seeks to describe “the common meaning for several individuals of their lived experiences of a concept or a phenomenon” (Creswell & Poth, 2018, p. 75). Transcendental phenomenology focuses on a description of participants’ experiences through epoche, or bracketing (Creswell & Poth, 2018; Moustakas, 1994). E. Kim’s (2012) model examined international student identity experiences in the United States and directly related to phenomenological experiences of Muslim international students in the United States. My research used Kim’s model to better understand the ways that individual Muslim international students experience their identities. METHOD By engaging in transcendental phenomenology, this study focused on a description of participants’ experiences through epoche (Creswell & Poth, 2018; Moustakas, 1994) to set aside biases and prejudgments and see the phenomenon in question with new and receptive eyes (Moustakas, 1994). Data The primary university for this study was a predominantly White, regional, rural, public university located in the midwestern United States. The campus enrollment is approximately 8,000 and nearly 65% of the students are male. International students account for less than 2% of the student body. International students from predominantly Muslim countries such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait account for approximately 40% of the degree-seeking international student population. In addition to recruiting students at the primary university site, I recruited participants from three additional campuses for the study. The campuses were a small, private, liberal arts college in a suburban setting; a small, private, professional university in an urban setting; and a large, public, research university in an urban setting. Using the descriptive/constructivist paradigm, I used purposive sampling to select participants based upon their relevance to my research question (Schwandt, 2015). I interviewed 10 participants for this study (see Table 2). The students identified as Muslim and had studied in the United States on a nonimmigrant student visa (e.g., F-1 or J-1) for a minimum of 1 year at the undergraduate or graduate level. Journal of International Students 326 One participant in the study was traditionally aged (18–23 years old) and nine participants in the study were non-traditionally aged students (24+ years old). Table 2: Sampling of Participants Pseudonym Religious identity Gender Country of citizenship Years in the US Level of study Campus Bob Sunni Muslim M Bangladesh 9 UG Midwest State University Faisal Sunni Muslim M Saudi Arabia & Kuwait 3 UG University of the Midwest Hannah Shia Muslim F Kuwait 2 UG Midwest State University Michael Sunni Muslim M Saudi Arabia 4 UG Midwest State University Michelle Shia Muslima F Iran 7 GR Midwest University Nicholas Sunni Muslim M Saudi Arabia 6 UG University of the Midwest Oscar Sunni Muslim M Saudi Arabia 8 UG University of the Midwest Rachel Sunni Muslim F Saudi Arabia 3.5 ESL Midwest State University Sam Muslimb M Saudi Arabia 5 UG Midwest State University Tyler Sunni Muslim M Saudi Arabia 6 UG Midwest College Note. UG = undergraduate; GR = graduate; ESL = English as a second language. aNot practicing. bPreferred not to identify sect. I asked participants to commit to two 90-minute audiorecorded semi-structured interviews in which they would answer interview questions pertaining to how they experienced their identity with a specific focus on religious, ethnic/racial, and gender identities. I constructed questions in the initial interview to reflect key points of the study: (a) how the participant experienced their religious, ethnic/racial, and gender identities prior to studying in the midwestern United States, and (b) how the participant experienced their religious, ethnic/racial, and gender identities now as a Journal of International Students 327 student in the midwestern United States. I based questions in the second interview on additional questions looking more deeply at key points of the study, but they also grew out from responses provided in the initial interview. Each participant signed a consent form that provided an overview of the study and informed them of their rights as participants in the study. Personal information including demographic questions was collected in order to gain an understanding of the student’s identities. Participants chose a pseudonym, and identifiable information was kept confidential. Data Analysis I used Moustakas’ (1994) method of analyzing phenomenological data to analyze the interview transcripts, along with Dedoose software to create meaning units and to organize my data for analysis. I generated themes from the analysis of significant statements that I developed into clusters of meaning to provide an understanding of how participants experienced the phenomenon (Moustakas, 1994; Polkinghorne, 1989). I developed textual and structural descriptions from the significant statements and themes and used them to describe the context that influenced how participants experienced the phenomenon (Creswell & Poth, 2018; Moustakas, 1994). I used E. Kim’s (2012) ISI model as a lens to identify themes from the analysis of interview transcripts. Incorporating this framework into a study of Muslim international students’ identity experiences acknowledged that establishing identities is a fluid, dynamic, and ongoing process occurring in different contexts (Jones & McEwen, 2000). RESULTS Over the course of the analysis, three findings emerged from themes related to the research questions. The emerging findings included: (a) religious difficulties of being Muslim along with Islam as a flexible religion, (b) difficulties with racial constructs and ethnic stereotypes, and (c) gender difficulties of male/female interactions and perceptions of veiling. Religious Difficulties of being Muslim and Islam as a Flexible Religion Six of the Muslim international students participating in the study talked about the difficulties they encountered trying to continue the important practice of Islamic prayer five specific times each day as well as Friday prayer each week. For Bob, having to choose between prayer and school work was especially difficult. Bob explained: Last year I skipped my prayer because I just didn’t have the time of day. …that would never happen back home because everything is closed. So that culture is set up that way. Being in school over here, if I choose to go to prayer, I have to make up the work I’m skipping. So, the student, it feels that a bargain. Journal of International Students 328 Bob felt he should not have to choose between practicing his prayers and fulfilling his obligations as a student. He knew he should practice his prayers and conveyed that he wanted to pray, but he also did not want to have to make up school work he would miss if he went to pray. Additionally, four participants had difficulty finding an appropriate place to pray discreetly while on campus. Four students stated they believed God recognizes and understands complications regarding prayer time in the United States, just as God would understand having to miss prayers back in their home countries due to being sick or in the hospital. Islam, therefore, was seen by many of the participants as a flexible religion, allowing for exceptions to the strict practice of prayer at specific times each day in the U.S. environment where Muslim prayer times are not a regular part of the culture. Regarding Islamic prayer Faisal explained: So, really, I can pray sometimes, with me, I practice my religion. I’m not a very rigid guy, you know—I have the freedom, the freedom to practice my religion and the way that keeps me continuing my whole life. Michael also discussed the flexibility of Islam in the context of his personal, social life and prayer. Michael shared: Like, for example, today we want to go out before the sunset. You know we have a prayer on that time. And we have another prayer, we have to pray before midnight. So, I’m going out—you know—I have to pray before. And, uh, because our religion make it easier for us. You can make it together when you are traveling—when you can’t, like, I can’t find a place to pray. So you can pray together when you are traveling you can pray the prayers together. You can combine. Yeah. Uh…so, this is something I like about Islam. Six of the students in this study struggled with being able to continue practicing their prayers at the regularly scheduled times each day due to needing to attend class and not being able to find a comfortable space to perform their prayers, especially as a woman. Despite these challenges, Muslim international students in this study found ways to practice Islamic prayer by delaying prayers until after classes were over or combining prayers together when they were able to pray. At least four students talked explicitly about being afraid to pray in public in the United States or altering where and how they pray so as not to raise fear in those around them who hold negative stereotypes of Muslims. Rachel described her fear of praying in the United States this way: I am scared to pray here in the US, like in a part of something because some people think it’s bad thing or something. And maybe because I saw a video of some people pray outside and someone is hurt him or do something to him and that make me comfortable to [only] do that in my home. Nicholas described his concern about making others feel afraid if they saw Muslims praying on campus: Journal of International Students 329 …if we want to prayer, we will not prayer in front of the people. Kind of go in the corner or something so we will not disrupt them or stand in their way. …because you know that American people they have this stereotype about Muslims and mostly it’s bad. So that I’m just trying to be normal and not make anything kind of, make them afraid. This finding also related to how Muslim international students were impacted by the Trump administration’s rhetoric and policies pertaining to the travel ban on individuals from predominantly Muslim-majority countries and general anti-Muslim sentiments. For Michelle the impact of the Trump administration’s travel ban had severe consequences. Unable to return home to Iran due to the travel ban, she was unable to visit her family, some of whom she had not seen since 2011, and her family could not visit her in the United States. Due to the uncertainty of what would happen to the Optional Practical Training program if Trump was elected, she had to delay her graduation by two semesters and pay additional tuition to remain enrolled during that time, creating a financial hardship. Half of the participants in the study described feelings of fear experienced by themselves and their family during the time leading up to the 2016 presidential election and for several months afterward caused by Trump’s anti-Muslim rhetoric and policies. Two participants in the study expressed conflicted feelings or no feelings of impact from the Trump administration’s travel ban. Faisal explained: …as a Muslim international student, as a Saudi especially, there is nothing have been changed for us as a Saudi students. …in my mind really this is just very simple rights for American government to do. Because they’re trying to avoid the, you know, avoid any bad people coming to America. …This is American rights to do, I think, my personal idea. So, yeah, but being a Muslim, as a Saudi student here … I haven’t facing any issue at all. Difficulties with Racial Constructs and Ethnic Stereotypes This finding is related to how Muslim international students viewed their ethnic or racial identity prior to studying in the United States and how Muslim international students viewed their ethnic or racial identity while studying in the Midwest. Racial identity was often a new and unfamiliar concept for participants in the study. Six students found the use of racial categories to be troubling. When asked to describe themselves racially, several students expressed they were unfamiliar with this construct before coming to the United States. Michael shared, “We don’t have something like this in Saudi.” The term racial identity was also new for Michelle who, originally from Iran, had lived in another Asian country before coming to the United States to study. Michelle explained, “…that concept was new to me when I came to the US …it was like hyphenized, African-American, or it was a question. So it was a very new concept for me when I came here.” Overall, participants in the study did not know about racial constructs and categories used in the United States until after arriving. Students’ ethnic identities such as Arab, Bengali, or Persian were more salient to them than any racial identity. Journal of International Students 330 Four students in the study discussed how their national identity was viewed either positively or negatively. Oscar shared how he believed Saudi students are viewed as either good or bad in the midwestern United States: … either they’re, um, seen as being perfect, um, a good Saudi, no problems, no fights, no, ah, partying, focus on school. Or, the opposite. … Partying 24/7, smoking, drinking, missing classes. That’s how I see Saudis are viewed in the US. Either this or that. And some of them are viewed as bad people. I don’t like to use that word, but they are viewed as terrorists … yeah, they’re viewed as terrorists. In a very bad way. Just because you’re Saudi. Or, in some way, because you’re a Muslim. Rachel shared how she believes Saudis are viewed by those who remembered the events of September 11, 2001, and those who did not: I think some old people see me… bad things… because do you remember September 11? I ask someone, why the old people always hate, not hate, but don’t like us Saudis? Do you remember September 11? They think the Saudis do that, they remember, but I think the younger people don’t remember that. Originally from Iran, Michelle discussed how she found Persians were viewed either positively or negatively by different generations in the United States: So Persians… either people know them very well, which is people who are …not the younger generation, they know them because of Iran and the US close relationship before Iran’s revolution. …And they have such a good perception about Persians. Or the younger generation, they, when they say Iran, they are like, oh, Iran, that has nuclear power, or wants nuclear power, or dangerous. Despite being stereotyped and facing discrimination as Muslim international students in the midwestern United States, participants found ways to cope with the impact, often with assistance from other Muslim international students. Oscar described an experience: I was giving a training to a couple of old people who don’t know how to use technology. …we finished this first session …they gave me the best attitude. The next day, um, she enjoyed the session so much to the point where, um, she started asking me, how old are you? Do you have a wife? …And as soon as I said, I’m from the Middle East, she paused and looked up… where in the Middle East? And I said, Saudi. And that acceptance just went away. Gender Difficulties of Male/Female Interactions and Perceptions of Veiling This finding is related to how Muslim international students in this study experienced differences between male/female interactions on campus and in the classroom in the midwestern United States. Two of the female students in the study, Rachel and Hannah, discussed difficulties navigating interactions with males and how Journal of International Students 331 those interactions differed from their interactions with males in their home country where cross-gender interactions were limited and closely monitored. Rachel described how her husband helped her frame this new and uncomfortable relationship with a male teacher in a way that made it possible for her to participate in the classroom: …when I came to the US when I talk with man I am so shy, because I don’t talk with man a lot in Saudi Arabia, I just talk with my family or my husband. …there were a teacher, he teach me and I, it’s hard to me to sit and have any question ask him. But then I thinking about, I didn’t do something wrong, I just came to here to learn and, but my husband says, it’s ok. He is a teacher, he’s not anyone, but I feeling so shy to do that. But when I thinking and doing I change …some idea in mind, it helps me a lot to be comfortable to talk with man in the education, just in the education. Like Rachel, Hannah was able to overcome a difficult situation where she needed to interact with men. In Hannah’s case, she was able to form friendships on campus with male Kuwaiti students who understood her culture and religion since there were no female Kuwaiti students who could fill the role. Like Rachel, Hannah felt it was alright to interact with men as long as it was within the context of helping each other with school. Nicholas shared what has and has not changed for him in the United States regarding interactions with females: One example of what is not ok—it’s not ok to sit alone if I’m a man and you’re a female, but for this studying thing, it’s ok, it’s not a problem. But it’s not good to stay like very far away in a room, nobody can see us, it’s kind of protecting us from something else. Like Hannah, Nicholas noted that on his campus, it is alright for men and women to study together as long as they are in spaces where others can see them so they are not tempted to interact in ways that are not appropriate or acceptable in Islam. The female participants in the study came from three different countries with different cultural expectations for veiling. When asked how she thought Muslims were perceived in the midwestern United States, Hannah shared most people are not comfortable with her wearing the hijab, but are respectful of her. Hannah explained, “They see me like, what’s she wearing? …but they don’t ask about that, they respect that. I see that they respect what I wear, what I do.” Sometimes Rachel would be with her friend who does not wear an abaya, only a hijab, and people would question why they were dressed differently. Rachel said: …people ask us in the [café], you are Muslim? And you are Saudi? In the same country, why it’s different, hijab? I tell to him that Islam says choose what you want. Just if you feel comfortable with something, just do it. And I choose cover my face and she, she choose hijab. Rachel viewed these questions as an opportunity to help people in her community understand Islam and Muslim women’s ability to choose if or how they wish to veil. Journal of International Students 332 Although Michelle chose not to cover, she believed veiling should not be viewed as a tool of oppression, but rather as a choice. Michelle shared: Like a nun, if you see a nun, you respect her, because you think she is pure. But we don’t have the same respect for Muslim women, because you see that hijab as an oppressive tool on the woman. But some of them, I would say, it’s their choice, they want to wear that way, but we usually ignore that part. All three female participants in the study believed that veiling was a choice for Muslim women. All three participants were comfortable with their own choice to veil or not to veil and respected the choices of other Muslim women to veil in different ways or not to veil at all. DISCUSSION While E. Kim’s (2012) ISI model showed how participants in my study experienced components of identity beyond what Chickering (1969) and Erikson (1968) theorized, additional factors made it difficult to apply. Participants shared how their identities were constructed around cultural values, viewpoints, and traditions from their home countries (Phase 1), how they opened up to unforeseen possibilities as challenges/obstacles were encountered (Phase 2), how they reflected heritage and cultural values strongly in their identities (Phase 3), and how they appreciated values of tradition, but also examined other ways of thinking (Phase 4). E. Kim’s (2012) model, however, did not always fit well with this population of students. Participants in this study did not express experiencing certain elements of E. Kim’s Phase 1: Pre-Exposure—Inheriting Self. Participants did not report experiencing conflict with their parents while selecting their U.S. university or major, nor did they express enduring rigorous competition with their peers or spending extra time working to meet university eligibility requirements. Perhaps this is because the majority of the students were from countries where they were financially sponsored by their governments and were able to choose from a list of approved U.S. universities and majors, thereby removing the element of competition that is typically present for students coming from East Asia and other Asian countries where competition for scholarships and prestige associated with getting into highly ranked universities is more prevalent. Participants did not express concern that U.S. students and instructors might falsely attribute their limited English proficiency to academic incompetence as found in Phase 3: Enclosure—Securing Self. However, it is possible that this concern would have emerged if the question had been asked of the participants. The study focused on the students’ religious, racial/ethnic, and gender identities and did not ask about academic or language acquisition experiences, which may explain why this competence concern did not emerge in the study. It is important to recognize two outlying participants in the study, Michelle and Bob, as their identity experiences tended to fall outside those of the other participants. Michelle and Bob had been in the United States longer than most of the other participants, 7 and 9 years, respectively. They tended to demonstrate a familiarity Journal of International Students 333 with the ways identity is conceived in the U.S. culture, which enabled them to provide a greater depth and breadth in their identity experiences. Michelle and Bob also tended to provide more examples of identity experiences ranging into Phase 4, Phase 5, and Phase 6, whereas the other participants who had not been in the United States as long did not show this depth and breadth of identity experiences. Michelle was the only graduate student in the study. Michelle was also the only nonpracticing Muslim in the study. Michelle was from Iran and Bob was from Bangladesh, which are non- Arab nations, while all of the other participants were from the Arab nations of Saudi Arabia or Kuwait. As in other studies, participants in this study had to renegotiate how they practiced their beliefs through prayer, the intentional process of exploring identity, (re)negotiating beliefs, and considering factors contributing to identity experiences (Cerbo, 2010; Dey, 2012; Neider, 2011). However, the theme of Islam as a flexible religion, especially when it comes to prayer and prayer times, was not found in any of the literature reviewed for this study. By identifying flexibilities within Islam, students in this study were able to find workable solutions despite studying on campuses and in communities that did not provide adequate access or space for daily prayer and communal Friday prayers. Like participants in the Fries-Britt et al. (2014) study, three of the students in my study found that typical race and racial identity development frameworks in the United States did not capture the behaviors and perceptions of foreign-born students of color. Participants in my study experienced consistent ethnic identities that did not change, despite exposure to U.S. ethnic identities. Like female participants in Cerbo’s (2010) study, Hannah and Rachel used a religious lens to make meaning of their interactions with others. As long as they did not violate their Islamic values, Hannah, Rachel, and one male student, Nicholas, were able to navigate relationships with the opposite sex in ways that would not have occurred in their home countries of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Rachel reported two incidents when her expression of her Muslim identity through the hijab resulted in feelings of resistance from members of her midwestern U.S. community. Hannah reported negative responses to her hijab when visiting a mall in a larger nearby city similar to participants in the Dimandja (2017) and Tummala-Narra and Claudius (2013) studies. While none of the participants in my study reported feeling unfairly discriminated against as a whole in their midwestern U.S. communities, five participants reported feeling unfairly discriminated against by specific faculty or segments of the population. Three participants discussed how they expected to find more discrimination against Muslims in the United States based upon what they had seen and heard in their home countries prior to coming to the United States. Despite being stereotyped and facing discrimination as Muslim international students in the midwestern United States, participants found ways to cope with the impact, often with assistance from other Muslim international students and family members. Participants who experienced incidents of bias and discrimination showed evidence of both stress and resilience. Seven of the participants in the study found Trump’s ban on individuals from Muslim-majority countries as well as general anti-Muslim sentiment caused feelings of marginalization, fear, and discrimination. Two of my participants, Michael and Journal of International Students 334 Faisal, not only did not feel threatened by the Trump administration’s policies and rhetoric, but also actually supported Trump’s decision to enact the policy even though they themselves were Muslim. Several implications for practice arose from the findings of this study. It was apparent that Muslim international students face difficulties in practicing Islamic prayer on U.S. campuses given that classes are scheduled during regular prayer times. As most U.S. university academic calendars are built around the Christian calendar, such accommodations are already built in for major Christian holidays such as Christmas. Building in accommodations, such as flexibility for attending class or taking exams on major religious holidays such as Eid al Fitr, eliminates the need for students to have to choose between their education and their faith. Creating space where Muslim international students can gather for prayer on campus meets another important need for Muslim international students, as well as Muslim faculty and staff. A dedicated multifaith room that can be used not only by Muslim international students, but also by students of any faith or belief system, is perhaps the number one need of Muslim students as well as all religious minorities on college campuses (Asmar, 2005; Dimandja, 2017; Mutakabbir & Nuriddin, 2016). Additional recommendations alluded to by students in the study included a number of suggestions for faculty on U.S. campuses. Faculty should make efforts to familiarize themselves with their roster of students prior to the start of each term and note any students they may have from other countries. Faculty should work to include in their course design something related to these students’ backgrounds. Many excellent resources exist to guide faculty in creating inclusive classrooms for international students as well as internationalizing the curriculum (Bond & Scudamore, 2010; Campbell et al., 2016). Institutions should reinvest part of the international tuition fees back into international student recruitment efforts, scholarships, retention services, and broadening access to students from lower socioeconomic backgrounds. Finally, institutions should create opportunities for international students to gain valuable work experience and recover a part of their investment (Choudaha & de Wit, 2019). Limitations and Future Research Directions Limitations of time and space made it impossible to investigate all aspects of participants’ religious, ethnic/racial, and gender identities. As reflective interpretation changes recollection of original events, oral histories provided by participants altered the original experience and, therefore, the meaning of the original event (Creswell & Poth, 2018; Patton, 2002). Further qualitative research with a larger sample and in other geographic regions would provide additional responses on how Muslim international students experience their identities. A grounded theory study could be used to develop a Muslim-specific ISI model. This could conceptually bring together E. Kim’s (2012) ISI model, Dey’s (2012) model of identity development of Muslim American students, and/or elements of other models. Future studies should consider the socioeconomic status of participants and whether or not they were self-funded or government-funded. Journal of International Students 335 CONCLUSION The findings of this study support other research within the literature that Muslim international students studying U.S. campuses encounter difficulties participating in Islamic prayer; difficulties with male/female interactions inside and outside of the classroom; and stereotypes and discrimination based upon their religious, ethnic, and gender identities and demonstrate resilience and the ability to cope with discrimination encountered in U.S. communities. Ultimately, this research is related to improving the experiences and outcomes for Muslim international students. These experiences and outcomes include successful completion of academic programs and earning their degrees, reduced incidents of racism and discrimination, and a safe and healthy environment for growing and learning. 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Her major research interests lie in the area of higher education internationalization, international student identity development, and diversity, equity and inclusion in international education. Email: donna.anderson@mso.umt.edu 
work_vv4z6lswyjgjpigkhzxf6f3dbe	----	doi:10.1080/09658210903153923 The rise and fall of gay: A cultural-historical approach to gay identity development Nic M. Weststrate University of Toronto Mississauga, ON, Canada Kate C. McLean Western Washington University, Bellingham, WA, USA Research on identity development has paid relatively little attention to the development of marginalised identities such as those of gays and lesbians, whose isolation from the canonical narrative of sexuality may limit the available resources required for establishing a coherent identity. We examined these contested identities in relation to cultural-historical factors that may have played a role in shaping these identities over the past 50 years, and looked at how such factors have impacted the voicing and silencing of gay experiences. Participants (N�251) reported (1) a memory of a cultural event relevant to their sexuality, and (2) a self-defining memory about their sexuality. Those in older cohorts reported cultural memories centred on politics and other external events (e.g., Stonewall riots), and younger cohorts reported more personal memories (e.g., coming out), suggesting that homosexual identities have become less culturally defined, and instead more personally defined. Further, participants of older cohorts reported self-defining events that were predominantly from one private domain (e.g., sex). In contrast, younger participants reported a variety of self-defining events. These results suggest that cultural- historical factors play an important role in defining the developmental pathway of individuals, perhaps especially those who have marginalised identities. Keywords: Narrative; Master narrative; Homosexuality; Culture; Identity. By looking closely at the changes that have occurred in gay culture in the past few decades, I attempt to represent the process through which a culture with unique traditions and rituals is submerged into the melting pot, its distinguish- ing characteristics dissolving into this grey, flavorless gruel as its members are accepted by society at large. (Daniel Harris, 1997, p. 4) This sentiment, from Daniel Harris (1997) in his book The Rise and Fall of Gay Culture, speaks to the ever-evolving nature of gay identity. Specifically, Harris is resisting the assimilation of gay1 culture into the mainstream, lamenting a distinct loss of identity that was once funda- mentally about being ‘‘different’’. Indeed, various scholars (Cohler & Hammack, 2007; Savin- Williams, 2005a, 2005b) have commented on the # 2009 Psychology Press, an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa business Address correspondence to: Kate McLean, Western Washington University, 516 High Street, MS 9172, Bellingham, WA 98225, USA. E-mail: Kate.McLean@wwu.edu The authors wish to thank Andrea V. Breen, Lewis W. Jones, Phillip L. Hammack, and two anonymous reviewers for extraordinarily thoughtful and helpful comments on previous versions of this manuscript. We thank Alvi Dandal for help with coding. This study was supported by a grant from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada awarded to the second author. 1In the current paper there are many instances where the term ‘‘gay’’ is used to capture the experiences of both males and females who identify as homosexual. The usage of this term is intended only for convenience sake, as in mainstream discourse we often find ‘‘gay’’ used as such a catchall phrase. We are not in any way trying to offer a male-centred view of sexuality. We will identify and attempt to explain those points at which our results diverge for males and females. MEMORY, 2010, 18 (2), 225�240 http://www.psypress.com/memory DOI:10.1080/09658210903153923 increasing variability in personal narratives held by gay youth, which are tending towards ‘‘nor- malcy’’ in an increasingly affirming society. It is the intersection between culture and gay identity that is the subject of the current study, which examines how different historical cohorts define themselves within a dynamic cultural context. Contested identities, which are associated with marginalisation and a struggle for personal coherence (Galatzer-Levy & Cohler, 2002), have been relatively under-represented in research on narrative identity (cf. Chandler, Lalonde, Sokol, & Hallett, 2003; Chandler & Proulx, 2006; Cohler & Hammack, 2006, 2007; Diamond, 2006; Hammack, 2005, 2006, 2008; King & Noelle, 2005; King & Smith, 2004; Lalonde & Chandler, 2004; Syed & Azmitia, 2008). Instead researchers have focused on the canonical life story, which in terms of sexual identity is one focused on heterosexuality. Nevertheless, the- ories in narrative psychology use an identity model that views the narration of personal stories as a mechanism for identity development regardless of one’s status as marginalised or not; that is, in narrating one’s experiences one comes to understand one’s own identity (e.g., McLean, Pasupathi & Pals, 2007). Thus we know quite a bit about the narrative construction of identity, yet we know less about how marginalised identities are forged in a variable cultural- historical situation. For the current study we have turned to a feminist framework crafted by Fivush (2004a, 2004b) based on the dynamics of ‘‘voice’’ and ‘‘silence’’. MARGINALISED IDENTITIES: VOICE AND SILENCE The theoretical framework of voice and silence is based on the dynamics of place and power. Voice and silence ‘‘emerge within the individual as a function of their historical and cultural place and their individual history of specific interactions with specific others’’ (Fivush, 2004b, p. 83). Those who have personal narratives that match the canonical narrative possess voice, and those who cannot or do not identify with the canonical narrative have stories that are si- lenced. These can be stories of subversion, resistance, or simply those stories that fall out- side normative ways of being or thinking in a given culture. It is within this dynamic relationship that voice oppresses silence, or the canonical narrative oppresses the non-dominant narrative.2 In the case of the current study, gay narratives subvert or resist the dominant narra- tive, and are thus silenced. According to McLean et al.’s (2007) process model of narrative identity development, the narrative construction of personal identity is an interactive process, developed and maintained through the telling of situated stories about the self. Importantly, it is through the management of such stories that an individual selectively weaves an extended autobiography of the self that provides a sense of unity and purpose, and ultimately comprises the life story (McAdams, 1993). Thus personal disclosure is critical in this model of narrative identity development because it can facilitate the development of a coherent narrative identity (see also Fivush, 2001; Pasu- pathi, 2001; Thorne, 2000). Conversely, when one’s voice is given limited air-time, or is silenced, the opportunities for personal identity develop- ment may be limited.3 Research on voicing and silencing has focused on how stories are co-constructed with important others. For example, Fivush and her colleagues have shown that narratives of autonomy are silenced for daughters (Fivush & Buckner, 2003) and narratives rich with emotion, particularly sadness, and those that are situated in terms of relationships are silenced for sons (Fivush, Brot- man, Buckner, & Goodman, 2000). In older age groups, Pasupathi and Rich (2005) have found that distracted listeners elicited less-elaborate stories, when compared to stories that were told to attentive listeners (see also Pasupathi & Hoyt, 2010 this issue). Thus, audiences may silence us by 2 There are some exceptions to this rule, where silence can conversely represent a form of power (Fivush, 2010 this issue), such as when one’s personal narrative is so powerful it need not be voiced. For example, one need not voice one’s heterosexual orientation, because heteronormativity assumes this to be the case unless otherwise told. Fivush (2010 this issue) conceptualises this form of silence as ‘‘being silent’’, in contrast to ‘‘being silenced’’. The latter is an imposed form of silence and is the focus of the current study. 3 One might challenge this claim, given the large collection of research that has examined coming-out narratives (e.g., King & Noelle, 2005; King & Smith, 2004). Certainly for many gay individuals this is an important developmental milestone, a turning point where the gay person claims their voice. However, coming-out experiences are only one possible narrative among a potentially vast number of experiences that a gay identity might be built around. To this end, we have taken a broader approach to gay identity development that is reflective of the pervasive silencing that we believe to be typical of this non-canonical narrative. 226 WESTSTRATE AND McLEAN emphasising one thing (e.g., sadness) and thereby silencing another (e.g., anger), as well as with behaviour that limits the degree to which we elaborate our stories. Consistent with Fivush’s original framework, we expect that the dynamics of voice and silence will also be impacted by the larger cultural context in which personal narratives are constructed. USING NARRATIVE PSYCHOLOGY TO EXAMINE THE ROLE OF CULTURE IN IDENTITY DEVELOPMENT Our approach to examining the role that culture plays in sexual identity development centred on a paradigm recently put forth by Hammack (2005, 2008; see also Cohler & Hammack, 2006), who suggests that to understand the development of sexual identity it is critical to understand both the cultural and personal developments relevant to the person. We defined a cultural event as an event that is experienced by many people (e.g., the AIDS epidemic), the meaning of which is often shared, or at least understood, among members of the cohort that experienced it. Conversely, a personal event is limited to one’s own self-experience (e.g., realising one is gay) and, likewise, the meaning made concerning the event is unique. If voice and silence emerge from an individual’s historical and cultural position vis-à-vis the canonical narrative, then this evolution raises the question of how cultural changes, and thus the condition of voice and silence in each decade, have had an impact on the construction of gay identity. Hammack (2005, 2008) suggests taking a narra- tive approach to the question of identity because narrative construction is both a personal and a cultural process. That is, the personal meaning of the story is only understood in the particular cultural-historical context within which it is con- structed (Hammack, 2005, 2008; McAdams & Pals, 2006). Indeed, culture not only influences the raw material for narration (e.g., the Stonewall riots), but also how to interpret such events. As such, in the current study, change in gay identity over time is examined by soliciting both personal and cultural narratives from gay individuals who came of age in different historical cohorts.4 Employing a narrative approach enables us to examine the potential master narratives used by historical cohorts to make sense of their experi- ences. Master narratives are culturally valued ways of telling personal narratives (Boje, 1991; McLean, 2008; Thorne & McLean, 2003), and alleviate some of the effort required to individu- ally integrate an event into one’s identity because the master narrative comes with pre-packaged narrative meaning. For instance, the master narrative informing heterosexual identity is so pervasive that sexuality is assumed, and no effort needs to be exerted to acknowledge or integrate it if one is heterosexual. Superficially, we agree that gay individuals likely engage in a high degree of meaning making by virtue of their non-canonical status (Bruner, 1990), and that across time it is unlikely that a single master narrative can account for all of the experiences of gay individuals. However, we suggest an expansion of Bruner’s (1990) theory, in that sub-groups of canon-breakers might be able to create master narratives when they share a common cultural experience. We expect that this process will be most pronounced for historical cohorts that have clear cultural events (e.g., AIDS) tied to their identities, and thus share a common voice. There are two possibilities for how older historical cohorts engage in identity integration. Older cohorts may engage in an active meaning-making process because they are such canon-breakers, and thus have a need to process and understand their unique experiences, or a less active meaning-making process com- pared to younger cohorts because they have created cultural master narratives that provide them with shared meaning. These speculations are consistent with the theoretical assertions of Cohler and Hammack (2007), who identify two potential master narratives for gay identity, de- pending in part on the cultural situation in which one comes of age: the narrative of struggle and success and the narrative of emancipation. A HISTORY OF HOMOSEXUALITY IN NORTH AMERICA AT A GLANCE We offer an abridged version of gay history over 50 years to illustrate how the personal stories of each cohort might be shaped by a variable cultural milieu. Three master narratives are used to roughly organise the major historical shifts relevant to gay identity. 4 We note that we are coming more from a historical framework than a collective memory framework, viewing historical events as possible vehicles for creating shared master narratives. CULTURAL INFLUENCES ON GAY IDENTITY 227 Narrative of silence In the 1960s the heterosexual narrative prevailed, silencing the gay narrative. The silencing involved the medical (e.g., homosexuality as a diagnosable mental illness; Bayer, 1987), legal (e.g., statutes criminalising sodomy), and religious communities (e.g., homosexuality as an abomination). Gays had a bifurcated identity where one’s private self was discrepant from one’s public self (Goffman, 1963). We suggest that the narrative of silence may result in fewer possibilities for stories about gay identity, given fewer possibilities for disclo- sure and ways of identifying oneself. Narrative of struggle and success The early 1970s was a period of political and social liberalism, begetting a full-blown gay rights movement. The political activity of gays escalated as a result of a pivotal event in gay history: the Stonewall Inn riots of 1969 (Herdt & Boxer, 1993; Loughery, 1998). The riots transformed the cam- paign for gay rights into a national movement. By the mid to late 70s, activists had secured an increase in social legitimacy for gays. In this post-Stonewall, pre-AIDS period, a culture of conservatism gave way to sexual freedom, in- creased social legitimacy, decriminalisation, and demedicalisation. In the post-Stonewall era of the 1980s, narratives include the AIDS epidemic, first mentioned in medical literature and popular media in 1981 (Loughery, 1998). Gay activism began to move from the fight for civil rights to national and global campaigning for AIDS awareness (Bernstein, 2002). Thus narratives in the first half of the 80s decade included the emergence of AIDS, whereas the second half of the decade included narratives of protest, panic, and loss. Despite the fact that gays experienced pervasive oppression in the 70s and 80s, activists established a shared voice and effectively put gay rights on the map, and can be captured by the theme of ‘‘struggle and success’’. We suggest that those who came of age in this era will have more possibilities for self-definition with the increasing social legitimacy and voice that char- acterised this period. Narrative of emancipation In the 1990s the fear of AIDS transmission abated and the focus shifted to treatment and prevention. The prevailing narrative in this generation is marked by the increased acceptance of gays (Loughery, 1998). Political activism still occurs, but it now functions out of highly populated and vibrant gay communities. Homosexuality began to appear in the media for purposes that were not solely political in nature (e.g., the television programme ‘‘Will and Grace’’), and information about homosexuality became accessible through books on a wide variety of topics. In terms of millennial gays, there are four important factors that distinguish them from their predecessors (Cohler & Hammack, 2006). First, in the 1990s medical advancements helped AIDS to develop from a fatal disease into one that is manageable, transforming the meaning of AIDS for young gays such that it is no longer perceived as a threat to this community. Second, the life- course options for gays are changing in an increasingly progressive society. For example, the legalization of same-sex marriage in Massa- chusetts, Connecticut, Vermont, Iowa, Maine, and Canada offers new opportunities for how gay youth in North America view their futures. Nevertheless, the idea of same-sex partnership is politically controversial, so we see gay activism re-emerge, targeting the gay marriage debate once again (e.g., Proposition 8 in California). Third, the globalisation of gay culture is facili- tated by the Internet. Finally, scholars have noted a propensity for millennial gays to ‘‘shun labels’’ (Savin-Williams, 2005a, 2005b) and to adopt a more fluid sexuality, emancipating gays from historical understandings of what it means to be gay. Thus we expect that more recent cohorts will have a less clear cultural identity, with greater focus put on a personal identity that is not defined by sexuality per se. HYPOTHESES AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS First, we expected that older cohorts would have clearer memories of cultural events tied to their identities, in contrast to more recent cohorts who will have fewer cultural events linked to their identities. Second, we expected that those who 228 WESTSTRATE AND McLEAN came of age in earlier cohorts would have fewer content possibilities for their personal narratives, reflecting greater silencing, and more recent cohorts will have greater variability in the content of their personal narratives, reflecting greater voice. Lastly, we expected that more recent cohorts would exhibit more elaborative meaning making when attempting to integrate personal narratives into a coherent identity, due to the need for individualised meaning making in a cohort that we expect to lack a larger master narrative. METHOD Participants The sample consisted of 251 participants (N�156 males) collected through Internet listservs from a variety of gay and lesbian organisations (e.g., university student groups, health networks, sports associations, counselling support groups, activist organisations) and any subsequent snowballing from these networks. Procedure Participants signed into the online survey using a login and password provided in an e-mail sent to them for the purposes of recruitment. They accepted an informed consent sheet, after having an opportunity to send the researchers an e-mail with questions before proceeding. The survey was completely anonymous. Participants were given an unlimited amount of time to complete the questionnaire, which should have taken them approximately 1 hour. Upon completion, partici- pants were shown a counselling referral sheet. Given the anonymity afforded by the Internet it served as an effective recruiting tool, a technique that other researchers have found to be a successful way to access hidden and stigmatised populations (Savin-Williams & Ream, 2003). Demographics. First, demographic information was obtained from the participant, such as age, gender, and ethnicity. Sexual identity was as- sessed categorically (i.e., gay or lesbian). Cultural memory. The first narrative solicited asked for a description of a cultural or historical event or period that has influenced the partici- pant’s gay or lesbian identity. The event or period could have occurred at any point over the course of his or her lifetime, and should have had a significant impact on them. Self-defining memory. The participant was then asked to share a self-defining memory pertaining to his or her sexuality, which was defined as vivid, emotional, helps him or her to understand them- selves better as a gay or lesbian individual, and is thought about frequently (modified from Singer & Salovey, 1993). Narrative coding The authors developed a coding system that was inductively derived from the narratives. The first author coded all of the narratives and was blind to the age, cohort, and gender of the participants. A second coder, who was also blind to these variables as well as the study’s hypotheses, coded 27% of the narratives for reliability purposes. Cultural event. Each cultural memory was coded as belonging to one of 13 mutually exclusive categories; although more than one event may have been present, only the central event was scored (overall kappa�.87). The categories were: coming out (5% of all events; e.g., ‘‘Coming out to my family and feeling accepted by them . . .’’); media (8%; e.g., ‘‘Re- presentation in pop-culture, such as shows like The L-Word, Will and Grace, and Ellen . . .’’); school setting as a significant time period (3%; e.g., ‘‘Freedom and acceptance in the university environment allowed the development of my gay identity . . .’’); education or learning experience (4%; e.g., ‘‘Reading Foucault’s History of Sexu- ality in a graduate course . . .’’); social justice, human rights, gay activism (7%; e.g., ‘‘Queer activism, such as ACT UP, Queer Nation, 1987 march on Washington . . .’’); sexual liberation/ revolution (1%; e.g., ‘‘The period of sexual liberation in the early 70s, pre-AIDS . . .’’); HIV/ AIDS (3%; e.g., ‘‘Learning many years ago of ‘‘The Gay Cancer’’ that was somehow con- tagious . . .’’); government/legislation, (13%; e.g., ‘‘Pierre Trudeau’s statement that the government has no place in the bedrooms of the nation . . .’’); exposure to gay people (8%; e.g., ‘‘Exposure to my gay uncle helped me to be comfortable with CULTURAL INFLUENCES ON GAY IDENTITY 229 myself . . .’’); experience of hate crimes, homopho- bia, marginalisation (12%; e.g., ‘‘Hearing my older brothers and sisters talk about fags and God’s hate for them . . .’’); sex, love and romance (6%; e.g., ‘‘My first same-sex kiss on a trip with my high school friends . . .’’); gay social events or celebrations (20%; e.g., ‘‘Attending my first Pride event . . .’’), and other (10%). Personal and cultural focus. This code was used to measure the degree to which participants focused on cultural versus personal experiences when prompted for a cultural memory. Each narrative was assigned a score on a linear scale from 0 to 2, with 0 representing the most personal narratives and 2 representing those with the most cultural focus (intraclass r�.94). Those narratives that received a score of 0 possessed only personal focus. In these narratives there was no mention of any event or period that was beyond the experi- ence of the teller, such as a specific coming-out story. Narratives with a score of 1 were about a specific personal experience, but contained fea- tures that would be recognisable to others, such as a Pride Parade. A score of 2 was assigned to narratives where the teller refers to an event or period that has immediate cultural focus, and has no more significance for the teller than any other person who might have experienced the same event or period, such as reference to seeing a TV programme. Self-defining event. Events reported by parti- cipants in their self-defining memories were coded as belonging to one of eight mutually exclusive categories, in which each narrative was only scored for the central event (overall kappa�.87). These were: realisation of ‘‘differ- ent’’ feelings towards same sex (19% of all events; e.g., ‘‘In grade 4 when I first realised I was ‘different’, in the school changeroom . . .’’); coming out to oneself as gay or lesbian (21%; e.g., ‘‘It was the first time I was forced to accept my sexual orientation. I always knew that there was something different about me, but I always denied that was what it was . . .’’); coming out to others as gay or lesbian (15%; e.g., ‘‘In grade 12 I first came out to a non-family member . . .’’); sexual experience, fantasy, or thought (16%; e.g., ‘‘Finding my father’s playboy magazines and masturbating for the first time . . .’’); romantic- relational experience or fantasies (14%; e.g., ‘‘Six years ago, for the first time in my life I found what being in love meant � the feeling and the way it changes a normal man into a slightly mad man . . .’’);5 exposure to gay and/or lesbian peo- ple (4%; e.g., ‘‘Having a lesbian boss who was a good role model who encouraged me to explore my sexuality, whichever it was . . .’’); discrimina- tion/marginalisation (7%; e.g., ‘‘I had a conver- sation with an extremely bigoted sexist homophobe who claimed that lesbianism doesn’t exist . . .’’); and other (4%). Meaning making. We operationalised meaning making as what the teller learns or understands from an event as he or she reflects back on it, coded on a scale from 0 to 3 based on McLean and Pratt’s (2006) system. A narrative with no explicit explanation of what one had learned was coded as 0 (intraclass r�.90). A narrative was coded as 1 if there was some evidence that the teller acquired some tangible or specific behavioural lesson from the experience (e.g., ‘‘I learned never to look for dates online.’’). A narrative was coded as 2 if the teller described an experience of growth or development, beyond behavioural change without much specificity (e.g., ‘‘My life changed after that.’’). Finally, narratives were coded as 3 when the meaning making applied to greater aspects of the teller’s life, and was specific, often evidenced by some sort of transformation in the teller (‘‘I became more comfortable with myself and my sexuality.’’). Meaning making was only coded in the partici- pant’s self-defining memory. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION Descriptive statistics Participants were aged from 18 to 74 years (M�31.69, SD�11.94). For the purposes of analysis, participants were divided into historical cohorts. There were 74 participants in the millen- nial cohort (born in 1983 or later; n�48 males), 87 participants in the 90s cohort (born between 1972 and 1982; n�52 males), 45 in the 80s cohort (born between 1962 and 1972; n�27 males), 21 in the 70s cohort (born between 1952 and 1962; n�12 males), and 15 in the 60s cohort (born 5 For the cultural memory sex and romance were treated as one category, unlike the distinct categories in the coding of the self-defining memory. This was done because both categories are personal memories in response to a cultural prompt and only comprised 6% of the responses to the cultural memory combined, whereas they made up 30% of the narratives in the self-defining memory. 230 WESTSTRATE AND McLEAN between 1942 and 1952; n�13 males). Nine participants did not report age, and five did not report gender. We were not able to examine ethnic differences as 35 participants were non-white, but covered 11 ethnic categories, and 64 did not report ethnicity. We also collected immigration status, with 206 participants born in North America, and 45 immigrants. There were no differences for immigration status on age, meaning making, the personal-cultural focus of the cultural memory, or the event types for either memory. Primary analyses We will first discuss the results for the cultural memory, followed by the results pertaining to the self-defining memory. In both sections we illus- trate the results with narrative examples. Finally, we will look at the degree to which different cohorts engage in meaning making in their self- defining memories. We also examine gender differences in all analyses. Cultural memory. We investigated the question of how cultural events shape personal identities by looking at the types of events reported when prompted for a cultural memory, and by examin- ing the degree to which these events possessed cultural versus personal focus. There were sig- nificant gender differences in event types, x 2(12)�28.57, pB.01. Inspection of percentages suggests that men were more likely to talk about ‘‘coming out’’, ‘‘social justice, human rights, gay activism’’, ‘‘sexual liberation/revolution’’, ‘‘HIV/ AIDS’’, ‘‘government/legislation’’, ‘‘experience of hate crimes, homophobia, marginalisation’’, and ‘‘sex, love and romance’’. Women were more likely to talk about ‘‘exposure to gays and lesbians’’. The rest of the event types are fairly evenly distributed between genders. It is possible that women discuss exposure to gays and lesbians more often because this describes a relational experience, which is consistent with research showing that women are more emotionally or- iented in their sexual identities (Savin-Williams & Diamond, 2000). Further, Savin-Williams and Diamond (2000) also observed that men are more sexually oriented, which would explain why they discussed sex-related topics more often. That gay men discussed such things as govern- ment/legislation, HIV/AIDS, and discrimination more than women might be a by-product of the persecution they endured during the AIDS epi- demic in comparison to women. In terms of the kinds of events reported, as expected there was a significant difference in event types reported by different cohorts, 80.80 (48), pB.01 (see Table 1). Older cohort members had clearer cultural events that are tied to their identities than those shared by younger cohorts, as they were more likely to report actual cultural events (events of which many people would be aware), such as ‘‘social justice, human rights and gay activism’’, ‘‘HIV/AIDS’’, and ‘‘sexual libera- tion/revolution’’. In contrast, younger people reported more personal memories of ‘‘coming out’’, ‘‘experiences in high school or university’’, ‘‘learning and education about sexuality’’, and ‘‘experience of hate crimes, homophobia, margin- alisation’’. In fact, the only cultural event that younger people reported pertained to ‘‘govern- ment/legislation’’, which was predominantly cele- bratory narratives that centred on the passing of gay marriage legislation. While the latter is TABLE 1 List of cultural event categories and percentage reported by each cohort Cultural event category 1960s cohort 1970s cohort 1980s cohort 1990s cohort 2000s cohort Coming out 0 0 18 46 36 Sex, love, and romance 25 0 8 25 42 Exposure to gay people 11 11 28 22 28 School setting as a significant time period 0 0 0 17 83 Education or learning experience 0 13 0 63 25 Hate crime, homophobia, marginalisation 8 8 29 25 29 Gay social events or celebrations 2 7 12 45 33 Media 0 0 18 47 35 Social justice, human rights, gay activism 14 21 29 29 7 HIV/AIDS 20 40 20 20 0 Sexual liberation/revolution 67 33 0 0 0 Government/legislation 4 7 11 39 39 Other 5 5 36 27 27 CULTURAL INFLUENCES ON GAY IDENTITY 231 clearly a legitimate cultural event, it is a positive event about an important political achievement, and as such is qualitatively different from the narratives of political upheaval and struggle that defined the older cohort’s narratives. To verify that a ‘‘cultural’’ event is actually cultural in nature, we examined the degree to which the events had a cultural versus personal focus. We conducted an ANOVA with cultural event type and gender as the between-partici- pants factors and the scale of personal-cultural focus as the dependent variable. There was a main effect of event type, F(12, 212)�31.43, pB .001, and post-hoc Tukey tests showed that the events with the most cultural focus were those concerning sexual liberation and government or legislation, followed by discrimination with a mid- level of cultural focus, and the events with the least cultural focus were education, school, ex- posure, sex/love/romance, and coming out. The other event types did not differ between groups on cultural focus. The most personal event types were reported by younger people, and the most cultural events were reported by older people, with the exception of government/legislation. There was no main effect of gender or gender� event type interaction. With less cultural focus attached to their identities, it appears that younger cohorts are no longer achieving self-definition through opposi- tion to the canonical. In contrast, this finding suggests that millennial gays, whose cultural memories are more personally focused than older cohorts, may be integrating into the dominant narrative of sexuality. This finding speaks to the cultural-historical specificity of sexual identity development. For example, Tyler provides a typically personal millennial narrative: When I was 18, just before I left for a year (backpacking in Europe), I told my father that I was gay. Surprisingly, he reacted in a very compassionate way! Once I got to Europe, I felt like it was time to explore my sexuality without hiding myself. At this time, I strongly thought my father would badly welcome this sight of me. Tyler’s story has no immediate cultural focus and is instead a completely personal event. In contrast, Denny, who came of age in the 80s, reported the following cultural event: 1985 � I am in university. I know I am gay. AIDS is destroying the lives of men throughout Canada and the United States. I am alone. The media is filled with right wing hatred from the Republican administration of Reagan. No one knows what this disease is, where it comes from, or how it is transmitted. It only kills gays and Haitians. Both of these groups are expendable. I know that to stay alive I must remain silent. I must not have sex. If you were not a gay adult during this time, you do not know the terror and hysteria that the media had whipped the general population into. Denny’s story is a powerful one, made vivid with the intensity of the emotions and the use of the present tense, which suggests that this experi- ence is still an important part of who he is (e.g., Libby & Eibach, 2002). Further, the event is narrated as a shared experience, particularly in reference to the subgroup that ‘‘must’’ know about this experience, namely the other gay adults from this era. Self-defining memory. We next investigated whether or not self-defining memories varied across cohorts in terms of event types and the degree of meaning making. There were no significant gender findings in relation to self- defining event category or meaning making, or interactions between gender and cohort for these variables. Finding some support for the second hypothesis, we found a marginally significant difference in self-defining memory event by cohort, x2(24)�38.35, p�.09. As can be seen in Table 2, those coming of age in the 1960s predominantly reported memories about ‘‘sexual experiences’’ to the exclusion of other types of memories, possibly because sexuality in this decade was restricted to the bedroom, reflecting the social values of the time. For the 70s cohort ‘‘realisation of ‘different’ feelings toward same-sex’’ and ‘‘coming out to oneself as gay or lesbian’’ become prominent and these two categories stay relatively prominent through all subsequent decades. This shift away from sexual experiences and towards the ‘‘self’’ is possibly a by-product of increasing social legiti- macy, coinciding with positive political change. This is also a time not yet marred by AIDS; in some ways the post-Stonewall, pre-AIDS period was a ‘‘golden era’’ for gay men and women. Still, identities seem concentrated in one or two areas of the self. 232 WESTSTRATE AND McLEAN The 80s mark a turning point in gay identity from being concentrated in one or two domains to a diffusion of events across a variety of domains, a trend that becomes stronger in the cohorts to come. Interestingly, the event code for ‘‘discrimi- nation/marginalisation’’ is highest in the 80s in relation to other decades, probably a result of socio-political prejudice surrounding the AIDS epidemic. Also, this decade marks the emergence of ‘‘exposure to gay and/or lesbian people’’ as important to gays, perhaps because the AIDS crisis and increasing prevalence of gays in the media created a higher profile for homosexuality. In the 90s issues pertaining to the ‘‘self’’ persist as a strong concern for gays, suggesting the possibility that increasing social acceptance af- fords greater self-exploration and commitment. Also, for the first time in the 90s, relational experiences outnumber sexual experiences, per- haps reflecting the greater life-course possibilities that accompany greater social acceptance. In the wake of the AIDS crisis, discrimination decreases, potentially because of the numerous support services and organisations that were developed to ameliorate the devastation caused by AIDS. Finally, more than any other decade, millennial gays embody an individualised identity, with almost all events being similarly represented. Interestingly, ‘‘discrimination/marginalisation’’ re- appears in this decade, which seems counter- intuitive given that the AIDS crisis has disappeared from the young gay radar. Closer inspection of this discrimination signifies a quali- tative distinction between millennial and 80s discrimination. Discrimination in the 1980s was systemic, social, cultural, and political, with an emphasis on the government. In the new millen- nium discrimination is almost exclusive to the personal realm, with stories of individual experi- ences of discrimination, such as the inability to bring your same-sex partner to the prom. Inter- estingly this example of millennial discrimination is based on an expectation to participate in a canonical rite of passage; indeed the importance of the prom date is almost mythical. Again this is evidence of integration into the dominant narra- tive, which is consistent of Cohler and Ham- mack’s (2007) narrative of emancipation. This narrative resists the social categorisation of sexual identities, preferring a more inclusive and fluid narrative of sexuality for younger cohorts. We turn now to some narrative examples, first focusing on narratives from the 60s cohort that centre on sex. George reports the following narrative: In Grade 9 I consented to a clandestine rendez- vous with a male classmate at the supper hour back at the school locker room. It was one of the few times in my teens when I had sexual contact. The feel of another male body was exciting. However, my cultured guilt took over for it was several years before I was truly able to sort my true feelings out. Back then, there were very few people to talk to in a small town. However, I knew then that this was a memorable moment in my life and I would probably revisit it again. This is a narrative about desire from a time when sexual contact was socially prohibited. There is also the reference to ‘‘cultured guilt’’, which is an example of the silencing that we suggest was more prominent in this era. Interest- ingly, he implies some resolution by sorting out his feelings, but he revisits this memory and reports it for this study, suggesting that this physical, sexual memory is an important part of his identity perhaps, we suggest, because of the era in which his identity was beginning to form. Ronnie, from the millennial cohort reported the following narrative: I can’t say that I have any memories that lead to ‘‘strong feelings’’ about my being gay. However, TABLE 2 List of self-defining event categories and percentage reported by each cohort Event type 1960s cohort 1970s cohort 1980s cohort 1990s cohort 2000s cohort Realisation 7 32 5 27 17 Coming out to self 7 26 30 22 15 Coming out to others 7 11 10 18 20 Sexual experiences 40 16 18 12 15 Romance, relationships 20 10 13 13 15 Discrimination 7 5 13 3 11 Exposure 0 0 10 4 3 CULTURAL INFLUENCES ON GAY IDENTITY 233 there is one memory I have that illustrates just why this is the case. That is, it illustrates just how natural I thought it was to be gay. In grade six, I remember many of my friends started talking more about girls they liked, celebrities and classmates alike. Some started asking girls out. First attempts at dating. One day I was sitting in class wondering why it was that I wasn’t feeling any of these same feelings for girls. I looked around the classroom at each girl there and tried to think about whether or not I thought they were attractive. Or, to be more crude, if any of them turned me on. None really did, although I thought if I had to I could say I liked Cynthia, since she didn’t seem too bad. But I did know that thinking about boys did excite me in the way that I thought was supposed to happen when I thought of girls. It didn’t occur to me that this was significant at all, it was just what I thought, and that was all. Ronnie gives us an example of a relatively normal feeling and an experience that is not clandestine, weird, silenced, or closeted. Although this narrative is about desire, it is more cognitive than it is physical in nature, as Ronnie is trying to figure out his desire. These data are notable for several reasons. First, these results suggest that for older cohorts there were fewer possibilities to choose from for self-definition, exemplifying the narrative of si- lence. In the 1960s homosexuality was defined by straight and gay society as being about sex. Indeed, for men especially, social interactions and places where gay people could meet were predominantly focused on sex (Loughery, 1998). This appears to be reflected in the dominance of one or two types of narratives, which we describe as a concentrated identity. In contrast, for the millennial gays there is no one specific kind of self-defining event, but rather a multiplicity. By this stage our culture has evolved to accept, or even embrace, many possibilities for gay youth to define themselves. In the new millennium, either there is no clear master narrative for gay identity or the master narrative is one of individualised identity. As such, millennial gays might be con- forming to a broader master narrative held by youth that are coming of age in the new millen- nium, irrespective of their sexual identity. In the current cultural moment, straight and gay youth alike seem preoccupied with establishing them- selves as unique (e.g., through dress-style, inter- ests, etc.). It could be that for millennial gays even their sexual identity is shaped by this master narrative that pushes for uniqueness, manifesting in the disposal of labels and the desire to simply be ‘‘who they are’’, which ultimately has come to reflect the narrative of emancipation (Cohler & Hammack, 2007). Thus, over these historical cohorts we see a movement from a ‘‘concen- trated’’ identity to an ‘‘individualised’’ identity. One interpretation of the data concerning self- defining memory events that we have put forth is that those in older cohorts have fewer narrative options or possibilities for identity. Based on this interpretation, it is possible that the older cohorts may have a more integrated sexual identity because there were fewer options for self-defini- tion, making the process of integration easier. We also suggested that older cohorts may have less need to make meaning of personal experiences, due to cultural master narratives that facilitate self-understanding. To further examine this inter- pretation we investigated the degree of meaning that participants made of their memories. To examine whether cohort predicted the degree of meaning making reported we con- ducted an ANOVA including event type and cohort as predictors of meaning. Results showed that there was a marginal cohort effect, F(4, 218)�1.24, p�.05. Post-hoc Tukey’s test showed that those who came of age in the 1970s and 2000s had the most meaning in their self-defining memories compared to those who came of age in the 1960s (those who came of age in the 80s and 90s did not differ from other groups). In terms of event type, there was a significant main effect, F(7, 218)�2.78, pB.01. Post-hoc Tukey tests showed that narratives about ‘‘coming out to the self’’ had the most meaning compared to narratives about ‘‘sexual experiences, fantasies, or thought’’ or ‘‘exposure to gay and/or lesbian people’’. There were no main effects of or interactions with gender. Although our findings on cohort and meaning are marginal they are potentially illuminating, and an argument can be made for how the fluctuations in meaning-making activity parallel the cultural evolution in which they are framed. That members of the 60s cohort engaged in the least meaning making may be best explained by the ubiquitous silencing that occurred in this era. Under such conditions of silence there was little room for exploring one’s identity or integrating it into the self in any overt way. We see a rise in meaning making in the 70s cohort. Given that this ‘‘golden era’’ marked the first major advancements in gay 234 WESTSTRATE AND McLEAN rights activity and also an increase in the visibility of gay people and their issues, cohort members had greater access to shared material for integra- tion into their identities. Thus cohort members began constructing the cultural gay experience, and infusing it with shared meaning*the result being new master narratives for which identifica- tion was possible. There were no significant differences in meaning making for the groups that came of age in the 80s and 90s when compared to the other groups, perhaps because the master narratives that had been established by the 70s cohort facilitated the integration process for later cohorts, relieving them of the need to engage in elaborative meaning-making processes. Finally, we see an increase in meaning-making activity in the millennial gay cohort. This is consistent with our previous interpretations that millennial gays have stopped identifying with antiquated master narratives, which no longer account for or capture the experience of what it is like growing up gay in this generation*a generation that emphasises the individual over the collective. As such, we see millennial gays engage in meaning making once again, so that they may negotiate, and ultimately integrate, a new cultural moment in time. Importantly, event type also predicted mean- ing, in particular the narrative of coming out. However, we do not view event type and cohort as competing predictor variables. Instead, we suggest that increasing social acceptance likely provided greater opportunities for meaning mak- ing; or put differently, more possibilities for events with which to define oneself. Indeed, our data and others’ (e.g., Floyd & Bakeman, 2006) show that the age of coming out is becoming progressively lower with each cohort (e.g., in our data set the age of coming out was 30 in the 1960s and 70s cohorts, 23 in the 1980s cohort, 20 in the 1990s cohort, and 17 in the millennial cohort). Thus we see event types as the raw material that each cohort has for narration, which predict both meaning and relate to the cultural happenings experienced by a given cohort. In sum, we must acknowledge the caution with which these findings should be interpreted. The cohorts may not necessarily be pure, in that they could be impacted by factors outside the realm of sexuality that have also evolved with time. For instance, our findings for the millennial cohort may be contaminated by an enormous self-help industry, which might press younger people to make meaning of their personal experiences compared to those coming of age in previous generations. We now turn to some examples concerning meaning making, beginning with Sameer, who is a millennial gay: I think the most defining conversation of my sexuality was with my twin brother after I came out to him. This was a few months before high school graduation, and I had already come out to about 8 friends and my mom. I found a time where I knew nobody would be around for a good couple of hours or so, and actually made him play hangman to guess the word ‘‘gay’’, and told him the word was about me. I just couldn’t tell him outright. Just afraid I suppose, afraid of the reaction or of saying it too abruptly. But afterwards the whole conversation was really about our mutual belief that the general popula- tion was intolerant (coming from a very small city), and how silly intolerance, homophobia, racism, etc. actually are. It turned out to be a very philosophical conversation, leading us to think about what life actually is and how happiness is the only thing that matters. It was a very uplifting and memorable conversation. It made me understand who I am, because I had to explain to someone very close to me when, how, what I felt and why I felt it. Up until this time I didn’t accept myself, I didn’t accept that I couldn’t change, I wanted to be normal and live normally with a wife and kids and a house and a job. I didn’t want to go through telling people and being different. And after this conversation, I still didn’t. I didn’t accept myself until a few months ago, after I’d ‘lost’ every tie that I have with my ‘old’ life as a closeted person. I now live with a roommate who knows I’m gay, I have many friends who I’m comple- tely out to, I volunteer for the University Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgendered and Allies center. And I’ve now endured a few same-sex relationships. Sameer represents several important aspects of the millennial gay narrative. First, he engages in a reflective narrative process about who he is, which was less prevalent in the older cohort. Second, while there have been massive cultural and societal changes in the direction of accep- tance, he reports quite a painful experience of intolerance. Thus, despite a more accepting atmo- sphere, the environment in which millennial gays CULTURAL INFLUENCES ON GAY IDENTITY 235 are attempting to integrate their personal experi- ences into a coherent identity is far from utopian. David, who is from the 60s cohort, offers a contrast to Sameer’s narrative: When I was a graduate student I told a friend that I had known for five years, who I knew was going to gay bars, that I was gay. He invited me to go with him to a gay bar. This was the beginning of my coming out. We were never sexual friends but without his accompanying me, it would have been much more difficult to come out. He then became my ‘confidant’ and I would tell him about my experiences meeting people. Having someone to share with was invaluable. He died in 1992 from the complications of HIV. I am in a very happy partnered relationship now, but I have never missed anyone who has died (including my parents) as much as I miss my first gay platonic friend Arnold. This narrative, like Sameer’s, is also about coming out to others; however, David narrates the event in a factual manner without reflection or elaboration on the impact of the event. In summary, we assert that the self-defining experiences of our cohorts tell us a story that reflects the evolution of the gay cultural-historical experience. Our tentative interpretations are that pervasive silencing restricted meaning-making processes for those coming of age in the 60s cohort. The 70s cohort engaged in elaborative meaning-making activity, perhaps to make sense of their newfound liberation and visibility, estab- lishing cultural master narratives for gays in the process. Finally, we suggest that the personal events shared by younger cohorts do not come packaged with meaning, resulting in a need for more individualised meaning-making processes. Summary of results An exploration of the cultural and personal memories relevant to historical cohorts of gays and lesbians has indicated variations in identity across historical cohorts. When prompted for a memory that pertained to a cultural event linked to one’s identity, older cohorts shared clearly cultural events compared to younger cohorts who had a more personal focus. In terms of self- defining memories, older cohorts shared mem- ories that were concentrated in one or two life domains, which were restricted to the private realm. In contrast, younger cohorts shared a variety of self-defining memory events. In terms of identity integration, silencing in the 60s may have restricted meaning making for this cohort, whereas members of the 70s engaged in more elaborative meaning-making activity. The millen- nial cohort engaged in elaborative meaning-mak- ing processes, perhaps due to their individualised identities, which falls outside the scope of pre- vious cultural master narratives. Lastly, meaning- making activity also varied by event type, which may be linked to available opportunities and experiences afforded to each cohort. Together these results suggest that some cohorts have more obvious cultural master narratives that inform their identities, despite their overall non-canoni- cal status (Bruner, 1990). Others find themselves in a process of developing such scripts or, like the millennial gay cohort, do not share cultural memories and are instead characterised by a multiplicity of personal narratives and a more elaborative identity integration process. IMPLICATIONS: THE END OF GAY In many ways the narratives shared with us have evidenced the rise and fall of gay (Harris, 1997). Early accounts of the gay life story were largely silenced by the canonical narrative of heterosexu- ality, which was illustrated in the self-defining memories of gays who came of age in the 1960s. Soon after, the gays of the 70s and 80s fought the canonical narrative, and through activism gener- ated a communal, politicised voice. The emer- gence of this voice marked the rise of gay culture, and was reflected in narratives with topics such as Stonewall, AIDS, and the gay rights movement. For years the gay voice challenged the canoni- cal, but as culture evolved to be more accepting of homosexuality the communal gay and lesbian voice waned. Gay individuals who came of age in more recent decades reported a diverse array of narratives that were more personal in nature. Despite a rich history of comradeship, the need for political unification in the 21st century may be less pressing, offering gay individuals a multi- plicity of narratives with which they can identify. Thus, their experiences possess less cultural meaning, at the same time as individual meaning making has increased. In his work The End of Gay (and the Death of Heterosexuality), Bert Archer urges older gays and lesbians to ‘‘free succeeding generations from 236 WESTSTRATE AND McLEAN the chains they took up to pull us into the modern age’’ (1999, p. 284). There is no doubt that the achievements enjoyed by gays in the millennial era are bountiful, reflecting acceptance and, in many cases, an increasingly socially legitimate place in both the medical, legal, and religious world. This acceptance has created an environ- ment that enables a multiplicity of gay narratives to flourish, resembling the plethora of possibili- ties that are characteristic of the canonical narrative of heterosexuality. To this end, millen- nial gays are not concerned with establishing themselves as distinct from the canonical, in contrast to their predecessors. However, the canonical narrative perpetuates itself by silencing other narratives, which is the mechanism through which it maintains its power. The canonical is, because other narratives are not. When the individualised millennial gay narrative and canonical narratives converge, silence con- sumes the voice that was once established by a revolutionary identity, giving way to the fall of gay. What significance will the transition from having a revolutionary identity to being just like everybody else hold for gay people? An interesting consequence of the individuali- sation of gay identity and the emergence of a multiplicity of potential gay narratives for young people is a culture of voice and silence between such narratives and the narratives held by older cohorts. This interchange may result in margin- alisation among the marginalised.6 That is, a narrative might not only be marginalised by canonical heterosexuality, but it might also be silenced within the gay community by a more powerful or socially acceptable gay narrative. One mechanism that enables a single narrative to marginalise another narrative is positioning, which refers to the social and emotional stand- point from which the narrative is told (Bamberg, 1997; Davies & Harré, 1990; Thorne & McLean, 2003). For example, one of our participants wrote, ‘‘I don’t particularly like to subscribe to a particular label, because I find it limiting and exclusive . . .’’ by voicing this position the repor- ter effectively silences personal narratives that express the position that endorses labels. We suggest that the interplay of voice and silence between these positional narratives may chal- lenge the capacity for gays and lesbians of different age cohorts to form meaningful transge- nerational relationships. Additionally, the multi- plicity of narratives characteristic of the millennial cohort is further subjected to within- cohort silencing. An illuminating parallel can be drawn between the status of voice and silence in gay identity and that of feminist identity over the past 50 years. Feminist activity has evolved considerably, an evolution that can be roughly captured in three distinct waves. Second-wave feminism resembles the identity politics of gays of the late 60s, 70s, and 80s, as both movements were concerned with attaining equality for its constituents. Currently, however, scholars have documented and critiqued what they call a ‘‘post-feminist’’ movement (Cop- pock, Haydon, & Richter, 1995; Porter, Ducker, Ferrell, & Helton, 2001). Of interest to us is a collection of post-feminists who argue that femin- ism is no longer pertinent to women’s lives (Coppock et al., 1995; Porter et al., 2001). Narratives like this have created a tension be- tween individuals who subscribe to the different schools of feminist thought, who often come from different cohorts. The formation of the individualised millennial narrative, or the narrative of emancipation (Coh- ler & Hammack, 2007), represents an analogous movement in gay identity politics; that is, the beginning of a ‘‘post-gay’’ era. It is possible that the inevitable silencing that is reflected in a post- gay narrative will challenge the formation a coherent identity. The interplay, or perhaps more appropriately the tension, between multiple gay narratives in contemporary society, as well as the loss of gay narratives altogether, should be the subject of further narrative inquiry. By this point the reader may have deduced that as authors we are positioned against the individua- lised millennial gay narrative, given that we have spent some time discussing the challenges it imposes on integration and the development of coherence in one’s identity. However, it is our goal to treat gay identity in a manner that recognises the inevitability of the individualisation of gay narra- tives. A multiplicity of narratives is not inherently problematic but, from a narrative perspective, silence is. That is, silence limits the telling of situated stories about the self, which is the material used in the social construction of identity. In contrast, it is voice that promotes telling. With this turning point in gay identity we suggest that it 6 See Loiacano (1989) who discusses how racial and sexual identity interact to produce marginalisation among the marginalised, specifically examining the challenges associated with identification as an African American in the predominantly white gay community. CULTURAL INFLUENCES ON GAY IDENTITY 237 is important to encourage the conditions of voice that are necessary to propagate a more sustainable and ubiquitous notion of acceptance. Recent events in California point to the fact that society is perhaps not as accepting as one might expect, and that gay is still a threatened identity. In the state of California, on 26th November 2008, a vote in favour of Proposition 8 turned back the clock on gay rights. The Proposition changed the state constitution to limit the definition of marriage to a union between a man and woman, and eliminated the marriage rights of same-sex couples. It is insufficient that only in times of threat do gays get torn out of complacency to protect their human rights. For this reason the gay developmental trajectory cannot be collapsed into that of the canonical, or straight, experience, which is in effect what silencing does. Without voice millennial gays are left to negotiate important aspects of develop- ment that are dissimilar from their heterosexual counterparts, such as enduring experiences of discrimination based on sexual orientation. Thus there are real risks associated with re-silencing communal narratives of gay identity. LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS Our first limitation is the homogeneity of our sample, restricting generalisations to various eth- nic groups who might have quite different stories to tell. We further cannot generalise to people from varying socio-economic levels or geographic locations. There is no doubt that such positions will impact how history is remembered and experienced, and will be important for future research. Second, using dichotomous and re- stricted categories for sexual orientation may have limited the stories told about fluidity in sexual identity. Third, given that this was an Internet survey there may have been access limitations. Fourth, although this was an anon- ymous survey there might be a sample bias concerning participants’ willingness to take part, particularly those who are more silenced. Finally, we note that cohort and age are confounded. Thus our conclusions about cohort differences should be taken with caution and in consideration of possible factors related to age. As we close, we would like to take a step outside the specifics of this study to suggest that our data fit within a larger literature on the social construction of identity. 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Scheibe (Eds.), Studies in social identity (pp. 245�273). New York: Praeger. Hammack, P. L. (2005). The life course development of human sexual orientation: An integrative paradigm. Human Development, 48, 267�290. Hammack, P. L. (2006). Identity, conflict, and coex- istence: Life stories of Israeli and Palestinian adolescents. Journal of Adolescent Research, 12, 323�369. Hammack, P. L. (2008). Narrative and the cultural psychology of identity. Personality and Social Psy- chology Review, 12, 222�247. Harris, D. (1997). The rise and fall of gay culture. New York: Hyperion. Herdt, G., & Boxer, A. (1993). Children of Horizons: How gay and lesbian teens are leading a new way out of the closet. Boston, MA: Beacon Press. King, L. A., & Noelle, S. S. (2005). Happy, mature, and gay: Intimacy, power, and difficult times in coming out stories. Journal of Research in Personality, 39, 278�298. King, L. A., & Smith, G. N. (2004). Gay and straight possible selves: Goals, identity, subjective well- being, and personality development. Journal of Personality, 72, 967�994. Lalonde, C., & Chandler, M. (2004). Culture, selves and time: Theories of personal persistence in native and non-native youth. In C. Lightfoot, C. Lalonde, & M. Chandler (Eds.), Changing conceptions of psycholo- gical life. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associ- ates Inc. Libby, L. K., & Eibach, R. P. (2002). Looking back in time: Self-concept chance affects visual perspective in autobiographical memory. Journal of Personality and Social Personality, 82, 167�179. Loiacano, D. K. (1989). Gay identity issues among black Americans: Racism, homophobia, and the need for validation. Journal of Counseling and Development, 68, 21�25. Loughery, J. (1998). The other side of silence: Men’s lives and gay identities: A twentieth century history. New York: Henry Holt/Owl Books. McAdams, D. P. (1993). The stories we live by: Personal myths and the making of the self. New York: Guilford Press. McAdams, D. P., & Pals, J. L. (2006). A new Big Five: Fundamental principles for an integrative science of personality. American Psychologist, 61, 204�217. McLean, K. C. (2008). The emergence of narrative identity. Social and Personality Psychology Com- pass, 2, 1685�1702. McLean, K. C., Pasupathi, M., & Pals, J. L. (2007). Selves creating stories creating selves: A process model of self-development. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 11, 262�278. McLean, K. C., & Pratt, M. W. (2006). Life’s little (and big) lessons: Identity statuses and meaning-making in the turning point narratives of emerging adults. Developmental Psychology, 42, 714�722. Pasupathi, M. (2001). The social construction of the personal past and its implications for adult devel- opment. Psychological Bulletin, 127, 651�672. Pasupathi, M., & Hoyt, T. (2010). Silence and the shaping of memory: How distracted listeners affect speakers’ subsequent recall of a computer game experience. Memory, 18, 159�169. Pasupathi, M., & Rich, B. (2005). Inattentive listening undermines self-verification in personal storytelling. Journal of Personality, 73, 1051�1085. Porter, N., Ducker, D. G., Ferrell, H. E., & Helton, L. (2001). Exploring the rift: An intergenerational CULTURAL INFLUENCES ON GAY IDENTITY 239 dialogue about feminism. Women & Therapy, 23(2), 57�78. Savin-Williams, R. C. (2005a). The new gay teenager. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Savin-Williams, R. C. (2005b). The new gay teen: Shunning labels. Gay and Lesbian Review, 12, 16�19. Savin-Williams, R. C., & Diamond, L. M. (2000). Sexual identity trajectories among sexual-minority youths: Gender comparisons. Archives of Sexual Behaviour, 29, 607�627. Savin-Williams, R. C., & Ream, G. L. (2003). Suicide attempts among sexual-minority male youth. Jour- nal of Clinical Child and Adolescent Psychology, 32, 509�522. Singer, J. A., & Salovey, P. (1993). The remembered self: Emotion and memory in personality. New York: The Free Press. Syed, M., & Azmitia, M. (2008). A narrative approach to ethnic identity in emerging adulthood: Bringing life to the identity status model. Developmental Psychology, 44, 1012�1027. Thorne, A. (2000). Personal memory telling and personality development. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 4(1), 45�56. Thorne, A., & McLean, K. C. (2003). Telling traumatic events in adolescence: A study of master narrative positioning. In R. Fivush & C. Haden (Eds.), Autobiographical memory and the construction of a narrative self: Developmental and cultural perspec- tives. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Inc. 240 WESTSTRATE AND McLEAN Copyright of Memory is the property of Psychology Press (UK) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. 
work_vw4l6rgm55bezook2mxfqakjoi	----	Hate Speech, Incitement to Hatred and Sexual Orientation in England, Wales and Northern Ireland Challenging Hate Speech: Incitement to Hatred on Grounds of Sexual Orientation in England, Wales and Northern Ireland Kay Goodall Senior Lecturer in Law and Director of Research, School of Law, University of Stirling Kay Goodall is Senior Lecturer in Law and Director of Research at the School of Law, University of Stirling. She specialises in statutory interpretation, anti-discrimination law and hate crime. With Ian McLeod, she is co-editor of forthcoming editions of Bennion’s Statutory Interpretation. She has carried out empirical research in several areas, in particular the policing of crimes involving violence or racism. Room 41, Airthrey Castle, School of Law, University of Stirling, Stirling FK9 4LA, United Kingdom. E-mail: k.e.goodall@stir.ac.uk Abstract: In England and Wales (in 2008) and Northern Ireland (in 2004) legislation has been enacted to render it a criminal offence to incite hatred based on sexual orientation. This paper examines the relevant pieces of legislation and considers whether they can be kept sufficiently narrow in operation to protect one’s freedom of expression. The paper also addresses criticism of such legislation, notably by Eric Heinze, based on arguments on equal protection and cause and effect. It concludes that in the British context, narrowly drafted legislation may have a useful, if marginal, impact and will not necessarily lead to the immense restrictions on freedom of expression that Heinze fears. Nor, however, will the legislation be likely to achieve radical social change while other powerful sources of discriminatory discourse remain uncontrolled. Keywords: incitement to hatred; sexual orientation; criminal law; hate speech; United Kingdom Introduction Less than half a century ago, consensual sex in private between adult males was a crime in the United Kingdom. If we read now the parliamentary records from that time, it is striking how supporters of reform sounded like today’s persecutors. In the first of several debates on the famous Wolfenden Report,1 the mover, Kenneth Robinson, Member of Parliament, remarked: I have no wish to suggest that I regard homosexuality as a desirable way of life. It is in my view undesirable for reasons which I will tell the House. It is undesirable because it leads so often to unhappiness, to loneliness and to frustration, because it entails in many cases heavy burdens of guilt and shame on those affected by it and because it seldom provides a basis for a stable mailto:k.e.goodall@stir.ac.uk emotional relationship. It may also possibly be undesirable on moral grounds because it is a sin, but these are matters on which I am not competent to pass judgment. Surely all this suggests that these unfortunate people deserve our compassion rather than our contempt…2 Another supporter, Antony Greenwood, Member of Parliament, noted: Tonight, we have had various estimates of the number of homosexuals in the country. Obviously, it is difficult for any of us to be positive about it. The lowest estimate which I have been able to find is 500,000, approximately the population of the City of Leeds. The highest estimate I have found is that they are nearly as numerous as the population of Wales.3 In 1960 – even with the growing support of broadsheet editors and moderate clergymen – it was a brave decision to speak in favour of the motion. Today, it is opponents of equality who regard themselves the brave ones to speak out. The arguments they use, from accusations of paedophilic tendencies4 to the description of same-sex sexual orientation as a sin and an abomination,5 were however used almost fifty years ago. The difference now is that a bundle of sexual minority rights has been achieved. British society has changed so spectacularly that, in 2008, Stonewall and other campaigners successfully persuaded Parliament to make it a crime in England and Wales to incite hatred against any person based on his or her actual or perceived sexual orientation. In this paper I examine this new law and its Northern Irish counterpart enacted in 2004 and ask whether this is the right direction for us to take. In particular, I consider the cogent arguments of Eric Heinze against sexual orientation-based hate speech bans. I conclude, with some reservations, that the legislation was the correct course to take. Prior developments There has been a whirlwind of decriminalisation and equality legislation in the UK in the last decade pertaining to sexual minorities. The ages of consent for different-sex and male/male sexual conduct are now finally equal;6 criminal laws governing sexual behaviour in England and Wales no longer distinguish between different-sex and male/male participants;7 civil partnership, albeit not marriage,8 has been enabled;9 adoption by same-sex couples has been made possible;10 and a person may seek redress if he or she suffers sexual orientation-based discrimination in some areas of employment and provision of goods and services.11 Once, consensual male/male sexual activity was a criminal matter; now the battle against homophobic crime is an official priority for the UK police forces.12 Offences found to have a homophobic element are more severely punished.13 These are only some of the more important developments. Policy too is changing, gradually taking account of the rights even of sexual minority children: if nothing else, surely realising that he ought to have been using the word we instead of always just that same cross, worn-out I in his angry mutterings would have helped… He cannot account for himself; he cannot describe what he sees.14 In Neil Bartlett’s poignant tale set in London in 1967, the protagonist toils to identify what he is feeling in a society in which he has never heard of homosexuality. Now, guidance to most schools issued by the Department for Children, Schools and Families requires that they provide sex education ‘relevant’ and ‘sensitive’ to the needs of all children, and that they are able to deal with homophobic bullying.15 As we will see, the modern UK is still far from being a society in which it is entirely safe to express alternative sexual orientations. Nevertheless, it has come far. It is in this context that we should take a closer look at the new law. UK laws concerning incitement to hatred on grounds of sexual orientation Incitement to hatred on grounds of sexual orientation will constitute a criminal offence16 in England and Wales17 – not Scotland – when the relevant legislative provisions amending Part 3A of the Public Order Act 1986 are brought into force.18 It has been an offence in Northern Ireland since 2004 under Part 3 of the Public Order (Northern Ireland) Order 1987;19 indeed the Northern Irish legislation is considerably wider than that applicable in England and Wales, although no prosecutions appear to have been brought so far.20 I will not discuss Scots law in this paper because there is as yet no corresponding legislation in the Scottish legal system. There is, however, potential for an interesting debate about the extent to which the flexibility of Scots common law could allow a conviction for similar activities. The provisions for England and Wales in Part 3A cover ‘threatening’ activities intended to stir up hatred against a group of persons because of their sexual orientation. This could be in the form of spoken words or behaviour or written material or a recording. Displaying material or publishing or distributing written material is an offence, as is distributing, showing or playing a recording. The offence can also (with some exclusions) include performing a play in public, broadcasting a programme or including it in a programme service, or possessing such material with the intention of broadcasting it. The offence can be committed in public or in private, but can only take place within a dwelling if the offending words or behaviour were heard or seen outside the dwelling and were intended to be heard or seen. It is essentially, then, a public order offence. Sometimes commentators have described the offence as ‘homophobic incitement’, but Part 3A in fact covers persons of any sexual orientation, including heterosexual (although it does not make specific provision for those who are transgender21). Section 29AB refers to ‘hatred against a group of persons defined by reference to sexual orientation (whether towards persons of the same sex, the opposite sex or both)’. There is no definition of sexual orientation in the Northern Irish Part 3. (One interesting question is whether the English Part 3A excludes asexuality (absence of sexual attraction22). What is important is that the offence focuses on hatred directed against a group, rather than hatred targeting individuals. Another key element is the audience, which does not necessarily include the victim, but is rather a separate audience who can be stirred up (hate speech delivered directly at the victim can be usually covered within the ordinary criminal law23). What is important too is that there need not be an aim to incite a crime. Advocating violence or other criminal action is already covered by the law.24 Rather, the offence consists of an incitement to hatred, which is not otherwise criminal behaviour. It was modelled very closely on the existing English provisions on incitement to hatred on grounds of religion, and as we will see, both are worded extremely narrowly.25 There are now three areas covered by incitement to hatred legislation in England and Wales: race, religion, and sexual orientation. The oldest is that which covers incitement to racial hatred. The classic example of an incitement to hatred offence in the UK has been a leaflet through the ordinary public’s doors or a speaker at a meeting of a racist group, deliberately stirring up the intended audience with provocative, hate-filled statements about an ethnic minority. Any prosecution of all incitement to hatred offences must first be approved by the Attorney General.26 The early convictions under the first specific offence (incitement to racial hatred, created by section 6 of the Race Relations Act 1965) involved extreme language and the ringleaders and active members of openly racist organisations.27 This was how Parliament had intended the legislation to be used – for the most brazen activities.28 Indeed, as the first version of the offence required proof of specific intent, it was often difficult to secure a conviction. Part 3 of the 1987 Northern Irish Order was drafted much like the English Part 3A. It covers the same basic offences in similar wording, but it also goes much further. First, it does not necessarily require specific intent: it extends to acts that are likely to stir up hatred; ‘likely’, in this area of law, is to be objectively assessed in the light of all the circumstances.29 Second, it also covers acts that ‘arouse fear’. Third, it extends not just to threatening words or behaviour, but also to those which are abusive or insulting. The aim of these sorts of legislation is to fill a perceived gap in the law. In most circumstances, those who stir up hatred are likely to commit an offence, such as when they abuse an identifiable individual, or when they incite others to commit a criminal act. Inciting others to hatred alone, however, (rather than inciting them to commit an offence) is usually not unlawful except where it has been specifically provided for by statute. When the Bill that contained the amended Part 3A was introduced to Parliament, Ben Summerskill of Stonewall, a non-governmental organisation for sexual minority causes in the UK, produced evidence to the House of Commons Bill Committee that cited popular reggae lyrics that exhorted listeners to kill gay men and lesbians (these could however, depending on context, amount to incitement to violence or to murder, which would be an offence). He also produced evidence of British National Party leaflets that explicitly linked paedophilic murders and homosexuality. When asked whether there was anything to suggest that such material had led to an increase in violence, he drew attention to the possibility of a link by citing Crown Office statistics showing a 167 per cent rise over the two preceding years in convictions for crimes aggravated on grounds of sexual orientation.30 Such links do not prove causation but they appear to have been sufficient for the Bill to succeed. Neither statute provides a detailed explanation of what ‘hatred’ or ‘incitement’ is to mean (other than a list of the groups to which they are to apply), nor does the Northern Irish Part 3 define ‘arousing fear’, ‘abuse’, or ‘insult’. It is likely that such words will be seen as ‘ordinary’ words and therefore a matter for the court of first instance.31 Prior case law may be relevant, although in the case of the English Part 3A, the fact that it is a separate Part to the Public Order Act, rather than a simple amendment of the existing law on racial hatred, makes previous decisions less persuasive than they would otherwise have been. The English Part 3A does, however, contain a saving32 on freedom of expression (section 29JA), which states: In this Part, for the avoidance of doubt, the discussion or criticism of sexual conduct or practices or the urging of persons to refrain from or modify such conduct or practices shall not be taken of itself to be threatening or intended to stir up hatred. This section was neither originally included in the provisions proposed by the government nor thought necessary by the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights.33 It was inserted by the House of Lords at the eleventh hour. They had done the same thing two years before when they forced through an amendment to religious hatred provisions to include a similar provision.34 The sexual orientation hatred provision is less emphatic than its religious hatred counterpart, which provides that ‘[n]othing in this Part shall be read or given effect in a way which prohibits or restricts discussion, criticism or expressions of antipathy, dislike, ridicule, insult or abuse of particular religions [etc.]’.35 The concern among Members of Parliament and the media about the religious hatred provisions was that they would discourage robust criticism and comic mockery of religious practices. The comedian Rowan Atkinson was given a great deal of media attention for his campaign over several years about the chilling potential of such legislation.36 Less media time was given to concerns about the sexual orientation hatred provisions – and the main thrust of these was simply that the provisions would discourage criticism by those with religious beliefs. Presumably, those moving the amendment creating the second saving did not therefore regard it necessary to emphasise the continuing right of comedians to mock gay men and lesbians. However, the express protection was not strictly necessary. This is because freedom of expression is already implicit as an aid to interpreting all British legislation. Any British statute must insofar as it is possible to do so be construed in a manner compatible with the Human Rights Act 1998.37 Courts must take account of the relevant jurisprudence under the European Convention on Human Rights (hereinafter referred to as ECHR or the Convention).38 The Human Rights Act requires that particular regard be had to the importance of the freedom of expression embodied in Article 10 of the Convention.39 Section 13 of the Human Rights Act similarly lays emphasis on upholding freedoms of thought, conscience and religion in accordance with Article 9 of the Convention. There are other kinds of protection under the Human Rights Act. Under section 19, Ministers introducing a government Bill to Parliament must make a statement that in their view the Bill is compatible with the Convention rights listed in the Act.40 All public authorities must also, under section 6, act compatibly with those Convention rights unless primary legislation expressly requires otherwise. This places a duty on the police and prosecution services to take human rights into account when investigating cases and deciding whether to initiate a prosecution. It was therefore – as a matter of UK statutory interpretation principles – unnecessary to add the saving. Also, superfluous words risk making it harder for judges to interpret the law.41 There is, however, a reasonable argument that since one saving already exists for the religious hatred provisions, inserting another clarifies the legal position for those who are not familiar with the principles of statutory interpretation. Both may deter overzealous policing. They may also help protect against the effects of malicious or misinformed exaggeration of the extent of the law.42 Consistency and analogical extensions of human rights norms Campaigners relied on what Heinze calls ‘cumulative jurisprudence’ to achieve the revision of Part 3A. They argued that it was logical to extend the established categories of the incitement laws (racial and religious) to include hatred on grounds of sexual orientation. Heinze defines cumulative jurisprudence as ‘a systematic application of general human rights norms to categories of persons not expressly named or intended in leading human rights instruments’.43 Here, the argument was that the experience of hate crime and incitement to hatred suffered by sexual minorities was similar to that experienced by ethnic and religious minorities on ethnic and religious grounds. With demonstrated evidence of this hatred towards individuals, and towards sexual minorities as a group, it would be equitable to extend the law on racial and religious hatred to cover sexual minorities. Stonewall has successfully used this strategy before: indeed it has been their focused approach to campaigning for one incremental advance at a time which has been one of the organisation’s most significant tactics in the 21st century, and which has attracted it considerable respect. The tactic has helped bring about some radical changes in law for sexual minorities in the UK, and it is an approach that, in general, Heinze supports. He has maintained that developments in sexual minorities law have been justified on a ‘Principle of Extant Rights’: they are necessary extensions of existing norms, because the differences between the existing norms and the proposed new one cannot be distinguished in any ethically relevant way (in the context of the surrounding norms of that particular society or international social order) in the light of the task the rights instrument is being asked to perform. Obviously, this argument from indistinguishability is contextual and relative. There are legal orders in which societal norms (such as a constitution based on a moral principle of the inseparability of law and a governing state religion) could cast sexual orientation as a legally relevant ground justifying extensive discrimination. The human rights instruments Heinze considers here, however, have developed in a historical context in which religion – the only powerful current ethical framework in Western states which holds sexual orientation to be a relevant factor by which to make fundamental judgments about the worth of individuals – has been increasingly irrelevant as a ground on which to interpret the key norms of those instruments. (Individual states may, however, uphold religious norms within the discretion permitted within their margins of appreciation).44 To maintain a legal distinction that includes some victim groups but not others whose plight is ethically similar would therefore render the existing law capricious. Heinze argues, however, that sexual orientation-based hate speech bans should be regarded differently. In his view, it is not appropriate to extend the law by deriving legitimacy in this way. The reason behind this is the consequences of providing fully equal protection. Heinze takes the radical view that hate speech bans are inconsistent because they are seriously incomplete. His argument here is not that extending the law to sexual minorities would logically be a step too far. Rather, it is that it would not be enough. Whenever a group is systematically disadvantaged by discrimination it is entitled to the assistance of the law. Why draw the line at sexual minorities when there is such widespread verbal abuse directed at elderly and disabled persons? Better, he argues, that there be no hate speech bans, which are a threat to freedom of expression than that the legitimacy of human rights law be undermined by fragmentary developments. During the parliamentary debate on amending the English Part 3A, Heinze’s views were echoed by Gareth Crossman, the policy director of Liberty (the most prominent human rights campaigning body in the UK). Crossman argued that there was ‘no logical reason’ for creating an incitement law protecting on some grounds but not on the grounds of sex or disability. He suggested that new offences in this area seemed to develop in response to ‘those who lobby most effectively to introduce that offence’, adding that: If we are determining that some areas are suitable for that to be an offence, then unless you can show a logical reason why you should not extend it to any other area where somebody could be discriminated against, then it has to be piecemeal and slapdash. Let me make this absolutely clear. I am not saying – please let me make this absolutely clear – and nor is Liberty saying, ‘Do away with all incitement to hate law. Do away with all speech offences.’ What we are saying is that the way that the law is developing at the moment is undesirable.45 Equally, however, Crossman expressed concern about the proportionality of creating a generic offence of incitement to hatred. Certainly, it is a fundamental value of human rights law that everyone is entitled to equal protection under the law. Indeed, this is the heart of Protocol 12 to the ECHR, which requires that all rights ‘set forth by law’ be secured without discrimination. They must be made available to everyone without discriminating between persons unless there is reasonable and objective justification for doing so. The official Explanatory Report for the Protocol observes that Article 1 (the general prohibition of discrimination principle) is not intended to impose a general positive obligation on the Parties to take measures to prevent or remedy all instances of discrimination in relations between private persons. … On the other hand, it cannot be totally excluded that the duty to ‘secure’ under the first paragraph of Article 1 might entail positive obligations. For example, this question could arise if there is a clear lacuna in domestic law protection from discrimination. … Nonetheless, the extent of any positive obligations flowing from Article 1 is likely to be limited.46 Thus, if there is differential treatment in the enjoyment of a right already set forth in national law, such as under the protection offered by incitement offences, this might amount to a breach of Protocol 12. The Protocol builds on and extends the limited antidiscrimination principle in Article 14. The UK has not yet ratified it,47 but its adoption by the Council of Europe buttresses the argument for equality which Heinze makes. There is an argument against Heinze here, though, which is that it would be justifiable to draw a line where the characteristics of the excluded groups make it in some way too difficult and unwieldy in practice for a revised law to operate successfully (i.e., where there is objective and reasonable justification to differentiate). It has in practice been more difficult to define disability for legal purposes than ‘race’ or religion or sexual orientation have been – and much harder to work out what would be reasonable accommodation to what can be a genuine and relevant difference.48 But disability is no more a relevant reason for stirring up hatred than ‘race’, religion or sexual orientation is. And in any case the ingenuity of modern human rights developments such as fourth generation human rights that create anticipatory duties49 should allow us to put this objection aside for now and consider Heinze’s argument more fully. It forces our attention to the very heart of a niggling uncertainty that I suspect has stirred in the thoughts of any fair-minded jurist who follows the developments in anti- discrimination law. An ad hoc answer, which would enable imperfect but necessary new laws to be enacted, is that the law has focused on those groups which can be shown to have suffered the deepest systematic discrimination over a long period of time in that state or social order. There is certainly good support for this argument. However, it is clearly not the whole or only explanation. Anti-discrimination law of all kinds has been enacted not only on the grounds of just desserts, but also where elite political opinion has been swung in favour of a group, often because of a calamitous event. In the UK we only need think of the legal changes brought about by the Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000 after immense publicity given to a critical report that (eventually) followed the murder of young black student Stephen Lawrence.50 Another precipitating factor is the successful mobilising of lobbying activity by effective campaign groups. Therefore, although it may in fact have been the most deserving social groups who have benefited from these events and activities, it is not necessarily so. Indeed, the persistence of disadvantage on the grounds of social class in the UK, most convincingly demonstrated by researchers such as Goldthorpe,51 makes it clear that there remain large groups of deserving individuals who are silently excluded from the full benefits of current antidiscrimination law. Furthermore, the law need not protect only the most needy. It could protect all who suffer significant disadvantage to the extent that this could legitimately be described as systematic, or, if not systematic, at least significant in the likely life course of an individual. It might well be that there is a line that should be drawn where the benefit to society is overall reduced by the enactment of new law, because of the further complexity added to the legal regime when weighed against a sufficiently slight benefit to a group. But the position of that line needs to be identified by rigorous research, not implicitly assumed as at present. Heinze’s argument is open to criticism, but we have yet to muster sufficient evidence to decide whether it is wrong, so debate should be had on whether British laws deal with the appropriate range of concerns. Implications for freedom of expression Heinze develops this point to strengthen his case against hate speech bans. He maintains that although this legal development by analogical extension is ethically justified in other areas of law, it is inappropriate in the case of hate speech bans. Having argued that protection should extend further, he then invites us to consider the effect on other rights if broader hate speech bans were enacted. If we were fairly to acknowledge the harm caused by hate speech, Heinze insists, we would admit that the damage caused by words such as ‘moron’ used against those with learning difficulties or ‘old bag’ used against an elderly woman could cause the same level of harm as does the word ‘nigger’ used against someone of African or Caribbean origin or ‘queer’ used against a gay man. In his view, the amount of censorship that would be required for such broad bans is immense, so immense that he does not need to lay out for us what the deleterious effects would be; they are obvious. Although Heinze’s arguments at first glance might seem risible, there is no good reason for that gut reaction. Why should the fierce, contemptuous or mocking use of a derogatory label against a member of a highly vulnerable group not amount to a potentially serious harm? Can we really say with confidence that a political figure, say, publicly describing a person with minor learning difficulties as a moron cannot cause distress, hurt or fear among those with similar disabilities? Can we argue with any certainty that this cannot shore up a form of discourse which constructs such individuals as objects of contempt or dislike? That Heinze fully recognises this harm is one of the strongest reasons to think very seriously before disagreeing with his decision to oppose hate speech bans. An important question that Heinze does not fully address, however, is whether there is a difference, if not in character, in degree. Equal protection does not require identical treatment if the circumstances are relevantly different. The current UK incitement laws have been enacted where there is some evidence of a history or culture of stirring up hatred against those particular groups. Is there evidence of a comparable culture of stirring up hatred against elderly individuals or those with learning difficulties in the UK? Referring to a particularly brutal attack on an openly gay man, Heinze observes: [It cannot be] be argued that Blacks, Jews or sexual minorities have more burdened histories. Nazism showed how physically or mentally disabled persons, along with all the propaganda—hate speech—concerning their threats to Aryan purity and perfection, led them to extermination on the grounds of their putative sub-humanity. Might Chenu’s attackers not just as eagerly have assaulted someone mentally or physically disabled, or someone elderly or obese? Can anyone argue that such an attack would not have been motivated by a cultural arsenal stockpiled with age-old barbs of ‘idiot’, ‘spas’, ‘old bag’ and ‘fat slob’? It would require a leap of sociological imagination to argue that such an assault would be ignited by a consciousness promoted by hate speech when racially motivated, but not when motivated by stereotypes of mental or physical conditions.52 It is a powerful point and this problem should be raised as a human rights argument much more often than it has been. Nevertheless, it needs qualification. Stereotyping language takes on a particular virulence in certain contexts. Words such as ‘nigger’ and ‘dirty Jew’ have become especially derogatory in Western states because of the particular history associated with, for instance, slavery and the Holocaust (and its predecessors such as the Russian pogroms), and because of the continuing evidence of hatred against those groups. Words such as ‘Paki’, for instance, clearly fall into the same category of disparaging labelling, but are not – yet – always regarded as equally toxic.53 It may well be that the rising level of vilification directed at Muslims may lead to that changing. When the Bill containing the amended Part 3A for England and Wales was introduced to Parliament, the government justified it by reference to vile examples of bigotry and violence, as noted above. Likewise, the official Explanatory Notes on the amending legislation for Part 3 for Northern Ireland specifically stated that there had been ‘increases in recorded incidents involving victims defined by their sexual orientation’.54 Homophobic aggression remains a serious problem. According to recent research carried out for Stonewall, one in five gay men and lesbians in Britain stated that they had experienced a homophobic hate crime or incident in the preceding three years.55 This is despite the fact that of those polled: A third of lesbian and gay people alter their behaviour so they are not perceived as being gay specifically to prevent being a victim of crime. This includes not showing affection for their partners in public, dressing differently and avoiding areas where they could be identified as lesbian or gay.56 Stonewall rather naughtily called this study the ‘Gay British Crime Survey’, though it is nothing of the sort. The costly British Crime Survey was close to a miniature census of around 51,000 people,57 carefully targeting a representative sample of the population in their homes, whereas Stonewall paid for a YouGov survey of 1,721 people in which self-selected participants answered questions online. However, the British Crime Survey cost millions, and given that it posed no questions covering this sort of hate crime, Stonewall’s only option was to pay what it could afford (with some Home Office support) to get somewhat nearer the precious statistics needed to convince government policy-makers. There is however strong supporting evidence in Northern Ireland, where state-funded research found a high and rising level of homophobic crime in some parts of the country. It concluded that ‘[s]tudies conducted in Northern Ireland have consistently recorded high levels of homophobic attacks, both verbal and physical.’58 While Heinze rightly cites the history of Nazi persecution of persons with mental disabilities, he has not shown why words such as ‘idiot’ and ‘moron’ carry a connotation quite as sinister as ‘nigger’ and ‘Jew’ do when used in societies that participated in the slave trade and have been profoundly affected by the mass murder and expulsion of Jews across the world. Nor has he provided evidence of current persecution equal to that suffered by sexual minorities in the UK. Likewise, although there has long been evidence for example of severe domestic abuse carried out against elderly individuals,59 there is less evidence of persecution of them as a group. Here, the difference is a question not of character, but of degree. We can relevantly distinguish. Certainly, it was concluded that the problem of hatred on grounds of disability was sufficiently serious to justify creating a corresponding hate speech ban in Northern Ireland. This seems to have been based, however, on research on persons with learning difficulties carried out in England in 1999 by Mencap, a mental health charity. As a result of this research, and because disability has now been included as a specific statutory ground for sentencing enhancement in English law,60 Parliament’s Northern Ireland Committee report on hate crime had recommended extending the incitement law to include disability.61 There appears to have been no other published evidence; another report by the same committee the following year noted that ‘[h]ate incidents and crimes against the disabled in Northern Ireland are the least well documented by the police and no statistics are available.’62 This is not to say, of course, that disability-based hate crimes are not a real problem, either in Northern Ireland or in England and Wales. Convictions for offences found to be aggravated on the grounds of disability are now monitored, and in 2008 the magazine Disability Now featured a list of horrific examples.63 However, evidence of widespread hate crimes against persons with disabilities is not the same as evidence of widespread incitement to hatred against persons with disabilities. The case remains to be made for a change in the English Part 3A to encompass disability. Nevertheless, it may well be that such a case can and soon will be made, and thus Heinze’s argument must be taken seriously. Cause and effect Heinze has put forward another compelling argument against hate speech bans. He argues that although there are correlations between hate speech and hate crime, there is no evidence that the speech causes the crime. Without this evidence, hate speech that is less direct than ‘fighting words’64 should not be made subject to the criminal law. The distinction he makes is not based on any facile assumption that hate speech is harmless; he is astutely aware of the ways in which social understandings help construct and reproduce social roles. He is also quick to acknowledge that the speaking of words is an act with consequences, so that (to cite one of his examples) a person is not born a ‘nigger’, but is made one. We should not forget that provocative words can have quite tangible results. Every nation has its history of incendiary demagogues who have not specifically advocated violence, but who have roused their audiences to a level of prejudice which has later spilled over into violence. One of the most frustrating and upsetting aspects of researching legal writing on hate speech is having to endure the mealy-mouthed or ignorant, or both, views of commentators who minimise the sting of hate speech whilst claiming that protection should not be available because victim groups are over-sensitive and too easily offended. It has been seriously unhelpful for legal debate that there are two common connotations of offensiveness in this context. One is displeasure – insulted sensibilities –- and the other is harm, likely to cause hurt or fear among vulnerable persons. It may be difficult in legal practice to distinguish the two, but that does not justify ignoring the distinction when discussing why legislation may be needed in the first place. Heinze does not make this mistake; rather he argues only that without sufficient evidence of cause and effect, such speech should not be faced with the full force of the criminal law. Given however that Heinze accepts that discourse helps to reproduce social roles (it is the labelling that identifies the ‘nigger’), it is odd that he steps back from accepting that hate speech can cause hate crime. Perhaps here we could distinguish between a sociological concept of cause in social research and a forensic concept of cause in criminal law. The law in the UK requires evidence of the stirring up to hate, not of the crime that may result, and so causation is not the concern here, which is what worries Heinze. It is extremely difficult to see how one could demonstrate direct causation between, say, the intemperate speeches of a far-right racist politician and an increase in assaults on ethnic minority individuals in his constituency, unless perhaps one of the assailants confessed that they had been motivated to act by the politician’s bile. Such examples of course exist, but we are a long way from being able to extrapolate from particular examples to carry out the extraordinarily difficult task of predicting, in all the circumstances, which incidents of hate speech will lead to hate crime. Social sciences can achieve such a thing only in science fiction. Nevertheless, research on racist discourse clearly shows general patterns. It shows that the impact of repeated discriminatory speech operates in an insidious way, not simply as individual acts of speech affecting relatively immediate audiences. It can take many forms, of which hate discourse is one, and we know that it can succeed. What we do not know to a high standard of reliability is how to predict when and where particular instances of hate speech will result in hate crime. But we do know that when it is successful, hate discourse acts as strategic persuasion, reinforcing and regenerating prejudiced beliefs and unequal treatment, and promoting – or more accurately, undermining - social solidarity by distinguishing outsiders.65 Where is the cut-off point that would prevent this leading to hate crime? The question then is not whether hate speech can lead, directly or indirectly, to hate crime. History shows that it can. It is whether, given our inability to tell what hate speech will achieve this and when in a particular context it will, we should ban any of it. The difficulty, then, is that this process of causation is indirect and contingent. It is near-impossible to show that one particular act or individual has caused or even is likely to cause this nebulous damage except in the unusual situation where there is compelling evidence such as perpetrator testimony. At best we can look at the wider discourse and context, then try and disentangle causes from correlations more broadly.66 The distinction in ECHR jurisprudence between ‘concrete expression’67 and expression that spreads hatred more indirectly has been underdeveloped, legal debate about this problem being thus unhelpfully vague. The important question, meanwhile, becomes where it is right in criminal law to draw a line. If the only concern was to prevent the reproduction of hate, we could prohibit even the most subtle forms of discriminatory speech, trampling gaily over freedom of expression. At the other end, if we require that a person can only be regarded as criminally responsible if we can prove to the criminal law’s standard of proof, that is, beyond reasonable doubt, that their particular speech will cause their particular audience to commit a particular crime, then it is arguable that even fighting words should be excluded from the criminal law. What proof is there that this angry man whipping up this particular angry crowd will beyond reasonable doubt turn them into a mob? His behaviour may be deeply irresponsible, but we do not know enough about his audience to prove that he needs to be silenced. In reality, almost all of us accept that there should be some limitation of personal liberty in the interests of a public order that we can never be sure will result. This is the terrible problem we face, and Heinze’s response, though clarifying the terms of the debate, does not solve it. Legal threshold and protection of freedom of expression This does not dispose of the discussion in the UK, however. What also needs to be considered is the history of prosecutions under incitement to hatred laws, and what threshold needs to be crossed for this offence. How much threat has it posed to the freedom of expression thus far? What risks lie ahead? Heinze observes: We can safely assume that the films, newspaper or magazine articles, radio and television shows or websites in which terms like ‘idiot’ and ‘moron’ appear—the same media that would no longer use ‘nigger’ or ‘queer’ in non- ironic or non-critical contexts—are innumerable. Remarkably broad censorship of both the media and everyday speech, backed up by legal penalties, would be required. Hate speech bans can only succeed either through enormous measures of censorship or through discriminatory selection of target categories or individuals.68 It may well be that the non-ironic or non-critical69 use of ‘nigger’, which is regarded as an extraordinarily inflammatory label, would raise the possibility of prosecution for incitement to racial hatred, but there would need to be evidence that the speaker intended to stir up hatred or that in the particular context the word was likely to stir up hatred. The word alone would not constitute grounds for a civil action or criminal prosecution in the UK, though, if uttered by a public figure, it would likely lead to calls for his resignation or dismissal from his post,70 and not much more than the use of the word might suffice to provide grounds for a civil action or a prosecution. The threshold for sexual orientation hatred is higher and it is likely that any future extension of the law to new groups will be similarly restricted. The new English Part 3A applies only to threatening words and behaviour intended to stir up hatred on grounds of sexual orientation. Abuse and insult do not constitute incitement to hatred; it is clear from both the wording of the statute and from parliamentary materials – which are admissible evidence in court – that they are not encompassed in the offence.71 Even if the English Part 3A were to be extended to include the grounds of disability, it still would not matter that a person expressed hatred in the form of words such as ‘idiot’ or ‘moron’ unless there were something more – an intended threat. I have argued elsewhere that because the near-identical offence of incitement to religious hatred requires proof of both threat and specific intent (to be construed in the light of the freedom of expression provision) it will be almost unenforceable unless the accused confesses.72 Equally, how easy will it be to prove, in the face of a not guilty plea, that words were not just insulting or abusive, but were actually intended to be threatening and furthermore were intended to stir up others to hatred of gay men and lesbians as a group? The history of racial hatred provisions in the UK – even when they have not required proof of intent – has been that prosecutions have been few and convictions consequently rare.73 Similarly-worded legislation in the Republic of Ireland under the Incitement to Hatred Act 1989 (which extends to sexual orientation) appears to have resulted in no convictions on grounds of sexual orientation74 – and indeed by 2001 there had only been one conviction on any ground.75 There have also been no prosecutions in Northern Ireland for incitement to hatred on grounds of either sexual orientation or disability – despite the wide wording that includes acts intended or likely to stir up hatred or arouse fear. On the other hand, there is no information to indicate whether this is because of a lack of will to prosecute; because the legislation is hard to enforce; because complaints to the police are not forthcoming; or because prosecutors suspect that juries would tend to acquit.76 One government report did, however, suggest that the lack of convictions was due to ‘problems of definition’.77 If so, whatever the criminal justice context, it is a poor day for civil liberties and the fundamental value of legal equality if, instead of legislative clarity, we have prosecutorial restraint. As Lord Bingham observed in the House of Lords decision in R. v. K.: The rule of law is not well served if a crime is defined in terms wide enough to cover conduct which is not regarded as criminal and it is then left to the prosecuting authorities to exercise a blanket discretion not to prosecute to avoid injustice.78 Prosecutions in practice The law in the UK needs to be understood, then, both in the light of its narrow wording and in the context of prosecutorial practice. Both should worry us. Bailey, Harris, and Jones have argued that one reason for the lack of case law on incitement to racial hatred was that racist literature had been less ‘intemperate’ than before.79 Rumney has mounted a particularly spirited and well-researched defence of the legislation in practice.80 But it is notable that for many years the practice was to prosecute only relatively severe cases of incitement to hatred – and not always some of those. Powerful interests can deter prosecutions. Geoffrey Bindman, one of the most respected human rights barristers and jurists in the UK, wrote recently of a decision to prosecute The Sun newspaper in 1986 for incitement to racial hatred. The decision was revoked after the paper’s fearsome lawyer put pressure on the Attorney General behind the scenes.81 The most relentless assaults on some groups in the UK come from the print media. Research in 2008 on news stories about Muslims demonstrated a pattern of misrepresentation in which two-thirds of the ‘news hooks’ involved terrorism, religious difference or extremism.82 The worst offences by the press include publishing inflammatory stories that are nothing more than invention.83 The United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination commented in 2003 that the UK Press Complaints Commission needed to be made ‘more effective’ in dealing with racial discrimination:84 a view the UK Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights supported.85 An academic study in 2008 found that the Commission had not upheld a single complaint about discrimination on grounds of race or ethnicity.86 It is unlikely, then, that the media targets Heinze identifies would be those who would face prosecution in the UK under a law criminalising incitement to hatred against persons with disability. This becomes clear if we look at the more recent prosecutions for incitement to racial hatred for analogous examples (ignoring for the moment the greater breadth of the racial hatred provisions than would be likely in the new legislation). The prosecutions encompassed such activities as preaching sermons that vilify Jews;87 making speeches to supporters stating that Islam sanctions rape;88 distributing leaflets alleging that ‘Muslims’ (which was held to be a codeword for Pakistanis) were ‘running amok’ and carrying out attacks in parts of Glasgow;89 and chanting hate-filled language during a demonstration.90 It is outsiders, albeit not ineffective outsiders, who are being prosecuted for perpetrating the offence. In bleak contrast, there has been no suggestion of prosecuting the Mail for claiming in 2003 that asylum-seekers infected with HIV were placing public health at risk when the parliamentary report from which this story originated had specifically stated that they were not the source of HIV infection from overseas. Worse still, the original report had expressed the view that it was prejudicial media reports that were in fact creating a situation where politicians felt obliged to isolate asylum-seekers, so that an asylum-seeker who did become infected would be less likely to get necessary medical care.91 Nor would even a mild reprimand from the Press Complaints Commission seem likely to be forthcoming for the likes of the Mail. Chris Frost notes that in 2000 the Commission failed to find The Sun’s bileful language – singled out in examples such as ‘scrounging Romanian gypsies’ and ‘our land is being swamped by a flood of fiddlers’ – to be either racist or discriminatory. It appears that the Commission defended its decision on the grounds that the ‘opinions’ were not directed at individuals.92 Heinze posits two options: either hate speech bans exclude some groups discriminatorily or include all and so unacceptably limit free speech. There is a third option, however, which is that they include as many groups as need protection, but serve a primarily symbolic or expressive function, because they are so difficult to make use of. This is the approach the UK seems to be taking. It is open to criticism – particularly if the religious and sexual orientation provisions turn out to be almost unusable – but it does not suggest a high risk of an immense increase in censorship. It needs to be remembered that states parties to the ECHR are required to uphold not only Articles 9 and 10, but also to meet their Article 17 duty not to permit the deprivation of other Convention rights and freedoms.93 Are the UK laws really ‘hate speech bans’? It is worth asking whether the English Part 3A and the Northern Irish Part 3 genuinely amount to ‘hate speech bans’. On the face of them, both would, particularly the Northern Irish. In his discussion of hate speech bans, Heinze focuses on two examples in international human rights instruments. Article 20(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights requires the prohibition of ‘advocacy’ of specified grounds of ‘hatred’ that constitute ‘incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence’. Article 4 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination requires states parties to prohibit among other things the ‘dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority or hatred’ and ‘incitement to discrimination’. Article 4 is potentially very broad, but Article 20(2) is quite specific. The resemblance between these provisions and the language of the UK legislation is obvious. There would be two difficulties with referring to the English Part 3A as a hate speech ban, however. First, it is not a ban on hate-filled speech as such – rather it is a ban on speech that seeks to incite others to hate. This is a significantly narrower category. It requires proof of specific intent to stir up others, which places a substantial burden on the prosecution. It also requires evidence of threat, not merely abuse or insult. The threat must be intentional, so it is not enough that abusive behaviour might in effect be threatening – the perpetrator must have intended that it be. Taking all these together, we see for instance that merely referring angrily to ‘queers’ would be far from enough to constitute an offence. Second, it tends to focus judicial thought on acts affecting a relatively circumscribed audience, whether that be those in the immediate vicinity or those likely to view a recording or broadcast. Its primary task is to maintain public order, not to tackle aggressive bigotry in whatever form it occurs. Whilst it may be that the Northern Irish provisions have been little used as a matter of political caution, the English legislation is very restrictively drafted. The English Part 3A, then, does not ban all immoderate expressions of hate, but it does extend further than the classic prohibition of ‘fighting words’. It deals not with inciting violence (which is a separate crime), or with inciting hatred against specific individuals (which is again subject to the ordinary criminal law), but with inciting hate against a group (where actual individuals need not be specified). What restricts it are the principles and rules I have discussed above. This does not justify any complacency. I have argued that the English Part 3A (the religion and sexual orientation hatred provisions) is so narrow as to be almost unusable. The English racial hatred provisions are significantly broader and have for many years been a better example of legislation that is workable and that has not opened floodgates to prosecutions. It should also now be restrained by the freedom of expression provisions of the Human Rights Act 1998. However, decisions have been reached recently both in incitement to hatred law and in other areas of the criminal law which should cause concern. In Hammond v. DPP,94 an evangelical Christian preacher was in the habit of setting up in a city centre square a large double-sided sign bearing the words ‘Stop Immorality’, ‘Stop Homosexuality’ and ‘Stop Lesbianism’. This had previously attracted protest. On the occasion in question, members of the public found it distressing and insulting. A group of protesters assaulted Mr Hammond. Police officers asked him to take down the sign and leave but he refused. They then formed the view that he was provoking violence and arrested him for breach of the peace. He was convicted of an offence under section 5 of the Public Order Act 1986, aggravated on grounds of sexual orientation, for displaying an insulting sign within the hearing or sight of a person likely to be caused harassment, alarm or distress thereby. The appellate court held that it was proportionate to restrict his freedoms of expression and of thought, conscience, and religion because it had been open to the lower court to conclude that Hammond had knowingly gone ‘beyond legitimate protest’ and was provoking violence and disorder, which interfered with the rights of others, and that he had failed to demonstrate a defence that his behaviour was reasonable. There was therefore a legitimate aim of preventing disorder and thus a pressing social need for the restriction. Further appeal to the European Court of Human Rights was refused. The court observed that a ‘heckler’s veto’ was not justifiable, but it is hard to see how someone in Hammond’s position could otherwise peacefully express his or her views in the face of persistent unrest. Ironically, in the light of the discussion here, it has been claimed that Hammond suffered from Asperger’s syndrome.95 If so, an impaired ability to make fine judgments about social situations would have made it harder for Hammond to identify when his actions had gone beyond legitimate protest. Another question that remains is who the targets of the English Part 3A are. The offence of incitement to racial hatred, as we have seen, has a wider compass than the other incitement offences. There is no freedom of expression saving in the legislation to confine judicial attention, and it can be applied not just where there is intent to stir up hatred, but where this is merely a likely outcome. It covers not just threats, but also abusive and insulting words. I have mentioned above that it has long been used only for dealing with far-right ringleaders and activists of organisations whose core activities promote racial division, but a recent decision has called this into question. In R. v. Saleem,96 one of the defendants, Saleem, was convicted of incitement to racial hatred after taking part in a demonstration about the Danish cartoons depicting Mohammed.97 Saleem had led chants of, inter alia, ‘democracy hypocrisy’, ‘UK you will pay’, ‘with your blood’ and ‘7/7 on its way’. Similar chants were led against Denmark, Norway and ‘Europe’. For this, he was sentenced to four years’ imprisonment (reduced to 30 months on appeal). What is disturbing about this conviction is, first, the presumption that the hatred likely to be stirred up was racial and, second, the context of the offence. Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers, Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales, delivering the judgment on behalf of the Court of Appeal of England and Wales stated: The offences with which we are concerned involved a one-off demonstration, mounted at short notice without sophisticated planning. It has been urged on behalf of the appellants that re-publication of the cartoons caused worldwide outrage on the part of Muslims. Peaceful and lawful demonstrations in these circumstances would not have been objectionable. But, as Miss Ezekiel for the Crown pointed out, this demonstration was not lawful and was objectionable. It attracted ultimately a band of some 300 demonstrators, most of whom were young men. We have viewed each of the individual videos prepared for the purpose of the separate trials. Most taking part in the demonstration appeared to be joining readily in chanting the slogans that were led over the amplification. Insofar as this crude chanting and the messages on the placards solicited murder, we do not think that this was likely to persuade those who witnessed the demonstration in central London, or who saw the television broadcasts of it, to resort to killing, although one cannot be sure of the effect that it might have on those already inclined to terrorist activity. We have been more concerned to consider the likelihood that the appellants' conduct might have stirred up those taking part in the demonstration to acts of violence. The police who were monitoring the demonstration would have been obvious targets, as might have been the Danish Embassy. The Common Serjeant recorded that police officers had assessed the mood as excitable and that it appeared to be being whipped up into a frenzy by the speakers. The videos that we have seen did not portray the scene that this had suggested to us. While at times the chanting was loud and enthusiastic, the demeanour of the demonstrators did not appear to be violent or threatening. There was a considerable police presence. The police decided that to intervene might provoke disorder and this evaluation may well have been correct. Having said this, the demonstration took place only six months after the London bombings of 7 July and, at times, both these, the Madrid bombings and the attack of 9/11 were the subject of approbatory chanting. The exhortations on some of the placards and the subject matter of the chanting were offensive in the extreme. They were a demonstration of and an incitement to racial hatred. This must have been apparent to Saleem and we consider that the Common Serjeant was entitled when sentencing him to proceed on the basis that he intended to produce this result.98 The court’s presumption that the chants led by Saleem had a racial component was not at all apparent from the court’s findings. In the context of the direct participation of the UK and the other named states in invading and occupying one or both of two Islamic countries (lest one forget, Afghanistan and Iraq), the chants could be taken as political rather than racial. To say this is not to downplay the odious violent content – particularly given that it took place only months after a bombing in that very city, which killed 52 victims – but rather to question the racial nature of the content. Supporters of the Irish Republican Army, for instance, were not convicted of incitement to racial hatred for similar seditious activities against the UK government, yet they did not always bother to distinguish between ‘British’ and ‘British government’. The convictions depoliticised the actions of the participants. It is, of course, hardly unusual for governments – and sometimes, courts – to suppress political activity in times of terrorist violence. The measures that were used to silence even the most mannerly dissent at the height of the conflicts in Northern Ireland were breathtaking. The young and those with short memories would do well to read Larry Grant’s discussion of the trial of pacifist Pat Arrowsmith for incitement to disaffection after she distributed leaflets in public informing soldiers on how to leave the army.99 The full text of the leaflet is reproduced in Grant’s article and it appears, to modern eyes, almost laughably mild and polite. Denial of the political element of violent activism is not unusual either. What is worrying here is the apparent weakness of the justification offered for Saleem’s conviction by the court for that particular offence. We are left with the fear that the breadth of the racial hatred legislation which lacks any need for proof of specific intent resulted in an inappropriate decision. The outcome suggests, as Lord Lester, the architect of the revised English Part 3A recently said, that Parliament ‘extended the race hate speech provisions very broadly indeed — perhaps too broadly.’100 Heinze’s fears about the consequences of overly broad legislation, then, can be challenged but in the light of Saleem they are not to be casually dismissed. England, Wales and Northern Ireland may have managed to implement incitement to racial hatred legislation that has been of little threat to freedom of expression for many years. Saleem, however, threatens (from the available evidence) to be the harbinger of a new and repressive direction. The question of how to protect rights and yet preserve a usable form of legislation is nevertheless no easy one. At the moment Members of Parliament and free speech campaigners may be congratulating each other for preventing the incitement to religious and sexual orientation hatred provisions from being so broad that they might threaten a reasonable degree of the freedom of expression. It would be simple to suggest that the incitement to racial hatred provisions should be revised to achieve the same effect. But the decision may prove less popular if extremist groups contest the English Part 3A and find that they can design a thousand loathsome ways to escape it. Little may be achieved, too, if a free hand is left to the daily print media. I carried out a newspaper search for reports and commentaries in UK local and national newspapers on the progress of the Bill to revise Part 3A. The great majority took a negative tone towards the Bill in its original format, contrasting it with ‘free speech’ which was always implicitly assumed to be achieved by minimum interference rather than by regulation. Most gave some space to arguments in favour of the Bill – but usually not before the last paragraph. A few were neutral in tone; these mostly appeared when the Bill was first announced. Only a handful were predominantly positive, two referring to the Bill ‘which faces being blocked’ and to ‘unbridled free speech’. One turned out to be a Mail piece dealing not with the incitement provisions but with separate Scottish proposals – and which had a twist in the tail, claiming that the proposals were causing a ‘fierce backlash’ among Scottish Muslims.101 The tone of the reports was not as negative as those which had covered the previous incitement to religious hatred proposals. There was also a great deal less hyperbolic rhetoric claiming that everyday critique and humour would be silenced. The underlying implication remained, however, that a group was receiving undeserved special treatment. This problem of a media meta-discourse that undermines groups through subtler attacks is difficult to tackle.102 Here there is a surprising but important point to be made about the reporting of prosecutions for incitement to hatred, and it suggests a direction for some interesting research to test it out. It is often argued that such prosecutions give the oxygen of publicity to small, extremist groups. However, the prosecutions are generally reported with considerable distaste for the views of the groups on trial. Far from providing unhealthy publicity, they could be seen as providing some of the few occasions in which the media give significant attention to the deleterious effects of unregulated speech. Conclusion It should be apparent that no consensus on hate speech bans is about to be reached, and so I can only conclude with my own observations. I believe that there is room for restricted (but not unenforceable) incitement law where good evidence shows there is a history of hatred against specific minorities for the law to address. As Rumney points out, some extremist groups are secretive and isolationist, uninterested in dialogue. Incitement to hatred laws have been more successful than many assume in limiting the impact of extremist activities in the UK.103 Another necessary element is more intelligent political strategy. Malik describes the amended English Part 3A as ‘a welcome sign of the commitment to take a zero tolerance approach to homophobic hate speech’ but also emphasises that non-legal solutions are more important because the most serious source of hate speech is mainstream public discourse. 104 She focuses on abuse of Muslims, but her arguments are applicable more widely. She has also argued that the more useful approach in extremist cases may be informed political engagement with the illiberal groups where the groups are willing to take part, even if in some cases the motives of the groups are at first opportunistic. What must come first, though, is developing more sophisticated principles for debate.105 I doubt whether any of this is enough without stronger UK enforcement of sanctions against media abuse of freedoms. Though newspapers and broadcasters like to present themselves as champions of the freedom of expression, most belong to private, profit-seeking corporations and all depend to some extent on audience figures. To pretend otherwise is cant, and their claim to a single noble motive should not be unquestioningly indulged. I have dealt here only with the print media, which occupy a shrinking sector of the market, but the bestselling newspapers are still powerful enough to shape public discourse and their excesses need to be controlled. Finally, we have to consider the contradictory records of successive UK governments themselves. Government policies and communications to the public come with many voices and some have consistently appeased bigoted sentiment.106 In a briefing to Parliament for an early and failed attempt to create an offence of incitement to religious hatred, Liberty made the following acid observation: Liberty is aware of the dangerous rise and promotion of anti-Muslim sentiment and hysteria over the last three years in this country. The Government would be wise to look to their own rhetoric and discriminatory and unjust policies before passing further criminal law.107 Acknowledgments I am much indebted to Phil C.W. Chan for his generous and tireless efforts in improving the most intricate details of my paper. I would like to express my gratitude for his enthusiasm and professionalism, and his exceptional intellectual commitment to this special double issue. I also wish to thank Eric Heinze and the three anonymous reviewers for their helpful and insightful comments on an earlier version of this paper. Notes 1 Wolfenden Committee, Report of the Committee on Homosexual Offences and Prostitution, Cmnd.247 (London: HMSO, 1957): among other things the report recommended decriminalisation in restricted circumstances of some sexual acts between men not below the age of 21. 2 HC Deb., col.1454-1455, 29 June 1960. 3 Ibid., at col.1499. 4 See the material provided by Ben Summerskill of Stonewall to the Public Bill Committee examining the Criminal Justice and Immigration Bill, HC Deb., col.75, 16 October 2007. 5 New Northern Ireland Assembly member, Iris Robinson, wife of the Northern Irish First Minister, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/northern_ireland/7482263.stm (last accessed at 23 August 2008). 6 Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 2000 (c.44), s.1. Note that the age of consent in England, Wales and Scotland is 16 but is 17 in Northern Ireland. A controversial draft Sexual Offences (Northern Ireland) Order 2007 has been proposed to reduce the age of consent in Northern Ireland to 16. 7 Sexual Offences Act 2003 (c.42), s.140 and Sch.7. 8 The distinction was widely debated in the UK in academic writing: for a useful introduction, see the special issue of Law and Policy, Vol.26 No.1 (2004). See also the critical discussion by Kristen Walker on the demerits of same-sex marriage: ‘The Same-Sex Marriage Debate in Australia’, International Journal of Human Rights Special Double Issue: Equality in Asia-Pacific: Reality or a Contradiction in Terms?, Vol.11 Nos.1/2 (2007), p.109. 9 Civil Partnership Act 2004 (c.33). 10 It was previously possible for a gay man or lesbian to adopt as an individual but not as part of a same-sex couple. It is a complex area of law, but see in particular the Adoption and Children Act 2002 (c.38), and section 30 of the Adoption and Children (Scotland) Act 2007, asp 4, in http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/northern_ireland/7482263.stm relation to same-sex couples. Consultation has been taking place in Northern Ireland on the possibility of similar legislation. 11 See, in particular, Employment Equality (Sexual Orientation) Regulations 2003/1661; Equality Act 2006 (c.3); and a forthcoming Single Equality Bill tabled to be introduced to Parliament in 2009. 12 See, e.g., Hate Crime: Delivering a Quality Service (London: Association of Chief Police Officers and Home Office Police and Partnership Standards Unit, 2005), ch.2. 13 See Criminal Justice Act 2003 (c.44), s.146; Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 2003, asp 7, s.74; and Criminal Justice (No.2) (Northern Ireland) Order 2004/1991 (NI 15), Art.2. These provide for enhanced sentencing where it is proved that an offence was aggravated by hostility (in Scotland, ‘malice and ill-will’) related to sexual orientation. 14 Neil Bartlett, Skin Lane (London: Serpent’s Tail, 2007), pp.204-205 and 250. 15 United Kingdom Department for Children, Schools and Families, Sex and Relationship Education Guidance, DfEE 0116/2000, at pp.12-13. Note that the guidance covers England, Wales and Northern Ireland only (Scotland deals with these matters separately under the devolution settlement) and does not apply to independent schools; parents may also withdraw their children in state schools from these lessons. 16 To be precise, the English legislation creates several offences under one umbrella, as does the Northern Irish. For the sake of clarity, though, I will refer to each as if there was a single offence in each jurisdiction. 17 All references in this paper to ‘English law’ or ‘English Part 3A’ also encompass Wales. 18 See the revised section 29A in Part 3A of the Public Order Act 1986 (c.64), as amended by the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 (c.4), s.74 and Schs.16 and 28, Part 5. My thanks to Santiago Alonso for correcting my misunderstanding of these. 19 Part 3 (Articles 8-17) of The Public Order (Northern Ireland) Order 1987 (NI 7), as amended by Article 3 of The Criminal Justice (No.2) (Northern Ireland) Order 2004/1991 (NI 15), which came into force on 28 September 2004. 20 See statement of Maria Eagle, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice, to the House of Commons Public Bills Committee discussing the Criminal Justice and Immigration Bill on 29 November 2007. A LexisNexis search I carried out for this paper also did not uncover any Northern Irish case law. 21 The United Kingdom Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights noted that evidence so far indicated that the kinds of incidents experienced by transgender individuals tended to be covered by the existing criminal law, and that there was currently no evidence of incitement of hatred against them as a group. It concluded, however, that ‘urgent’ research should be carried out. Fifteenth Report, March 2008, HMSO, at paras 2.18-2.20. 22 Thanks to Ian McLeod for raising this point. 23 See, e.g., sections 4, 4A and 5 of the Public Order Act 1986 (c.64), covering a range of offences involving threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour where these are likely or intended to cause harassment, alarm and distress. The Protection from Harassment Act 1997 (c.40) covers an extensive range of behaviours amounting to harassment. Other offences attract enhanced sentencing under several statutory provisions (general and specific) where there is evidence of motivation or demonstrated hostility related to sexual orientation. 24 This was originally a matter for the common law of incitement to crime: now see Serious Crime Act 2007 (c.27), Part 2, on encouraging or assisting crime, which covers England, Wales and Northern Ireland. Note that conspiring or soliciting to commit murder is covered by section 4 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 (c.100). 25 These are also to be found in Part 3A, and pre-date the amendment. 26 Where they extend to Scotland – which is the case only with incitement to racial hatred – the equivalent law officer is the Advocate General. 27 See the cases discussed in Geoffrey Bindman, ‘Incitement to Racial Hatred’, New Law Journal (March 1982), p.299. 28 B.A. Hepple, ‘Race Relations Act 1965’, Modern Law Review Vol. 29 (1966), p.314. 29 See discussion in A.T.H. Smith, The Offences Against Public Order (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1987), at p.157. 30 Public Bill Committee examining the Criminal Justice and Immigration Bill, HC Deb, col.75, 16 October 2007. 31 See the leading case of Brutus v. Cozens [1973] AC 854; see also Smith, note 29 above, at pp.42- 43 and 151-152. 32 Readers from outside the UK may be unfamiliar with the term ‘saving’. A saving is a provision ‘the intention of which is to narrow the effect of the enactment to which it refers so as to preserve some existing legal rule or right from its operation’: F.A.R. Bennion, Bennion on Statutory Interpretation: A Code, 5th ed. (London: Butterworths, 2008), at p.725. 33 Fifth Report, January 2008, HMSO, at para.1.64: the Committee stated that the provisions as introduced provided in their view ‘an appropriate degree of protection for human rights’. 34 HL Debs, passim, 7 May 2008. On the amendments regarding religious hatred in the original Bill creating Part 3A, see Ivan Hare, ‘Crosses, Crescents and Sacred Cows: Criminalising Incitement to Religious Hatred’, Public Law [2006], p.520; Kay Goodall, ‘Incitement to Religious Hatred: All Talk and No Substance?’, Modern Law Review Vol.70 (2007), p.90. 35 Public Order Act 1986, (c.64), s.29J. 36 Atkinson had also campaigned against the earlier failed proposals to introduce the offence. A speculative search of LexisNexis Butterworth News on 18 July 2008, covering all UK national and regional newspapers, simply on the search terms ‘Rowan Atkinson’, ‘religious hatred’, and ‘law’, brought up 510 citations. It should be noted that some of these are duplicates, but it remains evident that the press coverage was substantial. 37 Human Rights Act 1998 (c.42), s.3. 38 Ibid., s.2. 39 Ibid., s.12. 40 These include Articles 2-12 and 14, and Articles 1 to 3 of the First Protocol and Articles 1 and 2 of the Sixth Protocol, as read with Articles 16 to 18 of the Convention: see section 1 and Schedule 1. 41 As F.A.R. Bennion notes: ‘On the presumption that Parliament does nothing in vain, the court must endeavour to give significance to every word of an enactment’: Bennion on Statutory Interpretation: A Code, 5th ed. (London: Butterworths, 2008), at p.1157. Surplusage is therefore to be avoided. 42 Stonewall did not object to the possibility of such a saving being introduced when it was initially posited at the Public Bill Committee examining the Criminal Justice and Immigration Bill, HC Deb, col. 75, 16 October 2007. 43 Eric Heinze, ‘Cumulative Jurisprudence and Human Rights: The Example of Sexual Minorities and Hate Speech’, International Journal of Human Rights Special Double Issue: Protection of Sexual Minorities since Stonewall: Progress and Stalemate in Developed and Developing Countries, Vol.13 Nos.2/3 (2009). 44 The doctrine of margin of appreciation as developed in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights and associated bodies is a recognition that the Convention is implemented in states with different economic, political and cultural histories and distinctive legal systems. In the area of freedom of expression, the Court discussed this doctrine in Handyside v. United Kingdom (1976) 1 EHRR 737. 45 Public Bill Committee on the Criminal Justice and Immigration Bill, 18 October 2007, cols.127 and 129-130. 46 Protocol No.12 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Explanatory Report, Council of Europe. The justificatory restriction derives from Convention jurisprudence: see Robert Wintemute, ‘Filling the Article 14 “Gap”: Government Ratification and Judicial Control of Protocol No 12 ECHR’, European Human Rights Law Review [2004], p.485. 47 See also Abdulaziz et al. v. United Kingdom, 28 May 1985, Series A, No.94, (1985) 7 EHRR 471, where an applicant was permitted to rely on Protocol 4 which the UK had not ratified. 48 As regards the UK, see e.g., the informed discussion in David I. Hosking, ‘A High Bar for EU Disability Rights’, Industrial Law Journal, Vol.36 (2007), p.28. 49 Sandra Fredman, Discrimination Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), ch.6. Such rights focus on broadening the context of institutional responsibility, for instance imposing a positive duty on an organisation requiring it to be proactive in monitoring recruitment and progress of members of disadvantaged groups within the organisation. This can be compared with a more traditional reactive responsibility that only requires organisations to respond to individual allegations of discrimination as they occur. 50 Sir William Macpherson, The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry, Cmnd.4262-I (London: HMSO, 1999). 51 J. H. Goldthorpe, 'Globalisation and Social Class', West European Politics, Vol.25 No.3 (2002), p.1. 52 Heinze, note 43 above. 53 In DPP v. Green [2004] EWHC QB 1225, the court at first instance held that the repeated use of the word ‘Paki’ accompanied by several expletives did not in this case indicate racist hostility, but rather was in the context of use as a ‘racial name’ that appeared to mean a neutral label. The decision was criticised and overturned on appeal, although the appellate court observed, citing R. v. Woods [2002] EWHC 85 (Admin), that there can be cases that may have a racially neutral gravamen but nonetheless with demonstrated hostility based on the victim's membership of a racial group. The appellate court did not offer an opinion on whether the use of the word ‘Paki’ was capable of falling under this heading. 54 Explanatory Memorandum to Criminal Justice (No. 2) (Northern Ireland) Order 2004, SI 2004 No. 1991 (N.I. 15), 2004, HMSO, at paras.2 and 3. 55 Sam Dick, Homophobic Hate Crime: The Gay British Crime Survey 2008 (London: Stonewall, 2008), available at http://www.stonewall.org.uk/documents/homophobic_hate_crime__final_report.pdf (last accessed at 19 September 2008). 56 Ibid., at p.31. 57 For more information, see http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/bcs-methodological.html (last accessed at 19 September 2008). 58 Katy Radford, Jennifer Betts, and Malcolm Ostermeyer, Policing, Accountability and the Lesbian, Gay and Bisexual Community in Northern Ireland, Institute for Conflict Research (2006), at p.16, available at http://www.conflictresearch.org.uk/documents/LGB%20book%20complete.pdf (last accessed at 19 September 2008). See also Neil Jarman and Alex Tennant, An Acceptable Prejudice? Homophobic Violence And Harassment In Northern Ireland, Institute for Conflict Research (2003), available at http://www.conflictresearch.org.uk/documents/ICR_Homoph.pdf (last accessed at 19 September 2008). 59 For a summary of early research in the United States, see Karl Pillemer, ‘The Dangers of Dependency: New Findings on Domestic Violence Against the Elderly’, Social Problems, Vol.33 No.2 (1985), p.146. 60 See section 146 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (c.44), which provides for increase in sentences for aggravation related to disability or sexual orientation (see also section 145 which covers racial and religious aggravation). http://www.stonewall.org.uk/documents/homophobic_hate_crime__final_report.pdf http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/bcs-methodological.html http://www.conflictresearch.org.uk/documents/LGB%20book%20complete.pdf http://www.conflictresearch.org.uk/documents/ICR_Homoph.pdf 61 Select Committee on Northern Ireland Affairs, Fifth Report, ‘Hate Crime: The Draft Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 2004’, HC 615, HMSO. 62 Select Committee on Northern Ireland Affairs, Ninth Report, ‘The Challenge of Diversity: Hate Crime in Northern Ireland’, HC 548-I, HMSO, at para.16. 63 See http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/7203232.stm (last accessed at 19 September 2008). 64 See the United States Supreme Court decision in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942), and Eric Heinze’s discussion of the case in ‘Viewpoint Absolutism and Hate Speech’, Modern Law Review, Vol.69 (2006), p.543. 65 See, e.g., Clay Calvert, ‘Hate Speech and its Harms: A Communication Theory Perspective’, Journal of Communication, Vol.47 No.1 (1997), p.4. 66 For an interesting and exceptionally informed discussion of this in the context of health, see Nancy Krieger, ‘Does Racism Harm Health?’, American Journal of Public Health, Vol. 93 No.2 (2003), p.194. For a more sceptical perspective, see Larry Alexander, Is There a Right of Freedom of Expression? (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005). Alexander concludes, at p.193, that justified legislation in this field ‘will always be limited, local, and based on hunches about consequences’. 67 Gündüz v. Turkey, 4 December 2003, Application No. 35071/97, 41 EHRR 59, at para.40. 68 Heinze, note 43 above. 69 Readers will probably be familiar with the case of Jersild v. Denmark, (A/298) (1995) 19 EHRR 1, where broadcast of foul racist remarks about black people was held by the European Court of Human Rights to be in the light of all the circumstances justified. 70 See the 2008 example of a shadow government spokesperson using the phrase ‘nigger in the woodpile’ (it appears that this was not simply an uncharacteristic slip): http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/politics/article4297283.ece (last accessed at 19 September 2008). 71 The point was repeatedly made during parliamentary debates: for a list of the many occasions on which the Bill was debated (it covered several topics other than the incitement offence), see http://services.parliament.uk/bills/2007-08/criminaljusticeandimmigration.html (last accessed at 19 September 2008). 72 Goodall, note 34 above, at pp.112-113. Indeed, Helen Fenwick and Gavin Phillipson have argued that these restrictions are ‘a strong and welcome contrast’ to the potential breadth of the law on racial hatred: Media Freedom, Offence, Morality and Hate Speech (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), at p.516. 73 Between 1988 and 2007, there were 84 prosecutions and 60 convictions: Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights, Fifth Report (2008), HMSO, Appendix 2, at para.10. See also Peter Thornton, Public Order Law (London: Gaunt, 1987), at p.61. 74 Donncha O'Carroll, Legal Study on Homophobia and Discrimination on Grounds of Sexual Orientation – Ireland, European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights 2008, at para.33, available at http://fra.europa.eu/fra/material/pub/comparativestudy/FRA-hdgso-NR_IE.pdf (last accessed at 19 September 2008). The study deals only with the period of 2000-2005, but there is no information suggesting any prosecution before or since. 75 John O’Donoghue, Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform, Dáil Debates, Vol.541, 3 October 2001, at pp.60-61. 76 See Donncha O’Carroll, Legal Study on Homophobia, and also the citation there of Patricia M. Leopold, ‘Incitement to Hatred – The History of a Controversial Criminal Offence’, Public Law [1977], p.389 at pp.401-402. Leopold argues that the absence of prosecutions in Northern Ireland during the period when its racial hatred laws required specific intent was not due to the wording of the statute but because ‘a Northern Irish jury was unable to be objective about a case of incitement’. 77 Northern Ireland Affairs Committee, Inquiry into Hate Crime in Northern Ireland (2004), at p.6. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/7203232.stm http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/politics/article4297283.ece http://services.parliament.uk/bills/2007-08/criminaljusticeandimmigration.html http://fra.europa.eu/fra/material/pub/comparativestudy/FRA-hdgso-NR_IE.pdf 78 [2002] 1 AC 462 at 475. Consider also of course the extensive European Convention on Human Rights jurisprudence on interference with rights in accordance with law. 79 S.H. Bailey, D. Harris and D.C. Ormerod, Bailey, Harris & Jones Civil Liberties: Cases and Materials, 5th ed. (London: Butterworths, 2001), at p.1156. See also Anthony Lester and Geoffrey Bindman, Race and Law (London: Penguin, 1972), at p.371. 80 Philip N.S. Rumney, ‘The British Experience of Racist Hate Speech Regulation: A Lesson for First Amendment Absolutists?’, Common Law World Review, Vol. 32 No.2 (2003), p.117. 81 Geoffrey Bindman, ‘Inciting Hatred’, New Law Journal, Vol.157 (2007), p.1086. 82 Kerry Moore, Paul Mason, and Justin Lewis, Images of Islam in the UK: The Representation of British Muslims in the National Print News Media, 2000-2008, Cardiff School of Journalism, Media and Cultural Studies (2008), available at http://www.cardiff.ac.uk/jomec/resources/08channel4- dispatches.pdf (last accessed at 19 September 2008). 83 Peter Oborne, The Independent, 7 July 2008, available at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/media/the-shameful-islamophobia-at-the-heart-of- britains-press-861096.html (last accessed at 19 September 2008). 84 United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, CERD/C/63/CO/11, 10 December 2003. 85 JCHR, Tenth Report, March 2007, at para.366. 86 Chris Frost, ‘The Press Complaints Commission: A Study of Ten Years of Adjudications on Press Complaints’, Journalism Studies, Vol.5 No.1 (2004), p.101 at pp.111-112. 87 R. v. El-Faisal, [2004] All ER (D) 107, and R. v. Hamza, 7 February 2006 (unreported): see Simon Freeman, The Times, 7 February 2006. As the defendants also exhorted followers to kill or inflict violence on Jews and others, both were convicted of incitement to murder as well. 88 R. v. Griffin and Collett, 2 February 2006 (unreported): see The Guardian, 2 February 2006. The defendants were acquitted. Video extracts from BBC recordings of the speeches, in which Griffin said among other things ‘any woman that they can take by force or guile is theirs’, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/bradford/6135060.stm (last accessed at 19 September 2008). 89 P.F. v. Wilson (Sheriff Court) 24 October 2002 (unreported) (my thanks to the Crown Office for providing a copy of the Sheriff’s decision). 90 R. v. Saleem, R. v. Muhid, R. v. Javed, 2007 WL 3130840, [2007] EWCA Crim 2692, [2007] All ER (D) 462. 91 Nick Davies, Flat Earth News (London: Chatto & Windus, 2008), 374. 92 Frost, note 86 above. 93 See, e.g., Kühnen v. Federal Republic of Germany, 12 May 1988, Application No. 12194/86, (1988) 56 DR 205, where the European Commission of Human Rights stated that the freedom of expression in Article 10 could not be relied upon in order to carry out activities that were aimed at the destruction of other Convention rights as prevented by Article 17. 94 [2004] EWHC 69 (Admin), [2004] All ER (D) 50. 95 See http://www.christian.org.uk/rel_liberties/cases/harry_hammond.htm (last accessed at 17 September 2008). 96 R. v. Saleem, R. v. Muhid, R. v. Javed, 2007 WL 3130840, [2007] EWCA Crim 2692, [2007] All ER (D) 462. 97 In 2005, Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten published several cartoons depicting the prophet Mohammed. Such depictions offended Muslims greatly, and the paper justified their publication as a contribution to debate about censorship. Reaction to the cartoons (which was intensified by the malicious circulation of more extreme cartoons, in the pretence that they had been published by the same paper) led to Muslim protests worldwide, resulting in arsons and deaths. 98 Saleem, note 96 above, at paras.45-47. http://www.cardiff.ac.uk/jomec/resources/08channel4-dispatches.pdf http://www.cardiff.ac.uk/jomec/resources/08channel4-dispatches.pdf http://www.independent.co.uk/news/media/the-shameful-islamophobia-at-the-heart-of-britains-press-861096.html http://www.independent.co.uk/news/media/the-shameful-islamophobia-at-the-heart-of-britains-press-861096.html http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/bradford/6135060.stm http://www.christian.org.uk/rel_liberties/cases/harry_hammond.htm 99 Larry Grant, ‘Incitement to Disaffection’, Index on Censorship, Vol.3 No.3 (1974), p.3. There are many good works on the broader topic of suppression of freedoms of expression and association in this context, such as the decades of writings by Keith Ewing, Conor Gearty, Clive Walker and many others, but a short and startling piece from that time is David R. Lowry and Robert J. Spjut, ‘The European Convention and Human Rights in Northern Ireland’, Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law, Vol.10 (1978), p.297. 100 H.L. Deb., 7 May 2008, col.598. 101 Graham Grant, ‘Muslims’ Anger over SNP's Pro-Gay Stance’, 21 January 2008. 102 There is a huge literature on this in social psychology in particular; for classic texts, see the work of T.A. van Dijk, and also M. Wetherell and J. Potter, Mapping the Language of Racism (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992). 103 Rumney, note 80 above. 104 Maleiha Malik, ‘Speech Control’, Index on Censorship, Vol.36 No.4 (2007), p.21. 105 Maleiha Malik, ‘Engaging with Extremists’, International Relations, Vol.22 (2008), p.85. 106 On anti-immigrant government discourse, see, e.g., Bill Dixon and David Gadd, ‘Getting the Message? “New” Labour and the Criminalization of “Hate”’, Criminology and Criminal Justice, Vol.6 (2006), p.309 at pp.312-314; John Solomos, Race and Racism in Britain, 3rd ed. (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), chs.3 and 4. 107 Serious Organised Crime and Police Bill, Liberty’s briefing for second reading in the House of Lords, March 2005, at para.32. 
work_vxyxnguy4rgxvjrexyipkzdf4a	----	Thesis Draft 20141004 1 Migration as an adaptive response to ethnic nationalism in Russia Michelle O’Brien A thesis in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts University of Washington 2014 Committee: Steven Pfaff Stewart Tolnay Program Authorized to Offer Degree: Sociology 2 (c) Copyright 2014 Michelle O’Brien 3 University of Washington Abstract Migration as an adaptive response to ethnic nationalism in Russia Michelle O’Brien Chair of the Supervisory Committee: Steven Pfaff Sociology In this paper, I argue that migration responses to push factors differ along ethnic lines. I examine this hypothesis using panel survey data from the Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Survey, census data, and regional-level political data from Russia. I hypothesize that nationalist political parties send signals of anti-minority sentiment, which ethnic minorities interpret as threatening to their prospects in the region. This leads to a demand for an adaptive response, generating out- migration. I estimate an event history model and find that, although ethnic minorities do not demonstrate a higher propensity to migrate than the majority group, they do respond differently to political and economic push factors, in particular, to signals sent by nationalist parties. 4 In December of 2010, an ethnic riot erupted in Moscow (Barry 2010). The event appeared to be the result of a build up of ethnic tensions, fueled by xenophobic politics and sparked by episodic incidents of violence. While President Vladimir Putin has remained relatively conservative in his use of ethnicity in speeches, anti-minority sentiment in mainstream politics has been steadily growing, even as the country experiences more economic stability than at any other time after the fall of the USSR. The fourth largest political party in Russia is Vladimir Zhirinovsky’s so-called Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR). A stable ideological party, with varying regional success at the polls, it is rooted in deep-seated xenophobia and ethnonationalist rhetoric. Its success poses a threat to the status and life chances of ethnic minorities. Drawing on Hale’s (2008) relational theory of ethnic politics, I argue that this threat generates a demand for adaptive response. Two major venues through which actors may adapt are exit (i.e. migration) and voice (i.e. political advocacy). With opportunities for minority group advocacy severely limited in Putin’s Russia, this research focuses on migration as an adaptive response to ethnic politics. I hypothesize that nationalism, as a component of ethnic politics, contributes to out-migration of ethnic minorities in contemporary Russia. To arrive at the outcome of migration as an adaptive response in which minorities engage, two processes are necessary. First, an individual making the decision to migrate must interpret ethnic tensions as a threat to her life chances, and she must evaluate her future prospects in this ethnically charged framework. Second, the option of migration must be a viable one. That is, an individual must consider herself the plausible target of the threat of diminishing life chances, conclude that an adaptive response is required, and determine that the benefits of migrating outweigh the costs. In order to explain these processes, I employ the relational theory of ethnic 5 politics (Hale) and demographic theories. I estimate an event history model using regional, household, and individual-level data from Russian censuses and the Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Survey. I find evidence that political push factors affect minority groups differently than the ethnic majority, suggesting that the success of ethnonationalist politics in a region signals vulnerability to ethnic minorities, influencing migration decisions. Ethnic Tensions and Life Chances in Russia When does an individual interpret ethnic tensions as a threat to her own life chances? Why might minorities flee Russia in the face of ethnic tension, even if the sentiment is not directly aimed at or destructive towards them? Hale’s (2008) relational theory of ethnic politics distinguishes between ethnicity as a mechanism to reduce uncertainty and ethnic politics as the strategies a group engages in to increase member life chances. Identity, generally speaking, is a relational way in which actors make sense of their world. Ethnic identity, then, becomes salient when this particular point of reference “come[s] to have greater importance in people’s lives, when people’s lives are seen to be affected in more significant ways by the referent,” (2008:36). This is especially true when one group has the power to affect the other group’s average life chances, as through employment discrimination. Ethnic identification must not only be salient, but also be accessible (i.e. through contextual clues or repeated exposure) and must fit the situation (even if based on incomplete or wholly inaccurate stereotypes). In addition, ethnicity is a particularly “sticky” identifier, as it encompasses four categories that increase its accessibility and fit to social life: 1) ethnicity implies a common fate; 2) ethnicity tends to involve barriers to communication (both linguistically and culturally); 3) ethnicity carries visible physical differences that are hard to change; and 4) ethnic traits are usually correlated with less visible 6 traits (such as attitudes and values) (2008:42–43). Thus, while ethnicity may not be the only information in a given scenario, it is an important one for simplifying and making sense of social life. If ethnicity is pre-rational and exists as a mechanism to reduce uncertainty, then what people do in their newly simplified world is ethnic politics. Ethnic politics is a categorical way of thinking applied to widespread human desires. Hale defines these human desires as material gain, power, status, and/or security. Material well-being is a long-term desire, in which group members take a prospective approach to economic gains, potentially seeing a temporary tradeoff as a lifelong impediment. Power is a fungible good that may lead to other gains, such as economic prosperity or physical security. Status and self-esteem may be desires that, if left unfulfilled, lead to resentment and ethnic tension. Security can be considered a survival motive. It is likely to be important when “physical well-being is potentially at stake along group lines” (2008:54). When threatened with a reduction in life chances, then, ethnic identity becomes salient and actionable. Ethnicity certainly appears to be salient in Russia. The Russian language differentiates between ethnic Russians, russkii, and citizens of Russia, rossiiskii, and nationalist parties tend to follow suit, using the ethnic term for Russian when calling for a return of the country to its people (“Rossiya dlya russkikh” or “Russia for [ethnic] Russians”). Historically, the Russian Federation has taken a “fill-in-the-blank” approach to self-identified ethnicity. The Russian Census has respondents fill in their identified ethnicity; with no categorical options that one sees on the U.S. Census. In 2010, the Russian Census recorded over 160 ethnic groups residing within its borders. Table 1 shows the most numerous ethnic groups in the Russian Federation, as measured by the 2010 Russian Census. 7 [Table 1 about here] Although official statistics are unavailable, reports of discrimination and violence against ethnic “others” is common, and an oft-cited area of concern for the United Nations (Kulaeva et al. 2013; Verkhovsky, Kozhevnikova, and Sibireva 2010). Tension with minorities and migrants is evident in opinion polling as well as the media. Since 2000, the Levada Center has consistently reported that a majority of a representative sample supported the phrase “Russia for ethnic Russians” (Anon 2011a). In 2012, nearly 30% of respondents said that they can feel ethnic tensions in the city or town in which they live. When asked “Are violent ethnic clashes possible in Russia now?” 43% answered yes, and when asked the same question about their specific communities, 23% of respondents answered yes. Over 40% of respondents reported feeling annoyance or dislike toward residents of the “southern” republics (the Caucasus), and 42% reported that population restrictions should be placed on people from the north Caucasus ethnic groups living in Russia1. In a 2005 Levada Center opinion poll, a majority of respondents answered that they felt negatively about the employment of migrants in law enforcement, public service, and private enterprise. Similarly, the poll found a majority disapproval of migrants acquiring any type of property. The proportion of respondents who answered that they did not want a “foreigner” as a neighbor varied by origin of the “foreigner”, ranging from under 20% for Ukraine to over 70% for the Caucasus, Central Asia, or China2. 1 It is worth noting here that residents of the north Caucasus are citizens of the Russian Federation. The north Caucasus consists of the Russian oblasts of Dagestan, Chechnya, Ingushetia, North Ossetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachay-Cherkessia, parts of Krasnodar Krai, Adygea, and parts of Stavropolskii Krai. 2 Any one of these ethnic group members may be, in fact, a citizen of Russia. 8 Ethnicity is a matter of importance to contemporary politics and politicians as well. The current president, Vladimir Putin (2012), has written publicly about ‘the ethnicity issue,’ both calling for harsh legal action against disrespectful internal migrants, and suggesting that ethnic groups must live in harmony in order to secure the Russian state. More recently, Putin explicitly used the Russian ethnic background and shared linguistic and cultural history as pretext for the invasion of Ukraine’s Crimean region, fueling fears about the implications of Putin’s bold geopolitical action (Conant 2014). The main ethnonationalist political party in Russia, the LDPR, targets ethnic minorities through its rhetoric exalting ethnic Russians above all others, and pledging to return Russia to its ethnic Russian inhabitants. Thus, ethnicity is salient for both ethnic Russians and ethnic minorities in Russia, primarily through a hierarchy constructed in which ethnic Russians are above all others. For this reason, I do not focus on any particular ethnic group, and instead focus on the division between ethnic Russians and ethnic non-Russians. I posit that the signal sent by ethnonationalist groups will resonate differently between ethnic Russians and ethnic non-Russians, while specific ethnic groups may not have differential interpretations of the same signal. For instance, minorities may interpret the protest banner that reads “Russia for ethnic Russians” as a signal of potentially worsening prospects. A policy of returning the Russian Federation to its “rightful” ethnic Russian owners will likely be threatening to minority individuals, regardless of specific ethnic group identification. Nationalism as a Signal of Worsening Prospects Nationalism in Russia takes many forms, and is far from new, demonstrated by a long history of tension as nationalist interests attempt to operate within a multi-ethnic state (Kappeler 2001; Smith 1995). In this research, I focus on the right-wing platform of ethnonationalism, in 9 which the primary building block of nationalist rhetoric is anti-minority sentiment. As an indicator of the success of ethnonationalism, I use the vote share of a single party explicitly representing this platform, the LDPR. LDPR is the major ethnonationalist force in the Duma and has been one of the most stable political parties in Russia since the mid-1990s (Hanson 2010). It is an ideological party, relying on rhetoric that defines the future of Russia under an ideal LDPR leadership. “The central features of [Zhirinovsky’s] political creed… have been remarkably clear and consistent since nearly the beginning of his career as a public politician in the late Soviet period,” (Hanson 2010:195). Those features have changed little from Zhirinovsky’s first publications in the early 1990s to the LDPR’s published programs in 2014. The political creed includes an aim to “return to the [ethnic] Russian people the status of nation-state… What’s good for Russians is good for all. For [ethnic] Russians, along with all those indigenous people of Russia, we will build our common Russian home,” and to spread a political ideology that reunites the ethnic Russian people toward the common goal of restoring Russian boundaries to their “historical territory”. The LDPR program explicitly demands a universal system in which the Russian language is studied by every one, without alteration. LDPR claims to aim to “defend the country from migrants” and maintain a “continuous regime of counterterrorism operation” in the north Caucasus (Zhirinovsky n.d.). This familiar nationalist rhetoric places the ethnic Russian on top of an ethnic hierarchy and demands for the restoration of land and status to the population, while defending it from the threats of immigration and foreign politics. The LDPR is stable, with “remarkable organizational capacity in many of Russia’s regions” (Hanson 2010:208) . It is widely recognized party that has gained not only traction in legislative elections, but also media attention. This is important, because it indicates that Russians know what this party stands for, and are familiar with the platform on which it runs. Its 10 success or failure in a region signals information to individuals living in that region, upon which these individuals may evaluate their future prospects in the region and determine the need for adaptation (Lohmann 1993). What, then, is the signal that the success of the LDPR sends? LDPR’s registered leader, Vladimir Zhirinovsky, is blatantly anti-immigrant, anti- minority, and misogynistic. He has been quoted as claiming to intend to “close [all of Russia’s] borders on the day after the election,” (Bidder 2008), and threatening to “seize Alaska from the United States, to launch a nuclear strike on Japan, to flood Germany with radioactive waste, and to occupy the Baltic states,” (Anon 2000). While some consider Zhirinovsky to be merely a showman on the Russian political scene, he has had major successes, including LDPR’s first- place win in the legislative election of 1993 and his own presidential run, which landed him third place in both 1991 and 2008 (Hanson 2010). Zhirinovsky is not the only outspoken nationalist representing the party. Andrei Lugovi famously sits in parliament for LDPR, despite being wanted in Britain for his alleged connection to the poisoning death of Alexander Litvinenko (Anon 2011b). Despite the tendency of Westerners to write off Zhirinovsky because of his theatrics, experts see the LDPR as an enduring, successful, ideologically-coherent political party (Hanson 2010). Because LDPR is explicitly nationalist and pro-ethnic Russian, it serves as a proximate signal of a broader anti-minority sentiment. The interpretation of this signal as future risk of harm to life chances should delineate along ethnic lines. Thus, ethnic minorities receiving this signal update their information about their status in the regional environment and determine that adaptation is necessary, while ethnic Russians would not. The signal that LDPR sends may be global, but the implications are often local. Although electoral laws change often in Russia, during the time period studied, seats in the Duma were allocated based on a proportional representation system (State Duma 2005). In all regional 11 parliaments, either a proportional representation or mixed system is in place, meaning that at least some of the parliament seats are awarded due to the party’s proportion of vote share (Ross 2014). For example, in the Amur Oblast, characterized by over 20% nationalist vote share, the LDPR has taken a corresponding 8 of the 36 regional parliament seats. Popular regional support for LDPR also has indirect but formal political implications, such as the 2012 appointment of party deputy Alexei Ostrovsky as governor of Smolensk, a region in which LDPR captured 14.75% of the vote share in 2011. What difference does it make to have party leadership in Russia’s regions? A case study of Pskov under bold LDPR leadership in the mid- to late-1990s revealed a criminal, mafia-like takeover of the economic and civic organizations in the region (Slider 1999). In this context, elected governor3 Evgeny Mikhailov employed young LDPR members instead of experienced bureaucrats, turned over nearly all of his predecessor’s reforms, and quickly established a strict, vertical hierarchy with himself at the top. At the time of publication (1999), Slider reported that federal authorities paid little attention and made no effort to curb any local abuses made by LDPR leadership. In 2002, reports of discrimination against Polish Catholics in Pskov emerged, with native Russian Orthodox leaders fearing the ‘Catholic expansion’ and plans to “interfere with children of our Orthodox families,” (Myers 2002). In this case, violence was not necessary, administrative hurdles aimed at the foreign influences effectively halted the building of a cathedral in Pskov, and led to expulsions of Polish Catholic religious leaders (ibid). Regional vote share capitalizes on the global signal sent by LDPR, but the presence and power of LDPR has had direct regional impact. 3 In the Putin era, laws regarding the selection of governors have frequently changed. In 2004, during his first term as President, Putin abolished Yeltsin’s initiative of direct elections of governors. In 2012, Medvedev pushed legislation to allow for the option of election of regional governors. In 2013, again-President Putin overturned the reform and began appointing regional governors (Ross 2014). 12 How strong must a signal be in order to contribute to the costly decision to migrate? Perhaps vote share, in a struggling (and regionally variable) democracy (McMann and Petrov 2000), may not be the proxy of choice in determining political signals. To further extend this discussion, I also include a regional measure of reported hate crimes. These data are from the SOVA Center of Information and Analytics, based in Moscow. The center reports hate crimes annually, and breaks the crimes down in a number of ways, including violence (murder, credible threats of murder, stabbing, beating) and vandalism (arson, graffiti, breaking of windows). Like lynching in the U.S. South, hate crimes in today’s Russia are characterized by the victim’s membership in an ethnic minority group. They are rare, and centered in places of political power. However, just as with Tolnay and Beck’s (1992) study on lynching, I expect that hate crimes will have an effect on out-migration of ethnic minorities. I argue that although locally varying and rare, these events will trigger an evaluation of worsening prospects for minority individuals. Migration as an Adaptive Response Migration is a costly event, taken on as an adaptive response to both push factors at the origin and pull factors at the destination, with consideration of both personal factors and intervening obstacles (Lee 1966). Different theoretical camps have suggested mechanisms at every level of motivation. Macro neoclassical economic theory attempts to explain labor migration with the wage differential caused by variations in supply and demand between origin and destination countries, while micro neoclassical economic theory focuses on individual decision-making in which a rational actor weighs the costs and benefits of migration (Massey et al. 1993). For economists and demographers using a rational decision-making approach to migration, these costs and benefits have been almost exclusively economic ones. The new 13 economics of migration pivots from the individual to the household unit as the primary location of decision-making in order to diversify risk and increase exposure to favorable markets as a whole unit, thus characterizing migration as a family-unit strategy to increase household resources (Stark and Bloom 1985). In short, these theories are all making claims about a decision to maximize life chances through migration. Although many demographic studies of migration have focused on migration as a strategy to maximize economic well-being, some case studies have emerged to consider other aspects of life chance maximization, particularly when conflict occurs in the sending or origin location. Tolnay and Beck (1992) find that, in the early 20th century, lynching significantly contributed to the out-migration of the black population from southern U.S. states. The authors use county-level data for a sample of southern states, and model the net out-migration of blacks as a function of the frequency of lynchings. They find that blacks were more likely to leave counties where they were denied education, and where they were economically disadvantaged (Tolnay and Beck 1992). Importantly, the authors conclude that while white lynchings did occur, and while white migration did occur, the effect was not significant. Thus, “[t]he threat of violence was salient only for blacks in the South, and represented a motivation for migration only for them,” (1992:112). This evidence encourages the argument of this research, that ethnicity will be salient for minority ethnic groups in Russia, but not necessarily motivate the adaptive actions of the ethnic Russian majority group. Conflict, more generally speaking, has been shown to contribute to out-migration. Some of the highest rates of emigration in the world have been attributed to conflict. Between 1990 and 2003, amidst armed conflict with Russia, Georgia lost an estimated 20% of its residents to out- migration (Gerber and Torosyan 2013). This stream of migrants is similar to what the U.S. South 14 experienced in black out-migration, mentioned above. Likewise, in the months after gun battles associated with a larger conflict in Nepal, researchers have found a 67% increase in the likelihood of out-migration (Williams et al. 2012). These authors address cases of armed, state- level conflict. However, studies of the effect of lynching in the American South or hate crimes in contemporary Russia, present unique challenges. The events are rare, and it is difficult to interpret the threat of an individual event net of other contextual factors, although that is precisely what our statistical models ask of the data. Further, the data I use include hate crimes and nationalist vote share, both of which operate at a lower intensity than a state-level armed conflict. Research has offered support to the notion that non-violent, non-national level events may affect migration. Work on nationalist policies geared to provide economic advantages to Francophones over the previously dominant Anglophones has shown the effect of such policies on out-migration of Anglophones from Quebec to other provinces of Canada (Pettinicchio 2012). The characteristic of speaking English was a significant predictor of migration, as was the interaction of being an English speaker and a professional, providing evidence that ethnonationalist policy that provided economic advantages to French speakers also contributed to emigration of Anglophones. Researchers used a 2005 survey to investigate differences in propensity to out-migrate among Asians and Europeans in Kyrgyzstan. In justifying their focus on ethnicity, the authors note “because the collapse of the Soviet Union brought to the fore and rearranged ethnic identities and because ethnicity has been a major factor in post-Soviet migration, [they] focus in particular on ethnic differences in migration intentions,” (Agadjanian, Nedoluzhko, and Kumskov 2008:621). Noting the rarity of ethnic violence, the authors find few differences among ethnic groups in their propensities to migrate. Finally, a qualitative study in 15 post-Soviet Uzbekistan investigated the political and economic motivations of out-migration (Radnitz 2006). The author finds that the forces leading to migration exist not in the political factors alone (such as discrimination, insularity, or ethnic violence) but in their interaction with economic factors. Thus, when faced with both a fledgling economy and ethnic tensions, Uzbeks were more likely to emigrate. Data & Methodology Does nationalism contribute to ethnic minorities’ propensity to migrate in contemporary Russia? In order to investigate this question, I use panel data from the Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Survey 2009-2012, combined with regional data from the Russian Census and the SOVA Center for Information and Analytics. The Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Survey– HSE, is conducted by the National Research University Higher School of Economics and ZAO “Demoscope” together with Carolina Population Center, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and the Institute of Sociology RAS, and is henceforth referred to as the RLMS4. The RLMS is considered the only nationally representative survey in Russia. This survey has been repeated annually since 1994. Figure 1 maps the 25 sampled areas of Russia’s 87 regions5, stretching over multiple economic regions. [Figure 1 about here] 4 The RLMS can be accessed at http://www.cpc.unc.edu/projects/rlms-hse 5 Russia’s regions, commonly referred to as ‘oblasts’, are federal subjects officially called ‘oblasts’, ‘krai’, ‘republics’, and ‘federal cities’. With the exception of the federal cities Moscow and St. Petersburg, regions are roughly equivalent to U.S. states. They vary in size, population, and autonomy. 16 Data are collected at both the household and individual level, with a unique household and ‘site’ identified for each observation. Household-level variables include a detailed roster, reasons for members to have left the household, income and expenditures, and home ownership (among many others). Variables at the individual level include birthplace, self-identified ethnicity, previous migration experience, language(s) spoken, religious practice, and labor force participation (among many others). For each year, I merge the household and individual files, matching each individual to her corresponding record in the household roster. Generally speaking, not all members of the household will be in the individual file. This requires that some members of the household receive an ethnicity indicator based on the other members of the household. This decision relies on the important assumption that while only one individual in the household may be an ethnic minority, even an inter-ethnic married couple will interpret anti- minority sentiment as a threat to their future prospects. Thus, theoretical justification may be made for similar migration decision-making and heightened ethnic awareness for households in which even one ethnic minority resides. Using this method, approximately 19,000 observations with missing ethnicity information are deemed ethnic Russians, roughly 2,600 are deemed ethnic minorities, and a little over 2,000 cannot be determined, and are dropped from the analysis. I have structured the data in a person-year file in which individuals are nested within households within regions. The RLMS provides repeated observations of households and individuals over time, in which respondents may enter or exit the dataset at any time due to new sampling that year or to non-response. The repeated household roster is a significant asset to the RLMS. Interviewers surveying a household in the first year in which the household enters the survey take detailed notes about every person living in the household, including birthdate, gender, and relationship to others on the roster. In subsequent years, the interviewer takes the roster table 17 back to the household and updates it. Thus, if a member of a household leaves, the survey captures a general timeline of migration (i.e. if the member is present in 2009 but absent in 2010, but is present in 2011, we can make some migration duration assumptions) as well as the reason for absence (i.e. why is the person no longer in the household) and the distance the individual moved (i.e. responses to the ‘why’ question include: lives in this building, but in a different household, lives in this settlement but at a different address, lives outside of this settlement, moved for university, died, and other). This nuanced coding of individual moves was new to the RLMS in 2009. Dependent Variable I define out-migration as an individual migrating by T2 given that the independent variables are measured at T1. Moves count as out-migration if the individual moves out of their household and current population center for any reason other than to attend university. The household must exist to report the individual’s migration, and therefore, whole household migrations are not considered. The RLMS has produced few studies on migration and mobility. One exception is Guido Friebel and Sergei Guriev’s work on the effect of in-kind payments received by workers on their mobility. The authors use Rounds 6 and 7 of the RLMS and measure intent to move in Round 6 as well as actual moving in Round 7. Friebel defines a “move” as a move to a different population center or “community”. The dependent variable move takes a value of 0 if an interviewed individual in round VI lived in the same community round VII and a value of 1 if interviewers were unable to find that individual in the same community in round VII. The value of the category move=1 thus also includes nonrespondents and people who died between the two rounds, meaning that is an imperfect measure of regional mobility. (Friebel and Guriev 2005:191) 18 In another study by Yuri Andrienko and Sergei Guriev, the authors use this same measure as an estimate of informal migration to supplement aggregated official statistics in a paper on the determinants of interregional mobility in Russia. This method of operationalizing migration and mobility is demonstrative of the limitations of the early rounds of RLMS, which the authors use for its inclusion of the variable indicating intention to move. Unfortunately, the authors using these measures of migration are also counting death and non-response. Using later rounds of the data, however, allow this research to differentiate between individuals no longer in the household due to death, university, or out-migration from the region. Many studies on the years immediately following the collapse of the Soviet Union take into account official statistics, and take advantage of the propiska, or internal passport, that has historically been a part of the story of Russian mobility since the 1930s (as well as before the revolution, in the Russian empire). The Soviet propiska system was officially abolished after the collapse, but registration continues in a few FSU countries, including Russia. In Russia, registration is necessary if a person lives in one place for 90 days or more. It is generally accepted that penalties are rarely enforced, that firms hire unregistered employees regularly, and that informal migration is significant, and according to some estimates, as high as formal migration. Internal migration is penalized at much lower rates than international migration if unregistered. This presents some challenges to studies using official migration statistics to measure interregional mobility. Explanatory Variables 1 - Vote Share 19 To each individual observation, I attach the official vote share data for the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, which was collected from the Central Election Committee of Russia and compiled by Electoral Geography. This vote share is disaggregated to the region level, and is time-lagged so that each person-year receives the score of the most recent legislative election that occurred at least one year ago. Thus, an individual record in survey year 2011 receives the vote share for 2007, and the same record in survey year 2012 receives the vote share for the election 2011. In this way, the vote share is both time-lagged, and time-varying, although it does not change annually. I restrict my calculation of vote share to legislative elections instead of including presidential elections. Legislative votes are based more on party platforms than presidential elections, which may be more focused on individual candidates. Presidential elections in Russia in this time period are problematic to measure, as official corruption tends to be concentrated and highly public in presidential elections. In addition, with Vladimir Putin carrying the bulk of the vote share in these elections, the other candidates divvy up much less of the remaining vote share. Legislative elections allow the entrance of many more parties and have more meaningful results for smaller parties. While not ignoring the possibility of corruption during the height of Putin’s popularity, I note that much of the protest around vote rigging has occurred after 2012, which is outside the scope of this study. For the period sampled, none of the regions produced a vote share of 0% for LDPR or for turnout. Vote shares for the sampled regions are summarized in Table 2. [Table 2 about here] 20 Each sampled region has a corresponding, mutually exclusive site ID in the RLMS. Both the level of vote share and the percentage change in the share of votes captured by the LDPR contain regional and temporal variability. 2 – Hate Crimes In order to control for ethnically motivated factors outside of anti-minority sentiment, I include an indicator for hate crimes. I use annual hate crime count data from the SOVA Center for Information and Analysis, time-lagged by one year. The SOVA Center is a Moscow-based Russian non-profit organization that was founded in 2002. The center collects information about human rights violations in Russia and is funded by the Open Society Foundation, the National Endowment for Democracy, the Henry M. Jackson Foundation, the Russian Federation through the State Club Foundation, among many others. The center regularly publishes articles and books in addition to monthly counts of hate crime data, classified by region and victim identity. Systematic counts of violence were collected every month between 2009 and 2012. Table 3 shows a snapshot of the targets of hate crimes nationwide, over the last five years. [Table 3 about here] The SOVA Center classifies an incident as a hate crime if it is motivated by the target’s identity. Incidents of violence include murder, beating, stabbing, wounding, or threats of murder. Incidents of vandalism include breaking windows, arson, and graffiti. A major limitation to the SOVA Center’s statistics is gross underreporting and the inability for the SOVA Center to 21 identify minority status of many victims of apparent hate crimes. Therefore, the reported hate crime figures are very conservative estimates. 3 – Minority Status I operationalize minority status as non-Russian ethnicity. Often the terms nationality and ethnicity are used interchangeably in the Russian context. This is largely a result of imperial and Stalinist policies. Nearly always ethnicity is self-identified. This is true on the Russian census, which typically returns hundreds of ethnic group responses. In the RLMS, variables that capture ethnicity are as follows: 1 - “What nationality do you consider yourself?” Interviewers write down the answer in a blank space. 2 - “Were you born in the place of your current residence or elsewhere?” 1 – In another place 2 – In the place where I live now 7 – Doesn’t know 8 – Refuses to answer 3 - (for those who answered “in another place” for borndp) “In what republic of the former USSR were you born? I have constructed a variable called “minority” in which I give a “0” outcome to individuals who responded either that they were born in the place they were surveyed (all survey sites are in Russia), or that they were born elsewhere in Russia, and a “1” if they were born elsewhere, not in Russia or self-identify as a non-Russian ethnicity. Ethnic Russians make up the majority of the dataset, but with some significant categories of other ethnic groups. I create a household level variable representing minority households. Figure 2 shows the geographic dispersion of person- years contributed by Ethnic Russian and non-Russians in the RLMS sample from 2009 to 2012. 22 [Figure 2 about here] I have aggregated the 87 regions into their economic region counterparts. The economic regions are mutually exclusive. Ethnic non-Russians reside in every economic region and in the federal cities of Moscow and St. Petersburg, although some regions consist of a much larger proportion of minorities in the sample than others. Major cities are included, but not separately counted in the Full Sample calculation. Instead, they are counted as part of the Northwestern (St. Petersburg) or Central (Moscow) economic regions. Control Variables I control for demographic and economic conditions at the individual, household, and regional level. I calculate the respondent’s age using birth year and allow it to vary each year. The data are not restricted by a maximum age, but all children under the age of 18 are removed. I include gender in the model, with female respondents receiving a 1 and male respondents receiving a 0 on the indicator. Gender previously reported for the same individual is assumed to continue through to subsequent years. Individual respondents report their monthly income and home ownership status. However, for the vast majority of households, only one individual reports these figures. I carry these indicators forward to all members of the household. Although this means that the wages reported are not ‘real’ household wages, they are useful in generating relative income versus other respondents. For use in the model, I standardize the income figures, so that one unit increase is 23 equivalent to one standard deviation increase. This allows for the coefficient to be large enough to be legible in the model. Household ownership in the model indicates that the household in which the members reside is owned by someone living in the household, but does not differentiate between which members of the household own the home. Both income and home ownership status may vary by time. Once the household is owned, however, subsequent missing data may be replaced based on previous status in the same household. At the regional level, I include a standardized measure of the regional Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita in 2009. I also include a standardized measure of the regional population in 2010 according to the Russian Census. For both of these standardized regional levels, a unit increase is equivalent to one (sample) standard deviation increase. Neither variable is time varying, but both provide regional variability. I also include the year of the survey in the model to control for any period effects that may be unobserved. Table 4 summarizes the averages of these control variables for both ethnic Russians and minorities. [Table 4 about here] After merging the rounds of data, the result is a panel data set, with each row containing an individual who carries the properties of her self, her household, and her region. The total number of person-years in the data is nearly 90,000. Individuals who are gone from their households at the beginning of the case study time period are censored (dropped) entirely. Table 5 shows the migration status for each of the person-years by survey year. 24 [Table 5 about here] Reflecting the officially reported population make-up, ethnic Russians dominate the dataset. However, as Table 6 shows, approximately the same proportion of ethnic Russians and ethnic non-Russians migrate out each year. [Table 6 about here] Leveraging the longitudinal design of the RLMS, and the unbalanced panel construction described above, I estimate a discrete-time event history model (Allison 1984). I focus on a respondent’s first instance of migration, which simplifies the model and computational requirements, while also recognizing that it is impossible to distinguish a respondent who leaves every fall for a few months, returns in the spring, and leaves in the fall again and a respondent who is absent for multiple years. Thus, subsequent moves are not considered in this model. I restrict my analysis to those at risk of migrating out. Thus, all those in 2009 who are marked as absent (i.e. we don’t know when these individuals migrated out) are removed from the data. After any individual’s first migration out, they are also removed from the analysis. Right censoring occurs here if an individual does not migrate within this observation period, and no new information is available on that individual. The event history model allows for time varying explanatory and control variables. Because each observation is a person-year, indicators may change over time, as subsequent years for the same individual become additional observations. In this model, any individual may have between one and four observations, depending on when 25 they enter and/or exit the sample. Table 8 shows an example of this kind of repeated observation for an individual in the RLMS. [Table 7 about here] In the example shown in Table 7, a single individual has four observations in the data. Her age, income, home ownership status, exposure to nationalist vote share, and migration status are all allowed to vary by time. Repeated observations for each individual in the RLMS make it appealing to follow an individual and investigate their migration experience. However, repeated observations also generate statistical dependence between observations and are likely to underestimate p-values. To account for this dependence, I estimate clustered standard errors around the individual, so that standard errors are measured on the person and not the person-year. I expect to find that political factors affect ethnic minorities differently from ethnic Russians. I estimate a total of four event history models, outlined below. Each model uses a dichotomous indicator of whether or not a respondent migrates out this year as the dependent variable. I use two separate sampling frames for the models – 1) ethnic Russians only, and 2) ethnic non-Russians only. Within each sampling frame I model first the individual and household control variables (age, sex, home ownership, income, and survey year) and second the full model with regional-level variables included (GDP, Population, LDPR vote share, and count of hate crimes). 26 Findings & Discussion At top of Table 8, the correlations for ethnic Russians are coded in grey and at the bottom, the correlations for ethnic minorities are coded in white. Looking only at the bivariate relationship, LDPR vote share is negatively correlated for ethnic Russians but positively correlated for ethnic minorities. A plausible explanation for the opposing correlation signs might be that regions with an overrepresentation of ethnic Russians may be more likely to underreport hate crimes, whereas in more diverse regions, this may not be the case. We expect some variables to be correlated, such as population and GDP, for instance. [Table 8 about here] Table 9, below, shows the results from the event history models, controlling for individual, household, and economic variables. [Table 9 about here] 27 These findings support the hypothesis that the migration process for ethnic minorities in contemporary Russia is fundamentally different from that of ethnic Russians. Although both ethnic Russians and ethnic minorities are out-migrating, this outcome has a different relationship to nationalism among ethnic Russians and ethnic minorities. The regional LDPR vote share has a statistically significant positive relationship to out-migration among ethnic non-Russians, and a statistically non-significant relationship to out-migration among ethnic Russians. This implies a very different migration story for ethnic minorities from their ethnic Russian counterparts. Above and beyond regional economic conditions and individual factors, ethnic minorities are more likely to migrate when residing in a region with higher nationalist vote share. This is consistent with the argument that the nationalist vote share acts as a signal to minorities about their future prospects, which demands an adaptive response. In this context, some ethnic minorities decide to adapt by way of migration. In contrast to the migration story of individuals maximizing or diversifying their resources, the model for ethnic minorities suggests that, even controlling for economic factors, part of the migration story is the desire to protect life chances that are being threatened by the success of ethnonationalism. There is a large difference in the size of the coefficients of the nationalist vote share between ethnic Russians (.1463) and ethnic non-Russians (3.4997). I conducted additional tests that revealed that these two coefficients are not statistically significantly different. However, the small sample of ethnic non-Russians results in a large standard error for the vote share coefficient in that model. This makes it mathematically difficult to reject the null hypothesis that the coefficient for vote share is the same for ethnic Russians and ethnic non-Russians. The models share other similarities. The significance of the survey year indicator speaks to a period effect, net of all other factors. That is, with each subsequent year, the propensity to 28 migrate increases for all respondents. In both subsamples, a statistically significant negative relationship exists between age and migration, favoring younger respondents. This is consistent with existing demographic research on migration decision-making. I found no effect when adding an age-squared term to the model. In none of the models is home ownership significant, likely because of the high rates of home ownership among both subsamples. For the ethnic Russians, we find evidence of selectivity based on income, regional GDP, regional population, and residence in Moscow or St. Petersburg. This suggests that a respondent is more likely to migrate when experiencing lower income, but higher GDP and population. Respondents are much less likely to migrate if residing in Moscow or St. Petersburg. This tells a migration story of young ethnic Russian men striving to maximize their life chances through migration. The lower income but higher GDP and population suggests that men with lower income but access to resources in the community may be more likely to migrate. Respondents from extremely impoverished regions may not be able to shoulder the high cost of migration, despite the opportunity to maximize life chances. However, a different migration story emerges for ethnic minorities. While ethnic minorities are more likely to migrate while young, the gender effect disappears for this subsample. The statistical significance of income, regional GDP, and regional population also disappears. The regional factor that remains is the nationalist (LDPR) vote share. Conclusions and Implications This research has provided a difficult test for Hale’s theory of ethnic politics. Few other studies analyze the relationship between electoral processes and migration. Electoral processes and nationalist signaling are certainly less physically threatening than attacks to personal security. 29 However, these findings support the notion that electoral processes have consequences for social processes. Additionally, by using a nuanced and restrictive definition of migration, I restrict the analysis to migrants leaving their region for purposes other than university study. These are migrants poised to respond to contextual factors, without the inflationary effect of including young members of the household who leave to pursue higher education in major population centers like Moscow and St. Petersburg. The findings from this line of inquiry have implications for the way that the social scientists analyze the factors leading to migration in heterogeneous societies. In regional contexts of ethnic tension, migration decision-making may differ along ethnic lines. Including race and ethnicity indicators in the statistical models might improve research examining the causes of migration. Contextual factors may play a different role in decision-making of dominant and minority groups. Although I find no statistically significant effect of hate crimes, this indicator had tremendous statistical burden. The indicator was required to show effect after controlling for population, residence in a major city, and GDP, among other factors. It is a regionally-biased factor, and represents an act of contentious claims-making that occurs in places of political power. These places also tend to be diverse, densely populated and sources of in-migration and not necessarily out-migration6. I have argued that signals from the nationalist party conveys the idea of ethnic Russian superiority, and that ethnic minorities interpret this signal as threatening to their future prospects in a certain region. Targeted violence that appears to focus on phenotypical differences, specific ethnic groups, or particular symbols of minority status (such as attacking Muslims wearing the 6 Supplementary analysis revealed no effect of hate crimes when included as a rate, or when focusing on violence alone, without counting vandalism. Additional analyses found no effect when removing the indicator for population or residence in a major city. 30 hijab) may create acute fear within that minority group, but may not have the same aggregated effect of the signal that nationalist success sends. That is, when a specific ethnic group is targeted by violence, that ethnic group may respond7. However, when the superiority of ethnic Russians over all other groups is touted, then the signal is sent to all minorities, regardless of group identification. This underlines the importance of creating a dichotomous variable to represent minority status. Although, rightfully so, attacks against Chechens and migrants from Central Asia receive media and political attention, anti-minority sentiment against Jews, Catholics, Muslims, Westerners, Roma, and even Slavic minorities such as Ukranians and Belarussians is prolific. Thus, dividing ethnic groups not only reduces statistical power, but also forces the researcher to make too many arbitrary decisions about which minority group should rightfully fear the success of Zhirinovsky and the LDPR in their region. Equally as troublesome is the problem of underreporting of hate crimes, both for research and policy-making purposes. In 2010, the SOVA Center reported a decline in violence against ethnic minorities, noting that the decline could be a result of anti-violence measures. However, “it [had become] increasingly apparent that information about [racist violence] incidents fails to make it into the public sphere – and we learn about them not right after the crime is committed, but once the attacker receives his court sentence” (Kozhevnikova 2010). This underreporting may be occurring universally, or may be geographically biased, but with the current data, it is impossible to know. However, the correlation between LDPR vote share and hate crimes indicates that it is not an arbitrary factor, and that an explanation of ethnic minority migration 7 Subsequent analysis on specific targeted ethnic groups, such as those from Central Asia or the North Caucasus, reduced the power of the model to an unsatisfactory degree. Nearly 80 ethnic groups are represented in the survey data, and dividing the respondents in such a way dramatically reduces the statistical viability of the model. 31 decision-making might benefit from exploring more liberal operationalization of this variable, perhaps avoiding the use of official statistics. Limitations One limitation of this study is based on the structure of the data. The RLMS only has nuanced measures of migration from 2009 on, which limits the scope of the study. Additionally, individual economic factors are not ideal, and should be interpreted with care, due to the necessity of carrying forward information over an entire household. (The household survey contains the dependent variable of out-migration, as well as birthdate and gender of the household members. The ethnicity and monthly income indicators are measured in the individual interviews, and must be assumed for the rest of the household.) Future Research Nationalist vote share appears to have some effect on migration decision-making by ethnic minorities in Russia. These findings hold even when controlling for regional economic variables. I have argued that nationalist vote share is a proxy for anti-minority sentiment, and that this sentiment is interpreted by ethnic minorities as contributing to a context in which life chances are at risk. Thus, ethnic minorities interpret this context as demanding an adaption. In climates of limited political advocacy, this adaptation may be out-migration. Further research is needed to unpack and better nuance these political factors. As the measurement of hate crimes is a significant limitation to the indicator, a better representation of 32 violence against minorities should be explored. The nationalist vote share as a proxy for anti- minority sentiment certainly does not capture the universe of racist undertones in the Russian Federation. Indeed, scholars have remarked at the pace at which mainstream politics under Putin have adopted radical ethnonationalist stances (Hanson 2010). Content analysis focusing on media may allow for a more accurate measurement of anti-minority sentiment. An unexpected finding was the difference in the gender effect between ethnic Russians and minorities. Young Russian men were more likely to migrate, but the gender coefficient was not statistically significant for ethnic non-Russians. This is not likely a story of family reunification, as the only migration the data measures is that of an individual who leaves her household behind. Thus, these are not whole households moving, but rather individual women with the same propensity to migrate as individual men who are also ethnic minorities. Subsequent qualitative work may shed light on the decision-making process for minority women versus that of Russian women. 33 References Agadjanian, Victor, Lesia Nedoluzhko, and Gennady Kumskov. 2008. “Eager to Leave? Intentions to Migrate Abroad among Young People in Kyrgyzstan 1.” International Migration Review 42(3):620–51. Allison, Paul D. 1984. Event History Analysis: Regression for Longitudinal Event Data. Sage. Anon. 2000. “Zhirinovsky: Russia’s Political Eccentric.” BBC News, March 10. Retrieved July 3, 2014 (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/667745.stm). Anon. 2011a. “Natsionalizm v sovremennoi Rossii (‘Nationalism in contemporary Russia’).” Levada Center, April 2. Retrieved (http://www.levada.ru/press/2011020407.html). Anon. 2011b. “Vladimir Zhirinovsky.” The Moscow Times, April 1. Retrieved July 3, 2014 (http://www.themoscowtimes.com/people/article/vladimir-zhirinovsky/434232.html). Barry, Ellen. 2010. “Russian Protests Erupt Over Soccer Fan’s Killing.” New York Times, December 12. Retrieved May 19, 2014 (http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/13/world/europe/13russia.html?mabReward=relbias:s &contentCollection=Homepage&t=qry720%23/moscow+protest/from20101201to201012 31/&action=click&region=Masthead&module=SearchSubmit&url=http://query.nytimes.c om/search/sitesearch/?action=click&pgtype=Homepage&pagewanted=print). Bidder, Benjamin. 2008. “Zhirinovsky’s Follies: Nuclear Threats and Busty Ladies in the Race for Second-Place in Russia.” Spiegel, February 28. Retrieved (http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/zhirinovsky-s-follies-nuclear-threats-and- busty-ladies-in-the-race-for-second-place-in-russia-a-538403.html). Conant, Eve. 2014. “Ethnic Russians: Pretext for Putin’s Ukraine Invasion?” National Geographic, May 2. 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Moscow: Sova Centre for Information and Analysis. Retrieved (http://www.sova-center.ru/en/xenophobia/reports- analyses/2010/07/d19436/). Kulaeva, Stephania, Olga Abramenko, Alexander Verkhovsky, and Simon Papuashvili. 2013. Implementation of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination by the Russian Federation. Sova Centre for Information and Analysis. Retrieved (http://www2.ohchr.org/English/bodies/cerd/docs/ngos/SOVA_ADCM- IPHR_FIDH_RussianFederation_CERD82.pdf). Lee, Everett S. 1966. “A Theory of Migration.” Demography 3(1):47–57. Lohmann, Susanne. 1993. “A Signaling Model of Informative and Manipulative Political Action.” The American Political Science Review 87(2):319. Massey, Douglas S. et al. 1993. “Theories of International Migration: A Review and Appraisal.” Population and Development Review 19(3):431–66. McMann, Kelly M., and Nikolai V. 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Bloom. 1985. “The New Economics of Labor Migration.” The American Economic Review 75(2):173–78. 35 State Duma. 2005. On the Election of Deputies of the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation. Tolnay, Stewart, and E. M. Beck. 1992. “Racial Violence and Black Migration in the American South, 1910 to 1930.” American Sociological Review 57(1):103–16. Verkhovsky, Alexander, Galina Kozhevnikova, and Olga Sibireva. 2010. Xenophobia, Freedom of Conscience and Anti-Extremism in Russia in 2009. Moscow: Sova Centre for Information and Analysis. Williams, Nathalie E., Dirgha J. Ghimire, William G. Axinn, Elyse A. Jennings, and Meeta S. Pradhan. 2012. “A Micro-Level Event-Centered Approach to Investigating Armed Conflict and Population Responses.” Demography 49(4):1521–46. Zhirinovsky, Vladimir. n.d. “A practical program for the Liberal Democratic Party.” Retrieved July 30, 2014 (ldpr.ru/party/Program_LDPR/A_practical_program_for_the_Liberal_Democratic_Party/ ). 36 Appendix - Figures and Tables Figures Figure 1 Map of the RLMS Sampling Sites in the Russian Federation 37 38 Tables Table 1. Ethnic Groups in the Russian Federation Ethnic Group Number of Residents % of Population Language Group Russians 115,889,107 79.83 Indo-European Tatars 5,554,601 3.83 Turkic Ukrainians 2,942,961 2.03 Indo-European Bashkirs 1,674,389 1.15 Turkic Chuvashs 1,637,094 1.13 Turkic Chechens 1,360,253 0.94 Caucasian Armenians 1,130,491 0.78 Indo-European Belarusians 807,970 0.56 Indo-European Kazakhs 653,962 0.45 Turkic Germans 597,212 0.41 Indo-European 39 Table 2 – LDPR Vote Share in RLMS-sampled regions Regions 2007 2011 Altai 6.45% 10.65% Amurskaya 10.13% 20.99% Chelyabinskaya 9.45% 11.77% Chuvashia 8.49% 10.67% Kabardino-Balkaria 0.41% 0.08% Kaliningradskaya 10.17% 14.10% Kaluzhskaya 8.23% 14.36% Khanty-Mansiisky AD 13.19% 22.53% Komi 11.42% 11.91% Krasnodarsky krai 8.07% 10.45% Krasnoyarsky krai 10.56% 16.99% Leningradskaya Oblast 8.64% 14.78% Lipeckaya 9.65% 14.40% Moscow city 7.14% 9.45% Novgorodskaya 9.55% 11.48% Penzenskaya 5.86% 10.12% Rostovskaya 5.36% 10.15% Saint-Petersburg city 7.48% 10.30% Saratovskaya 6.22% 7.24% Smolenskaya 11.99% 14.75% Tambovskaya 7.68% 7.09% Tatarstan 3.88% 3.48% Tomskaya 13.20% 17.85% Tulskaya 7.13% 9.21% Volgogradskaya 9.03% 13.28% ALL RUSSIA 8.15% 11.68% 40 Table 3 - Targets of Hate Crimes (Violence or Vandalism), 2009-2014 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Total Central Asia 132 103 49 42 62 397 Caucasus 96 48 22 18 29 213 Blacks 61 28 20 26 5 140 Arab world 2 2 5 1 10 Other Asian countries 48 21 13 5 6 93 Other "non-Slavic" 59 109 26 16 33 243 Jews 4 3 3 2 12 41 Table 4 – Descriptive Statistics8 of Explanatory and Control Variables, by Ethnicity Ethnic Russians Std. Dev. Ethnic non- Russians Std. Dev. Number of Individuals 30623 -- 4646 -- Number of Person-Years 76085 -- 11385 -- Median Age 43 17.82 45 17.69 Median Monthly Income (rubles) 10,000 19160.9 9,723 33176.19 Median 2009 GDP in Region of Residence 15,098 9649.469 15,290 8472.784 Median 2010 Population in Region of Residence 2,521,892 2,968,800 1,521,420 2,549,721 Median LDPR vote share in region of residence .0945 .0335932 .0849 .0492 Median Count of Hate Crimes in Region of Residence 4 42.75704 3 33.82214 Ethnic Russians Ethnic non-Russians Proportion in Owned Homes 91.23% 90.83% Proportion Female 57.31% 54.55% 8 Averages and proportions counted on the basis of person-years and not unique individuals. These figures can be interpreted as the average or proportion over the number of observations, and thus the average contributed to the model, instead of the raw average for individuals. 42 Table 6 – Proportion of Individuals in the Sample Migrating Out Each Year Ethnic Russian Majority Ethnic Non-Russian Minority Year Total # of Individuals Individuals Migrating Out This Year Percent Migrating Out Total # of Individuals Individuals Migrating Out This Year Percent Migrating Out 2009 3,961 0 (censored) n/a 560 0 (censored) n/a 2010 7,919 750 9.47% 1150 124 10.78% 2011 8,432 1,313 15.57% 1177 166 14.10% 2012 9,804 1,068 10.89% 1377 139 10.09% Table 7 – Example of Repeated Observation for Individual in RLMS Data Using an Event-History Model Year Individual ID Gender Age Ethnicity Income Home Ownership Vote Share Migrates Out This Year 2009 PERSON A FEMALE 32 Russian 12,000 No 11.2% No 2010 PERSON A FEMALE 33 Russian 15,000 No 11.2% No 2011 PERSON A FEMALE 34 Russian 15,000 Yes 11.2% No 2012 PERSON A FEMALE 35 Russian 16,000 Yes 14.5% Yes Table 5 – Count of Person-Years Represented in the RLMS Sample, 2009-2010 by Migration Status Year Does not migrate out this year Migrates out this year Totals 2009 11,549 0 (censored) 11,549 2010 24,274 1,152 25,426 2011 24,166 1,568 25,734 2012 25,446 1,333 26,779 Total 85,435 4,053 89,488 43 Table 8 – Correlation Matrix of variables included in the analysis Correlations with statistical significance indicators for the subsample of ethnic Russians are above the line (grey), Below the line (white) for the ethnic minority subsample. Migrates Out This Year Sex Age Std. Mo. Income Home Owned Survey Year Std. 2009 GDP Std. 2010 Pop. LDPR vote share Hate Crimes Count Major Cities9 Migrates Out This Year 1.00 -.0325* -.0730* .0017 -.0695* .0682* .0188* .0289* .0159* .0252* .0165* Sex .0047 1.00 .1230* -.0996* .0088* -.0059 .0080 .0052 -.0029 .0051 .0072 Age -.0549* .1207* 1.00 -.0136* .1758* .0043 .0156* .0262* -.0285* .0298* .0281* Std. Mo. Income .0189* -.0874* .012* 1.00 .0120* .0761* .1588* .1600* .0342* .1497* .1521* Home Owned -.0409* .0334* -.097* -.0689* 1.00 - .0129* .0245* .0615* -.0618* .0436* .0398* Survey Year .061* -.0030 -.006 .0613* -.0121 1.00 .0081* .0134* .4437* -.1034* .0020 Std. 2009 GDP .0529* .0367* .012* .1258* -.1117* .0296* 1.00 .5885* .0705* .6369* .6808* Std. 2010 Population .0396* .0013 .007 .0639* -.1600* .0326* .6755* 1.00 -.2837* .8614* .7750* LDPR vote share .0449* -.0027 .001 .0887* -.1020* .1746* .3364* .0609* 1.00 -.2640* -.2130* Hate Crimes Count .0283* .0115 .007 .0639* -.1055* - .0773* .6213* .8380* .0471* 1.00 .8356* Major Cities .0205* .0233* .010* .0606* -.0580* .0140 .6413* .7762* .0273* .8638* 1.00 9 Residence in Moscow or St. Petersburg city limits. 44 Table 9 – Results from Event History Models on Two Subsamples Model I Ethnic Russian Subsample Model II Ethnic non-Russian Subsample Coeff. CSE Coeff. CSE Ethnonationalist Factors LDPR .1463 1.196 3.4997*^^ 2.006 Count of Hate Crimes .0004 .0023 .0056 .0071 Individual and Household Factors Age -.0446*** .0030 -.0358*** .0075 Sex -.3417*** .0784 .17998 .2088 Home Owned .1622 .1360 .5227 .3762 Std. Mo. Income -.3572*** .0658 -.5585 .3655 Contextual Factors Std. 2009 GDP .0939* .0524 .0845 .1265 Std. 2010 Pop. .1611** .0766 .0793 .1887 Major Cities -.7045** .3060 -.7942 .9148 Survey Year .6762*** .0438 .2951*** .0744 Intercept -1362.39*** 87.98 -597.1734*** 149.77 *** p < 0.001 ** p < 0.05 * p < 0.10 in a two-tailed test ^^^ p < 0.001 ^^ p < 0.05 ^ p < 0.10 in a one-tailed test (for hate crimes and LDPR variables only) 
work_vzxxkbmxdzfllome4gd4cfnns4	----	International Journal of Academic Research in Business and Social Sciences Vol. 1 0 , No. 9, 2020, E-ISSN: 2 2 2 2 -6990 © 2020 HRMARS 934 Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://hrmars.com/index.php/pages/detail/publication-ethics Hate Crime as a Barrier to Religious Tolerance in Malaysia: An Analysis of Al-Shahrastani’s Methodology in the Study of Religion Tuan Syarifah Nursyaza Aina Tuan Mohd Zawawi, Aman Daima Md. Zain, Rahimah Embong, Hanif Md. Lateh@Junid, Wan Mohd Khairul Firdaus Wan Khairuldin, Engku Ahmad Zaki Engku Alwi To Link this Article: http://dx.doi.org/10.6007/IJARBSS/v10-i9/7886 DOI:10.6007/IJARBSS/v10-i9/7886 Received: 24 June 2020, Revised: 06 July 2020, Accepted: 10 August 2020 Published Online: 25 September 2020 In-Text Citation: (Zawawi, et al., 2020) To Cite this Article: Zawawi, T. S. N. A. T. M., Md. Zain, A. D., Embong, R., Md. Lateh@Junid, H., Khairuldin, W. M. K. F. W., Alwi, E. A. Z. E. (2020). Hate Crime as a Barrier to Religious Tolerance in Malaysia: An Analysis of Al- Shahrastani’s Methodology in the Study of Religion. International Journal of Academic Research in Business and Social Sciences. 10(9), 934-942. Copyright: © 2020 The Author(s) Published by Human Resource Management Academic Research Society (www.hrmars.com) This article is published under the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY 4.0) license. Anyone may reproduce, distribute, translate and create derivative works of this article (for both commercial and non-commercial purposes), subject to full attribution to the original publication and authors. The full terms of this license may be seen at: http://creativecommons.org/licences/by/4.0/legalcode Vol. 1 0 , No. 9, 2020, Pg. 934 - 942 http://hrmars.com/index.php/pages/detail/IJARBSS JOURNAL HOMEPAGE http://creativecommons.org/licences/by/4.0/legalcode International Journal of Academic Research in Business and Social Sciences Vol. 1 0 , No. 9, 2020, E-ISSN: 2 2 2 2 -6990 © 2020 HRMARS 935 Hate Crime as a Barrier to Religious Tolerance in Malaysia: An Analysis of Al-Shahrastani’s Methodology in the Study of Religion Tuan Syarifah Nursyaza Aina Tuan Mohd Zawawi1, Aman Daima Md. Zain1, Rahimah Embong1, Hanif Md. Lateh@Junid1, Wan Mohd Khairul Firdaus Wan Khairuldin1, Engku Ahmad Zaki Engku Alwi1 1Universiti Sultan Zainal Abidin, Malaysia Email: amandaima@unisza.edu.my Abstract Religious tolerance requires commitments from the society comprises of diverse backgrounds of religions, races and cultures. In Malaysia, religions and races are commonly interrelated. Malays are commonly known as Muslim, Chinese are commonly known as Buddhist or Christian. However, under current development, such relations are considered unnecessary since the population of Muslim, as well as other religions – are now involving people across races. Hence, each religion shared different cultures originated from their races. The shared values among the society should become a strength that could ensure the society to live in peace and harmony. The existence of hate crime involving religions are concerning in which it portrays the state of religious tolerance, particularly in Malaysia. Al-Shahrastani in his methodology exemplified religious tolerance that could be emulated. This paper is to significantly address the concern of hate crimes in Malaysia which considered as a barrier in practicing religious tolerance and the approaches used by al- Shahrastani in his practice to instill and improve religious tolerance in Malaysia. The methodology adopted for this paper is the qualitative approach which included literature review and observation. The finding shows that even though hate crimes are a barrier to religious tolerance in Malaysia, there are still possible improvements and suggestions that could be appropriated by emulating al-Shahrastani’s thoughts and methodology. Keywords: Hate Crime, Religious Tolerance, Al-Shahrastani Introduction The progress of humanity developed from the most primitive age involving deviation, integrity, guidance and misguidance to the heights of civilization. Throughout the way, divine guidance attended each phase providing appropriate solutions and assistance. The primitive and stereotypical reasoning originated from distorted perception has deteriorated the true teaching of a certain religion. For example, Islam is often mistaken for terrorism. In a Muslim minority country, society has International Journal of Academic Research in Business and Social Sciences Vol. 1 0 , No. 9, 2020, E-ISSN: 2 2 2 2 -6990 © 2020 HRMARS 936 been prejudicially educated with fear whenever Muslim is on the street. Some would run for their lives due to the fear of the repercussions that will follow. The association of Islam and making peace is linguistically proven which derived from a Syriac word. It is a religion that calls for peace, charity, humility and service. It is irony for a religion that carries peace in its own name to be associated with terrorism or anything close to it. Islam does not only promote the theory and concept of religious tolerance but also provides various representations in its teaching (Fadzil, 2011). Without a doubt, terrorism is definitely a real threat. However, it is extremely incorrect to associate the words Muslim and terrorist while the facts implore them to do otherwise. Across the globe, Islamophobia does exist. It is a real disease, which is fuelled by inhuman acts of terrorist groups, who did injustice to the name of Islam. In another perspective, the existence of hate crime involving religion; for example, Islamophobia is not only due to the acts of spreading terror but also because of the half-knowledge of the rest of the world on various Islamic topics. The study found that interfaith dialogue is able to build trust and connect people through a harmonious platform (Mandour, 2010). The hate crimes that happened to Muslims in the various places across the world create a very clear picture of the current state of religious tolerance that affects the world today. It is definitely a form of discrimination that is similar to racism, particularly in a Muslim minority country. This kind of event also occurs in certain countries involving a particular religion recognized as a minority. According to The New York Times (15/3/2019), Brenton H. Tarrant, the conspirator behind the Christchurch mosque terrorist attack is a 28-year-old bodybuilder and personal trainer from the small town of Grafton, Australia. He was particularly identified as a non-Muslim. Now, the question arises that why a non-Muslim would initiate a terror attack to the Muslims? It is because a terror attack is not about being a Muslim or a Christian or a Buddhist, it just means being vindicated to a particular organization or intention. It is about seeking revenge; ultimately it is not about religion. The association of religion and terrorism is invalid and does not represent each other. The existence of a particular group who are trying to undermine the religious framework and representation of certain religions with extreme acts should not justify the original teaching of religion to be questioned (Fadzil, 2011). The crime committed by the individual resulting in the death of Makram Ali during congregational prayer at Finsbury Park, London (BBC News, 29/6/2017) and Nabra Hassanen in Virginia (BBC News, 28/11/2018), clearly shows how radicalism and violence are across culture, religion and society. In Malaysia, the event that unfolded at the Sri Maha Mariamman Seafield temple over a land dispute and its escalation into a racial and religious matter shows how easily a matter can transform violently into a racial and religious issue (Patto, 2019). Malaysia is a unique country with the existence of diverse religions, races and cultures. The interrelation between religions and races undeniably exists, even though under current development, race is proven to not necessarily represent only one religion as well as the religion itself. International Journal of Academic Research in Business and Social Sciences Vol. 1 0 , No. 9, 2020, E-ISSN: 2 2 2 2 -6990 © 2020 HRMARS 937 Current Development of Hate Crime in Malaysia Hate crime related to religion is a matter of having perception. Perception is formed through facts that are either valid or inaccurate. If the perception is formed through false facts, it will certainly give a negative effect to the whole opinion. In other words, perception does not necessarily symbolize the reality and often the reality is ignored or neglected because of those perceptions created on a false foundation. This includes the propaganda to aggravate the image of certain religion combined the attitude and actions of the minority which have also increased the negative perception of the religion itself. Through perception, the hatred towards any religion can be translated into various forms and can give bad implications for society and the image of the religion itself. For example, Muslim’s current condition today is normalized by those perceptions and generalization, mainly exposed to or influenced by the media. In any population of a certain community, there would be a minority with different stands or the outliers that do not represent the vast majority. The justification and propagation of hate mongering against Muslims are usually by televising and publicizing of these fringe element within the Muslim community and they are forced to be the ambassadors or the representatives of what all Muslim is about. Islamophobia, in any place, can have significant implications for the lives of Muslims and it also affects socio-economic development including mental and physical states of individuals. In Malaysia, religious issues involving houses of worship such as mosques, churches and temples are increasingly widespread. This can be clearly seen through the incidence involving a petrol bomb which was thrown to three churches (Utusan Malaysia, 9/1/2010). A significant event that has taken place at the Sri Maha Mariamman Temple which was originally identified as an internal issue involving the management division has resulted in the rioting that killed a life. This is due to religious provocations and racial sentiments associated with the Hindu temple (Harian, 26/11/2018). Since these religious issues are interpreted differently according to their own personal and social interests, it has resulted in disunity among the community. The effects of hate crime existed in Malaysia has been endured by society across religions, races and cultures. This includes the event involving the murder of a transgender over theft has been misinterpreted as a hate crime due to the rise of hate speech targeting religion in Malaysia (New Straits Times, 3/1/2019). Religion has been repeatedly targeted and accused of authorizing hate crimes involving any issues and groups who go against its original teaching. Under the influence of Western media, society has started to go against each other and using religion as the main cause to allow more hatred and disagreements violently took place which finally destructing the religious institution as well as religious tolerance in Malaysia. Religious Tolerance in Islamic Perspective Why, one may ask, does religion stigmatized in this manner? Why religion is viewed and carelessly concluded to be the reason for every individual crime? Why is there so much bias and antagonism against religion within certain crucial segments of society? In certain places, race has always been the ultimate factor to be blamed whenever something uncomfortable happened. It usually involved prejudice, discrimination, or antagonism directed against someone of a different race based on the International Journal of Academic Research in Business and Social Sciences Vol. 1 0 , No. 9, 2020, E-ISSN: 2 2 2 2 -6990 © 2020 HRMARS 938 belief that one's own race is superior. Hate crime involving religious disputes contained almost similar content, which could possibly acknowledge, for example; Islamophobia, as a new form of racism. The former Prime Minister of Malaysia, Tun Haji Abdullah Ahmad Badawi emphasized the role of religious tolerance to avoid any misunderstandings, malicious elements and hatred among society (Kamali, 2009). Religious tolerance should exist naturally from moral values such as mutual respect, justice and trustworthy. However, the increase of religious issues has been affecting the perception as well as the surrounding environment. For example, the case of apostasy involving Lina Joy gained the attention of the community which results in interfaith polemic (Sabir et al, 2013). Allah SWT mentioned in the Holy Qur’an: “And do not let the hatred of a people for having obstructed you from al-Masjid al-Haram lead you to transgress. And cooperate in righteousness and piety, but do not cooperate in sin and aggression. And fear Allah; indeed, Allah is severe in penalty”. (al-Quran, 5: 2) “Allah does not forbid you from those who do not fight you because of religion and do not expel you from your homes - from being righteous toward them and acting justly toward them. Indeed, Allah loves those who act justly”. “Allah only forbids you from those who fight you because of religion and expel you from your homes and aid in your expulsion - [forbids] that you make allies of them. And whoever makes allies of them, then it is those who are the wrongdoers”. (al-Quran, 60: 8-9) Based on the above verses of the Holy Qur’an, religious tolerance has been recognized as one of the important principles in Islam. The emphasis of religious tolerance existed within the existence of a human being with different backgrounds in religion, race and culture. Allah SWT mentioned in the Holy Qur’an: O mankind, indeed We have created you from male and female and made you peoples and tribes that you may know one another. Indeed, the most noble of you in the sight of Allah is the most righteous of you. Indeed, Allah is Knowing and Acquainted. (al-Quran, 49:13) Religious tolerance is a value existed in the core of humanity that must be understood and practiced to ensure the society with different backgrounds in religions, races and cultures could live in peace and harmony. Religious tolerance according to Islamic scholars is to recognize the existence of religious diversity and respect for other beliefs, respecting the right of every individual to embrace and practice their religion for the purpose of achieving peace and harmony in multiracial and religious society (Ramly et al., 2018). Al-Shahrastani’s Illustration of Religious Tolerance Taj al-Din Abū al-Fath Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Karim ash-Shahrastani or commonly known as al- Shahrastani is a prominent scholar in the field of comparative religion. His most notable work acknowledged by scholars across the globe is al-Milal wa al-Nihal which contained a strong emphasis of a systematic study of religion. Al-Milal wa al-Nihal is a reflection of al-Shahrastani attitudes in which International Journal of Academic Research in Business and Social Sciences Vol. 1 0 , No. 9, 2020, E-ISSN: 2 2 2 2 -6990 © 2020 HRMARS 939 distinguish himself from the other scholars of the same field. His methodology is described as an objective way of examining the universal history of religion and humanity (Watt, 2014). Al-Milal wa al-Nihal is also described as a monumental work, presenting the views of all religions and philosophies according to the timeline existed up to al-Shahrastani’s time (Watt, 2014). The study of religion emphasized the interest in understanding religions which is not typical to only modern centuries, in fact, the contributions to the field started way back. The methodology used by scholars from every generation differs from each other. However, the attempts to defend, criticize or interpreting religion is accomplished for a purpose to understand religion, which – under a harmonious platform – would create a society with a better understanding of each other and in a way, would allow them to let moral values such as respect and tolerance to grow. The current development of knowledge, as well as the platform involving interfaith dialogue which has played an important part in instilling such values in Malaysia, proved to have a significant influence in creating peace and harmony at the societal level. Objective Study of Other Religions Al-Shahrastani in his work, al-Milal wa al-Nihal outlined an important grasp on his methodology which the emphasis is on studying other religions with a proper understanding and accurate presentation without distortion. This can be seen through his methodology in explaining different parts of religious understanding accordingly. His representation of religious thoughts without inserting any critical observation and conclusion shows his identity and toleration towards the differences in areas that are uncoordinated with his beliefs. For example, his representation on Buddha explains a lot of his characteristic in dealing with something different from his experience. Buddha was an ideal human. He was not born, did not get old, and even did not die. He avoided the pleasure of eating, drinking and remained celibate all his life. He was a perfect ascetic and an exemplary model for his disciples. Accordingly, a Buddhist can be defined as a seeker of truth, a practitioner of various ascetic works, and a holder of the deepest sense of inner morality. Buddhist ethical practices include having patience, giving alms, renouncing this world, abstaining from greed and worldly pleasure, and showing compassion for all creatures. Thus, a Buddhist is required to live an ethically correct life. In addition to practicing these ascetic disciplines, a Buddhist is encouraged to pursue spiritual perfection. He must enhance his intelligence and seek a higher existence. By doing so, he can liberate himself from this lower world that is destined to decline, live in the eternal world, and eventually be led to the presence of divine beings. Buddhism places importance on ascetic disciplines and spiritual endeavour (Ramli, Awang,& Ab Rahman., 2018). Naturally responding to religious fanatics and critical analysis with potential to create a distortion between people across the globe, these methodologies are ultimately synchronized with the idea of religious tolerance in a way to treat the reality as it is, even with variety of understanding that differentiate one to another religiously, culturally or in any reality existed in current time. His stand International Journal of Academic Research in Business and Social Sciences Vol. 1 0 , No. 9, 2020, E-ISSN: 2 2 2 2 -6990 © 2020 HRMARS 940 to represent other religion according to its authentic sources is an ultimate goal especially for a country that wishes to accommodate people from different backgrounds to ensure the claimed uniqueness are not disgraced by assumptions, false allegations, defamations and disparagement that could be ingenerated by unwillingness of society to be fair to one another. Phenomenological Method of Al-Shahrastani in His Study His presentation in al-Milal wa al-Nihal is using among these fundamental sources which are the source of revelation, the scholarly works as well as the direct sources such as dialogue and research (Faizal, Fairooz & Fahmi, 2015). Through his study, one thing that is clear on his study of other religious history and thoughts is his acknowledgement and understanding that religions and communities should be allowed to speak for themselves. For example, Al-Shahrastani visited India in the eleven and twelve centuries, regarding Buddhism's standing in India. He attempts to understand the Hindu culture in its own terms, letting the subject matter speak for itself which the main concern is to record facts as they are, without any prejudgments. The visit is not only to ensure that he generates the idea and sources primarily but also believes that the closest references should be made to the authentic scriptures and texts of the religions and the authoritative writings of their scholars. This is because the authentic scriptures will give the most correct information about the religion itself and their scholars are the expert ones in their religion. Al-Shahrastani envision the study on other religion in a constructive manner which primarily emphasized on knowledge and virtue in seeking as well as presenting certain information fairly. Such virtues like justice and respect are highly interrelated to tolerance involving every level and aspect of current realities today. This approach fails the act of prejudice, injustice, ill-mannered and presumption that could easily distort the unity of society in a country. The acceptance on the differences in any aspect in life should be brought together with the readiness to fairly learn, on the basis of knowledge, about others to ensure that any negativity is inexistence. Non-Polemical Study of Al-Shahrastani in Al-Milal wa al-Nihal Al-Shahrastani in his presentation is very specific, less polemical and particular in explaining religion comprehensively which has opened up space for an objective study. An objective study requires a presentation of the subject matter as it is, without prejudice and presumptions. This attitude is required in practicing religious tolerance in a way to ensure that the society lives in a healthy environment without the existence of any element of hatred which usually is the prerequisite to prejudice and presumptions. Al-Shahrastani in al-Milal wa al-Nihal used a dialogical method which specifically referring to his discussions or debates with certain groups such as Batiniyyah, in order to better understand and enable him to present the group as it is (Bashir, 2013). His involvement in this method includes his dialogue with the other scholars to collect as much information through reliable sources in order to maintain its authenticity. Hate crime in Malaysia involving religion as well as the other subject such as race, commonly begin with false accusations or assumptions which ended up to bring harm, not only to individuals but also to the family and societal institution. Al-Shahrastani in his attitude maintained a civilized manner when it comes to disagreement in terms of religions, cultures, thoughts and perspectives. The ability to instill the sense of respect and acceptance in the existence of people with different interpretations International Journal of Academic Research in Business and Social Sciences Vol. 1 0 , No. 9, 2020, E-ISSN: 2 2 2 2 -6990 © 2020 HRMARS 941 is required to ensure that Malaysia would not be witnessing another hate crime in the name of religion, race or thoughts in future. The continuation of uncivilized and inhuman acts is among the prime reason and barrier to religious tolerance among society in Malaysia. Al-Shahrastani in his approaches portrayed the attitudes one should possess in encountering differences and disagreements. His methods emphasized on understanding the differences, through a reliable source in order to ensure the validity of the understanding, without inserting any prejudgments. The absence of prejudgments as well as prejudiced in our values would allow us to fix what is incorrect and in a way, becomes our sources of da'wah which to represent Islam as a religion of peace. Hate crime is a serious act of injustice that breeds from disagreements which were allowed to penetrate the moral values and destructed them in an unhealthy way. Hence, it is important to highlight the significance to instill moral values such as respect and tolerance, which has been illustrated by al-Shahrastani in his approaches to study religions. Conclusion Over the years, religious tolerance in Malaysia is affected by misconceptions and presumptions which lead the society to commit hate crimes involving an element of religious disputes. Malaysia has been witnessing continuous disputes regarding the difference in religions, races, cultures and thoughts. The media has portrayed various types of hate crimes across the globe which carries a heavy influence on the societal responses for the same occurrence. Without a strong understanding and moral values, the destruction of society is as easy as how it was televised and publicized. Malaysia is a unique country with religious diversities which allow the society to live together despite the difference in religious practices, races and cultures. For years, Malaysia has proven to be a country with peace and harmony. However, it is difficult to maintain the same understanding for every generation under the influence of globalization. Hence, a strong example is needed to ensure the continuation of such values is instilled at every individual, family and societal level. Al-Shahrastani has provided solutions and remedies through his methodology in conveying messages regarding religious diversities. He avoids the element of religious polemic at any cost in order to ensure the study is objective. He maintained the authenticity of the work by referring the subject matter to the expert in orientation to subject, in order to avoid prejudice and presumptions. Under the same example, hate crimes which are viewed as the barrier to religious tolerance could be diminished through the same framework provided by al-Shahrastani in his work, al-Milal wa al-Nihal. Appreciation This article is a part of research under Fundamental Research Grant Scheme (FRGS), FRGS/1/2018/SSI03/UNISZA/02/3, project code RR269 and is supported by the Ministry of Education and Universiti Sultan Zainal Abidin (UniSZA). Corresponding Author Aman Daima Md. Zain, Universiti Sultan Zainal Abidin, Gong Badak Campus, 21300 Kuala Terengganu, Malaysia. International Journal of Academic Research in Business and Social Sciences Vol. 1 0 , No. 9, 2020, E-ISSN: 2 2 2 2 -6990 © 2020 HRMARS 942 Email: amandaima@unisza.edu.my References Fadzil, A. (2011). 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The Application of Technology in the Dissemination of Fatwas: A Study on Religious Institutions in Malaysia, International Journal of Civil Engineering and Technology, 9(7), 2018, 1590–1596. Patto, K. (2019). It's Time to Act Against Hate Speech and Hate Crimes. https://www.malaysiakini.com/news/458886 Ramli, A. F., Awang, J., & Rahman, Z. A. (2018). Muslim scholar’s discourse on Buddhism: A literature on Buddha’s position. SHS Web of Conferences, 53, 04001. Ramly, R. M., Sulaiman, M., Ab. Mutalib, M. M., & Othman, K. (2018). Persepsi Pemimpin Agama Kristian Terhadap Konsep Dan Amalan Toleransi Beragama Di Malaysia. Journal of Islamic Social Sciences and Humanities. Vol. 16 (Special Edition). Shukor, S. A. (2013). Respon Ulama Kontemporer Menanggapi Beberapa Isu dalam Pluralisme Agama di Malaysia. Vol. 5, Issue 2. Tayseir, M. M. (2010). Islam and Religious Freedom: Role of Interfaith Dialogue in Promoting Global Peace. BYU Law Review. Vol. 2010, Issue 3. Watt, W. M. (2014). Muslim-Christian Encounters: Perceptions and Misperceptions. London and New York: Routledge. 
work_walpfv6cqjctbbqree3bddoltq	----	Extreme risk protection orders in King County, Washington: the epidemiology of dangerous behaviors and an intervention response ORIGINAL CONTRIBUTION Open Access Extreme risk protection orders in King County, Washington: the epidemiology of dangerous behaviors and an intervention response Shannon Frattaroli1,2* , Elise Omaki2, Amy Molocznik2, Adelyn Allchin3, Renee Hopkins4, Sandra Shanahan5 and Anne Levinson6 Abstract Background: Extreme Risk Protection Order (ERPO) laws are a promising gun violence prevention strategy. ERPO laws allow specific categories of people (law enforcement in all states, family in most) to petition a court to request that an individual be temporarily prohibited from purchasing and possessing firearms because that individual is behaving dangerously and at risk of violence, either to themselves or others. In 2017 Washington State’s ERPO law took effect. King County developed a comprehensive approach to implementing the ERPO law. The early experience of King County offers important insight into how early adopters of these laws are incorporating EPROs into their approach to gun violence prevention. Methods: We systematically reviewed, abstracted and coded data from every ERPO petition filed in King County in 2017 and 2018, and all ERPO court records associated with those petitions. We conducted descriptive analyses of the coded data. Results: Seventy-five ERPO petitions were filed in King County during the study period. Judges granted a temporary ERPO in all 75 cases; 65 (87%) of these cases resulted in a one-year ERPO. Law enforcement initiated 73 (97%) of these petitions, and family members filed the remaining two. The 75 petitions filed described respondents’ risk as to “themselves only” in 30 cases (40%), to “others only” in 20 cases (27%) and “to themselves and others” in 25 cases (33%). Five cases where the threat was to “others only” met a definition of mass shooting threat. For 95% of the temporary ERPOs issued, the courts’ reasoning for issuing ERPOs included either current violence or brandishing a firearm. Court records for the 75 cases detail firearms removed and/or include receipts for removed firearms in 61 cases (81%) either as part of ERPO precipitating events (n = 13, 17%) or in conjunction with ERPO service (n = 48, 64%). (Continued on next page) © The Author(s). 2020 Open Access This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence, and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this article are included in the article's Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the article's Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder. To view a copy of this licence, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/. The Creative Commons Public Domain Dedication waiver (http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/) applies to the data made available in this article, unless otherwise stated in a credit line to the data. * Correspondence: Sfratta1@jhu.edu 1The Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, Center for Gun Policy and Research, 624 North Broadway, Baltimore, MD 21205, USA 2The Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, Department of Health Policy and Management, 624 North Broadway, Baltimore, MD 21205, USA Full list of author information is available at the end of the article Frattaroli et al. Injury Epidemiology (2020) 7:44 https://doi.org/10.1186/s40621-020-00270-1 http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1186/s40621-020-00270-1&domain=pdf http://orcid.org/0000-0002-2973-277X http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/ mailto:Sfratta1@jhu.edu (Continued from previous page) Conclusions: These findings suggest that Washington’s ERPO law is being applied when someone is threatening violence to self or others, or brandishing a gun and at least one other risk factor is present. The early experience of King County provides insight into how this law is being implemented in one jurisdiction and how courts are evaluating such cases. Keywords: Firearm injury, Extreme risk protection order, Policy, Suicide, Homicide, Implementation Introduction As of July 1, 2020, 19 states and the District of Columbia (DC) authorize specific categories of people (e.g., law en- forcement, family, household members) to petition a court for a civil order to temporarily restrict persons at extreme risk of harming themselves or others from hav- ing access to guns, by prohibiting gun purchase and pos- session. (Bloomberg American Health Initiative, n.d.) These orders are generally known as Extreme Risk Pro- tection Orders (ERPOs), although not all statutes use this term. For example, California uses the term Gun Violence Restraining Order (GVRO), Risk Protection Order (RPO) is the name used under Florida law, and Lethal Violence Protection Order (LVPO) describes or- ders in Delaware. (Bloomberg American Health Initia- tive, n.d.) Media and policymakers commonly refer to these laws as red flag laws. For simplicity (and because the term "red flag law" stigmatizes individuals with men- tal illness and mischaracterizes the evidence-based ap- proach these laws use), we refer to these orders as ERPOs. All but 2 of these ERPO laws were adopted since 2016, based on a recommendation by the Consortium for Risk-based Firearm Policy released in the aftermath of the Sandy Hook Elementary School shooting in Con- necticut. (Consortium for Risk-Based Firearm Policy 2013; McGinty et al. 2014) Typically, legislatures have passed ERPO laws in response to mass shootings. While a case series using California data documents that indi- viduals threatening mass violence are respondents to these orders, (Wintemute et al. 2019) both early com- mentary (Frattaroli et al. 2015) and recent studies (Kivisto and Phalen 2018; Swanson et al. 2019; Swanson et al. 2017) suggest that ERPO laws are also a promising strategy for preventing suicide. We do note that these outcome studies to date reflect findings from Connecti- cut and Indiana, the two states with early “risk warrant” laws that predate the Consortium's recommendation and which differ in some procedural ways from that recom- mendation such as who can initiate the formal process (only law enforcement can request a risk warrant, al- though Florida, New Mexico, Rhode Island, and Virginia -- some of the most recent states to enact ERPO laws -- also limit petitioners to law enforcement) and the court proceedings that follow. (Bloomberg American Health Initiative n.d.) The rapid uptake of ERPO laws across the United States provides an opportunity to answer ques- tions about how ERPOs are being used (e.g., in response to threats of suicide, violence against others and/or mass shootings), inform implementation policy and practice, and provide a foundation for future ERPO evaluations. We sought to explore ERPO implementation by exam- ining the experience of King County, Washington. We chose to focus on King County for several reasons. King County’s ERPO implementation processes built on the re- gional effort there to strengthen policies and practices to enforce civil court orders prohibiting domestic violence offenders from purchasing and possessing firearms. Leaders in King County, the most populous county in the state and home to Seattle, established the Regional Do- mestic Violence Firearms Enforcement Unit (Unit), com- posed of police, prosecutors, a court orders “problem- solver,” and victim advocates with expertise in intimate partner violence and gun laws. Premised on a risk-based, public health approach to reduce the risk of harm, im- proving swift and certain compliance with firearm dispos- session orders for respondents to Domestic Violence Protection Orders (DVPOs) (who are prohibited from accessing, purchasing and possessing firearms and other dangerous weapons, or having a concealed pistol license while subject to a DVPO) is a priority of the Unit. Because ERPO laws follow a similar process that is based on state DVPO laws, (Frattaroli et al. 2015) the basic infrastructure needed to implement ERPOs was already in place. In addition, the Unit worked with the Seattle Police Depart- ment’s Crisis Response Unit – which responds to people experiencing a behavioral crisis (City of Seattle 2019) – to assure both their experience and their personnel were part of ERPO implementation. Washington was the second state, after California, of the 17 states that enacted an ERPO law post-Sandy Hook Elementary School shooting, and King County, in particular, through its new regional Unit, was an early ERPO adopter. As a result, the County’s initial efforts yielded sufficient quantities of ERPOs to in- form this initial analysis. Finally, we view the experience of King County, and the Unit, as informative for ERPO im- plementation in other jurisdictions. Overview of Washington law Washington voters passed ballot initiative 1491 (that would become the State’s ERPO law) on November 8, Frattaroli et al. Injury Epidemiology (2020) 7:44 Page 2 of 9 2016 with 69% of voters statewide and a majority of voters in 32 of the State’s 39 counties, including King County. (Ballotpedia 2016) The law took effect on De- cember 8, 2016. Washington’s ERPO law authorizes law enforcement, family (including intimate partners), and household members to first petition a court for a tem- porary (“ex parte”) ERPO to be issued without notice to the respondent when petitioners “have personal know- ledge that the respondent poses a significant danger of causing personal injury to self or others in the near fu- ture by having in his or her custody or control, purchas- ing, possessing, or receiving a firearm.” (Revised Code of Washington Chapter 7.94 n.d.) These orders are emer- gency orders that may be issued by a court when the threat of harm is imminent. The petition for the temporary order results in an im- mediate hearing that includes the petitioner and judge who grants or denies the request for a temporary ERPO based on whether the information provided by the peti- tioner, under penalty of perjury, establishes reasonable cause to enter the order. The petition must identify the number, types, and locations of any firearms the peti- tioner believes to be in the respondent’s possession, if any, so that law enforcement can remove them when the order is served. To determine a respondent’s level of risk, courts are to consider certain factors that research has demonstrated indicates a person is at an elevated risk of committing harm or violence to themselves or others, which are specified in the law (e.g., violent act or threat, violation of a protection order, problematic sub- stance use, criminal history, brandishing a firearm, ac- cess to or intention to acquire a firearm). The court must then hold a hearing within 14 days to de- termine if a one-year ERPO should be issued. The respond- ent must be served with notice of the hearing, including the underlying petition and temporary order, at least five court days prior to the full hearing. During the hearing, both the petitioner and the respondent participate and the judge de- termines whether a preponderance of evidence has been established to issue an ERPO. Both temporary and one-year EPROs prohibit respondents from having custody or con- trol, purchasing or attempting to purchase, possessing or receiving, firearms, or having a concealed pistol license, for the duration of the order. In 2019, Washington amended its law to replace “dan- gerous mental health issues” with “behaviors that present an imminent threat of harm to self or others,” add hate crime convictions as criteria for courts to consider when is- suing an ERPO, explicitly include minors as ERPO respon- dents, make the court process more immediate for officers dealing with rapidly emergent threats, and clarify other as- pects of the law. (Washington State Legislature 2019). While the literature documents how some local jurisdic- tions implement DVPOs, (Frattaroli and Teret 2006; Wintemute et al. 2014) there is scant information about ERPO implementation. In one evaluation of Connecticut’s risk warrant law (an ERPO-style law enacted in 1999 that allows only for law enforcement to petition the court) the authors include perspectives from law enforcement about implementation processes. (Swanson et al. 2017) Here we seek to add to the Connecticut and Indiana findings, and to the California case series, by addressing three questions: Who are the petitioners and respondents in ERPO cases? What are the behaviors described in ERPO petitions? How have courts responded to ERPO petitions? Methods We reviewed all ERPO petitions filed and heard in King County municipal, district or superior courts from Janu- ary 1, 2017 through December 31, 2018. Case docu- ments included the petitions and supporting materials, temporary ERPOs and one-year ERPOs issued, receipts for firearms obtained, and respondent and petitioner in- formation provided to the court. Because these are pub- licly available data, our institutional review board deemed this study to be "not human subjects research". We abstracted data from these court records using a single form developed by the research team. We used an early version of the form to review a small number of cases and made minor modifications to clarify and streamline the data collection process. The final form captured data about respondent demographics, whether the petitioner was a law enforcement officer or a family/ household member, respondent criminal history (if any), and narrative text detailing the petitioner’s encounter or past interactions with the respondent that preceded the ERPO petition. We also included information about the court’s basis for issuing an ERPO, as selected from a list of options on the ERPO form. Washington’s ERPO law requires the court to make findings regarding the grounds for issuing an ERPO. If the court declines to issue an ERPO, it must include in the record the particu- lar reason(s) for the court’s denial. Between February and April 2019 we abstracted data from an internal case management system maintained by the King County Prosecuting Attorney’s Office (where the Unit is located) about the number of firearms removed from each re- spondent after the court issued an ERPO and entered all resulting data into a Microsoft Access database. We used SAS 9.4 for all analyses. Our team a-priori identified summary variables of inter- est informed by our research questions and guided by the data abstraction form. We also sought to identify cases where mass shooting was a risk, and used the definition developed by Wintemute, et al. to identify such cases. That definition includes two parts: “1) a judicial officer is- sued [an ERPO] after the subject of the order had made a clear declaration of intent to commit a mass shooting or Frattaroli et al. Injury Epidemiology (2020) 7:44 Page 3 of 9 had exhibited behavior suggesting such an intent; and 2) the subject had or would soon have access to firearms.” (Wintemute et al. 2019) After receiving an introduction to the court records system, two authors (EO and AM) inde- pendently coded all of the narratives and then met to dis- cuss and reconcile any disagreements. When the two coders were unable to agree, a third coder (SF) served as the tiebreaker. The two main coders, who were new to reviewing court records, had ready access to a representa- tive from the prosecutor's office (co-author SS) where they accessed the ERPO records and participated in regular study team meetings with the representative and a retired judge (co-author AL). Resulting analyses include descriptive statistics of re- spondent demographics, categories of petitioners, and petition characteristics. Using the coded risk status vari- ables, we generated a mutually exclusive analytical vari- able for risk to self only, risk to others only, or risk to both self and others. Results Here we describe the incidents that precipitated the ERPO petitions, the courts’ decisions about those peti- tions at each hearing, and the firearms removed in re- sponse to those court orders. ERPO petitioners and respondents In 2017 there were 3 ERPO petitions filed in King County, Washington; in 2018, there were 72. Respon- dents were primarily male and white (Table 1) with an average age of 42; most (n = 43, 57%) respondents had multiple law enforcement encounters noted in the court records (not included in the tables) prior to the incident leading to the ERPO petition noted in the court records. Relative to the King County population, (US Census Bureau 2020) ERPO respondents were more often male (84% vs. 50%), and white (75% vs. 67%) or black (12% vs. 7%). Of the 75 petitions, family and partners were the petitioners for two. The remaining 73-law enforcement- initiated petitions resulted from calls for assistance most often initiated by family or friends of the respondents (n = 38, 51%) or the respondents themselves (n = 13, 17%). Among the family or friends who called law enforce- ment, most (84%) were eligible petitioners under the law because of their familial relationship to the respondent. Whether they were aware of ERPOs when they called law enforcement or knew they were eligible petitioners, is not consistently noted in the court records. The re- mainder of the calls to law enforcement came from other groups, as noted in Table 1. Dangerous behaviors that precipitated ERPO petitions The 75 petitions filed described respondents’ risk as to “themselves only” in 30 cases (40%), to “others only” in 20 cases (27%) and “to themselves and others” in 25 cases (33%) (Table 2.) The three most common danger- ous behaviors we coded, based on descriptions of events that precipitated the ERPO filings noted in the court re- cords, varied across these three risk profiles. Among the 30 respondents posing a risk to themselves only, each of their court records included a current, explicit expressed desire, intention or action to end their life; 14 (47%) noted substance use that caused concern among those on the scene of the precipitating event; and eight (27%) included brandishing a firearm. For the 20 respondents deemed to be a risk to others only, ERPO court docu- ments for 18 (90%) cases included threats or acts of vio- lence; 12 (60%) included reports of brandishing a firearm; and 10 (50%) had a history of law enforcement encounters (arrest only, or arrest with conviction). The 25 respondents posing a risk to both themselves and others had on average the highest number of dangerous behaviors coded, with court records noting a current ex- plicit expression to end their life among most (n = 16, 64%); substance use that caused concern among those on the scene in 15 (60%) cases; and 14 (56%) with past law enforcement criminal encounters (Table 2). While Table 1 ERPO respondents and petitioners Descriptor N (%) Respondent Mean, Median Age (SD) 41.6, 37.5 (16.3) Respondent Sex Male 63 (84%) Female 12 (16%) Respondent Race White 56 (75%) Black 9 (12%) Asian 4 (5%) Other 2 (3%) Unknown 4 (5%) Petitioner Seattle Police Department 46 (61%) Other King County Law Enforcement Agency 27 (36%) Family Member of Respondent 2 (3%) Petitioner was notified by: Friend or family member 38 (51%) Eligible Petitioner 32 (43%) Non-Eligible Petitioner 6 (8%) Respondent 13 (17%) Members of the Public 9 (12%) Neighbors 6(8%) Health Care Agency 4 (5%) Law Enforcement Agency 1(1%) Other or Unknown 4 (5%) Frattaroli et al. Injury Epidemiology (2020) 7:44 Page 4 of 9 family members and friends who initiated the calls for assistance that preceded ERPO petitions most often (n = 18, 47%) reported respondent self-harm risks, respon- dents who initiated calls for assistance were almost equally at risk of self-harm (n = 5, 38%), harm to others (n = 4, 31%) and both (n = 4, 31%). Those at risk of sui- cide self-reported directly to law enforcement, indirectly through a crisis hotline in three cases, or expressed sui- cidal intent while being arrested for driving under the influence. The other eight respondents who self- Table 2 Petitioners’ dangerous behaviors noted in court records Risk Factor Risk to Self only N = 30 (40%) Risk to Others only N = 20 (27%) Risk to Self and Others N = 25 (33%) Total N = 75 Suicide risk Yes 30 (100%) 0 25 (100%) 55 (73%) Explicit behaviors 30 (100%) 0 16 (64%) 46 (61%) Implicit behaviors 0 0 9 (36%) 9 (12%) No or Unknown 0 20 (100%) 0 (0%) 20 (27%) Risky Substance Use Yes, Substance(s): 14 (47%) 6 (30%) 15 (60%) 35 (47%) Alcohol 13 (43%) 5 (25%) 10 (40%) 28 (37%) Marijuana 1 (3%) 3 (15%) 5 (20%) 9 (12%) Prescription Drugs 2 (6%) 0 (0%) 4 (16%) 6 (8%) Opioids 1 (3%) 1 (5%) 1 (4%) 3 (4%) Illicit Drugs 0 (0%) 1 (5%) 2 (8%) 3 (4%) Other/Unknown 2 (7%) 1 (5%) 3 (12%) 6 (8%) No or Unknown 16 (53%) 14 (70%) 10 (40%) 40 (53%) Threatening violence or violent behaviors Yes 3 (10%) 18 (90%) 14 (56%) 35 (47%) No or Unknown 27 (90%) 2 (10%) 11 (44%) 40 (53%) Criminal History Yes 4 (13%) 10 (50%) 14 (56%) 28 (37%) No or Unknown 26 (87%) 10 (50%) 11 (44%) 47 (63%) Brandished firearm Yes 8 (27%) 12 (60%) 7 (28%) 27 (36%) No or Unknown 22 (73%) 8 (40%) 18 (72%) 48 (64%) Irrational/erratic behaviors Yes 2 (7%) 9 (45%) 12 (48%) 23 (31%) No or Unknown 28 (93%) 11 (55%) 13 (52%) 52 (69%) History of domestic violence Yes 3 (10%) 8 (40%) 5 (20%) 16 (21%) No or Unknown 27 (90%) 12 (60%) 20 (80%) 59 (79%) Expressed intent to obtain firearm Yes 4 (13%) 2 (10%) 2 (8%) 8 (11%) No or Unknown 26 (87%) 18 (90%) 23 (92%) 67 (89%) Recently purchased firearm Yes 3 (10%) 0 (0%) 2 (8%) 5 (7%) No or Unknown 27 (90%) 20 (100%) 23 (92%) 70 (93%) Number of risk factors identified through coding court files Mean (SD) 2.37 (1.16) 3.25 (0.91) 3.48 (0.96) 2.97 (1.14) Median (Range) 2 (1–6) 3 (2–5) 4 (1–5) 3 (1–6) Frattaroli et al. Injury Epidemiology (2020) 7:44 Page 5 of 9 reported contacted law enforcement with complaints about others’ risky behaviors (n=3), or threatening to harm others (n=5). Five (7%) of these cases met Wintemute’s definition of mass shooting threat. (Wintemute et al. 2019) All of these respondents threatened to shoot and kill specific groups (i.e. law enforcement, school communities) and two respondents additionally threatened violence against the public generally. In two cases, the threatened settings were evacuated in response to the threats. Court records note that all of these respondents expressed an intention to buy firearms. There are no references to any of these respondents already possessing firearms prior to the pe- tition or to law enforcement removing firearms as part of ERPO service, indicating one or more other required factors were present that warranted a prohibition on purchase and future possession nonetheless. Court decisions on ERPO petitions Courts issued temporary ERPOs for all 75 petitions. The three most frequent reasonable cause findings courts cited for granting temporary ERPOs in response to these petitions were violent threats and/or behaviors (n = 62, 86%), a pattern of violence (n = 34, 47%), and brandish- ing a firearm (n = 32, 44%); 71 of the 75 (95%) cases had at least one of these findings (Table 3). In most cases (n = 69, 92%), judges selected multiple findings. While these findings varied somewhat among those petitioners identified as “at risk of suicide only,” “risk to others only, ” or “risk to both self and others,” violent threats and/or Table 3 Courts’ reasonable cause findings for issued temporary ERPOs Reasonable Cause for temporary ERPO2 Risk to Self only N = 29 (40%) Risk to Others only N = 19 (27%) Risk to Self and Others N = 24 (33%) Total N = 721 a. Violence and threats 28 (97%) 15 (79%) 19 (79%) 62 (86%) b. Pattern of violence 8 (28%) 13 (68%) 13 (54%) 34 (47%) c. Brandished 11 (38%) 12 (63%) 9 (38%) 32 (44%) d. Dangerous Mental Health Issues3 10 (34%) 6 (32%) 13 (54%) 29 (40%) e. Substance Use 8 (28%) 5 (26%) 6 (25%) 19 (26%) f. Intent to obtain 7 (24%) 2 (11%) 6 (25%) 15 (21%) g. Felony Crime 0 (0%) 6 (32%) 8 (33%) 14 (19%) h. Force 1 (3%) 7 (37%) 6 (25%) 14 (19%) i. DV Crime 0 (0%) 6 (32%) 7 (29%) 13 (18%) j. Access 7 (24%) 2 (11%) 3 (13%) 12 (17%) k. Recently Acquired 5 (17%) 2 (11%) 3 (13%) 10 (14%) l. Violated PO 0 (0%) 2 (11%) 1 (4%) 3 (4%) m. Stalking 0 (0%) 3 (16%) 0 (0%) 3 (4%) n. Other 1 (3%) 3 (16%) 1 (4%) 5 (7%) Petition Outcome Risk to Self only N = 30 (40%) Risk to Others only N = 20 (27%) Risk to Self and Others N = 25 (33%) Total N = 75 Temp ERPO Granted 30 (100%) 20 (100%) 25 (100%) 75 (100%) Full ERPO Granted 26 (87%) 18 (90%) 21 (84%) 65 (86%) Full ERPO Denied 4 (13%) 2 (10%) 2 (8%) 8 (11%) Case Dismissed 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 2 (8%) 2 (3%) 1In three cases (one each from risk to self, risk to others, and risk to self and others), the temporary ERPO was issued, but no reasonable cause was selected 2Reasonable causes for ERPO are: a. Violence: Respondent has recently committed or threatened violence against self or others, whether or not respondent had a firearm b. Pattern: Respondent has shown, within the past 12 months, a pattern of acts or threats of violence, which can include violent acts against self or others c. Brandished: Respondent has unlawfully or recklessly used, displayed, or brandished a firearm d. Dangerous mental health issues: Behaviors that present an imminent threat of harm to self or others e. Substance use: There is corroborative evidence of the respondent’s abuse of alcohol or controlled substances f. Intent to obtain: Respondent expressed intent to obtain a firearm(s) g. Felony crime: Respondent has been arrested for or convicted of a felony offence or violent crime h. Force: Respondent has a history of use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against another person i. DV crime: Respondent has been arrested for or convicted of a domestic violence crime j. Access: Respondent has access to someone else’s firearms k. Recently aquired: Respondent recently acquired a firearm l. Violated PO: Respondent violated a civil or criminal protection order, no-contact order or restraining order. m. Stalking: Respondent has a history of stalking another person n. Other 3In 2019, Washington amended its law to replace “dangerous mental health issues” with “behaviors that present an imminent threat of harm to self or others” Frattaroli et al. Injury Epidemiology (2020) 7:44 Page 6 of 9 behaviors was the leading finding for all three categories (Table 3). Of the 75 temporary orders issued, court records indi- cate that 14 respondents appeared at the hearing to con- test the issuance of a one-year ERPO. In eight of these cases, the court denied the requested order (finding that the legal standard for the court to issue a one-year order was not met). The court dismissed an additional two cases: one after the respondent died in a motor vehicle crash and a second because the respondent was prohib- ited from possessing firearms through a felony convic- tion resulting from the same incident that initiated the ERPO petition. Courts granted ERPOs in the remaining four contested cases. Among the denied petitions, all eight had included a reasonable cause finding of violent threats or acts (directed at self and/or others) for the temporary ERPO and in five of the eight cases the court continued the temporary ERPO at least once (mean length of temporary ERPOs continued in these five cases = 129 days, range 28–407 days) so that it would remain in place during any delays surrounding the hearing date. This small number of cases resulting in denied and dis- missed ERPOs precludes significance testing of compari- sons with the cases for which courts granted ERPOs. Impacts of ERPO petitions: firearms removed Among the 75 cases, court records detail firearms re- moved and/or include receipts for removed firearms in 61 cases (81%) either as part of ERPO precipitating events (n = 13, 17%) or in conjunction with ERPO ser- vice (n = 48, 64%). For 10 cases (13%) the descriptions of respondents’ dangerous behaviors that prompted the ERPO petitions did not include information about re- spondents possessing firearms. The records do note in seven of those 10 cases that respondents expressed their intention to obtain firearms, but in three cases respon- dents neither possessed nor expressed plans to obtain firearms. In these cases, court records include declara- tions from the respondents as documentation that the respondents did not have firearms to relinquish. The remaining four cases (5%) include information about re- spondents’ firearms, but there is no indication that the respondents were dispossessed of those firearms after the court issued ERPOs. Discussion This descriptive analysis of the initial years of ERPO im- plementation in King County provides early insight into how these laws are being used to intervene when people are behaving dangerously and at risk of committing gun violence and informs what policymakers, implementers, and the public can expect from ERPO laws. Who are the petitioners and respondents in ERPO cases? Law enforcement filed the overwhelming majority (97%) of ERPO petitions in King County. Of note, family mem- bers were most frequently the group to engage law en- forcement in the events that precipitated ERPO petitions (43%), followed by respondents (17%). The role of family and the eventual respondent in engaging with law en- forcement suggests that at times family and individuals at risk are well-positioned to recognize when the risk of violence is escalating and law enforcement intervention is needed. Whether family who called for law enforce- ment assistance in these cases were aware of ERPOs or seeking law enforcement assistance with initiating an ERPO is not known based on these data. Whether family members seeking law enforcement assistance would pe- tition on their own and under what circumstances, are questions worth exploring as states and localities assess how best to implement ERPO laws. ERPO respondents in King County were overwhelm- ingly male (84%) with an average age of 42. Both white and black respondents are over-represented in the King County data. As ERPO implementation evolves in com- munities throughout the country, we urge implementers and researchers to understand how ERPOs are being used, particularly with communities of color where relationships with law enforcement are too often strained. ERPOs are an upstream civil intervention with few collateral conse- quences relative to traditional criminal justice options (e.g., arrest, incarceration, involuntary treatment), so for those reasons it may be seen as a preferred approach. Even so, assuring ERPO implementation is transparent and constructive, and does not result in unjust punitive conse- quences, will be important to realizing the preventive intention -- minimizing risk of harm due to firearm vio- lence -- and potential of this law. Engaging with commu- nities about how to use ERPOs effectively is an investment worth making. That most of the King County petitions re- sulted from contact initiated by family, friends and the re- spondents themselves suggests that law enforcement is using ERPOs as a tool to help respond to calls for assist- ance as one of several intervention options, and not as an enforcement action to target particular groups. What are the behaviors described in ERPO petitions? The largest segment of petitions filed was in response to suicide risk (40%) and risk of harm to self and others (33%). Fully 73% of respondents threatened self- harm. Those threatening harm to others only were the smallest group of ERPO respondents in King County but included all five mass shooting threats we identified. The mass shooting threats represent 7% of all temporary ERPOs issued, which is less than the 13% reported by Wintemute and colleagues in their analysis of California data. (Wintemute et al. 2019) With the inclusion of hate Frattaroli et al. Injury Epidemiology (2020) 7:44 Page 7 of 9 crimes in the 2019 amendments to Washington’s ERPO law, use of ERPOs in response to mass shooting threats may increase. How have courts responded to ERPO petitions? King County ERPO petitions consistently met the legal standard set forth in Washington law as evidenced by the courts’ decisions to grant temporary ERPOs for every petition filed, and to grant full ERPOs in 87% of those cases. The petitions described people who were express- ing their intentions to commit violence, and most pos- sessed firearms as well. While those narratives included many indicators of risk (risky substance use, criminal histories, and access or intention to obtain firearms) for 95% of the temporary ERPOs issued, the courts’ reason- ing for issuing ERPOs included either current violence or brandishing a firearm. These findings suggest that Washington’s ERPO law, which defines ERPOs for use when an individual “poses a significant danger of causing personal injury to self or others in the near future by having in his or her custody or control, purchasing, pos- sessing, or receiving a firearm” is being applied when someone is threatening violence to self or others, or brandishing a gun and at least one other risk factor is present. We did not observe ERPO petitions filed or is- sued solely because of risky substance use, involvement with the justice system, or access to a gun. Rather, these facts appear to be secondary to violent threats and ac- tions when petitioners and the courts assess whether an ERPO is an appropriate response. When respondents contested ERPOs in King County, the court tended to deny the one-year ERPO. Due to the small number (n = 8) of cases the court denied at the one-year order hearing, we were unable to test for any differences between contested orders that were granted and those that were denied. However, we do note that the denied cases all involved threats or acts of violence. Furthermore, from the perspective of the reviewers on our team, denied cases appeared qualitatively similar to cases where one-year ERPOs were issued in terms of the level of dangerousness conveyed through the court doc- uments. Whether respondents who successfully contest are different from those whose cases result in a full ERPO in terms of their risk, representation by counsel or other factors, and whether petitions that are ultim- ately denied (and thus shorten the time that a respond- ent is dispossessed of firearms) affect personal or public safety are all empirical questions that should be pursued. Do ERPOs result in firearm removal? When courts in King County issue an ERPO, most often respondents are dispossessed of firearms. Whether dis- possession happens at the precipitating event, during service of the order, or is initiated by the respondent, the infrastructure in place in King County is resulting in firearms removed. Importantly, ERPOs in Washington are also being used to preempt firearm acquisition when an individual is at heightened risk of committing vio- lence. This is consistent with both the intent of ERPOs and Washington law. (Revised Code of Washington 7.94 n.d.) The five mass shooting threats included in the data were all instances where the threat was real, even though the respondents did not have a firearm that law enforce- ment was aware of. Our findings are largely consistent with early research from Connecticut and Indiana about use of ERPO laws. (Swanson et al. 2017; Swanson et al. 2019) Temporarily removing firearms from people who are in crisis was demonstrated to be feasible in Connecticut and Indiana, and the demographic profile of respondents is similar across the data in Indiana, Connecticut and King County. The largest segment of petitions in all three ju- risdictions was in response to suicide risk (61 and 68% in Connecticut and Indiana, respectively). Likewise, po- lice were informed about the respondent by family members in Connecticut and Indiana at similar propor- tions as in King County. Unlike in King County, how- ever, neither Connecticut nor Indiana include any cases where the eventual respondent initiated the law enforce- ment contact that would lead to an ERPO petition. Limitations and strengths Here we present a descriptive study of ERPO petitions from one jurisdiction served by several law enforcement agencies, based on a review of court records. As such, the findings presented herein offer insight into the ex- perience of one county and are limited to information compiled through the courts. Future research is needed to better understand other localities’ experiences with ERPOs, and how they operate in the context of their state firearms laws. Additional data, such as perspectives of petitioners and respondents, would also add to these findings. While the single county focus limits the generalizability of these findings, the level of detail from this first insight into a complete set of EPRO data from a locality that is leading implementation efforts on this topic is instructive. We include all cases in the study and provide a detailed description of how this law is being used. Our findings are based on a rigorous process of double-coding and informed by both researchers and practitioners who together provide a comprehensive un- derstanding of ERPO law, and its implementation. Conclusion At a time when policymakers are considering ERPO laws in state legislatures around the country, and states as well as local jurisdictions are developing protocols and practices to implement ERPOs, the early experience of Frattaroli et al. Injury Epidemiology (2020) 7:44 Page 8 of 9 King County provides insight into how this law is being used in one jurisdiction and how courts are evaluating cases. Acknowledgements None. Authors’ contributions SF conceptualized the study, oversaw data collection, led the analysis and wrote the first draft of the manuscript. EO managed the project, abstracted data and coordinated data collection from Seattle, ran the analyses and provided substantive edits to the manuscript. AM abstracted data, contributed to the analysis and provided substantive edits to the manuscript. AA contributed to development of the data abstraction tool and interpretation of analysis results, and provided substantive edits to the manuscript. RH provided information about the legislative history of ERPOs in Washington, contributed to development of data abstraction tool and interpretation of analysis findings, and provided substantive edits to the manuscript. SS facilitated access to the data, contributed to development of data abstraction tool and interpretation of analysis findings, and provided substantive edits to the manuscript. AL facilitated access to the data, provided legal expertise that informed all stages of the project, and contributed substantive edits to the manuscript. The author(s) read and approved the final manuscript. Authors’ information This work is the result of a research-practice collaboration and incorporates both rigorous research methods in collecting and analyzing the data presented, and nuanced understanding of how Washington’s ERPO law is being implemented on the ground. Funding The Johns Hopkins Bloomberg American Health Initiative supported our previous work that informs this article. The Johns Hopkins Center for Gun Policy and Research paid the open access publication fee for this article. Availability of data and materials The data used in the analyses presented herein are publicly available. Ethics approval and consent to participate The data used for this analysis is publicly available and therefore not human subjects research. Consent for publication Not applicable. Competing interests The authors declare they have no competing interests. Author details 1The Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, Center for Gun Policy and Research, 624 North Broadway, Baltimore, MD 21205, USA. 2The Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, Department of Health Policy and Management, 624 North Broadway, Baltimore, MD 21205, USA. 3Educational Fund to Stop Gun Violence, 805 15th Street NW, Washington, DC 20005, USA. 4Alliance for Gun Responsibility, P.O. Box 4187, Seattle, WA 98194, USA. 5Regional Domestic Violence Firearms Enforcement Unit, King County Prosecuting Attorney’s Office, 516 Third Avenue, Room E400, Seattle, WA 98104, USA. 6Judge (Ret.), Seattle, WA, USA. Received: 27 April 2020 Accepted: 23 June 2020 References Ballotpedia. Washington Individual Gun Access Prevention by Court Order, Initiative 1491 (2016). Available from: https://ballotpedia.org/Washington_ Individual_Gun_Access_Prevention_by_Court_Order,_Initiative_1491_(2016). [cited 2020 Apr 13]. Bloomberg American Health Initiative. n.d. Extreme Risk Protection Order: A Tool to Save Lives. Available from: https://americanhealth.jhu.edu/implementERPO. [cited 2020 Apr 13]. City of Seattle. Seattle Police Department Manual: Crisis Intervention. 2019. Available from: http://www.seattle.gov/police-manual/title-16--- patroloperations/16110---crisis-intervention. [cited 2020 Apr 13]. Consortium for Risk-Based Firearm Policy. Guns, Public Health and Mental Illness: An Evidence-Based Approach for State Policy. 2013. Available from: http:// efsgv.wpengine.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Final-State-Report.pdf. Frattaroli S, McGinty EE, Barnhorst A, Greenberg S. Gun Violence Restraining Orders: Alternative or Adjunct to Mental Health-Based Restrictions on Firearms? Behav Sci Law. 2015;33(2–3):290–307. Frattaroli S, Teret SP. Understanding and informing policy implementation: A case study of the domestic violence provisions of the Maryland Gun Violence Act. Eval. Rev. 2006:347–60 Available from: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/ pubmed/16679500. [cited 2020 Apr 13]. Kivisto AJ, Phalen PL. Effects of risk-Based firearm seizure laws in Connecticut and Indiana on Suicide Rates, 1981–2015. Psychiatr Serv. 2018:855–62 Available from: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/29852823. [cited 2020 Apr 13]. McGinty EE, Frattaroli S, Appelbaum PS, Bonnie RJ, Grilley A, Horwitz J, et al. Using research evidence to reframe the policy debate around mental illness and guns: Process and recommendations. Am J Public Health. 2014;104(11): e22–6 Available from: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/25211757. [cited 2020 Apr 13]. Revised Code of Washington. Chapter 7.94. n.d. Available from: https://app.leg. wa.gov/RCW/default.aspx?cite=7.94. [cited 2020 April 19]. Swanson JW, Easter MM, Alanis-Hirsch K, Belden CM, Norko MA, Robertson AG, et al. Criminal justice and suicide outcomes with Indiana’s risk-based gun seizure law. J Am Acad Psychiatry Law. 2019;47(2):188–97. Swanson JW, Norko MA, Hsiu-Ju L, Alanis-Hirsch K, Frisman LK, Baranoski MV, et al. Implementation and Effectiveness of Connecticut’s Risk-Based Gun Removal Law: Does it Prevent Suicides? Law Contemp Probl. 2017;80(2): 179–208. US Census Bureau. U.S. Census Bureau QuickFacts: King County, Washington n.d.. Available from: https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/kingcountywashington. [cited 2020 Apr 13]. Washington State Legislature. Engrossed Substitute Senate Bill 5027, 2019. Available from: http://www.app.leg.wa.gov/billsummary?BillNumber=502 7&Initiative=false&Year=2019. [cited June 23, 2020]. Wintemute GJ, Frattaroli S, Claire BE, Vittes KA, Webster DW. Identifying armed respondents to domestic violence restraining orders and recovering their firearms: process evaluation of an initiative in California. Am J Public Health. 2014;104(2):e113–8 Available from: http://ajph.aphapublications.org/doi/10.21 05/AJPH.2013.301484. [cited 2017 Jul 20]. Wintemute GJ, Pear VA, Schleimer JP, Pallin R, Sohl S, Kravitz-Wirtz N, et al. Extreme risk protection orders intended to prevent mass shootings a case series. Ann Intern Med. 2019;171(9):655–658. Available from: http://www.ncbi. nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/31426088. [cited 2020 Apr 13]. Publisher’s Note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Frattaroli et al. Injury Epidemiology (2020) 7:44 Page 9 of 9 https://ballotpedia.org/Washington_Individual_Gun_Access_Prevention_by_Court_Order,_Initiative_1491_(2016) https://ballotpedia.org/Washington_Individual_Gun_Access_Prevention_by_Court_Order,_Initiative_1491_(2016) https://americanhealth.jhu.edu/implementERPO http://www.seattle.gov/police-manual/title-16---patroloperations/16110---crisis-intervention http://www.seattle.gov/police-manual/title-16---patroloperations/16110---crisis-intervention http://efsgv.wpengine.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Final-State-Report.pdf http://efsgv.wpengine.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Final-State-Report.pdf http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/16679500 http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/16679500 http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/29852823 http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/25211757 https://app.leg.wa.gov/RCW/default.aspx?cite=7.94 https://app.leg.wa.gov/RCW/default.aspx?cite=7.94 https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/kingcountywashington http://www.app.leg.wa.gov/billsummary?BillNumber=5027&Initiative=false&Year=2019 http://www.app.leg.wa.gov/billsummary?BillNumber=5027&Initiative=false&Year=2019 http://ajph.aphapublications.org/doi/10.2105/AJPH.2013.301484 http://ajph.aphapublications.org/doi/10.2105/AJPH.2013.301484 http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/31426088 http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/31426088 Abstract Background Methods Results Conclusions Introduction Overview of Washington law Methods Results ERPO petitioners and respondents Dangerous behaviors that precipitated ERPO petitions Court decisions on ERPO petitions Impacts of ERPO petitions: firearms removed Discussion Who are the petitioners and respondents in ERPO cases? What are the behaviors described in ERPO petitions? How have courts responded to ERPO petitions? Do ERPOs result in firearm removal? Limitations and strengths Conclusion Acknowledgements Authors’ contributions Authors’ information Funding Availability of data and materials Ethics approval and consent to participate Consent for publication Competing interests Author details References Publisher’s Note 
work_wbyx7qeipng6lkcxymiofuvcpe	----	C:\Documents and Settings\Dr....IE5\0XMI6LQ5\907201542[1].pdf Journal of Muslim Mental Health, 3:217–239, 2008 Copyright © Taylor & Francis Group, LLC ISSN: 1556-4908 print / 1556-5009 online DOI: 10.1080/15564900802487634 The Impact of the September 11, 2001, Attacks on the Well-Being of Arab Americans in New York City WAHIBA ABU-RAS School of Social Work, Adelphi University, Garden City, New York, USA SOLEMAN H. ABU-BADER School of Social Work, Howard University, Washington, DC, USA In this exploratory study, eight focus groups were conducted, utiliz- ing 83 participants. A structured, but flexible, interview guided by trauma theory was designed to solicit perspectives on the impact of the September 11, 2001, attacks on the Arab American community in New York City. Participants identified several common areas of concern, including fear of hate crimes, anxiety about the future, threats to their safety, loss of community, isolation, and stigmati- zation. Barriers to services and current mental health needs were discussed. The results of this study may assist social workers and clinical psychologists in developing targeted mental health initia- tives using community outreach strategies. This approach may en- hance recovery and healing at the individual and community lev- els, particularly if services are provided by those who are culturally and linguistically competent and sensitive. Keywords Arab and Muslim Americans, barriers, mental healths, September 11th, services INTRODUCTION The American Psychiatric Association (1994) has defined a traumatic event as: Address correspondence to Wahiba Abu-Ras, PhD, Assistant Professor, Adelphi University School of Social Work, 1 South Avenue, Garden City, NY, 11530, USA. E-mail: abu-ras@ adelphi.edu 217 D o w n l o a d e d A t : 2 0 : 0 0 1 5 M a r c h 2 0 0 9 218 W. Abu-Ras and S. H. Abu-Bader a psychologically distressing event that involves actual or threatened death or serious injury, or other threat to one’s physical integrity; or witnessing an event that involves death, injury or a threat to the physi- cal integrity of another person. . . . Responses to the event must involve intense fear, hopelessness, and horror. . . . (p. 424) Traumatic events may encompass either natural (floods, earthquakes) or man-made (airplane crashes, car accidents, terrorism) disasters, and their impact on individuals may last seconds, days, or years (Ursano, McCaughey, & Fullerton, 2001). The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon inspired a new category in the trauma field: mass trauma, which involves high numbers of injuries or causalities occurring outside the context of war (Galea, Ahern, Resnick, et al., 2002). Based on the trauma and health model (Ursano et al., 2001), individuals’ responses to traumatic events vary depending on the type and severity of the stressors. The model suggested that, in order to have a better understand- ing of the impact of traumatic events on individuals’ health, other mediator factors should be considered, including personal developmental history, pre- vious exposure to trauma, biological givens, preexisting illness, sociocultural context, availability of social support, and meaning and attribution that indi- viduals have for their trauma (Ursano, 1987; Ursano et al., 2001). Studies have suggested that the effects of trauma may be physical, so- cial, psychological, spiritual, and economic (Davidson & Baum, 2001; Galea, Resnick, Ahern, et al., 2002; Norris, Phifer, & Kaniasty, 2001), and that trauma affects individuals, groups, and communities in various ways. Trauma can manifest intense feelings of vulnerability, anger, and depression; physical illness; difficult interpersonal relations; and learning problems among school children. Findings from the International Society for Traumatic Stress Studies (2003) showed that individuals who have already experienced trauma (immi- grants, refugees, survivors of war, or those who have lived through periods of unemployment or discrimination) are more vulnerable to severe stress re- actions following a traumatic event. Social support is a crucial factor that di- rectly and indirectly contributes to the mental health outcomes of individuals exposed to traumatic events (Galea et al., 2002; Ursano et al., 2001). Provid- ing social support to individuals, whether through existing services or family and community, can be an important source of help and recovery to those who have been affected by traumatic events. Lack of social support, however, may put these individuals at greater risk of mental health problems, including depression, anxiety, and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Further, PTSD symptoms may generate ongoing insecurity and fear of exposure to danger or the threat of danger, which may impede daily functioning. Besides the nega- tive mental health outcomes, traumatic events may create a new meaning to those who have been exposed to trauma. According to Ursano et al. (2001), D o w n l o a d e d A t : 2 0 : 0 0 1 5 M a r c h 2 0 0 9 Impact of 9/11 on Well-Being of Arab Americans 219 meaning is a rich and varied concept which is not static but results from interaction of past history, present context, and physiological state. Thus, the meaning of a traumatic event changes over time with the individual’s ever changing psychosocial context. (p. 20) The 9/11 attacks, for example, were a significant traumatic event, not only for the many wounded, and the families of the nearly 3,000 individu- als who died, but also for many New York City residents. Several surveys (Fredrickson, Tugade, Waugh, & Larkin, 2003; Greenberg Quinlan Rosner Research, 2002) that tracked the impact of 9/11 on the mental health of Americans indicated that rates of PTSD and symptoms of stress among chil- dren and adults across the country had substantially increased. On the other hand, polling indicated that, post-9/11, approximately 60% of Americans felt heightened positive emotions for loved ones, subsequently resulting in strengthened relationships (Saad, 2001). Greenberg Quinlan Rosner Re- search (2002) concluded that 81% of Americans demonstrated resiliency and a healthy level of functioning following 9/11, while others continued to ex- perience significant distress (Bossolo, Bergantino, Lichtenstein, & Gutman, 2002; American Psychological Association, 2003). IDENTIFYING THE ARAB AMERICAN COMMUNITY IN NEW YORK CITY Before exploring the effects of the events of 9/11 on the Arab American community, it is useful to address the question: Who are Arab Americans? The term Arab is a cultural and linguistic designation referring to those who speak Arabic as their first language. The term Arab immigrants, now identified as Arab Americans (Abraham & Abraham, 1983), refers to Arabic-speaking peoples who have immigrated to the United States from such countries as Palestine, Syria, Lebanon, and Egypt as well as substantial communities from Yemen and Iraq.1 (Although the term would also include Arabs from the Persian Gulf region, their actual numbers in the New York City area are few.) There were approximately 6 million to 7 million Muslims (not all of them Arabs) and about 1.2 million Arabs (i.e., Muslims and Christians) living in the United States in 2000 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2000). The Arab American Insti- tute ([AAI], 2007) and others (Beveridge, 2001) believed that the exact num- ber was difficult to determine because Arab Americans are often reluctant to identify themselves for fear of negative societal reactions, particularly in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. About 94% lived in metropolitan areas, concentrated in Los Angeles, Detroit, New York, Chicago, and Washington, DC (AAI, 2007). The vast majority (77%) of Arab Americans were Christians (mostly Catholics, Eastern Orthodox, and Protestants) and only 23% were D o w n l o a d e d A t : 2 0 : 0 0 1 5 M a r c h 2 0 0 9 220 W. Abu-Ras and S. H. Abu-Bader Muslims (divided between Sunni, Shia, and Druze) (Zogby, 2001). About 40% and 24% of Arab Americans, respectively, had graduate and postgraduate degrees, compared to 17% and 9% of the general U.S. population (U.S. Cen- sus Bureau, 2000). The majority of Arabs immigrated to the northeastern United States in two waves. The first arrived between the 1870s and the 1920s, after which new laws curtailed much of the influx. From the late nineteenth century until the beginning of the 1940s, Manhattan’s Little Syria was home to countless immigrants from Syria and Lebanon, most of whom were Christian (Gotham Gazette, 2002). When these immigrants became more affluent, they settled on Atlantic Avenue in Brooklyn, which encompassed most of the neighborhoods now called Brooklyn Heights and Cobble Hill. Later, in the 1950s, many of these Syrian Americans moved to Bay Ridge. After immigration laws changed in 1965, the second large group of arrivals came to New York City, first set- tling on Washington Street, but the 1970s saw a new wave of immigrants who differed from their predecessors. This community was mostly Muslim, highly educated, and from Egypt, Yemen, Palestine, and Jordan (Gotham Gazette). THE IMPACT OF 9/11 ON ARAB AMERICANS: WHY ARE THEY AT HIGH RISK? The tragic events of 9/11 had negative consequences for the Arab Ameri- can community, consequences not reflected among the wider U.S. popula- tion. Following the attacks, Arab Americans became the subject of increased suspicion and hostility, and many became more fearful as a result (Alvi, 2003). According to reports by the American Civil Liberties Union (2002), the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee ([ADC], 2002), the Human Rights Watch Report ([HRWR], 2002), and the Federal Bureau of Investigation ([FBI], 2002), the number of hate crimes against people who were perceived to be Arabs or Muslims increased 17-fold since September 11, 2001. Simi- lar reports surfaced in 1995, after the Oklahoma City bombing, when 277 serious hate crimes were committed against Arab Americans and American Muslims (ADC, 2002). Further setting apart the Arab American community are a number of new immigration policies enacted by the federal government that specifi- cally target individuals of Middle Eastern origin. These policies have allowed for the detention of more than 1,200 people of Arab, Muslim, and South Asian heritage (HRWR, 2002), the investigation of over 8,000 individuals, the monitoring of international students, and the deportation of 16% of 130,000 individuals who registered following the Immigration and Naturalization Ser- vice alien registration process based on national origin and ethnicity (ADC, 2002; Eggen, 2003). Since 9/11, therefore, Arab Americans have expressed a pervading sense of insecurity and vulnerability (ADC, 2002). D o w n l o a d e d A t : 2 0 : 0 0 1 5 M a r c h 2 0 0 9 Impact of 9/11 on Well-Being of Arab Americans 221 The trauma of 9/11 also revived in many Arab Americans previous memories and experiences of trauma, thus intensifying their experiences of discrimination and exacerbating their preexisting political, economic, social, spiritual, psychological, and medical problems. Many Arab Americans have had firsthand experiences of war. Most emigrated from countries that were previously under the control of European colonialism and are now governed by repressive authoritarian regimes (ADC, 2002; Eggen, 2003). Thus, it is often second nature for Arab Americans to feel alienated from the authorities and, as a result, to fear and distrust the world beyond their own culture. As a consequence of these interrelated factors, Arab and Muslim com- munities in New York City are living under a great deal of pressure and, based on reports from both the Arab American Association of New York (AAANY) (Abu-Ras, 2003) and O. Ali, Milstein, and Marzuk (2005), an in- creasing number of clients have sought psychological counseling. Due to the lack of targeted services available to Arab Americans, however, mosques and churches have become important resources for families and individu- als seeking individual counseling. The issues raised in counseling include: mental health concerns, marital problems, partner abuse, divorce, emotional and personality growth, and the promoting of inner consciousness (Al-Radi, 1999; Abu-Ras, Gheith, & Courns, 2006). Providing services to address the needs of an immigrant community that is increasingly alienated by the larger society can be a tremendous challenge. This research attempted to redress the dearth of scholarly work on Arab Americans in this particular context, and highlight the new and specific traumas experienced by this community after a broad national tragedy. METHOD Although there is a considerable body of literature examining the impact of trauma on survivors of 9/11, this study—to the best of the authors’ knowledge—is the first systematic effort to explore the impact of September 11, 2001, on the Arab American community. This study, conducted 2 years afterward (between May and August 2003), aimed to examine the following within that community: 1. The impact on mental health conditions; 2. The impact on the community’s sense of well-being, coping strategies, and perception of ongoing trauma; 3. The positive and negative lifestyle changes brought about by 9/11; and 4. Impediments to obtaining mental health services. In addition, this study explored how mental health professionals might improve service delivery to this vulnerable population. Findings from this research should inform the development of educational programs, the D o w n l o a d e d A t : 2 0 : 0 0 1 5 M a r c h 2 0 0 9 222 W. Abu-Ras and S. H. Abu-Bader construction of social supports, and promotion of cultural, social, and po- litical understanding between individuals and ethnic groups as well as a nondiscriminatory and mutually respectful mental health care environment. Participants This study employed focus group methodology, using both qualitative and quantitative research methods. The principal investigator of this study facil- itated eight focus groups (six of which included both men and women and two of which comprised only women). Each focus group lasted 2 hours and consisted of 8 to 11 participants, all residents of Bay Ridge, Brooklyn, re- sulting in a total number of 83 participants. Participants in six of the groups were key male and female stakeholders (such as imams, priests, educators, youth center representatives, mental health providers, social workers, and physicians) selected from the community. About 53% (44) were men and 47% (39) were women. The ages of the participants ranged from 20 to 61, with a mean age of 39 for men and 33 for women. The majority (85%) of the male participants had undergraduate or graduate levels of education compared to 15% of the female participants. About 94% of the male participants and 35% of the female participants were employed. Their yearly income ranged from $43,000 to $71,000 with a mean income of $53,000 for men and $34,000 for women. The two female focus groups were comprised of housewives and unemployed participants. Ap- proximately 50% of these women were taking classes in English as a second language, and 85% of them had finished high school (the remainder had some college education). The vast majority of all focus group participants (95% of the men and 97% of the women) were Muslims; only four were Christians.2 All participants in this study immigrated to the United States from Al- geria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, or Yemen. About 95% of the male participants and 97% of the female participants were married and lived with a spouse and children. A majority of the participants were legal immigrants and had been living in the United States for more than 10 years. All but three participants were in the United States when the 9/11 attacks occurred. None of the participants reported any physical injury or immediate loss due to the attacks. All participants, however, reported ex- periences of hate crimes, racial profiling, and discrimination after September 11, 2001 (see Table 1). Materials All focus groups were conducted in Arabic and most of the groups met at the AAANY site. The first six focus groups were selected from the resource book, a list of community activists and service providers, prepared by the AAANY. D o w n l o a d e d A t : 2 0 : 0 0 1 5 M a r c h 2 0 0 9 Impact of 9/11 on Well-Being of Arab Americans 223 Table 1 Demographic Characteristics of the Study Sample (N = 83) Men Women Number 44 39 Age M = 39 M = 33 Education 85% Under/graduate 15%Under/graduate Employment 94% Employed 35% Employed Income M = $53,000 ($43,000–$71,000) M = $34,000 ($28,000–$42,000) Religion 97% Muslims 92% Muslims Marital status 95% Married 97% Married Immigration status 95% Had U.S. citizenship 85% Had U.S. citizenship Years in the US 100% > 10 83% > 10 Hate crimes, racial profiling, and discrimination experiences 100% 100% Injury 0% 0% The two solely female focus groups were recruited from the Family Services Center, and were intended to determine if and how women’s responses differed from men. Data Analysis For each focus group, the principal researcher and cofacilitators posed ques- tions that explored the coping strategies used and the major barriers faced in dealing with this trauma. Thematic findings were compared and contrasted using documentation from all eight focus groups, and all interviews were coded according to the system developed by Morgan and Krueger (1993). To improve consistency and reliability, all notes and coded data were given to an expert in the field of trauma for further analysis and identification of central themes. RESULTS Fear, Anxiety, and Safety Fear was the first reaction identified by all group participants. Their fear manifested itself in the common wish that the perpetrators of the 9/11 at- tacks had not been from an Arab or Muslim country. Almost all participants expressed fear of new waves of hate crimes against the Arab American community. According to the participants, hate crimes against Arabs was not a new phenomena, having occurred after the 1980 Iranian hostage cri- sis and during the 1991 Gulf War. All group participants reported that af- ter 9/11, intensified hate crimes had increased their feelings of fear and anxiety. D o w n l o a d e d A t : 2 0 : 0 0 1 5 M a r c h 2 0 0 9 224 W. Abu-Ras and S. H. Abu-Bader Approximately one third of the participants indicated that the war in Iraq had prolonged these attacks against the Arab and Muslim communities. “We fear for our lives and our children’s futures,” one male participant said. “We came to the States seeking a refuge from wars in our home countries only to face other types of war, a war of discrimination, a war against Islam, and war against Arabs in general.” A female participant expressed anxiety about the way that Americans perceive Arabs in this country: “They look at us as enemies and not as American citizens. We became the ones blamed for any terrorist activities inside and outside the U.S.” Safety emerged as the single biggest concern identified by participants. When asked what “safety” meant, the majority agreed on a definition: to feel secure in this country in and out of their homes. “To us, safety is not only to be physically and mentally protected,” one of the imams said, “but to have family stability, to be safe and protected from all institutionalized laws and policies that have been aggressively created and practiced against the Arab community, especially against illegal immigrants.” For the majority of the participants, and particularly for women, safety also meant feeling secure that the FBI or police would not raid their homes in the middle of the night to investigate or arrest them, their husbands, or their brothers. One female participant said, “I believe each one of us has the same fear of being . . . deported to our countries without regard for whether we have done something wrong or not.” The arrest of male providers was a particular threat to many of the female participants who came to this country as wives, and who had few independent sources of emotional, social, physical, or financial support in the United States. One participant, a physician, explained, “By holding so many Arabs prisoner without trial, our civil rights and safety are threatened. This is a threat to our financial, social, and political stability.” For the participants, feeling safe also meant a life free from mysterious and ever-changing laws and policies targeted specifically at Arabs and Mus- lims. As a female participant recalled, “After September 11th, my husband was in New Jersey and was stopped by a police car. [They] immediately ar- rested him after my husband was identified as an Arab; he was not released until the following day. We were at home and expecting the police to come any minute and deport us, especially because we still did not have our green cards.” Another participant said, “I was afraid to go out into the street. . . . My husband did not go to work because he was afraid that the police would . . . take him to jail just for being an Arab.” A third participant added, “We really don’t know what the next accusation will be. Every day, we are faced with new laws and policies. One day, we have problems with immigration, the next day with the motor vehicle department, and the following day with the rent . . . . God knows what other problems we may have.” The contrast between the mental health needs of Arab Americans and the wider American community is evident in the way these two communi- ties defined “safety.” For participants in this study, safety meant protection D o w n l o a d e d A t : 2 0 : 0 0 1 5 M a r c h 2 0 0 9 Impact of 9/11 on Well-Being of Arab Americans 225 from hate crimes and discrimination. On the other hand, 54% of the wider U.S. population defined “safety” as “protection from future terrorist attacks” (Fredrickson et al., 2003). Loss of Community According to the participants in this study, most Arab Americans have experi- enced three related traumas: the 9/11 terrorist attacks, increased hate crimes, and targeting by new immigration laws and policies—all of which have, in turn, generated a sense of loss of community. “Prior to September 11th, Arab Muslims, in the face of adversity or hard- ship, sought out religion and religious organizations as a source of comfort and support to help them bounce back until they could adapt to the new situation,” one group participant, a key leader, stated. “For example, in case of death, the whole community came together to support the traumatized family until they returned to normal life. However, after September 11th, this source of support has been hard-hit because many [individuals] are afraid to visit each other or to join religious institutions and organizations.” A second male participant explained how Arab Americans have further isolated them- selves for fear of guilt-by-association: “We became like strangers [to each other]. We lost trust in ourselves and in others and many of us stopped visit- ing each other, fearing that getting together could send a suspicious message to the authorities. Isolation became our only friend during the tragedy.” Most female participants reported that veiled Muslim women were or- dered by community and religious leaders to stay home and keep their children from going to school for several days. This isolation ruptured any reassuring sources of safety that daily routine might have provided. One imam emphasized individuals’ lack of trust in the Arab community itself: “[Since] September 11th, and despite our assurances to all worshipers, the number of people attending Friday prayer has decreased tremendously. They stopped coming to the mosque, fearing that one of our own people [might] point them out to police officers because they have no legal papers.” Another male community leader expressed disappointment in some Arab American individuals: “I did not fear the government as much as I feared my own peo- ple, who threatened my life if I [didn’t] go on TV and condemn the authority’s attitudes toward Arabs and Muslims in general. I had to resign from my job and move to another one just to avoid a conflict with my own people.” As a result of fear and insecurity, the Arab American community re- acted as individuals, rather than reaching out to others in the community for collective support. This avoidance of community made it difficult for orga- nizations or service providers to reach out to the Arab American community and address the issues they faced. The majority of the participants expressed their belief that Arab Americans were more isolated by September 11th than D o w n l o a d e d A t : 2 0 : 0 0 1 5 M a r c h 2 0 0 9 226 W. Abu-Ras and S. H. Abu-Bader any other immigrant community. As one young female participant voiced, “Even when we tried to come out of our hiding places and offered help and support, we were not acknowledged or recognized.” Stigmatization and Exclusion from the Grieving Process The 9/11 attacks and subsequent government response united most of the American people against one enemy, “terrorism.” Americans were further united by their shared sense of loss, trauma, and grief; quickly and collec- tively, they responded to the disaster and addressed the immediate needs of those who suffered most. Community relationships were strengthened by the bridging of formal and informal support services, manifested in the numer- ous services provided to victims and their family members by organizations such as the American Red Cross, New York City Family Assistance Center, New York State Individual and Family Grant Program, and the New York Crime Victims Compensation Board (Klitzman & Freudenberg, 2003). The opposite occurred in the Arab American community. The immedi- ate reaction of most Arab American individuals was to hide from mainstream society. One female participant stated, “My first and immediate concern was [the welfare of] my family members. I did not think about going out and con- necting with other Arab and Muslim friends or relatives.” A male participant said, “When I first heard about the attack, the first thing that came to my mind was how could I be safe tomorrow when I would go to work and find out that I was unemployed? What should I do if they asked about my legal papers, and how could I avoid confrontation with the American people?” A female participant said, “Some of us actually tried to hide our identities by changing our Islamic dress code, especially Muslim women who felt forced to uncover their heads in order to avoid hate crimes.” Another female par- ticipant said, “No matter how much I tried to hide my identity, whether by changing my Islamic dress or by avoiding speaking Arabic in public, my Arabic and Middle Eastern appearance is still obvious and I would not have been protected from all angry Americans. Therefore, I decided to stay at home and keep my kids around me.” The vast majority of the participants, reported feeling that, due to the nationality of the 9/11 perpetrators, the first reaction of the majority of Amer- icans was to blame Muslim and Arab citizens for the attack. As a result, the Arab American community felt itself in the “enemy camp” and automati- cally excluded from the larger American grieving process. One participant, a community leader, said, “America forgot that Arabs and Muslims were also victims of the attack and [excluded] us from expressing our sadness for what happened.” Further, about half of the participants emphasized the compounding of this isolation when the vast majority of Arab Americans further segregated themselves from the American mainstream. D o w n l o a d e d A t : 2 0 : 0 0 1 5 M a r c h 2 0 0 9 Impact of 9/11 on Well-Being of Arab Americans 227 This was the experience not only of individuals and families, but also of institutions that would have otherwise formed a crucial link between Arab Americans and overarching social and government institutions. According to several group participants, as a result of stigmas placed on Arabs and Muslims, some mosques in the area were targeted as purportedly supportive of terrorist acts. Some Islamic institutes and organizations were ordered to close their doors, and three imams reported the vandalism of their mosques, threatening telephone calls and letters, and stone throwing. One participant reported, “Three days after the September 11th attack, I was attending a noon prayer with several other guys. Suddenly, I heard a blast next to the mosque’s door. I thought something [had] happened in the street but, when I looked through the window, I saw a few young men sitting in a car and throwing something at the mosque door that made a kind of blast sounding like an explosion in order to scare us.” Another imam added, “Immediately after the attack, the phone started to ring and there were several threatening calls from various people asking us to leave and go back to our country.” A third imam participant said that he was called the name bin Ladin and taunted because of his beard. Several other male and female participants expressed fears of being targeted by the FBI because of their religious affiliation with certain mosques. “Although I have invited some of the police and FBI personnel to the mosque to reassure Muslims that the authorities will do their best to protect them,” one of the imams said, “the regular number of worshipers has decreased because they fear arrest.” These various layers of isolation are typical of those who have experienced trauma, who may in some cases withdraw from their extended family and community, isolating them from the world at large. Two years after the trauma of 9/11, Arab Americans had continued to seek ways to share its grief, loss, and fear. Historical and Ongoing Trauma The majority of the focus group participants indicated that historical trauma had continuing, negative effects on their lives. Trauma had become a part of their personal histories, and had also been passed to their children through recollections and the processes of identity building. One female participant said, “Every time I think about September 11th, it reminds me of the 1967 war [between Israel and Egypt, Syria, and Jordan] when I left my baby at home while I was trying to seek help from my neighbors. When the shooting started, I put myself in danger and ran from the neighbors’ home to my home so I could save my baby’s life.” Another female participant also related that television images of bodies falling from the Twin Towers brought back memories of the 1967 war when she was a child trying to cross the Jordan River with her parents to flee the West Bank: “In the street, I saw dead bodies of women, men, and children. These memories will never go away D o w n l o a d e d A t : 2 0 : 0 0 1 5 M a r c h 2 0 0 9 228 W. Abu-Ras and S. H. Abu-Bader no matter how hard I try to forget. They always come back to me, even if I hear about a normal death situation.” The 9/11 attacks compounded the list of traumas experienced by Arab Americans. One of the community leaders said, “Every time we overcome one trauma, we find ourselves struggling with another one, leaving us with no room to breathe and reflect on what happened earlier, until we became numb.” A second participant illuminated the transmission of trauma from one generation to another: “We can’t avoid talking about trauma anymore. Watching TV every day is a trauma in itself, [from] misconceptions the media has of Arabs and Muslims.” A third participant expressed concern about dealing with students who had been traumatized by what they saw, heard, and experienced: “As educators, we are always trying to come up with ways to stop the transmission of trauma from one generation to another. Students commonly talk about what happened after September 11th and reflect on their family experiences of specific types of trauma, such as the Palestinian problems, or what is happening in Iraq.” Another participant, a female social service provider, noted the manner in which Arabic satellite television now brings these traumas closer to communities in the United States by transmitting the daily images into Arab American living rooms. The specific nature of the insecurity felt after 9/11 is reminiscent of the historic traumas that initially brought some Arab Americans to the United States. Several participants in the study noted that they were forcefully up- rooted or deported from their own counties and had sought safe haven and salvation in the United States. Thus, the majority of the participants said that 9/11 had revived memories of earlier trauma. Constructing a New Meaning of Trauma According to Ursano et al. (2001), meaning is a concept that results “from the interaction of past history, present context and physiological state. Thus the meaning of traumatic events changes over time with individuals’ ever- changing psychosocial context” (p. 20). Most participants in this study at- tributed new meanings to 9/11, incorporating learned perceptions of how to best restore and reorganize their life and community as well as their own responsibilities in working to decrease harm and diminish threats to their safety. One of the male participants said, “We usually take life for granted but, after September 11th, we began to value our lives and safety more.” An- other female participant said, “After the attack, we were afraid to go out and defend ourselves but now—2 years later—I recognize that we should do more to protect ourselves by teaching the American people about our reli- gion, culture, and beliefs.” A third male participant said, “Before September 11th, few Americans knew about us as a people, culture, and religion. Now D o w n l o a d e d A t : 2 0 : 0 0 1 5 M a r c h 2 0 0 9 Impact of 9/11 on Well-Being of Arab Americans 229 there are many Web sites, printed materials, and lectures that were cre- ated specifically after the attack that include . . . information, educational materials, and articles about the Arabs and the real meaning of Islam.” Another male participant reported that he thought the gap between the Arab American community and the wider American community was nar- rowing. “We are learning every day,” he said. “The more we learn, the stronger we become . . . by voicing our concerns, we can find solutions. Many educated people have started new activities aimed at educating the American public about our needs, concerns, and problems. They are ac- tually changing our image and the way we are perceived by the general media.” The new meanings constructed by the participants indicated that, 2 years after 9/11, some Arab Americans were gradually developing new un- derstandings of their identity and regaining their sense of community. This process remains ambiguous, complex, and hard to define. Many participants expressed the need for specific spiritual, educational, and political strategies for dealing with the isolation resulting from 9/11. When employing spiritual strategies, participants advocated tolerance, forgiveness, and prayer as the best ways of coping in times of crisis. As mentioned above, participants advo- cated attempts to educate American society by providing information about Islam and Arab culture as a means of mediating their trauma. Some partici- pants took part in political coping methods, organizing the community and making themselves “visible” by donating blood, and planning educational and political activities against terrorism. Coping Methods Traditionally, the Arab American community has turned to its religious in- stitutions in times of emotional need and crisis. Most participants in this study reported that they first turn to God when seeking comfort and help in life, personified by the religious leaders in their mosques and churches. To many participants, one of the most important functions of any religion was to provide a framework for its parishioners in dealing with emotional hardships and mental health. According to the Arab Muslim American Fed- eration of New York and the imam’s council of New York, the number of Muslims seeking mental health counseling at New York City mosques had quadrupled since 9/11. For the majority of participants, the backbone of religious and spiritual well-being consisted of prayer, faith, tolerance, and forgiveness. Muslim reli- gious leaders in this study believed the Qur’an and Hadith were the best tools for prevention and treatment of emotional disturbances, and suggested that social service providers and mental health professionals incorporate religious values and ethics in their counseling techniques. D o w n l o a d e d A t : 2 0 : 0 0 1 5 M a r c h 2 0 0 9 230 W. Abu-Ras and S. H. Abu-Bader Prayer is the primary duty in both the Islamic and Christian faiths, and rejection of faith, according to an imam in this study, is considered a disease among Arab Americans. Many participants believed that, through the daily discipline of prayer and self-development, a Muslim could increase his or her own ability to adapt to stress and reach inner satisfaction, as stated in the Qur’an: But the guided to himself who turn to Him in patience, those who believe and whose hearts find peace and satisfaction in the remembrance of God: for without doubt in the remembrance of God do hearts find satisfaction and peace (Qur’an 5:27–28) Successful indeed are the believers who humble in their prayers. (Qur’an 23:1–2) Most participants spoke of tolerance’s ability to create peace and security within one’s self. The word tolerance was defined by the group as “to bear” and extends not only to other faiths or beliefs, but also toward one’s enemies. Participants further defined tolerance as “acceptance of others” and referred to a Qur’anic verse that states: God forbids you not with regard to those who fight you nor for (your) faith nor drive you out of your homes, from dealing kindly and justly with them, for God loves those who are just. (Qur’an 60:8) On the subject of forgiveness, one of the Muslim teachers said, “Our religion, Islam, has taught us [that] forgiveness helps us heal wounds and re- store good relations between people, and it maintains social order.” Another participant said, “As much as Islam emphasizes justice and punishment of the wrongdoers, it also emphasizes kindness, love, and forgiveness.” A third participant said, “Allah always forgives us for our own mistakes, and we also should practice what Allah has asked of us, [which is to act] the same towards those who do wrong to us.” A number of participants believed that forget- ting God and neglecting his commands and teachings may cause them to fail in their endeavors. One imam quoted, “As the prophet Mohammed said: ‘O Allah, I seek refuge with you from distress and sorrow, from sloth and from decrepitude’” (Sahih Muslim, Book 35, chapter 14, Hadith No. 6539). Participants rarely expressed overtly the desire to turn to other non- religious coping mechanisms, such as family comfort or professional help, but the need was articulated indirectly. For example, participants acknowl- edged that religious leaders may not have all the tools required to assist in all situations. In addition, the widespread acknowledgment that a sense of community had been lost indicates that individuals felt the absence of communal coping strategies not necessarily linked to religious belief and practice. D o w n l o a d e d A t : 2 0 : 0 0 1 5 M a r c h 2 0 0 9 Impact of 9/11 on Well-Being of Arab Americans 231 Barriers and Needs The focus groups were asked to describe the major problems and barriers facing the Arab American community in accessing mental health services prior to and after 9/11 as well as the community’s current needs. Several difficulties and obstacles were identified by the participants, some of which existed prior to 9/11 and had intensified afterward. According to one male participant, “After September 11th, hundreds of services and programs were offered to a variety of communities and busi- nesses, but nothing was done to address the problems of Arab Americans and Muslims.” Several participants expressed their disappointment with the lack of mental health services in the community: “Immediately after September 11th, none of the existing services and the community-based organizations remembered to include us in their list of services,” one participant offered. “As a matter of fact, they were indifferent to our needs and perhaps purposely ignored us as part of the general policy adopted against us.” According to one of the religious leaders, “We, as imams, are very limited in terms of our ability to deal with trauma. We use our religious beliefs and ethics to address certain problems, such as spousal relationships, problems with children and other social issues, but this does not mean we are professionally trained to handle depression, for example. Certain mental health problems need to be addressed professionally, and sometimes require medication which we can’t provide.” Another imam said, “We all believe that the Qur’an can help people heal mentally, but the Qur’an can’t solve problems such as discrimination or financial crises. Those problems should be addressed by specialized agencies that were created specifically for this particular purpose.” A key community leader concluded, “All those who approached us after the attack wanted something from us. They came to our community looking for information and material about Arabs, or to conduct interviews with some of us for their research, studies, and reports. No one came to offer help, only to receive help.” The lack of resources available was reinforced by, and remained unad- dressed due to, participants’ feelings of fear and insecurity. “My business is the only source of income I have,” another community leader noted. “Af- ter September 11, I almost lost my business because many people stopped going out to do their shopping and I did not have enough courage to seek help from funds specifically created for this purpose. I was afraid to bring my concern to the authorities, as many other communities had been doing, for fear of their negative response.” On the other hand, most participants indicated that other factors unre- lated to 9/11 prevented their access to mental health services. Most promi- nently, negative cultural attitudes toward counseling hindered participants’ access to assistance. “Women who have problems with their husbands are afraid to seek counseling or mental health help,” one woman asserted. “The D o w n l o a d e d A t : 2 0 : 0 0 1 5 M a r c h 2 0 0 9 232 W. Abu-Ras and S. H. Abu-Bader mere knowledge that she received help from a psychologist or counselor will cause her to be labeled ‘majnuna’ [crazy], and she will no longer be considered . . . a good mother . . . She could lose her children.” A male par- ticipant added, “Many of us don’t know much about mental health services and . . . don’t believe in such services. We usually rely on God for help and, if the problem is serious, we prefer to seek help from religious leaders.” Although mosques play a central role in providing culturally sensitive services to the Arab Muslim community, religious leaders were admittedly ill equipped to address severe mental health problems and community trauma resulting from a massive crisis such as the events of 9/11 (Abu-Ras et al., 2007; O. Ali et al., 2005). Stereotypes and Discrimination According to the majority of the participants, the events of 9/11 aggravated prevailing stereotypes of Arabs and Muslims as terrorists and murderers who are violent by nature. These perceptions have further affected Arab Amer- icans’ biased views of crisis intervention. Almost all of the participants ex- pressed fear of the way they are perceived by mental health professionals and social workers. They were also intimidated by the power these ser- vice providers wielded in their lives. “I have a problem with my children’s school,” one female participant expressed. “Every time the teacher sees a small scratch on my boys’ faces she reports us to the social worker. Then, the social worker reports us to Abused Child Services, believing that we, as Arabs, are very violent and we abuse our children.” Another female partic- ipant stated, “Before I went to [a clinical therapist], I almost decided to go back to my country. The school’s social worker had been . . . accusing me and my husband of beating our children. No matter how hard we tried to tell her that the cause of the injury was him falling from his bicycle, she still [did] not believe us. She [had] already made up her mind that we beat our children.” A third female participant concluded, “I know of many cases like that. Social workers at American schools think of us as abusive and this perception has increased since September 11th.” Thus, the community’s feel- ings of isolation, fear, and insecurity extend to the mental health community, transforming a possible aid into a threat. CONCLUSIONS Traumatic events often have a devastating impact on individuals’ health, community stability, and general ability to function. Psychological responses to man-made disasters, such as terrorism, are varied and usually cause in- tense fear, anxiety, isolation, stigmatization, and withdrawal. The 9/11 attack has left a severe impact on the entire U.S. population, regardless of ethnic D o w n l o a d e d A t : 2 0 : 0 0 1 5 M a r c h 2 0 0 9 Impact of 9/11 on Well-Being of Arab Americans 233 and religious background. It has caused the loss of thousands of lives, and psychological and social disruption for millions of others. The experience of trauma has nevertheless stimulated new thinking and new activities among Arab American individuals and communities. Zogby’s (2001) poll indicated a strong ethnic identity, even pride, in the face of adversity faced by the community after 2001. The Arab American Institute of New York (AAI, 2002), on the other hand, showed that many Arab individuals continued to express fear and anxiety and shy away from proud expression of their Arab identity or being identified with the Arab community, fearing that such identification may lead to harassment or deportation. Although this is a limited exploratory study, its findings clearly indicate that participants responded to this trauma with fear and an intense loss of se- curity. This response caused the participants to reflect on the causes of their fear and to advocate new mechanisms for ensuring their safety and further educating the American public about their culture, the meaning of Islam, and the needs, struggles, and concerns of their community. This process of constructing new meanings, as expressed by the focus group members, was characterized by a strong linkage between religious and spiritual beliefs and methods for coping with trauma. Almost all of the participants expressed a high level of faith, tolerance, and forgiveness as actual means of coping with trauma, but few mentioned mental health services as a tool for overcoming their fear and anxiety. This suggests that religion and spirituality play an important role in the mental health of Arab American individuals, families, and communities and may be a central component of their identity and self-conception (Abudabbeh, 1996; Al-Krenawi, 1996). These results con- firmed the findings of other studies (Conner, Davidson & Lee, 2003; Linley, Joseph, Cooper, Harris, & Meyer, 2003; Maercke & Herrle, 2003) that have shown the relationship between religious beliefs, personal growth, and suc- cessful processing of trauma. This relationship also indicates that, although some Arab Americans are becoming more familiar with and beginning to turn to, Western modern psychotherapy, many Arabs prefer to find solace within their faith and with traditional healers inside the community (Gorkin & Othman, 1994). Traditional and Qur’anic healing methods have also become more popular in most Muslim societies, and have gained further legitimacy among many Islamic scholars (Bari, 1993). Therefore, mosques and churches in the Arab American community in the United States have become impor- tant places for families and individuals to seek counseling for a variety of problems, including mental health problems, marital strife, partner abuse, di- vorce, and emotional trauma (Abu-Ras, Gheith, & Courns, 2007). At the same time, on the rare occasions when they solicited help in the outside world, participants in this study expressed concerns about the lack of culturally competent services at existing mental health agencies. This gap needs to be closed via a mental health initiative employing a community outreach methodology and social workers, clinical psychologists, D o w n l o a d e d A t : 2 0 : 0 0 1 5 M a r c h 2 0 0 9 234 W. Abu-Ras and S. H. Abu-Bader and other mental health professionals such as psychiatrists who are cultur- ally competent in Arab history and culture. Efforts should be directed at enhancing the cultural competence of mental health clinicians working in the Arab community. Integrating psychosocial educational interventions into nonstigmatizing physical settings, such as existing community centers, would minimize the stigma associated with mental health services. Disseminating language-appropriate information, life-net brochures in the Arabic language, and promoting psychosocial knowledge and education, which are essen- tial professional tools in identifying severe stress reactions, will enhance the process of recovery and healing both at the individual and community level. Limitations of the Study The findings of this study have several methodological limitations: The study relied on a small, nonrandom sample of 83 participants from the same com- munity in one borough of New York. The participants were contacted ex- clusively from a list provided by one organization site, the AAANY. These limitations potentially constrained the authors from making generalizations based on the findings because the data may not be representative of other subject populations in different regions. More varied data sources might en- hance the accuracy and usefulness of future results. This study also used focus group and qualitative methodology without controlling demographic variables, which may also have imposed certain limitations on the findings in terms of differences between the subjects’ age, education, and income, marital, religious, and immigrant status as well as political factors—variables that could lead to the findings being interpreted differently. In addition, the participants in this study were all people who had reported some experience of racial profiling, discrimination, and backlash related to 9/11. This may further limit the findings because it cannot be rep- resentative of all Arab Americans, many of whom may not have experienced discrimination in the wake of 9/11. SUMMARY The terror of 9/11 severely affected many Arab Americans in a unique man- ner. First, some of the victims of the attacks were Arabs and Muslims, and they and their families experienced insurmountable loss and grief. Secondly, Arab Americans have felt the subsequent brunt of Americans’ anger because of their national affiliation, and have been the target of a rising number of hate crimes. Finally, new government policies have singled out Arabs and Mus- lims in the Arab American community, generating feelings of isolation and discrimination instigated by the very agencies that are intended to promote D o w n l o a d e d A t : 2 0 : 0 0 1 5 M a r c h 2 0 0 9 Impact of 9/11 on Well-Being of Arab Americans 235 social security and stability. In the aftermath of 9/11, Arab Americans have lost employment, legal security, a feeling of safety, and freedom. These nega- tive stressors have compounded and revived previous traumas, forcing Arab Americans to relive past periods of crisis before their immigration to the United States. Participants in this study identified several symptoms resulting from these traumatic events. Their frequent reference to fear and lack of safety issues, as immediate reactions and responses to the trauma, reflects their psy- chosocial state and the effects of the threat of hate crimes. These emotions also reflect ongoing political and sociocultural challenges facing the Arab American community, which is among the most misrepresented and nega- tively perceived communities in mainstream America (Abudabbeh, 1996). The impact of such misunderstandings is twofold. Misperceptions of Arab Americans not only isolate Arab Americans from the wider community and damage their ability to cope with trauma through a communal grieving process, but also can lead to prejudice, biases, and faulty assumptions among mental health professionals who serve Arab Americans. Misperceptions about and misrepresentation of Arab Americans in American culture have prolonged feelings of danger and insecurity for this community. Therefore, Arab American methods for coping with trauma lean toward isolation, withdrawal, and avoidance in order to ward off danger from the wider society. Within the community, this threat has generated suspicion, lack of trust among community members, a loss of community support, and a decreased sense of belonging. Ursano et al. (2001) argued that community plays an important role in providing its members with a sense of belonging, identity, friendship, acceptance, and emotional, social, and practical support. As a result, traumatic events may create a feeling of extreme vulnerability among the entire community, thus heightening feelings of helplessness, loss of trust, loss of control, and uncertainty (Ursano et al., 2001). This isolation may lead to delays in the grieving process and future healing (Gerrity & Stenglass, 2001). In addition, self-blame is a common result of victimization (Janoff-Bulman, 1985). Many Arab Americans have avoided contact with their own religious organizations, and avoided seeking help or attending prayers, in order to preclude any accusation by the authorities. Further, according to the participants of this study, Arab American atti- tudes toward mental health counseling have been a serious barrier in access- ing and utilizing mental health services. In addition to a lack of awareness about available mental health support services in the community, there is a cultural stigma associated with Western mental health services. Based on her experience working as a clinical therapist in the Arab American community, the first author has ascertained that most individuals, regardless of their gen- der, express a high degree of fear and shame when they seek counseling services. Over the course of 8 months between 2003 and 2004, she worked with more than 30 individuals at their request and nearly all expressed worry D o w n l o a d e d A t : 2 0 : 0 0 1 5 M a r c h 2 0 0 9 236 W. Abu-Ras and S. H. Abu-Bader that they would be seen at the counseling site by other members of their community. If someone were to inquire about their visits to the site, they used their children as an excuse because seeking mental health services is associated with insanity or mental retardation in the Arab American culture (Gorkin, Massalha, & Yatziv, 1985; Kulwicki, 1996). This stigma may therefore constitute a formidable barrier to service utilization among Arab American individuals, especially for women, whose use of such services could harm their marital prospects, increase the possibility of divorce, and work against them in other social contexts (Abu-Ras, 2003; Al-Krenawi, 2000). Psychotherapy and other Western mental health techniques and ter- minology are still new concepts to most Arabs Americans (Abu-Ras et al., 2007). In addition, Arab culture places little value on self-importance, self- improvement, or understanding inner needs (Gorkin et al., 1985). Therefore, Arab Americans may have fewer tendencies than Westerners to be “psy- chologically minded” (Jackson, 1997). According to Gorkin et al. (1985), Arab patients with mental health problems, such as depression, anxiety, or other mental distress, commonly expressed their ailments in terms of stom- ach complaints, fatigue, poor appetite, or shortness of breath. Prior to 9/11, mental health and social services in the Arab American community were nearly nonexistent, and those that did exist were little known to the public. Additional services created to serve the public post-9/11 failed to address the Arab American community and its special needs. Those Arab Americans who did seek mental health counseling went to their mosques and churches for help, but religious leaders expressed dismay at their inability to address new problems as a result of 9/11 (Abu-Ras et al., 2007). The introduction of mental health services to the Arab American commu- nity should be undertaken with the nature of this group’s trauma at the fore. Mental health professionals, like any other individuals, are influenced by his- torical and current understandings and experiences of discrimination, racism, and oppression (Arredondo, 1999). In addition, Western models of therapy have not been successful at incorporating new forms that take into account prejudices against minority and non-White ethnic groups (Arredondo, 1999). Therefore, social work and mental health interventions that are not mindful and sensitive of cultural and religious concerns will not be effective in work- ing with Arabs and Muslims (Al-Dabbagh, 1993). Indeed, they may even aggravate the trauma. NOTES 1. It is perhaps significant to note that most of these modern states were—less than a decade ago—considered one geographical unit, the Levant or Greater Syria. 2. It is important to note that our sample group was comprised of much greater Muslim represen- tation than exists in the Arab American community as a whole. This may be the case, however, because all of the participants were first-generation immigrants, reflecting the more recent wave of Muslim Arab immigration. 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work_wcderwrzbrfifnohlfbc6vec34	----	© 2013 Nigel Copsey DOI 10.1163/22116257-00202012 This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported (CC-BY-NC 3.0) License. http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/ Fascism 2 (2013) 263–270 brill.com/fasc Conference Report Fascist Ideologues. Past and Present Centre for Fascist, Anti-Fascist and Post-Fascist Studies Teesside University, 4-5 July 2013 Nigel Copsey Centre for Fascist, Anti-Fascist and Post-Fascist Studies, Teesside University N.Copsey@tees.ac.uk Abstract This international conference, organised by Teesside University in conjunction with the University of Cambridge ( John Pollard), offered a variety of perspectives on leading fascist and far-right ideologues over the course of the twentieth (and into the twenty-first) century. Focusing upon the historical impact and contemporary influence of key far-right figures and intellectual trends (such as transnationalism and meta-politics), the conference brought together speakers over two days of academic discussion. The conference served several pur- poses: to examine the continuities and changes in fascist ideology; to present a report on the turn to online anti-Muslim hate by the contemporary far right in Britain; and to mark the for- mal launch of a new Centre for Fascist, Anti-Fascist and Post-Fascist Studies (CFAPS) based at Teesside University. Keywords fascism; Neo-Fascism; Far Right; Extreme Right; Radical Right; European New Right; transna- tionalism; Counter-Jihad; anti-Semitism; conspiracy Proceedings opened with a first panel organised around the theme of fascist ideologies and inter-war regimes. GREGORY MAERTZ (St John’s, New York) examined the Junge Kunst im Deutschen Reich, an exhibition of ‘young art’ held in Vienna in 1943. He focused in particular on the instrumental role played by Baldur von Schirach (Head of Hitler Youth, and later Reich Governor of Vienna) as the exhibition’s patron. Maertz argued that this exhibition represented an ambitious attempt by von Schirach to improve upon, and supersede the annual <UN><UN> Downloaded from Brill.com04/06/2021 01:18:33AM via free access http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/ 264 N. Copsey / Fascism 2 (2013) 263–270 Great German Art Exhibitions held in Munich. This Viennese exhibition, featuring work by much neglected and marginalised artists, was a significant departure because it was modernist/expressionist in aesthetic style, which clearly challenges orthodox views of the Nazi aesthetic as ‘static in eternity’. This state-sponsored exhibition of modernist art (as Nazi art) represented, for Maertz, an important act of ‘cultural insurgency’ by von Schirach (it gave rise to opposition within the Nazi hierarchy). The next paper, by DAN STONE (Royal Holloway, London) questioned the place of racial ideologues in the Third Reich’s ‘racial state’. For Stone, racial ideologues were at their most significant when they performed simple propa- gandistic tasks and not when they offered more ‘scientific’ justifications for racism. It is therefore possible, according to Stone, to distinguish between ‘race propaganda’ or ‘race mysticism’ on the one hand, and ‘race science’ on the other. The dominant race ideologues in the Third Reich were more race propa- gandists than race scientists (and so it is important not to overstate the signifi- cance of the latter in the Nazi decision-making apparatus). This distinction becomes clearer when we consider Nazi anti-Semitism for it evolved, Stone argued, more from mystical notions and political considerations than from eugenic or anthropological research. The first panel concluded with a paper from a recent graduate of Cambridge University, NATHAN KUNKELER, who spoke on the evolution of inter-war Swedish fascism. Sweden’s fascists proclaimed themselves proudly as ‘Fascists’ (following the Italian model) at first but they soon became, as ideas of Nordic supremacy gained traction, critical of Italian Fascism’s ostensible lack of race theory. The Italian model was then largely jettisoned in favour of National Socialism. Drawing on an indigenous tradition of racism, Swedish fascists increasingly explained their fascism as an ideology not connected to any nation in particular, but to the Nordic race (which transcended national boundaries). This expression of fascist self-identity coincided with Nazi Germany’s contro- versial international politics, which then forced Swedish fascists to abandon National Socialism altogether, leaving an anonymous transnational racism in its place. Kunkler’s paper underscored fascism’s capacity for revision whilst also raising awkward questions about fascism’s relationship to ultra-nationalism. This problematic relationship was explored further in a second panel (on fascist internationalism revisited). STEFFAN WERTHER (Södertörn, Stock- holm) surveyed greater Germanic ideology as propagated by the SS. In Himmler’s mind, this Germanic ideology was rooted in a transnational con- cept of a greater Germanic racial community whereby peoples of Germanic/ Nordic race all shared a ‘community of destiny’. Accordingly, the SS project represented, for Werther, a post-national, ‘nation-building’ project in its own right. This SS vision extended beyond 1945 (especially amongst SS veterans), and after the fall of the Iron Curtain, even into parts of post-Communist <UN><UN> Downloaded from Brill.com04/06/2021 01:18:33AM via free access N. Copsey / Fascism 2 (2013) 263–270 265 Eastern Europe. Werther gave the example of post-Communist Estonia, which has witnessed SS veteran parades. In his contribution to the second panel, ARISTOTLE KALLIS (Lancaster) examined the evolution of Italian Fascism’s claims to universality from Mussolini’s declaration in October 1930 that fascism could be exported, through the establishment and activities of CAUR – Action Committees for the Universality of Rome (which could boast its own constitution in 1935), and then on to the Esposezione Universale Roma – EUR project. The site for a world’s fair, the EUR project was intended as a major statement of the universal poten- tial of Italian Fascism. For Kallis, the EUR project (which was finally aban- doned in 1942) represented an abortive attempt to re-assert the primacy of Italy in the ‘pecking order’ of international fascism (given that by 1938 Hitler’s fascism had become the pre-eminent fascism). ANDREA MAMMONE (Royal Holloway, London) then discussed the nature of pan-European fascism in the post-war period. He identified an immediate attempt to regenerate fascism after the war. As post-war fascists looked to escape their social and political ghettos, and responding to international developments (principally the process of European integration in the late 1940s/early 1950s), certain pan-European fascists (e.g. Oswald Mosley, Per Engdahl) offered their alternative visions for Europe. In France, key platforms for the articulation of this transnational pan-European fascism were Maurice Bardèche’s journal, Défense de l’Occident (which also drew contributions from outside France), and the organisation, Europe-Action, both of which pre-dated the formation of the French (European) Nouvelle Droite (ND; New Right). For Mammone, if we are to fully understand the contemporary far right’s embrace of a transnational dimension, we need to appreciate that this development has a history that stretches back into the decades before the electoral breakthrough of the French National Front. In opening the final panel of the first day, ELISABETTA CASSINA WOLFF (Oslo) offered an examination of the intellectual output of leading Italian far- right ideologue, Julius Evola. Wolff portrayed Evola as a ‘philosopher of tradi- tion’ who understood fascism as a supra-national phenomenon, aimed at restoring traditional values inspired by aristocratic, monarchic and military ideals. Throughout Evola’s writings four unchanging elements stood out: criti- cism of modern society; rejection of faith in progress; traditionalism; and the belief in spiritual hierarchy. Despite Evola’s existential detachment from the world of politics, he became a cult figure for Italian neo-fascists, including those prepared to engage in terrorist massacres. In Wolff ’s view, Evola provides important analytical insights into the worldview of more recent far-right ter- rorists, and specifically Anders Breivik. TAMIR BAR-ON (ITESM, Querétaro) closed the first day’s proceedings with his paper summarising the French (European) New Right (ND). His contribution <UN><UN> Downloaded from Brill.com04/06/2021 01:18:33AM via free access 266 N. Copsey / Fascism 2 (2013) 263–270 covered four areas: the nature of the ND; conceptual tools for understand- ing  the ND; the ND and the ‘new faces’ of ultra-nationalism today; and the ND’s significance and impact on the far right. His conclusion was that the ND is best understood (conceptually) as an ‘alternative modernist right’. For Bar-On, the ND matters for scholars (and opponents) of fascism because it claims to belong to an anti-racist and anti-fascist right; it speaks the language of the ‘multicultural right’; and it has impacted on the party-political far right. Bar-On believes that the ND’s relationship with the French National Front reveals differences over policy ‘nuances’ more so than disagreements over fundamentals. The second day of the conference got under way with ERIK TONNING (Bergen) delivering a paper on fascist ideologue Ezra Pound. Tonning’s focus was on the arguments that Pound deployed in order to enlist support for the fascist cause amongst Christians in Britain. Tonning considered three of Pound’s correspondents: the economic historian Christopher Hollis; T.S. Eliot; and Henry Swabey. As the primary tool to develop pro-fascist sympathy amongst Christians Pound used canonical denunciations of usury. The prac- tice of usury was, for Pound, a Jewish conspiracy. Whilst Tonning demonstrates that Pound registered varying degrees of success with these three correspond- ents, Pound proved unsuccessful in terms of his ultimate aim: enlisting their support for the British Union of Fascists (BUF). JOE MULHALL (PhD student, Royal Holloway) further developed the theme of Jewish conspiracy in his analysis of the work of prominent British fascist ideologue, A. K. Chesterton. Mulhall began by discussing the inter- war period and argued that conspiratorial explanations for imperial decline had existed in Britain since the end of the First World War. However, they reached their zenith in the late 1950s under the influence of Chesterton  who  declared that the British Empire had been brought to its knees and destroyed by a secret cabal of Jews. For Mulhall, Chesterton’s ideas continue to exert lasting influence on Britain’s far right, especially upon the more nostalgic fascists for whom Britain’s imperial decline still remains a live issue. PAUL JACKSON (Northampton) then spoke about the work of Colin Jordan, another prominent British fascist ideologue. The major theme running through Jackson’s presentation was the question of ‘ideological authenticity’. For Jordan – a Hitler-worshipping National Socialist – was nothing if not ‘ideologi- cally authentic’. Throughout a political career spanning seven decades Jordan retained an ‘incorruptible’ core ideological identity that remained impervious to adaptation (unlike ND ideologues, for example). The flip side to this ‘authen- ticity’ was Jordan’s frequent denunciation of the ‘inauthentic’ and hence his condemnations of the ‘enemy within’, such as Strasserites and ‘Hollywood <UN><UN> Downloaded from Brill.com04/06/2021 01:18:33AM via free access N. Copsey / Fascism 2 (2013) 263–270 267 Nazis’ (a term used to refer to those who were more interested in the superfi- cial trappings of Nazism than its core ideas). The place of music in British fascism’s inter-war project for national rebirth has been almost entirely overlooked. This stands in marked contrast to the attention paid to contemporary manifestations of ‘white power’ music. GRAHAM MACKLIN (Huddersfield), in a panel devoted to music and the far right, examined how music was used by the BUF to disseminate its ideology. More than just ‘entertainment’ for its own sake, Macklin demonstrated how politicised music served as a mechanism through which activists could be socialised and radicalised, their ideological commitment reinforced. All this resulted from a vision which saw culture, and not just musical culture, as a key battleground in the struggle for the soul of the British nation. Musical modernism and especially jazz constituted the antithesis. These genres offended British fascism’s conservative cultural aesthetic and represented the wider degeneracy that British fascists felt was afflicting their race and nation. The focus of ANTON SHEKHOTSOV’s (Vienna) contribution was on the demonisation of the ‘enemy’ in contemporary far-right music, specifically neo-Nazi ‘white power’ music. According to Shekhovtsov, there is a general pattern to the construction of this enemy. It takes two forms: first, inherent or acquired ‘others’, such as peoples of non-white background (inherent) or left-wingers, liberals, anti-fascists, drug-users (acquired); and second, the ‘system’ (often synonymous with ‘ZOG’ – Zionist Occupation Government and/or the repressive state apparatus, such as the police). For Shekhovtsov, white power music is integral to far-right movements and should not be con- sidered as some insignificant adjunct to the extreme right. Revenue streams provide financial support (and since this is a business, white power bands tend to be more internationalist in outlook, that is to say, they appeal to ‘white pride’ worldwide). What is more, their message is arguably more pow- erful than the written word. Shekhovtsov concluded his paper by quoting the cult figure of Skrewdriver’s Ian Stuart Donaldson who once remarked that a pamphlet is read only once but a song is learned by heart and repeated a thousand times. The theme of the conference’s last panel was ‘faces of the far-right today’. EGIL TONNING, a Norwegian psychologist, examined the extremist psyche of Anders Breivik. Initial psychiatric reports had suggested that Breivik suffered from a ‘delusional psychosis’ and that his ideology was of secondary impor- tance. This initial assessment, when challenged in court, led to further psychi- atric reports. These found no sufficient confirmation of any psychosis. However, they did suggest that Breivik suffered from both a narcissistic personality dis- order and an anti-social personality disorder. So, Tonning asked, were Breivik’s <UN><UN> Downloaded from Brill.com04/06/2021 01:18:33AM via free access 268 N. Copsey / Fascism 2 (2013) 263–270 victims the victims of his ideology or his pathology? For Tonning, this is not an either/or question. The question is really one of understanding the complex interaction between extremist ideologies on the one hand, and psychopathol- ogy on the other. ANDREAS ÖNNERFORS (Lund and Malmö), in his presentation, examined the contemporary counter-jihad movement. For Önnerfors, this movement can be defined (ideologically) by Islamophobia; a belief in conspiracy, involv- ing the staged ‘Islamisation’ of the West/Europe; anti-multiculturalism; pan- European/Western and pro-Israeli positions; cultural Christianity; and by anti-establishment critiques. The question that Önnerfors addressed is why there are no leaders in the counter-jihad movement, only leading figures. The reasons largely relate to structure and organisation. The counter-jihad move- ment, he argued, is comprised of dispersed, decentralised, non-hierarchical networks. There is no set command and control hierarchy, no leader(s) as such, and therefore no one point of failure. It is this loose network that enables ‘ideas men’ (leading figures) to propagate within the networks, particularly online. The final conference paper, by DON WATTS (Emeritus, Anglia Ruskin) sur- veyed the far right in contemporary Denmark. According to Watts, Denmark, one of the most ethnically homogenous nations in Europe, has traditionally viewed itself as humane, tolerant and ‘cosy’. However, since Denmark had very little experience of mass immigration when there was an influx of Muslim immigrants at the end of the twentieth century and at the beginning of the 21st Century, it came as an enormous cultural shock. This influx was likened to the wartime experience of German occupation, with the far right drawing historic parallels between the German invasion and the ‘Muslim invasion’, and in so doing, appealing to respectable, mainstream society. The Dansk Folkeparti (DF; Danish People’s Party), Watts argued, was the first to respond to popular concerns over Muslim immigration. It reaped the benefits, placing it in a key political position whereby co-operation with the governing coalition secured the implementation of some of Europe’s strictest immigra- tion laws. The end to the conference proceedings came in a concluding session which formally launched the new Centre for Fascist, Anti-Fascist and Post-Fascist (CFAPS) at Teesside University (co-directed by Nigel Copsey and Matthew Feldman). Delegates heard more about the British Government’s counter- terrorist Prevent agenda (PAUL JORDAN), which has recently undergone revi- sion and now (somewhat belatedly) acknowledges the threat from far-right radicalisation; a summary of a new CFAPS report into online manifestations of anti-Muslim hate crime (NIGEL COPSEY); and information regarding training packages offered by the new Centre (MATTHEW FELDMAN). <UN><UN> Downloaded from Brill.com04/06/2021 01:18:33AM via free access N. Copsey / Fascism 2 (2013) 263–270 269 Conference overview: Thursday, July 4 2013 Panel 1: Fascist ideologues and interwar regimes Gregory Maertz (St John’s, New York) – ‘Modernist art in the service of Nazi culture: Baldur von Schirach and the Junge Kunst im Deutschen Reich Exhibition of 1943’ Dan Stone (Royal Holloway, London) – ‘Science and mysticism in the writings of Nazi racial ideologues’ Nathan Kunkeler (Cambridge graduate) – ‘The evolution of Swedish fascism from National Socialism to Völkisch Racialism’ Panel 2: Fascist internationalism revisited Steffen Werther (Södertörn, Stockholm) – ‘SS Visions: the Greater Germanic ideology and propaganda during WWII and its revival in the present’ Aristotle Kallis (Lancaster) – ‘Eugenio Coselschi and Giuseppe Bottai: Perspectives on Fascist internationalism and universality’ Andrea Mammone (Royal Holloway, London) – ‘Pan-European fascists: Maurice Bardèche, Europe Action, and Alain de Benoist’ Panel 3: The European radical right, yesterday and today Elisabetta Cassina Wolff (Oslo) – ‘The last battle against modernity: Julius Evola and the Italian radical right’ Tamir Bar-On (ITESM, Querétaro) –’Navigating between region, nation, and Europe: The French (European) New Right’s alternatives to modernity’ Friday, July 5 2013 Panel 4: Case study: Britain from ‘fascist epoch’ to post-war world Erik Tonning (Bergen) – ‘“Why can’t you step on the Gas”: Ezra Pound’s efforts to recruit Christians for fascism in the 1930s’ Joe Mulhall (Royal Holloway, London) – ‘A.K. Chesterton’s New Unhappy Lords and decline of the British Empire: Anti-Semitic conspiracy theories for imperial decline’ Paul Jackson (Northampton) – ‘Colin Jordan and post-war British neo-Nazism’ <UN><UN> Downloaded from Brill.com04/06/2021 01:18:33AM via free access 270 N. Copsey / Fascism 2 (2013) 263–270 Panel 5: Fascist and neo-fascist music Graham Macklin (Huddersfield) – ‘“Onward Blackshirts!” Music and the British Union of Fascists (BUF)’ Anton Shekhovtsov (Vienna) – ‘The (re)construction of the enemy in neo-Nazi music’ Panel 6: Faces of the far right today Egil Tonning (psychologist, Bergen) – ‘Lone-wolf terrorism and the extremist psyche: The case of Anders Behring Breivik’ Andreas Önnerfors (Lund and Malmö) – ‘“Leaderless Counter-Jihad:” why there are no leaders but only leading figures in the counter-jihadist milieu’ Don Watts (Emeritus, Anglia Ruskin) – ‘The radical right in Denmark today’ Formal launch of Centre for Fascist, Anti-Fascist and Post-Fascist Studies <UN><UN> Downloaded from Brill.com04/06/2021 01:18:33AM via free access Conference Report Fascist Ideologues. Past and Present 
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work_wga6vrdogzbp5ciuiln23gjmae	----	Denisova | From High Visibility to High Vulnerability: Feminist, Postcolonial and Anti-Gentrification Activism at Risk | Westminster Papers in Communication and Culture Login | Register Home News Articles Articles Issues Special Collections About About Research Integrity Become a reviewer Author Guidelines Editorial Team Editorial Team Submission Contact Start Submission Account Login Register Editorial From High Visibility to High Vulnerability: Feminist, Postcolonial and Anti-Gentrification Activism at Risk Authors: Anastasia Denisova (University of Westminster) , Michaela O'Brien (University of Westminster) Options Share:   A- A+ Dyslexia View Harvard Citation Style View Vancouver Citation Style View APA Citation Style Abstract This editorial considers how this special issue on media and activism reflects or extends current debates in the field and how it explores the possibilities for progressive activists around the world to use the media to resist the current rise of the extreme right alongside the disturbing and growing evidence of the techniques of fascism: populism, propaganda and fake news, hate speech and hate crimes. It follows Graham Meikle (2018) in defining ‘activism’ as ‘the widest range of attempts to effect [progressive] social or cultural change’ whilst its understanding of ‘the media’ includes a broad range of communication platforms, from traditional journalism to digital networks. The issue itself looks at macro- and meso-levels of activism with this editorial explaining how contributions reflect different critical and research approaches focusing variously on media as enabling activists to organise; the mediation of activism; and media as a tool through which activists can professionally deliver their strategic objectives. It calls for measures to make digital space a safer place for activists; to help activists own their narrative without constant risks of hijacking and abuse; and to celebrate the thriving strategies and tactics that bring together activists and the public who care. Keywords: social media, progressive, social change, public relations, journalism, media activism How to Cite: Denisova A. & O'Brien M., (2019) “From High Visibility to High Vulnerability: Feminist, Postcolonial and Anti-Gentrification Activism at Risk”, Westminster Papers in Communication and Culture 14(1). p.94–98. doi: https://doi.org/10.16997/wpcc.323 356 Views 110 Downloads Published on 03 Sep 2019 Peer Reviewed License Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 On 20 August 2018, a 15-year old girl decided not to attend school. Her reason was far from trivial – the looming climate crisis was risking the planet to the extent of changing land, air and water and damaging peoples’ lives. The name of the girl was Greta Thunberg, and her example of ‘school strike for the climate’ in front of the Swedish parliament was followed by hundreds of thousands of teenagers globally. They were abandoning classrooms to demand change from their governments and societies, galvanising 270 cities with their solidarity. Greta’s success did not happen in one day. Journalism outlets, political parties and numerous NGOs and international institutions have been warning the population about the climate crisis for decades. But the movement needed a symbol – and the quietly spoken Scandinavian girl with two symmetric braids was an emblem both strong and fragile that activism needed. Media activism is a long and laborious endeavour. The rise of digital media with its abundance of information, interconnectivity, visibility, channels of mobilisation and low threshold of participation creates communities not only for the progressive but for toxic forces too. This is why activism in the late 2010s to early 2020s needs to be both active and reactive, thoughtful yet loud enough so it does not get lost in internet storms. In these times when hijacking of terms and stories happens on a daily basis, activism also means constant narrative recreation and damage control. Some scholars call the internet a patriarchal structure (Megarry, 2018) and there are voices that demand gender equality of online space. The rallying cry of ‘We should all be feminists’ (Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie) is turning into ‘We should all be activists’ as new reports emerge concerning male bias in AI (Crawford, 2016; Adam, 2006; Leavy, 2018), sexist coding of digital voice assistants (West, Kraut and Ei Chew, 2019), the inherent inequality of AI-assisted recruitment processes (Dastin, 2018), and inequality of activism too. Female protesters and activists of colour face more challenges than others – due to the outbursts of toxic masculinity, racial abuse, cowardly anonymous online attacks and imbalance of visibility when it comes to hierarchy of influence. These issues are as virtual as they are real – and they need to be addressed to maintain liveable societies. As editors, we wanted to explore the possibilities for progressive activists around the world to use the media to resist the current rise of the extreme right along with disturbing and growing evidence of the techniques of fascism: populism, propaganda and fake news, hate speech and rise of hate crimes. We define ‘activism’ as ‘the widest range of attempts to effect [progressive] social or cultural change’ (Meikle, 2018: iii), while ‘the media’ includes a broad range of communication platforms, from traditional journalism to digital networks. This editorial aims to consider how the research articles published in this Westminster Papers in Communication and Culture special issue on media and activism reflect or extend current debates in the field. Media and activism is of interest to academics from a variety of disciplines. Sociologists examine the organisation of social movements, their mobilisation techniques and the role of collective identity in activism (Tilly and Tarrow, 2015). All of these aspects are enabled by media, and are being challenged and transformed by digital media (Bennett and Segerberg (2012), Kavada (2015). Media and communication academics also explore the mediation of activism, and the ways in which media enable activists to frame messages and share information, while also providing a space in which to create meaning (Meikle 2018). In the recent Routledge Companion to Media and Activism (2018), editor Professor Graham Meikle of the University of Westminster sets out the key themes of media and activism as: the role of the media in communicating political contention; activism and civil disobedience tactics and strategies; the affordances of digital communication technologies; and the role of creativity, self-expression and art in activism. Meanwhile public relations (PR) academics have only in the last decade started to research the use of the media by activists and activist organisations as actors with their own legitimacy; writing in the context of a largely corporate approach to public relations, where activists are routinely viewed solely as a threat to corporate success (Deegan 2001, Jaques 2014, Regester and Larkin 2008) to be managed by corporate PR professionals. Academics from the emerging critical PR tradition have started to explore the communicative activities of activists to challenge power holders, create pressure for legislative or individual change and deliver strategic goals, and are re-evaluating the history and aims of the PR discipline as a result (Adi 2018, Demetrious 2013, L’Etang 2016, O’Brien 2018). These different critical and research approaches focus variously on media as enabling activists to organise; the mediation of activism; and media as a tool through which activists can professionally deliver their strategic objectives. All these facets of the relationship between media and activism are explored in this special issue. This issue looks at macro- and meso-levels of activism. It explores the political opposition to journalist activism – the article by Tenford Chitanana and Bruce Mutsvairo reflects on the symbolic and real power of social media movements. As critical as it is hopeful, this piece zooms in on the digital-only campaign #ThisFlag against corruption and poor governance. This social media phenomenon brought people to the streets – becoming one of the first ever protest in Zimbabwe to be organised entirely online. This research provides the analysis of how exactly an online mobilisation brings organised activists and members of the public closer to each other. Another study on Zimbabwe by Khanyile Joseph Mlotshwa illuminates the inner complexities of what press freedom means for Zimbabwe; it demonstrates how the government and private media exchange rhetoric on anti-imperialism and neocolonialism. These discussions are timely and important in a wider context of decolonising and furthering postcolonial media studies. Whilst so many studies on media activism focus on the internet and social media in particular, the Brazilian turn reminds us of the materiality of the medium of community radio. Thiago O. S. Novaes and Francisco Antunes Caminati emphasise that the ‘nomadic transmitter’ is used both as the symbol and the actual equipment to connect and empower people in Brazil’s remote areas. The decentralised, liberating radio waves are making a difference on a quiet, community level. Another example of ‘grounded’ activism takes place in Liverpool. Anthony Killick examines how gentrification of the city is taking a neoliberal turn, which comes at a cost to organic rejuvenation of the abandoned areas. While local galleries and businesses are about to be replaced by generic coffee shops and imposed art spaces, activists organise resistance at both a physical level and at the level of discourse. The alarm goes off about the capitalist appropriation of the word ‘creative’ (‘a very corporate and manufactured idea of what a creative place is’), instead of welcoming that raw, ‘lawless’, community-inspired creativity of Liverpool’s free spirits. The feminist collective in Mexico called themselves Las Morras and started filming cat-callers in the streets – the resulting videos achieved viral fame and even interest from the United Nations. This digital campaign was, at first sight, successful – it enabled the activists to collaborate on launching a phone-reporting service on harassment. Yet the price for that victory was the mountain of online abuse that the group received on social media, which forced to them to close their accounts. The insightful study by Stuart Davis and Melissa Santillana embraces the interplay of liberation and oppression, visibility and vulnerability of such online campaigns to gender power structures. This approach makes the study of Las Morras emblematic for digital feminism, not only in Latin America but across the world. Lastly, with studies reporting that WhatsApp is becoming heavily influential on the political opinions of many people – especially in developing countries – Sérgio Barbosa and Stefania Milan ask how to research this encrypted, closed network. Their solution grows out of the classic code of conduct of media sociologists and ethnographers, but also brings a necessary update to it. It removes a cluster of questions for WhatsApp researchers so that they can start work immediately, without wasting time on doubts. This methodological work responds to the urgent need of unlocking the benefits and harms of digital intimate networks. This issue looks at the symbols and sustainable strategies of activism, at framing and reframing – at agreeing on terms and following up with actions – and eventually at making activism more accessible and efficient. In these times when fascist and racist, misogynist and nationalist narratives are so often revived from the 1930s, we need to adjust internet activism to protect both activists and the societies that they operate in. This special edition, firstly, calls for measures to make digital space a safer place for activists; secondly, to help them to own their narrative without constant risks of hijacking and abuse, and thirdly, to celebrate the thriving strategies and tactics that bring together activists and the public who care. Competing Interests The authors have no competing interests to declare. Author Information Anastasia Denisova is Lecturer in Journalism at CAMRI, University of Westminster. She had worked as a journalist in Russia for over a decade in the capacity of television news editor and reporter, magazine editor and columnist. Anastasia has published academic research on internet memes and politics, satirical microblogging and parody on Twitter, rap and politics on YouTube. In 2019, she released her monograph Internet Memes and Society: Social, Cultural and Political Contexts. Michaela O’Brien is Head of School, Westminster School of Media and Communications, University of Westminster and joint course leader of its Masters in Media, Campaigning and Social Change teaching also on the University of Westminster’s Masters in Public Relations. She is currently researching the historical development of framing in NGO campaign communications. References Adam, A. ( 2006). Artificial Knowing: Gender and the Thinking Machine. London: Routledge. Adi, A. (Ed.). ( 2018). Protest Public Relations: Communicating Dissent and Activism. Abingdon: Routledge. DOI: [doi: 10.4324/9781351173605] Bennett, W. L., & Segerberg, A. ( 2012). The logic of connective action: Digital media and the personalization of contentious politics. Information, Communication & Society, 15(5): 739–68. DOI: [doi: 10.1080/1369118X.2012.670661] Crawford, K. ( 2016). Artificial intelligence’s white guy problem. The New York Times, 25 June. Dastin, J. ( 2018). Amazon scraps secret AI recruiting tool that showed bias against women. , 10 October. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-amazon-com-jobs-automation-insight/amazon-scraps-secret-ai-recruiting-tool-that-showed-bias-against-women-idUSKCN1MK08G (last accessed July 2019). https://www.reuters.com/article/us-amazon-com-jobs-automation-insight/amazon-scraps-secret-ai-recruiting-tool-that-showed-bias-against-women-idUSKCN1MK08G Deegan, D. ( 2001). Managing Activism: A Guide to Dealing with Activists and Pressure Groups. London: Kogan Page/CIPR. Demetrious, K. ( 2013). Public Relations, Activism and Social Change. New York: Routledge. DOI: [doi: 10.4324/9780203078440] Jaques, T. ( 2014). Issue Management. In R. Tench, & L. Yeomans (Eds.), Exploring Public Relations (3rd edn.), pp. 300–312. Harlow: Pearson Education. Kavada, A. ( 2015). Creating the collective: Social media, the Occupy Movement and its constitution as a collective actor. Information, Communication and Society, 18(8): 872–86. DOI: [doi: 10.1080/1369118X.2015.1043318] Leavy, S. ( 2018, May). Gender bias in artificial intelligence: The need for diversity and gender theory in machine learning. In Proceedings of the 1st International Workshop on Gender Equality in Software Engineering (pp. 14–16). New York: Association for Computing Machinery. DOI: [doi: 10.1145/3195570.3195580] L’Etang, J. ( 2016). History as a Source of Critique: Historicity and Knowledge, Societal Change, Activism and Movements. In Routledge Handbook of Critical Public Relations, J. L’Etang, D. McKie, & J. Xifra (eds.), pp. 28–40. Abingdon: Routledge. Megarry, J. ( 2018). Under the watchful eyes of men: Theorising the implications of male surveillance practices for feminist activism on social media. Feminist Media Studies, 18(6), 1070–1085. DOI: [doi: 10.1080/14680777.2017.1387584] Meikle, G. (Ed.) ( 2018). The Routledge Companion to Media and Activism. Abingdon: Routledge. DOI: [doi: 10.4324/9781315475059] O’Brien, M. ( 2018). Nonprofit Issues Management: A New Approach to Resist the Label of ‘Risk’. In N. Garsten, & I. Bruce (Eds.), Communicating Causes, Strategic Public Relations for the Non-Profit Sector (pp. 41–54). Abingdon: Routledge. Regester, M., & Larkin, J. ( 2008). Risk Issues and Crisis Management in Public Relations: A Casebook of Best Practice (4th edition). Kogan Page: London. Tilly, C., & Tarrow, S. ( 2015). Contentious Politics 2nd ed. New York: Oxford University Press. West, M., Kraut, R., & Ei Chew, H. ( 2019). I’d blush if I could: Closing gender divides in digital skills through education. Paris: Equals Global Partnership/UNESCO. Download Download XML Download PDF Issue Volume 14 • Issue 1 • 2019 Jump to File Checksums (MD5) XML: 198c3b2c24860eca6daae7cf9fdede5f PDF: e3b11311f2c5318257d6bc0319ef0488 Harvard-Style Citation Denisova, A & O'Brien, M. (2019) 'From High Visibility to High Vulnerability: Feminist, Postcolonial and Anti-Gentrification Activism at Risk', Westminster Papers in Communication and Culture. 14(1) :94–98. doi: 10.16997/wpcc.323 Show: Vancouver Citation Style | APA Citation Style × Vancouver-Style Citation Denisova, A & O'Brien, M. From High Visibility to High Vulnerability: Feminist, Postcolonial and Anti-Gentrification Activism at Risk. Westminster Papers in Communication and Culture. 2019 9; 14(1) :94–98. doi: 10.16997/wpcc.323 Show: Harvard Citation Style | APA Citation Style × APA-Style Citation Denisova, A & O'Brien, M. (2019, 9 3). From High Visibility to High Vulnerability: Feminist, Postcolonial and Anti-Gentrification Activism at Risk. Westminster Papers in Communication and Culture 14(1) :94–98. doi: 10.16997/wpcc.323 Show: Harvard Citation Style | Vancouver Citation Style × Non Specialist Summary This article has no summary × | 1744-6716 | Published by University of Westminster Press | Privacy Policy Sitemap Contact Login 
work_wjcrd4qlsreyhgacx2tcopudrm	----	Soc. Sci. 2020, 9, 188; doi:10.3390/socsci9110188 www.mdpi.com/journal/socsci Article Topic Modeling and Characterization of Hate Speech against Immigrants on Twitter around the Emergence of a Far-Right Party in Spain Carlos Arcila Calderón *, Gonzalo de la Vega and David Blanco Herrero Department of Sociology and Communication, University of Salamanca, Campus Miguel de Unamuno, Paseo Francisco Tomás y Valiente, s/n, 37007 Salamanca, Spain; gdelaveg@outlook.com (G.d.l.V.); david.blanco.herrero@usal.es (D.B.H.) * Correspondence: carcila@usal.es; Tel.: +34-626-256-855 Received: 18 September 2020; Accepted: 21 October 2020; Published: 23 October 2020 Abstract: In this paper, we sought to model and characterize hate speech against immigrants on Twitter in Spain around the appearance of the far-right party Vox. More than 240,000 tweets that included the term ‘Vox’ between November 2018 and April 2019 were automatically collected and analyzed. Only 1% of the sample included hate speech expressions. Within this subsample of 1977 messages, we found offenses (56%), incitements to hate (42%), and violent speech (2%). The most frequent terms used were classified into five categories: Spain, Immigration, Government, Islam, and Insults. The most common features were foul language, false or doubtful information, irony, distasteful expressions, humiliation or contempt, physical or psychological threats, and incitement to violence. Using unsupervised topic modeling, we found that the four underlying topics (control of illegal immigration, economic assistance for immigrants, consequences of illegal immigration, and Spain as an arrival point for African immigrants and Islamist terrorism) were similar to those in the discourse of Vox. We conclude that the hate speech against immigrants produced around Vox, and not necessarily by Vox, followed the general patterns of this type of speech detected in previous works, including Islamophobia, offensive language more often than violent language, and the refusal to offer public assistance to these collectives. Keywords: Twitter; hate speech; topic modelling; natural language processing; VOX 1. Introduction The use of social media is growing among societies independently from conditions, such as age, gender, or origin, and this has made it easier for people around the globe to share any kind of message, including audio-visual content, breaking the monopole of mass media in producing and spreading content. Among these social media platforms, Twitter has become a public space for political conversation (Moyá and Herrera 2015), allowing contact between politicians and citizens and becoming an essential player in the construction of the public agenda (McCombs and Shawn 1972). Beyond the democratic and freeing effects of these media, this possibility for every citizen to express any opinion or feeling, making it public and accessible for almost every other person, has some risks associated, as offense and polemics can spread and reach a greater public. One of the clearest examples of this is the spread of online hate speech, as social media has allowed a faster and broader spread, which has led to greater visibility and, therefore, a greater impact and magnified effects. Through social media, a message that has not been verified in its production can be replicated and shared by any kind of account (Cueva 2012), which can be dangerous and harmful. Hate speech is especially dangerous as a trigger of potential hate crime (Müller and Schwarz 2018) and also as a Soc. Sci. 2020, 9, 188 2 of 19 crime itself. However, there exist different approaches to defining hate speech, differentiating it from offensive language (Davidson et al. 2017), or generally speaking about “dangerous speech.” This concept was established by Susan Benesch, who proposed that the efforts to reduce hate speech can be less effective due to the lack of clarity in its definition (Benesch 2014). The increase in online hate speech (Bartlett et al. 2014) has taken place in a global context in which migratory movements are growing, as well as anti-immigration discourse, which makes hate speech against immigrants predominant. In the case of Spain, although the arrival of far-right parties to the institutions took place later than in other European or Western countries, the political party Vox is now the third force in the National Parliament and plays a relevant role in many regional and local governments, after entering in a regional parliament for the first time in the Andalusian Elections, held in December 2018. In this context, the main goal of this paper was to use computational methods detect and analyze the dimensions of hate speech toward immigrants on Twitter within the frame of the Spanish socio- political scenario after the appearance of a strong far-right and anti-immigration party. The work seeks to fill the empirical gap existing regarding the features of hate speech against immigrants in the Spanish setting, to discover what characteristics define this kind of hateful speech in order to contribute to its identification and to the definition of a still unclear concept. This is intended to aid current efforts, such as the European project Preventing Hate against Refugees and Migrants (PHARM) or the Stop-Hate project, developed at the University of Salamanca of Spain, to identify and detect hate speech online. For this research, we automatically collected data from social media using Twitter’s application programming interface (API), and, using natural language processing techniques and topic modeling, we extracted valuable information from a large volume of unstructured data and tested the use of these two novel techniques in the field. 2. Theoretical Framework The present work used, as a basis, studies that have already attempted to model or automatically detect hate speech online using big data or machine learning techniques, such as the study of Mondal et al. (2017), which used sentence structure to automatically detect hate speech in social media, or that of Schmidt and Wiegand (2017), which used natural language processing for the detection of hate speech. More focused on immigration and in Spanish, but without a focus on discovering hate speech, Gallego et al. (2017) used a semi-automatic coding method with a dictionary to analyze 862,999 tweets that included the word “refugee” in Twitter messages to study the discourse regarding women and refugees around the Crisis of Refugees of the Mediterranean. The work of Ben-David and Matamoros-Fernandez (2016) monitored the activity of seven far- right pages in Facebook between 2009 and 2013 to analyze the presence of hate speech; they compared the frequency of certain words and their simultaneous occurrence to find patterns from which they could model underlying topics. This work showed how hate and discrimination on Facebook was being introduced within the legitimate boundaries of the Spanish political discourse. This study finished its analysis in 2013, prior to the appearance of Vox (at the end of that year) and long before its discourse became relevant in the Andalusian elections in December 2018. Our work follows a similar goal, but with a difference—that Vox is not a marginal party any longer, but one of the main actors in the Spanish political scene. Another difference is that the focus is not on Facebook groups, but on Twitter content, not only due to the significance of this social medium for political communication (D’heer and Verdegem 2014) but also because it has been proven a relevant and fruitful line of study for hateful content. In this vein, we highlight the efforts of Burnap and Williams (2015), who developed a model to detect violent and hateful content on Twitter with the goal of monitoring the reaction of the public to specific events that could be potentially controversial phenomena. In this interaction between online and offline events, a very relevant project is Umati, led by Susan Benesch, who showed how the surge of online hate speech was influenced by real events. Soc. Sci. 2020, 9, 188 3 of 19 Following these observations, other researchers explored social media to discover hate speech and its interactions with real events. Olteanu et al. (2018) characterized messages after extremist events along four dimensions (stance, target, severity, and framing) to detect hate speech, observing how some jihadist terrorist attacks that took place in Western countries had an impact and influenced hate speech towards Arabic and Muslim collectives, systematically increasing the number of messages promoting hate speech and violence towards these groups. Evolvi (2018) also approached the spread of Islamophobia on Twitter in connection to the Brexit process with a qualitative analysis of Islamophobic tweets collected after the Brexit referendum in 2016. In the opposite direction, the aforementioned Müller and Schwarz (2018) observed how online hate speech in social media influenced and could even help in predicting real events of violence or hate crimes against refugees and migrants by modeling together anti-refugee attacks and the frequency of anti-refugee messaging on social media based on the Facebook page of the far-right party Alternative für Deutschland in Germany. 2.1. Defining Hate Speech To approach this topic, it is important to consider freedom of speech, as the clash of its limits with xenophobic, extremist, or racist discourses goes beyond the law and becomes a discussion of political philosophy (Alcácer 2015). However, here, we will use a communicational perspective, understanding that speech has a social projection, as it aims at one or more audiences, whether they are broad or small, and it can be legally restricted if it harms or limits the freedom of others (Cueva 2012). Recommendation No. 15 of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (2016) defines hate speech as promoting hate, humiliation, or underestimation in any form against a person or a group, motivated by race, skin color, ancestry, national or ethnic origin, age, disability, language, religion or beliefs, sex, gender, gender identity, sexual orientation, or other personal characteristic or conditions. The Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA of 28 November 2008 of the European Council (2008) defines hate speech as “publicly inciting to violence or hatred directed against a group of persons or a member of such a group defined by reference to race, color, religion, descent, or national or ethnic origin.” More specifically, online hate speech has been defined or characterized in several previous works. We highlight Miró’s (2016) taxonomy of hateful content online, including any violent expression, which will be one of the bases for our model. Waseem and Hovy (2016) also defined a set of features to reliably decide whether a message shows hate speech or not, as it tends to be complex for different people to agree on homogeneous criteria in this matter. Other relevant work includes that of Warner and Hirschberg (2012), which addressed numerous problems when determining whether a message should be considered hate speech, as the use of specific words or expressions might not necessarily mean an expression of hate. Davidson et al. (2017) observed that the combination of offensive language and hate speech might lead to errors in the distinction between both concepts. However, Mondal et al. (2017) considered that any post motivated entirely or partially by the author’s prejudice toward an aspect of a group should be seen as hate speech and, in order to overcome the previously mentioned problems, they designed a different system, based on the detection of the complete structure of sentences. Finally, we also followed other indicators, including obscene language or other distasteful expressions, because Schmidt and Wiegand (2017) defended that this type of language is central to the detection of hate messages when combined with other features. Although less relevant for our text, there have been approaches to study anti-immigration discourse on social media from the perspective of qualitative techniques, such as the one of Kreis (2017), guided by critical discourse studies. In Spain, it was not until 2015 when the Disposición final sexta of the LO/1/2015 CP of the Gobierno de España (2015) adopted this European Framework Decision to the domestic legislation. It is article 510 of the Penal Code of Spain that punishes hate speech in any form for “racist, anti-Semitic or other reason referring to ideology, religion or beliefs, family situation, belonging to a race, ethnicity or nation, national origin, sex, sexual orientation or identity, gender, illness or disability.” However, the Soc. Sci. 2020, 9, 188 4 of 19 Law in this country does not protect a group as a general rule without further reason; instead, it demands specific conditions that lead a group to a situation of vulnerability. According to the Ministry of the Interior of Spain, there are eight motivations or prejudices that lead to the existence of vulnerable groups: racism/xenophobia, sexual orientation or identity, religious praxis or beliefs, disability, gender, antisemitism, and aporophobia. They all might interact with each other, aggravating some situations. The object of this study was hate speech against immigrants, given that, according to the figures of the Statistic System of Criminality (SEC) of the Ministry of the Interior of Spain, racism and xenophobia are the reasons behind the largest number of cases of hate speech and hate crime in the last years. Online hate speech against immigrants in Spain has been already tackled by Valdez-Apolo et al. (2019), who showed that negative messages are predominant when talking about migrants and refugees and also observed that immigrants are usually framed as a threat. Arcila-Calderón et al. (2020) studied the presence of rejection of immigrants in Twitter messages with a mixed manual and automated content analysis of tweets. Gualda and Rebollo (2016, p. 208) used a semi-automatic coding method with a dictionary to study the discourse regarding refugees in Twitter in different European nations, including Spain, and observed how messages can have xenophobic connotations and how “sometimes these discourses are supported by politicians, such as Donald Trump or other organizations in Europe”. In a broader sense, this article will also complement those works that tackle the attitudes toward immigrants, such as Murray and Marx (2013) and Verkuyten et al. (2018). Together with the works analyzing hate speech or rejection against immigrants, both in Spain and internationally, it is relevant to study the connection of this type of discourse with nationalism, as Peherson et al. (2011) did using a cross-sectional and longitudinal study. More specifically, in recent years, parallel to the rise of far-right populist parties, scholars have paid great attention to the role that anti-immigration nationalism has for these parties. In this field, Lubbers and Coenders (2017) studied how nationalism connects with radical right voting. In the Spanish setting, the analysis focused on the multiple reasons for the absence (until recently) of a populist radical right (PPR) party. Alonso and Rovira Kaltwasser (2015) mentioned the cleavage structure of the country and the strategy of competition of the mainstream right and the electoral system, and Casals (2000) added the lack of organization and the archaic political culture, far from the influence of European far-right parties. In a similar line, Morales et al. (2015) focused on the ambivalent approach to immigration by the main Spanish political parties. These works are, however, now outdated: first, because Teruel (2017) observed that concern about hate speech and the conducts built upon prejudices and stereotypes in Spain have grown, and more specifically, because the arrival of the far-right political party Vox has altered the political scenario in Spain, bringing also the topic of immigration—and, particularly, anti-immigration—into a more visible position of the political agenda as stated by Castromil et al. (2020) after analyzing the political program, the use of Twitter, and the political debates of different parties. Arango et al. (2019) also defend that the Spanish exception within the European context ended with the arrival of Vox to the Andalusian Regional Parliament in December 2018 and to the national one in April 2019, making anti-immigration a more relevant matter of the public discourse. Other studies have investigated the individual-level determinants of vote choice that explain the rise of this party (Turnbull-Dugarte 2019; Turnbull-Dugarte et al. 2020), and Ferreira (2019) conducted a qualitative content analysis of the political programs and discourses based on the causal chain method, confirming anti-immigration nationalism as a differential aspect of this party. However, there exist no studies similar to the one of Ben-David and Matamoros-Fernandez (2016), focusing not only on the party, but on the discussion around it, since the arrival of Vox to the highest democratic institutions of Spain. That is why we proposed to answer the following research question: RQ1: What are the features of hate speech toward immigrants around the emergence of a far-right party, such as Vox? The interest of this question is not only the study of hate speech in a particular context but also, given that the anti-immigration discourse surrounding Vox is one of the most defining sources of Soc. Sci. 2020, 9, 188 5 of 19 hate speech against immigrants in Spain, to model the topics underlying this type of discourse. That is why we proposed to answer: RQ2: What are the underlying topics of hate speech toward immigrants around the emergence of a far-right party, such as Vox? Both questions attempt to go further than the observation of the amount or the visibility of hate speech, focusing on the features and characteristics and also attempting to comprehend what topics are addressed when this discourse is used. This is a key aspect to understanding what is behind this discourse and how to address it, complementing some preliminary efforts in this sense, such as the study of Arcila-Calderón et al. (2020), regarding what negatives aspects were associated with the rejection of migrants and refugees. In order to answer those two questions, we will use, as a reference, the taxonomy of hate speech and violent communication online, built by Miró (2016) in his monitoring of hate speech in the frame of the jihadist attack toward the French magazine Charlie Hebdo, as well as the parameters that differentiate hate speech from offensive or vulgar language of Davidson et al. (2017). More specifically, we sought to use computational methods to discover the topics behind this discourse, as well as the most frequent and relevant terms in Spanish that allow for the detection of hateful content in digital media, creating a database that can be used in future projects. 3. Method 3.1. Sample and Procedure Using Python’s library Tweepy, we accessed Twitter’s application programming interface (API) to collect tweets related to Vox, taking advantage of this interface (Ong et al. 2015) to obtain the unstructured data for the study. Specifically, we collected tweets both from API Rest and from API Streaming. The first collects tweets using one or more keywords or hashtags from the historic flow of messages of the last ten days, whereas the second collects all messages produced in real time with one or more keywords or hashtags. We retrieved all tweets in Spanish (lang=es) and excluding retweets (exclude=“retweets”) that contained the word ‘Vox’ in the track—that is, any field of a tweet, including the name of the account that produces it, the text of the tweet, the links shared, etc.—from 25 November 2018 until 28 April 2019. The initial date of collection was close to the regional elections in the region of Andalucía (2 December), in which Vox obtained their first seats in a regional parliament of Spain. The collection period also included 15 February 2019, when the announcement of new elections in Spain by Pedro Sánchez, President of the Government, took place. The final day of collection was the day of the National Parliament Elections. In total, 244,095 messages were collected for a period of six months. The tweets were collected in JSON format, which allows running filters, such as date, language, geographical location, name of the user, etc. However, only the text of the tweet was analyzed, given that the analysis was intended to study the features and topics of the message, not a time or geographical distribution. The messages were produced by official accounts of the party, or by media or citizens naming the word ‘Vox’ in their content, generating tweets of multiple and diverse topics. As explained in the next paragraphs, we later filtered this enormous number of messages by manually removing those not containing hate speech toward immigrants in one of the three ways defined by Miró (2016), so that we could use a subsample for manual and computational analysis. The whole procedure, which will be detailed in the next section paying attention to each step, was as follows: a sample of 244,095 tweets that included the term ‘Vox’ somewhere in the track of the tweet was automatically collected, and then a manual classification allowed us to obtain a subsample of 1977 tweets that included expressions of hate against immigrants. That subsample was afterward classified in three groups following Miro’s classification (2016), and a manual exploratory analysis was conducted to observe the features of language in those tweets. Then, two computational methods were used to investigate the features and topics of the discourse of the subsample of hateful contents: first, natural language processing was used to identify the most frequent terms in each of the three Soc. Sci. 2020, 9, 188 6 of 19 groups in which hate speech was classified; and, second, latent Dirichlet allocation (LDA) topic modeling was used to discover what topics underlay the whole subsample of hateful messages. 3.2. Measures 3.2.1. Hate Speech towards Immigrants Based on the contemporary discussion regarding hateful content online as explained in Section 2.1, we considered any message in Twitter that directly or indirectly damaged the image of individuals or groups based on their condition of immigrant, refugee, asylum seeker, or displaced as hate speech toward immigrants (Miró 2016; Waseem and Hovy 2016; Warner and Hirschberg 2012; Davidson et al. 2017; Mondal et al. 2017; Schmidt and Wiegand 2017). Although these works offer guidelines for the detection of hate speech, Schmidt and Wiegand (2017) presented their concerns regarding the problems of reliability and the difficulty of consensus due to the lack of unanimity in the definition of hate speech. With this in mind, in the present study, the following criteria were established to determine whether a message contained hate speech against immigrants: They had to be messages showing contempt or hate toward the collective of immigrants and, in particular, those expressions using pejorative terms against immigrants, as well as those demanding or justifying a restriction of the rights of immigrants. Messages that were considered offensive or hurtful against feelings or beliefs of the collective were also included, together with those containing insults or grave offenses against a particular person or group of the immigrant collective. It was also considered hate speech when there was an association of individual victims or the whole collective with crimes or illicit behaviors when this association was intentionally false or not concerned with the truth of the accusation. Finally, the direct or indirect promotion of physical violence against one well-known member or the whole immigrant collective, as well as expressions of defense, justification, trivialization, or glorification of that violence. To obtain the inter-coder reliability of this variable, two independent judges were trained to analyze a random sub-sample of 24,225 messages (~10% of the total sample). According to the degree of agreement between both coders, we used Krippendorff’s alpha to test the reliability, as this is the most recommended measure (Hayes and Krippendorff 2007). We obtained a value of 0.88, which is over the acceptable minimum of 0.7 (Neuendorf 2002). 3.2.2. Types of Hate Speech against Immigrants Hateful messages were classified according to the types proposed by Miró (2016): (a) direct incitement or glorification of violence; (b) incitement to discrimination, hate, or restriction of rights; and (c) offenses against feelings. These types allowed a classification of hate speech at three levels of danger. According to the pyramidal shape (Figure 1) it was expected that a majority of hate messages would belong to the category of offenses against feelings, and the smallest proportion would be those directly inciting or glorifying violence. We also conducted an inter-coder reliability test, obtaining a Krippendorff’s alpha of 0.78, which was adequate for the study. Soc. Sci. 2020, 9, 188 7 of 19 Figure 1. Theoretical types of hate speech from Miró (2016). 3.2.3. Frequency Distribution We applied basic natural language processing (NLP) techniques to obtain the frequency distribution in hateful tweets against immigrants. NLP is a branch of computational sciences that is combined with applied linguistics and attempts to make a machine process and “comprehend” what a text in a particular language means. Essentially, NLP seeks to convert a text in a set of structured data that describe its meaning and the topics it mentions (Collobert et al. 2011). NLP-based technologies are growing in presence and play a relevant role in the current multi-linguistic societies (Bird et al. 2009). The programming language Python offers a broad library that includes components for graphic programming, numeric processing, and web connectivity. For the present study, it was essential to previously install the Numpy library, which adds stronger support for vectors and matrixes, as well as the Natural Language Toolkit (NLTK), which defines an infrastructure that allows the development of NLP programs (Bird et al. 2009). This type of linguistic analysis based on the distribution of the terms of a text was used as previous step for the identification of underlying topics after a filtering process and counting of the most frequent terms, both in the sub-sample of messages containing hate speech against immigrants and in the different categories that are part of it. Knowing the most frequent words offers valuable information that will be useful for interpreting the results of the topic modeling. The first step for properly conducting NLP techniques was the identification of tokens, the basic units, typically simple words or sentences, in which a text can be deconstructed for its following analysis. A token cannot be deconstructed into smaller parts; thus, in computational methods, a token is considered an atom (Webster and Kit 1992). For this process, called tokenization, we used the NLTK library in Python, together with the module that tokenizes the text at the level of words,1 and we indicated the location of the text that should be analyzed. The following step was the removal of Stop Words, that is, words that do not give relevant information and that are very common, such as articles or prepositions. It is vital to also remove punctuation, accents, and web links to avoid the repetition of terms and to obtain homogenous final results. Finally, we were able to observe the most repeated terms and their distribution and decide on the number of topics that we want to obtain. 1 Other approaches such as TFIDF or N-gram for text representation were not considered in this study. Direct incitement or glorification of violence Incitement to discrimination, hate or restriction of rights Offenses against feelings Soc. Sci. 2020, 9, 188 8 of 19 3.2.4. Topic Modeling (Latent Dirichlet Allocation—LDA) To detect underlying topics in hateful tweets against immigrants, we applied unsupervised machine learning in the form of topic modeling using the latent Dirichlet allocation algorithm (Blei et al. 2003). LDA is the most commonly used algorithm for topic modeling (Grimmer and Stewart 2013) and is frequently used to identify the topics in a set of documents (Ramage et al. 2009), allowing the automatic modeling of a large amount of data and to visualize this data as a combination of topics (Canini et al. 2009). According to Keller et al. (2020), this technique “is a form of automated content analysis that infers latent thematic structures called topics within documents in a ‘bottom-up’ approach.” This approach allows the inference of topics from texts—in this case, tweets—without prior knowledge or an extensive manual annotation. The topics are detected by discovering patterns in the presence of clusters of co-occurring words across documents (Jacobi et al. 2015). This method tends to be used in larger texts, such as articles from newspapers (Keller et al. 2020) or abstracts of journals (Zou 2018), but there are some arguments that push us to employ it in shorter messages, such as tweets: the longer extension of tweets since 2017 of 280 characters instead of 140, the relevance of Twitter in the construction of public discourse in the present—particularly around populist and radical parties, and the interest to test this technique in this medium in Spain, discovering whether it can be applied in larger studies. In this case, the application of the model to the sub-sample will allow us to dig into the connection of the terms that build hate speech against immigrants in Spanish and, this way, obtain groups of words that can be used to deduct the topic behind it. For this task, beside NLTK, it was also necessary to import the following libraries of Python’s version 3.7: pandas (data analysis), seaborn (visualization), gensim (topic modeling), and pyLDAvis (visualization of topics). After importing all the requested libraries and modules and selecting the text we want to model, the first step was to remove punctuation signs and double spaces and convert all text into lowercase. The first model conducted here offers a naïve model that does not discriminate Stop Words; a list of these words can be also imported and applied so that we can achieve a more adequate modeling. For this, it is advisable to use coherence measures of the topics; by calibrating the level of semantic similarity among words with a high score inside of a topic (Stevens et al. 2012), a more precise model can be achieved. For that goal, the Umass coherence index of the text we want to model must be calculated based on the number of topics and the number of terms inside of each; the further from 0 the obtained value is, the higher the coherence level is. For example, the lower coherence level that naïve models have is explained because of the presence of Stop Words, irrelevant terms that introduce noise in the text, reducing the coherence of the topics. Finally, the pyLDAvis library will allow us to print a map for visually exploring the final result of the modeling in a quick and simple way. This library also contains a tool that adjusts the level of ƛ (lambda) to increase or decrease the frequency ratio of a selected topic. 4. Results 4.1. Distribution of the Sample and Sub-Sample The total amount of collected messages was 244,095, of which 1977 were classified as hate speech against immigrants in the phase of manual tagging according to the previously mentioned rules (Figure 2 shows the proportion of messages that built the sub-sample inside of the total sample). The sub-sample built with those 1977 tweets in which hate speech was detected was divided into three categories depending the level of danger of the hateful discourse included in the text (Figure 3 shows the distribution of the sub-sample in the three previously specified categories of hate speech). The biggest group of this three, with 1026 tweets (56% of the total) was for the least serious type of hate, the type that included offenses against the sensibility of others; the second group, with messages that incite discrimination, hate, or the restriction of rights, had 757 messages (42%); and the most dangerous type of hate expression, the type promoting violence, was present in 42 messages—2% of the total. Soc. Sci. 2020, 9, 188 9 of 19 Figure 2. Proportion of hate messages inside of the total sample. Figure 3. Types of detected hate speech. 4.2. Features of Hate Speech Using exploratory analysis, we identified features of the different dimensions of hate speech, such as foul language, false or doubtful information, irony, distasteful expression, humiliation or contempt, physical or psychological threats, or incitement to violence. - Foul language: Dishonest or obscene words are used. As previously mentioned, the presence of this type of language in a message does not necessarily mean that there is hate against immigrants, and it is the co-occurrence—the proximity between the two terms—that determines the presence of hate. For example, when the obscene word is applied to the collective of immigrants, the presence of hate speech is more common, as in: “Putos inmigrantes. La gente que quieren que se mueran de hambre. esos merecen la pena. Viva VOX.”2 - Incitement to violence: This type of message invites others to conduct violent acts against a specific person or collective. This dimension is linked to physical and psychological threats (see next point), but it is based on an abstract call rather than a direct threat. In the next example, we can see how the emitter calls for the expulsion of immigrants in a violent way using despising terms in a threatening way: “A día de hoy solo Vox, pide acabar con la inmigración ilegal. Españoles hay que votarlos para limpiar España de estos salvajes. Y los que no los voteis, disfrutar de lo votado.”3 2 Published 30 November 2018 at 19:22. In English: “Fucking immigrants. People want them to starve to death. They deserve the punishment. Long live VOX.” 3 Published 25 November 2018 at 21:45. In English: “To this day only VOX demands to end illegal immigration. Spaniards, we have to vote to clean Spain from these savages. And those who do not vote for them, enjoy your vote.” Soc. Sci. 2020, 9, 188 10 of 19 - Physical or psychological threat: These messages go against the physical and psychological integrity of the victims (Miró 2016), and, unlike the previous group, the threat is more immediate and leads more directly to the completion of the violent act. It must be highlighted that violence might not be the end but rather a means, as in the following example: “A ver si sale vox y echamos a todas estas putas ratas de el pais.”4 - Humiliation and contempt: Underestimation of a person or collective and rejection of them based on their inherent condition. For Schmidt and Wiegand (2017), this dimension is sometimes given by the context, and so it might be hard to detect. See, for example: “Pues a mí me han convencido los de #vox, por fin gente como #shakira, #Messi, #Griezmann, #benzema … Dejarán de quitarle el trabajo a nuestros hijos españoles! A su casa!! #VOXalNatural #Politica #EleccionesYa.”5 - Distasteful expressions: Eschatological, vulgar, or disgusting expressions are used. This type of expressions can vary depending the geographical location of the emitter and the addition of a negative charge to the message. In the next example, it can be seen how these expressions highlight the hate against a specific group of immigrants: “Fuera los Moros!, … tomar por culo su religion! a si de claro!, … que se vaya la coño norte de Africa!”6 - Irony: This is the hardest to detect as the hate is expressed in a subtler way. In the next example, we can see how sarcasm is used to criticize and to say the opposite to the literal meaning of the words: “Pero los crucifijos fuera de las escuelas… y @vox_es son muy malos. Los siguientes hombres de paz van a ser los del ISIS… no?”7 - False or doubtful information: These messages include unconfirmed generalizations, stereotypes, or false affirmations regarding a collective. In the context of hate speech content, it is common that these messages attempt to create social alarm regarding something that attacks the internal culture or beliefs with external impositions. For example: “Exacto. Sin embargo, nos están destruyendo nuestras creencias, nuestras tradiciones e imponiéndonos islamismo radical y “culturas” ajenas a nosotros y que faltan el respeto.”8 4.3. Frequency Distribution We obtained the most common words used in hateful comments against immigrants in Spanish in order to characterize this kind of speech. After adding all the Stop Words9 and removing the terms that share the lexeme, we obtained the following list of the 20 most representative terms of content containing hate speech against immigrants (n = 1977): (‘inmigrantes’, 540), (‘españa’, 383), (‘pais’, 264), (‘ilegales’, 251), (‘inmigracion’, 237), (‘españoles’, 160), (‘mujeres’, 134), (‘musulmanes’, 92), (‘europa’, 84), (‘partido’, 81), (‘moros’, 73), (‘islam’, 73), (‘ayudas’, 71), (‘extranjeros’, 69), (‘votar’, 64), (‘gobierno’, 60), (‘pp’, 55), (‘expulsar’, 55), (‘trabajo’, 51), and (‘negro’, 49).10 4 Published 15 December 2018 at 23:29. In English: “Let’s hope Vox wins and we remove all these fucking rats from the country.” 5 Published 12 December 2018 at 22:27. In English: “I have been convinced by Vox, finally people like #shakira, #Messi, #Griezmann, #benzema… will stop taking the jobs from our Spanish children! To their house! #Voxasitis #Politics #ElectionsNow.” 6 Published 11 December 2018 at 21:08. In English: “Out with the moors! Fuck off with their religion! Clear as day! Fuck off to the fucking North of Africa!” 7 Published 13 December 2018 at 23:08. In English: “But the crucifixes out of the schools… and @vox_es are very bad. The next men of peace will be the ones of ISIS, right?” 8 Published 25 November 2018 at 21:05. In English: “Exactly. However, they are destroying our beliefs, our traditions and forcing us into a radical Islamism and “cultures” that are alien to us and that are disrespectful.” 9 Even when some terms might be not special or meaningful for the analysis, we did not include in the Stop Word list reference terms such as “Inmigrantes” (immigrants) or “España” (Spain). We consider that far from being redundant they might offer better results in the co-occurrence analysis. 10 In English: “immigrants, spain, country, illegals, immigration, spanish [masculine plural], women, muslims, Europe, party, moors, islam, benefits, foreigners, vote, government, pp [People’s Party of Spain], expel, work, black.” Soc. Sci. 2020, 9, 188 11 of 19 We conducted the same approach for each of the sub-categories. The 20 most frequent terms in the group of Offenses against the feelings (n = 1026) were: (‘inmigrantes’, 307), (‘españa’, 181), (‘inmigracion’, 180), (‘ilegales’, 170), (‘pais’, 111), (‘españoles’, 70), (‘partido’, 48), (‘pp’, 41), (‘musulmanes’, 40), (‘gobierno’, 35), (‘andalucia’, 34), (‘mujeres’, 34), (‘negro’, 34), (‘europa’, 34), (‘expulsar’, 34), (‘extranjeros’, 32), (‘votar’, 31), (‘islam’, 31), (‘programa’, 29), (‘melilla’, 29).11 The representative words in the group Incitement of discrimination, hate, or restriction of rights (n = 757) were: (‘inmigrantes’, 179), (‘españa’, 173), (‘pais’, 130), (‘españoles’, 77), (‘ilegales’, 77), (‘mujeres’, 70) (‘musulmanes’, 64), (‘ayudas’, 55), (‘moros’, 44), (‘europa’, 44), (‘inmigracion’, 39), (‘islam’, 39), (‘religion’, 28), (‘extranjeros’, 26), (‘musulmana’, 24), (‘mierda’, 21), (‘ley’, 21), (‘derechos’, 21), (‘cultura’, 20), (‘machistas’, 20).12 In the case of Direct incitement or glorification of violence (n = 42) we obtained: (‘españa’, 11), (‘pais’, 9), (‘inmigrantes’, 6), (‘putos’, 6), (‘mierda’, 6), (‘culo’, 6), (‘moros’, 5), (‘coño’, 5), (‘musulmanes’, 5), (‘puto’, 4), (‘puta’, 4), (‘niñas’, 3), (‘hijos’, 3), (‘basura’, 3), (‘violadores’, 3), (‘inmigracion’, 2), (‘españoles’, 2), (‘limpiar’, 2), (‘delincuentes’, 2), (‘gentuza’, 2).13 To obtain a better understanding of this analysis, we manually grouped all the terms detected into five topics selected for the study (see Table 1). Table 1. Manual grouping of the terms by topic. Spain Immigration Government Islam Insults España inmigrantes programa religión mierda españoles inmigrante ayudas cultura putos español Ilegales trabajo musulmana puto país Ilegal votar musulmán negro Andalucía extranjeros problema musulmanes basura Melilla expulsar ley moros gentuza países Europa mujeres violadores derechos mujer delincuentes partido coño pp culo psoe machistas 4.4. Topic Modeling After obtaining the distribution of frequencies for the general hateful tweets and for each of the specific three categories, we conducted topic modeling to automatically detect the underlying topics in this kind of speech. To determine an adequate number of topics, we measured the level of coherence—the farther from 0, the better—and we compared several models with 15 words for each topic and decided that the adequate number of topics was five, as this number offered a coherence value of −7.8415, the farthest from 0, as, from 6 topics onward, it started decreasing. After recursively removing the Stop Words, we detected and labeled the next topics: Topic 1: Lack of control of illegal immigration by the State. This refers to an alleged negligence from the Spanish government and the public institutions to control illegal immigration, especially the lack of strong measures to stop it from the traditional parties (Figure 4): 11 In English: “immigrants, spain, immigration, illegals, country, spanish [masculine plural], party, pp, muslims, government, andalusia, women, black, europe, expel, foreigners, vote, islam, program, melilla.” 12 In English: “immigrants, spain, country, spanish [masculine plural], illegals, women, muslims, benefits, moors, europe, immigration, islam, religion, foreigners, muslim, shit, law, rights, culture, male chauvinists.” 13 In English: “spain, country, immigrants, fucking [masculine plural], shit, ass, moors, cunt, muslims, fucking [masculine singular], whore/fucking [feminine singular], girls, sons, garbage, rapists, immigration, spanish [masculine plural], clean, offenders, riffraff.” Soc. Sci. 2020, 9, 188 12 of 19 1 (‘0.021*”inmigrantes” + 0.011*”españa” + 0.008*”inmigracion” + 0.007*”musulmanes” + 0.006*”pais” + 0.005*”mujeres” + 0.005*”españoles” + 0.004*”partido” + 0.004*”ilegales” + 0.004*”europa” + 0.003*”paises” + 0.003*”inmigrante” + 0.003*”psoe” + 0.003*”pp” + 0.003*”ilegal”‘).14 Figure 4. Interactive map of topic 1, ƛ = 1. Topic 2: Economic assistance to immigrants. This approaches the alleged frauds of immigrants when obtaining economic support from public institutions, as well as their advantages compared to Spanish citizens (Figure 5): 2 (‘0.020*”españa” + 0.010*”pais” + 0.009*”inmigrantes” + 0.009*”inmigracion” + 0.007*”españoles” + 0.006*”ilegal” + 0.005*”moros” + 0.004*”ayudas” + 0.003*”millones” + 0.003*”mujer” + 0.003*”ilegales” + 0.003*”musulmana” + 0.003*”expulsar” + 0.003*”inmigrante” + 0.003*”paises”‘).15 14 In English: “immigrants, spain, immigration, muslims, country, women, spanish [masculine plural], party, illegals, europe, countries, immigrant, psoe [Spanish Socialist Party], pp, illegal.” 15 In English: “Spain, country, immigrants, immigration, spanish [masculine plural], illegal, moors, benefits, millions, woman, illegals, muslim [feminine singular], expel, immigrant, countries.” Soc. Sci. 2020, 9, 188 13 of 19 Figure 5. Interactive map of topic 2, ƛ = 1. Topic 3: Consequences of illegal immigration. The focus is on the negative consequences that illegal immigration has for the Spanish population (Figure 6): 3 (‘0.012*”inmigrantes” + 0.008*”españa” + 0.006*”ilegales” + 0.006*”españoles” + 0.005*”gente” + 0.005*”pais” + 0.004*”inmigracion” + 0.004*”islam” + 0.003*”inmigrante” + 0.003*”europa” + 0.003*”extranjeros” + 0.003*”mujer” + 0.003*”marroquies” + 0.003*”problema” + 0.003*”ayudas”‘).16 Figure 6. Interactive map of topic 3, ƛ = 1. 16 In English: “immigrants, spain, illegals, spanish [masculine plural], people, country, immigration, islam, immigrant, Europe, foreigners, woman, Moroccan [masculine plural], problem, benefits.” Soc. Sci. 2020, 9, 188 14 of 19 Topic 4: Spain as the entrance of African immigrants to Europe. This focuses primarily on the arrival of African immigrants to the Southern border of Spain, especially in the city of Melilla in the Northern coast of Africa (Figure 7): 4 (1, ‘0.015*”inmigrantes” + 0.013*”españa” + 0.008*”ilegales” + 0.008*”inmigracion” + 0.005*”partido” + 0.004*”pais” + 0.004*”gente” + 0.003*”izquierda” + 0.003*”ilegal” + 0.003*”melilla” + 0.003*”fronteras” + 0.003*”europa” + 0.002*”español” + 0.002*”españoles” + 0.002*”invasion”‘).17 Figure 7. Interactive map of topic 4, ƛ = 1. Topic 5: Islamist terrorism. This topic focuses on the association of terrorism with Islam or with Muslim immigrants or people from Muslim countries or backgrounds (Figure 8): 5 (0, ‘0.013*”inmigrantes” + 0.009*”inmigracion” + 0.007*”españa” + 0.006*”pais” + 0.005*”españoles” + 0.004*”islam” + 0.004*”miedo” + 0.003*”islamistas” + 0.003*”expulsion” + 0.002*”gobierno” + 0.002*”mujeres” + 0.002*”ilegal” + 0.002*”familia” + 0.002*”problema” + 0.002*”negro”‘).18 17 In English: “immigrants, spain, illegals, immigration, party, country, people, left, illegal, melilla, borders, Europe, Spanish [masculine singular], spanish [masculine plural], invasion.” 18 In English: “immigrants, immigration, spain, country, spanish [masculine plural], islam, fear, islamists, expel, government, women, illegal, family, problem, black.” Soc. Sci. 2020, 9, 188 15 of 19 Figure 8. Interactive map of topic 5, ƛ = 1. 5. Discussion of Results and Conclusions As expected, the distribution of the different types of hate speech against immigrants follows a pyramid shape, from the most common offenses against the feelings, with 1026 tweets and 56% of this subsample; through the incitement of discrimination, hate, and the restriction of rights, with 757 messages and 42% of the subsample; finally to the direct incitement or glorification of violence, with 42 messages and only 2% of the subsample. This agrees with the distribution observed in previous studies, such as Miró (2016), in which only 2% of the original sample collected using hashtags after the Charlie Hebdo attacks in Paris in 2015 included hate speech expressions, and from those, the distribution also followed a pyramid, from the least to the most harmful. In total, we observed that 1% of the discussion surrounding Vox during the six months analyzed contained hate speech against immigrants. This does not indicate that 1% of the messages produced by Vox or its supporters included some form of hate speech against immigrants. First, because not all the conversation around Vox is produced solely by Vox and its followers, but also by the media and by citizens talking about the party; second, because there can be expressions of hate speech against immigrants that are not produced by Vox or its followers, but in which the party is mentioned for different reasons; and third, because Vox or its followers might produce hate speech against immigrants without mentioning the name of the party in the text of the tweet or in other fields of the track of the tweet. At the same time, those 244,095 messages collected with the term ‘Vox’ also included other topics discussed around Vox discourse—the economy, social protection, fight against criminality, etc.—without relation to immigration or without including hateful expressions. Similarly, although in a very small amount, other messages might have included the term ‘Vox’ in another context; for example, typos using the word “voz,”19 the Latin expression vox populi, or a brand of dictionaries also named Vox. As a conclusion of this aspect, we can affirm that around 1% of the conversation that mentioned Vox included hate speech against immigrants, but not that 1% of the discourse produced by the party, its leaders, and its followers does; future studies will be needed to determine if that proportion is bigger or smaller. This approach of the study also showed the need to continue researching different forms of hate speech around this far-right party, as a stronger relevance of other topics, such as Catalonia’s independency or the management of the COVID-19 crisis by the Government, could be expected, which might modify the proportion of hate speech against immigrants in Vox’s discussion on Twitter. 19 In English: “voice.” Soc. Sci. 2020, 9, 188 16 of 19 Thus, the volume of hate speech against a particular group may have increased or decreased, particularly, because it has been observed that online hate speech can be intensified on social media after high-impact events, such as a terrorist attack or news with the presence of disadvantaged or denigrated groups of the population (Awan and Zempi 2015; Awan 2014). In this line, a complementary study of the spikes and troughs in hate speech prevalence coinciding with the events presented along the period of study would have been interesting, and this will be developed in future works; however, given the focus of the study in the features and topics of this discourse rather than in the amount or evolution, it was not included at this time. The features and topics of this type of hateful discourse tend to be stable over time, which suggests that the answers of our research questions will remain valid for a long period of time, even as hate speech against immigrants might gain or lose presence. Therefore, in general terms, the study confirmed what previous studies have already pointed out, that anti-immigration nationalist discourses are closely associated to this far-right party, as observed by Ferreira (2019) and that the features of hateful contents go from (the more or less harmless) offensive language, as studied by Davidson et al. (2017), to public and direct incitements to violence that already constitute a crime by themselves. The second research question regarding the topics underlying these discourses was answered using a computational approach. The results of the distribution of frequencies and the five topics that were modeled demonstrated the presence of the main elements that build and explain hate speech against immigrants in the discourse around Vox on Twitter. These topics, which include the expulsion of illegal immigrants from Spain, the removal of public benefits for immigrants, and the “invasion” coming from the North of Africa, relate closely to the anti-immigration discourse of Vox, and are consistent with the broader analysis of hate speech or rejection toward immigration on Twitter in Spain. This study, combining NLP and LDA topic modeling, offers a complete analysis of the discourse of hatred against immigrants, going further than the studies focused on just one technique, such as that of Schmidt and Wiegand (2017), which focused on NLP. Due to this approach, we observed that Muslim immigrants were frequently the victims of hate speech, as the presence of a topic focused on them supports, which agrees with the Islamophobic condition of this party (Gould 2019). The consideration of this religion as barbaric or misogynist is a common way to justify the rejection and hate toward this collective. We also commonly discovered distasteful or obscene expressions in much of the content, as these expressions were used to stigmatize or hurt the feelings of immigrants. We also found expressions demanding discrimination or the restriction of rights, such as the reduction or removal of public support for these collectives. This connection of immigrants with their cost to public money was also found in the study that Arcila-Calderón et al. (2020) conducted regarding the reasons for the rejection of migrants and refugees in Twitter messages in Spain. Additionally, the use of lies or untrue generalizations or stereotypes regarding the public benefits that immigrants receive was common, something that previous works also observed, connecting this party with disinformation campaigns (Hernández Conde and Fernández García 2019). As a limitation of the study, the poor grammar of some of the messages made the study of frequencies and the topic modeling less accurate. The analysis of only one social media platform, Twitter in this case, although justified and common to many previous studies, makes it impossible to generalize the observations to the offline construction of hate speech against immigrants and the public discussion around Vox outside of Twitter; however, the relevance of this medium and the discoveries about the topics and terms that define hate speech against immigrants makes it useful for designing techniques to analyze and combat this form of hateful discourse. One of the main contributions of the article was precisely to dig into the features and topics behind hate speech, complementing previous works in the Spanish context (Miró 2016; Gallego et al. 2017) and to apply novel computational methods that have not been broadly applied toward this goal. Regarding the use of these techniques, particularly topic modeling, even when this method is frequently used in larger texts, the co-occurrence of words offers better results in larger contents. The Soc. Sci. 2020, 9, 188 17 of 19 topics detected in tweets offered good exploratory results to discover the characteristics of hate speech against immigrants taking place in the Twitter content surrounding Vox. Despite the use of these two novel techniques, other methods that could have been complementary, such as an n-gram analysis to study the interrelation and overlaps of the most frequent terms, are not present in this article. 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work_wlcngbrxhna75bfmfaxz7gy6e4	----	econstor Make Your Publications Visible. A Service of zbw Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft Leibniz Information Centre for Economics Endrich, Marek Working Paper A Window to the World: The long-term effect of Television on Hate Crime ILE Working Paper Series, No. 33 Provided in Cooperation with: University of Hamburg, Institute of Law and Economics (ILE) Suggested Citation: Endrich, Marek (2020) : A Window to the World: The long-term effect of Television on Hate Crime, ILE Working Paper Series, No. 33, University of Hamburg, Institute of Law and Economics (ILE), Hamburg This Version is available at: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/214659 Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your personal and scholarly purposes. You are not to copy documents for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public. If the documents have been made available under an Open Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence. www.econstor.eu INSTITUTE OF LAW AND ECONOMICS WORKING PAPER SERIES A Window to the World: The long- term effect of Television on Hate Crime Marek Endrich Working Paper 2020 No. 33 NOTE: ILE working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peer-reviewed. © 2020 by the authors. All rights reserved. February 2020 A Window to the World: The long-term effect of Television on Hate Crime Marek Endrich1 Institute of Law and Economics, University of Hamburg 07.02.2020 Abstract This paper analyzes the long-term impact of television on hate crimes in Germany. In the German Democratic Republic (GDR) foreign television served as a window to the world and exposed viewers to foreign influences. But certain parts of the GDR were excluded from receiving Western television due to geographical features. I argue that this resulted in long-lasting differences in the attitude towards foreigners. Using the spatial variation in signal strength as a natural experiment, the paper tests the effect of Western broadcasts on the rate of hate crimes. Municipalities with no access to foreign broadcasts exhibit a higher degree of xenophobic violence in the period of the migration crisis in Germany between 2014 to 2017. It shows that media can lead to preference changes that persist for a long time after the exposure. Keywords: hate crimes, refugees, natural experiment, media JEL Classification: J15, K42 1 marek.endrich@uni-hamburg.de. I am grateful to Davide Cantoni for sharing his data on the signal strength of Western television with me and would like to thank Stephan Michel, Konstantinos Pilpilidis and Stefan Voigt for helpful comments. I also gratefully acknowledge funding by the German Research Foundation. 1 Introduction Migration has become one of the main features of modern societies. Nevertheless, there is a cultural backlash against migrants and they are facing harassment and violence. In Europe, 24 percent of persons with a migrant background state that they were a victim of hate-motivated harassment in the previous year and three percent experienced an attack due to their foreign origin.2 These xenophobic attacks entail social and economic repercussions. They decrease the integration effort of foreigners (Gould and Klor 2015, Steinhardt 2018), worsen the image of affected regions and can lead to deteriorating economic conditions (Endrich and Michel 2018). Despite these costs, little systematic evidence on the determinants of hate crimes exists. Peculiar political events such as the terrorist attacks of 9/11 or political upheavals such as Trump’s presidential campaign in the US seem to trigger surges in violence against foreigners (Gould and Klor 2015, Mueller and Schwarz 2019). The question remains why some regions are more prone to outbursts of xenophobic violence than others. This paper contributes to the debate on the determinants of hate crimes. It demonstrates how the exposure to foreign television can lead to a lower inclination to commit acts of xenopho- bic violence. For the analysis, I look at one specific episode of surges in hate crimes, Germany in the years 2014 to 2017. A large influx of refugees since the beginning of the Syrian civil war in 2011 was accompanied by the rise of a new right-wing party and xenophobic demonstrations and attacks.3 Violence against refugees occurred country-wide, but the Eastern regions in Ger- many, synonymous with the area of the former GDR, were particularly affected (Figure A1). It continues a pattern of xenophobic violence against foreigners in the Eastern part of Germany after reunification (Krueger and Pischke 1997). Economic and cultural reasons are proposed to explain the susceptibility of the Eastern part of Germany to xenophobic violence. Some argue that the legacy of communism has led to different preferences in the former GDR compared to former West Germany (FRG) (Alesina and Fuchs-Schuendeln 2007).4 While political attitudes are predicted to catch up within 20 to 40 years after the reunification, social norms appear more resistant to change (Brosig-Koch et al. 2011). Economic explanations relate to the turmoil after reunification. Inhabitants in 2 The results come from the Second European Union Minorities and Discrimination Survey (2017). It was conducted by the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights. 3 Other European countries such as Austria and Italy experienced similar surges in hate crimes and increases in the support for far-right parties. 4 Research finds a legacy of the socialist state after reunification on preferences about the welfare state (Alesina and Fuchs-Schuendeln 2007), solidarity behavior (Brosig-Koch et al. 2011), social trust (Heineck and Süssmuth 2013), personality traits (Pannenberg et al. 2015), education and labor market outcomes (Fuchs-Schündeln and Masella 2016) and gender roles (Campa and Serafinelli 2019). 1 the area of the former GDR had to endure a period of economic hardship and degradation and such an experience can change preferences and incite xenophobic behavior (Falk et al. 2011). How does foreign television play a role? Watching Western TV was a popular leisure activ- ity in the GDR. The broadcasts covered foreign cultures and foreigners much more prominently than the national TV stations in the GDR. But geographical features only allowed some parts of the former GDR to receive the Western TV signal and excluded others from viewing West- ern broadcasts. I argue that the exposure had a positive impact on the sentiment towards foreigners. It manifested into long-lasting differences in xenophobia. These subsequently be- come relevant when anti-foreigner topics gain salience and result in diverging intensities of anti-refugee violence. I exploit the exogeneity in the quality of the transmission signal as a natural experiment and analyze how the exposure to foreign television can lead to differences in xenophobia. Looking at a cross section of German municipalities in the area of the former GDR, I compile a dataset on violence against refugees from an online data repository for the years of 2014 to 2017. I find that regions that were exposed to Western TV show a significantly lower level of violence against refugees than municipalities without access to Western TV. The result is consistent across the different kinds of hate crimes, namely assaults, arson attacks against refugee homes and other attacks against refugee housing. The effect of Western TV is diminished in regions with a history of xenophobic attitudes. It suggests that a more positive predisposition to foreigners made viewers more receptive to the media exposure. Further, I find that it’s the degradation of a municipality but not the economic situation per se that is associated with a higher level of hate crimes. The findings complement a literature on the causes of social and political backlashes against minorities and immigration. Large scale immigration can activate anti-foreigner sentiments and lead to hostile reactions of the local population (Hangartner et al. 2019). But if there is frequent contact between locals and refugees, it can also increase tolerance (Gamalerio et al. 2018, Steinmayr 2016). Xenophobic violence becomes more likely when the cultural distance between the migrants and the local population is large (Tabellini 2018) and when the influx leads to a rapid compositional change in the population (Entorf and Lange 2019). An increase in the visibility of minorities from different ethnicities can lead to political extremism and assaults (Colussi et al. 2016). But violence against migrants is mitigated when government efficiency is high and integration is well organised (Ziller and Goodman, forthcoming). The influx of refugees to Germany between 2014 and 2017 provides one recent event that triggered anti-foreigner sentiments. I elaborate why this has led to different degrees in the outbursts of hate crimes across the Eastern part of Germany. Cultural traits such as xenophobia exhibit remarkable persistence. Cantoni et al. (2019) 2 show how voting results for the NSDAP at the end of the Weimar Republic predict the vote share of the xenophobic German party AFD 80 years later. Anti-semitic norms have prevailed over centuries and fuel violence against jews (Voigtländer and Voth 2012). A history of right- wing voting is a good predictor for the propensity to cast a vote for parties with an anti- foreigner manifesto (Schwander and Manow 2017). One explanation for the persistence is the transmission of xenophobic traits across generations (Avdeenko and Siedler 2017). Past events such as the exposure to Western TV therefore can have long-lasting effects on attitudes. Economic conditions are the alternative explanation for xenophobic outbursts. Economic crises can perpetuate racial animus, leading to an increase in hate crimes (Anderson et al. 2018). Right-wing violence occurs more frequently in times of high unemployment (Falk et al. 2011), and a perception of relative deprivation can motivate citizens to vote for right-wing extremist parties (Dorn et al. 2018). Dippel et al. (2015) find that an increase in trade exposure benefits extreme right-wing parties and that labor market adjustments are the driver behind the effect. The economic hardship in the eastern part of Germany after reunification and a perception of refugees as competitors on the labor market and for resources can make them targets of scapegoating. In the empirics I consider the possible confounding influence of economic factors. There are only few studies that look at the association of media and hate crimes.5 Ivandic et al. (2019) find that media reports on terrorist attacks trigger anti-migration sentiments and motivate local hate crimes against Muslims. The penetration of social networks can instigate ethnic hate crimes and lead to an increase in xenophobic attitudes (Bursztyn et al. 2019). Propagations of anti-foreigner sentiments through channels such as twitter can have real world repercussions and bring about attacks on the targeted minorities (Mueller and Schwarz 2019). The closest to our study is the work by Ralsmark (2017) who deals with the visibility of minorities on television and how this can affect social tolerance. She observes the visibility of people of color in US television and finds that a higher visibility leads to less hate crimes in the subsequent year. Her argument that the exposure to minority cultures increases social tolerance is similar to ours, but I measure the long-term effects of such exposure on the attitude towards a minority group. 5 The literature on media and political preferences is larger and shows how biased broadcasting can affect voting decisions (DellaVigna and Kaplan 2007) or how entertainment TV leads to larger support for populist movements (Durante et al. 2019). On media and criminal behavior, violent movies induce a short-term increase in violent crime (Dahl and DellaVigna 2009). The portrayal of different ways of life on television can affect fertility (La Ferrara et al. 2012) and the attitude and behavior related to women (Jensen and Oster 2009). Radio transmissions with nationalistic content can fuel ethnic animosities and, if used as a propaganda channel, can be instrumental in ensuring public support for dictatorial regimes (Adena et al. (2015), Vigna et al. (2014)). A government can use mass media as a coordination device in state-sponsored violence (Yanagizawa-Drott 2014). 3 A few others have used the same natural experiment to analyze the influence of Western TV on preferences and behavior after reunification.6 Bursztyn and Cantoni (2016) exam- ine consumption patterns of former GDR citizens and detect that the exposure to Western broadcasts has moved preferences towards products that were heavily advertised. Hyll and Schneider (2013) provide evidence that viewing Western television has led to different hedonis- tic, consumptive and wealth aspirations. The decades of communist experience coupled with no reception of Western TV can explain persistent differences in financial risk taking and in the rate of participation in the stock exchange (Laudenbach et al. 2018). Friehe et al. (2018) are interested in the long-lasting effect on criminal behavior and find that regions with access to Western TV exhibit less violent crime, sex crime and theft, but more fraud. Our project deals with a different kind of crime, namely xenophobic violence. The empirical framework will account for potential dependencies between crimes and xenophobia and for the other channels of influence. Two studies argue that Western broadcasts have helped to create a democratic culture and to develop a political attitude closer to the Western system. Friehe et al. (2019) look at voting results after reunification and observe that regions with no Western TV reception come with a higher vote share for extremist parties. The effect is attenuated for parties on the political right. Hornuf and Rieger (2017) interpret the association of Western television and a larger vote share for right-wing parties as an indication that Western TV has led to less xenophobia. Their explanation is in line with my argument. However, this paper offers a more direct test of the argument. Hate crimes are an act of resentment against foreigners and represent a better proxy for anti-foreigner sentiment. The motivation for voting for a right-wing populist party can stem from economic and cultural reasons unrelated to xenophobia. One example is the expression of discontent with the reigning parties during economic crises (Funke et al. 2016). Hate crimes are hence more suited for answering the research question. The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 elaborates on the historical and institutional background and develops the theoretical conjectures. Section 3 describes the data and sets up the empirical framework. Section 4 presents the results and section 5 concludes. 6 Others have used the framework to elaborate on the effect of Western TV on behavior in the GDR and find little evidence for an unstabilizing role during the breakdown of the regime or for triggering effects on anti-government protests (Kern and Hainmueller 2009, Crabtree et al. 2015) 4 2 Western TV and Hate Crimes - Institutional setting This part elaborates on the design of the broadcasting system in the former GRD and the programming with regard to the visibility of foreigners and foreign cultures. I then describe the development of xenophobia in the former East Germany, offer theories that describe how television and xenophobia can be related and introduce the setting of the natural experiment. 2.1 Television in the GDR After World War II, Germany was divided in two blocs that became the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and the German Democratic Republic (GDR). Travelling and personal interactions between the two entities were frequent in the beginning, but the border closure and construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961 set up a spatial and mental separation. Communication across borders became prohibited and the GDR governed the restrictions with an iron fist. As a result, the trade with the West in cultural goods such as books or music almost completely stopped. FRG broadcasting was the only exposure of GDR citizens to Western influence. Television became the window to the western world. Regular broadcasting in the GDR started after a brief trial period in 1956 under the name of Deutscher Fernsehfunk (DFF). It initially sent out one program, but got expanded into two stations in 1969. Television quickly became a mass medium and in the beginning of the 1960s one million TV sets had been sold. In later periods over 95 percent of households reported having a television set and for a majority of citizens watching TV constituted their favourite leisure time activity (Hesse 1988). After 1969 most viewers could choose between at least five channels, including three from the FRG. The DFF was a state controlled broadcasting system under the auspices of the governing party, the Socialist Unity Party (SED). The department of agitation in the central committee of the SED commanded the political control and often used television as an instrument of pro- paganda.7 The programming of the television reflected the strong influence of the Soviet Union on the GDR. The second channel, for instance, often played Soviet movies and documentaries such as ’For friends of the Russian language’. The state tried to shield its citizens from watch- ing Western broadcasts and to promote its own stations but remained largely unsuccessful. In 7 The constitution of the GDR contained no right to freedom of information. The DFF’s mission was to strengthen the fraternal friendship with the Soviet Union in the greater struggle against the West and to build identification with the socialist state. No independent newspaper or radio broadcasts were available in the GDR. 5 the regions that received Western TV, a majority preferred the broadcasts from the FRG. The viewers also had low trust in the credibility of the news broadcast of the DFF in comparison with Western news (Hesse 1988). The programming of the DFF covered mainly domestic issues and focused on accomplish- ments of the GDR and other socialist countries. Coverage of foreign cultures was minor. This remained the constant principle, even though the competition with Western stations led to a step wise internationalisation of the program in the 1980s and to the screening of some Amer- ican and West European movies (Dittmar 2005). Still, even in the 1980s, West German TV stations exhibited a much larger share of broadcasts with foreign content than the Eastern counterparts (Hornuf and Rieger 2017). Reunification led to the dissolution of the DFF in 1991 and the FRG stations became the official public broadcasting system. The regional stations MDR and RBB that are part of the Association of Public Broadcasting Corporations provide specific media coverage on the area of the former GDR. 2.2 Xenophobia in the GDR Citizens in the GDR had little interactions with foreigners in comparison to the FRG. Travel- ling to countries outside of the Eastern Bloc was restricted with the exemption for an elite. In the GDR, foreigners consisted mostly of guest workers or personnel of the Soviet Army. Foreign workers got recruited on fixed-term contracts from countries such as Vietnam, Cuba and Alge- ria.8 But personal contacts between locals and foreigners remained sparse. The guest workers had to live in separate housing, were restricted in their freedom of movement and required to move back to their home country after the contract ended (Behrends et al. 2003). After reunification, a surge in hate crimes against foreigners was particularly endemic in the former part of the GDR (Krueger and Pischke 1997). East German cities such as Hoyerswerda and Rostock-Lichtenhagen gained prominence for xenophobic riots. Surveys confirm that areas in the former GDR showed a greater level of anti-foreigner sentiment (Krüger-Potratz 1991). But the xenophobia had precursors. Despite the self proclaimed image of an anti-fascist state, hostility against foreigners had been a recurring phenomenon since the beginning of the 1980s. Evidence is rare as the regime in the GDR suppressed information on xenophobic violence, but surveys reveal the negative opinion of citizens towards some foreigners. Indeed, the image of 8 At the high point at the end of the 1980s there were 60.000 guest workers from Vietnam and 15.000 from Mosambik in the GDR. 6 different nationalities corresponded with the portrayal of their nation in the East German state propaganda of the time (Friedrich and Schubarth 1991).9 2.3 TV and Xenophobia How can the exposure to Western television affect the attitude of the viewers towards other nationalities? I rely on the cultivation theory and the intergroup contact theory from a literature in psychology to explain how television can lead to a dissemination of values in tolerance and instigate learning processes about foreigners. According to the cultivation theory, the cumulative exposure to television can change moral values and the beliefs about the world. Television is said to create an artificial world that exposes its viewers to different realities (see, e.g. Gerbner et al. (2002)). Viewers distil infor- mation about different ways of life, use the portrayed characters as role models and absorb the expressed values into their own moral compass. If the depiction of foreigners departs from previous experiences, the exposure can affect the attitude towards foreigners and the perception of their role in a society. The experience of GDR citizens and the depicted reality on GDR television was void of foreign influence. The society was homogeneous, the presence of foreigners was deliberately muted and foreign influ- ence related if at all to life experiences in partner countries of the Eastern Bloc. In contrast, the popular entertainment and soap operas from the West represented the more diverse society of the FRG. FRG television frequently showed international imports.10 The broadcasts trans- mitted a world view that assigned foreigners a prominent role in a society. Viewers of Western television became more open to foreign influence and the exposure led to an increase in social tolerance towards foreigners. Complementary, exposure to others on television can lead to learning processes and mit- igate biases. The intergroup contact theory tells us that the exposition to other groups can reduce intergroup prejudice (Williams 1947). Prejudice decreases when anxiety about future interactions with out-groups is lowered. Just as the personal contact between locals and for- eigners can undo wrong beliefs and animosities, so can the exposition to other ethnicities on television decrease anxieties. The unbiased reporting on the minority, free expression and a fair representation are crucial factors for a tolerance-increasing exposure. Most often such unbiased 9 Information that could harm the GDR regime was commonly kept secret. The survey data by the Leipzig Institute for Youth Research on xenophobia fell under such a classification. 10 The foreign shows had many viewers in the GDR, and US soap operas such as Denver were among the most popular broadcasts (Hesse 1988). 7 portrayal are achieved in a political context with a free press (Ayoub and Garretson 2017), something that stood in stark contrast to the institutional environment in the GDR. The mission of the GDR television was to strengthen the bond to the communist regime. It portrayed Western cultures in a bad light and the coverage focused on failures of countries aligned with the ’class enemy’. The result was a nurturing of hostile attitudes towards foreign- ers. Western television on the other hand offered a culturally diverse programme with news and documentaries that often dealt with foreign cultures. At the same time it focused on the advantages of a globalised western world. One example is the coverage of the experience with guest workers in the FRG in the 1970s. It was covered in a better light in the Western media. While the FRG media emphasised their contribution to the economic miracle and painted a more positive picture of migrants in general, GDR television focused on the problems in the integration process. Not all citizens express the same responsiveness to television. The success of propaganda depends on the predisposition of recipients. If the viewer is negatively predisposed, they are unlikely to believe the message and can be even dissuaded off the cause. Adena et al. (2015) show how broadcasting by the Nazi party NSDAP in the 1930s was persuasive in regions with historic anti-semitism, but led to the opposite effect in regions that were more friendly to jews. For our case, if a viewer carries a negative predisposition towards foreigners, she will be less responsive to images on Western TV and disregard new information on foreign cultures. A positive predisposition induces an openness to new influences and the exposure can persuade her of the advantages of a diverse society. The evidence tells that the visibility of foreigners and the reporting on foreign cultures was much more pronounced and positive in the Western media. I expect, first, that citizens in regions that received Western TV show a lower inclination to commit hate crimes. Secondly, the effect of television depends on the predisposition towards foreigners. Regions that are historically less hostile to foreigners should experience a larger change in attitude. 2.4 Natural Experiment The partial reception of Western TV in the GDR provides for a natural experiment to test the effect of television on xenophobic attitudes. Antennas along the FRG and GDR border as well as from the Western enclave in West Berlin sent a terrestrial signal that transmitted Western television. The quality of the transmission depended on the distance to the next transmitter combined with the topological features of the viccinity. Regions surrounded by mountains or located in a valley were vulnerable to distractions and break offs. Bursztyn and Cantoni (2016) apply an irregular terrain model that uses information on all antennas that transmitted the 8 main public TV stations in the FRG. They calculate the average strength of the TV signal for each municipality in the former GDR based on the municipality borders of 1997. I rely on their measurement and transform it by the population weight to the municipality borders of 2016. Figure 1 depicts the signal strength on the municipality level. The region around Dresden in the South East and around Greifswald in the North East received the worst signal. As noted in many anecdotes, citizens in these vicinities could not view Western TV. I follow Bursztyn and Cantoni (2016) and use the signal strength of Dresden as the cut-off value for the assignment into a treatment and control group. TV signal quality falls discontinuously and the quality of reception does not react substantially to any variation in the signal if it is far from the cut-off level. Dresden was assumed to be close to the signal strength discontinuity. The Municipalities with a better signal strength than Dresden are assigned into the treatment group of reception of Western TV and with a worse or equal signal strength are in the control group of no reception. Insert Figure 1 about here The quality of the signal can serve as a natural experiment if the following preconditions are fulfilled: (1) GDR citizens viewed Western TV (2) The treatment and control region are comparable (3) There was no spatial sorting (1) GDR citizens viewed Western TV The first necessary condition for identification is that citizens who received Western TV did view it. Authorities in the GDR failed to prevent the transmission of the Western broadcast and after 1973 FRG television even lost its official taboo.11 Watching TV constituted the most preferred leisure activity in the GDR (Hesse 1988). On average households spent 28.6 hours per week on viewing television and this was consistent across different types of occupations (Hanke 1990). Hesse (1988) conducted a survey with refugees from the GDR on their consumption of Western television (see Table 1). Among the subjects who lived in areas with Western TV reception, 82 percent viewed it every day. In regions where the signal was too distorted, nobody in the sample used the television daily and 53 percent did never watch it. Insert Table 1 about here 11 In the beginning of the 1960s the GDR authorities planned to jam transmitters or remove parts of existing receivers to disturb the signal, but the envisaged protest of the public stopped the execution 9 A survey by the Zentralinstitut fuer Jugendforschung among GDR residents supports the popularity of Western TV. In the GDR districts with Western TV reception such as Magdeburg and Cottbus, the average respondent watched the broadcasts almost daily. In the district of Dresden where for most households the signal was too weak, 63.5 percent stated that they never watched Western television (Hennighausen 2015). The lack of foreign television did not lead to fewer purchases of TV sets, indicating that the citizens instead consumed GDR television (Bursztyn and Cantoni 2016). The treatment and control region are comparable The second assumption is that under a scenario of no Western broadcasts citizens in the treat- ment region would be no different to citizens in the control region. In the GDR, the uniform educational system and little parental influence on children’s development resulted in homoge- neous individual preferences (Hyll and Schneider 2013). The economic structure varied little between the treatment and the control region. Both had industrial centers with either Leipzig or Dresden and included parts characterised by agriculture such as the area around Schwerin for the control or around Greifswald for the treatment group. A comparison of indicators on the district level at the beginning of the GDR in 1950 and at the end in 1990 in Table 2 reveals that the two groups were almost indistinguishable from each other (Bursztyn and Cantoni 2016). The difference in the employment structure, population density and extent of retail sales does not reach a significant level and neither does the change over time in the indicators between the two groups. Insert Table 2 about here Socioeconomic characteristics in 1988 such as housing, education or the level of crime and the divorce rate show a high similarity and support the homogeneity assumption (Kern and Hainmueller 2009). Political attitudes before the introduction of Western TV did not differ, as measured by the voting results in 1946. The homogeneity across the two groups until the end of the GDR suggests an analysis with data from right after reunification. However, the sample of hate crimes covers the years 2014 to 2017. Even though the similarity until 1990 suits the analysis, the economic turmoil after reunification hampers the empirical set-up. Mass layoffs and plant closures during the transition from the socialist to a market economy had massive effects and could have led to different regional developments. Table 3 presents regional characteristics for the two groups in the year 2013. The control group fared considerably worse since reunification. It performed significantly worse in Gdp per capita and in the unemployment rate, its share of high school drop outs was larger and the loss of inhabitants more pronounced. If these divergences influence xenophobia, our results on the long-term effect of Western TV could be biased. In the empirical analysis I mitigate the concern by including a battery of variables that cover for the different 10 economic, political and social developments. Insert Table 3 about here Contact theory predicts that interactions with foreigners decrease hostility. Inflows of mi- grants after reunification could have led to a change in the degrees of xenophobia. But the effect depends on the favorability of the meeting conditions. While facilitated contact and little competition for local resources can alleviate negative sentiments, little contact and infrequent interactions do not lead to changes in attitudes (Gamalerio et al. 2018, Steinmayr 2016). Sur- veys report that regular contact with foreigners has picked up from a low level but remains far behind the level in the former Western part (Schmidt and Weick 2016). In the years after re- unification, many foreigners in the Eastern part were refugees who were allocated to the region. Language and cultural barriers inhibited communication and interactions remained scarce. Our sample shows a proportion of only 1.17 percent foreigners for 2011 in the area of the former GDR compared with 8.6 percent in the Western part. Potential contacts with foreign tourists remain less likely in the East where in 2013 foreign tourists make up 7.9 percent of all tourists, or 0.15 foreign tourists per capita, compared with a proportion of 20.7 percent of all tourists or 0.38 foreign tourism per capita in the former West. In the empirics I account for the varying exposure in the regions to foreign citizens, refugees and tourism. Spatial sorting Another confounding factor is the possibility of spatial sorting. In the times of the GDR, viewers who preferred to watch Western TV could have migrated into regions with good reception. If they exhibited different xenophobic attitudes, this would bias the results of the natural experiment. But citizens in the GDR seldom moved. The centrally planned economy was based on low labor mobility. Regional specialisation limited the mobility of workers and a shortage in the housing market kept residential mobility at a low level. During the period of 1970 and 1990, only 2.5 percent of inhabitants moved places in a year, and in 1988 only 0.9 percent relocated across county borders (Bursztyn and Cantoni 2016, Hyll and Schneider 2013). These numbers are three times lower than for citizens of the FRG. While spatial sorting in the GDR does not hamper with the empirical setting, the strong surge in migration after reunification can do. Borders opened in 1989, and in both 1989 and 1990 2.5 percent of the East German population migrated to the West (Hunt 2006). They consisted mostly of younger, well-educated citizens that were to a larger share female (Fuchs- Schündeln and Schündeln 2009). After the initial surge, the improvement in relative wages in the former East (Hunt 2006) quickly reduced internal migration (Chevalier and Marie 2017), though the out-flow increased again in the late 1990s. Importantly, at least for the beginning years migration rates were statistically similar across the treatment and control regions, a result that is consistent across the different age groups (Bursztyn and Cantoni 2016). The 11 fact that East Germans continue to show a low inclination to geographical mobility (Boenisch and Schneider 2013) further mitigates the risk of biases from spatial sorting. In the empirical framework I take into account the potential effect of differences in population losses. It does not offer a complete relief from the problem of spatial sorting though as the type of people that migrated is not observable. A bias from compositional changes could arise if regions with Western TV experienced less out-migration of people with little xenophobic attitudes or became attractive destinations for in-migration of such individuals. 3 Empirical specification and Data 3.1 Data The best data to test the theories presented would be individual information on xenophobic sentiments across the area of the former GDR. I am not aware of such data that allows a con- vincing measurement of anti-foreigner sentiments. The project therefore relies on data on the number of hate crimes collected at the lowest possible administrative level. The municipality is the lowest administrative unit in Germany, situated below the State and the county level. In 2016, the area of the former GDR was divided into six States, 80 counties and 2663 munic- ipalities. It has a population of 12.5 million, excluding Berlin, and the municipalities vary in size between 34 and about half a million inhabitants. Before reunification, the GDR consisted of 14 districts and 216 counties and had, excluding East-Berlin, 14.8 million inhabitants. Germany between the years 2014 and 2017 offers a nice case study on xenophobic violence. A large influx of refugees since the beginning of the Syrian civil war in 2011 has led to a drastic increase in xenophobic demonstrations and attacks and the rise of a new right-wing party. The NGOs Amadeu Antonio Stiftung and Pro Asyl keep track of violence and social unrest aimed at refugees. They provide an online data repository on all incidents that is freely accessible. Each incident is manually coded and includes information on the timing, the location of the event, the source of the information and if applicable the report and the number of victims. The source of the data are publicly available reports from the media, the police and from state institutions. The data collection started in 2014. The xenophobic activities are categorized into assaults, arson attacks, miscellaneous attacks against refugee housing and xenophobic demonstrations. I aggregate assaults, arson attacks and attacks against housing into a hate crime indicator. Anti-refugee incidents do not appear in the database when they cannot be attributed to one of the four categories or when there is no public information. This means that the data is not a complete representation of all hate 12 crimes against refugee and accounts only for a small part of all right-wing crime.12 There is no reason to expect differences in the spatial coverage of hate crimes across Germany. Henceforth, the indicator of hate crimes against refugees represents a good proxy for the overall extent of xenophobic violence. Hate crimes against refugees surged in the autumn of 2014, reached a peak in 2016 and declined afterwards (Figure 2). I collect the data on hate crimes from the data repository between October 2014 until the end of 2017 and aggregate it on the municipality level. The sample includes 4,715 cases of miscellaneous attacks, 968 assaults and 272 arson attacks. Figure 3 shows the spatial distribution of hate crimes by municipality for the region of the former GDR, normalized per 100.000 inhabitant. Insert Figure 2 about here Insert Figure 3 about here The largest rate of hate crimes happened in the municipality of Bad Gottleuba-Berggießhübel in Saxonia, followed by Guben and Freital. The majority of municipalities did not experience any hate crimes. One explanation for the zero counts is the fact that the allocation quota of refugees by the state authorities depends on the number of inhabitants. Municipalities with low population numbers did not get assigned any refugees. As the presence of refugees and their housing is a necessary condition for the crimes to take place, I restrict the sample to municipalities that have more than 5000 inhabitants. This leaves us with 510 municipalities of which 175 have zero hate crimes as shown in Figure A2. In the empirics I will apply models that consider the excess number of zeroes. A municipality is considered as treated if the signal strength of Western TV was better than the signal strength in Dresden. 460 municipalities belong to the treated group and 50 municipalities to the control group. Regions without access to Western TV experienced on average 9.53 hate crimes per 100.000 inhabitants. Regions with Western TV exposure had a lower level of 5.68 criminal incidents, a difference in the rate that is statistically significant. The different degrees indicate a long-term effect of Western TV on xenophobia. But even though the regions were homogeneous during the times of the GDR, the different development since reunification can bias the results and I control for it by using a battery of variables. 12 According to the German Federal Criminal Police, Germany experienced on average 22,345 cases of right- wing crime per year in the period of 2015 to 2017. The average in the sample from the online repository for Germany is at 1948 incidents per year over this period. 13 Covariates The control variables belong to the characteristics of the municipality, the economic and social circumstances, the presence of foreigners and cultural factors. If not mentioned differently, the data comes from the Federal Statistical Office of Germany (destatis ) and is on the municipality level for the year 2013, one year before the upsurge in hate crimes. All data is adjusted by population weights to the municipality borders of 2016. The first set of control variables captures the characteristics of the population and the municipality. I use the density of the geographical unit to estimate if more densely populated areas exhibit a larger rate of hate crimes. Young people are more prone to commit violent crimes and I include the proportion of the population below 25 years. The effect of religious affiliations is ambiguous. On the one hand, the doctrines of the two main religions Catholicism and Protestantism refer to the necessity to help others in need. It predicts a more welcoming reception of refugees and less xenophobic violence in religious areas. But intergroup bias theory tells us that identification with a local religious group can lead to derogations of people who are part of an out-group (LaBouff et al. 2012). Most refugees came from muslim majority countries. I control for religiosity by the proportion of the population that are Catholics or Protestants and the data comes from census data in 2011. It is not possible to account for the intensity of religious belief, which could be stronger for the minority group of Catholics. An economic explanation for hate crimes relates to competition on the labor market and for resources. Locals can regard refugees as competitors especially for jobs with low human capital requirements. I expect a harsher reaction in regions with less educated inhabitants. The proportion of high school drop outs covers for the educational attainment and the data is from the 2011 census and available at the county level. A worse economic situation dampens the labor market and can lead to a stronger competition for resources. One recurse is violence against out-groups such as refugees (Krueger and Pischke 1997, Falk et al. 2011). To control for conditions on the labor market, I include the unemployment rate and the unemployment rate of inhabitants under 25 which come from the Federal Employment Agency of Germany. GDP per capita and the share of welfare recipients cover for the general economic conditions and are provided on the county level. The well-being depends not only on the personal economic situation but on the economic and social development of the surroundings. The area of the former GDR faced a large out- migration to the West. Population loss leads to the depletion of public and private services in the affected regions and can nurture a feeling of exclusion. I look at the population change between 1997 and 2013 as a proxy for the relative deprivation of a municipality. There is a large variation in the change in population, ranging from a loss of 41 percent for the municipality of Weißwasser to an increase of 123 percent in Glienicke. The occurrence of hate crime can as well depend on the general level of crime, and crime data on the county level comes from the 14 German Federal Criminal Police. Friehe et al. (2018) show that crime is significantly higher in regions without former reception of Western TV, and including general crime as a control allows to distinguish the results from this confounding factor. Intergroup contact theory predicts that the exposure to foreigners and the quality of in- teractions can reduce ethnic intergroup prejudice and xenophobia. I use information on the proportion of foreigners who lived in a municipality before the beginning of the refugee crisis from the census data 2011. Data on the number of foreign tourists in 2013 is on the county level and normalized by the population. The unemployment rate of foreigners proxies for the integration success of foreigners and comes from the Federal Employment Agency of Germany. A better integration of foreigners leads to a lower probability of negative sentiments. The in- flux of refugees during the migration crisis led to a rapid compositional change for some regions which can fuel animosity among the residential population (Entorf and Lange 2019). I use the change per capita in the number of refugees between 2015 and 2017 on the county level. Last, cultural traits such as xenophobic attitudes exhibit a remarkable persistence and are prone to be triggered by events such as the refugee crisis (Voigtländer and Voth 2012, Cantoni et al. 2019). I control for such legacies by measuring the vote share of the party NSDAP in the year 1932 (Falter and Haenisch 1990).13 Another historical event that can reflect political preferences of former GDR citizens are the protests before the break-down of the GDR regime. Crabtree et al. (2015) provide information on protest events for the year 1989 on the county level for the former GDR. Table A1 shows the correlation matrix for the outcome variable and all controls. Our outcome rate of hate crimes has a strong negative correlation with Western TV. Additionally, the rate of hate crimes is negatively correlated with population change, while there is a positive correlation with the unemployment rate and its sub-indicators for the young and foreigners. The evidence points in the direction of a negative effect of Western TV on xenophobic violence. But we observe that regions that had no Western TV reception have a higher unemployment rate and more welfare recipients but also more foreign tourists. If these variables affect the rate of hate crime, it will distort the evidence on the effect of Western TV. A regression model helps to take account of the confounding factors. 13 The election of 1932 is regarded as the last election that was conducted under free circumstances in contrast to the election in 1933 that brought the NSDAP into power. 15 3.2 Empirical specification The theory predicts that Western TV has a negative long-term effect on the number of hate crimes. Hate crimes are count data and I normalize them by 100.000 inhabitants to make the incidents comparable across municipalities. I use a Poisson regression to estimate the determinants of the rate of xenophobic violence. The Poisson regression is typically used for count variables, but can account for the rate of incidents. The number of incidents of hate crime Hm in municipality m between the years 2015 and 2017, depending on the size of the population nm, is expressed as Hm(nm) = Poisson(λ̄mnm) (1) 14 The conditional mean of the rate of violence against refugees is given by λ̄ and is specified as log(λ̄m) = log(mn) + β0 + β1WesternTVm + X ′ mψ + φb + εm (2) The main explanatory variable of interest is WesternTV . The dummy variable is equal to one for a municipality that received Western TV during the times of the GDR and zero otherwise. The coefficient β1 tells by how much the rate of xenophobic violence differs for municipalities with Western TV and is the percentage difference in the rate of hate crime. Xm is a vector of covariates. I include State fixed effects φb to take account of any state specific factors that could affect the occurence of hate crimes. As the interest is in the rate of hate crimes, I add the log of population size of a municipality log(mn) as an offsetting factor to the estimation. The Poisson model assumes that the conditional variance and the conditional mean of the dependent variable are equal, E(H) = V ar(H) = λ (3) The hate crime indicator shows a dispersion of 3.77. As it is significantly different from the equi-dispersion at a value of zero, the restrictive condition is not fulfilled. Under over- dispersion, the Poisson quasi-maximum likelihood estimation provides for a consistent and 14 The Poisson probability specification is given by P(λ) = e−λmλhmm hm! where λm = Xmβ 16 efficient estimator of the conditional mean as long as the conditional mean is correctly specified. This is true even when the data-generating process is not following a Poisson distribution (Wooldridge 1999). It estimates a dispersion parameter δ2 in V ar(h|x) = δ2E(h|x) that for δ2 = 1 is just the assumed variance in the Poisson model. The quasi-maximum likelihood estimator includes robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level. The outcome variable hate crime per capita exhibits an excess number of zeroes that can be larger than the Poisson model predicts (see Figure A2). Zero-inflated models supplement the basic count models with a binary process that helps to model the excessive number of zeros. I apply the zero-inflated Negative Binomial model as it takes into account the issue of over-dispersion. Large economic and political changes after the breakdown of the Wall can affect the level of xenophobia. The battery of covariates aims to mitigate the concern. In one extension I include county fixed effects which provides for a conservative test of our theory. In order to understand who was most affected by the exposure to Western TV, the following estimation includes the conditioning effect of xenophobic predispositions. According to the prediction, the effect should be weaker for regions who exhibited stronger xenophobic sentiments before the introduction of Western TV. The vote share of the NSDAP per municipality in the 1932 elections proxies for long-term cultural sentiments towards foreigners and is interacted with the WesternTV dummy. log(λ̄m) = log(mn) +β0 +β1WesternTVm +β2nsdapm +β3WestTVm∗nsdapm +X′mψ +φb +εm (4) The coefficient β3 tells if regions that had a weaker predisposition to xenophobia were more strongly affected by the appealing effect of Western TV. 4 Results and discussion The theory predicts that hate crimes occur less often in the treated municipalities that were able to receive Western TV. Table 5 presents the result of the regressions. Regression (1) starts with variables for the characteristics of the municipality and step by step I add the controls for the characteristics of the population and the economic situation (2), the presence of foreigners and their integration success (3) and long-term cultural factors (4). Across all specifications the treated municipalities exhibit a significantly lower rate of hate crimes than the control regions. 17 In the fully specified model (4), a municipality that received Western TV experienced a 52 percent lower rate of hate crimes. Insert Table 5 about here Municipalities that have a larger proportion of Catholics experience less hate crimes against refugees. It seems that in the context of the refugee crisis in Germany, a larger role for Catholics leads to more social tolerance towards refugees. I find limited support for an economic explana- tion of hate crimes. Economic prosperity measured by gdp per capita, the proportion of welfare recipients and the general unemployment rate do not explain the variation in xenophobic ac- tivity. Only the unemployment rate of inhabitants under the age of 25 is positive and weakly significant, suggesting that some of the young are most strongly involved in hate crimes. The picture is different for the degradation of a municipality over time. For a municipality that had to endure a higher loss of inhabitants, the rate of hate crimes is significantly larger. It suggests that it is not the economic situation per se that leads to repercussions against refugees but the relative feeling of deprivation and exclusion. The finding that the crime rate per capita is negatively related to the number of hate crimes underlines the different nature of xenophobic violence compared to other crimes. The long-term number of foreigners living in a vicinity, the change in the influx of refugees and the number of foreign tourism appear to have no relation to xenophobia. Interestingly, the higher the unemployment rate among foreigners, the stronger the hostility. Tolerance seems not to depend on the frequency in contacts with foreigners but on the quality of the interaction and the perception of their integration effort. The historical voting record for the NSDAP as a proxy for long-term cultural traits has no predictive power to explain violence against foreigners today. Neither does the number of protests in 1989 predict the level of hostility towards refugees. In Table 6 I distinguish between the different categories of hate crimes. The result for the long-term effect of Western TV is consistent for minor attacks against refugee housing (1), assaults (2) and arson attacks against refugee homes (3). The treatment regions with Western TV perform much better with regard to xenophobia than the control regions. The magnitude of the effect varies between 48 per cent for miscellaneous attacks and 68 per cent for arson attacks. The effects of the confounding factors vary a bit across the different categories, but they are mostly in line with the results of the aggregated indicator. Assaults occur more often in municipalities with a lower share of high school drop outs. Arson attacks happen more often in less densely populated areas, are committed by populations characterizied by a larger share of young inhabitants and less welfare recipients and occur in municipalities with lower levels of foreign tourism. 18 Insert Table 6 about here Xenophobic demonstrations provide one additional category of xenophobic expressions. Re- gions that received Western TV exhibit a significantly smaller rate of demonstrations aimed at refugees, supporting the argument of a lower level of xenophobia. Further, in municipalities with higher educational attainment xenophobic demonstrations happen more often. In the next step, Figure 4 presents the marginal effect of Western TV on hate crimes depend- ing on the level of pre-existing xenophobia. For a municipality with a relatively low percentage of votes for the NSDAP in the election of 1932, the effect of Western TV is significant and negative, while for municipalities with a large vote share for the NSDAP Western TV had no or even a positive effect on hate crimes. Apparently Western TV was only effective in diminishing the hostility against foreigners in regions with little history of xenophobia. Recipients who have a stronger xenophobic predisposition got less convinced by the imagery of the West. Insert Figure 4 about here As of now the regressions use fixed effects for the States. A more conservative approach applies county fixed effects for the 76 counties in the region of the former GDR. It allows to see if municipalities within a county differ in xenophobia along the dimension of Western TV reception, but comes at the costs of less variation in the outcome variable. Table A2 shows that even under these strict restrictions, the long-term effect of Western TV remains significant. While the negative effect of a population loss remains significant, the influx of refugees and the number of foreign tourists now lead to more social tolerance towards refugees. For the population indicators, areas with better educated inhabitants but plagued by higher unemployment are associated with a larger number of xenophobic incidents. The descriptives show that we are dealing with an excess number of zeroes in the ob- servations on hate crimes. The zero inflated Negative Binomial model explicitly models the probability that any hate crime is committed. Using the same determinants for both stages, in Table 7 we can observe that Western TV is a strong negative predictor for the number of incidents but has no effect on the binary stage of hate crimes. Population loss is again a strong predictor for the likelihood of hate crimes and for a larger number as is the unemployment rate of foreigners. Insert Table 7 about here 19 5 Conclusion Media can change the attitude towards minorities, affect voting decisions and induce criminal behavior. This study shows the long-term effect of television on xenophobic violence. Using the upsurge in hate crimes in Germany during the migration crisis as a case study, we detect that municipalities that received Western TV in the GDR show a lower level of violence against refugees than regions that were excluded from the reception. Even though the times of the GDR are far gone, the long-term exposure to foreigners and foreign cultures on Western TV has led to long-lasting differences in the attitude towards foreigners. Events such as the large influx of migrants can act as a trigger to bring out such predispositions. The observation of such long-term trends merits consideration. One suggestion for improve- ment is the usage of data on hate crimes from the beginning of the 1990s from right after reunification. Official information from state authorities or the collection of news reports on xenophobic violence through a media analysis in line with Krueger and Pischke (1997) and Endrich and Michel (2018) are the potential sources for such data. An alternative is to work with data on the individual level from surveys. The analysis provides for a new explanation for the large differences in the degrees of hate crimes in the area of the former GDR. 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(1999). “Quasi-Likelihood Methods for Count Data.” Chap. 8 in Hand- book of Applied Econometrics Volume 2: Microeconomics, 321–368. John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Yanagizawa-Drott, David (2014). “Propaganda and Conflict: Evidence from the Rwandan Geno- cide.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 129 (4): 1947–1994. Ziller, Conrad, and Sara Goodman (forthcoming). “Local Government Efficiency and Anti- Immigrant Violence.” The Journal of Politics. 25 Figure 1: Signal Strength Western TV in the former GDR area Signal Strength of Western TV reception in the area of the former GDR. Borders are at the municipality level of 2016. Table 1: Frequency of Watching Western TV Frequency Reception of Western TV possible (in % ) Reception of Western TV Impossible (in %) almost every day 82 - often 12 - sometimes 5 5 rarely 1 42 never - 53 Survey among 205 refugees from the GDR, 162 from regions with reception of West TV and 43 from regions with no reception (Hesse 1988). 26 Table 2: Data comparison GDR districts variable signal mean nonsignal mean dif st.error p value year 1955 Population density 206 202 4 77 0.959 Share of employed in agriculture 23.7 27.8 -4.1 11.1 0.744 Share of employed in industry 34.1 28.7 5.4 10.0 0.635 Retail sales per capita 1691 1694 -3 102 0.979 Savings per capita 277 297 -20 28 0.544 year 1990 Population density 181 176 5 62 0.941 Share of employed in agriculture 13.5 11.3 2.2 5.1 0.706 Share of employed in industry 33.2 39.5 -6.3 7.5 0.479 Retail sales per capita 7577 7250 327 188 0.190 Savings per capita 9312 9381 -69 928 0.946 Cars per capita (1000) 237.4 237.6 -0.2 12.1 0.992 change 1955 - 1990 Population density -19 -26.2 8.2 15.4 0.626 Share of employed in agriculture -14.5 -12.6 -1.9 6.0 0.778 Share of employed in industry 5 5.5 −0.5 3.0 0.870 Retail sales per capita 5862 5557 305 157 0.142 Savings per capita 8946 8994 -48 770 0.954 The data is on the district level of the fomer GDR and comes from GDR statistical yearbooks (Krueger and Pischke 1997). Table 3: Regional Characteristics in 2016 by treatment status variable signal mean nonsignal mean Difference st.error p value Unemployment rate 0.12 0.15 -0.04 0.01 0.00 Unemployment rate foreigners 0.24 0.27 -0.03 0.02 0.13 Unemployment rate young 0.12 0.14 -0.03 0.01 0.01 Crime per capita 0.07 0.07 -0.004 0.002 0.03 Density 254.89 390.04 -135.15 59.15 0.03 4refugee per capita 0.01 0.01 0.001 0.0003 0.002 Foreign tourists per capita 0.25 0.48 -0.23 0.06 0.001 GDP per capita 23, 086.03 22, 344.74 741.29 384.59 0.06 Share inhabitants below 25 0.19 0.19 -0.001 0.003 0.65 Share high school drop outs 0.03 0.03 -0.003 0.001 0.02 Vote Share of NSDAP in 1932 0.38 0.36 0.02 0.01 0.01 Number of Protests 1989 3.08 3.12 -0.05 1.16“ 0.97 Population change -0.09 -0.15 0.06 0.02 0.001 Share Catholics 0.04 0.05 -0.02 0.01 0.17 Share Protestants 0.19 0.18 0.01 0.01 0.26 Share foreigners 0.01 0.01 -0.001 0.001 0.37 Share welfare recipients 0.01 0.02 -0.003 0.0004 0.00 Note: The sample consists of municipalities with more than 5000 inhabitants and excludes the area of the former East Berlin. Treated regions were able to receive Western TV in the times of the GDR. Share of Catholics, share of protestants and share of foreigners are from the year 2011. Population change covers the percentage change in population between the years 1997 and 2016 27 0 200 400 600 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Time H a te C ri m es Figure 2: Development of Hate Crimes Hate crimes against refugees over the years October 2014 until 2017 for the area of the former GDR. The data is aggregated on the monthly basis. 28 Figure 3: Hate Crimes per 100.000 inhabitants on Municipality Level, 10/2014 - 2017 Hate crimes against refugees per 100.000 inhabitants at the municipality over the years October 2014 until 2017 for the area of the former GDR. Table 4 Statistic Mean St. Dev. Min Max Western TV 0.10 0.29 0.00 1.00 population change −0.10 0.18 −0.41 1.23 population 19,204 43,269 5,004 581,980 density 268.14 317.50 19.27 2,652.28 vote share NSDAP 0.38 0.07 0.12 0.55 unemployment rate 0.12 0.04 0.04 0.31 unemployment rate young 0.12 0.04 0.01 0.29 unemployment rate foreign 0.24 0.15 0.00 1.00 share catholics 0.04 0.06 0.01 0.80 share protestant 0.19 0.09 0.04 0.63 gdp per capita 23,013.35 3,329.50 18,056.00 36,592.00 share welfare recipients 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.01 foreign tourism per capita 0.27 0.25 0.03 1.46 4refugee per capita 0.01 0.003 −0.0005 0.03 crime per capita 0.07 0.02 0.04 0.14 share population <25 0.19 0.02 0.14 0.29 share drop outs 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.05 hatecases 3.99 9.89 0.00 135.00 miscellaneous cases 2.63 6.65 0.00 80.00 arson attacks 0.16 0.51 0.00 5.00 assaults 1.20 3.46 0.00 50.00 demonstrations 0.45 1.80 0.00 29.00 Note: Data on municipalities with more than 5000 inhabitants, 510 observations. 29 Table 5: Cross-Section Quasi Poisson Dependent variable: (hatecases) (1) (2) (3) (4) Western TV −0.540∗∗ −0.540∗∗∗ −0.698∗∗∗ −0.719∗∗∗ (0.223) (0.195) (0.211) (0.204) density −0.0002 0.0001 −0.00005 −0.0002 (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) share population <25 3.117∗ 2.941 2.528 (1.770) (1.808) (1.778) share catholics −2.467∗ −2.733∗ −3.200∗∗ (1.404) (1.517) (1.468) share protestants −1.126 −1.129 −0.734 (0.768) (0.824) (0.765) share drop outs −19.925 −18.477 −17.043 (12.524) (12.378) (12.053) log(gdppc) 0.885∗ 0.969∗∗ 0.693 (0.455) (0.419) (0.453) crime per capita −11.715∗∗∗ −11.691∗∗∗ −15.361∗∗∗ (3.462) (3.661) (4.611) share welfare recipient 12.406 3.049 10.498 (18.277) (20.038) (21.221) unemployment rate 3.089 1.217 0.988 (2.682) (2.943) (3.026) unemp. rate young 3.969 4.244∗ 4.569∗ (2.623) (2.572) (2.616) population change −1.876∗∗∗ −1.574∗∗ −1.702∗∗∗ (0.605) (0.633) (0.588) share foreigner 3.693 7.021 (7.166) (6.949) unemp. rate foreigner 1.137∗∗∗ 1.054∗∗ (0.441) (0.429) foreign tourism per capita −0.253 −0.188 (0.182) (0.174) difference refugee per capita 6.553 4.745 (12.464) (11.091) vote share Nsdap −1.533 (1.147) protests 1989 0.010 (0.008) Constant −7.694∗∗∗ −17.128∗∗∗ −17.801∗∗∗ −14.244∗∗∗ (0.294) (4.681) (4.307) (4.906) Observations 510 510 510 510 Note: Standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust and clustered at municipality level. The unit of observation is the municipality. Significance at ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01 30 Table 6: Cross-Section Quasi Poisson. Subcategories Dependent variable: (misc) (assault) (arson) (demonstration) (1) (2) (3) (4) Western TV −0.651∗∗∗ −0.828∗∗∗ −1.164∗∗∗ −0.802∗∗∗ (0.227) (0.240) (0.340) (0.306) density −0.0002 0.0001 −0.002∗∗∗ −0.001 (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.001) (0.0004) share population <25 2.005 2.690 8.511∗ 1.585 (2.190) (2.865) (4.684) (4.706) share catholics −3.221∗∗ −3.151 −3.260 −1.688 (1.353) (2.699) (2.180) (2.365) share protestants −0.558 −0.770 −2.007 0.095 (0.866) (1.062) (2.280) (1.487) share drop outs −14.768 −27.343∗ 12.865 −72.390∗∗∗ (12.907) (15.246) (30.357) (26.222) log(gdppc) 0.528 0.954 1.615 −1.513 (0.515) (0.588) (0.983) (0.942) crime per capita −16.938∗∗∗ −13.505∗∗ −7.490 −0.398 (5.022) (6.482) (16.264) (10.139) share welfare recipients 18.530 16.582 −201.653∗∗∗ −44.331 (23.468) (27.717) (64.090) (71.225) unemployment rate −1.670 7.595∗ 3.900 −0.571 (3.193) (3.934) (7.975) (6.462) unemployment rate young 6.884∗∗ −0.612 1.482 9.807 (2.841) (3.329) (6.939) (6.228) population change −1.621∗∗ −1.997∗∗∗ −0.570 −1.351 (0.691) (0.753) (1.300) (1.128) share foreigner 8.173 8.940 −19.481 22.589 (7.666) (8.504) (16.152) (19.512) unemployment rate foreign 1.217∗∗∗ 0.645 1.259 0.946 (0.437) (0.678) (0.846) (0.770) foreign tourism per capita −0.120 −0.210 −0.889∗ −0.011 (0.192) (0.253) (0.466) (0.328) 4refugee per capita 14.743 −20.851 5.104 9.253 (12.445) (15.975) (34.152) (27.496) vote share NSDAP −2.016 −0.173 −2.386 −2.490 (1.264) (1.551) (2.668) (2.247) protests 1989 0.009 0.013 0.013 0.008 (0.010) (0.011) (0.023) (0.014) Constant −12.969∗∗ −18.344∗∗∗ −25.837∗∗ 6.246 (5.548) (6.264) (10.366) (9.805) Observations 510 510 510 510 Note: Standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust and clustered at municipality level. The unit of observation is the municipality. Significance at ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01 31 Table 7: Zero Inflated Neg. Bin.: Count Model Coefficients Dependent variable: hatecases (1) (2) (3) Western TV −0.605∗∗ −0.522∗∗ −0.550∗∗ (0.235) (0.256) (0.235) density −0.00002 0.0002 0.0001 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) share population <25 4.836 5.203 (4.705) (3.469) share catholics −0.475 −0.965 (0.870) (0.848) share protestants −0.280 0.208 (0.993) (0.731) vote share NSDAP 1.134 −1.365 (9.467) (9.409) log(gdppc) 0.500 0.736∗ (0.450) (0.376) crime per capita −6.103 −9.386∗∗ (4.691) (4.076) share welfare recipients −3.817 2.872 (18.525) (19.470) unemployment rate 4.682∗ 2.332 (2.691) (2.626) unemployment rate young 2.374 3.307 (2.469) (2.348) population change −1.954∗∗∗ −1.634∗∗∗ (0.600) (0.572) unemployment rate foreign 1.618∗∗∗ (0.449) foreign tourism per capita −0.213 (0.194) 4refugee per capita 10.381 (11.426) Constant −7.794∗∗∗ −14.434∗∗∗ −16.907∗∗∗ (0.235) (4.803) (3.740) Observations 510 510 510 Log Likelihood −1,037.883 −967.493 −953.669 Zero Inflation Coefficients (1) (2) (3) Western TV −6.461 −4.169 −5.115 (1.929) (8.324) (4.985) density −0.018∗∗ −0.005 −0.063 (0.008) (0.014) (0.048) share population <25 −296.121∗∗ −496.645∗∗∗ (149.96) (93.262) share catholics 110.348∗∗∗ 125.323 (149.46) (87.581) share protestants 40.976∗ 72.198∗∗∗ (23.203) (16.554) share drop outs −0.845 −71.082 (527.07) (253.130) log(gdppc) 6.613 26.718 (37.438 (22.528) crime per capita 52.090 110.536 (65.974) (116.740) share welfare recipients −127.854 −141.529 (1260.00) (220.650) unemployment rate 49.944 −157.653∗∗ (46.560) (66.354) unemployment rate young −44.365 112.268∗∗∗ (36.652) (31.919) population change 47.573∗∗ 53.303∗∗∗ (34.153) (14.574) unemployment rate foreign 25.745∗∗ (10.080) foreign tourism per capita −18.115 (18.031) 4refugee per capita −85.159 (103.060) Constant −14.347 −55.637 −209.880 (171.050) (367.630) (216.540) Observations 510 510 510 Log Likelihood −1,037.883 −967.493 −953.669 32 -4 -2 0 2 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 NSDAP Vote in 1932 E st im a te d C o effi ci en t fo r W es te rn T V CI(Max - Min): [3.492, 7.272] Figure 4: Effect of West TV on Hate crimes by NSDAP vote share Marginal effects of Western TV on hate crimes against refugees depending on the vote share of the NSDAP in the 1932 election. 33 6 Appendix Figure A1: Hate Crimes per 100.000 inhabitants on District Level, Germany Hate crimes against refugees per 100.000 inhabitants over the years October 2014 until 2017 for Germany. The data is aggregated on the county level. 34 0 50 100 150 0 50 100 150 200 Hate Crimes per 100.000 p. N u m b er C o m m u n it ie s Figure A2: Histogram of Hate Crimes Aggregate of hate crimes against refugees over the years October 2014 until 2017 for the area of the former GDR. The data is aggregated on the municipality level. 510 observations. 35 Table A1: Correlation Matrix 1 Rate Hate Crimes Western TV population change density vote share NSDAP protests 1989 alq alq young alq foreign Rate Hate Crimes 1 -0.152 -0.205 0.050 0.009 0.038 0.334 0.292 0.220 Western TV -0.152 1 0.096 -0.127 0.086 -0.002 -0.249 -0.168 -0.058 population change -0.205 0.096 1 0.386 -0.348 -0.058 -0.518 -0.323 -0.304 density 0.050 -0.127 0.386 1 -0.330 0.422 -0.050 0.00003 0.033 vote share NSDAP 0.009 0.086 -0.348 -0.330 1 0.011 0.090 0.039 0.056 protests 1989 0.038 -0.002 -0.058 0.422 0.011 1 0.074 0.049 0.100 alq 0.334 -0.249 -0.518 -0.050 0.090 0.074 1 0.874 0.437 alq young 0.292 -0.168 -0.323 0.00003 0.039 0.049 0.874 1 0.358 alq foreign 0.220 -0.058 -0.304 0.033 0.056 0.100 0.437 0.358 1 share catholics -0.063 -0.088 0.069 0.026 -0.212 0.009 -0.080 -0.101 -0.053 share protestants -0.085 0.043 -0.060 -0.237 0.427 -0.069 -0.336 -0.407 -0.064 gdppc 0.005 0.066 0.042 0.219 -0.214 0.363 -0.079 -0.049 -0.082 share welfare recipients -0.015 -0.208 -0.228 -0.175 0.137 0.065 0.338 0.308 0.069 foreign tourism pc -0.052 -0.276 0.192 0.198 -0.151 0.152 -0.014 0.065 -0.088 4refugee per capita 0.041 0.090 -0.004 0.093 -0.055 0.322 0.116 0.158 0.040 crime pc -0.001 -0.081 0.126 0.190 -0.265 0.381 0.217 0.256 0.039 share population <25 0.001 -0.037 0.417 0.387 -0.127 0.364 -0.127 0.001 -0.070 share drop outs 0.039 -0.124 0.155 -0.091 -0.092 -0.107 0.371 0.467 0.0123 6 Table A1: Correlation Matrix (continued) share catholics share protestants gdppc share welfare recipients foreign tourism pc 4refugee per capita crime pc share population <25 share drop outs Rate Hate Crimes -0.063 -0.085 0.005 -0.015 -0.052 0.041 -0.001 0.001 0.039 Western TV -0.088 0.043 0.066 -0.208 -0.276 0.090 -0.081 -0.037 -0.124 population change 0.069 -0.060 0.042 -0.228 0.192 -0.004 0.126 0.417 0.155 density 0.026 -0.237 0.219 -0.175 0.198 0.093 0.190 0.387 -0.091 vote share NSDAP -0.212 0.427 -0.214 0.137 -0.151 -0.055 -0.265 -0.127 -0.092 protests 1989 0.009 -0.069 0.363 0.065 0.152 0.322 0.381 0.364 -0.107 alq -0.080 -0.336 -0.079 0.338 -0.014 0.116 0.217 -0.127 0.371 alq young -0.101 -0.407 -0.049 0.308 0.065 0.158 0.256 0.001 0.467 alq foreign -0.053 -0.064 -0.082 0.069 -0.088 0.040 0.039 -0.070 0.012 share catholics 1 -0.092 -0.003 -0.011 -0.038 0.013 -0.095 0.161 -0.064 share protestants -0.092 1 -0.139 -0.200 -0.194 -0.267 -0.466 -0.056 -0.372 gdppc -0.003 -0.139 1 -0.056 0.341 0.239 0.367 0.213 0.013 share welfare recipients -0.011 -0.200 -0.056 1 0.106 0.343 0.388 -0.001 0.502 foreign tourism pc -0.038 -0.194 0.341 0.106 1 0.125 0.351 0.262 0.148 4refugee per capita 0.013 -0.267 0.239 0.343 0.125 1 0.498 0.069 0.300 crime pc -0.095 -0.466 0.367 0.388 0.351 0.498 1 0.117 0.497 share population <25 0.161 -0.056 0.213 -0.001 0.262 0.069 0.117 1 0.053 share drop outs -0.064 -0.372 0.013 0.502 0.148 0.300 0.497 0.053 1 3 7 Table A2: Cross-Section with kreis fixed Dependent variable: (hatecases) (1) (2) (3) (4) Western TV −0.827∗∗∗ −0.700∗∗∗ −0.712∗∗∗ −0.700∗∗∗ (0.219) (0.226) (0.224) (0.224) density 0.0003∗∗ 0.0002 0.0002 0.0001 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) share population <25 3.369∗ 2.843 3.234 (1.721) (1.840) (1.998) share catholics −1.083 −1.146 −1.086 (1.909) (1.922) (1.850) share protestants −0.584 −0.378 0.074 (0.790) (0.820) (0.817) share drop outs −65.252 −223.173∗∗∗ −226.528∗∗∗ (172.371) (82.041) (77.178) log(gdppc) 4.870∗∗ 2.937 2.156 (2.156) (2.842) (2.593) crime per capita −3.427 69.432∗ 58.256 (36.783) (36.507) (35.486) share welfare recipients −103.138 295.917 381.010 (221.735) (258.298) (233.981) unemployment rate 11.315∗∗∗ 10.657∗∗∗ 10.737∗∗∗ (2.410) (2.500) (2.608) unemployment rate young −0.470 −0.857 −0.661 (2.453) (2.487) (2.423) population change −1.186∗∗ −1.124∗∗ −1.424∗∗ (0.532) (0.533) (0.604) share foreigner 3.670 4.877 (6.444) (6.451) unemployment rate foreign 0.574 0.477 (0.395) (0.410) foreign tourism per capita −9.835∗∗∗ −8.506∗∗ (3.755) (3.721) 4refugee per capita −220.429∗∗ −201.242∗∗ (94.664) (85.287) vote share NSDAP −2.110∗∗ (0.943) protests 1989 0.006 (0.007) Constant −8.162∗∗∗ −56.324∗∗∗ −40.017 −32.355 (0.243) (20.510) (26.217) (23.977) Observations 510 510 510 510 Note: Standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust and clustered at municipality level. The unit of observation is the municipality. Significance at ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01 38 
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work_wp3b2fjjgzhshcg6ziifalvksu	----	[PDF] Random Acts of Violence? Examining Probabilistic Independence of the Temporal Distribution of Mass Killing Events in the United States | Semantic Scholar Skip to search formSkip to main content> Semantic Scholar's Logo Search Sign InCreate Free Account You are currently offline. Some features of the site may not work correctly. DOI:10.1891/0886-6708.VV-D-16-00039 Corpus ID: 5017286Random Acts of Violence? Examining Probabilistic Independence of the Temporal Distribution of Mass Killing Events in the United States @article{King2017RandomAO, title={Random Acts of Violence? Examining Probabilistic Independence of the Temporal Distribution of Mass Killing Events in the United States}, author={D. King and S. Jacobson}, journal={Violence and Victims}, year={2017}, volume={32}, pages={1014 - 1023} } D. King, S. Jacobson Published 2017 History, Medicine Violence and Victims Recent mass killings, such as those in Newtown, Connecticut, and Aurora, Colorado, have brought new attention to mass killings in the United States. This article examines 323 mass killings taking place between January 1, 2006, and October 4, 2016, to assess how they are distributed over time. In particular, we find that they appear to be uniformly distributed over time, which suggests that their rate has remained stable over the past decade. Moreover, analysis of subsets of these mass killings… Expand View on SpringerPub shj.cs.illinois.edu Save to Library Create Alert Cite Launch Research Feed Share This Paper 4 CitationsBackground Citations 2 View All Tables from this paper table 1 Paper Mentions News Article Four Myths About Mass Shootings American Council on Science and Health 10 August 2019 News Article Mass shootings aren't growing more common — and evidence contradicts common stereotypes about the killers Public Radio International 7 August 2019 News Article Mass shootings aren't growing more common – and evidence contradicts common stereotypes about the killers The Conversation 7 August 2019 News Article 4 myths about mass shootings debunked Business Insider 7 August 2019 News Article Mass shooting, news coverage, guns Homeland Security News Wire 19 October 2017 News Article Mass killings happen randomly, yet rate has remained steady, study finds EurekAlert! 18 October 2017 4 Citations Citation Type Citation Type All Types Cites Results Cites Methods Cites Background Has PDF Publication Type Author More Filters More Filters Filters Sort by Relevance Sort by Most Influenced Papers Sort by Citation Count Sort by Recency Evolution and study of a copycat effect in intimate partner homicides: A lesson from Spanish femicides J. Torrecilla, Lara Quijano-Sánchez, F. Liberatore, J. J. López-Ossorio, J. L. González-Álvarez Sociology, Medicine PloS one 2019 2 PDF Save Alert Research Feed Fame-seeking mass shooters in America: Severity, characteristics, and media coverage J. Silva, Emily A. Greene-Colozzi Psychology 2019 4 Save Alert Research Feed Overcoming randomness does not rule out the importance of inherent randomness for functionality Y. Ilan Computer Science, Medicine Journal of Biosciences 2019 5 View 1 excerpt, cites background Save Alert Research Feed The Use of Metaphors and Tragic Pictures in Eugene O’Neill‘S American Drama Haider Al-Selman Selman, Zaidah Zainal Art 2018 View 1 excerpt, cites background Save Alert Research Feed References SHOWING 1-10 OF 33 REFERENCES SORT BYRelevance Most Influenced Papers Recency Contagion in Mass Killings and School Shootings S. Towers, Andrés Gómez-Liévano, M. Khan, A. Mubayi, C. Castillo-Ch'avez History, Medicine PloS one 2015 122 Highly Influential PDF View 5 excerpts, references background and results Save Alert Research Feed The patterns and prevalence of mass murder in twentieth-century America G. Duwe Psychology 2004 100 View 3 excerpts, references background Save Alert Research Feed A circle of distortion: the social construction of mass murder in the United States G. Duwe Engineering 2005 43 Highly Influential View 5 excerpts, references background Save Alert Research Feed Psychiatric aspects of familicide. C. Malmquist Psychology, Medicine The Bulletin of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law 1980 29 PDF View 3 excerpts, references background Save Alert Research Feed The Nature and Prevalence of Familicide in the United States, 2000–2009 M. Liem, J. Levin, Curtis Holland, James A. Fox Medicine Journal of Family Violence 2013 26 View 1 excerpt, references background Save Alert Research Feed The berserk syndrome: A review of mass murder G. Palermo Psychology 1997 52 Save Alert Research Feed Social–emotional origins of violence: A theory of multiple killing T. Scheff Psychology 2011 30 PDF Save Alert Research Feed Crime Modeling Alfred Blumstein Computer Science Oper. Res. 2002 33 View 1 excerpt, references background Save Alert Research Feed Public Mass Shooters and Firearms: A Cross-National Study of 171 Countries Adam Lankford Medicine, Engineering Violence and Victims 2016 64 PDF View 2 excerpts, references background Save Alert Research Feed Patterns of Multiple Family Homicide M. Liem, Ashley Reichelmann Psychology 2014 37 View 2 excerpts, references background Save Alert Research Feed ... 1 2 3 4 ... Related Papers Abstract Tables Paper Mentions 4 Citations 33 References Related Papers Stay Connected With Semantic Scholar Sign Up About Semantic Scholar Semantic Scholar is a free, AI-powered research tool for scientific literature, based at the Allen Institute for AI. 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work_wq7p64vfa5gebphykt26rxsiki	----	Measuring the macrosystem in post-accord Northern Ireland: A social- ecological approach Townsend, D., Taylor, L., Furey, A., Merrilees, C. E., Goeke-Morey, M., Shirlow, P., & Cummings, M. (2016). Measuring the macrosystem in post-accord Northern Ireland: A social-ecological approach. Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology , 22(3), 282-286. Published in: Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology Document Version: Peer reviewed version Queen's University Belfast - Research Portal: Link to publication record in Queen's University Belfast Research Portal Publisher rights © 2016 American Psychological Association This article may not exactly replicate the authoritative document published in the APA journal. It is not the copy of record. The final version may be found at http://psycnet.apa.org/index.cfm?fa=buy.optionToBuy&id=2016-38187-007 General rights Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Queen's University Belfast Research Portal is retained by the author(s) and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights. Take down policy The Research Portal is Queen's institutional repository that provides access to Queen's research output. Every effort has been made to ensure that content in the Research Portal does not infringe any person's rights, or applicable UK laws. If you discover content in the Research Portal that you believe breaches copyright or violates any law, please contact openaccess@qub.ac.uk. Download date:06. Apr. 2021 https://pure.qub.ac.uk/en/publications/measuring-the-macrosystem-in-postaccord-northern-ireland-a-socialecological-approach(c19474f0-3480-4b5d-a0e3-0a3448a542b9).html MEASURING THE MACROSYSTEM Measuring the macrosystem in post-accord Northern Ireland: A social-ecological approach Dana Townsend University of Notre Dame Laura K. Taylor Queen’s University Belfast Andrea Furey University of Ulster, Magee Campus Christine E. Merrilees State University of New York Geneseo Marcie C. Goeke-Morey The Catholic University of America Peter Shirlow University of Liverpool E. Mark Cummings University of Notre Dame This research was supported by NICHD grant 046933-05 to E. Mark Cummings. We would also like to express our appreciation to project staff, graduate students, and undergraduate students at the University of Notre Dame and University of Ulster. Correspondence should be addressed to Dana Townsend, Department of Psychology, University of Notre Dame. Email: dtownse2@nd.edu. MEASURING THE MACROSYSTEM 2 Abstract The macrosystem refers to the overarching patterns that influence behavior at each level of the social ecology (Bronfenbrenner, 1977), making it a necessary component for assessing human development in contexts of political violence. This article proposes a method for systematically measuring the macrosystem in Northern Ireland that allows for a subnational analysis, multiple time units, and indicators of both low-level violence and positive relations. Articles were randomly chosen for each weekday in 2006-2011 from two prominent Northern Irish newspapers and coded according to their reflection of positive relations and political tensions between Catholics and Protestants. The newspaper data were then compared to existing macro-level measurements in Northern Ireland. We found that the newspaper data provided a more nuanced understanding of fluctuations in intergroup relations than the corresponding measures. This has practical implications for peacebuilding and advances our methods for assessing the impact of macro-level processes on individual development. Key words: social ecology, macrosystem, newspaper data, Northern Ireland, intergroup conflict MEASURING THE MACROSYSTEM 3 Measuring the macrosystem in post-accord Northern Ireland: A social-ecological approach Researchers have noted the importance of assessing the macrosystem to better understand the impact of political violence on human development (e.g., Cummings et al., 2013). Despite theoretical attention to the macrosystem in social-ecological research, empirical studies that incorporate systematic measurements of the macrosystem remain sparse. Disciplines outside of psychology have provided insight into the measurement and conceptualization of the macro- level. However, these approaches have limitations for assessing important elements of the macrosystem pertaining to the psychological impact of political violence. This study proposes a systematic macrosystem measurement that has implications for both psychological development and peacebuilding. Social-ecological Model Developmental research shows that individuals interact dynamically and continuously with their environment. Recognizing the interactions between individual and context as critical determinants of development, Bronfenbrenner proposed a social-ecological model to account for these multiple layers of influence (1977). This framework was conceived as a nested arrangement of structures. The outermost level is the macrosystem, which refers to the overarching institutional patterns of the culture or subculture, such as the economic, social, educational, legal, and political systems . . . Macrosystems are conceived and examined not only in structural terms but as carriers of information and ideology that, both explicitly and implicitly, endow meaning and motivation to particular agencies, social networks, roles, activities, and their interrelations. (Bronfenbrenner, 1977, p. 515) MEASURING THE MACROSYSTEM 4 Though the macrosystem’s influence on individual development is more complex than this model implies, research has shown that salient events in the outers systems tend to disrupt the environments in which individual development takes place (Cummings et al., 2013). The current study examines how the macrosystem can be assessed in settings characterized by political violence. Macro-level Measures of Political Violence and Peacebuilding Interdisciplinary research provides different approaches to measuring the macrosystem. In particular, political science has developed datasets to analyze armed conflict. Although these datasets provide systematic information on war and organized violence over a wide range of years, which is useful for comparing violence between different nations across time, they also face constraints. First, most of these datasets use the nation-state as their unit of analysis, which makes it impossible to assess political violence at a subnational level or in cases of contested territories. Second, these datasets operationalize conflict using a threshold of battle-related deaths (e.g., 25/year) or acts of terrorism as indicators of violence, and they stop tracking change when violence falls below established thresholds. This makes it difficult to assess low- level violence or intergroup tensions. Finally, these datasets rely on indicators of negative peace (i.e., absence of overt conflict) rather than positive peace (i.e., justice, restoration of relationships). Although providing useful information about intergroup violence at the community-level, these metrics fails to account for positive advances in the peace process or intergroup relations over time. To address these constraints, researchers may use large-scale surveys on individual attitudes, aggregating them on a regional or national level. However, since such data are derived from microsystem assessments, their conceptual adequacy as macrosystem measures is MEASURING THE MACROSYSTEM 5 debatable (Bronfenbrenner, 1977). Additionally, population-wide longitudinal surveys are expensive, and conflict settings may lack the resources for polling of this magnitude. Thus, alternative measures of change in the macrosystem are needed. Current Study The Northern Ireland conflict serves as a useful context for introducing a new method of macrosystem measurement. First, because Catholic-Protestant tensions currently manifest through segregation, political intransigence, and low-level violence (Shirlow, Taylor, Merrilees, Goeke-Morey, & Cummings, 2013), existing macro-level datasets on armed conflict miss significant indicators of peace and conflict. Second, the Northern Ireland conflict requires a subnational analysis, which is lost in the state-level metrics that code the United Kingdom as a whole. Third, after the 1998 accord, the ongoing peace process necessitates indicators of progress in addition to conflict and violence. A macrosystem measurement in post-accord Northern Ireland accounting for these factors may improve evaluation of the social-ecological shifts that ultimately affect individual psychological functioning and behavior. The current study proposes systematic coding of local newspaper reports about peace and conflict as a way to measure macro-level change in post-accord Northern Ireland. News organizations based in the region of conflict tend to have the most in-depth coverage of events and can be invaluable for highlighting the way discourse surrounding a conflict has been systematically produced and transmitted throughout society (Öberg & Sollenberg, 2011). Moreover, newspaper coding poses modest financial costs and can be applied retroactively using archived newspapers. This study compares newspaper coding with existing macro-level measurements for Northern Ireland. Method MEASURING THE MACROSYSTEM 6 Procedures Article selection. Local news articles were utilized as a method of assessing the macrosystem. Using Lexis Nexis, newspaper articles from 2006-2011 were randomly selected from Belfast Telegraph and Irish News – the two most circulated Northern Irish daily newspapers. A process of verification established that the following keywords identified all articles reflecting the Northern Ireland conflict and peace process: sectarian, paramilitary, crime, violence, IRA (Irish Republican Army), UVF (Ulster Volunteer Force), loyalist, republican, nationalist, unionist, UDA (Ulster Defence Association), SDLP (Social Democratic and Labour Party), DUP (Democratic Unionist Party), and Sinn Féin. From the pool of all identified articles, two were randomly selected per newspaper per weekday; thus, four articles were coded for each weekday during this period (N = 6,082). Coding procedure. Sixteen students were recruited from the University of Ulster Magee Campus in Northern Ireland to serve as coders for the project. Each article was read by two Catholic and two Protestant students and rated according to several criteria, described below. Coder pairings were alternated every 250 articles using an adapted Latin square design to balance individual differences. Common to studies that investigate topics related to perception, we used a “naïve” or “untrained” system of coding. In such studies, the use of manualized coding can inhibit the coder’s ability to detect subtle nuances of emotion and group dynamics hidden in the subtext (Schulz & Waldinger, 2005). By using lay observers who are native to Northern Ireland instead of trained coders, we were able to increase ecological validity by retaining the coders’ ability to apply intuitive judgments to the articles’ content and interpret culturally and historically embedded information. MEASURING THE MACROSYSTEM 7 Inter-rater reliability. Four coders rated each article, making it necessary to calculate inter-rater reliability. The intra-class correlation (ICC) was determined to be the most appropriate statistic because (a) it is suitable for Likert-scaled variables; (b) it can be applied when each article is rated by more than two coders; and (c) it accounts for the magnitude of agreement between coders rather than “all-or-nothing” agreement (Hallgren, 2012). We applied a two-way random effects model using average measures and absolute agreement. Since our research questions are based on the averaged rating across all four coders rather than the ratings of any single coder, the “average measures” unit of analysis is reported (Hallgren, 2012). An ICC(2,k) coefficient was calculated for each set of 250 articles. ICC(2) refers to designs where the coders have been randomly selected from a larger population, and each coder rates each article. The “k” indicates a reliability index calculated by averaging the measurements of k number of raters. The coefficients were then averaged together to give a final ICC(2,k) of α = 0.58 for political tensions and α = 0.68 for positive relations. According to Cicchetti (1994), ICC coefficients between .40 and .59 have “fair” reliability, and between .60 and .74 have “good” reliability. Measures Newspaper coding (‘political tensions’ and ‘positive relations’). These items derived from the newspaper coding dataset described above. For each article from the years 2006-2011, coders read the article and responded to the following questions: “How much do you think this article reflects (1) political tensions, (2) positive relations between Catholics and Protestants?” These constructs were rated separately, because an article could simultaneously indicate both political tensions and positive relations. Each question was rated along a 5-point Likert scale MEASURING THE MACROSYSTEM 8 from 0 (not at all) to 4 (very much), with higher scores indicating more tension or more positivity, respectively. Political Terror Scale. The Political Terror Scale (PTS) measures the macrosystem at the state-level by rating the amount of political violence and terror that a country experiences each year (Gibney, Cornett, Wood, & Haschke, 2014). This study uses 2006-2011 PTS data for the United Kingdom. Codes indicate the level of political imprisonment, political murder, torture, and other human rights violations. They are scaled from 1 (“Countries under a secure rule of law, people are not imprisoned for their view, and torture is rare or exceptional. Political murders are extremely rare”) to 5 (“Terror has expanded to the whole population. The leaders of these societies place no limits on the means or thoroughness with which they pursue personal or ideological goals”). Sectarian hate crimes. The Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency (NISRA) measures the macrosystem at a regional level using annual crime statistics based on information collected from the public, police forces, and regional agencies (NISRA, 2012). This measure captures the number of sectarian hate crimes (i.e., any incident perceived as being sectarian by the victim or any other person) reported to the Police Service of Northern Ireland from 2006- 2011. Results A series of descriptive analyses was conducted to examine how these different approaches capture changes in the macrosystem. Figure 1 compares political tensions perceived in news reports to two other measures of the macrosystem: the Political Terror Scale (PTS) (national measure of terror in the UK) and Sectarian Crime (regional measure of sectarian crime in Northern Ireland). The only variability in the national measure (PTS) occurs between 2009 MEASURING THE MACROSYSTEM 9 and 2010 when the UK’s total amount of political imprisonment, torture and political murder decreased. Regionally, police reports of sectarian crime show slightly more variability across the years with crime decreasing from 2006-2008 before a sharp increase in 2009 and subsequent decrease through 2011. However, the newspaper coding shows a different trend. Political tensions between Catholics and Protestants remained low in 2009 and peaked in 2010. While the PTS and sectarian crime suggest that intergroup violence decreased in 2010-2011, the newspaper coding suggests that intergroup tensions increased during these years. A more nuanced measure of political tensions captures dynamics that are overlooked by macro-level datasets focused only on the most violent forms of terrorism or crime. Figure 2 compares items from the newspaper coding, showing changes in political tensions and positive relations. Rather than looking at the yearly averages for these items, it shows the monthly averages across all six years. Figure 2 indicates that positive relations between Catholics and Protestants generally increase from March through May before steadily decreasing throughout the summer months and reaching a low point in August. Political tensions show less variability, increasing slightly from March through June and gradually decreasing throughout the rest of the year. Depicting political tensions and positive relations separately can demonstrate how each variable changes across time and how they may differentially affect individual development in Northern Ireland. Discussion This study proposes a method for systematically measuring the macrosystem in post- accord Northern Ireland. The findings suggest that newspaper coding may contribute insights about the macrosystem that differ from existing datasets. In addition, it can incorporate both MEASURING THE MACROSYSTEM 10 positive and negative indicators of intergroup relations, and allow for the assessment of macrosystem change across different units of time. The trends in newspaper coding differed from macro-level datasets focused exclusively on political terror and sectarian crime (Figure 1). The newspaper coding showed high political tensions as PTS and sectarian crime decreased. One explanation is that the newspaper coding captured low-intensity conflict as paramilitary violence shifted to community tensions. While the PTS and sectarian crime focus only on violent crime and human rights abuses, the newspaper coding accounts for violent activity as well as the broader discourse surrounding parades, protests, political intransigence, and reflections on the past. These factors, which are essential aspects of the macrosystem, were missed by existing measures. As a comparative advantage to other macrosystem measures, newspaper coding can assess shifts in the political climate across various time units (i.e., daily to yearly averages; monthly averages within years). For example, averaging the newspaper coding by month shows how political tensions and positive relations tend to fluctuate throughout the year (Figure 2). Every spring, Northern Ireland reports increased positive relations between Catholics and Protestants, but it is consistently undone during the summer parading season and its celebrations of in-group heritage. Newspapers contain information about local tensions surrounding the parades even when there is no violence. Understanding these seasonal patterns in the macrosystem may inform the timing of interventions. Further, gauging positive advances in the peace process can provide as much information as items that emphasize crime or violence, and may suggest when to target peacebuilding efforts. Including both positive and negative peace indicators allows for a more thorough understanding of conflict transformation occurring in the macrosystem. MEASURING THE MACROSYSTEM 11 The limitations of this method merit consideration. Newspaper reports are useful for studying macro-level dynamics in a society; yet, the choice of newspapers needs to be carefully considered across contexts to make sure the information is representative of the political climate, particularly in cases of state-controlled media. In addition, although naïve coding confers multiple benefits, the lack of a manualized system makes the coding process time-intensive and requires the articles to be coded by individuals who are native to the culture. Future directions include assessing the macrosystem in relation to other levels of the social ecology to evaluate the broader impact of political violence, as well as conducting a discourse analysis on the content of the newspaper articles to deepen our understanding of these trends. In conclusion, systematic newspaper coding can be an effective means of measuring the macrosystem, extending our understanding of how the political climate shifts over time and ultimately affects individual functioning. MEASURING THE MACROSYSTEM 12 References ARK. (2014). Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey, 2006-2013. ARK. Retrieved on 20 July, 2015 from www.ark.ac.uk/nilt Bronfenbrenner, U. (1977). Toward an experimental ecology of human development. American Psychologist, 32, 513–531. Cicchetti, D. V. (1994). Guidelines, criteria and rules of thumb for evaluating normed and standardized assessment instruments in psychology. Psychological Assessment, 6(4), 284-290. Cummings, E. M., Merrilees, C. E., Taylor, L. K., Shirlow, P., Goeke-Morey, M. C., & Cairns, E. (2013). Longitudinal relations between sectarian and nonsectarian community violence and child adjustment in Northern Ireland. Developmental Psychopathology, 25, 615-627. Gibney, M., Cornett, L., Wood, R., & Haschke, P. (2014). Political Terror Scale 1976- 2012. Retrieved April 19, 2014 from http://www.politicalterrorscale.org Hallgren, K. A. (2012). Computing inter-rater reliability for observational data: An overview and tutorial. Tutorials in Quantitative Methods for Psychology, 8(1), 23-34. NISRA, Northern Ireland Neighbourhood Information Service. (2011). NINIS data catalogue. Retrieved on April 27, 2014 from http://www.ninis.nisra.gov.uk/mapxtreme/DataCatalogue.asp?button=Crime Öberg, M. & Sollenberg, M. (2011). Gathering conflict information using news resources. In K. Höglund & M. Öberg (Eds.), Understanding peace research: Methods and challenges (pp. 47-73). London: Routledge. Schulz, M. S., & Waldinger, R. J. (2005). The value of pooling “naïve” expertise. American Psychologist, 60(6), 656-662. http://www.ark.ac.uk/nilt http://www.politicalterrorscale.org/ http://www.ninis.nisra.gov.uk/mapxtreme/DataCatalogue.asp?button=Crime MEASURING THE MACROSYSTEM 13 Shirlow, P., Taylor, L. K., Merrilees, C. E., Goeke-Morey, M. C., & Cummings, E. M. (2013). Sectarian hate crime: Record or perception? Space & Polity, 17(2), 237-252. MEASURING THE MACROSYSTEM 14 Figure 1. Comparison of the newspaper coding with existing macro-level measurements for Northern Ireland (2006-2011). Each scale has been standardized by converting data into z-scores. -2 -1 0 1 2 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Z- sc or e Year Newspaper coding vs. existing macro-level measures (z-scores) Newspaper (Political Tensions) Political Terror Scale Sectarian Crime MEASURING THE MACROSYSTEM 15 Figure 2. Seasonal fluctuations in political tensions and positive relations between Catholics and Protestants as reflected in the newspaper articles, averaged by month, 2006-2011. 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec M ea n Co di ng Month Average fluctuations across the year Newspaper (Political Tensions) Newspaper (Positive Relations) 
work_wqrbyv54nbe47plblqdwqdelpq	----	This paper provides an exploration of the link between increased negativity towards foreigners and government policies aimed at reducing the number of asylum seekers What lies beneath: exploring links between asylum policy and hate crime in the U K * Abstract This paper explores the link between increasing incidents of hate crime and the asylum policy of successive British governments with its central emphasis on deterrence. The constant problematisation of asylum seekers in the media and political discourse ensures that 'anti-immigrant' prejudice becomes mainstr earned as a common-sense response. The victims are not only the asylum seekers hoping for a better life but democratic society itself with its inherent values of pluralism and tolerance debased and destabilised. Introduction In March 2010, three Russian asylum seekers from the same family leapt to their death from a block of rundown flats in Glasgow1. A n earlier report by the Institute of Race Relations detailed many other cases of suicides and suspicious deaths of asylum seekers which may be, at least in part, attributable to the asylum process . Such incidents are certainly not uncommon in Glasgow where asylum seekers have been dispersed to the most deprived areas of the city where aspirations are low and there is very little chance of integration into the host population. In 2004, the charity Positive Action found that 75% of asylum seekers and refugees in the area had experienced violence and abuse . Additionally, operational problems continue to beset the asylum process: from unnecessary delays and procedural errors to squalid housing to and destitution. At the same time, a new racism based on cultural rather than biological superiority and the supposed ill-effects of other cultures on the white British heritage or English way of life is emerging4. Whereas the traditional forms of racism are today generally condemned (see for example the backlash to Nick Griffin's appearance on B B C ' s Question Time and the fact that the B N P has opened up its membership to non-whites5), a new form of xenophobia is tolerated and even encouraged in the pursuit of Britishness; an identity itself dependant on the fabrication of a mono-culture. Allegations of racism and discrimination are typically rejected *Senior lecturer i n law, Nottingham L a w School, Nottingham Trent University. Nottingham N G 1 4 B U . I am most grateful to comments on earlier drafts from Dr Loretta Trickett and Dr Jonathan Doak both of Nottingham L a w School. 1Harmit(2010). 2 Institute of Race Relations (2006). 3 The Daily Record (2004). 4 Bowling and Phillips (2002). 5 B B C (2009); Doward (2004). or downplayed with the consequence that it has becomes increasingly difficult to challenge discriminatory behaviour and inequality. As Van Dijk notes: the white consensus that denies the prevalence of racism is a very powerful element in its reproduction, especially since resistance requires public attention, media coverage and at least partial recognition of grievances . There can be no informed public debate i f the media and elected representatives are unwilling to move beyond the current discriminatory paradigm. As the number of hate crimes increase, this paper will seek to explore whether racist violence and xenophobia more generally are being encouraged by policies which result in the criminalisation and destitution of asylum seekers. It will demonstrate how the use of inflammatory language in the media and political debates helps to fuel the perception that asylum seekers constitute a threat to the fabric of society. It will be argued that in the current economic crisis, asylum seekers have become perfect scapegoats lacking a political voice to challenge such misperceptions. Mistrust and suspicion becomes the de rigueur, common-sense response. Consequently the right to seek asylum is being eroded whilst the impression of the U K as a place of tolerance and sanctuary is exposed as an illusion. A n examination of European asylum policy has become essential in this context, following the Amsterdam Treaty which brought certain aspects of immigration and asylum within the E U ' s legislative competence. Three significant directives have supported a common approach in refugee determination; reception conditions and, asylum returns. None take the right to seek asylum as a starting point; their objectives instead centre on reducing applications and burden-sharing. A lowest common-denominator approach pervades European asylum policy as European governments seek to show their electorates that they have immigration 'under control'. The construct of fortress Europe has emerged from ever increasing restrictions directed at outsiders with the effect that open and tolerant society is destabilised . Incidents of hate crime The British Crime Survey estimated the number of racist incidents to be around 207,000 in the o 2007/8 period , a figure 150,000 more than the number of reported racist incidents. There is evidently chronic underreporting of hate crime. For asylum seekers this reluctance to report can partly be attributed to fear of the police and authorities due to their uncertain immigration 6 Van Dijk (1992, 96). 7 Veenkamp et al (2003) 8 British Crime Survey (2009). status but also to experiences of persecution in their country of origin9. Although the British Crime Survey does not provide specific details for the perceptions or incidents of crime among asylum seekers, it does demonstrate that ethnic minorities have a greater fear of crime than whites10. This is corroborated by research undertaken by Refugee Action in 2002 which found that 83% of female refugees and asylum seekers surveyed did not go out at night for fear of harassment and crime11. Specialist police monitoring in London found that 30% of households reporting harassment were asylum seekers or refugees, a far greater proportion than were resident in the area . It has been noted that there have been particular problems with racist violence in Scotland, most notably Glasgow where many asylum seekers have been dispersed to 1 Q sub-standard tower-block accommodation in impoverished areas of the city . Police in the Lothian and Borders area which covers Edinburgh reported a huge increase in the number of reported racist crime in the year up to April 2008 with twice as many incidents as in the three years prior. A significant proportion of the victims were of Polish origin suggesting a different dimension to attacks which had in the past been predominately directed at black and Asian victims14 . The Scottish Executive noted that the stigma attached to asylum seeker and refugee status makes them increasingly vulnerable to victimisation and violence in the community15. Notwithstanding the absence of precise data, it is officially acknowledged that asylum seekers and refugees suffer a disproportionate level of hate incidents and crimes16. The recently published Government Action Plan contains a long term vision which sings all the right notes, including a desire to promote an environment which discourages and condemns prejudices, 1 n hostilities, discrimination, portrayals and other factors that enable and cause hate crime . Yet there is little detail to be found on the measures to be taken to advance this goal. For example, there is no consideration of measures that could be adopted to address hostile, inflammatory reporting in the media despite the findings of the Home Office's Community Cohesion report that the role of the media in undermining cohesion was constantly raised by respondents. The report also raised the same issues regarding political representatives and their tendency to make 9 H M Government (2009, 9). 10 Home Office (2007). "Refugee Action (2002). 12 ICAR (2004, 63). 13 Stewart (2007). 14 Human Rights First (2008). 15 Scottish Executive (2004, 5.39). 16 H M Government (2009, 12). 17 Ibid., 17. inflammatory statements undermining community cohesion . Unsurprisingly the new hate crime strategy contains no discussion of the way that current asylum law and policy may encourage the demonization process. Findings from focus groups suggest that there is a direct causal effect between inaccurate, unbalanced media images of asylum seekers and negative, hostile views of the reader19. The pattern of rising incidents of hate crime is replicated across Europe. Although many European states do not currently collate data on hate crimes, there has been a clear upward trend in racist crime in eight countries, including the U K , Germany and France over a 90 six year period . In 2009 the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe adopted a 91 decision endorsed by all 56 states to take important steps to combat hate crime . But as with the national hate crime strategy, the decision addresses cure rather than prevention by committing states to compile statistics and to ensure better reporting and training for criminal justice officials. There is no mention of states committing their representatives to use less inflammatory language and to tackle widespread misconceptions regarding immigration and asylum. Defining Hate crime There is a considerable academic debate over the legitimacy of hate crimes laws which is beyond the scope of this paper, but it is worth emphasising the commonly advanced view that hate crime results in greater psychological harm than that which typically results from other 99 crimes . Such crime impacts negatively on the whole target community, explaining why ethnic minorities have a greater fear of crime and additionally, they "impact on the shared values of equality held by the community as a whole" . They are crimes against tolerance and diversity: crimes in essence against democracy. Contemporary definitions of hate crime reflect the view of hate crime as a process directed at already stigmatised and marginalised groups. Barbara Perry's definition is particular pertinent in this context: Hate crime involves acts of violence and intimidation usually directed towards already stigmatised and marginalised groups. As such, it is a mechanism of power and oppression intended to reaffirm the previous hierarchies that characterise a given social order. It attempts to re-create simultaneously the threatened ....hegemony of the 18 Cantle (2002, 5.3.2; 5.14). 19 ICAR (2004, 77). 20 Human Rights First (2008b). 21 OSCE (2009). 22 See for example Iganksi (2002); Kahan (2001); Hurd (2001). 23 Moon (2002, 555). perpetrator's group and the 'appropriate' subordinate identity of the victim's group. It is a means of marking both the Self and the Other in such a way as to re-establish their 'proper' relative positions, as given and reproduced by broader ideologies and patters of social and political inequality . The victim's perception of the motivation behind the incident is accepted by the Association of 9S Chief Police Officers as the best way to attribute a hate or prejudice motivation . The Crown Prosecution Service follows the same, broad approach and confirms that a victim may be targeted because of their perceived asylum seeker status al one26. However, the current method of statistical complication does not allow the victims' status or perceived status to be identified which makes it impossible to be certain of the number of people targeted for this reason. Additionally, many hate incidents go unreported as victims' may regard such incidents as part of their daily life and, particularly i f it is a pattern of recurring behaviour, may not wish to aggravate the situation by making a formal complaint. In areas of British National Party 97 support there have reportedly been significant increases in racist incidents and victimisation with further evidence suggesting that there is a tendency to dismiss evidence of racist intention in many cases. Persons who are victims of hate crime may find themselves targeted repeatedly by what if often attributed to 'anti social' behaviour rather than criminal behaviour which is not seen as 'really offensive' but part of a trade in insults in the course of a neighbourhood 9R dispute . The down-playing of racist intent by the police is related to the observation by many 9Q criminologists that perpetrators are often sanctioned by the wider community . Accordingly, sympathizers draw on the wider culture including parents, teachers, friends and the media to support their hate . One Home Office study on the perpetrators of racial harassment and violence found that tacit support by the wider community was commonplace: The views held by all kinds of perpetrators towards ethnic minorities are shared by the wider communities to which they belong. Perpetrators see this as legitimising their actions. In turn, the wider community not only spawns such spectators, but fails to condemn them and actively reinforces their behaviour . 24 Perry (2001, 10). 25 H a l l (1995, 9); Bleich observes that the British definition is far more expansive than that used i n Germany and France (2007, 151). 26 Crown Prosecution Service (2010) 27 Booth (2010). 28 Ray and Smith (2002, 97). 29 Levin (2002, 71-87). 30 ibid., 80. 31 Sibbitt (1997); see also Mason (2005). These findings are confirmed by a study in Greater Manchester which noted that typical perpetrators came from estates which were marginalised in all senses and where a sense of collective isolation pervaded . Commenting on the Northern disturbances of 2001, Dixon and Ray observed how fear and ignorance was fuelled by 'pernicious myth's' which divided communities by weakening social cohesion . This 'enabling environment' is supported by and conditioned by the activity or inactivity of the state34. These 'pernicious myths' routinely see asylum seekers portrayed as economic migrants and/or criminals . They become perfect scapegoats; distracting people from real, underlying concerns such as unemployment and poverty and real insecurity about the future36. There is limited political will to challenge these myths as it would necessitate a genuine engagement with the complexities of the real issues. People find scapegoats to blame for their situation and this scape-goating then appears -in legitimised by the inaction of community leaders and ultimately the political elite . Whilst these enabling factors form the backdrop to perceptions of otherness, specific causative factors also need to be considered i f we are to identify the conditions which result in perpetrators deciding to act on their perceptions. Causative factors The dramatic pace of socio-economic change in British society has widened the gap between affluent and poor communities. Competition for resources and dependence on welfare provides fertile ground for xenophobia . In many cases support from the wider community legitimises and encourages violence towards foreigners. Marginalised gangs may begin as social outcasts but once they direct their frustration towards asylum seekers or immigrants their status appears to change favourably as they begin to obtain the respect that they have craved. On top of the individual factors, polarised political situations and inflammatory media reporting in which immigration policy is commonly depicted as a problem provide fertile ground for the emergence of violence . Frost observes how existing structural factors such as environmental disadvantage are compounded by additional factors that facilitate racial prejudice: Two such examples are the role played by dominant cultural and political discourses as disseminated by government policy, and by the negative reporting of immigration by 32 Ray et al (2003, 119). 33 Dixon and Ray (2007, 115). 34 Perry (2001, 179). 35 Ottewell (2007). 36 Sibbitt,(1987). 37 Association of London Authorities (1993). 38 Hopkins Burke and Pollock (2004, 11). 39 Bjorgo and Witte (1993, 43). sections of the media... the existence of broader socio-economic and political conditions that combine with a hostile media and government stance can facilitate racism and the particular complexion this takes . The influence of political rhetoric and leadership is thus of paramount importance to understanding the normalisation of hatred. The influence of political rhetoric Political rhetoric and media sensationalism play large parts in problematising asylum seekers and refugees. Political polarisation often results in immigration being seen as a hot topic. In the U K , political parties regularly battle over which has the strongest, most restrictive policies on immigration. The question of asylum is typically lost within this battle and subsumed into the general immigration debate. Opinion polls have consistently revealed the public perception that immigration and asylum policies are 'not tough enough' and that the 'problem of asylum is out of control'. In one particular YouGov survey for the Daily M a i l in 2004, 11% of the public agreed strongly (and 26% tended to agree) with the proposition that 'a significant proportion of asylum seekers in Britain are terrorists'41. More recently, the Independent Asylum Commission's 'Citizens Speak' consultation found the majority of respondents were critical of the asylum system and in particular asylum seekers, who were seen as receiving special, preferential treatment and benefits . Interestingly, the Commission also found that many of the same respondents were in favour of providing sanctuary to those fearing persecution but that they had received the message that most applicants were actually bogus43. The statistics show that the number of asylum seekers coming to the U K has been decreasing fairly steadily since the peak in 2001 with 48% fewer applications in the first quarter of 2010 compared to the same period of the previous year. Despite the initial recognition rate of only 15%, over half the applicants are eventually recognised as needing protection with 27% of applications accepted on appeal and 10%) receiving discretionary or humanitarian leave44. This picture is seldom presented to the public during political debate and it rarely features in popular news stories. Capdevilla and Callaghan have examined the opposition speeches of M P Michael Howard in 2005 which locate the need for tighter immigration controls within a context of 40 Frost (2007, 238). 41 YouGov (2003; 2004); see also YouGov Survey for Commission for Racial equality: Racial equality 2004: http://www.youcov.co.uk/corporate/archives/press-archives-social-Main.asp?dID=2005. 42 Independent Asylum Commission (IAC 2008, 4). 43 Ibid., 44 Home Office (2010). http://www.youcov.co.uk/corporate/archives/press-archives-social-Main.asp?dID=2005 cleaner hospitals and more police; thus equating immigration with both a lack of cleanliness and criminality45. His speeches describe an asylum system which is out of control. Most disturbing is the alleged link between terrorism and asylum: We face a real terrorist threat in Britain today - a threat to our way of life, to our liberties...there is a quarter of a million failed asylum seekers living in our country today. No-one knows who they are or where they are. To defeat the terrorist threat we need action not talk - action to secure our borders . The irony of course is that that the perpetrators of terrorist attacks in British soil have predominately been British citizens - born and bred in this climate of tolerance. Whilst the speech clearly equates asylum with criminality and terrorism, it also alludes to an idealized vision of 'British-ness' which is threatened by these outsiders. The link between immigration and criminality can be seen more recently in the Labour party's 2010 manifesto entitled ' A future fair for all' in which an entire section on strengthening communities is devoted to 'Crime and Immigration' .Howard does not feel it necessary to substantiate the link between asylum and terrorism as it is presented as axiomatic. But in keeping with the desire to disassociate from accusations of racism, he is at pains to confirm that he is not a racist by referring to his own 4R ancestry as a descendant of Russian Jews . More recently, the 'dangerous game' of allowing gay asylum seekers to claim asylum in the United Kingdom has been highlighted by Conservative M P Philip Davies49. The Supreme Court's judgement that Gay men in Cameroon and Iran may experience persecution on account of their sexuality was also described as 'absurd' by former M P Anne Widdecombe who predicted that civil unrest may result from such decisions50. The former Labour minister responsible for immigration and asylum, Phil Woolas, angered immigration activists shortly after he took up his post by emphasising that most asylum seekers were economic migrants and accusing immigration lawyers of undermining the law in their support for unworthy appeals51. Yet many asylum seekers struggle to find any legal representation; a position made much worse by the recent closure of the U K ' s largest specialist legal representation charity in the immigration field. Refugee Migrant Justice went into administration in June 2010 due to financial difficulties which they laid squarely at the door of the Government . 45 Capdevila and Callaghan (2008, 5). 46 Extract from Michael Howard's conference speech 2005 cited i n Ibid., 5. 47 Labour Party Manifesto (2010). Available atLabour.org.uk. 48 Capdevilla and Callaghan (2008, 97). 49 Daily Express (2010) 50 Widdecombe (2010). 51 Telegraph (2008). 52 New Statesman (2010). http://atLabour.org.uk The link between political rhetoric and violence is a common theme in criminological research. Regular use of terms such as 'bogus' in political debates on immigration and asylum are seldom substantiated by evidence . The constant problematization of asylum seekers can only serve to reinforce the impression that the asylum system is out of control. Fifteen years ago, the Association of London Authorities demanded that more attention was focussed on the underlying factors which breed, excuse or support racist activity54. In this context, the Home Office's Racial Attacks Group noted the obligation on politicians and those with influence on public opinion to avoid encouraging feelings of racial antipathy "politicians at both local and national level obviously have a crucial role to play in helping to create a cohesive and tolerant society"55. The use of openly inflammatory language in contemporary political debate appears to have declined but at the same time there has been a discernible shift to less obvious, pejorative labels, including metaphors such as swamping and flooding. The European Commission on Racial Intolerance and Xenophobia have suggested that negative perceptions by the media and politicians are poisoning public opinion and that they are being translated into increasingly restrictive policies and legislation, such as that contained in the Draft Immigration B i l l 2009 which makes it an offence for an asylum seeker to knowingly enter without a valid travel document56. Such charges have also been levied at political debate in Germany and Sweden where immigration restrictions appeared to legitimise the arguments of the anti-immigration lobby . The effect of restrictonism in the U K will be explored later in this paper. Media influences The media are of course vital in helping shape public perception of social and political issues C O particularly on immigration where the experience of most white Britons is very limited . Yet the picture painted is complex and misleading. Research by the Article 19 project at the University of Cardiff found 51 different labels used by the media to define asylum applicants Spencer (1998, 81). Sibbitt (1987, 85). Ibid., 85. ECRI (2009, para. 175). Clause 301 Draft Immigration Bill 2009. Karapin (1999, 437). Bailey and Harindranath (1993, 282); Van Dijk (1993, 243). including 'asylum cheat' and 'illegal refugee'59. Typically the most popular daily newspapers play on public anxieties by depicting Britain as a country under siege from welfare dependant asylum applicants60. A further common theme is the implied link between asylum seekers and criminality61. Consequently asylum seekers themselves feel alienated and ashamed by their negative portrayal in the British media62. Fear is understandably generated in communities by stories of 'waves of refugees'63 or to learn that the asylum system is "engulfed in chaos"64. Analysing the media response to the murder of a Kurdish asylum seeker in Glasgow, Carolyn Coole found that coverage "helped to create a climate of opinion in which readers were invited to view the incomers as a threat". Rather that counteracting misperceptions about asylum seekers the typical media response was to fuel ethic tension by labelling the attack as racially motivated and depicting the local community as unable to cope with the dispersed asylum seekers65. One project examining the impact of the media on community relations in London, found that almost half of the photographs of asylum seekers or refugees in national newspapers presented them as criminals. Other pejorative photographs included images of the Union jack being shown in association with asylum stories suggesting a challenge to traditional conceptions of 'Britishness'66. The U N H C R have continued to express criticism of the British press in this regard67. Yet the label 'asylum cheat' continues to feature regularly in headlines found in many daily newspapers68. This negative depiction creates a contagion effect where anti-immigration activists are buoyed by media accounts of similar actions in other regions. Bjorgo observes that in many cases isolated, personal disputes were erroneously defined as part of a race-war by the media which escalated disputes as in the Glasgow incident69. This contagion effect has also been 70 noted in the context of German hate crime . Again, there is a sense that anger towards 71 foreigners, including asylum seekers becomes normalised . 59 Article 19 Project. Available at: www.19.org/pdfs/publications/refugees-what-s-the-story-case-study-pdf. These findings are also demonstrated in research over 6 months in 2007 by Wurie Khan (2008). 60 Spencer (1998, 81). 61 ICAR (2004, 35). 62 Article 19 Project. Available at: www.19.org/pdfs/publications/refugees-what-s-the-story-case-study-pdf. 63 Bjorgo (1993, 105). 64 Daily Express (2009). 65 Coole (2002); see also Grillo(2005). 66 ICAR (2004, 28 and 29). 67 UNHCR (2006, 10-11). 68 See for example Daily Mail (2002; 2010). 69 Bjorgo (1993, 103). 70Greenetal(2001,496). 71 ibid., 489. http://www.19.org/pdfs/publications/refugees-what-s-the-story-case-study-pdf http://www.19.org/pdfs/publications/refugees-what-s-the-story-case-study-pdf It is submitted that anti-asylum and anti-foreigner rhetoric often escapes critical attention and is somehow regarded as 'fair comment'. Research on media responses to asylum during the early to mid 1990's (a period during which many asylum applicants from the ethnic conflict in Yugoslavia, arrived in the U K ) , found that The Daily M a i l used the expression 79 'bogus' in 90% of articles concerning asylum seekers . The Press Complaints Commission subsequently issued guidance to the media emphasising that 'inaccurate, misleading or distorted reporting may generate an atmosphere of fear and hostility that is not borne out by the facts' and 'there can be no such thing in law as an 'illegal asylum seeker' . In August 2001 Daily Express journalists passed a motion "expressing disapproval at the sustained campaign against asylum seekers in pursuit of circulation" having made a complaint to the Press Complaints Commission regarding editorial pressure to produce inflammatory stories. A 74 subsequent complaint was made in 2004 regarding pressure to produce anti-Gypsy articles . Following the recent Supreme Court decision there has been protests outside the Daily Express 7S offices about the newspaper's unsympathetic, inflammatory coverage . Whilst such guidance has had some effect on the way that the national press label asylum applicants, there remains confusion over what these labels actually mean. There has also been a tendency in both printed and broadcast media to give a platform to organisations which represent a particular anti-immigration agenda without actually clarifying the agenda to readers and listeners. In the U K , Sir Andrew Green is head of the anti-immigration think tank, Migration Watch U K . He presents his organisation as a neutral, research orientated advisory body and is regularly cited in news reports as i f he is an independent expert without any counterbalancing view being offered76. The construction of difference through binary oppositioning whereby the Other is 77 presented in a simplistic, negative comparative framework, is recognised by Hall ; the identity of ' U s ' can be shored up and strengthened through a positive comparison with 'Them'. Bailey and Harindranath argue that the media has a tendency to use binary oppositioning to •70 simplify highly complex situations and relationships . In the case of asylum seekers, they are presented as 'foreign' in a paradigm of territorial sovereignty which challenges the traditional, including the home and the family. The repeated use of the term bogus or illegal asylum 72Kaye(2001,58). 73 The Press Complaints Commission (2003). 74 Press Gazette (2004). 75 The Guardian (2010). 76 Wetherell (2003, 19). 77 Hall (1995, 237). 78 Bailey and Harindranath (1993, 277). seekers is commonplace in this paradigm. War also becomes a particularly useful metaphor, for example: 'new weaponry in the armoury of immigration services' which suggests that 'we' are fighting a war on asylum .The asylum applicant is thus stereotyped as a threat and their real life story is ignored or denied to support this interpretation. This process of Othering allows us to exclude those so labelled from our concern . Whilst this is typically not a conscious process, the use of war metaphors and the association of asylum with criminality promotes and legitimises this view. Banks explores the visual representation of asylum seekers and refugees showing how newspaper imagery constructs such groups as dangerous and deviant. Building on a deviancy amplification model, he has identified three stages in the discovery of deviance that collectively demonstrate how the social portrayal of the criminal immigrant fuses the otherness of the stranger with the otherness of the deviant. In the first phase, the faceless and de-identified stranger enables the construction of a panoply of feared subjects. Stigma is then implicitly illustrated, deviance obliquely intimated 0 1 and 'spoiled identities' are constructed. The mask is then removed and the asylum seeker is revealed with their deviant status confirmed. He then demonstrates how such a process is reinvented, repeated and reworked in news stories, with deviance becoming increasingly R9 engrained and entrenched in the image of the asylum seeker . The views of criminologists are supported by the results of psychological tests on stereotyping which found that exposing viewers to negative media stories linking asylum seekers with criminality resulted in negative judgements . Consequently, when the study group were asked to consider the merits of asylum applications they became more likely to refuse the application. One of the common problems in the depiction of asylum seekers in the press has been a blurring of labels such as immigrant, asylum seeker and refugee. Often the terms are used interchangeably which suggests erroneously that there is no obvious distinction between a person entering the U K under immigration laws and those seeking asylum. Inaccurate labelling serves a useful political purpose as the motivation of people entering the country is lost and the implication is that they intend to occupy an illegal space in society. Exclusion strategies thus R4 become easy to justify as a defence against the hostile invader . Again the absence of real life stories is critical to the success of this discourse as exclusion would be so much more difficult to justify i f asylum seekers were presented as being the same as everyone else. Saxton defines 79 ibid., 281. 80 Greenwald and Krieger (2006, 946); Stabile (2009). 81 Goffman (1963, passim). 82 Banks (2009). 83 Lido et al (2006). 84 Saxton (2003, 113). this as a "sanitised racist discourse that functions to establish, sustain and reinforce oppressive o c power relations between the dominant group and racial minorities" . The policy of deterrence In addition to political rhetoric and media sensationalism, the law has been far from neutral86. Law helps to legitimise the perception of 'them' as it exercises both an expressive and pedagogic role . The message of the legal provisions on asylum is clear: asylum seekers are not welcome. The use of detention and the prohibition on work mean that for many people asylum seekers are inherently criminals and/or economic burdens. Their experiences of persecution cannot be imagined by the host society and it thus becomes easy to regard them as unequal and undeserving. Legislation on immigration and asylum is frequently introduced with a preamble of 'fair but firm' yet the perception that immigration is out of control remains (despite falling numbers of asylum applicants) . Politicians appear to manipulate the debate by playing on peoples' fears for electoral advantage with loopholes highlighted in stories of alleged abuse of the system. Consequently "negative language has become the currency of public discourse on on immigrants and asylum seekers" . The 'fair but firm' agenda suggests that there is no alternative but to take a strict line on refugee determinations. Van Dijk notes the routine combination of fairness on one hand with pragmatism, realism and firmness in the parliamentary debates of several liberal states90. In this way the humanitarian objective can be diluted by some vague, pragmatic sense of a greater good. The argument suggests that there is no rational alternative to the view that strong immigration controls are a requirement for good community cohesion. Both sides of the political spectrum seem to have carelessly absorbed this view. Having defeated the B N P leader Nick Griffin in the general election, the Labour member of parliament, Margaret Hodge, felt the need to suggest that rationing housing by prioritising long term residents might be a solution to the popularity of the far-right91. The irony of this strategy is not lost on Simon Goodman: ibid., at 118. Tuitt (1996). Stabile (2009, 21). Coleman (1996). Spencer (1998, 91). Van Dijk (1992, 110-111). Harris (2010). It relies on the threat posed by extremist parties, and their more harsh policies on asylum seekers, to justify a move towards a position that more closely reflects the position of these extremists. In short, the argument here is that we must be more like the BNP to stop the BNP from gaining political success . There is no middle-ground in this form of analysis. It is unclear why asylum seekers are either to be placed in detention or luxury accommodation. Rather than 'firm but fair' this debate has placed 'firmness' and 'fairness' at polar opposites with firm policies becoming the norm in the last two decades with reductions in welfare support, expansion of the detention estate and increased penalties for unauthorised entry. There is an irreconcilable tension between increasing the focus on hate crimes and such regressive steps where the asylum seeker is defined as bogus, illegitimate and threatening . Dehumanization is an essential consequence of the rationalisation of hate towards 'out groups'. The challenge therefore is for policy to address the construction of 'out' groups but, in the case of asylum seekers, there has been a notable reluctance to do this. Even those M P ' s that are concerned about the treatment of asylum seekers tend to avoid being engaged publically on the subj ect, perceiving that it is not a vote winner to be exposed as ' soft' on immigration. There is also a view among many politicians that the only way to stop the extreme Right "has been to steal their electoral clothes, by taking a hard-line approach to immigration and asylum"94. A n examination of the law providing for the detention of asylum seekers is particularly illuminating in the context of this debate. As in other cases where liberty is restricted, one may expect to see requirements of necessity and proportionality at the forefront of the legal criteria. Yet, the law provides no maximum time limit for the detention of asylum seekers and successive Governments have expanded the detention estate makes it increasingly common for asylum seekers to experience detention without any requirement of necessity. Detention The U K has the largest number of people detained under immigration laws in Europe with a capacity to detain 30,000 people95. State practices vary enormously with some countries, including Britain, the Netherlands and Denmark avoiding a legal commitment to a maximum detention period. Increasingly states are resorting to detention for administrative convenience with the emphasis again being on 'firmness'. In the case ofSaadi v UK [2008]96, the European 92 Goodman (2008, 120). 93 Gadd (2004, 145). 94IRR(2010, 2). 95 Travis (2010). 96 Saadiv UK (2008). Court of Human Rights endorsed this use of detention for short periods as falling within the exception to the right to liberty found in Article 5 (1) f97. As a result, the designated removal centre at Oakington now detains asylum seekers for up to fourteen days with no requirement for the Home Office to show 'necessity' such as a risk of absconding or it being pursuant to imminent removal. The qualification on the right to liberty for asylum seekers is not seen in other contexts. In criminal justice and mental health detention, where the exceptions to Article 5 have been narrowly construed, the European Court of Human Rights has emphasised that effective and regular judicial supervision are key requirements of detention. In Brogan v 6X 9 8 , the detention of terrorism suspects for periods of four and seven days was held to breach the requirement for suspects to be bought promptly before a judicial authority". It is also clear that there must be reasonable grounds for suspicion before a person can be detained or arrested. Similarly i f a person of 'unsound mind' is to be detained there must be a medical assessment of necessity to ascertain that the person is suffering from a mental illness . In Litwa v Poland the need to consider all alternatives prior to detaining a person under Article 5(1) e was emphasised with the court stressing that it but must also be necessary in the circumstances . Thus we see a different standard of liberty applied in the immigration and asylum context. This may itself be a reflection of the European Court's concern to avoid making decisions which impact on the territorial integrity of states. The Convention itself makes no specific mention of a right to seek asylum or enter a particular state, unlike the Universal Declaration on Human Rights which provides in Article 14, the right to seek and enjoy asylum. However, it is less clear why such factors should not be construed in the context of the states margin of appreciation rather than being built into the framework of Article 5. According to international law and the Home Office's operational enforcement manual, detention should not be considered appropriate where there is evidence of torture. Yet evidence 1 A l recently uncovered shows that detention is not unusual in these cases . The charity Care of Victims of Torture collated figures over an eighteen month period, revealing that only 7 out of 250 detainees had been released following evidence of torture104. Issues of poor health care O'Nions (2008). '' Brogan v UK (1989). ' Article 5(3) ECHR. )0 Cornelisse (2004, 105). n Litwa v Poland (.2000). )2 Ibid, para 78. )3Townsend(2010). have been raised on numerous occasions by professional bodies with a recent academic report finding evidence of an 'institutional failure to address health concerns about asylum seekers in detention'106. The detention of children has also attracted widespread condemnation from international and domestic organisations who have been concerned about the effects of detaining vulnerable children . In 2009 it was estimated that up to 1000 children are placed in immigration detention in the U K each year with the average period of detention being over fourteen days . One of the first policy changes of the new coalition Government has seen a welcome pledge to end all such detention of children but the difficulties of determining age and the broader issue of detaining vulnerable people are left unresolved. The U K ' s desire to detain asylum seekers has received criticism from the European Commission Against Racism and Intolerance which noted a link between Government policies such as destitution, poor decision making and detention, and the hostile tone of public discourse109. Again, there was specific recognition of the exploitation of racism in politics and the media which were highlighted as particular causes for concern110. The routine use of detention inevitably links asylum seekers with criminality in the public perception. It can certainly be seen to fuel the perception that there is something wrong or dangerous with those seeking sanctuary and in this way it surely contributes to animosity towards asylum seekers as a whole111. Welch and Schuster identify it as an essential element in the state ritual of firm immigration policies: "That penal ceremony has become a media theatre on whose stage politicians proclaim their intentions to clamp-down on so-called bogus asylum seekers fraudulently in search of welfare, benefits, education, health-care, housing and jobs". Work and benefits policies Another aspect of current asylum policy which deserves attention in this context is the current rule denying asylum seekers permission to work in the U K whilst their application is being determined. Since July 2002 work and vocational training is not permitted until a positive decision has been received or the applicant has been waiting for an initial decision for over a 105 Ginn (2009). 106 Verkaik (2010). 107 The Children's Commissioner (2010). 108 House of Commons, Home Affairs Committee (2009). 109 ECRI (2010, 8). 110 Id., at 9. 111 Sales (2002, 459). year (delayed appeals are not counted in this calculation) . This particular rule needs to be seen in the light of wider immigration entry conditions such as the 'no recourse to public funds' rule. Asylum applicants can apply for some support and accommodation to the U K Borders Agency but the latter will be subject to the dispersal programme. Accommodation is offered to those considered destitute by a mixture of providers and the applicant is permitted no choice in the location. Consequently a disproportionate number of asylum seekers become homeless or 1 1 Q dependant on over-stretched charitable provision . The dispersal cluster system also means that many specialist services that would have been available in the larger cities are no longer accessible for those who need them114. Once an asylum claim is rejected the applicant and their family will be expected to take steps to leave the U K and may continue to receive support until the children reach 18115. However, the family will be denied this support under s9 Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants) Act 2004 i f they are considered not to have taken reasonable steps to depart voluntarily. The consequences of this provision for the welfare of children in vulnerable familial circumstances cannot be overstated116. Again the 'them' and 'us' relationship is emphasised as the policy draws a boundary 117 between the 'deserving' and 'undeserving' in society . The denial of the right to work has helped to label asylum seekers as 'undeserving' and as burdens (hence, threats) to the economic stability of the state. The workplace could constitute an opportunity for asylum seekers to interact with the host population in a positive, shared setting but this opportunity has been missed and opportunity for positive interaction is minimal. When interaction is forced upon communities, as happens with dispersal initiatives which appear to be poorly thought out and under-resourced, asylum seekers inevitably become caught up in social disintegration and poverty. Denial of the right to work inevitably means greater reliance on state support. However, state support itself will be unavailable unless the asylum application falls with s55 Nationality Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 which specifically excludes claimants that do not apply as soon as reasonably practicable after arrival. In R v SSHD exp Adan, Limbuela , Tesema [2005] the Home Secretary attempted to argue that the policy should prevail even in 112 Current rules can be found at: http://www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/asylum/support/employment/. 113 Homelessness Link (2000). 114 A review of the literature is provided by Aspinall and Watters (2010, 102). 115 s95 Immigration and Asylum Act 1999. 116 Aspinall and Watters (2010, 71). 117 Sales (20020). http://www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/asylum/support/employment/ cases where the applicant was left destitute and homeless as a consequence of it's operation The House of Lords however, determined that there had been a breach of Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights as the applicants had suffered inhuman and degrading treatment as a consequence of the policy's operation. S55 remains on the statute books however as a key element of the deterrence strategy. This is notwithstanding the Home Office's own research suggesting that the timing of an asylum application has little bearing on the legitimacy of the applicant's case119. A related issue which adversely affects many vulnerable asylum seekers is the policy withdrawing free medical treatment from certain groups including failed asylum seekers unable to travel home and undocumented migrants. A recent Court of Appeal decision confirmed that failed asylum seekers are not 'ordinarily resident' in the U K and therefore are not entitled to secondary NHS treatment . A consultation process is currently underway which proposes specific exemptions for secondary healthcare for failed asylum seekers who 191 are cooperating with the U K Border Agency and are supported under s4 or s95 . S4 cases concern adults who are taking reasonable steps to leave but there is a genuine recognised barrier to them leaving and s95 provides support to the estimated 7,600 failed asylum seekers 1 99 who would otherwise be considered destitute . At present neither of these groups receive free secondary healthcare. Lessons can be learnt from Barbara Perry's seminal work on the demonization of Black Americans. She demonstrates how the mother who is dependant on welfare support is perceived to be morally responsible for factors beyond her control including the disintegration 1 9^ of family values and the American way of life, and the economic woes of the country Politicians are then shown to play on these stereotypes for their own popularity with disastrous consequences for inter-racial relations. In the U K the asylum seeker fits this stereotype in a way which would be difficult to apply to the black community of modern Britain. Family values are depicted as threatened by young, male asylum seekers who are considered to be economic migrants and who, on successful application, may then ask for their extended 1 94 families to join them 118 U K HL 66. 119 O'Nions (2006). 120 A v SSfor Health [2009] E W C A Civ 225. 121 Asylum (Treatment of Claimants) Act 2004 and Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 respectively. 122 Aspinall and Watters (2010). 123 Perry (2001, 183). 124 See for example the printed opinions following " A depressingly predictable attack on asylum seekers" The Independent 30th July 2009. The operation of the dispersal programme means that asylum seekers are typically directed to poor, deprived areas where there is already generalised violence and casual racism. The particular problems experienced by those in Glasgow demonstrate the relationship between poverty, deprivation, social exclusion and a general culture of violence which is often directed at those perceived to be outsiders. Conversely, migrants from E U member states, that are exercising their right to work, are also perceived as a threat, particularly as they are accused of taking the jobs of British workers. It is no coincidence that the legally questionable promise of 'British jobs for British workers' made by Gordon Brown to the T U C in 2007 was subsequently adopted as party slogan for the far-right British National Party . One of the more balanced daily newspapers, The Independent, talked of a "'crackdown' on migrant workers" following the prime-ministers comments; clearly apportioning blame for jobs shortages in the British economy to the migrants who were legally exercising rights conferred by European law126. This is a point also noted in Perry's analysis of the United States: "From this perspective, immigrants- especially Third World immigrants- come to this country for two reasons: to sack the welfare system and to take the j obs of the Americans" The overall effect of the deterrence agenda on public perception Despite falling numbers of applications, asylum policy remains focussed on preventing asylum seekers from exercising their right to seek asylum as guaranteed by the Universal Declaration of Human rights . Formal mechanisms such as introduction of visa requirements, reduction of welfare support, criminal penalties for carriers of clandestine passengers are clear examples of this objective. Consequentially asylum seekers are typically misunderstood by the British public and in some cases this has yielded violent reactions. It might even be contended that these reactions are another element in the deterrence strategy; something that Perry would describe as an 'informal mechanism of control' If deterrence is the objective of asylum policy these measures do seem to be having some success with a dramatic reduction in the number of people seeking asylum since the peak Summers (2009). Russell (2007). Perry (2001, 197). As provided in Article 14 Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948, U N ; O'Nions (2006). Perry (2001, 79). 1 Q A i n 20021J . There are many on the political right who would be comforted by this outcome but we need to consider why successive Governments have become so obsessed with asylum to the extent that the United Kingdom can no longer be seen, in the time-honoured tradition, as a place of sanctuary. We need to further consider the consequences of this obsession for settled refugees and the wider community of ethnic minorities in the U K . If we see hate crimes, intolerance and support for far right policies as indicators of disunity which threaten the fabric of our democracy, there is at present much cause for concern across Europe. Contrary to the 1 Q 1 populist view that strong immigration controls promote positive race relations there is evidence to support the opposite contention; our obsession with deterring asylum seekers from seeking sanctuary is in fact damaging race relations. The problematization of asylum seekers cannot be seen in any other way . The prevalence of myths which are not countered by politicians inevitably leads to community tension as evidenced in the so-called 'Northern disturbances' of 2001 and the Birmingham 'race riots' of 2005 133 European policy As European law and policy advance well beyond the original objectives of the Treaty of Rome, an ideological construction of the true European has emerged134. It is contended that this true European is defined primarily by its relationship with non-European 'others'. Rising numbers of hate crime incidents are recognised in a recent Council framework decision yet the decision makes no reference to recent E U asylum policies as evidenced, for example, in the Returns directive which restricts access to the European club . As the E U has opened up to new members the problem of how to close it to 'Others' has become a focal point136. The Council of Europe has recently added its voice to concerns over the hardening of attitudes towards immigrants and asylum seekers in Europe and the proliferation of 1 -in detention . The Parliamentary Assembly's resolution expresses particular concern over the detention of asylum seekers and includes ten principles of guidance including requirements of proportionality and necessity. More specifically, fifteen rules are delineated. It is submitted 130 The peak was 84,130 i n 2002 which declined dramatically to 23,610 in 2006. The most recent statistics suggest that the level has stabilised with 29,800 fresh applications in 2009: U N H C R Asylum Levels and trends in industrialized countries in 2009: statistical overview U N H C R 23rd March 2010. 131 This has been a regular feature of Conservative party election manifestos: Dale (2000: 254, 302, 388, 452) 132 Spencer (1998, 82). 133 Dixon and Ray (2007, 117). 1 3 4Anthiasetal(1993, 131). 135European Council (2008); (2008b). 136 Cited inDummett (1998, 211). 137 Parliamentary Assembly (2010). that many European states do not at present comply with these rules which include: effective access to the outside world; legal advice, assistance and representation of the highest quality; appropriate material conditions of detention and effectively trained detention centre staff. The detention of asylum seekers is clearly viewed as arising in exceptional circumstances only after a full consideration of alternatives. In this area of asylum policy, the relative positions of the Council of Europe and the European Union are certainly not harmonious. The latter's Returns directive has been dubbed the 'directive of shame' in Latin America. It adopts a lowest common denominator or 'minimum standards' approach in which detention of up to 18 months is permissible Amnesty International and the European Council on Refugees and Exile had urged the European Parliament to reject the plans but the directive was eventually approved despite some reservations from parliamentarians' . The text also includes periods of custody and re-entry bans for up to five years and establishes a common discipline for all member states to either expel every illegally resident migrant or grant him/her a definite legal status. The detention of children and families is not specifically prohibited and unaccompanied minors will 'only be repatriated' i f they can be returned to their families or to "adequate reception facilities". Despite its restrictive nature, the Home Office have requested an opt-out from the new directive due to concern that the current fast-track detention and removal procedure for manifestly unfounded cases could be deemed unlawful140. Further concern was expressed that the provisions would require states to provide legal aid and improved translation services. More generally, there are warning signs that race relations may deteriorate further in Europe as the results from recent general and European elections reveal a rise in the mainstream popularity of far-right political parties such as the British National Party, the Swiss Peoples Party, the Danish Peoples Party and the fascist Northern League and National Alliance in Italy. A l l of these parties have strong anti-immigrant platforms but few are openly racist in the traditional sense. Xenophobia is typically presented as a reasonable response to economic decline and the perceived loss of identity. Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez called the rules "shameful" and threatened both to cancel investment in and disrupt oil exports to the countries that enact the controversial immigration measures. While Brazilian President Lula da Silva said "the cold winds of xenophobia are once again blowing from Europe," his Ecuadorean colleague Rafael Correa warned that trade talks between the E U and the Andean Community could be suspended if the 27 member bloc pushed ahead with the new law. "What do we have to talk about with a union of countries that criminalises immigrants? It will be very hard to talk business and ignore human rights." Cited on Euractiv News (2008). 139 ECRE (2008); Administrator (2008). 140 Travis (2010a). A n additional threat is paradoxically posed by attempts to reinvigorate democracy in Europe. The Lisbon treaty contains provisions to revitalise European democracy including the European Citizen's initiative which requires the Commission to respond to collective petitions with one-million intra-state signatories141. The danger of majoritarian politics dictating the agenda are illustrated by the experience in Switzerland where referenda are commonplace. The referendum in Sjobo on providing shelter to refugees resulted in 67% of residents voting against the proposals . Local referenda on similar issues with similar results have also been reported in France and Sweden and highly organised local campaigns against asylum seekers have been reported in Ireland and the Netherlands. Many of these campaigns are influenced by the far-right. Playing on the typical stereotypes, Jean-Marie Le Pen has recently called for a national referendum in France to curb immigration which, he described as a "burden on France's lifestyle, its finances, its security, its unemployment and schools"143. It would be a grave mistake however, to see the far right as the only influence in such campaigns. As I have shown, mainstream political debate on immigration and asylum typically centres on the view that strong immigration controls are necessary for positive race relations. The nature of these strong controls is rarely identified, but there is certainly no attempt to separate issues of immigration and asylum or to correct underlying assumptions that the majority of those entering the U K (from the E U and beyond) are unwelcome. The Institute of Race Relations has argued that the debate on reinvigorating democracy has seen insufficient attention paid to the relationship between direct democracy and human rights or between majoritarian politics and the situation of minorities and disenfranchised groups144. Conclusion Asylum seekers and refugees are increasingly the targets of hate incidents. The strategy of deterrence has helped to create a culture of suspicion and disbelief which has permeated public opinion145. The use of detention and the tendency for politicians to link asylum with criminality helps to legitimise this culture and encourages intolerance146. The emphasis on a traditional British mono culture which is the basis of B N P policy is not being significantly refuted by politicians from the main parties. As Spencer argues 'The European Parliament (2010). Reported in Institute of Race Relations Briefing (2010, 2). Agence France Presse (2010). Institute of Race Relations (2010, 2). Frost (2007, 240). Cohen (2003). U K needs to update it self image to accommodate its multicultural diversity . As government appears to be the "primary influence on public opinion" there needs to be a real attempt to counter such prejudice by the political elite. This cannot be done in a climate of overly restrictive asylum policies which criminalise and dehumanise asylum seekers. Asylum and immigration are not synonymous. Yet they are conflated in much of current political discourse and media stories where asylum seekers are pushed together with 1 A O other migrants as people whose presence is unwelcome . Current law and policy underpin this position. At the same time, xenophobic rhetoric directed at asylum seekers is taken out of the traditional understanding of racism, posing new challenges for labels such as 'hate crime' and for racism itself. The law fuels this hate by lumping all asylum seekers and other migrants together as 'unwanted commodities' and in doing so it takes anti-asylum seeker rhetoric outside the typical understanding and language of racism posing problems for concepts such as 'hate crime' and 'racism'. The promotion of democracy and tolerance require that society recognise the changing face of racism. Crimes perpetrated against asylum seekers are justified by the same arguments as other forms of racism. They result from the same misinformation, frustration and fear. At the same time they appear to be more socially acceptable; finding support from much of the British media and our elected representatives. A balanced public debate has been resisted yet is urgently required so that the need for international protection is understood and respected149. The effects of positive media coverage can be dramatic150. Intolerance can be challenged by a responsible political debate and balanced media reportage which must include the airing of 'real life stories'. As we 'lower the voices of some to hear the voices of others' we can begin to appreciate the real experiences of asylum seekers including the level of open discrimination that is typically part of their daily lives151. A process of a sentimental education could serve to challenge the media tendency to demonise asylum seekers and the liberalist tendency to 'empty' asylum applicants of their 1 C O diverse experiences in order to categorise and define the legitimate refugee . There is much that could be done, but whilst a tough stance on immigration is perceived by many to be a vote winner, asylum seekers are caught in an impossible position. As Frost contends: Spencer (1998, 91). Hayter (2000). House of Commons (2009, 179). Refugee Action (2006); Wurie Khan (2008). Fiss (1996). Parker, and Brassett (2005, 236). Both government and sections of the media have been pivotal in casting asylum seekers (alongside Muslims) as the new 'folk devils' of British society by criminalising these as 'bogus' economic migrants, as welfare scroungers, terrorists, disease carriers and 'illegals'. Their alleged high and increasing numbers and alleged refusal to 'integrate' represent asylum seekers as undesirables who threaten the cultural integrity of Britain . Xeno-racism is one way to forge a British identity in a time of economic instability and societal insecurity. Asylum seekers, lacking a political voice, have become the easiest target in the search for scapegoats154. It would take a brave politician indeed to counter the common-sense sentiment that has been fuelled by twenty years of increasingly restrictive asylum policy155. The campaign to punish hate crime is praised as a 'radical intervention' by Iganksi who perceives it as promoting justice "by attempting to mould the collective conscience"156. 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work_wuqgang7iffg3m6lgydts7zfx4	----	Microsoft Word - Stroinska TRAMES, 2019, 23(73/68), 2, 223–238 CAN THERE BE A ‘SAFE HAVEN’ FOR TRAUMA SURVIVORS IN THIS SOCIAL MEDIA DOMINATED WORLD? Magda Stroińska and Vikki Cecchetto McMaster University, Hamilton Hell is the other. Jean Paul Sartre Abstract. The 20th and 21st centuries have been marked by a number of traumatic events: with the two World Wars, Korean War and, especially in the last twenty-five years, with conflicts in the Middle East and in Africa, as well as others, vast numbers of people have been displaced and have had to journey far and wide to find not only a new home but a safe haven from the atrocities of war. While discrimination against newcomers to a country, prejudice, racism, nationalism, religious fundamentalism, and authoritarian dictatorships are not new phenomena, what makes the recent reactions to the current worldwide human influxes different is the use of language manipulation, propaganda and hate speech via social media to re-stigmatize and re-traumatize the new refugees, asylum- seekers, immigrants and migrants. Social media platforms give everyone the opportunity to express their views, whether positive or negative, about anyone who could be considered the other. Both right-wing and left-wing parties and governments also see the usefulness of using the manipulation of the labels given to newcomers and inciting fear of them for their own agendas. In this paper we will investigate how the use of linguistic labels and stereo- typing about the other contribute to the rise of hate speech worldwide and how the presence of hate speech about the newcomers has re-traumatized many refugees who had thought they had reached a safe haven after fleeing the source of their original trauma. For the purpose of this study, we will be using data that primarily refers to Italy and Poland, as well as some other examples. Keywords: refugees, migrants, hate speech, social media, populist rhetoric, re-traumatization DOI: https://doi.org/10.3176/tr.2019.2.07 Magda Stroińska and Vikki Cecchetto 224 1. Introduction: what is in a label? The 20th century was referred to as the century of the refugee or exile (from both World Wars and the conflicts in Europe and central Africa), and the present century as that of migration – immigrant/ emigrant, migrant or refugee. According to the United Nations High Commission for Refugees [UNHCR] (UNHCR, 2018), in 2017 the number of forcibly displaced persons worldwide amounted to 68.6 million, of which 25.4 million were refugees and 3.1 million were asylum- seekers, all fleeing from persecution, war or violence mainly in the countries of the Middle East and Africa: Syria (the largest refugee group), Afghanistan, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Central African Republic and Eritrea. To the above worldwide totals the approximately 150.3 million economic migrants – or migrant workers as the United Nations refer to them (Migration, 2017) can also be added.1 The meanings of the different terms used to describe persons forcibly displaced from their country have changed and continue to change according to the connotations and associations they produce in different countries and situations. A refugee – in the Oxford English Dictionary (Oxford English Living Dictionary, n.d.), or in Merriam Webster (Merriam Webster English Dictionary, n.d.), is “[a] person who has been forced to leave their country in order to escape war, persecu- tion, or natural disaster”; while the Cambridge English Dictionary (Cambridge English Dictionary, n.d.) is the only one to add for ‘economic reasons’ to the definition. Sometimes confused with refugee is the term exile – “1. The state of being barred from one’s native country, typically for political or punitive reasons. 1.1 A person who lives away from their native country, either from choice or compulsion” (Oxford Dictionary). The migrant has been defined as “[a] person who moves from one place to another, especially in order to find work or better living conditions” (Oxford), or “a worker who moves from place to place to do seasonal work” (Google Dictionary). According to the UN 1951 Refugee Con- vention, asylum seeker is the term used to define persons who have “left their country of origin seeking safety, who have applied to another country, and are awaiting a decision on their application.” Under this Convention, member nations have a legal and moral duty to provide international protection to both refugees and asylum seekers. But the distinction between refugees, asylum seekers and other people migrat- ing is often ignored by countries (e.g. the current crisis of South American nationals seeking asylum in the US; some European leaders in Italy, Austria and Hungary; the United States where ‘undocumented immigrants’ have now become ‘illegal aliens’ with all the connotations that this WWII designation resurrects). French sociologist and blogger Eric Fassin (Lehn 2018) perhaps explains this best: 1 Although the report refers to data as of June 2017, the most recent data reporting worldwide migrant workers, from the International Labour Organization (ILO) 2015 Report is from 2013. Migration 2017: 28. A “safe haven” for trauma survivors 225 “The emigrant is the one who has left, the immigrant is the one who has arrived, the migrant is the one who has no ‘purpose’ to be here, nor anywhere: he’s just moving about”. We will show how the populist and nativist associations and parties use labelling as a destructive weapon against the other, and as J. K. Rowling’s character says “Fear of a name increases fear of the thing itself.” Regardless of the name, designation or label given to these vast numbers of forcibly displaced persons, they have all suffered from persecution, war, ethnic cleansing or other forms of violence, in some cases for many years, before their decision to leave their native country in order to seek a safe haven. Adults and children alike brought with them memories of their traumatic experiences, and, unfortunately, in most cases, more and new trauma was added during their long and arduous journey to a final safe place, sometimes halfway around the world from their home country. Once arrived and settled in their safe haven, they had to start dealing with their traumatic memories in order to heal and continue with their lives. But given the current rise of xenophobic populism, hate speech and hate crimes, this healing process may become difficult to sustain because these recent immigrants are systematically re-traumatized by the actions of others in their new country. 2. The rise of populism, hate speech and hate crimes The rise within nations of xenophobic populism, with the subsequent impact of discrimination, prejudice, racism, nationalism, religious fundamentalism, and authoritarian dictatorships on affected peoples is not a new phenomenon: there have been instances recorded and commented on across the ages. Simultaneously with the rise of populism, the world has seen an ever-increasing surge in hate speech with alarming consequences for the ‘discriminated against’ – whether traditional subjects of discrimination (e.g.: marginalized populations such as Jews, Roma peoples or other ethnic and/ or cultural minorities), or the most recent ones such as refugees, asylum-seekers and migrants in general. This surge has been encouraged, protected, aided and abetted by the actions and rhetoric of certain populist governments and leaders – one only has to mention the name of Donald Trump for people everywhere to give examples of his inflammatory, dis- criminatory and humiliating speech regarding the subjects of his vitriol. As Victor Klemperer (1946/2000:15–16) remarked in his study of the language of the Third Reich, “Words can be like tiny doses of arsenic: they are swallowed unnoticed, appear to have no effect, and then after a little time the toxic effect sets in after all.” What constitutes hate speech? According to the Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary (Merriam Webster English Dictionary, n.d.), the legal definition of hate speech is language use (in any form – oral or visual) “that is intended to insult, offend, or intimidate a person because of some trait (such as race, religion, sexual orientation, national origin, or disability)”, while the Cambridge Online Dictionary Magda Stroińska and Vikki Cecchetto 226 (Cambridge Online Dictionary, n.d.) adds the important consequence of hate speech, “public speech that expresses hate or encourages violence [italics added by authors]”. In formulating a hateful message, the speaker purposely intends that the subject of the hate speech shall suffer some form of economic consequence (e.g.: loss of job, reduction in pay, prohibition from applying for a job, housing or other benefits) and/ or social harm (e.g.: by posting and sharing tweets, videos of violent confrontations or shaming subjects on social media platforms). In extreme cases, violence against the subject of the hate speech is purposely intended by the speaker. Donald Trump during a March 2016 Presidential campaign rally in Kentucky encouraged his supporters to use physical violence to deal with some protesters (Did Donald Trump Encourage Violence at His Rallies? 2019): “[k]nock the crap out of them, would you? Just knock the hell [---] I promise you I will pay for the legal fees. I promise.” 3. Social media: tool for the dissemination of hate speech / hate crimes or instrument to combat hate speech/hate crimes? The widespread use and accessibility to diverse social media platforms (e.g.: Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, Snapchat) and the potential instantaneous world- wide reach of any posted items (such as blogs, pictures, videos, news and ‘fake news’) makes the current crisis affecting war survivors, refugees and migrants different. These platforms allow anyone with access the opportunity to express their views – whether positive and encouraging or negative and hateful – about those different from themselves (refugees, migrants, legal or illegal immigrants, in other words, anyone who could be seen as the other) and work to keep them from coming into their (or any closely associated) country. Social media platforms also allow for ‘anonymous’ tribal affiliation and instantaneous exposure so that the inflamed rhetoric has a much larger reach. In addition, it can be spread to different countries since language is no longer a barrier, given that English is now an established global lingua franca. Where English is not known, online translation apps can be used to ‘get the message’, sometimes unfortunately with misinterpretations that can be even more sinister. Online sites can be ‘camouflaged’ to seem like legitimate government sites until one reads the message. Populist sites operate with impunity since they rely on the conventions allowing for free speech and the free exchange of ideas which are a hallmark of social media platforms to spread their message, or allow party members to be contacted when a ‘mob’ is needed at an event. Psychologists, anthropologists and sociologists have described the natural tendency all humans have to gather together into ‘groups’ based on norms, values, beliefs and an understanding of the roles of group members within the group that unite them and give them a guide to acceptable behaviour. This group adhesion provides many benefits to the members, such as social, psychological support (e.g.: from religious groups, political parties, athletic clubs, ethnic groups or A “safe haven” for trauma survivors 227 communities in a geographic area) and perhaps even economic stability (e.g.: trade unions or associations, word-of-mouth help in finding employment or housing or even medical doctors), giving rise to feelings of better self-esteem, and the possibility of their flourishing and surviving within the group. Belonging to a group also motivates its members to favour, trust and protect the interests not only of their own group, but also of similar or like-minded and like-structured groups – us; and to disapprove of, mistrust, oppose or even fear groups and/ or group members we see as different – them/ the other, leading to prejudice, discrimination and potentially to hate speech and hate crimes against the other (see Twose, Henderson 2018, Resnick 2017, Barth 2016). Increasingly, refugees and immigrants/ migrants escaping the trauma associated with war, ethnic cleansing, famine, poverty or economic hardship are finding that it is difficult to feel safe in the country or community that once welcomed them. The economic and political upheavals in the past two decades (the economic crash or 2008, the rise of right-wing parties and governments, the ISIS takeover of geographic areas in the Middle East, to name just a few) have seen an increased movement of refugees and migrants towards Europe and North America. Because of incidents (e.g.: the Toronto attack; the Bataclan and Nice attacks2) that have occurred in some of the countries that had previously accepted the refugees and migrants, many people feel that it is now acceptable to consider the new immigrants and refugees as targets of racism, discrimination and hate, since they seem to belong to the same group as those who perpetrated these acts (e.g.: ISIS affiliated terrorists, right-wing sympathizers), based on the assumption that they share the same ethnicity, religion or citizenship. Given the international impact of the 2008 crash of the financial markets or the effects of globalization, many people who have lost their economic security – decreased income or loss of their job or even homelessness – attribute this to the ‘invasion of immigrants’ and they fear that with an increase in the number of refugees and migrants coming into their country, they, the citizens, are being short changed. They are also becoming increasingly angry with the ‘benefits’ from the governments in the accepting nations that they see given to the refugees and migrants, and consequently taken away from them (in their minds), such as monthly support, housing and health assistance. 2 The Toronto attack occurred on the night of July 22, 2018 in the Greektown neighbourhood of Toronto, Ontario, Canada. Faisal Hussain killed two people and wounded thirteen others using a semiautomatic pistol. He committed suicide later the same night after engaging in a shootout with Toronto Police. The Bataclan attack, where 90 people were killed, was one of a series of attacks claimed by ISIL carried out on November 13, 2015 in Paris. In total, 130 people were killed and 413 people injured, almost 100 seriously. In Nice, France, on the evening of July 14, 2016, Mohamed Lahouaiej-Bouhlel deliberately drove his 19-tonne cargo truck into crowds of people celebrating Bastille Day along the Promenade killing 86 people and injuring 458 others. Magda Stroińska and Vikki Cecchetto 228 A campaign sign for Matteo Salvini in the 2018 election in Italy asserts that Italian citizens suffer poverty while illegal migrants waste food that they receive for free from the government: Pozzallo [Sicilian town with migrant centre] Al Centro di Accoglienza per migranti il cibo finisce nella spazzatura. Con gli italiani che non hanno soldi per fare la spesa… Vergogna! Basta soldi per questa gente. [‘At the migrant reception centre food ends up in the garbage. And Italians without money to buy food…Shame! No more money for such people’ – Translations by the authors] (Quattrone 2017). As a result, we have a marked trend to more right-wing governments who promise to ‘protect’ us from them (e.g.: the right-wing governments in Italy, Poland, the United States, and the Brexit vote in the UK). With this shift, we are witnessing in many countries a shocking rise of hate speech – an essential element of propaganda based on prejudice –, and we know from history that hateful rhetoric is a prelude to violence. As Barth says: One of my favorite psychoanalytical writers, Heinz Kohut, says [---]. Anger [---] is often a reaction to feeling injured, either physically or emotionally. It is a way of repairing damaged self-esteem, which makes us feel weak and vulner- able. “See”, our rage tells us and the world around us, “I’m not weak, I’m strong!”(Barth 2016). The concept of an enemy, someone to blame, is needed: the other, someone who is not one of us, who can be a scapegoat for all of a country’s ills, someone who is vulnerable, recognizably distinct from the us and cannot speak against or retaliate for the aggression perpetrated upon them (Burton 2017, Psychology Research and Reference, n.d., Girard 1987). Graciela Chichilnisky explains that “[p]olitical parties often take advantage of denial and fear in a moment of change. This is a well understood phenomenon that often leads to scapegoatism: blaming outsiders, such as immigrants, or racial and religious minorities. The phenomenon is behind Brexit and the violence in the political cycles in the US and EU” (Chichilnisky 2016). In addition, this unease has led to a shift away from the concept of nation – an entity that forged different peoples single-mindedly dedicated to the protection of and service to their country or state into a citizenry, and a return to the idea of tribe – an entity united by language, religion, blood and belief (Reich 2014). This new tribalism is not an ethnic cohesion but one predicated on like-minded people who share the same world views and values, sometimes bringing together ‘traditional enemies’, such as the Black Women for Trump groups during the 2016 campaign, or the Nigerian immigrant Toni Iwobi, elected as a senator from Salvini’s Lega Nord Party (an anti-immigration party) with responsibility for immigration (L’Espresso 2018, RAINews, Eletto il primo senatore di colore della Repubblica Italiana: è nigeriano e della Lega 2018). Many already settled immigrants now find themselves sharing the views of right-wing populist parties A “safe haven” for trauma survivors 229 since they have the fear of losing their established status because of the influx of new immigrants (e.g. support for Brexit; anti-immigrant feelings in Canada). With this shift have also come political parties or associations that promote nativism– “the intense opposition to an internal minority on the grounds of its foreign [---] connections” (Perea 1997:167) or populism understood as an ideology which contrasts the moral good of the people (usually middle class or poor) against the corrupt and self-serving (wealthy) elite – with both right-wing and left-wing political parties transforming this ideology for their own ends. 4. Why we fear the other: the role of anti-immigrant discourse Edmund Burke (1834) recognized that “no passion so effectively robs the mind of all its powers of acting and reasoning as does fear”. More recently, Rick Wilson, a Republican political strategist observed in an interview: “Fear is the simplest emotion to tweak in a campaign ad. You associate your opponent with terror, with fear, with crime, with causing pain and uncertainty” (Ball 2016). Especially in the last two decades, nativist/ populist parties have gained power or at least a major foothold in many Western democracies, Italy, Poland, Hungary, France, Britain and the United States, to name just a few. The political discourse of these parties has subsequently been employed to highlight the correlation between times of relative economic unease and/ or despair and increases in migra- tion patterns towards these countries, stoking the latent racism and discrimination against the other, resulting in an anti-immigrant backlash and sometimes violence. We know from history that hateful rhetoric is a necessary prelude to violence. The political right also blames the rise of political correctness for what they perceive as a prohibition to talk about the problems associated with the influx of immigrants. They maintain that political correctness represents a new cultural Marxism that has many elements of past communist regimes, which is committing the very evils it claims to correct, in effect causing reverse discrimination (Andary-Brophy 2015, Carroll 2015). After a Muslim gunman killed 49 people at a gay nightclub in Orlando, Donald Trump declared about his political opponents: “They have put political correctness above common sense, above your safety, and above all else [---] I refuse to be politically correct.” (Weigel 2016) As Robert Folsom (2016) indicates: “Today’s negative mood involves unformalizing the norms of the previous positive trend. Political correctness, and the collective tendencies it epitomizes, have given way to a new normal of exclusion, polariza- tion, impenitence and more wide-open speech.” Populist parties have essentially transformed this artificial problem and misrepresentation of political correctness into a powerful discourse tool, through the use of social media platforms, for galvanizing their base and spreading hate speech, racism, bigotry and ultimately (veiled) calls to violence against the other – mainly visible minorities, migrants and refugees (Jakubowicz 2017, Trindade 2018). Magda Stroińska and Vikki Cecchetto 230 5. The language used by populist parties in social media and its impact As J. A. C. Brown (1963) reminds us that (1) most people want to feel that issues are simple rather than complex, (2) want to have their prejudices confirmed, (3) want to feel that they ‘belong’ with the implication that others do not, and (4) need to pinpoint an enemy to blame for their frustrations. Modern political parties have taken these persuasion techniques to heart, especially on social media platforms (even those that do not restrict the character or word count) to the detriment of the groups being targeted. According to the 2017 Annual Report of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance “[t]he populist rhetoric has blended into a hatred of non-nationals or minorities; migration and multiculturalism have continued to be presented as a threat to social cohesion and security [---]” (ECRI 2017). Sophisticated propaganda and media manipulation techniques are being used across social media platforms and in political party rallies, party meetings and roundtables to “galvanize the base” of both the right-wing and left-wing populist parties. Left-wing leaning media seem to use graphic and dramatic prose, pictures or video that describe the horror encountered by the refugees and migrants in their dangerous journey across the Meditteranean or Agean Seas, or across nations in their quest for safety: the world opinion was moved by the 2015 photograph of the lifeless body of Alan Kurdi, the 3 year old Syrian boy, on the Turkish beach at the resort of Bodrum; or by the reports of the many children separated from their parents who were detained in the US as illigal migrants in 2018. Right-wing leaning media instead focusses on the safety, security and economic issues raised by the ‘invasion’ of migrants: we remember Trump’s warning that all Mexican migrants are terrorists; or the fear of losing national identity expressed in slogans such as Singapore for Singaporans or Poland for Poles. A similar sentiment was more explicitly formulated by Marine LePen: “Immigration is an organized replacement of our population. This threatens our very survival” (Washington, 2015). It has also been shown that, particularly in polls and surveys, the language used is important and can be manipulated to sway responses: “Of the 11 polls to gauge public opinion since the immigration order was issued [Trump’s 2017 Travel Ban], each uses different verbiage to describe Trump’s order – choices that impact the ultimate results” (Shepard 2017). Coded language that is understood only by the adherents of a particular party, group or association is used to inform and communicate with members without fear of the general public being able to understand the true meaning behind a post or slogan (Magu, Joshi, and Luo 2017), or to circumvent new restrictions placed on media platforms by some governments, e.g. the European Union. In the campaign ads, posts on Facebook, Twitter and on their own website, the language used by the Lega Nord, and Forza Nuova is strongly racist, anti-immigrant and violent: A “safe haven” for trauma survivors 231 Secondo il leader della Lega Nord bisogna effettuare una pulizia ‘via per via, quartiere per quartiere e con le maniere forti se serve, perché ci sono interi pezzi d’Italia fuori controllo…Non vedo l’ora una volta al governo di controllare i confini come si faceva una volta e usare le navi della Marina Militare per soccorre e riportare indietro i finti profughi’ (F.Q., 2017). [‘According to the leader of the Lega Nord, a purge has to be effected ‘street by street’, district by district and with heavy handed methods if needed, because there are parts of Italy that are out of control… I can’t wait to be in government so that I can control the borders as was done in the past and to use the ships of the Navy to help and then to repatriate the false refugees.’ Translation by the authors]. This passage echos the words of the former Fascist government and underlines the safety and security hardline of the new parties. Buzz words and slogans such as “Italia per gli italiani” [‘Italy for the Italians’], “Contro Rom e stranieri, le case agli italiani” [‘Against Roma and foreigners, houses to Italians’], “L’Italia ha bisogno di figli non di omosessuali” [‘Italy needs children not homosexuals’] or “Proteggiamo le nostre donne. No alla cittadinanza per gli immigrati” [‘Let’s protect our women. No to citizenship for immigrants’] emphasize the racism, disdain and hate these parties engender for those they consider the other. Today’s Poland is the most ethnically homogenous country in Europe: 96.9% declare their ethnicity as Polish. This rather simple situation, especially in the context of the increasingly globalized world and multicultural Europe, may be misleading if considered in isolation from a more colourful and multilingual past. For centuries, Poland was a linguistic and cultural melting pot of Europe with many languages spoken throughout its territory. Poles used to find pride in their tradition of tolerance that made Poland a safe haven for people fleeing religious persecution in Europe, from the 16th century onwards. Granting equal rights and state protection to nobility of all religions in Poland goes back to the 14th century and became an official policy in 1573, known as the Warsaw Confederation. Until WW II, Poland or Polish territories partitioned by the occupying neighbours were a multicultural mosaic. After regaining independence in 1918, while not free from ethnic conflicts, in particular antisemitism, Poland was a true mixture of nationalities and tongues with ethnic Poles making up only 65% of the population. The war brought total destruction, the death of millions of people and completely changed the ethnic and linguistic landscape of Poland. The most tragic was the planned and meticulously executed extermination of Polish and European Jews in Nazi concentration camps. One could expect that the trauma of war, mass deportations and random executions would have made Poles particularly sensitive to the suffering of people fleeing war and persecution in other countries. With a centuries-long tradition of emigration from Poland, the country is now prosperous enough to attract immigrants from less fortunate parts of the world. And indeed, there were waves of refugees from Vietnam or Greece who found a home in Poland in the 2nd half of the 20th century. Up until 2015 and the change of government, Poland was ready to participate in the EU plans of distributing refugees from the Middle East Magda Stroińska and Vikki Cecchetto 232 with ca. 20% of the population against accepting any refugees. Within 18 months, i.e. at the end of 2016, the percentage of those opposed rose to over 60 (Stosunek Polaków do przyjmowania uchodźców. Komunikat z Badań NR 1/2017, 2019). The main reason for this dramatic change is the rhetoric of fear and the language of hate used by the official propaganda. The most dramatic illustration of the changing climate is the rising number of hate crimes: in 2016 there were 1632 hate crimes reported; in 2015 – 1548; in 2014 – 1365, and in 2013 – 835. In three years, the numbers doubled. In her 2018 paper reflecting on the 14 thousand immigrants from Greece warmly welcomed in Poland in the 1950s, Magdalena Ochwat recalls refugee- hostile slogans from the more recent anti-immigration mass demonstrations in Poland: Witajcie w piekle, zabłąkane owieczki [‘Welcome to hell, lost sheep’] Narodowy solidaryzm zamiast Multikulti [‘National solidarity instead of Multikulti’] Płaczą Niemcy, płacze Francja, tak się kończy tolerancja [[Germany is crying and so is France, that’s how the tolerance ends’] To nie uchodźcy, to najeźdźcy [‘They are not refugees, they are invaders’] Imigranci do domu [‘Immigrants go home’] Polska to kraj dla Polaków [‘Poland is the country for Poles’] Chcemy repatrianta, nie imigranta [‘We want repatriates, not immigrants’] Nie islamska, nie laicka, wielka Polska katolicka [‘Not Islamic, not lay but great Catholic Poland’] Dzisiaj imigranci, jutro terroryści [‘Today immigrants, tomorrow terrorists’]. (Ochwat 2018:207) [Translations by the authors]. Ochwat labels these sentiments in post-2015 Poland using the Bakhtinian term cosmic fear, a fear that feeds off the insecurity and vulnerability of people. Cap (2018) argues that this fear is used by the government to legitimize anti-immigra- tion policies, coercing its supporters to see refugees “as ‘different’, ‘alien’ and ‘unbelonging’” (Cap 2018:380), i.e. as an imminent threat to the safety and to the traditional way of life of Polish citizens. Cap uses his Proximization Theory to demonstrate that government discourse manipulates societal attitudes towards refugees from non-Christian countries and encourages anti-European Union senti- ments. Anti-immigration discourse in Poland gives fuel to nationalistic and xenophobic demonstrations and the tacit approval of such movements by both the government and the Catholic Church hierarchy gives their supporters access to state and church sponsored mass media. The language used by the government representatives to refer to refugees uses ad hominem argumentation and often demonstrates features of hate speech. History teaches how this dangerous strategy was used in the past, in particular in both communist Russian and Nazi German propaganda. One common technique was the use of medical and scientific language to create metaphors that described A “safe haven” for trauma survivors 233 those who were deemed undesirable as parasites, pests, virulent bacteria, diseases, etc. Dehumanising language was also an important factor in the Kosovo war (Stroinska and Popovic 1999). When people of a certain ethnicity or political persuasion are perceived as vermin, dangerous parasites, a threat to health and life of the nation, destroying the enemy becomes an action of cleansing; elimination of a health risk. Killing such undesirable elements is no longer a question of morality, but of hygiene (Stroinska and Drzazga 2017). The first to use such language in modern Polish political discourse was Jarosław Kaczyński, the leader of the now ruling party (Law and Justice). On October 12, 2015 (at an election meeting in Maków Mazowiecki, reported by Gazeta Wyborcza (Jarosław Kaczyński boi się, że uchodźcy sprowadzą zarazę? Tak mówił na wyborczym wiecu., 2015) on 13 October 2015), he said that refugees may bring parasites and diseases with them that had not been seen in Europe in a long time. He suggested that there have already been cases of cholera on the Greek islands and dysentery in Vienna. He then added that refugees may be the carriers of “various kinds of parasites, protozoans, which may not be dangerous in the organisms of those people, but may be dangerous here. This is not intended to discriminate against anyone, but it must be checked out.” For anyone aware of the mechanisms of hate propaganda, this is a very dangerous development. Atrocities usually start with words used to strip the enemy of their humanity. Once this happens, people will stand by and observe the elimination of the enemy with the indifference of someone watching the extermination of bedbugs. 6. Conclusions: quo vadis mundi? In many countries all over the globe, we observe a tendency towards stereo- typing and scapegoating and a dramatic turn towards language that is markedly rude and offensive. This may not be a new phenomenon, but the intensity and spread through multiple social media platforms requires that attention be paid to all aspects of this wave of hate speech. As hatred and fear of the other are among the strongest of emotions, they play an important role in the creation of media stories that capture the attention of the audience. We all naturally need to impose some kind of order on the surrounding chaos of social and political reality. We all need a narrative and, unfortunately, online haters, trolls, and propagandists provide that narrative for many. With some governments’ tacit approval of hate speech against the refugees, the immigrants and all those seeking a refuge and safe haven from war, poverty, and violence, the spread of verbal aggression is getting out of control. This is the case particularly online where anonymity allows people to write what they would hesitate to say in face to face conversation, but, increasingly, even public figures feel at liberty to make hateful and offensive comments and are praised for their outrageous views by their online fans. Magda Stroińska and Vikki Cecchetto 234 Hate speech is a prelude necessary to incite violence. Hateful propaganda dehumanizes the enemies so that it becomes easier to attack them. Where there is hate speech, violence will follow. In the USA, anti-immigrant rhetoric, promoted by some Republican Party supporters and encouraged by President Trump himself, contributed to violence during demonstrations in Charlottesville, Virginia in August 2017. A peaceful protest against the Unite the Right rally ended with one of the white supremacists driving a car into the crowd, killing one young woman and injuring 28 people. Whether it is in Poland, Italy or other countries under right-wing governments, the government-controlled mass media and even some members of parliament regularly spread lies, hate speech, and all kinds of hostile comments about anyone and anything that is not following the official party line. In Italy, Forza Nuova, a neofascist party, regularly attacks migrants whether alone or in groups, or even groups of visible minorities (i.e.: Roma, Asians), or gays throughout the country. In Poland, the nationalistic youth organization, Młodzież Wszechpolska (‘All- Polish Youth’), went as far as sending fake death certificates to mayors of some Polish cities who openly supported the opposition in Poland. A popular charity collecting money for medical equipment for children’s hospitals also became a regular target of hate speech. Its organizer was portrayed in a racist way, as a corrupt fraudster, trying to gather money for himself. In January 2019, at the closing event for this year’s money collection in Gdańsk, in front of hundreds of celebrating people, the mayor of Gdańsk was fatally stabbed by someone who blamed his personal failures on the Polish opposition party that the mayor supported. Even if mental illness was a factor, hatred needs to be channelled and this assassin’s negative emotions were likely focussed on whom the media were telling him to hate. These examples of violence would have been impossible if there was no approval of hate and aggression. Jarosław Kurski, an opposition journalist commented on this tragedy: “The seed of hatred, once sown, will sooner or later produce its harvest” (Kurski 2019). People in Poland are already reaping the harvest of the last three years of government sponsored hate speech. The same will be the case in other countries that encourage this kind of rhetoric. It is easy to start but it cannot easily be stopped. The primary cause of evil in the world is hatred, and hatred is generated from a fear of the other, the unknown. Fear can easily lead to hatred, especially in times of scarcity and economic insecurity. The other, no matter how peaceful and willing to assimilate, can be portrayed as threatening and becomes the scapegoat, the target, and if there is enough fear and hatred, the victim. We know that in the past, such societal attitudes led to violent conflicts. All of those conflicts started with verbal aggression. As linguists, we believe that it is our duty to point to those dangers today. We must not turn away or be indifferent to the danger of hate because hate destroys both its target and the hater. We need to be a part of the solution or we risk becoming a part of the problem. In a Cherokee tale popular in Canada, a grandfather is teaching his grandson about life. He tells the little boy that a fight is going on inside him. It is a terrible A “safe haven” for trauma survivors 235 fight between two wolves. One is evil and represents negative emotions such as anger, envy, greed, arrogance, superiority, and ego. The other wolf is good – he represents joy, peace, love, hope, kindness, empathy, generosity, truth, com- passion, and faith. The same fight is going on inside every other person, too. The grandson thinks about it for a while and then asks his grandfather, “Which wolf will win?” The powerful answer usually quoted in internet sources is “the one you feed”. However, the original Cherokee version of this tale said that one has to feed both wolves. If we try to starve the evil wolf, it will only make it angrier and more dangerous. People who are full of hatred towards others, especially the immigrants and refugees need reassurance that the newcomers are not posing a threat and that diversity is a positive force. It may be easier in Canada, a big country with a relatively small population than in some European nations that struggle to accommodate thousands of refugees. But there is no moral excuse for countries that deny safe haven to traumatized women and children fleeing war, poverty, and starvation. It is particularly hypocritical when their leaders invoke the need to protect their countries’ Christian traditions from people of other faiths to cover up their fears. The use of the term migrant instead of refugee, exile or immigrant removes from the set of associations the reasons why the affected people leave their country: war, violence, poverty, famine or natural disasters. Thus, by promoting this particular terminology, the politicians and the media who accept their language rob the traumatized refugees of the main reason why people in potential accepting countries would want to show them the compassion that comes naturally when we see someone in need. This simple linguistic operation, removing the prefix from the term immigrant, may be a truly nefarious propaganda strategy. The words we use change our perception of the world and need to be handled with care. Addresses: Magda Stroińska McMaster University 1280 Main Street West Hamilton, Ontario L8S 4L8 Canada Tel.: 1-(905) 525-9140 ext 27067 E-mail: stroinsk@mcmaster.ca Vikki Cecchetto McMaster University 1280 Main Street West Hamilton, Ontario L8S 4L8 Canada Email: vikkicecchetto@gmail.com Magda Stroińska and Vikki Cecchetto 236 Internet sources Ball, Molly (2016) “Donald Trump and the politics of fear”. The Atlantic. 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work_wvvgifbi25bixkryzas7cjizt4	----	Feeling for and as a group member: understanding LGBT victimisation via group- based empathy and intergroup emotions Being a victim of a hate crime can be devastating (e.g., Herek, Gillis, & Cogan, 1999; McDevitt, Balboni, Garcia, & Gu, 2001). Compared with victims of other types of crime, hate crime victims are more likely to report feeling vulnerable, fearful, anxious, angry, and depressed (Corcoran, Lader, & Smith, 2015; Herek et al., 1999) and also suffer for longer (McDevitt et al., 2001). However, the impacts of hate crimes are not limited to the people directly involved in the crime. Qualitative research suggests that hate crimes have indirect effects that “ripple” out throughout communities (Bell & Perry, 2015; Noelle, 2002; Perry & Alvi, 2012). These “waves of harm” (Iganski, 2001, p. 628) frequently lead to feelings of vulnerability, fear, anger, and sadness amongst other group members. They can also lead to behavioural changes including avoidance and withdrawal (Bell & Perry, 2015), yet can also have a mobilising effect that inspires collective action (Noelle, 2002). Since recorded hate crimes are on the rise both in the UK and elsewhere (O'Neill, 2017; see FBI, 2017 for US context), we provide a timely and original investigation into these indirect effects that are of considerable international concern and interest. In two experiments, we extend intergroup emotions theory (IET; Mackie, Maitner, & Smith, 2009) and uniquely apply it to the phenomenon of hate crime to show that hate crimes against Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender (LGBT) people provoke heightened emotional and behavioural reactions in fellow LGBT individuals compared to non-hate crimes. We provide quantitative evidence that these group-level responses are a product of individuals feeling threatened as a group member – as IET would predict. Importantly, we are the first to show that these indirect effects also stem from the fact that people share strong empathic ties with fellow ingroup members and so also feel for hate crime victims to a greater extent than for non-hate crime victims. Indirect effects of hate crime: An intergroup emotions perspective With its emphasis on group-based appraisals, emotions and behaviours, IET provides a useful theoretical framework for understanding the community impacts of hate crime. Drawing on the social identity approach (Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987), IET posits that when group identities are salient, individuals redefine themselves as group members – rather than as individuals – and consequently think, feel and act on the group rather than the personal level. So what happens to the group is felt and responded to as if it has happened to them personally (Mackie et al., 2009; Mackie & Smith, 2015). Mackie and colleagues (2008) suggest that these group-based reactions occur through two routes: group-based appraisals and self-stereotyping. The latter suggests that group membership and identity become so central to the individual that they become, and respond as, the prototypical group member. The appraisal route, meanwhile, suggests that members appraise events in terms of the current intergroup context (e.g., is the situation a threat to the group?). This appraisal triggers relevant emotions (e.g., anxiety) which, in turn, instigate specific group-based behaviours (e.g., avoidance). In previously studying this appraisal–emotion–behaviour link, researchers have found that specific intergroup contexts give rise to specific intergroup emotions which, in turn, elicit related behaviours. For example, intergroup contexts which elicit group-based anger can lead to confrontation and mobilisation actions (Leonard, Moons, Mackie, & Smith, 2011; Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000), while group-based fear can lead to avoidant and withdrawal behaviours (Dumont, Yzerbyt, Wigboldus, & Gordijn, 2003). Group-based empathy: neglected but important In Mackie et al.’s (2008) explanation, the authors are clear that these group- based reactions do not occur through empathic ties: “It is not simply that group members feel empathy for other ingroup members who encounter good or ill fortune. On the contrary, intergroup emotion is emotion experienced as others...” (Mackie et al., 2008, p. 1873). They go on to explain that people are thrilled when their national team wins the world cup because they feel as if they have won it, not because they believe the team members feel good (i.e., they do not feel empathy for the team). However, while this example is illustrative, we believe it is incomplete. In this example, for instance, perhaps people do not feel for the team members as the authors suggest. However, their happiness may be increased by knowing that other fans (who are just as likely to be seen as group members as members of a national team) feel good and so individuals feel good about the win both because they feel as if they have won it and because they feel good for their fellow fans (i.e., have empathy for the fans). Such a surmise would be supported by the common-place observation of the enhanced exultation (or desolation) felt while watching televised reactions of fans after their team’s victory (or defeat). Mackie and Smith (2015) also suggest that if empathy were to impact on individuals’ reactions, it does so only on an interpersonal rather than intergroup level. However, others have shown empathy can be group-based. For example, ingroup members have been shown to feel more empathy for fellow group members than they do for outgroup members (e.g., Cikara, Bruneau, Van Bavel, & Saxe, 2014; Cikara, Bruneau, & Saxe, 2011). This so-called ‘ingroup empathy bias’ manifests itself both psychologically (Batson & Ahmad, 2009) and physiologically (Avenanti, Sirigu, & Aglioti, 2010) and impacts on group members’ thoughts, feelings, and helping tendencies (Cikara et al., 2011). Such an empathic preference for ingroup members supports our suggestion that empathy can be group-based and may play a part in understanding the indirect impacts of hate crime. Furthering our argument for the importance of group-based empathy, empathic ties seem to be important in the formation and maintenance of groups, and also in responses to discrimination (e.g., Cortland et al., 2017). Social Identity Theory (SIT: Tajfel & Turner, 1986) suggests that social groups are formed when individuals feel similar to one another on a particular dimension. This similarity may help group members understand and feel what their fellow group members experience: that is, perceptions of similarity may help to foster strong empathic ties within groups. In addition, Cortland and colleagues (2017) found that perceptions of similarity, this time across disadvantaged groups (Black people and gay people), increases empathy – and also support for pro-action in the face of discrimination (Exp 2). These empathic ties, then, serve to guide group-relevant and group-based emotions, attitudes and behaviours to maintain, promote and protect the group (e.g., Tajfel & Turner, 1986), and have also been identified as a response to discrimination (Cortland et al., 2017). So, in the case of hate crimes perpetrated against ingroup members, this suggests fellow group members will have greater empathy for an ingroup member than an outgroup member (e.g., Cikara et al., 2011) because they feel more similar to the ingroup member. Furthermore, feeling empathy for hate crime victims will elicit specific emotional responses that closely mimic those of the victim, and, as IET predicts, they will trigger certain behavioural responses (e.g., anxiety to avoidance; anger to pro-action; see Mackie & Smith, 2015 for a comprehensive review). The extent to which hate crimes affect other ingroup members may be dependent upon the nature of the hate crime perpetrated, for example, the number of perpetrators involved in the attack. Being attacked by a group of individuals may make the intergroup aspect of the crime more salient, especially compared to attacks perpetrated by a single attacker. As IET involves the appraisal of an intergroup context, the more the context is perceived as group-based (rather than personal), the more likely it is to elicit group-based reactions (Mackie & Smith, 2015). Thus, a hostile event instigated by several outgroup members might, on prima facie grounds, represent greater intergroup hostility and so be regarded as more threatening than one instigated by a single outgroup member. Considering group attacks are relatively common in hate crime, for instance, Chakraborti et al. (2014, p. 54) found that 48% of victims in their UK survey had been victimised by more than one perpetrator in a single incident (see McDevitt, Levin, & Bennett, 2002 for US context), here we explore how the number of perpetrators may moderate the indirect effects of hate crime. The current research In two experiments, we investigate the indirect impacts of anti-LGBT hate crimes. In the first study, we compare the reactions to newspaper articles about crimes that are motivated by hate to the same crimes not motivated by hate. Within this study, we also test whether the number of perpetrators increase the saliency of the intergroup context and hence moderate the reactions. The second study adds to this by simply comparing reactions to a hate crime against a group member with reactions to a non- hate motivated crime against a group member. Hypotheses 1. Reactions to hate crimes will be stronger than reactions to non-hate crimes 2. Hate crimes perpetrated by several offenders will elicit stronger reactions than hate crimes perpetrated by a single attacker. 3. As predicted by IET, hate crimes will increase the saliency of LGBT identity which, in turn, will lead to greater appraisals of threat. This threat will then increase feelings of anger and anxiety about the crime and these emotions will motivate specific behaviours (e.g., anxiety to more avoidance; anger to less avoidance and more pro- action: predicted associations shown in unbolded lines in Figure 1). 4. From our extension of IET it is predicted that hate crimes will increase perceptions of similarity to the victim which will enhance empathy for the victim. This empathy will then enhance emotional reactions to the crime which, in turn, are predicted to increase both avoidance and pro-action (these associations are represented by bolded lines in Figure 1). Study 1 Method Participants. Assuming ‘moderate’ effects (.30) and 80% power to detect main effects, we aimed for a minimum sample size of 90 (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007) but managed to recruit 181 participants from an LGBTQ+ Pride festival in Brighton, UK to a study advertised as an investigation into ‘Reactions to Street Crime’. Forty-eight did not identify as LGBT and a further 13 participants failed to correctly answer a manipulation check about the stimulus news article and so were dropped from the analyses. Of the remaining 120 participants, there were 58 females, 61 males and 1 trans. Ages ranged from 16-68 years (M = 33.51, SD = 12.61). Participants self- identified as gay (n = 57), lesbian (n = 43), bisexual (n = 12), queer (n = 4), straight (n = 2), pansexual (n = 1) and asexual (n = 1). The vast majority identified as White (n = 105), 8 as from mixed/multiple ethnic groups, 3 as Asian, 3 as Black, and one as Icelandic. Design and Procedure. Participants were randomly assigned to one of four conditions in a 2 (Motivation: Hate vs. Non-hate) x 2 (Perpetrators: Single vs. Group) design. They read an apparently real but actually fictitious newspaper article describing how a man’s leg was broken in a homophobic attack perpetrated by a single man (n = 26), a homophobic attack perpetrated by a group of six men (n = 40), a random attack perpetrated by a single man (n = 30), or a random attack perpetrated by a group of six men (n = 24). The articles were identical except for the description of the motivation of the crime (homophobic vs. random) and the number of perpetrators (one vs. six). The actual sexual orientation of the victim was not described in any of the conditions, though due to the motivation of the attack, it is likely that participants assumed the victim was Gay in the homophobic conditions. Experimenters were blind to conditions. Measures. All measures, unless otherwise stated, were measured on a 7 point Likert type scale (1 = Strongly disagree to 7 = Strongly agree). Because of the novel nature of this research, the measures have been specially adapted by the authors from related studies (available upon request)1. Manipulation checks. Participants indicated which types of crime were described in the article: Robbery, Physical Assault, Murder, Verbal assault, Mugging, 1 Participants also completed items concerning attitudes towards the criminal justice system, their feelings of shame, guilt and vulnerability that are to form the basis of a separate paper. Homophobic hate attack, Disability hate attack, Vandalism. They also indicated how many men attacked the victim (1-7). Strength of LGBT identity was measured by five items adapted from Phinney (1991): “I identify with other LGBT people”, “I feel good about being LGBT”, “I am like other LGBT people”, “Being LGBT is an important reflection of who I am”, and “I dislike being LGBT” (reverse scored; α = .87). Victim empathy was assessed using four items: “Thinking about your feelings towards the victim, to what extent do you...” “feel sadness for the victim?”, “feel sympathy for the victim?”, “feel respect for the victim?”, and “empathise with the victim?” (α = .80). Participants were also asked to what extent they felt Similar and Different to the victim. Group based threat was measured by seven items adapted from Cottrell and Neuberg (2005) with the stem statement “I believe the type of crime depicted in the article...” “poses a physical threat to LGBT people”, “endangers the safety of LGBT people”, “poses a threat to the possessions of LGBT people”, “poses a threat to the personal rights of LGBT people”, “poses a threat to LGBT culture”, “poses a threat to LGBT people’s way of life”, and “poses a threat to the beliefs and values of LGBT people” (α = .96)2. Feelings about the reported crime were assessed using Angry (“Angry”, “Revolted”, “Outraged”, and “Disgusted”, α = .82) and Anxiety (“Alarmed”, “Anxious”, and “Afraid”, α = .82). Using the stem statement “Having read about the crime, I would...”, Avoidance was measured using three items: “Go out less often”, “See friends less often”, and 2 While we had planned on separating realistic from symbolic threats as Cottrell and Neurberg (2005) suggest, a factor analysis on these items revealed just one factor with all items loading > .85, and so we aggregated these items into one overall threat scale. “Avoid certain places and people” (α = .76). Pro-Action used four items: “Join and/or increase my participation in anti-crime groups (e.g., Neighbourhood Watch)”, “Join and/or increase my participation in groups and charities that help victims of these types of crimes”, “Join and/or increase my participation in general local community groups”, and “Use social media (e.g., Twitter) to raise others’ awareness of the crime” (α = .90). Experiences with hate crimes. To check that there were no confounds between conditions in terms of prior direct or indirect victimisation, participants indicated how many times in the past 3 years they had been a victim of a homophobic or transphobic hate crime or incident (Direct experiences) and how many people they knew who had been a victim of such crimes (Indirect experiences). Response options were 0, 1-3 times/people, 4-6 times/people, 7-9 times/people, 10-12 times/people, 13-15 times/people, 16 times/people or more. Results Manipulation checks. The mean recalled ‘number of perpetrators’ was 1.19 (SD = .96) for the single-attacker condition and M = 5.62 (SD = 1.19) for the group-attack condition (t(112) = -21.72, p < .001). There were no differences between conditions in participants’ ages (F(3,115) = .43, p = .73, gender (χ2(3) = .63, p = .89), sexual orientation (χ2 (3) = 1.12, p = .74) or previous experiences with hate crimes (Direct: F(3, 98) = .13, p = .94; Indirect: F(3, 98) = .43, p = .73). Thus, the random allocation to conditions was successful. ANOVAs3. Table 1 presents the means and standard deviations of the four conditions and the significant results of the 2 (Motivation: Hate vs. Non-Hate) x 2 3 As the victim and offender(s) were male, we added gender as a third factor in the ANOVA. There were no main effects or interactions involving gender and so this factor is not discussed further. (Perpetrators: Single vs. Group) ANOVAs on all measures. Providing partial support for Hypothesis 1, hate crimes elicited more anger and were perceived as more threatening than comparable non-hate crimes. Hate crime victims were also empathised with more and were perceived to be more similar than victims of non-hate crimes. Such findings generally support the claim that hate crimes have more powerful effects on group members’ perceptions of similarity, feelings of empathy, threat and anger than comparable non-hate crimes. There were no main effects of number of perpetrators on any of the variables and so our second hypothesis received no support. Path model. Using Mplus (Muthén & Muthén, 2011) we tested the hypothetical path model presented in Figure 1. Variables on the same level (e.g., anger, anxiety) were allowed to covary and to ensure a most stringent examination of the variables, all paths between variables adjacent to one another in the model (e.g., similarity and strength of identity both predicting threat and empathy) were tested. The model fit the data well: χ2(24) = 23.32, p = .50, CFI = 1.00, RMSEA = .00 (90%CI: .00-.07), SRMR = .06 (Hu & Bentler, 1999). As shown in Figure 2 and consistent with H4, the hate condition was associated with increased feelings of similarity to the victim which, in turn, was associated with increased empathy and also perception of threat. Strength of identity, however, was not significantly impacted by the hate crime condition as would be expected in the traditional IET framework, though it was associated with increased feelings of empathy and threat (H3). In the next stage of the model, perceptions of threat were related to higher levels of anger and anxiety, showing support for the traditional IET hypothesis (H3). Adding to the IET formulation, though, empathy was also related to increased anger and anxiety (H4; though the latter was marginal p = .06), above and beyond the impact of threat. Also somewhat consistent with IET hypotheses (H3), anxiety was associated with more avoidance and pro-action while anger was related to more pro-action but not to less avoidance as expected. Study 1 Discussion In this experiment we have shown experimentally that an indirect experience of a hate crime targeted at one’s group (from reading a news article) can activate perceptions of threat (against one’s group) and feelings of anger. This is entirely consistent with IET. In addition, that same experience also instigated a perception of increased similarity to the victim and enhanced empathy for him. These latter two findings suggest a useful extension of IET. When analysing the relationships in a single path model, the support for IET and our proposed addition to it became even clearer. As we had predicted, an indirect experience of hate crime can plausibly be seen as triggering a series of psychological perceptions and emotional reactions, which then are associated with particular behavioural intentions. It is especially noteworthy that not only was threat associated with group-based emotions (as predicted by IET), but so was empathy (as we had hypothesised). Unexpectedly, varying the number of perpetrators had little effect on participants’ responses to the news article. Apparently, the crime was seen as sufficiently serious that whether it was instigated by a lone individual or a group became immaterial. Also, it is acknowledged that several of the dependent measures did not reveal any effect due to the manipulations. It is not clear why this might be. One possible weakness of the Motivation manipulation was that there was a potential confound between the nature of the crime (hate motivated or random) and the sexual orientation of the victim (assumption of being gay). Thus, strictly speaking, the observed effects due to this variable are ambiguously attributable – are participants reacting to an (assumed) ingroup member being targeted or to the fact that it is an identity motivated crime? With these considerations in mind, we conducted a second partial replication study, which addressed the possible confound and also used larger cell sizes. In view of the absence of any discernible effects due to the number of perpetrators variable, we dropped that factor from the design. Study 2 A second experiment was designed in which the sexual orientation of the victim was held constant between the two Motivation conditions. The alleged crime was always committed by a single perpetrator. In other respects, the procedure and measures were similar to Study 1. Participants Nine-hundred and twelve participants were recruited to the online experiment which was advertised as a “Reactions towards street crime” study. Participants were recruited by Qualtrics and received a pre-determined reward (e.g., vouchers, loyalty points) for completing the study. We made the a priori decision to include only participants who identified as LGBT (n = 206) and only those who correctly completed both manipulation checks (final N = 102). The distribution of these manipulation check exclusions between conditions is given in the Results section. These 102 participants were aged between 16-80 years (M = 36.21 years, SD = 14.78). Most identified as female (62) or male (34) with other individuals identifying as intersex, trans, trans male, trans male and female, agender, and no gender. Participants’ sexual orientations were bisexual (46), gay (34), lesbian (13), pansexual (4), queer (2), asexual (1), asexual and bisexual (1), and straight (1). Design and Procedure Participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions in which they read a newspaper article describing how a man’s leg was broken in an attack that was described as either a case of mistaken identity (Non-hate) or a homophobic hate attack (Hate). The articles were identical except in four parts which referred to whether the attack was motivated by hate or a mistaken identity. Since both articles included a statement from the victim’s husband as to why he had been attacked, the victim was clearly identifiable as Gay in both conditions. Measures Manipulation checks. So as not to prime participants’ LGBT identification or to reveal the main interest of the experiment, the two manipulation checks were placed at the end of the study. The first read, “Thinking back to the article you read at the start of the study, how would you describe the victim?” Straight, Gay, Lesbian, Trans, Don’t remember. The second item asked “How did the article describe the assault?” A case of mistaken identity, Homophobic hate crime, Islamophobic hate crime, Domestic abuse. The other measures were the same as those used in Study 1 and the scales showed good reliability: strength of LGBT identity (α = .83), similarity (r = .51, p < .001), victim empathy (α = .84), threat (α = .96), anger (α = .91), anxiety (α = .82), avoidance (α = .83), and pro-action (α = .96).4 Results Manipulation checks. Of the 206 self-indentified LGBT participants, 25 incorrectly answered both manipulation checks (Non-hate = 21, Hate = 4), 51 failed to identify the victim as Gay (Non-hate = 43, Hate = 8) and a further 28 were unable to specify the correct motivation of the crime (Non-hate = 27, Hate = 1). The resulting cell sizes of the two conditions were: Hate, n = 62; Non-hate, n = 40. Participants in the two conditions did not significantly differ in age or their direct or indirect experiences of hate crimes (all ts(100) = 1.65, all ps > .11). There were also no differences in their gender identities (χ(2) = 1.25, p = .54) or sexual orientations (χ(3) = 6.32, p = .10)5. Independent t-tests were used to examine differences between the two conditions. Table 2 provides clear support for H1 and shows that reactions towards the hate crime were more pronounced than reactions to non-hate crimes. Participants felt more similar to homophobic hate crime victims than non-hate crime victims and hate crime victims received significantly more empathy. Hate crimes also provoked more anger, anxiety, feelings of threat, and were more likely to lead to avoidance and pro-action and strengthened LGBT identification than a non-hate attack against a gay man. Path model 4 As in Study 1, participants also completed items concerning attitudes towards the criminal justice system, feelings of vulnerability, guilt and shame which are to form the basis of a separate paper. 5 Because of low numbers of certain gender and sexual identities, we compared the number of people identifying as male, female and neither, and compared the number of people identifying as bisexual, gay, lesbian and none of the above. As in Study 1, we tested the hypothesised model (Figure 1) using Mplus (Muthén & Muthén, 2011). The model fit the data well: χ2(18) = 29.34, p = .04; CFI = .96; RMSEA < .08 (90%CI: .01-.13); SRMR = .07 (Hu & Bentler, 1999) and Figure 3 presents the significant paths. Extending IET (H4), hate crimes were again associated with an increased feeling of similarity between the participant and the victim. This similarity, in turn, was related to more empathy and an increased perception of threat. The study also provided support for the IET hypotheses in that the hate crime was related to stronger LGBT identification than the non-hate crime. This primed identity was then again shown to be related to increases in empathy and perceptions of threat. Supporting H4, empathy for the victim predicted both anger and anxiety while threat only predicted anxiety. Consistent with H3, anxiety again predicted positively both avoidance and pro-action, whilst anger only positively predicted pro-action. Study 2 Discussion This experiment broadly replicated the results of Study 1, but with an improved and more powerful design. This time, the majority of dependent measures showed clear- cut effects of the manipulation, in the predicted directions. Consistent with both IET and our proposed extension, people exposed to a hate crime against a fellow ingroup member showed increased identification and enhanced perceptions similarity; increased perceptions of threat and stronger empathy; stronger feelings of anger and anxiety, and more inclination to engage in avoidance and pro-action, compared to those who learned only of a random attack against an ingroup member. When analysed together in a path model, the links between the experimental manipulation and the dependent variables were mostly as predicted. Here, then, is another experimental demonstration of the causal effects of indirect hate crime victimisation, a rarity in a field dominated by correlational designs. It is also noteworthy that these results were obtained from an experimental design in which the nature of the crime was unconfounded from the sexual identity of the victim. General discussion These findings provide convincing experimental evidence that hate crimes have more pronounced indirect effects than non-hate crimes. Given the scarcity of empirical research to document this claim, this, in itself, is a notable achievement. Moreover, these novel findings illuminate the probable social psychological processes which underlie those effects. By applying IET to a new area, we show that hate crimes are evidently viewed as threats to the ingroup that trigger the emotions of anger and anxiety which, in turn, are linked to specific action tendencies (pro-action and avoidance respectively). Providing a new theoretical contribution, we also show that an additional reason for the heightened response by people to hate crimes against fellow ingroup members is that they give rise to increased perceptions of similarity to the victim, and thence to heightened empathy for him or her. Independently of threat, such empathy is reliably associated with group-based emotions. The demonstrable role of empathy in these studies adds to the literature as it calls into question Mackie at al.’s (2008) suggestion that empathy is not implicated in group-based emotions. Our data show that it is not only the case that other group members respond with anger and anxiety because they feel as though their group – and by extension themselves – have been attacked. These findings indicate that these emotional reactions are also predicated upon the meaningful ties that bind group members together. That is, group members do not just respond as group members to feelings of threat, they also feel empathic concern for their fellow group members. Our findings, then, provide a new contribution to knowledge on the effects that group identity and empathy have on the indirect impacts of hate and prejudice. Future research testing the viability of our research methods and hypotheses to other groups (e.g. disability, race and ethnicity) will help to strengthen this new knowledge base further. Some progress has been made in research reported elsewhere (Authors, under review). In addition to the theoretical contributions made by this research, these findings have potential implications for social and legal policy-making. Although hate crimes are an increasing concern for many nations (e.g., OSCE, 2017), some commentators have argued against the introduction of specialised hate crime legislation since such crimes, in their opinion, are no more unique than their non-hate motivated counterparts (Jacobs & Potter, 1997). However, by clearly demonstrating that hate crimes have significantly greater effects on the wider community than non-hate motivated crimes, we believe the findings provide support for a legal distinction between offences motivated (or not) by hostility and prejudice. Figure 1 Hypothetical model. Unbolded lines represent traditional IET hypotheses, bolded lines represent hypotheses extending IET. All paths are predicted to be positive except between anger and avoidance. Note. All paths between variables on adjacent levels were calculated in the analyses and variables on the same level were covaried. Hate crime Empathy Group based threat Anger Anxiety Pro-action Avoidance Similarity Strength of LGBT identity - Table 1. Study 1 Means and standard deviations for conditions and significant ANOVAs Hate – Single attacker (n = 26) Hate – Group attack (n = 40) Non-hate – Single attacker (n = 30) Non-hate – Group attack (n = 24) Main effect of Motivation [ηp2] Similarity 4.52 (1.40) 4.56(1.29) 3.95(1.45) 4.00(1.26) 5.10*[.04] Strength of LGBT identity 5.91 (1.20) 5.73 (1.43) 5.94 (1.38) 5.72 (1.44); n = 23 - Empathy 6.26 (0.70) 6.41 (0.75) n = 39 5.86 (1.39) 5.61 (1.31) F(1,115) = 9.12**[.07] Group based threat 5.25 (1.37); n = 24 5.47 (1.27); n = 39 4.70 (1.93) 4.28 (1.61) F(1,113) = 8.86**[.07] Anger 5.80 (1.29) 6.03 (1.08) 5.53 (1.33) 5.24 (1.49) F(1,116) = 4.88*[.04] Anxiety 4.01 (2.04) 4.17 (1.58); n = 39 3.88 (1.66) 3.31 (1.17) - Avoidance 2.07 (1.15); n = 25 2.43 (1.56); n= 39 1.97 (1.00) 2.28 (1.20) - Pro-action 3.55 (1.49); n = 25 3.82 (1.72); n = 39 3.17 (1.59) 3.36 (1.47) - Note. There were no significant main effects of number of perpetrators or significant interactions. *p < .05, **p < .01 Figure 2. Study 1. Significant standardised paths in tested model Model fit indices: χ2(24) = 23.32, p = .50, CFI = 1.00, RMSEA = .00 (90%CI: .00-.07), SRMR = .06. ***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05; †p = .06. Hate condition (1 = non-hate vs. 2 = hate) Empathy Group based threat Anger Anxiety Pro-action Avoidance Similarity Strength of LGBT identity .21* .39*** .42*** .45*** .24** .27*** .18† .25** .31*** .23* .40*** .50*** No. of perps condition (1 = 1 vs. 2 = 6) R2=.32*** R2=.18** Table 2. Study 2 Means, standard deviations, and t-tests Mistaken identity (n = 40) Homophobic hate crime (n = 62) t (df = 100) Similarity 3.69 (1.52) 4.82 (1.40) 3.80*** Strength of LGBT identity 5.06 (1.27) 5.63 (1.21) 4.97*** Empathy 5.75 (1.20) 6.31 (.92) 2.70** Group based threat 4.04 (1.90) 5.66 (1.22) -4.78*** Anger 5.24 (1.55) 6.05 (1.21) -2.95** Anxiety 4.04 (1.37) 5.03 (1.37) -3.55*** Avoidance 2.63 (1.41) 3.30 (1.60) -2.15* Pro-action 3.38 (1.23) 3.97 (1.51) -2.09* *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 Figure 3 Study 2. Significant standardised paths in tested model. χ2(18) = 29.34, p = .04, CFI = .96, RMSEA = .08 (90%CI: .01-.13), SRMR = .07. ***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05. Hate condition (1 = non-hate vs. 2 = hate) Empathy Group based threat Anger Anxiety Pro-action Avoidance Similarity Strength of LGBT identity .36*** .35*** .38*** .58*** .37*** .32*** .35*** .24* .27** .23* .60*** .22* R2=.18** R2=.30*** References Authors. (under review). Avenanti, A., Sirigu, A., & Aglioti, S. M. 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work_wwwnln25hrghzovio2ebr3qmfe	----	Differential social organization, collective action, and crime Ross L. Matsueda # Springer Science + Business Media B.V. 2006 Abstract This article elaborates and extends Sutherland’s [Principles of criminology (4th ed.), Lippincott, Philadelphia, Sutherland (1947)] concept of differential social organiza- tion, the sociological counterpart to his social psychological theory of differential association. Differential social organization contains a static structural component, which explains crime rates across groups, as well as a dynamic collective action component, which explains changes in crime rates over time. I argue that by drawing on George Herbert Mead’s [Mind, self, and society. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, Mead (1934)] theories of symbolic interaction and social control, we can conceptualize organization in favor of, and against, crime as collective behavior. We can then integrate theoretical mechanisms of models of collective behavior, including social network ties, collective action frames, and threshold models of collective action. I illustrate the integrated theory using examples of social movements against crime, neighborhood collective efficacy, and the code of the street. Differential social organization, collective action, and crime The theory of differential association, along with the concept of white collar crime, was probably Edwin Sutherland’s greatest legacy. It is well known that the theory explains individual criminality with a social psychological process of learning crime within interaction with social groups. Criminal behavior, according to Sutherland [71], is the result of learning an excess of definitions favorable to crime. This is the differential association process. Less well known is Sutherland’s attempt to explain aggregate crime rates across groups and societies. Here, he specified the theory of differential social Crime Law Soc Change DOI 10.1007/s10611-006-9045-1 DO9045; No of Pages A portion of this chapter was presented at the Annual Meetings of the American Society of Criminology, Toronto, Canada, November 16–19. The research upon which this paper was based was supported in part by grants from the National Science Foundation (SES-0004323) and the National Institute on Drug Abuse (R01DA18148). The funding agencies bear no responsibility for the analyses and interpretations drawn here. James F. Short, Jr. and Joachim Savelsberg generously provided comments on an earlier draft. R. L. Matsueda (*) Department of Sociology, University of Washington, 202 Savery Hall, Box 353340, Seattle, WA 98195, USA e-mail: matsueda@u.washington.edu organization to explain rates of crime with an organizational process of group dynamics. The crime rate of a group is determined by the extent to which the group is organized in favor of crime versus organized against crime. Moreover, the explanation of crime rates, differential social organization, is consistent with the explanation of individual acts of crime, differential association. Sutherland spent considerable time refining his individual-level mechanism of differential association, which subsequently received much attention from the criminological community, as researchers tested (e.g., [46]) and revised the theory (e.g., [1, 13]). He devoted less time to his more sociological theory of differential social organization, which consequently never progressed beyond its original rudimentary form. Although Sutherland never explicitly specified the concrete content of organization in favor of crime and organization against crime, he did imply two components: (1) a static component, in which social structure and group organization explained differences in crime rates across social groups; and (2) a dynamic component, in which group processes explained changes in crime rates over time. In this paper, I will focus on the second component, conceptualizing differential social organization as collective action both for and against crime, and integrate theoretical mechanisms from developmental psychology, social networks, and collective action. To integrate these diverse mechanisms, I will use George Herbert Mead’s [52, 53] theory of social control as a general framework for the study of joint behavior among two or more persons. I then draw on developmental psychologists’ stages of moral reasoning [43], which extends Mead’s [52] stages of play and the game, and which may vary by the density of network ties. I also draw upon sociologists’ theories of social networks and weak ties to impose a communication structure on group behavior, as well as threshold models and collective action frames to account for the direction of collective behavior. Finally, I illustrate the integrated model with examples from social movements against crime, neighborhood informal social control, and collective acts of street crime. Differential association theory Sutherland stated differential association theory as a set of nine propositions, which introduced three concepts – normative conflict, differential association, and differential group organization – that explain crime at the levels of the society, the individual, and the group [22]. Normative conflict: the root cause of crime in society At the level of the society, crime in society is rooted in normative conflict. For Sutherland, primitive, undifferentiated societies are characterized by harmony, solidarity, and consensus over basic values and beliefs. Such societies have little conflict over appropriate behaviors. They also have little crime. With the industrial revolution, however, modern industrial societies developed, with advanced divisions of labor, market economies, and increased conflict. Such societies become segmented into groups that conflict over interests, values, and behavior patterns. These societies are characterized by specialization rather than similarity, conflict rather than harmony, coercion rather than consensus. Moreover, they tend to have high rates of crime. From these observations, Sutherland hypothesized that high crime rates are rooted in normative conflict, which he defined as a condition in which society is segmented into groups that conflict over the definition of appropriate behavior. R.L. Matsueda More precisely, normative conflict refers to conflict over the appropriateness of the law: some groups define the law as a set of rules to be followed under virtually all circumstances, while others define the law as a set of rules to be violated under certain circumstances. Therefore, when normative conflict is absent in a society, crime rates will be low; when normative conflict is high, societal crime rates will be high. In this way, crime is ultimately rooted in normative conflict. Differential association process: explanation of individual criminal acts At the level of the individual, the process of differential association provides a social psychological explanation of how normative conflict in society translates into individual criminal acts. According to differential association, criminal behavior is learned in a process of communication in intimate groups. The content of learning includes two important elements. First are the requisite skills and techniques for committing crime, which can range from complicated, specialized skills of computer fraud, insider trading, and confidence games to the simple, readily available skills of assault, purse-snatching, and drunk driving. Such techniques are necessary but insufficient to produce crime. Second are definitions favorable and unfavorable to crime. These definitions are motives, verbal- izations, or rationalizations that make crime justified or unjustified, and include Sykes and Matza’s [75] “techniques of neutralization” used by delinquents, and Cressey’s [21] “verbalizations” used by embezzlers. For example, definitions favorable to income tax fraud include “everyone cheats on their taxes,” “it’s not a real crime,” and “the government has no right to tax its citizens.” Definitions favorable to drunk driving include, “I can drive fine after a few beers,” “I only have a couple of miles to drive home,” and “I won’t get caught this time.” Definitions favorable to violence include, “if your manhood is threatened, you have to fight back,” “you got to have the backs of your boys, even if it means violence,” “to maintain respect, you can never back down from a fight.” These definitions favorable to crime help organize and justify a criminal line of action in a particular situation. They are offset by definitions unfavorable to crime, such as “Income tax fraud is wrong and immoral,” “Tax fraud deprives Americans of important programs that benefit the commonwealth,” “All fraud and theft is immoral,” “Turn the other cheek,” “Friends don’t let friends drink and drive,” “Any violation of the law is wrong.” These examples illustrate several points about definitions of crime. First, some definitions pertain to specific offenses only, such as “Friends don’t let friends drink and drive,” whereas others refer to a class of offenses, such as “All fraud and theft is immoral,” and others refer to virtually all law violation, such as “Any violation of the law is wrong.” Second, each definition serves to justify or motivate either committing criminal acts or refraining from criminal acts. Third, these definitions are not merely ex-post facto rationalizations of crime, but rather operate to cause criminal behavior. Sutherland recognized that definitions favorable to crime can be offset by definitions unfavorable to crime, and therefore, he hypothesized that criminal behavior is determined by the ratio of definitions favorable to crime versus unfavorable to crime. Furthermore, he recognized that definitions are not all equal; some are more important. Sutherland identified at least four dimensions (or modalities) on which definitions vary in importance or weight: frequency (the number of times a definition is presented), duration (the length of time a person is exposed to a definition), priority (the earlier a definition is presented in a person’s life), and intensity (the more intense relationship or prestigious the person presenting the definition). Differential social organization, collective action, and crime Therefore, the individual-level hypothesis of differential association theory states that a person will engage in criminal behavior if the following three conditions are met [47]. (1) The person has learned the requisite skills and techniques for committing crime. (2) The person has learned an excess of definitions favorable to crime over unfavorable to crime. (3) The person has the objective opportunity to carry out the crime. According to Sutherland, if all three conditions are present and crime does not occur, or a crime occurs in the absence of any one condition, the theory would be wrong and in need of revision. Thus, in principle, the theory can be falsified. The process of differential association with definitions favorable and unfavorable to crime does not occur in a vacuum, but is structured by the broader social organization in which individuals are embedded. This includes the structures and organization of families, neighborhoods, schools, and labor markets. This organization is captured by the concept of differential social organization. Differential social organization: explanation of group rates of crime At the level of the group or society, differential social organization provides an organiza- tional explanation of how normative conflict in society translates into specific group rates of crime. According to differential social organization, the crime rate of a group or society is determined by the extent to which that group or society is organized against crime versus organized in favor of crime. In modern industrial societies, the two forms of organization exist side by side – and indeed are sometimes interwoven in complex ways, such as when police take bribes and participate in organized extortion, or baseball players take steroids in full view of teammates. Sutherland hypothesized that the relative strength of organization in favor of crime versus organization against crime could explain the crime rate of any group or society. Thus, compared to suburban neighborhoods, inner-city neighborhoods are weakly organized against street crimes and strongly organized in favor of such crimes. Compared to other groups, the Mafia is strongly organized in favor of crime and weakly organized against crime. Compared to the US, Japan is strongly organized against crime, and weakly organized in favor of crime. Moreover, the group-level theory of differential social organization is linked to the individual-level theory of differential association. Groups that are strongly organized in favor of crime display numerous and intense definitions favorable to crime. Conversely, groups that are strongly organized against crime display numerous and intense definitions unfavorable to crime. It follows that differential social organization determines group crime rates by influencing the availability of definitions favorable and unfavorable to crime within a group [47]. When groups are strongly organized in favor of crime and weakly organized against crime, they will present an abundance of definitions favorable to crime and few definitions unfavorable to crime. Thus, individuals in such a group have a high probability of learning an excess of definitions of crime. Whether they do depends on their actual learning. Even in high crime communities, some residents are isolated from the abundant criminal definitions and exposed to the few anti-criminal definitions in the community. According to the theory, they will refrain from crime because of an excess of definitions unfavorable to crime. The opposite also holds. In low crime communities, some residents are exposed to the few criminal definitions in the community, and isolated from the abundant anti-criminal definitions. Given the opportunity and skills, they will engage in crime because of an excess of definitions favorable to crime. R.L. Matsueda Insights into Sutherland’s concept of differential social organization Sutherland [70] initially specified the root cause of crime to be social disorganization, a term he “borrowed from Shaw and McKay,” and viewed culture conflict as a special instance of general social disorganization [72:21]. Later, at the suggestion of Albert K. Cohen, he changed the concept to “differential social organization,” “with organization for criminal activities on one side and organization against criminal activities on the other side,” because “the organization of the delinquent group, which is often very complex, is social disorganization only from an ethical or some other particularistic point of view.” Although Sutherland did not specify the precise processes making up differential social organization, we can infer several processes from his writings. Shaw and McKay’s [61] concept of social disorganization – the breakdown in community institutions resulting in loss of control over youth – becomes weak organization against crime, and their concept of cultural transmission – older street gangs in disorganized areas transmit a delinquent tradition to groups of younger boys, resulting in high rates of delinquency across generations – becomes strong organization in favor of crime. Tannenbaum’s [76] concepts of conflict between spontaneous youth play groups and the adult community (which derives from [78]), the subsequent dramatization of evil, and the hardening process in which sporadic delinquency is transformed into delinquent careers is a key component of organization in favor of crime. Finally, seminar conversations between Sutherland, Alfred Lindesmith, Henry McKay, and Frank Sweetser about neighborhood delinquency rates contributed to differential social organization. Sweetser went on to write his PhD dissertation on personal neighborhoods, which drew parallels with differential social organization (Gaylord & Galliher, 1988). Analyzing network ties in a single block, Sweetser [74] found that residents’ networks of acquaintances and associates varied widely, that “personal neighborhoods” differed for most residents, and therefore, that person-to- person networks within spatially defined neighborhoods should replace family units or neighborhoods-as-primary-groups as neighborhood units of analysis. This explains why “many boys in the most delinquent areas fail to absorb the delinquent ‘tradition’ and remain law abiding”: the “culture of the delinquency area is a spatial interpenetration of a delinquent and a law-abiding tradition, perpetuated by differential acquaintance and association among neighbors” [74]). In other words, the neighborhood is differentially organized for and against crime. In laying out the theory, Sutherland never explicitly identified the content of diffe- rential social organization. His most explicit writings on the subject appear in a 1943 essay in Ogburn’s collection, American Society in Wartime, titled “Crime,” where he hypothesizes that increasing rates of theft during war may be due to differential group organization. War increases theft by undermining organization against crime, consisting of five processes [73:124–125]: First, the external opportunities for thefts increased because the owners of property spent a larger part of their time away from home, because supervision in industrial and commercial establishments decreased, because the railways carried increased loads of commodities without increase in the number of guards, because a large number of persons, not selected on the basis of trustworthiness, were placed in positions of responsibility, and because the police force decreased in number and training. Second, the efforts to train children and adults in opposition to stealing were relaxed Differential social organization, collective action, and crime or abandoned because parents were away from home and because schools and churches were closed or diverted to other purposes. Third, many persons, especially younger children, were left in complete idleness with no provision for supervised legal activities. Fourth, many of the poor people developed increased hostility toward some property owners who were regarded as hoarders or owners of goods by other illegal methods. Fifth, the meaning of property ownership and of property rights was confused by governmental appropriation of private property, by radical departures from the previous system of determining values and distributing property, and by general use of public property with little attention to its ownership. Clearly organization against crime is a multifaceted process that anticipates future criminological theories. Sutherland anticipated routine activities theory by positing that theft is increased when capable guardians are removed or undercut. He drew on social disorganization to emphasize the role of families, schools, and churches in controlling children through training and socialization against crime. He anticipated Hirschi’s [37] concept of involvement in conventional activities by specifying that involving children in legitimate activities prevented idleness, which reduced crime. He anticipated Sykes and Matza’s [75] technique of neutralization, “denial of victim,” by specifying a mechanism by which theft becomes increasingly justifiable when property owners are themselves viewed as criminals or hoarders. More generally, he maintains that when the sanctity of private property is weakened by government responses to war, laws protecting property are undermined. For Sutherland [73:125], war also increases theft by fostering organization in favor of crime, of which he identifies four mechanism: Sixth, contacts with criminal patterns were increased because of the passage of large numbers of children and women from the sheltered environment of the home to the heterogeneous environment of the factory, shop, and store, because of the great increase in the mobility of people, and because persons who had been stealing previously now stole with increased frequency and thus more effectively presented the patterns of theft to the non-thieves. Seventh, many public and private employees, especially railway employees, were in collusion with the thieves. Eighth, many persons who were not in economic distress were engaged systematically in stealing for the black markets. Ninth, a situation had occurred which was appropriate for theft according to the cultural definition which had been held for a long time and somewhat generally, namely, the situation in which theft is the only apparent alternative to starvation. Organization in favor of crime, then, is also multi-faceted. Sutherland shows that mobility can increase crime by moving law-abiding individuals (such as children and women) out of the protected private context of the home into heterogeneous public places, thereby increasing contacts with criminal patterns. He argues that when the frequency rate of theft (as opposed to the participation rate – see [12]) increases, an epidemic can result because of a sudden spike in criminal patterns made available to non-criminals. Black markets flourished by enticing those who were not in dire poverty and by colluding with employees – the latter anticipates Cloward and Ohlin’s [15] concept of bonds between conventional and criminal elements (the fence, fix, bail bondsmen) as a key structural element that help subcultures flourish. Finally, Sutherland observes that definitions of situations calling for crime interact with objective situations: the cultural belief that theft is justified when the alternative is starvation – an example of what Sykes and Matza [75] later R.L. Matsueda termed “appeal to higher loyalties” – will increase rates of theft only when individuals face (or perceive to face) starvation. Sutherland concludes that war is associated with higher rates of theft because the above organizational processes weaken social control of theft and strengthen patterns of theft. This implies that differential social organization is specific to forms of crime, such as theft, which increased during the war, and sex offenses and assaults, which did not. He also notes that this explanation of crime rates does not explain why organization changes. In his application, however, he is assuming that a fairly exogenous factor–war–changes local organization, which in turn explains changes in crime. Furthermore, Sutherland is assuming that crime rates are the result of both criminal patterns or organization and the reactions to crime or organization against crime. Thus, societal reactions or what later became known as labeling, is endemic to differential organization. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Sutherland [73:126] argues that both forms of organization consist of two principal elements – “consensus in regard to objectives and in implementation for the realization of objectives.” In other words, such social organization is the result of collective action and entails building consensus over a problematic situation, and then translating that consensus into action. This problem can be addressed using Mead’s [52] theory of interaction and social control. Mead’s theory of symbolic interaction and social control In 1910, as a graduate student at the University of Chicago, Sutherland enrolled in Mead’s course on social psychology, and later wrote an article, “The Biological and Sociological Processes,” which essentially summarized Mead’s theories of role taking and the meaning of objects [69]. Nevertheless, Mead’s influence on Sutherland’s theorizing was, in all likelihood, mainly indirect, through the writings and teachings of W.I. Thomas [30:32]. Indeed, Mead’s concepts do not appear explicitly in the principles of differential association or differential social organization. But if we want to develop the dynamic portion of differential social organization, and link it to research on collective behavior, a return to Mead’s social psychology is useful. Mead begins with three assumptions. First is a methodological holism, in which “the whole (society) is prior to the part (the individual), not the part to the whole; and the part is explained in terms of the whole, not the whole in terms of the part or parts” [52:7]. Second is a social process model within which society, selves, and cognition, arise, and which can be studied by using the abstract concept of the social act, a cooperative act between two or more individuals. Third is an organic or functionalist social psychology, in which social acts are viewed as a “dynamic whole” (rather than as aggregations of stimulus–response sets), in which the component elements are analyzed in terms of their functions [52:7]. Taking the role of the other The key concept in Mead’s social psychological writings is role-taking, which occurs in social acts.1 Within an ongoing social process, social acts are built up by participants adjusting their responses to each other within an ongoing social process. When adjustments 1 Elsewhere, Karen Heimer and I have described Mead’s concept of role-taking and social control and applied it to delinquency; here I draw liberally from that discussion (see [48, 49: 169–170]). Differential social organization, collective action, and crime are smooth and routine, situations are non-problematic, and behavior non-reflective. When, however, an ongoing response or impulse is temporarily blocked, the situation becomes problematic, and individuals engage in role-taking, seeking solutions to the problematic situation by taking the role of others, viewing themselves as objects from the standpoint of others, and considering alternative lines of action from the standpoint of others [52]. Specifically, when an impulse is blocked by a physical or social barrier, an emotion – such as anger, fear, sadness, or happiness – is released, and the impulse is transformed into an image, which includes a plan of action and the anticipated reactions of others to the plan. The impulse is reacted to by another impulse, which follows the plan to overt behavior, combines the plan with another, or blocks the plan, causing the situation to remain problematic – in which case, the individual again takes the role of the other, forms a self as an object, and considers new alternatives from the standpoint of others. This process – the serial process of cognition – continues until the problem is solved or the social act fades. Mead [52] termed the image the “me” and the impulse the “I,” and specified them as two phases of the self – the self as an object drawn from the past, and the acting self responding in the present. By “solution” Mead meant not that the problem is resolved in an optimal way, but rather that it is solved for the practical purposes at hand, which means the blocked or conflicting impulses are freed and the social act is allowed to resume. Moreover, when similar problematic situations are repeatedly solved in functionally equivalent ways, they become less problematic, and behavior becomes habitual or non- reflective. In highly institutionalized settings, with strong norms, most behaviors are non- reflective, actors are not self-conscious, and stimuli lead directly to responses. At times, however, even normative behavior is interrupted by unanticipated or unconventional exigencies, and behaviors become reflective, actors take themselves as objects, and stimuli are mediated or interpreted by cognitive processes. Mead’s [52] theory of cognition consists of this dialectical inner-dialogue of the “I” and the “me,” which, in form and substance, resembles the “conversation of gestures” occurring between two individuals, except that it occurs between phases of the self in the mind. The response of the “I” occurs in the present, but only insofar as it has been called out by the “me” (a past) in terms of a specific anticipated future. Moreover, the “I” – or more precisely, the dialectical unfolding of the “I” and the “me” – contains an element of novelty or emergence, which stems from being in multiple perspectives simultaneously. Mead used the term “sociality” to refer to the ability to be in multiple spatio-temporal perspectives simultaneously – a prerequisite for role- taking, which is made possible by the use of significant symbols, which call out functionally identical responses in oneself as well as in others [54]. Mead’s analysis of the social act – an interaction among two or more persons, with an emerging goal, and division of labor – provides a framework for examining collective behavior within an interactionist perspective consistent with Sutherland’s differential social organization. Three key points emerge here. First, consensus over the goal of the act is an ongoing accomplishment possible through taking the role of others and using significant symbols to call out functionally equivalent responses, which constitute shared meanings. Such intersubjectivity is a practical accomplishment, and not an ontological imperative [40]. Second, individual decisions are practical solutions to problematic situations – and not optimal solutions – in that they are simply the first solution considered that removes the obstacle that blocked the ongoing act, which is arrived at through a trial-and-error cognitive process or imaginative rehearsal. The solutions considered derive from the information gleaned not only from the concrete actors within the social act, but also the rules and norms governing the larger social group within which the act is embedded. Behavior, then, is R.L. Matsueda better characterized as “satisficing” than utility maximizing [64]. Third, consensus over goals and means for attaining goals cannot be assumed a priori, but is often built up or constituted through reciprocal role-taking. In other words, the “I” can suggest new alternatives (“me’s”) and vice-versa. This parallels Dewey’s [23] theory of “ends in view,” in which ends are always in the present and are reciprocally related to means. Once a problematic situation is solved, and conflicting impulses are resolved through role-taking, a reconstruction of the situation has occurred, and a new self emerges from the old self: “Solution is reached by the construction of a new world harmonizing the conflicting interests into which enters the new self” [53:149]. The social structure of the self and stages of development of the self The self, then, arises in social interaction as an object, and thus, is socially constituted (given meaning) as an object in the same way other physical objects are constituted. For Mead [53:141], the organized society is prior to the individual, and the self has a definite social structure, which derives from the larger society in which the individual participates: “Inner consciousness is socially organized by the importation of the social organization of the outer world.” That structure is revealed when Mead describes the process of acquiring a mature self using his well-known analogy of “play” and “the game.” Early in life, children learn to play roles by taking the role of concrete others independently: they play policeman and arrest themselves; they play parent and scold themselves [52:150]. During this period, the child becomes aware of his or her body, learns to identify with the body (that is, draw a connection between the self and the body), and differentiate the body from the rest of the world.2 Later, having developed a sense of the body, and a rudimentary or compartmen- talized self, children diversify the self by learning the game, in which they take the role of the entire group or “generalized other,” including the norms, rules, and expectations governing various positions and roles of the group, community, or society. They learn to relate the rules, expectations, and obligations of their own roles to those of others within the organized system. This process of taking the role of the generalized other is the most effective form of social control because organized groups and institutionalized norms enter individual behavior. Stages of moral reasoning and linguistic codes For Mead, the movement from the stage of play to the game illustrates not only the development of the self and social control, but also the development of moral reasoning. Beyond the rudimental beginning of the game stage, expanding the scope of the generalized other increases one’s facility to solve moral problems by transcending conventional moral thought. The social structure and its conventional standards, which are unimpaired by the problem, allow individuals to use reason to abstract from morally problematic values to a more universal discourse containing a solution. The ideal is a universal society, in which perfected intelligence allows each member to take the role of others and arrive at the same 2 For Mead [52], play is organized around collective reciprocal role-taking, occurring around age four, whereas Piaget saw pretend play as “nonserious symbolic gestures, and occurring around age two [16:412]. Differential social organization, collective action, and crime meanings – that is, a universal understanding of others [52]. Joas [41:137] summarizes Mead’s “rational resolution of moral problem-situations”: It consists in taking into account and understanding all values which appear in a situation. This does not mean that one merely juxtaposes these values in a relativistic fashion; rather, it means questioning the claim to validity of each of these values, from the standpoint of bringing about a universal community based on communication and cooperation among its members. Comprehensive communication with one’s partners in a moral situation and orientation to the realization of this ideal society are, then, two rules for the solution of moral problems. Kohlberg’s stages of moral reasoning The developmental psychologists, Piaget and Kohlberg, have expanded this notion of stages in cognition and role-taking and applied them to moral reasoning. For Piaget, children initially experience, with their parents, a relationship of one-sided authority, constraint, and respect. Consequently, they are unable to understand the rationale behind rules, and thus, see rules as “external and unchangeable” [14:191]. Morality is one of constraint by authority figures and their rules. Later, however, children’s interactions with peers are as equals, and therefore, they must learn to cooperate by taking the role of the other and understanding the perspectives of others. Empirical research showing problems are solved better by groups of children than individuals is consistent with Piaget, as well as Mead [41:163–164]. The child’s egocentrism allows it to tolerate contradictory perceptions in isolation; however, in groups, presentations of contradictory perceptions by different individuals cannot be dismissed and, consequently, stimulates the group to resolve the contradiction through role-taking. The emergent rules are based on mutual agreements and therefore are not sacred, but can be changed by mutual agreement. A morality of cooperation is less the application of moral rules or the use of moral principles, and more a process of resolving moral conflicts by coordinating perspectives [14]. At the heart of cooperation is role-taking. For Kohlberg [44:134], stages of moral development “represent successive modes of taking the role of others in social situations,” which, he notes, is the position of Mead, Dewey, and others.3 Building on Piaget’s work, Kohlberg conducted empirical research on children and adolescents, in which he presents them with moral dilemmas, asks them their opinion of the dilemma, and most importantly, probes them for the kind of reasoning they use to arrive at the opinion. An example, which we use to illustrate Kohlberg’s stages, called the “Heinz dilemma,” involves a legal dilemma: “Should Heinz steal a drug to save his dying wife if the only druggist able to provide the drug insists on a high price that Heinz cannot afford to pay?” [17:9]. Based on answers to such scenarios, Kohlberg [43] identified six stages of moral reasoning, which fell into three ordered levels: (1) pre-conventional morality, (2) conventional morality, and (3) post-conventional morality (see Table 1). The first stage, “obedience and punishment,” is characterized by unquestioned obedience to authority, avoidance of punishment (which proves that disobedience is wrong), and an egocentric point of view that ignores the interests of others. Here the child would argue that 3 Joas [41:163–166] has argued convincingly that stage theories of Piaget, Kohlberg, and others fail to develop Mead’s theory of the constitution of physical objects through practical intersubjectivity; instead, a focus on presocial cognitive development precludes a “truly sociological research on socialization.” R.L. Matsueda Heinz should not steal the drug because it is against the law, is bad, or will result in punishment. The second stage, “individualism and exchange,” recognizes that individuals have different viewpoints and interests, individuals act in their own self-interest, what is right is fair exchange, and ultimately what is right is not absolute, but is relative. Here the child would recognize that stealing would be in the interest of Heinz but not the druggist. Those in stages 1 and 2 are in a pre-conventional level because they act as individuals rather than members of a collectivity. They are rooted in Mead’s play stage, able only to take role of concrete others serially and individually. In contrast, those who have progressed to level II, conventional morality, recognize that they are members of a larger group or society. The third stage, “good interpersonal relationships,” emphasizes being good, which means having good motives, showing concern for significant others, and maintaining trust and loyalty in close relationships. Shared agreements and expectations take precedence over individual interests. Here, youth can put themselves in someone else’s shoes; they would view Heinz’s motives (looking out for his wife) as good, and those of the druggist (overcharging) as bad, selfish, and greedy. The fourth stage considers the social system as a whole: youth here take the role of the entire group, recognizing the rules and laws that govern relationships among roles. Right is defined as contributing to society and abiding by laws unless a law conflicts with other social duties. This corresponds to Mead’s stage of the game. Here, youth might say they un- derstand Heinz’s predicament, feel his motives are good, but cannot condone theft because if everyone did it, the social order would break down. Both stages three and four operate at level II, conventional morality because neither critiques current conventional institutions. Those who have progressed to level III, post-conventional morality, are able to take a “prior to society perspective” in which they imagine what an ideal society might look like [17:22]. In the fifth stage, “social contract and individual rights,” young adults recognize the validity of the social contract, which protects personal and property rights, Bentham’s utility principle – “the greatest good for the greatest number” – and the need to integrate perspectives or conflicting values through legitimate mechanisms such as agreements, contracts, and due process. Here, in judging Heinz’s behavior, they might reason that life is more important than property, and therefore, Heinz’s actions are justified. In stage six, “universal ethical principles,” adults recognize that the validity of a law rests on underlying universal principles of justice, such as respect for the dignity and worth of individuals, and the equality of all persons. If a law violates the universal principle, the principle should be followed. To implement stage six, all individuals involved would take the role of all others to arrive at an impartial judgment. Thus, in the example, the druggist would take the role of the wife and agree with the others that her life trumps his profit. Thus, in stage six, a consensual decision is a likely outcome. Table 1 Kohlberg’s stages of moral reasoning Levels Stages Level I Pre-conventional morality Stage 1. Obedience and punishment orientation Stage 2. Individualism, exchange, and instrumentalism Level II Conventional morality Stage 3. Good relationships and mutual expectations Stage 4. Law and order Level III Post-conventional morality Stage 5. Social contract and individual rights Stage 6. Universal ethical principles Differential social organization, collective action, and crime It is important to note that different stages of moral reasoning can lead to the identical outcome. In the example above, a child at stage one may disagree with Heinz’s theft for the simple reason that it is against the law, while a youth at stage four may also disagree, but for the reason that protecting the social order takes precedence over Heinz’s good intentions. Nevertheless, we would expect that higher levels of moral judgment will be associated with moral behavior. If we assume that conventional laws, norms, and morals tend to approximate the ideal of the social contract, we would expect individuals operating at a high level of moral reasoning to solve their problematic situations in ways consistent with laws and norms. Whether one used the reasoning of social contract or individual rights or of universal ethical principles, the result will likely be consistent with conventional norms. Empirical research supports this view: On average, individuals operating at higher stages of moral reasoning tend to engage in moral behavior, such as being honest, resisting temptation, and engaging in prosocial behavior [9, 16]. But the relationship between moral reasoning and behavior is likely complex and context dependent. Criminal laws and norms always contain a political element, favoring some classes or groups over others – which makes the social contract imagery at best an abstract ideal, and at worst an ideological tool of obfuscation. For example, Garland [29] argues that “the key to understanding criminal law in class terms is to appreciate the ways in which particular interests are interwoven with general ones,” and the ways in which the protection of class interests are disguised as protection of universal interests. If this statement is true and transparent to members of society, we would expect that, at least at times, higher stages of moral reasoning will be associated with behavior at odds with conventional norms and laws. Citizens recognizing the class bias in particular laws will be sympathetic to the plight of those (perhaps themselves) at the losing end. Thus, the legitimacy of laws would be drawn into question. More broadly, stages of moral reasoning point to the complicated issue of applying general abstract norms to specific concrete situations. There is a strong tendency to slant such applications in ways that reflect one’s self-interest, which may affect all but those of stage six. For example, the principle of stealing drugs for a dying wife can be easily transformed to stealing illicit drugs for a needy girlfriend. Such vocabularies of motive, such as embezzler’s rationalization that they are “merely borrowing their firm’s money,” [21] are precisely the definitions favorable to crime that Sutherland [71] felt were the key determinants of crime. Even the application of post-conventional moral reasoning requires accurate information, untainted by the bias of in-group or individual interests, with which to make moral judgments that transcend the individual or narrow group. We know, however, that information and knowledge is slanted, biased, and framed in ways that tend to reflect the interests of individuals. Thus, the structure of communication networks may be crucial for understanding how such moral reasoning translates into behavior. Moral reasoning and social networks Moral reasoning may vary directly with social networks. For example, Coser [20] argues that in simple role-sets, characteristic of a Gemeinshaft, interactions will be restricted to similar others, behavioral expectations are predictable, and the intentions and meanings of others is transparent. Intentions of others can be taken for granted, a morality of constraint dominates over a morality of cooperation, and individuals have little incentive to develop higher stages of moral reasoning. Rigid norms govern behavior which everyone understands. Consequently, in simple role sets, speech patterns devolve into what Bernstein R.L. Matsueda [8] terms restricted codes, which are particularistic in meaning, predictable, and rigidly organized around a narrow range of syntactic alternatives. Restricted codes are context- dependent and known only among in-group members who share a common history, interests, and folk knowledge. By contrast, in complex role-sets, characteristic of a Gesellschaft, interactions include dissimilar others, behavioral expectations are unpredictable, and intentions and meanings are opaque [20]. To understand the intentions, meanings, and perspectives of others requires the mental work of role-taking, in which the perspectives of others are identified by locating them within a larger structure of roles (generalized other). A morality of cooperation is necessary, which provides an incentive to develop higher stages of moral reasoning. Norms are fluid and open to reinterpretation within interaction. Thus, in complex role sets, elaborate role-taking exposes individuals to new organized groups, and intellectual flexibility and individualism result. Speech patterns evolve into elaborated codes, which are organized flexibly around a wide range of syntactic alternatives, such that meanings are more universal and context-free [8:77–80]. Moreover, codes are structured by class. The lower classes tend to form small insular peer groups, use restricted codes, and follow rigid rules; upper classes tend toward heterogeneous groups tied together by weak bridging ties, use elaborated codes, and use higher levels of moral reasoning in applying flexible rules. Code switching, then, is a useful skill because “the ability to switch codes controls the ability to switch roles” [8:129]. Given that elaborated codes are prevalent among middle classes and within conventional institutions, like schools, members of lower classes are handicapped not only by their lack of resources but also their limited access to elaborated codes, which fosters intellectual flexibility. Because codes are linked to class through social ties, an important question is how are network ties structured? Network structure, collective action frames, and thresholds For Mead, like W.I. Thomas and Sutherland, social structure consists of the stable compo- nents of organized groups. At an abstract level, we may consider such structures as existing independently of content – that is, independent of the specific purposive action of actors who constitute and reconstitute those structures.4 For Mead, social organization is constituted through social interaction, and therefore, the critical elements of social structure are communication networks [62]. Individuals’ generalized others, which constitute their selves and informs their practical activity, are limited to those with whom they interact. But to whom do they interact? We can explore the answer to this question using recent work on structural ties. Social networks and social capital Let me begin with Coleman’s [19] concept of social capital and social ties. Although Coleman had a different project – beginning with a utilitarian model of rational action and linking preferences and information to structural ties in the form of social capital – we can draw upon his discussion of social ties to help answer our question of who interacts with whom. For Coleman, closed network structures enable greater social capital and social 4 In reality, of course, structures arise because of the historically specific purposes of actors at a specific conjunction of history and spatial context. Differential social organization, collective action, and crime control. Figure 1a depicts an open structure in which A and B are linked to C, but not linked to each other. A and B can independently and additively influence C by using individual sanctions, developing trust, establishing norms, using moral persuasion, and the like. But they cannot engage in joint behavior because they lack social ties. Figure 1b depicts a closed structure in which A and B are linked not only to C, but also to each other. They can not only influence C independently, but – because they interact with each other – they can jointly (multiplicatively) influence C by developing coordinated strategies, simultaneous sanctions, similar rhetorical arguments, and the like. In other words, they can each take the role of C, as well as each other, in developing a collective strategy to influence C. Coleman gives a second example of parents and children. Figure 2a gives an open structure in which child B is friends with child C, but their parents, A and D do not know each other, and therefore, can only influence their own child’s behavior indepen- dently. Figure 2b provides a closed structure in which the parents are linked. Again, the parents can now work collectively to control or influence their children, monitoring each others’ children and calling each other, coordinating their punitive strategies and rhetorical arguments, etc. Given common everyday knowledge of the way in which these structures operate, individuals can use the structures strategically, seeking out closed structures to increase control over members, and perhaps working to maintain open structures, such as 1a, to insure that A and B are unable to conspire against C, in a kind of divide and conquer strategy. Strategic parents will befriend parents of their children’s friends, and develop joint strategies when possible. Of course, other structural conditions will affect whether this is possible, including job flexibility, income and other resources, (which provide free time to engage in such strategies), neighborhood residential stability (which provides a stable set of parents who care about the community and its children), and the like. Similarly, strategic peers will befriend the friends of their friends – and develop cohesive cliques and peer a A B A B a a. Open Neighborhood Structure b b b. Closed Neighborhood Structure Figure 2 Open and closed neighborhood structures. C A B A B C a. Open Structure b. Closed Structure Figure 1 Open and closed social networks. R.L. Matsueda groups – to enable joint activity, including coordinating goals and actions, developing trust and norms, sanctioning rule violators, and so on. The strength of weak ties Closed structures tend to form dense networks of like-minded actors. Granovetter [32, 34] argues that assortative matching is typically based on homophily, which creates close relationships among similar individuals. We seek out and form close attachments with individuals like ourselves. Strong ties within a homogenous group not only encourage conformity but also lead to the circulation and recirculation of similar ideas. Such groups will tend to be stable over time, and have strong internal social control – through shared information, consensus over goals, and strong norms and sanctions – particularly when members identify with the group. The group’s homogeneity and closed structure will cause it to be rigid, lack cognitive flexibility, and have difficulty adjusting to changes in the environment. Innovation will come slowly if at all. As Coser [20:242] argues, “there may be a distinct weakness in strong ties,” because “the Gemeinschaft may prevent individuals from articulating their roles in relation to the complexities of the outside world.” In contrast, groups that are not entirely closed, but have weak ties to other groups, will benefit from information flows between groups. Thus, Figure 3 depicts two groups, 1 and 2, with a single tie or bridge between C and E, which links the two groups. The information flowing across the bridge will expose members of each group to novel ideas and information, since it is coming from a set of comparatively dissimilar individuals. Granovetter [32] argues that weak ties provide group members with information on the latest ideas, fashions, and job openings, as well as increasing the likelihood of members being organized into social movements. Conversely, the absence of weak ties not only isolates members, but presents obstacles to building a critical mass necessary to produce a political movement or goal-oriented social organization. Moreover, echoing Sweetser’s [74] suggestion for studying the person-to-person contacts within a neighborhoods, Fine and Kleinman [25:9] argue for linking the concept of subculture to cultural spread through interlocking group networks (see also [62]). B A C E G F Group 1 Strongly Tied Group 2 Strongly Tied D H Local Bridge (Weak Tie) Figure 3 Local bridge (weak tie) linking two distinct closed networks. Differential social organization, collective action, and crime This conception is consistent with Mead’s [52] notion that creativity, innovation, and intellectual flexibility for solving novel problems is increased when one participates in multiple disparate groups, taking the role of those groups, and considering problems from their unique perspective. Expanding the generalized other toward the theoretical limit of a “universal other” maximizes a person’s ability to solve novel and complex problems by considering a multitude of perspectives, and even combining those perspectives. Such structures may be linked to classes. For example, following Blau [10], Granovetter [34] suggests that strong ties may be more frequent in the lower classes because of the tendency toward homophily and the pyramid-shaped class structure of modern societies, with few at the top and the masses at the bottom. The result is that lower class individuals will tend to form strong ties because there are so many lower class individuals with whom to form such ties, while upper class individuals will form a large number of weak ties – many of which are to the numerous lower class individuals – because there are so few upper class individuals with whom to form strong ties. This purely structural argument would lead to a fragmented lower class, with small isolated pockets of strongly tied groups, which require more time and energy to maintain, and an upper class characterized by diffuse weak ties, requiring less time, but yielding greater information and intellectual flexibility. To overcome their small number, members of upper classes must strategically form strong ties to one another through elite clubs and schools. Moreover, the poor and disenfranchised, isolated in parochial groups, perceive few alternatives to their problematic situations and adapt by investing in strong reciprocal ties to kinship networks [34:213]. Such structures provide a basis for theorizing about organization against crime and organization in favor of crime. For residents of affluent neighborhoods, who enjoy regular employment, good incomes, and sufficient time and resources to address local problems (such as delinquency), a mix of strong and weak ties is empowering. Strong ties enable such residents to reach consensus about shared problems, agree on promising solutions, and work collectively to try out such solutions [e.g., 58]. Weak ties to outsiders enable them to introduce innovative solutions by providing fresh ideas and information, and to draw directly on ties to outside social agencies. For residents of disadvantaged neighborhoods, high rates of residential mobility, poverty, and lack of time and resources undermines their ability to reach consensus about crime control beyond the kinship network, identify novel ways of controlling crime, link to other agencies, and act collectively. Moreover, in such neighborhoods, disadvantaged youth, who have high rates of school failure and bleak labor market trajectories, have a strong incentive to develop alternate ways of gaining status, perhaps in illicit ways [e.g., 2, 15]. Such innovation may be more likely when the group of disadvantaged youth have weak ties to other disadvantaged groups who share the same objective situation. To link these structures to instrumental action, we turn to theories of collective action. Collective action, frame analysis, and individual thresholds Let us begin by using Sutherland’s terms, “organization in favor of crime,” and “organization against crime,” but with the caveat that these are analytical abstractions, rather than concrete phenomena. It is only a slight exaggeration to say that organization lies inert, waiting to be actualized by actors’ instrumental action; it is an exaggeration because in reality, organization and the instrumental actions it may facilitate interact. Like social capital, the same social organization used for legitimate ends can be appropriated by actors for criminal ends [e.g., 18:S108]. In reality, the two are related in complex ways, at times R.L. Matsueda causally related – as when expanding criminal patterns cause conventional groups to organize against crime – and at times intertwined within a single fabric – as when violence is generally condemned, except when committed against outsiders. Again for analytic purposes, we can distinguish two polar opposite forms of social organization. The first, which may be termed “institutional action,” are those acts which occur in institutional contexts, entail routinized, formal, and norm-following behavior, and typically are found in formal organizations. The extreme case for us would be responses to crime that are carried out by the criminal justice system, a highly bureaucratized organization. The second, which we term “collective action,” are those acts commonly defined as occurring outside of institutional contexts in informal groups or gatherings, tending to be more spontaneous and creative, and requiring the building of coalitions and consensus in the absence of a strong normative system. I will focus on collective action, rather than institutional action, for three reasons. First, much research has been done on the formal role of the legal system, schools, and families on crime and delinquency. Second, with a few exceptions, such as the Mafia and drug networks, the threat of formal sanction by the state has consistently kept institutional action from becoming a prominent feature of most criminal activity. Third, the model of collective action among informal groups entails dynamic mechanisms that are relevant to institutional action within formal organizations when a novel problem arises, and rules and routines break down. In addition, institutional action typically originates in collective behavior, which then becomes useful for solving local problems, and is then routinized and institutitionalized [e.g., 7]. Of course, not all criminal acts or reactions to crime are collective acts of more than one individual. But, as Mead [52] argued, the prototypical behavioral act is thoroughly social, the individual is an abstraction from the group, and we can explain isolated individual acts with the same model.5 Symbolic interactionism played an important role in studies of collective action during the 1960s and 1970s with theories of spontaneity and emergent norms [42]. By the 1980s, however, such ideas were on the decline, replaced by resource mobilization theory, which argued that rational actors seeking to maximize utility draw upon social networks, pre- existing organization, and political opportunities to bring about collective action. In the past two decades, students of collective action have returned to interactionist ideas using the concept of frame alignment [6]. The argument is that the structure of network ties, political opportunities, and institutional support helps explain opportunity structures for collective action, but has little to say about the moment-to-moment dynamics of an emerging social movement, and in particular, how the framing of grievances may foster social movements. Drawing on Goffman’s [31] frame analysis, Snow et al. [68] view individuals as “signifying agents,” who actively produce, maintain, and fight for meanings about issues they find important, and “struggle to have certain meanings and under- standings gain ascendance over others” [67:587]. They produce “collective action frames,” which are emergent beliefs and meanings that foster social movements by framing a problematic situation as calling for an action-oriented solution. In other words, they help build, in Sutherland’s [73:126] terms, “consensus in regard to objectives and in implementation for the realization of objectives.” Framing is the process of constructing reality in ways that foster collective action and “entails agency in the sense that what evolves is the product of joint action by movement participants in encounters with antagonists and targets,” and is also “contentious in the 5 This is unlikely to apply to rare instance of behaviors that are the direct result of mental impairments. Differential social organization, collective action, and crime sense that it generates alternative interpretation schemes that may challenge existing frames” [67:587]. Snow et al. [68:478] argue that the process of frame alignment – linking the interpretive frameworks of individuals and social movement organizations – is the key task for social movement organizers. This includes frame bridging (linking ideologically congruent but structurally unconnected frames), frame amplification (invigorating frames by tying them to core values and beliefs), frame extension (enlarging a frame’s boundaries to incorporate views or interests salient to others), and frame transformation (radically changing a frame to secure participation and support). In addition, frames can be made more resonant by presenting them as salient and credible, and strategically diffused over time and across space [6]. Moreover, frames vary by Bernstein’s [8] restricted versus elaborated codes: restricted frames are narrow, closed, and difficult to extend or amplify, whereas elaborated frames are syntactically flexible, easily elaborated, and thus, more inclusive of disparate aggrieved groups [66]. The process of framing is rooted in Mead’s analysis of the social act. Using Mead’s terms, frames are constellations of meanings of objects rooted in the organization of groups. Moreover, they can be called up to solve problematic situations in the present, whereby they are modified and jointly constituted within social acts, calling out specific responses in self and other. Thus, frames are ways of interpreting a world out there, which helps marshal collective solutions to problematic situations. As individuals buy into the frame, participate in the social movement, and commit resources to the cause, they develop a personal identity from the activity, and when acting together, develop collective identities – that is, a shared sense of selves acting jointly to accomplish a common goal [e.g., 79]. Successful social movements, of course, require objective opportunities, including “the amount of resources at the discretion of potential constituents, the degree of previously existing organization among potential constituents, the configuration of allies and enemies, the social control policies of authorities, the strategy and tactics of organizers, and – overall – the structure of the political economy constraining mobilization and wielding of resources” [26:10]. What makes a frame more effective in mobilizing others to action? Gamson [28:155] argues that effective collective action frames contain three elements: “(a) it defines the root of the problem and its solution collectively rather than individually; (b) it defines the antagonists – ‘us’ and ‘them’; and (c) it defines an injustice that can be corrected through a challenger’s action.” Thirty years earlier, Cloward and Ohlin [15] made a similar argument about lower class boys who face structural barriers to success, and consequently a problem of social status. If they attribute their failure to an unjust system – “them” as opposed to “us” – they will seek out collective solutions to their status problems, such as innovating illegal ways of attaining success. Individual Thresholds and Collective Action Theoretically, there is reason to believe that beyond the antecedents of collective action discussed so far – the structure of network ties, political opportunities, and institutional support, as well as the successful situational framing of a grievance – we need to consider an additional situational mechanism in determining whether an individual joins an emerging collective action. This is Granovetter’s [33] notion of individual thresholds of collective behavior. Drawing on Schelling’s [55] threshold model of residential segregation, Granovetter [33] posits that each individual has a threshold for joining the collective action, which is defined as the proportion of the group that has already joined. Once that threshold has been exceeded, the individual will join, all else being equal. Thus, if one has a threshold of 0.6 and only half of the group has joined a riot, one will stay away from the riot. Granovetter [33] interprets this R.L. Matsueda effect within a rational choice framework: the individual with a high threshold either acts on a belief in safety in numbers (the certainty of arrest declines with number of rioters) or norms of fairness. Thus, he assumes that for individuals, “given their goals and preferences, and their perception of their situations, they act so as to maximize their utility” [33:1422]. But what explains individual differences in thresholds? Granovetter is rather vague on this issue, suggesting they result from background characteristics, personality, identities, available alternatives, sensitivity to the opinions of others, and preferences such as beliefs or norms. From the standpoint of Mead, the most important determinant would be a conception of self or identity – formed from the standpoint of significant others – followed by availability of alternatives, and sensitivity to opinions of others. Thus, those with an image of self (from the standpoint of others) as a “rabble-rouser” will have a low threshold for rioting, whereas those with an identity as a “conservative” will have a high threshold. Moreover, identities that are embedded in the emerging organization of collective action – the generalized other with interrelated roles – will be particularly salient. A rabble-rouser who has instigated riots within the group at hand will have a very low threshold. Also consistent with Mead [52], thresholds, like identities, are not completely stable, but can change within the course of a situation, such as when police arrive on the scene, increasing the costs of rioting. Thresholds also tend to be specific to forms of collective action, such as participating in a riot, breaking up a fight among kids, or being a good Samaritan. Threshold models reveal surprising macro-level outcomes from assumptions of initial distributions of thresholds. A simple example from Granovetter [33] illustrates this point well. Begin with a street corner in which 100 people milling around have a uniform distribution of thresholds to riot ranging from zero to 99. The instigator, with a threshold of zero (meaning he will riot in isolation) throws a brick through a window, followed by the person with threshold 1, then 2, and so on until all 100 individuals have rioted. This is a cascade or bandwagon effect, with equilibrium value of 100. Now, repeat the scenario but replace the person with threshold 1 with a threshold of 2. The instigator breaks a window, but no one else joins. The distributions of thresholds in the two populations are nearly identical, but the outcomes are radically different. Of course, all members of a group are not equal – some may be friends and have more influence on one’s decisions. Granovetter shows in this simple example that the first equilibrium of 100 rioters is very unstable in the face of small changes in friendship structure, whereas the second equilibrium of one rioter is very robust to such changes. The important point here is that collective action is not merely a result of access to resources, successful framing (or definition of the situation), or the absence of alternatives, but also has a dynamic temporal dimension that emerges in the situation, which is consistent with the social process model of Mead and other pragmatists. Social organization against crime We can apply collective action frames and individual thresholds to social organization against crime. I will do this by example, first describing a few social movements against crime and then providing a more detailed description of mechanisms by which collective action frames and individual thresholds translate social capital and collective efficacy into collective action against crime. In each of these examples, I focus on the collective action dynamic, and take the constellation of institutions – the static element of differential social organization – as a given. Differential social organization, collective action, and crime Social movements against crime A number of social movement studies have examined collective action that organizes groups against various crimes. For example, Becker [5] argued that the creation of deviance and crime begins with the process of rule creation, which is often instigated by moral crusaders, who are typically from upper classes, motivated by humanitarian concerns, and preoccupied with the substantive ends (rather than the logistical means) of their crusades. Moral crusaders bring attention to the problem using the mass media, and marshal support from various interest groups that may have disparate interests in seeing the rule passed. Moral crusades tend to have a natural history, beginning with a broad set of values – like self-determination or the protestant work ethic – deriving a specific rule based on those values, and then creating a bureaucratic system to enforce those rules. The job of enforcing rules falls to “rule enforcers” – police, prison guards, security – who tend to be more concerned with the bureaucratic imperatives of enforcement than with the actual substantive content of the rules. Becker [5] applies this framework to the passage of the Marijuana Tax Act of 1937, arguing that the Federal Bureau of Narcotics (FBN) used the news media to create a national panic over marijuana use, compelling Congress to enact legislation.6 McCarthy [51] argues that during the 1960s the “auto safety frame,” in which auto accidents are attributed to unsafe design features of automobiles gained ascendance under the leadership of Ralph Nader, and led to the creation of the National Highway Traffic and Safety Administration (NHTSA). The “drunk driving frame,” in which auto accidents are attributed to drinking and driving remained in the background until a report delivered to Congress in 1968 highlighted the number of crashes and deaths resulting from drinking and driving, attributed the problem to personal responsibility of the “drunk driver,” and pro- posed legal solutions to the problem. NHTSA committed to the frame, waged a “war on drunk driving,” and funded DUI law enforcement grants and demonstration programs. But, it was not until the late 1970s that a citizen’s movement brought drunk driving to the public consciousness. The movement included national organizations with local chapters, such as Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD) and Remove Intoxicated Drivers (RID), suc- ceeded in getting their message to the media because of their raw emotional message, emphasis on victimization, and local chapters in close proximity to local media [51]. Nevertheless, autonomous agents of the state played a key role in subsequently legitimating, dissemi- nating, and embedding the frame in law enforcement and judicial practices. Moreover, once the drunk driving frame became widespread, it provided a “collective identity opportunity” for other victims of drunk driving to conceive of themselves as victims [51:157]. Jenness and Broad [39] argue that hate crime legislation resulted from the intersection of four social movements. The civil rights movement provided a model for addressing discrimination and intergroup violence using government policy. The women’s movement altered the discourse on violence against women from a private personal problem dealt with in the privacy of the home to a public social problem involving a specific social category of victims – namely women. The gay and lesbian movement broadened the definition of what constitutes legitimate subjects of discrimination and reshaped discourse on sexual politics and violence. Finally, the crime victims movement pushed to articulate and expand the 6 Others, however, have argued that the act was either rooted in racist fears among law enforcement officials that marijuana fueled violence by Mexicans, rooted in an attempt by the FBN to expand its authority and scope, or rooted in a fear that it was associated with dropping out of society (see Galliher and Walker, 1977; Himmelstein, 1983). R.L. Matsueda rights of victims of crime, which are assumed inadequately addressed by the criminal justice system. Civil rights organizations such as the NAACP began documenting instances of violence against blacks and other minorities, as part of the racial justice movement. A coalition of organizations, using frames of racism and hate, pushed for legislation to address bias-motivated crimes. Jenness and Broad [35] show how the gay and lesbian movement appropriated frames from the women’s movement, such as “sexual terrorism,” to include violence against gays and lesbians as instances of hate crime. In a study of the diffusion of hate crime laws across states, Grattet et al. [35] find that early adapters of hate crime laws experimented with a variety of legal strategies (e.g., penalty enhancement, civil rights violation, ethnic intimidation), but later adapters coalesced around a couple (penalty enhancement and ethnic intimidation). They also find that the domain of hate crime expanded over time, as more classes of victims were included (sexual orientation and disability) and more forms of violence were included. Finally, Jenness and Grattet [40] examine enforcement of hate crime laws, and find that within the courts, appellate cases gradually arrived at a consensus over what constitutes a hate crime (settling on the broad definition of bias-motivated crime over a narrower conception requiring animus), and this definition was then followed by prosecutors and police. In this way, the definition was institutionalized. Collective action against crime: informal social control and collective efficacy Perhaps the most powerful deterrent of crime is informal social control, in which families, neighborhoods, schools, and other institutions seek to control crime informally without resorting to the legal system. Morenoff et al. [55] have used the concept of collective efficacy as a neighborhood-level concept defined as the “willingness of local residents to intervene for the common good,” which is largely dependent on “conditions of mutual trust and solidarity among neighbors” (Sampson & Raudenbush, 1997:919). It is a collective counterpart to self-efficacy, and like the latter, is “relative to specific tasks such as maintaining public order” [57:108]. Concretely, collective efficacy is measured by neighbors’ willingness to intervene when groups of children are hanging out, fighting, vandalizing, and the like. Moreover, Sampson et al. [58] link collective efficacy to the concept of social capital, arguing that intergenerational closure (ties between the parents of different children in the neighborhood) and reciprocated exchange (exchange of advice, favors, goods among neighbors) provide the “resource potential of personal and organizational networks” for children, which is realized in collective efficacy. In turn, the density of social ties are conditioned by neighborhood disadvantage versus affluence, including socioeconomic status, racial composition, and residential turnover. But the relationship between structural ties and the capacity of neighborhoods to solve problems may be more complex. Insular neighborhoods with dense networks may be effective in addressing some problems but not others. Uncomplicated problems – such as youth outsiders coming into the neighborhood and assaulting local youth – for which prior consensus exists may be readily solved, as solutions are known and straightforward (e.g., activating a neighborhood watch or calling the police). But more complicated problems – such as resource-poor local residents of a housing project seeking social control of violence – may be more difficult to solve. Such problems may require innovative ideas, intellectual flexibility, and high stages of moral reasoning characteristic of affluent neighborhoods containing networks with numerous weak ties to dissimilar groups. Thus, it is not only the density of ties within a neighborhood, but the distribution of weak ties that Differential social organization, collective action, and crime determines social capital. In general, strong ties may be more important for maintaining trust and cooperation (as in a Gemeinschaft), but weak ties more important for disseminating new information (as in a Gesellschaft). Moreover, this characterization of neighborhood control does not describe the dynamics of informal control. That is, given they are more or less embedded in local networks, how are residents able to act collectively to reduce crime and disorder in the neighborhood? I argue that moral, rational, and pragmatic persuasion through conversation is a key element of collective efficacy, and that collective action frames are a valuable resource to help create consensus over the specific forms of behavior requiring control and over the specific ways of achieving that control. In other words, there is a direct parallel between the dynamics of social movements, such as movements to control hate crime, and local collective behavior, such as achieving neighborhood or familial control over youth. In each case, consensus must be built up before acting collectively. In the case of neighborhood collective efficacy, residents use a “neighborhood frame,” in which the residents draw upon values of a safe and clean neighborhood, appeal to neighborhood pride, and create collective identities as neighbors [e.g., 65], and an “anti- crime frame,” which emphasizes the evils of delinquency, drugs, and misbehavior. Thus, a neighborhood with collective efficacy is one in which residents are able to use neighborhood and anti-crime frames to mobilize one another to achieve consensus over objectives, such as insuring a safe neighborhood, and procedures to attain objectives, such as supervising children of other families, being alert to unusual people or events in the neighborhood, and keeping youth away from bad elements and bad places (e.g., staging grounds for fights or parties for doing drugs). Elaborated, rather than restricted, neighborhood frames may be more effective in appealing to a broad set of residents. Individual residents will vary in the value they place on safe neighborhoods, and more importantly, in their own ability to persuade others. In this context, we define social efficacy as an individual’s ability to create consensus over group (neighborhood) objectives and procedures, and translate the procedures into action.7 Such individuals use higher stages of moral reasoning to consider not merely the parochial issues that affect their own self- interest, but also those that affect the community as a whole, including the way in which various roles operate within the neighborhood and operate between the neighborhood and relevant institutions. They would likely be proficient in elaborated speech, but in the case of mixed neighborhoods, be capable of code switching. Such individuals would correspond to indigenous or natural leaders described by Thomas and Znaniecki [77], who help reorganize a disorganized group by discovering new schemes of behavior, lobbying the group to accept the new schemes, rules and institutions, and overcoming the objections of defenders of the traditional system.8 One might be tempted to hypothesize that the greater aggregate or average social efficacy, the greater the collective efficacy in the neighborhood. But this simple hypothesis glosses over important heterogeneity within neighborhoods. For 8 In a different context, efficacious residents correspond to “ institutional entreprenuers,” organizational actors who create new institutions or organizational forms when they have sufficient resources and “see in them an opportunity to realize interests that they value highly” (DiMaggio 1988, p. 14) 7 This differs from Sampson’s notion of collective efficacy, which is a property of groups or neighborhoods, rather than individuals. It is a more specific application of Bandura’s [3:71] concept of self-efficacy, which refers to “people’s beliefs about their capabilities to produce designated levels of performance that exercise influence over events that affect their lives.” Social efficacy refers to an objective ability to organize social groups to realize a common goal, rather than a perceived belief about one’s capability to produce general effects important to one’s life. R.L. Matsueda example, neighborhoods may need only a small number of efficacious individuals, and beyond a threshold, there may be diminishing returns to such individuals. Moreover, the way in which an efficacious individual is embedded in a neighborhood’s relations may be critical for collective efficacy. For example, in a network highly centralized around a well-connected hub (a node with high degree centrality and between- ness centrality), if the hub is a socially efficacious individual (who values the neighborhood), the neighborhood’s structure is conducive to collective efficacy. With social ties to nearly all residents, the socially efficacious hub is in a position to mobilize residents to improve the neighborhood (see Figure 4). In contrast, in an identical neighborhood network structure, but with an inefficacious hub, the presence of two efficacious residents on the network’s periphery is unable to compensate for the B A C E G F J is an Efficacious Resident D H I J Figure 4 Structure conducive to collective efficacy. B A C E G F C and D are Efficacious Residents D H I J Figure 5 Structure not conducive to collective efficacy. Differential social organization, collective action, and crime inefficacious hub (Figure 5). This is because their structural location limits their ability to mobilize their neighbors. Of course, if they were truly efficacious, they might be able to use their agency to overcome their structural limitations and, for example, make a concerted effort to get to know their neighbors. But such efforts face an uphill battle compared to the naturally linked efficacious case (natural leader): residents may look with a wary eye on a neighbor looking to get to know them for instrumental reasons. Beyond a neighborhood’s structural ties among roles, the occupants of those roles are important for collective action. Specifically, a neighborhoods’ distribution of individual thresholds among role-occupants will determine whether cascades occur; in turn, the thresholds will be a function of the extent to which their personal identities include being a good resident of the neighborhood, the degree to which they have internalized neighborhood frames, the value they place on safe neighborhoods, and the degree to which they view delinquency as negative. The ways in which the distribution of individual thresholds interact with the distribution of structural ties, the distribution of socially efficacious residents, and the use of neighborhood frames will vary by the kind of problem facing the neighborhood. A simple problem, such as a couple of local children vandalizing houses, may require only a couple of parents to remedy. Clearly, neither elaborate framing, nor natural leaders, nor low thresholds are needed to resolve the problem. But a more complex problem, such as an alleged crack house being set up on the neighborhood’s periphery and enticing young residents into the business, requires a much greater degree of coordination and organization. Here, strong ties among residents including efficacious leaders with low thresholds, participation in voluntary associations such as a neighborhood watch, and convincing framing by those most affected may be necessary to mobilize most of the neighborhood. Moreover, neighborhood ties to outside organizations, such as law enforcement and local housing authority, may be needed. Complicating matters, such collective action may be impeded by criminal elements enmeshed in the neighborhood, who have an interest in maintaining their activity unencumbered by local residents. This discussion assumes that the composition of the neighborhood – the collection of individuals giving rise to collective efficacy – is exogenous. That is, the residents of a neighborhood are not changing in ways that influence crime. There is, however, good reason to expect exogeneity not to hold. Residential mobility in urban areas is typically a bit under 20% per year, and varies by renters (over 35%) versus home-owners (less than 10%), and youth (40% for those younger than 35) versus elder (11% for those older than 35). Thus, the composition of neighborhoods is changing sufficiently to question whether this mover–stayer process is in equilibrium. If the propensity of potential new residents to move into the neighborhood and that of old residents to move out of the neighborhood is orthogonal to the neighborhood’s crime rate, selectivity into and out of the neighborhood can be safely ignored. In the treatment effects literature, this would qualify as satisfying the “ignorability” criterion. Unfortunately, access to good schools and neighborhood crime rates are two of the most important considerations in housing decisions [e.g., 24]. Therefore, residential mobility decisions – which change the composition of neighborhoods – may confound research on the effects of neighborhood composition, such as collective efficacy. We can give two stylized examples to illustrate this point. At one extreme, suppose an affluent neighborhood has a long tradition of safety. The absence of crime may be due to the distant history of collective efficacy of the neighborhood, but that history has been altered by residential succession. The low crime rate will attract new residents who are less-tolerant of crime, wealthy socially efficacious people, but possibly also wealthy R.L. Matsueda isolates, looking to reap the rewards of the neighborhoods’ legacy of safety or free ride on the work of a few other residents who are highly socially efficacious. At the other extreme is a neighborhood with a long history of high crime rates. Residents who move in are those unable to afford safer neighborhoods, may be more tolerant of crime, or in the case of minorities, face housing discrimination elsewhere. Those residents who are able to move to better neighborhoods do so, leaving behind the less-efficacious and more impoverished. It could be that the correlation between collective efficacy and crime is confounded by these historical changes in residential composition. In the extreme case, neighborhood crime rates are due primarily to historical processes, or state dependence, which also explains the composition of the neighborhood, including social ties and perceptions of collective efficacy (respondents infer collective efficacy from the low crime rates). The most important point here is not that models of neighborhood collective efficacy may yield biased estimates, but rather that neighborhood residential mobility is an important part of the process by which neighborhoods affect crime. Examining both residential moves and collective action may uncover unanticipated results. Research could, for example, specify an individual threshold model of residential preference based on the number of criminals in the neighborhood [e.g., 60]. Such a threshold is likely to correlate with a collective action threshold for interceding in neighborhood problems. Combining the two threshold models would likely yield interactions between the two dynamic composition effects and other non-linear effects. Social organization in favor of crime Crime as Collective Action Crime rarely coalesces into a social movement – unless one would include revolution as an instance of crime. As noted by Sutherland [73], this is principally because states use legitimated violence to quell criminal movements, such as riots and collective violence, before they become widespread. Crime, however, is more often than not committed in groups of two or more persons. Therefore, if we follow Blumer’s [11] classic definition of collective behavior as essentially non-institutional group forms of spontaneous action, most crime falls under the rubric of collective action. We may speak of “collective criminal behaviors” to separate them from isolated acts of individuals. To explain collective crimes, we begin with the same framework we used to explain collective acts against crime: objective opportunities, including access to resources such as physical ability, weapons, and suitable targets, degree of prior organization among participants, alliances and enemies, and in particular, the social control policies of political authorities. The threat of formal sanction clearly separates crime from other forms of collective action. Conditional on these opportunities, then, the framing of criminal behavior is key in persuading others to join in. I will use two classic ethnographic studies to illustrate this explanation, Becker’s [4, 5] study of learning to be a marijuana user, and Anderson’s [2] study of violence and the code of the street. Becker [5] found that novice smokers must learn how to smoke marijuana, including how to inhale and hold the smoke in the lungs, how to recognize the effects of being high, and how to define the effects as pleasurable. In this way, an inherently ambiguous physiological experience – dizziness, nauseous, euphoric, or comical – is transformed and redefined into a collective action frame, in which a physiological state is defined as being “high,” and more importantly being pleasurable. The specific elements of the “weed Differential social organization, collective action, and crime smoking frame” are built up in interaction in groups, as other experienced members help demonstrate how to smoke properly, how to recognize the feeling of being high (including having the “munchies”), and how to interpret the high feeling as pleasurable and even euphoric. Thus, “marihuana acquires meaning for the user as an object which can be used for pleasure” and with repeated experiences of this sort, “there grows a stable set of categories for experiencing the drug’s effects” [5:56]. In this way, “deviant motives actually develop in the course of experience with the deviant activity” [5:42]. Here vocabularies of motive are constructed, such as “everyone is doing it, it’s cool,” and “no one gets hurt.” Because marijuana is illegal, whether the beginner progresses to an occasional user and then to a regular user depends on how he or she adapts to social control attempts to limit supply of the drug, detect drug users, and define the behavior as immoral. Through interaction, regular users develop contacts with drug dealers, learn verbalizations that neutralize definitions of the behavior as immoral, and deal with the possibility of being caught by segregating acquaintances into users versus nonusers, withdrawing into groups who condone marijuana, or concluding that detection would not be so bad. Through these processes, regular users adopt a stable self- concept as a marijuana smoker. Moreover, in a concrete situation of a party, the distribution of individual thresholds may determine whether marijuana smoking becomes joint behavior. If an instigator lights up, but within the group, all thresholds are above 1, the lone smoker might feel compelled to put the cigarette out. However, if the instigator provides a compelling frame, a threshold might be lowered to a 1, causing a cascading effect if other thresholds are, for example, clustered around three. If a novice user defines the situation of his first puff as aversive rather than pleasurable, and expresses displeasure, it may be sufficient to raise those thresholds clustered around 1 or 2 to stop the cascade. Becker’s discussion ignored social processes causing individuals to select or be selected into the party. Thus, objective opportunities are again important for collective behavior. Those opportunities include social networks to other partiers who have connections to drug dealers and can afford to purchase marijuana and other drugs. A second example is that of inner-city youth violence. A long history of research in criminology has found violence in impoverished inner-city neighborhoods is bound up with cultural responses to structural disadvantage. Facing structural barriers to gaining status and respect within the educational system and labor market, disadvantaged youth turn to the streets to gain a semblance of respect among other disadvantaged youth. For example, Cloward and Ohlin [14] argue that neighborhoods with high rates of gang violence are characterized by restricted legitimate opportunity structures and relatively prevalent illegitimate opportunity structures, consisting of prospects for gaining status through violence presented by turf gangs. The two structures, legitimate and illegitimate, and the cultures they produce, are intertwined. Such structures may lead to isolated networks of strong ties among similarly situated disadvantaged individuals. Isolated from interactions with dissimilar others (like members of upper classes), members of lower classes may experience fewer incentives to take the perspectives of others within complex role sets, resolve moral conflicts by coordinating perspectives, learn elaborated speech to convey particularistic perspectives in a universal medium, and develop the capacity for intellectual flexibility. Moreover, we can conceptualize the cultural components as “cultural frames,” which are used to define and make sense of situations [31]. In the abstract, legitimate and illegitimate frames are contradictory; at times that contradiction is starkly revealed in concrete situations. For example, using the term “code” rather than frame, Horowitz identified two cultural codes that structure behavior in Latino neighborhoods. The legitimate frame, the R.L. Matsueda instrumental code of the American Dream, is organized around economic success, espoused by community members, but in conflict with the reality of lower class schools and available jobs. The illegitimate frame – the code of honor on the streets – is organized around respect, manhood, and deference, and is espoused by young men. Violations of the code of honor – “actions that challenge a person’s right to deferential treatment in public” – can be “interpreted as an insult and a potential threat to manhood” [38:81]. In response, men must restore their honor, respect, and dignity by “being a man,” which calls for physical acts of violence and intimidation. Street identities of young men are shaped by their responses to challenges, negotiations of threats to manhood, and ability to maintain honor. Latino youth, according to Horowitz, must balance the instrumental frame, which requires being “decent,” against the honor code of the street, which requires being “street” or “bad.” We can speak of a “street frame” that is used to make sense of situations on the streets of inner-city impoverished neighborhoods. Like other frames, street frames contain vocabu- laries of motive, rules, and tacit sanctions for violating rules. Anderson [2] has identified the dimensions of rules or norms within the street frame. The most fundamental norm is “never back down from a fight.” Violations of this rule will result in a loss of street credibility and social standing, loss of self-esteem, and an increase in the likelihood of being preyed upon in the future. Status on the street is achieved by demonstrating “nerve” – a willingness to express disrespect for other males by getting in their face, throwing the first punch, pulling the trigger, messing with their women – which builds a reputation for “being a man.” Moreover, the phrase, “I got your back,” implies that a street youth will protect his friends and loved ones from insult, disrespect, or attack from others. Indeed, an insult or assault on one’s “crew” calls for revenge or payback. Underlying the notion of vengeance and never backing down is a norm of reciprocity, in which one is expected to respond in kind when disrespected by challenges, name calling, and violence. One of Anderson’s [2] key points is that not just street youth, but decent youth as well have an incentive to learn the tenets of the code of the street. Ignorance of the code may provoke a violent confrontation by staring too long at a street youth, stepping on someone’s toe, or failing to project a look of someone not to be messed with. The street frame is available on the streets to use instrumentally to incite collective action, maintain a sense of honor, and gain respect and status. For example, knowing the tenets of the frame, youth in search of a reputation seek to increase their status by “campaigning for respect,” by challenging, humiliating, or assaulting others, and disrespecting them by stealing their material possessions or girlfriends. When a member of a group is disrespected or assaulted, other members need only invoke the street frame, with its attendant rules, motives, and sanctions, to mobilize the group to exact payback. Short and Strodtbeck [63] found that in a situation of a gang fight, alternatives have narrowed to join the action or remain aloof – presumably through the street frame of a gang fight. Using subjective expected utility theory, Short and Strodtbeck [63:254] show that a gang leader calculates the probability and values of losing status by remaining aloof against that of being arrested for joining the action. We can add that gang leaders likely have low thresholds for joining the action; all else being equal, a non-leader may require a larger proportion of the gang to fight before joining. As in the case of collective action in general, the distribution of thresholds in the group may be important for collective acts of payback. Individual thresholds will be a function of the extent to which individuals are committed to the street frame, the degree to which their identities and self-esteem are tied to notions of manhood and nerve, and their role within disparate law-violating and law-abiding groups. Thus, most street youth will have low Differential social organization, collective action, and crime thresholds, whereas decent youth will have high thresholds. Interestingly, the equilibrium point of a group may be suboptimal for most group members [33]. Suppose that members of a “decent youth group” abhor violence and feel it is wrong, but are each unwilling to admit this to the group for fear of losing status, and being labeled a coward, woman, or “punk.” Each member believes that the others want to commit violence and exact payback, resulting in a “shared misunderstanding” to use Matza’s [50] terms. Their thresholds will be low, causing them to follow the street frame and engage in violence if a member has been disrespected. Thus, the violent collective outcome, resulting from the equilibrium point of the distribution of thresholds will be suboptimal for each individual, who would prefer to avoid violence [33]. Conclusion The importance of Sutherland’s abstract statement of differential social organization lies in its use of macro-level concepts of social organization to explain variations in crime rates and its acknowledgement that social organization can both foster and impede crime rates. Unfortunately, Sutherland did not explicate the precise mechanisms by which social organization affects crime, instead choosing to focus attention on the individual level explanation of differential association, and rely on examples from the literature to fill in the content of differential social organization. Focusing on the dynamic component of differential social organization, I have tried to identify theoretical mechanisms by which individuals mobilize others into collective behavior for crime and against crime, including closure in social networks, weak ties, collective action frames, and individual collective action thresholds. This initial foray into specifying some dynamic mechanisms of differential social organization raises additional questions and creates some new puzzles. First, I have treated organization in favor of crime separately from organization against crime, only touching on the relationship between them. In fact, the two are at times causally related, as Sutherland [73] recognized: increasing organization in favor of crime eventually elicits a strong response from conventional society, which organizes against crime. At other times, the two may interact in their effects on crime rates. Moreover, the two may be interwoven in very complicated ways that emerge through history. Several recent studies provide examples. In his study of public housing, Venkatesh [80] found that residents fought for a safe and secure neighborhood, battling with the housing authority, public service bureaucracies, and other city officials, and eventually turning to the very street gangs that dealt drugs in the neighborhood to help secure social order and provide services. In her study of a black middle class neighborhood juxtaposed to an impoverished high crime neighborhood, Patillo-McCoy [56] finds that strong neighborhood networks included drug selling gang members, who provided residents with protection, social control, and resources in exchange for latitude in enforcing their drug selling. Lyons [45] finds that rates of anti-black (but not anti-white) hate crimes are higher in neighborhoods with high collective efficacy, as organized neighborhoods seek to defend their territory against outsiders who pose a symbolic threat. Second, I have given short shrift to the important role of local institutions – families, schools, law enforcement, churches, voluntary associations – as well as broader social structures in organization against crime (as well as the rarer role in organization in favor of crime). Much has been written on such relationships, but the argument presented here is incomplete without specifying how broader structures and institutions exert social control R.L. Matsueda directly and also affect the very possibility of collective action. Clearly, the legal system looms in the background in every crime situation. How the legal system interacts with mechanisms of social organization is of paramount importance. Third, I have side-stepped the question of causes of individual criminal acts. Of course, all of the mechanisms I have identified have implications for the probability that criminal acts will occur for a given group in a given situation. 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Differential social organization, collective action, and crime Differential social organization, collective action, and crime Abstract Differential social organization, collective action, and crime Differential association theory Normative conflict: the root cause of crime in society Differential association process: explanation of individual criminal acts Differential social organization: explanation of group rates of crime Insights into Sutherland’s concept of differential social organization Mead’s theory of symbolic interaction and social control Taking the role of the other The social structure of the self and stages of development of the self Stages of moral reasoning and linguistic codes Kohlberg’s stages of moral reasoning Moral reasoning and social networks Network structure, collective action frames, and thresholds Social networks and social capital The strength of weak ties Collective action, frame analysis, and individual thresholds Social organization against crime Social movements against crime Collective action against crime: informal social control and collective efficacy Social organization in favor of crime Conclusion References << /ASCII85EncodePages false /AllowTransparency false /AutoPositionEPSFiles true /AutoRotatePages /None /Binding /Left /CalGrayProfile (Gray Gamma 2.2) /CalRGBProfile (sRGB IEC61966-2.1) /CalCMYKProfile (ISO Coated) /sRGBProfile (sRGB IEC61966-2.1) /CannotEmbedFontPolicy /Error /CompatibilityLevel 1.3 /CompressObjects /Off /CompressPages true /ConvertImagesToIndexed true /PassThroughJPEGImages true /CreateJDFFile false /CreateJobTicket false /DefaultRenderingIntent /Perceptual /DetectBlends true /DetectCurves 0.1000 /ColorConversionStrategy /sRGB /DoThumbnails true /EmbedAllFonts true /EmbedOpenType false /ParseICCProfilesInComments true /EmbedJobOptions true /DSCReportingLevel 0 /EmitDSCWarnings false /EndPage -1 /ImageMemory 1048576 /LockDistillerParams true /MaxSubsetPct 100 /Optimize true /OPM 1 /ParseDSCComments true 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work_wy4y2r22dnc55ks3i5jju25cry	----	Neoliberalism and subjectivity in Latin America Vol.:(0123456789) Subjectivity (2019) 12:279–280 https://doi.org/10.1057/s41286-019-00082-9 EDITORIAL Neoliberalism and subjectivity in Latin America Valerie Walkerdine1 Published online: 21 November 2019 © Springer Nature Limited 2019 Julian Medina Zarate and Flavia Uchoa’s introduction to the special issue offers us an important perspective on subjectivity and neoliberalism in Latin America. Point- ing out the complex history of the arrival and take-up of neoliberalism across the continent, the deep-seated role of colonial and post-colonial violence, thus the speci- ficity of modes of governance in the complex relationship between the North and the South. Moreover, as they point out, at the moment of writing this editorial, popular uprisings against neoliberalism are taking place in many countries. The papers that make up this issue cover a range of topics, from work to childcare to violence to university education. All of them work with the complexity of the relation of the South to the North, not least in terms of theoretical tools, ways of approaching problems, the use of Northern policies by Southern governments, the complex acts of translation to the new context, the problems of using Northern theo- ries and approaches that assume a different historical (and colonial) history. And more than this, Anglophone readers do not get to read much of the work of Latin American academics, published as it is, in Spanish and Portuguese. The immense problems of translation from their native languages, different styles of academic writing—all of these issues should be borne in mind, that do operate to keep South- ern academics understood as the poor cousins of their Northern peers. And to add even more, the vast library resources academics are used to in the North are not available in most of the Latin American Universities, not least access to this very journal. If academic work is to be genuinely international, then these issues have to be urgently addressed—for example, journals will not pay for translation and yet all the authors presented here required paid help to get their papers into publishable English. This is then an even greater burden on Latin American academics, not shared at all by their Anglophone peers. However, we also need to understand how much Anglophone readers miss out by not being able to learn about other approaches that might indeed challenge our very Anglocentric and Northern academic worldview. That seek to dem- onstrate that there are indeed other ways of understanding and engaging with the world, its geopolitics and its academic fashions and sensibilities. We hope therefore that this * Valerie Walkerdine walkerdinev@cardiff.ac.uk 1 Cardiff University, London, UK http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1057/s41286-019-00082-9&domain=pdf 280 V. Walkerdine issue will be the first of many in which new work can develop and challenge our own thinking and expand our modes of understanding and engagement. This special issue came about because my northern university offered money to allow me to undertake an extraordinary journey across the continent, meeting academ- ics in Mexico, Colombia, Brazil and Chile. Together, we began a research network on the theme of subjectivity and neoliberalism and those connections that facilitated this special issue. The theme of necropolitics is central to the paper by Antar Martinez Guzman, who considers the role of neoliberalism in the huge rise in male violence across the country, exploring hyper-violent masculinities in the context of social precarity. This involves work on men convicted of gender-based violence and media discourses on femicide and hate crimes against LGBT people. Bringing together necropolitics, masculinity, violence and neoliberalism is particularly significant given the place of necropolitics across the continent, as Medina Zarate and Uchoa argue. Antonio Stecher and Alvaro Soto Roy discuss the transformations in work identities and thus the consequences for subjectivity for workers in three kinds of employment in neoliberal Chile. Noting the shifts to more individualised narratives of work, the uneasy relationship and co-existence between old narratives of work and new ones sug- gest a far from straightforward take-up of neoliberal modes of being. The significance of this in relation to current protests across the country should be noted. Work is also the topic of Fabio d’Oliviera’s paper. In this case, the workers are psy- chologists operating in an increasingly precarised service sector in public assistance programmes in Brazil. As professionals, they increasingly feel that they cannot do their jobs properly and experience great difficulty with what they experience as an attack upon themselves, but also find ways around the red tape in order to do their jobs in the way that they feel is better, understanding this as a form of resistance. Hernan Pulido Martinez explores the role of artefacts in the introduction of discourses and practices related to quality within a university in Colombia. Acknowledging the complex relation between, for example, a grading scheme that has its origins north of the border but is adapted for use in Colombia, he explores the central importance of such artefacts in neolib- eral technologies of university governance that produce the possibility of what is understood as an internationally transferable quality. In that sense, he understands the flow of such arte- facts in the practices of ‘internationalisation’ as an analysis of the ‘how of power’. Ana Vergara discusses parent–child relations in the context of neoliberal Chile. She exemplifies the intensification of demands on both parent and child, which results in what she calls the over-demanding work of constantly trying to negotiate subject posi- tions, something which the participants describe as claustrophobic, draining and over- attentive, thus placing an excessive burden upon both parents and children. Publisher’s Note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Valerie Walkerdine is Distinguished Research Professor in the School of Social Sciences, Cardiff University. Neoliberalism and subjectivity in Latin America 
work_wzelbglzj5gkvalcl7camf6eea	----	31 Abyss. J. Bus. Soc. Sci. Vol. 2, No. 2, 2017, 31-38 © 2017 Wollo University Communicate Beyond Words: Investigating the Polarized Discourses of Conflict Entrepreneurs to Secure Peace and Stability in Ethiopian Universities Abate Getahun* Department of English Language and Literature, Wollo University, Dessie, Ethiopia ABSTRACT The prominent objective of this paper is to investigate polarized discourses of conflict Entrepreneurs so as to secure peace and stability in the Ethiopian universities. Conflict Entrepreneurs are those who have been fabricating hate speeches, disinformation, hate crimes, polarized ethnocentric and religious discourses to create crisis. As a result, dozens of universities are at different levels of chaos and crisis starting from 2015 than ever before in its severity and calamity. The sources of the problem seemed to be the slanted discourses of conflict Entrepreneurs. To unpack the problem, data were collected in natural settings of universities and other source by using chain or snowballing sampling techniques focusing on crisis and its causes. Key informant interviews, document analysis and reports of all universities at different meetings of universities were employed to gather data. The analysis was done on emerging and existing polarized discourses of conflict entrepreneurs. The overall findings revealed that because of the polarized and pretext discourses of conflict Entrepreneurs, there were crisis on human and non-human elements in dozens of Ethiopian universities. Therefore, pragmatic social vaccines (trainings and education), should be designed and implemented in all universities to secure peace and stability since the sources of the problem and the proposed solutions are almost similar. Key words: Communication beyond words, conflict Entrepreneurs, hate speeches, polarized discourses, social vaccine INTRODUCTION Existing and emerging discourses have revealed that fueled by conflict entrepreneurs, war and violent conflict pose one of the most difficult challenges and impediments to human development. Of the 20 poorest countries in the world including Ethiopia, most have continually experienced crisis and violent conflict. According to the Human Development Report (HDR 2002), in the 1990s more than 53 internal conflicts resulted in an estimated 3.6 million deaths, the majority of whom were civilians such as innocent farmers and university students. Frequently these wars accompany political, economic, and social transition, natural disasters, and profound pressures arising from globalization, which tends to make them intractable and protracted. Crisis, conflict and different form of war today is mostly internal, chronic, extending over long periods of time, often based on identity politics, religion and benefiting from globalized forms of financing, which include among others: the drug trade, arms trade, the exploitation of natural resources and financial remittances. Preventing the death and suffering of millions from violent conflict and building a sustainable peace is the most urgent challenge for human development today (UNDP, 2004). According to dozens of scholars (Coombs, 2009b and Topper, B., & Lagadec, 2013) and the investigation of these researchers, crisis and survival struggles are the everlasting human fates. A crisis is an event that threatens the organization’s tangible resources, such as people and property, or intangible resources, such as credibility and reputation. It is an unpredictable and/or unexpected event, which creates uncertainty impact on organization. Traditionally, a crisis has been perceived to have only negative outcomes but recently it has been seen rather as a turning point that presents the organization with both threats and opportunities. Virtually every crisis contains within itself the seeds of success as well as the roots of failure. Finding, cultivating and harvesting the potential * Corresponding Author E-mail; abate6565@gmail.com Abyssinia Journal of Business and Social Sciences 32 Abyssinia Journal of Business and Social Sciences Vol. 2, No. 2, 2017, 31-38 success is the essence of crisis management. The core of crisis mismanagement is to make a bad situation worse. This is because managing crisis is a time memorial prime responsibility for human survival. To overcome emerging and existing crises for survival, human spices have gone through three long eras until now. The first strategy to manage crisis appeared to be muscular era. In this era the most essential weapon to survive or to live and make its offspring live was being muscular and became physically strong. This is because the one who was very strong could run, hunt and fight with wild animals to get food and other survival or basic human needs. Then, through practical experiences with negligible differences, human spices have developed primitive weapons like bows and arrows, spear and knives from the generous gifts of nature such as stones, trees and animal products. This era was believed to be weapon era. The one who produced better weapon and fought well won over the weakest one and made them to the extent slave. The third era is Information Communication Era. This era has brought round digital transformation and intelligence. It appeared to be characterized by the rapid shift from traditional industry that the Industrial Revolution brought through industrialization to an economy based on information technology. In this 21st century, everything is at the tip of our figures. Nonetheless, existing and emerging surveyed evidences have stated that although there are many religious institutes, churches, mosques and educational institutions which are supposed to teach the youth, the present generation does not seem to be divorced from the previous two long aged practices most importantly here in Africa in general and in Ethiopia in particular. This is because ‘Conflict Entrepreneurs’ came into sight blinded with polarized and slanted discourses by using the emerging modern technologies than ever before. Thus, it is hoped that universities and other organizations while preparing manuals to overcome crisis and conflicts would use the result of the study. Hence, this paper is expected to investigate polarized discourses of conflict Entrepreneurs so as to give tailored trainings towards securing peace and stability in the universities. Then suggest possible way outs to solve the detected problems in tune with the following leading questions: 1. Why are dozens of Ethiopian Universities in crisis mainly for the last four years? 2. Who are conflict entrepreneurs? Who are their targets? 3. How do conflict entrepreneurs disseminate their hate discourses? To what extent do universities employ key elements of conflict resolutions to manage the polarized discourses conflict entrepreneurs? Theoretical Frameworks Language is a necessary pre-condition for our thought and action. This means that the way people think, the very categories and concepts that provide a framework of meaning for them are provided by the language that they use (Morgan, 2010). Morgan (2010:120) further added, “no intervention will be successful if it does not take into account the context in which language problem is embedded". As to this scholar, the real world is to a large extent unconsciously built up on the language habits of the group. In full agreement with Morgan (2010), Cook underscores, “language is at the heart of human life, without it; many of our most important activities are inconceivable” (Cook, 2003:5). Gee (2011) also proclaimed that language is a guide to social realities and human life since it powerfully conditions all our thinking about social problems and processes. Gee, (2011) further emphasized that without language, human beings could not live in the objective world alone or alone in the world of social activity as ordinarily understood. In full agreement with the above scholars, as to Fairclough (2003), one can see social life as interconnected networks of social practices of diverse sorts (economic, political, cultural, and so on). To demystify and unmask intricate social life, discourse analyzes has been employed. This is because discourse analysis is the study of social life, and offers a method of investigating meaning in interactions between and across people and systems. Moreover, discursive Practices are produced (created) and consumed (received and interpreted). Discursive practices, through which texts are produced (created) and consumed (received and interpreted), are viewed as an important form of social practice which contributes to the construction of the social world including social identities and social relations. It is partly through discursive practices in everyday life (processes of text production and consumption) that social and cultural reproduction and change take place. LITERATURE REVIEW Discourses of Conflict Entrepreneurs According to many scholars (Akinnawonu 2006 and Garland 2009, to mention some) lots of conflicts active in the world now there are politicians and individuals present that seek to increase their own power and wealth through participation in conflict by violent means. It is interesting to note that in many countries this can 33 Abyssinia Journal of Business and Social Sciences Vol. 2, No. 2, 2017, 31-38 be a (or virtually the only) opportunity for an individual to make a career in terms of power and finance. Conflicts can offer ways of gaining status, influence and money. In other words: conflict as a career. Other avenues available to resolving the conflict peacefully, might be taken but do not offer a future with them at the centre of power, in wealth or in any positions of control. This is why the integration of 'rebel', 'irregular' forces are so important in negotiations for peace deals. In full agreement with Grant (2008), Support (2006) described that conflict entrepreneurs are actors who use a specific situation or condition for the purpose of establishing a conflict in order to gain something through the exploitation of new power relationships. The gain can be personal (economic wealth, political power) or it can be seen by the conflict entrepreneur to benefit a collective with which s/he identifies. Instigating a conflict can even be seen as a prerequisite for preserving and protecting those collective against (perceived or real) external threats. Whether the 'real' reason is personal or collective gains will hardly influence the way the cause is presented. As to Turpin-petronin(2009), any conflict entrepreneur worthy of the label will mobilize 'his' or 'her' group for conflict by convincing the potential group members that the mobilization is for a collective good or in order to avoid the disastrous effect of the other group's mobilizing first. The conflict entrepreneur benefits not only by mobilizing strength against another group but also by gaining uncontested power within the group. Communication Beyond Words as Conflict Resolutions Communication beyond words is not mere informative since information is not enough although it is important to provide information in the early phases of a behavior change intervention and to reinforce such knowledge periodically. Communication beyond words is multi-layered! It lies on the meaning of culture beyond the words. It isn't easy to reach the deeper levels of culture and its meanings! In order to understand cultural differences better and make communication beyond words, view culture as an iceberg. As can be seen in fig. 1, large sections of human behaviors are hidden and invisible, only a small part can be seen. The huge part of human behavior is covert behavior. The covert behavior is found in the unconscious part of our mind. The unconscious is again the source of our motivation whether they are simple desires such as food or sex, neurotic compulsions, or the motives of an artist or scientist (Boeree 2009). Kosslyn and Rosenberg (2004:459) assert, “repressed thoughts, feelings and wishes are hidden from awareness.” The largest part by far is the unconscious. It includes all the things that are not easily available to awareness, including many things that have their origins, such as our drives or instincts, and things that are put there because we cannot bear to look at them, such as the memories and emotions associated with trauma (McVittie, and Mckinl6ay 2011). Just like that to bridge polarized discourses and demystify conflict entrepreneurs, communication beyond words essential. This is because the deeper meaning of the message is not revealed the surface, but shine through implicitly. The researcher of this paper distilled from different sources (to mention some, Bonta, Bruce D.,1996 and Brigg, Morgan, 2007) and has suggested the following conflict resolution principles to solve polarized discourse of conflict entrepreneurs. Making conflict resolution the priority rather than winning or "being right’’ is the prominent Fig. 1: Iceberg Theory of Culture and Hidden behaviors (Source: Kosslyn and Rosenberg (2004)) 34 Abyssinia Journal of Business and Social Sciences Vol. 2, No. 2, 2017, 31-38 principle of conflict management. This is to mean that maintaining and strengthening the relationship, rather than “winning” the argument, should always be our first priority (Andrew, W. and R.S. Ratner 2008). Hence, the following key elements of conflict resolution principles were used as conceptual framework while gathering data: Key Elements of Conflict Resolution Principles to Solve Polarized Discourses Key Axioms Conflict Resolution Principles to solve Polarized discourses 1 Education on Media Ethics Education on media ethics should focus on the rights and freedoms of consumers and their role in creating and promoting peaceful societies. 2 Encourage Conflict Sensitive Reporting and Multicultural Awareness campaigns Conflict sensitive reporting will help dispel the ‘us’ against ‘them’ fallacy. Activists and Journalists should be taught conflict sensitive reporting skills. Multicultural awareness campaigns should emphasize knowledge about and respect for the diversity of cultures and traditions 3 Regulate Social media without revoking the right to press freedom. Press freedom can be enhanced through education on media laws and ethics since many conflict entrepreneurs use FB as free grazing land 4 Encourage Victims and witnesses to report hate speech related crimes Hate speech remains largely invisible simply because many victims do not know where to report the cases or even understand that they are victims of hate speech. 5 End impunity against hate crimes: establishing monitoring and evaluation units in newsrooms to monitor hate speech trends, compiling reports and bringing these to the attention of key institutions and the civil society 6 Listen for what is felt as well as said. Listening strengthens us, informs us, and makes it easier for others to hear us when it's our turn to speak. 7 Recognize that all of us have biased fairness Recognize that all of us have biased fairness perceptions by overcoming our self-centred fairness perception using jointly hiring a mediator so as to avoid escalating tensions with threats and provocative moves. 8 Focus on the Present. If we are holding on to grudges based on past resentments, our ability to see the reality of the current situation will be impaired. Rather than looking to the past and assigning blame, focus on what we can do in the here-and-now to solve the problem. 9 Pick your battles. Conflicts can be draining, so it’s important to consider whether the issue is really worthy of our time and energy. 10 Be willing to forgive. Resolving conflict is impossible if we’re unwilling or unable to forgive. Resolution lies in releasing the urge to punish, which can never compensate for our losses and only adds to our injury by further depleting and draining our lives. 11 Know when to let something go. If we can’t come to an agreement, agree to disagree. It takes two people to keep an argument going. If a conflict is going nowhere, we can choose to disengage and move on. 12 Don’t Avoid Conflict- moderate conflict speeds up work. you could ignore it, and let the participants work it out among themselves. 13 Choose a Neutral Location One of the first steps to diffuse any conflict is to change the environment. People are heated and that anger is often tied to a place. It sounds odd, but just removing the people from the room they’re fighting in will help put the conflict in perspective. 14 Don’t Intimidate you are a leader, you’re in a position of authority. Don’t abuse it. It might seem like the simple fix to coerce the correct course, but that is not thinking in the long-term. The team never learns anything from this but to fear you, which means they won’t confide in you when something starts going wrong, leaving you in the dark until the issue is possibly beyond repair. So, take the time to work through your conflict resolution in such a way that it doesn’t pop up again the next day. 15 Act Decisively Remember, you want to put the time into conflict resolution to do it right. But once you have gone through that process, then it’s time to act, and you should do so decisively. 16 Communication beyond words Communication beyond words means paying attention to both verbal and nonverbal cues. This is because the most important information exchanged during conflicts and arguments is often communicated nonverbally. Use traditional materials and wisdoms to make conflict resolutions. 35 Abyssinia Journal of Business and Social Sciences Vol. 2, No. 2, 2017, 31-38 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY This study employed qualitative research approach because it helps in understanding issues from the affected individual perspectives and help to get to know the real need rather than the perceived needs or felt needs. Moreover, it plays a vital role in answering doubts and queries since it endeavors to reach multiple audiences via typical case samples, extreme cases, or outliers in order to unpack the real problems. This study uses different samples and sampling techniques to recruit relevant participants and discourses (texts) in order to gather proper data and come up with valid results. Many students were wounded, looted, females were raped, and sadly enough at least sixteen (16) university students were killed in the university campuses and their vicinities starting from 2015 up to 2017. Available or comprehensive sampling techniques were employed since all of them were sampled. Snow balling and extreme case sampling techniques were also used to fish genuine information from the victimized families, friends and other resourceful persons. Leaders from all ten universities from which at least one student found killed were used as typical case samples. These were university presidents, vice presidents, student councils, instructors, administrative workers, higher government officials, families and colleagues of the victims who were sampled by purposive sampling techniques. Thirty (30) key informants, three from each university were sampled and interviewed by using extreme case sampling technique in conjunction with the above sampling techniques. Moreover, discourses of activists, which are shared and propagated, by university students, instructors and administrative workers were gathered from Facebook walls and other chain sampling techniques. Three key government security figures and three professionals in Psychology, politics and law were interviewed to triangulate and to enrich the findings from by using expert sampling techniques. As highlighted above, all the sources of data were selected by using different types of sampling techniques on the basis of the following three criteria. These are; (a) the availability of sufficient information (b) the possibility of getting a good mixture of population such as top leaders from the university, instructors, administrative workers, students, activists and key government agents from police and security (c) accessibility to collect the necessary data. Information may be available but may not be accessible due to security and other confidential matters. The polarized discourses of conflict entrepreneurs were analyzed within the framework proposed by van Dijk (2004). The dichotomous categorization of polarized discourses of 'negative other- representation' and 'positive self-representation' (In-group vs. Out-group, US-THEM) has been adopted for the analysis of the data. In this framework, conflict entrepreneurs use the dichotomies of polarized discourses. This categorization is very effective in implementing the fundamental strategy of 'self-positive- representation' and 'other negative-representation. Virdee (1995) stated that the former is an ideological function, which is applied to portray oneself as superior than the others; instead, the latter is to present the other as inferior or mediocre. Positive self-representation or in-group favoritism is a semantic macro- strategy used for the purpose of 'face keeping' or 'impression management' (van Dijk, 2004). Negative other-representation is another semantic macro-strategy regarding in- groups and out groups, that is, their division between 'good' and 'bad', superior and inferior, US and THEM. Polarized discourses are notably degrading, demeaning and denigrating discourses (Chakraborti, 2010). RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS This part of the paper mainly dealt with investigating the polarized discourses of conflict entrepreneurs. Although, commendable achievements are attained in managing the stated problems so far, the lived and emerging discourses on the ground in almost universities have revealed that conflict and crisis seem to be prevalent on the ground even today. This researcher felt that these gray areas do not seem to be given meticulous attention. Hence, the following analyses were given: Crisis and Polarized Discourses Regularly emerging reports from university top leaders, professionals and experts in the area from typical case sampled universities have reiterated that universities were found in different levels of crisis and chaos. The findings revealed that dozens of conflict entrepreneurs were found: 1. Blind prejudices while overt prejudice is now much less prevalent than in decades past. Subtle prejudice which is indirect, covert in nature, or difficult to observe, and frequently goes undetected by both perpetrator and victim. 2. Defensive perpetrators that engage in hate crimes out of a belief they are protecting their communities. These are often triggered by a certain background event. Perpetrators believe society supports their actions but is too afraid 36 Abyssinia Journal of Business and Social Sciences Vol. 2, No. 2, 2017, 31-38 to act and thus they believe they have communal assent in their actions. 3. Retaliatory perpetrators engaged in hate crimes out of a desire for revenge. The attackers were blinded by distorted discourses posted on Facebook walls, books deliberately written in fictious manner and monument that instigate revenge which are proudly erected in different parts of Ethiopia. This can be in response to personal slights, other hate crimes. The avengers target members of a group whom they believe their ancestors, ethnic groups, religious groups or themselves have committed the crime, even if the victims had nothing to do with it by now. These kinds of hate crimes are a common occurrence after verbal or physical attacks occurred in one of the government universities in Ethiopia. 4. Mission offenders/perpetrators engage in hate crimes out of ethnic, religious and/ or ideological reasons. They consider themselves to be freedom fighters and crusaders, often for a religious or racial cause. They will often write complex explanations for their views and target symbolically important sites while trying to maximize damage. They believe that there is no other way to accomplish their goals, which they consider to be justification for excessive violence against innocents. Dozens of elites in and out of universities are members of different political parties and religious followers. They were some time given devilish missions by conflict entrepreneurs. Hence, assuring peace and security remain the prominent challenges in the university landscapes. Conflict Entrepreneurs Key informant professionals in the area during the interview sated that conflict entrepreneurs seemed to be power mongers, politicians, and activists who have been working day and night to boost their power in any means. Conflict entrepreneurs often mobilize individuals through three general tactics: appeals to ethnic, religious, and/or ideological solidarity; patronage; and positive or negative promises regarding security. They also aggravate minor good governance gaps to fuel their subtle agenda. This is because their daily bread to make a career in terms of power and finance heavily depends up on conflict. In other words, conflict as a career. Other avenues available to resolving the conflict peacefully, might be taken but do not offer a future with them at the centre of power, in wealth or in any positions of control. They have been consciously crafting aggressive quarrel among innocent university students. They meticulous fuel violence as a path for attaining economic and political power. Conflict entrepreneurs often have created chaos, havoc and crisis that lead to displacement. They are heavily Ethnocentric who falsely distort what is meaningful and functional to other peoples through their own tinted glasses. They display lack of regard for other people and assume that others are inferior. They interrupt others frequently, disregards what others say and has no qualms about literally taking over someone else’s space. They attack, verbally or physically, and think that all problems are someone else’s fault and also believes that everyone else is obligated to provide whatever he or she wants. They use intimidation and humiliation to get what they want, and they feel their behavior is justified. They smile at you when he or she is actually angry with you. They appear calm and cooperative but subtly disrupt, spread rumors and sabotages, etc against other groups to quietly get revenge. They communicate superficially avoiding the objects of their anger while releasing anger indirectly, such as through backhanded compliments or talking negatively about others behind their backs. The devilish targets of conflict entrepreneurs are innocent students who were murdered savagely. Many students were wounded, looted, females were raped, and nearly 20 university students were killed starting from 2015 until now. This is because conflict entrepreneurs have been meticulously crafting fake news, hate speeches, slanted discourses and distorted historical discourses on books, Facebook walls and different audio media. They have also produced disinformation, i.e. false information spread deliberately to deceive others when known misinformation is purposefully and intentionally disseminated. It appears apparent that hate and dangerous speech is a serious and growing problem in Ethiopia, both online and offline. In a nutshell, findings itemized that dozens of conflict entrepreneurs are not empathic toward people from other ethnic and religious groups since they lack to accurately perceive differences and similarities between theirs and others. Many of the respondents mentioned that university students were found that they cannot even joke in a form of mild and friendly insults with other ethnic & religious groups. If they do, their discourses have been hijacked by conflict Entrepreneurs. Most importantly if the university leaders are reckless in addressing even minor conflicts and crisis quickly and handled in an unhealthy manner that caused irreparable rifts, resentments, and break-ups, conflict entrepreneurs are very swift to aggravate these minor gaps of the University and escalate to all universities through different modern communication. 37 Abyssinia Journal of Business and Social Sciences Vol. 2, No. 2, 2017, 31-38 Communication Beyond Words for Conflict Resolutions No sampled universities had conflict resolutions strategies supported by conflict management guideline in order to manage the polarized discourses of conflict entrepreneurs. The key elements of conflict resolution and communication beyond words were not employed by the universities. Strong student council and peace and stability forum should have been organized in the university. Student leaders should have practiced conflict resolution principles by using both traditional and modern ways of conflict resolution methods in the form of extracurricular activities in the university. Leaders at different levels in the universities have failed to address conflicts beyond words. Communication beyond words means paying attention to both verbal and nonverbal cues. This is because the most important information exchanged during conflicts and arguments is communicated nonverbally. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS This section presents a brief conclusion of the findings vis-à-vis the research questions and makes some recommendation in the light of the findings. Conclusions Using these distilled lenses, all of the research questions were analyzed and the following conclusions were fished: 1. Lack of communication beyond words though important information exchanged during conflicts and arguments is often communicated nonverbally. Nonverbal communication is conveyed by emotionally driven facial expressions, posture, gesture, pace, tone and intensity of voice. The most important communication is wordless. When people are upset, the words they use rarely convey the issues and needs at the heart of the problem. Sadly enough, dozens of people tend to be unaware of their biases, placing stereotype and cultural assumptions on others. 2. Our country Ethiopia in general and universities in particular has no a comprehensive policy and/ or guideline which focuses on hate speeches, fake news, media ethics, conflict resolution, social media, hate crimes and the like. 3. All universities have no pragmatic conflict resolution and crisis management guidelines, which embraces the key elements of effective conflict resolutions and crisis management principles to demystify polarized discourses and conflict entrepreneurs. 4. Lack of Education on Media Ethics, Social media regulation and other surgical trainings in order to manage the polarized discourses of conflict entrepreneurs is another finding of this study. 5. The overall findings revealed that the largest waves of hate speeches, hate crimes, fake news and disinformation have been taken place for the last many years in general and the previous four years in particular. Violence, threats of violence and killings were common. Hundreds of lives were lost in and out of university campus due to large bodies of Face bookers who are working day and night on polarized discourses, hate speeches, fake news and fabricated lies blanketed with fake names. Surprisingly, fake news and distorted messages are traveling faster and farther on social media than the truth. As a result, students were stoned to death in their compound, some persons out of the university campuses were burnt alive and hanged their corpse. Burning of churches and mosques were also occurred. Recommendations In the light of the findings of the study, it is possible to suggest the following possible recommendations: 1. To curb crisis, it is high time that government of the country should develop alternative guidelines in conjunction with the universities should give social vaccine trainings for all university communities (leaders, instructors and students) focusing on conflict resolution and unity-in-diversity. 2. The pragmatic reality on the ground revealed that we live in a world where corporate reputations are fragile and where crises seem to be occurring more and more. Communication beyond words appeared to be essential. Hence, the role of pragmatic communicator in this transient university environment is critical. Furthermore, the communication planner who might foresee and prepare for such eventualities is a significant player in our interconnected and changing world, a comprehensive approach to managing situations that may turn into crises and handling crises once they occur. Their proposition is that it is impossible to live without risk and, therefore, it is important that universities are in constant dialogue with all the stakeholders with whom they operate. This means that communication in the university landscapes must be open, regularly evaluated 3. Conflict arises from differences, both large and small. It occurs whenever people disagree 38 Abyssinia Journal of Business and Social Sciences Vol. 2, No. 2, 2017, 31-38 over their values, motivations, perceptions, ideas, or desires. Sometimes these differences appear trivial, but when a conflict triggers strong feelings, a deep personal need is often at the core of the problem. These needs can be a need to feel safe and secure, a need to feel respected and valued, or a need for greater closeness and intimacy. Everyone needs to feel understood, nurtured, and supported, but the ways in which these needs are met vary widely. Differing needs for feeling comfortable and safe create some of the most severe challenges in our personal and professional relationships. REFERENCES Akinnawonu, BM. (2006): The Methods of Conflict Resolution in Peace and Conflict Studies. In S. Amuseghan, T. Obamuyi and K. Ogen (eds.), An Introductory Text, Akure: Stebak. Boeree, G. (2009): Revolution in Mind: The Creation of Psychoanalysis. New York: Bant Books. Bonta, Bruce D. (1994). Conflict Resolution among Peaceful Societies: The Culture of Peacefulness. Journal of Peace Research, 33(4). Brigg, Morgan. (2007): Governance and Susceptibility in Conflict Resolution: Possibilities Beyond Control. Social and Legal Studies, 16 (1). Chakraborti N. (2010): Crimes against the ‘other’: Conceptual, operational and Empirical challenges for hate studies. Journal of Hate Studies 8(1), pp.9–28. Cook, G. (2003). Applied Linguistics. Oxford: Oxford University. Coombs, W. T. (2009b). Crisis, crisis communication, reputation, and rhetoric. In R. L. Heath, E. L. Toth, & D. Waymer (Eds.), Rhetorical and critical approaches to public relations. New York: Routledge. Cresswell, J.W. (2009). Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative and Mixed Methods Approaches (3nd.ed). London: Sage Publications. Fairclough, N. (2003). Analyzing Discourse: Textual analysis for Social Research. London: Rutledge Gee, P. (2011). An introduction to Discourse Analysis: Theory and Method (3nded). New York: Rutledge. Grant A. (2008): Working at the edge of Polarized Conflict in organizations. In Stacey, R. and Griffin, D. (Eds), Complexity and the Experience of Values, Conflict and Compromise in Organizations. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston Kosslyn and Rosenberg (2004). Psychology: The Brain, the Person and the world (2nd eds.). Sage Publication, London, UK. McVittie, Ch. and Mckinl6ay, A. (2011): Identities in Context: Individuals and Discourse in Action: A John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., Publication, United Kingdom. Morgan, M. (2010). Language, Discourse and Power in African American Culture. Cambridge University Press, UK Topper, B., & Lagadec, P. (2013). Fractal crises: A new path for crisis theory and crisis management. Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, 1, 4–16. Turpin-Petrosino, C. (2009). Black victimization: perceptions and realities. In: Perry, B. (eds.) Hate crimes. The victims of hate crime. Westport: Praeger, pp.19-44. UNDP (2004), ‘Human Development Report 2004’, Oxford University Press, New York. Van Dijk, T.A (2001). Critical Discourse Analysis as a Method in Social Scientific Research. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. __________(2004). Ideology and discourse: A multidisciplinary Introduction. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Victim Support. (2006). Crime and prejudice. The support needs of victims of hate crime: a research report. London: Victim Support. Virdee, S. (1995). Racial violence and harassment. London: Policy Studies Institute of victims of hate crime: a research report. London: Victim Support. 
work_wzrema27d5hv7cmggixhyb25vy	----	15.1 Editorial 181 MH NATURE | VOL 427 | 15 JANUARY 2004 | www.nature.com/nature 181 In praise of immigration The United States is a nation of immigrants — and nowhere more so than in the lab. Yet officials of the federal government don’t seem to recognize that the country’s scientific strength depends in large part on foreign talent. 15 January 2004 Volume 427 Issue no 6971 A fter the atrocities of 11 September 2001, it was inevitable that the US government would tighten up its procedures for letting foreign nationals into the country. For the Department of State and consulates abroad, security is now the watchword. No one disputes the need to exclude potential terrorists, but the resulting controls on immigration have become an unwieldy mess, arbitrarily ensnaring individuals who would previously have been welcomed into the country with open arms. Visiting scientists, perhaps more than any other group, have experienced these policies first-hand — leading to missed conferences, lost lab time and delayed graduations for large numbers of scientists and students. Some of the affected individuals have been through a nightmarish experience, their careers thrown seriously off track. But as Nature’s investigation into the issue reveals, the greatest damage may ulti- mately be suffered by the US scientific enterprise (see page 190). If the world’s brightest young scientists turn instead to other academic destinations, the quality of research in US labs will suffer. You might expect to find science-oriented officials within the federal government speaking up to stress the important contribution made by foreign-born scientists, many of whom take up permanent residence in the United States. But in the most part, they have failed to do so. Even Elias Zerhouni, the Algerian-born director of the National Institutes of Health, has had little to say in public on the issue. Some comments by senior officials have added to the impression that foreign scientists aren’t valued. At a press conference in Novem- ber on the status of the US scientific workforce, for instance, Rita Colwell, director of the National Science Foundation, told reporters: “We must end our addictive dependence on foreign workers.” Her words were intended to bolster support for US science education, but they expose a widely held view that researchers from abroad are a stopgap that should be replaced by home-grown talent. History teaches us a different lesson. The first scientific Nobel prize won by the United States went in 1907 to Albert Michelson, a Prussian-born physicist whose measurement of the velocity of light inspired Einstein’s theory of relativity. Since then, immigrant scientists have accounted for more than a quarter of the United States’ Nobels in physics, chemistry and medicine. These scientists’ journeys from their homelands to the United States were not simply about securing superior funding and laboratory equipment. Many fled discrimination, war and genocide. Others were politically active in countries where dissenters were imprisoned or executed. All saw the United States as a land of freedom and opportunity. The experiences of foreign scientists currently attempting to enter the United States are eroding that perception. Visiting scientists are increasingly finding themselves in situations that are stressful or humiliating. Even more worrying are reports of hate crimes commit- ted against Iranian and Arab students. In contrast, over the past decade, other Western nations have worked to make their societies more receptive to talented foreigners by loosening immigration laws for technical workers and trying to combat prejudice in their societies. In the twenty-first century, the United States is just one of many destinations. The US scientific leaders who recognize the important contribu- tion made by foreign scientists are split into two camps. The optimists point out that about 40% of the world’s research dollars are spent inside US laboratories. A few visa delays will do little to change that scientific hegemony, they argue. But the pessimists fear that the world’s rising scientific stars are already starting to turn their backs on the United States. Even a superpower can’t afford to be complacent, they warn. Whoever is right, federal government officials must not seem indifferent to the plight of foreign scientists. They need to take measures to ensure that these valuable assets are treated with dignity and made to feel welcome. ■ A t first glance, it seems to render obsolete the armies of post- grads and postdocs employed in the world’s molecular- genetics laboratories. In this week’s issue (see page 247), a British team unveils an automated system that “originates hypoth- eses to explain observations, devises experiments to test these hypotheses, physically runs the experiments using a laboratory robot, interprets the results to falsify hypotheses inconsistent with the data, and then repeats the cycle”. What’s more, when set loose on experiments to investigate the genetic control of important metabolic pathways in yeast, it performs more cost effectively than scientifically educated human volunteers. The Robot Scientist seems to promise a future of successfully completed research projects, untouched by human mind. Neo-luddites must be unsure whether to curse or celebrate. On one hand, they are obliged to condemn another technology that seems to threaten established patterns of employment. But they may also be glad to see the scientific and technological élite seemingly hoist with its own petard. The truth is rather different. The Robot Scientist does represent an important step forward, but does not spell the end for its human counterpart. The deductive steps required to design experiments for functional-genomic analyses are particularly amenable to solution by computer algorithms. And this is a field in which the deluge of data requiring explanation exceeds researchers’ capacity to cope. The team behind the Robot Scientist argues that such automation “frees scientists to make the high-level creative leaps at which they excel”. Therein lies the challenge. Some lab heads still treat postgrads and postdocs as a cheap source of menial labour, rather than educat- ing them to become tomorrow’s creative research leaders. We can only hope that the Robot Scientist helps to change such attitudes. ■ Don’t fear the Robot Scientist Contrary to first impressions, an automated system that designs its own experiments will benefit young molecular geneticists. © 2004 Nature Publishing Group Don't fear the Robot Scientist 
work_x43wz4rztrdbhf6x7lrsceifqq	----	Counter-Hegemonic Citizenship: LGBT Communities Counter-Hegemonic Citizenship: LGBT Communities and the Politics of Hate Crimes in Canada by Ann-Marie Field Centre de recherche sur l’immigration, l’ethnicité et la citoyenneté (CRIEC) Université du Québec à Montréal Montréal, Québec e-mail : field.ann-marie@uqam.ca Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association York University, Toronto 3 June 2006 mailto:field.ann-marie@uqam.ca Introduction 718.2 A court that imposes a sentence shall also take into consideration the following principles: (a) a sentence should be increased or reduced to account for any relevant aggravating or mitigating circumstances relating to the offence of the offender, and, without limiting the generality of the foregoing, (i) evidence that the offence was motivated by bias, prejudice or hate based on race, national or ethnic origin, language, colour, religion, sex, age, mental or physical disability, sexual orientation, or any other similar factor, or... (Criminal Code) In 1994, the Canadian government introduced Bill C-411, an amendment to the Criminal Code stating that offences motivated by hate or bias would be subject to harsher sentences. The Bill which received royal assent in July 1995 was applauded by police services, community activists that work closely with targeted groups and others concerned about hate crimes. The amendment was viewed as an important step in addressing the problem of targeted violence. It sent a clear message that the Canadian government and society in general condemns hate and bias crimes. The new legislation offered hope that something was being done to stop hate crimes and that, as a result, targeted groups would be safer. In advanced liberal-democratic states such as Canada, hate crime policies are part of a larger discourse on issues of difference, equality and social justice. Some of the greatest challenges faced by the public, governments, policy-makers, public institutions (including police services) and the judiciary have to do with the accommodation of differences and protecting people who are different from state discrimination and violence from other citizens. The debates raised when trying “to live together with differences” often focus on issues of equality, equity and social justice (Fraser 1997). They are about access to citizenship, employment, social programs and lodging; they also are about fair treatment by the police, the judicial system and state authorities. They are about the entitlement to safety by all citizens and their right to be free from discrimination. Overall, these are issues that relate to the enjoyment of substantive citizenship by all in society regardless of differences. The focus of this paper is on citizenship as it is experienced by a group that is considered different. My main concern rests on the fact that in liberal democracies, including Canada, where citizenship is said to be universal —meaning that everyone who is a citizen benefits from the same treatment by the state and is entitled to the same rights— groups that are considered Other on the basis of gender, sexual or gender identity2, race, ethnicity, etc., do not enjoy substantive citizenship. Despite claims of universal citizenship, which carries with it a presumption about equality, large segments of society are unable to contribute fully to the political community, nor are they able to access the full benefits associated with citizenship. For those of us who deeply value social justice, this is a troubling situation. 1Bill C-41, An Act to Amend the Criminal Code (Sentencing) and Other Acts in Consequence Thereof, 1st Session, 35th Parliament, 1995 (assented on July 13, 1995). 2In order to not exclude transsexuals and transgendered people, it is necessary to mention “gender identity” and not simply “sexual identity” and “gender” (Namaste 2000, 140-1). 2 When I speak of citizenship, I do not limit my focus to the formal-legal definition of citizenship3. Ultimately, I am not interested simply in whether one is entitled to vote, run for public office, carry a passport, or access health and welfare benefits. I am also interested in aspects of citizenship that are not necessarily tangible, or at least, not immediately visible. I am concerned with the barriers that prevent individual citizens from accessing the benefits of substantive citizenship or that prevent them from contributing to society. I am particularly concerned with violence —violence motivated by hate and bias targeting specific groups— and state actions to counter such violence. I view targeted violence as the clearest expression of the denial of substantive citizenship. Although targeted violence or the threat of such violence does not negate legal equality and entitlements associated with citizenship, it is likely to undermine substantive aspects of the citizenship of targeted groups (Lister 1997a, 43, 71-2; Phelan 2001, 5). The above arguments are developed through a focus on the citizenship of lesbians, gays, bisexuals and transgendered (LGBT) people. Even when they enjoy formal-legal citizenship, LGBT people are denied the benefits of substantive citizenship. Violence targeting LGBT people is a reality with which this group is confronted on a daily basis. Although the data available on hate crimes is not as accurate as for other crimes (see Janhevich 2001 and Roberts 1995), we know that LGBT people are one of the main categories of victims of hate crimes. Violence motivated by hate or bias is oppressive for the entire group which is targeted, regardless of whether one is a direct victim of targeted violence or not. Targeted violence consists of random and unprovoked attacks on an individual or her/his property in order to humiliate and subordinate a group of people. The knowledge that one may become a victim at any given time makes this violence oppressive. In this regard, the presence of targeted violence is one indicator that LGBT people are denied access to substantive citizenship. As a result, I consider “being safe” a prerequisite for enjoying substantive citizenship. I am interested in state action—or inaction—with respect to ensuring minimum levels of safety for targeted groups to access citizenship. One response to this violence has been an amendment to the Criminal Code that requires that crimes motivated by hate or bias be given harsher sentences (i.e. s. 718.2 in the Criminal Code). This legislation mentions “sexual orientation” as one of the groups it protects. Since LGBT individuals are denied substantive citizenship partly as a result of targeted violence, I ask if a public policy that aims to protect LGBT people —in this case through harsher sentences for hate crimes—can ensure or contribute to ensuring the minimum level of safety needed by LGBT people for substantive citizenship. Does the hate crime policy, which confirms the citizenship of LGBT people by mentioning sexual orientation as one of the protected categories, open up the concept of citizenship in ways that allow LGBT individuals to be included in a substantive definition of citizenship (in contrast to a formal-legal one, in which they are already included)? In this paper, I use the concept of citizenship to establish that LGBT people, as a group, are marginalized. After having recognized that lesbians, gays, bisexuals and transgendered individuals do not benefit from substantive citizenship, I focus on how and when citizenship changes. The process of contesting citizenship is central to a project of transformative politics that wants to remove the barriers to substantive citizenship and thereby allow LGBT individuals 3Formal-legal citizenship is understood as a status that is bestowed on those who are full members of a political community and who, as a result of this status, enjoy rights (e.g. application of laws or legal codes) and benefits (e.g. socio-economic benefits of the welfare state) as well as responsibilities (e.g. political participation such as voting). Moreover, formal-legal citizenship usually corresponds to a given national identity. 3 to be included in citizenship. Relying on a case study in which I examine strategies used to counter violence targeted at LGBT people, I make the argument that public policies and laws that aim to protect groups cannot guarantee access to substantive citizenship. They can, however, be used as a resource by oppressed groups to force a shift in the boundaries of the citizenship regime. Substantive Citizenship: Understanding Difference, Challenging Exclusions The concept of substantive citizenship has been developed and discussed in various bodies of literature. Feminist scholars have a well-established tradition of linking various sources of oppression in a common web, to address simultaneously sexism, racism, classism, heterosexism and other forms of oppression. Women of colour were the first to discuss the issue of intersectional or overlapping discrimination (Moraga and Anzaldula 1983; Collins 1990; hooks 1984; Bannerji 1993). At a time when people were writing about identity politics, their work alerted us to the need of considering power relations as a dynamic system to inform our analysis. These writers argued that it is important to look at race or gender not simply as a difference, but to understand these as embedded in a system of power relations that highlight domination. This literature has expanded to include the concept of citizenship. Using citizenship as a lens for understanding women’s place in society, these works examine gender, sexism, racism, imperialism, colonialism and violence against women. They also explore women and the labour market, women and the welfare state, and the impact of westernization and globalization on women. Feminist theories of citizenship constitute a large and important body of literature (Lister 1997; Walby 1997; Young 2000, 1990; Jones 1990, etc.). As Lister explains, “feminist political theorists have exposed the ways in which women’s long-standing exclusion from the theory and practice of citizenship [...] has been far from accidental. The universalist cloak of the abstract, disembodied individual has been cast aside to reveal a definitely male citizen and a white heterosexual, non-disabled one at that” (1997a, 66). Feminists challenge the idea that citizenship is a universal concept by highlighting the ways in which gender serves to exclude them from citizenship. The debate around women’s citizenship has often been stated in absolute terms. It is assumed that either women want to be treated the same (meaning equal) as men or differently. Yet, this equality/difference debate is too simplistic. It disregards thinking about citizenship in substantive terms. The choice between being treated the same or different is a false choice. Feminists have shown that to treat women the same as men denies their gender identity by making women be like men. To treat women differently, however, runs the risk of reinforcing the sexual division of labour, the private/public divide and sex roles (Longo 2001, 270). Thus, feminist theories of citizenship tend to propose alternatives for thinking about citizenship. Feminist theories of citizenship contribute to the understanding of the oppression of women in the political community, an analysis that can be easily expanded to look at the oppression of other groups, including LGBT people. In terms of women and citizenship, gender is articulated when it is the barrier to citizenship, equality and freedom. Gender is not always central to this struggle. In this respect, feminism is not a struggle for an empirically defined group, but for the equality of women (Mouffe 1993). This understanding shows that the analysis is easily adaptable for confronting the barriers to citizenship faced by other groups. Using citizenship as a lens, while being informed by feminist theories of power and oppression, “provides an invaluable strategic theoretical concept for the analysis of women’s subordination 4 [or that of other groups] and a potentially powerful political weapon in the struggle against it” (Lister 1997a, 195). For the purpose of identifying barriers to substantive citizenship, citizenship is best understood as a regime (Jenson and Phillips 1996). Citizenship is a social construct that varies across time and space and that extends beyond the formal title of citizen. The notion of regime helps us consider other practices and institutions that shape the experience of citizenship. A citizenship regime is established through “the institutionalization of a set of practices by which states use public power to shape and regulate markets and communities” (Jenson 1997, 628). The state establishes a citizenship regime through a set of laws and public policies that regulates who is entitled to become a citizen (formal-legal citizenship) and who will have access to the rights and benefits that accompany citizenship (substantive citizenship). The citizenship regime covers a given territory coinciding with the geographic borders of the state. Despite the fact that formal- legal citizenship is granted to most individuals living on a permanent basis in Canada, the full privileges of citizenship are limited to a smaller group of individuals. By constructing the boundaries of the political community through policies and laws, a system of inclusion/exclusion is established. It distinguishes internally between persons who benefit fully from rights (or first-class citizenship) and some sort of second-class citizen status for those who, despite having legal citizenship, do not. In sum, the citizenship regime extends to all legal citizens; everyone within the territory is affected by the practices and policies of the regime whether or not they benefit from citizenship. Yet, substantive citizenship (or full access to the rights of citizenship) is limited to certain segments of the population. Thus, although lesbians, gays, bisexuals and transgendered people live within the territory covered by Canadian citizenship and most have formal-legal citizenship, LGBT people generally were excluded, until very recently, from important benefits and rights of citizenship, including the right to equality before the law, equal access to justice, health and welfare.4 Each regime defines citizenship. In a stable regime, the status proffered to citizens matches the status anticipated by citizens. Apart from widespread restructuring of the economy or fundamental changes in national or international relations that can culminate in changes to the regime, when large segments of society no longer recognize themselves in how citizenship is defined, it is likely that the boundaries of the regime will be contested by them. Because I am concerned with how individuals who are Other experience citizenship, the concept of regime is particularly useful. To think of citizenship in terms of a regime allows us to outline what is citizenship, to define the barriers to substantive citizenship as they are experienced by given groups and to contemplate what could be done to force changes in the regime to better reflect the interests of those who are excluded from the citizenship regime. The literature on citizenship does not focus sufficiently on how those with legal but not substantive citizenship can challenge situations of oppression or push for change. The model of counter-hegemonic citizenship, which I develop here, contributes to such an understanding. The radical democracy project informs my idea of counter-hegemonic citizenship. About citizenship in radical democracy, Mouffe asserts: 4This is inspired from Carl Stychin’s work. Stychin speaks of nation, nationalism and national identity, in conjunction with citizenship. I have purposely defined counter-hegemonic citizenship in terms of the state and citizenship, rather than nation (1995, 105). For a discussion on the separation of citizenship from nation, see Kathleen B. Jones (1990) and Nira Yuval-Davis (1997). 5 [c]itizenship is not just one identity among others, as it is in liberalism, nor is it a dominant identity that overrides all other, as it is in civic republicanism. Instead, it is an articulating principle that affects the different subject positions of social agent, while allowing for a plurality of specific allegiances and for the respect of individual liberty (Mouffe 1993, 84). The interest in the radical democracy project is that citizenship finds itself repoliticized (Delanty 2000, 36). When citizenship is no longer understood simply as a set of rights, but rather as an entry-point from which we can contest, challenge and reshape the citizenship regime, social groups are more likely to mobilize around their citizenship identity, articulating a counter- hegemonic project that, if successful, will force changes in the boundaries of the citizenship regime. Mouffe has claimed that “[a] radical democratic interpretation [of citizenship] will emphasize the numerous social relations in which situations of domination exist that must be challenged if the principles of liberty and equality are to apply” (1993, 84). When citizenship is contested from below—when the regime is challenged by a counter-hegemonic project by social groups who have experienced exclusion from substantive citizenship—then, citizenship is repoliticized. It becomes radical (Turner 1994, 18; Mouffe 1993) or, as I prefer to call it, counter-hegemonic. Citizens are social agents capable of forcing institutional changes when pressed to do so as a result of a situation of oppression. Counter-hegemonic citizenship consists of political action and projects that try to change how citizenship is experienced by forcing the citizenship regime to incorporate groups who had previously been marginalized and excluded from some of the benefits of citizenship. For example, the implementation of hate crime legislation that would punish those who unlawfully harmed LGBT people aims at a shift in the boundaries of the political community and so contest citizenship. This contestation serves to increasingly legitimize the treatment of lesbians, gays, bisexuals and transgendered people as citizens rather than stigmatize them as deviants. I am not suggesting, however, that citizens easily engage in counter-hegemonic projects. Laclau and Mouffe have argued that a central problem in identifying when such projects are possible has been to “identify the discursive conditions for the emergence of collective action, directed towards struggling against inequalities and challenging relations of subordination” (1985, 153). They conclude that when a relation of subordination have become a source of antagonism, citizens are likely to engage in challenges. To determine when individual citizens find themselves outside the realm of substantive citizenship, it is useful to rely on Iris Young’s framework of oppression (1990). According to Young, “...oppression designates the disadvantage and injustice some people suffer not because of tyrannical power coerces them, but because of everyday practices of a well-intentioned liberal society” (1990, 41). Oppression is a concept that is rarely used to name injustices in the Canadian political context; oppression does, however, reflect the reality experienced by disadvantaged groups. She identifies five faces of oppression: exploitation, marginalization, powerlessness, cultural imperialism and violence (1990a, 53-63). If experiencing a situation of oppression as defined by Young, it is likely that the conditions needed to stimulate engagement in a counter-hegemonic project are met. LGBT people are subject to several of the forms of oppression as identified by Young, the most obvious one being targeted violence. As I argue in the next section, targeted violence can serve as a catalyst to push for change. 6 With respect to the goals of such a project, Mouffe has argued that “the aim of a radical democratic citizenship should be the construction of common political identity that would create the conditions for the establishment of a new hegemony articulated through new egalitarian social relations, practices and institutions” (Mouffe 1993, 86). Citizenship is understood here as the lens through which some injustices are addressed and marginalization contested. In sum, the essence of counter-hegemonic citizenship is the redefinition of the boundaries of citizenship regime to achieve the promise of social justice implicit in the idea of universal (or formal-legal) citizenship to the extent that it is within the state’s scope. The model of counter-hegemonic citizenship that I propose takes into account feminist critiques of radical democracy regarding the autonomy of individuals. Social positioning has differential outcomes for different groups. At present, not everyone has an equal opportunity to participate in radical democracy. Counter-hegemonic citizenship is based on three pillars: “voice, difference and justice”. First, there is a need for citizens to be active participants, although this participation may take different forms (e.g. traditional party politics, local liaison committee with the police, etc.). Second, there is the assumption of difference. This model is proposed in part because we want to come to terms with the challenge that difference poses to the governance of liberal-democratic states. Finally, there is the assumption that social justice is the desired end (Delanty 2000, 46) because formal equality leaves LGBT people in a situation of having fewer rights and freedoms or second-class citizens. These are the conditions for the success of a project of transformative politics. The progressive potential for counter-hegemonic citizenship is met when the process leads to real changes, when the experience of the oppressed group is taken into consideration and when diversity is represented in the accounts of knowledge produced by oppressed groups to force changes in the boundaries of the citizenship regime (see Andrew 2003, 324). To work towards a regime shift through contesting the boundaries of citizenship, what is needed is an “agenda for change [that] will require the collective engagement in a positive politics of difference that combines short-term responses as well as long-term transformative practices which disrupt institutionalized structures of inequality” (Perry 2001, 23). This means that the approach to counter-hegemonic citizenship takes place on several fronts. To understand how to proceed, first, we must analyze systems of oppression, in this case heterosexism. We need an understanding of how heteronormative principles are upheld so that they can be challenged. The concept of hegemony is useful for explaining how a citizenship regime that is unfavourable to sexual minorities is maintained (Kinsman 1996). Taken for granted privileges built on the assumption of heterosexual relations, as well as numerous rules and policies that reinforce the assumption of heterosexual privilege. In this respect, we can speak of heterosexual hegemony, which is maintained in a variety of ways either through the non-recognition of sexual minorities, policing practices and application of laws and regulations in ways that reinforce the oppression of LGBT individuals, and historically, through the criminalization of acts considered as deviant. Such an analysis can guide groups in their choices of issues on which to focus and in their choice of mobilization. Considering that targeted violence is possible only in a system of inequalities, the state’s role in the institutionalization of power relations must be recognized. When violence targeting a group goes unabated, the state is responsible for its legitimation. Connell claims that “[t]hrough laws and administrative arrangements, the state sets limits to the use of personal violence, protects property (and thus unequal economic resources), criminalizes stigmatized sexualities, 7 and organizes violence in policing, prisons and war” (1994, 148). Laws that focus specifically on sexual assault, partner assault, or hate crimes send a message that the state will not tolerate these specific forms of personal violence. Of course it is not sufficient for these laws to exist; they must also be enforced through policing and the criminal justice system. Here violence is understood as a process of exclusion. Hate crimes or violence targeted at LGBT people are a way to maintain power inequalities between LGBT people and others in society. By upholding heterosexism, this violence denies LGBT individuals first-class citizenship. The state must intervene when such violence occurs and should aim to prevent these incidents. If not, it must shoulder the blame for targeted violence on its territory (Wieviorka, 1998). Targeted violence is a process of social control. Targeted violence is also the product of certain discourses. Violence targeting LGBT people only makes sense in a context in which heterosexuality is privileged over other forms of sexualities, and to this the state contributes. Although the right to live free from violence is rarely discussed as a right of citizenship, since without adequate safety and protection the other rights of citizenship are undermined or rendered inaccessible, security should be considered as a basic requirement for citizenship. The state’s most basic role is the protection of its citizens. The freedom to walk down the street or move around in public spaces “is fundamental to the functioning of a state that considers itself to be ‘democratic’ ” (Lahey 1999, 150). Citizenship is a central point for launching projects of political contestation or developing counter-hegemonic projects that will result in the inclusion in citizenship of groups disadvantaged by the current citizenship regime. By mapping the inclusions/exclusions delineated by the citizenship regime we can understand that certain groups have been marginalized and illuminate some strategies to overcome such exclusion and oppression. Although this will not allow me to explain why LGBT people are stigmatized and subsequently excluded, it allows me to focus on how to change the situation. The state must make targeted violence its responsibility and work to prevent it to fulfill its duty in granting equal protection from violence to all of its citizens. The difficulty with issues of difference and citizenship, or more precisely of exclusions from substantive citizenship, is that the problem is so broad that identifying where to start can be daunting. Considering the extent to which heterosexism and homophobia affect the citizenship of LGBT individuals, solutions must be equally broad. However groups decide to challenge this system of oppression, we must keep in mind that every little gain with respect to substantive citizenship is one step closer to being able to be ourselves safely regardless of our sexual identity.5 Keeping a sharp eye on the functioning of heterosexism is mandatory if the boundaries of citizenship are to be successfully challenged. As someone I interviewed said: Wherever homophobia exists, there will be a perversion of people’s freedom and rights of which hate crimes is a component. I think there have been some shifts in homophobia within the culture, but I still think it is preeminent. Therefore, all issues around our interests have to be, in my opinion, premised on that as the environment and probably even in terms of our ability to self define is hampered by that. We [...] continue to seek a self-definition of who we are and what that means in a completely 5Discussions on social control suggest that regardless of our sexual identity, we are all controlled by the same gender norms that are not to be transgressed if violence, harassment, discrimination is to be avoided (Rubin 1993, 31; Carabine 1992, 27-35; Smith 1994, 241; Connell 1994) 8 unbiased way by chipping away at this homophobic environment in which we live (Interview David Hoe, 11 April 2003). The next section focuses on an application. The Ottawa Police Liaison Committee with the LGBT community6 Although issues of safety are a concern for everyone, safety and living free from violence and discrimination is an even greater concern for LGBT communities which like others marginalized by difference are more likely to be the target of hate and bias-motivated activities and least likely to get the help they need to be safe. To determine whether the adoption of hate crime legislation could have an impact on the citizenship of LGBT individuals, I assessed police practices in Ottawa. More specifically, I studied the Ottawa Police Liaison Committee for the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender Communities (subsequently referred to as the Liaison Committee). I focused on the Liaison Committee to understand how the boundaries of the citizenship regime were challenged to better accommodate the interests of LGBT individuals. Through the study of the Liaison Committee, I show that the Ottawa police, more specifically the Hate Crime Section, as a result of the partnership with LGBT individuals and community organizations, has been willing to work with a definition of crime and safety that corresponds to the LGBT communities’ definition of violence or hate crimes. I conclude that this is key for challenging the boundaries of citizenship and ensuring minimum levels of safety to allow LGBT people to enjoy the benefits of citizenship and contribute to the political community. Although in the case of Ottawa the hate crime sentencing legislation does not seem to be at the origin of the changes that brought about specialized hate crime units and liaison committees, the case study helps to ascertain the role played by public policy in protecting LGBT people and enlarging their citizenship rights. My case study allows me to show that the hate crime policy was used as a resource for LGBT individuals to access police services and hold them accountable for their safety, subsequently resulting in a contestation of the boundaries of citizenship. The Liaison Committee, a community-based committee with police involvement, is a successful model of police accountability to the communities. The Liaison Committee’s collaboration with the Ottawa Police Hate Crime Section has been key in developing an approach to police work which conceptualizes crime and safety in ways compatible with the communities’ experience of targeted violence or hate crimes, rather than as strictly define in law (which addresses only most serious offences). The Liaison Committee came into being as a result of pressures from the LGBT communities and their willingness to liaise with the police to solve problems that compromised the safety of LGBT people. In the beginning, the LGBT communities wanted to secure an entry point to have access to the services of the Ottawa Police to which they were entitled as residents of Ottawa. The individuals who initiated the Liaison Committee were willing to work with the police to overcome police indifference to the problems of violence in the parks, community reluctance to report, and, more generally, safety issues affecting the LGBT communities. The 6 This paper presents partial findings from a broader study on citizenship, hate crimes and the safety of LGBT people. The fieldwork consisted primarily of formal and informal semi-structured interviews with LGBT individuals and individuals affiliated with LGBT organizations, individuals and state actors called upon to intervene with respect to the safety of LGBT citizens (police officers, policy-makers), mostly in Ottawa. I conducted 53 in- depth interviews in the period from 15 February 2002 until 4 March 2003. 9 police did not initiate this committee and originally had to be shamed into meeting with the LGBT communities. More than a decade later, this committee still exists and is vibrant. Police participation in the Liaison Committee has been necessary and is central to its existence (Interview David Pepper, 22 March 2002 and Interview Bruce Watts, 26 February 2002). According to Bruce Watts who was head of the Hate Crime Section from 1995-1998, a key distinction between this committee and other committees of the Ottawa Police is that unlike the others, this committee is community driven with some police involvement, rather than being police driven with community involvement (Interview, 26 February 2002). Although police voices are heard at meetings, the LGBT communities use the committee to voice their concerns and problems to the police. The committee meetings are a forum used to find solutions that will promote the safety of LGBT people in Ottawa, thereby opening up spaces where LGBT individuals are able to enjoy the rights associated with Canadian citizenship. As in most cities, the LGBT communities are quite diverse and not always visible. The Liaison Committee does attempt to represent the LGBT communities, but cannot do so fully. The Committee involves a number of organizations that represent diverse segments of the LGBT communities.7 LGBT people of colour and youths, however, have had little if any representation over the years. Moreover, since this committee engages with the police, some community activists are uncomfortable with or unwilling to associate with such a committee. The history of the LGBT communities’ relations with the police in Ottawa and elsewhere has been marked by a number of homophobic and repressive moments that still today leave some individuals unwilling to engage with the police. Nevertheless, the Liaison Committee does voice the concerns of a number of individuals from various backgrounds and works in the best interest of the LGBT communities. Many changes in the approach of the Ottawa Police are the result of work, outreach, and pressure from the Liaison Committee and community groups. The Liaison Committee was a major catalyst in getting the Hate Crime Section set up in January 1993. Also, over the years, there has been a noticeable increase in reporting of hate and bias-motivated incidents on the basis of sexual identity, which can be attributed to LGBT communities having come to recognize safe entry points to access police services, either through the Liaison Committee or the Hate Crime Section (Wellness Projects 2001, 42; OPS, 1993-2002; Roberts 1995, 17-18). The Ottawa Police Liaison Committee for the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender Communities is considered a definite success by those involved and most likely by a large number of LGBT people. Although it is quite possible that most LGBT individuals in Ottawa will not make a direct connection between their feelings of relative safety and the work done by the Liaison Committee, the partnership established between the police and the communities that is maintained through the Liaison Committee has been key in ensuring that increasing numbers of incidents are being reported, that actions are being taken to prevent incidents from occurring and that incidents are resolved (or investigated) when they do happen. As one community member explained, “the police is a great resource to deal with safety issues. If the community is not accessing police services, their safety is likely to be compromised” (Interview Matt Lundie, 26 February 2002). The Liaison Committee and the work being done by the Hate Crime Section 7The committee has a permanent membership that includes the representatives of the Ottawa Police Services, the Gatineau police, Carleton University Safety, University of Ottawa Security Services and the Crown Attorney’s Office. The list of community organizations that are represented are: Pink Triangle Services, Parents and Friends of Lesbians and Gays (PLAG), Gender Mosaic, Sage, AIDS Committee of Ottawa, Ottawa Knights, GLBT Centre (Carleton Univeristy), Pride Centre (University of Ottawa), Pride Committee of Ottawa, and VASOC. 10 which plays a central role in reducing the traditional barriers between minority communities and the police therefore affect the lives of countless individuals directly and positively, especially those who are the victims of hate and bias-motivated crimes and incidents. Keeping this success in mind, one might ask then whether the adoption of the hate crime sentencing legislation contributed in some way in changing police practices and ensuring the safety of LGBT individuals. In the case of Ottawa which already had a Hate Crime Section and Liaison Committee when Bill C-41 was adopted, it would be logical to assume that the LGBT communities would not benefit from this change in the Criminal Code.8 What then is the role of this legislation? When assessing the impact of the changes to the Criminal Code made in 1995 with respect to the work of police services, we need to keep in mind that this provision is intended for use by judges at the sentencing stage of a criminal process (Interview David Pepper, 22 March 2002). By introducing hate crime sentencing enhancement measures rather than a new category of crime, this provision offers no new laws or tools that can be used by police. This is not to say that the provision had no effect at all, however. It made the public more aware of what hate crimes are. It has also raised the public’s expectations of the police who are mandated to enforce the Criminal Code and must address hate crimes. In the long run, this can contribute to the reporting of these crimes and have an indirect impact on policing. What the hate crime sentencing legislation more generally contributed was a change in the ability to assess the situation with respect to hate crimes. Introducing changes to the Criminal Code gave police forces the ability to quantify hate crimes, which could not be done before. The concept of hate crime needed to be included in the Criminal Code in order for police to have the authority to charge individuals with such an offence. Once there was an operating definition of hate crimes in the Criminal Code, it became possible to quantify the number of cases in which charges are laid or the number of cases investigated (Interview Yves Martel, 28 February 2002). In other words, it became possible to compile data on this type of crime. Tabulating hate crime data does help police services in terms of resource allocation. Speaking about the initial stages of setting up the Ottawa Police Hate Crime Section, officers have also mentioned how it was a struggle to secure resources at a time when people were questioning whether this work should even be done. Now that the process is well entrenched in Ottawa, resources are secured for this section (Interview Bruce Watts, 26 February 2002). The codification of hate crime has likely contributed to this. The question is no longer whether resources will be allocated for work on hate crimes, but rather in what proportion. More generally, justifying the existence of a hate crime section is no longer an issue at the executive level of a number of large police services. It is accepted that the problem of hate crimes exists and that a specialized unit is needed to address these crimes. This substantiates how, in the case of Ottawa Police, there is an openness to community outreach and addressing hate crimes. This openness contributes to enlarging the boundaries of the citizenship regime by giving communities access to the protection they need and are entitled to. The police and criminal justice system have a role to play in terms of making sure that when such incidents occur there is an adequate response. In this respect, I conclude that cities with a liaison committee that plays a significant role in making police accessible to LGBT 8 The Ottawa Police and Liaison Committee actively lobbied for such a change. See: Ottawa-Carleton Regional Police Bias Crime Unit and the Liaison Committee for Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender Communities. 1995. Brief Submitted to the House of Commons Standing Committee on Justice and Legal Affairs respecting Bill C-41. (February) 11 communities, as does the Ottawa Liaison Committee, are likely better off than those who do not because access to police is a prerequisite to ensuring minimum levels of safety to enable the citizenship of LGBT individuals. Having a liaison committee means, in the case of Ottawa, that individuals have a place to which to turn when there is a problem, even if they do not wish to go directly to the police (for it is possible to report crimes anonymously through the liaison committee). It also means that there is an established dialogue with the police when there is a problem with that very institution. When the communities have a problem with the police, they can address them at Liaison meetings —a forum where the police are held accountable for their actions or inaction. Without such a venue, individuals are forced to use official complaints against, for example, an individual officer that are made to the police itself, which puts the onus on the individual making the complaint in a process which tends to be adversarial or confrontational, not to mention formal and much slower than raising issues in the informal setting of the Liaison Committee. Moreover, the scope of the issues addressed in the context of the Liaison Committee is much broader than in the system of complaints. For example, the community may ask the police to step up patrol in a given area where they have identified a problem or it may question why it had not received a warning that there had been a series of incidents and so on. A Liaison Committee is a tool that can contribute in making certain cities safer for LGBT individuals when used by the communities to hold the police accountable for their safety. It is not a sufficient condition however to ensure that a city is safe for LGBT communities. Carole Holland, one of the persons involved since the setting up the committee, assessed the work of the committee by saying that, because the focus of the Liaison Committee is on crime prevention, the work of the Committee will never be finished. The Committee must always question whether it is covering all the bases. In her words: Two necessary components [of the work done by the Liaison Committee]: Vision and Vigilance. Speaking about vigilance, we cannot assume that the police will be at a shared place of understanding and goal setting every moment on all issues; we cannot assume that the issues will come to us. We have to be aware of the issues and we have to identify the issues. This speaks to being proactive (Interview Carroll Holland, 15 February 2002). She warns that now that the Liaison Committee is more than a decade old, and should not allow itself to slip into a place of self-satisfaction. It needs to sharpen up and be vigilant and assess where it is at and what it should be doing next to continue on with crime prevention and safety of LGBT individuals. One can easily draw parallels between what Holland is saying about the role of the Liaison Committee and a project of radical democracy. A project of radical democracy implies that those engaged in counter-hegemonic projects, such as negotiating the conditions to ensure one’s safety, are always having to renegotiate their position to secure their access to substantive citizenship (Mouffe 1993, 83-6). This negotiation is made legitimate and possible in part because the Criminal Code now recognizes “hate crimes” as a particular form of violence. By naming this problem, it became easier for communities to demand police protection. The identification of the problem probably gave the Liaison Committee the needed legitimacy to pursue its work. For the police, the identification of hate crimes in the Criminal Code allows to justify the allocation of resources towards the Hate Crime section, the Liaison Committee, training, etc. An immediate and 12 concrete outcome is that LGBT individuals are more likely to receive appropriate and fair treatment at the hands of the police when they are victims of a crime. A less obvious and longer- term outcome is that the Liaison Committee, by allowing LGBT people to access police services, is empowering their communities by enabling their citizenship. This, I argue, is a necessary first step toward a regime shift, toward redefining citizenship in substantive terms that are inclusive of the LGBT communities. Conclusion In advanced liberal democracies, like Canada, managing diversity is one of the greatest challenges faced by state and society. For those concerned with social justice, debates raised by trying to “to live together with difference” can best be answered by understanding substantive citizenship. It is my premise that we must measure the citizenship of groups considered different or Other to determine how sexual identity, gender, race, ethnicity, etc. work as barriers to substantive citizenship. This requires in-depth analysis if Canada is to become a peaceful democratic state. A lot has changed over the last decade and even more since the events of 11 September 2001, reminding us that we cannot take for granted that Canada will act as a model state as its human rights record, its multiculturalism policies and its success in addressing matters that have to do with difference suggest is possible. Over the last decade, we have experienced a rolling back of the rights of citizenship. The re-organization of the state directed by neo-liberal tendencies in governance has compromised social rights (Rice and Prince 2000), while increased security measures invoked to combat terrorism have imperiled civil rights (Adelman 2002). In other words, the citizenship of many individuals has been diminished as a result of the changing political landscape. My concern is the particularly severe result for those who, on the basis of their identity, already encountered barriers to enjoying the rights and privileges of citizenship; whose citizenship remained proforma rather than substantive. The concept of citizenship is a useful lens for assessing power relations, understanding situations of oppression and developing strategies to challenge this oppression. Citizenship also helps us make sense of everyday situations. I argued that the hate crime sentencing provision (a policy of the Canadian state), by identifying sexual orientation as one of the protected categories, reaffirmed the citizenship of LGBT individuals, sending a clear message that violence targeted at LGBT people will not be tolerated. The hate crime sentencing provision is an instrument for judges rather than policing services. For the most part, it has not had a direct impact on policing practices. Nevertheless, as it was shown in the selected case study, the provision has been used, by the LGBT communities of Ottawa to hold the police accountable for their security (a right of citizenship) and in this way change policing practices. Again, this is a situation in which the state (through its police services) mediates a right associated with citizenship: the right to security and protection. Counter-hegemonic citizenship engages with the theory elaborated by Mouffe to allow concrete expressions of her framework. Mouffe’s work is invaluable for understanding the social struggles taking place in advanced liberal-democratic states. Her work is theoretical, however, and does not provide examples of the application of her framework. This paper has contributed to understanding how Mouffe’s model can become a strategy used by social actors to challenge situations of oppression. Throughout this paper, I have insisted on thinking about citizenship as a process - something that could be contested, enlarged, redefined- rather than a status or set of rights. I have also focused on understanding citizenship from below. The use of 13 interviews allowed me to hear from those who do not experience substantive citizenship and from individuals who engage in challenging inequalities and oppression. 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work_vtojylarszettfobfbnjh6pupy	----	Microsoft Word - final version.doc Multiculturalism and Sectarianism in post-Agreement Northern Ireland Peter Geoghegan PhD University of Edinburgh 2008 - ii - Abstract This dissertation contributes to existing scholarship on contemporary multiculturalism. It does so by exploring how multicultural agendas are operationalised in Northern Ireland – a society divided along sectarian lines. As the political violence of the conflict has receded, Northern Ireland has witnessed unprecedented levels of in-migration. This dissertation seeks to understand how, as Northern Irish society is increasingly being conceived of as culturally diverse, emerging multicultural agendas interact with embedded sectarianism. The empirical research focuses on the political institutions and policies pertaining to Northern Ireland as a whole, and the specific activities and social practices of various ethnically-identified minorities, voluntary organisations and anti-racist movements in selected areas of Belfast. The research involved interviews with civil servants, policy makers, ethnically-identified minorities, voluntary groups and anti-racist activists. This dissertation argues that a government concern for managing cultural diversity can be understood as part of a process of ‘normalising’ Northern Ireland after the conflict. However, a persistent sectarianism complicates, and often impedes, the advancement of multicultural, and particularly anti-racist, agendas. This argument is developed through an exploration of policy and institutional structures, anti-racist campaigns and responses to racialised violence, as well as initiatives that seek to recognise and celebrate cultural diversity. This dissertation shows that the relationship between sectarianism and multiculturalism in post-Agreement Northern Ireland is not unidirectional. Instead, the two processes are deeply imbricated with each other: multicultural initiatives are shaped by sectarianism, and sectarianism persists in emergent multicultural imaginaries. This said, the dissertation suggests that multiculturalism is also capable of disrupting sectarian constructions of space and identity in Northern Ireland. Based on these findings, this dissertation argues that cultural diversity provides an opportunity to denaturalise the social structures and narratives which reproduce sectarianism. It is argued that this process could play an important role in advancing the construction of a socially cohesive and multicultural Northern Ireland. - iii - Acknowledgements Over the last four years so many people helped me in different ways that it would be impossible to do them all justice here, but, of course, some people stand out for special thanks. First, my sincere thanks go to Jane Jacobs and Jan Penrose, my two supervisors. They stuck by me throughout; always on hand with help, advice and motivational talks when needed, and I owe this dissertation to them. The research for this dissertation would not have been possible without the generous sponsorship I received from the Institute of Geography at the University of Edinburgh. I would also like to thank the SPIRIT centre at the University of Aalborg (and the Marie Curie Foundation) for allowing me to spend four wonderful months in Denmark. I would also like to say a special thank you to all the participants in this research; so many of whom went out of their way to help me. The help (and, dare I say it, occasional hindrance) of my friends and family was always vital. In my early days in Edinburgh, Barry and Susie were always there for me; later joined by Ruairi, Brid, Ralph and Andy. In Belfast, I was met with so much goodwill that I’ve never really left since. Special thanks to Lewis, Stuart, Karen, Romana and many others for making me feel at home and then constantly distracting me with gigs to go to, pubs to drink in and plays to review. Thanks also to the Geography Department at Queens University, Belfast, and particularly Ian Shuttleworth, for allowing me to use their facilities for the duration of my fieldwork in Belfast. Cheers also to my fellow postgrads in Edinburgh who put up with me breezing in about once every six months, making a horrible mess and leaving again. Special thanks to Omar, Nick and Sebastian for helping with the formatting on the dissertation, and to Charlie for being a good friend and an even better example for me to finish up. It wasn’t always easy, but it was the inspiration provided by Mike McQueen, Ealasaid and Greg Dulli that got me through the difficult last few months. And a special thanks to my brother, Robbie. This dissertation is dedicated to my mum Mary Melvin Geoghegan and my grandfather Alfred Melvin. Their love, support and faith has helped me through this, and every other curveball life has thrown. Cheers. - iv - Declaration of Originality I hereby declare that the dissertation has been composed by me, that it is my own work and that it has not been submitted for any other degree or professional qualification. Parts of this dissertation have been published as ‘Beyond Orange and Green? The awkwardness of negotiating difference in Northern Ireland’ in Irish Studies Review 16 (2): 173-194. This paper is reproduced, with the permission of Routledge publishing, as Appendix V. Peter Geoghegan 2008 - v - Abbreviations AIA Anglo-Irish Agreement BBC British Broadcasting Corporation CCRU Central Community Relations Unit CDA Critical Discourse Analysis CEO Chief Executive Officer CERD Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination CRC Community Relations Council CRE Commission for Racial Equality CRJ Community Restorative Justice CRU Community Relations Unit CSU Community Safety Unit CWA Chinese Welfare Association DCA Department of Constitutional Affairs DSD Department of Social Development DUP Democratic Unionist Party ECNI Equality Commission for Northern Ireland GAA GRO Gaelic Athletic Association Good Relations Officer IRA Irish Republican Army MP Member of Parliament NI Northern Ireland NIA Northern Ireland Assembly NICEM Northern Ireland Council for Ethnic Minorities NIHRC Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission NIO Northern Ireland Office NISRA Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency OFMDFM Office of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister PD People’s Democracy PSNI Police Service of Northern Ireland PSP Prisoner’s Support Program PUP Progressive Unionist Party REU Racial Equality Unit - vi - RRA RRO Race Relations Act Race Relations Order RUC Royal Ulster Constabulary SACHR Standing Advisory Committee on Human Rights SCA Springfield Charitable Association SDLP Social Democratic and Labour Party TSN Targeting Social Need UDA Ulster Defence Association UFF Ulster Freedom Fighters UK United Kingdom UKUP United Kingdom Unionist Party UUP Ulster Unionist Party UVF Ulster Volunteer Force WARN West Against Racism Network - vii - Contents Abstract ........................................................................................................................ ii Acknowledgements ......................................................................................................iii Declaration of Originality........................................................................................... iv Abbreviations ............................................................................................................... v List of Figures ............................................................................................................. xi List of Tables.............................................................................................................. xii Chapter One: Introducing the Dissertation............................................................. 1 1.1. Introducing and Outlining the Dissertation........................................................... 2 Chapter Two: Understanding Multiculturalism and Sectarianism: A Review of the Literature.............................................................................................................. 9 2. 1. Introduction .................................................................................................... 10 2.2. Understanding Religious Difference ............................................................... 11 2.2.1. Geographies of religion............................................................................ 12 2.2.2. Existing perspectives on sectarianism in Northern Ireland...................... 13 2.3. Approaches to Understanding Multiculturalism ............................................. 18 2.3.1. Demographic multiculturalism and racism in multicultural societies...... 19 2.3.2. The politics of recognition ....................................................................... 22 2.3.3. Approaches to understanding anti-racism ................................................ 27 2.3.4. Reviewing UK multicultural policy ......................................................... 30 2.4. Perspectives on ‘Multicultural’ Northern Ireland ........................................... 34 2.4.1. Demographic changes and racism in Northern Ireland............................ 34 2.4.2. The politics of recognition in Northern Ireland ....................................... 38 2.4.3. Analyses of anti-racism in Northern Ireland ............................................ 40 2.4.4. Research on post-Agreement public policy ............................................. 41 2.4. Conclusion....................................................................................................... 43 - viii - Chapter Three: Methodology.................................................................................. 46 3.1. Introduction ..................................................................................................... 47 3.2. Discourse Analysis.......................................................................................... 48 3.3. Selecting Field Sites, Sources and Informants ................................................ 52 3.4. Data Collection and Analysis.......................................................................... 57 3.4.1. Interviewing through semi-structured interviews .................................... 58 3.4.2. Interviewer experiences ........................................................................... 61 3.4.3. Transcribing and analysing interview data .............................................. 65 3.4.4. Observation .............................................................................................. 68 3.4.5. Visual methods......................................................................................... 70 3.5. Limitations of Methodology ........................................................................... 73 3.6. Conclusion....................................................................................................... 75 Chapter Four: Setting the Scene: An Historical Overview of Sectarianism and Multiculturalism in Northern Ireland.................................................................... 77 4.1. Introduction ..................................................................................................... 78 4.2. A Brief History of Northern Ireland................................................................ 80 4.3. Managing Sectarianism: Community Relations in Northern Ireland.............. 84 4.4. The Agreement................................................................................................ 87 4.5. After the Agreement........................................................................................ 90 4.6. Migration and Diversity in Northern Ireland .................................................. 94 4.7. Conclusion..................................................................................................... 100 Chapter Five: Managing Multiculturalism in a Divided Society: Public Policy in Northern Ireland .................................................................................................... 103 5.1. Introduction ................................................................................................... 104 - ix - 5.2. ‘Race’ Relations Policy during ‘the Troubles’.............................................. 105 5.3. From ‘Community Relations’ to ‘Good Relations’: Multicultural Policy since the Agreement ...................................................................................................... 108 5.3.1. Managing diversity as ‘normalisation’................................................... 113 5.4. Sketching the Institutions of Good Relations................................................ 115 5.4.1. Good relations in the devolved administration ...................................... 116 5.4.2. Good relations in the non-devolved administration ............................... 120 5.4.3. Good relations in non-governmental public bodies ............................... 121 5.5. Interrogating Good Relations in post-Agreement Institutional Frameworks 126 5.5.1. Fragmented institutional structure ......................................................... 126 5.5.2. Separation between devolved and non-devolved institutions and powers .......................................................................................................................... 128 5.5.3. Privileging sectarian identities in the Agreement’s institutions and practices............................................................................................................ 130 5.6. Conclusion..................................................................................................... 135 Chapter Six: Multicultural Agendas in Practice: Responding to Racism and Recognising Difference .......................................................................................... 138 6.1. Introduction ................................................................................................... 139 6.2. Responding to Racism in Northern Ireland................................................... 140 6.2.1. Policing in Northern Ireland................................................................... 142 6.2.2. Visual culture of PSNI hate crime awareness campaign ....................... 146 6.2.3. ‘They’re not interested in our issues’: Policing ‘race’ in Northern Ireland .......................................................................................................................... 149 6.3. Celebrating Cultural Diversity ...................................................................... 155 6.3.1. Celebrating multiculture(s), essentialising difference............................ 155 6.3.2. Recognising cultural difference in sectarian spaces............................... 159 6.3.3. Negotiating cultural difference, destabilising sectarianism ................... 165 6.4. Conclusion..................................................................................................... 167 - x - Chapter Seven: ‘Showing Your True Colours’: The Visual Culture of Anti- racism in West Belfast ........................................................................................... 170 7.1. Introduction ................................................................................................... 171 7.2. Spatial Segregation and Visual Culture in Northern Ireland ........................ 172 7.2.1. Murals in Northern Ireland..................................................................... 174 7.3. Locating Anti-racism(s) in West Belfast....................................................... 178 7.3.1. Republican – WARN mural: ‘Fight Bigotry, Fight Racism’ ................. 184 7.3.2. Loyalist – Shankill Alternatives mural: ‘Declare War on Racism’ ....... 192 7.3.3. A glimmer of hope? Another anti-racist mural ...................................... 199 7.4. Posters and Pamphlets................................................................................... 204 7.4.1. WARN texts ........................................................................................... 204 7.4.2. ‘Loyalist or racist? You can’t be Both’.................................................. 210 7.5. Conclusion..................................................................................................... 218 Chapter Eight: Conclusion.................................................................................... 221 8.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................ 222 8.2 A Review of the Dissertation ............................................................................. 222 8.3 Concluding Reflections on Sectarianism, Multiculturalism and their Outworking in Northern Ireland ................................................................................................... 228 Appendix I: Sample Letter of Introduction .............................................................. 236 Appendix II: Interview Index................................................................................... 237 Appendix III: Sample Interview Schedules ............................................................. 239 Appendix IV: Consent Form .................................................................................... 243 Appendix V Published Material............................................................................... 244 Bibliography............................................................................................................. 265 - xi - List of Figures Figure 1.1 Map of Northern Ireland. 6 Figure 4.1 Racist attacks on Ulster’s minorities, Belfast Telegraph clipping. 99 Figure 4.2 Loyalists blamed for racist attacks, Guardian clipping. 100 Figure 5.1 Cover of A Racial Equality Strategy. 112 Figure 5.2 Chart of post-Agreement institutional structures. 116 Figure 5.3 Chart of Equality Directorate, OFMDFM. 117 Figure 5.4 Chart of non-governmental public bodies. 122 Figure 6.1 PSNI racial incidents flyer. 143 Figure 6.2 ‘Hate Crime is Wrong’ poster. 147 Figure 6.3 Brochure for 2005 Belfast Mela. 156 Figure 6.4 Samhain/Diwali flyer. 159 Figure 7.1 Map of residential segregation in Belfast. 179 Figure 7.2 Map of West Belfast. 180 Figure 7.3 UVF memorial, Shankill Road. 181 Figure 7.4 Bobby Sands mural, Falls Road. 182 Figure 7.5 Race crime in West Belfast, Andersonstown News clipping. 183 Figure 7.6 ‘Fight Bigotry, Fight Racism’ mural. 185 Figure 7.7 Fredrick Douglass mural. 189 Figure 7.8 Reproduction of ‘Fight Bigotry’ mural in Andersonstown News. 190 Figure 7.9 ‘Declare War on Racism’ mural. 192 Figure 7.10 Youths painting ‘Declare War on Racism’ mural. 195 Figure 7.11 Racialised minorities painting ‘Declare War on Racism’ mural. 196 Figure 7.12 ‘Multicultural dancing’ at mural launch. 197 Figure 7.13 Map showing location of ‘I’m Not Your Stereotype’ mural. 200 Figure 7.14 ‘I’m Not Your Stereotype’ mural (Filipino). 201 Figure 7.15 ‘I’m Not Your Stereotype’ mural (English). 201 Figure 7.16 ‘I’m Not Your Stereotype’ mural (Irish). 202 Figure 7.17 Front cover WARN passport. 206 Figure 7.18 Photo page WARN passport. 207 Figure 7.19 Front cover ‘Loyalist or Racist? You can’t be Both’ pamphlet. 211 Figure 7.20 Inside panel ‘Loyalist or Racist? You can’t be Both’ pamphlet. 213 Figure 7.21 Posters from ‘Loyalist or Racist? You can’t be Both’ campaign. 215 -xii- List of Tables Table 5.1 Summary of good relations institutions and their policies. 126 Table 5.2 Summary of reallocation of responses to 2001 Northern Ireland census.133 1 Chapter One Introducing the Dissertation 2 1.1. Introducing and Outlining the Dissertation It is clear that people are moving around the globe along new migratory pathways, and in larger numbers, than ever before (Abbas 2005). It is in this context that many commentators have identified the existence of cultural diversity as the defining feature of contemporary Western societies (Body-Gendrot 1998; Kobayashi 1993). This increased plurality and diversity has precipitated the rise of multiculturalism within the borders of many Western nation states (Hall 1992; Vasta 2007). In these contexts, multiculturalism – encompassing a wide range of inclusionary practices and principles – has become the major ideological response and societal adaptation to the presence of cultural diversity (Kymlicka 1995; Parekh 2000; Taylor 1994; Vertovec 1996; 2007a). Although multiculturalism is already being critiqued (Hesse 2000), multicultural agendas continue to dominate both policy and academic debates on cultural diversity in society (Cohen 1999). Through its engagement with the emergence of multicultural agendas in contemporary Northern Ireland this dissertation contributes to existing scholarship on contemporary multiculturalism. More specifically, my work investigates what happens when new multicultural visions are brought into a society that is grounded historically in sectarianism. Multiculturalism is typically conceived of as a response to issues of ‘race’ and ethnicity in contemporary societies and, indeed, has generally been studied as such (Mitchell 2004; Vasta 2007; Vertovec 1996).1 Despite this burgeoning literature, very little has been written about what happens when multicultural agendas emerge in a society divided along sectarian lines. In looking at multicultural agendas in contemporary Northern Ireland, my research is unique and represents an important contribution to the literature on multiculturalism in diverse societies. 1 The term ‘race’ was once understood to imply the existence of naturally discrete and discernible groups in human populations. This is no longer the case, and it is now widely accepted that ‘race’ is a socially constructed category; it is common now to talk of ‘racialised’ groups and processes of ‘racialisation’. However, the academic debate surrounding this facet of difference in contemporary society continues to be couched in the terms ‘race’ and ‘racial’. Mindful of the need to use the term, but also of its social construction, the terms ‘race’ and ‘racial’ are placed in quotes throughout this dissertation to stress that ‘race’ has no ontological status as a categorisation and that the distinctions made by the term have no biological basis. In doing this I follow a long tradition, e.g. Bonnett (1996), Jackson and Penrose (1993) and Miles (1989). 3 Sectarianism, the ‘adherence to a particular sect or party or denomination, often leading to the rejection of other beliefs’, has characterised relations between Catholic/Nationalists and Protestant/Unionists in Northern Ireland from colonial times right up to the present day (Darby 1976; Lewis 2006: 27).2 As will become apparent later, the social and economic division of Northern Irish society along sectarian lines dates back over four hundred years (Bardon 1992; Coulter 1999). It was this sectarian division that eventually precipitated the widespread violence and social unrest of ‘the Troubles’ (1969-1998) (Buckland 1981). This armed sectarian conflict lasted almost thirty years; ending in the later 1990s with the peace process and signing of the Good Friday Agreement (1998).3 This political settlement established the legislative basis for a devolved power-sharing administration in Northern Ireland, and created the context in which a post-conflict future for Northern Ireland could be envisaged (Graham and Nash 2006). Sectarian tensions have not completely disappeared (Shirlow and Murtagh 2006), yet the changes in the political situation in Northern Ireland over the course of the last decade have been so remarkable that the region has become a site of in-migration for the first time (Rogers 2006). It is within this context that the term multiculturalism has appeared in both academic and non-academic accounts of contemporary Northern Ireland (Chan 2006; McVeigh and Rolston 2007; Nash 2005; OFMDFM 2005a). 2 There has been a great deal of debate and discussion surrounding the precise terms used to signify the two dominant communal groupings in Northern Ireland (Coulter 1999). Unionists support the continuation of the political union between Northern Ireland and Great Britain. In contrast, Nationalists aspire to replace the union with Great Britain with an all-Ireland Republic. Although the terms Unionist and Nationalist refer to political positions, in practice they are seen as closely tied with religious difference. In Northern Ireland the vast majority of Unionists are Protestant, similarly almost all Nationalists define themselves as Catholic (Coakley 2007). In an effort to avoid the assumption that religious and political identities are identical (and the reification of the ‘two traditions’ conceptualisation of Northern Irish society that goes with this assumption), throughout this dissertation I refer to the two groups using the construction Catholic/Nationalist and Protestant/Unionist. The religious signifiers Catholic and Protestant are only used when I am referring directly to the religions themselves and/or their adherents. I also use the more specific terms Republican and Loyalist where appropriate. Republicans can be defined as Catholic/Nationalists who support the use of physical force to pursue their political goals and Loyalists as their Protestant/Unionist equivalent. Though these definitions are less than ideal a more detailed exploration is beyond the scope of this study (see Coulter (1999) and Todd (1987) for further discussions on these distinctions). 3 The official name of the settlement reached in April 1998 is ‘the Agreement reached in the Multi-Party Negotiations’. As with so much in Northern Ireland, the title of this settlement became a source of some debate, and a plethora of different names have been used to refer to it. In this instance I refer to it as the Good Friday Agreement, but henceforth in this dissertation it is referred to simply as the Agreement. 4 My research examines what happens when multiculturalism and sectarianism meet in the specific context of a Northern Irish society that is trying to move beyond sectarian division and towards ‘normality’ (Bairner 2006). The over-riding objective of this dissertation is to examine and elucidate the relationship between emerging multicultural agendas and sectarianism in post-Agreement Northern Ireland. More specifically, my research is concerned with how multicultural agendas have changed or tempered the expression of sectarianism in Northern Irish society. Conversely, my research is also concerned with how the legacy of sectarianism in Northern Ireland has structured, and potentially undermined, multicultural agendas. This research is significant because it will inform scholarship and understanding of these different processes in complexly diverse societies. Addressing these issues has empirical relevance too. Understanding how sectarianism and multiculturalism intersect has important policy implications for Northern Ireland as it tries to move beyond the sectarian division and violence of its past. In this dissertation I argue that emerging multicultural agendas and sectarianism in Northern Ireland are mutually constituted. Although the presence of cultural diversity in society is often constructed as a vehicle for moving Northern Ireland beyond sectarianism, in practice both multiculturalism and sectarianism have an effect on one another. As my work shows, the ways that these ideologies affect each other varies in accordance with the context in which they come together. In many contexts and situations the sectarianism embedded in Northern Irish society and its governing institutions is shown to hinder the goals of multicultural agendas. However, in some circumstances, it seems that multiculturalism provides an opportunity to fundamentally destabilise and change ways of being and doing that (re)produce sectarianism. As such, multiculturalism and sectarianism in Northern Ireland are always inflected. Ultimately, the relationship between them across a range of contexts will dictate whether Northern Irish society can move forward to a genuinely post-sectarian future, or whether it is, and will remain, a sectarian society glossed over with a sprinkling of multicultural rhetoric and initiatives. 5 To set the present work in context, Chapter Two reviews literature on sectarianism, multiculturalism and previous research on multicultural agendas in contemporary Northern Ireland. Sectarianism in Northern Ireland is introduced as much more than an expression of religious difference in society: it is shown to be a complex social and political phenomenon that is constituted by specific sets of discourses and practices that (re)produce sectarian narratives and identities in social space. Against this backdrop, I move on to consider multiculturalism in diverse societies. Following Stuart Hall (2000), I conceptualise multiculturalism as a range of different strategies, all of which attempt to fix the meaning of cultural diversity in society. Specifically, I outline four ways that multiculturalism has been conceived of in the literature; demographic multiculturalism, the politics of recognition, anti-racism and multicultural policy. These different multicultural agendas both frame the empirical research presented in the substantive chapters and provide the structure for the review of literature on cultural diversity and multiculturalism in Northern Ireland. Chapter Three details the methodological approach and research design of the dissertation. Here I describe and justify my broad methodological commitment to discourse analysis, and elucidate how discourse analysis can be productively utilised to investigate social practice, as well as texts and talk. I advocate the use of a range of qualitative methods, including semi-structured interviewing, observation, institutional and policy analysis, and visual analysis, to ensure the triangulation of research data in exploring the interaction of sectarianism and emergent multicultural agendas in Northern Ireland. In this research, my institutional and policy analysis concerned Northern Ireland as a whole, but my ethnographic engagement focused on Belfast (Figure 1.1). It was in Belfast that I conducted semi-structured interviews and participant observation. The rationale for site selection, interviews conducted, events attended and the fieldwork period that the research was carried out within is detailed in this chapter. I also discuss techniques of data collection and analysis, including the use of visual methods. Reflecting on issues that arose during my research, I consider my own identity and its potential impact on the research process. I also briefly reflect on some of the weaknesses and limitations of the methodological approach that has been employed in my work. 6 Figure 1.1: Map locating Northern Ireland and Belfast in relation to the United Kingdom and Ireland (Source: www.student.britannica.com) The context of the dissertation is developed further in Chapter Four. This chapter provides the reader with the background necessary for a full understanding of the succeeding substantive chapters. In a condensed account of the history of Northern Ireland I describe how sectarianism has been the dominant feature of society and space in this region since the first Ulster Plantations (from 1607). I also consider how attempts to resolve the Northern Irish conflict, including community relations and the Agreement itself, have sought to manage sectarian relations. In setting out the general situation in contemporary Northern Ireland Chapter Four reviews some of the social, economic and political changes that have taken place since the Agreement. This includes the emergence of efforts to present Northern Ireland as a ‘normal’ society that is moving beyond sectarianism. Finally, I outline the history of migration and the presence of ethnically-identified minorities in Northern Ireland. Increased migration and the increased incidence of racism in Northern Irish society provides the context that emerging multicultural agendas are being generated around. Chapter Five, the first of three analytical chapters, examines how multicultural agendas are being produced and enacted within the public policy and institutional frameworks of 7 post-Agreement Northern Ireland. More specifically, it considers how a multicultural vision of a post-conflict society emerges alongside, and is complicated by, the history and legacy of managing sectarianism. In this chapter I explore the shift in Northern Irish public policy and legislation from an almost singular concern with sectarian (community) relations to a burgeoning awareness of ‘race’ and multicultural (good) relations. Drawing on an analysis of public policy, institutional structures and interviews with policy makers and civil servants, Chapter Five charts and analyses the institutional structure of good relations in post-Agreement Northern Ireland. I assess how the emergence of a concern for other vectors of difference besides sectarian relations can be considered as part of a process of re-imagining Northern Ireland as a ‘normal’ and culturally diverse society. In the process of examining institutions and policies aimed at managing multiculturalism, I explore how, in certain contexts, emerging multicultural policy agendas are undermined by the continuation of practices that (re)produce sectarianism in post-Agreement governing structures. Chapter Six explores practices and initiatives that seek to actualise multiculturalism on the ground in Belfast city. In this chapter I consider two dimensions of a self-conscious drive to construct a multicultural, post-sectarian society: responses to racialised violence and events which seek to raise awareness of the presence of cultural diversity. Here I analysis the visual culture of a police hate crime awareness poster campaign and interviews with ethnically-identified minorities to assess the relationship between sectarianism and responses to racialised violence. Employing the concept of the multicultural politics of recognition, I also explore how events which seek to celebrate cultural diversity are structured by the sectarian division of society and space. Despite this, Chapter Six develops further my argument that sectarianism and multiculturalism are mutually imbricated with each other in post-Agreement Northern Ireland. Drawing on specific examples, I investigate how, in certain contexts, emerging multicultural agendas and practices are providing opportunities to deconstruct and undermine accepted ideas about sectarianism and sectarian difference. Visual culture such as political murals, posters and pamphlets have long played an integral role in the (re)production of sectarian identities and narratives in social space in 8 Northern Ireland (Jarman 1997; Shirlow and Murtagh 2006). Chapter Seven investigates the use of these same mediums to produce a different multicultural message: that of anti- racism. Here I look specifically at representations produced and distributed by anti-racist groups operating on either side of the Shankill/Falls ‘peaceline’ in West Belfast.4 Although deeply segregated along sectarian lines, the social and political context of West Belfast has changed significantly in the last decade. The emergence of anti-racist groups in West Belfast reflects increased migration and a concern about racism in the area. In this chapter I analyse murals, posters and pamphlets from two anti-racist groups; one based on the Republican Falls Road and the other on the Loyalist Shankill. As well as expanding traditional scholarship on political murals in Northern Ireland, this chapter investigates further the relationship between new visions of social relations in Northern Ireland (anti-racism) and embedded sectarianism. At the same time as exploring the impact of sectarianism on these anti-racist representations, I demonstrate how these representations are sometimes contested, and also how, in certain contexts, this visual culture of sectarian division is being used and potentially transformed by new migrant groups. Chapter Eight concludes this dissertation by suggesting that this detailed examination of sectarianism and emerging multicultural agendas opens up wider debates about the future of post-Agreement Northern Irish society. The presence of cultural diversity and the emergence of multicultural agendas provide an opportunity to radically alter sclerotic social relations in Northern Ireland. At the same time, however, it seems clear that the resilience of sectarianism in political institutions and social life has a major impact on efforts to re-imagine Northern Ireland as a ‘normal’, post-sectarian society in which cultural diversity is recognised and respected. Understanding how sectarianism and multiculturalism come together differently in different contexts has important policy implications if moving Northern Ireland beyond sectarianism to a socially cohesive future is really to be a meaningful aspiration. In this chapter I review the dissertation and draw out the theoretical and empirical implications of my research findings. 4 A ‘peaceline’ is the name given to the separation barriers erected at interfaces between Protestant/Unionist and Catholic/Nationalist residential communities in some urban areas of Northern Ireland. These barriers, which are supposed to reduce sectarian violence, typically take the form of iron or steel walls that can be up to 25 metres’ high. 9 Chapter Two Understanding Multiculturalism and Sectarianism: A Review of the Literature 10 2.1. Introduction This dissertation is concerned with the emergence of multicultural agendas in Northern Ireland; a society traditionally divided along sectarian lines. In this chapter the various ways that social scientists have approached sectarianism and multiculturalism are reviewed, and relevant empirical studies of contemporary Northern Ireland are discussed. The aim of this chapter is to establish a theoretical framework for analysing the intersection of emerging multicultural agendas and embedded sectarianism. First, this chapter considers studies of the role of religion in society and, particularly, sectarianism in Northern Ireland. Emerging geographies of religion have traced the intersection of religion, ‘race’ and identity in contemporary societies. However, I argue that these studies have limited utility for understanding the specific power of ideas of religious difference in Northern Ireland. Studies of sectarianism in Northern Ireland have more fully accounted for sectarianism as a social and political phenomenon. As such sectarianism is constituted by specific sets of discourses and practices that (re)produce sectarian narratives and identities; even in the absence of political violence. The chapter then reviews some of the extensive literature within human geography, sociology, cultural studies and political science that addresses the issue of multiculturalism in diverse societies. Drawing particularly on the work of Stuart Hall (2000), I argue that the term ‘multiculturalism’ can be understood to refer to a range of different strategies that attempt to fix the meaning of cultural diversity in society. In this section I briefly outline four ways in which multiculturalism may be operationalised. First, I treat multiculturalism as a basic description of a socially diverse society (Grillo 2007; Kobayashi 1993; Vertovec 1996; 2007b). Racism, racialisation and responses to these processes are considered as important issues that arise within contemporary socially diverse societies (Abbas 2005; Banton 1967; 2005a). Second, I examine debates around the ‘politics of recognition’ that have animated recent discussions on multiculturalism in liberal-democratic societies (Kymlicka 1995; 2001; Parekh 2000; Taylor 1994). Previous studies have often focused on the recognition of different culturally defined groups in society through ‘multicultural’ initiatives such as festivals 11 (Duffy 2005; Jackson 1988; 1992). Third, I approach anti-racism as a sub-field of multiculturalism that emerges in diverse societies (Anthias and Lloyd 2002; Bonnett 2000). Key empirical and theoretical literature on anti-racism is reviewed and discussed (Detant 2005; Lentin 2004; Lloyd 2002; Murji 2005; Wievorka 1997). Fourth, multiculturalism can be understood as both public policy and its institutions (Hall 2000; Vertovec 1996). In reviewing the history of multicultural policy in Britain I set out the contemporary policy landscape, and argue that previous studies have failed to attend fully to the role of institutions in the production and enactment of multicultural policy The third section of this chapter reviews the more specific, but rather patchy, literature on multiculturalism in contemporary Northern Ireland. Recent empirical studies have tended to focus on the problem of prejudicial attitudes and behaviours directed towards ethnically-identified minorities (Gilligan and Lloyd 2006; Jarman and Monaghan 2003). I argue that this work has failed to engage with the issue of responses to racism within the context of a society divided along sectarian lines. The discourses and practices of ethnically-identified minorities have also been absent from research which has used the theoretical framework of the politics of recognition to understand Northern Ireland. A lack of ethnographic engagement is also present in studies of anti-racism in Northern Ireland. This work has provided important historical detail but not produced empirical findings on Northern Irish anti-racism (McVeigh 2002). Finally, I look at research which has considered the emergence of a concern for multiculturalism in post-Agreement public policy. Here I suggest the importance of examining the institutional structures and practices through which multicultural policy is produced and enacted in Northern Ireland as part of my work on sectarianism and multiculturalism in the post-Agreement context. 2.2. Understanding Religious Difference This dissertation is not a study of religion, or even religiously defined difference, but the fact that multiculturalism in Northern Ireland emerges out of, and in the context of, a sectarian past draws this study into the orbit of recent thinking on religious difference in society. As such, it is important to try to understand more clearly both the politics of religion in diverse societies and the specific power of religion and sectarianism in 12 Northern Ireland. In the sections that follow, I argue that sectarianism in Northern Ireland is not simply a matter of religion. It encompasses more than just categorisations of religious difference in a diverse society, and so cannot be adequately accounted for by recent scholarship on religion in society. 2.2.1. Geographies of religion Modood (1998: 387) has argued that the multiculturalist politics of recognition, which will be explored in more detail in a later section (Section 2.3.2.), is guilty of a ‘theoretical neglect of the role of religion’. This is despite that fact that, as Kurien (2004: 367) notes, religion often acts as a carrier of ethnic identity in culturally diverse societies where it is often the case that ethnic ‘mobilization is accomplished by using religious organizations and symbols’. The acceptance of issues of religion and religious difference in Western states has created a situation that ‘[m]inorities are naturally tempted to take advantage of’ (Parekh 2000: 198). Consequently, many minority groups in society base their claims to cultural difference and particularity on religious grounds (Kurien 2004). Parekh (2000: 198) emphasises the ‘religionization of culture’; religion has acquired an increasingly ‘considerable influence over the development of the culture’ of ethnically- identified minorities, particularly immigrant groups, in society. Emerging geographies of religion have sought to provide more empirically grounded accounts of the role of religion in society. Although, as Kong (2001: 212) comments, in much human geography research ‘religion is forgotten or conflated with race’, there are signs that geographers are attending more closely to religion (see Hopkins 2007). For example, work has shown how British Muslim women forge their identities in the face of dominant media representations and societal narratives (Dwyer 1998). Hopkins (2004) demonstrates how discourses of ‘race’ and religion are often connected and overlapping in the lived experiences of young Muslim men in Scotland. As his work shows, young Muslim men who visibly appear to be Muslim, whether through skin colour, wearing a long beard or their dress, are far more likely to experience everyday racism and discrimination than those who are perceived as not ‘looking Muslim’. Such studies have illustrated how racialisation processes intersect with religious difference in 13 the everyday lives of many ethnically-identified minorities not generally classified in terms of the signifier ‘white’ (Alexander and Alleyne 2000). Although this literature has been important in terms of developing geographical perspectives on the role of religion in society, it has rarely been explicitly concerned with political processes attached to ideas of religious difference. It is this intersection of politics and religion that is crucial to understanding sectarianism in Northern Ireland. In this dissertation I argue that sectarianism in Northern Ireland is as much political as it is religious (Brewer 1992; Mitchell 2005), and, for this reason, sectarianism requires a quite distinct approach from that adopted in studies of the role of religion in diverse societies. 2.2.2. Existing perspectives on sectarianism in Northern Ireland The antagonistic relationship between Catholic/Nationalists and Protestant/Unionists in Northern Ireland is often understood as a product of ‘sectarianism’, but many analysts have failed to engage systematically with this concept, relying instead on imprecise lay definitions (McNair 2006). Consequently, as a topic of serious academic consideration sectarianism has largely been ignored and under-theorized (Leichty and Clegg 2001; McVeigh 1992; 1999). Sectarianism needs to be clearly defined in order to understand both its historical and contemporary agency in structuring social life in Northern Ireland. In general, sectarianism can be defined as a means of creating, and maintaining, boundaries between religiously-identified groups. Writing on the meaning of the term sectarianism, John Brewer (1992: 359) defines it as [t]he determination of actions, attitudes and practices by beliefs about religious difference, which results in their being invoked as a boundary marker to represent social stratification and conflict. In the specific context of the relationship between Catholic/Nationalists and Protestant/Unionists in Northern Ireland, sectarianism has been defined as: A complex set of problems — including dividing, demonising and dominating — which typically arise from malignant interactions of religion and politics and which are characteristic of the kind of 14 religiously-shaped ethno-national conflict experienced in Northern Ireland (Leichty and Clegg 2001: 37). To the extent that sectarianism in Northern Ireland is rooted in differences of theology and religious practice it seems plausible to understand the conflict in terms of geographies of religion. However, as the definitions above suggest, sectarianism in Northern Ireland is about much more than narrowly defined religious difference. Religion may be an important part of the everyday lives of many people, but the ‘[c]onflict in Northern Ireland has not been, is not and will never be holy war’ (Mitchell 2005: 1). The substance of the armed conflict was not religion as religion but the social, historical and political divisions which religion signified.5 Robbie McVeigh (1999: 17) describes the tendency to try and explain the Northern Irish conflict in terms of doctrinal difference as ‘the theological fallacy’. While sectarian blocs may be understood in terms of religious labels – Catholic and Protestant – the way they are formed and maintained ‘approximates much more closely to ethnicity than it does to religious belief’ (McVeigh 1999: 19). The political identification of Catholic/Nationalists with Ireland and that of Protestant/Unionists with Great Britain reflects deep-seated ethnic identification and conflictual histories and geographies, rather than simply religious persuasion per se. Jenkins (1986: 2) contends that ‘it is not religious systems which are in conflict, but their membership’; group identification rather than theology has played a defining role in the production and maintenance of division in Northern Ireland. Sectarianism, then, involves the complex interaction between religion and politics, and between theology and competing ethnic nationalisms, in which ideas about religious difference are used to infer political identities in Northern Ireland. The invocation of sectarian difference often leads to discrimination and negative feelings towards the sectarian ‘Other’ that can, in some cases, result in acts of violence. It is possible to discern three distinct levels at which sectarianism is manifest: at the level of ideas, as individual and collective action and as social structure (McNair 2006). At the level of ideas, it is characterised by stereotyping and negative feelings towards out-groups. As individual or collective action, sectarianism is expressed through harassment, including 5 The causes of the sectarian division in Northern Irish society are complex and are examined in Chapter Four. 15 verbal and/or physical abuse. At a structural level, it involves discrimination and bias in areas such as employment and in the creation and conduct of political institutions (Brewer 1992; Darby 1976; McVeigh and Rolston 2007; Whyte 1990). Certainly throughout the period of Unionist majority rule (1921-1972) the policies and practices of the Northern Irish state played a defining role in the (re)production of sectarianism (Murtagh and Keaveney 2006). As noted in the general definition of sectarianism provided above, religion in Northern Ireland represents a ‘boundary marker’ between the ‘two communities’ (Brewer 1992; Mitchell 2005). Boundaries are integral to the symbolic construction of communities that, although reflective of abstract social divisions, need to be marked in and through space (Barth 1969; Cohen 1985; Sack 1986). Residential segregation along sectarian lines is a dominant feature of social life in Northern Ireland, and many communities are physically separated from one another, sometimes by high metal fences that are euphemistically known as ‘peacewalls’ (Boal 2002; Boal and Douglas 1982; Compton and Power 1986; Poole 1983). These material boundaries between communities are often maintained through visual features in the landscape such as wall murals and kerb painting. As well as constructing physical boundaries, this visual culture also reflects sectarian constructions of identity, place and claims to space at a variety of scales (Coulter 1999; Jarman 1995; 1997; Rolston 2003a; 2003b). The relationship between specific forms of visual culture and the (re)production of sectarianism is developed further in Chapter Seven which examines the production of anti-racist messages in West Belfast through media such as murals, posters and pamphlets. The role of political institutions and their practices in the (re)production of sectarian identities in everyday life in Northern Ireland before, during and after ‘the Troubles’ has been observed (Darby 1976; McVeigh and Rolston 2007; O’Dowd, Rolston and Tomlinson 1980). One of the goals of the Agreement was to provide a new institutional structure that could overcome sectarian divisions (Shirlow and Murtagh 2006). However, the resilience of sectarianism in the Agreement and its governing structures has been noted (Graham and Nash 2006; Little 2003). As will be discussed further in Section 2.4.4, empirical research has seldom attended to the specifics of the new, post- 16 Agreement institutional milieu. This absence is partly addressed in my examination of the public policy and institutional frameworks of multiculturalism in Chapter Five. Work on performativity, both in geography and elsewhere, appears to offer a challenge to traditional scholarship on the construction and maintenance of sectarian boundaries in Northern Ireland. This scholarship has highlighted the way in which identities are made and re-made through embodied social practice (Nash 2000; Thrift 1999). Often drawing on the writing of Judith Butler (1990; 1993), this research argues that identity is not pre- given, but rather is constituted through sets of practices or performances that become routinised over time. In the Northern Ireland context, for example, political parades, especially Orange Marches, have been interpreted as pivotal performative acts through which sectarian identities and behaviours are constructed and naturalised in social space (Jarman 1997).6 For both Bryan (2000) and Jarman (1997) parades represent a unique form of embodied geography, the goal of which is both to perform sectarian identities and to reaffirm sectarian boundaries in space. David Cairns (2000) illustrates how everyday practices such as songs, dances and sport all provide opportunities for the performance of sectarian identities. Pieces of visual and material culture, such as flags and murals, but also less obviously politicised objects such as a photograph of a family member in army uniform, are all shown to be integral to the formation of Loyalist identity (Cairns 2000). Ogaswara (2003: 11), in a study of Glasgow Rangers versus Celtic football matches, attends to the role of both ‘performative utterances’, such as chanting, and material objects, such as jerseys or national flags, in the (re)production of sectarianism. While much of the scholarship reviewed thus far has focused on how sectarianism is materially produced through embodied social practice, the notion of performativity also suggests that identity is fluid, and that alternative, less divisive, constructions can be performed. As Catherine Nash (2000: 655) optimistically argues, conceiving of identity as performative ‘at least allows the possibility of challenging and parodying … naturalised codes’. Challenging sectarianism, then, is not just a matter of changing the 6 The vast majority of parades (over 80%) are Loyalist Orange Marches, and the ritualistic nature of these public displays plays a particularly powerful role in the (re)production of Ulster Loyalist political identities (Cairns 2001). For a detailed discussion on Orange Parades, see Bryan (2000). 17 social environment, but also of altering those embodied practices through which divisive sectarian constructions of identity are (re)produced. In my study I pay particular attention to those points at which multicultural agendas and practices might be leading to changes in the performance of sectarianism in Northern Irish society. Northern Ireland has changed dramatically over the course of the last decade. Yet, although it has witnessed major social, economic and political transitions (which will be discussed in Chapter Four), studies of post-Agreement Northern Ireland have been forced to come to terms with Cairns’ (2000: 438) contention that: [d]espite the advent of ‘the Peace Process’ and possibly a permanent end to the paramilitary conflict … the bulk of sectarianism is to be found in everyday life practices, and not in the armed struggle itself. He goes on to suggest that because of this ‘the basic problem will remain untouched irrespective of political settlement’. For Cairns, sectarianism should be understood as a set of social practices that (re)produce malignant, sectarian ways of seeing and knowing the world. This approach to conceptualising sectarianism is also evident in Peter Shirlow’s (2003) work on residential segregation in the ‘two Ardoynes’; the predominantly Catholic Ardoyne and the predominantly Protestant Upper Ardoyne. Shirlow approaches sectarianism as a discursive formation; an ‘articulatory process that enshrines spatial segregation’, and makes ‘truth’ claims based on sectarian readings of space, belonging and identity (Shirlow 2003: 86). The fear of the sectarian ‘Other’ produced by this system of knowing the world was found to limit the mobility of people in the ‘two Ardoynes’. Sectarian division has not gone away. Instead, it continues to structure the ‘lifeworlds’ and lived geographies of many in Northern Ireland, despite the political advance of the peace process and the Agreement (Morrissey and Smyth 2002; Murtagh and Keaveney 2006; Shirlow and Murtagh 2006). Understanding sectarianism not as a product of theological difference or even of political violence, but as constituted by embedded sets of discourses and social practices is very useful in terms of this dissertation. It provides my research with a theoretical frame for understanding the persistence of sectarian ways of thinking and being in the very processes and 18 institutional structures created to move society beyond sectarianism, and through which multicultural agendas are being operationalised in contemporary Northern Ireland. 2.3. Approaches to Understanding Multiculturalism Having reviewed literature on sectarianism in Northern Ireland, the following sections identify and engage with key themes and approaches to understanding multiculturalism. Bhikhu Parkeh (2000) defines multiculturalism as a response to the presence of cultural diversity, itself an outcome of the migration processes common to many contemporary Western societies. Multiculturalism refers to the broad set of inclusionary principles and practices that are manifested in diverse societies (Kymlicka 1995; Parekh 2000; Taylor 1994; Vasta 2007; Vertovec 1996; 2007a). Given the range of meanings attached to the term, multiculturalism has been described as a ‘fuzzy concept’ that is in an on-going and contested process of conceptualisation (Grillo 2007: 981). Stuart Hall’s (2000: 210) distinction between ‘multicultural’, an adjective which refers to the social make up of culturally diverse societies, and ‘multiculturalism’, the different strategies and policies which attempt to fix the meaning of this diversity, provides a useful road map for navigating a way through this ‘fuzziness’. In line with Hall’s distinction, Grillo (2007: 987) suggests that ‘multiculturalism is best understood as a political project, involving strategies, institutions, discourses, practices, seeking to address multicultural reality.’ This understanding of multiculturalism as a multiplicity of attempts to fix the meaning of cultural diversity is adopted in my research. The utility of this approach is that it allows my work to explore a number of different multicultural agendas that have emerged in Northern Ireland as it is trying to move beyond the sectarian division which characterised so much of its past, both distant and recent. Multiculturalism seeks to address the multicultural reality of contemporary societies in ‘many possibly related, but nevertheless discrete’ ways (Vertovec 2007a: 966). Steven Vertovec (1996: 50) outlines a number of ways that multiculturalism can be understood and operationalised. First, multiculturalism refers to a basic demographic description of society such that ‘the sheer presence of x number of immigrants from countries 1, 2 and 3 (is) offered as evidence of cultural diversity’. The existence of processes of racism and 19 racialisation can be understood, in part, as a feature of this ‘demographic multiculturalism’ (Kobayashi 1993: 212). Although racism is an ideology which can be present even in the absence of racialised ‘Others’, as migration to Western societies has increased so too have incidents of racism and ‘racial’ discrimination (Abbas 2005). Secondly, multiculturalism refers to the recognition of cultural diversity (Vasta 2007); often through the multicultural politics of recognition (Kymlicka 1995; 2001; Parekh 2000; Taylor 1994). This often encompasses both a ‘vague vision of how society, with its minorities, should function’ and celebrations of the ‘exotic otherness’ of these minorities (Vertovec 1996: 50). Thirdly, a subset of multiculturalism that is particularly relevant to my research is anti-racism. Anti-racism often envisages alternative social and political visions for multicultural societies (Anthias and Lloyd 2002; Bonnett 2000). Finally, multiculturalism can be approached as both ‘public policy aimed at minorities, including the promotion of equal opportunity’ and the institutional structures within which policy is produced and delivered (Vertovec 1996: 50; Wood and Gilbert 2005). These four ways that the meaning of multiculturalism is fixed in contemporary societies provide the framework used to approach and understand emergent multicultural agendas in my research, and structure the material that is reviewed in the sections that follow. 2.3.1. Demographic multiculturalism and racism in multicultural societies The existence of cultural diversity in society, and of multicultural societies themselves, can hardly be regarded as a recent phenomenon. ‘Movement and migration’, as Stuart Hall (2000: 212) notes, ‘are the defining conditions of humanity.’ Certainly the history of civilisation has been characterised by the migration of people for a variety of reasons; from famine and natural disasters to colonisation and conquest. However, there is a valid argument to be made that increased ‘demographic social diversity’ (Wood and Gilbert 2005: 684) makes contemporary societies quite distinct from their historical antecedents. The notion of ‘demographic multiculturalism’ refers simply to the existence of cultural diversity in society (Kobayashi 1993: 212). The very fact of demographic multiculturalism has thrown up socio-political questions and issues that are both novel and complex (Cohen 1999; Parekh 2000: 34; Wievorka 1998). According to Tahir Abbas (2005: 155), ‘multicultural societies in their current form are new to our age and 20 give rise to theoretical and political problems which have no parallel in history.’ My work is set within the particular context of a post-conflict Northern Ireland that is experiencing net in-migration (Jarman 2006), and in which issues of cultural diversity and demographic multiculturalism are beginning to emerge as prominent concerns. Societies that are characterised by demographic social diversity must contend with the issue of ‘race’ relations and the existence of racism (Banton 1967; 2005a; 2005b; Kobayashi 1993; Rex 1983). The post-World War II years witnessed increased migration to Western cities from former colonies, and this often led to violent clashes between the local white community and new migrants (Solomos 2003). Against this backdrop, the ‘Sociology of Race Relations’ emerged to try to understand ‘race’ relations in diverse societies (Banton 1967; Rex 1983). Michael Banton (2005a: 487), a leading figure in this movement, defines ‘race’ relations as ‘a general name comprehending prejudice (the dimension of attitude), discrimination (the dimension of behaviour) and racism (the dimension of ideology).’ This description of ‘race’ relations is strikingly similar to McNair’s (2006) understanding of sectarianism (Section 2.2.2.), and it has become increasingly common to approach sectarianism as a subset of racism (McVeigh and Rolston 2007). While I interrogate the relationship between sectarianism and racism in more detail later in this chapter (see Section 2.4.1.), it is worth noting here that in my work I do not treat sectarianism and racism as identical processes. Although the presence of cultural diversity in contemporary societies is often conceived of in terms of ‘race’, the precise meaning of this term has been a subject of much debate (Malik 1996). As my work engages with issues of ‘race’ and racism in the context of contemporary Northern Ireland, it is important to outline briefly the changing meaning of ‘race’ and the understanding of ‘race’ and racism that I adopt in my work. Unlike biological approaches to understanding ‘race’, sociologists of ‘race’ relations treated ‘the concept of race and the problem of racism (as) primarily a problem for social science’ (Rex 1983: 2). As a consequence of this shift in thinking, ‘race’ is no longer treated as a concrete thing, but as a ‘social classification based on physical distinctions of skin- colour, hair type and biological descent’ (Jackson and Penrose 1993: 4). ‘Race’, as Peter Wade (2004: 159) argues ‘is an idea’. Yet even ‘if race has absolutely no biological 21 basis in human nature, people are clearly prepared to discriminate against others they define as racially distinct’. Consequently, in the present day, the idea of ‘race’ and of ‘racial’ difference ‘remains a nexus of power and ideology’ (Wright, Houston, Ellis, Holloway and Hudson 2003: 470). In this way the social construction ‘race’, which is based on false assumptions about the significance of physical features, continues to have symbolic and material effect (Bulmer and Solomos 1998; Jackson 1987; 1989; 1994a; Malik 1996). In line with the determination that ‘racial’ difference is neither given nor essential, academic attention has turned to processes of racialisation (Jackson and Penrose 1993; Murji and Solomos 2005). The idea of ‘racialisation’ was introduced and developed by Robert Miles (1982; 1989; 1993; 2000). Miles (1989) argues that critical social science must not accept the putative social reality of ‘race’ as to speak of ‘race’ reifies a pernicious and dangerous social construct. As such, the use of the term “race relations” as an analytical framework can be seen to disguise the social construction of difference and to reproduce the idea that society is made up of discrete ‘races’ (Bonnett 1996; Miles 2000). Racialisation brings into view the processes of categorisation, signification and meaning construction by which populations are turned into racialised categories (Miles 1992; Mullings 2005). It shows that through these processes fluid, contextual categories of difference based on biological signifiers are essentialised and naturalised (Silverstein 2005; Wodak and Reisigl 1999). Thus, thinking about ‘race’ in terms of racialisation highlights the social processes by which the category is used to construct social groups (Jackson and Penrose 1993; Miles 1989; 1992; Peake and Schein 2000). The racialisation of social groups in Northern Ireland is a theme that is developed at various junctures in this dissertation, but particularly in Chapter Six. While contemporary societies are characterised by their multicultural make-up, the extensive literature on racism in Western nation-states has highlighted the fact that this diversity may be resisted through processes of racism and racialisation (Back 1996; Back and Solomos 2000; Essed 1991). Although racism is a commonly used word in both academic and non-academic discourses, it is important to be clear on the sense in which it is used in my work. Broadly understood, racism is a relationship of power, a 22 process ‘whereby social groups categorize other groups as different or inferior on the basis of phenotypical characteristics, cultural markers of national origin’ (Castles 1996: 31; cited in Vasta 2007: 728). In discussing racism in the Northern Ireland context, I conceptualise racism as ‘the assumption, consciously or unconsciously held, that people can be divided into a distinct number of discrete ‘races’ according to physical, biological criteria and that systematic social differences automatically and inevitably follow the same lines of physical differentiation’ (Jackson 1994a: 132-133). In my work racism is approached not a single, static phenomena but as a social process that may take a number of forms; from racist attitudes to discriminatory behaviour and even racialised violence against those groups categorised as ‘racially’ ‘Other’ (Banton 2005b). Although issues of ‘race’ and racism in Northern Ireland are prominent throughout my research, they are particularly salient in Chapter Six, which examines the relationship between sectarianism and responses to the increased incidence of racism in post-Agreement Northern Ireland. 2.3.2. The politics of recognition A common attribute of much of the literature on multiculturalism in liberal-democratic societies has been a commitment to what has been dubbed ‘the politics of recognition’ (Kymlikca 1995; 2001; Modood 1998; Parekh 2000; Taylor 1994). The central tenet of the multicultural politics of recognition is that culturally defined groups possess distinctive identities that they seek to have recognised in the public sphere (Kymlicka 2001; Parekh 2000; Taylor 1994). This position is most fully and famously explicated in the work of the political philosopher Charles Taylor. Arguing that Kantian liberalism ignores the fundamentally dialogical character of human life, Taylor (1994) proposes that identity is a product of an individual’s relations with significant others. Individuals struggle for the recognition of both their personal identity and the identity of the groups that they are members of (Taylor 1989). For Taylor (1994: 75), the contemporary politics of multiculturalism arises directly out of the demand for recognition of the latter identities articulated ‘on behalf of minority or “subaltern” groups’ in society. This desire for recognition is not, Taylor (1994: 76) argues, ‘a courtesy we owe people. It is a vital human need.’ Refusal to recognise difference or plurality (or alternatively to mis- 23 recognise this difference) is a powerful form of symbolic violence inflicted on those groups and individuals that hold a given identity. Although the ‘politics of recognition’ is often taken to be synonymous with multiculturalism (for example, Lentin 2001), it has been noted that a wide range of different groups or movements in society demand recognition for their views and identities (e.g. women, gay men, lesbians, indigenous peoples, etc). Reflecting on this issue, Parekh (2000) helpfully distinguishes between groups whose claim for recognition is grounded in ‘cultural difference’, defined in terms of putative ethnic or ‘racial’ identities, and those who demand recognition on the basis of ‘subcultural diversity’. Given the diversity of groups seeking recognition, Parekh (2000: 3) suggests that ‘although part of the politics of recognition, multiculturalism is a distinct movement’ that refers only to cultural diversity or culturally-derived difference. Parekh conceives of society as constituted by a number of different cultures which operate on their own principles and conceptions of the good life.7 In order to accommodate the cultural rights of everyone in society, Parekh proposes that specific laws and institutions should be created for each cultural group. While Parekh’s approach appears attractive for the organisation of diverse societies, I would argue that it has both philosophical and practical limitations. Attributing rights to culturally-defined groups risks reifying culture (Schaap 2004) and undermines the rights of the individual (Barry 2001). Commenting on the potential for using Parekh’s work as a basis for organising group relations in post-Agreement Northern Ireland, Adrian Little (2003) argues that the resources required to create separate institutions would be immense, and the existence of such institutions might dissuade groups from seeking to resolve their differences through political compromise. 7 While Parekh places a heavy stress on the embeddedness of individuals in their own culture, he also argues that cultures are not monolithic. Instead, he proposes that every culture is internally plural and diverse; society is made up of a diversity of cultures which are in themselves diverse and fluid. The tension between this argument and his position that specific laws and institutions be set up for each cultural group is obvious, and has been highlighted in critique’s of Parekh’s work (Barry 2001; Little 2003). Although Parekh (2000) argues that cultures are capable of containing internal dissent and plurality while maintaining a degree of unity such that they can be recognised as distinct, how this apparent contradiction is either theoretically justifiable or can be achieved in practice is not clear in his writings. 24 The politics of recognition constructs society as made up of distinct cultural groups that are either self-defined or defined by others in terms of axes of identity such as ethnicity and ‘race’ (Parekh 2000). However, this process of categorising groups as separate contributes to the ethnicisation and racialisation of society (Miles 1993).8 Some writers, most notably Nancy Fraser (1998: 20), have also argued that the multicultural politics of recognition has led to the replacement of class with identity ‘as the chief medium of political mobilization’ in contemporary societies. Fraser argues that the focus on recognition has unhelpfully shifted attention away from a Marxist politics of economic and material redistribution of wealth and resources and towards a cultural politics based on identity and difference. For Axel Honneth (2001: 54), and contrary to Nancy Fraser’s assumptions, ‘struggles over distribution … are themselves locked into a struggle for recognition … a struggle over the cultural definition of what it is that renders an activity socially necessary and valuable.’ Honneth’s struggle, however, is often more rhetorical than practical, and a concern for issues of social justice may often be lost in the clamour for recognition (Abbas 2005; Craig 2007). The multicultural politics of recognition has also been criticised as an attempt to manage diversity through ‘perverse mechanisms of political representation and public incorporation’ (Uitermark, Rossi and van Houtum 2005: 624). Multiculturalism has been accused of being little more than a government driven effort aimed at institutionalising cultural diversity for the purpose of controlling potentially threatening marginalised groups (Vertovec 1996). Parekh’s (2000) account of multiculturalism relies on the assumption that fluid institutions can be set up which are capable of responding to changes within cultural groups. However, the institutionalisation of cultural diversity often leads ‘to the formation of an elite of ethnic leaders who pretend to represent their respective communities’ (Uitermark, Rossi and van Houtum 2005: 624). In an analysis of the interaction between local government and Muslims in the city of Leicester, Steven Vertovec (1996) suggests that attempts to manage diversity through processes of public incorporation are often doomed to failure. Instead of relying solely on unelected ‘voices 8 A good example of this process from my research project is the specific designation of Travellers as a ‘racial’ group in the Race Relations (NI) Act 1997. While the inclusion of Travellers as a ‘racial’ group within this legislation was a response to discrimination faced by Travellers, this inclusion also contributes to the racialisation of this group through the process of recognition. 25 of the community’, new modes of interaction based on public forums and community participation are required (Vertovec 1996). A postcolonial perspective has generated another line of criticism of the politics of recognition. In asking who controls the process of recognition, Hesse (2000) argues that unresolved historical antagonisms and social and political inequalities are often ignored by multiculturalism. The terms by which a minority or subaltern group may be recognised as legitimate within multicultural states are usually dictated by the dominant society. This has meant that minority cultures are often forced to mobilise outmoded or obsolete ways of being in order to garner recognition. This point is deftly made in Elizabeth Povenilli’s (2002: 4) discussion of the ‘cunning of legal recognition’. Drawing on the example of contemporary Australian efforts to recognise indigenous interests and traditions, her research demonstrates how celebratory, multicultural discourses of diversity are used to by-pass the more difficult to resolve and historically embedded racisms bequeathed by colonial settlement. Povenilli’s work has specific relevance to the Northern Ireland context where new constructions of Northern Ireland co-exist with, and must negotiate, an ingrained, colonially-linked sectarian inheritance. Although open to many of the above criticisms, the work of Will Kymlicka (1995; 2001) has provided important contributions to the debate on the multicultural politics of recognition in liberal-democratic states. Central to Kymlicka’s analysis is the distinction drawn between ‘national minorities’ and ‘immigrants’ (Kymlicka and Norman 2000: 29). National minorities are established groups who were present prior to the foundation of the state, share a common culture and language and possess a prior history of self- government (Kymlicka 1995). Kymlicka argues for the adoption of specific rights and institutions for groups that fit these criteria. He proposes that this takes place alongside the integration of new migrant groups (which he terms ‘immigrants’) (Kymlicka 2001). The distinction between national minorities and immigrants is particularly useful for conceptualising contemporary Northern Ireland. Although the consociational political model adopted in the Agreement focuses on power-sharing rather than institutional separation, Kymlicka’s belief in the public recognition of national minorities has 26 influenced debates in Northern Ireland (Little 2003: 27).9 On the issue of immigrant multiculturalism, Kymlicka (2001: 165), unlike Parekh (2000), proposes that the recognition of these cultures must take place within the ‘common institutions’ of the state. Critiquing the argument that recognition leads to balkanisation (Barry 2001), Kymlicka (2001) argues that immigrant multiculturalism has little to do with state building and is unable to provide the public institutions needed to create a separate societal and legislative culture. Instead, immigrant multiculturalism leads to the pluralisation of society; which he sees as a particularly positive development in states with strong national minorities. Kymlicka’s notion of immigrant multiculturalism suggests the possibility that multicultural agendas could temper sectarianism as Northern Irish society becomes more culturally diverse and plural in the wake of new migration. This possibility is explored further in my research. As well as setting out a theoretical framework for recognition in liberal-democratic states, Kymlicka suggests that ‘to understand the meaning of multiculturalism … we need to look at what it does in practice’ (1998: 40; cited in Gilbert and Wood 2005: 685). The multicultural politics of recognition is manifested in a variety of ways, most notably in cities and, in particular, their public spaces (Grillo 2007; Uitermark, Rossi and van Houtum 2005). As Wood and Gilbert (2005: 685) note, ‘[b]ecause of the specifics of its landscape, the urban … is a significant scale of negotiation of cultures, knowledges, and powers between immigrants, members of cultural groups, and dominant groups’. Ethnically-identified minorities produce and reproduce themselves socially, spatially, and politically in the spaces of the city through ‘cultural work … embedded in cultural technologies and underpinned aesthetically’ (Werbner 2000: 8). This ‘cultural work’ ranges from involvement in community groups and processes of public incorporation (Vertovec 1996), through to ‘popular cultural celebrations, national commemorations and street carnivals’ (Werbner 2000: 8). Although Ghassam Hage (2000) argues that the latter practices are primarily concerned with the management and appropriation of diversity rather than its recognition, much research has focused on festivals as practices of recognition (Duffy 2005; Jackson 1988; 1992; Mitchell 2004). 9 Consociationalism is a form of government involving guaranteed group representation which is often suggested for managing conflict in deeply divided societies such as Northern Ireland (Graham and Nash 2006; Lijphart 1977; 2004). 27 Similar to Michelle Duffy (2005) and Peter Jackson (1988; 1992), I conceive of festivals as sites in which commitments to a multicultural society are expressed publicly in the urban spaces of contemporary societies. While both of these authors looked at festivals in countries with a relatively long ‘multicultural’ history (Australia in the case of Duffy and England and Canada in Jackson’s work), in Chapter Six I investigate particular multicultural events in Belfast; a city divided along sectarian lines. Although my work follows that of Duffy and Jackson in thinking about the articulation and expression of multicultural agendas and identities in such festivals, in keeping with the overall goals of my research it also pays particular attention to the impact of sectarian considerations on the practice of these festivals. 2.3.3. Approaches to understanding anti-racism Another framework through which the governing of cultural diversity can take place in multicultural societies is anti-racism. Anti-racism has many meanings; Alastair Bonnett (2000: 4-6) delineates six different types of anti-racism. These range from anti-racist sentiment expressed in music and popular culture, through to anti-fascist movements and radical critiques of capitalism. The breadth of Bonnett’s typology highlights the fact that there is no universal shared understanding of what anti-racism is, either at the level of political philosophy or of political action (Lentin 2004; Solomos and Back 1996). Consequently, it is not surprising that there are a wide diversity of ideas and organisations in contemporary society that are described as ‘anti-racist’ (Detant 2005; Lentin 2004; Lloyd 1998; 2002). The tendency to define anti-racism quite simply as the opposite of racism (Blaumer 1995) has been criticised as it takes ‘anti-racism for granted and subordinate(s) it to racism, which means that in theorizing racism, anti-racism has been eclipsed’ (Lloyd 2002: 60). Lloyd argues that anti-racism is a social movement with its own internal logic and power and that it should not be ‘consigned to the status of a ‘cause’, fit only for platitudes of support or denouncement’ (Bonnett 2000: 2). Instead, Lloyd (1998: 4) proposes that anti-racism be conceived of as an ‘alternative interpretation of political discourse.’ This conception of anti-racism combines a response to the presence of racism 28 and racialisation in multicultural societies with a wider social vision. This interpretation is developed further in Anthias and Lloyd’s (2002: 16) definition of anti-racism as ‘a set of polycentric, overlapping discourses and practices which combine a response to racism(s) with the construction of a positive project about the kind of society in which people can live together in harmony and mutual respect.’ This definition recognises the diversity of anti-racisms, their emergence in response to racism and the centrality of alternative social visions based on progressive principles (such as social justice and equality) to many anti-racist campaigns. As it encompasses all the key features of anti- racism identified in the literature, this definition is adopted in my research. The relationship between anti-racism and multiculturalism in the academic literature has shifted considerably over the course of the last thirty years. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s the terms were placed firmly in opposition to one another (Gilroy 1987; Vertovec 1996). Anti-racism was viewed as a radical critique of state and society and multiculturalism as a government sponsored attempt to promote some vague notion of ‘cultural empowerment’ (Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1992: 184). Bonnett (1993) explicitly differentiated between educators holding multiculturalist views and those supporting anti-racism. In his research, Bonnett (1993: 33) defines multiculturalism as ‘the mode of representation of cultural difference and inclusivity’, and anti-racism as ‘speaking for Black resistance against White racism.’ Recently, however, the rigidity of this distinction has been challenged. Anthias and Lloyd (2002) suggest that the binary constructed between anti-racism and multiculturalism is both untenable and unhelpful. In a later book on anti-racism, Bonnett (2000: 4) himself includes ‘multicultural anti- racism’ in his definition of anti-racist praxis. In line with these interventions, my work approaches anti-racism as a sub-field of multiculturalism that emerges in response to the existence of racism in multicultural societies. Although anti-racism appears to be an obvious social good, anti-racist objectives and strategies have been critiqued over the last two decades. Reactions from both left and right in the 1980s precipitated a crisis in the movement and the development of ‘anti- anti-racism’ (Bonnett 1993; Gilroy 2001). Paul Gilroy (1998; 2001) argued that the most deleterious aspect of anti-racism, and the motive for calling for the ‘End of Anti-racism’, 29 is that it is often based on a culturalist understanding of ‘racial’ difference. Following a similar argument to Gilroy, Taguieff (2001) suggested that in the process of essentialising racists as barbarians anti-racists are themselves engaged in an act of exclusion and dehumanization. Elsewhere, Tariq Modood (1988: 400) criticised what he perceived to be the suppression of Asian (particularly Muslim) identity within the ‘monolithic Black subject’ of anti-racism. Despite these critiques, Gilroy (2001: 251) does suggest that there is a place for anti-racism, provided it is a ‘much more limited project, defined simply, even simplistically, by the desire to do away with racism.’10 Another criticism levelled at anti-racism has focused on its assumptions, specifically the relationship between universalism and relativism. Wievorka (1997: 147) refers to universalism and relativism as ‘the two great orientations of anti-racism’, and the tension between them as ‘the structural problem which constantly undermines anti-racist action.’ Bonnett (2000: 19) also worries about universalism, defining it as ‘the assertion of the validity, across cultures or historical periods, of certain values, truths and processes.’ According to Bonnett, within anti-racist discourse universalist assumptions are ‘often associated with the conviction that people are all equally part of humanity and should be accorded the same rights and opportunities.’ Relativism, in contrast, refers to the ‘idea that cultural and/or physical differences between races should be recognised and respected’ (Bonnett 2000: 13). Relativism is most closely implicated in the reification of the concept of ‘race’, a process which is inherently problematic (Gilroy 1998). Rather than allow this debate to undermine anti-racist praxis, Michel Wievorka (1997: 149) suggests that ‘rational anti-racism has no choice’ but to accept the tensions and contradictions between these two positions. The foundations of anti-racism may have been critiqued, but it remains a powerful mobilising force in contemporary societies (Lloyd 2002). Recent research has attended to anti-racist practice at a variety of sites, from the ideological constructions employed by anti-racist educators in the UK (Bonnett 1993) and Canada (Bonnett and Carrington 1996), through to grassroots anti-racist movements (Detant 2005; Lentin 2004; Lloyd 10 Within the discipline of geography, such an anti-racist project might involve teaching which seeks to unsettle essentialised notions of racial difference (Nash 2003; Peake and Kobayashi 2002) and an active engagement with racism in the classroom (Kobayashi and Peake 2000). 30 1998; 2002). This latter literature is particularly useful in terms of my research as it has focused primarily on the discourses of anti-racist activists and campaigns. Alana Lentin (2004), in arguably the most comprehensive study of anti-racism in Europe, examined the orientations and motivations of anti-racist activists in Britain, Italy, France and Ireland. Lentin found that anti-racist groups reflected the political culture of the nation- state in which they were located. In terms of my own research, Lentin’s work suggests that the discourses of Northern Irish anti-racists should be influenced by the specific political culture within this context. Anja Detant (2005) looked at the discourses and strategies of the Hand in Hand anti-racism campaign that emerged in Belgium following the electoral success of the far-right. In particular, she focused on their use of demonstrations and public events to mobilise popular support. Elsewhere, Cathie Lloyd (1998; 2002) conducted empirical research on the discourses of anti-racist social movements in France. These studies all suggest the need for empirical research on anti- racism within the context of multicultural societies. Research on anti-racism has also focused on the visual representations produced in anti-racist campaigns (Gilroy 1987; Murji 2006). My research builds on this work on contemporary anti-racism by looking at anti-racist campaigns in West Belfast, focusing in particular on the extent to which sectarian narratives and identities are (re)produced in the discourses and representations of anti-racist groups active in this area (see Chapter Seven). 2.3.4. Reviewing UK multicultural policy Multiculturalism can also be understood as the policy and institutional practices through which the state ‘formally recognise(s) and reflects publicly the differentiated social needs and growing cultural diversity of its citizens’ (Hall 2000: 231; Vertovec 1996; Wood and Gilbert 2005). In general, multicultural policy is formulated to prevent social conflict by both upholding the value of diversity and promoting rights of equality of opportunity (Kobayashi 1993: 214; Vertovec 1996: 50). The enactment of this social policy also produces ‘distinctive institutional arrangements designed to benefit, or called for by, specific minority groups’ (Vertovec 1996: 50). There is no one single policy called multiculturalism. Instead, different national contexts (for example, United Kingdom (UK), Canada and Australia) display distinctive approaches and institutional 31 frameworks (Craig 2007; Wood and Gilbert 2005). As my research is concerned with a constituent region of the UK (Northern Ireland), this section focuses on multicultural policy in Britain.11 This research review also highlights the importance of looking at the institutions that multicultural policy is produced and enacted within. Although the history of Britain has been characterised by immigration, in particular of the Irish in the nineteenth century and the Jews in the early twentieth century, ‘it was the post-war large-scale immigration of African-Caribbean and South Asian (i.e. non-White) peoples which particularly prompted a set of changes in public policy’ (Vertovec 2007b: 1027). Policy in the 1950s and 1960s was characterised by what Kymlicka (2001: 153) refers to as the ‘Anglo-conformity’ model of assimilation that was based on the belief that if taught the English language ‘the immigrant population would learn “to become like us”’ (Abbas 2005: 158). With the recognition, in the late 1960s, that this policy was failing, ‘British policy-makers responded with various strategies for a kind of diversity management strategy that came to be called multiculturalism’ (Vertovec 2007b: 1027). Integration replaced assimilation as the key word in policy discourses. There was an increased recognition of rights to difference in areas such as language, religion and family life and the need for provision of funding for ethnically-identified minorities (Grillo 2007). From this time, multicultural policy in Britain moved into what Kobayashi (1993: 215) refers to as the ‘symbolic stage’. This is conceived of as an official policy that recognises and promotes diversity, though without a firm conception of the overall objectives of such a policy. A key plank of multicultural policy that emerged in the 1960s was the recognition that ‘negative discrimination on racial and other grounds should not be tolerated’ (Grillo 2007: 980). This government concern with ‘racial’ discrimination emerged in response to racist attacks against British subjects who had migrated to England from the Caribbean (Banton 1967; Miles 2000; Solomos 2003). The Race Relations Acts (1965 and 1968) banned discrimination on grounds of colour, race or ethnicity at the same time 11 I use Britain here as the term refers to England, Scotland and Wales without Northern Ireland. The term United Kingdom refers to all four constituent regions. I examine multicultural policy in ‘Britain’ (as opposed to the UK) in this section because (as will be shown in Chapter Five) these policies did not extend to Northern Ireland. 32 as promoting equality of opportunity (Phizacklea and Miles 1980; Solomos 2003: 80). These Acts had limited success (Lester 1998) and were replaced by the more far- reaching Race Relations Act (1976). This Act introduced the dual concepts of direct and indirect discrimination and set up a new Commission for Racial Equality (CRE). Since the 1965 Act, ‘race’ relations legislation has remained an integral part of broader British multicultural policy. As Pina Werbner (2003: 52) notes, multiculturalism ‘probably has more critics than defenders’, and this has often been true of British multicultural policy. From the 1970s on, the focus on cultural difference in policy was rejected by many ethnically-identified minorities ‘who deeply resented its implicit paternalism’ (Abbas 2005: 158). Through its complex institutional practices, ‘race’ relations legislation tended to create a ‘race relations industry’ which was both self-serving and failed to address issues of institutional racism (Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1992; Gilroy 1987). The definition of ‘race’ used in the Race Relations Act has also been accused of essentialising socially constructed groups (Malik 1996; Miles and Torres 1996) and even contributing to racism (Gilroy 2001).12 Arguably the harshest critics of multiculturalism in Britain during the late 1970s and 1980s were to be found in the Conservative Party that held power throughout this period (Bonnett 1993). Under the Conservatives, multicultural policy underwent a period of stasis. As John Solomos (2003) notes, this administration refused to strengthen ‘race’ relations legislation or to allocate further resources to equality bodies. This situation led to conflicts between central government and ‘racial’ equality institutions in many Labour-dominated local governments (see Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1992; Gilroy 1987). In 1997, following its election triumph, ‘New Labour was keen to embrace Britain’s multicultural and ethnically diverse mix of people’ (Abbas 2005: 158). The Human Rights Act, the Macpherson Report (1999) and the Race Relations (Amendment) Act (2000) were all important developments in multicultural policy (Abbas 2005). In the twenty-first century, community cohesion has appeared as a new agenda in British 12 The Race Relations Act (1976) defines a ‘racial group’ as a ‘group of persons defined by reference to colour, race, nationality or ethnic or national origins’. 33 multicultural policy (Abbas 2005; Cantle 2001; Grillo 2007). Community cohesion calls for a ‘type of multi-culturalism in which everyone supports the values and laws of the nation, whilst keeping hold of their cultural identity’ (The Community Cohesion Panel Final Report 2004: 8; cited in Grillo 2007: 989). As such, contemporary multicultural policy in the UK is based on the twin strategy of promoting ‘racial’ equality through ‘race’ relations legislation and community cohesion through the fostering of a common sense of identity and the celebration of cultural diversity (Grillo 2007: 990). Although increasingly popular in government circles, elements of this ‘twin strategy’ are deeply problematic. The notion of ‘community’ cohesion appears to essentialise and reify the putative culture and identity of socially constructed ‘communities’, and the strategy has even been accused of masking the re-appearance of an assimilationist agenda in UK multicultural policy (Worley 2005). Multicultural policy is grounded in specific institutional arrangements, but there has been very little research on ‘the institutional implications’ of multiculturalism (Uitermark, Rossi and Van Houtum 2005: 622). Some studies of multicultural policy in Britain have focused on government policy and institutions. Ben-Tovim, Gabriel, Law and Stredder (1992) examined ‘race’ relations policy and practice in local government in the UK through ethnographic research conducted in ‘racial’ equality units in Liverpool and Wolverhampton. This research specifically highlighted the ‘integral role of organizations and policies’ in the struggle for ‘racial’ equality (Ben-Tovim et al . 1992: 207). Similarly, Anthias and Yuval-Davis (1992) conducted ethnographic research on equal opportunities institutions in a London borough during the 1980s. This study focused on the discourses and practices, as well as the institutional structures, of a ‘racial’ equality unit to draw out the complexities and tensions between equal opportunities and cultural diversity in British multicultural policy. These studies highlight the importance of looking at both the content of multicultural public policy and the institutional arrangements in which it is produced and enacted. Both public policy and institutional structures are examined in Chapter Five, which engages with the emergence of multicultural policy agendas in Northern Ireland since the Agreement. 34 2.4. Perspectives on ‘Multicultural’ Northern Ireland Having outlined the different approaches to understanding multiculturalism that my research engages with, this next section looks at the more specific literature pertaining to emerging multicultural agendas in Northern Ireland. Increasingly the term multiculturalism is appearing in both academic and non-academic accounts of contemporary Northern Ireland (Chan 2006; McVeigh and Rolston 2007; Nash 2005; OFMDFM 2005a). In the sections that follow I review relevant research on various attempts to fix the meaning of cultural diversity in Northern Ireland. In particular, literature on demographic change and racism, the multicultural politics of recognition, anti-racism and recent studies of Northern Irish public policy are reviewed and discussed. The aim of these discussions is to show how my research both develops out of, and fills gaps in, these existing literatures. 2.4.1. Demographic changes and racism in Northern Ireland Although ethnically-identified minorities have always resided in the territory of Northern Ireland, the existence of groups beyond the ‘two traditions’ was generally ignored in academic studies of the region (Hainsworth 1998; Lentin and McVeigh 2006a; McVeigh 1998).13 Recent research, however, has highlighted the region’s growing demographic diversity (Devine 2006; Jarman 2006; Rogers 2006). Over the last ten years, immigration has increased, particularly from Eastern Europe, and Northern Ireland has recorded a higher level of in-migration than out-migration for the first time (Rogers 2006). McVeigh and Rolston (2007: 12) identify the peace process, which made Northern Ireland a more attractive place to live and work, and economic growth and labour shortages as the key factors behind these changing patterns of migration. As Northern Irish society has begun to display features of ‘demographic multiculturalism’ (Kobayashi 1993: 212), research has focused in particular on processes of racism and racialisation in response to this increased diversity (see Lentin and McVeigh 2006a). 13 The specifics of historical and contemporary processes of migration to Northern Ireland will be considered in detail in Chapter Four. Here it suffices to note that the main ethnic minorities present at the foundation of the state were Jews and Irish Travellers. From the 1960s on, the region also experienced migration from former Commonwealth areas, particularly Hong Kong and India (Irwin and Dunn 1997). 35 Throughout ‘the Troubles’ the issue of racism was almost completely absent from academic analyses of Northern Ireland for a number of reasons (McVeigh 1998). First, racism was not seen as a problem largely because of the popular misconception that there was not demographic diversity. Secondly, the dominance of sectarianism, the ‘[p]reoccupation with traditional communal politics and divisions’, marginalised the concerns of racialised groups, with government and civil society doing little to address the needs and experiences of these vulnerable peoples (Hainsworth 1998: 34; Mann-Kler 1997). Thirdly, the common identification of both of the dominant groups in Northern Ireland as ‘white’ led to a situation in which ideas of ‘racial’ difference were rarely explicitly evoked (McVeigh 1999: 17). Although recent scholarship has shown that ‘white’ is itself a racialised category (Anderson 2002; Bonnett 1997; 1999; Jackson 1998; McGuiness 2000; Nash 2003), the tendency to view Northern Ireland as a ‘white’ space remains (Chan 2006). Recently, however, as both the size and geographical location of demographic diversity has changed, the issue of racism ‘has emerged from almost complete obscurity to one of considerable legislative and political concern’ (Connolly 2002: 1; Lentin and McVeigh 2006b). There have been a number of quantitative and qualitative studies of racism in Northern Ireland conducted in the last decade. In Racist Harassment in Northern Ireland, Jarman and Monaghan (2003) analysed police data on ‘racial’ incidents.14 This research showed that the number and severity of such incidents is increasing. Both Gilligan and Lloyd (2006) and Hayes and Dowds (2006) drew on survey data in their analyses of ‘racial’ prejudice in Northern Ireland. These studies found that levels of self-reported prejudicial attitudes towards racialised groups have increased since 1994. Both of these studies also found that those holding strong sectarian attitudes were most likely to express prejudice against racialised groups. Connolly and Keenan (2000a; 2000b; 2001) conducted in- depth qualitative interviews to understand the experience of racist harassment among ethnically-identified minorities in Northern Ireland. This research found that racist harassment is ‘embedded in the routine behaviour and processes of Northern Irish 14 A ‘racial incident’, as defined by the Police Service of Ireland (PSNI), describes any incident with a ‘race’ dimension – and covers both crimes and ‘non-crimes’ (this phrase is adopted from Macpherson (1999)). As well as covering attacks on people and property, the definition of a ‘racial incident’ also includes incidents which would not normally result in criminal proceedings such as name-calling. 36 society’ (Connolly and Keenan 2001: 86). Studies have also combined quantitative and qualitative approaches. Irwin and Dunn’s (1997) ground-breaking study Ethnic Minorities in Northern Ireland investigated the experiences of these groups through both surveys and in-depth interviews. Using a similar approach, Bell, Jarman and Lefebvre (2004) examined the situation facing migrant workers in Northern Ireland. Although the focus of my research is not directly on racism, it is against the backdrop of increased discrimination against racialised groups that multicultural agendas have emerged in Northern Ireland. The research cited above suggests that practices of discrimination are embedded in at least some segments of Northern Irish society and that this situation is, in part, a legacy of sectarianism. However, research has not yet explored how sectarianism might impact on responses to racism in Northern Ireland. This is a theme of analysis that I develop throughout the dissertation, but particularly in Chapter Six. The impact of the sectarian division of Northern Irish society on minorities is a consistent theme in the literature (Chan 2006; Ellis 2001a; Lentin and McVeigh 2006b; McVeigh and Rolston 2007). The spatialisation of sectarianism has produced exclusivist notions of space and territory (Shirlow and Murtagh 2006), and excluded those groups not included in the ‘two traditions’ (Chan 2006). The movement of new migrants into areas with strong sectarian identifications has challenged sectarian expressions of place and space (Chan 2006). Connolly and Kennan (2001: 6) suggest that most racist acts in Northern Ireland are committed by boys and young men ‘based upon some notion of territory and a feeling that minority ethnic people represented a threat to that territory.’ Drawing attention to the spatialisation of processes of racialisation in Northern Ireland, Chan (2006: 71) argues that [Northern Ireland] offers many examples of place making by racialized, ethnicized minorities which have been prevented or opposed, such as the Mosque which was not built in Bleary Co. Armagh due to the objections of politicians purporting to speak on behalf of ‘locals’ in 2003, or the many homes of racialized, ethnicized migrants and minorities that have been attacked and their inhabitants assaulted. Jarman and Monaghan (2003: 21) highlight the intersection of territorialized sectarian division and processes of racialisation. 37 As sectarian residential segregation has continued to increase it is likely that some people have identified the minority as the new ‘other’ and turned their attentions away from the Protestant or Catholic minority towards the Chinese and Indian communities who are beginning to create new interfaces in some working class communities. This is not to argue that racism and sectarianism are exactly the same thing but they have common roots in a society which does not tolerate difference, which is focused in upon itself, is insecure and which accepts violence and abuse as a legitimate form of expression. As this dissertation looks at the emergence of multicultural agendas in the context of a sectarian society, it is important to take a step back from these empirical studies to probe a little deeper the relationship between sectarianism and racism. Above, Jarman and Monaghan argue that sectarianism and racism are not ‘exactly the same thing’, yet a tendency to treat the terms as equivalent has emerged in the Northern Ireland context (for example, McVeigh and Rolston 2007). In my own research I acknowledge that sectarianism and racism share commonalities as ‘socially and politically produced systems of power and discrimination’ (Chan 2006: 64). However, I also argue that sectarianism and racism are analytically and ontologically discrete processes. As Brewer (1992) contends, sectarianism and racism are similar but not the same: while ‘race’ is based on the perception of putative differences in physical characteristics, sectarianism is not based on perceptual cues (for example, one cannot see if a person is Catholic/Nationalist or Protestant/Unionist from their skin colour). Sectarianism is inferred instead from a series of stereotypical cues such as where a person went to school or where they live. McVeigh (1999: 18) analyses the two processes dialectically in terms of the social relations involved, and concludes that sectarianism and racism ‘involve groups which are constituted in substantially different ways’ such that ‘the two phenomena maintain a discrete integrity’. Although sectarianism and racism share similarities as the basis for discriminatory practices, they are not equivalent. While my own research has been very mindful of the distinctions between sectarianism and racism, in Chapters Five and Six my work explores how and why the two processes are often collapsed into one another in official and popular discourses in post-conflict Northern Ireland. 38 2.4.2. The politics of recognition in Northern Ireland Social and political analyses of Northern Ireland have not been populated by debates about the multicultural politics of recognition, despite the prominence of these discussions in the literature on the management of diversity in liberal-democratic societies. Adrian Little (2003: 23) argues that this absence ‘reflects the tendency of political analysts to see Northern Ireland as a ‘place apart’.’ Little suggests the utility of the multicultural politics of recognition as a theoretical framework for rethinking Northern Ireland in the context of peace and political settlement. Critically engaging with the work of both Bhikhu Parekh and Will Kymlicka, Little finds elements of the thought of both writers in contemporary political discourses in Northern Ireland. Little (2003: 36-37) shows that the Agreement is not based on a multicultural model, contrary to attempts to interpret it in terms of multiculturalism (for example, McVeigh and Rolston 2007; Rolston 1998). Rather it is grounded in a consociational model which relies on, and tends to reify, the existence of separate Catholic/Nationalist and Protestant/Unionist communal groupings (Schaap 2004). In order to move beyond the sectarian division of Northern Irish society, Little suggests that the politics of recognition must engage with both the internal diversity of the ‘two traditions’ (for example, in terms of class, gender, age, etc) and the existence of other groups in society such as ethnically-identified minorities.15 There has been an absence of research on how ethnically-identified minorities are included in the politics of recognition in Northern Ireland. My work addresses this lacuna by looking at the recognition of ethnically- identified groups in ‘multicultural’ festivals in Belfast (see Chapter Six). Palshaugen (2005) used the theoretical framework of the politics of recognition to investigate the workings of the Northern Ireland Civic Forum.16 The Civic Forum was constituted by representatives from various civil society groups ‘in an attempt at 15 This distinction between internal diversity within the ‘two traditions’ and other categories of ethnicised and racialised diversity mirrors Parekh’s (2000) distinction between subcultural and cultural diversity discussed earlier in this chapter. 16 The Civic Forum was a consultative body set up under strand 24 of the Agreement to represent the interests of wider civil society, rather than just those of political parties. It met on a number of occasions, but was suspended along with the Assembly in 2002 and has not met since. The Civic Forum had no formal legislative or governmental powers. It consisted of 60 members plus a Chairperson, and members were representative of the voluntary, business, agriculture, trade union, education, culture, community relations and fisheries sectors. 39 institutionalising an opportunity for debate and cooperation in the context of wider diversity and based on lines of division other than nationalist or unionist’ (Palshaugen 2005: 164). This research drew on interviews with members of the Civic Forum and observation at meetings to examine the politics of recognition in practice. Noting the tendency to privilege Nationalists and Unionists in the workings of the Civic Forum, Palshaugen (2005: 166) acknowledged the danger that Northern Ireland could ‘move from a situation dominated by one culture to a situation where the two communities dominate all other minorities.’ However, Palshaugen does not adequately address these concerns in her research. The ‘ethnic minority community’ representative sitting on the Civic Forum was not interviewed, and the study did not fully engage with the issues of those groups outside the ‘two traditions’. My work attempts to address this oversight by talking directly with representatives of different ethnically-identified minorities in Northern Ireland about their experiences, issues and concerns. The absence of empirical research involving ethnically-identified minorities in Northern Ireland has been noted in the literature (McVeigh and Lentin 2002; Lentin and McVeigh 2006a). One exception to this general omission is a study conducted by Suzanna Chan (2006) into efforts by the Chinese Welfare Association (CWA) in Belfast to secure space for a housing scheme for elderly people of Chinese descent. Drawing on reports, policy documents, interviews with CWA leaders and ethnography at consultation meetings, this research examined the difficulties faced by this group as it sought to reproduce itself spatially in Belfast. Chan notes that a site for the CWA was only identified and planning permission granted after the housing authority agreed to build more houses for Nationalist ‘locals’. Reflecting on the discrepancy between official discourses of multiculturalism and the problems the CWA experienced on the ground, Chan (2006: 67) argues that the basis of place-making practices of racialised minorities is always ‘conditional’ on sectarian considerations. As well as reiterating Ellis’s (2001a) finding that these groups are marginalised within the Northern Ireland planning system, Chan’s research shows how sectarian division hinders the multicultural politics of recognition. My study builds on Chan’s work by investigating the politics of recognition of ethnically-identified minorities in Belfast, in particular looking at events aimed at raising awareness of these groups (see Chapter Six). While Chan looked only at the CWA, my 40 engagement with a number of ethnically-identified minorities in Belfast represents an important step forward from existing research. Furthermore, my research is novel in the Northern Ireland context in that it combines an analysis of the multicultural politics of recognition with an investigation of other attempts to fix the meaning of cultural diversity such as through public policy and anti-racist movements. 2.4.3. Analyses of anti-racism in Northern Ireland There has, as McVeigh and Lentin (2002: 33) note, been ‘very little critical reflection on the process of anti-racism in Northern Ireland.’ Accounts of anti-racism in ‘Ireland’ have tended to focus only on the Republic of Ireland and neglected the situation north of the border (Garner 2004; Lentin 2004). For example, the sections on Ireland in Alana Lentin’s (2004) study of anti-racism in Europe were based on interviews with groups located only in the Republic of Ireland. Similarly, writing on the potential for new forms of anti-racist alliances and movements in Ireland, Steve Garner (2004) focuses only on the south of Ireland. Garner proposes that the internationalist agenda of militant Irish Republicanism could foster a discursive repertoire for anti-racists in ‘Ireland’. He does not, however, consider the obvious limits of adopting such strategies in the context of Northern Ireland, where Irish Republicanism is closely linked with sectarian politics and the division that this engenders. As Northern Irish society becomes more culturally diverse, the challenge is for writers on anti-racism to extend their analysis to include Northern Ireland, and to consider the specificities of this context in their work. The emergence of anti-racist discourses and practices in contemporary Northern Ireland has been observed in passing (Lentin and McVeigh 2006b). However, studies of anti- racism in Northern Ireland have been limited to historical analyses. Describing the establishment of Belfast branches of organisations like the Trotskyite anti-Nazi League during the late 1970s and early 1980s, Robbie McVeigh (2002a) highlights the role played by anti-racists based in the UK mainland in the development of anti-racism in Northern Ireland. McVeigh also outlines the formation of new anti-racist alliances involving ethnically-identified minorities from the start of the 1990s. Although McVeigh’s work is important in terms of outlining the historical trajectory of anti- 41 racism, it has not been followed up by empirically grounded studies of anti-racism in Northern Ireland. Similarly, while Suzanna Chan (2006: 61) argues that anti-racism in Northern Ireland ‘needs to thoroughly disrupt dominant discourses and relations between majorities and racialized, ethnicized minorities’ there has been no empirical engagement with the processes of anti-racism. This absence is part of the rationale for looking at anti-racism in West Belfast as part of my research (see Chapter Seven). Drawing on empirical research on anti-racist campaigns, this chapter examines the emergence of anti-racist discourses and representations – and their intersection with territorialized sectarian identities – in a deeply divided locale. 2.4.4. Research on post-Agreement public policy Since the Agreement, the emergence of discourses of cultural diversity and multiculturalism in Northern Irish public policy has been noted (Chan 2006; McVeigh and Rolston 2007). In a paper examining post-conflict policy in Northern Ireland, Graham and Nash (2006: 255) ‘take up a recent call for geographical attention to democracy’s routine procedures and policy matters’ to look specifically at the consultation process for the A Shared Future policy. Based on a close reading of responses to a draft of the A Shared Future document and analysis of the policy itself, their paper investigates the difficulty of encouraging pluralist policy within a society in which sectarian differences are articulated territorially. They observed that responses to the draft policy exhibited diverse and often conflicting interpretations of the meaning of ‘sharing’ and ‘pluralism’. This, the authors argue, illustrates the tension between state- led public policy and the reality of sectarian territoriality. Graham and Nash’s research is relevant to my study to follow in that it demonstrates how multicultural initiatives interact with embedded sectarianism in the context of post-Agreement Northern Ireland. As they surmise: ‘Northern Ireland remains an arena of conflict not only between identities but also between formal processes of consociational democracy’ (Graham and Nash 2006: 276). The emergence of a concern with pluralist policy is, they argue, part of a process of ‘normalization’ after the conflict (Graham and Nash 2006: 265). The idea that the emergence of multicultural agendas is a facet of ‘normalising’ Northern Ireland and moving it beyond sectarianism is a theme of analysis that I develop further in 42 Chapter Five. Graham and Nash’s work is important in terms of looking specifically at the emergence of pluralist policy in Northern Ireland; however, it does not fully attend to the institutional structures of public policy. In contrast, and building on their findings, my research looks at the content of multicultural policy alongside a detailed examination of the institutional structures of post-Agreement Northern Ireland in which such policy is being produced and enacted. A concern with multicultural policy initiatives animates other studies of contemporary Northern Ireland such as Silvia Mussano’s (2004) examination of the development of citizenship education policy. Based on an analysis of policy discourses and statements from key institutional players, she argues that public policy has begun to move towards full recognition of cultural diversity in Northern Ireland. The issue of multiculturalism and public policy in Northern Ireland is more directly addressed in a study by Catherine Nash (2005) of cultural policy in Northern Ireland. Defining multiculturalism as ‘the diverse policies and ways of thinking about societies characterised by cultural plurality’, Nash (2005: 274) traces shifts in the meaning of ‘identity’ and ‘tradition’ in Northern Irish cultural policy. Her analysis draws on policy documents and publications alongside interviews with policy makers and community relations practitioners. Using the framework of multicultural theory, Nash critically engages with the emergence of discourses of cultural diversity in public culture and politics with a specific focus on the Community Relations Council (CRC). In highlighting the potential for cultural policy to challenge essentialised conceptualisations of tradition and identity in Northern Ireland, Nash shows how efforts are being made to re-imagine Northern Irish society in terms of both sectarian difference and wider demographic diversity. Eschewing easy cynicism, Nash’s work suggests the potential for multicultural agendas to undermine and destabilise accepted sectarian conceptions of Northern Irish society. The potential identified by Nash (2005) for emerging multicultural agendas to help move Northern Ireland beyond sectarianism is a central starting point for my research which has sought to explore in detail the veracity of such claims and the ways in which these agendas manifest institutionally and in practice. For example, while Nash focused mainly on the CRC, my study engages with a wider set of institutions (such as key post- 43 Agreement institutions such as the Office of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister) as well as the discourses and policies of non-governmental bodies. Similarly, while Graham and Nash (2006) look at a key piece of post-conflict public policy and responses to a draft of this policy text, my work includes an analysis of institutional structures and relationships alongside interviews with policy makers and civil servants. This has allowed me to understand the production and enactment of multicultural policy within the specific governing structures of post-Agreement Northern Ireland. Finally, unlike the studies reviewed in this section, my research does not focus only on public policy. As outlined in this chapter, my work examines other attempts to fix the meaning of cultural diversity in contemporary Northern Ireland such as anti-racism and the multicultural politics of recognition. 2.5. Conclusion This chapter has reviewed a range of literatures that are relevant to understanding sectarianism, multiculturalism and the intersection of emerging multicultural agendas and sectarianism in Northern Ireland which is the focus of my research. The chapter began by attending to recent geographies of religion, concluding that the conceptual framing of religion in this work was inadequate for understanding the complexly embedded ‘religious’ nature of sectarianism in Northern Ireland. Sectarianism in the Northern Ireland context reflects social, psychological and economic factors and influences far beyond doctrinal divisions between Catholics and Protestants. Instead, sectarianism is understood in my research as those sets of discourses and social practices which (re)produce sectarian constructions of space and identity. Sectarianism continues to structure the lived experiences of many in Northern Ireland, despite the social and political advances since the peace process. A range of literatures relevant to understanding multiculturalism in contemporary societies were then examined. Multiculturalism was conceptualised as referring to a wide range of strategies for fixing the meaning of cultural diversity in society, of which four approaches which frame my research were identified. The first, demographic multiculturalism, refers simply to the existence of diversity in society. The presence of 44 cultural diversity, which is often understood in terms of ‘race’, may be rejected through racist attitudes and behaviours directed against racialised groups. At the same time, the issue of racism may stimulate societal responses aimed at addressing this problem. Secondly, the chapter looked at the politics of recognition that has influenced many debates and policy positions on multiculturalism. Proponents of this theory argue that contemporary society can be understood as composed of a range of culturally defined groups seeking the recognition of their collective identities. Reviewing research on the politics of recognition, I argued that the practices of recognition, particularly in the city, offer an opportunity for empirical engagement with the multicultural politics of recognition. Thirdly, anti-racism was approached as a sub-field of multiculturalism that combines a desire to combat racism with an alternative vision of social relations. Empirical studies of anti-racism were discussed, and it was argued that research should attend to the discourses and representations produced by anti-racist campaigns and activists. Fourthly, multiculturalism has been conceived of as public policy and its institutional arrangements. Given the focus of my study on Northern Ireland, multicultural policy in Britain was reviewed. The promotion of ‘racial’ equality through ‘race’ relations and the celebration of cultural diversity are central elements of current British multicultural policy. This discussion showed that while much has been written on the content of multicultural policy, empirical research has often failed to adequately account for the institutional structures within which multicultural policy is produced and enacted. The chapter then accounted for literature on processes of multiculturalism in present day Northern Ireland. First, it was argued that as the demographic make-up of Northern Irish society has changed due to increased migration, quantitative and qualitative studies have focused in particular on the issue of racism in Northern Irish society and the impact of sectarian division on racialised groups. The absence of research exploring the impact of sectarianism on responses to racism in Northern Ireland is addressed in my research. Secondly, research examining Northern Ireland through the theoretical framework of the politics of recognition was discussed. The politics of recognition has rarely been employed in academic discussions on Northern Ireland, and when it has been used it has tended to refer only to Catholic/Nationalist and Protestant/Unionist communal 45 groupings. This discussion highlighted the paucity of research on the recognition of ethnically-identified minorities in Northern Ireland. Thirdly, the literature on anti-racism in Northern Ireland was reviewed. It was shown that there has been a complete absence of empirical research on processes of anti-racism on the ground. Finally, studies which have considered the shift towards a greater recognition of diversity and pluralism in Northern Irish public policy were discussed. Although some of these studies have highlighted how embedded sectarianism hinders attempts to construct post-Agreement Northern Ireland as plural and diverse, they have not fully examined the institutional structures within which multicultural policy agendas are produced and enacted. Despite extensive research on sectarianism in Northern Ireland and multiculturalism in contemporary societies, as yet no research has fully engaged with the intersection of a range of emergent multicultural agendas and embedded sectarianism in this context. This chapter has highlighted the key debates and studies which inform my project and suggested how the empirical material presented in Chapters Five, Six and Seven addresses significant gaps in these literatures. In the following chapter the way in which a range of different qualitative methods, including interviewing, participant observation, policy and institutional analysis and visual methods, were all used in my research is discussed at length. 46 Chapter Three Methodology 47 3.1. Introduction Chapter Two introduced several important themes in the academic literature that frame my research on sectarianism and emergent multicultural agendas in Northern Ireland. These included sectarianism in Northern Ireland, demographic multiculturalism, the politics of recognition, anti-racism and multicultural policy frameworks (with a specific focus on the UK context). My research developed out of these recent academic debates, but, as this chapter outlines, the specific research questions and study areas addressed also reflect methodological and contextual concerns. In this chapter I describe how the specific units of analysis were selected, and explain and justify the selection of field sites. Data collection and analysis are also discussed. The aim of this chapter is to allow the reader to understand how the research was undertaken, and to identify and engage with the methodological strengths and weaknesses of my study. In this chapter the different qualitative methods I used to investigate the interaction between sectarianism and multicultural agendas in Northern Ireland are presented and discussed. There are research goals and objectives for which qualitative methods are particularly valuable: developing causal explanations of social phenomena; identifying unanticipated phenomena and outcomes; understanding participant’s context(s); and understanding the meaning of events, actions and experiences for participants (Maxwell 1996). My research relied on qualitative methods as the type of data I needed required an ‘in-depth, intensive approach rather than statistical description and generalizable predictions’ (Dwyer and Limb 2001: 6). Alongside the well-established qualitative methods of interviewing and observation, other methods popular in human geography such as document and institutional analysis and visual methods were used in this research project (Crang; 2003; Rose 2001). Until recently, the political situation in Northern Ireland led many human geographers to rely predominantly on quantitative methods (for example, Boal and Douglas 1982; Compton and Power 1986). While the conflictual and often violent nature of ‘the Troubles’ made in-depth qualitative studies difficult, Schubotz (2005) notes that since the ceasefires research in Northern Ireland has increasingly relied on such methods (for an example of in-depth qualitative research on Northern Ireland in human geography, 48 see Shirlow 2003). When working in Northern Ireland there are specific pressures to ensure transparency in one’s research. This is especially so given the danger of misrepresentation through the over-privileging of extreme viewpoints and positions (Brewer, Lockhart and Rodgers 1998). The process of ‘triangulating’ qualitative data helps to avoid this pitfall (Denizen 1989). While the importance of triangulation is often recognised in standard research design textbooks (Dwyer and Limb 2001; Kitchen and Tate 2000), the bringing together of different sources and forms of data is not always achieved in many qualitative research projects (Cochrane 1998). In an effort to ensure the validity of the research findings, in this study I use a variety of qualitative methods to interrogate the relationship between multiculturalism and sectarianism in post- Agreement Northern Ireland. This chapter starts by outlining the broad methodological commitment to discourse analysis adopted in this project, including a discussion of how discourse analysis was conceptualised in the research. The utility of this method for looking at policies, institutional structures, interviews and visual culture is outlined. I argue that discourse analysis can be productively supplemented by an engagement with the social practice and spaces within which discourses are mobilised. The chapter then accounts for the way in which I accessed the wider discursive field of multiculturalism in Northern Ireland, and the rationale and method by which specific sites and actors were selected. Techniques of data collection, specifically interviewing, observation and visual methods, are outlined in detail. This discussion includes a consideration of my own identity and positionality within the research process. Data analysis and interpretation are detailed to show how the findings presented in the substantive chapters were reached within the methodological framework of the research. The final section considers some of the limitations of the methodology adopted in this research. 3.2. Discourse Analysis This section develops an understanding of discourse, discourse analysis and the relation between discourse and social practice that provides a primary methodological frame for the research. The bulk of the work that has been carried out in discourse analysis refers, 49 directly or indirectly, to the writings of Michel Foucault (1967; 1972; 1973; 1974), and his discussions of power, knowledge and truth; the configuration of which constitutes discourse (Mills 2003). In contrast to traditional approaches in linguistics, Foucault did not think about discourse in terms of groups of signs or pieces of text, but rather as ‘practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak’ (Foucault 1972: 49). Foucault (1972) argued that power and knowledge are inter-related, and, therefore, every human relationship is a negotiation of power. According to Foucault (1972), discourse is intimately bound up with power as it operates by rules of exclusion. The dominant discursive formations control what can be spoken of, where and how one may speak and who may speak. Foucault (1979) rejected the notion that truth was objective and ‘out there’ in the world, arguing instead that it is socially produced and subjective. As a consequence, Foucault (1973) saw knowledge not as the quest for this ‘truth’ but as the struggle for control of discourse, what he termed ‘power/knowledge’ (Mills 2003: 22). A key element of Foucault’s work for my discourse analysis is his emphasis on how different social actors and organisations develop various discourses to conform with, circumvent, or contest dominant discursive formations. Amongst many others, Foucault’s work on discourse had a major influence on Norman Fairclough’s (1989; 1992; 1995) more pragmatically technical approach of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). This is an interdisciplinary approach to the study of text and talk which seeks ‘to unpack the ideological underpinning of discourse’ (Fairclough 1989: 20). According to CDA, discourse is not simply a reflection of social processes, but rather fundamental to the social reproduction of social structures (Teo 2000). For Foucault (1972), language is the primary instrument through which ideology is transmitted, enacted and reproduced.17 Fairclough (1992: 44) develops this position to 17 Although this is not a study of ideology, it is important to make clear my understanding of such a loaded term. The term ‘ideology’ dates back over two hundred years; it was used by Napoleon Bonaparte in a negative way to refer to all abstract or fanciful social theories or ideas (Williams 1985). In The German Ideology Marx developed his base/superstructure theory of society in which he argued that because the ruling class controls the means of production (the base of society) it also controls its superstructure, including its ideology (Marx and Engels 1970). Marx understood ideology as the instrument of social reproduction through which the ideas of the ruling class are reproduced and ‘false consciousness’ engendered in the proletariat. Gramsci (1971) built on Marx’s writing on ideology to develop the concept of ‘hegemony’ to refer to the way in which social control is maintained through the construction of bourgeois values and goals as ‘normal’. More recently cultural theorists have critiqued the dominant Marxist notion of ideology. Zizek (1989) argues that ‘false consciousness’, the simplistic assumption that 50 emphasise the ‘major role of discourse in the construction of social subjects.’ Discourse, according to Fairclough (1992: 55), constitutes the social but, at the same time, all discursive practice draws upon, and is related to, other forms of discourse that exist in the social realm. Fairclough (1992; 1995) presents Critical Discourse Analysis as a means of understanding the text itself and the wider discursive, and social, practice within which it is subsumed. As well as attending to linguistic features of the text, CDA investigates the macro-level social practices through which institutions both construct and constrain discourse. As outlined in Chapter Two, multicultural agendas, both in Northern Ireland and elsewhere, may be articulated in public policy and the institutional frameworks in which policy is produced and enacted. Policy analysis offers a means of examining the emergence of particular discursive constructions and their use in policy argumentation (Fischer 2003; Forester 1999). A CDA-informed approach to policy analysis looks in particular at changes in language use, repetition of terms and other linguistic attributes of policy texts. Although an analysis of policy texts allows for the emergence of particular discourses to be traced, it reveals little about how they are actualised in practice (Larner 2000). Fairclough’s (1992) model appears to recognise this limitation, suggesting that CDA should involve both textual analysis and analysis of the social and institutional structures within which texts are produced and disseminated. This emphasises the need to examine the characteristics of institutions, the nature of their relationship to other institutions, as well as the policy texts they produce (Czarniawska 1998; Halkier 2003). An institution may be defined as ‘a relatively enduring collection of rules and organized practices, embedded in structures of meaning and resources that are relatively invariant in the face of turnover of individuals’ (March and Olsen 2006: 6). ‘New institutionalism’ authority and ideas are blindly accepted, belies the cynicism of modern society. Ideology 'is not simply a “false consciousness”, an illusory representation of reality, it is rather this reality itself which is already to be conceived as “ideological”' (Zizek 1989: 21). Dominant ideologies wholly structure individual subjects’ senses of reality such that to speak of false consciousness has no meaning. Ideology, according to Zizek, does not mask some external ‘reality’, but instead is the very stuff that makes up consciousness. Understanding ideology as everyday, mundane social praxis suggests the need to focus on the discourses, objects and experiences of everyday life through which ideology is constructed and (re)produced. 51 emphasises the role played by institutions in constructing social order (March and Olsen 1984). Institutions are political in that they are the substance by which politics is constructed and the vehicle through which politics is practised (Karl 1990). As carriers of identities, institutions mark out the character, history and future visions of a society (March and Olsen 1989). At the same time, specific institutional arrangements may have an impact on policy and political actors, constraining or enabling outcomes and changes (March and Olsen 2006). This suggests the importance of speaking to civil servants and policy makers to understand both the discourses of these social actors and the institutions within which they are mobilised. In my research I also wanted to investigate the discourses of non-state actors and, for this reason, spoke with representatives from ethnically-identified minorities and voluntary/community groups. The selection process and collection of interview data will be detailed later in this chapter. The applicability of discourse analysis is not limited to interviews and policy analysis; it can also be used to analyse pictures, photographs and other visual materials (Rose 2001; Tonkiss 1998). Discourse analysis explicitly looks at different ways in which text and images are used to persuade and produce particular claims to truth in specific social contexts (Rose 2001). Again drawing on the work of Foucault, Gillian Rose (2001: 136) argues that discourse as ‘a particular knowledge about the world that shapes how the world is understood and how things are done in it’ is articulated through visual and verbal images as well as texts. In this way, images are used to construct specific views of the social world. Conducting discourse analysis, according to Tonkiss (1998), involves engaging with two specific aspects of the text. First, there is the analysis of the text itself; in the case of visual culture this includes the images and objects that carry them. Second, the social context of the discourse needs to be considered; this includes looking at who is producing the visual culture, why they are producing it and in what circumstances. Although language can only be understood in the context of its use, discourse analysis has been accused of failing to engage fully with social practice. Bridge (2005: 96) argues that social science and, in particular, discourse analysis tends to overemphasise the importance of ‘talk’ while failing to account for the performative aspect of 52 communication. Certainly non-representational approaches have highlighted the performative and embodied aspects of identity and social relations (Jacobs and Nash 2003; Thrift 1996; 1999; Whatmore 1999). This criticism has been noted by discourse analysts. Fairclough (1989: 20) suggests that we consider ‘language as a form of social practice’, and, as outlined above, Tonkiss (1998) emphasises the social context of discourse alongside the text itself. Similarly, Wetherell and Potter (1992: 90) argue that there is a need ‘to place much more emphasis on discourse as social practice, on the context of use and thus on the act of discursive instantiation.’ As well as looking at the words used in a particular situation, it is often important to consider non-discursive features of the social context. Oftentimes what a person does is just as important as what is said, if not even more so. Mindful of these concerns, and the questions which this research sought to address, my discourse analysis was augmented by observation at events organised by different groups (which will be detailed later in the chapter). 3.3. Selecting Field Sites, Sources, and Informants In this section my selection of specific field sites, sources and types of information will be discussed and justified. Writing about choosing a field site in Sudan, Cindi Katz (1994: 69) concluded that its selection was ‘an amalgam of historical circumstance, intellectual criteria, practical specifications, and default.’ Certainly my decision to conduct research in Northern Ireland reflects a variety of factors, some personal and circumstantial, others academic and career-oriented. Although I grew up in the south of Ireland, I lived relatively close to the border with Northern Ireland. As I was growing up, Northern Ireland was geographically near, but psychologically quite removed from my everyday life. Daily our television screens were filled with stories and images from Northern Ireland, but I rarely crossed the heavily militarised border zone. As the violence of ‘the Troubles’ began to end, and the optimism of the Peace Process and, eventually, the Agreement built, I became increasingly interested in the dramatic changes taking place in the neighbouring jurisdiction. These social, political and economic changes and the increase in cultural diversity that accompanied them have provided the context for this research (see Chapter Four). Of course, choosing a field site is, as Katz notes, also closely bound up with intellectual concerns and specific research 53 questions. As Chapter Two demonstrated, my research on the emergence of multicultural agendas in a society divided along sectarian lines arises out of, and seeks to contribute to, a number of key academic debates. Similarly, the decision to concentrate on Belfast rather than other areas of Northern Ireland was motivated by intellectual and practical considerations. The city has been identified as the most propitious site for researching multiculturalism (Wood and Gilbert 2005), and, as the main urban centre in Northern Ireland, Belfast was the most logical location for my research. Furthermore, Belfast has been both the most popular destination for new migrants (Rogers 2006), and the site of the majority of reported attacks on racialised minorities (Jarman and Monaghan 2003). Belfast also had significant advantages in terms of access to informants and social practices. All the administrative functions of Northern Ireland run from Castle Buildings at Stormont (just outside Belfast), and all the key policy makers and civil servants work in Belfast. The city is also home to numerous ethnically-identified minority groups and voluntary/community sector groups. Also, prior to beginning my PhD I already had a number of contacts in Belfast that I did not have in other areas of Northern Ireland. These contacts allowed me to conduct small scale pilot studies before commencing fieldwork proper, and provided me with an ‘in’ which I would not have had in, for example, Derry or a semi-rural area such as mid-Ulster. Academic links with Queens University, Belfast were another determining factor. During my fieldwork I held an honorary position as a Visiting Research Associate in the Department of Geography, Archaeology and Paleoecology at Queens. The next step was to develop an initial understanding of the discursive field of multiculturalism in Northern Ireland. This involved identifying the different types and sources of information that I would require for the study. As the research sought to examine public policy and institutional structures, information from both primary sources (interviews and observation) and secondary sources (policy documents and other printed materials) was needed. As well as consulting primary sources, speaking with representatives from ethnically-identified minorities and voluntary/community groups was identified as the most effective means of gaining access to information on responses 54 to racialised violence and attempts to raise awareness of cultural diversity in Northern Ireland. As will be described later in this chapter, these interviews were augmented by both observation and analysis of visual culture. Observation took place at multicultural festivals and anti-racist events (see Section 3.4.4.), and the visual culture produced by anti-racist groups was examined to explore the politics of anti-racism in West Belfast (see Section 3.4.5.). The policies to be analysed were selected based on their concern with ‘multicultural issues’, the recentness of their publication and the institution which produced them. As social policy in Northern Ireland is devolved I chose to focus on texts produced by institutions within the devolved administration. After consulting the websites of key devolved institutions, I chose two policies for detailed analysis: A Shared Future, published by the Community Relations Unit in March 2005, and A Racial Equality Strategy for Northern Ireland, published by the Racial Equality Unit in July 2005. The former document was intended to set out the broad vision and principles for a post- conflict Northern Irish society (Graham and Nash 2006), and the goal of the latter document was to outline a strategy for promoting racial equality across the political institutions of Northern Ireland. Both of these documents make direct references to issues of cultural diversity, multiculturalism and racism in Northern Ireland. Prior to entering the field a close reading was done of these texts, and a manual coding system was used to highlight key terms that recurred throughout the documents. Later these policy texts were analysed further according to the principles of CDA outlined in the previous section. An auxiliary outcome of this initial exercise was that I gained a better understanding of the general discursive arena in which multicultural policy was situated and this helped with later interviews. As well as looking at policy texts, my research also sought to engage with the discourses used by policy makers and civil servants, and with the institutional structures within which policies were produced and enacted. Based on triangulation between the research questions, pilot interviews with civil servants and preliminary analysis of policy texts, I began the process of selecting what I refer to as ‘government’ interviewees (to differentiate them from the ‘community’ interviewees described later). In the summer of 55 2005, I identified a number of key ‘government’ institutions such as the Community Relations Unit (CRU), the Racial Equality Unit (REU), the Community Relations Council (CRC), the Equality Commission, the Department of Social Development and the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI). These institutions were selected based on the extent of their contribution to the key policy areas identified (Cochrane 1998). For example, PSNI had recently appointed ‘minority ethnic liaison officers’; the Equality Commission has a duty to promote ‘race’ equality and had recently produced policy guidelines for enforcing this. Having identified key informants, I began the process of getting in contact with them using details gleaned from institutional websites. Prior to entering the field, the ethical implications of the research were thoroughly considered, and, in the summer of 2005, the research received ethical clearance from the Institute of Geography’s Research Ethics Committee. Mindful of the importance of providing potential interviewees with a clear description of both myself and the project (Kitchen and Tate 2000; Valentine 2005), a formal letter of introduction was drawn up. The intention was to post these letters to potential ‘government’ interviewees towards the end of the summer of 2005. However, as obtaining postal addresses for many individuals proved difficult, I decided to make initial contact via an e-mail containing the key points of the formal letter including my contact details and a synopsis of the research and its aims (see Appendix I for sample letter of introduction). In total I e- mailed 13 ‘government’ individuals and institutions and received 11 positive responses (see Appendix II for list of ‘government’ interviewees). As well as the discourses and practices of civil servants and policy makers, I was interested in multicultural events aimed at raising awareness of cultural diversity in Northern Ireland and those groups involved in them. I also wanted to talk to these same groups about their experiences of attempts to respond to racism in the context of a sectarian society. Following pilot interviews with representatives from ethnically- identified minorities, I decided that the criteria for selection of these ‘community’ interviewees should be that the group was based in Belfast and had, over the course of the previous year, received funding from the Racial Equality Unit for an event aimed at raising awareness of ethnicised and racialised diversity. The rationale behind this 56 selection policy was that those groups that had received funding were likely to be the most active and, hopefully, willing to discuss their opinions and experiences. Looking at press releases on the Racial Equality Unit’s website, I found the contact details of 14 different organisations that had been allocated money between the summer of 2004 and 2005. These groups included the Northern Ireland Council for Ethnic Minorities, the Chinese Welfare Association and Belfast Islamic Centre (see Appendix II for full list of groups interviewed). As Crang (2003) notes, research projects are often presented to different people in different ways. The formal letter drawn up for these ‘community’ interviewees was slightly different than that for ‘government’ interviewees (see Appendix I). A greater focus was placed on opinions and the types of practices engaged in. In total I contacted all 14 organisations that had received funding and obtained positive responses from 11 of these groups. A further two interviews were secured during the fieldwork (the reason for these extra interviews is outlined in Section 3.4.1.). The events selected for observation fell into one of three categories. First, there were festivals which sought to promote the recognition of cultural diversity. Observation was conducted at the Samhain/Diwali festival held in the Waterworks Park in North Belfast in November 2005 and the Belfast Mela held in the Botanic Gardens in August 2006. These two events were selected as both were organised by culturally-identified minorities and involved expressing and celebrating that identity through events held in prominent public spaces in Belfast. Observation at these festivals allowed me to explore the politics of recognition and the impact of the sectarian division of social space on these practices (see Chapter Six). The second category of events selected were those organised by the Racial Equality Unit, the institution of government most directly involved with ethnically-identified minorities in Northern Ireland. The goal of this observation was to supplement my interview data and to understand more about the relationship between institutions. To further this aim I observed a roundtable discussion involving government institutions and representatives of ethnically-identified minorities. The third, and final, category was those events organised to launch anti-racist campaigns in West Belfast (see Chapter Seven). 57 As outlined in Chapter Two, anti-racism represents another attempt to fix the meaning of cultural diversity in a multicultural society. In this research I was interested in how political murals, posters and pamphlets, traditional mediums for reproducing sectarian division, were now being used to carry an anti-racist message. I first picked up on this theme during a preliminary trip to Belfast in May 2005 when a local newspaper reported on the unveiling of an anti-racist mural in West Belfast. Consequently, I decided to focus on anti-racist groups in West Belfast, an area strongly divided along sectarian lines (Boal 1969; Dowler 2001) (see Chapter Seven). I chose to look at representations produced in a range of mediums including murals, posters and pamphlets. These anti- racist objects were selected if they had been produced and/or distributed in West Belfast, and if they carried a message about anti-racism and/or the acceptance of cultural diversity. I interviewed individuals involved in the production of these anti-racist texts and, in one instance, a mural painter who had worked on an anti-racist mural. Interviews and the analysis of texts and visuals were supplemented by observation at two events organised to launch anti-racist campaigns. My engagement with anti-racist visual culture also included an analysis of a poster distributed as part of a hate crime awareness campaign ran by the PSNI in 2005 and 2006.18 This campaign was prominent in different areas of Belfast during the fieldwork period, and, for this reason, I decided to focus in detail on the images used in it (see Chapter Six). As well as analysing the image used in this poster, I interviewed the PSNI officer responsible for this campaign. 3.4. Data Collection and Analysis The over-arching aim of the following sections is to demonstrate clearly to the reader how data was collected and analysed, and to reflect on my own experiences of these processes. The first section discusses the main data collection method used, semi- structured interviewing. Prior to outlining the methods by which interview data was 18 Hate crime is a legal term: in Northern Ireland it is used to describe any criminal offence committed against a person or their property that is motivated by a hatred of the person on the grounds of a particular person’s ethnicity, sexual orientation, gender identity, religion, political opinion or disability. In Northern Ireland hate crime is defined, recorded and policed by the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI). 58 analysed, my own experiences of conducting interviews during the research are considered. Subsequently, the collection, recording and analysis of observational data are discussed. The final section engages with the collection and analysis of visual data. 3.4.1. Interviewing through semi-structured interviews Interviews were the primary method used in this research. There are a variety of different types of interviewing in social science research (Fontana and Frey 1998). This research relied on semi-structured interviews as these give the interviewer freedom and flexibility in the conduct of the conversation, but are directed by a predetermined scheme that reflects research goals (Corbetta 2003). This had the advantage of allowing me to speak directly to a diverse group of respondents, and to alter the focus of the interview to reflect the relationship of the respondent and their organisation to the research objectives. Semi-structured interviews allowed me to focus on the respondent’s experiences and opinions to develop my understanding of ‘the processes which operate on particular social contexts’ (Punch 2005; Valentine 2005: 111). Interviews with policy makers and key civil servants, for example, allowed me to gain access to more detailed accounts of multicultural policy and its enactment within an institutional structure that continue to privilege sectarian political identities. Many of these interviewees brought along printed materials that they thought might be relevant to my study. These included official publications and policy documents as well as copies of speeches and, in one instance, an internal memo describing the establishment of the Racial Equality Unit (REU). The interviews with ethnically-identified minority groups that had been allocated funding from the REU allowed me to understand the opinions held by this constituency on multiculturalism and responses to racialised violence in Northern Ireland. Again, interviewees often gave me publications and other printed materials. In looking at the visual culture of anti-racism in West Belfast, speaking with individuals involved in the production and distribution of anti-racist texts supplemented the discourse analysis of these representations and helped me to understand the social context of their production. 59 In conducting qualitative research it is common that a ‘gatekeeper’ must be approached to gain access to relevant people or information (Dwyer and Limb 2001). During the early months of my PhD a contact I had known in Belfast for a number of years passed details of my project onto the Director of the Racial Equality Unit (REU) in the Office of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister. After exchanging e-mails the Director of the REU and I spoke briefly on the phone in March 2005. This individual was very interested in my work, and we arranged to meet in Belfast the following month. At this meeting, conducted informally in a city centre pub, the informant talked openly and suggested that we keep in touch. It was through this ‘gatekeeper’ that I was able to secure interviews with high-ranking civil servants and to attend a meeting of the Racial Equality Forum. Speaking with ethnically-identified minority groups it became clear that this key informant was well regarded within this constituency, and my association with him was beneficial with regard to conducting interviews and observation at events such as the Samhain/Diwali festival. In total I conducted 30 semi-structured interviews with 31 people (one interview was conducted with two people) (see Appendix II for full list of interviewees). All interviews were conducted in Belfast, with the exception of one interview which took place in Lisburn. The break down of interviews was 17 in the ‘community’ classification (of which 14 were with groups that had received REU funding, and 3 were with groups and individuals involved in anti-racist campaigns in West Belfast) and 13 in the ‘government’ category. Separate interview schedules were drawn up for each of the ‘government’ and ‘community’ groups with specific questions targeted at the individual interviewee added depending on information about the institution or group they worked with gleaned from reading policy documents and/or consulting websites (see Appendix III for examples of interview schedules). The mean length of interviews was an hour. On one occasion the respondent was opposed to the recording of the interview, and detailed notes were taken instead. All other interviews were recorded on a digital recorder, and all interviewees were given a consent form that they were asked to take a minute to read and sign before the interview proper commenced (see Appendix IV). Very few interviewees expressed 60 reluctance at being interviewed. I suspect that one of the reasons for this was that semi- structured interviews do not require respondents to give up a lot of their time, and, with the exception of those groups involved in events I wanted to observe, there was no further commitment required (Flowerdew and Martin 2001). I always thanked the interviewees, left my business card and explained to them that I was available if they had any issues or concerns they wanted to raise. The issue of where to conduct interviews was addressed by asking the interviewee to choose the venue. Most interviews took place in the interviewee’s place of work; though a small number were conducted in cafes in Belfast when no suitable alternative venue could be found. The latter location was found to be less than ideal. After listening to recordings of two interviews conducted in cafes it was decided that these were unsuitable venues (given the amount of background noise and distractions). All subsequent interviews took place in quieter locations. The bulk of the research took place during one fieldwork period between September 2005 and May 2006. The decision to conduct fieldwork during this time reflected practical and personal concerns. During the summer months institutional activity is scaled down as parliament is in recess. This is not, however, my only reason for avoiding conducting fieldwork in Northern Ireland at this time. Although the daily violence of ‘the Troubles’ is over, summer is still a politically tense and potentially volatile time in Northern Ireland. The annual parading season, which reaches its high point on July 12th, has often been associated with violence (Bryan 2000). People tend to leave Belfast as much as possible during the summer months, and the city is noticeably quieter at this time. Given these concerns it was somewhat ironic that the first weekend of my fieldwork proper (in September 2005) coincided with the worst civil disturbances in Belfast for ten years. Following the re-routing of a controversial Loyalist parade in West Belfast pitch battles with the police broke out in the Shankill area. Quickly rioting spread across Loyalist areas of the city. As I travelled through East Belfast to conduct my first interview in Castle Buildings, the bus was forced to take a detour to avoid a burning car 61 in the middle of the Newtownards Road. However, as I learned from subsequent experience, this was quite an exceptional weekend, and no further interviews required the negotiation of conflagrations. Only two interviews were conducted outside the main fieldwork time frame. One was with a Loyalist anti-racist group in Lisburn on the outskirts of Belfast that had received money from the REU during 2006. Although this group received funding later than the selection criteria (as noted previously, all other groups interviewed had received funding in 2005), the decision was made to include them as the direct involvement of former paramilitaries made this anti-racist group particularly interesting in terms of the research objectives. An interview with the mural artist involved in one of the anti-racist murals took many months to secure; this interview was conducted on a return visit to Belfast after the fieldwork proper ended. I also contacted some interviewees after the interview to clarify points they made that I was unsure about or to request further information on specific issues raised (when referred to in the text of the dissertation these follow-up contacts are referenced as ‘personal communication’ alongside the date). 3.4.2. Interviewer experiences Conducting good qualitative interviews is a difficult skill to master (Corbetta 2003). At the start of the project, I was relatively inexperienced in the art, and I needed to develop and hone various techniques throughout the interviewing process. This section will consider some of the techniques I used to help build up a relationship between my interviewees and myself, and will reflect on the effect of my own identity on the interview process (Crang 2003). Essentially an interview is a dialogue between two people, it is ‘a conversation with a purpose’ (Valentine 2005: 111). It is integral to the interview process that the interviewer is able to develop a balanced rapport with the respondent such that the interviewer rewards participation without evaluating responses (Kitchen and Tate 2000). Establishing rapport is an important way of developing and maintaining trust in the interview context (Rubin and Rubin 1995). This involves the interviewer being able to 62 put themselves in the respondent’s shoes, to see issues from their perspective rather than imposing academic or personal preconceptions on their ideas and responses (Fontana and Frey 1998). One method for building rapport is to begin interviews with descriptive or factual questions, such as asking how long the interviewee has been in the job, to make the respondent feel more comfortable (Valentine 2005). In the present research, this strategy was regularly employed to help judge the level at which to pitch communication (see Appendix III). The existence of a common understanding of the meaning and context in which terms are used is obviously crucial for successful interviewing. Mirroring back respondent’s language helped to establish a ‘sharedness of meaning’ in the interview context (Fontana and Frey 2000). The importance of appropriate use of language is even more pronounced in Northern Ireland where many terms are heavily politicised, and the possibility of revealing ignorance or, worse, causing offence is heightened. A good interviewer must be aware of the interview dynamic, be able to both adopt a style appropriate to the context and understand the position of the respondent. One useful way to develop these characteristics is through reciprocity, the sharing and exchanging of ideas and information with respondents (Valentine 2005). In the case of this study, for example, this involved telling respondents (particularly ‘community’ groups) about events and organisations that might be of interest to them. This sharing of information also demonstrated my (limited) expertise and helped to build trust. Similarly, when interviewing high-status respondents (such as senior civil servants) demonstrating that I was well informed and professional made me appear competent in the eyes of the interviewee. Dressing appropriately, and in a manner that reflects that of the respondents, also helped build rapport (Fontana and Frey 1998; Valentine 2005). Response effects are biases introduced by the researcher and the research context which can negatively effect the interview process (Fontana and Frey 2000). There exist three main types of bias: first, the respondent may attempt to please the interviewer by giving ‘socially desirable’ answers. In the present study this problem was not felt to be too severe as the nature of the questioning was rarely overly personal. The second type of bias is the wording of questions in a way that prompts certain responses. In an effort to 63 address this concern I attempted to avoid question phrasing that imposed answers, saying things like ‘Tell me about…’ which encouraged respondents to talk about an issue in their own words. Finally, the personality of the researcher and his/her style of interviewing can impede effective communication. Certainly early on in the study I found that some respondents had difficulty understanding my accent. As a result I made a conscious decision to speak more slowly and ask questions in a way that would maximise their communicability. Despite various attempts to ameliorate these biases, in some situations my interview style continued to have a negative effect on some responses. For example, I once asked a Republican mural artist if he ‘controlled’ the mural wall. The artist reacted angrily to my use of the word ‘control’ as he felt that I was accusing him of pushing a personal agenda; for him the wall is the property of the community and beyond the ‘control’ of any one individual. The identity of a researcher also shapes and effects the interview data. As Cochrane (1998: 2129) notes, researchers need to be ‘highly self-critical and reflexive about the approaches we adopt.’ A reflexive consideration of the research process engages with the researcher’s positionality and the power relations between the interviewer and the informants (Fontana and Frey 1998; Kitchen and Tate 2000; Valentine 2005). As many respondents were civil servants, policy makers or established community leaders, I often felt that I was in a subordinate position to my interviewees. However, this was not always the case. In some situations I was treated as a ‘high-status’ researcher, and unrealistic expectations were displayed concerning my ability to influence policy and practice. The negotiation of these interviewee expectations represented one of the most difficult challenges in the research process. An example of this was when an anti-racist group phoned me a few weeks after our interview asking what I would suggest they do to help address problems of racism in their area and aid the integration of new migrants. In this case I told them that I was not an expert, and gave them names and numbers of contacts in Belfast who I thought would be in a better position to assist them. In certain respects my experience of conducting research in Northern Ireland resonates with Katz’s (1994: 72) description of her subject position as constituted in ‘spaces of betweenness’. Coming from the South I was neither an insider nor an outsider in 64 Northern Ireland, and, although I was able to settle quickly in Belfast, it was obvious to interviewees that I was not from there. In some instances talking about my background, and how I came to the research topic, helped further in the building of rapport. There was never any question of attempting to suppress my identity as an Irish Catholic. My accent clearly marked me as coming from the Republic of Ireland and, by extension, being Catholic.19 On occasions the answers given and the language used suggested to me that my ‘community background’ had some effect on responses.20 For example, one government interviewee who grew up in a Republican area of Belfast often referred to our common religious background (‘we’) during the interview. As Gillian Rose (1997) argues, similarity is not a prerequisite for successful interviewing. It is possible to develop a positive relationship and mutual understanding across social differences. Prior to undertaking the study, I was reasonably concerned about the prospect of conducting research in areas where I might have been received with hostility, for example in Loyalist communities. In practice, I felt that as my religious identity and my origin was so obvious, the process of ‘Telling’ (Burton 1979) was rarely activated. This is not to argue that interviewees did not respond to my identity, but rather that they did not spend time trying to figure it out as they might have done if I was Northern Irish. I also found that some interviewees responded to my identity by trying to show how ‘open’ they were. For example, one interviewee insisted on ending our interview with a drink in a local bar. In this bar, which has well-known links with Loyalist paramilitaries, he talked about his love for Dublin city, an ex- girlfriend from County Kerry and the great time to be had in the bar on Saturday night.21 I interpreted the fact that that he wanted to show me off in his local as a sign of trust, especially as everyone in earshot would have known I was Catholic. Despite this, the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) insignia on the frosted glass of the front door and the bar’s reputation left me feeling very uncomfortable and I was glad to leave when I had finished my pint. 19 The vast majority of the population of the Republic of Ireland are Catholic, and the general assumption in Northern Ireland is that anyone from south of the border is a Catholic. 20 ‘Community background’ is a euphemism for religious identity often employed in Northern Ireland (see Coakley (2007) and Chapter Five). 21 The bar in question, ‘the Rex’, is mentioned in Gallaher and Shirlow (2006: 164) as a UVF-affiliated bar outside which gun shots broke out during the Loyalist feud on the Shankill in 2000. 65 3.4.3. Transcribing and analysing interview data The transcription of audio recordings is an important part of the research process. There exists no accepted standard for transcription (Flick 1998), instead it is generally agreed that in terms of time and energy it is best to transcribe only as exactly as the research question requires (Crang 2005). As this study involved discourse analysis, I decided that a rigorous method of transcription would be necessary. All statements made by both the respondent and myself were noted in full, with significant pauses and breaks included (Silverman 1983). Although this was very time consuming (it took approximately eight hours to transcribe each interview), this produced the type of comprehensive, well- ordered data needed for discourse analysis.22 I transcribed two interviews at the end of September 2005, and this allowed me to improve my interview techniques and to rephrase questions in my interview schedule that interviewees found difficult to understand. The rest of the transcription was conducted during 2006. Through the transcription process I became more familiar with the material, and noted emerging themes during the transcription that often informed later coding and textual analysis. While transcribing I often consulted context notes made during the interviews that detailed non-verbal communication such as body movements and facial expressions that the audio recording could not pick up on (Gorden 1980). These notes helped me to understand the context of the interview I was transcribing, and provided useful supplementary evidence used during later analysis of interview data. At the same time I paid attention to printed materials given to me by interviewees. As well as policy documents, I analysed the discourse of internal memos and relevant speeches; integrating this material alongside the interview data. Although I was obviously personally involved in the interpretation of interview data, many reports of qualitative analysis assume the researcher to be an unbiased ‘scientist’ reporting on the empirical ‘reality’ of the social phenomenon under investigation (Fontana and Frey 2000). Challenges to these positivist accounts have stressed the situatedness of knowledge and the role of the researcher in its production. As Norman Denizen (1998: 313) notes; ‘[i]n the social sciences there is only interpretation. Nothing 22 I personally transcribed all interviews. 66 speaks for itself.’ Hermeneutics, the study of interpretation, focuses attention on the role played by social agents in the production of meaning (Schostak 2006). As I began to sift through and ‘interpret’ the interview data, I was intimately involved in the construction of narratives or ‘tales from the field’ (Van Maanen 1988). I constructed these narratives as a means of grappling with the complex, and sometimes conflicting, stories emerging from the data. Rather than presenting the reader with an artificially ‘clean’ account of this process (Fontana and Frey 2000: 660), I want to draw attention to my own role in the process of interpretation and knowledge creation. There exists no single methodological framework for analysing qualitative data, instead researchers often use a repertoire of analytical techniques (Punch 2005). Dey (1993) identifies the key points of qualitative analysis as the description of the data, the classification of the data, and the establishment and understanding of the interconnections between concepts. In this study I used a manual coding method to code the data in terms of both theoretical concepts and themes and topics discussed in the interview. This allowed me the freedom to attend directly to what interviewees were saying in a given moment rather than relying on a fixed set of response categories. Although the data was coded manually, I decided that a qualitative software package would be useful for ordering and managing the large interview dataset. In September 2005, I attended a workshop at the University of Surrey on the use of the Atlas-ti program. This software has a range of applications, including auto-coding of data, but I was interested in its utility for storing interview transcripts and allowing for the attachment of open codes and memos to interview transcripts. As Glaser (1978: 83) noted, there is only one rule for qualitative data analysis: record all ideas. Making memos provided a particularly effective way of following this advice. While creating open codes, I used Atlas-ti to attach memos to pieces of text to reflect either potential relationships between codes or emerging ideas. After creating open codes and memos, I began to categorise these codes by grouping them around key themes and issues. For example, all codes which referred to aspects of policing and racism in Northern Ireland were grouped together within a broader 67 category. Kitchen and Tate (2000: 239) suggest that categories must be ‘conceptually and empirically grounded’; they must be connected to the conceptual basis of the study but also reflect the empirical situation expressed in the data. The categories I constructed were a product of both the interview data and the predetermined research foci. This represents a variation on traditional ‘grounded theory’ which asserts that theory must develop inductively from the data (Glaser and Strauss 1967). However, as Silverman (1993) notes, implicit theories often guide early analyses even in grounded theory approaches. In my study recurring patterns were identified following detailed examination of the open codes and memos. An example of this is the category ‘complexity’ which was used to classify instances where the complexity of institutional structures was referred to by interviewees. The identification of patterns allowed me to analyse interconnections between open codes and to build classificatory categories based on higher order concepts. The development of the coding process from open coding and memos to higher order abstractions allowed the analysis to narrow down on the material most relevant to addressing the specific research questions. In practice, the task of coding and analysing the data was seldom straightforward. As Mike Crang (2005) notes, coding is not an exact science, rather it is a creative process through which the researcher engages with the data to build an interpretation of the social context. Coding required a critical – and often reflexive – thought process and engagement with the data to spot emerging trends and themes. I used Atlas-ti as a database, as opposed to using the software to conduct content analysis or to build a networked coding framework. The ease of data coding and retrieval on Atlas-ti aided the writing process and assisted in the formation of coherent themes from the data. Semi- structured interviewing allowed me to understand how, where and why sectarianism intersects with multicultural agendas in Northern Ireland. However, I was also interested in the social practice of these discourses. Consequently, the next section describes the collection of data by observation and the analysis of this data. 68 3.4.4. Observation As outlined earlier in this chapter, I conducted observation at a number of events. As an ‘observer’ (Jones and Somekh 2005; Kitchen and Tate 2000) at these events I spoke with individuals taking part in the festivities and recorded details such as what food stalls were present and what type of music was played. By paying attention to issues such as differences in attendance at these two festivals and the types of cultural practices engaged in, I was able to examine the operationalisation of a multicultural politics of recognition in Northern Ireland, and to examine the effect of sectarian division on these practices (see Chapter Six). Another observational experience, being allowed to sit in on a meeting of the Racial Equality Forum in December 2005, helped supplement interviews with policy makers and civil servants. As will be discussed in Chapter Five, the Racial Equality Forum is a quarterly meeting organised and chaired by the Racial Equality Unit in OFMDFM. The aim of this meeting is to facilitate information exchange between institutions and ethnically-identified minorities. At the start of this meeting, which comprised forty people and took place in the Indian Community Centre in Belfast, I was introduced as a researcher from the University of Edinburgh by the ‘gate-keeper’ introduced earlier in this chapter. I took note of presentations given and discussions which took place. My observation at this event improved considerably my knowledge of key institutional and non-governmental players and my understanding of institutional relationships. This was also a good exercise in observing first hand the complexity of institutional structures and the positions and opinions of different institutions and organisations. I also attended two launch events organised by anti-racist groups in West Belfast to understand more about the social context in which anti-racist representations were being produced and displayed (see Chapter Seven). The first launch event was brought to my attention by a contact in Belfast. This launch, for the ‘Showing Your True Colours’ campaign, took place in a secondary school in the Shankill Road area of West Belfast in November 2005. At this event I observed what took place and took notes of the comments made by speakers. Once the event was over, I introduced myself to the organisers, who allowed me to photograph the mural and consented to an interview at a 69 later date. The second launch I observed, held in March 2006, unveiled an anti-racist ‘pubs and clubs’ campaign on the Falls Road in West Belfast. Similarly, I recorded what took place and the comments of speakers and people around me. Observation at these events helped me to understand who was producing the anti-racist texts and the social context in which they were being produced and distributed. Listening to comments by mural artists and other speakers involved in these campaigns was an effective way of gaining access to the intention behind the images, and this allowed me to develop further the discourse analysis of these representations. In observation the main method for recording data is the keeping of field notes (Cook 2005). Through note-taking the researcher begins to see how experiences in the field are linked and related to theoretical and empirical issues. This allows the researcher to make judgements on what material is most important. In writing my field notes I strove to be as accurate and detailed as possible. I wrote up my field notes as soon as possible after every event. These field notes consisted of two basic components: a description of the facts, events, places and persons as well as my interpretation of these events, together with reactions, impressions and reflections (Corbetta 2003). The recording of observations through field notes facilitated the building up of a ‘research diary’ in which data obtained by observation was supplemented by contextual information and my personal reflections on the research process. The creation of a research diary has a long history in social science research (Altricher and Holly 2005). The research diary helped me to spot emerging trends in the data and identify points of interest worthy of further exploration. In terms of interpretation and analysis, field notes were treated similarly to interview transcripts. The research diary was entered into Atlas-ti and, as I read through it, free codes and memos were attached (see discussion in the previous section). These codes and memos were often linked to those identified in the interviews and the connections between data from both sources developed. Field notes primarily fed into my understanding of the context in which other data was collected. In the substantive chapters field notes are occasionally drawn on in isolation, but more commonly are used 70 to expand upon and support findings arising from other data sources. The following section discusses data collected from visual and other textual sources. 3.4.5. Visual methods The use of visual methods in social science research has become increasingly popular (Banks 2001; Barnard 2001; Emmison and Smith 2000; Jay 2005; Rose 2001; Schirato and Webb 2004; Siber 2005). Analysis of visual culture often provides empirical insights that are not possible using other methods (Barnard 2001). In this study I collected and analysed anti-racist murals, posters, pamphlets and other texts. This allowed me to investigate the interaction between sectarianism and attempts to produce anti-racist visions of Northern Ireland in media which have traditionally been used to reflect and (re)produce sectarian identities (Jarman 1997). The visual culture I looked at in this dissertation was either produced by grassroots anti- racist groups in West Belfast (see Chapter Seven) or the PSNI as part of a hate crime awareness campaign (see Chapter Six). The texts produced by groups based in West Belfast were collected at the launch events described in the previous section, given to me by interviewees or chanced upon during the research process. For example, at the launch of the ‘Showing Your True Colours’ initiative on the Shankill Road I was given a bundle of pamphlets and posters to take home.23 In the case of the PSNI campaign, I had previously interviewed the officer charged with co-ordinating the campaign and, after seeing the posters on bus shelters in the city, I contacted him again and he sent me a copy of the poster and provided information about its production and distribution. Visual methods have become an increasingly popular and accepted approach in both human geography (Ryan 2003; Thornes 2004) and sociology (Jenks 1995; Virilo 1994). Reflecting recent academic debates, I use the term ‘visual culture’ in its widest sense to refer to a plethora of different forms and media, including murals, posters, pamphlets and other texts (Rose 2001; Sturken and Cartwright 2001). According to the art historian 23 Similarly, when I interviewed ‘community’ groups they often gave me copies of their publications which I occasionally refer to in the dissertation. 71 Nicholas Mirzoeff, visual culture ‘is not just part of your everyday life, it is your everyday life’ (1999: 3). Images and texts are vehicles through which the underlying ideas, values and beliefs of a particular society or cultural group may be examined (Howells 2003). I was interested not only in the nature of the images and texts themselves, but also the cultural and social functions they perform and contexts in which they are embedded (Barnard 2001). The ideological power of images relies on their ability to produce specific visions of identity and social difference in the process of creating meaning about the world through the act of representation (Rose 2001; Sturken and Cartwright 2001). As Gillian Rose (2001: 11) argues, it is important to interrogate the ways in which images ‘offer very particular visions of social categories such as class, gender, race, sexuality, able-bodiedness, and so on’. In this research, I was particularly interested in the production of narratives of social difference and specific visions of a future, multicultural Northern Ireland in anti-racist visual culture. The first step in the analysis of visual culture collected during fieldwork is the development of a methodological framework (Rose 2001). Looking at visual culture is an exercise in interpretation, not a matter of uncovering the ‘truth’ behind an image. [T]here is no single or ‘correct’ answer to the question, ‘What does this image mean?’ or ‘What is this ad saying’ Since there is no law which can guarantee that things will have ‘one, true meaning’, or that meanings won’t change over time, work in this area is bound to be interpretative – a debate between not who is ‘right’ and who is ‘wrong’, but between equally plausible, though sometimes competing and contesting, meanings and interpretations. The best way to ‘settle’ such contested readings is to look again at the concrete example and try and justify one’s ‘reading’ in detail in relation to the actual practices and forms of signification used, and what meanings they seem to you to be producing (Hall 1997: 9; in Rose 2001: 2). Interpreting visual data involves the justification of inferred meanings with reference to both the external narrative – the context of the image – and the internal narrative produced within the bounds of the image itself (Banks 2001). Earlier in this chapter I outlined my methodological commitment to discourse analysis. Unlike other methods for analysing visual culture – such as content analysis, semiology or psychoanalysis – 72 discourse analysis broadens the analytical focus to include the social context in which the image is produced and circulated (Rose 2001; Tonkiss 1998). The first step in the discourse analysis of these anti-racist representations was to familiarise myself with the material I collected and identify salient themes and images. For example, as I read through the texts of both the West Against Racism Network (WARN) ‘passport’ and the Loyalist Commission’s ‘Loyalist or Racist? You can’t be Both’ pamphlet I noted the way in which attempts were made to identify racialised minorities with Republicanism and Loyalism respectively. Second, as discourse analysis explicitly focuses on the way that text and images are used to persuade and make particular claims to truth, I looked more closely at the use of pictures, images and slogans in my materials (Lynn and Lea 2005). Discourse analysis emphasises the importance of complexity and contradictions within texts and images (Rose 2001). As I studied the materials collected, I looked for these features. For example, in the Loyalist anti-racist mural a counter-intuitive notion of anti-racism as a ‘war’ is constructed (see Chapter Seven). As well as considering what is present in texts, discourse analysis examines what is absent and rendered invisible (Rose 2001). In reading for what is not said, for example the absence of a reference to racism in Republican areas in some texts, the construction of specific (often sectarian) narratives of identity and difference in anti- racist representations was examined further. Thirdly, at the same time as looking at the images used, I read through transcripts of interviews conducted with the anti-racist groups involved in the production of these representations and field notes from the launch events. This allowed me to understand more about the intended meaning of the images as well as the social context of their production and distribution (Tonkiss 1998). My analysis of images and texts also considered where they were located or distributed. As Lynn and Lea (2005: 45) argue in a discussion on racist graffiti in Glasgow, ‘[w]here it is located, when it was put there, and by whom, are as significant as the graffiti itself.’ As well as observing and taking photographs at launch events, I considered issues of location; for example where an anti-racist mural was displayed or a pamphlet distributed. Thinking about the placement of these representations in specific sites and contexts led me to consider their materiality, the physicality of the objects which carried 73 the images and texts (Banks 2001). Consequently, in this dissertation I approach objects such as murals and posters as simultaneously visual and material. In doing so I follow recent attempts to destabilise the traditional binary constructed between discourse and representation; between the visual on the one hand and the material on the other (Jackson 2000; Lorimer 2005). For me, this flags up the need to consider the materiality of pieces of visual culture and to examine them as objects whose material form may play a role in the organisation of social space (Jackson 2000). Visual representations and the objects which carry these images often play a crucial role in the material construction of boundaries and social identity in space (Cresswell 2004). In Chapter Seven, I argue that both the image and materiality of anti-racist objects such as murals and posters may contribute to the construction of sectarian narratives of identity at the same time as producing an anti-racist message. 3.5. Limitations of Methodology In this section I will consider two obstacles encountered in this research that, although not detracting significantly from the findings, do warrant some discussion and clarification. The first issue is related to the research design and methodological standpoint adopted in this research. As highlighted, I attempted to combine discourse analysis with an examination of social practice by attending different events and making field notes of what I did and saw. Although I was looking at practice, the field notes were themselves another set of words and statements which I analysed as discourse. As such, non-discursive features of the social context, for example the type of music played at the Samhain/Diwali festival, were recorded discursively. A less discursively-driven approach to researching social practice could possibly be to adopt methods from non- representational theory and attend more closely to the embodiedness of social practice (Jacobs and Nash 2003; Nash 2000; Thrift 1996; 1999; Whatmore 1999). One way of achieving this might be through the use of videoing to shift the focus away from discursive observations and towards the direct recording of what participants actually do. In this research I chose not to conduct video recording at different events as I felt that this method would be too intrusive. Furthermore, as a PhD student I felt that I lacked the status and standing necessary to obtain permission to use video-recording. 74 The most significant obstacle I faced in my fieldwork was unrelated to me or the research design, but arose due to the political and institutional context in which the research was carried out. At the start of the fieldwork period the Northern Ireland Assembly (NIA), the devolved legislative body, had been in suspension since October 2002. Although the Assembly was eventually re-instated in May 2007, while I was in the field (September 2005 – May 2006) such progress seemed extremely unlikely. In my interviews almost everyone mentioned the political stasis; civil servants in particular expressed the fear that the devolved administration would be disbanded permanently. As well as preventing the NIA from meeting and passing legislation, the suspension meant that all devolved powers reverted back to the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, and the responsibility for running the devolved administration fell to the Northern Ireland Office (NIO). This represented a specific methodological challenge as I was forced to negotiate and figure out how to report on a quite unique institutional arrangement. As Shirlow and Murtagh (2006: 35) note, choosing ‘the correct tense in which to write’ is a major issue facing any researcher writing about the political institutions of post- Agreement Northern Ireland. I felt that it would be disingenuous to attempt to present an ideal, fully devolved governing structure, especially given the very real possibility that it may never be actualised. Instead, I decided to detail the institutions and structures as I found them at the time of my fieldwork. Consequently, this research presents an account of these policies and institutions at a particular historical moment and in the context of a suspended governing framework. Although the research was situated in and reflects this suspended structure, I would argue that this situation did not significantly influence the conclusions I draw from my research. The main reason for this being that during suspension all devolved departments continued to function as if under the Northern Ireland Executive.24 The only significant alteration to normal devolved procedures was the replacement of locally elected politicians by a Ministerial Team appointed by the Home Office to oversee the day-to-day workings of the administration. The suspension 24 The Northern Ireland Executive is the executive arm of the NIA. During suspension the various departments continued to function as outlined in the Agreement and to produce public policy, the only major difference being that civil servants were not answerable to an elected Northern Ireland Member of the Local Assembly (MLA) but to an MP appointed by the Home Office. 75 is rarely referred to in the analysis chapters, as it did not have a major impact on policies, institutions and structures as I found them. 3.6. Conclusion In conclusion, this chapter has explored and examined central aspects of the methodology used in this research project, discussing in particular discourse analysis, the selection of units of analysis and techniques of data collection and analysis. I began by outlining the broad methodological commitment to discourse analysis adopted in this research. While this method is particularly useful for looking at talk and text (including visual material), I argued that it can broadened to include an analysis of social practice. It was for this reason that I decided to combine observation with other qualitative methods such as interviewing and visual analysis. The criteria by which sites and units of analysis were selected was clearly laid out to allow the reader to understand how and why I chose which policy documents to analyse, people to speak to and events to attend. Interviewing was the main method used, and so was considered in some detail. I sought to engage reflexively with my own positionality; arguing that my accent and language use identified me as a Southern Irish Catholic, but that similarity is not integral to successful interviewing. As well as interviewing, institutional and policy analysis, observation and visual methodologies were also used. While all methodological approaches have inherent weaknesses, combining them in this way strengthens the validity of the research findings. The use of different qualitative research methods allowed for the triangulation of research data as material gleaned from different sources was often used to support – or call into question – interpretations made. Finally, some of the limits of the methodology used in this research project were considered. Although the research took place within the unique political and institutional situation of a devolved, suspended administration, I argued that this context did not have a significant effect on the research findings. A number of other research methods could have been used in this research project. It might have been that non-representational approaches, particularly videoing, would have allowed for a less discursively-driven investigation of festivals and other events. However, I do not think the research has 76 suffered by not using these approaches. The broad palette of qualitative research methods adopted has provided a rich insight into the interaction of emergent multicultural agendas and embedded sectarianism in Northern Ireland that the following chapters explore in detail. 77 Chapter Four Setting the Scene: An Historical Overview of Sectarianism and Multiculturalism in Northern Ireland 78 4.1. Introduction Having established the main foci of this project and the approaches taken to achieve the research objectives, this chapter outlines the history and politics of sectarianism and multiculturalism in Northern Ireland. The aim of this chapter is to provide the reader with the background necessary for a full understanding of the empirical material presented in Chapters Five, Six and Seven. This chapter examines the historical roots of sectarian division and shows how this division has structured social life in the region, both historically and into the present day. Political and policy attempts to manage sectarianism in this context, which frame later discussions on multicultural policy and institutional structures, are examined. The history of ethnically-identified minorities in Northern Ireland and the emergence of a concern with racism are also discussed. It is argued that multicultural agendas have emerged against this backdrop of increased migration and racism and alongside attempts to construct Northern Ireland as a ‘normal’ society that is seeking to move beyond sectarianism. The chapter begins by outlining how and why religion became such a dominant social cleavage in the North-East of Ireland. This brief synopsis of the contested history of the region traces the development of asymmetric power relations between Catholics and Protestants since the Plantations. The historical circumstances that led to the formation of Northern Ireland in 1920 are outlined. This discussion shows how the contemporary political formation of Northern Ireland arose directly from sectarian considerations about the viability of a Protestant/Unionist state in the face of aggressive Irish nationalism to the South. The social and political situation that precipitated the prolonged sectarian violence that became known as ‘the Troubles’ (1969-98) is briefly considered. This section ends with the suspension of Stormont in the face of rising political violence and the imposition of direct rule from Westminster. The chapter goes on to consider the policy and institutional framework of community relations that emerged in the 1970s as an attempt to manage sectarianism in Northern Ireland. This section highlights the key points of community relations policy and the changes in it since its introduction. It is argued that community relations in Northern 79 Ireland can be understood as referring to the management of relations between Catholic/Nationalists and Protestant/Unionists. This discussion is particularly relevant for understanding the context in which a concern for multiculturalism emerged in Northern Irish policy discourses (Chapter Five). The sections that follow (4.4. and 4.5.) outline the context of contemporary Northern Ireland through an analysis of the Agreement (1998) and the social, political and economic changes since its signing. It is argued that this settlement is grounded in the assumption that recognising and accommodating competing sectarian identities is the only viable means of achieving political stability in the region (Little 2003). The institutional changes ushered in by the Agreement are outlined as necessary background for understanding the institutional frameworks within which multicultural policy is enacted in Northern Ireland. The unstable political situation since the Agreement is also discussed as this is the backdrop against which the research took place. This section goes on to consider the continuation of sectarian division in Northern Irish society despite the significant diminishment in political violence (Shirlow and Murtagh 2006). The changes that have taken place in Northern Ireland since the Agreement, particularly the depiction of it as a society trying to move beyond sectarianism and towards ‘normality’, are also discussed (Bairner 2006). The final section of this chapter looks at the changing histories and geographies of ethnically-identified minorities in Northern Ireland. This section begins by charting the history of migration to the region. Although ethnicised and racialised diversity, for example the presence of Irish Travellers and the Jewish community, predate the formation of Northern Ireland, it is shown that the number and range of diverse groups has changed markedly in recent years. The history of migration to Northern Ireland is discussed in two separate phases: before and during ‘the Troubles’, and after the paramilitary ceasefires. For the first time in recorded history, Northern Ireland is currently experiencing net in-migration. At the same time the problem of racism has become a prominent issue in academic, political and media discourses. As will become clear later, the emergence of this multicultural face of Northern Ireland coincides with attempts to move society beyond the sectarian division that has characterised so much of 80 its history. The emergence of multicultural agendas in the post-Agreement milieu makes contemporary Northern Ireland a particularly good context in which to explore the relationship between multiculturalism and sectarianism. 4.2. A Brief History of Northern Ireland The history of contemporary Northern Ireland has its roots in the colonial project in Ireland begun over six centuries ago (Lydon 2003). From the thirteenth to the sixteenth century Ulster was the most Gaelic part of Ireland, the area of the island where English colonisers had met with the least success and where traditional chieftains retained most control (Bardon 1992).25 Although previous attempts had been made to colonise some parts of Ireland, it was only in the early years of the seventeenth century that a comprehensive, systematic effort was made to achieve this goal (Darby 1976). The Plantation of Ulster in 1609 was the largest plantation in Ireland and the most extreme. By 1703 Ulster was totally controlled by colonial settlers, and only 5% of its land remained in Catholic Irish hands (Darby 1976: 3). This massive social change removed the old Gaelic lords, introduced a new aristocracy and produced ‘a legacy of division and hatred persisting to our own time’ (Bardon 1992: 75). While English colonial settlements in the rest of Ireland were almost completely comprised of British gentry, the social make-up of the colonisers in Ulster was quite different (Buckland 1981). A conscious decision was made to attract all classes of coloniser to Ulster in an attempt to ensure their numerical advantage over the native population. This resulted in an entirely new community made up of both Anglicans and Presbyterians being introduced into Ulster; reducing the Catholic population to a position of servitude (Darby 1976). Society in Ulster, which had previously been strictly ordered by traditional Gaelic laws, became divided along religious and economic lines, between the wealthy, predominantly Protestant towns and the impoverished countryside which was mainly home to Catholics (Darby 1976). The presence of the colonisers was 25 The term ‘Ulster’ refers to two separate areas. One use of the term is to refer to the nine counties of the traditional province – Antrim, Down, Armagh, Derry, Tyrone, Fermanagh, Donegal, Monaghan and Cavan. The second usage denotes the administrative area of the state of Northern Ireland founded in 1921 and made up of the first six counties in the previous list. Following Darby (1976), the use of the term Ulster is eschewed in this dissertation in favour of Northern Ireland to refer to the latter meaning. 81 resisted by the native populations, leading to the Rising of 1641 and, eventually, the pivotal Battle of the Boyne in 1690 at which the Protestant King William of Orange trounced the Catholic King James I (McNally 2005). Although religious tensions remained relatively calm until the middle years of the nineteenth century, these Catholic/Protestant conflicts set the tone for the sectarian division and underlying violence that has structured social and political life in the region for over four centuries. The foundation of the administrative and political formation known as Northern Ireland has its roots in a series of major social and political upheavals that took place both on the island of Ireland and in Europe around the turn of the twentieth century. During the 1880s there was a massive growth in the popularity of the Home Rule movement in Ireland (Darby 1976; Lyons 1971). This movement, which was overwhelmingly supported by Catholics across the island, garnered 85 out of Ireland’s 103 parliamentary seats in the 1885 general election (Buckland 1981: 7). In response to this largely Catholic-backed demand for self-government, Protestants of all classes began to identify strongly with Unionism and the Conservative Party in Britain, particularly in the Ulster counties where they were in a majority (Buckland 1981).26 Consequently political developments in Ireland in the early years of the twentieth century began to take on two radically different forms. In the southern counties the defeat of the 1912 Home Rule Bill and the failed Easter Rising of 1916 set the scene for the emergence of violent Irish Republicanism. In response Unionists organised on a massive scale in their North- Eastern powerbase. From 1912 to 1914 they imported weapons with a view to a defensive war against the threat of a Republican victory in the south (Bardon 1992). During World War I, while significant numbers of Protestant Ulstermen were fighting in the British Army, a guerrilla war was being fought against the British administration by a resurgent Irish Republican Army (IRA) demanding an all-Ireland Republic. These twin track developments precipitated the introduction, in December 1920, of the Government of Ireland Act. This Act set up two subordinate administrations, one for the six Northern 26 As a result of the Ulster plantation, and subsequent migrations, Protestants were in numerical supremacy in the counties of the North-East where they constituted two-thirds of the population (the remaining one-third was made up of Catholics). This contrasted sharply with the situation in the rest of the island where Protestants made up barely 10% of the total population (Buckland 1981: 8). 82 counties and another for the remaining twenty-six counties.27 Although Unionists were opposed to any form of Home Rule, the option of self-government was infinitely preferable to control administered from Dublin and so, in 1920, the ‘state’ of Northern Ireland was born (Buckland, 1981).28 The partition of Ireland into the Irish Free State, later to become the Republic of Ireland, and Northern Ireland effectively divided the island along religious lines. The boundaries of the new Northern Irish state were carefully configured to ensure a stable Protestant majority within the new territory. For this reason, the proposition of a boundary that encompassed the traditional nine counties of Ulster – which would have contained 900,000 Protestants in favour of Union with Britain and 700,000 Catholics supporting Irish reunification – was eschewed in favour of a six county state with a religious breakdown of 820,000 Protestants and 430,000 Catholics (Darby 1976: 9).29 Cleary the Northern Irish state was a product of sectarian division, and the events of its early years reinforced the salience of this communal bifurcation. From the beginning of 1920 sectarian violence became a serious problem; beginning in Derry City, it spread to Lisburn, Banbridge, Dromore and Belfast before the year was out (Bardon 1992). The majority of this violence, which claimed 428 lives between June 21st 1920 and June 18th 1922, was carried out by Protestant vigilantes aiming to exterminate the unwelcome Catholic minority contained within the boundaries of the new state (Buckland 1981: 46). Sectarian violence greatly receded from 1922, as the reality that the Catholic minority could not be intimidated out of Northern Ireland became increasingly accepted. 27 The Government of Ireland Act established a new Northern Irish parliament in Stormont which, although its powers were not specified, was only allowed to legislate on matters pertaining to Northern Ireland; foreign policy, peace and war, external trade, exchange rate policy and monetary policy all excepted to Westminster (Wilson 1989: 65). 28 Northern Ireland is not, and has never been, a state (Coulter 1999). Instead, it is an autonomous, devolved region of the United Kingdom. However, it possesses many characteristics of a state, and the use of the term to refer to the administrative, juridical and political mechanisms of Northern Ireland is appropriate and is used in this dissertation to refer to these functions. 29 While this division obviously created a larger Protestant majority in the new Northern Ireland, it still did not divide Ireland along clear religious lines. However, even if Unionists politicians were in favour of it, a completely Protestant Northern Ireland was a practical impossibility. Although heavily concentrated around the border counties, the rest of the Catholic population was spread throughout the rest of Northern Ireland. As such the removal of all Catholics from Northern Ireland would have required displacement and ethnic cleansing on an unimaginable scale. 83 Nevertheless, the state moved to strengthen the Unionist position. In the same year, proportional representation for local government was abolished, and this resulted in Nationalists holding control of only eleven out of seventy-three local administrations despite comprising a third of the population (Wilson 1989: 68). Between 1922 and the onset of World War II in 1939 the political make-up and orientation of Northern Ireland was such that the Prime Minister James Craig could proclaim that ‘[a]ll I boast of is that we are a Protestant Parliament and a Protestant State’ (Buckland 1981: 55). Throughout the life of the Stormont government, as the administration from 1920 to 1972 was known, the Unionist Party exercised an uninterrupted hold on political power. During this time ‘[d]iscrimination became built into the processes of government and administration, as the government pandered to Protestant and Unionist whims large or small’ (Buckland 1981: 61). Alongside the gerrymandering of constituency boundaries to ensure a disproportionate Protestant majority, Catholics were discriminated against in housing, employment and other areas (Farrell 1980; Wilson 1989). Catholic’s frustration at their status as de facto second-class citizens began to be voiced openly from the early 1960s on (Hennessey 2005). Following the formation of a number of smaller pressure groups in 1963 and 1964, the broader-based Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA) was created in 1967 with the expressed aim of bringing the Northern Ireland situation to international attention (Darby 1976). Throughout 1968 the Civil Rights movement, in particular a more militant section called the People’s Democracy (PD), became increasingly vocal. The angry, often violent responses by Loyalist mobs to political marches organised by PD in January 1969 led indirectly to the start of ‘the Troubles’ in Northern Ireland (Darby 1976). In the summer of 1969, as intense sectarian violence flared up in Belfast, an international spotlight was focused on the Northern Ireland situation for the first time (Boal 1969; Buckland 1981). This violence took many forms including the burning of Catholic homes by Loyalist vigilante mobs, random abductions, shootings and stone throwing. Westminster responded to this wave of violence in Northern Ireland by sending in the British Army to calm tensions. Although the army was initially greeted warmly by Catholic/Nationalist communities, during 1970 the situation deteriorated further as 84 sectarian violence intensified and paramilitary groups were formed in both Catholic/Nationalist and Protestant/Unionist areas (Buckland 1981).30 The by now doomed Stormont government attempted to introduce a series of reforms aimed at pacifying the Catholic/Nationalist community and reassuring London of its competence, but the situation had spiralled out of its control and the patterns of sectarian violence that became the norm for the next thirty years were laid down. Residential segregation along religious lines increased dramatically as large populations moved out of more mixed neighbourhoods and into areas dominated by one religion (Compton and Power 1986; Darby and Morris 1974). In 1972, as violence increased exponentially, the British government abolished the Northern Irish parliament and introduced direct rule from Westminster.31 Despite efforts to broker power sharing through the Sunningdale (1974) and Anglo-Irish Agreements (1985), Northern Ireland was to be ruled from Westminster for the next twenty-five years, during which time sectarian violence and spatial division continued relatively unabated. 4.3. Managing Sectarianism: Community Relations in Northern Ireland As sectarian violence escalated, and with international attention firmly focused on the discrimination faced by Catholics, the government was forced to do something to address the political situation (Darby 1976). It was in this context that the framework of community relations was developed to manage Catholic/Protestant relations. The term ‘community relations’ first appeared in Northern Ireland in 1969 when the Northern 30 The history of paramilitarism in Northern Ireland is long and convoluted. Nevertheless, it is important to outline the main groupings. In 1969 the IRA, which had continued on in a number of guises since the War of Independence, split into the Official IRA and the Provisional IRA. This split followed anger in Catholic communities directed at the IRA who were accused of a failure to offer protection against Loyalist attacks (Moloney 2007). Although the Official IRA continued to play a minor role in Northern Irish affairs, from this time on the Provisional IRA became the IRA and, for this reason, in this dissertation I use IRA to refer to the Provisionals. The Protestant paramilitaries were numerically divided between the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) and the Ulster Defence Association (UDA). The UVF, which took its name from the organisation founded by Edward Carson in 1912, was formed in 1966. The UDA emerged in 1971 from a number of previously independent vigilante groups (known as Defence Associations) operating in Loyalist areas (Cusack and McDonald 2000). 31 There was a frightening escalation in the level violence in Northern Ireland at this time. In 1969 13 people were killed in political violence, by 1971 this figure had rose to 174, spiking in 1972 with 467 killed and 4866 injured (Wilson 1989: 300-302). During these years the number of killings motivated by a purely sectarian motive, such as the random abduction and murder of an individual from an area identified as Catholic or Protestant, increased dramatically (Buckland 1981). 85 Ireland Executive created a new Ministry of Community Relations.32 The following year a nominally independent Community Relations Commission was formed ‘to encourage the moderates of both sides to come together in some indeterminate relationship, and particularly to encourage catholics to participate in the operation of the reformed system’ (Hayes 1972: 11). The main aim of community relations, then, was to respond to sectarian division by promoting interaction and the building of positive relationships between Catholic/Nationalists and Protestant/Unionists. The community relations agenda in Northern Ireland was undermined from its inception as both the Ministry and the Commission ran into serious difficulties. The separation of community relations into two organisations (the Community Relations Commission and the Community Relations Ministry) with almost identical titles and purposes resulted in a Ministry engaged in fieldwork institutionally divorced from a Commission involved in policy work (Griffiths 1972). Although the Commission was given a wide remit to examine the causes of the conflict, ‘its independence was illusory and it was virtually ignored by government’ (Buckland 1981: 140). Furthermore, the central tenet of community relations at this time, the importance of promoting interaction between Protestant/Unionists and Catholic/Nationalists, overlooked the existence of separation in society and the dominant social and political reality of sectarian murder and bombings (Griffiths 1972: 129). In 1974, following five difficult years of generally fruitless work during which the political situation worsened markedly, the Commission, whose field staff numbered just fifteen, was abolished amid deteriorating relations between it and the Ministry (Darby 1976: 192). Just months later the Ministry was also disbanded, and its functions returned to the different departments which had previously held them. Despite noble aims, the initial community relations project was terminally weakened by a lack of consensus, institutional fragmentation, and, most seriously, the continuation of sectarian violence on the streets of Northern Ireland (Hayes 1972). Throughout the later years of the 1970s and the early years of the following decade, the community relations project became increasingly marginalised as the Northern Irish 32 The term emerged in Britain the previous year when a Community Relations Commission and a series of Community Relations Councils was created under the Race Relations Act (1968) to promote good ‘race’ relations. 86 conflict continued relatively unabated. It was the signing of the Anglo-Irish Agreement in 1985 which heralded the return of community relations institutions to Northern Ireland governance (Gilligan 2007). In 1986 the Standing Advisory Committee on Human Rights commissioned a report on community relations. This report led directly to the formation of the Central Community Relations Unit (CCRU) in the Northern Ireland Office (NIO) in 1987 (Gilligan 2007: 606; McVeigh 2002b).33 This unit was charged with advising the Secretary of State ‘on all aspects of the relationship between the different sections of the Northern Ireland community’ (Burgess 2002: 160). In 1990 the Community Relations Council (CRC), a state-funded but independent project development and grant-awarding body, was formed to assist in the promotion of ‘good community relations’ in the voluntary and community sector (Gilligan 2007). This ‘second wave’ of community relations is still recognisable in the present day and is qualitatively different from the programs introduced at the beginning of ‘the Troubles’. While a central aim of the Community Relations Commission of the early 1970s was to promote cross-community interaction in an effort to highlight the commonality and shared experiences of Catholic/Nationalists and Protestant/Unionists, in the 1990s the focus shifted to exploring and debating ‘questions of local identity and culture’ (Community Relations Council 1994: 23; Gilligan 2007). Around this time the Cultural Traditions Group was formed to investigate and explicate the nature and meaning of Protestant and Catholic ‘cultures’ in Northern Ireland. This shift effectively re-inscribed religious identities in terms of culture and tradition. In practice this meant that while earlier community relations initiatives had sought to create something akin to a shared sense of identity between Protestants and Catholics, later work began to explain the Northern Irish conflict in terms of the existence of ‘two traditions’ or ‘two communities’ in Northern Ireland. This new focus on difference and culture was reflected in media discourses during this time as the language of ‘parity of esteem’ was introduced into political discussions on the conflict and its resolution (Nash 2005: 273). Although it has 33 The Standing Advisory Commission on Human Rights was a body formed under the Northern Ireland Constitution Act 1973 to advise the direct rule government and the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland on issues of discrimination and human rights in Northern Ireland. The body was eventually replaced by the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission (NIHRC) in 1999 following commitments made in the Agreement. 87 been heavily criticised in some quarters (for example, Rolston 1998), community relations remains the main policy approach to managing sectarian relations in Northern Ireland. The institutional frameworks of community relations in post-Agreement Northern Ireland and the emergence of a new term, ‘good relations’, to refer to the management of multicultural relations are examined further in Chapter Five. 4.4. The Agreement The roots of the Agreement, the political settlement reached in 1998 which has, despite a number of setbacks, held since then, can be traced back to a series of political developments that took place in the 1980s (Ruane and Todd 1999). Although it was denounced by Republicans and stymied by massive Loyalist resistance, in retrospect it is clear that the Anglo-Irish Agreement (AIA) in 1985 represented an important first step on the road to a peaceful conclusion to ‘the Troubles’ (Wolff 2003). As well as confirming the ambiguous constitutional status of Northern Ireland, the AIA consolidated the interpretation of the Northern Irish conflict as arising from antagonistic relations between Protestants and Catholics that could be rectified by full recognition of both identities in the public sphere (Gilligan 2007). The discourse of identity and recognition running through the AIA provided the political vocabulary that facilitated the Peace Process in the 1990s and the subsequent Agreement (Gilligan 2007). Furthermore, the AIA’s inclusion of an ‘Irish Dimension’ in the form of representatives from the Irish government and Irish-American concerns showed the IRA what could be achieved by negotiation and dialogue as opposed to violence (Ruane and Todd 1999: 5). Although sectarian violence continued throughout the later years of the 1980s, a consensus was emerging that political violence would never achieve the aims of either group of protagonists in the conflict (Ruane and Todd 1999). Around this time the British government began to move away from its previous position that Northern Ireland must always remain a part of the Union, and towards an acceptance that its inclusion should be based on the wishes of the majority of its people (Coakley and O’Dowd 2007). One upshot of this change in the political and policy climate on all sides was a renewed attempt to reach a negotiated settlement to the conflict. Between 1991 and 1993 88 all the constitutional parties in Northern Ireland entered into a series of multi-party talks with the British and Irish governments. Following an agreement of common principles between the moderate Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) and Sinn Fein, and discussions between the latter and the British government, the two governments announced the Downing Street Declaration on December 10th 1993. Although not a settlement per se, the Declaration did set out common principles allowing for such a resolution (Ruane and Todd 1999). The following year, the IRA announced a ceasefire, and was joined six weeks later by the main Loyalist paramilitary groupings. While these ceasefires did not hold permanently, they provided the relative peace necessary for Sinn Fein to enter multi-party talks in September 1997. After months of stalemate, serious negotiations began in January 1998 (Ruane and Todd 1999). For the next four months the parties argued, lurched from crisis to crisis and, finally, following two days of high drama agreed to the text of a political settlement, the Agreement, by the deadline imposed, Good Friday, 10th April 1998. The Agreement established that the constitutional status of Northern Ireland must be determined by the expressed wishes of the majority of its citizens (Ruane and Todd 1999). It explicitly laid out the machinery by which a referendum on this issue could take place, and also confirmed the rights of everyone in Northern Ireland to choose Irish citizenship, British citizenship or both (Coakley and O’Dowd 2007). The Agreement deals with three main areas: democratic institutions in Northern Ireland, a British-Irish Ministerial Council and Safeguards for Rights and Equality of Opportunity (Wolff 2003). The commitments made in the Agreement were subsequently passed into law by the Northern Ireland Act (1998). The Government of Ireland Act (1920) was repealed and a devolved legislature, the Northern Ireland Assembly (NIA), established. This Act brought to an end the period of direct rule. The Agreement radically altered Northern Ireland’s governing structures. The key structural division within the governmental apparatus that was ushered in by the Agreement was between the devolved and non-devolved administrations. Under the terms of the Agreement devolved matters, those concerned with economic and social issues, passed into the control of the Assembly and the various government departments 89 which made up the new power-sharing Executive. The Executive’s remit was ‘not only to administer certain government departments but also to promote cultural and political equality’ (Shirlow and Murtagh 2006: 36). However, not all powers were devolved to the new Executive. Instead, constitutional and security issues have remained under the control of the non-devolved Northern Ireland Office (NIO) that is directly answerable to the Home Office and Secretary of State for Northern Ireland rather than the Executive. These structural divisions are examined further in Chapter Five, which looks at the emergence of multicultural agendas within these post-Agreement governing structures. The political settlement reached in the Agreement is based on the principle of consociation, a particular form of government which attempts to unite divided societies by power-sharing at the elite level (Lijphart 1977; McGarry 2001; Tonge 2005).34 As O’Leary (1999: 90) notes ‘[t]he Agreement is based on multiple forms of recognition’ including Unionists’ recognition of ‘Nationalists as Nationalists’ and Nationalists’ recognition of ‘Unionists as Unionists’. The Agreement’s bi-national character (McGarry and O’Leary 2004) is founded on ‘the idea that the two major communities or traditions should be given equal consideration or recognition’ (Thompson 2002: 205). Underpinning the Agreement is the notion of ‘parity of esteem’. As Article 1 states ‘the power of the sovereign government … shall be founded on … parity of esteem and of just and equal treatment for the identity, ethos, and aspirations of both communities’ (Good Friday Agreement 1998: 15). Parity of esteem, a term Thompson (2002) traces back to 1993, stipulates the need to recognise equally both Nationalist and Unionist cultural expressions and political aspirations, and it remains common in political parlance in the present day.35 34 Consociationalism is a form of government involving power-sharing that is often proposed for managing conflict in deeply divided societies. As Graham and Nash (2006) note, Arend Lijphart (1977) outlines four principles of consociational government: cross-community power-sharing, proportionality rules throughout government, equality in cultural life and veto rights for minorities. The goals of such a system are political stability and the avoidance of violence by the encouragement of cooperation at the elite level. A central tenet of any consociational settlement is the need to introduce a power-sharing executive and to overhaul existing political structures to allow for competing political claims to be expressed (McGarry and O’Leary 2004). 35 A good example of parity of esteem (and the limits of it) is the Agreement’s commitment to linguistic diversity. The Agreement pledges to support both the Irish language and Ulster-Scots, despite the questionable status of the latter as a distinct language. Consequently all official documents and parliamentary proceedings must be translated in three languages: English, Irish and Ulster-Scots (see Nic Craith (2002) for a detailed discussion on Ulster-Scots). 90 The philosophical and pragmatic basis of the Agreement rests on the assumption that power-sharing and equal recognition and representation are the most efficient ways to ensure broad Nationalist and Unionist support for the political institutions and foster peace rather than violence (Thompson 2002). In accordance with this principle, it was stipulated that both communal groupings should be equally privileged within the new institutional framework for governing Northern Ireland. Alongside cultural commitments, such as the provision of funding for both Irish and Ulster-Scots languages, the Agreement introduced a unique voting system aimed at ensuring cross- community support for all proposed measures. It is written into law that all representatives elected to the Assembly must formally declare themselves Nationalist, or Unionist or Other. For a bill in the Northern Irish Assembly to be passed into law it requires the support of at least 60% of one half of the Nationalist/Unionist blocs and at least 40% of the other half (Little 2003). Although this procedure effectively removes the political power of all those who designate themselves Other, it was hoped that it would encourage political stability by giving Nationalists and Unionists an equal investment in the governing of Northern Ireland (Thompson 2002). Despite setbacks, which shall be discussed in the next section, the Agreement, the first bi-latterly negotiated political settlement in Northern Ireland, did open up the possibility for a successful, peaceful resolution to ‘the Troubles’ (Cox, Guelke and Stephen 2006). 4.5. After the Agreement Although the Agreement precipitated the end of the endemic sectarian violence of ‘the Troubles’, the period since its signing has been fraught with difficulties. From the beginning the process of establishing and bedding in the new political institutions was particularly treacherous (Cox, Guelke and Stephen 2006). In accordance with rules laid down in the Agreement, elections were held on June 25th 1998. These elections saw the two moderate parties, the SDLP and the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP), emerge as the largest forces in the new NIA (Tonge 2006). The Assembly met in ‘shadow’ form on June 1st 1999: full powers were only devolved on December 2nd. Problems quickly arose with the new power-sharing structures. The UUP’s narrow majority within the Unionist 91 bloc threatened to undermine the settlement’s power-sharing basis.36 Disagreements over parliamentary procedures laid down in the Agreement, as well as concerns over IRA decommissioning, effectively stymied political development and led to extended periods of stasis. Over the following three years the Assembly sat only intermittently, and the increasingly strained relations between the UUP and Sinn Fein led to four separate suspensions.37 During these suspensions all devolved powers reverted back to the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, and responsibility for running the devolved administration fell to the NIO. Although Sinn Fein and Ian Paisley’s Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) emerged as the two largest parties in the NIA after the 2003 plebiscite, the two parties refused to negotiate with one another and power-sharing remained in hiatus. Finally, over three years later, the DUP and Sinn Fein began the talks which led to the St. Andrews Agreement and, from that, the holding of fresh elections and the reinstating of power-sharing in May 2007. That the DUP and Sinn Fein, parties whose support is drawn almost exclusively from one ‘community’, have emerged as the dominant players in the NIA has been interpreted as a signal that the Agreement has led to a deepening, rather than a transcending, of sectarian politics (Graham and Nash 2006; Tonge 2006). This entrenchment of sectarian division has been noted in other areas too. Residential segregation intensified dramatically over the course of ‘the Troubles’ and has changed little since the Agreement (Boal 2002; Boal and Douglas 1982; Shirlow and Murtagh 2006). In fact many areas of Belfast have become more segregated over the last ten years (Murtagh and Keaveney 2006). The number of ‘peacewalls’, metal barriers erected at contentious interfaces where Catholic/Nationalist and Protestant/Unionist residential communities meet, has actually increased steadily throughout the lifespan of the peace process (McPeake 2000; Shirlow and Murtagh 2006). This increase in peacewalls, coupled with 36 The results of the 1998 Northern Ireland Assembly elections gave the pro-Agreement Unionists (made up of the UUP and the UVF-aligned Progressive Unionist Party (PUP)), thirty seats and the anti- Agreement Unionists (constituted by the DUP, the United Kingdom Unionist Party (UKUP) and independent Unionists) twenty-eight seats (Tonge 2006: 71). This tight majority was further compromised by the existence of a number of dissidents within the UUP who were opposed to the Agreement, in practice jeopardising the 40% of the Unionist bloc needed to pass legislation. 37 The Assembly was suspended from February 11th to May 30th 2000. It was twice suspended for 24 hours (on August 10th 2001 and September 22nd 2001) before its longest suspension from October 14th 2002 to May 7th 2007 in the wake of accusations that an IRA spy ring was operating in Stormont. 92 the increased visibility of micro-level conflicts across the interface in areas such as North Belfast (Ó Dochartaigh 2007; Shirlow 2003), seems to contradict the assumption that sectarian segregation and the accompanying politics of territory is a thing of the past (Chan 2006; Murtagh 2002). Sectarian cleavages are not only resilient in residential spaces. Although legislation designed to prevent workplace discrimination on the grounds of religion has existed since the 1970s (Osborne 2003), Catholics are still under-represented in the labour force and are much more likely to be unemployed than their Protestant counterparts (Osborne and Shuttleworth 2004). Educational segregation, which has been a feature of Northern Ireland since its foundation, has been particularly intransigent. There are separate Protestant and Catholic run schools, and, at present, only 5% of the school population are enrolled in secondary schools classified as ‘integrated’ (Simpson and Daly 2004: 165).38 Sectarian considerations also continue to structure everyday practices, as Peter Shirlow’s (2003: 84) work on the ‘two Ardoyne’s’ demonstrates. This study of Catholic Ardoyne and Protestant Upper Ardoyne found that only 20% of Protestants interviewed would use the nearby shops in the Catholic Ardoyne and just 18% of Catholics would avail of the leisure centre facilities in the Upper Ardoyne. Rather than the improvement expected with the reduction in violence, in some areas community relations between Protestant/Unionists and Catholic/Nationalists have deteriorated since the Agreement, and there has been a general reduction in willingness to engage in community work with the sectarian ‘Other’ (Hughes and Donnelly 2003: 11). Even the assumption that the conflict has gone away appears to be premature. Sectarian violence remains a societal problem, whether in the form of attacks on symbolic sites (Jarman 2006) or the continuing presence of paramilitaries despite commitments to disband (Monaghan and McLaughlin 2006). Although the dark days of ‘the Troubles’ have been left behind, sectarian division continues to structure social space and everyday life in Northern Ireland (Shirlow and Murtagh 2006). 38 Since the foundation of Northern Ireland in 1920, the education system has been divided between schools dominated by a Catholic ethos (referred to as Maintained) and Protestant (or Controlled) schools. For a history of the education system in Northern Ireland see Simpson and Kirk (2004). 93 Despite the resilience of sectarian division and the absence of a functioning devolved Assembly for much of the period since its ratification, ‘Northern Ireland feels like a very different place in the early part of the twenty-first century than it did before the agreement was signed’ (Cox, Guelke and Stephen 2006: 1). The cessation of the sectarian atrocities which characterised daily life during ‘the Troubles’ has been a remarkable achievement, and one that must be considered all the more significant as it was thought by many to be all but impossible as recently as a decade ago (for example, Douglas 1998). The ending of ‘the Troubles’ has also provided Northern Ireland with an opportunity to re-imagine itself and its place in the world. Since the Agreement there has been a conscious effort to shift the popular image of Northern Ireland away from bombs and bullets and towards stability, prosperity and ‘normality’ (Bairner 2006). These attempts to reinvent Northern Ireland as a unique and vibrant place for living and working began in the early 1990s and have escalated since then (Neill 2003). This process has been facilitated by both the cessation of large-scale armed conflict and the economic upturn experienced by the region. As confidence in the Peace Process has grown, Northern Ireland, for years considered an exceptional case in the UK economy, has been repositioned as part of global economic restructuring and its formerly state dependent economy has been opened up to free-market forces (Jarman 2006). Economic investment has increased and flagship developments like the Laganside regeneration project in Belfast have been undertaken (Shirlow 2006). These economic shifts reflect the emerging construction of Northern Ireland as a society in transition from sectarianism to ‘normality’. Graham and Nash (2006) showed how post-Agreement social policy constructs Northern Ireland as a ‘normal’ society characterised by neo-liberal values and social identities. This notion of ‘normalisation’ proposes the replacement of sectarianism and its markers with ‘normal’ identities expressed in, and defined by, ‘normal’ capitalist space. As the following section demonstrates, these attempts to construct Northern Irish society as ‘normal’ have coincided with unprecedented levels of migration to the region. The multicultural agendas which are explored in my work have emerged in the context of a Northern Ireland that is increasingly conceiving of itself as ‘normal’ and moving beyond 94 sectarianism. Before examining the relationship between emerging multicultural agendas and embedded sectarianism in Chapters Five, Six, and Seven it is important to consider the history and geography of ethnically-identified diversity in Northern Ireland. 4.6. Migration and Diversity in Northern Ireland Although groups not definable in terms of the ‘two traditions’ have always existed in the region, there has, until recently, been a neglect of the histories and geographies of these groups (Hainsworth 1998). This chapter has, thus far, offered little challenge to the popular depiction of Northern Ireland as a land divided between Catholic/Nationalists and Protestant/Unionists. The following section seeks to address this absence by presenting a brief history of ethnically-identified minorities in Northern Ireland. This analysis of the history of migration to the region is developed in terms of two relatively distinct phases: migration prior to the Agreement, and population movement since the peace accord. The emergence of racism as a prominent issue in post-Agreement Northern Ireland (McVeigh and Rolston 2007) is also examined. These discussions are important as the multicultural agendas investigated in the chapters which follow have emerged against a backdrop of increased migration and racism in a Northern Ireland that is, at the same time, trying to move beyond sectarianism. The existence of migration and diversity in Northern Ireland actually predates the founding of the state. Irish Travellers have resided in the territory for centuries, often experiencing discrimination from both Catholics and Protestants (McVeigh 1992; 1998). There also existed a relatively small Jewish community in Belfast from the turn of the nineteenth century (Warm 1998). However, Northern Ireland only really became a site for in-migration in the post-war years, and the vast majority of these new migrants came from Commonwealth countries (Irwin and Dunn 1997; Jarman 2006). Despite images of bombs and riots beamed around the world, these new migrations, mainly from Hong Kong and the Indian sub-continent, which had began in the 1960s, continued throughout ‘the Troubles’ (Ellis 2001a). In terms of spatial distribution, the vast majority of these new migrants settled in the main urban centres of Belfast, Craigavon and Derry rather than in rural areas (Jarman 2006). Irwin and Dunn (1997: 10), in a study of the four main 95 ethnically-identified minorities conducted a decade ago, estimated that between 6,270 and 8,270 people identifying themselves as belonging to an ethnically-identified minority resided in Northern Ireland.39 Some groups, such as the Indian ‘community’, were found to display a ‘relative longevity in the region’ stretching back over sixty years (Irwin 1998: 187). The Chinese, the largest minority at the time of Irwin and Dunn’s study, hailed mainly from the New Territories/Hong Kong, and grew steadily throughout ‘the Troubles’ to number some 4,500 by 1989 (Watson and McKnight 1998: 129). During this first phase of migration, rates were relatively slow and numbers low compared with the rest of the UK. These migrants were typically from Commonwealth areas and arrived in Northern Ireland after having spent time in mainland UK (Donnan and O’Brien 1998). As they existed very much outside the tribal politics engulfing Northern Ireland, during ‘the Troubles’ many migrant communities formed formal representative organisations based on common ethnic or racial identities. Notable examples of such groups include the Belfast Islamic Centre (founded in 1977), the Indian Community Centre (1980) and the Chinese Welfare Association (1986). Existing beyond the sphere of electoral politics, these identity groups served a variety of religious, social, economic and political functions for the first wave of migrants to Northern Ireland. As detailed in Chapter Three, representatives from a number of these organisations were interviewed as part of this research. The significant numbers of new ethnically-identified representative groups which have emerged in the last decade, for example the Latino-American Association founded in 2000, reflect the changing origins of migrants coming to Northern Ireland which will now be discussed. Given its turbulent and conflictual recent history it is not surprising that throughout ‘the Troubles’ Northern Ireland was an area of net out-migration; the numbers leaving each year directly proportional to the level of violence recorded (Rogers 2006). However, since the Peace Process began this situation has been completely reversed. As noted in Chapter Two, not only has out-migration diminished, but Northern Ireland is now a 39 The main groups identified in Irwin and Dunn’s study (1997), in descending order in terms of size, were: Chinese, Indian, Pakistani and Irish Traveller. 96 migrant destination. Over the last five years it has recorded its highest levels of in- migration since records began (Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency 2006; Rogers 2006). According to the 2001 census, the first to include a question on ethnicity, 26,659 people living in Northern Ireland were born outside the United Kingdom or the Republic of Ireland: of this number, 14,276 described themselves as belonging to an ‘ethnic minority’ (approximately 0.9% of total population). In the years since this census was taken, the volume and patterns of migration have changed as migrants from countries without a strong history of immigration to either the UK or Ireland have begun to arrive in Northern Ireland (Jarman 2006: 46). All citizens of new member states joining the EU in the May 2004 expansion are entitled to freedom of employment in the UK. As a consequence there has been a significant movement of people from the A8 countries to Northern Ireland (Jarman 2006).40 These new migratory flows have changed the visible composition of Northern Irish society. New migrant communities have been created in areas which had witnessed only out-migration for most of the 20th Century (Shuttleworth 2007). While previous migratory cohorts from former Commonwealth countries tended to settle in Belfast and the large towns around it, many new migrants live close to employment opportunities in relatively under-populated rural areas. Alongside migrants from the former Eastern Bloc, substantial numbers of Portuguese nationals have also migrated, primarily living and working near the food processing industries of mid-Ulster (Shuttleworth 2007; Soares 2002). Similarly, healthcare workers from South Asia and the Philippines have begun working in a number of hospital trusts (Bell, Jarman and Lefebvre 2004). The changing demographics and geographies of migrants to Northern Ireland was neatly summarised by one interviewee. You will see and hear people of all cultures much more readily and it is not just in the more heavily populated areas. It really is much more spread out among mid-Ulster, obviously, where you have the factories that have been recruiting heavily from EU countries for a while and goes out to the West. We have got a growing Polish community in Derry and the borders, places like Omagh and Enniskillen, as well, where we would 40 The A8 countries are the Czech Republic; Estonia; Hungary; Latvia; Lithuania; Poland; Slovenia; and Slovakia. 97 have growing amounts of Eastern Europeans and things like that. It really is a Northern Ireland-wide change or development, which I think is a good thing because up until this new wave of migration it has tended to be quite Belfast-centric, this whole minority ethnic issue. ‘Oh, yes, we have got the Chinese community in Belfast.’ That was the only sort of obviously visible community, whereas now people are so much more aware of a whole range of nationalities that are here (Good Relations Officer, Northern Ireland Council for Integrated Education, 13/02/06). As a Good Relations Officer working in schools across Northern Ireland, this man of Chinese descent who grew up in Northern Ireland during ‘the Troubles’ is well placed to note both the changing origin and distribution of new migrants. This increased in-migration is very much a product of the improved social and economic situation created by the Agreement. As well as making Northern Ireland a more attractive place to live and work, the economic upturn since the Agreement has precipitated the need for overseas recruitment to supplement the local labour market. These two factors, allied with increased ease of movement, can account for the bulk of new migrations (Devine 2006; Rogers 2006). Until the next census (in 2011) it is impossible to ascertain the exact size of Northern Ireland’s ethnically-identified minority population (Rogers 2006) but some estimates have been made. As compliance with the Workers Registration Scheme appears to be low, Jarman (2006) used applications for National Insurance Numbers to estimate that the largest new migrant group in Northern Ireland is from Poland, followed by Lithuania, Portugal, Slovakia, India and the Philippines. These migrant workers are mainly employed in administration/management, manufacturing, construction and hospitality sectors (Jarman 2006).41 The Accession Monitoring Report suggests that Northern Ireland, at 0.72% of total population, has a higher proportion of A8 migrants than England (0.57%), Scotland (0.47%) or Wales (0.21%) (Home Office 2006: 9). Almost two-thirds of these A8 migrants are male and the bulk of these are under thirty-five with no dependents and work full-time in lower end occupations (Rogers 2006). Although these new migrants are spread across 41 From 2003 to January 2006 there were 12020 applications for National Insurance numbers from Polish nationals, 4987 from Lithuanians, 3605 from Portuguese, 3469 from Slovakians, 2486 from Indians, 1524 from Filipinos, 1358 from Latvians, 1338 from Czechs, 1317 from Chinese and 867 from Ukrainians. The A8 migrants are employed in the following industries, arranged in order of greatest number: Admin/Management, Manufacturing, Construction, Hospitality, Food Processing, Agriculture, Health, Retail, Transport and Entertainment (from Jarman (2006): 48). 98 Northern Ireland, between 25% and 33% live in Belfast. This suggests that Belfast has remained the main site for new migrants and has absorbed an in-flow of approximately 7,000 new migrants in the last three years (NISRA 2006: 13). As detailed in Chapter Two, there has been a significant increase in research on racism in Northern Ireland since the beginning of the 21st century (Connolly 2002; Gilligan and Lloyd 2006; Hayes and Dowds 2006; Jarman and Monaghan 2003). Over the last ten years racism in Northern Ireland has escalated and increasingly is being recognised as a major societal issue (Lentin and McVeigh 2006b; McVeigh and Rolston 2007). As reports of racism in the city increased Belfast, in 2004, was dubbed ‘the Race Hate Capital of Europe’ by the BBC (BBC Online 2004). More recently, Sir Hugh Orde, Chief Constable of the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI), opined that racist violence is the biggest threat to social stability in Northern Ireland (Kampfner 2006). During the period in which this research was conducted, racism in Northern Ireland often featured prominently in both national (see Figure 4.1) and international media (see Figure 4.2). Although these media discourses are often overly simplistic and sensationalist (Lentin and McVeigh 2006b), the argument that racism in Northern Ireland has rapidly increased is supported by PSNI statistics. In 1999/00 the total number of ‘racial incidents’ reported to the police stood at 93; in 2003/04 the figure was 453; and by 2006/07 the total number had jumped to 1,047 (PSNI 2007).42 These statistics suggest a doubling of racist incidents in the past three years alone. As well as having the largest concentration of ethnically-identified minorities, Belfast has been the site for the most number of racial incidents. In 2003/04, 217 of the 403 incidents reported occurred there; and in 2006/07 305 racial incidents were reported in the city (PSNI 2007). These incidents have not been spread evenly across the city. The largest numbers in 2006/07 were recorded in South Belfast (126), followed by North Belfast (82) and East Belfast (79), with only 18 recorded in West Belfast (PSNI 2007). 42 A ‘racial incident’, as defined by the Police Service of Ireland (PSNI), describes any incident with a ‘race’ dimension – it includes verbal abuse/threat, written material, graffiti, physical assault, attack on home and attack on property. From 2003/04 to 2006/07 the most significant increase was recorded in verbal abuse/threat, physical assault and attack on home (PSNI 2007). 99 Figure 4.1: Ulster’s minorities not getting justice, Belfast Telegraph 23.2.06, p. 9 The uneven distribution of racial incidents in Belfast is partly a product of the impact of sectarianism on racism which was discussed in Chapter Two (Chan 2006; Ellis 2001a; Lentin and McVeigh 2006b). The bulk of racial incidents have occurred in run-down Loyalist areas of inner city Belfast where there is a disproportionate amount of cheap and available housing stock (McVeigh and Rolston 2007). In one instance, in February 2004, the UVF stood down its local commander in the Village area of South Belfast following allegations of orchestrated paramilitary involvement in a series of attacks on the homes of people of Chinese descent in the area (Rolston 2004). The sense of alienation and disenfranchisement felt among Loyalist communities in the aftermath of the Agreement and fear of losing the area’s sectarian identity have been identified as potential contributing factors in the rise of racism in Loyalist areas (Lentin and McVeigh 2006b). That the majority of reported racist incidents have occurred in Loyalist areas is significant for understanding the background of some of the empirical material presented 100 in Chapters Six and Seven. It is against this backdrop of increased migration and racism that some of the multicultural agendas examined in this dissertation have emerged. Figure 4.2: Loyalists blamed for migrant attacks, The Guardian 30.5.06, p 8 4.7. Conclusion In conclusion, the brief historical overview presented in this chapter has shown that up to, and including, the present day sectarianism has been deeply embedded in Northern Irish politics and society. Stratification along religious lines has had a serious impact on society here since the Ulster Plantations of the seventeenth century. This chapter argued that Northern Ireland itself is a product of sectarian division, and that, after its foundation in 1920, discrimination against Catholics became a salient feature of governing processes and procedures. Catholic disaffection at this state of affairs led, indirectly, to the start of ‘the Troubles’ and the widespread sectarian violence for which Northern Ireland was to become infamous. 101 This chapter argued that attempts to manage sectarian relations and broker peace in Northern Ireland have tended to prioritise the recognition and accommodation of competing sectarian identities. In an effort to better manage Catholic/Protestant relations, community relations institutions and apparatuses were introduced in 1969. After falling out of favour for over fifteen years, community relations re-emerged at the end of the 1980s and remains the dominant policy position with regard to sectarianism in Northern Ireland. The Agreement, which established the framework for a negotiated settlement to the conflict, explicitly recognises and privileges sectarian identities in its institutional workings. This chapter argued that, in some contexts, the Agreement has contributed to a deepening of sectarian politics, and sectarianism remains a structuring feature of everyday life for many in Northern Irish society. Despite the new peaceful climate, sectarian division is still resilient in residential, labour and educational sectors. Although sectarianism remains a feature of Northern Irish society, this chapter showed that significant changes have taken place since the Agreement. The cessation of armed conflict has been accompanied by an economic upturn and a desire to move beyond sectarianism that is revealed in attempts to construct Northern Ireland as a ‘normal’ society. At the same time as efforts are being made to re-imagine Northern Ireland beyond the sectarian binary, the region has recorded levels of net in-migration for the first time. The history and geography of ethnically-identified minorities presented in this chapter showed that both the origin and number of new migrants coming to Northern Ireland has changed significantly since the Agreement. At the same time as migration has increased a ‘crisis’ in racist violence has emerged in Northern Ireland. Academic, media and political attention have all focused on the rising numbers of racist incidents, particularly in Loyalist areas of Belfast. Multicultural agendas that have emerged in Northern Ireland have done so against this backdrop of increased migration and racism, and in the context of a desire to present Northern Ireland as a ‘normal’ society that is moving beyond sectarianism. It is the interaction between these emerging multicultural agendas and embedded sectarianism that is explored in detail in subsequent chapters. As this chapter has shown, the highest 102 proportion of both migrants and racist incidents are in Belfast, and this point supports Chapter Six and Seven’s focus on emerging multicultural agendas in this context. Before this, however, the next chapter examines the emergence of multicultural agendas in the public policy and governing structures for the whole of Northern Ireland. 103 Chapter Five Managing Multiculturalism in a Divided Society: Public Policy in Northern Ireland 104 5.1. Introduction Having outlined the necessary background in the previous chapter, this dissertation now turns to an investigation of the emergence of multicultural agendas in the public policy and governing structures of post-Agreement Northern Ireland. This chapter draws on an analysis of institutional structures and policy texts, as well as interviews with key civil servants and policy makers. It argues that contemporary social policy seeks to move Northern Ireland beyond sectarian division by constructing it as a diverse, multicultural society within which relations across various axes of difference co-exist. However, as this chapter argues, these policies are enacted within an institutional landscape structured by the central focus that is still afforded to sectarian (community) relations. It is shown that sectarianism and multiculturalism are mutually constituted in complex ways in Northern Ireland. This means that multicultural agendas are changing how sectarianism is conceptualised, but that these agendas are also frustrated by the extent to which sectarian cleavages continue to structure the institutions and practices of post- Agreement governing. The chapter begins by presenting a brief historical examination of ‘race’ relations legislation in Northern Ireland. I argue that throughout ‘the Troubles’ anti-discrimination legislation was focused solely on issues of religion and sectarianism rather than ‘race’ and racism. The lack of any ‘race’ relations legislation until the last decade is presented as indicative of a general tendency not simply to ignore all those beyond the ‘two traditions’ binary, but also to incorporate them into Northern Ireland’s sectarian imaginary. Since the Agreement this situation has changed, with the emergence of ‘good relations’ as a central concept in policy development. Good relations is a concept developed which incorporates not only the matter of ‘community’ (Catholic/Nationalist and Protestant/Unionist) relations but also ‘race’ (multicultural) relations, and, in the process, repositions community relations as just one of many relations across difference that the Northern Ireland government has to manage. The formation of policy and political institutions aimed at promoting good relations is part of an attempt to re-imagine Northern Ireland as a ‘normal’ society after the conflict. 105 Acknowledging racialised minorities and ‘race’ relations (in short, developing a multicultural policy agenda) is part of this process of ‘normalisation’. However, as this chapter shows, these multicultural policy agendas are enacted within a complex, fragmented institutional structure divided between a number of different agencies and administrations. Furthermore, the political institutions laid down by the Agreement reproduce sectarian divisions and privilege the problem of Catholic/Nationalist and Protestant/Unionist relations. This argument is supported by a detailed account of how those respondents who selected ‘no religion’ or chose not to answer the religious question in the 2001 Northern Ireland census were reallocated into sectarian communal groups based on their perceived ‘community background’. Thus, despite commitments to the building of a ‘normal’, socially cohesive Northern Ireland based on pluralism and multiculturalism, the sectarian imagination remains within the structures and practices of post-Agreement governing. 5.2. ‘Race’ Relations Policy during ‘the Troubles’ While ‘race’ relations has remained a key legislative and policy term in Britain for over forty years (see Chapter Two), the history of ‘race’ relations legislation in Northern Ireland is much briefer. Northern Ireland was explicitly removed from the key Race Relations Act (RRA) (1965) for a number of reasons. When the Act was being drafted the Protestant dominated Stormont Government requested that Northern Ireland be excluded on the grounds that religion, rather than ‘race’, represented the most serious locus of discrimination (Dickey 1972). The public stance of the Stormont Government was that ‘race’ was not an issue worthy of legislative attention owing to the very low level of immigration and the absence of racialised violence on anything like the scale witnessed in other parts of the UK. This was the dominant position for the next twenty years, and is echoed in a 1992 Consultative Document entitled Race Relations in Northern Ireland which explored the possibility of bringing Northern Irish legislation in line with the rest of the UK. In the foreword of this document the then Secretary of State Sir Patrick Mayhew makes the following comments on ‘race’ relations legislation in Northern Ireland. 106 Although there has been legislation on race in Great Britain since 1965, a similar body of law has not been introduced in Northern Ireland. The main reason for this was that successive Governments believed that there was insufficient evidence of problems arising to warrant legislation equivalent to that in Great Britain (CCRU 1992: up). Despite the claim that ‘there was insufficient evidence of problems’, the exemption of Northern Ireland from ‘race’ relations legislation was not simply a reflection of a perceived absence of racialised minorities and racial hatred in the region. Instead, at the time of the drafting of the Race Relations Act (1965), there seems to have been a concern among many Unionist politicians that Catholics might claim the status of an ethnic group to use the legislation to seek redress against the government (Dickey 1972). As ‘the Troubles’ intensified, Catholic/Nationalist and Protestant/Unionist relations became the main focus of legislative interventions, and the issue of extending ‘race’- based legislation to cover Northern Ireland was marginalised still further (Hainsworth 1998). From the late 1960s onwards, any anti-discrimination legislation advanced in Northern Ireland was concerned with sectarian-based discrimination on the grounds of religion. For example, by the late 1960s both Northern Ireland and Britain had established what were dubbed ‘Community Relations Commissions’. However, while the British Commission was established under the Race Relations Act (1968) and had as its primary remit ‘race’ relations, the Northern Ireland Commission (established in 1969) was established by the Community Relations Act (Northern Ireland) and was charged with improving relations between Catholic/Nationalists and Protestant/Unionists (Griffiths 1972). Similarly, the Fair Employment Act (1976) in Northern Ireland outlawed workplace discrimination only on the grounds of religion and established the Fair Employment Agency to monitor this aspect of discrimination in Northern Ireland (Osbourne 2003).43 43 Revisions to the British RRA in 1976 saw an increasing precision in terminology with the more generally described Community Relations Council being subsumed into the Commission for Racial Equality (CRE). The Fair Employment Agency, set up along similar lines to the British CRE, took on many of the functions of the ill-fated Northern Ireland Community Relations Commission described in Chapter Four (Osborne 2003). 107 The early 1990s saw an emerging consensus on the need to implement some form of stand-alone ‘race’ relations legislation in Northern Ireland (Hainsworth 1998). The Standing Advisory Commission on Human Rights (SACHR) recommended, in its Second Report on Religious and Political Discrimination and Equality of Opportunity in Northern Ireland, that ‘race’ relations legislation parallel to that in Britain be introduced in Northern Ireland (SACHR 1990). A Consultative Document on the possibility of extending the legislation to cover Northern Ireland was produced by the Central Community Relations Unit (CCRU) in the Northern Ireland Office (NIO) (CCRU 1992). Eventually, in 1997, the Race Relations (NI) Order (RRO) was passed into law. The RRO mirrors the provisions of the Race Relations Act (1976), outlawing discrimination on the grounds of colour, race, nationality or ethnic or national origin. Under the RRO a Commission for Racial Equality (Northern Ireland) was also established. It is somewhat uncertain why it was 1997 that marked the moment when ‘race’ relations legislation was extended to Northern Ireland. Robbie McVeigh (2002b) argues that the mobilisation of civil society around the issue, in particular the Belfast-based Commission on the Administration of Justice and the influential Northern Ireland Council for Ethnic Minorities (NICEM), played a defining role. Certainly these groups began to petition government and supranational bodies, like the EU and the UN Committee on the Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), to have racial discrimination outlawed in Northern Ireland. With this international pressure the introduction of the Race Relations (NI) Order, according to McVeigh (2002b), followed. Another important factor in creating ‘race’ relations legislation was the 1997 election of a new Labour government in Britain. Unlike its Conservative predecessor, Labour was committed to supporting ‘race’ relations policy and legislation (Solomos 2003). Once in power it quickly moved to have the legislation, which had not progressed beyond the 1992 Consultative Document, written into Northern Irish law. Indeed, the fact that the RRO predates the EU Race Directive by some three years suggests that the extension of the British legislation to Northern Ireland was much more a product of Labour policy, as well as progress in the peace process, than pressure from the EU and the UN as 108 McVeigh (2002b) claims.44 The RRO is an important piece of legislation which provided protection against racial discrimination in Northern Ireland for the first time. As such, it signalled a move away from exclusively dualist imaginings of Northern Irish society and towards some nascent awareness of diversity beyond the ‘two traditions’, a movement that gathered speed with the signing of the Agreement in 1998. 5.3. From ‘Community Relations’ to ‘Good Relations’: Multicultural Policy since the Agreement The Agreement introduced a new, robust equality agenda into Northern Ireland policy based on a commitment to individual equality in all spheres of public life (Ellis 2001b; McCrudden 1999). The text of the Agreement itself is explicitly committed to ‘the right to equal opportunity in all social and economic activity, regardless of class, creed, disability, gender or ethnicity’ (Good Friday Agreement 1998: 17). At the same time as seeking to provide a negotiated political settlement to the conflict, the Agreement recognised wider axes of difference than just Catholic/Nationalist and Protestant/Unionist. In the wake of this equality agenda public policy has increasingly espoused pluralist ideals and visions of Northern Irish society (Graham and Nash 2006). This section argues that an integral element of these efforts to construct Northern Ireland as a plural society has been the emergence of self-consciously multicultural public policy. As discussed in Chapter Four, community relations was the main policy approach to managing sectarian difference during ‘the Troubles’. It is somewhat surprising, then, that the Agreement appears oddly ambivalent about the term. In fact, the phrase ‘community relations’ only appears once in the text of the Agreement (McVeigh 2002b). With Section 75(2) of the Northern Ireland Act (1998), which was passed to bring the political settlement into reality, a new term, that of ‘good relations’, was adopted into the political lexicon. Specifically, the Act obliges all public bodies to ensure equality of 44 The EU Race Directive arose from article 13 of the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997). The aim of the Directive was to provide a common basis on which to address issues of discrimination on the grounds of racial or ethnic origin across all EU member states. The Race Relations Order (Amendment) Regulations (Northern Ireland) (2003) was passed to implement the Directive. This legislation gave greater protection from unlawful discrimination and harassment on the grounds of ‘race’, ethnic or national origins. 109 opportunity ‘between persons of different religious belief, political opinion, racial group, age, marital status or sexual orientation’ (Section 75(1)). The Act then specifics that ‘a public authority shall in carrying out its functions relating to Northern Ireland have regard to the desirability of promoting good relations between persons of different religious belief, political opinion or racial group’ (Section 75(2); emphasis added). This, as far as my review of policy has found, is the first reference to good relations in legislation. Just one year after legislation preventing racial discrimination had been passed in Northern Ireland, the Act heralding the long-awaited Agreement between rival sectarian interests addresses itself in addition to widely defined differences. As one policy officer put it to me in interview, the notion of good relations enshrined in the Northern Ireland Act (1998) was ‘community relations plus race relations’ (Interview with Head of Policy, Equality Commission, 01/11/05). The commitment to good relations made in Section 75 represents an attempt to move beyond a singular focus on sectarianism as the locus of discriminatory practices in Northern Ireland. As another senior policy maker commented: the legislation, the Good Friday Agreement wrote into it Section 75, which moved us forward in the sense that it recognised that there isn’t just two main communities, and it actually isn’t just Catholic/Protestant, Loyalist/Nationalist … It [community relations] wasn’t even reflective in itself but not only that, we are now getting a growing minority ethnic sector. We are getting a growing minority faith sector as well, so therefore it moved from community relations specifically to good relations (Interview with Head of Policy, Community Relations Council, 14/10/05). In this quote good relations is constructed as a vehicle for ‘moving us forward’; a vision which looks towards a fundamental shift in the conceptualisation of Northern Ireland. While increased cultural diversity is facilitating this shift, these changes are also having a significant effect on how sectarianism is being conceived of and approached. As the quotation presented above illustrates, the idea that Northern Irish society can be easily divided into two rival sectarian blocs is seen as unhelpfully reductive and is increasingly being rejected. We can see in this quote how the emergence of a concern for cultural diversity in public policy is providing a basis from which traditional, sectarian constructions of Northern Ireland can potentially be decentred. 110 The shift to good relations has not seen the complete demise of the term community relations; there remains a Community Relations Unit (CRU) within the Office of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister (OFMDFM). Nonetheless the matter of ‘community relations’ vis a vis other relations is very precisely circumscribed. Here is how the Head of the CRU explained the new structure: we have moved away from the old community relations idea which tended to be based very much in the two communities towards a broader vision of Northern Ireland where good relations encompasses more than that. I would see that program [good relations] as being extremely embracive in terms of all relationships; so the race, the marginalisation, the issues around community would all be part and parcel of that (Interview with Head of CRU, OFMDFM, 09/01/06). For this senior policy maker, community relations is an out-dated idea in which the word ‘community’ operates as a euphemism for Catholic/Nationalist and Protestant/Unionist constituencies, and which has been replaced by the wider term good relations. Within the more inclusive concept of good relations, sectarian (community) relations cease to be the sole issue of concern for policy makers. Instead, these become just one of many relations across vectors of difference that the institutions of governance in Northern Ireland must manage. The discursive move from community relations to good relations, as well as a burgeoning awareness of ‘race’ relations, is evident in various policy texts published since the Agreement. In A Shared Future, which Graham and Nash (2006: 274) refer to as the key piece of post-conflict social policy in Northern Ireland, an explicit distinction is drawn between community relations and good relations. ‘Community Relations’ refers specifically to division between Protestant and Catholic communities in Northern Ireland. ‘Good Relations’ refers to Section 75(2) of the Northern Ireland Act which includes persons of different religious belief, political opinion or racial group (OFMDFM 2005a: 63). 111 In defining good relations in terms of religion, politics and ‘race’, A Shared Future commits to the management not just of sectarian (community) relations but also other axes of difference in Northern Ireland. On closer examination of the discursive terrain of A Shared Future it becomes apparent that good relations has almost completely replaced community relations as the all- embracing policy term. The policy’s full title A Shared Future: Policy and Strategic Framework for Good Relations in Northern Ireland is illustrative of this shift. Although both community relations and good relations appear throughout the text, the latter term appears much more frequently.45 This shows clearly the desire to position sectarian (‘community’) relations as one of the many relations across difference that the Northern Ireland government has to govern, as opposed to the sole and central relationship of difference. A significant feature of this is the positioning of sectarian relations as the same as or equivalent to ‘race’ relations, as in the following statement drawn from A Shared Future. This document outlines how the illustrative practical steps and actions, based on common fundamental principles, can be co-ordinated across government and throughout civic society to ensure an effective and coherent response to sectarian and racial intimidation with the aim of building relationships rooted in mutual recognition and trust (OFMDFM 2005a: 5; emphasis added). As I argued in Chapter Two, sectarianism and racism are distinct social processes. However, in the above quote, the two terms are collapsed into one another as sectarian and ‘race’-based ‘intimidation’ are constructed as equivalent. As such, A Shared Future is a document dedicated to envisaging what to do with, as it calls it, ‘a divided society that is becoming more multi-cultural’ (OFMDFM 2005a: 36). In explicitly figuring Northern Ireland as multicultural, the policy seeks to emphasise diversity rather than division, and to construct a vision of a society moving beyond sectarianism. 45 In A Shared Future the term Good Relations appears 155 times in comparison with 57 references to Community Relations. 112 While A Shared Future includes proposals for cultivating multiculturalism in Northern Ireland, ‘race’ relations policy is most clearly outlined in A Racial Equality Strategy for Northern Ireland, which, after a number of delays, was officially launched in the winter of 2005 (see Figure 5.1). Figure 5.1: Front cover of A Racial Equality Strategy This strategy was designed to set out aims and goals for racial equality in government, and work alongside A Shared Future ‘to initiate actions to promote good race relations’ (OFMDFM 2005b: 3). In this policy statement Northern Ireland is described as ‘becoming an increasingly multicultural society’ (OFMDFM 2005b: 27), and specific plans and policies are laid out for developing racial equality in a context in which discrimination on the grounds of ‘race’ was only made illegal less than ten years previously. The document explicitly sets out frameworks for funding ethnically- identified minorities and implementing racial equality across government institutions. In seeking ‘to develop good relations between majority community/ies and minority ethnic communities’ the policy explicitly aims to promote cultural diversity beyond the ‘two traditions’ (OFMDFM 2005b: 47). This reference to ‘majority community/ies’ is testament to the continued sectarian division of society, and the difficulty of promoting 113 ‘race’ relations policy within this context. However, the text reiterates key points made about the construction of Northern Ireland as diverse, and the emergence of a concern for managing many relations along axes of difference in the post-Agreement context. 5.3.1. Managing diversity as ‘normalisation’ The tendency to view Northern Ireland as ‘a place apart’, literally unrecognisable in comparison with other ‘Western’ contexts, has been common among many commentators (Little 2003). Certainly during ‘the Troubles’ many features of government and society were exceptional. Diplock courts, the presence of the army on the streets and metal detectors at entrances to shops marked Northern Ireland as a ‘state of exception’ removed from the ‘normal’ social space(s) of Britain and Ireland (Agamben 1998; Kearns 2006).46 Throughout the period from the 1960s to the end of ‘the Troubles’, British government policy towards Northern Ireland was often based on the notion of ‘containment’ – keep the conflict at a ‘manageable’ level and prevent further escalation (Gilligan 2007). As outlined in Chapter Four, following the cessation of large scale armed conflict and the political progress since there have been attempts to reconstruct Northern Ireland as a ‘normal’ capitalist space (Graham and Nash 2006; Shirlow 2006; Shirlow and Murtagh 2006). This discourse of ‘normalisation’ has replaced militarization and containment, and runs through much post-Agreement public policy and ministerial statements. The notion that Northern Ireland is in the process of becoming a ‘normal’ society characterised by tolerance and in which identity markers are no longer important is manifested on the first page proper of A Shared Future. On this page the aims of the policy are set out as follows: [t]he establishment over time of a normal, civic society, in which all individuals are considered as equals, where differences are resolved through dialogue in the public sphere and where all people are treated impartially (OFMDFM 2005a: 7; emphasis added) 46 The Diplock courts were established by the British government in Northern Ireland in 1972 following recommendations in a report by Lord Diplock. In these controversial courts trial by jury was suspended, and a single judge adjudicated and passed sentence. 114 Good relations in this quote is constructed as a vehicle which facilitates the progress of Northern Ireland towards ‘normality’. Furthermore, it is only by both possessing cultural difference and recognising this difference in the public sphere that Northern Ireland can move beyond the abnormality of ‘the Troubles’. This discourse of ‘normalisation’ is also evident in a speech delivered by the then Secretary of State Peter Hain on 21st September 2005. The vision we all share for Northern Ireland is of a normal civic society in which all individuals are treated as equals. Problems are resolved through dialogue and the state is impartial between contending claims. A Northern Ireland where the community or church you come from, your political opinion, race, gender, sexuality, age or disability makes no difference to where you are wanting to go (Speech delivered at Stormont Castle to senior representatives of Northern Ireland Civil Service, Source: CRU, OFMDFM). Again, Mr. Hain’s speech constructs an image of a future, Northern Ireland based on equality and respect for difference. A prominent feature of this putatively normal space is good relations, or the acceptance of a diversity of ‘political opinion, race, gender, sexuality, age or disability’. For Mr. Hain, the presence of cultural diversity and the building of a multicultural society is evidence that Northern Ireland is moving beyond the dark days of sectarian division. Clearly the shift from a past of violence and intolerance to a potential future of normality is linked in the Northern Ireland imaginary to the presence of other vectors of diversity. Indeed, in the course of an interview one (community relations) policy maker made clear the link between a multicultural Northern Ireland and a normalised (post-Troubles) Northern Ireland. She did so by recalling an incident at the height of ‘the Troubles’ when a group of Vietnamese refuges arrived to be settled in the region. When the first boat load was sent here, they wouldn’t get off the boat, they said ‘you must be joking, we are coming from war-torn Vietnam.’ The first boat load went back to Liverpool, which I found hilariously funny. That’s how bad it was … We are now, thankfully, I think, a growing society, becoming more normal, more multicultural. My view is 115 that that is a sign of progress and peace (Interview with Head of Policy, Community Relations Council, 14/10/05). Here multiculturalism is constructed as something that takes place within the bounds of – and is defining of – a ‘normal’ society, and is an integral part of the process of ‘normalising’ Northern Ireland after the conflict. 5.4. Sketching the Institutions of Good Relations The chapter thus far has indicated something of the complex interdependency between a post-sectarian imaginary and multiculturalist ambitions in Northern Ireland. This complexity is charted into specific policy statements, as I have shown, but is also present in the institutional framework in which these policies are produced and enacted. It is to this framework the chapter now turns. Of specific interest are the dispersed institutional responsibilities for multicultural policies, and how these relate to residual and emergent structures associated with managing sectarian relations. Since the beginning of ‘the Troubles’ ‘[a]n institutional approach has dominated attempts to build peace and political accountability in Northern Ireland’ (Shirlow and Murtagh 2006: 32). For example, power-sharing and institutional reform was a central plank of both the Sunningdale (1973) and Anglo-Irish Agreements (1985). As outlined in Chapter Four, the current institutional structure arises directly from the Agreement, to date the only successful attempt to instantiate power-sharing between Catholic/Nationalists and Protestant/Unionists. The Agreement produced radical institutional change (Todd 2007), and introduced a new and particularly complex state structure (Lentin and McVeigh 2006b). As highlighted previously, the key division in this new institutional structure is between the devolved and non-devolved administrations (see Figure 5.2). The following sections investigate the location of good relations policy in this partitioned governing structure. 116 Figure 5.2: Chart of institutional structures of devolved and non-devolved administrations 5.4.1. Good relations in the devolved administration As noted previously, responsibility for economic and social matters, including social policy, rests with the devolved administration. All devolved departments are subject to the equality and good relations duties contained in Section 75 and the Race Relations (NI) Order outlawing discrimination on grounds of ‘race’ (OFMDFM 2005b: 42). Explicit responsibility for good relations policy rests with the key ministry of the Office of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister (OFMDFM).47 The department is separated into a series of services and directorates, one of which is the Equality 47 As the policy driver of the devolved administration, OFMDFM is the lead department for much post- Agreement public policy. OFMDFM is here described as a ‘key ministry’ as it has a very wide range of responsibilities, including designing a Programme for Government which sets budgets and priorities for all departments. It is also unique in that it is not run by a single Nationalist or Unionist minister, but rather jointly run by two junior ministers; one from each bloc. Although this joint working may help promote cross-community partnership in government, this situation also demonstrates how those groups and individuals not accommodated within the Nationalist and Unionist blocs are marginalised in post- Agreement governing apparatus’. Northern Ireland Office (N.I.O.) Secretary of State Home Office Non- Devolved Devolved Northern Ireland Assembly (N.I.A.) Northern Ireland Executive (NIE) Devolved Departments Social Development Health Regional Development Finance Environment Enterprise, Trade and Investment Employment and Learning Education Culture, Arts and Leisure Agriculture and Rural Development OF MD FM Political Directorate Policing and Security Directorate Criminal Justice Directorate Central Services Directorate Information Service Directorate 117 Directorate (see Figure 5.3). Setting policy for the social relations that are subsumed by the term good relations is confined specifically to two of the units operating within the Good Relations and Reconciliation Division of this directorate: the Racial Equality Unit (REU) and the Community Relations Unit (CRU) (see Figure 5.3). Off ice of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister (OFMDFM) Equa lity Directorate Equality and Rights Division Equality and Social Need Division Good Relations and Reconciliation Division Communit y Relations Unit Race Equality Unit Victims UnitChildren and You ng People’s Unit . Figure 5.3: The Equality Directorate in OFMDFM with sub-divisions of Good Relations and Reconciliation Division shown (CRU and REU outlined in red) As well as authoring the policy text A Racial Equality Strategy for Northern Ireland (Figure 5.1), the REU is the main political institution concerned with ‘race’ relations policy in the devolved administration.48 The unit was founded ‘to reduce social exclusion among minority ethnic people’, and the story of its emergence illustrates well the ways in which a post-sectarian imaginary of Northern Ireland is linked to an emergent multiculturalism (OFMDFM internal memo 2000). The REU developed out of a working group established just prior to the Agreement, in March 1998, by the incoming Labour government. As part of the re-launch of the Targeting Social Need (TSN) Policy, which aimed to reduce socio-economic gaps between Catholics and 48 The Racial Equality Unit (REU) was formerly titled the Race Unit, this name was changed in 2005 following suggestions from representatives of ethnically-identified minorities that the use of the word ‘race’ in the title was unhelpful. 118 Protestants, an Ethnic Minorities Working group was established (OFMDFM internal memo 2000). This working group noted that at that time no department had lead responsibility in the area of ‘minority ethnic issues’ (OFMDFM internal memo 2000). Rather than assign this responsibility to an existing branch of government it was decided to set up a separate unit within OFMDFM. An internal memo relating to this process makes clear the reasons for this decision. A separate unit was considered necessary in order to avoid giving the ‘signal that government was less committed to tackling inequalities experienced by minority ethnic people than dealing with gender inequality or relationships between Catholics and Protestants’ (OFMDFM internal memo 2000: 2). This led to the creation of the Racial Equality Unit; a small unit comprising only five or six people located within the Equality Directorate of OFMDFM. The formation of the REU in 2002 supports the contention made earlier in this chapter that ‘race’ relations policy only really emerged in the wake of the Agreement and from policies put forward by the incoming Labour government. It also confirms the way in which, in post- Agreement Northern Ireland, sectarian differences were self-consciously being repositioned in relation to other vectors of social difference. The Racial Equality Unit has a number of functions. One of its key early roles was in producing the original draft of A Racial Equality Strategy and circulating this draft for consultation. The policy which was produced following this consultation aims to provide ‘a framework that will allow us to tackle racial inequalities in Northern Ireland and to open up opportunities for all; to eradicate racism and hate crime and … initiate actions to promote good race relations’ (OFMDFM 2005b: 3). The REU fulfils a range of functions, as a civil servant working in the Unit explained. A central part of my job is to promote the Racial Equality Strategy across the departments within the NI administration. This involves engaging with designated people in each department who are that department’s representative on the NI Racial Equality Forum and who are charged with promoting the Racial Equality Strategy in each of their respective departments. I am currently meeting with each to discuss ways in which the recently published Racial Equality Strategy will be implemented through actions within each department (Interview with Deputy Head of Racial Equality Unit, 12/09/05). 119 Another role assumed by the REU is to provide the chair for the Racial Equality Forum, a roundtable discussion which meets three or four times a year to address ‘minority ethnic’ issues. These meetings provide an important interface between relevant representative groups and political institutions such as statutory bodies and government departments. The Forum’s input was influential in wholesale changes made to the earlier draft Race Equality Strategy. Finally, the REU is also involved in the provision of funding to ethnically-identified minorities: for the period 2005-08, £1.7 million worth of funding has been made available to this sector in Northern Ireland (OFMDFM 2005b: 47). Some of this money has been used to fund specifically designated Good Relations Officers (GRO) within many of the larger ethnically-identified representative groups (for example, the Indian Community Centre and the Chinese Welfare Association). The aim of these GROs is to promote and build relationships between ethnically-identified minorities and ‘local’ (i.e. Catholic/Nationalist and Protestant/Unionist) communities. As Figure 5.3 shows, the other institutional arm of good relations policy in the devolved administration is the Community Relations Unit (CRU). As noted in the previous chapter, the CRU was formerly the Central Community Relations Unit (CCRU) established in the Northern Ireland Office in 1987. Following the commitments made in the Agreement and the Northern Ireland Act (1998), in 1999 the unit joined OFMDFM, and its name was changed to the CRU. Comprising seven staff, six of whom are full- time, the CRU has responsibility for an annual budget of over £5 million. Although nominally concerned with the management of relations between Catholic and Protestant communities, A Shared Future also commits the CRU to promoting a wider notion of cultural diversity (OFMDFM 2005a). It is in the CRU that it is possible to see some of the practical confusion around the relationship between sectarian (community) relations and ‘race’ relations in the devolved administration. While in Figure 5.3 the CRU and the REU appear to be clearly demarcated, in their daily practice of policy implementation the distinction between the two institutions is less clear cut. This was evident in the following account given by the Deputy Head of the REU: Although they are separate units the Racial Equality Unit is working increasingly closely with the Community Relations Unit. The Racial Equality Strategy is designed to work in tandem with A Shared Future, so 120 there are obvious links between the two (Interview with Deputy Head of Racial Equality Unit, 12/09/05). Not only do the Racial Equality Unit and Community Relations Unit work closely together, often times their aims and remits are almost identical. For example, in the CRU penned A Shared Future over a dozen references are made to racism in Northern Ireland, and the document states that one of its main aims is to ‘combat racism’ (OFMDFM 2005a: 16). While the previous quote suggests that the links between the two units are ‘obvious’, the precise contours of how sectarian relations and ‘race’ relations interact is far from so. The fact that the REU exists and that the CRU has become concerned with cultural diversity beyond sectarian difference shows that multicultural agendas are now considered as an important facet of post-Agreement public policy. This development is illustrative of the increased presence and awareness of cultural diversity in Northern Irish society over the last decade. However, the retention of a unit engaged specifically with relations between Protestant/Unionists and Catholic/Nationalists in spite of the shift to a more encompassing notion of good relations is illustrative of the uncertain relationship between anti-sectarian and multicultural agendas in the devolved administration. 5.4.2. Good relations in the non-devolved administration As noted previously, although all economic and social issues have been devolved to the Executive, the administration of constitutional and security matters, law and order, criminal justice, policing and immigration still rests with the Northern Ireland Office (NIO). Some of these functions, such as policing, are reserved, which means that they may eventually be transferred in more favourable political circumstances.49 Other powers, such as immigration, are excepted – they can never be devolved from Westminster to Stormont. The NIO operates in support of the Secretary of State, and is directly under the control of the Home Office in London (see Figure 5.2). Although the NIO was created to 49 Despite the improved political situation at the time of writing, policing remains reserved and there are no plans to devolve these powers in the immediate future. 121 administer Northern Irish affairs in 1972, since the Agreement its role has been greatly reduced. The present incarnation of the NIO is split into five core divisions: the Political Directorate, the Policing and Security Directorate, the Criminal Justice Directorate, the Central Services Directorate and the Northern Ireland Information Service (see Figure 5.2). Together these institutions attend to non-devolved matters in Northern Ireland. The key point concerning good relations policy in the non-devolved administration is that all institutions operating within the NIO, including the police and the immigration services, are subject to Home Office policy. Thus, in post-Agreement Northern Ireland, different policies are often operating within both the devolved and the non-devolved administrations. As later sections show, while devolved policy may seek to promote cultural diversity, Home Office policy on issues such as policing and immigration may act to impede this goal. 5.4.3. Good relations in non-governmental public bodies Alongside the devolved and non-devolved departments there exist a number of important non-governmental public bodies in Northern Ireland, otherwise known as ‘quangos’. A quango is an ostensibly non-governmental organisation that performs governmental functions, often with government funding or support from supranational bodies (Wettenhall 1981). Such bodies are very important in Northern Ireland; they comment on and implement public policy and, occasionally, criticise government policy and actions. Figure 5.4 identifies the most important non-governmental public bodies whose remit includes good relations, the administration that funds them (devolved or non-devolved) and the relationship between these bodies. The following sections look at how good relations policy is located within each of these non-governmental institutional actors. 122 Equality Commission Northern Ireland Community Relations Council Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission Funded by OFMDFM Funded by NIO Memorandum of Understanding Memorandum of Understanding Figure 5.4: Key non-governmental public bodies in post-Agreement Northern Ireland Community Relations Council As outlined in Chapter Four, the Community Relations Council (CRC) was founded in 1990 to help address the tension and violence that characterised relations between Catholic/Nationalist and Protestant/Unionist ‘communities’ during ‘the Troubles’. This non-governmental institution was charged with allocating funding to the voluntary sector for the promotion of dialogue and interaction between the two communities (Gilligan 2007). Although originally oriented around the sectarian division, the CRC has recently been at the vanguard of attempts to critically engage with the idea that Northern Ireland is composed of more than just the ‘two traditions’, and has become increasingly concerned with the management of both sectarianism and multiculturalism in Northern Ireland (Nash 2005). Since the Agreement the language used by the CRC has changed significantly, mirroring the general move from a language of community relations to that of good relations. For example, in A Shared Future the CRC is given a clear remit around the promotion of good relations (OFMDFM 2005a: 21). Policy makers from the CRC were involved in the consultation and draft phases of both A Shared Future and A Racial Equality Strategy for Northern Ireland (Interview with Head of Policy, CRC, Belfast, 14/10/05). Increasingly CRC policy and press releases combine anti-sectarian and multicultural 123 agendas. For example, a policy document produced by the CRC to aid organisations in producing good relations strategies argues for the importance of ‘understanding the part that sectarianism and racism play in dividing Northern Ireland society’ (CRC 2004: 5; emphasis added). The CRC have increased their funding for ethnically-identified minorities, and have provided monies to organisations such as the Chinese Welfare Association and the Indian Community Centre for events aimed at promoting cultural diversity in Northern Ireland (Interview with Head of Policy, CRC, Belfast, 14/10/05). Changes in both CRC discourse and its funding practice demonstrates that the organisation has expanded its focus beyond sectarian relations alone. Equality Commission Northern Ireland Like the CRC, the Equality Commission Northern Ireland (ECNI) is a non-governmental public body funded by the devolved department OFMDFM. It is responsible for monitoring and providing advice on Section 75 of the Northern Ireland Act (1998). As such it has a duty in regard to the promotion of equality of opportunity and good relations.50 The Commission for Racial Equality (Northern Ireland) was founded in 1997 following the Race Relations (Northern Ireland) Order. Less than two years later, under the terms of the Agreement, this body was amalgamated into the new ECNI. This new single equality body represents a movement away from the separation of multicultural and sectarian issues into discrete institutions. Relations between ethnically-identified minorities and ‘majority society’ are one of the many possible vectors of inequality that the ECNI concerns itself with. They have an explicit remit to promote ‘good relations between people of different racial groups’ (Interview with Head of Policy, Equality Commission, 01/11/05). For example, under the Race Relations Order, the ECNI has the power to prosecute on the grounds of racial discrimination. The Equality Commission 50 The ECNI is legislatively charged with ensuring equality of opportunity on grounds of ‘race’, religious belief or political opinion, sex, sexual orientation, age and disability. 124 also has the power to launch an investigation into a public body if there is evidence of a breach of commitments made in its equality scheme.51 While the ECNI is committed to promoting good relations between Catholic/Nationalists and Protestant/Unionists it does not have a duty in this area. The responsibility for these relations remains with the CRC.52 Again there is evident complexity around the division of responsibility for the management of cultural diversity and sectarianism in Northern Ireland. The ECNI is a product of the Agreement, and its nascent multicultural agenda. However, the retention of the CRC, which predates the Agreement and is a product of attempts to manage community relations only, shows that sectarian considerations continue to hold a central place in political institutions in the post-Agreement arena. Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission The issue of human rights in Northern Ireland has always been highly sensitive and politicised (Harvey 2001). In 1973 the Standing Advisory Commission on Human Rights was formed to advise direct rule ministers on human rights issues (Harvey 2001). In stark contrast to the lack of debate about the adoption of equality legislation during the negotiations on the Agreement, the issue of the formation of a human rights body was particularly vexed. Nationalist parties campaigned vigorously for such a body while many leading Unionist politicians were opposed to the move. Eventually cross-party support for a human rights body was secured, and on 1st March 1999 the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission (NIHRC) was established. The Secretary of State appoints the head of the NIHRC, and, as human rights is not a devolved issue, this body receives funding from the NIO. Although the prime concern of the debate around the NIHRC during negotiations leading up to the Agreement was on how human rights legislation would effect Catholic/Nationalist and Protestant/Unionist relations, the very notion of human rights 51 All public bodies in Northern Ireland must complete an equality scheme and submit it to the Equality Commission for scrutiny. See Ellis (2001b) and Osborne (2003) for more detailed discussion on ECNI and equality schemes. 52 This division of responsibility between the ECNI and the CRC is enshrined in a joint memorandum of understanding (see Figure 5.4). 125 obviously encompasses differences and identities beyond the ‘two traditions’. Since its creation the NIHRC has ‘kept a very close watching brief on race issues and racial equality’ (Interview with Human Rights Commission, Belfast, 14/03/06). At the international level, the commission has been involved with international treaty monitoring, and has prepared shadow reports to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD). A CERD sub-group is located in the Department of Constitutional Affairs (DCA) in London; allowing human rights institutions like the NIHRC to lobby directly the Human Rights Minister in the DCA. The NIHRC also comments on the human rights implications of both UK-wide and Northern Ireland specific policies, including policy on immigration and the detention of asylum seekers. The NIHRC also engages with local level ‘race’ relations’ policies, commenting on OFMDFM policies and sending a representative to the Racial Equality Forum (Interview with Human Rights Commission, Belfast, 14/03/06). Through these different activities the NIHRC are involved in the governance of the emergent multicultural Northern Ireland. Thus far this chapter has identified the key policies, institutions and activities pertinent to the governing of a multicultural Northern Ireland. To summarise these findings a table of key players/institutions and policies is set out in Table 5.1. From this detailed engagement with institutional structure and policy it is clear that multicultural policy, which was almost totally absent until a decade ago, is now being manifested in a plethora of initiatives and policies, themselves attached to different locations and institutions within the state. This multiplicity of sites is a reflection of what Shirlow and Murtagh (2006) call the ‘institutional approach’ to dealing with sectarian division and political violence in Northern Ireland. One legacy of sectarianism, then, is this awkward, unwieldy state structure that results in policy being dispersed across such a swath of institutions. As will be shown in the following section, this convoluted institutional structure structures and potentially undermines the realization of emerging multicultural agendas in post-Agreement Northern Ireland. 126 Table 5.1 Summary Table of Key Good Relations Institutions and their Policies Status Institution Policy Field Community Relations Unit A Shared Future Devolved Administration Racial Equality Unit A Racial Equality Strategy Policing and Security Directorate Home Office Policy Non-Devolved Administration Criminal Justice Directorate Home Office Policy Community Relations Council Equality Commission Non- governmental Public Bodies Human Rights Commission 5.5. Interrogating Good Relations in post-Agreement Institutional Frameworks This chapter has shown how multicultural-linked policy agendas are spread through and becoming part of different echelons and spheres of Northern Ireland government. The sections that follow show that this dispersal of policy produces an institutional situation which is difficult to negotiate in practice and has a negative impact on attempts to promote multicultural agendas. This section builds on material presented earlier in this chapter to highlight points of tension within the institutional structures and practices of post-Agreement governing which hinder attempts to move beyond sectarian division. 5.5.1. Fragmented institutional structure As the previous section illustrated, the political settlement in Northern Ireland has produced a particularly complex institutional structure. Although this structure was designed to manage Catholic/Nationalist and Protestant/Unionist relations, it is now being called upon to construct and manage an image and reality of Northern Ireland as 127 culturally diverse or multicultural. The difficulties inherent in managing issues of cultural diversity in the institutions of post-Agreement governance are clearly expressed by the Head of the Community Safety Unit. The problem that we face in Northern Ireland is that for community safety to work in a kind of cohesive way it needs to have a landscape that isn’t completely fragmented, in the way that it is here. Issues like race hate crime really do need a joined up approach, because it is a complex issue. And it’s about prevention, support, protection. So all of these things have to be connected. Northern Ireland is a very bad place for things to be connected, we have so many silos, so many government departments, so many councils. I used to work in Liverpool, I don’t know how much you know about Merseyside but it has got roughly the same population as Northern Ireland, 1.6 million people. But if you compare the structures on Merseyside: there are five councils, not twenty-six (Interview with Director of Community Safety Unit, 09/02/06). The Community Safety Unit (CSU) is a department within the Criminal Justice Directorate of the non-devolved NIO. Alongside a commitment to tackling anti-social behaviour and sectarian hate crime, it is charged with trying to reduce racist attacks and manifestations of racism. However, the lack of effective connections between the vast array of institutions that make up the post-Agreement governing structure makes it particularly difficult for the CSU to fulfil this function. The fragmentation evident in the large number of District Councils, government bodies and other political institutions has a negative impact on attempts to address issues like racist attacks and racially motivated crime.53 Reflecting on attempts to tackle social exclusion through planning policy, Geraint Ellis (2001b: 407) suggests that it is ‘somewhat ironic that the political climate of the peace process that has allowed these issues to emerge on the policy agenda has also necessitated an administrative structure that frustrates the process of implementation.’ His point is equally valid in considerations of multicultural policy and its ‘institutional 53 A review of public administration was launched by the then Secretary of State for Northern Ireland Peter Hain in 2005. As well as making proposals for streamlining measures in areas such as education this review recommended that the number of District Councils be reduced from twenty-six to seven. At present these recommendations have not been adopted, but it is expected that the number of district councils shall be radically reduced in the coming years. 128 implications’ in the post-Agreement context (Uitermark, Rossi and Van Houtum 2005: 622). Here the institutional set-up is so complex and institutional name changes so frequent that one interviewee who held a very senior position as Head of the Equality Directorate in OFMDFM was unable to remember the title of one of the units in the directorate! While the peace process, and political changes accompanying it, provided an opportunity to re-imagine Northern Ireland as culturally diverse, policy is often stymied by the high level of fragmentation and confusion within the institutional structures. These structures were set up by the Agreement to deal with sectarianism in Northern Ireland, and, as such, their fragmentation is directly linked to Northern Ireland’s older, sectarian past. 5.5.2. Separation between devolved and non-devolved institutions and powers The practical separation between devolved and non-devolved institutions and powers also undermines multicultural initiatives. A civil servant in the devolved Department of Social Development (DSD) explains this situation as follows: there is a Chinese Wall, if you like, between the NIO and the devolved administration in practical matters. If I access my computer, the devolved administration is all on one computer network, NIO is a separate one … I can log onto a dial system which will give me a telephone number of anybody here [devolved administration] but not there [NIO] (Interview with Director of Central Policy and Coordination, DSD, 02/0206). The existence of distinct computer systems and telephone directories attests to the sense of disconnection (a ‘Chinese Wall’) between the two administrations. This separation is not just cumbersome and inconvenient; it has important implications for an emergent multicultural Northern Ireland. This is evident in the area of ‘race’ relations policy. While individuals from devolved and non-devolved departments might work together on bodies like the Racial Equality Forum, the separate telephone networks are symptomatic of the lack of opportunities for everyday interaction between practitioners working in the two administrations. Also, as I noted in section 5.4.1., initiatives like the Racial Equality Forum are dogged by the infrequency of meetings (there were only three in 2005). 129 Consequently policy initiatives and advances made in one administration may not be carried over into the other, hindering attempts to promote best practice across the board. Similar difficulties arise with respect to policing ‘race’-based violence. As noted earlier, equality is a devolved matter, but policing and immigration, two areas which have huge implications for how multiculturalism is enacted and experienced, are reserved and excepted respectively. As will be discussed further in Chapter Six, policing has been implicated in processes of racialisation (Jackson 1993; 1994b; Keith 1993; Solomos 2003), with the existence of institutional racism within the police force emerging as a serious concern (Home Office 2000). As policing is a reserved matter, the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) is located within the NIO. This produces an anomalous situation whereby a devolved policy like A Racial Equality Strategy for Northern Ireland, which seeks to direct ‘race’ relations generally in Northern Ireland, negotiates a reality in which significant aspects of governing ‘race’ relations (such as the police) lie outside its jurisdiction and within the NIO. This means that social policy produced in the devolved administration to address specific issues and concerns around cultural diversity relevant in Northern Ireland is not necessarily implemented by significant institutions within this jurisdiction. Finally, we might turn to the area of immigration and border control to see further how the practical separation between devolved and non-devolved administrations shapes the ways in which multicultural Northern Ireland can be realised. Immigration is an excepted issue: Northern Ireland is bound to follow Westminster policy. At the current time this means complying with increasingly tight Home Office restrictions on the numbers and skills base of who can immigrate. The UK-wide ‘Managed Migration’ policy (Home Office 2005) was produced without policy makers in institutions such as the Racial Equality Unit having any influence over the content of the policy, nor were they given the option to opt out of it (Interview with Director of Racial Equality Unit, Belfast, 29/09/05). The lack of devolved control over immigration issues was given spectacular expression when, in 2000, asylum applicants were controversially locked up alongside dissident paramilitaries in Maghaberry Prison, Co. Derry (Tennant 2001). As this procedure was in accordance with Home Office policy for dealing with asylum 130 seekers in the absence of other secure accommodation, the Assembly, despite expressing cross-party condemnation of the practice, was powerless to intervene. It was only following negative media attention that the NIO established temporary holding centres on alternative sites in Belfast (Lentin and McVeigh 2006b). This example highlights how, while OFMDFM is promoting pluralist social visions, Home Office policy can at times work against this and even, in extreme cases, produce examples of racialised discrimination unacceptable to Northern Ireland’s emergent multicultural image of itself. Although the paradox between anti-discrimination legislation and policies and racialisation has become the hallmark of the actions of many contemporary states (Kemp 2004; Lentin 2001; Solomos 2003), what makes the Northern Ireland context distinct is that the devolved government will never have the opportunity to determine its own immigration policy. This finding highlights once again the impact that the specific political structures and institutional frameworks that multicultural policy is being produced and enacted within can have on the policy’s outworking on the ground (Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1992; Ben-Tovim, Gabriel, Law and Stredder 1992). 5.5.3. Privileging sectarian identities in the Agreement’s institutions and practices Thus far I have shown how the making of a new multicultural Northern Ireland happens in relation to structures and inheritances associated with an older, sectarian Northern Ireland. It is clear that sectarianism complicates — and perhaps even thwarts — the movement of Northern Ireland to a multicultural future. Furthermore, there is some evidence to suggest that sectarian axes of difference are privileged over and above other axes. This privileging of sectarian identities is particularly evident in the workings of the political institutions bequeathed by the Agreement (Little 2003). As noted in Chapter Four, the Northern Ireland Assembly (NIA) demands that all elected representatives declare themselves Nationalist, Unionist or Other. In order for a Bill to become law it requires the support of 60% of one ethno-national bloc and 40% of the other, in the process effectively silencing the ‘Others’. Sectarian divisions are also replicated in the devolved Executive; here the eleven departments are a direct reflection of the perceived numerical division between Catholic/Nationalists and Protestant/Unionists (Ellis 2001b). 131 As Northern Ireland is crudely assumed to be divided between Protestant/Unionists and Catholic/Nationalists in a 55:45 ratio (Anderson, Shuttleworth, Lloyd and McEldowney 2004), the eleven departments are, in practice, split into six that are Unionist-controlled and five that are headed by Nationalists.54 Given these divisions it is clear that the institutional fragmentation and separation outlined previously must be understood as a product of the attempt to recognise and accommodate sectarian political identities. Reflecting on this situation, Shirlow and Murtagh (2006: 35) conclude that ‘[t]he Agreement shifted the presentation and volume of ethno-sectarian competition but did not challenge the basis upon which it was founded and reproduced.’ While the peace process helped create a climate of relative stability in which new discourses on diversity and difference could emerge, the institutional structures of the Agreement continue to reproduce the very divisions it sought to ameliorate. This was given stark expression in the reallocation of responses to the 2001 Northern Ireland census. Before looking in detail at this process, the social science of the census in contemporary states will be considered briefly. The use of social science to classify and categorise different groups of people has been central to the governing of bodies in the ‘modern’ world (Foucault 1979). Following Foucault, the political project inherent in the construction of standardised quantitative measures, both for people and for objects, has been highlighted (Porter 1995). Although often perceived as unswervingly objective, quantitative science has been shown to be heavily implicated in specific state projects and economic and social transitions (Porter 1995; Scott 1999). In contemporary societies the census is a particularly powerful social scientific tool which is used to count people and groups. Although the census has become a key tool of public policy, census categories themselves are social constructions which may reify putatively ‘natural’ divisions between peoples (Hannah 2001). The census may also become a politically contested issue, particularly in ethnically divided societies where a demographic decline in one group may directly result in another’s growth, often with important political effects (Anderson and Shuttleworth 1994; Arel 2000; Horowitz 1985). 54 The D’Hondt system is used for to allocate ministerial positions in Northern Ireland. Although the Agreement does not have written into it that ministerial portfolios should be divided in a 6:5 ratio between Unionists and Nationalists, the use of this system means that in practice this division of ministerial labour will occur as long as voters continue to overwhelmingly support Nationalist and Unionist political parties. 132 Sectarian head counting has been integral to the governing of Northern Ireland since its foundation (Anderson and Shuttleworth 1994). When Northern Ireland was created in 1920 its borders were drawn in such a way as to ensure a 66% Protestant and 33% Catholic demographic balance. In this context, the census provided a very important tool for measuring the changing strengths of religious groups and, by extension, rival political aspirations. Since 1861 the census has asked what religion the respondent followed, and over time the choices available have changed to reflect shifts in the religious composition of Northern Ireland (Coakley 2007).55 The census became an overtly politicised issue when, at the start of ‘the Troubles’, Sinn Fein called for a boycott of the process. Consequently there was significant underenumeration in many Catholic areas such that the 1971, 1981 and 1991 censuses were generally considered unrepresentative of the total Catholic population in Northern Ireland (Coakley 2007: 578). Despite these weaknesses, possessing an accurate picture of the Catholic/Protestant demographic breakdown is particularly important for two main reasons. First, under Fair Employment legislation all medium- and large-scale employers have to match the religious denomination of their work force with the religious breakdown of the local area (Gallagher 1992). Second, as there is assumed to be a strong correlation between religious affiliation and political identities, numerical strength is often used as a proxy measure for support for alternative Nationalist/Unionist political visions (Anderson, et al. 2004; Coakley 2007). Although the Northern Ireland census is bent upon quantifying membership of the ‘two traditions’, since 1971 respondents have shown much less willingness to commit themselves to a religious identity (McNair 2006). The figure for ‘No Religion/Not- Stated’ responses to the religious question in the census rose from 9.4% in 1971 to 11% in 1991 (Coakley 2007: 578). As a result of this trend, in 2001 a supplementary question asking the religious background that the respondent was brought up in was added. This new variable, known as ‘community background’, was based on either the respondent’s professed religion or their childhood religion (Coakley 2007). As the 2001 census was the first census after the Agreement the relatively high proportion of respondents who 55 Coakley (2007: 594) notes that alongside the three main denominations (Catholic, Presbyterian and Church of Ireland) the census records a much greater number of religious groups and faiths. In 2001 ninety-four other Christian denominations that had ten or more adherents were recorded. 133 did not identify with one or other of the main (religious) categories (see Table 5.2) was considered to be of some significance.56 Table 5.2 Reallocation of 'non-religious' respondents into sectarian blocs in 2001 Northern Ireland census. Based on Coakley, J. (2007: 578); Hadden, T. (2003: 6) Pre-allocation Census Distribution Reallocated Census Distribution N % N % Catholics 678,500 40.3 737, 450 43.8 Protestants 767,900 45.6 895,400 53.1 Other religions 5,500 0.3 7,100 0.4 None/Not Stated 233,900 13.9 45,850 2.7 Total 1,685,800 100 1,685,800 100 This lack of self-allocation to one religious group or another threatened to undermine the ability of the census to give a definite figure on the Catholic/Protestant breakdown (Hadden 2003). So unthinkable was this that the Northern Ireland Statistical Research Agency (NISRA) took the decision to re-specify those in the ‘No Religion/Not-Stated’ category into Catholic and Protestant blocs. They did this by two statistical manipulations. First, they turned to the census question on community background that had been introduced that year. Respondents who had either selected ‘No Religion’ or not stated a religious affiliation but who also had indicated they were raised as Catholic or Protestant were reassigned back into the appropriate (Catholic or Protestant) community category. This statistical manipulation reduced the proportion of Northern Ireland’s population in the ‘No Religion/Not-Stated’ category from 13.9% to 7.5% (Hadden 2003: 56 In the lead-up to the 2001 census, the first census since the Agreement and the first in which Sinn Fein urged Catholic/Nationalist participation, there was a growing media discourse on changing demographics, and, in particular, the possibility of a Catholic majority in favour of a United Ireland (Anderson, et al. 2004). This led to the 2001 census becoming even more politicised than in previous years. In the run up to the census many Unionist politicians claimed it would show the strength of Protestant numerical superiority; Nationalists suggested it would show population changes which would see a Catholic majority in Northern Ireland in the coming decades (Anderson, et al. 2004). In this highly politicised context having almost 14% of respondents avoid a religious identity caused a serious problem which NISRA ‘resolved’ by the reallocation. 134 6). The second statistical manoeuvre to deal with the ‘problem’ of a high proportion not providing a religious identity was to compute a (Catholic or Protestant) community affiliation for those who remained in the ‘No Religion/Not-Stated’ category. This was achieved using a computerised matching process known as ‘donor imputation’ which assigned a (Catholic or Protestant) community background by drawing on factors such as respondents’ geographical proximity to someone who did state their religion or community background. As a result, a total of 127,000 respondents who refused a religious identity were reassigned as Protestants and 59,000 as Catholics (Hadden 2003: 6)! After reallocation the percentage of Catholics in Northern Ireland stood at 43.8%, Protestants made up 53.1% and None/Not-stated 2.7% (see Table 5.2). Commentators (Alexander 2002; Anderson et al. 2004) have argued that this manipulation of the census data was grounded in sectarianism, and, specifically, in the Unionist fear that Northern Ireland was moving quickly towards a demographic profile that was dominated by Catholics.57As Alexander (2002: np) stated, the process of reallocating all those who expressed a clear preference for avoiding religious identities ‘institutionalises the Northern Irish truism that there are only Catholic and Protestant atheists’ (Alexander 2002: np). This, admittedly extreme, example shows how sectarianism remains active in the social practice of political institutions, ‘distorting politics and marginalising non-sectarian factors and concerns’ and undermining the expressed desire to normalise social relations outlined previously (Anderson, et al. 2004: 1). The dangers inherent in this process are clearly flagged by the Belfast-based policy analyst Robin Wilson. The communal registration process has militated against the emergence of a strong political centre that might engender stability in the institutions. Indeed, on the contrary, it has reinforced ‘groupist’ stereotyping characteristic of media reporting of Northern Ireland, where actual Protestant and Catholic individuals are constantly hovered up into 57 Coakley (2007: 592) questions the assumption that rising Catholic birth rates will necessarily see an end to partition for two reasons. First, Catholic birth rates appear to be levelling off, and it is unlikely that they will make up a majority within the next couple of generations. Second, there is some evidence that a small but significant number of Catholics would vote to retain the Union, and that this number is much greater than those Protestants who would support Irish unity. These arguments could have been marshalled to allay Unionist fears instead of resorting to the manipulation of census data in such a way that those who actively refuse to state their religion were re-appropriated into sectarian blocs. 135 ethnonationalist ‘communities’ belying the pluralism of real social life (Wilson 2003: 15; cited in Shirlow and Murtagh 2006: 34). The practice of communal registration and the process of reallocation in the 2001 census is evidence that, in some locations, there is a continuation and strengthening of sectarianism occurring within the very same institutional structures and practices that are supposed to help Northern Ireland move beyond sectarian division. Despite the commitment to good relations between all groups, this process may appropriate those who actively assert their right to refuse to specify their religious identity on the census form back into sectarian identities. It seems fair to ask, given the processes of ‘normalisation’ described in this chapter, whether such practices could be considered as characteristic of ‘normal’ liberal-democratic societies. Certainly the reallocation of the ‘No Religion’ responses within the census provides a powerful illustration of the resilience of the sectarian imagination in Northern Ireland. 5.6. Conclusion This chapter examined the emergence of multicultural policy within post-Agreement governing institutions. It was argued that until the last decade Northern Irish social policy and legislation marginalised those groups not easily classified as Catholic/Nationalist or Protestant/Unionist. The failure to extend the Race Relations Act (1965) to the Northern Ireland context reflected both the widely held perception that racism was not an issue and a fear amongst the Unionist controlled government that Catholics might use this legislation against the Northern Irish state. During ‘the Troubles’ public policy and legislation dealt with discrimination on the grounds of religion or political belief, but offered no protection for those groups whose identity fell outside the ‘two traditions’. As such, the Race Relations (NI) Order has been a very important piece of legislation for ethnically-identified minorities; it offers legislative recourse against discrimination that previously was denied to them. In this chapter it was also argued that pluralist ideals and social visions of Northern Ireland run through both the Agreement and subsequent public policy statements. The Agreement introduced broader notions of equality and difference beyond the scope of 136 sectarianism. Illustrative of this was the emergence of the term ‘good relations’ which has sought to include older issues of (sectarian) community relations and more recent issues of (ethnic-based) multicultural relations. There has been an active repositioning of the status of Catholic/Nationalist and Protestant/Unionist relations in Northern Irish policy statements such that these relations are now ostensibly seen as the same as or equivalent to ‘race’ relations. This drive to decentre sectarian difference by diversifying the vectors of difference that the state sees itself as having the responsibility to govern was shown to be part of a process of ‘normalisation’ following the instability of the conflict. For many politicians and policy makers, the presence of cultural diversity is integral to the post-sectarian imaginary of Northern Ireland as a ‘normal’ society. Analysing the discourses of two key policy texts showed there to be considerable complexity surrounding the relationship between community relations and good relations and, by extension, between the management of sectarianism and multiculturalism. This complex relationship was mirrored in the structure of those institutions involved in the governing of a multicultural Northern Ireland. The separation between the Community Relations Unit and the Racial Equality Unit in the devolved administration (and the degree of over lap between these institutions) was shown to be symptomatic of this situation. The awkward division of labour between the Equality Commission and the Community Relations Council, with the former having a duty on ‘race’ but not religion, was held up as illustrative of the central place which sectarian relations continue to occupy in the post-Agreement context. Clearly multicultural agendas have emerged, but the relationship between them and efforts aimed at managing sectarianism has yet to be fully worked out. The final sections of this chapter sketched in detail the different institutions and policies contributing to the governing of multicultural Northern Ireland. This analysis demonstrated two key points. First, while the Agreement created a favourable climate for progressive political developments, it ushered in a fragmented state structure that stands in the way of successful policy implementation. Second, the separation of powers between devolved and non-devolved administrations has a negative impact on multicultural agendas. These institutional structures must be understood not as a product 137 of poor design or mismanagement but rather as a direct result of the Agreement. This political settlement was founded on an institutional approach to conflict resolution which explicitly sought to privilege sectarian political identities. Although admittedly extreme, the example of the reallocation of responses to the religious question in the 2001 Northern Ireland census demonstrated the persistence of sectarian constructions of identity within the emergent multicultural imaginary. While cultural diversity may afford an opportunity to construct Northern Ireland as ‘normal’, this new policy focus must negotiate engrained sectarian ways of thinking and doing within political institutions and their practices. It is to this complex interplay between a newer multicultural Northern Ireland and an older sectarian Northern Ireland that the dissertation now turns. 138 Chapter Six Multicultural Agendas in Practice: Responding to Racism and Recognising Difference 139 6.1. Introduction Having looked at policy and institutional frameworks for governing multiculturalism throughout Northern Ireland, the focus of this chapter turns to a range of organisations and initiatives operating in Belfast city that seek to actualise a multicultural vision of society. Specifically examined are those practices initiated in response to racialised violence and those which seek to raise awareness of cultural diversity. These two quite distinct processes are, each in their own way, dimensions of what might be understood as a multicultural society. In the former, we can see ways in which multicultural governance seeks to manage negative responses to cultural difference. In the latter, we can see the ways in which multicultural governance seeks to operationalise a politics of recognition and make space for the articulation of cultural difference. The analysis of institutional structures and discourses in Chapter Five indicated that multicultural initiatives are contoured by sectarianism. That vexed relationship is investigated further in this chapter, with the question asked: to what extent do sectarian divisions in society and social relations structure these two emblematic facets of a multicultural Northern Ireland? The material presented draws on interviews (with both different groups involved in multicultural practices in Belfast and civil servants), observation at events aimed at promoting cultural diversity and an analysis of a poster produced by the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) to encourage reporting of hate crime incidents. The presence of cultural diversity in contemporary societies is not always welcomed; it may be resisted through processes of racism and violence against racialised minorities (Abbas 2005; Back and Solomos 2000; Gilroy 2001). The increased reporting of racist incidents to the PSNI (especially in Belfast) has been well documented (Jarman and Monaghan 2003; Lentin and McVeigh 2006b). However, these reports of racism occur in a society in which policing itself is a contentious issue that is often linked to sectarian political positions (Mulcahy 2006; Weitzer 1985). This chapter explores the impact of the sectarianisation of the policing debate on responses to racism in Northern Ireland, paying particular attention to the Belfast context. Changes in legislation and police practice around issues of racism and cultural diversity in society, such as the introduction of hate crime legislation in 2004 and the production and circulation of a 140 poster to raise awareness of this legislation, are investigated. The chapter goes on to examine the extent to which sectarian cleavages attached to policing influence effective responses to racism in Northern Irish society through an investigation of the experiences of ethnically-identified minorities around policing and criminal justice issues. The chapter then moves on to look at those practices which seek to raise awareness of cultural diversity; understood in terms of the multicultural politics of recognition (Duffy 2005; Modood 1998; Parekh 2000; Taylor 1994). As Northern Ireland and, in particular, Belfast is being re-imagined as a diverse, multicultural society ethnically-identified minorities are being encouraged to engage in a range of activities designed to display their cultural difference and to raise awareness of their presence among wider society. This chapter specifically explores the work that such initiatives do in a society struggling to move beyond sectarianism. A range of events are examined in detail and include: the Belfast Mela; a joint Samhain/Diwali festival; a proposed ‘community’ dinner hosted by the Lord Mayor of Lisburn and the experience of a ‘multicultural’ educator in a school setting.58 While these events and initiatives speak of a Northern Ireland attentive to cultural diversity, this chapter examines how the historical sectarian division of Northern Irish society interacts with such a politics of recognition. The very existence of such efforts shows that Northern Ireland is becoming a more multicultural place, and, in the final section of this chapter, I look at how such practices might offer an opportunity to destabilise accepted sectarian readings of identity and social difference. 6.2. Responding to Racism in Northern Ireland One aspect of the governing of multicultural societies is the management of negative, racist responses to cultural difference (Abbas 2005; Gilroy 2001; Lentin 2001; Miles 1989; 1993), and the past twenty years have witnessed a plethora of theoretical 58 In popular discourse in Northern Ireland Catholic/Nationalist and Protestant/Unionist communal groupings are often referred to as ‘local’, the assumption being that ethnically-identified minorities are somehow ‘non-local’. For example, discussing the aims of government funding released in the aftermath of a series of racially motivated attacks in South Belfast, the Deputy Head of the Racial Equality Unit stated that the money was being made available ‘to assist local communities build relationships with minority ethnic people’ (Interview 12/09/05). In this chapter I self-consciously eschew this language of ‘local’ and ‘non-local’ and the racialised assumptions of identity and belonging associated with this vocabulary. 141 developments around the issue of racism in contemporary societies (Back 1996; Back and Solomos 2000). Theories of new racism (Barker 1981), elite racism (Van Djik 1984) and everyday racism (Essed 1991) have all emerged. The existence of racism often elicits responses from government, other official channels and, in particular, the police (Denney 1997). Policing plays an important role in the management of racism in multicultural societies. In the sections that follow I turn to police initiatives directed at addressing the rise in racist violence in Northern Ireland and the experiences of ethnically-identified minorities of these responses. I do so in order to explore the complexities between multiculturalism and sectarianism in policing practices. The intersection of policing practices and the construction of ‘race’ and racism in contemporary multicultural societies has been a recurrent theme in the literature over the past two decades (Fyfe 1995; Jackson 1993; 1994b; Keith 1993; Rowe 2004). It has been argued that the over policing of minorities, evident in practices such as excessive targeting of Black people as part of stop and search campaigns, constructs an image of these groups as deviant and criminal (Fyfe 1995; Gilroy 1987; Reiner 1985; Scarman 1981; Solomos 2003). The police in the UK have been accused of being openly antagonistic towards racialised minorities and even protecting neo-fascists (Gilroy 1998: 841). These concerns have, in different forms, been evident in government reports on the policing of racialised minorities. The Scarman Report, published in 1981 in the aftermath of the Brixton riots, was highly critical of the role played by government and the police in creating the situation that led to the riots. More recently, the Macpherson Report (1999) concluded that ‘institutional racism’, a phrase which refers to an engrained culture of ‘race’-based discrimination, existed within the UK police service. Neither of these reports, however, covered Northern Ireland. Here, policing has been a particularly divisive and politicised subject and to understand fully police responses to racism in Northern Ireland it is important to first consider briefly the history and changing shape of policing in this jurisdiction. 142 6.2.1. Policing in Northern Ireland Since the foundation of the state, the issue of policing in Northern Ireland has been uniquely contentious and politicised (Mulcahy 2006). The Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), which was formed following the disbandment of the all-Ireland Royal Irish Constabulary after the creation of the Irish Free State, was overwhelmingly Protestant in make-up. The regular police force was also supplemented by a virulently anti-Catholic auxiliary force known as the ‘B-Specials’ (Darby 1976). Even during the relatively peaceful period between 1922 and the late 1960s the RUC, as a largely Protestant force, lacked legitimacy in the eyes of many Catholic/Nationalists. This sense of distrust increased dramatically during ‘the Troubles’ as many Catholic/Nationalists came to regard the RUC as the coercive arm of a repressive Protestant state, and a force that should not be contacted or called into Catholic areas (Weitzer 1985). As a result many Catholic areas became no-go areas for the RUC, and policing duties were effectively transferred to local paramilitaries (Mulcahy 2006). In direct contrast, Unionist support for the force has always been strong, and many saw, and still see, the police as defenders of their community from the threat of IRA violence. Since the signing of the Agreement, policing in Northern Ireland has undergone a number of highly significant and historic changes. Similar to police forces in the rest of the UK, the RUC was often faced accusations of bias (although it was anti-Catholic bias instead of institutional racism). As a consequence, the focus on policing reform in Northern Ireland has been in terms of trying to fashion a force that would be acceptable to the Catholic/Nationalist community (Mulcahy 2006). In 1998, the Independent Commission on Policing in Northern Ireland (which later became the Patten Commission) was set up to review policing. Many of the recommendations made by the Commission, which were published in the Patten Report, were subsequently carried through. In November 2001, the name of the force was changed from the RUC to the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI). The Report made other important recommendations that were subsequently adopted, including the introduction of a 50/50 Catholic/Protestant recruitment quota for new members to address the force’s significant religious imbalance. Despite these changes, policing has remained a major stumbling block in the post-Agreement political process. During the period in which this research 143 was conducted, over seven years after the signing of the Agreement, Sinn Fein was still refusing to sign up to the policing board and did not encourage Catholic/Nationalists to contact the police. Also, as noted in Chapter Five, policing is a reserved issue: it is under the control of the non-devolved Northern Ireland Office rather than the devolved Assembly, and directly elected representatives in Northern Ireland are unable to alter policing policy or practice in response to the specifics of the situation in Northern Ireland. Figure 6.1: Racial incidents: Protecting your rights, flyer distributed by PSNI (Source: Community Safety Branch, PSNI) Given the daily reality of sectarian conflict, it is not altogether surprising that the experiences of ethnically-identified minorities were often marginalised and ignored by 144 the RUC. However, in recent years the PSNI has becoming increasingly concerned about cultural diversity and, in particular, racialised violence (Lentin and McVeigh 2006b: 159). The increased reporting of — and media attention on — attacks against ethnically-identified minorities has led the PSNI to respond to the issue of racism in new ways (Interview with Head of Community Safety Branch, PSNI, 10/12/05). Minority Ethnic Liaison Officers have been appointed to act as an interface between ethnically- identified minorities and the police (see Figure 6.1). A Racial Equality Strategy calls on the PSNI to ‘reduce and eliminate displays and manifestations of racial aggression’ (OFMDFM 2005b: 51). These changes in policing practice and policy proposals have been backed up by legislative changes. The Criminal Justice (No. 2) Northern Ireland Order (2004) introduced specific hate crime legislation to address offences committed against individuals or their property based on grounds of ethnicity, ‘racial’ group, disability, sexual orientation, religion or political opinion. Under Hate Crime legislation a ‘racial’ incident is any incident that is perceived as ‘racially’ motivated by either the victim or a third party (Lentin and McVeigh 2006b: 159). When this legislation was introduced the government expressed the belief that ‘police activity will be a crucial factor in bearing down on hate crime’ (House of Commons 2005: 15). Although the new hate crime legislation was introduced largely in response to increased racist incidents, it has also generated significant changes in the defining and recording of sectarian-based attacks. A prominent community relations policy maker explains the situation as follows. For the first time we record sectarian incidents because we have hate crime because of the focus on race hate and race attacks. The four categories within that [hate crime legislation] are race, sectarianism, disability and homophobia. Now, you would think that there would have been a record of sectarianism here in Northern Ireland long before this .... Incredible, what? (Interview with Head of Policy, Community Relations Council, 14/10/05). Despite the long history of sectarianism in Northern Ireland, shockingly there existed neither a definition nor a comprehensive recording mechanism for sectarian incidents until the introduction of hate crime legislation in 2004 (House of Commons 2005: 9). 145 This is some eight years after the commencement of records by the police for ‘race’- based incidents (which began in 1996). As a report to the Northern Ireland Affairs Committee entitled The Challenge of Diversity: Hate Crime in Northern Ireland noted, ‘[n]othing could illustrate the dysfunction of Northern Ireland society better than the absence, until recently, of an agreed, official definition of a sectarian incident’ (House of Commons 2005: 10). The quote from this community relations practitioner suggests that the move to record sectarian incidents is a direct result of the legislation introduced by Westminster in response to concerns around spiralling numbers of racist attacks. Following the recommendations of the Macpherson Report (1999), the PSNI adopted a definition of a sectarian incident that paralleled the definition used for ‘race’-based incidents, namely ‘any incident that is perceived to be sectarian by the victim or any other person’ (House of Commons 2005: 10).59 It seems incredible that a state so deeply shaped by sectarian violence could have failed to record incidents as such. This absence of a record of sectarian incidents is arguably the strongest signifier of how embedded and naturalised sectarian violence had become in Northern Ireland. In a seemingly contradictory logic, the commencement of records of sectarian incidents coincides with the very moment when Northern Ireland seeks to displace sectarianism from being the defining vector of difference and move beyond its popular designation as a ‘conflict society’. This speaks to the desire for sectarian violence to be contained (counted and countable) and to be placed as equivalent to violence based on other axes of difference. This imaginative ‘diminishment’ of sectarian violence to just one type of ‘hate crime’ of the many a society may encounter is yet another example of Northern Ireland’s effort to normalise itself. At the same time, these changes point to the potential for multiculturalism to facilitate a critical reappraisal and redefinition of accepted constructions of sectarianism. These shifts in police practices around sectarian incidents show that multicultural issues are altering how sectarianism is constituted and performed in Northern Irish society. 59 This definition of a sectarian incident only applies to victims who are perceived to be either Catholic/Nationalist or Protestant/Unionist. Offences committed against ethnically-identified minorities on the basis of their religion, for example against Muslims, are considered as racially motivated (House of Commons 2005: 10). 146 6.2.2. Visual culture of PSNI hate crime awareness campaign In this section the analysis of police responses to racism in Northern Ireland is developed further through an engagement with the visuals used in a PSNI poster campaign aimed at raising awareness of hate crime. Previous research has examined the visual representations used in campaigns by state bodies and statutory organisations to draw attention to racism and anti-racist campaigns. For example, Paul Gilroy (1987) assessed the anti-racist efficacy of a series of posters produced by the Greater London Council in the 1980s to promote a campaign against ‘race’-based discrimination. More recently, Karim Murji (2006: 260) analysed a series of adverts produced by the Commission for Racial Equality as part of its ‘personal responsibility’ campaign to raise awareness of ‘racial’ stereotyping. Building on this work, this section looks at a poster produced by the PSNI to promote the reporting of hate crime (see Figure 6.2). This poster was produced as a direct response to the increase in numbers of ‘race’-based hate crime incidents reported to the PSNI, and the main goal of this campaign was to promote awareness and reporting of racist attacks in Northern Ireland (Interview with Head of Community Safety Branch, PSNI, 10/12/05). The poster in Figure 6.2 first appeared in Belfast in January 2005. In this poster the different categorisations of hate crime are represented by four juxtaposed images (‘race’, sexual orientation, religion and disability). In the first photograph from the left the face of a woman who appears to be of Asian origin looks out through a hole in a window pane; possibly a result of a brick or a stone lobbed during a racist attack. This image represents ‘racially’ motivated hate crime. The second picture, a piece of graffiti which reads ‘Gays Out’, denotes homophobic hate crime. The next image, the interior of a burned out church, symbolises religious or sectarian incidents. The final photograph, which appears to be a disabled man in a wheelchair being assaulted by an unidentifiable assailant, represents hate crimes committed on the basis of disability. These visual representations clearly show the viewer what is meant by hate crime, what categories there are, that all forms are criminal and that hate crime should be reported to the police. The poster’s unifying theme, ‘Hate Crime is Wrong’, is suspended above the four images, semantically linking the depicted hate crime categories. The central message, that hate crime is pernicious, is created clearly and legibly through the use of large, 147 block capitals and two colours (red and black) in the piece of text which carries this imploration. The poster also seems to be aimed at victims of hate crime as information and contact details are provided for locations where victims or witnesses can report incidents. Figure 6.2: ‘Hate Crime is Wrong’ Poster (Source: Community Safety Branch, PSNI) The idea for a poster campaign was proposed by the Head of the PSNI’s Community Safety Branch, whose remit includes hate crime, in the winter of 2004. He brought this suggestion to the Graphics Department of the PSNI, and discussions took place about 148 the content of the poster. Subsequently the Graphics Department commissioned a photographer to capture the images for ‘race’, sexual orientation and disability hate crime (the image of the burnt church representing sectarian incidents was an actual crime scene photograph already in the possession of the PSNI) (Personal Communication, Head of Community Safety Branch, PSNI, 21/11/07). The campaign initially ran on Adshells (bus shelters) in January 2005 in the six districts with the highest numbers of hate crimes/incidents recorded (South Belfast, North Belfast, Craigavon, Ballymena, Foyle and Dungannon and South Tyrone). In February 2006, the poster campaign was re-launched in all twenty-nine police districts with advertisements appearing on both Adshells and phone booths (Personal Communication, Head of Community Safety Branch, PSNI, 23/11/07).60 Since the campaign began there has been an increase in reporting of ‘racially’ motivated hate crime (PSNI 2007). Though whether this reflects increased confidence as a result of such initiatives by the PSNI or increased levels of attacks remains a moot point (Gilligan and Lloyd 2006). The very fact that the PSNI have been running this campaign is a positive sign of changes in police practice in response to racist violence. However, on closer inspection the limitations of the representations used in the poster become clear. The image in Figure 6.2 signifying ‘racially’ motivated hate crime is that of a physically non-White body in a submissive position. The face in the image looks scared and vulnerable as it peers out through shards of broken glass. This representation of ‘race’, like much anti- racist advertising, tends to reproduce particular stereotypes and assumptions about putative ‘racial’ difference (Gilroy 1987; Murji 2006). Furthermore, rather than challenging racism, this image simplistically depicts the victims of ‘racially’ motivated crime in Northern Ireland as submissive, fearful and clearly marked as phenotypically ‘Other’. Although it was produced in response to racist incidents in Northern Ireland, this poster actually aids the process of signification and category construction by which non-White people in Northern Ireland are racialised. The image used in this poster essentialises and naturalises thinking about social difference based on physical and biological signifiers in terms of the category ‘race’, and, effectively, contributes to the 60 The twenty-nine police districts mirror the twenty-six district councils with the exception that Belfast, which is one district council area, is broken down into four police districts (North, South, East and West). The inclusion of these four Belfast police districts takes the total number to twenty-nine. 149 on-going processes of racialisation in Northern Irish society (Chan 2006; Jackson and Penrose 1993; Miles 1992; Mullings 2005). Even more striking is the fact that although an increase in racist attacks was the main motive for the poster’s production, ‘race’-based incidents are not signified visually as being any more or less significant than any other category of hate crime. Despite being produced in the wake of racist violence, this hate crime poster does not privilege racism over and above other kinds of discriminatory violence. Most importantly for the post- sectarian imaginary of Northern Ireland, the poster constructs sectarianism as an equivalent discriminatory axis to the others. As the third form of hate crime represented in Figure 6.2, sectarianism is placed as neither the first nor the largest, but one of a string of discriminatory axes. The poster creates a vision of equivalence – sectarianism is just one of many registers of discrimination including racism which co-exist within the bounds of a normal, post-sectarian Northern Ireland. Developing this theme further, the following section draws on interviews with representatives of ethnically-identified minorities to investigate whether sectarianism and racism are really equivalent in post- Agreement Northern Ireland. 6.2.3. ‘They’re not interested in our issues’: Policing ‘race’ in Northern Ireland While the hate crime legislation introduced a sophisticated new system for reporting ‘racial’ attacks, the clearance rate for ‘racial’ incidents remains low, and there have been serious difficulties in obtaining convictions under hate crime legislation (House of Commons 2005).61 This failure to secure convictions has further fuelled the absence of confidence characteristic of the relationship between ethnically-identified minorities and the police force in Northern Ireland. Speaking to the Northern Ireland Affairs Committee on the issue of hate crime Anna Lo, in her capacity as Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the Chinese Welfare Association (CWA), said that ‘a lot of [victims] do not report incidents. We feel there is a sense within the Chinese community that they are second 61 This assertion is based on figures from 2003/4 when the clearance rate for all crime was 27.4%, but for racial incidents stood at only 16.9% (House of Commons 2005: 15). 150 class citizens and they will always be second class citizens and the police will never take them seriously’ (House of Commons 2005: 17).62 Although the police force in Northern Ireland has often been accused of failing the Catholic/Nationalist community, ethnically- identified minorities share the feeling that the PSNI is not sufficiently attuned to their needs. We have always been very critical of the police in Northern Ireland. If you see our submission, in 1998 I think, to the Patten Commission. At that time, before Lawrence, we said that the police here in Northern Ireland are institutionally racist. And I think that is still the case (Interview with CEO, Northern Ireland Council for Ethnic Minorities, 30/01/06). This interviewee, who held a very important position as the CEO of the largest organisation representing ethnically-identified minorities in Northern Ireland, suggests that institutional racism is a significant problem within the PSNI. Nevertheless, the preoccupation with sectarianism and constructing a police force acceptable to the Catholic/Nationalist minority has meant that this issue has yet to be addressed. This situation has added to the perception among ethnically-identified minorities that the PSNI are not interested in their concerns. This is reflected in the following quote from a Good Relations Officer in the CWA in Belfast. In general the Chinese would say they [the police], and they would say this during the Troubles as well, they’re not interested in our issues, they’re only interested in issues relating to Protestants and Catholics. Everybody has their story [of reporting a racial incident]: There’s been no follow-up. That’s a big thing, there being so little follow-up in cases. There has been good successful convictions and prosecutions, and I know it’s not for the police to relate back convictions but see if they did … one case could get round the Chinese community and do so much to build confidence. An awful lot of effort that has been put into policing Hate Crime but I just think there is a huge training issue there (Interview with Good Relations Officer, Chinese Welfare Association, 30/09/05). 62 As well as being the CEO of the CWA, Anna Lo was elected a Member of the Local Assembly (MLA) for the Alliance Party in South Belfast in the May 2007 Assembly elections. Lo was the first MLA elected to come from an ethnically-identified minority in Northern Ireland, and was also the first politician of Chinese descent to be elected to a UK Assembly or parliament. Both of these facts attracted significant amount of media attention, and there were many positive stories in both national and international outlets following Lo’s election. 151 As this quote shows, for many representatives of ethnically-identified minorities the feeling persists that the police are only really interested in sectarianism, despite the recent changes in their practice around ‘race’-based hate crime. The polarisation of the policing debate in Northern Ireland, with Protestant/Unionists supporting the police and Catholic/Nationalists displaying varying degrees of animosity towards the force, has made it difficult for ethnically-identified minorities to express publicly their views on the police. For example, in early 2004 the Northern Ireland Council for Ethnic Minorities (NICEM) criticised the police for what it perceived to be its failure to arrest the perpetrators of attacks on the homes of people of Chinese origin in the Donegall Pass area of South Belfast. More generally, NICEM also criticised the police’s failure to secure convictions under the new hate crime legislation. The press response to this was critical, and an editorial in The Belfast Newsletter (a staunchly Unionist daily) threateningly argued that NICEM ‘were playing a very dangerous game to attack the police’ (Interview with CEO, NICEM, 30/01/06). As the CEO of NICEM explained in interview, ‘the policing issue is a very political one in Northern Ireland. And anytime you attack the police you are deemed to be attacking Unionists’ (Interview with CEO, NICEM, 30/01/06). It is clear from this quote that when NICEM criticised the police their criticism got co-opted by Unionists into a sectarian infrastructure. Rather than their complaint being spoken from a stable and sanctioned position of an ethnically- identified advocacy group, it was positioned as anti-Unionist and, by default, aligned with Catholic/Nationalist interests. The association of criticism of the police with criticism of Unionism generally severely limits the possibility for ethnically-identified minorities to speak of their rights on their own terms (including their right to be protected from ‘race’-based violence and to petition the police in this regard). Similar forces of sectarianising the issues of ethnically-identified minorities were evident in the responses to ‘race’-based violence in Catholic areas of Belfast. For example, in April 2004 the Springfield Charitable Association (SCA), a voluntary group which aims to tackle socio-economic disadvantage in the predominantly Republican Falls Road area of West Belfast, organised a conference ‘to consult with minority ethnic groups and look at a mechanism for exploring the issues of racism’ (SCA 2004: 3). This 152 conference arose in response to attacks on the homes of Filipino nurses working in the nearby Royal Victoria Hospital (Bell, Jarman and Lefebvre 2004) and aimed to discuss racist experiences and rehearse possible solutions. Despite this agenda, organisers did not consider it appropriate to include representatives from the PSNI. A community activist from the SCA explained: We didn’t have the PSNI because within the community there would be a lot of resistance to using PSNI in the area. And there is also a lot of unreported cases [of racism] due to a lack of confidence in the PSNI (Interview with SCA, 15/02/06). This quote reminds us that for residents of some Catholic neighbourhoods the police are still seldom seen as an impartial force. The tendency in such areas has been to avoid contacting the police if at all possible (Bryan 2003). But from the point of view of the ethnically-identified minority (here Filipino nurses who have experienced ‘race’-based attacks on their homes) their needs and rights to have access to policing get filtered through Catholic/Nationalist feelings of mistrust towards the police. Even a self- conscious effort to recognise and respond to the agendas of ethnically-identified minorities here ends up being shaped by sectarian politics and practices. Given the importance of policing in addressing issues of racism and racist attacks, the resulting absence of the PSNI from the SCA conference must have greatly altered the scope of action available to address this local problem. The previous quote from the SCA community activist even suggests that victims of racialised violence in West Belfast are themselves choosing not to report attacks, and are therefore having their right to call upon the police curtailed by local cultures of mistrust. The figures for reported ‘racial’ incidents in West Belfast seem to bear out this point. Although the number of incidents rose from 13 in 2005 to 18 in 2006, this number is still far less than in other areas of the city.63 There are a number of possible explanations for this. One is that the relatively small number of reported incidents simply reflects less 63 During the same time frame the number of racial incidents reported in North Belfast rose from 62 to 82, in East Belfast there were 74 ‘racial incidents’ recorded in 2005 compared with 79 in 2006, while South Belfast continues to be the area in which the most ‘racial incidents’ are reported, with 126 reported in 2006 compared with 106 in 2005 (PSNI 2007: 5). 153 racist behaviour in West Belfast. Alternatively, it may indicate a lack of reporting. It is difficult to discern if this is a result of an absence of faith in the police amongst ethnically-identified minorities, or an unwillingness to antagonise Catholic neighbours by calling the police into the area. Regardless of the motivation, it appears that an embedded sectarianism continues to structure the reporting of racist incidents by ethnically-identified minorities. The difficulty victims of ‘race’-based hate crime face in Catholic/Nationalist areas such as the Falls Road is further complicated by the apparent synergy between their experiences of prejudice and those historically experienced by Catholic/Nationalists. An interviewee from the Indian Community Centre in Belfast (Interview conducted 18/10/05) explained the ‘problem’ of such recognition. I think maybe with the Nationalist community it is ‘ok, we know because we have been oppressed and we have been discriminated against so we know exactly what you are going through’. As this interviewee goes on to suggest, the sense that there is a shared experience of discrimination often means that racism in these areas is not challenged. But how are they going to challenge it [racism] in their own areas? And it does happen in the Nationalist areas as well and there is no challenge there. We see here an example of the violation that can occur in and through recognition (which will be discussed in more detail in the sections which follow). The history of anti-Catholic discrimination provides Catholic/Nationalists with a sense that they know and have had experiences similar to those of ethnically-identified minorities. But it also legitimates inaction in relation to racism. While this example suggests once again that sectarianism is undermining official responses to racism, there are also signs that policing in Northern Ireland is finally becoming a less intensely politicised issue. On 28th January 2007, following the St. Andrews Agreement, which tied the restoration of devolution to a resolution of the 154 policing situation, Sinn Fein held a special Ardfheis on policing.64 A motion to support the PSNI was carried, leading to a historic sea change in the traditional Republican position on policing in Northern Ireland and the acceptance of the PSNI as a legitimate force. This policy shift has resulted in Sinn Fein signing up to the policing board; giving the PSNI widespread cross-community backing for the first time. As the sectarian cleavages attached to the issue of policing begin to fall away, it might be expected that minorities in Catholic/Nationalist areas will feel more comfortable reporting ‘racial’ incidents to the police. Likewise, criticising police responses to racialised violence should be freed up from associations with deeply embedded sectarian political positions. However, as this section has shown, responses to racism and racist attacks in Northern Ireland remain deeply shaped by embedded sectarianism. For the representatives of ethnically-identified minorities, the PSNI is still preoccupied with sectarian difference and unresponsive to their concerns. Furthermore, the sectarian polarisation of the policing debate has made it difficult for these groups to publicly voice their concerns around the policing of ‘race’-based violence. Ethnically-identified minorities in some Catholic/Nationalist areas may feel reluctant to exercise their right to contact the police as it is at odds with conventions of avoiding and mistrusting the police. In these different ways, the image of equivalence – that sectarianism is just one of many registers of discrimination in a normalising Northern Ireland – produced in the poster in Figure 6.2 is shown to be less than realistic. Instead, sectarianism continues to operate as the dominant axes of discrimination and to structure responses to racism. A different set of complexities between sectarianism and multiculturalism emerge when what could be conceived of as the ‘positive side’ of multicultural initiatives are examined. In the sections that follow, I turn to those initiatives and events which seek to recognise and raise awareness of cultural diversity in Northern Ireland. 64 An Ardfheis is a convention or special convention of a political party. It is an Irish word meaning ‘high festival’. 155 6.3. Celebrating Cultural Diversity As discussed in detail in Chapter Two, one framework for fixing the meaning of cultural diversity in society is the politics of recognition (Parekh 2000; Taylor 1989; 1994). Social practices invoked by a multicultural politics of recognition often seek to make wider society aware of the culture and identity of minority groups (Modood 1998; Parekh 2000). As such, multicultural festivals and celebrations of diversity are easily identifiable examples of recognition in practice (Duffy 2005; Jackson 1988; 1992). The history of such recognition practices in Belfast is remarkably brief. Throughout ‘the Troubles’ ethnically-identified minorities, which were predominantly resident in Belfast, intentionally kept a low profile (Hainsworth 1998). They rarely engaged in ‘cultural work’ (Werbner 2000) in the public sphere. As a publication produced by the Indian Community Centre (ICC) in Belfast points out: ‘during all the troubles in Northern Ireland, the Indian community kept their heads down’ (ICC 2004: 14). It is only since the peace process has bedded down that this situation has begun to change. Although people of Chinese origin have lived in reasonably large numbers in Belfast since the 1960s (Watson and McKnight 1998), it was only in 2003 that the Chinese New Year was celebrated in such a prominent public venue as the St. George’s Market in the centre of Belfast. This, the first celebration of ethnically-identified ‘culture’ in a ‘mainstream’ venue in Belfast, was a success and is now held annually at this venue. Since then the number and diversity of such events has increased. Newer migrant groups have begun arranging events, for example Poles in Belfast organised a festival of Polish food and music in July 2006 and have done so every year since. In the following sections empirical material gathered through interviewing and observation at multicultural events in Belfast is drawn on to explore the enactment of these celebratory practices in a society divided along sectarian lines. 6.3.1. Celebrating multiculture(s), essentialising difference By far the most prominent example of what Parker (2000: 71) refers to as ‘celebratory multiculturalism’ in Northern Ireland is the Belfast Mela (see Figure 6.3). This festival is run by the Indian Community Centre in Belfast and held every August in the Botanic 156 Gardens in South Belfast. Since its inception, in 2004, the Mela has proved increasingly popular. The profile of the festival has grown to such an extent that the 2007 Mela attracted over twenty corporate sponsors including Allianz, Western Union and FlyBe. Activities and events taking place during the Mela include henna tattooing, exhibitions of Indian art, performances of Indian music and the sale of Indian food and drinks. Figure 6.3: Brochure for 2005 Belfast Mela (Source: Indian Community Centre) As well as showcasing the cultural diversity of society, events like the Mela provide important opportunities for individuals to come together and contribute to the building of a sense of collective identity in a new place. However, the assumption that such multicultural celebrations recognise ‘authentic’ Indian culture was rejected as simplistic and patronising by many of those involved in organising and running such events. One interviewee, a project worker involved in numerous multicultural initiatives, has grown weary of these festivals and the assumptions of authenticity underlying them. I'm really tired that every time there is this cultural diversity stuff people are expecting the Chinese to cook, the Latin Americans to dance and the 157 Indians to do the Henna. I mean I am absolutely tired about that. We can think and we have things to say, we are more than just that stuff. I think it is important to share the cultural part but at the end of the day …. I started making a joke about why don't people from here do their Irish dance or their Morris dance. Is that what it is about? (Interview with Project Worker, Community Change, 09/11/05). In a reflective appraisal of her own multiculturalist practice this interviewee expresses frustration at the reduction of the experience of ethnically-identified minorities to putatively ‘authentic’ cultural practices such as cooking, dancing and tattooing; practices that belie the depth and breadth of their personal and collective stories and experiences. The culturalist notions of difference underlying so-called ‘Saris, Samosas and Steelbands’ multiculturalism have been accused of constructing ‘minority ethnic communities’ as essentialised cultural units and, in the process, denying the plurality and internal diversity of these groups (Hall 2000; Troyna 1987). Sivanandan (2006) critiques the commodification of culture and the reification of imagined communities like ‘the Indian community’ and ‘the Chinese community’ in these multicultural practices. In an effort to draw attention to her concerns, this interviewee has begun to joke with colleagues about the possibility of Catholics performing Irish dancing and Protestants Morris dancing as part of a more widely conceived cross-community project. This barbed comment reflects her sense that for many the ideal of authenticity of ‘Other’ cultures can be expressed through cooking and tattooing, but the notion that ‘authentic’ Protestant and Catholic culture is reducible to dancing is so ridiculous that it serves as a joke rather than a serious suggestion. An appreciation of the complexity of the culture and identity of the ‘two traditions’ has been a noted feature of Northern Irish policy in recent decades (Nash 2005). This awareness of the complexity of culture has not, however, been extended to cover ethnically-identified minorities. Instead, these groups are expected to present stylised versions of themselves at multicultural events, risking reification in the act of performance. The Good Relations Officer (GRO) of the Chinese Welfare Association (CWA) put it like this: 158 For many community groups their multi-cultural day is just bringing along Chinese and Indian or whatever to provide food. Which again might be a start and there are some benefits in it, but it’s not addressing the issues. I mean sometimes its reinforcing stereotypes and presenting communities as exotic and as different (Interview with GRO, CWA, 30/09/05). Though the very fact that ethnically-identified minorities are organising public celebrations is a sign that Northern Irish society is becoming more accepting of cultural diversity, these practices are open to the accusation that they exotisise ethnically- identified minorities and serve a multicultural desire that resides mainly in the hands of mainstream Catholic/Nationalist and Protestant/Unionist groups. The limits of multiculturalism are set by the dominant groups in society (Hage 2000; Hesse 2000), and in the Northern Irish context the constituencies with the power to confer recognition on ethnically-identified minorities are the ‘two traditions’. Indeed, there is a genuine question to raise with respect to whose ‘needs’ such events are serving. For example, the CWA has had the experience of enthusiastic non-Chinese groups claiming an association with them in the name of ‘good’ multicultural relations without actually consulting with them. There really needs to be an awful lot more consultation and evaluation of some of the projects that take place. Because people are just so quick, you know they put down that they are working with the Chinese Welfare Association on the application form and then consult us after (Interview with GRO, CWA, 30/09/05). One of the main reasons identified for the increased appetite for working with ethnically-identified minorities among Catholic/Nationalist and Protestant/Unionist voluntary groups is the increased availability of government funding for such initiatives. A project worker on a funded initiative noted this trend. There is suddenly a lot of funding around for work with minority ethnic communities. The Community Relations Council is starting to give money for minority ethnic work as well, not just around orange and green issues. The money is there, so lots of community groups who wouldn’t have been 159 interested before are starting to go for it (Interview with Project Worker, Multicultural Resource Centre, 03/10/05). Clearly the availability of dedicated funding is having an impact on the practical initiatives of cooperation and association between sectarian-identified groups and ethnically-identified groups. Such funding has enabled a range of multicultural initiatives, some of which are detailed in the remainder of the chapter. 6.3.2. Recognising cultural difference in sectarian spaces As well as recognising the identities of ethnically-identified minorities, some multicultural practices have recently sought to include Protestant/Unionist and Catholic/Nationalist cultural expressions. However, these efforts have often proved contentious, as the Indian Community Centre discovered when, buoyed by the success of the Mela festival, they organised a joint celebration for Diwali, the Indian festival of light, and Samhain, the Gaelic festival of Halloween (see Figure 6.4). Figure 6.4: Flyer distributed for Samhain/Diwali festival (Source: Indian Community Centre) 160 This event, held in November 2005, offered a mixture of traditional Hindu and Gaelic music and dance; a number of well-known Irish musicians participated, most notably Kila.65The venue for the festival was the Waterworks in North Belfast, a recently renovated park in one of the most deprived areas of the city (Shirlow and Murtagh 2004). Having witnessed some of the most brutal excesses of ‘the Troubles’, North Belfast is still divided along sectarian lines and remains prey to eruptions of violence at interfaces between Catholic/Nationalist and Protestant/Unionist communities (Shirlow 2003; Shirlow and Murtagh 2004). This sectarian geography encased the Waterworks park, with the northern end of the space being located in a Protestant-identified neighbourhood and the southern end of the park in a Catholic-identified neighbourhood. This sectarian territoriality had a direct impact upon the micro-geography of this event. As one festival organiser explained, what was contentious here was not the Indian content of the festival but the Gaelic content. The local people up in North Belfast were saying ‘you know it is this end of the Waterworks, why are you not including that end of the Waterworks?’ And it’s a matter of well if we are in that end of the Waterworks we’ll be attacked by Loyalists because it is seen as a Gaelic festival and even where the stage is being situated, everything is down to fine details (Interview with GRO, Indian Community Centre, 18/10/05). Gaelic cultural symbols are associated with Ireland and Irishness, and in Northern Ireland this would appeal almost exclusively to the Catholic/Nationalist community.66 Gaelic symbols were used in all the promotional material for this event, for example at the foot of the flyer in Figure 6.4 is a depiction of Celtic art. As a consequence, the positioning of the stage had to, on the one hand, ensure the safety of those identifying with a Gaelic cultural symbol (i.e. in the ‘Catholic’ part of the park) and, on the other, cope with complaints from Protestants that they were being excluded by the inclusion of Irish, rather than British, cultural symbols. On the day of the festival the attendance at the event was largely drawn from the Indian Community Centre or from the local Catholic population. As one festival goer noted, ‘most of the people here are from the 65 Kila are a popular seven-piece band from Dublin who play a fusion of Irish and East European music. 66 The vast majority of Catholic/Nationalists self-identify as Irish; the vast majority of Protestant/Unionists identify themselves as British (Coakley 2007). Consequently, cultural symbols, for example flags, representing Ireland or Britain tend to be associated with one side or other of the sectarian divide. 161 local [Nationalist] area, there’s nobody here from Tiger’s Ray or the Crumlin Road [nearby Loyalist areas]’ (Anonymous, Samhain/Diwali festival, 06/11/05). Another interviewee, reflecting on the absence of Protestant groups from the event, commented that ‘only one side of the community is being represented here, while this is cross- cultural it isn’t cross-community’ (Anonymous, Samhain/Diwali festival, 06/11/05). This complex language, of ‘cross-community’ and ‘cross-cultural’, reflects the difficulty of negotiating sectarian considerations alongside other cultural differences in the contested terrain of cultural politics in Northern Ireland. It also reminds us that a simplistic notion of a ‘local culture’ in the Northern Ireland context is contentious and bifurcated between Irish and British cultural representations. The case of the Samhain/Diwali festival reveals much about the politics of recognition of ethnically-identified minorities in Northern Ireland. Although ostensibly a celebration of new, multicultural Northern Ireland, in practice the festival was structured by the continuing sectarian division of North Belfast and of Northern Ireland more generally. This event demonstrates the difficulty of practicing even reductive ‘Saris, Samosas and Steelbands’ multiculturalism in a context in which space itself is absorbed into such dominant territoriality. As the Samhain/Diwali festival showed, it is practically impossible to include both ‘traditions’ in multicultural celebrations which call on notions of Irishness. This festival also suggests that, in some instances, celebratory, multicultural practices are being promoted and encouraged in an attempt to advance a vision of Northern Ireland as composed of more than just Green and Orange and, by extension, moving beyond sectarianism. However, as this study of the Samhain/Diwali festival clearly showed, sectarian divisions are not circumvented by these practices of multicultural recognition; rather, the unresolved historical legacy of sectarianism in Northern Ireland fundamentally structures and undermines them (Chan 2006; Hesse 2000; Povenilli 1998). The persistence of sectarianism in the emergent multicultural imaginary is also illustrated in other self-consciously multicultural initiatives. One such initiative was a planned dinner by the Lord Mayor of Lisburn. This dinner was to be self-consciously inclusive with the aim being to bring together ‘locals’ and Latvians and Poles who had 162 recently migrated to the area. At this dinner national food dishes from Latvia and Poland would be served alongside ‘local’ foods. This dinner event could be read as an encapsulation of the dream of a post-sectarian, multicultural Northern Ireland. However, events such as this met with scepticism, as this remark from a member of a Loyalist ex- prisoners support groups suggests.67 You get the real do-gooders who think that just by banging heads together, you the Latvian can try the Polish sausage. That is what they are going to do soon, have a dinner, you try the Polish sausage while you try this other food, isn’t that good? Then we’ll all get a photograph around the big table with the guy from Twinbrook who has done the cooking and what a picture that will make in their local paper (Interview with Lisburn Prisoners Support Project (PSP), 10/08/06). The Lisburn PSP, of which this interviewee is a representative, has chosen another course towards a multicultural future. When attacks on migrants in the area were reported in 2006, the PSP received funding from the Racial Equality Unit to hire a Polish community worker to liaise with new migrant groups. Although Lisburn is a predominantly Protestant town, this interviewee suggests that the food at the Lord Mayor’s dinner will be cooked by a member of the Catholic/Nationalist community from Twinbrook (a Catholic/Nationalist area of West Belfast which is technically within the boundaries of Lisburn). From his perspective, the proposed dinner, which is supposed to help heal tensions in the town, is simply a cynical photo opportunity for politicians to make claims on multiculturalism and cross-community involvement. Within this example the complex cross-hatchings of sectarianism and other differences are brought clearly into view. The inclusion of a Catholic in the multicultural dinner organised by a Unionist mayor illustrates how multicultural practices are called upon to recognise not only cultural diversity but also post-sectarian hopes. What is also revealed is an emergent differentiation among those who are engaged in multicultural initiatives, this is a differentiation between ‘tokenistic’ multiculturalism and a more ‘real’ multiculturalism. 67 This interviewee is a member of a Loyalist ex-prisoners group founded in a housing estate on the outskirts of Lisburn at the time of the paramilitary ceasefires to integrate former Ulster Defence Association (UDA) prisoners back into the community. 163 A closer reading of this ‘multicultural’ event, however, reveals another manifestation of sectarianism. The specific inclusion of Poles and Latvians at this planned dinner should also be seen as faith-based. Anecdotal evidence suggests that a process of ‘sectarianising’ some migrant groups has begun, in particular Poles are often identified as Catholic and Latvians as Protestant (Lewis 2006). In one well publicised case, Polish workers at a meat processing plant in Derry were subjected to sectarian taunts by their co-workers following the passing of Pope John Paul II (Lentin and McVeigh 2006b: 148). The verbal abuse directed at the Polish employees, the majority of whom are Catholic, included the vitriolic phrase ‘Fuck the Pope’, which is a common slogan on the walls of some Loyalist neighbourhoods. This co-option of migrants from other countries into the ‘two traditions’ binary provides another example of the resilience of sectarian ways of thinking and being in Northern Ireland. Against this backdrop the inclusive vision produced by the Lord Mayor’s multicultural dinner is underscored and undermined by the readiness by which new migrants can be drawn into existing sectarian processes of identification. While festivals and dinners are probably the most obvious (and clichéd) examples of multicultural practices, the classroom has been identified as a particularly important site for the articulation of ideas about difference, culture and identity (Bonnet 1993; Troyna 1987). In Northern Ireland, citizenship education classes have begun to involve lessons on multicultural diversity and immigration (Mussano 2004), and increasingly schools are inviting representatives from ethnically-identified minorities to speak about their culture and experiences in Northern Ireland. As noted in Chapter Four, levels of Catholic/Protestant integration in Northern Ireland schools are still very low, and this new curriculum is being delivered into schools which are predominantly segregated along sectarian lines. The experience of one interviewee, a white woman working on behalf of the Chinese community in Belfast, flags the difficultly inherent in trying to talk about multiculturalism in the segregated space of the classroom. Here she reflects on her experience of a visit to a Protestant school in South Belfast: the area with the highest recorded number of ‘race’-based incidents in the whole of Northern Ireland. Her visit to the school was in response to the Chinese Welfare Association being invited in to talk on the history and culture of Chinese people in Northern Ireland. 164 I actually went into this school in South Belfast. I was told when I went in not to speak about my religion, not to let the kids know what religion I was. And she [the teacher] was like ‘Well, we had an incident where we had a Catholic, a woman who was doing secretary and she had a Catholic name. She was temping and her car was vandalised because of her name. We were teaching the children about St. Patrick’s Day and we had parents writing letters of complaint.’ This woman was assuming I was Catholic and she was like ‘be careful when you are spelling things because the children will pick up that you are not a Protestant by the way you pronounce H and the way you pronounce A or Ah’ …. She actually told me that [before the session] the kid’s were asking ‘Where’s the name ------, where’s she from’. And she says ‘I told them you were English’ and I was like, ‘They’ll know whenever I open my mouth that I’m not English’. You know, and I’m not happy about having to lie to children about my identity. That defeats the whole purpose, its not just acceptance around minorities, we are talking about the whole area of diversity and oppression in general .… Sometimes the schools will address issues about other communities and about racism in a way to avoid having to deal with the traditional divide .… But I just couldn’t believe that this was the attitude of a teacher. With all good intentions she wanted to address issues of racism and so forth, but it was crazy (Interview with Good Relations Officer, Chinese Welfare Association, 30/09/05). In this example, awareness of a multicultural agenda of inclusiveness and recognition sits, without any sense of contradiction, alongside an attitude that seeks to by-pass sectarianism by a strategy of denial. Once again a multicultural initiative is being used to circumvent addressing the historical legacy of sectarianism in society (Hesse 2000; Povenilli 1998). The preoccupation with sectarian identities in Northern Ireland has led to the development over time of complex – almost subconscious – heuristics that individuals use to attempt to divine the religion of those they meet in their daily lives (Burton 1978). According to Burton (1979: 65), the use of various cues to try to predict an individual’s religious background, a process which he called ‘Telling’, was ‘the representation of sectarianism in contemporary Ulster’. Furthermore, he argued that of all the ‘Telling’ cues that could be used to predict an individual’s religious identity their name was the ‘first of the signs’ (Burton 1979: 65). Studies have shown that this process of ‘Telling’ is not confined to the adult population; from a very young age schoolchildren employ stereotypical judgements about eye colour, hair, dress, names and voices to discern the religious background of others (Stringer and Cairns 1983). In the above quote, the teacher in this Protestant school felt strongly that if the children 165 perceived the interviewee as Catholic, either by her name or the way she spoke, they would be unreceptive to her attempts to challenge attitudes and stereotypes to Chinese minorities. Consequently, she was asked to avoid any ‘Telling’ signs and to conceal her own religious identity. This suggests that issues of cultural diversity can only be addressed in Northern Irish schools if the topic of religion – and the stereotypical markers employed in the process of ‘Telling’ – are suppressed. Clearly this caused great difficulties and concerns for the facilitator; showing once again the extent to which sectarianism hinders efforts to recognise the identities of culturally diverse groups in Northern Ireland. 6.3.3. Negotiating cultural difference, destabilising sectarianism Multicultural practices are inherently messy, uncertain and open to multiple interpretations (Dwyer and Crang 2002). As this chapter has shown, placed into a sectarian context the ‘messiness’ of multiculturalism is given a specific inflection as various initiatives grounded in a politics of recognition negotiate sectarian divisions. In some instances, a multicultural agenda is undermined by sectarianism. In other instances, multicultural initiatives can offer an opportunity to re-imagine a diverse, plural Northern Ireland beyond the dominant tropes of sectarian identity. For example, the combination of Irish and Indian cultural practices in the Samhain/Diwali festival was intended to make participants reflect upon the range of different cultures that co-exist in their city (Interview with GRO, Indian Community Centre, 18/10/05). Although Protestant groups felt alienated from the event, the inclusion of both Irish and Indian identities suggests some nascent attempt to broaden multicultural practices to embrace different groups in society. The hope that multicultural initiatives can undermine the ‘two traditions’ conceptualisation of Northern Ireland was highlighted by the Good Relations Officer (GRO) of the Chinese Welfare Association (CWA) as she reflected on a planned school education activity. This year we are planning to do a multi-cultural day in local schools. The children can engage in calligraphy workshops, you know to write their name in Chinese and things like that there. Something that shows them that it is not just about Protestants and Catholics, there are other cultures. 166 And that’s the important thing, to make the children aware that it’s not just orange and green (Interview with GRO, CWA, 30/09/05). For this interviewee, teaching children to write their names in Chinese is envisaged as a facet of a wider project of promoting awareness of the diversity of Northern Irish society beyond the ‘two traditions’. Other interviewees involved in managing social relations in post-sectarian Northern Ireland gave a similar view of the potential for multicultural diversity to destabilise a sectarian construction of Northern Ireland. For example, for the Head of Policy of the CRC, the arrival of ‘minority ethnic people’ was helping Northern Ireland to ‘get over ourselves’: They are helping us focus in. Part of that is forcing us to look at sectarianism. There would be the theory, that some would believe, that you know, you just call it all racism, because that’s what it is. Because, like I said to you, the core principles are the same. It’s lack of respect for diversity and difference, lack of co-operation between the two, suspicion and hatred, misunderstanding, all those things, and that’s generally how you describe racism, so it is maybe all racism .… That’s an interesting debate in terms of how do you merge the two of them together. Is that the way to do it? Then you have to analyse what would be the response. Can you imagine? [There would be opposition] From some quarters, because they would be forced then to address it [sectarianism] as something that is wrong, that exists. Whereas at the moment I think sectarianism is looked at as something that has developed. Everybody’s responsible but nobody is really responsible. It is just there, it is the way we are. If you call it something else, racism, then you have to address it … you see all of them understand racism and maybe that is forcing them to acknowledge sectarianism (Interview with Head of Policy, Community Relations Council, 14/10/05). This quote reveals how sectarianism has become so naturalised that it is not only treated as an ahistorical phenomenon that is ‘just there, it is the way we are’, but also a vector of differentiation and dislike that is ‘acceptable’ or understandable. In contrast, racism is seen as something unacceptable. Indeed, this interviewee is suggesting that the growing awareness about the unacceptability of racism is forcing people to reflect on the unacceptability of sectarian-based resentments and prejudices. While sectarianism and racism share many similarities as forms of discrimination, they are sociologically distinct processes, and ‘there is a point in maintaining the integrity of sectarianism as an explanatory concept’ (Brewer 1992; Chapter Two: 37-38; McVeigh 1999: 19). In 167 treating these processes as identical there is a danger that the specificities of both will be lost, blunting rather than strengthening the ability to counter their expression in society. Constructing sectarianism and racism as the same may not represent the best way forward in the development of a socially cohesive society; however, the underlying idea that sectarianism should be understood not as an ahistorical ‘fact’ but as a social process akin to racism is potentially very useful in deconstructing accepted ideas about social difference in Northern Ireland. This chapter has looked in detail at a range of initiatives framed by a commitment to the recognition and celebration of culturally diverse groups in the interest of cultivating a multicultural Northern Ireland. It is easy to be cynical about such initiatives, and at least some of those involved in the work of managing social relations in post-Agreement Northern Ireland share that cynicism. Michelle Duffy (2005: 679), reflecting on the role of multicultural festivals in Australia, notes that ‘rather than the multicultural festival being a simple celebration of social cohesion’ such events produce encounters and interactions that can restructure entrenched notions of national identity and generate new ways of belonging. The emergence of ‘immigrant multiculturalism’ in the wake of new migration (and with it an increase in such ‘multicultural’ events) could, potentially, play an important role in promoting pluralism in the Northern Ireland context (Kymlicka 2001). Despite the difficulties of recognising cultural diversity in the context of a sectarian society, multicultural initiatives that seek to extend the politics of recognition beyond the ‘two traditions’ have the potential to furnish both children and adults with the moral and conceptual infrastructure needed to denaturalise embedded sectarianism. This brings with it the hope that emerging multicultural agendas are, in some contexts, helping to disrupt the idea that society has only ever been comprised of Catholics and Protestants and that sectarianism is a ‘natural’ way of being. 6.4. Conclusion This chapter has examined the extent to which the sectarian division of Northern Irish society and its social relations structures two particular dimensions of a multicultural society; namely responses to racialised violence and efforts to raise awareness of 168 cultural diversity. With regards to the former, as the number of reported ‘racial’ incidents have increased, the police force in Northern Ireland has began to focus its attention on issues of cultural diversity and racism. This chapter showed how hate crime legislation, introduced in 2004 in response to ‘race’-based attacks, has also led to changes in how sectarianism is approached and understood. Prior to this there existed neither a definition of a sectarian incident nor a comprehensive record of such incidents. While this failure to record sectarian incidents shows how naturalised and embedded sectarianism had become in Northern Ireland, the focus on ‘race’ hate crime has led to significant changes in the policing of sectarianism. In this way, the presence of cultural diversity is altering how sectarianism in Northern Ireland is constituted and performed. This chapter argued that the construction of sectarianism and racism as equivalent under hate crime legislation can be conceived of as part of Northern Ireland’s attempt to normalise itself. The poster produced by the PSNI to promote awareness of hate crime was motivated by the presence of ‘race’ hate incidents, but these incidents were not constructed as more significant in the poster itself. The analysis of the poster showed how it constructs sectarianism as just one of many axes of discrimination that co-exist in the new, multicultural Northern Ireland. However, this image of equivalence was not borne out empirically on the ground: the police remain preoccupied with sectarianism. This has led to a situation in which ethnically-identified minorities feel marginalised and the issue of institutional racism is not being addressed. Furthermore, as the comments by the CEO of NICEM demonstrated, these groups are limited in their ability to speak of their rights in their own terms. The sectarianisation of policing precipitated a situation in which the PSNI were not included in a conference on racism held in West Belfast and in which ethnically-identified minorities living in Republican areas might not be able to call the police. Although these findings point to the extent to which sectarianism structures and undermines police responses to racialised violence, it was argued that the recent historic changes in policing in Northern Ireland provide some grounds for optimism. The advent of peace in Northern Ireland has also created a situation in which ethnically- identified minorities feel more comfortable about organising and participating in events 169 which recognise their identity in the public sphere. However, drawing on interviews and participant observation, this chapter showed that these initiatives are often underpinned by culturalist assumptions which reproduce stylised versions of culture and identity. The issue of whose needs these events are serving was also raised. Certainly the proliferation of funding has created a situation in which sectarian-based groups are increasingly looking to work with ethnically-identified groups, but many fail to consult with these groups about their needs, wants and ambitions. The persistence of sectarianism in Northern Ireland’s emergent multicultural imaginary was demonstrated throughout this chapter. It was shown that the Samhain/Diwali festival, ostensibly a celebration of this new Northern Ireland, was structured by sectarian territoriality. Also, while multiculturalism is often a vehicle for post-sectarian hopes, there is evidence to suggest that some new migrants (particularly Poles and Latvians) are themselves being absorbed into sectarian groupings. While these findings point to the extent to which sectarianism structures multicultural initiatives, the experience of a white, Northern Irish woman invited into a Protestant school to talk about the Chinese community in Belfast showed that multicultural agendas may also be used to circumvent addressing historically embedded sectarianism. Nevertheless, this chapter also suggested that multicultural initiatives might have an important role to play in undermining the ‘two traditions’ conceptualisation of space and society in Northern Ireland. Multicultural initiatives offer an opportunity to denaturalise accepted understandings of sectarianism and, in the process, disrupt the construction of Northern Irish society as belonging to, and being comprised of, only Catholic/Nationalists and Protestant/Unionists. 170 Chapter Seven ‘Showing Your True Colours’: The Visual Culture of Anti- racism in West Belfast 171 7.1. Introduction Thus far, this dissertation has demonstrated how multicultural frameworks and policies have emerged in Northern Ireland over the course of the last decade. Chapter Five showed that a government concern for managing cultural diversity can be conceived of as part of a process of ‘normalisation’ in the aftermath of the conflict. However, the embeddedness of sectarianism within post-Agreement institutional structures often hinders the enactment of multicultural policy. Similarly, Chapter Six showed how multicultural initiatives, from official responses to racism to celebrations of cultural diversity, are also shaped by the persistence of sectarianism. In some instances, nevertheless, the presence of cultural diversity in Northern Irish society is influencing how sectarianism is conceived of and approached. In turning to another sub-field of multicultural practice, anti-racism, this chapter reinforces and reiterates many of the key themes and findings explicated in previous chapters. This chapter looks at the visual representations produced by anti-racist groups formed in response to what could be termed ‘multicultural issues’ (specifically new migration and racism) in West Belfast, an area deeply divided along sectarian lines (Boal 1969). Visual culture such as murals, flags and kerb paintings have been identified as playing an important role in identity construction and its spatialisation along sectarian lines in Northern Ireland (Jarman 1997). The content and context of anti-racist messages produced in mediums associated with sectarianism provides an excellent opportunity to illustrate, often quite literally, the relationship between emerging multicultural agendas and embedded sectarianism. In exploring the visual culture of these anti-racist campaigns, this chapter asks what messages do they convey? Do the representations and narratives used in these anti-racist campaigns reproduce sectarianism, challenge it by producing an alternative vision of a multicultural Northern Ireland or, perhaps, do both? The chapter begins with a brief discussion on the use of visual culture in the production and bounding of segregated space in Northern Ireland (Anderson and Shuttleworth 1998; Boal 1969; 2002; Boal and Douglas 1982; Murtagh 2002). Certain types of media play a particularly prominent role in this process, as much existing research has demonstrated 172 (Feldman 1991; Jarman 1995; 1997; 1998; Rolston 1991; 1992; 1995; 2003a; 2003b). This is often an explicitly geographical matter; where flags, murals and kerb paintings are located is integral to the production of sectarian territoriality and claims to space at a number of scales (Shirlow and Murtagh 2006). The brief history of murals in Northern Ireland that follows examines their social significance as vehicles for rival political narratives and identities and considers changes in the content of political murals since the Agreement. The rationale for this chapter’s focus on West Belfast is then outlined, including a discussion on the area’s specific social and political context and the factors which led to the emergence of anti-racist movements there. Following this, the anti-racist representations produced by two groups, one from each side of the ‘peaceline’, are interrogated. This analysis of anti-racist visual representations is divided into two sections; one focusing on murals and the other on posters and pamphlets. Within each section images produced by the West Against Racism Network (WARN) based on the Republican Falls Road are presented first, followed by those produced by Shankill Alternatives from the Loyalist Shankill Road. This analysis interrogates the complex, uncertain relationship between visions of a ‘normal’, multicultural Northern Ireland and infrastructures of sectarianism. Here I explore the extent to which the persistence of dimensions of another form of division and discrimination (sectarianism) within these anti-racist representations complicates their anti-racist message. At the same time, the very existence of these anti-racist campaigns in an area like West Belfast suggests that discourses of difference beyond the ‘two traditions’ binary have begun to permeate through Northern Irish society. The example of one specific anti-racist mural and responses to sectarian messages in an anti-racist booklet suggests that sometimes emergent multicultural processes have the potential to challenge sectarianism and contribute to the construction of a new, multicultural Northern Ireland. 7.2. Spatial Segregation and Visual Culture in Northern Ireland Recent work examining the idea of place within human geography has highlighted the ways in which identity is produced and performed spatially (Cresswell 2004; Pile and 173 Thrift 1995). The spatialisation of identity is predicated on the delineation of boundaries in social space (Barth 1969; Cohen 1985; Sack 1986). In Northern Ireland the creation of territory, or ‘spaces of identity’, is often founded on the inclusion of those with the same religious affiliation and the exclusion of the sectarian ‘Other’ (Gallaher and Shirlow 2006: 149). Territoriality is a means of communicating boundaries and social control which can allow for the classification of individuals based on where they live: a practice which is common in Northern Ireland (Burton 1979; Sack 1986). The construction of boundaries in sectarian terms at the local scale has dictated the nature and course of the Northern Irish conflict (Anderson and Shuttleworth 1998; Boal and Douglas 1982). Belfast, which Boal (2002: 691) describes as ‘the ethno-national city’, is characterised by street-by-street divisions along religious lines, and over 77% of residents live in areas that can be defined as segregated (Boal 2002: 689, Poole 1983).68 This residential segregation, and its attendant effects on the production of micro-territoriality at the local level, has contributed to the maintenance of sectarian division, particularly in Belfast (Shirlow and Murtagh 2006). Although all identities rely on the simultaneous delineation of difference and similarity, the processes and practices by which boundaries are symbolically and materially formed and maintained may vary greatly (Barth 1969; Cohen 1985; Cresswell 2004; Paasi 1996). Visual, material and symbolic cultures, such as art, language, stories and cultural institutions, are integral to the production of ethnic and national identity in social space (Billig 1995). In Northern Ireland the process of territorial definition, and consequent identity formation, relies on the quite unique use of specific types of visual and material culture. The identity of streets and, by extension, communities as Catholic/Nationalist or Protestant/Unionist is often achieved by the symbolic displaying of ‘territorial markers’ such as murals and flags or the painting of kerbstones (Feldman 1991; Jarman 1995; Shirlow and Murtagh 2006). In this way, local spaces are linked to different territorial units at the national scale, from the island of Ireland, to the constitutional link with Britain and even the notion of an independent Northern Ireland (Jarman 1997; Rolston 1991; 1992; 1995; 2003a). Murals, flags and kerb paintings all help (re)produce 68 Streets are classified as segregated if over 90% of residents belong to one communal grouping (Boal and Douglas 1982). 174 narratives about the community in which they are located, bolstering in-group social identity in many working-class areas at the same time as creating a boundary with the out-group (Buckley and Kenney 1995). This chapter looks at anti-racist messages produced in murals, posters and pamphlets because these mediums that are often used to construct sectarian boundaries (Shirlow and Murtagh 2006) are now also being used to carry an anti-racist message. Before moving onto this empirical material, it is important to consider in more detail the most graphic and powerful example of this visual culture in Northern Ireland: the political mural. 7.2.1. Murals in Northern Ireland Murals, often painted on the gable ends of houses and in other prominent positions, are the most notable and arguably the most interesting visual feature of sectarian division and territoriality in Northern Ireland (Jarman 1995; 1997). Despite their current ubiquity, particularly in urban areas, the history of political murals is surprisingly non-linear. Murals are now a feature of both Republican and Loyalist areas, but, for a long time, the tradition of mural painting was exclusively Loyalist (Jarman 1998). The first Loyalist mural was painted in Belfast around 1908, and the practice gained in popularity from that time on (Rolston 1992: i). Following the partition of the island in 1921, mural painting, alongside other practices such as flag flying and flower displays, became an integral part of the July commemorations of the Battle of the Boyne.69 Mural painting became an established part of a symbolic commemorative cycle by which the political and cultural identity of the new Northern Irish state was (re)produced (Jarman 1998). At this time most murals were depictions of William of Orange (King Billy), often unveiled during the July celebrations by prominent Unionist politicians. During the Stormont era, murals were a central part of a series of symbolic practices which served to unite all classes of Protestant/Unionists behind a common cultural identity (Rolston 1992). In 69 The Battle of the Boyne was the major turning point in the Jacobite and Willamite war. This war was very much a sectarian conflict, pitting the Protestant William of Orange against the Catholic King James II. The Battle of the Boyne took place on July 1 1690 outside the town of Drogheda in Co. Louth. William’s forces trounced those of James and an overall victory for the Protestant Williamite army was achieved. The battle is a key part of Protestant/Unionist folklore and is commemorated annually by the Orange Institutions on July 12th (McNally 2005). 175 direct contrast, Catholic/Nationalist culture, which includes things like the Irish language and Gaelic games, was denied recognition and space in the public sphere. While the painting and unveiling of murals was often a public event for Unionists, ‘[p]ainting murals was not a civic duty for nationalists; more, it would have led to severe harassment by the armed police of the Unionist state’ (Rolston 1992: iii). The tradition of Republican mural painting is surprisingly recent. The first example of Republicans using wall painting to produce a political message occurred in Derry in January 1969. Here the residents of the Bogside erected barriers to exclude security forces and proclaimed ‘You are Now Entering Free Derry’ on a gable wall in St. Columb’s Street (Jarman 1998: 85). Rather than celebrating the Unionist origins of the state, this mural was an act of civil disobedience by Catholic/Nationalist residents declaring the independence of the Bogside from the state.70 Although this is an example of Republicans using murals at the very beginning of ‘the Troubles’, the medium only truly became popular with Republicans at the beginning of the 1980s. Nevertheless, as the violence intensified during the 1970s, Loyalist mural painting virtually disappeared. One reason for this was the increasing insecurity felt by many Loyalists about pledging allegiance to a British state that appeared willing to negotiate with its sworn enemies; the government of the Republic of Ireland and Nationalists in Northern Ireland (Rolston 1991; 1992). The contemporary era of mural painting only really began when, during the spring and summer of 1981, murals in support of the Hunger Strikers began to appear in Republican areas (Rolston 1992).71 When the Hunger Strikes ended, however, Republicans did not 70 The Bogside is an overwhelmingly Catholic/Nationalist residential area that is located just outside the historic walls of Derry city. It was here, on January 30th 1972, that Bloody Sunday took place. At this pivotal event in the recent history of Northern Ireland 26 civil rights protestors were shot by members of the 1st Battalion of the British Parachute Regiment (13 died of their injuries) during a Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association march. This incident did much to boost the status of the Republican cause and increase recruitment to the IRA (Moloney 2007). 71 The Hunger Strikes were a series of political hunger protests staged by Republicans in the Maze prison in 1980 and 1981. The Hunger Strikes were the culmination of five years of protest by Republican prisoners against the British government’s withdrawal of Special Category Status for convicted paramilitary prisoners. During the second Hunger Strike, in 1981, one hunger striker, Bobby Sands, won a parliamentary by-election and was elected MP for Fermanagh and South Tyrone. By the time the strike was called off, ten Republican prisoners had died. However, the campaign brought much national 176 abandon their new medium, instead they began to diversify the number and content of murals. The emergence of Republican murals was perceived by many Loyalists as a challenge to what had once been their exclusive symbolic form (Rolston 1992). In the mid-1980s, the tradition of mural painting was revived in many Loyalist areas, and murals were used to reflect their indignation, and often violent opposition, towards the Anglo-Irish Agreement signed in November 1985. Since this time, mural painting has become an accepted feature of both Loyalist and Republican areas; a practice that, despite the changing political situations, looks unlikely to stop in the near future (Rolston 2003a; 2003b). Despite using the same medium, Loyalist and Republican murals are very different. Bill Rolston (1992) separates Loyalist murals into six broad categories. The first, and most obvious, category is the ‘King Billy’ murals. Although representations of William of Orange were the dominant feature of murals until the 1970s, during the 1990s these depictions declined significantly (Rolston 1995). A second category includes painted flags, particularly the Union Jack, the Northern Irish flag and the Saltire, which are prominent in many Loyalist murals, often appearing alongside the Red Hand of Ulster. A third category includes murals that have historical themes, particularly World War I and the Battle of the Somme, as well as more traditional references to the Battle of the Boyne. A fourth category of mural includes those with military images which emerged from 1986 and the time of the violent Loyalist opposition to the Anglo-Irish Agreement. From this time the subjects and tone of Loyalist ‘murals were no longer about Orange celebrations or unity but were declarations of territoriality’ (Rolston 2003b: 9). The main military images used were threatening figures in balaclavas clasping guns (Rolston 1992). The fifth category identified by Rolston (1992) is the memorial mural that was used to commemorate the activities and paramilitary affiliation of fallen comrades. The sixth, and final, category of murals is less serious, cartoon-style murals. These comic murals were particularly popular among the followers of the notorious UDA leader Johnny ‘Mad Dog’ Adair who appropriated a cartoon bulldog (a prominent British symbol) as his emblem (Rolston 1995). sympathy for the Republican movement and directly contributed to Sinn Fein’s subsequent electoral success (Moloney 2007). 177 Republican murals share common themes with Loyalist murals but also exhibit significant differences. While the roots of Loyalist mural painting lie in the commemoration of William of Orange, ‘[f]rom the very beginning … contemporary military images were prominent in Republican murals’ (Rolston 1992: iv). These early murals often depicted IRA volunteers and their activities. As with Loyalist murals, flags and historical themes are common in Republican paintings. However, the flag used is generally the Irish Tricolour, and the historical events refer to significant moments in Republican history as well as much older Gaelic legends. The tendency to commemorate dead combatants is shared by both Loyalist and Republican painters. The Hunger Strikers (particularly Bobby Sands), Liam Mellows and the Gibraltar Three have all appeared on murals in Republican areas.72 Unlike Loyalists, Republicans have used the medium to draw attention to and protest against wider issues such as repression by the British state, prison conditions and media censorship (Rolston 1992). One of the most significant differences in mural themes is in the scope of their symbolic associations. While Loyalist murals tend to only depict Ulster (though occasionally they refer to Scotland and the Ulster-Scots in North America), Republican murals often claim membership of a global anti-imperialist movement (Rolston 2003b). ‘[T]he struggle of Republicans in Ireland has been compared to that of people elsewhere in the world’, and representations of important figures like Malcolm X and Che Guevara, as well as paintings in support of Basque separatists and the cause of the Palestinians, have all featured in Republican murals at different times (Rolston 1992: iv). The visual culture of political murals is integral to the construction of particular narratives of sectarian identity – of similarity and difference – in Loyalist and Republican areas (Sluka 1997). All but the most politically naïve are aware of the significance of representations such as the Union Jack or the island of Ireland. These murals depict a range of different scenes, political visions and alternative interpretations of the conflict; all of which aid the (re)production of sectarian identities in the areas where they are displayed. However, in focusing purely on the symbols and images used 72 Liam Mellows was an Irish Republican who fought on the anti-Treaty side in the Irish Civil War and was executed by the Free State government on December 8th 1922 for his part in the seizure of the Four Courts in Dublin. The Gibraltar Three were three members of the IRA shot dead by the SAS on March 6th 1988 as they allegedly prepared to bomb a military parade taking place on the island. 178 in murals, there has been a downplaying of the materiality of murals themselves. Murals are ‘more artefact than art’; they are material objects which are located in, and constitutive of, social space (Jarman 1998: 81). Murals take meaning from, and give meaning to, the sites in which they are located: ‘their very location affects how they are interpreted and what they mean, while the location is used and treated differently because of the presence of the paintings’ (Jarman 1998: 81). Political murals segregate space; transforming otherwise mundane rows of housing into either welcoming or hostile territory (Jarman 1997). This transformation of public space into politicised space through the displaying of murals is central to the (re)production of sectarian territoriality in Northern Ireland. While images of labour, recreation and famous former residents have all appeared on different murals at one time or another (Rolston 1992; 1995), since the ceasefires and the signing of the Agreement in 1998 there have been subtle changes in the content of murals, reflecting changes in Northern Irish society (Rolston 2003a; 2003b). Funds made available by the Department of Social Development for the removal of paramilitary murals is one reason for this change. Another is a desire to broaden the political debate beyond sectarian violence; Republicans, in particular, have begun to use the medium to engage with wider debates around issues such as equality and social justice (Rolston 2003b). Though cognizant of the role of murals in the (re)production and spatialisation of sectarian identities, Bill Rolston (2003a: 3) asks that we ‘view murals not merely as artefacts, as products of artistic and political activity, but as innately bound up with political activity.’ As an important facet of political activity in many areas, new messages painted on murals offer a lens through which to investigate contemporaneous social processes and the emergence of new political agendas, such as anti-racism. 7.3. Locating Anti-racism(s) in West Belfast Before looking at the emergence of anti-racist movements in West Belfast, it is important to outline the general character of the area, which is one of the most heavily segregated locales in Northern Ireland (see Figure 7.1). West Belfast has been described 179 as a microcosm within which is encapsulated the wider history of sectarian division and violence of Northern Ireland since the Plantations (Boal and Livingstone 1984). During the seventeenth century Catholics were kept outside Belfast city walls and settled west of the city boundary in an area known as ‘the Falls’ (Aretxaga 1997). West Belfast is still home to mainly Catholics. The Falls Road is now the main artery running through what is often referred to as ‘Republican West Belfast’ (see Figure 7.2), an area stretching from Divis Street near the city centre all the way out to the housing estates of Twinbrook and Poleglass beyond the western edge of the city limits. Although the local MP is the president of Sinn Fein, Gerry Adams, West Belfast also includes the staunchly Loyalist Shankill area. The Shankill, home to around 22,000 working-class Protestants, is centred around the long, straight Shankill Road which runs almost parallel to, but a couple of hundred metres north of, the Falls (see Figure 7.2). Figure 7.1: Residential segregation along religious lines in Belfast based on the 1991 Census. Catholic and Protestant majorities are represented in green and red respectively. The area circled in light green is the Shankill/Falls area (Source: http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/images/maps/belfast_religion.gif) 180 The sectarian tensions across the segregated Falls/Shankill divide directly contributed to the eruption in sectarian violence that became ‘the Troubles’ (Boal 1969). In the summer of 1969, Loyalists from the Shankill Road carried out pogroms against their Catholic neighbours. This led to massive displacement of people in the area, the closing off of all connecting streets and the erection of a series of ‘peacelines’ (high metal walls that separate the two communities of West Belfast from each other). Violence, ranging from ‘recreational rioting’ at the ‘interface’ between the two areas to random abductions and murders, has played a major role in the (re)production of strong sectarian identities in both areas since (Aretxaga 1997; Burton 1978; Dowler 2001; Feldman 1991). Figure 7.2: Map of West Belfast showing the Shankill and Falls Roads (Source: http://maps.google.co.uk) Sectarian boundaries in West Belfast are also defined and control within these boundaries maintained through the construction of narratives of identity in visual culture (Dowler 2001; Jarman 1998; Rolston 1992). The entrance to the Shankill road, which is a five minute walk west of the city centre, is signified by a series of large, prominent murals valorising Loyalist paramilitaries. Red, white and blue bunting on every lamppost mirrors the paint that adorns every kerbstone. Murals are located on almost every corner, sometimes even on the street itself. These representations draw on many of the themes and categories discussed earlier in relation to the general character of 181 Loyalist murals. Traditional depictions of King Billy and military images of masked Loyalist paramilitaries carrying weapons are particularly popular on the Shankill (see Figure 7.3). Likewise, the murals on the other side of the peaceline reflect broader categorisations of Republican murals. Military images of IRA gunmen adorn many gable walls, often appearing alongside representations of the Hunger Strikers and other fallen comrades (see Figure 7.4) (Dowler 2001). With separate social and economic services, the two communities in West Belfast exist almost independently of one another (Shirlow 2003), and the visual culture on display on the Shankill and Falls Roads reflect the different (sectarian) social identities prevalent in the two areas (Jarman 1997; Rolston 2003a). Figure 7.3: Ulster Volunteer Force memorial, Shankill Road (Source: http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/images/photos/belfast/shankill/shankillmural4r.jpg) 182 Figure 7.4: Mural to Bobby Sands, Falls Road (Source: Author) The labour market in West Belfast remains deeply segregated, with both Catholics and Protestants fearful of working on the Shankill and the Falls respectively (Green, Shuttleworth and Lavery 2005). Despite this labour market segregation, West Belfast has witnessed increased migration in recent years as people have come to live and work in the area. Although anecdotal evidence suggests that the influx of migrants from Eastern Europe to West Belfast has not been as great as in other parts of the city, significant numbers of Filipinos have moved to the area to be close to their work in the Royal Victoria Hospital (Bell, Jarman and Lefebvre 2004). As migrants move into West Belfast, there have been media reports of racist incidents, most notably attacks on these same Filipino nurses (Bell, Jarman and Lefebvre 2004). However, only 18 racist incidents were reported in West Belfast in 2006 compared with 82 in East Belfast and 126 in the South of the city (PSNI 2007). These low figures may reflect a lack of confidence in the police amongst racialised minorities and a fear (discussed earlier) of inviting them into Republican area (see Chapter Six). While this may be case, there also seems to be a high degree of support for anti-racist agendas in West Belfast. The local media has celebrated the relative absence of racist incidents (see Figure 7.5), and grassroots anti-racist groups have been formed in the area. 183 Figure 7.5: ‘Race crime: west bottom of league’, The Andersonstown News 7/11/05, p. 1 The anti-racist groups operating in West Belfast were the most visible and active of such groups encountered during the fieldwork. The West Against Racism Network (WARN), founded in 2004, defines itself as ‘a grassroots anti-racism campaign based in West Belfast … to challenge individualised and institutionalised racism and to build a genuinely anti-racist culture in West Belfast’ (WARN 2006: np). This group is based in the Falls Road area of West Belfast (encircled in green in Figure 7.1 and shown in more detail in Figure 7.2). Although WARN is made up mainly of local white residents, members of racialised minorities in the area have also been involved in the group’s activities. Representatives from WARN have been very prominent in the local media, speaking on BBC Northern Ireland about racism in Belfast and also contributing regularly to The Andersonstown News.73 As well as organizing a vigil in response to attacks on the homes of Filipino nurses, WARN have been involved in a number of different campaigns, including the painting of an anti-racist mural. The visual culture produced by these anti-racist campaigns is examined later in this chapter. 73 The Andersonstown News is a popular Nationalist aligned twice weekly newspaper based in West Belfast. 184 Grassroots anti-racist initiatives have also emerged on the Loyalist Shankill Road (see Figures 7.1 and 7.2). As has been noted in studies of the emergence of anti-racism in other contexts (Detant 2005; Lentin 2004), this anti-racist campaign on the Shankill Road emerged in response to racist incidents in the area. In the autumn of 2005, local youths were involved in a racially motivated attack on the home of a Muslim family on the Shankill Road. These youths were referred by local paramilitaries to Shankill Alternatives, a Community Restorative Justice program on the Upper Shankill.74 Shankill Alternatives decided to involve these youths in an anti-racism awareness campaign before racism became a major issue in the area (Interview with Shankill Alternatives, 09/02/06). The Loyalist Commission and a prominent local Loyalist politician, Tommy Kircham, pledged support for this anti-racism campaign which was entitled ‘Showing Your True Colours’.75 This initiative involved the youths participating in a cultural exchange with a similar group from Nottingham as well as taking part in an anti-racist training session with a local facilitator and the painting of an anti-racist mural in a local school. As such, both WARN and Shankill Alternatives have been involved in producing anti-racist murals. In fact, West Belfast was the only location in which any anti-racist murals were found during the fieldwork.76 The content and context of these anti-racist murals is discussed in detail in the sections that follow. 7.3.1. Republican – WARN mural: ‘Fight Bigotry, Fight Racism’ As outlined in Chapter Three, the analysis of visual representations can provide important insights into social processes and phenomena that may not be possible through other means (Barnard 2001). As artefacts, murals are material objects located in space 74 Community Restorative Justice (CRJ) is a form of social/community criminal justice that focuses on crime as an act against another individual or a community rather than the state. CRJ groups have been active on both sides of the West Belfast ‘peaceline’. In Northern Ireland, as elsewhere, CRJ has been quite a contentious issue. At one stage during my research, funding was withdrawn from all groups following concerns about paramilitary involvement in these projects, but subsequently most groups have had their funding reinstated. 75 The Loyalist Commission is an unelected body representing all the main Loyalist paramilitary groups: the Ulster Defence Association (UDA), the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF), the Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF) and the Red Hand Commando (RHC). 76 Throughout my fieldwork I asked interviewees and other contacts about the existence of anti-racist murals. The only murals mentioned were those in West Belfast. I also personally looked out for relevant murals in South, North, East and West Belfast (as well as in Lisburn) but only found those discussed in this chapter. 185 and composites of text and images (Jarman 1997). Discourse analysis is a method that allows for an examination of such texts by taking a close look at the images themselves and the objects which carry them (Tonkiss 1998). Having selected the image to be analysed, the first step in the discourse analysis that follows will be to look at the iconographic story of the image and, in particular, the way in which images are used to construct narratives of social identity and difference. Second, after considering some of the mural’s main iconographic features, the social context of the mural’s production will be examined. This discussion will consider who produced the mural, where it is located and what images surround it. Figure 7.6: ‘Fight Bigotry, Fight Racism’ mural, Divis street, West Belfast (Source: Author) The wall mural in Figure 7.6, entitled ‘Fight Bigotry, Fight Racism’, juxtaposes the experiences of the Irish in London during the 1960s with those of present day migrants 186 to Belfast. The image adopted in this mural is of two guesthouse windows side by side; a thick blue line running through the centre producing a demarcation between the window on the left, representing a London window of 1966, and the window on the right, representing a Belfast window of 2005. The sign hanging in the London 1966 guesthouse window reads ‘No Blacks, No Dogs, No Irish’. The reference of this window and its sign is clearly historical, representing common prejudicial and exclusionary refrains of the time in which certain human categories were so demeaned they were unapologetically equated with animals (Hickman and Walter 1997; Leavey, Sembhi and Livingston 2004). The sign hanging in the Belfast 2005 window reads, in contrast, ‘No Racism, No Bigotry, No Prejudice’. While the former sign reports on how it was, the latter points forward to a tolerant and inclusionary vision of the future. This message relies upon the highlighting of the parallel experience of anti-Irish discrimination in London in the 1960s and contemporary prejudices and racism in Belfast. This image looks forward to a Belfast in which racists, bigots and prejudice are the unwelcome ‘guests’ in a more inclusive and tolerant society. In drawing parallels between the Irish experience of discrimination in London in the 1960s and racism in present day Belfast, the mural visually links the experiences of prejudice and discrimination suffered by people of colour and the Irish. In particular, the appearance of ‘No Blacks’ alongside ‘No Irish’ in the sign in the London 1966 window was part of a conscious attempt on the part of the artist to make the viewer consider the relationship between these two prejudicial refrains (Interview with Marty, 05/12/07).77 However, as well as being on the receiving end of discrimination, the Irish themselves have historically been involved in racism (McVeigh 1992). Writing on the situation in antebellum United States, Noel Ignatiev (1995) argues that the Irish became oppressors of Black people as they actively sought to enter the ‘white’ ‘race’. Consequently, the Irish ‘[i]nstead of seeing their struggles as bound up with those of colonized and coloured people around the world … came to see their struggles as against such people’ (Roediger 1992: 136-7). Gillian Rose (2001) asks us to also look for what is absent in visual representations. In the mural in Figure 7.6, an acknowledgement of the involvement of some Irish people in racism is absent. The absence of a reference to Irish 77 I have used a pseudonym to refer to the mural artist to protect his identity. 187 racism in the mural might reinforce the sense that racism is a problem in other (Loyalist) areas and does not happen in Catholic/Nationalist communities. As we found in Chapter Six, the sense of solidarity between the Catholic/Nationalist community and ethnically- identified minorities in Northern Ireland may create a situation in which racism in some Catholic/Nationalist areas is denied and goes unchallenged. The iconography of the mural in Figure 7.6 seeks to link the discrimination experienced by emigrant Irish communities and racism in contemporary Belfast, though it does not engage with the racist behaviour exhibited by white minorities like the Irish. The second step in the discourse analysis is to consider the social context, the ‘external narrative’ (Banks 2001), of an image or text. The text’s social context refers to who is producing the discourse and in what circumstances (Tonkiss 1998). The ‘Fight Bigotry, Fight Racism’ mural was commissioned by WARN and painted in May 2005 to coincide with an anti-racist campaign to create a ‘Republic of Conscience’, a reference to a Seamus Heaney poem of the same name, in West Belfast. The use of a mural in this campaign reflects changes in the nature of political murals in West Belfast. Since the IRA ceasefires, murals are no longer used to recruit volunteers for ‘the struggle’ but rather to discuss issues that emerge in the community (Interview with Marty, 05/12/07). The mural in Figure 7.6 replaced a mural in support of a campaign for the freedom of the Native American Leonard Peltier who was jailed in the 1970s for killing two FBI agents. At a time when A Shared Future includes an explicit commitment to the replacement of threatening paramilitary murals with non-sectarian images (OFMDFM 2005a: 18), this mural reflects the emergence of concerns around racism in West Belfast (Interview with Anti-racist Network, 06/05/06). As the artist explained, mural painting is often a creative exchange between the group who approach the artist to paint the mural and the artist himself. In this instance, the mural’s theme and the images used arose initially from suggestions made by members of the WARN anti-racist group and which were developed further by the mural artist (Interview with Marty, 05/12/07). The ‘Fight Bigotry, Fight Racism’ mural is located on a very popular and prominent mural wall on Divis Street which is the main entrance to the Falls Road from Belfast city centre. While there has been a net loss of mural space in Belfast, McCormick and 188 Jarman (2005: 60) identify the Divis Street wall as a particularly successful location where artistic merit is high, situation is propitious and ownership is not contested.78 Officially this wall is the property of the Andrews Flour Mill that it bounds, but it has been appropriated by ‘Marty’, the main Republican mural artist in the Falls Road area. The use of this wall for political murals began in 1993 when Marty approached the owners of the Mill seeking permission to paint on the wall. When the owners declined, Marty surreptitiously began painting on the wall, and six months later the first mural (a protest against the use of plastic bullets by the British Army in West Belfast) appeared on the site (Interview with Marty, 05/12/07). Marty has been using the wall continuously since. His relatively high profile in the area has afforded him de facto control of the wall and he is personally involved in all paintings that appear on it. In order to get a mural space on the Divis Street wall it is necessary for the proposed mural to reflect well defined artistic and political qualities as stipulated by Marty. All murals on this wall are seen as reflective of ‘the Nationalist community standing firm with people from oppressed nations’ and invoke international, national and local themes and subjects (Interview with Marty, 05/12/07). As noted earlier in the discussion of Republican murals, Republicans have long made such symbolic associations with anti-Imperialism and struggles for national liberation (Coulter 1999; Rolston 2003b), and the mural in Figure 7.6 was seen as an extension of this linkage (Interview with Marty, Belfast, 05/12/07). Political murals also take their meaning from the murals which surround them (Jarman 1997). An anti-Iraq war mural is located to the left of the anti-racist mural, with a painting in support of Republican prisoners in Maghaberry Prison to its right. This juxtaposition of images invites the viewer to perceive the ‘Fight Bigotry, Fight Racism’ mural’s anti-racist message as congruent with anti-war/anti-Imperialist discourses on the one hand and Irish Republican causes on the other. Further down the Divis Street mural wall the same artist painted a mural in homage to the African-American leader Fredrick Douglass (see Figure 7.7). Douglass was a freed slave and abolitionist who toured 78 McCormick and Jarman (2005: 55) suggest a number of reasons for this reduction in murals and mural spaces in Belfast. The main causes of this reduction identified by the authors are retirement (wear and tear of the mural), redevelopment of the mural site, reclamation of the site by a local community opposed to the mural’s message and redundancy of the mural’s message. 189 Ireland during the famine of 1845-46; noting, as he did so, the mournful similarities between slavery songs and Irish songs (Roediger 1992: 134). Figure 7.7: Fredrick Douglass mural, Divis Street, Belfast (Source: Author) Unlike the ‘Fight Bigotry, Fight Racism’ mural, the mural in Figure 7.7 includes an acknowledgement of both the Irish experience of racism and the racism practiced by some Irish people, particularly in America. As the quote to the right hand side of the bust of Douglass states, ‘perhaps no class has carried prejudice against colour to a point more dangerous than have the Irish and yet no people have been more relentlessly oppressed on account of race and religion’. Although the mural in Figure 7.7 echoes the anti-colonial sentiments of murals in support of Nelson Mandela and struggles in Angola and Mexico (Rolston 2003b), the conscious reference to racism committed by the Irish in a political mural is novel. Producing this message in a medium traditionally used to carry only positive images of Ireland and Irish Republicanism demonstrates willingness to engage with a less attractive side of Irish history: namely racism (Garner 2004). So 190 while the racism committed by some Irish people is absent from the ‘Fight Bigotry, Fight Racism’ mural, the near-by mural to Fredrick Douglass acknowledges the possibility that Irish people can be racist themselves, implicitly calling on the people of West Belfast to be anti-racist. The murals in Figures 7.6 and 7.7 graphically illustrate that anti-racism has become an accepted political message in West Belfast, so much so that it adorns arguably the most prominent mural wall in Northern Ireland. However, ‘recycling’, the replacement of old murals with new images, is very high on the Divis Street wall (McCormick and Jarman 2005), and, in late 2006, the ‘Fight Bigotry, Fight Racism’ mural was painted over. Yet the Douglass mural remains, and there are plans for a new anti-racist mural on the Divis Street wall (Interview with Marty, 05/12/07): this suggests the strength of both WARN and the mural’s anti-racist message. As well as being clearly visible to almost everyone entering and leaving ‘Republican’ West Belfast for over two years, the representation in Figure 7.6 was used on other WARN materials, such as an information pack, and reproduced in the local media (see Figure 7.8). Although the mural as a material object has ceased to exist, the representation itself continues to circulate. Figure 7.8: Reproduction of 'Fight Bigotry, Fight Racism' mural, The Andersonstown News 7/11/05, p10 191 The ‘Fight Bigotry, Fight Racism’ mural relies heavily on images and narratives rooted in Irish Republicanism. The use of Celtic motifs, such as the WARN symbol in the right- hand guesthouse window representing Belfast 2005, and Gaelic phrases would leave most local viewers in no doubt that this is both an anti-racist and a Republican mural.79 The location of the mural and the social identities of the vast majority of the local audience who were exposed to its message support this reading. Although Alana Lentin (2004) argues that anti-racist campaigns generally reflect the political culture of the nation-state in which they emerge, in Northern Ireland the nation-state itself is a contested and problematic construction. In this quite unique context, the discourse produced by this anti-racist mural appears to reflect the more specific political culture of Irish Republicanism in Northern Ireland. The mural’s call for solidarity between Irish and racialised groups is an example of how Republican murals ‘at their best’, according to Bill Rolston (2003a: 11), ‘educate, promote debate and encourage the best, most progressive elements in their community.’ The WARN mural, as well as the text of the mural to Douglass, may be understood as elements of an anti-racist ‘public pedagogy’ (Giroux 2004) aimed at educating the people of West Belfast. Indeed, highlighting the similarity between discrimination experienced by Irish migrants and contemporary migrants has been identified as central to the building of an anti-racist movement across Ireland (Garner 2004). Although the ‘Fight Bigotry, Fight Racism’ mural constructs its progressive, anti-racist message through iconography and narratives drawn from the ‘Irish’ experience, it does so in a context where Irish is a politically loaded term associated with Republicanism. The focus on the experiences of the Irish only constructs a narrative which only speaks to Catholic/Nationalists – Protestant/Unionists are totally absent and alienated. The mural could be read as an attempt to demonstrate to minorities how similar they are to the Irish, in the process appropriating racialised ‘Others’ into a Republican political position. The way in which sectarian issues and considerations complicate this anti- racist representation and its message is clearly demonstrated by the choice of medium and location. As noted, murals play a powerful role in affirming the sectarian identity of social space (Jarman 1998; Shirlow and Murtagh 2006). This mural and those that 79 ‘Cuir Stad le Ciniochas’, the phrase at the top of the mural, means ‘say no to racism’ in Irish. 192 surround it all contribute to the construction of the area as ‘Republican’ West Belfast; as such, they (re)produce dominant sectarian narratives of space and identity at the same time as they produce an anti-racist message. 7.3.2. Loyalist – Shankill Alternatives mural: ‘Declare War on Racism’ The image in Figure 7.9 is taken from a mural organised by Shankill Alternatives and painted by local youths in the Loyalist Shankill Road area of West Belfast. Unlike Figures 7.6 and 7.7, this mural was not painted on an outdoor wall but on a series of wooden panels and erected in a local school. The reason for this will be discussed later but first, as with the analysis of the WARN mural, the iconography of the image will be attended to (Tonkiss 1998). Figure 7.9: Declare War on Racism mural, Mount Gilbert School, Ballygomartin Road, West Belfast (Source: Author) This mural’s ‘internal narrative’ (Banks 2001) is framed by the phrase ‘Declare War on Racism’ in bold black print in the centre of the image; the word ‘war’ is highlighted in red. Below are gravestones surrounded by bright red poppies, open-handed salutes and 193 single words and phrases. The precise historical setting depicted is unclear. At its unveiling the artist talked about the Battle of the Somme and the World War I graves in Belgium which is a popular image in many Loyalist murals (Gallaher and Shirlow 2006; Rolston 2003b). However, an interviewee from Alternatives suggested that the graves were from World War II to show how ‘these ethnic minorities fought with Ulsterman. They died along with us to fight fascism, to fight Nazi Germany when Ulstermen fought against fascism and racism’ (Interview with Shankill Alternatives, 09/02/06). Regardless of the exact site, the dominant theme is that racism is something which must be fought. As such, the analogy of war and invasion which frames many racist discourses of nation (Gilroy 2001) is inverted through an appeal to the Loyalist experience of World Wars as a reason for pursuing an anti-racist agenda. Nevertheless, this message of anti-racist support and understanding through war is extremely contradictory and suggests a tension between militaristic Ulster Loyalism (Gallaher and Shirlow 2006) and anti-racist conceptions of solidarity and representation (Garner 2004; Lentin 2004). That said, the mural also simply communicates that there is a desire to see racism and racist jibes dead and buried. The offensive terms daubed on other stones, such as ‘Paki’, ‘Nigger’ and ‘Chink’, symbolise their removal from everyday speech – ‘the burying and putting to bed of these terms’ (Interview with Shankill Alternatives, 09/02/06). As well as words like “slavery” and “exterminate”, the names of two concentration camps (Auschwitz and Bergen-Belsen) occupy prominent positions on either side of the red hand in the centre of the frame. The systematic annihilation of Europe’s Jewish population during the Second World War was a product of the Nazi’s explicitly racial policies (Goldberg 2006). This reference to the camps speaks to the horrors inflicted when racist ideologies are followed to their limits and to the need to challenge such ideologies in everyday life. Like the Republican mural discussed in the previous section, this mural draws on incidence of racism in previous times and places to communicate an important message about local racisms. As noted, war is a prominent theme in this mural. The headstones are inscribed with the names of dead service personnel: for example ‘Rifleman Smyth Royal Irish Rifles’ appears on a stone in the extreme-right corner. Although Catholic and Protestant 194 Irishmen were involved in both World Wars, the sacrifice of working-class Protestants from areas like the Shankill is an integral anchor for Loyalist identity and is intimately bound up with the history of Ulster Loyalism (Brown 2007). The Remembrance Day Poppy, which is dotted throughout the mural, was initially used to commemorate the dead of World War I. The symbol has long been the preserve of the Unionist community, and nowadays it is seen as unequivocally British (Graham and Shirlow 2002). The wearing of a flower on Remembrance Day or ‘poppy day’ imputes political and sectarian identity on the wearer. The reliance on this symbol connects the mural and its anti-racist message to Loyalist identities and narratives. The Red Hand is perhaps the most instantly recognisable symbol of Ulster Loyalism; it is incorporated in the Northern Irish flag and also appears frequently in Loyalist mural paintings (Rolston 1992; 2003b). At more than double the height of any of the other hands, the image of the Red Hand dominates the centre of the mural. The large red hand is flanked by representations of other, smaller, more distant white, black and brown hands. The intention behind the inclusion of the Red Hand was to identify the mural with Loyalism as the Red Hand is ‘very closely associated with Loyalism’ (Interview with Shankill Alternatives, 09/02/06). According to one of the youths speaking at the launch, hands of different colours were painted alongside the Red Hand to signify racialised minorities living on the Shankill (Unidentified youth, Showing Your True Colours launch, 16/11/05). This co-presence of hands of many colours implies a vision of inter-racial cohabitation. However, the different scale and positioning of the hands carries a more ambiguous meaning. Are these other non-red hands destined to be equals to the red Loyalist hand, or is this to be diversity with Loyalist authority? Whatever the future that is imagined, the mural seems to suggest that the work of anti-racism, the discretion to accept or reject racialised minorities, lays largely in the hands of white Loyalists (Hage 2000). The ‘Declare War on Racism’ mural was painted by local youths from the Shankill Road with guidance from ‘Jackie’, a local artist. These youths both worked on the mural on their own (see Figure 7.10) and alongside victims of racist attacks in the area (see Figure 7.11). Looking more closely at these pictures we can see that the mural changed quite 195 significantly during its production. In an earlier version representations of brown hands occupy the very centre of the frame (see Figure 7.10), but by the time the finished article went on display a large red hand had taken their place (see Figure 7.9). Noticing this inconsistency, I spoke once again with Shankill Alternatives, and they said that they had voiced concerns to Jackie that the mural should focus on symbols of Loyalism and Loyalist heritage (Personal Communication, Shankill Alternatives, 12/03/08). These changes in the mural’s content reinforce the argument that its producers wanted this supposedly anti-racist object to be more Loyalist, and consequently, during its production, the focus shifted from anti-racism (Figure 7.10) to an increasing importance being placed on Loyalist representations (see Figure 7.9). Figure 7.10: Local Youths Painting Declare War on Racism Mural (Source: Shankill Alternatives) The mural was painted on four boards (see Figure 7.10) in a local community centre which were then moved to the Mount Gilbert School on the Ballygomartin Road; a short walk from the Alternatives centre in the Upper Shankill.80 After being erected in the 80 While the Shankill area is almost entirely Protestant (see Figure 7.1), the Shankill Road itself is also divided along paramilitary lines (Gallaher and Shirlow 2006). The Lower Shankill is controlled largely by 196 assembly hall of this secondary school the mural was unveiled at the launch of the ‘Showing Your True Colours’ initiative on 16th November 2005. This event was comprised of a series of speeches by youth involved in the project, representatives from Alternatives, and Loyalist politicians as well as Chinese and Indian dancing (see Figure 7.12). At the launch, however, there was no representation from the ethnically-identified minorities who had worked on the project and the ‘multicultural’ dancing was provided by groups from other areas of Belfast. Figure 7.11: Involvement of victims of racialised attacks in mural painting (Source: Shankill Alternatives) As well as stressing the need for anti-racism in the area, the mural launch provided an opportunity for Shankill Alternatives to make a case for the merits of Community Restorative Justice (CRJ). According to one speaker, ‘we as a community need to take restorative justice seriously because it can transform communities … it can provide the UDA and the Mid- and Upper-Shankill Road are UVF affiliated areas. The Alternatives office is located on the Woodvale Road, an area dominated by the UVF. The effects of this practical and ideological division is discussed in detail in Gallaher and Shirlow (2006: 154-7), but the key point here is that the UVF are generally more sympathetic to progressive politics and pluralist ideas than the UDA. This disposition might explain why Alternatives is based on the Upper rather than Lower Shankill and might suggest that the mural’s anti-racist message would have a better reception in this part of the Shankill. 197 alternatives to paramilitary activity and allow other issues like racism to be tackled’ (Jimmy, Shankill Alternatives, Showing Your True Colours launch, 16/11/05). In this quote, CRJ is constructed as a tool for both anti-racism and community transformation. The importance of respecting and accommodating new comers was raised by one of the youths who worked on the mural: ‘the other hands (in the mural) are representative of other communities. To make our community more diverse … we can have the clenched fist or we can offer out the red hand of friendship’ (Unidentified youth, Showing Your True Colours launch, 16/11/05). As with the policy discourses examined in Chapter Five, cultural diversity is held up as something that can facilitate social transformation – in this case the transformation of the Loyalist community of the Shankill Road. In this context, anti-racism on the Shankill Road is constructed as a vehicle for tackling racism and other social problems and building a stronger Loyalist community. This interpretation of anti-racism sits rather uneasily with its characterisation as a radical, alternative political discourse which seeks to transform all social relations (Lloyd 1998; 2002). Instead, it suggests that anti-racism can strengthen Loyalist constructions of space, culture and identity at the same time as addressing problems of racism. As such, the mural and the story of its production reveal the extent to which multiculturalism and sectarianism are deeply imbricated in post-Agreement Northern Ireland. Figure 7.12: ‘Multicultural’ dancing at launch of Showing Your True Colours initiative (Source: Shankill Alternatives) 198 As one of the organisers of the ‘Declare War in Racism’ mural explained, the initiative was part of an effort to change public perceptions of the Shankill: ‘the more we can positively sell our community to the wider world the better’ (Interview with Shankill Alternatives, 09/02/06). In the two years leading up to the campaign, the involvement of Loyalists in racist attacks in areas of Belfast, particularly in the south of the city, received much media attention (see Chapter Four). The ‘Showing Your True Colours’ initiative was a response to this situation and the need to be perceived to be challenging racism in Loyalist areas (Mervyn Gibson, Loyalist Commission, Showing Your True Colours launch, 16/11/05). However, the degree to which the mural and its message influenced people is uncertain. Although, as we have seen, its final message was contested and the inclusion of popular Loyalist symbols prioritised so that it would speak better to its target audience, the actual number of people who have been exposed to the mural has been extremely small. Since being unveiled, in November 2005, the mural, which was originally intended as a mobile artefact to be transferred easily between schools in different areas of Belfast, has remained out of sight in a store room in Mount Gilbert School. According to Shankill Alternatives, this occurred because in the immediate aftermath of the launch they were under threat of closure and did not have the resources to promote the mural.81 Since then funding has been secured, but the mural has not moved, rather the attention has shifted from anti-racism to anti-social behaviour issues on the Shankill (Personal Communication, Shankill Alternatives, 12/03/08). This shift in Alternatives’ focus coincided with a reduction in media attention on racism in Northern Ireland generally and in Loyalist areas in particular. This would seem to suggest that, perhaps, in the absence of unwanted publicity anti-racism is not as significant a concern as it had previously been. Murals are important and prominent features of the political process in Northern Ireland, but they do not act independently; they reflect the ideological context in which they are produced (Rolston 2003a). The differences in the two anti-racist murals analysed in this section reflects wider differences between the Republican and Loyalist murals displayed on either side of the West Belfast peaceline. While Republican murals on the Falls Road 81 Around this time a moratorium was placed on all CRJ funding, partly as a result of the continued refusal of Republicans to engage with the police. However, funding has since been re-instated and Alternatives remain in operation. 199 often speak of international solidarity, anti-Imperialism and the ‘Irish’ experience, those on the Shankill reflect the Loyalist character of the area through the use of symbols such as the Red Hand and the Union Jack (Rolston 2003b). In relying on specific symbols and narratives of identity and belonging associated with sectarian political identities to produce their anti-racist message, these murals could be accused of (re)producing sectarian constructions of space and identity. They often interpellate and incorporate ethnically-identified minorities into dominant, sectarian political positions and viewpoints. Yet, at the same time, the use of political murals to produce an anti-racist message in such a divided territory as West Belfast shows that the presence of cultural diversity is influencing sclerotic cultural practices grounded in sectarianism. The following section looks at the example of one anti-racist mural that gives hope that Northern Ireland really is moving forward to a multicultural future rather than simply becoming a sectarian society inflected with multiculturalism. 7.3.3. A glimmer of hope? Another anti-racist mural While this chapter has highlighted the existence of anti-racist groups on both sides of the Falls/Shankill peaceline, it has not, so far, examined the relationship between these groups. The research found little evidence of substantial contact between the groups involved in these anti-racist initiatives. The West Against Racism Network (WARN) are only active in the Falls area and displayed no plans to adapt their message for use on the Shankill. As a spokesperson for the group commented, ‘we’re not planning on going over there at the moment’ (Interview with Anti-racism Network, 06/05/06). Similarly, the Loyalist anti-racist project confined itself to the narrow geographical area of the Shankill Road. An interviewee involved with this project commented that ‘we invited all the anti-racisms over [to the launch of the ‘Showing Your True Colours’ campaign] but no-one came’ (Interview with Shankill Alternatives, 09/02/06). Although both groups expressed an interest in working cross-community, neither of the anti-racist groups in West Belfast interviewed were directly involved in cross-community work. This demonstrates once again the dominance of sectarian divisions over anti-racist agendas in West Belfast. 200 Despite the failure of these anti-racist groups to work cross-community or to produce anti-racist murals that could appeal to both Loyalist and Republican constituencies, the research did find one example of an anti-racist mural in West Belfast that does not refer to sectarian narratives of history and identity. The ‘I’m Not Your Stereotype’ mural (Figures 7.14, 7.15 and 7.16) was painted in 2004 by Filipino youths (with the help of local community activists) around the time of attacks on the homes of Filipino nurses living in West Belfast and working in the nearby Royal Victoria Hospital (Emerson 2005). The mural is from a wall just off Grosvenor Road (see Figure 7.13) which, along with Divis Street, is the main arterial route onto the Falls Road and ‘Republican’ West Belfast. It is located in a prominent position adjacent to the main Westlink Road into Belfast, and is thus clearly visible to many motorists travelling into, and out of, the city centre. This wall is also on the border between the Catholic/Nationalist residential community of Grosvenor Road and the urban centre of Belfast. Unlike the ‘Fight Bigotry, Fight Racism’ mural in Figure 7.6, this mural is not located on a popular mural wall, but is free-standing with no other political murals adjacent to it. Figure 7.13: Map showing location of I’m Not Your Stereotype mural close to Grosvenor Road, West Belfast (Source: http://maps.google.co.uk) 201 Figure 7.14: Left Panel ‘I'm Not Your Stereotype’ mural (Filipino), Grosvenor Road, Belfast (Source: Author) Figure 7.15: Centre Panel ‘I'm Not Your Stereotype’ mural, Grosvenor Road, Belfast (Source: Author) 202 Figure 7.16: Right Panel ‘I'm Not Your Stereotype’ mural (Irish), Grosvenor Road, Belfast (Source: Author) This mural’s iconographic story is remarkably concise and straightforward; based as it is around three pieces of text in bold, black, capital leaders which read ‘I’m Not Your Stereotype’ in Filipino (Figure 7.14), English (Figure 7.15) and Irish (Figure 7.16). The texts are separated by two sets of three stick figures. While previous murals discussed in this chapter were colourful, this mural uses just black and white paint to create a clearly legible representation that seems to speak to universalist conceptions of anti-racism. Universalism in anti-racist thought asserts the conviction that all people are equal and should be treated as such (Bonnett 2000). One advantage of this approach is that it avoids the reification of ‘race’ associated with anti-racism that relies on a relativist position (Gilroy 1998; Wievorka 1997). The fact that the representations of people used in this mural are neither gendered nor raced hints at the existence of a universal humanity beyond stereotypes (Bonnett 2000; Gilroy 1987). As well as avoiding racialised representations, sectarian symbols and narratives are not invoked in this mural. The mural is not just about accommodating new diversity in West Belfast; instead, people are implored not to judge others on the basis of stereotypical assumptions about an individual’s bodily appearance. 203 The central message of the ‘I’m Not Your Stereotype’ mural is anti-discriminatory. As such, it offers a glimmer of hope that an anti-racist discourse that transcends sectarian narratives is possible. However, it has not been interpreted as such by local commentators. One prominent writer on Northern Irish affairs remarked that the mural, far from challenging dominant political discourses, ‘is a West Belfast stereotype par excellence …. [t]hey want us all to be their stereotypes, branded by our postcodes’ (Emerson 2005: np). This reference to postcodes speaks to the segregation of religious space in Northern Ireland along sectarian lines. As Burton (1978) noted, where a person lives is an important cue in the process of ‘Telling’ their religious identity. In this quote, Emerson (2005) seems to be suggesting that the mural is instructing Filipinos to be Republican based on the fact that they live in a Catholic/Nationalist area. This rather crude reading fails to engage fully with either the mural’s message of anti-discrimination or who actually produced it. As noted, the mural was painted by Filipino youths living locally. This is significant as it suggests that the cultural practices by which sectarianism is (re)produced are being adopted – and in the process potentially transformed – by new groups in Northern Irish society. The fact that Filipino youths painted the mural also suggests that these new groups feel secure enough to draw attention to their presence in the area. The mural is located in a border area between the Catholic/Nationalist Grosvenor Road and the neutral space of Belfast city centre (see Figure 7.13). The very fact that the mural was not vandalised or ‘reclaimed’ by the local community suggests that its message is generally accepted and supported in the area (McCormick and Jarman 2005). Unlike the ‘Fight Bigotry, Fight Racism’ mural on Divis Street discussed earlier, the ‘I’m Not Your Stereotype’ mural avoids (re)producing sectarian narratives of space and identity. In fact, the crux of its anti-racist message (that judging people based on stereotypical assumptions based on their appearance is wrong) challenges sectarianism as well as racism. Rather than simply reflecting the political culture in which it is located (Lentin 2004), this mural (and the story of its production) appears to break out of dominant sectarian narratives and political identities to construct a broader anti-racist social vision based on inclusionary principles of tolerance and respect (Anthias and Lloyd 2002). The involvement of Filipino youths in the painting of the mural suggests 204 that, in this context, multiculturalism is both tempering sectarianism and providing an opportunity to move beyond it. Rather than being structured by sectarianism, the mural seems to graphically illustrate the potential for multicultural agendas to fundamentally challenge sectarianism and, in the process, imagine a future, post-sectarian Northern Ireland. 7.4. Posters and Pamphlets The following sections extend the analysis of visuals produced by anti-racist groups in West Belfast beyond murals to look at posters and pamphlets. There are two main reasons for doing this. First, this visual culture plays an important role in the (re)production of sectarian narratives of history, space and identity in Northern Ireland (Shirlow and Murtagh 2006). Second, anti-racist campaigns often utilise posters and pamphlets, and the representations carried in these media have been the subject of previous academic analysis (Gilroy 1987; Murji 2006). Reflecting on the construction of sectarian boundaries in Northern Ireland, it is clear that where political posters and pamphlets are displayed and distributed constructs boundaries. For instance, Sinn Fein election posters and Union Jacks act as powerful demarcations of sectarian space and territoriality. Similarly, distributing flyers for a Republican Easter Rising Anniversary celebration in a public house constructs the space of both the bar and the street as Catholic/Nationalist. Anti-racist campaigns in West Belfast have not confined themselves to painting murals, they have also produced anti-racist posters and pamphlets. The following sections investigate the representations that these objects use and their power to produce particular visions of identity as well as social difference and its accommodation (Rose 2001). 7.4.1. WARN texts As well as organising the painting of the ‘Fight Bigotry, Fight Racism’ mural, the West Against Racism Network (WARN) produced a number of different anti-racist texts. The object in Figure 7.17 is a mock passport which uses the same iconography and is the same size and shape as an authentic passport of the Republic of Ireland. The final page 205 mimics the photo page of a real passport, and there are instructions to attach a photo and personal details. As well as standard information such as address or date of birth, space is made for including the bearer’s hopes, values and language (see Figure 7.18). Instead of blank pages for passport control stamps, eight of the passport’s twelve pages are taken up with dense text. The putative link between anti-racism and Irish Republicanism is a salient feature of the ‘passport’. For example, significant portions, like the word ‘pas’ on the cover, are written in both English and Irish; symbolically linking both the passport and the bearer to Irish Republicanism. Inside, the narrative locates racism in Loyalist communities and the history of their involvement in sectarian violence. You don’t need to be a politics professor to work out the connection between Loyalists burning out Catholics in North Belfast, the Short Strand and in Larne, on the one hand, and Loyalists driving out Africans, Moslems, Filipinos, Portuguese and Chinese in South Belfast, Ballymena, Antrim and Dungannon. Take out the words “Taig”, “Fenian”, “Papist” etc. from a sectarian diatribe, and replace them with “hordes of asylum seekers”, “spongers”, “muggers” or “yellow peril”, and you have a classic racist text like the one Loyalists put about in South Belfast (WARN 2005a: 7). The suggestion made in the above quote is that the connection between Loyalism and racialised violence (McVeigh and Rolston 2007) is self-evident. Loyalists are portrayed as targeting racialised minorities with the same derogatory terms, as well as physical violence, as was once directed towards Catholics. The ‘classic racist text’ referred to was a black and white leaflet produced and distributed anonymously in the Donegall Pass area of South Belfast in 2004 that allegedly described the Chinese as a ‘yellow peril’ and a ‘bigger threat than thirty years of Republican violence’ (Interview with Chinese Welfare Association, 30/09/05). The passport’s text goes on to argue that Republicans should identify with racialised minorities as victims of aggression. It stands to reason that our solidarity with people from black and minority ethnic communities should be automatic, because we all know what it is like to be on the receiving end of such bigotry, whether it is from individuals, from Loyalist mobs or from the state (WARN 2005a: 7). 206 This quote reiterates some of the points made earlier in the discussion of the ‘Fight Bigotry, Fight Racism’ mural. The similarity of Irish experiences of discrimination and those of racialised minorities in contemporary Northern Ireland is stressed. The putative similarity between the experience of sectarianism (‘bigotry’) and racism discussed in Chapter Six is also constructed in this quote. The anti-racist message produced in the passport’s text pivots around the association of anti-Irish discrimination, anti-Catholic sectarianism and racism. Once again, this narrative neglects to mention the racist practices that have been associated with some of the Irish themselves (Ignatiev 1995). Similarly, as noted in the previous chapter, an acknowledgment of the potential for racism in Catholic/Nationalist areas is absent from the text. The continual references to a Republican ‘We’ and a Loyalist ‘Them’ locates racism only in the latter group at the same time as it interpellates the passport holder within specific discourses of identity and belonging based on sectarian difference. Figure 7.17: Front cover WARN passport The passport was written by a member of the Pat Finucane Centre in Derry and produced as part of WARN’s initiative to promote West Belfast as an anti-racist 207 ‘Republic of Conscience’ in May 2005.82 As part of this campaign a mock security checkpoint was constructed on the Falls Road, and all passing cars and pedestrians were issued with the passport that was printed at a discounted rate by a local press (Interview with Anti-racism Network, 06/05/06). The event was launched by Gerry Adams MP, with local Sinn Fein politicians also in attendance, and all had their picture taken for the local press brandishing copies of the passport (Interview with Indian Community Centre, 18/10/05). The stamps on the passport’s back page (see Figure 7.18) suggest the support of a sizable number of community groups active in West Belfast. Surplus copies were later distributed at Anti-racism Network meetings and inserted into the welcome pack discussed later in this section. Figure 7.18: Photo page, WARN passport As technologies for the control of entry and exit from certain defined territories and spaces, passports are central to the production and maintenance of borders and processes of racialisation in modern states (Kemp 2004). The use of a passport to carry an anti- 82 The Pat Finucane Centre is a centre for human rights and social change which is based in Derry. It is named after a prominent Catholic solicitor who was murdered by Loyalists in Belfast in 1989 in what has been one of the most controversial killings of ‘the Troubles’. 208 racist message disrupts this association with such exclusionary practices and suggests that one is entering an anti-racist space. In Northern Ireland this could be interpreted as an attempt to redefine citizenship in non-sectarian terms. However, the ‘issuing’ of these passports also produced a border around the area in which they were distributed and to which the text refers; namely ‘Republican’ West Belfast. As these passports were only circulated in Republican areas they served to (re)produce sectarian boundaries and narratives of space and identity. As a consequence, in creating an anti-racist space this text (and the overall event) also maintained the production of space in sectarian terms. The ability of anti-racist representations to contribute to the (re)production of sectarian identities – and potentially divisions – has been noted throughout this chapter. This possibility is most graphically illustrated in a booklet entitled Comhar na Gcomharsan produced by WARN for inclusion in an information pack geared towards migrants coming to live in West Belfast. This seventy-two page booklet is made up of eighteen separate sections which deal with a range of topics including social security, leisure centres and useful emergency numbers ‘to help you settle into and live in West Belfast’ (WARN 2005b: 1). The tone of the text is far from neutral: in an introductory section on the history of the area, the British presence in Northern Ireland is referred to as ‘the occupation’. Elsewhere, in a section on religious facilities in the area, only Catholic churches are listed. The interpellation of new migrants into Catholic and Republican subject positions is demonstrated in the following advice concerning the police. The police force in the North of Ireland (the PSNI) is seen by most people here as an extension of the British state and has no support. You should avoid calling them into the area, unless it is a necessity, e.g. for insurance purposes. If the PSNI ask questions about your neighbours, you should not answer them and you should inform your local community centre or councillor at once. It is advisable not to go to a PSNI station alone (WARN, 2005b: 7). Advising racialised groups not to contact the police is a dangerous example of the subsuming of new identities within dominant Republican discourses and practices, in 209 this instance opposition to the PSNI.83 Although the booklet was supposed to help newcomers settle in the area, it serves to create a sectarianised subject; one who should, after reading the booklet, be able to behave in a ‘properly’ Republican way. The production of the Comhar na Gcomharsan text followed a successful grant application written by WARN to the Racial Equality Unit (REU) of the Office of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister (OFMDFM) on behalf of the Falls Community Council (FCC), a community group in West Belfast. The FCC were awarded £8,000 to produce the welcome pack, and they asked WARN to compile the text. Not long after the launch of the pack in early 2005, the reference to policing in the booklet was picked up in the Northern Irish media (Emerson 2005). When the content of the text was brought to the attention of the REU in March 2005, funding for the project was withdrawn (Interview with Director of Racial Equality Unit, 29/09/05). As the money had already been spent and the welcome packs printed, WARN were forced to meet the publication costs.84 It was originally intended that the welcome pack would be distributed free of charge from the offices of community groups as well as those of politicians and service providers in West Belfast. Following its negative publicity, the pack was largely withdrawn from circulation, although I did see some copies distributed at the launch of the WARN ‘pubs and clubs’ initiative (Falls Road, 28/03/06). Criticism of the pack was not confined to media and political spheres. One member of a prominent voluntary group on the Falls Road that works closely with the migrants described the welcome pack as ‘a nightmare’. This interviewee commented as follows: We weren’t party to that … it was poor, very very bad … It was supposed to be a welcome pack about what was available in the area, what community groups were available, what service provision, what shops there were, schools, churches. But it was very much a one sided document, sort of ‘don’t contact the PSNI’. There was a list of churches, but every church in it was a Catholic church, there wasn’t a Protestant 83 As noted in the previous chapter, the Republican position on policing in Northern Ireland has changed remarkably in the last year. While at the time of the publication of the welcome pack Sinn Fein were still refusing to endorse PSNI, in 2006 they reversed their decision and chose to support policing. This brought to an end to over eighty-five years of Republican opposition to policing in Northern Ireland. 84 They did this by arranging for Damien Dempsey, a Dublin born folk singer pictured beside the ‘Fight Bigotry, Fight Racism’ mural in the press clipping in Figure 7.8, to play a fund raiser in Belfast on their behalf (Interview with Anti-racist Network, 06/05/06). 210 church in it. It was very narrow focused, in terms of the Equality Commission they couldn’t stand for it and there was a lot of complaints about it. A lot of councillors and that saying that it was totally unacceptable. It should have been more balanced, the content of it (Interview with Springfield Charitable Association, 15/02/06). The Comhar na Gcomharsan text and its reception reiterates two key points about the relationship between multiculturalism and sectarianism in post-Agreement Northern Ireland. First, this extreme example shows that sectarian division may be constructed within, and perpetuated by, anti-racist texts. If every new migrant in West Belfast followed the advice contained in this booklet they would be quickly reproducing Republican narratives of history and identity and contributing to the maintenance of sectarianism. Second, and more hopefully, it was found that the construction of sectarian discourses and subject positions in anti-racist texts was not uncritically accepted. The Springfield Charitable Association (SCA) is located on the Catholic/Nationalist side of the Springfield Road and, as such, would generally deliver services to people describing themselves as ‘Republican’. However, as the quote above demonstrates, the SCA were not involved in the booklet and did not support its message. For this interviewee, the text was unbalanced and its inclusion of details of only Catholic facilities sectarian. The fact that the text’s sectarian character was challenged by some in West Belfast suggests that, in this context, cultural diversity and anti-racism is forcing people to critically reflect on sectarianism; even when sectarian divisions are being (re)produced in texts aimed at new ethnically-identified minorities in the area. 7.4.2. ‘Loyalist or racist? You can’t be Both’ As well as producing the ‘Declare War on Racism’ mural, the Loyalist anti-racism campaign ‘Showing Your True Colours’ on the Shankill Road also distributed anti-racist pamphlets and posters. These texts all carried the message Loyalist or Racist? You can’t be Both and were initially circulated around Loyalist areas of Belfast in March 2005. The image in Figure 7.19 is taken from the front cover of this six-panelled glossy pamphlet and is somewhat clouded in ambiguity. The country of origin of the figure is unclear; perhaps she is South Asian, perhaps not. The tattoos on the body are equally ambiguous; they might be henna-inspired designs or the types of tattoos popular 211 amongst the white working-class in Loyalist areas of Belfast. It looks like a picture of a woman but the clothes, the sleeveless t-shirt and blue denims, seem to challenge assumptions about female dress. In this anti-racist pamphlet, the Union Jack t-shirt with ‘Made in Britain’ emblazoned across the front of the figure suggests that she could just as easily be a tough Loyalist woman saying no to her friends as a potential victim of racialised violence. This ambiguity extends to the gesture of the out-stretched right arm which could be interpreted as a defensive ‘hands off’ or as a conciliatory reaching out. Figure 7.19: Front panel, Loyalist or Racist? You can't be Both 212 It has been argued that, rather than challenging racism, the visual representation of the racialised body in anti-racist campaigns reproduces racism and racist modes of interpretation (Murji 2006). Representations of ‘race’ are generally negative, constructing difference as a ‘problem’ and reinforcing stereotypes (Gilroy 1998; Jackson 1994a). The place of ‘race’ in Figure 7.19 is quite uncertain. If the image is read as a victim of racist attacks (or even as a racialised Loyalist) the style, clothing and gesture disrupts dominant narratives of victimhood attached to the racialised ‘Other’ in Northern Ireland. Accordingly, this representation appears to challenge simplistic assumptions about ‘race’, sexuality and even gender. However, the viewer is also called on to see the person in the photograph as a strong Loyalist. This is done through the Union Jack t- shirt as well as the three phrases suspended above the image. ‘Ulster Says No’, ‘Ulster Will Fight’ and ‘Ulster Will Be Right’ are all popular Loyalist political slogans which emerged during the often violent Loyalist protests in 1986 against the Anglo-Irish Agreement. These protests led to increased paramilitary violence and the expulsion of many Catholic/Nationalists from Protestant/Unionist areas (Cochrane 2001). In this image, ‘Ulster Says No’ and ‘Ulster Will Be Right’ are written in red and blue respectively, colours very closely associated with Ulster Loyalism (Cairns 2000). Despite using such an ambiguous image on its front cover, this pamphlet constructs anti- racism as an extension of a Loyalist political position and locates it within dominant Loyalist discourses and narratives. This appeal to Loyalist narratives is continued on the inside pages of the pamphlet which are taken up with a series of photographic images accompanied by pieces of text. In the World War II recruitment poster reproduced in Figure 7.20, representations of what appears to be a Sikh man and a Black man are pictured alongside, but anterior to, five white men. All the characters are carrying arms, the intimation being that they are defending the Union Jack fluttering behind them. The positionality of the subjects in this image is important. Racialised bodies may be fighting with white men but they are located at the back, which suggests some degree of inferiority. The uniforms also support this reading. Some of the white men wear the garb of the air force and the navy, but the racialised bodies depicted are members of the less prestigious regular army. This presentation of racialised ‘Others’ as ‘loyal subjects’ was also noted in Barthes’(1972) 213 analysis of a French ‘negro’ soldier saluting the tricolour on the front cover of a copy of Paris Match. Figure 7.20: British army recruitment poster, Loyalist or Racist? You can’t be Both The image from the World War II recruitment poster in Figure 7.20 is juxtaposed with the promulgation that As loyal British subjects we are part of one of the greatest stories of world history. The world owes much to the British Empire – freedom of political choice, thought and religious belief. International trade and many global institutions are the positive result of British influence in the world. The great movements of Africa and Asia towards self-government and independence were nurtured in the schools of Empire. What was a right for us was offered as a right for all (Loyalist Commission 2005: np). 214 This quote suggests that without colonialism and, specifically, the British Empire nation- states in Africa and Asia would not have developed self-government. This is a remarkably contradictory discourse. Racist ideologies and contemporary racism are very much a product of colonial processes and the subjugation of ‘inferior’ peoples by white settlers (Goldberg 1993). Twentieth century independence movements were a product of colonial racism (Balibar 1991) not, as suggested in the above quote, of religious and political ideas handed down by imperialists. Furthermore, independence was rarely happily bequeathed by the British Empire, it was a product of both post-World War II social and political changes and armed independence movements in many colonies. The representations in this pamphlet fit Homi Bhabha’s (1994) definition of a ‘colonial text’ in that they disavow difference and the historical experience of colonialism. The pamphlet’s colonial discourse depicts racialised minorities as ‘loyal subjects’ and calls on Loyalists to protect these groups as they did previously during the time of empire. The argument that the legacy of empire furnishes Loyalists with an anti-racist history that can be used in the present day is deeply problematic. It constructs racialised groups as inherently inferior and in need of protection and denies the agency of these groups. Consequently, the work of anti-racism becomes the acceptance, or possibly even the rejection, of these groups rather than the imagining of a future, non-racist society (Anthias and Lloyd 2002). As well as the pamphlet, three glossy A4 size posters were produced as part of the Loyalist or Racist? You can’t be Both initiative. The images and text in these three posters is the same as that which adorns the back page of the pamphlet (see Figure 7.21). On one poster a picture of a Black man in military garb with what appears to be a sword resting on his shoulder is juxtaposed with the same ‘Declare War on Racism’ imploration that appeared in the Loyalist anti-racist mural. This combative language reflects the ‘conflict culture’ which exists within many Loyalist communities and which is bound up with a deep-seated ‘siege mentality’ in the wider history of Ulster Loyalism (Shirlow and McGovern 1996). During ‘the Troubles’ the notion that Loyalists were under siege from Republicans was commonplace and, more recently, dissident Loyalists have painted murals of the Siege of Derry to signal their dissatisfaction at power-sharing arrangements with Catholic/Nationalists (Gallaher and Shirlow 2006: 162). Allied to the 215 history of sectarian violence and conflict, this sense of being besieged seems to have produced a culture within which social issues are constructed in terms of ‘fights’ and ‘wars’ which must be ‘won’. As well as the contradictions inherent in constructing anti- racism as a battle, the use of such an unambiguously raced body in this poster (and in the other two posters discussed below) is also problematic. This image of a Black man in military uniform could be accused of reifying socially constructed notions of ‘racial’ difference (Gilroy 2001) and actually contributing to processes of racialisation in Northern Irish society (Chan 2006; Miles 1992; Penrose and Jackson 1993). Although the image used in this anti-racist poster might appeal to people who identify with Loyalist culture, the assumptions that inform these images may be counterproductive in advancing the vision of a socially cohesive future. Figure 7.21: Triptych of posters, Loyalist or Racist? You can’t be Both The photograph in the second poster is of a Black Glasgow Rangers footballer, Marvin Andrews, with a Union Jack in the background. The text in red beside the picture reads 216 ‘By Tackling Racism Head On’. The use of a football metaphor in this poster mirrors anti-racist campaigns in England, most notably the Football Association’s ‘Kick It Out’ campaign and, more recently, the ‘Show Racism the Red Card’ campaign.85 While football matches are often the scene of racist behaviours in the rest of the UK, in Northern Ireland sport, especially football, has been an arena in which sectarian division and violence has been played out (Sugden and Bairner 1993). Although based in Scotland, Glasgow Rangers are a very popular side in Loyalist areas of Northern Ireland for a number of historical and cultural reasons (Bairner and Shirlow 1998). In this poster, the presence of Black players on the Rangers team is used to illustrate the contribution of racialised ‘Others’ to Loyalist culture and, in the process, help the viewer identify with the campaign’s anti-racist message. The choice of Marvin Andrews also seems noteworthy. While there have been a number of more prominent Black Rangers players, Andrews is well known as a devout born-again Christian.86 In selecting Andrews for this poster, then, it seems that an attempt is being made to highlight the presence of racialised difference in both Protestantism and Glasgow Rangers. The final poster involves a photograph of what appear to be members of African branches of the Orange Order marching in an Orange parade beside the slogan ‘Ensuring Civil and Religious Liberties for All’. The Orange Order plays an integral role in the everyday lives of many Loyalists (Cairns 2000). Orange Parades, which occur all year round but are particularly concentrated around July 12th, are key symbolic and material processes in the (re)production of Loyalist political identities in space (Bryan 2000; Jarman 1997). In the photograph at the foot of Figure 7.21, there appears to be a white Northern Irish Orangeman in the left foreground with three Black members of the Order behind him. Although the Orange Lodge is associated primarily with Northern Ireland, it has branches around the world; including in Togo and Ghana in West Africa, and members of these West African Lodges have regularly attended the 12th July marches in 85 The ‘Kick It Out’ campaign was established in 1993 to challenge racism and work for positive change in English football. The campaign works through all levels of football, from professional to amateur, to raise debate and tackle racism in the game. Recently the campaign has been updated and rebranded as ‘Show Racism the Red Card’. This campaign has been active at football grounds and elsewhere in England, Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. 86 Andrews once famously refused medical treatment for a horrific leg injury saying that God would heal him. Relying solely on prayer he recovered in time to take part in the 2006 World Cup, representing Trinidad and Tobago. 217 Belfast in recent years. In recent decades, Orange Order parades have become increasingly contentious (Bryan 2000). Discourses of tradition and civil liberty are often employed to justify parade routes which pass by or through Catholic/Nationalist areas (Cairns 2001). This poster’s anti-racist message pivots on two related claims. First, as Loyalists and Orangemen are upholders of civil and religious liberty they should defend racialised minorities. Second, as there is racialised difference in the Orange Order, for Loyalists to engage in racist behaviour is to discriminate against members of their most sanctified Loyal institution. The posters and pamphlets discussed in this section were published and distributed by the Loyalist Commission (see base of Figure 7.21). The pamphlets were distributed mainly to community centres and voluntary groups and the posters given out to pubs and clubs in Loyalist areas. One interviewee commented that the poster showing African branches of the Orange Order was ‘by far the most popular’ in the bars ‘because it’s funny’ (Interview with Shankill Alternatives, Belfast, 09/02/06). The idea that Black men were members of the Orange Order challenged the assumptions of drinkers, many of whom were members of the Orange Order themselves and would presumably see the institution as exclusively white. Although most of the posters were apparently distributed, stockpiles of pamphlets in Shankill Alternatives’ offices almost a year after the campaign launch suggested that many of the pamphlets remained undistributed. One possible reason for this is the fact that many outside the Loyalist constituency found the images and associations used in the pamphlets and posters offensive and unhelpful. Some interviewees representing ethnically-identified minorities in Belfast were deeply dissatisfied with the confrontational tone of the pamphlet and refused to distribute it (Interview with Chinese Welfare Association, 30/09/05). This suggests that, while the campaign may have had some level of popular support in Loyalist areas, it also had a divisive effect as it alienated ethnically-identified minorities living in the same Loyalist areas. The statement ‘Loyalist or Racist? You can’t Both’, which is the overarching message of both the pamphlets and the posters, is a powerful one. Constructing Loyalism and racism as mutually exclusive ideologies provides a clear message for everyone exposed to it. In 218 looking more closely at the symbols and narratives used in these texts, this section has highlighted both the productive ambiguity of some representations and the problematic contradictions embedded within others. At various points these texts make reference to Loyalist opposition to the Anglo-Irish Agreement, Loyalist involvement in colonialism and the presence of racialised difference in the Glasgow Rangers Football team and the Orange Order. Although the aim of these references is to persuade Loyalists to be anti- racist, they all rely on particular narratives of history, identity and belonging grounded in Ulster Loyalism and exclude those not included in this tradition. As such, these anti- racist representations reflect the particular (sectarian) political culture and context within which they were produced and circulated (Lentin 2004). It is also important to note that as well as being visual representations, the Loyalist or Racist? You can’t be Both posters and pamphlets are also material objects whose presence marks a space as belonging to a specific (Loyalist) ‘side’ of the sectarian divide. While these posters and pamphlets were produced to promote an anti-racist message, in this context their message is structured by – and even tends to both symbolically and materially (re)produce – narratives of identity and belonging grounded in sectarianism. 7.5. Conclusion In this chapter, the final analysis chapter of the dissertation, the attention turned to another sub-field of multiculturalism (anti-racism), looking, specifically, at the visual culture produced by anti-racist campaigns in West Belfast. Visual culture such as political murals, posters and pamphlets contribute to the construction and (re)production of sectarian identities in Northern Ireland. This chapter examined how new agendas of social relations (anti-racism) are being reflected in, and are potentially reshaping, these important traditions of cultural and political expression. The empirical focus of this chapter was on anti-racist representations produced by grassroots anti-racist groups in West Belfast. As the brief discussion on West Belfast highlighted, this is an area deeply divided along sectarian lines. Residential segregation in West Belfast is particularly stark, and visual culture are often used to reflect the different (sectarian) identities on both sides of the ‘peaceline’. Yet, like the rest of 219 Northern Ireland, West Belfast is changing. The number of ethnically-identified minorities coming to live in the area has increased, as has the number of racist attacks reported to the police. Grassroots anti-racist groups emerged in West Belfast in this context. This chapter looked specifically at anti-racist visual culture produced by two such groups: the West Against Racism Network (WARN) on the predominantly Republican Falls Road and Shankill Alternatives on the Loyalist Shankill Road. The analysis of the anti-racist representations produced by both WARN and Shankill Alternatives reiterated the key findings of this thesis; namely the mutual imbrication of sectarianism and multiculturalism in Northern Ireland and the importance of context in dictating how they effect one another. As this chapter showed, at many junctures anti- racism is structured by sectarianism. The anti-racist murals produced by both WARN and Shankill Alternatives relied heavily on narratives and symbols drawn from specific (sectarian) traditions and influences. The most graphic illustration of the (re)production of sectarianism in anti-racist visual culture was found in Comhar na Gcormharsan, a booklet produced by WARN for migrant workers coming to West Belfast. This text, with its advice to new migrants to avoid contacting the police, served to interpellate ethnically-identified minorities into Catholic and Republican subject positions. Similarly, the colonial discourses contained in the Loyalist or Racist? You can’t be Both initiative's posters and pamphlets only made reference to Loyalist narratives and ignored the agency of racialised minorities. The impact of sectarianism on anti-racist agendas was even felt when anti-racist messages were produced in less traditional mediums. Although the WARN passport attempted to create an anti-racist space in West Belfast, as it was only distributed in Republican areas and relied on Republican narratives, the space it produced was simultaneously defined in terms of sectarianism. While the use of the visual culture of sectarian division to produce an anti-racist message may be considered problematic, it also provides opportunities to advance anti- racist arguments in media most likely to reach a captive audience in areas such as West Belfast. Despite the absence of cross-community anti-racism initiatives, this chapter’s analysis of anti-racist visual culture in West Belfast did uncover moments where the presence of cultural diversity seemed to temper dominant sectarian ways of being and 220 doing. The mural to Fredrick Douglass on the Falls Road included an acknowledgment of the role of some Irish in racist practices that has been identified as crucial to building wider anti-racist alliances on the island. Also, the sectarian messages contained in anti- racist campaigns were not always unquestioningly accepted. The analysis of the production of the ‘Declare War on Racism’ mural showed that its message had been contested and that an earlier version had a much greater focus on anti-racism than on Loyalist narratives. Similarly, the sectarian discourses contained in the Comhar na Gcormharsan booklet were rejected by an interviewee from a community group directly involved with new migrants in the Falls Road area. Elsewhere, the direct involvement of Filipino youths in painting the ‘I’m Not Your Stereotype’ mural suggests that the cultural practices that have helped maintain sectarian division may be in the process of being adopted, and potentially transformed, by new migrant groups. Moving beyond sectarianism requires more than a thin veneer of multiculturalism; it demands that Northern Ireland embraces a genuinely post-sectarian and multicultural framework. The ‘I’m Not Your Stereotype’ mural’s message and the story of its production is a powerful symbol of hope that multiculturalism can contribute to Northern Ireland moving towards a socially cohesive future. 221 Chapter Eight Conclusion 222 8.1 Introduction This dissertation has examined multiculturalism in the specific context of a society divided along sectarian lines. My work has demonstrated that sectarianism and multiculturalism are mutually constituted in post-Agreement Northern Ireland. In many contexts the sectarianism that is embedded in Northern Irish society, space and institutional structures makes it very difficult to pursue a multicultural vision of society. For example, Chapter Seven showed that visual culture produced by anti-racist groups in West Belfast (re)produces sectarian narratives and identities. Although it was overwhelmingly the case that sectarianism undermined emerging multicultural agendas, I also located some beacons of hope – contexts in which multiculturalism seemed to temper sectarianism. For example, Chapter Six suggested that practices which seek to recognise cultural diversity – such as multicultural festivals – might have the potential to introduce wider debates on identity and difference in Northern Ireland beyond the ‘two traditions’. This finding suggests the possibility that the presence of cultural diversity and the emergence of multicultural agendas might be helping Northern Ireland move forward into a future that is not just post-conflict but post-sectarian too. This concluding chapter begins with a review of the dissertation in order to show how the over-arching argument was built up and developed in each of the preceding chapters. The succeeding section reflects, in light of the conclusions drawn from the empirical chapters, on some of the theoretical and empirical implications of these conclusions. This reflection considers the contribution that the research makes to the literature on sectarianism in Northern Ireland and multiculturalism in complexly diverse societies. The chapter ends with a brief discussion on the implications of the findings for contemporary Northern Irish society and its attempts to realise a post-conflict, post- sectarian vision of itself. 8.2 A Review of the Dissertation Chapter One very briefly introduced and outlined the structure of this dissertation. In seeking to explore and understand multicultural agendas in a society divided along sectarian lines, I had to have a theoretical grasp of both multiculturalism and 223 sectarianism. To fully account for these processes in contemporary Northern Ireland, it was also important to consider relevant empirical research on emerging multicultural agendas in this context. Chapter Two’s tri-partite structure addressed these distinct but overlapping literatures and materials. The first section sought to conceptualise sectarianism in this research. Recent work from within the framework of geographies of religion was briefly reviewed, and was shown to be inadequate for understanding the complexly embedded nature of sectarianism in Northern Ireland. As the ensuing discussion suggested, sectarianism in Northern Ireland involves complex sets of discourses and social practices through which specific constructions of space and social identity based on sectarian difference are (re)produced. In the next section, I reviewed a range of literatures relevant to understanding multiculturalism in contemporary societies. I argued that multiculturalism can be understood as a wide range of strategies for fixing the meaning of cultural diversity in society (Hall 2000). I identified four separate approaches to understanding multiculturalism (demographic multiculturalism, the politics of recognition, anti-racism, and multicultural policy and its institutional structures), and showed how each was conceptualised and understood in relation to my research agenda. In the final section, I accounted for literature on multiculturalism and anti-racism in contemporary Northern Ireland. This discussion suggested the absence of, and need for, extensive, empirical research on the intersection of sectarianism and emerging multicultural agendas in Northern Ireland. I had several methodological and procedural considerations to assess in order to successfully conduct research that would illuminate the relationship between emerging multicultural agendas and sectarianism in post-Agreement Northern Ireland. In Chapter Three, I explored these considerations, thinking through both the methodological and practical rationale behind my research choices. Looking back, I began this chapter by outlining the broad commitment to discourse analysis which I adopted in this research. I discussed the utility of discourse analysis for looking at talk and text (including visual materials), and argued in favour of extending this method to include an engagement with social practice. As a consequence, my qualitative research design combined observation with interviewing, visual methods, and analysis of policy and institutional structures. I argued that the use of such a broad range of qualitative methods helped strengthen the 224 validity of research findings by allowing for the triangulation of data gleaned from different sources. In terms of practicalities, Chapter Three clearly laid out the criteria by which research sites and units of analysis were selected. The general empirical focus on Belfast was justified in terms of both my own location and that of the research participants. I also provided a detailed account of the fieldwork process; focusing, in particular, on interviewing as this was the main method employed. Considering the practice of conducting qualitative interviews led me to reflect on, amongst other things, the effect of my identity as a Southern Irish Catholic on interviewee responses. Here I argued that interviewer-interviewee similarity is not essential for successful interviewing (Rose 1997) and that my own identity did not unduly bias the research. Later in the chapter, I reflected on the methodological tensions that arose from the uncertain political situation during the fieldwork period. Rather than present an account of an ideal, fully devolved context, the research presented a snapshot of Northern Irish institutional structures and practices at a particular historical moment. Although the possibility of using research techniques from non-representational approaches was also considered, this chapter concluded that the methods used and approaches taken were well-suited to addressing my research goals and objectives. Chapter Four provided background material on the history and politics of sectarianism and multiculturalism in Northern Ireland necessary to fully understand the later analytical chapters. The brief overview of the history of Northern Ireland showed how sectarianism has been deeply embedded in Northern Irish politics and society since the Ulster Plantations of the seventeenth century. The Northern Ireland state was itself a product of sectarian division, and it was this social stratification that, eventually, precipitated ‘the Troubles’. In this chapter, I argued that attempts to manage sectarian relations and promote peace in Northern Ireland have generally prioritised the recognition and accommodation of sectarian identities. It is hardly surprising, then, that the Agreement has, in some contexts, contributed to a reiteration of sectarian politics. Although sectarian division continues to structure the everyday lives of many in Northern Ireland, significant changes have taken place since the Agreement. The 225 cessation of armed conflict has been accompanied by an economic upturn and broader social and political change. One significant change identified has been the increased presence of cultural diversity as Northern Ireland, for the first time in recorded history, is experiencing net in-migration from a variety of source countries. In considering the changing histories and geographies of ethnically-identified minorities in Northern Ireland, I argued that multicultural agendas have emerged against a backdrop of increased migration and diversity (and concomitant racisms), and alongside attempts to present Northern Ireland as a ‘normal’ society that is trying to move beyond sectarianism. The substantive chapters of the dissertation presented empirical material to demonstrate the mutual constitution of sectarianism and multiculturalism in Northern Ireland and the effect of context in determining the nature of this relationship. I focused in Chapter Five on the emergence of multicultural policy initiatives within post-Agreement governing institutions, examining institutional structures, policy, and interviews with civil servants and policy makers. I sought to show how a concern for ‘race’ and identities beyond the ‘two traditions’ has begun to animate post-Agreement public policy. It was shown that there has been an active effort to shift the status of sectarian (community) and multicultural (good) relations so both are seen as equivalent. Increasingly, the presence of cultural diversity in society is being held up by politicians and policy makers as emblematic of, and integral to, a ‘normal’ Northern Ireland. Although multicultural agendas have emerged in Northern Irish policy, this chapter demonstrated that sectarianism embedded in institutional structures and practices has a negative impact on these progressive, pluralist agendas. Analysing the structures of institutions involved in the governing of multicultural issues, I found a very complex, unwieldy and uncertain situation. The fragmented state structure and the separation of powers between devolved and non-devolved administrations clearly undermined multicultural policy agendas. I argued that this institutional arrangement is not a product of bad design or poor management, but arises directly from the privileging of sectarian identities in the Agreement. The example of the reallocation of ‘no religion’ responses to the 2001 Northern Irish census into sectarian categories illustrated clearly the resilience 226 of sectarian constructions of identity in the institutional practices of the new, ‘normal’ Northern Ireland. In this context the pluralist, multicultural focus of much post- Agreement social policy must negotiate – and is often stymied by – manifestations of sectarianism within the political institutions and their practices. Chapter Six again demonstrated the persistence of an older, sectarian inheritance in Northern Ireland’s emergent multicultural imaginary. In this chapter, I explored two specific dimensions of a multicultural society: responses to racism and initiatives which raise awareness of cultural diversity. I argued that while a hate crime poster produced by the PSNI presented racism and sectarianism as equivalent in a ‘normal’ Northern Ireland, sectarianism seriously undermines police responses to racialised violence. The police remain preoccupied with sectarianism, and ethnically-identified minorities feel that their issues are often ignored and marginalised. Furthermore, the historical sectarianisation of policing in Northern Ireland not only makes it difficult for ethnically- identified minorities to speak of their rights on their own terms but even structures the reporting of racist incidents in some areas. Similarly, the politics of recognition was found to sit awkwardly with embedded sectarianism. The Samhain/Diwali festival in North Belfast demonstrated that celebrations of cultural diversity may be structured by sectarian territoriality. While sectarianism structures multicultural initiatives in many contexts, the experience of a white Northern Irish woman invited into a Protestant school to talk about the Chinese community suggested that, in some instances, multicultural agendas are being used to avoid addressing the legacy of the sectarian division that is embedded in Northern Irish society. More hopefully, Chapter Six also suggested that multicultural agendas are capable of changing how sectarianism is approached and understood. Although the introduction of hate crime legislation in 2004 was a direct response to ‘race’-based attacks, this has led to the police defining and recording sectarian incidents for the first time. I argued that this change in the policing of sectarian incidents has altered the way sectarianism is performed and, consequently, (re)produced. Drawing on interviews with organisers of celebrations of multicultural diversity, I proposed that such initiatives could challenge sectarian conceptualisations of identity and space in Northern Ireland. Sectarianism still 227 complicates attempts to recognise cultural diversity, but these emergent practices offer an important opportunity to disrupt the popular perception that Northern Ireland is composed of just ‘two traditions’ and sectarianism is a natural, ahistorical way of being. Visual culture, such as murals, posters and pamphlets, play an important role in the (re)production of sectarian identities in Northern Ireland (Jarman 1997). Chapter Seven explored how new anti-racist agendas in West Belfast are being articulated in these notable expressions of political and cultural identity. The analysis of visual culture produced by grassroots anti-racist groups on both sides of the Shankill/Falls peaceline illustrated, quite literally, the extent to which anti-racist visions in West Belfast are structured by sectarianism. These anti-racist representations often used sectarian narratives and symbols and (re)produced constructions of identity and belonging based on sectarian difference. The sectarian identifications contained in these texts also served to incorporate new migrants entering West Belfast into dominant, sectarian subject positions. Although sectarian considerations had a significant impact on these anti-racist agendas, these sectarian narratives were not always uncritically accepted, as the response to the Comhar na Gcormhasan welcome pack demonstrated. The very existence of these anti-racist campaigns was held up as illustrative of the social changes taking place in both West Belfast and Northern Ireland more generally. Furthermore, the involvement of Filipino youths in the painting of the ‘I’m Not Your Stereotype’ mural revealed that the cultural practices that have maintained and (re)produced sectarian identities and boundaries may be in the process of being radically reshaped by new migrant groups. This example suggests that, in some contexts, multicultural agendas have the potential not only to temper sectarianism and its expression, but could contribute to the realisation of a multicultural, post-sectarian Northern Ireland. 228 8.3 Concluding Reflections on Sectarianism, Multiculturalism and their Outworking in Northern Ireland This dissertation has traced a journey through the operationalisation of a multicultural imaginary in a society historically divided along sectarian lines. My research has made it abundantly clear that multiculturalism and sectarianism do not exist separately in the society in which they are manifest. Instead, the emergence of multicultural agendas and strategies in the context of contemporary Northern Ireland shows that multiculturalism and sectarianism are mutually constituted in complex ways. This finding has real implications for the success or failure of multicultural agendas in Northern Ireland. The opportunities for turning multicultural visions of a post-conflict Northern Ireland into social reality are going to remain slim as long as sectarianism continues to play such a dominant role in structuring social relations and governing institutions. Later in this section I will consider briefly the potential for realising such a post-conflict vision of Northern Irish society, but first I would like to reflect on some broader conclusions about both sectarianism in Northern Ireland and multiculturalism in complexly diverse societies that can be drawn from my dissertation. Sectarianism in Northern Ireland My research demonstrates that the fear that the Agreement could precipitate a situation in which the ‘two traditions’ come to dominate all other groups in Northern Irish society (Little 2003; Palshaugen 2005) has, to a certain extent, already been realised. I argue that the reason for this is the continued reproduction of sectarianism in Northern Irish society and space. My work shows that sectarianism remains in post-Agreement Northern Ireland, and, what is more, is being (re)produced and sustained by the very institutions charged with moving society beyond sectarianism. As was illustrated most clearly in Chapter Seven, even new multicultural agendas are being used to (re)produce sectarian narratives and identities. This finding supports Cairns’ (2000: 438) contention that as long as the everyday processes and practices that symbolically and materially reproduce sectarianism are in operation ‘the basic problem will remain untouched irrespective of political settlement’. 229 There was also noted a tendency to treat sectarianism and racism as equivalent processes in recent academic analyses of social relations in Northern Ireland (for example, McVeigh and Rolston 2007). In this dissertation, I argued both that sectarianism and racism are not identical, and that it is important to understand why and how sectarianism and racism are collapsed into one another in the discourses of post-Agreement Northern Ireland. This latter process should, I suggested in Chapters Five and Six, be understood as a facet of Northern Ireland’s attempts to depict itself as a ‘normal’ society that it moving beyond sectarianism (Bairner 2006). In this context, sectarianism and racism are being constructed as two equivalent processes that co-exist in – and to a certain extent actively define – a multicultural Northern Ireland. However, my work shows that in spite of these visions of ‘normality’ social relations in Northern Ireland remain structured by embedded and dominant sectarian division (Shirlow and Murtagh 2006). The important question then becomes how can sectarianism in Northern Ireland be most productively understood and challenged. In this dissertation, I conceptualised sectarianism not as a static description of relations between Catholic/Nationalists and Protestant/Unionists, but as those sets of interactive discourses, narratives and embodied practices which (re)produce ways of seeing the world based on sectarian difference (Cairns 2000; Shirlow 2003). Challenging sectarianism, then, becomes a matter of changing how it is performed and (re)produced in everyday life. At various junctures my research provides empirical support for Catherine Nash’s (2005) contention that conceiving of Northern Ireland in terms of multiculturalism and cultural diversity has the potential to undermine sectarian conceptualisations of society and space. Chapter Six showed how the existence of cultural diversity and ‘race’-based hate crime in Northern Irish society has led to significant changes in the police approach towards sectarian incidents. Even more promisingly, the painting of a mural by Filipino youths (Chapter Seven) suggests that the cultural features of sectarian division could be adopted – and possibly transformed – by new ethnically-identified minorities. I would argue that conceptualising sectarianism as a fluid, contextual set of relations, discourses and practices allows research to identify both the points at which it is being embedded and strengthened and those at which it may be challenged and undermined. Such an approach would be very useful for any 230 future research that examines sectarianism in Northern Ireland and the efficacy of attempts to realise a ‘normal’, post-sectarian society. Multiculturalism in Complexly Diverse Societies Although arguably more extreme when overlaid with sectarianism, multiculturalism reaches practical and philosophical limits in all diverse societies (cf. Barry 2001; Little 2003; Schaap 2004; Vertovec 2007b). As Northern Ireland is an example of a complexly diverse society, my research can be seen to have implications for the understanding of multiculturalism in other contexts. In this section, I look at how my work provides empirically-based support for some of the discussions and criticisms of multiculturalism in diverse societies. This dissertation represents an important contribution to the scholarly literature on multiculturalism as it speaks directly to the concern that critiques of multiculturalism have tended to rely more on theoretical extrapolations than empirical research on multicultural agendas in practice (Wood and Gilbert 2005). I did not set out to deny the potentially positive benefits that can arise from the presence of cultural diversity in contemporary societies. Indeed, my work broadly supports Will Kymlicka’s (2001) contention that cultural diversity can facilitate pluralism, particularly in societies which possess well-defined ‘national minorities’. Practices such as multicultural festivals, which reflect the presence of what Kymlicka refers to as ‘immigrant multiculturalism’, could potentially play a significant role in promoting tolerance and respect in contested societies with strong national minorities, such as Northern Ireland. However, I would like to issue the caveat that the meaning and limits of immigrant multiculturalism are rarely set by ethnically-identified minorities themselves. As both Hage (2000) and Hesse (2000) argue, the terms by which immigrant groups are recognised within multicultural processes are generally dictated by the ‘host’ society. The empirical material presented in Chapter Six supports this contention. This work showed that ethnically-identified minorities are often forced to perform simplistic versions of their putative cultures and identities as they struggle for wider societal recognition (Hall 2000; Sivanandan 2000). Furthermore, I also argue, as Elizabeth Povenilli (1998) does, that immigrant multiculturalism is sometimes appropriated by dominant social groups and used to by-pass other more difficult and historically 231 intransigent issues of social difference. As my research on the Samhain/Diwali festival and the experiences of some of those involved in multicultural initiatives in Northern Ireland demonstrated, there is a danger that the recognition of cultural diversity can be used in an attempt to circumvent the historically embedded problem of sectarianism and its continuing legacy in structuring social relations. This finding has implications beyond the relatively narrow confines of Northern Ireland. While sectarianism itself may not be a problem in most other diverse societies, discrimination along other axes of difference such as gender, class and income certainly is. My work shows once again how the concerns of racialised minorities in contemporary Western nation-states (often around issues such as social justice and economic redistribution) may be ignored as these minorities are appropriated by dominant social groups in the service of the nation’s multicultural imagination of itself (Abbas 2005; Craig 2007; Fraser 1998; Hage 2000). My research also highlighted the importance of looking at the ‘institutional implications’ of multicultural policy in diverse societies (Uitermark, Rossi and Van Houtum 2005: 622). The analysis in Chapter Five of the emergence of multicultural agendas in the public policy of post-Agreement Northern Ireland supported the contention that the political structures and institutional frameworks that multicultural policy is produced and enacted within can be just as significant as the content of policy itself (Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1992; Ben-Tovim, Gabriel, Law and Stredder 1992). In my work, the negative impact that the complex, fragmented and unwieldy institutional structures of post-Agreement Northern Ireland had on the goals and ambitions of multicultural agendas expressed in public policy was starkly revealed. This suggests that future research on multiculturalism in other contexts should attend to political and institutional structures as well as policy positions. The extent to which initiatives aimed at addressing the problem of racism can actually contribute to processes of racialisation in society was another theme that emerged at a number of junctures in my analysis (Gilroy 2001). The representations used in both the PSNI hate crime awareness campaign (Chapter Six) and in some of the anti-racist campaigns in West Belfast (Chapter Seven) reproduced stereotypical images of ‘racial’ difference. Although the goal of these campaigns was anti-racist, they were primarily 232 concerned with the recognition and protection of ‘racial’ difference, and, as such, could be accused of aiding the racialisation of ethnically-identified minorities in Northern Ireland (Gilroy 1987; Murji 2006). The analysis of these representations visibly illustrated some of the problems inherent in relativist conceptions of anti-racism that have previously been identified in the academic literature (Bonnett 2000; Wievorka 1997). As well as reifying the social construction ‘race’, such an approach to anti-racist action fails to challenge other vectors of discrimination and leaves little space for a wider reaching anti-racist project (Detant 2005; Lentin 2004). To avoid these problems and build a stronger movement, anti-racism has to happen alongside and in tandem with other axes of difference besides ‘race’. Making the case for an all-encompassing, emancipatory anti-racism, Karim Murji (2006: 279) proposes that anti-racism requires a more developed and refined tactics of engagement in which racism could be considered through a wider lens or perspective than race itself, and its articulation with other social divisions, such as gender and age is brought out. While my research shows that in the Northern Ireland context the main vector of difference anti-racism needs to include is sectarianism, in other contexts it could be caste, gender, sexuality and so on that is most prominent. In the discussion of the ‘I’m Not Your Stereotype’ mural in Chapter Seven, I noted in passing the potential power of anti-discrimination as a social and political message. I would argue that anti-racist campaigns that can successfully marshal a wider discourse of anti-discrimination have greater potential to cut across and unite different vectors of difference than those that focus narrowly on the social construction ‘race’. Although Alana Lentin (2004) has shown that anti-racist campaigns reflect the political culture of the nation-state in which they are located, my work suggests that, in the Northern Ireland context at least, anti- racism may also possess the potential to break out of – and maybe even move beyond – dominant narratives and political identities. Perhaps then a broader anti-racist political project that would allow for the definition and creation of alternative social visions for complex, diverse societies could eventually be realised (Anthias and Lloyd 2002; Lloyd 1998; 2002). 233 Realising a Multicultural, Post-Sectarian Northern Ireland I would like to conclude my research by briefly considering the possible implications of these findings for contemporary Northern Ireland. This dissertation has not ‘proved’ that multiculturalism and diversification can eventually precipitate the movement of Northern Ireland beyond sectarianism. What it has done is highlighted both the need for and limits of alternative visions of what the post-conflict society could and should look like. There is a clear need for such a debate in Northern Ireland as it continues the long and often painful process of leaving behind the violence of ‘the Troubles’ and embracing democratic processes and principles. Ten years on the Agreement looks less like an end point and more like a crucial first phase in the building of a new, peaceful Northern Ireland. This political settlement brought the conflict to a negotiated conclusion and created a space in which new visions of Northern Ireland could be produced and, potentially, enacted. In many respects the explicit recognition of Nationalists and Unionists in the Agreement was a vital prerequisite for peace and devolved power-sharing. But now, as my work shows, Northern Ireland needs something more than the recursive cycle produced by the institutionalisation of sectarian mindsets. Although the reestablishment of political devolution within the context of its changed constitutional relationship with the rest of the United Kingdom could prove crucial in sustaining the political progress made, the institutional structures established for governing post-Agreement Northern Ireland continue to see the world through a sectarian-tinted lens. The difficulty this places on creating and sustaining alternative visions of social relations in Northern Ireland has been only too clearly revealed in my work. As long as sectarianism continues to be (re)produced unchallenged in Northern Irish society and space, the prognosis for genuinely moving beyond sectarianism will remain pessimistic. Of course, it is possible that sectarianism in Northern Ireland might just disappear over time without the need for social and political intervention. Perhaps the benefits of peace will ‘trickle-down’ through every stratum of Northern Irish society and those discourses and practices which (re)produce sectarianism will simply wither away. Maybe the housing boom and the plethora of new developments which are sprouting up 234 in ‘neutral’ areas, such as the Titanic Quarter on Belfast’s docks, will eventually force an end to residential segregation along sectarian lines. With an end to segregation in housing, maybe then sectarianism will finally dissipate and become an archaic way of being. And yet there have been precious few signs that sectarianism has been fatally weakened since the peace process. Indeed, many commentators have suggested that, in some contexts, the exact opposite has occurred (Shirlow and Murtagh 2006). Against this backdrop, I would argue that if Northern Ireland wants to get rid of sectarianism more quickly and explicitly then there will have to be much more proactive work in this regard across every tier of government and society. There is also an identifiable need for further research on multicultural agendas in Northern Ireland, particularly on the views and experiences of ethnically-identified minorities. As I noted in the discussion on demographic multiculturalism in Northern Ireland in Chapter Two, there has been a paucity of research on the changing histories and geographies of ethnically-identified minorities in Northern Ireland. During the course of this research I spoke to representatives from various ethnically-identified organisations and groups in Belfast. Although this allowed me to engage at different junctures in the dissertation with the experiences and perspectives of ethnically- identified minorities, this was not the over-riding objective of my work. Given my research aims and goals, the nature of my engagement with ethnically-identified minorities in Northern Ireland was always going to be partial and limited to the voices and opinions of prominent representatives. The absence of an in-depth understanding of the everyday experiences of ethnically-identified minorities in Northern Ireland is an important issue that should be addressed in future research. Such work needs to look beyond public representatives to explore the views of ‘ordinary’ migrants. It is also important that such future research explores the new migrant communities that have developed in rural and semi-rural parts of Northern Ireland (Shuttleworth 2007) as well as the more established communities in Belfast. In conclusion, I would argue that whether or not a multicultural vision of society could, or even should, be realised in Northern Ireland is still open for debate and discussion. What is vital, as my research clearly shows, is that the privileging of sectarian identities 235 is brought to an end. I would argue that the only way that this can happen is through a more explicit commitment to pluralism and cultural diversity. Instead of privileging Catholic/Nationalist and Protestant/Unionist cultural expressions, cultural policy and institutional structures need to recognise the divergent histories and ‘cultures’ of all the people of Northern Ireland. Such a broad cultural policy could play a significant role in the re-imagining of society beyond the sectarian binaries of Orange and Green. At the same time, there is a need for an explicitly anti-sectarian agenda that names and addresses sectarianism in all its manifestations. Ultimately, I do not know if cultural diversity and the recognition of senses of identity and belonging beyond the tired tropes of sectarianism will be enough to move Northern Ireland beyond sectarianism. One thing is certain, though, Northern Irish society will always find it hard to move in any positive direction, multicultural or otherwise, as long as sectarianism is allowed to continue to colonise social relations. 236 Appendix I: Sample Letter of Introduction � � � � � � � � � � � � Dear Chinese Welfare Association, My name is Peter Geoghegan and I am a PhD research student in Geography in the University of Edinburgh. My research explores the effect of increasing cultural diversity on Northern Ireland as it tries to move beyond sectarianism. I am interested in the history of the Chinese community and their experiences of living in Northern Ireland. I would very much appreciate it if you could spare some of your time (approximately 45- 60 minutes) to talk to me about the history and aims of the Chinese Welfare Association and the types of activities that you are engaged in. I would also like to talk to you about problems experienced and whether official responses have been satisfactory. This project is for research and not commercial purposes. By consenting to being interviewed you are agreeing to allow me to use this interview in my research. Your consent is, however, completely voluntary, and at any time you are free to stop the interview and/or withdraw any information given (e.g. ‘off-the-record’ remarks will not be quoted or referred to). I can be contacted by phone (07770501423) or e-mail (p.geoghegan@sms.ed.ac.uk). Thanks for your time and I look forward to hearing from you, Yours faithfully, _______________________ PETER GEOGHEGAN � � ������� � �� ������������������� � � ����������� ������������ � ���������������� �������� �� �!"#� 237 Appendix II: Interview Index Community/Voluntary Organisation Date Animate An Munia Tober 27/11/05 02/05/06 Anti-racism Network 06/05/06 Belfast Islamic Centre 29/03/06 Chinese Welfare Association 30/09/05 Community Change 09/11/05 Embrace 14/10/05 Indian Community Centre 18/10/05 Latino-American Association Law Centre (NI) 12/02/06 25/10/05 Lisburn Prisoner Support Program 10/08/06 Multicultural Resource Centre 31/10/05 Northern Ireland Council for Ethnic Minorities 30/01/06 Republican Mural Artist 05/12/07 Shankill Alternatives (supplementary telephone correspondence; 12/03/08) 09/02/06 South Belfast Partnership Springfield Charitable Association 11/10/05 15/02/06 238 Government Organisation Alliance Party (Steve Farry MLA) Date 10/04/06 Belfast City Council 14/11/05 Community Relations Council 14/10/05 Community Relations Unit 09/01/06 Community Safety Unit 09/02/06 Department of Social Development 02/02/06 Equality Commission Northern Ireland 01/11/05 Equality Directorate 09/01/06 Northern Ireland Council for Integrated Education 13/02/06 Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission 14/03/06 Police Service of Northern Ireland (supplementary e-mail correspondence; 20/11- 23/11/07) 10/12/05 Racial Equality Unit, Deputy Head Racial Equality Unit, Director 12/09/05 29/09/05 239 Appendix III: Sample Interview Schedules Introduction: Thanks for agreeing to participate in this research. As I mentioned in my e-mail, this research is about the effect that increasing cultural diversity is having on Northern Ireland as it tries to move beyond sectarianism. The research will involve interviews with individuals, observation at events and analysis of policy and other documents. I am a postgraduate student at the University of Edinburgh, and this research will eventually be submitted as a PhD dissertation. Interview Process: Informed Consent: You will be asked for your consent to record your interview. This consent will be granted by signing the consent form that I give you. You will also be asked if the interview material can be used for research purposes. I will provide you with my contact details and you can request a copy of your interview transcript. Confidentiality: The tapes and transcripts of your interview will be held confidentially by myself. You will not be identified in any research publications, unless you request this. Questions or concerns?: If you have any questions or would like to discuss any aspect of this project at any stage, please contact me or the supervisor of this project, or ask me any questions as we go along. Do you have any questions to start? Interview lead-in: All interviews began with a short series of factual questions around topics such as how long the interviewee had been working in their position and the history and functions of their institution or organisation. These factual questions helped build rapport and made it easier to move onto more substantive issues. 240 Sample Interview Questions for ‘Government’ Interviewee: Below are a sample of the themes and questions from an interview with the Deputy Head of the Racial Equality Unit (REU): History and Structure: Q1. There seems to have been a lot of change in the government structure of Northern Ireland in recent years, could you tell me how the Racial Equality Unit came into being? Q2. What is the main function of the REU? Q3. What size is your unit? What is its budget? How many people work in the REU? Q4. What is your role within the REU? Q5. What governmental and non-governmental institutions does the REU regularly interact with? Multicultural Policy: Q1. I have read the draft of the Racial Equality Strategy. What do you think are the main aims of the Strategy? Q2. How important do you think it is to have policies aimed at culturally diverse groups in Northern Ireland? Q3. Until quite recently there was little or no legislation against racism in Northern Ireland, but now issues of racism and cultural diversity seem to be very much on the policy agenda. Would you agree with this statement? If yes, why do you think this is the case? Q3. What actions do you expect the Strategy to generate? Q4. How will the REU work with other government departments to ensure that the Strategy is implemented? Q5. The Strategy highlights the role of the Racial Equality Forum, what is this? How does it work? Do you think it has been successful? Multiculturalism, Racism and Sectarianism: Q1. There seems to have been an increase in reports of racist incidents, do you think racism is a serious problem in Northern Ireland? If yes, what do you think needs to be done about this issue? 241 Q2. Do you think cultural diversity is changing Northern Ireland? If yes, in what ways? Q3. Some people have suggested to me that the government’s focus on tackling racism is an attempt to distract attention away from sectarianism in Northern Irish society. Would you agree with this statement? Sample Interview Questions for ‘Community’ Interviewee: Below are a sample of the themes and questions from an interview with the Chief Executive Officer of the Northern Ireland Council for Ethnic Minorities (NICEM): History: Q1. When was NICEM founded? Why? Q2. When NICEM began what kind of work was it engaged in? Q3. How has NICEM changed over the years? Current Activities: Q1. Who are members of NICEM? Q2. How is NICEM funded? Q3. What kind of events do NICEM organise and participate in? Q4. Is NICEM involved in events to raise awareness of cultural diversity in Northern Ireland? If yes, what exactly does this event(s) involve and what are its aims? Who is expected to attend the event(s)? Where did funding for the event(s) come from? Government Responses to Racism: Q1. What is your opinion of government’s responses to the problem of racism in Northern Ireland? Are you satisfied with the actions of the Police Service of Northern Ireland around ‘race’ hate crime? Q2. Do you think government initiatives aimed at tackling racism and promoting good race relations have been successful? What issues/concerns have you with these? Q3. How familiar are you with the policies A Shared Future and Racial Equality Strategy? Do you think they can have a positive benefit for minorities in Northern Ireland? 242 Multiculturalism and Sectarianism: Q1. Do you think cultural diversity is changing Northern Ireland? If yes, in what ways? Q2. In your opinion, what are the biggest problems facing members of ethnically- identified minorities in Northern Ireland today? Q3. Do you ever feel that sometimes racism and racial discrimination are not being addressed because of sectarianism? If yes, tell me about an experience you have had of this happening. Participant Observation As the interview with the ‘community’ interviewee draws to a close, I explain that I am interested in attending events they are organising to raise awareness of cultural diversity in Northern Ireland. I explain that I am interested in speaking with participants at the event as part of the research and request permission to do so. 243 Appendix IV: Consent Form Project Title: Beyond Orange and Green: Multiculturalism and Sectarianism in Northern Ireland. Researcher Contact Details: p.geoghegan@sms.ed.ac.uk tel: 07770501423 What am I consenting to: By signing this form I consent to being interviewed by Peter Geoghegan, and having my interview used as part of his doctoral research on the effect that increasing cultural diversity is having on Northern Ireland as it tries to move beyond sectarianism. This project is for research and not commercial purposes. Your consent is totally voluntary and may be withdrawn at anytime. I promise to do my utmost to respect both your confidentiality and your anonymity, but you should be aware that this cannot always be guaranteed. The recordings and transcripts of this interview will be stored in a locked drawer in my office and will only be accessed by myself. If you have any queries, either now or at a later date, about my conduct or the conduct of this research you are welcome to contact me or Prof. Jane Jacobs, Chair of the Institute of Geography Ethics Committee at the University of Edinburgh (Jane.Jacobs@ed.ac.uk). Also, if you do not have a problem with me contacting you at a later date if there are any questions I have forgotten to ask or statements that require clarification, please leave an e-mail address and/or telephone number. If you do not wish to be contacted again please let me know. Name (please print): Confirmation of Consent (please sign): Date: � � ������� � �� ������������������� � � ����������� ������������ � ���������������� �������� �� �!"#� � 244 Appendix V Published Material 245 265 Bibliography Abbas, T. 2005. Recent developments to British multicultural theory, policy and practice: The case of British Muslims. Citizenship Studies 9(2), 153-166. Agamben, G. 1998. Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life. 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work_x6l5ezz4abeylk74t7rtgmwsea	----	Betrayal: How Black Intellectuals Have Abandoned the Ideals of the Civil Rights Era by Houston A. Baker, Jr. this is through breaking up comfortable arrangements that prevent change and accountability; and soon enough, new arrangements of that sort will develop and it will be time for another change. Meanwhile, we need to keep plugging away on the harder and more important jobs that will make a real and last- ing difference. CHARLES L. GLENN Boston University Betrayal: How Black Intellectuals Have Abandoned the Ideals of the Civil Rights Era by Houston A. Baker, Jr. New York, Columbia Uni- versity Press, 2008. 272 pp. $24.95. Houston A. Baker of Vanderbilt University, one of the most talented and in- sightful scholars of this era, has researched and written a brilliant analysis of the works of leading post-Civil Rights Movement African American public in- tellectuals. Employing a well-known methodology of textual analysis of the published tracts and tomes of these public intellectuals, Baker offers persua- sive and compelling evidentiary arguments and findings that this current crop of public intellectuals has betrayed and abandoned the ideals and goals of the Martin Luther King, Jr.-led Civil Rights Movement. To attain his objectives, Baker begins his book with an autobiographical account of his early years in “Little Africa,” in Louisville, Kentucky. But he concludes from this point of departure, the limitations and weaknesses of such an approach, which is currently the centerpiece of the works by African Amer- ican conservatives, neoconservatives, and centrists. He reveals that one cannot project, as these current public intellectuals do, from individual personal journeys to the black majority (African American masses) without suffering all types of logical and epistemic difficulties. Yet none of these post-Civil Rights public intellectuals deal with this critical fault and the manner in which this critical fault undercut and undermined their political prescriptions for the black majority. Having illuminated the epistemic and logical problems inherent in the auto- biographical approach, this book creates a model for the African American pub- lic intellectual that is centered in Martin Luther King, Jr. and to an extent W.E. B. Dubois and shows that this model sought to elevate the black masses and not just the black elites and/or “Talented Tenth.” Unlike the current crop of public intellectuals, Baker’s model of King focuses not on the “I Have A Dream” speech but upon King’s letter from the Birmingham jail and on his struggle with the Memphis sanitation workers. This generates a different and a more-focused King, one committed to the rise of the black majority. And with this model of King as a public intellectual, Baker is now ready to compare and contrast this current crop of so-called public intellectuals with this formal, essential, and paramount model. None of the earlier critics and 192 | POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY evaluators of these current public intellectuals have been so astute and careful in creating a standard model. But Baker does not lump all of these conservatives and neoconservatives together in one category, as many of their critics do. He divides them into two categories: centrists, that is, those African American scholars at Ivy League universities, like Henry Louis Gates, Cornel West, and Michael Dyson, who always end up on both sides of the same public issue simultaneously, thereby trivializing it; and neoconservatives, that is, those who argue that race no longer matters and that blacks are now themselves their own worst problem. The latter group includes Shelby Steele, Stephen Carter, John McWhorter, and others of their ilk. And despite their differences, both groups, when Baker com- pares and contrasts them with the model of King and DuBois, end up betraying the Civil Rights Movement and the black majority in their communities. To date, no other book is so careful in its conceptualization, theoretical for- mulation, organizational and structural characterization, and textual analysis of the works of these current black public intellectuals. Thus, I highly recommend this exceptional work of scholarship, for it is worth the price of the ticket. HANES WALTON, JR. University of Michigan Queer Inclusions, Continental Divisions: Public Recognition of Sexual Diversity in Canada and the United States by David Rayside. Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 2008. 388 pp. Cloth, $75.00; paper, $35.00. American scholars too infrequently avail themselves of the unique opportuni- ties for comparison provided by Canada, a country shaped by so many similar historical, cultural, legal, geographic, and demographic circumstances as the United States. Much of the directly comparative work that does exist has been done by Canadian political scientists such as David Rayside of the University of Toronto, who extends this body of work in a new direction by studying dif- ferent patterns of “sexual diversity” in the two countries. This volume is stronger on depth than breadth; indeed, many issue areas that might well be considered forms of “queer inclusion,” including repeal of sodomy laws, anti-discrimination laws, military service, and hate crimes, are discussed only in passing. What Rayside does provide is a thorough compar- ative analysis of three major areas: recognition of same-sex partnerships; the parenting rights of lesbian, gay, and bisexual (LGB) individuals and couples; and reforms within schools to incorporate LGB issues. On these three topics, there can have been few major developments in either country that Rayside neglects to cover, giving this book at times the quality of a sophisticated ref- erence work as well as an impressive work of analysis. The divergence between the two countries is clearest with regard to recog- nition of same-sex partnerships. While the issue has polarized the United States BOOK REVIEWS | 193 
work_xc4m2zrlzva5foc2b4a4w2qwgu	----	International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health Article Exploring U.S. Shifts in Anti-Asian Sentiment with the Emergence of COVID-19 Thu T. Nguyen 1,* , Shaniece Criss 2 , Pallavi Dwivedi 3, Dina Huang 3 , Jessica Keralis 3 , Erica Hsu 4, Lynn Phan 4, Leah H. Nguyen 4, Isha Yardi 4, M. Maria Glymour 5, Amani M. Allen 6, David H. Chae 7, Gilbert C. Gee 8 and Quynh C. Nguyen 3 1 Department of Family and Community Medicine, University of California San Francisco, San Francisco, CA 94110, USA 2 Department of Health Sciences, Furman University, Greenville, SC 29613, USA; shaniece.criss@furman.edu 3 Department of Epidemiology & Biostatistics, University of Maryland School of Public Health, College Park, MD 20742, USA; pdwived1@umd.edu (P.D.); dinahuang26@gmail.com (D.H.); jkeralis@umd.edu (J.K.); qtnguyen@umd.edu (Q.C.N.) 4 Department of Public Health Science, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742, USA; ehsu@terpmail.umd.edu (E.H.); lphan04@terpmail.umd.edu (L.P.); leahn98@umd.edu (L.H.N.); iyardi@terpmail.umd.edu (I.Y.) 5 Department of Epidemiology & Biostatistics, University of California San Francisco, San Francisco, CA 94158, USA; maria.glymour@ucsf.edu 6 Divisions of Community Health Sciences and Epidemiology, University of California, Berkeley, CA 94704, USA; amaniallen@berkeley.edu 7 Department of Global Community Health and Behavioral Sciences, Tulane School of Public Health and Tropical Medicine, New Orleans, LA 70112, USA; dchae@tulane.edu 8 Department of Community Health Sciences, University of California, Los Angeles, CA 90095, USA; gilgee@ucla.edu * Correspondence: thu.nguyen@ucsf.edu Received: 1 September 2020; Accepted: 17 September 2020; Published: 25 September 2020 ����������������� Abstract: Background: Anecdotal reports suggest a rise in anti-Asian racial attitudes and discrimination in response to COVID-19. Racism can have significant social, economic, and health impacts, but there has been little systematic investigation of increases in anti-Asian prejudice. Methods: We utilized Twitter’s Streaming Application Programming Interface (API) to collect 3,377,295 U.S. race-related tweets from November 2019–June 2020. Sentiment analysis was performed using support vector machine (SVM), a supervised machine learning model. Accuracy for identifying negative sentiments, comparing the machine learning model to manually labeled tweets was 91%. We investigated changes in racial sentiment before and following the emergence of COVID-19. Results: The proportion of negative tweets referencing Asians increased by 68.4% (from 9.79% in November to 16.49% in March). In contrast, the proportion of negative tweets referencing other racial/ethnic minorities (Blacks and Latinx) remained relatively stable during this time period, declining less than 1% for tweets referencing Blacks and increasing by 2% for tweets referencing Latinx. Common themes that emerged during the content analysis of a random subsample of 3300 tweets included: racism and blame (20%), anti-racism (20%), and daily life impact (27%). Conclusion: Social media data can be used to provide timely information to investigate shifts in area-level racial sentiment. Keywords: social media; minority groups; racial bias; big data; content analysis 1. Introduction Recent reports [1,2] have noted a rise in prejudicial attitudes and discrimination against Asian Americans in the United States in relation to COVID-19 [3]. For example 1843 incidents of discrimination Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2020, 17, 7032; doi:10.3390/ijerph17197032 www.mdpi.com/journal/ijerph http://www.mdpi.com/journal/ijerph http://www.mdpi.com https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1185-045X https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2470-5377 https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8165-8231 https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3178-180X https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4745-6681 http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/ijerph17197032 http://www.mdpi.com/journal/ijerph https://www.mdpi.com/1660-4601/17/19/7032?type=check_update&version=2 Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2020, 17, 7032 2 of 13 and harassment against Asians were reported to Stop Asian American Pacific Islander (AAPI) Hate between 19 March 2020 and 13 May 2020 [4]. Beginning in February and March 2020, there was an increase in the use of stigmatizing language to refer to COVID-19 as the “Wuhan virus,” “Chinese virus,” and “Asian virus,” [5] leading COVID-19 to become increasingly associated with Asians. A rise in negative racial attitudes and racial bias can have significant social, economic, and mental and physical health impacts [6–8]. Prior research has shown that community-level racial climate is related to birth outcomes [9–11], cardiovascular outcomes [12], and mortality [13] of the area. Such attitudes reflect cultural racism, defined as the infusion of the ideology of racial inferiority in the values, language, imagery, symbols, and unstated assumptions of the larger society [14]. Cultural racism is displayed through media, stereotyping, and norms within society and its institutions. In this way, cultural racism is systemic and produces an environment where institutional and individual-level discrimination can thrive [14], both of which have been associated with adverse mental and physical health outcomes [6,15]. Prejudicial attitudes and speech are important aspects of cultural racism, but can be challenging to monitor. Prejudicial attitudes have been assessed via surveys [16], assessment of vignettes [17], and through performance-based tasks (e.g., implicit association tests) [18]. However, these methods are limited in several ways. For example, reporting in socially desirable ways is a common concern for surveys, particularly when assessing attitudes about socially sensitive topics, and can lead to response bias. Furthermore, these methods are employed in artificial settings. Surveys require participants to respond to forced-choice answers using predetermined questions. These items may not reflect the emergence of new forms of prejudicial language and may not capture the range of potential responses. In the present study, we examine data that have been collected in response to the emergence of COVID-19 through the popular online platform—Twitter. Millions of tweets are sent daily by users across the globe, and 90% of Twitter users make their profile public [19]. Perceived anonymity associated with online spaces may decrease self-censorship of socially unacceptable views and increased willingness to express attitudes that are less likely to be reported in survey interviews due to social desirability response bias [20]. Leveraging data from social media may be one way to circumvent some of the limitations of traditional self-reported measures and help capture attitudes about sensitive topics such as racial prejudice and bias. In addition, social media represents a rapid mode of communication and is a way to share frequent updates and information. Data derived from social media can therefore reveal aspects of people’s daily lives and rapidly fluctuating social and cultural processes at work both within and across the United States. The continuous and pervasive nature of social media use provides the opportunity to examine patterns of racial attitudes. This study aims to describe variation in racial sentiment based on the sentiment of tweets using race-related terms before and following the emergence of COVID-19 in the United States and describe themes of Twitter discussions related to race and COVID-19 to more fully explore the context of community-level racial sentiment. 2. Methods 2.1. Overview We used a mixed-methods approach that integrated state-of-the art machine learning sentiment analyses of publicly available tweets alongside qualitative content analyses of a subset of those tweets. First, a random 1% sample of publicly available tweets was collected from November 2019 to June 2020, using Twitter’s Streaming Application Programming Interface (API). Details of the data collection process including the full keyword list have been previously published [21]. We restricted our analyses to English language tweets from the United States with latitude and longitude coordinates or other “place” attributes that permitted the identification of the state where the tweet was sent. All tweets for the sentiment analysis used one or more of 518 race-related keywords. These keywords were compiled from racial and ethnic categories used by prior studies examining race-related online Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2020, 17, 7032 3 of 13 conversations [22,23] and an online database of racial slurs [24]. Tweets were classified into four main racial/ethnic categories: Asians, Blacks, Latinx, and Whites according to the keywords used. The analytic sample included 3,377,295 tweets from 521,161 Twitter users. Sentiment analysis was performed on this data set to examine temporal trends in negative racial sentiment before and after the emergence of COVID-19. The qualitative content analysis included a subset of tweets (n = 3300) that used race-related terms and one or more of 75 coronavirus-related keywords from February to April 2020 when public awareness of COVID-19 became widespread in the United States. Coronavirus-related terms were compiled from the medical and scientific community [25] and from colloquial terms used online. This study was determined exempt by the University of California, San Francisco Institutional Review Board (18-24255). 2.2. Sentiment Analysis Twitter data were cleaned and processed for the sentiment analysis. We dropped duplicate tweets according to their “tweet_id” and pre-processed the tweets to remove stop words, emojis, urls, punctuations, and hashtag signs. We utilized support vector machine (SVM), a supervised machine learning model to predict the sentiment of each tweet. Support vector machine (SVM) is used for text classification in natural language processing tasks [26]. Since SVM is a supervised machine learning model, it needs training data, typically human-labeled data, to “learn” what people consider a negative or positive tweet. We obtained training data from manually labeled Sentiment140 (n = 498) [27], Kaggle (n = 7086) [28], Sanders (n = 5113) [29], and 6,481 tweets labeled by our research group. Sentiment140, Sanders, and Kaggle datasets are all publicly available training datasets specifically labelled for sentiment analysis. First, we labeled negative tweets (assigned a value of 1) to all other tweets–positive or neutral tweets (assigned value of 0). We used 5-fold cross validation to assess the model performance and reached a high level of accuracy for the negative classification (91%) and a high F1 score (84%). Tweets were also labeled as positive or not positive. We similarly used 5-fold cross validation and achieved an accuracy of 89% and a F1 score of 81%. Once the SVM models have been trained for negative and positive sentiment prediction, we then applied the SVM negative and positive sentiment model to label new tweets we collected from 2019–2020. Statistical analyses were implemented with Stata MP16 (StataCorp LP, College Station, TX, USA). The prevalence of negative sentiment against time (time series) figures were generated using R (R Foundation for Statistical Computing, Vienna, Austria) [30]. LOESS (locally estimated scatterplot smoothing) was performed to fit smooth curves to the daily prevalence of negative sentiment. 2.3. Content Analysis While the sentiment analysis provides us with a classification of the sentiment of the tweets, the qualitative content analysis is used to provide complementary information on the topics and themes discussed in these tweets. To provide a more contextual-level understanding of social climate related to race and identify emerging themes of Twitter discussions related to race and COVID-19, we conducted a qualitative content analysis of a random subsample of COVID-19 and race-related tweets. Two members of the research team developed a codebook (i.e., a list of codes and definitions representing the emerging themes) based on a literature review and coding and discussing 200 tweets from the above sample. This consensus building process enhanced the codebook by clarifying operational definitions, thereby increasing internal validity. The final categories or emergent themes included racism, blame, anti-racism, misinformation, U.S. politics, news, call for action, and daily life impacted by COVID-19. Using this coding scheme, each of the two research members coded 100 tweets with two research assistants (400 tweets total) to test inter-rater agreement. Once Cohen’s kappa reached 70% or higher for each coder pair, indicating substantial agreement [31], all team members independently coded 2100 tweets. The researchers double-coded 1200 tweets throughout the process (800 tweets in the beginning and 400 in the last third of the sample). Any disagreements in coding were discussed until consensus was met. Kappa agreement of 70% or higher was met for each inter-coder session. Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2020, 17, 7032 4 of 13 3. Results From November 2019 to June 2020, we collected 3,377,295 tweets containing at least one of the relevant keywords pertaining to a racial or ethnic group. From a list of 518 terms, 20 terms comprised 80% of all tweets that referenced a racial or ethnic minority group. The top race-related Twitter terms were: “n*gga/n*ggas” (52%), “blacklivesmatter” (5%), “Chinese” (4%), white people (3%), and Mexican (2%). There were 2,564,082 tweets about Blacks, 306,012 about Asians, 285,920 about Whites, and 221,281 about Latinx. 3.1. Quantitative Sentiment Analysis of Tweets Using Race-Related Keywords The proportion of tweets referencing Asians that were negative increased from 9.79% at the beginning of November 2019 to 16.49% at the end of March 2020, a 68.4% increase (Figure 1). At the end of April 2020, the proportion of tweets referencing Asians that were negative declined to 13.2% (Figure 1), still higher than in November 2019. By the end of our follow-up, in June 2020, anti-Asian sentiment had declined but remained substantially elevated compared to levels in 2019 prior to the emergence of the novel coronavirus. In contrast, the proportion of negative tweets referencing other racial and ethnic minorities was substantially higher than tweets specifically referencing Asians but remained relatively stable during this time period, declining less than 1% for tweets referencing Blacks from 48.34% in November to 48.18% in April and increasing by 2% for tweets referencing Latinx (12.81% in November to 13.11% in April), (Table 1). In examining the temporal plots, tweets referencing Blacks had the highest proportion of negative tweets of all racial/ethnic groups but changed little over the same time period from 48.9% in beginning of November 2019 to 48.1% in the end of April 2020 (online supplemental Figure S1). Temporal changes in negative sentiment for tweets referencing Latinx also showed a stable pattern (online Supplemental Figure S2).Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2020, 17, 7032 5 of 13 Figure 1. Temporal changes in negative Asian sentiment, November 2019–April 2020. n235,263 tweets. LOESS (locally estimated scatterplot smoothing) was performed to fit smooth curves to the daily prevalence of negative sentiment. The shaded area represents 95% confidence bands around the smoothed trend line. The proportion of tweets referencing Asians that were positive declined beginning in February to April (Table 2). For Blacks, Latinx, and Whites, positive sentiment trends remained steady during this time period. Temporal trends of positive and negative Asian sentiment by U.S. states are presented in the online supplemental Figures S3 and 4 and show that for many states, a pattern of rising negative sentiment and declining positive sentiment from February to April. Table 2. Percent of tweets referencing racial and ethnic groups that are positive by month, November 2019-June 2020. November December January February March April May June Racial/ethnic group % (n) % (n) % (n) % (n) % (n) % (n) % (n) % (n) Asian 15.10 (31,774) 15.95 (30,476) 16.90 (27,588) 15.20 (32,925) 8.63 (65,915) 11.30 (46,585) 13.01 (40,356) 12.07 (30,150) Black 4.37 (298,548) 4.47 (321,531) 4.48 (253,019) 5.90 (280,354) 4.28 (286,452) 4.14 (275,009) 4.43 (342,085) 6.56 (504,600) Latinx 16.62 (27,466) 16.80 (26,831) 16.84 (21,401) 19.22 (33,258) 15.11 (28,310) 15.88 (24,385) 15.47 (27,981) 12.16 (31,357) White 3.66 (27,496) 3.63 (30,019) 3.69 (23,511) 3.64 (27,749) 3.59 (27,240) 3.57 (25,960) 52.57 (51,425) 50.57 (72,161) Percentages refer to percent of tweets in each racial/ethnic category that are negative. n refer to the total number of tweets for that racial/ethnic category for that month. 3.2. COVID-19 and Race-Related Tweets Of the tweets using race-related terms from February to April 2020, 61,228 tweets referenced COVID-19. The top COVID-19 related terms representing 95% of tweets were: virus, covid, Chinese Figure 1. Temporal changes in negative Asian sentiment, November 2019–April 2020. n235,263 tweets. LOESS (locally estimated scatterplot smoothing) was performed to fit smooth curves to the daily prevalence of negative sentiment. The shaded area represents 95% confidence bands around the smoothed trend line. Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2020, 17, 7032 5 of 13 Table 1. Percent of tweets referencing racial and ethnic groups that are negative by month, November 2019–June 2020. November December January February March April May June Racial/ethnic group % (n) % (n) % (n) % (n) % (n) % (n) % (n) % (n) Asian 9.45 (31,774) 9.34 (30,476) 9.96 (27,588) 9.81 (32,925) 15.21 (65,915) 13.11 (46,585) 12.02 (40,356) 13.41 (30,150) Black 48.34 (298,548) 48.22 (321,531) 48.37 (253,019) 45.15 (280,354) 47.63 (286,452) 48.18 (275,009) 46.77 (342,085) 38.15 (504,600) Latinx 12.81 (27,466) 13.14 (26,831) 13.15 (21,401) 12.51 (33,258) 12.02 (28,310) 13.11 (24,385) 15.58 (27,981) 21.63 (31,357) White 44.96 (27,496) 46.14 (30,019) 46.92 (23,511) 45.80 (27,749) 46.36 (27,240) 46.01 (25,960) 52.57 (51,425) 50.57 (72,161) Percentages refer to percent of tweets in each racial/ethnic category that are negative. n refer to the total number of tweets for that racial/ethnic category for that month. In sensitivity analyses, we examined negative sentiment of tweets using the following terms more specific to Chinese people: “Chinese,” “chinaman,” “ching chong,” and “chink.” The average sentiment of tweets using Chinese-related keywords closely follows sentiment for tweets using Asian related terms in general (online supplemental Table S1). For example, in March 2020, the proportion of tweets using Asian-related keywords that were negative was 15.2% compared to 15.7% of tweets using Chinese specific keywords. In April, 13.1% of tweets using Asian-related keywords were negative compared to 13.2% of tweets using Chinese-related keywords. These results indicate that antipathy towards Chinese people had spillover effects to Asians in general. The proportion of tweets referencing Asians that were positive declined beginning in February to April (Table 2). For Blacks, Latinx, and Whites, positive sentiment trends remained steady during this time period. Temporal trends of positive and negative Asian sentiment by U.S. states are presented in the online supplemental Figures S3 and S4 and show that for many states, a pattern of rising negative sentiment and declining positive sentiment from February to April. Table 2. Percent of tweets referencing racial and ethnic groups that are positive by month, November 2019–June 2020. November December January February March April May June Racial/ethnic group % (n) % (n) % (n) % (n) % (n) % (n) % (n) % (n) Asian 15.10 (31,774) 15.95 (30,476) 16.90 (27,588) 15.20 (32,925) 8.63 (65,915) 11.30 (46,585) 13.01 (40,356) 12.07 (30,150) Black 4.37 (298,548) 4.47 (321,531) 4.48 (253,019) 5.90 (280,354) 4.28 (286,452) 4.14 (275,009) 4.43 (342,085) 6.56 (504,600) Latinx 16.62 (27,466) 16.80 (26,831) 16.84 (21,401) 19.22 (33,258) 15.11 (28,310) 15.88 (24,385) 15.47 (27,981) 12.16 (31,357) White 3.66 (27,496) 3.63 (30,019) 3.69 (23,511) 3.64 (27,749) 3.59 (27,240) 3.57 (25,960) 52.57 (51,425) 50.57 (72,161) Percentages refer to percent of tweets in each racial/ethnic category that are negative. n refer to the total number of tweets for that racial/ethnic category for that month. 3.2. COVID-19 and Race-Related Tweets Of the tweets using race-related terms from February to April 2020, 61,228 tweets referenced COVID-19. The top COVID-19 related terms representing 95% of tweets were: virus, covid, Chinese virus, quarantine, rona, pandemic, wuhan, xenophobia, plague, social distancing, epidemic, stay at home, and ncov (Table 3). Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2020, 17, 7032 6 of 13 Table 3. Top COVID-19 related terms invoked in Tweets mentioning a race-related term, February–April 2020. Term n Percent virus 13,167 21.55 covid 12,347 20.21 chinese virus 8181 13.39 quarantine 6771 11.08 rona 6579 10.77 pandemic 4285 7.01 wuhan 2494 4.08 xenophobia 1548 2.53 plague 936 1.53 social distancing 809 1.32 epidemic 680 1.11 stay at home 387 0.63 ncov 344 0.56 stayhome 338 0.55 coro 268 0.44 curfew 265 0.43 socialdistancing 179 0.29 kung flu 171 0.28 wash your hands 168 0.28 6 feet 147 0.24 Data source: 61,089 tweets from the United States were collected between February 2019 and April 2020 included at least one COVID-19- and one race-related term. From a list of 75 COVID-19 terms, 20 terms comprised 98% of all tweets. 3.3. Qualitative Content Analysis: Themes In the random sample of 3,300 tweets for the thematic analysis, 20% had themes expressing racism or blame, 20% had themes expressing anti-racism, and 27% tweets related to daily life impacted by the pandemic. Less common themes included tweets about misinformation (4%), news (10%), politics (8%), and call for action (7%) (Figure 2). Tweets that mentioned President Trump accounted for 18% of tweets across the categories. This qualitative content analysis focuses on understanding the meaning of the tweets, so we provide a detailed description of each theme, temporal patterns from February to April. Illustrative example tweets are presented in Table 4.Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2020, 17, 7032 7 of 13 Figure 2. Percent and number of tweets in each content analysis category. Table 4. Content analysis of themes with illustrative examples. Themes Example Tweets Racism  Seeing Chinese people w these mask acting like we the ones that have the virus out here  Americans are starving and waiting in food lines for a bag of crap. Americans want to work. Not have immigrants stealing jobs  Border wall to keep illegals out should continue because of the virus Blame  Thank you China for unleashing this Chinese virus into the world.  The present crisis is a result of Trump’s ineptitude and inaction.  People being racist towards Chinese people because of the virus is like saying I got the flu cuz I’m white. I guess ethnicity now plays a part in the forces of nature? Being a racist isn’t going to solve the problem. Anti-racism  The real virus is the racism and hate that is spread from one generation to another. Let’s do better. Let’s be better.  You cannot be serious. Do not call it the Chinese Virus. You’re a racist idiot if you do Misinformation  ...Chinese Communist run research lab created this super viral weapon  On the Orange line this morning...man was telling his friend that he’s “not gonna get corona and neither are you” because “only White and Asian people get it.” News  Misguided virus fears said to be hitting Asian American businesses  Most Louisiana Carona deaths are in New Orleans where blacks make up 60% of the population and many are in the service industry. Politics  He knows it is going to get worse a lot worse. He’s setting up the scapegoat so he can flame xenophobia & shift blame before the election. It isn’t just ignorant racism, it’s a calculated political maneuver… Call to action  Good Night World! Please Stay Safe & Healthy. StayAtHome SocialDistance6Ft ThisWillPass TemporaryNormal BeatItCorona PeaceAndLove AllLivesMatter  As of today, all COVID19 deaths in City of St. Louis are African Americans. This reinforces the health disparities that existed before this virus, but also compels us to action now. Daily Life Impacted by COVID-19  So a lot of side n*ggas about be lonely during this pandemic guess u about see how much of a side n*gga u are.  At this point in quarantine, a n*gga just want a hug  I had graduation planned fa 14 years u think carona cared no… Some tweets were edited or shortened to remove identifying information. Hashtags, urls, and tags were removed. Data source: 61,089 tweets from the United States were collected between February 2019 to April 2020 included at least one COVID-19 and race-related term. 659 686 909 148 335 258 223 0.0% 5.0% 10.0% 15.0% 20.0% 25.0% 30.0% Figure 2. Percent and number of tweets in each content analysis category. Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2020, 17, 7032 7 of 13 Table 4. Content analysis of themes with illustrative examples. Themes Example Tweets Racism • Seeing Chinese people w these mask acting like we the ones that have the virus out here • Americans are starving and waiting in food lines for a bag of crap. Americans want to work. Not have immigrants stealing jobs • Border wall to keep illegals out should continue because of the virus Blame • Thank you China for unleashing this Chinese virus into the world. • The present crisis is a result of Trump’s ineptitude and inaction. • People being racist towards Chinese people because of the virus is like saying I got the flu cuz I’m white. I guess ethnicity now plays a part in the forces of nature? Being a racist isn’t going to solve the problem. Anti-racism • The real virus is the racism and hate that is spread from one generation to another. Let’s do better. Let’s be better. • You cannot be serious. Do not call it the Chinese Virus. You’re a racist idiot if you do Misinformation • ...Chinese Communist run research lab created this super viral weapon • On the Orange line this morning...man was telling his friend that he’s “not gonna get corona and neither are you” because “only White and Asian people get it.” News • Misguided virus fears said to be hitting Asian American businesses • Most Louisiana Carona deaths are in New Orleans where blacks make up 60% of the population and many are in the service industry. Politics • He knows it is going to get worse a lot worse. He’s setting up the scapegoat so he can flame xenophobia & shift blame before the election. It isn’t just ignorant racism, it’s a calculated political maneuver . . . Call to action • Good Night World! Please Stay Safe & Healthy. StayAtHome SocialDistance6Ft ThisWillPass TemporaryNormal BeatItCorona PeaceAndLove AllLivesMatter • As of today, all COVID19 deaths in City of St. Louis are African Americans. This reinforces the health disparities that existed before this virus, but also compels us to action now. Daily Life Impacted by COVID-19 • So a lot of side n*ggas about be lonely during this pandemic guess u about see how much of a side n*gga u are. • At this point in quarantine, a n*gga just want a hug • I had graduation planned fa 14 years u think carona cared no . . . Some tweets were edited or shortened to remove identifying information. Hashtags, urls, and tags were removed. Data source: 61,089 tweets from the United States were collected between February 2019 to April 2020 included at least one COVID-19 and race-related term. 3.4. Racism & Blame In February and March 2020, the phrase “Chinese virus” or variants of this were frequently debated on Twitter (Table 4). Many tweets blamed the Chinese government for mishandling the emergence of the pandemic and for providing insufficient or misleading information. Other Twitter users blamed the U.S. government for the handling of the COVID-19 pandemic. Tweets expressing racism and blame towards Asians for the pandemic were commonly interwoven. Some of the tweets also referenced Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2020, 17, 7032 8 of 13 conspiracy theories related to a weaponized virus or the intentional leaking of the virus for financial gain. Other tweets focused not on the government, but on Chinese people for behaviors that led to the emergence of the virus. These included tweets saying that Chinese people ate bats or other animals, which led to cross-species transmission. This locating of blame to the Chinese government or Chinese people was the primary justification for racist rhetoric that included not only prejudicial language, but calls to bomb China or attack Chinese people. These negative sentiments also spilled over into antipathy towards other Asian groups as well (e.g., Vietnamese, Koreans). This spillover is likely due to the “Asians all look alike” phenomenon documented in the literature, which suggests that many non-Asians conflate the various Asian groups [32]. In April, some tweets indirectly expressed support for the term “Chinese virus” or its variants by using it to comment on the virus, political ramifications, or urge certain actions to be taken such as boycotting Asian businesses and products. Tweets expressing racism also employed long-standing racial and ethnic stereotypes, such as ideas about immigrants or foreigners to the U.S. harboring disease. 3.5. Anti-Racism Many tweets argued that racism was exacerbating the negative effects of the pandemic. In March, some Twitter users were critical of President Trump for publicly using the term “Chinese virus.” Some Asian American Twitter users shared their personal experiences with harassment and discrimination during the pandemic. In February and March, there was a focus on the condemnation of attaching a nationality to the virus and speaking out against racism towards Asians. In April, there was greater focus on the condemnation of racism more broadly. Some Twitter users stated that there was racial bias in the enforcement of social distancing policies in parks or public spaces based on the race/ethnicity of the community member. 3.6. Misinformation A subset of tweets contained misinformation along several categories. These included misinformation about the susceptibility to COVID-19 infection of various racial and ethnic groups. In February and March, some users stated there was an increased susceptibility for Whites and Asians and less susceptibility for Blacks. Some tweets also expressed the belief that COVID-19 was created in a Chinese lab (i.e., “The Chinese Communist run Bioweapons research lab created this super viral weapon.”) Misinformation also included unsupported statements about treatment or preventive measures. 3.7. News Tweets related to news discussed a variety of domestic and international current events including, cases of COVID-19 in different geographic regions, economic impact of the pandemic, domestic and international response to COVID-19, and information about the virus, treatment, and preventive measures. In April, there was an increased discussion of higher infection and mortality rates among Blacks, indigenous groups, and other racial and ethnic minoritized populations with structural racism as a driver of these health disparities. 3.8. Politics Tweets about politics often referenced Trump and the upcoming presidential election. Some tweets supported President Trump, his response to the pandemic, and his use of the term “Chinese virus.” Others criticized Trump and his response to the pandemic. Some Twitter users stated that President Trump is attempting to shift blame. Commonly, tweets were polarizing and displayed negativity towards either Democrats or Republicans. Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2020, 17, 7032 9 of 13 3.9. Call to Action Some Twitter users emphasized the importance of preventive measures including hand washing, social distancing, and mask wearing in February and March. Others expressed the need to provide increased funding for COVID-19 efforts and to support small businesses through patronage. In April, there was also discussion of racial and ethnic disparities in infection, morbidity, and mortality from COVID-19 especially among African Americans and the need to address these disparities impacting minority, immigrant, and prisoner populations. 3.10. Daily Life Tweets about daily life described disruptions to plans and people’s experiences sheltering in place. Some of these tweets touched upon the impact of the pandemic on relationships, the development of new hobbies, and the cancellation of events such as in-person graduation ceremonies and travel. A few tweets centered around people not following social distancing measures. 4. Discussion Our mixed-methods study of over 3.4 million tweets shows a marked increase in anti-Asian sentiment and a decline in positive Asian sentiment following the emergence of COVID-19 in the U.S. Sensitivity analyses using Chinese specific keywords showed a similar temporal pattern to overall negative Asian sentiment, indicating antipathy towards Chinese people had spillover effects to Asians in general. Google searches for “Wuhan Virus” and “Chinese Virus” spiked in late January (online supplemental Figure S5). The WHO released guidelines in February 2020 cautioning against the use of stigmatizing language in reference to COVID-19 [33]. However, in early to mid-March, U.S. politicians including Republican Paul Gosar, Mike Pompeo, and President Trump used the terms “Wuhan virus” or “Chinese virus” [34]. Google searches for these terms again spiked and retweets using “Chinese virus” or related terms increased by 650% on 8 March. News media articles using these terms increased by 800% on 9 March [33]. This study finding aligns with reports from the FBI, newspapers, and other commentaries about a rise in anti-Asian hate crimes during the same period [3]. Our results are also consistent with a recent study using Project Implicit data and finding that Implicit Americanness Bias—or the subconscious belief that European American individuals are more “American” than Asian American individuals—declined steadily from 2007 through early 2020 but reversed trend and began to increase on 8 March, following the increase in stigmatizing language related to COVID-19 [35]. Our content analyses of the tweets enriched the quantitative analysis by identifying several interrelated themes related to racist rhetoric, conspiracy theories, misinformation and blame. It is noteworthy that negative sentiment existed prior to the emergence of COVID-19, and was generally higher for other racial and ethnic groups (e.g., African Americans and Latinx) compared with Asians. However, an important observation was that the increase in negative tweets occurred only for Asians between February to April, corresponding to the emergence of concern and social distancing practices in the U.S. Moreover, the apex was the week of March 16, corresponding to the controversy surrounding President Trump’s decision to use the phrase, “Chinese virus.” The World Health Organization has cautioned against using such a phrase to avoid stigma [33]. The temporal patterns seen herein provide further evidence of a specific effect of the pandemic on anti-Asian sentiment, and not just a general rise in racial tensions. Just as importantly, our qualitative analysis documented anti-racist sentiment. Many tweets condemned racist rhetoric, expressed solidarity towards the Asian community and sympathy for hate crime victims. This highlights the key role that counter-messaging can play in dampening negative speech online, as well as the potential to garner both social support for individuals, and social movements to support entire communities. Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2020, 17, 7032 10 of 13 This study has important limitations. Twitter data represent what people are willing to express in the online public sphere. These may differ from in-person interactions and discussions. However, the sense of anonymity online can permit some people to express views they would not express in in-person interactions or endorse in traditional surveys. Twitter can suspend users who tweet abusive or threatening content [36], and these users could have been suspended before our data were collected. Twitter users are not representative of the U.S. population. Compared to the general adult population in the U.S., adult Twitter users are younger and more educated [37]. For example, 29% of adult Twitter users are between 18–29 years of age, and this age group makes up 21% of all U.S. adults. Forty-two percent of Twitter users have a college degree compared to 31% of the adult U.S. population. Twitter users also are slightly more racially/ethnically diverse than the overall adult U.S. population. Among adult Twitter users, 11%, 17%, and 64% are Black, Hispanic, and White, respectively compared to 11%, 15%, and 60% of U.S. adults. Twitter users are similar to U.S. adult population in terms of gender with 52% of adult Twitter users being female [37]. Furthermore, our data are bound to the time periods studied and do not capture the important events that have arisen recently in response to the death of African Americans by police officers and the ensuing protests. Those analyses may be the topic of a future study, however. In addition, our analyses were limited to English-language tweets, which may lead to certain biases (e.g., underestimation or overestimation of racist tweets). Finally, our analyses should not be seen as providing causal evidence that COVID-19 resulted in anti-Asian bias, but rather, as documenting that the two phenomena are interrelated. There are a number of directions for future investigation. An essential question is whether the racial sentiments expressed on Twitter translate to racist actions in other venues and how long these attitudes persist. In our follow-up, we saw a rapid decline in negative sentiment within weeks of the peak, but the percent of negative tweets had not yet returned to pre-virus levels within the 3 months of our follow-up period. Future work is needed to examine longer-term temporal changes in racial attitudes in response to events. Future work might examine geographical variation in anti-Asian bias and possible predictors, including variation in area-level COVID-19 infection and mortality rate, demographics such as the density of Asians versus other racial and ethnic groups, economic disadvantage, political affiliation, among other factors. Additionally, future work might investigate how anti-Asian bias may have affected economic and health outcomes of Asians during the pandemic, given reports of economic hardships faced by Asian businesses and experiences with discrimination and harassment that may have an impact on mental health and physical health outcomes influenced by stress and anxiety. Previous research shows that both short-term acute stress experiences as well as prolonged stress, particularly due to social identity threat, has lasting physiologic impacts [38,39]. Further, even when not the target of direct racial discrimination or harassment, vicarious racial discrimination has been associated with poorer mental and physical health [40], especially among those with higher levels of racial group identification [41]. Despite these limitations, our study provides empirical evidence to support the numerous anecdotal reports of anti-Asian bias that have surfaced in the recent media. This study adds to the literature in several ways. We provide new empirical evidence that there may be effects of COVID-19 on a specific racial group that does not appear to affect other racial groups (e.g., African Americans). This suggests that interventions should not only address power, equity, and inclusion in a global fashion for all groups, but also address group-specific issues. Additionally, our qualitative findings provide previously unreported themes that could be studied in future research. For example, to what extent do anti-racism messages counterbalance hateful messages and how long do these increases in negative racial sentiment persist? Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2020, 17, 7032 11 of 13 5. Conclusions Our study gains strength from a mixed-methods approach that employs both sentiment and content analyses that involves a transdisciplinary collaboration of computer scientists, public health experts, and qualitative researchers. Our analyses imply that public health threats, such as a viral pandemic, can have spillover effects on race relations. Our findings join a broader corpus of research that has shown that racial discrimination is associated with health problems. Thus, future responses to health crises must not only address medical outcomes, but social outcomes as well. Finally, prior data suggests that public sentiment about the nature of disparities (victim blaming vs. discrimination) corresponds to sentiment about the provision of shared resources and social policies and programs to support those very groups [14,42]. Hence, the awareness of negative racial attitude may have policy implications that are critical for the health and well-being of stigmatized racial groups. Supplementary Materials: The following are available online at http://www.mdpi.com/1660-4601/17/19/7032/s1, Figure S1: Temporal changes in negative Black sentiment, November 2019–April 2020, Figure S2: Temporal changes in negative Latinx sentiment, November 2019–April 2020, Figure S3: Temporal changes in negative Asian sentiment by state, Figure S4: Temporal changes in positive Asian sentiment by state, Figure S5: Temporal trends in Google Searches of “wuhan virus” and “china virus”, Table S1: Percent negative tweets using Asian and Chinese-related keywords by month, November 2019–June 2020. Author Contributions: Conceptualization, T.T.N., S.C., A.M.A., M.M.G., D.H.C., G.C.G., and Q.C.N.; methodology, T.T.N., S.C., Q.C.N., D.H., P.D., and M.M.G.; software, T.T.N., D.H., and P.D.; validation, T.T.N., D.H., and Q.C.N.; formal analysis, T.T.N., S.C., E.H., I.Y., L.H.N., L.P., P.D., and D.H.; investigation, T.T.N., P.D., and D.H.; resources, T.T.N. and Q.C.N., data curation, P.D. and D.H.; writing-original draft preparation: T.T.N., S.C., G.C.G., and Q.C.N.; writing-review and editing, T.T.N., S.C., P.D., D.H., J.K., E.H., L.P., L.H.N., I.Y., M.M.G., A.M.A., D.H.C., G.C.G., and Q.C.N.; visualization; T.T.N., S.C., M.M.G., D.H., and P.D.; supervision, T.T.N. and Q.C.N.; project administration: T.T.N., S.C., and Q.C.N.; funding acquisition, T.T.N. and Q.C.N. All authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript. Funding: Research reported in this publication was supported by the National Institute on Minority Health and Health Disparities and the National Library of Medicine of the National Institutes of Health under Award Number R00MD012615 (Nguyen, T., PI), R01LM012849 (Nguyen, Q., PI). The content is solely the responsibility of the authors and does not necessarily represent the official views of the National Institutes of Health. We are grateful to the California Center for Population Research at UCLA (CCPR) for general support. CCPR receives population research infrastructure funding (P2C-HD041022) from the Eunice Kennedy Shriver National Institute of Child Health and Human Development (NICHD). Acknowledgments: We thank Krishay Mukhija for his research assistance. Conflicts of Interest: The authors declare no conflict of interest. References 1. Tavernise, S.; Oppel, R.A. Spit On, Yelled At, Attacked: Chinese-Americans Fear for Their Safety. 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Available online: https://www.kaggle.com/c/si650winter11 (accessed on 30 November 2018). http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0138511 http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/26398658 http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev-soc-073014-112305 http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0016059 http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/19586161 http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/dem.2006.0008 http://dx.doi.org/10.2196/17103 http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s40615-020-00712-y http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0122963 http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev-publhealth-040218-043750 http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev-clinpsy-032814-112728 http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/25581238 http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/135910539700200305 http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s40615-018-0463-4 http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/29512031 http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0956797616658450 http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/27557618 http://dx.doi.org/10.1089/1094931041291295 http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/15257832 http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/ijerph16101766 http://www.pewinternet.org/2016/08/15/social-media-conversations-about-race/ http://www.pewinternet.org/2016/08/15/social-media-conversations-about-race/ https://www.demos.co.uk/files/DEMOS_Anti-social_Media.pdf https://www.demos.co.uk/files/DEMOS_Anti-social_Media.pdf http://www.rsdb.org/ https://www.who.int/emergencies/diseases/novel-coronavirus-2019/technical-guidance/naming-the-coronavirus-disease-(covid-2019)-and-the-virus-that-causes-it https://www.who.int/emergencies/diseases/novel-coronavirus-2019/technical-guidance/naming-the-coronavirus-disease-(covid-2019)-and-the-virus-that-causes-it http://dx.doi.org/10.4310/SII.2009.v2.n4.a7 https://www.kaggle.com/c/si650winter11 Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2020, 17, 7032 13 of 13 29. Sanders Analytics. Twitter Sentiment Corpus. Available online: http://www.sananalytics.com/lab/twitter- sentiment/ (accessed on 11 November 2018). 30. The R Foundation. The R Project for Statistical Computing. Available online: https://www.r-project.org/ (accessed on 13 March 2020). 31. Landis, J.R.; Koch, G.G. The measurement of observer agreement for categorical data. Biometrics 1977. [CrossRef] 32. Flores, N.M.; Huo, Y.J. “We” Are Not All Alike: Consequences of Neglecting National Origin Identities Among Asians and Latinos. Soc. Psychol. Personal. Sci. 2012, 4, 143–150. [CrossRef] 33. WHO. Social Stigma Associated with COVID-19. Available online: https://www.who.int/docs/default-source/ epi-win/stigma/covid19-stigma-guide.pdf?sfvrsn=48f6ac1_2&download=true (accessed on 9 June 2020). 34. Rizzuto, M.U.S. Politicians Exploit Coronavirus Fears with Anti-Chinese Dog Whistles. Available online: https://medium.com/dfrlab/u-spoliticians-exploit-coronavirus-fears-with-anti-chinese-dogwhistles- ff61c9d7e458 (accessed on 20 September 2020). 35. Darling-Hammond, S.; Michaels, E.K.; Allen, A.; Chae, D.; Thomas, M.D.; Nguyen, T.; Mujahid, M.; Johnson, R. After “The China Virus” Went Viral: Racially Charged Coronavirus Coverage and Trends in Bias Against Asian Americans. Health Educ. Behav. 2020. [CrossRef] 36. Twitter. Violent Threats Policy. Available online: https://help.twitter.com/en/rules-and-policies/violent- threats-glorification (accessed on 9 June 2020). 37. Wojcik, S.; Hughes, A. Sizing Up Twitter Users. Available online: https://www.pewinternet.org/2019/04/24/ sizing-up-twitter-users/ (accessed on 15 October 2019). 38. Dickerson, S.S.; Kemeny, M.E. Acute stressors and cortisol responses: A theoretical integration and synthesis of laboratory research. Psychol. Bull. 2004, 130, 355–391. [CrossRef] [PubMed] 39. McEwen, B.S. Protective and damaging effects of stress mediators: Central role of the brain. Dialogues Clin. Neurosci. 2006, 8, 367–381. [PubMed] 40. Martz, C.D.; Allen, A.M.; Fuller-Rowell, T.E.; Spears, E.C.; Lim, S.S.; Drenkard, C.; Chung, K.; Hunter, E.A.; Chae, D.H. Vicarious Racism Stress and Disease Activity: The Black Women’s Experiences Living with Lupus (BeWELL) Study. J. Racial Ethn. Health Disparities 2019, 6, 1044–1051. [CrossRef] [PubMed] 41. Chae, D.H.; Powell, W.A.; Nuru-Jeter, A.M.; Smith-Bynum, M.A.; Seaton, E.K.; Forman, T.A.; Turpin, R.; Sellers, R. The Role of Racial Identity and Implicit Racial Bias in Self-Reported Racial Discrimination: Implications for Depression Among African American Men. J. Black Psychol. 2017, 43, 789–812. [CrossRef] 42. Pew Research Center. Race in America 2019. Available online: https://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2019/04/09/ race-in-america-2019/ (accessed on 7 June 2020). © 2020 by the authors. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/). http://www.sananalytics.com/lab/twitter-sentiment/ http://www.sananalytics.com/lab/twitter-sentiment/ https://www.r-project.org/ http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2529310 http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1948550612449025 https://www.who.int/docs/default-source/epi-win/stigma/covid19-stigma-guide.pdf?sfvrsn=48f6ac1_2&download=true https://www.who.int/docs/default-source/epi-win/stigma/covid19-stigma-guide.pdf?sfvrsn=48f6ac1_2&download=true https://medium.com/dfrlab/u-spoliticians-exploit-coronavirus-fears-with-anti-chinese-dogwhistles-ff61c9d7e458 https://medium.com/dfrlab/u-spoliticians-exploit-coronavirus-fears-with-anti-chinese-dogwhistles-ff61c9d7e458 http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1090198120957949 https://help.twitter.com/en/rules-and-policies/violent-threats-glorification https://help.twitter.com/en/rules-and-policies/violent-threats-glorification https://www.pewinternet.org/2019/04/24/sizing-up-twitter-users/ https://www.pewinternet.org/2019/04/24/sizing-up-twitter-users/ http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.130.3.355 http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/15122924 http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/17290796 http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s40615-019-00606-8 http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/31215018 http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0095798417690055 https://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2019/04/09/race-in-america-2019/ https://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2019/04/09/race-in-america-2019/ http://creativecommons.org/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/. Introduction Methods Overview Sentiment Analysis Content Analysis Results Quantitative Sentiment Analysis of Tweets Using Race-Related Keywords COVID-19 and Race-Related Tweets Qualitative Content Analysis: Themes Racism & Blame Anti-Racism Misinformation News Politics Call to Action Daily Life Discussion Conclusions References 
work_xfvj4256lnbxviuzbifd677e3q	----	UC Santa Barbara Journal of Transnational American Studies Title Excerpt from Internment During the Second World War Permalink https://escholarship.org/uc/item/5jv9n1wf Journal Journal of Transnational American Studies, 9(1) Author Pistol, Rachel Publication Date 2018 License https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ 4.0 eScholarship.org Powered by the California Digital Library University of California https://escholarship.org/uc/item/5jv9n1wf https://creativecommons.org/licenses/https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0//4.0 https://escholarship.org http://www.cdlib.org/ i Internment during the Second World War 9781350001428_pi-222.indd i9781350001428_pi-222.indd i 5/10/2017 9:04:38 PM5/10/2017 9:04:38 PM Journal of Transnational American Studies 9.1 (2018) ii 9781350001428_pi-222.indd ii9781350001428_pi-222.indd ii 5/10/2017 9:04:39 PM5/10/2017 9:04:39 PM Journal of Transnational American Studies 9.1 (2018) L O N D O N • OX F O R D • N E W YO R K • N E W D E L H I • S Y D N E Y iii Internment during the Second World War A Comparative Study of Great Britain and the USA Rachel Pistol Bloomsbury Academic An imprint of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc 9781350001428_pi-222.indd iii9781350001428_pi-222.indd iii 5/10/2017 9:04:40 PM5/10/2017 9:04:40 PM Journal of Transnational American Studies 9.1 (2018) iv Bloomsbury Academic An imprint of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc 50 Bedford Square 1385 Broadway London New York WC1B 3DP NY 10018 UK USA www.bloomsbury.com BLOOMSBURY and the Diana logo are trademarks of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc First published 2017 © Rachel Pistol, 2017 Rachel Pistol has asserted her right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, to be identifi ed as Author of this work. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information storage or retrieval system, without prior permission in writing from the publishers. No responsibility for loss caused to any individual or organization acting on or refraining from action as a result of the material in this publication can be accepted by Bloomsbury or the author. British Library Cataloguing- in- Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. ISBN: HB: 978- 1- 3500- 0142- 8 ePDF: 978- 1- 3500- 0141- 1 eBook: 978- 1- 3500- 0143- 5 Library of Congress Cataloging- in- Publication Data Names: Pistol, Rachel, author. Title: Internment during the Second World War : a comparative study of Great Britain and the USA / Rachel Pistol. Description: London ; New York : Bloomsbury Academic, 2017. | Includes bibliographical references. Identifi ers: LCCN 2017006374 | ISBN 9781350001428 (hb) | ISBN 9781350001435 (epub) Subjects: LCSH: Germans–Great Britain–Evacuation and relocation, 1940–1945. | Italians–Great Britain–Evacuation and relocation, 1940–1945. | World War, 1939–1945–Prisoners and prisons, British. | World War, 1939–1945–Concentration camps–Great Britain. | Japanese Americans–Evacuation and relocation, 1942–1945. | World War, 1939–1945–Prisoners and prisons, American. | World War, 1939–1945–Concentration camps–United States. Classifi cation: LCC D801.G7 P57 2017 | DDC 940.53/1741–dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2017006374 Cover image © Marshall/ Fox Photos/ Getty Images Typeset by Newgen Knowledge Works Pvt Ltd., Chennai, India Printed and bound in Great Britain To fi nd out more about our authors and books visit www.bloomsbury.com . Here you will fi nd extracts, author interviews, details of forthcoming events and the option to sign up for our newsletters. 9781350001428_pi-222.indd iv9781350001428_pi-222.indd iv 5/10/2017 9:04:40 PM5/10/2017 9:04:40 PM Journal of Transnational American Studies 9.1 (2018) v In memory of David Cesarani 9781350001428_pi-222.indd v9781350001428_pi-222.indd v 5/10/2017 9:04:40 PM5/10/2017 9:04:40 PM Journal of Transnational American Studies 9.1 (2018) vi 9781350001428_pi-222.indd vi9781350001428_pi-222.indd vi 5/10/2017 9:04:40 PM5/10/2017 9:04:40 PM Journal of Transnational American Studies 9.1 (2018) vii Contents List of Illustrations viii Acknowledgements ix Introduction 1 1. Th e Origins of Internment 9 2. Life in the Camps 33 3. Endings and Aft ermath 73 4. Memory 99 Conclusion 133 Notes 141 Bibliography 191 Index 223 9781350001428_pi-222.indd vii9781350001428_pi-222.indd vii 5/10/2017 9:04:40 PM5/10/2017 9:04:40 PM Journal of Transnational American Studies 9.1 (2018) viii Illustrations 2.1 Location of internment camps on the Isle of Man 39 2.2 Camps and holding facilities for those of Japanese ancestry in western United States 53 4.1 Th e recreated guard tower stands alone in the wilderness that is Manzanar 116 4.2 Excavated water garden foundations at Manzanar 118 4.3 Th e Tule Lake Visitor Center 120 4.4 Inside the Tule Lake Stockade as it stands today 121 4.5 Outside the Tule Lake Stockade as it stands today 122 4.6 Th e memorial in the cemetery at Manzanar 123 4.7 Th e memorial in the cemetery at Camp Amache, Granada 124 4.8 A section of memorial highway outside Manzanar 126 4.9 ‘Go for Broke’ memorial in Los Angeles 127 9781350001428_pi-222.indd viii9781350001428_pi-222.indd viii 5/10/2017 9:04:40 PM5/10/2017 9:04:40 PM Journal of Transnational American Studies 9.1 (2018) xii 9781350001428_pi-222.indd xii9781350001428_pi-222.indd xii 5/10/2017 9:04:40 PM5/10/2017 9:04:40 PM Journal of Transnational American Studies 9.1 (2018) 1 Introduction Th e topic of this book could not be timelier. In both Great Britain and the United States of America, much is being made in the political sphere of the issues of race, immigration, and the rights of foreigners residing in each nation. It is impossible to consider the treatment of enemy aliens during the Second World War without exploring the treatment of foreigners in preceding centuries. As the fi rst chapter of this book discusses, protests over immigration and calls for restriction are invariably heightened during times of economic discontent. Th roughout history, immigration is perceived negatively whenever a country is experiencing eco- nomic problems. Th e fi nancial crisis of 2007– 2008 and the subsequent recession and austerity measures hark back to the economic crises of the late 1800s, and the Wall Street Crash of 1929. Both countries have been in this position before, but arguably little has been learned. Current events are therefore not surprising, but are disappointing for the lack of attention paid to the history of the preced- ing centuries. It is, therefore, of even greater importance to be aware of the way foreigners have been treated in Great Britain and the United States of America, both in peace and war, in order to avoid repeating the mistakes of the past. Evidence of the turmoil both Britain and America are experiencing is found in recent political events, not dissimilar to those experienced during the 1930s and 1940s. Great Britain unexpectedly voted to leave the European Union, and the Leave campaign triumphed using a campaign of fear, which included mas- sive distortion of facts surrounding foreigners and immigration. Nigel Farage, former leader of the UK Independence Party (UKIP), unveiled a billboard dur- ing the campaign that showed a picture of Syrian refugees fl eeing their home- land, for which he was reported to the police for inciting racial hatred – not only was the image in incredibly poor taste, but it harked back to Nazi propaganda footage of migrants. 1 While UKIP tried to distance itself from the comparisons made between their rhetoric and that of the Nazis, there can be no mistak- ing the message UKIP was trying to portray  – that immigrants are parasites, 9781350001428_pi-222.indd 19781350001428_pi-222.indd 1 5/10/2017 9:04:40 PM5/10/2017 9:04:40 PM Journal of Transnational American Studies 9.1 (2018) 2 Internment during the Second World War 2 not refugees, and that many of them are trying to take advantage of Western countries. Such sentiments have been oft repeated in Britain, such as when east- ern Europeans arrived in Britain because of Russian persecution in the late nine- teenth century, and when Jewish refugees sought asylum in Britain during the 1930s. Th e ‘Brexiters’ consistently campaigned for the idea of ‘taking the coun- try back’. Gisela Stuart, Labour member of Parliament and spokesperson for the Leave campaign, claimed that the only way to ‘take back control’ on immigration was to leave the European Union, because of concern that ‘no matter how great the pressure on schools, hospitals and housing becomes or how much wages in our poorest communities are pushed down’, the needs of ordinary British peo- ple would not be met. 2 Th e problem with such arguments is that they encour- age a ‘them and us’ mentality, which feed xenophobic and racist attitudes. Proof that this attitude engenders violence was tragically given when Jo Cox, member of Parliament for Batley and Spen in West Yorkshire, was gunned down by a man who gave his name in court as ‘Death to traitors, freedom for Britain’. 3 In the days following the vote to Leave, thousands of stories were posted on social media that showed how those who were not white, or who spoke with an accent, were harassed, threatened, and told to ‘go home’. 4 In the fi rst few days following the EU referendum, hate crimes increased in Britain by as much as 57 per cent. 5 Regardless of nationality, no one should suff er insult or injury as a result of their nationality or skin colour. As the grieving family of Jo Cox said during this tragic and turbulent time, it is necessary for the British public ‘to focus on that which unites us and not which divides us’. 6 Th is is a message needed not just in Britain, but across the globe, as men, women, and children are imprisoned and killed for the sake of their race or religion. Both Great Britain and the United States of America are currently nations divided, and in America, immigration and the presence of foreigners is also being used as an explanation for social and economic problems. Refugees from the Middle East have been brought up in debates about the threat of terrorism. Since the tragedy of September 11, 2001, there has been a fear of anyone of Middle Eastern appearance, or more specifi cally, anyone who appears Muslim. Much in the same way that Japanese and Japanese Americans were targeted because of the way they looked, those who appear Muslim are subject to increased scrutiny and discrimination. Th is follows a long history in America of discrimination based on skin colour, particularly experienced by the African American community. Th ere have been many atrocities committed in the name of Islam, and since 9/ 11, many have been charged and found guilty of ‘jihadi terrorism’. 7 Th e problem America faces is that the attacks that have taken place in the past fi ft een years have been 9781350001428_pi-222.indd 29781350001428_pi-222.indd 2 5/10/2017 9:04:40 PM5/10/2017 9:04:40 PM Journal of Transnational American Studies 9.1 (2018) Introduction 3 3 perpetrated by American citizens. In the Orlando massacre  – the largest mass killing on American soil since 9/ 11 – the gunman was an American citizen. Th e growth of technology and accessibility via the World Wide Web of terrorist lit- erature and chatrooms where vulnerable children and teenagers are groomed for violence is perhaps the most serious threat to American national security that exists today. However, the issue is not as simple as America being targeted by these individuals. Th ose most vulnerable to such grooming are those who live on the edge of society. As the divide between the rich and the poor continues to grow, and the divide between diff erent ethnicities fails to diminish, the number of marginalized individuals in society is increasing. One only has to look at the case of Flint, Michigan, where the residents have been poisoned by the water sup- ply since 2014, and even today lead- fi lled water continues to enter their homes. Over half the population of Flint are black and 41 per cent live in poverty, forced to exchange food stamps for bottled water. 8 Th e residents feel that their concerns are not adequately addressed because of the colour of their skin, and because they are poor. Racial inequality is still prevalent in American society, and until this is eradicated, it is highly likely that the rise of extremism will continue. Th ere is also the issue of what constitutes terrorism. Since 9/ 11 there have been a number of mass shootings in America, but these are not classed as acts of terrorism in the same way as jihadi terrorist attacks. Oft en when a white extrem- ist opens fi re on schoolchildren, work colleagues, cinemagoers, shoppers, or those against whom he holds a grudge, the debate turns to gun control. Th e total number of individuals killed due to gun crimes in America far outweighs the numbers of those killed through acts of terrorism. 9 Th at is not to say terror- ism is not a threat, but it shows the distortion of the terrorism debates, which inevitably revolve around race, much as arguments about national security did during the Second World War. President Donald Trump, to take the highest pro- fi le example, made immigration and terrorism the foundation of his presidential campaign. Aft er the Orlando massacre, Trump said, ‘Th e bottom line is that the only reason the killer was in America in the fi rst place was because we allowed his family to come here’, and that ‘with the terrorists, you have to take out their families. When you get these terrorists, you have to take out their families’. 10 Such comments are redolent of the campaign waged against the families of Japanese immigrants during the Second World War. Trump supporters have even gone so far as to link present- day America with Japanese American internment by inap- propriately claiming that Second World War internment forms a legal precedent for the creation of a Muslim registry. 11 Th e need for a true understanding of the history of Japanese American internment has never been greater. 9781350001428_pi-222.indd 39781350001428_pi-222.indd 3 5/10/2017 9:04:41 PM5/10/2017 9:04:41 PM Journal of Transnational American Studies 9.1 (2018) 4 Internment during the Second World War 4 Trump’s campaign slogan is ‘Make America Great Again’  – the implication being that the alleged ‘weakness’ of America is due to the number of legal and illegal migrants resident, and not any other social or economic issues. Trump’s website proclaims the need for immigration ‘reform’, the main plank of his pol- icy being the insistence that Mexico pay to build a wall to strengthen American borders. According to Trump, ‘the Mexican government has taken the United States to the cleaners. Th ey are responsible for this problem, and they must help pay to clean it up’. 12 Trump has labelled Mexicans as ‘dirty’, ‘criminals’, and ‘rap- ists’, racial slurs that his supporters are quick to endorse, in the same way that the terms ‘Japs’ and ‘yellow peril’ were readily used by Americans in the nine- teenth and early twentieth centuries. Th ere have been hundreds of thousands of deportations of illegal immigrants from American soil during the twentieth century, but as Michael Chertoff , the former secretary of Homeland Security under President George W.  Bush, said regarding Trump’s ambitious deporta- tion plans: ‘I can’t even begin to picture how we would deport 11 million people in a few years where we don’t have a police state, where the police can’t break down your door at will and take you away without a warrant.’ 13 Once again, this harks back to the treatment of Jews in Europe during the 1930s and 1940s, and the treatment of enemy aliens during the Second World War. Th ere is a diff er- ence between illegal and legal immigration, but the problem of giving power for blanket arrests is that this power can so easily be abused. During the Second World War, German, Austrian, and Italian enemy aliens were considered on a case- by- case basis, while the wholesale internment of all Japanese along with their families, who were mostly American citizens, was a blatant contradiction of constitutional privilege. Th e concept of internment is not controversial in the sense of being a recognized solution to dealing with enemy aliens in a time of war, but when that becomes an excuse to lock away American children, it shows how power can be abused. Th is is a period of isolationism, where both Britain and America are call- ing for tougher border control. Right- wing politicians in both nations believe that the only way to protect a country is to keep out foreigners. Th ere are many diff erent issues involved in the immigration debate, such as illegal versus legal immigration; however, there is very little distinction made between these cat- egories when talking about immigration, leaving all foreigners victim to nega- tive connotations. Not since the 1930s and 1940s has there been such hatred directed at foreigners living in Britain, with calls for foreigners and non- whites to ‘go home’. In America, there have been various times during the twentieth century when immigrant or refugee groups have been targeted by racists, and 9781350001428_pi-222.indd 49781350001428_pi-222.indd 4 5/10/2017 9:04:41 PM5/10/2017 9:04:41 PM Journal of Transnational American Studies 9.1 (2018) Introduction 5 5 the Civil Rights Movement and the Black Lives Matter movement demonstrate how unequal American society continues to be in the present day. Th e fact that individuals are still targeted and stereotyped as a threat to be feared because of the colour of their skin shows how little progress has been made in the past cen- tury. Th e issues of racial inequality and the inherent fear of the ‘other’ are just as prevalent in modern- day society as they were in the early twentieth century. Th e First World War was a confl ict between nation- states, whereas the Second World War was a confl ict based more on ideology than nationality. Th e lack of greater understanding of this issue caused the detention of tens of thousands of individ- uals who would have gladly fought for the Allied powers from the beginning of the confl ict. Ultimately, as shown in Chapter 3 , many internees in both countries were admitted or draft ed into the Armed Forces, and the heroic eff orts of these former internees is impressive. As the chapter also discusses, many of the former internees have contributed incredibly positively to their adoptive nations post- war, or in the case of those of Japanese ancestry, they have gone on to achieve greatness in spite of their treatment by their country of birth. Th ere is much to be learned from the actions and reactions of the internees to their incarceration, and the sacrifi ces they and their families have made cannot be overlooked. Th is monograph is the fi rst transatlantic comparison of Second World War internment. Greg Robinson has written an excellent comparative history of North American internment, and Roger Daniels has also considered the treat- ment of enemy aliens in both the United States and Canada. 14 Th is work aims to build on their work, among others, to further demonstrate how Allied countries treated enemy aliens. Th e United States has a written Constitution and Bill of Rights, whereas Great Britain governs by an unwritten code, which makes the comparison of internment in the two nations signifi cant from both a legal and social standpoint. Th e benefi ts of comparative history are immense. As Marc Bloch believed, ‘history cannot be intelligible unless it can “ succeed in estab- lishing explanatory relationships between phenomena ” ’. 15 Comparative history is ‘a way to determine what needs to be known, and social analysis not at least implicitly comparative is hard to imagine. Th ere is really no other way to identify historical eras or recognize historical change’. 16 It is also a means of ‘isolating the critical factors or independent variables that account for national history’. 17 Th is book is written primarily from a social and cultural standpoint, and the experiences and memories of the internees themselves form a key part of the internment discussion. Th ere are as many diff erent experiences of internment as there were internees, but by telling the internees’ stories readers will hopefully understand the human sacrifi ces behind the history. 9781350001428_pi-222.indd 59781350001428_pi-222.indd 5 5/10/2017 9:04:41 PM5/10/2017 9:04:41 PM Journal of Transnational American Studies 9.1 (2018) 141 Notes Introduction 1. Heather Stewart and Rowena Mason, ‘Nigel Farage’s Anti- migrant Poster Reported to Police’, Th e Guardian , 16 June 2016. Available online:  http:// www.theguardian.com/ politics/ 2016/ jun/ 16/ nigel- farage- defends- ukip- breaking- point- poster- queue- of- migrants 2. ‘EU Referendum: Immigration Target “ Impossible ” in EU, Vote Leave Says’, BBC News , 20 June 2016. Available online:  http:// www.bbc.co.uk/ news/ uk- politics- eu- referendum- 36573220 3. Patrick Sawer, Laura Hughes, Robert Mendick, and Luke Heighton, ‘Jo Cox’s Sister Calls Her “ Perfect ” and “ Utterly Amazing ” as Accused Murderer Tells Court His name Is “ Death to Traitors, Freedom for Britain ” ’, Th e Telegraph , 18 June 2016. Available online http:// www.telegraph.co.uk/ news/ 2016/ 06/ 18/ jo- cox- mp- shot- thomas- mair- arrives- at- court- following- murder- cha/ 4. For examples, see Harriet Sherwood, Vikram Dodd, Nadia Khomami, and Steven Morris, ‘Cameron Condemns Post- Brexit Xenophobic and Racist Abuse’, Th e Guardian , 27 June 2016. Available online:  https:// www.theguardian.com/ uk- news/ 2016/ jun/ 27/ sadiq- khan- muslim- council- britain- warning- of- post- brexit- racism ; and Jamie Bullen, ‘Brexit: Facebook Page Highlights Racism aft er EU Referendum Vote Triggers Spike in Hate Crimes’, Evening Standard , 27 June 2016. Available online:  http:// www.standard.co.uk/ news/ politics/ brexit- facebook- page- highlights- racism- aft er- eu- referendum- vote- triggers- spike- in- hate- crimes- a3281951.html 5. Peter Yeung, ‘EU Referendum: Reports of Hate Crime Increase 57% Following Brexit Vote’, Th e Independent , 28 June 2016. Available online:  http:// www. independent.co.uk/ news/ uk/ home- news/ brexit- hate- crime- racism- reports- eu- referendum- latest- a7106116.html 6. Rajeev Syal, ‘MP Jo Cox Wrote Passionate Defence of Immigration Days before Her Death’, Th e Guardian , 19 June 2016. Available online:  https:// www.theguardian.com/ uk- news/ 2016/ jun/ 19/ jo- cox- passionate- defence- immigration- death- article- eu 7. For a list of attacks that have taken place since 9/ 11, see Nadia Khomami, ‘Terrorist Attacks by Violent Jihadis in the US since 9/ 11’, Th e Guardian , 5 December 2015. Available online:  https:// www.theguardian.com/ us- news/ 2015/ dec/ 05/ terrorist- attacks- by- islamists- in- the- us- since- 911 9781350001428_pi-222.indd 1419781350001428_pi-222.indd 141 5/10/2017 9:05:39 PM5/10/2017 9:05:39 PM Journal of Transnational American Studies 9.1 (2018) 142 Notes 142 8. See Oliver Laughland and Ryan Felton, ‘ “ It’s All Just Poison Now ” : Flint Reels as Families Struggle through Water Crisis’, Th e Guardian , 24 January 2016. Available online:  https:// www.theguardian.com/ us- news/ 2016/ jan/ 24/ fl int- michigan- water- crisis- lead- poisoning- families- children 9. See ‘Gun Violence Archive’. Available online:  http:// www.gunviolencearchive.org/ ; ‘Guns in the US: Th e Statistics Behind the Violence’, BBC News , 5 January 2016. Available online:  http:// www.bbc.co.uk/ news/ world- us- canada- 34996604 10. ‘Donald J. Trump Addresses Terrorism, Immigration, and National Security’, 13 June 2016. Available online:  https:// www.donaldjtrump.com/ press- releases/ donald- j.- trump- addresses- terrorism- immigration- and- national- security ; ‘Donald Trump on the Issues’, Th e Politics and Elections Portal . Available online:  http:// 2016. presidential- candidates.org/ Trump/ ?on=terrorism 11. Rachel Pistol, ‘Why Shinzo Abe’s Pearl Harbor Visit Comes as Th reat of Internment Returns’, Newsweek , 26 December 2016. Available online:  http:// europe.newsweek.com/ why- shinzo- abes- pearl- harbor- visit- comes- threat- internment- returns- 536364 ; Rachel Pistol, ‘75 Years aft er Pearl Harbor, the Th reat of Internment Returns’, Th e Huffi ngton Post , 1 January 2016. Available online:  http:// www.huffi ngtonpost.co.uk/ rachel- pistol/ 75- years- aft er- pearl- harb_ b_ 13896910.html 12. ‘Immigration Reform Th at Will Make America Great Again’, Available online:  https:// www.donaldjtrump.com/ positions/ immigration- reform 13. Julia Preston, Alan Rappeport, and Matt Richtel, ‘What Would It Take for Donald Trump to Deport 11 Million and Build a Wall?’, Th e New York Times , 19 May 2016. Available online:  http:// www.nytimes.com/ 2016/ 05/ 20/ us/ politics/ donald- trump- immigration.html?_ r=0 14. Greg Robinson , A Tragedy of Democracy: Japanese Confi nement in North America ( New York :  Columbia University Press , 2009 ) ; Roger Daniels , Concentration Camps, North America: Japanese in the United States and Canada during World War II ( Malabar, FL :  Krieger ,  1981 ) . 15. William H. Sewell Jr., ‘ Marc Bloch and the Logic of Comparative History ’, History and Th eory 6 ( 1967 ),  208 . 16. Raymond Grew , ‘ On Reading Six Books in Search of Another ’, Comparative Studies in Society and History 11 ( 1969 ),  355 . 17. George M. Frederickson , ‘ From Exceptionalism to Variability: Recent Developments in Cross- National Comparative History ’, Journal of American History 82 ( 1995 ),  587 . 18. See A. W. B. Simpson , In the Highest Degree Odious: Detention without Trial in Wartime Britain ( Oxford :  Clarendon Press , 1992 ) ; Aaron L. Goldman , ‘ Defence Regulation 18B: Emergency Internment of Aliens and Political Dissenters in Great Britain during World War II ’, Th e Journal of British Studies 12 , no. 2 ( 1973 ), 120 – 36 . 9781350001428_pi-222.indd 1429781350001428_pi-222.indd 142 5/10/2017 9:05:40 PM5/10/2017 9:05:40 PM Journal of Transnational American Studies 9.1 (2018) 
work_xgpqpjzjafe3pdz6tgmy3xq5ei	----	klan feb 21 2011 Hatred and Profits: Under the Hood of the Ku Klux Klan* Roland G. Fryer, Jr. Harvard University and NBER and Steven D. Levitt University of Chicago and NBER February 2011 * We are grateful Edward Glaeser, Claudia Goldin, Lawrence Katz, Robert Margo, and Peter Temin for helpful comments and suggestions. The authors thank Bowling Green University, Clark Historical Library, Colorado Historical Society, Emory University, University of Georgia, Harvard University Libraries, University of Kentucky, the Indiana Historical Society, the Montana Historical Society, and the Pennsylvania State Archives for their help in constructing our database. Paras Bhayani, Mandy Ching, Steve Cicala, Sean Garborg, Ethan Lieber, Alipo Melusi, Carter Mundell, and Lisandra Rickards provided exceptional research assistance. Correspondence can be addressed to either of the authors at (Fryer) 1805 Cambridge Street, Littauer Center – North Yard, Harvard University, Cambridge MA 02138 [rfryer@fas.harvard.edu]; (Levitt) 1126 East 59th Street, University of Chicago, Chicago IL 60637 [slevitt@uchicago.edu]. Abstract The Ku Klux Klan reached its heyday in the mid-1920s, claiming millions of members. In this paper, we analyze the 1920s Klan, those who joined it, and the social and political impact that it had. We utilize a wide range of archival data sources including information from Klan membership roles, applications, robe-order forms, an internal audit of the Klan by Ernst and Ernst, and a census that the Klan conducted after an internal scandal. Combining these sources with data from the 1920 and 1930 U.S. Censuses, we find that individuals who joined the Klan in some cities were better educated and more likely to hold professional jobs than the typical American. Surprisingly, we find few tangible social or political impacts of the Klan. There is little evidence that the Klan had an effect on black or foreign born residential mobility, or on lynching patterns. Historians have argued that the Klan was successful in getting candidates they favored elected. Statistical analysis, however, suggests that any direct impact of the Klan was likely to be small. Furthermore, those who were elected had little discernible effect on legislation passed. Rather than a terrorist organization, the 1920s Klan is best described as a social organization with a wildly successful multi-level marketing structure fueled by an army of highly-incentivized sales agents selling hatred, religious intolerance, and fraternity in a time and place where there was tremendous demand. 1 I. Introduction The Ku Klux Klan (KKK) is the most prominent hate-based organization in American history. Founded in the aftermath of the Civil War as a whimsical social club, the Klan quickly transformed into a terrorist organization aimed at subjugating newly freed blacks and driving out moderate whites that attempted to improve the plight of Freedmen in the Reconstruction South. Legal and military action undermined the effectiveness of the Klan, and by the 1870s it had largely disappeared. The Klan was revived in 1915. Its popularity and influence grew, first slowly, and then more rapidly, to a peak in the mid-1920s. By that time it claimed four million members, was credited with engineering the election of politicians across the country, and included in its membership some of the most powerful men in America.1 Marred by a high profile sex scandal, the Klan’s membership rolls decreased dramatically in the latter half of the 1920s and the Klan has since remained a shadow of its former self. In this paper, we analyze the rise and fall of the Klan during its peak years in the 1920s, attempting to answer a wide-ranging and ambitious set of questions concerning the organization: what explains the stunning rise and precipitous fall of the Klan? Was it a hate-based terrorist group, or merely a social club like the Elks or Veterans of Foreign Wars? Who joined the Klan, and why did they do so? To what extent did the Klan’s rise and fall have real effects, for instance, in the form of increased violence, migration of Blacks and Catholics away from Klan strongholds, or on electoral/legislative outcomes? These are difficult questions to answer, even under ideal circumstances. In this particular setting, the task is made more challenging both because nearly a century has elapsed, and also, the Klan was a highly secretive organization 1 It is alleged that President Warren Harding was inducted into the Klan in a ceremony performed at the White House (Wade 1987), though there is disagreement among historians on this point (Newton 2006). 2 about which information is scarce. Consequently, the answers that we offer are in many cases suggestive rather than conclusive. The key input into our analysis is a unique dataset on membership in the Ku Klux Klan in the 1920s that we have constructed based on archival research. The datasets contains data on nearly 60,000 actual Klan members whose names we gleaned from internal Klan documents including membership lists, completed application forms, meeting attendance sheets, signed correspondence between members and officials, and order forms for robes and other paraphernalia. Our research uncovered Klan records of this type for a number of different areas, including membership records for the states of Pennsylvania and Colorado, as well as cities including Knoxville, Tennessee and Athens, Georgia. By merging these Klan records with individual-level data from the 1920 and 1930 censuses, we are able to address the question of who joined the Klan. Second, based both on the documents contained in these archival sources and the existing historical record, we are able to paint a more complete and data-driven picture of the economic structure of the Klan than was previously available. For instance, using credible estimates of the number of Klan members in Indiana between 1923 and 1925 from two sources (an internal audit performed by Ernst & Ernst and a census of Klan members), as well as information on dues and other sources of revenue, we estimate the revenues that high-ranking individuals within the Klan likely earned. Third, we use county-level data from Indiana and Pennsylvania, two Klan strongholds during the 1920s, on the number of Klansmen in a given county to analyze the extent to which variation in Klan membership influenced real social, economic, and political outcomes. A 3 dramatic historical accident – the sordid murder conviction of the leader of the Indiana Klan which precipitated the Klan’s implosion within two years – provides a natural experiment for exploring the causal impact of the Klan. It is unlikely that the nativist sentiments underlying the Klan dissipated as quickly as the organization itself, potentially allowing us to separately identify the role of the organization from the social forces that spawned it. The results we obtain using our new dataset on members of the Klan are, in some cases, quite surprising. In some cities, individuals who joined the Klan were better educated and more likely to hold professional jobs than the typical American. In other cities, however, Klan members were significantly less likely to hold professional jobs despite being better educated, providing mixed evidence for earlier findings of a number of historians on the subject (Goldberg 1981). Yet, despite the sophistication of its members and its enormous rolls, we find that the Klan had few tangible social or political impacts. There is little evidence that the Klan had an effect on black or foreign-born residential mobility or on lynching patterns. There is some evidence that the Klan was successful at getting candidates it favored elected, but the direct impact of the Klan in this domain appears small. Moreover, even when the Klan succeeded in the electoral process (e.g. Indiana in 1925 had a Klan-endorsed governor, as well as control of the state legislature), there is little evidence that the legislation passed effectively advanced the Klan’s mission (Jackson 1992, Goldberg 1981). Instead, the Klan’s true genius lay in its remarkable ability to raise revenue. We estimate that at the peak of the Klan, initiation fees, dues, and profits from robes in the state of Indiana alone generated nearly $4.4 million (in 2011 dollars) annually for the national Klan leader, $2.6 million for the head of the Indiana Klan, and over $330,000 each for the national head salesman 4 and the salesman responsible for Indiana. Per capita income in the United States at this time was roughly $8,700 in 2011 dollars. Rather than a terrorist organization, the 1920s Klan is better described as a wildly successful multi-level marketing entity fueled by an army of highly incentivised sales agents and an unprecedented interest in fraternal groups of all kinds (Skocpol 2003). Our findings fit squarely into Glaeser’s (2005) pioneering analysis of “entrepreneurs of hate,” in which political and business leaders create and encourage hatred for private benefit. With stunning rapidity, however, the Klan collapsed as quickly as it had grown. By 1930, its national membership had declined to perhaps one percent of that achieved at the peak (Moore 1991, Wade 1987). The implosion of the Klan stands in stark contrast to other fraternal groups of the time, many of which still function on a large scale nearly a century later (e.g Elks, Rotary club). While there were idiosyncratic factors that contributed to this collapse (most notably the murder conviction of a prominent Klan leader), we argue that even absent these extenuating circumstances, the Klan was likely to be unstable, both because of the structure of the incentives given to Klan recruiters and because of its hate-based rather than civic-minded nature. The next section provides a brief history of the Ku Klux Klan and explores the peculiar nature of the organization. Section III describes how we construct our database of Klan members from archival data, summarizes the dataset, and provides some basic social and economic demographics of Klan members. Section IV estimates the revenues that accrued to key Klan officials from the state of Indiana during the peak years of membership. Section V attempts to understand the rapid decline of the Klan in the late 1920s. Section VI estimates the effect of the Klan on lynching, black and foreign-born migration, and politics in Indiana and Pennsylvania. 5 Section VI concludes. There are two appendices: Appendix A provides details of how we constructed our database of Klan members and Appendix B is a guide to Klan terminology. II. A Brief History of the Ku Klux Klan In December 1865, six ex-Confederates from Pulaski, Tennessee (near the Alabama border) organized a social club in which the six, dressed in white sheets, rode around on horseback for amusement.2 They called themselves the Ku Klux Klan, merging the Greek for circle (kyklos) with “clan.” The founding members created the group as a secret fraternity replete with ridiculous names and costumes.3 The group soon discovered that their strange appearance frightened newly freed African-Americans (Chalmers 1987).4 The idea caught on among others, and similar autonomous Klans began to emerge across the south. Many of the Klan’s early activities were child-like mischief.5 In April 1867, representatives of the various—and heretofore independent—Klans met in Nashville, Tennessee (Chalmers 1987). The meeting resulted in the election of Nathan Bedford 2 Our discussion of the history of the Klan draws heavily on the excellent accounts provided in Chalmers (1987), Wade (1987), Moore (1991), Alexander (1965), Newton (2006), Newton (2001), Tucker (1991). 3 For instance, there was initially an elaborate initiation ceremony that consisted of blindfolding the candidate, subjecting him to lengthy oaths, and bringing him before a “royal altar” (a mirror) where he was invested with the “royal crown” (two large donkey ears). 4 Prior to the Klan, there had been only one similar organization in U.S. history: the American Party, better known as the “Know-Nothings.” The Know-Nothings were an actual political party whose beliefs were predicated on a strong opposition to immigration. The party was largely based on nativisim, not racism. The party arose durng a period of massive immigration and directed its fire at new immigrants from nations such as Ireland, which had experienced a horrendous Potato Famine in 1848. Because the subjugation of Blacks was not a concern before the Civil War—most were enslaved, after all—the Reconstruction Klan was the first major American organization whose primary objective was targeting Blacks. 5 In one favorite Klan tactic, a white-sheeted, masked Klansman would ride up to a Black home at night and demand water. When the well bucket was offered, the Klansman would gulp it down and demand more, having actually poured the water through a rubber tube that flowed into a leather bottle concealed beneath his robe. After draining several buckets, the Klansman would exclaim that he had not had a drink since he died on the battlefield at Shiloh, and gallop away. 6 Forrest, a former Confederate general from Memphis, as the Klan’s chief, or Grand Wizard. Less than two years later, however, Forrest ordered the dissolution of the Klan, arguing that it was “being perverted from its original honorable and patriotic purposes, becoming injurious instead of subservient to the public peace.” Though many local Klans did dissolve following Forrest’s orders, many others did not (Chalmers 1987). In response to continued Klan violence in the South, the Radical Republicans began a campaign to destroy the Klan, using U.S. Army troops to break up Klan activities and prosecuting Klansmen in federal courts. The Klan ceased operations by the mid-1870s. The Second Coming and the Height of Power For over forty years the Klan laid dormant. Around 1915, it is widely believed that the confluence of two events, the release of The Birth of a Nation and the lynching of Leo Frank led to the coming of the second Klan (Wade 1987, Newton 2006). In the summer of 1915, D.W. Griffith released a largely fictional documentary, The Birth of a Nation, which greatly enhanced the public opinion of the Klan. Griffith’s film was an adaptation of a book—The Clansmen: An Historical Romance of the Ku Klux Klan, by Thomas Dixon—that largely conformed to what was the commonly accepted historical record of the day (Wade 1987). The film’s second portion, which focuses on the Klan, portrays ex-slaves as criminals intent on raping white women and northern carpetbaggers as co-conspirators in Blacks’ attempt to subjugate white southerners. The film shows the Klan as an organization founded to empower and defend white southerners, particularly “white womanhood,” and willing to engage in “noble violence” to achieve its ends. The film, which some have claimed had the highest box 7 office gross of any silent movie, was endorsed by President Woodrow Wilson, a former historian and friend of Dixon. After a White House screening, Wilson commented: “My only regret is that it is all so terribly true” (Wade 1987). In September 1915, a Georgia physician named William J. Simmons saw Griffith’s film. Inspired, he led a group of 34 men, including two veterans of the first Klan, on a trip to Stone Mountain. On Thanksgiving Day, in what Simmons would later claim were sub-zero temperatures, the group inaugurated the second coming of the Klan. Simmons declared himself Grand Wizard (Newton 2006, Wade 1987). Within weeks, ninety-one new members joined Simmons’ Klan, bringing in $10 apiece in initiation fees and $6.50 apiece for robes and hoods; forty-two of them paid $53,000 worth of Klan life insurance. The insurance program, characteristic of most adult fraternal orders at the time, provides some anecdotal evidence that the Klan was designed, in part, as a money-making device (more on this in section IV). Simmons has been described as a “good lodge man” who held membership in six other fraternal organizations when he started the Klan (Alexander 1965). According to Simmons, the new Klan was designed to be respectful and harmless; Klansmen were to refrain from coercive activity except to frighten an occasional “uppity” Negro. In many respects, the Klan resembles the many other fraternal orders that were thriving at the time.6 Over the next several years, the Klan spread, though the overall membership remained relatively. In June 1920, Simmons struck a deal to convert the Southern Publicity Association – an organization that had conducted campaigns for the Salvation Army and others – into the “Propagation Department” of the Klan. The contract stipulated that managers of the Propagation 6 The Klan’s charter describes the group as a “…benevolent, ritualistic, social, and fraternal order” (Ku Klux Klan 1921). 8 Department, Edward Clarke and Elizabeth Tyler, would get $8.00 of every $10.00 initiation fee. They sent over 1,000 Kleagles into southern and southwestern states with the charge to make salient whatever prejudices – anti-Catholocism, anti-Semitism, racism, and so on – were most acute in the particular areas they were selling Klan memberships. Only then did membership truly accelerate, and at a mind boggling rate. By 1924, estimates of the Klan’s peak size range from 1.5 million (Jackson 1992) to as many as four million, or roughly 5-14% of the eligible population.7 The largest estimates of membership are based on claims of Klan leaders, which are likely to be inflated. Figure 1 depicts this dramatic rise.8 A simple adaptation of the pioneering work in Glaeser (2005) may help explain the rapid rise of the Klan. In Glaeser’s model, there is an interaction between politicians (or social entrepreneurs in the case of the Klan) supplying hatred against an out-group and the willingness of in-group members to demand such hatred. The size of the in-group is fixed. If we make the size of the in-group endogenous and allow entry decisions to depend on the costs and benefits of group membership, one can rationalize the rise in Klan membership. The costs of joining the Klan likely included membership fees and potential social sigma from some segments of society. Benefits likely included police and personal protection, networking, and so on. These benefits 7 While these self-reported Klan numbers are likely an exaggeration, they are not completely out of the realm of possibility. An analysis of data from an internal census of Indiana Klan membership in 1925 finds that a total number of Klansmen is 162,267 or 18.44% of the eligible Indiana population. Klan penetration into Indiana is reputed to have among the highest in the country, so extrapolating this percentage to the whole of the United States will yield a (potentially very loose) upper bound of 5.2 million Klan members; using the Colorado Klan as a benchmark yields even higher numbers. If instead we extrapolate from the membership rolls of the Pennsylvania we obtain estimates of approximately 400,000 8 While the Klan’s rapid rise and fall make it rare among membership organizations, the years in which it hit peak operations are almost exactly those in which similar cross-class, fraternal organizations reached their apex (Skocpol (2003)). Given that the Klan was part of a broader trend of civic engagement, one interesting question is why these groups thrived in these particular historical periods. Skocpol (2003) argues that the civil war and World War I had important impacts on views regarding mobilizing citizens under common civic causes. Of course the motivations of the founders of the Klan were not civic in the conventional sense—they were fueled not by a sense of progressivism but by what they considered affronts to southern and national dignity. 9 may have increased with the number of individuals joining the Klan (or the social stigma decreased), leading to a social multiplier effect. While we do not have definitive evidence, some combination of the sales force and profit motive of Klan leaders, nativist sentiment, and the explosion of fraternal orders may have lowered the costs of Klan membership and increased the benefits – spurring meteoric growth in the Klan in the early 1920s. The organizational structure of the Ku Klux Klan of the 1920s, designed by the Propagation Department, was a hybrid that combined features of other fraternal orders with a multi-level marketing firm, with two distinct sets of reporting hierarchies that operated more or less independently. One hierarchy was made up of the Klan’s members, from the lowliest rank and file to the highest leadership. This hierarchy corresponds to the social club aspect of the Klan—the arm that intimidated Blacks and foreigners and attempted to influence political outcomes. In addition, however, there was a nearly invisible, parallel hierarchy of Klan recruiters, organized like a modern multi-level marketing firm, which represents the financial arm of the Klan. This highly incentivised sales force was responsible for recruiting new members to the Klan, and almost all of the financial rewards accrued to either the handful of top leaders or the individuals in this auxiliary hierarchy. The structure of the main portion of the Klan is presented in Figure 2. The highest level of the organization was the Empire, which governed the Klan’s national operations. The Grand Wizard (or Emperor) served as the nominal chair of the body, with the Imperial Wizard acting as the chief executive and aided by a fifteen-member Imperial Kloncilium. These included the Klaliff (first vice president), the Klazik (second vice president), the Klokard (lecturer), the Kludd (chaplain), the Kligrapp (secretary), the Klabee (treasurer), the Kladd (conductor), the Klarago 10 (inner-guard), the Klexter (outer-guard), the Klonsel (general counsel), the Night Hawk (courier), and the four Klokann (auditors). These individuals were responsible for keeping the Klan’s books, providing in-house legal advice, and serving as a Klan cabinet. (Newton 2006) The next tier of the organization consisted of the Realms, or the states, which were overseen by Grand Dragons and their staffs. The Realms served as administrative centers that recorded and processed new members. They also coordinated political activities within the states; in places of great Klan strength, such as Indiana, the Grand Dragon often wielded great political power. Reporting to the Grand Dragon was a fifteen member cabinet composed of Hydras, who held the same responsibilities as the Imperial Kloncilium, but at the state level. The most important positions were the Kligrapp, akin to a chief operating officer, and the Klabee, the treasurer. These officials handled much of the actual administration of the Klan (Newton 2006, Wade 1987). In the bottom tier of the organization, individual Klansmen, or Ghouls, were organized into local Klaverns. Exalted Cyclopses presided over the Klaverns—which at the Klan’s peak had as many as 200 active members—and organized Klan activities, including monthly meetings. In addition to the main Klan hierarchy, there was an auxiliary structure (illustrated in Figure 3) that existed primarily as a source of income generation for those involved. Klan members generated a tremendous amount of revenue. Each Ghoul paid a $10 initiation fee (equivalent to $110 in 2011 dollars), $6.50 to buy an official Klan robe (which cost roughly $2 to make), an annual membership fee of $5, an imperial tax of $1.80, and was also encouraged to 11 purchase other Klan-sanctioned merchandise including swords, Bibles, helmets, dry-cleaning, and life insurance. Joining the Klan was not a cheap undertaking. Using the numbers above, the first year of membership costs $23.30 (roughly $250 in 2011 dollars) and subsequent years were $6.80 (approximately $75 in 2011 dollars). At its peak in 1924, the Klan conservatively generated annual revenues from all sources of at least $25 million – equivalent to $300 million in current dollars. Only a small portion of this revenue was required to fund basic operations (Alexander 1965). The period of the Klan’s membership explosion was also the period when their political power is believed to have reached its pinnacle, especially in Indiana, Tennessee, Colorado, Oklahoma, and Oregon, where the Klan controlled portions of the state governments.9 The Klan shifted its focus from opposing the rights of Freedmen to those of immigrants, while also becoming more populist. The Klan typically aligned itself with the Democratic Party (at least in the South), though a candidate’s religion was a better indicator of Klan support (Moore 1991, Tucker 1991). The second Klan fell as swiftly as it rose. Incredibly, between 1924 and 1930 its national membership declined from over 1 million to just 30,000, and it has remained on the periphery since that time.10 III. Constructing a Database of Members of the Ku Klux Klan 9 See, for instance, Jackson (1992), and Moore (1991). 10 We explore possible explanations for the Klan’s rapid demise in Section V. 12 We have developed an extensive database of members of the Klan during the 1920s, when the organization was at its peak of popularity. We searched archives, libraries, and historical societies for data relevant to the Klan, finding a number of collections with data on individual Klan members, minutes from Klavern meetings, expenses, applications, robe-order forms, etc.11 Our two most comprehensive datasets are from Pennsylvania and Colorado. The Pennsylvania data consists of thirty microfilms worth of material and 32,390 Klan members. The majority of the membership data comes from dues records, personal correspondence, and applications for membership. There is also a wealth of information on finances, including receipts, checks, and quarterly reports sent from the Klabee to the Realm office. The data from Colorado is contained on three microfilms, one of which is a copy of the membership and dues ledger from the Denver metro area Klans totaling 20,351 names, addresses, and records of dues paid. We have similar individual level data, though less expansive in terms of numbers of Klansmen or accompanying information, gathered from Athens, Georgia, Pond Creek, Kentucky; Newaygo and Mecosta County, Michigan; Harlowton, Montana; Knox County, Tennessee; and Wood County, Ohio. The total number of Klansmen in these data was over 3,000, for a grand total of over 55,000.12 11 Appendix A provides further details. 12 These data were found in the following archives: Emory University (Knox County Klan Number 14, Knoxville, Tennessee), the University of Georgia Special Collections Library (Athens Klan #5), the Pennsylvania State Archives (Census of Pennsylvania, Delaware, and New Jersey Klans), Bowling Green University (Ohio Knights of the KKK, Wood County), the Indiana Historical Society (Census of Indiana), the Montana Historical Society (Wheatland Klan Number 29, Harlowton Montana), and the Colorado Historical Society (Denver Area Klans). Other individual level data was available for Bayfield, Colorado, Tillamook, Oregon and Tulsa, Oklahoma. Unfortunately, a large fraction of the data only contains last name and first initial that makes matching to the census too unreliable. 13 Given the clandestine nature of Klan activities, it is impossible to know how representative the data set we have assembled is. We are encouraged, however, by the geographic diversity of the areas the data cover, and by the varied ways in which the different data sources originated (in one case Klan headquarters was burglarized and the stolen files dropped off at a police station; in another case old records were found years later stored in an attic). After finding and constructing our bank of Klan members, we linked these data to the 1920 and 1930 decennial censuses. The extent of information on individual Klan members varied widely from archive to archive.13 Matching individuals to their census entries provides a uniform (if somewhat lackluster) set of variables to be studied. Further, census data allows us to formally compare the characteristics of Klan members to a representative cross-section of the population. To link our database to the census, we used three approaches. For the smallest communities (Harlowton, Pond Creek, and Newaygo and Mecosta), it was feasible to manually keypunch all of the information from the 1920 decennial censuses using copies of the original hand-written census rolls that we downloaded from Ancestry.com. We then linked the data we have from Klan membership rolls directly to the census data. Thus, for these communities, we not only have a complete match of Klan members and census data, but also all non-Klan members in the data set. For Athens, Knox county and Wood county, we follow the same matching procedure using the original Census rolls, but found it impractical to type in the entire population of non- Klan members. Instead, for these three areas, our control group of non-Klan members is 13 For instance, Knoxville reports years of formal education while much of Pennsylvania consisted only of last name and first initial. 14 constructed from two complimentary sources. First, we include individuals from those counties who are included in the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) from the University of Minnesota Population Center in 1920 and 1930. Unfortunately, the IPUMS is only a 1 percent sample in 1920 and a 0.5 percent sample in 1930, yielding relatively small control samples. To supplement this, we constructed a random sample of roughly 500 individuals in Athens and Knox County and 1,000 individuals in Wood County by randomly choosing PDF pages of the original hand-written census rolls for the 1920 census, and keypunching all of the information on white males twenty-one years or older. The Pennsylvania and Colorado data sets are too large to feasibly link individual Klan members to original census rolls by hand. Instead, we matched our Klan data to 1920 and 1930 IPUMS data using last names and first names, or in some cases, first initials, along with city or county of residence. The merge of our Klan data with IPUMS yields 475 matches on first name, last name, and county in Pennsylvania and 243 on first and last name in Colorado. We used the observations from the census data that did not merge with the Klan data as our controls. Two different types of errors can arise when merging IPUMS and Klan data this way. First, since IPUMS is only a 1 percent sample in 1920 and 0.5 percent sample in 1930, most Klan members will go unmatched. This reduces our usable sample size, but will not otherwise bias our findings. More problematic is the fact that if an individual’s name is at all common, there may be multiple people in the county who share that name. The IPUMS entry that matches the name in the Klan data base can be a different person who happens to share the same name. To deal with this problem, we cataloged the names of every individual included in the 1910, 1920, and 1930 IPUMS in states geographically proximate to Pennsylvania and Colorado 15 respectively.14 Based on the population of the county in question, we then used this large pool of names to estimate the expected number of people in the county who shared the same name as a Klan member whenever we found a match between IPUMS and the Klan data.15 The probability that the IPUMS record that matches the Klan data is a true match is the inverse of the expected number of people with that name, and that is the value we use as our measure of Klan involvement in the Pennsylvania and Colorado samples. For common names in large counties, the expected number of people sharing a name is not trivial, e.g. we estimate that there were approximately 500 John Smith’s in Philadelphia County in 1920. Most names, however, are relatively uncommon, making the probability high that the match we find is the correct one.16 Summary statistics for Klan members and our comparison group of males aged 21 and up who are not in the Klan members are displayed in Table 1 for each of our seven data sets. Klan members are shown in the odd-numbered columns, with non-Klan males in the even columns.17 The census information available during this time period is limited, unfortunately. As would be expected, members of the Klan are much more likely to be native born. They are also less likely to hold unskilled jobs (except in Athens) and more likely to be in service jobs or professionals 14 For Colorado, we used Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Kansas, Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Utah and Wyoming. For Pennsylvania, we used D.C., Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Hampshire, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, West Virginia, Vermont and Virginia. 15 More precisely, we estimated the expectation of the number of people sharing the name of the Klan member in the county conditional on there being at least n people in the county with that name, where n is the number of people with that name in the county’s IPUMS data. Because n people are present in IPUMS with that name, there must be at least that many people in the county as a whole with that name. 16 Unfortunately, we are unable to use the matching approaches employed by Atack, Bateman, and Gregson (1992) or Ferrie (1996). In both of those papers, the match was across Censuses, whereas in our setting the matching is between Census data and non-Census Klan data. Moreover, because our data only contain, at most, first and last name we cannot employ other traditional matching techniques used in the literature. 17 In Colorado and Pennsylvania we match Klan members probabilistically. Any case with a positive match is classified as Klan members, with the entries in those columns weighted in inverse proportion to our estimate of the number of people sharing that name in the county. 16 (except in Athens and Pennsylvania), which stands in sharp contrast to the image of today’s Klansmen. Literacy rates for all individuals, Klan and non-Klan, are very high, but slightly higher within the Klan. In most locations, Klan members are less likely to never have been married. In both Colorado and Pennsylvania, where we have county-level data on the share of the population that is Black or foreign born, we see no systematic relationship between those variables and Klan membership. Table 2 presents regression estimates of the social, demographic, and economic predictors of Klan membership in each of our locations for which we have individual level data. The specifications estimated are of the form: i socialeconomic i membershipklan !""" +#+$+= 21 _ , where klan_membership is the probability that individual i is a Klan member. Except in Pennsylvania and Colorado, this variable takes a value of 0 or 1 (either we know you are in the Klan or we know you are not); in Pennsylvania and Colorado, any name in IPUMS that matches a name in our Klan data base will have a positive value, but that value is less than one because of the possibility that multiple people share the same name. The set of covariates available in both the Klan data sets and the census in these years is limited to indicator variables for whether an individual is native born, a measure of occupational status (which we have divided into three mutually exclusive categories: unskilled/trade jobs (e.g. manual laborers, carpenters), service workers (e.g. clerks, salesman, agents), and professional jobs (e.g. doctors, lawyers, engineers)). In our regressions, unskilled jobs is the omitted category.18 Other covariates include age (which 18 We also explored classifying occupations along the dimension of whether Klan membership might directly benefit an individual’s business interests (e.g. the owner of a dry-cleaning establishment, or someone who provides personal 17 we turn into a dichotomous variable corresponding to whether the person is above or below the median age in the sample to make the interpretation of the odds ratio straightforward), and whether the respondent is literate, owns his own home, has ever been married, is the head of household, and is a veteran. With the exception of Pennsylvania and Colorado, we estimate this equation using a logistic specification. The coefficient estimates are interpretable as odds ratios. Given the relative size of our Klan and IPUMS observations varies widely across data sets, odds ratios are more easily interpretable than are OLS coefficients.19 Recall, the dependent variable in Pennsylvania and Colorado is continuous, thus we cannot use the logistic specification. Instead, we use OLS, but transform these estimates into odds ratios, using the Delta Method to compute the appropriate standard errors. Because the Pennsylvania and Colorado data cover a broad geographic area, we are able to estimate an additional specification which controls for the percent Black and percent foreign in an individual’s county, which we dichotomize into above or below the median of counties in the state.20 The two standard error confidence interval is reported in parentheses. A number of patterns emerge from Table 2. As would be expected given the strong nativist sentiments of the Klan, being native born is positively associated with Klan membership in all of our samples, with odds ratios ranging from 1.38 in Harlowton (i.e. being native born raises the likelihood of being in the Klan by 38 percent) to 5.89 in Athens (being native born services that might be used by other Klan members), but we found these variables had no predictive value for Klan membership. 19 For instance, in Bowling Green we have the universe of Klan members, but only a small fraction of non-Klan residents in the county. The OLS parameter estimate will not have the usual interpretation in this setting. 20 For our other data sets, all of the individuals reside in just one county. 18 more than quintuplesthe likelihood of being in the Klan). For Knoxville all Klan members are native born, so the parameter can not be estimated. The nativity coefficient is statistically different from one for all columns except Harlowton. The relationship between Klan membership and job status is mixed. In Athens and Pennsylvania, few professionals are in the Klan; in the other areas professionals are overrepresented in the Klan, although the differences are not always statistically significant. Literacy is higher among Klansmen in all samples, though the estimates are not statistically significant in a few of the cases. These findings are consistent with a quote MacLean (1994, p. xii) attributes to an unnamed contemporary who described Klan members as “if not the ‘best people,’ at least the next best…the good, solid middle class citizens.” 21 There is no systematic relationship between Klan membership and age, likelihood of being married, or head of household status. In Colorado and Pennsylvania, where we can include the share of the population in the county that is Black or foreign, the only statistically significant result is that in Pennsylvania Klan membership is strongly positively related to the percent foreign in the regression. Separate from the regressions, we have attempted to identify the share of police officers that are in the Klan using the data we matched to the Census. It has often been suggested that there were close ties between the Klan and law enforcement (Chalmers 1987). We find that the overlap between the Klan and the police force varies widely across the communities for which we have data. In Bowling Green, a community of less than 7,000 people, seven Klansmen were on the police force. While we do not have data on the total size of Bowling Green’s police force, 21 In terms of having relatively high education, this pattern of Klan membership parallels that of modern day terrorist organizations, as reported by Krueger and Malecková (2003), or social movements more generally (Glaeser, Laibson, and Sacerdote 2002). 19 typically a town of that size would have fewer than ten police, suggesting that most or all of the police in that area were in the Klan. In Athens, there were 19 police officers according to official records; we are able to identify four of these officers as Klan members. In other areas, however, Klan representation on the police force was much lower. In Pennsylvania and Colorado, linking Klan records to Census data, we estimate that less than one percent of police officers were in the Klan. In Knoxville, between 5 and 10 percent of police officers appear to have been Klan members. IV. Hatred and Profits: The Fiscal Genius of the Klan In this section, we will show that the Klan was tremendously successful at making money by generating revenue from members in the form of dues, taxes, and product sales. Unlike a firm, which generates revenues by selling products to outsiders, the Klan derived all of its funds from its own members. Growing the membership was therefore critical to generating profits for those in leadership positions in the Klan. In order to fuel this growth, the Imperial Wizard and Imperial Kleagle created a sales force in 1921 whose job it was to enlist new members. The subsequent meteoric growth in the Klan appears to be directly attributable to the work of this sales force (Alexander 1965, Wade 1987). For most members of the social hierarchy, the promise of financial rewards was not an important enticement. Among the local leadership, only the Exalted Cyclops and the Kligrapp were paid for their services, but this pay was minimal and these individuals almost always held other jobs outside the Klan as well. Klan membership appears to be driven less by pecuniary opportunities and more by the factors that underlie social clubs of all kinds, namely shared 20 interests and ideologies, networking opportunities, a sense of belonging or “fraternity,” etc. (Alexander 1965). The one exception was the Grand Dragon in charge of a state (or “realm”).22 When the sales structure was initially put into place in 1921, it appears that none of the initiation fees went to the Grand Dragon who was in charge of the state, but by 1924, $2.50 of each initiation was funneled to the Grand Dragon. In addition, each member was required to pay an annual $1 realm tax which was paid to the Grand Dragon responsible for that state (Alexander 1965). Loucks (1936) also reports that 50 cents of the $6.50 cost of a robe went to the Grand Dragon. The strongest financial incentives, however, were for the sales force and the national leaders. The sales force was organized on a multi-level marketing principle, much like modern companies such as Amway and Avon. The U.S. was split into nine Domains with a Grand Goblin in charge of each. A Goblin would then hire a King Kleagle for each state under his control; the King Kleagle was responsible for the army of Kleagles, salesmen who were paid by commission, in his state. The Kleagles were the core of the financial structure, actively hawking memberships for $10 apiece, and pocketing $4 from each membership sold. As noted earlier, by 1924, $2.50 was directed to the Grand Dragon who ran the state. The remaining $3.50 was sent up the recruiting structure, with the person in charge of sales in the state (King Kleagle) taking $1, the regional sales overseer (Great Goblin) getting $.50, the national sales overseer (Imperial Kleagle) $1.25, and the two most powerful men in the klan (Imperial Wizard and Grand Wizard) splitting 75 cents. Kleagles were paid for recruiting new members; once someone joined, none of the ongoing revenues accrued to the sales force. 22 At his pinnacle, D.C. Stephenson was Grand Dragon of 23 states. 21 Robes and other Klan paraphernalia generated a second source of revenue. All Klan members were required to purchase an official Klan robe produced by an approved factory; Klan members were not allowed to make their own robes. These robes were sold initially for $6.50, with the price later reduced to $5.00 when the Klan constructed its own robe production factory (Jackson 1992). The robes cost only $2.00 to produce, generating large profits for the Klan leadership. The revenues from the sale of robes were split four ways. The Kleagle who recruited the purchaser, the King Kleagle, and the Grand Dragon who headed the realm each received 50 cents. The remaining $5 went to the national headquarters, which netted $3 in profit after paying the $2 production cost. In addition to being a source of direct revenue for the Klan national leaders, the requirement that all members purchase officially sanctioned robes presumably served a second important purpose. Individual salesmen had strong financial incentives to under report the number of new members they recruited, allowing them to keep the full $10 initiation fee rather than sharing it with the central leadership. Each member had to purchase a robe from the Klan leadership, providing the central office with a roster of all new members. That made it much more difficult for local Klaverns to underreport new members, keeping the full initiation fees for themselves. Besides the purchase of robes, members were encouraged to buy an array of other officially-sanctioned products ranging from life insurance sold through the Empire Mutual Life Insurance Company, robe dry-cleaning services, and even specially wrapped candies with the klan insignia on it (Alexander 1965). 22 The final source of income was the “Imperial Tax,” which was levied on all members of a Klavern after it had received its charter, usually when it had 100 members (Alexander 1965). The tax, which totaled $1.80 per Klansmen per year, was levied in four parts of $0.45 year. This revenue stream flowed directly to the top and was not shared by anyone outside the Imperial office.23 Reliable information on the total earnings of those in the financial side of the Klan is generally not available since the number of Klan members nationwide is so uncertain. There are, however, credible membership numbers for Indiana during the period 1923-25, allowing us to calculate revenues generated in Indiana during that time period. In 1923, the Klan commissioned Ernst & Ernst to conduct an internal audit in Indiana to investigate impropriety within the hierarchy. As of August 27, 1923, the report shows 117, 245 members. In 1925, as part of the D. C. Stephenson trial, the Klan took an internal census, reporting approximately 162,000 members. Based on these numbers, knowledge of initiation fees, membership dues, and purchases of robes and other paraphernalia, we are able to construct estimates of revenues accruing to the various levels of the hierarchy. It is important to stress, however, that this case study is far from representative – the Klan’s recruiting success in Indiana was unparalleled and the period studied represents the Klan’s peak there. In addition, a number of important caveats apply. First, there is anecdotal evidence that the Klan had some difficulty actually collecting dues from members, and at least in later years offered discounts on initiation fees (Kennedy 1990). This would lead us to overstate Klan revenues across the board. On the other hand, we make two assumptions that will bias our 23 There are also references to local taxes levied by individual Klaverns (see Alexander 1965), but we have been unable to determine how widespread or large such taxes might have been. 23 calculated revenues downwards: (1) our calculations on merchandise are limited to robes, excluding other paraphernalia, and (2) we compute new initiations as the increase in the size of the membership, ignoring the fact that there was exit as well. Since much of the revenue was generated from initiation fees, trading a new member for an existing member boosted revenues. Table 3 provides estimates of the distribution of the annual revenues generated by the Klan from the state of Indiana at its peak. The first four columns correspond to the four different sources of revenues: new initiations, robes, the realm tax, and the imperial tax. The final column is the sum of these sources. The values shown have been transformed into 2006 dollars using the consumer price index.24 Our estimates are based off an assumption of 140,000 total Klan members in Indiana and 22,511 new members per year, with the latter number derived from the increase between the two Klan internal audits. New initiation fees, shown in column 1, generated revenues of nearly $200,000 for the national headquarters, over $300,000 for the highest ranking person in the national sales structure (Imperial Kleagle), over $600,000 for D.C. Stephenson, the Grand Dragon of Indiana, $132,000 for the regional sales manager (Great Goblin), $265,000 for the sales manager in Indiana (King Kleagle), and over $1 million for the street-level salesmen (Kleagles). Because we have no reliable data on the number of Kleagles in Indiana, we are unable to calculate a per capita wage for the salesmen. The sale of robes generated almost $800,000 in profit for the national headquarters; these numbers are net of the costs of supplying the robes. The Grand Dragon, King Kleagle, and the Kleagles each received over $100,000 from robes. The Imperial Tax was the single greatest 24 Between 1924 and 2006, prices rose approximately 1200 percent. 24 source of revenue, contributing nearly $3 million to national headquarters. The Realm Tax provided $1.65 million to D.C. Stephenson. According to our estimates, the single state of Indiana generated nearly $4 million in revenues for the national headquarters.25 After some modest expenses, most of that revenue would go directly to the Imperial Wizard, with the Grand Wizard having claims on some of it. D.C. Stephenson, the head of the Indiana Klan, received nearly $2.5 million annually from the state’s operations. The head of the state sales hierarchy pocketed nearly $400,000 a year. To put these numbers into perspective, in current dollars, a typical full professor during this time earned $45,000 in current dollars (Bachman 1929), Babe Ruth earned $613,000, and President Calvin Coolidge earned $885,000.26 V. Understanding the Expeditious Collapse of the Klan As fast as the Klan grew in the early 1920s, it shrunk even more quickly. Its membership in 1930 had declined to an estimated one percent of that achieved at the peak just five years earlier (Moore 1991, Wade 1987). The nativist forces that underlay the Klan remained strong, even as the organization itself imploded. The question, then, is why the Klan failed in such a dramatic fashion, and whether there are broader lessons to be drawn from the collapse. The proximate cause of the Klan’s demise was the sordid murder trial of one of the movement’s leading figures, D. C. Stephenson. In March 1925, Stephenson kidnapped 25 Alexander (1965) reports that D.C. Stephenson remitted $641,475 (in 1923 dollars) to Klan national headquarters covering the period February 17-July 14, 1923. In current dollars, that is roughly $7 million for a five-month period. That number is roughly three times higher than our estimate and is inconsistent with the other numbers reported in Alexander (1965). 26 It was not until 1931 that Ruth famously demanded a salary of $80,000 -- $5,000 more than President Calvin Coolidge – with the explanation that “I had a better year than he did.” 25 Oberholtzer, forced her onto a train heading to Chicago, forced her to drink, raped her, and even bit off portions of her flesh. Oberholtzer died shortly thereafter, leaving a death bed statement detailing her treatment at Stephenson’s hands. In November 1925, Stephenson was tried and convicted of second-degree murder and sentenced to life in prison. Ed Jackson, the governor who had been Stephenson’s protégé, refused to pardon him. The trial received spectacular media attention. The details of the murder were so gory and contrasted so sharply with Stephenson’s support of temperance and his self-defined image as a defender of “Protestant womanhood,” that entire Klaverns deserted the Klan. On the other hand, Stephenson, while prominent in the Klan, was neither the founder nor the titular leader of the Klan revival. It seems far from inevitable that his misdeeds should be the undoing of a social movement with millions of members. There appear to be at least two other factors specific to the Klan that made it particularly unstable, allowing the Stephenson affair to trigger a collapse. The first explanation for the Klan’s instability is that the sales force of Kleagles was incentivized exclusively on acquisition of new members. Whether the new member remained active in the Klan for many years, or provided public goods to the organization, was immaterial to the Kleagle. This fueled the growth in membership during the ascent, but resulted in an organization in which the level of attachment of the typical member to the group was likely to be weak, compared to other social groups. Moreover, the majority of Klan members had been part of the organization for a few years or less when the scandal unfolded, and many of these individuals held memberships in other fraternal groups. Consequently, in response to a shock that reduced the utility of being in the Klan, the proportion of members who were pushed over the margin and exited the Klan was 26 large. Contrast, for example, the sensitivity of the Klan to scandal compared to the Catholic church’s resilience in the face of widespread pedophilia charges. Unlike the Klan, people have an allegiance to a single religious denomination, one that is typically from birth, making church membership much more stable. The second factor that may have contributed to the Klan’s rapid downfall is its hate-based ideology. One of the Klan’s primary weapons has always been fear and intimidation. Any individual that challenges the Klan risks violent retribution. The more critics of the Klan who are active, the less credible is the Klan’s threat of violence towards any one of them, i.e. there are positive spillovers across critics. Consequently, there may exist multiple equilibria: one in which no critics of the Klan come forwards and another in which many critics speak out. The Stephenson scandal may have served as a coordinating device that shifted critics from the silent equilibrium to the vocal one.27 Glaeser (2005) offers another channel through which the interaction of a hate-based ideology and the Stephenson affair could undo the Klan. In Glaeser’s framework, leaders foment hatred by telling stories about the targets of the hatred which may or may not be true. It is possible for followers to determine whether the stories told are true, but only at a cost. For some set of parameters in the model, it will not be optimal for group members to pay the cost of determining whether the hateful stories are true. The Stephenson scandal showed that the Klan leadership was not living the virtuous life that it espoused. This revelation presumably also reduced the perceived likelihood that the hate-mongering stories told by the Klan leaders were true, raising the benefits to the rank and file from paying the costs to learn the truth about the Klan’s enemies. To the extent that the enemies turned out to be far less 27 In the words of Glaeser (2005), it becomes much easier to generate “hatred of the haters” after the scandal. 27 dangerous than the Klan’s rhetoric would suggest, an exogenous shock that leads members to invest in learning the truth could have a cataclysmic impact on Klan membership.28 VI. Quantifying the Social and Political Impact of the Ku Klux Klan There are extensive anecdotal examples of both the terror that the Klan produced and its political clout, but there has been little in the way of systematic quantitative analysis to substantiate such claims. Complicating this analysis is the fact that even if one finds a positive correlation between Klan activity at the county level and an outcome such as hate crimes, it is unclear whether this is causal since the same factors that lead people in an area to commit hate crimes lead them to embrace the Klan. The Klan may worsen hate crimes, or it may simply thrive in places where hate crimes would have occurred regardless of their presence. Our attempts to differentiate these two stories hinge on the crucial role that D.C Stephenson played in the rise and fall of the Klan, as discussed above. Stephenson’s charisma and entrepreneurial skills were critical to the success of the Klan in Indiana. Although similar nativist sentiments were at work in nearby states such as Pennsylvania and Ohio, the Klan grew much more slowly in these places absent a Stephenson-like figure. Thus, one might argue that a comparison of Indiana to Pennsylvania over the first part of the 1920s provides a crude measure of an independent contribution of the Klan. With Stephenson’s conviction for murder, however, the Indiana Klan collapsed even more quickly than it grew. Assuming that underlying nativist beliefs were unlikely to dissipate simply because of the murder trial and the dissolution of an 28 The scenario of collapse described is not unique to hate-based groups, but rather could operate in any organization in which leadership motivates the rank and file through lies which eventually are revealed. 28 organization, the period immediately following his conviction in 1925 provides another avenue for identifying the causal impact of the Klan. In this section, we look for evidence of an impact of the Klan in the form of the number of lynchings, change in the population distribution of Blacks and foreigners, vote shares in congressional elections, and legislation passed. We tackle these various outcomes in turn. Klan membership and the number of lynchings Given the hate-based beliefs of the Klan and its notoriety for violence, it is plausible that Klan activity would be associated with the increased frequency of hate crimes. The only type of hate crime for which there is any form of systematic data during this time period is lynchings.29 The Tuskegee Institute has assembled an extensive catalog of documented lynchings in collaboration with Project HAL – a remarkable effort to accumulate a database of all the lynchings that have taken place in the United States.30 Figure 4 presents a time series of Black lynching from 1880-1930 using data from Project HAL. The time series pattern in lynchings is exactly opposite of what one would expect if the Klan had a major impact. The number of lynchings peaked after 1890—a time period in which the Klan did not exist—and decreases steadily afterward. Between 1915 and 1925, when Klan memberships grew at fever pace, lynching continued to decrease, hitting their lowest levels in the time-series precisely when Klan popularity is at its peak. There is not a single recorded Black lynching in either Pennsylvania or Indiana in the 1920s when the Klan was thriving there. 29 For instance, the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s uniform Crime Reports, for instance, are not available until 1929, though these data would not have provided any systematic insight into hate crimes anyway. 30 See http://people.uncw.edu/hinese/HAL/HAL%20Web%20Page.htm#HAL%20History for more information on the database, its origins, and purpose. 29 The relationship between Klan membership and residential location choices of Blacks and foreigners Even if there is little evidence of widespread lynching on the part of the 1920s incarnation of the Klan, it is nonetheless possible that the Klan engaged in less drastic forms of intimidation and persecution which made life difficult for Blacks and foreigners. If that is the case, than one would expect to observe a reduction in the number of Blacks and foreigners in areas where the Klan was most active due both to people moving away and fewer people migrating in. To test this hypothesis, we run first differenced county-level regressions of the form tctctctcctc ForeignBlackPopKlanBlack ,10,310,210,11924,, )ln()ln()ln()(%% !"""# ++++=$ %%% (1) where the dependent variable is the percent change in the Black (or in some cases foreign) population in the county from one decennial census to another.31 The key explanatory variable is the percent of men aged 21 and up in the county who were in the Klan in 1924. The sample used is all counties in Pennsylvania and all counties in Indiana for which we have data. We examine changes between the 1910-1920 censuses as a test of pre-existing trends in these outcomes that we do not expect to be strongly causally related to our measure of Klan activity both because the Klan was not particularly strong in this period, and because our Klan measure is for the later period. In contrast, we do think that population changes between 1920 31 Because our dependent variable is the share of the population that is black, this regression captures differential migration patterns across races, as well as any cross-race differences in fertility. 30 and 1930 are potentially influenced by Klan activity. In all cases, the unit of observation is a county with observations weighted by county population. Table 4a presents estimation results for Pennsylvania. Columns 1-4 correspond to changes between the 1910 and 1920 censuses; columns 5-8 are for changes between 1920 and 1930. In each case the dependent variable in the first two columns is the change in percent Black, with the change in percent foreign in the next two columns. We present regression coefficients on our Klan measure with no controls and including controls for the log of population and share Black and foreign at the start of the period.32 The results in Table 4a provide little evidence for a causal impact of Klan activity on migration patterns of Blacks or foreigners. The coefficients in the period before the Klan becomes active (columns 1-4) are generally similar in sign and magnitude to those when the Klan is at its peak (columns 5-8). Absent controls, for both these periods the Klan measure is associated with strong negative values on population flows of both groups. In other words, the places where the Klan will thrive/is thriving, are places that are experiencing relative declines in the share Black or foreign. Once one controls for county population and the initial shares, however, the results for Blacks disappear. Black populations are growing more quickly in the most populous counties (such as Philadelphia), which are also areas with relatively little Klan activity. The coefficients for foreigners persist with controls. The fact that the same pattern exists in the 1910-1920 period, however, suggests a common cause of foreign emigration and Klan activity, as opposed to a causal impact of the Klan itself. All results are robust to the exclusion of Philadelphia and Pittsburgh, the two urban centers of Pennsylvania. 32 Adding county-level controls for the fraction who own farm, fraction who own home, age, family size, fraction married, and fraction in the labor force does not alter the results. 31 Table 4b is identical in structure to Table 4a, except that the sample used is Indiana counties. The results largely parallel the findings from Pennsylvania. The Indiana results for Blacks provide a hint of evidence that the Klan had some impact. In the pre-period, there is no apparent relationship between future Klan intensity and Black migration patterns. Between 1920 and 1930, there is a statistically significant negative relationship between the Klan and Black migration when controls are absent. Once controls are included, both the magnitude of the coefficient and the statistical significance decline, but the point estimate remains negative. The coefficient implies that a 10 percentage point increase in Klan prevalence is associated with roughly a 0.3 percent reduction in the Black share of the population between 1920 and 1930. The baseline Black share of the population was 3 percent, so in percentage point terms, a 10 percentage point increase in the Klan reduces the Black share of the population from 3 percent to 2.91 percent. The data provide no support for a claim that Klan activity drove away the foreign born; in all four specifications presented, the coefficient on the Klan variable is positive, and the point estimates in the later period are larger than in the pre-period. The impact of the Klan on Voting Behavior and Legislation The Klan of the 1920s is well-known for its political influence. Numerous historians have documented widespread electoral victories for Klan-supported candidates across the nation (Jackson 1992). The Klan exercised its political might in other ways as well, such as marching 50,000 Klansmen down Pennsylvania Avenue in August 1925. There is anecdotal evidence of Klan-initiated voter intimidation; an example is depicted in figure 5. 32 Politicians of both parties throughout the south and Midwest were under the Klan’s sway. Five U.S. Senators and at least four governors were Klansmen (Jackson 1992, McVeigh 2001). In 1924, the Klan captured the Republican primaries in Colorado, elected a governor of one house of the legislature, several judges and sheriffs, and the Denver chief of police. (Goldberg 1981). In Alabama, it ended the career of veteran Senator Oscar Underwood, whom it denounced as the “Jew, jug, and Jesuit candidate,” and replaced him with Hugo Black, who accepted an engraved life membership in the KKK (Morison 1980). While the Klan had a national reach and was particularly strong throughout much of the Midwest and the South, most historians believe that it experienced the most political success in Indiana. Stephenson not only aggressively boosted Klan membership and used his wealth to sponsor favored candidates, but actively meddled in Republican Party politics to engineer the election of pro-Klan candidates. At the 1924 Republican convention, Stephenson was able to force a large number of anti-Klan Republicans off the party’s ticket, an event that foreshadowed a near sweep of the state legislature and the Indiana congressional delegation that November.33 Edward L. Jackson's election to the governorship was the Klan’s crowning achievement that year (Jackson 1992). Many historians have presented these anecdotes as prima facie evidence that the Klan had an important impact on the political scene. Here we attempt a more rigorous, quantitative approach. Again using county level data on Klan membership in Indiana and Pennsylvania, we 33 The Klan turned Republican around this time as the Republican Party became more conservative and the Democrats turned more liberal. At least in Indiana, the Klan focused its efforts on knocking “old-guard” liberal Republicans out of the party, as best seen by the defeat of Merrill Moores, a veteran congressman from Indianapolis, at the 1924 Republican convention. 33 estimate the Klan’s effect on the change in republican vote share during the Klan's rise and fall . To do this, we estimate first differences county-level regressions similar to equation (1): ! %" Republican Vote c,t = #(%Klan c,1924 ) + $ 1 ln(pop c,1920 ) + $ 2 ln(blackpop c,1920 ) + $ 3 ln( foreignpop c,1920 ) + % c,t where the dependent variable is the percent change in the Republican vote share. We examine changes between 1920 and 1924 when the Klan’s membership growth was in overdrive and their political strength hit its zenith. We also investigate the change in Republican vote share between 1924 and 1926 and between 1924 and 1934. The Stephenson case, which initiated the crumbling of the Klan, occurred in 1925. This provides a rare opportunity to estimate the impact of the Klan during its decline. In all cases, the unit of observation is a county, with observations weighted by the county's population. Table 5a presents results for Pennsylvania. Columns 1-2 correspond to changes between 1920 and 1924, the rise of the Klan; columns 3-4 relate to changes between 1924 and 1926, the immediate impact of the Stephenson trial; and column 5-6 cover the years between 1924 and 1934, the years subsequent to the Klan's fall. We present regression coefficients on our Klan measure with no controls and including controls for the log of population and log of Black and foreign population, respectively. The estimates in Table 5a provide little evidence that the Klan had much influence on vote shares in Pennsylvania during its peak years. Between 1920 and 1924, the effects actually go in the opposite direction that one might have expected. Similarly, from 1924 to 1926, there is 34 an increase in Republican vote shares, the opposite of what one might expect, which then declines modestly.34 Table 5b provides the estimates of most interest, partly because many have argued that the Klan had an overwhelming influence on Indiana politics (Moore 1991) and partly because Stephenson provides a quasi-experiment regarding the effect of the Klan's rapid rise and fall on politics. Yet, as the table suggests, the Klan had surprisingly little influence. During the Klan’s peak growth period, the coefficient on percent Klan is .22. Evaluated at the mean, this implies that a 10 percentage point increase in Klan was associated with a 2.2 increase in the Republican vote share between 1920 and 1924. Klan popularity in a county is associated with a small decline immediately following the Stephenson trial, a decline that grows larger with time. Figure 6 further underscores the lack of causal influence the Klan had on politics. The figure plots the change in Republican vote share in three states: Pennsylvania, Indiana, and Illinois. Illinois makes an interesting “control” state, as it was deeply nativist but experienced only limited Klan activity. The trend lines follow a remarkably similar pattern. Despite our estimates regarding the relatively small effect of the Klan on changes in vote shares, eleven of the thirteen elected candidates elected to the U.S. House in Indiana in the 1924 elections were those backed by the Klan, and the Klan controlled virtually the entire state government. A key question, then, is whether these politicians were able to pass legislation that furthered Klan goals. In 1925, a series of bills were introduced, mainly concerning education, to further the Klan’s “100 percent Americanism” campaign. Weaver (1954) provides careful documentation of Klan-initiated legislation. The bills included the Religious Garb Bill, which 34 These results are robust to excluding the two most populous counties, Philadelphia and Pittsburgh, from the estimation. 35 would have prevented any person (i.e. Catholic nuns) who wore religious garb from teaching in the public schools; the Public Schools Graduate Bill, which would have required that teachers’ licenses in Indiana be granted only to individuals who attended public schools; the Uniform Textbook Bill, which would have made it compulsory for private and public schools to use the same textbooks; and the Bible Reading Bill, which would have made Bible reading mandatory in the public schools. Also on the Klan’s agenda were bills to allow college students to receive credit for Bible study outside the school, to allow public school students to leave school early for religious education, to create an entirely new board of education, and to have all students in Indiana study the U.S. Constitution. The final bill was the only one enacted. VI. Conclusion The Ku Klux Klan symbolizes the extremes of race and religious hatred in America. Since its inception in the months after the Civil War, the Klan’s organization, mission, and power have varied tremendously, with membership and political influence peaking in the mid- 1920s when over one million Americans were members. Our statistical analysis, however, finds that, contrary to conventional wisdom, the Klan had little impact on Black or foreign born migration, lynchings, or politics during this time period. Rather, the 1920s Klan is best described as an enormously successful marketing ploy; a classic pyramiding scheme – officials at the top getting rich off of the individuals at the bottom – energized by sales agents with enormous financial incentives to sell hatred. 36 References Alexander, Charles. “Kleagles and Cash.” 1965. The Business History Review. Vol. 39, No. 3, pp. 348-367 Bachman, Frank P. (1929) “Salaries and Supplemental Earnings of College Teachers.” Science, Vol. 70, No. 1802, pp 26-29. Chalmers, David. Hooded Americanism. 1987. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Davis, Lenwood and Janet Sims-Wood. 1984. The Ku Klux Klan: A Bibliography. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. Glaeser, Edward L. 2005. “The Political Economy of Hatred.” Quarterly Journal of Economics. Vol. 120, No. 1, pp. 45-86. Glaeser, Edward L., David Laibson, and Bruce Sacerdote. 2002. “An Economic Approach to Social Capital,” Economic Journal Vol. 112: 437-458. Goldberg, Robert Alan. 1981. Hooded Empire: The Ku Klux Klan in Colorado. Urbana: University of Illinois Press. Jackson, Kenneth T.The Ku Klux Klan in the City, 1915-1930. 1992. Chicago, IL: Elephant Paperback. Kennedy, Stetson, 1990, The Klan Unmasked. University Press of Florida. Ku Klux Klan, 1921, Constitution and Laws of the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Atlanta, GA. Krueger, Alan and Maleckova, Jitka. “Education, Poverty, and Terrorism.” 2003. The Journal of Economic Perspectives. Vol. 17, No. 4, pp. 119-144. Loucks, Emerson Huntsberger. The Ku Klux Klan in Pennsylvania, a Study in Nativism. 1936. New York, Harrisburg, PA: The Telegraph Press. MacLean, Nancy. Behind the Mask of Chivalry: The Making of the Second Ku Klux Klan. 1994. New York: Cambridge University Press. McVeigh, Rory. “Power Devaluation, the Ku Klux Klan, and the Democratic National Convention of 1924.” 2001. Sociological Forum 16(1):1-30. Moore, Leonard. Citizen Klansmen. 1991. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press. 37 Morison, Samuel, Commager, Henry, and Leuchtenburg, William. The Growth of the American Republic. 1980. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Newton, Michael. The Ku Klux Klan. 2006. Jefferson, NC: McFarland and Company. Newton, Michael. The Invisible Empire. 2001. Gainesville, FL: University of Florida Press. Skocpol, Theda. Diminished Democracy. 2003. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press. Tucker, Richard. The Dragon and the Cross. 1991. Hamden, CT: Archon Books. Wade, Wyn Craig. The Fiery Cross. 1987. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 38 Appendix A: Data Appendix We have developed an extensive database of members of the Ku Klux Klan during the 1920s. The database was developed in three stages. First, we scoured the country for archives, libraries, and historical societies that contained data on the Ku Klux Klan. Once we found those that contained potentially relevant information, we attempted to partner with these institutions by offering to pay for their collections to be microfilmed. Our price: one copy of all microfilm. Second, we analyzed these microfilms for data on individual Klan members, minutes from Klavern meetings, expenses, filed applications, and so on. Many of these forms contain information about each Klan member (name, height, weight, e.g.). From this, we developed the initial list of Klan members from all the microfilm that had such information. The final stage in creating our database was to link up Klan members to census information so that they could be compared to non-Klan members. Below, we detail each of these stages. Below, we provide the details of this three-stage process. In Search of Klan Members For obvious reasons, identifying members of secret societies or terrorist groups is a difficult task. We began by searching university libraries, archives, and historical societies around the country. Twenty-three of these organizations possessed a total of thirty collections regarding the Ku Klux Klan. Most were simply old copies of Klan propaganda, a robe here and there, or various copies of the Kloran and the Klan monthly newsletter. A number of repositories had remarkable data on members of the Invisible Empire including membership roles and dues paid, financial records, first and last names, as well as other useful information. These included Emory University (Knox County Klan Number 14, Knoxville, Tennessee), the University of Georgia (Athens Klan #5), the Pennsylvania State Archives (Census of Pennsylvania, Delaware, and New Jersey Klans), Bowling Green University (Ohio Knights of the KKK, Wood County), the Indiana Historical Society (Census of Indiana), Clark Historical Library (Newaygo and Mecosta County, Michigan and Calvin Enders Collection), and the Montana Historical Society (Wheatland Klan Number 29, Harlowton Montana). As with most data on organizations that are difficult to obtain, one worries that the information that has been discovered is not representative of the organization. While we cannot answer this directly, we have gone to great lengths to understand the origins of each of the collections in our database. The Klan collections arrived at their respective locations in various ways. In Pennsylvania, the Grand Wizard was burglarized and all the Klan’s confidential files were dropped off at the State Police headquarters in Harrisburg in the middle of the night. The collections at Emory and Bowling Green Universities and the Montana Historical Society were donated by unknown sources; typically an individual who discovered the files in their attic and believes they may have historical value but for which they want to distance themselves. The Indiana Historical Society was donated by a series of individuals in various parts of Indiana. Further information about the Indiana Klan was made publicly available through the criminal trial of D.C. Stephenson. 39 Once the files from the assorted collections were microfilmed, we printed each page to PDFs, which are available from the authors upon request. We then keypunched all information on individual members from these PDFs into Excel. This serves as the set of Klan members. Other information of interest such as dues records, expenses, checks written, bank statements, or other financial information were also type into separate spreadsheets. Matching Klan Members to the 1920 and 1930 Censuses To link our database to the census, we used three approaches. For the smallest community (Harlowton), it was feasible to manually keypunch all of the information from the 1920 and 1930 decennial censuses using PDF versions of the original hand-written census rolls available at ancestry.com. Appendix Figure 1 provides a sample of a typical census image. The census rolls are small and hand-written, which can make it difficult to be certain about some entries. In cases in which information was either blank or not legible, we created an indicator variable to denote both of these types of missing data. We then linked the data we have from Klan membership rolls directly to the Census data. Thus, for Harlowton, we not only have a complete match of Klan members and census data, but also have all non-Klan members included in the data set. For Knox and Wood counties along with Athens, we follow the same matching procedure using the original Census rolls, but found it impractical to type in the entire population of non- Klan members. Instead, for these two cities, our control group of non-Klan members is constructed from two complimentary sources. First, we include individuals from those counties who are included in the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) from the University of Minnesota Population Center in 1920 and 1930. Unfortunately, the IPUMS is only a 1 percent sample in 1920 and a 0.5 percent sample in 1930, yielding a relatively small control samples.35 To supplement this, we constructed a random sample of 500 individuals in Knox County and 1,000 individuals in Wood County by randomly choosing PDF pages of the original hand-written census rolls for the 1920 decennial census available at ancestry.com, and keypunching all of the information on white males 21 or older. The randomization was accomplished in a few steps. First, we set the number of observations equal to the total number of sheets available across all enumeration districts in a county. Then we generated a variable that took the values of 1 through the total number of sheets. Next, we took a random sample of 50 of those numbers. Before we took the sample we set the seed, which allows you to re-produce the same random numbers each time you run the do file. Finally, we took those numbers and calculated the actual sheet number within each district. For example, random number 151 in Knoxville represents sheet 39 of District 95. The Colorado and Pennsylvania data sets were too large to feasibly link individual Klan members (more than 30,000 of them in each case) to original census rolls by hand. Thus, in Colorado and Pennsylvania, we exclusively matched our Klan data to IPUMS data for their 35 wwThe data from Knoxville was quite comprehensive; 6 of the census variables were already in our files. Further, there were other interesting variables in the data such as years of education. As such, we just appended census data onto these datasets and assumed that those from the census were not Klan members. 40 respective states. Unfortunately, the data on klan members from these two states consisted mainly of last names and first names, or in many cases, first initials, along with city or county of residence. For instance, in Pennslyvania this merge yielded 394 matches on last name, first name and county – roughly 1% of our original klan data. We treated the observations from the census data that did not merge with the klan data as controls. Merges were performed on last name, first name, and county. In both the klan dataset and the IPUMS data there were duplicates based on these variables. In these cases, we counted the number of times that the duplicate arose and weighted each observation by one over this number. Dropping these observations does not in any way alter the results. Appendix B: A Guide to Klan Terminology Realm: In both the Reconstruction and modern Klans, a realm is equivalent to a state, administered by a grand dragon. The term is never applied to smaller geographical units, although the 1920s saw the term occasionally applied to larger areas, when membership in one state was insufficient to justify an imperial charter. Thus, the states of Maine, Vermont, and New Hampshire were considered a single realm. Province: In Reconstruction Klan terminology, the province was equivalent to a county, with a grand giant presiding over KKK affairs. In the modern Klan, province replace the obsolete Reconstruction term “dominion,” generally referring to the congressional district but more flexible, adapted to larger and smaller areas based on the needs of the Klan. The modern ruling officer is the great titan. Lictor: In the early Reconstruction Klan, the title was applied to a guard of the den. With the passage of time, the designation was apparently replaced by, or used interchangeably with, that of the nighthawk. Kludd: the chaplain of a klan, this rank is occupied by an ordained Protestant minister whenever possible. A great kludd offers prayers at the province level, with a grand kludd serving the realm and an imperial kludd selected for the Invisible Empire at large. Klokard: designated as the lecturer of a klan, the klokard has no counterpart at the province level. A grand klokard serves for the realm, while an imperial klokard is elected for the Invisible Empire at large. Klongress: Described in official documents of Mississippi’s White Knights as the Klan’s legislative branch, the Klongress theoretically consisted of two houses, the Klonvocation and the Klanburgesses. Members of the Klonvocation were designated “senators,” empowered to meet if and when called on by the Klanburgesses. The authoritarian control exercised by Imperial Wizard Sam Bowers suggests that the Klongress existed only on paper. 41 Klexter: Designated as the outer guard of a klan, the klexter is responsible for external security during regular meetings. The office does not exist at the province level. Each realm is served by a grand klexter, while the imperial klexter operates from KKK national headquarters. Kligrapp: As secretary of a klan or other jurisdictional unit, this title is further designated by rank to include the great kligrapp (at the province level), the grand kligrapp (of a realm), and the imperial kligrapp (for the overall Klan). Klokan: An individual member of the klokann, this officer serves as an adviser, auditor, and investigator for his respective geographical unit. Klokann: The advisory board of a klan, serving as auditors and investigators, the klokann is composed of several members dubbed klokans. At the klanton and province levels, three members are selected for each board, with the latter body known as the great klokann. Five members are specified for the grand klkann (at the realm level), and the imperial klokann (at national headquarters). Klavern: Technically applied to the local headquarters of a klan, this term is often used interchangeably to describe the klan itself. Kleagle: IN Klan parlance, a kleagle is an organizer or recruiter, appointed by the imperial wizard or his imperial representative to “sell” the KKK among nonmembers. Kleagles are generally paid on commission, receiving an established percentage of each recruiter’s klectokon. Klanton: a subdivision of a province, a klanton is the domain of a klan, with an exalted Cyclops and his twelve terrors presiding. Klarogo: As the inner guard of a klanton, the klarogo is roughly equivalent to a sergeant-at-arms. The office does not exist at the province level. Other rank designations include the grand klarogo (of a realm) and the imperial klarogo (for the national Klan). Klabee: The treasurer of a klanton, klabees are further designated by rank with the title of great klabee (at the province level), grand klabee (for a realm), and imperial klabee (for the national Klan). Kladd: As the conductor of a klanton, a kladd is the custodian of ritual paraphernalia, and he also introduces candidates for “naturalization.” The office does not exist at the province level, but rank is otherwise designated by the titles of grand kladd (for a realm) and imperial kladd (at the national levels). Klaliff: The vice president of a klanton, klaliffs multiply as one ascends the Klan ladder of rank. At the province level, three great klaliffs serve as an advisory board for the great titan. The grand 42 klaliff is vice president of a realm, while the imperial klaliff serves as second in command after the imperial wizard. Klan: The smallest unit of the Invisible Empire, a klan is administered by an exalted Cyclops and his twelve terrors presiding. To further confuse the issue, local units of the Constitutional Union Guard were also referred to as “klans” during Reconstruction. Imperial Kloncilium: In the modern United Klans of America, the kloncilium consists of fifteen genii serving as the imperial wizard’s command staff. Members include the imperial klaliff, imperial klokard, imperial kludd, imperial kligrapp, imperial klabee, imperial kladd, imperial klarogo, imperial klexter, imperial klonsel, imperial nighthawk, and the five-man imperial klokann. Imperial representative: The acting grand dragon of a prospective realm, this officer is appointed by an imperial wizard to organize local Klansmen in sufficient numbers to elect state officers and obtain a realm charter. He may also be empowered to appoint kleages, if that authority is not restricted to the imperial wizard. Imperial Wizard: Since 1915, this title has generally applied to the presiding officer of the Invisible Empire. He is the Klan’s supreme chief executive, its military commander-in-chief, and (at least in the United Klans of America) chairman of the imperial kloncilium, consisting of his fifteen genii. Some Klans use other titles for their leader: a few cling to the original “grand wizard” designation used by Nathan Forrest during Reconstruction. Other Klan chiefs have proclaimed themselves “emperor,” “grand emperor,” or simply “president.” Imperial Giant: Theoretically reserved for retired imperial wizards in the United Klans of America, this honorary title has never been used, since founding wizard Robert Shelton still remains in office. Hydras: IN Klan parlance, hydras are the advisory officers chosen to serve a grand dragon. During Reconstruction, there were six, each one without individual titles. The modern Klan specifies nine hydras, including the grand klaliff, grand klokard, grand kludd, grand kligrapp, grand klabee, grand kladd, grand klarogo, grand klexter, and grand nighthawk. Grand Wizard: As supreme leader of the Reconstruction Klan, the grand wizard was advised and assisted by ten genii. Grand Magi: During Reconstruction, this officer served as second in command of a den, presiding in the absence of the grand Cyclops. Today, the klaliff holds an equivalent rank as vice president of a klavern. Grand Monk: IN the original Klan, this officer was third in command of a den, presiding when both the grand Cyclops and the grand magi were absent. There is no equivalent rank in the 20th century KKK. 43 Grand Scribe: As secretary of the Reconstruction Klan, the grand scribe served at various levels from local dens to imperial headquarters without further differentiation in title. His modern equivalent is the kligrapp. Grand Sentinel: During Reconstruction, this officer held responsibility for den security, including selection and assignment of the grand guard. The modern KKK divides this task between the klexter and klarogo, with occasional assistance from special security squads. Grand Titan: The commanding officer of a dominion during Reconstruction, this officer was advised by six furies. Grand Turk: In the Reconstruction Klan, the grand turk served as den’s executive officer, charged with informing the rank and file of any irregular of informal gatherings called by the grand cyclops. Grand Cyclops: In the Reconstruction Klan, this officer commanded a local den, assisted by two nighthawks. Grand Dragon: Throughout Klan history, this title has applied to the chief officer of a realm. During Reconstruction, the grand dragon was advised by eight hydras, a number increase to nine for the 20th century Klan. Grand Ensign: In the Reconstruction Klan, the grand ensign was a local officer in charge of the Klan banner for a particular den. Today, the kladd fulfills that function, while the term “grand ensign,” at least in the United Klans of America, is reserved for the banner itself. Grand Exchequer: During Reconstruction, the grand exchequer was a Klan treasurer, serving at various levels from individual dens to imperial headquarters without different titles to designate rank. His modern equivalent would be the klabee. Grand Giant: In the Reconstruction Klan, this title designated the chief officer of a province who was advised by four goblins. Some modern groups retain the office, while the United Klans of America has added a unique twist, treating “grand giant” as an honorary title sometime (but not always) bestowed on retired grand dragons. Grand Guard: Selected as sentries for the original KKK, members of the grand guard were chosen by a den’s grand sentinel to stand watch during meetings. Their symbolic function is fulfilled in modern times by the klexter, but Klans of significant size normally maintain a special, uniformed security force to patrol public rallies and demonstrations. Ghouls: The original prescript of the Reconstruction KKK applied this designation to rank-and- file Klansmen. Published sources differ on whether the term still applies to modern Klansmen, 44 but it does not appear in the Kloran or in any current constitution of the various competing Klans. Dominion: According to the prescript of the Reconstruction KKK, a dominion was equivalent to a state congressional district, with Klan business supervised therein by an officer dubbed the grand titan. In modern Ku Klux jargon, the term has been replaced with “province,” carrying a flexible—but often identical—definition. Den: The official designation for local Klan unit or meeting place during Reconstruction, the term has generally been supplanted by “klavern” in 20th century Klan jargon. Klectokon: A sum of money not less than $10 and not more than $25. Figure 1: Membership in the Ku Klux Klan, 1921-2000 0 500000 1000000 1500000 2000000 2500000 3000000 3500000 4000000 4500000 1921 1922 1923 1924 1927 1929 1930 1970 1980 2000 Year KKK Members Sources: 1921, Jackson (1992); 1922, Chalmers (1965), 1923-1930, Newton (2006); and 1970-2000, Anti-Defamation League. Empire: U.S. Grand Wizard: Chairman Imperial Wizard: CEO 15-member Imperial Kloncilium (cabinet) composed of Genii: Klaliff (first vp), Klazik (second vp), Klokard (lecturer), Kludd (chaplain), Kligrapp (secretary), Klabee (Treasurer), Kladd ("Conductor")*, Klarogo (Inner-guard), Klexter (Outer-guard), Klonsel (Attorney), Night Hawk (Courier), and the four Klokann (auditors). Realm Realm Realm: State Grand Dragon: Head of Realm Imperial Wizard: CEO 15 Hydras: Same positions as Kloncilium, except at state level. Congressional District Grand Titan: Head of electoral operations in each district Furies: Aides to the Grand Titan District District Klavern Klavern Klavern: Local Organizations Exalted Cyclopes: Head of Klavern Several local officers, depending on Klavern, almost always including Kligrapp (secretary), Klabee (treasurer), and Kludd (chaplain) Figure 2: Klan Basic Organization Ghoul Rank-and-file Klansman who mostly attending Klavern meetings Imperial Wizard National: 12.5 percent Great Goblin Great Goblin Nine nationally: 5 percent Figure 3: Auxiliary Recruiting Structure of the Ku Klux Klan Ghouls Members Imperial Kleagle National: 12.5 percent Grand Wizard National: 20 percent Great Goblin Kleagle Local Salesman: 40 percent KleagleKleagle King Kleagle State: 10 percent King Kleagle King Kleagle Figure 4: Black Lynching, 1880-1930 Figure 5: An Example of Klan Initiated Voter Intimidation .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 % R ep ub lic an V ot e 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 Year Indiana Pennsylvania Illinois Figure 6: Republican Vote Share, by State City/State: Klan Non-Klan Klan Non-Klan Klan Non-Klan Klan Non-Klan Klan Non-Klan Klan Non-Klan Observations: 41 569 551 942 2208 1316 566 498 243 1573 475 40789 share native born 0.902 0.851 1.000 0.983 0.961 0.882 0.995 0.974 0.895 0.765 0.886 0.740 (0.300) (0.357) (0.000) (0.129) (0.194) (0.323) (0.073) (0.160) (0.307) (0.424) (0.318) (0.438) share unskilled 0.439 0.711 0.595 0.664 0.499 0.812 0.489 0.430 0.518 0.593 0.713 0.737 (0.502) (0.454) (0.491) (0.473) (0.500) (0.391) (0.500) (0.496) (0.501) (0.491) (0.453) (0.441) share service workers 0.390 0.171 0.297 0.265 0.373 0.127 0.389 0.345 0.395 0.336 0.265 0.219 (0.494) (0.377) (0.458) (0.442) (0.484) (0.333) (0.488) (0.476) (0.490) (0.473) (0.442) (0.413) share professionals 0.171 0.118 0.108 0.071 0.127 0.061 0.041 0.084 0.086 0.071 0.022 0.045 (0.381) (0.323) (0.310) (0.257) (0.333) (0.239) (0.198) (0.278) (0.282) (0.257) (0.147) (0.207) literacy rate 1.000 0.991 0.959 0.936 0.987 0.960 0.970 0.964 0.996 0.987 0.994 0.952 (0.000) (0.093) (0.198) (0.245) (0.112) (0.197) (0.171) (0.187) (0.065) (0.112) (0.079) (0.214) share own home 0.771 0.408 0.607 0.594 0.272 0.217 0.465 0.509 0.484 0.521 (0.426) (0.492) (0.489) (0.491) (0.445) (0.413) (0.500) (0.500) (0.500) (0.500) share never married 0.075 0.294 0.183 0.246 0.205 0.188 0.189 0.341 0.255 0.335 0.251 0.297 (0.267) (0.456) (0.387) (0.431) (0.404) (0.391) (0.392) (0.475) (0.437) (0.472) (0.434) (0.457) average age 46.900 41.820 34.849 37.069 43.336 43.948 39.634 39.739 41.619 40.405 40.162 39.642 (11.112) (14.911) (11.064) (14.204) (16.852) (15.480) (14.031) (15.755) (14.593) (15.640) (14.752) (15.116) share head hh 0.927 0.698 0.724 0.765 0.726 0.576 0.657 0.556 0.638 0.621 (0.264) (0.460) (0.447) (0.424) (0.446) (0.495) (0.476) (0.497) (0.481) (0.485) share veterans 0.171 0.167 0.124 0.078 (0.381) (0.374) (0.330) (0.269) pct of county blk 0.020 0.020 0.041 0.037 (0.009) (0.008) (0.034) (0.035) pct of county frgn 0.130 0.131 0.171 0.147 (0.022) (0.024) (0.056) (0.068) Table 1: Summary Statistics Harlowton Knoxville Notes: Data in this table correspond to the six different geographic areas noted in the column headings. The first column in each area corresponds to Klan members that we successfully matched to individuals in either the 1920 or 1930 Census; the second column contains Census data for white males over 21 who did not match anyone in our Klan records. For Harlowton, the Non-Klan data reflects the entire Census population. For the other areas, the non-Klan samples are based on all individuals included in the Public Use Microdata for 1920 and 1930 in these areas. In addition, we supplemented the PUMS data with a random sample drawn from the original Census rolls in Athens, Knoxville and Bowling Green. For Colorado and Pennsylvania, a probablistic match was made between Klan records and the PUMS data (see appendix for details). Any record with a positive match with the Klan data is treated as a Klan member in these summary statistics; some of these are false positives do to multiple people in a county sharing the same name. Standard deviations in parentheses. AthensBowling Green Colorado Pennsylvania Initiation Fees Robes Imperial Tax Realm Tax Total Recipient of Revenue National Headquarters 532 796 2,971 0 4,299 Imperial Wizard 100 796 2,971 0 3,867 Grand Wizard 100 0 0 0 100 Imperial Kleagle 332 0 0 0 332 Grand Dragon of Indiana 663 133 0 1,650 2,447 Great Goblin 133 0 0 0 133 King Kleagle 265 133 0 0 398 All other Kleagles combined 1,062 133 0 0 1,195 Total 2,655 1,195 2.971 1,650 8,472 Source of Revenue Table 2: Estimates of the Revenues Generated by the Klan in Indiana in 1924, (in thousands of $2006) Notes: Entries are the estimated revenues (in thousands of $2006) generate by the Klan in the state of Indiana in the year 1924 for Klan leaders and the sales force. Estimates are based on author calculations. Estimated number of Klan members in Indiana in 1924 is 140,000, with 22,511 new Klan members that year. The sources of revenue and the distribution across Klan leaders are based on a number of (sometimes conflicting) historical accounts, but especially on Anderson (1965). Entries are inflation adjusted using the CPI. City/State: Harlowtown Knoxville Bowling Green Athens Colorado Pennsylvania Variables: Klan Klan Klan Klan Klan Klan nativity 1.38 - 2.27 5.89 2.74 3.26 (0.45 - 4.26) (1.29 - 4.00)** (1.60 - 21.70)** (1.76 - 4.28)** (2.43 - 4.37)** service workers 3.66 1.19 5.20 0.92 1.22 1.00 (1.68 - 7.98)** (0.86 - 1.63) (3.47 - 7.80)** (0.69 - 1.22) (0.89 - 1.68) (0.81 - 1.24) professionals 2.00 1.75 3.15 0.46 1.27 0.40 (0.77 - 5.22) (1.06 - 2.89)* (1.75 - 5.65)** (0.27 - 0.80)** (0.73 - 2.19) (0.21 - 0.75)** literacy 1.36 1.68 3.62 1.58 4.66 (0.69 - 2.66) (0.66 - 4.31) (1.28 - 10.28)* (0.20 - 12.28) (1.47 - 14.74)** own home 4.38 0.96 1.08 0.90 0.87 (1.89 - 10.16)** (0.65 - 1.42) (0.77 - 1.51) (0.66 - 1.22) (0.72 - 1.06) never married 0.59 0.69 2.08 0.63 0.88 0.64 (0.14 - 2.58) (0.48 - 1.00) (1.28 - 3.36)** (0.40 - 0.98)* (0.57 - 1.36) (0.47 - 0.86)** age 1.67 0.73 0.88 0.81 1.21 1.23 (0.78 - 3.59) (0.54 - 0.99)* (0.63 - 1.24) (0.60 - 1.09) (0.89 - 1.65) (1.00 - 1.51)* head of household 5.51 1.70 0.78 1.11 0.80 (0.84 - 36.03) (0.90 - 3.18) (0.36 - 1.69) (0.72 - 1.73) (0.61 - 1.05) veteran 1.02 1.54 0.53 (0.39 - 2.68) (0.69 - 3.45) (0.30 - 0.93)* % of county pop black 0.94 0.82 (0.62 - 1.44) (0.66 - 1.01) % of county pop foreign 1.45 3.03 (0.73 - 2.87) (2.39 - 3.82)** Observations 528 1493 3522 1064 1805 41150 Klan Observations 41 551 2208 566 243 475 Table 3: Logistic Regression Estimates for Predictors of Klan Membership Notes: Coefficients in the table are estimated odds ratios. Each column in the table represents results from a single regression. The first three columns are from a logistic regression. Because the Klan/Census match is done probabilistically for Colorado and Pennsylvania, the dependent variable in the final columns is a continuous variable rather than an indicator variable. The entries in the final two columns are based on linear probability models, with the coefficients transformed into odds ratios. 95 percent confidence intervals in parentheses. For the final two columns, these confidence intervals are computed using the delta method. One asterisk denotes statistical significance at the 5% level; two asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% level. Literacy in column 1 and nativity in column 2 are dropped because there is no variation within Klan members. Decade: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) Variable: % change in blacks % change in blacks % change in foreigners % change in foreigners % change in blacks % change in blacks % change in foreigners % change in foreigners % Klan in 1924 -0.3054 0.0021 -0.3263 -0.7244 -0.6269 0.0040 -0.4408 -0.6631 (0.0834)** (0.0724) (0.2560) (0.2151)** (0.1606)** (0.1223) (0.2002)* (0.1523)** log (county pop in 1910) 0.0036 -0.0062 _ _ (0.0022) (0.0067) log (black pop in 1910) 0.0007 0.0066 _ _ (0.0007) (0.0019)** log (foreign pop in 1910) 0.0001 -0.0110 _ _ (0.0011) (0.0033)** log (county pop in 1920) _ _ 0.0075 0.0147 (0.0034)* (0.0043)** log (black pop in 1920) _ _ 0.0022 0.0003 (0.0010)* (0.0013) log (foreign pop in 1920) _ _ -0.0012 -0.0161 (0.0018) (0.0022)** Observations 67 67 67 67 67 67 67 67 R-squared 0.17 0.61 0.02 0.57 0.19 0.69 0.07 0.65 Table 4A: The Relationship Between KKK Membership and Population Changes, Pennsylvania 1910 -1920 1920-1930 Notes: The dependent variable in odd columns is the percent change in the black population in a county between decennial censuses; the dependent variable in even columns is the percent change in percent foreign born in the county. The first four columns are the changes between 1910 and 1920; the last four columns represent changes between 1920 and 1930. The key dependent variable in the specifications is the percent of the eligible county residents in the Klan at its peak in 1924. Klan membership began to grow rapidly beginning in 1921. Standard errors in parentheses. One asterisk denotes significance at the 5 percent level; two asterisks reflect significance at the 1 percent level. See the data appendix for further details on the data sources and construction. The unit of observation is a county in Pennsylvania. Decade: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) Variable: % change in blacks % change in blacks % change in foreigners % change in foreigners % change in blacks % change in blacks % change in foreigners % change in foreigners % Klan in 1924 -0.0254 0.0083 0.0990 0.0320 -0.0709 -0.0285 0.1483 0.0423 (0.0146) (0.0120) (0.0244)** (0.0174) (0.0175)** (0.0160) (0.0337)** (0.0229) log (county pop in 1910) 0.0054 0.0123 _ _ (0.0030) (0.0043)** log (black pop in 1910) -0.0023 0.0003 _ _ (0.0007)** (0.0011) log (foreign pop in 1910) 0.0038 -0.0139 _ _ (0.0012)** (0.0017)** log (county pop in 1920) _ _ -0.0098 0.0303 (0.0038)* (0.0054)** log (black pop in 1920) _ _ 0.0002 -0.0020 (0.0010) (0.0014) log (foreign pop in 1920) _ _ 0.0083 -0.0219 (0.0015)** (0.0022)** Observations 84 83 84 83 84 82 84 82 R-squared 0.04 0.49 0.17 0.67 0.17 0.48 0.19 0.72 Table 4B: The Relationship Between KKK Membership and Population Changes, Indiana 1910 -1920 1920-1930 Notes: The dependent variable in odd columns is the percent change in the black population in a county between decennial censuses; the dependent variable in even columns is the percent change in percent foreign born in the county. The first four columns are the changes between 1910 and 1920; the last four columns represent changes between 1920 and 1930. The key dependent variable in the specifications is the percent of the eligible county residents in the Klan at its peak in 1924. Klan membership began to grow rapidly beginning in 1921. Standard errors in parentheses. One asterisk denotes significance at the 5 percent level; two asterisks reflect significance at the 1 percent level. See the data appendix for further details on the data sources and construction. The unit of observation is a county in Indiana. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Variable: % change in republican vote 1920-1924 % change in republican vote 1920-1924 % change in republican vote 1924-1926 % change in republican vote 1924-1926 % change in republican vote 1924-1934 % change in republican vote 1924-1934 % Klan in 1924 -0.4829 -0.5313 0.6555 2.3358 2.6619 -0.3480 (0.8892) (1.0899) (0.8327) (0.9708)* (1.1883)* (1.0713) log (county pop in 1920) -0.0468 0.0261 0.0580 (0.0321) (0.0286) (0.0316) log (black pop in 1920) 0.0094 0.0093 -0.0363 (0.0093) (0.0083) (0.0092)** log (foreign pop in 1920) 0.0255 -0.0137 -0.0360 (0.0163) (0.0145) (0.0160)* Observations 67 67 67 67 67 67 R-squared 0.00 0.06 0.01 0.15 0.07 0.52 Table 5A: The Effect of th KKK on Political Vote Shares, Pennsylvania Notes: The dependent variable in all cases is the percent change in the Republican vote share for the U.S. House of Representatives in a county across elections. Virtually all Klan supported candidates in the North were Republican. The key dependent variable in the specifications is the percent of the eligible county residents in the Klan at its peak in 1924. Klan membership began to grow rapidly beginning in 1921 and then quickly declined after 1924. Standard errors in parentheses. One asterisk denotes significance at the 5 percent level; two asterisks reflect significance at the 1 percent level. See the data appendix for further details on the data sources and construction. The unit of observation is a county in Pennsylvania. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Variable: % change in republican vote 1920-1924 % change in republican vote 1920-1924 % change in republican vote 1924-1926 % change in republican vote 1924-1926 % change in republican vote 1924-1934 % change in republican vote 1924-1934 % Klan in 1924 0.1186 0.2182 -0.0541 -0.0932 0.0450 -0.1584 (0.0694) (0.0597)** (0.0706) (0.0693) (0.1088) (0.0749)* log (county pop in 1920) 0.0169 -0.0586 0.0194 (0.0143) (0.0166)** (0.0179) log (black pop in 1920) -0.0036 0.0101 -0.0038 (0.0036) (0.0042)* (0.0045) log (foreign pop in 1920) 0.0125 0.0088 -0.0390 (0.0059)* (0.0069) (0.0074)** Observations 84 82 84 82 84 82 R-squared 0.03 0.42 0.01 0.24 0.00 0.61 Table 5B: The Effect of th KKK on Political Vote Shares, Indiana Notes: The dependent variable in all cases is the change in the Republican vote share for the U.S. House of Representatives in a county across elections. Virtually all Klan supported candidates in the North were Republican. The key dependent variable in the specifications is the percent of the eligible county residents in the Klan at its peak in 1924. Klan membership began to grow rapidly beginning in 1921 and then quickly declined after 1924. Standard errors in parentheses. One asterisk denotes significance at the 5 percent level; two asterisks reflect significance at the 1 percent level. See the data appendix for further details on the data sources and construction. The unit of observation is a county in Indiana. Collection Name Location Description Size Ku Klux Klan collection (ca. 1915- [ongoing]) Atlanta History Center, Atlanta GA No membership roles or finances 2 boxes (.5 cu.ft.) Ohio Knights of the KKK, Wood County Bowling Green State U Detailed Membership Records very large Ku Klux Klan (1915- ) CALIFORNIA STATE UNIV, NORTHRIDGE Correspondence, Newspapers, and Pamphlets 33 items (1 box) ; 28 cm. Ku Klux Klan (Newaygo County, Mich.), (Mecosta County, Mich.), Calvin Enders Collection. CLARKE HIST LIBR Membership Cards 3.5 cubic ft. Ku Klux Klan (1915-) Colorado Historical Society, Stephen H. Hart Library, Denver CO One volume of members and applications for membership 3 linear ft. (1 box, 2 oversize volumes). Collection of miscellaneous papers, DUKE UNIV LIBR No membership roles or finances 146 items. Ku Klux Klan East Carolina University, J. Y. Joyner Library, Special Collections, Greenville NC Klan Publications 0.073 cu. ft. (6 items) Ku Klux Klan. No. 30 Butte, Montana EASTERN WASHINGTON STATE HIST Membership and financial records 2 ft. Ku Klux Klan (1915- ) Knox County Klan No. 14, Knoxville, Tenn. Emory University, Robert W. Woodruff Library, Special Collections Department, Atlanta GA Membership and Dues Records 288 items (8 linear feet) Ku Klux Klan (1915- ), Crown Point Klan #72 (Crown Point, Ind.), Whitewater Klan #60 (Richmond, Ind.), Local Officers, Indiana, Odon Unit, Klan 90, Logansport, Indiana Indiana Historical Society Membersip and financial records 4 microfilm Reels Ku Klux Klan (1915- ). Wheatland Klan No. 29 (Harlowton, Mont.) Montana Historical Society, Library and Archives Dept., Helena MT Membership Records .1 linear ft. Ku Klux Klan (1915- ). Ohio Knights Ohio Historical Society, Archives-Library Division, Columbus OH Correspondence of Brown Harwood 1/6 ft. Appendix Table 1: Results From our Search for Klan Archives and Special Collections Ku Klux Klan (1915- ). La Grande, Or., Chapter No. 14 Oregon Historical Society, Library, Portland OR Minutes of meetings relating to Klans Involvement in politics 190 items Pennsylvania State Police Collection, 30.16 – 30.19 Pennsylvania State Archive Membership and financial records 30 microfilm reels Ku Klux Klan (1915- ). Pond Creek Klan, no. 117 (Ky.) UNIV OF KENTUCKY LIBR Membership Records 1 microfilm reel Ku Klux Klan Women's Organization (Okla.) UNIV OF OKLAHOMA Oklahoma Women's group from 1924-1928 .66 ft. Women of the Ku Klux Klan. Klan 14 (Chippewa Falls, Wis.). UNIV OF WISCONSIN, EAU CLAIRE Minutes of meetings 0.2 c.f. (5 folders) Ku Klux Klan (1915- ). Athens Klan #5 (Athens, Ga.) University of Georgia, Libraries, Hargrett Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Athens GA Membership and financial records 2.5 linear ft., 3068 items Ku Klux Klan. Klan No. 51, Mt. Rainier, Maryland University of Maryland, Archives and Manuscripts Department, College Park MD Minutes 0.5 ft. or 5 ft. (two listings differ) Ku Klux Klan ((1915- )) University of Memphis, Special Collections / Mississippi Valley Collection, McWherter Library, Memphis TN Miscellaneous papers 1 box Ku Klux Klan (1915- ) Tillamook, Or., Chapter No. 8 University of Oregon, Knight Library, Special Collections, Eugene OR Membership records 1.25 linear ft. (4 containers) Ku Klux Klan University of Tulsa, McFarlin Library, Tulsa OK Membership list 140 (11x17) printed pages Bayfield Ku Klux Klan Collection Fort Lewis College, Colorado Membership Records .8 linear ft. Klan Figures and Tables 2.21.11 final.pdf klanpaperfigs 9.11.07.pdf Slide Number 1 Slide Number 2 Slide Number 3 Slide Number 4 Slide Number 5 Slide Number 6 KlanPaperTables 2.21.11 Table 1 - Summary Stats Table 2 - Revenues Table 3 - Regressions Table 4a - Migration, Penn Table 4b - Migration, Indiana Table 5a - Politics, Penn Table 5b - Politics, Ind A Table 1 
work_xl5mhnmuwnedxm2pqpsy7ltf2a	----	Microsoft Word - Offensive_communications_Exploring_the_challenges_involved_in_policing_social_media_Williams Offensive communications: exploring the challenges involved in policing social media Williams, M., Butler, M., Jurek-Loughrey, A., & Sezer, S. (2021). Offensive communications: exploring the challenges involved in policing social media. Contemporary Social Science, 16(2), 227-240. https://doi.org/10.1080/21582041.2018.1563305 Published in: Contemporary Social Science Document Version: Peer reviewed version Queen's University Belfast - Research Portal: Link to publication record in Queen's University Belfast Research Portal Publisher rights © 2019 Academy of Social Sciences. This work is made available online in accordance with the publisher’s policies. Please refer to any applicable terms of use of the publisher. General rights Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Queen's University Belfast Research Portal is retained by the author(s) and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights. Take down policy The Research Portal is Queen's institutional repository that provides access to Queen's research output. Every effort has been made to ensure that content in the Research Portal does not infringe any person's rights, or applicable UK laws. If you discover content in the Research Portal that you believe breaches copyright or violates any law, please contact openaccess@qub.ac.uk. Download date:06. Apr. 2021 https://doi.org/10.1080/21582041.2018.1563305 https://pure.qub.ac.uk/en/publications/offensive-communications-exploring-the-challenges-involved-in-policing-social-media(024b2448-5b03-4cc7-b6a2-0b85fe4a5dbd).html 1    Contemporary Social Science Themed Issue on ‘Evidence Policy in a Digital Society’ Guest editors: Linda Hantrais (corresponding guest editor), Aygen Kurt-Dixon and Ashley Thomas Lenihan Offensive communications: Exploring the challenges involved in policing social media Authors: Mark Williams (Corresponding author), Centre for Secure Information Technology (CSIT), Queen’s University Belfast, Northern Ireland Science Park, Queen’s Road, Queen’s Island, Belfast, BT3 9DT, United Kingdom. Email: mwilliams03@qub.ac.uk, Tel: 07557388471 Michelle Butler, School of Social Sciences, Education & Social Work, Queen’s University Belfast, Belfast, United Kingdom. Anna Jurek-Loughrey, School of Electronics, Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, Queen’s University Belfast, Belfast, United Kingdom. Sakir Sezer, The Centre for Secure Information Technology (CSIT), Queen’s University Belfast, Belfast, United Kingdom. 2    Notes on contributors Mark Williams is a Leverhulme Interdisciplinary Network on Cybersecurity and Society (LINCS) postgraduate research student at the Centre for Secure Information Technologies (CSIT) at Queen’s University Belfast (2016–2019). His research explores the interface between the social sciences and electronic engineering and computer science focussing primarily on the criminal use of social media. In his project, he is looking at ways of detecting and preventing inappropriate and criminal behaviour in social media, with particular emphasis on the definition, classification and mitigation of offensive online expressions. ORCID: 0000-0002-8159-1900 Michelle Butler is a Lecturer in Criminology at Queen’s University Belfast. She graduated from the University of Kent with a Master’s Degree in Forensic Psychology and a PhD in Criminology from the University of Cambridge. Her research interests include criminological psychology, penology, and the management of crime. ORCID: 0000-0002-6983-6215 Twitter: @MichelleBQUB Anna Jurek-Loughrey is a Lecturer in the School of Electronics, Electrical Engineering and Computer Science at Queen’s University Belfast. She graduated from the Technical University of Lodz in Poland with Masters Degrees in Computer Science and Applied Mathematics. She obtained her PhD in Computer Science from Ulster University. Her work has spanned a diverse set of topics comprising: machine learning; sensor-based activity 3    recognition within smart environments; social media analytics with application in security and public health; sentiment analysis; record linkage and entity resolution. Sakir Sezer is Professor of Secure Digital Systems at Queen’s University Belfast, where he leads the Networked System Security at the Centre for Secure Information Technology. He is an international expert in high-performance network processing and internet security technologies, spanning cybersecurity-related topics in malware, embedded systems, IoT, ICS and network security. His main research focus has been on the acceleration of network security-related functions by exploring novel hardware-based parallel processing architectures, System on Chip (SoC), NPU/NFP (Netronome) and programmable technologies, including MPSoC and FPGA. Acknowledgements The research reported in this article was carried out with funding provided by a postgraduate research scholarship from the Leverhulme Interdisciplinary Network on Cybersecurity and Society (Project code: R2179PAI) from September 2016–2019. Word length 6,985   4    Offensive communications: Exploring the challenges involved in policing social media Abstract The digital revolution has transformed the potential reach and impact of criminal behaviour. Not only has it changed how people commit crimes but it has also created opportunities for new types of crimes to occur. Policymakers and criminal justice institutions have struggled to keep pace with technological innovation and its impact on criminality. Criminal law and justice, as well as investigative and prosecution procedures, are often outdated and ill-suited to this type of criminality as a result. While technological solutions are being developed to detect and prevent digitally-enabled crimes, generic solutions are often unable to address the needs of criminal justice professionals and policymakers. Focussing specifically on social media, this article offers an exploratory investigation of the strengths and weaknesses of the current approach used to police offensive communications online. Drawing on twenty in- depth interviews with key criminal justice professionals in the United Kingdom, the authors discuss the substantial international challenges facing those seeking to police offensive social media content. They argue for greater cooperation between policymakers, social science and technology researchers to develop workable, innovative solutions to these challenges, and greater use of evidence to inform policy and practice. Keywords: digital policing; social media; offensiveness; offensive content online; technological policing interventions. 5    The rise of social media has revolutionised public communication (Burnap & Williams, 2016; Hanson, 2016). However, its growth has also contributed to the committing of new crimes and provided new avenues within which to commit more traditional crimes (House of Lords, 2014). In particular, its ability to reach a wide audience in a short timeframe has raised concerns about its use to spread hate crime, extremism and disinformation, as well as abusive, threatening and offensive content (Citron, 2014; Awan, 2016; Home Affairs Committee, 2017). In this regard, the policing of social media should be seen in the wider context of the regulation of the internet more generally and the role that criminal justice organisations, users and platform providers are supposed to play in preventing crime online (Trottier, 2012; Stenning & Shearing, 2015; Murray, 2016; Gillespie, 2018; Yar, 2018). Increasingly, governments are calling on social media companies and social media users to do more to police these networks and reduce the harm they cause (European Union Internet Forum, 2016). However, policing social media has often proven difficult due to the following factors: the volume of the number of posts that need to be policed; the inter-jurisdictional nature of users; the lack of international cooperation and information-sharing protocols; the ease and anonymity by which the content can be disseminated; and varying legal definitions regarding what qualifies as a crime and warrants prosecution (Council of Europe, 2003; Wall, 2013). Nowhere is this more obvious than when attempting to police offensive content on social media (Mangan & Gillies, 2017). Research has consistently highlighted problems defining what constitutes offensiveness, since what is considered to be offensive varies across time and place, depending on the social, cultural, political and religious norms in different jurisdictions and even within different social groups within the same jurisdiction (Frank, 2001; Jay & Janschewitz, 2008; Gray & Ford, 2013; The Economist, 2018). These variations may affect judgements regarding what 6    social media postings it is in the public interest to prosecute, contributing to disparities in policing policies and practices (Laidlaw, 2017). For example, in the United States users are unlikely to be prosecuted for posting abusive and threatening social media content due to cultural, social and political norms emphasising the freedom of speech (Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015)). Yet, in the United Kingdom (UK) users can and are regularly prosecuted for posting similar content under Section 127 of the Communications Act 2003 (Ministry of Justice, 2016). Moreover, challenges are involved in assessing the extent to which users intended to cause offense, especially if their posts have been shared without their consent to a larger audience than intended (Scaife, 2013).   Despite international agreement that online abuse and hate are a growing problem, no international consensus or political urgency to harmonise legislation is evident (Rohlfing, 2015), resulting in difficulties in the prevention, investigation and detection of this type of behaviour (Giannasi, 2015). Often, current international approaches to policing offensiveness on social media tend to rely on the police and/or social media companies manually reviewing content to judge its offensiveness, making these processes onerous, inefficient and expensive (Gillespie, 2018). Policing of social media content therefore tends to be retrospective, with victims reporting such behaviour to the police and/or social media companies after harm has already occurred (Awan & Zempi, 2016). Police officers are increasingly under pressure to do more to regulate social media in a ‘space that is privately owned but publicly populated’ (Wall, 2013, p. 455). This demand for action is due to victims’ fears that the offensive and threatening content online will materialise offline and result in their physical harm (Awan & Zempi, 2015, 2017). However, as Trottier (2012) notes, policing social media cannot rely solely on police ‘watching over’ users but 7    must also involve self and peer policing, as well as social media companies regulating content. Social media companies have tended to present themselves as a means to enable communication rather than publishers of content (Kiss & Arthur, 2013). As a result, they argue that their responsibility is one of protecting users from offense or harm that they have experienced, rather than proactively protecting users from exposure to such harm (Gillespie, 2018). This attitude has contributed to a retrospective approach to policing, resulting in the adoption of a ‘report and takedown’ model in which they do not proactively moderate illegal content but rely on users reporting offensive content for review and possible removal (Laidlaw, 2017; Home Affairs Committee, 2017). This article draws on a series of interviews with key criminal justice professionals in the UK to examine the strengths and weaknesses of the current approach used to police offensive content online. The authors seek to identify potential enablers and inhibiters of an effective evidence-based approach to the regulation of social media posts, and suggestions are offered for how policymakers, social scientists and computer scientists can work together to develop innovative solutions to ensure the consistent and effective application of government policy in this area. Researching the policing of offensive communications A qualitative approach using interviews was employed to obtain a better understanding of what types of offensive online communications are prosecuted, what evidence is needed to acquire convictions, and the challenges involved in working in this area. Interviews were utilised to help uncover the experiences of participants and to elucidate how policies and practices are implemented in institutions (Mason, 2002). In-depth, semi-structured interviews lasting approximately 45 minutes were conducted with 20 professionals in Northern Ireland 8    and England, including senior police officers, state prosecutors, the judiciary, legal experts and policymakers. A purposeful sampling approach was used to recruit participants, who were identified based on their professional criminal justice and/or policymaking expertise in this area. Initial contact was made via email, and snowball sampling was used to identify further participants. The voluntary nature of the research was outlined, and participants were notified that they were free to withdraw from the study at any time. Participants were informed that only limited confidentiality and/or anonymity could be offered given the small number of people working in this field. They were also informed that any disclosure of serious criminality, harm to oneself/another or staff malpractice would be reported to a relevant authority. Ethical approval for the research was obtained from authors’ institution. The interview data were coded using NVivo, and thematic analysis was used to identify, analyse and record recurring patterns or themes in the interview data, concerning the participants’ understanding of offensive content, and to uncover how policy is interpreted and enacted in the detection and prevention of this behaviour (Braun & Clarke, 2006). Anonymised quotes were chosen and presented in the findings to exemplify the themes under discussion. Inter-rater reliability, in which data are independently coded and compared for agreement, was used to ensure that the themes emerging from the interviews were accurate and supported by the underlying data (Armstrong, Gosling, Weinman, & Marteau, 1997). Using Cohen’s Kappa coefficient, inter-rater agreement was calculated at 84%. Cohen Kappa’s above 75% are usually considered to be very good. Research findings 9    The findings from our study are divided into three sections. The first section examines the responsibility of social media companies for dealing with offensive content, followed by a section reviewing the strengths of existing policy and practice in this area and describing potential enablers in the proactive policing of social media content. The third section explores the weaknesses of current policy and practice and identifies potential inhibiters to an evidence-based approach to proactive policing of social media. The responsibility of social media companies for offensive content The retrospective ‘report and take down’ model adopted by social media companies is in many respects a response to the European Electronic Commerce Directive 2000/31/EC, which states that social media companies are ‘mere conduits’ for the transmission of information and not liable for its content, on the condition that they do not select or modify the information contained within it (European Parliament and Council, 2000; Mangan & Gillies, 2017). The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) validates this approach and affords protection for social media companies from liability in relation to illegal content, provided they have no knowledge of its content and act expeditiously to remove it when informed (Google France SARL and Google Inc. v Louis Vuitton Malletier SA, 2010, C- 236/08 to C-238/08). The voluntary Code of Conduct agreed between the major social media companies, the EU and member states’ hate speech legislation reflects the same approach. The Code commits social media platforms to assessing and removing content that potentially breaches EU rules within 24 hours of user notification (European Union Internet Forum, 2016). While this approach has seen 70% of reported content in the EU being removed within 24 hours, social media companies continue to apply rules relating to offensive, abusive and 10    hateful content without transparency and inconsistently, usually only acting in response to commercial or media pressure (Home Affairs Committee, 2017; Statt, 2017; European Commission, 2018). Nonetheless, social media companies are being forced to review this approach in light of US and UK investigations into Facebook’s privacy practices following the Cambridge Analytica data scandal, in which approximately 87 million Facebook users’ data were improperly used allegedly to influence the US Presidential Election and Brexit vote in 2016 (Cadwalladr & Graham-Harrison, 2018). Currently, the lack of openness on the part of social media companies regarding the resources and policies employed to tackle offensive content has resulted in the development of a hierarchy of service. Content reported by high- profile users, the media or commercial partners receives closer scrutiny and more rapid resolution in direct contrast to the perfunctory response experienced by most ordinary users. This hierarchy of service has led to growing frustration on the part of governments and calls for social media companies to play a more proactive role in policing offensive behaviour (Home Affairs Committee, 2017). Governments are also realising that, due to the scale and global nature of social media, offline-policing practices are difficult to replicate online, and national governments alone cannot protect citizens from online harms (Cohen, 2017; HM Government, 2017; Gollatz, Beer, & Katzenbach, 2018). Discussions regarding responses to the harms users face have, consequently, broadened into a more expansive examination of the responsibilities of social media companies (Home Affairs Committee, 2017; Gillespie, 2018; Oltermann, 2018). This debate has resulted in recent German legislation imposing fines on social media companies who fail to remove illegal content when notified, and similar calls by the UK Home Affairs Committee to introduce fines (Home Affairs Committee, 2017; BBC, 2018). In 2018, the European Commissioner for the Digital Single Market called for social media companies to 11    remove offensive and illegal content proactively and automatically (Lomas, 2018). Gillespie (2018, pp. 4–5) argues that such changes require a paradigmatic shift and a move away from viewing the moderation of offensive content as ‘occasional and ancillary’ to that which is an ‘essential, constant and definitional’ component of what social media companies do. While the Electronic Commerce Directive does not impose a general obligation on social media companies to moderate content and, in many respects, disincentivises moderation due to the risk of being treated as a publisher, specific exceptions in cases of child pornography and terrorism have been made (Twentieth Century Fox and others v British Telecommunications plc , 2011; The Electronic Commerce Directive (Terrorism Act 2006) Regulations 2007). The distinction between general and specific moderation needs to be explored further in response to offensive content that is clearly unlawful and in cases where a ‘diligent economic operator should have identified the illegality’ (L'Oréal and others v eBay, 2011, p. 7). Recital 48 of the Electronic Commerce Directive provides EU member states with the possibility of imposing on social media companies an expectation to engage with them in the detection and prevention of illegal activities (European Parliament and Council, 2000). HM Government (2017) maintains that, while the illegality of offensive content is potentially problematic, a working model could be achieved through closer cooperation between social media companies and national legislators in defining what should be moderated and how technology can be best used as an enabling device. This approach is echoed by Scaife (2013) who notes that social media companies require further governmental guidance to ensure that rights are respected and a balance is found between user privacy and protection from offensive content. Reviewing existing policy and practice 12    One of the key enablers in the successful policing and prosecution of crimes committed via social media in the UK has been the Government’s commitment to tackling hate crime, extremism, disinformation, abusive, threatening and offensive content on social media, especially in the wake of the murder of Member of Parliament Jo Cox by a right-wing terrorist over her political views on Brexit during the 2017 election campaign. The commitment to tackling behaviour on social media is evidenced in several UK government publications (for example Home Affairs Committee, 2017; Committee on Standards in Public Life, 2017; HM Government, 2017; Law Commission, 2018). Reviews are useful for ensuring problems are fully understood and adequate responses coordinated. The move towards greater consistency of understanding, approach and response by the Government is also evidenced in the announcement that a national police online hate- crime hub would be established as a central nexus through which all reports of online hate crime would be channelled (HM Government, 2017). The centralisation and streamlining of such a service aims to ensure that specially trained police officers are available to provide specialist support to local officers investigating online hate, the collection of evidence and provision of support to victims. This focus on consistency and coordination is especially important in the UK given that the devolution of policing to Scotland and Northern Ireland, as well as the 43 territorial forces engaged in policing in England and Wales, provides ample opportunities for deviations in policy and practice to occur. The Metropolitan Police Service has already used a centrally coordinated, specialist police online hate hub as part of the Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime hate crime reduction strategy. This strategy relies on drawing together ‘Met resources alongside partners from social media companies, academic and data analysis experts, and national voices’ (Participant 13    9) to help identify, prevent and investigate hate crime and abuse occurring on Twitter and Facebook. This approach allows officers to police online hate more effectively by developing expertise in this area, and improving the ability of professionals to understand, identify and deal with this issue. As the same participant noted, the Hub facilitates: …[an] understanding of where and when and how hate crime is perpetrated online … and move[s] it into a place where we are starting to build the tools that will help us to address it and help the police to understand how they can address it. (Participant 9) Another participant explained that centralisation helps to ensure a consistent approach, reducing the potential for discretion to result in crimes not being followed up or actioned due to a lack of knowledge or unfamiliarity about what to do when such crimes occur: [social media] crimes have a lower chance of being screened out, because by and large the crimes are [normally] looked at by a DS [Detective Sergeant], who goes ‘No apparent leads, screen it out. It is a waste of our time. We are not going to go with it’. We [in the Hub] can do better than that. (Participant 11) The prosecution service works with the hub to build expertise in examining offensive social media content to determine if a prosecution should be brought. As one participant explained: The hub [was] set up to establish best practice on how to deal with these cases. How to identify if it meets the threshold for charging and how to deal with attribution. So, it is establishing best practice that could hopefully be disseminated around the country. (Participant 19) In this way, centralisation was believed to help to ensure consistency in the decision-making process regarding when to prosecute and build expertise in balancing freedom of speech and censorship concerns with the need to prosecute offensive, illegal content: It [offensiveness] is also very difficult to define and the fear is that it can very easily be used as a tool for censorship and a massive breach of freedom of speech. …so because 14    of that the attempt has been made to have a certain amount of consistency by having the same team always give authority [to prosecute] (Participant 20). It was hoped that a move towards a consistent approach to investigating and prosecuting these crimes would enable the development of expert knowledge required to investigate, gather and prosecute social media crimes, as well as ensure that examples of both good and bad practice are shared and learned from, rather than lost, forgotten or not used to enhance professionals’ skillsets. Of particular importance is the potential for this centralised, specialist approach to help build knowledge and expertise in undertaking evidential collection for social media crimes. For example, the online hate crime hub in London supports local police officers by ‘the capturing of evidence … [and] quality assur[ing] what then happens out at a borough level’ (Participant 9). This support is essential for local police officers as it provides ‘a package of information that identifies a suspect…[and] help[s] them to identify where that suspect lives’ (Participant 11). Ensuring that evidence is collected appropriately and managed properly also aids the successful prosecution of crimes by reducing the potential for evidence to be deemed inadmissible or tainted. Additionally, the development of centralised expertise helps to ensure that victims can be supported in a more consistent manner, with referrals being made to specialist victim support agencies, as one specialist officer commented: You are a victim. We see that you have been insulted by this…Do you mind if we refer you to victim support in the form of Stop Hate UK? They have a particularly good relationship with the social media providers and may well be able to assist you. (Participant 11) 15    Several participants reported that victims: ‘want the abuse, the harassment, the thing that is causing them distress to stop. In our world that is generally by having entries removed from social media’ (Participant 12). In contrast to local officers, who have not been trained to deal with these crimes and are unaware of the avenues by which victims can request the removal of social media content, specialist officers can easily provide support: ‘victims want the material taken down…that [is] fairly easy for us to achieve’ (Participant 11). Consequently, the UK government’s commitment to reviewing the laws surrounding offensive online communications and developing a centralised, coordinated approach to policing and prosecution of social media crimes could be expected to aid consistency, the use of evidence-informed policy and practice, as well as the collation of best practice examples that can be disseminated across the different police organisations throughout the UK. Currently, the lack of such an approach is one of the biggest weaknesses of existing policy and practice as knowledge regarding best practice is not being sufficiently collated, analysed or disseminated, resulting in it residing with a few specialist police officers. Weaknesses of existing policy and practice A key weakness in the current approach to policing social media is the disparate and disorganised manner in which these crimes are currently dealt with due to a lack of clear guidance and training. The devolution of policing to Scotland and Northern Ireland, as well as the 43 different territorial forces in operation in England and Wales, significantly complicates the provision of a common approach, clear guidance and training when different policies and practices are being adopted and pursued in these various organisations. Apart from the few police officers who had been specially trained in how to respond to these crimes, ordinary police officers reported confusion over what to do in such cases and how 16    evidence should be gathered. They were fearful of making mistakes which could undermine the case against the alleged offender. According to one officer: We need to put better guidance out to officers on how they actually respond to these incidents, what the expectations are from the service, what the expectations are from the Police Ombudsman and everyone else, because people are very confused as to actually what they can do and what they can’t do; be that capturing the evidence, be that interpreting the evidence, be that asking for help from social media providers and companies…there is a lot of confusion out there. (Participant 8) Given the prevalence of social media in society, the lack of training on this issue was seen as inhibiting best practice and leaving officers unsure as to what they should do and how they should support victims. Another officer told us: We had absolutely no training. You are trained in offences that can occur over social media, but you are not trained [in evidential capture of SM messages] … you are basically told to seize the phone and give it to DESU [Digital Evidence Support Unit]. (Participant 7) A failure to capture and learn from police officers’ experiences in this area weakened the adoption of an evidence-based best practice approach to policing social media content as officers’ successes, failures and lessons learned were not being captured, shared or discussed with colleagues or between police organisations in an organised manner. This resulted in an inconsistent approach being taken in the policing of social media crimes since, in the absence of training and clear guidance, officers began to use their discretion in deciding how cases should be responded to and what cases should be sent forward for prosecution, as reiterated by one officer: 17    …we don’t always have to send prosecution files [for prosecution] … if they have no offending history for that offence, and they admit the guilt… then it can basically be closed at that point. … That was the way that that was dealt with. So, there was no real investigation. (Participant 4) The use of this discretion is troubling, however. If cases are responded to and dealt with differently by different officers, in different locations or different organisations, the result may be inconsistency of approach, potential discrimination in how different cases and offenders are dealt with, and the undermining of public confidence in policing. These concerns were shared by one of the participants who feared that police discretion could result in the biased delivery of justice as not all cases were being referred to the prosecution service, potentially resulting in a filtering of cases by the police based on the nature of the offence and/or characteristics of the offender/victim: We wouldn’t encourage that approach [police discretion]. …If there is an offence disclosed, the police have a duty to investigate it. …I acknowledge that there can be difficulties in investigating and prosecuting these cases, but where the evidential test and prosecution and public interest tests are met, really those things shouldn’t get in the way. (Participant 5) The lack of training and a cohesive approach to the investigation of offensive social media communications was also evident in the inadequate resources available to local police officers to capture and process social media content and shortcomings in the collection of digital evidence that local police officers experienced. Outside of the hubs, the police lacked front-line capability to triage digital platforms and capture evidence in a timely, efficient and secure manner. The process was cumbersome, slow and potentially offers perpetrators the 18    opportunity to destroy evidence (by deleting social media content) before devices are collected for evidential purposes using forensic examination in accordance with the UK Association of Chief Police Officers Good Practice Guide for Computer-Based Electronic Evidence (ACPO, 2014). However, this is a lengthy process as there is ‘a seven, eight-month backlog on phones [being triaged]’ (Participant 7). To prosecute such cases successfully, digital evidence must be captured by appropriately trained officers on a secure police terminal. The lack of trained officers and their tendency to work only during regular office hours hindered the speedy capture of evidence, investigation and prosecution of cases: Participant 6 maintained that officers trained to capture digital evidence only worked 9am to 5pm whereas ‘by the very nature of it, we work 24/7’. These delays allow ample time for evidence to be lost/destroyed and for victims to continue to receive abusive messages. Officers are required to liaise with other specialist officers to connect the suspect’s IP address to a physical address or physical mobile device and then bank records, such as direct debit details, which are usually applied for to prove that a suspect is using the particular device to send offensive social media content to the victim. This process ‘takes about eight weeks or so, which is quite time consuming’ (Participant 6). To overcome delays, avoid perpetrators attempting to destroy evidence and reducing the likelihood of no further action being taken due to lack of evidence, some police officers screenshot offensive messages, although this method of capturing data is not legally admissible: ‘Well I knew that it is not technically allowed, but if it is the only way that we have, I just ran with it, knowing that I was probably going to get told off about it later on’ (Participant 7). Police officers justified screenshotting evidence by the delays in the current process, which they argued hindered efficient prosecution as well as allowing perpetrators to destroy evidence and/or continue to harass victims: 19    The thing then with doing everything so officially is that you are not… you don’t have the opportunity of getting him remanded overnight because it is going to take so long to get everything done. So your hands are tied and if that’s the only thing you have to get the evidence… (Participant 7) The potential, however, exists for evidence collected in this way to be legally challenged or tampered with, as one participant pointed out with regard to a case s/he investigated: I was very surprised that they [the suspect] did plead [guilty] to it [harassment, threats to kill and improper use of a public electronic communications network], because if they made an issue about it [how the evidence was captured] they could have got off with it. (Participant 7) The lack of clear policies, training and current weaknesses in the investigation of social media crimes is worrying not only due to its potential impact on the investigation and prosecution of cases that are reported to the police but also because it may deter potential victims from coming forward to report crimes: We know…. that when some people report offences to the police, the police might not recognise them as offences or know what to do in terms of attribution and so on…. So … if the police were trained up to a different level we could have far, far more cases coming into our system to deal with. (Participant 19) The impact of under-reporting and the lack of consistency in responding to cases when they are reported inhibit the investigation and prosecution of social media crimes in a number of ways. It impedes police understanding of the nature of the offences being committed, the scale of the problem and what resources are needed to tackle such crimes adequately. We found a great sense of frustration amongst investigators and prosecutors that current practices do not lend themselves easily to the effective policing of social media content: 20    People … hide behind personas and social media providers, and shout abuse and groom, threat, harass, stalk and commit all those offences without any expectation that the police will come and detect them. And it is very difficult for police to do that. (Participant 8) The need to invest in technology to aid police investigations was reiterated by a number of participants: We need then to invest in technology … with technology we can issue fixed penalties electronically, we can get emails electronically, but we can’t do evidential captures. And we need to … have front line capability to grab that when it is required. And we need kiosk examinations to triage mobile phones so that we are not taking very expensive devices off victims for long periods of time. And it needs to be: plug it in a kiosk, download it, evidential content has been grabbed, and there is your phone back. And those kiosk solutions would be in every station. And that would be the norm in the future. Yes, I’ve got an abusive message on social media. No problem. Plug it in. we have downloaded it, captured the content and given it back. (Participant 8) Nonetheless, even with these investments it was noted that police may still be overwhelmed due to the prevalence of offensiveness online. Participants expressed the need for a more proactive approach aimed at prevention to be adopted rather than the retrospective approach currently being used: I think the fundamental problem is the sheer wealth of material. That’s what I think is the main obstacle here … which is why I think one of our views is prevention rather than prosecution. (Participant 20) 21    These findings point to the dominance of an unstructured, decentralised approach to policing offensive social media content in the UK, resulting in offensive crimes committed online being dealt with differently depending on the discretion and knowledge of local police officers. Existing practice and policy were largely found to be hampering the adoption of a consistent, evidence-based approach to policing social media crimes due to the failure to collate, analyse and disseminate examples of successes and failures to local police officers who were at the frontline in responding to these cases. Conclusion While these findings are drawn from evidence gathered in Northern Ireland and England, potentially limiting their generalisability to other jurisdictions, a number of general conclusions can be drawn. Firstly, police forces prefer prevention to prosecution due to the sheer scale of offensiveness online. Even with the development of a centralised, coordinated response, the criminal justice system faces being overwhelmed by the volume of cases. Secondly, closer cooperation between social media companies, legislators and police officers is required to agree what types of offensive online communications will be prosecuted and how a balance between user privacy and protection from offensiveness will be achieved. Thirdly, the development of a centralised, coordinated expertise in policing social media content is a necessary first step to ensure consistency and the development of evidence-based best practices. In particular, specific attention needs to be paid to ensuring the different police and crime commissioners and chief constables –with responsibility for overseeing and developing policy and practice for the 43 territorial forces in England and Wales, the PSNI and Police Scotland – are coordinating and liaising with each other to avoid deviations in policy and practice emerging. Specifically, good practice and lessons from the 'hub' could be disseminated to police officers around the country through the ‘operations’ and/or ‘equality, 22    diversity and human rights’ coordinating committees of the National Police Chiefs’ Council (NPCC). Fourthly, local police officers need to be better trained and resourced to avoid the potential for discretion to be used in an inconsistent and potentially discriminatory manner, undermining public confidence and police legitimacy. Training can also help improve the investigative and evidence gathering techniques employed by officers, and lessen the potential for evidence to be deemed inadmissible or tainted. Moreover, local police knowledge, which is key for providing insights into contextual factors specific to that area/population, needs to be captured. For instance, police officers in Northern Ireland may be more aware of offensive sectarian messages than their counterparts elsewhere in the UK. Fifthly, while such a centralised approach would be beneficial, it will still be retrospective in nature. Technology can be used to help develop a more preventative, automatic and proactive model of policing social media content. Such an approach is preferable as it may reduce the publication of offensive material and hence victimisation. Technology offers the possibility to identify potentially criminal content proactively, by combining technological, criminological and legal expertise to ensure that what is censured is not arbitrary but derived through careful analysis, informed by legislation. While the necessary technology is not yet available, the authors are currently working on developing such software using these findings to inform its development and design. For example, machine learning can be used to identify potentially offensive messages as they are being written and a pop-up to inform users of the potential for harm and/or prosecution if the material is posted. Such an approach provides an opportunity for self-censorship, as well as helping to demonstrate intent to cause harm in a prosecution if the pop-up is dismissed. This software can also be used to aid the police in evidence capture by encoding metadata, such as the location of posting, time of posting, demographic details, required for investigation and prosecution. In this way, the investigation of cases could be 23    speeded up, evidence capture could be streamlined and the need to retain personal items, such as mobile phones and computers, for long periods of time could be reduced. By ensuring that experts in computer science, social science and the criminal justice system work together to agree a common understanding of what constitutes offensiveness that is criminally liable, this software can be modified for different jurisdictions based on relevant local legislation, rather than attempting to implement a one-size-fits-all model as employed in most existing technical solutions currently in use in which offensiveness is arbitrarily defined. However, it should be noted that the development of such a technological innovation will be insufficient to address all concerns in this area if it is not also combined with wider criminological research, policy and training in the policing of cybercrimes (see Wall & Williams, 2013; Yar, 2018). Lastly, legislative change is required before social media companies can be prosecuted for not removing liable content of which they have been made aware. 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work_xlwed4uzfbftleda4b6effmjve	----	Perceived Importance of Health Concerns Among Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Adults in a National, Probability-Based Phone Survey, 2017 Health Promotion Practice September 2020 Vol. 21, No. (5) 764 –768 DOI: 10.1177/1524839920908226 Perceptions of the importance of health problems can drive advocacy, policy change, resource distribution, and individual behaviors. However, little is known about how lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT), that is, sexual and gender minority (SGM) adults view the health problems facing SGM populations. In a 2017 national, probability-based survey of U.S. SGM adults (N = 453), we asked respondents to identify the most serious health problem facing SGM people today. Participants also rated the seriousness of five specific health problems (HIV/AIDS, suicide, hate crimes, harm- ful alcohol use, tobacco use). Analyses accounted for the complex sampling design and were stratified by gender identity. One quarter of U.S. SGM adults identified the most serious health problem facing SGM people to be HIV/AIDS (95% confidence interval [20.3, 31.2]). More respondents stated there were no serious LGBT health differences compared with straight/cisgender adults (4.2%, confidence interval [2.6, 5.9]) than identified tobacco use, hate crimes, chronic diseases, cancer, or suicide as the most serious. Importance ratings differed by gender and tobacco/alcohol use were perceived as less serious compared with HIV/AIDS, suicide, and hate crimes. Attention paid to HIV/AIDS by the SGM public, while important, may hinder efforts to address chronic diseases and other health issues affecting SGM people. Keywords: sexual and gender minorities; tobacco smoking; surveys and questionnaires >>IntroductIon There are substantial differences in health by sexual orientation and gender identity that disadvantage sexual and gender minority (SGM, e.g., lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender) populations. To address these inequi- ties, SGM communities have organized to improve health care, develop health centers that serve SGM pop- ulations, adapt interventions for SGM communities, and build networks and coalitions to address specific health topics (e.g., HIV/AIDS, tobacco control, violence, can- cer). Prominent have been efforts to address HIV and AIDS, including iconic activism by the AIDS Coalition to Unleash Power (ACT-UP) and others (Halcli, 1999). Similarly, community and public attention to SGM sui- cide and hate crimes have been driven by attention to 1University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Chapel Hill, NC, USA 2East Carolina University, Greenville, NC USA Authors’ Note: The authors thank Kurt Ribisl, Noel T. Brewer, and Quirina Vallejos for assistance with development of the survey items and Anna Hoffmeyer for her expertise in managing admin- istration of the telephone survey. Research reported in this pub- lication was supported by the National Cancer Institute of the National Institutes of Health and Food and Drug Administration Center for Tobacco Products (CTP) under Award Number P50CA180907. The content is solely the responsibility of the authors and does not necessarily represent the official views of the National Institutes of Health or the Food and Drug Administration. The funder had no role in the design of the study or in data collection, data analysis, interpretation, and writing of the article. Address correspondence to Marcella H. Boynton, NC TraCS Institute, Brinkhous-Bullitt Building, 160 Medical Drive, Chapel Hill, NC 27599, USA; e-mail: marcella_boynton@med. unc.edu. Perceived Importance of Health Concerns Among Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Adults in a National, Probability-Based Phone Survey, 2017 Marcella H. Boynton, PhD1 Jeffrey Gilbert, MPH1 Bonnie E. Shook-Sa, MAS1 Joseph G. L. Lee, PhD, MPH1,2 http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1177%2F1524839920908226&domain=pdf&date_stamp=2020-02-26 problems in communities and coverage in the media (Savage & Miller, 2012). Several theoretical and conceptual approaches illus- trate why public attention to a health problem matters to addressing inequities. Theories of agenda setting suggest that policy agendas are driven in part by atten- tion and media coverage (Scheufele, 2000). Similarly, the “issue attention cycle” posits that attention to a problem can drive interventions (Downs, 2016). Finally, public health practice recognizes the importance of media advocacy to drive changes (Drabble et al., 2006). In addition to mobilizing communities and driving policy agendas, perceptions of health issues important to SGM communities can also influence individual health behaviors. The importance of HIV to the SGM community may drive individual testing behaviors and safer-sex practices by, for example, changing individu- als’ perceived vulnerability and motivation to protect oneself. Despite the historic and current importance of SGM communities’ perceptions of health problems, there is little data regarding what health issues SGM communi- ties view as most salient. Only limited evidence is avail- able about what those perceptions are. For example, one venue-based (i.e., bar and club) study (N = 660) found HIV and sexually transmitted infections were rated high- est of issues of importance among gay and bisexual men and smoking was rated least important (Grov et  al., 2013). In a Houston, Texas, convenience sample (N = 99), just 6% of participants listed smoking or second- hand smoke exposure as a top-three health problem (Tami-Maury et al., 2015). It is important to understand where perceptions of problems may not align with premature death and dis- ease. That is, not all problems receive attention propor- tionate to their actual contribution to premature death and diseases. For example, SGM populations smoke at much higher rates than other groups (Buchting et  al., 2017; Wheldon et al., 2018). As such, tobacco use is a leading cause of death among SGM people given existing disparities (Max et al., 2020). Nonetheless, the dispro- portionate effect of tobacco use on the SGM community has received scant media attention and is not viewed as an important community issue by community members (Smith et al., 2008). Given the theoretical and practical importance of media and public attention to health problems, substan- tial health inequities for SGM populations, and limited probability-based data, we sought to (1) assess the sali- ence of health issues relevant to SGM adults, and (2) assess how tobacco use is perceived in relation to other key health issues in a national, probability-based survey. >>MEtHod From July to October 2017 we administered a cross- sectional phone survey to a sample of English speaking SGM adults living in the United States (Lee et al., 2020) who were recruited as a follow-up to a larger, probabil- ity-based tobacco use survey study implemented in two waves of data collection (Boynton et  al., 2016; Jeong et al., 2020). SGM individuals were recruited to the par- ent tobacco use survey as part of the probability-based sampling procedure or as part of a supplemental respondent-driven sampling chain. In all cases, partici- pants had a known probability of selection and therefore weights could be constructed to generate nationally rep- resentative estimates. A minimum of six call attempts were made to contact every eligible SGM participant, yielding a final sample of 453 SGM adults. After the screening and consent process was complete the interviewer made the statement, I’d like to start by asking you about issues important to the LGBT community. I will be using the term LGBT throughout this survey to refer to anyone who is lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, or queer. I appreciate your understanding if the term LGBT does not completely capture your identity. The interviewer then asked, “What do you think is the most serious health problem facing LGBT people today?” and typed the response verbatim. Respondents were then asked how serious of a problem each of five randomly ordered health issues are for people who are LGBT (alcohol abuse,1 hate crimes, HIV/AIDS, smoking, suicide) where 0 = not at all serious, 1 = somewhat serious, 2 = very serious, and 3 = extremely serious. For the open-ended response, two coders developed a code- book, independently coded a sample of responses (n = 60), and achieved acceptable reliability, Krippendorff’s α = .90 (95% confidence interval [CI; 0.80, 0.98]; Hayes & Krippendorff, 2007). To further ensure reliability, we then double coded all responses, and any differences were reconciled through discussion. These measures were adapted from prior work by Grov et al. (2013) and by Gallup (2018). The full survey instrument is available in our institutional repository (University of North Carolina Dataverse, accession doi:10.15139/S3/BX0RZE, available from https://dataverse.unc.edu/dataset.xhtml? persistentId=doi:10.15139/S3/BX0RZE). Because there are substantial differences by gender in SGM health and because HIV/AIDS disproportionately affects sexual minority men and transgender women, we https://dataverse.unc.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.15139/S3/BX0RZE https://dataverse.unc.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.15139/S3/BX0RZE conducted analyses stratified by gender identity. The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Institutional Review Board reviewed and approved the study proto- col (No. 13-2779). >rESuLtS Participant characteristics are provided in our online Dataverse repository cited above and in Lee et al. (2020). Table 1 shows frequencies and weighted propor- tions of responses identifying the most serious health problem facing LGBT people today, stratified by gender identity. For all groups, HIV/AIDS (25.7%) and sexually transmitted infections/unprotected sex (17.6%) were the most common responses; limitations in health ser- vices access, care, and information were also com- monly cited (11.0%). More participants reported that they thought no disparity existed (4.2%) than those that indicated discrimination/exclusion, tobacco use, hate crimes, chronic diseases, cancer, or suicide. As shown in our institutional repository supplemen- tal table cited above, when we asked participants to rate the seriousness of five topics presented in random order, participants rated suicide (mean [M] = 2.26, 95% confidence interval [CI; 2.17, 2.36]), hate crimes (M = 2.21, 95% CI [2.11, 2.30]), and HIV (M = 2.12, 95% CI [2.03, 2.21]) as significantly more serious health prob- lems for the LGBT community compared with harmful alcohol use (M = 1.69, 95% CI [1.59, 1.78]) and smok- ing (M = 1.64, 95% CI [1.54, 1.74]). We identified sig- nificant differences in the ratings for hate crimes by gender identity, with cisgender sexual minority women rating hate crimes as a more serious health issue (M = 2.36, 95% CI [2.25, 2.46]) compared with cisgender sexual minority men (M = 2.01, 95% CI [1.85, 2.16]) and cisgender sexual minority women rating smoking as a less serious problem (M = 1.52, 95% CI [1.39, 1.65]) compared with cisgender sexual minority men (M = 1.78, 95% CI [1.64, 1.93]). >DISCUSSION Our findings suggest that health issues connected to immediate harms (e.g., HIV infection, health ser-vices access, violence) are more salient, and therefore perceived as more serious, to SGM adults as compared to health issues associated with more distal harms such as chronic disease. For example, smoking, which is a leading cause of death and disability for U.S. adults and for LGBT individuals (Max et  al., 2020), was not generally perceived as a serious health risk to LGBT people. Access to quality health care is a major concern in the U.S. population and an important political topic. However, our findings suggest that the top health con- cerns for SGM populations may differ from those of the general public in important ways, specifically, by includ- ing a focus on HIV/AIDS. Addressing inequities in HIV/ AIDS for SGM men and gender minority women remains an important area of work, given, for example, the strik- ing inequities in HIV prevalence by race and gender identity among SGM populations (Matthews et  al., 2016). HIV/AIDS has historically been viewed as a core issue of SGM health; however, improvements in care (e.g., antiretroviral therapy) are resulting in chronic dis- eases replacing HIV/AIDS as leading causes of death for people living with HIV/AIDS (Helleberg et al., 2015). Our findings may be of particular concern for advo- cates working to address chronic diseases among SGM populations. For example, our findings may help explain the lack of traction that SGM tobacco control advocates report when speaking to SGM community leaders (Smith et  al., 2008) and why certain messaging around SGM health disparities performs poorly (Lee et al., 2017). Lack of SGM public attention to more distal health issues may, in turn, hinder efforts to successfully encourage SGM organizations to address health issues such as tobacco use and cardiovascular disease and hinder media advo- cacy efforts (Drabble et al., 2006). Regarding public health and health promotion prac- tice, our findings suggest the importance of engaging with SGM communities and SGM community organiza- tions on a broad range of health topics. For example, this could include invitations to SGM community leaders to participate in advisory boards and as community part- ners. The findings also highlight the importance of health advocates working on chronic disease topics par- ticipating in community events. And, it suggests the important need for getting chronic disease topics cov- ered by media tailored to SGM populations. This study’s strengths of probability sampling of a mar- ginalized population and use of an open-ended response option for health problems must be balanced against its limitations. First, our weights are based on the National Health Interview Survey and are thus limited by the ways in which that survey captured SGM identity. Second, we asked our questions in the context of a survey explicitly about tobacco use and SGM health and we used the term “alcohol abuse” as opposed to less potentially stigmatizing terms such as “alcohol use,” “alcohol use disorder,” or “harmful alcohol use.” This measurement approach may have affected the stated levels of concern for smoking and alcohol use in the SGM community. Third, our small sam- ple of transgender/nonbinary adults did not allow for meaningful comparisons with the cisgender groups. t A B L E 1 t o p ic I d en ti fi ed a s M o st S er io u s H ea lt h P ro b le m F a ci n g L G B t P eo p le t o d a y, c o d ed F ro m o p en r es p o n se s, u n w ei gh te d n s a n d W ei gh te d P ro p o rt io n s (N = 4 5 3 ), 2 0 1 7 T o p ic U n w ei gh te d F re q u en ci es W ei gh te d % [ 9 5 % C I] T o ta l (N = 4 5 3 ) F em a le s (n = 2 6 8 ) M a le s (n = 1 5 9 ) T ra n sg en d er o r N o n b in a ry ( n = 2 6 ) H IV o r A ID S 1 0 8 2 5 .7 [ 2 0 .3 , 3 1 .2 ] 2 0 .8 [ 1 4 .0 , 2 7 .6 ] 3 1 .1 [ 2 2 .7 , 3 9 .5 ] 3 3 .5 [ 8 .3 2 , 5 8 .6 ] S T Is o r u n p ro te ct ed s ex 8 3 1 7 .6 [ 1 3 .2 , 2 2 .1 ] 1 5 .9 [ 1 0 .3 , 2 1 .5 ] 2 0 .2 [ 1 3 .0 , 2 7 .4 ] 1 2 .6 [ 3 .3 1 , 2 1 .9 ] H ea lt h s er v ic es a cc es s, c ar e, o r in fo rm at io n 5 3 1 1 .0 [ 6 .6 1 , 1 5 .4 ] 1 2 .8 [ 6 .6 0 , 1 9 .0 ] 9 .8 5 [ 3 .0 5 , 1 6 .7 ] 0 .1 2 [ 0 .0 0 , 0 .3 7 ] M en ta l h ea lt h 5 2 1 0 .7 [ 7 .0 2 , 1 4 .3 ] 1 4 .6 [ 9 .1 8 , 2 0 .0 ] 6 .8 5 [ 1 .8 9 , 1 1 .8 ] 0 .0 3 [ 0 .0 0 , 0 .1 0 ] S u b st an ce u se ( al co h o l, d ru gs , o p io id s) 3 8 1 0 .1 [ 5 .3 5 , 1 4 .8 ] 5 .8 4 [ 1 .9 2 , 9 .7 7 ] 1 4 .7 [ 5 .1 7 , 2 4 .2 ] 1 6 .4 [ 0 .0 0 , 3 7 .0 ] D o n ’t k n o w 2 4 5 .0 6 [ 2 .6 1 , 7 .5 0 ] 6 .2 1 [ 3 .1 0 , 9 .3 2 ] 4 .1 1 [ 0 .3 5 , 7 .8 7 ] N o d is p ar it y w it h s tr ai gh t/ ci sg en d er p eo p le 2 0 4 .2 4 [ 2 .5 8 , 5 .9 1 ] 4 .8 5 [ 2 .4 1 , 7 .2 9 ] 3 .5 2 [ 1 .2 9 , 5 .7 5 ] 4 .1 1 [ 0 .0 0 , 1 2 .6 ] D is cr im in at io n o r so ci al e x cl u si o n 1 4 2 .7 5 [ 0 .8 9 , 4 .6 2 ] 4 .7 1 [ 1 .3 0 , 8 .1 2 ] 0 .6 2 [ 0 .0 0 , 1 .4 9 ] T o b ac co u se 1 4 2 .2 7 [ 0 .6 8 , 3 .8 7 ] 1 .9 9 [ 0 .0 0 , 4 .0 7 ] 2 .0 2 [ 0 .0 0 , 4 .3 7 ] 8 .7 6 [ 0 .0 0 , 1 8 .4 ] H at e o r h at e cr im es 1 1 2 .4 0 [ 0 .5 5 , 2 .2 4 ] 2 .4 5 [ 0 .0 0 , 4 .9 2 ] 1 .6 8 [ 0 .0 0 , 4 .3 9 ] 9 .4 5 [ 0 .0 0 , 1 9 .8 ] O b es it y, c ar d io v as cu la r is su es , o r d ia b et es 1 1 3 .3 8 [ 0 .5 7 , 6 .1 9 ] 4 .9 2 [ 0 .4 6 , 9 .3 8 ] 1 .8 0 [ 0 .0 0 , 5 .1 7 ] C an ce r 8 1 .6 9 [ 0 .3 0 , 3 .0 8 ] 2 .7 3 [ 0 .2 7 , 5 .1 9 ] 0 .5 7 [ 0 .0 0 , 1 .6 9 ] S u ic id e 7 1 .0 8 [ 0 .1 1 , 2 .0 5 ] 1 .4 1 [ 0 .0 4 , 2 .7 7 ] 0 .7 8 [ 0 .0 0 , 2 .3 3 ] C u rr en t p o li ti ca l cl im at e 6 0 .9 3 [ 0 .0 0 , 1 .9 9 ] 0 .2 6 [ 0 .0 0 , 0 .6 2 ] 1 .0 9 [ 0 .0 0 , 3 .1 5 ] 7 .9 4 [ 0 .0 0 , 1 7 .9 ] O th er 6 1 .1 0 [ 0 .0 0 , 2 .2 9 ] 0 .6 1 [ 0 .0 0 , 1 .4 2 ] 1 .1 4 [ 0 .0 0 , 3 .3 9 ] 7 .1 6 [ 0 .0 0 , 2 0 .9 ] N O T E : L G B T = l es b ia n , ga y, b is ex u al , o r tr an sg en d er ; S T Is = s ex u al ly t ra n sm it te d i n fe ct io n s. >>concLuSIon Efforts to address SGM health beyond HIV/AIDS may be hindered by the focus of the SGM public on the importance of HIV and other sexually transmitted infec- tions. 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Deaths from smoking and from HIV/AIDS among gay and bisexual men in California, 2005-2050. Tobacco Control, 29(3), 305-311. https://doi. org/10.1136/tobaccocontrol-2018-054850 Savage, D., & Miller, T. (Eds.). (2012). It gets better: Coming out, overcoming bullying, and creating a life worth living. Penguin. Scheufele, D. A. (2000). Agenda-Setting, priming, and framing revisited: Another look at cognitive effects of political communica- tion. Mass Communication & Society, 3(2/3), 297. https://doi. org/10.1207/S15327825MCS0323_07 Smith, E. A., Thomson, K., Offen, N., & Malone, R. E. (2008). If you know you exist, it’s just marketing poison: Meanings of tobacco industry targeting in the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender community. American Journal of Public Health, 98(6), 996-1003. https://doi.org/10.2105/AJPH.2007.118174 Tami-Maury, I., Lin, M. T., Lapham, H. L., Hong, J. H., Cage, C., Shete, S., & Gritz, E. R. (2015). A pilot study to assess tobacco use among sexual minorities in Houston, Texas. American Journal of Addictions, 24(5), 391-395. https://doi.org/10.1111/ajad.12244 Wheldon, C. W., Kaufman, A. R., Kasza, K. A., & Moser, R. P. (2018). Tobacco use among adults by sexual orientation: Findings from the Population Assessment of Tobacco and Health Study. LGBT Health, 5(1), 33-44. https://doi.org/10.1089/lgbt.2017.0175 https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7793-2111 https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9698-649X https://www.recoveryanswers.org/research-post/the-real-stigma-of-substance-use-disorders/ https://www.recoveryanswers.org/research-post/the-real-stigma-of-substance-use-disorders/ https://doi.org/10.1186/s12889-016-3151-5 https://doi.org/10.1186/s12889-016-3151-5 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.amepre.2016.11.022 https://news.gallup.com/poll/237392/satisfaction-important-problem-trends.aspx https://news.gallup.com/poll/237392/satisfaction-important-problem-trends.aspx https://doi.org/10.1177/1557988312463419 https://doi.org/10.1080/19312450709336664 https://doi.org/10.1080/19312450709336664 https://doi.org/10.1097/qad.0000000000000540 https://doi.org/10.1093/ntr/ntz035 https://doi.org/10.1093/ntr/ntz035 https://doi.org/10.2105/ajph.2017.303883 https://doi.org/10.1177/1090198119893374 https://doi.org/10.1177/1090198119893374 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10461-015-1158-z https://doi.org/10.1136/tobaccocontrol-2018-054850 https://doi.org/10.1136/tobaccocontrol-2018-054850 https://doi.org/10.1207/S15327825MCS0323_07 https://doi.org/10.1207/S15327825MCS0323_07 https://doi.org/10.2105/AJPH.2007.118174 https://doi.org/10.1111/ajad.12244 https://doi.org/10.1089/lgbt.2017.0175 
work_xnzfqxm4rjex7l6pptlr6c7cre	----	Microsoft Word - US paper Rabby-Rodgers-9-08-09 Economics of Security Working Paper Series Economics of Security is an initiative managed by DIW Berlin Faisal Rabby and William M. Rodgers III Post 9-11 U.S. Muslim Labor Market Outcomes October 2009 Economics of Security Working Paper 19 Economics of Security Working Paper Series Economics of Security is an initiative managed by DIW Berlin Correct citation: Rabby, F. and Rodgers, W. M. (2009). “Post 9-11 U.S. Muslim Labor Market Outcomes”. Economics of Security Working Paper 19, Berlin: Economics of Security. First published in 2009 © Faisal Rabby and William M. Rodgers III 2009 ISSN: 1868-0488 For further information, please contact: Economics of Security, c/o Department of International Economics, German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin), Mohrenstr. 58, 10117 Berlin, Germany. Tel: +49 (0)30 89 789-277 Email: neat@diw.de Website: www.economics-of-security.eu Post 9-11 U.S. Muslim Labor Market Outcomes Faisal Rabby Missouri State University 901 S National Avenue, Strong 371 Springfield, MO 65897 Phone: 848-391-5001 Fax: 417-836-4236 faisalrabby@missouristate.edu and William M. Rodgers III Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey 30 Livingston Avenue, Room 203 New Brunswick, NJ 08901 Phone (732) 932-4100, x6203 Fax (732) 932-2039 E-mail: wrodgers@rutgers.edu JEL Classification: J15, J61, J71 An earlier version of this paper was presented at the meetings of the Southern Economic Association, November 2008. We thank Reed Olsen, Anne Piehl, John Landon-Lane and Ira Gang for helpful comments and suggestions. Abstract Using a difference-in-differences framework and micro data from the Current Population Survey-Merged Outgoing Rotation Group Files (1999 to 2004), this paper estimates the impact that the 9-11 terrorists attacks had on the U.S. labor market outcomes of individuals with nativity profiles similar to the terrorists. We find that shortly after the attacks, the employment- population ratios and hours worked of very young (ages 16 to 25) Muslim men fell. By 2004, most losses had begun to dissipate. The employment-population ratios and hours worked of older Muslim men experienced little deterioration. JEL Classification: J15, J61, J71 1 I. Introduction The 9-11 terrorists attacks generated a significant amount of animosity towards Arabs and Muslims living in the United States. The Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) reported a 64% increase in discrimination complaints by the end of 2002. In 2003 and 2004, complaints increased by 70% and 49%.1 Further, CAIR reported civil rights violations increased, with 18 to 26 percent of the reported violations occurring in the workplace.2 Survey data also indicates an increase in discrimination. A 2007 PEW research center survey of 1,050 Muslim adults living in the U. S. found that 53% of all respondents agreed that since the 9-11 attacks it had become more difficult to be an American Muslim. Interestingly and very important for our analysis, younger Muslims (ages 18-29) more frequently reported being the object of suspicion (32% in contrast to 22% of older Muslims). The U.S. government’s policy and legal responses to the 9-11 attacks generated feelings of anxiety and isolation for Muslims.3 The executive branch implemented a number of anti- terrorism programs. These programs translated into a difficult legal environment for certain Arabs and Muslims. Some of the initiatives were targeted towards categories of non-citizens. Mass round-ups of predominantly Arab and Muslim immigrants started weeks after 9-11. Other initiatives include the special registration program (initiated in November 2002 and abolished in December 2003);4 "voluntary" interviews (about 13,434 interviewees were placed in removal proceedings for visa violations); the Justice Department's efforts to involve local police in the enforcement of federal immigration law; and holding Muslim detainees without charge. Arab and Muslim organizations described these programs as detrimental to community relations. Estimates of the impact that 9-11 had on Muslim labor market outcomes have emerged. Dávila and Mora (2005) find that between 2000 and 2002 (2001 excluded), Arabs and Muslims experienced a significant decline in earnings as compared to non-Latino Whites (those who speak only English at home). Their interpretation is that the 9-11 attacks affected the labor market outcomes of demographic groups that most closely match the terrorists’ ethnicity. Their sample included men between the ages of 25 and 40 who worked at least twenty hours per week and for thirty-two weeks or more in the survey year. Their target group included men from Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, and the Middle-eastern Arab countries.5 Kaestner, Kaushal, and Reimers (2007) find that the 9-11 attacks were not associated 2 with a reduction in the employment and hours worked of Arabs and Muslims. However, the attacks were associated with about a 14 to 16 percent decline in the real weekly earnings of 21 to 54 year old Muslim and Arab men. Kaestner et al. find that changes in occupation and industry account for some of the decrease in wages. They infer that the distribution of Arab and Muslim men by occupation and industry changed after 9-11 and that these changes adversely affected earnings of Arab and Muslim men. Kaestner et al. also find that internal migration of Arabs and Muslims decreased after 9-11. This is suggestive of a decline in the returns to mobility. Finally, they show that over time, the adverse impact of 9-11 dissipated. Orrenius and Zavodny (2005) estimate 9-11’s affect on the earnings of 18 to 39 year old male Latino immigrants who have, at most, completed a high school education. They estimate difference-in-differences models and find no effect on employment, but they do find a 4 to 7 percent decrease in hours worked and a 3 to 6 percentage point drop in the employment of Latino immigrants relative to Latino natives. These three studies utilize a variety of outcomes, periods of observation, ages, labor force attachments, and different control groups. This paper attempts to unify these three studies and answer the following questions. Did the labor market outcomes worsen for Muslims (i.e. immigrants from Muslim-majority countries) after 9-11, particularly for Muslims whose demographic profiles closely fit those of the terrorists? Was the deterioration short-lived (i.e. did they dissipate overtime)? Using the Census Bureau’s Current Population Survey (CPS) micro data from 1999 to 2004 and a difference-in-differences (DD) methodology, we estimate impacts for all men between 16 to 64 years of age and age sub-groups (e.g., 16 to 25). We estimate DD models for three outcomes: employment-population ratio, hours worked, and earnings. We estimate impacts using three target groups and three control groups. Finally, we perform several robustness checks. In particular, we incorrectly specify the dates of the attacks in the difference-in- differences models. We find that 9-11 and the anti-terrorism measures were associated with a relative decrease in employment, hours worked, and the earnings of immigrants from Muslim-majority countries. The largest decreases were among the youngest immigrant men (ages 16 to 25) from the Middle East (excluding Israel), Iran and Afghanistan, whose demographic profiles are the closest to the terrorists. Most significant is the finding that even for the youngest men, the 3 adverse impacts appear to be short lived. Many of the estimated losses dissipate by the end of 2004. II. Methods Our central method is difference-in-differences, where we compare the change in the employment-population ratio, usual hours worked per week, and real weekly earnings of a target group to that of a comparison group.6 Thus, we attempt to remove the impact that labor supply, labor demand and institutional factors have on target-group outcomes.7 More formally, outcomes are described as follows: ,uMuslim*TrendβTrendβ)Muslim*(Stateβ Stateβ)Muslim*(Quarterβ Quarter β)Muslim*(ZβZβ )Muslim*(XβXβ)Muslim*(Afterβ MuslimβAfterββY ististt13t12ists11 s10istt98istst7st6 istist5ist4istt3ist2t10ist ++++ +++++ +++++= (1) where istY is the labor market outcome of person i in state s at time t. The term tAfter is a dummy variable that equals one if the observation comes from any month after September 2001, and zero otherwise. The term istX denotes a vector of individual characteristics that include potential experience, education, race and ethnicity, marital status, length of stay in the US, citizenship status, and generation in the US. In our earnings equations, istX contains occupation and industry indicators.8 The term stZ represents the state unemployment rate, tQuarter is the interview quarter (ranging from 1 to 4) to capture seasonality and tTrend is as a cubic function of time (starting from 1 for January 1999), capturing unmeasured, time-varying influences.9 The notation State s represents dummy variables that capture differential effects of location. The coefficient 3β on the interaction of tAfter and Muslimist identifies the difference-in-differences effect of 9-11 on the labor market outcomes of Muslims.10 Most of the effects are allowed to differ by the Muslim status. This is done to allow for the fact that some factors like the business cycle, and citizenship status, might have affected the two groups differently over time. Two recent reports by the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination 4 Committee (Ibish and Stewart 2003) and the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR 2002 to 2005) suggest that discrimination varied by location. However, other than using the state/region dummies and Muslim to “non-Muslim” population ratios as an index of their visibility, no control is used for this variation across locations.11 The key to identifying the impact of the terrorists’ attacks on Muslim labor-market outcomes is the proper construction of target and comparison groups. Previous studies use a limited set of target and comparison groups. We demonstrate that there are additional considerations when constructing these groups. First, the impact of 9-11 on the labor-market outcomes of Muslims and Arabs varies by age. New job-market entrants might have experienced different outcomes than experienced workers. Given the terrorists’ profiles, younger Muslims/Arabs may be more vulnerable to discrimination.12 Second, the labor market outcomes of Muslims might have been affected by the laws and programs created after 9-11 as well as by the animosity and fear that emerged after 9-11. To operationalize these ideas, we create several target groups consisting of either Muslim men or immigrant men from Muslim-majority countries. III. Data and Results We use the 1999 to 2004 Current Population Survey (CPS) Merged Outgoing Rotation Groups files. The micro data sample is restricted to men who at the time of the survey were 16 to 64 years old and were not enrolled in school. The construction of the target and comparison groups and some salient features of the samples are described below. A. Target and Comparison Groups Religious affiliation is the appropriate information for categorizing whether an individual is Muslim, but the CPS does not contain this information. However, the CPS contains the reference person’s country of birth as well as their parents’ nativities, which makes it possible to identify 1st and 2nd generation immigrants from most Muslim-majority countries. We use this nativity information to define whether an individual is Muslim. We think this is a good proxy for determining whether an individual is Muslim. Evidence suggests that people did not discriminate against Muslims with much accuracy after 9-11.13 News reports and other studies find cases where non-Muslims with Muslim appearances experienced work place backlashes.14 In many 5 instances, it is very difficult to distinguish Arab Christians from Arab Muslims by name and appearance. Further, country of birth also links up with the US government’s special registration program. Most of the Muslim-majority countries (except Turkey and Malaysia) were on the Department of Justice’s “Special Registration” list.15 In November 2002, the first in a series of call-in requirements was imposed on men from these countries. It required men from these countries to report and register with the Immigration and Naturalization Service. The CPS contains geographic information that allows us to identify 12 of the program’s 24 countries. Nine countries are combined in two regions: the “Rest of North Africa” and the “Rest of Middle East” which excludes Israel. Two countries, Somalia and Eritrea are mixed with the CPS’s “other African countries” category. Countries in this category were not included in the special registration program. Thus, we can not identify Muslims from Somalia and Eritrea.16 We construct three target groups (i.e., three groups of Muslims). Target Group C, the broadest group consists of 1st and 2nd generation immigrants from all of the special registration countries identifiable in the CPS: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Middle Eastern Arab countries (Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Iraq, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen), Iran, Libya, Morocco, North Africa and Pakistan.17 Turkey, Indonesia and Malaysia are Muslim-majority countries but were not listed under the special registration program. There has been relatively little evidence that the immigrants from these countries experienced intolerance after 9-11. India has the 2nd largest Muslim population but it is not clear whether non-Muslim and non-Sikh Indians experienced discrimination.18 So neither target nor comparison groups include immigrants from these countries. Immigrants from Bangladesh, Indonesia, and North Africa (except for Egypt and Morocco) do not fit as well as Arabs with the nativity and ethnic profiles of the 9-11 terrorists. Therefore, we create Target Group B, a sub-group that is closer to the terrorists in nativity and ethnicity. This group consists of 1st and 2nd generation immigrants from Afghanistan, Middle Eastern Arab countries, Iran, Pakistan, Egypt and Morocco – immigrants from these countries should be closer to the nativity and ethnic profiles of the terrorists. The Iraq and Afghanistan wars, longstanding unrest in Palestine, and the Madrid Train Bombings might have made Arabs and Muslims from these regions targets for discrimination. To assess this possibility, we construct the narrowest sub-group, Target Group A, which consists of 6 only men from Middle Eastern Arab countries, Iran, and Afghanistan, the terrorists’ countries of origin. Finally, we limit the target samples to the 18 states in which 75 percent of Muslims live.19 We make this exclusion to keep the target groups’ geographic concentration similar. As the validity of the difference-in-differences approach largely depends on the comparison group’s quality, we constructed three comparison groups. In developing the comparison groups, we attempt to select individuals who should not be impacted by post 9-11 intolerance but at the same time are similar to Muslims in terms of their observable characteristics. Ideally, unobserved factors contemporaneous to 9-11 should have the same effect on target and comparison group labor market outcomes. Comparison Group 1 consists of 1st and 2nd generation immigrants from non-Muslim- majority countries. To keep the target and comparison groups similar in characteristics, we exclude 1st and 2nd generation Mexican, Central American, and Caribbean immigrants.20 Their observable characteristics such as education and U.S. legal status and possibly some unobserved characteristics are not very similar to immigrants in our target groups. To avoid additional contamination of the target and comparison groups, we excluded immigrants from Turkey, Malaysia, India, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria and the CPS’s “Other Africa” category, which contains Somalia and Eritrea.21 Comparison Group 2 consists of all US-born men excluding 2nd generation immigrants from Target Group C: Mexico, Central America, the Caribbean, Turkey, Malaysia, India, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria and Other Africa. As mentioned earlier, respondents from these countries are excluded from both the target and comparison groups to avoid possible contamination. Comparison Group 3 consists of all U.S. born non-Latino whites that are not in Target Group C. We exclude African Americans and Latinos from this group because some of their observable characteristics (e.g. education) are different from those of whites. Appendix I provides a summary description of the target and comparison groups. B. Descriptive Statistics Appendix II reports descriptive statistics for the youngest (ages 16 to 25) Muslim men and non-Muslim immigrant men (Comparison Group 1).22 The demographic characteristics of Comparison Groups 2 (all US born men) and 3 (US-born Non-Hispanic White men) are similar to those for group 1 and are not reported here.23 There are two noticeable differences between the 7 target and comparison groups, often irrespective of age. First, the target groups tend to have higher education (Bachelors degree and above) in contrast to all of the comparison groups. Second, the target groups are more concentrated in “Sales” occupations than the comparison group (21.2 to 25.0% versus 10.9%). Third, target group individuals are more concentrated in “Distribution, Hotels & Restaurants” industries than individuals in the comparison group. Table 1 uses the cell means in Appendix II to construct non-regression adjusted difference-in-differences estimators. The Table shows that relative to Comparison Group 1, the employment-population ratio of very young Middle Eastern, Iranian and Afghan men (Target Group A) fell by 16.6 percentage points by the end of December 2002. The loss in employment is largely due to an 18-point drop in the employment-population ratio of the target group. By the end of 2004, 9-11’s impact seems to have dissipated to only 2.5-percentage point drop, but this estimate has little statistical precision. We obtain a statistically significant yet smaller estimate for Target Group B (-0.119). For young men from all special registration countries (Target Group C), we obtain an even smaller estimated drop in employment, with little precision. Although the estimated gap by the end of 2004 indicates that the target group has a statistically significant advantage, it is only 1.0 percentage point. The Table shows similar results for hours worked and real weekly earnings: target group outcomes typically decline shortly after 9-11 and recover by 2004. We attribute the decline in statistical significance to the greater variation in earnings and hours that must be explained compared to the simple binary employment variable. In general, it is not clear from these basic estimates whether these adverse effects were caused by animosity towards Muslims, the laws/programs that followed 9-11, differences in labor supply, labor demand, and institutional characteristics of target and control groups. Our regression-adjusted difference-in-differences estimates attempt to account for these factors. C. Regression Results Table 2 reports the regression-adjusted difference-in-differences estimates ( 3β ) of target groups A, B, and C relative to Comparison Group 1. The upper panel shows the effects for 1999 to 2002 and the lower panel reports the effects for 1999 to 2004, which enables us to demonstrate 9-11’s immediate and short-term impacts. Each target group contains results for three age groups: 16 to 25, 16 to 29 and 16 to 64. Probit models were used to estimate the employment 8 equations. The partial derivatives are reported. Their standard errors were estimated using the Delta method. Ordinary least squares is used to estimate the log weekly earnings and hours worked equations. For these log weekly earnings and hours worked equations, robust standard errors, clustered by repeated observations are shown in parentheses.24 In Table 2, the first row of the upper panel shows that shortly after 9-11, the employment gap among younger men between target and comparison groups widened. This gap narrows as one moves from only Middle Eastern, Iranian and Afghan men (Group A) to immigrants from all Special Registration countries (Group C). The employment gap among 16 to 25 year old men expanded by nearly 45.0 percentage points for Target Group A by 2002, much larger than the unadjusted estimate of 16.6 percentage points (Table 1). This short-term effect is 38 percentage points when Pakistani and African Arabs (Target Group B) are included and 29 percentage points when men from all other Special Registration countries (Target Group C) are added. All are measured with moderate precision. Although large, the timing of these estimates corresponds to the year in which the reported number of civil-rights violations against Arabs and Muslims increased dramatically. The fact that 16 to 25 year old men comprise a very small fraction of the entire sample potentially makes the value of our findings dubious. However, when the sample’s upper age limit is extended to 29, we still obtain a 17.6 percentage point decline in relative employment for the broad target group (the effects for the narrow target groups were large and negative but not measured with precision). When we expand the sample to men aged 16 to 64, we find no change in the employment of these target groups associated with 9-11. Table 2’s lower panel shows that by 2004 only very young men, particularly those from the Middle East, Iran and Afghanistan were still experiencing a relative decline in employment that is attributable to 9-11. The panel also reveals that there is no statistically significant effect of 9-11 on the employment of 16 to 29 and 16 to 64 year old men by 2004. The simple inclusion of 25 to 29 year old men leads to a large dampening in 9-11’s impact. Switching to hours worked, we find that immediately after 9-11, there was a relative decrease in hours worked for the youngest target group. This is consistent with the relative decrease in their employment-population ratio as we set hours worked to zero for men who are not employed. By 2002, the narrow target group’s hours worked diminished by 17 per week relative to Comparison Group 1. For the broad group, the relative decrease was about 11 hours. 9 The decline in hours for the youngest Muslims persists through the end of 2004. The relative decrease was bigger for narrower groups (about 16 hours) than for the broad group (about 8 hours). It is possible that the elasticity of demand for young Muslims’ labor increased after 9-11 due to rising animosity, fear, or legal stringencies. We find few statistically significant changes in hours worked for older Muslim men. Similar to the employment-population ratio estimates, the terrorist attacks appear to have had little impact on the hours worked of older Muslim men. Weekly earnings have no distinct patterns that can be easily summarized. Shortly after 9-11, the earnings of Muslims in the narrow group (Target Group A) fall, with the largest erosion among 16 to 64 year old men. By 2004, the earnings disadvantage had largely dissipated. As we move to the Between Group, the pattern of losses among 16 to 64 year old men Muslims continues, but now young Muslims have an imprecisely measured advantage in 2002, which expands in 2004. This finding is even stronger in Target Group C. What explains the earnings results? The decrease in earnings among 16 to 64 year old Muslim men might have been caused by a rise in prejudice against or fear of Muslim men overall or by the increased anti-terrorism measures. Muslim men might have been forced to accept lower income from the same occupation or to switch from higher-income jobs to lower-income ones. Kaestner et al. (2007) find evidence that Arab and Muslim men were more likely to report switching from higher to lower-income occupations in the post-9-11 months. The puzzle lies with our estimates for 16 to 25 and 16 to 29 year old Muslim men. Our earnings models exclude the unemployed and those out of the labor force. Thus, we suspect that our DD estimates are biased due to nonrandom selection of lower-paid Muslims in to unemployment and departures from the labor force. Their exclusion raises the group’s post-9-11 average earnings. The next section utilizes quantile regressions to explore this possibility. IV. Robustness of Results Our findings that the employment of very young Muslim men deteriorated after 9-11 can be questioned on several grounds. First, during the post-9-11 years, the relative decline in the employment-population ratios and hours worked of young Muslims was accompanied by a relative increase in their average earnings (conditional on employment) for Target Group A in 2004, and Target Groups B and C in both 2002 and 2004. Second, for the narrow group of young Muslims, the number of observations is small. Third, the validity of our comparison groups can 10 always be questioned. Fourth, the post-9-11 drop in the employment-population ratio of young Muslims might have been driven by a significant net emigration of non-citizen working Muslims who had to leave the US due to the anti-terrorism programs (e.g., deportation of certain types of non-citizens). We address the first critique by estimating DD quantile regressions to show what appears to be a relative increase in the earnings of young Muslims can be attributed to employment loss by men concentrated in the lower tail of the earnings distribution. To address the additional critiques, we use pseudo-intervention dates in the difference-in-differences models. We explore the possibility whether increased net emigration was driving the results, and whether our results are sensitive to the use of additional comparison groups. Findings from Quantile Regressions It is important to note that the earnings equations in Table 2 were estimated only for employed men. If job loss for younger Muslims after 9-11 was concentrated in the lower tail of their earnings distribution, average earnings conditional on working are biased upward. If this form of selection is large enough, it could generate an increase in the target group’s average wage that exceeds changes in the control group’s average wage, thus explaining our estimates in Table 2. To assess the possibility of this type of bias, we estimate our difference-in-differences models using quantile regressions at the 25th, median, 75th and 90th percentiles of the earnings distribution. An individual’s earnings are set equal to zero if they are not employed. Relative to the control group, if a larger portion of low-wage young Muslims left employment after 9-11, we should observe our anticipated Muslim disadvantage at the distribution’s lower quantiles. Table 3 reports the quantile regression estimates for all special registration countries (Target Group C), compared to other immigrants. The difference-in-differences effects are specific to the 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th percentiles. These patterns support our basic hypothesis that a form of selection occurred among young Muslims, but not the full sample of 16 to 64 year old Muslim men. The estimated median coefficient of –0.003 in the upper panel shows that for the youngest Muslims, median earnings did not change relative to non-Muslims. However, a 50 percent relative decrease is found at the 25th percentile. By 2004, the disadvantage vanishes and becomes imprecisely measured at the 25th percentile for 16 to 25 and 16 to 29 year olds. The middle panel reports that Muslims aged 16 to 29 had their median earnings rise by almost 14 11 percent by 2002, compared to an imprecisely measured decline of 29 percent at the 25th percentile. For 16 to 64 year old Muslim men, except for the 90th percentile, their earnings decline at all quantiles. We obtain our hypothesized results for Middle Eastern, Iranian and Afghans (Target Group A). The relative earnings of younger as well as older Muslim men fell at lower quantiles by 2004.25 This drop in earnings at the lower quantiles was accompanied with unchanged median earnings, which indicates that less-skilled and therefore low-earning young Muslims bore the brunt of the job losses, pushing their post 9-11 average earnings conditional on employment upward. Findings from using Different Intervention Dates As an identification check, we incorrectly specify the timing of the attacks. To do this, we estimate our difference-in-differences models for two sub-periods. The first uses data from January 1998 to August 2001 and the second uses data from September 2002 to December 2004).26 For the pre-9-11 sub-period, we set the Post 9-11 dummy variable equal to 1 if the observation corresponds to a date after August 2000. For the post-9-11 sub-period, the dummy variable equals 1 if the data corresponds to a month after September 2003. For the full set of observations that run from January 1998 to December 2004, we also use a “rolling” date strategy. Here we set the attack date at a particular quarter and estimate the difference-in-differences model. We move the date forward by one quarter and re-estimate the model. The models are estimated for Target Groups A, B and C and comparison group 1. Table 4 shows that for the January 1998 through August 2001 sub-period, with August 2000 as the intervention date, the difference-in-differences effects on the employment-population ratio, log hourly earnings, and weekly hours worked are often close to zero and are never statistically significant, even for the youngest men. Estimates for the post 9-11 sub-period, September 2002 through December 2004 with September 2003 as an intervention date, which are not shown here, reveal that there was an increase in the relative employment and hours worked of younger men from the Middle East, Iran and Afghanistan. However, this is consistent with our earlier finding that the impact of 9-11 on these young men began to dissipate between 2003 and 2004. In other words, this second set of months is not independent of 9-11’s effects.27 Our “rolling” date strategy estimates thirteen (only the quarters from March 2001 to 12 March 2003 are shown in Table 5 and Appendices III and IV) difference-in-differences models where each model corresponds to an intervention date between June 2000 and June 2003. All of the estimates are regression adjusted and use data from 1999 through 2004. Choosing this wide range of dates pinpoints the narrow window when the outcome’s (e.g., employment-population ratio) relative change occurred. The difference-in-differences estimates shown in Table 5 suggest that the relative decline in the employment-population ratio of the youngest Muslims occurred between September 2001 and December 2001. For each target group, the relative decrease in employment is the largest in the year after 9-11 and dissipates as the intervention date moves farther from September 2001.28 Consistent with the relative drop in employment, Table 5 also shows that hours worked decreased by 8 to 16 percent for the youngest group and the effects worsen as one moves from the broad to the narrow group. We find a similar pattern for the 16-to-29 year olds (Appendix III). However, only a 10 percentage-point decrease in the broad target group’s employment- population ratio is found when the longer time-window is considered. For 16 to 64 year old men (Appendix IV), we do not find a significant drop in employment at any “pseudo” intervention date. The above results confirm our earlier conclusions that employment deteriorated for the youngest members of the target group and the effects were short-lived, and older Muslim men were not heavily impacted by 9-11. The earnings regressions using the rolling intervention dates yield results consistent with the 1999 to 2004 estimates in Table 2.29 From June, 2001 to March, 2003, the difference- in-differences estimates are positive. Young Muslims in each target group experience a relative increase in their earnings. The estimates reflect the impact of Muslim job losses that are concentrated at the lower tail of the earnings distribution. They persist well after the actual date of the attacks. Did Muslim Net Emigration from the US Explain their Labor Market Outcomes Deterioration? After 9-11, there is some evidence of increased net emigration of both target and comparison group individuals. We estimated the population of the two immigrant groups from the CPS-MORG files. We find that the number of immigrants from both the Special Registration countries and other countries was stable over this period. In fact, both groups experienced slight population declines from 2003 and 2004. For the Special Registration countries, the drop was 13 approximately 65,000 and for the comparison-group countries the estimated decline was near 986,000. Even though the emigration numbers are different between the two groups, these decreases are not significant and occurred only in 2004. Furthermore, the decline in population for the two groups is proportional. Therefore, net emigration may not be a force driving Muslim labor market outcomes unless two things occurred: mainly non-citizens emigrated and a significant number of the outgoing non-citizen Muslims was employed in the US. After 2001, the ratio of noncitizens-to-citizens decreased steadily until 2003 for the target group. The drop in the proportion of non-citizens is consistent with deportations and a significant fall in non-immigrant US-visa issuance after 2001, particularly for Special Registration countries. This change in the citizenship composition of the target group could have contributed to the relative decline. To check whether non-citizen emigration had any effect, we re-estimated the difference-in-differences models but restrict the Target Group C and Comparison Group 1 samples to US-citizens. We find that the estimates increase only slightly. If net emigration occurred mostly for employed non-citizen Muslims, our estimates are biased upward. However, the opposite scenario (e.g., increased net emigration of non-employed Muslims after 9/11) seems more plausible in which case our estimates are biased downward. Using US-Native Men as Comparison Groups As mentioned earlier, native-born men are not as good a comparison group as “non- Muslim” immigrants because the target groups differ from natives in terms of language proficiency. To assess whether this is true, we construct two additional comparison groups: Group 2 (US-born men other than members in target groups) and Group 3 (US-born non-Latino White Men other than members in target groups). The same regression models are estimated with these comparison groups.30 The estimates using the US-born men as comparison groups are similar to those using immigrants from non-Muslim countries. However, they are often not statistically significant. These estimates indicate that by 2002, employment dropped by about 20 percentage points (marginally significant at 10% level) for the youngest (age 16-25) immigrants from all special registration countries (Target Group C). For Arab, Iranian, Afghan and Pakistani men, this decrease is about 23 percentage points (significant at 10% level). For very young Middle Eastern Arabs, Iranians and Afghans, a 24 percentage-point relative drop in employment was not statistically significant but a 13-hour relative decrease in their work by 2004 is 14 statistically significant at 1% level. For 16 to 64 year old men, there were approximately 16, 15 and 10 percentage-point drops in earnings for Target groups A, B and C respectively relative to the US-born men. Use of Comparison Group 3, US-born non-Latino Whites yields qualitatively similar results (Available upon request). V. Summary and Conclusions This paper provides a comprehensive set of estimates of 9-11 and the associated anti- terrorism measures’ impacts on the labor market outcomes of Muslim men. Using a natural experiment framework, we find that labor market outcomes worsened for men with nativity profiles closer to the terrorists. Employment losses are greatest and longest in duration for very young (ages 16 to 25) Muslim men. Many of the estimated losses dissipate by the end of 2004, with weekly hours as the exception. Our results are similar to previous studies that include older individuals in their samples. When we include older individuals, the estimated losses are small and short-lived. Our findings are consistent with the hypothesis of an emergence in discrimination against minorities that more or less fit the Muslim stereotype after the 9-11 terrorist attacks. However, the labor market’s legal environment became relatively rigid for first-generation immigrants at least for a short period after 9-11. Because of these simultaneous changes, it is difficult to disentangle how much of the effects on labor market outcomes were caused by discrimination and how much by anti-terrorism legislation. Two pieces of evidence are suggestive of a growth in discrimination against immigrant men. First, Muslims with age and nativity profiles closer to the terrorists’ experienced larger declines in their employment. Second, the decline in employment and earnings of Muslims associated with 9-11 began to dissipate after 2002, just when some of the salient anti-terrorism programs and laws were initiated. Furthermore, the fear of discrimination might also have discouraged some minority workers from labor market participation. 15 References Baker, Wayne; Howell Sally; Jamal, Amaney; Lin, Ann; Shryock, Andrew; Stockton, Ron and Tessler, Mark. 2003. “The Detroit Arab American Study.” University of Michigan. Available at: http://www.umich.edu/news/index.html?Releases/2004/Jul04/r072904 Braakmann, Nils; Islamistic Terror, the War on Iraq and the Job Prospects of Arab Men in Britain: Does a Country’s Direct Involvement matter? University of Lüneburg Working Paper Series in Economics No. 70, December 2007, www.leuphana.de/vwl/papers Braakmann, Nils; The impact of September 11th, 2001 on the job prospects of foreigners With Arab background - Evidence from German labor market data; University of Lüneburg Working Paper Series in Economics No. 37, January 2007, www.uni- lueneburg.de/vwl/papers ISSN 1860 - 5508 Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR). 2002 to 2005 Annual Reports “The status of Muslim Civil Rights in the United States”. Washington, DC. 0H http://www.cair.com Davila, Alberto and Mora, Marie T. 2005. Changes in the Earnings of Arab Men in the US Between 2000 and 2002. Journal of Population Economics (2005) 18: 587-601 Human Rights Watch. 2002. ‘We are not the enemy’: Hate crimes against Arabs, Muslims and those perceived to be Arab or Muslim after September 11. Human Rights Watch Report 14, no. 6(G) (November). Ibish, H., and A. Stewart. 2003. Report on hate crimes and discrimination against Arab Americans: The post-September 11 backlash. Washington, DC: American-Arab Anti- Discrimination Committee. Kaestner, Robert, Kaushal Neeraj and Reimers Cordelia, 2007. Labor Market Effects of September 11th on Arab and Muslim Residents of the United States. The Journal of Human Resources, Volume 42, Issue 2, Spring 2007. 1Hnk464@columbia.edu 16 Leonard, Karen I. 2003. Muslims in the United States, The State of Research. Lindkvist, Heather. 2002, How to Restore Hope? Life After September 11 for the Somali Community in Maine. Paper presented to the Conference on Muslim Minorities in Western Europe and North America After September 11, Duke University, Durham, N.C. (March 23). Moore, Kathleen M. 2002. American Attitudes Toward Immigration and Muslim Presence in the United States Since September 11. Paper presented to the Conference on Muslim Minorities in Western Europe and North America After September 11, Duke University, Durham, N.C. (March 23). Orrenius, Pia M; Zavodny,Madeline. Did 9/11 worsen the job prospects of Hispanic immigrants? Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, Working Paper number 05-08; http://dallasfed.org/research/papers/2005/wp0508.pdf PEW Research Center; Muslim Americans, Middle Class and Mostly Mainstream; May 2007 Shryock, Andrew. 2002. New Images of Arab Detroit: Seeing Otherness and Identity Through the Lens of September 11. American Anthropologist 104(3): 917-22. Suleiman, Michael W. 1999. Arabs in America, Building a New Future. U.S. Bureau of the Census. 2003. The Arab population: 2000. Census 2000 Brief #C2KBR-23, December. U. S. Federal Bureau of Investigation. 2001. Hate Crime Report. http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/01hate.pdf 17 Table 1: Non-regression Adjusted Difference in Difference Estimates for 1st and 2nd Generation Immigrant Men Age 16 to 25 Target Groups: Immigrants from Muslim-Majority Countries. Comparison Group 1: Other Immigrants (Standard Errors in Parentheses) Variable Target Group A (Narrow Group) (Mid Eastern, Iranians, Afghan) Target Group B (In-Between Group) (Group A, Pakistanis, African Arabs) Target Group C (Broad Group) (All Special Registration Countries) Employment Jan. 99 to Sept. 01 - - - Oct. 01 to Dec. 02 -.166+ (0.089) -0.119+ (0.071) -0.060 (0.062) Oct. 01 to Dec. 04 -.025 (0.040) 0.022 (0.050) 0.010+ (0.005) Hours Worked Jan. 99 to Sept. 01 - - - Oct. 01 to Dec. 02 -7.73+ (3.38) -5.93 (3.9) -4.2 (2.8) Oct. 01 to Dec. 04 -2.83 (0.16) -3.63 (2.3) -1.7 (2.09) Real Weekly Earnings Jan. 99 to Sept. 01 - - - Oct. 01 to Dec. 02 -27.13 (40.11) -0.23 (32.9) -1.0 (29.0) Oct. 01 to Dec. 04 -7.53 (27.5) 6.57 (23.0) 34 (20.9) Notes: Entries are difference in difference estimators based on the cell means in Appendix II. Target and Control group definitions are reported in Appendix I. A “**” denotes significance at 1% level. A “*” denotes significance at the 5% level, and “+” indicates significance at the 10% level. 18 Table 2: Difference-in-differences Effects of 9/11 on Labor Market Outcomes of Immigrants form Muslim-Majority Countries Relative to Other Immigrants Living in the US Target A (Narrow) (Mid Eastern, Iranians, Afghan) Target B (In-Between Group) (Group A, Pakistanis, African Arabs) Target C, (Broad Group) (All Special Registration countries) Age 16-25 Age 16-29 Age 16-64 Age 16-25 Age 16-29 Age 16-64 Age 16-25 Age 16-29 Age 16-64 19 99 to 2 00 2 Employed=1 -0. 448 -0. 200 -0. 030 -0. 379* -0. 165 -0.010 -0. 292+ -0. 176+ -0.004 (0. 242) (0.153) (0.044) (0. 163) (0.102) (0.038) (0. 142) (0. 091) (0.034) Observations 4142 7795 39374 4219 7907 40091 4321 8024 40535 Weekly Hours -17.032 -7.912 0.097 -19.216+ -6.913 -0.468 -10.778* -5.112 -1.474 (10.997) (7.548) (2.051) (10.316) (7.639) (2.233) (4.949) (3.525) (1.648) Observations 4073 7575 38300 4152 7748 38990 4198 7850 39421 Log weekly earnings -0.176 -0.104 -0.196** 0.052 0.107 -0.142* 0.144 0.235+ -0.096* (0.372) (0.245) (0.057) (0.243) (0.153) (0.067) (0.178) (0.131) (0.042) Observations 2997 5826 27468 3036 5933 27927 3064 6003 28250 19 99 to 2 00 4 Employed = 1 -0. 306+ 0. 044 -0. 013 -0. 149 0. 064 -0.027 -0. 167 -0.090 -0. 020 (0. 161) (0. 087) (0. 034) (0.112) (0.068) (0.028) (0. 101) (0. 060) (0.025) Observations 6136 11443 58250 6241 11592 59243 6314 11752 40709 Weekly Hours -15.865** -3.575 -1.07 -16.383* -5.124 -1.783+ -7.659* -2.537 -1.315 (5.699) (4.412) (1.085) (6.161) (5.082) (0.905) (2.874) (2.749) (0.947) Observations 6037 11128 56714 6148 11355 57672 6216 11501 58296 Log weekly earnings 0.024 0.069 -0.060+ 0.231 0.166 -0.090+ 0.257+ 0.214** -0.022 (0.122) (0.125) (0.034) (0.186) (0.111) (0.052) (0.142) (0.074) (0.024) Observations 4396 8468 40359 4457 8615 40996 4497 8713 41468 Notes: For earnings and hours worked models, robust standard errors clustered by repeated observations are shown in parentheses. Statistical Significance: + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. For employment-population ratio, the effects are difference-in-differences of probabilities predicted by probit models. The difference-in-differences effects were predicted for each individual separately. Standard errors shown in parentheses were calculated using the delta method. Explanatory variables were Muslim, 9-11 dummy variable, race and ethnicity, state, potential experience, potential experience-squared, educational attainment, citizenship, length of time in US, generation, and a cubic time trend. all explanatory variables were interacted with Muslim dummy (except race, citizenship, experience, cubic time trend and log of state per-capita income). 19 Table-3: Difference-in-differences effects on the Weekly Earnings of Immigrants from all Special Registration Countries Compared to Other Immigrants (Target Group C) Effects at shown at the 25th, 50th, 75th and the 90th Quantiles 1999 to 2002 1999 to 2004 Quantiles: 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.90 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.90 Age 16-25 Muslim*After 9-11 -0.501+ -0.003 0.038 0.218+ -0.011 -0.078 0.071 0.175+ (0.261) (0.173) (0.120) (0.114) (0.183) (0.127) (0.088) (0.094) Observations 3521 3521 3521 3521 5185 5185 5185 5185 Age 16-29 Muslim*After 9-11 -0.293 0.142+ 0.349** 0.034 -0.211 0.096+ 0.316** 0.147 (0.196) (0.079) (0.111) (0.136) (0.146) (0.055) (0.078) (0.101) Observations 6687 6687 6687 6687 9737 9737 9737 9737 Age 16-64 Muslim*After 9-11 -0.107 -0.097* -0.022 0.033 -0.054 -0.017 -0.015 0.013 (0.073) (0.048) (0.056) (0.060) (0.061) (0.042) (0.042) (0.048) Observations 30651 30651 30651 30651 45149 45149 45149 45149 Notes: Standard errors are shown in parentheses. Statistical Significance: + means significant at 10%; * means significant at 5%; ** means significant at 1%. For Unemployed and Out-of-Labor force individuals, log-earnings was assigned a value of zero. The effects of divisions, unemployment rates, state per-capita incomes, occupations and educational attainment were allowed to vary by the target group. Target Group C consists of 1st and 2nd generation immigrants from all but two Special Registration countries. Comparison Group 1 consists of 1st and 2nd generation immigrants excluding those from countries in Target Group C, Mexico, Central America, the Caribbean, Turkey, Malaysia, India, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria and “Other-Africa. 20 Table 4: Difference-in-Differences Estimates from Using the Months Between January-1998 and August 2001 with August 2000 as the Intervention Date Effects for Target Groups A, B and C compared to Other Immigrants Target Group A Target Group B Target Group C Age 16-25 Age 16-29 Age 16-64 Age 16-25 Age 16-29 Age 16-64 Age 16-25 Age 16-29 Age 16-64 Ja n. 1 99 8 to A ug . 2 00 1 Employment -0.074 0.01 -0.024 -0.051 0.042 -0.011 0.046 0.064 -0.014 (0.081) (0.042) (0.025) (0.082) (0.033) (0.027) (0.094) (0.040) (0.027) Observations 3872 7279 36660 3836 7190 36282 3775 7056 35675 Log weekly earnings -0.097 -0.113 0.045 0.031 -0.049 0.037 -0.096 -0.115 0.052 (0.080) (0.079) (0.029) (0.088) (0.055) (0.030) (0.073) (0.093) (0.038) Observations 2783 2783 25639 2760 5419 25360 2729 5337 24963 Weekly Hours Worked -3.242 1.131 -1.102 -1.747 2.908 -1.053 0.329 1.492 -1.716 (3.557) (2.095) (1.498) (3.698) (2.261) (1.658) (4.081) (2.598) (1.606) Observations 3793 7104 35593 3757 7017 35226 3698 6889 34652 Notes: Numbers show the difference-in-differences effects from the models with a pseudo 9-11 date. We took the monthly data from January 1998 through August 2001 and used September 1999 as the month after which the “Post 9-11” dummy was assigned a value of one. Models were run for target groups A, B and C and comparison group 1. Robust Standard errors clustered by repeated observations are in parentheses. Statistical Significance: + Significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% . Effects on Earnings and Hours worked were given by OLS regressions and effects on Employment were from probit models. None of the estimates are statistically significant. 21 Table 5: Relative Changes in the Labor Market Outcomes of Muslim Men Age 16 to 25 after Various Dates (Regression Adjusted Difference-in-differences effects and Standard Errors are shown) Mid-Eastern & Afghan men (Group A) Mid-Eastern, Afghan & African men (Group B) Men from All SR Countries (Group C) Dates EPOP Hours Worked Log Earnings EPOP Hours Worked Log Earnings EPOP Hours Worked Log Earnings Mar-01 0.041 0.650 -0.102 0.083 2.563 -0.131 0.030 1.932 -0.081 (0.101) (4.647) (0.176) (0.090) (3.935) (0.142) (0.080) (3.732) (0.157) Jun-01 -0.130 -8.242 0.117 -0.048 -5.113 0.008 -0.109 -5.368 0.094 (0.114) (5.367) (0.195) (0.090) (4.174) (0.160) (0.080) (3.909) (0.174) Sep-01 -0.267** -15.744* 0.187 -0.130 -7.362+ 0.257 -0.160+ -8.051** 0.257 (0.121) (5.639) (0.237) (0.100) (4.449) (0.171) (0.090) (4.059) (0.170) Dec-01 -0.263* -10.401** 0.328 -0.156+ -6.724+ 0.285+ -0.197** -8.815** 0.211 (0.099) (4.730) (0.201) (0.080) (3.829) (0.150) (0.080) (3.604) (0.151) Mar-02 -0.134 -8.629+ 0.351+ -0.050 -3.720 0.334** -0.104 -5.364 0.292** (0.108) (4.931) (0.189) (0.080) (3.648) (0.138) (0.070) (3.404) (0.137) Jun-02 -0.137 -6.698 0.339+ -0.045 -1.990 0.386* -0.116+ -5.097+ 0.290** (0.095) (4.185) (0.184) (0.070) (3.069) (0.134) (0.060) (2.861) (0.129) Sep-02 -0.122 -5.922 0.377** -0.021 -0.983 0.401* -0.069 -2.942 0.301** (0.090) (4.027) (0.171) (0.070) (2.917) (0.128) (0.060) (2.763) (0.124) Dec-02 0.000 -1.725 0.497* 0.052 1.517 0.359* -0.001 -0.802 0.274** (0.088) (3.881) (0.158) (0.070) (2.861) (0.124) (0.060) (2.683) (0.119) Mar-03 -0.037 -3.430 0.368** 0.034 0.683 0.277** 0.001 -0.965 0.222** (0.085) (3.747) (0.147) (0.070) (2.813) (0.108) (0.060) (2.657) (0.104) Notes: Each regression uses 6,149 observations. Robust standard errors clustered by repeated observations are shown in parentheses. A “+” denotes significance at 10%. A “*” denotes significance at 5%, and “**” denotes significance at 1%. Explanatory variables are potential experience, experience-squared, state-unemployment rates, cubic-time trend, state-level ratio of Muslim to non-Muslim populations and dummies for Muslim, After-9/11, races, states, education, citizenship status, length of stay and generation in the US. Explanatory variables were interacted with the Muslim dummy variable. Special Registration countries include Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Middle Eastern Arab countries, Iran, Libya, Morocco, North Africa and Pakistan. Comparison Group consists of 1st and 2nd generation immigrants excluding those from the Special Registration countries, Mexico Central America, the Caribbean, Turkey, Malaysia, India, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, and “Other-Africa”. 23 Appendix I: Target and Comparison Group Definitions Muslims: Immigrants from Muslim-majority countries. TARGET GROUPS: Target Group C (the Broad Group): 1st and 2nd generation immigrants from most Countries under Special Registration Program. (Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Middle Eastern Arab countries Iran, Libya, Morocco, North Africa and Pakistan.). Target Group B (the In-between Group): 1st and 2nd generation immigrants from Afghanistan, Middle Eastern Arab countries, Iran, Pakistan, Egypt and Morocco Target Group A (the Narrow Group): 1st and 2nd generation immigrants from Middle Eastern Arab countries, Iran and Afghanistan COMPARISON GROUPS: Comparison Group 1: 1st and 2nd generation immigrants excluding Target group C, Mexico, Central America, the Caribbean, Turkey, Malaysia, India, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria and “Other- Africa”. Comparison Group 2: All US-born men excluding Target group C. Comparison Group 3: All US-born non-Hispanic Whites excluding target group C. 24 Appendix II: Descriptive Statistics for 1st and 2nd Generation Immigrant Men Age 16 to 25 living in the US Target Groups: Immigrants from Muslim-Majority Countries. Comparison Group 1: Other Immigrants Variable Target Group A (Mid Eastern Arabs, Iranians, Afghan) Target Group. B (All Arabs, Iranians, Afghan, South Asians) Target Group. A (Men from all Special Registration Countries) Comparison Group 1 (Immigrants from Non-Muslim-majority Countries) Employment Jan. 99 to Sept. 01 69.1 62.2** 63.2** 75.86 Observations 68 127 163 2,784 Oct. 01 to Dec. 02 51.3** 49.1** 56.0** 74.7 Observations 37 55 75 1,253 Oct. 01 to Dec. 04 64.6** 62.5** 62.4** 74.02 Observations 113 160 197 3,168 Hours Worked per Week Jan. 99 to Sept. 01 28.8 25.6* 26.3+ 29.36647 Observations 67 124 160 2726 Oct. 01 to Dec. 02 20.4* 19.0** 21.5** 28.72358 Observations 36 54 73 1230 Oct. 01 to Dec. 04 24.9* 20.9** 23.6** 28.30831 Observations 111 157 194 3117 Real Weekly Earnings Jan. 99 to Sept. 01 244.8 246.9* 241.0 247.3703 Observations 52 81 100 2029 Oct. 01 to Dec. 02 222.1 251.1** 245.2503 251.6574 Observations 21 31 40 895 Oct. 01 to Dec. 04 214.6 230.8** 268.7** 240.6799 Observations 71 103 124 2244 Age 21.941 21.943 22.088 21.879 Spouse Present = 1 8.333** 8.755* 8.413* 13.364 Citizen = 1 64.583** 59.677 55.449 58.294 Education Categories Below High school = 1 17.361* 17.05* 15.87* 27.915 High school Diploma = 1 38.194 36.405 36.137 39.586 Some College = 1 20.834 22.12+ 22.563* 18.516 Bachelors' Degree = 1 12.847 15.207* 16.252* 10.657 Masters' or Above = 1 10.764* 9.217* 9.178* 3.326 Generation in USA 25 1st Generation = 1 52.778 57.834 61.951+ 53.093* 2nd Generation =1 47.222 42.166 38.049+ 46.907* 3rd Generation =1 Length of Stay in USA 0 to 5 years =1 17.709 21.199 23.71+ 17.573* 5 to 10 years = 1 15.625 17.973 21.224 16.64* 10+ years = 1 66.667 60.83 55.067** 65.788* Major Occupation Groups Managers and Administrators 4.238 4.928 6.265 3.985 Professional 10.169 11.884 12.048 9.556 Associate Prof. & technical 3.39 3.478 3.132 2.04 Clerical and Secretarial 12.288 12.754 11.807 9.771** Craft and related 17.373 15.942 17.109 21.272+ Personal and Protective 4.661 5.217 4.578+ 4.414 Sales 25* 22.898 21.205+ 10.94 Plant and Machine operatives 20.3* 20.29 21.2** 30.434** Other 2.5* 2.609 2.651 7.588 Major Industry Groups Agriculture & Fishing 0.847 0.58 0.723 1.718 Energy & Water 0 0 0.241 0.453 Manufacturing 8.1+ 7.826 7.711** 12.276* Construction 5.1* 4.927 4.819* 12.419* Distribution, Hotels & Restaurants 46.6* 44.348 43.855* 32.844* Transport & Communication 5.509 7.247 7.711 5.345** Banking, Finance & Insurance 13.56 16.522 16.627 15.45 Public admin, Education & Health 8.475 7.826 7.229 8.053 Other Services 11.864 10.724 11.084 11.441 Total Observations 280 423 511 9527 Notes: All variables except real weekly earning, hours worked per week and age are categorical. Means are shown for variables for each target and comparison group. Whenever difference between a target group’s outcome is statistical significant, the target group’s outcome is marked with asterisk(s): ** means significant at 1% level, * means significant at 5% level, + means significant at 10% level. 26 Appendix III: Relative Changes in the Labor Market Outcomes of Muslim Men Age 16 to 29 after Various Dates (Regression Adjusted Difference-in-differences effects and Standard Errors are shown) Mid-Eastern & Afghan Men (Group A) Mid-Eastern, Afghan & African Men (Group B) Men from All SR Countries (Group C) Dates EPOP Hours Worked Log Earnings EPOP Hours Worked Log Earnings EPOP Hours Worked Log Earnings Mar-01 0.069 3.802 0.046 0.024 2.876 -0.009 -0.044 0.489 0.070 (0.081) (4.027) (0.154) (0.060) (2.921) (0.117) (0.054) (2.702) (0.117) Jun-01 0.006 -0.004 0.121 -0.038 -0.384 0.072 -0.106+ -2.722 0.157 (0.088) (4.446) (0.176) (0.061) (3.028) (0.123) (0.056) (2.784) (0.122) Sep-01 -0.046 -4.064 -0.053 -0.062 -2.719 0.081 -0.096 -3.741 0.194 (0.099) (4.796) (0.172) (0.070) (3.277) (0.128) (0.063) (2.967) (0.122) Dec-01 -0.052 -1.947 -0.034 -0.084 -3.677 0.094 -0.081 -3.563 0.116 (0.087) (4.066) (0.164) (0.062) (3.017) (0.113) (0.057) (2.714) (0.105) Mar-02 -0.046 -2.868 0.015 -0.059 -3.195 0.136 -0.060 -3.016 0.164+ (0.080) (3.658) (0.147) (0.056) (2.648) (0.099) (0.051) (2.391) (0.092) Jun-02 -0.016 -0.511 0.016 -0.027 -0.657 0.140 -0.043 -1.658 0.117 (0.074) (3.300) (0.132) (0.053) (2.398) (0.094) (0.047) (2.138) (0.084) Sep-02 -0.027 -0.874 0.072 -0.016 0.106 0.162+ -0.018 -0.225 0.123 (0.068) (3.109) (0.124) (0.049) (2.238) (0.092) (0.044) (2.001) (0.082) Dec-02 0.039 0.641 0.134 0.017 0.537 0.148 0.003 -0.363 0.089 (0.066) (3.046) (0.123) (0.049) (2.257) (0.095) (0.043) (1.987) (0.086) Mar-03 0.036 1.016 0.056 0.022 0.631 0.080 0.005 -0.364 0.053 (0.063) (2.945) (0.125) (0.048) (2.297) (0.096) (0.043) (2.018) (0.088) Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by repeated observations are shown in parentheses. A “+” denotes significance at 10%. A “*” denotes significance at 5%, and “**” denotes significance at 1%. Explanatory variables are potential experience, experience-squared, state-unemployment rates, cubic-time trend, state-level ratio of Muslim to non-Muslim populations and dummies for Muslim, After-9/11, races, states, education, citizenship status, length of stay and generation in the US. Explanatory variables were interacted with the Muslim dummy variable. Special Registration countries include Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Middle Eastern Arab countries, Iran, Libya, Morocco, North Africa and Pakistan. Comparison Group consists of 1st and 2nd generation immigrants excluding those from the Special Registration countries, Mexico Central America, the Caribbean, Turkey, Malaysia, India, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, and “Other- Africa”. 27 Appendix IV: Relative Changes in the Labor Market Outcomes of Muslim Men Age 16 to 64 after Various Dates (Regression Adjusted Difference-in-differences effects and Standard Errors are shown) Mid-Eastern & Afghan Men (Group A) Mid-Eastern, Afghan & African men (Group B) Men from All SR Countries (Group C) Dates EPOP Hours Worked Log Earnings EPOP Hours Worked Log Earnings EPOP Hours Worked Log Earnings Mar-01 -0.004 0.242 0.011 -0.01 -0.114 -0.005 -0.027 -0.929 0.014 (0.029) (1.615) (0.064) (0.023) (1.278) (0.053) (0.021) (1.168) (0.049) Jun-01 -0.026 -0.226 0.026 -0.034 -0.665 0.012 -0.041+ -1.253 0.021 (0.033) (1.814) (0.070) (0.027) (1.458) (0.058) (0.024) (1.302) (0.053) Sep-01 -0.004 -1.057 -0.113 -0.02 -1.375 -0.07 -0.016 -1.284 -0.047 (0.035) (1.867) (0.073) (0.028) (1.503) (0.060) (0.025) (1.344) (0.056) Dec-01 -0.032 -1.376 -0.089 -0.050** -2.718** -0.07 -0.036+ -2.233+ -0.082+ (0.029) (1.575) (0.066) (0.024) (1.316) (0.052) (0.021) (1.172) (0.048) Mar-02 0.007 0.403 -0.045 -0.009 -0.584 -0.031 -0.007 -0.654 -0.031 (0.026) (1.398) (0.062) (0.021) (1.160) (0.048) (0.019) (1.032) (0.043) Jun-02 0.008 0.313 -0.052 -0.005 -0.165 -0.045 -0.009 -0.503 -0.054 (0.024) (1.295) (0.054) (0.020) (1.064) (0.044) (0.018) (0.942) (0.039) Sep-02 0.014 0.397 -0.043 -0.002 -0.132 -0.015 -0.001 -0.26 -0.039 (0.023) (1.260) (0.052) (0.019) (1.031) (0.041) (0.017) (0.919) (0.037) Dec-02 0.02 0.597 -0.019 0.007 0.146 -0.001 0.004 -0.052 -0.024 (0.022) (1.196) (0.050) (0.018) (1.000) (0.041) (0.016) (0.893) (0.037) Mar-03 0.034 1.389 -0.007 0.014 0.533 0.003 0.014 0.535 -0.015 (0.021) (1.123) (0.057) (0.017) (0.952) (0.045) (0.016) (0.862) (0.039) Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by repeated observations are shown in parentheses. A “+” denotes significance at 10%. A “*” denotes significance at 5%, and “**” denotes significance at 1%. Explanatory variables are potential experience, experience-squared, state-unemployment rates, cubic-time trend, state-level ratio of Muslim to non-Muslim populations and dummies for Muslim, After-9/11, races, states, education, citizenship status, length of stay and generation in the US. Explanatory variables were interacted with the Muslim dummy variable. Special Registration countries include Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Middle Eastern Arab countries, Iran, Libya, Morocco, North Africa and Pakistan. Comparison Group consists of 1st and 2nd generation immigrants excluding those from the Special Registration countries, Mexico Central America, the Caribbean, Turkey, Malaysia, India, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, and “Other-Africa”. 28 ENDNOTES 1 The increase in reported incidences may exaggerate the increase in actual incidents for two reasons. First, reporting might have increased because CAIR’s online reporting system became more familiar to Muslims after 9/11. Second, CAIR counts all hate-crime and discrimination reports, verified and not verified. 2 According to US Equal Opportunity Commission (Washington, DC 20507) between 9/11/2001 and 12/11/2002, 705 charges were filed under Title VII with Process Type Z. - CAIR Annual Report 2002. For additional background, see for example, Baker et. Al (2003), Braakman (2007a, 2007b) Human Rights Watch (2002), Leonard (2003), Lindkvist (2002), Moore (2002), Shryock (2002) Suleiman (1999) and U.S. Census Bureau (2003). 3 Lawyers Committee for Human Rights (www.lchr.org); September 2003 Report. “Assessing the New Normal: Liberty and Security of the Post-September 11 United States”. Also see, Hate Crime Report (2001). 4 On November 6, 2002, a Federal Register Notice was issued. “Call-In” Requirements for Special Registration for Males form specific countries. It was a system that would let the US government keep track of non-immigrants that come to the U.S. Any affected individual failing to follow these requirements was subject to lose his immigration status. Approximately 35 million non-immigrants were required to register with immigration authorities either at a port of entry or a designated immigration office in accordance with the special registration procedures. These special procedures also require additional in-person interviews at an immigration office and notifications to immigration authorities of changes of address, employment, or school. Non-immigrants who were to follow these special procedures would also have to use specially designated ports when they left USA and report in person to an immigration officer at the port on their departure date. Non-immigrant adult males from the following countries were called in for the program: Iran, Iraq, Libya, Sudan and Syria, Afghanistan, Algeria, Bahrain, Eritrea, Lebanon, Morocco, North Korea, Oman, Qatar, Somalia, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Jordan and Kuwait. 5 Using quantile earnings regressions Dávila and Mora show that the difference in earnings between Muslims and non-Muslims widened at all earnings deciles during 2002 relative to deciles in 2000. Their results from a Juhn, Murphy and Pierce decomposition reveal that the unexplained earning gaps increased in 2002 for Middle Eastern men. Unexpectedly, they find that earnings improved for African Arab men compared to non-Hispanic Whites. Their study also indicates that the decrease in earnings for Muslims was bigger in states with larger Muslim populations (i.e. in states where Muslims are more noticeable). They find that the earnings gap between Middle Eastern Arab men and non-Hispanic White men widened by about 35 percentage points and for men from Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan the gap increased by about 29 percentage points in 2002. 6 Kaestner et al. (2007) regress “earnings” for employed individuals. For their “hours-worked” regressions, they include all individuals setting hours equal to zero for men who were not employed. We do the same in the OLS regressions but for the quantile earning regressions, we include all men assigning log of earnings equal to zero if not employed. This is done to avoid the sample selection bias occurring in the mean regression. 7 The recession that began in March 2001 is potentially one such confounding factor. Estimation of the pre- and post-9/11 changes in outcome using only the target-group (i.e. Muslims) sample may generate a negative coefficient simply because of the business-cycle downturn. 8 To control for industry of work, 9 major industry dummy variables were used. To control for occupations we constructed ten major occupation groups. However, we use “percentage of group members working in the respective occupation” to control for occupational variations instead of using occupation dummies. Exclusion of this variable does not significantly affect the difference in differences effect. 9 We follow the specifications of Kaestner et al. (2004) here. We find coefficients of the time-trend variables always negligible and statistically insignificant. Models with month dummy variables yielded similar results. 10 In the case of probit, the interaction effect is estimated by taking the average of difference-in-differences of the predicted probabilities. 11 Kaestner et al. allowed the effect of September 11th to differ according to an index of hate crime/discrimination against Arabs and Muslims. They used three measures of September 11th related hate crime or discrimination: 29 number of hate crime/discrimination incidents reported in a state; number of hate crime/discrimination incidents per Arab population in a state; and number of hate crime/discrimination incidents per state population. While the first two capture the risk of discrimination Arabs and Muslims face in a state, the third is an indicator of the prevalence of prejudice among the non-Arab population. Prior to October 2001, value of hate-crime index was assumed to be zero in all states. They estimated the results using all three indices and found the effects of all of them to be statistically insignificant. Due to the insignificant effects and the limited nature of the data, we do not include the indices in the analyses. 12 There has been no study on whether the 1st generation immigrants were affected more than the 2nd-generation immigrants. Anti-terrorism laws and programs targeted primarily those 1st generation immigrants who are not US citizens, especially those who are not residing or working legally in the US. A fraction of the 1st generation immigrants in the CPS datasets should be illegal immigrants. Demographic research suggests that at least a fraction of the illegal immigrants are in the CPS since the number of immigrants enumerated by the survey (and by the decennial Census, upon which the CPS weights are based) exceeds estimates of the number of the foreign-born legally present in the U.S. 13 Allen and Nielsen (2002) find that after 9/11, the single most predominant factor in determining who was to be a victim of an attack or infringement was their visual identity as a Muslim. This was found to be the case across reports from all 15 EU member states. Also, there were seven reported cases of murders of Sikh men between September 2001 and February 2005. Sikhism is a religion, which in no way is affiliated to Islam. All of the cases appear to be hate-crimes. Details can be found here: http://www.sikhcoalition.org/ListReports.asp 14 Detroit Arab American Study-2003, University of Michigan; ICPSR Study No.: 4413; CAIR Annual Reports on Civil Rights Violations. 15 Non-immigrant adult males from the following countries were called in for the special registration program: Iran, Iraq, Libya, Sudan, Syria, Afghanistan, Algeria, Bahrain, Eritrea, Lebanon, Morocco, North Korea, Oman, Qatar, Somalia, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, Yemen, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Jordan and Kuwait. The CPS-MORG files do not separately identify Algeria, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Tunisia and Eritrea. But they identify immigrants from North Africa, which consists of Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia and Western Sahara. 16 The “Rest of Africa” which includes Somalia and Eritrea is dropped from the data. This is done to make sure that none of the comparison groups contains immigrants from the special registration program. 17 Algeria, Libya and Tunisia cannot be identified separately but they are geographically included in North Africa. Most North African countries excluding Sudan were under the special registration list. Inclusion of North Africa might have created some contamination in Target group C. For Target group B, we dropped North Africa. 18 The 2005 CAIR report shows that there were over 1500 alleged incidents of civil-rights violations against Muslims. 198 of them were reported as employment discrimination. Most of the victims in CAIR (2002 and 2005) and ADC (2003) reports had Arab, Afghanistan or Pakistani nativity. In its 2003 report, ADC (American-Arab Anti- discrimination Committee) mentions 800 cases and summarizes 101 cases of employment discrimination. None of the summary cases of employment discrimination were about Indian natives. 19 Kaestner et al. included 20 states in their study. We excluded two of those states to keep number of younger Muslims reasonably large in each state. 20 Immigrants from Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean are excluded because their educational achievement and language proficiency is not similar to other immigrants. Besides, a recent study (Orrenius and Zavodni, 2005) found that the relatively new immigrants from Mexico experienced a small drop in earnings after 9- 11. 21 Turkey and Malaysia were not listed under the special registration program but are Muslim-Majority country. None of the excluded African countries were enlisted for special registration but they have significant Muslim population and they are close to immigrants from Egypt and Morocco in terms of nativity and ethnicity. 30 22 Descriptive statistics for men age 16 to 64 are available upon request for all ages, around 85% of the observations in the target groups are 1st generation immigrants whereas only 64% of the members of comparison group 1 are 1st generation immigrants. On the other hand, in the youngest age group (ages 16 to 25) the distributions of 1st and 2nd generation are similar between target groups and comparison group 1 (around 60% are 1st generation immigrants). Special registration and other similar legal requirements ensuing from 9/11 were targeted towards the first generation immigrants. If legal rigidities have had negative impacts on some group of workers (conditioning for other factors), one should find negative outcomes for the older Muslims (age 26 and up), as most of them are 1st generation immigrants. 23 They are available upon request. 24 For the employment regressions, the difference-in-differences of employment-ratio was predicted for each observation separately and the mean of all the difference-in-differences is reported for each age-range under each target group in table 3. Standard errors were estimated for each prediction and the mean of those standard errors is shown in parentheses. 25 The quantile regression results for the in-between group and the narrow group are available from the authors on request. 26 Notice that the second set of months should start sufficiently long after 9-11, i.e. after the effect of the event dissipates. 27 The results for the post-9/11 time window, i.e. the second set of months are available from the authors on request. 28 We used nine intervention dates for the 1999-2002 time window. September 2001 and January 2002 interventions yield the largest relative drops in the employment of the youngest members of the target groups. The drops are around 30 to 35 percentage points and are statistically significant. If is worth mentioning here that for the narrow target group, the unadjusted regressions show nearly 14 to 18 percentage-point relative drops in employment after 9- 11 for this shorter time-window. We used a shorter time-window, 1999 through 2002. Intervention dates close to 9- 11 yield bigger employment effects for 16 to 25 year old Muslims 29 Results available from authors on request. 30 Regression estimates from using US-born men as comparison groups are available from the author on request. In regressions that included comparison groups 2 and 3, we drop citizenship status and length of stay variables to avoid multicollinearity problem. 
work_xqbhfxzadjeyboutbnoiibymb4	----	NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES DIVIDED WE STAY HOME: SOCIAL DISTANCING AND ETHNIC DIVERSITY Georgy Egorov Ruben Enikolopov Alexey Makarin Maria Petrova Working Paper 27277 http://www.nber.org/papers/w27277 NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138 May 2020 We are grateful to Nadezhda Belyakova for excellent research assistance. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research. NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peer-reviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official NBER publications. © 2020 by Georgy Egorov, Ruben Enikolopov, Alexey Makarin, and Maria Petrova. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice, is given to the source. Divided We Stay Home: Social Distancing and Ethnic Diversity Georgy Egorov, Ruben Enikolopov, Alexey Makarin, and Maria Petrova NBER Working Paper No. 27277 May 2020 JEL No. D64,D74,I12 ABSTRACT Voluntary social distancing plays a vital role in containing the spread of the disease during a pandemic. As a public good, it should be more commonplace in more homogeneous and altruistic societies. However, for healthy people, observing social distancing has private benefits, too. If sick individuals are more likely to stay home, healthy ones have fewer incentives to do so, especially if the asymptomatic transmission is perceived to be unlikely. Theoretically, we show that this interplay may lead to a stricter observance of social distancing in more diverse and less altruistic societies. Empirically, we find that, consistent with the model, the reduction in mobility following the first local case of COVID-19 was stronger in Russian cities with higher ethnic fractionalization and cities with higher levels of xenophobia. For identification, we predict the timing of the first case using pre-existing patterns of internal migration to Moscow. Using SafeGraph data on mobility patterns, we confirm that mobility reduction in the United States was also higher in counties with higher ethnic fractionalization. Our findings highlight the importance of strategic incentives of different population groups for the effectiveness of public policy. Georgy Egorov Kellogg School of Management Northwestern University 2211 Campus Drive Evanston, IL 60208 and NBER g-egorov@kellogg.northwestern.edu Ruben Enikolopov New Economic School Skolkovskoe shosse 45 Moscow, Russia ruben.enikolopov@upf.edu Alexey Makarin Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF) Via Sallustiana, 62 Rome 00187 Italy alexey.makarin@eief.it Maria Petrova Barcelona Institute of Political Economy and Governance Ramon Trias Fargas 25-27 Barcelona 08005 Spain petrova.ma@gmail.com 1 Introduction Prosocial behavior may become commonplace in society either through government regulation or through voluntary adherence to social norms. Social distancing and self-isolation during a pan- demic is one example of such prosocial behavior, as it plays a key role in slowing down the spread of the infection. During the COVID-19 pandemic, governments in almost all affected countries imposed restrictions aimed at promoting social distancing. However, enforcement of these restric- tions is very costly, both logistically and politically. Thus, the effectiveness of these measures, to a large extent, depends on voluntary observance of social distancing by the population. Gen- erally, informal social norms are more difficult to sustain in ethnically diverse societies (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2000; Algan et al., 2016; Goette et al., 2006; Miguel and Gugerty, 2005; Putnam, 2007). This paper challenges this conventional wisdom by showing that ethnic diversity increased socially beneficial behavior during the COVID-19 pandemic in Russia and the United States, and proposes a theoretical mechanism to explain these findings. We start with a simple observation: at least in the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, most people considered themselves healthy. This could be because they had not traveled abroad, had not contacted the ones who had the disease, remembered early suggestions that human-to-human transmission was unlikely, or showed no symptoms. For such individuals, the decision to stay home is driven more by the fear of getting infected than by the desire to avoid infecting others. The like- lihood of getting infected is higher if sick people cannot be expected to self-isolate, which, in turn, depends on their prosocial considerations. If people are subject to out-group biases and care less about people from other groups, then the sick are less likely to engage in social distancing in more diverse places. This makes people who consider themselves healthy more likely to self-isolate. Since healthy people constitute a majority, at least at the early stages of the pandemic, we expect to see more social distancing in more diverse societies. Generally speaking, in these circumstances, the private benefits of those who consider themselves healthy are aligned with social objectives. In this paper, we formalize this argument and provide the causal evidence on the differential decline of social distancing in ethnic diversity in Russia and the United States. We develop a model where people can belong to one of two ethnic groups and have one of the following health statuses: they can be sick, healthy, or asymptomatic carriers. Sick people know they are sick, which means they cannot be infected, and the only reason to self-isolate is their concern for other members of the community. Healthy and asymptomatic carriers do not know whether they are infected, and their reasons to self-isolate are twofold. First, they may be healthy, and self-isolation allows them to remain healthy. Second, if they are asymptomatic carriers and believe they can transmit the disease, they may have altruistic reasons to self-isolate. Suppose that asymptomatic transmission is being underestimated or dismissed. Then in a more diverse 1 society, where sick individuals care less about others and are therefore less likely to self-isolate, the decision of healthy and asymptomatic individuals will be driven by private benefits, which will induce them to self-isolate, given that the sick fail to do so. As long as most people are healthy, which is likely the case at the beginning of the pandemic, more ethnically diverse places should exhibit more compliance with self-isolation. In contrast, if asymptomatic transmission is known to be the main risk, then prosocial incentives of the healthy (and asymptomatic carriers) determine overall compliance with social distancing. In this case, smaller tolerance to out-group members, implied by high fractionalization, should decrease social distancing. Our main empirical hypothesis is that, once the pandemic starts and the threat of getting infected becomes real, people will be more likely to minimize their day-to-day movements in places with higher ethnic diversity. To identify the effect in the Russian data, we rely on a discontinuous jump in the perceived threat of getting infected after the first case of COVID-19 in a given locality is reported.1 However, the timing of the official reporting of the first local case is potentially endogenous. It may be affected by the quality of the medical system (e.g., its capacity to diagnose) or by the officials’ willingness to publicly admit the problem, both of which can have implications for the citizens’ decision to observe social distancing.2 To deal with this potential endogeneity problem, we use the fact that pre-existing internal migration patterns predict travel flows in 2020. Therefore, how soon the virus spreads to different locations can be predicted by internal migration (Valsecchi, 2020; Mikhailova and Valsecchi, 2020). In Russia, the coronavirus spread primarily from Moscow, which methodologically allows us to use two-stage least squares. First, to predict the timing of the first case, we relate it to internal migration flows to Moscow. Next, following the literature on migration in labor economics (e.g., Altonji and Card, 1991; Card, 2001), we use a shift-share instrument for internal migration. In particular, we combine the data on migration from a given region to Moscow during the 1990s with the nationwide domestic out-migration from that region in more recent years (2015–2018) to instrument for more recent migration flows to Moscow. We then predict the timing of the first local case using the instrumented migration flows from a given region to Moscow. Finally, we use the timing of the first predicted coronavirus case in the region in a difference-in-differences framework, comparing people’s behavior before and after the predicted discovery of the first case in places with different levels of ethnic diversity. Note that internal migration to other large cities does not significantly explain the timing of the first COVID-19 case in a region, consistent with the disproportionately high penetration of the virus in Moscow.3 1E.g., Barrios and Hochberg (2020) document a significant increase in COVID-19 Google searches on the day of the announcement and the following day in the U.S. 2The virus was also more likely to hit more densely populated and economically developed places first: see, e.g., www.nytimes.com/2020/03/23/nyregion/coronavirus-nyc-crowds-density.html. 3Moscow has had more than 50% of all reported cases in Russia, see Figure 4. 2 www.nytimes.com/2020/03/23/nyregion/coronavirus-nyc-crowds-density.html We use the data on people’s movements in Russia provided by the largest Russian technology company Yandex, which tracks individuals’ cell phones that use its mobile apps.4 We find that people are more likely to engage in social distancing after the first local COVID-19 case report in more ethnically diverse places. Numerically, we find that a one standard deviation increase in ethnic fractionalization can explain 5.7% of mobility reduction after the first case report. This magnitude corresponds to 4.7% of the average weekday-weekend gap in mobility. Importantly, these magnitudes do not change much after controlling for the introduction of mobility restrictions by the government. To provide additional evidence on the mechanisms behind our findings, we test another predic- tion of the model, which is that intolerance between different ethnic groups may have an additional distancing effect on top of ethnic diversity. To measure ethnic tensions, we use data on xenophobic online searches and the number of ethnic hate crimes in a city in the recent years. The results confirm that the reduction in mobility after the first reported case is stronger in places with a higher number of xenophobic searches, as well as in places with a higher number of hate crimes, even taking ethnic fractionalization into account. The magnitudes imply that the additional reduction in mobility in places with one standard deviation higher xenophobia accounts for 2.2% of the average mobility reduction after the first report or, alternatively, 1.8% of weekday-weekend gap in an av- erage locality. Similarly, the additional mobility reduction for places with one standard deviation more ethnic hate crimes accounts for 2.8% of the average mobility reduction after the first report or, alternatively, 2.3% of weekday-weekend gap for an average locality. These reductions are on top of the differential decline by ethnic fractionalization documented earlier. To ensure that our results are not specific to Russia, we further investigate whether similar effects are observed in the United States. Since the epidemics in the U.S. started in several different locations, we lack a similar source of variation in the timing of the spread of the virus. Thus, we rely on a standard difference-in-differences approach and compare the behavior of people before and after the actual discovery of the first case, in places with different levels of ethnic diversity. Using data on mobile devices from SafeGraph at the county level,5 we show that the reduction in mobility in the U.S. following the report on the first case in the state is indeed stronger in more ethnically fractionalized counties. The magnitudes imply that a one standard deviation increase in ethnic fractionalization is associated with a 0.46 percentage point larger increase in the share of people staying home. Put differently, the difference between the counties with highest and the lowest fractionalization can explain 6.1% of average mobility reduction after the discovery of the 4The company offers many diverse products to its customers and claims to be the Russian Google, Amazon, Uber, and Spotify at the same time (https://www.datacenterdynamics.com/en/analysis/cloud-russia/). Its mo- bile apps include a web browser, a search engine, a map app, a traffic monitoring app, an Uber-type service (Yandex bought the Russian branch of Uber), a mobile payment app, and many others. Its website was the most visited in Russia as of March 2020 (https://www.similarweb.com/top-websites/russian-federation). 5https://www.safegraph.com/dashboard/covid19-commerce-patterns 3 https://www.datacenterdynamics.com/en/analysis/cloud-russia/ https://www.similarweb.com/top-websites/russian-federation https://www.safegraph.com/dashboard/covid19-commerce-patterns first case or, alternatively, 8.2% of the weekday-weekend gap for an average locality. These findings are entirely consistent with the results that we get in the Russian case. To put our estimates in a perspective, we produce a back-of-the-envelope calculation of how many lives might have been saved by a stronger social distancing response in communities with higher levels of diversity. For our calculations, we rely on two estimates of the effect of social distancing on the eventual number of COVID-19 deaths: one coming from a mainstream epidemi- ological model by Walker et al. (2020) and one from the local average treatment effect estimated by Kapoor et al. (2020) based on a rainfall IV strategy. We consider the elasticity produced by Walker et al. (2020) as an upper bound, as they take into account all potential future deaths from the disease that evolves according to their model. In contrast, we consider the elasticities in Kapoor et al. (2020) as the lower bound, as they study a temporary reduction in social distancing on one particular weekend and because they only take into account data available by the time of writing that article. Based on these two studies, we calculate that a one standard deviation increase in eth- nic fractionalization is associated with a range from 570 to 22,250 fewer deaths in Russia and from 2,000 to 40,000 fewer deaths in the United States. Our paper contributes to the literature on the role of voluntary adherence to social norms in establishing order in a society (Ostrom, 1990; Ellickson, 1994). Cooperation based on other- regarding preferences plays a vital role in sustaining informal institutions and social norms, which greatly enhance the possibilities of collective action (Fehr and Gächter, 2000). A vast existing literature suggests the informal social norms are more difficult to maintain in ethnically diverse societies (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2000; Miguel and Gugerty, 2005; Goette et al., 2006; Putnam, 2007; Algan et al., 2016). Our paper shows that, in contrast with this conventional wisdom, vol- untary social distancing during the pandemic may be higher in more diverse places, due to the co-existence of both public and private benefits from the prosocial action. The paper also relates to the literature on the impact of diversity on development outcomes. Ethnic diversity is often found to be detrimental for outcomes such as economic growth (Easterly and Levine, 1997; Alesina and Ferrara, 2005), public good provision (Alesina et al., 1999), and civil conflicts (Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005; Rohner et al., 2013; Arbatli et al., 2020).6 However, in recent years there was some evidence that diversity can also be beneficial for productivity (Ot- taviano and Peri, 2006; Peri, 2012), innovation (Lee, 2015), and economic development (Alesina et al., 2016; Ager and Brueckner, 2018; Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2020). Governments often blame ethnic cleavages for preventing them from reaching their policy goals. In this paper, we show that group heterogeneity can help governments reach their policy goal of imposing social distancing through better individual adherence to this behavior. 6Inter-group tensions induced by conflict are also found to decrease inter-ethnic team performance (Hjort, 2014) and inter-group trade (Korovkin and Makarin, 2019). 4 Finally, we also contribute to the emerging literature on the determinants of social distanc- ing and compliance with stay-at-home orders during the COVID-19 pandemic. This literature is mostly based on a difference-in-differences analysis with social distancing as a function of stay-at- home orders and some third variable. For instance, focusing on the United States, several studies independently find that Republican-leaning counties are less compliant with social distancing rec- ommendations and quarantine orders (Andersen, 2020; Allcott et al., 2020; Barrios and Hochberg, 2020; Engle et al., 2020; Painter and Qiu, 2020; Wright et al., 2020). Other factors that were found predictive of lower compliance with social distancing include local infection rates and older pop- ulation (Engle et al., 2020), poverty (Wright et al., 2020), as well as higher trust in science and higher education levels (Brzezinski et al., 2020). However, given that both stay-at-home measures and coronavirus spread are unlikely to be random, identification remains an important concern. The counterfactual is not observed: due to the unprecedented nature of the crisis, it is not clear what the trends in people’s behavior would be in this new, unusual situation that has not been experienced in the last 100 years. On top of that, policies and the spread of the virus could depend on the dynamics of capacity of the healthcare system and testing policies. In contrast to this literature, we rely on the fact that, in Russia, the virus mostly spread from a single location, and we thus improve on the identification by using pre-existing patterns of internal migration as an instrument. GE: removed "variable" - it’s not one variable. The literature also studies the impact of persuasion on people’s mobility. For example, Simonov et al. (2020) and Ananyev et al. (2020) independently show that higher Fox News viewership led to a significantly lower propensity to stay at home during the pandemic. Bursztyn et al. (2020) show that, even conditional on viewing Fox News, watching TV hosts that were more concerned about COVID-19 (Tucker Carlson) led to fewer coronavirus cases and deaths. Finally, there is mixed evidence of the effect of social capital and trust on social distancing. While Borgonovi and Andrieu (2020) and Durante et al. (2020) document evidence of a larger drop in social mobility in areas with higher social capital in the U.S. and Italy, respectively, Doganoglu and Ozdenoren (2020) provide cross-country evidence that generalized trust is associated with less social distancing. We contribute to these studies by providing evidence that social diversity is an important determinant of voluntary compliance with social distancing norms in a pandemic. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains some background information about Russia and its response to COVID-19. Section 3 presents a theoretical model and discusses its implications. Section 4 then presents our empirical strategy, while Section 5 discusses our data. We present our main results in Section 6 and additional results in Section 7. In Section 8, we show that our main results hold in the case of the U.S. as well. We discuss the implications of our results in Section 9. Section 10 concludes. 5 2 Background Starting in early January 2020, the world has been hit with one of the biggest pandemics in history—the COVID-19 pandemic. After an initial period when the virus originated and spread mostly in China, the novel coronavirus started to spread through the rest of the world. In the Western world, the pandemic first broke out in Italy in late February-early March 2020 and then spread in the rest of Europe, and them shortly to the United States and Russia. As of May 2020, these two countries have the largest numbers of detected COVID-19 cases. In Russia, travel restrictions from China were imposed starting January 31, 2020, and the virus did not begin to spread until it was brought from Italy in early March. Moscow became the main epicenter of the pandemic, and other Russian regions typically got the disease from people arriving from Moscow. Despite the preponderance of international news and evidence, Russian citizens were generally skeptical of the coronavirus threat and did not trust the media and the government with the information about the pandemic. Thus, discovery of regional COVID-19 cases played a big role in informing the local population of the reality and severity of the virus.7 Although commonly perceived as relatively ethnically homogeneous, Russia is a multi-national country and home to dozens of ethnic minorities. According to the 2010 Census, ethnic minorities comprise 19.1% of the Russian population. Moreover, there is plenty of regional heterogeneity in ethnic composition. For instance, Yaroslavl and Novgorod oblasts are relatively homogeneous and have 96% and 93% of Russians, respectively. At the same time, the Republic of Tatarstan is a highly ethnically heterogeneous with 115 different ethnicities, a Tatar majority (53.2%) but a sizeable Russian minority (39.7%). 3 Theoretical Framework 3.1 Setup Consider a simple one-period model. The society is a unit continuum of individuals G and it consists of two ethnic groups G1 (share g1 ∈ ( 0, 12 ] ) and G2 (share g2 = 1−g1). In the beginning of the game, each individual may be either healthy (subset H), sick (subset S), or an asymptomatic carrier (subset C). These states are mutually exclusive, and the shares of healthy (h), sick (s), and carrier (c) individuals are all positive and sum to 1; furthermore, we assume that health status is independent of ethnicity. We will denote infected people as I = CtS and individuals that do not 7A survey revealed that 60% of Russians trust information about the coronavirus from the doctors they personally know, while only 8% trust the information coming from the Russian Ministry of Health (https://www.rbc.ru/ society/17/04/2020/5e998b669a794768d09da79e). 6 https://www.rbc.ru/society/17/04/2020/5e998b669a794768d09da79e https://www.rbc.ru/society/17/04/2020/5e998b669a794768d09da79e exhibit symptoms as N = H tC. In other words, G = Group1 tGroup2 = No symptoms︷ ︸︸ ︷ HealthytCarrierHealthytCarriertSick︸ ︷︷ ︸ In f ected . Individuals observe whether or not they are sick, i.e., i knows if i ∈ S or i ∈ N. However, if they do not exhibit symptoms (i ∈ N), they do not know if they are healthy (i ∈ H) or are asymptomatic carriers (i ∈C). With this information in hand, all individuals make, simultaneously and indepen- dently, a binary decision di ∈{0,1}, where 1 is interpreted as self-isolation and 0 as refusal to do so (i.e., going out). Self-isolation does not produce any direct costs or benefits. Going out has a direct benefit bi; we assume that bi ∼ U [0,WN] if i ∈ N and bi ∼ U [0,WS] if i ∈ S (and it is independent from ethnicity). It might be natural to think that WS ≤WN , as sick individuals may have a less de- sire to go out, but nothing substantive changes in the model if we assume WS = WN = W . The cost of going out depends on one’s health status. A healthy person may become infected, and anyone who is infected in the end of the period gets disutility −L (where L > 0). An infected person might infect someone else, leading to a psychological cost M > 0 per each healthy person infected as long as this person is from the same ethnic group; the cost of infecting an outgroup person is tM, where t ∈ [0,1] captures tolerance towards individuals from the other ethnic group (i.e., lack of a negative out-group bias). Consider the following simplified model of interactions during a pandemic. Suppose that all individuals are matched in pairs, and let m(i) denote the match of individual i. Assume that if everyone goes out, then each i would come into close proximity of exactly one other person, their match m(i). If one or both of two matched individuals decide to stay home, there is no transmis- sion of the infection between them, and the same is true if both are healthy or both are infected (regardless if they are carriers or are sick). If one is healthy and the other is infected, the healthy one becomes infected with probability q if the infected person is sick and r if the infected person is a carrier.8 Naturally, r > 0 reflects the possibility of asymptomatic transmission. When deciding whether to self-isolate or not, individuals do not know who they are matched with, but know the distribution of types. Thus, individuals that show no symptoms (i ∈ N) choose 8The probability of getting infected is thus proportional to the mass of infected individuals who go out, weighted by their contagiousness. In practice, this relationship may be more complex. For example, it may be concave because of the possibility of getting infected by multiple individuals, or it might be convex, for example, because close interactions are easier to avoid when few sick people are out. We adopt the simple proportionality assumption for simplicity. 7 di to maximize their expected utility: UN =− c h + c L + bi1di=0 − h h + c ( q1m(i)∈S + r1m(i)∈C ) L1di=dm(i)=0 − c h + c r1m(i)∈S ( M1G(i)=G(m(i)) + tM1G(i)6=G(m(i)) ) 1di=dmi =0, (1) while sick individuals (i ∈ S) maximize US =−L + bi1di=0 −q1m(i)∈h ( M1G(i)=G(m(i)) + tM1G(i)6=G(m(i)) ) 1di=dm(i)=0. (2) We are interested in Perfect Bayesian equilibria of this game. To focus on the interesting case, we maintain the following assumption. Assumption 1. WN < qL and WS > qM. This first part of the condition is satisfied if the disutility of getting infected L is high enough. Specifically, it states that if a healthy person were certain to encounter a sick individual (and thus get infected with probability q), this person would prefer to stay home. The second condition suggests that altruism M is not too high. This condition means that at least some sick individuals (those with bi sufficiently high) would go out even if they were certain to encounter a healthy individual. If this condition were to fail, altruism would keep all sick individuals at home at least when most people are healthy. This upper boundary on M also happens to be sufficient (though not necessary) to guarantee existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium. 3.2 Analysis A Perfect Bayesian equilibrium of this game is characterized by four cutoffs, βN1,βN2 ∈ [0,WN] and βS1,βS2 ∈ [0,WS], such that individual i with health status j ∈{N,S} from ethnic group Gk, k ∈{1,2}, self-isolates if bi < β jk and goes out if bi > β jk. The following Proposition characterizes the equilibrium. Proposition 1. If WN > q hh+c sL, there is a unique interior equilibrium, in which 0 < βN1 < βN2 < WN and 0 < βS1 < βS2 < WS (provided that g1 < 1 2 and t < 1). 9 Otherwise, in the unique equilibrium, 9A closed form solution exists but is too cumbersome. For example, in the extreme case r = 0 (no asymptomatic transmission), we would have βN1 = βN2 as people without symptoms would not be concerned about infecting anyone else, and the solution would be given by βNk = WN ( 1−WS (c + h)WN −qhsL (c + h)WNWS −q2h2sLM (1−2g1g2 (1−t)) ) ; βSk = WS qhM (1−(1−gk)(1−t))((c + h)WN −qhsL) (c + h)WNWS −q2h2sLM (1−2g1g2 (1−t)) . 8 βN1 = βN2 = WN , βS1 = βS2 = 0, so all people without symptoms self-isolate and all sick people go out. The coefficient q hc+h s in the first condition is the probability that a person without symptoms will get infected by a sick person if all sick people go out. If this probability is sufficiently low, then at least some people without symptoms will go out (the first person to do so will not be afraid of getting infected by another such person, so the possibility of asymptomatic transmission does not enter this condition). For example, this condition is guaranteed to hold if s = 0, i.e., in the beginning of the pandemic. In equilibrium, people from the ethnic minority are less likely to self- isolate, because the person they might infect is likely to be from the majority group, whereas the probability of getting infected is the same for healthy individuals from both ethnic groups. We now turn to the comparative statics results. Proposition 2. Suppose that WN > q hh+c sL, so the equilibrium is interior. Then an increase in the size of the minority group g1, a decrease in altruism M or a decrease in tolerance t all decrease self-isolation by sick individuals. The effect on overall self-isolation is ambiguous: it is increasing as a result of either of these changes if r < q sc qhL−WN WS+q h h+c sL , and decreases if the converse is true. In the light of Assumption 1, the right-hand side of the last condition is positive for h close to 1, i.e., in the beginning of the pandemic. This means that the comparative statics critically depends on the likelihood of asymptomatic transmission. If it is small, then higher fractionalization implies less self-isolation by sick individuals, but more self-isolation overall, because healthy individuals are concerned of getting infected by sick ones who self-isolate less. If the likelihood of asymptomatic transmission is large, then people higher fractionalization also means that people without symptoms have less concern of infecting healthy ones, and thus overall self-isolation may decrease. As h becomes small (e.g., later in the pandemic), the comparative statics becomes driven solely by sick individuals, and fractionalization will imply less self-isolation. The effect of a decrease in altruism or tolerance is similar. Proposition 2 implies, in particular, that we should expect fractionalization to have a positive effect on self-isolation in the beginning of the pandemic (h close to 1) and in cases where asymp- tomatic transmission is believed to be impossible or unlikely (r close to 0). Of course, in the extreme, if h = 1 (i.e., before the pandemic), there is no self-isolation, and this does not depend on fractionalization or tolerance. 4 Empirical Strategy Our theory predicts that in places where the likelihood of asymptomatic transmission is per- ceived low, when the probability of getting infected becomes non-trivial, people engage more in 9 social distancing in places with higher ethnic fractionalization. To test this prediction, we report the results of two different estimation strategies. First, we report the difference-in-differences esti- mates, comparing cities with higher and lower level of ethnic fractionalization before and after the first reported case of COVID-19 infection in their region. Second, we combine the difference-in- differences approach with two-stage least squares approach, in which the timing of the first reported case is instrumented using pre-existing migration measures. More specifically, we aim to estimate the following regression specification: SocialDistanceirt = αi + θt + γ FirstCasert + β FirstCasert ×Ethnici + Xirt δ + εit. (3) Here, SocialDistanceirt is a measure of people’s mobility/staying at home in locality i in region r at time t; FirstCasert is an indicator variable equal to 1 after the first reported case of COVID-19 in region r (first predicted case in the region in case of IV estimation); Ethnici is a measure of ethnic fractionalization in locality i; Xirt is a vector of controls that includes some interactions of FirstCasert with the baseline locality characteristics; αi are the locality fixed effects, which con- trol for any time-invariant locality characteristics, such as population, population density, baseline levels of health, etc.; and θt are the day fixed effects which account for country-wide shocks. In the OLS specifications, we estimate equation (3) using the actual data on the dates of the first case. The identifying assumption is that of parallel trends, i.e., that in the absence of coronavirus, social distancing patterns in places with high and low ethnic diversity would have followed parallel trends. One potential concern with this approach, however, is that the timing of the first case is not fully random. For example, regions that reported their first COVID-19 case later that others could have done that because of lower medical capacity that did not allow them to identify the virus correctly in time, or their testing policies could be different, or their administration could have been more prone to conceal the first cases for longer. To deal with these potential confounds, we predict the timing of the first case in equation (3) in a two-stage least squares framework. More specifically, we use the fact that social connections between various cities and the place of the original major outbreak (Moscow) could affect the timing of the first case in their respective regions. We rely on internal migration as a proxy for these type of connections (Valsecchi, 2020; Mikhailova and Valsecchi, 2020). We then estimate the following regression specification for the timing of the first case at the regional level:10 FirstCaser = α0 + α1MigToMoscowr + ηr. (4) Here MigToMoscowr stands for recent migration flows from region r to Moscow, while FirstCaser 10We only have dates of the first case and internal migration flows data at the regional rather than the city level, thus we can only estimate this equation at the regional level. 10 is the date of the first case in this region.11 Next, we predict the timing of the first case from equation (4), create a dummy that is equal to 1 after the date of the predicted first case, and finally plug this variable into the equation (3) to esti- mate the second stage. Moreover, following migration literature, to consistently estimate equation (4), we create a shift-share instrument for internal cross-regional migration. More specifically, we compute the following term: EarlyMigrationToMoscowr ∑i EarlyMigrationToRegioni ×RecentTotalMigationFromRegionr (5) and then use it to predict MigToMoscowr in equation (4). Since this is not a standard IV proce- dure, for the second stage estimation, which combines IV with difference in differences, we use the bootstrap method to compute standard errors. The identifying assumption behind this identification is that the migration to Moscow from a particular region during the 1990s, interacted with recent (2015–2018) total outflow of migration for this region and further interacted with ethnic fraction- alization in a city, only affects isolation through the timing of the first case interacted with ethnic fractionalization (conditional on city and day fixed effects). 5 Data 5.1 Social Distancing Indicators As the main measure of people’s movements in Russia, we use daily averages of Yandex Iso- lation Index, compiled based on mobile app data.12 This index aggregates all the data on people’s movements at the city level, available from various Yandex applications. Yandex is the largest telecom company in Russia, and its main website Yandex.ru is the most visited website in Russia and the twelfth most visited website in the world. Yandex applications include Yandex browser, Yandex search engine, Yandex Maps (with traffic monitoring), Yandex Cash for payments, Yandex Taxi for taxi rides (in fact, Yandex bought the Russian part of Uber in 2019), Yandex Weather, etc. This data is similar to Google Mobility Index13 or the data on mobility in China provided by the largest Chinese search engine in China, Baidu (Xiao, 2020). The index is calibrated for each city to be 0 for the busiest hour of the working day, and 5 for the quietest hour of the night before the coronavirus outbreak. For example, Fig. 1 shows the change in isolation index for the city of 11Note that both Moscow and Saint Petersburg have regional status in the Russian administrative division, in contrast to most other cities, which are administratively parts of their region. Thus regional statistics on internal migration includes the data on migration to Moscow. 12More specifically, all the data comes from https://yandex.ru/maps/covid19/isolation. 13https://www.google.com/covid19/mobility/ 11 https://yandex.ru/maps/covid19/isolation https://www.google.com/covid19/mobility/ Moscow between February 23 and May 5. Figure 1: Illustration of the Yandex Isolation Index and Its Evolution for the City of Moscow between February 23 and May 5. Source: Yandex 2020. We use daily data for all the cities available, e.g. 302 cities with population over 50,000, from February 23, 2020, till April 20, 2020. As one can see, some decline in people’s movements began even before the week of March 29 when the first stay-at-home order was issued (see Figure 2 ). Note that in our subsequent analysis we exclude the data on Moscow and Saint Petersburg from the sample as these are clear outliers in many respects, with Moscow being the place of the largest outbreak in the country (see more on that below). 5.2 Data on COVID-19 Cases We use the official statistics on the daily number of coronavirus cases by region from the website that contains the official information about the coronavirus and policies enacted by the Russian government to fight it.14 Figure 3 reports the distribution of the dates of the first case in our data. Importantly for our identification strategy, even though COVID-19 spread across the country, it started in Moscow (the first case was confirmed in a traveler from Italy on March 1),15 and it 14The source of data is Rospotrebnadzor, the government agency responsible for the epidemiological surveillance. As the website does not report historical information, we obtain the actual data from Yandex coronavirus page, which uses this website as a source. 15Prior to that, four Russians were diagnosed with coronavirus, three from Diamond Princess cruise ship and one transit passenger flying from Iran to Azerbaijan. In addition, two Chinese citizens were diagnosed with COVID-19 as early as on January 31st, but they were quickly isolated without further documented spread. 12 Figure 2: Average Isolation Index Across All Russian Cities Over Time. 0 1 2 3 4 23 F eb 28 F eb 4 M ar 9 M ar 14 M ar 19 M ar 24 M ar 29 M ar 3 A pr 8 A pr 13 A pr 18 A pr Average Isolation Index in Russian Cities Source: Yandex 2020. still accounts for more than half of all cases in Russia. The dynamics of the number of coronavirus cases in Russia and in Moscow is summarized in Figure 4. 5.3 Other Data Migration. The data on cross-regional migration comes from the Russian Statistical Agency, RosStat. For our empirical exercise, we distinguish between early migration (1990-1997, before the crisis of 1998) and recent migration (2015-2018). Note that in all the years migration to Moscow, as summarized in Figure 5, constituted a much smaller share of overall migration as compared to Moscow’s share of coronavirus cases (see Figure 4).16 That implies that it is unlikely that migration to Moscow accounted for the vast majority of internal migration in Russia, thus our empirical approach, based on shift-share instrument (5) makes sense. Xenophobia. We use two alternative measures of xenophobia in a city, based on online searches and on the number of hate crimes. The first measure is based on the relative numbers of explicitly xenophobic Internet searches, coming from Yandex WordStat, which is similar to Google Search 16Note that RosStat data counts only "official" migration with the change in registration address, so migration to Moscow might be underestimated. However, in any case it is unlikely that migration to Moscow, on average, was even close to its share of coronavirus cases. 13 Figure 3: Distribution of dates of the first case of coronavirus by region, Moscow excluded. 0 20 40 60 80 10 0 N um be r o f C iti es 01mar2020 16mar2020 01apr2020 16apr2020 Day of the First Case in a Region Source: RosPotrebNadzor. Volume Index (SVI).17 The data is analogous to the search-based measures of xenophobia or racism are increasingly used in the literature (Stephens-Davidowitz, 2014; Chetty et al., 2019; Ross, 2015). The second measure is based on the city-level data on ethnic hate crime from the database compiled by SOVA Center for Information and Analysis.18 This is a Moscow-based Russian independent nonprofit organization providing information related to hate crimes that is generally considered to be the most reliable source of information on this issue. The dataset covers incidents of hate crimes and violent acts of vandalism, as well as convictions under any article of the Criminal Code related to “extremism.” These data are collected consistently starting 2007, with some incomplete data for 2004–2006. In the analysis we use data from 2007–2015. We classify all hate crimes as “ethnic” or “non-ethnic” based on the type of victim reported in the database. Based on the textual description of each incident in the database we manually coded the number of perpetrators for all the incidents. More details are available in Bursztyn et al. (2019). 17There are two main differences between Google SVI and Yandex WordStat. Most importantly, Yandex measure does show the relative numbers of searches per city even if their absolute numbers are small. In fact, Yandex does not have a minimal number of searches for the statistics to be shown, and even a single search is shown. Second, Yandex measure is easily available at the city level, while Google SVI does not report city-level searches for most requests in Russia. 18The database can be found at https://www.sova-center.ru/en/database/ 14 https://www.sova-center.ru/en/database/ Figure 4: Number of Cases Over Time. 0 20 00 0 40 00 0 60 00 0 80 00 0 10 00 00 1 M ar 6 M ar 11 M ar 16 M ar 21 M ar 26 M ar 31 M ar 5 A pr 10 A pr 15 A pr 20 A pr 25 A pr 30 A pr Total Number of Cases, Russia Total Number of Cases, Moscow COVID-19 Cases Over Time, Russia Source: RosPotrebNadzor. Other Data The city-level data on population, age, education, and ethnic composition come from the Russian Censuses of 2002 and 2010. The data on the average wage and municipal budgets come from the Russian Federal State Statistics Service (or RosStat). Additional city characteristics (latitude, longitude, year the city was founded, and locations of administrative centers) come from the national encyclopedia of Russian cities and regions.19 6 Empirical Results Parallel Trends. Identification in the OLS estimation of equation (3) relies on the parallel trends assumption. That assumption implies that in the absence of COVID-19, the patterns of people’s movements around or staying at home would evolve in parallel fashion for places with different lev- els of ethnic fractionalization. This assumption is not testable, but we can provide some supportive evidence by examining pre-trends. Figure 6 summarizes the patterns of people’s movements before and after the first case in a region. It shows the evolution of the isolation index conditional on city and day of the week fixed effects around the day of reporting of the first case of coronaviruis in the region. As one can see from Figure 6, there is no visible difference in the behavior of people in the two groups of cities before the first coronavirus case. In both groups of cities people engage more in 19Available at http://www.mojgorod.ru/. 15 http://www.mojgorod.ru/ Figure 5: Migration to Moscow over Time. .0 2 .0 4 .0 6 .0 8 19 90 19 91 19 92 19 93 19 94 19 95 19 96 19 97 19 98 19 99 20 00 20 01 20 02 20 03 20 04 20 05 20 06 20 07 20 08 20 09 20 10 20 11 20 12 20 13 20 14 20 15 20 16 20 17 20 18 Year Migration to Moscow as a Share of Interregional Migration Source: RosStat. Figure 6: Isolation over time for places with high and low ethnic fraction- alization, Russian data. -1 -.5 0 .5 1 Y an de x Is ol at io n In de x -20 -10 0 10 20 Days Since the First Case in a Region High Ethnic Fractionalization Low Ethnic Fractionalization Notes: The Yandex isolation index is demeaned by city and day of the week fixed effects. Source: Authors’ calculations. 16 social distancing after the discovery of the first case. However, there seem to be a marked difference in social distancing after the first coronavirus case is reported, with people in more fractionalized cities becoming more likely to stay home. These results are consistent with the parallel trends identifying assumption for (3). This preliminary evidence already points out in favor of our main empirical hypothesis. Baseline difference-in-differences results. Here, we report the results of estimation of equation (3) using ordinary least squares. Table 1 summarizes these results. Column 1 reports the basic specification with city fixed effects, day of the week fixed effects, and calendar week fixed effects included. Column 2 adds several additional controls on top of that, specifically the interactions of the Post First Case dummy with shares of people with higher education, average wage, and population density. Columns 3-4 report the same specifications with day fixed effects included instead of day of the week and calendar week fixed effects. The results indicate that the coefficient for the interaction between the Post First Case dummy and ethnic fractionalization is consistently positive and significant in all the specifications. The magnitude of the coefficient goes slightly down from 0.38 to 0.32 with additional interactions, but remains statistically significant at the 1% level. This reduction is smaller than the standard error for both coefficients, and we cannot reject the hypothesis of the equality of the coefficients in a seemingly unrelated regressions framework. Thus, we conclude that the coefficient is robust to inclusion of additional controls. Overall, the results in table 1 are consistent with our theoretical prediction: we indeed observe more social distancing in more ethnically diverse places. IV estimation. First stage. As discussed above, the OLS estimates from the previous subsection could be biased because of the endogeneity of reporting of the first case in a region, which would lead to the violation of the parallel trends assumption. In what follows, we proceed to estimate equation (3) using the IV approach. We first check whether our logic for the first stage holds, and internal migration to Moscow indeed predicts the timing of the first case in the region. In particular,we estimate equation (4) using OLS and IV, using the shift share instrument (5) to predict migration in the latter case. The results of these estimations are summarized in Table 2. Columns 1-2 present the results of the OLS estimation, and columns 3-4 present the results of the IV estimation with migration to Moscow being instrumented with the shift-share instrument (5). Columns 1 and 3 present the results without additional controls, while columns 2 and 4 contain the results with basic controls such as population density, income, and education. The results suggest that migration to Moscow has a large negative effect on the timing of the first case. The coefficient is remarkably stable when extra controls are added. IV coefficients are slightly larger than OLS ones, with the magnitudes of 17 Table 1: Social Distancing, First Case, and Ethnic Fractionalization. OLS. VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) Post First Case x Ethnic Fractionalization 0.378*** 0.318*** 0.380*** 0.324*** [0.111] [0.078] [0.113] [0.091] Post First Case -0.037 1.233** -0.095* 0.808 [0.068] [0.515] [0.050] [0.593] Post First Case x Education 1.880*** 1.818*** [0.263] [0.266] Post First Case x Average Wage -0.180*** -0.142** [0.055] [0.063] Post First Case x Population Density 0.003** 0.003** [0.001] [0.001] City Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Day of the Week and Calendar Week Fixed Effect Yes Yes Day Fixed Effects Yes Yes Observations 17,817 17,817 17,817 17,817 R-squared 0.816 0.820 0.944 0.948 Yandex Isolation Index Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in brackets are clustered by region. Isolation index is the aggregate measure of staying at home based on mobile app data. The sample includes 302 Russian cities with population of 50,000 and above. The time period is 23/02/2020–20/04/2020. coefficients going from -58.93 for OLS to -66.80 for IV. These magnitudes imply that one standard deviation in internal migration to Moscow led to the first case reported 4.6 days earlier according to the OLS estimates, or 5.2 days earlier according to the IV estimates. Another important predictor of the timing of the first reported COVID-19 case is the average wage. According to the estimates, one standard deviation of average wage led to the first case 2.5 days earlier. The results, summarized in Table 2 essentially represent the first stage of the IV estimation. We also check whether migration to Moscow indeed played a special role in spread of the virus across the country, as compared with that to other big cities. As Figures 4 and 5 suggest, Moscow accounted for the disproportionately large share of all COVID-19 cases, as compared with its share in internal migration (as well as its share in the country’s population, which is around 10%). This implies that while other large cities could play a similar role, their actual importance in spreading the virus is likely to have been smaller. In Table 3, we report the results of this estimation. As one can see, the coefficients at migration to the regions with other large cities are smaller in magnitude and flip signs if additional controls are added. Neither the OLS nor the IV coefficients are significant in this estimation, despite the fact that our shift-share instrument still works reasonably well, with the corresponding Kleibergen-Paap statistics around 200 (see columns 3 and 4). Overall, the results of Table 3 confirm the special role of Moscow and regional 18 Table 2: Timing of First Case and Internal Migration to Moscow in 2015–2018. VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) Migration to Moscow in 2015-2018 -59.676*** -58.934*** -68.697*** -66.979*** [11.314] [9.176] [5.869] [5.805] Average Wage -6.106** -5.957** [2.451] [2.416] Education 15.645 17.042* [9.623] [9.634] Population Denisty -0.018 0.011 [0.043] [0.047] Observations 302 302 302 302 R-squared 0.372 0.410 0.364 0.406 Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic 2,032 4,102 Date of the First Covid-19 case in a Region OLS IV Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in brackets are clustered by region. The sample includes 302 Russian cities with population of 50,000 and above. In columns (3) and (4), migra- tion to Moscow is predicted with a shift-share instrument, using earlier pre-1998 migration to Moscow combined with recent 2015–2018 aggregate outflow of internal migration from a region. links to Moscow in the spread of the virus, which is consistent with the idea that tighter migration connections to Moscow resulted in regions getting the coronavirus earlier. IV estimation. Second stage. Once we predict the timing of the first case, as summarized in columns 3 and 4 in Table 2, we can now use these predicted values in the second stage estimation. We report the results of this estimation in Table 4 below. The results of the IV estimation are similar to the results of the OLS estimation, with higher ethnic fractionalization leading to more social distancing post-outbreak. The IV magnitudes are slightly smaller than the OLS ones, but we cannot reject the hypothesis of the equality of the coefficients. The magnitudes in Table 4 imply that one standard deviation increase in ethnic fractionalization leads to 3.1 % higher social distancing following the report of the first local COVID-19 case. In other words, a one standard deviation increase in ethnic fractionalization can explain 4.7 % of the average mobility reduction after the report of the first case or, alternatively, 3.8% of the weekday-weekend gap for an average locality. Overall, the results in Tables 1 and 4 are consistent with the main theoretical prediction that higher ethnic fractionalization increases social distancing once the threat of the virus becomes real. 19 Table 3: Timing of First Case and Internal Migration to Other Large Cities in 2015–2018. VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) Migration to Other Large Cities in 2015-2018 0.631 -3.942 3.684 -0.259 [6.923] [4.147] [7.658] [4.897] Average Wage -7.323** -7.201** [3.434] [3.414] Education 2.392 5.211 [10.420] [10.434] Population Density -0.251*** -0.237*** [0.050] [0.051] Observations 302 302 302 302 R-squared 0.000 0.211 -0.009 0.199 Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic 198.5 183.1 Date of the First Covid-19 case in a Region OLS IV Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in brackets are clustered by region. The sample includes 302 Russian cities with population of 50,000 and above. Migration to Other Large Cities is computed as the aggregate migration to regions with cities with population of at least 1 million people. The list of regions includes Novosibirskaya oblast, Chelyabinskaya oblast, Sverdlovskaya oblast, Tatarstan Republic, Nizhegorodskaya oblast, Samarskaya oblast, Rostovksaya oblast, Bashkortostan Republic, Krasnoyarskyi krai, Permskyi krai, Voronezhskaya oblast, Volgogradskaya oblast, Krasnodarsky krai. In columns (3) and (4), migra- tion to these regions is predicted with a shift-share instrument, using earlier pre-1998 migration to these regions, combined with recent 2015–2018 aggregate outflow of internal migration from a source region. 7 Additional Results and Mechanisms Xenophobia. Our model suggests that a reduction in tolerance towards out-group members should lead to further increase in self-isolation, even holding the pre-existing levels of ethnic diversity fixed. We test this prediction using two distinct measures of xenophobia in Russian cities, one of which is based on the numbers of explicitly xenophobic Internet searches and the other one is based on the number of ethnic hate crimes in the earlier period. These results of these estimations are summarized in Table 5. The results indicate that both xenophobia and the history of ethnic hate crime led to an increase in social distancing following the discovery of the first COVID-19 case in the region. Moreover, both of these effects coexist with the positive effect of ethnic fractionalization, without canceling each other. The coefficients for xenophobic searches (Panel A of Table 5) and ethnic hate crime (Panel B of Table Panel A of Table 5) go down substantially when additional interaction terms with control variables are included, but the main coefficient for ethnic fractionalization remains remarkably stable in terms of its magnitude. Numerically, the estimates in Panel A of Table 5 imply that the difference in mobility between the place with the highest and the lowest level of xenophobia, on top of the impact of ethnic frac- tionalization, accounts for 2.2% of average mobility reduction following the report of the first case 20 Table 4: Social Distancing, First Case, and Ethnic Fractionalization. IV. VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) Post Predicted First Case x Ethnic Fractionalization 0.352*** 0.293** 0.345*** 0.285** [0.109] [0.122] [0.107] [0.117] Post Predicted First Case -0.154** 0.893 -0.186*** 0.793 [0.069] [0.547] [0.065] [0.540] Post Predicted First Case x Education 1.798*** 1.813*** [0.288] [0.289] Post Predicted First Case x Average Wage -0.156*** -0.151*** [0.059] [0.058] Post First Case x Population Density 0.003** 0.003** [0.001] [0.001] City Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Day of the Week and Calendar Week Fixed Effects Yes Yes Day Fixed Effects Yes Yes Observations 17,817 17,817 17,817 17,817 R-squared 0.816 0.820 0.944 0.949 Yandex Isolation Index Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Bootstrapped robust standard errors in brackets are clustered by region. Isolation index is the aggregate measure of staying at home based on mobile app data. The sample includes 302 Russian cities with population of 50,000 and above. The time period is 23/02/2020–20/04/2020. Predicted First Case is computed using the data on inter-regional migration, as summarized in the previous subsection. or, alternatively, 1.8% of weekday-weekend gap for an average locality. Similarly, the estimates in Panel B of Table 5 suggest that the difference in mobility between the place with the highest level and the lowest levels of ethnic hate crime, on top of the impact of ethnic fractionalization, accounts for 2.8% of average mobility reduction following the report of the first case or, alternatively, 2.3% of weekday-weekend gap for an average locality. 21 Table 5: Social Distancing, First Case, and Xenophobia. VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) Panel A Post First Case x Xenophobic Searches 0.051*** 0.023** 0.051*** 0.021** 0.050*** 0.022* 0.051*** 0.021* [0.011] [0.010] [0.011] [0.010] [0.012] [0.012] [0.012] [0.012] Post First Case x Ethnic Fractionalization 0.367*** 0.306*** 0.366*** 0.310*** 0.343*** 0.283** 0.336*** 0.274** [0.099] [0.077] [0.103] [0.091] [0.103] [0.123] [0.101] [0.118] Post First Case -0.075 1.333** -0.132** 0.904 -0.193*** 0.985* -0.226*** 0.883 [0.073] [0.536] [0.056] [0.616] [0.073] [0.570] [0.069] [0.562] Observations 17,640 17,640 17,640 17,640 17,640 17,640 17,640 17,640 R-squared 0.817 0.820 0.944 0.948 0.817 0.820 0.945 0.949 Panel B Post First Case x Ethnic Hate Crime 0.090*** 0.032*** 0.090*** 0.030** 0.088*** 0.032** 0.089*** 0.030** [0.010] [0.012] [0.010] [0.012] [0.012] [0.013] [0.012] [0.014] Post First Case x Ethnic Fractionalization 0.423*** 0.340*** 0.425*** 0.345*** 0.397*** 0.316*** 0.390*** 0.306*** [0.109] [0.076] [0.108] [0.086] [0.101] [0.119] [0.098] [0.115] Post First Case -0.106 1.246** -0.164*** 0.820 -0.221*** 0.910 -0.255*** 0.809 [0.069] [0.523] [0.051] [0.597] [0.072] [0.558] [0.068] [0.553] Observations 17,817 17,817 17,817 17,817 17,817 17,817 17,817 17,817 R-squared 0.818 0.820 0.946 0.948 0.818 0.820 0.946 0.949 City Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Day of the Week and Calendar Week Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Day Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Additional conrols Yes Yes Yes Yes Yandex Isolation Index OLS IV Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in brackets are clustered by region. In columns (5)–(8) bootstrapped standard errors are reported. Isolation index is the aggregate measure of staying at home based on mobile app data. The sample includes 302 Russian cities with population of 50,000 and above. The time period is 23/02/2020–20/04/2020. Data on Internet xenophobic searches by city, as captured by Yandex, was collected in 2018. Data on ethnic hate crime by city comes from NGO SOVA (2008–2015). Additional controls include interactions of the dummy for post first case with measures of education attainment, average wage, and population density. 22 Table 6: Social Distancing, First Case, and Stay-at-Home Orders. VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) Post First Case x Ethnic Fractionalization 0.281** 0.235** 0.284*** 0.240** [0.109] [0.105] [0.093] [0.117] Post First Case -0.005 1.214** -0.070 0.803 [0.070] [0.472] [0.055] [0.562] Stay at Home Measures x Ethnic Fractionalization 0.033 0.019 0.076 0.064 [0.191] [0.190] [0.145] [0.140] Stay at Home Measures 0.362** 0.353** 0.197*** 0.187*** [0.167] [0.158] [0.074] [0.060] Post First Case x Education 1.822*** 1.786*** [0.256] [0.260] Post First Case x Average Wage -0.174*** -0.139** [0.050] [0.060] Post First Case x Population Density 0.003** 0.003** [0.001] [0.001] City Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Day of the Week and Calendar Week Fixed Effects Yes Yes Day Fixed Effects Yes Yes Observations 17,817 17,817 17,817 17,817 R-squared 0.819 0.823 0.945 0.949 Yandex Isolation Index Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in brackets are clustered by region. Isolation index is the aggregate measure of staying at home based on mobile app data. The sample includes 302 Russian cities with population of 50,000 and above. The time period is 23/02/2020–20/04/2020. Stay-at-home orders. The results in Tables 1 and 4 can potentially reflect the fact that following the coronavirus outbreak, many regions introduced stay-at-home orders. If so, ethnic fractionaliza- tion could be related to the enforcement of these restrictions, rather then voluntary observance of social distancing as described in our theoretical model. To test this alternative explanation we explicitly account for the introduction of the restrictive measure by the regional governments. In Table 6, we report what happens if both the dummy for the report of the first case of COVID-19 and the dummy for the introduction of the local stay-at-home orders are included. As one can see, even though the introduction of stay-at-home measures led to a clear increase in social distancing, there is no differential effect of the stay-at-home measures in places with high and low ethnic fractionalization. Unfortunately, we do not have a convincing instrument for the stay-at-home measures, so we report only the results of the OLS estimation. 23 8 Empirical Results for the United States To provide evidence that the results reported in the previous section are not specific to Russia, we repeat the analysis using data from the United States. More specifically, we use county level data on mobile devices from SafeGraph to see if the results of estimation of equation (3) are consistent with the ones that we get based on Russian data. Background The initial spread of COVID-19 in the U.S. occurred almost simultaneously in sev- eral states, in particular, California, New York, and Washington. Eventually, New York became the hardest hit state in the U.S. However, due to the multiple initial epicenters, the predictive power of inter-state migration patterns with New York on the initial COVID-19 spread is much lower as compared to the case of Moscow and Russia. For this reason we are not able to use the IV approach in the U.S. setting and have to rely on the OLS estimation only. The issue of ethnic fractionalization is also highly relevant for the United States, which has one of the most ethnically diverse populations in the world. Typically, however, in the American context, instead of ethnicities, diversity is discussed in terms of races. According to the 2010 Census, 72.4% of the U.S. population are white, 16.3% are Hispanic, 12.6% are African American, and around 4.8% are Asian. Still, states and counties vary drastically in their levels of ethnic (or racial) diversity: for instance, on the one side of the spectrum, 93% of Maine’s population is white, while, on the other side of the spectrum, Texas is split 40%–40%–12% among whites, Hispanics, and African Americans.20 For historical reasons, however, the U.S. population is highly segregated, and ethnic fractionalization correlates with many county-level characteristics, such as population density. For this reason, in our analysis, we do our best to control for various confounders of ethnic diversity. Data As a measure of social distancing in the United States, we use the social distancing metrics compiled and released by SafeGraph.21 The data are generated using a panel of GPS pings from anonymous mobile devices. Similar to much of the literature (see, e.g., Chiou and Tucker, 2020; Kapoor et al., 2020), we use the share of devices remaining completely home on a given day in a given county as the dependent variable. For each device, ‘home’ location is determined by SafeGraph as the common nighttime location of each mobile device over a 6 week period. Since the data are presented at the census block level, we aggregate them up to the county level by taking 20https://www.kff.org/other/state-indicator/distribution-by-raceethnicity/ 21SafeGraph is a data company that aggregates anonymized location data from numerous applications in order to provide insights about physical places. To enhance privacy, SafeGraph excludes census block group information if fewer than five devices visited an establishment in a month from a given census block group. For details on this particular dataset, see: https://docs.safegraph.com/docs/social-distancing-metrics. 24 https://www.kff.org/other/state-indicator/distribution-by-raceethnicity/ https://docs.safegraph.com/docs/social-distancing-metrics Table 7: Social Distancing, First Case, and Ethnic Fractionalization. U.S. data. VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) Post First Case x Ethnic Fractionalization 3.615*** 2.545** 3.599*** 2.526** [1.280] [1.198] [1.295] [1.225] Post First Case x Education 0.115*** 0.114*** [0.026] [0.026] Post First Case x Median HH Income (in '000s) 0.134*** 0.135*** [0.027] [0.027] Post First Case x Population Density 0.220** 0.223** [0.091] [0.092] County Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Day of the Week and Calendar Week Fixed Effects Yes Yes Day Fixed Effects Yes Yes Days 115 115 115 115 Counties 3 138 3 137 3 138 3 137 Observations 360,870 360,755 360,870 360,755 R-squared 0.719 0.742 0.786 0.809 % Staying Home Standard errors in brackets are clustered at the state level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Percentage of people staying home is calculated based on the number of mobile devices never leaving house divided by the total number of mobile devices observed in the county that day. The time period is 01/01/2020-24/04/2020. Post first case indicator is equal to one after a county's state already had its first COVID-19 case, and zero otherwise. Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors in brackets are clustered at the state level. Percentage of people staying home is calculated based on the number of mobile devices never leaving house divided by the total number of mobile devices observed in the county that day. The time period is 01/01/2020–24/04/2020. Post first case indicator is equal to one after a county’s state already had its first COVID-19 case, and zero otherwise. a sum of the total number of devices and of the total number of devices remaining completely home. We then calculate the county-level daily share by dividing the latter number by the former. We use data on COVID-19 cases and deaths over time from the New York Times open repos- itory on coronavirus cases.22 From this source, we obtain data on the daily total number of cases and deaths in each county and state. We accessed these data on May 5, 2020. We obtain the data on counties’ ethnic compositions from the 2010 Census, based on which we calculate the standard measure of ethnic (racial) fractionalization. For other county-level controls, such as population density, median household income, and the share of adults with a BA degree, we rely on the county-level benchmark indicators from the Social Capital Project.23 Finally, we obtain data on state-level stay-at-home measures from Raifman et al. (2020). Empirical Results We report the results of the difference-in-differences exercise, similar to Ta- ble 1 for the Russian case. These findings are summarized in Table 7 below. The results are largely consistent with the Russian case. The magnitudes imply that following the discovery of the first case, the share of those staying at home increased by 1.9 percentage points 22https://github.com/nytimes/covid-19-data 23Available at https://www.lee.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/scp-index. 25 https://github.com/nytimes/covid-19-data https://www.lee.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/scp-index Table 8: Social Distancing, First Case, Stay-at-Home Orders, and Ethnic Fraction- alization. U.S. data. VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) Post First Case x Ethnic Fractionalization 2.875*** 2.138* 2.810*** 2.072 [0.876] [1.241] [0.899] [1.257] Post First Case -1.350*** -9.950*** -1.247*** -9.876*** [0.305] [1.040] [0.336] [1.059] Stay at Home Measures x Ethnic Fractionalization 1.630 0.980 1.764 1.110 [2.000] [1.928] [1.949] [1.881] Stay at Home Measures 2.091*** 1.960*** 2.053*** 1.918*** [0.556] [0.611] [0.548] [0.609] Post First Case x % Education 0.106*** 0.105*** [0.026] [0.027] Post First Case x Median HH Income (in '000s) 0.135*** 0.136*** [0.026] [0.027] Post First Case x Population Density 0.202** 0.205** [0.087] [0.088] City Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Day of the Week and Calendar Week Fixed Effects Yes Yes Day Fixed Effects Yes Yes Days 115 115 115 115 Counties 3 138 3 137 3 138 3 137 Observations 360,870 360,755 360,870 360,755 R-squared 0.724 0.745 0.791 0.812 % Staying Home Standard errors in brackets are clustered at the state level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Percentage of people staying home is calculated based on the number of mobile devices never leaving house divided by the total number of mobile devices observed in the county that day. The time period is 01/01/2020-24/04/2020. Post first case indicator is equal to one after a county's state already had its first COVID-19 case, and zero otherwise. Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors in brackets are clustered at the state level. Percentage of people staying home is calculated based on the number of mobile devices never leaving house divided by the total number of mobile devices observed in the county that day. The time period is 01/01/2020–24/04/2020. Post first case indicator is equal to one after a county’s state already had its first COVID-19 case, and zero otherwise. on average for the most fractionalized county as compared with the least fractionalized county. In other words, the difference between the counties with highest and the lowest fractionalization can explain 6.1% of average mobility reduction after the discovery of the first case or, alternatively, 8.2% of weekday-weekend gap for an average county. Similarly to Table 6, we report regressions that include interaction terms both with the report of the first case in the state and with the state-level stay-at-home orders. We summarize these results in Table 8. We find that, similar to the Russian case, there is no differential effect of statewide stay-at- home orders on the likelihood of staying at home depending on the level of ethnic fractionalization. At the same time, even in this demanding specification, the coefficient for the interaction between the dummy for the first reported case and ethnic fractionalization remains positive and significant in three out of four specifications. 26 9 Implications While the differential reduction in mobility by ethnic fractionalization is important to document on its own, it is also of interest to see the implications of this differential effect for the spread of the disease. To this end, we produce some back-of-the-envelope estimates of how many deaths may have been saved by greater social distancing in more diverse communities. Because the elasticity of deaths with respect to social distancing is unknown at this point, we rely on two estimates—one from a widely cited epidemiological study, and one based on the local average treatment effect estimated in the economic literature. Elasticity of COVID-19 deaths with respect to social distancing Based on an epidemiological model, Walker et al. (2020) predict that a uniform 45% reduction in interpersonal contact rate within a country would lead to a 50% reduction in mortality rate in Europe and North America, from eight deaths per 1,000 people to four deaths per 1,000 people. In economics, Kapoor et al. (2020) use variation in rainfall the weekend prior to the official government lockdown to produce the IV estimates of the effect of lower share of home-stayers on cases and deaths from COVID-19. According to (Kapoor et al., 2020, p. 7), “a one percentage point increase in the number of people leaving home on the weekend before the shutdown causes case counts to rise by roughly 13 per 100,000, which translates to roughly one extra death per 100,000.” One may think of the estimates from Walker et al. (2020) as the upper bound, as they assume a permanent reduction in interpersonal contact and take into account the full counterfactual of an exponential growth. In contrast, the latter numbers from Kapoor et al. (2020) need to be viewed as the lower bound, as they study a temporary reduction in social distancing on one particular weekend and because they only take into account the data available at the time of writing of their article. Russia First, we produce a back-of-the-envelope estimate of the potentially saved lives in Russia. We note that, according to our estimates in Columns 2 and 4 in Table 4, a one standard deviation increase of ethnic fractionalization (0.172) is associated with a 0.29×0.172 ≈ 0.05 increase in the isolation index. We also note that the pre-first-case median in isolation index is 1.4, which means that a 0.05 increase in isolation index is associated with a 3.5% decline in social mobility. For the upper-bound estimate based on the epidemiological literature, we assume that reduction in mobility is equivalent to reduction in interpersornal contact.24 Furthermore, we assume that the estimates from Walker et al. (2020) can be applied linearly with the same ratio, i.e., that a 1% reduction in interpersonal contact is always associated with a 1.1% reduction in mortality rates. Then, under these assumptions, one finds that a 3.5% reduction in social contact is associated with 24In principle, this need not be the case, since one can move around and still adhere to strict social distancing rules. 27 a 3.85% reduction in death rates. For Europe and North America, a 3.85% reduction from 4 deaths per 1,000 population is 0.154 fewer deaths per 1,000 population (see Figure 4 in Walker et al., 2020). For Russia, this is equivalent to 0.154×144,500 = 22,250 fewer deaths. For the lower-bound estimate, we assume that the a one standard deviation increase in isolation index in Russia is associated with a one standard deviation increase in the share of people staying at home in the US, i.e., that they are both measuring the same underlying factor. Under this assump- tion, a 0.05 increase in the isolation index as equivalent to 0.05×(6.63/0.85) = 0.39 percentage point increase in the share of people staying home. Under the assumption that the US calculations in Kapoor et al. (2020) are perfectly applicable to Russia, this is equivalent to 0.39×1450 = 565 fewer COVID-19 deaths (out of around 3,000 at the time of writing this, May 21, 2020).25 United States In the United States, according to our estimates in Columns 2 and 4 in Table 7, a one standard deviation increase in ethnic fractionalization (0.252) is associated with a 0.252×2.5 = 0.63 percentage point increase in share of people staying home. For the US, we start with the lower-bound estimate as it is straightforward to compute given that the estimates in Kapoor et al. (2020) rely on the same data from SafeGraph and the same variable of the share of people staying home. Under the assumption that the effect observed in Kapoor et al. (2020) is a LATE that is applicable to our “compliers” and that it is stable over time, a 0.63 p.p. increase in the share of people staying home is associated with 0.63 fewer deaths per 100,000 people. In the United States, it is equivalent to 0.63×3,282 = 2,000 fewer deaths (out of 94,000 at the moment of writing this, May 21, 2020). For the upper-bound estimate, we rely on the same assumption as earlier. Since the pre-first-case median in share staying home is 22%, a 0.63 percentage point increase in share of people staying home is equivalent to a 2.8% increase in social distancing, or, as we assume, a 2.8% reduction in interpersonal contact. Using the same 1.1 ratio as above, a 2.8% reduction in social contact is associated with a 3% reduction in death rates. For Europe and North America, a 3% reduction from 4 deaths per 1,000 people is 0.12 fewer deaths per 1,000 people. Thus, for the United States, this is equivalent to 0.12×328,200 ≈ 39,400 , or roughly 40,000 fewer deaths. 10 Conclusion This paper highlights the role of ethnic diversity in voluntary adherence to socially beneficial norms, such as self-isolation and social distancing during a pandemic. Using both Russian and 25Note that while the upper-bound estimates above take into account all potential future deaths from the disease, these lower-bound estimates are calculated assuming that no deaths would occur starting the day after the Kapoor et al. (2020)’s estimates were produced. This explains the wide range between the two estimates. 28 U.S. data, we show that people in more diverse places were more likely to restrict their mobility following the reports of the first local COVID-19 cases. While the Russian data allows us to establish a causal relation more cleanly than the data from the U.S. it is reassuring that our results are consistent for both countries. Theoretically, we argue that these results can be explained with a model where sick people self-isolate for altruistic reasons but do so less in more diverse societies due to out-group biases. At the same time, the decision of healthy individuals to self-isolate is determined by private benefits, so they are more likely to self-isolate in more diverse societies, where sick people are less likely to stay at home. As long as the majority considers themselves healthy, the second effect will dominate, and, on average, there will be more voluntary social distancing in more diverse societies. We document that this effect is observed at the beginning of the outbreak when most people believe they are healthy, especially if the threat of asymptomatic transmission is unknown or underestimated. Our study has important implications for government policy. It highlights that not only the propensity of different groups of people (ethnic or social groups, or healthy as opposed to sick) to engage in prosocial behavior may be different, but that there may be important strategic effects. In the context of the pandemic, decisions of healthy and sick individuals to self-isolate are strategic substitutes. This means, for example, that in a homogeneous society with high levels of tolerance, extensive testing would allow people to learn that they are sick and self-isolate, thus enabling the rest to go out with little fear. In a heterogeneous society with low levels of tolerance, the same policy may allow people who learn that they are contagious to go out more because they have little to lose, with the exact opposite implications for the healthy population. There are implications for optimal strategies on reopening the economy as well. As long as most people are not sick, we expect our results to hold even after the stay-at-home orders are lifted and the extrinsic motivation to stay at home becomes weaker. Naturally, expectations of voluntary observance of social distancing is likely to be one of the key elements of these strategies. As long as people observe social distancing even in the absence of restrictive government policies, the economy can be restarted even before pharmaceutical or technological solutions for the coronavirus problem are found.26 These expectations, however, should depend, in particular, on local ethnic diversity, and therefore should reopening strategies. More generally, understanding the effects of government regulations in heterogeneous societies has practical importance beyond the pandemic, which makes it an interesting direction for future research. 26See, e.g. the blog post by John Cochrane for the discussion of these considerations https://johnhcochrane. blogspot.com/2020/05/dumb-reopening-might-just-work.html 29 https://johnhcochrane.blogspot.com/2020/05/dumb-reopening-might-just-work.html https://johnhcochrane.blogspot.com/2020/05/dumb-reopening-might-just-work.html References AGER, P. AND M. BRUECKNER (2018): “Immigrants’ Genes: Genetic Diversity and Economic Development in the United States,” Economic Inquiry, 56, 1149–1164. ALESINA, A., R. BAQIR, AND W. EASTERLY (1999): “Public goods and ethnic divisions,” The Quarterly journal of economics, 114, 1243–1284. ALESINA, A. AND E. L. FERRARA (2005): “Ethnic diversity and economic performance,” Journal of economic literature, 43, 762–800. ALESINA, A., J. HARNOSS, AND H. 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work_xur2macrejbx7isekfypdgv7ce	----	josi_467.tex Journal of Social Issues, Vol. 62, No. 3, 2006, pp. 439--451 Looking Back as We Look Ahead: Integrating Research, Theory, and Practice on Intergroup Relations Biren (Ratnesh) A. Nagda∗ University of Washington, Seattle Linda R. Tropp University of Massachusetts, Amherst Elizabeth Levy Paluck Yale University This article looks back at the origins of intergroup relations in social psychology just over 50 years ago. Pioneers in the field—Robin Williams, Gordon Allport, and Kurt Lewin—were all deeply concerned with integrating social science and social action. We seek to re-center this mutuality of research and practice, and to expand the focus of intergroup relations from prejudice reduction to social inclusion. The articles in this issue document cutting-edge research, theory, and practice, and make substantive contributions to the future of intergroup relations. A unique feature of this issue is a set of commentaries by prominent scholars and practitioners in the fields of intergroup relations and education. Walter Stephan, James Banks, Thomas Pettigrew, and Patricia Gurin each reflect on the collection of articles through the lens of their own personal and professional biographies to help define the intersections of research, theory, and practice on intergroup relations. More than 50 years ago, the emergence of two early, seminal volumes cata- pulted the study of intergroup relations to a central place in social psychological theory and research. Williams’s (1947) monograph, The Reduction of Intergroup ∗Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Biren (Ratnesh) A. Nagda, School of Social Work, University of Washington, 4101 15th Avenue NE, Seattle, WA 98105 [e-mail: ratnesh@ u.washington.edu]. 439 C© 2006 The Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues 440 Nagda, Tropp, and Paluck Tensions, examined existing research on conflict and hostility in the context of racial and ethnic relations, with an eye toward identifying new theoretical proposi- tions and effective intergroup programs. Commissioned by the Social Science Research Council, the stated goal of this monograph was to “consider social psychological theory and research bearing on the problem of group conflict” and to derive “from any promising theory, not now practically applied, an action tech- nique which might be tested for its effectiveness in reducing hostility and resolving conflict” (ix). Growing from these early perspectives, Gordon W. Allport then de- veloped one of the most comprehensive and influential volumes in research on intergroup relations, with the publication of his 1954 book, The Nature of Preju- dice. In this book, Allport expresses his trademark concerns of integrating social science and social action (Pettigrew, 1999). In theorizing about intergroup contact, he challenged the notion that simple encounters among different people would be sufficient to reduce prejudice. In its stead, he proposed a series of situational con- ditions for intergroup contact that he deemed necessary for fundamental changes in intergroup prejudice. These social scientists’ deep concern for linking psychological research and theory to substantive social issues was echoed in the writings of their contem- porary—Kurt Lewin. Lewin’s (1946) “full-cycle psychology” approach to action research—incorporating the scientific study of social problems, the thoughtful development of solutions to those problems, and the generation of new knowledge from the practice—intimately tied explorations in academia to the real world. Lewin advocated for a mutuality between theory-driven experiments and field- based interventions: Many psychologists working today in an applied field are keenly aware of the need for close cooperation between theoretical and applied psychology. This can be accomplished . . . . if the theorist does not look toward applied problems with highbrow aversion or with fear of social problems, and if the applied psychologist realizes that there is nothing so practical as a good theory (Lewin, 1951, p. 169, as quoted in Bargal, Gold, & Lewin, 1992, p. 6) This issue of the Journal of Social Issues, along with other recent writings celebrat- ing a half-century of work on intergroup relations (see Dovidio, Glick, & Rudman, 2005; Zirkel, Lopez, & Brown, 2004), encourages us to look at the past and look ahead to the work that lies before us in the next half-century. Early investigations of intergroup processes reveal high degrees of involvement with communities and a direct commitment to application. For example, field studies of housewives in desegregated housing projects (Deutsch & Collins, 1951), seamen in the Merchant Marine (Brophy, 1945), police officers in Philadelphia (Kephart, 1957), and sol- diers fighting in World War II (Stouffer, Schuman, Devinney, Star, & Williams, 1949) offered cumulative evidence that contact between groups could reduce in- tergroup prejudice across many segments of society (see Pettigrew & Tropp, 2005, for a recent review). However, it appears that the interplay between research and Looking Back as We Look Ahead 441 practice has diminished over the years, such that the trajectories of researchers and practitioners have developed in largely divergent directions. As we approach a second half-century of intergroup relations research, we seek to revisit and extend Lewin’s full-cycle approach, which prioritizes theory and data collection in close collaboration with actors in the real world. This concern for establishing bridges between research and application has been shared by Aboud and Levy (1999), in their issue of the Journal of Social Issues. Entitled “Reducing racial prejudice, discrimination, and stereotyping: Translating research into programs,” the issue sought to identify ways in which basic research on prejudice and discrimination could be used to inform applied programs. Now, 7 years later, the present issue updates the ongoing dialogue among theoreticians, researchers, and practitioners in the field of intergroup relations. Moreover, we build upon this earlier contribution by exploring both how intergroup theory and research can inform applied programs, and how applied programs can contribute to the development of intergroup theories and research. Scope and Context of the Field of Prejudice Reduction and Social Inclusion Although most would agree that addressing the issue of prejudice requires a multi-layered response, relatively few collaborative efforts have been able to strike a balance between scholarly and applied approaches to understanding and reducing intergroup prejudice. Dialogues among theoreticians, researchers, and practitioners are often fraught with suspicion, judgments about valid knowledge, and concerns about unequal status, while at other times there have been no dia- logues of which to speak. Attempts to bridge theory, research, and practice may be especially complex today, as our field continues to grow in breadth and depth. The present issue seeks to highlight many of the achievements, current questions, and visions of future collaborations which lie at the nexus of these distinct approaches to the study of intergroup relations. Furthermore, in this issue, we seek to broaden our focus beyond concerns for prejudice reduction, that is, to consider how we can promote social inclu- sion within our work on intergroup relations. As we review examples from the research literature, it appears that much of the first half-century of scholarship on intergroup relations has focused on the problem of intergroup prejudice. In- deed, Allport (1954) originally defined prejudice as an “antipathy” toward other groups (p. 9), and this primary emphasis on negative aspects of intergroup rela- tionships has persisted during the last several decades. However, new questions and important extensions of intergroup research continue to surface, in response to the many societal changes that have occurred since Allport’s time; in particular, greater emphasis is now being placed on establishing multi-ethnic communities and promoting social inclusion (see Abrams, Hogg, & Marques, 2005; Gurin, Peng, Lopez, & Nagda, 1999; Hewstone et al., 2005; Jones, Lynch, Tenglund, & 442 Nagda, Tropp, and Paluck Gaertner, 2000). The growth of our field to address concerns about social inclusion suggests a positive approach, and one that moves beyond simply the absence or breakdown of prejudice. Our issue traverses some of this newly expanded terrain, and examines the various responses to these new concepts in the field of intergroup relations. The questions guiding this issue grew from our discussions at the June 2003 Anti-bias Education Conference in Evanston, Illinois. Co-sponsored by the So- ciety for the Psychological Study of Social Issues and the Slifka Foundation, the conference emerged from the work of the Anti-bias Education Workgroup of the American Jewish Committee Chapter in Chicago. The conference, and the origins of the workgroup, mark a growing movement and imperative of ex- changes among scholars and practitioners to work collaboratively in improving intergroup relations (see, e.g., Stephan & Vogt, 2004). Whether it is the growing concern for the persistence of inequalities (Massey & Denton, 1993), the resegre- gation of schools (Orfield, 2001), or the educational value of diversity (Gurin, Dey, Hurtado, & Gurin, 2002), scholars and practitioners are being called to envision new ways of improving intergroup relations. Colleagues from the United States, Israel, Germany, and South Africa gathered at the conference to mutually inform and strengthen the common work of anti-bias education. A follow-up conference was held a year later in Tempe, Arizona, under the auspices of Arizona State University. This interest in bringing together researchers and practitioners was similarly reflected in the 2004 conference on “Building Constructive Frameworks for Improving Ethnic Relations” sponsored by the University of Denver Conflict Resolution Institute. In light of these discussions, two critical questions inform our approach to this issue: How might we improve intergroup relations through focusing both on reducing intergroup prejudice and promoting social inclusion? And, as we explore these issues, how can we engage in an inclusive dialogue that is not limited to sim- ply scholars or practitioners, but expanded to include scholars and practitioners? Both questions, in their own way, center on deepening the connection of social psychology’s longstanding commitment to effecting social change: one, through continually examining how scholarly foci meet the challenges in the real world; and two, through fostering meaningful exchanges among the actors in these two broad realms to advance a mutually beneficial agenda. These questions are not new to us; they draw deep into social psychology’s disciplinary roots. Yet, we believe we are at an important juncture in the develop- ment of the field of intergroup relations, such that these themes call for especially careful and thoughtful attention. Not only are we bringing together scholars and practitioners in this issue, but we are also honored to include pioneers in intergroup relations—Walter Stephan, James Banks, Thomas Pettigrew, and Patricia Gurin— who have all provided insightful commentaries reviewing the contributions in this issue. As esteemed colleagues, they bring home the teaching of Sankofa, of the Looking Back as We Look Ahead 443 Akan people in West Africa. A simple translation of Sankofa means that we look back into our past and reclaim our history so that we may move forward.1 In this issue, we seek to return to the rich heritage of intergroup relations work in social psychology, toward the integration of research, theory, and practice. Integrating Research, Theory, and Practice on Intergroup Relations This issue serves as a platform for the interaction and exchange of ideas between researchers and practitioners in the area of intergroup relations. The con- ferences described above provided useful opportunities for the attending practi- tioners and scholars to share their expertise and reflect on their common interests. We encountered tremendous enthusiasm and willingness among researchers, prac- titioners, and practitioner–researchers to pull together our individual and collective work to forge new directions in the field of intergroup relations. Nonetheless, while researchers and practitioners work toward the same goals of reducing prejudice and promoting social inclusion, we often approach these issues from different starting points, and occasional meetings are not sufficient to provide a sustained intellectual engagement among us. Intergroup researchers typically seek to further our understanding of how basic motivational and perceptual processes contribute to shaping our responses to members of other groups. Practitioners tend to focus their attention on developing programs and interventions that can effectively reduce prejudice and promote social inclusion in applied settings. Given these differing orientations, practitioners and researchers often find that they ask different questions and frame their work in different ways, along with encountering distinct obstacles as they pursue strategies for prejudice reduction (Stephan, this issue). Thus, by highlighting an integration of cutting-edge research, theory, and practice, this issue can enhance a mutual understanding and sharing of perspectives among scholars in academic and applied settings who work to improve intergroup relations. Generally speaking, there are three possible ways to bridge theory, research, and practice. First, we can consider the approach of bridging theory to practice. Allport’s specification of conditions for optimal intergroup relations (e.g., equal status between groups, cooperation, common goals, and authority sanction) may be seen as an illustrative example. While Allport’s articulation of these conditions led to many waves of research on intergroup relations, it is still widely used as a basis for designing and improving programs (see Association for the Study and Development of Community, 1999; National Conference for Community and Justice, 1998; Stephan & Stephan, 2001). A second approach, bridging research to practice, fine tunes aspects of a pro- gram that can be enhanced based on research findings. For example, Gaertner and 1 See http://www.duboislc.net/SankofaMeaning.html. 444 Nagda, Tropp, and Paluck Dovidio’s theoretically driven and laboratory-tested Common In-group Identity Model was field-tested in an ongoing elementary school program known as the Green Circle Program (Houlette et al., 2004). The goal of the program was to promote social inclusiveness of all children, an appreciation of differences, and a feeling of common humanity. The research application to practice resulted in rein- forcing the sense of a common identity—“we”—through physical manifestations of the green circle of inclusion, e.g., a green circle made of green plastic tape was constructed around the perimeter of a classroom, and students given vests to wear with the green circle logo. Lastly, we can consider the approach of bridging practice to theory and re- search, an approach which is admittedly more difficult and rare. Two examples are instructive, however. Nagda’s article in this issue offers a useful example of how a deep engagement in intergroup dialogues can enhance the interactive communica- tion processes that underlie psychological change. The theoretical contribution is clear: the practice pushes for a more nuanced understanding of both the different processes that are involved in intergroup contact and a refinement of the com- plexity of intergroup communication processes when social identity and status are salient. A community practice example draws on the work of The Study Circles Resource Center that has focused on enhancing intergroup relationships in commu- nities to bring about effective change (Flavin-McDonald & Barrett, 1999). Study circles incorporate Allport’s conditions in bringing a diverse group of people in an equal status situation to work together toward the common goal not of prejudice reduction but of community change. A qualitative study of 17 study circle sites focused on the best practices to improve race relations in the community (Roberts, Houle, Kay, Nagda, & Elliott, 2000). McCoy and Scully (2002) translated these findings from a practice approach to a rich, conceptual model of multiple path- ways toward community change. Rather than a prescription for one or two paths, the rich conceptualization and theorizing calls for a deepened contextualized un- derstanding of the community-level conditions that influence certain pathways. This understanding, in turn, influences research and theorizing about intergroup relations and community change. Organization of This Issue The current issue is organized in three sections: the first focuses on prejudice reduction, the second on social inclusion, and the last on theory–research–practice intersections. Research, Theory, and Practice on Prejudice Reduction Prejudice reduction has been one of the longstanding and sought-after out- comes of intergroup programs. The first section includes empirical papers from Looking Back as We Look Ahead 445 researchers and practitioners concerning the psychological underpinnings of prej- udice and the potential effectiveness of prejudice reduction programs. In the first paper, Esses and Hodson discuss their research concerning people’s lay perceptions of ethnic prejudice, and how different conceptions of prejudice suggest different strategies in our attempts to change prejudiced attitudes. Specif- ically, these authors contend that understanding people’s lay beliefs about the nature of prejudice is important, as these beliefs can often provide a vehicle for legitimizing one’s prejudices, which in turn can contribute to the maintenance and perpetuation of intergroup biases. Across two studies, Esses and Hodson present compelling results that reveal clear relationships between measures of the per- ceived causes of prejudice, beliefs about the extent to which prejudice is inevitable and justifiable, and specific solutions that could be recommended to reduce preju- dice. Moreover, these authors find that those who score high on social dominance orientation and right-wing authoritarianism are especially likely to hold beliefs that can serve to maintain and perpetuate intergroup biases. Esses and Hodson conclude their paper by discussing implications of these trends for implementing prejudice reduction programs and achieving support for these programs among individuals in positions of power. Next, Cameron and Rutland demonstrate the benefits of using psychological theory and rigorous research methods to design and evaluate an anti-bias inter- vention. Their randomized controlled evaluation of an intervention, based on the “indirect cross friendship hypothesis” or “extended contact effect” (Wright, Aron, McLaughlin-Volpe, & Ropp, 1997), suggests that reduced bias might result from “vicarious” experiences of friendship. Using a 3 (between-subjects condition) × 2 (time) × 3 (disability of target) design, Cameron and Rutland involved chil- dren without disabilities in a 6-week intervention with one of three conditions: neutral (no mention of individual or group attributes), decategorized (emphasiz- ing individual identities), or intergroup (emphasizing category membership and typicality). Those who listened to and discussed stories involving children who had close friendships with children with disabilities, responded with increased positivity toward the disabled in terms of intended behavior and explicit outgroup attitude. The positive effect was most evident for those in the intergroup condition. Their findings are important theoretically in supporting Hewstone and Brown’s (1986) theory of maintaining group distinctiveness and salience for the general- ization of positive contact effects. Practically, the extended contact intervention could be used to create a more accepting climate in schools prior to the inclusion of children with disabilities, and potentially, children of other disadvantaged or devalued groups. Molina and Wittig examine the precise conditions under which intergroup contact can be effective in reducing prejudice using multiple, longitudinal studies of ethnic minority and majority high school students. Molina and Wittig note that while many conditions for contact have been regarded as important for achieving 446 Nagda, Tropp, and Paluck positive contact outcomes, researchers have yet to test the extent to which each of these conditions contributes significantly to producing positive contact effects. Findings from their studies indicate that conditions of acquaintance potential and interdependence between groups tend to predict reductions in intergroup prejudice; yet these effects also vary somewhat, depending on the outcomes of interest. In particular, acquaintance potential largely predicts reductions in affective preju- dice, whereas interdependence most strongly predicts perceptions of a common ingroup. Molina and Wittig discuss the broader significance of these findings, in terms of our attempts to establish optimal contact conditions in prejudice reduc- tion programs, along with considering the varied effects of these conditions for members of different ethnic groups. Wessler and De Andrade then focus on manifestations of intergroup bias in middle schools and high schools, in the form of verbal harassment. Growing from their combined experiences in research, hate crimes prosecution, and leadership of a non-profit civil rights organization, Wessler and De Andrade discuss the content and consequences of degrading words based upon race, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, religion, and other categories. Their focus group data show the pervasiveness and shocking intensity of degrading language, slurs, and jokes. The impact of the harassment on targeted students varies from depression to school dropout to self-inflicted harm. Their research with perpetrators of harassment found a disjuncture between the use of degrading language and an understanding of their hurtful impact. The perpetrators were typically motivated to use charged language simply because they thought the words were funny, or because they were looking for peer approval themselves. The authors then discuss the potential effectiveness of two anti-bias education interventions: a student leader project that educates students about the nature and impact of harassment, and a controversial dialogues program that facilitates sustained contact among perpetrators, targets, and pro-diversity advocates. Research, Theory, and Practice on Promoting Social Inclusion Other papers in this issue expand on the list of intended outcomes of intergroup programs. While prejudice reduction may be conceived of as involving individual- oriented outcomes, social inclusion broadens the sphere of outcome measurement to encourage positive changes at social and societal levels. With this broader fo- cus, this volume incorporates emerging scholarship that pays closer attention to the influence of social identities and social statuses on participants’ intervention experiences and outcomes. Many of the authors look at intergroup issues through the lenses of both dominant group and subordinated group members. Attention to the perspectives of different participants in intergroup programs highlights the need for a concerted study of processes and conditions of effective interventions. Looking Back as We Look Ahead 447 These papers distinguish between successful outcomes and the conditions and experiences that are crucial to these outcomes. Tropp and Bianchi begin this section by examining how placing a value on di- versity can enhance interest in intergroup contact among members of ethnic minor- ity and majority groups. Using open-ended responses, these authors demonstrate that ethnic minority group members are less likely to perceive that diversity is valued than ethnic majority group members; yet those who perceive that diver- sity is valued tend to express greater interest in intergroup contact. Similar trends are observed in subsequent survey studies, which also show that valuing diversity uniquely predicts interest in intergroup contact among majority group members, whereas perceiving that outgroup members value diversity predicts interest in in- tergroup contact among minority group members. Tropp and Bianchi conclude their paper by discussing the significance of diversity for reformulating aspects of intergroup contact theory, emphasizing how diversity can often enhance a sense of inclusion; yet the precise role diversity plays is likely to differ among members of minority and majority groups. Nagda reviews the emerging focus on process in intergroup contact, and brings in interdisciplinary perspectives from psychology, education, and communication. The majority of the research to date in social psychology has focused on psycholog- ical processes as mediating processes, while education focuses on the pedagogical processes used in training programs or classrooms. Emerging out of over 15 years of practice in intergroup dialogue, Nagda suggests situational and interactional processes that he calls communication processes. Factor analysis of survey data collected from participants in intergroup dialogues over 5 years reveals four factors that participants report were important in their learning—appreciating difference, engaging self, critical self-reflection, and alliance building. Each of the communi- cation processes has a significant and positive relationship to a previously identified psychological process–bridging difference. More important, however, is that the impact of intergroup dialogue encounter on bridging differences is fully mediated by the communication processes. In the discussion, Nagda proposes a new con- struct of critical-dialogic empathy that goes beyond simple perspective taking or cognitive empathy to a relational model that takes into account the societal power inequities which impact upon the parties in contact. Paluck reviews the field of diversity training and maps out a plan for future action research that would integrate theory and rigorous research with current diversity training practice. Her overview of various types of diversity training re- veals gaps in the theoretical foundations of this work and also in our knowledge about training impact. Two examples illustrate her vision of future action research. As a case of rigorous and theoretically driven impact research, she describes a recent field experiment that evaluated the impact of a school diversity training program. She then points to the intergroup contact literature as one existing body of psychological theory and data, which could inform unresolved questions about 448 Nagda, Tropp, and Paluck the procedure and goals of diversity training. A selective list of these questions is matched to relevant theoretical insights and research results from the inter- group contact literature, illustrating potential directions for future action research projects. Paluck’s envisioned research agenda is another instance of full-cycle psychology and a call to theoreticians, researchers, and practitioners alike. Intersections Between Research, Theory, and Practice Toward Improving Intergroup Relations The volume also seeks to chart continued scholarship and practice in in- tergroup programs by taking a reflective, retrospective view to inform a future vision. Each article in this volume seeks not only to document cutting-edge re- search, theory, and practice, but also to make substantive contributions to the future of intergroup relations. The authors share important insights about how their own research and/or practices help forge the road ahead. To help us think collectively and holistically about these individual contributions, we, the issue editors, invited prominent scholars and practitioners in the fields of intergroup relations and ed- ucation to provide reflections in defining the intersections of research, theory, and practice on intergroup relations. Walter Stephan, James Banks, Thomas Petti- grew, and Patricia Gurin each crafted their commentaries based on the following questions: (a) What are the critical issues we must address in integrating research and practice on intergroup relations? (b) What are their visions or insights regarding how research, theory, and practice on intergroup relations might be integrated in the future? (c) How do the articles in this volume relate to this vision? As a group, the commentators bring immense breadth, depth, and longevity of experience and wisdom in intergroup relations work. But their commentaries are not necessarily restricted to their established expertise; the commentaries also include their own continued engagement in intergroup relations. Indeed, we begin our introduction of each of the commentators with a personal–professional biogra- phy that speaks to their lived commitments to improving intergroup relations and the unique perspectives they bring to their specific commentaries. Conclusion The second half-century of our work in intergroup relations, as reflected in the articles and commentaries in this issue, promises to be rich in all ways— theoretically, empirically, and practically. Like the subject of our work—intergroup Looking Back as We Look Ahead 449 contact and intergroup relations—such promise needs to be carefully cultivated and not left to random chance. As Walter Stephan says in his commentary, multiple avenues for practitioner–researcher collaborations need to be availed of not only to bridge the practitioner–researcher divide, but also to powerfully advance the work of intergroup relations and social change to which we all have a deep commitment. As one of our student-practitioners noted, “We are here for different reasons, but we are headed in the same direction.” It is in this spirit that we, as the editors, have collaborated in offering this issue of the Journal of Social Issues. References Aboud, F., & Levy, S. (1999). Reducing racial prejudice, discrimination, and stereotyping: Translating research into programs. Journal of Social Issues, 55(4), 621–815. Abrams, D., Hogg, M. A., & Marques, J. M. (2005). The social psychology of inclusion and exclusion. New York: Psychology Press. Allport, G. W. (1954). The nature of prejudice. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. Association for the Study and Development of Community. (1999). Principles for intergroup projects: A first look. Gaithersburg, MD: ASCD. Bargal, D., Gold, M., & Lewin, M. (1992). Introduction: The heritage of Kurt Lewin. Journal of Social Issues, 48(2), 3–13. Brophy, I. N. (1945). The luxury of anti-Negro prejudice. Public Opinion Quarterly, 9, 456–466. Deutsch, M., & Collins, M. E. (1951). Interracial housing: A psychological evaluation of a social experiment. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Dovidio, J. F., Glick, P., & Rudman, L. A. (2005). On the nature of prejudice: Fifty years after Allport. Malden, MA: Blackwell. Flavin-McDonald, C., & Barrett, M. H. (1999). The Topsfield Foundation: Fostering democratic com- munity building through face-to-face dialogue. In P. J. Edelson & P. L. Malone (Eds.), Enhanc- ing creativity in adult and continuing education: Innovative approaches, methods, and ideas (pp. 25–36). San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. Gurin, P., Dey, E. L., Hurtado, S., & Gurin, G. (2002). Diversity and higher education: Theory and impact on educational outcomes. Harvard Educational Review, 72(3), 330–366. Gurin, P., Peng, T., Lopez, G. E., & Nagda, B. A. (1999). Context, identity and intergroup relations. In D. Prentice & D. Miller (Eds.), Cultural divides: Understanding and overcoming group conflict (pp. 133–170). New York: Russell Sage Foundation. Hewstone, M., & Brown, R. (1986). Contact is not enough: An intergroup perspective on the contact hypothesis. In M. Hewstone & R. Brown (Eds.), Contact and conflict in intergroup encounters (pp. 1–44). Oxford, UK: Blackwell. Hewstone, M., Cairns, E., Voci, A., Paolini, S., McLernon, F., Crisp, R. J., Niens, U., & Craig, J. (2005). Intergroup contact in a divided society: Challenging segregation in Northern Ireland. In D. Abrams, M. A. Hogg, & J. M. Marques (Eds.), The social psychology of inclusion and exclusion (pp. 265–292). New York: Psychology Press. Houlette, M. A., Gaertner, S. L., Johnson, K. M., Banker, B. S., Riek, B. M., & Dovidio, J. F. (2004). Developing a more inclusive social identity: An elementary school intervention. Journal of Social Issues, 60(1), 35–55. Jones, J. M., Lynch, P. D., Tenglund, A., & Gaertner, S. L. (2000). Toward a diversity hypothesis: Multidimensional effects of intergroup contact. Applied and Preventative Psychology, 9, 53– 62. Kephart, W. M. (1957). Racial factors and urban law enforcement. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. Lewin, K. (1946). Action research and minority problems. Journal of Social Issues, 2(4), 34–46. Lewin, K. (1951). Problems of research in social psychology. In D. Cartwright (Ed.), Field theory in social science: Selected theoretical papers (pp. 155–169). Westport, CT: Greenwood. 450 Nagda, Tropp, and Paluck Massey, D. S., & Denton, N. A. (1993). American apartheid. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. McCoy, M. L., & Scully, P. L. (2002). Deliberative dialogue to expand civic engagement: What kind of talk does democracy need? National Civic Review, 91(2), 117–135. National Conference for Community and Justice. (1998). Intergroup relations in the United States: Programs and organizations. New York: NCCJ. Orfield, G. (2001, July). Schools more separate: Consequences of a decade of resegregation. Re- trieved on March 1, 2006 (http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/research/deseg/separate schools01.php). Pettigrew, T. (1999). Gordon Willard Allport: A tribute. Journal of Social Issues, 55(3), 415–427. Pettigrew, T., & Tropp, L. (2005). Allport’s intergroup contact hypothesis: Its history and influence (pp. 262–277). In J. Dovidio, P. Glick, & L. A. Rudman (Eds.), On the nature of prejudice: Fifty years after Allport. Malden, MA: Blackwell. Roberts, R., Houle, K., Kay, S., Nagda, B. A., & Elliott, V. (2000). Toward competent communities: Best practices for producing community-wide study circles. Lexington, KY: Roberts & Kay, Inc. Stephan, W., & Vogt, P. (2004). Education programs for improving intergroup relations: Theory, practice and research. New York: Teachers College Press. Stephan, W. G., & Stephan, C. W. (2001). Improving intergroup relations. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Stouffer, S. A., Schuman, E. A., Devinney, L. C., Star, S. A., & Williams, R. M., Jr. (1949). The American soldier: Adjustment during army life. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Williams, R. M., Jr. (1947). The reduction of intergroup tensions. New York: Social Science Research Council. Wright, S. C., Aron, A., McLaughlin-Volpe, T., & Ropp, S. A. (1997). The extended contact effect: Knowledge of cross-group friendships and prejudice. Journal of Personality and Social Psy- chology, 73(1), 73–90. Zirkel, S. Lopez, G. E., & Brown, L. (2004). The 50th anniversary of Brown v. Board of education: Interethnic contact and change in education in the 21st century. Journal of Social Issues, 60(1), 1–214. BIREN (RATNESH) A. NAGDA, PhD, MSW, MA is Associate Professor of Social Work and Director of the Intergroup Dialogue, Education and Action (IDEA) Center at the University of Washington (http://www.ssw.washington.edu/idea). In 2001, he received the University of Washington Distinguished Teaching Award. In 2006, the IDEA Center received the University of Washington Brotman Award for Instructional Excellence in recognition of its efforts to advance innovative learning for undergraduates. Dr. Nagda’s research and teaching interests focus on cultural diversity and social justice, intergroup dialogue, and empowerment-oriented social work practice and education. He recently completed a study of community-based dialogue programs, and is currently conducting a multi-university evaluation of college-based intergroup dialogues. LINDA R. TROPP is Associate Professor at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst, where she contributes to the Social Psychology Division’s emerging concentration in intergroup relations and conflict resolution. Dr. Tropp is a mem- ber of the Governing Council of the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues, and she serves on the editorial boards of Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin and Group Processes and Intergroup Relations. She received the Gordon Allport Intergroup Relations Prize for her research on intergroup contact, as well Looking Back as We Look Ahead 451 as the McKeachie Early Career Award for the teaching of psychology. Her re- search concerns experiences with intergroup contact among minority and majority status groups, identification with social groups, interpretations of intergroup rela- tionships, and responses to prejudice and disadvantage. In addition to conducting research in these areas, she lends her expertise to the “Safe Schools Initiative” sponsored by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts Attorney General’s office, a program which has been developed to reduce bullying, hate crimes, and harassment in Massachusetts schools. ELIZABETH LEVY PALUCK, MS, is a doctoral candidate in the Psychology Department at Yale University. Her research interests include the psychology of intergroup prejudice and conflict reduction, research methodology, and gender psychology. For her dissertation, she reviewed evidence on the efficacy of prejudice reduction interventions in the laboratory and in the field, and conducted two field experiments on existing real-world interventions: a high school anti-bias program in the United States, and a reconciliation radio program in Rwanda. 
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work_y222gvbxnbgbbdtexi5uvnjlwi	----	doi:10.1017/S1049096517001111 © American Political Science Association, 2017 PS • October 2017 985 ........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................ ........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................ P r o f e s s i o n s y m P o s i u m Contentious Politics in the United States: What Role for Political Scientists? ........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................ Introduction Maryam Zarnegar Deloffre, Arcadia University Carrie Booth Walling, Albion College Teaching political science on college campuses in the United States in the past two years has been anything but “business as usual.” Political science faculty and their campus communities are simul-taneously witnessing a dramatic increase in ten- sion and polarization across differences as well as a resurgent community engagement around shared values and intersec- tional interests. As political scientists, we are observing a rise in racial and religious tensions, class divisions, and a deepen- ing distrust in government and democratic institutions that to us seem unprecedented. At the same time, we are witness- ing a rise in civic engagement and expression, a sustained social-protest movement, and an increase in the number of women and minorities seeking elected office for the first time. As citizens, we are working to make government under- standable to our colleagues, neighbors, and communities in a context defined by a heightened distrust of experts and a growing anti-intellectualism. As teachers, we recognize that college campuses are undergoing the same transformations taking place in American society at large and that this politi- cal, racial, religious, and economic diversity makes our college campuses sites of contentious politics. In speaking with colleagues around the country, we realized that many political scientists were grappling similarly with how to respond to the challenges facing our democratic society. Our symposium asks three main questions: What role should political scientists play in this current period of contentious politics? How can we build campuses to be both bastions of free expression and safe places for exploration? How should we engage our neighbors, communities, students, and the public? From the numerous compelling submissions to our call for proposals, it is clear that this topic has hit a nerve and that scientists are eager to engage. We offer in these pages a toolbox of sorts for political scientists seeking to navigate the contentious current politics. This symposium addresses several broad themes, includ- ing ways to strengthen civic engagement in our classrooms, across our campuses, and in our broader communities. Sym- posium authors represent diverse subfields of our discipline and various institutions from small private liberal arts col- leges to large public research universities. Collectively, the authors remind us of the ways that individuals are embedded within communities and how those communities and their values shape the behavior of individual members, making actions such as voting and bullying communal as well as individual acts. They challenge us to foster critical thinking by helping students and citizens to separate fact from false- hood and to challenge their own assumptions. They stress the need for political scientists to interrogate power hierarchies in American society as well as within our own discipline. Our authors remind us that however we choose to engage in this political moment, students and community members are watching and that our action or inaction will communicate the value of political science in addressing the challenges of contemporary society. The current political and social context in the United States is characterized in part by divisive trends, such as increas- ing partisan polarization, a surge in populist nationalism and anti-immigrant sentiment, a more fragmentary media landscape, and deepening distrust in government and civic institutions. In 2017, an overwhelming majority of American adults (86%) describe the country as more divided than in the past (Pew Research Center 2017, 1). Likewise, levels of inter- personal trust in the United States are generally low, with only 35% of respondents in a recent survey stating that “most people can be trusted” (World Values Survey 1981–2014). Although it is too early to determine whether it is a lasting trend, highly publicized hate crimes in the aftermath of the November 2016 presidential election have generated fear that hate is on the rise. From early January to early March 2017, multiple Jewish cemeteries in Rochester, St. Louis, and Phila- delphia were vandalized (Berlinger and Frehse 2017) and four mosques were burned to the ground in Texas, Washington, ............................................................................................................................................... http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1017/S1049096517001111&domain=pdf 986 PS • October 2017 ........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................ ........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................ P r o f e s s i o n S y m p o s i u m : W h a t R o l e f o r P o l i t i c a l S c i e n t i s t s ? and Florida (Yan and Cuevas 2017). The Southern Poverty Law Center identified 917 active hate groups in the United States in 2016—a slight increase from 892 hate groups iden- tified in 2015. Anti-Muslim hate groups, however, grew by an alarming 197%, from 34 in 2015 to 101 in 2016 (Potok 2017). Religious bias accounts for approximately 20% of hate crimes in the United States. Another 60% of hate-crime victims are targeted on the basis of their race, ethnicity, or ancestry and approximately 20% on the basis of sexual orientation, gender identity, or gender bias (Federal Bureau of Investigation 2015). Symposium authors Michael Suk-Young Chwe and Elizabeth Levy Paluck urge citizens to act collectively to prevent hate crimes and bullying by convincing potential perpetrators that community members oppose and will socially sanction acts of hate. The current political context also is characterized by wide- spread dissatisfaction with government institutions, which translates to low levels of political efficacy. American confi- dence in Congress has decreased from 52% reporting “a great deal” or “quite a lot” in 1981 to only 21% reporting favorable views in 2014 (World Values Survey 1981–2014). Although there is some disagreement in the literature, it is generally believed that a cynical view of government affects citizen engagement and voter turnout (Gronlund and Setala 2007; Teixeira 1992/2011). Contributors Carrie Eaves and Jason Husser argue that political scientists play a critical role in communicating the importance of government. They describe how a campus-wide commitment to civic engagement can foster political participation and prepare students to become engaged and active members of society after graduation. Amy Widestrom’s article explores community influences on voter behavior and shows how the civic environment in which peo- ple live affects their attitudes toward political processes and participation in civic life. She offers recommendations about how political scientists and policy makers might empower citizens and build vibrant and active civic institutions in all neighborhoods, regardless of economic status. Like voting, social capital and civic engagement are key indi- cators of democratic health, and low levels of both threaten the fabric of American democracy (Putnam 2001). Whereas data suggest that civic and political engagement may have declined and stagnated for decades, since November 2016, Americans seem to be increasingly paying attention to and getting involved in civic life. For example, on January 21, 2017, an estimated 4.2 million people peacefully protested in 654 Women’s Marches across the United States, making it the largest protest in American history (Pressman and Chenoweth 2017). A survey conducted during the Women’s March on Washington identified a high number of first-time marchers and also found that 56% of the marchers had not participated in a demonstration in the previous five years (Benac 2017). As of this writing, it appears that civic engagement has achieved a sustained momentum. Grassroots groups such as Tuesdays with Toomey apply weekly pressure to elected officials; citizens flood town hall meetings with their repre- sentatives and jam Senate telephone lines with their calls (Hefling 2017; Wheeler and Shelbourne 2017); charitable giv- ing has surged to unprecedented heights (Itkowitz 2016); and thousands attended rallies to protect the Affordable Care Act, protest the Dakota Access Pipeline, and stand against the travel ban. In this symposium, Michael Heaney examines the ways in which contemporary activism has become politically polarized. He identifies the opportunities and challenges this presents for activists seeking to build majoritarian social movements. Americans’ distrust in institutions extends to the press and information provided by conventional news outlets. In the early 1990s, 56% of Americans had “a great deal” or “quite a lot” of confidence in the press; this percentage dropped to 23% in the 2010s (World Values Survey 1981–2014). In another large-scale representative survey, only 22% of American adults reported having “a lot” of confidence in information provided by local news organizations, and only 18% reported “a lot” of confidence in national news organizations. Notably, fully 74% of American adults believe the media is biased and “tends to favor one side when covering political and social issues” (Mitchell et al. 2016, 8). Distrust of the media combined with the proliferation of “fake news” complicates our job as educators because we now must contend with and offer correctives to a context of misinformation, skepticism, and competing interpretations of reality. It is heartening to note that despite the spread of fake news and anti-intellectual rhetoric, Americans generally continue to hold positive views of universities. Recent data suggest that 62.6% of Americans have a “great deal” or “quite a lot” of confidence in universities (World Values Survey 1981– 2014). This data point suggests that whereas the public is skeptical of information provided by the media, universities could fill the information gap. Joshua Busby’s article explores how political scientists can respond to the proliferation of fake news by using social-media platforms to inform and engage the public. He promotes an ethos of cross-ideological conversation through online engagement in the form of blogs and social-media posts on platforms including Facebook and Twitter. In seeking to deepen understandings of politics, democ- racy, and citizenship, political science provides the tools to analyze and address these trends. Indeed, the study of political science is informed by long-standing questions about power, ...What role should political scientists play in this current period of contentious politics? How can we build campuses to be both bastions of free expression and safe places for exploration? How should we engage our neighbors, communities, students, and the public? PS • October 2017 987 ........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................ ........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................ freedom, justice, and equality, which entails a systematic but also critical examination of institutions and processes of gov- ernments and governance. Victor (2016) argues convincingly that political scientists are “the scholars who can most lucidly understand the relationships between institutions, behaviors, and policy outcomes.” She urges political scientists to revisit disciplinary norms regarding public engagement and to rally to protect the core institutions of constitutional, republican democracy. To do so does not require suspension of the scientific method or objectivity; rather, it recognizes that most political scientists value the preservation of democracy (Victor 2016). In this vein, Alison Brysk’s article describes how a gener- ation of human-rights scholarship can guide political scien- tists in responding to an increasingly illiberal and conflicted world. She challenges political scientists as dual citizens—of their country and of the republic of letters—to “speak rights to power” by disseminating the lessons of global history, fostering support for democratic movements, and deepening civic education within and beyond the academy. Finally, in their article, Bidisha Biswas and Shirin Deylami explain how questioning dominant paradigms and promoting a pedagogy of margins challenges students to actively practice critical thinking outside of their preestablished frames of reference. The goal is to equip students to become critical consumers of information and empathetic global citizens while simul- taneously broadening their sociocultural perspectives and strengthening their conceptual knowledge of politics. The articles in this symposium share a commitment to campus and community engagement as well as to a common understanding among their authors that there is no con- flict between maintaining the intellectual credibility of our discipline and engaging the public sphere—a view that we recognize is not uncontested. We suggest that being nonpar- tisan is not the same as being apolitical. It is possible—and perhaps even necessary—for political scientists to maintain rigorous ethical and intellectual standards and still engage in applied politics. Indeed, disseminating research about how to improve the functioning of political institutions and prepar- ing citizens to be effective political participants comprise a core objective of political science (APSA 2017). In 2017, college campuses in the United States, like American society at large, are threatened by a cynical understanding of politics that feeds off fear and fosters division. Just as menac- ing is the threat of indifference to the fear, pain, and despair of so many Americans, particularly the most marginalized groups in our society. Social science research shows that being a bystander normalizes human-rights abuses and makes resistance to abuse more difficult (Staub 1989; Thalhammer et al. 2007). Elie Wiesel warned that indifference “always benefits the aggressor and never his victim—whose pain is magnified when he or she feels forgotten” (Wiesel 1999). In his “Letter from a Birmingham Jail,” Reverend Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. lamented the complacency of the white moderate, who held greater devotion to order than justice and who distanced one’s self from the injustices taking place in other American communities (King 1963). In this spirit, the authors of this symposium suggest that it is incumbent on political scien- tists to refuse to be indifferent to the political contestations of our time. Instead, the role of the political scientist should include safeguarding democratic institutions, promoting civic engagement, advancing shared values of equality and justice, and protecting those most at risk of having their rights vio- lated or their freedoms revoked. We offer a toolbox for applied action created by political scientists for political scientists who are struggling with how to effectively engage our students, our communities, and the American public at large. We imagine that not all polit- ical scientists will agree with the arguments and suggestions advanced here and some even may object to the underlying premise of the symposium—that political scientists have a responsibility to publicly engage. As such, we hope that this symposium marks a beginning rather than an ending of an important conversation about institutional values and prac- tices of our discipline. We invite conversation. We welcome dissent. Perhaps most important, we encourage engagement rather than indifference. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS We thank the symposium participants and the editors and staff at PS: Political Science & Politics for their contribu- tions to and assistance with this symposium. We offer spe- cial thanks to Celina Szymanski, Joshua Busby, and Michael Heaney for their helpful comments and suggestions. We also thank Danika Gloege and Andrea Sanchez for their research assistance. n R E F E R E N C E S American Political Science Association. 2017. “About APSA.” Available at www.apsanet.org/ABOUT/About-APSA. Benac, Nancy. 2017. “Survey: DC Women’s March Drew Many First-Time Protesters.” Associated Press, January 26. Available at https://apnews. com/712f88ea46aa40babae99702514b3344. Berlinger, Joshua, and Rob Frehse. 2017. “Jewish Cemetery Vandalized in New York, Third Case in Recent Weeks.” CNN, March 3. Available at www.cnn. com/2017/03/03/us/jewish-cemetery-vandalized-headstones-new-york. Federal Bureau of Investigation. 2015. “2015 Hate Crime Statistics.” Available at https://ucr.fbi.gov/hate-crime/2015/tables-and-data-declarations/ 1tabledatadecpdf. Gronlund, Kimmo, and Maija Setala. 2007. “Political Trust, Satisfaction and Voter Turnout.” Comparative European Politics 5: 400–22. Hefling, Kimberly. 2017. “Thousands Flood Senate Phone Lines Seeking to Halt Confirmation of Devos.” Politico, January 26. Available at www.politico.com/ story/2017/01/betsy-devos-confirmation-senate-phone-lines-234216. It is heartening to note that despite the spread of fake news and anti-intellectual rhetoric, Americans generally continue to hold positive views of universities. http://www.apsanet.org/ABOUT/About-APSA https://apnews.com/712f88ea46aa40babae99702514b3344 https://apnews.com/712f88ea46aa40babae99702514b3344 http://www.cnn.com/2017/03/03/us/jewish-cemetery-vandalized-headstones-new-york http://www.cnn.com/2017/03/03/us/jewish-cemetery-vandalized-headstones-new-york https://ucr.fbi.gov/hate-crime/2015/tables-and-data-declarations/1tabledatadecpdf https://ucr.fbi.gov/hate-crime/2015/tables-and-data-declarations/1tabledatadecpdf http://www.politico.com/story/2017/01/betsy-devos-confirmation-senate-phone-lines-234216 http://www.politico.com/story/2017/01/betsy-devos-confirmation-senate-phone-lines-234216 988 PS • October 2017 ........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................ ........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................ P r o f e s s i o n S y m p o s i u m : W h a t R o l e f o r P o l i t i c a l S c i e n t i s t s ? Itkowitz, Colby. 2016. “‘It’s Unprecedented in Our History’: Trump’s Election Inspired Millions in Nonprofit Donations.” Washington Post, November 30. King, Martin Luther, Jr. 1963. “Letter from a Birmingham Jail.” King Papers, Martin Luther King Jr. Research and Education Institute, April 16. Available at https://kinginstitute.stanford.edu/king-papers/documents/ letter-birmingham-jail. Mitchell, Amy, Jeffrey Gottfried, Michael Barthel, and Elisa Shearer. 2016. “The Modern News Consumer: News Attitudes and Practices in the Digital Era.” S Y M P O S I U M C O N T R I B U T O R S Bidisha Biswas is professor of political science at Western Washington University. She previously served as a policy adviser to the United States Department of State. Bidisha works on international security, diaspora and immigration related issues. Her recent publications are Managing Conflicts in India: Policies of Coercion and Accommodation (2013, Rowman and Littlefield) and Indian Immigrant Women and Work: The American Experience (2016, Routledge). Bidisha may be contacted at Bidisha.biswas@wwu.edu. Alison Brysk is the Mellichamp Chair in Global Governance at University of California, Santa Barbara, past president of the APSA Human Rights Section, 2016 ISA Distinguished Scholar in Human Rights, and a 2013-2014 Woodrow Wilson Fellow. Brysk is the author or editor of 12 books on international human rights, and is currently researching mobilizations against gender violence at the frontiers of globalization. She may be reached at abrysk@global.ucsb.edu. Joshua Busby is associate professor at the LBJ School of Public Affairs at the University of Texas at Austin. His research interests include transnational advocacy movements, climate governance, climate and security, global health, and US foreign policy. He is the author of two books for Cambridge University Press. He is also a permanent contributor to the Duck of Minerva blog. Follow him on Twitter at @busbyj2 or email him at busbyj@utexas.edu. Michael Suk-Young Chwe is professor of political science at the University of California, Los Angeles, who specializes in game theory and its applications. His books include Rational Ritual: Culture, Coordination, and Common Knowledge and Jane Austen: Game Theorist. He served as coeditor of the American Political Science Review from 2007 to 2009. He may be reached at michael@chwe.net. Maryam Zarnegar Deloffre is associate professor of political science in the undergraduate program in political science and graduate program in International Peace and Conflict Resolution at Arcadia University. She is author of several articles on non- governmental organization (NGO) self-regulation and accountability; global pandemic governance; human security and global health; and pedagogy. Her current research explores inter-NGO governance, accountability, and organization. She can be reached at deloffrem@arcadia.edu. Shirin Deylami is associate professor of political theory at Western Washington University. She is also affiliated with interdisciplinary programs in Women, Gender, and Sexuality Studies and Arab and Islamic Studies. Her research and teaching focuses on the intersections of feminist theory, popular culture, and the complex relationship between Islam and the West. She is currently finishing a book on conceptions of the West in contemporary Islamist political theory. Shirin may be contacted at Shirin. Deylami@wwu.edu. Carrie P. Eaves is assistant professor of political science at Elon University. She may be reached at ceaves@elon.edu. Michael T. Heaney is assistant professor of organizational studies and political science at the University of Michigan. His research focuses on how social networks, social movements, interest groups, and political parties shape organizational processes and policy outcomes His articles appear in journals such as the American Political Science Review, the American Journal of Sociology, the Journal of Politics, Perspectives on Politics, Social Networks, American Politics Research, and the Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law. He may be reached at mheaney@umich.edu. Jason A. Husser is assistant professor of political science and director of the Elon Poll at Elon University. He may be reached at jhusser@elon.edu. Elizabeth Levy Paluck is professor in the Department of Psychology and in the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University. Currently she also serves as the deputy director of the Kahneman-Treisman Center for Behavioral Science and Policy at Princeton University. Her research explores how people understand, follow, and disobey social norms, and has been published in the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, and the American Political Science Review. She can be reached at epaluck@princeton.edu. We offer a toolbox for applied action created by political scientists for political scientists who are struggling with how to effectively engage our students, our communities, and the American public at large. Staub, Ervin. 1989. The Roots of Evil. New York: Cambridge University Press. Teixeira, Ruy A. 1992/2011. The Disappearing American Voter. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press. Thalhammer, Kristina E., Paula L. O’Loughlin, Myron Peretz Glazer, Penina Migdal Glazer, Sam McFarland, Sharon Toffey Shepela, and Nathan Stoltzfus. 2007. Courageous Resistance: The Power of Ordinary People. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 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Pew Research Center. 2017. “On Eve of Inauguration, Americans Expect Nation’s Deep Political Divisions to Persist.” January 19. Available at http://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/5/2017/01/ 19114635/01-19-17-2017-Political-outlook-release.pdf. Potok, Mark. 2017. “The Year in Hate and Extremism.” The Intelligence Report. Southern Poverty Law Center, February 15. Available at www.splcenter.org/ fighting-hate/intelligence-report/2017/year-hate-and-extremism. Pressman, Jeremy, and Erica Chenoweth. 2017. “Crowd Estimates January 21, 2017.” Open-access document available at https://docs.google.com/ spreadsheets/d/1xa0iLqYKz8x9Yc_rfhtmSOJQ2EGgeUVjvV4A8LsIaxY/ htmlview?sle=true. Putnam, Robert D. 2001. Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community. New York: Simon and Schuster. https://kinginstitute.stanford.edu/king-papers/documents/letter-birmingham-jail https://kinginstitute.stanford.edu/king-papers/documents/letter-birmingham-jail mailto:Bidisha.biswas@wwu.edu mailto:abrysk@global.ucsb.edu mailto:busbyj@utexas.edu mailto:michael@chwe.net mailto:deloffrem@arcadia.edu mailto:Shirin.Deylami@wwu.edu mailto:Shirin.Deylami@wwu.edu mailto:ceaves@elon.edu mailto:mheaney@umich.edu mailto:jhusser@elon.edu mailto:epaluck@princeton.edu http://www.vox.com/mischiefs-of-faction/2016/11/18/13673274/political-science-call-to-action http://www.vox.com/mischiefs-of-faction/2016/11/18/13673274/political-science-call-to-action https://origin-nyi.thehill.com/homenews/administration/316321-anti-devos-calls-jam-senate-phone-lines https://origin-nyi.thehill.com/homenews/administration/316321-anti-devos-calls-jam-senate-phone-lines https://origin-nyi.thehill.com/homenews/administration/316321-anti-devos-calls-jam-senate-phone-lines http://www.pbs.org/eliewiesel/resources/millennium.html http://www.pbs.org/eliewiesel/resources/millennium.html http://www.cnn.com/2017/03/02/us/mosque-fires-2017 http://www.cnn.com/2017/03/02/us/mosque-fires-2017 http://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/13/2016/07/08140120/PJ_2016.07.07_Modern-News-Consumer_FINAL.pdf http://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/13/2016/07/08140120/PJ_2016.07.07_Modern-News-Consumer_FINAL.pdf http://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/5/2017/01/19114635/01-19-17-2017-Political-outlook-release.pdf http://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/5/2017/01/19114635/01-19-17-2017-Political-outlook-release.pdf http://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/intelligence-report/2017/year-hate-and-extremism http://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/intelligence-report/2017/year-hate-and-extremism https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1xa0iLqYKz8x9Yc_rfhtmSOJQ2EGgeUVjvV4A8LsIaxY/htmlview?sle=true https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1xa0iLqYKz8x9Yc_rfhtmSOJQ2EGgeUVjvV4A8LsIaxY/htmlview?sle=true https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1xa0iLqYKz8x9Yc_rfhtmSOJQ2EGgeUVjvV4A8LsIaxY/htmlview?sle=true PS • October 2017 989 ........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................ ........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................ Carrie Booth Walling is associate professor of political science at Albion College and associate director of the Prentiss M. Brown Honors Program. Currently she is visiting scholar at the International Policy Institute, Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy, University of Michigan. She is the author of All Necessary Measures: The United Nations and Humanitarian Intervention published by the University of Pennsylvania Press and articles on human rights trials, ethnic cleansing and state sovereignty. Her current research explores human rights, justice and accountability norms in the Security Council and the International Criminal Court. She can be reached at cwalling@ albion.edu. Amy Widestrom is associate professor of political science at Arcadia University. Her forthcoming works include “The Effect of Political Parties on the Distribution of Income in the American States: 1917-2011,” in Social Science Quarterly, with Thomas Hays (University of Connecticut) and Chris Dennis (California State University, Long Beach), and “How Ideas Shape Urban Political Development,” in Ideas, Interests, Institutions, and Urban Political Development, edited by Richardson Dilworth (Drexel University) and Timothy Weaver (University of Albany), which is under contract with the University of Pennsylvania Press. She may contacted at widestroma@arcadia.edu. mailto:cwalling@albion.edu mailto:cwalling@albion.edu mailto:widestroma@arcadia.edu 
work_y2kqtwini5ew7mg7yfmv27333a	----	Not collateral damage: Trends in violence and hate crimes experienced by sex workers in the Republic of Ireland Article Not collateral damage: Trends in violence and hate crimes experienced by sex workers in the Republic of Ireland Rosie Campbell Department of Social Policy and Social Work, University of York, UK Lucy Smith UglyMugs.ie Becky Leacy and Miriam Ryan Chrysalis Community Drug Project, Dublin, Republic of Ireland Billie Stoica GOSHH, Gender Orientation Sexual Health HIV, Limerick, Republic of Ireland Abstract The Republic of Ireland’s new Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act 2017 (2017 Act) criminalised sex purchase. Drawing on primary data from reports made by sex workers in Ireland to UglyMugs.ie, we analyse trends in violent and other crimes against sex workers in Republic of Ireland (hereafter Ireland). Examining the four-year period 2015–2019, we highlight the various crimes sex workers experience, including incidents Corresponding author: Rosie Campbell, Department of Social Policy and Social Work, University of York, Heslington, York, North Yorkshire YO10 5DD, UK. Email: rosie.campbell@york.ac.uk Irish Journal of Sociology 2020, Vol. 28(3) 280–313 ! The Author(s) 2020 Article reuse guidelines: sagepub.com/journals-permissions DOI: 10.1177/0791603520939794 journals.sagepub.com/home/irj https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9008-3924 mailto:rosie.campbell@york.ac.uk http://uk.sagepub.com/en-gb/journals-permissions http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0791603520939794 journals.sagepub.com/home/irj http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1177%2F0791603520939794&domain=pdf&date_stamp=2020-07-22 of hate crime. Analysis of UglyMugs.ie data found that crimes (including violent offen- ces) against sex workers increased following the introduction of the new law and continued with low levels of reporting of said crimes to the police. The data suggest that the 2017 Act heightens the risks for sex workers. Here, we advocate an intersec- tional framework to provide a more nuanced understanding of how sex workers in Ireland experience violent and other hate crimes (ICRSE, 2014). We suggest that con- sidering the international research evidence, the most conducive framework in which to reduce violence against sex workers is that of full decriminalisation (Platt et al, 2018). But, as others have pointed out, that legal reform needs to be in tandem with other policies and a refocusing of police resources on sex worker safety, better enabling reporting and access to justice. Keywords Sex work, violence, hate crime, decriminalisation Introduction As other articles in this themed issue establish, Irish criminal law changed in 2017 when law was introduced (Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act 2017 – hereafter the 2017 Act), which made it a crime to pay for sexual activity with a prostitute, at the same time laws on soliciting which criminalised sellers were removed. Brothel keeping law, which is what is most often used to criminalise indoor sex workers, remained in place. When announcing the Bill in 2014, the Minister for Justice and Equality stated; ‘. . . I strongly believe that this proposal is the best suited to address the trafficking and exploitation associated with prostitution. It sends a clear message that purchasing sexual services contributes to exploitation’. She also said ‘the proposal I am announcing today reflects an All-Island consensus to targeting the predominantly exploitative nature of prostitution’ (Department of Justice and Equality, 2014). This illustrates the government position that the aim of the bill was to address trafficking and exploitation of people in sex work. Beegan and Moran (2017: 71), examining how the law was situated within feminist paradigms, stated that; ‘. . . there is undoubtedly a leaning towards the radical feminist/abolitionist perspective in this decision as it favours the development of the Nordic Model as an intervention to combat the exploitation of women in the sex trade’. Indeed, this legal change had been advocated for by the Irish neo-abolitionist organisation Turn off the Red Light (TORL). The dominant narrative framing the arguments of TORL was influenced by radical feminist analysis that prostitution is itself a form of violence against women, created by patriarchal male demand, which should be prohibited and eradicated (McGarry and Fitzgerald, 2018). Sex work was identified as inherently violent, a form of sexual violence against women, Campbell et al. 281 a coerced activity with trafficking predominant and harmful for the women involved. Those advocating the law proposed it as a means of reducing male demand for prostitution and hence reducing violence against women. Their argu- ments reflected those who advocated for the criminalisation of purchasing com- mercial sex as a regulatory framework modelled on law introduced in Sweden in 1998, followed by Norway in 2009, with such Nordic origins law which criminal- ises purchasing is often referred to as the Nordic model. Whilst many of those who supported the law will have had genuine concerns about exploitation, abuse and violence experienced within sex work and hoped the law could reduce these and reduce violence against women, whether this has happened in practice is debatable. The Sex Workers Alliance of Ireland (SWAI) – the only Irish sex worker-led sex worker rights organisation – has expressed its concerns about the detrimental impacts that the 2017 Act will have on sex workers’ safety. SWAI and its support- ers argue that it will lead to a further erosion of sex workers’ safety, increased stigmatisation and social marginalisation of sex work, further criminalisation, leading to continued mistrust and further deterioration in sex workers’ relations with the police and an increase in crimes against sex workers (FitzGerald and McGarry, 2016; Ward and Wylie, 2014). SWAI are one organisation who have expressed the view that the new law which is supported by organisations who aim to eradicate sex work ignores harms created by criminalisation of sex workers and their clients: [S]ex workers are collateral damage in the futile quest to eradicate sex work entirely. We see organisations who support further criminalisation of sex work minimise or ignore the harms and negative impacts that come from criminalisation (Kate McGrew, quoted in Moore, 2018, Irish Independent). This article argues that the sex workers safety should not be collateral damage in public policy, and enhancing sex worker safety should be a priority in law and policies shaping sex work. Sanders (2016) challenges the conceptualisation of sex work as inherently vio- lent and points to three dynamics that shape violence in sex work: first, the envi- ronment in which sex work happens; second, the relationship of sex work to state. She argues ‘. . . how prostitution is governed in any one jurisdiction and associated treatment of violence against sex workers by the police and judicial system dictates the very organization of the sex industry and the regulation, health and safety of the sex work communities’ (Sanders, 2016: 93) and third, social status and stigma and their effects on societal attitudes toward sex workers. In this article, we acknowledge these dynamics and their complex interplay which shape sex workers’ experiences of work-related victimisation. We approach sex work and sex worker experiences as situated within the complex intersections of patriarchal gender relations, race, nationality, class, sexual identity and other structural axis within neo-liberal capitalism, within which sex workers are denied the limited work-based protections, human rights and labour rights other workers have. Their work is 282 Irish Journal of Sociology 28(3) criminalised which heightens their vulnerability to violence, other crimes and forms of labour exploitation. We adopt an intersectional understanding of sex work and violence against sex workers, which recognises how different and multiple forms of oppression at the structural level (e.g. race, ethnicity, gender based violence, sexual orientation, socio-economic status, economic deprivation, migration, drug use) can intersect and shape sex workers’ experience differentially (ICRSE, 2014). At a micro-level, this acknowledges how ‘. . . some sub-communities of sex workers, transgender sex workers, migrant sex workers, sex workers living with HIV, or sex workers who use drugs, are particularly vulnerable to multiple forms of exclu- sion and discrimination’ (ICRSE, 2014: 2). We approach violence against sex workers as a social justice issue because it denies individuals’ – and particularly women’s – human right to live and work in safety (FitzGerald and McGarry, 2018). Whilst we approach sex work as gendered with the majority of sex workers in Ireland being women, we also acknowledge that the focus and conceptualisation of sex work as violence against women mean that the debate and policy in Ireland have not adequately considered the experiences of male sex workers or captured the diversity of gender identifications of sex workers, as (Smith et al., 2015) have noted is often the case. Building on discussions we had at a workshop on ‘Sex Work and Violence’ held at the Irish Sex Work Research Network conference in November 2018, we respond to Irish practitioners’ concerns that since the 2017 Act was introduced, they had witnessed an increase in anti-social behaviour, violent and other crimes against sex workers, particularly amongst migrant and transgender sex workers, identifying this as an area needing further research. In the context of debates about the impact of law on violence and other harms, we would argue the importance of monitoring and researching such harms, so policy impacts can be assessed. Deering et al. (2014: 9) describe ‘major gaps in documentation of violence against sex workers in most parts of the world’. Notwithstanding ongoing arguments about violence and other harms experienced by sex workers in Ireland, at the time of writing, no government body has examined the nature and level of violent and other crimes against sex workers, conducted an impact assessment prior to intro- duction of the 2017 Act or put in place mechanisms to assess the impact of the law on sex worker safety. The government has committed to review and report on the legislation after three years, and, as part of this process, it will assess the Act’s impact on sex workers’ safety and well-being, and we hope that the government will commission independent academic research to review the legislation. A pri- mary objective of this paper is to contribute to a developing body of sex work scholarship in Ireland, building an understanding of trends in violent and other crimes against sex workers based on data. To do this, we use primary data gener- ated through sex workers’ online reports of crime and anti-social behaviour, including incidents of hate crime, over a four-year period between 2015 and 2019 to UglyMugs.ie (UM), 1 a third-party reporting and alerting scheme for sex workers in Ireland. Before proceeding, it is important to establish the following parameters around our discussion. When examining crimes committed against sex Campbell et al. 283 workers, the focus obviously becomes on work-related victimisation. In this paper, we draw on data from a reporting scheme designed to enable sex workers to report such incidents of victimisation. It is important to set this in the wider context of commercial sex encounters and note that most commercial sex interactions go without violence and harassment (Brewis and Linstead, 2000; Kinnell, 2008). Recognising a disproportionate level of victimisation is important but equally to characterise all commercial sex encounters as involving victimisation is not accu- rate. Ellison et al. (2019), assessing the law criminalising purchasing sexual services in Northern Ireland (NI), carried out an online survey of 199 sex workers; 51% (n ¼ 75) said that they had never been the victim of a crime while doing sex work in NI, compared to 49% (n ¼ 72) who said they had been the victim of a crime, i.e. slightly more reported never being a victim of crime. We are very mindful that our analysis is based on data from a third-party reporting system that receives reports from sex workers in Ireland who have been victimised; it does not necessarily reflect the experiences of the wider sex worker population in Ireland. We did not have access to any recent survey data which would inform about a wider sample of sex workers beyond those who report to UM. These limitations notwithstanding, we think that our analysis provides some important insights about trends in violent and other crimes against sex workers in Ireland, and this makes an important contribution to Ireland’s emerg- ing research base. We aim to contribute to an understanding of the type of victim- isation Irish sex workers experience, in relation to the new law. We are also proposing that data indicates that the new law has not reduced crime and abuse experienced by sex workers nor has it improved confidence in sex workers to report victimisation to the police. We further put forward that victimisation reported to UM shows that the targeted hostility sex workers report, manifested in a range of crimes and anti-social behaviour, meets established definitions of hate crime. We structure our article as follows. First, we discuss the literature on the prev- alence and nature of sex workers’ victimisation in Ireland, contextualised within the wider, global literature. Second, we analyse trends in violent and other crimes against sex workers in Ireland based upon primary data sampled from reports made by sex workers in Ireland to UM. Finally, as our data highlight very low levels of reporting of crime by sex workers to the police in Ireland, suggest that tackling violence against sex workers requires a refocusing of policing resources to promote sex worker safety and mechanisms to empower them to report crimes committed against them, facilitating their right to access to justice. Therefore, it is our contention in this article that advocating for the full decriminalisation of sex work is the most conducive framework to achieve this. Prevalence and nature of sex work victimisation Empirical research on sex workers’ global experience of violence, including work- place violence over the lifetime, finds that between 45 and 75% of sex workers experience violence (with 32–55% experiencing violence in the last year) (Deering 284 Irish Journal of Sociology 28(3) et al., 2014). Studies grounded in sex workers’ complex, lived realities illustrate their different experiences of risk in terms of prevalence and forms of victimisation across sectors and various socio-economic realities (Platt et al., 2018; Shannon et al., 2009). Studies which examine the different characteristics and prevalence of violence between sex markets have found off-street sex workers reporting lower levels of violence and identify higher levels of violence in street sex work (Church et al., 2001; Deering et al., 2014; Sanders and Campbell, 2007; Weitzer, 2012). Research also illustrates different patterns of victimisation within off-street mar- kets, including internet-enabled sex work (Campbell et al., 2019; Kinnell, 2008; Sanders, 2005; Sanders and Campbell, 2007; Sanders et al., 2018; Whittaker and Hart, 1996). Research has illustrated how the structure and organisation of indoor, parlour- based sex work can reduce risk relative to street sex work with indoor settings providing opportunities to introduce a range of protective measures to deter or reduce risk (O’Doherty, 2011; Kinnell, 2008; Whittaker and Hart, 1996). Although the extent to which these are in place varies within the sector (Lister, 2018; Pitcher, 2015). A primary reason why sex workers choose indoor locations to work is their concerns for their safety (Lister, 2018), with brothel work or work flat sharing providing an opportunity to have others present while they work, despite the fact that working in a brothel can lead to prosecution. Escorting, independently via the Internet or working for an agency and other forms of online sex work, is the largest sector of the UK and Irish sex industries for workers of all genders (Ellison et al., 2019; Sweeney and FitzGerald, 2017), but it is the sector where a lacuna exists in relation to research on violent and other crimes (Sanders et al., 2018). Yet, emerging international research is beginning to provide a more detailed picture that resonates with emerging trends in sex workers’ expe- riences of violent and other crimes in this sector in Ireland (Moorman and Harrison, 2016; Sanders et al., 2016; Sanders et al., 2018). For example, Sanders et al. (2016) in a UK-based survey of 240 internet-based sex workers (mainly independent escorts) found that nearly half of respondents (47%) reported that they had experienced crime in their sex work. The most common crimes experi- enced were threatening or harassing texts, calls and emails; verbal abuse and removal of condoms. This study suggested that internet-based sex workers do experience less violent crime than street-based sex workers, but blackmail, stalking and harassment by text and email were significant issues for online sex workers. The ‘Beyond the Gaze’ (BtG) research project, the largest study to date of the safety, regulation and working conditions of internet-based sex work in the UK (Sanders et al., 2018), found that in their survey of 651 online sex workers, 80.8% (n ¼ 518) reported experiencing at least one form of crime in the past five years and 62.4% (n ¼ 400) experienced at least one type of crime in the past year. The patterns of crime types experienced were distinctive when compared to those reported in studies of street sex work. For online workers, the majority of crimes was digitally facilitated, with the two most commonly experienced crimes being persistent or repeated/unwanted contact or attempts to contact sex workers Campbell et al. 285 through email, text or social media and threatening or harassing texts, calls or emails. The study found that digitally facilitated crimes were often part of patterns of harassment and stalking and often involved ‘outing’ or threats to publicly out sex workers to: neighbours, friends, family, police, universities, employers, social services or generally online including ‘doxing’ (maliciously posting private or iden- tifying details about workers online). Physical assaults and sexual violence were reported at lower levels, but still at higher rates than the general population. Ellison et al. (2019) carried out an online survey of 199 sex workers working in NI, none of whom identified as street sex workers, reflecting the Northern Irish sex work population which is ‘almost exclusively based online’ (p. 38). They found that amongst those respondents who said they had been victimised while doing sex work in NI, the most common offence categories in order of prevalence were abusive or threatening phone calls/messages (73.3% of sex workers in their survey reported receiving these in the previous 12 months), in-person threatening or abusive behaviour (50.6% said they had experienced such in the previous 1 months), assault, robbery and rape/sexual assault. The later, as in the BtG research, reported by less than 10% of those who experienced a crime in the last year. The Ellison et al. (2019) study is significant because it provides a substantive and contemporary study of sex work in NI which includes data on sex worker victimisation. In the Irish context, there is limited contemporary, empirical academic or other published research on crimes committed against sex workers. Over 20 years ago, O’Connor (1996) carried out a qualitative study with 86 women working in sex work in Dublin and Cork, with experiences of violence being one topic examined. Amongst participants, 20% (n ¼ 17) had been ‘beaten by a client’ and 11% had been ‘forced to have sex’. That study included street and indoor parlour workers, yet sex work in Ireland has changed considerably since then, particularly with the rise of online sex work. Sweeney and Fitzgerald (2017) describe Irish sex work as having moved from brothel-based sex work and street work to escorting, with more isolated, independent and mobile work- ing, with many sex workers travelling within Ireland to reach more customers. Their recent qualitative study on migrant sex workers’ health found that fear of violence, robbery and refusal to pay for services ‘combined with the need to remain invisible and on the margins due to their precarious legal status impact- ed migrant sex workers’ health’ (Sweeney and FitzGerald, 2017; Sweeney et al., 2019). In interviews, sex workers described actual incidents of crime such as rapes, physical assault and abuse or the risk of being a target of these. Researchers in Ireland have highlighted the need for further research (FitzGerald and McGarry, 2016; McGarry and FitzGerald, 2018; Ryan, 2019; Ryan and Huschke, 2017; Ward and Wylie, 2014, 2016) to provide an up-to- date empirical baseline about the nature of violence against sex workers in Ireland in a variety of contexts. And it is in this context that we situate the current article’s contribution to the literature by focusing on original data on 286 Irish Journal of Sociology 28(3) victimisation made available through UM and consider how legal changes have shaped victimisation and its prevalence. Criminalisation, stigma, hate crime and sex worker victimisation Ireland’s decision to introduce legislation that criminalises sex purchase mirrors trends in other jurisdictions. Debates about sex work law in Ireland and the proposals to make it a crime to criminalise purchasing reflected wider academic and policy debates about the regulation of sex work. Therefore, it is important to consider what international research shows about the impact of regulatory frame- works on sex worker safety including the criminalisation of selling and purchasing sex. There is a considerable body of work that identifies how the social margin- alisation, stigmatisation and criminalisation of sex work place sex workers in vul- nerable positions, heightening the risk of work-related violent and other crimes (Deering et al., 2014). Platt et al. (2018) in their systematic review of sex work studies that examine how law and policing practices globally affect sex workers’ health, safety and well-being found that the key harmful impacts of arrests and harassment of sex workers or their clients which accompany criminalisation were displacement of sex workers to isolated work locations, the disruption of peer support networks and access to services, limitation of risk reduction and deterring sex workers from carrying condoms. The review also found that enacted or feared police enforcement which targeted sex workers, clients or third parties organising sex work displaces sex workers into isolated and dangerous work locations and disrupts risk reduction strategies, such as screening and negotiating with clients, carrying condoms and working with others. Legislation that criminalises sex workers working together for safety through brothel keeping is one way that the criminal law impedes sex workers implement- ing safer working practices and reporting crime to the police (Pitcher, 2015). Such legislation is in place in Ireland, and the new legislation increased penalties for brothel keeping and has been used against sex workers themselves working togeth- er in small groups. For example, in June 2019, two migrant workers from Romania working together in Newbridge, County Kildare, were found guilty of brothel keeping at the Naas District Court. Each woman receiving nine months prison sentences, one of the convicted women was pregnant at the time of the conviction (Oppenheim, 2019). Such actions further undermine sex workers’ trust and confi- dence in the police. The impact of policing activities associated with policing brothels, experienced as ‘raids’ by sex workers, have a range of impacts; not only can they be frightening (Scoular et al., 2019) but they can also cause economic deprivation due to loss of earnings when business is disrupted or closed (Lister, 2018). A key finding from research in settings where sex work is criminalised is that sex workers have restricted access to protection and justice due to a difficult and often adversarial relationship between sex workers and the police. The police are the ‘agency’ sex workers are meant to go to for protection and to report crime but at Campbell et al. 287 the same time, the police are the state body empowered to arrest them, their customers or others with whom they work. In some jurisdictions, police incivility, misconduct and abuse are commonplace, and the police are often one of the groups who perpetrate violence, harassment and extortion against sex workers (Sherman et al., 2015; SWAN, 2009; Platt et al., 2018). Platt et al. (2018: 34) describe policing in criminalised environments as ‘creating an environment of impunity for perpetrators of violence’. Research shows that the majority of work-related crime experienced by sex workers remains unreported to the police due to fear of arrest or other action, not being taken seriously, public identifica- tion, stressful and protracted court cases with uncertain outcomes being salient amongst other reasons (Boff, 2012; Campbell et al., 2019; Kinnell, 2008; Sanders et al., 2018). Barriers to reporting are heightened for migrant sex workers with concern that contact with the police may lead to deportation or other immigration action for those with irregular or illegal status (Mai, 2009). Sweeney and FitzGerald (2017) found that female, migrant sex workers in Ireland feared reporting crimes and abuse they experienced to the Garda�ı (the Irish police force) due to the risk of self-identifying as sex workers, their precarious legal status in Ireland (risk of potential deportation), as well as language difficulties. There is a lacuna in our understanding of the effect that the introduction of the 2017 Act has had on policing of sex work in Ireland and the implications this has had on sex worker safety. The Irish criminalisation of purchasing commercial sex occurred within a broader international context and debate around the best legis- lative models for regulating sex work. Studies, specifically examining the effects of criminalising sex purchase in a number of national jurisdictions, report that crim- inalisation has an adverse effect on sex worker safety (Platt et al., 2018). Findings reveal several important facts, namely (i) that violent crime increases (LeBail et al. 2019), (ii) the prosecution and penalisation of sex workers does not end, (iii) sex workers remain subject to high levels of policing and (iv) targeting of sex workers by the police increases in multiple, intersecting ways, with policing remaining focused on the repression of sex workers via public order or immigration agendas. Research in three jurisdictions that have introduced criminalisation of sex pur- chase found that sex work regulation operated primarily through immigration and third-party laws, with migrant workers as the primary targets (Vuolaj€arvi, 2018). This increases sex workers’ precarity because they are pushed to work in riskier conditions and are less able to enact screening and other safety strategies (e.g. rushed negotiations on street) (Landsberg et al., 2017). Indoor workers who pre- viously would not go to buyers’ homes or other outcall locations, are now under increased pressure to do so to avoid detection by the police or eviction from their own homes (Amnesty International, 2016). Ellison et al. (2019) in a study funded by Northern Ireland Department of Justice reviewed the impact of a law introduced in 2015 to criminalise purchasing sexual services. Reviewing research studies which have looked at the impact of sex purchase legislation on risk and victimisation, they accepted as a general point that 288 Irish Journal of Sociology 28(3) such law increases violence and abuse. However they also queried whether violence and abuse have ‘increased at the same rate and at the same time in the on-street and off-street sectors’ in countries where such laws have been adopted. They point out that samples in these studies have consisted of more street sex workers, a sector that global research suggests is more dangerous. They argue there is less evidence to assess the impacts on indoor sex work, a sector which, as we have seen, whilst not free from victimisation, is associated with lower levels of violent crime. Ellison et al. (2019), reviewing the impact of law criminalising purchasing which came into force in NI in 2015, specifically considered whether violence and abuse towards sex workers had increased in NI after the law had been implemented. That review is of particular interest to those concerned about violence and abuse amongst sex workers in Ireland because, as in NI, sex work is mainly internet- based indoor sex work. Drawing on a range of data sources including 2556 UM reports from sex workers in NI, a survey of 199 online sex workers working in NI and 13 narrative interviews, they drew a number of conclusions related to victim- isation of sex workers. They concluded that assaults committed against sex work- ers reported to UM had increased by 225% from 2016 to 2018; they cautioned that these were reported in low numbers considering the size of the online sex worker population estimated from data provided by a main online advertising platform for escorts in Ireland and web scrapes of escort advertisements on three other platforms. No such recent estimation is available for Ireland to enable contextu- alisation of the data we analyse. In their survey of sex workers in NI, amongst those who reported having experienced crimes in the past 12 months or 5 years, the most common offences they had experienced were abusive or threatening phone calls/messages, in-person threatening or abusive behaviour, assault, robbery and rape and sexual assault. Of those offences reported abusive or threatening phone calls or messages and in-person threatening and abusive behaviour had increased in the last 12 months, 73.3% for the former and 50.6% of the later having expe- rienced them in the last 12 months compared to 17.3% for assault, 14.6% rape and 9.3% sexual assault. They concluded that commercial sex was now more risky and underground: while direct evidence of massive increases in overt violence and abuse against sex workers may not be necessarily evident in Northern Ireland, high levels of nuisance and anti-social behaviour can be every bit as insidious with the potential impact on sex workers mental health in the longer term. (Ellison et al., 2019: 147) Their assessment highlighted the impact the new law had had on the fear of crime. In their survey, 39.3% of sex workers who had never been victims of crime reported that sex work is more dangerous since the new law, 31.8% said that it was about the same as before and 28.7% said that it was less dangerous. And 74.6% of those who had been a victim of crime thought that it was now more dangerous, 7.4% less and 17.95% the same. They suggested that the very high levels of anxiety they found in interviews with sex workers about being outed as a sex worker due to Campbell et al. 289 sex work stigma ‘combined with high levels of nuisance and anti-social behaviour creates the perfect storm for a heightened state of “fear”’ (Ellison et al., 2019: 150). They also suggested that such nuisance and anti-social behaviour targeted at sex workers were acting as signal crimes for sex workers signalling ‘the likelihood of more serious victimisation and the potential of harm to the individual’ (Ellison et al., 2019: 152). They found sex workers in interviews expressed the view that purchasing criminalisation had increased the stigmatisation of sex workers and contributed to a ‘heightened state of anxiety and concern’ (p. 153) about victimisation. Their inter- views with sex workers highlighted not only how online and in-person abuse impacts on the mental well-being of sex workers but also erodes sex workers’ sense of safety. Describing the situation they found in NI, Ellison et al. (2019: 147) stated: . . . through no fault of their own, sex workers are having to contend with higher rates of nuisance and abusive behaviour than they were before Article 64A came into effect. . . . some of these behaviours can be extremely distressing for the sex worker concerned . . . What is presented as an asymmetric law, bearing more heavily on the purchaser of sex, seems rather symmetric in practice and in many ways impacts more heavily on the seller They noted the contradiction that for a law which intended to address violence against women, ‘it is somewhat paradoxical that it appears to have subjected many women (and of course male sex workers) to a highly unsafe work context, resulting in a heightened state of anxiety’ (Ellison et al. 2019: 142). Researchers have long identified the ‘othering’ and stigmatisation of sex work- ers (Benoit et al., 2018; O’Neill, 1997; Whitaker et al., 2011) including the specific misogynistic ‘whore stigma’ (Pheterson, 1993), as causal factors in the dehuman- isation of sex workers and denial of sex worker rights. Within this framing, sex- working women are least deserving of all of respect and protection. Such othering has been linked directly to high levels of targeted violence and hostility experienced by sex workers. Academics have documented a range of dehumanising discourses, which construct sex workers as pollutants, vectors of disease and urban blight. Lowman (2000) described a ‘discourse of disposability’ prevalent in media descrip- tions of policy actors’ efforts to ‘get rid’ of street prostitution from residential areas’, treating sex workers as a disposable social outcast group, contributing to a social milieu, in which violence against sex workers flourishes. Kinnell (2008: 164) identified this discourse in public statements from police, politicians, residents groups and other policy actors using the language of cleaning up, eliminating and eradicating sex work, reinforcing a ‘rhetoric of abhorrence’ which condones the victimisation of sex workers, including extreme acts of violence, via a process of cultural disinhibition. Campbell (2014) found that sex workers’ experiences of target victimisation in Merseyside, UK, fitted several established definitions of hate crime, including those that define hate crimes as expressions of prejudice, discrimination and power (Hall, 2005; Perry, 2001) against socially marginalised and othered groups. They pointed 290 Irish Journal of Sociology 28(3) to over two decades of research evidencing the othering and social stigmatisation of sex workers and how this has been linked to hostility and violence against sex workers. To more fully understand sex workers’ experiences of hate crime, they also drew on the definition of hate crime as violence, hostility and intimidation perpetrated because of perceived difference or vulnerability (Chakraborti and Garland, 2012), where perceived vulnerability describes perpetrators seeing ‘their target: as weak, defenceless, powerless, with a limited capacity to resist’. Sex work- ers in the study expressed the view that some offenders target sex workers in the belief that they are ‘easy targets’, and they (the offender) will be more likely to ‘get away with it’. Perpetrators believed that sex workers would not report to the police or that they can exploit other vulnerabilities such as sex workers’ fears of public identification or their situational vulnerability, with sex workers often working in isolation to avoid criminalisation or detection. This resonates with some claims by Ellison and Smith (2017) that identified some Irish sex workers’ experiences of crime victimisation as akin to hate crime. They also drew on Perry’s (2001) struc- tural conceptualisation of hate crime as violence and intimidation directed towards stigmatised groups to reaffirm a hierarchical social order arguing ‘Perry’s concep- tualisation captures some elements of how and why violence is directed towards sex workers in the Irish context’ (p. 181). They point to sex workers as a highly stigmatised and marginalised group. They also describe how in relation to wider misogynistic violence against women ‘sex workers are often seen as easy targets in so far as they are targeted by men with particularly misogynistic tendencies’ not due to any ‘innate characteristics of the sex worker, rather it is sex workers situ- ational and their stigmatised image which exposes them to certain kinds of risk’ (Ellison and Smith, 2017: 182). Ellison et al. (2019: 153) in considering violence and abuse towards sex workers in NI, as part of a review of the impact of law crim- inalising purchasing sexual services, described how criminal and other behaviours towards sex workers ‘can reflect both bias motivation that defines the victim as a legitimate target (hostility towards a perceived social group) and also as an easy target insofar as sex workers can be seen as inherently vulnerable’. This framing of the victimisation of sex workers within conceptualisations of hate crime is relevant to our purposes because it makes visible the targeted hostility and intimidation sex workers experience across a range of crime types, anti-social behaviour and nui- sance. Recognising the hate elements of the crimes and nuisance incidents experi- enced by sex workers brings into focus the origins of such behaviour, the severity of impacts and points to potential ways forward for policy and the policing sex workers experience of victimisation. It is important to note that Ireland has been identified as being anomalous compared to other EU member states for not adopt- ing laws which address the hate elements of crime. Haynes and Schweppe (2017) evidence inadequacies in the criminal justice system in providing legal redress for bias crime. Hate is recognised only through the Prohibition of Incitement to Hatred Act 1989 which made it an offence to create or distribute racist, homo- phobic and other discriminatory materials. In December 2019, the UN again urged Ireland to introduce hate crime legislation (Pollack, 2019). Despite these legislative Campbell et al. 291 limitations, some third sector and civil society groups working to promote the rights of communities who are targets of racist, religious, disabalist, homophobic and transphobic hate have embraced the concept of hate crime and supported hate crime prevention and awareness campaigns, third-party reporting and monitoring mechanisms and advocated for better responses from the Garda�ı (Sheenan and Dwyer, 2017). Furthermore, this framing of sex workers experiences victimisation through the prism of hate crime makes visible how sex workers are subjects of other more recognised forms of hate crime but are rarely recognised in wider hate crime policy debates. The sample For this paper, we carried out an analysis of a subset of UM Republic of Ireland (ROI) report data for four years between 2015 and 2019. For our sample frame, we purposefully selected the two years pre and post the 2017 Act coming into force. During this period, a total of 14,370 reports were made into the scheme and form our sample. UM was established in 2009 as an online third-party reporting and alerting scheme with the aim of improving sex workers’ safety and reducing crime. It works by providing an online platform through which sex workers can report information about potential dangers and be alerted about these, many access and report through a phone app and make a report by filling in a pro forma. UM has been collecting data about crimes, anti-social behaviour and nuisance against sex workers for over a decade, and it is the primary third-party reporting scheme for sex workers in Ireland; indeed, there is no other comparable third-party reporting scheme for sex workers. Ellison et al. (2019: 133) note that as violence and abuse committed against sex workers is rarely reported to the police creating a ‘“dark figure” in official sources . . . In this sense UM data is considerably more reliable than official data (e.g. from police or government sources) given the fact that UM is trusted by sex workers’. In light of limited official data related to crimes against sex workers in Ireland UM data, with the scheme’s longstanding history of receiving and recording reports from sex workers for a decade, provides an important and useful source of data. The sample of over 14,000 reports we draw on offers significant material to work with, even if it may not be completely representative. Methods and sources We used a mixed-method approach combining qualitative and quantitative data analysis. For quantitative analysis, we have presented the data as it is categorised by the UM system. Anonymised data were provided by UM in MySQL relational database format. Using PHP (Hypertext Preprocessor) and SQL (Structured Query Language), the data was then queried to produce statistical tables that were exported to Excel. Graphs were then generated in Excel. We analysed the total number of reports made to UM and a number of quantitative data variables. 292 Irish Journal of Sociology 28(3) When making a report to UM, members can fill in a long or a short form, the short form includes fewer fields and is the form the majority of members opt to use. This form contains the data fields we have been able to draw upon in our analysis. All victim reports include details about the date the incident happened and the date the individual reported the incident to UM. UM records the location data for each incident reported. With incidents where individuals do not record a location because they experience abusive or threatening phone calls, UM assigns the loca- tion where the sex worker was when the incident occurred as their location. An incident type or multiple incident types are assigned to each report made to UM. Sex workers fill in an online reporting form with tick boxes for predefined catego- ries which describe the offence/behaviour they are reporting. Incident types are assigned in two ways: as described, they may be selected by the UM member when submitting the report or they can be added to the report by a UM administrator based on information provided in the free text ‘Description of Incident’ field. UM has 47 incident types of which 29 are considered by UM to be crime incident types and 18 non-crime incident types (Tables 3 and 4 list these). UM considers a subset of 12 of the crime incident types to be violent crime, including anal rape, assault (slapping, punching, kicking), assault with a weapon (knife/gun/other), attempted rape/sexual assault, other sexual assault, drugging (adminstered drug/poison), forced oral sex, groping/kissing without consent, held against will, removal of condom without consent, strangulation/suffocation and vaginal rape (see Tables 1 and 2). In general, crime incident types are those where it is likely the perpetrator’s behaviour constitutes a criminal act, and non- crime incident types are those where it is likely the perpetrator’s behaviour does not constitute a criminal act. We examined the frequency of these in each year and calculated increases and decreases. We were also able to examine the total number of reports by gender. We were not able to examine reports by nationality because this is not routinely recorded in the UM system; the majority of members opt not to provide their nationality and UM does not insist on this for privacy. For our qualitative data, we analysed the narrative responses in the free text box where sex workers describe the incidents they are reporting. We did this for all crime reports between 2015 and 2019. We carried out a preliminary content anal- ysis using a directed approach (Hsieh and Shannon, 2005), using prior research to identify key variables in the data for coding and collation of report narrative extracts. Our analysis, which was a purposefully targeted one, used initial codes informed by conceptualisations of sex workers’ experiences of hate crime using various indicators of sex worker targeted hostility. We explored whether or not sex workers’ reports of victimisation to UM contained indicators of hate crime–for example, reports which contained descriptions of expressions of prejudice and derogatory language about sex workers. Also, using conceptualisations of hate crime as the outcome of the targeting of ‘perceived vulnerability’, we identified incidents of sex worker targeted hate crime where there were indicators of ‘per- ceived vulnerability’. For example, we took as indicators of perceived vulnerability incidents where perpetrators threaten sex workers that they will inform police, Campbell et al. 293 landlords or others parties, as these highlight that perpetrators were aware that this would place sex workers in a difficult position and hence could be used against them. Such indicators were prevalent in many sex workers’ reports made to UM. Also, we identified cases in which sex workers included descriptive information in their report that revealed other experiences of targeted hostility such as racism, homophobia and anti-migrant sentiments. We also identified incidents where the person reporting refers to incidents directly as a hate crime. We utilised extracts from this qualitative data to illustrate sex workers’ experiences of targeted hostil- ity. We did not carry out any level of longitudinal analysis, which enabled us to assess changes in the levels of such experiences of hate crime victimisation over time, and hence we have not extrapolated from the data to comment on trends over time. Such experiences of targeted hostility are not visible in the statistical data. We turn now to discuss our findings from our analysis of the UM data. When completing membership of UM, sex workers agree to Terms of Service which include agreement for UM to use anonymised data for public reporting and academic research. Having analysed the free text qualitative data, we have ensured that any personally identifying data was removed from any material used, fully anonymising qualitative data. Also, for further anonymity, we have used regions of Ireland and not specific towns. Trends in violent and other crimes against sex workers in Ireland Report totals per year Our analysis of UM data reveals that the total number of reports made to UM between 2015 and 2019 has increased incrementally (see Figure 1). Crime reports, as a subset of the total number of reports, have also increased incrementally between 2015 and 2016 (n ¼ 607) with the largest increase from crime reports in 2016–2017 (n ¼ 945) to reports in 2017–2018 (n ¼ 1445). Sex workers’ reports to UM of violent crime have increased specifically since 2015–2016 (n ¼ 168), reach- ing their highest level during 2017–2018 (n ¼ 387). Indeed, comparing the two years pre and the two years post-Ireland’s legislative change in this area, sex workers’ crime reports to UM increased by 91% and violent crime specifically increased by 92%. Whilst our preliminary analysis cannot prove direct causation, these increases are a concern in terms of sex workers’ safety and raise issues around wider public protection from crime. Previous research based on UM data (Ellison and Smith, 2017) analysed 7200 incident reports made to UM over a six-year period between 2009 and 2015, of which a subset were crime incidents (n ¼ 2945). The data showed some year-on-year increases. We acknowledge that there could be other reasons for increased reporting of crime to UM; for example, an increase in the number of sex workers, better reporting or recording techniques, greater awareness of crime amongst the sex worker population or greater awareness of the value of reporting 294 Irish Journal of Sociology 28(3) incidents to a third-party scheme, particularly with increased public debate around the introduction of the new law. Also, it is important to stress that we are not proposing that it is only laws criminalising sex purchase that generate crimes against sex workers. Rather, we recognise that a multiplicity of factors create an adverse terrain for maximising sex worker safety. For example, policing, other laws such as brothel keeping legislation, stigmatisation of sex work and lack of work- based rights/protections contribute to this problem. Interestingly, UM membership has remained the same in the period between 2015 and 2019, with between 6000 and 7000 users per year each year. Hence, it is unlikely that this increase in reported crimes and incidents is due to an increase in UM membership. However, as UM cannot split members into NI and ROI, 2 this membership figure is an all-Ireland statistic. This data shows that sex workers working throughout Ireland report crimes they have experienced. The geographical distribution of crime reports 2015–2019 by region and county is detailed in Table 1. The largest number of reports were incidents in Dublin 2019 (44.78%), which is unsurprising, given it is the capital and has the largest population, followed by Cork 543 (12.04%), Limerick 470 (10.42%) and Galway 268 (5.94%), reflecting larger urban population centres. Crime types and incidents reported by sex workers UM adopts an approach to defining crime that is informed by sex workers’ per- ceptions of crime. Each report made to UM is not individually scrutinised as to whether it represents a criminal offence, which may result in overall under or over- counting of crime. For example, incident types which represent abusive and threat- ening behaviour are deemed a crime incident type by UM, but it may be the case 1537 2741 4598 5494 607 945 1445 1512 168 217 387 354 27 Mar 2015 - 26 March 2016 27 Mar 2016 - 26 March 2017 27 Mar 2017 - 26 March 2018 27 Mar 2018 - 26 March 2019 0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 Total Reports Crime Reports Violent Crime Reports Figure 1. Reports to UM by year 2015–2019. Campbell et al. 295 that not all reports assigned these incident types would meet the thresholds required to be deemed criminal offences in law. UM does not count incident types involving the purchase of, or attempts to purchase, sexual services as crimes, even though such activities are now criminalised. Non-crime incident types are those, which UM does not consider criminal but are representative of behaviours which make sex workers uncomfortable, con- cerned or distressed, and UM provides as a means through which sex workers can report and alert other sex workers. Historically, ugly mugs schemes in other jurisdictions took such reports because the behaviour of some of the individuals concerned escalated to criminal incidents (Kinnell, 2008). Examples of such behav- iours include conduct that is suspicious, potentially dangerous or time wasting. Time wasters have emerged as one of the most common work-related problems identified by sex workers in the indoor and online sector (Sanders et al., 2018). Ellison et al. (2019: 137) describe UM as ‘not solely a crime focused reporting mechanism’ and described how, for sex workers in NI, it is also used as a valued ‘work tool’ by individual sex workers allowing sex workers to share information about potential time wasters. We analysed the frequency of non-crime incident types in the two-year period before and after Ireland’s new legislation (see Table 2). The most frequently reported incident types in the period 2015–2017 were: No show/location Seeker (n ¼ 1640), Look and go/arrived without money (n ¼ 434), Seeking free sex chat/no intent to book (n ¼ 236), Suspicious behaviour (n ¼ 180) and Sought vaginal/anal sex without condom (n ¼ 83). These five incident types were also the most frequent- ly reported incident types in 2017–2019; No show/location Seeker (n ¼ 4171), Look and go/arrived without money (n ¼ 1070), Suspicious behaviour (n ¼ 659), Seeking free sex chat/no intent to book (n ¼ 569) and Sought vaginal/anal sex without condom (n ¼ 276). The largest percentage increases found, when comparing the two years pre and post the legislative change, were with the following non-crime Table 1. Total UM 2015–2019 reports by region and county. Region Number and percentage of reports South-East Carlow 10 (0.22%), Kilkenny 26 (0.58%), Waterford 51 (1.13%), Westmeath 112 (2.48%) and Wexford 53 (1.18%) Border Cavan 86 (1.91%), Donegal 42 (0.93%), Leitrim 33 (0.73%), Monaghan 38 (0.84%) and Sligo 30 (0.67%) Mid-West Clare 46 (1.02%), Limerick 470 (10.42%) and Tipperary 76 (1.69%) South-West Cork 543 (12.04%) and Kerry 148 (3.28%) Dublin Dublin 2019 (44.78%) West Galway 268 (5.94%), Mayo 131 (2.91%) and Roscommon 8 (0.18%) Mid-East Kildare 92 (2.04%), Louth 133 (2.95%), Meath 18 (0.40%) and Wicklow 3 (0.07%) Midlands Laois 48 (1.06%), Longford 14 (0.31%) and Offaly 11 (0.24%) 296 Irish Journal of Sociology 28(3) incident types: Other suspected danger (754.55%), Suspicious behaviour (266.11%), Sought vaginal/anal sex without condom (232.53%), Unauthorised photography/recording (216.67%) and Maliciously reported you to police/author- ities (200.00%). Analysing UM data for NI, Ellison et al. (2019) report that a far higher pro- portion of UM reports related to what they refer to as low and intermediate level offences (abuse on the telephone and threatening behaviour), rather than violence and serious crime as well as anti-social and nuisance activities which for them included seeking free sex, turning up without money, not showing up for a book- ing, bogus outcalls, threatening to call landlord/police, threatening to damage the sex worker’s reputation, drunkenness, illegal drug use, unauthorised photography/ video recording, pretending to be a police officer and nuisance text messages and phone calls. This led them to observe that whilst serious and violent crimes against sex workers in NI may not be as prevalent as assumed, following the criminalisa- tion of purchasing, there had been a ‘gradual creeping up of certain violent offen- ces’ (Ellison et al., 2019: 139). Table 2. Non-crime incident types reported to UM 2015–2019. Incident 27 March 2015–26 Mar 2017 Frequency (%) 27 Mar 2017–26 Mar 2019 Frequency (%) Percent increase/ decrease Bogus outcall 49 (0.89%) 141 (1.12%) 187.76% Drug user or in possession of drugs 62 (1.13%) 175 (1.39%) 182.26% Drunk/intoxicated with alcohol 73 (1.33%) 194 (1.55%) 165.75% Look and go/arrived without money 434 (7.93%) 1070 (8.52%) 146.54% Maliciously reported you to hotel/ landlord 10 (0.18%) 24 (0.19%) 140.00% Maliciously reported you to police/ authorities 1 (0.02%) 3 (0.02%) 200.00% No show/location seeker 1640 (29.95%) 4171 (33.22%) 154.33% Other 33 (0.60%) 49 (0.39%) 48.48% Other suspected danger 11 (0.20%) 94 (0.75%) 754.55% Other timewasters 71 (1.30%) 82 (0.65%) 15.49% Police warnings 0 (0.00%) 3 (0.02%) Public warnings 0 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%) Seeking free sex chat/no intent to book 236 (4.31%) 569 (4.53%) 141.10% Sought vaginal/anal sex without condom 83 (1.52%) 276 (2.20%) 232.53% STI (sexually transmitted infection) or other contagious condition 19 (0.35%) 45 (0.36%) 136.84% Suspicious behaviour 180 (3.29%) 659 (5.25%) 266.11% Unauthorised photography/recording 12 (0.22%) 38 (0.30%) 216.67% Undercover journalist 2 (0.04%) 3(0.02%) 50.00% Campbell et al. 297 Based on UM quantitative data, we analysed the frequency of crime incident types in the two-year period before and after Ireland’s new legislation (see Table 3). The five most frequently reported crime types in the period between 2015 and 2017 were abusive or threatening phone calls/SMS (n ¼ 687), in-person threatening behaviour (n ¼ 500) in-person verbal abuse (n ¼ 356), assault (slapping, punching, kicking) (n ¼ 137) and other sexual assault (n ¼ 114). The two most frequently reported crime incident types in the period between 2017 and 2019 were abusive or threatening phone calls/SMS (n ¼ 1215) and in-person threatening behaviour (n ¼ 1131). These were also the two most frequent crimes types found to be reported by sex workers to UM in Ellison et al.’s.(2019) Northern Irish study and the two most reported crimes in their survey. In our data, these were followed by in-person verbal abuse (n ¼ 757), assault (slapping, punching, kicking) (n ¼ 325) and robbery (n ¼ 241). The largest percentage increases found, when comparing the two years pre and post the law change, were with the following crime incident types: assault with a weapon (knife/gun/other) (441.67%), attempted robbery (366.67%), caused damage to property (275.00%), robbery (254.41%) and requested illegal acts, e.g. underage sex (218.18%). Taken together, this data mirrors trends in other international studies that examine online sex workers’ experience of abuse and violence (Sanders et al., 2018). The prevalence of abusive or threatening phone calls, in-person threats and verbal abuse reflect one strand of crime sex workers most commonly reported in other studies (Campbell et al., 2019). What the data shows is that the over- whelming majority of UM members are online sex workers, reflecting the structure of the Irish commercial sex market now. Whilst the statistical data is key to establishing the trends in the Irish sex indus- try and establishing evidence about sex workers’ victimisation in Ireland, sex work- ers’ narrative accounts of their lived experiences of violence provide powerful insights into how sex workers live on a daily basis with the threat of hostility, intimidation and violence. Their words provide us with important resources to help policy makers understand the forms of targeted hostility and intimidation sex workers can face. As we analysed sex workers reports of crimes and abuse within UM data, we were struck by the impact, intensity and ferocity of targeted hostility sex workers encounter, including as part of crimes such as online and in-person verbal abuse. Importantly, the UM qualitative data high- lights how crimes can have a sex worker-targeted hate element as the following reports show: Man made a booking. Then he asked the price for a three-hour booking. The lady gave him the price. Then he started offending the lady calling her a sex slave, pros- titute, bitch. He then began threatening her. He has now called her over 12 times. She feels he is very dangerous. (Tipperary, 2019) Another example of this kind of sex worker-targeted hate is visible in a report made by a female sex worker in Monaghan in 2017. She reported being constantly 298 Irish Journal of Sociology 28(3) harassed by a man who had left a message for her calling her a ‘dirty fucking whore’ and saying that ‘all prossies should be murdered’. As Chakraborti et al. (2014) found in the largest UK study of hate crime, whilst ‘often it is the more violent and extreme acts of targeted hostility which attract Table 3. Crime incident types reported to UM 2015–2019. Incident 27 March 2015–26 March 2017 Frequency (%) 27 Mar 2017–26 Mar 2019 Frequency (%) Percent increase/ decrease Abusive or threatening emails/online msgs 9 (0.16%) 8 (0.06%) �11.11% Abusive or threatening phone calls/SMS 687 (12.55%) 1215 (9.68%) 76.86% Anal rape 18 (0.33%) 21 (0.17%) 16.67% Assault (slapping, punching, kicking) 137 (2.50%) 325 (2.59%) 137.23% Assault with a weapon (knife/gun/other) 12 (0.22%) 65 (0.52%) 441.67% Attempted assault 20 (0.37%) 22 (0.18%) 10.00% Attempted rape/sexual assault 45 (0.82%) 56 (0.45%) 24.44% Attempted robbery 21 (0.38%) 98 (0.78%) 366.67% Exploitation/abuse by landlords and hotel staff 43 (0.79%) 41 (0.33%) �4.65% Caused damage to property 12 (0.22%) 45 (0.36%) 275.00% Did not pay or paid with fake money, etc. 60 (1.10%) 83 (0.66%) 38.33% Drugging (administered a drug/poison on you) 0 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%) Forced oral sex 24 (0.44%) 29 (0.23%) 20.83% Groping/kissing without consent 97 (1.77%) 124 (0.99%) 27.84% Harassment/stalking 79 (1.44%) 103 (0.82%) 30.38% Held against will 33 (0.60%) 21 (0.17%) �36.36% Impersonating a police officer 25 (0.46%) 33 (0.26%) 32.00% In-person threatening behaviour 500 (9.13%) 1131 (9.01%) 126.20% In-person verbal abuse 356 (6.50%) 757 (6.03%) 112.64% Masturbate in front of you without consent 16 (0.29%) 19 (0.15%) 18.75% Offering illegal acts, e.g. drugs 9 (0.16%) 18 (0.14%) 100.00% Other deception or fraud 8 (0.15%) 9 (0.07%) 12.50% Other sexual assault 114 (2.08%) 205 (1.63%) 79.82% Pimping, trafficking or other exploitation 32 (0.58%) 33 (0.26%) 3.13% Removal of condom without consent 70 (1.28%) 163 (1.30%) 132.86% Requested illegal acts, e.g. underage sex 11 (0.20%) 35 (0.28%) 218.18% Robbery 68 (1.24%) 241 (1.92%) 254.41% Strangulation/suffocation 14 (0.26%) 19 (0.15%) 35.71% Vaginal rape 39 (0.71%) 40 (0.32%) 2.56% Campbell et al. 299 political and academic attention’ whilst ‘the experiences and cumulative harms of the more “ordinary”, everyday forms of abuse, bullying, and harassment go unac- knowledged’ (p. 15). In their study, verbal abuse emerged as the form of hate crime most likely to have been experienced by their respondents, followed by harassment and property crime (e.g. burglary, theft or damage to victims’ houses or cars). The increase in reports for these crime categories in the UM data alongside assaults with a weapon, robbery and damage to property plus the increases in all, but three of the crime types overall are concerning and require further investigation. UM records the gender of the sex worker making the report (or the gender of the victim if the report is being made by a third party) (see Figure 2). The gender iden- tities used in the scheme are female, male or trans. Trans encompasses both trans- vestite and transgender. The majority of trans workers in Ireland are trans women (Ellison et al., 2019). Predominantly, victims of crime reporting to UM identify as female (n ¼ 3924) or trans (n ¼ 505). Male victims were represented (n ¼ 80). Crime reports received from trans sex workers have increased sharply in recent years from (n ¼ 61) in the period between 2016 and 2017, with a 236.07% increase to (n ¼ 205) during the period between 2017 and 2018. Reporting remained high during the period between 2018 and 2019 (n ¼ 196). This increase in crimes reported by trans- gender sex workers is concerning and requires further exploration. We can look to European research to interpret trends in the UM data. Transgender Europe (Fedorko and Beredo, 2017) has identified a disproportionate number of transgender and gender diverse migrant sex workers as victims of crime. As well as identifying anti trans and sex worker bias and hatred as the main causes for high levels of violence against trans sex workers, they point to: Current trends contributing to the marginalisation and exclusion of trans and sex worker communities, such as the criminalisation of migration and sex work, the use of punitive approaches to ‘tackling’ poverty, homelessness, and drug use, increasingly 554 10 43 865 19 61 1205 35 205 1300 16 196 Female Male Trans 0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 27 Mar 2015 - 26 March 2016 27 Mar 2016 - 26 March 2017 27 Mar 2017 - 26 March 2018 27 Mar 2018 - 26 March 2019 Figure 2. Gender of victims of crime incidents reported to UM 2015–2019. 300 Irish Journal of Sociology 28(3) precarious living and working conditions, and growing racial, gender, and economic disparities. (Fedorko and Berredo, 2017: 4) Of particular interest here in light of the current article’s focus is a recent study of the relationship between the wider transgender community and An Garda S�ıochána (the Irish police force). Haynes and Schweppe (2018) reported low levels of trust of, and satisfaction with, the Garda�ı amongst the trans population compared to the general population. Their report specifically recommended fur- ther research into trans sex workers’ experiences of crime. UM tags some reports to indicate the perpetrator-made specific types of threats (see Table 4). This is done by UM administration based on text occurring in a free text field entitled: ‘Description of Incident’. Here, the UM member has the oppor- tunity to provide details of some specific threats that the perpetrator made. The three most common types of threats reported are threats by the perpetrator to contact the police, threats of eviction and threats of reputational damage. Our analysis of the data indicates that sex workers’ reports of perpetrators’ threats to report them to police have risen most significantly (98.31%) since 2017. This may indicate that a growing number of perpetrators believe that threatening sex work- ers with police action is an effective form of intimidation. Here, we interpret these threats as hate incidents because they fit within our working definition of hate crime as acts that target perceived vulnerability. These involve an awareness on the part of the perpetrator that the victims’ sex working status can be used against them and create problems for them, for example, if they are outed publicly or to a specific party, be that police, landlords, employers, universities, family or friends. It was common for UM reports to contain descriptions of threats to inform various parties that the victim was sex working. Thereby, exploiting a perceived vulnerability that sex workers would not want to be identified or ‘outed’ to those parties. Most frequently, perpetrators’ threats involved exposure to the police, media and parties who had control over or were linked to their home and/or work accommodation; for example, landlords, or hotel staff. Often sex workers received threats of outing to one or more of these parties. Sanders et al. (2018) found that amongst the key disadvantages of online sex work which sex workers identified were worries that neighbours, friends, family or police would find out about their sex work. Hence such threats can create a great deal of anxiety and fear. Table 4. Types of threat reported to UM 2015–2019. Incident 27 March 2015–26 March 2017 Frequency (%) 27 March 2017–26 March 2019 Frequency (%) Percent increase/decrease Threat of police 118 (41.11%) 234 (48.85%) 98.31% Threat of eviction 59 (20.56%) 79 (16.49%) 33.90% Threats of reputational damage 110 (38.33%) 166 (34.66%) 50.91% Campbell et al. 301 Informing the police and claiming to be police officers Frequently, sex workers cited perpetrators’ threats to report them to the Garda�ı. This demonstrates offenders’ awareness that sex workers are fearful of the Garda�ı and their use of that fear and perceived vulnerability as a form of coercion. Some used the threat as part of attempts to extort free services or money. This is dem- onstrated in the following reports: ‘A trans sex worker reported that a man is threatening her that if she will not agree to unprotected sex he will send the police to her apartment’ (Clare 2018). ‘Man has called the lady 20 times now. He is saying that he will call the guards if the lady doesn’t leave the apartment that she lives in’ (Dublin, 2019). Further: A female sex worker reported that a man made a booking and when he got to her hotel room he demanded money or he would report her to the hotel staff and garda. The lady says he was very aggressive and she was very scared. (Dublin, 2018) Some reports from migrant workers highlighted how some of those targeting sex workers utilised the perceived immigration status of the worker as part of their threat in relation to police: A female sex worker reported that a violent and aggressive man came to visit her. He threatened to call the police on her if she was not with him for free. He said to her that in Ireland she was illegal and that he can call the police on her (Sligo, 2019). Ellison et al. (2019) argued that amongst sex workers in NI, threats of reporting the worker to the police or of causing reputational damage, which were commonly reported to UM, ‘are done entirely on the basis of perceived vulnerability and that the sex worker is powerless to fight back’ (p. 153). They observe that in NI, ‘Even in a situation whereby it is the client not the sex worker breaking the law, the client has the power to enact considerable harm against the sex worker’ (p. 154). Their study flagged up a range of issues for sex workers in NI which caused anxiety about identification to the police, in a context where they were not com- mitting a crime selling sexual services but clients are by purchasing services. These included to avoid the client causing problems by reporting them to police, fear of being recorded as a sex worker by police, being prosecuting for brothel keeping, of losing accommodation and fear of action regarding immigration status for some migrant workers. Some sex workers’ reports to UM (n ¼ 58) mentioned perpetrators’ imperson- ating a police officer between 2015 and 2019. Qualitative data illustrate how the police officer guise could be used often including perpetrators’ attempts to extort free services or force sex workers to provide services they did not want to provide. For example: A trans woman sex worker reported that a man came to see her and her friend and then began threatening them, saying he was police, and if they didn’t do what he wanted he would hurt them, and also that he could denounce them to their landlord. (Dublin, 2015) 302 Irish Journal of Sociology 28(3) Despite the fact that impersonating a police officer is a crime and that it is not a crime to sell sexual services, while sex workers report such incidents to UM, they remain reluctant to report these incidents to the police. Accommodation Threats to expose sex workers to those who had influence over their home and/or work accommodation manifested in a number of ways: Two female sex workers were working from a hotel room and took a booking with two men, the booking went ok until after services were provided. The men started to make a big fight breaking things in the hotel room and said if the women didn’t give the money back they will go to reception and get them kicked out. Victims did not report to the police but consented to data share. UM had received two previous similar reports which matched the numbers used by these men. (Galway, 2017) We find similar evidence here: A female sex worker reported phone abuse from a man who found out where she was staying then said the hotel was ‘aware you are prostitute and are waiting on Garda to arrive’. He later said ‘I will continue until all you whores are caught, you dirty, filthy, tramp’. (Meath, 2018) One worker described graffiti outside his apartment; the male sex worker reported harassment and stalking, including that he found written in black marker on the post office boxes in his apartment ‘Apartment *** prostitution and selling drugs’ (Dublin, 2019). Ellison et al. (2019) in their evaluation research in NI reported that the fear of potentially being evicted following a police investigation was identified by a number of sex workers in their research, and this was one of several factors preventing reporting of crime to the Police Service Northern Ireland (PSNI). Specific reference to hate crime and experiences of other forms of hate crime and intersectional experiences of hate Specific direct reference to hate crime in sex workers’ reports was rare but did occur. For example, a female sex worker reported that she received what she described as ‘hate crime texts’ from a man. She gave examples like: ‘What are you doing in Cork slut?’ (Cork, 2016). We find further evidence of this framing in the following report: A female sex worker reported that her two female sex worker friends were attacked and robbed. She said her friends had all their money taken and were hit in their faces and had to be taken to the hospital. She says her and her friends are now afraid to Campbell et al. 303 work in the South of Ireland and that the men who do this are criminal people who hate escorts. (Dublin, 2017) Working within a definition of hate crime, which understands hate crime as crime motivated by hostility or prejudice, we noted that sex workers’ reports of crimes of various kinds which contained evidence of hate manifested in hostile and derogatory attitudes towards sex workers and were expressed verbally or text- based. The following quotations provide examples of the most commonplace forms of abuse: ‘A female sex worker reported phone abuse and harassment from a man saying in the last message he ended by calling her ‘another pimped out prostitute’ (Limerick, 2018). Below, we provide a more explicit example: A female sex worker reported that she had been violently attacked. . . She said that whilst the man was hitting her, he was saying ‘you fucking whore, you’ll get it, where’s the money you stole from me?’ Despite it being the case that he’d never paid her any money. Reporting the next day, she said she was still crying and shaking. (Dublin, 2015) As public understanding of formally recognised forms of hate crime is limited, and with sex worker hate crime not formally recognised in Ireland, and no public discourse or understanding of the conceptualisation of targeted hostility towards sex workers as hate crime, it is not surprising that sex workers were not self- identifying sex worker hate crime. Some sex workers reported other forms of hate crime. It was not unusual for these reports to reflect sex workers’ intersectional experiences of hate that entwine with multiple forms of hate. Homophobia appears in several male sex workers’ reports: A male escort reported that a man called him pretending to be a client. When the supposed client called back saying he had arrived at the escort’s street, the escort could see it was a group of teenagers. The escort says they then started sending messages with hate against escorts and the LGBTQ community. (Dublin, 2016) In the following report, anti-migrant, homophobic and whorephobic hate are present: A male sex worker reported a man has posted several open threats against sex work- ers, especially if they are Brazilian and LGBTIþ, saying that he will personally hunt them down, and report them to the Garda and immigration, so they are arrested and go back to Brazil as criminals. One thing he’d said was ‘Me, together with the Garda and the immigration, will go after each one of you to send you back to Brazil, from where you never should have left’. (Dublin, 2017) Reports including xenophobic, racist hate, targeted at migrant workers were not uncommon: 304 Irish Journal of Sociology 28(3) ‘A female sex worker reported abusive calls and messages from a man saying things like ‘fuckin bitch go back to your country’ (Dublin, 2019). Other examples include: ‘A male sex worker reported a man called saying offensive and threatening things, like all escorts should leave this country, all escorts should die and more’ (Dublin, 2017). And finally: A female sex worker reported being sexually assaulted by a man who told her she was a bitch and threatened her that she didn’t know who he was and that she is not a woman and she should go back from where she came from. She said he was a totally racist person. [Dublin, 2018] Amnesty (2016) found that changes to sex work policy in Norway, which included the introduction of the criminalisation of sex purchase, had led to a hardening in attitudes to sex workers. Amnesty reported that negative attitudes to sex workers were more common and that migrant workers reported discrimi- nation from the public, which interwove racism and anti-migrant sentiment. We observe that the hate language reported to Amnesty by migrant sex workers was very similar to that contained in UM reports. Joyce et al. (2017) analysed the invisibility of anti-Irish Traveller and anti-Roma hate in Ireland. With limited documentation of such hate, some sex workers described experiences of such hate crime; in these cases, in relation to abusive texting: a female sex worker reported that a man texted her ‘Fuck u ye gypo’ (Monaghan, 2016). Our preliminary analysis of UM qualitative report data shows that not only sex workers are the targets of sex worker-targeted whorephobia but also can be the victims of other forms of hate crime too. Sex workers from other structurally marginalised groups and communities who experience prejudice and hate crime, such as black and ethnic minority communities (including migrant and Traveller and Roma communities) and the LGBT community, are targets of a range of hate crimes, and those forms of hate can intersect within the work-based victimisation they face as sex workers. Sharing information with and reporting to the police The number of sex workers reporting a crime incident into UM and who indicate that they have also reported it to the police (or plan to do so) is extremely low (see Figure 3). From our sample, the sum total of sex worker reports made to the scheme and to the police was 40. In the period 2015–2016 11 (1.81%), in 2016– 2017 4 (0.42%), in 2017–2018 15 (1.04%) and in 2018–2019 10 (0.66%). UM reports that when temporary rises in crime reporting occur, then, UM can usually attribute this to specific work done to support sex workers to report to police. For example, in recent years, SWAI have tried to encourage and facilitate reporting to the police in response to some particular incidents, usually repeat offender violent robberies, which directly result in several workers making police reports with SWAI support. Campbell et al. 305 The majority of crime incidents reported to UM by sex workers appear not to be reported to the police. This is particularly low when compared to the documented level of reporting to the police for reports from sex workers reporting into the NUM scheme in the UK. Connelly et al. (2018) analysed 2056 reports submitted to NUM between 2011 and 2016 and found that in nine out of ten cases (90%), the sex worker had given anonymous consent to share report data with the police, whereas in only two out of ten cases (20%) gave their full consent (permission to report formally) compared to no more than 1.81% in any of the years examined for UM. Whilst reporting to the police has been consistently low, UM data indicate that reporting levels have not improved since Ireland introduced the 2017 Act. As with NUM, UM members are more willing to give UM permission to share data anonymously with the police. The number of sex workers reporting a crime incident to UM who indicate that they give permission for UM to share anonymously details of the offender with police is high (see Figure 4). In the period 2016–2017 770 (81.48%), in the period 2017–2018 1172 (81.11%) and in the period 2018–2019 1222 (80.82%). This variable is not available for the period 2015–2016 because UM only began collecting this data in late-2015. Conclusions: Protections, social justice and decriminalisation Our analysis of UM data highlights the types of victimisation sex workers in Ireland are experiencing. It highlighted the wide spectrum of victimisation sex workers experience, including serious sexual and violent crime as well as online and in-person abuse, harassment and hate crime. Our data seem to call into ques- tion the argument that because sex workers are no longer criminalised through soliciting laws but their clients are, they will be empowered to come forward and 607 945 1445 1512 11 4 15 10 27 Mar 2015 - 26 March 2016 27 Mar 2016 - 26 March 2017 27 Mar 2017 - 26 March 2018 27 Mar 2018 - 26 March 2019 0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600 Crime Reports Reported To Police Figure 3. Crime incidents reported to police 2015–2019. 306 Irish Journal of Sociology 28(3) report crimes to the police. The data reveals instead that sex workers’ experiences in Ireland resonate with what has happened in other countries where purchasing laws were introduced. It appears that most crimes reported to UM are not also reported to the police. Sex work remains stigmatised. Sex workers wish to remain invisible to the authorities particularly the police. It ignores the reality that other laws and policies that remain in place around activities such as brothel keeping, renting premises for prostitution, advertising sexual services and immigration pol- icies place sex workers in positions of greater precarity and vulnerability to violent and other crimes. We support and call for further research with the wider sex work community and with specific cohorts of sex workers to explore the varied and intersectional experiences of victimisation amongst sex workers in Ireland. Participatory models of research have been identified as ethical ways of working with sex work com- munities to identify community needs and experiences (O’Neill, 2010). This should involve existing sex worker-led and peer-based organisations already involved in monitoring and supporting sex worker victims of crime in Ireland such as SWAI and UM. Such research could assist with evaluating and informing the develop- ment of law, policy and support interventions. Platt et al. (2018: 45) stress the importance of ‘participatory research to document the context specific ways in which criminalisation or decriminalisation interacts with other structural factors and policies related to stigma, poverty, migration, housing and sex worker collec- tive organising, to inform locally relevant interventions alongside legal reform’. In highlighting that in Ireland some of the problems identified in other juris- dictions with the Nordic model, particularly its effects on violence and discrimi- nation against sex workers are manifested, this article offers further support for decriminalisation. We also argue for the full decriminalisation of sex work in light of the weight of international research evidence which demonstrates 945 1445 1512 770 1172 1222 27 Mar 2016 - 26 March 2017 27 Mar 2017 - 26 March 2018 27 Mar 2018 - 26 March 2019 0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600 Crime Reports Allow Data Share to Police Figure 4. Crime incidents where victim allows anonymous offender data share to police 2016–2019. Campbell et al. 307 decriminalisation provides the best framework for safety and reducing sex worker victimisation. Where it has been enacted in New Zealand, it has enabled a more radical and ‘a dramatic shift in the approach to policing sex work’ (Armstrong, 2017: 1), with much greater trust amongst sex workers in the police and a sense of responsibility amongst the police for sex worker safety, enabling police to take a ‘proactive interest in sex worker safety’ (p. 14). It has provided sex workers with legitimacy through the ‘realisation of employment, legal, health and safety rights’ (Abel and Fitzgerald, 2010: 256). Such recognition and enforcement of labour rights and work-based protections are all vital elements in reducing work-related crime victimisation. In March 2020, the Department of Justice and Equality is legislatively required to review the 2017 Act, and this includes the impact of the law on the safety and well-being of people in sex work. We hope that this will produce additional independent academic research on sex workers’ victimisation. The increase in crimes reported to UM across many crime groups since the introduc- tion of 2017 Act is concerning. The persistent and very low levels of reporting of all crimes against sex workers reported to UM which are, in turn, reported to the police is a red flag. It suggests that in Ireland, many sex workers feel unable and afraid to report to the police, and their rights to protection and justice are curtailed. We urge proactive initiatives to improve access to justice for sex work- ers and to improve sex worker rights to security of the person, non- discrimination and equal protection of the law, including when sex workers are victims of crime. Platt et al. (2018: 45) concluded that all forms of sex work criminalisation ‘deprioritise sex workers’ safety, health and rights and hinder access to due process of law’ and recommended decriminalisation of sex work. At the same time, they argued that legal reform needs to be accompanied by policies to reduce ‘structural inequalities, stigma and exclusion – including introducing anti-discrimination and hate crime laws that protect sex workers and sexual, gender, racial and ethnic minorities’ (Platt et al., 2018: 45). Law and policy needs to be refocused on making sex workers’ lives safer and improving the relationship sex workers have with the police. This is a social justice issue. Changes to policing policy and practice which improve responses to crimes against sex workers and prioritise safety are needed. There may be some practical learning from policing initiatives which have refocused on sex worker safety and have demonstrated success in increasing reporting to the police and enabling access to justice: for example, the approach of treating crimes against sex workers as hate crime adopted in Merseyside (Campbell, 2018); introducing Police Sex Work Liaison officers located in units not involved in enforcement activity linked to sex work but with a remit of encouraging reporting and building confidence in the police, as enacted with some positive progress in PSNI (Ellison et al., 2019) and some UK forces (Brown et al., 2019). Such policing initiatives need to be developed through processes which include sex worker-led groups who are well placed to advice about policy and practice changes which enable sex workers to feel safe to report crimes committed against them and identify how sex workers can be best 308 Irish Journal of Sociology 28(3) made aware of their rights as victims in the criminal justice system. Such a refocus of law and policy we would suggest is needed in Ireland to ensure that sex worker safety is not collateral damage in the future development of sex work policy in Ireland. Authors’ Note Lucy Smith is Coordinator of UglyMugs.ie and Rosie Campbell was Chair of National Ugly Mugs at the time of writing. Declaration of conflicting interests The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, author- ship, and/or publication of this article. Funding The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article. ORCID iD Rosie Campbell https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9008-3924 Notes 1. The term ‘ugly mugs’ originated in Australia, where local sex workers reluctant to report to the police shared details of concerning individuals targeting sex workers with each other. Practitioners from the UK and Ireland adopted this practice within outreach and support services since the 1980s. National schemes were established in the UK (National Ugly Mugs) and Ireland (UglyMugs.ie). UM was established in 2009 as an online ugly mug scheme, with the aim of improving the safety of sex workers and reducing crime, by bringing workers together to share information about potential dangers. UM has been collecting data about crimes against sex workers for over a decade and is the primary third-party reporting scheme for sex workers in Ireland. 2. 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work_y625f7kknnbqzepmjvf6ypwhq4	----	Press/Politics 7(4) Fall 2002Vinson, Ertter / Entertainment or Education Entertainment or Education How Do Media Cover the Courts? C. Danielle Vinson and John S. Ertter In this study, the authors look at how the media cover the courts and the balance they strike between entertaining the audience and educating it. The authors expected that the rise of market-driven journalism combined with the increase in cameras in the courtroom has encouraged coverage of the judicial branch that is dramatic and designed to attract an audience rather than to inform and educate about the judicial process. Using a content analysis of local television and newspaper coverage of the courts in five media markets, the authors found that while coverage is not devoid of informative and even explanatory content, its subject matter and emphasis on the most accessible facets of the judicial process appear to be driven by audience and mar- ket considerations. Two case studies provide evidence that cameras contribute to the dramatization of court reporting. Since 1994 when the O.J. Simpson murder trial dominated print and broadcast media around the country for months, judges have struggled with decisions about whether to allow television cameras in their courtrooms, especially in high-profile cases. There are two dominant views about media coverage of the courts and cameras in the courtroom in particular (Haltom 1998). Critics con- tend that journalists cover the judicial process as entertainment. This perspec- tive suggests that cases receiving attention in the press tend to be sensationalistic, dramatic, often involving someone famous, and rarely representative of the rou- tine cases that pass through courtrooms. Critics also claim that cameras disrupt the courtroom as judges, lawyers, and even witnesses play to the cameras. In contrast, others, especially journalists, maintain that coverage of the courts and cameras in courtrooms educate people about the judicial process and encourage judges and lawyers to be meticulous in following due process. The concern over media coverage of the courts is due largely to its effects, both proven and presumed. Whether it entertains or educates, unrestricted 80 Press/Politics 7(4):80-97 DOI: 10.1177/108118002236351 © 2002 by the President and the Fellows of Harvard College coverage of cases can affect both the victims and the accused. For example, vic- tims who are covered by the media may have difficulty recovering and feel fur- ther victimized by reporters and their stories (Gersh 1992). Early coverage of the accused may lead to a presumption of guilt by the public, making it difficult to find an impartial jury; even if jurors are not biased, some contend that they may be influenced indirectly by the expectations of the public. The American Bar Association has taken this possibility seriously enough to propose guidelines for lawyers about what information might be prejudicial if it appeared in news reports so that lawyers will not provide such details to reporters (Imrich et al. 1995). Coverage may even affect lawyers’ strategies. Pritchard (1994) found that cases receiving more pretrial coverage were less likely to be plea-bargained because prosecutors did not want to appear soft on crime. Those who believe the media cover the courts as entertainment worry that this may undermine the legitimacy of the courts. Public cynicism and declining confidence in government institutions are at least in part related to media cover- age, especially negative reporting (Nye 1997). While the judicial system tends to fare better than the legislative and executive branches of government in surveys of public support, confidence in the Supreme Court has hovered around 30 per- cent in recent years (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 1995:32). A lack of public confi- dence is particularly dangerous for the courts because they have no independent enforcement power; they rely on the other branches of government to uphold their decisions. Without public pressure to support the courts, the executive and legislature might be less vigilant in carrying out judicial decisions. In light of these potentially serious consequences of coverage, how much access media should have to courtrooms and the various players in the judicial process is in part a cost-benefit analysis. Do the benefits of educating the public about the judicial process outweigh the costs to victims, defendants, and the judi- cial branch? To begin to answer that question, we must know what the media report about the courts—whether reporters cover the courts to entertain by highlighting sensational or dramatic cases and reactions or to educate the public about the judicial system by explaining the process and judicial decisions and why the judges and juries make these decisions. Before presenting the results of our analysis of local media coverage of the courts, we discuss what is already known about this topic and two developments that influence court reporting. What We Know about Media Coverage of the Courts The literature on media coverage of the courts is limited. We know the most about the relationship between the Supreme Court and the press (Davis 1987, 1994; Graber 1989; Slotnick and Segal 1998). This research has shown that cov- erage of the Court is scarce and sporadic and court reporters face a variety of challenges in covering an institution that has little interest in press relations. Vinson, Ertter / Entertainment or Education 81 Less attention has been paid to how the media cover the trial courts. Drechsel (1983) is one of the few scholars to provide specific insight into coverage of the trial courts, although his emphasis is more on the process of news making than the actual product. Providing a case study of one reporter’s relationship to his sources, Drechsel’s research helps us understand how reporters gather and filter information from the trial courts, but it does not tell us much about what infor- mation is reported. In his synthesis of existing literature, Haltom (1998:179-80) finds that coverage of the criminal courts tends to be brief and relies on insider accounts. More generally, several studies have shown that crime is one of the most cov- ered topics in the news. Crime stories make up 20 to 30 percent of local televi- sion news content (Kaiser Family Foundation 1998; Klite et al. 1997) and 20 to 28 percent of newspaper stories (Graber 1980:24-5). It was the sixth most reported topic on national network news in one study (Kaiser Family Foundation 1998). The crimes reported are not generally representative of what occurs, with journalists preferring murders, sensational cases, and crimes involving celebrities or public officials (Graber 1980; Kaniss 1991). Not reflective of actual racial and ethnic breakdowns of victims and perpetrators, crime coverage tends disproportionately to show minorities as the perpetrators and whites as the victims (Graber 1980; Kooistra 1998). While existing research sheds light on what is reported, it does not directly address whether court coverage is more explanation or entertainment. Two relatively recent developments may work together to encourage report- ers to highlight the entertainment aspects of the courtroom at the expense of explaining the judicial process. First, the number of cameras in the courtroom has increased dramatically since the late 1970s. Prior to 1976, the American Bar Association banned cameras in courtrooms (Hale 1998). As late as 1965, the Supreme Court supported this ban in Estes v. Texas as necessary to ensure the accused a fair trial. However, in 1976, several states began to experiment with cameras in the courtroom, and in 1981, the Supreme Court ruling in Chandler v. Florida cleared the way for cameras, declaring that “at present no one has been able to present empirical data sufficient to establish that the mere presence of the broadcast media inherently has an adverse effect” on due process (Hale 1998). In 1984, the American Bar Association amended its policy concerning cameras in courtrooms (Hale 1998), and currently all states permit television to record at least some court proceedings. A second development that might be expected to affect court reporting is market-driven journalism. In the 1980s, in response to declining readership and changes in ownership, newspapers and television news began to pay more atten- tion to ratings and profits than they had in the past with important consequences for the content of the news and for the news-gathering process (McManus 1994; Underwood 1993). Journalists were encouraged to report on what would 82 Press/Politics 7(4) Fall 2002 interest the audience, regardless of importance, and to cut costs by focusing on people and events that were most accessible (McManus 1994:85-9; Underwood 1993:37, 64). Neither the increase in cameras in the courts nor the rise of market-driven journalism by itself would necessarily result in coverage of the courts as enter- tainment. While cameras in the courtroom make it easier for television news to cover events inside courtrooms by providing visuals, reporters still have to decide how to write the story and what parts of the proceedings to use. And market-driven journalism does not demand that the courts be covered at all. If there were no cameras to capture the dramatic events that happen in court- rooms, news organizations would find coverage of the courts too costly and inef- ficient. However, the courtroom events that evoke the emotional responses that news media, particularly local television, hope will attract audiences (Kaniss 1991:47) are made accessible by cameras in the courtroom. The confluence of these developments leads us to expect that coverage of the courts will emphasize entertainment over explication of the judicial process and the laws in question. We now turn our attention to answering the question of what local media cover about the courts and the judicial process and why. We hypothesize that sto- ries in both newspaper and television will reflect entertainment and profit values of market-driven media rather than an emphasis on important cases and educat- ing the public and that cameras in the court will increase the drama in court reporting. To the extent that there is any explanation of the judicial process and the legal context, we expect this to be reported more in newspapers than on television. Method To test these hypotheses, we examined coverage of the courts in daily newspa- pers and local television newscasts from five media markets—Los Angeles; Atlanta; Philadelphia; Columbia, South Carolina; and Raleigh, North Carolina. Because the taped local television news coverage that we used was gathered for an unrelated project, we had no control over the media markets or the dates of coverage.1 We performed content analysis of all the news and editorial stories that occurred in a U.S. courtroom or that mentioned a U.S. court or judge. For television, we used an early and late evening newscast from each media market during six weeks scattered from September 1993 through October 1994. Time constraints and availability of the newspapers forced us to analyze just two or three of these weeks for each newspaper, but that is sufficient to compare print and broadcast coverage of the same cases at least for those weeks, which will allow us to draw some conclusions about differences between the two media. While we have chosen to focus on local coverage because that is where most court reporting occurs, we were also able to obtain network news coverage of Vinson, Ertter / Entertainment or Education 83 the courts during the same time period and will use it as a point of comparison below. There were a total of 998 stories—279 from newspaper and 719 from televi- sion. For all of them, we analyzed the amount of coverage, the substantive infor- mation reported, and how the stories were reported. Because 230 stories dealt with the O.J. Simpson trial and the beating of Reginald Denny during the Los Angeles riots and these cases were unusual, we analyzed the data both including and excluding the coverage of these two cases. For most aspects of coverage, the findings did not change significantly with the exclusion of the Simpson and Denny trials, and thus, we report the results of the full data set. Where findings were different, we mention both sets of results. What Is Covered? Violence. The types of cases and the subjects of court reporting support the hypothesis that entertainment value is a concern. Coverage primarily focused on murder and other violent crimes rather than on less dramatic nonviolent issues such as constitutional questions or white-collar crime, which may be harder to explain but often have a greater impact on the public. More than two-thirds of all stories dealt with some type of violent crime. Controlling for the type of media, violent crime accounted for 54 percent of newspaper stories and almost 75 per- cent of television coverage. Even without the Denny and Simpson trials, 60 per- cent of the coverage dealt with violent crime, although newspaper coverage of it dropped to 42 percent without the two high-profile cases. When we break down coverage by the subjects of each story, the focus on vio- lence and entertainment becomes even clearer. The top seven topics—murder, the case of the men accused of beating Reginald Denny in the Los Angeles riots, the O.J. Simpson murder trial, other violent crimes (mostly sexual assault and other assaults not specified in one of the other subjects), the Bobbitt trials, child abuse cases, and the Menendez brothers’ murder trial—made up 62 percent of coverage. In contrast, the subjects that were arguably most significant and whose outcomes had the most impact on a broad number of people—political corrup- tion; judicial misbehavior; discrimination and other civil rights issues, including hate crimes and the attempt by women to be admitted to the Citadel; first amendment cases; and environmental and military cases—combined took up barely one-fifth of all coverage. Not only did violent cases receive more attention, but they tended to be more prominent than others. Seventy percent of murder stories appeared on page one or before the first commercial, and 56 percent of other violent crimes received top billing, but only 42 percent of nonviolent cases were given such attention. Excluding the Simpson and Denny cases made little difference in these findings. 84 Press/Politics 7(4) Fall 2002 Location. The location of cases covered also suggests that news organizations put audience interest ahead of importance. Sixty-five percent of the stories dealt with cases in the state. While some of these did have important implications for the audience—local white-collar crime, local political cases, and local environ- mental cases, for example—most of these stories reported murders and violent crimes, many of which held no greater significance for the community. They were not, for example, covered as evidence of increasing crime in the community. Thirty-five percent of all stories were not local. Of these, 80 percent took place in other states and had no apparent consequences for or ties to the local audience. These cases were often controversial with race-related undertones, such as hate crimes and the Rodney King and Reginald Denny trials in Los Angeles. Many of these out-of-state cases were accompanied by graphic video of the crime and victims, which might have made them more interesting to the media. For example, audiences were repeatedly shown video or photographs of truck driver Reginald Denny being pulled out of his truck and beaten during the Los Angeles riots and of ice skater Nancy Kerrigan sobbing after someone hit her knee with a metal pipe. Other out-of-state stories were just bizarre or humor- ous; for example, one story that received attention in several markets was about whether a talking parrot, who had apparently seen the murder of his owner, could be considered a witness in the case. The remaining nonlocal cases, only 7 percent of all the cases, were national, meaning the United States was a party to the case or the case was being heard by the Supreme Court. It is these national cases that would potentially affect the most people as the Supreme Court ruled on First Amendment freedoms and civil rights. Race. Coverage of the courts included much that at least implicitly dealt with racial issues. Two of the top three subjects—the O.J. Simpson trial and the beat- ing of Reginald Denny—raised some questions about racism. These two sub- jects combined with hate crimes comprised 25 percent of all stories. At first, this might appear contrary to our hypothesis that the media consider audience inter- est over importance of a subject. Race relations, after all, are a significant con- cern in the United States. However, the way these stories were covered did little to highlight the issue of race relations and almost nothing to analyze the causes of tensions or the implications beyond the immediate case. While most of the news organizations in each market mentioned the race of the defendants and victims explicitly in some, although not most, of their reports, they did not go beyond that. They left the audience to decide if and why this was important. Some stories did mention concern that the verdicts might spark more riots, but little more was said. Instead, the stories discussed precautions police were taking to handle that possibility. After the verdict was read, many stories reported reactions from blacks and whites but did not explicitly analyze the differences in those groups. Vinson, Ertter / Entertainment or Education 85 Coverage of the Simpson trial included some discussion that one police officer was racist, but most of the early coverage of the case omitted this. Consequently, what might have been important—race relations or racism—was rarely men- tioned explicitly, and when it was, the audience was on its own to determine why or how race mattered in the case. The larger context of racism was not addressed. Racial minorities were portrayed as perpetrators of crime in 58.5 percent of the stories compared to whites in 41.5 percent of the two-thirds of coverage where the race of defendants was discernible in the story. However, minorities were rarely seen as the victim of crimes (21.5 percent) in contrast to whites, who were the plaintiffs in 78.5 percent, which is completely unreflective of national crime statistics that show nonwhites are much more likely than whites to be victims (Kooistra 1998). When the Denny and Simpson trials were excluded, the percentage of cases where the race of the defendants and victims was clear from the coverage declined, and the discrepancy between minorities as perpetrators and victims evened out somewhat—minorities were the defen- dants in 38 percent of the coverage and were the victims in 36 percent. But the fact remains that in the most widely reported cases, minorities were often the defendants and whites the victims. Coverage of race in the judicial process supports our hypothesis that audience considerations drive coverage. While media were drawn to stories with racial undertones and implications because these subjects are controversial and inter- esting to audiences, reporters showed little interest in elaborating on or evaluat- ing these issues. And the coverage tended to support societal stereotypes of minorities as perpetrators and whites as victims. Characters and sources. Defendants were overwhelmingly the major focus in coverage of cases. They were the primary characters in 50 percent of the stories and the secondary characters in another 22 percent. By contrast, plaintiffs or vic- tims were major players in a story only 38 percent of the time, 14 percent as the primary character, and 24 percent as the secondary character. Contrary to expectations that famous defendants or plaintiffs would be cov- ered most or at least most prominently because of their interest to audiences, only 38 percent of the stories had a plaintiff or defendant who was nationally or locally well known. In fact, of the six cases we labeled high profile, meaning they received front-page coverage and some attention on local evening news in all of the markets we studied, only the O.J. Simpson trial involved someone well known prior to the alleged crime. The others—the Bobbitt trials, the Rodney King beating, the Denny trial, and the Menendez brothers’ murder trial— became high profile because of their unusual and violent subject matter and because there was video of the trials and/or the crimes in all of these, except John Bobbitt’s case, making them accessible to the media. 86 Press/Politics 7(4) Fall 2002 Some might dismiss this finding as a matter of timing, that perhaps no famous people were involved in court proceedings during the weeks we studied. While this is a valid question that warrants more study, one example from our data casts doubt on this line of reasoning. During three of the six weeks we followed cover- age, U.S. senator Kay Bailey Hutchison (R-TX) was indicted by a grand jury for misconduct during her campaign, unindicted because of a problem with the grand jury, reindicted by a new grand jury, and then absolved when charges were dismissed by a judge. All of this was dutifully reported as front-page news in the Texas media. However, all of the television and most of the newspapers in the markets we studied ran only one story on the case when the first indictment was issued, and they buried that in the middle pages of the paper or late in the newscast. In addition to plaintiffs and defendants, lawyers and judges received attention, especially as secondary characters. In some cases, they took center stage even when the defendant was famous, as in the case of the Simpson trial. We heard much more about lawyers Johnnie Cochran and Marcia Clark and Judge Lance Ito than we did about Simpson himself. That is probably because the lawyers and judges do much of the action—filing motions and ruling on them—while the defendant or plaintiff merely observes. Occasionally, the lawyers or judges did things that called attention to themselves. In some of the high-profile cases, law- yers held press conferences after the day’s proceedings to answer questions for the media or to put their own spins on rulings or verdicts. Comments made by judges in several cases turned the spotlight on them. In North Carolina during the trial of several men accused of raping two women hired to dance for them at a private party, the judge compared the women to prostitutes and said he would find the men not guilty if he were on the jury.2 Although the jury was not present during the judge’s commentary, many in the courtroom were taken aback by the statement. In a Philadelphia courtroom, a judge imposed a harsh sentence on a man convicted of murder and in doing so stated that the defendant “has no sal- vage value” (WPVI-TV, Philadelphia, January 14, 1994). That prompted the con- victed man to curse at the judge and the victim’s family. All of this was captured on camera and replayed on the evening news and described in the local papers in a way that featured the defendant and the judge prominently. Process. Media interest in the judicial process was strongest at the beginning and end of a case. Arraignments and pretrial hearings or motions were covered in 36 percent of the stories, while verdicts and immediate reactions were the focus of 34 percent. Just under one-fifth of the coverage reported on the trial itself. This pattern reflects audience and news-gathering considerations rather than educational concerns. The beginning and end of the process are usually most interesting and predictable, making them easier to cover. In the early stage of a trial, the facts of the case are new, and there is some suspense in how judges will Vinson, Ertter / Entertainment or Education 87 rule on pretrial motions. At the end of a case, the verdict is the climax and may be accompanied by dramatic emotional responses from defendants and plaintiffs or their supporters in the courtroom. In contrast, the actual trial often rehashes old information, may get very technical and tedious, and can be unpredictable in how long it lasts, making it less interesting to audiences and more difficult to cover. The importance of accessibility to the process can be seen in the lack of coverage of jury selection (2.6 percent of stories) and the appeals process (6.3 percent of stories). Cameras are usually not allowed in these parts of the process, making television coverage less likely. Just the facts. To try to get more directly at whether court coverage tended to educate or entertain, we coded each story for its primary content. Content was divided into three broad categories. A story could be a straightforward report on the facts of the case—who did what, when, and where. The second category was for stories that were primarily explanatory—that is, reporters explained the rel- evant laws and/or the judicial process, often relying on legal experts as sources. Finally, there was a category for reports that were mostly entertainment. This included stories that went beyond the facts of the case to include graphic details of the crime, descriptions of appearances, dramatic emotional reactions or testi- mony, and human interest stories about participants in the process. It also included commentary or opinion pieces that discussed strategies or opinions of a trial or verdict without making sense of them on legal or procedural grounds. Three-fourths of the stories were unadorned presentations of the facts of the case, especially on television. Almost one-fifth of the stories fell into the enter- tainment category, and only about 6 percent could be called explanations. And somewhat surprisingly, excluding the Simpson and Denny trials did little to lower the percent of entertainment stories; they still made up 13 percent of the coverage. When broken down by the type of media, we found that newspapers included more entertainment (23.3 percent) and explanation stories (11.8 per- cent) than did television (15.4 and 3.3 percent, respectively). This may be explained by the larger news space available to the print media. We found that short stories were most likely to be just the facts of the case, and 75 percent of all television stories were short (less than a minute) compared to only a third of newspaper articles. Not only did longer stories allow print reporters to dwell more on explanations and to add quotes and descriptions that made the story more entertaining, but the additional space meant that for the more prominent cases, the paper could run more than one article on the same case on the same day. One article might focus on the facts and what had happened in court, while the other dwelt on reactions to what had happened. The high percentage of stories that were straightforward presentations of facts suggests that coverage mostly informs us about what takes place in the courts, and entertainment is secondary. While that may be encouraging, the lack 88 Press/Politics 7(4) Fall 2002 of explanatory stories may trouble some. Does the fact that so few stories can be characterized as explanatory mean that people receive no help from the media in figuring out the judicial process? To answer this question and to learn about the kinds of explanations reporters give their readers, we coded whether each article contained any explanation of the law or legal definitions relevant to the case, the judicial process itself, or the penalties possible in a case. Almost one-fifth contained some discussion of pen- alty options or why one penalty was chosen. Seventeen percent provided some procedural explanation—for example, why a piece of evidence was considered admissible—and only 10 percent offered any explanation of relevant laws—for example, the conditions that had to occur to charge someone with marital rape, which was relevant to the Bobbitt trials. There were substantial differences in the kinds of explanations offered by television and newspaper. In all cases, a greater percentage of newspaper reports contained some explanation. Nearly one-fourth had legal explanations, about one-fifth included discussion of procedure, and 31 percent explained penalties. In comparison, about 15 percent of television reports included procedural and/ or penalty explanations, but only 5 percent discussed legal aspects. This is proba- bly because television’s shorter stories and visual format make discussion of the laws and technical legal definitions difficult. Impact of Cameras in Court One thing we have not dealt with much to this point is the extent to which cameras in the courtroom affect coverage. To examine this, we turn to a more qualitative discussion of reporting on several specific cases. First, we look at both local and national television coverage of two cases stemming from the same incident—John Bobbitt’s sexual assault trial for allegedly raping his wife and Lorena Bobbitt’s trial for mutilating her husband following the purported assault. At Mr. Bobbitt’s trial, which lasted three days, all during the time we were following the news, cameras were not permitted in the courtroom because Virginia law prohibits them in sexual assault trials. However, they were allowed at Mrs. Bobbitt’s trial less than two months later because it was not a sexual assault case. Her trial lasted almost two weeks, with the first week occurring during the time we were taping the news. In addition to our good fortune that we just happened to be following the news during both these trials, they offer an excellent case study on the effects of cameras in the courtroom because they deal with the same incident, the same facts, and the same people, thus avoiding prob- lems of comparability and the injection of additional variables that might arise between two unrelated cases. The key difference between the two was that the second trial included more detailed testimony of Mr. Bobbitt’s history of abusing his wife because that was the foundation of her defense. Vinson, Ertter / Entertainment or Education 89 Somewhat unexpectedly, we found that cameras in the court were not neces- sarily a guarantee that a case would get more coverage. While there were more stories on Lorena Bobbitt’s trial than her husband’s on both the national net- works (nine stories on her and five on him) and the local television stations we observed (twenty-seven compared to sixteen), the pattern did not hold up for individual news outlets. For example, ABC evening news ran four stories on Lorena Bobbitt’s case and only one report on John Bobbitt’s trial, but CBS ran just one story on each of them during the weeks we studied. And if we take into account the fact that Mrs. Bobbitt’s trial was longer, all meaningful differences in the number of reports vanish. However, local television news stories about Lorena Bobbitt’s case were longer than those about John Bobbitt’s trial. WRAL in Raleigh was typical: All stories on Mr. Bobbitt’s trial were less than twenty sec- onds, while all those about the later case were between twenty and forty sec- onds. Interestingly, the networks were consistent in the length of the stories for both trials. CBS’s reports were all less than thirty seconds, while ABC and NBC ran stories ranging between one and a half to slightly more than two minutes. Overall, the presence or absence of cameras did little to influence the amount of coverage. The impact of cameras was much more obvious on the substance of reporting. The sources of reports and how graphic and dramatic the stories were varied directly with whether cameras were permitted. In the first case where cameras were not allowed, reporters and anchors had to paraphrase and summarize testi- mony and usually did so in a very clinical way. Most local news stories did not go beyond this. The networks, which were slightly more graphic in their summaries of the testimony, supplemented these with outside sources and more focus on the larger implications of the trial. ABC and NBC both ran long stories that men- tioned that women’s groups hoped the case would call attention to the abuse of women and the need to change marital rape laws. ABC’s one report included sound bites from two experts—a professor at American University and a spokesperson at the Women’s Policy Center—who commented on marital rape laws and how they differ among states. It also looked at a North Carolina state senator’s efforts to change the laws in her state. While NBC did less outside reporting of this concern about marital rape laws, it did include a graphic in one report showing which states had tough marital rape laws. It was not until the announcement of the verdict that the news was able to get sound bites from the people involved directly in the case. On that day, John Bobbitt made a brief statement expressing relief that the trial was over and he had been acquitted. It was carried on both local and national television. In addition, NBC covered comments by lawyers from both sides that they hoped women who were abused by their spouses would not be discouraged by the outcome of the case from pressing charges. 90 Press/Politics 7(4) Fall 2002 In contrast, coverage of Lorena Bobbitt’s trial centered almost entirely on what happened in court and made liberal use of sound bites from the testimony captured by cameras in the courtroom. One local television newscast ran a seventeen-second sound bite of John Bobbitt explaining in graphic terms what had happened at the hospital the night he was cut and what his life would have been like had the surgery not been successful. The sound bites from the networks ran as long as thirty seconds—an eternity when compared to the ten-second sound bites allotted to the candidates during most of the presidential campaigns of the 1990s (Patterson 1994:164). Because the testimony was reported directly, it was much more graphic than in the first trial, where the reporters usually sanitized the most explicit comments. For example, reporters’ bland summaries in the first trial mentioned that Mrs. Bobbitt had been abused. How- ever, in the second trial, the testimony of witnesses who had seen her injuries offered more details, and Mrs. Bobbitt’s own description of the physical and sex- ual abuse she allegedly endured left little to the imagination. The graphic descriptions made more accessible by cameras in the court were not the only way cameras added to the drama of the coverage. Cameras could show how the testimony and arguments were delivered. For example, in her opening statement, Lorena Bobbitt’s lawyer explained that the jury would hear how Lorena Bobbitt was “beaten, pushed, dragged, abused, and raped.” The inflections in her voice and her dramatic pauses after each word built up tension that reached a peak on the final word of her sentence. No summary by a reporter could have conveyed that drama. A few reports also opted to run unedited exchanges between lawyers and witnesses during cross examination, which emphasized the conflict as lawyers tried to pressure witnesses or point out inconsistencies. In the first case, video had largely been confined to shots of the Bobbitts and their lawyers arriving at or leaving the courthouse each day. This was supple- mented with artist sketches of what took place in the courtroom, still shots of newspaper headlines about the case, graphics on how marital rape laws differ across the country, and some outside video of interviews with people unrelated to the case. However, in the second case, most of the video came from inside the court. Instead of having the reporters mention that the witnesses had been emo- tional, television news showed Lorena Bobbitt crying and shaking on the witness stand. In one story, after John Bobbitt described how his wife had cut him, the video switched to a lawyer holding up the knife that Lorena Bobbitt had used. And the pictures of Lorena Bobbitt’s injuries from previous fights with her hus- band that were shown to the jury were broadcast to the television audience as well. Cameras in the court also seemed to change the framing of the story. Without video of what took place in court in the first case, reporters had to expand the focus beyond the courtroom. The networks did this by focusing on the larger Vinson, Ertter / Entertainment or Education 91 implications concerning marital rape and abuse of women. In the second case, however, because of the cameras, there was no need to go outside the courtroom for interesting video and sources. Consequently, reporters could frame the story more narrowly. Most chose to look at the case as a strategic game between two sides. NBC referred to the case as “round 2” and consistently reminded viewers that the defense strategy was to portray Mrs. Bobbitt as the victim rather than a criminal. None of the stories in our data set on the second case revisited the ques- tions of domestic abuse. Newspaper versus Television In addition to the differences in coverage resulting from the presence or absence of cameras in the court, we also wanted to see if newspaper reporters, in an effort to stay competitive with television, covered trials in the same dramatic way as broadcast media did when cameras were present. To examine this, we sin- gled out a local North Carolina trial in which a teenage boy was charged with assault with intent to kill. The teen had thrown a forty-two-pound cemetery vase off an overpass, hitting a car and severely injuring a woman riding in the car. We chose this case because the entire trial was done in a week, and while it received quite a bit of attention locally, it was not accompanied by all the hype of the higher profile cases. Local television coverage of the trial on WRAL in Raleigh was extensive and dramatic. It was reported on five nights—five times on the early evening news and three times on the late news. Two of the late reports were summaries of the earlier stories and were less than a minute, but only one of the early newscast sto- ries was less than a minute. The other five reports were between one and a half and three minutes long. From the first day, the reporter following the trial and the two anchors on the early newscast treated it like a minidrama. On Monday evening, it was the lead story. As video of the granite vase and the badly damaged vehicle rolled, the first anchor began, “It was supposed to be an uneventful trip home.” The second anchor picked up the story, “It was supposed to be [pause] but. . . . ” At that point, she described how a group of teens had dropped the vase on the car, causing extensive injuries to the car’s passenger, Ellen Daley, who was pictured in a still shot taken before the incident. The story then shifted to the courtroom with an edited video package of the day’s events—the judge’s ruling on a pretrial motion to move the case to another location, jury selection, and the likely witnesses— narrated by the court reporter. It ended with the reporter live in front of the courthouse. The second anchor breathlessly asked, “What about Mrs. Daley—is she going to be at the trial? Will she testify?” The reporter explained that he had spoken to her by phone and that she had no memory of the accident. The first anchor asked about Mrs. Daley’s health, and the reporter replied that her life “is 92 Press/Politics 7(4) Fall 2002 pretty limited” because of physical and personal problems related to the acci- dent. The story concluded with the second anchor reminding the audience, “It’s going to be an emotional trial.” Subsequent stories were equally dramatic. On the second day, the report included parts of Mr. Daley’s testimony describing what happened when the vase hit his car and injured his wife. The video showed him crying on the witness stand, his daughter in the front row of the court being comforted by a friend, and the defendant with his head in his hands. Both anchors and the reporter reminded viewers that this was dramatic and emotional testimony. In addition to using frequent video of Mr. Daley and his daughter sobbing during testimony and sound bites from various witnesses, the reporter heightened the drama by con- necting the events in short, clipped sentence fragments that built up to the next event in the report. The anchors also continued to ask human interest questions that would elicit emotional responses from the audience. For example, one of them asked the reporter what struck him about the proceedings, and he related how the prosecutor had dropped the vase on the evidence table and the sound reverberated through the floor. He also pointed out early in the trial that Mr. Daley held no bitterness toward the defendants. The attention to reactions within the courtroom during the trial carried over after the case was done as the three television reports following the verdict focused on reactions from those involved in the trial—the defendant’s visible response as well as comments by the jury foreman, the prosecutor, citizens in the town where the teen lived, and Mr. Daley. The reporter also noted that Mr. Daley seemed bitter that the jury had taken so long to reach a decision and that the judge had dismissed the most serious charge. During the trial, the television audience learned the basic facts of the case. But while there was some discussion of the possible penalties facing the teen and occasional mentions of the judge’s decisions regarding motions, television reporting of the case included little explanation of the process. There was no attempt to link the story to a broader context or community concern. Instead, most of the coverage looked inward at what took place in the courtroom, and the anchors and reporter emphasized the dramatic human interest elements of the case as a way to get the audience interested. Newspaper coverage of the trial was somewhat different. First, there was less of it. Only three stories ran in the Raleigh News and Observer: one short report (less than nine paragraphs) on the first day of the trial and two longer ones (twenty paragraphs). Despite fewer stories, the newspaper provided more details. The first story summarized the incident, detailed all the charges against the teen and the possible penalty, and gave a more complete description of Mrs. Daley’s injuries than television coverage did. The newspaper reporter also quoted the prosecutor’s explanation of why Mrs. Daley would not attend the trial, saying that he did not “think emotionally she was up to the trip.”3 The other Vinson, Ertter / Entertainment or Education 93 articles included more details about how the teens had been vandalizing mail- boxes and other property earlier on the night of the incident and how they had taunted Mr. Daley as he tried to flag down help. Newspaper reports paid more attention to the defense case, paraphrasing parts of the defense attorney’s closing argument. In addition, the final report on the trial briefly mentioned a larger implication of the case. The reporter explained why the assault with intent to kill charge had been dropped and quoted the prosecutor as saying he would push for a change in state law “that would make throwing objects at moving vehicles an automatic crime” that would not force lawyers to have to prove an intent to kill to get a conviction.4 The longer two stories in the newspaper included their share of drama. An article on the second day of the trial opened like a short story: Phil and Ellie Daley worried about driving to Florida so much that they talked of avoiding Jacksonville for fear of being shot from an overpass. But their biggest danger lurked in the darkness high above a Johnston County bridge—a 42-pound cemetery vase in the hands of a teenager.5 There were some mentions of reactions in the courtroom during testimony— the Daley’s daughter crying in court, for example—but these were not as promi- nent or as plentiful as in television coverage of the trial. The verdict story was largely concerned with reactions from the victims and the defendant, their fami- lies, and the lawyers. However, in contrast to television coverage, which sug- gested that not everyone was happy with the outcome, most of the responses in the newspaper did not indicate any bitterness or conflicts that could be turned into a dramatic story line. Mr. Daley’s comment suggested that he believed jus- tice had been done, and so did the defense attorney. The only dramatic reaction reported in the paper was that of the defendant’s mother, who broke down in tears. Conclusions Our quantitative analysis of coverage of the courts does not reveal a flagrant attempt to make court reporting entertaining. The large majority of stories do not focus explicitly on drama and human interest, and most report the facts of cases in a straightforward way. Some stories even include some explanation of laws, processes, or penalties. Celebrity cases are not guaranteed prominent cov- erage. However, there is unmistakable, if somewhat subtle, evidence that news organizations do prefer to report on what will interest us, regardless of its importance or implications for us, and they are partial to stories and sources that are most accessible and therefore easiest to cover. The most frequent subjects of 94 Press/Politics 7(4) Fall 2002 coverage are violence and the unusual, while cases with broader consequences or that happen more routinely are neglected. The parts of the process that are most predictable and accessible attract the most attention. Thus, it appears that our hypothesis concerning market-driven journalism is largely confirmed, although perhaps not in the blatant way we had anticipated. And although we would hesitate to make generalizations on the basis of our limited case studies, we do see evidence in the Bobbitt trials that cameras in the courtroom shape coverage and encourage the broadcast media to highlight the more dramatic aspects of a case at the expense of discussing the wider signifi- cance of a judicial proceeding. Our comparison of television and newspaper cov- erage of the North Carolina case reveals that newspapers are not immune to the temptation to dramatize coverage, focusing on emotions and using a narrative style. However, cameras in the court allow television more avenues for dramatic reporting than print media have. Furthermore, because of the limited news space in television, newspaper reporters may be better able than their television counterparts to incorporate more detailed information and point out the broader importance of seemingly isolated local cases even in the most dramatic reports. We began this article with the question of whether the benefits to the audi- ence of coverage of the courts outweighed the costs of that coverage to victims, defendants, and the judicial branch. Our study suggests that audiences can gain some knowledge of the judicial process through the media, especially newspa- pers. However, they are likely to learn the most about the unusual cases that have the least significance to the community or the public. We also saw evidence that coverage might in some ways undermine support for or trust in the judicial process. While they were the exceptions, there were cases in which many people were not happy with the verdict. Because the media, especially television, tended to focus on the dramatic evidence against the defen- dant, the audience may have made up its mind on the person’s guilt and been sur- prised when the jury decided otherwise or opted for lesser charges based on evi- dence that did not make the evening news (e.g., see the Reginald Denny case or the vase-throwing case in North Carolina). Cameras in the courtroom may well contribute to this because they allow reporters to pick and choose what portions of the trial to show and do not force them to explain why things occurred. In con- trast, without cameras in the court, journalists must provide more of the text of the story and may, as in coverage of the first Bobbitt trial, decide to pursue more explanation than simple summaries of what happened. The good news in this study is that the media are capable of providing educa- tional reporting on the courts. The bad news is that they may have little incentive to do so in a world of journalism driven by market concerns and the ready access of cameras in the courtrooms. Vinson, Ertter / Entertainment or Education 95 Notes 1. Collection of the local television data was funded in conjunction with another project by grants from the National Science Foundation and the Dirksen Congressional Institute and the Caterpillar Corporation. The videotapes of the network news mentioned later were funded by a grant from the Furman University Research and Professional Growth Commit- tee, and research assistance was funded by the Furman Advantage Program. The authors appreciate this generous support and take full responsibility for the findings in this article. The newspapers analyzed were the Atlanta Constitution, Los Angeles Times, Raleigh News and Observer, Philadelphia Inquirer, and The Columbia [South Carolina] State. The television sta- tions were KABC (Los Angeles), WIS (Columbia, SC), WPVI (Philadelphia), WRAL (Raleigh, NC), and WSB (Atlanta). The dates of the coverage were September 26–October 2, October 17–23, and November 7–13, 1993, and January 9–15, September 18–24, and October 9–15, 1994. 2. Todd Nelson, “Judge’s Comments on Rape Case Shock Observers,” News and Observer, Oct. 22, 1993:2B. 3. Pamela Babcock, “Trial Begins in Assault from Overpass,” News and Observer, Oct. 19, 1993:8B. 4. Pamela Babcock, “Teen Found Guilty,” News and Observer, Oct. 22, 1993:1B. 5. Pamela Babcock, “Traveler Takes Stand to Recount Night of Horror,” News and Observer, Oct. 20, 1993:1B. References Davis, Richard. 1987. “Whither the Congress and the Supreme Court? The Television News Portrayal of American National Government.” Television Quarterly 22:55-63. Davis, Richard. 1994. Decisions and Images: The Supreme Court and the Press. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. Drechsel, Robert. 1983. News Making in the Trial Courts. New York: Longman. Gersh, Debra. 1992. “Crime Victims and the Media: Press Coverage Has a Lasting Impact on Their Lives.” Editor and Publisher 125(26 September):12-4. Graber, Doris. 1980. Crime News and the Public. New York: Praeger. Graber, Doris. 1989. Mass Media and American Politics. 3rd Edition. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press. Hale, Dennis F. 1998. “Cameras in the Courtroom: State Supreme Court Justices’ Attitudes.” News Photographer (October). Haltom, William. 1998. Reporting on the Courts:How the Mass Media Cover Judicial Actions. Chicago: Nelson-Hall. Hibbing, John, and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse. 1995. Congress as Public Enemy. New York: Cam- bridge University Press. Imrich, Dorothy J., Charles Mullin, and Daniel Linz. 1995. “Measuring the Extent of Prejudicial Pretrial Publicity in Major American Newspapers: A Content Analysis.” Journal of Communica- tion 45(Summer):94-117. Kaiser Family Foundation and the Center for Media and Public Affairs. 1998. “Crime Most Com- mon Story on Local Television News.” Press release. March 3. Kaiser Foundation home page, http://www.kff.org. Kaniss, Phyllis. 1991. Making Local News. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Klite, Paul, Robert A. Bardwell, and Jason Salzman. 1997. “Local TV News: Getting Away with Murder.” Journal of Press and Politics 2 (Spring):102-12. 96 Press/Politics 7(4) Fall 2002 Kooistra, Paul. 1998. “Images of Race and Crime on Local TV News.” Unpublished paper. McManus, John H. 1994. Market-Driven Journalism: Let the Citizen Beware. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Nye, Joseph S., Jr. 1997. “The Media and Declining Confidence in Government.” Journal of Press and Politics 2 (Summer):4-9. Patterson, Thomas E. 1994. Out Of Order. New York: Vintage. Pritchard, David. 1994. “Homicide and Bargained Justice: The Agenda-Setting Effect of Crime News on Prosecutors.” In Media Power in Politics, ed. Doris Graber. 3rd Edition. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press. Slotnick, Eliot E., and Jennifer A. Segal. 1998. Television News and the Supreme Court: All the News That’s Fit to Air? New York: Cambridge University Press. Underwood, Doug. 1993. When MBAs Rule the Newsroom. New York: Columbia University Press. Biographical Notes C. Danielle Vinson is an associate professor of political science at Furman University. She is the author of a forthcoming book on local media coverage of Congress and has written articles on media and politics and campaign finance. Address: Department of Political Science, Furman University, 3300 Poinsett Hwy, Greenville, SC 29613; telephone: (864) 294-3241; fax: (864) 294-3513; e-mail: danielle.vinson@furman. edu. John S. Ertter graduated from Furman University with a B.A. in political science and communi- cation studies. He has done research on media and the courts, wrote his senior thesis on higher education lobbying, and works in public relations. Address: 425 Battery Chase, Beaufort, SC 29902; e-mail: johnertter@juno.com. Vinson, Ertter / Entertainment or Education 97 
work_y777xna7lbhmll4xacswaivsqm	----	Confrontation and loss of control: Masculinity and men's fear in public space www.elsevier.com/locate/jep Journal of Environmental Psychology 23 (2003) 311–322 Confrontation and loss of control: Masculinity and men’s fear in public space Kristen Day*, Cheryl Stump, Daisy Carreon Department of Planning, Policy and Design, School of Social Ecology, University of California, Irvine, CA 92967, USA Received 24 September 2001; received in revised form 5 December 2002; accepted 9 April 2003 Abstract Existing research typically examines fear in public space from women’s perspectives. To date, environment–behavior researchers have largely overlooked men’s fear in public space, and the role of masculinity in shaping men’s perceptions of fear and safety. This paper investigates the intersections of traditional, dominant masculinity—or masculinism—and men’s fear in public space, based on interviews with 82 undergraduate men students. Masculinism features qualities such as control, competition, aggression, and physical strength. We argue that, for many men, public spaces and situations that challenge this masculinist identity may generate fear. Similarly, spaces and situations that promote feelings of safety do so, in part, by bolstering this identity. We employ the lens of masculinity to explore men’s feelings of fear of the unknown, heightened awareness and safety, fear of confrontation, and safety in numbers. Conclusions examine implications for the development of masculinity and recommendations for future research. r 2003 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. 1. Introduction Fear in public space has prompted considerable scholarly research in recent years. Such research often highlights women’s experiences of fear (cf. Gordon & Riger, 1989; Valentine, 1990, 1992; Pain, 1991; Bow- man, 1993; Gardner, 1994, 1995; Koskela, 1997; Day, 1999a, b; Mehta & Bondi, 1999). Older women, Hispa- nic and black women, and lower income women are identified as especially fearful (Gordon & Riger, 1989). Researchers’ emphasis on women’s fear makes good sense, since women report higher levels of fear in public space, compared with men (US Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2000). Furthermore, fear of crime and harassment significantly and negatively impacts women. Though women face considerable risk of violence (including sexual assault and domestic violence) in the ‘‘private’’ spaces of home, women’s fear often empha- sizes public spaces, and especially the outdoors (Day, 2001). Fear restricts women’s freedom and enjoyment in public space and limits their opportunities and conve- nience (Deegan, 1987; Gordon & Riger, 1989; Day, 1997). The concept of ‘‘fear’’ in public space is intimately intertwined with our ideas of what it is to be a woman in the contemporary USA. Fear shapes many women’s gender identities by prompting women to adopt restrictive social norms to preserve personal safety. At the same time, traditional female gender identities may reinforce women’s fear in public space by emphasizing women’s vulnerability and dependence, and by support- ing the idea of public spaces as dangerous for women (Gardner, 1989; Bowman, 1993; Day, 1994). To date, environment–behavior research on fear in public space has largely ignored men and male gender identities. What is identified as fear inducing—crime, stranger assault, rape—are typically those situations and settings that impact women specifically or those that affect both women and men. Men’s fear—or lack of it— is accepted as ‘‘normal’’ and remains unmarked by gender (Goodey, 1997), while women’s fear is proble- matized. Men in the USA do not report high levels of fear in public space. In 2000, only 23% of American men reported that they felt afraid to walk alone in their neighborhood at night, compared to 52% of American women (US Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2000). And yet, American men are more likely than women to be victims of crimes in public space (Baumer, 1978; DuBow, McCabe, & Kaplan, 1979; Harris & Miller, 2000). The ARTICLE IN PRESS *Corresponding author. Fax: +1-949-824-2056. E-mail address: kday@uci.edu (K. Day). 0272-4944/03/$ - see front matter r 2003 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/S0272-4944(03)00024-0 disjuncture between women’s higher fear and men’s higher victimization in public space is known as the ‘‘fear paradox’’ (Koskela, 1997). As Koskela rightly notes, this situation is only paradoxical if one assumes that fear follows directly from actual crime and not, as we and many others argue, from more complex relationships between factors such as crime, reactions to crime and violence, crime reporting, myths about violence and crime, and the construction of male and female gender identities. Thus, the fact that many men in the USA describe themselves as fearless in public space surely derives (at least in part) from how masculinity is constructed. This paper attempts to expand our understanding of fear in public space by considering how masculinism shapes men’s feelings of fear and safety in public space, based on findings from interviews with 82 men college students in Irvine, California. By ‘‘public space,’’ we refer to a loose category of everyday, publicly accessible places (after Franck & Paxson, 1989; Koskela, 1997). These spaces are both publicly and privately owned. Our intention is to begin to unpack the ways in which men’s construction of gender shapes their perceptions and experiences of public space. We argue that, for many men, public spaces and situations that challenge a masculinist identity may generate fear. Similarly, spaces and situations that promote feelings of safety may do so, in part, by bolstering masculinist identity. 2. Background on masculinity Masculinity, like femininity, is socially constructed (Messner, 1998). The meanings of masculine identities are prescribed by time, place, race/ethnicity and sexuality (Carrigan, Connell, & Lee, 1985; Morgan, 1992; Espiritu, 1998; Marable, 1998; Thompson, 1998; Zinn, 1998). Traditional, dominant masculinity—or ‘‘masculinism’’—is one of a range of male gender identities. Masculinism refers to a particular masculine identity that supports patriarchy: in sum, an ‘‘ideology that privileges males and certain masculine values, meanings and culture over females and feminine values, meanings and culture’’ (Sanders, 1996, p. 11). Masculin- ism is also theorized as ‘‘hegemonic’’ masculinity (Connell, 1995; Goodey, 1997; Kimmel & Messner, 1998; Laberge & Albert, 1999). Key attributes asso- ciated with masculinism include control, competition, aggression, and physical strength, among others. Later sections of this paper examine masculinism in relation to men’s fears in public space. Masculinist identity is most readily available to the most privileged group of men—straight, white, middle- class, able-bodied and young. Men who share only some or none of these characteristics—gay or transgendered men, men of color and those who are biracial or multicultural—reap less privilege from masculinist identities. Varied masculinities shape men’s experience of fear in public space in different ways. For example, several authors address the intersection of black masculinity and fear of hate crimes and of police brutality (cf. Kelley, 1988; Feagin, 1991; hooks, 1995). Likewise, authors discuss the intersections of queer identities with men’s perceptions of danger and fear in public space, such as through fear of ‘‘gay bashing’’ and fear among transgender and transsexual individuals of not ‘‘passing’’ (cf. Adler & Brenner, 1992; Namaste, 1996). 1 Privilege adheres to those groups in society who experience the least resistance in managing surrounding social, political, and economic contexts (Hill, 2001), because these contexts are constructed around the group’s values, norms, and behaviors. The specificity of these contexts—that they are not ‘‘neutral’’— becomes obscured, allowing the adeptness of a privi- leged group to be inaccurately attributed to the group’s perceived physical, mental, or emotional competence. Masculinism is the most privileged of masculine identities, though not all men who are young, straight, white and so on experience privilege similarly or in all circumstances. Men may not consistently ‘‘practice’’ masculinity from the vantage point of masculinism, yet men frequently reap benefits from the hierarchical system of masculinities, relative to the overall subordi- nation of women (Goodey, 1997). At the same time, masculinism oppresses men by ensuring that men adopt its trappings or endure challenges to their ‘‘manliness.’’ Though it shapes men’s behaviors and perceptions, masculinity—and especially masculinism—is often char- acterized by invisibility. Masculine perspectives and behavior frequently remain unmarked (see also Franken- berg (1993) on the invisibility of whiteness). The most privileged men (straight, white, and so on) are often unconscious of themselves as explicitly gendered. They may view individuals in terms of biological sex, and yet be unaware of how the social meanings attached to sex shape their own experiences (Kimmel & Messner, 1998). Critical theorists have usefully conceptualized mascu- line and feminine gender identities as ‘‘performance,’’ which involves reiterating or repeating the norms by which one is constituted: it is not a radical fabrication of a ARTICLE IN PRESS 1 Given the nature of the interviews in the present study (i.e. brief and conducted by a stranger), it was not possible to explore fear and sexual identity directly, except in the few interviews where respondents raised the topic of sexual identity themselves. One interview question asked men how they felt their sexual and/or racial identities might impact their feelings of fear or safety in public space. Most men elected not to discuss sexual identity in responding to this question. In addition, the limited number of black men students at UCI and in this sample limited the direct exploration of black racial identity in this study. K. Day et al. / Journal of Environmental Psychology 23 (2003) 311–322312 https://isiarticles.com/article/36271 
work_yaw76dpuqndcjgyaf5uhfurddu	----	HTTP500 内部服务器出错 http500错误 http 500内部服务器错误，请与管理员联系。 请尝试以下操作： ·打开主页，然后查找指向您感兴趣信息的链接。 ·单击后退链接，尝试其他链接。 错误：javax.servlet.ServletException: java.lang.NumberFormatException: null 错误码：500 异常：null exception:javax.servlet.ServletException: java.lang.NumberFormatException: null cause:java.lang.NumberFormatException: null message:java.lang.NumberFormatException: null localizedMessage:java.lang.NumberFormatException: null stackTrace:javax.servlet.ServletException: java.lang.NumberFormatException: null at org.apache.struts.action.RequestProcessor.processException(RequestProcessor.java:535) at org.apache.struts.action.RequestProcessor.processActionPerform(RequestProcessor.java:433) at org.apache.struts.action.RequestProcessor.process(RequestProcessor.java:236) at org.apache.struts.action.ActionServlet.process(ActionServlet.java:1196) at org.apache.struts.action.ActionServlet.doGet(ActionServlet.java:414) at 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org.apache.catalina.core.ApplicationFilterChain.internalDoFilter(ApplicationFilterChain.java:239) at org.apache.catalina.core.ApplicationFilterChain.doFilter(ApplicationFilterChain.java:206) at com.lyt.util.web.CharacterEncodingFilter.doFilter(CharacterEncodingFilter.java:44) at org.apache.catalina.core.ApplicationFilterChain.internalDoFilter(ApplicationFilterChain.java:239) at org.apache.catalina.core.ApplicationFilterChain.doFilter(ApplicationFilterChain.java:206) at com.lyt.util.filter.JournalIDFilter.doFilter(JournalIDFilter.java:151) at org.apache.catalina.core.ApplicationFilterChain.internalDoFilter(ApplicationFilterChain.java:239) at org.apache.catalina.core.ApplicationFilterChain.doFilter(ApplicationFilterChain.java:206) at com.lyt.util.filter.ReadRequestRefererFilter.doFilter(ReadRequestRefererFilter.java:32) at org.apache.catalina.core.ApplicationFilterChain.internalDoFilter(ApplicationFilterChain.java:239) at 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work_ybnheftrq5eezgn7gypmx2q6lm	----	Microsoft Word - Bliss+-+CPS+Article University of Birmingham The crown prosecution guidelines and grossly offensive comment Bliss, Laura DOI: 10.1080/17577632.2017.1369574 License: None: All rights reserved Document Version Peer reviewed version Citation for published version (Harvard): Bliss, L 2017, 'The crown prosecution guidelines and grossly offensive comment: an analysis', Journal of Media Law, vol. 9, no. 2, pp. 173-188. https://doi.org/10.1080/17577632.2017.1369574 Link to publication on Research at Birmingham portal Publisher Rights Statement: Checked for eligibility: 03/09/2019 This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Media Law on 03/10/2017, available online: http://www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/17577632.2017.1369574 General rights Unless a licence is specified above, all rights (including copyright and moral rights) in this document are retained by the authors and/or the copyright holders. 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Apr. 2021 https://doi.org/10.1080/17577632.2017.1369574 https://doi.org/10.1080/17577632.2017.1369574 https://research.birmingham.ac.uk/portal/en/publications/the-crown-prosecution-guidelines-and-grossly-offensive-comment(ea5e59aa-6106-49d0-be3c-f72dfc262fc3).html The Crown Prosecution Guidelines and Grossly Offensive Comments: An Analysis Laura Bliss Department of Law and Criminology, Edge Hill University Laura Bliss, Department of Law and Criminology, Edge Hill University, L39 4QP E: Blissl@edgehillac.uk T: 01695 654335 ORCID ID: 0000-0002-9605-1798 Author Bibliography Laura Bliss is a graduate teaching assistant at Edge Hill University. Her research interests include: media law, particularly the law and social media; feminist research and aspects of public law. These interests are reflected in Laura’s PhD which examines the law’s response to online abuse, particularly abuse directed at women. The Crown Prosecution Guidelines and Grossly Offensive Comments: An Analysis This article will critically evaluate the Crown Prosecution Service guidelines concerning grossly offensive comments made via social media. Abusive comments conducted online have recently dominated newspaper headlines. The Crown Prosecution Service has attempted to give clear advice to prosecutors as to when a comment made online will go from being one that is simply offensive, to one that is so grossly offensive it warrants criminal prosecution. The guidelines were first created in 2013 and updated in 2016. This article will critically examine the guidelines and grossly offensive comments made online and consider whether a coherent and accessible document has been created. Key Words: Social Media; Grossly Offensive Comments; CPS Guidelines; Malicious Communications Act 1988; Communications Act 2003 Introduction Each day millions of comments are made online via social media platforms. For example, on average around 500 million “tweets” are sent every day.1 Social media is considered electronic communication via the use of the internet to connect with other individuals, build profiles and publicly share information.2 Social media networks include the likes of Facebook, Twitter, Instagram and Snapchat. Recent figures indicate the reach of social                                                              Laura Bliss blissl@edgehill.ac.uk. The author would like to thank Adam Pendlebury and Grace Robinson for reading earlier versions of this article and for providing feedback. The author is forever grateful to Dr John McGarry for his guidance in producing this article. The time and wisdom provided by Dr McGarry has been much appreciated. 1 Internet Live Stats, ‘Twitter Usage Statistics’ (Internet Live Stats, 2016) <http://www.internetlivestats.com/twitter-statistics/> accessed 8 November 2016 2 For a range of definitions which can be associated with social media see Christian Fuchs, Social Media a critical introduction (Sage Publications 2014) 35-37 media, with 73% of individuals having access to one or more social media sites.3 With such easy access to the online world, the law has sometimes struggled to keep pace with changing technology. This is particularly the case with regard to abusive comments made online.4 Such comments can have a significant effect on those to whom they are directed. For instance, Gina Miller (the claimant who argued that the Government needed Parliamentary approval before it could trigger the Article 50 process to begin exiting the European Union5), felt the need to employ 24 hour private security protection after receiving death threats online and threats of sexual violence.6 Following the stream of online abuse aimed at Miller, Rhodri Phillips received a 12 week custodial sentence for two counts of sending menacing messages contrary to section 127 of the Communications Act 2000.7 He posted on his Facebook page, “£5,000 for the first person to ‘accidentally’ run over this [Gina Millar] bloody troublesome first generation immigrant.” The issues associated with prosecuting abusive comments made online have been well documented in recent years. The lack of consistency when it came to prosecuting online behaviour resulted in the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) introducing guidelines (the                                                              3 Office for National Statistics, ‘Internet Access – Households and Individuals 2016 – ONS’ (Office for National Statistics, 2016) <https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/householdcharacteristics/homeinternetandsocialmedi ausage/bulletins/internetaccesshouseholdsandindividuals/2016> accessed 04 October 2016 4 The ever-growing issue of online abuse, particularly aimed at individuals in the public domain, has been raised as an issue before Ministers following the 2017 general election. HC Deb 12 July 2017, Vol 267, cols 152-169 5 R (Miller) v The Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2016] EWHC 2768 6 Lisa O’Carroll ‘Gina Miller: “I’ve been told that as a colored women, I’m not even human”’ The Guardian (London, 25 January 2017) <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/jan/25/parliament-alone-is-sovereign- gina-miller-speaks-out-after-article-50-victory> accessed 6 June 2017 7 R v Rhodri Phillips Westminster Magistrates’ Court 13 July 2017 (unreported). His second count for sending menacing messages was in relation comments he made about Arthur Sube. See, Julia Gregory, ‘Aristocrat faces jail after being menacing and racist about Gina Miller’ The Guardian (London, 11 July 2017) <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/jul/11/man-jail-offering-money-run-over-gina-miller-rhodri- philipps-viscount-brexit> accessed 20 July 2017 guidelines) on social media prosecutions in 2013.8 These guidelines were not without fault and, consequently, the CPS produced a revised version in October 2016.9 This article critically examines the social media guidelines and their application to grossly offensive comments made online. First, the law which criminalises grossly offensive comments will be identified. Then, three cases will be considered to illustrate why the guidelines were thought necessary. Moving on from this, the basic two stage approach introduced by the guidelines will be explored, before focusing on the concept of grossly offensive comments. This will take the format of outlining the approach to grossly offensive comments given in the guidelines, examining the significant weight accorded to freedom of expression and evaluating the defences identified by the CPS. Recommendations will then be put forward as to how the guidelines can be improved for future use. The Law The sending of grossly offensive messages is controlled under two statutes in the United Kingdom: the Malicious Communications Act 1988 (MCA) and the Communications Act 2003 (CA). The MCA was originally enacted to govern malicious communications sent by post. The CA was enacted to control the provision of broadcast services by organisations. Both have been adapted10 to cover conduct carried out via social media platforms. Under section 1 of the MCA it is a criminal offence to convey, via the use of a communications network (e.g. the internet): “(i) a message which is indecent or grossly                                                              8 Crown Prosecution Service, ‘Guidelines On Prosecuting Cases Involving Communications Sent Via Social Media’ (CPS.gov.uk, 2013) <http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/a_to_c/communications_sent_via_social_media/index.html> accessed 27 February 2016. 9 Crown Prosecution Service, ‘Guidelines On Prosecuting Cases Involving Communications Sent Via Social Media’ (CPS.gov.uk, 2016) <http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/a_to_c/communications_sent_via_social_media/> accessed 10 October 2016 10 The MCA has been amended to cover electronic communications by s.43(1)a of the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001. offensive; (ii) a threat; or (iii) information which is false and known or believed to be false by the sender”. It is also an offence to send “any article or electronic communication which is, in whole or part, of an indecent or grossly offensive nature”. The actus reus of the offence is in the sending of the message, there is no need for the message to be received. However, the purpose of the sender must be to “cause distress or anxiety to the recipient or to any other person to whom he intends that it or its contents or nature should be communicated”. The CA generally deals with comments which are in the public domain, for instance a message posted on a Facebook page. Under section 127 of the Act, a message sent, via a communications device, which is “grossly offensive” or of an “indecent, obscene or menacing character” is an offence. Like the MCA, the offence is in the sending of the message; there is no need for the intended victim to receive the communication, although there has to be an intention or awareness present that the conduct was grossly offensive.11 Both the MCA and CA are similar; indeed, Scaife suggests that the Acts are interchangeable.12 However, the courts and the CPS have distinguished the key differences between the two Acts: the CA covers only communications which makes use of technology, whereas the MCA governs all communications including the postal system: A letter dropped through the letterbox may be grossly offensive, obscene, indecent or menacing, and may well be covered by section 1 of the 1988 Act [MCA], but it does not fall within the legislation now under consideration [CA].13 However, their use in an online context has created some difficulties, especially with regard to the term grossly offensive. Neither Act gives a clear indication as to what is meant by this phrase. As a result, this has created problems in cases concerning the prosecution of actions which utilise social media.                                                              11 DPP v Collins [2006] UKHL 40 per Lord Bingham at paras 8 & 10 12 Laura Scaife, Handbook of Social Media and the Law (Routledge 2015) 166 13 DPP v Collins, n.11 para 7 Pre Guidelines Cases considered by the courts before the 2013 guidelines, after recommendations for prosecution by the CPS, left the position unclear as to when conduct undertaken online would be seen as a breach of the criminal law. This is clear from Chambers v DPP.14 Here, the defendant found himself before the courts, after being prosecuted for breaching section 127 of the CA for sending a message of a menacing nature. Chambers, in January 2010, following the closure of an airport due to bad weather, posted the following comment on his twitter page: “Crap! Robin Hood Airport is closed. You’ve got week [sic] and a bit to get your shit together otherwise I’m blowing the airport sky high.” This comment later came to the attention of airport officials. As a result, Chambers was arrested and convicted under section 127 of the CA, despite the airport deeming the threat non-credible.15 He subsequently appealed his conviction and, on appeal, the Crown Court determined that the tweet was “menacing in its content and obviously so. It could not be more clear. Any ordinary person reading this would see it in that way and be alarmed.”16 Chambers and his legal team appealed the decision in the High Court. The judges during the original High Court appeal were unable to reach an agreement and consequently the matter was subjected to a second appeal in the same court. In July 2012, the High Court quashed Chambers’ conviction, coming to the conclusion that his comments, although ill thought out, were intended as a joke. Lord Judge stated: Satirical, or iconoclastic, or rude comment, the expression of unpopular or unfashionable opinion about serious or trivial matters, banter or humour, even if distasteful to some or painful to those subjected to it should and no doubt will continue at their customary level, quite undiminished by this legislation.17                                                              14 Chambers v DPP [2012] EWHC 2157 (Admin), [2013] 1 WLR 1833 15 R v Chambers Doncaster Magistrates’ Court 10 May 2010 (unreported) 16 Per Judge Jacqueline Davis found in Laura Scaife, Handbook of Social Media and the Law (Routledge 2015) 135 17 Chambers, n.14 per Lord Judge at para 28 Although this case concerned a communication of a menacing nature, rather than a grossly offensive comment, it illustrates the difficulties of prosecuting a comment made on social media. This statement made by Lord Judge can apply to grossly offensive comments, exposing a lack of clarity when it comes to determining at what point a comment goes further than being one which is merely offensive (and so lawful), to one that is so grossly offensive it should be criminalised. In R v Woods, 18 grossly offensive comments made by the defendant resulted in prosecution and conviction. Following media coverage of a young child, April Jones, going missing in Wales, Woods, under the influence of alcohol, made a number of Facebook comments in relation to April. These included: “Who in their right mind would abduct a ginger kid?” and “I woke up this morning in the back of a transit van with two beautiful little girls, I found April in a hopeless place.” These comments later took a more sinister turn when he made sexually explicit statements regarding April. His comments quickly caught other Facebook users’ attention. His remarks were actively shared across the Facebook community, where one member publicly published Woods’ home address. Consequently, around fifty people descended upon the property where Woods lived, resulting in the police having to arrest him for his own safety. He was later rearrested and charged under the CA for sending grossly offensive comments. He received a custodial sentence of twelve weeks for his actions. A different outcome occurred in the matter of Thomas.19 Thomas, a Port Talbot footballer, made a homophobic comment about the divers Tom Daley and Peter Waterfield,                                                              18 R v Woods Chorley Magistrates Court 8 October 2012 (unreported). See also, The Telegraph, ‘April Jones: Facebook troll jailed for “despicable” comments’ The Telegraph (London, 8 October 2012) <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/facebook/9594228/April-Jones-Facebook-troll-jailed-for-despicable- comments.html> accessed 25 October 2016 19 Crown Prosecution News Brief, ‘DPP Statement On Tom Daley Case And Social Media Prosecutions’ (CPS.gov.uk, 2012) <http://blog.cps.gov.uk/2012/09/dpp-statement-on-tom-daley-case-and-social-media- prosecutions.html> accessed 27 February 2016 following them coming fourth during the 2012 Olympics: “if there is any consolation for finishing fourth atleast [sic] daley and waterfield [sic] can go bum each other #teamHIV.” Despite the nature of this message being offensive, it was deemed that this message was not so grossly offensive it warranted prosecution. Subsequently, no criminal action was brought against Thomas.20 It is perhaps easy to see why the comments made by Woods were grossly offensive and so worthy of prosecution. It is less obvious why those made by Thomas were not. Or, to put the matter more pertinently, if the two cases of Woods and Thomas are on either side of a line between comments which are merely offensive and those which are grossly so, the question arises as to where that line lies. This was an element reflected in the DPP’s statement concerning Thomas: … the CPS has the task of balancing the fundamental right of free speech and the need to prosecute serious wrongdoing on a case by case basis. That often involves very difficult judgment calls and, in the largely unchartered territory of social media, the CPS is proceeding on a case by case basis. In some cases it is clear that a criminal prosecution is the appropriate response to conduct which is complained about … But in many other cases a criminal prosecution will not be the appropriate response.21 That had followed concerns raised over the “disproportionate application of the criminal law”22 with regards to social media prosecutions. Indeed, the national lead on digital crime, Chief Constable of Essex Constabulary, Stephen Kavanagh, suggested that there was a lack of consistency in prosecuting online abuse.23                                                              20 Thomas was, though, fined by his football club, Port Talbot, for his actions. 21 Crown Prosecution News Brief, n.19 22 Jacob Rowbottom, ‘Crime and communication: do legal controls leave enough space for freedom of expression?’ in David Mangan & Lorna E. Gillies (eds), The Legal Challenges of Social Media (Edward Elgar Publishing 2017) 53 23 Matthew Weaver, ‘Police are inconsistent in tackling online abuse, admits chief constable’ The Guardian (London, 14 April 2016) <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/apr/14/online-abuse-police-inconsistent- digital-crime-stephen-kavanagh> accessed 1 March 2017. See, also Alex Bailin QC & Edward Craven, ‘Prosecuting social media: the DPP’s interim guidelines’ (The International Forum for Responsible Media Blog, 23 December 2012) <https://inforrm.wordpress.com/2012/12/23/prosecuting-social-media-the-dpps-interim- guidelines-alex-bailin-qc-and-edward-craven/> accessed 20 July 2017 The lack of clarity as to what amounts to a grossly offensive comment, as well as a desire to create some form of consistency across police forces,24 led the CPS to issue interim guidelines in 2013: Guidelines on Prosecuting Cases Involving Communications Sent via Social Media. The DPP, Keir Starmer QC stated at the time of publication: The guidelines will help prosecutors to make fair and consistent decisions to prosecute in those cases that clearly require robust prosecution in accordance with the Code for Crown Prosecutors, and to uphold the right to freedom of speech in those cases where a communication might be considered grossly offensive, but the high threshold for prosecution is not met.25 Following the initial interim guidelines being published, the first House of Lords Select Committee meeting took place examining how the current criminal law framework applied to social media in the United Kingdom. Here, it was put forward that the law was adequate in governing social media and the CPS guidance was “clear and accessible.”26 Despite this, the guidelines were later updated in 2016. The following section will examine the two stage test introduced by the 2013 guidelines in order to establish whether they bring sufficient clarity to the question of when a comment is so offensive as to be a crime. The Guidelines: A two stage test The guidelines indicate that a two stage approach should be undertaken when it comes to deciding if certain conduct online should result in prosecution. The CPS will look at the facts before them and establish that two elements are present in order for a recommendation of                                                              24 BBC News, ‘Lindsay Hoyle MP says Lancashire Police “inconsistent” over social media’ The BBC (London, 18 October 2012) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-lancashire-19992795> accessed 1 March 2017. 25 Crown Prosecution Service, ‘DPP publishes final guidelines for prosecutions involving social media communications’ (CPS.gov.uk, 2013) <http://www.cps.gov.uk/news/latest_news/dpp_publishes_final_guidelines_for_prosecutions_involving_social_ media_communications/> accessed 20 July 2017 26 Select Committee on Communications, Social media and criminal offences (HL 2014-15, 37) para 14 prosecution to occur. First, the comment or conduct in question must fall within one of four categories:  There is a credible threat of violence, either to the person or someone’s property;  The actions can be seen to amount to “harassment, stalking, controlling or coercive behaviour, revenge pornography, an offence under the Sexual Offences Act 2003, blackmail or another offence”;27  There is a breach of a court order;  The statement in question can be considered grossly offensive, indecent, obscene or false. If it can be found that the behaviour in question falls within one of these four categories, the second part of the test will be applied: the public interest test. Essentially, public interest falls on a number of considerations:28  The seriousness of the offence – the more serious the more the likelihood of prosecution;  The culpability of the defendant – here, among other things, the criminal history of the person committing the acts will be taken into account;  The circumstances and any harm caused to the victim – the more vulnerable the victim and the greater the harm, the more likely a recommendation for prosecution will occur;                                                              27 CPS Guidelines, n.9 found under Category 2: Communications Targeting Specific Individuals 28 Crown Prosecution Service, ‘Code for Crown Prosecutors’ (CPS.gov.uk, 2016) <https://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/code_for_crown_prosecutors/codetest.html> accessed 10 October 2016  The age of the defendant – the social media guidelines suggest that it will not normally be in the public interest to prosecute those under 18 years old;  Community impact – the greater the impact upon the overall community affected by the message, the more likely it is that prosecution will be recommended;  Proportionality – with reference to the evidence available, is prosecution the appropriate response. Here, consideration must be made to the cost of bringing the action before the court;  The protection of sensitive information – would it do more harm than good to release information contained in the case into the public domain. Subsequently, with regard to online comments, if prosecution is considered to be within the public interest, when the above considerations are taken into account, and the comments fit within one of the categories established in the first part of the test, then it is more likely that the CPS will recommend prosecution. The remainder of the article will primarily consider the fourth classification in the first test of the guidelines; specifically, whether there is sufficient clarity about what amounts to a grossly offensive comment. Grossly offensive comments and the guidelines As demonstrated above, a number of issues arose when it came to prosecuting actions which might amount to being of a grossly offensive nature. As a result, the CPS attempted in both the original version of the guidelines and its newest form to combat this problem. In this section, three main elements will be explored:  The question of what may be deemed a grossly offensive comment;  Freedom of expression and its implications with regard to grossly offensive comments; and  The factors specified in the guidelines that may indicate that a prosecution would be inappropriate. What is a grossly offensive comment? In the original guidelines, the section governing grossly offensive comments starts by simply stating how the MCA and CA can be applied in relation to such comments. The guidelines briefly outline the main elements of these statutes. However, there is no new information contained in this section to which the CPS or even the police did not already have access. For instance, little clarification is contained in relation to what constitutes a grossly offensive comment. Instead the CPS relies on the judgment of Lord Justice Dyson in Connolly v DPP: “The words ‘grossly offensive’ and ‘indecent’ are ordinary English words.”29 So what then comprises a grossly offensive or indecent comment? For the CPS, context is everything. Within the guidelines, the suggestion is that conduct online differs from many other forms of communication and is similar in nature to ephemeral conversations one may encounter in a relaxed, informal social setting. This is reflected further in the House of Lords Select Committee on Communications social media report, who argue that this form of communication is casual and therefore, a higher legal threshold should be applied.30 The guidelines make use of Eady J’s judgment in Smith v ADVFN to illustrate the point: ... [they are] like contributions to a casual conversation (the analogy sometimes being drawn with people chatting in a bar) which people simply note before moving on; they are often uninhibited, casual and ill thought out; those who participate know this and expect a certain                                                              29 Connolly v DPP [2007] EWHC 237 (Admin), [2008] 1 W.L.R. 276 per Lord Justice Dyson at para 10 30 Select Committee on Communications, n.26 amount of repartee or ‘give and take’.31 The analogy that comments made online can be compared to a social situation taking place in a bar is, I suggest, flawed.32 Many abusive comments made online would not be spoken in a public setting. Indeed, online abuse may seem more sinister and therefore the likelihood that a person would say such comments, without the physical presence of a screen between them and the wider public, is slim: “activities have not only replicated those in the virtual world but also have taken on their own character fuelled by an environment where anonymity is the norm”.33 For instance, in a recent interview with the BBC, two female online gamers have spoken out about the abuse they have suffered online. In the article, they speak of being harassed online, where they have received threats of rape: “the way I get harassed is about what they would do to my body, about why I don't deserve to be there because I use my sexuality - it’s all extremely graphic”.34 Comments made online are often more explicit than statements made in the “real world”. The CPS use the judgment of Lord Judge in Chambers – that satirical, rude, potentially offensive comments or unpopular opinions should be permitted – to illustrate that the comments in question need to go beyond what is considered tolerable within society.35 This is a very subjective approach; what one person might find “more than offensive,” another might not. This, therefore, adds little to our understanding of what constitutes a                                                              31 Nigel Peter William Smith v ADVFN Plc [2008] EWHC 1797 per Justice Eady at para 14 32 Further arguments have been put forward that although online communications are like everyday speech, these digital conversations remain “stored and searchable”. See, Jacob Rowbottom, ‘Casual comments and legal controls: watch what you say online’ (The International Forum for Responsible Media Blog, 13 April 2012) <https://inforrm.wordpress.com/2012/04/13/casual-comments-and-legal-controls-watch-what-you-say-online- jacob-rowbottom/> accessed 20 July 2017. See also, Diane Rowland, Uta Kohl and Andrew Charlesworth, Information Technology Law (5th edn, Routledge 2017) 306 33 Subhajit Basu & Richard Jones, ‘Regulating Cyberstalking’ (2007) 2 Journal of Information, Law and Technology 1, 4 34 BBC News ‘100 Women 2016: The women challenging sexism in e-sports’ The BBC (London, 21 November 2016) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-37992322> accessed 22 November 2016 35 Chambers, n.14 grossly offensive comment. Simply put, the CPS has created a document of case law comments, which does very little to clearly establish the point at which the law can intervene on a matter. For better clarification, the guidelines could have contained explicit examples, in their relevant context, of comments which would be considered grossly offensive and those which would not. For example, clarifying why a Facebook comment stating that “all soldiers should die and go to hell”36 was offensive and therefore warranted prosecution but threats of physical violence via social media was not a breach of the law.37 Furthermore, the case of Woods, as mentioned previously, could have been used to illustrate how the CPS concluded that his actions warranted prosecution. Instead, the CPS has made brief references to judicial commentary, without supplying specific examples of when a comment will be deemed to be one so grossly offensive it warrants prosecution. Subsequently, the ambiguity of what would amount to a grossly offensive comment remained despite the publication of the 2013 guidelines. This is a factor which is not overcome in the 2016 updated version of the guidelines. Here, the issue of grossly offensive comments takes a similar format, though a non- exhaustive list of judicial dicta is now given. Despite the inclusion of these comments, like that of the previous guidelines, there are no explicit examples of when a statement will be regarded as one that is grossly offensive. All the judgments referred to in this section predate the guidelines themselves; essentially, the CPS has made no reference to cases which have gone before the courts between 2013 and 2016. This is a failure on behalf of the CPS. The                                                              36 R v Azhar Ahmed Huddersfield Magistrates’ Court 9 October 2012. See also, Helen Carter, ‘Man gets community sentence for Facebook post about dead soldiers’ The Guardian (London, 9 October 2012) <https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2012/oct/09/community-sentence-facebook-dead-soldiers> accessed 22 July 2017 37 Sky News, ‘McCann Trolls: Police Won't Take Action’ Sky News (London, 1 May 2015) <http://news.sky.com/story/mccann-trolls-police-wont-take-action-10361261> accessed 24 July 2017 CPS could have taken the opportunity in the updated version of the guidelines to demonstrate how they are applied in a working context. For instance, one case that came before the courts after the publication of the 2013 guidelines concerned abusive messages aimed at the feminist campaigner Caroline Criado- Perez. In January 2014, two individuals were prosecuted under section 127 of the CA following their sending of grossly offensive tweets to Criado-Perez. This followed her well- documented campaign to get the author Jane Austin printed on bank notes in the United Kingdom.38 Messages ranged from derogatory comments about Criado-Perez to threats of rape. The CPS could have taken this opportunity to give a detailed statement as to why these two individuals were prosecuted and others were not. For instance, it could have drawn on aggravated factors such as the anonymity of the messages, the continued abuse aimed at Criado-Perez by the defendants and the comments spanning over more than one social media site.39 In addition, despite the successful prosecution of these two individuals, others who had also been abusive towards the writer were not brought before the courts.40 Little clarification has been given by the CPS as to why this was the case. In addition, the case of R v Newsome41 could be used as a further example. In 2014, following the murder of a teacher, Ann Maguire, by a student, Newsome posted the following comment on his Facebook page: “Personally im [sic] glad that teacher got stabbed up [sic], feel sorry for the kid… he shoulda [sic] pissed on her too.” He was later convicted and sentenced to 6 weeks under section 127 of the CA. Again, this case could have been used to demonstrate the application of the guidelines. Reference could have been made to factors                                                              38 R v John Raymond Nimmo and Isabella Kate Sorley Westminster’s Magistrates’ Court 24 January 2014. See also, Alexandra Topping, ‘Jane Austen Twitter row: two plead guilty to abusive tweets’ The Guardian (London, 7 January 2014) <https://www.theguardian.com/society/2014/jan/07/jane-austen-banknote-abusive-tweets- criado-perez> accessed 10 October 2016 39 These factors, and more, were taken into account by the court. 40 Crown Prosecution Service News Brief, ‘CPS authorises charges in Twitter-related cases’ (CPS.gov.uk, 2013) <http://www.cps.gov.uk/news/latest_news/stella_creasy_mp_caroline_criado-perez/> accessed 26 October 2016 41 R v Jake Newsome Leeds Magistrates’ Court 4 June 2014 (unreported) which led to the conclusion that prosecution was appropriate as well as to any aggravating and mitigating considerations which may have been taken into account. The guidelines, therefore, provide little clarity as to when a comment goes further than being one deemed as offensive, to a comment considered so grossly offensive it warrants prosecution. Grossly Offensive Comments v Freedom of Expression When it comes to prosecuting online commentary, freedom of expression must be taken into account. Under the European Convention of Human Rights, citizens have the qualified right of freedom of expression.42 The guidelines give significant weight to free speech, with a high threshold test being applied to all statements in order to establish whether they warrant criminal intervention. In essence, the CPS argue that a higher threshold will be applied to potentially grossly offensive comments, owing to human rights considerations. The guidelines recognise the importance of the right of freedom of expression and state that no prosecution should be brought under section 1 of the Malicious Communications Act 1988 or section 127 of the Communications Act 2003 … unless it can be shown on its own facts and merits to be both necessary and proportionate. 43 This reflects the courts’ approach to this convention right, as suggested by Akhtar, who states that Lord Judge’s judgment in Chambers “tilts” in the direction of freedom of expression in social media law cases.44 However, other rights may be under threat when it comes to abusive comments made online, as supported by the Secretary General for the United Nations:                                                              42 European Convention of Human Rights Article 10. 43 CPS Guidelines, n.9 found under The High Threshold Test 44 Zia Akhtar, ‘Malicious communications, media platforms and legal sanctions’ (2014) 20 (6) Computer and Telecommunications Law Review 179, 181 The technical difficulty of regulating the content of messages broadcast through the Internet makes it a particularly effective means of misusing the freedom of expression and inciting discrimination and other abuses of human rights.45 The guidelines indicate the importance of protecting freedom of expression. This is consistent with the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, which gives clear primacy to this right.46 However, the guidelines fail to make direct reference to other rights which may be breached when it comes to abuse online, such as the right to respect for one’s private life.47 The balancing of convention rights against each other is nothing new for the justice system, yet the lack of direct reference to rights and considerations – other than freedom of expression – that may be in play when considering the legality of online comments, is an error.48 Concerns have been raised that the guidelines give clear weight to freedom of speech and consequently, allow “cyber-bullying to go unchallenged.”49 Following implementation of the guidelines, prosecutions for sending threating abuse online dropped by a third50 despite an increase in police reports concerning social media.51 Indeed, Agate and Ledward suggest that if the case of Woods (the individual who made grossly offensive comments regarding the                                                              45 The Secretary-General, Preliminary Rep. of the Secretary-General on Globalization and Its Impact on the Full Enjoyment of All Human Rights, 11 26-28, U.N.Doc. A/55/342 (Aug. 31, 2000) 6 46 Handyside v United Kingdom (1976) 1 EHRR 737, para 49. Such significant weight is given to the freedom of expression, as it is considered a fundamental right of a democratic society; therefore, the freedom of expression is highly protected by the European Court of Human Rights, which is reflected in the guidelines. See, European Court of Human Rights, ‘Internet: case-law of the European Court of Human Rights’ (ECHR, June 2015) <http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Research_report_internet_ENG.pdf> accessed 3 March 2017 47 European Convention of Human Rights Article 8. 48 For an argument suggesting that Article 8 should take precedence in cases concerning social media, see, Lorna Wood, ‘Social Media: it not just about Article 10’ in David Mangan & Lorna E. Gillies (eds), The Legal Challenges of Social Media (Edward Elgar Publishing 2017) 104-124 49 Jacob Rowbottom, n.22, 54 50 Alice Philipson, ‘Online bullies go unpunished as prosecutions for abusive messages plunge by a third’ The Telegraph (London, 30 January 2014) <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/social-media/10606329/Online- bullies-go-unpunished-as-prosecutions-for-abusive-messages-plunge-by-a-third.html> accessed 20 July 2017 51 Martin Evans, ‘Police facing rising tide of social media crimes’ The Telegraph (London, 5 June 2015) <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/crime/11653092/Police-facing-rising-tide-of-social-media- crimes.html> accessed 20 July 2017. For a critique of these figures, see, Jacob Rowbottom, n.22 missing school girl, April Jones) was presented to the CPS today, the case would never make it before the courts.52 The CPS have attempted to overcome some of these difficulties in the updated version of the guidelines by including specific sections dealing with hate crimes and violence against women and girls in the UK, where the commission of such offences may be aided by social media. Both these sections imply that comments which amount to hate crimes or promote violence against women and girls53 are likely to breach the high threshold test, and therefore warrant prosecution. This is a significant step forward by the CPS, as hate crime has recently been on the increase in the UK,54 this is especially true in relation to hate crime conducted online since the referendum in the UK on membership of the European Union.55 The CPS have thus attempted to take into account other factors outside freedom of expression in the newest version of the guidelines. This is a significant step forward in the protection of individuals from online abuse, although it is yet to be seen how these changes will be applied in reality. Proportionality                                                              52 Jennifer Agate & Jocelyn Ledward, ‘Social media: how the net is closing in on cyber bullies’ (2013) 24 Entertainment Law Review 263, 264. This is disputed by Dorfman. She is highly critical of the law’s interference with conduct carried out via the use of social media. She suggests that it is for society to dictate and comment on when an action goes beyond a statement of bad taste. For her, the guidelines are too wide and, therefore, leave open the possibility that freedom of speech will be limited. See, Rosalee Dorfman, ‘Can you say “social media prosecutions” with a straight face? The Crown Prosecution Service can’ (2013) The Leeds Journal of Law and Criminology <http://criminology.leeds.ac.uk/2013/09/05/social-media-prosecutions/> accessed 20 October 2016. 53 Sills et al state “the pervasiveness of these platforms [social network sites] – such as Facebook, YouTube, Twitter, and numerous others – has driven many social and cultural activities online” including violence against women”. Sophie Sills, Chelsea Pickens, Karishma Beach, Lloyd Jones, Octavia Calder-Dawe, Paulette Benton- Greig, & Nicola Gavey, ‘Rape culture and social media: young critics and a feminist counterpublic’ (2016) 16 (6) Feminist Media Studies 1, 5 54 Katie Forster, ‘Hate crimes soared by 41% after Brexit vote, official figures reveal’ The Independent (London, 13 October 2016) <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/brexit-hate-crimes-racism-eu-referendum- vote-attacks-increase-police-figures-official-a7358866.html> accessed 14 February 2017. See also, Jon Robins, ‘Post Brexit Hate Crimes’ (2016) 180 Criminal Law Justice Weekly 696 55 Cara McGoogan, ‘Government funds research into social media hate crime after Brexit vote’ The Telegraph (London, 9 February 2017) <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/2017/02/09/government-funds-research- social-media-hate-crime-brexit-vote/> accessed 14 February 2017 It is clear that not all grossly offensive comments made online will result in prosecution. Rowbottom states that “there are simply not the resources to prosecute all those [grossly offensive comments] that could fall foul to the letter of these laws.”56 Similarly, Chief Constable of Essex Constabulary, Stephen Kavanagh, has publicly spoken about the continued pressure on the police when it comes to online abuse: “the levels of abuse that now take place within the internet are on a level we never really expected. If we did try to deal with all of it we would clearly be swamped”.57 The guidelines reflect the notion that prosecution should only occur where it is appropriate. Indeed, prosecution is “unlikely to be necessary and proportionate” where one or more of the following elements are present: genuine remorse being expressed by the defendant for their behaviour; comments being swiftly removed from social media platforms; proof that the conduct in question was never intended for a wide audience; or if the comments can be regarded as simply a person expressing their right to freedom of speech. If some, or all, of these elements are present in a matter before the CPS, it is unlikely that a recommendation for prosecution will be put forward. However, similar to the issue of what is deemed a grossly offensive comment, little clarity is given on these factors within the guidelines. For example, what constitutes swift action in relation to removing a statement online? Could it be said that removing a comment within 24 hours is sufficient? The guidelines do not provide an answer to this question, or any indicative examples; this is a significant flaw on the CPS’s behalf. Conclusion                                                              56 Jacob Rowbottom, n.32 57 Sandra Laville, ‘Online abuse: “existing laws too fragmented and don’t serve victims”’ The Guardian (London, 4 March 2016) <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/mar/04/online-abuse-existing-laws-too- fragmented-and-dont-serve-victims-says-police-chief> accessed 04 October 2016 The reasoning behind the implementation of the guidelines was to create some form of coherency and consistency when it came to the prosecution of online abuse. Nearly one year on from the updated document, there are still issues when it comes to grossly offensive commentary online. The CPS could overcome these difficulties by being more transparent in the methods they undertake when it comes to their decision-making processes of prosecuting grossly offensive material posted online. Here, the CPS should publish statements after a case is considered in the judicial system as to how they came to the decision that the matter should be brought before the courts. The recent case of R v Omega Mwaikambo58 provides an example. Although this case concerned a grossly offensive pictures rather than comments, the defendant was successfully prosecuted under section 127 of the CA. Following a fire in a tower block in Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea, London, Mwaikambo published an image on his Facebook page of a body of a man killed in the disaster. The photo, which was taken by Mwaikambo, clearly displayed the deceased’s face and other distinguishing factors, after Mwaikambo opened the body bag to take the images.59 Despite numerous requests from other Facebook users to remove the photo, he did not do this, claiming that posting the image was a form of protest about how the deceased was being treated by the authorities.60 The picture was reported to police, resulting in Mwaikambo receiving a 12- week custodial sentence, despite having no previous convictions. This case could be used as an example to illustrate how the CPS reached their conclusion that the matter should go before the courts. Emphasis should be placed on how the                                                              58 R v Omega Mwaikambo Westminster’s Magistrates’ Court, 17 June 2017 (unreported) 59 The deceased had been placed in a body bag which had been left unattended following the aftermath of the fire. 60 Telegraph Reporters, ‘Man jailed for sharing photo of dead Grenfell Tower fire victim on Facebook’ ) The Telegraph (London, 16 June 2017) <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/06/16/man-jailed-sharing-photo- dead-grenfell-tower-fire-victim-facebook/> accessed 26 July 2017 two-stage test, as set out in the guidelines, was applied taking into account any aggravating factors, such as his refusal to remove the pictures. This would create more clarity as to what constitutes “grossly offensive” in a social media context. Furthermore, the factors considered in cases which do not result in a recommendation of prosecution should be made available to the public, with a clear explanation as to why it was decided not to prosecute. With online abuse slowly becoming more common within society, more needs to be done to tackle this behaviour. Following the 2017 general election, the abuse and intimidation of MPs, particularly online abuse, resulted in Theresa May calling for a parliamentary inquiry to be held.61 Labour shadow home secretary Diane Abbott recalled just some of the comments she had received via social media during a parliamentary debate: In my case, the mindless abuse has been characteristically racist and sexist. I have had death threats, and people tweeting that I should be hanged “if they could find a tree big enough to take the fat bitch’s weight”. There was an English Defence League-affiliated Twitter account—#burnDianeAbbot. I have had rape threats, and been described as a “Pathetic useless fat black piece of shit”, an “ugly, fat black bitch”, and a “nigger”—over and over again.62 Other MPs were subject to similar comments, with social media playing a key part in the targeting of these individuals. The issues of consistency and how the phrase ‘grossly offensive’ should be understood have not been overcome by the publication of either the 2013 or the 2016 guidelines. Little clarity is given by the CPS as to when a comment would go beyond being simply offensive, to one being so grossly offensive it should result in prosecution. The guidelines still need further modification, to reflect recent judicial decisions and lay a basis for more strongly articulated criteria for prosecution decisions. The new guidelines should include details of the decision making processes adopted, and factors considered, in actual                                                              61 Andrew Sparrow, ‘May orders inquiry into abuse of parliamentary candidates - Politics live’ The Guardian (London, 13 July 2017) <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/blog/live/2017/jul/12/pmqs-grenfell-tower- damian-green-emily-thornberry-labour-accuse-tory-hq-of-personal-attacks-smears-and-untruths-as-mps-debate- candidate-abuse-politics-live> accessed 24 July 2017 62 HC Deb 12 July 2017, Vol 627, Col 152-170, 159 cases when deciding whether or not to prosecute. The new guidelines should also state that, when deciding on prosecution, account should be given to the significant effect online abuse can have on an individual. 
work_xv6k2gdd4nfarbt5tc7dszpah4	----	Discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity in Europe 2nd edition Council of Europe Publishing The opinions expressed in this work are the responsibility of the author(s) and do not necessarily refl ect the offi cial policy of the Council of Europe. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be translated, reproduced or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic (CD-Rom, Internet, etc.) or mechanical, including photocopying, recording or any information storage or retrieval system, without prior permission in writing from the Public Information Division, Directorate of Communication (F-67075 Strasbourg Cedex or publishing@coe.int). Cover design: Graphic Design Workshop, Council of Europe Layout: Jouve, Paris Council of Europe Publishing F-67074 Strasbourg Cedex http://book.coe.int ISBN 978-92-871-7257-0 © Council of Europe, September 2011 Printed in France Contents | 3 Contents Foreword .......................................................................................................... 5 Summary ......................................................................................................... 7 Recommendations .................................................................................... 11 Introduction .................................................................................................. 17 1. Attitudes and perceptions ............................................................... 21 1.1. Lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender persons ........................................ 21 1.2. Criminalisation and medical classifi cations ............................................... 22 1.3. Attitudes towards LGBT persons ............................................................... 25 1.4. Perceptions of the nation, religion and traditional values .......................... 29 1.5. Perceptions of LGBT persons’ visibility and use of public space ............... 31 1.6. Media .......................................................................................................... 32 2. Legal standards and their implementation ............................. 35 2.1. Introduction ................................................................................................ 35 2.2. International and European standards ....................................................... 35 2.3. National standards ..................................................................................... 41 2.4. National structures for promoting equality ................................................ 45 2.5. National policy initiatives ........................................................................... 48 3. Protection: violence and asylum .................................................. 51 3.1. Introduction ................................................................................................ 51 3.2. Violence against LGBT persons .................................................................. 52 3.3. Asylum on the grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity ............. 62 4 | Discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity in Europe 4. Participation: freedoms of assembly, expression and association ................................................................................... 71 4.1. Introduction ............................................................................................... 71 4.2. International and European standards ...................................................... 71 4.3. Situation in the member states .................................................................. 73 5. Privacy: gender recognition and family life ............................ 83 5.1. Introduction ................................................................................................ 83 5.2. Recognition of transgender persons’ new gender and name ..................... 84 5.3. The right to marry and legally contract a partnership ............................... 91 5.4. Parenting and children ............................................................................... 96 6. Access to health care, education and employment .......... 103 6.1. Introduction .............................................................................................. 103 6.2. Health ....................................................................................................... 103 6.3. Education .................................................................................................. 111 6.4. Employment ............................................................................................. 116 Conclusions ................................................................................................ 123 Appendix: Terms and concepts ......................................................... 129 Foreword | 5 Foreword Many people in Europe are stigmatised because of their actual or perceived sexual orientation or gender identity and cannot fully enjoy their universal human rights. Some of them are victims of hate crime and may not receive protection when attacked in the street by fellow citizens, while some of their organisations are denied registration or are banned from organising peaceful meetings and demonstrations. Some people have fl ed to Council of Europe member states from countries where they risk being tortured or executed because of their sexual orientation or gender identity. Too few opinion leaders and leading politicians have taken a fi rm stand against homophobic and transphobic expressions, discrimination and violence. I have often discussed these and other problems with the authorities of Council of Europe member states. The serious concerns about the problems faced by lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) persons are refl ected in my country monitoring reports as well as in thematic publications. I have also initiated a debate on the specifi c human rights issues encountered by transgender persons. Unfortunately, I have repeatedly noted that there is too little objective data and information available to conduct a well-informed discussion with author- ities on these questions. For this reason, my Offi ce launched a comprehensive study on the situation concerning homophobia, transphobia and discrimina- tion on grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity in the 47 member states of the Council of Europe. This report, coupled with a more comprehen- sive version, is the result of the study and contains a socio-legal analysis of the situation of LGBT persons across member states. The study relies on data and information made available by public authorities, national human rights structures, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and academic experts in the member states. I extend my gratitude to all organisations and people involved for their active participation and forthcoming contributions. Special thanks and recognition are due to the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA), which kindly shared its research and data on the 27 member states of the European Union. In this regard, effective use was made of respective areas of expertise and complementary capacities. The standards used in this report are based on judgments of the European Court of Human Rights and recent recommendations of the Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers and Parliamentary Assembly. Several institu- tions of the European Union, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the United Nations have expressed concerns relating to the treatment of LGBT persons. The report clearly demonstrates that member states need to take further steps to address discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity. It also provides a knowledge base for effective measures to combat homophobia and transphobia. 6 | Discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity in Europe There is considerable resistance among many people to discuss the full enjoy- ment of universal human rights by LGBT persons. Even if this may not be a popular human rights topic, the time has now come to take the discussion forward and make it concrete. Supported by the facts presented in this report, I look forward to a constructive dialogue with authorities and other stake- holders to improve respect for the human rights of LGBT persons. Thomas Hammarberg Summary | 7 Summary This report is the result of the largest study ever made on homophobia, transphobia and discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity in the 47 member states of the Council of Europe. The fi ndings are presented in six thematic chapters followed by forward-looking conclusions. The Commissioner’s recommendations on the issues that emerged from the fi ndings of the study can be found at the beginning of the report. Attitudes and perceptions Homophobic and transphobic attitudes have been identifi ed in all 47 member states, though attitudes vary signifi cantly among and within the countries. Biased, outdated and incorrect information on what constitutes sexual orien- tation and gender identity as well as stereotypical portrayals of LGBT persons in the media and in textbooks contribute to the shaping of negative attitudes. Infl ammatory and aggressive discourse against LGBT persons, occasionally amounting to hatred, has also been identifi ed in several member states. LGBT persons have often been portrayed as a threat to the nation, religion, and traditional notions of gender and the family. Such speech has rarely been offi cially condemned. The invisibility of LGBT persons and the absence of a serious discussion about their human rights situation are recurring themes in this report. Many LGBT individuals conceal their sexual orientation or gender identity in everyday life out of fear of negative reactions at school, work, in their neighbourhood or in their family. They fear that public knowledge of their sexual orientation and gender identity will lead to discrimination, harassment, rejection or even violence. Legal standards and their implementation A large number of member states have adopted legislative and other meas- ures to prohibit discrimination against individuals on grounds of their sexual orientation and, though in fewer cases, also on grounds of gender identity. The majority of member states (38) have recognised, in line with interna- tional and European standards, that sexual orientation is one of the grounds of discrimination in comprehensive or sectoral non-discrimination legisla- tion. Some nine member states do not appear to protect LGB persons against discrimination. A lower number, 20 out of 47 member states cover discrimina- tion based on gender identity in their non-discrimination legislation, either as gender identity explicitly or as a recognised interpretation of the terms “sex”, “gender” or “other ground of discrimination”. For the other 27 member states, the non-discrimination legislation remains silent or is unclear on the protec- tion of transgender persons. Offi cial statistics and data regarding discrimination on grounds of sexual orien- tation and gender identity are scarce in member states. National structures 8 | Discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity in Europe for promoting equality do not always have an explicit mandate to receive complaints of discrimination based on sexual orientation and even fewer have a clear mandate to cover gender identity as a ground of discrimination. Protection: violence and asylum LGBT persons run a serious risk of becoming victims of a hate crime or a hate-motivated incident, especially in public places. Violence may also take place within a family setting. Moreover, some state agents, such as the police, have been involved in blackmailing and harassing LGBT persons. Often LGBT persons do not report such violence to the competent authorities due to lack of trust in law-enforcement agencies, who may have no training in investi- gating effectively such hate-motivated crimes and incidents. Homophobic and transphobic incidents or hate crimes are not refl ected in offi cial hate crime statistics in most of the member states. The incitement of hatred, violence or discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation is considered as a criminal offence in only 18 member states. Similarly, homo- phobic intent is accepted as an aggravating factor in common crimes in only 15 member states. In only two member states is gender identity or transphobic hate crime explicitly addressed in hate crime legislation. Owing to criminalisation and persecution on grounds of sexual orientation and/or gender identity, a number of LGBT persons have sought to fl ee their country of origin. Thirty-three member states recognise sexual orientation as a ground for persecution in asylum claims, while only six member states do so for gender identity. LGBT persons encounter particular diffi culties in the process of seeking asylum, often owing to inadequate knowledge by immi- gration authorities about conditions for LGBT persons in countries of origin. Some authorities appear to consider that, if LGBT persons kept their sexual orientation or gender identity secret, they would not be at risk. LGBT asylum seekers also face diffi culties in asylum centres and may be exposed to harass- ment from other applicants. Participation: freedoms of assembly, expression and association Violent and discriminatory reactions have occurred when LGBT persons have collectively attempted to express their views, freely associate or gather for public demonstrations. In most member states the freedoms of asso- ciation, expression and assembly of LGBT persons are respected. However, in a few states they have been infringed upon. Bans or administrative impediments imposed on public LGBT demonstrations were identifi ed in 12 member states, and in some instances the police have failed to protect peaceful demonstrators from violent assaults. Obstructions and/or refusal of attempts to register LGBT associations have been identifi ed in fi ve member states, though in some instances courts have overturned such bans at a later stage. Infringement of the freedom of expression has been reported in three member states, whereas attempts to criminalise “propaganda of homo- sexuality” were identifi ed in three member states. Summary | 9 Privacy: gender recognition and family life Transgender persons face signifi cant problems in the process of their legal gender recognition. In at least 10 member states no legislation regulating it was identifi ed. In 13 other member states no or only partial legislation was identifi ed, but transgender persons are able to have their new gender legally recognised, either through court decisions or by certain administrative prac- tices. Twenty-nine member states require, as a precondition for legal gender recognition, surgery leading to infertility, whereas 15 member states require the transgender person to be unmarried or divorced, which can leave couples without a legally recognised relationship after divorce. Same-sex couples wishing to marry can do so in seven member states (gender-neutral marriage) and in 14 other member states they can enter a registered partnership which provides a form of recognition. The lack of access to marriage or registered partnership deprives same-sex couples of rights and benefi ts granted to different-sex relationships. It has also conse- quences for same-sex couples having children as one of the partners may not have custody rights, inheritance and next-of-kin status, which need to be assured in the best interests of the child. Ten member states allow second- parent adoption to same-sex couples, while 35 countries provide no access to it. Two member states give only some parental authority and responsibilities to registered same-sex partnerships, but no adoption is available. Access to health care, education and employment LGBT persons are more prone to suffer from depression, anxiety, and anguish. Suicide and attempted suicide rates are signifi cantly higher for LGBT persons than their heterosexual peers, especially young people. LGBT persons also experience problems when accessing health care, caused by mistrust between patients and doctors, problematic attitudes of medical staff, as well as outdated approaches to homosexuality and transgenderism. Contrary to international medical classifi cations, some offi cial textbooks contain references to homo- sexuality as an illness. Transsexuality continues to be considered a mental disorder according to some international classifi cations. In 13 member states medical facilities for gender reassignment treatment are non-existent or insuf- fi cient. Health care insurance’s coverage of gender reassignment treatment is problematic in at least 16 countries. In the remaining states there is partial or full reimbursement. Bullying of LGBT persons within the educational system is a reality. Objective information on sexual orientation and gender identity is rarely imparted in schools. Discrimination and harassment of LGBT persons also occurs in the employment sector. Even though the majority of member states include sexual orientation in non-discrimination legislation for employment, gender identity is usually only partially included under the sex or gender ground. Trade unions and employers in some member states have taken measures to combat these practices. Transgender persons face particular problems when accessing the labour market, as privacy of personally sensitive data related to their gender identity history is rarely ensured. Recommendations | 11 Recommendations The Commissioner’s recommendations build on the fi ndings of this report and provide policy-oriented advice to member states to prevent and address homophobia, transphobia and discrimination on grounds of sexual orienta- tion and gender identity. The Commissioner for Human Rights recommends that authorities in Council of Europe member states should: 1. Attitudes and perceptions 1) Take a strong public position against violations of the human rights of LGBT persons and promote respect on issues related to sexual orienta- tion and gender identity, for example through human rights education and awareness-raising campaigns. 2) Take steps to encourage factual, objective and professional reporting by the media on LGBT persons and issues related to sexual orientation and gender identity. 2. Legal standards and their implementation 1) Implement international human rights obligations without discrimina- tion on grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity. The Yogyakarta Principles are a useful tool to provide guidance for implementing inter- national human rights standards in relation to sexual orientation and gender identity. Member states are also encouraged to sign and ratify Protocol No. 12 to the European Convention on Human Rights on the general prohibition of discrimination. 2) Enact comprehensive national legislation on non-discrimination and include sexual orientation and gender identity among the prohibited grounds of discrimination. NGOs representing LGBT persons should be consulted and involved in the legislative process and in the preparation of policy measures for the implementation of the legislation. 3) Screen national legislation to detect and correct possible inconsisten- cies with non-discrimination legislation in force to prevent discrimina- tion on grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity. Eliminate any discriminatory criminalisation of same-sex sexual activity if this is still present in the legislation. 4) Set up independent national structures for promoting equality and non- discrimination. The scope of their mandate should include discrimina- tion on grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity. 12 | Discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity in Europe 5) Monitor the effectiveness of the implementation of national non- discrimination legislation and involve national human rights structures, including national structures for promoting equality, and organisations representing LGBT persons in the monitoring process. A regular moni- toring mechanism should be put in place to this end. 3. Protection: violence and asylum 1) Include homophobic and transphobic hatred explicitly as possible motives in national legislation on bias-motivated crime and hate speech. Crimes targeting individuals or groups of people because of their perceived or real sexual orientation or gender identity should be punished and the bias motive taken into account as an aggravating circumstance. 2) Investigate effectively bias-motivated crimes, speech and incidents related to homophobia and transphobia. Specifi c training for law enforcement offi - cials and members of the judiciary should be provided for this purpose. 3) Improve systematic data collection on hate-motivated crimes, speech and incidents related to homophobia and transphobia. Data on homo- phobic and transphobic crimes, speech, incidents and complaints should be clearly disaggregated from other hate-motivated crimes, speech and incidents. 4) Recognise that persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity may be valid grounds for granting refugee status and asylum. Unnecessarily invasive tests for LGBT asylum seekers for giving proof of their sexual orientation or gender identity should be avoided. 5) Provide expertise and training to asylum offi cers and other related professionals in order to ensure that LGBT asylum seekers are met in a respectful, informed and sensitive way during the asylum procedure. Procedures should be set up in a way that LGBT asylum seekers feel safe to disclose their sexual orientation or gender identity. 6) Address social isolation, violence and discrimination experienced by LGBT asylum seekers in asylum centres, and provide for their specifi c health care needs. 4. Participation: freedoms of assembly, expression and association 1) Respect the effective right to freedom of assembly of LGBT persons by ensuring that peaceful Pride festivals and other public events organised by LGBT people or focusing on issues related to sexual orientation and gender identity can take place without being subjected to discriminatory measures by the public authorities. Practices amounting to misuse of Recommendations | 13 legal or administrative provisions in order to hinder the organisation of such events should be prevented. 2) Provide effective protection to participants of peaceful Pride demonstra- tions or public events organised by and for LGBT persons from attacks and violent counter-demonstrations. 3) Respect the effective right to freedom of association of LGBT persons by ensuring, in particular, that non-governmental organisations repre- senting LGBT persons or working on issues related to sexual orientation and gender identity can be set up and operate without being subjected to discriminatory measures by the public authorities. Administrative procedures which render the registration of these NGOs disproportion- ately lengthy or diffi cult should be prevented. 4) Respect the effective right to freedom of expression by safeguarding the possibility to receive and impart information on issues related to sexual orientation and gender identity in any form of expression such as the press, publications, oral and written statements, art and other media. Any discriminatory provision criminalising the dissemination and diffu- sion of factual information concerning sexual orientation and gender identity should be abolished. Unlawful interferences in the enjoyment of the right to freedom of expression by LGBT persons should be subject to criminal proceedings. 5. Privacy: gender recognition and family life 1) Grant legal recognition for the preferred gender of transgender persons and develop expeditious and transparent procedures for changing the name and sex of a transgender person on birth certifi cates, civil registers, identity cards, passports, educational certifi cates and other similar documents. 2) Abolish sterilisation and other compulsory medical treatment which may seriously impair the autonomy, health or well-being of the indi- vidual, as necessary requirements for the legal recognition of a trans- gender person’s preferred gender. 3) Remove the requirement of being unmarried, or divorce for already married persons, as a necessary condition for the legal recognition of a transgender person’s preferred gender. 4) Respect the right of transgender persons to effectively exercise their right to marry in accordance with their legally recognised gender. 5) Enact legislation recognising same-sex partnerships by granting such partnerships the same rights and benefi ts as different-sex partnerships or marriage, for example in the areas of social security, employment and pension benefi ts, freedom of movement, family reunifi cation, parental rights and inheritance. 14 | Discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity in Europe 6) Grant same-sex couples and LGBT individuals, in compliance with the principle of the best interests of the child, similar opportunities as other applicants to be considered without discrimination as adoptive parents for a child. 7) Recognise the parental rights of same-sex parents, individually or jointly, including their rights of guardianship and custody without discrimi- nation on grounds of their sexual orientation or gender identity. The parental rights of transgender persons should continue to be respected after the legal recognition of their preferred gender. 8) Allow access to assisted reproduction to LGBT persons without discrimi- nation on grounds of their sexual orientation or gender identity. 9) Seek to provide adequate support for families with LGBT members in order to foster inclusion, respect and safety. 6. Access to health care, education and employment 1) Abolish outdated classifi cation systems which portray homosexuality as an illness or disease. 2) Review any requirements of a diagnosis of mental disorder for accessing transgender health care in view of eliminating obstacles to the effective enjoyment, by transgender persons, of the rights to self-determination and the highest attainable standard of health. 3) Include in the education and training of health care professionals the importance of respecting the dignity of LGBT persons as well as their specifi c health care needs and choices. 4) Make gender reassignment procedures, such as hormone treatment, surgery and psychological support, accessible to transgender persons subject to informed consent and ensure that they are reimbursed by health insurance. 5) Promote respect and inclusion of LGBT persons at school and foster objective knowledge on issues concerning sexual orientation and gender identity in schools and other educational settings. 6) Combat bullying and harassment of LGBT students and staff. Schools should be a safe environment for LGBT students and staff, and teachers should be provided with tools to respond effectively to bullying and harassment of LGBT students. 7) Promote policies and practices aimed at combating discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity; also promote policies to foster diversity in the workplace together with initiatives which encourage the full inclusion and respect of LGBT staff in the work environment. Recommendations | 15 8) Respect the right of transgender persons to access the labour market by guaranteeing the respect of their privacy concerning the disclo- sure of personally sensitive data related to their gender identity and by promoting measures aimed at ending the exclusion and discrimination of transgender persons in the workplace. 7. Research and data collection 1) Encourage systematic research and disaggregated data collection concerning discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity in all areas of life. LGBT-related questions should be included in general attitude surveys and public opinion polls. 2) Apply safeguards protecting the right to respect for private life of LGBT persons in the collection of any sensitive data. Introduction | 17 Introduction This report presents the results of the largest study ever made on homophobia, transphobia and discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity in Europe.1 It is published by the Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe and covers the 47 member states of the Council of Europe. The report is based on research and data collection primarily focused on the period 2004-2010 although some important data preceding this period have been included as well. Changes in policy and legislation in Council of Europe member states which took place after 31 December 2010 have not been systematically taken into account. There have been two phases in the research and data-collection process. The fi rst phase focused on the collection and comparative analysis of informa- tion and data of a legal nature (legislation and case law). This research was conducted through desk research and by national legal experts. The second phase focused on the collection and comparative analysis of data of a socio- logical nature. The aim of the sociological part of the study was to collect data on the everyday life of lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) persons in the 47 member states. This part of the research was conducted by desk research and fi eld visits in the member states. The research and data-collec- tion process was co-ordinated by the international consultancy fi rm COWI. During the fi eld visits, semi-structured qualitative interviews were conducted with key stakeholders in each member state.2 The relevant stakeholders provided oral statements as well as written materials, which gave a broad over- view of the issues at stake. To start with, representatives of national authori- ties, in most instances offi cials working in the Ministry of Justice, Ministry of the Interior, Ministry of Foreign Affairs or Ministry of Health were met in order to access available offi cial data and statistics. This could include infor- mation regarding discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity and incidents of homophobia and transphobia as well as information on the relevant national policies, action plans, and “good practice” related to combating discrimination and promoting human rights. These interviews aimed to collect information but also to gauge awareness of the national situ- ation with regard to homophobia, transphobia and discrimination among the interlocutors. Many interlocutors emphasised the usefulness of this study and engaged constructively in the data-collection process, though on many occa- sions there were not many statistics or data to share. Public authorities have generally been co-operative in their contribution to the study. 1. Voluntary contributions for this project were provided by Belgium (Flemish Government), Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), Switzerland and the United Kingdom. 2. With the exception of Andorra, where no fi eld visit took place (phone interviews were conducted instead). Furthermore, meetings with the Russian authorities during the fi eld visit in the Russian Federation did not take place. In the national contributions (sociological reports) a precise overview per country is given regarding the interlocutors interviewed. 18 | Discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity in Europe Organisations representing LGBT persons were also met, usually LGBT organisations as well as human rights non-governmental organisations. Representatives of LGBT organisations provided their perspectives on the information collected and directed attention to further materials. LGBT organisations, having hands-on experience and knowledge of various aspects of the situation for LGBT persons, have been a valuable source of data. This is particularly the case when research and/or offi cial data have been scarce. The European Region of the International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association (ILGA-Europe) and Transgender Europe (TGEU) provided additional information. In addition, consultations regarding the research design and implementation took place at regular intervals with ILGA-Europe and Transgender Europe. Furthermore, representatives of national human rights structures (that is, national human rights institutions, ombudsman institutions and equality bodies) were met during the fi eld trips. Whereas this report shows that not all these structures are currently engaged in combating discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity, the meetings turned out to be useful. Once again, on most occasions, representatives of these national structures emphasised the need for more engagement in this area. Based on the information and data collected for each country, a legal and a sociological report were drafted for each Council of Europe member state. Regarding the 27 member states of the European Union, this report draws primarily from research conducted by the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA). Relevant FRA publications from 2008, 2009 and 20103 as well as data from primary research as published in the FRA’s national contributions (reports on the social situation and – updated – legal reports) were key resource documents. In line with the co-operation agree- ment between the FRA and the Council of Europe,4 these reports and data were shared by the FRA with the Offi ce of the Commissioner for Human Rights. The Commissioner’s Offi ce was also able to benefi t from the technical expertise of the FRA throughout the research process. As regards the other 20 member states of the Council of Europe, the legal and sociological reports were drafted by consultants and national experts. All reports have been quality assured by independent reviewers. However, any views or opinions expressed in the national country reports do not necessarily represent those of the Offi ce of the Commissioner for Human Rights. These two sets of 47 national reports form the basis for the comparative report. For readability of this summary report, footnote referencing has been limited 3. See European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, “Homophobia and Discrimination on the grounds of Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity in the European Union Member States: Part 1 – Legal Analysis”, 2008; “Homophobia and Discrimination on Grounds of Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity in the European Union Member States: Part II – The Social Situation”, 2009; “Homophobia, Transphobia and Discrimination on Grounds of Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity: 2010 Update – Comparative Legal Analysis”, 2010. 4. Agreement between the European Community and the Council of Europe on cooperation between the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights and the Council of Europe, paragraph 7. Introduction | 19 to the most necessary information. Full details and references can be found in the comprehensive version of the report and the national reports, which will be made available separately. Information provided by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Offi ce for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and the Offi ce of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was also used in the compilation of this report. It should be pointed out that research for this report was conducted in areas which face serious challenges regarding data availability. Systematically collected data on homophobia, transphobia and discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity in most member states remain scarce or simply non-existent. The lack of data requires serious scrutiny, a conclusion backed by the fact that many of the public authorities met during fi eld visits expressed the need for improving the collection and handling of data. Signifi cant improvements in data collection would be needed in order to acquire comprehensive data sets on the socio-legal position of LGBT persons. The report is structured in the following manner. The Commissioner’s recommendations to member states, which build on the fi ndings of the report, can be found at the beginning of the volume. The report starts with a chapter providing a general overview of attitudes and perceptions towards LGBT persons. Attitudinal surveys, research and studies related to Council of Europe member states are presented here. This overview can be considered as a general contextual introduction for the thematic chap- ters to follow. Chapter 2 outlines the applicable international and European human rights standards from the perspective of non-discrimination followed by a summary of the relevant national legal frameworks with reference to sexual orientation and gender identity as prohibited grounds for discrimination. This chapter also looks into national implementation of non-discrimination legislation, including the work conducted by national structures for promoting equality and policy initiatives undertaken by member states. Chapter 3 focuses on the right to life and security as protected by interna- tional human rights law. It demonstrates the extent to which LGBT persons are victims of hate crimes, hate speech and other violent acts. In addition, this chapter explores the protection mechanisms in place for asylum seekers who have fl ed countries where they face persecution due to their sexual orienta- tion or gender identity. Chapter 4 covers the participation of LGBT persons in society through their full enjoyment of the freedoms of association, expression and assembly. In this chapter, obstacles related to the organisation of Pride events as well as problems of registering LGBT organisations are discussed. 20 | Discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity in Europe Chapter 5 considers aspects of private and family life. It highlights the specifi c problems transgender persons encounter in obtaining legal recognition of their preferred gender. The recognition of same-sex partnerships and parental rights with reference to the best interests of the child are also discussed in this chapter. Chapter 6 discusses the access of LGBT persons to health care, education and employment. This chapter analyses the extent to which LGBT persons enjoy their rights to the highest attainable standard of health, education and employment which are essential for their social inclusion and well-being. General conclusions can be found at the end of the report. They are policy- oriented and forward-looking. The terms and concepts used in the report are explained in an Appendix. Attitudes and perceptions | 21 1. Attitudes and perceptions 1.1. Lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender persons Lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) persons are present in all Council of Europe member states. This heterogeneous group of persons is often stigmatised and faces homophobia, transphobia, discrimination and the fear of being rejected by family, relatives, friends and society at large due to their sexual orientation or gender identity. For this reason, LGBT persons may not be able to share this most intimate aspect of their private life with family, friends and colleagues. While the “LGBT” label has been used as a self-designatory cluster to denote the group concerned in political and human rights discourse, in this report this collective designation is merely used as an umbrella term. It is important to note that many people considered as LGBT may individually not feel the need to iden- tify themselves under this designation. Other people, including intersex persons or those who identify themselves as “queer”, may associate themselves with the LGBT community, which can then be collectively referred to as “LGBTIQ”. Yet others may point out that the human rights issues affecting lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender persons respectively are signifi cantly different for each sub-group concerned, despite the interconnected nature of the encountered discrimination, and would therefore require different approaches. In the 1940s lesbian and gay persons in Europe began to meet collectively and set up groups and organisations representing them, sometimes at a time when homosexuality was still a criminal offence. The oldest still-existing organisations in Council of Europe member states were founded in 1946 (the Netherlands) and 1948 (Denmark). In the following decades, such groups and organisations were gradually established in many member states in Western Europe along with other social movements throughout the 1960s and 1970s. They also gradually started to address the demands of bisexual persons. The consolidation of many lesbian and gay organisations in Central and Eastern Europe followed after the political changes of the 1990s in that region. The International Lesbian and Gay Association (ILGA) was founded in 1978 and its European regional section (ILGA-Europe) representing lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex persons was set up in 1996. Groups and organisations representing transgender persons were set up at a later stage, with some of them founded in the 1990s and others in the new millennium. Transgender Europe (TGEU), an organisation building a European network of transgender groups and activists, has existed since 2005. In recent years, political advocacy on transgender human rights and community building of transgender persons have strengthened considerably, due to the consolidation of TGEU and other transgender groups, and because several LGB organisations have gradually started to address the human rights of transgender persons as well. 22 | Discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity in Europe 1.2. Criminalisation and medical classifi cations The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe stated in 2010 that “lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender persons have been for centuries and are still subjected to homophobia, transphobia and other forms of intoler- ance and discrimination even within their family – including criminalisation, marginalisation, social exclusion and violence – on grounds of sexual orienta- tion or gender identity”.5 It should thus not come as a surprise that for a long time LGBT persons in many Council of Europe member states remained – and in some member states still are – invisible. Only in the second half of the last century – and with notable differences between the 47 countries – have LGBT persons and their organisations become more visible in society and participa- tory in human rights debates. Two historical circumstances, one of a legal and the other of a medical nature, offer partial explanations for the invisibility of LGBT persons in society and the absence of sexual orientation and gender identity in relevant political and human rights debates. First, different forms of criminalisation of same-sex consensual sexual acts between adults – primarily between men, as women were often not considered in this context – have been found for shorter or longer periods in the criminal codes or legal traditions of nearly all Council of Europe member states.6 The fi rst countries to decriminalise such acts did so in the 18th century while the last countries only did so at the beginning of the 21st century (see Table 1.1).7 Accession criteria to become a member state of the Council of Europe played a part in the process. In countries where homosexuality was criminalised it was often impossible to be openly gay or lesbian and to set up and register organisations advocating for the rights of this community. No Council of Europe member state criminalises same-sex sexual acts as such any longer, even though there are still provisions in the criminal law of some Council of Europe member states which explicitly discriminate on the basis of 5. Committee of Ministers Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)5 on measures to combat discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation or gender identity, adopted on 31 March 2010, preamble. 6. Waaldijk C., “Civil Developments: Patterns of Reform in the Legal Position of Same-sex Partners in Europe”, Canadian Journal of Family Law, 17(1) (2000), pp. 62-64. See also Foucault M., The history of sexuality, vol. 1 (An Introduction), 1976. 7. This table is based on the following sources: Leroy-Forgeot F., Histoire juridique de l’homosexualité en Europe, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France 1997; Graupner H., “Sexual Consent: The Criminal Law in Europe and Outside of Europe”, in H. Graupner and V. L. Bullough (eds), Adolescence, Sexuality and the Criminal Law, Haworth Press, New York, 2005, pp. 111-171; Waaldijk K., “Legal recognition of homosexual orientation in the countries of the world”, paper for the conference “The Global Arc of Justice – Sexual Orientation Law around the World” (Los Angeles, 11-14 March 2009);  Ottosson, D., State-sponsored Homophobia, ILGA, Brussels, 2010. These sources contradict each other on some points, partly because the enactment of a law and its entry into force do not always take place in the same year. In some member states decriminalisation took part in different years in different parts of the country, and in a few other states different penal provisions were repealed in different years. Please note that national borders have changed over time and that some of the member states listed here can be considered as successors to earlier states existing in the corresponding geographical area. According to the Andorran authorities, same-sex consensual acts have never been criminalised in the country. Attitudes and perceptions | 23 sexual orientation.8 The legacy of criminalisation and the fairly recent removal of criminalisation provisions in some member states have contributed to the stigma historically attached to homosexuality and attitudes towards LGBT persons which are, as this report will show, still negative in many regards. In fact, surveys demonstrate that in some member states the majority of the population may still believe that homosexuality is illegal. The United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Right of Everyone to the Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental Health has stated that “criminali- zation may not be the sole reason behind stigma, but it certainly perpetuates it, through the reinforcement of existing prejudices and stereotypes”.9 The second historical factor lies in the medical fi eld. LGBT persons were, and many still are, regarded as being ill or suffering from a disease. Only in 1990 did the World Health Organization (WHO) remove homosexuality from the International Statistical Classifi cation of Diseases and Related Health Problems (ICD).10 The American Psychiatric Association removed homosexuality (which was defi ned as a mental disorder) from the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) in 1973.11 Despite the removal of homosexuality from the list of diseases, this report has found evidence that in some member states of the Council of Europe health practitioners, offi cial health policies and some textbooks in schools still apply these outdated classifi cations leading to factually incorrect information on homosexuality. This is compounded by the fact that public opinion in many member states considers homosexuality as a biological disorder or an illness that needs to be cured. In a similar manner, systems for classifying mental disorders have a direct impact on the way transgender persons are perceived by society. The WHO lists transsexualism as a mental and behavioural disorder in the ICD.12 Transgender persons are thus labelled as having a psychiatric pathologisation. The American Psychiatric Association13 includes the term “gender identity disorder” as a mental health disorder in its DSM and uses it to describe persons who experience signifi cant gender dysphoria, that is, discontent with the biological sex they are born with. This report has identifi ed serious obstacles for many transgender persons in accessing basic services, particularly health services, due to these classifi cation systems and, more widely, in accessing their right to be legally recognised in their preferred gender. 8. For example, in Gibraltar (United Kingdom) an unequal age of consent for homosexual and heterosexual relation- ships is still applied. The issue has been brought to the attention of the Gibraltar Supreme Court. Article 347 of the Greek Penal Code incriminates contact “against nature” between males in certain situations. 9. Human Rights Council, “Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right of Everyone to the Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental Health, Anand Grover”, A/HRC/14/20, paragraph 22, 27 April 2010. 10. World Health Organization, International Statistical Classifi cation of Diseases and Related Health Problems, 1990. 11. American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4th edn), 1994. 12. World Health Organization, International Statistical Classifi cation of Diseases and Related Health Problems, Tenth Revision, Version for 2007. 13. American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Washington, DC (4th edn), 2000. Attitudes and perceptions | 25 The legacy of criminalisation and medical classifi cations naturally do not account for a full explanation for the longstanding invisibility of LGBT persons and the lack of discussion on sexual orientation and gender identity discrimi- nation. Other factors, discussed below, have also played a major role. Yet the criminalising and medical discourses have directly infl uenced perceptions on the states’ human rights obligations to address the discrimination of LGBT persons and combat homophobia and transphobia. 1.3. Attitudes towards LGBT persons Attitudes towards LGBT persons are not homogeneous across Europe or within the member states. They range from very negative to very positive. Their articulation may vary depending on a specifi c subject matter (access to marriage for same-sex couples) or political context (at election time defending the human rights of LGBT persons may not be considered attractive by some politicians). European and national public opinion surveys and research have measured the attitudes of the general population towards LGBT persons. These European studies include the Eurobarometer14 as well as the European Values Study15 and the European Social Survey.16 Such studies have focused on questions related to whether gay men and lesbian women should be free to live their life as they wish, how people feel about having a gay or lesbian neighbour or whether a gay or lesbian person should hold the highest polit- ical offi ce in the country. European studies Some differences between European attitude studies exist relating to the geographical focus: not all surveys include all Council of Europe member states. Secondly, the use of different methodologies is common: normally the focus is on lesbian and gay persons only rather than on bisexual and transgender persons. This often makes the fi gures incomparable. However, some overall patterns can be identifi ed in these studies. For example, regarding opinions on the statement: “Gay men and lesbians should be free to live their own life as they wish”, respondents in Sweden, the Netherlands and Denmark register the lowest levels of disagreement with the statement (about 10% of respondents disagreeing).17 In the same survey, respondents in Ukraine, Romania, Turkey and the Russian Federation give the highest rates of disagreement (about 70% of respondents disagreeing with the statement). 14. European Commission, Special Eurobarometer 296, “Discrimination in the European Union: Perceptions, Experiences and Attitudes”, 2008; European Commission, Special Eurobarometer 317, “Discrimination in the EU”, 2009. 15. European Values Study, “How do Europeans think about life, family, work, religion, sex, politics, and society?”. 16. European Social Survey, “Exploring Public Attitudes, Informing Public Policy. Selected Findings from the First Three Rounds”, 2005. 17. European Social Survey, “Exploring Public Attitudes, Informing Public Policy. Selected Findings from the First Three Rounds”, 2005, pp. 16-17. Attitudes and perceptions | 27 Analysing the socio-demographic and political profi le of the respondents, the Eurobarometer found that men are usually more negative than women, older generations more negative than young, less-educated persons more nega- tive than higher-educated, and persons with right-wing political views more negative than those with left-wing political views. A crucial factor contrib- uting to more positive attitudes towards LGBT persons is to have them as friends or acquaintances. The Eurobarometer survey from 2008 shows a correlation between those respondents who have homosexual acquaintances themselves and a positive attitude towards having a homosexual person as a neighbour, or as a country leader.23 The lowest proportion of people who state that they have homosexual acquaintances are found in Romania (3%), Latvia (6%) and Bulgaria (7%), whereas the highest proportion of people with homosexual acquaintances are found in the Netherlands (69%), Sweden (56%), Denmark, France and the United Kingdom (all 55%). As the Eurobarometer concludes: It is quite stunning how potent an infl uence diversity in one’s social circle is upon attitudes to minorities. Being open-minded and having contact with minorities is the factor with the most positive infl uence on people’s attitudes. When rating out of 10 how comfortable (with 10 being completely comfortable) they would feel with an LGBT person attaining the highest elected offi ce in the land, those with LGBT friends gave an average rating of 8.5, while those without gave an average rating of 5.5 – a signifi - cantly lower rating. This sort of fi nding is now consistent across three waves of this Eurobarometer study and is, no doubt, going to continue being so.24 This was also recognised by an expert in the Russian Federation: “Very few people in Russia have personal acquaintances with lesbian, gay or bisexual persons. Even fewer people know transgender persons, because it is a very new phenomenon in our society. People with personal relations with LGBT have a higher degree of tolerance.”25 National surveys in Council of Europe member states In many Council of Europe member states similar surveys have been conducted, again with different methodologies, focus and scope. Regarding survey results related to having a gay or lesbian neighbour, a Turkish survey from 200926 showed that 87% of the population did not want to have a gay or lesbian neighbour – the same fi gure is found in an Armenian survey from 2005.27 A survey from Croatia in 2002 indicated that a little less than half of the people surveyed would not like a gay or lesbian person as a neighbour.28 23. European Commission, Special Eurobarometer 296, “Discrimination in the European Union: Perceptions, Experiences and Attitudes”, 2008, Chapter 9, p. 53. 24. European Commission, Special Eurobarometer 317, “Discrimination in the EU”, 2009, p. 119. 25. National contribution (sociological report) on the Russian Federation, p. 7. 26. Esmer Y., “Radicalism and Extremism”, Bahcesehir University, 2009. 27. Carroll A. and Quinn S., “Forced out: LGBT people in Armenia”, ILGA-Europe/COC Netherlands, 2007, p. 34. 28. National contribution (sociological report) on Croatia, p. 5. 28 | Discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity in Europe In 2007, in a survey held in “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”, 62% of those surveyed answered that it is “unacceptable to have neighbours who have sexual relations with people from the same sex”. 29 It should be kept in mind that the “neighbour” question is just one indi- cator of attitudes. Similar questions have been asked in relation to other contexts such as the workplace, education and personal acquaintances and friendships. A study in Cyprus, for example, found that respondents would be more uncomfortable with gay or lesbian persons teaching their child than if the person was a colleague or a neighbour.30 In a study from Bosnia and Herzegovina, 71% of respondents believed that they would feel very uncomfortable in the company of a gay or lesbian person. Some 82% held negative opinions about gays and lesbians, although it is worth noting that the focus of the study was to register public opinions on homosexuality and prostitution.31 According to a Lithuanian study,32 62% would not like to belong to any organisation with gay and lesbian members, 69% did not want gay or lesbian persons to work in schools and 50% objected to gay or lesbian persons working in the police force. In Georgia 84% of respondents expressed negative attitudes towards homo- sexuality.33 Signifi cantly more positive fi gures are found in a survey from the Netherlands, according to which “the percentage of the population who can be characterised as ‘anti-gay’ fell from 15% in 2006 to 9% in 2009”.34 Surveys related to transgender persons are rare. In only two member states did studies focus on attitudes towards transgender persons. A study in the United Kingdom concluded that discriminatory attitudes are particularly common in respect of transgender persons.35 A study in Germany found that 45% agreed to the statement that they have no or little understanding of those who intend to or have changed their gender.36 29. Coalition for Protection and Promotion of Sexual and Health Rights of Marginalised Communities, “Annual Report on sexual and health rights of marginalised communities”, 2009, p. 41. 30. Cyprus College Research Center, “Attitudes and Perceptions of the Public towards Homosexuality”, 2006. 31. Prism Research, “Researching Public Opinion about Homosexuality and Prostitution”, Sarajevo, 2005, cited in Durkovic S., “The Invisible Q?: Human Rights Issues and Concerns of LGBTIQ Persons in Bosnia and Herzegovina”, p. 19. 32. The Market and Opinion Research Centre Vilmorus Ltd, “Discrimination against Various Social Groups in Lithuania”, 2006, also quoted in: European Union Agency for Fundamental Human Rights, “Homophobia and Discrimination on Grounds of Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity in the European Union Member States: Part II – The Social Situation”, 2009, p. 34. 33. Quinn S., “Forced Out: LGBT People in Georgia”, ILGA-Europe/COC Netherlands, 2007, p. 26. 34. Keuzenkamp S., “Steeds gewoner, nooit gewoon. Acceptatie van homoseksualiteit in Nederland”, Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau, The Hague, 2010. 35. Bromley C., Curtice J. and Given L., “Attitudes to discrimination in Scotland: 2006, Scottish Social Attitudes Survey”, Scottish Government Social Research, Edinburgh, 2007, p. ix. 36. Federal Anti-Discrimination Agency, Benachteiligung von Trans Personen, insbesondere im Arbeitsleben, Berlin, 2010, p. 62. Attitudes and perceptions | 29 1.4. Perceptions of the nation, religion and traditional values Despite differences between member states in their populations’ attitudes towards LGBT persons, there are similarities across member states as regards the perceptions underpinning such attitudes. The fi rst set of perceptions relates to the nation, religion and traditional values on gender roles, sexuality and the family. In some member states, being gay or lesbian is viewed as a “betrayal” of national values and unity. Such arguments may be grounded on a specifi c understanding of the nation or the state which aims to preserve the homo- geneity of the nation. For example, an interlocutor from the authorities explained that in Armenia being homosexual is often seen as disloyal to the traditional values of the Armenian people.37 In other countries, LGBT persons may also be seen as damaging the unity and moral order of the country. With reference to the organisation of an LGBT Pride parade in the Russian Federation, the Moscow Patriarchate was quoted as stating that it “infringes on our multi-ethnic nation’s moral norms, on public order, and in the long run – on people’s future. … If people refuse to procreate, the nation degrades. So the gay propaganda ultimately aims at ruining our nation.”38 In a study from Bosnia and Herzegovina 77% of respondents believed that accepting homosexuality would be detrimental for the country.39 In a Serbian study, half of the respondents thought that homosexuality was dangerous to society, and that state institutions should work to prevent homosexuality.40 In other member states certain political groups use the “national values” argu- ment in the promotion of respect for LGBT persons as a marker of tolerance inherent in their national culture. They stress that their national culture is fundamentally different from the national cultures of immigrant communi- ties. For example, in Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands attitudes of immigrant and in particular Muslim communities are portrayed by some polit- ical groups as anti-western.41 This has generated debates on what is termed “homo-nationalism” as pointed out by Judith Butler: “We all have noticed that gay, bisexual, lesbian, trans and queer people can be instrumentalised by those who want to wage wars, i.e. cultural wars against migrants by means of 37. National contribution (sociological report) on Armenia, p. 5. 38. Moscow Patriarchate Department of External Church Relations, quoted by Interfax, “Stop gay propaganda in Russia – Moscow Patriarchate”, 23 May 2007. 39. Prism Research, “Researching Public Opinion about Homosexuality and Prostitution”, Sarajevo, 2005, cited in Durkovic S., “The Invisible Q?: Human Rights Issues and Concerns of LGBTIQ Persons in Bosnia and Herzegovina”, p. 19. 40. Gay Straight Alliance, “Prejudices Exposed – Homophobia in Serbia”. Public opinion research report on LGBT population, 2008, research conducted for Gay Straight Alliance by Centre for Free Elections and Democracy (CeSID), February-March 2008, p. 5. 41. Drud-Jensen M. T. and Knudsen S. P., ”Ondt i røven. Folk der har ondt i røven over bøsser – bøsser der har ondt i røven over folk”, Copenhagen: Høst & Søn, 2005; Simon B. (2007) Einstellungen zur Homosexualität: Ausprägungen und sozialpsychologische Korrelate bei Jugendlichen mit und ohne Migrationshintergrund, Christian-Albrechts- Universität, Kiel; Mepschen P. “Sex and the Other – Homosexuality and Islam in Dutch public discourse”, University of Amsterdam (Master’s thesis), 2008. 30 | Discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity in Europe forced islamophobia. … Currently, many European governments claim that our gay, lesbian, queer rights must be protected and we are made to believe that the new hatred of immigrants is necessary to protect us.”42 Ideas of the nation can thus be used to embrace LGBT persons or be used to dissociate them from others, be it the national majority or immigrant populations. Second, negative attitudes towards LGBT persons are also shaped by religious beliefs, such as that LGBT persons are sinful and acting against religious teaching. Such arguments draw upon a particular interpretation of religion to support the view that LGBT persons are detrimental to religion or religious believers. This report found many examples of such statements by infl uential religious leaders, as well as opinion leaders. In 2010, before a debate in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on a report focusing on LGBT human rights, different religious communities in Georgia collabora- tively protested about “abnormalities, such as homosexuality, bisexuality and other sexual perversions, that are considered not only by Christianity but also by all other traditional religions as the greatest sin, causing degeneration and physical and mental illnesses”.43 However, while many religious leaders brand homosexuality as immoral and issue warnings of a demographic threat, others, like Archbishop Desmund Tutu, have highlighted that combating discrimination against LGBT persons is a matter of ordinary justice: “We struggled against apartheid in South Africa because we were being blamed and made to suffer for something we could do nothing about. It is the same with homosexuality.”44 Third, traditional values can relate to notions of gender and the family: LGBT persons are then seen as transgressing the normative perceptions and boundaries of what it entails to be a “man” or a “woman”. This is considered to be provocative and unacceptable. Various stakeholders from, among others, Albania, Italy, Georgia, Greece, Montenegro and Ukraine pointed out that in their societies patriarchal values, including concepts about masculinity and femininity, were strong.45 Transgender persons are particularly affected by such values, in the sense that transgender persons are not always iden- tifi able as either male or female. They face negative attitudes, ridicule and outright rejection in public. Traditional notions of gender can also relate to the concept of the family in the sense that LGBT persons are perceived as a threat to heterosexual families. 42. Butler J., “I must Distance Myself From This Complicity with Racism”, Civil Courage Refusal Speech, Christopher Street Day, Berlin, 19 June 2010. Speech made by the author when she refused to accept a Civil Courage Prize. 43. Joint written statement by the Patriarch of the Georgian Orthodox Church, the Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Holy See to Georgia, Head of the Georgian Eparchy of the Armenian Apostle Church, Acting Chief Rabbi of Georgia and the Plenipotentiary Representative of the Caucasian Muslims’ Organisation in Georgia, 29 January 2010. 44. Baird V., Tutu D. and Perry G., Sex, Love and Homophobia, Amnesty International, 2004. 45. National contribution (sociological report) on Georgia, p. 5; National contribution (sociological report) on Montenegro, p. 5; “Ukrainian Homosexuals and Society: A Reciprocation – Review of the situation: society, authori- ties and politicians, mass-media, legal issues, gay-community”, Kiev, 2007, p. 67. Attitudes and perceptions | 31 1.5. Perceptions of LGBT persons’ visibility and use of public space Another set of perceptions relate to notions of what constitutes the private and the public space. Acts perceived as uneventful and unassuming for hetero- sexual couples (for example, holding hands, kissing or talking about their private life) may often be perceived as provocative and offensive when done by LGBT persons. Some representatives of national human rights structures in member states lent a degree of understanding to such attitudes by expressing views that there should not necessarily be public venues, such as clubs and bars, for LGBT persons, or that resistance against public LGBT manifestations was understandable because they were merely displays of sexual, intimate or private matters.46 A Lithuanian Member of Parliament has also stated: “I am not against gays, but I wish they would not demonstrate their views.”47 Several surveys show that people believe that LGBT persons should not be visible in public, but rather be discreet or confi ne themselves to the private sphere. For example, according to a study from the Netherlands, 40% of the population fi nd it objectionable if two men kiss in public and 27% feel the same if two women kiss each other. People are much less troubled by a hetero- sexual couple kissing in public, with 13% taking exception to this. One in three people in the Netherlands fi nd it less problematic if a man and a woman walk hand in hand compared with when two men do the same.48 A study in Germany shows similar results.49 Where LGB persons may have the possibility to choose to be invisible, trans- gender persons may have the opposite problem. Owing to often long gender reassignment treatment, transgender persons may fall out of the normative perception of what “men” and “women” should look like, which may lead to ridicule and rejection in public. This may also happen during simple everyday occurrences such as not being addressed with the right personal pronoun in shops or banks or when transgender persons use the toilet which fi ts their gender identity. The lack of positive role models of transgender persons in society further increases the negative attitudes towards this group. Harsh reactions against LGBT persons are not least seen in relation to the public presence of LGBT persons, for example during Pride parades. Fierce reactions against public LGBT demonstrations in many member states show that homophobic and transphobic expressions are particularly accentu- ated when LGBT persons are visible in public – either as individuals or as 46. National contribution (sociological report) on Azerbaijan, p. 7; National contribution (sociological report) on Ukraine, p. 6. 47. Lithuanian tabloid LT (13 February 2007) quoted in Terškinas A., “Not Private Enough? Homophobic and Injurious Speech in the Lithuanian Media”, LGL, Vilnius, 2008, p. 10. 48. Keuzenkamp S., “Steeds gewoner, nooit gewoon. Acceptatie van homoseksualiteit in Nederland”, Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau, The Hague, 2010, pp. 355-56. 49. Institut für interdisziplinäre Konfl ikt und Gewaltforschung, “Indikatoren des Syndroms Gruppenbezogene Menschenfeindlichkeit im Vergleich”, 2006, p. 17. 32 | Discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity in Europe groups claiming their right to freedom of assembly. The visibility of LGBT persons and the public character of such events appear to increase the level of general reactions and expression of attitudes in both negative and posi- tive terms. 1.6. Media The media have a signifi cant infl uence on, and to some extent mirror, public opinion and attitudes in society. In a majority of member states, among others in the United Kingdom, Denmark, Luxembourg, Portugal and Germany, reports from LGBT organisations and surveys50 show that LGBT issues lack presence in the media and that the media, to varying degrees, simplify, sensa- tionalise and stereotype LGBT persons and the issues crucial for them. A Slovenian study51 carried out a comprehensive analysis of the Slovenian print media from 1970 to 2000, in which fi ve dominant categories of LGB images were identifi ed: – stereotyping – relying on rigid gender schemes presenting gay men as effeminate and lesbian women as masculine; – medicalisation – consigning homosexuality to the medical and psychi- atric spheres and searching for causes; – sexualisation – reducing homosexuality to a question of sex; – secrecy – making homosexuality appear as concealed and related to shame and regret; – normalisation – making homosexuals appear as heterosexuals in order to make homosexuality less threatening and politicised. A study in the United Kingdom called negative and inaccurate representa- tions of transgender persons “an endemic problem, leading to considerable suffering on the part of transgender persons”.52 It also suggested that such representations inspired at least some verbal and physical abuse against trans- gender persons. Transgender persons face the problem of “medicalisation of identity” and the medical labels applied to them, not only by the medical profession and public offi cials but also by society at large. A study from 50. Stonewall, “Written Out: The Scottish Press’ Portrayal of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender People”, Scotland, 2007; FRA national contribution (sociological report) on Luxembourg, p. 8; FRA national contribution (socio- logical report) on Denmark, p. 10; FRA national contribution (sociological report) on Portugal, pp. 8-9; Walters S. D., “Take my Domestic Partner, Please: Gays and Marriage in the Era of the Visible”, 2001, in Bernstein M. and Reimann R. (eds), Queer families, Queer Politics: Challenging Culture and the State, Columbia UP, New York, pp. 338-57. 51. Kuhar R., Media Representations of Homosexuality: An Analysis of the Print Media in Slovenia, 1970-2000, Mediawatch: Ljubljana, 2003, p. 7, also quoted in European Union Agency for Fundamental Human Rights, “Homophobia and Discrimination on Grounds of Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity in the European Union Member States: Part II – The Social Situation”, 2009, p. 92. 52. Trans Media Watch, “How Transgender People Experience the Media. Conclusions from Research November 2009-February 2010”, 2010, p. 11. Attitudes and perceptions | 33 Belgium53 found hardly any media focus on transgender issues apart from a sensationalist or medical perspective. Evidence showing that lesbian, bisexual and transgender persons are more invisible than gay men in the media has been reported in many member states, including Austria, the Czech Republic, Portugal, Slovenia, Sweden and the United Kingdom.54 A particular problem is homophobic and transphobic discourse in the media. This has been identifi ed as a problem in many member states, including in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Italy, Poland and Latvia.55 Incidents have been reported in studies from Lithuania, Germany, Scotland (United Kingdom) and “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”. Some studies, such as one in Bosnia and Herzegovina, go as far as to conclude that the media are perceived “as the most public promoter of homophobia, also by using language of hate”.56 The media as an active player in the creation of negative perceptions of LGBT people was also found in an analysis of the Russian media.57 On the positive side, some studies demonstrate that there is an increased presence and a more nuanced presentation of LGBT persons in the media in some member states. A study in the Czech Republic found that “while in the fi rst half of the 1990s negative stereotyping, sexualisation and comedic or criminal contexts were dominant factors in LGBT representation”, coverage of LGBT persons in the media increasingly improved afterwards.58 A study on media representations of LGBT persons in “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” also found that even though the media still, to some extent, portray LGBT persons in an excessively sexualised manner, the situation has changed drastically in the period 2000-2009, infl uenced by the emer- gence of new media and LGBT activism.59 In a Spanish60 study some objec- tive and balanced coverage of LGBT topics in the media has been reported In Lithuania, a LGBT organisation worked closely with the media to provide 53. FRA national contribution (sociological report) on Belgium, p. 9. 54. FRA national contribution (sociological report) on Czech Republic, p. 9; FRA national contribution (sociological report) on Austria, p. 9; FRA national contribution (sociological report) on Portugal, pp. 8-9; FRA national contribution (sociological report) on Slovenia, p. 9; FRA national contribution (sociological report) on Sweden, p. 10; FRA national contribution (sociological report) on the United Kingdom, p. 11. 55. National contribution (sociological report) on Bosnia and Herzegovina, pp. 12-13; FRA national contribution (sociological report) on Latvia, p. 12; FRA national contribution (sociological report) on Poland, p. 10; FRA national contribution (sociological report) on Italy, p. 11. 56. Organization Q,  “The Invisible Q? Human Rights Issues and Concerns of LGBTIQ Persons in Bosnia and Herzegovina”, Sarajevo, 2008, p. 50. 57. Moscow Helsinki Group, “Situation of Lesbians, Gays, Bisexuals and Transgenders in the Russian Federation”, 2009, pp. 52-57. 58. Working Group on the Issues of Sexual Minorities of the Minister for Human Rights and National Minorities, “Analysis of the Situation of the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender Minority in the Czech Republic”, Government of Czech Republic, 2007, pp. 49-51, also quoted in European Union Agency for Fundamental Human Rights, “Homophobia and Discrimination on Grounds of Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity in the European Union Member States: Part II – The Social Situation”, 2009, p. 93. 59. Dimitrov S., “Sexualities in Transition: Discourses, Power and Sexual Minorities in Transitional Macedonia”, Euro- Balkan – Institute for Humanities and Social Science research, Skopje, 2009, p. 88. 60. FRA national contribution (sociological report) on Spain, p. 9. 34 | Discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity in Europe journalists with training and tools to improve reporting on LGBT issues.61 Some improved media coverage on LGBT issues has also been reported by NGOs in Albania, Croatia, Moldova, Montenegro, Serbia and Turkey though serious problems remain. The presence of positive role models in the media was highlighted by many interlocutors as being of paramount importance for the visibility of LGBT persons. Role models could include openly LGBT artists, opinion leaders, sport- spersons or politicians. Other good practices can also be reported in this fi eld. In 2005 in the Russian Federation, the Institute of Press Development organ- ised two educational seminars for journalists in St Petersburg. The seminars served the purpose of dismantling myths and stereotypes about LGBT persons, and they allowed journalists to ask questions to representatives of the LGBT community.62 NGOs in other member states have also conducted such work- shops for journalists. Another good practice is reported about the broadcaster Channel 4 in the United Kingdom which actively monitors how the channel portrays ethnic minority groups, gays and lesbians, people with disabilities, and other groups. For that purpose, it conducts ongoing audience reputation tracking surveys and commissioned a study in 2009 on viewers’ perceptions of the representation and portrayal of lesbian women and gay men.63 61. Lithuanian Gay League, “A Media for Diversity: LGBT in the News – A Guide for Better Reporting”. 62. Sabynaeva M., “Lesbians, Gays, Journalists: In Search for Mutual Understanding”, November 2005. 63. Channel Four Television Corporation, “Report and Financial Statements 2009”, 2010, p. 50. Legal standards and their implementation | 35 2. Legal standards and their implementation 2.1. Introduction In debates on the human rights of LGBT persons it is sometimes assumed that the protection of the human rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual and trans- gender people amounts to introducing new rights or “special” rights. This line of thinking is misleading, as international human rights law clearly recognises that all human beings, irrespective of their sexual orientation or gender identity, are entitled to all rights and freedoms deriving from the inherent dignity of the human person without discrimination. Legislative and judicial developments in the last decades have led to the consistent interpretation that sexual orienta- tion and gender identity are recognised as prohibited grounds of discrimina- tion under major human rights treaties and conventions, including the UN International Covenants and the European Convention on Human Rights. This chapter outlines the agreed universal standards from the perspective of non- discrimination followed by a summary of the relevant national legal frameworks. The implementation of the legal standards by national structures for promoting equality and the means of national policy initiatives is also highlighted. 2.2. International and European standards UN instruments The principles of equality in dignity and rights and non-discrimination are fundamental elements of international human rights law. These principles are enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and reiterated as legally binding obligations in the UN International Covenants. Thus, Article 2(1) of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and Article 2(2) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) oblige states to ensure the enjoyment of human rights without any discrimination on grounds of race, colour, sex, language, reli- gion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. The principle of non-discrimination before the law is laid down in Article 26 of the ICCPR and prohibits discrimination on the same grounds listed in Article 2(1) of the ICCPR. Although sexual orientation and gender identity are not expressly mentioned as prohibited grounds of discrimination, the respective treaty bodies have interpreted the covenants in their case law64 or in a general comment as including sexual orientation and gender identity within the scope of the open-ended lists of grounds. Indeed, in its General Comment No. 20, the UN 64. UN Human Rights Committee, Toonen v. Australia, Communication No.  488/1992 30, March 1994, CCPR/ C/50/D/488/1992, paragraph 8.7; UN Human Rights Committee, Young v. Australia, Communication No. 941/2000, 6 August 2003, CCPR/C/78/D/941/2000; UN Human Rights Committee, X v. Colombia, Communication No. 1361/2005, 14 May 2007, CCPR/C/89/D/1361/2005. 36 | Discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity in Europe Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights explains that the “States Parties should ensure that a person’s sexual orientation is not a barrier to realising Covenant rights, for example, in accessing survivor’s pension rights. In addition, gender identity is recognised as among the prohibited grounds of discrimination; for example, persons who are transgender, transsexual or intersex often face serious human rights violations, such as harassment in schools or in the workplace.”65 The principle of non-discrimination is also part of more specialised UN human rights conventions. The UN Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) contains a non-discrimination clause66 and the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women has clarifi ed in a general recommendation that “discrimination of women based on sex and gender is inextricably linked with other factors that affect women, such as race, ethnicity, religion or belief, health, status, age, class, caste, and sexual orientation and gender identity. … States Parties must legally recognize and prohibit such intersecting forms of discrimination and their compounded negative impact on the women concerned.”67 Similarly, Article 2 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) constitutes a general non-discrimination provision for the enjoyment of the rights protected under the convention. In a general comment, the Committee on the Rights of the Child referred specifi cally to sexual orientation as a prohibited ground of discrimination, albeit not gender identity.68 Several UN special rapporteurs have applied the international standards in raising serious human rights concerns about the treatment of LGBT persons. They include the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression,69 the Special Rapporteur on the Right of Everyone to the Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental Health,70 the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Education,71 the Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing as a Component of the Right to an Adequate Standard of Living72 65. UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 20 on Non-Discrimination in rela- tion to Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 2009, paragraph 32. 66. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, 1979, Article 2. 67. General Recommendation No. 28 on the core obligations of states parties under Article 2 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, CEDAW/C/2010/47/GC.2, paragraph 18. 68. UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 4, 2003, paragraph 6. 69. United Nations, “Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, Ambeyi Ligabo, Addendum: Mission to Columbia”, E/CN.4/2005/64/Add.3 of 26 November 2004, paragraph 75. 70. United Nations, “The Right of Everyone to the Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental Health – Report of the Special Rapporteur, Paul Hunt”, E/CN.4/2004/49, paragraph 24; Human Rights Council, “Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right of Everyone to the Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental Health, Anand Grover”, A/HRC/14/20, paragraph 9, 27 April 2010. 71. United Nations, Commission on Human Rights, “Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Girls’ Right to Education, Report Submitted by the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Education, Mr V. Muñoz Villalobos”, 8 February 2006, paragraph 113; United Nations, “Report of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Right to Education”, A/65/162, 23 July 2010, paragraph 23. 72. UN Economic and Social Council, “Report of the Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing as a Component of the Right to an Adequate Standard of Living, Miloon Kothari”, E/CN.4/2004/48, 8 March 2004, paragraph 49. Legal standards and their implementation | 37 and the Special Rapporteur on the Question of Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.73 Council of Europe instruments All member states of the Council of Europe are parties to the European Convention on Human Rights. The Convention provides an open-ended list of grounds in Article 14 on the prohibition of discrimination, which are repeated in Protocol No. 12 to the Convention on the general prohibition of discrimination. The Protocol has a wider scope of application than Article 14 since its scope of application is not limited to the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention itself. Neither Article 14 nor the Protocol specifi cally mentions sexual orientation or gender identity as prohibited discrimination grounds but the commentary on the provisions of the said Protocol stipulates that the list of non-discrimination grounds is not exhaustive.74 The European Court of Human Rights confi rmed in 1999 that sexual orien- tation is a discrimination ground covered by Article 14 of the Convention.75 Similarly, in 2010, the Court explicitly mentioned transsexuality76 – albeit not gender identity – as a prohibited ground of discrimination under Article 14 of the Convention although this could have been adduced from its earlier rulings as well.77 The Court has issued several landmark judgments on alleged discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation in which Article 14 has been invoked in conjunction with substantive articles of the Convention, in partic- ular Article 8 on the right to respect for private and family life. In these cases, the Court has severely limited the margin of appreciation of states stressing that differences in treatment related to this ground require particularly weighty reasons to be legitimate under the Convention.78 The principle of non-discrimination can also be found in more special- ised Council of Europe conventions. On 7 April 2011, the Committee of Ministers adopted the Convention on preventing and combating 73. “Report of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Question of Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment”, UN Doc. A/56/156, 3 July 2001, paragraph 22; UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/59/324, 1 September 2004, paragraph 39. 74. Explanatory report to Protocol No. 12 to the 1950 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which entered into force on 1 April 2005, ETS No. 177. 75. See European Court of Human Rights, Mouta v. Portugal, Application No. 33290/96, judgment of 21 December 1999. However, as early as 1981 the Court had found in Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, Application No. 7525/76, that discrimination in the criminal law regarding consenting relations between same-sex adults in private was contrary to the right to respect for private life in Article 8 ECHR. 76. European Court of Human Rights, P.V. v. Spain, Application No. 35159/09, judgment of 30 November 2010, para- graph 30. In the specifi c case no violation of the provision was found. Judgment not fi nal. 77. See for example European Court of Human Rights, Christine Goodwin v. United Kingdom, Application No. 28957/95, judgment of 11 July 2002. 78. European Court of Human Rights, Karner v. Austria, Application No. 40016/98, judgment of 24 July 2003, para- graph 37, E. B. v France, Application No. 43546/02, judgment of 22 January 2008, paragraph 91 and Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, Application No. 30141/04, judgment of 24 June 2010, paragraph 97. 38 | Discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity in Europe violence against women and domestic violence.79 This convention is the fi rst legally binding instrument in the world creating a comprehensive legal framework to prevent violence and to protect victims. The non- discrimination article of the convention includes the grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity thereby making it the fi rst international treaty to include explicitly both sexual orientation and gender identity as prohibited grounds of discrimination. Another binding Council of Europe instrument, the revised European Social Charter, includes an open-ended non-discrimination provision in Article E with reference to the enjoyment of the rights set out in the charter. Although sexual orientation and gender identity are not directly mentioned among the prohibited grounds of discrimination, in 2009, the European Committee of Social Rights affi rmed that “educational materials [should] not reinforce demeaning stereotypes and perpetuate forms of prejudice which contribute to the social exclusion, embedded discrimination and denial of human dignity often experienced by historically marginalised groups such as persons of non-heterosexual orientation”.80 In 2010, the Council of Europe Committee of Ministers adopted a Recommendation on measures to combat discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation or gender identity.81 The recommendation invites the member states to ensure that the stipulated principles and measures are applied in national legislation, policies and practices relevant to the protec- tion of the human rights of LGBT persons. The recommendation covers a wide range of areas including hate crime, freedoms of association, expression and peaceful assembly, respect for family life and private life, employment, educa- tion, health, housing, sports, asylum, national human rights structures and discrimination on multiple grounds. While it is not a legally binding instru- ment, all Council of Europe member states should implement this recommen- dation. The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe also adopted resolutions and recommendations on the subject.82 79. The convention was opened for signature in Istanbul on 11 May 2011 (CETS No. 210). 80. See European Committee of Social Rights, International Centre for the Legal Protection of Human Rights (Interights) v. Croatia – Collective Complaint No. 45/2007, decision of 30 March 2009, paragraphs 60-61. 81. See Committee of Ministers Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)5 on measures to combat discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation or gender identity – Explanatory Memorandum to the Recommendation, CM(2010)4 add3 rev2E, 29 March 2010. 82. Recommendation 1915 (2010) of the Parliamentary Assembly on Discrimination on the basis of sexual orienta- tion and gender identity; Resolution 1728 (2010) of the Parliamentary Assembly on Discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity; Recommendation 1635 (2003) of the Parliamentary Assembly on Lesbians and gays in sport; Recommendation 1474 (2000) of the Parliamentary Assembly on situation of lesbians and gays in Council of Europe member states; Recommendation 1470 (2000) of the Parliamentary Assembly on Situation of gays and lesbians and their partners in respect of asylum and immigration in the member states of the Council of Europe; Recommendation 1117 (1989) of the Parliamentary Assembly on the condition of transsexuals; Recommendation 924 (1981) of the Parliamentary Assembly on Discrimination against homosexuals; Resolution 756 (1981) of the Parliamentary Assembly on discrimination against homosexuals. Legal standards and their implementation | 39 European Union instruments Currently, 27 member states of the Council of Europe are also members of the European Union. The general principle of equal treatment between men and women was introduced into European Union law in 1957 by the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community (the Treaty of Rome). The Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) and the Treaty of Lisbon (2007) further strength- ened the equal treatment principle by allowing European Union measures to combat discrimination on several grounds, including sexual orientation albeit not gender identity. The Treaty on European Union (TEU) as modifi ed by the Lisbon Treaty affi rms the centrality of “respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities”83 as a fundamental principle of the Union. These values are also deemed essential for a society in which non-discrimination prevails. Accordingly, the Lisbon Treaty renders the prin- ciple of non-discrimination into a horizontal clause which should apply in the implementation of the entire text of the treaty. The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union includes a general non-discrimination provision in Article 21.1 of the charter that also mentions sexual orientation among the prohibited grounds of discrimination.84 Gender identity is not explicitly mentioned but since the list of grounds is not exhaus- tive it is open for the inclusion of other grounds that give rise to differen- tial treatment. Moreover, the scope of the ground of “sex” in the Charter of Fundamental Rights should be applied in conformity with the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union on that ground. The European Union has also introduced specifi c equal treatment directives. Currently, combating discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation under European Union law is limited to the fi eld of employment only.85 The question of extending the material scope of the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of sexual orientation beyond employment is being exam- ined by the Council of the European Union with reference to a Commission proposal for a so-called “horizontal” equal treatment directive.86 Gender identity is not explicitly recognised as a prohibited ground of discrim- ination in the European Union directives. However, the Court of Justice of the European Union has applied the ground of sex to extend equal treat- ment guarantees to cover, at least partially, the discrimination experienced 83. European Union, Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, OJ C115/13, Article 2, 9 May 2008. 84. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, adopted in 2000, OJ C 83/02, 30 March 2010. 85. European Union, Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000, establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation, 2000, OJ 2000 L 303. See also Court of Justice of the European Union, C-267/06, Tadao Maruko v. Versorgungsanstalt der deutschen Bühnen VddB, judgment of 1 April 2008, paragraph 65, ECR I-1757. 86. European Union, Proposal for a Council Directive on implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation COM/2008/0426 fi nal – 2008/0140 (CNS), 2 July 2008. 40 | Discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity in Europe by transgender persons. In the case of P. v. S. and Cornwall County Council from 1996, the Court of Justice stated that the principle of equal treatment “must extend to discrimination arising from gender reassignment, which is based, essentially if not exclusively, on the sex of the person concerned, since to dismiss a person on the ground that he or she intends to undergo, or has undergone, gender reassignment is to treat him or her unfavourably by comparison with persons of the sex to which he or she was deemed to belong before that operation”.87 This was confi rmed by two other decisions of the Court of Justice.88 In line with this jurisprudence, the Council of the European Union has stated that discrimination arising from gender reassignment is also protected under the scope of the European Union Directive implementing the principle of equal treatment between men and women in the access to and supply of goods and services.89 The Gender Recast Directive of 2006 became the fi rst European Union Directive which also refers to persons intending to undergo or having undergone gender reassignment.90 Whereas European Union law thus protects this segment of the transgender community under the ground of “sex”, European Union law does not explic- itly cover the right to equal treatment of transgender people who have not undergone and do not intend to undergo gender reassignment surgery. In June 2010, the European Parliament called upon the European Commission to ensure that future European Union gender equality initiatives address this gap.91 The European Commission has decided to examine “specifi c issues pertaining to sex discrimination in relation to gender identity” in the frame- work of the European Union’s Strategy for equality between women and men 2010-2015.92 Yogyakarta Principles The Yogyakarta Principles on the Application of International Human Rights Law in relation to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, adopted in 2006 by a group of human rights experts, promote the implementation of already existing obligations under international human rights law in relation to LGBT persons. As such, they propose baseline standards for the protection and 87. Court of Justice of the European Union, C-13/94, P. v. S. and Cornwall County Council, judgment of 30 April 1996, paragraphs 21-22. 88. Court of Justice of the European Union, C-117/01, K.B. v. National Health Service Pensions Agency, Secretary of State for Health, judgment of 7 January 2004, C-423/04, Sarah Margaret Richards v. Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, judgment of 27 April 2006. 89. 2606th meeting of the Council of the European Union (Employment, Social Policy, Health and Consumers Affairs) held in Luxembourg on 4 October 2004, Minutes, Doc. No. 13369/04 of 27 October 2004, p. 7. 90. European Union, Directive 2006/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5  July 2006 on the implementation of the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in matters of employ- ment and occupation (recast) OJ L 204, 26 June 2006 pp. 23-36. Recital No. 3. 91. European Parliament Resolution of 17 June 2010 on assessment of the results of the 2006-2010 Roadmap for Equality between women and men, and forward-looking recommendations. 92. Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Strategy for equality between women and men 2010-2015, paragraph 6.2. Legal standards and their implementation | 41 promotion of the full enjoyment of all human rights irrespective of sexual orientation and gender identity. Several states, including the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland, have endorsed the Principles or referred to them in their statements at the United Nations Human Rights Council. Other countries endorsed the principles at the execu- tive level (Germany, the Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom) or the legislative level (Belgium).93 2.3. National standards Non-discrimination legislation at the national level has developed at great speed during recent decades. Most member states of the Council of Europe have now adopted non-discrimination legislation. In some countries this is a recent phenomenon while in others national non-discrimination legislation has already been subject to frequent amendments and improvements. A great number of member states have chosen to introduce a comprehen- sive prohibition against discrimination. Comprehensive non-discrimination legislation refers to non-discrimination legislation which covers several grounds of discrimination (for example sex or gender, race, religion or belief, age, disability, sexual orientation, gender identity or other status) and provides protection against discrimination on these grounds in several different fi elds (for example employment, access to goods and services, education, social security and health care). For the purposes of this chapter, national non-discrimination legislation is described as comprehensive when more grounds than sex and race are covered and when the material scope is extended beyond the fi elds of employment and access to goods and services. Comprehensive non-discrimination legislation can be distinguished from non-discrimination legislation which is specifi c to a particular fi eld, such as non-discrimination legislation which only applies in the fi eld of employ- ment. This will be referred to in this chapter as sectoral non-discrimination legislation. Third, specialised legislation in different fi elds may also include non-discrimination provisions, although such legislation does not directly amount to non-discrimination legislation. Comprehensive non-discrimination legislation Twenty member states have enacted comprehensive non-discrimination legislation which explicitly includes sexual orientation among the prohib- ited grounds of discrimination. This is the case in Albania, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Montenegro, the Netherlands, Norway, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. 93. Ettelbrick P. L. and Zerán A. T., The Impact of the Yogyakarta Principles on International Human Rights Law Development. A Study of November 2007 – June 2010, Final Report, 2010, p. 12. 42 | Discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity in Europe Nine member states (Albania, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, Montenegro, Serbia, Sweden and the United Kingdom) have included gender identity explicitly in comprehensive non-discrimination legislation. However, no standard wording is currently followed to cover gender identity in these member states, which may imply signifi cant differ- ences as to the legal scope of these terms.94 At least 11 member states treat discrimination on grounds of gender identity or gender reassignment as a form of sex or gender discrimination in comprehensive non-discrimination legislation (Andorra, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Slovakia and Switzerland), while Sweden95 has chosen a multiple formulation to describe the applicable ground. In the remaining 27 member states the situation regarding coverage of transgender persons under comprehensive non-discrimination legislation is unclear. These 27 member states include many European Union member states which, under European Union law, should provide protection against discrimination in the fi elds of employment and access to and supply of goods and services to a person who intends to undergo or has undergone gender reassignment as a form of sex or gender discrimination. However, the FRA has pointed out that the Gender Recast Directive has not yet led to a clear picture regarding the explicit coverage of transgender persons within the realm of non-discrimi- nation legislation in these European Union member states.96 Finally, it should be noted that in member states where sexual orienta- tion or gender identity are not explicitly mentioned as prohibited grounds in comprehensive non-discrimination legislation, these grounds may still be covered under “other status” (non-exhaustive list of grounds), possibly explicitly recognised through case law. However, in many other countries this is not clear because case law on discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity is scarce. Sectoral non-discrimination legislation Several member states which have not enacted comprehensive non-discrim- ination legislation which prohibits discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation have enacted sectoral non-discrimination legislation which provides protection on the ground of sexual orientation in the fi elds of employment and/or access to goods and services. Sexual orientation is an 94. Instead of “gender identity” the legislation in these nine member states may refer to “gender expression”, “gender identifi cation”, “transgender identity”, “gender change”, “gender reassignment” or “sexual identity”. In Spain, the Constitutional Court established that gender identity is to be read in among the prohibited grounds of discrimination. See European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, “Homophobia, Transphobia and Discrimination on Grounds of Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity: 2010 Update – Comparative Legal Analysis”, Vienna, 2010, pp. 21-23. 95. Legislation in Sweden prohibits discrimination on grounds of “transgender identity and expression” and also recognises discrimination of transsexual persons under the ground of “sex”. 96. European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, “Homophobia, Transphobia and Discrimination on Grounds of Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity. 2010 Update-Comparative Legal Analysis”, 2010, pp. 21-22. Legal standards and their implementation | 45 Data on cases of discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation or gender identity Despite the adoption of non-discrimination legislation in many Council of Europe member states, it has been diffi cult to identify comprehensive data on the application of such laws. This report identifi ed a number of court cases related to alleged discrimination of LGBT persons either under non-discrimi- nation legislation or other legal provisions as well as complaints submitted to national structures promoting equality. Such information on sexual orienta- tion or gender identity discrimination has been identifi ed in 31 member states in the period 2004 to 2010: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Malta, Moldova, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania, the Russian Federation, Serbia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine and the United Kingdom.101 Cases reported by NGOs (but not offi cially reported by the victim to national structures promoting equality or court) are not included in this list of countries. Statistics are often not available or not disaggregated by area of discrimina- tion or on the prohibited ground. The lack of information on case law related to discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation or gender identity in the remaining 16 member states may partly be ascribed to the fact that the laws are relatively new for some member states. Other reasons reported by inter- locutors include the widespread anti-LGBT public discourse; a lack of aware- ness raising and training of offi cials in the area of non-discrimination and the lack of trust in authorities and the judiciary by LGBT victims of discrimina- tion. Moreover, LGBT victims of discrimination often do not want to run the risk of exposure brought about by reporting a case to relevant authorities. 2.4. National structures for promoting equality National structures for promoting equality are bodies created by statute to promote equality and combat discrimination at member state level. They are usually established under non-discrimination legislation and should carry out their functions independently of all stakeholders, including the state. There is a broad diversity of national structures for promoting equality across the member states. This diversity is particularly evident in the legal structure of the bodies, in the range of grounds that they cover, in the nature of the func- tions and powers accorded to the bodies, and in the scale of operations of the bodies. Some of these structures are referred to as national equality bodies, others are ombudsmen or national human rights institutions. There are two broad types of national structures for promoting equality. There are quasi-judicial type bodies which predominantly operate to investigate, hear or mediate, and make fi ndings in relation to claims of discrimination. There are also promotional type bodies that predominantly operate to provide assistance to individuals experiencing discrimination and to implement a broader range 101. (FRA) national contributions (legal reports) contain annexes with descriptions on court cases identifi ed in the member states. 46 | Discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity in Europe of awareness-raising initiatives, survey work and activities supporting good practice. Some national structures have the characteristics of both types. Within the Council of Europe, the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) has called on national authorities to set up specifi c national bodies to combat racism, xenophobia, anti-Semitism and other forms of intolerance. ECRI Policy Recommendations No. 2 and No. 7 set out basic principles as guidelines for the establishment and operation of such bodies which should be set up on a constitutional or statutory basis.102 The Commissioner for Human Rights has issued an Opinion on National Structures for Promoting Equality which gives guidance to member states on enacting comprehensive equal treatment legislation and setting up independent bodies for promoting equality.103 Under European Union law, three equality directives (the Race Equality Directive, the Gender Goods and Services Directive and the Gender Recast Directive) require member states of the European Union to establish or desig- nate a body or bodies for the promotion of equal treatment on the grounds of racial or ethnic origin and gender. Although the European Union provi- sions for establishing equality bodies are limited to race, ethnic origin and gender, several European Union and other member states have enacted non- discrimination legislation and established national structures for promoting equality that clearly go beyond the minimum requirements stipulated by European Union legislation. In practice, most equality bodies set up through the implementation of European Union equality directives also cover either all or some of the grounds stipulated in the Employment Equality Directive, including sexual orientation and in some cases gender identity as well. Equality bodies in 21 European Union countries are vested with the mandate to receive complaints of discrimination on many grounds, including on the grounds of sexual orientation: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal104, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden and the United Kingdom. The other six European Union member states do not have any equality body formally competent to address discrimi- nation on grounds of sexual orientation (the Czech Republic, Finland, Italy, Malta,105 Poland and Spain). However, in four of these, another national human rights structure promoting equality (for example, an ombudsman institution) 102. European Commission against Racism and Intolerance, General Policy Recommendation No. 2 on specialised bodies to combat racism, xenophobia, anti-Semitism and intolerance at national level, adopted on 13 June 1997, CRI(97)36; and General Policy Recommendation No. 7 on national legislation to combat racism and racial discrimina- tion, adopted on 13 December 2002, CRI(2003)8. 103. Commissioner for Human Rights, “Opinion on National Structures for Promoting Equality”, CommDH(2011)2. 104. In Portugal, the Commission for Citizenship and Gender Equality is the co-ordinating body for implementation of the National Plan for Equality: Gender, Citizenship and Non-Discrimination 2011-13. Relevant references are found on pp. 2, 308 and 314-15 of this plan. 105. However, in Malta the National Commission for the Promotion of Equality (NCPE) has initiated a qualitative study on discrimination experienced by LGBT persons. Legal standards and their implementation | 47 competent to receive complaints about discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation is in place (the Czech Republic, Finland, Poland and Spain). As regards the ground of gender identity, the situation is quite varied. At least four equality bodies (Hungary, Slovakia, Sweden and the United Kingdom) have an explicit mandate to cover gender identity as a ground of discrimina- tion. The Commission for Citizenship and Gender Equality in Portugal has also recently started to incorporate issues of gender identity in its activities. In many other countries gender identity may be covered, at least partially, through the ground of sex or gender in line with European Union law. In some countries gender identity may also be addressed among the unspecifi ed grounds of open- ended lists of discrimination grounds in national equal treatment legislation. In a survey on national equality bodies conducted by the European Network of Equality Bodies (Equinet) in 2009, some 25% of the bodies reported that they, in one way or another, actually received and treated complaints related to discrimination on the ground of gender identity.106 Under European Union law, more equality bodies should join to carry out such work. In other member states of the Council of Europe there may be different bodies dealing with different grounds of discrimination or bodies with separate functions respecting a division into promotional and quasi-judicial functions. Many of these institutions are ombudsman bodies or national human rights institutions with the mandate to protect and promote human rights, including non-discrimination, with reference to the Paris Principles.107 Some of them also deal with issues or incidents related to sexual orientation and gender identity. For example in Croatia, the Offi ce of the People’s Ombudsman and the Ombudsperson for Gender Equality are mandated to receive complaints on the grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity under the non-discrimination legislation. In Norway, the Equality and Anti-Discrimination Ombud has the power both to promote equality in society and to enforce non-discrimination legislation, including by treating individual complaints within and outside the labour market with regard to a wide range of discrimination grounds. Sexual orientation is covered as an explicit discrimination ground, whereas gender identity is currently addressed though the ground of gender. Adoption of new non-discrimination legislation in some member states means that new equality bodies are in the process of being established with a mandate to enforce and monitor the implementation of the legislation. These include the Commissioner for Protection against Discrimination in Albania and the Commissioner for Protection from Discrimination in Serbia. Both of them have an explicit mandate to address discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity. 106. Equinet, “Making Equality Legislation work for Trans people”, 2010, p. 7. 107. Principles relating to the Status of National Institutions (the Paris Principles), UN General Assembly Resolution 48/134 of 20 December 1993. 48 | Discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity in Europe National structures for promoting equality possess great potential for dealing with complaints on grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity as well as promoting the enjoyment of human rights by LGBT persons more generally. However, awareness of these possibilities should be enhanced among LGBT communities as well as within national structures themselves. The Human Rights Defender of Armenia, for example, noted that his offi ce receives a large number of complaints about discrimination from minorities but has not regis- tered any from LGBT persons. He concludes that this “is the best proof that the problem is bigger than assumed and well hidden”.108 Many LGBT NGOs interviewed for this study expressed the view that national structures were not suffi ciently active in this fi eld. Although an increasing number of equality bodies, ombudsmen and national human rights institu- tions appear to work on questions related to sexual orientation and homo- phobia, even more efforts are needed to initiate work to address discrimination on grounds of gender identity. 2.5. National policy initiatives Action plans and policy initiatives Some member states have chosen to integrate the human rights of LGBT persons into general national action plans for human rights and equality. For example in Sweden, the National Action Plan for Human Rights 2006- 2009109 included 135 measures, some of which focused on promoting the enjoyment of human rights by LGBT persons. In Portugal, the National Plan for Equality for the fi rst time has a chapter on sexual orientation and gender identity.110 Other member states have set up specifi c national policies or action plans to improve the human rights situation of LGBT persons in their countries. Such initiatives were identifi ed in Norway,111 Belgium112 and the Netherlands.113 In the Netherlands, the policy plan “Simply Gay” constitutes a national action plan encompassing 60 different measures, including 24 projects sponsored or implemented by various government departments. This “mainstreaming” approach aims to ensure that LGBT human rights are taken into account when drafting general equality and human rights policies. Public policies are also developed and implemented by local or regional authorities. The city councils of Cologne, Turin and Barcelona have devel- oped policies focused on fi ghting homophobia and transphobia under 108. National contribution (sociological report) on Armenia, p. 11. 109. Swedish Government Communication 2005/06:95. 110. National Plan for Equality: Gender, Citizenship and Non-Discrimination 2011-13, Lisbon, 2011, pp. 314-15. 111. Norwegian Ministry of Children and Equality, “The Norwegian Government’s action plan – Improving quality of life among lesbians, gays, bisexuals, and transgender persons, 2009-2012”, Oslo, 2008. 112. LGBT Policy in Flanders – a brief introduction, Flemish Government, Brussels, 2010. 113. Emancipatienota ‘Gewoon homo zijn’, Parliamentary Papers II 2007-2008, 27017, No. 3. Legal standards and their implementation | 49 the project Against Homophobia European local Administration Devices (AHEAD). The objective of this project is the preparation of a White Book that collects recommendations and good practices to foster local public policies aimed at fi ghting discrimination on grounds of sexual orienta- tion and gender identity. Similar local or regional policies have also been developed in Berlin, Ghent, Antwerp, and Dumfries and Galloway.114 In the Netherlands, national government funding is provided through a national expertise centre, which assists civil servants in 18 municipalities to devise policies which aim to improve attitudes towards LGBT people. Policy initiatives should ideally have a solid knowledge base. A few exam- ples of research commissioned by public authorities in Council of Europe member states were identifi ed during the study. In the Netherlands, research in different subject areas is commissioned to centres of expertise.115 Two surveys about safety at schools for LGB persons were also conducted by the Netherlands Inspectorate of Schools.116 In Belgium, the Flemish Policy Research Centre on Equal Opportunities carries out scientifi c research on equal opportunities issues, which includes a specifi c line of research on LGBT persons. The University of Ghent and the Flemish authorities’ Equal Opportunities Assistance Centre have carried out a study into the school careers of LGB persons.117 In Italy in 2008 the Minister of Equal Opportunities signed an agreement with the National Statistics Offi ce to carry out the fi rst multipurpose survey regarding “Discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation, identity and ethnicity”.118 Governments may also rely on research conducted in co-operation with national structures for promoting equality and develop specifi c activi- ties based on the outcome of such research. For example, in the United Kingdom the Scottish Government and the Equality and Human Rights Commission have commissioned a discrimination module as part of the Scottish Social Attitudes Survey, which is conducted every four years. The survey includes questions on attitudes towards lesbian, gay and bisexual people and, since 2006, transgender people.119 In Germany the Federal 114. “Building a Network – Roundtable of Local Focal Points LGBT Equality Policies – Rainbow cities”, The Hague, 27 October 2010. 115. Research is, for example, conducted in the area of family law (annual statistics about registered partner- ships and civil marriages of same-sex couples) collected by the National Statistics Institute, CBS; the Annual National Monitor of criminal cases of discrimination against LGBT persons reported to the Police; further research conducted by the Netherlands Institute for Social Research, SCP and the Netherlands Centre for Social Development, MOVISIE. 116. Netherlands Inspectorate of Schools, Weerbaar en divers, Onderzoek naar seksuele diversiteit en seksuele weerbaarheid in het onderwijs. Anders zijn is van iedereen, 26 February 2009. 117. Dewaele, Cox, Van Houtte & Vincke, De schoolloopbaan van holebi- en heterojongeren. Steunpunt Gelijkekansenbeleid, University Antwerp – University Hasselt, University Ghent. Antwerp, 2008. 118. FRA national contribution (legal report) on Italy, p. 6. 119. Bromley C., Curtice J. and Given L., “Equalities: Research Findings No.1/2007: Attitudes to Discrimination in Scotland 2006: Scottish Social Attitudes Survey”, Scottish Centre for Social Research, 2007, Edinburgh; Ormston R., McConville S and Reid S., “Scottish Social Attitudes 2010”, Scottish Centre for Social Research, 2010, Edinburgh. 50 | Discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity in Europe Anti-Discrimination Agency published research on discrimination against transgender people in working life.120 Co-ordination and consultation structures Some member states have set up specifi c co-ordination and consultation structures within their national administrations regarding LGBT-related policy and legislative initiatives. In Estonia, the Gender Equality Department of the Ministry of Social Affairs has, since 2009, consulted with different LGBT organisations and worked on increasing competence in the fi eld. In Poland, the Department for Women, Family and Counteracting Discrimination of the Polish Ministry of Labour and Social Policy set up an Advisory Committee which included experts on the issue of discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation.121 In Ukraine, the Ministry of the Interior has set up public councils in all regions of the country, in which representatives from civil society and local police offi cers discuss relevant human rights. The Ukrainian NGO Our World was a member of such a council in the Kiev district, and the NGO For Equal Rights was a member in the Kherson district.122 Interdepartmental structures were also identifi ed in the Netherlands (“LGBT interdepartmental working group”) and the Czech Republic, where a Committee for Sexual Minorities continues the work of a previous working group which made a detailed analysis of the situation of lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender minorities.123 Co-ordination and consultations on national LGBT policies between many member states of the Council of Europe also take place in the European Network of Governmental LGBT Focal Points, which has included govern- ment representatives from 23 member states. 120. Federal Anti-Discrimination Agency, Benachteiligung von Trans Personen, insbesondere im Arbeitsleben, Berlin, 2010. 121. FRA national contribution (legal report) on Poland, p. 84. 122. National contribution on Ukraine (sociological report), p. 8-9. 123. Working Group on the Issues of Sexual Minorities of the Minister for Human Rights and National Minorities, “Analysis of the Situation of the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender Minorities in the Czech Republic”, 2007. Protection: violence and asylum | 51 3. Protection: violence and asylum 3.1. Introduction There is a growing amount of evidence demonstrating that a signifi cant number of LGBT persons in Council of Europe member states experience physical violence, harassment or assault because of their real or perceived sexual orientation and gender identity. Such violence may take different forms but is often driven by deep hatred, intolerance, disapproval or rejection of the sexual orientation or gender identity of the person. A commonly used term in this regard is “hate crime” or “hate-motivated violence”, which may be fuelled by speech and public expressions which spread, incite, promote or justify hatred, discrimination or hostility towards LGBT people. Such speech can be expressed by fellow citizens, but also by political and religious leaders or other opinion makers, whether circulated by the press or the Internet. Sometimes state actors are involved in violence or harassment against LGBT persons, and in some instances family members. Violence against LGBT persons is often not recognised and frequently ignored as a problem. The majority of member states of the Council of Europe have no explicit legal basis which recognises sexual orientation and gender identity in hate crime legislation. The Committee of Ministers has emphasised the need for effective protection from hate crimes and other hate-motivated incidents.124 When violence or cumulative harassment, assault or other forms of harm reach a particular severity and threshold, LGBT persons may decide to fl ee their home town or even their country. There are many countries outside Europe where LGBT persons face serious human rights violations and perse- cution, including those due to criminalisation of consensual same-sex acts. In approximately 76 countries worldwide laws are in force which prohibit consen- sual same-sex sexual acts between adults.125 In seven countries the death penalty is applied to homosexuals (Iran, Mauritania, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, United Arab Emirates and Yemen). In this regard, a joint statement was delivered in December 2008 at the United Nations General Assembly condemning killings, torture and arbitrary arrests of LGBT persons and other human rights violations.126 The statement was supported by 67 states, including 41 member states of the Council of Europe. Some 85 states sponsored a similar statement in March 2011 at the UN Human Rights Council, among which were 43 Council of Europe member states.127 124. Committee of Ministers Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)5 on measures to combat discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation or gender identity, adopted on 31 March 2010, paragraphs 1-5. 125. ILGA, “State-Sponsored Homophobia: A World Survey of Laws Prohibiting Same-Sex Activity Between Consenting Adults”, May 2010, p. 4. 126. General Assembly, Sixty-third session, Agenda item 64(b), 22 December 2008, A/63/635, Promotion and protec- tion of human rights: human rights questions, including alternative approaches for improving the effective enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms. 127. United Nations, Human Rights Council, 16th session, Agenda item 8, 22 March 2011, Follow-up and implemen- tation of the Vienna Declaration and Program of Action. 52 | Discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity in Europe 3.2. Violence against LGBT persons Hate-motivated violence and hate crimes against LGBT persons take place in all Council of Europe member states.128 Expert reports conclude that “homo- phobic hate crimes and incidents often show a high degree of cruelty and brutality. … They are also very likely to result in death. Transgender people seem to be even more vulnerable within this category.”129 Such attacks often occur in public places and include attacks on LGBT venues, such as attacks on gay discos or on the premises of LGBT organisations. Attacks may also happen in the street when gay, bisexual or lesbian couples simply hold hands as a sign of affection for each other. Attacks which result in death, or outright murders, are not uncommon either. National legislation in Council of Europe member states The incitement of hatred, violence or discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation is considered as a criminal offence in only 18 member states (Andorra, Belgium, Croatia, Denmark, Estonia, France, Iceland, Ireland, Lithuania, Monaco, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom130). Similarly, homophobic intent is accepted as an aggravating factor in common crimes in only 15 member states: Andorra, Belgium, Croatia, Denmark, France, Greece, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. In only two member states is gender identity or transphobic hate crime explicitly addressed in hate crime legislation (see Map 3.1).131 In the remaining member states sexual orientation and/or homophobic motivation are neither a criminal offence nor an aggravating factor. However, several of these states have provisions in the criminal law that could include hate crime or hate speech against LGBT persons under defi nitions such as “other population group” or “any social group”.132 128. Poelman M. and Smits D., “Agressie tegen holebi’s in Brussel-Stad”, Apeldoorn, Antwerp, 2007; Tiby E., “Hatbrott? Homosexuella kvinnor och mäns berättelser om utsatthet för brott”, Stockholms universitet Kriminologiska institutionen, 1999; MANEO – the gay Anti-Violence-Project in Berlin; Buijs L., Duyvendak J. W. and Hekma G., “Als ze maar van me afblijven”, Amsterdam School for Social Science Research, Amsterdam, 2008; Abramowicz M. (ed.), “Situation of bisexual and homosexual persons in Poland”, Kampania Przeciw Homofobii and Lambda Warsaw, 2007. 129. OSCE/ODIHR, “Hate Crimes in the OSCE Region – Incidents and Responses. Annual report for 2006”, OSCE/ ODIHR, Warsaw, 2007, p. 53. 130. England and Wales have a specifi c incitement criminal offence on grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity. They also have a homophobic intent statutory aggravation. Scotland has no specifi c incitement criminal offence on grounds of sexual orientation or gender identity but has both homophobic and transphobic statutory aggravations for common crime. 131. This overview is based on European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, “Homophobia, Transphobia and Discrimination on Grounds of Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity: 2010 Update – Comparative Legal Analysis”, 2010; OSCE/ODIHR, “Hate Crimes in the OSCE Region – Incidents and Responses. Annual Report for 2009”, Warsaw, 2010; national contributions (legal reports). 132. However, in four countries, provisions in the criminal law against incitement to hatred cannot be extended to LGBT persons as they are restricted to predefi ned groups only (Austria, Bulgaria, Italy and Malta). Source: European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, “Homophobia, Transphobia and Discrimination on Grounds of Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity: 2010 Update – Comparative Legal Analysis”, 2010, pp. 42-43. 54 | Discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity in Europe are, as a rule, aware of the environment in general and the heteronormativity determining this environment.”133 Perpetrators of violent attacks against LGBT persons do so because of their rejec- tion of what they label as “visible” homosexuality or transgressing traditional gender roles. It is important to note that violence also happens against persons who are perceived to be LGBT even when they are not. The perpetrators are often unknown to the victim, though in some cases relatives or colleagues are the perpetrators. Lesbian women are more likely to be assaulted by older perpe- trators, often acting on their own, and often by somebody they know. In some instances, for example LGBT sex workers, the client could be the perpetrator. The perpetrators of anti-LGBT violence are primarily men and often young men in organised groups. Several interlocutors during the study linked the occurrence of hate crime against LGBT persons with broader nationalist, xenophobic or racist tendencies in society who attack anyone perceived as an outsider.134 In a few member states, among which the Netherlands and Germany, some public debate has taken place on alleged higher percentages of members of ethnic minority or migrant communities in committing hate- motivated incidents against LGBT persons. There is, however, no clear trend in this direction and research is scarce. However, these reports have contrib- uted to understanding some of the motives of perpetrators.135 Violence, harassment and the collection of sensitive private data by state actors Interlocutors in some member states reported incidents of violence and harassment against LGBT persons perpetrated by state actors.136 In Turkey harassment and violence towards LGB and especially transgender persons in Istanbul, Ankara, Mersin and Eskisehir was fl agged as a major concern by several interlocutors, including in a report published by the Istanbul Provincial Human Rights Board.137 133. Švab A. and Kuhar R., The Unbearable Comfort of Privacy: Everyday Life of Gays and Lesbians, Politike: Ljubljana, 2005, pp. 95-96, also quoted in European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA), “Homophobia and Discrimination on Grounds of Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity in the European Union Member States: Part II – The Social Situation”, 2009, p. 35. 134. European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, “Homophobia and Discrimination on Grounds of Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity in the EU Member States: Part II – The Social Situation”, 2009, p. 42; National contribution (socio- logical report) on Serbia, p. 7; National contribution (sociological report) on Russian Federation, pp. 25-26. 135. For example Buijs L., Duyvendak, J. W. and Hekma G., “Als ze maar van me afblijven”, Amsterdam: Universiteit van Amsterdam, Amsterdam School for Social Science Research, 2008. 136. FRA national contribution (sociological report) on Greece, pp. 5, 11; FRA national contribution (sociological report) on Romania, p. 5; national contribution (sociological report) on Albania, p. 8; national contribution (sociological report) on Armenia, pp. 3, 9-11; national contribution (sociological report) on Georgia, pp. 8-10; national contribution (sociological report) on “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”, pp. 8-9; national contribution (sociological report) on Moldova, pp. 8, 12-13; national contribution (sociological report) on Serbia, pp. 9-10; national contribution (sociological report) on Turkey, pp. 7, 9-12; national contribution (sociological report) on Ukraine, p. 16. 137. Report of TC Istanbul Valiliği, Sayı B054VLK4340300/521/3764; National contribution (sociological report) on Turkey, p. 11; Human Rights Watch, “We Need a Law for Liberation” – Gender, Sexuality, and Human Rights in Changing Turkey”, May 2008, p. 75. Protection: violence and asylum | 55 In some member states NGOs reported that law-enforcement agencies have kept records on a person’s sexual orientation. For example, in Austria and the United Kingdom police have kept databases of gay and bisexual men who were convicted in the past for consensual, although then illegal, same-sex acts. These records are still visible on criminal records and may show up, for example when employers check the credentials of job applicants. Whereas in the United Kingdom this has led to the introduction of legislation remedying this situation138 some Austrian citizens have fi led complaints at the European Court of Human Rights.139 In Ukraine, NGO reports document experiences of Ukrainian gay men who were arrested in a park late at night, subsequently photographed by police and had their fi ngerprints taken.140 In a pending case before the European Court of Human Rights an applicant from Romania claims he has been detained, questioned, photographed and fi ngerprinted because of his homo- sexuality.141 Again in Ukraine, during the investigation of a criminal case connected with the murder of a gay man, NGO reports refer to the police raiding the gay club “Androgin” in Kiev during the night of 10 to 11 April 2009. Over 80 people were allegedly detained and taken to a police station. Some people reported rude and abusive treatment by police offi cers and also claimed that the offi cers used force against them. At the police station, the offi cers took fi ngerprints and photos of those detained.142 These reports come six years after the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe invited the Ukrainian authorities “to investigate allegations of police harass- ment of the lesbian and gay community and to take disciplinary action as appropriate”.143 In Azerbaijan during 2009 police raided bars which LGBT persons visit and arrested almost 50 people. Police reportedly held the individuals and threat- ened to expose their sexual orientation publicly unless they paid a bribe.144 A fi lm documentary from Azerbaijan in which several people testify about their experiences also points to such incidents of blackmail.145 UN treaty bodies and UN special rapporteurs have, in relation to Azerbaijan, the Russian Federation and Turkey, urged these states to end acts of violence 138. The UK Government has introduced the Protection of Freedoms Bill which, among other issues, will expunge convictions for now-legal consensual same-sex sex from criminal records. 139. European Court of Human Rights, F.J. v. Austria, Application No.  2362/08, case pending; E.B. v. Austria, Application No. 26271/08, case pending; H.G. v. Austria, Application No. 48098/07, case pending. 140. Nash Mir, “Overview of LGBT human rights situation in Ukraine in 2010”, Kiev, Ukraine, p. 5. 141. European Court of Human Rights, Adrian Costin Georgescu v. Romania, Application No. 4867/03, case pending. 142. Ukraine national contribution (legal report) p. 40. 143. Resolution 1346 (2003), Honouring of obligations and commitments by Ukraine, adopted by the Assembly on 29 September 2003 (27th Sitting), paragraph 8, iii. 144. US Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, US Department of State “Human Rights Report: Azerbaijan”, 2009, section 1, paragraph c. 145. ILGA-Europe and COC Netherlands, “Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person”. Documentary. 56 | Discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity in Europe and harassment by the police against LGBT persons.146 In some instances LGBT human rights defenders have been a target of such harassment and violence. The UN Special Representative on the situation of human rights defenders pointed out in 2007 that “In numerous cases … police or government offi - cials are the alleged perpetrators of violence and threats against defenders of LGBTI rights. In several of these cases … police offi cers have, allegedly, beaten up or even sexually abused these defenders of LGBTI rights.” The Special Representative reminded states of their responsibility for protecting defenders against violence and threats.147 Violence in the family While many LGBT persons meet acceptance and respect in the family, many others may have to hide their sexual orientation from family members because they are afraid of bad repercussions. Systematically collected data on the scale of the problem are unavailable, but NGOs report the following: in France, 16% of LGB persons reported they had been beaten at home by homophobic family members.148 Homophobic violence in the family was also reported by lesbian and bisexual women in, among others, Georgia149 and Azerbaijan.150 Transgender people in Moldova reported151 beatings from their fathers in an attempt to “cure” them and similar reports came from other coun- tries. A survey in Scotland (United Kingdom) found 73% of the respondents experiencing at least one type of transphobic emotionally abusive behaviour from a partner or ex-partner; 47% of respondents had experienced some form of sexual abuse from a partner or ex-partner; 17% threatening behaviour; 11% physical violence; and 4% sexual abuse.152 An NGO report on Azerbaijan in 2009 stated that the “most frank displays of violence against lesbian and bisexual women occur in the home, and include verbal and physical abuse, confi nement indoors, compulsion, compulsory marriage” as well as the threat of crimes to avenge family honour.153 The prevalence of domestic violence against LGBT persons is diffi cult to assess, but LGBT NGOs described family pressure, harassment, control and, in some cases, violence as invisible or under-reported. More research is needed to identify the level of violence or 146. See Concluding Observations on Azerbaijan, CCPR/C/AZE/CO/3, 13 August 2009, paragraph 19; Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the situation of human rights defenders, Addendum: Summary of cases transmitted to Governments and replies received, A/HRC/10/12/ADD.1, 4 March 2009, paragraphs 2574-2577 (Turkey); Concluding Observations on Russian Federation, CCPR/C/RUS/CO/6, 29 October 2009, paragraph 27. 147. Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the situation of human rights defenders, A/HRC/4/37, 24 January 2007, paragraph 96. 148. National contribution (sociological report) on France, p. 6. 149. National contribution (sociological report) on Georgia, p. 11. 150. “The Violations of the Rights of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender Persons in Azerbaijan – A Shadow Report”, submitted to the UN Human Rights Committee, July 2009, p. 13. 151. National contribution (sociological report) on Moldova, p. 14. 152. Roch A., Ritchie G. and Morton J., “Out of Sight, Out of Mind? Transgender People’s Experience of Domestic Abuse”, Scotland: LGBT Youth Scotland, Equality Network, 2010, p. 5. 153. “The Violations of the Rights of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender Persons in Azerbaijan – A Shadow Report”, submitted to the UN Human Rights Committee, July 2009, p. 13. Protection: violence and asylum | 57 rejection LGBT people experience in their families. A positive recent devel- opment in this regard is the adopted Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence, as it will also apply to lesbian, bisexual and transgender women.154 Hate speech Speech which is likely to incite, spread or promote hatred against LGBT persons may create a climate where hate-motivated violence against them becomes an accepted phenomenon. While Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights guarantees the freedom of expression, this right is not abso- lute. Restrictions are permitted on speech or other expressions which incite to xenophobia, anti-Semitism and the like155 as such speech is incompatible with the values proclaimed and guaranteed by the Convention. Two Committee of Ministers’ recommendations156 as well as the Council of Europe’s White Paper on Intercultural Dialogue157 call on the member states to take steps to combat speech which are likely to produce the effect of inciting, spreading or promoting hatred or discrimination. In Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)5, the Committee of Ministers points to the fact that a “specifi c responsibility is vested with the public authorities and offi cials to refrain from statements that may be understood as legitimising hatred or discrimination and to promote tolerance and respect for their human rights”.158 The Commissioner for Human Rights has publicly spoken out against hate speech on numerous occasions.159 During the research for this report numerous examples of often strong hate expressions were identifi ed in Council of Europe member states. For example in relation to attempts to organise a Pride march in the Russian Federation a regional governor was quoted as saying: “Tolerance?! Like Hell! Faggots should be torn apart. And their pieces should be thrown in the wind.”160 In 2009, when organisers of a Gay Pride event in Serbia held a press conference, protestors outside were reportedly shouting: “Faggots, we will kill you.”161 In Bosnia and 154. The convention was opened for signature in Istanbul on 11 May 2011. 155. See, for example, European Court of Human Rights, Incal v. Turkey, Application No.  22678/93, judgment of 8 June 1998. 156. Committee of Ministers Recommendation No.  R (97) 20 on “hate speech”, adopted on 30 October 1997; Committee of Ministers Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)5 on measures to combat discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation or gender identity, paragraphs 6-8. 157. The Council of Europe White Paper on Intercultural Dialogue “Living Together As Equals in Dignity”, section 5.1, 2008. 158. Committee of Ministers Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)5 on measures to combat discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation or gender identity, paragraphs 6-8. 159. Viewpoint, “Homophobic policies are slow to disappear”, 16 May 2007; Viewpoint, “Gay Pride marches should be allowed – and protected”, 24 July 2006. 160. Statement of Mr Betin, Governor of the Tambov Region, as quoted in ILGA-Europe, “Human Rights + Responsibility + Respect. A contribution to the Council of Europe conference: Human Rights in Culturally Diverse Societies: challenges and perspectives”, p. 3; GayRussia.ru, 29 July 2008, “Activists intend to take the case to courts up to Strasbourg”. 161. Human Rights Watch, Letter to the President of the Republic of Serbia, 16 November 2009. 58 | Discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity in Europe Herzegovina, a YouTube clip was posted representing a direct death threat to one of the organisers of the Queer Sarajevo Festival in 2008, depicting her being beheaded. The latter situation led the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders, together with the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, to send a communication to the Bosnian authorities.162 A commu- nication was also sent by the Special Rapporteur to the Bulgarian authorities on 27 June 2008 regarding a Gay Pride Parade scheduled to take place in Sofi a the day after, expressing her serious concerns for “speech which may incite hatred’’.163 Other examples of web-based hate groups were reported from Latvia and Portugal. 164 The European Court of Human Rights has shown little tolerance for hate statements, in particular when they are used by authorities as an argument for defending a ban on a Gay Pride march. In the landmark case Alekseyev v. Russia165 the Court stated: As regards any statements calling for violence and inciting offences against the partici- pants in a public event, such as those by a Muslim cleric from Nizhniy Novgorod, who reportedly said that homosexuals must be stoned to death …, as well as any isolated incidents of threats of violence being put into practice, they could have adequately been dealt with through the prosecution of those responsible. However, it does not appear that the authorities in the present case reacted to the cleric’s call for violence in any other way than banning the event he condemned. By relying on such blatantly unlawful calls as grounds for the ban, the authorities effectively endorsed the inten- tions of persons and organisations that clearly and deliberately intended to disrupt a peaceful demonstration in breach of the law and public order.166 Data on violence against LGBT persons Offi cial data on the scale and nature of police violence against LGBT persons and family violence is scarce. Offi cial data on hate crimes and hate incidents are also scarce but data collected and published annually by the OSCE/ ODIHR show that 15 Council of Europe member states collect data on crimes committed against LGBT persons (Andorra, Belgium, Croatia, Cyprus, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Liechtenstein, the Netherlands, Norway, Serbia, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom).167 However, not all these 15 member 162. Communication by the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders and the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, 27 November 2008, referred to in Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity in Human Rights Law: Reference to Jurisprudence and Doctrine of the United Nations Human Rights System, 2010, p. 38. 163. Ibid., p. 39. 164. The Latvian NoPride Association and the Portuguese Partido Nacional Renovador. 165. European Court of Human Rights, Alekseyev v. Russia, Applications Nos. 4916/07, 25924/08 and 14599/09, judgment of 21 October 2010. 166. Ibid., paragraph 76. 167. OSCE/ODIHR, “Hate Crimes in the OSCE Region – Incidents and Responses. Annual Report for 2009”, Warsaw, 2010, pp. 18, 77-81. Protection: violence and asylum | 59 states actually provided data to ODIHR. In fact only four states (Germany, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom) submitted data on homophobic hate crimes to ODIHR and only two of those states, Sweden and the United Kingdom, submitted data fi gures on hate crimes committed against trans- gender persons. Some other member states provided information on incidents but did not have comprehensive data sets. Yet other member states, such as Finland, do collect data on hate crime but do not necessarily disaggre- gate according to the motive or target group,168 which makes it hard to get a complete overview of the scale of homophobic and transphobic hate crimes and hate incidents. It can be observed that the United Kingdom has the most comprehensive data collection system on hate crimes.169 In 2007, 988 criminal court cases were initiated against suspects of LGBT hate crimes; 759 persons were convicted, while in 2009 these fi gures had risen to 1 078 and 868 respec- tively.170 Norway reported that in 2009 it recorded 36 crimes committed against LGBT persons based on bias motivation.171 Germany reported that in 2009 it recorded 164 crimes motivated by a bias against sexual orienta- tion, 45 of which were violent crimes.172 In Sweden, in 2008, 1 055 hate crimes against LGB persons were recorded of which 1 046 had a homo- phobic motive. In the same year 14 crimes were recorded against trans- gender persons.173 In 2009, Sweden recorded 1 060 hate crimes against LGB persons of which 1 040 were homophobic crimes. In the same year the police recorded 30 hate crimes targeting transgender persons.174 Public authorities in Turkey counted seven murdered transgender persons in 2008 and 2009.175 One should, however, keep in mind that these fi gures cannot be easily compared. As the OSCE/ODIHR observes: “there is still a paucity of clear, reli- able and detailed data on the nature and scope of hate crimes in the OSCE area. … Even where statistics exist, they are not always disaggregated according to bias motivation, type of crime or outcome of prosecution. … Since different participating States keep statistics in different manners, it is also not possible to make comparative judgments on the extent of hate crimes.”176 Indeed, 168. FRA national contribution (legal report) on Finland, p. 10. 169. OSCE/ODIHR, “Hate Crimes in the OSCE Region – Incidents and Responses. Annual Report for 2007”, Warsaw, 2008. 170. FRA national contribution (legal report) for the United Kingdom, p. 100. 171. OSCE/ODIHR, “Hate Crimes in the OSCE Region – Incidents and Responses. Annual Report for 2009”, Warsaw, 2010, p. 79. 172. Ibid., p. 78. 173. OSCE/ODIHR, “Hate Crimes in the OSCE Region – Incidents and Responses. Annual Report for 2008”, Warsaw, 2009, p. 56. 174. OSCE/ODIHR, “Hate Crimes in the OSCE Region – Incidents and Responses. Annual Report for 2009”, Warsaw, 2010, p. 80. 175. Information provided by the Turkish authorities to the Offi ce of the Commissioner for Human Rights. Three convictions were found by the courts. 176. OSCE/ODIHR, “Hate Crimes in the OSCE Region – Incidents and Responses. Annual Report for 2009”, Warsaw, 2010, p.14. 60 | Discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity in Europe some data refer to the number of court cases initiated, other data refer to the number of persons convicted, and yet other data refer to hate crimes or hate incidents recorded or police reports registered. In addition to the data provided by member states additional information for this report has been identifi ed in studies carried out by NGOs or exper- tise centres.177 These studies argue that hate crimes and hate-motivated incidents against LGBT persons are experienced by signifi cant numbers of people. ILGA-Europe lists examples of hate killings against LGBT persons in the period 2005-2008 in the Netherlands, Portugal, the Russian Federation, Turkey and the United Kingdom.178 The Transgender Murder Monitoring Project of Transgender Europe recorded 36 hate killings in Council of Europe member states in the period 2008 to November 2010:179 Italy and Turkey (thirteen cases each), Spain (three cases), Germany and the United Kingdom (two cases each), Albania, Portugal and Serbia (one case each). Most of these victims were transgender women, and a signifi cant number of them worked as irregular migrants in the adult entertainment industry. In a 2008 report by London’s Metropolitan Police180 65% of lesbian and transgender women surveyed experienced incidents that they considered as homophobic or transphobic in nature. Nearly two thirds (64%) of the women having expe- rienced such incidents said they had a short-term or long-term impact on them. Of the incidents mentioned by these women, 83% went unreported to the police. Other studies in the United Kingdom181 provide similar accounts of experiences of harassment, physical or sexual abuse. In Sweden, a third of the transgender respondents in a survey reported that they had been the victim of violence, abuse or harassment at some point in their lives.182 Obstacles in understanding data on hate crime There are several obstacles regarding data on hate crime against LGBT persons: fi rst of all, the lack of a legal basis recognising sexual orientation and gender identity in hate crime legislation in a majority of member states. As the previous section described, only less than half of the member states have relevant criminal law provisions. Regarding gender identity, the lack of recog- nition of gender identity in hate crime legislation is even more worrisome. A second obstacle is the low number of victims who report a hate-motivated incident or a hate crime to the police. According to an NGO study in Poland, 177. For example “Geweld tegen homoseksuele mannen en lesbische vrouwen. Een literatuuronderzoek naar prak- tijk en bestrijding”. Movisie, Netherlands, 2009. 178. Submission to the Council of Europe Expert Committee: ILGA-Europe, “The Preparation of a Recommendation on Discrimination Based on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity”, February 2009, paragraph 57-59. 179. Transgender Europe, Trans Murder Monitoring project. 180. Metropolitan Police, “Women’s Experience of Homophobia and Transphobia: Survey Report”, London, 2008, p. 16. 181. Dick S., “Homophobic Hate Crime – The Gay British Crime Survey 2008”, Stonewall, 2008, p. 3; Turner L., Whittle S. and Combs R., “Transphobic Hate Crime in the European Union”, Press for Change, London, 2009, p. 18. 182. Statens Folkshälsoinstitut, “Homosexuellas, bisexuellas och transpersoners hälsosituation, Återrapportering av regeringsuppdrag att undersöka och analysera hälsosituationen bland hbt-personer”, FHI, Östersund, 2005, pp 41, 68. Protection: violence and asylum | 61 15% of hate incidents against LGBT persons are reported.183 In the United Kingdom this fi gure is 23% according to a NGO survey.184 Research confi rms that many victims of a hate crime do not report this because of fear of expo- sure of their sexual orientation or gender identity or because of a lack of trust in the judiciary.185 Others are reluctant to go to the police because they have previously encountered police offi cers being reluctant to believe in the existence of a homophobic motive for a crime or incident. In France, Greece, Hungary and Italy, more than half of the transgender respondents in a NGO hate crimes study were not confi dent of the police.186 Inactivity by the police in reply to transgender persons’ calls has also been reported, for example in Croatia.187 Anonymous reporting schemes have been initiated in the Netherlands, Denmark and Slovenia in an attempt to get a more realistic view of the scale of the problem.188 Hate incidents and hate crimes can be reported anony- mously on the Internet. Another tool is the “third party reporting system”, where victims or witnesses of hate crime can report the incidents online or by phone. Examples of such initiatives were identifi ed in France, Germany and the United Kingdom. A third obstacle is the lack of skills and awareness as well as concrete tools among law-enforcement agencies to register cases of hate crime. The element of hatred is not always recognised by the police when a victim reports the incident. Hate crimes may be seen as an act of “hooliganism” or bodily injury. If not registered by the police as such, the hate motivation is likely not to be considered as an aggravating factor during the investigation with the result that the homophobic or transphobic motive becomes indistinguishable during the prosecution of hate crime cases. For example, a study in Sweden189 and a NGO report on Turkey190 show that the bias motivation is sometimes not taken into account in the trial and sentencing. However, regarding Turkey, in 2007 a court recognised for the fi rst time an element of hate motivation and elements of prejudice in a relevant case.191 In another case in 2009 a Turkish 183. Abramowicz M. (ed.), “Situation of bisexual and homosexual persons in Poland”, Kampania Przeciw Homofobii & Lambda Warsaw, 2007, p. 15. 184. Dick S., “Homophobic Hate Crime – The Gay British Crime Survey 2008”, Stonewall, 2008. 185. European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, “Homophobia and Discrimination on Grounds of Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity in the EU Member States: Part II – The Social Situation”, 2009, pp. 43-45; national contribution (sociological report) on Armenia, p. 11; national contribution (sociological report) on Croatia, p. 9; national contribution (sociological report) on Georgia, p. 11; national contribution (sociological report) on Moldova, pp. 11-12; national contribution (sociological report) on Serbia, p. 10. 186. Turner L., Whittle S. and Combs R., “Transphobic Hate Crime in the European Union”, Press for Change, London, 2009, p. 55. 187. National contribution (legal report) on Croatia, p. 20. 188. Quoted in European Union Agency for Fundamental Human Rights, “Homophobia and Discrimination on Grounds of Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity in the European Union Member States: Part II – The Social Situation”, 2009, p. 43. 189. Tiby E., “En studie av homofoba hatbrott i Sverige”, Forum för levande historia, Stockholm, 2006, p. 11. 190. Human Rights Watch, “We need a Law for Liberation, Gender, Sexuality and Human Rights in a Changing Turkey”, 2008, pp. 24, 47. 191. Ankara 11th High Criminal Court, case number: 2007/250, decision number: 2008/246. 62 | Discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity in Europe court acknowledged that the perpetrator committed the crime with a homo- phobic or transphobic motivation.192 It should be recalled that the European Court of Human Rights has held that there is a positive obligation under the Convention for authorities to take all reasonable steps to uncover and estab- lish any bias motive in a crime as part of an effective investigation193 and to investigate and punish bias-motivated criminal acts. The OSCE/ODIHR designed the former Law Enforcement Offi cer Programme (LEOP) on combating hate crime, which has been piloted in Spain and Hungary, fully implemented in Croatia and in the process of full implementation in Poland and Bosnia and Herzegovina. The newly revised programme, Training Against Hate Crime for Law Enforcement (TAHCLE), is pending implementation in Bulgaria, pursuant to a signed agreement. A pilot project in nine European coun- tries (Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Latvia, Portugal, Romania, Sweden and the United Kingdom) has been set up to focus on how the police handle hate crime cases. The project has developed a toolkit for handling hate crimes, including a database for reporting, a website with information about hate crime, training material for police and information material for LGBT people.194 3.3. Asylum on the grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity Violence and hatred directed at LGBT persons may be of such severity and/or framed by an absence of state protection that LGBT persons see no other solution than to fl ee their country of origin. While most LGBT asylum seekers in Council of Europe member states come from outside the Council of Europe geographical area, there have also been incidental reports of refu- gees who have fl ed from one Council of Europe member state to another.195 While international and European human rights standards have been adopted in this fi eld, this chapter demonstrates that the implementation of these standards still faces serious obstacles. International standards When the situation in the home country amounts to a risk for LGBT persons to be subjected to persecution, including torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, they have the right to seek and enjoy 192. Ankara 6th High Criminal Court, decision of 15 October 2009. 193. These are positive obligations fl owing from Articles 2 and 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights read in conjunction with Article 14. European Court of Human Rights, Cobzaru v. Romania, Application No. 48254/99, judg- ment of 26 July 2007; Secic v. Croatia, Application No. 40116/02, judgment of 31 May 2007, and Angelova and Iliev v. Bulgaria, Application No. 55523/00, judgment of 26 July 2007. 194. The project website for Tracing and Tackling Hate Crimes against LGBT Persons: www.stophatecrime.eu. 195. For example, a refugee from the Russian Federation (Ingushetia) was granted asylum in Poland in 2007 on the ground of her sexual orientation (FRA national contribution (legal report) on Poland, p. 30). Another refugee from the same region was granted asylum in 2006 in France. In 2006 a citizen from Bosnia and Herzegovina was granted subsidiary protection in France (FRA national contribution (legal report) on France, p. 28). Protection: violence and asylum | 63 asylum in another country. This is enshrined in Article 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and further elaborated in the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees196 (hereafter the 1951 Convention) and its Protocol of 1967.197 States Parties to the 1951 Convention are prohibited from expelling or returning a refugee to a country (non-refoulement) where his or her life or freedom would be threatened. This is an obligation to ensure that asylum seekers are not returned or sent to a country where their life is threat- ened or where they face the risk of torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Complementary to refugee status is the subsidiary protec- tion in situations where the individual does not fulfi l the requirements for obtaining refugee status but is in need of international protection. Subsidiary protection may be invoked notably on grounds relating to the rights and freedoms contained in the UN Convention against Torture and other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment, the UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights or the European Convention on Human Rights. Member states of the Council of Europe also have the positive obligation under the European Convention on Human Rights to provide protection in order to guarantee the right to life (Article 2) and to prohibit torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (Article 3). Protection against refoule- ment is further granted under the ground of Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which thus goes beyond the mere scope of the 1951 Convention. As a well-established principle, the prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, includes an obliga- tion for contracting states not to expel a person to a country where there are substantial grounds to believe that that person will face a real risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3.198 Two cases in this regard are pending before the European Court of Human Rights.199 They involve a lesbian woman from Zimbabwe and a homosexual man from Iran who fear that they run the risk of being subjected to ill-treatment if returned to their countries of origin. The Committee of Ministers stressed the need for the member states bound by the 1951 Convention200 to recognise that a well-founded fear of persecu- 196. United Nations, Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, adopted on 28 July 1951 by the United Nations Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons convened under General Assembly Resolution 429(V) of 14 December 1950. 197. United Nations, Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, 606 U.N.T.S. 267, entered into force 4 October 1967. Of the 47 member states of the Council of Europe, 44 are parties to both the 1951 Convention and to the 1967 Protocol. Andorra and San Marino are not parties to the Convention and Monaco is party to the 1951 Convention only. 198. European Court of Human Rights, Soering v.  United Kingdom, Application No.  14038/88, judgment of 7 July 1989, Series A No. 161, p. 35, paragraph 88, and Chahal v. United Kingdom, Application No. 22414/93, judg- ment of 15 November 1996, paragraph 74. 199. European Court of Human Rights, D. B. N. v. United Kingdom, No. 26550/10, case pending; European Court of Human Rights, K. N. v. France, No. 47129/09, case pending. 200. United Nations, Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, adopted on 28 July 1951 by the United Nations Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons convened under General Assembly Resolution 429(V) of 14 December 1950. 64 | Discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity in Europe tion based on sexual orientation or gender identity may be a valid ground for granting refugee status and asylum. Finally, for European Union Member States, Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 on minimum standards for the qualifi cation and status of third country nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need international protection and the content of the protec- tion granted (hereafter the Qualifi cation Directive)201 applies. This direc- tive defi nes a “refugee” following the wording of the 1951 Convention, and provides for subsidiary protection.202 The formulation “member of a partic- ular social group” is spelled out in Article 10(1)(d) and explicitly mentions sexual orientation.203 Gender identity is not referred to in the Qualifi cation Directive but may be included under the ground of “membership of a partic- ular social group”, especially in light of the wording in Article 10(1)(d), which refers to “gender-related aspects”. The UN Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Forms of Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment204 and the UN Committee Against Torture205 have expressed concerns regarding the situation of LGBT asylum seekers. The UNHCR has released a Guidance Note on Refugee Claims Relating to Sexual Orientation or Gender Identity, which recognises that LGBT persons may fall within the refugee defi nition of the 1951 Convention if they have a well-founded fear of persecution, including serious abuse, discrimination and criminalisation.206 Whether or not a fear of persecu- tion is well founded should be assessed by authorities taking into account the statements of the claimant in the context of background information concerning the situation in the country of origin.207 The concept of perse- cution involves serious human rights violations, including a threat to life or freedom, as well as other serious harm. A pattern of harassment and discrimination could, on cumulative grounds, also reach the threshold of persecution.208 While sexual orientation or gender identity are not explic- itly addressed in the list of grounds of the 1951 Convention, the UNHCR Guidance Note maintains that these two grounds may be subsumed under the grounds of “political opinion”, “religion” or “membership of a particular social group”.209 For the purposes of granting refugee status to LGBT asylum 201. Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004. 202. Cf. Article 2(e) and Article 15. 203. Cf. Article 10(1)(d). 204. UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/59/324, 1 September 2004, paragraph 39. 205. UN Committee against Torture, General Comment No. 2 on implementation of Article 2 by states parties, 2007, paragraph 21. 206. UNHCR, Guidance Note on Refugee Claims Relating to Sexual Orientation or Gender Identity, 21 November 2008, paragraph 3. 207. UNHCR, “Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees” (paragraphs 42-43), HCR/IP/4/Eng/REV.1. Reedited, Geneva, January 1992. 208. UNHCR, “Guidance Note on Refugee Claims Relating to Sexual Orientation or Gender Identity”, 21 November 2008, paragraph 10. 209. Ibid., paragraphs 29-32. Protection: violence and asylum | 65 seekers, it is particularly the ground of “membership of a particular social group” that is increasingly applied in cases.210 National legislation and data on LGBT asylum and refugee cases Twenty-six member states have explicitly recognised in their national legis- lation that sexual orientation is included in the notion of “membership of a particular social group” (Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Moldova, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden). In the other member states there is no explicit mention in their legislation. There are, however, at least seven other member states which, even in the absence of such explicit recognition, have had asylum claims in which sexual orienta- tion has been recognised as a ground for persecution (Denmark, Greece Norway, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine and the United Kingdom) evidenced by decisions of national competent bodies in these countries. In the other 12 member states which are parties to the 1951 Convention there is no explicit recognition of persecution on the basis of sexual orientation as a valid ground for asylum claims either in legislation or in actual successful cases fi led by LGBT asylum seekers (Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Estonia, Georgia, Liechtenstein, Monaco, Montenegro, the Russian Federation, Serbia and “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”). Explicit recognition in national legislation of gender identity as a notion of “membership of a social group” is hard to fi nd. The only member state explicitly mentioning gender identity as being encompassed in the notion of “membership of a particular social group” in its national asylum legislation is Iceland.211 Moreover, transgender persons have been granted asylum in a few other member states, including in Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, the Netherlands and Switzerland.212 Regarding data collection, in two member states (Belgium and Norway) offi - cial statistics are collected in relation to LGBT asylum seekers. In Belgium213 116 cases were handled in 2006 of which 33 people were granted refugee status. For 2007 these fi gures were 188 (60 people granted refugee status) and in 2008 the fi gure increased to 226 (96 were granted refugee status or subsidiary protection). In 2009 the fi gure further increased to 362 (with 129 persons granted refugee or subsidiary protection status) and in 2010 the number of 522 was reached, out of which 156 received refugee protection. 210. Cf. UNHCR, “Guidelines on International Protection No.  2: ‘Membership of a Particular Social Group’ Within the Context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees” (HCR/GIP/02/02), 7 May 2002, paragraph 1. 211. National contribution (legal report) on Iceland, p. 20. 212. See for example (FRA) national contributions (legal reports) on Cyprus (p. 15) and Switzerland (pp. 17-18). 213. Information provided by the Commisariat Général aux Réfugiés et aux Apatrides (CGRS). The fi gures cover sexual orientation and gender identity asylum cases, but do not distinguish between the two. 66 | Discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity in Europe In Norway, partial statistics suggest that in 2008-2009 11 people had claimed asylum on grounds of sexual orientation; a tentative overview from 2002 suggests that approximately 41 cases involved individuals seeking asylum for persecution or ill-treatment due to their sexual orientation.214 In the other member states no offi cial statistics are available. However, some member states provided estimates on the number of applications on the grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity. The Swedish Migration Board estimated in 2002 the number of applicants seeking asylum in Sweden on grounds of sexual orientation or gender identity to be approximately 300 per year.215 In the Netherlands the applications of homosexual and transgender asylum seekers amount to approximately 200 per year.216 In Italy, according to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, in the period from 2005 to the beginning of 2008, at least 54 cases were fi led, of which at least 29 were granted refugee status or humanitarian protection.217 Challenges and obstacles in and during the asylum procedure LGBT asylum seekers are confronted with particular obstacles in making their claim and diffi culties are faced by authorities in assessing asylum claims on the grounds of sexual orientation or gender identity.218 First, criminalisation of consensual same-sex relations in the countries of origin of the applicants is interpreted and evaluated differently by the competent bodies in Council of Europe member states. The nature of the legislation and its potential impact on the safety and life of the applicant are evaluated in terms of a certain degree of gravity that the persecution has to attain in order to be considered as threatening to the asylum seeker. UNHCR has noted in this respect: “Criminal laws prohibiting same-sex consensual relations between adults have been found to be discrimina- tory and to constitute a violation of the right to privacy. The very existence of such laws, irrespective of whether they are enforced and the severity of penalties they impose, may have far-reaching effects on LGBT persons’ enjoyment of their fundamental rights.”219 214. UNHCR, “Fleeing for Love: Asylum Seekers and Sexual Orientation in Scandinavia”, Research Paper No. 181, 2009, p. 4. 215. European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, “Homophobia, Transphobia and Discrimination on Grounds of Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity: 2010 Update – Comparative Legal Analysis”, 2010, p. 60. 216. IND Informatie- en Analysecentrum, “Evaluatie Gendergerelateerd Vreemdelingenbeleid in Nederland”, The Hague, Ministry of Justice, 2008. 217. FRA national contribution (legal report) on Italy, p. 15. 218. See, for example, UNHCR Expert Roundtable, Summary Conclusions: Asylum-Seekers and Refugees Seeking Protection on Account of their Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, November 2010; UNHCR Discussion Paper, The Protection of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender and Intersex Asylum-Seekers and Refugees, 22 September 2010; Human Rights First: “Persistent Needs and Gaps: the Protection of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender and Intersex (LGBTI) Refugees: An Overview of UNHCR’s Response to LGBTI Refugees and Recommendations to Enhance Protection”, 2010, pp. 8-9. 219. UNHCR, “UNHCR Guidance Note on Refugee Claims Relating to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity”, 2008, p. 10. Protection: violence and asylum | 67 Decisions in asylum cases in the member states illustrate the different approaches to this end. In some member states the existence of criminal provisions prohibiting “homosexual conduct” in itself is not suffi cient to justify the granting of refugee status. Examples of this line of thinking imply that applicants can avoid persecution in the country of origin by living discreetly, meaning to conceal their sexual orientation. UNHCR raised in this regard that Norwegian immigration authorities generally consider that LGBT persons must be required to keep their sexual orientation or gender identity hidden from their local community if spreading this knowledge could lead to persecution.220 It is of particular concern that in such case law there is an attempt to make distinctions between a mere “tendency” to be gay or lesbian, which the individual could hide or conceal, and “irreversible” homosexuality, which would lead to recognising the individual concerned as deserving of international protection. In other member states, for example Belgium, the Netherlands and Sweden, the competent authorities have recognised the right of lesbian and gay refu- gees to live openly in their countries of origin. These countries have removed the inconsistency between asylum claims based on sexual orientation, and those based on other grounds, as members of ethnic or religious minorities, and political dissidents are also not expected to hide their ethnicity, religion, or political beliefs. A ruling in the United Kingdom in 2010 also reached such a conclusion, stressing that “to reject his application on the ground that he could avoid the persecution by living discreetly would be to defeat the very right which the [1951] Convention exists to protect – his right to live freely and openly as a gay man without fear of persecution”. 221 In yet other member states, for example Germany,222 different courts have adopted both positions. The German judiciary has in the context of this “discre- tion requirement” referred questions for a preliminary ruling concerning homosexual asylum seekers to the Court of Justice of the European Union to get clear guidance to the question whether a homosexual person can be expected to live with his or her sexual orientation in his or her home country in secret.223 A second obstacle is the assessment of the credibility of the asylum seeker, as LGBT asylum cases build on intimate private life issues. Under the threat of criminal laws, family or community violence, internalised homophobia, fear of dismissal from employment or discrimination LGBT asylum seekers may have concealed their sexual orientation or gender identity in the country of origin and may have no “proof” of their sexual orientation or gender identity. 220. UNHCR, “Fleeing for Love: Asylum Seekers and Sexual Orientation in Scandinavia”, Research Paper No. 181, 2009, p. 13. 221. H. J. (Iran) and H. T. (Cameroon) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, UKSC 31, 7 July 2010, UK Supreme Court, paragraph 82. 222. FRA national contribution (legal report) on Germany, pp. 20-23. 223. Court of Justice of the European Union, C-563/10, Kashayar Khavand v. Federal Republic of Germany, case pending. 68 | Discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity in Europe UNHCR has noted: “Self-identifi cation as LGBT should be taken as an indica- tion of the individual’s sexual orientation. While some applicants will be able to provide proof of their LGBT status, for instance through witness statements, photographs or other documentary evidence, they do not need to document activities in the country of origin indicating their different sexual orientation or gender identity.”224 There are several accounts where asylum offi cers do not accept the asylum claims based on sexual orientation for example because an applicant is married in a heterosexual relationship or has children. How the applicant should “prove” his or her sexual orientation and/or gender identity has also been the subject of several court cases.225 A Swedish study on asylum procedures fi nds that “distrust is often based on stereotypical preconceptions of sexual orientation and gender expression”,226 and in Denmark similar conclu- sions were reached.227 Phallometric testing has been used in several cases in the Czech Republic in order to “test” whether the applicants were gay or not.228 The use of such tests, and their results, can infringe a person’s right to be free from inhuman or degrading treatment under Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights, as was also acknowledged in a decision by a regional admin- istrative court in Germany229 ordering the stay of transfer under the Dublin II Regulation of an Iranian gay man because of the possible use of ‘phallometry’ in the Czech Republic. There is a strong need for using sensitive interview tech- niques and sensitisation of asylum offi cers in line with UNHCR guidelines.230 Third, LGBT asylum seekers in asylum centres face diffi culties when their sexual orientation or gender identity is known. The reactions of other asylum seekers, especially if they come from the same region, could include harass- ment and ostracism among others. In some instances staff remedied the situ- ation.231 In others, asylum seekers are afraid to stay in the centres because of 224. Ibid., p. 15. 225. For example, R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Vraciu (1995) Appeal No. HX/70517/94; J v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2006] EWCA Civ 1238. 226. Borg H., Törner E. and Wolf-Watz O., “Norm-Critical Study of the Swedish Asylum Examination, produced for the Swedish Migration Board by Ramböll Management Consulting”, 2010, p. 4. 227. The Danish Refugee Appeals Board, “Formandskabet 13. Beretning 2004”, 2004, p. 146. 228. European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, “Homophobia, Transphobia and Discrimination on Grounds of Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity: 2010 Update – Comparative Legal Analysis”, 2010, pp. 58-59; “Testing Sexual Orientation: A Scientifi c and Legal Analysis of Plethysmography in Asylum and Refugee Status Proceedings”, ORAM, 2010. 229. Schleswig-Holsteinisches Verwaltungsgericht, 6 B 32/09, 7 September 2009. 230. UNHCR, “Guidelines on International Protection No. 1: “Gender-Related Persecution Within the Context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees”, HCR/GIP/02/01, 7 May 2002. 231. European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, “Homophobia and Discrimination on Grounds of Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity in the EU Member States: Part II – The Social Situation”, 2009, p. 101; European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, “Homophobia, Transphobia and Discrimination on Grounds of Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity: 2010 Update – Comparative Legal Analysis”, 2010, pp. 58-60; National contribution (legal report) on Switzerland, p. 17. Protection: violence and asylum | 69 the risk of abuse,232 marginalisation and harassment from other applicants. Another specifi c problem for transgender persons is access to trans-specifi c health care while being in an asylum centre or in the asylum procedure. There may not be any possibility of accessing hormonal treatment or other therapy. This may lead to grave health problems as interrupting hormonal treatment is detrimental for their health, which will put a further burden on a person already traumatised. 232. UNHCR, “Fleeing for Love: Asylum Seekers and Sexual Orientation in Scandinavia”. Research Paper No. 181, 2009, p. 19; Helsinki Citizen’s Assembly – Turkey and ORAM – Organisation for Refuge, Asylum and Migration, “Unsafe Haven: The Security Challenges Facing Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Asylum Seekers and Refugees in Turkey”, 2009. Participation: freedoms of assembly, expression and association | 71 4. Participation: freedoms of assembly, expression and association 4.1. Introduction Freedom of association, freedom of expression and freedom of assembly are three basic human rights which are essential for a full and active participation in society. Indeed, hindrances to the free enjoyment of these rights impinge on the possibility of individually or collectively participating in civil, social and political life. These freedoms are pivotal to combating discrimination, to enhance communication, to favour dialogue and to improve civil society’s understanding of issues pertaining to the human rights of LGBT persons. The enjoyment of the rights to associate, express and assemble by LGBT persons and their organisations is guaranteed in most of the member states of the Council of Europe. However, as this report has demonstrated, public representation and visibility of LGBT persons may be received with hostile reactions, denial or rejection. In a few Council of Europe member states this has led to restrictions to the freedoms of expression, assembly and associa- tion of LGBT persons. Such cases have included the impossibility to organise Pride parades and cultural festivals, the denial of registering LGBT associa- tions, and refusal or obstacles when publishing and distributing material on issues concerning sexual orientation and gender identity. 4.2. International and European standards International human rights standards guarantee the respect of these three freedoms irrespective of a person’s sexual orientation or gender identity. LGBT persons are free to express their views, organise assemblies and register organisations which focus on issues concerning sexual orientation and/or gender identity. The freedom of expression is protected in Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as well as in Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The European Convention on Human Rights ensures the protection of the right to freedom of expression in Article 10 and the European Union Charter for Fundamental Rights enshrines it in Article 11. Freedom of association and assembly are protected in Article 20 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in Articles 21 and 22 of the International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights. Provisions guaranteeing these freedoms are also found in other international instruments.233 In Europe the right to freedom of assembly and association is enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights (Article 11) and in the European Union Charter for Fundamental Rights (Article 12). The Committee of Ministers in its recommendation called for 233. Such as the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination or the Convention on the Rights of the Child. 72 | Discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity in Europe measures to be adopted in order to ensure the effective enjoyment of these rights irrespective of one’s sexual orientation or gender identity.234 The rights to associate, express and assemble are not absolute. In some instances legitimate limitations can be applied by authorities. However, according to the European Convention on Human Rights, restrictions should be (1) prescribed by law, (2) have a legitimate aim, and (3) be necessary in a democratic society to achieve those aims. When applicants bring a case to the European Court of Human Rights, the Court will therefore verify whether there is an interference by public authorities and then apply this three-part test. Legitimate aims for restricting freedom of expression, assembly and asso- ciation include, in particular, national security, public safety, prevention of disorder or crime, protection of health or morals and protection of the rights and freedoms of others. The European Court of Human Rights has further clarifi ed to what extent limiting these three freedoms is in compliance with the European Convention on Human Rights. The Court has stressed that when evaluating a specifi c restriction applied in a national context it is faced “not with a choice between two confl icting principles, but with a principle of freedom of expression that is subject to a number of exceptions which must be narrowly interpreted”.235 Regarding the possibility of invoking the “morality” justifi cation for limitations to the freedom of expression the Court has main- tained that, in order to promote pluralism, broadmindedness and openness in society, it is necessary also to accept opinions, expressions and informa- tion that may be welcomed unfavourably by a part of the population.236 The authorities should not therefore limit freedom of expression on the basis of their moral outlook, but rather be obliged to ensure freedom of expression even if the matters expressed are controversial. This has also been stated in a case of freedom of expression of LGBT persons, in the judgment of Alekseyev v. Russia.237 In relation to freedom of assembly the Court has held,238 and later restated in both Bączkowski and Others v. Poland 239 and Alekseyev v. Russia,240 that protection of freedom of assembly goes as far as also including those assemblies that are not positively perceived by the majority. There is 234. Committee of Ministers Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)5 on measures to combat discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation or gender identity, adopted on 31 March 2010, paragraphs 9 and 13. 235. European Court of Human Rights, The Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, Application No. 13166/87, judgment of 26 April 1979, paragraph 65. 236. European Court of Human Rights, Handyside v. United Kingdom, Application No.  5493/72, judgment of 7 December 1976, paragraph 49. 237. European Court of Human Rights, Alekseyev v. Russia, Applications Nos. 4916/07, 25924/08 and 14599/09, judgment of 21 October 2010. 238. European Court of Human Rights, Stankov and the United Macedonian Organisation Illinden v. Bulgaria, Applications Nos. 29221/95 and 29225/95, judgment of 2 October 2007, paragraph 77. 239. European Court of Human Rights, Bączkowski and Others v. Poland, Application No.  1543/06, judgment of 3 May 2007. 240. European Court of Human Rights, Alekseyev v. Russia, Applications Nos. 4916/07, 25924/08 and 14599/09, judgment of 21 October 2010. Participation: freedoms of assembly, expression and association | 73 also a positive obligation for the authorities to protect the participants of an assembly from violent counter-demonstrators.241 4.3. Situation in the member states Freedom of assembly LGBT persons and their organisations in many member states of the Council of Europe have been invisible from public life for a long time. The “Stonewall Riots” of June 1969 in New York, during which LGBT persons protested against continuing harassment by the police, marked a turning point for the freedom of expression, assembly and association of LGBT persons. The events of June 1969 constituted an important inspiration for LGBT human rights defenders to stand up publicly and to denounce the discriminations they experienced. LGBT Pride events have since 1969 been celebrated in many places around the world. Over time, other specifi c events have also become recurring, such as the Transgender Day of Remembrance celebrated annually on 20 November to commemorate victims of transphobic violence. The enjoyment of the right to freedom of assembly is sometimes considered as a litmus test for the attitudes of society towards LGBT persons. In most member states Pride parades and similar cultural events take place without signifi cant problems and participants enjoy police protection if need be. Political parties and commercial companies may participate in Pride events. Trade unions in at least nine member states (France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom) have also participated in Pride festivals. However, in some member states bans or administrative impediments have been imposed or the police have not effectively protected participants from violent counter-demonstrators. Opposition to events promoting the human rights of LGBT persons have their roots in sensitivity of parts of the popula- tion, as such events raise public attention to issues of discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity. The mere visibility of LGBT persons at such events is seen as provocative by a majority of the population, as evidenced by surveys carried out, for instance, in Serbia,242 where 73% of those surveyed said they oppose public demonstrations of LGBT persons. Since 2004 in at least 12 member states there have been cases of bans and/ or administrative impediments on Pride events or other large public cultural LGBT events (Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Romania, the Russian Federation, Serbia, Turkey, Ukraine and “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”). In eight other member states (Albania, Armenia, 241. European Court of Human Rights, Plattform “Ärtze für das Leben”, Application No.  10126/82, judgment of 21 June 1988, paragraphs 32 and 34. 242. Gay Straight Alliance, “Prejudices Exposed – Homophobia in Serbia”. Public opinion research report on LGBT population, 2008, February-March 2008, p. 6. Participation: freedoms of assembly, expression and association | 75 prevent the Pride parade from taking place.245 The Court recalled its previous case law that there is a positive obligation by states to protect the participants from violent counter-demonstrations. As for administrative impediments, the landmark case Bączkowski and Others v. Poland concerned a request from the authorities to present a traffi c plan to the organisers of the 2005 Pride parade in Warsaw, resulting in an impingement on the right to freedom of assembly, as ascertained by the European Court of Human Rights.246 Administrative impediments have also been used in other member states in order to deny authorisa- tion to hold Pride parades. Administrative impediments have been justi- fi ed by authorities on the ground that the police would not be able to protect the participants from hostile or violent counter-demonstrations. This has been the case in, amongst others, Estonia, Latvia, Moldova, the Russian Federation, Serbia, Turkey and Ukraine. In some instances, such as in Serbia and Moldova, the authorities made the location of the event conditional for police protection. Sometimes they would propose locations which were far away from the city centre. Counter-demonstrations as a reaction to Pride parades are not uncommon in member states and may be held by religious communities, nationalist or extreme right-wing groups. While most of these counter-demonstrations are carried out within the limits of the right to freedom of assembly, others take the form of organised attacks on participants in Pride parades, resulting in clashes and incidents. This has been the case in at least 15 member states since 2004 (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Moldova, Poland, Romania, the Russian Federation, Serbia, Sweden and Ukraine247). Sometimes counter-reactions have had a wider reach and have been promoted and sustained by political or religious fi gures. European institutions, including the Commissioner for Human Rights, have expressed concern for violence and limitations on the right to freedom of assembly of LGBT persons.248 Violent clashes seriously hamper the possibility for LGBT persons to peacefully demonstrate for their human rights and contribute to fostering hostility and prejudices. The OSCE has developed a set of guidelines to provide guidance to states on how to respect the freedom of assembly.249 The guidelines contain a principle of non-discrimination on the part of the authorities in guaranteeing the exer- cise of the right to freedom of assembly, including on the ground of sexual orientation, while they do not make mention of gender identity. 245. Ibid., paragraph 51. 246. European Court of Human Rights, Bączkowski and Others v. Poland, Application No.  1543/06, judgment of 3 May 2007. 247. See (FRA) national contributions. 248. Commissioner for Human Rights, “Pride events are still hindered – this violates freedom of assembly”, 2010, Human Rights Comment. 249. OSCE/ODIHR, “Guidelines on Freedom of Peaceful Assembly” (2nd edn), Warsaw, 2010. 76 | Discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity in Europe Freedom of expression Interference in the exercise of freedom of expression of LGBT persons is not frequent in Council of Europe member states. If it happens, it is usually directed at impeding expressions, opinions and information concerning sexual orientation or gender identity from being circulated because of possible nega- tive reception by the majority population. On the most basic level the freedom of expression of LGBT persons can be restricted when the legislator drafts bills in order to impose sanctions on those accused of “promoting homosexuality”. This has been the case in three member states since 2004. In Lithuania the Law on the Protection of Minors against the Detrimental Effects of Public Information was passed in December 2009. According to that law, information deemed to be detrimental to minors includes information promoting sexual relations, expressing contempt for family values and encouraging the concept of entry into marriages and families other than by the defi nition of marriage in the Lithuanian Constitution as being exclusively between a man and a woman.250 The fi rst version of the law, which was passed in July 2009, included “promo- tion of homosexual, bisexual and polygamous relationships”. Following national and international criticisms this reference was dropped but the law still contains the expression “contempt for family values”, the scope of which remains unclear.251 Moreover, drafts to supplement the Penal Code and the Code of Administrative Offences have been proposed, which aim to prevent issues of homosexuality from being raised in public. Adoption of these proposals is still pending but they would be likely to include, if adopted, a limitation to the right to freedom of expression of LGBT persons. In Poland in 2007, the attempt to adopt a similar law was not successful and the amendments to the Law on Education System, proposed by the then Minister of Education, were rejected.252 In the Russian Federation in 2003 and in 2006 two federal bills punishing the so-called “propaganda of homosexuality” were proposed in the Duma. Such “propaganda” would include any public statement, including in the mass media, and public displays of a “homosexual lifestyle”. The draft bills formulated as punishment “deprivation of the right to occupy certain posts or practise certain activities for a period of two to fi ve years”.253 The Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, however, maintained when reviewing the draft bill of 2006 that: 250. FRA national contribution (legal report) on Lithuania, pp. 45-46; European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, “Homophobia, Transphobia and Discrimination on Grounds of Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity: 2010 Update – Comparative Legal Analysis”, 2010, pp. 34-35. 251. FRA national contribution (legal report) on Lithuania, pp. 45-46. 252. FRA national contribution (legal report) on Poland, pp. 67-68. 253. Federal Law on Amending the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation to Criminalise the Propaganda of Homosexuality, Draft No.  367150-3: proposed by Deputy of the State Duma A. V. Chuyev on 15 September 2003; Federal Law on Amending the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation to Criminalise the Propaganda of Homosexuality, Draft No. 311625-4: proposed by deputy of the State Duma A. V. Chuyev on 20 June 2006. Participation: freedoms of assembly, expression and association | 77 in accordance with the current legislation sodomy and lesbianism are considered as criminal only if these deeds are associated with the violence or with the threat of it, or in taking advantage of the victim’s helpless condition. Committing the mentioned deeds by mutual consent do not form any crime or administrative offence. The Federal Law on the Mass Media prohibits the distribution of information that promotes pornography, and a cult of violence and cruelty, but does not exclude the possibility of releasing erotic publications under certain conditions (Articles 3 and 37).254 The drafts were not supported by the government and were also rejected by the state Duma. Despite the fact that such law initiatives failed on the federal level, in the region of Ryazan a Regional Law on Administrative Offences punishing the “Propaganda of Homosexuality” among minors255 was adopted in 2008, together with a Regional Law on the Protection of Morality and Health of Minors, which contains similar provisions.256 In 2009 Russian LGBT activ- ists appealed to the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, and asked the Constitutional Court to test the constitutionality of the Regional Law of Ryazan. The Constitutional Court in 2010 refused to consider the complaint regarding this law, and noted that “the family, mother- hood and childhood in the traditional interpretation, received from our ancestors, are the values that provide a continuous change of genera- tions, and are conditions for the preservation and development of the multinational people of the Russian Federation, and therefore require a special state protection”.257 Interference with the freedom of expression can also take the form of explicit bans on specifi c materials or performances in which LGBT issues are presented or discussed. Although not common in most member states, inci- dents have been registered in three member states and concerned diverse kinds of publications. In Poland in 2006 the publication of Compass, the manual for human rights education of the Council of Europe, constituted the reason for the then Polish government to dismiss the director of the government agency which had fi nanced and distributed the Polish version of the manual. In the view of the government the manual did not refl ect Polish values since it did not depict homosexuality as a deviation.258 The 254. On the Draft Federal Law on Amending the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation to Criminalise the Propaganda of Homosexuality: Offi cial Response of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation No. 492-2/общ. of 20 April 2006. 255. Law of Ryazan Region on Administrative Offences: passed by the Ryazan Region Duma on 24 November 2008. 256. Law of Ryazan Region on the Protection of Morality and Health of Children in Ryazan Region: passed by the Ryazan Region Duma on 22 March 2006. 257. On refusal to consider the complaint of citizens Alekseyev Nikolay Aleksandrovich, Baev Nikolay Viktorovich and Fedotova Irina Borisovna regarding the violation of their constitutional rights by Article 4 of the Law of Ryazan Region on the Protection of Morality and Health of Children in Ryazan Region: Decision of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation of 19 January 2010. 258. FRA national contribution (legal report) on Poland, p. 67. 78 | Discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity in Europe Secretary General of the Council of Europe259 and the Commissioner for Human Rights spoke publicly against this point of view.260 In Turkey, following the decision of the Ankara Public Prosecutor Offi ce to seize an LGBT magazine in 2006,261 which was justifi ed on the ground of Article 28 of the Turkish Constitution and the Law on Criminal Procedure, the NGO which had published the magazine fi led an appeal. This appeal was unsuccessful and after the fi nal decision of the Ankara Criminal Court of First Instance, the NGO brought the case before the European Court of Human Rights,262 which is now pending. In Azerbaijan the novel “Artush and Zaur”, by the author Alekper Aliyev, portraying the love between an Azerbaijani man and an Armenian man, was removed by the police from a big bookstore in Baku.263 Freedom of association LGBT NGOs have been formed in nearly all member states. LGBT NGOs in some member states of the Council of Europe face challenges on the most basic level: to register their organisation and statutes. Restrictions on the freedom of association have been observed in fi ve member states during the period 2004-2010: Armenia, Azerbaijan, the Russian Federation, Turkey and Ukraine. Such restrictions by the authorities are usually motivated on the ground that the founding documents and scope of the association are contrary to national law. Authorities have also used the argument that the scope of the association is in contrast to or undermines national moral values. Furthermore, adminis- trative issues may arise in relation to registration formalities. In the Russian Federation, notwithstanding the constitutional guarantee of the freedom of association, some LGBT organisations have been refused regis- tration. In February 2010, the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation denied state registration of the organisation “Marriage Equality Russia”. The organisation, which included in its statutes that it wished to achieve marriage equality for LGBT people in the Russian Federation, was denied registra- tion because its founding documents would be contrary to the legislation of the Russian Federation as well as incompatible with the Family Code of the Russian Federation, which defi nes marriage as a union between a man and a woman.264 Another organisation, Rainbow House, was denied registra- tion because the goals of the organisation aimed “to protect the rights and freedoms of individuals, including persons of non-traditional sexual orien- tation, to promote education of identity of these individuals as citizens of 259. Article by Terry Davis, Secretary General of the Council of Europe, published in Gazeta Wyborcza of 2 October 2006. 260. Commissioner for Human Rights, Memorandum to the Polish Government, 20 June 2007, CommDH(2007)13, paragraphs 53-55. 261. National contribution (legal report) on Turkey, p. 12-16. 262. European Court of Human Rights, KAOS LG v. Turkey, Communicated to the Government for observations, Application No. 4982/07, Date of Decision to Communicate 16 June 2009. 263. National contribution (legal report) on Azerbaijan, p. 6. 264. National contribution (legal report) on the Russian Federation, pp. 16-17. Participation: freedoms of assembly, expression and association | 79 society which are equal in rights and value”. According to the authorities “the propaganda of non-traditional sexual orientation”, which in turn “could lead to undermining the security of the Russian society and State”, would “undermine the moral values of the society, and undermined the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Russia because of a reduction of the population”, which means that the organisation would “infringe on institutions of family and marriage, protected by the State”.265 The decision was unsuccessfully chal- lenged domestically by the NGO,266 which therefore decided to fi le an applica- tion at the European Court of Human Rights.267 Other cases in the Russian Federation involved organisations in Arkhangelsk and St Petersburg. In the fi rst case, the NGO Rakurs in Arkhangelsk had already been registered in 2007 as an NGO working on women’s rights, but had at a later stage wished to change its statutes by defi ning its purposes as encompassing issues pertaining to homophobia, discrimination and support to LGBT persons. The refusal to accept the amendments to the statutes was motivated by the authorities with reference to the argument that they were in confl ict with the Law on Countering Extremist Activity.268 In the second case, the organisation Gender-L, which had organisational aims similar to those of the Rakurs organisation, successfully challenged in court the denial for registration. Indeed, there is evidence that more LGBT organisations have been able to register, such as two LGBT NGOs in St Petersburg and Murmansk whose statutes explicitly mention the fi ght against discrimination and homo- phobia as the purpose of the associations. Problems with the registration of the statutes of LGBT associations have also been registered in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Ukraine. In Ukraine in 2008, despite the absence of formal limitations, the “People of Bukovina” NGO was requested to delete from its statute the wording “sexual orien- tation” and compelled to use “gender orientation”.269 Another Ukrainian organisation, the Lviv LGBT Organisation Total, reported similar problems. In Armenia, NGOs report being unable to include in their statutes references to LGBT issues, sexual orientation or gender identity, although the authori- ties have denied that this is the case.270 In Azerbaijan the NGO Gender and Development managed to get the registration but reported that they were contacted several times during the registration process by the State Security Committee regarding the target groups, scope of the organisation and the organisation’s relations with other countries. 265. National contribution (legal report) on the Russian Federation (Annex to Chapter 2, case 6). 266. On the cassation appeal of A. V. Zhdanov on the decision of Centralny District Court of Tyumen, case No. 33-2383. 267. European Court of Human Rights, Aleksandr Zhdanov and Rainbow House v. Russia, Application No. 12200/08. 268. Decision of the Offi ce of the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation on the Arkhangelsk Region and Nenets Autonomous District of 31 May 2010 No.  03-09-3266 on the refusal of state registration of amendments to the constituent documents of a public association. 269. National contribution (legal report) on Ukraine, p. 14. 270. National contribution (sociological report) on Armenia, p. 8. 80 | Discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity in Europe In Turkey, LGBT organisations have faced problems in relation to attempts by the authorities to close them down. There is a pattern in this regard and problems were reported in different cities, such as in Ankara (KAOS LG), Istanbul (Lambdaistanbul), Izmir (Black Pink Triangle) and in Bursa (Rainbow Association). Arguments used to carry out these operations, later success- fully challenged in Turkish courts by the NGOs, related in all these cities to issues concerning the contrariety of the activities of these associations to Turkish moral and family values. The case of Lambdaistanbul was heard in 2009 by the Turkish Supreme Court of Appeals after the Istanbul 3rd Civil Court of First Instance had ruled for the closure of the association. The Supreme Court in deciding the case ascertained that the scope of activity of the association did not go against moral values and therefore overturned the previous decision.271 However, although Lambdaistanbul defeated the legal challenge to its registration, the Supreme Court of Appeals left open the possibility of future challenges to freedom of association in its ruling: “The dissolution of the defendant organisation could still be demanded if it would act counter to its charter, in the ways of encouraging or provoking lesbian, gay, bisexual, transvestite and transsexual behaviour or acting with the aim of spreading such sexual orientations.” Lambdaistanbul lodged a case challenging this aspect of the judgment at the European Court of Human Rights in June 2010.272 Restrictions to freedom of association are not exclusively limited to unlawful interference by the authorities in registration processes. They can also take the form of impediments for LGBT associations to carry out social and cultural activities in their premises or in locations rented out by private parties. Evidence for such occurrences were identifi ed in, but not confi ned to, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Italy, Lithuania, Serbia, Slovenia and the Russian Federation. Refusals to rent or to provide access to these locations are connected to the LGBT-related character of these events. For instance, Organisation Q in Bosnia and Herzegovina was evicted from its premises by the landlord and the Lithuanian Gay League was unable to rent offi ce space from another NGO working on disability issues.273 In Slovenia the celebration of the 10th anniversary of the LGBT movement, to be held in a castle, was cancelled after the owner had discovered the nature of the event.274 In the Russian Federation, the LGBT Film Festival “Side by Side” was prevented from taking place in 2007 because the owner of the premises intended to be used for the event in St Petersburg cancelled the booking, allegedly motivated in part by pressure from public authorities. A similar incident was also registered the following year when the owner of 271. Beyoğlu/Istanbul Civil Court of First Instance No. 3, Case No. 2009/65, Decision No. 2009/69. National contribu- tion (legal report) on Turkey, pp 10-11. 272. European Court of Human Rights, Lambda Istanbul v. Turkey, Application No.  53804/10. The application has been registered but not yet communicated. 273. FRA national contribution (sociological report) on Lithuania, p. 13. 274. FRA national contribution (sociological report) on Slovenia, p. 6. Participation: freedoms of assembly, expression and association | 81 another facility in which the event was to take place cancelled the screen- ings following a threat to have the electricity cut off.275 In Serbia the press conference of the Gay Straight Alliance was cancelled by the Director of the Sava Centar in Belgrade because it had been deemed inappropriate for the venue.276 In Italy, LGBT associations in 2007 were prevented from taking part in the Conference for the Family organised by the Ministry of the Family and faced problems when seeking access to theatres and venues for organising public debates.277 275. National contribution (sociological report) on the Russian Federation, pp. 21-22. 276. National contribution (sociological report) on Serbia, p. 8. 277. National contribution (sociological report) on Italy, p. 7. Privacy: gender recognition and family life | 83 5. Privacy: gender recognition and family life 5.1. Introduction Part of every life is private and member states have positive obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights to protect this private sphere. In fact, Article 8 on the right to respect for private and family life of the Convention has a vast scope of application. In addition to family life, it may also protect, for example, medical information, correspondence, collection of personal data and many issues related to self-identity. This chapter examines two aspects of private life which are particularly impor- tant for LGBT persons: the legal recognition of a person’s preferred gender and family life in several respects. First, gender or sex is an integral part of self-identity for practically all people, whether they are heterosexual, gay, lesbian or bisexual, and an especially intimate part of private life under Article 8 of the Convention. Gender identity is of course a crucial issue for transgender persons. People who are ill at ease with the gender they were assigned at birth may face diffi culties in later life if they want to change their legal gender. This chapter starts with an analysis of the legislative framework and practice in place for the legal recognition of preferred gender and explores to what extent the authorities of member states protect transgender persons from interference with it. Second, this chapter considers to what extent member states currently protect the private and family lives of LGBT persons and enable the respect due to them under Article 8. It starts with the ability to seal a legal partnership and examines whether same-sex couples receive the rights and benefi ts which are customarily granted to different-sex partners. Parental rights are of particular interest here because many LGBT persons have children and the rights to custody, inheritance and next-of-kin status need to be assured in the best interests of the child. The European Court of Human Rights no longer considers that the right to marry under the European Convention of Human Rights must in all circumstances be limited to different-sex couples and has found it artifi - cial to maintain that a same-sex couple cannot enjoy “family life” for the purposes of Article 8 of the Convention.278 This landmark ruling from 2010 refl ects a decade of rapid change that saw some Council of Europe member states introduce the right to marry for same-sex couples. However, Council of Europe member states are not obliged to give access to marriage to same- 278. Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, Application No.  30141/04, judgment of 24 June 2010, paragraph 55. It built on arguments in earlier cases, notably Karner v. Austria, Application No.  40016/98, judgment of 24 July 2003 and Kozak v. Poland, Application No. 13102/02, judgment of 2 March 2010, and was repeated in the case of P. B. and J. S. v. Austria, Application No.  18984/02, judgment of 22 July 2010. Until June 2010, the Court had interpreted Article 12 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which affords the right to marry and found a family to “men and women of marriageable age” as the prerogative of different-sex couples. 84 | Discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity in Europe sex partners and they enjoy a wide margin of appreciation in this fi eld under Article 12 of the Convention on the right to marry, which refers directly to national legislation. The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union includes a gender-neutral Article 9 on the right to marry and found a family but recognises the subsidiarity principle vis-à-vis national legisla- tion in this fi eld. Yet member states that do not give cohabiting same-sex couples the opportunity to marry or enter into a legal partnership cannot treat such couples less favourably than cohabiting different-sex couples in the same situation, unless the less favourable treatment can be justifi ed by very weighty reasons. 5.2. Recognition of transgender persons’ new gender and name European standards For transgender persons it is crucial to acquire the state’s legal recognition of the preferred gender. In practice this implies a rectifi cation of the recorded sex on birth certifi cate or civil register. A second issue is the change of fi rst name. Changes are also needed for other offi cial documents such as passports, driving licences, social security or tax numbers as well as other documents including pension accounts, school diplomas, credit cards, or mortgage contracts. They may identify the bearer not only by name and gender explicitly, but also by an encoded “gender marker”, such as 1 for men and 2 for women. For many transgender persons in Council of Europe member states these are complex and cumbersome processes. The case law of the European Court of Human Rights has evolved over time and developed new standards on legal recognition of the preferred gender. In Christine Goodwin v. United Kingdom, in which the Court found a violation of Articles 8 and 12, the Court argued that there is “clear and uncontested evidence of a continuing international trend in favour not only of increased social acceptance of transsexuals but of legal recognition of the new sexual identity of post-operative transsexuals”.279 Member states are therefore required to legally recognise the gender reassignment of these persons. This was reiterated in 2007 in the case of L. v. Lithuania, when the Court stressed that a legislative gap on full gender reassignment treat- ment left the applicant “in a situation of distressing uncertainty vis-à-vis his private life and the recognition of his true identity”.280 279. European Court of Human Rights, Christine Goodwin v. the United Kingdom, Application No. 28957/95, judgment of 11 July 2002, paragraph 85. The Gender Recognition Act (2004) was enacted as a response to this judgment. 280. European Court of Human Rights, L. v. Lithuania, Application No. 27527/03, judgment of 11 September 2007, paragraph 59. The Committee of Ministers is supervising the execution of judgment in this case. Privacy: gender recognition and family life | 85 The Commissioner for Human Rights,281 the Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers282 and the Parliamentary Assembly283 have also emphasised states’ positive obligation in this regard. The Committee of Ministers has recom- mended member states to “take appropriate measures to make possible the change of name and gender in offi cial documents in a quick, transparent and accessible way” as well as to “ensure, where appropriate, the corresponding recognition and changes by non-state actors with respect to key documents, such as educational or work certifi cates”.284 The European Court gives states wide discretion for the means of recognising the preferred gender and name. In practice the requirements can be medical (for example surgery leading to sterilisation, a gender dysphoria diagnosis or a medical opinion, preceded by psychological or psychiatric treatment), legal (for example a court order, automatic divorce) or of another nature (for example being childless, “real-life experience” or the intention to live in the opposite gender for a specifi c period). In many member states there is a blurring of such legal and medical requirements. The length and cost of these procedures may vary signifi cantly and result in them being beyond the reach of the interested parties. Procedures often involve fees for diagnosis, medical treatment and court proceedings, all of which can be a signifi cant burden for a single individual. To date, no cases have been judged by the European Court of Human Rights over requirements such as mandatory sterilisation and surgery leading to infertility. The Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers, however, states that “requirements, including changes of a physical nature, for legal recognition of a gender reassignment, should be regularly reviewed in order to remove abusive requirements”.285 Parliamentary Assembly Resolution 1728 (2010) calls upon member states to ensure that “offi cial documents refl ect an individual’s preferred gender identity, without any prior obligation to undergo sterilisation or other medical procedures such as sex reassignment surgery and hormonal therapy”.286 National legislation regulating gender recognition Twenty-four Council of Europe member states have adopted legislation on the legal recognition of the preferred gender. This is the case in Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece, Italy, 281. Commissioner for Human Rights, “Human Rights and Gender Identity”, Issue Paper, Strasbourg, 2009. 282. Committee of Ministers Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)5 on measures to combat discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation or gender identity, adopted on 31 March 2010. 283. Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly Resolution 1728 (2010) on discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity, adopted 29 April 2010. 284. Council of Europe, Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)5 of the Committee of Ministers on measures to combat discrimination against discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation or gender identity, paragraph 21. 285. Committee of Ministers Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)5 on measures to combat discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation or gender identity, adopted in 31 March 2010, paragraph 20. 286. Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly Resolution 1728 (2010) on discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity, adopted 29 April 2010, paragraph 16.11.2. 86 | Discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity in Europe Latvia,287 Malta, Montenegro, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Romania, the Russian Federation, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland (in some cantons only – no national legislation), Turkey, Ukraine and the United Kingdom. 288 In 10 Council of Europe member states this report has not identifi ed legislation regulating the legal gender recognition. This is the case in Albania, Andorra, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Ireland,289 Liechtenstein, Monaco, San Marino, Slovenia and “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”. Nor did this study fi nd evidence that these 10 states offer the possibility for transgender persons to have their preferred gender legally recognised in an alternative manner (in the absence of legislation). In 13 other member states transgender persons are able to have their new gender legally recognised, either through going to court or by certain administrative practices or decrees. This is the case in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, France, Georgia, Hungary, Iceland, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Moldova, Poland and Serbia. However, in some of the states where legislation is in place, such legislation is not always clear in its scope. For example, some laws appear to confuse the legal recognition of the preferred gender with procedures regulating access to gender reassignment treatment. In other instances laws are not implemented – in Ukraine, NGOs report that the medical board in charge of deciding on applications from transgender persons did not meet once in the period 2007-2008 despite its obligation to meet every three months.290 In yet other instances, procedures described in laws are not “quick, transparent and acces- sible” as recommended by the Committee of Ministers. Transgender persons have expressed concern regarding such procedures and the inability to have decisions on their legal gender recognition made subject to judicial review. Surgery leading to sterilisation as a requirement for legal gender recognition Some countries require surgery leading to sterilisation before they legally recognise the new gender. It should be stressed that this requirement would also apply in the absence of a medical necessity or the applicant’s wish for such surgery. Surgery leading to sterilisation has been identifi ed as a require- ment in 29 member states (Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark,291 Estonia, Finland,292 France, 287. Amendments have been proposed to the Civil Status Document Law allowing for the rectifi cation of the recorded sex in the birth registry, but these proposals have not been adopted. European Union Agency for Fundamental Human Rights, “Homophobia, Transphobia, Discrimination on Grounds of Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity: 2010 Update – A Comparative Legal Analysis”, 2010, p. 15. 288. However, (aspects of) the law have been declared unconstitutional in Germany and Austria, therefore these member states will have to adapt their laws or develop new legislation. 289. However, the Irish Government has stated in its government programme that it “will ensure that trans- gender  people will have legal recognition and extend the protections of the  equality legislation to them”. See “Towards Recovery: Programme for a National Government 2011-2016”, p. 54. 290. National contribution (sociological report) on Ukraine, p. 27. 291. In Denmark a “permission for castration” is required. FRA national contribution (legal report) on Denmark, p. 23. 292. Despite the legally prescribed requirement, there is evidence that cross-hormonal treatment for a minimum period of six months is also accepted as proof of infertility in Finland. Privacy: gender recognition and family life | 89 Austrian Constitutional Court granted a transgender woman the right to change her sex to female while remaining married to her wife. It ruled that “changing a sex entry in a birth certifi cate cannot be hindered by marriage”.299 The German Constitutional Court in 2008 ruled that change of sex on a birth certifi cate should not lead to a mandatory divorce, resulting in a decision300 that prompted a change in the German law and ended compulsory divorce for married couples in which one partner is transgender. Change of name Transgender persons may wish to change their fi rst name regardless of their desire to undergo gender reassignment treatment. In order to be eligible for a change of fi rst name, there are similar patterns to some of the proce- dures described above for legal gender recognition. However, in some coun- tries a name change is easier to obtain since most countries have general provisions for a name change in their law – also for non-transgender persons who want to change their fi rst or last name. A problem arises, however, that in some countries there is a limited choice of names avail- able for the purpose. Reportedly in some member states only gender-neutral names can be chosen while in other member states the opposite is true: no gender-neutral names are allowed. Generally, member states require some form of medical opinion. Some states allow a change of name on documents only on production of a certifi cate from the medical profession confi rming that gender reassignment surgery has taken place or evidence of the legal gender recognition (for example Croatia, Georgia, Latvia, Moldova, San Marino, Slovakia and Ukraine). At least three other member states require proof of hormonal treatment (Belgium, Croatia and Switzerland). In yet other states applicants need to have a gender dysphoria diagnosis to qualify for the name change (Denmark, Germany, Finland and some cantons in Switzerland). In some states such as Malta a court authorisation is required for a change of name. In the United Kingdom and Ireland a certifi cate from a notary is suffi cient to secure a legal name change. In Ireland, it is remarkable that while it is impossible to receive legal gender recognition, there is a relatively simple procedure for a name change. Privacy is not always respected during such processes. For example, in Croatia, the Personal Names Act301 prescribes that after receiving a request for a change of name, the municipal administrative body is obliged to publish an announcement of the submitted request on a public notice board. The State Registries Act then prescribes that a change of personal name and sex are entered as additional entries. This means that if a person changes her name from Marko to Ana, she will have a birth certifi cate in which ‘Marko’ 299. Constitutional Court of Austria (Verfassungsgerichtshof), V 4/06, 8 June 2006. 300. Federal Constitutional Court of Germany (Bundesverfassungsgericht), 1 BvL 10/05, 27 May 2008. 301. Personal Names Act, OG, No. 69/92. 90 | Discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity in Europe will be entered in the basic entry, and below, in small letters at the bottom of the document, the following note would be added: “By the decision of the municipal administrative body No. ..., the name was changed to Ana on the date ... .”). As a result, all citizens are able to fi nd out about the applicant’s change of gender and name when the data is published on the notice board, and later on that information is also visible in birth certifi cates. The diffi culty of living with documents that refl ect the wrong gender iden- tity or wrong name cannot be exaggerated. Transgender persons who have been unable to change their passport or ID experience problems every time they have to identify themselves, for example when paying with a credit card, taking out a library book, opening a bank account or crossing a border. As a result of having inadequate documents, transgender persons can spend long periods of life effectively barred from meaningful and full participation in society, education or employment, as they may face continual problems “justifying” their identities. Transgender persons may also face practical problems in institutional settings such as hospitals, public toilets, police stations302 and prisons. Even after transgender persons have achieved legal gender recognition and the change of name, the problems with privacy may not always disappear – for example when transgender persons are unable to change their name and gender on their diplomas and other educational documents. Some grad- uate transgender persons have had diffi culty changing the sex or name on diplomas that were issued before their gender was legally recognised. The Ministry of Education in the Netherlands has ordered all universities to change graduates’ diplomas on legal gender recognition, after the University of Amsterdam lost a case against a former student at the Equal Treatment Commission in 2010.303 The Committee of Ministers in its Recommendation R(2010)5 has explicitly stipulated that member states should provide effec- tive protection of privacy of transgender persons in relation to, for example, employment applications, and with regard to disclosure of the gender identity history.304 However, in a survey in Scotland (United Kingdom) “40% of trans- gender respondents rated the services of their human resources departments as “extremely poor (…) and 15% felt that their employer failed to protect their privacy”.305 302. For example, in France, a transgender woman whose ID papers indicated that she is male complained that she was put in the male ward of a prison. Communication received by the Offi ce of the Commissioner for Human Rights. 303. Dutch Equal Treatment Commission, Decision No. 2010-175, 30 November 2010. 304. Committee of Ministers Recommendation R(2010)5 on measures to combat discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation or gender identity, paragraphs 29 and 30. 305. Scottish Transgender Alliance, “Transgender Experiences in Scotland – Research Summary”, Equality Network, Edinburgh, 2008, pp. 14-15, also quoted in European Union Agency for Fundamental Human Rights, “Homophobia and Discrimination on Grounds of Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity in the European Union Member States: Part II – The Social Situation”, 2009, p. 117. 92 | Discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity in Europe Montenegro, Serbia, Ukraine and Romania) have specifi ed that marriage is the prerogative of different-sex couples.306 Some member states would refuse to recognise same-sex partnerships and marriages concluded abroad. Others wish to avoid having their nationals enter a same-sex partnership abroad at all. Before they register a partner- ship or marriage abroad Polish citizens, for example, usually need to present a certifi cate from the Polish Civil Status Offi ce confi rming that they are unmarried. The Ministry of Internal Affairs and Administration of Poland has instructed307 that certifi cates will be issued only to persons wishing to enter a different-sex marriage. Lesbian women, bisexual or gay men wishing to enter a marriage or partnership abroad must obtain special notary certifi cates at additional cost and effort. A petition of Polish NGOs on this subject was presented on 31 May 2010 to the European Parliament Petitions Committee, which is examining it. States that do not give same-sex couples the opportunity to marry or to enter into a legal partnership arrangement granting the same or similar rights must ensure that they do not treat them less favourably than cohabiting different- sex couples in the same situation, unless the less favourable treatment can be justifi ed by very weighty reasons.308 Over the last decade, the European Court of Human Rights has gradually narrowed states’ margin of appreciation in this area. In the case of Karner v. Austria it found that the Convention had been breached when Austria terminated the tenancy of someone whose same- sex partner had just died. In the ruling, the Court found that the Austrian Government had failed to advance any arguments (particularly the need to protect the “traditional family”) that showed that excluding same-sex couples from the provisions of the Rent Act was necessary to achieve its objective.309 With regard to differences in treatment between same-sex registered partners and married different-sex couples, the Court has stated that member states enjoy a certain margin of appreciation concerning the exact status given by alternative means of recognition.310 In its Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)5, 306. National contributions (legal reports) on the relevant member states; European Union Agency for Fundamental Human Rights, “Homophobia, Transphobia, Discrimination on Grounds of Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity: 2010 Update – A Comparative Legal Analysis”, 2010, pp. 46-47. 307. Instruction of the Deputy Director of the Department for Information Technology Development and State Registers of the Ministry of the Interior and Administration of 3 April 2002, No. DIR-V-6000-21-2731/2002. 308. The Court also held in other cases that, where a difference of treatment is based on sexual orientation, the margin afforded to the state is narrow. See, for example, European Court of Human Rights, E. B. v. France, Application No.  43546/02, paragraphs 91 and 93, S. L. v. Austria, Application No.  45330/99, judgment of 9 January 2003, paragraph 37, Smith and Grady v. United Kingdom, Applications Nos. 33985/96 and 33986/96, judgment of 27 September 1999, paragraphs 89 and 94; Karner v. Austria, Application No. 40016/98, judgment of 24 July 2003, paragraphs 37 and 41, and Kozak v. Poland, Application No. 13102/02, judgment of 2 March 2010, paragraph 92. 309. European Court of Human Rights, Karner v. Austria, Application No.  40016/98, judgment of 24 July 2003, paragraph 92. 310. European Court of Human Rights, Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, Application No. 30141/04, judgment of 24 June 2010, paragraph 108. Privacy: gender recognition and family life | 93 the Committee of Ministers recalls and reiterates the case law of the Court and recommends as follows: “Where States grant rights and obligations to unmar- ried couples, these should apply equally to same-sex couples; where States grant rights and obligations to same-sex couples through registered partner- ships, these should be the same as for heterosexual couples in a comparable situation; and where neither of these situations apply, States should consider the possibility of providing same-sex couples with legal or other means to address the practical problems related to the social reality in which they live.”311 Transgender persons’ right to marry Case law from the European Court of Human Rights on the right of trans- sexual persons to marry has also evolved. Before 2002 it held that the right to marry under Article 12 of the European Convention on Human Rights referred exclusively to marriage between persons of different biological sex.312 In the case of Goodwin v. United Kingdom in 2002, however, it found that the right to marry can no longer depend on a gender determination based only on biological criteria, and should extend to transsexual persons who have undergone gender reassignment surgery and wish to marry a person of the opposite sex after gender reassignment. It found that the United Kingdom had violated the right to marry of a transgender woman when it prevented her from amending her birth certifi cate and so marrying a male partner.313 However, transgender persons may still face obstacles in this regard in some member states. For example in Malta in 2007 a transgender woman who had successfully legally changed her sex to “female” on her birth certifi cate was refused permission to marry her male partner by the Maltese Marriage Registrar on the basis that the applicant was a man and could not be author- ised to marry a man. While the applicant’s initial request to marry was fi rst upheld by the court, it was later successfully challenged by the Marriage Registrar. In view of this, the applicant fi led a constitutional case alleging a violation of her right to marry and the Maltese Constitutional Court decided in her favour on 30 November 2010 citing jurisprudence from the European Court of Human Rights. The Marriage Registrar, however, appealed this deci- sion on 17 December 2010.314 311. Committee of Ministers Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)5 on measures to combat discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation or gender identity, adopted 31 March 2010, paragraphs 23-25. 312. European Court of Human Rights, Rees v. United Kingdom, Application No. 9532/81, judgment of 17 October 1986, paragraphs 49-51; Cossey v. United Kingdom, Application No. 10843/84, judgment of 27 September 1990, paragraphs 43-48; Sheffi eld and Horsham v. United Kingdom, Applications Nos. 22985/93 and 23390/94, judgment of 30 July 1998 (Grand Chamber), paragraphs 62-70. 313. European Court of Human Rights, Christine Goodwin v. United Kingdom, Application No.  28957/95, judg- ment of 11 July 2002, paragraphs 100-104. See also I. v. United Kingdom, Application No. 25680/94, judgment of 11 July 2002. 314. Cassar Joanne v. Direttur Tar-Registru Pubbliku, Application No. 43/2008, 30 November 2010, Civil First Hall. The fi nal judgment is pending. Privacy: gender recognition and family life | 95 In Denmark, 82% of the population favoured giving same-sex couples access to marriage.319 Impact of non-recognition LGBT families can face unique challenges when their partnerships are not recognised. Institutions usually assume a different-sex couple or a mother and a father when devising services, benefi ts and procedures.320 LGBT families may suffer from stigma in society. Research also identifi ed that lack of legal recognition may lead them to receive inferior tax, employment and insur- ance benefi ts, public housing allocations and non-recognition as a second parent from day-care or education services. In cases of serious illness, it is possible too that life partners are unable to get recognition as next of kin and so are excluded from their partner’s bedside and hospital decisions about their care. At a day-to-day level, LGBT families may have a poor experience of services – such as schools, day-care centres and health services – that are designed with heterosexual families in mind. This was the experience of 19% of LGBT respondents to a survey in Finland. In response to similar complaints in Sweden, the then Ombudsman for Sexual Orientation Discrimination initi- ated a revision of all municipal application forms for social security and child- care to remove their heterosexual bias. Same-sex couples and LGBT families may be restricted in their freedom of movement within Europe as they may not be able to reside with their family members as their family ties are not recognised. Same-sex couples – with or without children – face particular problems if they want to emigrate, work abroad or move for reasons of family reunifi cation. The destination country may not recognise the marriage certifi cate of a same-sex couple, which is rele- vant for same-sex couples married in the seven member states who opened civil marriage for same-sex couples. An evaluation of Dutch legislation on registered partnerships and marriage commissioned by the Dutch Ministry of Justice321 concluded that even though freedom of movement of persons is guaranteed within the European Union, the legal recognition abroad of marriages between same-sex partners is problematic. The situation for same- sex couples under registered partnerships or for those with no access to any form of registered partnership is even more complex. A comparative legal analysis by the European Agency for Fundamental Rights in 2010 notes Europe’s “uneven landscape with respect to freedom of movement and family reunifi cation for same-sex couples”.322 It says that the meaning of the term “family member” in the context of free movement, family reunifi cation and 319. Westerlund J., “Regnbågsfamiljers ställning i Norden. Politik, rättigheter och villkor”, Oslo: Nordiskt institut för kunskap om kön, 2009, p. 131. 320. See, for example, “The Equality Authority for a Diverse Ireland. Implementing Equality for Lesbians, Gays and Bisexuals”, 2002. 321. Boele-Woelki K. et al., Huwelijk of geregistreerd partnerschap?, Evaluatie van de wet openstelling huwelijk en de wet geregistreerd partnerschap, Kluwer, Deventer, 2007. 322. European Agency for Fundamental Rights, “Homophobia, Transphobia, Discrimination on Grounds of Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity: 2010 Update – A Comparative Legal Analysis”, 2010, p. 8. 96 | Discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity in Europe asylum “often remains vague” although it has been or will be expanded to include same-sex couples to different degrees and in different areas in Austria, France, Ireland, Luxembourg, Portugal and Spain. 5.4. Parenting and children Many LGBT persons in Council of Europe member states raise children, whether alone or with their partners. They may bring children from previous relationships to their partnership, or they may have adopted children or acquired legal custody over a child. LGBT persons may also have accessed services for medically assisted reproduction. Regardless of the specifi c form, rights of custody, inheritance and next-of-kin status need to be assured in the best interests of the child. Transgender persons who are parents face partic- ular problems. They may have to divorce in the process of their legal gender recognition and lose custody rights that arose from their married status. An expert report produced for the Council of Europe focused on the rights and legal status of children brought up in various forms of marital or non- marital partnership or cohabitation. It found that the well-being of children in families of same-sex partners depends not only on the families themselves, but on the legal framework that ensures or limits the stable protection they receive from their carers. It notes: Children do not live in a vacuum, but within a family, and an important part of their protection is that the family unit, no matter what form it takes, enjoys adequate and equal legal recognition and protection. In other words, it is as discriminating to the child to limit legal parenthood, or to deny signifi cant carers legal rights and responsibilities, as it is to accord the child a different status and legal rights according to the circum- stances of their birth or upbringing.323 The Committee of Ministers has recommended to member states in its Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)5 that member states make the child’s best interests the primary concern when they decide on parental responsibility for or custody over a child, and that any such decisions are taken without discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity.324 Adoption The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child sets the legally binding, inter- national standards for adoption. Inter-country adoptions are further regulated by the 1993 Hague Convention. In the European context, the 2008 European Convention on the Adoption of Children (revised) addresses the scope for 323. Lowe N., “A study into the Rights and Legal Status of Children Being Brought Up in Various Forms of Marital or Non-Marital Partnerships and Cohabitation”, Directorate General of Human Rights and Legal Affairs, Council of Europe Secretariat, 2010, p. 3. 324. Committee of Ministers Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)5 on measures to combat discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation or gender identity, adopted on 31 March 2010, paragraph 26. Privacy: gender recognition and family life | 97 considering same-sex couples as adoptive parents.325 It fi nds that states may permit a child to be adopted by couples of the same sex who are married to each other, or who have entered into a registered partnership. States can also extend the scope of this convention to different-sex couples and to same- sex couples who are living together in a stable relationship.326 The European Court of Human Rights has held that adoption means “providing a child with a family, not a family with a child” and where the interests of the child compete with those who want to adopt, the best interests of the child shall be decisive.327 The Court has found that distinctions drawn on the basis of sexual orientation are unacceptable under the convention in (single-parent) adop- tion cases328 as it had also already done in a case regarding child custody.329 The Committee of Ministers has recommended states that if they permit single individuals to adopt, they should be sure to apply the law without discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation or gender identity.330 LGBT persons can adopt a child by one of three procedures. A single lesbian woman or gay man may apply to become an adoptive parent (single-parent adoption). Alternatively, a same-sex couple can adopt their partner’s biolog- ical or adopted children without terminating the fi rst parent’s legal rights. These are called “second-parent adoptions” and give the child two legal guardians. Second-parent adoptions also protect the parents by giving both of them legally recognised parental status. The lack of second-parent adop- tion deprives the child and the non-biological parent of rights if the biological parent dies or in the case of divorce, separation, or other circumstances that would bar the parent from carrying out parental responsibilities. The child also has no right to inherit from the non-biological parent. Moreover, at an everyday level, the lack of second-parent adoption rules out parental leave, which can be harmful fi nancially for LGBT families. The third procedure is joint adoption of a child by a same-sex couple. Ten member states allow second-parent adoption to same-sex couples (Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Iceland, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom). Apart from Finland and Germany these member states also give access to joint adoptions for same-sex couples. In Austria and France there is no access to second-parent adoption but same-sex couples in registered partnerships are allowed some parental authority or responsibilities. No access to joint adoption or second-parent adoption is a reality in 35 member 325. European Convention on the Adoption of Children (revised), Strasbourg, 27 November 2008 (CETS No.  202), opened for signature in November 2008. 326. Ibid., Article 7. 327. European Court of Human Rights, Pini and others v. Romania, Applications Nos. 78028/01 and 78030/01, judg- ment of 22 June 2004, paragraphs 155-56. 328. See, for example, European Court of Human Rights, E. B. v. France, Application No. 43546/02, paragraphs 91 and 93, judgment of 22 January 2000. 329. European Court of Human Rights, Salgueiro Da Silva Mouta v. Portugal, Application No. 33290/96, judgment of 21 December 1999, paragraph 34. 330. Committee of Ministers Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)5 on measures to Combat Discrimination on Grounds of Sexual Orientation or Gender Identity, adopted on 31 March 2010, paragraph 27. Privacy: gender recognition and family life | 99 States, however, need very weighty reasons for denying assisted reproduc- tion facilities on the ground of the sexual orientation of a single lesbian woman, where such facilities are provided to single heterosexual women. This follows from the Court’s argumentation in E. B. v. France, in which it concluded that the refusal of adoption to a single lesbian woman – which would not have applied had she been heterosexual – led to a distinction drawn from her sexual orientation that violated the principle of non- discrimination.333 The Committee of Ministers has recommended that member states which permit single women assisted reproductive treat- ment ensure access to such treatment “without any discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation”.334 Some Council of Europe member states, including Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom335 give lesbian couples access to assisted reproduction. Other states make these services available only to married different-sex couples. Denmark banned assisted insemination for women in same-sex couples and for single women in 1997, but reinstated the right in 2007. In Italy, donor insemination was made illegal in 2004 for single women and women living in long-term de facto relationships, among them lesbians.336 Attitudes towards parenting of LGBT persons Research and attitudinal surveys on parenting and adoption have gener- ally centred on whether same-sex couples can make “suitable” parents and whether an LGBT family background has a negative impact on children. Opinion has polarised on both scores. In 2006 the Eurobarometer found an extreme range of views across countries about adoption by same-sex couples (see Map 5.6). It ranged from 7% acceptance in Poland and Malta to over 50% in Sweden and 69% in the Netherlands.337 Among those most receptive to adoption by same-sex couples were people under 55 years of age, those with the longest formal education, and those who placed them- selves on the left of the political spectrum.338 333. European Court of Human Rights, E.B. v. France, Application No. 43546/02, paragraphs 91 and 93, judgment of 22 January 2008. 334. Committee of Ministers Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)5 on measures to Combat Discrimination on Grounds of Sexual Orientation or Gender Identity, adopted on 31 March 2010, paragraph 28. 335. Overview based on national contributions (legal reports). Also ILGA-Europe, Rainbow Europe Map and Country Index, 2010. 336. FRA national contribution (sociological report) on Italy, p. 8. 337. European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, “Homophobia and Discrimination on Grounds of Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity in the EU Member States: Part II – The Social Situation”, 2009, pp. 31-32. 338. European Commission, Special Eurobarometer 66, “Public Opinion in the European Union”, 2006, pp. 45-46. Privacy: gender recognition and family life | 101 – children of same-sex parents sometimes suffer from discrimination but have the psychological strength to withstand it; – children of same-sex parents are more tolerant of homosexuality but no more likely than the national average to become gay themselves.342 “Coming out” in the family Aspects of parenting also come into play from the perspective of the “coming out” of a family member as lesbian, gay, bisexual or transgender. This applies especially to young people who grow up and live with their families and who may at some point discover their sexual orientation or gender identity. In a online survey 47% of Lithuanian LGB persons replied that their families do not know about their sexual orientation.343 In Georgia, NGO research demon- strates that 87% of LGB persons conceal their sexual orientation to their fami- lies.344 A survey in Serbia shows that 70% of the population would not want one of their relatives to be gay or lesbian.345 In Croatia, 14% of men surveyed and 3% of women said they would disown a gay son.346 The family may be experienced by LGBT persons as an institution of imme- diate social control. This imposes expectations on the gender roles of boys and girls alike, which can be problematic for LGBT children who do not meet them. NGO representatives in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey stressed the double discrimination facing lesbians and bisexual women in those states. As women, they are expected to marry and have children, and until they do they must come home directly from the workplace and not go out alone. Family honour is an infl uential concept. In some member states, lack of acceptance by family members can lead to spells of homelessness for young LGBT persons. A study from the United Kingdom showed that 29% of lesbian respondents and 25% of gay ones had to leave their parents’ home after “coming out”.347 Young people forced to leave home after “coming out” in Albania and Moldova, where children often live at home until they marry, had diffi culty fi nding accommodation. Similarly, transgender persons report problems after “coming out” to their families. In the United Kingdom a study found that 45% of respondents experienced a breakdown of their relationship with their family as a result.348 342. Eggen B., “Gleichgeschlechtliche Lebensgemeinschaften mit und ohne Kinder. Eine Expertise auf der Basis des Mikrozensus 2006”, Staatsinstitut fur Familienforschung an der Universitat Bamberg, 2009. 343. FRA national contribution (sociological report) on Lithuania, p.7. 344. Inclusive Foundation, Discrimination survey conducted among 120 LGBT in Georgia – February 2006. 345. Gay Straight Alliance, “Prejudices Exposed – Homophobia in Serbia”. Public Opinion Research report on LGBT population, 2008. February-March 2008, p. 2. 346. Lesbian Group Kontra, “Violence against Lesbians, Gays and Bisexuals in Croatia: Research Report”, Zagreb, 2006, p. 7. 347. Averill S., “How Can Young People be Empowered to Achieve Justice when they Experience Homophobic Crime?”, Middlesex University, 2004, pp. 20-21. 348. Whittle S., Turner L. and Al-Alami M., “Engendered Penalties: Transgender and Transsexual People’s Experience of Inequality and Discrimination”, Wetherby: The Equalities Review, 2007, p. 68. Access to health care, education and employment | 103 6. Access to health care, education and employment 6.1. Introduction Access to health care, education and employment is crucial to each person’s life and well-being. In early life, access to school and consequently education as a means to access paid work can make goods and services available that are indispensable to adult life. In retirement, access to work-related pension and other benefi ts contribute to a person’s autonomy. Underpinning both educa- tion and employment is access to health care and the right to the highest attainable standard of health. Access to health care, education and employ- ment are thus interlinked. In fact, a standard of living that is adequate for a person’s health is impossible without basic social services and housing as well as food, clothing and medical care, as highlighted by Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. This chapter considers how LGBT persons in the Council of Europe member states enjoy these three rights in light of the fact that international standards prohibit discriminatory access to health care, education and employment on grounds of sexual orientation or gender identity.349 In practice, however, this chapter will demonstrate that several impediments prevent LGBT persons from enjoying these rights in a full and effective way. 6.2. Health The right to enjoy the highest attainable standard of health involves both entitlements and freedoms. Among entitlements is a system of health protec- tion that makes facilities available to all people without discrimination on any grounds. Freedoms include the right to control one’s own body including one’s sexual and reproductive freedom, and to be free from non-consen- sual medical treatment, experimentation and torture. The UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights underlines both dimensions in a general comment adopted in 2002, which recognises sexual orientation350 as a prohibited ground for discrimination in accessing the highest attainable standard of health. In 2009 it explicitly recognised gender identity among the prohibited grounds as well.351 349. Three General Comments from the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights confi rm this: General Comment No.  14, The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health, paragraphs. 8, 12(b), 18, and General Comment No. 20, Non-Discrimination in Economic, Cultural and Social Rights, paragraph 32, and General Comment No. 13, The Right to Education, paragraphs 1, 6d and 37. 350. UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No.  14, The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health, paragraph 8. 351. UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No.  20, Non-Discrimination in Economic, Cultural and Social Rights, paragraph 32. 104 | Discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity in Europe Different UN special rapporteurs have cited these standards. In 2009 the UN Special Rapporteur on the Right of Everyone to Enjoy the Highest Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental Health emphasised the stigma on vulnerable communities such as LGBT people that “prevents legislative and policymaking institutions from addressing their health-related matters adequately”.352 He went on to note that attempts to “cure” those who engage in same-sex conduct are not only “inappropriate”, but could potentially cause signifi cant psychological distress and increase “stigmatisation”. In 2001 the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment referred to reports that “members of sexual minorities have received inadequate medical treatment in public hospitals – even after having been victims of assault – on grounds of their gender identity”.353 Since 2007 three recommendations of the Committee of Ministers included references to the right of LGBT persons to health protection.354 Among other things, they recommended the member states to “take appropriate legislative and other measures to ensure that the highest attainable standard of health can be effectively enjoyed without discrimination on grounds of sexual orien- tation or gender identity’’ and also to “take into account the specifi c needs of lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender persons in the development of national health plans, including suicide prevention measures, health surveys, medical curricula, training courses and materials and when monitoring and evalu- ating the quality of health care services”.355 A question of defi nition As a whole, the threat of non-consensual medical intervention has decreased for lesbian, gay and bisexual persons since the WHO removed homosexuality from its International Classifi cation of Diseases in 1990.356 Nevertheless, this report found that these outdated classifi cations still infl uence medical prac- tice as well as the contents of educational materials in schools, evidenced by examples identifi ed in some of the Council of Europe member states, including Montenegro, the Russian Federation, Serbia, Croatia and Turkey. Not only was such information found in secondary school textbooks, but also in academic 352. Human Rights Council, “Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right of Everyone to the Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental Health, Anand Grover”, A/HRC/14/20, 27 April 2010, paragraphs 22-23. In 2004 the (then) UN Special Rapporteur, Paul Hunt, also raised concerns regarding LGBT persons’ access to health; see E/CN.4/2004/49, paragraph 24 and Hunt P. and de Mesquita J., “The Rights to Sexual and Reproductive Health”, University of Essex, 2006, p. 7. 353. “Report of the UN Special Rapporteur on the Question of Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment”, UN Doc. A/56/156, 3 July 2001, paragraph 22. 354. Committee of Ministers Recommendation CM/Rec(2007)17 on gender equality standards and mechanisms, adopted on 21 November 2007; Committee of Ministers Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)5 on measures to combat discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation or gender identity, adopted on 31 March 2010; Committee of Ministers Recommendation Rec(2006)18 on health services in a multicultural society, adopted on 8 November 2006. 355. Committee of Ministers Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)5 on measures to combat discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation or gender identity, adopted on 31 March 2010, section VII. Health, paragraph 33. 356. The World Health Organization, International Classifi cation of Diseases, 1990. Access to health care, education and employment | 105 literature for medical students. NGOs report that some psychotherapists are still addressing the homosexuality of their clients as a medical or psychiatric problem. In Turkey the military still considers homosexuality as pathology rendering men “unfi t to serve” in the armed forces.357 Gay or bisexual men who apply for exemption from military service undergo “degrading medical and psychological tests”358 or have to prove their homosexuality, which may have an impact on their future job prospects if applying to work for the authorities. Two other classifi cation schemes have direct infl uence on the way Council of Europe member states approach transgender persons when they want to access gender reassignment treatment. The WHO considers transsexualism as a “mental and behavioural disorder”359 and the American Psychiatric Association360 includes the term “gender identity disorder” among mental health disorders. Both schemes categorise transgender persons as mentally disordered. Such defi nitions could infl uence, for example, the way the mili- tary perceives transgender persons as evidenced by a regulation issued by the Bulgarian Ministry of Defence in which transsexuality is perceived as a sexual disorder, making transgender people unfi t for military service.361 There is gradually growing support for the view that transgender people should be able to access relevant medical treatment and have their preferred gender legally recognised without a diagnosis of being mentally disordered. The Gender Recognition Act in the United Kingdom supports this view, as do the World Professional Association for Transgender Health and many activists for transgender rights worldwide.362 The WHO’s revision of its medical classi- fi cation, which is planned for publication in 2013, is an important opportunity for reviewing the place of transsexualism within the classifi cation. Two Council of Europe member states have announced a revision of their national classifi cation systems. In 2009 the National Board of Health and Welfare in Sweden made changes to its national classifi cation system and in 2010 France announced it would delete transsexuality from the list of “long- term psychiatric conditions”.363 It is, however, too early to assess the impact of the decree in France, where clarifi cations on the practical implications of the announcement are still needed. 357. Armed Forces Health Regulation, Paragraph 17, also quoted in national contribution (sociological report) on Turkey, p. 15. 358. Commission of the European Communities, “Turkey 2008 Progress Report”, 2009, p. 26. 359. World Health Organization, International Statistical Classifi cation of Diseases and Related Health Problems, Tenth Revision, Version for 2007. 360. American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 4th edn, Text Revision: DSM-IV-TR, Washington, DC, 2000. 361. FRA national contribution (legal report) on Bulgaria, p. 32. 362. The Gender Recognition Act 2004; World Professional Association for Transgender Health, “WPATH De-Psychopatholisation Statement”, 26 May 2010; see also “Human Rights and Gender Identity”, issue paper published by the Offi ce of the Commissioner for Human Rights, 2009. 363. Décret No. 2010-125 du 8 février 2010 portant modifi cation de l’annexe fi gurant à l’article D. 322-1 du code de la sécurité sociale relative aux critères médicaux utilisés pour la défi nition de l’affection de longue durée “affections psychiatriques de longue durée”. 106 | Discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity in Europe The state of health of LGBT persons According to the few studies on the health situation of LGBT persons conducted in Council of Europe member states, LGBT persons have a higher incidence of poor health than heterosexual persons. A study in Belgium, for instance, found that LGB persons are twice as likely to have a chronic disease as the average citizen, which confi rms fi ndings by other studies.364 A Norwegian report from 2007 shows that young lesbians and gay men often experience loneliness and depression.365 Another report from Norway of 2006 shows that the relatively high level of bullying, harassment and violence to which LGB youth are exposed is linked with high levels of health risk behaviours: “LGB teenagers who have been exposed to severe physical maltreatment reported higher levels of sexual-risk behaviours, substance abuse, suicide ideation, and loitering about in the city.”366 Suicide by LGBT persons, especially when they are young, has been identi- fi ed as an urgent issue. The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe adopted a resolution in 2008 in which it expressed its concerns that suicide rates among young LGBT persons are signifi cantly higher than among their peers. It notes that this heightened risk is due to the stigmatisation, margin- alisation and discrimination which they experience in society.367 Studies in member states found an alarmingly high percentage of LGBT persons who had attempted or considered committing suicide. For example, in a Danish study, it was found that the percentage of LGBT persons who had considered (16%) or attempted (11%) suicide is about twice as high as the average population.368 Of these attempts 61% were carried out by people under 20 years of age and 6% by children under 12.369 A 2007 Norwegian report found young LGBT persons over-represented among youth with high- risk behaviours and suicide ideation.370 Similarly, in France an NGO survey found that 34% of young transgender persons aged 16-26 had attempted 364. van Heeringen C. and Vincke J. “Suicidal acts and ideation in homosexual and bisexual young people: a study of prevalence and risk factors”, Social Psychiatry and Psychiatric Epidemiology No. 35 (2000), pp. 494-99. 365. Hegna K., “Homo? Betydningen av seksuell erfaring, tiltrekning og identitet for selvmordsforsøk og rusmid- delbruk blant ungdom. En sosiologisk studie”, Norsk institutt for forskning om oppvekst, velferd og aldring (NOVA), Rapport 1/07, 2007, Oslo, p. 87. 366. Moseng B. U., “Vold mot lesbiske og homofi le tenåringer. En representativ undersøkelse av omfang, risiko og beskyttelse – Ung i Oslo 2006”, Norsk institutt for forskning om oppvekst, velferd og aldring (NOVA), Rapport 19/07, Oslo, 2006, p. 53. 367. Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Resolution 1608 on Child and teenage suicide in Europe: a serious public health issue, 2008, paragraph 10. 368. Gransell L. and Hansen H., “Lige og ulige? Homoseksuelle, biseksuelle og transkønnedes levevilkår”, Copenhagen: CASA and Landsforeningen for bøsser og lesbiske, 2009, p. 121. 369. Moseng B. U., “Vold mot lesbiske og homofi le tenåringer. En representativ undersøkelse av omfang, risiko og beskyttelse – Ung i Oslo 2006”, Norsk institutt for forskning om oppvekst, velferd og aldring (NOVA), Rapport 19/07, Oslo, 2006, p. 53. 370. Hegna K., “Homo? Betydningen av seksuell erfaring, tiltrekning og identitet for selvmordsforsøk og rusmid- delbruk blant ungdom. En sosiologisk studie”, Norsk institutt for forskning om oppvekst, velferd og aldring (NOVA), Rapport 1/07, 2007, Oslo, p. 56. Access to health care, education and employment | 107 to commit suicide.371 A United Kingdom study reported that almost 30% of transgender persons had attempted to end their lives.372 Some studies suggest that the share of lesbian and bisexual women partic- ipating in screening for breast, cervical and uterine cancer is low possibly because they themselves and medical professionals assume they are low-risk groups. Their vulnerability to HIV/AIDS and other sexually transmitted infec- tions (STIs) is largely unknown and often disregarded in awareness-raising campaigns.373 Some good practice, however, can be reported from member states such as Ireland, which includes in its health strategy a focus on lesbian and bisexual women in all its campaigns on cancer and STIs. Staff are required to have specialist knowledge of lesbian and bisexual women’s health prob- lems and a non-judgmental attitude to their sexual orientation. Obstacles accessing health care: prejudices, stigmatisation and risk of disclosure A fi rst obstacle in accessing health care is identifi ed in NGO reports374 which fi nd a signifi cant level of mistrust between LGBT patients and their health care providers which may lead to LGBT persons not seeking medical care if they need it or withholding information about their sexual orientation or gender identity. For example, in Germany a study showed that lesbian women do not reveal their sexual orientation to health services due to fear of discrim- ination.375 A large survey among lesbian and bisexual women in the United Kingdom in 2008 showed that nearly half said they conceal their sexual orientation from health professionals.376 Mistrust between LGBT persons and their medical practitioners may be fed by fears that the privacy and confi dentiality of one’s health status, sexual orientation or gender identity and medical records is not respected. For example in Albania in 2006, after the arrest of some LGBT persons on suspicion of prostitution,377 the media reported that two of the arrested persons were HIV-positive and printed their police photos. In Ukraine the Police Act permits police offers to “reveal and inform the medical establishments in an established order about persons who constitute a group at risk of HIV/AIDS, and to bring these people, as well as persons infected by HIV/AIDS, by sexually transmitted diseases … at the request 371. Homosexualités & Socialisme, Mouvement d’Affi rmation des jeunes Gais, Lesbiennes, Bi et Trans, Enquête sur le vécu des jeunes populations trans en France, 2009, p. 1. 372. Whittle S., Turner L., Combs R. and Rhodes S., “Transgender EuroStudy: Legal Survey and Focus on the Transgender Experience of Health Care”, Brussels, 2008, p. 49. 373. ILGA, “Lesbian and Bisexual Women’s Health: Common Concerns, Local Issues”, 2006, p. 18. 374. Quinn S., “Accessing Health: the Context and the Challenges for LGBT People in Central and Eastern Europe”, ILGA-Europe, 2006, p. 57. 375. Dennert G., “Die gesundheitliche Situation lesbischer Frauen in Deutschland: Ergebnisse einer Befragung (Dissertation)”, Nürnberg: Med. Diss. FAU Erlangen-Nürnberg, 2004. 376. Hunt R. and Fish J., “Prescription for Change. Lesbian and Bisexual Women’s Health Check”, Stonewall, 2008, p. 3. 377. National contribution (sociological report) on Albania, p. 8. 108 | Discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity in Europe of a medical establishment and authorisation of a prosecutor, for a compul- sory examination and treatment”.378 When they seek health care, LGBT persons sometimes perceive that they expe- rience worse treatment in the health service than their peers. For example, reports and statements from NGOs in Albania379 and Azerbaijan,380 challenged by the health ministries of both member states,381 refer to hospitals which allegedly have refused to treat transgender women in accident and emer- gency departments. In Turkey, the Istanbul Provincial Human Rights Board has reported on similar problems as well as on the lack of privacy for medical examinations of transgender women.382 A second obstacle is the prejudiced attitude of medical staff towards LGBT persons, which may be caused by the fact that their knowledge is based on outdated approaches to homosexuality and transgenderism. Doctors may assume that their patients are heterosexual, and if proved otherwise, the medical staff may feel uncomfortable or unduly focus on sexuality, instead of the actual health issues reported by the patients.383 Several examples of good practice to combat this obstacle can be identifi ed within the Council of Europe member states, for example in the United Kingdom where a guide for health and social care staff who work with transgender persons has been produced.384 In Sweden educational trainings on LGBT issues have been run by an LGBT NGO and attended by health care students and professionals. In the Russian Federation the Society of Psychoanalytic Therapy has adopted a Code of Ethics that prohibits discrimination on different grounds, including sexual orientation. A third problem reported is that same-sex partners are not recognised as next of kin in countries that do not grant some form of legal recognition to same- sex partners. In practice it means that patients in life-threatening conditions, or suffering from chronic illness, may fi nd their life partners excluded from decision-making processes about their treatment. Sometimes the partners are not allowed at their bedside. In Estonia, the female partner of a woman who gave birth was not allowed to be present at the birth of the couple’s child.385 A visitor to a gay man living with HIV in a hospital in St Petersburg was report- 378. Article 10, paragraph 21 of the Police Act No. 565-12, 20 December 1990. 379. National contribution (sociological report) on Albania, p. 11. 380. “The Violations of the Rights of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender Persons in Azerbaijan”, an NGO shadow report presented to the UN Human Rights Committee, July 2009. 381. National contribution (sociological report) on Albania, p. 11 and national contribution (sociological report) on Azerbaijan, p. 15. 382. Report of TC Istanbul Valiliği, Sayı B054VLK4340300/521/37648; national contribution (sociological report) on Turkey, pp. 16-17. 383. Gibbons M., Manandhar M., Gleeson C. and Mullan, J., “Recognising LGB Sexual Identities in Health Services: The Experiences of Lesbian, Gay and Bisexual People with Health Services in North West Ireland”. Equality Authority of Ireland, Dublin, 2008, pp. 46-47. 384. An Introduction to working with transgender people: information for health and social care staff, Department of Health, United Kingdom, 2007. 385. FRA national contribution (sociological report) on Estonia, p. 8. Access to health care, education and employment | 109 edly told by the ward nurse that “this is no place for the meeting of faggots”.386 Other examples from the United Kingdom show that access to a partner’s hospital ward can vary according to the discretion of ward staff.387 Finally, according to NGOs, gay and bisexual men face situations where they are assumed to be HIV-positive when accessing health services. HIV/AIDS had, and still has, a profound infl uence on the LGBT community. After being discovered in the 1980s, HIV/AIDS sparked a signifi cant debate and media interest, often using a sensationalist approach referring to HIV/AIDS as the “gay cancer”. Despite the fact that the introduction of new medication in the mid 1990s has brought some improvements in living conditions, stigmatisa- tion of persons living with HIV/AIDS is still widespread. In some member states gay and bisexual men have been automatically barred from donating blood. Whereas blood donor centres in some member states have changed their policies and focus on risk behaviours rather than the sexual orienta- tion of the donor, other member states continue to bar gay and bisexual men categorically. The European Court of Human Rights set an important standard when it ruled that an HIV-positive person cannot be refused a resi- dence permit on the basis of his health status.388 Specifi c obstacles for transgender persons when accessing health services Transgender persons who wish to undergo gender reassignment treatment can face a range of obstacles when trying to access health services. The European Court of Human Rights has established that states have a positive duty to provide for the possibility to undergo gender reassignment as “medi- cally necessary” treatment, which should be covered by insurance schemes. Failure to provide this places a disproportionate burden on a person “in one of the most intimate areas of private life”, according to a groundbreaking ruling in 2003.389 The Court restated this in another case in 2007.390 Twenty-eight member states offer full or partial gender reassignment treat- ment to transgender persons (Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Germany, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Hungary, Greece, Georgia, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, the Russian Federation, Serbia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom and Ukraine). The differences between these 28 member states are signifi cant, ranging from member states where quality expertise centres are available and those where some but not all necessary treatment is available. In Malta and 386. National contribution (sociological report) on the Russian Federation, p. 34. 387. Stonewall, “Prescription for Change. Lesbian and Women’s Health Check”, 2008, p. 14. 388. European Court of Human Rights, Kiyutin v. Russia, Application No.  2700/10, judgment of 10 March 2011, paragraph 74. 389. European Court of Human Rights, van Kück v. Germany, Application No. 35968/97, judgment of 12 June 2003, paragraph 82. 390. European Court of Human Rights, L. v. Lithuania, Application No. 27527/03, judgment of 11 September 2007, paragraph 59. 110 | Discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity in Europe Ireland, for example, hormonal treatment is available, but no surgery. In yet other member states services are only available in one city. In 13 member states (Albania, Andorra, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Moldova, Monaco, Montenegro and San Marino) no facilities needed for gender reassignment treat- ments were identifi ed. Transgender persons from these 13 countries wishing to undergo gender reassignment would then have to go abroad (they are explic- itly advised to do so in some member states). For the remaining six member states information on availability of health facilities is unclear. A person who wants to access gender reassignment treatment must usually meet a strict and unifi ed “one size fi ts all” list of requirements. Such require- ments may be based on legislation or regulations, though often this is rather a matter of custom and practice. Generally requirements include medical and psychological assessments of the applicant and/or the diagnosis of gender dysphoria or gender identity disorder (following the WHO classifi cation). Yet other member states require applicants to undergo a “real-life experience” (RLE) by living in the preferred gender for a specifi ed length of time, which varies by state. Doctors may assess the “success” of such RLE on the basis of the person’s clothing taste and gender-normative behaviour. According to transgender persons, they have to perform in a highly stereotypical way, often going to the extremes in their preferred gender to fi t the eligibility criteria. Other requirements include the risk of suicide of the client, absence of “homosexual inclinations”, or vague concepts such as “no serious fl aws in the ability for social adaptation”.391 Concerns have also been raised by trans- gender persons in relation to medical professionals who have large decision- making powers over their access to treatment. Financial obstacles to accessing gender reassignment treatment The European Court of Human Rights has required states to provide insur- ance to cover expenses for “medically necessary” treatment, which gender reassignment surgery is a part of.392 However, research for this report shows that access to health care insurance is highly problematic in at least 16 coun- tries (Albania, Andorra, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Georgia, Lithuania, Moldova, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, the Russian Federation, Serbia, Slovakia and Turkey). In these countries trans- gender persons claim that they must bear the fi nancial burden of medically necessary health care themselves. 391. National contribution (legal report) on Ukraine, p. 32. 392. European Court of Human Rights, van Kück v. Germany, Application No. 35968/97, judgment of 12 June 2003, paragraphs 47, 73 and 82 and L. v. Lithuania, Application No. 27527/03, judgment of 11 September 2007, para- graphs 59 and 74. Access to health care, education and employment | 111 In the remaining 31 member states, research for this report shows that there is partial or full reimbursement.393 In Germany, Portugal, Sweden and Italy public health insurance covers most if not all expenses related to a person’s gender reassignment treatment. In Greece, Iceland and Ireland, payment by public health insurance for treatment abroad has been reported, though not confi rmed as a general rule. In San Marino, since gender reassignment facilities are not available in the country, transgender persons may have the costs of surgeries performed abroad reimbursed by the national health fund. Hungary’s health insurance cover for gender reassignment treatment is 10% of the total costs. In the Netherlands, not all surgery is covered, and some surgery is covered only partially. Malta covers only hormone treatment. Norway covers costs for some but not all transgender persons, depending on the particular diagnosis of the person. In Switzerland private health insur- ance companies have in the past refused transgender people. In the judg- ment Schlumpf v. Switzerland the European Court of Human Rights found that the refusal of the insurance company to cover the costs of the applicant’s gender reassignment surgery due to non-compliance with the requirement to complete two years of observation in order to ascertain the existence of “true transsexualism” was in violation of Article 8.394 In the UK around 86% of transgender respondents claimed that they were refused state funding for surgery and more than 80% claimed they were refused funding for hormone treatment. Over half of transgender respondents said they had funded their own treatment.395 Coverage of public health insurance is unclear in the coun- tries not mentioned above. 6.3. Education The right to education includes the right to receive information about sexual orientation and gender identity that is objective and knowledge- based. International standards take the view that impartial information can overcome prejudice and save people from infl icting or suffering violence. The UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Education396 views sex education as an important way of counteracting discrimination. The UN Committee on the Rights of the Child has recommended that states include sexual education in the curricula of primary and secondary schools,397 which may 393. For a full overview, see the (FRA) national contributions (sociological and legal reports) on the mentioned countries. 394. European Court of Human Rights, Schlumpf v. Switzerland, Application No. 29002/06, judgment of 8 January 2009, paragraphs 115-16. 395. Whittle S., Turner L., Combs R., Rhodes S., “Transgender EuroStudy: Legal Survey and Focus on the Transgender Experience of Health Care”, Brussels, 2008, p. 57. 396. Report of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Right to Education, A/65/162. 23 July 2010, paragraph 60. 397. Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding Observations: Antigua and Barbuda CRC/C/15/Add.247, para- graph 54; Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding Observations: Trinidad and Tobago, CRC/C/TTO/CO, paragraph 54. 112 | Discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity in Europe also imply that laws that prevent young people educating themselves about their sexual orientation confl ict with the Convention.398 The European Committee of Social Rights set an important standard in 2009 when it found that Croatia had breached the non-discrimination provisions of the European Social Charter by issuing teaching materials that were “biased, discriminatory and degrading, especially in the way they describe people whose sexual orientation is different from heterosexual”.399 The Croatian Ministry of Education later withdrew the biology textbook in question. A 2010 resolution and recommendation of the Parliamentary Assembly as well as a Committee of Ministers recommendation include references to the right to education.400 The Committee of Ministers pointed out that the right to education should be enjoyed without discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation or gender identity. This includes, among others, “safeguarding the right of children and young people to education in a safe environment, free from violence, bullying, social exclusion or other forms of discriminatory and degrading treatment related to sexual orientation or gender identity”. The Committee of Ministers also stresses that “objective information with respect to sexual orientation and gender identity” must be provided, “for instance in school curricula and educational materials”.401 Heteronormativity in education and teaching materials There is a range of educational systems in Council of Europe member states. Some are determined centrally by government and others more autono- mously by schools. Overall there seems to be little teaching material of good quality on LGBT issues. In a signifi cant number of member states, including Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Denmark, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Malta, Moldova, Montenegro, Poland, the Russian Federation, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” and Turkey, NGOs report that schools do not provide any information about homosexuality or if so only biased, incorrect informa- tion. Such schoolbooks and teaching materials tend to present incorrect information not refl ecting the WHO de-classifi cation of homosexuality. In Moldova, for instance, according to NGO reports, at the Medical University 398. Concluding observations: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, CRC/C/15/Add.188, 9 October 2002, Adolescent health, paragraph 43. 399. International Centre for the Legal Protection of Human Rights (INTERIGHTS) v. Croatia – Collective Complaint No. 45/2007, decision of 30 March 2009, paragraphs 60-61. 400. Recommendation 1915 (2010) of the Parliamentary Assembly on discrimination on the basis of sexual orien- tation and gender identity; Resolution 1728 (2010) of the Parliamentary Assembly on discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity; Committee of Ministers Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)5 on meas- ures to combat discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation or gender identity, adopted on 31 March 2010, paragraphs 31-32. 401. Committee of Ministers Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)5 on measures to combat discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation or gender identity, adopted on 31 March 2010, paragraphs 31 and 32. Access to health care, education and employment | 113 homosexuality is taught as a disease from text books written when it was still criminalised.402 In “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” a book on “Pedagogy” intended for use in secondary schools includes a chapter on “Negative Aspects of Sexual Life” that describes gay and lesbian persons as “psychotic and highly neurotic” people participating in a “degenerated sexual life”.403 In Croatia the textbook With Christ to Life refers to religious dogmas describing homosexuality as “intrinsically disordered” and “contrary to the natural law”.404 In an academic thesis in 2004, a sociologist from the Russian Federation argued that academic discourse often presents homosexuality as a curable disease and a pathology.405 Even though in 2006 Spain introduced a law on “Education for Citizenship and Human Rights” with a view to recognising “emotional-sexual diversity”,406 an analysis of textbooks by NGOs407 shows that only some publishing houses comply with the law’s minimum standards. Surveys in Malta,408 Slovenia409 and Sweden410 also point to heteronormative approaches in schools. Norway is one of the few member states to provide objective information about trans- genderism in the state school curriculum. Research in Norway, however, suggests that, despite the good intentions, teachers commonly depict gay men and lesbians as “the other”, something different and problematic, while heter- osexuality is “normal” and “natural”.411 In the Netherlands, research shows that 50% of school textbooks pay attention to homosexuality and bisexuality, but they are silent on transgenderism.412 The Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC) in the United Kingdom has studied the ways educa- tional materials and schools ignore people who are transgender.413 402. National contribution (sociological report) on Moldova, p. 15. 403. Coalition for Protection and Promotion of Sexual and Health Rights, “Annual Report on sexual and health rights of marginalised communities”, Skopje, 2009, p. 54. 404. Peri J., Vuica M. and Vuleti D., With Christ to Life, Kršćanska Sadašnjost, Zagreb, 2008, p. 16. 405. National contribution (sociological report) on the Russian Federation, p. 30. 406. FRA national contribution (legal report) on Spain, p. 54. 407. Federación Estatal de Lesbianas, Gays, Transexuales y Bisexuales, La diversidad afectivo-sexual y familiar en los manuales de “Educación para la Ciudadanía y los Derechos Humanos”, Un estudio de los manuales de Educación para la Ciudadanía, 2008. 408. FRA national contribution (sociological report) on Malta, p. 10. 409. FRA national contribution (sociological report) on Slovenia, p. 7; Kuhar R. and Švab A., “Homophobia and Violence against Gays and Lesbians in Slovenia”, Revija za Sociologiju, Vol. XXXIX, No. 4, 2008, pp. 267-81. 410. Reimers E., “Always somewhere else: heteronormativity in Swedish teacher training”, in Martinsson L., Reimers E., Reingarde J. and Lundgren A. S. (eds), Norms at Work. Challenging Homophobia and Heteronormativity. TRACE: The Transnational Cooperation for Equality, 2006, pp. 59-61. 411. Røthing Å., “Gode intensjoner, problematiske konsekvenser. Undervisnig om homofi li på ungdomsskolen”, Norsk Pædagogisk Tidsskrift, vol. 91: 485-97, 2007; Røthing, Å., “Homonegativisme og homofobi i klasserommet: marginaliserte maskuliniteter, disiplinerende jenter og rådville lærere”, Tidsskrift for ungdomsforskning, vol. 7(1): 27-51, 2007. 412. Korte B., Leurink A., Lodeweges J. and Ridderink M., Homoseksualiteit in leermiddelen, Nationaal InformatieCentrum Leermiddelen, SLO, Enschede, November 2001. 413. EHRC, “Provision of Goods, Facilities and Services to Trans People: Guidance for Public Authorities in Meeting Your Equality Duties and Human Rights Obligations”, 2010, p. 39. 114 | Discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity in Europe Absence of information at all stages of the curriculum helps maintain the invisibility of LGBT persons and it helps to maintain the absence of discussing sexual orientation and gender identity issues according to studies carried out in Hungary and Slovenia.414 It should be stressed that this is often at an age that many may fi nd out that they are LGB or T. In some member states some good initiatives have been taken to counterbal- ance this trend. A national action plan in Norway targeted schools at both primary and secondary level and provided guidance for teachers and new teaching materials. These added an LGBT dimension to subjects in the main- stream curriculum.415 The national study curriculum set by the Estonian Ministry of Education and Science provides a basis for discussions on LGB issues.416 In Belgium, in 2007, public authorities subsidised a website and brochure on “gender diversity and transgender” for pupils of 14-18 years.417 With older school students in mind, the Slovenia Peace Institute issued a CD-ROM in 2003 to help teachers discuss sexual orientation during classes.418 Homophobic and transphobic bullying and discrimination in educational settings According to studies carried out across member states419 and supported by some government research, LGBT students suffer from bullying from both peers and teachers. In a United Kingdom study among transgender persons it was found that some 64% of transgender men and 44% of transgender women reported experiencing harassment or bullying by their peers and sometimes by their teachers.420 In Serbia, 21% of students surveyed admitted they had verbally attacked or threatened someone they thought was gay or “feminised”, while 13% said they had actually helped beat them up. Some 60% of respondents held that violence against homosexual persons was always justifi ed.421 Research conducted by an NGO in the United Kingdom422 found that homophobic language is widespread in schools. Some 90% of secondary schoolteachers said that pupils in their schools are bullied, harassed or called 414. Takács J., Mocsonaki L., Tóth T. P., “Social Exclusion of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender (LGBT) People in Hungary”, Institute of Sociology, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, 2008; Kuhar R. and Švab A, “Homophobia and Violence against Gays and Lesbians in Slovenia”, Revija za Sociologiju, Vol. XXXIX, No. 4, 2008, p. 271. 415. Norwegian Ministry of Children and Equality, “The Norwegian Government’s action plan: Improving quality of life among lesbians, gays, bisexuals and trans persons, 2009-2012”, 2008, pp. 19-20. 416. FRA national contribution (legal report) on Estonia. p. 33. 417. FRA national contribution (sociological report) on Belgium, p. 7. 418. European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, “Homophobia and Discrimination on Grounds of Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity in the European Union Member States: Part II – The Social Situation”, 2009, p. 78. 419. Takács J., “Social Exclusion of young lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) people in Europe”, ILGA- Europe and IGLYO, 2006. Also research in Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Belgium, Germany, Hungary, Malta, Montenegro, the Netherlands, Norway, Ireland, Serbia, Slovenia, Turkey, Ukraine and the United Kingdom, and by ILGA-Europe. 420. Whittle S., Turner L., Al-Alami M., “Engendered Penalties: Transgender and Transsexual People’s Experiences of Inequality and Discrimination”, Wetherby: The Equalities Review, 2007, p. 17. 421. CARE International and International Center for Research on Women, Young Men Initiative for Prevention of Gender-Based Violence in Western Balkans, “Baseline Research Technical Brief – Country Report. Serbia”, 2009, p. 8. 422. Stonewall UK, “Homophobic Bullying in Britain’s Schools – The Teachers’ Report”, 2009. Access to health care, education and employment | 115 names for being – or for being perceived to be – homosexual. Half of the teachers who indicated that they are aware of homophobic bullying in school pointed out that the overwhelming majority of incidents are never offi cially reported or dealt with. Some national human rights structures and NGOs have found that the management and staff of schools do too little to address bullying. In some other member states, such as in Ireland, a joint campaign of NGOs and the equality body have been set up, resulting in posters to all secondary schools with the message “Homophobic bullying is not acceptable in our schools”.423 However, even when anti-bullying policies are in place, they may provide inadequate protection or be insuffi ciently implemented. A United Kingdom study found that out of 300 schools observed, 82% were aware of verbal homophobia and 26% of physical homophobic bullying, even though almost all of these schools had anti-bullying policies in place.424 Research in 2009 from the United Kingdom reported that a higher percentage of transgender persons experience bullying at school (75%) than lesbian, gay and bisexual persons (25%).425 Teachers who are gay, lesbian, bisexual or transgender can also suffer discrim- ination and harassment from their colleagues, students or their employer as such. In Romania the Ministries of Education and Health jointly introduced psychological testing for teachers in 2003 and forbade gay and lesbian persons to teach. Although the regulation was repealed, it was replaced in 2006 by another joint order, listing homosexuality among grounds for exclusion.426 In some member states, including in the Netherlands and Lithuania, discus- sions have taken place regarding the equal treatment laws in these countries and the extent to which schools based on religion or belief may or may not be able to lawfully refuse to employ a gay or lesbian teacher (Netherlands) or limit educational awareness-raising activities on LGBT issues (Lithuania).427 Cases against discrimination in education on grounds of sexual orientation or gender identity have been brought to national courts or equality bodies in Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania, Russia,428 Turkey, Greece,429 Italy430 and Sweden.431 423. European Union Agency for Fundamental Human Rights, “Homophobia and Discrimination on Grounds of Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity in the European Union Member States: Part II – The Social Situation”, 2009, p. 71. 424. Averill, S., “How can young people be empowered to achieve justice when they experience homophobic crime?”, 2004, p. 20. 425. ECHR, “Provision of Goods, Facilities and Services to Trans People: Guidance for Public Authorities in Meeting Your Equality Duties and Human Rights Obligations”, 2010, p. 40. 426. Romanian Ministry of Education and Research, Ministry of Health and the National Health Insurance Authority, Order No. 4840/IR 38342/2796/2005 on mandatory health check of school personnel. 427. European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, “Homophobia, Transphobia and Discrimination on Grounds of Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity: 2010 Update – Comparative Legal Analysis”, 2010, pp. 25-26. 428. National contribution (legal report) on the Russian Federation. pp. 45-46. 429. FRA national contribution (sociological report) on Greece, p. 8. 430. FRA national contribution (legal report) on Italy, p. 20. 431. HomO, Dossier No. 620-2006. Decision, 3 August 2007. 116 | Discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity in Europe The negative consequences of bullying may be enormous. NGOs and studies in several member states point to the negative impact that bullying has on the school performance and well-being of LGBT students generally. Lesbian, gay, bisexual or transgender adolescents may not seek support from their families and/or community because they have not yet “come out” with their sexual orientation or gender identity, or because they had previously been rejected for doing so. Several studies show that a homophobic or transphobic environment at school may lead to higher drop-out rates of LGBT young persons from secondary school. These young people are also more likely to contemplate self-harm and engage in high-risk behaviour.432 A study in the Russian Federation made similar fi ndings.433 Stress and social isolation are most acute for young people who become aware of their homosexuality during their years at school. Homophobia and bullying in school may damage the academic work of LGBT pupils and destroy their self-image and confi - dence. Studies moreover suggest that bullying has a negative impact on the health of LGBT persons434 but the social stigma surrounding LGBT issues has delayed concerted public health research in member states. School boards have a duty to provide a safe setting in which LGBT students and teachers are protected from bullying. Some good practice can be reported from the Netherlands, where an NGO coalition has developed a practical standard for managing a school that is safer for LGBT persons;435 in the same country a handbook on student counselling includes a chapter on the needs of LGBT students.436 6.4. Employment Work is essential both for personal development and for social and economic independence.437 In fi nancial terms, it implies the right to be able to ensure an adequate standard of living for oneself and one’s dependants. The right to work is enshrined in Article 6 of the ICESCR438 and Article 8 of the ICCPR.439 There is an obligation for states to guarantee that the right to work can be exercised without discrimination of any kind.440 In its General Comment No. 20, the UN 432. Jenett, M., “Stand up for us: Challenging homophobia in schools”, Yorkshire, Crown Copyright, 2004, p. 10; IGLYO and ILGA-Europe, Written contribution to Schools for the 21st Century Commission Staff Working Paper (SEC (2007) 1009), December 2007. 433. Moscow Helsinki Group, “Situation of Lesbians, Gays, Bisexuals and Transgenders in the Russian Federation”, Moscow, 2009, pp. 29-30. 434. For example, National Institute for Working Life. “Arbetsvillkor och utsatthet”, Sweden, 2003; Jenett M., “Stand up for us – Challenging homophobia in schools”, Department for Education and Skills, London, 2004, p. 8. 435. Schouten M. and Dankmeijer P., “Een roze draad in veiligheid op school”, February 2008. 436. Dankmeijer P., “Homo- en transseksuele aandachtspunten in de leerlingenbegeleiding”, in Toolkit Leerlingenbegeleiding, Kluwer, 2006. 437. UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 18, 24 November 2005, Article 6, paragraph 4. See also General Comments Nos. 14, 15 and 20. 438. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 439. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 440. Cf. UN Committee of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 18 of 24 November 2005, Article 6, paragraph 19. Access to health care, education and employment | 117 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights lists sexual orientation and gender identity among prohibited grounds for discrimination. It recognises that “persons who are transgender, transsexual or intersex often face serious human rights violations such as harassment in schools or in the work place”.441 The revised European Social Charter guarantees social and economic rights including the right to work442 and the principle of non-discrimination applies to all rights set out in it. The Committee of Ministers Recommendation CM/ Rec(2010)5 explicitly puts sexual orientation and gender identity among prohib- ited grounds for discrimination in the employment sphere. A specifi c provision covers effective protection of the privacy of transgender persons in relation to employment applications and disclosure of their gender identity history.443 The European Union Employment Equality Directive prohibits discrimi- nation on grounds of sexual orientation in the private and the public sectors, not only in the place of employment, but also in procedures governing access to work, and in labour-related organisations. In 2009, the European Commission reviewed the Directive’s444 application in European Union member states to fi nd that three member states had infringed the Employment Equality Directive’s provisions against discrimination on the ground of sexual orientation (Poland,445 the United Kingdom446 and the Netherlands447). “Sex” discrimination in employment is currently the legal basis of European Union legislation to combat employment discrimina- tion on the ground of gender reassignment. One of the employment cases before the Court of Justice of the European Union on discrimination on the grounds of gender identity produced a landmark judgment. In 1996 it found that dismissal of a transsexual person for reasons related to gender reassignment was precluded under the 1976 Equal Treatment Directive on prohibition of discrimination on the ground of “sex”.448 In total, 38 member states regard sexual orientation as a prohibited ground for discrimination either in comprehensive non-discrimination 441. UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 20 on non-discrimination, para- graph 32. 442. The European Social Charter, adopted in 1961 (ETS No. 35) and revised in 1996 (ETS No. 163). 443. Committee of Ministers Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)5 on measures to combat discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation or gender identity, adopted on 31 March 2010, paragraphs 29-30. 444. European Union Directive 2000/78/EC establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation, Articles 7 and 10. 445. Reasoned Opinion sent on 29 January 2010 concerning the prohibition of discrimination on all grounds set out in the Directive (including sexual orientation) which is not provided for in regulations on access to certain professions according to the European Commission. 446. Reasoned Opinion sent on 23 November 2009 concerning the possibility of justifying discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation in case of employment by religious institutions which is considered too wide by the European Commission. 447. Reasoned Opinion sent on 1 February 2008 concerning the exceptions provided for legal relations within religious communities and employment by religious institutions which are considered to be too wide, also making it possible to discriminate unduly for example on grounds of sexual orientation. 448. Court of Justice of the European Union, C-13/94, P. v. S. and Cornwall County Council, judgment of 30 April 1996, paragraph 20. 118 | Discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity in Europe legislation, or in employment-specifi c (sectoral) legislation. Even though this is an overwhelming majority of Council of Europe member states, the 2007 Eurobarometer survey showed that only 30% of European Union citizens were aware of laws prohibiting discrimination on grounds of sexual orienta- tion in the labour market.449 Regarding gender identity, the situation is more complex. Nine member states have included gender identity explicitly in comprehensive non-discrimination legislation. At least 11 member states treat discrimination on grounds of gender identity or gender reassignment as a form of sex or gender discrimination in comprehensive non-discrimination legislation. In the remaining 27 member states the situation regarding coverage of transgender persons under non- discrimination legislation is unclear. These 27 member states include European Union member states which should as a minimum recognise, in the fi eld of employment, discrimination of a person who intends to undergo or has under- gone gender reassignment as a form of sex or gender discrimination.450 Discrimination and harassment against LGBT persons in the work place LGB employees may experience the denial of benefi ts provided to heterosexual staff and their spouses such as parental leave; health care insurance for employees and their families; educational and leisure facilities for employees and their families; bereavement leave, or leave to care for a sick partner and survivor’s benefi t in occupational pension schemes. Discrimination against transgender persons may occur when they are not addressed by the correct name and/or pronoun or when they are denied time off work for gender reassignment therapy. In states where men and women retire at different ages, transgender women may be forced to wait for a state pension until they reach male retirement age. Employees who are “out” at work, or suspected of being lesbian, gay, bisexual, or transgender, can experience indirect discrimination by employers, colleagues or clients which can include sexually explicit remarks intended to embarrass or ridicule. For example, according to the National Institute for Working Life451 some 30% of lesbian and bisexual women in Sweden say that demeaning comments at work are the norm. The scale of discrimination against LGBT persons in the work place is hard to estimate. Very few member states compile statistics on discrimination in the employment sector, and statistics that exist are generally not disaggre- gated in a meaningful way. Research for this report revealed that between 2005 and 2010 a handful of employment discrimination cases came to court or equality bodies in at least 21 Council of Europe member states (Austria, 449. European Commission, Special Eurobarometer 263, “Discrimination in the European Union”, 2007, p. 30. 450. See chapter 2.3 for a full overview of national non-discrimination legislation. 451. National Institute for Working Life. Arbetsvillkor och utsatthet, Sweden, 2003, p. 73, also quoted in European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, “Homophobia and Discrimination on Grounds of Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity in the European Union Member States: Part II – The Social Situation”, 2009, p. 68. Access to health care, education and employment | 119 Belgium, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania, the Russian Federation, Spain, Sweden, Turkey and the United Kingdom).452 In addition to these data, surveys reveal that signifi cant numbers of LGBT persons claim to have been discriminated against at work; however, those inci- dents are not formally reported. These surveys include 52% of LGBT workers in the United Kingdom surveyed by a trade union; 39% of lesbian and gay workers surveyed in Denmark;453 over a third of respondents in Hungary;454 56% of transgender employees surveyed in Spain.455 Examples of claims of discrimination and harassment cases identifi ed for this report include a Croatian civil servant who was given an offi ce in the basement and told that a “faggot should die in the basement with rats”. Supervisors reportedly did not respond to his memo, and he was reluctant to bring a charge against the ministry.456 A transgender woman in Moldova claimed to have been dismissed from her post as a high-school teacher during her hormone therapy, despite requests from her students’ parents to let her stay.457 Under-reporting may be endemic. Some equality bodies and NGOs think this is because LGBT persons risk more than most other people if they complain.458 By irrevocably “coming out” with a complaint in the workplace, they fear, like other complainants, being victimised and dismissed. Unlike other complain- ants, however, they fear they will never be able to conceal their sexual orienta- tion or gender identity in the future and so become permanently unemployed, especially if they live in a small town where the social control is strong. It is fear of dismissal and long-term unemployment that prompts many LGBT persons to adopt a protective silence.459 A report by ILGA-Europe suggests that homophobic and transphobic attitudes often prevail in the workplace because employers hesitate to tackle what is often considered a diffi cult subject to address. The report says that “many people are simply not aware that their colleagues may experience their daily 452. (FRA) national contributions (legal reports) contain annexes with descriptions on such cases identifi ed in the member states. See also European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, “Homophobia and Discrimination on Grounds of Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity in the European Union Member States: Part II – The Social Situation”, 2009, p. 64. 453. European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, “Homophobia and Discrimination on Grounds of Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity in the European Union Member States: Part II – The Social Situation”, 2009, p. 68. 454. Takács J., Mocsonaki L. and Tóth T. P., A leszbikus, meleg, biszexuális és transznem (LMBT) emberek társadalmi kirekesztettsége Magyarországon (Social Exclusion of LGBT People in Hungary), MTA SZKI, Budapest, 2007. 455. Esteva, I. et al. “Social Inequalities: Demographic Characteristics of Patients Treated at the First Gender Identity Disorder Unit in Spain”, 2001. 456. National contribution (legal report) on Croatia, p. 30. 457. National contribution (sociological report) on Moldova, p.16. 458. For example Walsh J., Conlon C., Fitzpatrick B. and Hansson U., Enabling Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Individuals to Access their Rights under Equality Law, Equality Authority and Equality Commission for Northern Ireland, 2007, p. 47. 459. Moscow Helsinki Group, “Situation of Lesbians, Gays, Bisexuals and Transgenders in the Russian Federation”, 2009, p. 45. 120 | Discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity in Europe work lives in a fundamentally different manner. ... Some argue that sexual orientation is a private matter, best confi ned to the bedroom and that it has no relevance to the workplace”.460 In employment sectors where traditional notions of masculinity and femininity prevail, it may be a serious problem for people who challenge gender norms to fi nd employment. The impact on victims and strategies to end discrimination LGB persons tend to conceal their sexual orientation in the workplace. The Eurobarometer survey found that 68% of European Union citizens think that it is diffi cult for a homosexual person to state his/her sexual orien- tation in the workplace.461 An investigation in Sweden found that 50% of LGB respondents were not “out” at work and 40% avoided socialising with colleagues for fear of having to share such private details with colleagues.462 This pattern was also identifi ed in empirical studies in Albania,463 Croatia,464 Finland,465 Germany,466 Norway,467 Poland,468 the Russian Federation469, Slovakia,470 and in an ILGA-Europe report.471 Transgender persons who decide to undergo gender reassignment treat- ment could face the opposite problem, especially during the period of gender reassignment treatment. Surveys suggest that up to 77% of trans- gender employees do not tell their employers about their gender identity and 50% of them fi nd this stressful. They may fi nd themselves pushed to the margins of the job market and out of formal employment, which in some Council of Europe member states results in transgender women working in the sex industry. LGB persons may be more productive at work if they do not need to conceal their sexual orientation. Some fi rms in member states have used this 460. Quinn S. and Paradis E., “Going beyond the law: promoting equality in employment”, ILGA-Europe, Brussels, 2007, pp. 10-11. 461. European Commission, Special Eurobarometer 263, “Discrimination in the European Union”, 2007, p. 13. 462. National Institute for Working Life. Arbetsvillkor och utsatthet, Sweden, 2003, pp. 123-24. 463. GISH, “Survey Research with the LGBT community in Albania”, Tirana, 2006. 464. Lesbian Group Kontra, “Violence Against Lesbians, Gays and Bisexuals in Croatia: research report”, Zagreb, 2006, p. 39. 465. Lehtonen J. and Mustola K. (eds), “Straight People Don’t Tell, Do They?”: Negotiating the Boundaries of Sexuality and Gender at Work, Ministry of Labour, Helsinki, 2004, pp. 4-5. 466. Frohn D. (ed.), “‘Out im Offi ce?!’ Sexuelle Identität, (Anti-)Diskriminierung und Diversity am Arbeitsplatz”, Schwules Netzwerk NRWe.V., Cologne, 2007, p. 7. 467. Moseng B. U., “Lesbiske og homofi le arbeidstakere – en pilotundersøkelse”, NOVA, Oslo, 2005. 468. Abramowicz M. (ed.), “The Situation of Bisexual and Homosexual Persons in Poland: 2005 and 2006 Report”, Campaign Against Homophobia and Lambda Warsaw Association, Warsaw, 2007. 469. Moscow Helsinki Group, “Discrimination based on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity in the Russian Federation”, Moscow, 2007. 470. Daucikova A., Jojárt P. and Siposova M., “Report on Discrimination of Lesbians, Gay Men and Bisexuals in Slovakia”, Documentation and Information Centre, Bratislava, 2002. 471. Quinn S. and Paradis E., “Going Beyond the Law: Promoting Equality in Employment”, ILGA-Europe, Brussels, 2007, p. 24. Access to health care, education and employment | 121 argument and argued for the “business-case for diversity”, which resulted in LGBT employee networks being established and partner benefi ts to both LGB and heterosexual workers given.472 In France, 150 large employers have agreed to check their employment practices for compliance with a diversity charter devised by the High Authority for Equality and the Elimination of Discrimination (HALDE).473 The NGO Stonewall in the United Kingdom has developed a 25-question online survey to help employers assess how well they perform on equality issues. An International Gay and Lesbian Chamber of Commerce has been set up, and has developed an International Business Equality Index based on Stonewall’s survey. Some good practice can be reported from member states. A lesbian NGO, ŠKUC, in Slovenia has tried to change public attitudes to LGBT persons through TV adverts that show LGBT Slovenian celebrities at their work places. The same organisation, in co-operation with the Slovenian Ministry of Labour, Family and Social Affairs, published two manuals on “Measures against employment discrimination” to be used by trade unions and employers.474 Some 55% of European Union citizens thought in a Eurobarometer survey in 2009 that not enough efforts were made to combat employment discrimi- nation based on grounds of sexual orientation.475 Trade unions play in this regard a crucial role in preventing discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity. Some national unions in Poland and Italy have appointed staff to focus on LGBT issues. In 2006, a Polish trade union defended gay and lesbian teachers against homophobic comments by Polish offi cials.476 In 2007 the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) adopted targets for raising LGBT awareness and tackling prejudice among its members477 and in 2008 it held the fi rst Europe-wide trade union confer- ence on LGBT rights. Non-discrimination legislation is the fi rst step towards combating discrimi- nation in the workplace against LGBT persons, but it needs to be effectively implemented. Public sector employers can give a strong lead in this area and tools exist for them to facilitate the process. The United Kingdom introduced a public sector gender equality duty, which requires all public authorities and their contractors to include transgenderism among eight prohibited grounds of discrimination and to promote equality of transgender women and men. 472. Quinn S. and Paradis E., “Going Beyond the Law: Promoting Equality in Employment”, ILGA-Europe, Brussels, 2007, p. 26. 473. FRA national contribution (legal report) on France, p. 15. 474. Greif T., “Ukrepi proti diskriminaciji v zaposlovanju za sindikat”, ŠKUC, Ljubljana 2006; Greif T., “Ukrepi proti diskriminaciji v zaposlovanju za delodajalce”, ŠKUC, Ljubljana, 2006. 475. European Commission, Special Eurobarometer 317, “Discrimination in the EU”, 2009, p. 33. 476. European Commission, “Trade Union Practices on Anti-Discrimination and Diversity”, pp. 34-36. 477. European Trade Union Confederation, “The Seville Manifesto”, adopted by the XIth ETUC Congress, Seville, 21-24 May 2007. Conclusions | 123 Conclusions This report provides a socio-legal overview of the human rights situation of LGBT persons in the 47 Council of Europe member states. It identifi es serious fl aws as well as positive developments in the protection from discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity in several thematic fi elds. The report also looks beyond the legislative frameworks and clearly demonstrates that LGBT persons continue to be subjected to homophobia and transphobia in their everyday lives. Further efforts by member states are needed to pursue legislative reforms and social change to enable LGBT persons to fully enjoy universally recognised human rights. Attitudes and perceptions Despite the fact that criminalisation and medicalisation of homosexuality belong to the past in Europe, attitudes towards gay, lesbian and bisexual persons are often still characterised by outdated and incorrect information on what constitutes someone’s sexual orientation. Transgender persons continue to face a particularly medicalised and prejudiced environment. Homophobic and transphobic attitudes have been identifi ed in all member states, though attitudes vary signifi cantly among and within the 47 member states of the Council of Europe. There is an urgent need to counterbalance such attitudes and deeply rooted prejudices by disseminating unbiased and factual informa- tion on sexual orientation and gender identity in the media, in schools and society at large. Invisibility of LGBT persons and the absence of sexual orientation and gender identity in relevant human rights debates have turned out to be recurring themes during the data collection for this report. At the most basic level, many LGBT persons remain invisible in everyday life out of fear of nega- tive reactions at school, at work, in their neighbourhood or in their family. They fear that being “out” will lead to harassment, rejection, physical violence and discrimination. Many LGBT individuals conceal their sexual orientation or gender identity and adjust to the heteronormativity present in society. Several member states have introduced programmes promoting education and dialogue with a view to challenging negative attitudes towards LGBT persons. Such initiatives need to be consistently followed across Europe to counterbalance negative stereotypes. Legal standards and their implementation A large majority of member states have adopted legislation to prohibit and eliminate discrimination against persons because of their sexual orientation. Transgender persons, however, receive less clear protection in existing non- discrimination legislation in most member states. When they are included in the scope of protection, it is often not explicit or the protection does not go beyond a limited concept of gender identity, which seriously diminishes its 124 | Discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity in Europe impact. There is an urgent need for member states to remedy this situation by introducing “gender identity” as an explicit ground of discrimination in non- discrimination legislation. The extent of discrimination against LGBT persons on grounds of their sexual orientation and gender identity is hard to determine with precision due to the non-availability of offi cial data in most member states. This sharply contrasts with data on discrimination provided by NGOs. There is a need for member states to review the accessibility to and effective implementation of non- discrimination legislation in view of this incongruence between offi cially avail- able data and the information provided by civil society. National structures for promoting equality have a key role to play in combating discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity and making their complaint mechanisms accessible to LGBT persons. However, many of them lack an explicit mandate to address discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation and the situation is even worse regarding the ground of gender identity. Comprehensive equal treatment legislation should be accompanied with appropriate policy measures for its implementation. A handful of member states of the Council of Europe have initiated national policies to address discrimination of LGBT persons in the employment sector and bullying of young LGBT persons at school or in other sectors. Other member states could draw inspiration from such initiatives. Protection: violence and asylum LGBT persons run a serious risk of becoming victims of hate crimes or hate- motivated incidents. Such violence, inspired by the perpetrators’ deeply felt hatred and rejection of the real or perceived sexual orientation or gender identity of the victim, is rarely specifi cally addressed in member states’ legis- lation. Under-reporting of such violence is a problem as victims do not trust law-enforcement agencies, which may lack proper training to investigate effec- tively hate-motivated crimes, speech and incidents. Even if incidents or crimes are reported, there is ample evidence that the bias motivation is not usually refl ected in offi cial statistics as homophobic and transphobic motives are not recognised by most member states in relevant legislation. Discriminatory and infl ammatory language against LGBT persons, including by politicians and religious fi gures, compounds the problem and paves the way for a climate where hate-motivated incidents occur without a strong public condemnation, but are rather condoned. Member states should step up efforts to combat hatred against LGBT persons. In the area of asylum claims, a majority of member states recognise that sexual orientation can be a ground of persecution in asylum claims under the notion of “membership of a particular social group”. However, the recognition that gender identity can also be a ground for people to fl ee their countries is only recognised in a handful of states. Member states should draw inspiration Conclusions | 125 from relevant UNHCR guidelines concerning the international protection of LGBT asylum seekers. Participation: freedoms of assembly, expression and association Too often, violent and discriminatory reactions occur when LGBT persons join together to form associations, express their views or demonstrate in public. While in most member states the freedoms of association, expression, and assembly of LGBT persons are respected, in a few countries bans or admin- istrative impediments have been imposed on peaceful LGBT demonstrations in recent years. In some instances, the police have failed to protect peaceful demonstrators from violent assaults. When such bans and impediments happen, LGBT organisations often have to apply to courts in order to over- turn decisions by authorities. The same phenomena can be seen when LGBT associations try to register their organisations: some bans have again been overturned by courts. There is no justifi cation for member states to impose bans on LGBT organisations and peaceful assemblies as the European Court of Human Rights has set up clear standards in this regard. The same goes for attempts to criminalise “propaganda of homosexuality” as it violates the freedom of expression. Privacy: gender recognition and family life Transgender persons face signifi cant problems in their efforts to have their preferred gender legally recognised. The absence of relevant legislation as well as cumbersome and unclear procedures in most member states contribute to a failure by many member states to recognise the preferred gender of trans- gender persons. Twenty-nine member states require gender reassignment surgery whereas 15 member states require the transgender person to be unmarried, which entails mandatory divorce if the person is already married. There is an urgent need for member states to review and adapt their legisla- tion in light of the Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers as well as recent legislative reform in a few member states. Same-sex couples who wish to legally seal their relationships face signifi cant challenges in most Council of Europe member states. Even though family law is to a great extent a matter of national competence, under European human rights law it is becoming increasingly diffi cult to justify differential treatment between same-sex couples and different-sex couples when accessing rights and benefi ts if the only difference is the sexual orientation of the partners involved. The European Court of Human Rights has recognised that same-sex partners enjoy “family life” with reference to the European Convention and come under its protection in this area as well. Access to health care, education and employment LGBT persons encounter a wide range of problems in accessing health care. Limited knowledge and awareness among health professionals of the health 126 | Discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity in Europe problems of LGBT persons and the denial of treatment are only some of the identifi ed obstacles. Moreover, contrary to international medical classifi ca- tions, medical professionals in some member states may still be taught that homosexuality is an illness. Transgender persons face particular problems in accessing health care. In 13 member states the infrastructure suitable for gender reassignment treatment is non-existent or insuffi cient. Transgender persons have no other choice than to go abroad to receive treatment. Furthermore, a person wanting to access gender reassignment treatment must usually meet a strict “one size fi ts all” list of requirements, which include the diagnosis of gender dysphoria. A fundamental shift towards a human rights approach for transgender persons is necessary to address the excessively medicalised practices of today. Bullying at schools is present in the lives of LGBT persons from a very early stage in practically all member states. Only in very few member states are poli- cies in place to combat bullying and harassment of LGBT students, teachers, and staff. Consequently, schools are not experienced as a safe environment for LGBT persons. Textbooks may transmit information that homosexuality is an illness; these do not contribute to a healthy development of young LGBT persons. Member states should do more to prevent bullying and provide objective information in schools. LGBT persons are affected by discrimination in the employment sector. Even though the majority of national non-discrimination legislations include sexual orientation as one of the discrimination grounds in the employment sphere, gender identity is usually not included even if it may be partially covered by the ground of gender or sex. Not only do transgender persons face particular problems when accessing the labour market, they also encounter issues concerning privacy and the disclosure of personally sensi- tive data related to their gender identity history. The concept of reasonable accommodation should be further developed in this context to improve the access of transgender persons to employment. Some trade unions and employers have set up policies and practices in order to foster diversity in the workplace encouraging the full inclusion of LGBT staff. Such initiatives need to be supported by member states. Data collection, research and monitoring The general lack of offi cial data on discrimination on grounds of sexual orien- tation and gender identity as well as homophobia and transphobia is a signifi - cant obstacle to remedial measures. There is a need for member states to collect data on these issues. Without such data there can be no solid basis for informed decision making and monitoring, which is crucial for addressing the many human rights challenges identifi ed in this report. When privacy concerns are properly addressed, setting up data-collection mechanisms can be the start of developing and implementing policies combating discrimi- nation and intolerance on grounds of sexual orientation and gender iden- tity. This can of course only be successful when there is the political will Conclusions | 127 to recognise that problems exist and that discrimination, transphobia and homophobia need to be combated – and that progress has to be monitored. Some member states have experience in this fi eld and could share their good practices, which could form the basis for a development establishing a set of clear and reliable indicators and benchmarks. Wider outlook An important premise for drafting this report has been to offer a tool for dialogue with the authorities of the 47 member states of the Council of Europe. In this regard it can be considered a baseline study for further action in both legisla- tive and policy fi elds. The Committee of Ministers Recommendation from 2010 has already provided the political impetus to take concrete steps to develop and implement effective policies for preventing sexual orientation and gender identity discrimination in all member states of the Council of Europe. National and international monitoring is needed to measure progress in all fi elds covered by this report. Within member states, national structures for promoting equality have an important role to play in monitoring. Civil society organisations representing LGBT persons should be able to participate in this process. The Council of Europe and its monitoring mechanisms have added value to offer. The Council of Europe should also provide assistance to member states in implementing the European and international standards in this fi eld. Moreover, as this report has demonstrated, the standards set by the 47 member states of the Council of Europe bear a direct infl uence on the protection afforded to LGBT persons from countries where they face persecution, repres- sion or even the death penalty for being LGBT. There is a need to take stock of this fact and bring it to the attention of other fora for the wider promotion of human rights. Converging efforts by the Council of Europe, the European Union, the OSCE and the UN to implement human rights without discrimina- tion are essential for ensuring the full enjoyment of universal rights by LGBT persons everywhere. Appendix | 129 Appendix: Terms and concepts This report uses a number of terms and concepts which are defi ned and clari- fi ed below in order to facilitate the full understanding of the report. The defi - nitions are not considered exhaustive. While referring to the list, one should bear in mind that some of the terms may have slightly different meanings in various contexts and in different languages. Discrimination is legally defi ned as unjustifi ed, unequal treatment: – Direct discrimination occurs when for a reason related to one or more prohibited grounds (for example, sexual orientation and gender identity) a person or group of persons is treated less favourably than another person or another group of persons is, has been, or would be treated in a comparable situation; or when, for a reason related to one or more prohibited grounds, a person or group of persons is subjected to a detriment.478 – Indirect discrimination occurs when a provision, criterion or practice would put persons having a status or a characteristic associated with one or more prohibited grounds (including sexual orientation and gender identity) at a particular disadvantage compared with other persons, unless that provision, criterion or practice is objectively justifi ed by a legitimate aim, and the means of achieving that aim are appropriate and necessary.479 – Experienced discrimination, also called subjective discrimination, is the experience of being discriminated against. Experienced discrimination does not necessarily entail discrimination in the legal sense.480 Gender identity refers to a person’s deeply felt individual experience of gender, which may or may not correspond with the sex assigned at birth, and includes the personal sense of the body and other expressions of gender (that is, “gender expression”) such as dress, speech and mannerisms.481 The sex of a person is usually assigned at birth and becomes a social and legal fact from there on. However, some people experience problems identifying with the sex assigned at birth – these persons are referred to as “transgender” persons. Gender identity is not the same as sexual orientation, and trans- gender persons may identify as heterosexual, bisexual or homosexual.482 478. The Equal Rights Trust, Declaration of Principles on Equality, London, 2008, pp. 6-7. 479. Ibid. 480. Olli E. and Olsen B. K. (eds), “Towards Common Measures for Discrimination: Exploring possibilities for combining existing data for measuring ethnic discrimination”, Danish Institute for Human Rights, 2005. 481. Defi nition based on the Yogyakarta Principles on the Application of International Human Rights Law in relation to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, 2006. 482. Commissioner for Human Rights, “Human Rights and Gender Identity”, Issue Paper, Strasbourg, 2009, pp. 5-6. 130 | Discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity in Europe Gender marker is a gendered designator on, for example, an identity docu- ment (passports). The most obvious gender markers are designations such as male/female or Mr/Mrs/Ms/Miss. They can also be professional titles or personal pronouns, or coded numbers, such as social security numbers and tax numbers which may use certain combinations for men and for women (for example, even/uneven numbers). Gender markers are often embedded in ID cards or personal certifi cates such as passports, birth certifi cates, school diplomas, and employers’ reference letters. Gender reassignment treatment refers to different medical and non-medical treatments which some transgender persons may wish to undergo. However, such treatments may also often be required for the legal recognition of one’s preferred gender, including hormonal treatment, sex or gender reassignment surgery (such as facial surgery, chest/breast surgery, different kinds of genital surgery and hysterectomy), sterilisation (leading to infertility). Some of these treatments are considered and experienced as invasive for the body integrity of the persons. Harassment constitutes discrimination when unwanted conduct related to any prohibited ground (including sexual orientation and gender identity) takes place with the purpose or effect of violating the dignity of a person or creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environ- ment.483 Harassment can consist of a single incident or several incidents over a period of time. Harassment can take many forms, such as threats, intimida- tion or verbal abuse, unwelcome remarks or jokes about sexual orientation or gender identity. Hate crime towards LGBT persons refers to criminal acts with a bias motive. Hate crimes include intimidation, threats, property damage, assault, murder or any other criminal offence where the victim, premises or target of the offence are selected because of their real or perceived connection, attach- ment, affi liation, support or membership of an LGBT group.484 There should be a reasonable suspicion that the motive of the perpetrator is the sexual orientation or gender identity of the victim.485 Hate-motivated incident are incidents, acts or manifestations of intoler- ance committed with a bias motive that may not reach the threshold of hate crimes, due to insuffi cient proof in a court of law for the criminal offence or bias motivation, or because the act itself may not have been a criminal offence under national legislation.486 483. The Equal Rights Trust, Declaration of Principles on Equality, London, 2008, p. 7. 484. OSCE/ODIHR, “Hate Crimes in the OSCE Region – Incidents and Responses. Annual Report for 2009”, Warsaw, 2010, p. 13. 485. See Committee of Ministers Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)5 on measures to combat discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation or gender identity, adopted on 31 March 2010. 486. OSCE/ODIHR, “Hate Crimes in the OSCE Region – Incidents and Responses. Annual Report for 2009”, Warsaw, 2010, p. 13; Committee of Ministers Recommendation on measures to combat discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation or gender identity, CM/Rec(2010)5, adopted on 31 March 2010. Appendix | 131 Hate speech against LGBT people refers to public expressions which spread, incite, promote or justify hatred, discrimination or hostility487 towards LGBT people – for example, statements made by political and religious leaders or other opinion leaders circulated by the press or the Internet which aim to incite hatred. Heteronormativity can be defi ned as the institutions, structures of under- standing and practical orientations that make heterosexuality seem coherent, natural and privileged. It involves the assumption that everyone is hetero- sexual, and that heterosexuality is the ideal and superior to homosexuality or bisexuality. Heteronormativity also includes the privileging of normative expressions of gender – what is required or imposed on individuals in order for them to be perceived or accepted as “a real man” or “a real woman” as the only available categories.488 Homophobia is defi ned as an irrational fear of, and aversion to, homosexu- ality and to lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender persons based on prej- udice.489 Transphobia refers to a similar phenomenon, but specifi cally to the fear of, and aversion to, transgender persons or gender non-conformity. Manifestations of homophobia and transphobia include discrimination, criminalisation, marginalisation, social exclusion and violence on grounds of sexual orientation or gender identity.490 Intersex people are persons who are born with chromosomical, hormonal levels or genital characteristics which do not correspond to the given standard of “male” or “female” categories as for sexual or reproductive anatomy. This word has replaced the term “hermaphrodite”, which was extensively used by medical practitioners during the 18th and 19th centuries. Intersexuality may take different forms and cover a wide range of conditions.491 LGBT people or LGBT persons is an umbrella term used to encompass lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender persons. It is a heterogeneous group that is often bundled together under the LGBT heading in social and political arenas. Sometimes LGBT is extended to include intersex and queer persons (LGBTIQ). Multiple discrimination describes discrimination that takes place on the basis of several grounds operating separately.492 Another term often used in 487. Based on the defi nition in Committee of Ministers Recommendation No. R(97)20 on “hate speech”, adopted on 30 October 1997. 488. Based on Warner M., “Introduction: Fear of a Queer Planet”, Social Text, 9 (4 [29]), 1991, pp. 3–17; Rosenberg T., Queerfeministisk Agenda, Arena, Stockholm, 2002; RFSL, Open Up Your Workplace: Challenging Homophobia and Heteronormativity, 2007. 489. European Parliament resolution on homophobia in Europe (P6_TA(2006)0018 (PE 368.248)). 490. Committee of Ministers Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)5 on measures to combat discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation or gender identity, adopted 31 March 2010. 491. World Health Organization, “Genetic components of Sex and Gender”. See also Federal Anti-Discrimination Agency, Benachteiligung von Trans Personen, insbesondere im Arbeitsleben, Berlin, 2010, p. 11. 492. European Commission, Tackling Multiple Discrimination. Practices, Policies and Laws, 2007. 132 | Discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity in Europe this regard is intersectional discrimination, which refers to a situation where several grounds operate and interact with each other at the same time in such a way that they are inseparable.493 Queer is a term laden with various meanings and a long history, but currently often denotes persons who do not wish to be identifi ed with reference to traditional notions of gender and sexual orientation and eschew heterosexual, heteronormative and gender-binary categorisations. It is also a theory, which offers a critical perspective into heteronormativity. Sexual orientation is understood to refer to each person’s capacity for profound emotional, affectional and sexual attraction to, and intimate and sexual relations with, individuals of a different gender (heterosexual) or the same gender (homosexual, lesbian, gay) or more than one gender (bisexual).494 Transgender persons include persons who have a gender identity which is different from the gender assigned to them at birth and those people who wish to portray their gender identity in a different way from the gender assigned at birth. It includes those people who feel they have to, prefer to, or choose to, whether by clothing, accessories, mannerisms, speech patterns, cosmetics or body modifi cation, present themselves differently from the expectations of the gender role assigned to them at birth. This includes, among many others, persons who do not identify with the labels “male” or “female”, transsexuals, transvestites and cross-dressers.495 A transgender man is a person who was assigned “female” at birth but has a gender identity which is “male” or within a masculine gender identity spectrum. A transgender woman is a person who was assigned “male” at birth but has a gender identity which is female or within a feminine gender identity spectrum. Analogous labels for sexual orientation of transgender people are used according to their gender identity rather than the gender assigned to them at birth. A heterosexual transgender man, for example, is a transgender man who is attracted to female partners. A lesbian transgender woman is attracted to female partners. The word transgenderism refers to the fact of possessing a transgender identity or expression. Transsexual refers to a person who has a gender identity which does not correspond to the sex assigned at birth and consequently feels a profound need to permanently correct that sex and to modify bodily appearance or function by undergoing gender reassignment treatment. Transvestite (cross-dresser) describes a person who regularly, although part- time, wears clothes mostly associated with the opposite gender to her or his birth gender. 493. Ibid. 494. Yogyakarta Principles on the Application of International Human Rights Law in relation to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, 2008. 495. Defi nition based on Commissioner for Human Rights, “Human Rights and Gender Identity”. Issue Paper, Strasbourg, 2009. 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work_ybvnpmcgpjflxe3qbhdtayi77y	----	1 Ensuring Protection against Caste Discrimination in Britain: Should the Equality Act 2010 be extended? Annapurna Waughray and Meena Dhanda* Abstract: Section 97 of the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013 requires the addition of caste to the Equality Act 2010 by secondary legislation as ‘an aspect of’ the protected characteristic of race; but despite being mandated, no secondary legislation has been introduced and the addition of caste remains contested by some academics, civil society organisations, and politicians who question the adequacy of any definition of caste, the estimates of the extent of caste discrimination, and whether legal protection against caste discrimination already exists under the Equality Act. In this article we assess whether legal protection against caste discrimination is now assured following the Employment Tribunal judgment in September 2015 in Tirkey v Chandhok & Anor which held that discrimination on grounds of caste, depending on the facts, might be capable of falling within the scope of race as currently defined in the Equality Act. We argue that Tirkey is significant but not decisive and that it remains open to government to extend the Equality Act to cover caste. Keywords: caste, caste discrimination, Equality Act 2010, discrimination, discrimination law, equality law, race, ethnic origins, Jati, Adivasi, Tirkey v Chandhok 1. Introduction In April 2010 there was mixed reaction – jubilation for some, dismay for others - at the inclusion of s. 9(5)(a) in the Equality Act 2010 (EA), an enabling provision which provided a power for caste to be added in the future, by secondary legislation, to s. 9(1) of the Act as ‘an aspect of’ the protected characteristic of race, defined in the legislation as including colour, nationality, and ethnic or national origins. In April 2013, s. 97 of the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013 (ERRA) converted the ‘caste power’ in EA s. 9(5)(a) into a duty, thereby requiring government to introduce secondary legislation to add caste to race - although it gave no indication as to how this was to be done.1 In July 2013 the coalition government published a timetable for the introduction of the secondary legislation which included two public consultations on the proposed legislation, going up to and beyond the May 2015 General Election. 2 A year later, in July 2014, with no consultation document 2 unveiled, the Government was questioned in Parliament about the delay. The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Women and Equalities, Helen Grant, explained that the UK’s Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC) had originally intended to commission research to establish “baseline data” inter alia on the scale of caste discrimination in the UK, but had decided that such research might be intrusive and damaging to community relations. The Government was therefore conducting a study on the feasibility of carrying out such research;3 but as at the time of writing this study had not been published.4 No secondary legislation was introduced by the then Conservative - Lib-Dem coalition government (2010- 2015) and the Conservative government which came to power in May 2015 has not formally announced whether it intends to introduce legislation or not. In coalition the Conservatives were opposed to extending discrimination legislation to cover caste, and conceded to s. 97 of the ERRA only because the government suffered a last-minute defeat on the issue in the House of Lords (Waughray, 2014). 5 At present, over five and a half years since the enactment of the EA there is still no statutory prohibition of caste discrimination in British discrimination law, and despite being mandated in 2013, the addition of caste in the EA remains highly contested. The existence of, first, a statutory power and subsequently a statutory duty to make caste an aspect of race in the EA has raised the visibility of caste as a ground of discrimination and has given rise on the one hand to an expectation of legal protection against caste discrimination, on the other hand to vocal opposition to the principle of introducing a statutory prohibition of caste discrimination in the UK. Against this backdrop, and in the absence of an explicit statutory prohibition of such discrimination, it was inevitable that claimants would seek to persuade the courts that caste is already covered by the EA under one or more existing protected characteristics. Since the EA came into force, UK Employment Tribunals have been asked to determine in two cases whether caste is or could be subsumed within race as currently defined, specifically within the concept of ethnic origins. In Naveed v Aslam in 2012 the Employment Tribunal held that it could not;6 but in Tirkey v Chandhok & Anor in September 2015 the Employment Tribunal held that the claimant was the victim of unlawful harassment on grounds of race and that her treatment was because of her ethnic origins, defined by reference to her inherited position in society (in whole or in part on the basis of her caste), her birth, and her upbringing.7 Tirkey is the first UK case in which caste has formed an element of a successful race discrimination claim, and the judgment was immediately hailed in the media as a legal landmark.8 However, it does not resolve the question of whether in principle caste falls within the scope of race in the EA as currently worded. Supporters of caste discrimination legislation argue that the outcome in Tirkey should not be used as an excuse to further delay or abandon introducing 3 a statutory prohibition of caste discrimination as mandated by parliament. Opponents of legislation, including the 2010-15 coalition government and the Conservative government of David Cameron, have argued that there is insufficient evidence of caste discrimination in the UK to justify legislation; that introducing statutory protection against caste discrimination is socially divisive and will damage community cohesion; and that caste is already covered within the scope of existing discrimination legislation, as shown by Tirkey. Organisations such as the Alliance of Hindu Organisations and the National Council of Hindu Temples UK further argue that the demand for caste discrimination legislation, and the outcome in Tirkey, reflect Christian evangelical denigration of what they have begun to term the global ‘Dharmic community’ (Hindus, Sikhs and Jains), 9 a phenomenon allegedly rooted in colonialism whose perpetrators have ‘created’ the ‘caste system’ (Shah, 2014) as representing the immorality and degeneracy, in their eyes, of Indic religions and cultures.10 In this article we assess the current position vis a vis the legal regulation of caste discrimination. We ask whether legal protection against caste discrimination is now assured by the Tirkey judgment, or whether irrespective of the outcome in Tirkey the EA should be extended to cover caste. We argue that, notwithstanding the prevarication of successive governments on the introduction of caste legislation, an important impact of the change made in April 2013 to the EA was the creation of the climate in which the Tirkey case could be brought. We explain the political and legal background to the inclusion of the ‘caste power’ in EA s. 9(5)(a) and the circumstances which resulted in the power being converted, in 2013, into a duty to add caste; we introduce the concepts of caste and caste discrimination in the UK context; we take stock of legal developments since 2010, including an analysis and evaluation of the Tirkey judgment; and we conclude by reflecting on the alternative options available to the government to ensure legal protection against caste discrimination in accordance with its international law obligations. 2. Caste in the Equality Act 2010: Legal and Political Context11 The movement to secure legal protection against caste discrimination in the UK gained momentum in the early 2000s against the backdrop of growing international awareness of discrimination on grounds of caste, coupled with frustration among Dalits (formerly known as ‘Untouchables’) at the perceived lack of legal redress in Britain for such discrimination.12 Caste is a prohibited ground of discrimination in the legal orders of a number of States, including India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Burkina Faso, and Mauritius, but the term caste is not found in any international human rights instrument, and until its appearance in EA s. 9(5)(a) the term did not appear in UK discrimination law.13 In India, caste discrimination (alongside discrimination on grounds of religion, race, sex, and place of 4 birth) is prohibited in the 1950 Constitution of India (COI), drafted following independence in 1947.14 The COI also abolishes ‘Untouchability’ and criminalises its practice,15 and provides for affirmative action measures for Scheduled Castes (the official administrative term for ex- Untouchables) and Scheduled Tribes (the administrative term for tribal peoples or ‘Adivasis’) in the form of quotas in higher education, public sector and government employment, and political representation.16 India also has legislation in place prohibiting hate crimes against Scheduled Castes (although unlike the UK, India lacks civil anti-discrimination legislation). The same legislation prohibits hate crime against Scheduled Tribes (Adivasis). 17 It was assumed that as a result of these measures, discrimination, inequality, and violence on grounds of caste would be quickly eradicated. This did not happen, and by the early 1980s Indian activists had begun to look beyond India, to UN fora and non-governmental organisations, for help in challenging the abysmal social and economic conditions and discrimination faced by many Dalits (Bob, 2007). As a result of their efforts, by the mid- 1990s the UN human rights system had begun to take cognisance of caste discrimination and oppression as a human rights issue. The response came from two UN bodies in particular: the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination or CERD, the monitoring body of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 1965 (ICERD, to which India and the UK have been parties since 1968 and 1969 respectively); and the former UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights (now the Human Rights Council Advisory Committee). Racial discrimination is defined in Article 1(1) of ICERD as discrimination on grounds of race, colour, descent, national origins, and ethnic origins. In 1996 CERD affirmed that caste is captured by Article 1(1), within the sub-category of descent. 18 CERD’s interpretation of descent as including caste was reiterated in 2002 in its General Recommendation No. 29 in which it affirmed that discrimination based on descent ’includes discrimination against members of communities based on forms of social stratification such as caste and analogous systems of inherited status which nullify or impair their equal enjoyment of human rights.’ 19 In the meantime, in 2000 the then UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights declared discrimination based on work and descent - a new legal category which includes but is wider than discrimination based on caste - to be a violation of international human rights law, commissioning what would be the first of three experts’ reports on the phenomenon.20 Since 2002 CERD has enquired about discrimination based on descent, including caste and ‘analogous systems of inherited status’, in a number of States including India, Japan, Nepal, and the UK. CERD’s interpretation of descent as including caste is rejected by India and Japan – although not by the UK or Nepal. The UK’s response to recommendations by CERD in 2003 and again in 5 2011 to introduce domestic legislation to address descent-based discrimination including discrimination on grounds of caste, rather than challenge CERD’s interpretation of descent, has been to argue that the UK does not have a problem of caste discrimination requiring a legislative solution (Waughray, 2014). In Britain there has been a Dalit presence since the 1960s.21 Academic studies show that as a ‘minority within a minority’ Dalits in Britain have faced not only ‘external’ discrimination, as South Asians, by the majority community but also ‘internal’ discrimination on grounds of caste from fellow South Asians.22 The EA now provides comprehensive protection against discrimination on nine grounds, or protected characteristics (age, disability, gender reassignment, marriage and civil partnership, pregnancy and maternity, race, religion or belief, sex, and sexual orientation); but it has been argued that pragmatism rather than principle continues to drive decisions as to whether the legislation should be extended (O’Cinneide and Lui, 2015). The absence of the term ‘caste’ in British discrimination law prior to the EA meant that there was no cause of action for caste discrimination unless claimants could successfully argue that caste was subsumed within an existing protected characteristic such as race or, after 2003, religion or belief. This remains the case given that caste has not yet been explicitly added to the prohibited grounds of discrimination, or protected characteristics, in the EA. In 2000, a UK-based Dalit non-governmental organisation (NGO), Voice of Dalit International, organised an International Conference on Dalit Human Rights in London which called for caste be added to UK discrimination law, demanding that ‘laws which address discrimination based on racism should take cognisance of casteism and place it on a par with racism’ (Muman, 2000). The legislation in force at that time, the Race Relations Act 1976 (RRA), prohibited discrimination on racial grounds, meaning colour, race, nationality or ethnic or national origins or by reference to membership of a racial group defined by the same grounds. These terms were not defined in the legislation; instead, their meaning was developed through case law. Dalit NGOs argued that there was a gap in the existing law because caste could not be captured by race or ethnic origins given that perpetrators and victims of caste discrimination often shared the same race and/or ethnic origins as then understood. In 2005 the then Labour government announced its intention to introduce a new, single, Equality Act. Dalit NGOs seized this opportunity to campaign for the addition of caste to the legislation, submitting responses to the government’s consultation process, collecting and publishing evidence of caste discrimination, organising conferences on caste and British equality law, and lobbying parliamentarians.23 This activity was mirrored by those opposed to the inclusion of caste in the new legislation, primarily South Asian religious and 6 civil society organisations, who either disputed the existence of caste discrimination altogether or argued that there was no such discrimination in spheres regulated by discrimination law (Waughray, 2009). When the Equality Bill was published in April 2009, caste was not included. The government’s primary reason was that there was insufficient evidence of a problem requiring a legislative solution (for example discrimination occurring in legally-regulated fields); a secondary reason was that caste could already be covered by existing protected characteristics (Waughray, 2009; Waughray, 2013). Advocates of caste discrimination legislation argued not only that such discrimination did occur in both regulated and unregulated spheres, but that it could only partially be captured by existing legislation on race and religion or belief discrimination, and that to establish in the courts that discrimination on grounds of caste is covered by existing legislation would be an extremely costly and uncertain process (Waughray, 2009; Waughray, 2014; Dhanda et al, 2014a). Between April 2009 when the Bill was published and April 2010 when the EA was adopted, caste was transformed from a legally and politically invisible issue to a visible issue, largely due to the efforts of Dalit organisations for whom the possibility of securing legal protection against caste discrimination in the new legislation was perceived as a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity. The question for legislators – indeed, for all - was whether caste could fall within the ambit of an existing ground of discrimination. If it could, did this therefore mean that a statutory prohibition of caste discrimination was unnecessary? If it could not, did this mean that caste should be introduced as a new, distinct, ground? (Waughray, 2009). RRA case law on ‘racial grounds’ had focussed on the meaning of ethnic origins rather than race as such. The leading case on ethnic origins, Mandla v Dowell Lee (1983), established that ‘ethnic origins’ or membership of an ethnic group is not synonymous with ‘race’ in a narrow, biological sense but is to be construed ‘relatively widely’ in a broad cultural/historic sense. For a group to constitute an ethnic group, it must regard itself and be regarded by others as a distinct community by virtue of certain characteristics, two of which are essential: a distinct, living and long shared history as a group; and a cultural tradition of its own, including family and social customs, often but not necessarily associated with religious observance.24 On this basis Sikhs, Jews, Romani gypsies, and Irish travellers have been held to be ethnic groups; but Rastafarians and Muslims have not.25 Whether and how the Mandla definition could apply to caste groups was unclear. It was by attempting to address this question from the mid-2000s onwards that one of the authors first drew attention to the challenge of capturing caste in domestic discrimination law.26 It was inevitable, given the growing awareness of caste and caste discrimination in the UK, that 7 arguments that ‘ethnic origins’ include caste would eventually come before the courts. In 2009 the UK Supreme Court in R (E) v JFS had held that ‘ethnic origins’ in domestic law includes the notions of a person’s birth, lineage, descent, or ancestry – descent being the category in the ICERD definition of racial discrimination which has been affirmed by CERD as including caste (see above), although it has never been a category in domestic race discrimination legislation. 27 This led successive governments to argue that caste could already be covered by race as currently defined in the EA by virtue of the descent aspect of ethnic origins; but as has been argued elsewhere, ‘in order to construe caste as part of race in domestic law following the JFS route, a three-fold interpretive leap had to be made; caste must be viewed as part of descent, itself part of ethnic origins, which in turn is a sub-set of race’ (Dhanda et al., 2014a: 15). The enabling provision permitting caste to be added at a future date ‘as an aspect of’ race came to be included in the EA as the result of a last-minute House of Lords amendment to the Bill, which was unopposed by the then Labour government due to the need to reach agreement on the terms of the Bill before the end of the Parliamentary session. Its inclusion was to prove critical to subsequent developments, but it was not the immediate prohibition of caste discrimination that Dalit organisations had sought, and it located caste within the protected characteristic of race rather than listing it as a separate characteristic. On the other hand, its inclusion pursuant to well-publicised debates in Parliament contributed to a legal climate which was receptive to the pleading of claims of caste discrimination subsequently. By this time, reports by researchers commissioned by Dalit NGOs and community organisations detailing examples of caste-related harassment, humiliation and other discriminatory behaviour had emerged (Mahimaidass and Sadana (DSN), 2006; ACDA, 2009). However, these reports were criticised by sceptics and opponents of legislation as lacking independence and objectivity. 28 In March 2010 the outgoing Labour government commissioned research on caste discrimination from the National Institute of Economic and Social Research (NIESR). Due to its small scale, its evidence was deemed unconvincing by some and insufficient by others,29 but it confirmed the existence of caste in Great Britain as well as evidence suggesting the occurrence of discrimination based on caste in regulated fields (NIESR Report: Metcalfe, 2010). In September 2013 the EHRC, at the request of government, commissioned independent research from a team of academics (including the present authors) to help inform the introduction of the statutory prohibition of caste discrimination pursuant to the requirement in the ERRA. As part of the EHRC Caste in Britain research, two events were organised: an experts’ seminar and a workshop for extended dialogue between three sets of ‘stakeholders’: representatives of those opposed to legislation, those in support, and those responsible for implementing it; and two research 8 reports were published. The gap in perception between the first two sets of stakeholders was replayed in the stakeholders’ workshop conducted as a part of the EHRC research (Dhanda et al 2014b). The widest divergence was in the written answers to one specific question in the statements submitted by stakeholders: ‘Have you directly or indirectly come across any instances of discrimination, harassment or victimisation related to the issue of caste in the UK? Please give examples if you can.’ Opponents of legislation uniformly answered ‘no’, whilst supporters of legislation gave examples of perceived caste discrimination. Following the workshop, the Alliance of Hindu Organisations (AHO), one of the main opponents of legislation, did shift its position to accept the existence of ‘pockets of discrimination’.30 To understand the divergence of views, partly resting on differing estimates of conceptual difficulties in including caste in the EA, we turn now to the meaning of caste and caste discrimination both in the international context and in the UK.31 3. Explaining Caste and Tracking Caste Discrimination The meaning of the term ‘caste’, the social phenomena it seeks to capture, the processes linked to the perpetuation of caste in one form or another, and the relationship between ‘caste’, class, and race, continue to be debated in social sciences literature. We agree with the historian Susan Bayly (1999: 6) that ‘caste [is] a dynamic and multi-dimensional reality of Indian life, rather than an orientalist fiction or monolithic cultural code.’ Diaspora from South Asia have continued to practise some forms of ‘caste’ behaviour, and it is clear from the existence of the many caste-based organisations in the UK 32 and from the regular online advertisements for marital partners specifying ‘Religion/Caste’, (e.g. a Jain/Vania from Ealing or a Hindu/Brahmin from Dundee)33 that caste identification is present in the UK.34 The Portuguese origin of the term ‘caste’ from ‘casta’ (Bayly, 1999: 106; Guha, 2014: 21), which predates the English word ‘caste’ by more than two centuries, is used by some commentators to challenge its ability to capture Indic forms of social organisation. In our view this challenge fails to appreciate the ways in which the phenomenon of ‘caste’ has repeatedly adapted so as to redefine and reproduce boundaries between groups (Vishwanath, 2014). Birth-ascribed status is usually accepted as the basis of membership of a bounded group, but this is so only if a person’s group membership is acknowledged by others. In the case of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in India, so-named because they are listed by caste/tribe name in Schedules to the COI, certificates issued by the State authorities identify individuals as members of a Scheduled Caste or Tribe (and hence entitled to the benefit of affirmative action measures). In the UK, caste certification does not exist, and no-one advocates adoption of this model, hence recognition of inherited 9 caste or tribal status rests either on one’s assignment by others to a particular group or sub- group, or on one’s own self-definition or self-identification (sometimes through membership of caste-based organisations). Similarly, the practice of endogamy (rules which determine who can or cannot be a marriage partner) reinforces caste identity. Once labelled with a caste/tribal identity, restrictive social interaction, rank ordering of groups, albeit contested, and possible discriminatory behaviour may follow. The earliest Indian references to caste and its origins appear in the Rg Veda (15000 BCE), the ancient Sanskrit text which represents Hindu society as divided into four varnas or social classes: Brahmin (priests), Kshatriya (warriors, rulers), Vaishya (traders, artisans) and Shudra (labourers). In the South Asian context the term caste also refers to the concept of jati, meaning hereditary-membership of endogamous ‘caste’ groups, with region-specific hierarchical ordering. The concept of jati is cultural and cross-religious; it is not limited to Hindus. The number of caste groups (jatis) in India is estimated to be anywhere between 2000-4000. Data on caste affiliation in the first three British Indian Censuses (1865, 1872, 1881) were based on the four-fold Hindu varna division but thereafter shifted away from the religious to the occupational criterion, i.e. caste as essentially guilds, initiated by Census Commissioner Denzil Ibbetson in the 1891 Census (Bannerjee-Dube, 2008: xxxviii) and continued until 1935. The anthropologist Balmurli Natrajan describes the ways in which ‘caste’ is normalised and presented as a benign form of cultural grouping when in fact it continues to play a crucial role in the exercise and monopoly of social, political, economic, and cultural power (Natrajan, 2012). In the UK, when victims bring forward claims of harassment, discrimination, or victimization on grounds of caste, understanding the normalisation of casteist patterns of interaction enables us to recognise the common patterns of behaviour used to stigmatise others – looking down on others, attaching prejudicial characteristics to others, treating others as unworthy of an equal moral status, considering others ‘unclean’, ostracising others if they refuse to follow caste norms, treating others with contempt: these would be some of the ways of recognising caste discrimination. These ‘normalised’ patterns of interaction apply to treatment of tribal peoples as well as caste groups, but as pointed out in Dhanda (2014a: 3) ‘sociologically speaking, the distinction between caste and tribe is to some extent arbitrary and reified by law’. Tribal peoples in particular were ‘primitivized’ and infantilized under colonialism (Chandra 2013: 161). However, the ‘caste/tribe divide’ is not how ‘colonial subjects saw themselves’; it was the Scheduled Districts Act 1874 that ‘separated castes and tribes by law’ (ibid.). The 10 arbitrariness of this distinction is crucial to note in the context of the judgment in Tirkey, discussed below. Dr. Prakash Shah, a legal academic opposed to caste discrimination legislation, has argued that the lack of a single, agreed definition of caste reflects a lack of clarity as to what concepts the English word ‘caste’ refers to, and that the term has been mapped onto Indian/ South Asian cultural phenomena in a way which only distorts them; for these reasons, he argues, ‘caste’ cannot and should not be included in the EA (Shah, 2014; Shah, 2015a). However, victims of caste discrimination in the UK have not found the lack of a detailed, agreed definition of ‘caste’ restrictive in describing the harassment they have had to contend with (Kumar, 1990; ACDA 2009). Interviews with Dalit respondents in the West Midlands, whilst showing a generational difference in the way the old and the young acknowledge, remember, and respond to caste slights (Dhanda, 2014), nonetheless reveal a common factor: they all hope that a change in the law would improve conditions for them. Caste/tribal status in South Asia is tied to unequal access to resources such as land and water, opportunities such as education and employment, and to political power, as well as acts of humiliation, stigmatisation and, frequently, violence (Thorat and Newman, 2010; Guru, 2009). In the different socio-political environment of the UK, humiliations vary in degree from subtle forms of disrespect and name-calling (e.g. in schools), through to inferiorising of groups, exclusion (e.g. in employment), and refusal of service (DSN, 2006; ACDA, 2009; Metcalf and Rolfe, 2010; Dhanda, 2009, 2015; Ghuman, 2011). The EHRC Caste in Britain reports noted that caste awareness is not necessarily declining or confined to older generations and new cases continue to emerge (Dhanda et al 2014a and 2014b). Some of these cases might be legally actionable under the EA if caste is covered by the legislation, either by explicit inclusion or via judicial interpretation of existing characteristics. But it is important to note that such cases of denigration have the corrosive effect of turning routine confrontations into potentially violent conflicts, ultimately far more risky for the victims of discrimination than the perpetrators, because of the deepening sense of helplessness with every insult that remains unacknowledged as such. In extreme cases, confrontations due to caste divides have led to loss of life, even in the UK.35 Unfortunately, there is persistent denial of hidden caste prejudice by some of the so-called upper castes who posit caste identity as a benign ethnic identity, failing to note that, as argued elsewhere, ‘carrying the ‘caste mark’ as a confrontational identity in the face of denigration is different from carrying it as uncritical mark of pride’ (Dhanda, 2015: 41). The former may be a necessary strategy of drawing strength from a collective, the latter is the insouciance of the already powerful. 11 The difference in the political pressure exerted by competing lobbies on the government of the day might end up determining the direction the law will take. In section 5 below, we discuss the alternatives open to Government in the light of the judgment in Tirkey which was eagerly awaited by all sides in the debate, and which we discuss next. 4. Case law with special reference to Tirkey v Chandhok & Anor The inclusion of caste within ethnic origins has been argued in three cases. The first, Begraj and Anor v Heer Manak Solicitors and Ors, a pre-EA case, collapsed in February 2013 before judgment was reached, due to judicial recusal. 36 The first post-EA caste discrimination case in which judgment was reached, Naveed v Aslam and Ors (2012), involved a claim of unlawful racial discrimination on account of caste by a Pakistani restaurant worker against his employers, the owners of an Indian restaurant. The Employment Tribunal (ET) held that the claim of caste discrimination was doomed to failure for two reasons; first, because no order had been made extending EA s. 9(1) so as to provide for caste to amount of itself to an aspect of race; and secondly because it was impossible for the claimant’s caste to fall under the existing definition of ethnic origins given that the claimant and respondent were from the ‘same’ caste (described in the judgment as the ‘Arain Pakistani caste’); the ET concluded that the claimant was being treated differently because of his class, not his caste. As explained elsewhere by one of the authors, the ET failed to consider that the Claimant and the Respondents may have been of different sub- castes or jatis – and hence of different status - within the wider group or caste to which they both belonged (Waughray, 2014: 17). The third case, Tirkey v Chandhok and Anor, concerned an Indian domestic servant employed in a private home in the UK. It involved egregious violations of employment rights and unlawful discrimination contrary to the EA which the claimant, Ms. Permila Tirkey, alleged had occurred for reasons related to her ethnic origins including her perceived status in the caste system. There are three judgments in this case: the first, in 2013, followed a preliminary hearing in the ET on an application by the Respondents to strike out the caste element of the Claimant’s amended claim (Tribunal 2013); the second, in 2014, was a judgment of the Employment Appeal Tribunal (EAT) on appeal from the ET’s refusal to strike out the amendment (Appeal Tribunal 2014); the third was the judgment in the substantive ET hearing in September 2015 (Tribunal 2015). 37 Ms Tirkey’s claim was for unpaid wages, unfair dismissal, violations of the Employment Rights Act 1996 and the Working Time Regulations 1998, direct discrimination or harassment on grounds of race, specifically ethnic origins including her inherited position in society in whole or in part because of her caste, and direct or indirect discrimination on grounds of religion or belief. Ms Tirkey was recruited 12 in India by the respondents, Mr and Mrs Chandhok, to work for them as a domestic servant in their UK home. During the four and a half years of her employment Ms Tirkey was subjected to conditions of work and an environment which the ET found violated her dignity and created an atmosphere of degradation (Tribunal 2015, 211). In her evidence Ms Tirkey described her family as ‘”Adivasi” [i.e. tribal] people who are dark skinned and poor’, the ‘lowest class’ in ‘“the caste pyramid”’ (Tribunal 2015, 8). She described herself as a Christian, of the ‘servant class’, ‘“low caste”’, with no employment expectations other than domestic service. This evidence was not challenged by the Chandhoks and was accepted as fact by the Tribunal (Tribunal 2015, 9-10, 24). In May 2013 – shortly after the introduction of the ERRA requirement that caste must be made an aspect of race in EA s. 9(1) - the claimant was permitted to amend her original claim of race and religious discrimination by inserting a new paragraph averring that ‘her ethnic and/or national origins includes (sic) but is not limited to her status in the caste system as perceived by the Respondents’ (Tribunal 2013, 2; Appeal Tribunal 2014, 6). Her amended claim argued that ICERD prohibits discrimination on grounds of descent, descent has been interpreted by CERD to include caste, the EU Race Directive adopts the principles in ICERD, and the EA implements the Race Directive, therefore the EA should be interpreted as prohibiting caste discrimination. In the new paragraph the claimant averred that ‘the and/or a reason why she was recruited and treated in the manner alleged was that the Respondents concluded she was of a lower status to them’, and that ‘this view was tainted by caste considerations’ (Tribunal 2013, 2; Appeal Tribunal 2014, 6). The Respondents denied all the allegations. They applied for the caste discrimination element of the claim to be struck out on the grounds that it had no reasonable prospect of success because – following Naveed - the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to consider it. In a preliminary hearing in December 2013 the ET refused the application. The fact that the government had decided to legislate to make caste an aspect of the protected characteristic of race was not determinative of the issue (Tribunal 2013, 26.5). The ET ruled that EA s. 9(1) ‘can and should be construed in such a way as to provide for caste discrimination in the context of this case [emphasis added] to be part of the protected characteristic of race discrimination’ (sic) (Tribunal 2013, 26.3). The Respondents appealed. In December 2014 the Honourable Mr Justice Langstaff (President of the EAT), sitting alone, refused the appeal, upheld the ET decision, and referred the case back to the ET. He held that ‘though “caste” as an autonomous concept did not presently come within the EA s. 9(1) many of the facts relevant in considering caste in many of its forms might be capable of doing so since “ethnic origins” had a wide and flexible ambit including characteristics determined by “descent”’, and it was ‘possible that the facts found in hearing 13 the present claim might come within the scope of that phrase’ (Appeal Tribunal 2014, Summary). Langstaff P noted that the claimant’s amendment raised ‘no separate claim of caste discrimination as such’; yet it was precisely on the basis that the amendment did raise such a claim that the application to strike it out was pursued (Appeal Tribunal 2014, 7, 8). He identified two central questions; first, whether the predecessor to the EA, the Race Relations Act 1976 (RRA), provided a remedy for discrimination in the factual circumstances which the claimant proposed in her claim to establish in evidence; second, whether, if so, the fact that the EA, as originally enacted and as amended by the ERRA, envisaged the addition of caste to s. 9(1) meant that any claim asserting ‘caste’ reasons for less favourable treatment was precluded, such that the law no longer provided a remedy for them (Appeal Tribunal 2014, 33). The answer to the first question lay in the principles expressed in the two principal authorities on the scope of race in the RRA, Mandla and JFS,38 the effect of which, he found, is to give a wide and flexible scope to the meaning of “ethnic origins” and, given the emphasis on the word “origins” in that phrase, descent is, as JFS shows, clearly to be included within it, at least where it is linked to concepts of ethnicity (Appeal Tribunal 2014, 42). Langstaff P also noted that once a statute is enacted it has the meaning that courts assign to it; Parliament’s own view as to that which the legislation meant cannot be conclusive as to its meaning (Appeal Tribunal 2014, 43). Langstaff P found that the issue of whether “caste” as a distinct concept exists as a separate strand in the definition of race was not determinative; the effect of EA s. 9(5) as amended by the ERRA was to clarify or supplement s. 9(1) (the component elements of race), not to restrict it (Appeal Tribunal 2014, 44, 52). He concluded that ‘there may be factual circumstances in which the application of the label “caste” is appropriate, many of which are capable – depending on their facts – of falling within the scope of s. 9(1), particularly coming within “ethnic origins”, as portraying a group with characteristics determined in part by descent, and of a sufficient quality to be described as “ethnic”’(Appeal Tribunal 2014, 51). As a postscript he added that, although the parties may have been hoping for a definitive decision in principle that caste discrimination either was, or was not, within the scope of the EA, he did not see his role as being to resolve academic disputes or establish more general propositions; rather, his focus was the appeal in this particular case, in its particular circumstances (Appeal Tribunal 2014, 55). Judgment in the merits hearing was delivered on 17 September 2015. The ET reiterated the EAT’s finding that ‘the fact that there is no single definition of caste [as the parties were 14 agreed] does not mean that a situation to which that label can, in one of its manifestations, be attached cannot and does not fall within the scope of “ethnic origins”’ (Appeal Tribunal 2014, 45; Tribunal 2015, 199). Regarding the race discrimination and/or harassment claim, Ms Tirkey’s argument was that her ethnic origins, including her nationality and her hereditary position in society (in whole or in part on the basis of her caste) was the reason she was treated as she was by the Chandhoks. The extent of the control, exploitation, humiliation, and negation of personal autonomy suffered by Ms Tirkey during the course of her employment with the Chandhoks is evident from the judgment. The Tribunal found that she slept at all times on a mattress on the floor and was not given a bed; she was denied access to her own passport by the Respondents; she had no control over the bank account opened by the Respondents in her name; she worked on an ‘on-call’ basis seven days per week which meant that she was unable to attend church; her personal freedoms and movement were restricted (for example she was not allowed to go out on her own); she was denied access to English language classes; she had no access to money and was unable to contact her family or to buy clothes or personal effects; she wore second hand clothes not of her choice or taste, provided by the family (Tribunal 2015, 251-253). The Tribunal found that Ms Tirkey was recruited in India to work in the UK because the Respondents wanted someone of Indian descent, whose inherited position was as Ms Tirkey’s: ‘a low caste, servile, Indian person who could not speak English.’ They did not seek a UK-based employee ‘because no such person would have accepted the intended conditions of work, either as to physical conditions, workload, or payment/ non-payment’ (Tribunal 2015, 205-211). We argue that the conduct described in the judgment is indicative of the normalized behaviours of humiliation, exploitation, and control typical within relationships of subordination marked by caste and/or tribe difference.39 Such extreme behaviour may not be equally evident in other cases of caste and/or tribe discrimination of the kind catalogued in the official and community reports noted above; but the judgment provides valuable insight as to the patterns and types of behaviour through which caste discrimination and harassment are manifested. 5. Concluding Reflections The Government’s present position on the duty to make caste an ‘aspect of race’ in the EA following Tirkey is indicated in its responses to written parliamentary questions in November and December 2015. In the House of Lords on 10 November 2015, in response to a question asking the Government to clarify how the Tirkey judgment has changed the law on 15 caste discrimination, the answer was that ‘the judgment suggests there is an existing legal remedy for claims of caste-associated discrimination, under the “ethnic origins” element of s.9 EA.’40 When asked on 14 December 2015 why they had not yet published the 2014 feasibility study on caste discrimination, the Government’s written answer on 21 December 2015 was: ‘We are currently considering the conclusions and recommendations of the caste feasibility study as part of our wider consideration of the implications of the Tirkey v Chandhok tribunal judgments.’ 41 We suggest that the implications of Tirkey for the addition of caste to the EA are significant but not decisive. In conclusion we explain why we think so. The ET in Tirkey found, on the basis of the facts, numerous violations of UK employment law by the Chandhoks, moreover that they engaged in unwanted conduct which had the purpose or effect of violating their employee’s dignity and creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading or offensive environment for her contrary to the harassment provisions in s. 26 of the EA.42 The ET found that this mistreatment was related to Ms Tirkey’s race, specifically her ethnic origins, defined as her birth, her descent, her inherited position in society or caste, and her background and upbringing. Rather than seek a UK-based employee who would not have accepted to be treated in the way it was intended to treat Ms Tirkey, the Chandhoks deliberately flouted UK immigration law in order to secure her entry to the UK. 43 The Chandhoks knew or believed her to be an Adivasi; Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes/Adivasis in India, despite being differently categorised, legally and administratively (a distinction inherited from colonial times – see above), are afforded similar protections by the Constitution of India 1950 and by hate crimes legislation, and share a common experience of inferiorisation, marginalisation, social exclusion, discrimination, and stigmatisation, on the basis of inherited status and hereditary position in society. Ms Tirkey used the term ‘caste’ to capture this experience, describing herself as both an ‘Adivasi’ and ‘low caste’ – descriptions which were not challenged by the Chandhoks.44 Both these labels are tied to notions of descent, origins, inherited social position, in other words to the concept of ethnic origins. The key point for the ET was whether, on the evidence, the reason for the mistreatment of Ms Tirkey was related to her ethnic origins, whether actual or as perceived by the Chandhoks. The ET found that it was. Ms Tirkey’s legal representatives declared that the judgment renders untenable the Government’s opposition to an explicit statutory prohibition of caste discrimination on the grounds that there is no evidence of such discrimination taking place in the UK.45 Dalit Solidarity Network (DSN) UK on its website acknowledged the ‘excellent outcome for the victim’ but cautioned that ‘despite the fact that the judgement appears to allow for caste discrimination under race and ethnic origin, this case does not set a precedent and future 16 cases may not be covered by existing legislation.’ 46 Lord Lester QC (Lib Dem) was cited by DSN-UK and by the National Secular Society as stating that ‘the decision is of no value as a precedent and the Government should not be allowed to use it as an excuse for defying the will of parliament.’47 For the Government, the Minister for Women and Equalities, Nicky Morgan, when asked in the House of Commons by the chairman of the All Party Parliamentary Group for British Hindus, Bob Blackman (Con), shortly after the judgment whether the Government would now undertake not only not to trigger the provision on caste discrimination in the ERRA ‘but to repeal it so that the Hindu community (sic) will know where it stands legally’, responded that because of Tirkey ‘the law as it stands has changed’; the judgments in the case ‘suggest that legal protection against such discrimination already exists under the Equality Act 2010’. Thus ‘a litigant could now seek to bring a case of caste discrimination in an employment tribunal using the ethnic origin provisions in the Equality Act, which is why we should take time to look at the judgment before making further decisions.’48 The Government has made no comprehensive public statement since Tirkey on the duty to make caste an aspect of race. If it considers Tirkey to establish that discrimination on grounds of caste is covered through judicial interpretation under existing provisions on race, specifically ethnic origins, and that it is therefore unnecessary to make caste an aspect of race in the EA, this could lead to a decision to repeal the statutory duty to add caste to s. 9(1) EA. Alternatively, given the statutory obligation to add caste, the Government could decide that naming caste in some way in s. 9(1) would provide greater clarity than exists under the current EA formulation of race which does not explicitly include caste, thereby ‘future-proofing’ caste discrimination protection against the development of case law in conflict with Tirkey. Making caste an aspect of race in the EA would bring other aspects of the legislation into play, for example the public sector equality duty, and the exceptions provisions applicable to community groups and associations. Alternatively, at this stage the government could do nothing and simply allow matters to develop through case law. As a first-tier Tribunal decision, the merits judgment in Tirkey is of persuasive value but has no binding authority as a precedent. However it can only be appealed on a point of law; and the point of law in question here, namely whether ethnic origins in the EA can include caste, was determined by the EAT whose decision preceded the ET hearing and which, as a legally-binding judgment, the ET was obliged to follow. Unless and until the EAT judgment is overruled by a higher court, lower tribunals are obliged to follow it. However, seen through the eyes of potential victims of caste discrimination, a legitimate fear remains that Tirkey may be 17 overruled in the future, leaving them potentially unprotected unless and until the position that caste discrimination is covered by the existing prohibition of race discrimination becomes common ground and accepted beyond challenge, or until the position is confirmed by the Supreme Court. It is our view that even if the precedential value of Tirkey is ultimately limited, the judgment is valuable in addressing the ‘problem’ of ‘no definition’ of caste. The lack of an agreed definition of caste has annoyed opponents of caste discrimination legislation for some time (even though neither race nor ethnic origins are defined in statute); however, Langstaff P ruled that the lack of a single definition of caste ‘does not mean that a situation to which that label can, in one of its manifestations, be attached cannot and does not fall within the scope of “ethnic origins”’ (Appeal Tribunal 2015, 45). Tirkey illustrates that where discrimination is evident or inferable from the facts, the ET will proceed to ask whether the discrimination is related to the relevant protected characteristic – in this case, race, specifically ethnic origins, including notions of inherited status/ and/or caste/ and/or inherited position in society. However, for the facts to come to light, the claimant has to break out of the silence that is sometimes self-imposed because ill-treatment is a part of normalised conduct. Some victims may feel that this is all someone of their status can expect, and the perpetrator may fail to notice the effect of their exploitative or harassing behaviour. In the case of Ms Tirkey, the exploitative relationship she suffered continued for four and a half years before erupting into a confrontation between her and her employers, and leading to a complaint to the ET which required the support of an NGO, the Anti Trafficking and Labour Exploitation Unit, to come to Tribunal. From the perspective of victims of caste discrimination, the critical outcome is that such discrimination is acknowledged, recognised, and is prohibited by law. Tirkey v Chandhok has opened up the possibility of bringing claims of caste discrimination in the Employment Tribunal via the interpretive route using ethnic origins in EA s. 9(1)(c), a possibility anticipated in Dhanda et al (2014a: 25). It must be stressed that a significant role in facilitating the outcome in Tirkey was played by the passage of ERRA s. 97 in April 2013 preceded by the inclusion in 2010 of the ‘caste power’ in EA s. 9, both of which drew on the work of NGOs, parliamentarians and academics in making visible the hidden phenomenon of caste discrimination. It would be premature, even provocative, to repeal EA s. 9(5)(a) on the basis of the judgment in Tirkey, despite pressure from some quarters to do so. For the victims of caste discrimination, such a move would be retrogressive and would be seen as abandoning those who need protection. Extending the EA by secondary legislation, as 18 decided by Parliament in April 2013, to include caste as an aspect of race (however this is done), offers legal certainty and proclaims publicly that discrimination on grounds of caste is both unacceptable and unlawful.49 Without the EA and the discretionary ‘caste power’ which was included at the last minute in s. 9(5)(a), and its amendment in 2013 to become a duty, caste might not have been pleaded as a ground of discrimination, or part of one, in Tirkey (or indeed in Naveed). The EA and its amendment have surely increased the traction of caste as a ground of discrimination. However, the unfinished process of embedding protection against caste discrimination within the EA detracts from the otherwise positive assessment of the impact of the EA on this issue five years on. References: ACDA (2009) Hidden Apartheid, Voice of the Community: Caste and Caste Discrimination in the U.K., a scoping study. 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(2014) The Equality Act 2010: caste discrimination. House of Commons Briefing Paper No. 06862, 31 December 2014. London: House of Commons Library. Rao A. (2009) The Caste Question: Dalits and the Politics of Modern India. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. Shah P. (2014) ‘UK caste discrimination legislation: Implications for business and employers’ 9 October 2014, at https://aryalegal.wordpress.com/2014/10/09/uk-caste-discrimination- legislation-implications-for-business-and-employers/Shah P. (2015a) ‘Why the British government should repeal the caste provision in the Equality Act 2010’, 22 July 2015, at http://www.equalityhumanrights.com/publications/our-research/research-reports/research-reports-91-100/ http://www.equalityhumanrights.com/publications/our-research/research-reports/research-reports-91-100/ http://www.equalityhumanrights.com/publications/our-research/research-reports/research-reports-91-100/ https://aryalegal.wordpress.com/2014/10/09/uk-caste-discrimination-legislation-implications-for-business-and-employers/ https://aryalegal.wordpress.com/2014/10/09/uk-caste-discrimination-legislation-implications-for-business-and-employers/ 20 https://aryalegal.wordpress.com/2015/07/22/why-the-british-government-should-repeal-the- caste-provision-in-the-equality-act-2010/ Shah P. (2015b) ‘What’s caste got to do with it? Deception and the law on caste discrimination’, 30 September 2015, at https://aryalegal.wordpress.com/2015/09/30/whats- caste-got-to-do-with-it-deception-and-the-law-on-caste-discrimination/ Thorat S. and Newman K. (eds) (2010) Blocked by Caste: Economic Discrimination in Modern India. Delhi: Oxford University Press. Vishwanath R. (2014) The Pariah Problem: Caste, Religion, and the Social in Modern India. New York: Columbia University Press. Waughray A. (2009) Caste discrimination: A Twenty-first century challenge for UK discrimination law? Modern Law Review 72 (2): 182-219. Waughray A. (2013) Capturing Caste in Law: The Legal Regulation of Caste and Caste- based Discrimination. Unpublished PhD thesis, University of Liverpool Repository, University of Liverpool. Waughray A. (2014) Capturing Caste in Law: Caste Discrimination and the Equality Act 2010 Human Rights Law Review 14 (2): 359-379. Zaffrelot C. (2005) Dr. Ambedkar and Untouchability: Analysing and Fighting Caste. London: Hurst & Company. * Annapurna Waughray is Reader in Human Rights Law at Manchester Metropolitan University. Meena Dhanda is Reader in Philosophy and Cultural Politics at University of Wolverhampton. Contact emails: a.waughray@mmu.ac.uk; m.dhanda@wlv.ac.uk. 1 See Waughray (2014). 2 See https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/caste-discrimination-legislation-timetable (visited 29 December 2015). See also HC Deb vol 584 col 134WH-142WH 9 Jul 2014; HL vol 755 col WA357-358. 3 See HC Deb vol 584 col 141WH 9 Jul 2014. 4 Feasibility study on measuring caste discrimination in Britain was commissioned by the Government Equalities Office (GEO) to Tns-BMRB and the National Institute of Economic and Social Research in 2014 to explore methodological and technical issues (including possible ethical ones) and the costs associated with reliably and accurately measuring caste discrimination over time. One of the authors, Dhanda, was consulted on ethical issues. 5 See also Letter, Helen Grant (Minister for Women and equalities) to the AHO, 9 May 2013, at http://www.mycasteishindu.org/images/pdfs/Helen_Grant_Letter_to_AHO.pdf (visited 14 September 2015). 6 Naveed v Aslam and others ET /1603968/2011. 7 Tirkey v Chandhok and Anor [2015] ET/3400174/2013 (Tribunal 2015), paras. 2, 205-210. 8 See http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-34330986 (visited 22 September 2015). 9 The term ‘Dharmic communities’ is explained by Prakash Shah as follows: ‘[A]n umbrella term….. consisting of people who follow any of the Indian traditions that often brought under the labels Hinduism, Jainism, Sikhism, or Buddhism (sic). The choice of term reflects the importance of the idea of Dharma/Dhamma shared by these traditions, which we believe also underpins the open-ended pluralism of Indic civilization which requires adherence to no specific belief system or dogma’; see “EHRC Strategic Plan 2016-2019 Consultation: UK Dharmic Communities’ Response” at https://aryalegal.wordpress.com/2015/12/18/ehrc-strategic-plan-2016- 2019-consultation-uk-dharmic-communities-response/ (visited 21 December 2015). https://aryalegal.wordpress.com/2015/07/22/why-the-british-government-should-repeal-the-caste-provision-in-the-equality-act-2010/ https://aryalegal.wordpress.com/2015/07/22/why-the-british-government-should-repeal-the-caste-provision-in-the-equality-act-2010/ https://aryalegal.wordpress.com/2015/09/30/whats-caste-got-to-do-with-it-deception-and-the-law-on-caste-discrimination/ https://aryalegal.wordpress.com/2015/09/30/whats-caste-got-to-do-with-it-deception-and-the-law-on-caste-discrimination/ mailto:a.waughray@mmu.ac.uk mailto:m.dhanda@wlv.ac.uk https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/caste-discrimination-legislation-timetable http://www.mycasteishindu.org/images/pdfs/Helen_Grant_Letter_to_AHO.pdf http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-34330986 https://aryalegal.wordpress.com/2015/12/18/ehrc-strategic-plan-2016-2019-consultation-uk-dharmic-communities-response/ https://aryalegal.wordpress.com/2015/12/18/ehrc-strategic-plan-2016-2019-consultation-uk-dharmic-communities-response/ 21 10 For a response to the charge made by Shah (2014) that the ‘caste system’ was a creation of ‘Christian conversion efforts’ see Dhanda (2015). 11 For a fuller account see Dhanda et al. (2014a: 27-34); Waughray (2014). 12 The term ‘Dalit’ means ‘crushed’ or ‘broken to pieces’(Rao, 2009: 1) 13 The term ‘caste’ appeared in British India legislation e.g. in the Caste Disabilities Removal Act 1850 which abolished the imposition of penalties under religious law with regards to inheritance and other matters when a person converted out of Hinduism. 14 Constitution of India (COI) Article 15; see http://india.gov.in/my-government/constitution-india (visited 18 October 2015). 15 COI Article 17, ibid. 16 COI Article 16, ibid. 17 See Protection of Civil Rights Act 1955 at http://ncsc.nic.in/files/PCR_ACT1955.pdf ; Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act 1989 at http://socialjustice.nic.in/poa-act.php (both visited 18 October 2015). 18 UN Doc. CERD/C/304/Add.13, 17 September 1996. 19Committee for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, General Recommendation No. 29 on Article 1(1) of the Convention (Descent). 20 UN Sub-Commission, Resolution 2000/4, Discrimination based on work and descent (DWD), 11August 2000; UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/46, 23 November 2000, 25; R.K.W. Goonesekere, Working paper on the topic of discrimination based on work and descent; UN Doc. E/CN.4/ Sub.2/2001/16, 14 June 2001. 21 Waughray (2013), Chapter 6. 22 See Waughray (2013) Chapters 6 and 9. See also Waughray (2009: 203-206). On how uncritical multiculturalism naturalises difference as pre-given and denies difference within difference see Dhanda (2015). 23 See for example Castewatch UK Archives at http://castewatchuk.org/archives/castewatch-orig/history.htm; Castewatch UK Sandwell conference http://castewatchuk.org/archives/castewatch-orig/sandwellconference.htm; Castewatch UK Westminster conference http://www.castewatchuk.org/westminster-conference.htm (all visited 29 December 2015). 24 Mandla (Sewa Singh) and Anor v Dowell Lee and Ors [1983] 1 All ER 1062, 1066-1067. 25 Rastafarians and Muslims are now covered by provisions on religious discrimination. 26 See Waughray (2009); Castewatch UK Westminster conference, n 23 above. 27 R (on the application of E) (Respondent) v The Governing Body of JFS and the Admissions Appeal Panel of JFS and others (Appellant) [2009] UKSC 15; see also Waughray (2014). 28 See for example Vera Baird QC, HC Deb vol 508 col 928 6 April 2010. 29 See http://www.hinducouncil.net/index.php/news-and-media/news-letters/85-caste-discrimination-and- harassment-in-great-britain (Posted on 24 August 2011; visited 29 December 2015). 30 See http://www.mycasteishindu.org/index.php/component/content/article/20-frontpage/318-press-release- 13th-november-2013 (visited 29 December 2015). 31 An analysis of different community positions on the desirability of including ‘caste’ in the EA, following the EHRC project, was presented in Mosse, Dhanda and Waughray (2014), forthcoming. 32 There are many caste based organisations in the UK e.g. Ramgarhia Gurdwara Society of Hitchin, Gujrati Arya Association, Shree Kshatriya Association of UK, and East London and Essex Brahm Samaj. One active and unique caste-based organisation is Registered Charity no. 288167, Navnat Vanik Association of the United Kingdom. In a history of this community, Jayant Doshi writes: ‘I realised that the caste system, the customs and traditions are so entwined in our lives that it would be difficult to discard them over night. I realised that the caste based social organisation would be required in our lives for many years to come’; see http://www.navnat.com/pages.php?page=history (visited 11 Oct 2015). 33 These are current advertisements on http://www.shaadi.com/matrimony/gujarati-matrimony (visited 11 Oct 2015). 34 We have explained elsewhere that the continued existence of caste based organisations would be covered by the EA exceptions provisions for associations in the same way as associations based on other aspects of race (except colour) (Dhanda et al. 2014a: 24). 35 For a painful case of a young British Punjabi man driven to commit suicide due to the recalcitrant caste divide that jeopardised his plans to marry the woman he loved, see Dhanda, M. (2015a). 36 See Begraj and another (appellants) v Heer Manak Solicitors and others (respondents), [2014] Industrial Relations Law Reports 689-696. 37 Tirkey v Chandhok and Anor ET/3400174/2013 (Tribunal 2013); Chandhok and Anor v Tirkey [2014] UKEAT/0190/14/KN (Appeal Tribunal 2014); Tirkey v Chandhok and Anor [2015] ET/3400174/2013 (Tribunal 2015). 38 See n 24 and n 27, above. http://india.gov.in/my-government/constitution-india http://ncsc.nic.in/files/PCR_ACT1955.pdf http://socialjustice.nic.in/poa-act.php http://castewatchuk.org/archives/castewatch-orig/sandwellconference.htm http://www.castewatchuk.org/westminster-conference.htm http://www.hinducouncil.net/index.php/news-and-media/news-letters/85-caste-discrimination-and-harassment-in-great-britain http://www.hinducouncil.net/index.php/news-and-media/news-letters/85-caste-discrimination-and-harassment-in-great-britain http://www.mycasteishindu.org/index.php/component/content/article/20-frontpage/318-press-release-13th-november-2013 http://www.mycasteishindu.org/index.php/component/content/article/20-frontpage/318-press-release-13th-november-2013 http://www.navnat.com/pages.php?page=history http://www.shaadi.com/matrimony/gujarati-matrimony 22 39 One of the authors, Dhanda, observed the hearing as a member of the public. In the demeanour of the Chandhoks there was no sense of apology for mistreatment of Ms Tirkey. Rather, the Respondents claimed they had treated her like a ‘member of the family’. 40 HL Deb vol 766 no 18 HL 3180 10 November 2015. 41 HL Deb vol 766 no 41 HL 4547 21 December 2015. 42 It was suggested in 2009 that the new EA harassment provisions offered ‘an as yet unexplored remedy to casteist bullying occurring in regulated fields’ (Waughray, 2009: 203). 43 The judgment does not justify the assertion by one commentator that ‘it was simply assumed throughout that, because the claimant was an Adivasi and the employers were from an upper caste, caste discrimination must have been present’ (Shah, 2015b). 44 We reject the argument (see Shah, ibid.) that because of their separate administrative and legal status in India, Adivasis are not subjected to behaviour which can be described as casteist. 45 See “Victim of Domestic Servitude wins first caste discrimination claim in the Employment Tribunal”, Press Release, 21 September 2015, Anti Trafficking and Labour Exploitation Unit, at http://atleu.org.uk/our-recent- cases/2015/9/21/victim-of-domestic-servitude-wins-first-caste-discrimination-claim (visited 18 October 2015). 46 See http://dsnuk.org/2015/09/23/tirkey-v-chandok-case-rules-in-favour-of-the-victim/ (visited 18 October 2015). 47 See http://www.secularism.org.uk/news/2015/09/calls-for-government-to-outlaw-caste-discrimination-after- tribunal-rules-in-favour-of-victim-kept-in-domestic-servitude (visited 18 October 2015). 48 HC Deb vol 600 col 479 15 Oct 2015. 49 The process of instituting the pending secondary order would also provide an opportunity to revisit and refine the Explanatory Notes on caste in line with suggestions since the enactment of the EA. http://atleu.org.uk/our-recent-cases/2015/9/21/victim-of-domestic-servitude-wins-first-caste-discrimination-claim http://atleu.org.uk/our-recent-cases/2015/9/21/victim-of-domestic-servitude-wins-first-caste-discrimination-claim http://dsnuk.org/2015/09/23/tirkey-v-chandok-case-rules-in-favour-of-the-victim/ http://www.secularism.org.uk/news/2015/09/calls-for-government-to-outlaw-caste-discrimination-after-tribunal-rules-in-favour-of-victim-kept-in-domestic-servitude http://www.secularism.org.uk/news/2015/09/calls-for-government-to-outlaw-caste-discrimination-after-tribunal-rules-in-favour-of-victim-kept-in-domestic-servitude 
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work_yelqkfarczf7db3iz3nwsc6cmu	----	513 прегледни научни рад UDK: 343.352(497:114-672EU) Рад примљен: 07.07.2018. Рад прихваћен: 09.11.2018. doi:10.5937/zrpfni1880513D * darko@prafak.ni.ac.rs ** Рад је реализован у оквиру пројекта бр. 179046, Министарства за просвету, науку и технолошки развој Републике Србије. Др Дарко Димовски,* Ванредни професор Правног факултета Универзитет у Нишу МОГУЋНОСТИ ПРИМЕНЕ РЕСТОРАТИВНЕ ПРАВДЕ НА ЗЛОЧИН МРЖЊЕ** Апстракт: Аутор на почетку рада истиче да се феномен злочина мржње јављао још у античко доба. Државе широм света су на злочине мржње почеле да реагују тек у шездесетим и седамдесетим годинама прошлога века, при чему се та реакција огледала у примени тзв. ретрибутивне правде. У последње време поједини криминолози заговарају примену концепта ресторативне правде на случајеве злочина мржње. Полазећи од ове тенденције, аутор наглашава да постоје два модела ресторативне правде – диверзиони и терапеутски, при чему даје образложење у могућој примени и једној и другог модела у Републици Србији на основу постојеће законске регулативе. Кључне речи: злочин мржње, ресторативна правда, диверзиони модел, терапеутски модел, Република Србија. 1. Увод Људска историја је препуна примера које бисмо модерним речником назвали злочин мржње. Наиме, овакви злочини не само да су остављали последице по жртве једног оваквог понашања, већ су обликовали и историју појединих држава. Довољно је споменути прогон припадника новоосноване хришћанске вере од стране Римљана, злочине према домородачком становништву приликом колонизације Америке, злочине над Јерменима од стране Турака, апартхејд у Јужноафричкој Републици, злочине према Афроамериканцима итд. Зборник радова Правног факултета у Нишу | Број 80 | Година LVII | 2018 514 Иако је историја вршења злочина мржње дуга, треба нагласити да су тек у шездесетим и седамдесетим годинама прошлога века уложени додатни напори с циљем инкриминације једног оваквог понашања. Бројне државе су током прошлога века увеле у своја законодавства инкриминацију злочина мржње као посебног кривичног дела или као обавезне отежавајуће околности прописане у општем делу кривичног закона или само код појединих кривичних дела. Другим речима, основи начин реакције на злочин мржње отелотворује се у примени ретрибутивне правде кроз наведене начине инкриминације овог облика криминалитета насиља. Вршењем кривичних дела долази до бројних менталних и емоционалних тешкоћа код особа жртава овог друштвено неприхватљивог понашања. Уједно, последице по извршиоца огледају се у његовом кажњавању, призонизацији и тешкоћама у животу након извршења казне затвора. Такође, последице по друштво су огромне. Наиме, поред губитка живота жртава злочина мржње, извршење овог облика криминалитета насиља условљава велике економске губитке у виду рада полицијских, тужилачких и правосудних органа, пенитенцијарних установа, здравствених центара, те губитка производње добара или пружања одређених услуга жртве злочина мржње. Стога у последње време поједини криминолози заговарају примену концепта ресторативне правде како би се заједничким договором између извршиоца, жртве и локалне заједнице пронашао одговор на овај облик криминалитета насиља и како би се превазишле све његове последице. Уједно, треба нагласити да су се временом развила два облика ресторативне правде – диверзиони и терапеутски, што ће у наредном делу рада бити посебно обрађено како би се сагледала могућност њихове примене на случајеве злочина мржње. Ипак, пре него што се посебна пажња посвети од стране аутора овог чланка облицима ресторативне правде, неопходно је одредити њен појам. 2. Појам ресторативне правде Ресторативна правда је, као појам, први пут употребљена у касним седамдесетим годинама XX века. Криминолог Брајтвајт (Braithwaite) под њом подразумева процес чији је циљ поправљање штете жртви, локалној заједници и учиниоцу до које је дошло извршењем кривичног дела (Strickland, 2004: 1). Кривично право даје одговор на питање о томе који је закон прекршен, кога је прекршио и коју кривичну санкцију треба изрећи извршиоцу кривичног дела да би се постигла сврха изрицања кривичних санкција. За разлику од система кривичног права који је окренут ретрибуцији, ресторативна правда је усмерена интересима учиниоца Д. Димовски | стр. 513-530 515 кривичног дела, оштећеном лицу и локалној заједници. Ресторативна правда омогућава да извршилац кривичног дела, оштећени и локална заједница заједно одлуче о конкретном друштвеном одговору на тачно одређено кривично дело (Димовски, Илић, 2012: 90). Пенолог Маршал (Marshall) одређивао је ресторативну правду „као процес помоћу кога стране, од којих свака учествује у дотичном кривичном делу, долазе заједно да колективно реше како да савладају последице злочина и његове импликације у будућности“ (Константиновић Вилић, Костић, 2006: 101). Норвешки теоретичар Нилс Кристи (Nils Christie) сматрао је да кривично дело представља конфликт, и да је као такав својина оних који су на неки начин повезани са њим (учинилац, жртва и локална заједница), а не оних (правника) који га на неки начин краду. Као такво, кривично дело треба да представља основу на којој ће заинтересоване стране постићи договор о друштвеном одговору (компензацији) за извршено кривично дело. Кристи наводи да „ресторативна правда представља бољи одговор на криминалитет јер је карактерише непосредна комуникација оних који су у конфликту а која треба да доведе до компензације“ (Ћопић, 2007: 27). Ресторативна правда захтева потпуно учешће и сагласност свих оних који су на било који начин били погођени извршењем кривичног дела – жртве, делинквента, њихових породица и пријатеља, као и особа из друштвене заједнице. Затим, ресторативна правда покушава да поправи оно што је уништено. Зато се процес усмерава на потребе жртве (шта је потребно учинити да се траума зацели; повраћај осећања сигурности), делинквента (шта је потребно урадити да се зло више никада не понови; шта предузети да се делинквент понаша у сагласности са постигнутим договором) и чланова заједнице (шта ће им помоћи да се они осећају сигурно; које кораке треба предузети за унапређење стања заједнице тако да има мање изгледа да се злочин догоди у будућности). Следеће што је неопходно је да постоји потпуна и непосредна одговорност свих учесника. Оптужене особе суочавају се са својим жртвама и другима који трпе последице злочина и којима је дата могућност да објасне своје понашање, преузму пуну одговорност и буду део процеса који одлучује о начину како да обједини потребе свих заинтересованих. Такође, ресторативна правда тежи да врати у целину све оно што је било „раздвојено“, уништено кривичним делом. Наиме, злочин дели чланове једне друштвене заједнице на „ми-они“ начин размишљања. Ресторативне расправе налазе начин да превазиђу ту разлику, тако да „ми и они“ буду поново повезани унутар једне друштвене заједнице постављене на здравим основама. Повраћај у једну целину свих чланова заједнице онемогућава изолацију унутар заједнице. Изолација се Зборник радова Правног факултета у Нишу | Број 80 | Година LVII | 2018 516 иначе јавља као природан пратилац злочина. То је отуђеност коју осећају како делинквент и жртва, тако и остали чланови друштвене заједнице који трпе последице. Међутим, ресторативна расправа не може да повеже жртву и делинквента у нешто што је већ постојало као нездрав, злостављајући однос. На крају, расправа у ресторативној правди стреми ка томе да оснажи заједницу, с циљем да се спречи даље повређивање тиме „што ће изградити односе и обратити пажњу на значајна социјална питања која су на првом месту узроци злочина“ (Coward, 2000: 7). 3. Два облика ресторативне правде Постоје два модела ресторативне правде – диверзиони и терапеутски. Диверзиони модел ресторативне правде је више окренут извршиоцу кривичног дела, при чему се он спроводи уместо кривичног поступка, чиме се обезбеђују алтернативне санкције. Заговорници овог модела ресторативне правде сматрају да је кривични поступак препун одређених предрасуда, као и да је према појединим извршиоцима кривичних дела боље и ефикасније да се поступа ван зидина пенитенцијарних установа. Применом диверзионог модела ресторативне правде олакшава се ресоцијализација извршиоца кривичног дела, при чему долази до помирења са жртвом и локалном заједницом (Miller, 2011: 12). Развојем ресторативне правде умножавали су се различити типови диверзионих модела – конференција ресторативне правде за младе делинквенте (ресторативе јустице цонференце) (Elrod, Ryder, 2004: 177‒179), скретање са вођења кривичног поступка (пре триал диверсион) (Strickland, 2004: 66‒67), диверзиони програм намењен за малолетнике који су вршили кривична дела под утицајем психоактивних супстанци (Chemical Awareness Program), диверзиони програм специјализован за малолетне лопове (Theft Awareness Program), диверзиони програм намењен малолетним лицима која су се бавила нелегалном трговином дуваном (Tobacco Awareness Class) и други. За разлику од диверзионог модела ресторативне правде, терапеутски модел ресторативне правде спроводи се након осуде окривљеног, уз поклањање посебне пажње жртви с циљем њеног оснаживања и превазилажења свих недаћа извршеног кривичног дела. Бројни заговорници ресторативне правде наглашавају значај потреба жртве у укупном сагледавању реакције друштва на извршено кривично дело. Овај модел ресторативне правде највећу примену има код кривичних дела сексуалног насиља, у којима се жртва и насилник познају. У кривичним делима, у којима је учинилац мушког пола, а жртве су особе женског пола, постоји несразмера у погледу Д. Димовски | стр. 513-530 517 моћи између учиниоца и жртве. Терапеутски модел ресторативне правде се може применити и код кривичних дела са смртних исходом – убиства.1 Диверзиони модел ресторативне правде не даје посебне резултате у погледу превазилажења односа надмоћи починиоца у односу на жртву, уз могућност ревиктимизације жртве. Стога терапеутски модел ресторативне правде надомешћује недостатке диверзионог модела и поклања посебну пажњу потребама жртве родно заснованог насиља (Miller, 2011: 12). 4. Примери добре праксе примене ресторативне правде на злочине мржње Бројне криминолошке студије показале су бенефите спровођења поступка ресторативне правде на сва три учесника – извршиоца кривичног дела, жртву и локалну заједницу. Ипак, до скоро није постојала ниједно криминолошко истраживање чији би предмет био могућности и бенефити примене ресторативне правде на случајеве злочина мржње. Стога су неки криминолози, попут већ поменутог Умбрејта (Umbreit), Гаврилидеса (Gavrieledes) и Коатеса (Coates), почели да спроводе анализу случајева злочина мржње код којих је примењена ресторативна правда.Ове студије су показале да се баријере, које постоје између учесника поступка ресторативне правде, могу превазићи чиме се остварују сви бенефити примене оваквог поступка (Hall, Corb, Giannasi, Grieve, 2004: 403). Криминолог Коатес је, на пример, заједно са својим сарадницима, спровео цасе студy на неколико случајева примене ресторативне правде на извршене злочине мржње. Један од случајева, који се издваја по својим карактеристикама односи се на претње смрћу упућене припадницима тзв. Исламског културног центра у Орегону од стране једне особе након терористичких напада на Сједињене Америчке Државе 11. септембра 2001. године. Друштвени одговор на овај догађај огледао су у организовању 1 Ретрибутивна правда, као основни начин реакције државе и друштва на почињено убиство, није давала адекватне резултате. Због тога су неки криминолози и пенолози веома смело предложили концеп тресторативне правде. То не значи потпуно искључење вишевековног начина реакције на најтеже облике криминалитета насиља, већ њихово међусобно преламање. Тако је, према професору Марку Умбрејту (Mark Umbreit), најбољи пример за концепт ресторативне правде и убиства случај Саре (Sarah), чији је отац убијен, и његовог убице по имену Џеф (Jeff ). Он је после двадесетогодишње казне затвора стекао право на условни отпуст. Чувши за такву могућност, Сара се осетила рањивом и бесном. Потражила је помоћ професора Умбрејта, који је организовао неку врсту медијације између ње и убице. Сара је једва после четири минута успела да каже како се осећа. Након тога, Џеф је испричао своју верзију догађаја и како је само убиство имало утицај на његов живот. На интервју у после медијације, Сара је рекла да је виђење са Џефом било као ходање кроз ватру која односи њен бол (Димовски, 2012: 3). Зборник радова Правног факултета у Нишу | Број 80 | Година LVII | 2018 518 поступка медијације између извршиоца кривичног дела, са једне стране, и жртве и његове породице, са друге стране. Иако је на првом састанку поводом медијације извршилац кривичног дела показао одређене знаке кајања, обе стране у поступку овог облика ресторативне правде сагласили су се да је потребно уложити додатни напор како би се превазишла емоционална разлика која постоји између њих. Разлог постојања неслагања на крају првог састанка манифестовао се у томе што је један учесник са стране оштећених лица рекао да је извршилац очигледно родитељ који се на неадекватан начин бринуо о свом преминулом детету, док је истовремено извршилац избегавао да оствари контакт очима са другом страном. На другом састанку атмосфера је поправљена на тај начин што је извршилац стекао додатно поверење у супротну страну, те је испричао своје у вези губитка детета, при чему је посветио посебну пажњу својим осећањима која су допринела томе да има непријатељски став према својој околини. На крају поступка медијације извршилац је прихватио одговорност за своје понашање и извинио се жртви и његовој породици. Уједно, медијацијом је договорено да извршилац, као начин да исправи последице свог понашања, посећује предавања о исламу и да уједно одлази на курс о контролисању беса. На крају је договор обухватаио обавезу извршиоца да добровољно обавља одређене послове у пенитенцијарној установи намењеној малолетницима. Бенефити спроведеног поступка медијације, како је то истакао криминолог Коатес, огледали су се у развоју хуманијег односа сваке од страна према другој страни, развоју емпатије и могућношћу да свака страна настави свој живот на један позитивнији и мирнији начин (Hall et. al., 2004: 403). Поред навођења овог случаја који треба да послужи као пример добре праксе, могуће је навести криминолошку студију, спроведену од стране Марк Волтерса (Marc Walters) и Каролин Холи (Carolyn Hoyle), која се односи на анализу пројекта под називом Hate Crime Project којим је руководио тзв. Community Mediation Centre у јужном делу Лондона. Наиме, њих двоје су интервјуисали 23 учесника поступка медијације, при чему је 17 исказало своје задовољство поступком медијације, јер је он допринео њиховом бољем емоционалном стању. Уједно, код 15 жртава злочина мржње дошло је услед поступка медијације до смањење анксиозности, док је код четранаесторо смањен осећај беса према извршиоцу злочина мржње. Од укупног броја интервјуисаних код њих 13 као последица медијације јавило се мањи осећај страха према злочинцу (Hall et. al., 2004: 403). Спроведена квалитативна истраживања о примени ресторативне правде на случајеве злочина мржње указала су на постојање одређених варијабли од којих директно зависи успешност емоционалног опоравка жртве овог Д. Димовски | стр. 513-530 519 облика криминалитета насиља и спречавање у будућности вршења истог или сличног кривичног дела. Наиме, као варијабле издвојили су се следеће чињенице: имање могућности учествовања у поступак медијације, давање објашњења супротној страни како је извршење злочина мржње утицао на живот дате стране, покушај разумевања емоционалног стања супротне стране у поступку медијације, добијање подршке од стране медијатора како би се превазишле све постојеће разлике између учесника у поступку медијације, тежња да се поправе последице извршеног злочина мржње, као и обећање извршиоца да се неконформистичко понашање у будућности неће поновити (Hall et. al., 2004: 403). Поред постојања примене ресторативне правде због извршења кривичног дела услед мотива мржње у Великој Британији, могуће је истаћи да се на случајеве злочина мржње примењује ресторативна правда и у Сједињеним Америчким Државама. Тако је у оквиру Министарства правде САД основан тзв. Community Relations Service (CRS) чији је задатак да обезбеди препоруке и сервисне услуге жртвама и локалној заједници који су се суочили са извршењем злочина мржње.У оквиру услуга, које се пружају жртвама злочина мржње и локалној заједници у којој се овај облик криминалитета насиља извршио, јесте и медијација. Бенефити спроведене медијације за извршен злочин мржње огледа се у успостављању поновне безбедности у локалној заједници у којој је почињен злочин мржње. До оваквих резултата долази се непосредном укљученошћу не само жртве и извршиоца злочина мржње, већ и лидера локалне заједнице и представника удружења жртва (Perry, 2009: 208). Како бисмо указали на значај ЦРС-а представићемо у кратким цртама злочин мржње који се догодио у мају 1999. године на Универзитету Орегон у Сједињеним Америчким Државама. Наиме, на Универзитету су се десили расистички говори који су обухватили и слање електронске поште са расистичким садржајем, што је на крају, под притиском протеста студената, условило хапшење 31 студента који су одбили да напусте зграду Универзитета током периода од осам сати. Због тога су контактирани стручњаци ЦРС-а како би спровели поступак медијације. Ангажовањем ових стручњака спречена је ескалација сукоба (Altschiller, 2005: 124). 5. Примена диверзионог модела ресторативне правде на злочине мржње у Републици Србији Применом начела опортунитета, јавни тужилац у Републици Србији може да одложи кривично гоњење према осумњиченима за кривична дела за које је предвиђена новчана казна или казна затвора до пет година, ако Зборник радова Правног факултета у Нишу | Број 80 | Година LVII | 2018 520 осумњичени прихвати да испуни једну или више обавеза: 1) да отклони штетну последицу насталу извршењем кривичног дела или да накнади причињену штету; 2) да на рачун прописан за уплату јавних прихода уплати одређени новчани износ, који се користи за хуманитарне или друге јавне сврхе; 3) да обави одређени друштвено-корисни или хуманитарни рад; 4) да испуни доспеле обавезе издржавања; 5) да се подвргне одвикавању од алкохола или опојних дрога; 6) да се подвргне психосоцијалном третману ради отклањања узрока насилничког понашања; и, 7) да изврши обавезу установљену правноснажном одлуком суда, односно поштује ограничење утврђено правноснажном судском одлуком.2 Наредбом о одлагању кривичног гоњења, јавни тужилац одређује рок у којем осумњичени мора да изврши преузету обавезу, при чему рок не може бити дужи од годину дана. Испуњавањем обавезе од стране осумњиченог, јавни тужилац ће решењем одбацити кривичну пријаву и о томе обавестити оштећеног. Пре него што кренемо се анализом могућности примене начела опорту- нитета на злочине мржње неопходно је нагласити да је 2012. године извршена новелација Кривичног законика. Новелацијом Кривичног законика из 2012. године додат је члан 54а, којим је прописана посебна околност за одмеравање казне за кривично дело учињено из мржње. Наиме, у поменутом члану предвиђено је да, ако је кривично дело учињено из мржње због припадности раси и вероисповести, националне или етничке припадности, пола, сексуалне оријентације или родног идентитета другог лица, ту околност суд ће ценити као отежавајућу, осим ако она није прописана као обележје кривичног дела. На овај начин проширен је дијапазон кривичних дела код којих је мржња, поред кривичних дела изазивања националне, расне и верске мржње и нетрпељивости и расне и друге дискриминације, мотив извршења кривичних дела, чиме је појачана државна репресија против извршења злочина мржње. Анализом еволуције начела опортунитета можемо доћи до закључка да је по решењу из Законика о кривичном поступку из 2001. године3 било прописано да је била потребна претходна сагласност оштећеног како би се примениле неке од предвиђених обавеза, као што су плаћање новчаног износа у хуманитарне сврхе, каквој хуманитарној организацији, фонду 2 Чл. 283. Законика о кривичном поступку, Сл. гласник РС, бр. 72/2011, 121/2012, 32/2013, 45/2013 и 55/2014. 3 Законик о кривичном поступку, (Службени. лист СРЈ, бр. 70/2001 и 68/2002 и Службени гласник РС, бр. 58/2004, 85/2005, 115/2005, 85/2005 – други закон, 49/2007, 20/2009 – други закон, 72/2009 и 76/2010. Д. Димовски | стр. 513-530 521 или јавној установи, као и да се осумњичени бави друштвено корисним или хуманитарним радом. Како ресторативна правда захтева укљученост оштећеног у стварање договора о одговору друштва на извршено кривично дело са извршиоцем кривичног дела и локалном заједницом, који се у овом случају отелотворују у јавном тужиоцу, можемо закључити да је овакво решење било добро. Међутим, каснијим изменама ЗКП-а, али и доношењем новог Законика о кривичном поступку из 2011. године више се не захтева добијање претходне сагласности оштећеног како би се применио опортунитет, чиме се остварује још већа ефикасност у процесуирању кривичних дела. Полазећи од друштвене опасности злочина мржње, као и последица његових извршења, која се отелотворују у бројним менталним и емоционалним тешкоћама код жртава, али и шире друштвене узнемирености припадника исте групе у којој је члан и сама жртва конкретног кривичног дела, може се истаћи аргумент да одлуку о одлагању кривичног гоњења треба условити претходним пристанком жртве конкретног злочина мржње. На тај начин законодавац би показао већи степен кривичноправне заштите лица из одређених друштвених група које су често угрожене кривичним делима извршеним из мотива мржње, иако је интенција законодавца да се у последњем периоду тежи већој ефикасности кривичног поступка која се огледа, између осталог, и непостојањем добијања претходне сагласности оштећеног како би се одустало од кривичног гоњења од стране јавног тужиоца. Ипак, наглашавамо да није за очекивати да законодавац изрази вољу за враћање на старо законско решење уколико све посматрамо кроз поглавље 23 у поступку приступања Европској унији. Наиме, такозвани скрининг поглавља 23 односи се и на ефикасност кривичних поступака. Враћањем на претходно законско решење о примени опортунитета пристанком жртве конкретног злочина мржње само бисмо смањили обим утицаја института условног одлагања кривичног поступка на ефикасност решавања предмета у кривичним стварима. Уједно, као противаргумент ставу да је неопходно постојање претходног пристанка оштећеног ради примене опортунитета може се изнети схватање да, чак и да законодавац прихвати овакав став, на тај начин се неће довољно добро сагледати специфичне потребе оштећеног (жртве) услед извршења злочина мржње, као и да се неће на тај начин дати могућност оштећеном да равноправно учествује у стварању заједничког одговора на извршено кривично дело. Посматрањем начела опортунитета кроз призму злочина мржње можемо видети да је законодавац предвидео као једну од обавеза подвргавање психосоцијалном третману ради отклањања узрока насилничког понашања. Другим речима, за кривична дела за која је прописана новчана Зборник радова Правног факултета у Нишу | Број 80 | Година LVII | 2018 522 казна или казна затвора за пет година, а код којих је мотив извршења кривичног дела мржња, осумњичени се може упутити на психосоцијални третман ради отклањања узрока насилничког понашања, што је у конкретном случају мржња. Међутим, треба нагласити да ограничавањем примене опортунитета на кривична дела за које је предвиђена новчана казна или казна затвора до пет година знатно смањен обим примене начела опортунитета на друга кривична дела за која је прописана тежа кривична санкција а извршена су из мотива мржње, као што је за кривично дело особито тешка телесна повреда за које је прописана казна затвора од једне до осам година. Поред нормативног ограничења примене диверзионог модела ресторативне правде на случајеве злочина мржње постоје и фактичка ограничења. Наиме, до сада центри за социјални рад као установе надлежне да се баве отклањањем узрока насилничног понашања нису покренули одговарајући програм који би се бавио овим послом код извршилаца злочина мржње. До сада је Република Србија током 2012. године покренила пројекат под називом „Борба против сексуалног и родно заснованог насиља“ у центрима за социјални рад у Београду, Нишу и Крагујевцу. Овим пројектом се пружао одговарајући третман мушким извршиоцима насиља у партнерским односима. Заустављање и спречавање насиља у партнерским односима у породици и заштита жртава од насиља у породици, како је прописано у пројекту, применом начела опортунитета у виду обавезе отклањања узорка насилничког понашања, је општи циљ пројекта (Димовски, 2015: 429‒430). На овај начин Република Србија је омогућила примену обавезе отклањања узорка насилничког понашања само код кривичних дела насиља у породици извршених од стране мушкараца. Иако ово кривично дело може бити у одређеним случајевима извршено услед мотива мржње, оно представља само једно од бројних других кривичних дела која бисмо могли подвести под злочин мржње. Постојање формалних и фактичких препрека за примену диверзионог модела ресторативне правде на случајеве злочина мржње указују нам на тренутну немогућност примене овог модела за овај облик криминалитета насиља у пуном обиму. Неке препреке се могу отклонити променом законских решења и већом агилношћу органа социјалне заштите у погледу примене нових програма за отклањање узрока насилничког понашања, док се неке препреке не могу отклонити, јер мора постојати одређена граница у вези кривичних дела која могу потпасти под примену начела опортунитета – граница на кривична дела за која је предвиђена новчана казна или казна затвора до пет година. Д. Димовски | стр. 513-530 523 6. Примена терапеутског модела ресторативне правде на злочине мржње у Републици Србији Поред диверзионог модела ресторативне правде, како смо у претходном делу рада нагласили, постоји и терапеутски модел ресторативне правде чија се суштина огледа у томе да се жртва оснажи ради превазилажења свих проблема и последица извршеног кривичног дела, при чему је битно нагласити да се овај модел спроводи након вођења кривичног поступка и доношења одговарајуће судске одлуке. Као потенцијална могућност спровођења терапеутског модела ресторативне правде можемо навести његово спровођење након изрицања одређених кривичних санкција, при чему у зависности од изречене кривичне санкције постоји условљеност у вези начина његове имплементације. Наиме, уколико је за конкретан злочин мржње изречена казна затвора неминовно се намеће да се терапеутски модел ресторативне правде може спровести у пенитенцијарним устано- вама. Терапеутски модел ресторативне правде се може спроводити у случају изрицања условне осуде. Стога у наредном делу рада аутор ће изнети основне поставке примене терапеутског модела ресторативне правде због извршеног кривичног дела, које се може подвести под злочин мржње, у случају изрицања казне затвора ради остваривања условног отпуста, као и модела који се примењује током постпеналног третмана или условне осуде. Временом се у пенитенцијарним установама развило неколико варијанти терапеутског модела ресторативне правде у пенитенцијарним установама у зависности од циља којим се тежи, при чему треба нагласити да се свака варијанта не може применити у случају изрицања казна затвора због извршеног злочина мржње. Као варијанте терапеутског модела ресторативне правде у пенитанцијарним установама можемо навести: 1) ресторативна правда којом се тежи развоју свести и емпатије код осуђеника о жртвама кривичних дела; 2) ресторативна правда у којој се омогућава осуђеницима да се искупе за извршено кривично дело својим жртвама; 3) ресторативна правда која за циљ има олакшавање посредовања између осуђеника, са једне стране, и жртава кривичних дела, породица жртва, као и заједнице, са друге стране; 4) ресторативна правда, чији се циљ огледа у јачању веза пенитенцијарних установа и локалних заједница у којима се оне налазе, нарочито је развијена у Уједињеном Краљевству; 5) развитак културе у пенитенцијарним условима у којима је могуће све конфликте решити на миран начин је циљ ресторативне правде и 6) стварање атмосфере и околности у пенитенцијарним установама на основу којих се очекује самопромена осуђеника представља последњи циљ ресторативне правде (Van Ness, 2005: 2‒4). Зборник радова Правног факултета у Нишу | Број 80 | Година LVII | 2018 524 Детаљнија анализа варијанти терапеутског модела ресторативне правде указује нам да поједине варијанте, попут ресторативне правде, чији се циљ огледа у јачању веза пенитенцијарних установа и локалних заједница, стварање атмосфере и околности у пенитенцијарним установама на основу којих се очекује самопромена осуђеника представља последњи циљ ресторативне правде, као и развитак културе у пенитенцијарним условима у којима је могуће све конфликте решити на миран начин, не могу имати примену код затвореника осуђених због извршеног кривичног дела из мотива мржње (Димовски, Костић, 2015: 687‒701). Ипак, поједине варијанте терапеутског модела ресторативне правде се могу користити код злочина мржње. Пре тога треба нагласити да се одређене варијанте терапетског модела, попут ресторативне правде којом се тежи развоју свести и емпатије код осуђеника о жртвама кривичних дела или ресторативне правде, у којој се омогућава осуђеницима да се искупе за извршено кривично дело својим жртвама, могу применити на осуђенике због извршеног злочина мржње не као појединачни циљеви, већ као циљеви којима се истовремено тежи. Другим речима, треба радити у поступку примене ресторативне правде у пенитенцијарним установама на осуђенике због извршеног злочина мржње на остваривању и емпатије и надокнади причињење штете услед кривичног дела. Уједно, треба искористити позитивна искуства у вези са применом ових варијанти како би се у пенитенцијарним установама разрадио терапеутски модел ресторативне правде који би дао добре резултате на случајеве злочина мржње. Иако нису првобитно намењене примени на злочине мржње, ресторативна правда која за циљ има олакшавање посредовања између осуђеника, са једне стране, и жртава кривичних дела, породица жртва, као и заједнице, са друге стране, може имати примену у случају доношења осуђујуће пресуде на казну затвору због извршења злочина мржње. Ради илустрације овакве наше идеје узећемо за пример програм који је највише развијен у америчкој држави Тексас. Наиме, сам поступак ресторативне правде се спроводи, на иницијативу саме жртве кривичног дела, након дуготрајних припрема, при чему се тежи избегавању секундарне виктимизације. Из тога да се у ресторативна правда спроводи у Тексасу на иницијативу жртве произилази закључак да је постојеће решење добро, јер постојећа законска решења у државама широм света не омогућавају контакт са жртвом на иницијативу осуђеника (Carlson, Simon Garrett, 2005: 594). Као питање се намеће чињеница ко би спроводио поступак ресторативне правде у пенитенцијарним установама у Републици Србији. Као једно од могућих решења намеће се служба за третман, која је предвиђена чланом Д. Димовски | стр. 513-530 525 10 Закона о извршењу кривичних санкција,4 што подразумева претходну обуку припадника службе за третман у вези са основама ресторативне правде, њеним облицима и циљевима. Као пример за успешну примену поступка ресторативне правде може послужити поступак медијације који се спроводи у васпитно-поправном дому у Крушевцу (Димовски, Илић, 2012: 89‒116), при чему се она примењује између штићеника ове установе, те у том погледу не може да послужи као репер о примени ресторативне правде између осуђеника, који је послат на издржавање казне затвора због злочина мржње, са једне стране, и жртве, која се налази на слободи. Међутим, поступак медијације спроведен у ВПД-у у Крушевцу може да укаже на основне смернице ради развитка успешног модела ресторативне правде у пенитенцијарним установама због извршеног злочина мржње. Успешно спроведен поступак ресторативне правде утиче на одлуку надлежних органа у вези са давањем условног отпуста (Van Ness, 2005: 3). Ово захтева промену члана 46, став 1 Кривичног законика (у даљем тексту КЗ)5 у вези са условима који ће се узети у обзир приликом доношења одлуке о давању условног отпуста. Иако је могуће успешно спроведен поступак ресторативне правде подвести под друге околности које показују да је у односу на њега постигнута сврха кажњавања, било би целисходно ради номотехничког уређена законске норме увести да је могуће ценити и успешност поступка ресторативне правде у случају да је он спроведен. Једна од замерки наведеном примеру је чињеница да се поједини осуђеници могу понашати опортуно зарад добијања условног отпуста са издржавања казне затвора. Међутим, треба напоменути да је, због наведене опасности да се осуђеник понаша опортуно, могуће размишљати да се поступак ресторативне правде примењује тек након изласка осуђеника из затвора, с циљем давања подршке условно отпуштеним осуђеницима зарад њихове пуне интеграције у друштво. На овај начин дошли смо до наредне могућности примене ресторативне правде на случајеве злочина мржње – ресторативна правда која се примењује током постпеналног третмана. Сходно претходном наведеном, успешност процеса ресторативне правде није услов за добијање условног отпуста, већ разлог његовог евентуалног опозива. Наиме, основ за овакво размишљање већ постоји, јер је могуће да надлежни суд одреди да је осуђени дужан да испуни обавезе предвиђене кривичноправним одредбама како би био отпуштен за издржавања казне затвора (члан 46, став 3 КЗ). Уколико условно отпуштени не испуни 4 Члан 10 Закона о извршењу кривичних санкција, Сл. гласник РС, бр. 55/2014. 5 Члан 46, став 1 Кривичног законика, Сл. гласник РС, бр. 85/2005, 88/2005 ‒ испр., 107/2005 ‒ испр., 72/2009, 111/2009, 121/2012, 104/2013, 108/2014 и 94/2016. Зборник радова Правног факултета у Нишу | Број 80 | Година LVII | 2018 526 обавезу коју му је суд одредио у складу са чланом 46, став 3 овог законика, суд може опозвати условни отпуст. Са разлогом се поставља питање да ли је могуће да успешан поступак ресторативне правде представља основ за евентуални опозив условног отпуста сходно нормативним решењима која постоје у садашњем Кривичном законику. Пажљивом анализом можемо видети да основ за овакво тумачење услова из члана 46, става 3 већ постоји. Тако је у члану 73 КЗ-а прописано, између осталог, да заштитни надзор код условне осуде може обухватити отклањање или ублажавање штете причињене кривичним делом, а нарочито измирење са жртвом учињеног кривичног дела. Појам измирења може се тумачити као поступак медијације као један од облика ресторативне правде, што је могуће подвести под законски израз из члана 46, став 3 ‒ обавезе предвиђене кривичноправним одредбама. На тај начин је могуће опозвати условни отпуст уколико се условно отпуштени не измири са жртвом учињеног кривичног дела, односно не отклони или ублажи штету причињену извршеним кривичним дело. Међутим, поставља се још једно питање: Да ли жртва извршеног злочина мржње може својим понашањем довести до тога да поступак ресторативне правде буде неуспешан, те резултирати евентуалним опозивом условног отпуста? Како је одговор да, неопходно је да медијатори буду нарочито опрезни да унапред процене мотивацију жртве извршеног злочина мржње, јер је могуће да код њега постоји мотив освете према извршиоцу злочина мржње. Ово захтева постојање искусних и посвећених медијатора. Као последњу могућност примене ресторативне правде на злочин мржње навели смо у случају изрицања условне осуде. Наиме, као што смо већ образложили код објашњавања могућности примене ресторативне правде на злочин мржње током постпеналне помоћи, у случају изрицања условне осуде суд може одредити заштитни надзор који се, између осталог, може отелотворити и у обавези отклањања или ублажавања штете причињене кривичним делом, а нарочито измирења са жртвом учињеног кривичног дела. Како је овај начин примене ресторативне правде већ објашњен, аутор неће у детаље објашњавати начин његове примене. 7. Закључак Ретрибутна правда представљала је основни начин реакције на злочине мржње од почетка шездесетих година прошлога века. Временом се јавила мисао да је могуће применити ресторативну правду и на случајеве злочина мржње без обзира што је, због њиховог мотива извршења ‒ мржње, очекивано да се на ову појаву реагује изрицањем и извршењем кривичних Д. Димовски | стр. 513-530 527 санкција. У раду је наглашено да постоје два модела ресторативне правде: диверзиони и терапеутски. Како је сврха диверзионог модела избегавање вођења кривичног поступка, самим тим и изрицања кривичних санкција, јасно произилази да се диверзиони модел ресторативне правде спроводи уместо ретрибутивне правде. За разлику од диверзионог модела, терапеутски модел нема за циљ његово спровођење уместо ретрибутивне правде, већ је на неки начин он са њим испреплетен, јер се спроводи после завршетка кривичног поступка и изрицања кривичних санкција у чему се све огледа ретрибутивна правда. Аутор је у раду покушао да анализира постојеће кривично законодавство у Републици Србији у погледу ова два модела како би указао на могућности њиховог спровођења у вези са злочинима мржње. Анализа диверзионог модела ресторативне правде показала је да се она отелотворује у примени начела опортунитета из члана 283 ЗКП-а. Уколико би се начело опортунитета посматрало кроз призму злочина мржње, може се закључити да постоји законом адекватно одређена обавеза – отклањање узрока насилничког понашања. Ипак, треба бити нарочито опрезан са тиме да ли се постојећа обавеза може применити у пуном обиму код злочина мржње. Наиме, аутор је у раду указао на постојање како формалних, тако и фактичких ограничења примене ове обавезе код овог облика криминалитета насиља. Примена терапеутског модела ресторативне правде на злочине мржње, према схватању аутора, може се односити на случајеве изрицања казне затвора ради остваривања условног отпуста, као модела који се примењује током постпеналног третмана или условне осуде. Код неких од могућности примене терапеутског модела ресторативне правде неопходно је преузети позитивна искуства из других земаља, а код појединих је потребно примени законске норме. Ипак, на крају је потребно нагласити да је Република Србија скоро увела посебну законску норму у вези са злочином мржње, те до сада је уопште није примењивала. Стога није било за очекивати да се примењивала ресторативна правда на случајеве злочина мржње. На тај начин овај рад треба да послужи као смерница примене ресторативне правде на овај облик криминалитета насиља. Литература/References Altschiller, D. (2005). Hate Crimes: A Reference Handbook, Santa Barbara: ABC- CLIO. Carlson, P., Simon Garrett, J. (2005). Prison and Jail Administration: Practice and Theory, USA: Jones and Bartlett Publishers. Зборник радова Правног факултета у Нишу | Број 80 | Година LVII | 2018 528 Ћопић, С., (2007). Појам и основни принципи ресторативне правде, Темида, број 1, година 10, Београд: Прометеј. Димовски, Д., Илић, И. (2012). Могућности примене инструмената рестора- тивне правде у кривичном поступку према малолетницима, Кривичноправни положај и социјалноправна заштита малолетника, Ниш: Правни факултет Универзитета у Нишу и Центар за социјални рад „Свети Сава“. Димовски, Д., Костић, М. (2015). Ресторативна правда у пенитенцијарним установама, Суђење у разумном року и други кривичноправни инструменти адекватности државне реакције на криминалитет / ЛВ редовно годишње саветовање удружења, Београд: Српско удружење за кривичноправну теорију и праксу. Димовски, Д. (2012). Криминолошко одређење убиства – докторска дисертација, Ниш: Правни факултет у Нишу. Димовски, Д. (2015). Ресторативна правда у функцији заштите од насиља у породици, Зборник радова Правног факултета у Нишу, Ниш: Правни факултет у Нишу. Elrod, P., Ryder, S. (2004). Juvenile Justice: A Social, Historical, and Legal Perspec- tive, Burlington: Jones & Bartlett Learning, Burlington. Hall, N., Corb, A., Giannasi, P., Grieve, J. (2014).The Routledge International Handbook on Hate Crime, London: Routledge, London. Retrieved 02. November 2013, from: http://www.ci.oakdale.mn.us/ i n d e x . a s p? Ty p e = B _ B A S I C & S E C = %7 B C 61 3119 C - F 3 0 6 - 4 0 A F - B 8 B 2- B8090E8EA2DA%7D. Константиновић Вилић, С., Костић, М. (2006). Пенологија, Ниш: СВЕН. Кривични законик, Сл. гласник РС, бр. бр. 85/2005, 88/2005 ‒ испр., 107/2005 ‒ испр., 72/2009, 111/2009, 121/2012, 104/2013, 108/2014 и 94/2016. Miller, S. (2011). After the crime: The power of restorative justice dialogues between victims and violent offenders, New York: New York University Press. Perry, B. (2009). Hate Crime, Westport: Greenwood Publishing Group. Coward, S. (2000). Restorative Justice in Cases of Domestic Violence: Healing Ju- stice- Directed Interdisciplinary Studies, Ottawa: Carleton University. Strickland, A. (2004). Restorative justice, New York: Petera Lang Publishing. Д. Димовски | стр. 513-530 529 Van Ness, D. (2005) Restorative Justice in Prisons. Retrieved 25, January 2014, from http://www.restorativejustice.org/editions/2005/july05/2005-06- 21.9036003387/at_download/file Закон о извршењу кривичних санкција, Сл. гласник РС, бр. 55/2014. Законик о кривичном поступку, Службени лист СРЈ, бр. 70/2001 и 68/2002 и Службени гласник РС, бр. 58/2004, 85/2005, 115/2005, 85/2005 – други закон, 49/2007, 20/2009 – други закон, 72/2009 и 76/2010. Законик о кривичном поступку, Сл. гласник РС, бр. 72/2011, 121/2012, 32/2013, 45/2013 и 55/2014. Darko Dimovski, LL.D. Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Niš POSSIBILITIES OF IMPLEMENTING RESTORATIVE JUSTICE IN HATE CRIMES Summary The author first points out that the phenomenon of hate crimes has roots in ancient times. In the contemporary world, the social reaction against hate crimes may be traced back to the 1960s and the 1970s, when countries around the world began to implement the so-called concept of retributive justice to cases involving hate crimes. Lately, individual criminologists have been arguing for the application of the concept of restorative justice in hate crime cases. Starting from these tendencies, the author discusses the two models of restorative justice: the diversion model and the therapeutic model, and on the basis of existing legislation, elaborates on the possible implementation of each of these models in the Republic of Serbia. Keywords: hate crime, restorative justice, diversion model, therapeutic model, Republic of Serbia. 
work_y75vnl755nhg3nv2dj6eaj5geq	----	READING PROFESSOR OBAMA: RACE AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITION Stacey Marlise Gahagan and Alfred L. Brophy This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 United States License. This site is published by the University Library System of the University of Pittsburgh as part of its D- Scribe Digital Publishing Program and is cosponsored by the University of Pittsburgh Press. UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW Vol. 75 ● Summer 2014 ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2014.342 http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2014.342 http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu 495 READING PROFESSOR OBAMA: RACE AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITION Stacey Marlise Gahagan* and Alfred L. Brophy** ABSTRACT Reading Professor Obama mines Barack Obama’s syllabus on “Current Issues in Racism and the Law” for evidence of his beliefs about race, law, and jurisprudence. The syllabus for the 1994 seminar at the University of Chicago, which provides the reading assignments and structure for the course, has been available on the New York Times website since July 2008. Other than a few responses solicited by the New York Times when it published the syllabus, however, there has been little attention to the material Obama assigned or to what it suggests about Obama’s approach to the law and race. The class began with four weeks of foundational readings followed by four weeks of student-led class discussions. The readings started by discussing the malleability of racial categories and progressed to cases from the nineteenth century on Native Americans and on slavery. The second day’s readings shifted to the Reconstruction era and changes in the Constitution and statutory law, as well as the rise of the “Jim Crow” system of segregation and the response of African American intellectuals. The third class covered the Civil Rights revolution and retrenchment. It included reading from such diverse figures as Robert Bork, Martin Luther King, and Malcolm X. The fourth class, “Where Do We Go From Here?,” addressed some of the enduring issues of inequality facing our nation, the fragility * Visiting Clinical Assistant Professor of Law, University of North Carolina School of Law; Owner, The Gahagan Law Firm, PLLC. ** Judge John J. Parker Distinguished Professor of Law, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill. Contact the authors at staceygahagan@gmail.com or at abrophy@email.unc.edu. The authors would like to thank Mary Sarah Bilder, Chapin Cimino, Kareem Crayton, Daniel M. Filler, Riki Kotua, Eric J. Miller, Richard E. Myers, Gregory Parks, Gregg Polsky, Dana A. Remus, Carolyn Shapiro, and most especially David J. Garrow, for their assistance. U N I V E R S I T Y O F P I T T S B U R G H L A W R E V I E W P A G E | 4 9 6 | V O L . 7 5 | 2 0 1 4 ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2014.342 http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu of the African American middle class, continuing racism against African Americans, and a plea for more understanding. After the initial four class meetings, student groups selected additional readings and led class discussions on a variety of race-related topics. The syllabus has suggested topics for the presentations and brief discussion of those topics. The media has called attention to President Obama’s public relationship with Derrick Bell; notwithstanding the option to read Bell’s summaries of cases in lieu of the actual opinions, the readings have no overt endorsement of Derrick Bell, Critical Race Theory (“CRT”), or Bell’s Interest-Convergence theory. Obama included many critics of CRT and offered readings that seemingly demonstrate his hope for substantially more dialog and perhaps, ultimately, economic uplift of those labeled by some of his readings “the truly disadvantaged.” Obama’s use of the Martin Luther King, Jr.’s essay Where Do We Go from Here: Chaos or Community? as the title of the last group of readings suggests that Obama did not share Bell’s vision of the unalterable nature of racism. The readings, while instructive, are just the starting point of our analysis. Obama’s suggested topics encourage students to wrestle with the modern consequences of racism and to question its malleability. Thus, we suggest that the readings and group presentation topics reveal Obama, the teacher, as interested in, but not necessarily aligned with, many of the key questions of CRT. The syllabus fits with the story that Obama focuses on issues that unite Americans while he seeks equal treatment. This may reflect the future of constitutional doctrine related to race. R E A D I N G P R O F E S S O R O B A M A P A G E | 4 9 7 ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2014.342 http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu Table of Contents I. Reading Obama’s Syllabus for “Current Issues in Racism and the Law” ............................................................................................................ 502 A. The Elements of the Course ................................................................ 505 B. Obama Teaching: The Reading Assignments ..................................... 506 1. Framing the Course: Theory and Pre-Civil War History ............ 506 2. Reconstruction to Civil Rights .................................................... 510 3. “Where Do We Go from Here?”................................................. 514 II. The Origins and Meanings of the Readings: Assessing Obama’s Jurisprudence ............................................................................................... 519 III. The Meaning and Origins of the Group Presentations Topics ..................... 527 A. Ten Primary Tenets of Critical Race Theory ...................................... 530 B. CRT Pedagogy .................................................................................... 532 C. CRT and the Obama Group Presentation Topics ................................ 533 1. The All-Black All-Male School .................................................. 534 2. Interracial Adoptions .................................................................. 537 3. Racial Gerrymandering ............................................................... 538 4. Race and the Criminal Justice System ........................................ 541 a. Discriminatory Sentencing ................................................. 541 b. Criminal Legislation That Targets Minorities? .................. 544 c. Hate Crimes ....................................................................... 546 d. Statistical Discrimination/Criminal Profiling ..................... 547 5. Immigration Policy ..................................................................... 549 6. Racial Bias in the Media ............................................................. 551 7. Welfare Policy and Reproductive Freedom ................................ 553 8. Inter-ethnic Tensions .................................................................. 556 9. Reparations ................................................................................. 558 10. Hate Speech ................................................................................ 559 U N I V E R S I T Y O F P I T T S B U R G H L A W R E V I E W P A G E | 4 9 8 | V O L . 7 5 | 2 0 1 4 ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2014.342 http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu 11. Affirmative Action ..................................................................... 562 a. Minority Set-Asides ........................................................... 562 b. Class-based, Rather Than Race-based, Affirmative Action in College Admissions ........................................... 564 c. The Meaning of Merit ........................................................ 566 12. Public School Financing ............................................................. 569 III. Conclusion: Critical Race Pragmatism ........................................................ 570 Appendix 1. Reading Assignments with Additional Bibliographic Information .................................................................................................. 574 Appendix 2. Suggested Topics for Seminar Presentations ................................... 578 R E A D I N G P R O F E S S O R O B A M A P A G E | 4 9 9 ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2014.342 http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu Even though we are well into President Barack Obama’s second term as president, many wonder about his ideas regarding the jurisprudence of race and what they signal about the future of race in American political and legal thought. Historians trace the intellectual roots of Obama’s political and racial ideology in diverse places, from Hawaii to Occidental College, Columbia College, Harvard Law School, the streets of Chicago, and even the halls of the University of Chicago Law School.1 One analysis in the New Republic situates Obama somewhere between Harvard Law Professor Laurence Tribe’s orientation towards constitutional doctrine and former University of Chicago Law Professor and former Administrator of the White House Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs Cass Sunstein’s skepticism of courts and preference for legislation.2 By wielding classic techniques of intellectual history, such as situating historical actors in their context and looking closely at the ideas of leading liberal intellectuals of the twentieth century,3 Harvard history professor James Kloppenberg analyzed the readings assigned to Obama as a student. Kloppenberg deftly drew inferences about the development of Obama’s beliefs from what was taught and read in courses Obama took at Occidental, Columbia, and Harvard.4 While there are limits to such methods, there is also much to admire in Kloppenburg’s efforts to place Obama in the context of his times, which demonstrate that Obama is not only the product of his times but also a representative of them. Kloppenberg focuses on several key ideas: Obama sought to emphasize the issues that unify Americans, rather than those on which we differ;5 and Obama followed African American intellectuals like Ralph Ellison who sought to hold our country to its principles, such as the equality promised in Declaration of Independence and later the Fourteenth Amendment.6 Like his 1 E.g., JAMES KLOPPENBERG, READING OBAMA: DREAMS, HOPE, AND THE AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION ix–xviii (2010). 2 Justin Driver, Obama’s Law: A New Argument About His Legal Philosophy—and Its Troubling Consequences, THE NEW REPUBLIC, June 30, 2011, at 10, available at http://www.tnr.com/article/ politics/magazine/89647/obama-legal-philosophy-laurence-tribe. 3 See, e.g., G. EDWARD WHITE, THE MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE, 1815–1835 (1988); William W. Fisher, Texts and Contexts: The Application to American Legal History of the Methodologies of Intellectual History, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1065 (1998). 4 KLOPPENBERG, supra note 1. 5 Id. at 82. 6 KLOPPENBERG, supra note 1, at 13 (discussing Ellison); see also Eric J. Sundquist, “We Dreamed a Dream”: Ralph Ellison, Martin Luther King, Jr. & Barack Obama, DAEDALUS 108, 108–24 (Winter 2011). U N I V E R S I T Y O F P I T T S B U R G H L A W R E V I E W P A G E | 5 0 0 | V O L . 7 5 | 2 0 1 4 ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2014.342 http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu predecessors, optimism lay at the foundation for Obama. His optimism was grounded in the belief that the fragmentation of recent politics7 could be overcome. Obama believed that focusing on a common core of values would lead to a political resolution of differences. Related to this was his belief that race is not the permanent, almost insurmountable barrier it had been for activists of earlier generations.8 In March 2012, interest in Obama’s early ideas about race—and his connections to Harvard Law Professor Derrick Bell in particular—revived after the rerelease of a video recording of Obama’s brief introduction of Bell given at a protest over faculty diversity at Harvard on April 24, 1990.9 Fox News covered the story extensively and used it to draw connections between Obama and Bell and, by implication, charge Obama with statements that Bell made.10 Breitbart.com went even further with an article entitled Obama Assigned Bell at University of Chicago 7 DANIEL T. ROGERS, THE AGE OF FRACTURE (2012). 8 KLOPPENBERG, supra note 1, at 82–83, 127. 9 See Ben Shapiro, OBAMA: ‘Open up your hearts and your minds’ to racialist prof, BREITBART (Mar. 7, 2012), http://www.breitbart.com/Big-Government/2012/03/07/buzzefeed-selectively-edits- obama-tape (“[T]his video is a smoking gun showing that Barack Obama not only associated with radicals, he was their advocate.”); see also Exclusive: Breitbart.com Unveils Unedited Video of Obama and Radical Professor, FOXNEWS.COM, http://www.foxnews.com/on-air/hannity/2012/03/08/exclusive- breitbartcom-unveils-unedited-video-obama-and-radical-professor#ixzz1unTHcW00 (Mar. 8, 2012); but see Andrew Golis, The Story Behind the Obama Law School Speech Video, PBS.ORG (Mar. 7, 2012, 7:09 PM), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/government-elections-politics/the-story-behind-the- obama-law-school-speech-video/ (stating that contrary to Breitbart’s claim to unveiling the video, the tape was part of a PBS documentary before the 2008 election and has been posted “online at [www.pbs.org] and on YouTube since then”). 10 See, e.g., Todd Starnes, Obama Harvard Tapes Exposed on Hannity, FOXNEWS.COM (Mar. 7, 2012), http://nation.foxnews.com/president-obama/2012/03/07/obama-harvard-tapes-exposed-hannity (“And when Barack Obama says, open your hearts and open your minds to the words of Professor Derrick Bell and calls him an inspiration and talks about his scholarship, he’s talking about some very radical things, so radical that later on, Derrick Bell got into serious trouble when he wrote an essay, a fictional story, called space traders [sic], positing that Americans, white Americans would sell black Americans to space aliens in order to pay out the national debt and that Jews would stand by and let it happen. This is a kind of background Derrick Bell had.”) (quoting Joel Pollak, editor-in-chief of Breitbart.com); More Obama Harvard Professor Videos Surface, FOXNEWS.COM, http://nation.foxnews.com/derrick-bell/ 2012/03/09/more-obama-harvard-professor-videos-surface (last visited Aug. 19, 2012); Joel B. Pollak, The Vetting—Exclusive: Obama Letter to Bell to Blurb ‘Dreams from My Father,’ BREITBART (Apr. 26, 2012), http://www.breitbart.com/Big-Government/2012/04/26/The-Vetting-Obama-Letter-Derrick-Bell- Blurb-Dreams-from-My-Father (“By the time Obama reached out to [Bell to ask for blurb for Dreams], Bell’s radicalism was well and widely known. He had just blurbed Louis Farrakhan’s book on black self-reliance, A Torch Light for America, and praised the Nation of Islam’s community education programs.”). R E A D I N G P R O F E S S O R O B A M A P A G E | 5 0 1 ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2014.342 http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu Law School with the inflammatory subtitle, “Barack Obama made his own students at the University of Chicago Law School read some of Derrick Bell’s most radical and racially inflammatory writings.”11 Yet, as David Graham wrote in March 2012 in The Atlantic, after surveying the controversy over the video of Obama introducing Derrick Bell: “A better test of Obama’s own legal views would be to look at his teaching career.”12 Obama’s intellectual relationship to Derrick Bell and to other faculty who may have served as his mentors during his time at Harvard Law School continues to draw the public’s interest. Some have attempted to gain insight into Obama’s ideas from his “lost law review article”13—a case note in the Harvard Law Review14—as well as from an article written by Laurence Tribe while Obama was his research assistant.15 Such speculation produces pretty low yield ore, as much of it simply draws inferences from a limited set of data. An article in Politico, for instance, charged Obama with the content of various abstracts published in the Harvard Law Review.16 Similarly, one blogger tried to draw a negative inference from the number of times that the Harvard Law Review volume for which Obama was president has been cited in comparison to other volumes.17 Perhaps because efforts thus far have produced little more than speculation, there remains 11 Charles C. Johnson, Obama Assigned Bell at University of Chicago Law School, BREITBART (Mar. 8, 2012), http://www.breitbart.com/Big-Government/2012/03/08/obama-made-bell-required-reading- chicago. 12 David Graham, Breitbart.com’s Massive Barack Obama-Derrick Bell Video Fail, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 8, 2012, 3:02 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/03/breitbartcoms-massive- barack-obama-derrick-bell-video-fail/254213/. 13 Ben Smith & Jeffrey Ressner, Exclusive: Obama’s Lost Law Review Article, POLITICO (Aug. 22, 2008, 5:08 AM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0808/12705.html. 14 Note, Tort Law—Prenatal Injuries—Supreme Court of Illinois Refuses to Recognize Cause of Action Brought by Fetus Against Its Mother for Unintentional Infliction of Prenatal Injuries, Stallman v. Youngquist, 125 Ill. 2d 267, 531 N.E.2d 355 (1988), 103 HARV. L. REV. 823 (1990). 15 Laurence H. Tribe, The Curvature of Constitutional Space: What Lawyers Can Learn From Modern Physics, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1989); see, e.g., F.J. TIPLER, THE OBAMA-TRIBE “CURVATURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL SPACE” PAPER IS CRACKPOT PHYSICS (2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1271310. 16 See Jeffrey Ressner & Ben Smith, Obama Kept Law Review Balanced, POLITICO (June 23, 2008, 4:38 AM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0608/11257.html. 17 See Steve Sailer, How Good Was Obama at Running the Harvard Law Review?, VDARE.COM (Feb. 12, 2008, 9:47 PM), http://www.vdare.com/posts/how-good-was-obama-at-running-the-harvard- law-review. U N I V E R S I T Y O F P I T T S B U R G H L A W R E V I E W P A G E | 5 0 2 | V O L . 7 5 | 2 0 1 4 ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2014.342 http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu substantial interest and uncertainty in how Obama sees the relationship between race and the legal system. I. READING OBAMA’S SYLLABUS FOR “CURRENT ISSUES IN RACISM AND THE LAW” One source has the potential to provide significantly more insight on Obama’s perspective than either the brief case note he wrote while a student or the article for which he served as a research assistant. It is the syllabus for the “Current Issues in Racism and the Law” course he taught in the Fall of 1994 at the University of Chicago Law School.18 The syllabus contains four weeks of required reading, including excerpts from Derrick Bell’s casebook Race, Racism, and American Law,19 and also a series of suggested discussion questions that students could use as starting points for their own class presentations. The syllabus received a moderate amount of attention on July 30, 2008 when the New York Times published the syllabus on its website. The syllabus accompanied an article by Jodi Kantor, Teaching Law, Testing Ideas, Obama Stood Slightly Apart,20 alongside commentary by law professors Akhil Reed Amar of Yale, Randy Barnett of Georgetown, John Eastman of Chapman, and Pamela S. Karlan of Stanford.21 Those faculty members, whose views span a broad political 18 Jodi Kantor, Teaching Law, Testing Ideas, Obama Stood Slightly Apart, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2008, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/30/us/politics/30law.html?ex=1375156800&en= 337ecbaa93d25b8c&ei=5124&partner=permalink&exprod=permalink. 19 DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM, AND AMERICAN LAW (3d ed. 1992) (For further discussion of the parts that appeared in the syllabus, see infra note 143.). 20 Kantor, supra note 18. 21 See Jodi Kantor, Inside Professor Obama’s Classroom, THE CAUCUS (July 30, 2008, 11:11 AM), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/07/30/inside-professor-obamas-classroom/; Pamela S. Karlan, Comment to Inside Professor Obama’s Classroom, THE CAUCUS (July 30, 2008, 1:30 PM), http:// thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/07/30/inside-professor-obamas-classroom/ (deeming the syllabus to be “relatively well thought out” but commenting on the almost exclusive emphasis on black-white racial issues); John Eastman, Comment to Inside Professor Obama’s Classroom, THE CAUCUS (July 30, 2008, 11:11 AM), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/07/30/inside-professor-obamas-classroom/ (syllabus evidenced Obama’s “deep and nuanced command of the law” containing “reading from across the ideological spectrum”); Randy Barnett, Comment to Inside Professor Obama’s Classroom, THE CAUCUS (July 30, 2008, 12:15 PM), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/07/30/ inside-professor- obamas-classroom/ (syllabus offered balanced perspective of competing ideologies and his exam questions were designed to “ferret out” his students’ understanding of the law rather than simply regurgitate “the teacher’s viewpoints”); Akhil Reed Amar, Comment to Inside Professor Obama’s Classroom, THE CAUCUS (July 30, 2008, 11:51 AM), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/ 2008/07/30/inside-professor-obamas-classroom/ (reviewing the syllabi and exams and commenting on R E A D I N G P R O F E S S O R O B A M A P A G E | 5 0 3 ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2014.342 http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu spectrum, praised the breadth and balance of readings. Randy Barnett, a leading libertarian law professor, said: “The materials assigned were balanced, including several readings by Frederick Douglass, who many modern race theorists have come to disparage as insufficiently radical (as Obama would know), along with an exchange between Harvard law professor Randall Kennedy on the one hand and Charles Cooper (who is now on Senator McCain’s advisory committee) and Texas law professor Lino Graglia on the other.”22 Similar to the assigned readings, Barnett found Obama’s summaries accompanying the class discussion questions “even handed” and “remarkably free of the sort of cant and polemics that too often afflicts academic discussions of race.”23 However Karlan pointed out, despite Obama’s experiences with the “multiracial and indigenous” groups in Hawaii, the discussion questions solely focused on racial issues affecting black and whites.24 In addition to the commentary Cantor’s article generated on law professor blogs,25 the syllabus has also received occasional attention, such as in David Remick’s 2010 book The Bridge: The Life and Times of Barack Obama.26 Discussion surrounding the syllabus resurfaced during the 2012 election season27 with conservative discussion boards deeming it evidence of Obama’s radicalism28 and his connections the “great deal of moral seriousness” in the materials extending beyond “technical and technocratic legal questions . . . [into] [s]ome of the great mysteries and tragedies of human life and American society”). 22 Barnett, supra note 21. We are unsure if Professor Barnett meant Douglass or Booker T. Washington in that quotation. Washington seems to fit better and he, too, appeared on the syllabus. 23 Barnett, supra note 21. 24 Karlan, supra note 21. 25 See, e.g., Ann Althouse, Barack Obama at the University of Chicago Law School, ALTHOUSE (July 30, 2008), http://althouse.blogspot.com/2008/07/barack-obama-at-university-of-chicago.html; Daniel Solove, When to Turn Down a Tenured Law Professorship Job Offer, CONCURRING OPINIONS (July 29, 2008), http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2008/07/when_to_turn_do.html. 26 DAVID REMNICK, THE BRIDGE: THE LIFE AND RISE OF BARACK OBAMA 263 (2010); see also Kevin Brown, This Is a Time for Hope and Change, 87 IND. L.J. 431, 444 (2012) (“Many of the writings that Obama used in his course are ones that I have used over the years in mine. So there can be little doubt that he has a black scholar’s understanding about race in America.”); KLOPPENBERG, supra note 1, at 69–70 (discussing readings in syllabus). 27 See leevank, Barack Obama’s Teaching Style: What Conservative Scholars Have to Say, DAILY KOS (Mar. 9, 2012, 7:10 AM), http://www.dailykos.com/story/2012/03/09/1072720/-Barack-Obama-s- teaching-style-What-a-CONSERVATIVE-scholar-has-to-say#. 28 See Obama: Fanning the Flames of Racism Since 1994, https://web.archive.org/web/ 20120423110217/http://intangiblesoul.wordpress.com/2012/04/06/obama-fanning-the-flames-of-racism- since-1994/ (last visited Apr. 24, 2014, 4:43 PM). U N I V E R S I T Y O F P I T T S B U R G H L A W R E V I E W P A G E | 5 0 4 | V O L . 7 5 | 2 0 1 4 ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2014.342 http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu to Critical Race Theory.29 Some of the commentary was remarkably ill-informed, such as one blog post labeled, “Obama didn’t even write his own syllabus.”30 That post contained only the unsupported guess that Bernadine Dohrn wrote it.31 The syllabus invites further scrutiny because it offers extended insight into what Obama viewed as key texts on racism and law; it also gives some sense of the topics that Obama thought students should investigate further and present in their group discussions. If we viewed the syllabus solely to see what Obama was assigning, we might even transpose the title of James Kloppenberg’s book Reading Obama to “Obama reading.” Or maybe even more apt would be “Obama teaching.” In fact, Kloppenberg suggested that the syllabus was one source that deserved further scrutiny.32 In this article, we analyze the syllabus’ assignments for several purposes: To gain a sense of what Obama thought mattered in the area of racism and law, and, to a lesser extent, to analyze what Obama left out; and we attempt to trace the origins and meanings of Obama’s sources. That is, we grapple with Professor Obama’s syllabus to gauge his mind. Then, we turn to the topics Obama suggested to his students for their presentations. Our goal is to read Professor Obama’s syllabus to understand more about his jurisprudence of race and then use those ideas to enhance our understanding of Obama’s race jurisprudence. We view his ideas as grounded in issues of importance to critical race theory, but, at the same time, we see Obama moving in new directions away from critical race theory. Thus, our concluding section aspires to draw some conclusions about how Professor Obama sought to blaze new paths regarding race and law. Obama was grounded in similar questions as Derrick Bell; however, standing on the shoulders 29 See Charles C. Johnson, Obama’s Law School Course Description Cited ‘Institutional Racism in American Society,’ THE DAILY CALLER (Sept. 19, 2012, 1:57 AM), http://dailycaller.com/2012/09/19/ obamas-law-school-course-description-cited-institutional-racism-in-american-society/ (citing, among other works, an earlier version of this article). 30 See Ann Barnhardt, Obama Didn’t Write His Own Syllabus, RADIO PATRIOT (Mar. 27, 2012, 8:20 PM), http://radiopatriot.wordpress.com/2012/03/28/barnhardt-on-obies-course-syllabus/ (“Guys, Obama didn’t even write his own syllabus. The prose is sophisticated, the grammar is flawless, and the punctuation is good—heck, there are several semicolons used, and used correctly. In other words, the syllabus is everything that every other sample of genuine Obama-written prose is not. It isn’t the same voice. It isn’t the same author. Period. . . . I think Obama was (and is) so stupid, and such a fraud that he had to have someone else prepare his course for him, including what little bit of lecture he delivered in those four class sessions.”). 31 Id. (“Who might have prepared a course syllabus and light lecture notes on constitutional race issues with an emphasis toward education and race? Bernardine Dohrn. As in Bill Ayers’ wife.”). 32 KLOPPENBERG, supra note 1, at 267–68. R E A D I N G P R O F E S S O R O B A M A P A G E | 5 0 5 ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2014.342 http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu of Professor Bell, Obama sought a pragmatic and political approach for the twenty- first century. We are tempted to call it Critical Race Pragmatism. A. The Elements of the Course The syllabus provides information on grading, reading assignments, and suggested topics for group presentations. An hour-long group presentation accounted for 40 percent of each student’s grade for the course. Each student group selected a topic, provided the class with about fifty pages of reading on the topics, and then led the class discussion for an hour. Another 40 percent of the grade came from a paper of at least twelve pages on a topic of the student’s choosing. The primary criterion was that students had “broken some sweat trying to figure out the problem in all its wonderful complexity.”33 Obama also asked for “a thorough examination of the diversity of opinion that exists on the issue or theme.”34 The paper did not, however, require research beyond the class material and discussion. The final 20 percent was based on a reading quiz, which required the identification of sources, quotes from the assigned readings, and class participation. The syllabus provided a list of the required and optional readings for the first four class meetings. The readings are listed in Appendix 1, with bibliographic information to the extent that is available.35 These readings are discussed in section two of this paper to gauge Obama’s ideas. After the first four meetings, groups of students took turns leading the weekly seminar discussion around some topic related to the various intersections of “Racism and the Law.” Each group selected a maximum of fifty pages of reading for their classmates. Those assignments are not included in the syllabus as it only lists the readings Obama assigned. The syllabus does, however, list twelve topic areas that students might use as the basis for their presentations. Those topics, and Obama’s suggested approaches to present the topics, are listed in Appendix 2. We use the suggested group presentation topics in section three to gain further insight into Obama’s ideas. 33 Barack Obama, Current Issues in Racism and the Law Syllabus—Spring 1994: Seminar Requirements, at II, available at http://www.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/politics/2008OBAMA_LAW/ Obama_CoursePk.pdf. 34 Id. 35 See Barack Obama, Current Issues in Racism and the Law Syllabus—Spring 1994: Reading Assignments [hereinafter Obama, Reading Assignments], available at http://www.nytimes.com/ packages/pdf/politics/2008OBAMA_LAW/Obama_CoursePk.pdf. U N I V E R S I T Y O F P I T T S B U R G H L A W R E V I E W P A G E | 5 0 6 | V O L . 7 5 | 2 0 1 4 ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2014.342 http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu B. Obama Teaching: The Reading Assignments The assignments for the first four classes were organized first to provide a broad theory about racism and law; the assignments then proceeded, chronologically, from the early Republic through Reconstruction, to the Civil Rights Movement and backlash, to contemporary debate. In this section, we discuss the readings and identify, to the extent possible, what was assigned followed by our interpretation of the meaning of those readings in the next section. 1. Framing the Course: Theory and Pre-Civil War History The two initial classes presented a historical view shifting to contemporary constitutional law, sociology, and politics for the third and fourth classes. The first class covered “theory” and cases on slavery and Native Americans before the Civil War. The theory section included excerpts from George Fredrickson’s The Arrogance of Race,36 Anthony Appiah’s essay on “Racism,” and an excerpt from Appiah’s essay on the Uncompleted Argument: Du Bois and the Illusion of Race.37 As with many of the readings, it is unclear whether it was the introduction or another part of Fredrickson’s Arrogance of Race that Obama assigned. One of the major themes running through Fredrickson’s work is the importance of racism and racial hierarchy as categories of analysis by themselves; and, also, how those categories declined in importance among people studying race over time. While Fredrickson continued to see the salience of racism and racial hierarchy, he realized that more recent work emphasized interrelatedness of economic and social considerations and racism and the desire for racial hierarchy. Perhaps because his work was the opening assignment in the syllabus, Fredrickson may be particularly helpful in framing Obama’s mission of seeing the nuances of race and the ways that economics, history, and social organization have all worked together to influence it. Similarly, though perhaps somewhat more obliquely, Anthony Appiah’s essay on the varieties of “Racism” may have helped frame the ways that actors interpreted issues of race as indicative of innate characteristics of people. Appiah seemed to suggest that racial attitudes may change. This perspective provided more flexibility in approaching problems of race than many, like Derrick Bell, had previously allowed. Appiah’s essay on The Illusion of Race argued that 36 GEORGE FREDRICKSON, THE ARROGANCE OF RACE: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON SLAVERY, RACISM, AND SOCIAL INEQUALITY (1988). 37 Anthony Appiah, The Uncompleted Argument: Du Bois and the Illusion of Race, 12 CRITICAL INQUIRY, No. 1, Autumn 1985, at 21–37. R E A D I N G P R O F E S S O R O B A M A P A G E | 5 0 7 ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2014.342 http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu race was less a biological fact but rather, a category that had been culturally imposed, thus suggesting that it can be undone—an argument that likely resonated with Obama’s experiences in Hawaii, in the Pacific, and on the mainland United States. It also appeared as a central theme in Obama’s 2008 “A More Perfect Union” speech in Philadelphia.38 Such an argument stands in stark contrast with Bell’s sense that racism, particularly white on black racism, was a central, and seemingly unchanging, fact of American history and America’s future.39 By contrast with the theoretical beginnings, the readings for the remainder of the first day on Native Americans and slavery imparted the cold reality of past racial atrocities as they were dealt with by the legal system. The readings covered two issues: Andrew Jackson’s plan of Indian Removal and the statute Congress passed to support it. Obama included the response by “Speckled Snake”40 and the antecedents to the plan found in Vattel’s Law of Nations41 and Hugh Henry Brackenridge’s Law Miscellanies.42 Chief Justice John Marshall’s opinion in Johnson v. M’Intosh43 dealt with the ideology of colonization and deprivation of Native lands. The latter three sources all justified taking land from societies who did not practice farming. 38 Barack Obama, A More Perfect Union (Mar. 18, 2008), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/ story/story.php?storyId=88478467 (“But I have asserted a firm conviction—a conviction rooted in my faith in God and my faith in the American people—that, working together, we can move beyond some of our old racial wounds, and that in fact we have no choice if we are to continue on the path of a more perfect union.”). 39 See generally DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM (1992). 40 Speckled Snake, Untitled Speech in Response to President Jackson, in SAMUEL G. DRAKE, THE BOOK OF THE INDIANS, OR, BIOGRAPHY AND HISTORY OF THE INDIANS OF NORTH AMERICA: FROM ITS FIRST DISCOVERY TO THE YEAR 1841, at 110 (Boston, Benjamin B. Mussey 9th ed. 1845) (circa 1830). 41 EMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS § 81, at 35–36 (Philadelphia, T. & J.W. Johnson 1844) (1758) (“Those nations . . . who inhabit fertile countries, but disdain to cultivate their lands and choose rather to live by plunder, are wanting to themselves, are injurious to all their neighbours, and deserve to be extirpated as savage and pernicious beasts.”); see also TIM ALAN GARRISON, THE LEGAL IDEOLOGY OF REMOVAL: THE SOUTHERN JUDICIARY AND THE SOVEREIGNTY OF NATIVE AMERICAN NATIONS 69– 73 (2001) (discussing Vattel’s justification of taking of Native land). 42 HUGH HENRY BRACKENRIDGE, LAW MISCELLANIES 125–26 (Philadelphia, P. Byrne 1814). 43 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823). U N I V E R S I T Y O F P I T T S B U R G H L A W R E V I E W P A G E | 5 0 8 | V O L . 7 5 | 2 0 1 4 ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2014.342 http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu The section on slavery included four cases addressing questions about who was a slave and how slaves could be treated. The first, Gobu v. Gobu,44 was an 1802 North Carolina case that established the presumption cited by later courts that a black man is a slave until proven otherwise.45 The next case, Hudgins v. Wrights,46 articulated a pseudo-scientific approach to determine a supposed slave’s ancestry, including the shape of a person’s nose and the texture of hair. By explaining the logic the courts used to interpret race, both Gobu v. Gobu and Hudgins v. Wright illustrate courts’ struggle to define racial categories during the era of slavery. Sawney v. Carter47 demonstrates the court’s unwillingness to emancipate a slave without proper written documentation despite the slave’s testimony or the testimony of third parties regarding the master’s actions to grant his freedom. State v. Mann48 is one of the best-known cases from the era of slavery—perhaps surpassed only by Dred Scott49 in notoriety. Mann absolves a man from criminal liability for his abuse of a rented slave, Milly. Justice Thomas Ruffin’s opinion in Mann, often invoked by abolitionists as evidence of the 44 1 N.C. (Tay.) 188, 188–89 (1802) (deeming a person’s freedom to be dependent upon his color and refusing to apply the presumption of slavery to persons of mixed blood). The plaintiff “of an olive colour, between black and yellow, had long hair and a prominent nose” sought his freedom from the defendant who found him in her barn when he was eight years old and she twelve. Id. at 188. After stating the presumption of slavery applied to all black persons, Judge John Louis Taylor freed the plaintiff due to his mixed blood. Id. at 188–89. 45 See Nichols v. Bell, 46 N.C. (1 Jones) 32, 34 (1853) (citing Gobu, 1 N.C. 188 as the first recognition “that if [a man] was black, he was by law presumed to be a slave”). Paul Finkelman’s introduction to the 1993 Chicago-Kent Law Review’s Symposium on the “Law of Slavery” may have brought this obscure case to Obama’s attention. See Paul Finkelman, The Centrality of the Peculiar Institution in American Legal Development, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1009, 1014 n.35 (1993). 46 11 Va. (1 Hen. & M.) 134, 139 (1806) (justifying by law and precedent that “all American Indians are prima facie FREE” and once the “maternal” genealogy of anyone challenging his freedom “is satisfactorily established” as descending from an Indian, the burden of proof then shifts to the one who claims him as a slave). Because there are no birth records kept for any but whites, Judge Tucker discusses the method of proof that must be used by judges to evaluate whether or not someone claiming freedom is of Indian, white, or African heritage—“a flat nose and woolly head of hair” are “characteristic marks” that “Nature has stampt upon the African and his descendants.” Id. at 137–39. 47 27 Va. (6 Rand.) 173, 173–75 (1828) (holding that a Court of Equity is powerless to enforce an oral promise of a master to emancipate a slave or to determine that the actions of a former master effected a slave’s emancipation unless the owner complied with the law for emancipation. The only way to duly emancipate a slave is by “last Will and Testament, or by any other instrument in writing under his or her hand and seal, attested and proved in the County Court by two witnesses . . . .”). 48 13 N.C. 263 (1830). 49 60 U.S. 393 (1857). R E A D I N G P R O F E S S O R O B A M A P A G E | 5 0 9 ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2014.342 http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu inhumanity of slavery, acknowledges that slavery requires the “uncontrolled authority of the master over the body of the slave.” Though Ruffin was zealously pro-slavery, his honest assessment, ironically, may have ultimately helped to undermine the system of slavery.50 The Fugitive Slave Act of 185051 is included, as is a brief address by Millard Fillmore regarding the Compromise of 1850, most likely his first annual message.52 The Act had important implications for jurisprudence. It cut off the rights of the accused slave to challenge his status as a slave and compelled free people in Northern states to assist in the rendition of slaves.53 There are three excerpts from anti-slavery advocates regarding the Act: Frederick Douglass’ Is it Right to Kill a Kidnapper,54 The Right to Criticize,55 and an unidentified speech from Martin Delany. Yet, there are other publications of the jurisprudence around slavery that one might have expected to appear here, such as Henry David Thoreau’s Civil Disobedience.56 The controversy over the obedience of the Fugitive Slave Act is one of the most often discussed parts of American jurisprudence in the nineteenth century.57 The section concludes with the optional reading of Dred Scott or Derrick Bell’s synopsis of the case. 50 See, e.g., Sally Greene & Eric Muller, Introduction: State v. Mann and Thomas Ruffin in History and Memory, 87 N.C. L. REV. 669 (2009); Alfred L. Brophy, Humanity, Utility, and Logic in Southern Legal Thought: Harriet Beecher Stowe’s Critique of Southern Legal Thought in Dred: A Tale of the Great Dismal Swamp, 78 B.U. L. REV. 1113, 1132–37 (1998) (discussing abolitionist Stowe’s use of State v. Mann). 51 Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, 9 Stat. 462 (1850). 52 Millard Fillmore, First Annual Message (Dec. 2, 1850). 53 ROBERT COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTI-SLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 175–77 (1975); Jeffrey Schmidt, The Antislavery Judge Reconsidered, 29 L. & HIST. REV. 797 (2011). 54 Frederick Douglass, Editorial, Is it Right and Wise to Kill a Kidnapper?, FREDERICK DOUGLASS’ PAPER, June 2, 1854. 55 Frederick Douglass, The Right to Criticize American Institutions, Speech Before the American Anti- Slavery Society (May 11, 1847). 56 Henry David Thoreau, Civil Disobedience [Resistance to Civil Government], 10 THOREAU’S WORKS 131 (1893). 57 See, e.g., COVER, supra note 53, at 175–91; Alfred L. Brophy, Utility, History, and the Rule of Law: The Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 in Antebellum Jurisprudence, in TRANSFORMATIONS IN AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 109 (Daniel W. Hamilton & Alfred L. Brophy eds., 2009). U N I V E R S I T Y O F P I T T S B U R G H L A W R E V I E W P A G E | 5 1 0 | V O L . 7 5 | 2 0 1 4 ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2014.342 http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu 2. Reconstruction to Civil Rights The second class fast-forwarded past secession and the Civil War to focus on “Reconstruction, Retrenchment, and Jim Crow.”58 The readings included the Thirteenth,59 Fourteenth,60 and Fifteenth Amendments,61 the Civil Rights Act of 1866,62 South Carolina’s Black Codes,63 the Enforcement Act of 1870,64 and the Civil Rights Act of 1875,65 along with leading Supreme Court cases—the Slaughterhouse Cases,66 Civil Rights Cases,67 United States v. Cruikshank,68 Giles v. Harris,69 and Plessy v. Ferguson.70 There were also excerpts from Frederick Douglass on the Civil Rights Cases,71 an account from 1910 of how few African Americans actually served on juries (perhaps a precursor to realist jurisprudence),72 58 See Obama, Reading Assignments, supra note 35, at II. 59 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. 60 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 61 U.S. CONST. amend. XV. 62 Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27–30 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981–1982 (1987)). 63 An Act Preliminary to the Legislation Introduced by the Emancipation of Slaves, 1865 S.C. Acts No. 4730–33, available at http://home.gwu.edu/~jjhawkin/BlackCodes/pdfSouthCarolina.pdf. 64 The Enforcement Act, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140 (1870). 65 Civil Rights Act of 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335, invalidated by The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 66 83 U.S. 36 (1872). 67 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 68 92 U.S. 542 (1876). 69 189 U.S. 475 (1903). 70 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 71 Frederick Douglass, Speech at Lincoln Hall opposing the Supreme Court’s 1883 decision in the Civil Rights Cases (Oct. 22, 1883), available at http://memory.loc.gov/cgibin/ampage?collId=mfd&fileName =24 /24004/24004page.db&recNum=6. 72 Gilbert Thomas Stephenson, Actual Jury Service by Negroes, in RACE DISTINCTIONS IN AMERICAN LAW 253 (1910); see also Alfred L. Brophy, Did Formalism Never Exist?, 92 TEX. L. REV. 383, 399– 400, 408 (2013) (discussing the importance of empirical studies of law’s effect in thought of nineteenth and early twentieth-century reformers, such as Realists); Roger A. Fairfax, Wielding the Double-Edged Sword: Charles Hamilton Houston and Judicial Activism in the Age of Legal Realism, 14 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 17–44 (1998). R E A D I N G P R O F E S S O R O B A M A P A G E | 5 1 1 ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2014.342 http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu a historian’s account of lynching,73 and Bell’s summary of the Civil War amendments and Reconstruction.74 The readings from the second class concluded with excerpts from Booker T. Washington’s Up from Slavery,75 W.E.B. Du Bois’ The Souls of Black Folk,76 and Marcus Garvey’s Philosophy and Opinions.77 While these selections are not atypical, it would, perhaps, be more common to have an excerpt from C. Vann Woodward’s The Strange Career of Jim Crow.78 Obama moved right from Plessy to Brown,79 without a glance at the cases in the intervening period that set the stage for the Civil Rights triumph in Brown—not even some of the well-known stepping stones to Brown, such as Missouri ex rel. Gaines80 or Shelley v. Kraemer.81 Nor is there mention of some of the key criminal procedure precedents, such as the Scottsboro Boys.82 Also missing is discussion of the federal government’s role in promoting segregation and later in promoting integration.83 These nuances are flattened down in Obama’s syllabus, as is probably necessary when one moves from 1865 to the 1980s in two classes that attempt to cover the spectrum of race, law, and constitutionalism. The third class focuses on “Civil Rights and Retrenchment.”84 It begins with Brown, followed by Robert Bork’s 1963 New Republic article85 opposing 73 RALPH GINZBURG, 100 YEARS OF LYNCHINGS (2d ed. 1988). 74 DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM, AND AMERICAN LAW 30–34 (2d ed.). 75 BOOKER T. WASHINGTON, UP FROM SLAVERY (1901). 76 W.E.B. DU BOIS, THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK (1903). 77 MARCUS GARVEY, PHILOSOPHY AND OPINIONS (Amy Jacques Garvey ed., 1923). 78 C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW (1955). 79 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 80 Missouri ex. rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938) (holding that Missouri could not satisfy the “separate but equal” mandate by sending blacks to neighboring states to obtain a legal education and maintaining only an all-white law school in the state). 81 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (abolishing racially restrictive covenants). 82 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). 83 See, e.g., KENNETH JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES (1985); MICHAEL KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY (2004). 84 See Obama, Reading Assignments, supra note 35, at Reading Packet #2, at III. 85 Robert Bork, Civil Rights—A Challenge, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 31, 1963, at 21. Bork challenged the constitutionality of the “public accommodations” provision of the forthcoming Civil Rights Act of U N I V E R S I T Y O F P I T T S B U R G H L A W R E V I E W P A G E | 5 1 2 | V O L . 7 5 | 2 0 1 4 ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2014.342 http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu additional federal civil rights statutes, and Martin Luther King’s Letter from a Birmingham Jail.86 It then excerpts the leading desegregation cases of Cooper v. Aaron,87 Griffin v. County Board of Prince Edward County,88 Green v. County School Board,89 Pasadena Board of Education v. Spangler,90 Milliken v. Bradley,91 Hills v. Gautreaux,92 and Milliken II.93 The reading also included cases on poverty and education (San Antonio v. Rodriguez94), employment discrimination (Washington v. Davis95), and housing discrimination (Arlington Heights v. Metro 1964 preventing private establishments from denying access to blacks. Bork believed this violated the freedom of assembly rights of racist whites. 86 Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., Letter from a Birmingham Jail, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Aug. 1963, at 78. 87 358 U.S. 1 (1958) (rejecting the requested delay by an Arkansas school official to implement a desegregation plan in compliance with Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)). In addition, the Court reiterated the supremacy of the U.S. Constitution and the requisite “obedience of the States to [the principles announced in Brown], according to the command of the Constitution” contrary to the assertions by the Governor of Arkansas. Id. at 19. 88 377 U.S. 218 (1964) (deeming the County School Board’s closing the public schools to all children while financially supporting private segregated schools as denying the constitutional rights of the Negro children of Prince Edward County to attend desegregated public schools). 89 391 U.S. 430 (1968) (rejecting the school system’s “freedom-of-choice” plan which did not effectuate desegregation as implemented, but rather propagated its continuance). 90 427 U.S. 424 (1976) (Applying the holding of its earlier decision in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1 (1971), that courts are limited in their ability to desegregate schools when a school’s racial composition was not caused by school district actions but rather by normal patterns of demographic migration. The Court deemed it to be judicial overreaching to “require annual readjustment of attendance zones so that there would not be a majority of any minority in any Pasadena public school . . . .”). Id. at 2704. 91 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (striking down an desegregation injunction in Detroit and surrounding areas that included areas that did not have de jure segregation). 92 425 U.S. 284 (1976) (holding metropolitan area remedies are not impermissible as a matter of law). 93 Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977) (articulating a three-part test framework to guide district courts as they attempted to remedy segregated school districts). 94 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (finding poverty did not merit strict judicial scrutiny in an equal protection challenge to public school financing based on property taxes). 95 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (holding that a racially discriminatory impact of a facially neutral policy is not conclusively in violation of the Due Process Clause), superseded by statute, 2 U.S.C. § 1973, as stated in, Chapman v. Nicholson, 579 F. Supp. 1504 (N.D. Ala. 1984). R E A D I N G P R O F E S S O R O B A M A P A G E | 5 1 3 ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2014.342 http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu Housing96). Although most of those cases also appeared in Bell’s textbook, they are the central texts in constitutional law and one would expect them in any basic course on the subject. Obama also added three articles from a symposium on Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio97 in the Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy. The articles, by Lino Graglia,98 Charles Cooper,99 and Randall Kennedy,100 spanned a broad spectrum. Unlike Randall Kennedy, Cooper agreed with the Court in Wards Cove. Cooper believed Wards Cove offered the country a “last clear chance to retreat from quotas in the workplace”101 and a chance to return to the original congressional intent of Title VII.102 Graglia posits that “[g]ranting racial preferences undermines the ability of blacks to attain [self-respect and the respect of others].”103 Graglia focused more attention on the divisiveness of racial preferences. He concluded with an ominous warning that such preferences might lead to the nation tearing itself apart. The grim concluding line of his article is that “Perhaps then America will then finally have paid the full price for the terrible mistake of bringing in Africans in chains.”104 Randall Kennedy’s response to Cooper and Graglia105 argues the merits of a disparate-impact analysis employed by 96 Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) (requiring the plaintiff to prove a racially discriminatory intent or purpose motivated the defendant’s decision to deny a change in zoning for a tract of land from single-family to multi-family). 97 Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989) (abandoning the business necessity test in employment discrimination cases and altering the plaintiff’s burden of proof regarding employment policies that have a disparate impact on minority groups), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1074, as recognized in Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44 (2003). 98 Lino A. Graglia, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964: From Prohibiting to Requiring Racial Discrimination in Employment, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 68 (1991). 99 Charles J. Cooper, Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio: A Step Towards Eliminating Quotas in the American Workplace, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 84 (1991). 100 Randall Kennedy, Competing Conceptions of “Racial Discrimination”: A Response to Cooper and Graglia, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 93 (1991). 101 Cooper, supra note 99, at 92. 102 Id. at 88–89. 103 Graglia, supra note 98, at 76. 104 Id. at 77. 105 Kennedy, supra note 100, at 93. U N I V E R S I T Y O F P I T T S B U R G H L A W R E V I E W P A G E | 5 1 4 | V O L . 7 5 | 2 0 1 4 ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2014.342 http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.106 He challenges the arguments advanced by Cooper and Graglia contending that employers who employ policies that have a racially-disparate impact should be held accountable for these policies because they are a “hindrance that our society faces in its struggle to transcend the gravitational pull of its racist history.”107 The section concludes with the Civil Rights Act of 1991108—designed to counteract Wards Cove and allow for broader evidence for establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. 3. “Where Do We Go from Here?” The concluding section of Obama’s assigned readings—“Where Do We Go from Here?”—is the shortest of the sections and also the least law-oriented.109 It begins with a short section from Bell’s textbook on “Employment and Race-Class Conflict”110—a summary of the case-law on employment discrimination—followed by the introduction to Bell’s Faces at the Bottom of the Well.111 In many ways Bell’s introduction is backward looking, for it questions even the idea of racial equality and whether African Americans have given up too much in the hope for racial equality. The goal of racial equality is, while comforting to many whites, more illusory than real for blacks. For too long, we have worked for substantive reform, then settled for weakly worded and poorly enforced legislation, indeterminate judicial decisions, token government positions, even holidays. . . . If we are to seek new goals for our struggles, we must first reassess the worth of the racial assumptions on which, without careful thought, we have presumed too much and relied on too long.112 106 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 107 Kennedy, supra note 100, at 98. 108 Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1079 (1991). “[An Act] to amend the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to strengthen and improve Federal civil rights laws, to provide for damages in cases of intentional employment discrimination, to clarify provisions regarding disparate impact actions, and for other purposes.” 109 See Obama, Reading Assignments, supra note 35, at IV. 110 BELL, supra note 19, at 627–32. See infra note 141 for further discussion of the edition of Bell’s casebook that Obama used. 111 BELL, supra note 39, at 1–14. 112 Id. at 14. R E A D I N G P R O F E S S O R O B A M A P A G E | 5 1 5 ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2014.342 http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu The introduction to Faces provides a summary of Bell’s ideas related to the declining civil rights fortunes of African Americans and the difficulty of overcoming white racism and, in many ways, is an overview of his career. Bell’s work emerged from a world of Jim Crow—he was born in the 1930s—and is built on his experiences.113 It is from this vantage point that he deemed white racism intractable and unsusceptible of moral suasion—even as the events of the 1960s suggested otherwise. Thus, much of Bell’s scholarship focuses on the ways white racism functions and the difficulty, if not impossibility, of overcoming it. It is an undeniably pessimistic vision of our nation’s history.114 Although neither the Preface nor the concluding section of Faces at the Bottom of the Well was part of the assigned readings, in both Bell directly addresses the pessimism of his scholarship. Bell suggests that even if there was perhaps no hope that people should continue the struggle, to strive for improvement is part of human character.115 Much of Bell’s other writings were left out of the syllabus. For instance, one of Bell’s most famous works, Space Traders,116 deals in metaphorical terms with contemporary United States society. It hypothesizes the arrival of aliens on earth promising health and riches in exchange for the African Americans.117 This is a thinly veiled story about the slave trade and the covenant with slavery that white 113 RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, THE DERRICK BELL READER 3 (2005). One is tempted here to refer to candidate Obama’s A More Perfect Union speech in March 2008, supra note 38, when he interpreted his minister, Reverend Jeremiah Wright, as a representative of the era of Jim Crow. Reverend Wright, Obama said, “spoke as if our society was static; as if no progress had been made; as if this country—a country that has made it possible for one of his own members to run for the highest office in the land and build a coalition of white and black, Latino and Asian, rich and poor, young and old—is still irrevocably bound to a tragic past.” This is one instance in which Obama directly confronted the generational divide between people who came to adulthood in the heart of the grim years of Jim Crow. 114 Obama’s A More Perfect Union speech, supra note 38, offers a different reading of United States’ history: “what we know—what we have seen—is that America can change. That is the true genius of this nation. What we have already achieved gives us hope—the audacity to hope—for what we can and must achieve tomorrow.” 115 See BELL, supra note 39, at 198–200. 116 Bell, The Space Traders, in FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL, supra note 39, at 158–94 [hereinafter Bell, Space Traders]. Earlier versions of Space Traders appeared in Derrick Bell, After We’re Gone: Prudent Speculations on America in a Post-Racial Epoch, 34 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 393, 397– 400 (1989–1990), and in Derrick A. Bell, Jr., A Prophecy for the Year 2000, 42 RUTGERS L. REV. 93, 96–100 (1989). 117 Bell, Space Traders, supra note 116, at 158–94. U N I V E R S I T Y O F P I T T S B U R G H L A W R E V I E W P A G E | 5 1 6 | V O L . 7 5 | 2 0 1 4 ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2014.342 http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu Americans so readily adopted as early as the seventeenth century.118 In the story, the United States is disturbingly eager to accept the aliens’ offer. Space Traders may be a critique of utilitarian thought and a critique of the law and economics movement as well as racism. Yet, Sean Hannity and Joel Pollak, editor-in-chief of Breitbart.com, discussed Space Traders in a brief and confused manner as evidence of Bell’s supposed anti-American values and charged Obama with subscribing to those ideas.119 Arguably of more significance is that Obama’s vision of history and of the future was broader than Bell’s. Obama’s assigned reading suggested that ideas of race, rather than being fixed, are contingent on society. Moreover, he did not assign some of Bell’s most radical work, like Space Traders. However, neither did he assign any of the substantial commentary that existed directly addressing and countering Bell’s bleak assessment of the future of race relations.120 It looks as though he did not directly assign anything on Bell’s interest convergence theory— the idea that white people will only support African American civil rights when it is in their best interest.121 The absence (or at very least minimization) of Bell’s interest-convergence thesis from the readings is particularly apt because the interest-convergence theory is so central to Bell’s work, and it has been one of the real flashpoints of recent discussions of Bell’s indictment of American law.122 The other assignments of the final section (“Where Do We Go from Here?”123) demonstrate Obama’s vision was broader than Bell’s. They are from 118 See EDMUND S. MORGAN, AMERICAN SLAVERY—AMERICAN FREEDOM (1975) (hypothesizing that slavery helped form the basis for white freedom); CHRISTOPHER TOMLINS, FREEDOM BOUND: LAW, LABOR, AND CIVIC IDENTITY IN COLONIZING ENGLISH AMERICA, 1580–1865 (2010) (discussing ways that slavery provided the economic basis of white society). 119 Starnes, supra note 10. 120 See, e.g., Randall Kennedy, Racial Critiques of Academia, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1745 (1989). 121 See Derrick Bell, Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518 (1980) [hereinafter Bell, Interest-Convergence Dilemma]. A short version of the interest- convergence theory appeared in section 1.14 of Bell’s RACE, RACISM, AND AMERICAN LAW, supra note 19, at 47–51, but that section does not seem to have been assigned to the students. For more on what sections of Bell were likely included in the readings, see infra note 143. 122 See Whet Moser, Derrick Bell, Barack Obama, and Andrew Breitbart: Breaking Kayfabe, CHICAGOMAG.COM (Mar. 9, 2012, 4:19 PM), http://www.chicagomag.com/Chicago-Magazine/The-312/ March-2012/Derrick-Bell-Barack-Obama-and-Andrew-Breitbart-Breaking-Kayfabe/. 123 The title of the final section is also title of Martin Luther King, Jr.’s 1967 speech delivered at the Southern Christian Leadership Conference’s annual convention in Atlanta and his subsequent book— Where Do We Go From Here: Chaos or Community? In addition, during the Harvard Civil Rights-Civil R E A D I N G P R O F E S S O R O B A M A P A G E | 5 1 7 ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2014.342 http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu Shelby Steele,124 William Julius Wilson,125 an excerpt from a book on the New Black Middle Class,126 and a National Affairs article on a conflict at Stanford (over racial identity and a dispute about whether Mozart was black, alleging all creative musicians are black).127 Steele’s I’m Black, You’re White, Who’s Innocent? presents a stark contrast with Bell: It suggests that the current generation has little connection with the past and, to the extent that it does, it should not be held liable for past racial crimes. Harvard Sociologist William Julius Wilson’s The Truly Disadvantaged,128 published in 1990, offered a call to remember the millions of African Americans who had been left behind economically in the 1970s and 1980s.129 Obama had highlighted Williams’ work in 1988, before entering law school, in a brief essay entitled, Why Organize?130 Along those lines, Landry’s chapter from The New Black Middle Class questions the size of the black middle class and its economic power, while John Bunzel’s Black and White at Stanford deals with a relatively minor—if heated—controversy around students at Stanford who fought about black identity. Liberties 1992 Symposium: The State of Civil Liberties: Where Do We Go From Here?, Harvard Law Professor Frank Michelman contributed an article to the symposium addressing one of the suggested group presentation topics: Hate speech. There was substantial academic commentary on the topic following the introduction of the “Collegiate Speech Protection Act of 1991” by United States Representative Henry Hyde’s proposal to “deny federal financial assistance to organizations that practice discrimination based on race, color, or national origin.” Frank Michelman, Universities, Racist Speech and Democracy in America, 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 339, 341 (1992). Michelman finds the bill as one “not aimed at racial discrimination . . . [but rather] aimed at censorship of expression in our country’s institutions of higher education.” Id. 124 Shelby Steele, I’m Black, You’re White, Who’s Innocent? Race and Power in an Era of Blame, HARPER’S.ORG, June 1988, at 44–53, available at http://harpers.org/archive/1988/06/0023431. 125 WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY, THE UNDERCLASS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1987). 126 Bart Landry, How Big a Piece?, in THE NEW BLACK MIDDLE CLASS (1987). 127 John H. Bunzel, Black and White at Stanford, 105 NAT’L AFFAIRS, Fall 1991, at 61, available at http://www.nationalaffairs.com/doclib/20080709_19911055blackandwhiteatstanfordjohnhbunzel.pdf. 128 WILSON, supra note 125. 129 There is a parallel here with the preface of Bell’s FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL, supra note 39, which pointed out that some people have made it, but far from everyone. Id. at xi. 130 Why Organize?, ILLINOIS ISSUES (1988), available at http://illinoisissues.uis.edu/archives/2008/09/ whyorg.html (mentioning University of Chicago sociologist William Julius Williams’ work on problems with declining cities and suggesting need for broad-based empowerment). People and local political power were solutions in Obama’s mind. U N I V E R S I T Y O F P I T T S B U R G H L A W R E V I E W P A G E | 5 1 8 | V O L . 7 5 | 2 0 1 4 ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2014.342 http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu The final section concludes with three pieces from the New York Times: one addressing the difficulty of integration; another highlighting merchants’ bias against African American shoppers; and the final piece is Cornel West’s article in the New York Times Magazine—Learning to Talk of Race131—which appeared in August 1992 in the wake of the Los Angeles Riots. West focused on racial divisions, while pleading for the mutual interest that all Americans had in racial harmony. Here West, in contrast with Bell, emphasized the common mission of Americans. Both are concerned with racial inequality: West appealed to the common interest, whereas Bell was skeptical of the amount of common interest and whether there would be action on those interests: To establish a new framework, we need to begin with a frank acknowledgment of the basic humanness and Americanness of each of us. And we must acknowledge that as a people—E Pluribus Unum—we are on a slippery slope toward economic strife, social turmoil and cultural chaos. If we go down, we go down together. The Los Angeles upheaval forced us to see not only that we are not connected in ways we would like to be but also, in a more profound sense, that this failure to connect binds us even more tightly together. The paradox of race in America is that our common destiny is more pronounced and imperiled precisely when our divisions are deeper. . . . There is no escape from our interracial interdependence, yet enforced racial hierarchy dooms us as a nation to collective paranoia and hysteria—the unmaking of any democratic order.132 West, to be sure, placed a big burden on white America to understand and acknowledge the “flaws of American society.”133 But West differed in his aspirations from Bell; West saw opportunities for discussion—a topic of little interest for Bell. The final words of West’s article—and the concluding line of the readings for Obama’s syllabus—were “Let us hope and pray that the vast intelligence, imagination, humor and courage in this country will not fail us. Either we learn a new language of empathy and compassion, or the fire this time will consume us all.”134 131 Cornel West, Learning to Talk of Race, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Aug. 2, 1992. 132 Id. 133 Id. 134 Id. R E A D I N G P R O F E S S O R O B A M A P A G E | 5 1 9 ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2014.342 http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu II. THE ORIGINS AND MEANINGS OF THE READINGS: ASSESSING OBAMA’S JURISPRUDENCE There was a lot of assigned reading (550 pages spread over four class meetings); so it’s hard to imagine that any of the ideas being discussed received a lot of attention. Yet, the syllabus invites questions such as: Why did Obama structure the course the way he did? And why did he choose those readings? And what meaning can we extract form those assignments about Obama as a thinker and teacher? Some contend that the syllabus shows Professor Obama’s debt to Derrick Bell and Critical Race Theory; while others think the readings and ideas were drawn exclusively from Derrick Bell. Our reading of Obama’s syllabus suggests that Obama embraced a broader philosophy than Bell of racial classifications and of the ability and ways to alter racism. Yet, given the repeated references to Bell in the syllabus, and the focus of late on Obama’s relation to Derrick Bell,135 it makes sense to look closely at Bell’s role in the syllabus. Obama assigned a lot of readings from Derrick Bell’s textbook Race, Racism, and American Law; however, Bell is remarkably absent in the first day’s readings on theory and history that began to frame the course. Bell’s ideological presence was also less evident in the final readings—“Where Do We Go from Here?”— discussing where the law’s treatment of race was going.136 Obama opened with historian George Fredrickson and philosopher Anthony Appiah, followed by readings and cases on dispossession of the Native Americans and on slavery— suggesting the malleability of the definitions of race.137 Arguably, Bell’s perception of the permanence of racism was not the undergirding of the course. Moreover, Booker T. Washington—admonishing African Americans to build up their own communities and not try to otherwise push for social progress—appears here alongside his opposite, W.E.B. Du Bois, whose constant drum beat in favor of lawsuits and political activism led the way for the modern civil rights revolution.138 135 See Starnes, supra note 10. 136 One place that Bell may have influenced the course was the suggested topics—racial gerrymandering (which had already been approved by the U.S. Supreme Court), race and the criminal justice system, immigration policy, racial bias in the media, welfare policy and reproductive rights, inter-ethnic tensions, reparations, hate speech, affirmative action, and public school financing. 137 See Obama, Reading Assignments, supra note 35, at I–II.A; see supra text and notes 36–37 (discussing Frederickson and Appiah). 138 See Obama, Reading Assignments, supra note 35, at II.D. U N I V E R S I T Y O F P I T T S B U R G H L A W R E V I E W P A G E | 5 2 0 | V O L . 7 5 | 2 0 1 4 ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2014.342 http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu Immediately after the reading on Du Bois came Marcus Garvey, whose solution to racism was to promote a return to Africa and an early version of what became known in the 1960s as black power.139 Conservative University of Texas law professor, Lino Graglia, conservative Supreme Court litigator, Chuck Cooper, conservative economist, Shelby Steele, and Professor Robert Bork are also included in the readings.140 In other parts of the course, the debt to Bell was greater. The course readings drew upon Bell’s textbook,141 yet the syllabus departed in important ways from that book. Obama included more than fifty pages of excerpts from Race, Racism, and American Law,142 about ten pages from Bell’s Faces at the Bottom of the Well, and 139 Adjoa Aiyetorro & Adrienne Davis, Historic and Modern Social Movements for Reparations: The National Coalition for Reparations in America (N’COBRA) and its Antecedents, 16 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 687 (2010) (discussing historical origins of black power). 140 See Obama, Reading Assignments, supra note 35, at III & IV. 141 As with other parts of the syllabus, which lists only the author’s name and a short title of the work excerpted or the case name, it is unclear which edition of Bell’s textbook Obama drew upon in compiling the readings for his class. Did he use the second edition of RACE, RACISM, AND AMERICAN LAW, supra note 74, published in 1980 (which was the one current while Obama was in law school) or the third edition published in 1992, supra note 19, which was the current one when he taught the course in 1994? There are reasons to suspect each one. For instance, Obama assigned five pages of readings from Bell, “The Legacy of Washington v. Davis,” which was the heading of section 9.8 in the third edition Race, Racism, and the Law (pp. 854–63). However, that section was ten pages long. Thus, he may have copied two pages from Bell’s textbook onto each page of his readings. Obama copied two pages from the introduction to FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL, supra note 39. It is fourteen pages long, but the reader section on it was only seven pages long. See Obama, Reading Assignments, supra note 35, at IV. On the other hand, Section 9.8 in the second edition was titled “Washington v. Davis and the Search for Discriminatory Purpose” and was five pages long. BELL, RACE, RACISM, AND AMERICAN LAW, supra note 19, at 627–32. One wonders if he used the text from the second edition but used the heading from the third edition. It does not appear that the changes were dramatic between the two editions for most of the material excerpted, although the third edition had extensive treatment of Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 433 U.S. 299 (1989) at 838–48. Because Wards Cove was decided in 1989, the 1980 second edition obviously had no discussion of it. The syllabus did, however, have excerpts from three articles on Wards Cove. See Graglia, supra note 98 (five page excerpt); Cooper, supra note 99; Kennedy, supra note 100 (five page excerpt). 142 The excerpts are in Section II.B of the syllabus: “Bell summary” of Dred Scott, which may be pages 15–20 in the second edition or 20–26 in the third edition; in section II.C, “Bell, Summary of Civil War Amendments, Reconstruction,” which may be pages 30–34 and 83–91 in the second edition or pages 36–44 and 109–21 in the third edition; also in section II.C. “Bell Summary” of Plessy v. Ferguson, which may be pages 86–90 in the second edition; in section III, “Bell, The Legacy of Washington v. Davis,” which may be pages 627–32 in the second edition or 854–63 in the third edition; and “Fair Employment Laws: An Overview,” which may be pages 612–15 and some other unknown excerpts from the second edition; and in section IV, “Bell, Employment and the Race-Class Conflict,” which is R E A D I N G P R O F E S S O R O B A M A P A G E | 5 2 1 ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2014.342 http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu also excerpts from a number of works that Bell cited; however, the course was significantly different from Bell’s books. The theory and history sections (the first class) owe very little, if anything, to Derrick Bell. The second class “Reconstruction, Retrenchment, and Jim Crow” owes more, but perhaps not much more, to Bell, for it has several significant readings that are never or barely mentioned in Bell, such as the South Carolina Black Codes,143 Frederick Douglass on the Civil Rights Cases,144 Ralph Ginzburg’s One Hundred Years of Lynchings,145 and Gilbert Thomas Stephenson’s Actual Jury Service.146 Some of the other readings in the syllabus are mentioned, but not significantly discussed, in Bell’s Race, Racism, and American Law, such as Marcus Garvey’s Philosophy and Opinions.147 Obama also offered students several of Bell’s summaries of key cases as an alternative to reading the cases.148 Later in the course, he also offered several of Bell’s overviews of employment law.149 Like Bell’s casebook, which is self-consciously about “American racism initiated by whites against blacks,”150 Obama’s course focused largely on African Americans; it also emphasized constitutional issues but left out criminal justice. Perhaps most importantly, for the purpose of considering the syllabus’ debt (or lack of it) to Bell, Bell’s interest-convergence thesis is overtly absent from the readings. It is possible that the optional excerpt from Bell, “Summary of Civil War Amendments, Reconstruction” included several pages on Bell’s interest- likely pages 894–906 in the third edition if Obama copied two pages of text to each page of his readings. BELL, supra note 74 (2d ed.); BELL, supra note 19; Obama, Reading Assignments, supra note 35. 143 An Act Preliminary to the Legislation Introduced by the Emancipation of Slaves, 1865 S.C. Acts No. 4730–33 (originally published as Volume 13 of The Statutes at Large of South Carolina), available at https://ia600503.us.archive.org/11/items/statutesatlargeo13repu/statutesatlargeo13repu_bw.pdf. 144 Douglass, supra note 71. 145 GINZBURG, supra note 73. The first edition was published in 1962 and includes newspaper accounts of tortures and lynchings beginning with an account reported on April 17, 1880 of the “First Negro at West Point Knifed by Fellow Cadets.” 146 Stephenson, supra note 72. 147 BELL, supra note 19, § 1.16, at 57 n.5. 148 See Obama, Reading Assignments, supra note 35, at II.B (“Bell summary” of Dred Scott); id. at II.C (mentioning “Bell summary” of Giles v. Harris, “Bell, Summary of Civil War Amendments, Reconstruction,” and “Bell summary” of Plessy v. Ferguson). 149 See id. at III (mentioning “Bell, The Legacy of Washington v. Davis” and “Bell, Fair Employment Laws: An Overview”); see also id. at IV (“Bell, Employment and Race-Class Conflict”). 150 See BELL, supra note 19, at xxiii. U N I V E R S I T Y O F P I T T S B U R G H L A W R E V I E W P A G E | 5 2 2 | V O L . 7 5 | 2 0 1 4 ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2014.342 http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu convergence thesis. In essence, this theory postulates that white people act collectively in their self-interest rather than according to a moral compass; thus, advances in African American civil rights come only when those advances benefit white people. Much has been written about this thesis; but without entering into debate about its explanatory power in American history, one can observe its important and controversial nature. Certainly parts of the readings—such as the optional excerpt on “Employment and Race-Class Conflict”—rely upon the interest-convergence theory. In assessing Obama’s jurisprudence, we note what is and is not present in the readings. Obama’s reading selections include both examples of the law as it is written and of the law in action. He included some substantive law (e.g., the black codes and the Civil Rights Act) and also examples of how law functioned (e.g., 100 Years of Lynching and the “Black Juror”). There are extensive excerpts from the United States Supreme Court’s desegregation decisions; but even in the day dedicated to “Civil Rights and Retrenchment” there are articles that look to how these policies will or should be applied. Really, more than is immediately apparent, much of the syllabus is about the future. So what is not included? There are no critical race scholars assigned other than Derrick Bell. Mari Matsuda and Richard Delgado are noticeable by their absence.151 The readings are remarkably non-theoretical. A few of the readings— like Frederick Douglas’ Is it Right to Kill a Kidnapper? invite some discussion about what is law and should it be obeyed—and others, such as Actual Jury Service By Negroes invite discussion of the distinction between law in the books and law in action. But even those are grounded in experience. Thus, there is relatively little assigned reading on jurisprudence. The readings are cases and statutes or historical and sociological essays on race. The readings, especially for the third day, are largely about cases and primarily focus around school desegregation efforts. Most of the readings written after 1970 are Supreme Court opinions; but the cases on affirmative action such as Bakke,152 Wygant,153 and Croson154 are noticeably absent. Obviously Obama could 151 Kennedy, supra note 120 (discussing primarily works by Derrick Bell, Richard Delgado, and Mari Matsuda). 152 Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 153 Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986), abrogation recognized by Associated Util. Contractors of Md., Inc. v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 83 F. Supp. 2d 613 (D. Md. 2000). 154 Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989). R E A D I N G P R O F E S S O R O B A M A P A G E | 5 2 3 ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2014.342 http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu not possibly cover the full spectrum of opinions and case law in four days of readings. The material on civil rights and retrenchment focused on desegregation in education, but the absence of affirmative action is perhaps somewhat surprising. The cases focused largely around issues involving African Americans; Hispanics appear only in one case, San Antonio v. Rodriguez.155 Asian Americans appear only as the subjects of the Wards Cove156 case. If we are looking at Obama and Bell, the points of departure from Bell are important. One key tenet of Bell’s work is the permanence of racism because racial problems “grow more intractable with time”;157 however, Obama framed the course with readings on the malleability of racial categories, suggesting that racism is not permanent. He concluded with readings on the need to address economic inequality, inquiries about the opportunities for the black middle class, and well- educated students—both white and black. These selections could reflect his perception about the interests of students at the University of Chicago or perhaps some of his own interests. The diversity of readings likely itself gives a glimpse of Obama’s mind. The excerpts from people like Booker T. Washington and Robert Bork illustrate at a minimum that Obama was willing to give a wide variety of speakers a chance to be heard. But perhaps their purpose was more than mere props in a debate; maybe they were present in the readings for the insights they might contribute to everyone’s understanding. The best glimpse of Professor Obama’s vision in this syllabus may be found in the final assignment. The concluding line of the readings packet suggests even more radicalism than we have seen from Obama; but its call for hope and for a new language of empathy and compassion bespeaks a belief in the possibility of a better future through law: “Let us hope and pray that the vast intelligence, imagination, humor and courage in this country will not fail us. Either we learn a new language of empathy and compassion, or the fire this time will consume us all.”158 The assignments fit with several key themes that characterize Obama’s jurisprudence and politics as they relate to race. First, that our nation has high aspirations, embodied in places like the Declaration of Independence and the Fourteenth 155 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 156 Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1074, as recognized in Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44 (2003). 157 BELL, supra note 39, at 9. 158 West, supra note 131. U N I V E R S I T Y O F P I T T S B U R G H L A W R E V I E W P A G E | 5 2 4 | V O L . 7 5 | 2 0 1 4 ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2014.342 http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu Amendment’s Equal Protection principle. While those promises have not always been fulfilled, Obama—like leaders before him from W.E.B. Du Bois159 to Ralph Ellison160—sought to hold our country to those principles. This commitment was explicit in candidate Obama’s A More Perfect Union speech in March 2008 at the National Constitution Center in Philadelphia, where he spoke of the Constitution’s promise of freedom and the Constitution as containing the mechanism for ending slavery.161 Others have noted Obama’s fascination with Ralph Ellison,162 and there are a lot of parallels between Obama’s focus on the as-yet unfulfilled promises of the Declaration and Constitution and Ellison’s faith in those documents, too. The faith is extraordinary, for as Ellison was growing up in Oklahoma, African Americans were subject to extraordinary violence. Yet, many people in Ellison’s community had a faith that the principles of the Constitution might be put into action.163 Such faith in the Constitution’s promises, particularly the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, has a long lineage in African American legal thought. Those brave civil rights pioneers of the early twentieth century like Du Bois asked for equal treatment on a regular basis by showing the gross inequalities in treatment of African Americans. It was a powerful and successful argument, grounded in the idea of equal treatment that itself found a home in Matthew 7:12, the Golden Rule. For what is the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment but a secular injunction to “all things whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye even so to them.”164 This is a principle that antedated the original Constitution and the Declaration and that early Americans— particularly those who opposed slavery—had been citing since the seventeenth century.165 One can trace the revolution in thinking that African American 159 DAVID LEVERING LEWIS, W.E.B. DU BOIS, 1919–1963: THE FIGHT FOR EQUALITY AND THE AMERICAN CENTURY (2001); ALFRED L. BROPHY, RECONSTRUCTING THE DREAMLAND: THE TULSA RIOT OF 1921, at 1–23 (2002) (discussing ideas of equality set in motion by the Harlem renaissance). 160 See, e.g., Alfred L. Brophy, The Great Constitutional Dream Book, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SUPREME COURT 360–63 (David S. Tanenhaus ed., 2008) (discussing ideas about equality, which Ralph Ellison labeled “the great constitutional dream book”). 161 Obama, A More Perfect Union, supra note 38. 162 See KLOPPENBERG, supra note 1, at 13 (discussing Obama’s affection for Ellison). 163 RALPH ELLISON, Roscoe Dunjee and the American Language, in THE COLLECTED ESSAYS OF RALPH ELLISON (John Callahan ed., 1996). 164 Matthew 7:12 (King James Bible). 165 Alfred L. Brophy, “Ingenium est Fateri per quos profeceris”: Francis Daniel Pastorius’ Young Country Clerks Collection and Anglo-American Legal Literature, 1682–1716, 3 U. CHI. L. SCH. R E A D I N G P R O F E S S O R O B A M A P A G E | 5 2 5 ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2014.342 http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu intellectuals wrought by looking from Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’ dismissive treatment of the Equal Protection argument in Buck v. Bell as the usual last resort of constitutional argument166 to its triumph in Brown v. Board of Education less than three decades later.167 This is also the conclusion of modern political theory. James Kloppenberg has shown that Obama was, like many of his generation, deeply affected by John Rawls’ political theory. Rawls was able to demonstrate in A Theory of Justice that we should judge the morality of action from the perspective of one who is “behind the veil of ignorance,” that is one who does not know what their interests are.168 To take a common example, we should judge the morality of the welfare state from the perspective of one who is unsure of whether she will be a recipient or a payer. While that is most assuredly the way to take self-interest out of an equation, what remains unclear is how to implement that in politics. For everyone indeed knows their position and will, consequently, judge their actions accordingly. That is the problem that Ellison faced. He asked in Invisible Man, whether politics could ever “be an expression of love.”169 Or, to phrase it in the way that Obama does, how to get voters to adopt principles based on the Golden Rule, the Declaration, or the Equal Protection principle. This is, indeed, one of the central problems faced by contemporary political theory. The second part of Obama’s post-professor thought that appears in the syllabus is his attempt to solve the problem of self-interest in politics. Where self- interest led Derrick Bell to articulate the interest convergence theory that did not offer much in the way of hope, both Ellison and Obama saw a similar solution: focus on the issues that unite us. Ellison recorded the historical ways that African Americans formed American culture. Invisible Man sees the many become one through mixing of African American and white culture. Obama’s campaign rhetoric is more forward-looking. It is often about how the themes that unite are ROUNDTABLE 637, 653, 659 (1996) (discussing Quaker anti-slavery advocacy and their invocation of the Golden Rule). 166 Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927), abrogation recognized by Fieger v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 740, 742 (6th Cir. 1996). 167 Alfred L. Brophy, Invisible Man as Literary Analog to Brown v. Board of Education, in RALPH ELLISON AND THE RAFT OF HOPE: A POLITICAL COMPANION TO INVISIBLE MAN 119, at 122–26 (Lucas Morel ed., 2004). 168 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971). See KLOPPENBERG, supra note 1, at 89–98 (discussing Rawls and noting connections to Obama). 169 RALPH ELLISON, INVISIBLE MAN 341 (1952). U N I V E R S I T Y O F P I T T S B U R G H L A W R E V I E W P A G E | 5 2 6 | V O L . 7 5 | 2 0 1 4 ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2014.342 http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu greater than those that divide and that political action comes from people who united together around common missions, rather than dividing along racial lines.170 The third part of Obama’s thought that appears in the syllabus is related to the Declaration’s and the Constitution’s foundational promises and to the possible political solution: He has, moreover, an optimism that racism is not permanent and, in fact, progress is being made.171 This optimism was supported by the evidence that generations of Americans had struggled, first to end slavery, and then to end Jim Crow.172 A fourth element of Obama’s thought that appears, somewhat obliquely in the syllabus as in the complete omission of cases from the final section on “Where do we go from here?,” is the belief that progress comes from political, not judicial, action.173 The Constitution is largely, in Obama’s mind, about structuring deliberations rather than rights. To be sure, Obama recognizes some 170 See Obama, A More Perfect Union, supra note 38. I chose to run for president at this moment in history because I believe deeply that we cannot solve the challenges of our time unless we solve them together, unless we perfect our union by understanding that we may have different stories, but we hold common hopes; that we may not look the same and we may not have come from the same place, but we all want to move in the same direction. See also id. (“This nation is more than the sum of its parts . . . out of many we are truly one.”). See also RUTH O’BRIEN, OUT OF MANY, ONE: OBAMA AND THE THIRD AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION (2013). 171 Obama, A More Perfect Union, supra note 38 (“[W]hat we have seen—is that America can change. That is the true genius of this nation.”); id. (“[W]orking together, we can move beyond some of our old racial wounds, and that in fact we have no choice if we are to continue on the path of a more perfect union.”). 172 Id. (“[W]ords on a parchment would not be enough to deliver slaves from bondage, or provide men and women of every color and creed their full rights and obligations as citizens of the United States. What would be needed were Americans in successive generations who were willing to do their part— through protests and struggles, on the streets and in the courts, through a civil war and civil disobedience, and always at great risk—to narrow that gap between the promise of our ideals and the reality of their time.”); see also BARACK OBAMA, THE AUDACITY OF HOPE 85–95 (2006) (talking about the relevance of the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution and how they shape our values). 173 Obama, A More Perfect Union, supra note 38. Out of the fragmentation of law and politics that had been so racially divisive in the 1970s and 1980s, Obama sought to move in a more positive direction. Constitutional law had not solved the problems; there was no clear meaning. There needed to be political solutions. Cf. KLOPPENBERG, supra note 1, at 153–61 (discussing Obama’s views on the contingency of the Constitution and how political mobilization was necessary to achieve the promises of the Constitution). R E A D I N G P R O F E S S O R O B A M A P A G E | 5 2 7 ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2014.342 http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu fundamental rights—such as free speech, property, and Due Process.174 But the Constitution is largely about discussion and making democracy function, rather than outcomes. “[O]ur democracy,” Obama wrote in The Audacity of Hope, is “not as a house to be built, but as a conversation to be had.”175 And the Constitution has a big role to play in that conversation, for “the framework of our Constitution can do is organize the way by which we argue about our future.”176 A final theme that appears in Obama’s thought is that the legacies of slavery and Jim Crow continue to demand attention.177 These tenets, which are so prominent a part of Obama’s Philadelphia speech and have received so much commentary, can be found in his reading assignments as well. There were also reading assignments that did not fit neatly with these themes, such as Robert Bork’s essay on the Civil Rights Act of 1964.178 But some of those reading assignments may also have been about the spectrum of ideas, taking the measures of those with whom you might disagree, seeing what the common ground may be, preparing to compromise, and maybe believing that “society can change.”179 III. THE MEANING AND ORIGINS OF THE GROUP PRESENTATIONS TOPICS The initial reading assignments and ensuing class discussions provided students with the necessary case law and theory for the remainder of the class. After the first four class meetings, Obama relinquished control of the reading assignments as the course turned to presentations by student groups with each group assigning up to fifty pages of reading to their classmates. Obama suggested 174 OBAMA, supra note 172, at 86 (focusing on core constitutional values of free speech, property rights, and Due Process). 175 Id. at 92. This invites further speculation on Obama as a legal historian. James Kloppenberg has already linked Obama’s writing about constitutional history in THE AUDACITY OF HOPE, supra note 172, to the literature on Republicanism in American history that was so popular in the 1980s and 1990s. See Kloppenberg, supra note 1, at 153–61. 176 OBAMA, supra note 172, at 92. 177 Obama, A More Perfect Union, supra note 38 (“That history helps explain the wealth and income gap between blacks and whites, and the concentrated pockets of poverty that persist in so many of today’s urban and rural communities.”); see also THOMAS SUGRUE, NOT EVEN PAST: BARACK OBAMA AND THE BURDEN OF RACE 73 (2010) (discussing William Julius Williams). 178 Bork, supra note 85. 179 Obama, A More Perfect Union, supra note 38 (“[W]hat my former pastor too often failed to understand is that embarking on a program of self-help also requires a belief that society can change.”). U N I V E R S I T Y O F P I T T S B U R G H L A W R E V I E W P A G E | 5 2 8 | V O L . 7 5 | 2 0 1 4 ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2014.342 http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu about a dozen topics on which students might present, but he noted that groups had substantial flexibility in choosing a topic. Based on the class reading assignments, we hypothesize that the debt to Derrick Bell was not nearly as great as one might expect given how much recent public discussion has revolved around Bell; however, when analyzing the suggested group discussion topics, Obama’s support of the tenets of Critical Race Theory becomes somewhat more arguable. Recognizing Obama’s political aspirations and his reluctance to take controversial positions in matters of race, the allegiance to CRT in the group discussion topics is neither overt nor incontrovertible. While there were non-CRT scholars simultaneously writing about these topics as well, it is interesting to note that ten of the twelve suggested topics reflect the ten key tenets of CRT identified in a 1993 article by Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic.180 We posit that student groups researching these topics might have discovered these articles and been exposed to the CRT ideals. Regardless of whether they agreed with the ideas advanced by CRT scholars, the students would have presented them to the class as part of Obama’s mandate “to draw out the full spectrum of views on the issue.”181 The syllabus section suggesting group presentation topics provides an enlightening—and up to now relatively unused—perspective on how Obama approached the issues of race and law in the course. Obama reportedly refrained from direct Socratic questioning and instead opted to engage in more discussion and debate with his students.182 Therefore, the list of required readings really offers only a glimpse of the myriad of possible class discussions or viewpoints Obama elicited from his students. While we have made some speculations from the first four days of readings, the twelve suggested presentation topics and Obama’s synopsis of the ideas embedded within each topic are even more helpful in understanding Obama’s closely held beliefs about race. Appendix Two reprints the topics and Obama’s discussion of each topic in its entirety. As with the readings, we have two initial questions: Where did these topics come from, and why did he choose these particular topics? In seeking the answers, 180 Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Critical Race Theory: An Annotated Bibliography, 79 VA. L. REV. 461 (1993). 181 Barack Obama, Current Issues in Racism and the Law Syllabus—Spring 1994: Possible Group Presentation Topics, available at http://www.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/politics/2008OBAMA_LAW/ Obama_CoursePk.pdf [hereinafter Obama, Group Presentation Topics]. The group presentation topics are reprinted in Appendix II at the conclusion of this article; however, the introductory material referenced in this footnote is not included in the appendix. 182 Kantor, supra note 18, at A1. R E A D I N G P R O F E S S O R O B A M A P A G E | 5 2 9 ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2014.342 http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu it is arguably relevant that Obama served as an adjunct professor during this time, maintained a position with a local civil rights law firm, and served as a State Senator.183 Thus, Obama had less time to devote to the preparation of his syllabus and the background reading and scholarship than a full-time professor,184 and Obama likely had real, rather than theoretical, experiences with many of these topics. From the vantage point of one with limited time to develop a comprehensive syllabus, it is possible that Obama drew on the work he performed as a research assistant for Laurence Tribe and as president of the Harvard Law Review; however, he may also have relied upon an article published the year before he taught the class by Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic, Critical Race Theory: An Annotated Bibliography,185 to develop his suggested approaches to the group presentations. The Delgado and Stefanic article, published in the Virginia Law Review, outlines ten fundamental tenets of Critical Race Theory followed by a list of the top one hundred CRT articles and books published in the preceding twenty years. The authors included a brief summary of the main points of each article and identified which of the ten fundamental tenets each included. Among many others, the bibliography included the scholarship of Derrick Bell and Patricia Williams. Obama’s relationship with Derrick Bell has already been established, but Obama was also particularly familiar with Williams’ work because he published one of her CRT articles during his tenure as president of the Harvard Law Review.186 We suggest the strong possibility that the Delgado and Stefanic CRT bibliography was a source for Obama’s student presentation topics. Ten of the twelve topics suggested by Obama for student presentations (and every suggested subtopic for those ten) appear in Delgado and Stefanic’s CRT bibliography.187 For a class on current issues in racism and law, it is, of course, unsurprising that Obama’s syllabus covers the same topics as much of the CRT then-leading 183 Id. 184 Id. Obama reportedly did not produce any academic scholarship during his tenure at the University of Chicago; nor did he participate in any of the famous roundtable discussion held regularly by the full- time faculty members. 185 See generally Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 180. 186 Patricia Williams’ article went through the editing cycle under his supervision as president of the Harvard Law Review. See Patricia J. Williams, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC: Regrouping in Singular Times, 104 HARV. L. REV. 525 (1990). 187 With the exception of employment discrimination and Native American or Latino issues, the topics of his group presentations—as articulated further in the accompanying synopses—are all contained within this bibliography. See Obama, Group Presentation Topics, supra note 181. U N I V E R S I T Y O F P I T T S B U R G H L A W R E V I E W P A G E | 5 3 0 | V O L . 7 5 | 2 0 1 4 ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2014.342 http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu scholarship. Perhaps Obama was merely drawing from a similar well of cultural ideas as CRT scholars, rather than drawing on their work explicitly. However, an inspection of the topics themselves—and, more importantly, Obama’s suggestions for how student groups might present each topic—reveals important connections with the CRT scholarship. Therefore, we suggest that Delgado and Stefancic’s CRT bibliography is a good framework for demonstrating Obama’s interest in topics that were also central to CRT. Thus, we rely on their definitions of ten key tenets of CRT to help frame the exploration of the group presentation topics and the potential influence of these tenets on the students’ individual exploration of racism and law in their assigned research papers.188 As we show below, those tenets were often interlaced in the class discussion questions. Beginning with the ten key tenets of CRT that Delgado and Stefancic outlined, the analysis that follows is based solely on articles and editions of texts that were available to Obama when drafting this syllabus. Thus, these resources are likely those employed by his students as they prepared their chosen topics for presentation in class. A. Ten Primary Tenets of Critical Race Theory189 1. Critique of liberalism: Many CRT theorists find liberalism an ineffective means to address issues of race. While many of the articles to which Delgado and Stefancic attribute this characteristic deal with specific liberal programs, attitudes, or actions designed to promote racial equality—“affirmative action, neutrality, color blindness, role modeling or the merit principle”190—others merely carry the theme throughout the article. 2. Storytelling/counter-storytelling and “naming one’s own reality”: CRT scholars find most mainstream discussions and perceptions of race emanate from the “majoritarian mindset” and the “presuppositions, received wisdoms, and shared cultural understandings”191 that the 188 Obama did not require or encourage outside research for the students’ papers, which comprised 40 percent of their grade. He asked them to apply the concepts discussed in class and covered in the readings, which would have included the readings assigned by the student groups. Id. 189 Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 180, at 462–63. The ten tenets identified are direct citations from Delgado and Stefancic followed by a paraphrase of each tenet. 190 Id. at 462. 191 Id. at 462. The “majoritarian mindset” generally refers to the conservative white males’ perspective. R E A D I N G P R O F E S S O R O B A M A P A G E | 5 3 1 ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2014.342 http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu majority brings to any discussion of race. To counteract this mindset and demonstrate an alternative perspective, CRT authors use stories and parables to elucidate the fallacies of the majoritarian mindset. 3. Revisionist interpretations of American civil rights law and progress: CRT scholars question the source of the ineffectiveness and cyclical nature of America’s attempts to institute and enforce antidiscrimination laws. CRT authors seek explanations in the “psychology of race . . . [and] white self-interest” among other sources.192 4. A greater understanding of the underpinnings of race and racism: Articles credited with this tenet often look to another discipline—social science—for insight on American society’s view of race to see how it affects the way the law is applied. A specific example, included in an article on Obama’s syllabus, is: “understanding how majoritarian society sees black sexuality helps explain the law’s treatment of interracial sex, marriage, and adoptions.”193 5. Structural determinism: These CRT articles recognize the effect that established legal and cultural structures have on maintaining the status- quo. The authors posit that naming and understanding these “constraints” provides society the freedom “to work more effectively for racial and other types of reform.”194 6. Race, sex, class, and their intersections: Are these “separate disadvantaging factors?”195 7. Essentialism and anti-essentialism: Does the black middle class have the same needs and interests as the black urban poor? Do all “oppressed people” have the same interests?196 8. Cultural nationalism/separatism: These CRT scholars assert the belief that the interests and advancement of people of color is best effectuated 192 Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 180, at 462. 193 Id. 194 Id. at 463. 195 Id. 196 Id. U N I V E R S I T Y O F P I T T S B U R G H L A W R E V I E W P A G E | 5 3 2 | V O L . 7 5 | 2 0 1 4 ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2014.342 http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu through separation from mainstream American society; and preserving diversity promotes the welfare of all.197 9. Legal institutions, critical pedagogy, and minorities in the bar: These articles discuss the representation of minorities in law school, the bar, and offer alternative CRT pedagogical approaches.198 10. Criticism and self-criticism/responses: CRT, due to its counter- majoritarian nature, provokes substantial criticism. This final tenet includes this criticism and the subsequent responses from both those within and outside the CRT movement.199 B. CRT Pedagogy Within the Delgado and Stefancic CRT bibliography, there are several articles that address the importance of acknowledging—and then teaching—students to identify the racial issues that underlie many aspects of the law.200 One article, Charles Lawrence’s The Word and the River: Pedagogy as Scholarship as Struggle,201 provides suggestions for how to teach CRT. Lawrence shares the successes he has experienced implementing a “student-centered, student-generated pedagogical method.”202 Lawrence assigned articles by noted CRT scholar Alan 197 Id. at 462. 198 Id. 199 Id. 200 See, e.g., Frances Lee Ansley, Race and the Core Curriculum in Legal Education, 79 CALIF. L. REV. 1511 (1991); Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Humanity in Legal Education, 59 OR. L. REV. 243 (1980); Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Foreword: Toward a Race-Conscious Pedagogy in Legal Education, 11 NAT’L BLACK L.J. 1 (1989); Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Autobiography and Legal Scholarship and Teaching: Finding the Me in the Legal Academy, 77 VA. L. REV. 539 (1991); Gerald P. López, Training Future Lawyers to Work with the Politically and Socially Subordinated: Anti-Generic Legal Education, 91 W. VA. L. REV. 305 (1989); Gerald Torres, Teaching and Writing: Curriculum Reform as an Exercise in Critical Education, 10 NOVA L.J. 867 (1986). 201 Charles R. Lawrence, III, The Word and the River: Pedagogy as Scholarship as Struggle, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 2231 (1992). Delgado and Stefancic explain that Lawrence provides tools to law professors to “analyze issues of racial justice more effectively.” Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 180, at 499. 202 Lawrence, supra note 201, at 2247–50. Each week prior to class Lawrence required students to submit a reflection essay describing their reactions to the readings and to refer to them during class. It is through these personal reflections and subsequent class discussions that Lawrence encourages students to look beyond the way the story of the law is traditionally “told within the dominant discourse [which] has systematically excluded the experiences of people of color and other outsiders and where we are trained to believe that the story told by those in power is a universal story.” Id. R E A D I N G P R O F E S S O R O B A M A P A G E | 5 3 3 ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2014.342 http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu Freeman and asked students to “keep Freeman’s challenges in mind as they approached the reading, exercises and discussions throughout the course.”203 He encouraged his students to wrestle with how to “become effective advocates for liberation while living and working within institutions and cultures that appeared hell-bent on perpetuating racist domination.”204 This same method was advocated by Derrick Bell and employed in the course offered at Harvard during Obama’s first year as a law student.205 Although there is no evidence that Obama read Lawrence, there are similarities between Obama’s method and the “student- centered, student-generated pedagogical method” that Lawrence advanced. Thus, as we have suggested above, Obama may have been relying explicitly on Lawrence, or similar works on CRT pedagogy, or he was drawing from some other teaching tradition or developing such parallel ideas on his own. Just as Freeman’s work served as a cornerstone for Lawrence’s classes, Derrick Bell’s work provided a starting point for Obama’s course—though as we suggested in Part II, much of the assigned reading—went in different directions from Bell. C. CRT and the Obama Group Presentation Topics With the background of the key tenets of CRT, we now turn to Obama’s suggested group presentation topics to suggest how they often reflect those key tenets. We take up each of the dozen topics, which are reprinted in their entirety in the second Appendix. It is an odd list of topics. Some topics, like the all black, all male school, interracial adoptions, and reparations, seem relatively peripheral, albeit interesting. Meanwhile, other important topics, such as affirmative action in higher education and large-scale desegregation of primary and secondary schools are absent. It would have been unsurprising to see a simple listing of topics, such as “Race and the Criminal Justice System” or “Immigration Policy” followed by directions to explore one aspect of the topics and provide a sampling of alternative viewpoints. However, Obama offered students a set of questions on these potentially controversial topics. For each group presentation topic, Obama provided 203 Id. at 2243. Lawrence describes Alan Freeman’s Legitimizing Racism Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049 (1978), as a “cornerstone text” in his class and later assigned Freeman’s subsequent article, Race and Class: The Dilemma of Liberal Reform, 90 YALE L.J. 1880 (1981), which reviews Derrick Bell’s, RACE, RACISM, AND AMERICAN LAW, supra note 74. Lawrence, supra note 201, at 2242. 204 Lawrence, supra note 201, at 2243. 205 See Derrick Bell, Racial Reflections: Dialogues in the Direction of Liberation, 37 UCLA L. REV. 1037, 1041–42 (1990) [hereinafter Bell, Racial Reflections]. U N I V E R S I T Y O F P I T T S B U R G H L A W R E V I E W P A G E | 5 3 4 | V O L . 7 5 | 2 0 1 4 ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2014.342 http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu a summary and suggestions for framing the class discussion. This commentary potentially provides insight on his perspective—or at least on the points that Obama viewed as controversial—of the issues themselves.206 Obama required each group to meet with him prior to finalizing a presentation topic to review their planned approach to leading the class discussion;207 there is no further evidence available regarding the substance of those meetings. The introductory commentary to each topic is effectively a “pre-reading” exercise designed to shape the research and presentations. The Delgado and Stefancic article often conforms with, or overlaps, Obama’s commentaries; however, we are merely speculating that it was one source that the students may have used in preparing for their group presentation that did not appear in the syllabus. For each of the twelve discussion topics and the enumerated subtopics, we begin with Obama’s summary and guiding questions from the syllabus. We then discuss the prevalence of each topic in Delgado and Stefancic’s CRT bibliography and choose excerpts or themes from these articles that student groups may have encountered. We also include a sampling of other contemporaneously published (non-CRT articles) that student groups may have drawn from to present alternative perspectives. 1. The All-Black All-Male School A number of public school systems, including those in Detroit and Milwaukee, have initiated pilot programs whereby inner-city black males are voluntarily placed in a segregated learning environment, with black male teachers, an Afrocentric curriculum, etc. Proponents say that given the unique problems facing black males, such “self-segregation” contributes to self-esteem and enhances learning performance. Opponents argue that these programs are a betrayal of [Brown v. Board of Education], discriminate against whites and females, stigmatizes black males, and politicizes school curriculums.208 Obama first suggests that students might address inner-city pilot programs followed by two countervailing inquiries: “Do these programs benefit the 206 See Kantor, supra note 18, at A1. Obama refrained from participating in faculty discussions on controversial topics, refused to give his opinion on Lani Gunier’s election restructuring proposals, and declined to support or oppose a controversial anti-gang measure. 207 See Obama, Group Presentation Topics, supra note 181. 208 Id. R E A D I N G P R O F E S S O R O B A M A P A G E | 5 3 5 ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2014.342 http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu educational and emotional development of inner-city black males? Or are they merely a return to the discrimination purportedly overcome by the Supreme Court’s decision in [Brown v. Board of Education]?” Because the third day of readings included Milliken,209 students were familiar with the plight of the Detroit schools and the Supreme Court’s restriction of integration remedies. Thus pondering an unorthodox response, such as the all black, all-male public school may have provided an opportunity for renewed debate or for discussing the issue from a different perspective than in a previous class discussion. Similarly, reading the Court’s opinions in Croson and Washington Housing Authority would have provided enough background to present and discuss the potential equal protection challenges that such schools might raise.210 A student group selecting this topic should have found several of Derrick Bell’s articles on school integration; however, due to the controversy surrounding Milliken and Detroit’s failed attempts at desegregation, there were also many articles available presenting statistical information regarding the current achievement of black males and potential for alternative solutions such as Afro- centric curricula.211 Kevin Brown’s article, Do African-Americans Need Immersion Schools?: The Paradoxes Created by Legal Conceptualization of Race and Public Education,212 provides a historical account leading up to the current debate surrounding these issues. Derrick Bell’s article, “Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma,”213 questions the effectiveness of Brown as “whites flee in alarming numbers from school districts ordered to implement 209 Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974). 210 See Kevin D. Brown, The Dilemma of Legal Discourse for Public Educational Responses to the “Crisis” Facing African-American Males, 23 CAP. U. L. REV. 63, 126–27 (1994) (discussing the Court’s shift in interpreting the Equal Protection Clause from an individualist perspective that applies equally to all people rather than a traditional approach that looks at classes or groups of disadvantaged individuals). 211 See, e.g., Pamela J. Smith, Comment, All Black Male Schools and the Equal Protection Clause: A Step Forward Toward Education, 66 TUL. L. REV. 2003 (1992); see also Brown, supra note 210, at 126–27 (discussing the district court’s decision in Milliken and stating that “[t]he legal justifications given for these schools was that black males are in a crisis situation because of their homicide rates (tendencies toward violence), their unemployment rates (tendencies toward laziness), and their drop out rates (lack of intelligence)”). 212 Kevin D. Brown, Do African-Americans Need Immersion Schools?: The Paradoxes Created by Legal Conceptualization of Race and Public Education, 78 IOWA L. REV. 813 (1993). 213 Bell, Interest-Convergence Dilemma, supra note 121. U N I V E R S I T Y O F P I T T S B U R G H L A W R E V I E W P A G E | 5 3 6 | V O L . 7 5 | 2 0 1 4 ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2014.342 http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu mandatory reassignment plans.”214 Bell discusses a perceived detrimental effect on the education of racial minorities resulting from desegregation efforts215 and suggests, in the alternative, refocusing on the segregated minority’s quest of “obtaining true educational effectiveness which may entail the improvement of presently desegregated schools as well as the creation or preservation of model black schools.”216 Obama assigned many cases emphasizing the extreme nature of the steps school boards took to prevent Brown’s desegregation mandate (such as Prince Edward County’s closing of their public schools to all students for four years).217 Obama’s decision to only assign readings emphasizing resistance to desegregation efforts, and not assign any readings demonstrating successful efforts, made Bell’s arguments seem more valid. Bell advanced that “some black educators . . . see major educational benefits in schools where black children, parents, and teachers can utilize the real cultural strengths of the black community to overcome the many barriers to educational achievement.”218 In support of this statement, Bell cited a book review published in 1979 of four authors discussing the results of judicially mandated school integration.219 Three of the four authors upheld integration as the only viable method for achieving educational equality between all racial groups; however, only Sara Lawrence Lightfoot’s premise of separate all- black schools designed to integrate the support of the black family and community achieved Bell’s praise.220 214 Id. at 531. 215 See id. at 532. 216 Id. at 532 (emphasis added). 217 See Obama, Reading Assignments, supra note 35, at III. 218 Bell, Interest-Convergence Dilemma, supra note 121, at 532. 219 Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Book Review, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1826 (1979) [hereinafter Bell, Book Review] (reviewing RAY C. RIST, THE INVISIBLE CHILDREN: SCHOOL INTEGRATION IN AMERICAN SOCIETY (1978); GARY ORFIELD, MUST WE BUS?: SEGREGATED SCHOOLS AND NATIONAL POLICY (1978); DAVID J. ARMOR, WHITE FLIGHT, DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION, AND THE FUTURE OF SCHOOL DESEGREGATION (1978); SARA LAWRENCE LIGHTFOOT, WORLDS APART: RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN FAMILIES AND SCHOOLS (1978)). 220 See Bell, Book Review, supra note 219, at 1828–29. Bell describes the experiences recounted by Rist of black children voluntarily reassigned to white schools in Portland. Bell warns readers that “[m]any of the experiences will cause the readers to wince,” id. at 1829, and concludes his review with “[n]onetheless having observed this phenomenon for a full year during which ill-prepared and outnumbered black children struggled to survive the ‘relief’ transformed into the very opposite of what R E A D I N G P R O F E S S O R O B A M A P A G E | 5 3 7 ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2014.342 http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu This article provides a good example of how Obama’s students might have been exposed to interest-convergence theory even though it was not specifically referenced in the assigned readings. Students opting to use Bell’s article in their research would have read Bell’s interest-convergence theory in the beginning of the article to eventually discover Bell’s position on all-black, all-male schools at the end of the article. To support and to counter any advances made by Bell, a student group would have needed to read the sources of Bell’s argument and look for counter-arguments. Bell’s book review, although dismissive of the three authors advocating school integration, provided sources addressing both sides of the argument. It is, of course, possible that Obama’s students found all their readings and sources without ever using Bell. We merely suggest the likelihood that Bell’s perspective and his interest-convergence theory would be included—and perhaps influential—in the class discussion.221 2. Interracial Adoptions Several states have established regulations that look to place black children up for adoption exclusively with black families. Such policies are supported by black social worker organizations, who argue that same-race adoptions are best for the child, give the child a strong sense of identity, etc. Opponents, including white families interested in adopting black children, say that the policy is racist, and is detrimental to the thousands of unplaced black children currently up for adoption.222 Brown intended, Rist’s commitment to integrated schools remains unshaken.” Id. at 1832. Bell describes Orfield’s book as a “veritable military manual of racial balance tactics. It is doctrinaire and uncompromising, leaving little doubt as to the identities of the enemy and the allies.” Id. at 1834–35. Bell dismisses Armor’s work as providing “more proof of the obvious regarding the connection of court-ordered desegregation and White Flight.” Id. at 1838. After reading Rist’s account of the effect on black students in Oregon’s voluntary desegregation plan, Bell rejects Armor’s suggestion that such a plan is the remedy to White Flight. See id. The tone of Lightfoot’s review is indicative of Bell’s support of her premise. He describes her as “[w]riting in warm, humane terms that exude caring for, and commitment to, children” and appreciates her recognition of the almost magical quality that black families give to education. Id. at 1841. 221 In addition to these two articles, Bell wrote many articles regarding school desegregation and reform efforts. See, e.g., Derrick A. Bell, Jr., The Community Role of Putting Education into Practice, 17 THEORY INTO PRAC. 114 (1978); Derrick A. Bell, Jr., The Legacy of W.E.B. Du Bois: A Rational Model for Achieving Public School Equality for America’s Black Children, 11 CREIGHTON L. REV. 409 (1977). 222 Obama, Group Presentation Topics, supra note 181. U N I V E R S I T Y O F P I T T S B U R G H L A W R E V I E W P A G E | 5 3 8 | V O L . 7 5 | 2 0 1 4 ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2014.342 http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu A search for articles written between 1980 and 1993 discussing interracial adoptions produced eleven results. Obama asked the students to consider state regulations that attempt to exclusively place black children with black families. He provided two of the commonly advanced arguments: “[same-race adoptions] give the child a strong sense of identity” versus “the policy is racist, and is detrimental to the thousands of unplaced black children currently up for adoption.” Interracial adoptions were cited as an example in the fourth tenet of CRT identified by Delgado and Stefancic; however, none of the one hundred articles in their CRT bibliography had interracial adoptions as a primary theme. Of the eleven articles retrieved by the authors’ search, there were several that addressed the topic tangentially while the rest focused on the history and current implications of the “best interest of the child” test.223 None of these articles presented strong arguments in support of placement decisions made exclusively on race or advocate placing children without regard to race.224 So while there did not appear to be any direct correlation for this presentation topic to the CRT articles and scholars cited by Delgado and Stefancic, an academic bias existed regarding the unnecessarily pervasive role of race in adoption decisions. 3. Racial Gerrymandering The Voting Rights Act of 1965 was designed to enforce the [F]ifteenth [A]mendment, and ensure the full and equal enfranchisement of minorities in the political process. But with the elimination of such obvious barriers to voting as the poll tax and literacy tests, what constitutes a violation of the Act? Some 223 See, e.g., D. Michael Reilly, Constitutional Law: Race as a Factor in Interracial Adoptions, 32 CATH. U. L. REV. 1022 (1983) (supporting the consideration of race as a factor but arguing it should not be dispositive); Eileen M. Blackwood, Note, Race as a Factor in Custody Dispute: Palmore v. Sidoti, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 209 (1985); Timothy P. Glynn, Note, The Role of Race in Adoption Proceedings: A Constitutional Critique of the Minnesota Preference Statute, 77 MINN. L. REV. 925 (1993); Elizabeth Bartholet, Where Do Black Children Belong? The Politics of Race Matching in Adoption, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1163 (1991) (providing substantial historical information regarding the evolution in interracial adoption policies). 224 Compare Jo Beth Eubanks, Transracial Adoption in Texas: Should the Best Interests Standard Be Color-Blind?, 24 ST. MARY’S L.J. 1225 (1993) (arguing against the use of race when matching children and deeming it harmful rather than beneficial), and Myriam Zreczny, Note, Race Conscious Child Placement: Deviating from a Policy Against Racial Classifications, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1121 (1994) (opposing the use of race in adoption decisions), with Margaret Howard, Transracial Adoption: Analysis of the Best Interests Standard, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 503 (1984) (suggesting different effects of interracial adoptions and different approaches by the courts when considering African American children and Native American children). R E A D I N G P R O F E S S O R O B A M A P A G E | 5 3 9 ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2014.342 http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu commentators and courts have insisted that such facially neutral practices as the at-large voting district dilute minority voting strength, and have designed single- member, “super-majority” districts that ensure minorities are elected to various political offices. Others say that the drawing of district lines to ensure the success of minority candidates (as opposed to the ability of minorities to vote) amounts to nothing more than racial gerrymandering, encourages racial block voting, and further isolates blacks and other minorities from the broader political community.225 In addition to articles from Cardozo Law Review’s 1993 Symposium on Districting,226 student groups choosing this topic had many CRT articles available to discuss and validate the necessity of taking affirmative steps to “ameliorate the continuing social and economic consequences of several centuries of American racism.”227 The summaries in Delgado and Stefancic’s CRT bibliography identified four articles dealing with this issue,228 which addressed not only the purpose of the Voting Rights Act and its modern application, but also the manners in which racism continued to penetrate the electoral process.229 One article spanned more 225 Obama, Group Presentation Topics, supra note at 181. 226 See, e.g., Lani Guinier, The Representation of Minority Interests: The Question of Single-Member Districts, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1135 (1993) (advancing alternative ideas to race conscious districting that may actually be more effective to prevent voter dilution); Frank J. Macchiarola & Joseph G. Diaz, The 1990 New York City Districting Commission: Renewed Opportunity for Participation in Local Government or Race Based Gerrymandering?, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1175 (1993) (challenging the perception that the new voting districts amounted only to “race counting”); Bernard Grofman, Would Vince Lombardi Have Been Right if He Had Said: “When it Comes to Redistricting, Race Isn’t Everything, It’s the Only Thing?,” 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1237 (1993) (surveying the previous twenty- five years of litigation surrounding the Voting Rights Act). 227 T. Alexander Aleinikoff, A Case for Race-Consciousness, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1060 (1991) [hereinafter Aleinikoff, Race Consciousness] (rejecting the notion that a colorblind approach is feasible and instead arguing the need for race-consciousness as a means of remedying past discrimination). 228 See Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 180, at 464 (identifying T. Alexander Aleinikoff, The Constitution in Context: The Continuing Significance of Racism, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 325 (1992) [hereinafter Aleinikoff, Constitution in Context]; Lani Guinier, Keeping the Faith: Black Voters in the Post-Reagan Era, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 393 (1989) [hereinafter Guinier, Keeping the Faith]; Lani Guinier, No Two Seats: The Elusive Quest for Political Equality, 77 VA. L. REV. 1413 (1991) [hereinafter Guinier, No Two Seats]; Lani Guinier, The Triumph of Tokenism: The Voting Rights Act and the Theory of Black Electoral Success, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1077 (1991) [hereinafter Guinier, The Triumph of Tokenism] as articles dealing with “voting rights”). 229 See Aleinikoff, Constitution in Context, supra note 228, at 360–62 (admitting that many of the explanations for racial bloc voting would be “plausible” “[i]f we believe we live in a world where racism has been largely eradicated” but ultimately rejecting such explanations due to persistence of U N I V E R S I T Y O F P I T T S B U R G H L A W R E V I E W P A G E | 5 4 0 | V O L . 7 5 | 2 0 1 4 ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2014.342 http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu than one hundred pages and outlined the black community’s struggle have a “meaningful” vote which the author defined as “a vote capable of electing candidates of a black community’s choice.”230 Obama suggested the group presentations center on voter dilution, racial bloc voting, the purported effect of these efforts to isolate minority groups, and determining what constitutes a modern violation of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Following the publication of the 1990 census, there was an increasing academic interest in the subject—over a dozen articles published between 1990 and 1993.231 Two of these articles, written by Lani Guinier and included in the CRT bibliography, offer the comprehensive analysis Obama sought. These articles were familiar to Obama who “taught Lani Guinier’s proposals for structuring elections differently to increase minority representation.”232 These articles identify and analyze the fallacies of many of the modern arguments advanced by various scholars.233 Interest-convergence theory permeates the articles as scholars recognize the “pyrrhic [litigation] victories” that are “ultimately emptied of importance.”234 Therefore, we posit that any group opting for this presentation would likely be exposed to CRT and the arguments its scholars advance. racism in American society); see also Guinier, Keeping the Faith, supra note 228, at 399–400 (discussing the historical purpose of the Voting Rights Act and the Reagan administration’s interpretation of the rights afforded under the Act); Freeman, supra note 203, at 1082–88. 230 Guinier, No Two Seats, supra note 228, at 1415. 231 See, e.g., Binny Miller, Who Shall Rule and Govern? Local Legislative Delegations, Racial Politics, and the Voting Rights Act, 102 YALE L.J. 105 (1992) (focusing on the role of local legislative delegations in state legislatures); Adam J. Chill, The Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments with Respect to the Voting Franchise: A Constitutional Quandary, 25 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 645 (1992) (discussing the constitutionality of drawing minority districts with smaller populations than non- minority districts). 232 Kantor, supra note 18, at A1. 233 See, e.g., Guinier, No Two Seats, supra note 228, at 1416 (arguing the necessity of “a new conceptual approach . . . to structure majoritarian collective decisionmaking [sic] bodies to ensure meaningful minority interest representation and participation at both the electoral and legislative stages of the political process”); Guinier, The Triumph of Tokenism, supra note 228, at 1079 (rejecting the then current state of the black electoral process that celebrates enfranchisement but “ignor[es] problems of tokenism and false consciousness”). 234 Guinier, No Two Seats, supra note 228, at 1416. Guinier credits Richard Delgado’s “Law of Racial Thermodynamics” as the principle that “racism is neither created nor destroyed but merely has different guises including procedural racism of seemingly neutral or meritocratic rules that predictably handicap blacks.” Id. at 1416 n.7 (quoting Richard Delgado, When a Story Is Just a Story: Does Voice Really Matter?, 76 VA. L. REV. 95, 106 (1990)). R E A D I N G P R O F E S S O R O B A M A P A G E | 5 4 1 ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2014.342 http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu 4. Race and the Criminal Justice System In his introduction to this section, Obama noted: “There are a range of issues in this area that would make interesting group presentations.”235 In close proximity to Obama’s 1994 class, the impact of race on the criminal justice system was presented and discussed in a variety of forums.236 Articles addressing race in the criminal justice system had a strong presence in CRT scholarship.237 Often repeated and challenged in CRT discourse238 was Judge Harlan’s declaration that “Our Constitution is color blind.”239 a. Discriminatory Sentencing [T]o what degree is race (as opposed, say to poverty and the reduced ability to hire legal assistance) a primary determinant in criminal sentencing? Have such policies as mandatory sentencing guidelines helped to alleviate any bias that may exist, and if not, what other solutions are available?240 If Obama sought inspiration for subtopics from Delgado and Stefancic’s bibliography, it would have been unnecessary to read many of the article summaries in the CRT bibliography—the mere titles of many articles are instructive and self-explanatory.241 The Supreme Court’s rejection of the empirical data offered by the Baldus study242 analyzing Georgia’s capital sentencing system 235 Obama, Group Presentation Topics, supra note 181, at 4. 236 In addition to a lecture series at the end of November 1993, the Capital University Law Review held a conference in 1994 to discuss African-Americans and the legal system. From this conference the entire first issue is filled with articles discussing these topics from somewhat disparate perspectives. 237 Approximately 20 percent of the works included in the Delgado-Stefancic bibliography address various aspects of the criminal justice system. 238 See, e.g., Neil Gotanda, A Critique of “Our Constitution is Color-Blind,” 44 STAN. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (1991) (arguing that “a color-blind interpretation of the Constitution legitimates, and thereby maintains, the social, economic, and political advantages that whites hold over other Americans”). 239 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 240 Obama, Group Presentation Topics, supra note 181, at 4.a. 241 See, e.g., Sheri Lynn Johnson, Black Innocence and the White Jury, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1611 (1985); Sheri Lynn Johnson, Cross-Racial Identification Errors in Criminal Cases, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 934 (1984); Sheri Lynn Johnson, Race and the Decision to Detain a Suspect, 93 YALE L.J. 214 (1983). 242 Randall L. Kennedy, McClesky v. Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment, and the Supreme Court, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1388, 1396–1400 (1988) [hereinafter Kennedy, McClesky v. Kemp]. Kennedy called the U N I V E R S I T Y O F P I T T S B U R G H L A W R E V I E W P A G E | 5 4 2 | V O L . 7 5 | 2 0 1 4 ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2014.342 http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu and its decision to uphold the death penalty in McClesky v. Kemp243 sparked significant academic commentary during this time.244 The Baldus study demonstrated that when a victim is white, the perpetrator of the crime is over 400 percent more likely to be sentenced to death than when the victim is a minority, and black defendants received the death penalty twice as often as white defendants.245 After McClesky various authors analyzed empirical data evincing racial bias in death penalty decisions and the sentences imposed under the federal sentencing guidelines;246 one author’s analysis focused on “unconscious racism” within the criminal justice system.247 The author, Sherri Lynn Johnson, contended that unconscious racism continued to permeate the system due to “ignorance” or “denial” of its existence, “fear” of its implications, and “denial” of its subsequent effects.248 Johnson compared the psychological rejection of the existence of unconscious racism with Derrick Bell’s interest convergence theory: the “legal establishment does not respond to civil rights claims that threaten the status of privileged whites.”249 Baldus Study “the most comprehensive statistical analysis ever done on the racial demographics of capital sentencing in a single state.” Id. at 1388. 243 481 U.S. 279 (1987). 244 See, e.g., SAMUEL R. GROSS & ROBERT MAURO, DEATH AND DISCRIMINATION: RACIAL DISPARITIES IN CAPITAL SENTENCING (1988); Sheri Lynn Johnson, Unconscious Racism and the Criminal Law, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 1016 (1988) [hereinafter Johnson, Unconscious Racism] (discussing the empirical data that support the premise that the Supreme Court has a “blindspot that mars the reasoning of all the recent cases involving both race and criminal procedure”); Kennedy, McClesky v. Kemp, supra note 242 (focusing on the race-of-the-victim equal protection violation). 245 McClesky, 481 U.S. at 286. 246 See, e.g., M. Sharana Gilbert, Racism and Retrenchment in Capital Sentencing: Judicial and Congressional Haste Toward the Ultimate Injustice, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 51, 55–56 (1991) (referencing a study by the United States General Accounting Office to draw the “inference that, in the minds of judges and juries, and of the society which spawns them, black life holds less value than white life”); Theresa Walker Karle, Are the Federal Sentencing Guidelines Meeting Congressional Goals?: An Empirical and Case Law Analysis, 40 EMORY L.J. 393, at 401–20 (1991) (presenting the results of a statistical analysis of the sentences imposed before and after the sentencing guidelines were enacted). 247 Johnson, Unconscious Racism, supra note 244. 248 Id. at 1027–31. 249 Id. at 1030 (citing Bell, Interest-Convergence Dilemma, supra note 121, at 523–34 and Charles Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 387 (1987)). R E A D I N G P R O F E S S O R O B A M A P A G E | 5 4 3 ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2014.342 http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu McClesky brought the role of race in subjective sentencing to the forefront and, as president of the Harvard Law Review during this time, Obama’s awareness of the academic commentary surrounding this issue should be assumed. For example, Hofstra Law Review’s 1990 “Symposium on Drug Decriminalization” presented divergent views on the most effective ways to regulate, prevent, or punish drug use. Delgado and Stefancic’s bibliography includes the Foreword to this symposium250 which analyzes the spectrum of arguments and plots them on a grid comprised of metaphoric “carrots” and “sticks” based on their suggested approaches.251 Additionally, the Emory Law Journal published a statistical analysis of the mandatory federal sentencing guidelines evaluating their effectiveness at meeting the congressional goals espoused during their establishment.252 An article exploring non-mandatory sentencing, Black Innocence and the White Jury,253 provides an in-depth CRT analysis of the issue of race and its effect on guilt determination, criminal stereotypes, and judicial sentencing.254 The author uses evidence gathered by social scientists to reveal that most white subjects did not consciously demonstrate a bias “motivated by hostility” in which they attempted to penalize black defendants at every opportunity.255 While significant bias by white mock jurors against black defendants at the guilt attribution stage was common, once deemed guilty, this same bias was less evident at sentencing, and black defendants did not appear to receive harsher sentences than white defendants.256 These mock studies correlate with findings from actual case studies that demonstrate unfair racial bias primarily in older cases, in cases from Southern states, or in rape cases.257 While the ultimate sentence received by the defendant 250 See Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 180, at 489–90 (including Dwight L. Greene, Drug Decriminalization: A Chorus in Need of a Masterrap’s Voice, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV. 457 (1990), in the bibliography). 251 See generally Greene, supra note 250. 252 See Theresa Walker Karle & Thomas Sager, Are the Federal Sentencing Guidelines Meeting Congressional Goals?: Empirical and Case Law Analysis, 40 EMORY L.J. 393 (1991); see also William Rhodes, Criminology: Federal Criminal Sentencing: Some Measurement Issues with Application to Pre- Sentencing Guideline Disparity, 81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1002 (1991). 253 Johnson, Black Innocence and the White Jury, supra note 241. 254 See generally id. 255 Id. at 1637. 256 Id. The exception to these mock findings was found when dealing with rape and with subjects from the South who approached both the guilt attribution and sentencing stages with equal hostility. Id. 257 Id. U N I V E R S I T Y O F P I T T S B U R G H L A W R E V I E W P A G E | 5 4 4 | V O L . 7 5 | 2 0 1 4 ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2014.342 http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu had the potential to be race neutral, the author reminds the reader of the role of race in the initial determination of guilt.258 Thus these articles provided Obama’s students substantial CRT-influenced background for a group presentation as well as empirical data to support advances made by non-CRT authors regarding the documented racial disparities in sentencing. b. Criminal Legislation That Targets Minorities? Recently, a Minnesota state court held that a criminal statute that punishes possession of crack more severely than possession of cocaine is discriminatory, insofar as crack is the drug of choice in the black community, while cocaine is more popular among the wine and brie crowd. Likewise, some commentators have argued that legislation that imposes additional penalties on women who use drugs during pregnancy are racially biased. Do such arguments have any merit?259 Obama’s commentary on how to approach this issue is similar to six CRT articles on Delgado and Stefancic’s bibliography, whose summaries directly address his targeted suggestions.260 CRT scholars asserted that “the war on drugs could more aptly be called a war on the minority populations,”261 while non-CRT scholars, likewise, expressed a generalized frustration with the current “ineffective” approach to dealing with drug addictions and the resulting social and general 258 Johnson, Black Innocence and the White Jury, supra note 241, at 1638. 259 Obama, Group Presentation Topics, supra note 181, at 4.b. 260 See Regina Austin, Sapphire Bound!, 1989 WIS. L. REV. 539 (“discuss[ing] problems facing pregnant, unmarried black women”); Dwight L. Greene, Abusive Prosecutors: Gender, Race, and Class Discretion in the Prosecution of Drug-Addicted Mothers, 39 BUFF. L. REV. 737 (1991); Lisa C. Ikemoto, The Code of Perfect Pregnancy (COPP): At the Intersection of the Ideology of Motherhood, the Practice of Defaulting to Science, and the Interventionist Mindset of Law, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 1205 (1992) [hereinafter Ikemoto, COPP]; Lisa C. Ikemoto, Furthering the Inquiry: Race, Class, and Culture in the Forced Medical Treatment of Pregnant Women, 59 TENN. L. REV. 487 (1992) [hereinafter Ikemoto, Furthering the Inquiry]; john a. powell & Eileen B. Hershenov, Hostage to the Drug War: The National Purse, the Constitution and the Black Community, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 557 (1991); Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color, Equality, and the Right of Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1419 (1991). 261 powell & Hershenov, supra note 260, at 559. R E A D I N G P R O F E S S O R O B A M A P A G E | 5 4 5 ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2014.342 http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu welfare ramifications of drug abuse.262 Student groups would likely include both types of articles and encourage the class to grapple with the more persuasive arguments espoused by each author. For example, various articles addressed the imposition of additional penalties on pregnant minorities. Sapphire Bound! challenged the “rigid economic, social, and political categories that a racist, sexist, and class-stratified society would impose upon [‘young, single, sexually active, fertile, and nurturing black women’]” such applied to Crystal Chambers—a young, single, pregnant black woman discharged from her position as a teacher at the Omaha Girls Club.263 In an effort to prevent “negative role modeling” for the young girls who attended the Omaha Girls Club, the Club’s policy included dismissal “for single parent pregnancies.”264 The author noted the “policy appeal” of this outcome for those, such as the Club’s white administrators and the court system, who lack an “understanding of the historical oppression of black women and no appreciation of their contemporary cultural practices.”265 Non-CRT authors similarly challenged the judges and legislators who made and enforced such laws. However, rather than seeing the laws as a demonstration of racial bias, non-CRT authors alleged the law attacked women in the name of fetal protection.266 With regard to the issue of prosecution of drug use during pregnancy, CRT authors questioned prosecutorial discretion as applied to selective prosecution of drug-addicted mothers.267 As most of the women prosecuted under these statutes 262 See Louise Marlane Chan, S.O.S. from the Womb: A Call for New York Legislation Criminalizing Drug Use During Pregnancy, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 199 (1993); James E. Hopper, Bright Lines, Dark Deeds: Counting Convictions Under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1951 (1991); Victoria J. Swenson & Cheryl Crabbe, Pregnant Substance Abusers: A Problem that Won’t Go Away, 25 ST. MARY’S L.J. 623 (1994). 263 Austin, supra note 260, at 555 (discussing the outcome of Chambers v. Omaha Girls Club, 629 F. Supp. 925 (D. Neb. 1986), aff’d 834 F.2d 697 (8th Cir. 1987), reh’g denied, 840 F.2d 583 (1988)). 264 Id. at 550 (quoting Chambers, 834 F.2d at 699 n.2). 265 Id. at 552–53. The district court opinion noted that 90 percent of the girls attending the club were black, 629 F. Supp. at 928, the teachers were black, id. at 928, and the Club’s administrators were white, id. at 945 n.40. 266 See, e.g., Nancy K. Schiff, Note, Legislation Punishing Drug Use During Pregnancy: Attack on Women’s Rights in the Name of Fetal Protection, 19 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 197 (1991); Barrie L. Becker, Note, Order in the Court: Challenging Judges Who Incarcerate Pregnant, Substance- Dependant Defendants to Protect Fetal Health, 19 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 235 (1991). 267 See, e.g., Greene, supra note 260; Roberts, supra note 260. U N I V E R S I T Y O F P I T T S B U R G H L A W R E V I E W P A G E | 5 4 6 | V O L . 7 5 | 2 0 1 4 ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2014.342 http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu were black and addicted to crack cocaine,268 criminal prosecution of these mothers exemplified society’s negative perception of this behavior and desire to regulate it.269 CRT scholars argued that the “society” that set the norms and determined who was culpable was generally not the same “society” that was consequently prosecuted.270 Obama’s query of the correlation between the reduced ability to hire legal assistance and criminal sentencing was on point according to one CRT scholar who found: Most of the drug-addicted mothers that were prosecuted plead guilty, but “[o]f those who contested the charge none were convicted.”271 c. Hate Crimes A number of states have passed legislation that increase the penalties for crimes that are shown to be racially-motivated. The Supreme Court recently struck down one such law. Were the Supremes right?272 Although the CRT bibliography only includes one article—by Alexander Aleinikoff—which specifically references “hate crimes,”273 there was much scholarly debate surrounding the Supreme Court’s holding in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul274 deeming the city’s hate-crime statute in violation of the First Amendment’s protection of free speech.275 Aleinikoff’s article looks at “hate crimes” from the 268 Roberts, supra note 260, at 1421 (citing reports by the ACLU, newspaper articles, and state by state case summary on prosecutions against pregnant women). 269 See Ikemoto, COPP, supra note 260, at 1266–67; see also powell & Hershenov, supra note 260, at 598 (discussing the “singling out of pregnant women for special prosecution” and the effective fear of prosecution that discourages pregnant women from seeking medical care, either prenatally or at birth). 270 See Roberts, supra note 260, at 1422 (“[Poor women of color] are . . . the most vulnerable to government monitoring, and the least able to conform to the white, middle-class standard of motherhood.”); see also powell & Hershenov, supra note 260, at 598 (“Treating addicted pregnant women as criminals misconstrues the nature of addiction by presumptively concluding that pregnant addicts are intentionally injuring their unborn children.”). 271 Id. at 1268. 272 Obama, Group Presentation Topics, supra note 181, at 4.c. 273 Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 180, at 464 (listing Aleinikoff, Constitution in Context, supra note 228). 274 505 U.S. 377 (1992). 275 See, e.g., Kevin N. Ainsworth, Targeting Conduct: A Constitutional Method of Penalizing Hate Crimes, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 669 (1993) (suggesting an approach to punish hate crimes that fits R E A D I N G P R O F E S S O R O B A M A P A G E | 5 4 7 ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2014.342 http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu perspective of their continued presence in American society and the increase in reported crimes.276 It includes numerous examples of reported hate crimes followed by a powerful narrative from a Boston police sergeant describing the moment he understood the effect of hate crimes on the life of a family.277 In an effort to enable other non-hate crime targets to comprehend living with the ever-present fear of being the victim of violent crime, the author asked readers to consider the effect on their daily routines and emotional health upon learning that: “several homes in their neighborhood have been burned by an arsonist, or a child down the street was molested on her way home from school by an attacker who escaped.”278 Obama’s reference to the Supreme Court’s decision in R.A.V. and merely asked—“Were the Supremes right?”279 The Supreme Court grounded this controversial decision in the First Amendment; therefore, many non-CRT articles addressing this issue focused on the limits of free speech in a detached, academic manner rather than responding with emotional pleas. Consequently, most of the other group presentation topics could not avoid incorporating a CRT perspective on race when presenting alternate viewpoints. Student selecting this topic could have focused entirely on freedom of speech and content-based restrictions. Just comparing the three articles we have cited in this short section (Hate Crimes) gives a perspective of the characteristic difference in approach between CRT and non- CRT authors of identifying and focusing on, or not, the underlying impact on and effect of race in the law. d. Statistical Discrimination/Criminal Profiling Is the use of criminal profiles (e.g. black male with Starter Jacket and gold- chain) in establishing reasonable cause inherently discriminatory? (This can be expanded into a discussion of the non-criminal context—i.e. store-owners with door-buzzer).280 within the constitutional framework of R.A.V.); Cass R. Sunstein, Words, Conduct, Cast, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 795 (1993). 276 Aleinikoff, Constitution in Context, supra note 228, at 344. 277 Id. at 346. 278 Id. at 346–47. 279 Obama, Group Presentation Topics, supra note 181, at 4.c. 280 Id. at 4.d. U N I V E R S I T Y O F P I T T S B U R G H L A W R E V I E W P A G E | 5 4 8 | V O L . 7 5 | 2 0 1 4 ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2014.342 http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu Although several articles in the bibliography touch on this issue, Delgado and Stefancic specifically reference statistical discrimination and criminal profiling in two summaries.281 CRT scholars endeavored to prove that race is a “central rather than a marginal factor in defining and explaining individual experiences of the law.”282 Racial stereotyping, and thus racial and ethnic profiling, “ascrib[e] to all members of a group characteristics thought to be possessed by some” the danger of racism influencing the ascribed characteristics is ever-present.283 However, is the “danger of racism” inherently discriminatory? CRT scholars alleged that the routine practice of businesses and police officers engaging in racial and ethnic profiling of suspected gang membership sacrificed the civil liberties of those with the wrong physical appearance or fashion sense.284 Where social scientists innocuously refer to this type of “rational, race- specific sorting” of people as “statistical discrimination,”285 CRT scholar, Stephen Carter, warned against the lurking and irrational aspects of racism that abound when categorizing people solely on the basis of race.286 Carter reviewed the impact of race in various situations: the Bernard Goetz subway shootings and subsequent acquittal; the shopkeeper who locks her door to potential patrons; the taxi driver who selectively stops for customers; and the liberal who avoids certain neighborhoods at dark. To have a victim there must be an identified transgressor287—yet who was the identified victim and who is the transgressor in each of these situations? Was Bernard Goetz the victim that responded to previous attacks of violence or was it the four youths that he shot? Was it the shopkeeper 281 Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 180, at 477, 506 (identifying Stephen L. Carter, When Victims Happen to Be Black, 97 YALE L.J. 420 (1988), and Margaret M. Russell, Entering Great America: Reflections on Race and the Convergence of Progressive Legal Theory and Practice, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 749 (1992)). 282 Russell, supra note 281, at 762–63. 283 See Carter, supra note 281, at 429–30. 284 See Russell, supra note 281, at 759–62 (describing the racial profiling experiences of African- American and Latino males at Great American Amusement park and their encounters with Great American’s security personnel). Russell discusses the prevalence of gang profiling and the “ostensibly neutral institutional practices . . . [that] in fact represent deeply embedded stereotypes of people of color,” id. at 752, and outlines the profiles used by law enforcement officials in Contra Costa County, id. at 765–66. 285 Id. at 430. 286 See id. at 431. 287 Id. at 439. R E A D I N G P R O F E S S O R O B A M A P A G E | 5 4 9 ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2014.342 http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu and taxi driver who feared being robbed or the potential customers who were excluded due to racial categorizations? The CRT articles cited suggest alternative views and incorporate many paradigm shifts to demonstrate the seemingly insidious effect of race on our personal, community, and political realities. 5. Immigration Policy Much of the recent controversy surrounding the United States’ policy towards Haitian refugees centers around the suspicion that blacks in particular, and people of color in general, are subject to a different set of rules when it comes to who is allowed to immigrate into the [U.S.]. At the same time, Latinos have long argued that immigration policy and INS enforcement not only unfairly targets undocumented workers from poor countries, but also increases discrimination in hiring in regard to [U.S.] minorities. These issues could be dealt with either together or separately.288 The racial issues underlying immigration controversy during Obama’s presidency have not differed significantly from those he outlined for his students in 1994. Where Obama’s student groups focused on Haitian refugees and Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) enforcement against Latinos, today the controversies surround federalist issues as to how states enforce immigration policies against targeted racial and ethnic groups. The CRT bibliography includes two articles addressing immigration; the title of Gerald Lopez’s article— Undocumented Mexican Migration: In Search of a Just Immigration Law and Policy—is directly on point with Obama’s suggested discussion topics.289 Basing his “search [for] a just immigration law and policy” on the “push-pull” theory of migration, Lopez began with the basic assumption that “the primary motivation underlying modern mass migration is the desire to survive and prosper.”290 He addressed the popular perceptions regarding the evils of undocumented workers: a one-to-one displacement of American workers for every undocumented alien and the drain on American public service resources by these 288 Obama, Group Presentation Topics, supra note 181, at 5. 289 See Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 180, at 500, 503 (listing Gerald P. Lopez, Undocumented Mexican Migration: In Search of a Just Immigration Law and Policy, 28 UCLA L. REV. 615 (1981), and Michael A. Olivas, The Chronicles, My Grandfather’s Stories, and Immigration Law: The Slave Traders Chronicle as Racial History, 34 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 425 (1990), in their annotated bibliography). 290 Lopez, supra note 289, at 621. U N I V E R S I T Y O F P I T T S B U R G H L A W R E V I E W P A G E | 5 5 0 | V O L . 7 5 | 2 0 1 4 ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2014.342 http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu undocumented workers.291 Although Lopez advanced significant empirical data to contradict these perceptions, he acknowledged their existence and the resultant “social friction.”292 Lopez found the United States culpable for perpetuating the status quo through its solicitation of immigrant workers “to serve the self-perceived needs of American employers to cheap temporary labor,” lax enforcement of the immigration laws passed to assuage “domestic labor’s demands,”293 and willingness to ignore the substandard wages and working conditions of the workers to widen the profit margin of U.S. businesses.294 Lauding Derrick Bell’s use of storytelling and narratives, another CRT scholar, Michael Olivas, deemed The Slave Traders Chronicle “ahistorical” claiming “this scenario has occurred, and occurred more than once in in our nation’s history.”295 Olivas demonstrated his thesis by exploring the experiences of three distinct ethnic groups that predate Bell’s fictional invasion: the Cherokees, the Chinese, and Mexican agricultural workers. He concluded with a [then] contemporary accounting of the state of immigration: INS set up camps to hold detained undocumented adults and unaccompanied minors without access to “health, educational, and legal services” as a “deterrent to Central American refugees and as ‘bait’ to attract their families already in the United States.”296 The makeshift rafts of approximately 20 thousand Haitian “boat people” were being intercepted at sea: INS granted asylum only to six.297 The (then) current reality of U.S. immigration policy led Olivas to conclude with the ominous statement: “The cycle of United States immigration history continued, and all was ready for the Space Traders.”298 291 Id. at 631–37. The author points to the origin of and reassertion of the one-to-one displacement theory. Id. 292 Id. at 631–38. “The[se] accusation[s] manifest[] not only the universal tendency to blame outsiders for societal ills (in this case rising taxes) but, as one observer has noted, the equally pernicious tendency to stereotype aliens, in this instance, as lazy, scheming Mexicans.” Id. at 636. 293 Id. at 654. 294 Lopez, supra note 289, at 629. 295 Olivas, supra note 289, at 429–30. 296 Id. at 440–41. 297 Id. at 441. 298 Id. R E A D I N G P R O F E S S O R O B A M A P A G E | 5 5 1 ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2014.342 http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu In addition to the CRT commentary, there was also significant non-CRT academic commentary on the United States’ approach to immigration in the early 1990s that would have provided ample background for Obama’s students.299 The history of American immigration policy and the quotas once assigned based on race and country of origin seem more appropriate topics for a middle school research paper, so it is unlikely that Obama was hoping for a mere regurgitation of these facts. As in all the topics on Obama’s syllabus, it was the subtle, lurking, insidious nature of racism that Obama encouraged his students to search for, name, and discuss. For example, if only six out of 20 thousand Haitians were granted asylum, as Olivas suggested, then who was granted asylum in greater numbers and why? Was there an element of interest-convergence theory lying beneath the surface? Skeptical scholars were asking these same questions, thus it is likely that Obama’s students would ultimately be led to their writings. 6. Racial Bias in the Media Observers have long complained about the inaccurate stereotypes that permeate the depiction of minorities in the mass media in general, and the news in particular. Are these complaints well founded, and if so, will FCC guidelines designed to promote diversity, such as those upheld by the Supreme Court in [Metro Broadcasting], solve the problem?300 Obama’s introduction was in response to the controversy over minority preferences afforded by the government. The FCC’s preference for minority applicants for broadcasting licenses and for relaxed regulatory standards for sale of failing broadcasting companies to minorities were upheld narrowly in Metro Broadcasting.301 In an article presumably selected and edited under Obama’s tenure as president of the Harvard Law Review, CRT scholar, Patricia Williams, directly addressed the questions Obama raised in his suggested approach to discussing racial bias in the media.302 Williams provided examples of “inaccurate stereotypes that permeate the depiction of minorities in the mass media in general, and the 299 See, e.g., Peter H. Schuck, Continuity and Change: Patterns of Immigration Litigation in the Courts, 1979–90, 45 STAN. L. REV. 115 (1992); Hiroshi Motomura, The Curious Evolution of Immigration Law: Procedural Subrogates for Substantive Constitutional Rights, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1625 (1992). 300 Obama, Group Presentation Topics, supra note 181, at 6. 301 Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990). 302 Williams, supra note 186. U N I V E R S I T Y O F P I T T S B U R G H L A W R E V I E W P A G E | 5 5 2 | V O L . 7 5 | 2 0 1 4 ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2014.342 http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu news in particular.”303 She alleged a proximate correlation between the race/heritage of the owner of a station and the station’s programming304 and “executives in the communications industry exercise a power that is not merely concentrated but propagandistic.”305 As minorities entered into the (formerly exclusive) realm of the executives with the power to control the broadcasting, the voices of minorities that were formerly silent began to be heard.306 Three additional articles included in the annotated bibliography addressed the depiction of minorities in the mass media.307 These commentators sought to acknowledge and stop mass media’s perceived tendency to minimize and devalue the role of race and the experiences of people of color.308 While one article explored the historical origins of racially biased media and negative imagery of minority groups,309 another discussed the defamation suit filed by Ruby Clark after her purported portrayal by ABC News as a black prostitute.310 All the CRT scholars 303 Id. at 531. For example, Williams recounts watching a news story that included reports of dismal statistics on the math and science performance of inner-city youth. After which four young black males in the audience—students at an inner-city school for youth that excel in science—were asked if they were present to prove the just-reported, dismal statistics were “a lie.” This effectively forced the students to “redeem themselves from the great group of ‘not very good’ by setting themselves apart as ambitious, dedicated, and ‘different’ yet ‘just the same’ as the majority of all other kids at the same time.” Williams asserts that although it was not the stated the majority to which the kids had to prove they were the same as were the normal, achieving white middle class student but “different” than the other inner-city kids. Id. 304 Id. at 533; see also Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Images of the Outsider in American Law and Culture: Can Free Expression Remedy Systemic Social Ills?, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1258, 1260 (1992) [hereinafter Delgado & Stefancic, Images of the Outsider] (offering a brief answer to why those who drew, designed, and promulgated degrading images of various racial groups in the media—“they did not see them as grotesque. Their consciences were clear—their blithe creations did not trouble them.”). 305 Williams, supra note 186, at 535. 306 Id. at 537. 307 Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 180, at 465, 484, 506, 512 (including in the bibliography Regina Austin, Black Women, Sisterhood, and the Difference/Deviance Divide, 26 NEW ENG. L. REV. 877 (1992) (analyzing a defamation suit filed by black women v. ABC); Delgado & Stefancic, Images of the Outsider, supra note 304; Margaret M. Russell, Race and the Dominant Gaze: Narratives of Law and Inequality in Popular Film, 15 LEGAL STUD. F. 243 (1991); and Williams, supra note 186). Delgado and Stefancic’s summary of Williams’ article notes: “Analyzes the significance of Metro Broadcasting and its effect on broadcasting diversity and multiculturalism.” Id. at 512. 308 See Russell, supra note 307, at 242; see also Williams, supra note 186, at 535–37. 309 See generally Delgado & Stefancic, Images of the Outsider, supra note 304. 310 See Austin, supra note 260, at 879–85. R E A D I N G P R O F E S S O R O B A M A P A G E | 5 5 3 ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2014.342 http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu appeared to agree that “popular culture has enormous potential not only for entertainment but also for political and social change as well . . . [g]iven the power of mainstream films to reflect and to shape dominant visions of race, law, and equality. . . .”311 In addition to those articles published by CRT scholars, other articles addressed media culpability for violations of the Fair Housing Act312 and the media’s influence in criminal cases.313 Few of these articles specifically citing the decision in Metro Broadcasting addressed the “media” per se; instead the articles discussed the decision as applied to other areas of race-conscious law making. A survey of these articles would have increased Obama’s students’ understanding of the depth and breadth of race-conscious law making and could have led the class discussion in various directions. 7. Welfare Policy and Reproductive Freedom The politics of welfare appears inseparable from the politics of race, despite the oft-quoted statistic that the majority of those on welfare are white. Recently, commentators have been revisiting the issue of child-bearing among the poor, and asking some difficult questions. Should we change welfare policy so that welfare grants no longer increase with each child? Should judges or welfare agencies have the power to restrict the reproductive choices of mothers who are found to have neglected their children, or take drugs during pregnancy? Are commentators who say such policies smack of “racial genocide” misguided?314 Three articles included in the Delgado and Stefancic CRT bibliography315 directly addressed Obama’s suggested topic as perceived by women of color.316 311 Russell, supra note 307, at 253. 312 See, e.g., Debra L. Alligood, Comment, When the Medium Becomes the Message: A Proposal for Principal Media Liability for the Publication of Racially Exclusionary Real Estate Advertisements, 40 UCLA L. REV. 199, 209–14 (1992) (discussing the evolution of the regulatory regime of the Fair Housing Act as applied to the media). 313 See, e.g., Tracey L. McCain, The Interplay of Editorial and Prosecutorial Discretion in the Perpetuation of Racism in the Criminal Justice System, 25 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 601, 612–22 (1992) “Media speech is a powerful tool for the perpetuation of racist stereotypes about African- Americans and crime . . . .” Id. at 613. 314 Obama, Group Presentation Topics, supra note 181, at 7. 315 See Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 180, at 494–95, 505. Delgado and Stefancic’s summaries of these three articles specifically state: (1) Ikemoto, COPP, supra note 260: “Argues that culturally inscribed norm of the good mother is middle-class, educated, and white, thus women of color are U N I V E R S I T Y O F P I T T S B U R G H L A W R E V I E W P A G E | 5 5 4 | V O L . 7 5 | 2 0 1 4 ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2014.342 http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu These articles questioned the motivation behind imposing such restrictions—is it for the greater good of society317 or to protect future unborn children?318 Obama’s query as to whether these policies “smack of ‘racial genocide’” was echoed by at least one CRT scholar.319 There were many articles published in the decade prior to Obama’s class addressing teenage pregnancy, welfare reform, and reproductive freedom. The articles provided a historical context for the then-current state of welfare policy and many articles overlapped other subtopics on the syllabus.320 Following Obama’s direction to discuss divergent viewpoints, students may have presented the conservative claims that “sterilization reduces the number of persons on Medicaid who will need obstetrical services or contraception, and thereby reduces the especially likely to become victims of state intervention aimed at assuring compliance with emerging Code of Perfect Pregnancy (COPP),” id. at 494; (2) Ikemoto, Furthering the Inquiry, supra note 260: “Shows that not only gender, but also race, class, and culture are sources of illegitimate discrimination.” Id. at 494–95; and (3) Roberts, supra note 260: “Demonstrates that this trend in prosecution [of women for pre-natal drug use] weighs heavily on poor, black women, who are more likely than others to be reported to government agencies.” Id. at 505. 316 See Ikemoto, Furthering the Inquiry, supra note 260, at 488 (discussing the importance of viewing the issue through the eyes of women of color and women in poverty because the “de facto standard” is the “experience of white middle class women”). From reviewing case reports of medical procedures performed without a woman’s consent, Ikemoto infers the following characteristics of a “good mother”: “self-sacrificing and nurturing . . . altruisti[c] . . . fearless . . . white and middle-class.” Id. at 511. 317 See id. at 492. “[This claim] suggests that the good of the many members of society who would benefit outweighs the good of the few women subject to forced medical treatment. . . . [T]he argument defines the woman’s interests in opposition to society’s.” Id.; see also Ikemoto, COPP, supra note 260, at 1233 (discussing the “excessive sterilization of poor women of color”). “[F]ederal funding of involuntary sterilizatoin sends the message that if anyone is to sacrifice for the good of society it should be women . . . because they are childbearers.” Id. 318 See Ikemoto, Furthering the Inquiry, supra note 260, at 493–94; Ikemoto, COPP, supra note 260, at 1275. “[C]onduct during pregnancy is considering probative of future mistreatement.” In these cases, the court purports to focus on the child’s future well-being. Id. (citing In re “Male” R, 422 N.Y.S.2d 819 (Fam. Ct. 1979); In re Stefanel Tyesha C., 556 N.Y.S.2d 280 (App. Div. 1990)). 319 See Austin, supra note 260, at 546 (expressing her interest in the “causes of excess death in minority communities or what is the unacknowledged genocide of the poor, black, brown, and red peoples of America”). 320 See generally Deborah L. Rhode, Politics and Pregnancy: Adolescent Mothers and Public Policy, 1 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 99 (1992) (examining the evolution of public policy and attitude towards teenage pregnancy); Kenneth L. Karst, Citizenship, Race, and Marginality, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 5–7 (1988) (discussing the consequences of the public’s perception of the “poor” on welfare policy); Molly McNulty, Note, Pregnancy Police: The Health Policy and Legal Implications of Punishing Pregnant Women for Harm to Their Fetuses, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 277 (1988). R E A D I N G P R O F E S S O R O B A M A P A G E | 5 5 5 ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2014.342 http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu demand for public resources.”321 Included in one of the CRT articles is Justice Holmes’ commentary regarding forced sterilization: We have seen more than once that the public welfare may call upon the best citizens for their lives. It would be strange if it could not call upon those who already sap the strength of the state for these lesser sacrifices . . . in order to prevent our being swamped with incompetence.322 To demonstrate the reality of this perspective, one CRT article included evidence of sterilizations done on poor, non-English speakers, the court’s uncontroverted findings in Relf v. Weinberger323 that “an indefinite number of poor people have been improperly coerced into accepting a sterilization operation under the threat that various federally supported welfare benefits would be withdrawn unless they submitted to irreversible sterilization,” and the estimation that “thirty to forty-two percent of all Native Americans have been sterilized.”324 The topic of prenatal drug use overlapped somewhat with the presentation topic “Criminal Legislation that Targets Minorities,” but addressed the issue from a civil, rather than criminal, perspective. In civil court, mothers who engaged in prenatal drug use were less successful in defending a custody challenge.325 Furthermore, one CRT scholar asserted that “[p]oor Black women have been selected for punishment as a result of an inseparable combination of their gender, race, and economic situation.”326 This assertion was supported by statistics that black mothers were “ten times more likely than whites to be reported to public health agencies for substance abuse during pregnancy” despite evidence of similar rates of substance abuse between the races.327 Paralleling Obama’s opening 321 Id. at 1232 (citing GENA COREA, THE HIDDEN MALPRACTICE: HOW AMERICAN MEDICINE TREATS WOMEN AS PATIENTS AND PROFESSIONALS 181 (1973)). 322 Ikemoto, COPP, supra note 260, at 1232 (quoting Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927)). 323 37 F. Supp. 1199 (D.D.C. 1974). 324 Ikemoto, COPP, supra note 260, at 1232–33. 325 See id. at 1275; see Roberts, supra note 260, at 1430. “The most common penalty for a mother’s prenatal drug use is the permanent or temporary removal of her baby.” Id. 326 Roberts, supra note 260, at 1424. 327 Id. at 1434. Roberts acknowledges that there are factors that may influence this disparity in reporting; however she concludes, “both public health facilities and private doctors are more inclined to turn in pregnant Black women who use drugs than pregnant white women who use drugs.” Id. U N I V E R S I T Y O F P I T T S B U R G H L A W R E V I E W P A G E | 5 5 6 | V O L . 7 5 | 2 0 1 4 ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2014.342 http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu statement regarding the impact of race on welfare policies, students focusing on prenatal drug use would have found ample support for this position in the three articles included in the CRT bibliography. 8. Inter-ethnic Tensions The L.A. riots, the disturbances in Crown Heights, and boycotts of Korean and Arab grocery stores in inner city communities, indicate that the “browning of America” may increase, rather than decrease, racial tensions in the coming years. What are the sources of some of these tensions? Is the black community alienating potential political allies? Are Latinos, Asians, and other more recent immigrants adopting the racist sentiments of white America in their eagerness to assimilate, or are they victims of unjustified black resentment? A variant of this topic would be to examine the degree to which the bi-polar model of black/white relations is or is not relevant to the struggles and aspirations of other racial minorities.328 Delgado and Stefancic’s bibliography provides one CRT article by Kenneth Karst, Paths to Belonging: The Constitution and Cultural Identity, that contained the answers to all Obama’s queries.329 Karst also offered a guided explanation to the variant that Obama suggested to this topic—“examin[ing] the degree to which the bi-polar model of black/white relations is or is not relevant to the struggles and aspirations of other racial minorities.”330 Karst outlines the three progressive, generalized steps cultural groups must take to assimilate into the majoritarian society: (1) taking part in the institutions and activities previously accessed only by members of the larger society—attending public schools and universities, working, and moving away from culturally segregated neighborhoods; (2) improving the economic position of members of the cultural group which is generally the effect of better paying jobs secured due to higher education; and (3) forming identifiable bonds with those of the majoritarian society with whom the group members now 328 Obama, Group Presentation Topics, supra note 181, at 8. 329 See Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 180, at 497. The summary for Karst’s article, infra note 331 includes the following: “Analyzes the experience of immigrants and cultural or ethnic minorities. Demonstrates that in responding to the universal need to belong, members of these groups tend to follow one of two paths: either assimilate into the majoritarian society or seek group solidarity.” 330 See Obama, Group Presentation Topics, supra note 181, at 8. R E A D I N G P R O F E S S O R O B A M A P A G E | 5 5 7 ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2014.342 http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu live and work.331 Karst identified that “[o]ne of the most pernicious features of the Jim Crow system was that it fed on itself, polarizing Southern society and inhibiting the diversification of identities and attachments.”332 So although Brown v. Board of Education theoretically offered blacks the opportunity to begin the assimilation process, the Jim Crow system effectively prevented it from progressing. Contrary to one of the important premises of CRT scholars, Karst posited that across the United States’ history, all ethnic groups eventually assimilated into the greater American society,333 because immigrants quickly learn the importance of assimilation in American society. Assimilation provides not only better economic opportunities, it provides security.334 However, the greater American society is comprised of cultural, ethnic, racial, social, and economic groups, each with distinct values and often competing values. Such intercultural conflicts have existed throughout American history and, although emotionally fueled under the guise of preserving distinct cultural values, the underlying competing interests are economic.335 Is it surprising then, that inter- ethnic tensions continue to exist in ethnically diverse communities that are all competing for the same finite supply of economic opportunities? Despite the economic causes and effects of intercultural clashes, as a cultural group begins to assimilate, it participates in the political process and in order “[t]o carry its influence outside ethnic enclaves—a step necessary for the achievement of many status goals and virtually all welfare goals—the group must form coalitions with other interests.”336 The wave of “bias crime” in the five years preceding Obama’s class brought this issue to the forefront and—without Obama’s commentary and suggested approach—student groups may have addressed this issue from various 331 See Kenneth L. Karst, Paths to Belonging: The Constitution and Cultural Identity, 64 N.C. L. REV. 303, 333–35 (1986). 332 Id. at 335. 333 Id. at 333. Karst notes the obvious exception to this has been “until recently” black people who continued to live in segregated communities, attend segregated schools, and live in “racial isolation.” Id. at n.200. 334 Id. at 314. 335 Id. at 310. Karst provides numerous examples, such as the 1834 burning of the Ursuline convent that expressed anti-Catholic sentiments, and also the outrage directed at Irish laborers taking jobs from protestant, non-Irish bricklayers. Id. 336 See id. at 331. U N I V E R S I T Y O F P I T T S B U R G H L A W R E V I E W P A G E | 5 5 8 | V O L . 7 5 | 2 0 1 4 ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2014.342 http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu perspectives.337 Obama asks his students to consider the sources of the racial tensions that may increase due to the “browning of America” and whether “Latinos, Asians, and other more recent immigrants [are] adopting the racist sentiments of white America in their eagerness to assimilate, or are they just the victims of unjustified black resentment?”338 It is impossible to avoid noting Obama’s choice of language that factually states the existence of white racism against blacks. If students accepted Obama’s suggested hypothesis of the spreading of white racism “in [immigrants’] eagerness to assimilate,” they were effectively limited to accept the conclusions advanced by CRT scholars. 9. Reparations Given the perceived failures of the traditional civil rights agenda in bringing about racial equality in the U.S., a number of black commentators argue that a program of reparations is the only legitimate means of making up for three- hundred plus years of slavery. More recently, some white commentators have also supported a variant of the reparations concept—for example, the government financing a Community Reinvestment funds that would be controlled by the black community and render affirmative action obsolete. Do such proposals have any realistic chance of working their way through the political system? Would there be any legal impediments to such a broadly-conceived reparations policy?339 “What significance should we attribute to the struggle for racial justice that African-Americans have waged for the past 300 years with no end in sight?”340 Derrick Bell’s perspective was clear regarding reparations such as affirmative action and minority admissions programs: using such terms “sounds in noblesse oblige, not legal duty, and suggests the giving of charity rather than the granting of relief. . . . The recipient class may request benefits, but is not entitled to receive them as a matter of a legally enforceable right.”341 Obama referenced “variants of 337 See Abraham Abramovsky, Bias Crime: A Call for Alternative Responses, 19 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 875, 878–81 (1992). 338 Obama, Group Presentation Topics, supra note 181, at 8. 339 Id. at 9. 340 Bell, Racial Reflections, supra note 205, at 1037. These words are taken from the Bell’s introduction of a compilation of student essays on race covering a wide variety of topics. 341 Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Bakke, Minority Admissions and the Usual Price of Racial Remedies, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 8 (1979) [hereinafter Bell, Bakke]. R E A D I N G P R O F E S S O R O B A M A P A G E | 5 5 9 ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2014.342 http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu the reparations concept” and asked student to consider the opposition such proposals may face in being implemented.342 Bell’s immediate frustration with any such proposal was the absence of a minority voice in the discussion.343 Contrary to Bell’s determination—“[B]lacks can progress in the society only when that progress is perceived as a clear benefit to whites, or at least not a serious risk”344— other contemporaneously published articles questioned the intrinsic value of reparation models for various reasons.345 With the impending independence of South Africa from white majority rule, there was substantial academic discussion surrounding the topic of reparations during this time to guide a student group in addressing the “realistic chance” of reparation measures “working their way through the political system.”346 Subsequent events have demonstrated that the answer to that important question is a resounding no.347 10. Hate Speech Universities have begun to promulgate speech codes designed to eliminate racially and sexually offensive speech on campus. Are such codes a reasonable measure to protect minorities from harassment, or is the cure worse than the disease?348 A popular topic in the years immediately preceding Obama’s seminar, the Delgado and Stefancic CRT bibliography included numerous articles addressing 342 See Obama, Group Presentation Topics, supra note 181, at 9. 343 Bell, Bakke, supra note 341, at 3–7 (lamenting the noticeable absence of minorities in the Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 98 S. Ct. 2733 (1978), litigation and the discussion regarding minority admissions programs in general). 344 Id. at 16. 345 See, e.g., Larry Alexander, What Makes Wrongful Discrimination Wrong? Bias, Preferences, Stereotypes, and Proxies, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 149, 187–89 (1992). “The case for reparations beyond wrongs narrowly circumscribed both in time frame and in type is quite problematic.” Id. at 187; George Rutherglen, Abolition in a Different Voice, 78 VA. L. REV. 1463, 1469–70 (1992) (challenging Richard Epstein’s contention that there is “no adequate remedy” nor justification for slavery). 346 Appendix II, Subtopic 10. In addition, the authors’ search on the Westlaw database of legal journal articles published between 1980 and 1993 addressing “race and reparations” produced over 323 results. 347 See ALFRED L. BROPHY, REPARATIONS PRO AND CON (2006) (discussing reparations precedents and their unlikely future in politics). 348 Obama, Group Presentation Topics, supra note 181, at 10. U N I V E R S I T Y O F P I T T S B U R G H L A W R E V I E W P A G E | 5 6 0 | V O L . 7 5 | 2 0 1 4 ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2014.342 http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu the topic of “hate speech”349 and University efforts to promulgate and enforce speech codes.350 Commentators focused on the two manners to approach these regulations—First Amendment freedom of speech protection and protection of equality—each triggering a different standard of review and thus potentially producing a different outcome.351 A consistently repeated theme in these articles is the divisiveness of the issue amongst civil libertarians who—accustomed to arguing on the same side—were now in adversarial camps.352 One CRT author suggested that racial slurs and epithets were the equivalent of unprotected hate speech,353 another looked to other countries to find examples of successful and unsuccessful efforts in dealing with hate speech,354 and two others focused on the 349 See Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 180, at 482–83, 486, 499, 502, 505. See Richard Delgado, Campus Antiracism Rules: Constitutional Narratives in Collision, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 343 (1991) [hereinafter Delgado, Campus Antiracism Rules]; Richard Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133 (1982) [hereinafter Delgado, Words That Wound]. “Early article on discourse, focusing on hate-speech.” Id. at 486; Charles R. Lawrence, III, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431 (1990). “Urges that free speech, properly understood, should not trump equal-dignity concerns at stake in campus speech controversies.” Id. at 499; Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim’s Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320 (1989). “Suggests that an absolutist First Amendment response to hate speech furthers racism.” Id. at 502; Jordan J. Paust, Rereading the First Amendment in Light of Treaties Proscribing Incitement to Racial Discrimination or Hostility, 43 RUTGERS L. REV. 565 (1991). Paust “praises” Mari Matsuda’s article and “offers further constitutional arguments” regarding hate speech. Id. at 505. 350 See Jerome McAlister Culp, Jr., Diversity, Multiculturalism, and Affirmative Action: Duke, the NAS, and Apartheid, 41 DEPAUL L. REV. 1141 (1992) (noting Representative Henry Hyde’s belief that “the most important threat to colleges is the use of speech codes to restrain racist and sexist speech and activity on our college campuses. . . .”). 351 See Delgado, Campus Antiracism Rules, supra note 349, at 345–47. From a freedom of speech perspective, the University would bear the burden of demonstrating “the interests in protecting the members of the campus community from insults and name-calling is compelling enough to overcome the presumption in favor of free speech . . . [and] there is no less onerous way to accomplish this objective.” Id. at 345 (citing numerous cases for support of this standard). However, framed as an Equal Protection claim, the “defenders of racially scathing speech are required to show that the interest in its protection is compelling enough to overcome the preference for equal personhood.” Id. at 346 (citing numerous cases for support of this standard). 352 See Lawrence, If He Hollers Let Him Go, supra note 349, at 434–35; Matsuda, supra note 349, at 2326. 353 Id. at 449–57. 354 See Delgado, Campus Antiracism Rules, supra note 349, at 362–71. R E A D I N G P R O F E S S O R O B A M A P A G E | 5 6 1 ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2014.342 http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu international community’s adoption of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.355 The intense response to these speech codes and their supporting academic arguments were documented in Delgado’s article, Campus Antiracism Rules: Constitutional Narratives in Collision,356 and would have provided an excellent resource to student groups choosing this topic. In addition to the constitutional arguments, CRT authors also focused on the effect of hate speech on “victims, . . . perpetrators, and society as a whole.”357 Obama asked his students to consider whether the protections afforded by these speech codes were reasonable or whether “the cure [was] worse than the disease?” The cited authors concurred that eradicating racist speech was paramount,358 deeming the good faith belief that the “best cure for bad speech is good speech, and ideas that affirm equality and the worth of all individuals ultimately will prevail over racism, sexism, homophobia, and anti-semitism because they are better ideas” to be an “empty ideal.”359 However, one civil libertarian warned that open-ended endorsements of these restrictions “offer[] no principled way to confine racist speech regulations” and could “warrant the prohibition of all racist speech, and thereby cut to the core of our system of free expression.”360 355 See generally Matsuda, supra note 349, at 2341–48 (“The international community has chosen to outlaw racist hate propaganda.”); Paust, supra note 349; Elizabeth J. Defeis, Freedom of Speech and International Norms: A Response to Hate Speech, 29 STAN. J. INT’L L. 57 (1992). Defeis is not included in the CRT bibliography. Her article compares the response of the United States to the protection of hate speech as compared with the response of the European Convention. 356 Delgado, Campus Antiracism Rules, supra note 349, at 358–62. 357 Delgado, Words That Wound, supra note 349, at 134. “The racial insult remains one of the most pervasive channels through which discriminatory attitudes are imparted.” Id. at 135; see also Lawrence, If He Hollers Let Him Go, supra note 349, at 458–66. Lawrence dedicates a section of his article to “Understanding the Injury Inflicted by Racist Speech” and throughout the article recounts personal incidents of hate speech experienced by his students and family members. Id.; Matsuda, supra note 349, at 2335–41. 358 See Lawrence, If He Hollers Let Him Go, supra note 349, at 476–83; see also Delgado, Campus Antiracism Rules, supra note 349, at 374–75; Matsuda, supra note 349, at 2321–22. “A legal response to racist speech is a statement that victims of racism are valued members of our polity.” Id. at 2322. 359 Lawrence, If He Hollers Let Him Go, supra note 349, at 476. 360 Nadine Strossen, Regulating Racist Speech on Campus: A Modest Approach?, 1990 DUKE L.J. 484, 491 (1990). U N I V E R S I T Y O F P I T T S B U R G H L A W R E V I E W P A G E | 5 6 2 | V O L . 7 5 | 2 0 1 4 ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2014.342 http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu 11. Affirmative Action Affirmative action, a hotbed of controversy,361 was frequently referenced in the CRT annotated bibliography.362 While most authors in the bibliography supported CRT ideals, there were some, such as Stephen Carter, that challenged the perspective generally embraced by CRT scholars, thus providing a springboard for CRT responses to his article. The perspectives of black conservatives, like Carter and Randall Kennedy, were more readily validated by CRT scholars as these authors had similar life experiences as people of color.363 The future of affirmative action, its costs and benefits, and the rationale behind the remedy were all pervasive themes that Obama’s students would have encountered while preparing for a group presentation. The landscape of affirmative action scholarship, like that of race and criminal law, was wide; therefore, Obama divided the topic into three specific areas where there was substantial scholarship and hearty debate. a. Minority Set-Asides In Croson, Justice O’Connor argued that many minority set-aside programs are little more than race-based variants of the pork-barrel. Many commentators share this view, noting that minority contractors don’t necessarily hire the poor and working—class blacks that suffer most from the legacy of racial discrimination, and are often serve as fronts for white contractors. Other commentators argue that public contracts have been a well-worn path for other immigrant groups to establish a foot-hold in business, and that the courts are 361 See Thomas Ross, The Richmond Narratives, 68 TEX. L. REV. 389 (1989). “The constitutionality of affirmative action has been perhaps the most divisive and difficult question of contemporary constitutional jurisprudence.” Id. at 389. 362 See Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 180, at 467. Robin D. Barnes, Politics and Passion: Theoretically A Dangerous Liasion, 101 YALE L.J. 1631 (1992); Bell, Bakke, supra note 341; Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Xerces and the Affirmative Action Mystique, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1595 (1989); STEVEN CARTER, REFLECTIONS OF AN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION BABY (1991); Richard Delgado, Affirmative Action as a Majoritarian Device: Or, Do You Really Want to Be a Role Model, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1222 (1991); Thomas Ross, Innocence and Affirmative Action, 43 VAND. L. REV. 297 (1990); John O. Calmore, Exploring the Significance of Race and Class in Representing the Black Poor, 61 OR. L. REV. 201 (1982); Culp, supra note 350. 363 See, e.g., Barnes, supra note 362, at 1638–43 (countering positions advanced by Carter in REFLECTIONS, supra note 362). Throughout the CRT scholarship, the writings of white conservative voices are dismissed as part of the majoritarian society seeking to maintain the status quo. Similarly, the challenge is often advanced that white civil libertarians are the only voices that are recognized and upheld by the legal academy. See Bell, Bakke, supra note 341, at 4–6. R E A D I N G P R O F E S S O R O B A M A P A G E | 5 6 3 ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2014.342 http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu simply changing the rules now that blacks control various levers of government.364 The decisions rendered in Fullilove v. Klutznik365 and City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson366 both directly addressed minority set-asides in the realm of government contracts—one upheld and one struck down.367 Obama credited Justice O’Connor with the argument that “many minority set-aside programs are little more than race- based variants of the pork-barrel.” While this language is not present in the Croson opinion, Justice O’Connor did appear to reject the remedy of societal discrimination against minorities and repeatedly cited a lack of “probative evidence” of particular discrimination against minorities in Richmond’s construction industry.368 One CRT author deemed this analysis as “denying the actual victimization of black beneficiaries”369 and another contended that “she seems to say that the city council members can’t be trusted because they are black people voting on an affirmative action law.”370 An article not included in the CRT bibliography analyzed the decision from a different perspective contending: “[t]he City of Richmond Court bears an uncanny resemblance to the Lochner Court, picking and choosing among state policies according to the decisionmakers’ personal visions of the just society.”371 Interestingly, although the Croson opinion provides a good perspective of the spectrum of the Court’s positions on affirmative action—from Scalia’s adamant opposition to Marshall’s unbridled support372—neither the opinion, nor a summary 364 Obama, Group Presentation Topics, supra note 181, at 11.a. 365 448 U.S. 448 (1980). 366 488 U.S. 469 (1989). 367 See Ross, supra note 362, at 305–06 n.24 (noting that the Richmond set-aside program, rejected by the Court, was modeled after the federal program approved in Fullilove and citing Justice O’Connor’s distinguishing the two because “Congress especially is empowered under the fourteenth amendment to address racial discrimination”). 368 See Croson, 488 U.S. at 498–500, 503. 369 Ross, supra note 362, at 306 (citing language in O’Connor’s opinion referencing “generalized assertions” and “amorphous claims”). 370 Ross, The Richmond Narrative, supra note 361, at 395. 371 Mary C. Daly, Rebuilding the City of Richmond: Congress’ Power to Authorize the States to Implement Race-Conscious Affirmative Action Plans, 33 B.C. L. REV. 903, 930 (1992). 372 See id.; see also Ross, supra note 362, at 306. U N I V E R S I T Y O F P I T T S B U R G H L A W R E V I E W P A G E | 5 6 4 | V O L . 7 5 | 2 0 1 4 ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2014.342 http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu by Derrick Bell, was included in the reading list. However, Thomas Ross’ article, The Richmond Narratives, was included on Delgado and Stefancic’s bibliography and would have provided sufficient background to serve as a catalyst for student groups to research other perspectives.373 b. Class-based, Rather Than Race-based, Affirmative Action in College Admissions As more and more universities chase after the pool of minority students with high SATs (students who frequently come from middle-class families and have gone to prep schools), some have argued for the replacement of race-based affirmative action with some sort of class/income based test. Such proposals go to the heart of the affirmative action debate, and our contrary understanding of the wrong it’s designed to remedy: is it designed to make up for current racial/cultural bias against minorities? Or historical discrimination that has resulted in higher poverty rates, etc. among minorities? Or to promote diversity of viewpoints in the range of [U.S.] institutions?374 The Bakke375 and Defunis376 decisions brought this issue to the forefront as the nation’s elite universities faced challenges regarding their process for enrollment decisions and their rationale for making them. Rather than arguing for the advancement of one measure of affirmative action over another, the CRT articles focused on the value of affirmative action per se and the controversy within the academic and political communities that surrounded it. Derrick Bell dismissed any notion of “innocent whites” that were negatively affected by affirmative action decisions.377 Richard Delgado alleged that affirmative action critics strategically 373 See Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 180, at 506. The first sentence of their annotation for the article is: “Analyzes in narrative terms the Supreme Court’s opinion in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, Co., which struck down a minority set-aside.” 374 Obama, Group Presentation Topics, supra note 181, at 11.b. 375 Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 376 Defunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974). 377 Bell, Xerces and the Affirmative Action Mystique, supra note 362, at 1596. “This obsession with protecting the ‘innocent whites’ has both overshadowed the need to remedy the economic conditions of discrimination-scarred racial minorities, and obscured the fact that affirmative action remedies serve to maintain a socio-economic status quo in which whites (or some of them) retain the dominant roles.” See also Ross, supra note 362, at 301. R E A D I N G P R O F E S S O R O B A M A P A G E | 5 6 5 ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2014.342 http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu “label[] problematic, troublesome, and ethically agonizing a paltry system that helps a few of us get ahead, critics neatly take our eyes off the system . . . [unjustified preferences in jobs and education resulting from old-boys network and official laws that lessened the competition] that enabled [whites] to develop rules and standards of quality and merit that now exclude us, make us appear unworthy, dependent (naturally) on affirmative action.”378 Jerome McAllister Culp, Jr. championed the role of affirmative action: “I believe that universities have a role to play in ending the racial apartheid that still exists in this country, and that affirmative action, diversity, and multiculturalism have an important role to play in helping society—including higher education and law schools—achieve that goal.”379 However, Culp noted that “[p]eople use affirmative action as an excuse to increase racial stereotypes”380 and questioned the impact of the programs and the public’s reaction to them.381 Per Bell, “[t]he important question, of course, is whether the debilitating effects of racial discrimination can be remedied without requiring whites to surrender aspects of their superior social status.”382 From a slightly different perspective, an article not included in the CRT bibliography offered the myriad of reasons apart from race that are routinely used to determine university admissions and argues the use of the term “reverse Within [the] rhetoric [of innocence advanced by whites] affirmative action plans have two effects. They hurt white people, and they advantage undeserving black people. The unjust suffering of the white person becomes the source of the black person’s windfall. Given the obvious power of the rhetoric of innocence, its use and persistence in the opinions of those Justices who seek to deny or severely limit affirmative action is not surprising. Id. 378 Delgado, supra note 362, at 1225. 379 Culp, supra note 350, at 1142; see also CARTER, supra note 362, at 15–17. “I will say it again: I got into law school because I am black. So what?” 380 Culp, supra note 350, at 1157. 381 Calmore, supra note 362, at 204. “[A]lthough America’s underlying premises of individual opportunity, pluralistic politics, and majoritarian values may authentically serve some advancement of the black middle class, for most black poor—particularly the welfare state’s dependent poor and the underclass—these premises simply provide too little, too.” See also Barnes, supra note 362, at 1645 (“Faced with stigma, feelings of inferiority, and fears of white backlash, many blacks have chosen as the target of their criticism the one set of programs that has helped them to advance. White supremacy goes unchallenged, while affirmative action takes a beating.”). 382 Bell, Bakke, supra note 341, at 12. U N I V E R S I T Y O F P I T T S B U R G H L A W R E V I E W P A G E | 5 6 6 | V O L . 7 5 | 2 0 1 4 ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2014.342 http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu discrimination” is merely a political device designed to generate a negative perspective of quotas or other non-merit devices to devices to determine enrollment standards.383 Ultimately, the vast majority of articles available in the spring of 1994, would have led student groups seeking to present alternatives to solely race based arguments to find that “affirmative action demands the paradoxical solution of first taking account of race in order to get to a world where it is not taken into account.”384 c. The Meaning of Merit With affirmative action increasingly justified on the basis of the desire for a diversity of view-points, the very notion of a fixed meaning to the idea of merit has come under attack? Is the notion of merit inherently political, embodying the preferences of the dominant group? Or is it possible to agree on some common standards by which jobs and university slots are allocated? Does it depend on the task? (e.g. law professors v. airline pilots). Do minorities gain or lose when fixed notions of merit give way to more flexible standards for allocating goods and privileges?385 A myriad of possible approaches to this topic were contained within the CRT scholarship included in Delgado and Stefancic’s bibliography.386 Addressing the meaning of merit primarily in the context of affirmative action hiring preferences and tenure decisions, as well as whether minority scholars were truly invited into the “inner circle” of the legal academy. If a student group opted for a more academic or scholarly discussion of “merit,” there were articles available to provide such a perspective;387 however, the CRT authors’ personal narratives were, arguably, more captivating. 383 Philip L. Fetzer, ‘Reverse Discrimination’: The Political Use of Language, 17 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 293 (1992). “‘Reverse discrimination’ is a covert political term . . . [which] is an obstacle to change in the lengthy struggle for shared power in American society.” Id. at 293. “Are colleges discriminating when they admit football players or musicians while rejecting students with higher SAT scores?” Id. at 297. 384 Ross, The Richmond Narratives, supra note 361, at 389. 385 Obama, Group Presentation Topics, supra note 181, at 11.c. 386 See Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 180. 387 See, e.g., Fetzer, supra note 383, at 310 (enumerating the reasons quota systems are viewed as “reverse discrimination”). R E A D I N G P R O F E S S O R O B A M A P A G E | 5 6 7 ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2014.342 http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu For example, in an article focusing on the power of words, Charles Lawrence recounted his experiences as a child during recess. During recess, he dismantled the invisible wall separating him from the white children on the playground—he became one of the inner circle.388 He remembered standing shoulder-to-shoulder in that circle with his white classmates each day as they performed the pre-game ritual of playing “enie menie minie mo.” Lawrence described the physical sensations of waiting to see what or who would be caught by the toe during the pre-game ritual of playing.389 This metaphor is a powerful tool—not only to demonstrate the lingering effect of the harm caused by words—because it pulls on a thread common in our humanness of wanting to be included and valued as equal members of the game. Regardless of the advances Lawrence felt he made with his classmates in disassembling the wall, when the pre-game ritual began the menacing wall reassembled.390 Similarly, regardless of the advances minority scholars made within legal academia, the divisive wall was perceived to perpetually reassemble whenever issues of “race” were raised. In addition to the “fantasy” writings of Derrick Bell, many CRT authors used narratives similar to Lawrence’s to bridge the chasm of race by retelling common experiences from the perspective of a person of color. The CRT scholars consistently perceived that majoritarian scholars and members of the judiciary were purposefully refusing to engage them in academic discourse or the legal process addressing civil rights issues.391 The authors advanced many theories for this exclusion: the desire to “control the assumptions underlying [legal] discourse”;392 388 See Lawrence, If He Hollers Let Him Go, supra note 349, at 482–83. 389 Id. at 482. 390 See id. at 483. 391 See generally Bell, Bakke, supra note 341 (discussing the absence of minority voices in the debate surrounding affirmative action admissions to higher education institutions); Richard Delgado, The Imperial Scholar: Reflections on a Review of Civil Rights Literature, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 561 (1984) (analyzing the citation practices of majoritarian legal scholars and advancing the claim that they are purposefully not minority scholars). See also his follow up article revisiting the issue ten years later and finding the same evidence, Richard Delgado, The Imperial Scholar Revisited: How to Marginalize Outsider Writing, Ten Years Later, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1349 (1992); Mari Matsuda, Affirmative Action and Legal Knowledge: Planting Seeds in Plowed Up Ground, 11 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 1 (1988); but see Kennedy, Racial Critiques of Legal Academia, supra note 120 (criticizing the arguments advanced by Bell, Matsuda, and Delgado). 392 Jerome McAlister Culp, Jr., Posner on Duncan Kennedy and Racial Difference: White Authority in the Legal Academy, 41 DUKE L.J. 1095, 1098 (1992) [hereinafter Culp, Racial Difference]. Culp references Posner’s many opportunities to cite black legal scholars in his work and his failure to do so deeming black scholars “invisible” to Judge Posner. Id. at 1105. Delgado and Stefancic’s bibliography U N I V E R S I T Y O F P I T T S B U R G H L A W R E V I E W P A G E | 5 6 8 | V O L . 7 5 | 2 0 1 4 ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2014.342 http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu the preference for articles that represent traditional approaches to legal scholarship;393 and a lack of appreciation at best, and attempt to silence at worst, of the voices and experiential perspective of minority scholars.394 Derrick Bell’s imaginary tales regarding the hiring practices of minorities at Harvard395 did not seem as far-fetched in light of the statistical representation of minority faculty at Harvard law school and comments from a Washington Post article the following year that the law school was unable to find any qualified female applicants of color to invite to join the law school faculty.396 While these remarks were criticized as “pure sophistry and at its heart a disguised form of racism,”397 the limited pool of traditionally “qualified” minority candidates cannot be denied.398 Student groups may have gravitated to comments by Richard Posner, a critic of affirmative hiring programs, who questioned its effect on legal scholarship and hiring standards.399 Although purportedly detached from the Chicago law faculty, Obama was one of the few minority professors at the describes his article as advancing the position that the “refusal to engage scholars of color helps perpetuate the subjugation of black people and black viewpoints.” Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 180, at 480. 393 Derrick A. Bell, Jr., The Final Allegory: Harvard’s Affirmative Action Allegory, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2382, 2388 (1989) [hereinafter Bell, The Final Allegory] (alleging that scholars are less likely to be selected for tenured positions “if their approach, voice, or conclusions depart radically from traditional scholarship”); see also Culp, Racial Difference, supra note 392, at 1099–1101. 394 See Harlon L. Dalton, The Clouded Prism, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 435 (1987). 395 See Bell, The Final Allegory, supra note 393, at 2387–88; DERRICK A. BELL, JR., The Unspoken Limit on Affirmative Action: The Chronicle of the DeVine Gift, in AND WE ARE NOT SAVED 140–61 (1987); see also Culp, supra note 362, at 1162–65 (reporting a similarly grim report on hiring practices of minorities at Duke). 396 Culp, supra note 350, at 1156 (citing Christopher B. Daly, Harvard Law Students Demand Diverse Faculty, WASH. POST, Apr. 25, 1990, at A3); see also Linda S. Greene, Tokens, Role Models, and Pedagogical Politics: Lamentations of an African American Female Law Professor, 6 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 81, 82 (1990). 397 Culp, supra note 350, at 1156. 398 See Kennedy, Racial Critiques of Legal Academia, supra note 120, at 1765 (challenging Derrick Bell for not engaging in this argument and instead choosing to reject the validity of the conventional standards used to identify “qualified” candidates). 399 See Richard A. Posner, Duncan Kennedy on Affirmative Action, 1990 DUKE L.J. 1157 (1990). In addition to his assertions regarding faculty affirmative action programs, Judge Posner asserts that although minority students who are admitted via affirmative action programs may indeed be able to graduate, “they are unlikely to do so with great distinction.” Id. at 1159; see also Culp, Racial Difference, supra note 392, at 1097 (responding to Judge Posner’s article, supra). R E A D I N G P R O F E S S O R O B A M A P A G E | 5 6 9 ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2014.342 http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu University of Chicago during his tenure400 and may have had personal insight to share during the class discussion of this topic. 12. Public School Financing With white and black middle class families increasingly choosing to exit from the public school system, many local public school districts are on the verge of financial collapse. Some commentators have argued that a school system based on property taxes necessarily creates a separate and unequal school system, and have challenged such school financing systems under state constitutional mandates of equal educational opportunity. How have such suits fared, and what does their success or failure say about the possibilities of bringing about genuine equality of opportunity for generations to come?401 Regardless of how ideological aspirations of equality in educational opportunities are touted, choices related to funding those opportunities continue to reveal the limitations to the commitment. After the Supreme Court decided San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez402 in 1973—determining that public education was not a fundamental right and decisions made on the basis of wealth were not subject to strict scrutiny—the states were given substantial freedom in determining how to best fund their public schools.403 Various funding mechanisms designed by the states were challenged unsuccessfully in the courts until 1989, when three state courts declared their state’s school financing system unconstitutional.404 These decisions appeared to rejuvenate those challenging the current funding systems based on property taxes and the resulting disparity in educational opportunities for the state’s entire student populace. Consequently, this topic generated significant academic commentary as individual states began to wrestle with the constitutionality of their own funding 400 See Kantor, supra note 18. 401 Obama, Group Presentation Topics, supra note 181, at 12. 402 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 403 Id. at 29–31, 40. 404 Kate Strickland, Note, The School Finance Reform Movement, a History and Prognosis: Will Massachusetts Join the Third Wave of Reform?, 32 B.C. L. REV. 1105, 1109 (1991) (noting the decisions in Kentucky, Montana, and Texas “declar[ing] their respective state financing plans unconstitutional on the grounds that significant disparities in school district funding violated their state educational provisions.”). U N I V E R S I T Y O F P I T T S B U R G H L A W R E V I E W P A G E | 5 7 0 | V O L . 7 5 | 2 0 1 4 ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2014.342 http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu structures.405 However, contrary to the other topics on the group presentation syllabus, neither the titles nor the summaries on the CRT bibliography contained any obvious reference to public school financing. For this presentation topic, Obama encouraged students to look at the results of lawsuits designed to challenge the constitutionality of school finance based on property taxes and to analyze the results to judge the “possibilities of bringing about genuine equality of opportunity for generations to come.” This was the only topic that specifically asked students to apply their analysis to the future rather merely present opinions related to current and past issues. III. CONCLUSION: CRITICAL RACE PRAGMATISM Our project was to read Professor Obama’s syllabus to understand his views on race and the American constitutional tradition. Several conclusions emerge. First, while Obama saw a lot of important critiques of racism in CRT, he had optimism about the possibility of progress on racial equality and the promises of the Declaration of Independence and the Equal Protection Clause.406 Racism in Obama’s mind was no longer immutable. He saw the solution not through separatism or through courts, but through political action focused around common goals. That is, in some ways, his solution to the interest-convergence dilemma identified by Derrick Bell: to expand the interests at stake and to tie the interests of African Americans to other groups struggling for economic and social justice.407 The Equal Protection principle would be made real by finding common ground. The goal was to have voters and those in power recognize the merits of the claims of the humble to justice and the shared interests of all societal groups. Obama appears less interested in theory and more interested in pragmatic action. He is a realist, a pragmatist, and a dreamer all at the same time. Viewing Obama’s perspective as a descendant of Bell’s, perhaps Obama’s generation of race 405 A search on Westlaw for academic articles written between 1990 and 1993 containing the terms “public school financing” and “property taxes” generated 690 responses. 406 Obama’s classmate Kenneth Mack suggested that Obama wanted a route out of Critical Race Theory’s pessimism. KLOPPENBERG, supra note 1, at 127. 407 In fact, Derrick Bell noted some of these differences between his perspective and Barack Obama’s in an address delivered shortly after Obama’s election, see Derrick Bell, On Celebrating an Election as Racial Progress, 36 HUM. RTS. 2, 2 (2009) (asking, “Is Obama’s elevation to the White House more than just another unique moment when the fervent hopes of blacks coincide with the needs of white and other non-whites?”). Thanks to Riki Kotua for bringing this article to our attention. R E A D I N G P R O F E S S O R O B A M A P A G E | 5 7 1 ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2014.342 http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu scholarship should be called critical race pragmatism.408 For it joins the sociology of Du Bois and the vision of Ellison to Obama’s pragmatism.409 Six years into Obama’s presidency the pragmatism that seeks compromise and unity is disillusioning to some African American intellectuals.410 It might have been so for Derrick Bell, too. And yet the mission of democracy continues. Such may be the future of pragmatic racial constitutionalism that joins the interests of African Americans and other racial minorities to the goals of other groups.411 In Obama’s mind, there is likely a place for people like Bell. For even as he pushed the importance of discussion in a democracy, Obama acknowledged in The Audacity of Hope that there remains a role for people like William Lloyd Garrison, Denmark Vesey, and Frederick Douglas412—perhaps signaling the place that future critical race scholarship plays in Obama’s world, even as he departs significantly from it. There is another part of this story, though, and it is about critical race pedagogy. Here Obama is close to the leading CRT scholars.413 Following a model 408 A number of people have noted the pragmatic elements of Obama’s thought. See, e.g., KLOPPENBERG, supra note 1, at 17–18; Bart Schultz, Obama’s Political Philosophy, Pragmatism, Politics, and the University of Chicago, 39 PHILOSOPHY SOC. SCI. 127–73 (2009); Susan Schulten, Barack Obama, Abraham Lincoln, and John Dewey, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 807–17 (2009). 409 See also Charles Ogletree, Understanding Obama from Barry to Barack, speech at W.E.B. Du Bois Center for African American Thought, Harvard University, Nov. 2011), available at http://www.law .harvard.edu/news/2011/11/17_ogletree_obama.html. 410 Adolph Reed & Kenneth Warren, Renewing Black Intellectual History (2010), http://www .blackagendareport.com/content/where-obamaism-seems-be-going (interpreting Obama as moving in a decidedly non-radical direction). 411 Obama, A More Perfect Union, supra note 38 (“This time we want to talk about how the lines in the Emergency Room are filled with whites and blacks and Hispanics who do not have health care; who don’t have the power on their own to overcome the special interests in Washington, but who can take them on if we do it together.”). 412 OBAMA, supra note 172, at 98. 413 It is exciting to think about how the directions that Obama was moving towards in the 1990s—and continues to work towards now—relate to the directions that scholars who self-consciously work in Bell’s tradition are now moving. Many of the other papers in this symposium point towards similar alteration from Bell’s primary themes. Juan Perea focuses, as did Bell, on the lessons of history. Thus he looks to how affirmative action was “uncoupled” from its historic purpose in the Great Society. Juan F. Perea, Doctrines of Delusion: How the History of the G.I. Bill and Other Inconvenient Truths Undermine the Supreme Court’s Affirmative Action Jurisprudence, 75 U. PITT. L. REV. 583 (2014). Montre Carodine and SpearIt both identify the ways that legal doctrine and economic interest continues to distinguish by race and how that tends to subordinate racial minorities. Montre Carodine, Contemporary Issues in Critical Race Theory: The Implications of Race as Character Evidence in U N I V E R S I T Y O F P I T T S B U R G H L A W R E V I E W P A G E | 5 7 2 | V O L . 7 5 | 2 0 1 4 ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2014.342 http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu set by many CRT scholars,414 Obama’s students appreciated the way he shared personal anecdotes, his engaging personality and his seemingly softer approach to teaching—especially when juxtaposed to other law professors at the University of Chicago.415 Even the course reading packet purportedly included his own notes in the margins which he comments is the result, as an adjunct, of not having a teaching assistant. “On the other hand” he adds, “my wife tells me that she wouldn’t have minded getting the professor’s notations on her reading material when she was in law school.”416 It is impossible to know if these are his notes from when he was perhaps Derrick Bell’s student or notes he made in preparation for teaching the course. Whatever the origins of the notes, this allowed his students to begin to build a relationship with the man who would be their teacher. Good teachers, as Charles Lawrence reminds us, allow their students to find their own answers and have no need to be the center of attention, nor the imparters of wisdom.417 Such a teacher thoughtfully provides just enough material so the student will find the desired answer; but the student believes the discovery to be solely due to his efforts, his insightfulness, his intelligence, and thus “owns” the new, cherished information. Students rarely appreciate the frustrating experience of searching for these answers in the midst of the process, but the fruit of their labors is a deeper understanding and appreciation of the lessons learned. To learn by Recent High Profile Cases, 75 U. PITT. L. REV. 679 (2014); SpearIt, Economic Interest Convergence in Downsizing Imprisonment, 75 U. PITT. L. REV. 475 (2014). Jean Stefancic looks to join critical theory to action. Jean Stefancic, Discerning Critical Moments: Lessons from the Life of Derrick Bell, 75 U. PITT. L. REV. 457 (2014); Richard Delgado takes Bell’s theory in another direction in Law’s Violence: Derrick Bell’s Next Article, 75 U. PITT. L. REV. 435 (2014). Delgado extrapolates from Bell’s work to suggest that he might have written about our country’s origins in violence and how that shapes our law and our national character. Delgado even suggests that our “originary violence” as he terms it conditions us to later injustice. It may even suggest that some values, like violence, will be so deeply embedded that economic-self interest will not overcome them. George H. Taylor picks up on the possibilities of a better future in developing a sub-theme of Bell: “the possibility of correlation between racial justice and its concrete manifestation, to varying degrees, in the law.” George H. Taylor, The Object of Diversity, 75 U. PITT. L. REV. 653 (2014). 414 See Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Autobiography and Legal Scholarship and Teaching: Finding Me in the Legal Academy, 77 VA. L. REV. 539 (1991) (discusses the value of a minority professor’s use of personal anecdotes when teaching); see also Lawrence, supra note 201. 415 See Kantor, supra note 18 (discussing how well students reacted to Obama’s teaching style). 416 Id. 417 See generally Lawrence, supra note 201. Lawrence described his pedagogical approach of asking students the most difficult questions and guiding their struggle to discover the answers as a “well-worn professor’s ruse.” Id. at 2243. R E A D I N G P R O F E S S O R O B A M A P A G E | 5 7 3 ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2014.342 http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu discovering, the students must be willing to make mistakes and trust the teacher who is pushing them to delve deeper, think harder, and discover the correct answer. The relationship Obama built with his students, the structure of the assigned readings, the directions to guide the students to complete their paper, and his suggested approaches to the student presentations could be interpreted to have provided such a learning experience about CRT. There is no overt mention of CRT or interest-convergence or other “radical” theories in Obama’s 1994 syllabus. For someone with lofty aspirations and a tenuous place in the world where race was so important, taking a stand on issues of race had the potential to alienate supporters. The question is thus posed, and future commentary is invited to answer, was CRT the “desired answer” that the Obama intended the students to find? Or that innately guided his own beliefs? It appears as though Obama was already in the class striking out on a pragmatic approach that was rooted in his optimism that politics and morality were bending towards justice. Whatever the answer, the prevalence of presentation topics potentially generating such significant CRT commentary that Obama included on the syllabus suggests that Obama had at least considered, although perhaps rejected, the fundamental tenets of Critical Race Theory as principles influencing “Current Issues in Racism and the Law.” U N I V E R S I T Y O F P I T T S B U R G H L A W R E V I E W P A G E | 5 7 4 | V O L . 7 5 | 2 0 1 4 ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2014.342 http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu Appendix 1. Reading Assignments with Additional Bibliographic Information Students were to focus on readings with an asterisk. The numbers following the “p.” or “pp.” indicated pages in the readings packet. We have added full citations where available and have in a few instances, when it is unclear the work cited, speculated about the most likely source. I. Theory (First Day) *George Fredrickson, The Arrogance of Race: Historical Perspectives on Slavery, Racism and Social Inequality (1988), pp. 2–10 *Kwame Anthony Appiah, “Racisms,” in Anatomy of Racism 3-17 (David Goldberg ed., 1990), pp. 11–20 Kwame Anthony Appiah, “The Uncompleted Argument: Du Bois and the Illusion of Race,” 12 Critical Inquiry 21-37 (1985) II. Historical Foundations A. Indian Removal Vattel, The Law of Nations, p. 29 Brackenridge, pp. 30–31 [Law Miscellanies 123–25 (Philadelphia, 1814)] Andrew Jackson, pp. 32–33 Message on Indian Removal (Dec. 6, 1830) Speckled Snake, Untitled Speech in Response to a Message Concerning Indian Removal by President Jackson, in SAMUEL G. DRAKE, THE BOOK OF THE INDIANS, OR, BIOGRAPHY AND HISTORY OF THE INDIANS OF NORTH AMERICA 110 (Boston, Benjamin B. Mussey 9th ed. 1845) (circa 1830), p. 34 Act to Provide Exchange of Lands (Indian Removal Act, May 28, 1830), pp. 35–36 *Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheaton) 543 (1823), pp. 37–43 B. Slavery Gobu v. Gobu, 1 N.C. 188 (1802), p. 47 Hudgins v. Wrights, 11 Va. 134 (1806), p. 43 Sawney v. Carter, 27 Va. (6 Rand) 173, pp. 49–50 *State v. Mann, 13 N.C. 263 (1830), pp. 51–54 Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, pp. 55–58 Fillmore, Address, p. 59 (First Annual Message, Dec. 2, 1850, on compromise of 1850) R E A D I N G P R O F E S S O R O B A M A P A G E | 5 7 5 ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2014.342 http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu Martin Delany: Excerpt of Speech, p. 60 *Frederick Douglass, Is It Right and Wise to Kill a Kidnapper, pp. 61–64 *Frederick Douglass, The Right to Criticize American Institutions, pp. 65 *Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857) (or Bell summary), pp. 66–129 C. Reconstruction. Retrenchment, and Jim Crow (Second Day) Emancipation Proclamation, p. 131 Thirteenth Amendment, p. 132 *South Carolina Black Codes (skim), pp. 133–40, available at http://home .gwu.edu/~jjhawkin/BlackCodes/pdfSouthCarolina.pdf Civil Rights Act of 1866, p. 141 Johnson’s Veto Message, pp. 142–44 (Veto of the Civil Rights Bill, Mar. 27, 1866) * Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment, pp. 145–46 * Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872), Civil Rights Act of 1875, Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), pp. 147–70 (or Bell summary at end of section) Frederick Douglass, The Civil Rights Cases (Oct. 22, 1883) (optional), p. 171, available at http://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/index.asp?document= 774 *The Enforcement Act of 1870, United States v. Cruikshank, pp. 182–95 (or Bell summary at end of section) *Ralph Ginzburg, One Hundred Years of Lynchings (1969) (skim), pp. 196– 212 (cited in Bell) *Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475 (1903), pp. 213–28 (or Bell summary at end of section) (discussed in Bell) *Gilbert Thomas Stephenson, Actual Jury Service by Negroes, in Race Distinctions in American Law (1910) (skim), pp. 229–46 Bell, Summary of Civil War Amendments, Reconstruction, from Race, Racism, and American Law, pp. 247–65 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (or Bell summary), pp. 266–80 U N I V E R S I T Y O F P I T T S B U R G H L A W R E V I E W P A G E | 5 7 6 | V O L . 7 5 | 2 0 1 4 ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2014.342 http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu D. Black Responses * Booker T. Washington, Excerpt from Up from Slavery, pp. 282–88 * W.E.B. Du Bois, Excerpt from The Souls of Black Folk (chap. 2 optional), pp. 289–315 * Marcus Garvey, Philosophy and Opinions (1923) (focus on first two speeches), pp. 316–50 III. Civil Rights and Retrenchment (Third Day) *Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), pp. 353–59 Martin Luther King, “Letter from Birmingham City Jail,” pp. 361–68 Robert Bork, “Civil Rights—A Challenge,” The New Republic, Aug. 31, 1963, pp. 370–74 Remedying Segregation—Case Law Excerpts, pp. 376–83 Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958) Griffin v. County School Board, 377 U.S. 218 (1964) Green v. County School Board, 391 U.S. 430 (1968) Pasadena Board of Educ. v. Spangier, 427 U.S. 424 (1976) Miliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976) Milliken II, 433 U.S. 267 (1977) San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), pp. 384–90 Malcolm X, Two Lectures, pp. 392–418; specific lectures not located Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), pp. 420–22 Arlington Heights v. Metro. Housing, 429 U.S. 252 (1977), pp. 422–23 Bell, The Legacy of Washington v. Davis, in Race, Racism, and American Law, pp. 424–29 *Bell, Fair Employment Laws: An Overview, in Race, Racism, and American Law, pp. 430–39 Lino Graglia, “Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964: From Prohibiting to Requiring Racial Discrimination in Employment,” 14 Harv. J.L. & Pub. 68 (1991), pp. 440–44 R E A D I N G P R O F E S S O R O B A M A P A G E | 5 7 7 ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2014.342 http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu Charles Cooper, “Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio: A Step Toward Eliminating Quotas in the Workplace,” 14 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 84 (1991), pp. 445–49 *Randall Kennedy, “Competing Conceptions of ‘Racial Discrimination’: A Response to Cooper and Graglia,” 14 Harv J.L. & Pub. Pol’y (1991), pp. 449–53 Civil Rights Act of 1991, pp. 455–58 (skim) IV. Where Do We Go From Here? (Fourth Day) Bell, Employment and Race-Class Conflict, in Race, Racism, and American Law, pp. 460–66 *Bell,” Divining Our Racial Themes,” Introduction to Faces at the Bottom of the Well (1992), pp. 468–75 *Shelby Steele, “I’m Black, You’re White, Who’s Innocent? Race and Power in an Era of Blame,” Harper’s June 1988, pp. 476–87, http://harpers.org/ archive/1988/06/0023431 *William Julius Wilson, The Truly Disadvantaged:: The Inner City, the Underclass, and Public Policy (1990), pp. 489–520 Bart Landry, “How Big a Piece?” in The New Black Middle Class (1987), pp. 521–32 John H. Bunzel, “Black and White at Stanford,” 105 National Affairs (Fall 1991), pp. 534–42, http://www.nationalaffairs.com/public_interest/detail/ black-and-white-at-stanford Isabel Wilkerson, “Balancing Act; A Special Report; One City’s 30-Year Crusade for Integration,” New York Times, Dec. 30, 1991, pp. 544–49, http:// www.nytimes.com/1991/12/30/us/balancing-act-a-special-report-one-city-s- 30-year-crusade-for-integration.html Lena Williams, “When Blacks Shop Bias Often Accompanies Sale,” New York Times, Apr. 30, 1991, pp. 549–50, http://www.nytimes.com/1991/04/ 30/us/when-blacks-shop-bias-often-accompanies-sale.html Cornell West, “Learning to Talk of Race,” New York Times Magazine Aug. 2, 1992, pp. 551–52 U N I V E R S I T Y O F P I T T S B U R G H L A W R E V I E W P A G E | 5 7 8 | V O L . 7 5 | 2 0 1 4 ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2014.342 http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu Appendix 2. Suggested Topics for Seminar Presentations 1) The All-Black, All-Male School—A number of public school systems, including those in Detroit and Milwaukee, have initiated pilot programs whereby inner-city black males are voluntarily placed in a segregated learning environment, with black male teachers, an Afrocentric curriculum, etc. Proponents say that given the unique problems facing black males, such “self-segregation” contributes to self- esteem and enhances learning performance. Opponents argue that these programs are a betrayal of Brown v. Board of Education, discriminate against whites and females, stigmatizes black males, and politicizes school curriculums. 2) Interracial Adoptions—Several states have established regulations that look to place black children up for adoption exclusively with black families. Such policies are supported by black social worker organizations, who argue that same-race adoptions are best for the child, give the child a strong sense of identity, etc. Opponents, including white families interested in adopting black children, say that the policy is racist, and is detrimental to the thousands of unplaced black children currently up for adoption. 3) Racial Gerrymandering—The Voting Rights Act of 1965 was designed to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment, and ensure the full and equal enfranchisement of minorities in the political process. But with the elimination of such obvious barriers to voting as the poll tax and literacy tests, what constitutes a violation of the Act? Some commentators and courts have insisted that such facially neutral practices as the at-large voting district dilute minority voting strength, and have designed single-member, “super-majority” districts that ensure minorities are elected to various political offices. Others say that the drawing of district lines to ensure the success of minority candidates (as opposed to the ability of minorities to vote) amounts to nothing more than racial gerrymandering, encourages racial block voting, and further isolates blacks and other minorities from the broader political community. 4) Race and the Criminal Justice System—There are a range of issues in this area that would make interesting group presentations: * Discriminatory sentencing: to what degree is race (as opposed, say to poverty and the reduced ability to hire legal assistance) a primary determinant in criminal sentencing? Have such policies as mandatory sentencing guidelines helped to alleviate any bias that may exist, and if not, what other solutions are available? * Criminal Legislation that Targets Minorities?: Recently, a Minnesota state court held that a criminal statute that punishes possession of crack more severely than possession of cocaine is discriminatory, insofar as crack is the drug of choice in the black community, while cocaine is more R E A D I N G P R O F E S S O R O B A M A P A G E | 5 7 9 ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2014.342 http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu popular among the wine and brie crowd. Likewise, some commentators have argued that legislation that imposes additional penalties on women who use drugs during pregnancy are racially biased. Do such arguments have any merit? * Hate Crimes: A number of states have passed legislation that increase the penalties for crimes that are shown to be racially-motivated. The Supreme Court recently struck down one such law. Were the Supremes right? * Statistical Discrimination/Criminals Profiling: Is the use of criminal profiles (e.g. black male with Starter Jacket and gold-chain) in establishing reasonable cause inherently discriminatory? (This can be expanded into a discussion of the non-criminal context—i.e. store-owners with door-buzzers). 5) Immigration Policy—Much of the recent controversy surrounding the United States’ policy towards Haitian refugees centers around the suspicion that blacks in particular, and people of color in general, are subject to a different set of rules when it comes to who is allowed to immigrate into the U.S. At the same time, Latinos have long argued that immigration policy and INS enforcement not only unfairly targets undocumented workers from poor countries, but also increases discrimination in hiring in regard to U.S. minorities. These issues could be dealt with either together or separately. 6) Racial Bias in the Media—Observers have long complained about the inaccurate stereotypes that permeate the depiction of minorities in the mass media in general, and the news in particular. Are these complaints well founded, and if so, will FCC guidelines designed to promote diversity, such as those upheld by the Supreme Court in Metro Broadcasting, solve the problem? 7) Welfare Policy and Reproductive Freedom—The politics of welfare appears inseparable from the politics of race, despite the oft-quoted statistic that the majority of those on welfare are white. Recently, commentators have been revisiting the issue of child-bearing among the poor, and asking some difficult questions. Should we change welfare policy so that welfare grants no longer increase with each child? Should judges or welfare agencies have the power to restrict the reproductive choices of mothers who are found to have neglected their children, or take drugs during pregnancy? Are commentators who say such policies smack of “racial genocide” misguided? 8) Inter-ethnic Tensions—The L.A. riots, the disturbances in Crown Heights, and boycotts of Korean and Arab grocery stores in inner city communities, indicate that the “browning of America” may increase, rather than decrease, racial tensions in the coming years. What are the sources of some of these tensions? Is the black U N I V E R S I T Y O F P I T T S B U R G H L A W R E V I E W P A G E | 5 8 0 | V O L . 7 5 | 2 0 1 4 ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2014.342 http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu community alienating potential political allies? Are Latinos, Asians, and other more recent immigrants adopting the racist sentiments of white America in their eagerness to assimilate, or are they victims of unjustified black resentment? A variant of this topic would be to examine the degree to which the bi-polar model of black/white relations is or is not relevant to the struggles and aspirations of other racial minorities. 10)418 Reparations—Given the perceived failures of the traditional civil rights agenda in bringing about racial equality in the U.S., a number of black commentators argue that a program of reparations is the only legitimate means of making up for three-hundred plus years of slavery. More recently, some white commentators have also supported a variant of the reparations concept—for example, the government financing a Community Reinvestment funds that would be controlled by the black community and render affirmative action obsolete. Do such proposals have any realistic chance of working their way through the political system? Would there be any legal impediments to such a broadly-conceived reparations policy? 11) Hate Speech—Universities have begun to promulgate speech codes designed to eliminate racially and sexually offensive speech on campus. Are such codes a reasonable measure to protect minorities from harassment, or is the cure worse than the disease? 12) Affirmative Action * Minority Set-Asides: In Croson, Justice O’Connor argued that many minority set-aside programs are little more than race-based variants of the pork-barrel. Many commentators share this view, noting that minority contractors don’t necessarily hire the poor and working—class blacks that suffer most from the legacy of racial discrimination, and are often serve as fronts for white contractors. Other commentators argue that public contracts have been a well-worn path for other immigrant groups to establish a foot-hold in business, and that the courts are simply changing the rules now that blacks control various levers of government. * Class-based, rather than race-based, affirmative action in college admissions: As more and more universities chase after the pool of minority students with high SATs (students who frequently come from middle-class families and have gone to prep schools) , some have argued 418 There was no number nine in the original. R E A D I N G P R O F E S S O R O B A M A P A G E | 5 8 1 ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2014.342 http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu for the replacement of race-based affirmative action with some sort of class/income based test. Such proposals go to the heart of the affirmative action debate, and our contrary understanding of the wrong it’s designed to remedy: is it designed to make up for current racial/cultural bias against minorities? Or historical discrimination that has resulted in higher poverty rates, etc. among minorities? Or to promote diversity of viewpoints in the range of U.S. institutions? * The Meaning of Merit: With affirmative action increasingly justified on the basis of the desire for a diversity of view-points, the very notion of a fixed meaning to the idea of merit has come under attack? Is the notion of merit inherently political, embodying the preferences of the dominant group? Or is it possible to agree on some common standards by which jobs and university slots are allocated? Does it depend on the task? (e.g. law professors v. airline pilots). Do minorities gain or lose when fixed notions of merit give way to more flexible standards for allocating goods and privileges? 13) Public School Financing—With white and black middle class families increasingly choosing to exit from the public school system, many local public school districts are on the verge of financial collapse. Some commentators have argued that a school system based on property taxes necessarily creates a separate and unequal school system, and have challenged such school financing systems under state constitutional mandates of equal educational opportunity. 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work_yfh5tj3mfzgera4p5ga3mdnrim	----	1 The ‘Duel’ Meaning of Feminisation in IR: The Rise of Women and the Interior Logics of Declinist Literature Caron E. Gentry University of St Andrews Abstract: ‘Feminisation’ in International Relations refers to multiple, and sometimes contradictory, concepts. Much of the time it refers to the incorporation of women into various organisations and institutions, such as women’s participation in militaries or in politics. The decline of violence, or declinist, literature lists it as one of the contributing factors in the decline of violence and associates feminisation with women’s social, political, and economic empowerment. Feminist theory in IR, however, conceptualises ‘feminisation’ in a different light. As the feminine is often devalued or deprioritised for the preferred masculine, feminisation is synonymous with devalourisation.1 Therefore, this paper will play with the dual meaning of feminisation, offering a cautionary tale for the dependency on women’s empowerment in the declinist literature by asserting that it is hampered by masculinist thinking. It will do so by challenging the equation of women with gender in the declinist literature. Gender equality and/or progress cannot simply be limited to raising women’s status, which implicates an understanding of gender as a binary categorisation of men/masculinity or women/femininity. Instead, gender is a spectrum that understands the multitude of gender identities, going beyond heteronormativity to lesbian, bi-, gay, trans, queer, and intersex (LBGTQI). Limiting gender to women means violences against other communities, particularly sexual minorities, is unrecognised and unaccounted for. Keywords: Feminism, Gender, Post-colonialism, ‘Feminisation’ in International Relations refers to multiple, and sometimes contradictory, concepts. Much of the time it refers to the incorporation of women into various organisations and institutions, such as women’s participation in militaries or in politics. The decline of violence, or declinist, literature lists it as one of the contributing factors in the decline of violence and associates feminisation with women’s social, political, and economic empowerment. Feminist theory in IR, 1 V. Spike Peterson, ‘Feminist Theories Within, Invisible to, and Beyond IR’, Brown Journal of World Affairs, 10 (2003). 2 however, conceptualises ‘feminisation’ in a different light. As the feminine is often devalued or deprioritised for the preferred masculine, feminisation is synonymous with devalourisation.2 Therefore, this paper will play with the dual meaning of feminisation, offering a cautionary tale for the dependency on women’s empowerment in the declinist literature by asserting that it is hampered by masculinist thinking. It will do so by challenging the equation of women with gender in the declinist literature. Gender equality and/or progress cannot simply be limited to raising women’s status, which implicates an understanding of gender as a binary categorisation of men/masculinity or women/femininity. Instead, gender is a spectrum that understands the multitude of gender identities, going beyond heteronormativity to lesbian, bi-, gay, trans, queer, and intersex (LBGTQI). Limiting gender to women means violences against other communities, particularly sexual minorities, is unrecognised and unaccounted for. The decline of violence literature is most closely associated with Steven Pinker3, Joshua Goldstein4, and Nils Petter Gleditsch’s5 scholarship. Together this scholarship challenges one of the fundamental assumptions of post-Cold War IR: that civilian death in war now outnumbers combatant death eight-to-one.6 Arguing that this was a 2 V. Spike Peterson, ‘Feminist Theories Within, Invisible to, and Beyond IR’, Brown Journal of World Affairs, 10 (2003). 3 Steven Pinker, The Better Angels of Our Nature: The Decline of Violence in History and Its Causes (London: Penguin, 2011) 4 Joshua S. Goldstein, Winning the War on War: The Decline of Armed Conflict Worldwide (London: Penguin, 2011). 5 Bethany Lacina and Nils Petter Gleditsch, ‘Monitoring Trends in Global Combat: A New Dataset of Battle Deaths’, European Journal of Population, 21/2-3 (2005): pp. 145-166; Nils Petter Gleditsch, Peter Wallensteen, Mikael Eriksson, Margareta Sollenberg, and Håvard Strand, ‘Armed Conflict 1946-2001: A New Dataset’, Journal of Peace Research, 39/5 (2002): pp. 615-637. 6 Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organised Violence in a Global Era (London: Polity, 1999. 3 miscalculation, the declinist literature gives scholars of war hope that something is forcing a shift in war-making and fighting. While there are multiple, inter-connected proposed reasons for this, one such rationale is the aforementioned ‘feminisation’. This argument coheres with the women=peace thesis, one that Francis Fukuyama (somewhat, as it never really went away) revived and championed in a controversial 1998 Foreign Affairs article.7 It is a proposition that has had traction in recent research, including the work of Valerie Hudson in which she argues that women’s security is correlated to regional security.8 Others argue that women’s economic empowerment is also an indicator of both societal security and economic development.9 The declinist argument and the associated literature are right to identify women's empowerment/feminisation as a contributing force. However, they are reliant upon Western masculinist presuppositions, which work to reify a Western-centric notion of security, empowerment, and development that erases gender structures/constructions and intersectional politics. The feminisation argument is reliant upon legal and bureaucratic changes to stand for actual socio-structural changes—in effect forcing gender equality from the top-down and not encouraging or accounting for dispositional changes about the lived realities of gender hierarchies. This means that the declinist feminisation argument is possibly headed for failure as it unwittingly props up the current gender hierarchy without effecting lasting change. In other words, because ‘woman/women’ is being made to stand for ‘gender’, when other 7 Francis Fukuyama, ‘Women and the Evolution of World Politics’, Foreign Affairs, 77/5 (1998). 8 Valerie M. Hudson, Bonnie Ballif-Spanvill, Mary Caprioli, Chad F. Emmett, Sex and World Peace (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012). 9 Nicholas D. Kristof and Sheryl WuDunn, Half the Sky: Turning Oppression into Opportunity for Women Worldwide (New York: Vintage Books, 2010). 4 gendered violences are (finally) recognised (like homophobic or transphobic attacks) and affect peace measurements, does this mean ‘feminisation’ will be seen to have failed? Declinist literature is already critiqued for failing to integrate violences that fall outside of the confines of its methodology, including sexual and gender-based violence10 and structural violence.11 Changing the declinist conceptualisation of feminisation by taking a more holistic account of empowerment, inclusive of non- binary gender identities and diverse sexualities, would be more productive. Therefore, this paper will focus on the vulnerability of the LBGTQI community not just globally but more specifically in the United States. While the International Gay, Lesbian, and Transgender Agency (ILGA) highlights the spectrum of LGBTQI rights secured (or not) worldwide, this fails to acknowledge the high-levels of violence against this community. Legal rights, such as marriage equality, do not equate to personal and social security. Indeed, the conventional wisdom holds that as rights are secured for marginalized and vulnerable communities violent backlashes are probable.12 For example, whereas the United States has technically granted this community the highest level of rights—marriage—violence towards the community happens across the country and has been steadily increasing, particularly against transgender people of colour. 10 Jacqui True, ‘Winning the Battle but Losing the War on Violence’, International Feminist Journal of Politics, 17/4 (2015): pp. 554-572. 11 John Gray, ‘Steven Pinker is Wrong About Violence and War’, The Guardian, 13 March 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/books/2015/mar/13/john-gray-steven- pinker-wrong-violence-war-declining accessed 16 September 2015. 12 Lucas Grindley, ‘We Saw the Backlash Coming, But Have You Really Notice All of It?’, The Advocate, 1 April 2016, http://www.advocate.com/commentary/2016/4/01/we-saw-backlash-coming-have- you-really-noticed-all-it accessed 17 May 2016. http://www.theguardian.com/books/2015/mar/13/john-gray-steven-pinker-wrong-violence-war-declining http://www.theguardian.com/books/2015/mar/13/john-gray-steven-pinker-wrong-violence-war-declining http://www.advocate.com/commentary/2016/4/01/we-saw-backlash-coming-have-you-really-noticed-all-it http://www.advocate.com/commentary/2016/4/01/we-saw-backlash-coming-have-you-really-noticed-all-it 5 This paper will explore the ‘duel’ meaning by bringing the two literatures on feminisation together through the juxtaposition of the post-colonial writings on modernity, particularly by Dipesh Chakrabarty.13 In his article and subsequent book, Provincialising Europe, Chakrabarty first argues that European/Western societies and governments are the model to which all other states are held in comparison. Furthermore, he explores how women in colonised societies are held as the bellwether for progress and modernisation. In order to demonstrate the applicability of a post- colonial perspective, the paper first examines the declinist literature on feminisation is tied to neo-liberal Western expectations. After a deeper exploration of how women are often used as social standard bearers in modern Western thinking. The paper then looks at the feminist literature on ‘feminisation’. It concludes that while it is helpful that the declinist literature emphasises women’s rights and empowerment it does so by problematically conflating women with gender and then saying that the rise of women indicates gender progress when gender progress is so much more than this. This is evidenced through the endemic violence against the LGBTQI community not just worldwide but in the United States. Gendered Peace, Feminisation, and the Decline of Violence The women=peace thesis is dependent upon the gender binary, stemming from the Greek patriarchy, that men are more independent, rational, and assertive and women 13 Dipesh Chakrabarty, ‘Provincialising Europe: Postcoloniality and the Critique of History’, Cultural Studies, 6/3 (1992); Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincialising Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 2000). 6 are inherently more nurturing, emotional, and passive.14 This of course helped to create and maintain the division of the public/private spheres, where men are associated with government, war, and business and women home-making and child- rearing.15 Jean Bethke Elshtain looks at how the gender binary operates in war through the Hegelian conceptualisation of men as ‘Just Warriors’ and women as the ‘Beautiful Souls’ that the Just Warriors fight to protect.16 This has further implications for how citizenship is conceived: a good citizen is one who is able to die defending the state. If women are left out of this war-citizen matrix, women are unable to be good citizens.17 Thus, women’s association with the ‘Beautiful Soul’ narrative is circular: women’s supposedly essentialist peaceful dispositions barred them from the military and hence full entry into material or epistemological understandings of citizenship thereby reinforcing their place in the private sphere. Instead of offering an alternative way of seeing gendered bodies, Elshtain’s overarching argument in Women and War (1987) holds that these differences between women and men’s role within society should be implicated equally in the value of their citizenship. Therefore, rather unfortunately, Elshtain continues to reify the binary between bodies gendered only as men and women, failing to take into account the different range of experiences different bodies/individuals, from cis-gender to queer, have as well as fully engaging and dismantling the gender hierarchical structure. While her work examined in this section are more than likely not 14 Peter Beckman and Francine D’Amico, Women, Gender, and World Politics (Westport: Greenwood, 1994): p. 3. 15 Jean Bethke Elshtain, Public Man, Private Woman: Women in Social and Political Thought (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981). 16 Jean Bethke Elshtain, Women and War (Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press, 1987). 17 Elshtain, Women and War. 7 biologically essentialist, unfortunate echoes linger. Masculine or feminine characteristics that feminists and poststructuralists would see as socially constructed, such as women are innately peaceful and men are innately prone to violence, are taken as a given in biological essentialism. Elshtain’s argument sustains the women=peace thesis. It is a sentiment that Francis Fukuyama picked up on in a 1998 Foreign Affairs article. He finds that there are sociobiological reasons behind women’s inherent peacefulness, which are independent of gender structures, and that [a] world run by women would follow different rules…and it is toward that sort of world that all postindustrial or Western societies are moving. As women gain power in these countries, the latter should become less aggressive, adventurous, competitive, and violent.18 He terms this ‘rise’ the ‘feminisation’ of world politics: ‘women have won the right to vote and participate in politics in all developed counties, as well as in many developing countries, and have exercised that right with incredible energy’.19 These empowered women are less supportive of wars, defence spending, and the use of force abroad (in the US at least).20 While Fukuyama is less positive about men’s ability to be peaceable, he believes ‘democracy and modern capitalism…ope[n] up many more peaceful channels for satisfying’ a desire for hierarchy.21 Thus, feminisation in declinist literature is tied with Western ideas about modernisation, economic (capitalist) progress, and good democratic governance. Before 18 Fukuyama, ‘Women’, p. 27. 19 ibid.,34. 20 ibid., 34 21 ibid., 40 8 demonstrating in the next section how such gender essentialisation reifies problematic gender hierarchies, I wish to clarify how the women=peace thesis continues to influence approaches to international politics and development. Feminisation in Declinist Literature This section serves as an overview of ‘feminisation’ in the declinist literature. Most of the authors covered in this section argue that empowering women through voting rights, the provision of physical security, and economic inclusion will enable societies and states to progress and stabilise.22 These are all encapsulated within policies like the Hillary Doctrine, UNSCR 1325, and development projects. Together, the declinist literature makes feminisation dependent upon a neo-liberal perspective because women’s empowerment and individual security is seen as being achieved through democratic participation and capitalist economic empowerment. These are all achievements to be lauded, yet, these presume that political and economic liberalisation is the best means of achieving peace,23 which then leads to an erasure of certain types of violence. This erasure is made deeper when gender is conflated women, which means gender violence, like cis-gender idealisations that drive homophobic attacks, is unseen in the realm of declinist feminisation. Feminisation is as much about legal rights as it is about economic ones. For instance, Steve Pinker attributes feminisation to four processes, including political 22 Pinker, The Better Angels of Our Nature; Hudson et al., Sex and World Peace; Kristof and WuDunn, Half the Sky. 23 Such thinking has already been problematised by the ‘liberal peace critique’ proffered by Oliver Richmond and Roger Mac Ginty. (Oliver Richmond, A Post- Liberal Peace [London: Routledge, 2012]; Roger Mac Ginty, ‘Indigenous Peace- Making Versus the Liberal Peace’, Cooperation and Conflict, 43/2 [2008]: 139-163). 9 empowerment, the declining emphasis on male honour, women’s increased ability to make their own marital choices, and women’s reproductive rights.24 Women’s economic empowerment has become a common phrase and motivation in development circles. Women’s lack of education and absence from the labour market is detrimental not just to women’s own social standing but it also holds the state economy back.25 Thus, the international development community has placed a greater emphasis on helping women enter the labour market, believing such changes lead to women’s empowerment.26 Empowerment and the rights of women is reflected in how much women can expect to have their bodily person and integrity respected by the law, arguably leading to decline in violence against women.27 Economic empowerment limits the effects of ‘everyday violences,’ or the often overlooked violences against women that include rape, sex slavery, genital mutilation, and that these work in tandem to eradicate global poverty.28 Other scholars connect women’s activism, which may come in a context, or not, of political and social rights, to the creation of security. Making a similar argument to Fukuyama’s, in Winning the War on War Goldstein pays particular attention to the role women play in peace-making and conflict resolution. He traces out how women’s peace activism has shaped world affairs with a focus on the UN’s 1995 Fourth Conference on Women in Beijing and in the subsequent UN’s Security Council Resolution 1325 in 2000 (which will be discussed in more depth shortly).29 24 Pinker, Better Angels, 684-689; see also True, ‘Winning the Battle’. 25 Kristof and WuDunn, Half the Sky, p. xv. 26 Andrea Cornwall, Jasmine Gideon, and Kalpana Wilson, ‘Introduction: Reclaiming Feminism: Gender and Neoliberalism’, IDS Bulletin, 39/6 (2008): p. 4. 27 ibid. 28 Kristof and WuDunn, Half the Sky, pp. xv, xxi, xxiv. 29 Goldstein, Winning the War, p. 197. 10 More specific to the declinist argument is the work that links women’s status with regional security concerns. Societies with a male ‘surplus,’ which is owed to social preference for male children leading to female foeticide and infanticide, higher childhood mortality rates in girls, and the abandonment of girls, are more secure societies.30 The ‘surplus’ population of men will lead to social instability because: men who are not provided the opportunity to develop a vested interest in a system of law and order will gravitate toward a system based on physical force, in which they hold an advantage over other members of society.31 Hudson and Den Boer conclude that this particular population ‘are already at risk for establishing a system based on physical force in order to obtain by force what they cannot obtain legitimately’.32 The authors relies the classic binary: if women are both peaceable and pacifying, then without women men are brutish and nasty. Without marriage, this population of men ‘may not transition from potential threats to potential protectors of society.33 Thus, gender imbalance must be taken seriously by government and regional actors. This argument is taken further by Hudson et al. in later work that correlates women’s insecurity, due to interpersonal violences, with state and regional instability. They argue that ‘societies that are more gender-equal are less likely to go to war, to use 30 Valerie M. Hudson and Andrea M. Den Boer, Bare Branches: The Security Implications of Asia’s Surplus Male Population (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2004); Valerie M. Hudson and Andrea M. Den Boer, ‘A Surplus of Men, A Deficit of Peace: Security and Sex Ratios in Asia's Largest States’, International Security, 26/4 (2002): pp. 10-11. 31 Hudson and Den Boer, ‘A Surplus of Men’, pp. 21-22. 32 ibid. 33 ibid. 11 force during conflicts, or to be involved in violent international crises’.34 Gender inequality is owed simply to the ‘subordination’ of women to men in economic, physical, and social instances.35 The creation of gender equal societies is both a top- down process encompassing family law, quotas, and including women in law-making practices36 and a bottom-up process of changing gendered norms and attitudes within society.37 Bringing women into security and economic equations are reflected in the policy realm as well. The Hillary Doctrine was defined during Hillary Clinton’s tenure as Secretary of State under President Obama and it is assumed it will feature in her possible presidency.38 The Hillary Doctrine places both economic and physical security at the centre of foreign policy. It originated in a 2010 TEDWomen’s conference talk in which then-Secretary Clinton argued: Let women work and they drive economic growth across all sectors. … Give women equal rights and entire nations are more stable and secure. Deny women equal rights and the instability of nations is almost certain.39 The Hillary Doctrine fully encapsulates declinist feminisation: women’s economic development provides women with a social standing in their community that enables 34 Hudson et al., Sex and World Peace, pp. 3-4. 35 ibid., chapter 1. 36 ibid., chapter 5. 37 ibid., chapter 6. 38 Gayle Tzemach Lemmon, ‘The Hillary Doctrine’, Newsweek, 6 March 2011, http://www.newsweek.com/hillary-doctrine-66105, accessed 24 February 2016. 39 CNN, ‘Hillary Clinton: Empower Girls and Women’, http://edition.cnn.com/2010/OPINION/12/12/clinton.empower.girls/ accessed 24 February 2016. http://edition.cnn.com/2010/OPINION/12/12/clinton.empower.girls/ 12 individual and communal security which is then correlated to regional and (possible) international security. Perhaps the most prominent place that one can see the feminisation argument in global politics today is in UNSCR 1325. It is considered a landmark document that works to secure women’s places in the prevention and resolution of conflicts, peace negotiations, peace- building, peacekeeping, humanitarian response and in post-conflict reconstruction and stresses the importance of their equal participation and full involvement in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security.40 However much lauded UNSCR 1325 was, it has also been the recipient of feminist criticism that is relevant to my later argument. In short, the critique is that UNSCR 1325 is beholden to a biological essentialist lens, where ‘gender has been interpreted as woman, and women remain differentiated from men’.41 In a conflict framework this means women are identified solely as ‘victims in need of protection’ and men ‘as protectors and policymakers’,42 and arguably, adversaries. This literature assumes the gender binary of man/masculinity or woman/femininity and often assumes gender is a variable that can be weighed. Yet, there is another way of looking at gender, which is to see it as a structuring force, like race or class, and as 40 United Nations, ‘Landmark Resolution on Women, Peace and Security’, http://www.un.org/womenwatch/osagi/wps/, accessed 24 February 2016. 41 Susan Willett, ‘Introduction: Security Council Resolution 1325: Assessing the Impact on Women, Peace, and Security’, International Peacekeeping, 17/2 (2010), p. 143. 42 ibid. http://www.un.org/womenwatch/osagi/wps/ 13 something that makes assumptions not just about people but about places and ideologies. These assumptions then structure people, society, and international politics.43 The neo-liberal paradigm of declinist literature rests upon modern Western propositions about what good governance and economic practices are and these are masculinist and assume heteronormativity (as discussed later). By presuming a gender binary and in reifying a gender hierarchy, things that fall outside of the binary and are thereby devalued in the hierarchy go unseen in the declinist literature. Again, gender is not a binary but a spectrum. When gender is conflated with women, the spectrum is unrecognised. In this focused attention on women, violences and biases that are owed to gender politics, like those against the LBGTQI community, go unaddressed. Such a conflation fails to see violence against this community is driven by heteronormative gender idealisations that harm this community in a multitude of ways. Before fully engaging in the feminist critique, it is also necessary to work through how women have been used as the ‘standard bearers’ for progress, modernity, and perceptions of civilisation and how this erodes once we go beyond the man/masculine and woman/feminine binary. Holding the Light In Greek mythology, Medea is a powerful sorceress seduced by Jason to enable his quest for the Golden Fleece. Different accounts deal with her actions during her relationship with Jason, which included Medea murdering her brother in order to overthrow or weaken their demigod father, King Aietes, and her two sons when Jason 43 Laura Sjoberg, Gendering Global Conflict: Toward a Feminist Theory of War (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013). 14 left her for another woman.44 Medea’s story is complicated and thus Medea is a complicated ‘heroine.’ Her femininity is constantly called into question as her use of magic and possible position of power refuses to be hemmed in by the classic (stereotypical) behaviour of a passive yet supportive wife and nurturing mother.45 Even though Jason, the archetypical (patriarchal) hero, needed Medea’s (unfeminine) power for his success, he was also put off by her strength. It is no surprise then that upon discovering his infidelity she declares incredulously, ‘I made you victor/ I held the light that saved you’.46 Why do I bring up Medea and Jason here? Feminisation ‘holds the light’ of the declinist argument. While I do not dispute the use of statistical analysis to demonstrate the decline of violence thesis, I do query the interior logistics of how the argument works, or in this case, potentially does not. Currently, the declinist literature cannot account for two distinct possibilities that will undo feminisation. The first, and one that I will not spend time on in this paper, is that women are not necessarily more peaceful. Female heads of state can be just as aggressive, one only has to think of Margaret Thatcher or Golda Meir. Women participate in genocide, torture, and terrorism.47 Second, gender cannot be hemmed in by conflating it with ‘women’.48 Such a conflation will be the ultimate downfall of ‘feminisation’. The better solution is to be more inclusive of all identities, particularly those on the 44 Emma Griffiths, Medea (London: Taylor and Francis, 2006): pp. 7-8. 45 ibid., p. 5. 46 as quoted in Edith Hamilton, Mythology (New York: Little, Brown, 1969 [1940]): p. 128. 47 Caron E. Gentry and Laura Sjoberg, Beyond Mothers, Monsters, Whores: Thinking About Women’s Violence in Global Politics (London: Zed, 2015). 48 Terrell Carver, Gender is not a Synonym for Women (Boulder: Lynne Reinner, 1996). 15 margins and the ones that lay outside of the gender binary of heterosexual idealisations. The critique I wish to raise here is that resting an argument on women’s status is not new and not without power dynamics. The focus upon women’s empowerment is embedded in a larger dependency on Western masculinist thinking that de-prioritises the concerns of those on the margin. While the focus on women should be welcomed, the focus on gender only works if the epistemological, if not ontological, arrangements of Western conceptions of society and governance remain unquestioned. In other words, they only work if the heteronormative gender hierarchies remain in place. The current gendered configuration is harmful as will be shown in the criticisms of UNSCR 1325 and development goals. Other feminists have already critiqued Fukuyma’s argument presented above and declinist literature for failing to understand how gender structures impact the performativity of gendered behaviours.49 The section below utilises a post-colonial and gender lens to view declinist ‘feminisation’ from a different perspective. It demonstrates that women and their position in a society have always served as the ‘light that saves’ particular socio- political theses, from colonialism to the decline of violence. Because of this, women’s rights, bodies, and lives become tools for the success of the project instead of ends in their own right. Additionally, this ‘end’ means examining other forms of gender violence is no longer necessary. Civilisation, Progress, and Decline of Violence 49 J. Ann Tickner, ‘Why Women Can’t Rule the World: International Politics According to Francis Fukuyama’, International Studies Review, 1/3 (1999); True, ‘Winning the Battle’. 16 The declinist literature is based on the assumption that ‘progress’ looks like specific notions of a desirable, good government and society, similar to Francis Fukuyama’s ‘end of history’ argument. The premise of Fukuyama’s thesis held that the liberal democratic West had won the Cold War and liberal democracy ‘remain[ed] the only coherent political aspiration that spans different regions and cultures around the globe’. 50 The idea of civilisational progress and its Western reliance upon democratic and capitalist participation is inherent within declinism. The intolerance towards violence and violent solutions is owed to ‘civilisation, modernity, and Western society’.51 ‘Peaceable societies’ are ‘richer, healthier, better educated, better governed, more respectful of their women, and more likely to engage in trade’.52 Thus, there is a presumption within the declinist literature that the best way to achieve non-violence or more peace is via a particular form of government and economic organisation, one that is more specifically Western and holds very Western norms about what public life is meant to look like. Therefore, the rationale behind the declinist literature rests within a Eurocentric framework. ‘End of history’, modernisation, economic progress, and (democratic) rights reside within Western understandings of how governments and economics are meant to be organised. These may be the most statistically advantageous ways to arrange human life; nevertheless, the problem that arises is one where all other state 50 Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992): p. xiii. 51 Pinker, Better Angels, p. xx. 52 ibid., pp. xxi-xxii. 17 actors are compared to and are held in comparison with ‘Europe/The West’ and the seeming perfection contained therein. Whereas I have critiqued the presumption within this literature that the West is nearly flawless, particularly in the advancement of women’s security, in a previous publication,53 the argument in this paper asserts it is problematic to hold women as the ‘proof’ of a state’s progress. Women are the ones that hold the light. ‘Europe’ operates as both a ‘master narrative’ and a ‘silent referent’.54 While there is not a singular understanding of ‘Europe’ nor one that holds up under academic scrutiny, there is nonetheless a concept ‘reified and celebrated in the phenomenal world of everyday relationships of power as the scene of the birth of the modern’.55 When ‘philosophers and thinkers who shape the nature of social science’ attempt to produce ‘theories that embrace the entirety of humanity’ they are ‘produced in relative, and sometimes absolute, ignorance of the majority of humankind—that is, those living in non-Western cultures’.56 Europe is the theoretical premise upon which all studies are based and thus ‘all other histories are matter of empirical research that fleshes out a theoretical skeleton that is substantially “Europe”’.57 Another way of positing this argument is to recognise that if a singular ‘Europe’ cannot be said to exist outside of theoretical discussions of it, this ‘Europe’ borrows its ontological weight and significance of what it is not. Chakrabarty argues that in the words of various European philosophers, Europe is not what is identified by Husserl’s descriptions of the ‘mythical-religious’ ‘oriental philosophies’; similarly, it is not the 53 Caron E. Gentry, ‘Epistemological Failures: Everyday Terrorism in the West’, Critical Studies on Terrorism, 8/3 (2015): pp. 362-382. 54 Chakrabarty, Provincialising Europe, pp. 27-28. 55 ibid, p. 28. 56 ibid, p. 29. 57 ibid., p. 29. 18 ‘prebourgeois’ or ‘precapital’ economies articulated by Marx. Instead, in opposition to what exists outside of Europe, European philosophies enable scientific (rational) investigations and liberal economic progress.58 Modernity and the modern stem from ‘ideas …[that] emerg[ed] out of the processes of economic and political revolution located in Europe’.59 Modernity is a binary discourse that was utilized by European colonisers to set themselves up as progressive and ‘non-Europeans as… “static” [and] “prehistorical”’.60 Therefore there is a ‘tendency’ of reading non-Western histories ‘in terms of a lack, an absence, or an incompleteness that translates into “inadequacy”’.61 There are multiple forms of modernity that exist outside of Europe and within it as well. As it is well known, colonialism and neo-imperialism were about exporting Western values, ideas, and epistemologies.62 When deliberating the non-West the modern is seen ‘as a known history, something which has already happened elsewhere, and which is to be reproduced, mechanically or otherwise, within a local content’ (emphasis true to text).63 Progress and/or modernisation are dependent upon what is assumed to already have happened in the European (and Western context): empowering capitalism that 58 ibid., p. 30. 59 Gurminder K. Bhamba, ‘Historical Sociology, Modernity, and Postcolonial Critique’, The American Historical Review 116(3) (2011): 653-662, p. 653. 60 Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths, and Helen Tiffin, Post-Colonial Studies: The Key Concepts (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013), 161. 61 ibid., p. 32. 62 Colonialism was not simply a movement extending from the West to the non-West but a more complex process that involved hegemonising the non-West as well hegemonising perceived outsiders that existed in the West. (Anne McClintock, Imperial Leather: Race, Gender and Sexuality in the Colonial Contest [London: Routledge, 1995]). 63 Meaghan Morris, ‘Metamorphoses at Sydney Tower’, New Formations, 11 (1990) as cited in Chakrabarty, Provincialising Europe, p. 39. 19 works in tandem with full civil/human rights in functioning democracies. Or in the presumption that the women/gender question is settled in the West. From this perspective, the West comes sweeping in with its need to ‘protect its little brown brothers’ or convert ‘heathens’ to Christianity or teach ‘dirty’ people basic hygiene.64 Makau Mutua identifies the Western actor as constructing itself as a saviour and the non-West as either a victim or a savage.65 Savages and victims’ agencies are both curtailed. Savages ‘are presented as so cruel and unimaginable as to represent their state as a negation of humanity’66 whereas the victim is a ‘human being whose dignity and worth have been violated by the savage’.67 Finally, the saviour is truly the ‘better angel’: the saviour or the redeemer, the good angel who protects, vindicates, civilises, restrains, and safeguards. The saviour is the victim’s bulwark against tyranny. The simple, yet complex promise of the saviour is freedom: freedom from the tyrannies of the state, tradition, and culture. But it is also the freedom to create a better society based on particular values.68 Furthermore, ‘the saviour is the human rights corpus itself, with the United Nations, Western governments, INGOs, and Western charities as the actual rescuers, redeemers of a benighted world’ and ‘savage cultures and peoples’ exist outside of ‘regime of political democracy’.69 In many ways then, the assumption of the necessity of feminisation to the decline of violence thesis operates unwittingly within 64 See McClintock, Imperial Leather. 65 Makau W. Mutua, ‘Savages, Victims, and Saviours: The Metaphor of Human Rights’, Harvard International Law Journal, 42/1 (2001): pp. 201-245. 66 ibid., p. 202. 67 ibid., p. 203. 68 ibid., p. 204. 69 ibid., pp. 204-205. 20 a Eurocentric paradigm where the European model of society and government is the model that can fix those in the non-West. Holding the Light in the Decline of Violence This Euro- or Western-centric paradigm is deeply gendered. Guyatari Spivak’s renown phrase is apt: ‘white men saving brown women from brown men’.70 When Western colonial and neo-colonial interventions are made on the ‘behalf’ of women, those women become the standard bearers for modernity and progress. The question of women’s empowerment in nineteenth-century India was a significant concern to its European colonisers, who believed that women’s rights stood as exemplars for the progression of the ‘modern individual, freedom, equality, and rights’.71 Women’s education and their living conditions became increasingly emphasised, seeing these as necessary for India’s progression into ‘modernity’.72 Yet this is clearly hypocritical and lacking critical self-awareness as ‘the women question’ was far from settled in the colonising states (and remains unsettled). Through the lens of post-colonialism, declinism’s claim that it is Western civilisational progress, with an emphasis on political organisation, political rights, and economic empowerment, looks all too familiar. When Chakrabarty’s critique is applied to declinist literature, feminisation becomes all the more suspect. Women’s 70 Guyatari C. Spivak, ‘Can the Subaltern Speak?’ in Cary Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg (eds), Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1988): p. 93. 71 Chakrabarty, ‘Provincialising Europe’, p. 343. 72 ibid., p. 344. 21 positions in society, not women themselves, are manipulated to hold the light that saves a deeply Western discourse. When gender is conflated with women the prioritisation of this conflation is done in a way that may fail women and all other marginalised populations. The conflation erases nuance and intersectionality, where race, gender, class, sexuality, and so forth, all may interact to hold a person back.73 ‘Feminisation’ in practice, in policies like UNSCR 1325 or gender mainstreaming and inclusion in development work, is not without its challenges. The earlier criticism of UNSCR 1325 argued that instead of 1325 becoming a way of reworking UN (gendered) hierarchies and gendered practices, it simply became a way of re-inscribing them.74 Similarly, Carol Cohn, a feminist anti-militarist activist and scholar who runs 1325 training and workshops, has herself admitted she ‘fear[s]’ 1325’s focus on ‘Women-as-peacemakers’ and that it ‘leaves the dominant political and epistemological frameworks [of the UN] untouched’.75 Women have become the face of development policies; the push to include women in development policies is referred to as ‘gender equality equals smart economics’.76 This push is dependent upon the notion that since women represent 50 percent of the 73 Combahee River Collective, ‘A Black Feminist Statement’, https://we.riseup.net/assets/43875/combahee%20river.pdf accessed 29 February 2016. 74 Willett, ‘Introduction’. 75 Carol Cohn, ‘Mainstreaming Gender in UN Security Policy: A Path to Political Transformation’, The Boston Consortium of Gender, Security and Human Rights, working paper 204 (2004): p. 18. 76 Sydney Calkin, ‘“Tapping” Women for Post-Crisis Capitalism: Evidience from the 2012 World Development Report’, Internatinal Feminist Journal of Politics, 17/4 (2015): p. 612. https://we.riseup.net/assets/43875/combahee%20river.pdf 22 world’s population, better inclusion of women in the economy just makes ‘smart economics’. Sydney Calkin critically examines the World Development Report from 2012 for this gendered concept of ‘smart economics’. While Calkin applauds the ‘acknowledgment of the intrinsic value of gender equality’ in the Report, much like Cohn’s appreciation of 1325, she feels it has been at the expense of critical, feminist interrogation of the ‘gendered nature of markets and the gendered harms of neo- liberal policy’.77 Calkin ultimately argues that gender development initiatives that have received positive attention, ‘such as microcredit [and] conditional cash transfers’, only ‘wor[k] to discipline and control women’.78 Thus, even though the onus of these policies is ‘empowerment’ and autonomy, these policies also reinscribe problematic gender dynamics. Additionally, Cornwall, Gideon, and Wilson look at the inclusion of gender and women the neo-liberal institutions of the World Bank and the Department for International Development (DFID). These two institutions ‘have…a growing interest in women’ even though they do not ‘grasp the concept of gender’.79 Because the development community does not share a common definition of empowerment, they often fail to change gendered structures and biases—thereby revealing this lack of gender-as-power awareness.80 Women are held by these organisations as ‘resourceful providers, reliable micro-entrepreneurs, cosmopolitan citizens, and positioned as “disposable domestics’”.81 Thus, when DFID articulates women as ‘a “weapon” in the fight against poverty’ they do so dependent upon the potentially harmful gender 77 ibid., p. 615. 78 ibid., p. 625. 79 Cornwall, Gideon, and Wilson, ‘Introduction’, p. 2. 80 ibid., p. 4. 81 ibid., p. 2. 23 norms that exist in those social contexts.82 These policies replicate gender structures that contain and constrain: women, due to their lack of mobility due to social and familial dependency, are construed as less risky and more reliable for loan repayment. Because women are more negatively affected by ‘shame’, they are less likely to skip payments and/or default entirely.83 Women’s positions then become a way for DFID to manipulate a better outcome itself, not the society. The perspective that women are more ‘reliable’ and ‘stable’ depends on an element of essentialism and takes advantage of how women are controlled and dependent in the local environment, thus the policies depend upon these harms and replicate them to their own end. Feminisation then replicates the gender hierarchy rather than dismantling it. An understanding of gender as a tool for power that operates similarly to class and race is in desperate need here. The first step is to recognise that woman does not equal gender.84 The second step is to understand the hierarchical nature of gender does not just operate between individuals, but through organisations and institutions, structuring global politics. In a gender hierarchical structure, masculine priorities come at the expense of feminine ones. Even with lip service to gender and women’s positions, without an understanding of gender structures international politics will never move beyond masculine priorities.85 This is devalorisation, or the de-valuation of the feminine for the prioritisation of the masculine. Declinism’s feminisation is falling into the same trap as modern Western thought due to its masculine underpinnings and conflation of women with gender. 82 ibid., p. 2. 83 ibid., p. 5. 84 Carver, Gender is not a Synonym for Women. 85 Sjoberg, Gendering Global Conflict. 24 Feminisation as Devalorisation IR scholarship, amongst other scholarship, has always valued masculine traits above feminine ones: rationality of capability over weakness (as well as the rationality of attitude over one informed by emotion); sovereignty over cooperation/dependency.86 Therefore, the discourse of progress and good governance is not only Western-centric but inherently masculinist as well. To demonstrate this I will unpack the feminist understanding of ‘feminisation’. It is not enough to think that simply by ‘including’ women in policies, solutions, or measurements means that progress is being made. This is the assumption that Chakrabarty pointed out as a hypocritical fallacy. Instead, a deeper grasp of what gender is and how it operates as a structure must be understood. The declinist literature is not manipulating women’s positions but it is replicating gender dynamics when it fails to pay attention to certain violence, like structural violence, sexual and gender-based violence, and violence against sexual minorities. Ann Tickner begins her seminal text on gender and international relations by working through a critique of how Morgenthau transposes the rational man onto the state. This has given mainstream IR scholars the presumption that states are (or ought to aspire to being) rational, sovereign actors.87 Yet, as Tickner points out, rationality and sovereignty are masculine attributes.88 In a logocentrism, such as the one that exists in the masculinity-femininity binary, one side is always valued over another. 86 Sjoberg, Gendering Global Conflict; Neta C. Crawford, ’The Passion of World Politics: Propositions on Emotion and Emotional Relationships’, International Security, 24/4 (2000): 116-156. 87 J. Ann Tickner, Gender and International Relations (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992): Chapter 2. 88 ibid. 25 Particular masculinities are valorised—rational, wealthy, white, heteronormative ones89; most if not all femininities are devalorised. The bias towards masculinity is what V. Spike Peterson refers to as feminisation.90 Peterson clarifies that Gender is not simply an empirical category that refers to embodied men and women and their material activities but also a systematically analytical category that refers to constructions of [privileged] masculinity and [devalorised] femininity and their ideological effects (emphasis true to text).91 She continues by adding that ‘the privilege and power attributed masculine qualities depends on the devalorisation of feminised qualities’ (emphasis true to text).92 The creation of gendered hierarchies depend on the ‘natural[isation], depolitical[isation], legitim[ated]…denigration of the feminine, and it is the feminisation of “others” that link multiple oppressions’.93 It is not that the declinist literature intends to oppress— this is more than likely the opposite of what is desired—but that due to its devalorisation of particular violences, this is an unexpected outcome. Gender analysis can be used to undo feminisation. Gender analysis, or utilising a gender lens, means paying attention to what is socially constructed as masculine or feminine. Gender, like race or class, determines what is prioritised.94 This analysis 89 V. Spike Peterson and Anne Sisson Runyan, Global Gender Issues in the New Millennium (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2013): p. 56. 90 Peterson, ‘Feminist Theories’, p. 39. 91 ibid., p. 40. 92 ibid., p. 40. 93 ibid., p. 41. 94 Peterson and Runyan, Global Gender, p. 6. 26 acknowledges that gender shapes more than people, it shapes organisations, institutions, and states.95 Some feminists see this as an apparatus, a la Althusser,96 and others see this a laddering of sorts, where competing masculinities vie for the hegemonic position.97 Deprioritised Violences The critique of the implementation of ‘feminisation’ in UNSCR 1325 and development policies is illustrative here. Instead of fundamentally changing how the structural gender inequalities, these policies reified them. These policies fundamentally misunderstood what feminists believe gender to be. They see gender as women, as an operational variable instead of as the aforementioned way of ordering people, organisations, and international hierarchies. My fear is that a declinist understanding of ‘feminisation’ mirrors feminism’s ‘feminisation’. It does so, in the first instance, by minimising, if not deprioritising, violences that are not combat-related. In the second instance, by conflating gender with women and prioritising women’s rights, it fails to make actual change by challenging the very structures that subordinate women and other marginalised peoples. By only seeing gender as ‘women’ it fails to see gender as a hierarchical structure that organises international relations98 (both in what is studied and how it is studied). 95 Jill Steans, Gender and International Relations, 3rd Edition (London: Polity, 2013). 96 Bonnie Mann, ‘Gender Apparatus: Torture and National Manhood in the U.S. War on Terror’, Radical Philosphy, 168, July/August (2011). 97 Robert W. Connell and James W. Messerschmidt, ‘Hegemonic Masculinity Rethinking the Concept’, Gender and Society, 19/6 (2005): 829-859. 98 Sjoberg, Gendering Global Conflict. 27 When declinist scholarship prioritises the statistical measurement of certain types of violence, particularly combatant death versus non-combatant death, it then fails to see other forms. Specifically, John Gray criticises the declinist thesis for failing to recognise the deaths that happen under dictatorships or due to structural violence.99 Equally, Jacqui True discusses how the declinist literature fails to account for and take seriously sexual and gender-based violence.100 This paper is concerned with how it deals with the rights and empowerment of marginalised people whose identity lies outside of the gender binary that declinist’s modern Western focus cannot account for. Feminisation in declinist scholarship is defined by rights, empowerment, and legal, if not social, recognition of these. Feminisation in feminist literature is about the deprioritisation of what is seen as the feminine. Feminisation in declinist literature thankfully takes individual security seriously, something feminist IR has championed for decades. Yet, it only pays attention, seemingly, to certain people’s rights, mainly women in the conflation of women and gender. This has led to an ignorance of the issues outlined above. Yet, if we take Hudson’s argument in Sex and World Peace or Pinker’s ‘rights revolution’ argument seriously, it is not just legal rights that matter, but the personal security of marginalised individuals. Since gender and gender identity is not a binary but a fluid and multifaceted spectrum, just looking at women as an indicator of changing norms or progress does not work. It is not just that declinist feminisation scholars omit homosexuality (because Pinker includes homosexuality within his rights chapter), but that the rise of women cannot be a stand in for gender progress. It has to be the rise of all people that ‘fail’ to live up to the hetero-masculine norms. 99 Gray, ‘Steven Pinker is Wrong’. 100 True, ‘Winning the Battle’. 28 Among the many insecurities and violences we should then be very alarmed at includes the ongoing and quite likely rise of violence against the LGBTQ and HIV- affected community in the US, Russia, and elsewhere.101 Even if LGBTQI rights are more secure, particularly in the West, they are still tenuous. Furthermore, rights, like the legal right to marriage, says little about social acceptance and being free from mental and physical harm. In order to illustrate the difference between secured rights and individual insecurity, the yearly publication of ‘The Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual Map of World Laws 2015’ by the ILGA is useful.102 The map colour codes each states based upon the strength or weaknesses of their laws recognizing gay rights. ‘Recognition’ is shaded in green—the darkest (highest) green indicates the right to marry or full recognition of same-sex unions. ‘Persecution’ is shaded in a red-scale that fades to yellow. Additional symbols are added to various countries: an exclamation mark in a triangle indicates ‘anti-propaganda laws’; a question mark in a triangle indicates unenforced death penalties; and a shield indicates laws that prohibit discrimination. Finally, a pale citrine colour is used to denote countries without specific legislation. Dark green states, those that recognize marriage or the equivalent, include all of North America, Uruguay, Argentina, Europe, Iceland, and South Africa. Yellow countries with anti-propaganda, or homophobic or homonegative propaganda towards non- binary people that encourages discrimination, but without other legislation 101 Adam Withnall, ‘What Are the Worst Places in the World to Be Gay?’ The Independent, 25 February 2014, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/politics/and-you-thought-uganda-was-bad- map-shows-where-in-the-world-it-is-worst-to-be-gay-9152558.html accessed 26 February 2016. 102 http://old.ilga.org/Statehomophobia/ILGA_WorldMap_2015_ENG.pdf http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/politics/and-you-thought-uganda-was-bad-map-shows-where-in-the-world-it-is-worst-to-be-gay-9152558.html http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/politics/and-you-thought-uganda-was-bad-map-shows-where-in-the-world-it-is-worst-to-be-gay-9152558.html http://old.ilga.org/Statehomophobia/ILGA_WorldMap_2015_ENG.pdf 29 persecuting on the basis of sexual orientation is limited to Russia and Lithuania. Algeria and Nigeria are a pale red but with a warning of anti-propaganda laws. India, Tanzania, and Guyana are a mid-tone red as they have laws that could mean imprisonment from 14 years to life for homosexual behaviour. The dark red states include Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Sudan, and Mauritania. Afghanistan and Pakistan have a non-implemented death penalty whereas Iran’s death penalty is carried out by non-state actors. Therefore, rights for the LGBTQI community are globally unsettled, but the main focus on ‘rights’ and particularly the securing of the right to marry are, in some ways, red herrings as the rights mask the continued violence against LGBTQI folk. The focus on violence against this community in the US is purposeful: the declinist argument tends to argue that rights equates to personal security; yet, even though the US has some of the most equitable LGBTQI laws in the world, the personal security of LGBTQI individuals is far from settled. Violence against the LGBTQI community in the US has been marked by several stand-out instances: the police raid on the Stonewall Inn in New York City that led to the Stonewall riots in 1969 and the first Pride parades across the US the following year; the sexual assault and murder of Brandon Teena in 1993, a trans-man upon whom the movie Boys Don’t Cry is based; and the beating, torture, and death of Matthew Shepard in Wyoming in 1998. While there are far more many incidents of hate violence against the LGBTQI community than these, the latest crystallising moment is the June 2016 mass shooting at the Pulse Orlando gay nightclub. Forty-nine people were killed and another 53 were injured, making this the largest mass shooting in the US to date. 30 The Pulse shooting is often referred to as a hate crime against the LGBTQI community and hate crime against the community has been rising in the US. Overall, ‘[r]eported homicides against the LGBT community [in the US] have surged since 2007’.103 A 2011 FBI analysis of hate-crime statistics revealed that ‘LGBT people are more than twice as likely to be the target of a violent hate-crime than Jews or black people’.104 In 2013 ‘sexual orientation motivated roughly 20 percent of hate crimes’ and ‘the only factor that accounted for more was race’.105 One of the most insecure groups are trans-people of colour and ‘hate-motivated violence against transgender people rose 13 percent’ in 2014.106 An article that looks at hate crime against the LGBTQI community maintains that the violence has everything to do with social attitudes towards gay and non-binary sexualities. For instance, ‘[i]n 2014, a majority of Americans said they believed gay sex is morally unacceptable’.107 Furthermore, ‘anti-LGBT groups form a plurality of hate groups’ according to the Southern Poverty Law Centre; these groups are mostly affiliated with ‘fundamentalist religious groups’.108 This is crucially important to recognize: because laws may change, rights may be secured, but that does not mean that the individual is any more safe. While many LGBTQI folk felt that they could 103 Rob Wile, ‘It’s Still Dangerous to Be Gay in America. Here are the Statistics That Prove It,’ June 13, 2016, http://fusion.net/story/313047/lgbt-violence-statistics/ 104 Ibid. 105 Emma Green, ‘The Extraordinarily Common Violence Against LGBT People in America,’ The Atlantic, June 12, 2106, http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/06/the-extraordinarily-common- violence-against-lgbt-people-in-america/486722/ 106 National Coalition of Anti-Violence Programs, ‘Lesbians, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Queer, and HIV-Affected Hate Violence in 2014’, http://www.avp.org/storage/documents/Reports/2014_HV_Report-Final.pdf accessed 25 February 2016: pp. 4-6. 107 Green, ‘The Extraordinarily Common Violence’ 108 Wile, ‘It’s Still Dangerous’ http://www.avp.org/storage/documents/Reports/2014_HV_Report-Final.pdf 31 report to the police, there is a perception that LGBTQ people of colour, gender non- conforming, and youth ‘are disproportionality targeted by the police and subjected to traumatising forces of state violence’. This leads to the reluctance to report violence to the police and, even when the violence is reported, either the victim or the police may not code it as a hate crime.109 This discomfort shows up in the reporting of violent attacks. More violence against LBGTQI individuals is reported in states that are often assumed to be ‘gay friendly’, such as California, Massachusetts, and New York. These three states are ‘amongst the top ten [US] states with the highest rates of anti-gay hate crimes’ from 2003 to 2013.110 States that are more often associated with conservative social values, such as Alaska, Wyoming, and Mississippi, reported zero-LGBTQI hate crime in the same time period.111 This could be owed to the community/individuals in ‘gay-friendly’ states being more willing to report this violence to the police and that the police take the violence seriously.112 Thus, the violence, the reporting of the violence, and the investigation of the violence is dependent upon social attitudes and dispositions towards the rights and lives of those within this targeted community. A response could be that while laws are changing, normative and attitudinal change are slower. After all, President Obama only signed an Executive Order ‘outlawing discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity for federal employees and contractors’ in July 2014 and the Supreme Court decision allowing for marriage equality only followed a year later. Marriage-rights continue expand, but we are 109 National Coalition of Anti-Violence Programs, ‘Lesbians’, pp. 4-6. 110 Flory, ‘FBI Anti-LGBT’. 111 ibid. 112 ibid. 32 warned that this must come with the assurance of other ‘fundamental rights’.113 As the National Coalition of Anti-Violence Programs notes Those within the LGBTQ communities that live at the intersection of other marginalised identities continue to face disproportionate violence and discrimination—justice and equality for LBGTQ communities are innately connected to issues affecting communities of colour, immigrant communities, low-income communities, people with disabilities, and any others that face oppression through a history of systemic and structural barriers.114 The point is that we cannot isolate one group’s status, mainly women, see it as improving, and say it is the bellwether or the ‘holder of light’ for a partial explanation of the decline of violence. Conflating women and gender is a trap. It means we fail to fully contextualise and understand what gender is—more than women—and how it structures societies. Heteronormative gender idealisations of individuals and how this idealisation should be reflected in laws are behind the violent targeting of the LGBTQI community in the US. Even though feminisation is only one piece of the declinist argument, it pins its relevance to gender-as-represented-in-women and this very limited way of thinking about gender means that an entire breadth of violence is missed. The way that feminisation is described in declinist literature, which is limited at best, and how the canon as a whole exceptionalises a particular idea of society and government indicates a very narrow perspective. Conclusion 113 National Coalition of Anti-Violence Programs, ‘Lesbians’, p. 5. 114 ibid., p. 5. 33 The decline of violence thesis offers a new way of approaching war in international relations: as declining, becoming a thing of the past as humanity works towards a better peace. Yet, the decline of violence is limited on what violence is included and, more specifically to this paper, how it understands gender. Gender is not synonymous with women nor is it simply a variable to statistically analyse individual relations. Instead, gender is a structuring force, determining what is seen as relevant and necessary. In this case, being gender-blind has meant that declinist literature has limited the definition of ‘feminisation’ to only encompass the rights and empowerment of women. It does so at the expense of minorities and marginalised groups. If the feminisation argument holds that the more women rights are accounted for then the greater social stability and peace, then gender is not understood. Because it is not understood, women stands in for gender. The increasingly better position of women in the world is thus used as the exemplar for highlighting how rights are being secured worldwide. So when the rights of other gender/sexuality identities, like the LGBTQ community, are unsettled, and the fight for them unsettles society as witnessed in the violence against them, then feminisation and gender are seen to have failed. What does this then do for the feminisation premise in declinist literature? I propose something rather challenging and potentially divisive. Let’s drop the term ‘feminisation’ from the literature, but adopt a more holistic and inclusive gender perspective. The focus should instead be on the ‘rights revolution’, but instead of projecting that the West has all rights deficits resolved, let’s acknowledge where some immense problems and difficulties still lie in all regions and corners of the world. For 34 instance, the US is not post-race nor is it post-homo-/trans-phobic. There is still a long way to go in order to say that all members of US society have a secure place within it. Once there is greater awareness of the pitfalls that exist in all countries, we can remove some of the harmful, gendered dynamics that are holding us back from achieving a deeper, lasting peace. 
work_yee2md4cwrbg7op4ggq6kmctbi	----	  Developed  by:   Dr.  Monisha  Bajaj   Dr.  Ameena  Ghaffar-­‐Kucher   Karishma  Desai   with  support  from  SAALT     Lessons  to  address  bullying  of  South  Asian  American  youth     IN  THE  FACE  OF   XENOPHOBIA             ©  2013  South  Asian  Americans  Leading  Together  (SAALT)  and   Monisha  Bajaj,  Ameena  Ghaffar-­‐Kucher  &  Karishma  Desai     All  Rights  Reserved     These  materials  may  be  reproduced  for  educational  use  with  attribution  to  the  original  authors  and   source.  The  materials  contained  here  may  not  be  reproduced  for  commercial  purposes  or  in  ways  that   distort  the  accuracy  of  the  information  presented.           The  full  citation  information  for  this  document  is:     Bajaj,  Monisha,  Ameena  Ghaffar-­‐Kucher  &  Karishma  Desai.  In  the  Face  of  Xenophobia:  Lessons  to  address   bullying  of  South  Asian  American  youth.  Takoma  Park,  MD:  South  Asian  Americans  Leading  Together   (SAALT),  2013.       TABLE  OF  CONTENTS   ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS   NOTE  TO  FACILITATORS   1   KEY  CONCEPTS  AND  TERMINOLOGY   4   SIX-­‐LESSON  LEARNING  UNIT  OVERVIEW   5   LESSON  ONE:  SOUTH  ASIAN  AMERICANS  IN  THE  UNITED  STATES   7   GLOSSARY   9   GLOSSARY  MATCHING  FLASHCARDS   11   TIMELINE  ACTIVITY  IMAGES   16   SOUTH  ASIANS  IN  THE  US  TIMELINE   28   WHO  ARE  SOUTH  ASIAN  AMERICANS?     31     MY  MIGRATION  STORY  WORKSHEET     32   LESSON  TWO:  EVERYONE’S  MIGRATION  STORY   33   TIMELINE  ACTIVITY  EXTENSION   36   EMMA  LAZARUS  POEM     50     BULLYING  101  HANDOUT   51   LESSON  THREE:  BULLYING  INTERSECTIONS   52   IDENTIFYING  ROLES   54   LESSON  FOUR:  BUILDING  EMPATHY   57   BBC  ARTICLE   60   BBC  ARTICLE  GRAPHIC  ORGANIZER   62   OAK  CREEK  TESTIMONY   63   LESSON  FIVE:  RACIALIZATION  OF  SOUTH  ASIANS  –  PAST  &  PRESENT   65   BACKGROUND  INFORMATION   68   PAST  &  PRESENT  STORY  SETS   69   PAST  &  PRESENT  GRAPHIC  ORGANIZER   74   LESSON  SIX:  FROM  BYSTANDER  TO  ALLY   75   CYBER-­‐BULLYING  ACTIVITY  SHEET   77   PLEDGE  OF  ALLY-­‐GIANCE     79           ADDITIONAL  RESOURCES   80   MAP  OF  ASIA   89   MAP  OF  SOUTH  ASIA   90   MAP  OF  THE  MIDDLE  EAST   91     ABOUT  THE  AUTHORS               ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS       The  curriculum  was  made  possible  due  to  the  generous  support  of  South  Asian   Americans  Leading  Together  (SAALT).  We  would  also  like  to  acknowledge  Samip  Mallick,   from  South  Asian  American  Digital  Archive  (SAADA),  who  gave  us  permission  to  use   several  of  the  images  in  this  curriculum,  and  helped  us  identify  relevant  resources  and   contacts;  and  Mathangi  Subramanian,  for  sharing  her  research  and  insights  that  helped   inform  the  lessons.  Finally,  we  are  grateful  to  the  graduate  students  who  assisted  with   various  parts  of  this  project:  From  the  University  of  Pennsylvania,  Josh  Cleveland  and   Laura  Humphrey  assisted  in  writing  lesson  2;  Ming  Cai  wrote  the  annotations  for  the   resource  bibliography.  From  Teachers  College,  Columbia  University,  Anushri  Alva   provided  copy-­‐editing  assistance  for  our  final  draft.   IN  THE  FACE  OF  XENOPHOBIA:   LESSONS  TO  ADDRESS  BULLYING  OF  SOUTH  ASIAN  AMERICAN  YOUTH       Dear  Facilitator,   This  curricular  unit  seeks  to  provide  communities,  individuals,  and  educators  with  resources  for   addressing  bullying,  harassment  and  racism  directed  at  youth  of  South  Asian  descent  in  U.S.   schools.    These  students  hail  from  diverse  religious  backgrounds,  including:  Christian,  Hindu,   Jain,  Jewish,  Muslim,  and  Sikh.    The  unit  includes  six  lessons,  numerous  suggestions  for  further   course  topics,  and  additional  resources  to  counter  ignorance,  misunderstanding,  and  prejudice   directed  at  students.  While  the  lessons  are  presented  in  a  way  that  presumes  a  formal   classroom  setting  (using  common  classroom  features  and  the  terms  “student”  and  “teacher”),   they  can  easily  be  adapted  to  after-­‐school  or  community  group  settings.  We  encourage  flexible   use  of  the  lessons  and  resources  and  adaptation  wherever  necessary  to  best  meet  the  needs  of   the  specific  context  you  may  be  working  in.       Background   Bullying  has  been  noted  as  an  acute  problem  within  U.S.  schools.  Bullying  manifests  as  a  power   imbalance  in  schools  and  the  larger  society,  and  can  include  physical,  social,  and  psychological   intimidation.  Harassment  is  also  a  form  of  bullying;  like  bullying,  it  is  often  ongoing  and   pervasive  and  creates  discomfort  for  the  victim.  A  distinguishing  feature  is  that  it  is  often  based   on  race,  gender,  sexual  orientation,  and/or  religion.  In  this  unit,  when  we  talk  about  bullying,   we  include  the  definition  of  harassment  within  it;  hence  we  refer  to  this  as  “bias-­‐based   bullying”.  The  role  of  educators,  parents,  and  communities  in  intervening  and  preventing  bias-­‐ based  bullying  through  the  creation  of  safe  school  and  out-­‐of-­‐school  environments  is  essential.           BULLYING   Causes  harm  from   negaUve  conduct   (oVen  repeated)  in  a   relaUonship  with  an   imbalance  of  power     HARRASSMENT   Causes  harm  from   conduct  that  is  severe   and/or  pervasive,  oVen   based  on  race,  naUonal   origin,  gender,  religon   etc.   Biased based bullying 1 Since  the  tragic  terrorist  attacks  on  September  11,  2001,  students  and  families  who  have  no   connection  to  terrorism,  have  been  singled  out,  harassed,  and  attacked.  Hate  crimes  and   harassment  in  schools  and  communities  are  on  the  rise.     According  to  a  2009  U.S.  Department  of  Justice  and  Department  of  Education  Study,  over  54   percent  of  Asian  American  youth  reported  experiencing  bullying,  the  highest  percentage  of  any   ethnic  group  surveyed.  Additionally,  the  New  York  City  Department  of  Education  and  the  Sikh   Coalition’s  2007  report  indicates  that  in  the  nation’s  most  diverse  neighborhood  of  Queens,   77.5  percent  of  young  Sikh  men  reported  being  harassed,  taunted  or  intimidated  because  of   wearing  a  turban.  These  young  men  are  often  mistaken  to  be  Muslim  and  their  harassment   exemplifies  the  pervasive  Islamophobia  and  xenophobia  targeting  youth  from  South  Asian   communities  (official  estimates  of  the  South  Asian  American  population  place  it  at  3.4  million  in   the  United  States).    Similarly  high  figures  emerge  from  accounts  of  Muslim  American  youth   (South  Asian  and  non-­‐South  Asian)  across  the  United  States.    This  curriculum  primarily  focuses   on  South  Asian  Americans—whose  families  (perhaps  many  generations  ago)  originally  hail  from   the  countries  of  Afghanistan,  Bangladesh,  Bhutan,  India,  the  Maldives,  Nepal,  Pakistan  and  Sri   Lanka.  Examples  in  our  lessons  demonstrate  how  distinct  national,  ethnic  or  religious  groups   are  often  confused  and  conflated.    We  note  that  many  of  the  dynamics  of  bullying,  intimidation,   and  harassment  target  individuals  who  simply  look  ‘foreign,’  regardless  of  their  diverse  ethnic   origins.     While  xenophobia  has  always  existed  in  the  United  States,  it  has  become  particularly  acute  for   youth  of  South  Asian  descent  in  diverse  locales  in  the  post-­‐9/11  context  who  are  frequently   subject  to  bullying  based  on  their  (assumed)  religious  and  ethnic  backgrounds.  Considering   racial  and  religious  identity  are  significant  markers  of  difference  in  educational  contexts,  if  the   root  causes  of  harassment  are  not  addressed,  schools  will  continue  to  reproduce  exclusion  and   marginalization.         Goals   To  counter  this  bias-­‐based  bullying,  we  provide  anti-­‐racist  and  multicultural  educators  with   resources,  materials,  and  knowledge  of  community  organizations  that  can  equip  them  to   educate  and  prevent  instances  of  bullying,  harassment  and  intimidation—whether  from  peers,   adults,  or  law  enforcement  officials.     The  objectives  of  this  resource  pack  are  to:   1) Clarify  misconceptions  about  the  South  Asian  American  community,  namely:       o [Myth]  South  Asians  have  recently  arrived  in  the  United  States.   o [Fact]  South  Asians  have,  in  fact,  been  in  the  United  States  since  the  1800s.     o [Myth]  South  Asians  are  not  politically  active.   o [Fact]  On  the  contrary,  there  is  a  strong  tradition  of  civic  engagement.         o [Myth]  Discrimination  against  South  Asians  is  a  post-­‐9/11  phenomenon.   o [Fact]  Indeed,  xenophobia  has  existed  since  the  1800s,  but  is  more  visible  now.     2 2) Address  roots  of  xenophobia  and  place  it  in  historical  perspective;     3) Provide  information  and  tools  to  interrupt  xenophobic  and  racist  ideologies  in  schools   and  communities;     4) Teach  understanding  and  skills  for  engaging  with  difference;     5) Provide  educators,  school  officials,  community  members,  staff  of  non-­‐profit  agencies,   faith-­‐based  communities,  and  students  with  strategies  to  be  effective  allies;     6) Build  empathy  among  students,  staff,  administrators,  teachers,  and  community   members.     Enclosed  you  will  find  six  comprehensive  lessons  about  the  history  of  South  Asian  migration  to   the  United  States,  manifestations  of  exclusion,  examples  of  bullying  in  and  outside  of  schools,   and  tools  for  countering  xenophobia.     We  suggest  that  facilitators  of  these  lessons  develop  ground  rules  for  discussion,  if  they  have   not  already  been  developed,  to  ensure  that  participants  feel  safe  to  share  about  difficult  issues   related  to  bullying  and  racism.    Youth  can  be  asked  to  brainstorm  rules  and  facilitators  should   ensure  that  all  participants  are  respected  and  heard.  If  these  lessons  will  take  place  in  a   classroom  or  after-­‐school  context  where  students  already  know  each  other,  the   teacher/facilitator  might  share  some  information  about  the  larger  goals  and  suggest  norms  of   confidentiality.  If  these  take  place  in  a  community  space  where  participants  do  not  know  each   other,  the  first  few  sessions  may  require  ice-­‐breakers  or  community  building  exercises  in  order   to  allow  for  discussions  in  the  lessons/workshops  to  proceed  in  the  most  productive  manner.     Finally,  we  encourage  you  to  contact  us  with  questions,  concerns  and  feedback  on  this   curricular  unit,  or  if  you  would  like  to  explore  possibilities  for  further  workshops/training.     Sincerely,       Dr.  Monisha  Bajaj   Associate  Professor,  Teachers  College,  Columbia  University   bajaj@tc.columbia.edu     Dr.  Ameena  Ghaffar-­‐Kucher   Senior  Lecturer,  Graduate  School  of  Education,  University  of  Pennsylvania   agk@gse.upenn.edu   Karishma  Desai   Doctoral  Student,  Teachers  College,  Columbia  University  &  Middle  School  Staff  Developer   khd2112@tc.columbia.edu   3 KEY  CONCEPTS  AND  TERMINOLOGY     Throughout  these  lessons,  the  following  key  concepts  will  be  utilized:     Micro-­‐aggressions:  contemporary  form  of  racism  -­‐  invisible,  unintentional  and  subtle  in  nature;   usually  outside  the  level  of  conscious  awareness  but  which  cumulatively  and  over  time  creates   an  uncomfortable  or  hostile  environment  for  the  victim   Bullying:  verbal,  physical,  or  psychological  acts  of  intimidation  where  there  is  an  imbalance  of   power   Harassment:  systemic  and/or  continued  unwanted  actions,  including  threats  and  demands,   often  based  upon  race,  sex,  religion,  gender  etc.     Hate  crimes:  acts  of  violence  against  individuals,  groups,  places  of  worship  etc.,  typically   motivated  by  some  form  of  prejudice.   Xenophobia:  fear  of  foreigners  and  things  foreign  (we  use  the  term  xenophobic  racism  to   emphasize  the  racist  undertones  of  xenophobia).   While  the  title  of  this  resource  packet  focuses  on  bullying  -­‐-­‐and  indeed  we  emphasize  those   occurrences  that  happen  in  and  around  schools-­‐-­‐it  is  important  to  note  that  schools  are   embedded  in  larger  societies  where  attitudes  towards  those  considered  “foreign”  are  shaped   by  foreign  policy,  immigration  trends  and  laws,  larger  cultural  and  social  attitudes,  and  the   media.       XENOPHOBIC   RACISM   Micro-­‐aggressions   Invisible,  unintenHonal,   subtle,  and  repeHHve   statements  or  behaviors   that  cumulaHvely  create   a  hosHle  environment   Bullying   Verbal,  physical,  or   psychological  acts  of   inHmidaHon  where  there   is  an  imbalance  of  power   Harassment   Systemic  and/or   conHnued  unwanted   acHons,  including  threats   and  demands,  oKen   based  upon  an   individual's  religion,   gender,  etc.   Hate  crimes   Acts  of  violence  against   individuals,  groups,   places  of  worship   4  IN  THE  FACE  OF  XENOPHOBIA:     LESSONS  TO  ADDRESS  BULLYING  OF  SOUTH  ASIAN  AMERICAN  YOUTH   SIX-­‐LESSON  LEARNING  UNIT         Common  Core  Standards     Reading  Standards  for  Informational  Texts       Integrate  and  evaluate  multiple  sources  of  information  presented  in  different  media  or  formats   (e.g.,  visually,  quantitatively)  as  well  as  in  words  in  order  to  address  a  question  or  solve  a   problem.     Reading  Standards  for  Literacy  in  History/Social  Studies  (6-­‐12)     • Key  Ideas  and  Details     o Cite  specific  textual  evidence  to  support  analysis  of  primary  and  secondary   sources,  attending  to  such  features  as  the  date  and  origin  of  information.     o Determine  the  central  ideas  or  information  of  a  primary  or  secondary  source.   • Integration  of  Knowledge  and  Ideas     o Compare  and  contrast  treatments  of  the  same  topics  in  several  primary  and   secondary  sources.         Essential  Questions     • How  does  understanding  historical  narratives  of  South  Asian  American  history  lead  us  to   comprehend,  unpack,  and  undo  current  views  and  forms  of  xenophobic  racism?   • How  do  deeper  understandings  of  complex  and  diverse  community  and  individual   histories  help  us  build  empathy  and  act  as  allies?       • How  do  we  build  more  inclusive  schools  and  communities?         Enduring  Understandings     • Bias-­‐based  bullying  takes  a  variety  of  forms  and  is  due  to  an  array  and  combination  of   factors.       • Xenophobic  racism  against  South  Asians  Americans  has  a  long  history  that  manifests  in   micro-­‐aggressions,  bullying,  harassment,  and  hate  crimes.             • Our  migration  stories  have  common  themes  and  struggles,  and  when  we  are  aware  of   these  commonalities,  we  can  develop  greater  empathy  and  the  capacity  to  become   allies.   • Deep  and  complex  understandings  of  people’s  histories,  religions,  cultures,  and  present   realities  can  disrupt  xenophobic  sentiments  and  lead  individuals  and  groups  to  stand  as   allies.     5   Overview  of  Lesson  Objectives     Lesson  1   o Define  key  terms  related  to  bullying,  harassment  and  xenophobia.   o Understand  the  historical  migration  of  South  Asians  to  the  United  States.   o Explore  instances  of  discrimination  and  xenophobia  at  the  individual,  community  and   policy-­‐level.       Lesson  2   o Address  the  roots  of  xenophobia.   o Build  empathy.   o Leave  the  classroom  with  a  better  understanding  of  the  commonly  used  phrase     “everyone  comes  from  somewhere.”     Lesson  3     o Understand  specific  instances  of  xenophobic  bullying.   o Build  awareness  and  the  capacity  to  serve  as  an  ally.     Lesson  4   o Understand  the  Oak  Creek  tragedy  in  historical  context.   o Build  empathy.             Lesson  5   o Examine  historical  roots  of  xenophobia  against  South  Asians  in  America.     o Compare  past  occurrences  with  modern  day  forms  of  harassment  and  bullying.         Lesson  6   o Practice  taking  action  when  students  see  someone  being  bullied.   o Explore  common  forms  of  discrimination  and  consider  ways  to  intervene  effectively.   o Understand  what  being  an  ally  means  and  how  to  cultivate  behaviors  that  promote   respect  for  differences  and  pluralism.       6   LESSON  1:  SOUTH  ASIAN  AMERICANS  IN  THE  UNITED  STATES       Time:  60  Minutes       Essential  Questions   • How  does  history  shape  present-­‐day  attitudes  towards  South  Asian  Americans?     • What  are  the  challenges  faced  by  immigrants  (and  their  children  and  grandchildren)?   • How  do  we  make  our  society  more  inclusive?     Lesson  Objectives   Learners  will  be  able  to:     o Define  key  terms  related  to  bullying  and  xenophobia;   o Understand  the  historical  migration  of  South  Asians  to  the  United  States;   o Explore  instances  of  discrimination  and  xenophobia  at  the  individual,  community  and   policy-­‐level.       Materials   1. Keyword  Cards  (cut  up  and  shuffled  so  that  half  the  class  receives  keywords  and  the   other  half  definitions)   2. Handout  on  “Who  are  South  Asian  Americans?”  (one  page,  one  copy  per  student)   3. Glossary  Handout  (one  page,  one  copy  per  student)   4. Printouts  of  Images  (11  pages,  1  image  per  group)   5. Short  Timeline  of  South  Asian  Americans  in  the  U.S.  handout  (2  pages,  one  copy  for  each   student)   6. Chart  Paper  with  a  timeline  from  1870-­‐the  present  (this  can  also  be  written  on  a   blackboard  or  white  board  as  long  as  it’s  large  enough  for  the  images  to  be  posted).       7. Post-­‐its  and  pens/markers       Performance  Tasks   Glossary  Activity,  Timeline  of  South  Asians  to  the  US  &  Discussion     Opening  Activity  (15  minutes)   1. Prior  to  the  class  meeting,  print  and  cut  up  the  Glossary  Activity  Keyword  Cards  (see   attached  handout).    Shuffle  the  words  and  definitions  (there  are  16  of  each  so  32  total   cards  and  you  may  need  to  adjust  for  the  amount  of  students.  Remove  words  and   definitions  for  less  participants  so  that  all  words  have  a  matching  definition).   2. Once  students  find  their  matching  pair  (words  with  definitions),  have  students  read  and   understand  their  keyword.    Once  everyone  has  found  their  match,  have  all  the  students   read  out  the  terms  and  definitions.       3. Once  all  terms  and  definitions  have  been  read,  distribute  copies  of  the  glossary  to  each   student  and  have  them  briefly  review  it,  marking  any  terms  that  they  don’t  understand.     4. Explain  to  students  that  they  will  use  these  keywords  in  the  next  activity  and  over  the   course  of  the  following  5  class  sessions.   7   Main  Activity    (30  minutes)   1. Make  sure  that  a  timeline  from  the  1850s  to  the  present  is  drawn  (or  a  clothesline  can   be  hung  with  dates  dangling  and  clothespins  for  students  to  attach  their  images)   somewhere  in  the  room  with  room  for  students  to  hang/stick  their  images  on.       2. Divide  students  into  11  groups  (ideally  of  no  more  than  2-­‐3  students  per  group).   3. Distribute  the  Timeline  of  South  Asian  Americans  in  the  U.S.  (one  per  student)  and  the   images  (one  per  group).   4. Ask  students  to  discuss  their  image  and  utilize  any  terms  from  the  glossary  that  apply  to   the  example  and  situation  given.  Students  can  apply  post-­‐its  with  keywords  that  apply   to  their  historical  image  on  the  bottom  of  the  page  or  if  using  a  clothesline,  on  the  back   of  the  printed  image.   5. After  students  have  discussed  their  image,  have  them  look  at  the  timeline  of  South   Asian  Americans  in  the  U.S.  and  decide  where  on  the  timeline  their  image  goes.     6. Once  all  images  are  lined  up,  have  students  read  out  chronologically  the  historical   timeline  of  events  and  examine  the  images.  [Variations:  students  can  line  up  with  their   images  and  read  out  chronologically.  Students  can  do  a  silent  gallery  walk  to  read  about   the  images  and  look  at  the  historical  timeline.]         Discussion/Closing    (15  minutes)   1. Pose  the  question:  What  did  you  learn  in  today’s  lesson  that  you  didn’t  know  before?   2. What  things  can  lead  to  a  rise  in  xenophobia  (historically  or  in  the  present)?       3. How  can  tolerance  be  promoted?         Homework:     Ask  students  to  investigate  their  migration  stories  using  the  worksheet  enclosed.         8   Glossary     Ally:  Someone  who  acts  to  help  an  individual  of  a  group  targeted  by  bullying  or  discrimination.   Allies  can  help  by  standing  up  on  behalf  of  (and  together  with)  the  victim,  or  advocating  for   changes  in  attitudes  or  policies.     Bigotry:  Intolerance  or  inability  to  stand  those  people  who  have  different  opinions  or   backgrounds.       Bullying:  Intentional  acts  that  physically,  emotionally  or  mentally  hurt  another  person.  Bullying   usually  involves  a  difference  in  power  and  when  repeated  over  time  creates  a  pattern  of   aggression.       Bystander:  Someone  who  witnesses  an  act  of  bullying  and  does  not  intervene.  Bullies  often   “play  to  the  audience”  and  bystanders  can  make  the  bully  feel  powerful.       Cyberbullying:    Hurtful  and  repeated  harassing  and  intimidation  of  another  person  through   computers,  online  social  networks,  cell  phones,  and  other  electronic  forms  of  communication.     Empathy:  The  ability  to  understand  someone  else’s  feelings,  challenges,  or  problems.  Empathy   for  another’s  difficult  situation  should  ideally  lead  to  some  action  to  help  address  that  situation   or  its  causes.       Harassment:  Any  type  of  repeated  or  persistent  behavior  that  is  unwanted,  unwelcome  and   causes  emotional  distress  in  the  person  it  is  directed  at.  It  is  typically  motivated  by  gender,  race,   religion,  national  origin  etc.     Institutionalized  racism:  A  system,  policy,  or  agency  that  discriminates  based  on  race  or  ethnic   origin  through  its  policies  or  practices.       Islamophobia:  Irrational  fear  and  strong  dislike  of  anyone  who  is,  or  appears  to  be,  Muslim.       Micro-­‐aggressions:  Interactions  between  people  of  different  races,  genders,  cultures,  or  sexual   orientations  where  one  person  exhibits  non-­‐physical  aggression.  Micro-­‐aggressions  can  be   intentional  or  unintentional  but  they  convey  hostility,  discrimination,  and  attitudes  of   superiority.       Nativism:  Literally  refers  to  the  practice  of  favoring  the  interests  of  those  of  a  particular  place   over  immigrants.  In  the  1900s,  nativist  policies  in  the  United  States  made  immigration  policies   restrictive  to  non-­‐European  countries.       Naturalized  Citizen:  Someone  born  in  one  country  that  becomes  a  citizen  of  another  country.  In   the  U.S.,  there  are  three  ways  people  become  citizens:  (1)  Jus  Sanguinis  (Right  of  Blood)  in   which  case  if  one  parent  is  a  U.S.  citizen,  then  the  child  is  also  entitled  to  U.S.  citizenship,  even   9   if  s/he  is  born  outside  the  U.S.;  (2)  Jus  Soli  (right  of  birthplace)  in  which  case  if  a  person  is  born   in  the  U.S.,  they  are  granted  citizenship;  (3)  through  naturalization  in  which  case,  after  living  in   the  U.S.  for  multiple  years,  a  person  must  apply  for  citizenship  and  complete  a  citizenship  test.       Prejudice:  Negative  feelings  and  stereotyped  attitudes  towards  members  of  a  different  group.   Prejudice  or  negative  prejudgments  can  be  based  on  race,  religion,  nationality,  economic   status,  sexual  orientation,  gender,  age,  or  other  factors.       Refugee:  Someone  who  is  outside  of  the  country  where  they  are  from  or  have  lived  because   s/he  has  been  targeted,  harassed  or  persecuted  because  of  her/his  race,  religion,  sexual   orientation,  political  beliefs,  etc.  Refugees  are  often  seeking  asylum  in  other  countries.     Second  Generation:    This  term  refers  to  the  U.S.-­‐born  children  of  immigrant  parents.  Second-­‐ generation  children  and  youth  sometimes  face  discrimination  because  of  their  appearances  or   religion  even  though  they  are  Americans.       Solidarity:  Demonstrating  unity  or  cooperation  to  work  with  others  who  may  or  may  not  share   the  same  interests  or  challenges.    Being  an  ally  and  working  in  solidarity  go  hand  in  hand   together.       Tolerance:    The  ability  to  be  fair  and  open  to  people  or  beliefs  that  are  different  than  oneself.   Being  tolerant  means  being  free  from  prejudice  and  bigotry.       Upstander:  A  person  or  group  of  people  who  stand  up  when  they  see  an  injustice.  Upstander  is   a  term  that  is  the  opposite  of  a  ‘bystander’  who  takes  no  positive  action  when  they  see   something  wrong  happening.     Xenophobia:  A  strong  and  unreasonable  hatred  of  people  who  are  from  other  countries,  or   ideas  and  things  that  are  foreign.         Definitions  were  drawn  from  the  following  sources:     Derald  Wing  Sue  &  David  Rivera.  “Microagressions  in  Everyday  Life.”  Accessed  November  16,  2012  from   http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/microaggressions-­‐in-­‐everyday-­‐life/201011/microaggressions-­‐more-­‐just-­‐race     Facing  History  &  Ourselves.  “Upstanders  Alliance.”  Accessed  November  16,  2012  from   http://www.choosingtoparticipate.org/explore/upstanders     Hinduja,  S.    Cyberbulling  Glossary.  Accessed  November  16,  2012  from   http://www.cyberbullyingbook.com/Cyberbullying_Glossary.pdf     Olweus  Bullying  Prevention  Program.  Accessed  November  16,  2012  from   http://www.violencepreventionworks.org/public/bullying.page     The  Bullying  Effect  Glossary.  Accessed  November  16,  2012  from  http://thebullyingeffect.weebly.com/glossary.html     Three  Legal  Ways  to  Become  an  American  Citizen.  Accessed  December  19,  2012  from     http://voices.yahoo.com/three-­‐legal-­‐ways-­‐become-­‐american-­‐citizen-­‐27127.html   10 Lesson  1  Glossary  Opening  Activity     Please  cut  up  the  terms  and  definitions  from  the  following  four  pages  and  distribute  them   randomly  to  students.  The  correct  pairings  of  terms  and  definitions  are  in  the  glossary,  which   should  be  distributed  to  students  after  the  activity  is  over.                                                               11 A L L Y B I G O T R Y B U L L Y I N G B Y S T A N D E R C Y B E R B U L L Y I N G E M P A T H Y I N S T I T U T I O N A L I Z E D R A C I S M M I C R O - A G G R E S S I O N S TERMS   12 N A T U R A L I Z E D C I T I Z E N P R E J U D I C E R E F U G E E H A R A S S M E N T S O L I D A R I T Y T O L E R A N C E U P S T A N D E R X E N O P H O B I A       TERMS   13 Someone who acts to help an individual of a group targeted by bullying or discrimination Intolerance or inability to stand those people who have different opinions or backgrounds Intentional acts that physically, emotionally or mentally hurt another person. It usually involves a difference in power and when repeated over time creates a pattern of aggression. Someone who witnesses an act of bullying and does not intervene. Hurtful and repeated harassing and intimidation of another person through computers, online social networks, cell phones, and other electronic forms of communication The ability to understand someone else’s feelings, challenges, or problems A system, policy, or agency that discriminates based on race or ethnic origin through its policies or practices Interactions between people of different races, genders, cultures, or sexual orientations where one person exhibits non-physical aggression.       DEFINITONS   14 Someone born in one country that becomes a citizen of another country. In the U.S., there are three ways people become citizens: (1) by being born to an American parent; (2) by being born in the U.S., and (2) through naturalization after living in the U.S. for multiple years and completing a citizenship test Negative feelings and stereotyped attitudes towards members of a different group. Prejudice or negative prejudgments can be based on race, religion, nationality, economic status, sexual orientation, gender, age, or other factors. Someone who is outside of the country where they are from or have lived because s/he has been targeted, harassed or persecuted because of her/his race, religion, sexual orientation, political beliefs, etc Any type of repeated or persistent behavior that is unwanted, unwelcome and causes emotional distress in the person it is directed at. It is typically motivated by gender, race, religion, national origin etc. Demonstrating unity or cooperation to work with others who may or may not share the same interests or challenges. Being an ally to someone else or another group of people. The ability to be fair and open to people or beliefs that are different than oneself. Being free from prejudice and bigotry A person or group of people who stand up when they see an injustice. Opposite of ‘bystander’ A strong and unreasonable hatred of people who are from other countries or ideas and things that are foreign     DEFINITIONS   15 Lesson 1 - Timeline Activity 16 1885 A memento of the Dean's reception, held October 10, 1885 -- Photograph of Anandabai Joshee, Kei Okami, and Tabat M. Islambooly, students from the Woman's Medical College of Pennsylvania taken in 1885 (left). Gurubai Karmarker (from India) graduated from Women's Medical College of Pennsylvania in 1892 (right). (1885-1892) From Drexel University College of Medicine, Philadelphia, PA. With international ships and missionary societies, people from India began visiting the United States as early as the late 1700s. In the late 1800s, international students from India attended the Women’s Medical College of Pennsylvania, such as the women pictured above. Image #1 courtesy of the Legacy Center Archives, Drexel University College of Medicine, Philadelphia. “Students posing for photo,” photo# ahc1_003 Image #2 courtesy of the Legacy Center Archives, Drexel University College of Medicine, Philadelphia. “Gurubai Karmarker,” photo# ahc_1520 17 1912 The first Gurdwara (Sikh House of worship) in the United States was established in 1912 in Stockton, California. Immigrants from India, usually men and generally from the region of Punjab, came to the United States to study, work on the Pacific & Eastern Railroad as construction workers, in lumberyards, or in agriculture. By 1910, 5,000 men had migrated to the West Coast of the United States from colonial India. Many early immigrants were not able to bring family members to the United States with them, and few women were allowed to migrate, so many migrants inter-married with other groups, such as European Americans, Mexican Americans, or other Asian Americans. The PBS film, Roots in the Sand, documents the history of this community. “Exterior photograph of the Stockton Gurdwara." January 1916. The Hindusthanee Student. Courtesy of South Asian American Digital Archive. (http://www.saadigitalarchive.org/item/20121224-1186). 18 http://www.pbs.org/rootsinthesand/ http://www.saadigitalarchive.org/item/20121224-1186 1917 In February 1917, during World War I, the U.S. Congress passed the Immigration Act of 1917 (also known as the Asiatic Barred Zone Act). Although President Woodrow Wilson previously vetoed it in 1916, the congressional majority overrode the President’s veto. The act added people originating from the Asiatic Barred Zone (see above) to the list of people who were considered “undesirable” for immigration to the U.S.; the list also included: “homosexuals”, “idiots”, “feeble-minded persons”, "criminals", “epileptics”, “insane persons”, “alcoholics,” “professional beggars”, all persons “mentally or physically defective”, “polygamists,” and “anarchists.” The Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 had barred Chinese from entering the U.S. and the 1917 legislation expanded the categories to the entire Asian region. The rising “nativism” and “xenophobia” in the U.S. led to the passage of the Act in prohibiting immigration of certain groups. Congress repealed the Chinese Exclusion Act in 1943 and the Luce-Cellar Act of 1946 ended discrimination against Asian Indians and Filipinos, who were accorded the right to naturalization, allowed a quota of 100 immigrants per year. The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, known as the McCarran-Walter Act allowed other Asian groups (Japanese, Korean, and others) to become naturalized U.S. citizens. Accessed from: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Asiatic_Barred_Zone.png 19 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Epileptic http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alcoholics http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polygamist http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anarchism http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chinese_Exclusion_Act_(United_States) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chinese_Exclusion_Act http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Luce-Celler_Act_of_1946 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Immigration_and_Nationality_Act_of_1952 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Asiatic_Barred_Zone.png 1918 Bhagat Singh Thind at Camp Lewis. Photograph dated November 18, 1918 of Bhagat Singh Thind with his battalion at Camp Lewis, Washington. His unit was called Washington Company No. 2, Development Battalion No. 1, 166th Depot Brigade. From the South Asian American Digital Archive, donated by David Thind Bhagat Singh Thind (who lived from 1892-1967) was born in Punjab, India and came to the U.S. to study in 1913. He was enlisted to join the U.S. military during World War I (in 1918). He was first granted U.S. citizenship because his military service in 1918, but it was revoked four days later because citizenship was only available at the time for “free white men.” Later, Thind brought a case to the Supreme Court (in 1923) arguing the immigrants from India to the U.S. should be allowed to be naturalized citizens. The Supreme Court disagreed since only commonly understood “Caucasian” immigrants were eligible to become citizens. Thind finally became a citizen in 1936. He went on to study spirituality and lecture extensively in the U.S. “Bhagat Singh at Camp Lewis” November 18, 1918. Courtesy of South Asian American Digital Archive. 20 http://www.saadigitalarchive.org/donor/david-thind http://www.saadigitalarchive.org/donor/david-thind With Permission from Donor David Thind. (http://www.saadigitalarchive.org/item/20110802-264) 1937 “East India Store Section,” Honolulu Advertiser, Hawaii (1937), From South Asian American Digital Archive, from the collection of the Watumull Family, donated by Indru Watumull Description: This four-page advertisement insert from the June 3, 1937 edition of the Honolulu Advertiser, marking the opening of the Watumull Building on 1162 Fort Street. Includes several short articles about G.J. Watumull and J. Watumull, advertisements for the stores, products, and boutiques housed in the building, as well as photographs of the East India Store interior and its employees. “East India Store Section,” Honolulu Advertiser (1937). Courtesy of South Asian American Digital Archive. With Permission from Watamull Family. (http://www.saadigitalarchive.org/item/20110722-249) 21 http://www.saadigitalarchive.org/item/20110802-264 http://www.saadigitalarchive.org/collection/watumull-family http://www.saadigitalarchive.org/donor/indru-watumull http://www.saadigitalarchive.org/sites/default/files/objects/watumull-family/item-honolulu-advertiser-001.jpg 1961 Congressional Coffee Hour at the White House with President John F. Kennedy, May 18, 1961. From Left to Right: Congressmen Dilip Singh Saund (California), Congressman Harold C. Ostertag (New York); Congressman James A. Haley (Florida); President John F. Kennedy; Congressman Frank W. Boykin (Alabama); Congressman Harold T. Johnson (California); Congressman John W. Byrnes (Wisconsin). Photographer Robert Knudsen. From J.F. Kennedy Presidential Library & Museum. Dalip Singh Saund (who lived from 1899-1973) was the first Asian-American member of the U.S. House of Representatives (Congress). He served as the Congressman from the 29 th District of California from 1957-1963. He was born in Punjab, India while it was under British rule and migrated to the United States (via Ellis Island) in 1920 and pursued his Masters and Doctoral degrees at the University of California, Berkeley. He campaigned for the rights of South Asian immigrants in the United States. After the Luce-Celler Act was signed into law by then-President Harry Truman in 1946 (allowing for people from India and the Philippines to become naturalized U.S. citizens), Saund could become a U.S. citizen, and later, successfully ran for national office. Photograph No. KN-17834, “President John F. Kennedy at Congressional Coffee Hour,” May 18, 1961.John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum. http://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/Archives/JFKWHP-KN-17834.aspx 22 1965 President Lyndon B. Johnson signing the 1965 Immigration Act with Vice President Hubert Humphrey and Senator Edward (Ted) Kennedy greeting the President. Source: LBJ Library and Museum, Photo credit: Yoichi Okamoto. In 1965, President Lyndon B. Johnson signed the Immigration Act of 1965, which changed U.S. immigration policy. Previously, immigrants from Asia and Africa were allowed into the United States in very small numbers (even if they were highly educated or had family living in the U.S.). The Act of 1965 was signed in from of the Statue of Liberty, on Liberty Island, and reflected the Civil Rights movement’s gains for racial equality. U.S. immigration policies had been severely discriminatory given decades of exclusion of non-European immigrants. Departing from the previous system of country-based quotas, U.S. immigration after 1965 has focused on the skills that immigrants bring and reunification of families (immigrants sponsoring their families to join them in the United States). Image from: http://www.lbjlibrary.net/collections/photo-archive.html 23 http://www.lbjlibrary.net/collections/photo-archive.html 1987 In 1987, a 30-year old immigrant from India who worked in a bank, Navroze Mody, was brutally beaten to death by a group of teenagers who called themselves “Dotbusters.” This group was active in New Jersey, where a large South Asian immigrant community is concentrated, and they had been harassing immigrants from South Asia for months. A month before Mody’s killing, Dotbusters (referring to the bindi that Hindu women where on their foreheads for religious purposes), sent a letter to a local newspaper. Part of their letter read: "I'm writing about your article during July about the abuse of Indian People. Well I'm here to state the other side. I hate them, if you had to live near them you would also. We are an organization called dot busters. We have been around for 2 years. We will go to any extreme to get Indians to move out of Jersey City. If I'm walking down the street and I see a Hindu and the setting is right, I will hit him or her. We plan some of our most extreme attacks such as breaking windows, breaking car windows, and crashing family parties. … They are a week race physically and mentally. We are going to continue our way. We will never be stopped." In Jersey City, after Mody’s death, another person of South Asian descent was assaulted by three men with baseball bats. Laws against hate crimes have been in existence in New Jersey though incidents still continue. Information sourced from http://pluralism.org/ocg/CDROM_files/hinduism/dot_busters.php, and from the FBI hate crimes statistics: http://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2011/november/hatecrimes_111411 24 http://pluralism.org/ocg/CDROM_files/hinduism/dot_busters.php http://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2011/november/hatecrimes_111411 2011 The federal government has ordered Hamtramck to print election ballots and other materials in the Bangla language By Charles Sercombe Here’s more proof that Hamtramck’s Bengali community is a major voting bloc. The federal government is now requiring the city to print all election material, including ballots and candidate nominating petitions, in the Bangla language as well as in English. That’s because, according to the U.S. Census, the Bangladeshi community is sizeable enough to warrant separate ballots. The agency said it used a variety of data to determine this mandate, but just what exactly the decision was based on was not immediately known. Hamtramck is not alone in being ordered to print separate ballots. Some 248 voting districts across the country have been told to print up separate ballots for their dominant ethnic group. City Clerk Ed Norris said the mandate will mean an additional cost to the city, but he did not know how much more elections will now run. He said there is not enough time to ready ballots for the Bengali community for the Nov. 8 General Election. The next election after the November election is the Republican Primary on Feb. 28. Norris said he’s not sure if the additional ballots will be ready by then, either. “We’re going to try to comply the best we can, as soon as we can,” he said. Part of the problem in getting ballots ready is finding both a reliable translation service, and a printer that has the proper font for the Bangla language. Another issue to figure out is who is responsible for preparing and paying for the separate ballots when elections are under the jurisdiction of the county or state. Not all elections are solely city elections. Norris said trying to coordinate this mandate with county and state officials is another hurdle to jump. In the online social network site Facebook, there has been criticism of this mandate. There are some who believe that if you are a citizen and are eligible to vote, you should be able to understand the English language. But the Voting Rights Act of 2006 mandates special language ballots for there is a significant ethnic presence in a community. Norris said that there is no appeal option to challenge the mandate. Norris added that the city has already provided some election material in Polish, Arabic and Bangla. 2011 Article Accessed and Reprinted with Permission from: http://www.hamtramckreview.com/2011/10/feds-order-city-to-print-bengali-ballots/ 25 http://digg.com/submit?phase=2&url=http://www.hamtramckreview.com/2011/10/feds-order-city-to-print-bengali-ballots/&title=Feds%20order%20city%20to%20print%20Bengali%20ballots http://digg.com/submit?phase=2&url=http://www.hamtramckreview.com/2011/10/feds-order-city-to-print-bengali-ballots/&title=Feds%20order%20city%20to%20print%20Bengali%20ballots http://www.hamtramckreview.com/2011/10/feds-order-city-to-print-bengali-ballots/ http://www.hamtramckreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/bengalivoterlr.jpg Post-2001 New York Neighbors is an inter-faith organization that uses the symbols of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam to show how people of different backgrounds can get along. In the post-9/11 period, many groups have come together to unite against extremism, and to understand individuals from different backgrounds in order to make sure that unfair laws and practices don’t result in discriminatory treatment. Thousands of individuals with no links to any terrorists networks or organizations have been detained, jailed, or spied upon since 9/11; many human rights groups and civil rights agencies have protested the U.S. government’s actions. New York Neighbors is a coalition of over 130 groups in New York City that strives to “defend the constitutional and American values of religious freedom, diversity and equality while fighting against anti-Muslim bigotry and discrimination against our neighbors no matter what their national origin or religion.” Information accessed from: http://nyneighbors.org/ 26 http://nyneighbors.org/ 2012 On Sunday August 5, 2012 an armed gunman entered a Sikh Gurudwara (Sikh house of worship) in Oak Creek, Wisconsin and opened fire on innocent people praying in their house of worship. Six people were killed (Seeta Singh, a congregational leader ; Parkash Singh, a congregational leader ; Ranjit Singh; Satwant Singh Kaleka, president of the Gurdwara; and Subegh Singh and Parmjit Kaur, members of the congregation). Two other worshippers were injured. A police officer fatally shot the gunman, Wade Michael Page, aged 40. Wade Michael Page is reported to have been affiliated with white supremacist and hate groups and was on the watchlist of organizations that track hate crimes like the Southern Poverty Law Center. After the shooting, President Obama released a statement that, “At this difficult time, the people of Oak Creek must know that the American people have them in our thoughts and prayers, and our hearts go out to the families and friends of those who were killed and wounded. My Administration will provide whatever support is necessary to the officials who are responding to this tragic shooting and moving forward with an investigation. As we mourn this loss which took place at a house of worship, we are reminded how much our country has been enriched by Sikhs, who are a part of our broader American family.” White House Statement from: http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2012/08/14/honoring-victims-oak-creek-tragedy & Map from Panth.org: http://www.panthic.org/data/pics/articles/2012b/5449_AttackMap.jpg 27 http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2012/08/14/honoring-victims-oak-creek-tragedy http://www.panthic.org/data/pics/articles/2012b/5449_AttackMap.jpg Short  Timeline  of  South  Asian  Americans  in  The  United  States       **Key  moments  in  U.S.  &  world  history  are  also  presented  in  brackets       1845:       More  than  500,000  Asian  Indians  are  brought  to  British  Guyana,  the  West  Indies,  and  various   French  colonies,  marking  the  beginning  of  the  global  trend  toward  “coolie”  labor  (similar  to  in-­‐ dentured  servitude).  [Slavery  was  abolished  in  the  British  Caribbean  islands  in  1834  and  in  the   U.S.  in  1863)     1880s  &  1890s:       2,000  South  Asians  residing  in  the  U.S.  Many  are  from  the  Punjab  region  and  are  of  the  Sikh  re-­‐ ligion  working  on  farms  in  California.  Others  are  studying  in  the  U.S.  [The  countries  of  India,   Bangladesh,  Pakistan,  Sri  Lanka,  Nepal  and  Burma  were  ruled  by  the  British  Empire  from  1858-­‐ 1947]     1907-­‐1908:       The  ‘Asian  Exclusion  League,’  an  anti-­‐immigrant  group,  opposes  immigration  from  Asia  and   leads  to  often  violent  “Anti-­‐Hindu”  riots  in  Washington,  California,  and  Oregon  in  order  to  “help   drive  out  the  cheap  labor.”    Chief  of  bureau  of  naturalization  actively  opposes  the  granting  of   naturalization  to  “Hindoos”  (a  derogatory  and  incorrect  term  then  used  for  all  people  from  In-­‐ dia;  of  those  in  this  early  migration,  85%  were  Sikh,  about  13%  Muslim,  and  only  2%  Hindus)     1912:       Sikhs  build  the  first  Gurdwara  (Sikh  House  of  worship)  in  the  U.S.  in  Stockton,  California       1917:       Immigration  Act  of  1917  defines  a  geographic  “barred  zone”  (including  what  is  now  South  Asia)   from  which  no  immigrants  can  come  to  the  U.S.  [World  War  I  lasts  from  1914-­‐1918]     1920:       Alien  land  laws  in  the  states  prohibit  the  transfer  and  ownership  of  land  to  non-­‐citizens;  Indians   owned  over  120,000  acres  in  California  which  was  taken  away.    In  the  following  years,  over   3,000  Indians  return  to  their  homeland  due  to  xenophobic  pressures.  Research  shows  that   some  immigrants  still  come  to  the  U.S.  as  traders  or  merchants  through  port  cities,  such  as  New   Orleans  or  New  York,  and  settle  in  African  American  or  Puerto  Rican  communities.  [Women  in   the  U.S.  are  granted  the  right  to  vote  in  1920]     1923:       U.S.  v.  Bhagat  Singh  Thind.  U.S.  Supreme  Court  declared  Asian  Indians  could  not  become  U.S.   citizens  because  they  are  not  “white”  immigrants.    [In  1924,  U.S.  President  Calvin  Coolidge  signs   the  Snyder  Act  giving  Native  Americans  U.S.  citizenship,  but  many  states  still  denied  them  the   right  to  vote  until  1948]       28 1946:       Luce-­‐Celler  Bill  grants  right  of  naturalization  and  small  immigration  quotas  to  Asian  Indians  and   Filipinos,  including  a  national  quota  of  100  per  year  for  immigrants  from  India.  [World  War  II   lasts  from  1939-­‐1945]     1957:     Dalip  Singh  Saund,  an  Indian-­‐American  from  Imperial  Valley,  California,  is  elected  to  United   States  Congress  and  serves  from  1957-­‐1963.  South  Asian  Americans  numbered  more  than   12,000.    [In  1955,  the  Montgomery  Bus  Boycott  starts  in  Alabama.  In  1956,  the  Supreme  Court   declared  segregation  on  buses  to  be  illegal].     1965:     The  Immigration  and  Nationality  Act,  which  removed  quotas  for  Asian  immigrants,  triggers  the   second  wave  of  South  Asian  immigration,  which  primarily  includes  scientists,  engineers,  and   doctors.  [1965:  President  Lyndon  B.  Johnson  signs  the  Voting  Rights  Act].       1966-­‐1977:     83%  of  South  Asians  enter  the  United  States  under  employment  visas,  including  20,000  scien-­‐ tists,  40,000  engineers,  and  25,000  medical  doctors.     1987:     Navroze  Mody  murdered  in  hate  crime  by  “Dotbusters”  –  a  violent  spree  in  parts  of  New  Jersey.     South  Asian  Americans  number  more  than  200,000  in  the  United  States.    [1989  marks  the  be-­‐ ginning  of  the  end  of  the  Cold  War].     1990:       Third  wave  of  South  Asian  immigrants  begins,  including  H1-­‐B  visa  holders  (many  working  in  Sili-­‐ con  Valley),  students,  and  working  class  families.       2000:       Hamtramck,  Michigan  is  the  first  jurisdiction  to  provide  language  assistance  in  a  South  Asian   language  –  Bengali  –  to  voters  following  a  lawsuit  by  the  Department  of  Justice.       September  11,  2001:       Attacks  against  the  World  Trade  Center  and  the  Pentagon.  [None  of  the  hijackers  were  of  South   Asian  origin].       September  11-­‐17,  2001:       In  the  week  following  9/11,  there  were  645  reports  of  bias  incidents  perceived  to  be  aimed  at   persons  of  Middle  Eastern  and  South  Asian  descent.  South  Asians  Balbir  Singh  Sodhi  of  Arizona,   Waqar  Hasan  of  Texas,  and  Vasudev  Patel  of  Texas  were  all  killed  in  post-­‐9/11  hate  crimes.  Har-­‐ assment  and  threats  are  most  common,  making  up  more  than  two-­‐thirds  of  all  reported  inci-­‐ dents.       29 September  2001-­‐February  2002:       The  U.S.  government  detains  without  charges  about  1,100  individuals  (many  from  India  &  Paki-­‐ stan).  Many  are  denied  access  to  counsel  and  undergo  secret  hearings.  Many  are  detained  for   months  on  end,  other  are  deported  with  no  evidence  ever  presented  of  terrorist  activity.     2002:       FBI  reports  that  after  9/11,  reports  of  violence  against  Muslims  rose  by  1600%.  Nineteen  peo-­‐ ple  are  murdered  in  hate  violence  in  the  US  related  to  9/11.     2002:     Special  Registration  program  requires  men  and  boys  –  ages  16  and  older  –  from  25  countries   (24  of  which  are  predominantly  Muslim  countries,  including  Pakistan  and  Bangladesh),  to  report   to  their  local  immigration  office  for  fingerprinting  and  interrogation.  Over  83,000  people  regis-­‐ tered  throughout  the  country,  none  of  whom  were  charged  with  any  terrorist-­‐related  activity.   Thousands  of  people  are  deported.     2005:     Piyush  Bobby  Jindal  becomes  second  South  Asian  American  member  of  Congress.  Many  South   Asians  are  elected  to  state  office.  [In  2007,  Bobby  Jindal  became  the  first  Indian-­‐American  gov-­‐ ernor  in  U.S.  history  (of  Louisiana),  and  Nikki  Haley  became  the  second  in  2011  (South  Caroli-­‐ na).]       2012:     Wade  Michael  Page,  associated  with  white  supremacist  groups,  walked  in  and  opened  fire  dur-­‐ ing  services  at  a  Sikh  Gurdwara  (Sikh  House  of  worship)  in  Wisconsin,  killing  six  people.  Page   was  killed  by  a  police  officer  who  arrived  at  the  scene.  The  shooting  was  labeled  an  act  of  “do-­‐ mestic  terrorism.”       2012/2013:     According  to  the  2010  U.S.  Census,  there  are  3.4  million  people  of  South  Asian  descent  in  the   United  States.  In  2012,  Ami  Bera  from  California  becomes  the  third  Indian-­‐American  to  be   elected  to  the  U.S.  House  of  Representatives.       Adapted  from  “South  Asians  in  the  U.S.:  A  Social  Justice  Timeline,”  developed  by  SAALT.     30 Who  are  South  Asian  Americans?     Population  of  South  Asians  in  the  U.S.  (density)       According  to  the  2010   Census,  approximately   3.4  million  South  Asians   live  in  the  United   States.    South  Asian   Americans  are  originally   from  the  countries  of   Afghanistan,  Bangladesh,   Bhutan,  India,  Nepal,   Pakistan,  Sri  Lanka,  and   the  Maldives.  They  may   have  been  born  in  those   countries,  or  their   parents  or  grandparents   originally  came  to  the   U.S.  from  there.  The   community  also  includes  members  of  the  South  Asian  diaspora  –  past  generations  of  South   Asians  who  originally  settled  in  many  areas  around  the  world,  including  the  Caribbean   (Guyana,  Jamaica,  Suriname,  and  Trinidad  &  Tobago),  Africa  (Kenya,  Nigeria,  South  Africa,   Tanzania,  Uganda,  Zambia),  Canada,  Europe,  the  Middle  East,  and  other  parts  of  Asia  and   the  Pacific  Islands  (Fiji,  Indonesia,  Malaysia,  and  Singapore).     The  South  Asian  American  community  is  very  diverse  not  only  in  terms  of  national  origin,   but  also  by  virtue  of  possessing  a  variety  of  ethnic,  religious,  and  linguistic  characteristics.   There  are  South  Asian  Americans  who  practice  Buddhism,  Christianity,  Hinduism,  Jainism,   Judaism,  Islam,  Sikhism,  and  Zoroastrianism.  The  most  common  languages  other  than   English  spoken  by  South  Asians  in  the  United  States  include  Bengali,  Gujarati,  Hindi,  Punjabi,   and  Urdu.     South  Asians  are  also  diverse  in  terms  immigration  and  socio-­‐economic  status.  With  respect   to  employment,  many  South  Asians  have  careers  in  the  technology  and  medical  fields;  there   are  many  teachers;  and  many  within  the  community  are  also  employed  in  lower-­‐wage  jobs   as  cashiers,  taxi  workers,  domestic  workers,  and  restaurant  workers.  South  Asians  in  the   U.S.  are  also  on  TV,  in  government,  and  in  the  military.           Adapted  from  South  Asian  Americans  Leading  Together  (SAALT)’s  factsheets  and  website     31     Migration  Worksheet   Use  this  worksheet  to  find  out  as  much  information  as  possible  about  how  your  family  came  to  the   United  States.  If  your  ancestors  are  Native  American,  find  out  any  stories  of  migration  within  the  U.S.   over  the  past  few  centuries.  It  is  hard  to  pinpoint  many  historical  dates,  but  just  get  as  much  information   as  you  can  to  share  with  classmates.   What  can  you  find  out  about  the  first  person  in  your  family  (on  either  or  both  sides)  who  migrated  to  the   U.S.?    Around  what  year  did  that  migration  take  place?   _____________________________________________________________________________________   _____________________________________________________________________________________   _____________________________________________________________________________________   _____________________________________________________________________________________   _____________________________________________________________________________________   _____________________________________________________________________________________   _____________________________________________________________________________________   _____________________________________________________________________________________   _____________________________________________________________________________________   _____________________________________________________________________________________   _____________________________________________________________________________________   _____________________________________________________________________________________     Any  additional  details?     _____________________________________________________________________________________   _____________________________________________________________________________________   _____________________________________________________________________________________   _____________________________________________________________________________________     Feel  free  to  affix  copies  of  any  photos  or  documents  you  can  find  to  the  back  of  this  sheet.   32 LESSON  2:  EVERYONE’S  MIGRATION  STORY     Time:  40-­‐60  minutes       Essential  questions     • How  do  different  interpretations  of  history  impact  our  current  views  of  xenophobia?   • How  can  an  increasing  realisation  of  immigration  stories  build  levels  of  empathy?   • How  can  looking  back,  help  us  to  move  forwards  as  a  cohesive  society?     Lesson  Objectives     Learners  will  be  able  to:   • Address  the  roots  of  xenophobia   • Build  empathy   • Leave  the  classroom  with  a  better  understanding  of  the  commonly  used  phrase     “everyone  comes  from  somewhere”     Materials   1. Timeline   2. Pens,  markers  etc.   3. Tape   4. Post-­‐its   5. Bullying  101  hand-­‐out  (one  page,  one  copy  per  student)   6. Emma  Lazarus  poem  (optional)       Performance  Tasks   Timeline  Activity  &  Discussion       Opening  Activity  (10  minutes)   1. Directions  for  students:  Based  on  your  interviews  with  a  family  member,  you  have  5   minutes  to  draw  3  symbols  (or  words)  that  represent  your  migration  story.                                       Aim:  5  mins  /  Allow:  8  mins   Note:  If  facilitator  was  not  able  to  put  up  time  line,  now  is  the  opportunity.  Facilitator  is   also  encouraged  to  include  their  own  symbols.     2. (As  students  are  finishing)  Invite  students  to  come  up  in  groups  of  5  to  add  their   migration  story  to  the  timeline.                                                                                                                                                                                                 Aim:  5  mins  /  Allow:  5  mins     Main  Activity  (20  minutes)   3. Silent  gallery  walk  and  reaction:  Encourage  students  to  absorb  fellow  classmates’   stories  and  reflect  on  their  own.    We  encourage  the  facilitator  to  also  participate.     Students  should  be  provided  with  post  its  for  use  during  this  exercise  in  order  to  write   and  stick  any  reactions  they  may  have  to  the  time  line.                                                                                     33 Invite  students  to  share  their  own  thoughts  and  reactions  to  having  read  their   classmates’  stories/reactions.       o Prompts:  If  there  is  little  response,  the  facilitator  may  choose  to  read  aloud  some   examples  from  the  students’  post  its/symbols  in  an  attempt  to  show  the   variation  of  backgrounds  that  have  led  all  students  to  be  in  this  same  classroom.     The  aim  is  to  illustrate  that  we  all  come  from  somewhere  and  have  a  place  in  the   larger  American  story.       o Questions  to  help  facilitate  further  discussion:   § How  does  it  make  you  feel  to  read  these  stories  of  your  classmates’   histories?   § What  surprised  you  about  this  exercise?                                                                                                     [Insert  extension  activity  here  if  time  permits  or  if  the  conversation  is  not  taking  off.]     Discussion/Closing    (Aim:  10  minutes;  allow  15  minutes)   1. Discussion  questions:  Where  do  I  come  from?   a. Who  do  I  consider  to  be  American?   b. What  does  an  American  look  like?   i. Our  goal  is  for  students  to  recognize  their  own  migration  histories  and   the  episodic  nature  of  xenophobia.   ii. Closing  from  facilitator:  Talk  about  recent  acts  of  xenophobia,  for   example,  the  Oakcreek  shooting  or  attacks  on  mosques  in  the  U.S.       Homework:   • Background  research  on  bias-­‐related  crimes.  Ask  students  to  find  news  articles  on   instances  where  people  have  been  attacked  for  their  religious  beliefs  or  racial  identity   (sample  article  on  the  Oakcreek  shootings  provided  in  the  next  lesson).     o Invite  students  to  make  bullet  pointed  notes  on  the  background  of  a  particular   bias-­‐related  crime/event  involving  South  Asians  or  Muslims  in  the  U.S.     • Read  “Bullying  101”  handout  and  jot  down  reactions  on  the  worksheet.         Optional  activity  (for  classes  between  40-­‐60  minutes  long):     • Use  the  poem  provided  in  the  pack  entitled  ‘The  New  Colossus’  to  encourage  students   to  reflect  on  what  it  means  to  be  American.    Explain  first,  that  it  is  displayed  on  the   statue  of  liberty.     o Ask  for  a  volunteer  to  read  the  poem  out  loud.   o Discussion  of  the  meaning  of  the  poem  should  occur  firstly  in  their  groups  (5   mins)  and  then  as  a  class  (10  mins).    If  class  discussion  is  limited,  the  following   questions  could  be  used  to  encourage  that  discussion:   34 § What  is  the  message  of  this  poem?   §  Do  you  feel  that  todays’  America  reflects  the  ideals  expressed  in  this   poem?    Do  you  have  any  examples  (positive  or  negative?)     o Prompt  for  facilitator:  The  goal  of  sharing  this  poem  with  the  class  is  to  evoke  the   US’s  ideals  of  welcoming  all  –  irrespective  of  where  they  come  from  and  what   their  background  is.  Facilitator  should  try  to  stimulate  discussion  and  reflection   as  to  whether  we  (Americans)  are  living  up  to  this  standard.     35 Lesson  2  –  Timeline     (Extension  of  Lesson  1  Timeline)   36 W E ST E R N STAT E S C E N T E R Uniting Communities 84 Linking the Issues T I M E L I N E 1619 Slavery begins. First shipload of enslaved Africans to the American colonies arrives in Jamestown, Virginia. A detailed drawing of the slave ship Brookes, showing how 482 people were to be packed onto the decks. 1 1 Library of Congress, (http://memory.loc.gov/rbc/rbpe/rbpe28/rbpe282/28204300/001dr.jpg) 37 Ameena Kucher W E ST E R N STAT E S C E N T E R Uniting Communities 86 Linking the Issues T I M E L I N E 1857 Many states place residency restrictions on African Americans and other non-white immigrants, preventing them from living or owning property in the state. For example, the Oregon State Constitution banned any “free negro, or mulatto, not residing in this State at the time” from living, holding real estate and making any contracts within the state. This allowed Blacks to travel through the state, but banned them from living within it. The punishment was public whipping. It was removed from the Constitution by the voters in 2001. Detroit, MI - February 1942. 3 3 Siegal, Arthur S, 1942. Library of Congress Repository. http://memory.loc.gov/pnp/fsa/8d13000/8d13500/8d13572r.jpg Long, Bill. 8/21/05 http://www.drbilllong.com/LegalEssays/OregonBlacks.html 38 Ameena Kucher W E ST E R N STAT E S C E N T E R Uniting Communities 87 Linking the Issues T I M E L I N E Congress passes the Page Act which e!ectively ends the entry of unmarried Asian women into the country as a way of limiting family development. “A Chinese Invasion” by illustrated by J. Keppler in 1880 depicts the sentiment towards Chinese Immigrants at the time. 4 1875 4 Keppler, Jospeh. “A Chinese Invasion,” 1880. The National Archives (http://memory.loc.gov/service/pnp/cph/3c00000/3c03000/ 3c03100/3c03143r.jpg) 39 Ameena Kucher Ameena Kucher Ameena Kucher W E ST E R N STAT E S C E N T E R Uniting Communities 88 Linking the Issues T I M E L I N E The Great Migration was the movement of 1.3 million African-Americans out of the Southern United States to the North, Midwest and West from 1915 to 1930. African-Americans migrated to escape racism, seek employment opportunities in industrial cities and to get better education for their children, all of which were widely seen to lead to a better life. 1916-1930 A migrating African-American family. 5 5 www.discoverblackheritage.com 40 Ameena Kucher W E ST E R N STAT E S C E N T E R Uniting Communities 89 Linking the Issues T I M E L I N E Between 1882 and 1968 the Tuskegee Institute recorded 3,437 lynchings of African-Americans. In the south, lynching was one of the terrorist tactics used to control and threaten the African-American population. According to the mythology popular at the time, black men were lynched because they had raped white women, yet historians find that in eighty percent of the cases there were no sexual charges alleged, let alone proved. George Meadows was lynched at Pratt Mines, Alabama in 1889 6 1882-1968 6 Photograph by L. Horgan, Jr. (http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/aap/aapmob.html) 41 Ameena Kucher W E ST E R N STAT E S C E N T E R Uniting Communities 90 Linking the Issues T I M E L I N E In the United States, various state laws prohibit the marriage of Whites and Blacks, and in many states also Asians. In the US, such laws were called anti-miscegenation laws. From 1913 until 1948, 30 out of the then 48 states enforced such laws. 1913-1948 42 Ameena Kucher Ameena Kucher American Philosophical Digital Library diglib.amphilsoc.org/fedora/repository/graphics:1419 Ameena Kucher Ameena Kucher Ameena Kucher Ameena Kucher Ameena Kucher Heredity chart with human faces entitled "Interesting Researches by the Carnegie Institution Disprove the Popular Notion that a 'Pass-for-White' Person Married to a Pure White May Have a Negro Child." Ameena Kucher W E ST E R N STAT E S C E N T E R Uniting Communities 95 Linking the Issues T I M E L I N E 1939-1945 During World War II, many of those threatened by Nazi Germany wanted to immigrate to the US. The 1938 Evian Conference and the 1943 Bermuda Conference met to discuss responsive immigration policy, and due to nationalist and anti-Semitic sentiments at the time, very few refugees were allowed to immigrate. Following the deaths of millions of Jews and other religious, political, “racial” and sexual minorities, the Displaced Persons Act of 1948 allows refugees to enter the US outside the quota system in place. Statue of Liberty 11 11 http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Statue_of_Liberty.jpg 43 Ameena Kucher W E ST E R N STAT E S C E N T E R Uniting Communities 96 Linking the Issues T I M E L I N E Servicemen’s Readjustment Act, better known as the G.I. Bill, established payment for college or vocational education and one year of unemployment compensation for WWII veterans. It also provided loans for returning veterans to buy homes and start business. However, this remained largely beneficial for white men because the military (1948) and schools (1954) were racially segregated, and many suburban neighborhoods prevented blacks from owning homes. 1944 12 National Archives. http://www.english.ucla.edu/ucla1960s/6061/giandbill.gif 12 44 Ameena Kucher W E ST E R N STAT E S C E N T E R Uniting Communities 98 Linking the Issues T I M E L I N E 1955: The brutal murder of Emmett Till. Rosa Parks begins the Montgomery Bus Boycott to protest segregation. 1961: Freedom Rides 1963: March on Washington 1964: Height of Civil Rights Movement; Civil Rights Act outlaws discrimination in public accommodations and by employers. 1965: Voting Rights Act; Malcolm X is assassinated. 1968: Martin Luther King is assassinated. 1955-1968 Martin Luther King and Malcolm X waiting for a press conference in 1964. 14 14 Library of Congress. http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:MartinLutherKingMalcolmX.jpg. 45 Ameena Kucher 1965 ! ! ! ! The!Immigration!and!Nationality!Act!of!1965!(Hart;Celler!Act,!INS,!Act!of!1965,! Pub.L.!89;236)!abolished!the!National!Origins!Formula!that!had!been!in!place! in!the!United!States!since!the!Immigration!Act!of!1924.!It!was!proposed!by! United!States!Representative!Emanuel!Celler!of!New!York,!co;sponsored!by! United!States!Senator!Philip!Hart!of!Michigan!and!heavily!supported!by!United! States!Senator!Ted!Kennedy!of!Massachusetts.! ! The!Hart;Celler!Act!abolished!the!national!origins!quota!system!that!was! American!immigration!policy!since!the!1920s,!replacing!it!with!a!preference! system!that!focused!on!immigrants'!skills!and!family!relationships!with!citizens! or!U.S.!residents.!Numerical!restrictions!on!visas!were!set!at!170,000!per!year,! with!a!per;country;of;origin!quota,!not!including!immediate!relatives!of!U.S.! citizens,!nor!"special!immigrants"!(including!those!born!in!"independent"! nations!in!the!Western!hemisphere;!former!citizens;!ministers;!employees!of! the!U.S.!government!abroad).![Source:!Wikipeda].! ! ! Image!from!http://immigration;online.org/594;immigration;and;nationality;act;of;1965.html! 46 2001 9/II The$September$11$attacks$(also$referred$to$as$September$11,$September$11th,$or$9/11)$ were$a$series$of$four$coordinated$suicide$attacks$upon$the$United$States$in$New$York$ City$and$the$Washington,$D.C.$areas$on$September$11,$2001.$On$that$Tuesday$morning,$ 19$terrorists$from$the$militant$group$alIQaeda$hijacked$four$passenger$jets.$The$ hijackers$intentionally$flew$two$of$those$planes$into$the$North$and$South$towers$of$ the$World$Trade$Center$complex$in$New$York$City;$both$towers$collapsed$within$two$ hours.$Debris$from$the$collapsing$towers$fell$onto$or$initiated$fires$in$several$ surrounding$buildings$leading$to$the$partial$or$complete$collapse$of$all$the$other$ buildings$in$the$complex.$Debris$also$caused$major$damage$to$ten$other$large$ structures$in$the$immediate$area.$The$hijackers$also$intentionally$crashed$another$ plane$into$the$Pentagon$in$Arlington,$Virginia,$and$intended$to$pilot$the$fourth$ hijacked$jet$into$the$United$States$Capitol$Building$in$Washington,$D.C.;$however,$the$ plane$crashed$into$a$field$near$Shanksville,$Pennsylvania,$after$its$passengers$ attempted$to$take$control$of$the$jet$from$the$hijackers.$Nearly$3,000$people$died$in$ the$attacks,$including$all$227$civilians$and$19$hijackers$aboard$the$four$planes.$In$the$ days$following$Sept.$11,$2001,$reactions$to$the$attacks$ranged$from$grief$to$rage.$ Some$Americans$blamed$all$Muslims$since$the$perpetrators$claimed$to$be$doing$this$ in$the$name$of$Islam.$Within$days,$several$individuals$were$killed$in$the$U.S.$solely$ because$of$they$were$Muslim$or$perceived$to$be$Muslim.$[Adapted$from$Wikipedia]$ 47 W E ST E R N STAT E S C E N T E R Uniting Communities 125 Linking the Issues T I M E L I N E 2005 REAL ID Act Passes: A federal law intended to standardize identification information. This means if someone is living/working in the US, they will need their identification to meet REAL ID standards in order to travel by airplane, open a bank account, collect Social Security payments and/or to utilize the services of all government service. People must provide legal residency documents in order to obtain a REAL ID, cutting o! nearly all recourse and opportunities for undocumented citizens. All states are required to comply with the REAL ID Act by May 2008. 41 http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Deltalax.jpg. 41 48 Ameena Kucher W E ST E R N STAT E S C E N T E R Uniting Communities 127 Linking the Issues T I M E L I N E 43 2007 Anti-immigrant bills increasingly introduced in state legislatures across the country, including: • Eliminates ability to get o"cial government identification cards, such as a driver’s license or occupational license, and prevents undocumented immigrants from obtaining public benefits or assistance other than what is required by federal law. • Defines the o"cial language of the state as English. • Gives local police the authority of immigration enforcement agents. • Mandates that the Department of Human Services checks for lawful presence in US for all public assistance applicants. • Requires proof of citizenship in order to register to vote. 43 Gibbs, Nathan. http://www.flickr.com/photos/57954193@N00/126220665. 49 Ameena Kucher         THE  NEW  COLOSSUS   by  Emma  Lazarus       “A  mighty  woman  with  a  torch,  whose  flame   Is  the  imprisoned  lightning,  and  her  name   Mother  of  Exiles.  From  her  beacon-­‐hand   Glows  world-­‐wide  welcome;  her  mild  eyes  command   The  air-­‐bridged  harbor  that  twin  cities  frame.   "Keep  ancient  lands,  your  storied  pomp!"  cries  she   With  silent  lips.  "Give  me  your  tired,  your  poor,   Your  huddled  masses  yearning  to  breathe  free,   The  wretched  refuse  of  your  teeming  shore.   Send  these,  the  homeless,  tempest-­‐tost  to  me,   I  lift  my  lamp  beside  the  golden  door!"       This  excerpt  from  the  poem,  “The  New  Colossus”     is  inscribed  on  the  pedestal  of  the  Statue  of  Liberty       50     Bullying  101     Bullying  consists  of  repeated  physical,  emotional,  psychological  or   cyber  attacks  between  someone  who  has  power  in  a  particular   situation  and  someone  who  is  victimized.    Those  targeted  by   bullying  often  fear  for  their  safety  and  may  be  scared  to  speak  out.         Examples  of  bullying  behaviors:                            Physical:  Hitting,  pushing,  shoving,  kicking,  pinching,  throwing  things  at                            Verbal:  Name-­‐calling,  insulting,  hurtful  teasing,  threats,  spreading  false  rumors                            Indirect:  Humiliating  someone  behind  their  back,  exclusion,  hurtful  graffiti                            Cyber:  Creating  a  “hate  page,”  nasty  Facebook  posts,  threatening  text  messages         Bullying  in  U.S.  Schools:     o In  the  U.S.,  each  year  over  3  million  young  people  are  bullied.     o Nearly  25%  of  students  said  they  were  bullied  in  school  because  of  their  race,  ethnicity,   gender,  religion,  sexual  orientation,  or  disability.       o Bullying  occurs  at  school,  on  the  way  to  and  from  school,  and  outside  of  schools.     o Bystanders  encourage  bullies  by  providing  an  audience  for  their  behaviors.     o Positive  school  climate  and  open  communication  between  teachers  and  students  have   been  shown  to  be  the  most  effective  ways  to  prevent  and  address  bullying.     o Three  million  children  are  absent  from  school  each  month  because  they  are  afraid  of   bullies.     o Bullying  can  result  in  physical  and  emption  harm,  and  can  result  in  suicide  of  students   who  are  routinely  victimized.       o Many  students  fear  telling  a  teacher  will  bring  more  bullying.       o Students  who  faced  racist  bullying  say  that  teachers  sometimes  share  the  views  of   bullies.    A  South  Asian  American  mother  reported  finding  students  and  teachers  writing   comments  in  her  son’s  yearbook  calling  him  a  “terrorist.”           Adapted  from  information  available  at:    http://bullyfree.com/free-­‐resources/facts-­‐about-­‐bullying   51 LESSON  3:  BULLYING  INTERSECTIONS       Time:  40-­‐60  Minutes       Essential  questions   • What  are  root  causes  of  the  manifestations  of  bias-­‐based  bullying  behavior  that   exist  in  and  around  schools  involving  South  Asian  American  students?   • Why  do  individuals  act  as  bystanders  in  the  face  of  bullying  and  harassment?   • How  do  larger  social  processes  influence  what  happens  in  schools?     Lesson  Objectives   Learners  will  be  able  to:   • Understand  specific  instances  of  xenophobic  bullying   • Build  awareness  and  the  capacity  to  serve  as  an  ally     Materials   1. Roles  sheet  (cut  up)   2. Glossary  (from  Lesson  1)   3. Bullying  101  factsheet  (from  Lesson  2’s  homework)   4. Scissors   5. Newsprint  or  board   6. Pens,  markers  etc.       Performance  Tasks   Why  bullying  happens,  Identifying  roles,  &  Discussion     Opening  Activity  (15  minutes)   1. Draw  two  columns  on  a  board  or  newsprint.   2. Encourage  students  to  share  any  examples  of  bullying  from  personal  experience   or  TV  shows.    In  one  column,  record  all  the  instances  of  bullying  (i.e.  what   happened?)   3. Ask  students  to  brainstorm  all  the  reasons  people  are  bullied  (i.e.  why?).    Record   in  the  second  column  the  reasons  for  bullying.       4. Discuss  reasons  for  bullying  behavior  and  harassment.     Main  Activity  +  Discussion  (25-­‐45  minutes)   1. In  this  role  play,  each  pair  of  students  will  receive  a  slip  with  a  role  on  it   (facilitator/teacher  should  cut  up  the  roles  before  class  from  the  role  sheet  and   hand  out  to  students  for  this  activity).       a. Note:  there  are  15  roles.  If  there  are  more  participants,  the  facilitator   may  need  to  create  new  ones  or  have  three  people  assigned  to  some  as   opposed  to  pairs.   52 2. Using  the  terms  and  definitions  of  “bullying,”  “victim,”  “bystander,”   “harassment”,  and  “ally”  from  the  glossary  from  Lesson  1  and  the  “Bullying  101”   handout  from  Lesson  2’s  homework,  have  students  work  in  pairs  to  analyze  the   situation  given  using  the  questions  below.  Students  may  also  discuss  what  an   “ally”  could  have  done  in  each  of  the  situations.  After  students  have  had  time  to   discuss  the  roles,  have  each  pair  present  back  to  the  class.       3. It  is  important  that  students  know  that  many  times  these  categories  are   situational  and  someone  who  is  bullied/abused  at  home,  may  exhibit  bullying   behaviors  at  school.    In  order  to  not  vilify  youth,  the  facilitator  should  engage   participants  in  critically  analyzing  the  roles  given.       The  facilitator  should  write  the  following  questions  on  the  board:     a. What’s  problematic  about  this  scenario?   b. What  kind  of  bullying  is  it?  (physical,  verbal,  indirect,  cyber)   c. What  roles  can  you  identify  in  this  situation?  (bully,  victim,  bystander,  ally  –   use  the  definitions  handout  from  Lesson  1’s  glossary)   d. What  terms  from  the  glossary  apply  to  this  situation?       Before  splitting  up  into  smaller  groups,  the  facilitator  walks  through  first  example  with   the  group  as  a  demonstration.    The  facilitator  then  hands  out  the  other  14-­‐15  scenarios   to  pairs  of  students.    Allow  15  minutes  for  group  work  or  adjust  the  time  as  needed.     Re-­‐group.  Have  each  pair  read  their  scenario  and  a  brief  synopsis  of  their  analysis.     After  each  pair  states  their  scenario,  ask  the  class  to  consider,  “Why  do  you  think  this   situation  occurred?”  to  further  their  ability  to  critically  analyze  the  situations  presented.       Note  to  Educator/Facilitator:  The  vignettes  in  this  lesson  have  been  developed  from   real-­‐life  instances  of  bias-­‐based  bullying  and  harassment.    Many  instances  include  what   has  been  discussed  up  to  this  point  (in  this  curricular  packet)  as  non-­‐South  Asian   Americans  targeting  South  Asian  Americans  with  bullying  behavior.    However,  there  also   exists  discrimination  and  bullying  behavior  within  the  South  Asian  American  community   as  a  few  of  the  examples  will  highlight.  It  is  important  to  portray  the  complexities  of  the   dynamics  that  exist  among  youth  in  different  contexts  in  the  U.S.  and  the  fluid  nature  of   these  roles.  We  encourage  you  to  stress  the  need  for  addressing  bullying  behavior  with   empathy  and  as  an  ally  however  it  may  occur.    Additionally,  the  psychological  impact  of   bullying  behavior  can  also  result  in  myriad  reactions  (depression,  acting  out,  self-­‐ inflicted  violence).    If  this  is  a  case  you  encounter  in  your  school  or  community,  you  may   consult  local  organizations/services  that  offer  counseling  support  or  this  organization   that  specifically  considers  the  needs  of  South  Asian  Americans:  www.chaicounselors.org       Homework   Consider  how  events  in  society  affect  what  happens  in  school.    Ask  students  to  come   back  with  2-­‐3  examples.   53 ROLES       1.  Afifa  wants  to  go  to  College  and  study  to  be  a  lawyer.  The  other  students  at  school   and  even  her  guidance  counselor  at  her  high  school  said  because  her  parents  are  from  a   Muslim  country  and  her  mom  wears  traditional  clothing,  they  would  never  let  her  go  to   College  and  she  shouldn’t  even  try.     2.  Taimur  and  his  friends  often  get  into  fights  with  Hussein  and  other  students  from   Bangladesh.  Taimur  and  his  friends  are  from  Pakistan  while  Hussein  has  recently  arrived   from  Bangladesh.  All  of  the  boys  involved  are  Muslim,  however,  they  still  find  reasons  to   fight  with  newly  arrived  students,  especially  those  from  South  Asia.     3.  Alyssa  and  Sarika  are  close  friends  in  the  7th  grade.    They  have  sleepovers  and  spend  a   lot  of  time  hanging  out  and  studying  together.    Some  of  the  other  kids  have  started   calling  them  gay  and  teasing  them  for  their  close  friendship.  Some  kids  tease  Alyssa  for   spending  time  with  someone  of  a  different  culture  and  religion.     4.  Suman  goes  to  a  Catholic  school  and  has  to  go  to  a  different  class  with  the  other  non-­‐ Christian  students  for  one  period  during  the  week.    Some  of  the  kids  told  her  she  is   going  to  hell  and  that  God  will  punish  her  if  she  doesn’t  convert.    She  is  scared  to  talk   about  her  family’s  religion  at  school.       5.  Iqbal  found  out  that  some  students  at  his  school  created  a  “hate  page”  online   targeted  at  him.    He  checked  it  and  there  were  many  insults,  rumors,  and  attacks.    He   wasn’t  sure  who  to  tell,  and  dreads  going  to  school  each  day.    Every  day  new  items  get   added.               54       6.  Gurpreet  wears  a  turban  as  part  of  his  Sikh  religion.  One  day,  some  classmates  in  the   locker  room  asked  him  if  he  wears  a  turban  to  hide  his  bombs  in  there  and  why  his   family  were  terrorists.    They  pushed  him  really  hard  against  the  lockers  and  hit  his  head.     He  ended  up  having  a  concussion  and  was  out  of  school  for  more  than  a  week.    His   parents  were  really  scared  and  the  school  didn’t  want  to  take  any  action  against  the   classmates  who  bullied  Gurpreet.   7.  Saniya  was  participating  in  the  memorial  program  her  school  planned  on  9/11.    She   was  born  in  the  U.S.  and  was  a  small  child  when  the  tragic  event  occurred.  On  the  way   to  school  while  she  was  walking,  an  older  man  leaned  out  of  his  car,  shouted  as  Saniya   saying,  “Go  back  to  your  country!”  and  spit  in  her  face.    Saniya  didn’t  know  what  to  do   or  who  to  turn  to  for  help.   8.  One  afternoon  after  school,  Josh  sees  three  guys  from  the  local  area  throwing  trash   and  yelling  insults  at  a  few  of  his  classmates  who  wear  a  hijab  (Muslim  headscarf).    He’s   not  sure  what  to  do  since  these  guys  are  bigger  and  might  come  after  him  if  he  says   anything.       9.  Several  of  the  girls  in  the  8th  grade  student  council  were  planning  a  class  event.    They   decided  they  didn’t  want  Alka  to  be  a  part  of  it  and  ignored  her.  When  she  asked  the   student  council  leaders  when  the  trip  was,  they  refused  to  answer.    Alka  didn’t  know   who  to  ask  for  help.       10.  In  10th  grade  history,  students  were  learning  about  India.    While  learning  about   historical  facts,  some  students  started  asking  Reva  if  her  relatives  ride  camels  and  live  in   the  desert,  if  she  ever  rode  on  a  magic  carpet,  and  why  some  women  have  tattoos  on   their  forehead.    Reva  wasn’t  sure  how  to  respond  to  these  stereotypes  and   misconceptions.  The  teacher  and  the  other  students  were  laughing  and  the  class   couldn’t  complete  the  lesson.             55       11.  Samir  recently  immigrated  to  the  U.S.  from  Punjab,  India  where  he  loved  playing   basketball.    His  new  school  is  especially  for  ‘newcomer’  youth  from  around  the  world   and  he  was  excited  to  join  the  basketball  team,  make  friends,  and  learn  more  English.     After  the  first  practice,  some  of  the  other  boys  said  he  smelled  funny  and  wouldn’t  let   him  use  the  jerseys  that  all  players  are  supposed  to  share.       12.  At  back-­‐to-­‐school  night  (an  annual  event  for  families  and  students),  Fateema’s   mother  brought  Bangladeshi  food  and  came  dressed  in  a  shalwar-­‐kameez  with  a  scarf   covering  her  head.  Some  of  her  classmates  didn’t  want  to  talk  to  her  mom  or  touch  her   food,  saying  that  it  was  too  odd  and  smelly.       13.  Yosuf  brings  lunch  from  home.  His  mother  often  makes  him  traditional  Pakistani   food  such  as  daal  (lentils),  kebabs,  and  chicken  korma  (curry).  Yusuf  sometimes  does  not   eat  his  lunch  because  kids  make  fun  of  the  food  calling  it  weird  and  disgusting.   14.  There  are  many  students  whose  families  are  originally  from  different  South  Asian   countries  and  from  the  Caribbean  (originally  of  Indian  descent  many  generations  ago)  at   Central  High  School.    The  lighter-­‐skinned  South  Asian  American  students  make  jokes   about  those  who  are  darker-­‐skinned  ones  by  calling  them  kalu  (which  means  dark-­‐ skinned),  brownie,  and  dirty.       15.    Several  refugee  students  from  Afghanistan  have  been  at  Parker  High  for  a  few   years.    In  between  classes,  Zaheer  and  Saleha  were  talking  about  a  wedding  they   attended  over  the  previous  weekend  in  Dari  (one  of  the  languages  spoken  in   Afghanistan).    Carlos  and  Devon,  who  often  tease  the  Afghani  students,  overhear  their   conversation  and  say,  “Stop  speaking  in  your  terrorist  language.  This  is  America  –  speak   English!”         56 LESSON  4:  BUILDING  EMPATHY         Time:  60  minutes       Essential  Questions   • What  turns  xenophobia  into  violence?       Lesson  Objectives:     Learners  will  be  able  to:   • Understand  the  Oak  Creek  tragedy  in  historical  context   • Build  empathy             Materials  Needed:     1. Handout  1:  BBC  Article     2. Handout  2:  Graphic  Organizer  (optional)     3. Handout  3:  Oak  Creek  Testimony   4. Projector  or  smart  board  for  You  Tube  viewing         Performance  tasks   Understanding  and  Situating  the  Oak  Creek  Tragedy     Activity  (3  min)     1. Connect  students  to  the  activity  from  Lesson  two  where  they  represented  their  own   migration  story  and  the  xenophobia  their  families  may  have  faced  and  also  to  the  South   Asians  in  America  timeline  that  they  walked  through  for  Lesson  one.       Part  I:  Opening  Activity  (15  min)     Direction  for  Students:     1. Today,  we  will  examine  the  treatment  of  South  Asians  in  America.    We  will  begin  class   by  reading  and  reacting  to  a  current  event.  In  the  fall  of  2012,  a  white  supremacist   opened  fire  in  a  Sikh  Gurdwara  (a  Sikh  house  of  worship),  and  killed  six  innocent  people.     As  you  read  this  article,  pay  attention  to  what  happened  and  why  it  happened.    Use  the   headings  to  take  note  of  the  key  ideas  the  author  wants  to  illustrate,  and  also  pay   attention  to  how  you  are  feeling.    Annotate  the  article  as  you  read  for  key  ideas  and   your  reactions.    Draw  on  information  you  learned  in  the  previous  two  lessons  as  you   respond  to  the  text.         Instructions  for  Facilitator/Teacher:     1. Give  students  7-­‐10  minutes  to  read  and  react  to  the  article  and  follow  with  a  facilitated   discussion.     o Handout  1:  BBC  News  Article   o Handout  2:  Graphic  Organizer  (optional)   57 2. Guiding  Questions  for  Discussion:  What  are  your  reactions  to  this  article?  What  do  you   see  happening  here?  Why  do  you  think  this  happened?  How  do  you  see  xenophobia  and   racism  at  play?     Part  II:  Historicize  Oak  Creek  –  9/11  Connections    (15  minutes)     1. If  a  student  doesn’t  mention  this,  highlight  that  a  key  idea  the  article  mentions  is  that   this  is  not  the  first  of  these  kinds  of  incidents.    Ten  years  ago,  after  the  World  Trade   Center  attack  on  9/11,  Muslims  and  Sikhs  became  targets  of  xenophobic  harassment   and  attack.         2. Guiding  Questions:     o What  do  you  know  about  9/11?     o What  knowledge  do  you  have  of  what  happened  to  members  of  the  South  Asian   and  Muslim  communities  after  9/11?   o  Why  do  you  think  this  happened?       3. Use  a  t-­‐chart/graphic  organizer  to  capture  student  responses.     o Key  Understanding:     § After  9/11,  South  Asians  have  experienced  increased  incidents  of  racial   profiling,  harassment,  discrimination,  bullying,  and  hate  crimes.     4. Have  students  watch  the  opening  sequence  of  the  documentary  Divided  We  Fall    (0-­‐4:30)     https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d22ZuUbgZeg.  Frame  the  viewing  by  telling   students  that  you  will  now  watch  a  segment  of  a  film  that  captures  the  aftermath  of   9/11  faced  by  South  Asians  and  Arab-­‐Americans.    Tell  students  to  record  their  reactions.       5. Discussion:  What  are  your  thoughts  regarding  the  connections  between  the  Oak  Creek   tragedy  and  post-­‐9/11  aftermath?       Part  III.  Building  Empathy:  Oak  Creek  Testimony  and  Response  Letter  (25  min)     1. Bring  students  back  to  the  Oak  Creek  tragedy  by  suggesting  that  hearing  people’s   testimonies  and  narratives  deepens  our  understandings.    Tell  students  that  you  will  now   read  a  testimony  from  the  Oak  Creek  tragedy.         2. Engage  in  a  shared  reading  of  the  Oak  Creek  testimony  (Teacher  reads  aloud,  students   follow  along).     a. Handout  3:  Oak  Creek  Testimony     3. Ask  students  to  reread  the  Oak  Creek  testimony  independently,  and  respond  by  writing   a  letter  to  Harpreet.    As  they  read  the  Oak  Creek  testimony  again,  guide  them  to  capture   their  emotional  reactions,  and  think  about  what  they  would  like  to  share  with  teenagers   who  share  Harpreet’s  religious  background.       4. Before  the  end  of  the  class  period,  ask  if  any  student  would  like  to  share  any  excerpts   from  their  letter.    Ask  students:  How  did  it  feel  to  write  the  letter?   58       US  &  CANADA     6  August  2012  Last  updated  at  09:21  ET   http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-­‐us-­‐canada-­‐19143281     Sikhs  express  shock  after  shootings  at  Wisconsin  temple     Sikhs  living  in  the  United  States  have  expressed  their  shock  and  fear  after  a  shooting  at  a   temple  in  Wisconsin  on  Sunday  which  left  seven  people  dead.     Some  community  members  could  not  believe  what  happened.  Others  said  they  had  feared  such   attacks  since  9/11.  A  gunman  entered  the  Sikh  temple  on  Sunday  morning  and  opened  fire,   killing  six  people  and  injuring  a  policeman.  The  suspect  has  been  named  as  Wade  Michael  Page,   a  40-­‐year-­‐old  army  veteran,  in  US  media  reports.   But  his  identity  has  not  been  independently  confirmed  to  the  BBC.     A  vigil  for  the  victims  was  held  in  nearby  Milwaukee  as  police  searched  the  suspect's  home.     FBI  and  bomb  squad  officers  have  surrounded  the  property  of  the  alleged  gunman  in  Cudahy,   about  2.5  miles  (4km)  north  of  the  Wisconsin  Sikh  Temple,  and  evacuated  local  residents.     In  total,  seven  people  died  in  the  attack  in  Oak  Creek,  a  suburb  of  Milwaukee,  including  the   gunman.  A  police  officer  and  two  other  men  were  critically  injured.     Indian  Prime  Minister  Manmohan  Singh,  who  is  himself  a  Sikh,  said  he  was  "deeply  shocked  and   saddened"  by  the  attack.     "That  this  senseless  act  of  violence  should  be  targeted  at  a  place  of  religious  worship  is   particularly  painful,"  Mr  Singh  said  in  a  statement.     Muslim  confusion     Officials  have  not  yet  identified  the  gunman  or  a  possible  motive,  but  Sikh  organisations  in  the   US  say  the  community  has  been  vulnerable  since  the  9/11  attacks.     "This  is  something  we  have  been  fearing  since  9/11,  that  this  kind  of  incident  will  take  place,"   said  Rajwant  Singh,  chairman  of  the  Washington-­‐based  Sikh  Council  on  Religion  and  Education.     "It  was  a  matter  of  time  because  there's  so  much  ignorance  and  people  confuse  us  [as]  being   members  of  Taliban  or  belonging  to  [Osama]  bin  Laden,"  he  told  Associated  Press.     "We  never  thought  this  could  happen  to  our  community,"  Devendar  Nagra,  48,  told  Associated   Press.  "We  never  did  anything  wrong  to  anyone."     Sikhism  hails  from  the  Indian  subcontinent,  and  observant  Sikhs  wear  turbans.  Members  of  the   community  have  been  attacked  in  the  past  by  assailants  mistaking  them  for  Muslims.     "That  turban  has  tragically  marked  us  as  automatically  suspect,  perpetually  foreign  and   potentially  terrorists,"  Valarie  Kaur,  a  filmmaker  based  in  the  US  who  has  chronicled  attacks  on   Sikhs,  told  AP.     59     Several  hundred  people  turned  up  to  an  impromptu  candlelit  vigil  in  Milwaukee  on  Sunday   evening  for  the  victims.  Cab  driver  and  Oak  Creek  resident  Kashif  Afridi  went  to  the  temple   after  he  heard  about  the  attack.     "When  the  shooting  happened,  I  was  at  home  watching  the  news.  I  went  straight  out  and  drove   to  the  temple.  There  were  lots  of  police  and  the  area  was  closed  off.     "The  press  was  already  there  and  there  were  lots  of  people  from  the  Sikh  community.  I  spoke   to  one  girl  who  was  in  the  temple  when  the  shooting  happened.     "She  said  when  the  shooting  started,  everyone  panicked.  People  were  running  around  trying  to   hide.  She  said  she  lost  her  uncle.     "People  here  are  in  a  state  of  a  shock.  This  is  a  very  small  and  peaceful  place,  you  would  never   imagine  this  kind  of  attack  could  happen  here.  Nobody  can  believe  it.     "Lots  of  people  have  gathered  in  the  area.  People  just  stop  by  to  express  their  sympathies."     'Terrorist-­‐type  incident'     There  are  an  estimated  2,500-­‐3,000  Sikh  families  in  and  around  the  city  worshipping  at  two   gurdwaras,  or  temples,  including  the  Wisconsin  Sikh  Temple.     Lakhwinder  Singh,  a  member  of  the  congregation  there,  told  Reuters  that  two  of  the  victims   were  believed  to  be  the  president  of  temple  and  a  priest.     "It  will  take  a  long  time  to  heal.  We're  hurt  very  badly,"  he  said.     President  Barack  Obama  expressed  his  condolences  with  victims  of  the  attack,  which  comes  just   over  two  weeks  after  a  gun  massacre  left  12  people  dead  at  a  Colorado  cinema.     "As  we  mourn  this  loss  which  took  place  at  a  house  of  worship,  we  are  reminded  how  much  our   country  has  been  enriched  by  Sikhs,  who  are  a  part  of  our  broader  American  family."     The  US  embassy  in  India  said  it  was  "deeply  saddened  by  the  senseless  loss  of  lives  and  injuries"   caused  by  the  shooting.  "Our  hearts,  thoughts,  and  prayers  go  out  to  the  victims  and  their   families,"  a  statement  said.     "The  United  States  takes  very  seriously  the  responsibility  to  respect  and  protect  people  of  all   faiths.  Religious  freedom  and  religious  tolerance  are  fundamental  pillars  of  US  society."     Local  politician  Mark  Honadel  called  the  attack  "craziness".     The  state  representative  told  CNN:  "Unfortunately,  when  this  type  of  stuff  hits  your  area,  you   say  to  yourself,  'why?'  But  in  today's  society,  I  don't  think  there's  any  place  that's  free  from   idiots."     Police  have  described  it  as  a  "domestic  terrorist-­‐type  incident".  The  FBI  are  taking  over  the   criminal  investigation.     There  was  believed  to  be  only  one  attacker,  with  eyewitness  reports  suggesting  it  was  a  white   male.       60       BBC  Article:  “Sikhs  express  shock  after  shootings  at  Wisconsin  temple”     Information  from  the  Article   My  Reactions                                                                     61 Testimony  before  the  U.S.  Senate  of  Harpreet  Singh  Saini  (age  18)     [Survivor  of  the  Oak  Creek  Shooting]   Subcommittee  on  the  Constitution,  Civil  Rights  and  Human  Rights   Committee  on  the  Judiciary  on  “Hate  Crimes  and  the  Threat  of  Domestic   Extremism”   September  19,  2012  (excerpts)   My  name  is  Harpreet  Singh  Saini.    I  am   here  because  my  mother  was  murdered   in  an  act  of  hate  45  days  ago.  I  am  here   on  behalf  of  all  the  children  who  lost   parents  or  grandparents  during  the   massacre  in  Oak  Creek,  Wisconsin.    A   little  over  a  month  ago,  I  never  imagined   I’d  be  here.  I  never  imagined  that   anyone  outside  of    Oak  Creek  would   know  my  name.  Or  my  mother’s  name.   Paramjit  Kaur  Saini.       As  we  all  know,  on  Sunday,  August  5,   2012,  a  white  supremacist  fueled  by   hatred  walked  into  our  local  Gurdwara   with  a  loaded  gun.  He  killed  my  mother,   Paramjit  Kaur,  while  she  was    sitting  for   morning  prayers.  He  shot  and  killed  five   more  men  –  all  of  them  were  fathers,  all   had  turbans  like  me.  And  now  people   know  all  our  names:  Sita  Singh.  Ranjit   Singh.  Prakash  Singh.  Suvegh  Singh.   Satwant  Singh  Kaleka.       This  was  not  supposed  to  be  our   American  story.  This  was  not  my   mother’s  dream.    My  mother  and  father   brought  Kamal  and  me  to  America  in   2004.  I  was  only  10  years-­‐old.  Like  many   other  immigrants,  they  wanted  us  to   have  a  better  life,  a  better  education.   More  options.  In  the     land  of  the  free.  In  the  land  of  diversity.       It  was  a  Tuesday,  2  days  after  our   mother  was  killed,  that  my  brother   Kamal  and  I  ate  the  leftovers  of  the  last   meal  she  had  made  for  us.  We  ate  her   last  rotis  –  which  are  a  type  of  South   Asian  flatbread.  She  had  made  the  rotis   from  scratch  the  night  before  she  died.   Along  with  the  last  bite  of  our  food  that   Tuesday…came  the  realization  that  this   was  the  last  meal,  made  by  the  hands  of   our  mother,  that  we  will  ever  eat  in  our   lifetime.  My  mother  was  a  brilliant   woman,  a  reasonable  woman.  Everyone   knew  she  was  smart,  but  she  never  had   the  chance  to  get  a  formal  education.   She  couldn’t.  As  a  hard-­‐working   immigrant,  she  had  to  work  long  hours   to  feed  her  family,  to  get  her  sons   educated,  and  help  us  achieve  our   American  dreams.  This  was  more   important  to  her  than  anything  else.       Senators,  my  mother  was  our  biggest   fan,  our  biggest  supporter.  She  was   always  there  for  us,  she  always  had  a   smile  on  her  face.  But  now  she’s  gone.   Because  of  a  man  who  hated  her   because  she  wasn’t  his  color?  His   religion?  I  just  had  my  first  day  of   college.  And  my  mother  wasn’t  there  to   send  me  off.  She  won’t  be  there  for  my   graduation.  She  won’t  be  there  on     62 my  wedding  day.  She  won’t  be  there  to   meet  her  grandchildren.  I  want  to  tell   the  gunman  who  took  her  from  me:  You   may  have  been  full  of  hate,  but  my   mother  was  full  of  love.    She  was  an   American.  And  this  was  not  our   American  dream.       We  ache  for  our  loved  ones.  We  have   lost  so  much.  But  I  want  people  to  know   that  our  heads  are  held  high.  We  also   know  that  we  are  not  alone.  Tens  of   thousands  of  people  sent  us  letters,   attended  vigils,  and  gave  us  their   support  –  Oak  Creek’s  Mayor  and  Police   Chief,  Wisconsin’s  Governor,  the   President  and  the  First  Lady.  All  their   support  also  gave  me  the  strength  to   come  here  today.       Senators,  I  came  here  today  to  ask  the   government  to  give  my  mother  the   dignity  of  being  a  statistic.  The  FBI  does   not  track  hate  crimes  against  Sikhs.  My   mother  and  those  shot  that  day  will  not   even  count  on  a  federal  form.  We   cannot  solve  a  problem  we  refuse  to   recognize.       Senators,  I  also  ask  that  the  government   pursue  domestic  terrorists  with  the   same  vigor  as  attackers  from  abroad.   The  man  who  killed  my  mother  was  on   the  watch  lists  of  public  interest  groups.   I  believe  the  government  could  have   tracked  him  long  before  he  went  on  a   shooting  spree.       Finally,  Senators,  I  ask  that  you  stand  up   for  us.  As  lawmakers  and  leaders,  you   have  the  power  to  shape  public  opinion.   Your  words  carry  weight.  When  others   scapegoat  or  demean  people  because  of   who  they  are,  use  your  power  to  say   that  is  wrong.       So  many  have  asked  Sikhs  to  simply   blame  Muslims  for  attacks  against  our   community  or  just  say  “We  are  not   Muslim.”  But  we  won’t  blame  anyone   else.  An  attack  on  one  of  us  is  an  attack   on  all  of  us.       I  also  want  to  be  a  part  of  the  solution.   That’s  why  I  want  to  be  a  law   enforcement  officer  like  Lt.  Brian   Murphy,  who  saved  so  many  lives  on   August  5,  2012.  I  want  to  protect  other   people  from  what  happened  to  my   mother.  I  want  to  combat  hate  –  not  just   against  Sikhs  but  against  all  people.   Senators,  I  know  what  happened  at  Oak   Creek  was  not  an  isolated  incident.  I  fear   it  may  happen  again  if  we  don’t  stand  up   and  do  something.       I  don’t  want  anyone  to  suffer  what  we   have  suffered.  I  want  to  build  a  world   where  all  people  can  live,  work,  and   worship  in  America  in  peace.       Because  you  see,  despite  everything,  I   still  believe  in  the  American  dream.  In   my  mother’s  memory,  I  ask  that  you   stand  up  for  it  with  me.  Today.    And  in   the  days  to  come.       Accessed  and  excerpted  from  full  testimony   available  at:     http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/pdf/9-­‐19-­‐ 12SainiTestimony.pdf   63 LESSON 5: XENOPHPBIC RACISM AGAINST SOUTH ASIANS - PAST & PRESENT Time: 60 minutes Essential Question: How can examining historical manifestations of xenophobia and racism help us understand present forms of bias-based bullying? Lesson Objectives: Students will be able to:  Examine historical roots of xenophobia against South Asians in America  Compare past occurrences with modern day forms of bias-based bullying Materials Needed: 1. Background Information handout 2. Past & Present sets 3. Graphic Organizer Performance Tasks: Connecting the past to the present Activity: (5 min) Connect students to the previous lesson in which they developed an understanding that the Oak Creek tragedy was not a new phenomenon. Rather hate crimes against South Asians have significantly increased after the attacks on the World Trade Center. Tell students that today, they will further historicize this and understand how xenophobia is most often linked to what is happening in the political landscape. Quick Write (5 mins) Ask students to recall when the earliest South Asians came to the United States. Draw upon the timeline. Prompts: What you think early arrivers might have experienced? What leads you to make these inferences? Part I: Background Information (10 min) Instructions for Facilitator/Teacher: For the main activity for this lesson, students will be working in groups in order to compare the harassment of South Asians in the past and present. In the next ten minutes, you will provide students with background knowledge to set them up effectively for their independent work. As a class you can read through Handout 1 which provides a brief synopsis of each historical occurrence that students will examine. You may want to include visual media that can be accessed below: 64 1907 Bellingham Riots: http://depts.washington.edu/civilr/bham_intro.htm; http://depts.washington.edu/civilr/bham_film.htm The Persian Gulf War: http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/gulf/ Dotbusters: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X1tG6mwjOtM (begin at 0:42) Part II: Small Group Work (25 min) Break students into three larger groups and then create sub- groups of 3-4 students. Before you break students into groups, discuss terms: Micro-aggressions: contemporary form of racism - invisible, unintentional and subtle in nature; usually outside the level of conscious awareness but which cumulatively and over time creates a uncomfortable or hostile environment for the victim Bullying: verbal, physical, or psychological acts of intimidation where there is an imbalance of power Harassment: systemic and/or continued unwanted actions, including threats and demands, often based upon race, sex, religion, gender etc. Hate crimes: acts of violence against individuals, groups, places of worship etc., typically motivated by some form of prejudice. Ask students to independently read their set of events (Handout 2). Thereafter, they should work together to complete the graphic organizer (Handout 3) (this could be completed using chart paper as well). Students will summarize each event and identify whether the occurrence is an example of micro-aggression, bullying, or hate crime. Next, they will analyze the language used to describe South Asians either by perpetrators or by media sources in each excerpt. Finally, they will use guiding questions to synthesize the exercise and compare and contrast the xenophobic and racist treatment of the past and present. Students should prepare a quick three-minute presentation for the class on their event set. Note: You may want to model or use guided practice for the first set to give students an example of the type of thinking they will need to do. Part III: Whole Class Share (15 min) After each group shares, debrief the comparison of the past/present and discuss why the analysis of historical forms of xenophobic/racist phenomena is significant. 65 http://depts.washington.edu/civilr/bham_intro.htm http://depts.washington.edu/civilr/bham_film.htm http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/gulf/ http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X1tG6mwjOtM  Guiding Questions: o What did you realize as you read about the Bellingham Riots, the hate crimes that occurred during the Persian Gulf War, and the Dotbusters? o Why do you think the events of the past occurred? What was happening between the United States and other countries during this time that influenced those events? o What about present day occurrences? o What was similar to the present day forms of harassment? What was different? o What can be done? 66     South  Asians  Past  &  Present  -­‐  Background  Information     1907  Bellingham  Riots     “Located  in  the  northwest  corner  of  Washington  State,  just  shy  of  the  Canadian  border,   Bellingham  boomed  in  the  early  20th  century  as  a  center  of  extractive  industries  like  mining,   fishing  and  timber.  Workers  from  all  over  the  world  arrived  in  Bellingham  looking  for  jobs,   including  a  sizable  number  from  Asia.   In  the  early  1900s,  Asian  immigrants  numbered  in  the  hundreds  and  were  a  substantial   presence  in  Bellingham,  sustaining  small  communities  with  their  own  restaurants,  pool  halls   and  barber-­‐shops.  Yet,  due  to  sustained  campaigns  of  racism  and  exclusion,  little  to  nothing  of   these  communities  remains  in  the  city  today.  By  1950,  city  census  numbers  reported  a  mere   eight  individuals  of  Asian  ancestry.   The  most  visible  manifestation  of  these  campaigns  was  the  riot  of  1907.  A  group  of  South  Asian   migrant  workers  arrived  in  Bellingham  in  1906,  employed  mostly  in  the  city's  lumber  mills.   Immediately,  white  labor  leaders  demanded  the  South  Asian  workers  be  expelled  from  the  city,   claiming  the  newcomers  took  jobs  away  from  white  workers  and  drove  down  wages.”     Information  excerpted  from  http://depts.washington.edu/civilr/bham_intro.htm       Dotbusters:  Anti-­‐Indian  Hate  Group  in  New  Jersey     In  the  fall  of  1987,  an  anti-­‐Indian  hate  group  formed  in  New  York  and  New  Jersey  that   committed  their  crimes  in  Jersey  City.    Hate  crimes  included  burglary,  vandalism,  and  assault  to   murder.    While  the  violence  seemed  to  be  aimed  at  the  Hindu  community,  where  the  wearing   of  the  bindi  is  most  common,  it  is  believed  that  the  Dotbusters  actions  were  based  on  racial   grounds,  aimed  at  South  Asian  immigrants.     Information  excerpted  from:  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dotbusters         Hate  Crimes  During  the  Persian  Gulf  War       The  Persian  Gulf  War  against  Iraq  was  led  by  the  United  States,  and  backed  by  a  UN  Coalition  of   34  nations  states,  and  followed  Iraq’s  invasion  of  Kuwait.    This  conflict  led  to  an  eruption  of   hate  crimes  against  Arabs  and  Muslims,  and  other  ethnic  communities  perceived  to  be  Middle   Eastern  in  the  United  States.     Information  excerpted  from:  http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/gulf/    and   http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/usa1102.pdf       67 Xenophobic  Racism  Against  South  Asians  in  the  United  States:     Past  and  Present       Set  #1   Event  #1:  1907           Description:     On  September  4th,  1907  five  hundred  white  working  class  men  in  Bellingham,   Washington  attacked  South  Asian  millworkers  and  their  families.  Within  ten  days  the   entire  South  Asian  population  departed  town.       Morning  Reveille  Sept.  6,  1907,  p.  4  (Editorial)   The  Hindus  Have  Left  Us.   While  any  good  citizen  must  be  unalterably  opposed  to  the  means  employed,  the  result   of  the  crusade  against  the  Hindus  cannot  but  cause  a  general  and  intense  satisfaction.   The  school  kids,  who  made  up  the  greater  portion  of  the  mob  that  put  the  heathen  out   of  business,  should,  of  course,  be  spanked  and  sent  to  bed  and  the  hoodlums  should  go   to  jail,  but  the  fact  that  the  fear  instilled  into  the  hearts  of  the  Hindus  induced  them  to   return  to  the  land  which  owes  them  protection  [note:  reference  here  is  to  Canada]  is  a   cause  for  rejoicing.  Two  wrongs  never  make  a  right,  it  is  true,  and  such  riotous   demonstrations  are  to  be  discouraged  and  prevented,  but  the  departure  of  the  Hindus   will  leave  no  regret.     From  every  standpoint  it  is  most  undesirable  that  these  Asians  should  be  permitted  to   68 remain  in  the  United  States.  They  are  repulsive  in  appearance  and  disgusting  in  their   manners.  They  are  said  to  be  without  shame  and,  while  no  charges  of  immorality  are   brought  against  them,  their  actions  and  customs  are  so  different  from  ours  that  there   can  never  be  tolerance  of  them.  They  contribute  nothing  to  the  growth  and  up-­‐building   of  the  city  as  the  result  of  their  labors.  They  work  for  small  wages  and  do  not  put  their   money  into  circulation.  They  build  no  homes  and  while  they  numerically  swell  the   population,  it  is  of  a  class  that  we  may  well  spare.  ...  ...They  have  been  working  here   because  of  the  labor  shortage,  but  now  that  they  have  decamped  their  places  will  be   filled  by  white  men...There  can  be  no  two  sides  to  such  a  question.  The  Hindu  is  a   detriment  to  the  town,  while  the  white  man  is  a  distinct  advantage.  .     Information  sourced  from:   Image:  ” The Reveille (September 5, 1907)   http://www.wce.wwu.edu/resources/AACR/documents/bellingham/main/8.htm (Accessed July 18, 2011). Courtesy of the Asian American Curriculum and Research Project Article:  “The  Reveille”  The  Hindus  Have  Left  Us,  (September  6,  1907)  Seattle  Civil  Rights  &  Labor  History   Project  <  http://depts.washington.edu/civilr/  http://depts.washington.edu/civilr/bham_news.htm)>         Event  #2:  2005     “In  the  fall  of  2005,  seventh-­‐grader  Mandeep  Singh’s  daily  routine  included  fighting  off   classmates  who  pulled  and  yanked  at  his  jurdha  (the  topknot  worn  by  Sikh  men)  while   calling  him  “Bin  Laden”  and  “meatball  head.”  Though  Mandeep  and  the  Sikh  Coalition   repeatedly  complained  to  his  school’s  administration,  nothing  was  done  to  stem  the   harassment  for  almost  two  years.    In  February  2005  students  hit  the  seventh-­‐grader   twice  on  his  head,  leading  to  contusions  and  a  severe  injury  that  left  Mandeep  confined   to  bed  rest  for  weeks.  Unconvinced  that  the  school  could  do  anything  to  ensure  their   son’s  safety,  Mandeep’s  parents  sent  him  back  to  his  native  England  to  finish  his   schooling.”     Information  sourced  from:   http://sikhcoalition.org/documents/pdf/HatredintheHallwaysFinal.pdf           69 Xenophobic  Racism  Against  South  Asians  in  the  United  States:     Past  and  Present       Set  #2     Scenario  #1:  1987     In  1987,  a  30-­‐year  old  immigrant  from  India  who  worked  in  a  bank,  Navroze  Mody,  was   brutally  beaten  to  death  by  a  group  of  teenagers  who  called  themselves  “Dotbusters.”   This  group  was  active  in  New  Jersey,  where  a  large  South  Asian  immigrant  community  is   concentrated,  and  they  had  been  harassing  immigrants  from  South  Asia  for  months.    A   month  before  Mody’s  killing,  Dotbusters  (referring  to  the  bindi  that  Hindu  women   where  on  their  foreheads  for  religious  purposes),  sent  a  letter  to  a  local  newspaper.     Part  of  their  letter  read:     "I'm  writing  about  your  article  during  July  about  the  abuse  of  Indian  People.  Well  I'm   here  to  state  the  other  side.  I  hate  them;  if  you  had  to  live  near  them  you  would  also.   We  are  an  organization  called  dot  busters.  We  have  been  around  for  2  years.  We  will  go   to  any  extreme  to  get  Indians  to  move  out  of  Jersey  City.  If  I'm  walking  down  the  street   and  I  see  a  Hindu  and  the  setting  is  right,  I  will  hit  him  or  her.  We  plan  some  of  our  most   extreme  attacks  such  as  breaking  windows,  breaking  car  windows,  and  crashing  family   parties.  …    They  are  a  weak  race  physically  and  mentally.  We  are  going  to  continue  our   way.  We  will  never  be  stopped."       In  Jersey  City,  not  long  after  Mody’s  death,  another  person  of  South  Asian  origin  was   assaulted  by  three  men  with  baseball  bats.    Incidents  still  continue  even  though  laws   against  hate  crimes  have  been  instituted  in  New  Jersey.     Information  sourced  from:  http://pluralism.org/ocg/CDROM_files/hinduism/dot_busters.php       Scenario  #2:  2003     “On  November  27,  2003  Metro  West  reported  that  an  Ashland,  Massachusetts   teenager  defaced  a  Hindu  temple  in  Ashland  on  Halloween.  Anthony  Picciolo,  17,  was   convicted  of  spray-­‐painting  hate  messages.  Police  said  Piccioli  spray  painted  'Sand  N-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐   beware,'  and  'head,'  on  a  rock  near  the  Hindu  temple.  Police  said  'head'  was  short  for   'towel  head.'  On  June  25,  2003  in  Boston,  an  Indian  graduate  student  named  Saurabh   Bhalerao,  who  was  working  part  time  as  a  pizza  deliveryman,  was  the  target  of   deplorable  abuse.  He  was  robbed,  beaten,  burned  with  cigarettes,  stuffed  in  a  trunk  and   stabbed  twice  before  finally  being  dumped  along  a  road.  Police  suspect  that  the   attackers  mistook  the  Hindu  man  for  a  Muslim.  As  they  were  beating  him,  the  attackers   supposedly  taunted,  ‘go  back  to  Iraq.’”   Information  sourced  from:  http://www.pluralism.org/reports/view/104   70 Xenophobic  Racism  Against  South  Asians  in  the  United  States:     Past  and  Present       Set  #3     Event  #1:  1991     Suspicious  Fires  Probed  for  Ties  to  Gulf  Tension:  Crime:  An  arson  unit  studies  a  West   Los  Angeles  market  blaze  and  police  label  the  torching  of  a  Sherman  Oaks  store  a   likely  hate  crime.  Owners  of  both  businesses  are  of  Mideast  descent     ….The  Los  Angeles  Fire  Department,  meanwhile,  opened  an  arson  investigation  into  the   other  blaze  that  seriously  damaged  the  Elat  Market  on  West  Pico  Boulevard  and   destroyed  an  adjoining  stationery  store  and  storage  area.  The  fire,  which  occurred  about   11  p.m.  Tuesday,  caused  an  estimated  $325,000  damage.   “Because  of  the  situation  in  the  Middle  East,  we  called  for  an  arson  unit  right  away,”   said  Assistant  Fire  Chief  Ed  Allen.  “The  market  is  owned  by  a  gentleman  from  Iran.”   “The  fire  had  a  very  good  start,”  Allen  added.  “There  was  a  lot  of  heavy  smoke  when  the   first  companies  arrived.  It  very  quickly  broke  through  the  roof.  When  that  happens,  you   take  a  hard  look  at  it.”   Although  the  owner,  Ray  Golbari,  said  repeatedly  he  thought  the  fire  was  “just  an   accident,”  some  neighbors  said  it  was  possible  someone  had  started  the  fire  in  the   mistaken  belief  that  Golbari  is  of  Arab,  rather  than  Jewish,  descent.   The  Elat  Market  has  signs  in  both  Hebrew  and  Persian  script  on  the  front,  but  Golbari   said  the  Persian  script  is  sometimes  misread  as  Arabic.   There  have  been  two  other  suspicious  fires  in  the  Pico-­‐Robertson  district  in  recent   weeks.  One  occurred  Dec.  27  at  an  insurance  agency,  and  another  on  the  night  of  Jan.   17  at  a  hot  dog  stand.   “This  is  the  kind  of  violence  that  we  have  been  warning  the  authorities  that  the  Arab-­‐ American  community  would  be  subjected  to,”  said  Nazih  Bayda,  regional  director  of  the   American-­‐Arab  Anti-­‐Discrimination  Committee.   Information  sourced  from:  http://articles.latimes.com/1991-­‐01-­‐24/news/mn-­‐1117_1_hate-­‐ crime   71 Event  #2:  February  2009      “As  an  eighth-­‐grade  student  at  Beckendorf  Junior  High  School  in  Katy,  Texas-­‐-­‐the  same   town  where  residents  infamously  held  pig  races  to  protest  a  proposed  mosque  in  2006  -­‐ -­‐  Abdul  Hamed  initially  accepted  a  classmate's  explanation  that  jibes  like  "terrorist"  and   "you're  family  blows  things  up,"  were  just  jokes.   But  the  teasing  continued  almost  daily,  and  soon  escalated  into  shoving.   Abdul  alerted  his  teachers,  who  separated  the  boys  in  class,  but  the  bullying  would   continue  in  the  hallways.  In  early  February  2009,  on  the  school's  track  field,  Abdul   shoved  back.   According  to  Abdul,  the  boy  left  but  returned  several  minutes  later  and  sucker  punched   him,  knocking  him  out  and  breaking  his  jaw.  That  was  how  Abdul's  Palestinian  parents   first  learned  about  the  bullying.   Abdul  said  school  officials  made  the  boy  go  to  anger  management  counseling.  "For  what   I  went  through,  that  punishment  wasn't  even  close,"  said  Abdul,  whose  jaw  was  wired   shut  and  missed  several  weeks  of  school.   Abdul,  now  a  15-­‐year-­‐old  sophomore  at  Seven  Lakes  High  School  where  his  attacker  also   goes,  said  he's  “moved  on.”     Information  sourced  from:  http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/09/07/bullying-­‐muslim-­‐teens-­‐ push-­‐back_n_952947.html     72 Xenophobic  Racism  Against  South  Asians  –  Past  &  Present     SUMMARIZE!       What’s  happening  in  each  event?   Which  acts  are  micro-­‐aggressions,  which  might  be  called  bullying,  and  which  are  hate  crimes?   Event  #1   Event  #2       ANALYZE!     What  terms  are  used  to  describe  South  Asians  in  each  event?   Event  #1   Event  #2                       SYNTHESIZE!     Why  does  this  matter?  What  does  this  show  us?  How?   Event  #1   Event  #2         73     LESSON  6:  FROM  BYSTANDER  TO  ALLY  -­‐  TAKING  ACTION  TO  STOP  XENOPHOBIC  BULLYING       Time:  60  minutes       Essential  Questions   • How  can  individual  actions  make  a  difference?   • What  can  we  do  to  make  our  school  a  better  place?   • How  can  we  contribute  to  positive  social  change  in  society?     Lesson  Objectives   Learners  will  be  able  to:   • Practice  taking  action  when  they  see  someone  being  bullied;   • Explore  common  forms  of  discrimination  and  consider  ways  to  intervene  effectively;   • Understand  what  being  an  ally  means  and  how  to  cultivate  behaviors  that  promote   respect  for  differences  and  pluralism.       Materials   1. Scenarios  from  Lesson  4  (3  scenarios,  1  per  group)   2. Cyberbullying  handout/worksheet  (one  per  student)   3. Pledge  of  Ally-­‐giance  (one  per  student)       Performance  Tasks   Cyberbullying  &  Pledge  of  Ally-­‐giance     Opening  Activity  (15  minutes)   1. Hand  out  the  Cyberbullying  Facts  and  Activity  Sheet.       2. Divide  students  into  groups  of  3-­‐4  students  each.       3. Ask  students  to  read  through  the  definitions  and  share  in  their  small  groups  any   examples  they  have  seen  of  Cyberbullying.  Have  each  group  brainstorm  responses  to   the  two  questions  on  the  back  of  the  worksheet.  If  time  permits,  have  some  of  the   groups  share  out  the  ideas  they  came  up  with.               Main  Activity  (15  minutes)   1. Divide  the  class  into  3  groups.   2. Pass  out  the  scenarios  from  Lesson  5  (1  per  group).       3. Have  each  group  consider  how  people  acting  as  allies  could  have  changed  the  situation   encountered  in  the  article  to  result  in  a  positive  and  non-­‐violent  outcome.       4. Ask  students  to  develop  a  brief  role-­‐play  –  acting  out  the  situation  and  how  an  ally   helped.    The  roles  might  include  bullies,  victims,  bystanders,  and  allies  (as  well  as   teachers  and  parents  if  the  scenario  includes  them).     74     5. Each  group  will  get  3  minutes  to    act  out  the  scenario  with  the  changed  outcome  based   on  the  actions  of  the  ally  or  allies.       Closing  Activity  (10  minutes)   1. Ask  students  why  being  an  ally  is  important.   2. If  they  want  to,  ask  students  to  sign  the  “Pledge  of  Ally-­‐giance.”               Options  for  continuing  this  learning  unit:       o Have  students  plan  a  “school  audit”  where  they  can  investigate  how  safe  their   school  community  is  for  people  of  different  backgrounds  (students  who  identify  as   gay,  lesbian,  bisexual  or  transgender;  religious  or  racial  minorities;  etc…)     o Have  students  work  with  administrators  to  create  a  community  map  of  areas  where   bullying  is  most  likely  to  occur  and  devise  strategies  for  addressing  bullying.         o Plan  a  screening  and  discussion  of  the  film  “Divided  we  Fall”  by  Valarie  Kaur  on   discrimination  against  South  Asians  and  Muslims  after  9/11.  Several  lessons   accompany  the  film  and  are  available  at:  http://www.dwf-­‐film.com/for-­‐educators     o Plan  a  screening  and  discussion  of  the  film  “Bully”  by  Lee  Hirsch  on  bullying  in  U.S.   schools.    A  curriculum  developed  by  the  organization  Facing  History  and  Ourselves  is   available  at:  http://www.facinghistory.org/publications/guide-­‐film-­‐bully-­‐fostering-­‐ empathy-­‐ac     o Explore  how  to  train  students  as  peer  mediators  to  identify  and  intervene  when  they   see  bullying  happening.       o Create  a  club  that  raises  awareness  about  issues  of  bullying,  diversity,  tolerance,   etc…         75     Cyber-­‐Bullying  Facts  and  Figures     Cyberbullying  is  a  repeated  form  of  harassment  of  using  communication  technology  like   cellular  phones,  computers,  or  video  games.      Some  examples  of  Cyberbullying  are:     o Sharing  someone’s  picture  (particularly  inappropriate  or  revealing  photos)  without  their   permission   o Airing  someone’s  private  conversation  to  others  (also  sometimes  known  as  “outing”)   o Posting  mean  comments  or  sending  hurtful  or  threatening  text  messages   o Creating  hate  sites  (Facebook  or  other  websites  dedicated  to  insulting  someone)   o Stealing  a  password  and  posting  under  someone  else’s  name    (also  known  as   “impersonation”)     Reasons  for  Cyberbullying:     o People  think  it’s  funny   o They  think  it  might  make  them  more   popular   o Jealousy  or  envy     o Electronic  spaces  can  be  anonymous     o Revenge  for  being  bullied     Facts:     o Over  42%  of  kids  who  have  acccess   to  the  internet  in  the  U.S.  report   being  bullied  online.       o One  in  ten  kids  on  Facebook  report   being  bullied  on  the  site.       o 3  million  kids  are  absent  each  month   in  the  U.S.  because  they  are  afraid   of  bullies.     o 90%  of  teens  who  witness  online   bullying  say  they  ignore  it.       No  matter  the  reason,  Cyberbullying  is  never  okay.  Talk  to  an  adult,  save  the  message,  or  in  the   case  of  a  threat,  approach  the  police  if  you  are  being  bullied.       Information  drawn  from:  http://www.onlinecollege.org/cyberbullying/  &  http://vtisp.org/parents/cyberbullying/     76     Cyberbullying  Worksheet   In  groups  of  3-­‐4,  brainstorm  answers  to  the  following  two  questions.     1.  What  are  3  ways  you  could  respond  if  you  see  this  on  Facebook?    Who  else   would  you  ask  to  help  you  respond?         2.  What  would  it  mean  to  be  a  Cyber-­‐Ally?    What  types  of  steps  could  you  take?     77       Pledge  of  Ally-­‐giance     I  believe  that:     No  one   o Deserves  to  be  bullied.   o Deserves  to  be  discriminated  against  because  of  their  race,   religion,  color,  ethnicity,  language,  sexual  orientation,   disability,  etc.     o Should  be  targeted  in  our  school  for  any  reason.     I  pledge  to:   o Speak  up  when  I  see  somebody  being  insulted  or  targeted.  If   it’s  unsafe  to  stand  up  to  a  bully,  I  will  look  for  help  from  an   adult  (parent,  teacher,  school  counselor,  coach,  etc.).   o If  I  see  an  adult  saying  or  doing  things  that  are  insulting,   mean,  or  prejudiced,  I  will  stand  up  for  what  I  know  is  right.       o Treat  everyone  fairly  and  equally  regardless  of  their   background.           _______________________     ______________   Signature               Date   78 ANNOTATED  RESOURCE  LIST     Curricular  and  Lesson  Plans       o The  Bully  Project:  toolkits  for  educators.     http://thebullyproject.com/toolkits/educatorstoolkit.html   3  short  documents  on  community  involvement,  educators'  roles  in  bullying  prevention,   and  the  “Principals'  Pledge  to  Stop  Bullying.  Period.”       o The  Bullyproof  Classroom:  Professional  Development  Opportunities  for  Teachers.   “Great  Anti  Bullying  Activities  and  Lesson  Plans”   James  H.  Burns   http://bullyproofclassroom.com/great-­‐anti-­‐bullying-­‐activities   3  anti-­‐bullying  activities  and  one  full  lesson  plan  for  educators.  Appropriate  for  late   elementary  to  middle  school  students.       o Eyes  on  Bullying.  “Preventing  bullying  in  children's  lives!”     http://www.eyesonbullyin   Video,  news  article,  and  general  information  on  how  to  prevent  bullying.     o Sikh  Coalition  anti-­‐bullying  resources.       http://www.sikhcoalition.org/resources/educational-­‐materials   http://www.sikhcoalition.org/resources/sikh-­‐awareness   All  Sikh  awareness  and  anti-­‐bullying  resources  for  teachers,  Sikh  parents,  and  Sikh   students.     o Project  Change.  Bullying  Prevention  Peer  Education  Program.     http://www.projectchange-­‐md.org/yhtp/what.php   Focuses  on  youth-­‐powered  community  improvement  through  peer  education.  Provides   steps  for  what  to  do  in  bullying  situations.       o This  is  Where  I  need  to  Be:  Oral  Histories  of  Muslim  Youth  in  NYC   http://www.thisiswhereineedtobe.com/teachers.html   A  curriculum  guide  with  lesson  plans,  an  oral  history  primer,  and  additional  resources   for  educators.  Includes  video  segments  of  students'  oral  histories  that  compose  the   eponymous  book.     o National  Education  Association.  “Muslims  in  America:  When  Bullying  meets  Religion”   Sabrina  Holcomb   http://www.nea.org/home/42528.htm   Overview  of  the  rise  anti-­‐Islamic  bullying  and  what  educators  can  do  to  prevent     it.  Also  includes  an  educator's  guide  to  Islamic  religious  practices.         79 Videos  and  Film     o “An  America  for  All  of  Us:  Reflections  &  Action”     South  Asian  Americans  Leading  Together  (SAALT)         http://saalt.org/attachments/1/Calling%20Students-­‐ Build%20an%20America%20for%20All%20of%20Us%21.pdf   Detailed  facilitators  guide  for  an  hour  long  workshop  accompanying  on  the  film.             http://saalt.org/attachments/1/Campus%20Workshop%20Cheat%20Sheet.pdf   Also  includes  a  “cheat  sheet”  with  key  terms,  potential  plans,  statistics,  and  policies  on   bullying.       o “Bullying:  It  Stops  Here”     Anderson  Cooper  360°  Town  Hall     http://cnnpressroom.blogs.cnn.com/2011/10/04/anderson-­‐cooper-­‐360%C2%B0-­‐town-­‐ hall-­‐%E2%80%9Cbullying-­‐it-­‐stops-­‐here%E2%80%9D-­‐to-­‐air-­‐october-­‐9/   In  collaboration  with  CNN,  Facebook,  Cartoon  Network,  and  Time,  Inc.,  Anderson   Cooper  hosts  this  week-­‐long  series  focuses  on  how  to  stop  the  bullying  crisis.  The  ending   town  hall  special  takes  place  at  Rutgers  University  one  year  after  Rutgers  freshman  Tyler   Clementi's  death.       o “Bullies  Called  Him  Pork  Chop.  He  Took  That  Pain  With  Him  And  Then  Cooked  It  Into   This” http://www.upworthy.com/bullies-­‐called-­‐him-­‐pork-­‐chop-­‐he-­‐took-­‐that-­‐pain-­‐with-­‐him-­‐ and-­‐then-­‐cooked-­‐it-­‐into   A  remarkable  animated  video  clip  that  describes  the  pain  of  bullying  in  an  artistically   innovative  way.       o “Change  Attitudes  Toward  Bullying:  Be  An  Ally”     https://www.teachingchannel.org/videos/be-­‐an-­‐ally   Video  lesson  designed  to  encourage  students  to  be  allies.       o “Divided  We  Fall:  America  in  the  Aftermath”   Valerie  Kaur   Film:  http://www.dwf-­‐film.com/buy   Curricular  Resources:  http://www.dwf-­‐film.com/for-­‐educators   Documentary  on  confronting  race  and  religion  in  a  post-­‐9/11  America.  Includes  a   discussion  guide  for  screenings  and  multi-­‐disciplinary  resources.       o TVbyGIRLS     http://www.tvbygirls.tv/the_site/videos.html   Youth  organization  focusing  on  leadership,  critical  thinking,  and  social  justice  for  young   women  and  girls.  Created  in  response  to  mainstream  media  representations  of  girls  and   women.       80 o “Sikhs  vs.  Sheiks”     Totally  Biased  with  W.  Kamau  Bell   http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vZ_MTNHk2Dw   Comedian  criticizing  mainstream  conservative  news  sources  for  their  confusion  of  Sikhs   and  Sheiks.  Uses  humor  to  highlight  the  tensions  in  racial,  ethnic,  and  cultural   stereotypes.         o 10  minute  Video  of  a  Personal  Account  of  Experiences  with  Xenophobia  (Sonny  Singh)   http://www.withwingsandroots.com/video/article-­‐of-­‐faith     o Remembering  the  Oak  Cree  Tragedy  in  Film  (Valerie  Kaul)   http://www.huffingtonpost.com/valarie-­‐kaur/remembering-­‐the-­‐oak-­‐ creek_b_2624819.html       Cyberbullying     o “11  Facts  About  Cyber  Bullying”     http://www.dosomething.org/tipsandtools/11-­‐facts-­‐about-­‐cyber-­‐bullying   Key  facts  and  statistics  about  cyber  bullying  for  middle  and  high  school  students.       o “Cyberbullying:  Understanding  and  Addressing  Online  Cruelty”   http://www.adl.org/education/curriculum_connections/cyberbullying/cyberbullying_ed ition_cc_entireunit.pdf   Comprehensive  resource  kit  for  educators  compiled  by  the  Anti-­‐defamation  League.   Includes  lesson  plans  and  activities  appropriate  for  elementary,  middle,  and  high  school   classrooms.         o “The  Development  and  Validation  of  the  Online  Victimization  Scale  for  Adolescents”   Brendesha  M.  Tynes,  Chad  A.  Rose,  David  R.  Williams     Cyberpsychology:  Journal  of  Psychosocial  Research  on  Cyberspace     http://www.cyberpsychology.eu/view.php?cisloclanku=2010112901   Article  outlining  the  Online  Victimization  Scale  (OVS)  and  its  possible  uses  and  validity  in   practice.       o “Standing  up,  Not  Standing  By”     Common  Sense  Media     http://www.commonsensemedia.org/educators/cyberbullying-­‐toolkit   Free  cyberbullying  toolkit  for  elementary,  middle,  and  high  school  educators.  Features  a   short  video  on  cyberbullying  and  accompanying  lesson  plans.             81 News  Articles     o BBC  News.  “Daily  torment  of  racism  in  the  classroom”   Divya  Talwar,  5/22/12.   http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/education-­‐18150650   Tells  the  story  of  Khadeja  Fahat,  a  14-­‐year-­‐old  student,  and  her  experiences  of  being   bullied.  Highlights  the  lasting  impacts  of  bullying  on  mental  and  socio-­‐emotional  health,   and  why  and  how  it  needs  to  be  prevented.       o The  Guardian.  “Passport,  visa,  virginity?  A  mother's  tale  of  immigration  in  the  1970s”   Huma  Qureshi,  5/12/11.     http://www.guardian.co.uk/lifeandstyle/2011/may/13/virginity-­‐tests-­‐uk-­‐immigrants-­‐ 1970s   Reflection  on  virginity  tests  administered  to  South  Asian  women  at  Heathrow  airport   and  its  implications  for  racial  and  gender  discrimination.       o The  Huffington  Post.  “Islamophobia,  Sikhophobia,  and  Media  Profiling”   Simran  Jeet  Singh,  7/11/12.   http://www.huffingtonpost.com/simran-­‐jeet-­‐singh/islamophobia-­‐sikhophobia-­‐and-­‐ media-­‐profiling_b_1654692.html   Discusses  the  portrayal  of  “The  Islamic  other”  and  its  negative  consequences  for   Muslims  and  non-­‐Muslims.       o The  Huffington  Post.  “9/11  Bullying:  Muslim  Teens  Push  Back”   Omar  Sacirbey,  9/8/11   http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/09/07/bullying-­‐muslim-­‐teens-­‐push-­‐ back_n_952947.html     Article  discussing  the  youth  response  to  anti-­‐Muslim  bullying  in  a  post-­‐9/11  era  and  the   added  challenge  of  having  to  stand  up  to  negative  representations  in  news  and  media.       o The  New  York  Times.  “Test  Your  Savvy  on  Religion”     Nicholas  D.  Kristof,  10/9/10.     http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/10/opinion/10kristof.html   Op-­‐ed  article  that  includes  a  multiple-­‐choice  test  designed  to  show  the  complications  of   understanding  religion.       Journal  Articles  &  Papers     o Berkman  Center  for  Internet  &  Society  at  Harvard  University.  Series  of  papers  on   Bullying     o “Bullying  in  a  Networked  Era:  A  Literature  Review”   Nathaniel  Levy,  et  al.,  9/17/2012.   http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/publications/2012/kbw_bulling_in_a_networked_ 82 era   o "What  You  Must  Know  to  Help  Combat  Youth  Bullying,  Meanness,  and  Cruelty"   by  danah  boyd  and  John  Palfrey   o "An  Overview  of  State  Anti-­‐Bullying  Legislation  and  Other  Related  Laws"  by  Dena   Sacco,  Katharine  Silbaugh,  Felipe  Corredor,  June  Casey,  and  Davis  Doherty   o "Bullying  Prevention  101  for  Schools:  Dos  and  Don'ts"  by  Susan  Swearer,  Mia   Doces,  Lisa  Jones,  and  Anne  Collier   o "Implementing  Bullying  Prevention  Programs  in  Schools:  A  How-­‐To  Guide"  by   Lisa  Jones,  Mia  Doces,  Susan  Swearer,  and  Anne  Collier   o "Changing  the  Culture:  Ideas  for  Student  Action"  by  Anne  Collier,  Susan  Swearer,   Mia  Doces,  and  Lisa  Jones     o Terrazas,  A.  (2008).  Indian  Immigrants  in  the  United  States   Migration  Policy  Institute.  Accessed  October  29,  2012,  online  at   http://www.migrationinformation.org/usfocus/display.cfm?ID=687       Magazines  and  Blogs     o CAIR-­‐Chicago.    “'Know  Your  Rights':  Bullying  at  School”     Sarah  Goomar,  7/5/12.   http://www.cairchicago.org/2012/07/05/know-­‐your-­‐rights-­‐bullying-­‐at-­‐school/   How  to  identify  how  and  when  bullying  is  occurring  at  school,  and  how  students'  rights   should  protect  against  it.           o Colorlines.  “Not  Senseless,  Not  Random:  The  Deadly  Mix  of  Race,  Guns  &  Madness”   Rinku  Sen,  8/6/12.     http://colorlines.com/archives/2012/08/how_long_before_islamophobias_toxic_spread _destroys_america.html   Article  arguing  that  the  Oak  Creek  shooting  at  the  Gurdwara  was  a  racialized  violent   hate  crime  and  actions  that  must  be  taken  in  its  aftermath.       o Counterpunch.  “The  Sense  of  White  Supremacy”   Vijay  Prashad,  8/6/12.     http://www.counterpunch.org/2012/08/06/the-­‐sense-­‐of-­‐white-­‐supremacy/   Article  on  the  Oak  Creek  shooting  at  the  Gurdwara.  Provides  background  information  on   anti-­‐Sikh  violence.         o Harvard  Graduate  School  of  Education.  “The  Bullying  Conundrum”   Ed.  Magazine,  Fall  2012.     http://www.gse.harvard.edu/news-­‐impact/2012/09/the-­‐bullying-­‐conundrum/   Article  discussing  why  bullying  awareness  needs  to  be  a  part  of  school  curriculums.       o PsychCentral.  “Beating  the  Bully:  Cope  with  Bullying  at  Any  Age”   83 Katherine  Prudente   http://blogs.psychcentral.com/bullying/   Blog  for  youth  and  adults  dealing  with  how  to  handle  bullying  behavior.  Updated   frequently  by  the  calendar  month.       o Racialicious.  “Hate  Crimes  Always  Have  A  Logic:  On  The  Oak  Creek  Gurudwara   Shootings”   Harsha  Walia,  8/6/12.   http://www.racialicious.com/2012/08/06/hate-­‐crimes-­‐always-­‐have-­‐a-­‐logic-­‐on-­‐the-­‐oak-­‐ creek-­‐gurudwara-­‐shootings/   A    reflection  on  The  Oak  Creek  Gurudwara  Shootings  and  its  relation  to  systemic  racism.         o Teaching  Tolerance.  “Bullied,  Bully,  Bystander...and  Beyond”     Barbara  Coloroso,  Spring  2011.     http://www.tolerance.org/magazine/number-­‐39-­‐spring-­‐2011/bully-­‐bullied-­‐ bystanderand-­‐beyond   Article  examining  the  complex  relationship  between  the  roles  people  play  in  bullying   and  suggestions  for  change.         Useful  Books  for  Curriculum       o South  Asia  Book  Award   http://southasiabookaward.org/2012-­‐award-­‐books/   List  of  winners,  honorable  mentions,  and  highly  commended  for  the  South  Asia  Book   Award  for  children's  and  young  adult  literature.         o South  Asia  and  the  South  Asian  Diaspora  in  Children's  Literature   http://www.poojamakhijani.com/picture_books.html   Annotated  bibliography  for  elementary  school  books.   http://www.poojamakhijani.com/young_adult.html   Annotated  bibliography  for  young  adults  books.     o Bengali  Harlem  and  the  Lost  Histories  of  South  Asian  America     http://bengaliharlem.com/   This  new  book  project  explores  the  undocumented  history  of  early  immigration  of  South   Asians  on  the  east  coast,  and  narratives  of  inter-­‐cultural  solidarity  in  Harlem.           Reference  Books       o Subramanian,  Mathangi.  Bullying:The  Ultimate  Teen  Guide.  Lanham,  MD:  Scarecrow   Press,  Inc.,  forthcoming.   84 Online  Tools     o ARBAX  Project.  Online  Simulations  and  Role-­‐Plays  on  Bullying     (available  February  2013)     http://www.schoolbullying.eu/en/stories   3D  simulation  game  based  on  real-­‐life  situations  and  requires  role-­‐playing  to  find   solutions  and  make  decisions  related  to  bullying  and  xenophobia.       o BullyBust:  Promoting  a  Community  of  Upstanders.  “Upstander  Alliance”   http://www.schoolclimate.org/bullybust/upstander   Free  student  tool  kit  and  moderator  guide  to  implement  Upstander  Alliance  programs  in   schools  and  communities.  Engages  students  and  adults  to  become  leaders  in  their   communities  to  stop  bullying.       o The  Bullying  Project   http://specialneeds.thebullyproject.com/toolkit   Toolkit  to  deal  with  the  bullying  of  children  with  special  needs.  Includes  resources  for   parents,  educators,  and  students.       o Courage  to  Bloom:  Tools  for  Growth  and  Change.  “How  to  Spot  a  Bully”   Psychologist  Elisabeth  Martindale   http://www.couragetobloom.com/how-­‐to-­‐spot-­‐a-­‐bully   Card  decks  designed  to  help  educators  and  school  psychologists  to  get  children  and   youth  to  open  up  about  bullying.     o Islamic  Network  Groups  (ING).  “Statistics:  Is  Bullying  Really  a  Significant  Problem?”     http://www.ing.org/stats   Infographics  and  statistics  on  bullying.       o National  Education  Association   http://www.nea.org/assets/docs/BullyFree_How_To_Identify_Bullying.pdf     o “How  to  Identify  Bullying”  info  sheet.     http://www.nea.org/assets/docs/BullyFree_How_to_Intervene_in_a.pdf   “How  to  Intervene  in  a  Bullying  Incident”  info  sheet.       Organizational  Links     o Anti-­‐Bullying  Centre,  Trinity  College,  Dublin,  Ireland   http://www.abc.tcd.ie/ABC.html   Research  center  that  studies  awareness  and  prevention  of  bully  behavior.  Provides   advice  and  resources  to  counselors,  researchers,  parents,  schools,  and  organizations.   Information  packs  are  available  by  mail.     85   o Counselors  Helping  (South)  Asians/Indians  (CHAI)   http://www.chaicounselors.org     CHAI  seeks  to  provide  proactive  and  culturally  relevant  information  and  referrals  on   mental  health  and  wellness  to  members  of  South  Asian  communities  in  the  United   States.     o Council  on  American-­‐Islamic  Relations  (CAIR)   www.cair.com   Civil  rights  group  that  seems  to  enhance  understanding  of  Islam,  encourage  dialogue,   protect  civil  liberties,  empower  American  Muslims,  and  build  collations  that  promote   justice  and  mutual  understanding.       o Imagine  2050     http://imagine2050.newcomm.org/   Collective  of  activists,  immigrants,  artists,  and  students  promoting  multiracial   democracy  through  conversations  about  race,  immigrant,  environment,  and  American   identity.       o Muslim  Consultative  Network   www.mcnny.org   MCN  seeks  to  build  consensus  and  cooperation  among  diverse  Muslims  (primarily  in  the   NYC  area)  through  dialogue,  education,  collaboration,  and  social  action.     o Sikh  American  Legal  Defense  and  Education  Fund  (SALDEF)   http://www.saldef.org/   The  oldest  Sikh  civil  rights  and  educational  organization  in  the  U.S.,  SALDEF  empowers   Sikh  Americans  through  advocacy,  education,  and  media  relations.  SALDEF  functions  to   protect  the  civil  rights  of  Sikh  Americans.           o Sikh  Healing  Collective   http://Sikhhealingcollective.wordpress.com   A  relief  effort  that  brings  together  trained  mental  health  professionals  to  support  the   mental  health  needs  for  the  Oak  Creek  Sikh  community.       o The  Sikh  Coalition     http://www.sikhcoalition.org/   Community-­‐based  organization  advocating  civil  and  human  rights  for  all.  Works  through   the  legal  system  to  create  strong  local  communities  where  Sikhs  may  freely  practice  and   enjoy  their  faith.       o South  Asian  Americans  Leading  Together  (SAALT)   http://www.saalt.org/   National,  nonpartisan,  non-­‐profit  organization  aimed  to  build  a  more  just  and  inclusive   86 society  in  the  United  States.  Promotes  equality  of  voices  and  perspectives  by  partnering   with  South  Asian  individuals  and  organizations,  public  policy  analysis,  community   mobilization,  and  leadership  development.       o Southern  Poverty  Law  Center  (SPLC)   http://www.splcenter.org/blog/   Blog  managed  by  the  Intelligence  Report,  an  investigative  magazine  published  by  the   Alabama-­‐based  SPLC.  SPLC  is  a  nonprofit  civil  rights  organization  that  fights  bigotry  and   seeks  justice  for  the  most  vulnerable  members  of  society.       o United  Sikhs     http://unitedsikhs.org/   United  Nations  affiliated,  international  non-­‐profit  NGO  specialized  in  humanitarian   relief,  human  development,  and  advocacy.  Empowers  underprivileged  and  minority   communities  and  individuals  through  civic,  educational,  and  personal  development   programs  focusing  on  social  and  economic  activity.     87 88 South Asia: Political 70°E 10°N 20°N 30°N 40°N 60°N 80°E 90°E 60°E 70°E 80°E 90°E 100°E 40°N 30°N 20°N 10°N INDIAN OCEAN A r a b i a n S e a B a y o f B e n g a l Kabul Dhaka ThimphuNew Delhi Kathmandu Islamabad Colombo INDIA SRI LANKA PAKISTAN AFGHANISTAN BHUTAN NEPAL BANGLADESH W E N S National boundary National capital LEGEND 250 500 250 500 0mi 0km 89 90                                     Customizable  professional  development  workshops     for  teachers  and  community  leaders  also  available.     Please  contact  the  authors  if  interested.       ABOUT  THE  AUTHORS       Monisha  Bajaj,  EdD,  [bajaj@tc.columbia.edu]  is  Associate  Professor  of  International  and   Comparative  Education  at  Teachers  College,  Columbia  University.    Her  research  and   teaching  interests  focus  on  education  as  a  force  for  social  transformation  and  education   for  peace  and  human  rights.  She  is  the  editor  of  the  Encyclopedia  of  Peace   Education  and  author  of  Schooling  for  Social  Change:  The  Rise  and  Impact  of  Human 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experiences  of  Muslim-­‐immigrant  youth.  She  is  co-­‐editor  (with  Lesley  Bartlett)  of  the   volume,  Refugees,  Immigrants,  and  Education  in  the  Global  South:  Lives  in  Motion   (Routledge  Research  Series).       Karishma  Desai  [khd2112@tc.columbia.edu]  is  a  doctoral  student  in  the  Department  of   International  and  Transcultural  studies  at  Teachers  College.  Her  research  interests   include:  curriculum  studies;  youth,  globalization,  and  citizenship;  postcolonial  studies,   the  role  of  education  in  social  movements;  and  teacher  education.  She  also  works  as  a   staff  developer  and  curriculum  specialist  at  Central  Queens  Academy,  a  small  middle   school  in  Queens,  NY.         00_Cover 00_TOC 0ii_ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 1a_Intro_for_Facilitators 1b_Key_Concepts 2_UnitOverview 3_Lesson1-SouthAsians_in_the_US 4_Final_Glossary 5_Glossary_Matching_Activity 6_Lesson1_Timeline_Images_rev 7_Lesson1_MigrationTimeline_OVERVIEW_rev 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work_yg4x2ux5gnhcpfaouyppigztwe	----	Diversity and inclusivity at university: a survey of the experiences of lesbian, gay, bisexual and trans (LGBT) students in the UK ELLIS, S. J. Available from Sheffield Hallam University Research Archive (SHURA) at: http://shura.shu.ac.uk/117/ This document is the author deposited version. You are advised to consult the publisher's version if you wish to cite from it. Published version ELLIS, S. J. (2008). Diversity and inclusivity at university: a survey of the experiences of lesbian, gay, bisexual and trans (LGBT) students in the UK. Higher Education. Repository use policy Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any article(s) in SHURA to facilitate their private study or for non- commercial research. You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities or any commercial gain. Sheffield Hallam University Research Archive http://shura.shu.ac.uk http://shura.shu.ac.uk/ Diversity and Inclusivity at University Diversity and inclusivity at university: A survey of the experiences of lesbian, gay, bisexual and trans (LGBT) students in the UK. Sonja J. Ellis Sheffield Hallam University, UK Address for correspondence: Faculty of Development and Society Sheffield Hallam University Collegiate Crescent Campus Sheffield S10 2BP UK. Email: S.J.Ellis@shu.ac.uk Phone: +44 114 2252484 Departmental Fax: +44 114 2252430 Diversity and Inclusivity at University 1 Diversity and inclusivity at university: A survey of the experiences of lesbian, gay, bisexual and trans (LGBT) students in the UK. Abstract The extent to which UK universities are ‘gay friendly’ has received some attention in the press. Whilst there are a number of published studies exploring campus climate for Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Trans (LGBT) students and/or staff, these are primarily localised studies undertaken in State Universities and Baccalaureate Colleges in the US. The present study is a nationwide UK study of campus climate, based on survey data collected from a sample of 291 LGBT students from 42 universities across the UK. The findings show that despite the increased implementation of an equality agenda (e.g. equal access; widening participation) in UK Higher Education, homophobia on campus is still a significant problem and therefore universities are not perceived nor experienced by LGBT students as ‘safe spaces’ in which to be open about sexual orientation/gender identity. The implications of the findings for university policy and practice in relation to LGBT (and indeed all) students is also explored. Keywords Diversity and equal opportunities; Inclusivity; Higher Education; Homophobia; Lesbian, gay, bisexual and trans students. Diversity and Inclusivity at University 2 Diversity and inclusivity at university: A survey of the experiences of lesbian, gay, bisexual and trans (LGBT) students in the UK. Introduction Historically, lesbian, gay, bisexual and trans (LGBT) people have been heavily stigmatised and therefore subject to harassment and discrimination. However, in recent times, most western countries have made considerable moves to afford legal rights on a basis of sexual orientation and/or gender identity. While it is difficult to identify tangible evidence that society itself is more inclusive of LGBT people, recent research (e.g. Ellis, 2002; Hegarty, Pratto & Lemieux, 2004) suggests that, at least in principle, equal rights for LGBT people are well supported. However, homophobic/transphobic hate crimes (i.e. crimes against people or property with sexual orientation/gender identity as a motive) are relatively common. For example, in the UK from April 2006 to March 2007, the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) heard 822 such cases, with 73.5% resulting in convictions (http://www.cps.gov.uk). As with many types of victimisation, hate crime centring on sexual orientation/gender identity is massively underreported. This is often because victims fear further retribution, stigmatisation from the police, and in some cases the risk of their orientation/identity being disclosed. Furthermore, the term ‘hate crime’ does not encompass all forms of victimisation that LGBT people (and indeed those assumed to be LGBT) might encounter. For example, it does not include more mundane incidents such as ‘name-calling’, discriminatory practices and other forms of hostility which may not be crimes (in the legal sense), yet may still be psychologically or emotionally damaging and/or result in social marginalisation. The focus of this paper, therefore, is on the wider remit of harassment and discrimination as it applies to LGBT people. Adopting the widely used definition of sexual orientation/gender identity Diversity and Inclusivity at University 3 discrimination as any incident which is perceived to be homophobic/transphobic by the victim or any other person, this study will focus primarily on the perceptions of homophobia by LGBT students. In the UK, issues around discrimination against LGBT people within a higher education (HE) context have recently received considerable media attention. A number of articles in Times Higher Education (THE) have featured league tables (e.g. Fazackerley 2005) and reports of good practice (e.g. Shepherd 2006) in relation to LGBT issues. Equally though, other articles have highlighted the ways in which universities may be seen as far from ‘gay- friendly’ (e.g. Tysome 2006; Wojtas 2006). For the most part, these reports focus on the experiences of LGBT staff working in UK HE, with limited attention to the student experience. Context The study on which this paper reports was carried out between April and August 2006, and is set within the context of the UK government’s agenda of widening participation and equal opportunities in HE. Aims of the widening participation agenda include encouraging participation by under-represented groups and ensuring that all students have the best possible chance of succeeding in their studies. Since there is a paucity of work on the participation and prospects of LGBT students in Higher Education, and information on the sexual orientation/gender identity of students is not collected; it is impossible to determine the extent to which LGBT people are underrepresented in HE and what retention rates look like for this group of students. However, there is considerable research evidence to suggest that LGBT youth are overrepresented in the statistics for truancy, underachievement, and premature exit from education at secondary school (e.g. see Rivers 2000). It would therefore seem reasonable Diversity and Inclusivity at University 4 to presume that LGBT people should be included within policy and practice aimed at facilitating access to HE and actively supported to ensure their retention. However, all too often widening participation policy and practice focuses primarily on ethnic minority, and occasionally working-class students, at the expense of other underrepresented groups (e.g. disabled students; LGBT students; etc). This is largely due to the fact that (a) funding is often tagged for the support of specific minority groups; (b) that legislation is piecemeal, addressing different forms of prejudice and discrimination under a disparate range of Acts; and (c) the greater visibility of some marginalised groups means that they are more readily identifiable and their participation more easily monitored. With the introduction in December 2003 of the Employment Equality (Sexual Orientation) Regulations, universities in the UK are now required to ensure that staff and students are not discriminated against on the basis of sexual orientation. Similarly, the Gender Equality Act (2006; revised from the Sex Discrimination Act, 1975) was similarly instituted to protect not only women and men, but also Trans people in the workplace. It should be noted, however, that although UK law addresses sexual orientation discrimination and gender discrimination separately, these two issues are deliberately conflated in this paper as homophobia is underpinned by prejudice based on non-conformity in relation to both gender and sexuality. Whilst many universities have acted to develop policies for addressing such discrimination, the implementation and enforcement of these policies is much more opaque. Nevertheless, if these legal obligations are to be fully instituted, consideration of issues around campus climate for LGBT students (and staff) should be a priority for universities and other institutions within the education sector. Furthermore, the UK Equality Act (Sexual Orientation) Regulations (2007) prohibits sexual orientation discrimination in the provision of goods, facilities and services in the public and private sector; including education. Diversity and Inclusivity at University 5 Universities are therefore now legally obliged to ensure that LGBT students are afforded equality in the same way as ethnic minority and other marginalised students. A third reason why this issue is especially pertinent to HE is that university is typically the first time that young people will have been away from home for an extended period. For young LGBT students this is often the first opportunity to explore their identity without the limiting constraints of the home and the secondary school, both of which in many cases are not gay-affirmative settings in which to ‘come out’ (Epstein et al. 2003). Similarly, because of potential repercussions from parents, the school climate often mitigates against LGBT teachers being open about their sexual/gender identity. Therefore, university is often the first time that LGBT youth have encountered openly LGB or T role models. Few will have encountered adult LGBT people prior to coming to university, and for the most part, their knowledge of LGBT issues and people will be that articulated through the homophobic lens of playground bullying, and the negatively biased stereotypes of media portrayals. For all these reasons, it is important to ensure that the university setting is a ‘safe’ environment for LGBT people in the same way that it is desirable that it be a safe and affirming environment for all students, independent of class, race, (dis)ability and so forth. However, this is also a time when the demands on young people to fulfil the heterosexual imperative and form adult opposite-sex couple relationships (Epstein et al. 2003). This places LGBT students at particular risk, highlighting the need for appropriate and adequate support. Homophobia on Campus Within the social science literature, several works (e.g. see Tierney & Rhoads 1993) have highlighted the negative experiences of LGBT academic staff working within universities. However, there are also a number of published studies exploring homophobia in universities more generally under the banner of ‘campus climate’, and typically through localised studies Diversity and Inclusivity at University 6 undertaken in State Universities and Baccalaureate Colleges in the United States (e.g. Eliason 1996; Malaney, et al. 1997; Brown et al. 2004). In addition to the published work, several US institutions (Indiana University; Kansas State University; University of Arizona) have undertaken assessments of campus climate with reports of their findings widely available (e.g. see http://www.lgbtcampus.org/resources/campus_climate.html). In the main, this body of research comprises survey-based studies undertaken in a single institution for the purposes of monitoring equal opportunities for LGBT students on campus. However, these studies vary in the samples which they employ. In most cases both staff and students (‘gay’ and ‘straight’) have been surveyed about campus climate for LGBT people. However, there is one notable exception, a UK study (Fahey, 1995) undertaken more than a decade ago, in which 105 ‘gay’ students from (up to) 35 UK institutions were surveyed about their experiences of homophobic discrimination in HE. Although the findings of these studies vary somewhat, all indicate that homophobia on campus is endemic, with little evidence of real change over the past two decades. For example, in D’Augelli’s (1989) study, 75% of lesbians and gay men surveyed had experienced verbal harassment, 25% had been threatened with physical violence at least once, and 17% had sustained property damage. Similarly, Norris (1991) found that more than 80% of those surveyed had overheard stereotypical or derogatory remarks about lesbians, gay men and bisexuals. In contrast, studies which have surveyed heterosexual students and/or staff have tended to suggest that campus climate is less hostile than is reported in studies with exclusively LGB samples. For example, only 57% of employees in Eliason’s (1996) study thought that anti-LGB attitudes were prevalent, whilst in a study by Malaney et al. (1997) only 25% of students surveyed thought anti-LGBT attitudes were prevalent on campus. A detailed examination of past studies and their reported findings would seem to suggest that differences in findings are more a function of the samples used, the questions asked, and Diversity and Inclusivity at University 7 differences in the types of institutions than ‘real’ differences in the occurrence of homophobia. In particular, the fact that more general samples report less experience of a homophobic climate is to be expected. Although homophobia is not exclusively aimed at LGBT people, it is these people who are most directly affected by it. In contrast, a few small scale qualitative studies looking at campus climate within specific settings – in particular, residence halls (e.g. Taulke-Johnson & Rivers 1999; Evans & Broid, 2002) – have also been published, including one of the few UK studies on campus climate (Taulke-Johnson & Rivers 1999). These studies report findings from samples of fewer than 15 participants based in a very localised setting. Whilst qualitative research lends itself to small samples, and indeed it is difficult to access large samples of LGBT participants, these studies offer valuable insights into LGBT students’ experiences in residence halls. The main finding reported in this type of study centres on the difficulty which LGBT people have in ‘coming out’ in this context. Although some felt supported by the sense of community in their particular corridor/flat, others encountered hostility which made their life at university unnecessarily difficult. However, because there are only a few studies of this kind, and they focus on a residential setting, little is known about students’ experiences on campus more generally. Furthermore, studies which explore campus climate more generally tend to focus on documenting incidences of homophobia and perceptions of homophobic climate with little emphasis on who the perpetrators are, and the contexts within which these incidences occur. Although one UK study (Epstein et al. 2003) explored the experiences of gay male students (N = 12) longitudinally identifying a numbers of structural and implicit issues, the small sample size means it is unclear how widespread these may be. Despite the limitations of existing studies, research over the past 20 years consistently suggests that – at least in the US – homophobia on campus is a significant problem. In particular, verbal harassment and threats of physical violence have been found to be common. Diversity and Inclusivity at University 8 Whilst actual incidents of violence are small in comparison, the subjective climate for LGBT students is one of fear in which many ‘choose’ to stay silent and invisible. For example, most LGBT students report not feeling comfortable disclosing their sexual identity and many report deliberately making changes to their behaviour (e.g. avoiding known lesbian/gay locations; ‘passing’ as straight; disassociating from known LGBT people) in order to avoid harassment and discrimination (e.g. see Taulke-Johnson & Rivers 1999). As with any form of harassment and discrimination (overt or covert) such a ‘climate of fear’ places LGBT students at increased risk of psychological distress. Indeed, research on the psychosocial correlates of homophobia consistently reports a much higher incidence of depression, anxiety and attempted suicide - all of which are subclinical indicators of social stress - among LGBT youth (e.g. see Koh & Ross, 2006). Within the literature, homophobia in education is recognised as a problem which needs addressing. Whilst most of this work is UK-based it primarily focuses on a school rather than university context. For example, there are a number of studies which focus on social exclusion of LGBT youth (e.g. Epstein 1997; Rivers 2000, 2004) and homophobic bullying in school (e.g. Rivers & D’Augelli 2001). On the other hand, work which focuses on intervention in higher education settings is typically US-based, and focuses specifically on the classroom setting and curriculum context. For example, a number of papers highlight the benefits of panel discussions (e.g. Burkholder & Dineen 1996; Nelson & Krieger 1997), the creation of ‘safe zones’ (e.g. Evans 2002), zero tolerance of homophobia in the classroom (Neumann 2005) and diversity training (Finkel et al. 2003) as solutions to address the issue of homophobia on campus. Whilst these approaches have typically been found effective in changing attitudes, they only address part of the problem. By focusing on providing ‘safe spaces’ for LGBT people and increasing awareness of these issues, they are limited in their ability to effect change in the wider social setting of the university. Only a few papers explore Diversity and Inclusivity at University 9 the need for support at an institutional level through policy development and the development of innovative student support services (Messinger 2002; Biaggio et al. 2003), and none address extra-curricular concerns. Rationale Whilst the existing body of literature on campus climate is very illuminating, and that on intervention offers some interesting approaches to addressing this issue, the fact that it is overwhelmingly US-based research raises some issues about its application in a UK context. First, there are some differences between US Universities/Colleges and UK Universities in that the former tend to function like small close-knit communities. This may contribute to differences in the way issues such as homophobia are managed. For example, the tendency for students in the US to live in university/college accommodation on campus, means that the university/college may have the ability to address issues of harassment and discrimination in ways that are not possible in the UK where most students live in accommodation which is not university owned or managed. Perhaps more significant though is the difference in socio- political climate between the UK and US. In particular, the US has tended to be much more conservative about the inclusion of LGBT people and issues whereas in the UK (and in Europe) there has been a much more liberal approach to these issues. It could therefore reasonably be expected that the dominant political ethos in each country would impact both on the way in which such issues are managed within the university context, as well as on the attitudes and behaviours of individuals within those contexts. Potential cross-national differences aside, despite the increased attention to equality and diversity, widening participation, and inclusivity in UK universities, surprisingly little is known about the prevalence (or otherwise) of harassment and discrimination against LGBT people in UK HE. Whilst data may be collected in some institutions, data on this issue is not Diversity and Inclusivity at University 10 systematically nor routinely collected. To date, there is no publicly available baseline data on this topic. The purpose of this study is, therefore, to explore LGBT students’ perceptions and experiences of homophobic discrimination/harassment on campus, and to gather baseline descriptive data regarding campus climate (in relation to homophobia) in the UK. Rather than focusing on a single setting (e.g. halls of residence; classroom teaching) this study aims to explore campus climate more generally, with a view to identifying barriers (or points of resistance) to inclusivity for LGBT students. Unlike other studies published to date this is a national study and therefore focused on general issues rather than those specific to a given institution. Furthermore, it offers a more comprehensive approach to campus climate through a multifaceted questionnaire rather than the more narrowly focussed (and somewhat patchy) questionnaires used in previous studies. Method Participants Participants comprised a self-selected sample of 291 LGBT students (57% male; 42% female; 1% unspecified) from 42 universities across the UK, primarily recruited via student union based LGBT groups. They ranged in age from 18-52 (mean = 22) and 88.4% of the sample were aged 25 or under. In the UK, the Higher Education sector comprises ‘traditional universities’ (those inaugurated prior to 1992), ‘modern universities’ (those incorporated since the institution of the Further and Higher Education Act in 1992) and ‘University Colleges’ which teach degree programmes, but are not recognised as a university and typically are affiliated to a university through which their degrees are awarded. All three types of institution were represented Diversity and Inclusivity at University 11 within this sample: Respondents represent 32 traditional universities, nine modern universities, and one university college. Although 0.7% of the sample identified as heterosexual, 51.9% identified as gay male, 25.4% as lesbian/gay female, 16.8% as bisexual (9 male; 40 female), 0.7% as trans and 4.1% ‘other’ (e.g. “gay AND trans”, “I don’t identify myself”, “predominantly gay but open- minded”). The sample predominantly comprised ‘white’ participants (90.7%) with a small number identifying as Irish (3.4%), Asian (1.3%), Black (0.6%) or other. Most (87.6%) were undergraduates and the sample as a whole represented students from a wide range of subjects and disciplines. Procedure Based on surveys used in existing published studies, a questionnaire was developed to explore both actual experiences of homophobia on campus and perceptions of the ‘gay-friendliness’ of the university. The final questionnaire consisted of 25 questions comprising 5-point likert- type scales, forced-choice (yes/no) and open-response formats. Questions included in the survey covered four main aspects of campus climate. These were actual harassment/discrimination (e.g. 'since you have been at university have you ever been a victim of homophobic harassment/discrimination?'); perceptions of campus climate (e.g. 'how often do you think students at your campus might experience direct verbal harassment because they were thought/known to be LGBT?'); campus climate and outness (e.g. 'since you have been at university have you ever deliberately concealed your sexual orientation or gender identity to avoid intimidation?'); and LGBT inclusiveness (e.g. 'LGBT issues are adequately represented within the curriculum'). The survey was administered electronically via an online Proforma hosted on the University’s server. A request for participation, which contained the direct URL link to the Diversity and Inclusivity at University 12 questionnaire was sent to every university in the UK. Where a contact point could be established, the request was sent directly to the Chair/Leader of the university’s LGBT Society/Association. Where the existence of such a group could not be confirmed, the call for participants was sent to the President (or similar Executive) of the Students’ Union requesting that it be forwarded to the appropriate contact person. By the number of responses returned per institution, it was evident that in many cases the message was forwarded to mailing-list members of the respective LGBT group as requested. It is likely that through 'snowballing' (see Ritchie & Lewis 2003) some non-members of such groups may have been reached; however, it is not possible to determine the extent to which this was the case. Questionnaire responses were automatically collated by Questionnaire Maker (the programme with which the survey was created). At the end of the survey period, the quantitative responses were imported into SPSS for analysis. The quantitative data did not meet the assumptions of parametric analysis (i.e. normal distribution; at least interval level data) therefore non-parametric analyses have been used throughout this paper. Analyses were carried out both for the whole sample, and by group (i.e. on a basis of gender, age, sexual identity, and discipline of study). Age differences were not found for any of the questionnaire items. Where analyses have been undertaken on sexual identity, the 17 respondents who did not identify as gay male, lesbian or bisexual have been excluded from the analysis. Since participants represented a wide range of degree subjects, these were categorised into two groups: ‘people-based’ (e.g. Psychology, Social Sciences, Education, Medicine) and other (e.g. Humanities, business, art). Degree subjects were deemed ‘people-based’ if their focus was primarily about people (i.e. behaviour, learning, health, social wellbeing). Qualitative data was derived from open-response items within the questionnaire (e.g. ‘if you are aware of any specific homophobic incidents which have occurred at your university, please outline these here’). All qualitative data was accessed directly from Diversity and Inclusivity at University 13 Questionnaire Maker and analysed using content analysis (see Robson 2002). This involved categorising and coding responses into similar types of responses. These have been used to illustrate the findings of the quantitative analysis. Results The findings reported in this section have been organised under headings representing the four main subsections of the questionnaire: Actual harassment/discrimination, perception of campus climate, campus climate and outness, and LGBT inclusiveness. Each of these will now be considered in turn. Actual Harassment/Discrimination 23.4% of the students surveyed indicated that they had on at least one occasion been a victim of homophobic harassment/discrimination since being at university. Of these incidents, the most common forms of harassment/discrimination comprised derogatory remarks (77.9%), direct or indirect verbal harassment or threats (47.1%), and threats of physical violence (26.5%). The incidence of verbal harassment reported here would appear to be significantly higher than the 39% reported by Fahey (1995) more than a decade ago. Whilst this appears to be a cause for concern, it may simply be a product of increased awareness of LGBT issues and therefore higher levels of reporting, rather than increased incidence. However, it is also worth noting that compared with US studies, the incidence of homophobic harassment appear to be substantially lower in the UK. Less common forms of harassment were also noted, including pressure to be silent about one’s sexual orientation/gender identity (16.2%), being the recipient of written comments containing anti-LGBT sentiments (13.2%), having been denied services (10.3%), actual physical assault or injury (8.8%), having been threatened to Diversity and Inclusivity at University 14 have one’s sexual orientation/gender identity exposed (5.9%), and being the target of anti- LGBT graffiti (4.4%). Typically, respondents reported these incidents as commonly occurring in public spaces on campus such as the Student Union or cafeteria (38.2%), in a hall of residence (27.9%), or whilst walking around campus (25.0%). In comparison, such incidents infrequently occurred in a class (8.8%) or in the office of a staff member (1.5%). Consistent with this, the overwhelming majority of incidents were perpetrated by students (76.5%), with only a small number being perpetrated by lecturers/tutors (4.4%), admin staff (1.5%), security staff (1.5%), or catering staff (1.5%). This concurs with the findings of Fahey’s (1995) UK study in which students, rather than staff, were also reported to be the main perpetrators of homophobia at university. However, some respondents indicated that it was often difficult to identify the source of harassment/discrimination due to the fact that their university was not campus based which opened up the possibility of incidents being perpetrated by members of the general public as they moved between university buildings or frequented venues (e.g. cafes) near the university which were predominantly occupied by students. In this study many of the specific incidents of homophobic harassment/discrimination which were reported, occurred in student accommodation (e.g. halls of residence; university assigned flats). These incidents tended to be much more extreme and/or enduring forms of harassment, and therefore more troublesome for the individuals affected by them: My first year, 1 of the 3 people I was randomly assigned to share a flat with turned out to be homophobic and acted very disrespectfully towards me. My second year, I moved, and the 1 person out of two that the university selected to share my flat in the second year was very homophobic, saying things like "better dead then gay" and threatening me several times. (#3242) I know of two guys who found a disabled (wheelchair bound) guy’s gaydar [a web forum for gay men] photos (partially naked) and then pinned them to his room door in our halls of Diversity and Inclusivity at University 15 residence out of his reach. They remained there for over 24 hours before they were removed. (#3025) Another common site of oppression were student organisations, in particular (although by no means exclusively) religious groups such as the Muslim or Christian Societies. These groups were often reported as perpetrating discrimination against LGBT students/groups: The Uni Christian Union invited a guest speaker to address their congregation, a known homophobic preacher, who suggested in the course of his address that Christians shouldn’t give up on gay people that they can be ‘saved’, equating us with other godless people such as Osama Bin Laden (#3090) The Debating Society put forward the motion “The LGB should be banned because it promotes segregation” They failed to apply this motion to the Christian Union, Islamic Society, Afrocarribean Society, etc. (#2990) However, hostility towards LGBT people and their advocates was not necessarily direct and overt, nor directed specifically at LGBT individuals. For example, some respondents reported incidences of homophobia as resistance to attempts to increase LGBT visibility and raise awareness of LGBT issues: We have recently run our LGBT Awareness Week, all of the LGBT volunteers and our committee were quite surprised at the anti-gay feelings of some students that we hadn’t ever noticed before. For example – we gave out flyers, lollys and other things in front of our library, whilst decorating the library with rainbow colours. Many people openly avoided us, took the flyer and seeing what it was about gave it back to us, or approached us to ask what was going only to step away with a frightened look when they found out! (#2949) I’m involved with my university LGBT association, and had a stall in my college (which is like halls of residence) for an ‘awareness week’. The Principal of the college was concerned to make sure that the stall was ‘not too overt’. (#3068) Diversity and Inclusivity at University 16 Respondents were also asked about the frequency of anti-LGBT sentiments. Consistent with the above findings, only 2.7% had frequently or quite often heard lecturers or tutors stereotyping, making negative remarks, or telling jokes which put down LGBT people. In contrast, 28.8% had heard friends and 31.3% other students stereotyping, making negative remarks, or telling jokes which put down LGBT people (see Table 2). An analysis of these results using the Wilcoxon test indicated a highly statistically significant difference between responses (Chi 2 =356.128, df = 2; p<.001) suggesting that lecturers and tutors were significantly less likely to have been heard espousing anti-LGBT views than were both friends and other students. These findings are comparable to those reported in the US study by Malaney et al (1997) in that students were much more likely than lecturers/tutors to have been heard making negative remarks. Table 1: Frequency of anti-LGBT sentiments by source (%) frequently quite often sometimes seldom never 4. How often have you heard lecturers or tutors stereotyping, making negative remarks, or telling jokes which put down LGBT persons? 1.0 1.7 14.1 30.2 52.6 5. How often have you heard friends (at university) stereotyping, making negative remarks, or telling jokes which put down LGBT persons? 11.3 17.5 39.5 23.4 6.5 6. How often have you heard other students stereotyping, making negative remarks, or telling jokes which put down LGBT persons? 12.4 18.9 35.4 26.8 5.5 Analyses exploring group differences were carried out using the Mann-Whitney test (a non-parametric test used to compare mean responses of groups). No significant differences were found for responses to any of these questions on a basis of gender (male/female) or sexual identity (lesbian/gay male/bisexual). However, an analysis based on responses of participants studying for degrees in ‘people-based’ disciplines vs those studying in other Diversity and Inclusivity at University 17 disciplines found significant differences. Those studying in people-based disciplines were significantly more likely to have heard lecturers/tutors (U=6119.5, N=289, p<0.001) and friends (U=6716, N=285, p=.05) making negative remarks or telling jokes which put down LGBT people. It is likely that these differences are attributable to the fact that LGBT issues/perspectives are more salient in people-based subjects, and therefore, there is more opportunity for both lecturers/tutors and students to express their resistance to such issues being made visible. Furthermore, a heightened awareness of LGBT issues/perspectives through their explicit inclusion in the curriculum may facilitate out-of-class discussion between students, thus increasing the likelihood of students expressing anti-LGBT views. Perception of Campus Climate Despite the evidence that actual harassment/discrimination against LGBT people was widespread on campus, more than half of respondents (54.7%) indicated that they thought anti-LGBT attitudes existed to a little/very little extent, and only 7.9% indicated that they thought they existed to a great/very great extent. However, a sizeable minority (37.1%) believed that they existed to some extent. Likewise, only 13.4% of respondents thought that an LGBT person was likely/very likely to be harassed on campus, whilst the majority of respondents (79.4%) thought that an LGBT person was unlikely/very unlikely to be harassed on campus. Table 2: Perceptions of frequency of victimisation frequently quite often sometimes seldom never 8. How often do you think students at your campus might experience having their personal property defaced or otherwise vandalised because they were thought/known to be LGBT? 0.0 0.7 8.9 46.4 43.6 9. How often do you think students at your campus might experience direct verbal harassment because they were thought/known to be LGBT? 0.7 3.8 25.1 58.1 12.0 Diversity and Inclusivity at University 18 10. How often do you think posters advertising LGBT activities/events might be defaced, destroyed or otherwise vandalised? 3.1 5.8 25.1 39.5 25.4 11. How often do you think students at your campus might receive threatening or otherwise derogatory notes, phone calls or emails because they were thought/known to be LGBT? 1.0 0.0 6.5 46.7 45.0 With the exception of Q2 “to what extent do you think anti-LGBT attitudes exist on your campus”, no significant differences were found for any of these questions on a basis of gender (male/female) or sexual identity (lesbian/gay male/bisexual). For Q2, a significant gender difference was found between responses (U=8617.5, N=285, p=.039) suggesting that male participants were significantly more likely than female participants to believe that anti-LGBT attitudes exist on campus. The existing literature on homophobia overwhelmingly suggests that males are significantly more homophobic than females (e.g. see Donnelly et al., 1997; Schellenberg et al. 1999) and that gay men are significantly more likely than lesbians to be the targets of homophobia. It would therefore seem reasonable that male participant (gay, bisexual or trans) might perceive the campus climate more negatively than their female counterparts. Campus Climate and Outness Item 24 asked students to indicate the extent to which they agreed with the statement ‘I feel comfortable about being out on campus’. Of all respondents, 77.7% agreed/strongly agreed with this statement, whilst only 18.2% disagreed/strongly disagreed. Whilst no significant differences were found for this question on a basis of gender and discipline of study, for sexual identity there were significant group differences (Chi 2 =9.683, df=2, p=.008). For this item, bisexual participants were significantly more likely than both gay male and lesbian participants to feel comfortable about being out on campus. This is, however, not entirely Diversity and Inclusivity at University 19 surprising in that bisexuality is commonly seen by young people as a ‘safe’ alternative to a lesbian or gay identity. Many lesbian and gay youth initially identify as bisexual as a way of averting the stigma of being labelled lesbian/gay, enabling them to retreat into the closet should they feel the need. Despite most respondents reporting feeling safe about being out on campus, responses to questions around other indicators of ‘climate’ were much more mixed (see table 3). Table 3: Indicators of ‘climate of fear’ yes no 13. Since being at university have you ever feared for your safety because of your sexual orientation or gender identity? 23.4 75.6 14. Since being at university have you ever deliberately concealed your sexual orientation or gender identity to avoid intimidation? 54.3 44.7 15. Since being at university have you ever avoided disclosing your sexual orientation or gender identity to a tutor, lecturer, supervisor or other staff member of the university due to fear of negative consequences? 40.5 59.1 Whilst most LGBT students (75.6%) reported that they had not feared for their safety whilst at university, around half had deliberately concealed their sexual orientation or gender identity to avoid intimidation. Similarly, two fifths (40.5%) reported having avoided disclosing their sexual orientation or gender identity to a lecturer, tutor, supervisor or other staff member due to fear of negative consequences. An analysis of responses to these questions showed a statistically significant difference (Chi2=71.7, df=2, p<.001) between responses to Q13 and both Q14 and Q15. This would seem to suggest that LGBT students do not particularly perceive a ‘climate of fear’ but actively behave in ways that respond to such a climate. No significant differences were found for any of these questions on a basis of gender (male/female) or sexual identity (lesbian/gay male/bisexual). However, an analysis based on responses of participants studying for degrees in ‘people-based’ disciplines vs those studying in other disciplines found statistically significant differences for question 15 (U=6812, Diversity and Inclusivity at University 20 N=290, p=.009) suggesting that those studying in people-based subjects were more likely to avoid disclosing their sexual orientation or gender identity to staff of the university due to fear of negative consequences. Although respondents were not specifically asked to explain their responses to these questions, one respondent explained it in the following terms: The problem is that visible homophobia is pretty much illegal now at British unis, and academics aren’t allowed to act on it openly. However, one always worries if they can discriminate against you and you’ll never know… so you end up keeping your sexuality in the closet simply because you know it is likely there will be some people who dislike your identity enough to treat you badly, and that you can’t identify them, so the only safe option is to stay in the closet. (#3242) Overall, the findings in relation to outness suggest that despite the relatively low incidence of homophobia on campus, it occurs frequently enough to have created a ‘climate of fear’ whereby LGBT students deliberately act to conceal their sexual orientation/gender identity in order to avoid discrimination/harassment. So, rather than homophobia on campus being simply about overt forms of harassment and discrimination, the threat of potential harassment/discrimination ensures that LGBT students more often than not ‘voluntarily’ choose not to be out on campus (see Kitzinger 1996 for a detailed discussion of this). LGBT inclusiveness The final part of the questionnaire asked respondents for their perception of their university’s LBGT inclusiveness. These questions largely centred on the visibility of LGBT issues and concerns in the curriculum, through the provision of resources, and the addressing of issues in practice. 39.2% of respondents agreed or strongly agreed that ‘the university thoroughly addresses campus issues related to sexual orientation/gender identity’, whilst a similar number Diversity and Inclusivity at University 21 (36.8%) disagreed/strongly disagreed with this same statement. This would seem to suggest considerable variation between institutions in the degree to which these issues are seen to be addressed. However, respondents were more inclined to believe that their universities provided visible resources on LGBT issues/concerns, with 58.4% of respondents agreeing/disagreeing with this statement. With regard to inclusion of issues within the curriculum and the climate of classes, the pattern of responses was somewhat different. Only 17.5% of respondents agreed or strongly agreed that LGBT issues are adequately represented within the curriculum, whilst 37.8% agreed/strongly agreed that they felt comfortable raising LGBT issues in class and 74.6% agreed/strongly agreed that the climate of classes they have taken are accepting of LGBT people. A summary of responses for these questions can be found in Table 4. Table 4: Perceived extent to which the university delivers LGBT inclusiveness (%) strongly agree agree don’t know disagree strongly disagree 20. The university thoroughly addresses campus issues related to sexual orientation/gender identity 7.2 32.0 23.4 29.6 7.2 21. LGBT issues are adequately represented within the curriculum 3.1 14.4 29.9 28.5 23.7 22. The climate of classes I have taken are accepting of LGBT persons 16.5 58.1 12.7 8.9 2.1 23. I feel comfortable raising LGBT issues in class 7.6 30.2 15.1 31.3 15.5 25. The university provides visible resources on LGBT issues/concerns 13.4 45.0 7.9 22.0 11.3 No significant differences were found for any of these questions on a basis of gender (male/female), nor for sexual identity (lesbian/gay male/bisexual). However, an analysis based on responses of participants studying for degrees in ‘people-based’ disciplines vs those studying in other disciplines found statistically significant differences for questions 20 Diversity and Inclusivity at University 22 (U=3550.5, N=221, p=.004), 21(U=3230, N=203, p<.004), and 25 (U=5164, N=267, p=.001). In all three cases, those doing ‘people-based’ degrees were significantly more likely to disagree/strongly disagree that the university thoroughly addresses LGBT issues, that LGBT issues are adequately addressed within the curriculum, and that the university provides visible resources on LGBT issues/concerns. A number of respondents reported specific examples illustrating inadequate coverage of LGBT issues and concerns within academic courses. Typically students reported minimal coverage and an extremely narrow focus: “nursing coverage of LGBT issues revolves around STD’s – one lesson in a 3 year programme!”(#3080). Others, however, reported resistance (and even hostility) to inclusion of these issues: In sexual health education classes the whole class has made humour of gay men’s sexual health issues, as encouraged by the facilitator. At its worst one comment extended to “it makes me sick” on discussing gay sexual practices. The comment was unchallenged. They were all medical students, the facilitator a student doctor and the observer a doctor. This was in my first week of medical school – before I had come out. (#3093) Courses can do more to teach people about LGBT people or at least provide cases studies in lectures that are appropriate. This did happen on my course but many people began to voice “I don’t see why we should have to learn about ‘them’, I’m sick of it” or “I don’t see how gay people’s experiences are any different to ours. It’s a waste of time!’. These remarks were from people who knew that I was gay. (#3013) Whilst many respondents reported examples of good practice within their universities, it is clear that in some cases more attention needs to be paid not just to the inclusion of LGBT issues/concerns, but to the ways in which these are managed within a classroom setting. For many respondents, the problem appeared to be wider than the curriculum and what does/does not happen in a classroom setting. Many reported that they felt the university itself Diversity and Inclusivity at University 23 was not supportive of LGBT issues/concerns and did little to indicate a commitment to addressing these issues: Although I know the sexuality of some of my tutors (some of which actually told me themselves) and LGBT issues are being raised to a higher degree at the moment, I feel that the university itself does not… offer any fully obvious support for LGBT students other than of guidance to the LGBT forum within the student union (# 3006) In terms of directly improving the campus climate for LGBT persons I suggest that all university publicity material reflect the fact that LGBT students exist and succeed at university. Whilst acknowledging the shallow tokenistic gesture of such rationally capitalistic branding and publicity exercises I do in part believe that by projecting what can be, we work some way towards creating ‘what is’. (#3079) It would appear then that in terms of the widening participation and equality agendas, universities could be much more proactive in addressing the inclusiveness of LGBT students. Summary and Conclusions The purpose of the present study was to explore LGBT students’ experiences and perceptions of harassment and discrimination on campus. Overall, the analysis of the data suggests that whilst homophobia on campus is not an overwhelming problem, it is still a significant one. Although extreme acts (e.g. actual physical violence) are relatively uncommon, verbal harassment and anti-LGBT sentiments are prevalent. It is also evident that fellow students are, in the main, responsible for incidents of homophobia, both through explicit anti-LGBT sentiments and also through resistance to visibility and inclusiveness. The findings suggest that there is some resistance to LGBT inclusivity creating a climate which inhibits many LGBT people from being open about their sexual orientation/gender identity and therefore to collude in their own oppression by actively ‘passing’ as heterosexual. Therefore, far from Diversity and Inclusivity at University 24 enhancing the student experience, this campus climate ensures that LGBT students continue to feel vulnerable and marginalised. In part, the data suggests that universities as organisations are in neglect of their duties of ensuring equality for LGBT students. In particular, universities are reported to fail to ensure adequate representation of LGBT perspectives in courses, not making LGBT students visible in marketing, and not actively enforcing their non-discrimination policies in relation to sexual orientation/gender identity issues. Whilst policy can be an important catalyst for change (Epstein et al., 2003) – and many universities in the UK have detailed policies for addressing ‘sexual orientation’ and ‘gender’ discrimination – as others (e.g. Biaggio et al., 2003; Epstein et al., 2003) highlight too often these fail to be implemented in any practical way. Policies may be useful for dealing with grievances, but are not easily able to be used to address more mundane and pervasive forms of homophobia which are unlikely to be brought before a grievance panel. Furthermore, for much the same reasons that I highlighted in relation to hate crimes, homophobic incidences are likely to be considerably underreported. Consequently, even the best policies and procedures will have little impact on the wider context. Although structural issues may contribute to campus climate, the findings of this study suggest that primarily homophobia on campus is perpetrated by students towards other students. Therefore, the problem is predominantly not (in this instance) curriculum content nor staff conduct as suggested in previous work. Consequently, any effort to effect positive change needs to shift its focus away from staff to students. Providing appropriate (and dedicated) student support services for LGBT students (e.g. see Messinger 2002) might be beneficial, however, this merely addresses the aftermath of homophobia rather than proactively preventing it. While studies on campus climate have typically suggested raising awareness of LGBT issues, this has tended to constitute extra-curricular classes for staff Diversity and Inclusivity at University 25 (particularly those based in Halls of Residence) and/or LGBT people as ‘guest lecturers’. Typically these classes attract attendees who are already sympathetic to LGBT issues, whilst attendance is resisted by those who wish to distance themselves from the issues (in case someone presumes that they are LGBT) or who hold extreme negative views towards LGBT people/issues. They also tend to centre on attitudinal change, ignoring the ways in which the wider social context contributes to a positive or negative climate. However, awareness raising is an important strategy for addressing issues of prejudice and discrimination and also falls within the remit of education. For all these reasons, embedding LGBT issues (along with other diversity issues) in curriculum content is a much more powerful way of awareness raising and contributing towards a more positive climate. It also more reliably ensures engagement by a much wider audience. Focusing solely on curriculum content will, however, only have a limited effect in that it neglects the wider context which has a more direct impact on the student experience. The main focus, therefore, needs to be on creating a campus climate of zero tolerance of all forms of prejudice (including homophobia). Some of the data excerpts in this paper highlight the way in which, when it occurs, blatant homophobia passes without comment. By doing nothing, both staff and students are complicit in reproducing a homophobic climate and ensuring the continued marginalisation of LGBT students. It is therefore important to develop a climate in which LGBT students feel safe to choose to come out (or not) and in which staff and other students feel empowered to challenge homophobia and other forms of resistance to the inclusion of LGBT issues. The challenge is how to achieve this. As I see it, the key to addressing the issue of homophobia on campus is to establish a climate of zero tolerance (Neumann 2005) towards all forms of harassment and discrimination. To implement this would involve a multi-pronged approach which would include embedding LGBT issues in the curriculum; implementing policy and monitoring Diversity and Inclusivity at University 26 practice; instigating sanctions for prejudiced behaviour; and most importantly, embedding LGBT issues within the wider practices around inclusivity. Universities need to be much more proactive in addressing diversity issues. Bringing LGBT issues under the diversity and inclusivity umbrella will strengthen the ability to address homophobia on campus. Addressing any form of prejudice on its own facilitates discrimination by mobilising opposition to that particular group or issue. However, to package all the strands together helps to construct a welcoming and creative environment that is inclusive of all students regardless of difference. Such an environment would be one which not only takes LGBT issues seriously, but as seriously as issues affecting any other subgroup of the student (and staff) population. In summary, this study highlights that there is still some way to go before the inclusivity agenda is realised within universities. While the focus of this paper has been on the experiences of LGBT students, it is important to recognise that addressing homophobia and promoting a 'gay friendly' campus climate does not just benefit this group. If the experience of LGBT students at university is poor, this affects the overall campus climate for all students (LGBT and 'straight'). If it is not safe for LGBT students to be open about their sexual/gender identity, then it will be difficult for any student to deviate from the narrow stereotyped notions of heterosexuality which are perpetuated on campus. Furthermore, the student who is still exploring his/her sexuality will also struggle in this climate. This situation makes it more difficult for students to integrate fully into university life and to benefit socially and emotionally from attending university. Likewise, it is not just students who are affected by homophobia on campus - its existence (and persistence) affects the quality of life of university staff also. Exploring the experiences of staff was beyond the scope of this study, but clearly, student homophobia will undoubtedly impact on the experiences of LGBT staff. Enhancing the campus climate is therefore of benefit to the whole university community: to ignore homophobia is to impoverish the quality of life for all who work, study and visit there. 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work_ygfdi3cd3nenhdmcojo7siryxi	----	International Journal of Economics and Politics 1(2): 71-92, 2020 IJEP Lyuba Spasova1 a, Anna Mantarova a, Rafal Smoczynski b Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, Bulgariaa Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the Polish Academy of Sciences, Poland b Keywords: Immigrants Attitudes Moral panics Personal relevance Social distancing 1. Introduction ignificant number of people from the Middle East and Africa have come to Europe over the last eight years in an attempt to escape dangers of war, repressions, poverty or other unfavorable conditions. Bulgaria was not excluded from the intensified migration mostly because of the country’s location – it lies on one of the main migration routes. Further, although Bulgaria is not among the desired destination countries, there was a considerable - around 20 times - increase in the number of people filing for 1 . Email: lyuba_spasova@abv.bg ABSTRACT Influenced mainly from a sociology of deviance perspective, the article explores perceptions and attitudes towards immigrants in Bulgaria in the context of the intensified migration processes to Europe. Drawing on data from a set of representative surveys, the article aims to reconstruct the social distance specifics, fears and threat perceptions, radicalization and victimization associated with immigrants and to study the way they are affected by spatial and psychological proximity and personal relevance. Influenced mainly from a sociology of deviance perspective, the article explors affected by spatial and psychological proximity and personal relevance. ARTICLE INFO Article history: Date of submission: 05-06-2020 Date of acceptance: 29-06-2020 International Journal of Economics and Politics Attitudes towards Migrants in the Context of Intensified Migration in Bulgaria: Moral Panic and Personal Relevance JEL Classification: J10 J15 J17 S A A mailto:lyuba_spasova@abv.bg 72 L. Spasova et al. / International Journal of Economics and Politics 1(2): 71-92, 2020 asylum. In 2010 1025 foreigners file for a refugee asylum, in 2012 - 1387 and at the peak in 2015 the number is 20391. The massive migration caused changes in the overall attitudes towards immigrants and even stirred moral panics. According to the ESS data, in the 2012 beginning of the migration wave, most often Bulgarians were willing to accept some immigrants of different race/ethnic origin from majority (36%) and from poorer countries outside Europe (29%), whereas in 2018 the most common answer to both topics was “allow none” (resp. 37% and 40%). The article aims to deepen the understanding of the changes by analyzing in detail the perceptions and attitudes towards immigrants in Bulgaria in the context of the intensified migration processes to Europe. Using the concept of personal relevance and anti-immigrant moral panic, the article explores the social distance, fears and threat perceptions, radicalization and victimization associated with immigrants. The analysis is based on the data from a representative survey, which is a part of a broader interdisciplinary study focused on social deviations in the context of the current migration processes. The article is structured as follows: the first part introduces the main theoretical notions and concepts; after that the second and the third part present the methodology of the empirical study and the analysis of the data; finally, the last part concludes with an overview of the most important findings and offers some notes on the possible future research. 2. Theoretical framework The influence of personal significance and involvement on attitudes related to social problems have long been a subject of research interest (Schwarz, Bohner 2001; Liberman, Chaiken 1996; Harton, Latane 1997; Henderson, Fujita, Trope, Liberman 2006). The most important effects of personal significance are the strength and extremity of attitudes (Liberman, Chaiken 1996; Harton, Latane 1997), the impact on moral judgments (Eyal, Liberman, Trope 2008; Napier, Luguri 2013; Agerström, Björklund 2009), reflection through intragroup dynamics (Ledgerwood, Chaiken 2007; Liviatan, Trope, Liberman 2008), risk and victimization perceptions (Tyler, Rasinski 1984; Solymosi, Bowers, Fujiyama 2015). Attitudes towards Migrants in the Context of Intensified............ 73 The present study builds on the idea of psychological distance connected to the personal involvement and physical closeness and its influence on the relationships and attitudes, developed within the theory of construal levels (Fujita, Henderson, Eng, Trope, Liberman 2006; Fujita 2008; Gouseti, Jackson 2015; Matthew, Matlock 2011; Trope, Liberman 2011). Psychological distance "refers to the perception of when an event occurs, where it occurs, to whom it occurs, and whether it occurs" (Trope, Liberman 2010: 442), i.e. psychological distance includes temporal, spatial and social proximity and probability assessment. The closer to the perceiving individual are the relevant parameters, the smaller the psychological distance, hence - a direct impact on the way the event is perceived and interpreted and on the attitude towards it (Fujita et al. 2006; Matthew, Matlock 2011; Trope, Liberman 2011; Williams, Bargh 2008; Trope et al. 2007; Ledgerwood, Trope, Liberman 2010). When the event is psychologically distant, it is more likely to be presented with a high level of abstraction and vice versa - the closer it is, the more contextualized and detailed is its presentation, which has a direct effect on judgments and decisions. A number of studies (e.g. Fujita et al. 2006, Williams, Bargh 2008; Matthew; Matlock 2011) have shown the importance of spatial proximity or remoteness for psychological distance and, respectively, for the ways of perceiving and interpreting events. The practical manifestations and effects of psychological closeness and distance on attitudes that are of greatest interest to the study are: the impact on perceptions of risk probability (Bonner, Newell 2008), the impact on fear of crime and perceptions of risk of victimization (Gouseti, Jackson 2015), the relationship with self-control (Fujita, Trope, Liberman, Levin-Sagi 2006), the impact on persistence and change of opinion (Ledgerwood et al. 2010), the impact on the tendency to conform to group norms (Ledgerwood, Callahan 2012). Even though, this study does not draw directly on the moral panic scholarship (Cohen 1972; Goode, Ben-Yehuda 1994), nonetheless, it is relevant to note some parallels of the analyzed data with the recent findings on anti-migrant moral panics taking place particularly in Western European countries (Chan et al 2013; Robinson 2009; Spigelman 2013). Overall, moral panic studies are commonly located in the current of the sociology of social 74 L. Spasova et al. / International Journal of Economics and Politics 1(2): 71-92, 2020 control which explores societal reactions towards different categories of threats posed allegedly by folk devils (e.g. migrants) to moral frontiers of society. In order to detect moral panics, the conventional moral panic literature points out the necessity of the emergence of the following parameters: there must be an increase of the collective concern over certain social problem which might be detectable either in the mainstream media as well as in the social media, tendency of labeling certain folk devils as deviants (i.e. usually individuals who are attributed to pose a menace to common good), the emergence of the interest groups which produce moral panic articulations usually exposing the threat connected to folk devils, importantly, moral panic articulations contribute to the rise of perceived hostility towards folk devils. Finally, the literature emphasis the fact of exaggeration which constitutes an inherent part of moral panic claims making, namely, the allegations about the threat towards societal values are usually unsubstantiated, sometimes made up or, most often, the menace which is denounced by moral panic proponents does not pose a serious threat for society (Goode, Ben-Yehuda 1994). The literature recently has demonstrated that the criterion of volatility is less frequently applicable, since the moral panics, particularly these related to anti- migrant resentments are open-ended (Mawby, Gisby 2009). The analyzed below data reveal the typical moral panic parameters and in line with the recent research on anti-migrant moral panics we see that similarly as it was with Eastern European migrants in the Western Europe also migrants who arrived in Bulgaria are consistently linked with the perceived rise of crime/terror threats and unemployment insecurities (Fitzgerald, Smoczynski 2015). Acknowledging these parallels might be interesting since there has been little knowledge produced on the anti-migrant moral panics in Eastern Europe, thus the present study might bring some flavor on societal reactions towards migration in a broader inter-European context. Most striking similarities refer to anti-migrant resentments which are driven primarily by the fear of crime/terror and employment insecurities appearing commonly among the indigenous population. Building on previous results and research, the main hypothesis of the study is that spatial proximity through psychological proximity leads to lower levels of abstraction, which on the one hand enhances perceptions and Attitudes towards Migrants in the Context of Intensified............ 75 assessments of the likelihood of specific risks and, on the other hand, contributes to situational change of opinion and disregard for the role of normatively recognized morality. 3. Design of the empirical research The analysis uses empirical data collected from a CAPI study conducted as a part of a broader interdisciplinary research on different types of social deviations in the context of the highly dynamic migration processes in the past eight years. Taking into consideration the importance of spatial and psychological proximity and distance (Liberman, Chaiken 1996) the study design includes two parallel samples: 1) a two-stage nested sample of 800 individuals, representative of the adult population of Bulgaria; 2) a two-stage nested sample of 400 individuals in settlements located near centers for accommodation of migrants and refugees. The field survey is conducted in the period November - December 2017, as already mentioned - at a time of massive inflow of migrants from third countries. Data from the nationally representative sample is weighted by sex and age. 3.1. Data and results Importance of the topic Although the majority of Bulgarians are interested in the topic of immigrants to one extent or another, more than one third (35%) declare they are indifferent to the topic (Figure 1). There is a significant difference in this regard between the national survey and the one with people living close to accommodation centers as the latter predominantly answer they are interested, although not very much (47%). In the regions with accommodation centers 93% of the respondents are to some extent interested in the topic of immigrants, while in the rest of the country the respective percentage is 65%. There is also a clear difference in the extremity of opinions depending on proximity to accommodation centers in line with our hypothesis based on earlier research (Ledgerwood et al. 2010). 76 L. Spasova et al. / International Journal of Economics and Politics 1(2): 71-92, 2020 Figure 1. Interest in the topic of immigration (%) Most people consider the arrival of immigrants and refugees to be a very serious problem for the country and this applies both for the national sample and for the accommodation centers sample. In this regard the influence of spatial proximity and personal relevance on the perceptions is seen in the differing importance (Gouseti, Jackson 2015) attached by the two groups. A much larger number of extreme assessments as given by people living closer to accommodation centers - 82% of them think that the arrival of refugees and immigrants poses a very serious or severe problem for the country, while for the rest of the country this opinion is shared by 65%. Social distance The increased rejection of migrants compared to other groups and previous studies is clearly visible from the results of the adapted version of the Bogardus social distance scale (Bogardus 1933) used in the study. As can be expected, from all tested positions the acceptance of immigrants as colleagues sharing the same room is the highest (36% for the country), and for a family member is the lowest (10% for the country) (Figure 2). As an illustration of the context and keeping in mind possible remarks on the differing methodology, the data from an older representative study conducted by one of the authors show significantly lower social distance towards immigrants ten years ago. According to the data from 2007 81.9% of Bulgarians would accept an immigrant from the EU as a neighbor, 82.3% - as a colleague sharing the same room, 72.3% - as a close friend, and 50.7% as a family member (Mantarova, Zaharieva 2007). The comparison with the data 9% 31% 26% 37% 21% 47% 25% 7% 0% 20% 40% 60% Very much interested Rather interested Rather not interested Not at all interested National sample Accommodation center regions Attitudes towards Migrants in the Context of Intensified............ 77 from 2007 is also unfavorable for an immigrant from a non-EU country, that would be accepted as a neighbor by 61.4% of the respondents, as a colleague in the same room - by 68.9%, as a close friend - by 53.6%. % and for a family member - from 28.7%. Despite the differences in the questions asked and especially the lack of distinction in the current study of immigrants according to their country of origin, the large difference in the results from two surveys indicates the serious impact of social processes related to the increased migration flows from the Middle East and Africa and one might argue – the effects of moral panic and the rise of hostility towards folk devils. However, we do not have enough data to pinpoint the exact time the changes emerged or whether they were gradual or more abrupt. The differences in terms of social distance according to personal relevance are not so distinct or unambiguous. In fact, in two out of four tested types of relations the respondents living close to accommodation centers would allow greater closeness with the immigrants compared to the respondents in the rest of the country (Figure 2). While for the "family member" position the differences are within the statistical error, for the "colleague in the same room" position they are large enough - in regions with centers 43% would accept an immigrant as a colleague, and in the rest of the country 36% would. Figure 2. Acceptance of immigrants (%) We can presume that this is probably due to another aspect of psychological closeness that we need to keep in mind - the influence of the likelihood of an occurrence of the specific event. It is the more probable 32% 36% 23% 10% 27% 43% 21% 12% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% As a neighbor As acolleague in the same room As a close friend As a family member National sample Accommodation center regions 78 L. Spasova et al. / International Journal of Economics and Politics 1(2): 71-92, 2020 events, insofar as the characteristics of the current migration wave allow us to draw conclusions, that are assessed as more undesirable by people in regions with accommodation centers. Fears and perceptions of threats The study shows that in terms of fears connected to immigrants Bulgarians attach the greatest importance simultaneously to threats to security and to well-being and this is confirmed by data from both open and closed versions of the questions. Figure 3. Perception of threats connected with the arrival and the presence of immigrants in the country (“completely agree” and “tend to agree”) The comparison between the results of the national survey and the regions with accommodation centers shows significant statistical differences in the prevalence of some fears. People near the centers are more concerned that immigrants carry diseases and pose a threat of terrorism. In the country as a whole, fears of job-loss as a result of the competition from newcomers are more widespread, as well as fears of possible disruptions of the ethnic balance in the future in case of permanent settlement of the immigrants. 50% 66% 70% 74% 77% 83% 84% 34% 70% 48% 79% 81% 82% 88% 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% Take local jobs Commiting crimes against locals Their settlement will disrupt the… Carry diseases Are involved in trafficing in human… Their maintenance is а havy burden Carry a threat of terrorism Accomodation centers regions National sample Attitudes towards Migrants in the Context of Intensified............ 79 As in other countries with a massive influx of asylum seekers (Zorba 2016: 25, Berisha, Slavkovic, Barisic 2017: 74), in Bulgaria the fear of threats to security, and above all the fear of importing terrorism, is very common. 83.4% of the respondents agree to some extent with the statement that immigrants pose a threat of terrorism. In the regions with refugee centers such an answer is given by 87.8% of the respondents, as the difference in the categorical support - 63.7% against 50.1% in the national sample is particularly strong. Nationwide most often this statement is supported by those living in the capital Sofia (72.2%), young people between 18 and 29 years (62.7%), people living in settlements where the population is predominantly Christian (68.8%, as in settlements where the Christian and Muslim population is almost equal, the share of respondents is well below average - 36.9%) , those who assess the state of crime in the country as a very serious problem, dissatisfied with life, in a poor financial situation (60.3%). It is also widely believed that refugees commit various crimes - theft, beatings, rapes, robberies, which is very much in line anti-immigrant moral panics claims in other EU countries and particularly those in West Europe against Bulgarians themselves (Fitzgerald, Smoczynski 2015; Smozsinski, Spasova 2018). Our research shows that the presence of refugees in people's minds is definitely associated with a risk of an increase in various types of crime. The statistics on registered crimes, which for various objective and subjective reasons cannot be accepted unreservedly, do not contain information that would give sufficient grounds to support or reject such and assumption. Therefore, it is especially interesting to compare the data on the victimization in the regions with a concentration of refugees and the rest of the country. Indeed, the study refers to a period in which the presence of asylum seekers is no longer so massive, but for the year of the study there is no difference in the victimization of the two groups. Despite this fact, the claim that refugees commit crimes is quite common - 30.0% fully support it and another 36.2% - rather support it, without significant differences between the two samples. Those who fully agree are more often: young people (46.8%), people with primary education (39.8), those dissatisfied with their 80 L. Spasova et al. / International Journal of Economics and Politics 1(2): 71-92, 2020 lives (43.9%), the ones living in poor financial situation (43.8%), those living in settlements with almost only Christian population, those who define the state of crime as a very serious problem in our society (41.2%), those who do not trust the police. It is interesting that people for whom the danger of becoming a victim of a crime is the most serious personal problem are more moderate in their position and are much more prone to give the moderate answer - "rather agree". A specific aspect of security is the threat to health. As can be seen from both the open and the closed questions referring to fears and concerns, the claim that refugees carry diseases is quite common. This holds true especially in the regions with centers – people living there that completely agree with this are 60.9% compared to 45.0% in the rest of the country and rather agree - respectively 17.8% and 29.1%. Respondents supporting this statement are more often women (48.3%), young people – 18-29 years (57.3%), people with secondary education (50.0%), people living in Sofia (68.0%), people living in settlements with almost only the Christian population (66.1%), poor people (53.8%), people with low satisfaction with their lives in general and people for whom health is the worst personal problem (53.6%). The vast majority of respondents share the opinion that the support of immigrants is too much of a financial burden for the Bulgarian society. Against the background of the fact that poverty is most often assessed as a very serious problem in our society - by 81.7% of the respondents, and the low income is the biggest personal problem for more than one third (37.1%), the emphasis on this aspect is not a surprise at all. Looking at the profile of respondents, emphasizing the burden of financial costs (those who answered "strongly agree" - 46.2% of respondents in the regions with centers and 45.1% of respondents in the rest of the country), these are most often respondents between 18 and 29 (52.4%), with secondary education (50.3%), self-assessed as poor (56.8%), Christians, and slightly satisfied with their lives in general (54.6%). Among those who definitely agree with the statement that refugees are a threat to a job security (22.9% of the people in the country and 9.0% in the regions with centers) most are young people (18-29 years - 35.7 %), the Attitudes towards Migrants in the Context of Intensified............ 81 inhabitants of the villages (33.8%), people with primary education (32.2%), the dissatisfied with their life (34.9%), the ones in poor financial situation, people for whom the low income is the most serious personal problem. Although not a current problem, respondents identify another risk - a threat to the ethnic balance and national identity in the future, which one might argue is a typically Bulgarian or at the very least Balkan moral panics claim. There is a significant difference between the two samples - respondents in the country are much more concerned than those in the places with centers (Cramer's V = 0.225). Proponents of this statement are most often young people (35.7%), with primary education (39.1%), living in villages (39.5%), in settlements with equal Christian and Muslim population (36.4%), people dissatisfied with their lives, people with poor financial situation, people for whom ethnic relations and national security are a real problem. Concerns about preserving the identity are also clear from the opinion expressed by about three quarters of the respondents that immigrants will harm the culture in the country. Spatial distance The study shows a desire for keeping distance from immigrants as well in a purely spatial sense, which again one might argue is a consequence of the anti- immigrant moral panic. There are no statistically significant differences between the national and regional samples. On the question of the type of centers that asylum seekers should live, the opinion that they should be in closed centers (75.9%) definitely dominates. These views are most strongly influenced by security fear in its various aspects (Cramer’s V is over 0.240). With regard to cohabitation in the town/neighborhood of residence of the respondents, it can definitely be said that there is a discriminatory attitude. Only 20.7% of Bulgarians agree with this. Associations exist with the socio- demographic characteristics of religious affiliation (Cramer’s V = 0.253), education (Cramer’s V = 0.207), material status (Cramer’s V = 0.191). As expected, Muslims are twice more likely (47.8%) to consent to cohabitation with immigrants. People with higher education (33.3%) and those in the age range of 30-50 are as well more likely to welcome immigrants in the neighborhood. There is a significant and strong association between the 82 L. Spasova et al. / International Journal of Economics and Politics 1(2): 71-92, 2020 opinion on the type of center for asylum seekers and the consent to have immigrants settled in the town/neighborhood of respondents. The data show significant associations between the willingness to allow immigrants to settle near and the perceptions of threats and, in particular, security threats. The values of the association coefficients show the strongest connection with the perception of the threat of immigrants committing crimes against locals (Cramer’s V = 0.363); getting involved in human trafficking, drugs, weapons (Cramer’s V = 0.329); bringing diseases (Cramer’s V = 0.29); bringing terrorism (Cramer’s V = 0.256). As for the other types of material threats – the ones related to the entry of immigrants into the labor market and the necessary financial resources for their allowance, the dependence is weaker. The impact of symbolic threats is quite pronounced as well. For example, there is an association with the opinion on possible future threats to the ethnic balance (Cramer’s V = 0.267). Respondents who fully agree with the possibility of this threat are much less likely than average to agree immigrants to settle in their towns or neighborhoods (9.1% compared to the national average of 20.6% and 52.6% among respondents who do not share this opinion). Definitely negative are the attitudes towards building an accommodation center for refugees near the place of residence of the respondents - only 16.3% of the respondents give a positive answer, again without differences between the national sample and the sample of residents near current refugee centers. The dependencies and associations established in the previously discussed topics are replicated here as well. Opinions are polarized on where immigrant’ children should study - in separate classes or with local children. 57.9% of the respondents are for isolation in separate classes. There are significant associations of this opinion and respondents’ education (Cramer’s V = 0.272), place of residence (Cramer’s V = 0.212), religion (Cramer’s V = 0.187), age (Cramer’s V = 0.157). In short, the strongest supporters of isolation are respondents with primary and secondary education, living in district cities and young people (18-29 years). In contrast, respondents with higher education, living in Sofia, Muslims, respondents between 30 and 39 years of age are mostly for joint training. The data show the strongest association is with the perception of a Attitudes towards Migrants in the Context of Intensified............ 83 symbolic threat, namely that the settlement of immigrants in the future will upset the ethnic balance (Cramer’s V = 0.355). Among those who fully agree with this statement 77.7% are adherents of education in separate classes. There is also a quite strong association with opinions on security threats and foremost with the fear that immigrants will commit crimes against locals (Cramer’s V = 0.346). Of those who fully support this statement, 79.2% are in favor of separating the children of immigrants in separate classes, while of those who do not agree to a strong degree only 44.0% are for separation. Although less pronounced, there is an association with other aspects of the security threat perceptions - participation of immigrants in organized crime (Cramer’s V = 0.246), import of terrorism (Cramer’s V = 0.134). A significant influence of the perceptions of purely economic threats is also observed (Cramer’s V is between 0.233 and 0.217). Resistance against the admission of immigrants The data gathered shows that active personal participation in actions aimed at stopping the admission of immigrants is low. 3.6% joined petitions with such a request, 0.8% took part in peaceful actions, and 0.7% took part in self- organized citizen groups to stop immigrants and refugees from crossing the border. As expected, for a number of reasons, there are significant differences depending on the regions. The percentages of personal participation in such actions for people from regions with refugee centers are much higher - 11.4%, 8.3% and 3.8%, respectively. As for the approval of such actions, it is much more common. Petitions against admission of immigrants are approved by 36.6% of the residents of regions with accommodation centers and by 26.7% of the people living in the rest of the country. Peaceful protests meet the approval of 42.5% of the people in the regions with centers and of 31.0% of the country's population. The self-organization of civilians to stop the illegal crossing of the border is approved respectively by 44.7% and by 28.0%. Most often, petitions and actions against the presence of immigrants are approved by those who categorically assess them as a threat to personal security (57.6% and 49.8%, respectively) and those who assess them as a threat to the ethnic balance in the country (55.3% and 47.3%). Hate speech and hate crimes, offending and victimization 84 L. Spasova et al. / International Journal of Economics and Politics 1(2): 71-92, 2020 Expressions of hatred and aggression towards immigrants are generally common, according to the respondents, and there is also a clear influence of spatial proximity and involvement. Only 4% of respondents in the regions with centers have never heard of hate speech towards immigrants, while in the rest of the country this percentage is 20%. Also, there is a difference in the frequency nationwide and in the regions with accommodation centers. In the regions with centers hate speech is present rather often according to 85%, and rather rarely – according to11% and for the rest of the country the ratio is 61% to 19% (Figure 4). Figure 4. Hate speech against immigrants Although the data on the hate crime offending and victimization do not cover only cases connected to immigrants, the differences between the national sample and the sample of people living close to refugee and immigrant accommodation centers allows for certain observations in this regard and especially on the effect of proximity and psychological distance. The data suggest spatial and psychological proximity to immigration centers leads to higher levels of hate crimes offending and victimization. In the regions with accommodation centers 11% respondents report they had cases in which they offended another person because they considered her/him different, while the percentage for the rest of the country is 6%. Similarly, in regions with accommodation centers, 7% had a case in which they attacked someone verbally or physically because he/she was different from them, and in the rest of the country the percentage is 3%. 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% National sample Accommodation center regions Rather often Rather rare Never Attitudes towards Migrants in the Context of Intensified............ 85 In the accommodation center regions’ sample respondents have shared details about five cases of physical or verbal attacks motivated by anti- immigrant resentment, that is cases, connected to immigrants, in which respondents have verbally of physically attacked other people because they perceived them as different: "In the park - very dark and impudent, it is not clear whether they are gypsies or refugees." - A man, 18-29 years old, student, satisfactory financial status, with personal contacts with immigrants. "Yes – a German" - woman, 30-39 years, higher education, good financial status, with business contacts with immigrants. "A paid journalist who works against Bulgarian interests with his words." - male, 40-49 years, secondary education, satisfactory financial status, with personal contacts with immigrants. "Verbal attacks during the protests." - male, 18-29, secondary education, poor financial status, with personal contacts with immigrants. "Black, bearded, smelly Arabs, with the veiled harem." - male, 18-29, secondary education, poor financial status, with personal cantatas with immigrants. The shared cases from the rest of the country are three: "Arabs who behaved like kings in the center of Sofia." - male, 18-29, secondary education, satisfactory financial status, with personal contacts with immigrants. "Immigrants in the neighborhood who look at and shout at young girls." - a man, 18-29 years old, student, satisfactory financial situation, has no contact with immigrants. "Verbal insults when gypsies, Arabs behave impudently and insolently in the streets." - a man, 18-29 86 L. Spasova et al. / International Journal of Economics and Politics 1(2): 71-92, 2020 years old, student, satisfactory financial status, no contact with immigrants. Similarly, we see the influence of spatial proximity on victimization in relation to hate speech and hate crimes. According to the results, 7.3% of respondents in the general population were verbally abused because some people thought they looked or behaved differently, and 1.6% were physically assaulted because some people thought they looked and behaved differently. In the regions with centers 10% of the respondents were subjected to verbal insults, and 2.8% were subjected to physical assault because some people think that they look or behave differently. It is noteworthy that a large proportion of respondents living in places with accommodation centers who share details about the situation do not belong to a minority group. In the shared cases of victimization from people nationwide there is none related to migrants, and in the regions with accommodation centers there are three such cases: "A paid journalist called me a xenophobe because of the fight against the aliens" - a man, 40-49 years old, secondary education, satisfactory financial status, with personal contacts with immigrants. "I was attacked and robbed by three dark-skinned people - I could not understand gypsies or refugees" - a man, 18-25, a student, in poor financial condition, with personal contacts with immigrants. "I was booed and insulted by a group of Arab- speaking men with newly learned cynical expressions in Bulgarian." - female, 40-49, higher education, good financial status, with personal contacts with immigrants. Attention should be paid to the use of the term "aliens" - a clear sign of radicalization, as well as, again, to the parallel with the Roma referred to as the negatively connotated "gypsies". It must be said that the data on victimization and on hate speech and hate crime acts are not objective, i.e. based on these the real rate of victimization and crime cannot be estimated. However, the higher number of reported cases of hate speech and hate crimes in the regions with centers and Attitudes towards Migrants in the Context of Intensified............ 87 especially the close results on questions about victimization and offending show a tendency of hate speech and hate crime normalization in the regions close to accommodation centers. Radicalization As for the assessment of whether the presence of immigrants causes radicalization and stimulates aggression against other risk groups, in both samples the respondents mostly believe that this is indeed the case. Although not revealing the actual effect on radicalization and normalization of aggression, the question reflects the respondents' perceptions and in a projective way reveals their own attitude. In the regions with accommodation centers, a slightly higher proportion of people tend to agree to one extent or another with this statement (78% compared to 76% in the rest of the country). Somewhat contrary to expectations, however, the differences are too small, especially considering they fall in the margin of the statistical error. In addition, it is not the extreme opinions that are higher, but the moderate ones. A possible explanation could be the higher degree of abstraction that the question suggests and possibly the opposite effect of spatial and psychological proximity that this would have. 4. Discussion and conclusion Evident from the results of the study, non-acceptance and hostility towards immigrants are very high both in terms of social distance and of the desire for a higher special distance. The effect of spatial and psychological proximity and personal relevance on social distance towards migrants however is ambiguous. There are significant differences caused by the spatial and psychological proximity and distance in the attitudes towards immigrants, in fears and perceived threats, in hate speech and hate crimes offending and victimization. As a whole the most common fears connected to immigrants are the same in the regions with accommodation centers and in the rest of the country and parallels can be drawn as well with other European countries. There are however certain differences in the distribution of fears and perceived threats connected to spatial and psychological distance and personal 88 L. Spasova et al. / International Journal of Economics and Politics 1(2): 71-92, 2020 relevance, indicating that the greater proximity leads to increased security fears – of terrorism, of transgressions and crime, of health threats. Similarly as in other studies concerned with anti-migrant moral panics in Western Europe, the data collected in Bulgaria seem to confirm that security and economy insecurities related to the inflow of migrants also triggered a certain social unrest in Eastern Europe. Migrants, besides being conventionally accused of posing a criminal or terrorist threat to indigenous population are also labeled as folk devils who subvert employment safety of the Bulgarian population. These moral panic claims-making not necessarily should be conceptualized as irrational racist reactions, instead these might be related to broader structural social problems underpinning Bulgarian society such as issues connected with personal security, mistrust in institutions, labor market problems due to short-terms contracts and self-employment practices. These structural factors underpinning contemporary risk societies contribute to the permanent insecurities existing both in the core European countries as well as in newer EU countries. Besides similarities of the anti-migrant imagery found in this study, clearly there are also local peculiarities of anti-migrant claims making, for example the perceived threats to ethnic balance, which would require further comparative research. Acknowledgements The authors gratefully acknowledge the financial support of the project “Social Context and Deviations: Persistent Dependencies and Situational Influences (Social Deviations in the Light of Contemporary Migration Processes)”, funded by the Bulgarian National Science Fund under contract DN 05-12/15.12.2016 and of the project “Intensified migration processes in the UE– societal reactions to migrants in Poland and Bulgaria” funded by the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences and the Polish Academy of Sciences. Refrences Agerström, J., Björklund, F. (2009). Temporal distance and moral concerns: Future morally questionable behavior is perceived as more wrong and Attitudes towards Migrants in the Context of Intensified............ 89 evokes stronger prosocial intentions. Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 31: 49–59 Berisha H., R. Slavkovich, I. Barishich. (2017). Migrantska kriza i posleditse po bezbednost republike Srbije. In: L. Mitrovich (Ed.) 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work_yhm5pjyfzbgz7btrwbd6dhgirq	----	A PENNY FOR YOUR THOUGHTS: POST-MITCHELL HATE CRIME LAWS CONFIRM A MUTATING EFFECT UPON OUR FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE GOVERNMENT'S ROLE IN OUR LIVES I. INTRODUCTION ROPER: So now you'd give the Devil benefit of law! MORE: Yes. What would you do? Cut a great road through the law to get after the Devil? ROPER: I'd cut down every law in England to do that! MORE: Oh? And when the last law was down, and the Devil turned round on you-where would you hide, Roper, the laws all being flat? This country's planted thick with laws from coast to coast-man's laws, not God's-and if you cut them down-and you're just the man to do it-[do] you really think you could stand upright in the winds that would blow then? Yes, I'd give the Devil benefit of law, for my own safety's sake. ' Human laws are clumsy and necessarily incomprehensive. It is easy to sympathize with a desire to punish every evil that we presume to perceive. But, living in a world where human laws have reign, subjects must accept, if regrettably, the limited capacity of those laws. Human law has limited capacity because humanity's perception and understanding are restrained. This deficiency necessarily limits the legitimate jurisdiction and purpose of human law.2 In the same vein, I. ROBERT BOLT. A MAN FOR ALL SEASONS 66 (Vintage Books 1990) (1960). 2. As St. Thomas Aquinas reveals in the SUMMA THEOLOGICA: Human law is said to permit certain things, not as approving of them, but as being unable to direct them. And many things are directed by the Divine Law, which human law is unable to direct, because more things are subject to a higher than to a lower cause. Hence the very fact that human law does not meddle with matters it cannot direct, comes under the ordination of the eternal law. It would be different, were human law to sanction what the eternal law condemns. Consequently it does not follow that human law is not derived from the eternal law, but that it is not on a perfect equality with it. HeinOnline -- 10 Regent U. L. Rev. 167 1998 REGENT UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW [Vol. 10:167 St. Thomas Aquinas concluded that though some vices are condemned by "eternal law ' 3 and "Divine Law, ' 4 human law lacks legitimate jurisdiction to do so.5 If human law condemned hatred and everything else that eternal law condemns, then human law would be equal to eternal law, rather than a derivation of it. 6 The Bible teaches that Divine Law condemns hatred,7 and that it is only, God who truly discerns, understands, and tests the ways of the heart. It is from this basis that one may conclude that human law lacks jurisdiction to govern the human heart. Far beneath the outward appearance of Fallen Man, 9 hidden among the secret affairs of the 2 ST. THOMAS AQUINAS. SUMMA THEOLOGICA Pt. 1-1I, Q. 93, Art. 3, Reply Obj. 3 (Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans., Christian Classics 1981). 3. According to Aquinas, [E]ternal law is a type [model] existing in the Divine mind. Therefore it is unknown to all save God alone.... So then no one can know the eternal law, as it is in itself, except the blessed who see God in His Essence. But every rational creature knows it in its reflection, greater or less .... We cannot know the things that are of God, as they are in themselves; but they are made known to us in their effects.... id. Q. 93, Art. 2. ObJ. 1, 3. Reply Obj. 1. 4. See id. Q. 91. Art. 4 (Aquinas explained Divine Law as that part of the eternal law which God made known by special revelation). 5. Id. 6. Id. Q. 93. Art. 3, Reply Obj. 2. 7. See Leviticus 19:17, Deuteronomy 19:11, Matthew 5:22, Galatians 5:20. 8. See. e.g., I Samuel 16:7 (King James). ("... . for the LORD seeth not as man seeth: for man looketh on the outward appearance, but the LORD looketh on the heart"); I Chronicles 28:9 (King James). ("... for the LORD searcheth all hearts, and understandeth all the imaginations of the thoughts..."); Psalms 7:9 (King James). ("Oh let the wickedness of the wicked come to an end: but establish the just: for the righteous God trieth the hearts and reins."); Psalms 44:21 (King James). ("[Slhall not God search this out? For he knoweth the secrets of the heart"): Psalms 139:22-24 (King James). ("I hate them with perfect hatred: I count them mine enemies. Search me. 0 God, and know my heart: try me, and know my thoughts: and see if there be any wicked way in me, and lead me in the way everlasting."); Jeremiah 17:9-10 (King James). ("The heart is deceitful above all things, and desperately wicked: who can know it? I the LORD search the heart, I try the reins, even to give every man according to his ways. and according to the fruit of his doings"); Jeremiah 20:12 (King James). ("But 0 LORD of hosts, that triest the righteous, and seest the reins and the heart, let me see thy vengeance on them: for unto thee have I opened my cause"); Revelation 2:23 (King James). ("And I will kill her children with death; and all the churches shall know that I am he which searcheth the reins and hearts: and I will give unto every one of you according to your works"). 9. See FRANCIS A. SCHAEFFER, A CHRISTIAN MANIFESTO 125 (1981) (Christian theologian, Francis Schaeffer, explains, "Man is not basically good, bound only by social, HeinOnline -- 10 Regent U. L. Rev. 168 1998 A PENNY FOR YOUR THOUGHTS heart or imagination of the thoughts, is found the womb and residence of hatred; and from deep within the tangled complexity of the human mind may it send as a minion, intent. But, motives are various, and intent serves many masters, some anonymous. And, to further complicate matters, it is possible for Man to falsely portray a motive. The "tangled" complexity of the human mind is distinct from that of a computer chip, which is "ordered" complexity. The active human mind is a twisted, disorderly cyclone of emotion, thought, desire, love, hate, instinct, and urge. Hatred sends intent as a minion from this cyclone to be judged by Man. This is one scenario where it is appropriate to "punish the messenger," and leave hatred (or whatever it was) to be judged by God. A fine example of this "tangled complexity" is O.J. Simpson's interesting explanation that, "Even if I did do this, it would have to have been because I loved her very much, right?"' 0 Which master from deep within the seeming "kaleidoscope mind" in Simpson's hypothetical scenario sent the punishable minion, intent? While the Los Angeles jury may punish the minion, it lacks the capacity to seek out and regulate the master. Humanity is not fit for this job. Indeed, Divine Law warns of this dilemma, teaching that, "The heart is deceitful above all things, and desperately wicked: who can know it? I the Lord search the heart. I try the reins, even to give every man according to his ways, and according to the fruit of his doings." 'I Aquinas summarizes this Scriptural idea when noting multiple reasons for God's revelation of the Divine Law.' 2 Among these is a reason peculiarly instructive to the issue of human law proscribing hatred: "man is not competent to judge of interior movements, that economic, and political chains. . . . Man is not intrinsically unselfish, corrupted only by outward circumstances. He is fallen; he is not what he was created to be"). 10. Celia Farber, Whistling in the Dark, ESQUIRE, Feb. 1998, at 54. 58. (O.J. Simpson, a popular American athlete, was acquitted of a double murder charge in California in 1996). 1I. Jeremiah 17:9-10 (King James). 12. See AQUINAS, supra note 2, Q. 91, Art. 4, Obj. 3 at 1005 (Aquinas offered four reasons that Divine law was necessary to direct human conduct: "First, because .... man is ordained to an end of eternal happiness .... Secondly ... on account of the uncertainty of human judgment. . . . Thirdly, because . . . man is not competent to judge of interior movements, that are hidden.... Fourthly, because.., human law cannot punish or forbid all evil deeds .... "). 1998] HeinOnline -- 10 Regent U. L. Rev. 169 1998 REGENT UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW [Vol. 10:167 are hidden . . . ,,'3 Though human legislators may not agree as to which laws are actually or properly derived from eternal law, they should at least abide by the principle that what naturally escapes humanity's perception and understanding should likewise escape human law's jurisdiction. Unfortunately, they do not. Perhaps in response to under- standable indignation among voters, state legislatures have seen fit to pass "hate crime" statutes. The majority of these legislatures have passed statutes which serve to enhance the penalty for certain criminal behavior when it is related to or motivated by the actor's "hate" or, more generally, bias. 14 Illinois, among other states, has passed a statute that, instead of enhancing a penalty for a particular crime, actually creates an entirely new crime.P 5 Proponents of such laws have attempted to justify their position by asserting that the incidence of hate crimes has risen steadily.' 6 Some have gone so far as to infer an "epidemic" from the data.' 7 Even so, a thorough and convincing argument has been made against such assertions and implications. 18 Moreover, a sense of urgency to act against bigoted actions should never be the basis for compromising the fundamental right of free thought and differing beliefs. 13. Id. 14. See e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-5-13 (Michie 1996): CAL. PENAL CODE § 422.7 (West 1988 & Supp. 1991): DEL. CODE ANN. Tit. II § 1304 (1997); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.085 (West 1991); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-7.1 (West 1994); IOWA CODE ANN. § 729A.2 (West 1997): LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:107.2 (West 1998); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-301 (1997); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-221 (1996); NEV. REV. STAT. § 193.1675 (1995); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-28-46 (1996): S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-19B-1 (1997); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 42.014 (Vernon Supp. 1994); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.36.078 (West 1997); WIS. STAT. § 939.645 (West 1990). 15. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/26-1 (West 1994). 16. See, e.g. H.R. Rep. No. 981, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1992); Daniel Goleman, As Bias Crime Seems to Rise, Scientists Study Roots of Racism, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 1990, at CI ("Everybody who collects data reports a steady increase in hate crimes in the last year or two"). 17. Eric Zom, A Trend That's ... Well, Epidemic, CHI. TiB., Mar. 23, 1994, at NI. 18. See generallv James B. Jacobs and Jessica S. Henry, The Social Construction of a Hate Crime Epidemic, 86 1. CRIm. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 366 (1996) (Jacobs and Henry examine the possibility of a contrived "epidemic," and show considerable cause for questioning the reliability of hate crime data compiled by the Anti-Defamation League, the Southern Poverty Law Center's Klanwatch Project, and the FBI, effectively demonstrating the political and subjective nature of counting hate crimes). HeinOnline -- 10 Regent U. L. Rev. 170 1998 A PENNY FOR YOUR THOUGHTS Such a fundamental right, as stated before, is rooted in a principle that there are some evils that are properly beyond the jurisdiction of human law. This article builds upon this principle in an analysis of state coercion toward acceptable, or at least non-punishable, private reasoning. While this principle was semantically dodged by the Supreme Court in Wisconsin v. Mitchell,19 it was flatly ignored in certain subsequent case law. Specifically, recent Illinois precedent serves as an example to confirm the threat of Mitchell to punish characteristically private notions as if they were actual, discernable, criminal intentions or conduct subject to state regulation. Part II of this article will lay the groundwork for the subject, analyzing the basic, relevant parameters of the First Amendment right of free speech, including the Supreme Court's controversial ruling in Mitchell. Part III will investigate an Illinois appellate case of 1996, In Re Vladimir p.,20 in an effort to illustrate the troubling effects that Mitchell has precipitated. The article will conclude with short comments on the reasoning and implications behind the legislative expansion of the government's role. II. THE BASIC PARAMETERS OF FREE SPEECH The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech...,,2 1 Freedom of speech being a fundamental right, the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits violation of such by state legislatures. 22 Legislators of hate crime statutes, in attempting to punish and deter the hatefulness of crime, must success- fully hurdle the Constitution's protection of speech. However, the U.S. Supreme Court's definition of the scope of the First Amendment has offered little assistance for the leap. The first step in analyzing a statute that proscribes the reasoning or motive behind a crime is to seek out the breadth of the First Amendment. "Speech" is found to be literally protected, but are thoughts within the scope? Does the First Amendment permit our government to regulate the beliefs that may or may not compel verbal 19. 508 U.S. 476 (1993). 20. 670 N.E.2d 839 (I11. App. 1996). 21. U.S. CONST. amend. 1. 22. Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 450 (1938). 19981 HeinOnline -- 10 Regent U. L. Rev. 171 1998 REGENT UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW [Vol. 10:167 or other forms of expression? Abood v. Detroit Board of Education 23 provides the answer. In Abood, appellants argued that they were prohibited from refusing to associate with their union's contributions for political purposes.2 4 In holding for the appellant, the Court explained that "at the heart of the First Amendment is the notion that an individual should be free to believe as he will, and that in a free society one's beliefs should be shaped by his mind and his conscience rather than coerced by the State."' 5 This opinion makes it clear that the First Amendment applies not only to expressions such as conduct, but to reasoning encompassing all forms of belief which citizens may develop and cultivate. 26 Under this Constitutional interpretation, a question of application arises. What happens when a government wishes to punish a belief, but finds itself unable to reliably detect such a hidden, private, mental process? Absent any recognition of mind reading or psychokinesis, the state is resigned to regulate the subtle, even latent notions that it perceives at work behind proscribed conduct. 27 First Amendment precedent offers little assistance for prospective legislators of hate crime. For example, the "fighting words" excep- tion has proven to be highly restrictive. Under this exception, the U.S. Supreme Court has found that there are certain verbal expressions that by their recalcitrant nature are beyond the scope of the First Amendment's protection. Such words must be "likely to provoke the average person to retaliation, and thereby cause a breach of the peace.",29 The "fighting words" exception has been narrowly 23. 431 U.S. 209 (1977). 24. Id. at 234. 25 Id. at 234-35. 26. See United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644 (1929). The decision in Abood may have been an echo of the dissent of Justice Holmes in Schwimmer. In Sehwimmer, Justice Holmes wrote in his dissent: "[1]f there is any principle of the Constitution that more imperatively calls for attachment than any other it is the principle of free thought - not free thought for those who agree with us but freedom for the thought that we hate." Id. at 654-55 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 27. For fictional works depicting this scenario, see generally EUGENE ZAMIATIN, WE (1924); GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 (1949). For non-fictional works depicting this scenario, see generally Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (1993). 28. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). 29. Id. at 574. HeinOnline -- 10 Regent U. L. Rev. 172 1998 1998] A PENNY FOR YOUR THOUGHTS 173 defined, 30 however, and the Court has recently found that it does not automatically pierce the protection of the First Amendment. 3 1 Besides, the Supreme Court has not upheld any convictions under this doctrine since it was conceived in 1942. Another exception is found in the context of important govern- mental interests. 32 In 1965, Congress prohibited the mutilation of a selective service certificate. 33 The Supreme Court, in United States v. O'Brien,34 recognized that although such a law had the effect of limiting anti-war expression, such a limitation was only an incidental restriction on the right to free speech. Furthermore, the law was justified by a sufficiently important governmental interest: regulation of the accompanying non-speech elements. 35 In 1989, the Court reaffirmed this precedent in Texas v. Johnson.36 Here, the defendant burned an American Flag in violation of a Texas statute that prohibited a person from knowingly offending another through the desecration of specific types of sites and objects.37 The Court held that such a limitation on expression was unconstitutional, since the law was based on the content of the message expressed by the desecration. Likewise, Texas failed to assert a governmental interest 30. See Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 (1974) (words that convey or are intended to convey disgrace are not "fighting words"); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15. 20 (1971) (the state was found not to have exercised its police power in preventing a speaker "from intentionally provoking a given group to hostile reaction"). 31. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992). 32. See Simon & Schuster. Inc. v. Members of the New York State Crime Victims Board. 502 U.S. 105, 118 (1991) (State may regulate speech directly based on its message upon showing that the law serves a compelling state interest); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 115 (1972) (State may impose reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions upon showing of significant government interest). 33. U.S. v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 375 (1968) (citing 32 C.F.R. § 1617.1 (1962)). 34. 391 U.S. 367 (1968). 35. Id. at 376. 36. 491 U.S. 397 (1989). 37. Id. at 400. The Texas statute read, in pertinent part: (a) A person commits an offense if he intentionally or knowingly desecrates: (1) a public monument; (2) a place of worship or burial: or (3) a state or national flag. (b) For purposes of this section, 'desecrate' means deface, damage, or othervise physically mistreat in a way that the actor knows will seriously offend one or more persons likely to observe or discover his action. TEX. CODE ANN. § 42.09 (West 1989). HeinOnline -- 10 Regent U. L. Rev. 173 1998 REGENT UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:167 sufficient to support the limitation. 38 The Court reasoned that since the Texas statute permitted the State to punish speech based merely on the content of the message, "the most exacting scrutiny" should be applied. 39 By overturning the conviction in Johnson, the Court emphasized a foundational principle of the First Amendment regarding the government's neutrality toward the subjective offensiveness of a person's ideas: "[i]f there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable." 40 The Johnson Court rejected the argument that the proscribed conduct may have offended a group or led to a disturbance of the peace, and stated that the narrow "fighting words" exception did not apply. 4 1 In fact, the law was found to be contra to a principal function of free speech, which is "to invite dispute. Regarding racist or bigoted speech, the Court has also recognized protection in the First Amendment. 43 In 1978, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit decided such an issue in Collins v. Smith.44 Skokie, a largely Jewish village, attempted to prohibit the National Socialist Party of America (NSPA) from marching in front of the Skokie city hall.45 Skokie eventually passed a number of ordinances in pursuit of this goal.46 The ordinances placed conditions upon the granting of a parade permit, requiring that the marching assembly would not "portray criminality, depravity or a lack of virtue 38. Id. at 417. 39. Id. 40. Id. at 414. See also Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55-56 (1988) (First and Fourteenth Amendments prohibited a public figure from recovering damages for tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress, by reason of a magazine's publication of an advertisement parody, without showing in addition that that publication contained a false statement of fact that was made with actual malice). 41. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 408. 42. Id. at 408-09 (quoting Terminello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949)). 43. See generallv Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (reversing the conviction of a Ku Klux Klan leader and holding that the First Amendment protects expression advocating racial violence); c.f, Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969) (holding that the public expression of ideas "may not be prohibited merely because the ideas are themselves offensive to some of their hearers"). 44. 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978). 45. Id. at 1199. 46. Id. HeinOnline -- 10 Regent U. L. Rev. 174 1998 A PENNY FOR YOUR THOUGHTS in, or incite violence, hatred, abuse or hostility toward a person or group of persons by reason of reference to religious, racial, ethnic, national or regional affiliation. 4 7 The Skokie ordinances also prohibited "the dissemination of any materials, which promotes and incites hatred against persons by reason of their race, national origin, or religion, and is intended to do so.''48 The court found these ordinances to be content-based and outside of the reach of the "fight- ing words" doctrine. 49 The Village argued that such ordinances were justified because a demonstration by the NSPA could possibly inflict emotional damage on the residents, many of whom were survivors of the Nazi holocaust. Ultimately, the court refused to permit a limitation upon free speech in anticipation of such a damage. 50 The court supported this position by quoting the U.S. Supreme Court, emphasizing that the First Amendment's protection of free speech focuses on the content of the expression, not merely the expression: "[a]ny shock effect must be attributed to the content of the ideas expressed . . . It is firmly settled that under our Constitution the public expression of ideas may not be prohibited merely because the ideas are themselves offensive to some of their hearers." 5 1 The issue of special, emotional damage addressed in Collins resurfaced in the case of R.A. V v. City of St. Paul.52 In this landmark case, the Court struck down a municipal ordinance that prohibited actions "which one [knew] or [had] reasonable grounds to know" would cause "anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender." 53 The Supreme Court applied an analysis similar to that used in Collins; it addressed the applicability of the "fighting words" doctrine while recognizing that though emotional distress may be real and even significant, the source of this harm is the idea behind an expression: 47. Id. (quoting Skokie, Ill., Ordinance 77-5-N-994, § 27-56(c) (May 2, 1977)). 48. Collins, 578 F.2d at 1199 (quoting Skokie, Ill., Ordinance 77-5-N-995, § 28-43.1 (May 2, 1977)). 49. Id. at 1200-03. 50. Id. at 1205. 51. Id. at 1206 (quoting Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969)). 52. 505 U.S. 377 (1992). 53. Id. at 380 (quoting St. Paul Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance, ST. PAUL, MINN. LEGIS. CODE § 292.02 (1990)). 1998] HeinOnline -- 10 Regent U. L. Rev. 175 1998 REGENT UNIVERSITY LA WREVIEW [Vol. 10:167 What makes the anger, fear, sense of dishonor, etc., produced by the violation of this ordinance distinct from the anger, fear, sense of dishonor, etc., produced by other fighting words is nothing other than the fact that it is caused by a distinctive idea, conveyed by a distinctive message. The First Amendment cannot be evaded that easily. 54 This reasoning focuses on the Constitutional significance of the impact of an idea, not on the mode of expression of that idea. Therefore, the distinction between a "money-motivated" crime and a "hate-motivated" crime is rooted in something that the R.A. V court has recognized as beyond the scope of government's jurisdiction. When the Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 55 the R.A. V. opinion was approximately a year old. Mitchell involved a type of hate crime statute that enhanced penalties beyond the maximum statutory penalty of a crime. 56 In Mitchell, Todd Mitchell was convicted in the Circuit Court of Kenosha County, Wisconsin, for aggravated battery, a crime that carried a maximum sentence of two years. 57 The Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed the conviction, 58 relying on the U.S. Supreme Court's analysis of content- based regulations of expression in R.A. V v. City of St. Paul.59 But, upon further review by the U.S. Supreme Court, the Wisconsin hate crime statute was held to be constitutional. Redefining the issue of "special harms" addressed in Collins and R.A. V, the Court reasoned that because crimes such as physical 54. Id. at 392-93. 55. 508 U.S. 476 (1993). 56. Id. at 481. n.1 (citing to Wis. STAT. § 939.645(I)(b) (1989-90)). In 1993, the Wisconsin hate crime statute read in pertinent part: (1) If a person does all of the following, the penalties for the underlying crime are increased as provided in sub. (2): (a) Commits a crime under chs. 939 to 948. (b) Intentionally selects the person against whom the crime under par. (a) is committed or selects the property which is damaged or otherwise affected by the crime under par. (a) because of the race, religion, color, sexual orientation, national origin or ancestry of that person or the owner or occupant of that property .... WIS. STAT. § 939.645(1)(b) (1989-90). 57. Mitchell. 508 U.S. at 480. 58. State v. Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d 807 (Wis. 1992). 59. 505 U.S. 377 (1992). HeinOnline -- 10 Regent U. L. Rev. 176 1998 A PENNY FOR YOUR THOUGHTS assault are not expressive conduct under the First Amendment, the violence of the crimes is not protected by the Constitution: "Violence or other types of potentially expressive activities that produce special harms distinct from their communicative impact.., are entitled to no constitutional protection .... ,60 Special harms from expressed ideas, which the R.A. V. court had addressed as attributable to the impact of the idea communicated, 6t were noted to be separate and distinct from a communicative impact, and thus punishable: "[t]he First Amend- ment does not protect violence." 62 The Court justified the statutory punishment of hateful motive by citing cases in which sentencing judges had considered a variety of factors in determining the severity of sentence to impose upon a defendant who was already convicted.63 Also, the Court relied on precedent, specifically Dawson v. Delaware64 and Barclay v. Florida,6S which allowed the admission into evidence of a defendant's racial animus when relevant to the proceedings. From these cases, the Court held that a defendant's abstract beliefs may not be taken into account by a sentencing judge, but evidence of racial hatred is admissible when relevant to the commission of an offense. 66 Justice Thomas, in his dissenting opinion in Dawson, wrote that the majority opinion recognized that "the First Amendment limits the aspects of a defendant's character that [the sentencing judge] may consider." The truth of this assertion is discovered in the recognition that a judge's discretionary consideration of aggravating factors is significantly different than legislatively regulating a motive. Apart from the general, human inability to reliably identify hidden motives, another interesting dilemma surfaces: just because an aggravating factor can 60. Mitchell. 508 U.S. at 484 (quoting Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 628 (1984)). 61. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 393. 62. Mitchell, 508 U.S. at 484 (quoting NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886. 916 (1982). 63. Id. at 489 (citing to Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 818-20 (1991); United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 446 (1972); Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 246 (1949)). 64. 503 U.S. 159 (1992). 65. 463 U.S. 939 (1983). 66. Mitchell, 508 U.S. at 486. 19981 HeinOnline -- 10 Regent U. L. Rev. 177 1998 REGENT UNIVERSITYLAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:167 be considered in determining a convicted criminal's sentence does not mean that the substance of that factor can be prohibited by law. 67 The Mitchell Court also held that the Wisconsin hate-crime statute was analogous to federal and state anti-discrimination laws, which had been upheld as constitutional.68 The Court used Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196469 as an example of a constitutional statute that prohibits discrimination in the public sphere, specifically in employment practices. 70 The Court reasoned that both the Wis- consin hate-crime statute and Title VII are aimed at unprotected conduct, not expression, and thus are both permissible content-neutral conduct regulations. 7 However, the Court did not address the significance of the difference between a person's actions in a private and public sphere. While the government's interest in equal opportunity may justify anti-discrimination laws, such laws were created to address "the consequences of employment practices, not the underlying motivation." 72 This is evidenced by Title VII, where proof of biased motive is not even necessary to bring a case; it is sufficient to bring proof of a disparate impact upon different groups resulting from a specific employment practice. 73 III. IN RE VLADIMIR P. As A DEMONSTRATION OF MITCHELL'S FLAWS Certain flaws in the Supreme Court's Mitchell decision become especially apparent in a recent Illinois case. The 1996 Illinois 67. See Susan Gellman, Hate Crime Laws Are Thought Crime Laws, 1992/1993 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 509 (1993). Gellman cogently argues that, [A] judge may consider such factors as education, employment, and religion to assess whether an offender is likely to secure gainful employment or to commit future crimes. However. a legislature could not constitutionally enact a penalty enhancement that is triggered whenever the offender is poorly educated or unemployed. Id. at 522. 68. Mitchell. 508 U.S. at 487. (citing Roberts, 468 U.S. at 628 (1984); Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 78 (1984); Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 176 (1976)). 69. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to e-17 (1988) (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discriminatory employment practices). 70. Mitchell, 508 U.S. at 487 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1988)). 71. Id. 72. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 73. See, e.g., Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio, 490 U.S. 657 (1989). 178 HeinOnline -- 10 Regent U. L. Rev. 178 1998 1998] A PENNY FOR YOUR THOUGHTS 179 appellate case, In Re Vladimir P., 74 serves as the clearest example of a fruit borne of the "corrupted seed" of the controversial Mitchell. Such flaws include an overlooking of the precedent set by the Supreme Court in R.A. V v. City of St. Paul,75 and a blurred distinction between motive, mens rea (guilty mind), and conduct. Both of these flaws, which concern freedom of expression and due process, will be analyzed in the context of the facts of Vladimir P. Finally, the Vladimir P. court's opinion regarding the proof of a hate crime violation deserves attention for the purpose of understanding the implications of expanding the government's role into regulation of the human heart. The respondent in Vladimir P., aged 15, was convicted of violating the Illinois hate crime statute 76 for aggravated assault upon a Jewish boy, Bergovoy. 77 Bergovoy was walking home and wearing clothing accessories that symbolized his religious beliefs,78 when he passed by Vladimir and Igor, who were both parties in the case. 79 Both Vladimir and Igor were in the company of a third youth on the steps of an apartment building. 80 An unknown number of the three youths began shouting at Bergovoy: "F--- you Jew, get out of here Jew, I am going to kill you Jew, f--- you Jew."8' Igor and respondent then both threw knife parts at Bergovoy: Igor threw a knife handle 74. 670 N.E.2d 839 (II. App. 1996). 75. 505 U.S. 377 (1992). 76. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-7.1 (West 1994). The statute reads in pertinent part: (a) A person commits hate crime when, by reason of the actual or perceived race. color, creed, religion, ancestry, gender, sexual orientation, physical or mental disability, or national origin of another individual or group of individuals, he commits assault, battery, aggravated assault, misdemeanor theft, criminal trespass to residence. misdemeanor criminal damage to property, criminal trespass to vehicle, criminal trespass to real property, mob action or disorderly conduct as these crimes are defined [in specific sections of the Code], respectively, or harassment by telephone as defined in [a specific section of the Obscene Phone Call Act]. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-7.1 (West 1994). 77. Vladimir. 670 N.E.2d at 841. 78. Id. Bergovoy was wearing a head covering (yarmulke) and prayer tassels (tzitzis). Id. 79. Id. 80. Id. 81. Vladimir P., 670 N.E.2d at 841 (expletive deleted). HeinOnline -- 10 Regent U. L. Rev. 179 1998 REGENT UNIVERSITYLAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:167 and respondent threw a knife blade.8 2 Bergovoy perceived this attack and ran home frightened for his safety. Bergovoy's mother later accompanied her son to investigate the incident. They encountered Igor, who approached and yelled, "F--- you Jew."8 3 Bergovoy and his mother then called the police. When a police officer investigated, the respondent, Vladimir, told him that "they were bored and that Bergovoy looked 'funny' when he went by."8 4 At trial, Vladimir's mother testified that respondent was Jewish and knew what Bergovoy's head covering and tassels represented. 5 A. Overlooking R.A. V The Illinois Appellate Court upheld Vladimir's conviction and rejected arguments that the Illinois hate-crime statute was unconst- itutional.8 6 The court recognized that a fundamental difference between the Wisconsin statute8 7 examined in Mitchell and the Illinois statute examined in Vladimir P. was that the Wisconsin statute was a penalty enhancer while the Illinois statute created a crime within itself.88 The court nevertheless brushed off this incon-sistency as insignificant and relied upon Wisconsin v. Mitchell to justify its ruling, stating "this distinction does nothing to diminish the applicability of the Supreme Court's analysis on the issue of whether 12-7.1 [the Illinois hate-crime statute] impermissibly criminalizes thought." 89 But, such an analysis of Supreme Court precedent is incomplete. Immediately prior to deciding Mitchell, the U.S. Supreme Court, in R.A. V v. City of St. Paul,90 ruled on a Minnesota ordinance 9' which, 82. Id. 83. Id. (expletive deleted). 84. Id. 85. Id. 86. Id. 87. WIS. STAT. § 939.645(!)(b). 88. Vladimir P.. 670 N.E.2d at 843. 89. Id. 90. 505 U.S. 377 (1992). 91. ST. PAUL. MINN. LEGIS. CODE § 292.02 (1990). The Minnesota ordinance prohibited cross-burning, among other conduct, by making it a crime to "display a symbol. object, appellation, characterization or graffiti, including but not limited to, a burning cross or Nazi swastika, which one knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender." Id. HeinOnline -- 10 Regent U. L. Rev. 180 1998 A PENNY FOR YOUR THOUGHTS like the Illinois hate-crime statute, created a separate crime for conduct based on biased motivation, punishing conduct on the basis of the ideas expressed by the conduct.92 The Supreme Court held the ordinance to be facially invalid, stating that "[t]he First Amendment does not permit St. Paul to impose special prohibitions on those speakers who express views on disfavored subjects." 93 Rather than discussing the applicability of the R.A. V ruling, the Vladimir P. court again referred to the analysis of Mitchell, emphasizing that the First Amendment does not legalize criminal conduct. 94 The Supreme Court, in Mitchell, distinguished its ruling from that in R.A. V, stating "[T]he ordinance struck down in R.A. V was explicitly directed at expression ...[this statute is] aimed at conduct unprotected by the First Amendment." 95 The Vladimir P. court adopted this reasoning in upholding the Illinois hate crime statute: "'a physical assault is not by any stretch of the imagination expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment.' 96 Such an argument is problematic in that it seems to imply that opponents of hate-crime statutes would actually advocate using the First Amendment as a shield against punishment of expressive criminal conduct. But clearly, an argument against punishing the beliefs or hatred that have motivated a person's criminal conduct is not an argument that the First Amendment protects that criminal conduct from punishment. Rather, a proper analysis of R.A. V and First Amendment precedent instructs that while the First Amendment protects only certain types of expression, it also protects the viewpoints, opinions, and beliefs behind expression, generally. In other words, whether or not the expression itself finds protection under the First Amendment, the viewpoints, notions, and beliefs behind it are always protected.97 92. R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 380-81. 93. Id. at 391. 94. Vladimir P., 670 N.E.2d at 843. 95. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 487 (1993). 96. Vladimir. 670 N.E.2d at 843 (quoting Mitchell. 508 U.S. at 484). 97. The idea is not unprecedented in First Amendment jurisprudence that protected beliefs remain protected even if they motivate unprotected actions. See Cantwell v. Connecticut 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940) (The Court stated that "[T]he [First] Amendment embraces two concepts. -- freedom to believe and freedom to act. Thefirst is absolute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be. Conduct remains subject to regulation for the protection of society." (emphasis added)). See also Reynolds v. United States 98 U.S. 145, 19981 HeinOnline -- 10 Regent U. L. Rev. 181 1998 REGENT UNIVERSITYLAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:167 To argue otherwise would be to deny the precedent of Abood v. Detroit Board of Education which held that "at the heart of the First Amendment is the notion that an individual should be free to believe as he will, and that in a free society one's beliefs should be shaped by his mind and his conscience rather than coerced by the State." 98 Indeed, the Supreme Court in R.A. V reinforced this concept by moving one step beyond the affirmation that content-based regulations of expression are presumptively invalid. The Court held that through "practical operation, . . . the [Minnesota] ordinance goes even beyond mere content discrimination, to actual viewpoint discrimination." 99 Thus, while the Vladimir P. court correctly recognized that the First Amendment does not protect expressions such as assault, it failed to recognize that an assailant's beliefs, motivational or otherwise, remain protected. B. Motive, Mens Rea, and Conduct The Vladimir P. court, through its misguided reliance on Mitchell, inherited a seeming disability to distinguish between motive, mens rea, and conduct, as well as an inconsistent determination of what exactly is being punished by hate-crime legislation. These faults pervade the court's decision in its analysis of arguments on the grounds of freedom of expression, due process, and proof beyond a reasonable doubt. However, before analyzing the Vladimir P. opinion fully, it is helpful to first briefly trace the possible roots of the confusion. The confusion may be traced back to the U.S. Supreme Court's analysis of motive and mens rea in Mitchell. The Court discussed the important factors that are considered in determining what sentence to impose on a previously convicted defendant. 10 0 Seemingly in support of its assertion that "[t]he defendant's motive for committing the 166 (1878) ("Laws are made for the government of actions, and while they cannot interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, they may with practices"). See generally Gary Stuart McCaleb, A Century of Free Exercise Jurisprudence: Don't Practice What You Preach, 9 REGENT U. L. REV. 253 (1997). 98. 431 U.S. 235. 234-45 (1977). See supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text. 99. R.A.V. 505 U.S. at 391. 100. Mitchell, 508 U.S. at 485. HeinOnline -- 10 Regent U. L. Rev. 182 1998 A PENNY FOR YOUR THOUGHTS offense is one important factor,"' 0' the Court quoted from a case which expounded on the punitive significance of mens rea, not motive: "Deeply ingrained in our legal tradition is the idea that the more purposeful is the criminal conduct, the more serious is the offense, and, therefore, the more severely it ought to be punished."' 0 2 Having established this premise, the Court moved immediately to a conclusion regarding the relevance of motive as an aggravating circumstance: "Thus, in many States the commission of a murder, or other capital offense, for pecuniary gain is a separate aggravating circumstance under the capital sentencing statute." 13 The Court's peculiar syllogism raises a puzzling question. Why would the punitive significance of mens rea be relevant to the conclusion that motive is an appropriate factor for consideration in determining the punishment for a convicted defendant? It is a fundamental error to confuse mens rea with motive. The Court's description of criminal conduct as "purposeful" is surely a reference to the guilty mind (or mens rea) of the actor. The determination of a defendant's mens rea centers on the issue of specific intent, and the question of whether the defendant committed the actus reus intentionally. 10 4 This should not be mistaken for motive, which has been properly described as the "moving power which impels to action, "induces action or gives birth to a purpose. 107 Indeed, motive has traditionally been contrasted with a defendant's state of mind, a required element of crimes, in the determination of criminal culpability. Whenever it is established that a person committed a crime, with whatever state of mind was required for the mens rea of the particular offense, all of the requisites of criminal guilt are present, even if no possible motive for the deed can be shown. 10 8 Thus, was the Supreme Court's seemingly irrelevant 101. Id. (emphasis added). 102. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Tison v. Arizona. 481 U.S. 137, 156 (1987)). 103. Mitchell. 508 U.S. at 485. 104. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 10.02[C] (1987). 105. People ex rel. Hegeman v. Corrigan, 87 N.E. 792 (N.Y. 1909). 106. State v. Santino, 186 S.W. 976, 977 (Mo. 1916). 107. People v. Kuhn. 205 N.W. 188, 189 (Mich. 1925). 108. See Commonwealth v. Danz, 211 PA. 507, 517 (1905) (Distinguishing motive from elements of a crime, holding that, "Itihere can be no escape from punishment for crime when all the elements of it are proved, whether the evidence be positive or circumstantial, simply because the motive lies hidden in the heart of the only one who knows it.") 1998] HeinOnline -- 10 Regent U. L. Rev. 183 1998 REGENT UNIVERSITYLAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:167 premise in Mitchell a harmless mix-up? Or was it a sign of increasing confusion among the courts regarding what mental process is key to determining a violation of a hate crime? The decision in Vladimir P. confirms the latter. The confusion has been transmitted through precedent and has been compounded through an approach that interprets "selection" as "conduct." The trend is seen among hate-crime proponents who interpret selection as an "act" in order to advance the notion that hate crimes are deter- mined not by a showing of motive, but rather by the volition of the "act" of selection. One proponent showed enthusiasm for this new focus, alleging how it escapes the motive question entirely: The simple elegance of this approach is that it neatly sidesteps what has surfaced in some of the case law as a true doctrinal and philosophical tangle about what mental process is going on inside the mind of the offender-be it focused on motivation, purpose, intent, or some other kind of mental activity-in determining whether a hate crime has occurred. Instead, this formulation concentrates on the actual "act" of intentional selection, which is at the root of any hate crime. 109 This reasoning was adopted in Vladimir P., as the court attempted to separate the idea of motive from the "act" of selection. Whether such a separation was achieved can be analyzed through a comparison of the court's response to the respondent's due process and freedom of expression claims. The respondent in Vladimir P. argued that the Illinois hate crime statute violated his Constitutional rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.1 0 At issue was whether the statute's phrase "by reason of' was impermissibly vague.' The statute read, "[a] person commits hate crime when, by reason of the actual or perceived race, color, creed, religion [etc.] ... of another individual or 109. Richard Corday, Transcript: Free Speech and the Thought We Hate, 21 OHIo N.U. L. REV. 871, 873 (1995). 110. Vladimir P.. 670 N.E.2d at 844. Ill. Id. HeinOnline -- 10 Regent U. L. Rev. 184 1998 A PENNY FOR YOUR THOUGHTS group of individuals, he commits assault, battery [etc.] .... ,,12 The court attempted to explain the phrase by quoting the Supreme Court of Washington's analysis of the same issue: "In ordinary usage 'because of means 'by reason of or 'on account of.' When read as a whole, this language is clear and provides adequate notice that the prohibited conduct is the selection of crime victims from certain specified categories."113 A fundamental error is apparent from this analysis. In attempting to separate the causal-motive element from the selection element, the court defines the crime in its entirety as the selection of the crime victim from certain specified categories. But, this distinction presented "as a whole" would apply absurdly to anyone, regardless of motive, whose selected victim had the universal attribute of race. Since selection of such victims for criminal behavior represents a question of mens rea, it is easier for the court to define the proscribed conduct of a hate crime "as a whole" without dealing with the messy business of including an explanation of how the element of "hate" is shown. But, what is the use of a hate/bias crime statute, which, without any reference to bias, beliefs, hatred, or motive, punishes merely the intentional selection of victims of identified characteristics? The ignored truth of the matter is that motive is the factor that separates meaning-laden selection from random selection. If the goal of hate crime legislation is to address the "greater individual and societal harm" of bias-inspired conduct, 114 then analytically detaching the criminal's bias-motive from his selection is counterproductive. The type of selection being targeted for punishment is inextricably intertwined with motive. Proponents of hate crime legislation must 112. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-7.1 (West 1994 & Supp. 1997) (emphasis added). supra note 76 and accompanying text. 113. Vladimir P. 670 N.E.2d at 844 (citation omitted) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Talley. 858 P.2d 217, 229 (Wash. 1993) (emphasis added)). 114. Mitchell. 508 U.S. at 487-88 ("[T]he Wisconsin statute singles out for enhancement bias-inspired conduct because this conduct is thought to inflict greater individual and societal harm"). See also Vladimir P. 670 N.E.2d at 845 ("It has been widely documented that victims of bias-motivated crimes suffer harmful psychological effects, and these crimes are more likely to provoke retaliatory crimes and incite political unrest."). State v. Vanatter, 869 S.W.2d 754 (Mo. 1994) ("While 574.093 [the Missouri hate-crime statute] admittedly creates a new motive-based crime, its practical effect is to provide additional punishment for conduct that is already illegal but is seen as especially harmful because it is motivated by group hatred"). 1998] HeinOnline -- 10 Regent U. L. Rev. 185 1998 REGENT UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:167 admit that it is not random, intentional selection that they wish to punish. They wish to punish only intentional selections resulting from legislatively enumerated motives. Through this unavoidable reasoning, a hate crime legislator must choose between writing a hate crime statute that either counterproductively punishes intentional, categorical selection,' 15 or unconstitutionally punishes a criminal's private motivational notions. The Vladimir P. court apparently recognized this dilemma, and attempted to explain its decision by focusing on the causal connection between the criminal's reasoning and the victim's characteristic. The court wrote that, "[t]he phrase 'by reason of clearly indicates for police officers and offenders that there must be a causal connection between a victim's race, religion, etc., and the offender's reason for choosing that person as a victim."1 16 But, this analysis is also problematic: without addressing the offender's beliefs, it represents a flawed understanding of motive and reasoning. Does a bias- motivated criminal select a victim by reason of the victim's religion or by reason of the criminal's beliefs about/hatred toward the victim's religion? It would not make much sense to argue that the offender's motive was the "category" of religion. A proper understanding of motive addresses not the external characteristics of the criminal's victim, but rather the internal reasoning and beliefs of the criminal. This distinction warrants a reexamination of the wording of the 115. See Gellman. supra note 67, at 512-3, analyzing the reasoning in Mitchell: The Wisconsin statute upheld in Mitchell ...was defended as punishing not bigotry, but the special harms to the victim and others created by "intentional selection of the victim" because of ethnicity. It therefore would apply where a victim is selected because of race, in a situation that has nothing to do with bigotry and creates no risk of the special harms which are said to justify the extra punishment. For example, A goes to her car and sees that the windshield has been smashed. A bystander tells her that the deed was done just a few seconds ago, by an Asian. A looks around and sees, among a dozen people, only one Asian, B, whom she then assaults. A's selection of B was based upon his ethnicity, although it was significant only for identification, not for bias. Nevertheless, the law applies even though none of its purposes are implicated. If it doesn't, then the law demonstrably is punishing bigotry, not "intentional selection." Id. 116. Vladimir P.. 670 N.E.2d at 844. 186 HeinOnline -- 10 Regent U. L. Rev. 186 1998 A PENNY FOR YOUR THOUGHTS Illinois hate crime statute.1 17 The statute does not actually mention anything about a person's beliefs or hatred: "[a] person commits hate crime when, by reason of the actual or perceived race, color, creed, religion [etc.] ...of another individual or group of individuals, he commits assault, battery [etc.] .... ,I 18 But, as discussed previously, in order for a hate crime statute to fulfill the purpose of a hate crime statute, it must punish belief-motivated or hate-motivated conduct. 119 The Vladimir P. court seemingly attempts to compensate for this problem by offering a different and contradictory analysis (still within the same opinion, but this time addressing the argument over freedom of expression). Rather than tracing a causal connection between the victim's characteristic and the offender's reason for choosing the victim, the court inserts a requirement that the selection be connected to the offender's beliefs or hatred: We find that the statute at issue here does not punish an individual for merely thinking hateful thoughts or expressing bigoted beliefs. Instead, section 12-7.1 punishes an offender's criminal conduct in choosing a victim by reason of those beliefs or hatred, and then committing one of the criminal acts included in section 12-7..12 How can this interpretation of the hate crime statute be reconciled with the court's other analysis in which the statute's language prohibited selection by reason of category, with no reference to the selector's beliefs about or hatred toward that category? They cannot be reconciled. Clearly, the Vladimir P. court in its due process claim analysis attempted to avoid connecting motive with selection, preferring to conclude that the statute's prohibition focused on the mens rea of the "act" of selection of specific categories of victims. But here, in its analysis of the freedom of expression claim, the court found the connection to be unavoidable. In order to effectively explain that the statute does not require the government to 117. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-7.1 (West 1994 & Supp. 1997), supra note 76 and accompanying text. 118. Id. 119. See infra note 114 and accompanying text. 120. Vladimir P.. 670 N.E.2d at 843 (emphasis added). 1998] HeinOnline -- 10 Regent U. L. Rev. 187 1998 REGENT UNIVERSITYLAWREVIEW [Vol. 10:167 read the thoughts of non-criminals, the court blatantly admitted that such a "selection" must be by reason of a criminal's motivational "beliefs or hatred." It apparently did not bother the Vladimir P. court that there existed no mention of "beliefs" or "hatred" in the statute being interpreted. Liberal inferences are designed to bridge such "gaps." Besides, such work is necessary for a court bold enough to attempt an impossible task: to maintain a singular interpretation that retains the definitive purpose of a "hate" crime statute, 12 yet purports to punish the offender based merely upon the mens rea of the "act" of categorical selection. C. Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt The respondent's final contention in Vladimir P. was that the evidence was insufficient to prove him guilty of the hate crime.' 22 Noting that the State's burden of proof was guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the court responded that when a minor challenges that sufficiency, the court's task is to review the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, and overturn only if it found that "no rational trier of fact could have found the offense beyond a reasonable doubt."' 123 The respondent, Vladimir, asserted and the court admitted that the facts of the case show no evidence that Vladimir shouted the religious insults at the victim, Bergovoy. 124 The significance of this defense would seem obvious: such evidence was necessary for the trier of fact to supposedly determine that Vladimir had beliefs about or hatred toward Bergovoy's religion, and that such beliefs or hatred motivated Vladimir's assault. Since no such evidence existed, the charge of a "hate" crime should not have been even applicable to Vladimir. But, the court's will was not so easily thwarted: it demonstrated a remarkable faith in a human being's ability to discern and identify another's intimate hatred or beliefs from even the most subtle of pre-criminal actions or omissions. The court reasoned as follows: 121. See supra note 114 and accompanying text. 122. Vladimir P., 670 N.E.2d at 845. 123. Id. (citing In re W.C., 657 N.E.2d 908, 923 (I11. 1995)). 124. Id. See also supra text accompanying notes 77-85. HeinOnline -- 10 Regent U. L. Rev. 188 1998 A PENNY FOR YOUR THOUGHTS The evidence . . . demonstrates that, even if it was Igor [Vladimir's companion] who uttered the offensive religious slurs, respondent made no effort to leave the scene or disassociate himself with Igor. Rather, as respondent him- self told Officer Roytman, Igor threw the knife handle at Bergovoy and respondent followed by throwing the blade. Under these circumstances, the trier of fact was entitled to infer that the youths were not acting independently, but rather in concert and that respondent participated in all of the acts. 125 Is Vladimir's failure to "leave the scene" of a verbal insult or to disassociate himself with a vocal racist enough evidence for a trier of fact to conclude anything about the specific beliefs which motivated his subsequent assault? Apparently, the court deemed such omissions entirely adequate even to support a conclusion that the respondent shared the beliefs of the vocal companion before or during the assault. Thus, not only does a hate crime statute allow the state to punish the supposedly perceivable motivating beliefs of a criminal, but the trier of fact is permitted to "cut and paste" those beliefs onto criminal bystanders who fail to do what the trier of fact believes a non-bigot should have done when hearing those beliefs verbally expressed. The facts reveal that Vladimir told a police officer at the station that he and Igor "were bored and that Bergovoy looked 'funny' when he went by."1 26 But, the court discredited the evidentiary significance of such a confession: "Immediately after hearing anti-Semitic shouts, respondent admittedly committed an assault on the 13-year-old target of the abuse. The trial judge could properly infer that respondent's motive for his conduct was not the result of boredom, but was caused 'by reason of Bergovoy's religion."' 127 Faced with such strained logic, are criminals thus forewarned that in order to protect their motivating ideas from punishment, they are to make reasonable efforts to disavow ideological associations before or during a crime? 125. Id. 126. Vladimir P., 670 N.E.2d at 841. 127. Id. at 845. 1998] HeinOnline -- 10 Regent U. L. Rev. 189 1998 REGENT UNIVERSITYLAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:167 More specifically, should a criminal assailant who is motivated by boredom or amusement, but in the company of a vocal religious bigot, be expected to somehow assert a disclaimer before or during the assault, such as, "the views expressed by my fellow assailant are not necessarily the views of Vladimir P."? A desperate court reaching beyond its capacity to discern beliefs has pulled the exacting nature of Law into gutters of absurdity. At the root of the misanalysis are two logical fallacies. The first is that coincidence of action necessarily proves beyond a reasonable doubt coincidence of motive: that respondent's motive is the same as that of his companion merely because they acted simultaneously. The second, auxiliary fallacy is post hoc, ergo propter hoc, a common error of concluding that one event caused a later event simply because it happened earlier. Such is to say that correlation proves causation: that an assailant who first hears anti-Semitic shouts and then assaults a Jewish victim must have committed the assault from an anti-Semitic motive. These logical fallacies, however, are only a symptom of the larger problem found in the conclusion that human government can reliably detect the secret affairs of the heart or imagination of the thoughts let alone exercise authority to regulate them. IV. CONCLUSION A well-intentioned desire to regulate the private, biased, motivational notions of criminals should not overwhelm the deeply rooted, traditional freedoms of the First Amendment, nor compromise the integrity of the legal distinction between motive and mens rea. Confusing the regulation of mens rea with the regulation of motive, the volition of a crime with its compelling notion, is akin to the fallacy of legislatively entangling the regulation of mental illness with the regulation of "mental abnormality,"' 28 and no less dangerous to 128. See generally Lance L. Losey, Note, The Sexually Violent Predator Act - A Dangerous Alternative, 8 REGENT U. L. Rv. 123, 140-44 (1997) Losey warns of the deleterious consequences of effectively equating mental illness, which cripples volition, with "mental abnormality," which is "any emotional state that motivated deviant conduct, including strong desires to engage in such behavior, .... [which] would ... include virtually anyone who engages in seriously antisocial conduct." Id. at 143, n. 98 (quoting Schopp & Sturgis, Sexual Predators and Legal Mental Illness for Civil Commitment, 13 BEHAV. SC. & L. 437. 451) (1995)). HeinOnline -- 10 Regent U. L. Rev. 190 1998 A PENNY FOR YOUR THOUGHTS liberty. The privacy of our motivational opinions, regardless of whether or how we express them, is as necessary to the security of our God-given liberty as the opinions themselves are distinguishable from criminal action or intention. It has been proposed that "hate inspired" crimes can inflict greater harm on individuals and society than crimes of other motivations, and that the victim's community often feels "isolated, vulnerable, and unprotected by the law."' 29 But, the shock effect of such crimes is properly attributed to the constitutionally protected ideas of the criminal.13 0 And, regardless of subjective "feelings" to the contrary, the law does protect the victim's community through ensuring equal justice for all: "all" being a term that includes the victim and the criminal. Moreover, even if a hate crime law was to remedy such a societal "feeling," the issue is not properly the efficacy of the means, but whether they are just and constitutional. The twisted judicial fallacies of cases such as Vladimir P. could be avoided by the basic recognition that beliefs and hatred, motivational or otherwise, are beyond human jurisdiction: that "man is not competent to judge of interior movements, that are hidden... ,,131 When the heavy hand of government enumerates for regulation not only actions and intentions, but motivational notions, it has trespassed into a new jurisdiction, grasping at reins not meant for human hands. SCOTT T. NOTH 129. Steven M. Freeman, Hate Crime Laws: A Potent Weapon Against Crimes of Bigotry, 56 TEX. B.J. 1150, 1150 (1993). 130. See Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969)). 131. 2 ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SuMMA THEOLOGICA Pt. I-11, Q. 91, Art. 4. at 1005 (Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans., Christian Classics 1981). 1998] HeinOnline -- 10 Regent U. L. Rev. 191 1998 
work_yhmzquxlkzgbhatw3wvmgizesq	----	Microsoft Word - Lamble_trans_remembrance_Sept07a.doc Retelling Racialized Violence, Remaking White Innocence: The Politics of Interlocking Oppressions in Transgender Day of Remembrance Sarah Lamble --DRAFT VERSION— September 2007 (Forthcoming in Sexuality Research & Social Policy, March 2008) Abstract: Transgender Day of Remembrance has become a significant political event among those resisting violence against gender variant persons. Commemorated in more than 250 locations worldwide, this day honors individuals who were killed due to antitransgender hatred or prejudice. However, by focusing on transphobia as the definitive cause of violence, this ritual potentially obscures the ways in which hierarchies of race, class, and sexuality constitute such acts. Taking the Transgender Day of Remembrance / Remembering Our Dead project as a case study for considering memorialization politics, and tracing the narrative history of the Fred F.C. Martinez murder case in Colorado, I argue that deracialized accounts of violence produce seemingly innocent white witnesses who can consume these spectacles of domination without confronting their own complicity in such acts. I suggest remembrance practices require critical rethinking if we are to confront violence in more effective ways. Key words: gender; identity; racism; transphobia; memorialization; narrative; activism; queer politics 2 In the last eight years, Transgender Day of Remembrance (TDOR) has become a significant political event among those resisting violence against gender variant persons. Commemorated in more than 250 locations predominately throughout North America, but also in Europe, Australia, New Zealand, South America and Southeast Asia, this day honors individuals who were killed due to antitransgender hatred or prejudice (TDOR, 2005a, 2006a). While various memorial activities are organized at the grassroots level, most events are linked through two sister websites, the Remembering Our Dead project, which records transgender deaths, and the official Transgender Day of Remembrance site, which provides educational resources and publicizes transgender vigils around the world. Projects of the non-profit organization Gender Education and Advocacy, both websites provide vital tools for local community mobilization, and play an influential role in shaping transgender remembrance practices worldwide (Gender Education and Advocacy, 2003a).1 Indeed, these projects have played a crucial role in raising public awareness about the extreme violence regularly perpetrated against gender variant persons. Despite their importance as resources for activism, the Transgender Day of Remembrance website and Remembering Our Dead project are nonetheless limited in the scope of analysis around causes of, and potential responses to, violence. By focusing on transphobia as the definitive cause of violence, the websites do not fully contextualize incidents of violence within their specific time and place, and obscure the ways in which hierarchies of race, class, and sexuality situate and constitute such acts. In the process, transgender bodies are universalized along a singular identity plane of victimhood and rendered visible primarily through the violence that is acted upon them. Taking the Transgender Day of Remembrance / Remembering Our Dead project as a case study for 1 While some websites include independent information about Transgender Day of Remembrance, most provide a direct link to either the Remembering Our Dead project or Transgender Day of Remembrance website. See for example, Day of Silence (2007); National Organization for Women (2004); Gay Straight Alliance Network (2006); GLAAD (2003); Press for Change (2007); Vancouver Transgender Day of Remembrance (2006); Crisalide Azione Trans Nazionale (2002a); Support Transgenre Strasbourg (2005). Because the TDOR website posts more than 25 educational resources, including sample flyers, press releases, banners, and instructions for organizing remembrance vigils in schools and communities at the local level, its influence is evident in memorialization efforts elsewhere. A recent posting on YouTube (2006), for example, entitled “Transgender Day of Remembrance Tribute – Part 1 & 2”, relies exclusively on the TDOR website’s resources for its content, taking language verbatim from the website. See also, 3 considering memorialization politics, and tracing the narrative history of the Fred F.C. Martinez murder case in Colorado, I demonstrate how deracialized accounts of violence produce seemingly innocent white witnesses who can consume these spectacles of domination without confronting their own complicity in such acts. Without addressing violence as a systemic effect of power, I argue that current manifestations of Transgender Day of Remembrance potentially limit the possibilities for resisting racialized gender violence in meaningful and effective ways. This article is not written to denigrate the important work of activists who struggle against violence.2 Nor is it to suggest that we should abandon remembrance practices that honor those who have suffered from violence. Such practices serve multiple purposes, and mark important forms of collective healing, community gathering and public denunciations of violence. Rather, this article critically questions the politics of who and how we remember, it interrogates the implications of speaking on behalf of the dead and it examines what is at stake in taking up particular kinds of remembrance practices. I argue that if we3 are to engage in effective struggle against violence, we must resist remembrance practices which rely on reductionist identity politics; we must pay attention to the specific relations of power that give rise to acts of violence; we must confront violence in its structural, systemic, and everyday forms. Narratives of remembrance are not merely problems of representation. The stories we take up in remembrance are constituent practices: They tell us who we are and how we know the world. As Roger Simon (2005) noted, “Practices of remembrance are questions of and for history as a force of inhabitation, as the way we live with images and stories that intertwine with our sense of limits and possibilities, hopes and fears, identities Houston Transgender Day of Remembrance (2006); Groupe Activiste Trans (2006); Trans Alliance Society (2003); Crisalide Azione Trans Nazionale (2002b). 2 This article arose from my own involvement in Transgender Day of Remembrance and my participation as a nontrans person in ongoing struggles against trans-related oppression. I wrote this piece cautiously; I do not wish to replicate the history of nontrans persons who have critiqued, demonized, and pathologized trans struggles. At the same time, I take seriously the call for self-reflexivity within activism and my analysis emerges from concerns raised within my local trans and genderqueer communities about the overall effectiveness and broader implications of current manifestations of Transgender Day of Remembrance. 3 I recognize that some readers may feel excluded from, or wish to remain outside, the various significations of the word we as I use it in this article. Although my use of we does presume readers’ general interest in working to end oppressive violence, I do not intend the term to denote inclusion or 4 and distinctions” (p. 3). In other words, narratives practices of remembrance have material effects on the social ordering of relations of power and the ways in which we come to know ourselves in relation to the dead. These effects are neither politically neutral nor socially inconsequential: “In these practices of remembrance, there is a prospective orientation that seeks to legitimate and secure particular social relations, making normative claims on the conduct of human behaviour’” (Simon, p. 4). At stake in this article is not simply a debate about what version of a story is told, how particular persons are presented, or who is included and excluded. Underlying this article is a broader concern about what kind of spaces for resistance are created through narratives of remembrance and how those narratives determine the boundaries and possibilities for enacting change. Decontextualized Violence: Deracing Transgender Bodies The Remembering Our Dead project was founded by trans activist Gwendolyn Ann Smith in response to the death of Rita Hester, an African-American transwoman who murdered in her Massachusetts apartment in November 1998. Concerned that deaths of transgender persons were poorly documented and quickly forgotten, Smith began gathering and publicizing information about transgender deaths so trans communities would better know their own histories (Smith, 2000, ¶ ; 2001, ¶ 3-6; 2003, ¶ 2 ). In November 1999, Smith organized the first Transgender Day of Remembrance, a candlelight vigil in San Francisco. Now an annual event, Transgender Day of Remembrance has become “the largest multi-venue transgender event in the world” (Smith, 2003, ¶ 3). As part of the ongoing Remembering Our Dead project, a small group of volunteers compile and record the name, date, location, and cause of death for trans- related murders worldwide. As of November 2006, the list included 363 individuals (TDOR, 2006f).4 The comprehensiveness of the list is no doubt limited by an unavoidable reliance on mainstream media sources, which consistently fail to report exclusion of any specific community. Rather, I invite readers to participate in the process of self-reflexive questioning of remembrance practices. 4 Several lists of transgender murders are available online. However, the most comprehensive and widely cited list is maintained on the Remembering Our Dead (2006c) and TDOR (2006f) websites. 5 thoroughly on transgender deaths, and reports from law enforcement officers, which often reflect inadequate responses to violence against transgender persons (Moran & Sharpe, 2004, 396). Indeed, as Smith noted, “the media’s reluctance to cover our deaths lies near the heart of this project” (Smith, 2000, ¶ 3). Chronic under-funding and limited resources within transgender communities poses further challenges to the project, and the emotional burden of collecting this information can be high (Smith, 2001, ¶ 9). Nevertheless, the project is a collaborative one, with international appeals for reports and strong links with a range of gender-related social justice organizations (Remembering Our Dead, 2006a; 2006b; 2006d). Likewise, many of the resources posted on the Transgender Day of Remembrance website are produced by other allied groups in the United States, such as the Day of Silence Project, the Gay-Straight Alliance Network, and the Transgender Law Centre (TDOR, 2005b, 2006b). The Transgender Day of Remembrance website acknowledges that “not every person represented during the Day of Remembrance self-identified as transgendered— that is, as a transsexual, crossdresser, or otherwise gender-variant—[but] each was a victim of violence based on bias against transgendered people” (TDOR 2004a, ¶ 2; 2005a, ¶ 2). Both the TDOR website and Remembering Our Dead project are thereby explicit in privileging transphobia as the exclusive motivation for violence: “Over the last decade, more than one person per month has died due to transgender-based hate or prejudice, regardless of any other factors in their lives [italics added]” (TDOR 2005a, ¶ 3, 2006a, ¶ 3; Smith, 2000, ¶ 5). Evident here is a deliberate effort to isolate transphobia from any other form of prejudice or cause of violence. From this vantage point, other factors are deemed not only to complicate our understanding of violence, but pose a threat to the legitimacy of the project’s political goals. The authenticity of the cause is secured through the authority of a particular community: The murder list includes “only those deaths that are known to the transgender community or that have been reported in the media” (TDOR, 2004a, ¶ 1). But who is this community that determines who will be remembered? Who is the subject that we are asked to remember? The answers to these questions are not simple. First, there is no clear consensus on what constitutes transgender, let alone transgender community. Emerging in the early 1990s as an umbrella term to include a multiplicity of gender experiences and practices 6 that transgress dominant norms of gender expression (including trans-identified persons who use medical interventions to express their gender and those who do not, cross- dressers, pan-gendered, intersex persons,5 two-spirited, etc), transgender has been broadly used as an identity around which gender-variant individuals could gather and organize political strategies.6 The term also emerged in resistance to pathologizing labels imposed by the medical establishment and in contestation of the trivialization of gender- variant behavior in popular culture. However, fierce debates persist on how the term should be used, whom it includes—and what proximity it has to queer, gay, lesbian and bisexual organizing (Califia, 1997; Currah, 2006; Feinberg, 1996; Moran & Sharpe, 2004; Namaste, 2005; Phelan, 2001; Valerio, 2002). These debates go beyond simple semantics and strike at the root of political struggles around citizenship rights and protection from harm. For individuals whose membership in a particular group can greatly affect their claims to medical care, protection from violence, and legal recognition of identity, the stakes are high.7 These divisions over who is included in the community resurface within projects such as Transgender Day of Remembrance, where belonging through victimhood is the platform for political agency. For example, the 1993 high-profile murder of Brandon Teena8 sparked fierce sectarian battles among transgender, transsexual, and lesbian and 5 Although intersex persons are often included within the scope of “transgender” struggles, there is an emerging consensus among gender activists that intersex issues and transgender issues, though related, should not be conflated (Currah, Juang & Minter, 2006, p. xv; Intersex Society, 2006, ¶ 4-5 ). 6 Leslie Feinberg (1996) attributed the first use of transgender to Virginia Prince, who coined the term in the late 1980s as both a self-description and a way of describing people who “trans the gender barrier [but] not the sex barrier” (Feinberg, p. x). Prince was attempting to find a name for people who live in a gender that is not traditionally associated with their assigned gender at birth, yet differ from transsexuals by not seeking anatomical changes through surgery or hormones. The term is sometimes still used to differentiate between those who use medical interventions and those who don’t, but is now used more widely as an umbrella term. 7 For example, when legal definitions of transgender identity require surgery or hormones as proof of transition, individuals who are unable, or choose not, to access those medical interventions may be denied gender-appropriate identification on key documents, such as passports, drivers licenses, birth certificates and health cards. When a person’s identification papers conflict with their self-expressed gender presentation, such individuals may then be denied vital social services, and can be at higher risk for state based harassment and violence. Similarly, if a state has human rights protections based on sexual orientation, but not gender identity or vice versa, the decision to claim one particular identity over another can affect whether a person is eligible for legal remedy against discrimination. 8 I use the name Brandon Teena here because it is the name that is most commonly recognized. However, as Jacob Hale (1998) carefully documented, the identity of the individual who is popularly known as Brandon Teena was far more complicated than most accounts convey. It is not clear that this individual used the name Brandon Teena or firmly identified within any singular identity category. 7 gay activists, who each wanted to claim this murder as an attack against their own kind (Halberstam, 2005; Hale, 1998). A similar example can be found in the 1996 murder of three sex workers in Toronto who were shot within hours of each other by Marcello Palma. Two of the victims, Deanna/Thomas Wilkinson, and Shawn Keagan, were identified as cross-dressers and are listed on the Remembering Our Dead website as victims of transphobic violence. Yet they are also included in Douglas Janoff’s (2005) recent inventory of homophobic violence in Canada. From a third camp, Mirha-Soliel Ross and Viviane Namaste argued that these deaths arose from antiprostitute and class- based discrimination, because the perpetrator described street people and prostitutes as scum and demonstrated no clear evidence of transphobia (Namaste, 2005).9 Similarly, Ross and Namaste noted that Grace Baxter, a fully passable, postoperative transsexual sex worker who is also listed on the Transgender Remembrance website, was killed by a john who was unaware of her trans status. Ross thus denounced Transgender Remembrance Day as “a big, bold and sickening political fraud” (quoted in Namaste, p. 92). Within this political framework of claiming victims, activists—whose struggles are ultimately linked—can become pitted in a battle of what Razack and Fellows (1998) described as competing marginalities. In this model, justice claims rest not only upon proof that one group is most oppressed, but also most innocent; that is, the group in question must convey itself as bearing no responsibility in the oppression of others (Razack & Fellows). Identities are thus marked as constituting so-called good and bad victims, and these categories tend to fall along particular class, gender, and racial lines. The so-called perfect victim is the one who is believed to be most pure, innocent, and helpless—typically the white, middle-class girl child. It is not surprising then, that Matthew Shepard and Brandon Teena, both marked as young, white, barely masculine (and, in Shepard’s case, also middle class), have become the poster children for resisting homophobic and transphobic violence. In contrast, cases involving victims of color, 9 I would argue that this case is more complicated than what is presented by any of the above-noted accounts; the evidence suggests that class, race, gender, and sexuality were all factors in the murder. Though one might assume that race is only in operation when the victim or perpetrator is non-white, such a view fails to understand the logic of racial oppression. As many critical race scholars have demonstrated, whiteness is not simply the absence of race, but the site of a racial identity that renders itself invisible 8 prostitutes, and street people are rarely noticed, particularly by mainstream media, politicians and service organizations (Ott & Aoki, 2002). When less ideal victims are taken up by the media or championed by political groups, undesirable facts or complex dimensions of identity are often omitted from the story so as to produce a good victim narrative. By predicating political strategies upon innocent victimhood, violence against individuals who deviate from the ideal becomes less visible and more tolerable. Consequently, “those who are the most severely affected victims of sexism and racism (e.g. prostitutes or teenaged black males in the juvenile justice system) qualify least as ‘genuine’ victims of crime” (Simon, 2000, p. 1132). Hence, the claims of the most privileged groups are advanced through the disavowal of other groups’ claims. There are, no doubt, strategic reasons why this tactic continues to be employed. As Razack and Fellows (1998) noted, “One reason we feel compelled to secure our own place on the margin as the most oppressed is that not to do so is to risk erasure” (p. 339). This is a vital concern for trans people, whose invisibility—induced by dominant power relations of sex and gender norms—makes it difficult to secure such basic rights and services as heath care and shelter access. Historically treated as freaks of science, sources of entertainment, or fodder for academic theorizing, trans people struggle to define visibility on their own terms (Namaste, 2000). Even among groups who claim solidarity with transpeople, tokenism and exclusionary practices persist (Namaste, 2005; Phelan, 2001). Within this context, there is “much pressure to conform to the totalizing and essentializing dimensions of identity if claims of access to resources and demands for recognition of citizenship of transgender people are to have the gloss of legitimacy” (Moran & Sharpe, 2004, p. 412). Moreover, when the urgency of addressing violence is coupled with limited resources, time-pressures, and media demands for sound-byte politics, the more simple rhetorical strategies can easily win out over complex and nuanced analysis. It is not surprising, then, that the political narrative of Transgender Remembrance Day is reduced to a singular cause (transphobia) and singular identity (victim of transphobic violence). This narrative is achieved not only through the website’s self- through its status as the norm (see for example, Delgado & Stefancic, 1997; Dyer, 1997; Frankenberg, 1993; hooks, 1992; Leonardo, 2004). 9 description, but also through the remembrance archive itself. The list of murder victims, includes no information on the age, race, class, ability or particular circumstances of each individual who was murdered. While a handful of victim profiles include a photo of the person, most include only a generic silhouette image (2005d; 2006d).10 Nor is any such information provided about the persons who committed each crime, even when the perpetrators are known. Each case is abstracted from its history and context. Each murder is decontextualized and reabsorbed within a unified narrative and a universalized body of the dead trans subject. The narrative encoding of gender violence dovetails with a narrative decoding of racial violence, class violence, and sexual violence. Within this framing, each individual death can stand in and be substituted for another; difference is subsumed within sameness. Because we know so few details about each case, the cause of death becomes the most powerful marker of inclusion within the community of remembrance. The gruesome details of violence, which are repeated at vigils and reiterated through the remembrance archive, have strong visceral impact; we do not remember the names of the victims so much as we remember the violence that was done to them. Just as Western feminism’s reliance on a universal female victim has tended to define gender as what is done to women, the gender identity of trans people is signified by what is done to their bodies (Razack, 2001). Deliberately unmarked by race, class, age, ability, sexuality, and history, these individuals—otherwise unknown—are rendered visible solely through the violence that is enacted upon their bodies. The very existence of trans people is verified by their death. Violence thus marks the body as belonging to the trans community. In this way, violence simultaneously obliterates and produces a particular trans subject—both materially (in the act of killing) and symbolically (in the subsequent narration). Defined by the details of brutality, violence is reduced to the snapshot of a crime scene, a momentary fragment in time between perpetrator and victim. Without history or context, the systemic roots of violence are rendered invisible; violence is comprehensible only at the microlevel whereby individual transphobia becomes the only viable explanation. This picture is not only incomplete, but it undermines the scope of 10 Drawing attention to the prevalence of silhouette images is not meant as a critique of the project organizers, who, as noted above, do not have the resources to find photographs of every victim listed on the 10 antiviolence efforts. Several scholars have illustrated the problem of using phobias as a primary explanation for violence (Spade & Willse, 2000). As Gary Kinsman (1996) noted of homophobia, “it individualizes and privatizes gay and lesbian oppression and obscures the social relations that organize it” (p. 33). Hence, the trans murder victim emerges as the product of an individual hatred or fear, rather than the accumulative effect of social institutions (such as legal, economic and political systems) which are founded on, and perpetuate, complex hierarchies of power and violence (such as white supremacy, patriarchy, heteronormativity). By accumulating a collective list of murder victims, the TDOR website does make efforts to demonstrate that acts of violence against trans people are not isolated events. One of the educational handouts, titled “Anti-Trans Murder: Over One A Month,” (TDOR, 2002) conveys the frequency at which such violence occurs. Yet the prevalence of murders is provided as further evidence of widespread transphobia, which invariably returns to individual perpetrators as the root cause of violence. This analysis is confirmed by the handout’s conflation of justice with individual punishment and retribution. As the handout states, “Those who are caught seldom receive sentences commensurate with their crimes. In over 200 cases, only one such murderer is currently on death row, and just two others are serving life sentences” (TDOR, ¶ 4). The wording suggests that justice would be better fulfilled if more perpetrators were given life—or death—sentences. Indeed, the Remembering Our Dead project actively supports harsher penalties for transgender related hate crimes (Gender Education and Advocacy, 2003b). Such so-called solutions, however, fail to confront systemic causes of violence (such as the criminal justice system itself) and ignore state complicity in authorizing violence (Spade & Willse, 2000). As Wendy Brown (1995) aptly demonstrated, the call for such judicial responses “casts the law in particular and the state more generally as neutral arbiters of injury rather than as themselves invested with the power to injure” (p. 27). Moreover, because hate crime claims require the entrenchment of a fixed identity in order to prove disadvantaged status, identities are reduced to stereotypical categories, which appear natural and immutable rather than effects of power relations (Brown). In other words, as Jonathan Simon (2000) put it, “the satisfaction that comes from avenging oppression caries the price of site. Rather, the emphasis here is on the narrative effects of such images. 11 reinforcing the very categories of the original victimization” (p. 11). Therefore, the website’s efforts to illustrate the rifeness of violence are undermined by its singular focus on transphobia. The overarching political narrative of transphobia, however, is not absolute; it is destabilized by the highly racialized visual imagery that is conveyed through photos on the website. Educational handouts and other resources include photos of selected murder victims, a majority of which depict non-white faces. Of the names listed, many are non- Anglo, and several are accompanied by a parenthetical pronunciation key (e.g., “Julio Argueta [HOO-lee-o ar-GET-tah]” [TDOR, 2005e, p. 3]), which speaks to a white-Anglo audience presumed to be unfamiliar with such names. Marked as racialized others, these names and faces both reinforce the website’s narrative norm of whiteness and contest its totality. Against the political narrative that denies racialized violence, these photographic images suggest that race cannot be ignored.11 Hence, two overlapping discourses are at work: the narrative voice of the activist cause, which refuses to formally acknowledge race, and the visual messages—captured by the names and photos of racialized others—which explicitly call upon race as a marker of victimhood. Yet these discourses do not operate with equal cognitive effect. The activist narrative, which arguably saturates the entire site, is overtly teleological, relying on a coherent story line of cause (transphobia) and effect (violence), where death marks the moment of truth at the end of the story. By contrast, the racialized images, which are scattered randomly throughout the site, operate at a more subconscious, yet nonetheless vivid, level; they hover as a ghostly reminder of the dead, a lingering specter of race. Because these images are few in number, their visual force is particularly striking against a text-heavy website, further highlighting the significance of race, even as race is formally written out of the official activist narrative. These seemingly conflicting 11 A few online lists of transgender deaths explicitly note the racial identity of victims, highlighting the significance of race. For example, of the 51 persons included on GenderPAC’s list of murder victims, 37 are identified as persons of color, the vast majority of which are African-American and Latina transwomen (GenderPAC 2007). In its (2006) report on killings of transgender youth between the ages of 13 and 30, GenderPAC explicitly notes that 91% of the victims were people of color and the majority were economically poor (p. 4). However, by claiming that “if federal law mandated the FBI to track gender- based hate crimes, they would outweigh every other category except race,” (and providing a graphic which compares hate crime murders based on race, gender identity, sexual orientation, ethnicity, religion and 12 messages work symbiotically to produce both a naturalized white subject and a brutalized body of color. The website’s photos depicting activists—seen at vigil ceremonies, marches, and speech-making events—predominantly comprise white faces, whereas the victim profiles depict predominantly people of color (TDOR, 2005a, 2005a, 2006f). When these images are juxtaposed, white activists are positioned as saviors of victims of color. In this way, the brutalized body of color is called upon to advance a political agenda that reinforces racial hierarchies while simultaneously disavowing the significance of race (Razack, 2001). Although the deracialized narratives of the TDOR / Remembering Our Dead project emerge from a particular political strategy, they are also the product of a broader social context which promotes individually-focused and legally-oriented responses to violence. In particular, because corporate media is the primary source of reporting on violence and law enforcement is the primary mechanism for redressing violence, these institutions play a significant role in setting the stage for activism. For example, although anti-discrimination and hate crime law in the U.S. and Canada has been strongly critiqued for its repeated failure to address multiple, intersectional and structural forms of oppression (see Crenshaw, 1989; Spade & Willse, 2000; Ehrenreich, 2002; Grabham 2006), legal responses are still treated as a key remedy for violence. Because raising public consciousness is a key activist strategy, the “naming power” of hate crime legislation (i.e., identifying violence as perpetrated against specifically oppressed groups) remains politically appealing (Spade and Willse, 2000). In seeking such recognition, however, activists must adhere to the state’s limited criteria and logic for identifying and prosecuting hate crimes. Similarly, because corporate media is often the first source of reporting about violence, such sensationalized accounts can set the tone for subsequent narratives. Turning to the example of Fred Martinez murder case, we can see how law enforcement agencies and mainstream media shape the terms by which activists respond to and recount incidents of violence. Tracing these narratives, one can begin to see the depth to which deracialized accounts of violence are socially embedded and collectively authorized. disability), the report nevertheless divides race from other dimensions of identity, and risks succumbing to the politics of competing marginalities (2007, p. 2). 13 The Erasure of Race in the Fred Martinez Murder On June 21, 2001, the brutalized and decomposing body of 16-year-old Fred (F.C.) Martinez was found in a shallow canyon on the outskirts of Cortez, Colorado. Martinez, a Navajo high school student who identified as openly gay and transgender, suffered blunt-force trauma to the head, as well as cuts to his abdomen and wrists. It was reported that on the night of June 16, 2001, Martinez had been chased by his attacker to a desolate, rocky area known as the pits, run into a barbed wire fence, struck in the head with a rock, and left to die (Quittner, 2001). Shaun Murphy, a white 19-year-old from Farmington, New Mexico, subsequently pleaded guilty to second degree murder, after witnesses reported him bragging that he had “bug smashed a joto” (Spanish derogatory slang for a gay or effeminate male; Emmett, 2001i, ¶ 11). At the onset of investigation, Montezuma County Sheriff Joey Chavez stated that detectives were “looking at the boy’s sexuality, as well as the fact that he was Native American, as possible motives in the crime” (Emmett, 2001b, ¶ 13). But race quickly disappeared as a relevant factor. District attorney Joe Olt refused to prosecute the murder as a hate crime, treating the case as though the severity of the physical violence was all that mattered. As Olt explained to the local press: “We’re looking at it as a murder that is heinous enough...To me, a murder is a hate crime.” (GenderPAC, 2001a, ¶ 3). The failure to treat the crime as legally hate motivated was widely attributed to the fact that Colorado’s crime bias legislation (the 1988 Ethnic Intimidation Act) did not include sexual orientation or gender identity as grounds for special prosecution (Colorado State General Assembly, 2005, p. 3). The fact that the legislation included race, color, and ancestry was considered—by both news reporters and victim-advocacy groups— irrelevant (Emmett, 2001e; GenderPAC, 2001a). Some news reports even implied that Colorado had no hate crime legislation at all (Colorado Anti-Violence Program, 2001b; GenderPAC, 2002; Heidelberg, 2002).12 The outrage over the Martinez murder was subsequently channeled into lobbying efforts to reform Colorado’s bias-crime statutes to include sexual orientation, changes that were successfully adopted in 2005 (Colorado 14 State General Assembly, 2005; Lambda Legal, 2001).13 When the Martinez case received brief national attention, it was attributed to the antigay and anti-transgender dimensions of the crime, and not at all to factors of race (Colorado Anti-Violence Program, 2001a; Mimiaga, 2002). When the story hit national news feeders via the Associated Press, Martinez’s Navajo identity was not even acknowledged (Gay and Lesbian Alliance Against Defamation [GLAAD], 2001). The farther the story traveled, the more race disappeared. While most regional press stories tacitly noted Martinez’s Navajo identity, few articles considered it more than a supplementary detail. The controversy instead focused on whether or not the case constituted a hate crime and if so, whether it was motivated by homophobia or transphobia; either way, race was deemed largely inconsequential. Although Martinez’s mother, Pauline Mitchell, repeatedly described racism as a factor in her son’s death and the subsequent legal proceedings, this perspective was largely absent from the press coverage. Aside from public statements made by the Two Spirit Society of Colorado (which were largely ignored in mainstream press), even victim advocacy groups did not specifically discuss race.14 In almost all accounts, sexuality and gender consistently eclipsed race as an important factor in the crime. By the time the Martinez case reached the TDOR website, race disappeared altogether. The case is currently memorialized as: “Fred Martinez, Jr. (aka Fredericka, F.C.). Cortez, Colorado. 16-Jun-01. Bludgeoned to the head” (TDOR, 2006f, p. 25, ¶ 9).15 A careful examination of the case, however, clearly demonstrates that racialized hierarchies of power were in operation before, during, and after the murder. Martinez’s mother, Pauline Mitchell, described numerous incidents that she attributed to racism, many of which began long before her son’s death. Noting that Martinez was often a target 12 Technically, the Ethnic Intimidation Act did not, at that time, include the term hate crime, but it effectively served the same purpose. Where crimes were shown to be motivated by particular forms of bias (noted above), stiffer criminal penalties could be applied (Ethnic Intimidation Act, 1988). 13 In every annual legislative session since 1994, lobbyists had introduced legislation that would enhance penalties for violence motivated by prejudice against the victim’s sexual orientation, but each time the bills were defeated (TG Crossroads, 2002). 14 Gay and Lesbian Alliance Against Defamation (GLAAD), a media advocacy group that assessed press coverage of the case, did criticize news media that did not include Martinez’s Navajo identity in their coverage. However, the organization nonetheless did not make race a central point of analysis. 15 for harassment and violence at school, Mitchell felt that school officials not only failed to protect her son, but frequently blamed Martinez and subjected him to regular discipline (Quittner, 2001; TG Crossroads, 2002). As Mitchell described, He was sent home often. I would have to leave work to go pick him up because they sent him home so much. The principle and vice-principle made so many complaints. Too many Native American kids are sent home from school. (GenderPAC, 2001b, ¶ 13) Mitchell recalled several occasions in which Martinez was sent home from school for wearing what school officials called gender-inappropriate clothing, incidents she felt were also racialized: One time, Fred went in wearing the same shoes this other girl was wearing. They were sandals. Nike. She didn’t get sent home, but Fred did. I complained to the school, but of course they aren’t going to listen to me because I’m Native American. (GenderPAC, 2001b, ¶ 14) Racial discrimination continued in the aftermath of Martinez’s death. Although Mitchell reported that her son was missing on June 18, the police did not notify her when the (unidentified) body was first discovered on June 23.16 Nor did the police inform Mitchell of the arrest and arraignment of Shaun Murphy; she learned of both, after the fact, from a newspaper (GenderPAC, 2001b; Lambda Legal, 2001).17 When she complained to the district attorney (DA) that it was her right to bear witness for her son at the court proceedings, he claimed that there had been insufficient time to contact her (Emmett, 2001g). Apparently, however, there was ample time to notify Murphy’s family 15 Although this description is consistent with that of the other deaths listed on the website (i.e., racial identity is generally excluded for all murders noted on the list) it remains an important fact in tracing how this narrative of violence become deraced as it circulated in various media networks. 16 According to Mitchell, she reported her son missing on June 18, 2001, phoned in to follow up 2 days later, and then again on June 23 when she read in the newspaper that a body had been found near her home. The sheriff’s office denied Mitchell’s claims, saying that she only filed a missing person’s report on June 23, 2001 (Emmett, 2001g). 17 According to the sheriff’s office, when the body was first found, its decomposed state made it difficult to determine how the individual had died, how long the body had been there, or “even the ethnicity of the man” (Emmett, 2001a, ¶ 4). Despite the state of the body, the sheriff’s office nonetheless concluded that the body did not match any missing person reports from the area. According to Detective Kalvin Boogs: “Every one (missing-persons report) that we have received in the last year we’ve already ruled out” (Emmett, ¶ 6). Given the lack of clear identifying evidence, it seems odd that the police would rule out so quickly a missing-persons report that had been made only a few days prior. The fact that there was no 16 since his mother, grandmother, girlfriend, and daughter were present at the arraignment (Lambda Legal). Requesting that she be kept informed of any details of her son’s death, Mitchell was subsequently assured by the DA that she would be notified when the autopsy was complete. However, the police released the autopsy results to the media without informing Mitchell; she learned of the gruesome details of her son’s murder from a newspaper (Emmett; GenderPAC; Human Rights Campaign, 2001). Mitchell also expressed concerns that the police had not investigated the crime scene adequately. When she examined the site herself, Mitchell found evidence that police had not removed, including some of her son’s hair, which was matted with blood (Human Rights Campaign). For Mitchell, the disrespectful treatment by police was symptomatic of racism (GenderPAC). Describing another indignity, she noted: When they had Fred’s body bagged, I wanted to look at his body, to make sure. When they showed it to me, they had left a bunch of blood and rubber gloves with him. It hurt and it made me mad. They were willing to leave these gloves and blood like this with my baby. They treat me this way because I’m an Indian. (GenderPAC, 2001b, ¶ 23) Later, when she was at the police station, she noted that “all the Native Americans have handcuffs on them, even leg-cuffs. But white kids and Shaun, they have nothing on them. They can move around freely. It’s just not right” (GenderPAC, 2001b, ¶ 23). Mitchell subsequently filed a formal complaint with the governor’s office that her rights had been violated under Colorado’s constitutional law. Under the state’s Victims Rights Act, the surviving family of a deceased victim has the right “to be informed of and present for all ‘critical stages’ of the criminal justice process” and “to be treated with fairness, respect and dignity” (Colorado Department of Safety, 1993, ¶ 2; Lambda Legal, 2001, ¶ 3). Shunning Mitchell’s allegations that the violation of her rights had anything to do with her son’s sexuality or ethnicity, the DA stated glibly: “If you’re thinking that [it was intentional]—don’t” (Emmett, 2001h, ¶ 13). Although Pauline Mitchell described these experiences as specifically related to her Navajo identity, the racial dimension of her grievances were absent from news reports. Even the advocacy organizations that mention of a missing youth at the time suggests that Mitchell’s report of her missing son was not on the minds of police, or had been ignored. 17 supported Mitchell’s formal complaint nonetheless treated race as a secondary factor; her son’s sexuality and gender identity was consistently highlighted as the key issue in the case (Emmett, 2001g; GenderPAC, 2001b; Lambda Legal).18 Against the media narratives, Mitchell refused to reduce her son’s death to a single cause. When asked why her son was killed, she stated repeatedly that it was because he was different (Emmett, 2001f; GenderPAC 2001b; Quittner, 2001). According to Mitchell (2002): F.C. [Martinez’s nickname] had many difficult times in his short life. Much of this was related to the fact that he was Navajo living in a world that does not honor and respect different ways, and also that he was Nadleeh--Two-Spirit--and he could comfortably walk the path of both male and female, that he would love differently from most. F.C. also felt the pain of what comes when your family is poor, but very proud. It is not easy to grow up as Navajo, Nadleeh and poor. (¶ 4) Mitchell’s statement describes how race, gender, sexuality, and class hierarchies collectively constituted the circumstances of her son’s death. At the same time, Mitchell (2002) refused to reduce these factors to simple identity labels. For Mitchell “labels mean nothing—and they meant nothing to F.C. He used these terms to make other people comfortable, not himself” (¶ 1). By rejecting these labels, Mitchell eschewed a logic that would reduce difference to an inherent quality about her son. As Razack (2001) argued, “When difference is thought to reside in the person rather than in the social context, we are able to ignore our role in producing it” (p. 21). In no way did Mitchell deny the factors that marked her son as different, but she recognized that such differences are always relational; otherness can only be understood against its norm. In this way, Mitchell insisted on situating her son’s death within its broader social context and thereby called upon collective responsibility for such oppression. The differences that marked Martinez as other cannot be understood independently from each other. As Iris Marion Young (1997) pointed out, “The absurdity 18 Unlike most reports, GenderPAC did make explicit reference to “reports of racism” as a “persistent theme” in the police treatment of Martinez’s mother, and noted intersecting identities as factors in the murder (GenderPAC 2001a, ¶ 1-2, 2001b, ¶ 2) However, it still reported that “the dominant theme surrounding Fred's murder has been his gender and sexuality” (GenderPAC 2001b, ¶ 2). 18 of trying to isolate gender identity from race or class identity becomes apparent if you ask of any individual woman whether she can distinguish the ‘woman part’ of herself from the ‘white part’ or the ‘Jewish part’ (p. 13). Likewise, when a boy is accused of being a fag it is not simply his sexuality that is in question, but also his masculinity; he is not man enough. As Viviane Namaste (2000) argued, “Gender is a cue used to locate lesbians and gay men” (p. 141). But gender is not simply mistaken for sexuality or vice versa; the two are read through one another and constitute each other’s logic. Even the most hypermasculine man will be accused of failing to be a real man if he is gay, just as an assuredly heterosexual male will be accused of not being straight enough if he is in any way effeminate. In the same way that gender and sexuality are produced symbiotically by and through each other, so is race constituted by the logic of gender, sexuality, and class (Ehrenreich, 2002). Martinez was attacked not simply because he failed to embody proper masculinity and heterosexuality; Martinez did not conform to a certain kind of heterosexual masculinity—namely, white, middle-class, able-bodied heterosexual masculinity. Masculine heterosexuality is not a universal, abstract hegemonic ideal; it is contextually bound, ordered by time and place. Black masculinity, for example, is not governed by the same standards as white masculinity. Just as gender is a cue for sexuality, so is race a cue for sexuality, gender, and class. As Gail Mason (2002) argued, “Categories of gender, race and/or sexuality do not just intersect with each other in incidents of inter-personal violence. Rather, they are the ‘vehicles of articulation’ for each other” (p. 61). For these reasons, we cannot say that Martinez was killed primarily because he was gay and transgender, but also because he was Navajo and poor; this additive approach fails to account for the ways the racial and class dimensions of identity are produced by and through the other. Race and class do not simply complicate violence, but enable it (Razack & Fellows, 1998). Indeed, race and class, like gender and sexuality, are also constituted through violence (Smith, 2005). The interlocking nature of oppression can be understood in the particular context that situated the relationship between Martinez and Murphy. In an earlier encounter on the night of June 18, 2001, Murphy and a friend, Clint Sanchez, picked up Martinez after seeing him at a party and went for pizza. After they had dropped off Martinez, Sanchez 19 asked Murphy whether he thought Martinez had assumed they were gay (Emmett, 2001d; Quittner, 2001). This question, unremarked upon by the media, is significant; it speaks to the economy of desire that arose in that encounter. The question verbalizes a possibility that Murphy and Sanchez might have been thought to be gay. In this way, the question speaks to a forbidden desire not only between men, but between white and racialized other. In this moment, Murphy’s heterosexuality, masculinity, and whiteness are simultaneously threatened—with serious consequence. To be misread as gay is not a trivial mislabeling of identity, but a significant disruption of the dividing line between self and other. Indeed, false accusations of homosexuality are not only considered slanderous enough to spark civil litigation cases, but also have been used successfully as a defense (known as the gay-panic defense) in several murder trials (Ott & Aoki, 2002). Because sexuality cannot be dislodged from racial and gender identity, this moment of desire threatens to undo the racial, gendered, and sexual ordering of Murphy’s social identity. In a context where white, heterosexual masculinity is dominant, the proximity of desire that arises in this encounter with the other strikes at the heart of the straight white male’s sense of self. Murphy must disavow this desire; he accomplishes this through violence (Pinar, 2003). The role of violence in securing a sense of self was confirmed by Murphy’s actions following his attack on Martinez. In returning to his friend’s apartment and proclaiming that he had “bug smashed a joto” (Emmett, 2001i, ¶ 11), Murphy declared neither shame nor remorse, but pride. His statement was a way of recording what he had done. It was not enough to simply do the violence; he had to claim it as his. To brutalize another and to recount it with pride is an exercise in identity formation; it reaffirms Murphy’s sense of self as dominant and superior. Violence radically re-marked the boundary between himself and the other; no longer could the other threaten to engulf him by desire. He reaffirmed who he was: masculine, dominant, white, whole. Murphy’s reassertion of identity through violence was not simply a moment of individual psychological crisis, but was also rooted in broader social forces. Both the instability of identity itself, which drives the incessant need for its reassertion, and the impetus to secure a privileged position through violence, are consequences of hierarchical power relations. Murphy’s own history, for example, was marked by previous acts of 20 violence, repeated conflicts with the law and difficulties in educations (TG Crossroads, 2002; Emmett 2001c). First expelled from school in the 6th grade, and subsequently ousted from two high schools, Murphy was labeled a “troublemaker” from a young age. According to the principal of one school, Murphy “was considered by state law as a habitually disruptive student. He was one of those kids you just don’t know about” (Emmett, ¶ 11). In a context where educational and legal systems respond to problem behavior through labeling, expulsion, and punishment, it is not surprising that Murphy projected these experiences onto others; institutionalized social exclusion arguably breeds further acts of marginalization. Indeed, Murphy’s behavior extends a pattern of oppression whereby attempts by one group to overcome social exclusion are channeled through subjugation of another.19 Further evidence suggests that the encounter between Murphy and Martinez was a colonial one. That Murphy chased Martinez into an isolated area known as the pits is not insignificant.20 A place where teenagers go to party and smoke marijuana, this zone is marked outside the boundaries of the civilized city; it is a space of social, economic and legal abandonment. As Razack (2001) noted, “The city belongs to the settlers and the sullying of civilized society through the pretence of the racial Other in white space gives rise to a careful management of boundaries within urban space” (p. 129). Indeed, the location of Martinez’ murder outside the city proper reflects this colonial ordering of space; such violence further constitutes the wilderness as a place of savagery. Known as a tiny frontier town, Cortez is not only characterized by deep racial divisions, but by its 19 Murphy’s last name, which marks him as bearing Irish heritage, signals a much longer history of struggle for racial belonging. As Noel Ignatief (1996) argued, when Irish Catholic immigrants first came to the US, their attempts to shed oppressed status in Ireland and attain white privilege in America meant racially distinguishing themselves from non-whites. “Having fair skin made the Irish eligible to be white, but it didn't guarantee their admission. They had to earn it” (Ignatief, 1997, ¶ 21). Irish-Catholic immigrants collectively earned this white (working class) status, argued Ignatief, by disavowing the struggles of Blacks in the US, and by participating in the oppression of non-whites. 20 The evidence is not entirely clear on this point, in part because Murphy recounted three different versions of what happened that night (Heidelberg, 2002). Murphy claimed that Martinez attacked him, so he struck Martinez with the rock in self-defense, and in one version of this story he claimed that Martinez chased him to the pits, not the other way around. In another version, Murphy claimed that the two had met in the pits, at which point a fight ensued. However, the evidence from the autopsy—namely the type of cuts on Martinez’s body—suggested that in the darkness he had run into a barbed wire fence while being chased (Quittner, 2001). Moreover, there was no evidence to demonstrate that the fight was mutual, because Murphy suffered no injuries. By contrast, the autopsy noted extreme blood loss and a fractured skull as among the causes of Martinez’s death (Emmett, 2002). 21 boundary line against the half-million inhabitants of the neighboring Navajo territory (Quittner, 2001). As Murphy chased Martinez to the outskirts of town, he literally drove an Indian outside the bounds of civilization and closer to the reservation. Against a long history of white Americans forcing the Diné people from their land, when a young Navajo is chased to the edges of the frontier, brutally beaten and left to die by a white man, how can we not see this as a colonial encounter?21 Indeed, this is how Mitchell understood her son’s death: not as a singular attack by one individual against her son, but as part of a long history of colonial oppression. The sexualized, racialized, and gendered dimensions of the violence that Martinez experienced are certainly consistent with the legacy of colonization. As Andrea Smith (2005) powerfully demonstrated, sexualized violence is deeply imbedded within, and constitutive of, colonial relationships. Colonization required careful management of gender and sexual relations, which was largely achieved through institutionalized violence. Reflecting this legacy, the Two Spirit Society of Colorado released a formal statement acknowledging that Martinez’s murder was not an isolated incident, but part of the historic violence against Native Americans. Mitchell concurred: “I will tell you here in Cortez, too many Indians die. They just let it go and nothing is done about it” (GenderPAC, 2001b, ¶ 31). Mitchell’s statement suggests not only that the deaths of Indians are common (and therefore not isolated incidents), but also that such deaths are socially authorized and 21 Navajo history is characterized by government-inflicted displacement, abuse, and environmental racism. Most notably, in 1864, the Navajo were interned by Colonel Christopher Carson at Fort Defiance, Arizona, and then force-marched, in what is known as the Long Walk, 300 miles in mid-winter to Bosque Redondo, New Mexico (Churchill, 1998; Iverson, 2002). Confined there for 4 years, the Navajo endured substandard living conditions, abject poverty, and starvation. By conservative estimates, the Diné lost half of their population during this ordeal (Churchill, 1998). Though the Navajo people eventually were permitted to return to a reduced area of their territory, the United States government continued to exercise colonial control over the territory through economic exploitation. In the 1940s, discovery of uranium deposits in the Navajo territory led to a massive mining project in support of nuclear testing. Between 1946 and 1968, more than 13 million tons of uranium ore were mined on Navajo territory, resulting in radioactive contamination of the local water supply. In the 1980s, the Navajo Health Authority documented unusually high rates of birth defects among babies born in mine-adjacent areas, and other studies found higher rates of miscarriages, infant deaths, birth defects, and learning disabilities (Churchill). Under the Navajo-Hopi Relocation Act of 1974, the United States sought to remove 13,000 Diné from the Big Mountain region in Arizona to turn the land over to the Peabody Coal Company. The history of the Navajo reservation was also scarred by forced sterilization and residential schools characterized by widespread sexual abuse (Churchill; Smith, 2005) 22 enabled by the community, the law, and the state. In this light, we cannot isolate Martinez’s death from the harassment and violence that he experienced on a daily basis— acts that were endorsed by school authorities (through their disciplining of Martinez) and permitted by members of the community (who did nothing about the harassment). Martinez’s death can be seen as an extension of that everyday violence. Alan Cook, an openly gay psychotherapist who assisted Martinez following a suicide attempt 6 months prior to the murder, noted: “I did not understand the gravity of [Martinez’s] sense of malaise about his safety. I am a middle-class white male, and I didn’t have insight into the part of the community that is young and Navajo and gay” (quoted in Quittner, 2001, ¶ 5). Although some would argue that the 40-year jail term to which Shaun Murphy was eventually sentenced is evidence that Martinez’s death did not go unnoticed, the media coverage suggests that this response was largely owing to the public outrage over what they saw as a homophobic attack, rather than a case of racialized violence. More importantly, however, the sentence does not call into question the structures of power that enabled the murder in the first place. As the sole bearer of responsibility, Shaun Murphy becomes the scapegoat that allows others to deny complicity. By assigning blame to an individual, the social hierarchies of power that give rise to such violence are left fully and forcefully intact. The sentencing process gives the state an opportunity to confirm the official story: that violence is an exceptional moment, not an everyday one. Doing justice reinstalled the narrative that violence is the act of a lone killer, not the consequence of a system of racial, gender, class, and sexual hierarchies. When responsibility belongs to a singular perpetrator, the rest of us are positioned as innocent bystanders. Producing Innocent Onlookers: Spectacle and Witness as Complicity So long as violence is attributed to the singular act of an individual, the role of the witness—the one who is left to remember—is rendered innocent. At most, our duty as witnesses is to spread awareness. This orientation is reflected in the George Santayana quote that prefaces the Remembering Our Dead website (http://www.gender.org/remember/): Those who cannot remember the past, are doomed to repeat it. But as Simon and Rosenberg (2005) argued, memorialization practices that 23 function as warnings or simple object lessons are insufficient to dislodge our own complicity in deep seated patterns of violence: On such terms, initiating and participating in remembrance defines one’s own responsibility as one of educating others (since one already knows about the events in question), a practice that too often and too easily slides into a postponement of what one needs to do oneself. (pp. 84–85) Without critical reflexivity, the exercise of educating others serves to entrench a sense of self that is beyond reproach. Those who know and educate are positioned as morally superior to those who are ignorant; we congratulate ourselves for our political awareness without moving outside the comfort zone of moral authority and self-knowing. Such positions of moral superiority are usually classed and raced; the well-educated, “enlightened” white subject is juxtaposed against the ignorant redneck, the high school dropout, the “backwards” ethnic other (Ott & Aoki, 2002). Our innocence as witnesses is also secured through outpourings of public sympathy. Particularly when we are called to remember those who we did not know personally, we are invited into a community of shared grief; we are called upon to experience a sense of collective sympathy. But, as Susan Sontag (2003) argued, “So far as we feel sympathy, we feel we are not accomplices to what caused the suffering. Our sympathy proclaims our innocence as well as our impotence” (p. 102). In this way, sympathy is seductive. By recognizing the pain of others, we tell ourselves, we engage in a shared sense of humanity. We identify with the other through the recognition of our own pain. But in doing so, we risk appropriating another’s pain for our own purposes— or, as Razack (2007) called it, stealing the pain of others. When the deracialized narrative of Fred Martinez’s murder is held up to further the transgender cause, it is not simply that the pain of colonial violence is erased and usurped; by obscuring the racialized nature of oppression, the witness denies the ways in which hegemonic whiteness is enacted and sustained through violence. In other words, the witness upholds the myth of white innocence. Perpetuating this narrative of power, the witness is also constituted by it; in this sense, the witness becomes white. This process of white witnessing is, of course, never stable or absolute, particularly for racialized witnesses who are already constituted as not white, even as they are 24 simultaneously ushered into a white narrative. Indeed, the social and political effects of a racialized witness engaging in a white discourse (which ultimately marks the further pain of silencing, erasure and assimilation), is different from a subject whose whiteness is being reaffirmed and reprivileged through that discourse. Yet the overall effect is one that enables white complicity; 22 the narrative allows whites to deny the ways in which we/they enable and benefit from the ongoing legacy of colonial and racialized violence. White witnesses do not have to consider the ways in which our/their daily practices contribute to, authorize, or uphold racialized power relations which enable violence. Such witnessing thereby uses the pain of others to reaffirm a sense of self. This process of witnessing is evident in a remembrance ritual whereby the living speak for the dead. Among the resources provided by the TDOR website is a set of first- person narratives. For example: My name is China Zainal (CHI-na zy-NALL), and I was a forty-six year old Indonesian-born sex worker living in Sydney, Australia. On November thirtieth of two thousand and three, two witnesses saw me staggering down one street before collapsing in another. They called an ambulance, which took me to St Vincent’s Hospital. I died at the hospital from nine stab wounds to the neck and upper torso. (TDOR, 2004b, p.1) I’m Mylène [mee-LEN], a 38 year old transsexual born in Ecuador, and living in France. On March 26th, my body was discovered in a room in a hotel near the center of Marseilles [mar-SAY]. My throat was cut -- as were my genitals. (TDOR, 2005e, p. 2) My name is unknown, but I was Chinese or East Malaysian, and living in Kuala Lumpur. On the 11th of November, my body was found head-first 22 By complicity, I do not mean to suggest direct involvement or intentional collaboration with acts of violence; rather, I refer to less visible and more mundane actions that nonetheless contribute to structural injustice or perpetuate social processes that enable violence. If violence is socially produced, than responsibility must be socially enacted. This is not to say that responsibility is equally shared, but to suggest that it cannot be reduced to individual accountability or simple questions of moral obligation. Rather, responsibility must be structurally-oriented, socially-connected and collectively-enacted (Young, 2006; Veitch, 2007). 25 in a garbage bin, wearing a dark T-shirt, white shorts and padded bra. Police revealed that there was a single slash wound on the neck and numerous bruises on my body. (TDOR, 2005e, p.4) Presumably, these biographies are designed to be read at vigils in order to make individual deaths more real to those bearing witness. But what does it mean to speak for the dead in this way? Is this how each individual would want to be memorialized, by the gruesome details of their death? In taking the voice of the other as our own, we colonize the bodies of the dead. These narratives speak not to the honoring of life, but the fetishizing of death. Once again the violent act itself—and not the social conditions that facilitate violence—takes center stage. The details of these killings pander to an imagination that is enticed by images of shock and suffering. Death becomes spectacle and the horror of violence eclipses the humanity of those who have died. The spectacle of violence undermines the antiviolence cause by sensationalizing brutality, objectifying the dead, and exploiting raw emotion. This is not to minimize the importance of mourning and grief, particularly for those who have lost a loved one. Rituals of remembrance can be important practices of healing and support. However, the closeness of pain that arises from personal grief cannot be confused with the distanced emotions that are generated through the consumption of spectacles of violence. As Simon, Di Paolantonio, and Clamen (2005) noted, spectacle “is not a thing, it is not an event or even a particular representation of an event…Rather spectacle is a particular mode of attentiveness…It is a way of entering the significations of social” (p. 143). It is through this mode of attentiveness that we experience the narrative of violence while still maintaining a position of exteriority: The projections and identifications made within spectacle, and the consequent defences it elicits, both require and enact leaving ourselves intact, at a distance, protected from being called into question and altered through our engagement with the stories of others…Our attentiveness while not “inactive,” is compliant; it does not engage in the praxis of making and re-making our historical consciousness. (Simon et al., p.144) As Martinot and Sexton (2003) argued, “Spectacle is a form of camouflage. It 26 does not conceal anything; it simply renders it unrecognizable. One looks at it and does not see it” (p. 174). One might look at Martinez as Navajo, but not see the way in which his murder is racialized. In this way, spectacle invites us to read particular narratives “on the terms of the moral certainties we hold dear, allow[ing] us to disavow any requirement that the terms on which we are moved might throw ourselves into question, into destabilization” (Simon et al., 2005, p. 144). This process constructs the gaze as innocent, one that is fascinated, pleasured; the onlooker is overcome by both grief and gratification, but either way, the witness bears no responsibility. In this context, evoking sympathy serves to advance the agenda of a privileged few at the expense of others. As Ross described Transgender Remembrance Day, It sure makes for a powerful street performance: candles, tears, hugs, and snuggles over cardboard pictures of butchered members of a marginalized minority produces emotionally charged images. But it functions, both theatrically and politically, to benefit a privileged subsection of the trans community. (quoted in Namaste, 2005, pp. 92–93) The consequences of such practices have concrete material affects. As Jacob Hale (1998) argued, “When a border zone denizen’s corpse is claimed by those with firmer categorical location, border zones become less habitable for those who are trying to live in the nearly unspeakable spaces created by overlapping margins of distinct categories” (p. 319). In other words, when the complexity of identity is denied or ignored for political gain, those whose lives do not conform to easily politicizable identities have even less space in which to express themselves, make political claims and confront oppression. Remembrance practices also inform the political priorities of social movements, generating further material consequences. Because remembrance narratives define problems of violence on certain terms, they directly influence the kinds of solutions proposed in response. For example, when the bulk of an advocacy group’s funds are used to lobby for hate crime legislation rather than advocacy for transgender prisoners, or for increased “community” policing rather than decriminalization of sex work, or for corporate employee benefits rather than universal health care, it is often low-income people of color who lose out. For this reason, activists have an obligation to continuously 27 examine how their political strategies affect those who are most disenfranchised. If the most privileged within the community benefit at the expense of the most marginalized, such strategies are not worth pursuing. Conclusion: Remembering Otherwise The narrative erasure of racialized violence in the Transgender Day of Remembrance / Remembering Our Dead project is arguably not isolated, but symptomatic of broader racial hierarchies within transgender politics. The first National Survey of Transgender Violence in the United States, for example, failed to adequately discuss race. Although the racial identity of victims and perpetrators was included in the data collection, this information is obscured by the paper’s overall analysis, which isolates transphobia from other factors (Moran & Sharpe, 2004; Wilchins, Lombardi, Priesing, & Malour, 1997). Likewise, the story line of Boys Don’t Cry, the award- winning film about Brandon Teena, was deliberately deracialized; one of the murder victims—Philip DeVine, a disabled African American—was purposefully left out of the narrative.23 The fact that DeVine was dating the sister of Brandon’s lover, Lana—a white woman—and the fact that one of the murderers had affiliations with white supremacist military groups, were deemed irrelevant to the larger context of the triple murder (Halberstam, 2005). When questioned on her decision to excise DeVine from the screenplay, filmmaker Kimberly Pierce suggested that the racial dimension would have overcomplicated the plotline. In doing so, as Judith Halberstam pointed out, Pierce not only denies DeVine’s racially charged death, but also fails to recognize how race was key factor in Brandon’s death as well. The denial of racialized violence dovetails with the deracing of mainstream transgender history. The famous Stonewall Riots were led by Black and Latina drag queens, yet popular representations of this history are frequently deraced (Feinberg, 1996). Similarly, some of the most well-known and popular heroes of the transgender movement—Leslie Feinberg, Kate Bornstein, Pat Califia, Riki Ann Wilchins, and Brandon Teena—are read as white. 23 DeVine was removed not only from the narrative itself but also from the film’s original dedication, which read, “To Brandon Teena and Lisa Lambert.” Because the dedication references actual facts more directly than the narrative itself, this decision to leave out DeVine selectively presents a true-life tale as though DeVine did not exist at all (Halberstam, 2005). 28 The pervasive denial of race within some trans activism calls into question current conceptions of trans identity categories, particularly in struggles against violence. As Moran and Sharpe (2004) noted, The use of the term ‘transgender’…needs to be treated with some caution, having the potential to reduce our understanding of the nature of the violence and the experience of those who are the target of this violence to a uniform phenomenon. (p. 401) If the political usage of trans identity requires that race, class, ability, and sexuality be subordinated or displaced by gender, its deployment will inevitably fail as a political strategy because it denies the interlocking character of hierarchical systems of oppression (Razack & Fellows, 1998). This is not to say that trans identity should be abandoned as a basis for political organizing, but its usage must be recuperated from a deracializing logic. Given propensities among trans activists to contest binaries between masculinity and femininity, surely there is ample room to rethink experiences of violence beyond either-or categories. Although this paper traced a single murder case to show how its inclusion within Transgender Day of Remembrance was predicated upon a deracialized narrative, I would argue that the same process of tracing race can be undertaken for each case. By reducing violence to a single cause, the Transgender Day of Remembrance / Remembering Our Day project not only obscures the social, political, and historical context of violence, but forecloses upon the possibilities for resistance. When justice is reduced to simple awareness campaigns on the one hand, or calls for stiffer sentences on the other, we fail to address the structures of power that enable violence in its everyday and mundane forms. Underlying these responses is a liberal plea for tolerance—a plea that locates violence in the sphere of individual attitudes. Not only do these strategies create an environment of competing marginalities, but they limit the possibilities for meaningful political solidarity. When violence is reduced to transphobia alone, only those who identify as trans can have a real stake in trans politics; others who take up the cause can only do so from the position of charity or from the basis of sympathy rather than shared struggle and collective responsibility. This limits the possibility for political affinities that are grounded in an understanding that oppressions are inextricably linked. 29 These critiques are not to suggest that we should cease remembering those who are commemorated by the Remembering Our Dead project. As Simon (2005) noted, “the task of working for social transformation is not to forget the past, but to remember it otherwise” (p. 9). The question, then, is how do we remember otherwise? What would it mean to remember in such a way that confronts structural violence (i.e., processes of domination that are socially, politically and economically instituted over time) and requires examination of our own complicity? Simon provided a useful starting point: Remembering otherwise will proceed from those practices of remembrance whose over-riding consideration is the question of what it might mean to take the memories of other (memories formed in other times and spaces) into our lives and so live as though the lives of others mattered. (p. 9) Such a response demands “an attentiveness to an otherness that resists being reduced to a version of our own stories” (Simon et al., 2005, p.135). Remembering otherwise may require a rethinking of the political uses of narrative itself. While narrative can play a vital role in giving voice to those who are marginalized, perhaps its deployment in particular contexts comes at too high a cost. Perhaps activists and academics must further interrogate the political logic of narrative itself, which organizes time, place and identity in particular ways, thereby opening up some political possibilities, but foreclosing on others (White, 1980, 1984). In some circumstances, we might seek out narrative forms that are more open, flexible and fluid—drawing on narrative expressions that resist totalizing messages or reductionist identity claims. In others, we might reject narrative altogether and choose alternative modes of communication from which to launch our political demands. Either way, we must be attentive not only to the content of our political claims, but also to their form. There are signs of hope. Organizers of a recent Transgender Remembrance Vigil, at the 519 Community Centre in Toronto, made explicit efforts to address violence against trans people within its broader context of oppressions. Flyers that were circulated to promote the event read: The Trans Day or Remembrance ceremony at The 519 provides an opportunity for trans/two-spirit/gender-queer people and their allies to gather together to gain strength, to educated, and to perform an act of 30 resistance. While most “Transgender Day of Remembrance” events internationally focus on “anti-transgender violence” we here at Trans Programmes at The 519 are choosing to acknowledge not only transphobia as a root cause of violence in our community, but also to specifically mark the various forms of oppression in our culture that increase violence and limit protections for many members of the trans community. These include racism, ageism, ableism, stigma against sex-workers, classism and homophobia. Although the language could go further in acknowledging the interlocking nature of oppression, the flyer nonetheless demonstrates a move in the right direction. Similarly, the ceremony itself made efforts to celebrate the lives of transgender people, rather than sensationalize their deaths. Our task, then, is to push these efforts further—not only with respect to Transgender Remembrance Day, but in the many ways we recount and confront violence. None of us are innocent. We must envision practices of remembrance that situate our own positions within structures of power that authorize violence in the first place. Our task is to move from sympathy to responsibility, from complicity to reflexivity, from witnessing to action. It is not enough to simply honor the memory of the dead; we must transform the practices of the living. Acknowledgments Many thanks to Sherene Razack and my fellow students in the graduate research seminar on Race, Violence and Law, at the University of Toronto, 2006, whose rigorous discussions contributed enormously to this article. Thanks also to Transgender Day of Remembrance organizers in Toronto and Peterborough whose knowledge and experiences inspired my analysis. Dean Spade, Davina Cooper, Niiti Simmonds, Toni Johnson, and five anonymous reviewers provided very helpful feedback on earlier drafts. 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work_yizqxudzwjaidg3dsh2ot7jumq	----	DOCUMENT RESUME ED 470 419 CG 032 048 AUTHOR Dworkin, Sari H. TITLE LGBT Identity, Violence, and Social Justice: The Psychological Is Political. PUB DATE 2002-08-00 NOTE 22p.; Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Psychological Association (110th, Chicago, IL, August 22-25, 2002). PUB TYPE Information Analyses (070) Speeches/Meeting Papers (150) EDRS PRICE EDRS Price MF01/PC01 Plus Postage. DESCRIPTORS *Bisexuality; Civil Liberties; Homophobia; *Homosexuality; *Lesbianism; *Psychology; Statistical Data; *Violence. IDENTIFIERS *Social Justice; *Transsexuals ABSTRACT This paper reviews the statistical evidence of lesbian, gay, bisexual, or transgender (LGBT) violence in the United States and in the world. Statistics are from Amnesty International and the New York City Gay and Lesbian Anti-Violence Project. Reasons why this violence exists and international human rights responses are reviewed. In addition, research on homophobia, homonegativity, and antigay violence is also reviewed. An argument for a greater role in the amelioration of prejudice against LGBT people by the American Psychological Association as the premier psychological organization involved in social justice issues around the world is presented. The paper concludes with recommendations for future directions. (Contains 25 references.) (Author/GCP). Reproductions supplied by EDRS are the best that can be made from the original document. LGBT Identity, Violence, and Social Justice 1 LGBT Identity, Violence, and Social Justice: The Psychological is Political Sari H. Dworkin, Ph.D. Professor, Counselor Education California State University, Fresno Fresno, Ca. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION Office of Educational Research and Improvement EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION CENTER (ERIC) This document has been reproduced as received from the person or organization originating it. Minor changes have been made to improve reproduction quality. Points of view or opinions stated in this document do not necessarily represent official OERI position or policy. 1 PERMISSION TO REPRODUCE AND DISSEMINATE THIS MATERIAL HAS BEEN GRANTED BY TO THE EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION CENTER (ERIC) Draft of paper to be presented at the August, 2002 national convention of the American Psychological Association in Chicago. This presentation is part of a symposium entitled: "Interlocking Issues of Culture, Poverty, and Violence: An International Perspective. 2 T COPY AM L A BLE LGBT Identity, Violence, and Social Justice 2 LGBT Identity, Violence, and Social Justice: The Psychological is Political Abstract This paper reviews the statistical evidence of LGBT violence in the United States and in the world. Statistics are from Amnesty International and the New York City Gay and Lesbian Anti-gay violence Project. Reasons why this violence exists and international human rights responses are reviewed. In addition, research on homophobia, homonegativity, and antigay violence is also reviewed. An argument for a greater role in the amelioration of prejudice against LGBT people by the American Psychological Association as the premier psychological organization involved in social justice issues around the world, is presented. The paper concludes with recommendations for future directions. 3 LGBT Identity, Violence, and Social Justice 3 LGBT Identity, Violence, and Social Justice: The Psychological is Political Introduction "There remains a great deal to be accomplished in freeing many millions of gays and lesbians from the tyranny of fear of discovery, of actual and potential economic disenfranchisement, of the burden of ridicule, shame, and scorn, and of penalties for alleged criminal behavior. Nevertheless, the recognized status, for example, of openly gay and lesbian psychologists...is light years away from their inferior and almost certainly closed status of 1954" (cited in Baxer & Carrier, 1998, p. 1, 2). This quotation is from Evelyn Hooker, the woman whose research was instrumental in the removal of homosexuality as a mental disorder from the DSM. In 2002 a person identified as lesbian, gay, bisexual, or transgender (hereafter referred to as LGBT) or perceived to be LGBT not only faces ridicule, shame, disenfranchisement, and possible criminal charges, but in most of the world and even in this country can face violence and even death. An LGBT identity is hazardous to one's health, mental and physical. Psychologists concerned about social justice must take an active role both professionally and politically to end this situation. This presentation will review the prevalence of LGBT violence internationally and in this country as reported by organizations such as Amnesty International and the New York City Gay and Lesbian Anti-gay Violence Project, review research on the correlates of anti-gay violence and homonegativity done primarily in this country, and argue why psychology must do more in this area especially if social justice is to be a primary thrust for our field. I will conclude with recommendations for future directions in research, policy, education, practice and treatment. 4 LGBT Identity, Violence, and Social Justice 4 International Violence Against LGBT People "The manner in which discrimination is experienced on grounds of race or sex or religion or disability varies considerablethere is difference in difference. The commonality that unites them all is the injury to dignity imposed upon people as a consequence of their belonging to certain groups...In the case of gays, history and experience teach us that the scarring comes not from poverty or powerlessness, but from invisibility. It is the tainting of desire, it is the attribution of perversity and shame to spontaneous bodily affection, it is the prohibition of the expression of love, it is the denial of full moral citizenship in society because you are what you are, that impinges on the dignity and self-worth of a group," stated by Justice Albie Sachs, Constitutional Court of South Africa in 1998 (cited in Amnesty International, 2001). LGBT people as well as LGBT activists around the world are targeted not for their activities but on the basis of who they are. Violence occurs in the home, school, and community. In fact schools may be one of the most dangerous places for LGBT youth (Amnesty International, 2001). Not only are LGBT youth or those perceived to be LGBT harassed but often they are removed from the schools. Children don't seek redress due to shame and fear of continued persecution. "The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child explicitly obliges states to protect all childrenwithout distinction of any kindagainst violence and other abuse in the home, at school and in the community" (Amnesty International, 2001, p. 46). Amnesty International (2001) reports rapes, beatings, and life imprisonment for alleged crimes against the order of nature in such countries as Uganda, Zimbabwe, Romania, Malaysia, the Caribbean, Russia, China, Sri Lanka, Afghanistan, and, yes, the 5 LGBT Identity, Violence, and Social Justice 5 United States. In fact at least 70 countries criminalize LG relationships and some countries punish offenders with flogging or the death penalty. All over the world LGBT people face oppression. There are laws against them, freedom of association is denied, and access to services is limited or nonexistent unless they hide their identity. Places such as bars where LGBT people gather are subject to police raids. Medical services are often used to force a change to heterosexuality. These medical interventions range from institutionalization to aversion therapy, and chemical castration. Reports of abuse are rarely made due to fear of disclosure, lack of responsiveness, and knowledge that the authorities are often the perpetrators of the violence. Transgendered persons are especially singled out for torture and there is an alarming increase of this. Cross-dressing is seen as an obscenity and blackmail and extortion are commonplace occurrences. LGBT people cannot count on the police or the courts to offer any protection. In fact in most of the world the police are the worst offenders, beating and raping the very people they are supposed to protect while in custody. "Perceived or actual sexual orientation has been found to be one of four categories that make a female prisoner a more likely target for sexual abuse" according to Amnesty International (2001, p.32). Laws and governmental officials often provide the justification for this maltreatment (Amnesty International, 2001). President Mugabe of Zimbabwe publicly called gay people less than human and therefore not deserving of human rights. The president of Uganda ordered the Criminal Investigations Department to hunt out lesbians and gays and lock them up. Since joining the United States coalition against terrorism, Egypt has begun hunting gay men alleged to be homosexual and entrapping them on the Internet in order to convince their citizens that the government and not just Muslim extremists are 6 LGBT Identity, Violence, and Social Justice 6 protecting the morality of the nation (Gauch, 2002). Which leads to some of the reasons that governments use when denying the rights of LGBT people. The United States is not alone in using culture, religion and morality as reasons to oppress LGBT people (Amnesty International, 2001). This occurs around the world. Homosexuality and transgenderism is considered un-Christian, un-Islamic, against Judaism, a plague, a white man's issue, un-American, un-African, and part of bourgeois decadence to name a few justifications. A more insidious reason because it's rarely explicitly noted or understood is the betrayal of gender expectations and beliefs. LGBT persons frequently challenge notions about gender-roles and the dichotomy of gender. Gay men and transgendered male to female persons are believed to betray male gender role superiority and privilege and therefore must be punished. Lesbians and transgendered female to male persons are believed to attempt to take on male privilege and therefore must be punished. Ultimately, LGB persons are believed to threaten the established social order (Amnesty International, 2001). This is a prevalent belief in the United States as well as in other countries. LGBT Violence in the United States A coalition of twenty-six anti-violence organizations in the United States monitor instances of antigay violence in their respective regions. The most current statistics (New York City Gay and Lesbian Anti-violence Project, 2001) compare the period 1998-1999 to 1999-2000 data. Results indicate the following: Reports of separate incidents of antigay violence increased from 1,992 to 2,152 incidents. The number of victims increased from 2,249 to 2,475 and the number of perpetrators increased from 3,262 to 3,344. The increase in incidents reported reversed the declining trend noted in 1998 to 7 LGBT Identity, Violence, and Social Justice 7 1999. Overall the current trends are as follows: Exceptionally violent and bias-related murders decreased. Serious injuries and hospitalizations and sexual assaults and rapes also decreased. That's the good news. The bad news is: Attempted assaults with weapons increased. Harassment and intimidation increased. The victims and perpetrators became more diverse, for example, there were more female perpetrators. There was an increase in heterosexual victims of antigay violence. More of the victims knew their perpetrators. They were acquaintances, friends, employers, co-workers, landlords, neighbors, relatives, and family members. More male to female transsexuals reported victimization. Police responsiveness deteriorated and there were increased reports of police misconduct and abuse. In all likelihood there were many more instances than reported in this national document. Most victims do not report. Many areas of the United States do not have any organizations monitoring this abuse. The FBI typically underreports LGBT violence. For example in 1999 the FBI reported three murders and the National Coalition of Anti- violence Programs documented twenty-nine LGBT related murders in New York City alone (New York City Gay and Lesbian Anti-Violence Project, 2001). The reasons victims in this country don't report anti-LGBT violence are similar to reasons reported in other countries. Victims fear they won't be believed, the authorities will abuse them more, disclosure of their sexual identity will have disastrous and ongoing consequences, nothing will be done, and/or services offered will not be culturally sensitive. Often significant others urge the victim not to report and just to move on with life (New York City Gay and Lesbian Anti-violence Project, 2001). The psychological impact of victimization makes moving on with life difficult. 8 LGBT Identity, Violence, and Social Justice 8 World bodies interested in human rights and social justice have made statements decrying violence based on a person's being. Interpretations of these documents have concluded that these documents protect LGBT people. International Human Rights Response The United Nations Convention against Torture prohibits force, pain, suffering, both physical and mental when it is based, among other areas, on discrimination and is perpetrated by a public official or any person in an official capacity or with their consent (Amnesty International, 2001). Much of the LGBT violence perpetrated around the world is therefore prohibited by this convention. Abuses against LGBT people documented by Amnesty International (2001) violate the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Policing the bedroom, the underpinning of laws against gay relationships, violates the privacy rights guaranteed under the European Convention on Human Rights. The United Nations Human rights Convention and the European Convention on Human Rights bans discrimination against transsexuals and the UN document urges governments to decriminalize sexual orientation and to prohibit sex discrimination in their constitutions. The Commission on Human Rights further states, "International standards require that there be concerted state policy to eradicate practices even if the proponents argue that they have their roots in religious beliefs and rituals" (Amnesty International, 2201, p. 45). If society continues to ignore the principles of these world documents, psychologists will continue to try to alleviate the psychological symptoms of victimization. a LGBT Identity, Violence, and Social Justice 9 Psychological Affects of Victimization There is a large body of literature documenting the effects of torture and abuse. Much of this literature has studied refugees seeking political asylum (Gorman, 2001). While a comprehensive review of this literature is beyond the scope of this paper, some of the findings have relevance to what victims of anti-LGBT violence face. It is important to recognize that this is where mental health and human rights converge (Gorman, 2001). Often when psychologists work with victims of violence the victimization is depoliticized due to the emphasis on personal psychological symptoms. Victimization based on who a person is rather than what he or she does robs that person of his or her voice, and deters others from speaking out making the abuse a political and human rights issue. Politics aside, the typical symptoms of posttraumatic stress disorder such as somaticization, denial, guilt, and numbing of emotion occur with torture and LGBT violence victims. Gorman (2001) notes that with victims of torture there are three processes psychologists must help with: safety, reconstruction, and reconnection. He especially emphasized the support of family. One difference between political refugees from torture and LGBT victims is that LGBT victims don't always have the support of families (DiPlacido, 1998). A recent study of LGBT victims of violence in the Sacramento area found that there is more psychological damage with hate crimes than with other violent crimes (Herek, Gillis, & Cogan, 1999). Victims of hate crimes suffer more depression, stress and anger and the symptoms last longer. LGBT people are likely to have experienced anti-gay violence in one form or another from early adolescence (D'Augelli, 1998; DiPlacido, 1998). Cumulative negative experiences cause greater 10 LGBT Identity, Violence, and Social Justice 10 stress. These negative experiences result from homophobia, and heterosexism. The majority of the research on this comes from the United States. Once again a comprehensive review of this literature is beyond this paper but what we have learned is important for the future work of psychologists in this area. Homophobia and Heterosexism "The challenges unique to lesbian, gay, and bisexual youths are mostly caused by cultural and institutional victimization as well as direct attacks. Both systemic victimization and direct attacks must be eliminated" (D'Augelli, 1998, p.206). SOV, Sexual Orientation Violence, a term coined by D'Augelli (1998) begins early. By the end of elementary school, youth know that heterosexuality is good and homosexuality is bad. Not conforming to gender role stereotypes is unacceptable especially for boys. For those youth who consider themselves LG moving into adolescence with the increase of hormones that is part of puberty means that they cannot express age-appropriate romantic behaviors (D'Augelli, 1998). In addition they cannot get needed peer support at a time when peers are the most important group in an adolescent's life (Savin-Williams, 1994). Today's youth in the United States are more likely to be victimized because they are more visible. According to a review done by D'Augelli (1998) the normal victimization of LGB youth includes marginalization, negative family responses to disclosure, and the impact of HIV/AIDS. LGB youth are more likely to run away, abuse drugs and alcohol, engage in risky sexual behavior, have school problems, exhibit depression, anxiety, and symptoms of PTSD, and attempt suicide (D'Augelli, 1998; Savin-Williams, 1994). In studies done by Savin-Williams (1994)"Many youths report 11 LGBT Identity, Violence, and Social Justice 11 that they became prostitutes to survive and to escape physical, sexual, and emotional abuse in their homes and schools" (1994, p. 265). According to the 1989 Report of the Secretary's Task Force on Youth Suicide (as cited in Savin-Williams, 1994) suicide is the leading cause of death among LGB youth. Suicides are believed to stem from the difficulties of growing up in a homophobic society. Suicide attempts are linked to coming out to self and others. The research supports relationships between stigma and negative psychological effects but cause and effect has yet to be studied (Savin-Williams, 1994). The roots of the prejudice that causes SOV are developmental and must be studied from adolescence through adulthood. Studies examining antigay, lesbian, attitudes have been done with high school students, juvenile offenders, and with college students. Studies examining behaviors and affect are beginning to be done. A brief review of current research shows the following: Baker and Fishbein (1998) found that male prejudice toward LGs increased between grades nine and eleven and female prejudice decreased. Van de Ven (1994) in a study of undergraduates, high school students, and young offenders which examined attitudes, affect and behavior, found high school students and young offenders to be more prejudiced, more angry, and engage in more negative behaviors, than undergraduates. In terms of anger and behaviors there was no difference between high school students and young offenders. Similar to findings of other studies males were more negative than females. In 1996 Van deVen, Bornholt, and Bailey teased out two affective components of homophobia. They considered anger to be an external component and guilt defined as personal discomfort as an internal component, Students chose from a 12 LGBT Identity, Violence, and Social Justice 12 list of activities such as, see an LGB video, or talk with LGB people either individually or in small groups as a means to measure behavior. They also chose from an adjective list of descriptors of LGB persons to measure affect. Their results did not show gender differences either by gender of subject or gender of target. Anger seemed to be stronger than guilt for affect and behavior. The authors concluded that a homophobic response set is a combination of thoughts feelings and actions. Bernat, Calhoun, Adams, and Zeichner (2001) examined negative affect and aggression. Using an erotic stimulus they varied the target as either heterosexual male or gay male. The erotic gay male condition resulted in increased anxiety, hostility and aggression as measured via shocks to a fictitious opponent. The homophobic group of subjects didn't differ in aggression toward the heterosexual male from the non-homophobic group. In a study looking at self-report attitudes, behaviors, and the effect of social desirability Roderick, McCammon, Long, and Allred (1998) found that social desirability didn't impact men's reports but did impact women's reports. The authors wondered if social desirability for men means having negative attitudes toward LG people. Another finding was that negative behavior fell into either passive-avoidance behavior (walking away) or more active, aggressive behavior (hitting, damaging property) and passive-avoidance behavior is more common. Similar to other studies they found that the more contact subjects had with LG people the less negative were their attitudes. 13 LGBT Identity, Violence, and Social Justice 13 Patel, Long, McCammon, and Wuensch (1995) also looked at homonegativity and aggression in college males. They found a strong correlation between the two. A disturbing finding was that a potential for aggressive behavior against LG people was seen even in those males who didn't register homophobia. Dormitory life has been difficult for LGBT college students. D'Augelli and Rose (1990) sampled 500 freshmen living in dorms. The study explored subjects' views of lesbians and gays, personal knowledge of LG people and homophobia. Subjects reacted more negatively to lesbian and gay lifestyles and toward gay men. Few subjects of either gender knew LGB people either well or causally and nor did they have the desire to know more LGB people or more about LGB life. Almost all of the subjects had heard disparaging remarks made about LGB people and most had made these types of remarks. These studies are important because the literature has found that the perpetrators of antigay violence tend to be young males in their late teens or early twenties (Harry, 1990; Herek, 1998; Herek & Berrill, 1992). Therefore in order to end the violence we need to understand the many components of homophobia as well as how antigay attitudes become antigay violence. In a review of literature about perpetrators Harry (1990) found that those who perpetrate violence tend to do it in groups rather than individuals. Often it's to prove their "maleness." The stereotypic male role justifies violence and society condones violence against LGBT people. LGBT people are considered of little value. Sometimes the perpetrators actually go looking for people they perceive to be LGBT. Sometimes the opportunity just arises. Most people, as evidenced by the research I reported on earlier, merely disapprove of those who are or perceived to be LGBT, The LGBT Identity, Violence, and Social Justice 14 people who disapprove don't perpetrate violence. But, they also don't act as guardians, protectors or helpers of LGBT people (Harry, 1990). Rather than help or protect, many disapprovers use religion or politics to sanction what has come to be known as Reparative Therapy. Members of our own psychological profession practice Reparative therapy (Drescher, 1998). Reparative Therapy In 1918 Freud stated (as cited in Drescher, 1998, p31), "...we cannot accept the proposal...that psychoanalysis should place itself in the service of a particular philosophical outlook on the world and should urge this upon the patient for the purpose of ennobling his mind. In my opinion this is after all only to use violence, even though it is overlaid with the most honorable motives." Reparative Therapy seeks to cure homosexuality and to change homosexuals into heterosexuals. According to a review by Drescher (1998) today's reparative therapists draw from pastoral counseling, have abandoned the neutrality psychoanalysis is based on, urge conformity to traditional values, idealize heterosexuality, file affidavits in support of antigay amendments and believe that their homosexual clients must be ostracized in order to be cured of homosexuality. In spite of the declassification of homosexuality as an illness these therapists continue to treat it as one. They have formed their own organization, NARTH, National Association for Research and Therapy of homosexuality. The work of NARTH perpetuates the hostile climate for LGBT people in this country. Psychology must respond. Mental health and social justice are linked. 15 LGBT Identity, Violence, and Social Justice 15 Psychology, Social Justice, and LGBT Persons In 1932 Franklin Delano Roosevelt said: "In these days of difficulty, we Americans everywhere must and shall choose the path of social justice...The path of faith, the path of hope, and the path of love toward our fellow man" (Halprin, 1997, p. 55). Psychology as the science of human behavior subscribes to a value system that advocates for diversity and for equal treatment of all (Fowers & Richardson, 1996). According to Fowers and Richardson (1996) it is "...a moral movement that is intended to enhance the dignity, rights and recognized worth of marginalized groups" ( p. 609) and "...actively fights against political oppression and economic injustice in the world, in our country, and especially in our local communities" (p. 611). Therefore, psychology must use the tremendous amount of knowledge gained through research to change the policy of oppression toward LGBT people that currently exists. This must happen on an international basis. According to Marsella (2000): "Today's world requires psychology to acknowledge the global context of our times" (p.!). Our knowledge must be used to advocate for the repeal of laws that serve as a justification for the torture and imprisonment of LGBT persons. International conferences such as the recently APA sponsored International LGB Conference must continue to occur (De Angelis, 2002. It is at these conferences that a network of psychologists from around the world can share knowledge, resources and offer support to those whose countries still use old justifications for the oppression of LGBT persons. One of the resources currently being LGBT Identity, Violence, and Social Justice 16 translated into a number of different languages is APA's Guidelines for Psychotherapy with Lesbian. Gay, and Bisexual Clients (2000). But the response cannot come only from divisions and organizations specifically dealing with LGBT identity issues. According to Juan Pablo Ordonez, a human rights defender, "The defence of human rights of homosexuals soley by homosexuals is impossibleor at best, places them in imminent peril of their lives. The struggle must be taken up by outsiders, gay or straight people, who are not themselves victims of this hostile society" (Amnesty International, 2001, p.58). APA must engage with international psychological organizations to remove the illness classification of LGBT persons. China just did that (De Angelis, 2002) and if a country like China where a great deal of repression occurs can be moved to declassify homosexuality as an illness than so can other countries. APA must take a stronger stance against Reparative Therapy both here and around the world. Amnesty International (2001, p.61) recommends that medical associations "...prohibit their members from participating in any treatment aimed at 'curing' or 'treating' it" (homosexuality). The education of psychologists must include the recent research and understanding about the lives of LGBT persons and how to do LGBT Affirmative therapy. Psychologists must be trained to do public policy work and to advocate for social justice. Whether we agree or not the fact is that the psychological is political. One important piece of public policy where psychologists can add their expertise is in the advocacy of laws and constitutional amendments banning discrimination based on sexual orientation and/or gender identity expression discrimination. Psychologists need to be active not only in public policy but in the training of prison workers, police, medical LGBT Identity, Violence, and Social Justice 17 personnel, immigration workers, teachers, and on and on to be sensitive to LGBT issues. A critical area for psychologists and counselors to be active in is making schools a safe place for all children. "The response that is urgently needed now...is for public officials educators, clergy, and all people of conscience to acknowledge, condemn, and counter anti-gay prejudice and violence" (Berrill, 1992, p.40). Of course research must continue. Research must examine the psychological correlates of anti-LGBT attitudes, emotions, behaviors, and thoughts throughout the lifespan. Occupational biases must be understood and the mechanism for effective change must be developed. Religious and political biases and their mechanisms also must continuously be examined. LGBT persons must be studied longitudinally so we know about both healthy and unhealthy identity development, and maintenance. In 1943 Franklin Delano Roosevelt made a statement to White House correspondents that still rings true for people concerned with social justice. It's a statement that has relevance for the topic of this paper, LGBT Identity, Violence and Social Justice. "Unless the peace that follows (WWII) recognizes that the whole world is one neighborhood and does justice to the whole human race, the germs of another world war will remain as a constant threat to mankind" (Halprin, 1997, p.122). Psychology should heed his statement. LGBT Identity, Violence, and Social Justice 18 References American Psychological Association (2000) Guidelines for Psychotherapy with lesbian, gay, and bisexual clients. Adopted by the American Psychological Association Council of Representatives, February 26, 2000. Washington D.C.:APA Amnesty International (2001). Crimes of hate, conspiracy of silence. Oxford, United Kingdom: The Alden Press. Baker, J. G. & Fishbein, H. D. (1998). The development of prejudice towards gays and lesbians by adolescents. Journal of Homosexuality, 36 (1), 89-100. Bernat, J. A., Calhoun, K. S., Adams, H. E. & Zeichner, A. (2001). Homophobia and physical aggression toward homosexual and heterosexual individuals. Journal of Abnormal Psychology,110 (1), 179-187. Berrill, K. T. (1992). Anti-gay violence and victimization in the United States: An overview. In G. M. Herek, & K. T. Berrill (Eds.). Hate crimes: Confronting violence in lesbians and gay men (pp. 19-45). Newbury Park, CA.: SAGE Pubs. Boxer, A. M. & Carrier, J. M. (1998). Evelyn Hooker: A life remembered. Journal of Homosexuality. 36 (1), 1-17. D'Augelli, A. R. (1998). Developmental implications of victimization of lesbian, gay, and bisexual youth. In G. M. Herek (Ed.). 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American Psychologist, 51 (6), 609 621. Gauch, S. (2002, Friday, March 1'). Egypt cracks down on gays, trumping Islamists. Christian Science Monitor, p. 7. Gorman, W. (2001). Refugee survivors of torture: Trauma and treatment. Professional Psychology: Research and Practice, 32 (5), 443-451. Halprin, L. (1997). The Franklin Delano Roosevelt Memorial. San Francisco, CA: Chronicle Books. Harry, J. (1990). Conceptualizing anti-gay violence. Journal of Interpersonal Violence, 5 (3), 350-358. Herek, G. M., Gillis, J. R. & Cogan, J. (1999). Psychological sequelae of hate crime victimization among lesbian, gay, and bisexual adults. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 67 (6), 945-951. Kite, M. E. & Whitley, B. E. (1998). Do heterosexual women and men differ in their LGBT Identity, Violence, and Social Justice 20 attitudes toward homosexuals? A conceptual and methodological analysis. In G. M. Herek (Ed). Stigma and sexual orientation: Understanding prejudice against lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals (pp. 39-61). Thousand Oaks, Ca. SAGE pubs. N.Y.C. Gay and Lesbian Anti-Violence Project (2001). A report of the national coalition of anti-violence programs. New York: National Coalition of Anti-Violence Programs. Patel, S., Long, T. E., McCammon, S. L. & Wuensch, K. L. (1995). Personality and emotional correlates of self-reported antigay behaviors. Journal of Interpersonal Violence, 10 (3), 354-366. Roderick, T., McCammon, S. L., Long, T. E., & Allred, L. J. (1998). Behavioral aspects of homonegativity. Journal of Homosexuality. 36 (1), 79-88. Savin-Williams, R. C. (1994). Verbal and physical abuse as stressors in the lives of lesbian, gay male and bisexual youths: Associations with school problems, running away, substance abuse, prostitution, and suicide. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology. 62 (2), 261-269. Simon, A. (1998). The relationship between stereotypes of and attitudes toward lesbians and gays. In G. M. Herek (Ed.). Stigma and sexual orientation: Understanding prejudice against lesbians.gay men, and bisexuals (pp. 62-81). Thousand Oaks, Ca. SAGE pubs. Van de Ven, P. (1994). Comparisons among homophobic reactions of undergraduates, high school students and young offenders. The Journal of Sex Research. 31 (2), 117-124. Van de Ven, P., Bornholt, L., & Baily, M. (1996). Measuring cognitive, affective, and LGBT Identity, Violence, and Social Justice 21 behavioral components of homophobic reaction. Archives of Sexual Behavior, 25 (2), 155-179. 22 U.S. Department of Education Office of Educational Research and Improvement (OERI) National Library of Education (NLE) Educational Resources Information Center (ERIC) REPRODUCTION RELEASE (Specific Document) I. DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION: ERIC Title: ()01ence. a d So Psyclo "cal Is Po I ill( ot--1 Author(s): Scx H . ,t) P rr D Corporate Source: II. 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work_ykabwxaoyjeizagfclvq5msq2e	----	UWS Academic Portal The challenges of safety and community integration for vulnerable individuals Terras, Melody M.; Hendry, Gillian; Jarrett, Dominic Published in: Safety DOI: 10.3390/safety5040085 Published: 06/12/2019 Document Version Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record Link to publication on the UWS Academic Portal Citation for published version (APA): Terras, M. M., Hendry, G., & Jarrett, D. (2019). The challenges of safety and community integration for vulnerable individuals. Safety, 5(4), [85]. https://doi.org/10.3390/safety5040085 General rights Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the UWS Academic Portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights. 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Download date: 06 Apr 2021 https://doi.org/10.3390/safety5040085 https://myresearchspace.uws.ac.uk/portal/en/publications/the-challenges-of-safety-and-community-integration-for-vulnerable-individuals(82dfbb42-14db-484b-b4eb-44ca0f352c16).html https://doi.org/10.3390/safety5040085 Safety 2019, 5, 85; doi:10.3390/safety5040085 www.mdpi.com/journal/safety Article The Challenges of Safety and Community Integration for Vulnerable Individuals Melody M Terras 1,*, Gillian Hendry 1 and Dominic Jarret 2 1 Department Division of Psychology, University of the West of Scotland, Paisley PA1 2BE, UK; gillian.hendry@uws.ac.uk 2 North Ayrshire Health and Social Care Partnership, Irvine, KA12 8EE, UK; dominic.jarrett@nhs.net * Correspondence: melody.terras@uws.ac.uk Received: 26 July 2019; Accepted: 22 November 2019; Published: 6 December 2019 Abstract: Although community inclusion brings a number of advantages for vulnerable individuals, it can also entail a range of challenges, and draws in issues of safety and security. This qualitative psychological study, therefore, aimed to explore the challenges being faced by two groups of vulnerable individuals: those with intellectual disabilities and dementia, and how these could be addressed in order to establish a community that is safe and welcoming for all. Interviews and focus groups were conducted with a range of community stakeholders—for instance, local businesses, residents, and individuals with intellectual disabilities, dementia and their carers—and data was thematically analysed to explore the issue of inclusion and participation particularly in relation to stigma and prejudice, self-worth, social isolation and feeling safe. As well as highlighting practical issues regarding inclusion and support, the work emphasised the psychological dimension, linking to a multi-faceted conception of community participation. While significant work is already addressing issues of risk and safety for vulnerable populations (such as “Keep Safe” schemes), the work described here leads to an alternative conceptualization, tied to notions of kindness in communities with a view to crafting communities capable of safely welcoming a wider variety of marginalized groups. Keywords: community safety; intellectual disability; dementia; vulnerable adults; discrimination; inclusion; barriers to participation; psychological perceptions of safety; kindness; inclusive design 1. Introduction Human beings have a basic need to belong, which causes them to affiliate, to join and be members of groups. Such affiliation results in successful connections to others, producing heightened self-esteem and self-worth [1]. Group affiliation not only brings benefits for individuals themselves, but can also afford opportunities to further shape the group and its surrounding community context. Almost 100 years ago, Dewey recognized that engaging citizens in meaningful participation in local practices and decisions that shaped their lives led to increased participation at a community level which protected and advanced citizens’ interests within broader society [2]. Existing research also identifies a number of other advantages of community participation, such as health and social benefits [3], strengthening relationships between members [4], enhancing services and preventing crime [5]. Community participation has both a physical dimension, in terms of the engagement behaviour itself, and a psychological dimension which reflects motivational, emotional and attitudinal aspects. Sense of community i.e., feelings of membership or belongingness to a community group [4] is a fundamental psychological aspect of participation, and it is essential to the development and empowerment of local communities; especially those that are marginalized and disadvantaged [6]. Its absence presents a significant barrier to community participation, and brings to the fore concerns Safety 2019, 5, 85 2 of 18 about safety and security, in both practical and socio-emotional terms, particularly in relation to marginalized groups; a significant issue which has been highlighted previously within the literature, e.g., [7–11]. The multi-faceted perspective on community participation, outlined above, provides a valuable lens through which to view the issues of safety and security for more vulnerable members of society. Previous research has focused on teaching road safety [12], first aid skills [13], and use of public transport [14,15]. However, such a multifarious perspective on community participation highlights the need to not only address these very real and practical issues, but also psychological ones, such as belongingness and sense of community. Existing research indicates that community perceptions of vulnerable populations can play a role in marginalization [16], and vulnerable groups can be more susceptible to harm due to their minority status [17] and becoming “lost” in the community [8]. Encouragingly, the importance of social connectedness is reflected in a variety of government policies within the UK. For example, the Scottish Government’s first strategy in 2018 aimed at tackling social isolation and building stronger communities makes specific recommendations to address stigma and discrimination, improve opportunities for people to connect and further empower communities themselves [18]. Everyone has the right to access their local community, though for some people this can be more challenging than others: individuals with an intellectual disability are at greater risk of isolation within their communities [19]. Individuals with an intellectual disability are “one of the most marginalized groups in Western society, experiencing severe personal, social and institutional abjection and discrimination” [20] (pp. 107). Heiman and Shemesh [11] report that, compared to students without intellectual disabilities, students with intellectual disabilities report more cyber victimization, and a plethora of research has identified that people with intellectual disabilities are at an increased risk of abuse in differing forms [10,21,22]. Available evidence indicates that rates of social and community inclusion for people with an intellectual disability generally are low [23]. Individuals, especially those with mild disabilities, have more negative perceptions of key aspects of the environment such as whether they like the neighbourhood and perceived community spirit; access to shops, education and health care, and feelings of safety and fear of crime [9]. Insight into how inclusion may be promoted comes from the observational work of Craig and Bigby (2015) who examined how community groups respond to and support the participation of people with a moderate level of intellectual impairment. Findings indicate that successful community participation is characterised by equality i.e., the individual with a learning disability feels and is perceived as an equal and full member of the group, is engaged in a high degree of co-operative working within the group and that membership is rewarding for all members [24]. Inclusion brings challenges for all concerned: the person with an intellectual disability may be concerned about participating; support staff and family carers may want to protect them from discrimination and therefore restrict opportunities; and there may be practical challenges in terms of time and resources to support the activity. Community groups too face challenges both practically in terms of risk management and socially in terms of attitudes and beliefs as the inclusion of an individual with an intellectual disability may change the dynamic and initial shared vision of the group [23]. Therefore, further research is required to examine community views and community responses to the inclusion of people with an intellectual disability generally, and to explore the views, experiences and challenges that community participation brings for people with an intellectual disability and their carers. People with dementia represent another vulnerable population for whom the advantages of community participation are increasingly being recognised. Loneliness is a significant issue for people with dementia, as noted by Moyle and colleagues [25]. In their exploration of the experiences of people with dementia and those caring for them, they found that carers attributed the socially isolating behaviour of peers to a lack of understanding of dementia, and a fear regarding how to communicate or interact. Bowes et al. [26] identify that participating in community leisure activities has benefits beyond those associated with remaining physically active when an individual develops dementia, as they can promote both social and mental well-being. International work has further underlined the impact of stigma and lack of understanding [27]. These issues are also familiar to Safety 2019, 5, 85 3 of 18 people with intellectual disabilities, and the ways in which society can at times fail to recognise their rights is mirrored in the experiences of people with dementia. The Dementia Engagement and Empowerment Project, for example, highlights the rights of people with dementia to have access to information they can understand, and makes recommendations in this regard [28] which share much with guidance around accessible materials for people with intellectual disabilities. Data also indicates the relatively low rates of inclusion for people with dementia. For instance, Morgan et al. [29] identified eight barriers that individuals with dementia face when accessing community-based services, such as lack of awareness, challenges in service delivery, and beliefs and attitudes: the same factors have been identified in relation to people with intellectual disabilities [7]. Snyder and colleagues [30] termed people’s feelings of decreased self-worth in being part of the community as “devaluation”, and in their review of literature on the needs of people with dementia, van der Roest et al. [31] identified that the most frequently reported needs of people with dementia are to be accepted and respected as they are, which is not necessarily realistic in terms of being safe and secure in the community. Indeed, there is a plethora of literature focusing on the stigmatic and prejudiced attitudes towards people with an intellectual disability or dementia (e.g., [32–35]) which undoubtedly contributes to diminished feelings of safety and inclusion in the community. Existing research illustrates the extent to which both dementia and intellectual disability populations experience similar physical and psychological barriers in terms of safe community participation. Although the available literature indicates that increased community participation raises a number of challenges for adults with an intellectual disability or dementia as distinct populations, a detailed understanding of community participation and safety issues and how they overlap for these populations remains underexplored and unspecified. The project reported below aims to address this issue by considering the rich contextualized insights from a community-based qualitative study. The opportunity arose to work with a community who were motivated to make their community more inclusive for all and who were keen to understand the barriers to participation and the challenges to safety and security it entails. Similar to work in Ireland which sought to use a Universal Design Approach to produce guidance around dementia friendly hospitals [36], the work described here sought to use the experiences of people with intellectual disabilities and/or dementia and those who care for them to generate insights that would help craft a community that was safer and more welcoming for all. The specific aims for the study were to identify the following: • What are the key issues that people with an intellectual disability and/or dementia, and their carers, face in community settings? • How do community members perceive the needs of people with an intellectual disability and/or dementia? • What support is required to accommodate the needs of individuals with an intellectual disability and dementia within the safer and friendlier community initiative? 2. Materials and Methods In this section we report the finding of a community-based qualitative study, based in a small town in the West of Scotland that was interested in making their community more inclusive and safe for all community members, especially vulnerable individuals such as those with dementia and/or an intellectual disability. 2.1. Participants and Recruitment Before recruitment commenced university ethical approval was sought and received. Participants were self-identifying and recruited via convenience and snowball sampling: existing community groups (e.g., carers/support groups), and individual carers of vulnerable individuals known to the members of the community group leading the initiative were contacted and asked if they had members or friends who might also be interested in participating. Participants were also recruited more generally within the community in response to the opportunity to participate in a Safety 2019, 5, 85 4 of 18 community engagement exercise advertised via local community links. Recruitment snowballed as other community stakeholders heard about the project and were keen to be included, resulting in interviews and focus groups being conducted with community members with and without any form of disability, local businesses, carers, volunteers, local councillors, church groups, community group leaders and charitable organisations. Definitions of intellectual disability have habitually made reference to IQ criteria along with other defining features. However, a more pragmatic concept of learning disability, less bound by IQ criteria, is beginning to emerge. Within the recent Learning Disability (the preferred term for intellectual disability in Scotland) Strategy published by the Scottish Government, the definition used (and one developed with the involvement of people with intellectual disability themselves) was: “A learning disability is significant and lifelong. It starts before adulthood and affects the person’s development. This means that a person with a learning disability will be likely to need help to understand information, learn skills and live a fulfilling life. Some people with learning disabilities will also have healthcare needs and require support to communicate.” ([37], pp. 9). With regard to dementia, within the World Health Organisation global action plan on dementia, it is described as: “an umbrella term for several diseases that are mostly progressive, affecting memory, other cognitive abilities and behaviour, and that interfere significantly with a person’s ability to maintain the activities of daily living”. ([38], pp. 2). For the purposes of this work, participants were recruited as outlined above from a range of community services or local support groups for people with intellectual disability, or people with dementia. No formal assessment of intellectual disability or dementia was undertaken by the project team, or required to be evidenced and so, in effect, we accepted people as self-identifying as having an intellectual disability and/or dementia. Thirty-five participants were recruited including older adults with dementia and/or an intellectual disability (N = 5), carers/support workers for people with dementia and/or an intellectual disability (N = 9), community and charity group leaders and volunteers, representatives from local businesses and church groups, and other interested community members (N = 21). Thirteen one to one interviews (with eight carers/support workers for adults with an intellectual disability and three individuals with dementia) and two focus groups (one focus group with 21 community stakeholders, and one focus group with one support worker from a local charity and two individuals with an intellectual disability who attended that group on a regular basis) were conducted. 2.2. Data Collection and Analysis Discussions with vulnerable adults and carers/support workers were focused by using a semi-structured interview schedule that probed issues such as the extent and experience of community participation, preferences for community participation, barriers to community participation, and the support required to enable increased participation in community events. Discussions with community stakeholders were also focused using a semi-structured interview schedule that contained trigger questions to probe issues such as their perceptions of the needs and abilities of vulnerable individuals, barriers to community participation and what support (in terms of education, training and adaptation) is required to increase the safe participation of vulnerable individuals within the community. All discussions were audio-recorded, transcribed verbatim and thematically analysed [39]; a method which is in keeping with existing research with similar populations [40,41]. Data collection totalled 472 min. Individual interviews ranged from 10–53 (average: 29) minutes and focus groups ranged from 46–53 (average: 49) minutes in length. In accordance with ethical clearance all participants were fully informed of the aims of the study and their right to withdraw (both verbally and via an information sheet) and gave signed consent to participate and were debriefed after the study (both verbally and via a debrief sheet). Participants’ identities were protected by using pseudonyms, and only the named authors had access to the recordings and transcripts, which were stored securely. Safety 2019, 5, 85 5 of 18 3. Results The following section outlines the key themes concerning the integration of vulnerable individuals in the community illustrated with quotes from various community members. These themes focus on (1) stigma and prejudice, (2) self-worth, (3) social isolation, and (4) feeling safe. In general, these themes illustrate barriers to community inclusion. However, participants also reflected on how some of these difficulties may be overcome and identified a range of potential enablers consisting of the provision of practical and emotional support captured by the theme of (5) supporting community participation. 3.1. Stigma and Prejudice Erving Goffman [42] (pp. 3) is credited for his seminal work regarding stigma, defining it as, “[an] attribute that is deeply discrediting and that reduces the bearer from a whole and usual person to a tainted and discounted one”. The term was used frequently by participants as a barrier to the development of an inclusive community, and there was reference to the fact that other people’s attitudes have an impact on the lives of people with an intellectual disability and dementia, highlighting the need for understanding and learning on the part of the community: “I don’t know if there’s just not the understanding there, the stigma, I don’t know, but I’ve had a few people say certain places they go they feel a bit even more isolated because they’ve made an effort to go along to an activity and then they’re not really included in it” (Support worker for an individual with an intellectual disability). It is clear from the above quote that there is a direct link between stigma and inclusion, or lack thereof. The participant identifies that although there are community opportunities for the more vulnerable members of the community, they still may not be included: that in theory there are opportunities, but in practice there is still exclusion. However, participants, too, realised that this may not be a barrier that is specific to the current community, but representative of a wider problem: a finding consistent with existing research [43]. For example, “You’re always going to get people in communities that are out unfortunately to target vulnerable people but that’s everywhere” (Support worker for an individual with an intellectual disability). “I think you never get away from the fact that some people are biased… there’s always people who are gonna treat them differently, but as long as they’re being treated well by the most people, I think that’s the important part” (Community Group Leader). The above quotes demonstrate that the targeting of vulnerable individuals appears to be universally accepted: it is found “everywhere”. This normalisation is concerning as it suggests a pervasive problem in society, and even though it is mentioned that “most people” treat such groups well, it suggests that more community education is required to ensure that people with intellectual disabilities and dementia are not denied opportunities to engage in the community, and are supported to do so. One study, for instance, demonstrated that disabled youths described feeling safe in their community only half as often as nondisabled peers [44]. This highlights the importance of making spaces safe for individuals with vulnerabilities, which is the whole premise of dementia friendly communities: a place or culture in which people with dementia can be empowered, supported and included in society [45–48]. Alzheimer Scotland determines that a dementia friendly community is made up of the whole community; people who are committed to working together and helping people with dementia to remain a part of their community and not become apart from it [49]. This is particularly important in the current study, as exclusion was identified as an issue for the more vulnerable members of the community. However, that is not to say that only individuals with dementia benefit from such cultures: they can be beneficial for all [50]. Safety 2019, 5, 85 6 of 18 3.2. Self-Worth Issues of prejudice and stigma can be an even greater barrier to safety and community participation if they are manifested as hate crime. Traditionally focused on religion, race and sexuality, disability hate crime is a relatively more recent topic [51]. Participants identified that for the more vulnerable members of the community, there was evidence of “mate crime”; a play on the term “hate crime”, it refers to a specific form of hate crime against disabled people, predominantly those with intellectual disabilities [52]. “It’s not just disability hate crime, there’s mate crime as well and it’s where friendships are struck up because there are a lot of people with an intellectual disability in the area that are vulnerable that don’t have support” (Support worker for an individual with an intellectual disability). “There’s people that can take advantage of people with an intellectual disability as in, ‘oh they don’t get support in their support hours’ and maybe target them for like mate crime, you know, ‘oh, I’ve not got any money today’ ” (Support worker for an individual with an intellectual disability). In the above quotes, there is acknowledgement of mate crime happening to some of the individuals in the community under consideration. It is identified that friendships are established with vulnerable people who do not have support, on the proviso that they give them money, with such exploitation being identified as a common feature of the “crime” [53]. Individuals with intellectual disabilities may not realise that they may be taken advantage of in such a way, and even if they do, research has shown that disabled people generally face barriers to reporting abuse (e.g., [10,54–56]). Grundy [57] details an initiative focused on mate crime: “Safety Net” was established in 2009, aiming to prevent the exploitation of people with intellectual disabilities by those claiming to be their friends. The project reported the main finding to be that people with an intellectual disability can struggle to recognize when they are being exploited [58]; a finding replicated in further research [52]. This has clear links to the safety of the more vulnerable community members, however, feeling unsafe in the community is not only linked to social factors within the community and the incidence of crime, it can also be attributed to psychological resources such as fear of crime, motivation and low self-worth, which may also function as barriers to community participation. O’Rourke and colleagues [59] discussed how people with an intellectual disability have a desire to engage more in community activities, and indeed, respondents in this study spoke about the benefits that are obtained for individuals by being included in the community, as detailed below: “Feeling wanted and needed and for themselves, just to get out” (Carer of someone with Dementia). Participants regarded inclusion as important as it was related to self-worth, which was also identified as a barrier to inclusion, in that if individuals had feelings of low self-worth, they are less likely to want to be actively part of the community. This presents somewhat of a dilemma: individuals do not have the self-worth to feel a valued part of the community, but not being part of the community may enhance the feelings of low self-worth. Furthermore, lack of participation reduces the opportunity to become aware of the actual nature of the community and this lack of understanding and experience may help reinforce negative perceptions of the risks and increase concerns over safety that further restrict motivation to engage with the community. This then puts vulnerable community members at risk of social isolation, as detailed in the next section. 3.3. Social Isolation Although increased community involvement is assumed to entail a degree of risk as detailed by aforementioned research (e.g., [31–34]), a number of community stakeholders identified social Safety 2019, 5, 85 7 of 18 isolation as a major risk due to a lack of community participation. Although some of this risk may be attributed to geographical location, much is due to social factors. Research suggests that rates of social and community inclusion for people with an intellectual disability generally are low [23,60] and that the barriers faced by people with intellectual disabilities in their everyday lives indicate the importance of social knowledge and skills to help facilitate social integration, the role of support, and the impact of community factors such as lack of amenities and attitudes [7]. Consider the following: “Isolation must be hell, and to feel needed and, you know, it must be awful being lonely and seeing nobody from day to a day, and there must be quite a few like that” (Carer of an individual with Dementia). It was worrisome that isolation was being identified in the current project as a major risk factor: there are people within the community that do not see other people on a day to day basis or are not able to pursue friendships. Despite isolation being a huge concern amongst all participants—and being identified as a problem for the community—participants identified that support is needed to tackle the issue: “You see so many of these people that are in isolation and you think, ‘I wish there was a way just to get them altogether’, but again it would be about they’d need lots of support” (Support worker for an individual with an intellectual disability). Often, community participation is linked to leisure, and a number of barriers to participation in leisure activities for such vulnerable groups were identified. Such barriers may be intrinsic in nature; attributable to characteristics of the individual such as communication and social skills and degree of dependency on caregivers, or more environmental factors such as perceived attitudes of others and more practical issues such as access [61]. Here, too, constraints often interact and even when practical issues are addressed such as the availability of transport, social barriers such as the attitudes of carers remain [62]. Research has also examined how dementia can restrict participation in leisure activities which also highlights the importance of environmental factors concerning accessibility in relation to transport, toilets, venues and carer influences concerning fear of the person with dementia getting lost and the restriction choice of activities [43], as detailed by the following: “If they didn’t have the support to go to them, you know, they probably wouldn’t be able to access them. Sometimes as well if there’s things on they might want to go to, but if it’s out-with their support hours, that might be a barrier” (Support worker for an individual with an intellectual disability). Despite such barriers, community members do recognise opportunities to take part in community initiatives: (MyBus: door to door transport) “so you could be picked up from your house, taken to the shop and then picked up again as a group which I think it sometimes—people feel safer that way” (Support worker for an individual with an intellectual disability). (The local group for people with intellectual disabilities) “are gonny start working on a wee drama now…about keeping safe in the local community, so any new community initiatives, if I can support it with our guys (I will)” (Support worker for an individual with an intellectual disability). “it’s about having safer communities, so having an approach that as communities we’re aware. There’s these initiatives going on but it’s all under the same umbrella; it’s to make everybody feel safe in their local communities” (Support worker for an individual with an intellectual disability). Safety 2019, 5, 85 8 of 18 As noted by Hall [63], community involvement is one aspect of social inclusion that enhances the quality of life of people with intellectual disabilities. However, research indicates that integration requires a collaborative effort: the individual with the additional needs must adapt to the community, but the community also needs to be responsive to their needs [19]. The Scottish Commission for Learning Disability [64] highlights a similar point, in that individuals supporting people with intellectual disabilities into mainstream community groups will help them to adapt to the group, and vice versa. Exiting research also indicates that successful participation is characterised by equality in that the individual with an intellectual disability feels and is perceived as an equal and full member of the group—as discussed in the previous them—and is engaged in a high degree of co-operative working within the group [24]. Research has also demonstrated that disabled people do not always wish to be associated with other disabled people [65], however, contrasting work has shown that disabled individuals can feel a greater sense of belonging when around others also like them, and that spending time in places that feel safe is a key element for the maintenance of friendships between disabled people [66], as detailed below in the next theme. 3.4. Feeling Safe One striking finding that was clear from the people we spoke to was that feeling safe is often dependent on other people. Indeed, Gerber [67] reviewed the different factors that can contribute positively to quality of life for people with intellectual disabilities and for successful adjustment in the community and identified the important role that peers and family play in offering social support. Consider the following: (when asked if she thinks her mother feels safe) “I think so because there’s neighbours that look out for her curtains aren’t open, you know, so, knocking the door” (Carer of an individual with Dementia). “We are lucky, when we’re out and about, people help” (Support worker for an individual with an intellectual disability). (Talking about her sheltered accommodation) “you’ve got people looking after you…a perfect place” (Person with Dementia). Above, we see the participant discuss how her assurances of her mother’s safety comes from her mother’s neighbours who will check in with her mother if anything seems out of the ordinary (i.e., her curtains not being open). Similarly, another participant talks about feeling “lucky” due to other people helping when they are out in the community, whilst a person with dementia talks about the security she feels from the people looking after her. Research has similarly identified the importance of strong commitment by community members to support more vulnerable individuals in rural places [68]; indeed, this focus on support is mentioned as one of the defining features of a dementia-friendly community by Alzheimer’s Society [69], but returning to the focus on isolation, consider the individuals who are not able to contribute to the community, as detailed in the following quote: “I also think as well that those that are socially isolated: do we know we are connecting with them? I’m very conscious in terms of community engagement that I see a lot of people—a lot of people—and there’s a real will to join in things, but I see a lot of the same people and they’re doing shed loads of work but I worry that the people I don’t see—who am I not seeing?” (Community Stakeholder). A key finding from existing research is the importance of support staff/carers for individuals with an intellectual disability and those with dementia (e.g., [19,70]): this is absolutely crucial, as without support and care, some individuals with an intellectual disability and/or dementia would Safety 2019, 5, 85 9 of 18 face considerable difficulties with many routine daily activities, as well as participating in the community [71]. Shalock et al. [72] identified the twenty-five most commonly reported indicators of quality of life which include community integration and participation, community roles and social supports: it is evident from the data set that without support from others, individuals with dementia and intellectual disabilities would be even more isolated than they currently are. In this, they are no different from any other member of society, for all that the nature of that support may differ in terms of scale and intensity. Indeed, the increasing profile attached to isolation issues within Government policy [18,73] further highlights the basic need for connection that all community members share. 3.5. Supporting Community Participation Community members also identified a range of enablers that may facilitate increased community participation. The enablers identified mostly related to support, either physical in the form of improved transport, more accessible information and having someone available to assist and provide both practical and emotional support. For example, the issue of accessing transport to enable individuals to participate in a wider range of community events was discussed at length, particularly as access to transport was currently perceived as a constraint. For example: “She stays in a little village eight miles out of town, there’s a lot less opportunities there, and because transport becomes a logistics thing” (Carer of an individual with Dementia). “I think it’s transport we need—better transport” (Carer of an individual with Dementia). The above quotes are just a sample of the responses concerning how the lack of transport can act as barrier, but improved transport can function as an enabler. This is in keeping with existing research which highlights the significance of transport as an enabler to community participation [74]. Although there may be opportunities for vulnerable individuals to contribute to community activities, if they cannot physically get there, then the opportunity cannot be maximised. It is important to remember that the simple practical availability of transport may not be sufficient, and individuals may require support to use transport due to cognitive difficulties, money troubles, or low confidence [75]. Another facet of “support” is the enabling aspect of being able to access information. Participants in this study clearly reflected on existing practice and highlighted the need for information about community happenings to be delivered in a way that is accessible to all. The fact that there is variability in how people share and receive information was also noted and the importance of recognising these individual differences to minimise the risk of marginalisation for all vulnerable groups [20]. For instance, “I don’t know that we always present information in the best way for people” (Support worker for an individual with an intellectual disability). “The communication needs to be put out in different ways so that everybody knows…Facebook will get one generation, newspapers will get another generation but you’re not going to get your person with dementia who’s stuck in the house on a Facebook page or reading the local paper, so you’re not—to me it’s just simple: you’re not going to get them” (Support worker for an individual with an intellectual disability). When discussing the issue of community inclusion consideration was given to the importance of raising awareness within the wider population of the needs of individuals with dementia and a learning disability in order to foster increased inclusion within the community, as evidenced by the following: Safety 2019, 5, 85 10 of 18 “I think as an area we need to maybe raise a bit more awareness among young people” (Community Stakeholder). (The community needs) “to be more caring, considerate, and I think people’ve got to learn what it’s all about, and understand it a bit more” (Carer of an individual with Dementia). The importance of awareness is recognized as being crucial for the community inclusion of individuals with dementia [31. However, awareness although it may be necessary may not be sufficient. For example, in relation to people with an intellectual disability as research indicates that integration for people with a learning disability requires a collaborative effort: the individual with a learning disability needs to adapt to the community, but the community also need to be responsive to their needs [19]. Interestingly this was recognised by respondents who also identified that not only was community effort and awareness required, but also that people with dementia and a learning disability need to be aware of the community happenings: “Is there a better way of advertising what there is for people? I don’t know how you target the folk individually, but how do we make sure people are getting the information about what we’re saying?” (Support worker for an individual with an intellectual disability). “Even letting people know that’s on and things: it doesn’t matter how many posters you put up, it’s sometimes difficult to make contact with everybody” (Community Group Leader). Participants also recognized the need to provide more opportunities for participation with the very practical suggestions of facilitating more scope for involvement not just for vulnerable individuals but for the whole community, whether that be through work placements, buddies to go shopping with, or community events, offer interesting ways to break down these barriers. For example: “I think more opportunities for them to be involved in their communities, whether it’s volunteering, whether it’s wee work placements. Just being able to be involved in initiatives if there’s clubs, if there’s activities going on” (Support worker for an individual with an intellectual disability). “I was suggesting like a buddy system in supermarkets/a befriender, a buddy, and transport to get to places” (Support worker for an individual with an intellectual disability). “For our group of people, anything arts and crafts and anything music…even if they could do something like all year round, like even set up a tea dance almost, so it was open to everybody, not just our focus” (Support worker for an individual with an intellectual disability). “I’m sure there was a lot of more things that they could add to the town that’s already here to help other people and I just feel there’s a definite lack of further thinking” (Carer of an individual with Dementia). Participants recognized that there is a clear gap between the kinds of opportunities that are sought, and the ability to put them in place. It is essential that this area is addressed as research demonstrates that participating in leisure activities has benefits beyond those associated with remaining physically active but also promotes social and mental well-being [70]. Existing research illustrates the important role of support staff and carers in enabling the community participation for individuals with a learning disability and those with dementia [19] and their importance was also recognised and valued by participants in this study: Safety 2019, 5, 85 11 of 18 “You can’t just put ten people with a learning disability in a room and expect them all to learn the same way as you or I; they need support” (Support worker for an individual with an intellectual disability). 4. Discussion The project findings highlight a range of psychological factors and practical influences on the safety and community participation of people with intellectual disabilities and/or dementia. Stigma and lack of awareness within the community presented significant barriers, which are by no means unique to the populations considered here, but which carry further significance as a result of their particular vulnerability and potentially considerable support needs. As an enabler and consequence of community participation, self-worth has a significant contribution to make to the overall wellbeing of individuals. Yet as highlighted here, its absence can present a significant barrier to that participation, and increase the risk of social isolation within the community. This was a very real issue for participants within the project, which further highlights the importance of the crucial role played by support from others in generating feelings of safety and enabling participation. Responses to this complex interplay of issues are varied, but a particular approach highlighted by participants within this study was the promotion of “Keep Safe” schemes. These community initiatives work with a network of businesses such as shops, libraries and cafes who have agreed to make their premises a Keep Safe place for people to go if they feel frightened, distressed or are the victim of crime when out in the community. Keep Safe places are identified by displaying a sticker in the premises’ window and are listed online [76]. Research has demonstrated that people with an intellectual disability often report observing the community instead of being part of it [77], and so such initiatives allow individuals to engage with the community, and also have the safety net of certain places they can go if they feel vulnerable. Similarly, research has identified that at some point in their disease process, people with dementia will have a “missing” incident and be unable to safely return to their care setting [78], at which point having established and identifiable places of safety to go to will be of the utmost importance. Participants in the current study identified the potential value of Keep Safe locations within their community. A recent report reviewing the Keep Safe initiative identified that, of 660 responses from a wider community survey, 94% thought that the Keep Safe initiative was worthwhile; 84% highlighted that it had made them more aware of disability hate crime and harassment; and 82% were more likely to report incidents of suspected hate crime [79]. Recent research has also explored the concept of “self-building safe havens”, demonstrating that individuals with intellectual disabilities are themselves finding and negotiating welcome spaces in their neighbourhoods, and reclaiming the welcoming communities’ agenda [80]. While “Keep Safe” schemes definitely have much to offer as regards further enabling community participation, the multi-faceted perspective highlighted previously encourages the exploration of other routes. The promotion of “Keep Safe” schemes are welcome steps towards addressing some of the barriers discussed here, yet they remain partial solutions delivered in ways which acknowledge and are limited by the status quo, for example, in being inherently risk oriented approaches. The findings from this study offer a more positive means of conceptualizing and promoting inclusion, with a number of participants discussing how sensitivity and awareness of needs of vulnerable individuals contributes to feelings of actual and perceived safety. For example. one participant spoke about people being helpful when they were “out and about”; another participant discussed the benefits of a vulnerable relative having neighbours who would look out for them, and another participant spoke about the need for the community to be “more caring, considerate”. The recognition of helping and caring as factors in facilitating safety and inclusion opens up the opportunity to consider the role of kindness, at the individual and community level. The multi-faceted perspective on inclusion introduced previously can apply here as: Knafo-Noam et al. (2015) describe how the complex array of positive behaviours displayed by humans, which they refer to as “prosociality”, encompasses behavioural, attitudinal and emotional elements [81]. As well Safety 2019, 5, 85 12 of 18 as reflecting this conceptual link, a focus on kindness also provides a practical link into current activity regarding community and service development. Kindness as a concept invites a variety of definitions and approaches to describing and measuring it are still evolving [82]. There is, however, a growing body of evidence outlining the positive impact of acts of kindness at an individual level, to the extent of describing the neurological changes associated with their commitment [83]. While there has been recognition of a need for kindness to figure more explicitly in public policy [84], the related concept of compassion has an established place both as a potential mechanism for improving professional practice [85,86], and as a tool for change promoted in policy (for example, within the Compassion in Practice vision and strategy document produced by the English Department of Health (2012) [87], and the Compassionate Connections learning resources produced by NHS Education Scotland [88]). The notion of kindness as a relevant focus of explicit consideration is also increasingly emergent, linked not only to research based enquiry such as that outlined previously, but also high profile, practical examples of community change, such as the various strands of activity taking place as part of the Compassionate Inverclyde programme [89] which focuses on what the authors describe as “enabling ordinary people to do ordinary things for ordinary people” [89, p2]. This includes the provision of conversation cafes, the provision of boxes of food stuffs and other resources for people coming home from hospital and the delivery of a programme of support to school pupils and others exploring the benefits of being kind to yourself and others. Recent work by the Carnegie Foundation [90] further highlights the potential of kindness as an alternative perspective on risk and inclusion; one which is broader in its vision and has clear links to the psychological dimensions of community safety and participation—stigma, self-worth, and isolation—highlighted by this study. The Carnegie Foundation examined the place of kindness within communities, how it is realized, and how it can be promoted, and highlighted a range of barriers to kindness, including concerns about personal risk (what will happen when we open up and interact with others); regulation (the focus of organizations of managing risk through policy and regulation); professionalism (the perceived dominance of the “dispassionate professional” ideal); and performance management (measuring what we can, as opposed to what matters). The response of the Carnegie Foundation to these barriers [90] included leaders and government empowering people to act in kindness, and making it easier to do. Crucially, they also speak about the need to think and talk about kindness, with the consequence that this in itself will encourage kinder action. The work of the Carnegie Foundation and others, combined with the existing evidence base around kindness and prosocial behaviour more generally, provides a significant conceptual and practical resource for further exploring the role of kindness with regard to inclusion. As suggested by the responses of participants within the project described here, there is a clear link between concerns about kindness within communities, and issues of safety and inclusion with regard to marginalized populations. This is particularly true when viewed in light of the psychological aspects of safety and community participation highlighted within the current work, and the role of issues such as confidence and self-worth as enablers for inclusion. A potential obstacle to the adoption of kindness as a focus for community development may be that how this can be achieved is perhaps less readily tangible than actions linked to notions of risk (such as the promotion of “Keep Safe” schemes). Yet, as a long-term destination, guiding development of inclusively designed services and communities, greater kindness seems to be an aspiration worth investing in. While the promotion of kindness in a community and service context is inherently positive, the responses of participants within the work described here highlights the need to retain sight of marginalized groups such as those with intellectual disabilities and dementia while doing so. Indeed, the current authors would argue that basing any such activity around a consideration of those groups in the first place, should be a priority. A kindness-oriented approach to the development of inclusive communities has a further advantage in providing a unifying framework for considering all members of the community. As noted earlier, vulnerable individuals (regardless of source e.g., dementia or an intellectual disability) seem to encounter similar challenges to safety when engaging in the community, and it may be Safety 2019, 5, 85 13 of 18 beneficial to adopt a more global approach that seeks to accommodate the needs of all, as opposed to developing specific responses to the needs of specific groups of individuals. Communities should be more inclusive in general and thereby be able to meet the needs of all members. The dementia-friendly communities movement has a profile and momentum which has the potential to benefit many, if it is developed with deliberate attention being paid to its potential for cross-cutting benefits. The same holds true in relation to work focused on people with intellectual disabilities. As noted in the previously cited work from the Scottish Commission for Learning Disability [64] (pp. 6) “if the learning disability movement joined with other movements to advocate for a place-based approach across Scotland, the impact would be transformational”. Arguably, it is in the promotion of this synergy that the greatest potential lies for addressing community safety issues in a way which will benefit a range of marginalized groups. A further mechanism for facilitating that synergy, which draws in both physical and psychological aspects of community participation, is the Inclusive Design paradigm. Inclusive Design (or the similar label, Design for all) provides an existing option which encourages the exploration of design issues with a view to accommodating a broad range of needs and abilities. The British Design Council describes Inclusive Design as aiming to remove of barriers that create undue effort and separation, thereby enabling everyone to participate equally, confidently and independently in everyday activities [91]. As such, it has much to offer in terms of enabling individuals, thereby building self-worth, which, as highlighted by the present study, is a critical resource in respect to safety concerns and community participation. While the project around which the present article is built identified a significant crossover with regard to the concerns of and barriers experienced by people with intellectual disabilities, and those with dementia (e.g., transport access; the experience of stigma; lack of accessible information on community opportunities; lack of awareness within the community), as the above quote suggests, it is in a broader vision that the most potential for progress may lie. Inclusive Design has the potential to accommodate that breadth of vision. Inclusive Design is a clear priority within the private sector, but the extent to which it is consistently and meaningfully realized within the broader community and public sector is debatable. Collaboration with the community as part of the work described here highlighted the potential in creating new opportunities for engagement and exposure, to overcome prevalent preconceptions, and build greater confidence in marginalized groups. It may be that a critical part of this exposure/engagement relates to those specialist services supporting groups such as people with intellectual disabilities, or dementia. Professional identity is a powerful motivator for all, and for those working within specialist services, that professional identity is frequently closely tied to the identity of the individuals they work with, as perceived by the service. Inclusive, safe communities demand a lowering of barriers and divisions, yet all too often, services seem to be built around the preservation of some of those divisions. Although it is anticipated that the conceptual frameworks for increasing community participation and the research findings discussed, with their emphasis on considering both the practical and psychological determinants of safe community participation, will promote debate, discussion, and help inform interventions; it is also essential to recognize the limitations of the current study. The small scale exploratory nature of this study entails some methodological implications that should be noted. The study was conducted in close collaboration with a community group who wished to make their community more inclusive and the study drew on these community links to facilitate recruitment. Doing do may have induced a degree of bias into the sample with participants potentially having favourable attitudes towards inclusion. However, this also brings the advantage of an informed perspective and the data itself shows how participants were able to critically reflect on existing initiatives and identify improvements for the future. The recruitment of vulnerable participants also presented a challenge to the research team and the final number of individuals interviewed was lower than anticipated. This may be attributable to a number of practical (not aware about the option to participate or lack of support to allow participation) and psychological factors (low self-esteem and/or not viewing themselves as a Safety 2019, 5, 85 14 of 18 member of the community) many of which are a consequence of poor community integration in its own right. It is interesting to note that such factors were identified as barriers to inclusion by participants, with and without disabilities, within this study; and difficulties in engaging and recruiting individuals who are excluded or those of high risk of exclusion is a well-recognised challenge [92]. In order to maximise the voice of vulnerable individuals future research would benefit from supporting the interview process by the use of symbolic/photographic material and draw upon a “Talking Mats” approach where needed, to guide participants through the interview process at their pace and provide a supportive structure for their responding [93,94]. The provision of practical support, in terms of self-advocacy training, to help vulnerable participants articulate their views may also be beneficial [95]. Future research may also benefit from the use of a mixed methods approach that draws upon observational work of actual community activities to supplement interview and/or questionnaire data and build a more contextualized understanding of experiences of all community members [96]. 5. Conclusions Community participation has clear benefits at an individual and group level, yet these benefits are not equally available to all. Our findings indicate that similar barriers to safe community participation are experienced by individuals with an intellectual disability and dementia alike. Furthermore, the research findings indicate the importance of considering the role of psychological determinants such as prejudiced attitudes and stigma, self-worth and feelings of community belonging in relation to community safety and inclusion. As the current project outlined, people with intellectual disabilities and/or dementia are significantly disadvantaged in this respect, with concerns about safety (in various aspects) contributing largely to this. Individuals and communities can potentially benefit from targeted activity (e.g., Dementia Friendly Communities) or risk-oriented approaches (e.g., Keep Safe schemes). However, a perspective on participation and safety which draws in psychological as well as physical concerns creates an opportunity to address these issues from other, possibly more positive and inclusive perspectives. The role of kindness and inclusive design within communities are two such perspectives. Arguably, how they can be leveraged as mechanisms for promoting inclusion and participation for all, particularly for vulnerable groups such as those with intellectual disabilities and/or dementia, is an area that has been significantly under explored to date. Doing so has the potential to bridge the areas of community safety and asset-based community development, to the advantage of all community members. Author Contributions: All three authors have contributed towards this paper: conceptualization; M.M.T., D.J., G.H.; methodology: M.M.T., D.J., G.H.; formal analysis: G.H., M.M.T., D.J.; investigation: G.H., M.M.T., D.J.; original draft preparation: G.H., M.M.T., D.J.; writing, review and editing: M.M.T., G.H., D.J.; project administration: M.M.T. Funding: This research was funded by the RS MacDonald Charitable Trust (seedcorn grant) and distributed through host organization Alzheimer Scotland Centre for Policy and Practice, University of the West of Scotland. 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work_ykxpmkpoxbaq3nnuuiasqcc5w4	----	Do Laws Shape Attitudes? Evidence from Same-Sex Relationship Recognition Policies in Europe econstor Make Your Publications Visible. A Service of zbw Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft Leibniz Information Centre for Economics Aksoy, Cevat Giray; Carpenter, Christopher S.; De Haas, Ralph; Tran, Kevin Working Paper Do Laws Shape Attitudes? Evidence from Same-Sex Relationship Recognition Policies in Europe IZA Discussion Papers, No. 11743 Provided in Cooperation with: IZA – Institute of Labor Economics Suggested Citation: Aksoy, Cevat Giray; Carpenter, Christopher S.; De Haas, Ralph; Tran, Kevin (2018) : Do Laws Shape Attitudes? Evidence from Same-Sex Relationship Recognition Policies in Europe, IZA Discussion Papers, No. 11743, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), Bonn This Version is available at: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/185203 Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your personal and scholarly purposes. You are not to copy documents for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public. If the documents have been made available under an Open Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence. www.econstor.eu DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES IZA DP No. 11743 Cevat G. Aksoy Christopher S. Carpenter Ralph De Haas Kevin Tran Do Laws Shape Attitudes? Evidence from Same-Sex Relationship Recognition Policies in Europe AUGUST 2018 Any opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author(s) and not those of IZA. Research published in this series may include views on policy, but IZA takes no institutional policy positions. The IZA research network is committed to the IZA Guiding Principles of Research Integrity. The IZA Institute of Labor Economics is an independent economic research institute that conducts research in labor economics and offers evidence-based policy advice on labor market issues. Supported by the Deutsche Post Foundation, IZA runs the world’s largest network of economists, whose research aims to provide answers to the global labor market challenges of our time. Our key objective is to build bridges between academic research, policymakers and society. IZA Discussion Papers often represent preliminary work and are circulated to encourage discussion. Citation of such a paper should account for its provisional character. A revised version may be available directly from the author. Schaumburg-Lippe-Straße 5–9 53113 Bonn, Germany Phone: +49-228-3894-0 Email: publications@iza.org www.iza.org IZA – Institute of Labor Economics DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES IZA DP No. 11743 Do Laws Shape Attitudes? Evidence from Same-Sex Relationship Recognition Policies in Europe AUGUST 2018 Cevat G. Aksoy EBRD, London School of Economics and IZA Christopher S. Carpenter Vanderbilt University, NBER and IZA Ralph De Haas EBRD and Tilburg University Kevin Tran DIW Berlin ABSTRACT IZA DP No. 11743 AUGUST 2018 Do Laws Shape Attitudes? Evidence from Same-Sex Relationship Recognition Policies in Europe* Understanding whether laws shape or simply reflect citizens’ attitudes is important but empirically difficult. We provide new evidence on this question by studying the relationship between legal same-sex relationship recognition policies (SSRRPs) and attitudes toward sexual minorities in Europe. Using data from the European Social Surveys covering 2002- 2016 and exploiting variation in the timing of SSRRPs across countries, we show that legal relationship recognition is associated with statistically significant improvements in attitudes toward sexual minorities. These effects are widespread across demographic groups, emerge only after the policies are adopted, and are not observed for views on other social issues. Our results suggest that laws can exert a powerful influence in shaping societal attitudes. JEL Classification: F5, K36 Keywords: public opinion, same-sex relationship recognition policies, LGBT attitudes Corresponding author: Cevat Giray Aksoy European Bank for Reconstruction and Development One Exchange Square London EC2A 2JN United Kingdom E-mail: aksoyc@ebrd.com * We are grateful for helpful comments from Nathan Anderson, Marcus Dillender, Sergei Guriev, Cindy Kam, Berkay Ozcan, Nathaniel Young, and conference and seminar participants at Vanderbilt University, the 2018 AEA/ASSA meetings, the 2017 CREST/IZA/OECD Conference on Discrimination, and the 2017 APPAM Fall Research Conference. Results do not imply endorsement from the EBRD or any other organization. All interpretations, errors, and omissions are our own. 1 1. Introduction Scholars have long recognized the importance of understanding whether laws shape or simply reflect societal attitudes (Downs 1957, Besley and Case 2003, and others), but providing credible empirical evidence on this question has proven difficult. We present new evidence on this topic by using the gradual rollout of same-sex relationship recognition policies throughout Europe as plausibly exogenous policy variation to understand whether laws shape attitudes toward sexual minorities. Studying these policy changes is timely because advancements in civil rights for lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) individuals throughout Europe and the Americas have been some of the most striking social changes in recent decades. As recently as 2000, same-sex marriage was not legal in any European country; as of the time of this writing, same-sex couples can legally marry in 17 countries throughout Europe while same-sex registered domestic partnerships/civil unions are available in 11 others. Figure 1 shows that over this same period, the share of citizens who agree with the statement that “Gay men and lesbians should be free to live their own life as they wish” increased considerably – by about ten percentage points. How might same-sex marriage and same-sex registered domestic partnership policies (henceforth: same-sex relationship recognition policies, or SSRRPs) affect attitudes toward sexual minorities? Flores and Barclay (2016) discuss four possibilities: backlash, legitimacy, polarization, and consensus. A 2 backlash model predicts that attitudes toward LGBT people might become substantially more negative following legal recognition of same-sex relationships, especially in the case of judicial rulings. A legitimacy model predicts that legal rulings may increase acceptance and approval of LGBT populations as people infer the laws as increasing social legitimacy. A polarization model predicts that focusing on events such as major same-sex relationship policies may reduce ambivalence toward LGBT people and increase both social approval and disapproval of sexual minorities. Finally, a consensus model predicts that attitudes shape policy but that policy has no effects on attitudes. These alternative hypotheses make clear that ultimately the relationship between legal same-sex marriage and attitudes towards gay men and lesbians is an empirical question. We provide direct evidence on this question by using variation in the timing of the adoption of SSRRPs across a large set of European countries. SSRRPs remain high on the policy agenda across the world, including in Australia, Europe, and Latin America. Understanding the impact of such policies on public attitudes is important for policymakers trying to gauge their social implications – particularly with respect to the risk of backlash and/or polarization. Our data allow us to examine whether relationship recognition policies have unintended negative effects on views toward sexual minorities for particular demographic groups such as men, rural populations, and religious individuals. 3 Knowing whether there are adverse attitudinal effects for specific groups can help design policies to counterbalance any such spillover effects from SSRRPs. Our analysis uses data from the 2002-2016 European Social Surveys which asked over 325,000 individuals across Europe identically worded questions about a range of social and economic issues. Of particular interest is a specific question on whether the respondent agrees that “Gay men and lesbians should be free to live their own life as they wish”. We use cross-country variation in the timing of SSRRP adoption to estimate difference-in-differences models while controlling for individual demographic characteristics, country characteristics, other LGBT policies (such as nondiscrimination laws, adoption policies, and hate crimes legislation), country, year, and month fixed effects, and linear country- specific time trends. To preview, we find that – consistent with a legitimacy model – laws do cause changes in attitudes. The introduction of a relationship recognition law for same-sex couples is associated with a statistically significant 3.6 percentage point increase in the likelihood that a respondent agreed that gay men and lesbians should be free to live their own life as they wish. This effect is about five percent of the baseline average. These results mean that the adoption of expanded relationship recognition policies for same-sex couples can explain 36 percent of the ten-percentage point increase over our sample period in the share of adults 4 agreeing that gay men and lesbians should be free to live their own life as they wish (Figure 1). Event study models confirm that the effects we identify emerge only after policy adoption, suggesting that the policies cause changes in attitudes (and not vice versa). We also show that the effects of same-sex relationship policies are unique to LGBT attitudes: there is no systematic relation between these policies and people’s views on other social and economic issues (including attitudes toward other minority groups such as immigrants). Moreover, we document that the effects we identify are widespread across many demographic groups. Our results also illustrate the importance of accounting for time invariant country-specific effects. Models that rely only on cross-sectional differences in the presence of SSRRPs across countries return associations between policies and attitudes that are three to ten times larger than our two-way fixed effects estimates. Thus, we find that policies both reflect and affect attitudes. Regarding the latter, our results suggest that attitudes toward sexual minorities are likely to improve further as the trend toward more countries adopting SSRRPs continues. We proceed as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on same-sex relationship recognition policies and attitudes toward LGBT people. Section 3 then describes the data and outlines our empirical approach. Section 4 presents the results after which Section 5 concludes. 5 2. Related literature Only few papers have examined how same-sex relationship policies may be related to public opinion and attitudes. Like us, Takács and Szalma (2011) and Hooghe and Meeusen (2013) use European Social Survey (ESS) data but instead rely on cross-sectional designs. They find that individuals in countries with marriage equality had significantly more pro-LGBT attitudes than individuals in countries without relationship recognition for same-sex couples. Takács et al. (2016) use the 2008-2010 European Values Survey (EVS) to show that legislation permitting same-sex couples to adopt children is associated with respondents’ views about whether homosexual couples should be allowed to adopt children. However, the cross-sectional nature of these research designs limits their ability to make credible causal claims. Our study is more closely related to a recent working paper by Kenny and Patel (2017) who use the 1989-2014 World Values Survey data and the 2006- 2016 Gallup World Poll data to estimate difference-in-differences models relating legalization of homosexuality to attitudes toward sexual minorities. They find evidence that when countries make homosexuality illegal, individuals are significantly more likely to state that they would not like to have a gay neighbor, less likely to state that homosexuality is justifiable, and more likely to state that their area is a bad place for gay men and lesbians to live. 6 Our contribution differs in several respects. First, and most importantly, we focus on relationship recognition policies instead of policies to make homosexuality illegal. Our results are therefore more germane for understanding shifts in attitudes in North and South America, where relationship recognition has recently been adopted or is on the current political agenda. We also employ different data (the European Social Survey, which we describe below) including a novel measure of attitudes toward sexual minorities. Importantly, we also explore heterogeneity in the effects of policies on attitudes toward sexual minorities to see whether policies widened or reduced pre-existing gaps in these views. Our study is also related to two recent papers in political science that use individual-level panel data to examine the effects of same-sex marriage policies. Kreitzer et al. (2014) study a panel of individuals before and after Iowa’s state Supreme Court legalized same-sex marriage. They examine stated support for various relationship recognition statuses for same-sex couples and find that the law signaled new social norms which pressured some respondents to modify their expressed support. Flores and Barclay (2016) examine the effects of the 2013 rulings on same-sex marriage in the United States on attitudes toward LGBT people as measured by ‘feeling thermometers’ (in addition to questions about support for same-sex marriage). They find that people in states that introduced same-sex marriage saw the greatest reduction in anti-gay attitudes. They interpret 7 this evidence as consistent with a legitimacy model and inconsistent with backlash or polarization models. Unlike these two studies, we lack panel data to follow the same individuals over time. Our data and setting, however, do provide some unique advantages that allow us to complement prior work. Relative to the Kreitzer et al. (2014) study, for example, our paper examines effects of policies on mass attitudes toward LGBT people as opposed to support for specific policy proposals such as marriage equality. And unlike Kreitzer et al. (2014) and Flores and Barclay (2016), we are also able to test for heterogeneity in the relationship between same-sex relationship recognition policies and attitudes toward LGBT people. Our work also contributes to recent research examining the determinants of homophobia and transphobia. Broockman and Kalla (2016), for example, performed a randomized experiment and find that conversations with residents in South Florida that asked participants to take the perspective of others significantly reduced prejudice, and that the effect persisted for three months. They also show that the intervention increased support for a nondiscrimination law. In contrast, this paper asks if public policies related to relationship recognition independently lead to meaningful changes in attitudes toward sexual minorities. Finally, our paper is related to State and Wernerfelt (2017) who use data from Facebook profiles. The authors examine how state and federal court rulings 8 on same-sex marriage impact individuals’ social-media behavior including using the ‘rainbow filter’ to show support for same-sex marriage, ‘liking’ a page for LGBT rights organizations, or changing one’s relationship status. They find sharp changes in these LGBT-support measures coincident with the timing of legal same-sex marriage in the United States. 3. Data description and empirical approach Our data on attitudes toward sexual minorities come from the 2002-2016 European Social Surveys (ESS). These surveys are fielded every year in over 30 European countries and include questions on a range of topics.1 Our main sample includes over 325,000 respondents age 18 and older from 32 European countries. The key outcome variable in this paper comes from a question asked to all ESS respondents: “Do you believe that gay men and lesbians should be free to live their own life as they wish?”.2 We also examine responses to other questions 1 The sample is an unbalanced panel because not all countries contribute data in every year. 2 Other European surveys also ask questions about homosexuality and/or sexual minorities but do not provide sufficient coverage, in terms of countries and years, to support the two-way fixed effects empirical framework we use. Despite this, we have confirmed that our ESS ‘free to live their own life as they wish’ question is strongly correlated with questions from other European surveys when aggregated by country-year. For example, the 1990, 1999, and 2008 European Values Survey (EVS) asked: “On this list are various groups of people. Could you please sort out any that you would not like to have as neighbors?” ‘Homosexuals’ was one response option, so we can identify individuals who would prefer not to live next to a gay person. The 2010 and 2016 Life in Transition Survey (LiTS) includes a similar question. The EVS also included a question about the ‘justifiability of homosexuality’ on a scale of 1 to 10, with 1 being ‘always justifiable’ and 10 being ‘never justifiable’. The Gallup World Polls asks respondents whether their city or area is ‘a good place to live for gay men and lesbians’. Appendix Table A1 presents a correlation 9 about immigration and related social issues as placebo outcomes. We do not have information on the sexual orientation of ESS respondents, but most credible population-based surveys indicate that sexual minorities constitute a very small share of the overall population (generally between 1 and 3 percent of adults). To estimate the effect of relationship recognition policies for same-sex couples on attitudes toward sexual minorities, we estimate standard difference-in- differences models that rely on plausibly exogenous variation in the timing of policy adoption across countries. These models take the form: Yict = β0 + β1Xict + β2SSRRPct + β3Zct + β4Cc + β5Tt + β6Cc*Trend + εict (1) where Yict is a variable indicating positive attitudes toward sexual minorities for individual i in country c at time t. Xict is a vector of standard individual characteristics: a Male dummy; Age and its square; dummy variables for Education categories (secondary and tertiary schooling, with less than secondary education as the excluded category); dummy variables for Marital/partnership status; a dummy variable for living in an Urban area; and dummy variables for religion (Orthodox Christian, Catholic, Protestant/Other Christian, Muslim, and Other religion, with atheist/agnostic/None as the excluded category). Same-Sex Relationship Recognition Policy (SSRRP) is an indicator variable equal to one in matrix for our ESS measure and these other variables and shows that they are all strongly correlated in predictable ways. 10 the countries and periods when same-sex marriage and/or same-sex registered partnerships/civil unions are legally available to same-sex couples.3 We estimate linear probability models for ease of interpretation. The coefficient of interest is β2, which in the presence of country and year dummies and country-specific trends (described below) is identified from sharp within- country changes in outcomes coincident with variation in the timing of policy adoption across countries. The key identifying assumption is that LGBT attitudes would have evolved identically in countries with and without relationship recognition policies had they not been adopted. Zct is a vector of other country-time varying policies and characteristics that may correlate with the policies we study. The data come from the International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association (ILGA) and various government webpages. These variables indicate whether the country has an explicit ban on same-sex marriage, whether the country's antidiscrimination protections include sexual orientation, whether the country permits adoption by same-sex couples, whether the constitution explicitly protects sexual minorities, 3 We experimented with separate variables for same-sex marriage and same-sex registered partnerships/civil unions, but we do not have enough power to separately identify their effects. Also, in a few countries there was a lag between the legalization of same-sex marriage (enactment date) and the issuance of the first same-sex marriage licenses (effective date). For example, Finland approved same-sex marriage in December 2014, but marriage licenses for same-sex couples were not available until March 2017. Given that same-sex couples constitute a small fraction of the population and given that we think the treatment is mainly about the legitimization of same-sex couples by the government, we code the policy variables according to the enactment dates. In most cases, there was little time between the enactment and effective dates. 11 and whether the country allows sexual orientation-based crimes to be classified as hate crimes. Zct also includes the log of GDP per capita (in 2010 US Dollars). Cc and Tt are a full set of country and year dummies, respectively. The former absorb time-invariant variation in the outcome variable caused by factors that vary across countries while the latter eliminate time-varying shocks that affect all countries simultaneously. We also include calendar month-of-interview dummies (not shown in equation 1). Lastly, we control for country-specific linear time trends by interacting each country fixed effect with a variable Trend that equals 1 in the first year of the sample, 2 in the second, and so forth. These trends remove variation in within-country attitudes toward sexual minorities due to factors that are country-specific over time. Sample weights make the data representative at the country level, and we cluster standard errors by country (Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan, 2004). 4. Results 4.1. Descriptive statistics We first present descriptive statistics for the policy variables, LGBT attitudes, and individual demographic characteristics in Table 1. We provide means for the full sample in column 1, for countries that had adopted SSRRPs by the end of our sample period in column 2, and for countries that did not adopt SSRRPs by the end of our sample period in column 3. 12 The majority of respondents in our sample live in a country that had adopted legal same-sex marriage or registered domestic partnership/civil unions by 2016. Table 1 also shows that countries with legal relationship recognition for same-sex couples by 2016 were much more likely to have adopted other pro- LGBT policies such as employment protection for sexual minorities, the establishment of hate crimes laws covering sexual orientation, explicit constitutional protection for sexual minorities, and adoption rights for same-sex couples. Moreover, these differences are large, in the order of 30-50 percentage points between countries with and without legal relationship recognition policies for same-sex couples by the end of the sample period. This pattern suggests that unobserved fixed differences across countries may be important as well, an issue we address by using a quasi-experimental approach. Table 1 also shows that individuals in countries with relationship recognition policies for same-sex couples were much more likely (40 percentage points or twice as likely) to agree with the statement that gay men and lesbians should be free to live their own life as they wish. These differences are much larger than the differences for questions related to immigrants (which are not very different across columns 2 and 3). We also see that differences in demographic characteristics across countries with and without legal relationship recognition for same-sex couples are small, with a few exceptions. One notable difference is the share of individuals who identify as religious: while less than 80 percent of 13 individuals in countries that had same-sex marriage or registered domestic partnerships/civil unions by 2016 report a religion, the share reporting a religion in countries without legal relationship recognition for same-sex couples by 2016 is significantly higher at 91 percent. This pattern also underlines the importance of accounting for country fixed effects. 4.2. Main results Table 2 presents our baseline estimates, based on equation (1), of the link between relationship recognition policies and attitudes toward sexual minorities. Each column reports a separate regression model, and we report the coefficient on the SSRRP indicator and the associated standard error. Column 1 reports results from a model where we only include the indicator for SSRRPs. We find that individuals in country/year combinations with same-sex relationship recognition have significantly more positive attitudes toward sexual minorities than individuals in country/year combinations without these policies. Specifically, we estimate that the presence of SSRRPs is associated with a statistically significant 40 percentage point higher likelihood of agreeing that gay men and lesbians should be free to live their own life as they wish. In column 2 we control for individual characteristics, country characteristics, and other LGBT-related public policies. When we add those covariates, the size of the association between SSRRPs and attitudes toward sexual minorities declines substantially. Yet, we 14 still find that individuals in country/year combinations with SSRRPs are 9.3 percentage points more likely to agree that gay men and lesbians should be free to live their own life as they wish, as compared with otherwise similar individuals in places without SSRRPs. The results in column 3 of Table 2 speak directly to the importance of accounting for time-invariant country-specific unobserved heterogeneity as well as smooth country-specific linear time trends. In this augmented model the SSRRP dummy is identified from sharp deviations off smooth trends in outcomes coincident with the timing of the relationship recognition policies across countries. These country-specific time trends are jointly significant predictors of the sexual minority attitude outcome (p-value < 0.01). Once we account for year and month fixed effects, country fixed effects, and linear country trends, we find that the association between same-sex relationship recognition policies and attitudes toward sexual minorities is reduced further in magnitude: it is about a third of the size of the model in column 2 and one tenth of the size of the model in column 1. This is consistent with the idea that unobserved permanent cross- country differences and country-specific trends explain a substantial portion of the variation in support for sexual minorities, or put differently that laws reflect attitudes. We nevertheless continue to find that same-sex relationship recognition is associated with a statistically significant increase in the likelihood of agreeing with the pro-LGBT statement, an effect of about 3.6 percentage points. Relative 15 to the base year sample mean, this is an effect of 5.3 percent. This pattern is consistent with the idea that laws affect attitudes. We consider the estimate in column 3 of Table 2 as our baseline estimate. Figure 2 shows event-study estimates of the relationship between the adoption of legal SSRRPs and improved LGBT attitudes. The figure is based on our baseline specification (column 3 in Table 2) with linear country trends, a battery of individual covariates, and the full set of fixed effects. The sample consists of all countries that ever adopted a same-sex relationship recognition policy during our sample period. We follow Adukia et al. (2018) and exclude as our reference periods the year just prior to SSRRP adoption and the period for three or more years prior to SSRRP adoption. The event study estimates in Figure 2 provide evidence that relationship recognition policies for same-sex couples led to improved attitudes toward sexual minorities. Although few of the individual event time estimates are individually statistically significant, there is a noticeable immediate estimated increase in the likelihood of reporting that gay men and lesbians should be free to live their lives as they wish. The broad pattern and magnitude matches the baseline difference-in-differences estimates in Table 2. Returning to Table 2, we present in column 4 the results from a model where we exclude all of the LGBT policy controls except the relationship recognition variable to address possible concerns about collinearity among the various policies (though these models retain all the fixed effects and country- 16 specific time trends). We continue to find that same-sex relationship recognition policies are associated with statistically significant improvements in attitudes toward sexual minorities. Columns 5 and 6 of Table 2 shows estimates based on a sample of only those 23 countries that ever adopted a relationship recognition policy (column 5)4 or only the 13 counties that ever adopted a relationship recognition policy within our sample period (column 6).5 Our core findings are robust to these sample restrictions. Next, in column 7 of Table 2, we show estimates for the sample of individuals in countries that were observed for at least 12 years during the 2002- 2016 ESS period. Our result is robust to this sample restriction as well. Finally, in column 8 of Table 2 we report results from a model where we use the Wild Cluster bootstrap procedure with 999 repetitions to account for the small number of clusters, and again our main finding is robust. In Table 3, we strengthen inference further by showing that the relationship between SSRRPs and attitudes toward sexual minorities is unique to the LGBT domain. Specifically, we estimate similar models where we consider other outcome variables related to attitudes about non-LGBT issues such as immigration. If the timing of same-sex relationship recognition policies were 4 These countries are Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, England, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Northern Ireland, Norway, Portugal, Scotland, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and Wales. 5 These countries are Austria, Czech Republic, England, Estonia, Hungary, Ireland, Luxembourg, Northern Ireland, Scotland, Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland, and Wales. 17 correlated with other unobserved factors associated with more liberal or accepting societies in general, it would be incorrect to interpret the findings in Table 2 and Figure 2 as the effect of the relationship recognition policies on improving attitudes toward LGBT people. In this case, we might expect that the coefficient on same-sex marriage policies would be significantly related to more liberal attitudes on a range of issues and minority populations.6 Each row of Table 3 presents a separate regression model using the fully saturated specification with country-specific linear trends as in column 3 of Table 2. We report the pre-reform outcome means in column 1. Column 2 shows the coefficient estimates for the key indicator variable of interest: whether the country has legal same-sex relationship recognition. We begin by reprinting the baseline estimates for the “gay men and lesbians should be free to live their own life as they wish” question in the top row of Table 3. Row 2 then shows results for an outcome that equals one if the individual agreed that the country would be better if most people shared the same values. Row 3 shows results for an outcome that equals one if the individual agreed that immigrants cause crime. Row 4 shows results for an outcome that equals one if the individual agreed that immigrants put in more than they take out. Row 5 shows results for an outcome that equals one if the individual agreed that immigration enriches cultural life. Row 6 shows results 6 Of course, it is also possible that there are ‘real’ spillover effects of the treatment effects of relationship recognition policies at improving attitudes on other social issues, but we would expect any such spillovers to be small relative to the findings in Table 2. 18 for an outcome that equals one if the individual agreed that it is important to understand different people. Lastly, row 7 shows results for an outcome that equals one if the individual agreed that it is good to have a law against ethnic discrimination at the workplace. Together, these results confirm that the significant associations documented in Table 2 are unique to views about sexual minorities: we find no statistically significant associations between the availability of same-sex relationship recognition and any of the other attitudes in column 2 of Table 3.7 In Table 4, we investigate heterogeneity in the effects of same-sex legal relationship recognition policies on attitudes toward sexual minorities. The format is the same as that of Table 3 except that we now examine associations for various demographic groups. In each case, the outcome in Table 4 is the same outcome as in Table 2 (i.e., agreeing that gay men and lesbians should be free to live their own life as they wish). Column 1 reports the mean of the LGBT attitude question for 2002-2004 (the beginning of the sample) for the sub-group identified in each row. We report the relevant policy coefficient estimates on the SSRRP indicator in column 2. As in Table 3, each row reflects a separate regression that is fully saturated with controls for individual and country characteristics, country and time fixed effects, and linear country-specific time trends. 7 We are admittedly limited in the range of ‘placebo’ questions we can examine because over the sample period the ESS did not consistently ask questions about, for example, views on women or disabled individuals. 19 Column 1 of Table 4 reveals interesting descriptive heterogeneity in attitudes toward sexual minorities. For example, there is a notable gender difference: men report significantly more negative attitudes toward sexual minorities than women. There is also a substantial age effect: older individuals have significantly more negative attitudes toward sexual minorities than younger ones. Partnership, education, religion, and urban/rural differences are also observed clearly in the data. All of these differences are statistically significant at the 5 percent level. The regression results in column 2 indicate that legal same-sex relationship recognition policies were associated with statistically and economically significant improvements in attitudes toward sexual minorities across a broad demographic spectrum. We do, however, find some interesting heterogeneity in the impact of relationship recognition policies. For example, column 1 showed that partnered individuals (i.e., those married or with a cohabiting partner) hold significantly more negative attitudes toward sexual minorities than non-partnered people. Importantly, in column 2 we also find that relationship recognition policies have larger effects at improving attitudes toward sexual minorities for partnered people than for non-partnered people. In contrast, however, we do not find similar evidence that relationship recognition policies work to “close the gaps” associated with age, education, or religious affiliation. 20 5. Discussion and conclusion Do laws shape attitudes? Or do they simply reflect them? The results in this paper provide evidence that cross-country variation in policies toward sexual minorities reflects attitudes of the citizenry but also that such policies do have real effects in terms of shaping attitudes. Over our sample period, 13 countries adopted relationship recognition policies for same-sex couples. Our 2002-2016 data return evidence that such policies significantly improved attitudes toward sexual minorities. We also show that cross-sectional designs used in some of the prior literature tend to dramatically overstate the true causal relationship between policies and attitudes. Event study estimates confirm that improvements in attitudes toward sexual minorities only occur after policy adoption, further suggesting that the policies change attitudes. The effects are unique to attitudes about sexual minorities and are broad-based across gender, age, education, and relationship status. We do, however, estimate notably stronger responses for partnered individuals who had systematically more negative attitudes toward sexual minorities at the beginning of the sample period. What do our results suggest about the underlying structure of policies and attitudes? Recall that the political science literature on same-sex marriage and attitudes toward sexual minorities has considered four somewhat competing models of how legal same-sex marriage might be related to attitudes: backlash, 21 legitimacy, polarization, and consensus (Flores and Barclay 2016). Our findings provide direct commentary on these candidate models. First, the findings from Europe – like those in Flores and Barclay (2016) for a single state in the United States – do not support the backlash model. In no case do we find that policies to legally recognize same-sex relationships are associated with a significant worsening of attitudes toward LGBT people. Second, the results also are broadly inconsistent with a model of polarization. That model would predict that some groups’ attitudes would worsen while others would improve. We did not find much evidence for this at least as proxied by base period differences in attitudes toward sexual minorities. Third, the findings are also generally not supportive of the consensus model which predicts that there will be no effect on attitudes as the policies simply reflect changes in attitudes (and not vice versa). Instead, we find evidence that legal adoption of same-sex relationship recognition increases agreement with pro-LGBT views. This finding is most consistent with the legitimacy model whereby legal status confers legitimacy toward a particular group (here, sexual minorities), and attitudes adjust in response. Our results suggest that as marriage equality and other relationship recognition policies continue to expand throughout the world, we might expect to observe continued improvements in attitudes towards sexual minorities. This could translate into less discrimination (or more inclusion) in labor and housing 22 markets, improved mental health for sexual minorities, and a range of other potential benefits associated with less anti-LGBT sentiment. 23 References Adukia, Anjali, Sam Asher, and Paul Novosad (2018). “Educational Investment Responses to Economic Opportunity: Evidence from Indian Road Construction,” working paper. Bertrand, Marianne, Esther Duflo, and Sendhil Mullainathan (2004). “How Much Should We Trust Differences-in-Differences Estimates,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119(1): 249-275. Besley, Tim and Anne Case (2003). “Political Institutions and Policy Choices: Evidence from the United States,” Journal of Economic Literature, 41: 7- 73. Broockman, David and Joshua Kalla (2016). “Durably Reducing Transphobia: A Field Experiment on Door-to-Door Canvassing,” Science, 6282. Downs, Anthony (1957). “An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy”, Journal of Political Economy, 65(2): 135-150. Flores, Andrew R. and Scott Barclay (2016). “Backlash, Consensus, Legitimacy, or Polarization: The Effect of Same-Sex Marriage Policy on Mass Attitudes,” Political Research Quarterly, 69(1): 43-56. Hooghe, Marc and Cecil Meeusen (2013). “Is Same-Sex Marriage Legislation Related to Attitudes Toward Homosexuality? Trends in Tolerance of Homosexuality in European Countries Between 2002 and 2010,” Sexuality Research and Social Policy, 10(4): 258-268. Kenny, Charles and Dev Patel (2017). “Norms and Reform: Legalizing Homosexuality Improves Attitudes,” Center for Global Development Working Paper 465. Kreitzer, Rebecca J., Allison J. Hamilton, and Caroline J. Tolbert (2014). “Does Policy Adoption Change Opinions on Minority Rights? The Effects of Legalizing Same-Sex Marriage,” Political Research Quarterly, 67(4): 795-808. State, Bogdan and Nils Wernerfelt (2017). “Tipping in Social Norms: Evidence from the LGBT Movement,” working paper. 24 Takács, Judit and Ivett Szalma (2011). “Homophobia and same-sex partnership legislation in Europe,” Equity, Diversity and Inclusion: An International Journal, 30(5): 356-378. Takács, Judit, Ivett Szalma, and Tamás Bartus (2016). “Social Attitudes Toward Adoption by Same-Sex Couples in Europe,” Archives of Sexual Behavior, 45(7): 1787-1798. 25 Figure 1 Trends in Attitudes Toward Sexual Minorities Outcome is share of people in the country who agree that “Gay men and lesbians should be free to live their own life as they wish” 2002-2016 European Social Survey Data, Adults age 18+ Note: This figure includes all countries that were observed during at least 10 years of the ESS. We further restrict the sample to observations used in the full-sample estimation. 26 Figure 2 Event Study for Same-Sex Relationship Recognition 2002-2016 European Social Survey Data, Adults age 18+ Note: This figure is based on the specification in column 3 of Table 2, which contains linear country-specific time trends. The sample consists of countries that ever adopted legal same-sex marriage between 2001 and 2016. 27 Table 1: Sample Characteristics 2002-2016 European Social Survey Data (1) (2) (3) Variables Full sample Countries that had relationship recognition for same-sex couples by 2016 Countries that did not have relationship recognition for same-sex couples by 2016 LGBT public policies Same-sex marriage/domestic partnerships legal 0.56 (0.49) 1 -- Constitutional ban on same-sex marriage 0.14 (0.34) -- 0.31 (0.46) * LGBT employment protection 0.69 (0.46) 0.92 (0.27) 0.40 (0.49) * Hate crimes law for sexual orientation 0.34 (0.47) 0.56 (0.49) 0.05 (0.22) * Adoption legal for same-sex couples 0.25 (0.43) 0.45 (0.49) 0.01 (0.04) * Constitutional protection for sexual minorities 0.20 (0.40) 0.36 (0.48) 0.01 (0.10) * Attitudes toward minority groups Gay men and lesbians should be free to live their own life as they wish 0.62 (0.48) 0.80 (0.39) 0.40 (0.49) * Better for a country if almost everyone shares customs and traditions 0.46 (0.49) – N: 75,281 0.41 (0.49) – N: 45,493 0.55 (0.49) – N: 29,788* Immigrants put in more than they take out 0.15 (0.36) – N: 71,901 0.15 (0.36) – N: 43,951 0.15 (0.35) – N: 27,950 Immigrants make crime problems worse 0.06 (0.24) – N: 73,076 0.06 (0.24) – N: 44,573 0.06 (0.23) – N: 28,503 Immigration enriches cultural life 0.35 (0.47) – N: 310,764 0.41 (0.49) – N: 186,630 0.27 (0.44) – N: 124,134* Individual demographics Age 48.70 (17.95) 49.64 (17.84) 47.51 (18.04) * Male 0.45 (0.49) 0.47 (0.49) 0.43 (0.49)* Less than degree level education 0.69 (0.46) 0.72 (0.44) 0.65 (0.47) Partnered 0.53 (0.49) 0.53 (0.49) 0.54 (0.49) Urban 0.33 (0.47) 0.30 (0.46) 0.36 (0.47) * Any religion 0.84 (0.36) 0.79 (0.40) 0.91 (0.28) * N 326,069 191,840 134,229 Notes: Weighted means (standard deviations). * indicates the difference in means between column 2 and column 3 is significant at p<.05. 28 Table 2: Relationship Recognition Policies for Same-Sex Couples Significantly Improve Attitudes Toward Sexual Minorities 2002-2016 European Social Survey Data, Adults age 18+ Outcome is indicator for agreeing with “Gay men and lesbians should be free to live their own life as they wish” (1) No controls (2) (1) plus controls for individual Xs, country- specific X’s, and other country- specific LGBT policies (3) (2) plus month and year FE, country FE, and linear country- specific time trends [Baseline model] (4) (3) but exclude all other LGBT policies (5) (3) but only countries that ever adopted relationship recognition for same- sex couples (6) (3) but only countries that adopted relationship recognition for same- sex couples within our sample window (7) (3) but only countries observed in at least 12 of the 14 years (8) (3) but use Wild cluster bootstrap with 999 repetitions Mean, 2002-2004 .691 .691 .691 .691 .729 .683 .716 .691 Relationship recognition for same-sex couples .400*** (.068) .093** (.040) .036** (.014) .030*** (.011) .025** (.011) .025* (.012) .032** (.014) .036** (.018) R-squared 0.168 0.277 0.303 0.302 0.143 0.152 0.162 0.303 N 326,069 326,069 326,069 326,069 255,307 112,623 165,853 326,069 Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The individual characteristics are: a male dummy, age and its square, a dummy variable for being unemployed, dummy variables for education categories (secondary and tertiary schooling, with less than secondary education as the excluded category), a dummy variable for being partnered (married or living with a partner), a dummy variable for living in an urban area, and dummy variables for religion (Orthodox/Catholic, Protestant, Jewish, Islamic, and other, with no religion as the excluded category). Country characteristics include GDP per capita (in 2010 US Dollars). Other LGBT-related policies are: LGB employment protection, hate crimes law for sexual orientation, adoption legal for same-sex couples, and constitutional protection for sexual minorities. Results are weighted, and standard errors are clustered at the country level. 29 Table 3: No Effects on Placebo Outcomes 2002-2016 European Social Survey Data, Adults age 18+ Baseline Model from Column 3 of Table 2 (1) (2) Mean of outcome (2002-2004) Coefficient on Relationship Recognition for same-sex couples (standard error) Gay men and lesbians should be free to live their own life as they wish .691 .036** (.014) Better for a country if almost everyone shares customs and traditions .513 .235 (.122) Immigrants put in more than they take out .137 -.089 (.256) Immigrants make crime problems worse .053 .087 (.070) Immigration enriches cultural life .408 -.032 (.021) Important to understand different people .955 .005 (.008) Good to have a law against ethnic discrimination at the workplace .626 -.255 (.247) Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. See notes to Table 2. 30 Table 4: Effect Heterogeneity 2002-2016 European Social Survey Data, Adults age 18+ Baseline Model from Column 3 of Table 2 (1) (2) Average of ‘gay men and lesbians should be free to live their own life as they wish’ (2002-2004) Coefficient on Relationship recognition for same-sex couples (standard error) Full sample .678 .036** (.013) Males .666 .039** (.016) Females .714 .035** (.014) Above median age .612 .030 (.020) Below median age .762 .041*** (.011) Less than degree level .659 .032* (.016) Degree level education .809 .053*** (.013) Partnered .670 .046*** (.016) Not partnered .717 .025* (.014) Rural .675 .035** (.016) Urban .728 .034* (.015) Any religion .672 .035** (.013) Atheist or no religion .789 .043** (.016) Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. See notes to Table 2. 31 Appendix Table A1: ESS Measure is Strongly Correlated with LGBT Attitudes Questions from Other Surveys ESS ‘Gay men and lesbians should be free to live their own life as they wish’ question LiTS ‘don’t want homosexuals as neighbors’ question Gallup ‘area is a good place to live for gay or lesbian people’ question EVS ‘justifiability of homosexuality’ EVS ‘homosexuality is never justified’ EVS ‘homosexuality is always justified’ ESS ‘free to live’ question 1 -- -- -- -- -- LiTS ‘neighbor’ question -0.919*** 1 -- -- -- -- Gallup ‘area’ question 0.958*** -0.906*** 1 -- -- -- EVS ‘justifiability’ question 0.870*** -0.881*** 0.923*** 1 -- -- EVS ‘never justified’ -0.876*** 0.878*** -0.925*** -0.974*** 1 -- EVS ‘always justified’ 0.884*** -0.781*** 0.834*** 0.947*** -0.853*** 1 Notes: *** significant at 1%. Author calculations, various datasets. Do Laws Shape Attitudes? Evidence from Same-Sex Relationship Recognition Policies in Europe Cevat G. Aksoy, Christopher S. Carpenter, Ralph De Haas, and Kevin Tran Abstract JEL codes: F5; K36 3. Data description and empirical approach Our data on attitudes toward sexual minorities come from the 2002-2016 European Social Surveys (ESS). These surveys are fielded every year in over 30 European countries and include questions on a range of topics. Our main sample includes over 325,0... 4. Results 5. Discussion and conclusion Trends in Attitudes Toward Sexual Minorities Outcome is share of people in the country who agree that “Gay men and lesbians should be free to live their own life as they wish” Figure 2 Event Study for Same-Sex Relationship Recognition Table 1: Sample Characteristics Notes: Weighted means (standard deviations). * indicates the difference in means between column 2 and column 3 is significant at p<.05. Table 3: No Effects on Placebo Outcomes Table 4: Effect Heterogeneity 
work_ymv6jotoxfe6tolgf7lj3xjnri	----	International Journal of Politics and Security (IJPS) ISSN: 2667-8268 https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/pub/ijps Countering Psychological Operations and Deceptions that Indoctrinate Anti-Islam Hate and Violence Author(s): Yusuf FIRINCI Source: International Journal of Politics and Security (IJPS) / Vol. 2 / No. 5 / Oct. 2020, pp.94- 126 Received Date : 23.04.2020 Accepted Date : 07.09.2020 How to cite this article: Fırıncı, Yusuf. “Countering Psychological Operations and Deceptions That Indoctrinate Anti- Islam Hate and Violence”. International Journal of Politics and Security (IJPS), Vol. 2, No. 5, 2020, pp.94-126 All intellectual property rights of this article belong to the International Journal of Politics and Security (IJPS). It cannot be republished, reproduced, distributed, sold, or made available to the public for free / paid to use in any way, without any prior written, written communication, copying, or the broadcasting system. Academic citations are outside this rule. The ideas stated in the article belong only to the author(s). https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/pub/ijps IJPS, 2020; 2(5):94-126 International Journal of Politics and Security, 2020: 2(5):94-126 94 Countering Psychological Operations and Deceptions that Indoctrinate Anti-Islam Hate and Violence Yusuf FIRINCI Abstract This research article examines the connection between anti-Islam indoctrinations, pseudo-reality construction using engineered misinformation, and ideological aggressions resulting in crimes against Muslims such as massacres with anti-Islam media and internet networks. It can be argued that various kinds of education strategies on indoctrinations of various topics such as nationalism, conservatism, or extremist ideologies resulting in terrorism can be designed, constructed, and transferred by creating fictions, engineered-informations, and pseudo-realities within the digital cyberspace. Today, it can be argued that the internet is a secret weapon, and some institutions very well discovered how to use it on the psychological front. This article suggests that the misinformants must be warned and educated, whereas manipulators and disinformants must be prevented, to save innocent people. This research analyzed the influence, deception, and indoctrination strategies by utilizing critical discourse analysis methods, such as Ideological Square Model developed by Teun A. Van Dijk. The essential steps of possible counter psychological indoctrinations are briefly illustrated. Key Words: Manipulation, Disinformation, Psychological Operations, Anti-Islam Violence, Critical Discourse Analysis. İslam Karşıtı Nefreti ve Şiddeti Telkin Eden Aldatma ve Psikolojik Operasyonlara Karşı Koyma Özet Bu araştırma makalesi Müslümanlara karşı katliamlar gibi suçlara neden olan anti-İslam telkinleri, yanlış bilgiler ile tasarımlanmış düzmece gerçeklik inşaları, idelojik saldırganlıklar ile anti-Islam medya ve internet ağları arasındaki bağları inceler. Dijital siber alemde; kurgular, tasarlanmış bilgiler, sahte gerçeklikler yaratmak suretiyle, milliyetçilik, muhafazakarlık veya terörizme yol açabilen aşırıcı ideolojiler gibi çeşitli konularda telkinler üzerine çeşitli eğitim stratejilerinin dizayn, inşa ve transfer edilebileceği iddia edilebilir. Günümüzde internetin gizli bir silah olduğu ve bazı kurumların bunun psikoloji cephesinde nasıl kullanılacağını çok iyi keşfettikleri iddia edilebilir. Bu makale masum insanların korunması için; yanlış bilgi yayınların uyarılması ve eğitilmesini, diğer taraftan dezenformasyon ve manipülasyon kaynaklarının ise önlenmesini önermektedir. Bu araştırma Teun A. Van Dijk tarafından geliştirilen İdeolojik Yerleştirme Modeli gibi eleştirel kavram analiz metodlarını kullanmak suretiyle tesir, aldatma ve aşılama stratejilerini analiz etmiştir. Gerekli karşı psikolojik tesirlerin temel basamakları kısaca tasvir edilmiştir. Anahtar Kelimeler: Manipülasyon, Dezenformasyon, Psikolojik Operasyonlar, Anti-İslam Şiddet, Eleştirel Kavram Analizi Doktora, Ankara Ünversitesi, Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, Din Sosyolojisi, yfirinci@ankara.edu.tr ORCID ID: 0000-0002-4364-0142 IJPS, 2020; 2(5):94-126 International Journal of Politics and Security, 2020: 2(5):94-126 95 1. Introduction Hate crimes against the Muslims have been fueled since the various levels of media and populist politicians around globe have been pumping misinformation and disinformation against Islam and Muslim immigrants from invaded or conflict infected post-colonial countries of Muslim populations. In some cases, right-wing populism results in islamophobia which results anti-Muslim hate. Islamophobia can be defined as a modern word for a prejudice that dates back to the Middle Ages and “it refers to the fear of and hostility toward Muslims and Islam, as well as the discriminatory, exclusionary, and violent practices arising from these attitudes that target Muslims and those perceived as Muslims”.1 Islamophobia and some of the anti-Islamic narrations may result in hate crimes, violence or even terrorist ideologies and terrorist attacks. Hate crimes can be defined as”criminal acts motivated by bias or prejudice towards particular groups of people”.2 Hate crimes may be fueled orprevented by using perception management strategies. Perception management aims to shape “the attitudes of people, whether domestic publics, the ‘global’ public, or audiences within conflict zones”.3 This researchpaper focuses on prevention of islamophobia and hate crimes against Muslims by prevention of destructive perception management strategies and promotion of peaceful perception management policies. According to Haig & Hajdu,4 in hybrid warfare, the frontiers between enemies blurs, the boundary between soldiers and civilians vanish, non-state actors seem like combatants whereas every conflicts within the cognitive space require a solution again within the cognitive space. As if a combatant of a hybrid anti-Muslim warfare, recently an anti-Muslim terrorist from Australia, who have been announcing his hate freely on internet, had attacked two 1Todd Green, “Islamophobia,” Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Religion (2019), https://oxfordre.com/religion/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780199340378.001.0001/acrefore-9780199340378-e-685, (05.09.2020). 2OSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Preventing and Responding to Hate Crimes, (Warsaw, 2009): 15. 3Piers Robinson, “News Media, Communications, and the Limits of Perception Management and Propaganda during Military Oparations” in At the End of Military Intervention: Historical, Theoretical and Applied Approaches to Transition, Handover, and Withdrawal, eds. Robert Johnson and Timothy Clack (Oxford University Press, 2015), 273. 4Zsolt Haig and Veronica Hajdu, “New Ways In The Cognitive Dimension Of Information Operations,” Land Forces Academy Review 22, no. 2 (2017): 95. IJPS, 2020; 2(5):94-126 International Journal of Politics and Security, 2020: 2(5):94-126 96 mosques in New Zealand and murdered in cold blood 51 innocents people while they were praying. Interestingly, before the attack, the terrorist, identifying himself as fascist and ‘European-blood’ published an anti-Muslim manifesto titled The Great Replacement, and during his raid, he streamed live online via social media. What more important and related to the topic of this essay is the fact that the anti-Islam terrorist declared in his manifest that he received/researched/developed his beliefs by using internet. This research article illustrates the connection between anti-Islam indoctrinations resulting in monstrous terrorist acts and global and local anti-Islam and anti-Muslim media and internet networks. Many commentators stated that seeming like a computer game, the video of the Christchurch mosque massacre gave other online fascists the message that, by opening fire on perceived enemies, they too could become the main player and not a non-player character.5 Online communities may pose great threat to civilization when these groups are used for indoctrinating hate and violence. Inspired by Jacques Lacan’s statement as: “truth is structured like a fiction”,6Al- Zaman7argues that the digital cyberspace provides a world of “pseudo-reality” and any wrong- doer information-holder will misguide people with the “engineered information”. He also emphasizes that the digital dis-informants construct incorrect stories deliberately in a fictional style to attract more attention. Considering these findings, it can be argued that various kinds of education strategies on indoctrination of various phenomena such as nationalism, conservatism, cultural/historical stories or extremist ideologies resulting in terrorism can be designed, constructed and transferred by creating fictions, engineered-informations and pseudo- realities within the digital cyberspace. In this respect, a reminder about the roles of human communication will be inspiring. Melvin L Defleur describes human communication, the basis for group norms, as the means by which social control is exercised, roles are assigned, organization of effort is accomplished, 5Jeff Sparrow, “What Induces Men to Imitate the Christchurch Massacre?” The Guardian (2019), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/aug/05/what-induces-men-to-imitate-the-christchurch- massacre (19.03.2020). 6Jacques Lacan, Écrits: A Selection, trans. Alan Sheridan (London: Tavistock Publications 1977), 306, quoted in Sayeed Al-Zaman, “Digital Disinformation and Communalism in Bangladesh,” China Media Research 15, no. 2 (2019): 68-76. 7Sayeed Al-Zaman, “Digital Disinformation and Communalism in Bangladesh,” China Media Research 15, no. 2 (2019): 68-76. IJPS, 2020; 2(5):94-126 International Journal of Politics and Security, 2020: 2(5):94-126 97 expectations are made obvious, and the social operation is carried on.8 Considering this fact, governments and citizens must be well aware of the functions of communication strategies, social control tactics and social operations. 2. Lessons from Brief Historical Facts Whether in the forms of misinformation or in the forms of global/glocal disinformation campaigns, the wrong accusations and misinformation policiesregarding Islam have been toxicating the hearts and minds of peoples, both Muslim and non-Muslims, all around globe intensely. Psychological operations are defined as: “planned activities using methods of communication and other means directed at approved audiences in order to influence perceptions, attitudes and behavior, affecting the achievement of political and military objectives”.9 Hostile psychological operations must be confronted and prevented by counter psychological operations. The foundational article Psychological Warfare, written by Office of War Information veteran Paul Linebarger (1948) stated that the very first case of psychological warfare can be the Gideon’s deception against the Midianites in the Old Testament.10 Whereas Alexander the Great is also accepted as one of the developers of psychological methods and the hidden cause of many of his victories and his practices were: a) “Maintain good relations with pacifist elements within neighbouring people in order to take advantage of favourable opinions and sentiments. b) Use secret agents to infiltrate and spread rumours and news. c) In moments of crisis, bury the enemy — with public opinion — under an avalanche of information, true or false, that can produce concern, demoralisation and chaos.”11 8Melvin L. Defleur, Theories of Mass Communication, (New York: David McKay, 1966), quoted in Sunil Narula, “Psychological Operations (PSYOPs): A conceptual Overview,” Strategic Analysis 28, no.1 (2004):189. 9NATO AJP-3.10.1 Allied Joint Doctrine For Psychological Operations, Edition BO Peracje psychologiczne ( 2010) DD/3.10.1 (A), (2014) Sztab. Gen., op. cit., p. 14. Warszawa, quoted in Zsolt Haig and Veronica Hajdu, “New Ways in The Cognitive Dimension of Information Operations,” Land Forces Academy Review 22, no. 2 (2017): 96. 10Paul Linebarger, Psychological Warfare, (Oxford: Infantry Journal Press, 1948), quoted in Jeffrey Whyte, “A New Geography of Defense: The Birth of Psychological Warfare,” Political Geography 67 (2018): 32. 11Sunil Narula, “Psychological Operations (PSYOPs): A conceptual Overview,” Strategic Analysis 28, no. 1 (2004): 180. IJPS, 2020; 2(5):94-126 International Journal of Politics and Security, 2020: 2(5):94-126 98 When we look into 20th century, in 1918, Britain assigned Lord Beaverbrook, owner of The Daily Express, as the first head of Ministry of Information to control home and allied morale through propaganda whereas the owner of The Daily Mail and The Times, Lord Northcliffe was assigned as the head of The Enemy Propaganda Department to conduct practices that today are called psychological operations.12After the end of Great War, Lord Northcliffe suggested that good propaganda presumably saved Britain and its allies a year of war and a million lives.13 It is evident that psychological operations have been utilized very effectively by some strategists. University of Chicago's radio program director Sherman Dryer,14 (1942), argued that “radio is a secret weapon. The secret is how to use it as a weapon … For all the ballyhoo about the power of radio on the psychological front,” Dryer15 demurred, “we still have not discovered that secret, nor has any other country”. Today, it can be argued that internet is the secret weapon and some groups/agencies very well discovered how to use it on the psychological front. Whereas regarding psychological warfare, in his work titled The Strategy of Terror, Edmond Taylor (1940) stated that “the battlefront of the mind, where ideas and ideologies, propaganda and emotions, clash in ordered ranks, disciplined like soldiers. The war never ends. It was raging before the first gun spoke”.16 It can be argued that the studies on and utilization of psychological warfare have been continuously evolving since the known history and the clash of disciplined ideas, disciplined ideologies and emotions never ends in the battlefields of minds. During Vietnam War, United States Psychological Operations leaflets from 1968 entitled “Freedom of Religion” promoted the idea of “South Vietnamese enjoy freedom of religion. All religions are developed beautifully”.17 Considering this example, this article also 12Phillip Taylor, “Munitions of the Mind: A Brief History of Military Psychological Operations,” Place Branding and Public Diplomacy 3, no.3 (2007): 198. 13Ibid. 14Sherman Dryer, Radio in Wartime, (New York: Greenberg, 1942), 36, quoted in Jeffrey Whyte, “A New Geography of Defense: The Birth of Psychological Warfare,” Political Geography 67, (2018): 41. 15Ibid. 16Edmond Taylor, The Strategy of Terror: Europe's Inner Front, (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin Company, 1940), 2, quoted in Jeffrey Whyte, “A New Geography of Defense: The Birth of Psychological Warfare,” Political Geography 67, (2018): 36. 17Marcin Górnikiewicz, “Evolution of the US PSYOP Products’ Effectiveness during Vietnam War 1965-1969,” Security and Defence Quarterly 1, no. 2, (2013): 114. IJPS, 2020; 2(5):94-126 International Journal of Politics and Security, 2020: 2(5):94-126 99 suggests prevention of false extremist indoctrination against Islam and suggests constructing positive approaches regarding information operations on Islam. 3. Some of the Theoretical Tools Surely, information operations, psychological operations and similar fields have been the main focus points of social psychology and neuroscience. Social psychologists already discovered that when people interact, they are inclined toimitate each other’s expressions, actions and they tend to deduce each other’s emotions & intentions which can be related to neuroscientific discovery of mirror neurons.18 Also, according to the social brain concept, sensitivity to the emotions and intentions of others allowpersons to engage inshared agendas such as jointly activating the practical cycles of planning, acting, reflecting, and re-planning to solve problems and also constructing new collective understandings which can be defined as inter-thinking.19 It can be argued that psychological operations and warfare strategists utilize the psychological science to reach maximum effects. Countering psychological operations also requires depth in knowledge of psychological science. Also, constructivist theories can be utilized to understand how the learners construct their knowledge. According to Jean Piaget’s cognitive constructivism, knowledge is constructed in the learner’s mind while the person is organizing his/her experiences& cognitive structures and cognitive constructivism can beutilized to analyze how the individual understand things in developmental stages and learning styles.20 On the other hand According to Lev Vygotsky’s social constructivism, knowledge is constructed via social, cultural interactions and social constructivism can be utilized to analyze how meaning and understanding grow out of social encounters.21 Discourses, rhetorics, various information operations can both be designed or analyzed by using constructivist theories. Evaluating the influence strategies by media may include evaluating the narration of news and stories by examining what part of the story is written and by examining what part of the story is left out. Thomas Huckin’s (2002) ‘manipulative silences framework’ is about 18Neil Mercer, “Education and the Social Brain: Linking Language, Thinking, Teaching and Learning,” Éducation and Didactique10, no. 2 (2016): 9-24. 19Ibid. 20Khadidja Kouicem and Kelkoul Nachoua, “Constructivist Theories of Piaget and Vygotsky: General Teaching Implications,” University of Eloued DSpace, 64-75, http://dspace.univ-eloued.dz/handle/123456789/2775 (22.04.2020). 21Ibid. IJPS, 2020; 2(5):94-126 International Journal of Politics and Security, 2020: 2(5):94-126 100 covering relevant information deliberately from the reader or listener to the advantage of the writer or speaker.22 McLaren & Patil23 applied the ‘manipulative silences framework’ in media discourse analysis and argued that media’s discursive tools, to influence the public mind, existed in both what is written in text and what has been left out (silences). This dimension of deliberate information silencing can beuseful in understanding some of basics of the media strategies. Considering the scope of this research paper, the critical discourse analysis methods can be relevant and beneficial for analysing the psychological indoctrinations and operations. Our main instrument may be utilization of methods that focus on manipulation of discourses. Internet and in general, cyberspace have been functioning as an arena of manipulation of discourses whether in the form of information warfare or in the form of psychological operations. Manipulation is a social practice of power abuse which involves controlling people’s knowledge, opinions and beliefs, and manipulative discourse typically exists in mass communication controlled by dominant political, bureaucratic, media, academic or corporate elites.24 Manipulative discourses regarding this research paper are constructed mostly within the forms of representation of the self in positive discourses and representation of the others within negative discourses. The Ideological Square Model, developed by Teun A. Van Dijk can be used in this research because it specifically focuses upon the polarizing macro strategy of ‘positive self- representation and negative other-representation.25According to Dijk’smacro-analysis, four basic strategies are used to legitimize the self and de-legitimize the other: a) “Emphasize positive things about ‘us’; b) Emphasize negative things about ‘them’; c) De-emphasize negative things about ‘us’; and. 22Thomas Huckin, “Textual Silence and the Discourse of Homelessness,” Discourse & Society 13, (2002): 347- 72, quoted in Helen Jacqueline McLaren and Tejaswini Vishwanath Patil, “Manipulative Silences and the Politics of Representation of Boat Children in Australian Print Media,” Continuum: Journal of Media & Cultural Studies 30, (2016): 602–12. 23Helen Jacqueline McLaren and Tejaswini Vishwanath Patil, “Manipulative Silences and the Politics of Representation of Boat Children in Australian Print Media,” Continuum: Journal of Media & Cultural Studies 30, (2016): 602–12. 24Teun A. van Dijk, “Discourse and Manipulation,” Discourse & Society 17, no. 2 (2006): 359–383. 25Mohsin Hasan Khan et al. “Muslims’ Representation in Donald Trump’s Anti-Muslim-Islam Statement: A Critical Discourse Analysis,” Religions 10, no. 115 (2019):1-16. IJPS, 2020; 2(5):94-126 International Journal of Politics and Security, 2020: 2(5):94-126 101 d) De-emphasize positive things about ‘them’”.26 However the Dijk’s micro level analysis includes rhetorical discursive strategies such as: “Actor description, authority, burden, categorization, comparison, consensus, counterfactual, disclaimer, euphemism, evidentiality, argumentation, illustration/example, generalization, hyperbole, implication, irony, lexicalization, metaphor, national self- glorification, norm expression, number game, polarization (us-them), populism, presupposition, vagueness, and victimization.”27 These macro and micro level discourse analysis methods are relevant in our quest to understand and interpret the manipulative, polarizing information operations and psychological influencing indoctrinations. On the other hand, there are various theories that can either be utilized to construct or deconstruct strategies behind psychological operations such as manipulation. For example, a recent theory of deceptive discourse production : Information Manipulation Theory 2 explains deception as involving the covert manipulation of information through various dimensions and as a contextual problem-solving exercise directed by the thirst for fast, effective and practicable communicative solutions.28 Information Manipulation Theory 2 is built upon synthesizing literatures such as cognitive neuroscience, linguistics, artificial intelligence and speech production.29 This kind of theories may also be instrumentalized to further our understanding about manipulation, but due to the scope of this research paper, only critical discourse analysis methods will be utilized. 4. Cyberspace, Influence, Indoctrination The capability of social media to influence people’s minds and also subconscious sphere may transform the individual in the form of zombification and wide ranges of manipulative techniques such as; information overload, substitution or rewriting history, use of 25th frame technology to hide the fact of information-psychological influence.30 26Teun A. Van Dijk, Politics, Ideology and Discourse, Elsevier, quoted in Mohsin Hasan Khan et al. “Muslims’ Representation in Donald Trump’s Anti-Muslim-Islam Statement: A Critical Discourse Analysis,” Religions10, no. 115 (2019): 6. 27Ibid. 28Steven A McCornack et al. “Information Manipulation Theory 2: A Propositional Theory of Deceptive Discourse Production,”Journal of Language and Social Psychology, (2014): 1-30. 29Ibid. 30Yuriy Danyk and Serhii Hudz, “Special Operations for Disruption of State and MilitaryControl System Security and Military Control System,” Security & Defense Quarterly 9, no. 4 (2015): 51. IJPS, 2020; 2(5):94-126 International Journal of Politics and Security, 2020: 2(5):94-126 102 To prevent and counter the spread of cyberspace toxic information that cause Anti- Muslim hate crimes and terrorism, this research suggest to develop and instrumentalize counter- information operations and counter-psychological operations against these sources of extremisms. Misinformation is described as false information disseminated by the persons believing that it is true,whereas disinformation is described as false information disseminated by the persons knowing that it is false, put it simply, disinformation is deliberate, intentional lie by malicious actors.31Whereas black propaganda is described as the false information and material seeming to be from a source on one side of a conflict, but is actually from the opposing party which is typically practised to vilify, shame or misrepresent the opponent.32 The misinformants must be warned and educated, whereas disinformants must be prevented to save innocent people. The institutional level misinformation or disinformation must be classified into various categories such as global disinformation operations, and must be prevented by using international cooperation strategies such as naming and shaming. Deception is one of the most important components of psychological operations. NATO definition of deception is: “Those measures designed to mislead the enemy by manipulation, distortion or falsification of evidence to induce him to react in manner prejudicial to his interests.”33 To achieve this target, essentials of psychological operations may be utilized. Polish national doctrinal document may provide inspiration to construct counter psychological operations against anti-Islamic information operations. The essential steps of possible counter psychological operations doctrinations may be defined as: a) “Weakening of the will to act and the aggressive intentions of the opposite or potentially opposite target audiences; b) Strengthening the commitment and support from friendly target audiences; 31Claire Wardle and Hossein Derakhshan, “Thinking About ‘Information Disorder’: Forms of Misinformation, Disinformation and Mal-information,” in Journalism, ‘Fake News’ & Disinformation, Handbook for Journalism Education and Training, eds. C. Ireton and Julie Posetti, (UNESCO Series on Journalism Education, 2018): 43- 54, https://bit.ly/2MuELY5 (30.06.2019). 32Leonard W. Doob, “Gobbels’ Principles of Nazi Propaganda,” The Public Opinion Quarterly 14, no. 3 (1950): 419-442, quoted in Marcin Górnikiewicz, “Evolution of The US PSYOP Products’ Effectiveness during Vietnam War 1965 – 1969”, Security and Defence Quarterly 1, no. 2, (2013): 124. 33Ministerstwo Obrony Naradowej Operacje Informacyjne : DD-3.10(A), (Centrum Doktryn I Szkolenia Sil Zbrojnych, 2017), quoted in Zibigniew Modrzejewski, “Informační Operace Z Polské Perspektivy, Information Operations from the PolishPoint of View,” (2018): 126, 127. IJPS, 2020; 2(5):94-126 International Journal of Politics and Security, 2020: 2(5):94-126 103 c) Obtaining support and cooperation from uncommitted or undecided communities”.34 These strategies may assist any institution or authority which aims to counter anti-Islam information operations or anti-Islam extremist thinking. Whereas regarding terrorist group divisions, the use of divisive propaganda in psychological operations could include fabrication of information or correspondence ‘on behalf of’ targeted organisations or persons designed to misrepresent them and also it should be emphasized that ethical issues of PSYOP must be recognized when agents provocateursare encouraged to carry out acts of violence.35 Governments and institutions must take precautions and all citizens must be informed, prior to possible plots of provocateurs. The targets of psychological operations or psychological warfare may support hidden agendas. For example, the main goal of psychological warfare may include objectives such as “…making the opponent’s military and civil population support the attacker to the detriment of their own government and country”.36 Regarding psychological operations in the field of information on religion; the hidden agenda strategies may include making the citizens of a countryor the members of a religion to support the attacker to the detriment of their own values, cultures and religion.One crucial kind of misinformation or deception may be the ones, that are designed by using some of the the so-called ‘reformers’ or some of the so-called ‘modernists’. Some of the modernists might had sincere and loyal thoughts for the progress of their communities but some might had been misinformed. For example, the co-founder of Singapore reformist journal al-Imam, Sayed al-Hadi (1867-1934), went so far as to praise British colonizers in his country as God’s ‘righteous servants’.37Also, it was recently revealed that a so-called activist, who claims to be a defender of Muslim women rights and, who writes on the 34Zibigniew Modrzejewski, “Psychological operations After the Second World War,” Security and Defence Quarterly12, no. 3 (2016): 74-99. 35George Garner, “Case Studies in Exploiting Terrorist Group Divisions with Disinformation and Divisive/BlackPropaganda,” Journal of Terrorism Research 1, no. 1 (2010): 11, 12. 36Janis Berzins, “Russia’s New Generation Warfare in Ukraine: Implications for LatvianDefence Policy,” National Defence Academy of Latvia, Center for Security and Strategic Research, http://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/Russia%E2%80%99s-NewGeneration-Warfare-in-Ukraine%3A-for- B%C4%93rzi%C5%86%C5%A1/20509c9769cfc7920908f7b7e959ecdfd43ca2f4 (22.04.2020), quoted in Tomáš Čižik, “Baltic States - How to React to “New Warfare” in the Context of the ArticleV?,” Slovak Journal of Political Sciences17, no. 2 (2017): 189. 37Charles Kurzman, “The Modernist Islamic Movement,” in Modernist Islam 1840-1940, ed. Charles Kurzman, (Oxford University Press, 2002): 3-27. IJPS, 2020; 2(5):94-126 International Journal of Politics and Security, 2020: 2(5):94-126 104 so-called need of Islam for reformation is not a mere critic of Islam but a cheerleader, labelling Islam ‘a destructive, nihilistic cult of death’ that must be ‘crushed’.38 Today, it is an undeniable fact that psychological operations are increasingly using cyberspace and related fields. Accordingly, network warfare entails manipulating or degrading the information networks of the adversaries whereas the strategies for attacks may include; denying, disrupting, degrading, stealing, exploiting, intercepting, modifying, corrupting the information to change the perceptions of peoples towards the information.39 Regarding religion, especially thinking on Islam, it can be argued that it becomes harder to reach true information and reliable sources due to these kinds of manipulative, degrading, modifying information attacks. In their article, illustrating how misinformation can pave the way for brutal conflicts and how refutation of misinformation can be instrumental in peace, Lewandowsky et al.40argue that; cognitive tools such as framing a conflict or designing narratives, facilitate communication even if they emphasize facts unevenly and popular narratives within the United States, leading up to Iraq War of 2003 helped the distribution of misinformation, some of which has been resilient to correction for up to a decade. Almost immediately after the 9/11 attacks, American president Bush framed American response within a metaphor of war between civilization and barbarism within ‘Global War on Terror’label and this simplistic ingroup-outgroup conflict framing highlighted United States as a good Christian nation while feeding a culture of fear of Islam with the help of most of the media coverages.41According to a UN report, the invasioncaused more than 32000 civiliandeaths and according to another institution, 58000 security personnel and 42000 opposition combatants were killed during the invasion.42Whereas in 2001, during the very early days of bombings, the Taliban leadership was ready to discuss handling over Osama bin Laden to a neutral country if the US had stopped the bombing of Afghanistan but US rejected Taliban’s 38Azeezah Kanji, “Ayaan Hirsi Ali, Brett Kavanaugh, and Imperial Feminism,” Aljazeera, https://www.aljazeera.com/indepht/opinion/ayaan-hirsi-ali-brett-kavanaugh-imperial-feminism- 181004212426518.html (22.03.2020). 39Brett Van Niekerk and Manoj S. Maharaj, “The Information Warfare Life Cycle Model,” SA Journal of InformationManagement 13, no. 1 (2011): 2. 40Stephan Lewandowsky et al. “Misinformation, Disinformation, and Violent Conflict, From Iraq and the ‘War on Terror’ to Future Threats to Peace,” American Psychologist Association 68, no. 7 (2013): 488. 41Ibid. 489, 490. 42British Broadcasting Company (BBC a), “Afghan Conflict: US and Taliban Sign Deal to End 18-Year War”, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-51689443 (01.03.2020). IJPS, 2020; 2(5):94-126 International Journal of Politics and Security, 2020: 2(5):94-126 105 offer.43The roles of national and global media have always been important. For example one week before the 2004 elections in U.S., terrorist Osama bin Laden’s threatening speeches were disseminated via American and global media and these broadcastings by instilling fear during this crucial time allegedly affected American election results.44 Interestingly, even though American psychological operations doctrine strictly orders to target only non-U.S. citizens since U.S. laws prohibit the implementation ofmilitary operations on civilian populations, a Defense Department document illustrated that psychological war has been transmitted to U.S. audiences and Tyler Wall45 (2010) argues that this militarization of U.S. citizens by psychological war tactics to constructapproval for war and to impose a ‘military definition of reality’ is equally concerned with executing imperial fantasies such as having power over foreign territories, ideas and also bodies through practices of violence and subjugation. 5. Cloaked Social Media Channels as the Agents of Deception and Psychological Warfare One of the known covert operations within the history of false-flag manipulations may be the Lavon Affair, named after Israel’s one of the former minister of defense, Pinhas Lavon. This false flag operation was aiming to organize bombings of Western and Egyptian institutions in Egypt by activating a sleeper cell of Israeli Military Intelligence while the blame was planned to be put on members of the groups such as Muslim Brotherhood or the Communist Party.46 False-flag operations can be defined as strategies designed to discredit opponents or enemies by putting the blame of various crimes and accusations that are covertly prepared by the strategists themselves. Cloaked media operations can be defined as one of the kinds of covert operations or false-flag manipulations. Similarly, some government covert operations such as US Federal Bureu of Investigation’s COunter INTELligence PROgram (COINTELPRO) may include psychological targets. COINTELPRO covert operations under the official label took place between 1956and 43The Guardian. “Bush Rejects Taliban Offer to Hand Bin Laden Over,” (2001) https://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/oct/14/afghanistan.terrorism5 (01.03.2020). 44Zohar Kampf, “Rhetorical Bypasses: Connecting with the Hearts and Minds of People on the Opponent’s Side,” Journal of MulticulturalDiscourses 11, no. 2 (2016): 154. 45Tyler Wall, “U.S. Psychological Warfare and Civilian Targeting,” Peace Review: A Journal of Social Justice 22, (2010): 288–294. 46Leonard Weiss, “The Lavon Affair: How a False-Flag Operation Led to War and the Israeli Bomb,” Sage, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 69, no.4 (2016): 58. IJPS, 2020; 2(5):94-126 International Journal of Politics and Security, 2020: 2(5):94-126 106 1971 but “COINTELPRO tactics are still used to this day and have been alleged to include discrediting targets through psychological warfare; smearing individuals and groups using forged documents and by planting false reports in the media; harassment; wrong imprisonment; and illegal violence including assassination”.47 Living within the information warfare era, media plays crucial role in influencing masses. Various interest groups or institutions, political parties or state agencies have sometimes been using covert media operations to discredit their opponents and to indoctrinate anti-Muslim sentiments. Carefully designed fake Muslim profile comments have sometimes been serving affectively to spread anti-Muslim hate, such as: “Alhamdulillah. We take over Denmark and you kuffars [infidels] can’t even stop us. We transform shitty Denmark into an Islamic state and this will happen before your eyes, and youcan’t do a thing about it. Your churches will be turned into mosques, your whore women will be fucked and used by us Muslims to make our babies, we take your money that you work 7 to 5 to earn while we Muslims live in luxury, your food will become halal and your laws will be sharia and what are you going to do about it? NOTHING!”48(Islam: The Religion of Peace, [fake] Facebook Post) Based on discourse analysis methods, it can be argued that the message above, clearly illustrates rhetorical discursive strategies such as: emphasizing negative thing about ‘them’, outgroup actor description in a negative way, victimization, using counterfactuals, touching the feelings of target audience, categorization, comparison and hyperbole. Fake Muslim Facebook pages are designed to construct platformed antagonismwith illustrations such as ‘the barbaric Muslim’ against ‘the civilized Dane’ and ‘the naïve Dane’ unable to understand that the Muslim conspiracy happening ‘in front of their very eyes’.49 For instance, a post of a social media profile, can be presented as an example: “LOL, people write tomesaying that Muslims won’t take over Denmark, but just look around you!! You can’t pretend it’s not already happening, while the food you eat is halal. While you’re cheap women are having sex with Muslim men. While we take your money and apartments. While churches are torn down and Mosques are built.”50 (Ali El-Yussuf, 4 June 2015, Facebook Post,). 47Wikipedia, “COINTELPRO” (2020), https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/COINTELPRO (20.03.2020). 48Johan Farkas, Jannick Schou and Christina Neumayer, “Cloaked Facebook Pages: Exploringfake Islamist Propaganda in Social Media,” New Media & Society 20, no. 5 (2018):1850, 1851. 49Johan Farkas, Jannick Schou and Christina Neumayer, “Platformed Antagonism: Racist Discourses on Fake Muslim Facebook Pages,” Critical Discourse Studies15, no. 5 (2018): 463-480. 50Ibid. 472. IJPS, 2020; 2(5):94-126 International Journal of Politics and Security, 2020: 2(5):94-126 107 Discourse analysis methods can help us identify that the message above was constructed with rhetorical discursive strategies such as: actor description, categorization, victimization, evidentiality, hyperbole, using counterfactuals, touching the feelings of target audience. It is also an undeniable fact that anti-Islam user comments may also fuel antagonisms. The media user comments may serve as destructive as fake profile comments that these anti- Islam comments make readers think that some of these user profiles are also designed to fuel and spread constructed hate. By using Essex School of discourse analysis, Farkas et al.51analysed 77 social media posts together with 21.739 user comments, and they found out thatcomments from social media users attached a crucial, extra layer to the construction of aggression and hostility by actualizing the enemy of the political identity of ‘Muslims’, as designed by the social media pages. Cloaked social media profiles named such as Mohammed El-Sayed, Fatima El- Mohammed and Zahra Al-Sayed deceived thousands of Danish social media users and some of these users supported a dominant anti-Muslim narratives as a result of posts such as:52 “We Muslims have come here to stay. We have not come here for peace but to take over your shitty infidel country. But of course we can’t take over the country right away so we wait. While we Muslims wait, we take your money, houses, we fuck your cheap women and exploit them to make our babies, exploit your educational system so we Muslims can use it against you infidel pigs. These things happen before your very eyes and you infidel pigs can’t do a thing about it. You infidel pigs are afraid of us Muslims because Allah (swt) has given us the strength for it. Just you wait until we Muslims have you infidel pigs removed under sharia law. Takbir! Allahu Akbar! P.S my imam is an ethnic Dane.”53 (Mohammed El-Sayed, Facebook post, 30 June 2015). Discourse analysis methods can help us identify that the message above was constructed with rhetorical discursive strategies such as: emphasize positive things about ‘us’, presupposition, emphasize negative things about ‘them’, actor description, categorization, victimization, hyperbole, using counterfactuals, generalizations, irony, touching the feelings of target audience. One can also find manipulative silencing tactics in this message since the some parts of the story such as hardships of being Muslim or hardships of being foreigner to the culture are omitted. 51Ibid. 467. 52Johan, et all. “Cloaked Facebook Pages,”1850-1867. 53Ibid. 1859. IJPS, 2020; 2(5):94-126 International Journal of Politics and Security, 2020: 2(5):94-126 108 Considering the professional construction design in these above mentioned social media posts, it can be argued that these posts seem not to be prepared by random media users. These messages seem to be designed exclusively to fuel hatred by professionals who have expertise in scientific fields such as social psychology, mass communications, and deception and information operations. One way to detect misinformation, disinformation and deception may be raising awareness on logical fallacies and focusing on sharpening critical thinking skills. Media persuasion and influence can be inspected and controlled if one can develop critical thinking skills and evaluate logical fallacies hidden in information, served. Critical thinkers are advised to check; logical fallacies such as:54Post Hoc Ergo Propter Hoc(after, therefore, because of), Cum Hoc Ergo Propter Hoc (along with, therefore because of), Dicto Simpliciter (sweeping generalization), Petitio Principii (begging the question), Argumentum Ad Hominem (argument against the man), Argumentum Ad Verecundiam (argument to authority), Argumentum Ad Antiquitatum (appeal to tradition), Argumentum Ad Populum (appeal to public), Argumentum Ad Numerum (appeal to numbers), Tu Quoque (you too). Recently, BuzzFeed News research illustrated that “Researchers say Facebook is the primary mainstream platform where extremists organize and anti-Muslim content is deliberately spread”.55 It is also emphasized that that Facebook’s mysterious algorithm identifies viewers of hate-speech posts and “recommends related groups that can point people to extremism.”56Recently Sri Lankan governmentblamed Facebook of failing to control rampant hate speech that contributed to anti-Muslim riots that left three people dead.57On the other hand, Chinese state media targeted to cast doubt on human rights violations in Xinjiang Muslim Internment Camps and depict them as just great, via Facebook 54Golden Gate University, “Fake News: Common Logical Fallacies,” https://ggu.libguides.com/c.php?g=810754&p=5785291 (01.03.2020). 55Jane Lytvynenko, “Anti-Muslim Hate Speech Is Absolutely Relentless On Social Media Even As Platforms Crack down on Other Extremist Groups,” BuzzFedd News, https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/janelytvynenko/islamophobia-absolutely-relentless-social-media (30.04.2020). 56Ibid. 57Michael Safi, “Sri Lanka Accuses Facebook over Hate Speech after Deadly Riots,” The Guardian (2018), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/mar/14/facebook-accused-by-sri-lanka-of-failing-to-control-hate- speech (01.03.2020). IJPS, 2020; 2(5):94-126 International Journal of Politics and Security, 2020: 2(5):94-126 109 advertisements.58Whereas in 2019, WhatsApp, owned by Facebook wasused for spreading of hate speech, disinformation and scary rumors, resulting in violence and deaths in India.59 Another social media network with islamophobic hate and disinformation, was subject to a research and the data from the summer and fall of 2018 illustrated that many of the top 100 YouTube videos cited in this social media platform, contained graphic and patently false rumors about Islam and topics such as pedophilia and violence.60It can be argued that if some researchers could easily found hate campaigners by simple internet search methods, then the local and international authorities could took necessary actions to prevent the spread of anti- Islam hate and disinformation. After the devastating terror attacks on mosques in Christchurch, New Zealand, some online community networks of the far right extremists self-censored or mass-deleted user comments celebrating the horrific attacks because the administrators of these hate servers feared to be considered as accomplices of the terrorist.61Butthe government authorities or international organizationsactednot much active as them, in preventing anti-Muslim hate campaigners. As a result of various factors such asthe desire to gain more acceptability, some of the ‘western’ online groupstoday, mostlydo not attack Muslims explicitly. It can be argued that most of these kinds of online groups nowadays hide their attacks under the cover topics such as women’s rights. Examples of this strategy can be seen in France.”Online activities of NGOs such as Printemps Republicain (Republican Spring) and Comité Laicité République (Laicité– Republic Committee) do not attack Muslim people straightforwardly but hide their anti-Muslim 58Ryan Mac, “These New Facebook Ads From Chinese State Media Want You To Believe Xinjiang’s Muslim Internment Camps Are Just Great,” BuzzFeed News (2019), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/ryanmac/chinese-media-facebook-ads-xinjiang-uighur-propaganda (01.3.2020). 59Rohit Chopra, “In India, WhatsApp is a Weapon of Antisocial Hatred,” The Conversation, http://theconversation.com/in-india-whatsapp-is-a-weapon-of-antisocial-hatred-115673 (01.03.2020). 60Samuel Woolley, Roya Pakzad and Nicholas Monaco, “Incubating Hate: Islamophobia and Gab’ Working Paper: Preliminary Research Findings,” The German Marshall Fund of the United States, Digital Innovation and Democracy Initiative (2019): 1, http://www.gmfus.org/publications/incubating-hate-islamophobia-and-gab (30.04.2020). 61Keegan Hankes, Caroline Sinders and Unicorn Riot, “Extremists Purge Hateful Messages after Christchurch Massacre,” Hatewatch, The Southern Poverty Law Center, https://www.splcenter.org/hatewatch/2019/05/09/extremists-purge-hateful-messages-after-christchurch-massacre (30.04.2020). IJPS, 2020; 2(5):94-126 International Journal of Politics and Security, 2020: 2(5):94-126 110 racism under the veil of secularism, women’s rights, and Jacobin ideology”.62 Raising awareness on these kinds of covert strategies may be very important. What more unimaginableis that a recent investigation exposed that some of the major charities in USA have been helping anonymous donors to fund millions of dollars for production of anti-Muslim movies?63 Governments and international organizations can prevent anti-Muslim hate campaigns and related terror attacks by fighting against these kinds of wealthy secret financiers. Whereas in Germany, a far-right nationalist party, whose platform includes explicit hostility to Islam and Muslims has enjoyed the enthusiastic financial support from an American philanthropist, whose website, spreads endless fake news about the threat of Islam, and spreads false reports of non-European migrants raping German women, migrants bringing deadly infectious diseases into Germany.64 Recently in India, coronavirus pandemic fears used to fuel anti-Muslim hate. Videos, falsely claiming to illustrate members of an Indian Muslim group spitting on police and other people, went viral on social media with hastags such as #CoronaJihad, worsening an already dangerous atmosphere for Muslims.65 A recent United Nations Human Rights Council report titled: “Report of the Independent Fact-finding Mission on Myanmar” described Facebook as a “useful instrument for those seeking to spread hate”.66 On the other hand, UN seems to fight against extremism, violence, and terrorism, at least theoretically, considering many pages of UN documents such as Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy or resolutions such as A World against Violence and 62Léonard Faytre, “Islamophobia in France: National Report 2019,” in European Islamophobia Report 2019, eds. Enes Bayraklı and Farid Hafez, (Istanbul: SETA, 2020), 317. 63Alex Kotch, “Exposed: Major Charities Are Helping Anonymous Donors Fund Anti-Muslim Films,” Sludge, https://readsludge.com/2019/03/06/exposed-major-charities-are-helping-anonymous-donors-fund-anti-muslim- films/ (22.04.2020). 64Jason Hannan, “Trolling ourselves to death? Social media and post-truth Politics,” European Journal of Communication 33, no.2 (2018): 222. 65Billy Perrigo, “It Was Already Dangerous to Be Muslim in India. Then Came the Coronavirus,” Time, https://time.com/5815264/coronavirus-india-islamophobia-coronajihad (22.04.2020). 66United Nations Human Rights Council, Report of the Independant International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar, 12.09.2018, A/HRC/39/64, quoted in Pranav Dixit, “Facebook Failed the Rohingya in Myanmar. Now It may be Repeating Its Mistakes in Assam”, BuzzFedd News (2019), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/pranavdixit/facebook-failed-the-rohingya-in-myanmar-now-it-may-be (30.04.2020). https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/pranavdixit/facebook-failed-the-rohingya-in-myanmar-now-it-may-be IJPS, 2020; 2(5):94-126 International Journal of Politics and Security, 2020: 2(5):94-126 111 Violent Extremism.67 But considering the capabilities of UN, it seems not acceptable to arguethat the UN fights efficiently against the spread of anti-Muslim extremism. Another field, which may be utilized as fertile lands to seed hate propaganda easily and very effectively may be the media channels regarding politicians and political debates which attract immense attention from huge part of citizens. Any message infiltrated through these communication channels will reach and influence great number of intellectuals. Recently, it is discovered that two Muslim US congresswomen, Ilhan Omar and Rashida Tlaib have been targeted by a vast international operation of a mysterious Israeli-based group, disseminating more than a thousand coordinated fake news posts of distorted news and pure fabrications per week to more than a million followers by using 21 Facebook pages across the USA, Australia, UK, Canada, Austria, Israel and Nigeria.68Interestingly, in February 2020, it was revealed that Facebook failed to stop anti-Islamic hate and disinformation network even though almost two months ago this network was publicly exposed for spreading anti-Islamic sentiment across the western world.69Considering the level of organized hate propaganda and influence management, it becomes an undeniable fact that organized hate propaganda must be recognized and tracked as international organized crime. One of the reporters of this kind, a reporter fabricating fake news, admitted that he ignored certain facts and took situations out of context to fit his narrative. Regarding a Muslim community three hours of Manhattan, ex-reporter for Infowars, Josh Owens70 recently revealed that, by preying on the vulnerable and feeding the prejudices and fears of their audience, they fabricated information and posted headlines like: “Shariah Law Zones Confirmed in America”, “Infowars Reporters Stalked by Terrorism Task Force”, “The Rumors Are True: Shariah Law Is Here!”This example may emphasize the need for fact checking before believing news, informations and even truths. 67UN United Nations, UN Documents Office of Counter-Terrorism, https://www.un.org/counterterrorism/documents (19.03.2020). 68David Smith, et al. “Revealed: Ilhan Omar and Rashida Tlaibtargeted in Far-Right Fake News Operation,” The Guardian (2019), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/dec/05/ilhan-omar-rashida-tlaib-targeted-far- right-fake-news-operation-facebook (19.03.2020). 69Christopher Knaus and Michael McGowan, “Far-Right ‘Hate Factory’ Still Active on Facebook despite Pledge to Stopit,” The Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2020/feb/05/far-right-hate-factory-still- active-on-facebook-despite-pledge-to-stop-it (30.04.2020). 70Josh Owens, “I Worked for Alex Jones. I Regret It,” New York Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/05/magazine/alex-jones- infowars.html?action=click&module=Editors%20Picks&pgtype=Homepage (30.04.2020). IJPS, 2020; 2(5):94-126 International Journal of Politics and Security, 2020: 2(5):94-126 112 Information operations against Muslims can also be conducted in international level. A Recent US Senate Report of the Select Committee on Intelligence stated that in 2016, Russians in Saint Petersburg used a Facebook page called “Heart of Texas” to promote a protest against Islam outside the Houston Islamic Da’wah Center and consequently, Russians used a Facebook page called “United Muslims for America” to promote an event the same place, date and time, which resulted in escalation of two protests into confrontation and verbal attacks.71According to this intelligence report, “social media researcher John Kelly characterized the operational intent as “kind of like arming two sides in a civil war”.72 This instance may be the international dimension of covert information warfare which targets Muslims, Islam and the countries they live. Similar to this covert information warfare operation, another obvious version of information operation had been designed to deceive international community. Before the invasion of Iraq, USA illustrated fake evidences on weapons of mass destruction that Iraqi armed forces supposedly had. After the American presentation by former Secterary of State Colin Powell, most academics and politicians were not satisfied by the evidences but the invasion forces and their supporters did what they had in their minds. Today, the evidence that Powell presented about Iraq’s weapons program and Iraq’s ties to terror group Al Qaeda proved to be incorrect. Recently, Colin Powell’s former Chief of Staff, retired U.S. Army Colonel Lawrence Wilkerson who prepared the Powell’s presentation in U.N. Security Council which resulted in invasion of Iraq, admitted that the false evidence was fabricated, by emphasizing his regret on his role in orhestrating the presentation: “I regret it. I will regret it to my grave. I wish I’d resigned”.73Various groups had opposed the invasion of Iraq. For example the 150 theologians and religious leaders organized by Orthodox Peace Fellowship in North America74 wrote a letter to American president Bush and among other things, stated that “the Orthodox 71Todd J. Gillman, “Russian Trolls Orchestrated 2016 Clash at Houston Islamic Center, New Senate Intel Report Recalls,” The Dallas Morning News, https://www.dallasnews.com/news/politics/2019/10/08/russian-trolls- orchestrated-2016-clash-houston-islamic-center-senate-intel-report-says (30.04.2020). 72Ibid. 73Bridge Initiative Team, “Iran, and Our Not So Distant Past with Iraq / Colonel Wilkerson,” Bridge, A Georgetown University Initiative, https://bridge.georgetown.edu/video/3240/ (22.04.2020). 74Orthodox Peace Fellowship in North America, “OPF’s Iraq Appeal: A Letter to President Bush. A Plea for Peace from the Orthodox Peace Fellowship in North America,” (2004), https://incommunion.org/2004/10/19/iraq- appeal/ (30.04.2020). IJPS, 2020; 2(5):94-126 International Journal of Politics and Security, 2020: 2(5):94-126 113 Church has never considered any war to be just or good”.75Butthey could not prevent the invasion. Considering the facts regarding disinformation strategies used in Iraq such as the one mentioned above, it would be not surprising to hear that fake videos illustrating Islam with terrorism, were fabricated for various strategies. In Iraq, it was revealed that a PR agency, which was working at the hearth of military intelligence, was paid more than half a billion dollarsto run a top secret propaganda program including production of fake al Qaeda terror videos.76 Far right groups may indoctrinate hostile propaganda to misrepresent the Muslims very effectively. Some right wing group influencersmay like media coverages regarding crimes of some terrorists or criminals, to legitimize their opposition against all Muslims living in the West. One of the intellectual thinkers of new right ideology in Europe emphasizes that “The widely circulated videos showing the beheading, with a long blade, of hostages of jihadists, are much more eloquent than the rhetoric of people wanting to explain to us that Islam is a religion of peace, tolerance and love”77 This example illustrates how the media coverages can be effective tools for perceptions of masses against a whole religion and all Muslims. But the public perception of Western masses may be enlightened if additional facts revealed on various similar issues. For example, when it was revealed that, three British schoolgirls in the ages of 15, 15 and 16 aiming to join ISIS were allegedly helped by an intelligence agent working for one of the states in the US-led coalition fighting against ISIS, it was said that British Foreign Minister was responded this information with the words: ‘just as usual’.78 Interestingly, in 2016 Donald J. Trump declared that American President Barack Obama created terrorist organization so-called Islamic State (ISIS) by saying: “He’s the founder of 75Boris Knorre and Aleksei Zygmont, “Militant Piety” in 21st-Century Orthodox Christianity: Return to Classical Traditions or Formation of a New Theology ofWar?” Religions11, no. 2 (2019):9. 76Crofton Black and Abigail Fielding-Smith, “Pentagon Paid for Fake ‘Al Qaeda’ Videos,” The Daily Beast, https://www.thedailybeast.com/pentagon-paid-for-fake-al-qaeda-videos (25.01.2020). 77Pierre Vial, “Email Interview with the Author Jose Pedro Zúquete,” (2015) quoted in Zúquete J. P. The Identitarians, the Movement against Globalism and Islam in Europe, (University of Notre Dame Press, 2018), 202. 78Matthew Taylor and agencies. “Man Suspected Helping British Schoolgirls Join ISIS Arrested in Turkey,” The Guardian (2015), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/12/man-british-schoolgirls-join-isis-arrested- turkey (29.03.2020). IJPS, 2020; 2(5):94-126 International Journal of Politics and Security, 2020: 2(5):94-126 114 ISIS.....”, “I would say the co-founder would be crooked Hillary Clinton”.79 On the other hand, French Minister of Foreign Affairs declared “France is in Libya to combat terrorism”80 by wrongly using the term jihadists instead of terrorists. Jihad has different meaning in Islam which is not terrorism. However in past, regarding French troops in Libya, Libya’s U.N. backed government completely rejected the violation of the nation’s sovereignity and Libyan people protested France with placards that read “Get your hands off Libya”.81 Recently, Libya’s U.N.- backed government accused France of supporting war criminal and rebel commander Haftar82 Also, Libyan Prime Minister accused France of supporting ‘dictator’ Haftar and interestingly, US president Donald Trump also supported Haftar for his “significant role in fighting terrorism and securing Libya’s oil sources”.83 On the other hand, United Nations condemned Haftar’s attack on Libya’s Tripoli port.84 One can askwhat the role of information warfare is, in legitimizing attempts of the various countriesfor the sake of their interests. Another important point that must be mentionedmay be identifying and portrayingthe primary reasonsbehind some of the attacks or conflicts correctly.It was revealed that in some cases of suicide terror attacks, “religion is not a necessary or sufficient condition”.85 Some of the attacks to Western military forcesconducted by operatives of international terrorist organizations such as al-Qaedamaynot be motivatedprimarily by religious fundementalism. An examination of 71 cases of suicide attacks between 1993 and 2003 revealed that “the presence of American military forces for combat operations on the homeland territory was stronger than 79Nick Corasaniti, “Donald Trump Calls Obama ‘Founder of ISIS’ and Says It Honors Him,” The New York Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/11/us/politics/trump-rally.html?_r=0 (25.01.2020). 80 Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs (MfEFA), “Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian: “France is in Libya to Combatterrorism,” France Diplomatie (2019), https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/our-ministers/jean-yves-le- drian/press/article/minister-jean-yves-le-drian-france-is-in-libya-to-combat-terrorism-02-05-19 (22.04.2020). 81Sudarsan Raghavan and James McAuley, “Libya’s U.N.- Backed Government Decries French Troop Presence in Rival Zone,” The Washington Post (2016) https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/libyas-un-backed- government-decries-french-troop-presence-with-rival/2016/07/21/71168ede-4f33-11e6-aa14- e0c1087f7583_story.html (22.04.2020). 82France 24, “Libya’s UN-Backed Govt Accuses France of Supporting Haftar, ends Cooperation,” https://www.france24.com/en/20190418-libya-france-end-cooperation-haftar-warrant (30.04.2020). 83France 24, “Libyan PM Accuses France of Supporting ‘Dictator’ Haftar”, https://www.france24.com/en/20190424-libyan-pm-accuses-france-supporting-dictator-haftar (30.04.2020). 84TRT World, “UN Tries to Salvage Libya Talks After Government Pulls Out”, https://www.trtworld.com/africa/un-tries-to-salvage-libya-talks-after-government-pulls-out-33932 (01.03.2020). 85Stuart A. Wright, “Reframing Religious Violence After 9/11: Analysis of the ACM Campaign to Exploit the Threat of Terrorism,” Nova Religio: The Journal of Alternative and Emergent Religions 12, no. 4 (2009): 22. IJPS, 2020; 2(5):94-126 International Journal of Politics and Security, 2020: 2(5):94-126 115 Islamic fundamentalism in predicting whether individuals from that country would become al- Qaeda suicide terrorist”86 To return to understanding the roles of media channels, one of the most effective way to spread anti-Muslim emotions easily, is throughusing TV shows, dramas, series. For example highly popular drama of British Broadcasting Company (BBC), Bodyguard, with several awards and more than 10 million viewers, pandered to stereotypes of Muslim women who use hijab as oppressed or subservient.87Besides, popular TV shows such as 24, Sleeper Cell, and NCIS were also referring Muslims and Arabs only from the standpoint of so-called Islamic terrorism.88 Mind control studies on cult researches may be instrumentalized to add new perspectives to visions and understandingson perception management policies regarding Islam. It can be argued that some‘western’ governments or institutions may falsely attempt to construct their own kind of Islamsuch as so-called German Islam or so-called French Islam. These isntitutions may try to persuade Muslims to accept their form of Islam. These practices may even embody ‘coercive persuasion’. Robbins89 argues that some cults use coercive persuasion forms which are more effective than persuasion techniques used in prisoner of war camps to indoctrinate prisoners. It can be argued that some of the ‘western’ initiatives to develop new forms of Islam may in the future result in these kinds of coercive persuasionssimilar to cultist proselytizing techniques which may increase vulnerability of Muslim citizens. On the other hand a meme, celebrating the murder of Muslim men, women and children featuring Vlad III, Prince of Wallachia on terroristBrenton Tarrant’s Facebook.90Actually, Vlad the Impaler was described as a ‘demented psychopath, a sadist, a gruesome murderer, a masochist’91 even by some other Europeans at his time. Distortion of history and glorification 86Robert Pape, Dying to Win, (Scribe Publications, 2005), 103, quoted in Stuart A. Wright, “Reframing Religious Violence after 9/11: Analysis of the ACM Campaign to Exploit the Threat of Terrorism,” Nova Religio: The Journal of Alternative and Emergent Religions 12, no. 4 (2009): 22. 87Faisal Hanif, “State Of Media Reporting On Islam & Muslims,” Quarterly Report: Oct - Dec 2018, (Centre of Media Monitoring, 2018): 42. 88Maheen Haider, “The Racialization of the Muslim Body and Space in Hollywood,” Sociology of Race and Ethnicity 1, no. 14 (2019): 3. 89Thomas Robbins, “Constructing Cultist ‘Mind Control’,” Sociological Analysis 45, no. 3 (1984): 247. 90TellMAMA, “Brenton Tarrant: How the Media Helped Turn the ‘Shitposting’ Terrorist into a Meme”, Tellmamauk (2019), https://tellmamauk.org/brenton-tarrant-how-the-media-helped-turn-the-shitposting-terrorist- into-a-meme (01.03.2020). 91Radu Florescu and Raymond T. McNally, Dracula, Prince of Many Faces: His Life and His Times, (Back Bay Books, 1989), quoted in Wikipedia, “Vlad the Impaler”, and https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vlad_the_Impaler (01.03.2020). IJPS, 2020; 2(5):94-126 International Journal of Politics and Security, 2020: 2(5):94-126 116 of brutalities of Radovan Karadzic or Vlad III is not patriotism but weaponization of misinformation toxicating young minds. Another crucial dimension of misinformation that aims to discredit the Muslims may be disinformative social media sites that spread wrong information about Islam. The Creator warns the believers against the disinformants by saying: “And when you see those who engage in [offensive] discourse concerning our verses, then turn away from them until they enter into another conversion. And if Satan should cause you to forget, then do not remain, after the reminder, with the wrongdoing people”.92 The ingroup misinformation and preventing misinformation against Muslims is important since these kinds of misinformations may misdirect or trigger the emotions of some non-muslim communities with the ideology of what Knorre and Zygmont93 define as ‘militant piety’. Also, white nationalism uses some misinformation and disinformation strategies to attract followers. White nationalism, an US export ideologydriven by the fear over the loss of white primacy, used the internet worldwide to share their ideas and encourage violence, is now accepted as a global terror threat.94 Information warfare must also be used to struggle against conspiracy theories such as ‘white-extinction conspiracy theory’ or ‘white-genocide conspiracy theory’, which suggest that white people face existential decline, even extinction as a result of rising immigration in the West and declining birthrates among white women.95It should not be underestimated that these theories also result in rising hate crimes. International online groups such as the ‘far-right’ Identitarian movement whichis under growing scrutiny for allegedly having links to the Christchurch attacker, must be monitored effectivelysince they may stroke fears of a ‘great replacement’ and theymay use Islamophobic 92Quran, Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı, http://kuran.diyanet.gov.tr/mushaf/kuran-meal-1/enam-,suresi-6/ayet- 68/diyanet-isleri-baskanlıgı-meali-1 (30.04.2020). 93Boris Knorre and Aleksei Zygmont, “Militant Piety” in 21st-Century Orthodox Christianity: Return to Classical Traditions or Formation of a New Theology of War?,” Religions11, no. 2 (2019): 1-17. 94Art Jipson and Paul J. Becker, “White Nationalism, Born in the USA, is Now a Global Terror Threat,” The Conversation, https://theconversation.com/white-nationalism-born-in-the-usa-is-now-a-global-terror-threat- 113825 (30.04.2020). 95Farhad Manjoo, “The White-Extinction Conspiracy Theory Is Bonkers,” The New York Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/20/opinion/new-zealand-great-replacement.html (30.04.2020). IJPS, 2020; 2(5):94-126 International Journal of Politics and Security, 2020: 2(5):94-126 117 provocations such as mosque occupations or ‘pork sausage and booze’ parties in Muslim neighbourhoods.96 Recently German terrorist Tobias R. killed nine innocent persons with a racist motive and German Chancellor Angela Merkel said “racism is poison”97 but the anti-immigrant attacks have been going on for decades and these kind of declerations which are not supported by sound policies are not satisfying the conscioussnesses of masses. Lastly, scholars describing Muslims and Islam to non-Muslim crowds, must be careful not to use terminologies such as ‘radical Islam’, or ‘fundamentalist Islam’ because these kinds of stigmatizatizations discredits the whole religion and all believers. Similarly, as seen in the example of Gillespie,98 western scholars must not simplfy, generalize and accuse Islam for being the source of inspiration to antimodern forces.In a similar way, some of the American neoconservative intellectual elites portray Islam as hostile to America’s very foundation, they cast Islam as a fatal hazard to everything good in the world and this kind of extremism, forms an ideological agression which is far more worse than the invasion of other people’s country with the stated motive of protecting the world from chaos.99To sum up, it can be argued that, just as Søren Kierkegaard suggests that “Christianity is not a doctrine”100, one can suggest that not believing to Islam does not necessiatebeing a supporter of an anti-Muslim doctrine or being a supporter of ideological agression against Islam. 6. Conclusion Just as Jacques Lacan stated before in 1977, reality is structured like a narration, contemporary era of global war against Islam is an arena of engineered informations, pseudo- realities and various communication operations that shape group norms and utilized for social control strategies. Nowadays, teaching skills to combat fake news and misinformation has 96JasonWilson, “With links to the Christchurch attacker, what is the Identitarian Movement?,” The Guardian (2019), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/mar/28/with-links-to-the-christchurch-attacker-what-is-the- identitarian-movement (19.03.2020). 97British Broadcasting Company (BBC b) “Germany Shooting: Chancellor Angela Merkel Says 'Racism is Poison',” https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-europe-51577265/germany-shooting-chancellor-angela-merkel- says-racism-is-poison (01.03.2020). 98Michael Allen Gillespie, the Theological Origins of Modernity, (The University of Chicago Press, 2008), 299n3. 99Robert Dickson Crane, “Human Rights in Traditionalist Islam: Legal, Political, Economic, and Spiritual Perspectives,” American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 25, no. 1 (2008): 82-105. 100Søren Aabye Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments, trans. Howard Hong and Edna Hong, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 467, quoted in Russel Johnson, “The Ministering Critic: Kierkegaard’s Theology of Communication,” Religions, (2020): 11, 35. IJPS, 2020; 2(5):94-126 International Journal of Politics and Security, 2020: 2(5):94-126 118 become a popular trend in higher education institutions such as University of Washington101but states and international organizations must fight against fake news. Against the destructive effects of information warfare, studies intensified to foster the immunity of societies against disinformation and to construct a disinformation resilient society.102Constructing disinformation resilient societies must be regarded as one of the core functions of the governments and international institutions. Psychological operations spreading anti-Muslim misinformations and anti-Islam hate must be preventedeffectively by counter-psychological strategies designed by national authorities and international cooperation efforts. In the light of evaluations on psychological operations and historical lessons, this research analyzed the influence, deception and indoctrination strategies by utilizing discourse analysis methods, such as Ideological Square Model developed by Teun A. Van Dijk. The essential steps of possible counter psychological indoctrinations are briefly illustrated. The literature review allows us to trace back the roots of psychological operations found in the verses of Old Testament and proceeding throughout the strategies of Alexander the Great or prominent newspapers such as The Daily Mail or The Times. Apart from patriotic uses of information and psychological operations, various forms of fabrications of informations, hidden agenda strategies, manipulating or degrading information networks have been used to design popular narratives and distribution of misinformation. Since cyberspace provides a world of pseudo-reality, this research analyzed some of the cloaked social media messages, coordinated fake news posts and psychological methods that were designed to spread anti-Islamic and anti-Muslim hate. Social brain concept and mirror neurons may allow us to understand the battlefields of minds, clashing ideologies and emotions. Fake Muslim profiles and provacative comments are evaluated and rhetorical discursive strategies embedded within these hate campaigns are briefly illustrated. These analysis illustrated that the cloaked social media pages, comments and some of the responses to these provacative hate messages may specially be designed by psychological operation experts. Piaget’s cognitive constructivism, Vygotsky’s social constructivism and Huckin’s manipulative 101UoW “Trends and Issues in Higher Education,” University of Washington, (2018), https:www.washington.edu/trends/teaching-skills-to-combat-fake-news-and-misinformation/(01.03.2020). 102Ondřej Filipec, “Towards a Disinformation Resilient Society? The Experience of the Czech Republic,” Cosmopolitan Civil Societies: an interdisciplinary Journal 11, no. 1 (2019): 1-26. IJPS, 2020; 2(5):94-126 International Journal of Politics and Security, 2020: 2(5):94-126 119 silences framework, may be utilized in deconstruction and prevention of these cloaked media strategies, and conspiracy theories such as White-genocide conspiracy theory. Since these false flag communication strategies and destructive psychological operations have been defined as some of the probable reasons causing terrorist massacres such as Christchurch massacre and genocides such as Myanmar, the need for struggling against black propaganda and deception by defining them as anti-Muslim terror crime may be a must. Theories of deceptive discourse production such as information manipulation theory 2 may be utilized to prevent substitution or rewriting history and zombification of the individuals. Developing critical thinking skills and detecting logical fallacies are also important. Wheras the misinformation channels must also be monitored and warned by international institutions to correct the wrong informations since theymay feed platformed antagonism and a culture of fear of Islam. Psychological operations can still be used as popular instruments utilized to blame and degrade Muslims via million dollars of anti-Muslim film industry or social media networks reaching millions of followers that propagate hate against Muslims. The terror management theory103 illustrates that individuals who would not normally tolerate aggressive attacks on others can be inclined to support those actions when their need for safety from existential fear, as a result of an out-group that challenges core characteristics of their cultural worldview, is alleviated.104 Social media channels and psychological operations that may trigger existential fears of individuals, must be prevented. The motivations that feed anti-Islam extremisms must be detected and prevented. A research on 34 former White supremacists illustrates that various motivations and methods such as incarceration and therapies such as Acceptance and Commitment Therapy may help them to disengage from an extremist group.105 Prevention of anti-Muslim hate may be achieved by raising awareness on and utilization of these methods effectively. 103Jeff Greenberg, Tom Pyszczynski and Solomon Sheldon, “The Causes and Consequences of a Need for Self- Esteem: A Terror Management Theory” in Public Self and Private Self, ed. R. F. Baumeister, (New York: 1986), 189–212 104Johannes Beller and Christoph Kröger, “Religiosity, Religious Fundamentalism, and Perceived Threat as Predictorsof Muslim Support for Extremist Violence,” American Psychological Association10, no. 4 (2018): 345- 355. 105Brian F. Bubolz and Pete Simi, “Leaving the World of Hate: Life-Course Transitions and Self-Change,” American Behavioral Scientist 55, no. 12 (2015): 1588–1608, quoted in John Horgan, Mary Beth Altier, Neil IJPS, 2020; 2(5):94-126 International Journal of Politics and Security, 2020: 2(5):94-126 120 Prevention of anti-Muslim hate crimes may also be achieved throughout two processes. First disengagement, then deradicalization. It should not be forgotten that “disengagement strategies categorize a violent extremist who decides to set aside the use of violence for strategic purposes as a success due to the reduction in violence, whereas deradicalization initiatives do not consider these cases a success because of the individual’s continued adherence to extremist beliefs”.106 Security authorities of all levels, must be trained both in disengagement and deradicalization strategies by the governments that experience hate crimes against their citizens. Also, members of far right groups must be examined and controlled for specific disorders that may pose risk for misconduct such as Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder, Oppositional Defiant Disorder and Conduct Disorder.107 If thelawsare for protection of all citizens, including the Muslims living in the West, the governmets and communities must take necessary steps to prevent misuses of information such as disinformation, manipulation, deception and covert operations. References Al-Zaman, Sayeed. “Digital Disinformation and Communalism in Bangladesh.” China Media Research 15, no. 2 (2019): 68-76. Beller, Johannes and Christoph Kröger. “Religiosity, Religious Fundamentalism, and PerceivedThreat as Predictors of Muslim Support for Extremist Violence”. Psychology of Religion and Spirituality, American Psychological Association 10, no. 4 (2018): 345-355. 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work_yl2ebh34lrblzaby76qynhbtqa	----	The Long&#x2010;run Effect of 9&#x002F;11: Terrorism, Backlash, and the Assimilation of Muslim Immigrants in the West THE LONG-RUN EFFECT OF 9/11: TERRORISM, BACKLASH, AND THE ASSIMILATION OF MUSLIM IMMIGRANTS IN THE WEST* Eric D. Gould and Esteban F. Klor This article investigates whether the 9/11 attacks affected the assimilation rate of Muslims in the US. Terror attacks by Islamic groups are likely to induce a backlash against Muslims, thereby raising their costs of assimilation. We find that Muslim immigrants living in states with the sharpest increase in hate crimes also exhibit: greater chances of marrying within their own ethnic group; higher fertility; lower female labour force participation; and lower English proficiency. These findings shed light on the increasing use of terror and concurrent rise in social tensions surrounding Muslim immigrants in the West. The terror attacks on the US in 2001 impacted the world in many ways. The shock and the loss of life were the most acute and immediate effects. Soon after, the economy was affected by the damage, disruption of air travel and increasing uncertainty in the security situation and world financial markets. Major military campaigns were subsequently launched in Afghanistan and Iraq, creating new tensions and alliances between countries. It is safe to say that the 9/11 attacks transformed the economic and diplomatic landscape on a global scale. In this article, we examine how the 9/11 attacks affected the Muslim community within the US. In particular, we investigate the general idea that terror attacks by radical Islamic groups are likely to induce a backlash against the Muslim community as a whole, raising their costs of assimilation. Evidence for a backlash after 9/11 is supported by the data on hate crimes against Muslims, which went from 28 to 481 reported incidents from the year 2000 to 2001. A similar backlash against Muslims took place all across Europe (�Aslund and Rooth, 2005; Hanes and Machin, 2012; Sch€uller, 2012). We empirically examine whether this backlash slowed the rate of assimilation by exploiting variation across states in the number of hate crimes against Muslims in the wake of the 9/11 attacks. Using individual-level data from the Census and American Community Surveys from 1990–2010, our results show that Muslim immigrants living in states which experienced the sharpest increase in hate crimes after 9/11 also exhibit: (i) greater chances of ‘intra-marriage’ (marrying someone who also originates from a Muslim country); (ii) higher fertility; (iii) lower female labour force participation; and (iv) lower English proficiency. * Corresponding Author: Esteban F. Klor, Department of Economics, Hebrew University, Mt. Scopus, Jerusalem, 91905, Israel. Email: eklor@huji.ac.il. We thank the editor, Kjell Salvanes, two anonymous referees, Moshe Hazan, Daniele Paserman, Jacob Shapiro and participants at numerous seminars and conferences for helpful comments and suggestions. We thank The Maurice Falk Institute for Economic Research and the Israeli Science Foundation (grant No. 408/ 12) for financial support. [ 2064 ] The Economic Journal, 126 (November), 2064–2114. Doi: 10.1111/ecoj.12219 © 2014 Royal Economic Society. Published by John Wiley & Sons, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA. Interestingly, the higher rate of intra-marriage is coming at the expense of marrying outside of the ethnic group, rather than a general increase in the marriage rate. All of these patterns are consistent with a less-assimilated outcome, since Muslim countries are characterised by very low rates of female labour force participation and high fertility rates compared to natives in the US. Overall, our findings show that the 9/11 attacks induced a backlash which made the Muslim community in America more cohesive and traditional. In order to attribute a causal interpretation to our results, it is important to note that the state-level increase in hate crimes against Muslims after the 9/11 attacks was not correlated with the pre- existing state-level trend in any of the assimilation outcomes, or with the characteristics of Muslim immigrants living in the state prior to the 9/11 attacks. In addition, the results are robust to the inclusion or exclusion of a rich set of personal and state-level characteristics, including state-level hate crimes against blacks, Jews and homosexuals. These findings support our identifying assumption that variation in the extent of the backlash across states can be considered exogenous. Moreover, we conduct a placebo analysis by showing no effect of hate crimes on the marriage decisions of older Muslim immigrants, who had largely already made their marriage decisions before the 9/11 attacks, and by showing that no other immigrant group exhibited a slower rate of assimilation in response to hate crimes against Muslims. These findings lend even more support for a causal interpretation for our findings that the 9/11 attacks increased the ethnic identity of the Muslim community in the US. There is no systematic empirical research on the question of whether the backlash against Muslim Americans after 9/11 affected their rate of assimilation in the US. The lack of research on this subject is surprising, given the increasing social and political tensions surrounding the assimilation of a large influx of Muslim immigrants to Western European countries and North America, and a concurrent increase in the use of large-scale terror attacks on Western cities. The most related literature has been conducted by historians, sociologists, journalists and Islamic scholars, who claim that Muslims and their communities in the US underwent substantial changes after the 9/11 attacks (Abdo, 2006; Barrett, 2008; Bakalian and Bozorgmehr, 2009).1 These studies argue that American Muslims, who felt under attack by the government, general public and the media in the aftermath of 9/11, sought refuge in their religion and community to withstand the backlash. According to these authors, the 9/11 attacks spurred a renewed sense of solidarity among Muslims and a religious revival in the face of widespread criticism of Islam. However, the existing literature suffers from several shortcomings. The empirical evidence is based on a small number of selected interviews, rather than a systematic analysis of a large, representative sample of Muslims in the US. Individuals who agreed to be interviewed may not have opinions which reflect the average person’s experience, and an individual’s thoughts and opinions may not match their actions. In addition, 1 There is also a large literature studying the immigration of Muslims to Western European countries and the potential for clashes with the native population. Some of these studies speculate that the backlash in the aftermath of terror attacks is associated with the radicalisation of Muslim immigrants but do not conduct a systematic analysis of that connection (Sniderman and Hagendoorn, 2007; Murshed and Pavan, 2009). Others studies focus on the increasing political power of Muslim immigrants in European countries as a major source of conflict between immigrants and the native European population (Dancygier, 2010). © 2014 Royal Economic Society. [ N O V E M B E R 2016] TERROR AND ASSIMILATION OF MUSLIMS IN THE WEST 2065 the existing literature does not attempt to establish a causal connection between the backlash and assimilation and, therefore, cannot determine whether the changes in the Muslim community after 9/11 were due to the attacks themselves or were part of a pre-existing trend in their assimilation patterns. Our article is the first systematic empirical analysis of how the Muslim community in the US. reacted to the 9/11 attacks. We present the first evidence that the backlash against Muslims slowed their rate of assimilation, as reflected by higher rates of intra- marriage and fertility, and lower rates of female labour force participation and English proficiency. In this manner, our findings suggest that terror attacks against Western targets may have a long-term political and socio-economic impact, by creating a more ethnically cohesive Muslim community in this generation and also the next. The idea that terror groups instigate a backlash is not new in the theoretical literature on political conflict (Rosendorff and Sandler, 2004, 2010; Siqueira and Sandler, 2006; Bueno de Mesquita and Dickson, 2007; Baliga and Sj€ostr€om, 2012). However, this literature focuses on the backlash against the country or territory where the perpetrators reside. In the context of 9/11, this is consistent with the US attacking Afghanistan. Our findings raise the possibility that terror groups may also intentionally induce a backlash on persons of a similar ethnic origin in the targeted country, in order to decrease their rate of assimilation. The remainder of the article is organised as follows. The next Section briefly surveys the literature on Muslim immigrants to the US, focusing on their experiences before and after the 9/11 attacks. Section 2 presents the data on Muslim assimilation and hate crimes. Section 3 presents our empirical strategy, followed by our main results for ‘intra-marriage’ in Section 4 and other assimilation outcomes in Section 5. Section 6 examines other immigrant groups and Section 7 concludes with a discussion of the broader implications of our results. 1. Background and Related Literature According to a recent survey by the Pew Research Center (2011), the vast majority of Muslims in the United States were born abroad, with only 37% native-born. (Peck, 2004 finds a very similar number – 66% are foreign born.) Among Muslim immigrants, 71% arrived after 1990. So, the Muslim population in America is relatively new and mostly foreign-born, with almost all of the immigrants arriving after the repeal of country- based immigration quotas in 1965. This policy change created a strong positive selection regarding the characteristics of immigrants that were allowed into the US. Consequently Muslim immigrants to America, mostly from the Middle East and South Asia, were substantially more educated and wealthier than their counterparts that immigrated to Europe. These characteristics, along with their pragmatism and drive to succeed, led to a relatively fast integration into the labour market and suburban communities of the US (Abdo, 2006). Although Muslim immigrants in the West tend to be less assimilated than other immigrant groups (Bisin et al., 2008), several scholars noted that Muslims in the US were on the path of assimilation or ‘Americanization’ before the 9/11 attacks (Haddad and Esposito, 2000; Abdo, 2006). These immigrants, while still religiously identified as Muslims, started to view traditional practices in their home country as out- © 2014 Royal Economic Society. 2066 T H E E C O N O M I C J O U R N A L [ N O V E M B E R dated and out of place, and adopted customs more similar to their American peers (Hasan, 2000). Some of them even anglicised their names, intermarried with non- Muslims and began to speak Arabic less frequently (Goldwasser, 2000; Kulczycki and Lobo, 2002). Several scholars argue that the 9/11 terror attacks brought this process of Americanisation to a sudden halt. They suggest that the substantial increase in hate crimes, harassment, racial profiling and discrimination against Muslims in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 started a process of re-Islamisation. At the individual level, Muslim Americans renewed their interest in the Quran and traditional Islamic practices (Bryan, 2005; Abdo, 2006). One example is the growing number of young women wearing the hijab (headscarf) as an icon of Islamic pride and defiance to a hostile environment (Haddad, 2007). Another example is the growing demand for Islamic educational and recreational programmes for children and young adults, which led to the creation of numerous Islamic day schools and Sunday schools across the US (Schmidt, 2004), as well as the spread of additional chapters of the Muslim Students Association at numerous universities (Abdo, 2006). These studies also claim that Muslims in search of community and a safe haven from a more hostile environment started to attend mosque services more frequently (Haddad, 2007; Bakalian and Bozorgmehr, 2009). In turn, mosques and Islamic community centres took a more central role in the lives of Muslims after 9/11, as they ceased to be only places of worship and became social centres. Women’s groups began to flourish (Haddad, 2007). Mosques and Islamic centres also started to play a more active political role, with the Muslim community increasing their participation in electoral politics in every election since 2001 (Bakalian and Bozorgmehr, 2009). While the studies cited above present a poignant picture of how 9/11 affected the Muslim community in the US, the conclusions are based entirely on anecdotal evidence collected from extensive interviews. It is possible that individuals who agreed to be interviewed hold views and underwent experiences that were not representative of the Muslim community at large. In addition, these studies do not attempt to establish a causal connection between the backlash and assimilation, nor do they address whether the changes in the Muslim community after 9/11 were due to the attacks themselves or were part of a pre-existing trend. Our contribution is to examine this issue with standard econometric tools and with a large, representative sample of Muslim immigrants obtained from the US Census and American Community Surveys. In particular, we control for the aggregate trends in the assimilation rate of Muslim immigrants and for a broad set of personal and state-level characteristics, and exploit the geographic variation in hate crimes across states to explain the changes in the state-level assimilation rate of Muslim immigrants. Although this article is the first systematic analysis of the assimilation patterns of Muslims in the aftermath of 9/11, several articles have examined whether terrorism increased discrimination against Muslims in the labour market. Overall, the evidence is mixed. Some studies find that terror attacks affected the earnings and employment of Muslims living in the targeted country (Rabby and Rogers, 2009), while others report a significant effect only on earnings (D�avila and Mora, 2005; Kaushal et al., 2007). A third group of studies finds no effect on any labour market outcome for Muslims (�Aslund and Rooth, 2005; Braakmann, 2010). Importantly, this literature focuses © 2014 Royal Economic Society. 2016] T E R R O R A N D A S S I M I L A T I O N O F M U S L I M S I N T H E W E S T 2067 exclusively on labour market outcomes in the immediate aftermath of terror attacks. In contrast, we focus on assimilation outcomes measured up to nine years after the attacks, and since these outcomes are difficult to reverse (marital status, fertility etc.), they are much more likely to have long-term implications. 2. The Data 2.1. Data on the Assimilation Outcomes of Muslim Immigrants Information about the assimilation of immigrants from Muslim countries over time is obtained from the US Census in 1990 and 2000, as well as the American Community Surveys (ACS) for 2007–10.2 We used the four years of the ACS in order to obtain a large sample of Muslim immigrants after the 9/11 attacks in 2001.3 Therefore, our main analysis is broken down into two time periods: the pre-attack period of 2000 and the post-attack interval of 2007–10 (which is referred to as the 2010 period throughout the text). In addition, the 1990 Census is used to examine pre-existing trends. Since many of our measures of assimilation concern marriage and fertility decisions which are typically made in early adulthood, our sample of interest is restricted to immigrants between the ages of 20 and 40. Although it is possible to determine whether someone is an immigrant in the Census and ACS data using information on their country of birth, it is not straightforward to identify who is a Muslim. The Census and the ACS contain no information on a person’s religious affiliation (see Ruggles et al., 2008). Therefore, we use information on the respondent’s self-reported ‘country of ancestry’ to infer whether the person is likely to be a Muslim. Specifically, individuals reporting an ancestry from the predominantly Muslim countries in the Middle East, Northern Africa and Asia were classified as Muslims. A similar set of countries was used by Kaushal et al. (2007) to examine the effect of the 9/11 attacks on the labour market outcomes of Arab and Muslim residents.4 However, Kaushal et al. (2007) based their definition on the respondent’s country of birth, not the respondent’s ancestry. For foreign-born individuals, these two variables are almost always the same. However, when the two pieces of information differ, we believe the ‘ancestry’ variable is likely to be more accurate, since some individuals are born in foreign countries when their parents lived abroad for a brief period of time. More importantly, our definition on ancestry allows us to categorise native-born individuals as having a Muslim background as well. This is important in order to estimate the size of the Muslim population in each state and also to provide a more accurate measure of whether an immigrant who is married to a native has in fact married someone of the same background or not. 2 The sample size of Muslims in the General Social Survey is too small to analyse (about 10 self-identified Muslims per year). 3 The ACS is the largest representative survey that was conducted after 2000. Many existing studies examine inequality and other labour issues over time using the Census for years up to and including 2000, and the ACS for the post-2000 period. For example, see Beaudry et al. (2010, p. 1005) and Acemoglu and Autor (2011, p. 1050). 4 The only exceptions are that we did not include Lebanon and Malaysia, since we believe most Lebanese immigrants in the US are Christian and it was not clear that Malaysia is mostly Muslim. However, our results are robust to changing the definition to include or exclude these countries. © 2014 Royal Economic Society. 2068 T H E E C O N O M I C J O U R N A L [ N O V E M B E R If we used country of birth to determine whether a person is likely to be Muslim, any immigrant who is married to a native would be considered to have married outside of his/her group. Since this is one of our main measures of assimilation, we based our definition of being a Muslim on the country of ancestry. Appendix Table A1 lists the 20 countries of ancestry used in our definition of being a Muslim. The most common countries are Pakistan and Iran, followed by Turkey, Egypt and Bangladesh. As discussed below, there is considerable variation across the different countries of origin in terms of their assimilation outcomes and the extent to which each group experienced a backlash in the wake of the 9/11 attacks. Using the Census and ACS data, we constructed several standard measures of assimilation for each Muslim immigrant in the sample. Our first measure is whether the person is ‘intra-married’ in the sense of being married to someone whose ancestry is coded as one of the Muslim countries described above.5 This measure is widely used to capture the strength of one’s ethnic identity and level of assimilation (Bisin and Verdier, 2000; Bisin et al., 2004, 2008). There are two alternatives to being ‘intra- married’: being single or being ‘inter-married’ in terms of marrying someone whose ancestry is not one of the Muslim countries described above. Since someone who is single may eventually be ‘intra-married’, as opposed to someone who is currently ‘inter- married’ (unless they divorce and remarry), we will also examine the rate of ‘inter- marriage’ as a relevant assimilation outcome. Summary statistics for these marriage outcomes are presented in Table 1. For example, 43.4% of the sample is intra-married in the 2000 Census, while 13.5% are inter-married. Among the 69% that have ever been married, 63% are married within the Muslim community according to our measure, while 37% are married outside of the community. So, although intra-marriage is the most common type of family formation within this community, there does appear to be a significant level of integration into the rest of society as measured by the rate of inter-marriage.6 However, as seen in Appendix Table A1, the rate of intra-marriage varies consid- erably across the different countries of origin. For example, individuals from Pakistan and Bangladesh have very strong ethnic identities (their rate of intra-marriage is 53% and 57% respectively), while individuals with a background from Egypt, Iran and Turkey are much more assimilated (the rate of intra-marriage is 46%, 36% and 38% respectively). Our other measures of assimilation include the respondent’s fertility, labour force participation and proficiency in English. Fertility is measured by the respondent’s number of children, or alternatively, by the number of children below the age of 5. A higher level of fertility is consistent with a stronger ethnic identity. This can be seen in Appendix Table A1 which shows that immigrants from Pakistan and Bangladesh, which have a high rate of intra-marriage compared to other countries (e.g. Egypt, Iran and Turkey) also tend to have much higher rates of fertility. (Egypt is the exception, with a comparable level of fertility to Bangladesh.) 5 The spouse is considered a Muslim if he/she meets the ancestry criterion, regardless of whether the spouse was born in the US or not and regardless of whether the spouse meets the age requirements to be included in our empirical analysis (between 20 and 40 years of age). 6 Table 1 reveals little about the aggregate trends in assimilation outcomes, due to changes over time in the size and demographic composition of the population of Muslim immigrants. © 2014 Royal Economic Society. 2016] T E R R O R A N D A S S I M I L A T I O N O F M U S L I M S I N T H E W E S T 2069 Female labour force participation is also a useful measure of assimilation, since families with a higher sense of ethnic identity are more likely to adhere to traditional family roles whereby women are less likely to participate in the labour market. Again, evidence for this notion is seen in Appendix Table A1, which shows that women from countries with a higher intra-marriage rate (Bangladesh and Pakistan) have much higher rates of being in the ‘home sector’ (47% and 52% respectively) than women from countries that have much lower intra-marriage rates (31% from Turkey and 24% from Iran). Being in the ‘home sector’ is defined as not being in the labour force and not being enrolled at school. It is worth noting that there are no differences in the rate of being in the ‘home sector’ for men across these countries of origin, which is Table 1 Descriptive Statistics of Immigrants from Muslim Countries and Number of Hate Crimes Against Muslims 1990 2000 2007–10 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Assimilation outcomes Intra-married 0.370 0.48 0.434 0.50 0.451 0.50 Inter-married 0.186 0.39 0.135 0.34 0.131 0.34 Ever married 0.681 0.47 0.690 0.46 0.688 0.46 Number of children 0.896 1.25 0.992 1.31 1.002 1.30 Number of children less than age 5 0.400 0.68 0.425 0.71 0.442 0.71 Home sector (not in labour force or school) 0.171 0.38 0.237 0.43 0.220 0.41 Speak English at home 0.098 0.30 0.075 0.26 0.098 0.30 Speak English well 0.672 0.47 0.649 0.48 0.647 0.48 Demographic characteristics Male 0.626 0.48 0.570 0.50 0.514 0.50 Years in the US 8.849 5.94 10.790 7.81 11.280 8.30 Age 30.550 5.64 31.145 5.84 31.106 5.85 High school dropout 0.071 0.26 0.074 0.26 0.063 0.24 High school graduate 0.194 0.40 0.217 0.41 0.191 0.39 Some college 0.284 0.45 0.258 0.44 0.250 0.43 College graduate 0.451 0.50 0.451 0.50 0.495 0.50 Home sector rate for women within state 0.218 0.02 0.222 0.02 0.192 0.02 Male unemployment rate within state 0.058 0.01 0.055 0.01 0.087 0.03 Male mean log wage within state 10.264 0.11 10.567 0.11 10.823 0.12 Percentage of males within state (Muslims) 0.604 0.03 0.560 0.03 0.512 0.05 Percentage Muslim within state 0.005 0.00 0.008 0.00 0.009 0.00 Hate crimes against Muslims Muslim hate crimes (since last period) 14.549 14.58 78.966 62.49 Muslim hate crimes per capita 0.004 0.00 0.028 0.03 Muslim hate crimes per capita (excl. 2002–8) 0.014 0.01 Hate crimes against blacks per capita 0.052 0.06 0.037 0.05 Log hate crimes against homosexuals 6.084 1.42 5.884 1.25 Log hate crimes against jews 5.997 1.76 5.519 1.69 Number of observations 13,467 20,139 17,558 Notes. Hate crime data come from the FBI Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Program. All other variables are computed from the United States Census (1990 and 2000) and the American Community Surveys (2007–10). The sample is restricted to immigrants from Muslim countries, as detailed in Appendix Table A1. © 2014 Royal Economic Society. 2070 T H E E C O N O M I C J O U R N A L [ N O V E M B E R consistent with the idea that the differences across groups represent different rates of assimilation choices rather than opportunities. Similar patterns are also seen with our remaining measures of assimilation which capture the respondent’s proficiency in English. Our first measure is whether the respondent speaks English at home (only 7.5% in 2000), and the second measure is whether the respondent speaks English well (65% in 2000). A respondent was classified as speaking well if he/she was coded as speaking ‘only English’ or speaking ‘very well’. Again, we see a consistent pattern whereby immigrants from a more assimilated background (Iran and Turkey) have lower intra-marriage rates, higher female labour force participation, lower fertility and a higher chance of speaking English at home or speaking very well (11% and 76% respectively for Iran, 11% and 63% for Turkey). In contrast, immigrants with less assimilated outcomes (Bangladesh and Pakistan) tend to have higher intra-marriage rates and fertility, with lower rates of female labour participation, speaking English at home, and speaking English well (4.5% and 47% for Bangladesh on the last two outcomes, and 6.6% and 69% for Pakistan). The consistency of these independently-measured and defined assimilation outcomes across groups supports the idea that they individually and jointly capture an accurate picture of the assimilation rate of each group, and therefore, justifies their use as meaningful outcomes in our empirical analysis. The US Census and ACS surveys also contain a rich set of demographic information such as: gender, age, education level and, notably, the state of residence for each respondent. This geographic information is particularly important for our identifica- tion strategy since we do not want to rely on aggregate time trends to identify the causal effect of anti-Muslim hate crimes on assimilation behaviour. Rather, we control for aggregate time trends and exploit the geographic variation in hate crimes across states to explain the changes in the assimilation outcomes across locations. To do this, we need variation in the location of Muslims across the US, which is shown in Appendix Table A2. 2.2. Data on Hate Crimes Against Muslims Our goal is to estimate the effect of the anti-Muslim backlash on the assimilation outcomes of Muslim immigrants. However, it is not straightforward to measure the extent of the backlash in an accurate and consistent way across states. To do this, we use information on the reported number of ‘hate crimes’ against Muslims as a proxy for the extent of the backlash felt across states by immigrants from Muslim countries. Since 1992, the FBI Uniform Crime Reporting Program (UCR) has been collecting data on crimes motivated by racial, religious, ethnicity/national-origin, sexual- orientation and disability bias. A hate crime is not defined as a separate type of crime. Rather, hate crimes are typical types of crime like assault or burglary but are defined as a hate crime if the offender’s motive is based on a bias against the victim’s gender, race, etc. That is, a crime can be classified as a hate crime only if the police obtain additional information about the motives of the perpetrator and, using their judgment, determine that a biased motivation exists. © 2014 Royal Economic Society. 2016] T E R R O R A N D A S S I M I L A T I O N O F M U S L I M S I N T H E W E S T 2071 Hate crimes are reported to the FBI for eleven categories of offences, but the most common type by far is ‘intimidation’. In Appendix Table A3, we present the number of hate crimes against Muslims in 2001 for all eleven categories. The largest categories are ‘intimidation’ with 53.4% of the total, ‘destruction/vandalism’ with 24.2%, the two types of assault (simple and aggravated) with 16.2% and arson with 3.3%. According to the UCR Hate Crime Report, 2001, ‘hate crimes touch not only the individual victim, but they also affect the entire group associated with the particular bias motivation’. For this reason, the reported number of hate crimes against Muslims is likely to be a good proxy for how Muslims are accepted by the wider public in their locality. To the extent that this measure provides an inaccurate portrayal of the relationship between the Muslim community and the rest of society, our results should be biased towards zero. Since more populous states will tend to have larger numbers of hate crimes, we divide the number of hate crimes against Muslims in each state by the number of Muslims (individuals with an ancestry from a Muslim country as defined above) found in the 2000 Census in each state. We normalise by the state-level Muslim population from the 2000 Census, and not the earlier or later years, for a few reasons. The main drawback of normalising by the 1990 Census is that this census does not include the large wave of immigration during the 1990s (Table 1 shows that share of the state population represented by Muslim immigrants almost doubled from 1990 to 2000). There are two advantages of using the 2000 Census over the ACS Surveys from 2007–10. First, the 2000 Census is a much larger sample than the ACS samples for 2007–10. More importantly, it is possible that the distribution of Muslims across states in 2007–10 is endogenous to the extent of the local backlash in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, so that estimates of the Muslim population for each state after 9/11 should not be considered exogenous. For these reasons, we normalise the number of hate crimes against Muslims by the 2000 state-level estimate of the Muslim population size, which we refer to as ‘hate crimes per capita’. Appendix Table A2 presents the number of hate crimes against Muslims per capita for each state in the post-9/11 period. The Table displays considerable variation in hate crimes against Muslims across states. For example, hate crimes per capita were much higher in Michigan, Ohio, Massachusetts, and New Jersey relative to Virginia, Maryland, Texas, Pennsylvania, California, Illinois, Florida and New York. Therefore, a high intensity of hate crimes against Muslims was not limited to the largest states or to any particular region of the country. For this study, it is important to note that there was a dramatic increase in hate crimes against Muslims in the wake of the 9/11 attacks. With only four months remaining in the calendar year after the incident, the reported total number of hate crimes against Muslims increased 1,600% from 2000 to 2001. This sudden jump is displayed in Figure 1, which also shows that the number of hate crimes against Muslims decreased after the surge following the 9/11 attacks but settled down to a yearly mean of 139.5 incidents after 2001 compared to 23.3 prior to 2001. It is worth noting, however, that even the peak year of anti-Muslim hate crimes does not approach the levels of attacks against other groups (Blacks, Jews, Gays and Lesbians), as seen in © 2014 Royal Economic Society. 2072 T H E E C O N O M I C J O U R N A L [ N O V E M B E R Figure 2. Even on a per capita basis, Table 1 shows that hate crime against blacks after 2001 is considerably more prevalent than hate crime against Muslims.7 Although the number of hate crimes against Muslims never approached levels experienced by other groups, it is clear that the 9/11 attacks caused an unexpected surge in anti-Muslim sentiment, which led to a permanent shift in sentiment thereafter. The goal of this article is to examine whether the change in sentiment towards Muslims strengthened their ethnic identify. To do this, our strategy is to examine whether 0 100 200 300 400 500 N um b er o f H at e C ri m es 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 year Fig. 1. Hate Crimes against Muslims in the US Source. FBI Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Program. 0 1,000 2,000 3,000 4,000 N um b er o f H at e C ri m es 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 year Anti-Muslim Anti-Black Anti-Jew Anti-Gay Fig. 2. Hate Crimes in the US Source. FBI Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Program. 7 The Census data do not provide information on the size of the Jewish or homosexual community. Hence, we cannot normalise hate crimes for those groups by their population sizes. © 2014 Royal Economic Society. 2016] T E R R O R A N D A S S I M I L A T I O N O F M U S L I M S I N T H E W E S T 2073 changes in the assimilation patterns of Muslims across states since 2001 are associated with the size of the local backlash. Figure 3 presents a first look at whether changes in the state-level intra-marriage rate between 2000–10 are correlated with the state-level changes in Muslim hate crimes per capita. For both men and women, there is a statistically significant positive relationship, suggesting that the assimilation rate of Muslim immigrants was indeed slower in places which experienced a more intensive backlash. This preliminary analysis is explored extensively throughout the remainder of the article but Figure 4 conducts a simple placebo analysis by showing that the post- 9/11 backlash was not correlated with higher rates of intra-marriage for Muslim immigrants over the age of 40 – most of whom had already made their marriage decision before the 9/11 attacks. It is also important to note that the size of the backlash was not higher in places that were already experiencing slower rates of assimilation. Figure 5 shows that the change in the state-level intra-marriage rate between 1990 and 2000 was not significantly correlated with the backlash felt by Muslim immigrants in the wake of the attacks in 2001. For women, the relationship even appears to be negative. In the next Section, we describe our empirical strategy to establish these results more extensively, while providing support for a causal interpretation of the results. 3. Empirical Strategy Our empirical strategy is designed to identify the causal effect of hate crimes against Muslims on the assimilation outcomes of Muslim immigrants. Our unit of observation is the individual, and we model his/her outcome as a function of his/ –0.2 0 0.2 0.4 0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0 0.05 0.1 0.15 Females Males 2 00 0– 1 0 C h an ge i n In tr a- m ar ri ag e 2000–10 Change in Muslim Hate Crimes Per Capita Means by State for Sample under Age 41 Fig. 3. State Analysis of Intra-marriage, 2000–10 Notes. Female slope = 1.177 (t-stat = 3.56); Male slope = 0.764 (t-stat = 2.31). Regressions are weighted by state sample size, represented by the size of each circle. © 2014 Royal Economic Society. 2074 T H E E C O N O M I C J O U R N A L [ N O V E M B E R her personal characteristics, state of residence, survey year and the level of hate crimes per capita in the individual’s state of residence. Specifically, we estimate the following model: –0.2 0 0.2 0.4 0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0 0.05 0.1 0.15 Females Males 1 99 0– 2 00 0 C h an ge i n In tr a- m ar ri ag e 2000–10 Change in Muslim Hate Crimes Per Capita Examining Pre-existing Trends for Sample under Age 41 Fig. 5. State Analysis of Intra-marriage, 1990–2000 Notes. Female slope = �0.797 (t-stat = �1.60); Male slope = 0.345 (t-stat = 1.05). Regressions are weighted by state sample size, represented by the size of each circle. –0.2 0 0.2 0.4 0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0 0.05 0.1 0.15 Females Males 2 00 0– 1 0 C h an ge i n In tr a- m ar ri ag e 2000–10 Change in Muslim Hate Crimes Per Capita Means by State Fig. 4. Intra-marriage for Those Older than 40, 2000–10 Notes. Female slope = 0.408 (t-stat = 1.04); Male slope = �0.0022 (t-stat = �0.01). Regressions are weighted by state sample size, represented by the size of each circle. © 2014 Royal Economic Society. 2016] T E R R O R A N D A S S I M I L A T I O N O F M U S L I M S I N T H E W E S T 2075 outcomeist ¼ a � Muslim Hate Crimes PCst þ b � xist þ ct þ ls þ eist (1) where outcomeist represents the assimilation outcome of individual i who lives in state s in year t; Muslim Hate Crimes PCst is the number of hate crimes against Muslims per capita in state s in year t; ct is a fixed-effect for each survey year t; ls is a fixed-effect unique to state s; and xist is a vector of individual and state characteristics which include the individual’s gender, age, years of schooling and years living in the US. In some specifications, the xist vector will also include characteristics which vary at the state-year level (computed from the same Census and ACS Surveys) such as the female ‘home sector’ rate (not enrolled in school or in the labour force) for native women in state s, the unemployment rate of native men in the state and the mean log wage for native men in the state. Unobserved determinants of the individual’s assimilation outcome are captured by the error term, eist. As indicated earlier, Muslim Hate Crimes PCst is the total number of hate crimes in state s at year t, divided by the total number of individuals reporting an ancestry from a Muslim country in state s in the year 2000. When t equals the year 2000, the total number of hate crimes in that state refers to the sum of the hate crimes in that state from 1992 (the first year that the FBI started collecting hate crime data) to the year 2000. When t refers to a year after 2001 (2007–10), the total number of hate crimes in that state refers to the sum of hate crimes against Muslims between 2001 and 2008. We use the sum of hate crimes across years in order to obtain a more precise measure of the level of anti-Muslim sentiment, since the number of hate crimes is quite low, particularly in the pre-2001 period. In this manner, our measure of hate crimes per capita is designed to capture the extent to which Muslims felt an increase in hate crimes after 2001 within each state. The goal of the proposed econometric specification is to identify a, which represents the causal effect of anti-Muslim hate crimes on an individual’s assimilation outcome. There are several reasons why hate crimes against Muslims may affect their rate of assimilation. It is likely that hate crimes, which may be accompanied by increased discrimination, harassment, racial profiling and hostile rhetoric against Muslims, create a barrier between the Muslim community and the rest of society. By increasing the isolation of the Muslim community, hate crimes raise the costs of assimilation and perhaps increase the return to investing in social capital within their own community, thus leading to lower rates of integration. As mentioned above, these forces have been highlighted in the existing literature (Abdo, 2006; Barrett, 2008; Bakalian and Bozorgmehr, 2009). However, hate crimes also increase the cost of being publicly identified as a Muslim and, therefore, might lead some Muslims to shed their identity and blend into society at large. Given these two conflicting predictions, the goal of our analysis is to determine which hypothesis is supported by the data. By including fixed-effects for each state and survey year, we are essentially examining whether changes over time in hate crimes against Muslims within a state are correlated with the changes over time in the assimilation rate of Muslims within that state, after controlling for the national trend and a rich set of personal and state-level characteristics. Our identifying assumption in (1), therefore, is that hate crimes against Muslims at the state level are not correlated with omitted variables that affect the local assimilation rate and that changes in Muslim hate crimes at the state level are © 2014 Royal Economic Society. 2076 T H E E C O N O M I C J O U R N A L [ N O V E M B E R not caused by changes in the assimilation rate within the state (i.e. no reverse causality). We address these issues in several ways. First, as depicted in Figure 3, we show that changes in the number of hate crimes per capita against Muslims are positively correlated with concurrent changes in intra-marriage for younger Muslim immigrants but not with the intra-marriage rates of older Muslim immigrants (Figure 4) who are likely to be characterised by the same unobservable proclivities for assimilation, but were too old to change their marriage behaviour after 9/11. In addition, we conduct extensive robustness checks across assimilation outcomes and by including/excluding a vast array of control variables which are highly significant determinants of assimilation tendencies. Regarding reverse-causality, we show that hate crimes after 9/11 were not more prevalent in states that were already becoming less-assimilated (Figure 5 and Tables 2 and 3) and that the results are similar using the immediate backlash against Muslims, which could not be a response to assimilation trends over the decade after 9/11, as the treatment variable. Finally, we examine whether there is a systematic relationship between the local level of anti-Muslim hate crimes and observable characteristics of the local Muslim population which are likely to affect the local trends in assimilation. Table 2 analyses which state-level characteristics as of 2000, just prior to the 9/11 attacks, are associated with a larger backlash after the attacks. The Table distinguishes between two broad groups of state characteristics: those associated with the state’s non- Muslim population (upper panel) and those characterising the local Muslim population (bottom panel). Each coefficient comes from a simple regression of the state level backlash after 9/11 (Muslim Hate Crimes PCst for t = 2010) on the state mean in the year 2000 of the variable indicated above each estimate. The Table shows that the extent of the backlash was correlated with certain characteristics of the local non- Muslim population. In particular, hate crimes against Muslims were larger in states that tended to be more white, native-born (less immigrants including those from Muslim countries), and where hate crimes were already abundant against blacks and Muslims before the 9/11 attacks. The bottom panel of Table 2 shows very little connection between the backlash after 9/11 and the characteristics of the Muslim state population in 2000. The backlash is not associated with most of the country-of-origin shares, and most importantly, is completely uncorrelated with the assimilation and education characteristics of the local Muslim community just prior to 9/11. Overall, Table 2 demonstrates that the backlash was not entirely random – it was indeed larger in areas that had a history of hate crimes against Muslims and other groups (blacks) and tended to occur in areas where immigrants (not just Muslim immigrants) were smaller in concentration. But, the extent of the backlash was not correlated with the local assimilation rates or characteristics of Muslims themselves. This lends support to our identifying assumption that the local backlash was an event external to the behaviour and character of the local Muslim community and, therefore, was not correlated with omitted factors affecting their assimilation rates after 9/11. To provide further support for this assumption, Table 3 examines whether the backlash after 9/11 was associated with the pre-existing trends (between 1990–2000) in the characteristics of the Muslim and non-Muslim communities before the attacks. © 2014 Royal Economic Society. 2016] T E R R O R A N D A S S I M I L A T I O N O F M U S L I M S I N T H E W E S T 2077 T a b le 2 T h e R el a ti on sh ip be tw ee n A n ti -M u sl im H a te C ri m es by S ta te a ft er 9 /1 1 (2 0 0 1 – 8 ) a n d S ta te C h a ra ct er is ti cs Ju st P ri or to 9 /1 1 D e p e n d e n t va ri a b le : a n ti -M u sl im h a te cr im e s p er ca p it a b y S ta te fr o m 2 0 0 1 – 8 C h a ra ct er is ti cs of th e st a te p op u la ti on in ye a r 2 0 0 0 S ta te le ve l h a te cr im e s in ye ar 2 0 0 0 a g a in st : M u sl im h at e cr im e s P C B la ck s h a te cr im e s P C G ay h a te cr im e s P C Je w is h h a te cr im e s P C 4 .0 3 3 * * * 0 .1 9 8 * * * �1 .4 8 9 �0 .9 9 1 (0 .7 6 8 ) (0 .0 5 9 ) (3 .6 2 6 ) (1 .5 7 2 ) S ta te le ve l d e m o g ra p h ic s a n d e co n o m ic co n d it io n s fo r 2 0 – 4 0 ye a r o ld s in ye a r 2 0 0 0 % N at iv e % B la ck % W h it e % M u sl im M a le u n e m p lo ym e n t ra te M a le m e a n w a g e % m a le H S d ro p o u ts % m a le co ll e g e g ra d s 0 .1 1 9 * * * �0 .0 8 1 0 .1 4 3 * * * �3 .2 0 0 * * * �0 .7 7 4 * �0 .0 3 7 �0 .2 6 0 �0 .1 3 4 (0 .0 3 4 ) (0 .0 6 8 ) (0 .0 3 9 ) (0 .9 0 8 ) (0 .3 9 0 ) (0 .0 3 9 ) (0 .1 8 4 ) (0 .1 2 7 ) C h a ra ct er is ti cs of M u sl im im m ig ra n ts by st a te in ye a r 2 0 0 0 S ta te le ve l a ss im il a ti o n a n d e d u ca ti o n ch a ra ct e ri st ic s o f M u sl im im m ig ra n ts in ye a r 2 0 0 0 In tr a -m a rr ie d N u m b e r o f ch il d re n N u m b e r o f ch il d re n < 5 ye ar s S p e a k E n g li sh a t h o m e S p e a k E n g li sh w e ll % H S d ro p o u ts % co ll e g e g ra d �0 .0 9 0 0 .0 2 3 0 .0 3 6 0 .1 7 9 �0 .0 0 8 0 .0 7 8 0 .0 0 7 (0 .0 6 3 ) (0 .0 3 1 ) (0 .0 6 8 (0 .1 4 0 ) (0 .0 8 4 ) (0 .1 9 0 ) (0 .0 7 7 ) S ta te le ve l p e rc e n ta g e o f M u sl im im m ig ra n ts b y co u n tr y o f o ri g in in ye ar 2 0 0 0 E g yp t M o rr o co Ir a n Ir a q Jo rd a n S yr ia T u rk e y 0 .0 4 2 0 .1 0 4 �0 .0 5 8 0 .5 2 4 * * * 0 .6 9 2 * 0 .1 4 1 0 .0 3 5 (0 .0 8 1 ) (0 .1 9 2 ) (0 .0 3 8 ) (0 .0 5 9 ) (0 .3 4 6 ) (0 .1 0 1 ) (0 .1 6 8 ) P a le st in e A fg h a n is ta n B a n g le d e sh P a k is ta n In d o n e si a O th e r A ra b 0 .1 1 0 �0 .3 0 6 * �0 .1 3 9 �0 .1 0 5 0 .0 6 4 0 .1 9 7 (0 .1 7 1 ) (0 .1 5 9 ) (0 .0 8 6 ) (0 .0 9 0 ) (0 .2 2 4 ) (0 .1 1 7 ) N ot es . R o b u st st a n d ar d e rr o rs a p p e ar in p a re n th e se s. E ac h co e ffi ci e n t co m e s fr o m a se p a ra te re g re ss io n w h e re th e n u m b e r o f a n ti -M u sl im h a te cr im e s p er ca p it a b y st a te is re g re ss e d o n th e st a te -l e ve l va ri a b le in d ic a te d in th e T a b le a b o ve e a ch co e ffi e n t. N u m b e r o f o b se rv a ti o n s in e a ch re g re ss io n is 5 0 . R e g re ss io n s a re w e ig h te d b y th e st a te sa m p le si ze o f M u sl im im m ig ra n ts in 2 0 0 0 . S ig n ifi ca n ce le ve ls a re in d ic a te d b y * , * * , o r * * * w h ic h re p re se n t 1 0 % , 5 % a n d 1 % le ve ls , re sp e ct iv e ly . H at e cr im e s p er ca p it a fo r g a ys a n d Je w s a re cr e a te d b y d iv id in g b y th e st a te p o p u la ti o n si ze in 2 0 0 0 . © 2014 Royal Economic Society. 2078 T H E E C O N O M I C J O U R N A L [ N O V E M B E R T a b le 3 R el a ti on sh ip be tw ee n th e C h a n ge in A n ti -M u sl im H a te C ri m es fr om 2 0 0 0 – 1 0 a n d th e C h a n ge in S ta te C h a ra ct er is ti cs fr om 1 9 9 0 – 2 0 0 0 D e p e n d e n t va ri a b le : ch a n g e in a n ti -M u sl im h at e cr im e s p er ca p it a b y st a te fr o m 2 0 0 0 – 1 0 C h a n ge in ch a ra ct er is ti cs of th e st a te p op u la ti on 1 9 9 0 – 2 0 0 0 S ta te le ve l d e m o g ra p h ic s a n d e co n o m ic co n d it io n s fo r 2 0 – 4 0 ye a r o ld s % N a ti ve % B la ck % W h it e % M u sl im M a le u n e m p lo ym e n t ra te M a le m e an w a g e % m a le H S d ro p o u ts % m a le co ll e g e g ra d s 0 .4 3 6 * 0 .1 3 3 0 .3 3 9 * * �7 .1 1 1 * * �1 .3 8 2 * * * 0 .4 2 8 * �0 .4 3 2 0 .6 2 3 (0 .2 4 5 ) (0 .4 6 2 ) (0 .1 4 5 ) (3 .1 6 0 ) (0 .4 7 8 ) (0 .2 5 4 ) (0 .3 6 7 ) (0 .4 7 9 ) C h a n ge in ch a ra ct er is ti cs of M u sl im im m ig ra n ts by st a te 1 9 9 0 – 2 0 0 0 S ta te le ve l a ss im il a ti o n a n d e d u ca ti o n ch a ra ct e ri st ic s o f M u sl im im m ig ra n ts In tr a -m a rr ie d N u m b e r o f ch il d re n N u m b e r o f ch il d re n < 5 ye a rs S p e a k E n g li sh a t h o m e S p e a k E n g li sh w e ll % H S d ro p o u t % co ll e g e g ra d �0 .0 0 7 0 .0 0 1 0 .0 1 3 �0 .0 9 5 �0 .0 5 6 0 .0 2 9 �0 .0 8 9 (0 .0 7 0 ) (0 .0 3 0 ) (0 .0 3 4 ) (0 .1 4 7 ) (0 .0 5 4 ) (0 .2 6 6 ) (0 .0 8 1 ) S ta te le ve l p e rc e n ta g e o f M u sl im im m ig ra n ts b y co u n tr y o f o ri g in E g yp t M o rr o co Ir a n Ir a q Jo rd a n S yr ia T u rk e y 0 .2 2 8 * 0 .1 7 1 0 .1 0 5 0 .4 8 1 0 .5 4 9 �0 .1 4 1 0 .1 9 2 (0 .1 3 4 ) (0 .2 1 5 ) (0 .1 6 9 ) (0 .3 6 3 ) (0 .3 5 9 ) (0 .1 3 5 ) (0 .2 3 4 ) P a le st in e A fg h a n is ta n B a n g le d e sh P a k is ta n In d o n e si a O th e r A ra b �0 .1 1 7 �0 .2 0 9 �0 .1 5 0 �0 .0 6 9 0 .2 8 2 �0 .2 2 2 (0 .2 6 6 ) (0 .2 9 1 ) (0 .1 7 9 ) (0 .0 8 9 ) (0 .2 6 1 ) (0 .2 0 3 ) N ot es . R o b u st st a n d ar d e rr o rs a p p e ar in p a re n th e se s. E a ch co e ffi ci e n t co m e s fr o m a se p a ra te re g re ss io n w h e re th e ch a n g e in th e n u m b e r o f a n ti -M u sl im h a te cr im e s p er ca p it a b y st a te fr o m 2 0 0 0 – 1 0 (a s d e fi n e d in th e te x t, w h e re 2 0 0 0 re fe rs to th e p e ri o d 1 9 9 2 – 2 0 0 0 a n d th e 2 0 1 0 p e ri o d re fe rs to 2 0 0 1 – 8 ) is re g re ss e d o n th e 1 9 9 0 – 2 0 0 0 ch a n g e in st a te -l e ve l va ri a b le in d ic a te d in th e T a b le a b o ve e a ch co e ffi e n t. N u m b e r o f o b se rv a ti o n s in e a ch re g re ss io n is 9 9 , a s th e re g re ss io n w a s p e rf o rm e d w it h a p a n e l d a ta se t o f st a te s w it h st a te fi x e d -e ff e ct s a n d ye a r e ff e ct s. R e g re ss io n s a re w e ig h te d b y th e st a te sa m p le si ze o f M u sl im im m ig ra n ts in 2 0 0 0 . S ig n ifi ca n ce le ve ls a re in d ic a te d b y * , * * , o r * * * w h ic h re p re se n t 1 0 % , 5 % , a n d 1 % le ve ls , re sp e ct iv e ly . © 2014 Royal Economic Society. 2016] T E R R O R A N D A S S I M I L A T I O N O F M U S L I M S I N T H E W E S T 2079 Table 3 does not include measures for the pre-existing trends in hate crimes against various groups, since the FBI did not collect these data prior to 1992. Table 3 shows that the change in Muslim hate crimes per capita between 2000–10 was positively associated with certain pre-existing changes in the non-Muslim community between 1990–2000 (states that were becoming relatively more native-born, more white, less Muslim and better economic conditions). However, the backlash after the attacks is completely uncorrelated with the pre-existing assimilation trends of the local Muslim community. This result provides additional support for the assumption that the backlash was not associated with contemporaneous factors which affected Muslim assimilation after 9/11. This assumption is explored further in Table 4 which examines whether the change in local hate crimes against Muslims after 9/11 is correlated with other factors which may be concurrently affecting the assimilation rate of Muslims in the post-9/11 period. This Table does not include the assimilation outcomes of Muslims, since these are the main outcomes of interest which are examined in the remaining sections of the article. Once again, Table 4 shows that the extent of the local backlash after 9/11 was not correlated with the trend in hate crimes against other groups, the demographic and schooling characteristics of the state population, and the education and country-of- origin shares of the local Muslim population. Although Table 4 shows that the local backlash was not correlated with a larger share of Muslim immigrants from a particular country, Table 5 examines whether there is an underlying, systematic pattern whereby immigrants with a particular tendency to assimilate became more concentrated in areas with a larger local backlash.8 As discussed previously, Muslim immigrants from certain countries display much stronger tendencies to be assimilated versus others (Turkey and Iran versus Bangladesh and Pakistan). In order to see if hate crimes after 9/11 are associated with higher concentrations of immigrations from the group of countries that tend to be less assimilated, we assign to each Muslim immigrant in the 2000 and 2010 samples the mean of the assimilation outcome for that person’s country of ancestry in the year 2000, and regress that variable on the state level of hate crimes against Muslims in both periods. This analysis appears in Table 5. The upper two panels of Table 5 use data from the 2000 and 2010 periods; each coefficient comes from a regression of the mean of the assimilation outcome for the individual’s country of ancestry in the year 2000 on a state fixed-effect, year fixed- effects and Muslim Hate Crimes PCst, as defined above. The bottom two panels use data only on Muslim immigrants that arrived after 2001, so state-fixed effects cannot be included since only the 2010 period is used. The 10 coefficients in the upper panel of Table 5 do not show any systematic evidence that immigrants from countries with lower assimilation rates tended to concentrate in areas with more hate crimes. Only one of the ten coefficients is significant at the 10% level (which is likely to occur even if the true parameter is zero in all ten regressions). The sign of this coefficient indicates that hate crimes are 8 The existing literature has emphasised that immigrant assimilation is heavily determined by the country of origin and parental identity (Dustmann, 1996; Casey and Dustmann, 2010). © 2014 Royal Economic Society. 2080 T H E E C O N O M I C J O U R N A L [ N O V E M B E R T a b le 4 R el a ti on sh ip be tw ee n th e C h a n ge in A n ti -M u sl im H a te C ri m es fr om 2 0 0 0 – 1 0 a n d th e C h a n ge in S ta te C h a ra ct er is ti cs fr om 2 0 0 0 – 1 0 D e p e n d e n t va ri a b le : th e ch a n g e in a n ti -M u sl im h a te cr im e s p er ca p it a b y st a te fr o m 2 0 0 0 – 1 0 C h a n ge in ch a ra ct er is ti cs of th e st a te p op u la ti on 2 0 0 0 – 1 0 S ta te le ve l h a te cr im e s a g a in st : B la ck s h a te cr im e s P C G a y h a te cr im e s P C Je w is h h a te cr im e s P C �0 .0 7 8 4 .2 3 9 3 .9 0 9 (0 .1 5 0 ) (5 .4 2 6 ) (3 .5 6 5 ) S ta te le ve l d e m o g ra p h ic s a n d e co n o m ic co n d it io n s fo r 2 0 – 4 0 ye ar o ld s % N a ti ve % B la ck % W h it e % M u sl im M a le u n e m p lo ym e n t ra te M a le m e an w a g e % m a le H S d ro p o u ts % m a le co ll e g e g ra d s �0 .3 2 8 * * 0 .1 5 0 �0 .2 0 1 �8 .2 5 6 0 .4 2 9 �0 .2 0 5 0 .1 8 4 �0 .0 7 8 (0 .1 5 1 ) (0 .2 9 5 ) (0 .1 8 5 ) (9 .2 8 1 ) (0 .5 7 6 ) (0 .1 8 1 ) (0 .7 9 8 ) (0 .4 1 8 ) C h a n ge in ch a ra ct er is ti cs of M u sl im im m ig ra n ts by st a te 2 0 0 0 – 1 0 S ta te le ve l e d u ca ti o n ch a ra ct e ri st ic s o f M u sl im im m ig ra n ts P e rc e n t H S d ro p o u t P e rc e n t co ll e g e g ra d 0 .1 6 2 �0 .0 8 0 (0 .1 8 4 ) (0 .0 9 3 ) S ta te le ve l p e rc e n ta g e o f M u sl im im m ig ra n ts b y co u n tr y o f o ri g in E g yp t M o rr o co Ir a n Ir a q Jo rd a n S yr ia T u rk e y �0 .0 8 8 �0 .1 6 7 �0 .1 1 2 �0 .0 0 8 �0 .5 4 5 �0 .1 7 5 0 .0 5 8 (0 .1 5 2 ) (0 .5 6 1 ) (0 .1 1 4 ) (0 .3 9 1 ) (0 .4 1 5 ) (0 .2 5 6 ) (0 .1 6 7 ) P a le st in e A fg h a n is ta n B a n g le d e sh P a k is ta n In d o n e si a O th e r A ra b 0 .0 6 0 0 .1 3 7 �0 .2 4 4 0 .0 4 6 �0 .1 7 4 0 .2 6 5 * (0 .3 6 0 ) (0 .5 0 4 ) (0 .2 5 5 ) (0 .1 1 8 ) (0 .2 8 1 ) (0 .1 4 8 ) N ot es . R o b u st st a n d a rd e rr o rs a p p e ar in p a re n th e se s. E a ch co e ffi ci e n t co m e s fr o m a se p a ra te re g re ss io n w h e re th e ch a n g e in th e n u m b e r o f a n ti -M u sl im h at e cr im e s p er ca p it a b y st a te fr o m 2 0 0 0 – 1 0 (a s d e fi n e d in th e te x t, w h e re 2 0 0 0 re fe rs to th e p e ri o d 1 9 9 2 – 2 0 0 0 a n d th e 2 0 1 0 p e ri o d re fe rs to 2 0 0 1 – 8 ) is re g re ss e d o n th e 2 0 0 0 – 1 0 ch a n g e in st a te -l e ve l va ri a b le in d ic a te d in th e T a b le a b o ve e a ch co e ffi e n t. N u m b e r o f o b se rv a ti o n s in e a ch re g re ss io n is 1 0 0 , a s th e re g re ss io n w a s p e rf o rm e d w it h a p a n e l d a ta se t o f st a te s w it h st a te fi x e d -e ff e ct s a n d ye a r e ff e ct s. R e g re ss io n s a re w e ig h te d b y th e st a te sa m p le si ze o f M u sl im im m ig ra n ts in 2 0 0 0 . S ig n ifi ca n ce le ve ls a re in d ic a te d b y * , * * , o r * * * w h ic h re p re se n t 1 0 % , 5 % , a n d 1 % le ve ls , re sp e ct iv e ly . H at e cr im e s p er ca p it a fo r g a ys a n d Je w s a re cr e a te d b y d iv id in g b y th e st a te p o p u la ti o n si ze in 2 0 0 0 . © 2014 Royal Economic Society. 2016] T E R R O R A N D A S S I M I L A T I O N O F M U S L I M S I N T H E W E S T 2081 T a b le 5 R el a ti on sh ip be tw ee n M u sl im H a te C ri m es a n d P er so n a l C h a ra ct er is ti cs of Im m ig ra n t M u sl im s C o u n tr y o f o ri g in m e a n in ye a r 2 0 0 0 a ss ig n e d to e a ch re sp o n d e n t in e a ch p e ri o d (2 0 0 0 – 1 0 ) In tr a -m a rr ie d N u m b e r o f ch il d re n N u m b e r o f ch il d re n le ss th a n a g e 5 E n g li sh a t h o m e S p e a k E n g li sh w e ll (1 ) (2 ) (3 ) (4 ) (5 ) 2 0 0 0 – 1 0 a n a ly si s w it h a ll im m ig ra n ts a n d st a te fi xe d -e ff ec ts M a le s M u sl im h at e cr im e s P C 0 .0 5 1 0 .3 0 8 0 .0 9 6 �0 .0 1 9 �0 .0 5 0 (0 .0 5 7 ) (0 .1 9 2 ) (0 .0 8 9 ) (0 .0 3 1 ) (0 .0 7 7 ) S a m p le si ze 2 0 ,4 2 2 2 0 ,4 2 2 2 0 ,4 2 2 2 0 ,4 2 2 2 0 ,4 2 2 F e m al e s M u sl im h at e cr im e s P C �0 .1 2 5 0 .2 1 8 0 .0 6 9 0 .0 0 7 0 .1 3 6 * (0 .1 0 1 ) (0 .3 2 8 ) (0 .0 7 0 ) (0 .0 3 4 ) (0 .0 6 8 ) S a m p le si ze 1 7 ,1 0 8 1 7 ,1 0 8 1 7 ,1 0 8 1 7 ,1 0 8 1 7 ,1 0 8 2 0 0 7 – 1 0 a n a ly si s w it h im m ig ra n ts a rr iv in g a ft er 2 0 0 1 M a le s M u sl im h at e cr im e s P C �0 .1 3 1 0 .5 3 8 * 0 .1 9 2 0 .0 0 7 �0 .0 5 3 (0 .1 3 0 ) (0 .3 0 8 ) (0 .1 1 8 ) (0 .0 7 0 ) (0 .2 0 2 ) S a m p le si ze 3 ,0 1 9 3 ,0 1 9 3 ,0 1 9 3 ,0 1 9 3 ,0 1 9 F e m al e s M u sl im h at e cr im e s P C �0 .2 4 1 0 .8 8 5 0 .2 7 3 * 0 .0 1 1 0 .1 8 8 (0 .2 0 9 ) (0 .8 9 7 ) (0 .1 5 9 ) (0 .0 5 4 ) (0 .1 9 5 ) S a m p le si ze 3 ,0 1 4 3 ,0 1 4 3 ,0 1 4 3 ,0 1 4 3 ,0 1 4 N ot es . S ta n d ar d e rr o rs , w h ic h a re cl u st e re d b y st a te , a p p e ar in p a re n th e se s. S ig n ifi ca n ce le ve ls a re in d ic a te d b y * , * * o r * * * w h ic h re p re se n t 1 0 % , 5 % a n d 1 % le ve ls re sp e ct iv e ly . In th e u p p e r p a n e l, w h ic h u se s d a ta fr o m 2 0 0 0 – 1 0 , th e O L S re g re ss si o n s in cl u d e a s co n tr o l va ri a b le s: st a te fi x e d -e ff e ct s, ye ar fi x e d -e ff e ct s, a g e , a g e - sq u a re d , a n d a g e -c u b e d . U si n g d a ta fr o m 2 0 0 7 – 1 0 in th e b o tt o m p a n e l, th e O L S re g re ss si o n s in cl u d e a s co n tr o l va ri a b le s: ye a r fi x e d -e ff e ct s, a g e , a g e -s q u a re d , a n d a g e -c u b e d . © 2014 Royal Economic Society. 2082 T H E E C O N O M I C J O U R N A L [ N O V E M B E R associated with a higher rate of assimilation for Muslim women (more likely to speak English well) – which is the opposite direction of our main findings. The bottom panel performs a similar analysis focusing only on those immigrants that arrived after the 9/11 attacks. The results show that new immigrants did not settle down across states in a way that produced a correlation between hate crimes and country of origin. Therefore, there is no evidence that new immigrants, with observable tendencies to assimilate less, settled down in states with a higher intensity of hate crimes against Muslims. To summarise, the backlash against Muslims after the 9/11 attacks was larger in states which tended to be less familiar with immigrants (i.e. a higher share of native born residents) and already had a history of abundant hate crimes against minorities (Blacks and Muslims). However, we present several arguments in favour of our identifying assumption that local hate crimes against Muslims after 9/11 were not correlated with unobserved factors which affected the assimilation rate of Muslims in the aftermath of the attacks. First, we showed that hate crimes against Muslims after 9/ 11 were not associated with the pre-existing levels or trends in the demographic and assimilation characteristics of Muslims before the attacks (Figures 3–17, Tables 2–4). Second, Table 5 demonstrates that local hate crimes were not higher in states that were increasingly populated by the type of Muslim immigrants (according to their country of origin) which tend to be less assimilated. Further support for our identifying assumption is provided later when we show the robustness of the results across different assimilation outcomes, and also to the inclusion or exclusion of a vast array of personal and state-level control variables. In addition, we perform a placebo analysis on other groups (older Muslims and members of other ethnic groups) which should not be affected by the anti-Muslim backlash after 2001. Finally, it is important to note that the 9/11 attacks were a total surprise, which resulted in a sudden and unexpected surge in anti-Muslim hate crimes. The extent of this backlash was correlated with pre-existing factors which made the non-Muslim community more prone to commit hate crimes but was uncorrelated with the trend or level of any characteristic or behaviour that is associated with the assimilation rate of the local Muslim community. Taken as a whole, these results suggest that it is safe to regard the backlash against Muslims in the wake of the 9/11 attacks as an exogenous surge in anti-Muslim sentiment, with variation across states that can be exploited to examine whether the backlash affected the assimilation rate of local Muslim immigrants. 4. The Effect of Anti-Muslim Hate Crimes on Intra-marriage Rates We now analyse the effect of anti-Muslim hate crimes on our main assimilation outcome variable: being ‘intra-married’ in the sense of marrying someone with a similar background from a Muslim country. Table 6 presents the main results for immigrant Muslim men, while Table 7 presents a similar analysis for immigrant Muslim women. In the first column of both Tables, the ‘intra-marriage’ status of each individual is regressed only on Muslim hate crimes per capita and dummy variables for each sample year, with the reported coefficients representing the marginal effects evaluated at the means from a probit analysis. For both men and women, the intra- © 2014 Royal Economic Society. 2016] T E R R O R A N D A S S I M I L A T I O N O F M U S L I M S I N T H E W E S T 2083 marriage rate increases with the number of hate crimes against Muslims per capita, but is significant only for men. In the second column of each Table, ‘basic controls’ for personal characteristics (age, number of years in the US, education, country of origin fixed-effects) are added to the specification. The coefficients are virtually unchanged, –0.4 –0.2 0 0.2 0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0 0.05 0.1 0.15 Females Males 1 99 0– 2 00 0 C h an ge i n In te r- m ar ri ag e 2000–10 Change in Muslim Hate Crimes Per Capita Examining Pre-existing Trends Fig. 7. State Analysis of Inter-marriage, 1990–2000 Notes. Female slope = 0.300 (t-stat = 0.98); Male slope = 0.421 (t-stat = 1.20). Regressions are weighted by state sample size, represented by the size of each circle. –0.4 –0.2 0 0.2 0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0 0.05 0.1 0.15 Females Males 2 00 0– 1 0 C h an ge i n In te r- m ar ri ag e 2000–10 Change in Muslim Hate Crimes Per Capita Means by State Fig. 6. State Analysis of Inter-marriage, 2000–10 Notes. Female slope = �0.352 (t-stat = �1.35); Male slope = �0.562 (t-stat = �1.98). Regressions are weighted by state sample size, represented by the size of each circle. © 2014 Royal Economic Society. 2084 T H E E C O N O M I C J O U R N A L [ N O V E M B E R although both are now very significant since the standard error for women became much smaller. State fixed-effects are added to the specification in the third column of Tables 6 and 7. Again, the coefficients for men and women remain statistically significant. –1 –0.5 0 0.5 1 0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0 0.05 0.1 0.15 Females Males 1 99 0– 2 00 0 C h an ge i n N u m be r o f C h il dr en 2000–10 Change in Muslim Hate Crimes Per Capita Examining Pre-existing Trends Fig. 9. State Analysis of Number of Children, 1990–2000 Notes. Female slope = �1.065 (t-stat = �0.90); Male slope = 0.882 (t-stat = 1.40). Regressions are weighted by state sample size, represented by the size of each circle. –0.5 0 0.5 1 0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0 0.05 0.1 0.15 Females Males 2 00 0– 1 0 C h an ge i n N u m be r o f C h il dr en 2000–10 Change in Muslim Hate Crimes Per Capita Means by State Fig. 8. State Analysis of Number of Children, 2000–10 Notes. Female slope = 2.226 (t-stat = 2.42); Male slope = 1.669 (t-stat = 2.67). Regressions are weighted by state sample size, represented by the size of each circle. © 2014 Royal Economic Society. 2016] T E R R O R A N D A S S I M I L A T I O N O F M U S L I M S I N T H E W E S T 2085 In the next column of both Tables, we examine whether the strong results for hate crimes against Muslims are simply capturing a more widespread atmosphere of animosity to minorities in general. To do this, we add the number of hate crimes against blacks per capita (normalising by the state-level size of the black population –0.5 0 0.5 0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0 0.05 0.1 0.15 Females Males 1 99 0– 2 00 0 C h an ge i n C h il dr en < 5 Y rs 2000–10 Change in Muslim Hate Crimes Per Capita Examining Pre-existing Trends Fig. 11. State Analysis – Children Less Than Age 5, 1990–2000 Notes. Female slope = �0.390 (t-stat = �0.68); Male slope = 0.400 (t-stat = 0.81). Regressions are weighted by state sample size, represented by the size of each circle. –0.2 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0 0.05 0.1 0.15 Females Males 2 00 0– 1 0 C h an ge i n C h il dr en < 5 Y rs 2000–10 Change in Muslim Hate Crimes Per Capita Means by State Fig. 10. State Analysis – Children Less Than Age 5, 2000–10 Notes. Female slope = 1.634 (t-stat = 2.95); Male slope = 0.725 (t-stat = 1.75). Regressions are weighted by state sample size, represented by the size of each circle. © 2014 Royal Economic Society. 2086 T H E E C O N O M I C J O U R N A L [ N O V E M B E R according to the 2000 Census), and the log number of hate crimes against Jews and homosexuals (we cannot normalise by the size of the Jewish and homosexual populations since this information does not exist). Although hate crimes against these groups are much more prevalent than anti-Muslim hate crimes, the estimated effects of –0.4 –0.2 0 0.2 0.4 0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0 0.05 0.1 0.15 Females Males 1 99 0– 2 00 0 C h an ge i n H o m e S ec to r 2000–10 Change in Muslim Hate Crimes Per Capita Examining Pre-existing Trends Fig. 13. State Analysis of Being at Home, 1990–2000 Notes. Female slope = �0.791 (t-stat = �1.68); Male slope = �0.155 (t-stat = �1.05). Regressions are weighted by state sample size, represented by the size of each circle. –0.4 –0.2 0 0.2 0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0 0.05 0.1 0.15 Females Males 2 00 0– 1 0 C h an ge i n H o m e S ec to r 2000–10 Change in Muslim Hate Crimes Per Capita Means by State Fig. 12. State Analysis of Being at Home, 2000–10 Notes. Female slope = 0.855 (t-stat = 2.68); Male slope = 0.168 (t-stat = 0.93). Regressions are weighted by state sample size, represented by the size of each circle. © 2014 Royal Economic Society. 2016] T E R R O R A N D A S S I M I L A T I O N O F M U S L I M S I N T H E W E S T 2087 anti-Muslim hate crimes on the rate of intra-marriage become even larger after controlling for other types of hate crimes. These findings suggest that the intra- marriage rates of Muslim immigrants are responding very specifically to the level of animosity towards Muslims, regardless of the overall level of bigotry to other minorities which typically suffer much higher rates of hate crime. –0.3 –0.2 –0.1 0 0.1 0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0 0.05 0.1 0.15 Females Males 1 99 0– 2 00 0 C h an ge i n E ng li sh a t H om e 2000–10 Change in Muslim Hate Crimes Per Capita Examining Pre-existing Trends Fig. 15. State Analysis of English at Home, 1990–2000 Notes. Female slope = �0.159 (t-stat = �0.68); Male slope = 0.048 (t-stat = 0.19). Regressions are weighted by state sample size, represented by the size of each circle. –0.4 –0.2 0 0.2 0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0 0.05 0.1 0.15 Females Males 2 00 0– 1 0 C h an ge i n E ng li sh a t H om e 2000–10 Change in Muslim Hate Crimes Per Capita Means by State Fig. 14. State Analysis of English at Home, 2000–10 Notes. Female slope = �0.434 (t-stat = �2.15); Male slope = �0.578 (t-stat = �2.58). Regressions are weighted by state sample size, represented by the size of each circle. © 2014 Royal Economic Society. 2088 T H E E C O N O M I C J O U R N A L [ N O V E M B E R Since our main variable of interest, anti-Muslim hate crimes, varies at the state level for each time period, we now test whether the coefficient on this variable is robust to the inclusion of other variables which vary at the state-year level. These –0.2 0 0.2 0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0 0.05 0.1 0.15 Females Males 1 99 0– 2 00 0 C h an ge i n S pe ak E ng li sh W el l 2000–10 Change in Muslim Hate Crimes Per Capita Examining Pre-existing Trends Fig. 17. State Analysis of Speak English Well, 1990–2000 Notes. Female slope = �0.361 (t-stat = �0.65); Male slope = �0.645 (t-stat = �1.85). Regressions are weighted by state sample size, represented by the size of each circle. –0.4 –0.2 0 0.2 0.4 0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0 0.05 0.1 0.15 Females Males 2 00 0– 1 0 C h an ge i n S pe ak E ng li sh W el l 2000–10 Change in Muslim Hate Crimes Per Capita Means by State Fig. 16. State Analysis of Speak English Well, 2000–10 Notes. Female slope = �0.609 (t-stat = �1.51); Male slope = �0.782 (t-stat = �2.65). Regressions are weighted by state sample size, represented by the size of each circle. © 2014 Royal Economic Society. 2016] T E R R O R A N D A S S I M I L A T I O N O F M U S L I M S I N T H E W E S T 2089 variables include measures for the state-level marriage market conditions for Muslims (percentage of Muslims in the state and the percentage of males among Muslims in the state) and for state-year economic conditions (percentage of native- born females in the home sector, the unemployment rate of native-born men and the mean log wage for native-born men). In principle, these variables could be endogenous to the level of hate crime against Muslims, particularly the marriage market variables. However, in column 5 of Tables 6 and 7, the estimated effect of anti-Muslim hate crimes on the intra-marriage rate of men and women remains statistically significant and virtually of the same magnitude after including these additional state-year controls. It is worth noting that the gender composition of the local Muslim community is significant and displays the expected sign – a higher percentage of men versus women in the state decreases the likelihood that a Muslim male will intra-marry while increasing the chances for Muslim females to do the same. The fact that the intra-marriage rate is responding in expected ways to factors which should be relevant justifies the use of this measure as an accurate and meaningful assimilation outcome. In column 6 of Tables 6 and 7, we use an alternative measure of anti-Muslim hate crimes which considers only the hate crimes that occurred before the 2001 attacks and those that occurred right after the attacks (only 2001 and 2002). In other words, we ignore anti-Muslim hate crimes that occurred after 2002, since it could be the case that hate crimes after 2002 were responding endogenously to changes in the local Muslim community’s behaviour and characteristics, while the sudden burst of anti-Muslim activity after the 9/11 attacks was more of an unexpected, exogenous shock. Column 6 shows that the results are still very significant after discarding the hate crime information after 2002. So far, the results show that anti-Muslim hate crimes led Muslim immigrant men and women to a less-assimilated marriage outcome and that these findings are robust to specifications which include very few controls or a vast array of personal and state-level characteristics. The robustness of the results to the inclusion of virtually any control variable provides support for the identifying assumption that anti-Muslim hate crimes are not correlated with an omitted variable which affects assimilation outcomes. The estimated coefficients are not only statistically significant and robust across different specifications but also substantial in magnitude. The average number of hate crimes per capita after 9/11 is equal to 0.028, which implies an increase in the intra-marriage rate of 2% for men and 4.3% for women, according to the coefficients in column 5. These numbers constitute a 6.4% and a 7.3% increase in the intra-marriage rate of Muslim men and women respectively, relative to their means in the 2000 Census (0.31 for men and 0.60 for women). We now address whether these findings are due to Muslim immigrants simply getting married at younger ages, or whether they are choosing to marry within their community at the expense of marrying someone outside of their ethnic group. The last two columns of Tables 6 and 7 show very clearly that anti-Muslim hate crimes are significantly lowering the rate of marrying outside of the group (inter-marriage) for men and women, while increasing the chances of being married only for women. In particular, for an individual experiencing the mean rate of Muslim hate crimes after 9/11, the estimated coefficients imply a decrease of 8.3% and 13.1% in © 2014 Royal Economic Society. 2090 T H E E C O N O M I C J O U R N A L [ N O V E M B E R T a b le 6 M a rr ia ge P a tt er n s of Im m ig ra n t M u sl im M en In tr a -m a rr ie d In te r- m a rr ie d E ve r m a rr ie d (1 ) (2 ) (3 ) (4 ) (5 ) (6 ) (7 ) (8 ) (9 ) M u sl im h a te cr im e s P C 0 .6 8 4 * * 0 .6 4 2 * * 0 .6 8 8 * * * 0 .8 6 7 * * * 0 .6 9 7 * * * �0 .4 7 2 * * �0 .0 7 5 (0 .2 9 6 ) (0 .2 5 7 ) (0 .2 1 4 ) (0 .2 6 4 ) (0 .2 4 0 ) (0 .2 3 2 ) (0 .3 2 5 ) M u sl im h a te cr im e s P C , 2 0 0 1 – 2 1 .7 5 6 * * * (0 .5 6 3 ) L e a d M u sl im h a te cr im e s P C 0 .3 0 0 (0 .2 6 6 ) A g e 0 .2 9 5 * * * 0 .2 9 9 * * * 0 .2 9 9 * * * 0 .2 9 9 * * * 0 .2 9 8 * * * 0 .1 3 3 * * 0 .2 2 9 * * * 0 .2 4 1 * * * (0 .0 6 5 ) (0 .0 6 6 ) (0 .0 6 6 ) (0 .0 6 7 ) (0 .0 6 7 ) (0 .0 6 1 ) (0 .0 4 4 ) (0 .0 4 8 ) A g e -s q u a re d �0 .0 0 7 * * * �0 .0 0 7 * * * �0 .0 0 7 * * * �0 .0 0 7 * * * �0 .0 0 7 * * * �0 .0 0 2 �0 .0 0 6 * * * �0 .0 0 4 * * * (0 .0 0 2 ) (0 .0 0 2 ) (0 .0 0 2 ) (0 .0 0 2 ) (0 .0 0 2 ) (0 .0 0 2 ) (0 .0 0 1 ) (0 .0 0 2 ) A g e cu b e d 0 .0 0 0 * * 0 .0 0 0 * * 0 .0 0 0 * * 0 .0 0 0 * * 0 .0 0 0 * * 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 * * * 0 .0 0 0 (0 .0 0 0 ) (0 .0 0 0 ) (0 .0 0 0 ) (0 .0 0 0 ) (0 .0 0 0 ) (0 .0 0 0 ) (0 .0 0 0 ) (0 .0 0 0 ) Y e a rs in U S 0 .0 0 1 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 4 0 .0 0 6 * * * 0 .0 0 9 * * * (0 .0 0 2 ) (0 .0 0 2 ) (0 .0 0 2 ) (0 .0 0 2 ) (0 .0 0 2 ) (0 .0 0 3 ) (0 .0 0 1 ) (0 .0 0 3 ) Y e a rs in U S sq u a re d �0 .0 0 0 * * * �0 .0 0 0 * * * �0 .0 0 0 * * * �0 .0 0 0 * * * �0 .0 0 0 * * * �0 .0 0 0 * * * �0 .0 0 0 * * �0 .0 0 0 * * * (0 .0 0 0 ) (0 .0 0 0 ) (0 .0 0 0 ) (0 .0 0 0 ) (0 .0 0 0 ) (0 .0 0 0 ) (0 .0 0 0 ) (0 .0 0 0 ) H ig h sc h o o l g ra d u a te �0 .0 2 2 * �0 .0 2 2 �0 .0 2 2 �0 .0 2 3 �0 .0 2 3 �0 .0 1 7 0 .0 6 2 * * * �0 .0 0 3 (0 .0 1 3 ) (0 .0 1 4 ) (0 .0 1 4 ) (0 .0 1 4 ) (0 .0 1 4 ) (0 .0 1 6 ) (0 .0 1 7 ) (0 .0 2 4 ) S o m e co ll e g e �0 .0 5 5 * * * �0 .0 5 5 * * * �0 .0 5 5 * * * �0 .0 5 6 * * * �0 .0 5 6 * * * �0 .0 6 0 * * * 0 .1 1 3 * * * �0 .0 2 1 (0 .0 1 1 ) (0 .0 1 0 ) (0 .0 0 9 ) (0 .0 1 0 ) (0 .0 1 0 ) (0 .0 1 6 ) (0 .0 1 9 ) (0 .0 2 2 ) C o ll e g e g ra d u a te 0 .0 2 2 * * 0 .0 2 0 * 0 .0 2 0 * 0 .0 1 8 0 .0 1 8 * 0 .0 1 3 0 .0 6 3 * * * �0 .0 4 0 (0 .0 1 1 ) (0 .0 1 1 ) (0 .0 1 1 ) (0 .0 1 1 ) (0 .0 1 1 ) (0 .0 1 4 ) (0 .0 1 2 ) (0 .0 2 6 ) B la ck h a te cr im e s P C 0 .2 0 6 �0 .0 4 6 �0 .0 0 1 �0 .3 6 3 * * �0 .2 4 6 (0 .2 2 5 ) (0 .1 9 0 ) (0 .1 7 2 ) (0 .1 4 9 ) (0 .2 2 4 ) L o g h o m o se x u a l h at e cr im e s �0 .0 4 9 * * �0 .0 2 2 �0 .0 2 1 0 .0 1 2 0 .0 1 5 (0 .0 2 0 ) (0 .0 1 8 ) (0 .0 1 8 ) (0 .0 1 4 ) (0 .0 1 7 ) L o g Je w is h h a te cr im e s 0 .0 2 3 0 .0 0 7 0 .0 0 9 �0 .0 2 4 �0 .0 3 6 (0 .0 1 9 ) (0 .0 1 7 ) (0 .0 1 7 ) (0 .0 2 3 ) (0 .0 2 8 ) S ta te % m a le a m o n g M u sl im s �0 .7 3 9 * * * �0 .7 4 8 * * * 0 .1 4 5 * �0 .5 0 4 * * * (0 .1 1 3 ) (0 .1 1 4 ) (0 .0 8 4 ) (0 .1 1 2 ) © 2014 Royal Economic Society. 2016] T E R R O R A N D A S S I M I L A T I O N O F M U S L I M S I N T H E W E S T 2091 T a b le 6 (C on ti n u ed ) In tr a -m a rr ie d In te r- m a rr ie d E ve r m a rr ie d (1 ) (2 ) (3 ) (4 ) (5 ) (6 ) (7 ) (8 ) (9 ) S ta te % M u sl im �1 9 .2 0 6 * * * �1 7 .9 5 0 * * * 1 .1 2 4 �2 6 .8 4 7 * * * (5 .5 9 8 ) (6 .0 0 0 ) (6 .1 2 3 ) (8 .2 2 9 ) S ta te fe m a le % h o m e (n a ti ve -b o rn ) �0 .9 0 9 �1 .0 3 7 �0 .6 2 9 �1 .2 8 6 (0 .7 1 8 ) (0 .6 9 5 ) (0 .4 2 1 ) (0 .8 7 4 ) S ta te M a le U n e m p . R a te (N a ti ve -b o rn ) 0 .8 8 9 * * 0 .8 4 0 * * 0 .1 9 4 0 .4 7 3 (0 .4 2 5 ) (0 .3 9 8 ) (0 .4 4 7 ) (0 .4 3 8 ) S ta te m a le m e an w a g e (n a ti ve -b o rn ) 0 .0 3 8 �0 .0 4 0 0 .0 9 0 �0 .1 5 1 (0 .1 7 4 ) (0 .1 6 9 ) (0 .1 6 9 ) (0 .1 9 4 ) Y e a rs 2 0 0 0 – 1 0 2 0 0 0 – 1 0 2 0 0 0 – 1 0 2 0 0 0 – 1 0 2 0 0 0 – 1 0 2 0 0 0 – 1 0 1 9 9 0 – 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 – 1 0 2 0 0 0 – 1 0 Y e a r fi x e d e ff e ct s Y e s Y e s Y e s Y e s Y e s Y e s Y e s Y e s Y e s B a si c co n tr o ls N o Y e s Y e s Y e s Y e s Y e s Y e s Y e s Y e s C o u n tr y o f o ri g in fi x e d e ff e ct s N o Y e s Y e s Y e s Y e s Y e s Y e s Y e s Y e s S ta te fi x e d e ff e ct s N o N o Y e s Y e s Y e s Y e s Y e s Y e s Y e s O th e r st a te -y e a r co n tr o ls N o N o N o N o Y e s Y e s N o Y e s Y e s O b se rv a ti o n s 1 9 ,9 4 0 1 9 ,9 4 0 1 9 ,9 4 0 1 9 ,9 4 0 1 9 ,9 4 0 1 9 ,9 4 0 1 9 ,3 9 3 1 9 ,9 1 8 2 0 ,4 8 5 N ot es . T h e re p o rt e d co e ffi ci e n ts a re th e m a rg in a l e ff e ct s fr o m a p ro b it , co m p u te d a t th e m e a n s o f th e in d e p e n d e n t va ri a b le s. S ta n d ar d e rr o rs , w h ic h a re cl u st e re d b y st a te , a p p e a r in p a re n th e se s. S ig n ifi ca n ce le ve ls a re in d ic a te d b y * , * * , o r * * * w h ic h re p re se n t 1 0 % , 5 % , a n d 1 % le ve ls , re sp e ct iv e ly . T h e ‘b a si c co n tr o ls ’ in cl u d e th e p e rs o n a l ch a ra ct e ri st ic s a d d e d to th e sp e ci fi ca ti o n in co lu m n (2 ) re la ti ve to co lu m n (1 ), w h il e th e co u n tr ie s in cl u d e d in th e ‘c o u n tr y o f o ri g in ’ fi x e d -e ff e ct s a re li st e d in A p p e n d ix T a b le A 1 . © 2014 Royal Economic Society. 2092 T H E E C O N O M I C J O U R N A L [ N O V E M B E R T a b le 7 M a rr ia ge P a tt er n s of Im m ig ra n t M u sl im W om en In tr a -m a rr ie d In te r- m a rr ie d E ve r m a rr ie d (1 ) (2 ) (3 ) (4 ) (5 ) (6 ) (7 ) (8 ) (9 ) M u sl im h a te cr im e s P C 0 .5 3 2 0 .5 1 1 * 1 .2 3 5 * * * 1 .3 8 5 * * * 1 .5 4 3 * * * �0 .4 6 2 * * * 0 .5 6 7 * * (0 .5 0 7 ) (0 .2 8 2 ) (0 .2 6 4 ) (0 .2 6 3 ) (0 .2 8 2 ) (0 .1 7 3 ) (0 .2 8 8 ) M u sl im h a te cr im e s P C , 2 0 0 1 – 2 3 .3 6 3 * * * (0 .8 4 2 ) L e a d m u sl im h a te cr im e s P C �0 .8 3 8 * * (0 .4 1 8 ) A g e 0 .4 8 2 * * * 0 .4 8 5 * * * 0 .4 8 8 * * * 0 .4 8 5 * * * 0 .4 8 6 * * * 0 .3 5 5 * * * 0 .0 9 8 * * * 0 .2 1 7 * * * (0 .0 8 8 ) (0 .0 8 8 ) (0 .0 8 9 ) (0 .0 8 8 ) (0 .0 8 8 ) (0 .0 6 1 ) (0 .0 3 6 ) (0 .0 5 4 ) A g e -s q u a re d �0 .0 1 2 * * * �0 .0 1 2 * * * �0 .0 1 2 * * * �0 .0 1 2 * * * �0 .0 1 2 * * * �0 .0 0 8 * * * �0 .0 0 2 * * �0 .0 0 4 * * (0 .0 0 3 ) (0 .0 0 3 ) (0 .0 0 3 ) (0 .0 0 3 ) (0 .0 0 3 ) (0 .0 0 2 ) (0 .0 0 1 ) (0 .0 0 2 ) A g e cu b e d 0 .0 0 0 * * * 0 .0 0 0 * * * 0 .0 0 0 * * * 0 .0 0 0 * * * 0 .0 0 0 * * * 0 .0 0 0 * * 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 (0 .0 0 0 ) (0 .0 0 0 ) (0 .0 0 0 ) (0 .0 0 0 ) (0 .0 0 0 ) (0 .0 0 0 ) (0 .0 0 0 ) (0 .0 0 0 ) Y e a rs in U S �0 .0 1 3 * * * �0 .0 1 4 * * * �0 .0 1 4 * * * �0 .0 1 4 * * * �0 .0 1 4 * * * �0 .0 0 9 * * * 0 .0 0 3 * * * �0 .0 0 9 * * * (0 .0 0 1 ) (0 .0 0 2 ) (0 .0 0 2 ) (0 .0 0 2 ) (0 .0 0 2 ) (0 .0 0 2 ) (0 .0 0 1 ) (0 .0 0 1 ) Y e a rs in U S sq u a re d �0 .0 0 0 * �0 .0 0 0 �0 .0 0 0 �0 .0 0 0 �0 .0 0 0 �0 .0 0 0 * * * 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 * * (0 .0 0 0 ) (0 .0 0 0 ) (0 .0 0 0 ) (0 .0 0 0 ) (0 .0 0 0 ) (0 .0 0 0 ) (0 .0 0 0 ) (0 .0 0 0 ) H ig h sc h o o l g ra d u a te �0 .0 3 7 * * �0 .0 3 8 * * �0 .0 3 8 * * �0 .0 3 8 * * �0 .0 3 8 * * �0 .0 2 6 * 0 .0 4 7 * * * �0 .0 1 0 (0 .0 1 7 ) (0 .0 1 8 ) (0 .0 1 8 ) (0 .0 1 8 ) (0 .0 1 8 ) (0 .0 1 5 ) (0 .0 1 8 ) (0 .0 1 4 ) S o m e co ll e g e �0 .1 6 0 * * * �0 .1 5 8 * * * �0 .1 5 8 * * * �0 .1 5 8 * * * �0 .1 5 8 * * * �0 .1 5 0 * * * 0 .0 7 5 * * * �0 .1 0 7 * * * (0 .0 1 7 ) (0 .0 1 6 ) (0 .0 1 7 ) (0 .0 1 7 ) (0 .0 1 7 ) (0 .0 1 5 ) (0 .0 1 6 ) (0 .0 2 0 ) C o ll e g e g ra d u a te �0 .1 9 3 * * * �0 .1 8 9 * * * �0 .1 8 9 * * * �0 .1 9 0 * * * �0 .1 9 0 * * * �0 .1 7 2 * * * 0 .0 7 4 * * * �0 .1 4 8 * * * (0 .0 1 3 ) (0 .0 1 2 ) (0 .0 1 2 ) (0 .0 1 3 ) (0 .0 1 3 ) (0 .0 1 6 ) (0 .0 1 1 ) (0 .0 1 7 ) B la ck h a te cr im e s P C 0 .5 4 2 * 0 .4 6 5 0 .4 9 5 * �0 .2 4 2 * * 0 .2 7 1 (0 .2 8 5 ) (0 .3 1 6 ) (0 .2 8 7 ) (0 .1 2 3 ) (0 .2 2 3 ) L o g h o m o se x u a l h a te cr im e s �0 .0 1 5 �0 .0 2 5 �0 .0 1 9 0 .0 1 1 0 .0 2 5 * (0 .0 2 4 ) (0 .0 2 2 ) (0 .0 2 2 ) (0 .0 1 2 ) (0 .0 1 3 ) L o g Je w is h h a te cr im e s 0 .0 0 7 0 .0 1 5 0 .0 1 9 �0 .0 1 1 �0 .0 4 3 * * (0 .0 2 3 ) (0 .0 2 4 ) (0 .0 2 6 ) (0 .0 1 3 ) (0 .0 1 7 ) S ta te % m a le a m o n g M u sl im s 0 .3 8 1 * * * 0 .3 5 0 * * �0 .1 0 6 * 0 .0 6 2 (0 .1 4 1 ) (0 .1 3 8 ) (0 .0 6 1 ) (0 .1 1 5 ) S ta te % M u sl im 0 .5 9 2 2 .9 5 8 �1 3 .2 4 3 * * * �1 2 .3 3 2 * * (9 .6 0 4 ) (9 .7 2 0 ) (3 .8 1 0 ) (5 .7 6 0 ) © 2014 Royal Economic Society. 2016] T E R R O R A N D A S S I M I L A T I O N O F M U S L I M S I N T H E W E S T 2093 T a b le 7 (C on ti n u ed ) In tr a -m a rr ie d In te r- m a rr ie d E ve r m a rr ie d (1 ) (2 ) (3 ) (4 ) (5 ) (6 ) (7 ) (8 ) (9 ) S ta te fe m a le % h o m e (n a ti ve -b o rn ) �1 .8 3 6 * * �2 .0 6 3 * * 1 .0 4 5 * * 0 .2 5 7 (0 .8 4 9 ) (0 .8 2 8 ) (0 .4 3 4 ) (0 .5 6 2 ) S ta te m a le u n e m p . ra te (n a ti ve -b o rn ) 0 .5 3 7 0 .4 4 9 �0 .3 1 0 �0 .6 1 7 (0 .6 5 8 ) (0 .6 0 1 ) (0 .2 4 9 ) (0 .4 3 8 ) S ta te m a le m e a n w a g e (n a ti ve -b o rn ) 0 .0 1 6 �0 .1 8 8 �0 .2 0 4 * * �0 .4 2 8 * * * (0 .2 4 2 ) (0 .2 2 7 ) (0 .1 0 0 ) (0 .1 5 6 ) Y e a rs 2 0 0 0 – 1 0 2 0 0 0 – 1 0 2 0 0 0 – 1 0 2 0 0 0 – 1 0 2 0 0 0 – 1 0 2 0 0 0 – 1 0 1 9 9 0 – 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 – 1 0 2 0 0 0 – 1 0 Y e a r fi x e d e ff e ct s Y e s Y e s Y e s Y e s Y e s Y e s Y e s Y e s Y e s B a si c co n tr o ls N o Y e s Y e s Y e s Y e s Y e s Y e s Y e s Y e s C o u n tr y o f o ri g in fi x e d e ff e ct s N o Y e s Y e s Y e s Y e s Y e s Y e s Y e s Y e s S ta te fi x e d e ff e ct s N o N o Y e s Y e s Y e s Y e s Y e s Y e s Y e s O th e r st a te -y e a r co n tr o ls N o N o N o N o Y e s Y e s N o Y e s Y e s O b se rv a ti o n s 1 6 ,7 4 9 1 6 ,7 4 9 1 6 ,7 4 9 1 6 ,7 4 9 1 6 ,7 4 9 1 6 ,7 4 9 1 3 ,3 9 3 1 6 ,7 4 1 1 7 ,1 5 6 N ot es . T h e re p o rt e d co e ffi ci e n ts a re th e m a rg in a l e ff e ct s fr o m a p ro b it , co m p u te d a t th e m e a n s o f th e in d e p e n d e n t va ri a b le s. S ta n d ar d e rr o rs , w h ic h a re cl u st e re d b y st a te , a p p e a r in p a re n th e se s. S ig n ifi ca n ce le ve ls a re in d ic a te d b y * , * * , o r * * * w h ic h re p re se n t 1 0 % , 5 % , a n d 1 % le ve ls , re sp e ct iv e ly . T h e ‘b a si c co n tr o ls ’ in cl u d e th e p e rs o n a l ch a ra ct e ri st ic s a d d e d to th e sp e ci fi ca ti o n in co lu m n (2 ) re la ti ve to co lu m n (1 ), w h il e th e co u n tr ie s in cl u d e d in th e ‘c o u n tr y o f o ri g in ’ fi x e d -e ff e ct s a re li st e d in A p p e n d ix T a b le A 1 . © 2014 Royal Economic Society. 2094 T H E E C O N O M I C J O U R N A L [ N O V E M B E R the inter-marriage rate of men and women, relative to their respective means in 2000. Therefore, the increasing rate of intra-marriage for men is coming at the expense of a declining rate of inter-marriage, while the increasing rate of intra- marriage for women is coming from both the declining rate of inter-marriage and the increasing probability of being married. For both men and women, the results point to a striking phenomenon whereby immigrants from Muslim countries are increasing their ethnic identity in response to the backlash in the wake of the 9/11 attacks. We now examine whether our main findings stem from a correlation between the state-level backlash against Muslims and state-level trends in unobserved factors which affect their assimilation rate. First, we perform a similar analysis with data from the pre- 2001 period, and test whether the state-level backlash against Muslims after the 2001 attacks was correlated with changes in the intra-marriage rate before the attacks (between 1990 and 2000). This placebo analysis is presented in column 7 of Tables 6 and 7 where we estimate the effect of anti-Muslim hate crimes between 2000 and 2010 (‘Lead Muslim Hate Crimes PC’) on the intra-marriage outcomes between 1990 and 2000. A comparison between columns 3 and 7 of both Tables reveals that hate crimes against Muslims during the 2000–10 period are very significant and positive determinants of intra-marriage during the same period but are insignificant (for men) or significantly negative (for women) for intra-marriage during the pre-9/11 period between 1990 and 2000. Figures 3–7 show similar results for the state-level means in the intra-marriage and inter-marriage rates, but contain no other controls in the regression. A further placebo analysis is presented in Table 8 for all Muslim immigrants and for only those that are married. A simple comparison of columns 1 and 7 shows that our main results tend to be stronger for men when the sample is restricted to married individuals but smaller in magnitude (still significant) for women because hate crimes had a much larger effect on the marriage rate for women versus men. In the second column for each group in Table 8, we exploit the idea that older Muslims are less able to respond to the sudden backlash after 9/11 in terms of intra-marriage, since they most likely already made their marriage decisions prior to the attacks. However, they are likely to be affected by unobserved determinants shaping the local trends in assimilation. Therefore, a second placebo strategy is to perform a similar analysis on Muslim immigrants who were most likely too old to respond to the 9/11 backlash in the marital outcome. In particular, the sample in the second column of Table 8 is restricted to Muslim immigrants who were older than 40 in the survey year. That is, the youngest people in this sample were 31 at the time of the attacks (those that are 41 in the 2010 ACS Survey). Consistent with Figure 4, the results in Table 8 indicate that the intra-marriage rate for older Muslim immigrants was indeed unaffected by the state-level backlash against Muslims after 9/11. The differential results for those that were young enough to be affected by the backlash versus those that were older, provides further evidence that the changes in the local assimilation rate was a response to the backlash and not due to unobserved factors which should affect young and old alike. The remaining columns in Table 8 pool both samples together, and show that the differential effect is significant. In addition, using the older group as a control group within each state, © 2014 Royal Economic Society. 2016] T E R R O R A N D A S S I M I L A T I O N O F M U S L I M S I N T H E W E S T 2095 T a b le 8 In tr a -m a rr ia ge fo r Im m ig ra n t M u sl im s w it h In te ra ct io n s w it h A ge , 2 0 0 0 – 1 0 (1 ) (2 ) (3 ) (4 ) (5 ) (6 ) (7 ) (8 ) (9 ) (1 0 ) (1 1 ) (1 2 ) A ll m e n M a rr ie d m e n M u sl im h a te cr im e s P C 0 .6 8 8 * * * �0 .0 5 5 0 .8 6 4 * * * 2 .2 3 9 * * * 1 .1 5 6 * * * �0 .1 8 6 0 .8 2 4 * * * 2 .3 6 8 * * * (0 .2 1 4 ) (0 .2 7 3 ) (0 .1 6 3 ) (0 .4 9 3 ) (0 .3 4 5 ) (0 .2 9 4 ) (0 .1 6 9 ) (0 .5 0 1 ) M u sl im h a te cr im e s P C 9 a b o ve a g e 4 0 �0 .9 8 6 * * * �0 .9 8 0 * * * �0 .8 2 3 * * * �0 .8 3 4 * * * (0 .3 0 7 ) (0 .2 9 7 ) (0 .2 6 3 ) (0 .2 5 3 ) M u sl im h a te cr im e s P C 9 a g e �0 .0 4 5 * * * �0 .0 4 5 * * * �0 .0 4 7 * * * �0 .0 4 7 * * * (0 .0 1 3 ) (0 .0 1 3 ) (0 .0 1 4 ) (0 .0 1 3 ) S a m p le si ze 1 9 ,9 4 0 2 1 ,4 2 7 4 1 ,3 4 2 4 1 ,3 4 2 4 1 ,3 4 2 4 1 ,3 4 2 1 1 ,9 1 1 2 0 ,2 9 9 3 2 ,1 8 5 3 2 ,1 8 5 3 2 ,1 8 5 3 2 ,1 8 5 A ll w o m e n M a rr ie d w o m e n M u sl im h a te cr im e s P C 1 .2 3 5 * * * 0 .1 2 4 0 .8 2 3 * * * 1 .4 5 9 * * * 0 .8 0 6 * * * 0 .2 4 7 0 .7 0 0 * * * 1 .3 7 7 * * * (0 .2 6 4 ) (0 .4 5 4 ) (0 .2 3 5 ) (0 .3 7 7 ) (0 .2 5 1 ) (0 .4 3 4 ) (0 .2 5 1 ) (0 .3 9 0 ) M u sl im h a te cr im e s P C 9 a b o ve a g e 4 0 �0 .4 0 1 �0 .4 0 8 �0 .3 4 5 * �0 .3 6 1 * * (0 .2 6 5 ) (0 .2 6 8 ) (0 .1 7 9 ) (0 .1 8 0 ) M u sl im h a te cr im e s P C 9 a g e �0 .0 2 1 * * �0 .0 2 1 * * �0 .0 2 1 * * * �0 .0 2 2 * * * (0 .0 1 0 ) (0 .0 1 0 ) (0 .0 0 7 ) (0 .0 0 7 ) S a m p le si ze 1 6 ,7 4 9 1 3 ,9 3 2 3 0 ,6 1 5 3 0 ,6 1 5 3 0 ,6 1 5 3 0 ,6 1 5 1 3 ,0 7 8 1 3 ,3 5 4 2 6 ,3 6 6 2 6 ,3 6 6 2 6 ,3 6 6 2 6 ,3 6 6 A g e ra n g e s 2 0 – 4 0 4 1 – 7 0 2 0 – 7 0 2 0 – 7 0 2 0 – 7 0 2 0 – 7 0 2 0 – 4 0 4 1 – 7 0 2 0 – 7 0 2 0 – 7 0 2 0 – 7 0 2 0 – 7 0 Y e a r fi x e d e ff e ct s Y e s Y e s Y e s Y e s Y e s Y e s Y e s Y e s Y e s Y e s Y e s Y e s S ta te fi x e d e ff e ct s Y e s Y e s Y e s Y e s Y e s Y e s Y e s Y e s Y e s Y e s Y e s Y e s S ta te sp e ci fi c ti m e tr e n d s N o N o N o Y e s N o Y e s N o N o N o Y e s N o Y e s N ot es . T h e re p o rt e d co e ffi ci e n ts a re th e m a rg in a l e ff e ct s fr o m a p ro b it , co m p u te d a t th e m e an s o f th e in d e p e n d e n t va ri a b le s. S ta n d ar d e rr o rs , w h ic h a re cl u st e re d b y st a te , a p p e ar in p a re n th e se s. S ig n ifi ca n ce le ve ls a re in d ic a te d b y * , * * , o r * * * w h ic h re p re se n t 1 0 % , 5 % , a n d 1 % le ve ls , re sp e ct iv e ly . E a ch re g re ss io n in cl u d e s th e se t o f co n tr o lv a ri a b le s in th e co re sp e ci fi ca ti o n d e sc ri b e d in co lu m n (3 ) o f T a b le 6 ,i n a d d it io n to th o se in d ic a te d a t th e b o tt o m o f e a ch co lu m n .S ta te -s p e ci fi c ti m e tr e n d s a re d e fi n e d a s st a te fi x e d -e ff e ct s in te ra ct e d w it h p e ri o d ,w h e re b y th e fi rs t p e ri o d is fo r 2 0 0 0 a n d th e se co n d p e ri o d is fo r th e p o st -9 / 1 1 p e ri o d (2 0 0 6 – 1 0 ). T h e sa m p le s w h ic h in cl u d e th o se a b o ve th e a g e o f 4 0 a re re st ri ct e d to th o se th a t a re n o t w id o w s. © 2014 Royal Economic Society. 2096 T H E E C O N O M I C J O U R N A L [ N O V E M B E R T a b le 9 In tr a -m a rr ia ge fo r M u sl im Im m ig ra n ts by S u bg ro u p s, 2 0 0 0 – 1 0 A ll im m ig ra n ts A t le as t n in e ye a rs in U S A rr iv e d b e fo re a g e 2 0 A rr iv e d a ft e r a g e 2 0 N o t a co ll e g e g ra d C o ll e g e g ra d A ll im m ig ra n ts A t le as t n in e ye ar s in U S A rr iv e d b e fo re a g e 2 0 A rr iv e d a ft e r a g e 2 0 N o t a co ll e g e g ra d C o ll e g e g ra d (1 ) (2 ) (3 ) (4 ) (5 ) (6 ) (7 ) (8 ) (9 ) (1 0 ) (1 1 ) (1 2 ) M e n W o m e n M u sl im h a te cr im e s P C 0 .8 6 7 * * * 0 .6 0 1 * 0 .5 5 3 * 0 .8 9 4 * 1 .0 2 3 * * * 0 .5 1 5 1 .3 8 5 * * * 0 .8 9 7 * 1 .8 9 8 * * * 0 .8 2 7 * * * 1 .6 5 0 * * * 0 .8 5 1 * * (0 .2 6 4 ) (0 .3 1 9 ) (0 .2 8 6 ) (0 .4 6 1 ) (0 .2 1 8 ) (0 .5 4 0 ) (0 .2 6 3 ) (0 .4 7 8 ) (0 .4 3 3 ) (0 .3 0 5 ) (0 .3 8 1 ) (0 .3 8 5 ) S a m p le si ze 1 9 ,9 4 0 1 1 ,3 9 6 9 ,6 6 2 1 0 ,2 4 3 1 0 ,2 2 7 9 ,6 7 9 1 6 ,7 4 9 8 ,9 8 9 7 ,6 8 0 9 ,0 4 4 9 ,0 3 6 7 ,7 0 1 M a rr ie d m e n M a rr ie d w o m e n M u sl im h a te cr im e s P C 1 .3 0 3 * * * 0 .9 7 4 * * 0 .8 0 8 1 .4 0 4 * 1 .6 1 4 * * * 0 .9 6 2 0 .8 3 5 * * * 0 .6 7 9 * 1 .3 4 7 * * 0 .5 2 6 * 0 .9 2 3 * * 0 .5 9 2 * * (0 .4 3 4 ) (0 .4 2 3 ) (0 .5 2 1 ) (0 .7 2 7 ) (0 .5 5 2 ) (0 .6 1 5 ) (0 .2 5 6 ) (0 .4 0 3 ) (0 .5 5 1 ) (0 .2 7 3 ) (0 .3 9 4 ) (0 .2 3 4 ) S a m p le si ze 1 1 ,9 1 1 7 ,4 9 5 4 ,7 3 7 7 ,1 6 2 5 ,6 3 6 6 ,2 5 8 1 3 ,0 7 8 6 ,9 0 9 4 ,9 0 3 8 ,1 4 0 7 ,1 1 6 5 ,9 4 4 N ot es . T h e re p o rt e d co e ffi ci e n ts a re th e m a rg in a l e ff e ct s fr o m a p ro b it , co m p u te d a t th e m e an s o f th e in d e p e n d e n t va ri a b le s. S ta n d a rd e rr o rs a p p e a r in p a re n th e se s, w h ic h a re cl u st e re d b y st a te . S ig n ifi ca n ce le ve ls a re in d ic a te d b y * , * * , o r * * * w h ic h re p re se n t 1 0 % , 5 % , a n d 1 % le ve ls , re sp e ct iv e ly . E a ch re g re ss io n in cl u d e s th e se t o f co n tr o l va ri a b le s in th e co re sp e ci fi ca ti o n d e sc ri b e d in co lu m n (3 ) o f T a b le 6 . © 2014 Royal Economic Society. 2016] T E R R O R A N D A S S I M I L A T I O N O F M U S L I M S I N T H E W E S T 2097 Table 8 shows that these patterns are significant after pooling both age groups together and controlling for state-specific time trends. This later specification is essentially a triple differences specification and the results demonstrate that the local backlash caused younger individuals to increase their intra-marriage rate relative to older Muslim immigrants in the same state. The last two columns show similar results but instead of using a somewhat arbitrary threshold age for being ‘too old’ to be affected, we simply interact the treatment variable (hate crimes) with the person’s age. Again, the results show a significant positive effect of hate crimes on intra-marriage (even after controlling for state-specific time trends) but the effect weakens dramatically with age. Along with Figures 3–7, Tables 6–8 show that the local backlash against Muslims in the wake of the 9/11 attacks was not correlated with any pre-existing tendency for local Muslims to become less assimilated over time and that hate crimes led younger Muslim immigrants to a less-assimilated outcome relative to older Muslims in the same state, even after controlling for a broad array of control variables and for the state-specific trends of all unobserved factors affecting the marriage decisions of both groups. These findings support a causal interpretation of our main results in Tables 6 and 7. Table 9 examines whether the effect of the backlash on the intra-marriage rate varies across different segments of the Muslim immigrant population. Of notable interest is the robustness of the main results to the sample that includes only those immigrants who have been in the US for at least nine years – meaning that everyone in this sample was in the US before the 9/11 attacks in 2001. This finding once again demonstrates that our main results are not due to the placement of new immigrants across locations according to the local upsurge in hate crimes. The results are similar for those that arrived before or after the age of 20 and for different education groups (with or without a college degree) – although the effects appear to be stronger for the less educated immigrants (who tend to be more assimilated) than those with more education. Overall, the evidence indicates that the backlash against Muslims in the wake of the 9/11 attacks led all segments of the Muslim population to a less assimilated marriage outcome. The next Section examines whether these findings are robust to using other assimilation outcomes, which would lend further support to the causal interpretation of our intra-marriage results. 5. The Effect of Anti-Muslim Hate Crimes on other Assimilation Outcomes We now perform a similar analysis with other assimilation outcomes measured by the individual’s fertility, labour market participation, and English proficiency. For each outcome, we first present results from a core specification, and then test the robustness of the results to the inclusion of additional control variables. We also examine whether our findings are possibly due to pre-existing state-specific trends. Table 10 examines whether anti-Muslim hate crimes affected the fertility level of Muslim immigrants. Fertility is measured by the total number of children in the household, or alternatively, by the number of children less than five years of age. The © 2014 Royal Economic Society. 2098 T H E E C O N O M I C J O U R N A L [ N O V E M B E R T a b le 1 0 E ff ec t of H a te C ri m es on th e N u m be r of C h il d re n fo r Im m ig ra n t M u sl im s M e n W o m e n (1 ) (2 ) (3 ) (4 ) (5 ) (6 ) (7 ) (8 ) (9 ) (1 0 ) N u m b e r o f ch il d re n N u m b e r o f ch il d re n M u sl im h a te cr im e s P C 1 .3 9 9 * * 1 .6 4 7 * * 1 .4 8 2 * * 1 .3 2 2 * * 1 .5 6 0 * * * 2 .1 3 3 * * * (0 .5 4 6 ) (0 .6 4 1 ) (0 .6 0 3 ) (0 .6 4 3 ) (0 .5 6 7 ) (0 .7 1 5 ) M u sl im h a te cr im e s P C , 2 0 0 1 – 2 3 .3 9 7 * * 4 .4 5 5 * * (1 .2 6 9 ) (2 .1 0 5 ) L e a d M u sl im h a te cr im e s P C 0 .4 3 8 �0 .4 9 2 (0 .4 9 2 ) (0 .5 9 6 ) N u m b e r o f ch il d re n u n d e r a g e 5 N u m b e r o f ch il d re n u n d e r a g e 5 M u sl im h a te cr im e s P C 0 .6 7 8 * 0 .7 2 2 * 0 .8 2 1 * * 1 .1 5 7 * 1 .0 7 5 1 .4 4 1 * * (0 .3 9 1 ) (0 .4 1 0 ) (0 .4 0 6 ) (0 .6 1 6 ) (0 .6 8 2 ) (0 .6 6 7 ) M u sl im h a te cr im e s P C , 2 0 0 1 – 2 2 .3 8 7 * * 2 .5 9 5 (0 .9 0 8 ) (1 .8 9 9 ) L e a d M u sl im h a te cr im e s P C 0 .2 1 9 �0 .2 0 1 (0 .4 4 6 ) (0 .5 7 9 ) S a m p le si ze 2 0 ,4 8 5 2 0 ,4 8 5 2 0 ,4 8 5 2 0 ,4 8 5 1 9 ,8 9 1 1 7 ,1 6 2 1 7 ,1 6 2 1 7 ,1 6 2 1 7 ,1 6 2 1 3 ,6 6 4 Y e a rs 2 0 0 0 – 1 0 2 0 0 0 – 1 0 2 0 0 0 – 1 0 2 0 0 0 – 1 0 1 9 9 0 – 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 – 1 0 2 0 0 0 – 1 0 2 0 0 0 – 1 0 2 0 0 0 – 1 0 1 9 9 0 – 2 0 0 0 Y e a r a n d st a te F E Y e s Y e s Y e s Y e s Y e s Y e s Y e s Y e s Y e s Y e s O th e r h a te cr im e s N o Y e s Y e s Y e s N o N o Y e s Y e s Y e s N o O th e r st a te -y e a r co n tr o ls N o N o Y e s Y e s N o N o N o Y e s Y e s N o N ot es . T h e re p o rt e d co e ffi ci e n ts a re fr o m O L S re g re ss io n s. S ta n d ar d e rr o rs , w h ic h a re cl u st e re d b y st a te , a p p e ar in p a re n th e se s. S ig n ifi ca n ce le ve ls a re in d ic a te d b y * , * * , o r * * * w h ic h re p re se n t 1 0 % , 5 % , a n d 1 % le ve ls , re sp e ct iv e ly . E ac h re g re ss io n in cl u d e s th e se t o f co n tr o l va ri a b le s in th e co re sp e ci fi ca ti o n d e sc ri b e d in co lu m n (3 ) o f T a b le 6 , in a d d it io n to th o se in d ic a te d a t th e b o tt o m o f e a ch co lu m n . T h e ‘o th e r st a te -y e a r’ co n tr o ls a re th o se a d d e d to th e sp e ci fi ca ti o n in co lu m n (5 ) o f T a b le 6 : p e rc e n ta g e m a le a m o n g o f th o se o f M u sl im o ri g in , p e rc e n ta g e w it h M u sl im o ri g in , p e rc e n ta g e o f fe m a le s in th e ‘h o m e ’ se ct o r, m a le u n e m p lo ym e n t ra te a m o n g n at iv e s, m a le m e an w a g e a m o n g n a ti ve s. © 2014 Royal Economic Society. 2016] T E R R O R A N D A S S I M I L A T I O N O F M U S L I M S I N T H E W E S T 2099 advantage of the latter measure is that we know that children under the age of five in the 2007–10 period were conceived after 2001 and, therefore, were the product of decisions taken in the aftermath of the attacks. The first column for each group in Table 10 presents the core specification which includes individual controls and fixed-effects for each year and state.9 Using either measure of fertility, the results show that anti-Muslim hate crimes led men and women to increase their fertility. The results are a bit stronger when other hate crimes (against blacks, Jews and homosexuals) and other state-year controls (related to the marriage market and economic conditions) are added to the specification in the second and third columns for both men and women. The estimated coefficients imply that the number of children in a Muslim household increased by 5.7% and by 4.5% for males and females, respectively, as a consequence of the mean level of hate crimes against Muslims in the aftermath of 9/11. If we measure the anti-Muslim backlash by the unexpected surge in hate crimes occurring right after the 9/11 attacks (i.e. anti- Muslim hate crimes in 2001–2 only), the results are still significant (columns 4 and 9 of Table 10). The last column for both groups in Table 10 uses the sample prior to the 9/11 attacks (1990–2000) and shows very clearly that the surge in hate crimes against Muslims after 9/11 was not correlated with pre-existing state-level trends in fertility rates. These findings are illustrated very simply (without any additional control variables) in Figures 8–11, which show that hate crimes against Muslims from 2000–10 are strongly correlated with the changes in fertility during the 2000–10 period but uncorrelated with fertility in the previous period from 1990– 2000. Since the previous Section showed that hate crimes against Muslims affected marriage patterns, it is natural to wonder whether the fertility results are coming indirectly from changes in the propensity to get married. Table 11 investigates this issue and also presents results for different segments of the Muslim immigrant population. In general, the results are stronger for married men versus all men but the reverse pattern holds for women. These findings are consistent with our previous results that anti-Muslim hate crimes affected the marriage rate for women but not for men, so the indirect channel of affecting fertility through the marriage rate should be larger for women versus men. Furthermore, Table 11 displays similar results, although not always significant, across a broad spectrum of the Muslim immigrant population according to their education, when they arrived in the US, and whether they were in the US at the time of the 9/11 attacks. Overall, the unexpected increase in hate crimes against Muslims after the 9/11 attacks appears to have made the Muslim community more insular in terms of increasing the rate of intra-marriage, while at the same reinforcing traditional customs by increasing their fertility and subsequent demographic strength.10 Once again, these 9 The core specification is detailed in column 3 of Tables 6 and 7. 10 These results are consistent with an increasing preference by US Muslim immigrants for having children that religiously identify with Islam. Bisin et al. (2004) label this the ‘relative intolerance’ parameter. Their dynamic analysis shows that small changes in this parameter have substantial and long lasting effects on the religious composition of the population. © 2014 Royal Economic Society. 2100 T H E E C O N O M I C J O U R N A L [ N O V E M B E R T a b le 1 1 E ff ec t of H a te C ri m es on th e N u m be r of C h il d re n fo r M u sl im Im m ig ra n ts by S u bg ro u p s, 2 0 0 0 – 1 0 A ll im m ig ra n ts A t le a st n in e ye a rs in U S A rr iv e d b e fo re a g e 2 0 A rr iv e d a ft e r a g e 2 0 N o t a co ll e g e g ra d C o ll e g e g ra d A ll im m ig ra n ts A t le a st n in e ye ar s in U S A rr iv e d b e fo re a g e 2 0 A rr iv e d a ft e r a g e 2 0 N o t a co ll e g e g ra d C o ll e g e g ra d (1 ) (2 ) (3 ) (4 ) (5 ) (6 ) (7 ) (8 ) (9 ) (1 0 ) (1 1 ) (1 2 ) D e p e n d e n t va ri a b le : n u m b e r o f ch il d re n M e n W o m e n M u sl im h a te cr im e s P C 1 .6 4 7 * * 1 .2 9 8 0 .7 2 2 2 .0 3 5 * * 1 .1 4 7 1 .9 5 8 * * 1 .5 6 0 * * * 3 .7 7 9 * * * 3 .1 8 0 * * * 0 .5 3 3 1 .2 0 7 2 .1 5 7 * * (0 .6 4 1 ) (0 .8 7 3 ) (0 .6 3 7 ) (0 .8 1 7 ) (0 .9 7 1 ) (0 .8 3 7 ) (0 .5 6 7 ) (1 .0 7 5 ) (0 .9 1 1 ) (0 .8 1 2 ) (0 .7 7 3 ) (0 .8 4 7 ) S a m p le si ze 2 0 ,4 8 5 1 1 ,7 1 4 9 ,9 3 7 1 0 ,5 4 8 1 0 ,5 8 1 9 ,9 0 4 1 7 ,1 6 2 9 ,1 7 8 7 ,8 9 4 9 ,2 6 8 9 ,3 1 8 7 ,8 4 4 M a rr ie d m e n M a rr ie d w o m e n M u sl im h a te cr im e s P C 2 .4 1 5 * * 2 .2 1 6 * * 1 .3 5 4 2 .8 8 0 * * 2 .0 9 1 2 .6 4 7 * * 0 .9 8 3 * 3 .9 0 1 * * * 2 .9 4 0 * * �0 .3 7 9 0 .8 3 5 1 .5 3 5 * (0 .9 9 0 ) (1 .0 7 6 ) (1 .0 1 4 ) (1 .3 0 1 ) (1 .9 1 5 ) (1 .0 6 5 ) (0 .4 9 7 ) (1 .1 8 6 ) (1 .2 9 6 ) (0 .8 6 7 ) (0 .8 5 9 ) (0 .8 8 5 ) S a m p le si ze 1 2 ,4 5 6 7 ,8 1 6 4 ,9 8 9 7 ,4 6 7 5 ,9 7 4 6 ,4 8 2 1 3 ,4 9 1 7 ,0 9 5 5 ,1 1 4 8 ,3 7 7 7 ,4 0 4 6 ,0 8 7 D e p e n d e n t va ri a b le : n u m b e r o f ch il d re n u n d e r a g e 5 M e n W o m e n M u sl im h a te cr im e s P C 0 .7 2 2 * 0 .8 8 6 0 .4 9 1 0 .8 1 2 * 0 .3 6 2 0 .9 9 8 1 .0 7 5 1 .6 9 5 * * 1 .7 1 1 * * 0 .9 6 5 0 .6 7 5 1 .7 1 4 * * (0 .4 1 0 ) (0 .7 3 7 ) (0 .5 7 7 ) (0 .4 6 6 ) (0 .4 6 1 ) (0 .6 6 5 ) (0 .6 8 2 ) (0 .8 0 4 ) (0 .8 2 1 ) (0 .6 2 0 ) (0 .9 8 0 ) (0 .6 5 6 ) S a m p le si ze 2 0 ,4 8 5 1 1 ,7 1 4 9 ,9 3 7 1 0 ,5 4 8 1 0 ,5 8 1 9 ,9 0 4 1 7 ,1 6 2 9 ,1 7 8 7 ,8 9 4 9 ,2 6 8 9 ,3 1 8 7 ,8 4 4 M a rr ie d m e n M a rr ie d w o m e n M u sl im h a te cr im e s P C 1 .1 5 0 * 1 .4 3 2 0 .7 8 1 1 .3 5 9 * * 0 .8 1 5 1 .5 2 7 * 0 .7 4 6 1 .5 9 8 * * 1 .1 5 3 0 .6 7 3 0 .2 7 8 1 .3 8 4 * * (0 .5 7 5 ) (0 .9 7 3 ) (0 .9 3 7 ) (0 .5 9 7 ) (0 .8 8 2 ) (0 .8 9 5 ) (0 .6 9 1 ) (0 .7 9 2 ) (0 .9 8 0 ) (0 .6 6 4 ) (1 .0 7 2 ) (0 .6 7 7 ) S a m p le si ze 1 2 ,4 5 6 7 ,8 1 6 4 ,9 8 9 7 ,4 6 7 5 ,9 7 4 6 ,4 8 2 1 3 ,4 9 1 7 ,0 9 5 5 ,1 1 4 8 ,3 7 7 7 ,4 0 4 6 ,0 8 7 N ot es . T h e re p o rt e d co e ffi ci e n ts a re fr o m O L S re g re ss io n s. S ta n d ar d e rr o rs , w h ic h a re cl u st e re d b y ye a r, a p p e ar in p a re n th e se s. S ig n ifi ca n ce le ve ls a re in d ic a te d b y * , * * , o r * * * w h ic h re p re se n t 1 0 % , 5 % , a n d 1 % le ve ls , re sp e ct iv e ly . E a ch re g re ss io n in cl u d e s th e se t o f co n tr o l va ri a b le s in th e co re sp e ci fi ca ti o n d e sc ri b e d in co lu m n (3 ) o f T a b le 6 . © 2014 Royal Economic Society. 2016] T E R R O R A N D A S S I M I L A T I O N O F M U S L I M S I N T H E W E S T 2101 findings are robust to the inclusion or exclusion of a broad array of control variables, and the surge in hate crimes against Muslims did not occur in states which were already undergoing an increase in fertility. Our next assimilation outcome is measured by being in the ‘home sector’, which is defined as a person who is not enroled in school and not participating in the labour market. Table 12 shows that hate crimes against Muslims increased the probability that females stayed at home, with no effect on immigrant men from Muslim countries. The magnitude of the coefficient implies that the mean level of hate crimes in the wake of 9/11 increased the probability that Muslim women stayed at home by 7.6% relative to its mean in 2000. Furthermore, although the state-level of hate crimes against Muslims is positively related to the change in the ‘home sector’ for females in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, the state-level surge in anti-Muslim activity after 2001 was not positively correlated with pre-existing trends in the labour market behaviour of females (the correlation is actually negative in column 5 of Table 12). These results are robust to the inclusion of several control variables (see also Figures 12 and 13 for no controls) and are found across many segments of the female Muslim population (Table 13). The finding that anti-Muslim hate crimes led Table 12 Effect of Hate Crimes on Being in the Home Sector for Muslim Immigrants (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) Men Muslim hate crimes PC 0.149 0.131 0.031 (0.168) (0.166) (0.178) Muslim hate crimes PC, 2001–2 0.120 (0.511) Lead Muslim hate crimes PC �0.288* (0.155) Sample size 20,462 20,462 20,462 20,462 19,714 Women Muslim hate crimes PC 0.757** 0.987** 1.152*** (0.360) (0.405) (0.372) Muslim hate crimes PC, 2001–2 3.261*** (0.812) Lead Muslim hate crimes PC �1.120*** (0.389) Sample size 17,154 17,154 17,154 17,154 13,657 Years 2000–10 2000–10 2000–10 2000–10 1990–2000 Year and state FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Other hate crimes No Yes Yes Yes No Other state-year controls No No Yes Yes No Notes. The reported coefficients are the marginal effects from a probit, computed at the means of the independent variables. Standard errors, which are clustered by state, appear in parentheses. Significance levels are indicated by *, **, or *** which represent 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Each regression includes the set of control variables in the core specification described in column (3) of Table 6, in addition to those indicated at the bottom of each column. The ‘other state-year’ controls are those added to the specification in column (5) of Table 6: percentage male among of those of Muslim origin, percentage with Muslim origin, percentage of females in the ‘home’ sector, male unemployment rate among natives, male mean wage among natives. © 2014 Royal Economic Society. 2102 T H E E C O N O M I C J O U R N A L [ N O V E M B E R T a b le 1 3 B ei n g in th e H om e S ec to r fo r M u sl im Im m ig ra n ts by S u bg ro u p s, 2 0 0 0 – 1 0 A ll im m ig ra n ts A t le a st n in e ye ar s in U S A rr iv e d b e fo re a g e 2 0 A rr iv e d a ft e r a g e 2 0 N o t a co ll e g e g ra d C o ll e g e g ra d A ll im m ig ra n ts A t le a st n in e ye a rs in U S A rr iv e d b e fo re a g e 2 0 A rr iv e d a ft e r a g e 2 0 N o t a co ll e g e g ra d C o ll e g e g ra d (1 ) (2 ) (3 ) (4 ) (5 ) (6 ) (7 ) (8 ) (9 ) (1 0 ) (1 1 ) (1 2 ) M e n W o m e n M u sl im h a te cr im e s P C 0 .1 3 1 0 .1 4 2 �0 .0 8 4 0 .2 1 9 0 .2 1 4 0 .0 2 7 0 .9 8 7 * * 0 .3 4 0 1 .0 8 7 * * 0 .7 0 9 1 .7 0 5 * * * 0 .0 4 7 (0 .1 6 6 ) (0 .2 1 1 ) (0 .2 0 6 ) (0 .2 6 7 ) (0 .2 4 1 ) (0 .2 4 3 ) (0 .4 0 5 ) (0 .6 2 6 ) (0 .5 3 5 ) (0 .4 4 7 ) (0 .6 5 5 ) (0 .4 7 0 ) S a m p le si ze 2 0 ,4 6 2 1 1 ,6 3 5 9 ,7 5 2 1 0 ,5 1 5 1 0 ,5 3 2 9 ,7 8 0 1 7 ,1 5 4 9 ,1 5 1 7 ,8 7 3 9 ,2 6 5 9 ,3 0 9 7 ,8 3 6 M a rr ie d m e n M a rr ie d w o m e n M u sl im h a te cr im e s P C 0 .3 7 9 * * 0 .2 7 1 * 0 .0 0 1 0 .5 1 5 * 0 .6 8 4 * * * �0 .0 4 1 0 .6 5 5 * 0 .2 1 5 0 .4 5 7 0 .6 2 4 1 .3 0 7 * * �0 .2 2 7 (0 .1 5 9 ) (0 .1 6 1 ) (0 .2 2 3 ) (0 .2 6 5 ) (0 .1 9 3 ) (0 .2 4 7 ) (0 .3 9 7 ) (0 .6 4 6 ) (0 .6 6 4 ) (0 .4 5 1 ) (0 .6 4 6 ) (0 .5 8 8 ) S a m p le si ze 1 2 ,3 8 6 7 ,6 3 5 4 ,8 1 2 7 ,3 5 2 5 ,8 2 7 6 ,4 0 6 1 3 ,4 8 4 7 ,0 7 5 5 ,0 9 8 8 ,3 7 5 7 ,3 9 5 6 ,0 7 2 N ot es . T h e re p o rt e d co e ffi ci e n ts a re th e m a rg in a l e ff e ct s fr o m a p ro b it , co m p u te d a t th e m e a n s o f th e in d e p e n d e n t va ri a b le s. S ta n d ar d e rr o rs , w h ic h a re cl u st e re d b y st a te , a p p e ar in p a re n th e se s. S ig n ifi ca n ce le ve ls a re in d ic a te d b y * , * * , o r * * * w h ic h re p re se n t 1 0 % , 5 % , a n d 1 % le ve ls , re sp e ct iv e ly . E ac h re g re ss io n in cl u d e s th e se t o f co n tr o l va ri a b le s in th e co re sp e ci fi ca ti o n d e sc ri b e d in co lu m n (3 ) o f T a b le 6 . © 2014 Royal Economic Society. 2016] T E R R O R A N D A S S I M I L A T I O N O F M U S L I M S I N T H E W E S T 2103 T a b le 1 4 E ff ec t of H a te C ri m es on E n gl is h P ro fi ci en cy fo r Im m ig ra n t M u sl im s (1 ) (2 ) (3 ) (4 ) (5 ) (6 ) (7 ) (8 ) (9 ) (1 0 ) M e n W o m e n S p e a k E n g li sh a t h o m e S p e a k E n g li sh a t h o m e M u sl im h a te cr im e s P C �0 .5 2 6 * �0 .4 8 4 �0 .3 5 6 �0 .2 4 4 * �0 .3 6 1 * * * �0 .4 0 7 * * * (0 .2 9 0 ) (0 .3 0 1 ) (0 .2 3 9 ) (0 .1 2 5 ) (0 .1 3 9 ) (0 .1 4 8 ) M u sl im h a te cr im e s P C , 2 0 0 1 – 2 �1 .0 1 7 * * �0 .8 1 0 * * * (0 .4 8 6 ) (0 .2 7 4 ) L e a d M u sl im h a te cr im e s P C 0 .1 1 1 �0 .1 8 9 (0 .1 7 5 ) (0 .1 4 7 ) S a m p le si ze 2 0 ,4 6 1 2 0 ,4 6 1 2 0 ,4 6 1 2 0 ,4 6 1 1 9 ,8 5 6 1 7 ,1 0 3 1 7 ,1 0 3 1 7 ,1 0 3 1 7 ,1 0 3 1 3 ,4 9 2 S p e a k E n g li sh w e ll S p e a k E n g li sh w e ll M u sl im h a te cr im e s P C �0 .7 3 0 * * �0 .7 1 3 * �0 .9 3 3 * * �0 .4 0 6 �0 .6 2 2 * * �0 .6 5 7 * (0 .3 5 9 ) (0 .3 8 5 ) (0 .4 0 2 ) (0 .3 0 9 ) (0 .3 1 5 ) (0 .3 7 3 ) M u sl im h a te cr im e s P C , 2 0 0 1 – 2 �1 .4 2 7 * �1 .1 7 7 (0 .7 9 0 ) (0 .9 1 0 ) L e a d M u sl im h a te cr im e s P C 0 .1 5 3 �0 .0 9 6 (0 .3 1 7 ) (0 .4 6 5 ) S a m p le si ze 2 0 ,4 8 5 2 0 ,4 8 5 2 0 ,4 8 5 2 0 ,4 8 5 1 9 ,8 8 3 1 7 ,1 5 4 1 7 ,1 5 4 1 7 ,1 5 4 1 7 ,1 5 4 1 3 ,6 4 4 Y e a rs 2 0 0 0 – 1 0 2 0 0 0 – 1 0 2 0 0 0 – 1 0 2 0 0 0 – 1 0 1 9 9 0 – 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 – 1 0 2 0 0 0 – 1 0 2 0 0 0 – 1 0 2 0 0 0 – 1 0 1 9 9 0 – 2 0 0 0 Y e a r a n d st a te F E Y e s Y e s Y e s Y e s Y e s Y e s Y e s Y e s Y e s Y e s O th e r h at e cr im e s N o Y e s Y e s Y e s N o N o Y e s Y e s Y e s N o O th e r st a te -y e a r co n tr o ls N o N o Y e s Y e s N o N o N o Y e s Y e s N o N ot es . T h e re p o rt e d co e ffi ci e n ts a re th e m a rg in a l e ff e ct s fr o m a p ro b it , co m p u te d a t th e m e a n s o f th e in d e p e n d e n t va ri a b le s. S ta n d ar d e rr o rs , w h ic h a re cl u st e re d b y st a te , a p p e ar in p a re n th e se s. S ig n ifi ca n ce le ve ls a re in d ic a te d b y * , * * , o r * * * w h ic h re p re se n t 1 0 % , 5 % , a n d 1 % le ve ls , re sp e ct iv e ly . E a ch re g re ss io n in cl u d e s th e se t o f co n tr o l va ri a b le s in th e co re sp e ci fi ca ti o n d e sc ri b e d in co lu m n (3 ) o f T a b le 6 , in a d d it io n to th o se in d ic a te d a t th e b o tt o m o f e a ch co lu m n . T h e ‘o th e r st a te -y e a r’ co n tr o ls a re th o se a d d e d to th e sp e ci fi ca ti o n in co lu m n (5 ) o f T a b le 6 : p e rc e n ta g e m a le a m o n g o f th o se o f M u sl im o ri g in , p e rc e n ta g e w it h M u sl im o ri g in , p e rc e n t fe m a le s in th e ‘h o m e ’ se ct o r, m a le u n e m p lo ym e n t ra te a m o n g n a ti ve s, m a le m e a n w a g e a m o n g n a ti ve s. © 2014 Royal Economic Society. 2104 T H E E C O N O M I C J O U R N A L [ N O V E M B E R T a b le 1 5 E ff ec t of H a te C ri m es on th e E n gl is h P ro fi ci en cy fo r M u sl im Im m ig ra n ts by S u bg ro u p s, 2 0 0 0 – 1 0 A ll im m ig ra n ts A t le a st n in e ye a rs in U S A rr iv e d b e fo re a g e 2 0 A rr iv e d a ft e r a g e 2 0 N o t a co ll e g e g ra d C o ll e g e g ra d A ll im m ig ra n ts A t le a st n in e ye a rs in U S A rr iv e d b e fo re a g e 2 0 A rr iv e d a ft e r a g e 2 0 N o t a co ll e g e g ra d C o ll e g e g ra d (1 ) (2 ) (3 ) (4 ) (5 ) (6 ) (7 ) (8 ) (9 ) (1 0 ) (1 1 ) (1 2 ) D e p e n d e n t va ri a b le : S p e a k E n g li sh a t h o m e M e n W o m e n M u sl im h a te cr im e s P C �0 .4 8 4 �0 .6 2 2 �0 .6 9 0 * * �0 .3 0 8 �0 .6 6 6 * * �0 .2 9 8 �0 .3 6 1 * * * �0 .9 1 0 * * * �0 .6 7 6 * * �0 .1 7 1 �0 .3 1 3 * �0 .3 3 8 (0 .3 0 1 ) (0 .4 7 5 ) (0 .2 8 9 ) (0 .3 6 5 ) (0 .3 2 5 ) (0 .3 9 1 ) (0 .1 3 9 ) (0 .3 3 4 ) (0 .2 9 6 ) (0 .1 5 1 ) (0 .1 6 8 ) (0 .2 4 2 ) S a m p le si ze 2 0 ,4 6 1 1 1 ,6 7 9 9 ,9 1 2 1 0 ,5 1 9 1 0 ,5 0 1 9 ,8 9 0 1 7 ,1 0 3 9 ,1 3 6 7 ,8 6 5 9 ,1 7 8 9 ,1 5 1 7 ,7 6 9 M a rr ie d m e n M a rr ie d w o m e n M u sl im h a te cr im e s P C �0 .5 8 6 �0 .9 8 7 �1 .1 9 7 �0 .1 9 9 �0 .5 5 4 �0 .5 2 6 �0 .4 2 3 * * * �0 .9 0 8 * * * �0 .8 8 9 * * * �0 .1 7 4 �0 .4 3 3 * * �0 .4 2 9 * (0 .4 5 2 ) (0 .6 3 8 ) (0 .7 5 7 ) (0 .3 9 9 ) (0 .5 0 0 ) (0 .5 4 0 ) (0 .1 4 4 ) (0 .2 9 2 ) (0 .2 6 2 ) (0 .1 6 0 ) (0 .1 9 5 ) (0 .2 3 2 ) S a m p le si ze 1 2 ,4 2 9 7 ,7 8 5 4 ,9 6 3 7 ,3 3 2 5 ,9 2 1 6 ,4 5 4 1 3 ,4 3 6 7 ,0 5 4 5 ,0 9 5 8 ,2 3 4 7 ,2 6 8 5 ,9 7 3 D e p e n d e n t va ri a b le : S p e a k E n g li sh w e ll M e n W o m e n M u sl im h a te cr im e s P C �0 .7 1 3 * �0 .8 8 4 * * �0 .9 3 1 * * * �0 .2 1 2 �1 .0 1 8 * * �0 .3 5 1 �0 .6 2 2 * * �0 .7 7 8 * * �1 .3 1 1 * * * �0 .0 4 5 �1 .1 1 8 * * �0 .0 9 9 (0 .3 8 5 ) (0 .3 8 8 ) (0 .2 2 1 ) (0 .6 1 8 ) (0 .4 7 3 ) (0 .3 9 4 ) (0 .3 1 5 ) (0 .3 9 5 ) (0 .3 4 9 ) (0 .4 1 0 ) (0 .5 3 8 ) (0 .6 4 5 ) S a m p le si ze 2 0 ,4 8 5 1 1 ,6 9 6 9 ,9 1 4 1 0 ,5 3 4 1 0 ,5 7 6 9 ,8 8 9 1 7 ,1 5 4 9 ,1 6 5 7 ,8 8 4 9 ,2 6 3 9 ,3 1 2 7 ,8 2 2 M a rr ie d m e n M a rr ie d w o m e n M u sl im h a te cr im e s P C �0 .4 5 2 �0 .8 9 4 �0 .8 1 0 * 0 .0 3 0 �1 .1 9 5 * * 0 .1 2 1 �0 .7 3 0 * * �1 .2 8 5 * * �1 .8 9 1 * * * �0 .1 9 2 �1 .1 1 5 * * �0 .3 0 6 (0 .5 3 8 ) (0 .5 6 4 ) (0 .4 8 2 ) (0 .6 2 5 ) (0 .5 0 3 ) (0 .5 4 6 ) (0 .3 4 7 ) (0 .5 2 6 ) (0 .4 4 4 ) (0 .4 3 7 ) (0 .5 6 3 ) (0 .6 2 6 ) S a m p le si ze 1 2 ,4 5 0 7 ,7 8 9 4 ,9 4 3 7 ,4 6 0 5 ,9 6 2 6 ,4 7 3 1 3 ,4 8 5 7 ,0 8 5 5 ,1 0 4 8 ,3 7 2 7 ,3 9 7 6 ,0 6 2 N ot es . T h e re p o rt e d co e ffi ci e n ts a re th e m a rg in a l e ff e ct s fr o m a p ro b it , co m p u te d a t th e m e a n s o f th e in d e p e n d e n t va ri a b le s. S ta n d ar d e rr o rs , w h ic h a re cl u st e re d b y st a te , a p p e ar in p a re n th e se s. S ig n ifi ca n ce le ve ls a re in d ic a te d b y * , * * , o r * * * w h ic h re p re se n t 1 0 % , 5 % , a n d 1 % le ve ls , re sp e ct iv e ly . E ac h re g re ss io n in cl u d e s th e se t o f co n tr o l va ri a b le s in th e co re sp e ci fi ca ti o n d e sc ri b e d in co lu m n (3 ) o f T a b le 6 . © 2014 Royal Economic Society. 2016] T E R R O R A N D A S S I M I L A T I O N O F M U S L I M S I N T H E W E S T 2105 women, and not men, to be in the home sector, is consistent with a reinforcement of traditional gender roles, thus providing additional support for the idea that the backlash in the aftermath of 9/11 attacks intensified the ethnic identity of Muslim immigrants. Our last assimilation outcome is based on the individual’s level of English proficiency. The two measures of English proficiency are whether the respondent speaks English at home and whether the individual speaks English ‘well’. An affirmative answer to either one is indicative of a more assimilated outcome. The results for both measures are presented in Table 14, while Figures 14–17 present a similar analysis without any additional controls. Comparing the first four columns for each group with the fifth column, Table 14 shows that anti-Muslim hate crimes decreased the use and proficiency of English for both men and women, and these patterns were not consistent with pre-existing trends before 2001. These findings are robust across both measures of English proficiency and to the inclusion of many controls. Table 15 shows that the results are similar across many segments of the Muslim immigrant community, including those that were in the US prior to the 9/11 attacks (at least nine years in the US). Overall, the findings for English proficiency are a bit weaker than previous outcomes in terms of statistical significance but are consistent with previous findings that the anti-Muslim backlash in the wake of the 9/11 attacks led to a more insular Muslim community. 6. The Assimilation Outcomes of Other Immigrant Groups The analysis in the previous Sections shows that anti-Muslim hate crimes after 9/11 created a more closed, less-assimilated Muslim community of immigrants in the US. These findings are consistent across a variety of specifications, across men and women, and for several different assimilation outcomes. Even when we control for the level of hate crime activity against other often-persecuted groups, the analysis shows that Muslim immigrants are responding particularly to the hate crimes against their own group. As a further placebo analysis, this Section examines the assimilation outcomes of other immigrant groups to see if they are responding to anti-Muslim hate crimes in a similar way. Table 16 presents estimates for the effect of anti-Muslim hate crimes on six assimilation outcomes for the following immigrant groups: Hispanics, Chinese, Japanese and Koreans. Our previous results for Muslim immigrants are also presented using the same specification for comparison purposes. Consistent with a causal interpretation of our previous results, Table 16 shows that Muslim immigrants were the only group that became systematically less assimilated in response to the surge in anti-Muslim sentiment after 2001. For men and women, Muslim immigrants are responding in a significant way for each assimilation outcome towards a more insular and traditional way of life. For the other immigrant groups, most of the coefficients are not significant, and the ones that are significant often point to a more assimilated outcome. The group with the © 2014 Royal Economic Society. 2106 T H E E C O N O M I C J O U R N A L [ N O V E M B E R T a b le 1 6 T h e E ff ec t of M u sl im H a te C ri m es on th e A ss im il a ti on O u tc om es of V a ri ou s Im m ig ra n t G ro u p s, 2 0 0 0 – 1 0 M e n W o m e n (1 ) (2 ) (3 ) (4 ) (5 ) (6 ) (7 ) (8 ) (9 ) (1 0 ) (1 1 ) (1 2 ) In tr a -m a rr ie d N u m b e r o f ch il d re n N u m b e r o f ch il d re n le ss th a n a g e 5 H o m e se ct o r S p e a k E n g li sh a t h o m e S p e a k E n g li sh w e ll In tr a -m a rr ie d N u m b e r o f ch il d re n N u m b e r o f ch il d re n le ss th a n a g e 5 H o m e se ct o r S p e a k E n g li sh a t h o m e S p e a k E n g li sh w e ll M u sl im s M u sl im h a te cr im e s P C 0 .8 6 7 * * * 1 .6 4 7 * * 0 .7 2 2 * 0 .1 3 1 �0 .4 8 4 �0 .7 1 3 * 1 .3 8 5 * * * 1 .5 6 0 * * * 1 .0 7 5 0 .9 8 7 * * �0 .3 6 1 * * * �0 .6 2 2 * * (0 .2 6 4 ) (0 .6 4 1 ) (0 .4 1 0 ) (0 .1 6 6 ) (0 .3 0 1 ) (0 .3 8 5 ) (0 .2 6 3 ) (0 .5 6 7 ) (0 .6 8 2 ) (0 .4 0 5 ) (0 .1 3 9 ) (0 .3 1 5 ) S a m p le si ze 1 9 ,9 4 0 2 0 ,4 8 5 2 0 ,4 8 5 2 0 ,4 6 2 2 0 ,4 6 1 2 0 ,4 8 5 1 6 ,7 4 9 1 7 ,1 6 2 1 7 ,1 6 2 1 7 ,1 5 4 1 7 ,1 0 3 1 7 ,1 5 4 H is p a n ic M u sl im h a te cr im e s P C 0 .1 9 2 0 .6 7 9 0 .0 9 7 0 .5 2 2 * * * 0 .1 4 3 0 .2 3 8 �0 .0 1 3 0 .1 7 3 0 .0 1 4 0 .2 7 2 * 0 .1 1 1 0 .0 2 0 (0 .1 4 8 ) (0 .4 4 8 ) (0 .2 3 0 ) (0 .1 3 0 ) (0 .1 0 8 ) (0 .2 3 8 ) (0 .1 3 4 ) (0 .2 7 2 ) (0 .1 2 3 ) (0 .1 4 0 ) (0 .0 9 2 ) (0 .2 7 4 ) S a m p le si ze 3 0 8 ,4 6 1 3 1 9 ,2 3 4 3 1 9 ,2 3 4 3 1 9 ,2 3 4 3 1 9 ,2 3 4 3 1 9 ,2 3 4 2 6 0 ,8 1 7 2 6 9 ,8 6 6 2 6 9 ,8 6 6 2 6 9 ,8 6 6 2 6 9 ,8 6 6 2 6 9 ,8 6 6 C h in es e M u sl im h a te cr im e s P C 0 .2 0 0 0 .9 7 6 * * 0 .6 0 3 * * * 0 .2 8 4 �0 .1 2 4 �0 .0 8 1 �0 .2 7 8 0 .4 8 9 0 .3 7 1 0 .3 8 9 * * �0 .1 3 3 0 .1 0 6 (0 .2 7 8 ) (0 .3 9 0 ) (0 .2 2 4 ) (0 .1 8 4 ) (0 .1 2 9 ) (0 .3 4 0 ) (0 .3 1 0 ) (0 .6 5 1 ) (0 .2 4 6 ) (0 .1 8 9 ) (0 .1 6 7 ) (0 .4 4 7 ) S a m p le si ze 2 3 ,5 9 9 2 4 ,1 9 6 2 4 ,1 9 6 2 4 ,0 8 8 2 4 ,1 6 9 2 4 ,1 9 6 2 7 ,4 6 8 2 8 ,2 1 6 2 8 ,2 1 6 2 8 ,2 1 6 2 8 ,1 3 6 2 8 ,2 1 6 Ja p a n es e M u sl im h a te cr im e s P C 0 .6 1 6 0 .0 0 6 �0 .4 9 8 �0 .1 9 4 0 .2 9 7 �0 .6 9 7 �0 .1 9 1 �0 .3 9 2 �0 .9 7 0 * �0 .5 8 2 �0 .0 6 4 0 .3 6 5 (0 .4 1 0 ) (0 .7 6 3 ) (0 .5 4 7 ) (0 .3 2 3 ) (0 .3 8 3 ) (0 .5 8 6 ) (0 .3 3 6 ) (0 .7 7 8 ) (0 .5 2 0 ) (0 .5 0 4 ) (0 .3 0 4 ) (0 .5 6 7 ) S a m p le si ze 4 ,0 3 5 4 ,1 4 7 4 ,1 4 7 3 ,8 6 3 4 ,1 2 0 4 ,1 2 1 6 ,3 9 4 6 ,6 7 8 6 ,6 7 8 6 ,6 7 2 6 ,6 7 7 6 ,6 7 0 K or ea n M u sl im h a te cr im e s P C �0 .6 0 0 0 .4 6 1 �0 .0 4 6 �0 .0 6 9 0 .3 9 6 * * 0 .9 6 5 * 0 .1 2 7 0 .7 7 9 0 .4 5 3 * 0 .5 0 1 * * 0 .3 0 1 0 .2 2 5 (0 .3 8 5 ) (0 .5 0 4 ) (0 .3 6 1 ) (0 .2 1 3 ) (0 .1 7 1 ) (0 .5 4 0 ) (0 .3 4 4 ) (0 .4 9 4 ) (0 .2 6 0 ) (0 .2 4 6 ) (0 .2 2 3 ) (0 .4 3 7 ) S a m p le si ze 1 2 ,0 4 1 1 2 ,2 3 3 1 2 ,2 3 3 1 2 ,1 0 9 1 2 ,2 3 3 1 2 ,2 2 2 1 5 ,6 0 9 1 5 ,9 9 3 1 5 ,9 9 3 1 5 ,9 5 9 1 5 ,9 9 3 1 5 ,9 6 8 N ot es . T h e re p o rt e d co e ffi ci e n ts fr o m re g re ss io n s u si n g th e n u m b e r o f ch il d re n a re fr o m O L S re g re ss io n s. In th e o th e r co lu m n s, th e re p o rt e d co e ffi ci e n ts a re th e m a rg in a l e ff e ct s fr o m a p ro b it , co m p u te d a t th e m e a n s o f th e in d e p e n d e n t va ri a b le s. S ta n d ar d e rr o rs , w h ic h a re cl u st e re d b y st a te , a p p e ar in p a re n th e se s. S ig n ifi ca n ce le ve ls a re in d ic a te d b y * , * * , o r * * * w h ic h re p re se n t 1 0 % , 5 % , a n d 1 % le ve ls , re sp e ct iv e ly . E a ch re g re ss io n in cl u d e s th e se t o f co n tr o l va ri a b le s in th e co re sp e ci fi ca ti o n d e sc ri b e d in co lu m n (4 ) o f T a b le 6 . © 2014 Royal Economic Society. 2016] T E R R O R A N D A S S I M I L A T I O N O F M U S L I M S I N T H E W E S T 2107 most significant coefficients is the Koreans but two of the four significant coefficients are pointing to increased assimilation. While it is a priori conceivable that the assimilation behaviour of other immigrants could respond to the overall level of bigotry against their group or even other groups, the consistent pattern pointing to less assimilation is found only for Muslim immigrants. By showing that our findings for Muslim immigrants are not part of a general pattern found for other groups, the results in this Section support a casual interpretation of our previous findings showing less assimilation by Muslim immigrants in response to the unexpected surge in anti-Muslim sentiment after the 2001 attacks. 7. Conclusions Our analysis shows that the 9/11 attacks induced a backlash against the Muslim community which, in turn, increased the ethnic identity and demographic strength of the Muslim immigrant community in the US. The results are not due to pre-existing trends in the assimilation outcomes of Muslim immigrants across states and are found to be robust to the inclusion or exclusion of a wide array of personal and state-level characteristics. Notably, we show that Muslim immigrants are reacting specifically to hate crimes against Muslims, after controlling for the level of hate crimes against other groups. Further support for a causal interpretation comes from our findings that other groups (Hispanics, Chinese, Japanese, Koreans, as well as Muslims who already made their marital decisions before the 9/11 attacks) did not respond in a similar way to the anti-Muslim backlash. In this manner, our analysis supports the idea that 9/11 may have a long-term political and socio- economic impact, by creating a larger and more ethnically cohesive Muslim community in this generation and also the next.11 Our findings are consistent with the anecdotal evidence in the current literature which argues that the 9/11 attacks led to a galvanised and more observant Muslim community.12 Overall, our analysis highlights a new type of ‘backlash’ that has been ignored in the literature on political conflict. Existing models argue that extremist groups commit terror attacks with the goal of provoking a backlash in order to radicalise moderate supporters that reside in the same country as the perpetrators (Rosendorff and Sandler, 2004, 2010; Siqueira and Sandler, 2006; Bueno de 11 While we show that hate crimes against Muslims lead to an increase in the demographic strength of the US Muslim community, Adida et al. (2011) show that Muslim demographic strength leads to more discrimination against Muslims. Hence, the combination of both results suggests the existence of a potential feedback loop between Muslim demographic strength and discrimination against Muslims that reinforces itself over time. 12 Although Westerners tend to link a heightened Islamic identification with radicalisation and violence, there is no consistent and systematic evidence of such a link. For example, whereas Chen (2006) uncovers a strong relationship between Islamic religious intensity and social violence during the Indonesian financial crisis of 1997, Clingingsmith et al. (2009) find that participation in the Hajj among Pakistanis causes an increase on the observance of Islamic practices, together with an increase in more tolerant attitudes towards fellow Muslims and non-Muslims, and beliefs of harmony and peace among different religions. Similarly, Manning and Roy (2010) report that second generation Muslim immigrants to Britain tend to think of themselves as British almost as much as the white UK-born population. © 2014 Royal Economic Society. 2108 T H E E C O N O M I C J O U R N A L [ N O V E M B E R Mesquita and Dickson, 2007; Baliga and Sj€ostr€om, 2012).13 Despite differing mechanisms and modelling assumptions, most of these models analyse how the counter-terror response by the targeted country affects the local political support for the terrorist group and their aims, and the subsequent recruitment of members from the local population to commit terror attacks in the future.14 The predictions of these models are consistent with the idea that Al Qaeda provoked the US to invade Afghanistan. Our findings, however, suggest that terror groups may try to provoke a backlash against their own ethnic or religious group in the targeted country, in order to halt the assimilation of Muslim adherents into Western society. Although our analysis uses data from the US, our results are likely to be highly relevant for Europe for several reasons. First, the 9/11 attacks in the US produced a backlash against Muslims in several countries throughout Europe (�Aslund and Rooth, 2005; Hanes and Machin, 2012; Sch€uller, 2012). Second, there were subsequent attacks by Al Qaeda on major European cities after the 9/11 attacks (Madrid in 2004 and London in 2005), which may have induced a further backlash. Third, Muslim immigrants in Europe tend to be less assimilated than other immigrant groups, even before the 9/11 attacks (Bisin et al., 2008). In general, the assimilation of Muslim immigrants is a much larger public issue in Europe than in the US, most likely because of the larger scale of the immigration wave and perhaps due to the lower education levels of Muslims who migrated to Europe versus the US. Therefore, our findings shed new light on our understanding of the increasing use of terror attacks on Western countries, with the concurrent rise in social and political tensions surrounding the assimilation of Muslim immigrants in Europe and the US. 13 In addition to a strategy of backlash, the related literature mentions a myriad of other goals behind a terror campaign. See, for example, the analyses of Lapan and Sandler (1993), Kydd and Walter (2002, 2006), Berman and Laitin (2005, 2008), Bloom (2005), Bueno de Mesquita (2005, 2013), Berrebi and Klor (2006), Benmelech and Berrebi (2007), Rohner and Frey (2007), Abadie and Gardeazabal (2008), Gould and Klor (2010), Becker and Rubinstein (2011) and Benmelech et al. (2012). 14 The empirical evidence on the effectiveness of provoking a military response to gain political support at home is limited. Focusing on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Jaeger et al. (2012) show that Palestinian fatalities cause the short-run radicalisation of the Palestinian population but the effect is fleeting and disappears within ninety days. Jaeger et al. (2012) also show that more critical events of the conflict, like the occurrence of the first Palestinian uprising or the signing of the Oslo accords, do have a long lasting effect on Palestinians political attitudes, an effect that remains substantial even over 20 years after the event. For other empirical studies on the effects of terrorism and political violence on the political attitudes of the affected population, see Karol and Miguel (2007), Berrebi and Klor (2008), Gardeazabal (2010), Gould and Klor (2010), Montalvo (2011), Shayo and Zussman (2011) and Jaeger et al. (2015). © 2014 Royal Economic Society. 2016] T E R R O R A N D A S S I M I L A T I O N O F M U S L I M S I N T H E W E S T 2109 T a b le A 1 M ea n C h a ra ct er is ti cs a n d O u tc om es by C ou n tr y of O ri gi n , 2 0 0 0 – 1 0 C o u n tr y o f a n ce st ry N u m b e r o f o b se rv a ti o n s, 2 0 0 0 – 1 0 In tr a - m a rr ie d In te r- m a rr ie d E ve r m a rr ie d N u m b e r o f ch il d re n N u m b e r o f ch il d re n b e lo w a g e 5 H o m e se ct o r m e n H o m e se ct o r w o m e n S p e a k E n g li sh a t h o m e S p e a k E n g li sh w e ll Y e a rs in U S M a le C o ll e g e g ra d M u sl im h a te cr im e s P C A fg h a n 1 ,5 1 6 0 .4 7 3 0 .0 6 1 0 .6 3 8 1 .1 3 7 0 .4 2 7 0 .0 9 6 0 .3 5 6 0 .0 5 7 0 .6 2 1 1 3 .8 2 2 0 .4 9 0 0 .2 4 2 0 .0 1 3 A lg e ri a n 1 1 7 0 .3 6 5 0 .1 9 1 0 .6 9 2 0 .9 2 3 0 .4 7 9 0 .0 7 9 0 .2 9 6 0 .1 2 8 0 .5 6 4 8 .7 4 4 0 .5 3 8 0 .4 8 7 0 .0 2 7 A ra b 1 ,6 9 7 0 .4 4 0 0 .1 4 3 0 .7 2 6 1 .2 4 0 0 .5 4 2 0 .0 9 5 0 .5 1 8 0 .0 6 7 0 .6 4 2 1 0 .7 0 2 0 .6 1 7 0 .3 7 7 0 .0 1 6 A ra b ic 2 ,4 4 3 0 .4 3 6 0 .1 4 6 0 .7 2 6 1 .3 2 5 0 .5 8 8 0 .1 1 4 0 .5 3 2 0 .0 6 7 0 .5 6 7 1 0 .6 2 0 0 .6 0 2 0 .3 0 0 0 .0 1 9 B a n g la d e sh i 2 ,6 3 1 0 .5 7 0 0 .0 4 9 0 .7 4 2 0 .9 5 6 0 .3 9 6 0 .0 7 8 0 .4 6 6 0 .0 4 5 0 .4 7 0 8 .7 0 1 0 .5 0 6 0 .4 5 4 0 .0 1 1 B e n g al i 4 4 1 0 .4 6 0 0 .1 2 7 0 .7 0 5 0 .9 8 0 0 .3 2 4 0 .0 5 5 0 .4 1 7 0 .0 6 8 0 .5 6 0 1 1 .1 2 9 0 .4 9 4 0 .4 3 5 0 .0 1 5 E g yp ti a n 2 ,9 0 9 0 .4 5 7 0 .1 4 4 0 .6 9 9 1 .0 0 6 0 .4 7 8 0 .0 8 3 0 .3 9 7 0 .1 1 6 0 .6 7 2 1 0 .7 7 3 0 .5 7 9 0 .6 2 2 0 .0 1 6 In d o n e si a n 1 ,5 3 3 0 .2 7 7 0 .2 4 0 0 .5 9 6 0 .6 6 3 0 .3 0 5 0 .0 5 5 0 .3 0 5 0 .1 4 6 0 .5 7 5 8 .9 5 4 0 .4 1 6 0 .4 9 1 0 .0 1 5 Ir a n ia n 6 ,3 4 9 0 .3 6 3 0 .1 4 0 0 .6 0 6 0 .6 7 1 0 .2 8 6 0 .0 6 7 0 .2 4 1 0 .1 0 7 0 .7 6 1 1 4 .5 0 6 0 .4 9 9 0 .5 7 8 0 .0 1 1 Ir a q i 1 ,0 6 5 0 .4 3 3 0 .0 9 8 0 .6 2 8 1 .1 3 9 0 .4 6 2 0 .1 5 8 0 .4 3 7 0 .0 5 9 0 .4 8 1 9 .2 3 2 0 .5 5 3 0 .2 6 6 0 .0 3 0 Jo rd a n ia n 1 ,0 5 0 0 .5 2 2 0 .1 4 4 0 .7 6 8 1 .3 5 8 0 .6 2 5 0 .0 8 0 0 .5 2 7 0 .0 7 1 0 .7 0 6 1 1 .2 2 1 0 .5 8 1 0 .4 2 8 0 .0 1 5 K a sh m ir i 1 9 0 .4 2 1 0 .1 5 8 0 .6 3 2 0 .7 3 7 0 .3 1 6 0 .0 0 0 0 .3 7 5 0 .2 6 3 0 .9 4 7 9 .5 7 9 0 .5 7 9 0 .7 3 7 0 .0 0 2 M id d le E a st e rn 9 4 4 0 .4 2 1 0 .1 5 6 0 .7 0 2 1 .0 7 0 0 .4 6 0 0 .0 6 9 0 .3 6 0 0 .1 3 1 0 .7 5 5 1 2 .9 8 9 0 .5 5 0 0 .5 4 4 0 .0 2 1 M o ro cc a n 1 ,2 7 6 0 .2 6 7 0 .2 7 6 0 .7 0 7 0 .6 7 2 0 .3 7 4 0 .0 7 4 0 .3 2 2 0 .1 1 4 0 .5 9 5 7 .9 3 7 0 .6 4 5 0 .3 5 4 0 .0 1 6 O th e r A ra b 4 7 9 0 .3 4 5 0 .1 6 6 0 .6 3 0 0 .8 1 4 0 .4 4 3 0 .0 8 2 0 .4 3 2 0 .1 1 3 0 .5 8 9 6 .0 2 3 0 .6 6 2 0 .4 7 8 0 .0 3 4 P a k is ta n i 7 ,1 7 5 0 .5 2 7 0 .0 8 2 0 .7 2 7 1 .1 3 5 0 .4 7 4 0 .0 6 8 0 .5 1 9 0 .0 6 6 0 .6 8 7 1 0 .6 2 6 0 .5 3 8 0 .4 9 6 0 .0 1 4 P a le st in ia n 1 ,2 7 3 0 .5 1 1 0 .1 7 8 0 .7 9 3 1 .6 0 5 0 .6 7 9 0 .0 7 9 0 .5 3 1 0 .0 6 5 0 .6 8 7 1 3 .1 8 2 0 .5 8 6 0 .3 6 7 0 .0 1 5 S yr ia n 1 ,0 7 4 0 .4 8 5 0 .1 5 2 0 .7 4 0 1 .2 5 3 0 .5 3 3 0 .0 8 9 0 .5 1 8 0 .0 8 8 0 .6 5 6 1 1 .7 1 0 0 .5 2 5 0 .4 2 4 0 .0 1 4 T u rk is h 3 ,3 4 9 0 .3 7 9 0 .1 7 3 0 .6 5 5 0 .6 6 0 0 .3 1 0 0 .0 7 2 0 .3 1 1 0 .1 0 5 0 .6 3 1 8 .3 0 0 0 .5 6 6 0 .5 6 1 0 .0 1 7 Y e m e n i 3 5 7 0 .5 2 9 0 .0 8 1 0 .8 4 0 1 .6 9 5 0 .7 0 0 0 .0 7 0 0 .7 7 1 0 .0 2 5 0 .3 9 8 1 0 .7 9 0 0 .5 9 7 0 .1 5 4 0 .0 3 0 N ot e. T h e sa m p le a n d d a ta so u rc e s u se d fo r th e se ca lc u la ti o n s a re d e sc ri b e d in T a b le 1 . A p p e n d ix A . © 2014 Royal Economic Society. 2110 T H E E C O N O M I C J O U R N A L [ N O V E M B E R Table A2 Number of Hate Crimes Against Muslims by State after the Year 2000 Number of Muslims in 2000 Census Hate crimes, 2001–8 Hate crimes in 2001–2 Hate crimes per capita (2001–8) Hate crimes per capita (2001–2) Wyoming 9 3 2 0.333 0.222 Minnesota 293 54 23 0.184 0.078 Vermont 14 2 2 0.143 0.143 Nebraska 91 12 4 0.132 0.044 Maine 46 6 1 0.130 0.022 New Hampshire 79 8 4 0.101 0.051 Montana 20 2 0 0.100 0.000 Arizona 599 59 29 0.098 0.048 Michigan 2,014 186 68 0.092 0.034 Idaho 56 5 5 0.089 0.089 Tennessee 385 30 12 0.078 0.031 Utah 137 10 6 0.073 0.044 Delaware 97 7 2 0.072 0.021 Ohio 1,129 78 48 0.069 0.043 Colorado 449 30 18 0.067 0.040 Kentucky 214 14 7 0.065 0.033 Missouri 347 21 15 0.061 0.043 Washington 715 40 21 0.056 0.029 Massachusetts 1,204 64 34 0.053 0.028 Oregon 381 20 9 0.052 0.024 North Dakota 20 1 0 0.050 0.000 Alaska 40 2 2 0.050 0.050 Kansas 209 10 1 0.048 0.005 South Carolina 176 7 2 0.040 0.011 New Jersey 3,291 124 66 0.038 0.020 Nevada 286 10 5 0.035 0.017 West Virginia 94 3 2 0.032 0.021 Wisconsin 254 8 6 0.031 0.024 Oklahoma 244 7 3 0.029 0.012 Indiana 386 11 6 0.028 0.016 Connecticut 495 14 9 0.028 0.018 North Carolina 584 15 9 0.026 0.015 Virginia 2,215 51 27 0.023 0.012 District of Columbia 174 4 1 0.023 0.006 Maryland 1,397 29 18 0.021 0.013 Texas 2,955 60 38 0.020 0.013 New Mexico 128 2 2 0.016 0.016 Rhode Island 202 3 2 0.015 0.010 Pennsylvania 1,155 17 10 0.015 0.009 Arkansas 75 1 0 0.013 0.000 Illinois 2,179 28 12 0.013 0.006 California 13,756 173 87 0.013 0.006 Louisiana 281 3 2 0.011 0.007 Iowa 109 1 0 0.009 0.000 Florida 2,586 23 13 0.009 0.005 New York 7,302 55 0 0.008 0.000 Alabama 169 1 0 0.006 0.000 Georgia 862 4 3 0.005 0.003 South Dakota 37 0 0 0.000 0.000 Mississippi 89 0 0 0.000 0.000 Hawaii 67 0 0 0.000 0.000 Note. 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work_ynfr5skdxfft7lgmhqllfzgcwq	----	THE „PROPAGANDA” CONCEPT IN THE CONTEMPORARY DOCTRINE AND THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ROMANIA AND THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA Associate professor Aurel Octavian PASAT1 Abstract This scientific article aims at the interdisciplinary research of the concept of propaganda through the perspective of sociological, political and legal sciences, as well as the substantiation of a relevant study in the field of criminal liability for criminal acts that are committed in the form of propaganda. Therefore, as the objectives proposed for this study will serve the following: research into the contemporary doctrine in the field of sociology, political science and jurisprudence for the formulation of a concept relevant to the science of criminal law; the synthesis of characteristic traits of propaganda (deliberate action in the form of systematic communication) as ways of committing crimes that are incriminated in the contemporary criminal law of Romania and the Republic of Moldova; conducting a differentiated comparative study of the legal-criminal norms in the Special Part of the Criminal Code of Romania, as well as the Special Part of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Moldova; demonstrating inconsistencies in legislative technique that have been dropped from the legislator's view and suggesting suggestions for improving both criminal science and the criminal legislation in force in both countries. Methods of research have been chosen systemic method, comparative method, analysis and synthesis. The author carried out the investigation of comparative comparative criminal and extrapenal norms (Romania, Republic of Moldova), identified some gaps in the legal technique, and demonstrated the need to revise some legislative concepts that will ultimately contribute to the reconceptualization of the criminal law in force crimes involving elements of propaganda. Keywords: propaganda; deliberate communication; conviction; influencing the public; criminality of extremist nature; war propaganda; propaganda of extremism; the extremist-terrorist offense; extremism; terrorism. JEL Classification: K14 1. The introductory section The research department of this study consists of the interdisciplinary approach of the concept of propaganda, as well as its differentiated analysis in the process of application in the doctrine and incriminating text of the criminal law of Romania and the Republic of Moldova. The research focuses mainly on the in-depth study not only of some provisions of the Special Part of the New Criminal Code of Romania2 and, implicitly, of the Special Part of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Moldova3 (CP RM) but, to an equal extent, attention is paid to the questionable issues of extrapenetal legislation on arms and ammunition in both states. From the doctrinal point of view, we find the presence of interdisciplinary scientific studies necessary both in Romania and in the Republic of Moldova (sociology, politics, law), but we observe the lack of thorough comparative criminal law studies on the concept of propaganda. In this respect, we will notice that propaganda is a deliberate, sometimes deliberate act (timely thought) as a form of systematic communication but accompanied by a specific purpose, such as influencing public opinion through various non-violent methods, also instigating to hate and violence, so that the subject to whom the message is addressed accepts it willingly. Not every form of propaganda has the socially advanced danger enough to reach the threshold of prejudice of criminal law, but only those forms that involve signs of extremism (hate speech, etc.) or even its extreme form of war propaganda. In our opinion, war propaganda correlates with extremist propaganda as part and whole, in other words, war propaganda is the propaganda of extremism, but not any form of propagation of extremism is war propaganda. 1 Aurel Octavian Pasat - State University „Bogdan Petriceicu Haşdeu”, Republic of Moldova; Customs Inspector, Border Customs Office Galaţi-Giurgiuleşti, octavian_passat@yahoo.com. 2 Law no. 187/2012 for the enforcement of the Law no. 286/2009 on the Criminal Code. Originally published in the Official Gazette of Romania no.757 of 12.11.2012. 3 Criminal Code of the Republic of Moldova, no. 985 of 18.04.2002. Republished in the Official Gazette of the Republic of Moldova, 2009, no. 72-74. Perspectives of Law and Public Administration Volume 7, Issue 2, December 2018 215 Propaganda as a deliberate act in the form of systematic communication addressed to a target group in order to convey certain ideas, values, settings does not affect the degree of prejudice of the criminal law, and therefore does not constitute an offense. At the same time, if the speech spoken or disseminated in any way, it will contain elements of hatred based on discriminatory signs provided by the criminal law, it will constitute, as the case may be, an offense. 2. Concept of "propaganda" in contemporary doctrine Propaganda is a concept associated with an ambition or totalitarian practice, which has led to its degradation. This term can be interpreted as exerting influence on the human intellect in order to impose a person's opinions, attitudes or ideas. B-A.Teodor authors and V-I.Nicula believes that propaganda is "an act of persuasion through instigating, tends to replace reason with impresionabilitatea, erasing the line between truth and false"4. The author, R. Herjeu, emphasizes that any message is intended to get a reaction from the other. Every word hides in it a kernel of manipulation, of propaganda5. In its most basic formulation, propaganda is a neutral term for spreading ideas. In principle, propaganda is dialogue without interlocutor. The dialogue is conducted with the beliefs, the perceptions and the sensations of the people we are trying to get a certain idea of. The other is present only to accept or reject ideas transmitted. The origin of the word comes from the Latin expression " congregatiode propaganda fid" - a congregation of the propagation of faith. The term obviously implies the transmission of information to a public, which is to be welcomed to it and which is not perceived by the informant as a liar but, on the contrary, as an expression of the only truth. Propaganda actions are diverse after 1) contained; 2) form and 3) techniques of spreading the message6, and as mentioned by S. Roşca, the key to the success of the propaganda on the people is the predominance of the image on the explanation, the sensible frustration over the rational7. In the author's opinion, the ability to perceive the masses is limited, the level of understanding is low, but the ability to forget is great. This really is concluded that any propaganda effect should be limited to a few points that should be used as passwords, as long until you clearly even last be understood in such a password which is meant to be understood8. Propaganda is an independent form of communication. The notion of communication began to be used in the fourteenth century and comes from the Latin "communis", which means sharing, being in a relationship, sharing. In the next century, as a result of road development and post, it is enriched with the sense of transmission9. A communication process is "individual acts of transmission and reception" of a message. Communicating involves the action of "transmitting a message" about "something" to someone who is the "receiver," a message from an entity called "transmitter". Over time, the term "propaganda" has gained a depreciative connotation due to the implications of the use of propaganda by totalitarian regimes. Practice is often considered treacherous, deceitful and manipulative term "propaganda" was replaced by "information" or "education", the difference is reflected in hate propaganda purposes. In this context, the author, C. Pavel, argues: "While the information provides its public with a direct assertion of the facts, propaganda "packs" these facts into a package designed to evoke a certain answer. While education teaches recipient how to think, so as to form their own intellect, propaganda trying to tell people what to think (emphasis ours - the author's note). Information and education seek to expand 4 Teodor B.-A., Nicula V.-I., Propaganda versus comunicare politică: perspective teoretice în era informațională. Analele Universităţii „Constantin Brâncuşi” din Târgu-Jiu, Seria Litere și Ştiinţe Sociale, 2012, no. 2, p.32-46. 5 Herjeu R. Tehnici de propaganda, manipulare și persuasiune în televiziune, p.9-12. https://dorinpopa.files.wordpress.com/2008/ 04/herjeu-radu-tehnici-de-propaganda-manipulare-si-pers-in-tv.pdf. (accessed: 20.07.2018). 6Teodor B.-A., Nicula V.-I., op.cit., p.32-46. 7Roșca S. Reflecții conceptuale asupra noțiunii de propagandă: istorie și actualitate. Institutul de Relaţii Internaţionale din Moldova. „Revistă ştiinţifico-practică”, 2016, no. 1, p.51-67. 8 Idem, p.51-52. 9Teodor B.-A., Nicula V.-I., op. cit., p.32-46. Perspectives of Law and Public Administration Volume 7, Issue 2, December 2018 216 public outlook and open up the rationale, while propaganda strives to reduce it, eventually stop it"10. In this context, author S. Roşca reports: "Since the dawn of human consciousness, it has been and has remained in the nature of people this need to convince, influence, persuade, deceive, lie to each other. The boundary between persuasion, influence, deception, persuasion and lie is very easy to pass. It depends only on the interests or, in other words, on the individual's motivation. Only when he fails "by talking", the "civilized and educated" man resorts to force, violence, war"11. The quoted author continues to argue: "Citizens are cultivating a certain image that, professionally, seems to be reality itself. They come to believe in such a picture and do not question whether it is true or not. All this must be understood in the context of the period of assertion of the masses, the mass media and especially the revolutions. Just as revolutions can not be accomplished without the direct participation of the masses, propaganda was also needed by revolutionary leaders to trigger, and then maintain, the spirit and the revolutionary psychic energy among the crowds. Along with public speeches, the media of that era was the preferred vehicle for transporting messages and revolutions from leaders to masses"12. In other words, in our opinion, studying the concept of "propaganda" can not be done outside the knowledge of the sociological phenomenon of propaganda. Thus, propaganda should be investigated at the intersection of a goal defined by a political leader with the obedience effect achieved by the masses through non-violent means (in a physical sense). In this sense, sociologist D. Dungaciu brings "Theorem of Thomas"13. The most popular application of this theorem is the attack on a bank or financial-banking system. A suite of rumors related to a bank that is bankrupt though it is not (fake), once believed by the public (perceived as real), leads to the action of depositors to withdraw money, both concomitantly and unexpectedly, from banks. As a result, the bank goes bankrupt (the fake fact becomes real through consequences). This example and many others fuel the idea that propaganda and false rumors irrepressibly and decisively influence social life on all its levels. In fact, no. The admitted error can be seen in the previous example: for the original rumor (the bank is bankrupt or incapacity to pay) to be perceived as real, there must have been, in the population, mistrust, and the feeling of precariousness of the financial and banking system, and, of the respective bank. In other words, before the crisis itself (the fall of the bank) there must be another crisis, less visible but essential - the crisis of confidence14. When the company is already in crisis, then propaganda has an indisputable chances to change the profile of a society. Sociologist D. Dungagiu therefore demonstrates that the effectiveness of propaganda/misinformation is directly proportional to the crises of trust in our societies15. In the opinion of author A. Jefflea, the concept of propaganda involves systematic actions aimed at inserting into the public consciousness of certain ideas or in the formation of certain settings and beliefs16. According to R. Herjeu, the propaganda techniques are not very many, because the ideas to be transmitted are few simple and linear. Manipulation is mainly through omission, not by lying17. In a different way, sociologist Jean Marie Domenach issued the following rules of propaganda: I. Orchestration rule. In a propaganda action, the themes of instigation must be repeated in various forms, adapting to different audiences. 10 Pavel C. Publicitatea și propaganda în sociatatea contemporană: asemănări și deosebiri. „Management Intercultural”, Vol. XV, No.3 (29), 2013, p. 258. 11Roșca S., op. cit., p.51-52. 12 Idem, p.51-52. 13Dungaciu D., Gândirea în doi pași sau cum trebuie gândit războiul informational.„Revista de Științe politice și Relații internaționale”, 2017, XIV, Vol.2, p.22-26. 14 Ibidem. 15Dungaciu D., op. cit. ( Gândirea în doi pași...), p. 22-26. 16 Jeflea A., Moraru V. Infracțiuni ce implică semne de extremism religios: aspecte de drept penal. „Studia Universitatis Moldaviae”, 2016, no. 8(98), Seria „Științe sociale”, p.175. 17Herjeu R., op. cit. Perspectives of Law and Public Administration Volume 7, Issue 2, December 2018 217 II. The rule of simplification and the unique enemy. The political message has to be vulgarized to the fullest. The slogan and graphic symbols need to be simplified, mystically loaded and not necessarily explained III. The rule of deformation and caricature. It is based on news deformation, which is a journalistic process currently used by the partisan press, which only highlights the convenient information. In parallel, the context quotes process is frequently used. IV. Transfer rule. The message must always take into account the cultural background, information baggage and the level of education of the target group. V. The rule of unanimity and contagion. It is based on the studies of psychologists who have shown that opinions in a group are strengthened under the pressure of the values of the group to which the individual belongs. From the literature we synthesized the following characteristic traits of propaganda: it is a species of communication - the induction through the systematic effort of the desired behavior of a group using only communicative means, involves a process of transmitting ideas and values derived from conscious reasons, a social interaction symbolic (based on symbols) - manipulation of the beliefs and behavior of the population through the use of symbols and speeches, is planned and executed only under the authority of an authority, awakens the interest of the audience and determines the subject to which the communication is addressed to willingly accept this as a deliberate action, determined by a certain purpose (hidden, camouflaged or unknown) - changing the attitudes and behaviors of a selected target audience. Thus, in our opinion, propaganda is a deliberate action in the form of systematic communication, which is a process of transmitting ideas and values, based on symbols, in order to influence public opinion to think and act in a in particular, being planned and executed only under the authority of an authority. In the literature, three types of propaganda have been outlined, depending on the veracity of the information promoted, as follows: white propaganda - comes from a correctly identified source and communicates correct information, but the presentation is a tendentious one; gray propaganda is the form of propaganda that comes from a source that might or may not be correctly identified and the accuracy of the information is not certain; is frequently used in misinformation because it contains real-world information, combined with false information, and which, on the whole, creates an apparently accurate but difficult to verify aspect; black propaganda – the hidden propaganda (misinformation or big lie), which claims a false source of message origin and metapropaganda, which discredits the propaganda of the other camp, the source is false and its contents encompass inventions, fabrications, lies of the most varied types. In this sense, misinformation is the dissemination of false willful information, in order to confuse the enemy about its own position or intentions of action. It also refers to the distortion of real information to make them unusable. Misinformation is the technique that allows the provision of misleading general information to third parties, causing them to commit collective acts or to disseminate the desirable judgments of misinformers. There are many ways to treat information so that it becomes fit for an act of misinformation: denying facts; reversing the facts; the mixture of truth and lie; changing the reason; blurring; generalization; the use of unequal parts. According to the criterion of the conception of the propaganda message, three types of propaganda were identified: rational propaganda - using only concrete and real facts and facts, exposed in a certain logic, convincing by selecting arguments favorable to the proposed goal; rational-emotional propaganda-uses especially the allusion, association or transfer of image, suggesting without concrete assertion, being the most difficult to perceive and emotional propaganda-the form that uses any way of exploiting emotional states: indoctrination and expansion- having the right objectively attracting and convincing indifferent or oscillating; of agitation (prepropaganda) - is based on the exploitation of a single idea or message and integration propagation-specific to totalitarian regimes, with the aim of consolidating and maintaining sympathizers or those already convinced. Perspectives of Law and Public Administration Volume 7, Issue 2, December 2018 218 In principle, the formation of beliefs has four stages: presentation of ideas (transmission of the message); perceptual conceptualization (association of ideas with notions); the third stage is the most important and presupposes acceptance of the ideas submitted. If he rejects them, propaganda failed because of construction deficiencies (ignorance of people's previous convictions, ignorance of unconscious sensations, lack of logic and coherence), or because of transmission deficiencies (use inappropriate communication channel, wrong choice of time and duration of transmission or ignoring the circumstances of the transmission); the objectification of values in subsequent behaviors (application of ideas and attitudes derived from their acceptance)18. Manipulation is a propaganda technique, an action designed to make us think or act as the manipulator dictates. It is the method by which one's ideas are induced to accept them, this implying on our part the reactions desired by the one who manipulates us. It can be done in several ways, most often encountering the use of truncated truths and arguments a bit arranged. With the right message, any information reaches directly to the emotional center of our consciousness, and it is the surest way that we are served with various major impact information, carefully hidden among things known, banal, uninteresting. Banality creates a state of safety, quietness, comfort, while the new always puts us on guard. The most used are the use of falsified arguments or some truths arranged in false sequences and the combination of the message with those elements that appeal to the non-rational emotional centers of human consciousness. While the first form of manipulation is coarse and is used with large groups of people with a low level of intelligence and culture, the latter is put into practice by professionals trying to influence the hardest to induce error with lies relatively easy to discover by using logic, common sense, culture and information19. Persuasion - the second propaganda technique for changing the opinions of a person (or group of people) and getting desirable reactions on their part(s). Unlike manipulation, it is a belief activity based on such an organization of influences that leads to the personal adoption of personal change. Following manipulation, a person may have a certain reaction (possibly the one that the manipulator wants) in an instinctual and less rational way. Essential persuasion is the sensation the other person needs to understand that he understands what he is told, that he has integrated the motives of change, and that subsequent decisions belong entirely to him, without influences from the outside. Another difference between manipulation and persuasion is that the former is based on that personal factor called suggestiveness while persuasion is based on persuasiveness, that is, the tendency to be responsive to influences. Unlike suggestiveness, persuasiveness involves the individual's awareness of accepting and internalizing transmitted messages. Persuasion may also resemble with negotiation, but they are different, not as a way of putting them into practice, but by reference to the other. When you negotiate, you are not interested in whether the other person shares your point of view or not, as long as you can reach a mutually accepted conclusion. You need persuasion when you want to reach a mutually accepted decision, but you also want the other person to better understand your position and share your own views. For propaganda to be effective, it must be: continuous (without giving the subject "wake-up breaks"); symphonic (transmitted on all channels of communication available to the propagandist); long-term; partisan (presents only one point of view, never two points of view in competition or dispute); affirmative but not documented (the propagandist affirms something but never indicates the source from which he knows that). Propaganda, together with military, economic and/or political measures, is also a component part of the psychological warfare20. From a geopolitical and social perspective, propaganda can be seen as a form of informational warfare, owing to a degree of globalization in the media. At present, a new component of the military conflict is considered the informational one. The main features of the informational war are detached from its very complex nature: the difficulty of specifying opponents; absence of 18 Idem, p. 9-12. 19 Șerban (Marin) Gh.T., Social-media – o nouă dimensiune a raporturilor dintre securitatea societală și mass-media: summary of the PhD thesis. Specialty "Public order and national security" - Bucharest: 2016, p.5-6. 20 Enachi V. Comunicarea interculturală versus propaganda: aspect istorice, „Analele Ştiinţifice ale Universităţii de Studii Europene din Moldova”: 5th ed., University of European Studies of Moldova, col. red.: Sedleţchi Iurie (ed. chief) [et al.]. – Chişinău: USEM, 2016, p.67. Perspectives of Law and Public Administration Volume 7, Issue 2, December 2018 219 geographic and/or temporal borders; the multitude of targets; the lack of rapid ways to address the consequences it generates; the use of relatively simple, cheap and widespread technology; the difficulty of establishing clear and precise responsibilities for domain management; the relatively low costs of running information operations relative to the results that can be obtained; increased handling possibilities; deleting differences between command levels. 3. Propaganda in the criminal law of Romania and the Republic of Moldova According to Article 5 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, no. 1965 of 21.12.196521, States Parties undertake to incriminate and punish the dissemination of ideas based on superiority or racial hatred, any incitement to racial discrimination and any acts of racial discrimination. violence or provocation against such acts, directed against a race or group of persons, of another color or other ethnic origin. The definition of the concept of discrimination belongs to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination which, in Article 1, refers to any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, color, ascendancy or national or ethnic origin, which has as its purpose or effect destroy or compromise the recognition, use or exercise on equal terms of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the public, economic, social and cultural spheres or in any other sphere of public life. State obligations also include criminalization and punishment of organization or propaganda activities that incite and encourage racial discrimination, acts of participation in such organizations or activities, and the incitement or encouragement of racial discrimination carried out by public authorities or institutions. A form of extremist propaganda is the hate speech materialized in criminal law in hate crimes. Thus, in Council of Europe Recommendation R (97) 20a of the Committee of Ministers, the "hate speech" is defined as follows: "all forms of expression that propagate, incite, promote or justify racial hatred, xenophobia, anti-Semitism or other forms of hatred based on intolerance, including intolerance expressing aggressive nationalism and ethnocentrism, discrimination and hostility towards minorities, immigrants and people from immigration"22. As a result of the existence of this Recommendation, the term "hate speech" has been introduced in the literature in different countries of the Council of Europe, and there is no generally accepted and binding definition for this concept. If we use the meaning of Recommendation (97) 20 to compare hate speech with hate crimes, we note that hate speech is by no means an offense, but may become, in certain contexts. For example, when it is spoken in public, it may be constituted by the offense referred to in Article 346 of the CP RM (enhancement of national, ethnic, racial or religious discrimination, division or division). Depending on the ways of communication through which the hate speech is transmitted, they can be verbal, on-line, in paper publications, or even through comic symbols. For example, hate speech in the form of racist and xenophobic propaganda propagated through the Internet are facts that the Council of Europe considers to be sufficiently serious to propose their sanction by criminal penalties when they are the following: - the distribution of racist and xenophobic materials through computer systems; - the threat based on a racist and xenophobic motivation; - denying, grossly minimizing, approving or justifying genocide or crimes against humanity23. In accordance with the provisions of Article 369 of the New Romanian Criminal Code (Article 369. Incitement to Hate or Discrimination) it criminalizes the incitement of the public, by 21 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, no. 1965 of 21.12.1965. International Treaties, No. 1, art. 78. 30.12.1998. 22 Recommendation No. R (97) 20 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on “hate speech”. https://www.coe.int/en/web/ freedom-expression/committee-of-ministers-adopted-texts/-/asset_publisher/aDXmrol0vvsU/content/recommendation-no-r-97-20-of- the-committee-of-ministers-to-member-states-on-hate-speech-?_101_INSTANCE_aDXmrol0vvsU_viewMode=view (accessed: 22. 07.2018). 23 Jeflea Alexe, Spre clarificarea conceptului terorismului religios în accepțiunea criminologică, „Buletinul Ştiinţific al Universităţii de Stat „Bogdan Petriceicu Hasdeu‖ din Cahul”, no. 1 (5), 2017 Ştiinţe Sociale, p.133-144. Perspectives of Law and Public Administration Volume 7, Issue 2, December 2018 220 any means, to hatred or discrimination against a category of persons. At the same time, the art.346 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Moldova (art.346, Intentional actions directed towards the enchantment of national, ethnic, racial or religious distinction or discrimination) criminalizes intentional actions, public exhortations, including through mass-media, written and electronic , directed to the pursuit of national, ethnic, racial or religious dishonesty, differentiation or division, to the abolition of national honor and dignity, and to the direct or indirect limitation of rights or the establishment of direct or indirect advantages to citizens according to their national affiliation , ethnic, racial or religious. Although the definitions in the criminal laws of Romania and the Republic of Moldova are slightly differentiated, the meaning remains the same. By hatred of racial or national hatred it is meant to stir up, incite or encourage racial or national hatred of feelings within a nation or racial group against another nation or racial group. At the same time, the literature uses the doctrinal category - "hate crimes", which is an umbrella term that refers to all those crimes committed by the perpetrator on the basis of a discriminatory motivation. In the explanation provided by the Organization for Security and Co- operation in Europe (OSCE), hate crimes contain two elements: they are acts that the criminal law provides as crimes and the commission of the offense, the perpetrator acts on the basis of prejudices24. State criminal law treats hate crimes differently, depending on the characteristics of the criminal law systems in question. The differences relate, among other things, to the treatment of hate crimes as standing or ground crimes, as well as to the number of protected features expressly recognized by law as part of the discriminatory motivation. The way in which hate crimes are effectively defined in state criminal law also influences how authorities collect data on these offenses. For example, data on offenses containing discriminatory motivation in their definition is easier to collect than data on the number of offenses to which the penalty for discriminatory motivation has been applied25. It is not propaganda to show a critical attitude, disapproving of mistakes, inappropriate attitudes of representatives of national, political, religious groups, etc. Another form of extremist propaganda is the propaganda of the war. Article 20 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights states directly: "Any propaganda in favor of war is forbidden by law. Any exhortation to national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes an incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence is prohibited by law". By resolution no. 110 of 3 November 1947, the UN General Assembly condemned "war propaganda in any form and in any country that has the purpose or potential to create or amplify a threat of peace, a violation of it or an act of aggression". In 1970, the UN declared that, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations, States have the duty to refrain from any propaganda in favor of the aggression war. In line with the National Defense Strategy of the Republic of Moldova in 2016, foreign propaganda constitutes an element of the informational warfare, and is manifested through media manipulation techniques with destructive potential; it is capable of negatively influencing the domestic public opinion, affecting the strategic vectors of foreign policy, and damaging the image of national government institutions, in particular, of the institutions of the defense system. Foreign propaganda is one of the most serious threats to national values and interests, diminishing the trust of society in the institutions of the national defense system and their ability to protect the country's territory and its population. Propaganda, especially that manifested through various sources of information (mass media, social networking, etc.), favors radicalism and extremist-terrorist actions26. 24 "Hate Crime Laws: Practical Guide". Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights of the OSCE in 2009. https://www.osce.org/ro/odihr/36428?download=true; Combating hate crimes. Guide for practitioners and decision-makers © Center for Legal Resources, Bucharest, June 2015. http://www.crj.ro/wp-content/uploads/2015/01 /Combaterea-infractiunilor-motivate-de- ura.Ghid-pentru-practicieni-si-decidenti.pdf (accessed: 23.07.2018). 25 Ibidem. 26 National defense strategy. Chisinau: 2016. http://www.army.md/img/userfiles/doconline/sna.pdf (accessed: 23.07. 2018). Perspectives of Law and Public Administration Volume 7, Issue 2, December 2018 221 War is an armed conflict (lasting) between two or more groups, social categories or states, to achieve economic and political interests. The propaganda of war is characterized by a lower level of concretisation and a higher level of ideology. The instigation is committed to concrete persons, and war propaganda targets a broader, undetermined circle of people, an action of warfare, of apology, by spreading the theories and concepts that support war or the spread of biased or invented news capable of serving the war. So, the essential requirement is that all these material acts follow incitation to war. The notion of propaganda of war means the spread of ideas, doctrines in favor of the war. The spread of tendentious or inventive incitement to war means bringing to the attention of the public (to an indeterminate number of persons) the totally or partially denatured facts aimed at rooting in the conscience of the members of society a state of psychological tension or psychosis of the war through interviews with attendees at various meetings, rallies, demonstrations, the publication of such information in newspapers, the broadcasting of various TV and radio reports, etc. Any other action aimed at triggering a war means any form and type of manifestation, of warring encouragement. The actions in question can be done orally or in writing, via radio, television, cinema, internet, etc. By tendential or invented information, incitement to war means that information that does not correspond to truth and which promotes the cult of war. Other actions aimed at triggering a war include the development of films, the example of the governments of states promoting a militarist policy, etc., all of which awaken a sense of acceptance of the war as a form of resolving the differences between states, promoting a positive attitude towards war, as an acceptable behavior within the international community27. The Moldovan lawmaker, unlike the Romanian one (Article 401 New Criminal Code), expressly lists various methods of committing the offense - verbal, in writing, by means of radio, television, cinema - to which they do not attribute an exhaustive character, the offense may be committed by any other means or by any other means. At the same time, the Romanian criminal law uses the term "war of aggression" (which, in our opinion, is close to the terms used in the Rome Statute, 1998), and creates a sanctioning regime differentiated from the aggression war (paragraph (1) art. 401 New Criminal Code of Romania) and war of aggression against Romania (paragraph (2) art. 401 New Criminal Code of Romania). Moreover, we can deduce that the Romanian legislature, using the expression "as well" in the content of paragraph (1) of art. 401 New Romanian Criminal Code, distinguishes two categories of criminal offenses: 1) propaganda for aggression war and 2) the spread of biased or invented news for the purpose of provoking a war of aggression. From the current wording of this legal-criminal norm, it is clear that propaganda and the spread of biased or invented news are two distinct facts, although in our opinion this is not the case, because the spreading of news is a form of propaganda among other forms. The offense is formal and is consumed with the spread of information either from the time of any other propaganda action, irrespective of the fact that the war was triggered. Thus, we conclude that the prohibition of informational influence on the public that affects the state security and the peaceful coexistence of peoples acquires different traits in the criminal law of the Republic of Moldova in the following juridical-criminal norms: - art.140 CP RM (Propaganda of the war). In accordance with the provisions of paragraph (1) of article 140 CP RM, the propaganda of war is the dissemination of tendentious or invented information, instigators of war or any other action aimed at the outbreak of a verbal warfare committed in writing through radio, cinema or other means; - paragraph (1) art. 2792 CP RM (Terrorist Incitement or the Public Justification of Terrorism). Incitement to a terrorist purpose, that is, to distribute or otherwise make available to the public a message intended to instigate or knowing that such a message may incite a terrorist offense; 27 Sergiu Brânză, Xenofon Ulianovschi, Vitalie Stati (coord.), Drept penal, 2nd ed., Vol. 2, Ch. Cartier, Combinatul Poligr., 2005, p. 25-26. Perspectives of Law and Public Administration Volume 7, Issue 2, December 2018 222 - paragraph (2) art. 2792 CP RM (Terrorist Incitement or the Public Justification of Terrorism). Publicly justifying terrorism, ie distributing or otherwise making available to the public a message about the recognition of an ideology or practice of committing terrorist offenses as fair, which needs to be sustained or is worthy of being followed; - paragraph (1) art. 341 CP RM (Calls to the overthrow or change by violence of the constitutional system of the Republic of Moldova). Public calls for the overthrow or change of constitutional order or violation of the territorial integrity of the Republic of Moldova through violence, as well as the dissemination for this purpose of materials with such calls. - art. 346 CP RM (Intentional actions aimed at enforcing national, ethnic, racial or religious indignation, division or division). Deliberate actions, public urges, including through media, print and broadcast, aimed at incitement hatred, differentiation or division national, ethnic, racial or religious hatred, to humiliate the national honor and dignity and limitation, direct or indirect rights or the establishment of direct or indirect benefits to citizens by virtue of their national, ethnic, racial or religious affiliation. Analyzing the content of these norms from the perspective of techniques and methods of informational influence on the general public, we note that these criminal deeds are common to a special purpose: "triggering a war" (paragraph (1) art. 140 CP RM); "The intention to instigate or knowing that such a message may induce the commission of a terrorist offense" (paragraph (1) art. 2792 CP RM); the overthrow or change of the constitutional order or the violation of the territorial integrity of the Republic of Moldova (paragraph (1) art. 341 CP RM); "The enticement of national, ethnic, racial or religious divisions, differentiation or division, to the devaluation of national honor and dignity" (art. 346 CP RM). In our opinion, such goals can be generalized as having an extremist end to challenge the need, divide, differentiate, trigger public conflicts, war. Some rules aim extremist criminal acts is one that is causing hatred, division and differentiation, to arouse public conflicts based on certain discriminatory features, and other criminal acts for this purpose acquires the public conflict intensified and proliferated war. From this hypothesis we can deduce that the criminal act of war propaganda is a special case of extremist propaganda, which proves the interconnection of war propaganda and other extremist crimes. However, here we are dealing with a problem: the criminal law of the Republic of Moldova does not use the term "extremism" and defined by extrapenetal legislation (Law of the Republic of Moldova on counteracting extremist activity, no. 54 of 21.02.2003) - extremism like attitude, doctrine of currents political, which, on the basis of extreme theories, ideas or opinions, seek through violent or radical measures to impose their program. Extremist activity, according to the Law of the Republic of Moldova on counteracting extremist activity, no. 54 from 21.02.2003, comprises several forms of manifestation: a) the activity of the public or religious association, the mass media or other organization or the physical person in order to plan, organize, prepare or carry out actions aimed at: the violent change of the foundations of the constitutional regime and violation of the integrity Of the Republic of Moldova; undermining the security of the Republic of Moldova; usurpation of state power or official qualities; the creation of illegal armed formations; the conduct of terrorist activity; the challenge of racial, national or religious hatred, as well as social hatred, linked to violence or violence; humiliating national dignity; causing mass disorder, committing acts of hooliganism or acts of vandalism on the grounds of hate or ideological, political, racial, national or religious hatred, as well as for hatred or hostility towards any social group; the propagation of exclusivity, superiority or inferiority of citizens according to their attitude to religion or to the criterion of race, nationality, ethnic origin, language, religion, gender, opinion, political affiliation, wealth or social origin; b) displaying, making, spreading, and holding for the public dissemination of fascist, national- socialist (Nazi) or extremist symbols or symbols, as well as attributes or symbols created by stylizing fascist, national-socialist symbols or symbols (Nazi) or an extremist organization that can be confused with them. Perspectives of Law and Public Administration Volume 7, Issue 2, December 2018 223 From the analysis of the extrapenetal legislation of the Republic of Moldova we note that propaganda is only a form of manifestation of an extremist activity. According to A. Jefflea, extremism is the attitude or doctrine of religious, political, etc., which, based on extreme theories, ideas or opinions, seeks, through violent or radical measures, to impose their program with a goal of change, through violence, the foundations of the constitutional regime and the violation of the state's integrity; undermining state security; usurpation of state power or official qualities; the creation of illegal armed formations; the conduct of terrorist activity; the challenge of religious hatred; humiliating personal dignity; the challenge of mass disorder; committing acts of hooliganism or acts of vandalism on grounds of hatred or hostility; as well as the propagation of the exclusivity, superiority or inferiority of citizens according to their attitude towards religion or the criterion of religion. The positive attitude expressed towards extremist organizations and personalities from the eras that have fallen within the limits of a historical- scientific discourse is not the formulation of extremist ideas28. What is characteristic of an extremist act is the uproar of discord (a verbal negative condemnation in public or an action directed against the person in connection with her belonging to an unmarried group that may be characterized by a discriminatory sign or any negative expression in public with reference to a group). As an example, they can serve: calls for murder; striking or deporting people belonging to a group; organization, commission or instigation of such acts. Thus, an ECHR case (Abedin Smajič versus Bosnia and Herzegovina, ECHR Judgment of 16 January 2018) must be relevant, the complainant claimed that the elements of the offense in question had not been committed because a "closed forum" on the Internet could not be considered a "public place". He further argued that he did not incite hatred, but only expressed his personal opinion about a hypothetical scenario that had a correlation with the "real world" - namely the frequent appeals from the highest political authorities in Serbia for secession. Moreover, the complainant pointed out that the case caught the attention of the media only after it had been made public by the prosecutor and subsequently written in several national newspapers. Concerning the interpretation of the relevant law, it was concluded that the Internet forum was "closed" only in terms of participation, but the content was fully available to anyone and could be considered a "public place". It was also concluded that for the use of the offense of incitement to hatred or intolerance it was not necessary for the applicant's action to have had adverse effects, but only that "they were able to produce such effects". Although the posts were written in a hypothetical form, the court concluded that they can not be considered expressions of free thinking on topics of general interest, but rather an inappropriate form of dialogue that advocates a behavioral strategy towards an ethnic group in Brčko. The court concluded that freedom of expression was significantly reduced in multiethnic communities, especially when it has led to the offending of religious or national feelings of members of religious or ethnic groups in these communities29. The public character is the indispensable feature of extremist facts, therefore we will not be in the presence of a criminal act provided by art.140, paragraph (1) art.2792, paragraph (2) art.2792, paragraph (1) art.341 CP RM, art.346 CP RM in the case of interpersonal conflicts, when the parties to this conflict, in order to offend and insult each other, resort to the use of the personal characteristics related to their private life, taking into account the attitude towards certain discriminatory aspects. Taking into account the fact that there is an inconsistency in the criminal and extrapenal law of the Republic of Moldova conditioned by the lack of express provisions regarding the act of extremism in the criminal law in order to ensure the uniformity of the criminal and extrapenal law in order to exclude its extensive unfavorable interpretation, we advocate for the amendment to the General Part of the Criminal Code of the name of article 13411 from "Terrorist offenses" in "Extremist terrorist offenses" with the amendment of the list of articles in the Special Part by 28 Jeflea Alexe, Vulnerabilități și amenințări de natură religioasă în mediul de securitate publică: aspect criminologice. „Revista Națională de Drept”, 2017, no. 2, p.49. 29Application no.48657/16Abedin Smajič against Bosnia and Herzegovina, The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting on 16 January 2018. https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22fulltext%22:[%22Smaji %C4%87% 22],%22itemid%22:[%22001- 180956%22]}(accessed: 20.07.2018). Perspectives of Law and Public Administration Volume 7, Issue 2, December 2018 224 extending them, including art.140, art.341 and art. 346 CP RM. Another reason for widening the list is the argument that the extremist act is the predecessor of the terrorist offense and, as the analysis of the already existing norms that criminalizes such crimes shows, the extremist activity itself already reaches the threshold of the prejudice of a crime. However, as expressly provided by the Law of the Republic of Moldova on Counteracting Extremist Activity no. 54 of 21.02.2003, it should be taken into account that their representation in manuals/books or other scientific/educational support, nor their exposure to in scientific/educational exhibitions, their manufacture, possession or use in theatrical/film performances or in the historical reconstruction activities in which the participants carry out a program according to a predefined plan to recreate various aspects of an event or a historical period. The criminal law is to be revised in such a way as to introduce other rules that would incriminate the manifestation of extremism. To compensate for this loophole, we believe that the Penal Code requires that changes be made, and other forms of extremism (including the religious one) are introduced, as follows: Art.3461 Criminal Code. Violation of legislation on preventing and combating extremism: 1) The display, manufacture, distribution and possession for public broadcasting of extremist attributes or symbols or of an extremist organization, including those stylized or camouflaged, which may be confused with them, shall be punished by a fine in the amount of up to 400 conventional units or by community service from 120 to 180 hours or by imprisonment for up to one year 2) Mass distribution of extraneous science materials and their manufacture or preservation for mass broadcasting purposes, shall be punished by a fine in the amount of up to 650 conventional units or by community service from 180 to 240 hours or by imprisonment for up to 3 years. In addition, in order to prevent and counteract the manipulation of public opinion by defamation of a person holding a position of responsibility, of a public person or of a person with public dignity in committing a criminal offense of a character extremistically analyzed during the exercise of his/her duties, it is proposed to criminalize this fact in the criminal law of the Republic of Moldova. At the same time, the political polemic, which sometimes admits rationality and harsh statements from public slander, is to be diffused, which is to be confirmed by judicial process. The completion of the Special Part of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Moldova shall read as follows: Art. 3462 Penal Code. Liability of a person with a position of responsibility, public persons and persons with a public dignity function: Calmniation (a knowingly publicly accused public prosecution) of a person in charge of a public office, of a public person or of a person with a public dignity function in the commission of an extremist criminal offense analyzed during the performance of his duties shall be punished by a fine of up to 400 conventional units or community service from 120 to 180 hours or by imprisonment for up to one year. 4. Conclusions 1. In our opinion, propaganda is a deliberate action in the form of systematic communication, which is a process of transmitting ideas and values, based on symbols, in order to influence the public opinion to think and act in particular, being planned and executed only under the authority of an authority. 2. The characteristic features of propaganda are: is a species of communication - the induction by the systematic effort of the desired behavior of a group using only communication means; involves a process of transmitting ideas and values stemming from conscious thoughts; a symbolic (symbol-based) social interaction - manipulation of the beliefs and behavior of the population through the use of symbols and speeches; is planned and executed only under the authority of an authority; awakens the interest of the audience and determines the subject to which the Perspectives of Law and Public Administration Volume 7, Issue 2, December 2018 225 communication is addressed to willingly accept this view as if it were his own; a deliberate action, determined by a certain purpose (hidden, camouflaged or unknown) - changing the attitudes and behaviors of a selected target audience. 3. The Moldovan lawmaker, unlike the Romanian one (Article 401 New Criminal Code), expressly lists various methods of committing the offense - verbal, in writing, by means of radio, television, cinema - but which does not give them an exhaustive character, the offense being committed by any other means or by any other means. Moreover, we can deduce that the Romanian legislature, using the expression "as well" in the content of paragraph (1) of art. 401 New Romanian Criminal Code, differentiates two categories of criminal offenses: 1) propaganda for aggression war; 2) and the spread of biased or invented news for the purpose of provoking a war of aggression. From the current wording of this legal-criminal norm, it is clear that propaganda and the spread of biased or invented news are two distinct facts, which is incorrect, since spreading news is a form of propaganda among other forms. 4. A form of extremist propaganda is the hate speech materialized in criminal law in hate crimes. Another form of extremist propaganda is the propaganda of the war. The purpose of any propaganda that reaches the threshold of prejudice within the meaning of criminal law can be generalized as having an extremist end to the challenge of hatred, division, differentiation, triggering public conflicts, war. Thus, in some norms, the purpose is an extremist one, which consists in aggravating public conflicts based on certain discriminatory features, and in the case of other propaganda crimes, this goal acquires the level of public conflict that has become intense and proliferated in the war. 5. The criminal propaganda act of war is a special case of extremist propaganda, attesting to the interconnection of war propaganda and other extremist crimes. 6. The Criminal Law of the Republic of Moldova does not use the term "extremism". Taking into account the fact that there is an inconsistency in the criminal and extrapenal law of the Republic of Moldova conditioned by the lack of express provisions regarding the act of extremism in the criminal law in order to ensure the uniformity of the criminal and extrapenal law in order to exclude its extensive unfavorable interpretation, we advocate for the amendment to the General Part of the Criminal Code of both the name of Article 13411 from "Terrorist offenses" in "Extremist terrorist offenses" with the amendment of the list of articles in the Special Part by extending them, including art. 140, art. 341 and art. 346 CP RM. Another reason for widening the list is the argument that the extremist act is the predecessor of the terrorist offense and, as the analysis of the already existing norms that criminalizes such crimes shows, the extremist activity itself already reaches the threshold of the prejudice of a crime. 7. The criminal law is to be revised in such a way as to introduce other norms that would incriminate the manifestation of extremism. To compensate for this loophole, we believe that the Penal Code requires the necessary changes to be made, and other forms of extremism (such as religion) are introduced as follows: Art.3461 Criminal Code. Violation of legislation on preventing and combating extremism: 1) The display, manufacture, distribution and possession for public broadcasting of extremist attributes or symbols or of an extremist organization, including those stylized or camouflaged, which may be confused with them, shall be punished by a fine in the amount of up to 400 conventional units or by community service from 120 to 180 hours or by imprisonment for up to one year 2) Mass distribution of extraneous science materials and their manufacture or preservation for mass broadcasting purposes, shall be punished by a fine in the amount of up to 650 conventional units or by community service from 180 to 240 hours or by imprisonment for up to 3 years. 8. In order to prevent and counteract the manipulation of public opinion by defamation of a person with a position of responsibility, of a public person or of a person with public dignity in committing an extremist criminal offense analyzed above during the exercise of his/her duties, it is proposed to criminalize this fact in the criminal law of the Republic of Moldova. At the same time, Perspectives of Law and Public Administration Volume 7, Issue 2, December 2018 226 the political polemic, which sometimes admits rationality and harsh statements from public slander, is to be diffused, which is to be confirmed by judicial process. The completion of the Special Part of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Moldova shall read as follows: Art.3462 Penal Code. The calumniation of a person with a responsible position, public figures and a person with public dignity Calumniation (a knowingly publicly accused public prosecution) of a person in charge of a public office, of a public person or of a person with a public dignity function in the commission of an extremist criminal offense analyzed during the performance of his duties shall be punished by a fine of up to 400 conventional units or community service from 120 to 180 hours or by imprisonment for up to one year. Bibliography 1. Teodor B.-A., Nicula V.-I., Propaganda versus comunicare politică: perspective teoretice în era informațională, Analele Universităţii „Constantin Brâncuşi” din Târgu-Jiu, Seria Litere și Ştiinţe Sociale, 2012, no. 2, p.32-46. 2. Roșca S. Reflecții conceptuale asupra noțiunii de propagandă: istorie și actualitate. Institutul de Relaţii Internaţionale din Moldova. „Revistă ştiinţifico-practică”, 2016, no. 1, p.51-67. 3. Pavel C. Publicitatea și propaganda în sociatatea contemporană: asemănări și deosebiri. „Management Intercultural”, Vol. XV, No.3 (29), 2013, 255-263. 4. Dungaciu D., Gândirea în doi pași sau cum trebuie gândit războiul informational.„Revista de Științe politice și Relații internaționale”, 2017, XIV, Vol.2, p.22-26. 5. Jeflea A., Moraru V. Infracțiuni ce implică semne de extremism religios: aspecte de drept penal. „Studia Universitatis Moldaviae”, 2016, no. 8(98), Seria „Științe sociale”, p.170-177. 6. Enachi V. Comunicarea interculturală versus propaganda: aspect istorice, „Analele Ştiinţifice ale Universităţii de Studii Europene din Moldova”: 5th ed., University of European Studies of Moldova, col. red.: Sedleţchi Iurie (ed. chief) [et al.]. – Chişinău: USEM, 2016, p. 60-69. 7. Jeflea Alexe, Spre clarificarea conceptului terorismului religios în accepțiunea criminologică, „Buletinul Ştiinţific al Universităţii de Stat „Bogdan Petriceicu Hasdeu‖ din Cahul”, no. 1 (5), 2017 Ştiinţe Sociale, p.133- 144. 8. Sergiu Brânză, Xenofon Ulianovschi, Vitalie Stati (coord.), Drept penal, 2nd ed., Vol. 2, Ch. Cartier, Combinatul Poligr., 2005. 9. Jeflea Alexe, Vulnerabilități și amenințări de natură religioasă în mediul de securitate publică: aspect criminologice. „Revista Națională de Drept”, 2017, no. 2, p.46-52. 10. Law no. 187/2012 for the enforcement of the Law no. 286/2009 on the Criminal Code. Originally published in the Official Gazette of Romania no.757 of 12.11.2012. 11. Criminal Code of the Republic of Moldova, no. 985 of 18.04.2002. Republished in the Official Gazette of the Republic of Moldova, 2009, no. 72-74. 
work_ynutitz4ebhofhpv2lxafyri4e	----	NEEDS ASSESSMENT OF NATIVE AMERICANS IN NEW ENGLAND CRIMINAL JUSTICE NEEDS OF NATIVE AMERICANS IN NEW ENGLAND by William M. Holmes and Sylvia I. Mignon October 19, 2011 Revision of a paper presented at the meetings of the Academy for Criminal Justice Sciences, San Diego, 2010. College of Public and Community Service University of Massachusetts at Boston 100 Morrissey Boulevard Boston, Massachusetts 02125 ii CRIMINAL JUSTICE NEEDS OF NATIVE AMERICANS IN NEW ENGLAND Abstract Criminal justice needs of Native Americans in New England were examined through 71 questionnaires completed by members of Native American tribes in New England. Groups not recognized by the federal government lacked tribal law enforcement, emergency, court, or correctional services. Non-native police departments serving the Native communities often lacked training in Native culture and traditions. Criminal justice systems had few opportunities for developing cooperative agreements with Native organizations. Official federal recognition of the tribes, bands, or communities enables them to receive greater financial and criminal justice resources. The public safety needs of Native Americans can be better met by developing improved crime statistics, by developing tribal dispute resolution programs, and by fostering partnerships between Native American communities and non-Native criminal justice and social service agencies. Keywords: Native American; Criminal Justice; Public Safety; Federal Tribal Recognition 1 CRIMINAL JUSTICE NEEDS OF NATIVE AMERICANS IN NEW ENGLAND Indigenous peoples have long been subjected to the intrusion, oppression, and rule of dominant European cultures. Numerous efforts over the past hundreds of years have sought to impose these cultures on Native peoples and to interpret and define the needs of Natives without their input and consent. Criminal justice institutions have frequently been used to impose non-Native cultural norms on Native Americans. The ongoing conflict between Native American and broader American society has contributed to Native American involvement in state and federal criminal justice systems. This study reports the results of a survey of Native American communities in New England. It summarizes self-report information on their criminal justice needs. It is part of a larger study of community, social, economic, and political issues facing Native American communities (Mignon, Holmes, & Kohler, 2006). This research presents Native perceptions of the unfulfilled need for services within their specific tribes/communities/bands. It identifies areas in which criminal justice and other agencies can work together in addressing these needs. It offers suggestions for meeting those needs in ways that promote a more efficient operation of the criminal justice system. Efforts to disband, dissolve, and eradicate Native Americans in New England date back to the Colonial period. The dissolving of reservations and governmental insistence on dealing only with individual tribal members for many tribes has meant that they have lost the documentation of historical continuity necessary for federal recognition. This article examines implications of lack of federal recognition for addressing service needs of Native Americans in New England. 2 Literature Review A variety of reasons contribute to Native American involvement in the criminal justice system. Tribal Americans are among the poorest Americans (Cornell & Kalt, 1992; Evans & Topoleski, 2002; Horejsi, Craig, & Pablo, 1992). They have faced considerable economic, political, and social problems (Begay, Cornell, & Kalt, 1997; Deer, 2004; Jorgensen & Taylor, 2000). The conflict of Native culture and traditions with broader society has contributed to involvement in crime (Jorgensen & Taylor, 2000; Deer, 2004; Wolfe, 2004). Health problems, especially diabetes and substance abuse, educational challenges, and conflicting cultures have intensified problems of Native Americans in the criminal justice system (Broussard et al., 1995; Morris, Wood, & Dunaway, 2006; Sanchez, Plawecki, & Plawecki, 1996; Schinke, Tepavac & Cole, 2000; Tepper & Tepper, 2004). Family violence, including sexual abuse, is a major concern for Native Americans, especially those living on reservations (Deer, 2004; Ecoffey et al., 2003). There is considerable evidence that Native Americans are involved in crime as both perpetrators and crime victims (Greenfield & Smith, 1999; Minton, 2009; Wakeling & Jorgensen, 2007). Regardless of age group, Native American violence is higher than for other races and ethnicities in the United States. Victims of Native American violence state that offenders have the highest rates of alcohol use during the offense than other races/ethnicities (National Drug Intelligence Center, 2008). Problems related to substance abuse, mental health, and violence are often criminalized by broader society, which means that the criminal justice system may respond to Native American issues without a great deal of information on how these problems arise, how they are interrelated, and 3 what criminal justice responses may most effectively deal with them. Historical factors are critical to an understanding of the development of criminal justice responses to offenders and victims (Ross, 1998; Ross & Gould, 2006). The non-recognition of many Native American tribes in New England has also meant the members who do commit crimes cannot be handled by a Native American administered criminal justice system such as Tribal Healing to Wellness Courts (Tribal Law & Policy Institute, 2003). There are significant issues in tribal law enforcement agencies including understaffing, as well as high turnover rates among staff (Community Policing Dispatch, 2008). More police officers are needed, including updated equipment and training. There is evidence that Native police officers find their work among their own peoples even more stressful than that which is typically associated with police work (Gould, 2002). Methodology The authors compiled a list of all Native American tribes and Native communities in New England through the use of the Internet, querying state agencies with responsibility for Native American affairs, and talking with Native Americans about the tribes of which they were aware. This report focuses on five tribes/communities that appear to have fewer resources than other tribes in New England, as evidenced by self- reports from tribal members. The Mashantucket Pequot and Mohegan tribes in Connecticut are excluded because their social, political, and cultural problems are less severe than those of other tribes. This does not mean that the Pequots or other tribes do not have needs, only that their needs appear to be less immediate than the tribes included in this study. 4 The investigators met with the Commissioner of the Massachusetts Commission of Indian Affairs and reviewed potential tribes/communities for inclusion in this study. At the meeting with the Commissioner, we also reviewed the survey topics for assurance that the most important concerns would be addressed. These topics covered public safety concerns, as well as health services, culture, traditions, and political and economic concerns. The five tribes/communities selected for inclusion are the Mashpee Wampanoag Tribe of Cape Cod, the Nipmuc Nation of Sutton, Massachusetts, the Abenaki Tribe of Vermont, the Narragansett Indian Tribe of Rhode Island, and the Penobscot Indian Nation of Indian Island Reservation in Maine. In addition, members of the North American Indian Center (NAICOB) in Boston, Massachusetts were surveyed to reflect the views of other Natives living and being serviced in urban areas of New England, and this is considered the sixth community for the purposes of this study. The Mashpee Wampanoags of Cape Cod have approximately 1,200 members and achieved official federal recognition in 2007 (Ryan, 2007). The Nipmuc Nation has approximately 500 members and was denied official federal recognition in 2004 (Nipmuc Nation, n.d.). The Abeneki Tribe of Vermont numbers approximately 1,700 and was denied official federal recognition in 2007 (Abeneki Nation, n.d, Rathkee, 2011). The Narragansett Indian Tribe of Rhode Island has over 2,400 members and received official federal recognition in 1983 (Narragansett Tribe, 2003). The Penobscot Indian Nation of Indian Island Reservation in Maine has approximately 562 members and has official federal recognition (Indian Island School, n.d.). 5 Some respondents who completed questionnaires at the conference were members of the Lakota, Apache, Navaho, Iroquois, and the Pocasset and Seekonk Wampanoag tribal groups. Tribes native to New England in the study mainly are from the Wampanoag, the Iroquois, and the Mohegan nations, which represent different social and cultural groups. Members from tribes from outside New England add even greater diversity of traditions in handling issues we classify as criminal justice issues. As residents, they need criminal justice services appropriate for their cultures and traditions. Questionnaires were initially distributed to participants at a Native American conference held at the University of Massachusetts Boston. The intent of the conference was to discuss the concerns of Natives and elicit suggestions for how a new Native American Institute located at the University of Massachusetts Boston could be helpful to them. This gave an overall feel for concerns of Natives for their communities throughout New England. Tribes/communities that were represented, beyond the six chosen for inclusion in the study, include the Seacohke Wampanoags, the Pocasset Wampanoags, the Assonet Band of Wampanogs, the Pequots, and the Prairie Band of Potawatons. Thus, the data reflects concerns of Natives throughout New England with specific attention to five New England tribes, as well as NAICOB, the center that offers services to Native Americans living in the greater Boston region. Thirty-two usable questionnaires were yielded from the conference. Representatives of five of the six target communities were present at the conference and were enlisted to distribute questionnaires to 10 members of their tribes/communities. The six coordinators were responsible for locating any 10 members of their communities, including NAICOB, to fill out the University of Massachusetts Boston 6 needs assessment questionnaires. Each coordinator was paid $500 and each of the ten community members was paid $25 for completing the questionnaires. Thirty-nine of these questionnaires were returned for analysis and inclusion in the final report. Seventy-one total respondents (32 at the University of Massachusetts Boston conference and 39 from four tribes) filled out the two-page questionnaire that asked them to check off services that are provided in the tribes/communities and to identify unmet needs (See Appendix for the questionnaire). Overall, responses were remarkably similar in their concerns for their tribes/communities. Results and Discussion The following section describes the more prominent needs and concerns and discusses how public safety needs can be addressed by cooperation with other state and community agencies. Public safety concerns were often interwoven with service needs in other areas. Public Safety Historically, tribes have tended not to have the capacity to collect, manage, and analyze crime data. This has been true even for those tribes recognized by the federal government and that have their own law enforcement agencies. The problem has been considered so significant that the federal government began to respond in recent years. In conjunction with the Justice Research and Statistics Association (JRSA), with a grant from the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS), the Tribal Justice Statistics Assistance Center (TJSAC) was established in 2002. Recognizing the lack of law enforcement resources, this federal effort sought to provide training and technical assistance in collecting and analyzing crime data. This important effort assisted tribes to use the crime statistics they 7 collected in ways that could help categorize crime and determine adequate responses to different types of crime. Trainings by JRSA were well received but continued funds for this effort were not available (Wolfe, 2004). Another important federal response was the Tribal Criminal History Records Improvement Program (T-CHRIP) funded through the U.S. Department of Justice between 2004 and 2006 through the Bureau of Justice Statistics. It funded 17 programs with a total of almost 3 millions dollars to improve criminal records (Perry, 2007). Overall, the effort was to improve criminal records and facilitate background checks to improve overall public safety with a focus on developing and refining databases and expanding accessibility of records. Tribes that had any public safety resources tended to have a variety of other resources. Some tribes had few public safety resources. This is correlated with whether the tribe is officially recognized by the federal government or whether tribal members are living off a reservation in a city. For Native Americans living in cities, there are public safety resources available to all residents, but none that address needs specific to tribal members. The availability of crime statistics was unrelated to whether there was a law enforcement agency available. The information systems of tribal police (where they exist) or local law enforcement in cities and towns, often did not identify tribal members in providing these statistics. Therefore, they cannot provide data supporting a request for state or federal funding to address needs of the Native American communities in their jurisdiction. When information systems identify tribal members, a range of statistics becomes available. Compiling these statistics is necessary to obtain public safety grants for tribes. 8 Only 20 percent of the tribal members surveyed had tribal police available for the purpose of public safety (see Table 1). Thirty-one percent had tribal courts. Sixteen percent had firefighting services available to them. Tribal emergency services were available in only 10 percent of tribes/communities. None had criminal justice programs such as Weed and Seed or Community Policing that would use public services as a crime prevention strategy. **************** Insert Table 1 Here **************** The lack of appropriate crime-related statistics is a major concern. Only 14.3 percent of tribes kept statistics on victimization of tribal members (see Table 2). Sixteen percent kept track of rape statistics. Hate crime statistics were available in only 15.7 percent of communities. Qualitative data from the surveys also suggested unmet public safety needs on reservations include domestic violence, building safety, traffic control, lack of statistics on juvenile delinquency, and a tribal dispute resolution process. ********************** INSERT TABLE 2 HERE ********************** Other Needs Related to Criminal Justice Health, cultural, social, political, and economic needs of the Native Americans had criminal justice implications. Overall, Native Americans have high rates of tobacco use, alcohol use, and use other drugs at higher rates than other racial/ethnic groups (Deer, 2004; Struckman-Johnson, Miller, & Struckman-Johnson, 2008). The 2010 National 9 Survey on Drug Use and Health found that 35.8% of Native Americans use tobacco products, compared with Caucasians (29.5%) and African Americans (27.3%) (Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration [SAMHSA], 2011). More Native Americans use illicit drugs (12.5%) than do Caucasians (9.1%) and African Americans (10.7%). Native Americans also have the highest percentage of alcohol and drug dependence, the most severe forms of substance abuse. Among Native Americans, 16% are alcohol or drug dependent with significantly lower percentages among Caucasians (8.9%) and African Americans (8.2%) (SAMHSA, 2011). Among children and adolescents, smoking, drug use, and binge drinking are higher among Native American youth. This may lead to involvement in the juvenile justice and adult criminal justice systems. Much more research is needed on the prevention and appropriate treatment of adolescent Native American substance abuse and on its relationship with criminal behavior (Friese et al., 2011; Schinke et al., 2000). A reduction in alcohol and other substance use can reduce crimes related to their use. However, lack of adequate health resources and access to treatment are major issues for most respondents. The Indian Health Service (IHS), a federal program, may be the only health service available to Native peoples in certain areas (Voss et al., 1999). Also, inaccurate reporting of race (and the incomplete recording of tribal affiliation) has led to difficulties in assessing the types, prevalence, and severity of medical problems of Natives peoples—reducing the allocation of resources to address those problems (Frost, Taylor, & Fries, 1992). Native communities tend not to have perceptions of mental illness shared by the larger community, viewing health issues in terms of life balance (Clifford-Stoltenberg & 10 Earle, 2002). Only 19.7 percent of tribe/community members had mental health services available to them. In contrast, the behavioral manifestation of mental health problems outside of Indian Country tends to result in criminalization of Native youth as “delinquents” (Clifford-Stoltenberg & Earle, 2002). Culture. The history of Native Americans is fraught with concern for how to maintain ties to the land and Native traditions (Jorgensen & Taylor, 2000; Ross, 1998; Wall & Arden, 1990). The importance of culture and traditions underlie all other concerns for specific needs of tribes/communities (Tepper & Tepper, 2004). The presence of tribal cultural support encourages Native American traditions and is likely to involve children and adults in more pro-social behavior and address their spiritual needs. Overall, 36.6 percent of the respondents thought that the tribal history and traditions needed better documentation (see Table 3). This reflects concern for the transition from old traditions and language to current realities. Thirty percent felt that spiritual counseling needs to be made available to tribe members. However, many correctional facilities do not have available Native spiritual healers to meet those needs. It has taken legal action for some Native Americans in custody to have access to Native spiritual healers (O'Hanlon, 2004). ********************** INSERT TABLE 3 HERE ********************** Social Needs. The social needs of tribal members appear enormous. With poverty such a significant concern for many tribes, it is not surprising that major social problems are present (Evans & Topoleski, 2002; Morris et al., 2006). The link between poverty 11 and crime underscores the need to address severe financial problems as a crime prevention strategy. Social services in communities with no official federal recognition were in short supply. Approximately one-half of tribes/communities had social supports. Only 31 percent offered a telephone help line. Food assistance was offered by 48 percent of tribes. Utility assistance was offered by 31 percent. Twenty-four percent offered adult vocational training. Financial and legal assistance was offered by 18.3 percent of tribes. Concern for Native children is of critical importance to reduce the risk of delinquency. This includes the history of inability and unwillingness of non-Natives to understand the culture and the ways in which children and families are impacted by social problems (Deer, 2004). According to Horejsi et al. (1992): “The oppression suffered by Native Americans has so undermined their culture and ability to parent that child abuse and neglect are frequent problems” (p. 329). The need to have culturally appropriate services available to address abuse, neglect, and delinquency is great, however, only 31 percent had available National Indian Child Welfare Association (NICWA) assistance. The NICWA provides culturally competent service providers to meet the needs of tribal members. According to respondents, 31 percent of tribes offered Indian Child Welfare Protection Act enforcement assistance. The ICWPA is a federal statute that requires abused or neglected children of tribal members to be placed in tribal foster homes, rather than state foster homes. Recognition and Meeting Criminal Justice Needs. Meeting the criminal justice needs of Native Americans is closely related to federal recognition of their tribe. This is 12 a major issue with 59.2 percent of respondents indicating that achieving federal recognition is a very high priority. The importance of federal recognition is that it brings considerable financial opportunities to support public safety, correctional, rehabilitative, and adjudicatory programs. It also supports housing, healthcare, social programs, and education that have crime prevention applications. Thus, federal recognition promotes being able to meet criminal justice needs. Correlates of Criminal Justice Needs The relationship between these factors and meeting criminal justice needs is explored below by looking at crosstabulations among the needs and by using logistic regression to see which factors correlated with criminal justice needs after controlling for other factors. Table 4 below presents results of the crosstabulation. Factors associated with meeting the criminal justice needs were identified by crosstabulating the dichotomous measures of criminal justice need with other needs of the tribes. Factors having a statistically significant association with a criminal justice need were identified using a .05 alpha level for a chi-square test. *********************** INSERT TABLE 4 HERE *********************** The need for a tribal police force was associated with needing federal recognition, documentation of traditions, education about a tribe’s history and traditions, documentation of a tribe’s governance, needing a tribal library, and legal assistance. While it might be thought that absence of federal recognition would be the only meaningful factor associated with needing tribal police, this was not even the factor 13 having the highest association. As an indicator of association, needing documentation had a Phi coefficient of .42 with needing tribal police, while federal recognition had a Phi of .31, which indicates a weaker association with needing tribal police. To more clearly identify what factors were associated with needing tribal police, the correlates were entered in a stepwise logit regression with tribal police need as a dichotomous dependent variable. When federal recognition or governance documentation were controlled, all other factors, except legal assistance, were no longer associated with tribal police need. Federal recognition had a significant interactive effect with governance documentation. When an interactive term combining recognition and governance documentation is entered in the logistic regression, it is the only significant correlate (see Table 5). The effect of recognition and governance documentation alone is not significant when the combined effect of both is taken into consideration. While federal recognition was necessary for having a tribal police department, it was much more likely to happen if there was also documentation of a tribe’s governance. Recognized tribes having a significant need for more documentation of their governance were much less likely to have tribal police. ********************* INSERT TABLE 5 HERE ********************* The availability of legal assistance was also associated with having tribal police. A tribal police force was eight times more likely to exist when a tribe had legal assistance, after controlling for other factors. Whether this means offering legal 14 assistance increases the chances of obtaining a tribal police force or having a police force increases an imperative to obtain legal assistance remains to be determined. The need for a tribal court was associated with the need for federal recognition, performance of ceremonies, documentation of governance, spiritual counseling, and needing legal assistance. Only federal recognition and governance documentation remained significant in the logit regression as correlates of having a tribal court. When there was a need for governance documentation, federal recognition had only a modest relationship with having a tribal court. It only increased to odds of having a court by a factor of 2. On the other hand, when a tribe did have governance documentation and federal recognition, a tribal court was fourteen times more likely to exist. The interaction of recognition and governance documentation increased the likelihood of a tribal court by a factor of six. Needing various crime statistics was not associated with needing federal recognition. None of the crime statistic needs were associated with federal recognition at the bivariate level. Bivariate correlates were associated with needs identified for documenting various aspects of a tribe and for ceremonial performance and spiritual counseling. The lack of victimization statistics was associated with having ceremony performances and documentation of governance. When presence of ceremony performances is controlled, the relationship between needing victimization statistics and having governance documentation disappears. When ceremonies are available, the odds of having victim statistics is nearly four times greater than when ceremonies are not available. The nature of this relationship between ceremony performance and 15 victimization statistics is not clear. It could be that performing ceremonies stimulates a desire to have victimization statistics. It could also be that having victimization statistics stimulates a desire to offer ceremonies to deal with the victimization. Lack of rape statistics was associated with history and tradition documentation, and governance documentation. It, too, was not associated with federal recognition. When governance documentation was controlled in the logistic regression, the association between needing rape statistics and needing history and tradition documentation disappears. When there is a perceived need for governance documentation, having rape statistics is four times more likely than when there is not a perceived need for governance documentation. The desire for more documentation of tribal governance may lead to setting up a procedure for obtaining rape statistics, irrespective of whether there is a tribal police force present or the tribe is federally recognized. The lack of delinquency statistics was associated with needing documentation of history and traditions, ceremony performance, governance documentation, and spiritual counseling. As is the case for rape statistics, when governance documentation is controlled, the association of the other factors with needing delinquency statistics disappears. When there is a perceived need for governance documentation, delinquency statistics are nearly four times more likely to be available than when governance documentation is not a perceived need. The lack of hate crime statistics was associated with needing documentation of history and traditions and performance of ceremonies. When documentation of history and traditions is controlled, performance of ceremonies is not associated with having hate 16 crime statistics. Similar to the relationship between the need for documenting governance rape and delinquency statistics, a perceived need to document history and traditions of a tribe is associated with having hate crime statistics. Such statistics are nearly four times more likely than when a need to document history and traditions is not present. Limitations of the Study This survey identified important needs of Native American Tribes in New England that are unmet by the criminal justice system. However, the study does not identify all of the unmet needs. Several factors contribute to this. Participants in the meeting were not a probability sample of Native Americans. The sample was voluntary and relatively small, although the volunteer sample of those attending the conference were considered leaders within their Native groups and knowledgeable about their groups’ needs. Less frequently occurring needs may not have been found in this sample. The needs of those more socially and culturally involved were more likely to be represented while the needs of those socially isolated are probably understated. In addition, the necessity to keep the questionnaire short meant that some issues could not have follow-up questions that might have identified additional needs. All of these factors suggest that future research may identify additional needs not discussed in this study. Recommendations and Conclusion The following are recommendations for ways of assessing and meeting the public safety needs of Native Americans in New England. Existing hate crime and other victim statistics can be improved by providing training so that police software can identify tribal affiliation and develop alternative reporting systems can be developed where tribal police 17 are not available. Police officer education can be enhanced by providing education on Native American policing and encouraging pay supplements for Tribal Police. See Gould (2002) for a discussion of the potential cultural and psychological issues when Native Americans serve as police within their own communities. Legal education on Native American courts and criminal justice is needed to build dispute resolution programs adapted for specific tribes and communities. Cooperative agreements with Native American correctional systems can allow Native prisoners to serve their time under tribal jurisdiction and offer healing ceremonies and spiritual advisors to promote rehabilitation. The Tribal Healing to Wellness Courts offer an important model for developing drug courts (Tribal Law & Policy Institute, 2003). Beyond criminal justice services, there are a host of things that can assist New England tribes and support the provision of appropriate criminal justice resources to communities. Partnerships with non-Native agencies and communities can support the public safety goals of tribes/communities. These partnerships can enhance the opportunities for others to learn about Native cultures and design culturally appropriate interventions when needed. Partnerships also promote ways for Natives to correct misunderstandings, share their stories, and develop procedures for compiling criminal justice statistics. Educational needs can be supported by promoting Native American criminal justice studies in colleges and universities. Financial assistance for Natives should be a priority as should opportunities for online learning. Historical information from educational institutions can help document tribal governance, history, and traditions. 18 Native values need to be supported in rehabilitation and other programs. Family support is especially needed when substance abuse is present in the home. This would also support offering healing ceremonies for offenders and victims. A valuable addition is including grandmothers and others as teachers to support an appreciation for the wisdom of Native elders (Skye, 2002; Tribal Law & Policy Institute, 2003). Intertribal partnerships among tribes/communities can be an enormous benefit in sharing criminal justice and rehabilitative resources, especially by focusing on issues tied to concerns around federal recognition or the lack of federal recognition. Different tribes want the same things and sharing space and resources can benefit all. The Iroquois Confederacy of the 1700s and 1800s developed a successful system of political organization beginning with five tribes in central New York. A confederacy of all New England tribes, similar to the Iroquois Confederacy, could facilitate the sharing of Native American experiences and resources. 19 REFERENCES Abeneki Nation. (n.d.) Abeneki Tribe of Vermont. Retrieved October 17, 2011 from http://www.abenekination.org. Alvarez, A. & Bachman, R.D. (1996). American Indians and sentencing disparity: An Arizona test. Journal of Criminal Justice, 24(6), 549-561. Begay, M.A., Jr., Cornell, S., & Kalt, J. P. (1997). Making research count in Indian Country: The Harvard project on American Indian economic development. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University. Broussard, B.A., Jr., Sugarman, J.R., Bachman-Carter, K., Booth, K. Stephenson, L. Strauss, K., & Gohdes, D. (1995). Toward comprehensive obesity prevention programs in Native American communities. Obesity Research, 3, 289S-297S. 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Tribal Healing to Wellness Courts: The Key components. West Hollywood, CA: Author. U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Assistance. Voss, R. W., Douville, V., Little Soldier, A., & Twiss, G. (1999, May). Tribal and shamanic-based social work practice: A Lakota perspective. Social Work,44(3), 228-241. Wakeling, S. & Jorgensen, M. (2007, September). Strengthening and rebuilding tribal justice systems: A participatory outcomes evaluation of the U.S. Department of Justice comprehensive Indian Resources for Community and Law Enforcement (CIRCLE) Project. Tucson, AZ: Native Nations Institute of Leadership, Management and Policy. 24 Wall, S. & Arden, H. (1990). Wisdomkeepers: Meetings with Native American spiritual elders. Hillsboro, Oregon: Beyond Words Publishing, Inc. Wolfe, G. S., Jr. (2004, September). TJSAC arranges tribal crime data training. The JRSA Forum (Justice Research and Statistics Association), 22(3), 4-5. 19 Table 1 Availability of Tribal Public Safety Resources Resource Percent Available Tribal Police 20% (n=14) Tribal Courts 25% (18) Tribal Firefighting 16% (11) Tribal Emergency Services 10% (7) Weed and Seed 0% (0) Community Policing 0% (0)___________ Table 2 Availability of Tribal Criminal Justice Statistics Statistics Percent Available Victim Statistics 14.3% (n=10) Rape Statistics 16.0% (11) Hate Crimes Statistics 15.7% (14) The greater availability of rape and hate crime statistics than crime statistics is due to reporting systems in addition to police. 20 Table 3 Cultural and Social Tribal Needs Needs Percent Reporting Need Documentation of History and Traditions 36.6% (n=26) Native Spiritual Counseling 30.0% (21) Tribal Social Supports 50.0% (35) Tribal Help Line 69.0% (48) Food Assistance 52.0% (36) Utility Assistance 69.0% (48) Adult Vocational Training 76.0% (53) Financial or Legal Assistance 81.7% (57) NICWA assistance 69.0% (48) ICWPA assistance 69.0% (48) 21 Table 4 Correlates of Criminal Justice Needs Has Tribal Police Has Tribal Court Has Victim Stats Has Rape Stats Has Delinquency Stats Has Hate Crime Stats need Federal_recognition Phi coefficient .305 .306 .071 .115 .015 .035 Sig. (2 tailed) .010 .009 .559 .343 .905 .772 N 70 71 70 70 70 70 need hist_tradition_documents Phi coefficient .207 .095 .278 .318 .281 .237 Sig. (2 tailed) .086 .432 .020 .007 .019 .048 N 70 71 70 70 70 70 need hist_tradition_educ Phi coefficient .258 .188 .199 .155 .115 .155 Sig. (2 tailed) .031 .117 .099 .199 .344 .199 N 70 71 70 70 70 70 need ceremony_performance Phi coefficient .182 .200 .236 .199 .259 .199 Sig. (2 tailed) .131 .095 .049 .098 .031 .098 N 70 71 70 70 70 70 need governance_documentation Phi coefficient .418 .306 .210 .266 .257 .178 Sig. (2 tailed) .000 .009 .081 .026 .032 .141 N 70 71 70 70 70 70 need spiritual_counseling Phi coefficient .158 .261 .103 .161 .237 .074 Sig. (2 tailed) .191 .028 .395 .182 .048 .540 N 70 71 70 70 70 70 need tribal_library Phi coefficient .258 .188 .035 .077 .115 .077 Sig. (2 tailed) .031 .117 .773 .529 .344 .529 N 70 71 70 70 70 70 legal_assistance Phi coefficient .404 .226 .225 .198 .129 .198 Sig. (2 tailed) .001 .058 .061 .101 .289 .101 N 70 71 70 70 70 70 22 TABLE 5 LOGIT PREDICTORS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE NEEDS Need Predictors Odds Logit Parameter Significance Tribal Police Federal recognition, Federal recognition*Governance Documentation, legal assistance 4.76 8.28 8.57 -3.32 3.35 2.42 .006 .004 .005 Tribal Court Federal recognition*Governance Documentation 6.08 1.81 <.001 Victim Stats Ceremony Performance 3.79 2.72 <.001 Rape Stats Governance Documentation 4.06 1.40 .026 Delinquency Stats Governance Documentation 3.67 1.30 .032 Hate Crime Stats History and Tradition Documentation 3.67 1.30 .048 Appendix 23 NATIVE AMERICAN TRIBAL SURVEY The following questions ask about your group, its resources, and its needs. The information will be used to develop programs and services of the Native American Institute at the University of Massachusetts at Boston. Please answer as best you can for your tribe/band/ or community. Not all questions will be relevant to your group. Ignore those that are inapplicable. Thank you for your time and help. Name of Your Tribe/Band/Community___________________________________________ Your Title/Role/Position in your tribe____________________________________________ HEALTH SERVICES. Please check all of the services that are offered by or in collaboration with your Tribe, Band or Community. � Hospital or Medical Clinic � Use of Health Service grants � Indian Health Service medical care � Cultural training for service providers � Mental Health services � Scholarships for tribal members for training in health or medical careers � Native American Medicine � Indian Health Service technical assistance � Other Native American health services (specify)_________________________________________ Please list the two most important unmet health needs of your tribal group. ________________________________________________________________________ PUBLIC SAFETY. Please indicate all of the following that are available to your tribe, band, or community. � Tribal police or law enforcement � Tribal courts or dispute resolution process � Tribal fire fighting service � Tribal emergency service � Statistics on criminal victimization of tribal members � Statistics on rape or sexual assault of tribal members � Statistics on delinquency of tribal children or youth � Statistics on hate crime victimization of tribal members Please list the two most important unmet public safety needs of your tribal group. CULTURE AND TRADITIONS. Please check the traditions or cultural elements below for which your tribe has an unmet need. � Documentation of history and traditions of your tribe 24 � Education about the history and traditions your tribe � Performance of ceremonies and rituals � Information about genealogy of tribal members � Documentation of the history of the governance of the tribe, band, or community � Spiritual counseling � Tribal library � Tribal newsletter or news dissemination process Please list the two most important unmet needs regarding culture and traditions of your group. SOCIAL NEEDS. Please indicate which of the following social services are available to your tribal members. � Information and referral for social services � Legal assistance � Help line for tribal members � Adult vocational training � Food assistance � National Indian Child Welfare � Housing assistance Association assistance � Financial assistance � Indian Child Welfare Protection Act � Utility assistance enforcement assistance � Child care � Tribal foster homes � Early childhood education � Tribal adoptive service Please list the two most important unmet social service needs of your group. ________________________________________________________________________ _______ POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC. Please check which of the following needs of your community are unmet. � Federal recognition � Tribal governance organization � Federal designation of historically significant areas � Cooperative agreements with non-tribal organizations � Museum or educational visitor sites � Production of native goods � Tribally sponsored businesses � USDA Rural Business Grant involvement � Assistance in enforcing hunting and fishing rights � Assistance in enforcing water rights � Grave protection and repatriation 25 OTHER NEEDS. Please list any other needs of your community that aren’t mentioned above. ________________________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________________________ 
work_yo4glzm4jzdirlezardyqrvjmy	----	The Racialization of Islam in the United States: Islamophobia, Hate Crimes, and “Flying while Brown” religions Article The Racialization of Islam in the United States: Islamophobia, Hate Crimes, and “Flying while Brown” Craig Considine Department of Sociology, Rice University; 6100 Main St., Houston, TX 770055, USA, craig.m.considine@rice.edu Received: 17 May 2017; Accepted: 24 August 2017; Published: 26 August 2017 Abstract: This paper explores the intersectionality of race and Islamophobia by using a set of empirical data relating to the experiences of American Muslims and non-Muslims in the United States. Through a multi-tiered methodology, the paper reveals how racialization processes interact with Islamophobic discourses and actions in American society. Specifically, the dataset is anchored in U.S. public perceptions of American Muslims, hate crime incidents against Muslims and non-Muslims, and the institutionalization of Islamophobia. The paper, which shows how race is endemic to Islamophobic incidents, appeals to the general U.S. public, especially community members from religious, political, academic, civil rights, and social justice backgrounds. Keywords: American Muslims; Islamophobia; race; racial state; racism 1. Introduction This paper explores the racialization of Islam in the United States and how this discriminatory process is influenced by historic, domestic and geopolitical trends surrounding American Muslims and people who “look Muslim”. In the context of the “war on terror”, the racialization of American Muslims generates local and palpable experiences of exclusion and abuse for both Muslims and non-Muslims. These experiences are captured by the term Islamophobia, which is now accepted and designating as a special form of discrimination. Although it is widely used in international media, “Islamophobia” still appears in inverted commas to imply the meaning of Islamophobia is not clear, or not as clear as others claim (Richardson n.d., p. 3). A further implication of the inverted commas “is that there is in reality no such thing as Islamophobia: it is merely the figment of a paranoid or politically motivated imagination; or constructed out of a desire to perpetuate a siege mentality and sense of victimhood against Muslims, or to put an end to legitimate criticism, or to engage in lazy abuse” (Richardson n.d., pp. 3–4). Islamic organizations and advocacy groups in the United States criticize this approach towards Islamophobia, citing racial profiling and hate crimes as evidence of anti-Muslim racism in American society. The Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), a civil rights and advocacy organization based in Washington, D.C., is at the forefront of combatting Islamophobia in the United States. In a 2016 report, Nihad Awad, CAIR’s Executive Director, stated that fear and hatred of American Muslims have “moved from the fringes of American society to the mainstream” (Council on American-Islamic Relations 2016, p. v). During the 2016 presidential campaign, candidates of the Republican Party made several controversial comments including, “Islam hates us,” “[Muslims are] uncorked animals,” and “I would not advocate that we put a Muslim in charge of this nation” (Bradner 2015; Waldman 2015). Another Islamophobic buzzword, the fear of “creeping sharia,” or Islamic law, has led to legislation designed to vilify or otherwise target Muslims at an institutional level. To date, at least 32 states across the United States have introduced and debated anti-sharia or anti-foreign law bills (Rifai 2016). This movement reached its climax in 2011 and 2012, when 78 bills or amendments designed to denigrate Islamic religious Religions 2017, 8, 165; doi:10.3390/rel8090165 www.mdpi.com/journal/religions http://www.mdpi.com/journal/religions http://www.mdpi.com http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/rel8090165 http://www.mdpi.com/journal/religions Religions 2017, 8, 165 2 of 19 practices were introduced in the legislatures of 29 states as well as the U.S. Congress (Saylor 2014). Seventy-three of these bills were introduced by Republicans, while only one bill was introduced by a Democrat from Alabama. In total, only three anti-sharia bills at the state level were bi-partisan (Kansas, South Carolina, and South Dakota (Saylor 2014). Anti-sharia bills were signed into law in Arizona, Kansas, South Dakota, and Tennessee in 2011 and 2012 (Saylor 2014). According to the Institute for Social Policy and Understanding (ISPU), a solution-seeking research institute that tracks Islamophobia in the United States, approximately 80% of U.S. legislators who sponsor this type of legislation also sponsor bills restricting the rights of other minorities and vulnerable groups in the United States. Islamophobia is also exacerbated by the Islamophobia industry (Lean 2012). In recent years, anti-Muslim groups and organizations have enjoyed access to at least $205 million to spread fear and hatred of Muslims (Council on American-Islamic Relations 2016, p. v). In 2011, the Center for American Progress (CAP), a public policy research and advocacy organization based in Washington, DC, found that seven charitable foundations spent $42.6 million between 2001 and 2009 to support the spread of anti-Muslim and anti-Islam rhetoric in the United States (Ali 2011). The CAP’s report, “Fear, Inc.: The Roots of the Islamophobia Network in America,” identified several key foundations that help to fuel Islamophobia, including the Donors Capital Fund, the Richard Mellon Scaife Foundation, the Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation, the Newton and Rochelle Becker Foundation and Newton and Rochelle Becker Charitable Trust, the Russell Berrie Foundation, the Anchorage Charitable Fund and William Rosenwald Family Fund, and the Fairbrook Foundation (Ali 2011). The culmination of anti-Islam legislation and rhetoric has undoubtedly inspired attacks against Muslims and non-Muslims across the United States. In the last two months of 2015 alone, American Muslims reported 34 violent incidents against their mosques, acts that serve to intimidate Muslim worshippers (Council on American-Islamic Relations 2016, p. v). In addition to the activities of anti-Muslim groups and organizations, media and entertainment representations of Islam and Muslims are key factors in the rise of Islamophobia across the United States. According to Media Tenor International, a research institute that studies data for NGO’s and governments, news outlets such as Fox, NBC, and CBS depicted Islam primarily as a source of violence between 2007 to 2013 (Media Tenor International n.d.). In another 2011 report, Media Tenor found that U.S. and European news outlets focused on the Middle East primarily through the context of Muslim militancy (Media Tenor International 2011). The entertainment industry, too, contributes to the racialization of Islam and Muslim, which exacerbates anti-Islam and anti-Muslim sentiments. In a study on news coverage from LexisNexis Academic and CNN for all terrorist attacks in the United States between 2011 and 2015, researchers found that news outlets gave drastically more coverage to attacks by Muslims, particularly foreign-born Muslims—even though these attacks are far less common than other kinds of terrorist attacks (Kearns et al. 2017a). Attacks by Muslim perpetrators received, on average, 449% more coverage than attacks carried out by non-Muslims (Kearns et al. 2017b). Erin Kearns, an author of the study, told National Public Radio (NPR) in June 2017 that when the perpetrator of a terrorist attack is Muslim, “you can expect that attack to receive about four and a half times more media coverage than if the perpetrator was not Muslim.” Put another way, as Kearns notes, “a perpetrator who is not Muslim would have to kill on average about seven more people to receive the same amount of coverage as a perpetrator who is Muslim.” The term “racial formation,” as introduced by Omi and Winant (1994), is a useful starting point to explore the ways in which media determine the content and importance of Muslim identities, by which they are then shaped by racial meanings. The reaction of Americans to the genre of action-adventure film, and its increasing use of Arabs and Muslims as villains, shows how Americans’ perceptions of Arab and Muslims populations can be shaped and skewed (Wilkins 2008). Jack Shaheen, author of Reel Bad Arabs: How Hollywood Vilifies People and A is for Arab: Archiving Stereotypes in U.S. Popular Culture, spent his career analyzing the way that Arabs have been portrayed in American film and television over the last century. In 2006, his book Reel Bad Arabs showed that Hollywood depicts Arabs as “brute murderers, sleazy rapists, religious fanatics, oil-rich dimwits and abusers of women.” Religions 2017, 8, 165 3 of 19 Shaheen’s research documented well over 1000 films depicting Arabs and subsequently found that 932 films depict them in a stereotypical or negative light. Only 12 films have a positive depiction. He also cites films that portray Arabs as cold, money hungry Muslims or inept villainous terrorist that seek to destroy “Western civilization.” In the plot of one film, the popular movie “Back to the Future” (1985), the antagonists who shoot the main character are portrayed as Libyan Muslim terrorists who shout Arabic gibberish as they ruthlessly gun down the protagonist. Omi and Winant (1994) suggest that these representations lead to a kind of “racial etiquette,” or a set of interpretative codes and racial meanings that operate in the daily interactions of people living in the United States. By reinforcing stereotypes of the Middle East as a place of extremism and Muslims as terrorists, these representations produce support for policies that have dire consequences for Arabs, Muslims, and people who are believed to be Arab and Muslim (Alsultany 2015). These caricatures of Arabs and Muslims also provide a popular “permission to hate,” which often unfolds through a synthesis of racial and religious discrimination (Poynting and Mason 2006, p. 367). Despite the conflation of Arab identity and “radical Muslims,” the facts reveal that American Muslims are far from homogenous. The Pew Research Center estimates that there were about 3.3 million Muslims of all ages living in the United States in 2015 (Mohamed 2016). No single racial or ethnic group makes up for more than 30% of the total Muslim population (Mohamed 2016). Overall, 30% describe themselves as white, 23% as black, 21% as Asian, 6% as Hispanic, and 19% as other or mixed race (Mohamed 2016). Of those aged 18 and older, more than six in 10 (63%) were born abroad, and many are relative newcomers to the United States (Pew Research Center 2011). Approximately one-quarter of all Muslim adults (25%) have arrived in the country since 2000. Despite the high proportion of immigrants in the American Muslim population, the vast majority (81%) report that they are citizens of the United States (Pew Research Center 2011). Recent studies carried out by the Pew Research Center (2007) also reveal that nearly one-quarter of Americans Muslims say they have converted to Islam; nine in 10 (91%) converts to Islam were born in the United States, and almost two-thirds (67%) of all converts to Islam came from Protestant Churches (Pew Research Center 2007). With this heterogeneity in mind, nearly all Muslim racial or ethnic groups have higher odds of reporting one or more types of perceived discrimination than white Muslims (Zainiddinov 2016). Asian Muslims report the lowest frequency of perceived discrimination than other Muslim racial or ethnic groups (Zainiddinov 2016). The experiences of European Muslims reveal additional insight on the dynamics of contemporary Islamophobia in Western countries. According to the European Islamophobia Report (2017), Islamophobia has become “a real danger” to the democratic foundations of the European Union. The 2016 EIR country reports, which cover almost all the European continent, shows that the level of Islamophobia in fields such as education, employment, media, politics, the justice system and the Internet is on the rise (European Islamophobia Report 2017). In terms of politics, as Hafez (2014) notes, “Islamophobia has become a useful tool for right-wing parties to mobilize electors in many European nation-states.” This development, he continues, means that Islamophobia has become a kind of “accepted racism” found not only on the margins of European societies, but also at the center. In one European nation-state (Ireland), Carr (2014) found that over 50% of Muslims indicated that they did experience some form of hostility between 2010 and 2014. Over one in three (36%) of Carr’s survey participants felt they had been targeted on the basis of their being identified as Muslim. In the context of Pakistani Muslims in Ireland, they are positioned between exclusionary notions of Irish national identity and their racialized Muslim identities, even as Pakistani Irish Muslims report a preference for more democratic-oriented conceptualizations of Irishness (Considine 2017). By recognizing anti-Muslim racism as a distinct phenomenon, the Irish State and other European countries can take “a first step in a process towards the formation of evidence based, effective policies that can challenge anti-Muslim racism and concomitantly encourage the reporting of this phenomenon” (Carr 2014, p. 2). Religions 2017, 8, 165 4 of 19 2. Methodology A methodological overview is needed before the author engages with the intersectionality of race and Islamophobia in the United States. In selecting an appropriate research design, the author deployed several methodological tools. This paper follows Yin (1994, p. 23) because the boundaries between the phenomenon (Islamophobia) and the context (race) is not clearly evident, hence multiple sources of evidence must be used. Coding of news media stories is one source of examination. Coding in qualitative inquiry is most often used to identify words or short phrases that symbolically assign a summative, salient, essence-capturing, and/or evocative attribute for a portion of language-based or visual data (Saldana 2009, p. 3). The coding process of this research entailed looking through a selected sample of relevant news media coverage and systematically noting its traits as it pertains to the racialization of Islam in the United States (Pew Research Center n.d.). Choosing a sample of articles involved a focus on representativeness and the practical use of the article, specifically in terms of two units of analysis: “race” and “racial profiling.” In terms of the sampling technique, this research can best be described as purposeful sampling. Purposeful sampling is widely used in qualitative research for the identification and selection of information-rich cases for the most effective use of limited resources (Patton 2002). Because there are numerous purposeful sampling designs, the author opted for a criterion technique that identifies and selects cases that meet some predetermined criterion of importance. In light of this research, the criterion of importance included terms like race, racism, hate crime, racial profiling, Muslims and Islamophobia. The selection of the material involved identifying and selecting news articles that are especially pertinent to the role that race played in incidents of anti-Muslim discrimination and violence. Embedded in the purposeful sampling strategy is the ability to compare and contrast, to identify similarities and differences across the selected articles. The author framed “news articles” in a broad manner to include print, online news sites, network TV programs, cable TV programs, radio broadcasts, and blogs (Pew Research Center n.d.). In total, 98 articles were examined for initial inclusion in the content analysis. Using the key search words, “racial profiling of Muslims in the United States” and “hate crimes against Muslims in the United States,” the news websites were reviewed for further consideration, particularly in light of incidents involving race and racialization. The publications were identified based on a number of reasons; first, to embody a diversity of political orientations in the United States, a country that plays an important role in framing Muslims and linking it with terrorism. All the news articles examined in the research are considered to be reputable sources and among the largest media outlets in terms of online circulation. A total of 42 relevant articles were chosen for the final analysis. These 42 articles revealed data which support the idea that race serves as a symbolic justification for Islamophobic incidents in the United States. A smaller selection of these articles is examined in the data sections of this paper. Throughout the research phase, the author used content analysis, a research tool used to determine the presence of certain words or concepts within texts or sets of texts. The content analysis of this paper examines numerous sources of evidence through pattern matching, a methodological technique that provides potential linkages between pieces of information (race), while simultaneously applying the same theories (Islamophobia) (Campbell 1975). In the case of this paper, the proposition or phenomenon is the intersectionality between race and Islamophobia. It should also be made clear that the author allowed the analytical categories to flow from the articles themselves (Kondracki et al. 2002). In this regard, the author approached the texts in a subjective manner, but classified the texts by coding and identifying language, themes or patterns (Hsieh and Shannon 2005, p. 1278). The language used in the articles is important because of what it describes and what it is associated with. As Fowler (2007) notes, anything that is written about the world is articulated from a particular position: language is not a clear window but a refracting, structuring medium. As the examination of language played a pivotal role within this study, it is important to remember that language is not neutral. Instead, language is seen as a set of symbols that Religions 2017, 8, 165 5 of 19 describe something. It is this meaning that the author focuses on while analyzing how Muslims and non-Muslims experience anti-Muslim racism in the United States. At the first level of coding, the author looked for two categories in the available articles: “race” and “racism.” These two categories formed the basic units of the first phase of analysis. Headlines that contained potential information about the representative concepts were examined and noted as a specific Islamophobic incident against Muslims or those perceived to be Muslim. Additional search entries into LexisNexis included “race and hate crimes against Muslims” and “racism and anti-Muslim attacks.” After exhausting an online news search of these units of analysis, the research moved to the second level of coding, which focused on locating articles for coverage of specific hate crimes against groups such as Muslims, Arabs, Sikhs, South Asians, and People of Color. The sample of articles examined in the second coding stage relate to concepts such as “looking Muslim,” “flying while brown,” and “racial profiling” at airports and on planes. Once these stories were identified, the author started to code and relate that coding system to several broad conceptual themes including Islamophobia, racial profiling, racism and civil rights violations. Islamophobia is the most common word in the cluster of competing phrases that emerged from the coding system. All of the recorded material analyzed in the paper is available online to be re-analyzed for reliability checks. The final analysis of the articles was undertaken at a “micro” rather than “macro” level, meaning, the author engaged with stories relating to everyday lived experiences of Muslims rather than poll numbers or surveys. Ultimately, the author decided to frame the inquiry largely as a contemporary analysis of how Islamophobia operates in the United States, focusing particularly on research-based evidence and current events that point to the racialization of Islam. Ultimately, the goal of this study is to reveal how race is a symbolic form of Islamophobia as well as Islamophobic incidents in the United States. 3. The Intersectionality of Race and Islamophobia There is a cluster of terms and phrases referring to hostility towards American Muslims. The most widely known term is Islamophobia. One of the first uses of Islamophobia in English appears in an article by Said (1985); he initially brought into focus the stigmatized identity of Muslims in his work Orientalism, which unpacked the Western perspectives that create dehumanizing representations of the “exotic” and “barbarous” countries of the Middle East, Africa, and Asia (Said 1978). Said (1978) saw many features of Western representations of the “Arab Other” as based on a fear of Muslims. Lurking behind these depictions is the menace of violent jihad, and a fear that Muslims (and Arabs) will destroy “Western civilization” and then take over the world (Said 1978, p. 287). These discourses, as Said notes, represent Muslims as systematically different from the “rational, developed, humane, superior” Westerners, while the Muslims and Arabs of the Orient are framed as “aberrant, undeveloped, inferior” (Said 1978, pp. 300–1). The Otherness of Muslims, as Said (1978) points out, is a narrative that judges a Muslim or Muslim group as inferior. This position requires an a priori assertion that the racialized Muslims actually have a core culture or a uniform way of expressing their Islamic beliefs and practices (Modood 2005, pp. 13–14). To assert such a shared cultural inferiority is hardly different from asserting a shared biological inferiority (Dunn et al. 2007, p. 567). The racialization of Islam and Muslims nonetheless draws heavily upon observable elements of culture. This is a continuity of the so-called biological realities—that racism still depends on physical features for the selection of victims (Dunn et al. 2007, p. 567). In today’s Western context, as noted by Meer and Modood (2009), Orientalism and Islamophobia have resulted in the racialization of Muslims and the social construction of a “visible archetype” of Muslims, who are characterized as inimical to “Western” culture and religion. The racialization of American Muslims also signifies an ideological process, and a historically specific one, which extends racial meaning to Islamic social practices and Muslims themselves (Omi and Winant 1994). These constructions of Orientalism and Islamophobia (incivility, inferiority, and incompatibility) are key tools of contemporary racism in the United States. Following Carr and Haynes (2015), American Muslims appear to be caught in a “clash of racializations” Religions 2017, 8, 165 6 of 19 between exclusionary notions of American national identity and racialized “Muslimness,” both of which operate to expose Muslims to racist activity while concomitantly excluding them from the protection of the state. Despite the heterogeneity of the American Muslim population, Muslims in the United States are racialized, meaning they are cast as a potentially threatening Other based on racial characteristics. Racialization, in this light, is a process by which American Muslims are identified and labelled through racial differentiation, such as genetics or skin color, and also through perceived cultural features such as religious symbols, like a beard or head covering. While Muslims are not a “race,” they are examined through a racial process that is demarcated by physical features and racial underpinnings. In terms of “war on terror” discourses, this can be seen “in the dichotomy between the benevolent, deviant masculinity of the ‘brown man’” (Khalid 2011, p. 20). This gendered Orientalist representation relies on binaries, but also employs racialized hierarchies (Khalid 2011, p. 20). Through this racialization, racism surfaces to demonize Muslims as “threats” who need to be handled through racial profiling, coercion, and violence. The term Islamophobia gained further traction when the Runnymede Trust defined Islamophobia in two reports: A Very Light Sleeper, which led to the following report, Islamophobia: A Challenge for Us All (Runnymede Trust 1997). The 1997 Runnymede report defined Islamophobia as the unfounded and close-minded fear and/or hatred of Islam, Muslims or Islamic/Muslim culture. The definition identifies eight components as characteristic of Islamophobia in this sense: (1) Islam is seen as a monolithic bloc, static and unresponsive to change; (2) Islam is seen as separate and Other. It does not have values in common with other cultures, is not affected by them, and does not influence them; (3) Islam is seen as inferior to the West. It is barbaric, irrational, primitive, and sexist; (4) Islam is seen as violent, aggressive, threatening, supportive of terrorism, and engaged in a clash of civilizations (original emphasis); (5) Islam is seen as a political ideology and is used to acquire political or military advantage; (6) Criticism of the West by Muslims is rejected out of hand; (7) Hostility towards Islam is used to justify discriminatory practices towards Muslims and the exclusion of Muslims from mainstream society; (8) Anti-Muslim hostility is seen as natural or normal. Adding to the theoretical foundation provided by the Runnymede Report, Allen (2010, p. 188) suggested that three different components of Islamophobia exist. The first is that Islamophobia is an ideology, one that provides meaning about Islam and Muslims in the contemporary setting “in similar ways to that which it has historically” (Allen 2010, p. 188). The second component of Islamophobia is the “modes of operation” through which meaning about Islam and Muslims is sustained and perpetuated. The final component of Islamophobia is exclusionary practices: practices that disadvantage and discriminate against Islam and Muslims in social and political spheres. Exclusionary practices include the subjection to violence as a tool of exclusion. Since the Runnymede Trust popularized “Islamophobia,” many scholars have raised methodological and theoretical concerns about the term (Bleich 2011; Savelkoul et al. 2012). Joppke (2009) dismisses the concept outright, and Halliday (1999) questioned the utility of the term. Bravo-Lopez (2011, p. 559) rejects the notion of Islamophobia being a type of racism because it is “devoid of any of the biological or cultural determinism” of racist discourses. Other critics maintain that the term Islamophobia is a politically manipulative coinage designed to silence critics of “Islamic supremacism” (Berlinski 2010). Moreover, Larsson and Sander (2015) discuss a further potential implication with the Runnymede Trust’s definition of Islamophobia. They question whether an individual must hold and assent to all of these beliefs to be considered Islamophobic or, mutatis mutandis, responsible for Islamophobic action (Larsson and Sander 2015, p. 15). Critics have also Religions 2017, 8, 165 7 of 19 argued that Islamophobia is a propaganda term coined by the Muslim Brotherhood and seamlessly adopted by its Western confederates (Semkiw 2015). The notion that Islamophobia intersects with race is rooted in the idea that race is a social construct rather than a biological fact or reality. Race, a pre-eminently socio-historical concept, is given concrete expression by the specific social relations and historical context in which they are embedded (Omi and Winant 1994). In terms of scientific data, experts conclude that there is no single gene or cluster common to various “races” such as Asian, Black, or White. Recent analyses of the human genome have established that human evolution has been recent, copious, and regional, meaning that races or racial identities are fluid rather than static (Wade 2014). As such, the 17th century concept of defining race based on physical and generic variations is no longer accepted by most sociologists, anthropologists and biologists. The science of race is now concerned with the social production of race, or what the American Scientist (2011) refers to race as “folk taxonomy, not science.” While there are geographical differences in human biology, in light of vulnerabilities of particular diseases, we would be remiss to see the differences as meaningfully organized around race. Note carefully that these declarations do not claim that “there is no such thing as race.” What scholars mean is that there is no “biological entity the warrants the term ‘race’” (Brace 2000). The other side of the argument sees nothing wrong in defining, categorizing, and naming the different human populations of the world. Some forensic anthropologists, for example, support the idea of the basic biological reality of human races (Gill 2000). Biologists scanning the genome for evidence of natural selection have detected signals of many genes that have been favored by natural selection in the recent evolutionary past (Wade 2014). Of course, no forensic anthropologist or biologist would make a racial assessment based upon these methods, but in combination they can make reliable assessments; in other words, multiple criteria are the key to success in all of these determinations (Gill 2000). Andreasen (2000), too, challenges the tendency to reject the biological reality of race by arguing that cladism—a school of classification that appeals to common ancestry—provides a new way to define race biologically. Racism as defined by ancestral genome differences is rooted in biological essentialism and the idea that there exist incontestable differences among the “races” of the world. In the U.S. historical context, racial and religious minority communities have been objectified and exploited as “colored” men and women through racial classifications. This form of discrimination manifested in a direct and personalized prejudice by white Americans against different “races” (Welty 1989). These “races” are People of Color who were literally pre-judged—that is, they were judged before the relevant evidence about their abilities and interests were available to those who would come to judge them (Welty 1989). To reiterate, scholars might refer to “races,” but it does not make them coherent biological realities. The approximately 1.8 billion Muslims worldwide do not carry genes for tribalism or violence, nor do they lack genes for freedom or democracy. Though race and racism appear to be similar, they can be differentiated by a number of factors. Race is a way of classifying human beings based on perceived biological, cultural, and social relationships. Racism, on the other hand, is a way of treating others based on their “race.” Racism has been defined as “the coordinated interaction of particular types of stereotypes, prejudices and discrimination” (Jones 1997). Jones further states that racism reflects the discrimination by individuals and institutions in ways that are justified by—and tend to perpetuate—negative beliefs, attitudes, and consequences. Escaping accusations of racism is a common tactic among certain critics of Islam. Those who fall under the umbrella of Islamophobia, for example, might see themselves not as racist or xenophobic, “but as defenders of democracy and human rights against the adherents of a religion they believe is incompatible with both” (Musharbash 2014). Racism and Islamophobia, as Hussain and Bagguley (2012, p. 4) explain, are “analytically distinct,” but they also note that these two concepts are “empirically inter-related.” While biological racist discourses have declined, racism derived from perceptions of cultural and religious superiority has emerged as a dominant form of racism worldwide. These kinds of racisms do Religions 2017, 8, 165 8 of 19 not even mention the word “race.” They are focused on the cultural inferiority/superiority dichotomy of a group of people based on habits, beliefs, behaviors, or values. With increasing frequency, this kind of racism draws links between physical characteristics and perceived social customs, manners and behavior, religious and moral beliefs, as well as cultural practices, language, aesthetic values, and leisure activities (Halstead 1988). Islamophobia has been described as a type of racism that oppresses American Muslims on the grounds that their perceived “Islamic culture” is nefarious, and that their “Islamic culture” is antithetical to “American culture.” This kind of racism represents intolerance towards cultural and ethnic diversity as a whole, rather than Muslims alone (Welty 1989). Racism, in this context of cultural orientation or imagined cultures, involves prejudice or discrimination against individuals because of their perceived cultural preferences. This kind of “subliminal racism,” or “racism without race,” lacks a formal system of segregation and other forms of overt racism, but it does suggest a system of inequality, injustice and racial differentiation (Cole 1997; Gilroy 1987; Hall 1992, pp. 256–58). Islam and American Muslims play a dominant role in these kinds of racist discourses. The contemporary tropes of Muslims as “uncivilized,” “barbarian,” “primitive,” “authoritarian,” and “terrorist” depicts Islam as an inferior set of beliefs and cultural practices. These tropes are a repetition of older biological racist discourses. Nation-states are also able to construct racial classifications, not as units of biology, but as ways to regulate the nation and demarcate the boundaries of national identity. Goldberg (2002) provides a mechanism to unpack the intersectionality of race and Islamophobia as viewed through the prism of U.S. institutions. His conceptualization of the racial state—a state that “defines populations in racially defined groups”—is used by institutions to regulate social categories (Goldberg 2002, p. 110). Building on Goldberg’s concept of racial state, Sayyid (2014) refers to Islamophobia as “a form of racialized governmentality” that results in a series of institutional interventions and classifications that affect the well-being of populations designated as Muslims. In this context, Islamophobia preserves institutional racism while masking, but not eliminating, the individual displays of prejudice that gave racism based on biological differences its vulgarity (Welty 1989). The theoretical grounding of this paper is that discrimination of, and hate crimes against, American Muslims are infused with racialized understandings of “Muslim identity,” which shed light upon the manifestations of the U.S. racial state and racialized governmentality. In this light, race has emerged as a “symbolic form” of Islamophobia (Allen 2010). The paper reinforces the racialization framework by arguing that in the United States, American Muslims have become victims of race-based violence through the construction of “visible archetype” of “Muslim identity,” utilizing symbolic markers such as name, dress, phenotype, and language (Naber 2008). In the next section, three sets of findings are provided to examine the intersectionality of race and Islamophobia. The first section examines public opinion polls to reveal the extent of anti-Muslim sentiments in the United States. The second and third datasets use a content analysis of news articles that cover hate crimes against Muslims and the racial profiling of “Muslim-looking” people. 4. Islamophobia, Hate Crimes, and “Flying While Brown” A review of recent polls shows that the majority of non-Muslims in the United States have become increasingly hostile towards Muslims, paralleling the developing discourse among politicians and media outlets. The most recent compilation of Islamophobic hate crimes data by the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) (2017) shows that, between 2014 and 2016, anti-Muslim bias incidents increased by 65%. In 2016 alone, incidents of Islamophobia rose by 57% (Council on American-Islamic Relations 2017). CAIR’s findings were similar to data collected by the Center for the Study of Hate and Extremism (CSHE) at California State University San Bernardino, which accounted for 20 states and documented a total of 196 incidents in 2015 (Levin 2016b). This number is 29% higher than 2014’s total of 154 for the entire nation, as tabulated by the FBI (Levin 2016b These are levels not seen since the attacks of 9/11, a year that recorded 481 anti-Muslim hate crimes (Levin 2016b). The largest previous increase since 2001 was in 2010, when anti-Muslim hate crimes rose from Religions 2017, 8, 165 9 of 19 107 to 160, a rise of 49.5%, amid the controversy over the “Ground Zero mosque” in New York City (Levin 2016b). Anti-Muslim attacks are not only rising in total numbers, but as a percentage of overall hate crimes (Lichtblau 2016). Out of all religious groups in the United States, Americans view atheists and Muslims most coldly (Pew Research Center 2014). In 2015, unfavorable attitudes toward American Muslims rose to a high of 67% (Arab American Institute 2015). A YouGov/Huffington Post survey on American’s views of Muslims show that 55% of those polled had “a somewhat or very unfavorable view” of Islam, while one in four said they were not sure how they viewed the faith (Kaleem 2015). Of the Americans that were surveyed in the YouGov/Huffington Post poll, only one in 10 said they had ever visited a mosque, and 44% said they would not want to learn more about Islam. In addition to their broadly unfavorable views of Islam, a large percentage (42%) of Americans believe that law enforcement agencies are justified in using racial profiling tactics against Muslims and Arabs (Siddiqui 2014). These trends inevitably contribute to Islamophobic discourse and sentiment. Furthermore, Zogby Analytics, an advocacy group, found the favorability toward Muslims living in the United States was just 27%, compared with 36% in 2010 (Siddiqui 2014). The Zogby poll also found that a growing number of Americans doubt that Muslims or Arabs would be able to perform in a government post without their ethnicity or religion affecting their work (Siddiqui 2014). Finally, anti-Islam and anti-Muslim sentiment is more common among Americans who are 45 and older, those who are Republican, and those who are white (Chalabi 2015). The Americans who voice an unfavorable opinion of Islam may have sympathized with Donald Trump’s call for a “total and complete shutdown on Muslims entering the United States” during the 2016 presidential election (Johnson 2015). While attitudes towards Islam and Muslims should be considered separately, studies suggest that the two overlap considerably, as many people fail to distinguish between the two (Chalabi 2015). According to a poll conducted by Telhami (2015), Americans do differentiate between Muslims and Islam, and they view Islam more unfavorably than they do Muslims. This may have many reasons, but at the core, it is probably easier for Americans to express dislike of an abstract idea (Islam) rather than to appear prejudiced toward people (Muslims) (Telhami 2015). Despite claims that the United States has entered a “post-racial era,” racial profiling, a discriminatory practice, occurs every day in cities and towns across the country, when law enforcement and private security target People of Color (American Civil Liberties Union n.d.). According to the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), this policing tactic is patently illegal because it violates the U.S. Constitution’s core promises of equal protection under the law to all, as well as freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures (American Civil Liberties Union n.d.). 4.1. Hate Crimes A hate crime is understood as “a criminal offense motivated in whole or in part by the actual or perceived group status of another, such as race and ethnicity, religion, disability, sexual orientation, gender and gender identity” (Levin 2016a). According to this definition, an anti-Muslim hate crime constitutes a form of religious hate crime, although these hate crimes can also be understood as a “race hate crime” or by hate that is politically motivated. A persistent difficulty, of course, is that such neat distinctions often break down in the real world (Copsey et al. 2013, p. 6). In reality the distinction between “religion hate crime” and “race hate crime” can often become blurred, making conceptual and reporting clarity difficult (Copsey et al. 2013, p. 6). What is more transparent is that hateful rhetoric towards American Muslims has consequences. When a significant number of Americans hold unfavorable views of Islam and Muslims, it can hardly be a surprise, as the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC) (2016) points out, that some percentage of them engage in hate crime attacks. Since 9/11, American Muslims, and those living in the United States who are perceived to be Muslims, have faced a spike in racially and religiously motivated hate crimes. A May 2017 report by The Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) showed that hate crimes against Muslims in the United States rose dramatically in 2016, just as they did in 2015 (Pitter 2017). Religions 2017, 8, 165 10 of 19 Key findings in the report highlight how Islamophobic bias continues its trend towards increasing violence (Council on American-Islamic Relations 2017). In 2016, CAIR recorded a 57% increase in anti-Muslim bias incidents over 2015, which was accompanied by a 44% increase in anti-Muslim hate crimes in the same period. Harassment (a non-violent or non-threatening bias incident) was the most frequent type of abuse in 2016, accounting for 18% of the total number of incidents. According to FBI statistics, the number of hate crimes against Muslims, as of 2015, had stabilized at approximately five times the pre-9/11 rate (Ingraham 2015). The number of anti-Muslim hate crimes incidents in the United States is likely higher than the numbers documented in the 2016 CAIR report. American Muslims, the organization wrote, “will often not report incidents such as harassment and bullying since there is a certain level of desensitization.” CAIR added that some American Muslims often feel like “nothing can be done” when they are harassed for their faith, feeling that such incidents “have become normal” (Mathias 2017). What is thought-provoking about the prevalence of anti-Muslim hate crimes is that they have not been limited to Muslims. Readers do not need to look far in our time to find people being targeted for “looking Muslim.” The case of Cameron Mohammed is notable for being one of the most explicit examples of how the racialization of Islam leads to Islamophobic hate crimes (Goeman 2013). Mohammed, a Florida resident, was shot repeatedly with a pellet gun outside of a Walmart in 2013 (Orlando and Sullivan 2013). The assailant explicitly asked Mohammed if he was in fact a Muslim or from the Middle East; when he answered negatively, the attack did not stop (Goeman 2013). The assailant’s remarks to the police after the incident reveal his real motive. When deputies told the assailant that his victim was not Muslim, he told them he did not care, that “they’re all the same.” In this case, “they” (or “Muslim-looking people”) are painted as a monolith. Mohammed’s physical appearance, in particular his skin tone, was connected with a social identity (Muslim or Arab). The discrimination that he experienced reinforced a racial identity that was linked to Islam. Because many U.S. citizens perceive them as threatening and inferior, American Muslims endure regular expressions of hostility in public places, particularly U.S. airports. Selod (2014) interviewed 48 South Asian and Arab Americans about their experiences pre- and post-9/11 in Chicago and the Dallas/Fort Worth area between 2009 and 2012. Her research found that the association of Islam with terror, violence, and the oppression of women contribute to a process of racialized governmentality at airports, which conveys the message that American Muslims are a threat to national security and require careful monitoring and surveillance. This process of racialized governmentality regularly targets Muslims at U.S. airports and has led to many American Muslim men and women being treated with suspicion. Non-Muslims, too, have been impacted by racial profiling and the racialization of Islam. In May 2016, Guido Menzio, a decorated Ivy League economist from Italy, was removed from an American Airlines flight because his seatmate expressed concerns after seeing him writing math equations in a notebook before the plane’s take-off. Menzio, who was described by a passenger as having “dark, curly hair, olive skin and an exotic foreign accent,” was taken off the plane for questioning (Danner 2016). Authorities told him he had been suspected of terrorism. Menzio’s case is an instance of racial profiling of airline passengers whose skin color, actions, or speech make airline passengers and flight attendants think they are Muslim. His experience highlights the way that internalized racial bias against Islam and Muslims can lead to the perception that U.S. Muslims pose a security treat. In light of Menzio, Chu (2015) argues that it is hypocritical to say that Islamophobia is a simple consequence of “rational disagreement” with the tenets of Islam rather than xenophobic distrust of people who look different from “normal” Americans. Chu’s point becomes clearer when we see how much of Islamophobia falls on Sikhs. Sikh communities across the United States have been victims of hate crimes perpetrated by Americans. Reports of incidents in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 and concerns that hate crimes would rise prompted the founding of the Sikh Coalition, now the largest Sikh advocacy and civil rights organization in the country (Basu 2016). In the first month after 9/11, the Coalition documented more than 300 cases of violence and discrimination against Sikhs in the Religions 2017, 8, 165 11 of 19 United States (Basu 2016). Fifteen years after 9/11, many Sikhs say they feel no safer in the country, primarily because of the continued confusion between Sikhs and Islam (Basu 2016). Ultimately, linking such features of “Muslim-ness” means that people who are not Muslim are also subjected to violence as a result of the racialization of Islam. Those who attack Sikhs do not appear to care much about such fine distinctions as Sikhism and Islam being two different religions. In September 2001, Balibar Singh Sodhi was shot and killed outside of his Mesa, Arizona, gas station by Frank Roque, a U.S. citizen who told law enforcement he wanted to “kill a Muslim” in retaliation for the attacks on 9/11 (Sikh American Legal Defense and Education Fund 2011). According to one prominent Sikh advocacy group, Sodhi was selected by Roque because he had a beard and wore a turban in accordance with his Sikh faith (Sikh American Legal Defense and Education Fund 2011). Although the Sikh turban signifies commitment to upholding freedom, justice and dignity for all people, “the physical appearance of a Sikh is often ignorantly conflated with images of foreign [Muslim] terrorists, some of whom also wear turbans and many of whom have received copious publicity in our mainstream media in the post-9/11 environment” (Sikh Coalition 2012). In Roque’s case, he confused Sodhi’s long beard and turban as a representation of Islam. He then effectively used Sodhi’s “race” to categorize and ultimately harm him in the worst way imaginable—murder. Sodhi’s murder is not an isolated case; two other examples alert us to the racialization of Islam and its connection to hate crimes against non-Muslims in the United States. In December 2015, a robber shot an Indian store clerk in Grand Rapids, Iowa. The clerk, a non-Muslim from the Punjab in India, was shot in the face after the assailant called him a “terrorist” (McVicar 2015). Indeed, terms such as “terrorist,” “jihad,” and “sharia” are elements of a widely used Islamophobic lexicon. These components of bias comprise a structure of Muslim-hating that depicts Muslims as the visibly identifiable Other (Singh 2016). In another incident in September 2013, a highly accomplished Sikh doctor was attacked while walking near Central Park in New York City. He had a long beard and wore a turban (Basu 2016). The victim, Prabhjot Singh, heard someone yell: “Terrorist, Osama, get him!” In American public discourse, the name “Osama” is popularly linked to Osama bin Laden, the “terrorist extremist” who allegedly planned the 9/11 attacks. Singh eventually ran from his attacker, but not fast enough. A group of boys and young men on bicycles taunted him using racial slurs (Basu 2016). One pulled his beard and then the attackers punched and kicked him repeatedly (Basu 2016). Singh’s attackers conflated religion and race such that religion—in this case Islam—became the inherently “defining criterion” of Muslim identity (Bayoumi 2006, p. 278). Thus, the “visible archetype” became attached to a Sikh, such that religious, ethnic, cultural, and national differences are transformed into racial differences (Naber 2008). The conflation of Muslims and Sikhs shows how shallow Islamophobia can be—Sikhism does not share Islam’s Abrahamic lineage and has no direct connection to Islam, unlike Judaism or Christianity. Sikhs also do not originate from anywhere in the Middle East, but from the Punjab region of India (Chu 2015). Nevertheless, Sikhs are conflated with Muslims for the oversimplified reason that the turban—one of the most common forms of headgear in the world—is associated with the Middle East and ultimately Islam. While turbans are commonplace in many Muslim-majority countries, there is no similar requirement to wear a turban in the Islamic tradition. These hate crimes against Sikhs suggest that one does not actually have to be a Muslim in any theological or cultural sense to be singled out for an Islamophobic assault (Goeman 2013). Rather, what matters is how one expresses their culture, how one looks, and whether those “looks” are conflated in a negative manner with Islam and Muslims. The data presented on hate crimes against American Muslims and non-Muslims in the United States demonstrate how Islamophobic incidents result from, and contribute to, the idea that “Muslim identity” has racial underpinnings (Samari 2016, p. 1921). Although Sikhs and other “Muslim-looking” people continue to experience hate crimes on account of their identity, the FBI has recently begun to track hate crimes against Sikhs (Sikh Coalition 2015). The Sikh Coalition claims that officially categorizing hate crimes against Sikhs is imperative “because it is impossible to address a problem Religions 2017, 8, 165 12 of 19 unless it is being accurately measured” (Sikh Coalition 2012, p. 3). The next section, which examines racial profiling at the institutional level, sheds further light on the idea that race serves as a symbolic form of Islamophobia. 4.2. “Flying while Brown” Racial profiling has been defined as “any use of race, religion, ethnicity or national origin by law enforcement agents as a means of deciding who should be investigated” (Leadership Conference Education Fund n.d., p. 11). Under this definition, “racial profiling does not only occur when race is the sole criterion used by a law enforcement agent in determining who to investigate” (Leadership Conference Education Fund n.d., p. 11). Racial profiling heightened with the 2001 Patriot Act and associated legislation, which gave the State new powers to categorize Muslims or “Muslim-like” Americans. The Patriot Act legislation not only contributed to social segregation and differential access to resources (Love 2009), but also effectively “securitized” Muslims such that they became defined as a unique security threat (Hussain and Bagguley 2012). To account for these kinds of institutional security measures, Larsson and Sander (2015, p. 16) use the term structural or institutional Islamophobia, that is, something along the lines of the following suggestion by the Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia: . . . those established laws, customs and practices which systematically reflect and produce inequalities in society between Muslims and non-Muslims. If such inequalities accrue to institutional law, customs or practices, an institution is Islamophobic whether or not the individuals maintaining those practices have Islamophobic intentions. (Richardson 2004, p. 14) According to this definition, institutional Islamophobia is “distinct from the attitudinal Islamophobia of individuals in being caused by the existence of systematic, pervasive and habitual policies and practices that have the effect of disadvantaging certain racial, religious, or ethnic groups” (Larsson and Sander 2015, p. 16). At the institutional level, programs such as the National Security Entry–Exit Registration System (NSEERS) target Muslims on the basis of their names and national origins rather than religion (Bayoumi 2006). This practice of racial profiling perpetuates “a logic that demands the ability to define what a Muslims looks like from appearance and visual cues” (Rana 2007, p. 149). Because Muslims are often represented as coming from non-white groups, their religious identity becomes linked to their racial identity (Samari 2016, p. 1921). As the author previously highlighted, Islamophobia affects the lives of people with “Muslim-like” appearances in the United States (Samari 2016, p. 1921). Racial profiling systems in the United States have targeted South Asians, presumably focusing on their perceived racial, ethnic, and religious similarities to the 9/11 hijackers (Chandrasekhar 2003, p. 215). One highly visible and contested manifestation of post-9/11 race-based discrimination has been the widespread increase in airlines’ disparate treatment of people of South Asian descent and those individuals who “look Muslim” (Chandrasekhar 2003, p. 216). Since 9/11, airlines have racially profiled “brown, Muslim-like” passengers and subjected them to heightened security screening on the belief that ethnicity or national origin increases passengers’ risk of carrying out an act of terrorism (Chandrasekhar 2003, p. 216). In January 2016, for example, an attendant of American Airlines kicked four Brooklyn men off a flight for “looking too Muslim”—claiming their appearance made the captain “uneasy” (Carrega-Woodby 2016). Passengers surrounding the men allegedly made racist comments and clutched their children “as if something was going to happen,” a lawsuit charges. The four men—two Bangladeshi Muslims, an Arab Muslim, and a Sikh from India—were all ordered off the flight. All of the men have a darker skin complexion; one wears a turban and another has a beard. One man—who communicated by the pseudonym M. K.—asked the agent if they were thrown off because of their appearance. The agent said their appearance “did not help,” according to the lawsuit. Put another way, the detained individuals were “passing” as people who are thought to be Muslim Religions 2017, 8, 165 13 of 19 based on a racialized meaning of “Muslim identity.” This discriminatory treatment of racial profiling reveals the way that internalized racism against Muslims can lead to the perception that Muslims are a threat (Credo Action n.d.). It also is clear that airline staff may not have adequate skills to protect the rights of passengers who are being racially profiled. There is a common misperception that all Muslims are the same and all Muslims are Arabs. Muslim, however, does not mean Arab. Moghul (2016) makes this point while discussing a Muslim airline passenger and Iraq asylee, Khairuldeen Makhzoomi, who was removed from a Southwest Airlines flight because his appearance reportedly set off “alarm bells.” According to a Southwest Airlines (2016) statement, Makhzoomi triggered anxiety among other passengers by speaking Arabic. The crew reported the situation to law enforcement agencies to prevent any threat to civil aviation, and later requested Makhzoomi to leave the aircraft. Makhzoomi also had a beard and a generically Middle Eastern appearance, which allegedly contributed to the anxiety of the plane’s passengers. The willingness to communicate publicly in a language (Arabic) associated with Islam, as well as “looking Muslim,” is correlated with being “religiously Muslim” (Moghul 2016). The common thread in these cases of racial profiling seems to be that anyone who does not conform to the standardized appearance of an “American” is made to feel like a criminal. Nor is what happened to these men and others a mere misunderstanding or mistake; it can be viewed as racism based on profiling (Dharas 2016). This kind of racism involves the subordination of People of Color based on institutions that enforce or extend people’s personal dislike or mistrust of individuals and groups such as Muslims or those perceived to be Muslims. The implication of these incidents is that Muslims are depicted as “radicalized,” or potentially so, and that they present a “security threat” to American society because they “look Muslim.” In the case of Muslims and non-Muslims who “look Muslim,” race and religion have effectively comingled to form aspects of an Othered identity, which has been effectively criminalized by the State (Singh 2016). To be clear, racial profiling on airlines does not attack Islamic theology, but rather Muslim people or people perceived to be Muslim. In this light, racial profiling is not based solely on ideas about Islam, but rather on the color and physical appearance that are associated with Muslims. It is worth noting that, under current laws, an airline “may not subject a person in air transportation to discrimination on the basis of race, color, national origin, religion, sex, or ancestry” (United States Government 2016). The Department of Transportation is authorized to prevent and seek redress for acts of discrimination (Khan 2016). Given the increasing frequency of, and seemingly arbitrary grounds for, the removal of Muslims and passengers who others perceive to be Muslim from domestic airlines, it is clear that the Department of Transportation needs to act to counter Islamophobia. 5. Conclusions The findings presented suggest that race is a symbolic form of Islamophobia. According to Allen (2010, p. 189), symbolic forms of Islamophobia are relayed, produced, and constructed before being disseminated through incidents of anti-Muslim discrimination. The incidents examined in this paper suggest that Islamophobia does not belong in the realm of “rational” criticism of Islam or Muslims; it is often discrimination against people who look different to the majority of U.S. citizens. The manifestation of Islamophobia in the United States also often fuses racial and religious bias, largely because the stereotypical Muslim has been constructed as an ominous figure: the bearded, dark-skinned, turban-wearing terrorist guided by perceived archaic religious practices (Singh 2016). The production of Muslims as “visible archetypes” sustains and perpetuates negatively evaluated meanings about Islam and Muslims in the United States. Race, therefore, shapes and determines the perception of Muslims, which then informs and constructs thinking about Islam as “Other” (Allen 2010, p. 190). Racism against Muslims and non-Muslims in the United States, as this paper highlights, plays out at the social/interactional as well as institutional level. While anti-Muslim racism often unfolds in everyday interactions between Muslims and non-Muslims, institutionalized power struggles in the United States are key to exacerbating Islamophobia (Allen 2010, p. 188). Religions 2017, 8, 165 14 of 19 Hate crimes against American Muslims and those perceived to be Muslim have created circumstances of second-class citizenship, whereby Muslims and groups linked to Islam see their safety and freedoms limited in the United States. Taking a “colorblind” understanding of Islamophobia—that is, to dismiss the role that race plays in anti-Muslim racism—legitimizes certain racialized practices and maintains inequalities such as racial profiling at airports, police brutality, housing and job discrimination, and voter disenfranchisement (Bonilla-Silva 2013). The Department of Justice (2011) has started to take measures to protect Muslims, as well as members of the Arab, Sikh, and South Asian communities, from threats and violence directed at them because of their race and religion. Identifying the impact that racialization plays in hate crimes and institutional racial profiling illuminates a major impediment to building a more pluralist society, one in which people are judged by the content of their character instead of their racial or religious backgrounds. Moreover, following Hopkins (2004, pp. 268–69), improving public understanding of Islam and “Muslim identity,” as well as expanding public recognition of American Muslims outside of stereotypical depictions of “Muslim identity,” might lead to a decrease in hate crime incidents and racial profiling. Going forward, advocacy groups and organizations could do more to incorporate race and racialized processes in their approach to understanding and combatting Islamophobia. By noting the impact of race and racialization on Islamophobic incidents, these entities can help American Muslims secure their civil rights protections. Whether the term Islamophobia captures the endemic suspicion and vilification of Americans Muslims is a promising and important area of inquiry in terms of future research. In summary, American Muslims can be simultaneously profiled in terms of race and religion. 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Introduction Methodology The Intersectionality of Race and Islamophobia Islamophobia, Hate Crimes, and “Flying While Brown” Hate Crimes “Flying while Brown” Conclusions 
work_ypatsvdodjbrfld6uyuhdsro6y	----	A Calling. | Semantic Scholar Skip to search formSkip to main content> Semantic Scholar's Logo Search Sign InCreate Free Account You are currently offline. Some features of the site may not work correctly. DOI:10.1097/ALN.0000000000000877 Corpus ID: 10179565A Calling. @article{Bradley2015AC, title={A Calling.}, author={Burke T Bradley}, journal={Anesthesiology}, year={2015}, volume={123 6}, pages={1473-5} } Burke T Bradley Published 2015 Medicine Anesthesiology Last week, hundreds of protestors from across the country descended upon the small, deep, southwest, sleepy town of Jena, located in rural central Louisiana along U.S. Highway 84. Caravans of people of all ages and racial groups poured into the town along with the normal morning commute traffic. Fields of commercial crops of cotton, soy beans, Milo and corn blanketed the flatlands on either side of the road. The mix of trailer homes, wooden frame houses and ranch style estates lined the… Expand View on PubMed doi.org Save to Library Create Alert Cite Launch Research Feed Share This Paper Supplemental Presentations Presentation Slides A Calling. Explore Further Discover more papers related to the topics discussed in this paper Topics from this paper Soybeans Sorghum bicolor Beans (food) Classification Inventions References SHOWING 1-8 OF 8 REFERENCES 1-866-483-1057, USWA $1200 WEEKLY, Assembling Toys from Home. 1-866-232-0752, www.toyimport1.com MYSTERY SHOPPERS! Earn up to $150 daily. Get paid to shop pt/ft 1-866-483-1057, USWA $1200 WEEKLY, Assembling Toys from Home. 1-866-232-0752, www.toyimport1.com MYSTERY SHOPPERS! Earn up to $150 daily. Get paid to shop pt/ft 30cpm Starting pay for 6mo exp 30cpm Starting pay for 6mo exp Big Miles/Big Bucks/New Trucks: Get It All! Western Express Inc All '05, '06, and now '07 Business, School/House. Almost Everyone qualifies! Live Operators! AVOID DEADLINES! Listings Business, School/House. Almost Everyone qualifies! Live Operators! AVOID DEADLINES! Listings Do you earn $800 in a day? Your own local candy route. Includes 30 Machines and Candy All for $9 Do you earn $800 in a day? Your own local candy route. Includes 30 Machines and Candy All for $9 Home Weekly! Open 7 days/wk 1-800-883 Home Weekly! Open 7 days/wk 1-800-883 Pay $20/hour or $57K annually including Federal Benefits and OT. Paid training, Vacations Pay $20/hour or $57K annually including Federal Benefits and OT. Paid training, Vacations Weekly Hometime. One-Day Orientation Weekly Hometime. One-Day Orientation Related Papers Abstract Supplemental Presentations Topics 8 References Related Papers Stay Connected With Semantic Scholar Sign Up About Semantic Scholar Semantic Scholar is a free, AI-powered research tool for scientific literature, based at the Allen Institute for AI. Learn More → Resources DatasetsSupp.aiAPIOpen Corpus Organization About UsResearchPublishing PartnersData Partners   FAQContact Proudly built by AI2 with the help of our Collaborators Terms of Service•Privacy Policy The Allen Institute for AI By clicking accept or continuing to use the site, you agree to the terms outlined in our Privacy Policy, Terms of Service, and Dataset License ACCEPT & CONTINUE 
work_ypkase4kofgwjbawinu74y3f7e	----	Considering the Role Marked Variation Plays in Classifying Humans: A Normative Approach Philos Theor Pract Biol (2018) 10:13 book symposium Considering the Role Marked Variation Plays in Classifying Humans: A Normative Approach Catherine Kendig∗ The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the ongoing analyses that aim to confront the problem of marked variation. Negatively marked differences are those natural varia- tions that are used to cleave human beings into different categories (e.g., of disablement, of medicalized pathology, of subnormalcy, or of deviance). The problem of marked variation is: Why are some rather than other variations marked as epistemically or culturally signif- icant or as a diagnostic of pathology, and What is the epistemic background that makes these—rather than other variations—marked as subnormal? For Wilson (2018a), critical examination of the problem of marked variation is central to understanding the epistemol- ogy of medicalized pathology that made the history of eugenics possible. My aim is to explore the role marked variation plays in eugenic and other problematic classifications and the inferences they appear to license. I pay particular attention to the normative val- uations of marked variations, how these valuations affect the inferences that are made by others about those possessing the variation, and how those possessing the variation per- ceive themselves. In the final sections, I illustrate this by critically discussing three putative kinship conceptions of race. I rely on these to extend the scope of the puzzle of marked variation from the context of historic and current markings of an individual’s variation as disability in the eugenics movement to historic and current markings for assigning putative racial ascriptions to individuals and groups. Lastly, I suggest that the problem of marked variation is a problem that looms over any epistemic account that is dependent upon sorting or classifying. Keywords marked variation • classifying humans • philosophy of classification • critical race theory • values in science • eugenic thinking • normative classificatory practices Part of an author-meets-critics book symposium on The Eugenic Mind Project by Robert A. Wilson (MIT Press, 2018) with Wilson 2018c and Love 2018. ∗Michigan State University, Department of Philosophy, 503 Kedzie Hall, 368 Farm Lane, East Lansing MI 48824 USA kendig@msu.edu Received 24 June 2018; Accepted 7 July 2018 doi:10.3998/ptpbio.16039257.0010.013  open access - ptpbio.org mailto:kendig@msu.edu http://dx.doi.org/10.3998/ptpbio.16039257.0010.013 http://ptpbio.org kendig: marked variation in classifying 2 1 The Normativity of Human Classificatory Practices Eugenics emerged in the nineteenth century as a putative science of human improvement. Its aim was to use scientific knowledge and the techniques of selective breeding used by animal and plant breeders to restrict the reproduction of certain kinds of people and enhance the reproduc- tion of others in an effort to improve humanity in each subsequent generation (Wilson 2018a). After their emergence, eugenic practices continued and were justified as powerful ameliorative tools used to sort the socially desirable from the socially undesirable (Wilson 2018a; Valles 2012; Caspari 2003).1 How is it possible that eugenic practices have persisted for so long? An attempt to answer this question invites a further question: What do we need to do, and Who must we listen to in order to hear and understand the answers to the “How is it possible?” question? What is clear is that the continued subhumanization of those thought to possess traits deemed undesirable and/or pathological demands careful investigation. Careful investigation means ask- ing why eugenic practices have persisted as well as what effects these have on individuals whose mental variation was marked as defective and used to justify subhumanizing practices such as forced or coercive sterilization and institutionalization. Understanding the history of eugenics and its persistence requires a critical historical, sociological, and philosophical investigation that includes the narratives of those harmed. However, to understand how those harms were even conceivable also requires an exploration of the very classificatory activities that were used to discriminate between those deemed “mental defectives”2 and those who were not. Robert Wilson (2018a) carefully and critically explores these and related problems in The Eugenic Mind Project (TEMP hereafter). Wilson begins to address the first set of questions in Parts I and III. Part II examines how certain variations are marked as defective and used to justify the mistreatment of those possessing the pathologized variation. Wilson examines the various classifications of disablement and medicalized pathology that aim to describe people that are “regarded as being, in some medically significant way, subnormal” (Wilson 2018a, 104). Their “subnormalcy” refers to “forms of human variation that tend to be viewed as falling below the normal” (Wilson 2018a, 104). These definitions may seem vague, but by defining “subnormalcy” in this way, Wilson avoids problematic descriptions of human variation as negative except insofar as they have been socially or historically defined as such. While he addresses the history of eugenics, Wilson’s explicit aim in TEMP is to investigate how “eugenic thinking” has operated and uncover the reasons why the practice of sorting humans is epistemically as well as socially problematic (Wilson 2018c, this volume). The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the ongoing analyses that aim to confront the problem of marked variation. To do this, I begin by critically engaging with Wilson’s account in Part II of TEMP.3 I then explore the normative valuations of these marked variations, how the valuations affect the inferences that are made by others about those possessing the variation, and how those possessing the variation perceive themselves. I will go on to suggest that Wil- 1For instance, the Sterilization Act of Alberta, Canada was still in force in 1972 (see Grekul, Krahn, and Odynak 2004; Wilson 2018a; The Eugenics Archive at http://eugenicsarchive/discover/world; and Muir v. Alberta (1996) Dominion Law Reports 132 (4th Series) 695–762. Canada LII 7287). 2Sean Valles’s (2012) work on the history of eugenics is a particularly useful resource for those seeking further articulation of the way in which marked variations were used to classify “mental defectives.” Valles pays particular attention to how variations in IQ were used to pathologize some and normalize others. He does this by draw- ing on Lionel Penrose’s (1933) distinction between the classification of “subcultural mental defects” and that of “pathological mental defects.” 3It is because of the potentially significant and long-ranging impact that his argument might have on classifi- catory practices in a wide range of fields, that I have chosen to focus on chapters five and six: “Where do ideas of human variation come from?” and “A socio-cognitive framework for marked variation” within Part II.  open access - ptpbio.org http://eugenicsarchive.ca/discover/world http://ptpbio.org kendig: marked variation in classifying 3 son’s inquiry within Part II involves asking questions that not only help reveal the problematic practices of classifying humans in the context of eugenics and disability, but also may shed light on the normative aspects of many other classificatory practices. In doing so, my aim will be to show that the problem of marked variation is a problem that looms over any epistemic account that is dependent upon sorting. In the final section, I illustrate this by critically discussing three putative kinship conceptions of race. I rely on these to extend the scope of the puzzle of marked variation from the context of historic and current markings of an individual’s variation as dis- ability in the eugenics movement to historic and current markings for assigning putative racial ascriptions to individuals and groups. Variation is ubiquitous. This is true of humans as much as it is of the rest of the living world. We compare ourselves as the same or as different to others by relying on cues to identify what we may consider to be a particularly helpful or informative grouping. We may consider these resultant groupings to be either natural or artificial. For instance, we may assume that the groupings we consider to be natural are simply those that can be discovered, read off the structure of reality, or can be known self-evidently. That we distinguish natural from artificial groupings is indisputable. But asking how we do so, whether we should, and what harms come by sorting in this way, allows us to better understand the meaning attached to these groupings, the motivation for the categorization, the purposes they have been used for, and their historical origins. Considering the role these and other normative considerations play in our classifications of the world may provide insight into how and why we sort individuals into groups. The history of biological classification exemplifies the different ways in which organisms are sorted into groups. Shared essential features, family resemblances, continuous phylogenetic lineages, the possession of shared homeostatic properties or mechanisms, genetic markers, and the coordination of symbionts have all been used to determine membership within different biological categories. Biological categories, such as species, may refer simply to taxonomic units (Dupré 1999, 18). But they may also be used in a way that suggests the category is in some sense “natural,” because it is a discoverable grouping of individuals who share a common property or relationship (e.g., descended from the same lineage).4 Assuming that a group is natural implies that there are certain ways in which it is delimitable. As such, it leads to certain practices of delimitation that rely on specific understandings of the causes of its naturalness and tracks these in terms of certain kinds of processes, products, events, and relationships which are taken to be causally significant in defining any group or lineage (Kendig 2014, 157). Doing so constrains membership within the category. For instance, if a lineage conception is used to define the category, it is the series of actual reproductive events of interbreeding individuals that is the focus of attention. Reliance on lineages may (but does not necessarily) also rely on a presumption that what makes lineages evolutionary natural units is that there is an exchange of genetic material between organisms. Many classifications and sortings rely on deploying concepts that signal difference. Organisms, including humans, are distinguished from one another and classified in terms of certain variations. These putative difference makers may furnish investigators with the grounds on which to make inferences over the categories. In this way, the classification of organisms seems to involve an epistemic valuing of certain variations over others. When considering the classification of non-human organisms, we might consider the reliance on these variations to be relatively uncontroversial even if we might disagree about which variations are the best to identify in order to make good inferences over the category and admit that there may be no value-free way of identifying which variations 4Membership in the species category, for example, has been linked to over 27 different conceptions of species which rely on genetic, ecological, phylogenetic, morphological, and a host of other characteristics, processes, and relationships (Wilkins 2011).  open access - ptpbio.org http://ptpbio.org kendig: marked variation in classifying 4 to select. However, when considering the sorting of humans, the reliance on variation and difference appears much more problematic. Wilson distinguishes the relatively unproblematic reliance on what might be called “mere variation” from the problematic use which is “marked variation” (see Wilson 2018a, 103–104). In distinguishing the former from the latter, Wilson also tackles the assumption that the status of a group’s naturalness is self-evident. Relying on the history and narrative records of individu- als affected by the eugenics movement, he describes what has happened and what continues to happen when certain forms of human cognitive and physical variation are identified as putative pathological markers for an individual to be considered to have a eugenic mind. These were treated as diagnostic variations which marked the individual in possession of them as being of eugenic interest. Detection of these eugenic-marked variations meant the individual was con- sidered a candidate for confinement, institutionalization, sterilization, or any other intervention that was justified by the goal of human improvement. She was someone who belonged within the category for whom eugenic practices were appropriate, e.g., detention within institutions de- voted to the isolation and medical intervention of those pathologized as possessing a disability of eugenic interest. 2 The Puzzle of Marked Variation Carefully articulating the recent and distant history of the eugenic movement and the harms it meted out to those marked makes it clear that there is a difference between mere and neg- atively marked variation. Negatively marked differences were (and continue to be) treated as those natural variations that cleave human beings into different categories (e.g., of disablement, of medicalized pathology, of subnormalcy, or of deviance).5 But what exactly is the nature of this difference, and how is it that some variations are marked and others are not? Considering why certain human variations are negatively marked (e.g., race, disability, sexual orientation) seems to issue in a puzzle when considered in terms of why some rather than other variations are marked as epistemically or culturally significant or as a diagnostic of pathology. Wilson sets out this puzzle succinctly in the form of a question that leads his later investigation: “What is it that provides the basis for our registration of disablement and medicalized pathology as forms of marked, subnormal variation?” (Wilson 2018a, 104). That is, what is the epistemic background that makes these—rather than other variations—marked as subnormal? This question concerns the epistemology of medicalized pathology that made the history of eugenics possible. It is a question that Wilson positions within feminist epistemology, disability studies, standpoint theory, the extended mind thesis, philosophy of biology, and phenomenology. Doing so, he articulates the site(s) of marked variation in a relationship in terms of the phenomenological state of the individual. This a two (or more) person relationship. It includes both what-it’s- like to be the person whose variation is marked as a form of disablement and the marking of that difference by another as disabled for the purpose of sorting them from others considered to belong to the privative category of non-disabled. But this relationship is contained within a wider context. As such, it is not simply one’s individual variations that are marked as subnormal. Variation is coded as disability only if the social context that the person lives within provides inadequate accommodation for the negative effects of the variation. The marking is not of the person but of the limitations within the person’s social environment which fails to compensate for one’s variability (Wilson 2018a, 106–110). How we self-identify as differently-abled and self-adjust in virtue of our variation is frustrated when our attempts to make adjustments are 5The focus here is on negatively marked variation. But marked variation may not always have negative conno- tations. It is also how we may choose to identify ourselves and about how we see ourselves as relating to others.  open access - ptpbio.org http://ptpbio.org kendig: marked variation in classifying 5 thwarted by (or limited) by our environment or if our self-identification is misread or inten- tionally contravened. This is not to say that disability is socially constructed.6 It is both real in the phenomenal experiences of those whose attempts are thwarted, and in the harmful as- sessments of them (as a result of negatively marking their variation) as subnormal. If saying disability is socially constructed means it is unreal or made by others then doing so ignores the very phenomenal nature of lived experience—within a body that is ours and the pursuit of a life that we value as well as one that is valued by others. Wilson suggests reality is located in the choice of cognitive resources we use, whether these choices are aided or frustrated by our social structure, the normative impact our marked variation makes on us, and the cognitive resources available to us. These may include individual cognition as well as group level cognition, shared intentionality, or other situated or extended forms of cognition that we may be afforded in our environment. 3 Shared Intentionality and the Use of “Like Us” Detectors Shared intentionality is what makes normative assessments of variation possible according to Wilson. It is the intentionality we don’t have on our own but as the result of our sociality and in virtue of our shared cognitively-mediated normativity (Wilson 2018a, 128–130). This nor- mativity affects how we sort people into categories and by what criteria. People sort themselves and each other into categories based on morphological, physiological, neurological, and phy- logenetic criteria. But they also sort on the basis of vocations, avocations, or where they go on holiday. When meeting new people, we might find sociability in learning that we both are runners or gastronomists. One way we sort human beings into groups is deciding whether they are “like us” or “not like us” in some important way. Doing so, we refer to ourselves in terms of being a member of a certain sort of group and decide whether someone else is or not part of that same group (see Wilson 2018a, 132). What counts as being “like us” in some important way may differ depending on context, interest at the moment, or the way in which we are in the world at that time. We consider whether someone is “like us” by considering who we are, how we are living, where, and for what purpose. We reflect on our self-identity and what we take to be the identifying features of ourselves as members in that group of which we feel we are a part. If someone shares those features we might count them as “one of us.” Of course, this marking may or may not track how the individual marked by us as “like us” actually self-identifies herself. In contrast, she may perceive me to have a variation that marks me in a category separate to her. She may deem that I am not like her in a way important to her and that she uses to mark herself by and therefore she marks my variation as different from hers. I would therefore be marked as “not like us” for her and because of that, I may also be considered “subnormal” for those, like her, who self-identify as “normal.” Wilson regards “like us” detectors as a set of “underlying cognitive mechanisms [that] oper- ate on normatively meaningful social categories, some of which (such as kinship) are key to our prosocial life, others of which operate on marked variation in other domains” (Wilson 2018a, 137). Like Naomi Zack (1993, 2001), Shelley Tremain (2001), and Linda Martín Alcoff (1995), Wilson sees the kind of knowledge generated by these classifications as deploying not just a form of knowledge about oneself and how one thinks of those like her, but about how others com- municate with her based on who they think she is. Whereas Zack and Alcoff focus on issues 6Individuals self-described as neurological, physiological, or morphologically atypical may perceive and mark themselves and their variation as atypical in order to disclose their variation and signal their difficulties accommo- dating to certain environments.  open access - ptpbio.org http://ptpbio.org kendig: marked variation in classifying 6 of self-identification and classification of humans in terms of race, ethnicity, sex and gender, Wilson follows Tremain in focusing on the classifications of ablement and disablement. 4 Externally Mediated, Cognitively Driven Normativity The sorting of people into those “like us” and those “not like us” has been widely discussed within the study of the history, philosophy and social studies of disability studies and critical race theory. But the way in which Wilson investigates the cognitive faculties that make marked variation possible in the context of the eugenics movement may prove additionally useful in considering the puzzle of negatively marked variation within these and in other areas. A general version of the problem of marked variation seems to be Wilson’s target: “[If cognitive function relies on a sort of “like us” mechanism], then all it would take for us to end up with the kind of difference between people being marked as subnormal is for the norms that make someone not like me, that is, not a member of my group, to be ones that class as subnormal those people who have (or even simply are perceived to have) disabilities or impaired parts as subnormal” (Wilson 2018a, 208). In positing first-person plural knowledge such as “like-us” detectors, Wilson tries to capture the phenomenology of marked variation by focusing on the cognitive mechanisms that make it possible in very different social and cultural circumstances. His significant contribution in TEMP is that he focuses on the cognitive processes that make these sortings manifest rather than simply focusing on the sortings themselves. That is, he asks, what is going on cognitively when one sorts people into groups? This process is not merely located in the inner thoughts of the classifier. Sorting, like many other cognitive activities is something that can only be satisfactorily described as an extended process rather than one accommodated by a purely internalist conception of mind. For those familiar with his work in philosophy of mind, Chapters 5 and 6 will seem philosophically contiguous with his previous research. But in TEMP, external mindedness takes on an ineluctably normative dimension: “So we have a kind of externally mediated, cognitively driven normativity, and it constitutes an important feature of human social life. One thing that this cognitively mediated normativity does is allow us to distinguish not simply between individual people but between kinds or sorts of people …” (Wilson 2018a, 130). One of the most conceptually provocative aims of TEMP is to investigate how people cat- egorize other people and what impact that has on those categorized, the categorizers, and the communities that have sustained these activities of sorting people. I am particularly sympathetic to this aim, as elsewhere I’ve discussed the importance of focusing on classificatory activities such as sortings or “kindings” rather than simply the products of those activities (Kendig 2016, 5–6). I suggested that finding out how people sort and categorize might reveal normative aspects of the practices employed in classifying that could not be known by simply investigating the resul- tant categories. Knowing the route by which people sorted subjects of interest into categories may affect our valuation of the category and whether we take it to be a credible category. Rather than relying on folk conceptions, biological conceptions, or even sociological conceptions that have been used to classify and sort people, we must also focus on how people classify people. What are people thinking and doing when they distinguish between individuals? Or when they ascribe some people to one kind or sort, and other people to another sort?7 7Wilson points out that this is not a discussion of finding some sort of natural kind for humans, nor is the project one that aims to find some common property or set of properties all people share. Neither is the project one which aims to find some social or biological notion that exists irrespective of our way of thinking about the world.  open access - ptpbio.org http://ptpbio.org kendig: marked variation in classifying 7 In the remainder of this paper, my aim will be twofold. First, I explore Wilson’s suggestion that we can investigate normativity via shared intentionality in discussions of classification by what he calls an “externally mediated, cognitively driven normativity.” Secondly, I consider the role marked variation plays in classifying humans and how “like us” detectors might apply in other areas of research. To do this, I will briefly sketch and evaluate three ways people have sorted others into putative kinship groupings using “like us” and “not like us.” 5 Sorting with “Like Us” Detectors I agree with Wilson’s diagnosis: some recognized variations don’t hold much epistemic weight (for instance: what day of the week someone was born on; whether they have two middle names, or one, or none; or whether they wear their hair up or down), whereas others are both recog- nized and thought to hold some or much epistemic weight. Possession of these variations are thought to license certain inferences based on knowing that the individual possesses them. But although Wilson points to the connection between possession of variations and how this affects the inferences made on the basis of these, I think much more could be made of this. I suggest that the problem of marked variation is a problem that looms over any epistemic account that is dependent upon sorting. To do this I will consider an application that Wilson does not address in TEMP: conceptions of race. Elsewhere (Kendig 2011, 200–202), I’ve examined how some putative kinship notions of race rely on coding certain perceived variations as diagnostic markers that can be used to deter- mine whether an individual belongs to a particular racial classification or not.8 Concentrating on another form of marked variation, Ron Amundson (2000) critically discusses the problem- atic nature of the concept of normal function in a way that is particularly helpful in elucidating the more global nature of the problem of marked variation I have in mind. It also serves to justify my focus on conceptions of race in order to extend the scope of the problem. Amundson writes: I consider the concept of normal function to be similar to the traditional concept of race. Like the concept of race, the concept of biological normality is invoked to explain certain socially significant differences, such as unemployment and segrega- tion. Like the concept of race, the concept of normality is a biological error. The partitioning of human variation into the normal versus the abnormal has no firmer biological footing than the partitioning into races. Diversity of function is a fact of biology. (Amundson 2000, 34) In the remaining sections of this paper, I discuss three putative kinship conceptions of race. I rely on these to extend the scope of the puzzle of marked variation from the context of historic and current markings of an individual’s variation as disability in the eugenics movement to historic and current markings for assigning putative racial ascriptions to individuals and groups. The first of these are the widely used “one-drop rules” in the United States. 5.1 One-drop rules “One-drop rules” refers to a number of laws first enacted during slavery and were common in the southern United States. The original rule was set into law in North Carolina in 1802 (Gobu 8For a critical survey and analysis of the kinship conceptions of race as well as the morphological, biomedical, subspecies, population, and social constructionist conceptions of race see Kendig 2011.  open access - ptpbio.org http://ptpbio.org kendig: marked variation in classifying 8 v. Gobu, 1 NC 188). The last was upheld in 1982 (Omi and Winant 1994). These were laws for assessing the purity or impurity of an individual’s ancestral lineage. They were widely used to determine whether an individual was “like us” or “not like us” when the diagnostic markers used to negatively mark variation failed. Ancestry was used as the back-up litmus test for ensuring purity of someone’s race and was used as an additional mechanism for the detection of marked variations. In providing a means of detecting the presence of a non-white ancestor, their aim was to protect and regulate white privilege against the perceived threat of its gradual dilution by multiracial individuals. Their continued use is evident in the widespread use of a dichotomous racial division in ascribing an individual’s race by selectively ignoring part of their ancestral history; that is, “black” used to refer to individuals of multiple racial backgrounds, and “white” was reserved for someone who had very distant ancestors identified as black. In practice, one- drop rules often took the form of witch-hunt-like searches for any distant black ancestors of individuals living as, and accepted as, white. Although originally aimed at black and white races, the absolute intolerance to those of “mixed race” was not limited to those of black and white ancestry (Kendig 2011, 201–202). The use of one-drop rules persists (cf. Omi and Winant 2000), but it often relies on folk genetics of racial inheritance: individuals inherit all of their genes from their parents, genes code for traits, and so all of their racial traits are encoded in the genes they inherit from their parents. Individuals have the same traits, same genes, same talents, same diseases, and same behaviours as their ancestors because these are all reliably inherited through a pure, unbroken lineage of ancestors. Its use has played into the growing interest in genetic testing kits as diagnostic for discovering one’s “true” ancestry. Not only does this view overestimate the role of genes in development, it mistakenly assumes the identity of genes across generations. The genes we inherit from our parents are not the same, they are neither materially nor structurally identical with our own. Not only are the genes not identical across generations, they are also non-identical within the trillions of cells of one’s body throughout one’s ontogeny (Kendig 2011, 207–209). 5.2 You-know-one-when-you-see-one The second putative kinship grouping that uses “like us” and “not like us” detectors is one of the most prolific kinship notions of race. It is a sort of you-know-one-when-you-see-one concep- tion of race that I refer to as the “naïve-recognition concept of race” (Kendig 2011, 204–208). Although not labelled as such, it is a view widely discussed and criticized (Zack 2001; Piper 1992). The naïve-recognition concept of race is a folk social-scientific notion that assumes that race is exactly how “we” judge it, assuming that “we” all perceive race in the same way. This kinship notion is often justified with genealogical evidence that is sociologically determined. For instance, it groups human beings into racial kinds based on whether they are part of the same family tree. But the significance of these biological relationships and their use in con- structing family trees is biologically given but ritually determined by sociological and cultural interests, e.g., paternal inheritance of the family name, maternal inheritance, or the lineage of the mother’s brother. Family trees are never produced without heavy pruning. Without system- atic pruning of certain branches, one would end up with a never-ending tree (Müller-Wille and Rheinberger 2009). According to this widely adopted kinship conception, an individual is the same race as her parents if her parents both belong to the same race as each other (Gelman and Wellman 1991; Carey and Spelke 1994). The naïve-recognition concept of kinship is similar to what is often taken to be a “common-sense biological notion” used by Mayr (2002, 90–92). In framing his subspecies conception of race, Mayr suggests that although many characteris- tics are just quantitative or descriptive, others—the Diego blood group for individuals of Native  open access - ptpbio.org http://ptpbio.org kendig: marked variation in classifying 9 American ancestry and Tay-Sachs disease for those of Jewish descent—are “virtually diagnostic” (May 2002, 92). And later, relying on the assumption that there are folk biological races, he suggests, “if I introduce you to an Eskimo and a Kalahari Bushman I won’t have much trouble convincing you that they belong to different races” (Mayr 2002, 90). This naïve realism assumes the judgement of another’s race is given—unmediated—to “us.” This requires the further as- sumption that the “us” is taken to be a generic perceiver. In privileging this generic perceiver, the possibility of other perceivers holding different positions is ignored. 5.3 Common blood Looking at the ways in which both the naïve recognition concept and the one-drop rules were used to categorize people according to a putative conception of kinship reveals the negative marking of variation and its negative use in regulating the inheritance of white privilege. The process by which individuals used these “like us” or “not like us” detectors can be contrasted with W. E. B. Du Bois’s positive notion of race in terms of “common blood”: a vast family of human beings, generally of common blood and language, always of common history, traditions and impulses, who are both voluntarily and invol- untarily striving together for the accomplishment of certain more or less vividly conceived ideals of life. (Du Bois 1897/2000, 110) Du Bois seeks a more explicitly social-scientific notion of kinship than the seemingly biologically- tied kinship account of the one-drop rules or the naïve recognition conception. He does so by referring to a “vast family” sharing a “common history.” The notion of “blood quantum” used in some Native American tribes may initially appear to function in a similar social-familial way as Du Bois’s common blood, since it is used to determine one’s belonging to a particular tribe.9 Du Bois’s notion of common blood emphasizes at once the physical, psychological, and socio- logical continuity among individuals of the same race. Together with common history and vast family it frames his sociohistorical conception of race, one that emphasizes multiple routes by which race is passed on. I would suggest that Du Bois’s sociohistorical conception provides a clear way to understand Wilson’s account of cognitively-mediated normativity through engaged community knowledge exchanges. Du Bois calls the ability to recognize this value-based community knowledge “cultural recog- nition.” A similar notion is described by Susan Wolf as “self-recognition” and Kyle Powys Whyte discusses something similar in terms of different interpretations of “traditional ecological knowledge.” What is counted as community knowledge and what role it plays within the com- munity is dependent upon the traditions, values, and origin stories of that community (Whyte 2013). They shape the environmental, moral, and governance relationships that are part of in- digenous communities and are reciprocally co-constructed by them. The relationships between individuals—human, animal, plant, soil, weather, and spiritual elements are often intertwined. It is in the activities of making and maintaining relationships that is the focus. For instance, 9However, whereas Du Bois’s common blood was intended to positively unify a “vast family” in a way that expressed an understanding of their common history, the practical uses of blood quantum make the comparison more complicated. Blood quantum has been used to unify. But it has also been used as enrollment criteria to negatively police tribal membership. Membership in some tribes is an official claim as it is within the remit of the US Bureau of Indian Affairs to control what is called a “Certificates of Degree of Indian or Alaska Native Blood” (CDIB). With a CDIB, one gains eligibility to a host of federal benefits that are exclusively held for Native Americans. It also provides proof that one is a member of a tribal nation. (For a detailed account see Spruhan 2018).  open access - ptpbio.org http://ptpbio.org kendig: marked variation in classifying 10 in discussing knowledge exchange between indigenous and non-indigenous institutions of envi- ronmental governance, native scholars Raymond Pierotti and Daniel Wildcat suggest that there is community self-knowledge that is based in the knowledge that native societies existed under conditions of constant pressure on the resources upon which they depended, and that a means had to be found to convince communities and families to economize with regard to their use of natural resources … The connections that are a crucial aspect of traditional ecological knowledge (TEK) are based on a mixture of extraction, e.g. animals are taken as prey, combined with recognition of the inherent value and good of non- human lives. Traditional knowledge is based on the premise that humans should not view themselves as responsible for nature, i.e., we are not stewards of the nature world, but instead that we are a part of that world, no greater than any other part. In this way TEK deals largely with motivating humans to show respect for nonhumans. (Pierotti and Wildcat 2000, 1336, as quoted in Whyte 2013, 4) These appear to be views complementary to what Wilson refers to as a shared intentionality— the conditions that make normative assessments of variation possible. For Wilson, this seems to come from the nature of our socio-ecologically-embedded and cognitively extended experience: human beings experience the world through their bodies. That experience is always of a body situated in a certain place at a certain time and in relation to others’ bodies is not a new view. But the focus of these diverse accounts of shared intentionality, cultural and self-recognition seems to be on the underlying causal reciprocity between an individual’s experiences of herself within her environments, her interactions with others, and the knowledge exchange within a community. I would suggest that relying on these accounts and the extensive work in disability studies, critical race theory, and feminist epistemology provides us with necessary tools of inves- tigation. These may help reveal the connection between how we see ourselves and how we see others as like or unlike us. Doing so could further our attempts to understand why these “like us” comparisons have led to violence against those marked as “not like us” in some cases, while in others they have been employed intentionally by a community as a way of self-marking that allows for affirmation within a community. 6 How Might We Know when the Sorter Gets It Wrong? How can we eliminate the problematic nature of marked variation but keep the ability of in- dividuals to self-identify, preserve culture-framing narratives, and attribute felt differences as markers to belonging to a particular group culture? Because these manifest in such different ways (the former in potential harm and violence, the latter in recognition and affirmation), we require a way of understanding the processes by which people mark, how they mark, and for what purpose. This is especially true if how one is perceived by others as well as how one perceives oneself and their own self-identification—in terms of sex, gender, sexual orientation, or race—is liminal. Racial categorization may change throughout a person’s life depending on where they live, what they experience, and how these are perceived by others as well as themselves (Kendig 2011, 212–217). This change may be due to the categorizations available to them. For instance, a young woman living in the US might be classified in 1920 as “Hindu,” in 1940 be considered “White,” in 1960 become “Other,” and in 1980 be “Asian” according to the categorizes used in US Census data collection (Nobles 2000). Racial categorization may also be dependent upon an interaction between them and others, for example, how an individual is perceived by others  open access - ptpbio.org http://ptpbio.org kendig: marked variation in classifying 11 or is seeking to be perceived by others. In either case, an individual’s perceived identity relies on, is thwarted by, or is in some way influenced by stereotypes that underpin those categories (cf. Zack 2010; Hom 2018).10 Human classificatory practices do not occur randomly. In order to sort a person (including ourselves) into a category, we rely on stereotypes that underpin those categories. The stereotypes underpinning those categories may be damaging. Our use of them may serve to perpetuate these stereotypes both in ourselves and in our ascriptions of others we believe belong to that category. Sociologists, Aliya Saperstein and Andrew M. Penner (2012) performed a longitudinal study focusing on how racial ascription by others affects one’s own racial self-identification and leads to internalized racist stereotypes. They found that people who have been unemployed, incarcerated or on welfare for a sustained period of time are significantly less likely to be classified by others and identify themselves as “White” despite being classified as “White” in the previous year. And they are more likely to be identified as “Black” and self-identify as “Black” (Saperstein and Penner 2012, 698–701). Wilson’s approach to the problem of marked variation in the context of his exploration of new eugenics, provides a further set of considerations that promises to be beneficial to the ongoing discussion. But what seems to be missing is a response to the following questions: How might we know when the sorter gets it wrong? And: To what or to whom do we defer as arbiter of the correctness or incorrectness of the categories to which a sorter ascribes an individual? We surely want to say that there is a way of getting it wrong. That it isn’t the case that the sorter can just sort like with like and in any way that is profitable for the sorter. As Wilson’s TEMP has shown, at least sometimes the sorting goes horribly wrong, and at most, it often does. For instance, we might consider the identification of someone as being lesbian, gay, straight, bisexual, or queer as something that, in sorting people, we can get wrong. Of course, we can get it wrong regardless of whether we are of the same sexual orientation as the individual or of a different one. But I think the more interesting question is: What are the truth-makers for the correspondence of our putative categories of sorts of people and the “real” identity of the individual as belonging to a group? It seems obvious that someone’s own self-identification should be a truth-maker in this case. But, are these truth-makers all we need? For instance, can someone be harmed on the basis of a hate crime directed to them as the object of hate on the basis of being perceived as gay even if the person self-identifies as straight? Most would say that there is still harm that outstrips that harm done to the individual; there is also violence committed against the community. There might be harm to the community if the perpetrator of the hate crime relied upon detection of a marked difference he or she believed was shared by the members of the target community. In committing the hate crime, the perpetrator marked the difference as deviant or pathological, and one, when detected in another was license for mistreatment and harm. Harm to the community would then still be done even if the victim of the hate crime was not a member of the targeted community. Attempting to understand the conditions under which we can decide whether a particular categorization is correct or incorrect connects us back to the larger puzzle of marked variation. My suspicion is that we might not find a general solution to the problem of marked variation in all cases, (e.g., disability studies, critical race theory, or gender and sexuality studies), as there are significant differences which might may make this impossible (see, for instance, Hom 2018). But even if we might not find a general solution that would reveal the conditions under which we can decide whether a categorization is correct or incorrect as well as what are the truth-makers 10Asking how (and why) a sorter misidentifies the category to which someone belongs seems to require careful understanding of the notion of “passing” and the multiple historical and current contexts within which it is used (see Spencer 2000; Sexton 2008; Zack 2010).  open access - ptpbio.org http://ptpbio.org kendig: marked variation in classifying 12 required in determining this, I would still suggest that seeking the grounds by which we might know when the sorter gets it wrong surely should be part of our investigation. 7 Disability as an Epistemic Resource TEMP begins with an explicit premise: knowledge is always culturally, historically, and socially situated. This seems to me to pose an insurmountable problem. That is, how might we resolve the puzzle of marked variation if the social ascription of our categorization seems to always su- pervene on the properties of the individuals for whom the categorization is intended to include? If the groupings one relies upon to make sense of the variation in the world rely on first-person plural perspectives which are informed by our conceptual, historical, cultural, social, and envi- ronmental conditions, how can we avoid negative marked variation? Wilson’s solution is to treat disability as an epistemic resource. Doing so, Wilson positions himself at the interdisciplinary nexus of standpoint theory, philosophy of mind, philosophy of biology, and disability studies. In doing so he follows Kafer (2013), Harding (1991, 2004), Garland-Thompson (2012), and Wylie (2004, 2012). But, I suggest, the approach he takes is also consistent with those inter- ested in philosophy of science in practice, who take on the activities of science in addition to its products as the focus of investigation. This is an approach which emphasizes the need to consider the knower(s) and not just what is known (cf. Grene 1966).11 The use of disability as epistemic resource means that when we consider the phenomenal experience of someone experiencing a disability and hear their first-person narrative, we may “discover alternative ways of being in the world … [and] recognize and value interdependence” (Kafer 2013, 83). The use of disability and narrative as epistemic resources is not limited to the first-person plural perspective. The what-it’s-like for an individual to have knowledge of themselves and the world around them may also include extended forms of cognition. Their narrative may also include joint intentionality, novel tool use, prosthetics, and alternative ways of maneuvering or thinking in the world. In this way, narrative is intended to be a site of engagement that allows us to focus on how people talk about their lives, their sense of place, how they sustain their ways of living and stories that they use to talk about themselves. This awareness is gained by attending to how someone who may be initially perceived as not-like- us attains her knowledge, how she uses this knowledge, and how we might understand the conditions that make her knowledge possible. 8 Concluding Thoughts Biological classification and the classification of people in particular is a topic long discussed within philosophy of biology, disability studies, gender and sexuality studies, and critical race theory. Within philosophy of biology, the processes of classifying—and not just the classifica- tions or the classificatory practices or protocols of classification—are now more widely being discussed. Recent discussions surrounding the nature of natural groupings have shifted to fo- cus on the natural kinds and processes of kinding within different contexts (see Kendig 2016). Although this shift has highlighted the interest-relativity of discovering and constructing kinds that are relevant in investigating certain research questions, values in classification have also been shown to play a significant role in determining what (as well as how) we consider a sort or kind to be relevant, useful, natural, and/or constructed. With new light being shed on this 11Although this is now a widespread approach, many attribute its origins to Marjorie Grene’s influential text, The Knower and the Known 1966, and her later work (see also Grene 1985).  open access - ptpbio.org http://ptpbio.org kendig: marked variation in classifying 13 role, I would suggest that there is a secondary set of questions arises with regard to scientific practice. That is, how can we preserve valuable scientific inference-supporting biological clas- sification whilst acknowledging their normativity? And how can we block the sinister eugenic classifications in a way that acknowledges their epistemic, methodological, and evaluative errors? Targeting these questions, Wilson (2018a) offers a critical account of the sorting processes used in classifying humans and shows not only how they are context sensitive, but also liable to cause harm. My focus in this paper has been to explore the role marked variation has and continues to play within the philosophy of classification. Acknowledging how marked variation may lead to problematic and at times vicious classifications and inferences requires understanding the concepts used, by whom, for what purpose, and how these classifications affect those classified. As such, I suggest that the normative epistemological methods Wilson employs in TEMP will be valuable to those pursuing a rigorously engaged philosophical approach to the problem of negatively marked variation in a variety of different disciplines. Acknowledgments Generous thanks go to Rob Wilson, Alan Love, and Judy Johns Schloegel and the audience in attendance at our author meets critics session at the Biennial conference of the International Society for History, Philosophy and Social Studies of Biology & Associação Brasileira de Filosofia e História da Biologia in 2017. 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Wylie, A. 2012. “Feminist Philosophy of Science: Standpoint Matters.” Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 86 (2): 47–76. Whyte, K. P. 2013. “On the Role of Traditional Ecological Knowledge as a Collaborative Concept: A Philosophical Study.” Ecological Processes 2 (7): 1–12. Zack, N. 1993. Race and Mixed Race. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. Zack, N. 2001. “Race and Philosophic Meaning.” In Race and Racism, edited by B. Boxill. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Zack, N. 2010. “The Fluid Symbol of Mixed Race.” Hypatia 25 (4): 875–890. © 2018 Author(s) This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International license, which permits anyone to download, copy, distribute, or display the full text without asking for permission, provided that the creator(s) are given full credit. ISSN 2475-3025  open access - ptpbio.org https://aeon.co/essays/eugenics-today-where-eugenic-sterilisation-continues-now https://aeon.co/essays/eugenics-today-where-eugenic-sterilisation-continues-now http://dx.doi.org/10.3998/ptpbio.16039257.0010.012 http://dx.doi.org/10.3998/ptpbio.16039257.0010.012 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ http://ptpbio.org The Normativity of Human Classificatory Practices The Puzzle of Marked Variation Shared Intentionality and the Use of ``Like Us'' Detectors Externally Mediated, Cognitively Driven Normativity Sorting with ``Like Us'' Detectors One-drop rules You-know-one-when-you-see-one Common blood How Might We Know when the Sorter Gets It Wrong? Disability as an Epistemic Resource Concluding Thoughts 
work_yr64hftihnbvjnfavrwxy6kvsu	----	Temida 2.indb 3 Sprovođenje antidiskriminacionih politika u Srbiji Mehanizmi unapređenja institucionalnih kapaciteta za sprečavanje govora mržnje i zločina iz mržnje Mirjana DokManović* Izmenama i dopunama Krivičnog zakonika Republike Srbije krajem 2012. godine omogućeno je da krivična dela učinjena iz mržnje budu strože sankcionisana. Ukoliko je krivično delo učinjeno iz mržnje zbog pripadnosti rasi i veroispovesti, nacionalne ili etničke pripadnosti, pola, seksualne orijentacije ili rodnog identiteta drugog lica, sud tu okolnost treba da ceni kao otežavajuću prilikom odmeravanja kazne. Međutim, država još uvek zapostavlja preventivno delovanje u ovoj oblasti. Ne poklanja se dovoljno pažnje ni suzbijanju verbalnog izražavanja netrpeljivosti i diskriminacije koje najčešće prethodi aktu motivisanom mržnjom. Predmet ovog rada je sagledavanje mogućnosti unapređenja edukacije i koordinisanog delovanja države, a posebno policije, sudova, tužilaštava i jedinica lokalne samouprave, u cilju suzbijanja govora i zločina iz mržnje. Cilj rada je predstavljanje mehanizama unapređenja institucionalnih kapaciteta za sprečavanje ovog fenomena sprovedenih u okviru projekta Evropske unije „Sprovođenje antidiskriminacionih politika u Srbiji“. Zaključuje se da je edukacija državnih aktera ključna kako u sprovođenju zakona, tako i u formiranju vrednosnog sistema zasnovanog na ravnopravnosti i prihvatanju razlika. Ključne reči: govor mržnje, zločin iz mržnje, prevencija kriminaliteta, policija, pravosuđe. TEMIDA Jun 2014, str. 3-26 ISSN: 1450-6637 DOI: 10.2298/TEM1402003D Pregledni rad Primljeno: 15.06.2014. Odobreno za štampu: 21.7.2014. * Prof. dr Mir ja na Dok ma no vić je van red na pro fe sor ka na Fa kul te tu za evrop ske prav no-po li tič- ke stu di je, No vi Sad, Edu cons uni ver zi tet. E-mail: mi ra d@e u net.rs Mirjana Dokmanović 4 Uvod Govor mržnje je složena i, na žalost, široko prisutna pojava čiji se podstrekači mogu svuda naći (za skupštinskom govornicom, u medijima, školama, kafanama, političkom govoru, na internetu, uličnim zidovima...). Gde leži odgovornost? „Svuda.“, odgovara kratko Tulkens (2013:4). Motivi govora i delovanja iz mržnje nalaze se u stereotipima i predrasudama prema „različitima“. S obzirom da su to vrednosni stavovi koji se mogu menjati, najefikasniji način eliminisanja ovih pojava je menjanje negativnog odnosa (mržnje i netrpeljivosti) prema „različitima“ u smeru formiranja odnosa uvažavanja i tolerisanja „različitosti“. Na državi je odgovornost da podstiče te promene putem edukacije i menjanja stanja svesti u društvu. U tom poslu treba prvo da pođe od sebe. Uloga političara1, sudija, tužilaca, policijskih službenika, medijskih poslanika i prosvetnih radnika je ključna kako u sprovođenju zakona, tako u formiranju vrednosnog sistema zasnovanog na ravnopravnosti i prihvatanju razlika. Uprkos tome što je govor mržnje u Republici Srbiji zabranjen zakonom, javni prostor, mediji i internet su puni poruka netrpeljivosti i poziva na proterivanje, ubijanje i linč pojedinaca ili grupa ljudi zbog njihovog rodnog identiteta, seksualne orijentacije, rasne, nacionalne ili verske pripadnosti ili nekog drugog ličnog svojstva. Romi su najčešće izloženi otvorenom govoru mržnje, kao i čestim napadima od strane pojedinaca i grupa (Strategija prevencije i zaštite od diskriminacije; Helsinški odbor za ljudska prava, 2013; ECRI, 2011). Faktor mržnje je često prisutan i u političkom govoru (Helsinški odbor za ljudska prava u Srbiji, 2013). U godišnjim izveštajima Poverenika za zaštitu ravnopravnosti2 (2014; 2013; 2012) upozorava se na incidente izražavanja netrpeljivosti i pozivanja na nasilje prema manjinskim grupama, najčešće pripadnicima romske i LGBT populacije, dok se državni organi podsećaju da su obavezni da na takve slučajeve reaguju. Izostajanje odgovarajuće i blagovremene reakcije dovodi do mržnjom motivisanog nasilja i napada na manjinske grupe (Poverenik 1 Svi poj mo vi ko ji su u ovom ra du upo tre blje ni u mu škom gra ma tič kom ro du ob u hva ta ju mu ški i žen ski rod li ca na ko ja se od no se. 2 Po ve re nik za za šti tu rav no prav no sti je usta no vljen kao sa mo sta lan i ne za vi san dr žav ni or gan Za ko nom o za bra ni dis kri mi na ci je (Slu žbe ni gla snik RS, br. 22/09). Pr va po ve re ni ca za za šti tu rav no prav no sti, dr Ne ve na Pe tru šić, iza bra na je 5.5.2010. go di ne. Dostupno na: http://www. ravnopravnost.gov.rs/sr/o-nama/osnovne-informacije, pristup lje no 15.1 2. 2013 . Temida 5 za zaštitu ravnopravnosti, 2012; Beogradski centar za ljudska prava, 2014). U godišnjem izveštaju Poverenika za 2013. godinu primećuje se da izostaje adekvatna reakcija regulatornih tela i u slučajevima govora mržnje koji se šire posredstvom medija. Ovo se navodi i u godišnjem izveštaju Beogradskog centra za ljudska prava (2014). Najnoviji Izveštaj Evropske komisije o napretku Srbije (2013) takođe konstatuje da se grupe koje su najviše diskriminisane (Romi, žene, osobe sa invaliditetom i seksualne manjine) i nadalje često suočavaju sa govorom mržnje i pretnjama, što je zabeleženo i u godišnjem izveštaju Zaštitnika građana (2014). Pored sveobuhvatne inkriminacije zločina iz mržnje i adekvatnog kažnjavanja počinilaca, u godišnjem izveštaju Poverenika za 2011. godinu ističe se potreba obuke policije i pravosudnih organa „kako bi bili osposoblјeni da adekvatno reaguju, sprovode istrage, sakuplјaju i razmenjuju informacije i da, u saradnji sa drugim društvenim akterima, proaktivno deluju na suzbijanju zločina iz mržnje“ (Poverenik za zaštitu ravnopravnosti, 2012:33). Polazeći od ovih preporuka, Kancelarija za ljudska i manjinska prava, u saradnji sa Poverenikom, preduzela je niz aktivnosti tokom 2013. i 2014. godine radi prevencije ovog fenomena u okviru IPA3 2011 projekta „Sprovođenje antidiskriminacionih politika u Republici Srbiji“4 finansiranom 3 Instrument za pr edpris tupn u pomoć (Inst rument fo r Pre -A ccessi on A ssista nc e, IP A) je finan- sijs ki instrum en t p ut em koga EU p ru ža podr šk u držav ama k andi dat kinjama i p otenci ja lnim ka ndi da tkinjam a, uključ uj ući Srbi ju . Svrha ins tr umenta j e p ružanje p omo ći koris ni cima s red- stava p ri li ko m sprovo đen ja a ktivnosti neophodnih za n apr edak u ovkiru Proce sa stabilizacije i pridruž ivan ja. Pravni okvir IPA uspostavljen je Uredbom Saveta (EC) No 1085/2006, dostupnoj na: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:02006R1085– 20120301&qid=1397475599751&from=FR. O IPA usmerenoj Srbiji vidi: http://www.europa.rs/ en/eu_assistance_to_serbia/ipa.html , pr i stuplj en o 3.5.20 14 . 4 IPA 20 11 proje kat „Sprovođ en je antidi skr im inacio ni h p oliti ka u Republi ci S rbiji“ usmeren je na povećanje spos obno sti Rep ublike Srb ije d a obezbe đu je , štiti i unap re đu je lјudsk a i manjins ka prava na osno vu na čela jedna ko sti i n ed is kr iminacije. Projeka t se sastoj i od t ri ko mp one nte: (1 ) podrške Ka ncelar ij i za lјudska i manjin sk a pr av a Vlade Republ ik e Srbi je ; ( 2) pod rš ka Pove- reniku z a zaštitu ra vn opravnosti; i (3) kampan ja na menjena na jšir oj srpsk oj jav nosti. A ktiv- nos ti su us me rene i na u na pređenj e os posobl je no sti re le vantni h m inista rs t ava i vlad in ih i ns tituc ija , pravo suđa, p olicij e, medija , lokal ni h samo up ra va i orga ni zacija c iv ilnog d ruštva rad i efikasne primene ant idisk ri mi na cionih z ako na , politi ka i m era. Za sv aku od ovih ci lјn ih gru pa org ani zu ju se akt iv no st i u vidu ob uk a, pre ven ti vn ih i prom oti vn ih mera prevencije d is krim inacij e i una pr eđ enj a informis an osti. A kti vnosti uk lјučuju i sve obuhvat nu pr oc en u zakon od avnih i st rateš ki h potreb a u o bl asti bor b e pr otiv dis kriminacije. Projek at sprovodi Eptisa u k on zorcij umu sa B eograds kim centrom za l judska prava, DRC i GDSI. Predviđeno vre- me trajanja projekta je 24 meseca (od 20.11.2012. do 19.11.2014.) Opširnije: http://ec.europa. eu/enlargement/pdf/serbia/ipa/2011/02_implementation_of_anti-discrimination_policies. Mirjana Dokmanović 6 od strane Evropske unije. U ovom radu će se sumirati rezultati tih aktivnosti, nadograđujući se na upoznavanje sa pojmom govora mržnje i njegove zabrane u Republici Srbiji. Govor mržnje Pojam Iako se izraz „govor mržnje“ široko koristi u pravnim, političkim, akademskim i javnim debatama i spisima, ne postoji opšte prihvaćena definicija ovog termina. On se odnosi na široki opseg izuzetno negativnih oblika izražavanja koji se kreću od iznošenja, podsticanja i širenja pretnje, netrpeljivosti, neprijateljstva i ekstremnih predrasuda (npr. negativnog stereotipiziranja manjinskih grupa), do huškanja i pozivanja na nasilje (McGonagle, 2013), a koja mogu da proizvedu drastične, pa čak i fatalne posledice po one na koje su usmerene. Ukoliko se toleriše, govor mržnje izaziva „osećaj kod velikog dela građana da je takvo ponašanje prema određenom licu/grupi društveno poželjno i opravdano, kao i da će takvo ponašanje biti tolerisano i da neće biti predmet odgovornosti“ (Mršević, 2013). Sadržaj poruka upućenih javnosti može da bude veoma ekstreman, kao u slučajevima pozivanja na rat i širenja ratne propagande. S obzirom da je reč o javnom ispoljavanju mišljenja, fenomen govora mržnje je tesno povezan sa uživanjem pojedinih sloboda, kao što su sloboda izražavanja, mišljenja i veroispovesti, postavljajući izazov za države da odredi koji su to slučajevi kada se ove slobode, garantovane međunarodnim pravom ljudskih prava, mogu ograničiti, pa i sankcionisati. Ljudska prava i slobode nisu apsolutna prava, već su ograničena pravima i slobodama drugih. Ona podrazumevaju i odgovornost i obaveze. U slučaju govora mržnje, pokazuje se da je ponekad teško povući granicu između slobode izražavanja i potrebe ograničavanja ove slobode radi zaštite prava na dostojanstvo i drugih prava i sloboda drugih (Nancy, 2013). Nove tehnologije u digitalno doba, naročito internet, otvaraju nove izazove i probleme u ovoj oblasti, vezane, između ostalih, i za pitanje slobode medija i demokratizacije društva (Steering Committee on Media and Information Society, 2013). pdf, pristupljeno 12.05.2014. Za detalje o rezultatima projektnih aktivnosti vidi: http://www. ljudskaprava.gov.rs/index.php/projekti/eu. Temida 7 Evropska konvencija o ljudskim pravima5 ustanovljava institucionalni okvir za suzbijanje ekstremizama i oblika izražavanja koji se smatraju da su u suprotnosti sa Konvencijom (uključujući rasizam, ksenofobiju, antisemitizam, agresivni nacionalizam i diskriminaciju pripadnika manjina i imigranata), kako to navodi Preporuka R 97(20) Komiteta ministara Saveta Evrope o govoru mržnje6, kao i drugi akti Saveta Evrope7 i Preporuka br. 7 Evropske komisije protiv rasizma i netolerancije8. S obzirom na različita shvatanja koncepta govora mržnje od strane država, Savet Evrope je pripremio „Vodič o govoru mržnje“9 koji treba da posluži kao smernica vladama i sudovima u borbi protiv govora mržnje. Evropski sud za ljudska prava (European Court of Human Rights, 2012) je svojom praksom ustanovio određene parametre za određivanje šta je govor mržnje kako bi takav govor mogao biti izuzet iz opšte zaštite koju pruža sloboda izražavanja10 ili sloboda udruživanja11. U tom pogledu Sud primenjuje čl. 17 Konvencije12 u slučajevima kada određeni komentari predstavljaju govor mržnje i time negiraju osnovne vrednosti Konvencije. Takođe, može da primenjuje ograničenja iz čl. 10 st. 2 i iz čl. 1113. Međutim, Sud (European Court 5 Euro pean Con ven tion on Hu man Rights and Fun da men tal Fre e doms, as amen ded by Pro to- cols No. 11 and No. 14. (CETS No. 194) 6 http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/media/doc/cm/rec(1997)020&expmem_EN.asp, stranici prist upljeno 14 .3 .2014 . 7 Council o f Euro pe, Par liamenta ry Assembly , Recommend ation 1 805 (2007), Bla sphemy, rel ig ious insult s and ha te speech ag ainst persons on grounds of th eir religi on, of 29 June 20 07 . Co uncil of Europe, Add itional Pro toc ol to th e Conven tio n on Cyb ercrime , concerning the cri mi nalisation of a cts of a raci st and x enophobic nature commi tted thr oug h comput er syst ems, 28 Jan ua ry 20 03. 8 G eneral Po li c y Reco mm end ation No. 7 of th e European Commiss ion ag ai nst Racis m and Intolerance (ECRI) on natio nal legisl at ion to co mbat racism and r ac ial discrimination 9 W eber, A. (2008 ) Manual on Hate Speech, Strasbourg: Council of Europe. Council of Europe Fact sheet 4 “Hate speech”. Dostupno na: https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=1477721&Site=DC, pristupljeno 14. 3. 201 4. 10 Ar t icle 10, Euro pean Conve nt ion on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedom s, as amended by Proto col s No. 11 a nd No. 14. (CETS N o. 19 4) 11 Ar t icle 11, Euro pean Conve nt ion on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedom s, as ame n de d b y Prot ocols N o. 11 and No. 14. ( CETS No. 194) 12 Za br ana z loupotreb e pr av a: „Ni šta u ovoj Konv en ciji ne može se tumačiti tak o da pod razum- eva pravo bilo k oje d ržave, grup e ili lic a da se upust e u neku del at no st ili izvrše nek i čin usmeren n a poništa va nj e bilo kog od na vedenih prav a ili slob od a ili na nj ih ovo ograniča va- nj e u ve ćoj meri od one ko j a j e predviđe na Konve nc i jom .“ 13 O gra ni čenja ko ja se sma tr aju neoph od ni m za o ču vanje naci on al ne bez bed nosti, javne bez- be dnosti, s pre čavanj e nereda i li kri minala, zaštit e zd ra vlja i m orala il i zašti te prava i slobod a drugi h. Mirjana Dokmanović 8 of Human Rights, 2012:1) je oprezan u formulisanju svojih zaključaka i razlikuje podsticanje na ekstremizam od prava pojedinaca, uključujući novinare i političare, na slobodno izražavanje svojih stavova i da time „uvrede, šokiraju ili uznemire“ druge14. Zabrana govora mržnje u nacionalnom zakonodavstvu Ustav Republike Srbije15 garantuje svakome poštovanje i zaštitu dostojanstva ličnosti (čl. 23), pravo na zaštitu ljudskih i manjinskih prava i sloboda (čl. 22), uključujući pred sudovima i drugim državnim organima na principu jednakosti (čl. 36). Pored zabrane diskriminacije (čl. 21), Ustav zabranjuje izazivanje i podsticanje rasne, nacionalne i verske mržnje i netrpeljivosti (čl. 49). Najviši pravni akt države jasno ukazuje da su slobode i ljudska prava ograničena slobodama i ljudskim pravima drugih. Sloboda izražavanja, ispoljavanja vere i uverenja, širenje informacija i okupljanja ne može se koristiti niti biti opravdanje za izazivanje rasne, nacionalne ili verske mržnje. Stoga Ustav dozvoljava ograničenje tih sloboda u slučaju govora mržnje (čl. 43 st. 3, čl. 44. st. 3, čl. 50 st. 3, čl. 54. st.4). Republika Srbija zabranjuje i sankcioniše govor mržnje svakog tipa, bio on u verbalnom, pismenom, elektronskom, posterskom, plakatnom ili uličnografitnom obliku. Član 11 Zakona o zabrani diskriminacije16 definiše govor mržnje kao „izražavanje ideja, informacija i mišljenja kojima se podstiče diskriminacija, mržnja ili nasilje protiv lica ili grupe lica zbog njihovog ličnog svojstva, u javnim glasilima ili drugim publikacijama, na skupovima i mestima dostupnim javnosti, ispisivanjem i prikazivanjem poruka ili simbola i na drugi način“. Elemenat javnosti je bitan. Govor mržnje ne pogađa samo pojedinca odnosno grupu na koju je neposredno usmeren; on je posredno usmeren i prema trećim licima, radi izazivanja i širenja mržnje, nasilja ili diskriminacije, a „naročito je opasan ukoliko je upućen publici koja se nalazi u situaciji da joj je takav govor nametnut” (Petrušić, Krstić, Marinković, 2014:69–70). Zakon zabranjuje i „uznemiravanje i ponižavajuće postupanje koje ima za cilj ili predstavlja povredu dostojanstva lica ili grupe lica na osnovu njihovog 14 V idi kompi la ci ju presuda Evropskog su da za ljudska prava u informativnom materijalu od juna 2012. godine http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/FS_Hate_speech_ENG.pdf, pr istupljeno 14.2.2014. 15 S lužben i glasnik RS, br. 98/06. 16 Službeni glasnik RS, br. 2 2/ 09. Temida 9 ličnog svojstva, a naročito ako se time stvara neprijateljsko, ponižavajuće i uvredljivo okruženje“ (čl. 12). Izazivanje i podsticanje neravnopravnosti, mržnje i netrpeljivosti Zakon smatra teškim oblikom diskriminacije (čl. 13). Zakon o javnom informisanju17 zabranjuje „objavljivanje ideja, informacija i mišljenja kojima se podstiče diskriminacija, mržnja ili nasilje protiv lica ili grupe lica zbog njihovog pripadanja ili nepripadanja nekoj rasi, veri, naciji, etničkoj grupi, polu ili njihove seksualne opredeljenosti, bez obzira da li je objavljivanjem učinjeno krivično delo“ (čl. 38). Govor mržnje zabranjuju i Zakon o radiodifuziji18 (čl. 21), Zakon o oglašavanju19 (čl. 6 i 7) i Zakon o zabrani manifestacija neonacističkih ili fašističkih organizacija i udruženja i zabrani upotrebe neonacističkih ili fašističkih simbola i obeležja20. Prepoznajući društvenu opasnost govora mržnje, Krivični zakonik 21 sankcioniše propagiranje rasne mržnje i podsticanje na rasnu diskriminaciju (čl. 387, st. 3), širenje tekstova, slika ili svakog drugog predstavljanja ideja ili teorija koje zagovaraju ili podstrekavaju mržnju, diskriminaciju ili nasilje, protiv bilo kojeg lica ili grupe lica, zasnovanih na rasi, boji kože, verskoj pripadnosti, nacionalnosti, etničkom poreklu ili nekom drugom ličnom svojstvu (čl. 387, st. 4), javnu pretnju da će, protiv lica ili grupe lice zbog pripadnosti određenoj rasi, boji kože, veri, nacionalnosti, etničkom poreklu ili zbog nekog drugog ličnog svoj stva, iz vr ši ti kri vič no de lo za ko je je za pre će na ka zna za tvo ra ve ća od če ti ri go di ne za tvo ra (čl. 387, st. 5), iza zi va nje na ci o nal ne, ra sne i ver ske mr žnje, raz do ra ili ne tr- pe lji vo sti (čl. 317, st. 1) i jav no iz la ga nje po ru zi li ca ili gru pe zbog pri pad no sti od re- đe noj ra si, bo ji ko že, na ci o nal no sti, et nič kog po re kla ili ne kog dru gog lič nog svoj- stva (čl. 174). Ver bal no iz ra ža va nje mr žnje za bra nje no je i u čla nu 344a ko ji se od no si na na sil nič ko po na ša nje na sport skoj pri red bi ili jav nom sku pu. Gra fi ti mr žnje Is pi si va nje mr žnjom i ne tr pe lji vo šću mo ti vi sa nih po ru ka u jav nom pro- sto ru pred sta vlja po seb no opa snu pod vr stu go vo ra mr žnje (Mr še vić, 2012; Mr še vić, 2013). Uko li ko osta nu do volj no du go, ta kve po ru ke pro iz vo de uti sak 17 Službeni glasni k RS, br. 43/ 200 3, 61/ 2005, 71/2009, 89/2010 – odluka US i 41/2011 – odluka US. 18 Slu žbeni glasnik RS, br. 42 /02 , 97/0 4, 76/05, 79/05 i 62/06. 19 S lužben i glasnik RS, br. 79/05. 20 Službeni glasnik RS, br. 41/09. 21 Službeni gla sni k RS, br. 85/05, 88/05, 107/05, 72/09, 111/ 09, 1 21/12 i 104/13. Mirjana Dokmanović 10 o svo joj do zvo lje no sti i pri hva tlji vo sti, či me otva ra ju vra ta no vim „pro duk- ti ma“ slič nog ti pa, ohra bru ju isto mi šlje ni ke tvo ra ca gra fi ta mr žnje i „mo bi li šu ih po ru ču ju ći im da ni su sa mi i je di ni, ima onih ko ji mi sle isto i ko ji ma se mo gu pri dru ži ti, jer je do šlo vre me za oku plja nje i za ak ci ju“ (Mr še vić, 2014: 11). Ta kve jav ne pret nje za stra šu ju ne sa mo ci lja nu gru pu, već i ši ru po pu la ci ju, iza zi va- ju ći op štu ne si gur nost i strah, na ro či to uko li ko iz o sta ne bla go vre me na i od go- va ra ju ća re ak ci ja grad skih vla sti. Mr še vić (2012: 14) upo zo ra va da gra fi ti mr žnje „otva ra ju men tal na vra ta pa ni ci, jer nji ho vo pri su stvo po ka zu je na šu ra nji vost u kul tu ri to le ri sa ne mr žnje i to le ri sa nog na si lja“. Ste pen dru štve ne opa sno sti gra fi ta mr žnje za vi si i od nji ho ve kon stek tu- a li za ci je, od no sno od me sta i vre me na ka da se po ja vlju ju. Nji ho va po ru ka je sna žni ja uko li ko je is pi sa na na pod lo zi ko ja do dat no na gla ša va nji hov pre te ći sa dr žaj (na pri mer, u rom skim na se lji ma, na ku ća ma bra ni te lja ljud skih pra va ili pri pad ni ka LGBT po pu la ci je, cr kva ma, isto rij skim do bri ma ili nad grob nim spo me ni ci ma) ili u od re đe nom vre me nu (na pri mer, to kom po li tič ke kam pa- nje i pre na ja vlje nog odr ža va nja Pa ra de po no sa). Ova kvi gra fi ti su po seb no opa sni uko li ko se po ja vlju ju u i oko škol skih dvo ri šta, ne sa mo zbog pod sti- ca nja na vr šnjač ko na si lje, već i zbog pod sti ca nja ne ga tiv nih pred ra su da kod de ce i mla dih, kod ko jih se vred no sni sta vo vi tek uob li ča va ju, pre ma po je di- nim ma njin skim za jed ni ca ma. Auto ri po ru ka mr žnje po pra vi lu osta ju ne vi dlji vi, a ta kvo ver bal no na si lje ne sank ci o ni sa no, iako pred sta vlja ne sum nji vu pret nju, na ja vu i mo gu ću pret- hod ni cu stvar no uči nje nog na si lja. Ova kvi slu ča je vi u prak si ni su ret ki (Mr še vić, 2012; Stra te gi ja pre ven ci je i za šti te od dis kri mi na ci je; Po ve re nik za za šti tu rav- no prav no sti, 2012). Od go va ra ju ća i bla go vre me na re ak ci ja dr žav nih or ga na na gra fi te mr žnje po pra vi lu iz o sta je. Uko li ko ima re ak ci ja, one uglav nom do la ze od stra ne gra đa na i or ga ni za ci ja ci vil nog dru štva. Zlo čin iz mr žnje u na ci o nal nom za ko no dav stvu Ka da dru štvo to le ri še oma lo va ža va nje, pret nje i ver bal no na si lje pre ma pri pad ni ci ma od re đe nih gru pa, fi zič ko na si lje ra ste. Po ve ća va se broj kri vič nih de la iza zva nih pred ra su da ma i mr žnjom, što „pred sta vlja po se ban pro blem bez bed no sti i jav nog re da” (Pe tro vić, 2013: 35). Vik ti mi za ci ja ne do ti če sa mo ne po sred ne žr tve, već i nji ho ve po ro di ce i ši ru za jed ni cu. Po sred ne po sle- di ce su rast ten zi ja i ne tr pe lji vo sti iz me đu ve ćin ske i ma njin ske za jed ni ce, kao Temida 11 i op šte ne si gur no sti svih gra đa na. Sto ga mno ga za ko no dav stva sank ci o ni šu zlo čin iz mr žnje (FRA, 2012). Bu du ći da su kri vič na de la mo ti vi sa na mr žnjom sve uče sta li ja i u na šem dru štvu, za ko no da vac je pre po znao pro ble me i kra jem 2012. go di ne usvo jio iz me ne i do pu ne Kri vič nog za ko ni ka22 ko ji ma je uveo ote ža va ju ću okol nost pri li kom od me ra va nja ka zne za kri vič no de lo uči nje no iz mr žnje. Pre ma čla nu 54a, „ako je kri vič no de lo uči nje no iz mr žnje zbog pri pad no sti ra si i ve ro i spo- ve sti, na ci o nal ne ili et nič ke pri pad no sti, po la, sek su al ne ori jen ta ci je ili rod- nog iden ti te ta dru gog li ca, tu okol nost sud će ce ni ti kao ote ža va ju ću okol- nost, osim ako ona ni je pro pi sa na kao obe lež je kri vič nog de la.” Uno še nje ove no vi ne u za ko no dav stvo ima i sim bo lič ni zna čaj, jer po ka zu je da za ko no da- vac pre po zna je dru štve nu opa snost kri vič nih de la mo ti vi sa nih pred ra su da ma i is ka zu je sprem nost da ta kvo po na ša nje osu di. Zlo čin iz mr žnje je opa sni ji od dru gih kri vič nih de la po to me što je žr tva iza bra na zbog to ga šta, od no- sno ko ju gru pu pred sta vlja, a ne zbog to ga ko je ta žr tva kon kret no. Ti me se po ru ka pre no si na ši ru gru pu či ji je žr tva član (Pe tro vić, 2013: 34). Zna čaj ja ča nja ka pa ci te ta dr ža ve za spro vo đe nje za ko na Zlo či ni iz mr žnje „če sto po či nju re či ma“ (Tul kens, 2013:7). Ver bal no iz ra- ža va nje mr žnje i ne tr pe lji vo sti te sno je po ve za no sa re al nim ak ti ma na si lja pre ma pri pad ni ci ma po je di nih ma njin skih gru pa (Po ve re nik za za šti tu rav no- prav no sti, 2012; Be o grad ski cen tar za ljud ska pra va, 2014). U osno vi ta kvog iz ra ža va nja su uvek pred ra su de. Uči ni o ci ovih de la po se žu za na si ljem (ver bal- nim i/ili fi zič kim), jer „po gre šno ve ru ju da im od pri pad ni ka ma njin skih gru pa pre ti ne ka opa snost; ne a de kvat no re a gu ju na po na ša nja ko ja tu ma če kao uvre dlji va po se be i se bi bli ska li ca; ili ve ru ju da se na taj na čin bo re za ostva- re nje svo jih po li tič kih i na ci o nal nih ide a la“ (Ko va če vić, 2009:95). Ći rić (2011:29) sto ga za klju ču je da se „sred stvo i na čin za su zbi ja nje zlo či na iz mr žnje u stva ri ne na la zi to li ko u sfe ri kri vič nog pra va, ko li ko u sfe ri edu ka ci je i raz vi ja nja at mos fe re to le ran ci je, ne di skri mi na ci je i de mo krat skih dru štve nih od no sa“. Prav na nor ma je ste bit na, ali ne do volj na za su zbi ja nje ova kvih štet nih po na- ša nja; sprem nost dr ža ve da ka zni uči ni o ce mo ra bi ti ja sno is ka za na, ali se ti me ne uti če na pro me nu nji ho vih vred no snih sta vo va. Sa ma pret nja ka znom ne 22 Služ be ni gla sn ik RS, br. 121/12. Mirjana Dokmanović 12 mo ra mno go zna či ti, s ob zi rom da je reč o psi ho lo škim, so ci o lo škim i kul tu ro- lo škim fe no me ni ma ko ji zah te va ju od go vo re van do me na sa mog pra va23. Po red zna ča ja za kon skih nor mi i sank ci ja u ovoj obla sti, go di šnji iz ve šta ji Po ve re ni ka za za šti tu rav no prav no sti (2012, 2013) uka zu ju na va žnost ja ča- nja ka pa ci te ta dr ža ve za su zbi ja nje i pre ven ci ju go vo ra mr žnje. Pre po ru ke or ga ni ma jav ne vla sti (Po ve re nik za za šti tu rav no prav no sti, 2012) od no se se, iz me đu osta lih, na ja ča nje edu ka ci je, po di za nje sve sti jav no sti i us po sta vlja nje ko or di ni sa nog od go vo ra svih nad le žnih or ga na i me di ja na su zbi ja nju go vo ra mr žnje i dis kri mi na tor nih sta vo va. Po red to ga, oni se pod sti ču da de lu ju „u ci lju me nja nja dru štve nih i kul tur nih obra za ca ko ji se za sni va ju na ste re o ti- pi ma i pred ra su da ma pre ma ma njin skim gru pa ma“ (Po ve re nik za za šti tu rav- no prav no sti, 2012:103). U po gle du edu ka ci je, pre po ru ču je se „obu ka po li cij- skih slu žbe ni ka za su zbi ja nje zlo či na iz mr žnje, ka ko bi bi li osposoblјeni da ade kvat no re a gu ju, spro vo de is tra ge, sakuplјaju i raz me nju ju in for ma ci je, sa ra đu ju sa tu ži o ci ma, kao i da u sa rad nji sa dru gim dru štve nim ak te ri ma pro- ak tiv no de lu ju na su zbi ja nju zlo či na iz mr žnje“ (Po ve re nik za za šti tu rav no- prav no sti, 2012:105). Pre po ru ke Ko mi te ta za eli mi na ci ju ra sne dis kri mi na ci je24 i Ko me sa ra za ljud ska pra va Sa ve ta Evro pe25 ta ko đe na la žu Re pu bli ci Sr bi ji da pre du zme me re ra di edu ka ci je no si la ca pra vo sud nih funk ci ja u ovoj obla sti. Po red onih ko ji spro vo de za ko ne, po treb no je edu ko va ti i one ko ji ih for- mu li šu i usva ja ju. Ova kav za klju čak na me ću re zul ta ti is tra ži va nja pred stav ni ka jav ne vla sti o nji ho vom od no su pre ma dis kri mi na ci ji26. Re zul ta ti po ka zu ju da 23 U prilo g ovom z ak ljučku Ćiri ć (2011:3 0) navo di sl edeće: „Lako j e n a pri me r osudit i m ladića, ko ji pones en s vojim m ladalačk im žaro m, ekstr avagancijom, ideološkim slep il om, pr omoviše nasilje i gov ori govo ro m mržn je . Ali, da l i smo tim e re šili prob lem? Da li sm o dot ič nog, njegove prijate- l je i rodbi nu, edu ko vali na pra vi nač in, pr ev as pitali , ili smo i h u stvar i samo dalj e gurnuli u j oš ve ću (samo)izo laciju, mržnju i ideo loško sl epi lo, i z kojeg će pro izići neš to još i gore od sa mog gov or a mržn je , zaprav o rea lni zločin mržnje. Dr ug im re čima, ak o jed no g mlad ića osud im o na dužu zatvors ku k aznu zbog govor a mržnje pr ema Romima, onda je pita nje, šta će se dog oditi kada taj iz ađ e iz z at vora – da li će on i z straha, i li zbog stvarne sopstv en e res ocijaliz aci je reći: ne , neću v iše to da r adi m, ili će, ume st o govora mrž nje, po segn ut i za zločinom mržn je? “ 24 Comm itt ee o n the Eliminat ion of Racial Dis cr im ination (C ERD), C oncl ud in g observa tions of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Dis cri mi n ation: Ser bia, of 13 Apr il 2011, CE RD/C/ SR B/C O/1. para . 1 3. 25 Commissi oner for Human Right s, Report by Thomas Ha mmarberg, C ommissione r for Human Rig hts of the Cou nc il of Europe, Following his visit to Se rb ia on 12–15 J un e 2011, S trasbourg, C om mDH(2011) 29. Pa ra. 134. 26 Istraž iv an je je spro ved eno ok to bra 20 13. godine u okviru p rojek ta „ Podr šk a Po v erenik u za za štitu rav no pravn osti za e fikasn u primenu a ntidisk ri min aciono g zakonodavstva u Sr bi- Temida 13 „tre ći na pred stav ni ka za ko no dav ne i iz vr šne vla sti ne zna ili mi sli da go vor mr žnje ni je za ko nom za bra njen“, a isto to li ki pro ce nat njih „ne pre po zna je go vor mr žnje pre ma LGBT oso ba ma u kon kret nom slu ča ju“ (Po ve re nik za za šti tu rav no prav no sti, 2014:32). Sve na ve de no po tvr đu je da je bi lo oprav da no da se su zbi ja nje go vo ra mr žnje uvr sti me đu ključ ne za dat ke Stra te gi je pre ven- ci je i za šti te od dis kri mi na ci je usvo je ne 2013. go di ne. Smer ni ce UN za stra te ške od go vo re dr ža ve na jav no pod sti ca nje mr žnje Ra bat ski ak ci o ni plan za bra ne jav nog za go va ra nja na ci o nal ne, ra sne ili ver- ske mr žnje ko je pred sta vlja pod sti ca nje na dis kri mi na ci ju, ne tr pe lji vost ili na si- lje27 mo že da po slu ži Re pu bli ci Sr bi ji kao ko ri sna osno va u for mu li sa nju i una- pre đe nju od go vo ra na ove ne ga tiv ne dru štve ne po ja ve. Do ku ment je re zul tat se ri je eks pert skih se si ja28 ko je je or ga ni zo va la Kan ce la ri ja Vi so kog ko me sa ra UN za ljud ska pra va to kom 2011. go di ne kao od go vor na po rast in ci de na ta i kon fli ka ta ši rom sve ta ko ji pod sti ču na ci o nal nu, ra snu ili ver sku mr žnju. Ra bat ski ak ci o ni plan da je kon kret ne pre po ru ke dr ža va ma u obla sti za ko- no dav stva, pra vo su đa i po li ti ka. Dr ža va ma se pre po ru ču je da u za ko ni ma ja sno de fi ni šu ključ ne poj mo ve kao što su mr žnja, dis kri mi na ci ja, na si lje i ne tr- pe lji vost, ru ko vo de ći se de fi ni ci ja ma da tim u Kam den skim prin ci pi ma o slo- bo di iz ra ža va nja i rav no prav no sti29. Dr ža ve tre ba da obez be de da se tro del na ji koji sp r ovo di progra m za r azvoj U je di nje nih na ci ja (UNDP) . Istra živanjem su obu hvaćeni pr eds tavnici/e za konoda vne, izvršne i s ud ske vl ast i na repub lič kom, po kra jinsk om i lokal no m nivou, iz 10 razli či ti h instit uci ja: Na ro dne skup šti ne Re pub like Sr bije, S kup štine A P Vojv odi ne, skupšt ina grad ova, sk upštin a op ština, Vlade Re publike S rb ije, Pok raji nske vlade, gradskih veća, opštinskih veća, sudova i tužilaštva. Dostupno na: http://www.ravnopravnost.gov. rs/jdownloads/files/izvestaj_odnos_predstavnika_ javne_vlasti_prema_diskriminacijiji_u_ srbiji_final.pdf, pristupl je no 19. 5 .2014. 27 Z ak ljučci i preporu ke ek spertski h s esija usvo jene su u Rabatu 5. oktobra 2012. godine u vidu Akcionog plana. Dokument, kao i prateće studije od značaja, prilozi i izveštaji stručnjaka, dostupni su na: www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/FreedomOpinion/Articles19–20/Pages/Index.aspx, stranici pri stu pljeno 1 0.10.2013. 28 Radionice na kojima je učestv ovalo 4 5 stručnjaka i preko 200 pos matrača o dr žane su u Evropi (Beč, 9–10.02.2011 .), u Af ri ci (Naj rob i, 6–7. 04. 2011.), u Aziji i Pacif iku (Bangko k, 6–7.7 . 20 11.) i u Južnoj A merici (Sa nt jago de Č il e, 12–1 3.1 0. 2011). 29 Ka md enske p rin cipe je iz radila Glo baln a kamp anj a z a slo bo du izraž av an ja, Articl e 19, 2009. godine. Kamde ns ki prin cipi pre ds tavlja ju pro gre si vno tumače nje m eđu na rodno g prava i Mirjana Dokmanović 14 pro ve ra za ogra ni če nje slo bo de iz ra ža va nja – le gal nost, sra zmer nost i neo p- hod nost – ta ko đe pri me nju je i na slu ča je ve pod sti ca nja na mr žnju. Do ku ment iz Ra ba ta pred la že us po sta vlja nje vi so kog pra ga za de fi ni sa- nje ogra ni če nja slo bo de iz ra ža va nja i de fi ni sa nje pod sti ca nja na mr žnju, kao i pri me nu čla na 20 Me đu na rod nog pak ta o gra đan skim i po li tič kim pra vi ma30. Su do vi ma se na la že da se re do vi to in for mi šu o me đu na rod noj, re gi o nal noj i kom pa ra tiv noj sud skoj prak si u ovoj obla sti. Kri vič ne sank ci je za ne za ko ni te ob li ke iz ra ža va nja tre ba da bu du po sled nja me ra ko ja će se pri me nji va ti sa mo u stro go oprav da nim slu ča je vi ma. Ka ko bi se de lo va lo na eli mi ni sa nje uzro ka iz ra ža va nja ko ja pod sti ču na na si lje, ne tr pe lji vost ili dis kri mi na ci ju, neo p hod no je raz vi ti ši rok op seg po li tič- kih me ra (na pri mer u obla sti obra zo va nja o raz li či to sti), kao i po li ti ke osna ži- va nja ma nji na da ko ri ste svo je pra vo na slo bo du iz ra ža va nja. Dr ža ve se sto ga opo mi nju da su du žne da pre ki nu prak su ne pro ce su i ra nja. One bi tre ba lo da se vi še an ga žu ju i ra di su zbi ja nja ne ga tiv nih ste re o ti pa i dis kri mi na ci je po je di- na ca i za jed ni ca. Ak ci o ni plan is ti če zna čaj obu ke pro svet nih rad ni ka i uvo đe- nje me đu kul tur nog raz u me va nja u škol ski pro gram. Dr ža va ma se pre po ru ču je da ja ča ju ka pa ci te te za edu ka ci ju po li ci je i sud ske ad mi ni stra ci je, te si ste mat- ski pri ku plja ju po dat ke o slu ča je vi ma pod sti ca nja na mr žnju. Ak tiv no sti u okvi ru IPA 2011 pro jek ta Ima ju ći u vi du pri ro du, mo ti ve i dru štve nu opa snost go vo ra i rad nji uči- nje nih iz mr žnje, kao i pre po ru ke me đu na rod nih ugo vor nih te la i Po ve re ni ka za za šti tu rav no prav no sti, Kan ce la ri ja za ljud ska i ma njin ska pra va je u okvi ru IPA 2011 pro jek ta spro ve la niz ak tiv no sti u ci lju pre ven ci je i su zbi ja nja ovog fe no me na. One uklju ču ju edu ka ci ju, is tra ži va nje, po di za nje jav ne sve sti i za go- va ra nje za us po sta vlja nje ko or di ni sa nog od go vo ra svih nad le žnih ak te ra na go vor i de la uči nje na iz mr žnje. Cilj ne gru pe ob u hva ta ju su di je, tu ži o ce, po li- cij ske slu žbe ni ke, dr žav ne i lo kal ne funk ci o ne re, so ci jal ne i pro svet ne rad ni ke, me di je i ci vil no dru štvo. standa rda, praksu država i opšte principe prava prihvaćene od strane zajednice nacija u ovoj oblasti. V. http://www.article19.org/data/files/pdfs/standards/the-camden-principles- on-freedom-of-expression-and-equality.pdf, stranici p ristup ljeno 3 .4 .2014 . 30 „Svako zag ovaranje n aciona ln e, r asne i ver ske mržn je k oje pod stiče diskriminaciju, netrpeljivost i nasilje biće zabranjeno zakonom.“ Temida 15 Edu ka ci ja su di ja i tu ži la ca Uvo đe nje mo ti va mr žnje kao ote ža va ju će okol no sti pri li kom od me ra va- nja ka zne za kri vič no de lo do ve lo je do po tre be da se su di je i tu ži o ci upo zna ju sa ovom no vi nom i ospo so be za spro vo đe nje u prak si. Ot kri va nje po sto ja nja mr žnje kao mo ti va kri vič nog de la je, po red obez be đe nja do ka za, naj te ži deo za is tra gu, jer je u pi ta nju su bjek tiv no ose ća nje ko je je u prak si ve o ma te ško do ka za ti, na ro či to ako po či ni lac pre iz vr še nja de la ni je otvo re no is ka zi vao ne pri ja telj stvo, pri me ra ra di, is pi su ju ći gra fi te (Pe tro vić, 2013). Sto ga tu ži la štvo u sa rad nji sa po li ci jom mo ra na ći na či na da do ka že ve zu po či ni o ca sa ide ja ma mr žnje i ne tr pe lji vo sti. Ra di se o slo že nom po stup ku či ji uspeh za vi si od ste- pe na ospo so blje no sti su di ja, tu ži la ca i po li cij skih slu žbe ni ka. U tom ci lju, ma ja 2013. go di ne odr ža na je edu ka ci ja akre di to va nih tre ne ra Pra vo sud ne aka de- mi je, ka ko bi mo gli, pu tem od go va ra ju ćeg mo du la, da lje ob u ča va ti su di je i tu ži o ce. Za njih je pri pre mljen na stav ni ma te ri jal31 ko ji je uklju čio i broj ne pri- me re iz stra ne32 i do ma će sud ske prak se. Edu ka ci ja po li cij skih slu žbe ni ka Obu ka po li ci je ob u hva ti la je sve ni voe (osnov nu po li cij sku obu ku i struč no usa vr ša va nje) i sve cilj ne pod gru pe (vi so ke ru ko vo di o ce, po li cij ske slu žbe ni ke i po la zni ke osnov ne obu ke). Te ži šte je bi lo na odr ži vo sti i pod sti ca nju stal ne na do grad nje na stav nih sa dr ža ja i me to da u obla sti rav no prav no sti i ne di skri- mi na ci je. a) Se mi nar za vi so ke ru ko vo di o ce Mi ni star stva unu tra šnjih po slo va (MUP-a) Se mi nar „Ulo ga MUP-a u pre ven ci ji i su zbi ja nju dis kri mi na ci je“, odr žan u Na rod noj skup šti ni 14. ju na 2013. go di ne, oku pio je vi so ke ru ko vo di o ce MUP-a iz se di šta i po li cij skih upra va iz ce le ze mlje33, ka ko bi se de talj no upo zna li sa ulo- 31 Dostupan na sajtu Kancelarije za ljudska i manjinska prava: http://www.ljudskaprava.gov.rs/ index.php/projekti/eu. 32 Uključivši pre vod bil te na Evrop skog su da o ljud skim pra vi ma o go vo ru mr žnje od ju na 2012. go di ne. http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/FS_Hate_speech_ENG.pdf, pristupljeno 14.2.2014. 33 ht tp://w w w.ljudskaprava.gov.rs/index.php/vesti/arhiva- dogadjaja/227-ministarst vo - unutrasnjih-poslova-u-prevenciji-i-borbi-protiv-diskriminacije, pristupljeno 20.1.2014, Mirjana Dokmanović 16 gom po li ci je u spro vo đe nju Stra te gi je pre ven ci je i za šti te od dis kri mi na ci je ko ja je ta da bi la pred usva ja njem34. Na sku pu su pred sta vlje ne te me va žne za im ple- men ta ci ju an ti di skri mi na ci o nih po li ti ka, kao što su pre po zna va nje dis kri mi na ci je i me ha ni zmi za šti te; dis kri mi na ci ja na ra du; od nos eti ke, dis kri mi na ci je i zlo sta- vlja nja na ra du; go vor mr žnje i zlo čin iz mr žnje. Zbor nik ra do va35 sa ovog sku pa di stri bu i rao se svim po li cij skim upra va ma u ze mlji ka ko bi se što ši ri krug po li cij- skih slu žbe ni ka upo znao sa ulo gom i od go vor no šću po li ci je u ovoj obla sti. b) Una pre đe nje pla no va, pro gra ma i sa dr ža ja Cen tra za osnov nu po li cij sku obu ku Ima ju ći u vi du da je do bro ob u če na po li ci ja naj bo lja ga ran ci ja pro tiv lo šeg po stu pa nja, kao i za bla go vre me nu i od go va ra ju ću za šti tu žr ta va kr še nja ljud- skih pra va, Cen tar za osnov nu po li cij sku obu ku u Srem skoj Ka me ni ci obez- be đu je kon ti nu i ra no ško lo va nje po la zni ka, bu du ćih po li cij skih slu žbe ni ka, o ljud skim pra vi ma i slo bo da ma. Ova edu ka ci ja uklju ču je i te me kao što su pre- ven ci ja lo šeg po stu pa nja i tor tu re, re a go va nje na vi do ve ra sne, na ci o nal ne i et nič ke dis kri mi na ci je, kse no fo bi je i sa nji ma po ve za ne raz li či te vi do ve ne tr pe- lji vo sti za sno va ne na pred ra su da ma. Pro ce na po tre ba una pre đi va nja ove obu ke, ura đe na po čet kom 2013. go di ne u sa rad nji sa Upra vom za struč no obra zo va nje, ospo so blja va nje, usa vr- ša va nje i na u ku, kao i ru ko vod stvom i tre ne ri ma ovog Cen tra, po ka za la je da ima pro sto ra za da lje obo ga ći va nje na stav nih sa dr ža ja i me to da. Ovo me je do pri- ne lo i uvo đe nje po seb ne okol no sti za od me ra va nje ka zne za kri vič no de lo uči- nje no iz mr žnje, što je zah te va lo da se obez be di da bu du ći po li cij ski slu žbe ni ci stek nu od go va ra ju ća zna nja o po stu pa nju u slu ča ju zlo či na iz mr žnje u okvi ru nji ho vog de lo kru ga (pr ven stve no u pri ku plja nju do ka za u to ku is tra ge). Po red ove pro ble ma ti ke, ra di o ni ca sa tre ne ri ma Cen tra36 je ob u hva ti la raz ma tra nje pri- pre me od go va ra ju ćeg na stav nog sa dr ža ja u ve zi ra da po li ci je sa eks trem nim i de sni čar skim gru pa ma, di sci plin skih sank ci ja u slu ča ju kr še nja ljud skih pra va i dis kre ci o nih ovla šće nja po li cij skih slu žbe ni ka, pra va i oba ve za iz rad nih od no sa – http://www.ravnopravnost.gov.rs/sr/doga%C4%91aji/mup-u-prevenciji-i-borbi-protiv- diskriminacije, pristupljeno 30.1.2014. 34 Vlada RS je usvojila Strategiju 29. juna 2013. godine. 35 Dostupan je na: http://www.ljudskaprava.gov.rs/index.php/projekti/eu. 36 http://www.ljudskaprava.gov.rs/index.php/yu/vesti/388-unapredenje-nastavnog-plana-i- programa-i-nastavnih-sadrzaja-u-centrima-za-obuku-policije, pristupljeno 9.12.2013; http:// www.copo.edu.rs/Jezik_kosti_nema_ali_kosti_lomi-160–1-383, pristupljeno 3.2.2014. Temida 17 i ko ri šće nja ne di skri mi na tor nog i rod no ose tlji vog je zi ka. Ak ce nat je sta vljen na raz u me va nje uzro ka i po sle di ca dis kri mi na ci je i ve zu sa pred ra su da ma i ste re o- ti pi ma, pre po zna va nje ob li ka u ko ji ma se dis kri mi na tor no po na ša nje po ja vlju je, kao i raz u me va nje ulo ge po li ci je u su zbi ja nju i pre ven ci ji dis kri mi na ci je. Ra di obo ga ći va nja na stav nih me to da stu di ja ma slu ča ja, tre ne ri ma je sta- vlje no na ras po la ga nje mno štvo pri me ra iz stra ne i do ma će prak se, uklju čiv ši prak su, pre po ru ke i mi šlje nja Po ve re ni ka za za šti tu rav no prav no sti. c) Obu ka po li cij skih slu žbe ni ka ra di pre po zna va nja go vo ra mr žnje i po stu pa nja u ci lju nje go ve pre ven ci je Uvo đe njem stro žeg sank ci o ni sa nja kri vič nih de la uči nje nih iz mr žnje u za ko no dav stvo, zna čaj ne kom pe ten ci je su da te po li ci ji s ob zi rom na nje nu ulo gu u kri vič noj is tra zi. Po li ci ja mo ra bi ti do bro ob u če na da pre po zna go vor i de la mo ti vi sa ne mr žnjom i netrpelјivošću, pro ce ni ni vo opa sno sti ko je iza zi- va ju i pre du zme od go va ra ju će rad nje u ci lju pri ku plja nja do ka za i po kre ta nja kri vič ne pri ja ve, kao i even tu al ne za šti te žr ta va. U tom ci lju or ga ni zo van je se mi nar37 za tre ne re Cen tra za osnov nu po li- cij sku obu ku ko me su pri su stvo va li i po tri po li cij ska slu žbe ni ka iz 11 lo kal nih sa mo u pra va38 u ko ji ma se u okvi ru ovog IPA pro jek ta spro vo de pi lot ak tiv no- sti ra di pre ven ci je dis kri mi na ci je. Ob u če ni po li cij ski slu žbe ni ci uče stvo va li su u de ba ta ma na lo kal nom ni vou, or ga ni zo va nim ra di pod sti ca nja osmi šlja va nja ko or di ni sa nog od go vo ra svih nad le žnih ak te ra, ra di pre ven ci je go vo ra i zlo- či na iz mr žnje u tim sre di na ma.39 d) Na pred na obu ka po li cij skih slu žbe ni ka – tre ne ra U cilјu uspostavlјanja sve o bu hvat nog si ste ma edu ka ci je po li cij skih slu- žbe ni ka u obla sti rav no prav no sti i ne di skri mi na ci je, or ga ni zo va na je na pred na obu ka40 po li cij skih slu žbe ni ka – tre ne ra ko ji su već pret hod no ospo so blje ni za 37 Se mi nar je odr žan 9. ok to bra 2013. go di ne u Cen tru za osnov nu po li cij sku obu ku u Srem- skoj Ka me ni ci. http://www.ljudskaprava.gov.rs/index.php/yu/vesti/389-obuka-policije-u- suzbijanju-govora-mrznje-i-zlocina-iz-mrznje, pristupl jen o 2.12.2013 . 38 Bor, Iv an j ica, Jag odina, Kosjer ić, Leskovac, L oznica, Novi Pa zar, O džaci , P ri jep olјe, V ranje i Žiti šte. 39 Ove aktivnosti se održavaju u perio du d ecembar 2013 – juni 2014. 40 Održana su d va ciklu sa ob uke radi oni ča rskog tipa ( u Vrnjačko j Ban ji 12–14. 03.20 14. i u Sr em- skoj Kamenic i 19– 21.3.20 14.). Ovu o bu ku je p oh ađ alo 40 policijski h služben ika /ca – tr enera Mirjana Dokmanović 18 pla ni ra nje, or ga ni zo va nje i re a li zo va nje na sta ve, kao i za ru ko vo đe nje u obla sti struč nog ospo so blja va nja i usa vr ša va nja41. Sa dr žaj obu ke je ob u hva tio te me ko je su, u pret hod nom pro ce su pro ce ne po tre ba za obu kom, utvr đe ne na osno vu kon sul ta ci ja i su ge sti ja od stra ne Upra ve za struč no obra zo va nje, ospo so blja va- nje, usa vr ša va nje i na u ku. Li sta te ma je uklju či la, iz me đu osta log, osno ve pre po- zna va nja dis kri mi na ci je, po jam, uzro ci, po sle di ce i ob li ci; prav ni i in sti tu ci o nal ni okvir bor be pro tiv dis kri mi na ci je; raz li ko va nje dis kri mi na ci je od zlo sta vlja nja na ra du; ko deks po li cij ske eti ke; di sci plin ska od go vor nost i njen zna čaj u obla sti dis- kri mi na ci je; za šti ta pri vat no sti na rad nom me stu; an ti di skri mi na ci o ni pre ven tiv ni me ha ni zmi u MUP-u (ko le ga za po dr šku, po sred nik, oso be od po ve re nja i dr.); go vor mr žnje i zlo čin iz mr žnje; rod na rav no prav nost i rod no za sno va na dis kri mi- na ci ja; upo tre ba ne di skri mi na tor nog i rod no ose tlji vog je zi ka, a sve uz na gla sak na stu di je slu ča je va i prak su i pre po ru ke Po ve re ni ka za za šti tu rav no prav no sti. e) Pri pre ma na stav nog ma te ri ja la za obu ku po li ci je u obla sti rav no prav no sti i ne di skri mi na ci je Po red edu ka ci je, na pred na obu ka po li cij skih slu žbe ni ka – tre ne ra, opi sa na u pret hod nom odelj ku, ima la je i do dat ni cilj – pro ce nu po tre ba na stav nih je di ni ca ko je će sa dr ža ti ma te ri jal ko ji će ob u če ni tre ne ri ko ri sti ti u re a li za ci ji na sta ve. Na stav ni ma te ri jal (ko ji ob u hva ta i te me ve za ne za go vor mr žnje i zlo čin iz mr žnje), u for mi pri ruč ni ka pod na zi vom „Rav no prav nost i dis kri mi na- ci ja“, ko ri sti će se od dru gog po lu go di šta 2014. go di ne na se mi na ri ma u okvi ru Pro gra ma struč nog usa vr ša va nja ko ji do no si mi ni star unu tra šnjih po slo va, a re a li zu je se ko ri šće njem sred sta va Mi ni star stva. Struč no usa vr ša va nje će se re a li zo va ti pu tem in struk tiv nih se mi na ra uz ko ri šće nje raz li či tih me to do lo- ških pri stu pa, kao što su in ter ak tiv na pre da va nja, stu di je slu ča je va, ra di o ni ce, di sku si je, igra nje ulo ga, grup ni rad i vi deo za pi si. iz 27 policijskih uprava ( Vranje, K raguje vac , Niš, N ovi Pazar, Užice, Bor, Z a ječar, J ago dina, K ral јevo, Kr uš evac, Le sk ovac, Pirot, Prok up lј e, Prij ep ol јe, Čačak, Sremska Mitr ov ica, Šabac , Val јe vo , Sombo r, Beograd, Kikin da, Zren ja ni n, Panče vo, Subotic a, No vi Sad, Sme derev o i Pož areva c) , kao i 12 predstavnik a/ca Up ra ve policije u sedištu, Upra ve g ra nične po l icije, Uprave za upravne poslove, Uprave saobraćajne policije i Uprave za stručno obrazovanje, osposoblјavanje, usavršavanje i nauku. 41 ht tp: //w w w.ljudskaprava.gov.rs/index.php/yu/vesti-l/668 -suzbijanje - disk riminacije - i-zastita-ravnopravnosti-u-radu-policijskih-sluzbenika, pristupljeno 6.05.2014, http:// w w w. ljudsk aprava.gov.rs/index .php/yu/vesti - l/657- obuk a - p olicijsk ih -sluzbenik a - o - antidiskriminaciji-i-zastiti-ravnopravnosti, pri st upljen o 6.5 .2014. Temida 19 Is tra ži va nje o sta vo vi ma kri mi na li stič kih po li cij skih slu žbe ni ka o dis kri mi na ci ji42 U okvi ru na uč no-is tra ži vač kog pro jek ta „Po lo žaj i ulo ga po li ci je u de mo- krat skoj prav noj dr ža vi (2012–2015)“, Kri mi na li stič ko-po li cij ska aka de mi ja je po čet kom 2014. go di ne spro ve la is tra ži va nje o sta vo vi ma pri pad ni ka kri- mi na li stič ke po li ci je o osnov nim po jav nim ob li ci ma dis kri mi na ci je. Cilj ovog is tra ži va nja je od re đi va nje tre nut nog sta nja, pre pre ka i mo gu ćih re še nja po pi ta nju dis kri mi na ci je u okvi ru po li cij skih sna ga i ot kri va nje so cio-de mo graf- skih po kre ta ča dis kri mi na ci je, dok se spe ci fič ni ci lje vi od no se na raz u me va nje ci lje va po li cij ske de lat no sti, sta vo va pre ma pri me ni za ko na, per cep ci je dis kri- mi na ci je u od no su pre ma ose tlji vim gru pa ma i lič nog do ži vlja ja dis kri mi na ci je. Ovo je pr vo is tra ži va nje ova kve vr ste spro ve de no u okvi ru ove cilj ne gru pe, te su nje go vi re zul ta ti zna čaj ni u po gle du sa gle da va nja po sto je ćeg od no sa po li- ci je pre ma dis kri mi na ci ji uop šte. Re zul ta ti is tra ži va nja su ko ri sni i kao pu to kaz u osmi šlja va nju edu ka ci je u obla sti ljud skih pra va ka ko po sto je ćih, ta ko i bu du ćih po li cij skih slu žbe ni ka, sa ci ljem eli mi na ci je pred ra su da i obez be đe nja pro fe si o- nal nog po stu pa nja pre ma li ci ma ko je ka rak te ri še bi lo ko ji vid raz li či to sti. Edu ka ci ja no si la ca jav nih funk ci ja na lo kal nom ni vou Ak tiv no sti IPA 2011 pro jek ta ob u hva ta ju i po kre ta nje pi lot me ra u 11 iza- bra nih lo kal nih sa mo u pra va pre ven ci je dis kri mi na ci je i pro mo ci je an ti di skri- mi na ci o nih po li ti ka i me ha ni za ma43. Jed na od ovih pre ven tiv nih me ra od no si se na po kre ta nje jav nih de ba ta o gra fi ti ma mr žnje ka ko bi se lo kal na jav nost, a na ro či to pred stav ni ci op štin skih upra va, su di je, tu ži o ci, no vi na ri, pro svet ni i so ci jal ni rad ni ci, na u či li da pre po zna ju ovaj ob lik go vo ra mr žnje i nje go ve da le ko se žne štet ne po sle di ce. Pri pre mlje na je pu bli ka ci ja44 o gra fi ti ma mr žnje 42 Istraž ivanj e koje je sp roveo dr Rad om ir Zekavica p redsta vljen o je u njegovom radu „ Odnos po li cije prem a di sk riminaci ji u Srbiji ” o bjavlj en om u o vo m br oju Temide . 43 Sagla snos t o spr ovođen ju o vi h pilot mer a toko m 2013 . i 2014. g odine po tvr đe na je po tpisiva- nje m Protoko la o s aradnji izm eđu Kance la r ije za ljudska i manji ns ka prava , P overen ik a za zaš tit u ravno pra vnosti, St alne k onfer encije gr adova i opština i predstavnika/ca 11 lokalnih samouprava (Bor, Vranje, Žitište, Ivanjica, Jagodina, Kosjerić, Leskovac, Loznica, Novi Pazar, Odžaci i Prijepolјe) 29.10.2013. http://www.ljudskaprava.gov.rs/index.php/vesti/kancelarija- mediji/439-rtv-potpisan-protokol-za-borbu-protiv-diskriminacije , prist upljeno 4.4.2014. 44 Publikacija „O grafitima mržnje“ autorke dr Zorice Mršević je dostupna na sajtu Kancelarije za ljudska i manjinska prava http://www.ljudskaprava.gov.rs/index.php/projekti/eu, pristupljeno 4.5.2014. Po za vr šet ku de ba te u lo kal nim sa mo u pra va ma u ju nu 2014. go di ne, iz ra di će se Mirjana Dokmanović 20 ko ja ob ja šnja va za što su ulič ni nat pi si sa po ru ka ma mr žnje pod vr sta go vo ra mr žnje, ko ji su nje go vi efek ti, šta su mi zo gi ni ja i ho mo fo bi ja u jav nom pro- sto ru, ka ko se ma ni pu li še mr žnjom i ko ji su osno vi za kon skog sank ci o ni sa- nja gra fi ta mr žnje. Ove te mat ske ras pra ve su pri li ka i da se lo kal ni ak te ri pod- stak nu da pre du zmu sve o bu hvat nu i ko or di ni sa nu ak ci ju ra di pre ven ci je i eli- mi ni sa nja gra fi ta mr žnje i ta ko do pri ne su spre ča va nju even tu al nog pre li va nja ver bal nih pret nji „dru ga či ji ma“ i hu ška nja na na si lje u fi zič ko na si lje. U tom ci lju lo kal nim ak te ri ma se nu di na pro mi šlja nje mo del pro to ko la o eli mi na ci ji gra fi ta mr žnje i su zbi ja nju svih ob li ka dis kri mi na ci je na lo kal nom ni vou45. Edu ka ci ja no vi na ra Edu ka tiv no usme re ne ak tiv no sti ob u hva ti će i me di je pu tem se mi na ra za no vi na re i ured ni ke o etič kom iz ve šta va nju46. Po red upo zna va nja sa an ti di skri- mi na ci o nom le gi sla ti vom, po li ti ka ma i me ha ni zmi ma, te me obu ke će uklju či ti pre po zna va nje dis kri mi na ci je i upo tre bu ne di skri mi na tor nog go vo ra. Za klju čak Is ku stva u spro vo đe nju ak tiv no sti u ci lju su zbi ja nja go vo ra i zlo či na iz mr žnje u okvi ru IPA 2011 pro jek ta po tvr đu ju da je edu ka ci ja od su štin skog zna ča ja za raz u me va nje i pri hva ta nje raz li či to sti, što do pri no si spre ča va nju na ve de nih štet nih po ja va. Ohra bru je da su dr žav ne in sti tu ci je nad le žne za spro vo đe nje za ko na pre po zna le tu po tre bu i uvr sti le te me ve za ne za rav no- prav nost i ne di skri mi na ci ju u na stav ne sa dr ža je obu ke svo jih ka dro va. Is ku- stva iz na ve de nih edu ka tiv nih ak tiv no sti uka zu ju da je ključ uspe ha u te melj- nim pri pre ma ma tog pro ce sa, po la ze ći od pro ce ne i iden ti fi ka ci je po tre ba, is ho da, te ma, na stav nih me to da i cilj nih gru pa obu ke. Efi ka snost se po ve ća va uko li ko se u pr vi krug obu ke uklju če akre di to va ni pre da va či i tre ne ri ci lja ne gru pe pro fe si o na la ca (u na ve de nim slu ča je vi ma, su di je, tu ži o ci i po li cij ski slu- žbe ni ci), s ob zi rom da oni već po se du ju po treb no spe ci fič no pro fe si o nal no fi nal na ver zi ja pu bli ka ci je uz su mi ra nje re ak ci ja i su ge sti ja uče sni ka/ca i re zul ta ta ove pi lot ini ci ja ti ve. 45 Mo del pro to ko la iz ra đen je na osno vu Pro to ko la o po stu pa nju u slu ča ju zlo či na iz mr žnje ko ji je Vla da Re pu bli ke Hr vat ske usvo ji la 2.4.2011. go di ne (YUCOM, 2013:6). 46 Obu ka je pla ni ra na za je sen 2014. go di ne, na kon iz la ska iz štam pe ovog bro ja Te mi de. Temida 21 zna nje iz te obla sti, kao i da do bro po zna ju prak su unu tar tog si ste ma. Bit no je da se nji ma da slo bo da u kre i ra nju kon kret nih na stav nih mo du la ka ko bi naj bo lje od go vo ri li na po tre be i ni vo zna nja od re đe nih cilj nih pod gru pa. Na ovaj na čin se po sti že odr ži vost obu ke, uz od go va ra ju ću po dr šku nad le žnih in sti tu ci ja kao što su Pra vo sud na aka de mi ja i Upra va MUP za struč no obra- zo va nje, ospo so blja va nje, usa vr ša va nje i na u ku. Na stav ni me to di tre ba da se za sni va ju na in ter ak ci ji sa po la zni ci ma i pod sti ca ju nji ho vog ak tiv nog uče šća (u vi du ra di o ni ca, stu di ja slu ča ja, pre zen ta ci ja i igre ulo ga). Ti me se do pri no si raz u me va nju za što je od re đe ni vred no sni stav pre ma pri pad ni ci ma po je di nih ma njin skih gru pa dis kri mi na to ran, uvre dljiv i de struk ti van i za što pro iz vo di štet ne po sle di ce po ce lo dru štvo. Ko ri sno je da se na stav ni ma te ri jal stal no obo ga ću je stu di ja ma slu ča je va iz do ma će sud ske i po li cij ske prak se, kao i mi šlje nji ma i pre po ru ka ma ne za vi- snih in sti tu ci ja za ljud ska pra va, s ob zi rom da su one pu to kaz ka ade kvat nom od go vo ru dr žav nih ak te ra na go vor i rad nje mo ti vi sa ne mr žnjom. Nu žno je i da se sa dr žaj edu ka ci je kon ti nu i ra no una pre đu je i obo ga ću je shod no po tre- ba ma i kre ta nji ma u dru štvu. Pre po ru ču je se da se po sti za nje is ho da edu ka ci je me ri pe ri o dič no pu tem is tra ži va nja vred no snih sta vo va od no snih cilj nih gru pa pre ma dis kri mi na ci ji. Po red edu ka ci je, efi ka sni od go vor dr ža ve na go vor i de la iz mr žnje tre ba da sa dr ži for ma li zo va ne ob li ke sa rad nje raz li či tih ak te ra (or ga na vla sti, pra- vo su đa, po li ci je, ško la, vr ti ća, uni ver zi te ta, cen ta ra za so ci jal ni rad, me di ja i ci vil nog dru štva) na lo kal nom i cen tral nom ni vou. Pred lo že ni mo del pro to ko la na lo kal nom ni vou mo že da po slu ži kao po la zi šte ka tom ci lju. Pre po ru ču je se i uvo đe nje si ste mat skog pri ku plja nja i evi den ti ra nja po da ta ka o slu ča je vi ma pod sti ca nja na mr žnju. Dr ža va ne bi tre ba lo da za ne ma ri is ku stva i do stig nu ća ci vil nog dru štva u obla sti bor be pro tiv ovih fe no me na i edu ka ci je za ljud ska pra va, pri hva ta nje raz li či to sti i eli mi ni sa nje pred ra su da. Sto ga je us po sta vlja nje part ner stva sa or ga ni za ci ja ma ci vil nog dru štva iz u zet no va žno. For mu li sa nje i spro vo đe nje me ra pre ven ci je i za šti te od go vo ra mr žnje i zlo či na mr žnje je slo žen za da tak. Vred no sni sta vo vi se ne me nja ju br zi nom ko jom se do no se za ko ni, no ka da pred ra su de pre ma „dru ga či ji ma“ za me ne uva ža va nje i po što va nje, ka žnja va nje ne će ni bi ti po treb no. Mirjana Dokmanović 22 Li te ra tu ra Be o grad ski cen tar za ljud ska pra va (2014) Ljud ska pra va u Sr bi ji 2013 – pra vo, prak sa i me đu na rod ni stan dar di ljud skih pra va. Be o grad: Be o grad ski cen tar za ljud ska pra va. Ći rić, J. (2011) Zlo či ni mr žnje – ame rič ko i bal kan sko is ku stvo. Te mi da, 4, str. 21–36. Com mis si o ner for Hu man Rights, Re port by Tho mas Ham mar berg, Com mis si o ner for Hu man Rights of the Co un cil of Euro pe, Fol lo wing his vi sit to Ser bia on 12–15 Ju ne 2011, Stras bo urg, CommDH(2011)29. Pa ra. 134. Com mit tee on the Eli mi na tion of Ra cial Di scri mi na tion (CERD), Con clu ding ob ser va ti- ons of the Com mit tee on the Eli mi na tion of Ra cial Di scri mi na tion: Ser bia, of 13 April 2011, CERD/C/SRB/CO/1. Co un cil of Euro pe, Ad di ti o nal Pro to col to the Con ven tion on Cyber cri me, con cer ning the cri mi na li sa tion of acts of a ra cist and xe nop ho bic na tu re com mit ted thro ugh com pu ter systems, 28 Ja nu ary 2003. Co un cil of Euro pe, Par li a men tary As sembly, Re com men da tion 1805 (2007), Blasp- hemy, re li gi o us in sults and ha te spe ech aga inst per sons on gro unds of the ir re li gion, of 29 Ju ne 2007. Euro pean Co urt of Hu man Rights (Ju ne 2012) Fact she et: Ha te spe ech. Press unit. Evrop ska ko mi si ja (2013) Iz ve štaj o na pret ku Sr bi je za 2013. go di nu, COM (2013)700, Bri- sel, 16.10.2013. Euro pean Com mis sion aga inst Ra cism and In to le ran ce (EC RI), EC RI Re port on Ser bia, forth mo ni to ring cycle, adop ted on 23 March 2011. Euro pean Con ven tion on Hu man Rights and Fun da men tal Fre e doms, as amen ded by Pro to cols No. 11 and No. 14. (CETS No. 194) FRA – Euro pean Union Agency for Fun da men tal Rights (2012) Ma king ha te cri me vi si- ble in the Euro pean Union: ac know led ging vic tims’rights, Vi en na: FRA – Euro pean Union Agency for Fun da men tal Rights. Ge ne ral Po licy Re com men da tion No. 7 of the Euro pean Com mis sion aga inst Ra cism and In to le ran ce (EC RI) on na ti o nal le gi sla tion to com bat ra cism and ra cial di scri mi na- tion. Hel sin ški od bor za ljud ska pra va u Sr bi ji (2013) Po pu li zam: uru ša va nje de mo krat skih vred no sti: ljud ska pra va u Sr bi ji 2012. Be o grad: Hel sin ški od bor za ljud ska pra va u Sr bi ji. Ko va če vić, M. (2009) Zlo či ni mr žnje. Te mi da, 4, str. 93–103. Kri vič ni za ko nik, Slu žbe ni gla snik RS, br. 85/05, 88/05, 107/05, 72/09, 111/09, 121/12 i 104/13. Temida 23 McGo na gle, T. (2013) The Co un cil of Euro pe aga inst on li ne ha te spe ech: Co nun drums and chal len ges, Co un cil of Euro pe Con fe ren ce of Mi ni sters Re spon si ble for Me dia and In for ma tion So ci ety Fre e dom of Ex pres si on and De moc racy in the Di gi tal Age, Bel gra de, 7–8.11.2013. Mr še vić, Z. (2012) Stre et Graf fi ti – Bet we en Am nesty of Our Chil dren and Mo ral Pa nic- king. Bez bed nost, 2, str. 7–22. Nancy, J.L. (2013) Ha tred, a So li di fi ca tion of Me a ning, Co un cil of Euro pe Con fe ren ce of Mi ni sters Re spon si ble for Me dia and In for ma tion So ci ety Fre e dom of Ex pres si on and De moc racy in the Di gi tal Age, Bel gra de, 7–8.11.2013. Pe tro vić, V. (2013) Go vor mr žnje i zlo čin iz mr žnje, Mi ni star stvo unu tra šnjih po slo va u pre- ven ci ji i bor bi pro tiv dis kri mi na ci je. Be o grad: Ep ti sa. Pe tru šić, N. Kr tić, I. Ma rin ko vić, T. (2014) Ko men tar Za ko na o za bra ni dis kri mi na ci je. Be o grad: Pra vo sud na aka de mi ja. Po ve re nik za za šti tu rav no prav no sti (2012) Re do van go di šnji iz ve štaj Po ve re ni ka za za šti tu rav no prav no sti za 2011. go di nu. Be o grad: Po ve re nik za za šti tu rav no prav no sti. Po ve re nik za za šti tu rav no prav no sti (2013) Re do van go di šnji iz ve štaj Po ve re ni ka za za šti tu rav no prav no sti za 2012. go di nu. Be o grad: Po ve re nik za za šti tu rav no prav no sti. Po ve re nik za za šti tu rav no prav no sti (2014) Re do van go di šnji iz ve štaj Po ve re ni ka za za šti tu rav no prav no sti za 2013. go di nu. Be o grad: Po ve re nik za za šti tu rav no prav no sti. Re com men da tion 1805 (2007) of the Par li a men tary As sembly of the Co un cil of Euro pe on blasp hemy, re li gi o us in sults and ha te spe ech aga inst per sons on gro unds of the ir re li gion. Re com men da tion No. R 97(20) of the Com mit tee of Mi ni sters of the Co un cil of Euro pe on “ha te spe ech”, of 30 Oc to ber 1997. Ste e ring Com mit tee on Me dia and In for ma tion So ci ety (2013), Bac kgro und Pa per, Co un cil of Euro pe Con fe ren ce of Mi ni sters Re spon si ble for Me dia and In for ma tion So ci ety Fre e dom of Ex pres si on and De moc racy in the Di gi tal Age, Bel gra de, 7–8.11.2013. Tul kens, F. (2013) The ha te fac tor in po li ti cal spe ech: Whe re do re spon si bi li ti es lie?, Co un cil of Euro pe Con fe ren ce – The ha te fac tor in po li ti cal spe ech – Whe re do re spon si bi- li ti es lie?, Co un cil of Euro pe. Ustav Re pu bli ke Sr bi je, Slu žbe ni gla snik RS, br. 98/06. We ber, A. (2009) Ma nual on Ha te Spe ech. Stras bo urg: Co un cil of Euro pe Pu bli ca tion. YUCOM (2013) Zlo čin iz mr žnje – bro šu ra za gra đa ne. Be o grad: YUCOM. Za kon o jav nom in for mi sa nju, Slu žbe ni gla snik RS, br. 43/2003, 61/2005, 71/2009, 89/2010 - od lu ka US i 41/2011 – od lu ka US. Mirjana Dokmanović 24 Za kon o ogla ša va nju, Slu žbe ni gla snik RS, br. 79/05. Za kon o za bra ni ma ni fe sta ci ja neo na ci stič kih ili fa ši stič kih or ga ni za ci ja i udru že nja i za bra ni upo tre be neo na ci stič kih ili fa ši stič kih sim bo la i obe lež ja, Slu žbe ni gla snik RS, br. 41/09. Za kon o ra di o di fu zi ji, Slu žbe ni gla snik RS, br. 42/02, 97/04, 76/05, 79/05 i 62/06. Za kon o za bra ni dis kri mi na ci je, Slu žbe ni gla snik RS, br. 22/09. Za štit nik gra đa na (2014) Re do van go di šnji iz ve štaj za štit ni ka gra đa na za 2013. go di nu, Be o grad: Za štit nik gra đa na. In ter net iz vo ri Ar tic le 19, The Cam den Prin ci ples of Fre e dom Ex pres si on and Equ a lity, April 2009, http://www.arti cl e19.org/dat a/files/pdf s/standa rds/th e-camden-principles-on- freedom-of-expression-and-equality.pdf, pristupljeno 12.4.2014. Council of Europe Fact sheet 4 “Hate speech”, https://wcd.coe.int/ ViewDoc. jsp?id=1477721&Site=DC, pristupljeno 14.3.2014. http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/serbia/ipa/2011/02_implementation_of_anti- discrimination_policies.pdf, 3.5.2014. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:02006R1085– 20120301&qid=1397475599751&from=FR pristupljeno 3.5.2014. http://www.article19.org/data/files/pdfs/standards/the-camden-principles-on- freedom-of-expression-and-equality.pdf pristupljeno 3.5.2014. http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/media/doc/cm/rec(1997)020&expmem_ EN.asp, pristupljeno 14.3.2014. http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/media/doc/cm/rec(1997)020&expmem_ EN.asp, pristupljeno 14.3.2014. http://www.copo.edu.rs/Jezik_kosti_nema_ali_kosti_lomi-160–1-383, pristupljeno 3.2.2014. ht tp://w w w.echr.coe.int /Documents/FS_ Hate_ speech_ ENG.pdf, pristupljeno 14.2.2014. http://www.europa.rs/en/eu_assistance_to_serbia/ipa.html, pristupljeno 3.5.2014. http://www.ljudskaprava.gov.rs/index.php/projekti/eu, pristupljeno 3.4.2014. ht tp: //w w w.ljudskaprava.gov.rs/index .php/vesti/kancelarija -mediji/439 -r t v- potpisan-protokol-za-borbu-protiv-diskriminacije, pristupljeno 4.4.2014. Temida 25 http://www.ljudskaprava.gov.rs/index.php/yu/vesti/388-unapredenje-nastavnog- plana-i-programa-i-nastavnih-sadrzaja-u-centrima-za-obuku-policije, pristupljeno 9.12.2013. ht tp: //w w w. lju dsk ap r av a .g ov. r s/ in d e x . p hp/ y u / ves ti /389 - o b uk a - p o licij e - u - suzbijanju-govora-mrznje-i-zlocina-iz-mrznje, pristupljeno 2.12.2013. ht tp: //w w w.ljudskaprava.gov.rs/index.php/yu/vesti-l/657- obuka-policijsk ih - sluzbenika-o-antidiskriminaciji-i-zastiti-ravnopravnosti, pristupljeno 6.5.2014. http://www.ljudskaprava.gov.rs/index.php/yu/vesti-l/668-suzbijanje-diskriminacije-i- zastita-ravnopravnosti-u-radu-policijskih-sluzbenika, pristupljeno 6.5.2014. http://www.ravnopravnost.gov.rs/sr/izve%C5%A1taji/izve%C5%A1taji, pristupljeno 3.4.2014. http://www.ravnopravnost.gov.rs/sr/o-nama/osnovne-informacije, pristupljeno 15.12.2013. w w w.ohch r. org/EN/Issues/Free do mOpin ion/Ar ti cle s19 –20/Pages/Index. aspx, pristupljeno 10.10.2013. Mršević, Z. (2013) Grafiti mržnje, dostuno na: http://www.ljudskaprava.gov.rs/index. php/projekti/eu pristupljeno 4.5.2014. Strategija prevencije i zaštite od diskriminacije, dostupno na: http://www.slglasnik. info/sr/60–10–07–2013/13430-strategija-prevencije-i-zatite-od-diskriminacije.html, pristupljeno 4.5.2014. Mirjana Dokmanović 26 Mirjana DokManovic Mechanisms of Improving Institutional Capacities of the State to Prevent Hate Speech and Hate Crimes The Republic of Serbia has introduced special circumstances for the determination of sentence for hate crime in the Criminal Code amended in December 2012. If a criminal offence is committed through hate based on race or religion, national or ethnic affiliation, sex, sexual orientation or gender identity of another, the court shall consider any aggravating factors except when it is not stipulated as a feature of the criminal offence. However, the State still neglects to consider mitigating factors. Moreover, it does not pay sufficient attention to eliminating verbal expressions of hatred and discrimination that often precede crimes motivated by hate. The paper discusses the possibility of improving education and coordinated activities of the State, particularly of courts, prosecutors, police and local self-governments, to combat hate speech and hate crimes. The aim of the paper is to present mechanisms of improving institutional capacities to prevent these phenomena that have been implemented within the project “Implementation of Anti-Discrimination Policies in Serbia” financed by the European Union. The paper concludes that central to the success of this process are the education of state actors, and the development of a value system based on equality and acceptance of diversity. Key words: hate speech, hate crimes, crime prevention, police, judiciary. 
work_yr6yeirv4zaerikvwebirwqoja	----	Moving beyond the Immutability Debate in the Fight for Equality after Proposition 8 ARTICLE MOVING BEYOND THE "IMMUTABILITY DEBATE" IN THE FIGHT FOR EQUALITY AFTER PROPOSITION 8 M.K.B. DARMER* TIFFANY CHANG** I. Introduction ............................................... 2 II. LGBT Rights in the United States Supreme Court ........ 11 III. Marriage Equality in the States ........................... 23 IV. Proposition 8 and the Peculiar Vulnerability of LGBTs .... 34 V. Moving Beyond Proposition 8 ............................. 40 V I. C onclusion ................................................ 44 "All men are created equal. No matter how hard you try, you can never erase those words."' * Professor of Law, Chapman University School of Law. A.B., Princeton University; J.D., Columbia University School of Law. Founding board member and Legal Chair of the Orange County Equality Coalition (OCEC), a grass-roots organization formed after the passage of Proposition 8 in California. The author thanks Chapman University School of Law for a research stipend in support of this Article. * Chapman University School of Law, Candidate for Juris Doctor 2010. OCEC Board Member. This Article draws on arguments made in an amicus brief filed by these authors and others in support of the prior petitions to invalidate Proposition 8. The authors thank Ronald Steiner and other colleagues who assisted with the amicus brief and our OCEC friends for sharing their stories. They also express appreciation to the editors of The Scholar: St. Mary's Law Review on Minority Issues. 1. RANDY SHILTS, THE MAYOR OF CASTRO STREET: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF HARVEY MILK 225 (St. Martin's Griffin 2008) (1982) (quoting Harvey Milk, a gay rights activist and the first openly gay politician to be elected to public office in California in 1977). THE SCHOLAR I. INTRODUCTION Questions about whether sexual orientation is "immutable",2 have delayed the attainment of full equality for sexual orientation minorities.3 Those opposed to marriage equality, for example, have sought to draw distinctions between racial or ethnic minorities and sexual orientation mi- norities by arguing that only the former groups have "immutable" traits.4 This Article does not wade into the "immutability" debate, but instead 2. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (Brennan, J., plurality opin- ion) (describing an immutable characteristic as a "characteristic determined solely by the accident of birth"). Webster's Dictionary defines "immutable" as "unchangeable." WEB- STER'S DELUXE UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 910 (2d ed. 1983). 3. See Diane S. Meier, Note, Gender Trouble in the Law: Arguments Against the Use of Status/Conduct Binaries in Sexual Orientation Law, 15 WASH. & LEE J. Civ. RTS. & Soc. JUST. 147, 163 (2008) ("In terms of sex, gender, and sexual orientation, courts tie up no- tions of immutability with sex and gender performance and notions of mutability with sex- ual orientation. Notions of immutability and mutability provide a jurisprudential justification for withholding protection of sexual orientation and protecting sex and gen- der."); cf. id. at 185 ("[The] decision to characterize sexual orientation as mutable or immu- table becomes objectively incoherent" when conduct is contrasted with orientation (emphasis in original)); Jo Becker, The Road to Championing Same-Sex Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2009, at A14, available at 2009 WLNR 16127520 (noting that Ted Olson, in a federal marriage lawsuit, "dismisses" the contention that California's marriage ban is justified by a state interest in encouraging relationships that lead to procreation). "If sex- ual orientation is not a choice-and Mr. Olson argues that it is not-then the ban is not going to encourage his clients to enter into heterosexual, child-producing marriages, he insists." Id. The fact that the defenders of marriage bans rely on "encouraging procrea- tion" as a justification for supporting marriage bans is, in our view, a species of an argu- ment from immutability because it suggests that if marriage for same-sex couples is not an option, same-sex couples might opt to abandon same-sex partners in favor of opposite-sex partners, an argument that is ultimately grounded on the notion of ."choice." As developed further in Part V of this Article, our view is that sexual orientation is so integral to the person that for the state to seek to force or even encourage a "change" is inconsistent with the respect due to sexual orientation minorities. 4. See, e.g., Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 892 (Iowa 2009) (noting the local gov- ernment's argument that plaintiffs, six same-sex couples, "could not prove, as a matter of fact, that sexuality is immutable"). The court found, however, that "[s]exual orientation is not the type of human trait that allows courts to relax their standard of review because the barrier is temporary or susceptible to self-help." Id. at 893. As Professor Janet Halley has pointed out, "anti-gay constructivists say that being gay, lesbian, or bisexual is a choice, and that for that reason forms a proper target for a majority that thinks these ways of being are morally bad and seeks to deter people from adopting them." Janet E. Halley, Sexual Orientation and the Politics of Biology: A Critique of the Argument from Immutability, 46 STAN. L. REV. 503, 517 (1994) (noting former Vice President Dan Quayle's articulation of this viewpoint during the 1992 presidential campaign, when he stated: "'My viewpoint is that it's more of a choice than a biological situation.... I think it is a wrong choice."' (footnote omitted)). [Vol. 12:1 MOVING BEYOND THE "IMMUTABILITY DEBATE" asserts that the immutability question is the wrong one to ask.5 Gender itself is not ultimately an "immutable" trait,6 and yet few would deny that discrimination based on gender is not only wrong, but also a violation of equal protection norms.7 The California Supreme Court's decision in In re Marriage Cases (Mar- riage Cases) provides the framework for moving beyond "immutability" questions to provide expanded protections to sexual orientation minori- ties.8 In that landmark decision, the court not only held that marriage is a 5. See Janet E. Halley, Sexual Orientation and the Politics of Biology: A Critique of the Argument from Immutability, 46 STAN. L. REV. 503, 506 (1994) (arguing that the "pro-gay legal arguments from biological causation should be abandoned"). Nevertheless, more than ten years later, arguments regarding immutability abound in the political arena and continue to inform judicial analysis of the issue. See, e.g., Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 892 (discussing the immutability argument). 6. See Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 893 (citing IOWA CODE § 144.23 (2008)) (referencing an Iowa statute that permits one to obtain a new birth certificate reflecting a gender reassignment). 7. See United States v. Virginia (VMI), 518 U.S. 515, 534 (1996) (finding that the Virginia Military Institute's male-only admissions policy did not serve an "exceedingly per- suasive justification," as admitting women would not diminish the school's stature). The Court noted: "Inherent differences" between men and women, we have come to appreciate, remain cause for celebration, but not for denigration of the members of either sex or for artificial constraints on an individual's opportunity. Sex classifications may be used to compensate women "for particular economic disabilities [they have] suffered," to "promot[e] equal employment opportunity," to advance full development of the talent and capacities of our Nation's people. But such classifications may not be used, as they once were, to create or perpetuate the legal, social, and economic inferiority of women. Id. at 533-34 (citations omitted). 8. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 442 (Cal. 2008) (overturning the court of ap- peals, which analyzed the case under the rational basis test after noting that questions existed regarding whether or not sexual orientation was "immutable"), superseded in part by constitutional amendment, CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5, as recognized in Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48 (Cal. 2009). The California Supreme Court held that "immutability is not invariably required in order for a characteristic to be considered a suspect classification for equal protection purposes." Id. The court also noted that: [O]ur decisions make clear that the most important factors in deciding whether a char- acteristic should be considered a constitutionally suspect basis for classification are whether the class of persons who exhibit a certain characteristic historically has been subjected to invidious and prejudicial treatment, and whether society now recognizes that the characteristic in question generally bears no relationship to the individual's ability to perform or contribute to society. Id. at 443. The Marriage Cases decision was superseded only in part by constitutional amendment, following passage of Proposition 8, a voter initiative defining marriage as solely between one man and one woman. Because neither Proposition 8 nor the 2009 California Supreme Court decision recognizing its validity address the court's holding in the Marriage Cases that discrimination based on sexual orientation is subject to heightened 2009] THE SCHOLAR fundamental right,9 but also that sexual orientation is a suspect classifica- tion for equal protection purposes under the California constitution. 10 The court did not find it necessary to declare sexual orientation "immuta- ble" in reaching that holding.1" Rather, it found, critically, that sexual orientation is so "integral" to the person that one should not have to change it to avoid discrimination. 1 2 Of course, Proposition 8 partially undid the court's holding by amend- ing the state constitution to provide that "only marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in California."1 3 On November 4, scrutiny, we argue that the supersession was only partial. See also Richard Salas, In Re Marriage Cases: The Fundamental Right to Marry and Equal Protection Under the Califor- nia Constitution and the Effects of Proposition 8, 36 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 545, 560 (2009) ("Of overwhelming importance is something that Proposition 8 does not change: sexual orientation is now a suspect classification under ... California's equal protection clause triggering strict scrutiny review of any statute that is classified on this basis." (footnote omitted)). 9. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 419 (stating that "the right to marry is a funda- mental right whose protection is guaranteed to all persons by the California [c]onstitution"). 10. Id. at 444. In the court's words: Because sexual orientation, like gender, race, or religion, is a characteristic that fre- quently has been the basis for biased and improperly stereotypical treatment and that generally bears no relation to an individual's ability to perform or contribute to soci- ety, it is appropriate for courts to evaluate with great care and with considerable skep- ticism any statute that embodies such a classification. Id. 11. See id. at 443 (declining to define sexual orientation as an immutable trait). In- stead, the court determined that sexual orientation is a suspect classification because, his- torically, people have faced prejudice for sexual orientation. Id. 12. Id. at 442 (citation omitted) (comparing sexual orientation with religion and alien- age, both examples of traits that are changeable, yet trigger strict scrutiny as a suspect classification). The court used these examples to explain why immutability is not required for suspect classification and emphasized that, because sexual orientation is so fundamen- tal to a person's identity, he or she should not feel required to change it. See id. 13. CALIFORNIA SECRETARY OF STATE, VOTER GUIDE: TEXT OF PROPOSED LAWS 128 (2008), http://voterguide.sos.ca.gov/past/2008/general/text-proposed-laws/text-of-proposed- laws.pdf. The Voter Guide provides: This initiative measure is submitted to the people in accordance with the provisions of Article II, Section 8, of the California Constitution. This initiative measure expressly amends the California Constitution by adding a section thereto; therefore, new provisions proposed to be added are printed in italic type to indicate that they are new. SECTION 1: Title This measure shall be known and may be cited as the "California Marriage Protection Act." SECTION 2: Section 7.5 is added to Article I of the California Constitution, to read: SEC. 7.5. Only marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in California. [Vol. 12:1 MOVING BEYOND THE "IMMUTABILITY DEBATE" 2008, California voters passed Proposition 8 by a fifty-two percent mar- gin.1 4 Legal challenges immediately followed. 5 On May 26, 2009, the California Supreme Court upheld the validity of Proposition 8 as a lawful amendment to the state constitution.1 6 At the same time, it held that Proposition 8 would not apply retroactively, thus sustaining the validity of 18,000 gay and lesbian marriages that occurred between June 2008 and November 2008.17 As this Article goes to press, a further legal challenge is pending, as Proposition 8 is now the subject of a controversial federal lawsuit.1 8 Underlying Proposition 8 was an enduring hostility towards one of the most vulnerable minority groups in society.19 The decision by the court to uphold Proposition 8 judicially sanctioned the people's decision to Id. (emphasis in original). 14. Bob Egelko, But Justices Unanimous That 18,000 Couples Married Before Election Remain Wed, S.F. CHRON., May 27, 2009, at Al, available at 2009 WLNR 10004887. 15. Id. (discussing challengers' contention that the amendment "was so far-reaching that it was a constitutional revision, which, unlike an amendment, requires legislative ap- proval or a constitutional convention before reaching the ballot"). 16. Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 110 (Cal. 2009) (finding Proposition 8 to be a law- ful amendment based on the absence of "explicit subject-matter limitation on the use of the initiative to propose and adopt constitutional amendments" as well as the "numerous California precedents interpreting and applying" the distinction between constitutional amendments and revisions). 17. Id. at 119 (holding that Proposition 8 should only be applied prospectively, as the statute does not explicitly provide that it apply retroactively). The marriage of co-author Tiffany Chang was upheld under this provision. 18. See Complaint for Declaratory, Injunctive, or Other Relief, Perry v. Schwarzeneg- ger, No. CV 09 2292 VRW (N.D. Cal. May 22, 2009), 2009 WL 1490740 (seeking to enjoin the State of California from enforcing Proposition 8 as an unconstitutional violation of gays' and lesbians' Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection of the law). Plaintiffs argue: More than 30 years ago, the Supreme Court of the United States recognized that "[m]arriage is one of the 'basic civil rights of man,' fundamental to our very existence and survival." But today, as a result of the passage of Proposition 8 in November 2008, the State of California denies its gay and lesbian residents access to marriage by providing in its constitution that only a civil marriage "between a man and a woman" is "valid or recognized in California." Instead, California relegates same-sex unions to the separate-but-unequal institution of domestic partnership. This unequal treatment of gays and lesbians denies them the basic liberties and equal protection under the law that are guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Id. (citations omitted). The filing of the federal lawsuit has spurred controversy, including among gay rights organizations. Maura Dolan, Prop. 8 Foes Clash over Federal Suit, L.A. TIMEs Aug. 9, 2009, at A35, available at 2009 WLNR 15397202. 19. Cf. Erwin Chemerinsky, Challenging Direct Democracy, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 293, 297 (2007) (noting the frequency with which the initiative process is used to target minority groups, including sexual orientation minorities). 2009] THE SCHOLAR strip away a "fundamental right '2° from a group that the same court had already found to be entitled to the highest level of scrutiny under equal protection analysis.2 ' The court's earlier holding that sexual orientation is a suspect classifi- cation, however, survived Proposition 8, which was silent on that mat- ter,2 2 and may provide a framework for eventual development of equal protection doctrine in other state courts and, ultimately, in the federal courts.2 3 Thus, this Article is designed to highlight an important feature of the Marriage Cases that it might be tempting to overlook in light of the in- tense focus on Proposition 8 itself and on the later court decision uphold- ing it. As problematic as Proposition 8 was,24 the court's May 2008 decision preceding its passage may ultimately prove to be of more long- standing importance than the decision upholding Proposition 8.25 That is because the decision upholding Proposition 8 was largely based on the peculiar nature of California's constitutional amendment framework and 20. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 419 (Cal. 2008) ("[T]he right to marry is a fundamental right whose protection is guaranteed to all persons by the California [clonstitution."), superseded in part by constitutional amendment, CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5, as recognized in Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48 (Cal. 2009). 21. See generally Strauss, 207 P.3d 48 (upholding the validity of Proposition 8); see also id. at 129 (Moreno, J., dissenting) (pointing out that the majority opinion strips away the right to marry from a minority group). 22. See CALIFORNIA SECRETARY OF STATE, VOTER GUIDE: TEXT OF PROPOSED LAWS 128 (2008), http://voterguide.sos.ca.gov/past/2008/general/text-proposed-laws/text-of-pro- posed-laws.pdf (amending the California constitution to say only that a valid marriage is between a man and a woman). Because Proposition 8 itself did not address the "classifica- tion" of sexual orientation for purposes of judicial equal protection review, the California Supreme Court did not review the issue in Strauss v. Horton. See generally Strauss, 207 P. 3d 48. 23. See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 444 (trailblazing in equal protection law by recognizing the "suspect classification" of sexual orientation). 24. M. Katherine Baird Darmer, "Activist" Courts, Misleading Wedge Politics and the Tragedy of Proposition 8, 14 NEXUS 69, 70 (2008) ("It is an unfortunate feature of democ- racies that the majority can pass laws that disfavor minority groups."). 25. See, e.g., Kerrigan v. Comm'r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 424 (Conn. 2008) (following the precedent set in the Marriage Cases by ruling that same-sex and opposite- sex couples are similarly situated and acknowledging marriage as a fundamental right for same-sex couples in Connecticut). The Supreme Court of Connecticut held: Although we acknowledge that many legislators and many of their constituents hold strong personal convictions with respect to preserving the traditional concept of mar- riage as a heterosexual institution, such beliefs, no matter how deeply held, do not constitute the exceedingly persuasive justification required to sustain a statute that discriminates on the basis of a quasi-suspect classification. Id. at 478. [Vol. 12:1 MOVING BEYOND THE "IMMUTABILITY DEBATE" will have little precedential force outside California. 26 The underlying Marriage Cases, however, addressed fundamental questions regarding marriage and the rights of sexual orientation minorities that will continue to be addressed in courts across the country.21 The Marriage Cases, thus, have the potential to help shape the jurisprudential debate about rights and equal protection in a landscape in which United States Supreme Court precedent is underdeveloped.2 8 26. See Strauss, 207 P.3d at 60 (noting the relative ease with which the California constitution can be amended and noting that the California constitution has been amended more than five hundred times); Ronald Steiner, Understanding the Prop 8 Litigation: The Scope of Direct Democracy and Role of Judicial Scrutiny, 14 NEXUS 81, 84-85 (2009) (describing the relative rarity of California's initiative system). Steiner states that between twenty-one and twenty-three states have initiative systems to change legislation, but only sixteen, including California, allow change by direct initiative. Ronald Steiner, Under- standing the Prop 8 Litigation: The Scope of Direct Democracy and Role of Judicial Scru- tiny, 14 NExus 81, 84-85 (2009). He refers to these states as a "distinct minority," and asserts that all of these states have some form of "procedural or substantive constraints." Id. 27. See generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE (1996); cf. Andrew E. Taslitz, Judging Jena's D.A.: The Prosecutor and Racial Esteem, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 393, 406-07 (2009) (discussing the various legal and economic advantages to marrying). Professor Taslitz notes that marriage "carries with it a wealth of new rights-presumptive joint ownership of property, access to a portion of the other's social security benefits, inheritance rights, and eased access to joint medical insurance ben- efits being but a few of the prominent examples." Andrew E. Taslitz, Judging Jena's D.A.: The Prosecutor and Racial Esteem, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 393, 406-07 (2009). These benefits are incentives for people to fight for their fundamental right to marriage. 28. Cf. Melissa Murray, Equal Rites and Equal Rights, 96 CAL. L. REV. 1395, 1403-04 (2008) (noting other ways in which the Marriage Cases were groundbreaking). The Cali- fornia Supreme Court's decision "prompts broader questions about equality, marriage, and the state's role in ensuring equal rights." Id. at 1401. Professor Murray states: Although it will be understood as the case that created gay marriage in California, its legacy is likely to be considerably more broad-and ultimately, more compelling- than this significant development. In making clear the constitutional obligation to en- sure equality for all families, the court's decision forces us to confront the important question of how to square marriage with the promise of equal rights and the law's role in structuring family life. In its innovative approach to the question of equal rights, the court not only broadens the available options, it also deepens a conversation about marriage and equality that goes beyond same-sex marriage. Id. at 1403-04. Regarding the Supreme Court's under-development of jurisprudence in this area, see Part II of this Article. 2009] THE SCHOLAR The lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT)29 community has long suffered discrimination.3 0 In response, the United States Supreme Court has given grudging protection without explicitly applying a height- ened level of scrutiny to cases involving discrimination against the LGBT community, as the California Supreme Court recently did.3" LGBTs, thus, remain vulnerable to the whims of majorities in all fifty states.32 A colleague, who is not a lawyer, summed up this situation in a reflective email: I sense this feeling of sup[p]ression . . . like something is bubbling just underneath the surface ready to explode. I think that the feel- ings of depression may be hitting even harder [than] after the elec- tion. The public battle pre-election was intense yet there seemed to be something more personal about the [California] Supreme Court hearing. We actually had the opportunity to go inside the courtroom and listen to other human beings argue why [we should] or why we should not have the right to marry. It is very demoralizing to have your rights removed by voters. It is even more demoralizing to have the highest court in the state support the voter's right to remove your 29. While issues of marriage equality are addressed primarily with reference to the gay and lesbian communities, we also refer in this Article to the LGBT communities, which include bisexuals and transgender individuals as well as gays and lesbians, in recognition that all of those communities have suffered discrimination and are in need of more robust legal protections. Where discussing court cases, we attempt to employ the terminology used by those courts in order to give an accurate sense of the scope of protection in various cases. 30. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571 (2003) ("[For centuries there have been powerful voices to condemn homosexual conduct as immoral."). 31. See id. (invalidating Texas anti-sodomy law under Due Process Clause analysis without explicitly finding that a "fundamental right" was at issue such as to trigger a formal strict scrutiny analysis); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996) (finding that amendment to the Colorado constitution, precluding any type of governmental action to protect homo- sexuals from discrimination, failed even to meet rational basis requirements). The Romer Court concluded: We cannot say that Amendment 2 is directed to any identifiable legitimate purpose or discrete objective. It is a status-based enactment divorced from any factual context from which we could discern a relationship to legitimate state interests; it is a classifi- cation of persons undertaken for its own sake, something the Equal Protection Clause does not permit. Romer, 517 U.S. at 635 (indicating that, had the amendment been directed at a "legitimate purpose or discrete objective," rather than at discrimination for its own sake, it might with- stand rational basis scrutiny); cf. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 586 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (claiming that the Court applied an "unheard-of form of rational basis review" in evaluating an anti- sodomy statute). These cases are discussed in more detail in Part II of this Article. 32. See Part II of this Article for further discussion. [Vol. 12:1 MOVING BEYOND THE "IMMUTABILITY DEBATE" rights and then realize as a tax[-]paying, voting citizen, you have no- where else to go legally.33 Following this introduction, this Article will proceed in four parts. Part II provides a background discussion of the landmark United States Su- preme Court cases dealing with sexual orientation. We then turn, in Part III, to state court decisions in the marriage context, including a focus on the California Supreme Court's 2008 Marriage Cases decision, which de- clared sexual orientation a suspect classification, eschewed the "immuta- bility" debate, and mandated marriage equality for all Californians.34 Part IV will discuss Proposition 8 and the peculiar vulnerability of LGBTs illustrated by that voter initiative. Finally, Part V will provide an analysis of how greater rights may ultimately be achieved in the courts by building upon the California Supreme Court's analysis of the "integral nature" of sexual orientation. We seek throughout to provide a real-world framework for these issues by relying on our own and others' personal experiences with Proposition 8. 3 1 These narrative accounts bolster the California Supreme Court's finding that sexual orientation is "integral" to the self3 6 and animate the need for true equal protection. As a lesbian and co-author of this Article, it has been particularly sobering for Tiffany to realize how her experience with marriage equality has been dictated by the lack of protections for LGBTs: I have been together with my wife, Lindsey, for five years. After a couple of years, we began thinking about getting married .... On July 14, 2007, Lindsey and I had our wedding ceremony and recep- tion at our church in Long Beach in front of one hundred of our close friends and family members. Not only was it one of the happi- 33. E-mail from Karla Bland to Katherine Darmer, Professor of Law, Chapman Uni- versity School of Law (Mar. 13, 2009) (on file with author). 34. See generally In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008), superseded in part by constitutional amendment, CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5, as recognized in Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48 (Cal. 2009). 35. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., Gaylegal Narratives, 46 STAN. L. REV. 607 (1994) (explaining the importance of "gaylegal" narratives). Gaylegal narratives seek to "[expand] legal debate and [drive] social transformation by illuminating legal issues from the perspectives of nomic groups frequently excluded from political and academic debate, particularly gays and lesbians." Stanford Law Review, Abstract, William N. Eskridge, Jr., Gaylegal Narratives, 46 STAN. L. REV. 607, 607 (1994). According to Professor Eskridge, gaylegal narratives may "be 'beneficial' to the extent that they can speak to audiences with mainstream experiences and values." William N. Eskridge, Jr., Gaylegal Narratives, 46 STAN. L. REV. 607, 609 (1994). 36. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 426. 2009] THE SCHOLAR est and most significant days of my life, but it also changed my life and relationship for the better. With our relationship never feeling more solid and secure, we moved to New York shortly after our wedding for my first year of law school. It was in the midst of the cut-throat world of finding an apartment to rent in and around New York City that reality hit again-the protection I felt from my marriage ceremony was not a legally tangible protection. Despite our scrambling to prove we were a legitimate couple, including our domestic partnership paperwork, landlords insisted that we each separately meet the annual income requirement. Without a legal marriage certificate, we were deemed to be no more than "roommates." Although we met the financial threshold as a family, it was impossible for me to do so individually as a new law student. With my dignity tucked away, I had to ask my brother to co-sign my portion of the lease agreement, and we had to pay additional months in advance. We paid over $10,000 to get our foot into the door of a one-bedroom apartment; it would have been half that amount if we had been able to get legally married. Nine months later, on May 15, 2008, the California Supreme Court ruled in favor of marriage equality. For our one-year wedding anni- versary, Lindsey and I flew back to California to get our official mar- riage license. The county clerk who represented the local and state government recognized our relationship, validated our marriage, and even took our picture for us. Walking out of the clerk's office, I felt a level of protection and equality that I think is impossible to know exists until you have experienced it. One month later, we moved back to California to enjoy having a legal status that was equal to our neighbors. And sure enough, our car insurance premium was re- duced by half when our agent figured out that we were legally mar- ried. In that small gesture, we realized that gay and lesbian people were finally gaining equality and that this recognition of gay and les- bian relationships meant that we did not have to worry quite as much about every detail of our future together. We enjoyed this newfound equality for only a few months before a bare majority of voters chose to strip gays and lesbians of a basic civil right and their human dignity and to write this discrimination into the California constitution. When I awoke to the shocking and rep- rehensible news that Proposition 8 had passed, I felt like someone punched me in the stomach and knocked the wind right out of me. For the first few days, I cried; I was depressed, I barely went to my classes, and I dreaded seeing anyone. And for a week or so after the election, I found myself unable to look at strangers in the eye. I literally looked down when I was passing someone on the sidewalk. [Vol. 12:1 MOVING BEYOND THE "IMMUTABILITY DEBATE" Part of it was anger, thinking that perhaps that person voted to strip my wife and me of our rights, and part of it was humiliation that people might be thinking, "See, you were wrong, you are less than me." It is strange to consider that on November 3, 2008, I was en- joying all the rights of a full California citizen for the first time in my life, and one day later, I was relegated to being a second-class citizen. Although my marriage is currently considered valid, I still worry when Lindsey is out without me, or when we hold hands in public, of what abuse others will feel entitled to commit after the codifying of discrimination into the constitution. I worry that in a year and a half, when I must take an oath to be admitted to the state bar, I will have to decide between surrendering my livelihood as an attorney in Cali- fornia or swearing an oath to support a constitution that discrimi- nates against me and my family. There has been one common and striking observation each time I have told my personal story about how the give and take of my fun- damental right to marry has affected my life. That observation is that the tears from so many in the audience listening were not for my hardships, but because my story echoed the pain that they have felt and endured in silence up until that point. II. LGBT RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution con- tains the provision: "[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, lib- erty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."37 While the lan- guage of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses is plain, the long history of civil rights movements in this country has shown group after group battle for the recognition of their rights and equality.3" On many occasions, it has been necessary for the Supreme Court to articulate ele- vated federal protections for a group that would otherwise face discrimi- nation and inequity when subject to the whims of the majority.39 37. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 38. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 685 (1973) (discussing the struggle for civil rights for women); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 554-55 (1964) (explaining at- tacks on voting rights for minorities); see also M. Katherine Baird Darmer, "Activist" Courts, Misleading Wedge Politics and the Tragedy of Proposition 8, 14 NEXus 69, 70 (2009) (noting that "[t]hroughout this country's history, minority groups have.., resorted to the courts to gain rights guaranteed by our federal and state constitutions"). 39. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985) (applying strict scrutiny review to race-based discrimination); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (applying heightened scrutiny analysis to gender-based discrimination). Ac- cording to Justice Thurgood Marshall, the strict requirements of strict scrutiny review 20091 THE SCHOLAR Under the Equal Protection Clause, a law that discriminates against a particular group of people is subject to one of three levels of scrutiny- "rational basis" review, "intermediate scrutiny," or "strict scrutiny. '"n° While most laws are subject to only rational basis analysis, which gives great deference to the state's actions, those that discriminate against a "suspect" or "quasi-suspect" class receive at least a heightened level of scrutiny.4 1 For a quasi-suspect classification, such as gender, the State must show that the law is substantially related to an important govern- ment interest in order to pass intermediate, or heightened, scrutiny. 42 For a suspect classification, such as race, the State must show that the law is narrowly tailored to address a compelling state interest in order to pass strict scrutiny review. 3 Under the Due Process Clause, a law that im- pacts a "fundamental right" is also subject to strict scrutiny review.4 4 make such review "strict in theory, but fatal in fact" to almost all race-based categoriza- tions. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (198C) (Marshall, J., concurring). 40. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996) (applying rational basis review, which requires that the law be rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest, to a case involving discrimination against homosexuals); City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440 (not- ing that statutes that classify by "race, alienage or national origin" must be "suitably tai- lored to serve a compelling state interest"); Craig, 429 U.S. at 197 (finding that "classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be sub- stantially related to achievement of those objectives" under heightened scrutiny review). 41. See, e.g., City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440; Craig, 429 U.S. at 197. 42. United States v. Virginia (VMI), 518 U.S. 515, 532-33 (1996) (discussing the dif- ferent standards of review used in gender discrimination cases, as compared with those used in racial discrimination cases); Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982) (applying an intermediate test for a state statute that excluded males from enrolling in a state-supported school for nursing). 43. See, e.g., City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440. The general rule [mandating rational basis review] gives way, however, when a statute classifies by race, alienage, or national origin. These factors are so seldom relevant to the achievement of any legitimate state interest that laws grounded in such considera- tions are deemed to reflect prejudice and antipathy-a view that those in the burdened class are not as worthy or deserving as others. For these reasons and because such discrimination is unlikely to be soon rectified by legislative means, these laws are sub- jected to strict scrutiny and will be sustained only if they are suitably tailored to serve a compelling state interest. Id. (citations omitted). 44. E.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973) (stating that infringement upon a fundamental right under the Due Process Clause is subject to strict scrutiny review); see also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 586 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that the majority had not explicitly found a "fundamental right" at issue in overturning Texas anti-sodomy law); Romer, 517 U.S. at 625-26 (noting that the Colo- rado Supreme Court rejected an amendment to the Colorado constitution that banned state legislation prohibiting discrimination against homosexuals because it infringed on the "fundamental right of gays and lesbians to participate in political process," but it did so under equal protection review). [Vol. 12:1 MOVING BEYOND THE "IMMUTABILITY DEBATE" When the Supreme Court has applied heightened scrutiny, the practical result has been an expansion of civil rights for the affected group.4 5 For example, after the Court found that race was a suspect classification re- quiring the highest level of judicial scrutiny in Korematsu v. United States,46 the Court decided Brown v. Board of Education and Loving v. Virginia, respectively striking down school segregation and anti-miscege- nation laws.4 7 Subsequently, the Supreme Court held in Craig v. Boren that gender was a "quasi-suspect" classification requiring a heightened level of scrutiny.48 It was not until the 1990s that the Court began to recognize the rights of sexual orientation minorities.49 Before discussing the Supreme Court cases that have shaped the federal legal landscape for those rights, a sum- mary of Bowers v. Hardwick provides necessary background.5" Michael Hardwick was arrested for sodomy when a police officer en- tered his home and found him engaging in oral sex with another man.51 Hardwick challenged the Georgia anti-sodomy law, which prohibited oral and anal sex between both different-sex and same-sex couples, arguing that the right to privacy is implicit in the Fourteenth Amendment and protects personal liberty in private sexual matters.52 The Supreme Court rejected this argument and held that "homosexual sodomy" was not a 45. See, e.g., Craig, 429 U.S. at 197 (applying heightened scrutiny to invalidate a gen- der discriminatory law); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1967) (applying the strictest scrutiny to strike down Virginia's anti-miscegenation law). 46. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944). Despite its finding that race was a suspect classification requiring strict scrutiny, the Court upheld the forced intern- ment of Japanese-Americans during World War II, rationalizing that "[p]ressing public ne- cessity may sometimes justify the existence of such restrictions [but] racial antagonism never can." Id. 47. Loving, 388 U.S. at 11-12 (invalidating anti-miscegenation law in Virginia); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (compelling integration of public schools in Kansas). 48. Craig, 429 U.S. at 199 (nullifying an Oklahoma law permitting women to purchase 3.2% beer at age eighteen, while men could not do so until age twenty-one). 49. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 635 (rejecting an amendment to the Colorado constitution that would have precluded protection from discrimination based upon sexual orientation). The Court found in Romer, "We must conclude that Amendment 2 classifies homosexuals not to further a proper legislative end but to make them unequal to everyone else. This Colorado cannot do." Id. 50. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 195 (1986) (finding no constitutional right to engage in "homosexual sodomy" and upholding anti-sodomy laws), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 51. Id. at 187-88. 52. Id. at 188 n.1, 195 (describing the Georgia statute and Hardwick's grounds for challenging its constitutionality). While Hardwick likened his case to Stanley v. Georgia, in which the United States Supreme Court overturned a ban on possessing obscene materials in the privacy of one's home, the Court distinguished Stanley as "firmly grounded in the 2009] THE SCHOLAR fundamental right.5 3 As such, the Court found that the Georgia anti-sod- omy law was constitutional because enforcing morality was a legitimate government interest, thereby allowing the law to survive a rational basis analysis.5 4 And that is where LGBT constitutional rights stood in the Supreme Court for the next decade.55 In 1996, the Court issued an important opinion in Romer v. Evans.56 In that decision, the Court rejected an effort by the State of Colorado to deny gays and lesbians the protections of anti-discrimination laws via a statewide referendum repealing then-existing anti-discrimination laws and precluding similar laws from future enactment. 57 Writing for a six-to- three majority, Justice Kennedy declared, "A State cannot so deem a class of persons a stranger to its laws.",58 Finding the law invalid under the Equal Protection Clause, the Court invoked only the rational basis test in lieu of upholding the state court's finding that strict scrutiny was the appropriate test for a case involving impairment of a fundamental right of gays and lesbians.5 9 The conclusion that the amendment failed First Amendment," rather than the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 195; see also generally Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969). 53. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191-92 (stating that because homosexual sodomy is neither "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," nor "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition," it is not a fundamental right (citations omitted)). 54. Id. at 196 ("The law, however, is constantly based on notions of morality, and if all laws representing essentially moral choices are to be invalidated under the Due Process Clause, the courts will be very busy indeed."). The Court invoked the "slippery slope" admonition, warning that prohibiting sodomy laws would make it "difficult, except by fiat, to limit the claimed right to homosexual conduct while leaving exposed to prosecution adultery, incest, and other sexual crimes even though they are committed in the home." Id. at 195-96. Accordingly, the Court stated, "We are unwilling to start down that road." Id. at 196. 55. American Civil Liberties Union, ACLU and the History of LGBT Rights & HIV/ AIDS, http://www.aclu.org/lgbt/gen/24578res20060316.html (last visited Aug. 3, 2009) (pro- viding a timeline of "major events and legal cases in [the LGBT community's] civil rights struggle"). 56. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635-36 (1996). 57. Id. 58. Id. at 635 (arguing that the Colorado amendment's legislative end was not only improper, but served to make homosexuals "unequal to everyone else"). 59. Id. at 625 (explaining that "the [s]tate [slupreme [c]ourt held that Amendment 2 was subject to strict scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment because it infringed the fundamental right of gays and lesbians to participate in the political process" (citation omitted)). The Court reasoned that "if a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, [the Court] will uphold the legislative classification so long as it bears a rational relation to some legitimate end." Id. at 631 (citation omitted). Even under this "conventional inquiry," the Court found that Amendment 2 did not further a legiti- mate governmental goal. Id. at 632. [Vol. 12:1 MOVING BEYOND THE "IMMUTABILITY DEBATE" even under rational basis review has limited the impact of the Court's holding in other contexts. 60 In reaching its decision that the amendment failed equal protection re- quirements, the Romer Court rejected Colorado's primary argument that the amendment precluded extension of only "special rights" based upon sexual orientation. 6 1 Rather, the Court found that "the amendment im- poses a special disability upon [homosexual] persons alone."6 2 Indeed, the Court noted that "[h]omosexuals are forbidden the safeguards that others enjoy or may seek without constraint" and that "[t]hese are pro- tections taken for granted by most people either because they already have them or do not need them.",63 The Court also rejected two other arguments for Amendment 2: first, that it was rooted in the right to free- dom of association under the First Amendment; and second, that it was an effort to conserve government resources to combat discrimination against other groups.6 4 Repealing and preventing any future legislation that protects a particular disadvantaged group, the Court concluded, was too far removed to bear a rational relation to those stated government interests.6 5 Justice Kennedy wrote in the Romer decision that "'if the constitu- tional conception of "equal protection of the laws" means anything, it must at the very least mean that a bare ... desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest."' 6 6 Moreover, the Colorado amendment was "a classification of persons un- dertaken for its own sake, something the Equal Protection Clause does not permit. ''6 1 The Court, thus, found that such animus-based lawmaking 60. See, e.g., In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 442 n.60 (Cal. 2008) (listing state court cases in which sexual orientation was found not to be a "suspect" categorization requiring heightened review in equal protection challenges), superseded in part by constitu- tional amendment, CAL. CoNST. art. I, § 7.5, as recognized in Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48 (Cal. 2009). 61. Romer, 517 U.S. at 631 ("We find nothing special in the protections Amendment 2 withholds."). 62. Id. 63. Id. 64. Id. at 635 (finding, to the contrary, no legitimate governmental objective to justify the disparate treatment of homosexuals under Colorado's Amendment 2). "'[Cjlass legis- lation... [is] obnoxious to the prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment.'.." Id. (citing Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 24 (1883)). 65. Id. ("The breadth of the amendment is so far removed from these particular justi- fications that we find it impossible to credit them."). 66. Romer, 517 U.S. at 634 (quoting Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)) (emphasis in original). 67. Id. at 635. 20091 THE SCHOLAR was illegitimate.6 8 As one scholar noted, the focus on "animus" was "re- markable" because "it is the only time the Court has used that word to invalidate a law under equal protection."69 In a strongly-worded dissent, Justice Scalia took issue with the Romer Court's analysis and disagreed with the majority's rejection of moral op- probrium as a legitimate basis for discriminatory legislation.7" In his dis- sent, Scalia argued that Amendment 2 merely prohibited giving "special rights" based upon sexual orientation, while leaving intact the baseline protection that all Colorado citizens are afforded under the Colorado constitution.7 1 Scalia argued that the anti-discrimination laws at issue simply made it more difficult for a group to receive "preferential" treat- ment and that this was not a violation of equal protection.72 The dissent also contended that enforcing public sexual morality was a legitimate government interest to which Amendment 2 was rationally related.7 3 In 68. Id. at 632 ("[The Amendment's] sheer breadth is so discontinuous with the rea- sons offered for it that the amendment seems inexplicable by anything but animus toward the class it affects; it lacks a rational relationship to legitimate state interests."). 69. Sharon E. Rush, Whither Sexual Orientation Analysis? The Proper Methodology when Due Process and Equal Protection Intersect, 16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 685, 718 (2008). The author notes, however, that the Romer Court's singular use of the term "ani- mus" did not announce a new rule that all animus-based legislation is per se unconstitu- tional. Id. Rather, Colorado's Amendment 2 could not stand because "no other legitimate purpose could justify it." Id. 70. Romer, 517 U.S. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the amendment was not an attempt to harm homosexuals, but rather it was a "modest attempt by seemingly tolerant Coloradans to preserve traditional sexual mores against the efforts of a politically powerful minority to revise those mores through use of the laws"). 71. Id. at 638 (stating that "the clear import of the Colorado [amendment] is that 'general laws and policies that prohibit arbitrary. discrimination' would continue to prohibit discrimination on the basis of homosexual conduct as well"). 72. Id. ("The amendment prohibits special treatment of homosexuals, and nothing more." (emphasis in original)). Scalia elaborated as follows: It would not affect, for example, a requirement of state law that pensions be paid to all retiring state employees with a certain length of service; homosexual employees, as well as others, would be entitled to that benefit. But it would prevent the State or any municipality from making death-benefit payments to the "life partner" of a homosex- ual when it does not make such payments to the long-time roommate of a nonhomosexual employee. Or again, it does not affect the requirement of the State's general insurance laws that customers be afforded coverage without discrimination unrelated to anticipated risk. Thus, homosexuals could not be denied coverage, or charged a greater premium, with respect to auto collision insurance; but neither the State nor any municipality could require that distinctive health insurance risks associ- ated with homosexuality (if there are any) be ignored. Id. 73. Id. at 652. [Vol. 12:1 MOVING BEYOND THE "IMMUTABILITY DEBATE" Scalia's view, the majority opinion flew in the face of precedents, such as Bowers v. Hardwick and Davis v. Beason.7 4 Justice Scalia further pointed out that it was irreconcilable that a law preventing preferential treatment of persons with a tendency to engage in sodomy could be held unconstitutional when laws criminalizing sodomy were upheld as constitutional in Bowers.7 5 Scalia wrote that he would have upheld Amendment 2, deferring to the "legitimate government in- terest" of honoring the public majority's decision to voice their moral disapproval of homosexual conduct by denying homosexuals "special rights."7 6 Seven years later, in Lawrence v. Texas, the Supreme Court directly confronted its prior holding in Bowers.7 7 In Lawrence, John Geddes Lawrence and Tyron Garner, both male adults, were arrested for having consensual sex with one another when police entered Lawrence's home in response to a reported weapons disturbance.7 8 The men were charged with and convicted of violating a Texas statute prohibiting sexual inter- course between people of the same sex,79 a conviction that was sustained 74. Id. at 649-50 (citing Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190 (1986) (upholding Georgia sodomy ban), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003); Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 346-47 (1890) (endorsing Idaho law prohibiting polygamists and bigamists from voting)). 75. Romer, 517 U.S. at 642 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that "if it is rational to criminalize the conduct, surely it is rational to deny special favor and protection to those with a self-avowed tendency or desire to engage in the conduct"). 76. Id. at 653. According to Scalia: Amendment 2 is designed to prevent piecemeal deterioration of the sexual morality favored by a majority of Coloradans, and is not only an appropriate means to that legitimate end, but a means that Americans have employed before. Striking it down is an act, not of judicial judgment, but of political will. Id. 77. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564 (overturning Texas law criminalizing "deviate sexual intercourse" between consenting adults and, thereby, overruling Bowers). The Court con- cluded that: [T]he case should be resolved by determining whether the petitioners were free as adults to engage in the private conduct in the exercise of their liberty under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. For this inquiry we deem it necessary to reconsider the Court's holding in Bowers. Id. (citing Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196 (upholding Georgia sodomy ban)). 78. Id. at 562-63. 79. Id. at 563 ("The complaints described their crime as 'deviate sexual intercourse, namely anal sex, with a member of the same sex (man)."'). Lawrence and Garner chal- lenged their convictions under the Equal Protection Clauses of both the United States Constitution and the Texas constitution. Id. For an extended discussion of Lawrence, see WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DISHONORABLE PASSIONS: SODOMY LAWS IN AMERICA, 1861-2003 299-330 (2008). 2009] THE SCHOLAR by the state appeals court pursuant to the precedent set in Bowers v. Hardwick."° The Supreme Court invalidated the convictions on due process grounds, and the majority briefly explained why it did not rely upon the Equal Protection Clause."' While acknowledging that equal protection was a "tenable argument," the Court recognized that Bowers v. Hardwick could be distinguished because that case dealt with an anti-sodomy law applicable to both same-sex and opposite-sex couples."2 Deciding Law- rence based on the Equal Protection Clause would have left Bowers as good law, thereby permitting similarly discriminatory penal provisions as long as they applied to opposite-sex as well as same-sex couples. 8 3 In- stead, the Court focused on the Due Process Clause, explaining that the majority in Bowers erroneously framed the issue as being about the right to engage in particular sexual conduct rather than about a person's right to privacy-including the right to privacy in intimate sexual behavior.8 4 According to the Court, "To say that the issue in Bowers was simply the right to engage in certain sexual conduct demeans the claim the individ- ual put forward, just as it would demean a married couple were it to be 80. Lawrence v. State, 41 S.W.3d 349, 355 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001) (applying Bowers, rather than Romer, in upholding the Texas statute), rev'd, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). The Texas appeals court explicitly found that Romer did not protect Lawrence and Garner: Romer provides no support for appellants' position. Romer, for example, does not disavow the Court's previous holding in Bowers; it does not elevate homosexuals to a suspect class; it does not suggest that statutes prohibiting homosexual conduct violate the Equal Protection Clause; and it does not challenge the concept that the preserva- tion and protection of morality is a legitimate state interest. Id. 81. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574-75. 82. Id. at 575. 83. Id. (pointing out that due process analysis in Lawrence would allow the Court to determine that Bowers had "continuing validity"). The Court also noted: If protected conduct is made criminal and the law which does so remains unexamined for its substantive validity, its stigma might remain even it if were not enforceable as drawn for equal protection purposes. When homosexual conduct is made criminal by the law of the State, that declaration in and of itself is an invitation to subject homo- sexual persons to discrimination both in the public and in the private spheres. The central holding of Bowers has been brought into question by this case; and it should be addressed. Its continuance as precedence demeans the lives of homosexual persons. Id. 84. Id. at 578 (citing Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986) (Stevens, J., dis- senting), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003)) (explaining that Justice Stevens's dissent in Bowers, in which he argued that the case was truly about the right to privacy, should have controlled the majority's decision in Bowers and did control the deci- sion in Lawrence). [Vol. 12:1 MOVING BEYOND THE "IMMUTABILITY DEBATE" said marriage is simply about the right to have sexual intercourse. '8 5 Dis- patching Bowers, Justice Kennedy wrote: "Bowers was not correct when it was decided, and it is not correct today. It ought not to remain binding precedent. Bowers v. Hardwick should be and now is overruled., 86 Find- ing that there was no legitimate governmental interest to justify the Texas law, the Court held that private sexual conduct between two consenting adults is a protected liberty interest under the Due Process Clause.8 7 Justice O'Connor concurred with the Lawrence majority in a separate opinion, arguing that the Texas anti-sodomy law should have been invali- dated under the Equal Protection Clause, leaving Bowers intact.88 Rely- ing on a rationale similar to that of the Romer majority, Justice O'Connor applied rational basis analysis to reject a law that sought to target and harm a particular group based upon the majority's moral disapproval of that group's nature or conduct.8 9 Justice O'Connor found the State's ar- gument that the Texas law targeted only certain conduct, rather than gays and lesbians themselves, unconvincing. 9° Rather, because the conduct was so intimately related to gays and lesbians, it inevitably targeted that 85. Id. at 567. 86. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. 87. Id. at 578-79 (explaining that because the petitioners were not minors and were not injured or coerced into the prohibited sexual act, they were entitled to privacy from governmental intrusion). The Court stated: The petitioners are entitled to respect for their private lives. The State cannot demean their existence or control their destiny by making their private sexual conduct a crime. Their right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives them the full right to engage in their conduct without intervention of the government. Id. at 578. 88. Id. at 579 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 89. Id. at 580-83 (explaining that the Court has "been most likely to apply rational basis review to hold a law unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause where, as here, the challenged legislation inhibits personal relationships" and that "[m]oral disap- proval of a group cannot be a legitimate governmental interest"). O'Connor continued: A law branding one class of persons as criminal based solely on the State's moral disapproval of that class and the conduct associated with that class runs contrary to the values of the Constitution and the Equal Protection Clause, under any standard of review. I therefore concur in the Court's judgment that Texas' sodomy law banning "deviate sexual intercourse" between consenting adults of the same sex, but not be- tween consenting adults of different sexes, is unconstitutional. Id. at 585. 90. Id. at 583 (noting that, while it was true that only the conduct was being penalized, this was conduct that was closely related to and perceived as homosexual behavior). In fact, O'Connor wrote that Texas admitted that the law criminalizing sodomy created the perception in the state that simply being gay or lesbian was a crime. Id. at 583-84 ("In Texas, calling a person a homosexual is slander per se because the word 'homosexual' 'im- pute[s] the commission of a crime."' (emphasis in original) (citations omitted)). 20091 THE SCHOLAR group. 91 But, straying from a straightforward, traditional rational basis approach, O'Connor stated, "When a law exhibits such a desire to harm a politically unpopular group, we have applied a more searching form of rational basis review to strike down such laws under the Equal Protection Clause. 92 O'Connor also explicitly stated, however, that there may be times that classification based on sexual orientation would be permissible under the rational basis standard.9 3 Of particular current relevance, O'Connor cited "national security or preserving the traditional institution of marriage" as examples of potentially legitimate state interests.9 4 In the primary dissenting opinion, Justice Scalia argued against overrul- ing Bowers, disagreed with the majority that the Texas anti-sodomy law violated the Due Process Clause, and argued that Justice O'Connor's con- clusion that the law failed under the Equal Protection Clause was wrong.95 Scalia persisted in framing the issue narrowly-considering only the right to engage in homosexual sodomy-rather than focusing on a more broadly articulated privacy right.96 In her recent article, Professor 91. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 583 (2003) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[The law] is ... directed toward gay persons as a class."). 92. Id. at 580 (emphasis added). For a discussion of the concept of a de facto but unacknowledged heightened scrutiny, or "rational basis with bite," see Jeremy B. Smith, Note, The Flaws of Rational Basis with Bite: Why the Supreme Court Should Acknowledge Its Application of Heightened Scrutiny to Classifications Based on Sexual Orientation, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2769 (2005). 93. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 585 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("That this law as applied to private, consensual conduct is unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause does not mean that other laws distinguishing between heterosexuals and homosexuals would simi- larly fail under rational basis review."). 94. Id. 95. Id. at 586-88 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (claiming that whether or not the Texas law targeted homosexuals, the undisputed history of criminalizing sodomy in general preempts a finding that homosexual sodomy is a fundamental right, as a fundamental right is defined as "deeply rooted in our Nation's history and tradition"). Because there was no funda- mental right that would invoke heightened scrutiny, Scalia argued that moral disapproval of certain sexual conduct was a legitimate government interest sufficient to satisfy the ra- tional basis test used in the majority's due process analysis and the equal protection analy- sis suggested by O'Connor. Id. at 593. Scalia gave examples of existing laws criminalizing "fornication, bigamy, adultery, adult incest, bestiality, and obscenity," which were based on sexual morality and would also presumably fail a rational basis test after Lawrence. Id. at 599. Additionally, Scalia suggested that there was no equal protection violation in Law- rence because the Texas law equally prohibited all people-both heterosexuals and homo- sexuals from engaging in sexual acts with someone of the same sex. Id. at 599-600. Distinguishing Lawrence from the anti-miscegenation cases, Scalia argued that, while a "racially discriminatory purpose is always sufficient to subject a law to strict scrutiny," only rational basis review applies in cases like Lawrence, involving discrimination based on sex- ual orientation. Id. at 600. 96. Id. at 586 ("[N]owhere does the Court's opinion declare that homosexual sodomy is a 'fundamental right' under the Due Process Clause; nor does it subject the Texas law to [Vol. 12:1 MOVING BEYOND THE "IMMUTABILITY DEBATE" Sharon Rush identifies this approach to the issue as the "collapsible er- ror," in which the "underlying right is defined by the group targeted by the law." 97 Scalia's protests notwithstanding, in Romer and Lawrence, the Su- preme Court provided sexual orientation minorities limited protections under the Fourteenth Amendment.98 But the framework the Court pro- vided has led to inconsistencies in the lower courts.9 9 Neither Romer, in the equal protection context, nor Lawrence, using a due process analysis, purported to apply any form of heightened scrutiny.100 Yet the Court rejected both Colorado's amendment targeted at sexual orientation and Texas's anti-sodomy law, leading some to conclude that the Court applied de facto heightened scrutiny under what has been sometimes termed "ra- tional basis with bite."1 °1 In a recent article, one scholar explores the consequences of "rational basis with bite" in the sexual orientation con- text after Romer and Lawerence.'°2 He demonstrates that this phantom level of scrutiny has led many lower federal courts to ignore the protec- the standard of review that would be appropriate (strict scrutiny) if homosexual sodomy were a 'fundamental right."' (emphasis in original)). 97. Sharon E. Rush, Whither Sexual Orientation Analysis? The Proper Methodology when Due Process and Equal Protection Intersect, 16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 685, 743 (2008). Rush explains: Courts commit the Collapsible Error when they conflate the equal protection question ("Are gays a suspect class?") into the due process question ("Is there an underlying fundamental right?") by defining the underlying right by the group targeted by the law-gay marriage-and then limiting the analysis to substantive due process ("Is there a fundamental right to gay marriage?"). Id. This tendency is reflected in cases addressing marriage rights for same-sex couples: courts frame the issue as whether same-sex couples have a right to "gay marriage," rather than asking whether same-sex couples have a right to marriage. See generally id. 98. See generally Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558; Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 99. See Jeremy B. Smith, Note, The Flaws of Rational Basis with Bite: Why the Su- preme Court Should Acknowledge Its Application of Heightened Scrutiny to Classifications Based on Sexual Orientation, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2769, 2770 (2005). 100. See generally Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558; Romer, 517 U.S. 620. 101. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Some Confusions About Due Process, Judicial Review, and Constitutional Remedies, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 309, 316-17 (1993) ("When gov- ernment draws classificatory lines that are likely to stigmatize or that come close to trench- ing on other protected rights, the Supreme Court, within both substantive due process and equal protection frameworks, has sometimes given its rational basis review enhanced bite." (footnotes omitted)). 102. Jeremy B. Smith, Note, The Flaws of Rational Basis with Bite: Why the Supreme Court Should Acknowledge Its Application of Heightened Scrutiny to Classifications Based on Sexual Orientation, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2769, 2770 (2005) (citing Gayle Lynn Pet- tinga, Note, Rational Basis with Bite: Intermediate Scrutiny by Any Other Name, 62 IND. L.J. 779, 780 (1987) for use of the term) (arguing that the Supreme Court should acknowl- edge that heightened scrutiny was applied in both Romer and Lawrence so that lower courts will not be trepid about applying this more searching review). 20091 THE SCHOLAR tive implications of Romer and Lawrence while simply "apply[ing] tradi- tional rational basis review without examining whether the classification at issue may be based on animus or on notions of majoritarian morality without a true legitimate governmental interest., 10 3 On the other hand, some state courts have been less hesitant to invoke "rational basis with bite," applying a more searching form of scrutiny than mere rational basis review, but without explicitly applying height- ened scrutiny.'° 4 The extension of greater protections in these cases, however, was largely the result of state courts interpreting more flexible and protective state constitutions. 10 5 Despite elevated protections in some states, a lack of adequate federal protection has left LGBTs vulner- able to discriminatory laws that may be upheld under a rational basis test.10 6 Smith suggests that, in order to relieve the inconsistency created by the Supreme Court's opacity, the Court must explicitly acknowledge the heightened scrutiny analysis that was implemented, de facto, in both Romer and Lawrence.' 7 While Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Law- rence hints at this by referencing "a more searching form of rational basis review, ' ' the current state of federal jurisprudence leaves LGBTs vul- nerable to unchecked, discriminatory legislation. This has been illus- 103. Id. at 2785. 104. Id. at 2796-97 (citing Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003); Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999)). 105. Id. at 2796 (pointing out that these state constitutions allow for "greater flexibil- ity" in applying "rational basis with bite"). Writing in 2005, Smith notes: Other jurisdictions have also dealt with the right of gay men and lesbians to marry at some level, including Alaska, Arizona, California, Hawaii, New Jersey, New York, and Washington, D.C. These cases have reached different conclusions based on different grounds-often due process or other idiosyncrasies of their respective state constitu- tions-but none have used heightened scrutiny based on sexual orientation. Id. at n.229. Other state court opinions have explicitly relied upon heightened scrutiny in sexual orientation discrimination cases. Id. at 2800-04 (citing Tanner v. Or. Health Sci- ences Univ., 971 P.2d 435 (Or. Ct. App. 1998); Castle v. State, No. 04-2-00614-4, 2004 WL 1985215 (Wash. Super. Ct. Sept. 7, 2004)). Other state court opinions have explicitly re- plied upon heightened scrutiny in sexual orientation discrimination cases. Id. at 2800-04 (citing Tanner, 971 P.2d 435; Castle, 2004 WL 1985215). 106. See id. at 2785. 107. Jeremy B. Smith, Note, The Flaws of Rational Basis with Bite: Why the Supreme Court Should Acknowledge Its Application of Heightened Scrutiny to Classifications Based on Sexual Orientation, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2769, 2813 (2005) (explaining that the Su- preme Court must explicitly designate heightened scrutiny as the appropriate analysis for cases involving sexual orientation discrimination in order for lower courts to apply this rationale appropriately and consistently). "The rational basis with bite approach . . . though successful in striking down classifications based on sexual orientation, is also unsat- isfactory due to the courts' failure to acknowledge explicitly their use of heightened scru- tiny and thereby opening up those decisions to compelling criticism." Id. at 2812. 108. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 580 (2003) (O'Connor, J., concurring). [Vol. 12:1 MOVING BEYOND THE "IMMUTABILITY DEBATE" trated most recently in the fight for marriage equality as well as in the recent anti-adoption initiative in Arkansas. 10 9 III. MARRIAGE EQUALITY IN THE STATES "Laura and I were married on August 8, 2008. In front of family and friends, some of whom flew in from Texas and New York, we were allowed to remove the label of second class citizen. Being married ... gave us a sense of protection that neither one of us felt before. Our love and commit- ment... seemed even stronger and deeper afterwards." -Karla Bland' "What an incredible day that was for us, our two children, our family and our friends. We were so happy that our children would be able to say that their parents were 'married' just as their friends are able to say. It meant a lot to both of us for our children to be seen as equals with their peers." -Jeffrey L. Van Hoosear... 109. See Alternatives to Marriage Project, AR Adoption Ban, http://www.unmarried. org/ar-adoption-ban.html (last visited Aug. 4, 2009) (providing the text of Arkansas Ballot Initiative No. 1 (passed in November 2008), which precludes same-sex couples from adopt- ing or fostering children). The text of the initiative reads: An act providing that an individual who is cohabitating outside of a valid marriage may not adopt or be a foster parent of a child less than eighteen years old ... [p]roviding that a minor may not be adopted or placed in a foster home if the individ- ual seeking to adopt or to serve as a foster parent is cohabiting with a sexual partner outside of a marriage which is valid under the constitution and laws of this state;... the foregoing prohibition applies equally to cohabiting opposite-sex and same-sex individuals. Id. While the adoption law applies on its face to those cohabiting with either opposite-sex or same-sex partners, the law falls much harder on gay and lesbian couples, who have no ability to marry in Arkansas. See Lambda Legal, Lambda Legal's Safety Scale: Respect for Same-Sex Couples' Relationships, http://data.lambdalegal.org/publications/downloads/fs- lambda-legals-safety-scale.pdf (last visited Aug. 4, 2009) (ranking states' constitutional treatment of same-sex couples and noting that, as of 2009, the constitutions of twenty-five states, including Arkansas, ban marriage for same-sex couples). 110. Appendix of Exhibits in Support of Brief of Amici Curiae Individual Chapman University Organizations, Faculty, Staff, and Students, Orange County Equality Coalition, and Other Orange County Community Members Including Legally Married Same-Sex Couples, in Support of Petitioners at 3-4, Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48 (Cal. 2009) (No. 168047), available at http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/courts/supreme/highprofile/documents/s 168047-amcur-chapman.pdf (providing the personal declaration of Karla Bland, a forty- one-year-old telecommunications worker and married lesbian). 111. Id. at 39 (providing the personal declaration of Jeffrey L. Van Hoosear, a forty- eight-year-old lawyer and married gay man). 2009] THE SCHOLAR According to Lambda Legal's current "safety scale," twenty-five states' constitutions expressly bar same-sex couples from legal marriage recogni- tion and do not otherwise provide legal protection for these couples. 1 12 In addition, ten states and Puerto Rico have statutes or regulatory prac- tices that bar marriage between same-sex couples and do not otherwise provide legal protections for these couples.' 13 One state recognizes out- of-state marriages between same-sex couples,' 14 one state provides same- sex couples similar protections to marriage under the label of civil union,'5 and three other states, including California, have constitution- ally barred same-sex couples from marriage but provide protections simi- lar to marriage under a different label, such as "civil union.""' 6 Finally, only six states have recognized and maintained marriage equality for same-sex couples and opposite-sex couples alike." 7 Three of those states-Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Iowa-have afforded same-sex couples the right to marry through court decisions, as California did before the passage of Proposition 8 eliminated the right of same-sex couples to marry. 1 8 112. Lambda Legal, Lambda Legal's Safety Scale: Respect for Same-Sex Couples' Re- lationships, http://data.lambdalegal.org/publications/downloads/fs-lambda-legals-safety- scale.pdf (last visited Aug. 4, 2009) (ranking states' constitutional treatment of same-sex couples). As of 2009, the constitutions of twenty-five states, half of the country, not only ban marriage for same-sex couples, but also either provide no protections for same-sex couples or contain provisions causing even more harm to same-sex couples: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michi- gan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, and Wisconsin. Id. 113. Id. (listing ten states and Puerto Rico that ban marriage for same-sex couples and provide no legal protections for same-sex couples to mitigate the harm: Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Minnesota, New Mexico, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, West Vir- ginia, and Wyoming). 114. Id. (noting that New York recognizes out-of-state marriages of same-sex couples). 115. Id. (stating that New Jersey affords same-sex couples the right to "civil unions," but not marriage). 116. Id. (noting that California, Oregon, and Washington have banned marriage but provide protections for same-sex couples under a different label). 117. Lambda Legal, Lambda Legal's Safety Scale: Respect for Same-Sex Couples' Re- lationships, http://data.lambdalegal.orgpublications/downloads/fs-lambda-legals-safety- scale.pdf (last visited Aug. 4, 2009) (listing these states as Connecticut, Iowa, Maine, Mas- sachusetts, New Hampshire, and Vermont). 118. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 419 (Cal. 2008) (holding that the right of all Californians-including both same-sex and opposite-sex couples-to marry is fundamen- tal), superseded in part by constitutional amendment, CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5, as recog- nized in Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48 (Cal. 2009); Kerrigan v. State Comm'r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 481 (Conn. 2008) (requiring that same-sex couples be allowed to marry in Connecticut); Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 906-07 (Iowa 2009) (declaring unanimously that same-sex couples have the right to marry); Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. [Vol. 12:1 MOVING BEYOND THE "IMMUTABILITY DEBATE" In Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts became the first state high court to find marriage bans un- constitutional.1 1 9 That court held that denying marriage licenses to same- sex couples violated the Massachusetts constitution on both equal protec- tion and due process grounds.1 2 0 The court addressed both grounds si- multaneously because "[i]n matters implicating marriage, family life, and the upbringing of children, the two constitutional concepts frequently overlap, as they do here.' 2 ' Finding that there was no need to consider the argument that this case warranted strict scrutiny, the court held that the law prohibiting same-sex couples from marrying did not pass muster even under the rational basis test.' 22 The State's three primary arguments in defense of limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples were to maintain prime circumstances for procrea- tion, to maintain prime circumstances for child-rearing, and to preserve state resources by denying benefits to gays and lesbians, who, the State argued, are more financially independent.' 2 3 The court rejected all three interests as not having a rational relationship to the law barring marriages for same-sex couples. 1 24 The court reasoned that marriage was not de- pendent on the ability or the desire to procreate, nor were state benefits from marriage dependent on the financial independence of an individ- ual. 2 5 In respect to the child-rearing argument, the majority held that Massachusetts courts had already deemed that the welfare of a child was not determined by the sexual orientation of the parents or the make-up of other families.'2 6 And with no evidence to the contrary, the absence of Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 969-70 (Mass. 2003) (requiring that same-sex couples be allowed to marry in Massachusetts). 119. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 969-70. 120. Id. 121. Id. at 953. 122. Id. at 961 (rejecting the State's arguments in support of barring same-sex couples from legally marrying). According to the court, "providing a 'favorable setting for procre- ation,"' ensuring a two-parent (one of each sex) family unit as the "optimal setting for child rearing," and preserving financial resources are not legitimate legislative interests sufficient to overcome judicial scrutiny under the rational basis test. Id. 123. Id. 124. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 961-64. 125. Id. at 961 (stating that Massachusetts's "laws of civil marriage do not privilege procreative heterosexual intercourse between married people above every other form of adult intimacy and every other means of creating a family"). 126. Id. at 962-63 (explaining that demographics change, and there is no basis for determining that child welfare will be hurt by same-sex parents). The court emphasized that same-sex parents are often "excellent." Id. at 963. 2009] THE SCHOLAR a civil marriage in a child's life could be harmful to the child by denying many tangible and intangible benefits attached to marriage. 127 The court deconstructed the claim that lifting the ban on marriage be- tween same-sex couples would obliterate traditional notions of marriage by explaining that, though permitting same-sex couples to marry would redefine marriage, the values and purpose of civil marriage would survive just as they had through past redefinitions to recognize the rights of wo- men and interracial couples. 12 8 Finally, addressing the argument that al- lowing same-sex couples to marry would cause interstate conflict, the court responded that "[t]he genius of our [f]ederal system is that each [s]tate's [c]onstitution has vitality specific to its own traditions, and that subject to the minimum requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment, each [s]tate is free to address difficult issues of individual liberty in the manner its own [c]onstitution demands.' 129 Because the Massachusetts court found that the state's marriage ban could not withstand even rational basis review, it did not reach the ques- tion of whether sexual orientation is a suspect classification.1 3' Five years later, the California Supreme Court did reach that question. 1 3 1 In its May 15, 2008 decision, the California Supreme Court invalidated Proposition 22-the statutory precursor to Proposition 8-which decreed that "only marriage between a man and a woman is valid and recognized in California.' ' 132 That statute had been passed by a ballot initiative in California in 2000.133 The court found that gays and lesbians had a right to marry that was grounded in the fundamental right to marry that ap- 127. Id. at 964 ("Excluding same-sex couples from civil marriage will not make chil- dren of opposite-sex marriages more secure, but it does prevent children of same-sex couples from enjoying the immeasurable advantages that flow from the assurance of 'a stable family structure in which children will be reared, educated, and socialized."'). The majority went on to address two other secondary arguments. Id. at 964-68 (striking down arguments that same-sex marriage would "trivialize or destroy the institution of marriage," that only the legislature might define the boundaries of marriage because of "the State's strong interest in the institution of marriage," and that expanding marriage rights would "lead to interstate conflict"). 128. Id. at 958 (explaining the history of interracial marriage bans, comparing them to marriage bans affecting same-sex couples, and asserting that "history must yield to a more fully developed understanding of the invidious quality of the discrimination" (footnote omitted)). 129. Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 967 (Mass. 2003). 130. See id. at 961. 131. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 419 (Cal. 2008) (holding, among other things, that sexual orientation is a suspect classification for purposes of equal protection analysis), superseded in part by constitutional amendment, CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5, as recognized in Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48 (Cal. 2009). 132. Id. at 409 (describing the limiting language of Proposition 22). 133. Id. [Vol. 12:1 MOVING BEYOND THE "IMMUTABILITY DEBATE" plies to all persons under the California constitution.134 The court also found that sexual orientation is a "suspect classification" for equal pro- tection purposes' 3 5 and held that there was no compelling state interest in limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples. 1 36 Rather than the three-tiered model used in federal equal protection analysis, California utilizes a two-tiered model where suspect and quasi- suspect classes are reviewed under strict scrutiny and all other laws are subject to rational basis review.' 37 The practical difference is that, while gender discrimination is given intermediate scrutiny, in the federal courts, California affords strict scrutiny analysis to gender-based discrimination as well as to discrimination based on race and religion.'3 8 Finding similar patterns of discrimination faced by sexual orientation minorities as faced by other minority groups, the court found that sexual orientation met the qualifying criteria of a "suspect" classification because sexual orientation "bears no relation to a person's ability to perform or contribute to soci- ety, and is ... associated with a stigma of inferiority and second-class citizenship, manifested by the group's history of legal and social disabilities.' 1 3 9 Importantly, although immutability and political powerlessness are also traditional factors to consider for suspect classification, the court pointed 134. Id. at 427. The court noted that: In light of the fundamental nature of the substantive rights embodied in the right to marry-and their central importance to an individual's opportunity to live a happy, meaningful, and satisfying life as a full member of society-the California [c]onstitution properly must be interpreted to guarantee this basic civil right to all individuals and couples, without regard to their sexual orientation. Id. (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted). 135. Id. at 441-42. 136. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 451 ("After carefully evaluating the pertinent considerations in the present case, we conclude that the state interest in limiting the desig- nation of marriage exclusively to opposite-sex couples, and in excluding same-sex couples from access to that designation, cannot properly be considered a compelling state interest for equal protection purposes."). 137. Id. at 401. The court explained: Although in most instances the deferential "rational basis" standard of review is appli- cable in determining whether different treatment accorded by a statutory provision violates the state equal protection clause, a more exacting and rigorous standard of review-"strict scrutiny"-is applied when the distinction drawn by a statute rests upon a so-called "suspect classification" or impinges upon a fundamental right. Id. The court further explained that state equal protection analysis does not include an intermediate scrutiny, and strict scrutiny is used for both suspect and quasi-suspect classes in California. Id. at 444. 138. Id. at 444 ("Unlike decisions applying the federal [E]qual [Pirotection [C]lause, California cases continue to review, under strict scrutiny rather than intermediate scrutiny, those statutes that impose differential treatment on the basis of sex or gender."). 139. Id. at 442. 20091 THE SCHOLAR out that neither is necessary to such a finding. 4 ° The California Supreme Court specifically found that, like religion, "sexual orientation is so inte- gral an aspect of one's identity, it is not appropriate to require a person to repudiate or change his or her sexual orientation in order to avoid dis- criminatory treatment."14 ' Similarly, the court reasoned that current po- litical powerlessness is not necessary; otherwise, "it would be impossible to justify the numerous decisions that continue to treat sex, race, and re- ligion as suspect classifications."' 42 The supreme court explicitly disagreed with the lower court's rejection of sexual orientation as a suspect classification based upon an immutabil- ity analysis.14 3 By finding immutability to be unnecessary and acknowl- edging the integral nature of sexual orientation to personhood, the court issued a decision profoundly respectful of gay men and lesbians that is straightforward in its analysis of the criteria for finding a classification "suspect.' ' 1 44 Strict scrutiny was also applied in the Marriage Cases based on the principle that any law infringing upon a fundamental and constitutionally protected right is deserving of the most searching constitutional re- view. 1 45 The court stated: [T]he right to marry is a basic, constitutionally protected, civil right .... [O]ur cases make clear that the right to marry is ... pro- tected by the privacy provision of article I, section 1, and of the lib- erty interest protected by the due process clause of article I, section 7 [of the California constitution].' 4 6 The court rejected the argument that the scope of the right to marry is limited to opposite-sex couples merely because marriage has historically been between a man and a woman and further explained that tradition has never been enough to justify the infringement of a fundamental 140. Id. at 443. 141. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 442 (Cal. 2008), superseded in part by consti- tutional amendment, CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5, as recognized in Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48 (Cal. 2009). 142. Id. at 443 (stating that California has never "identified a group's current political powerlessness as a necessary prerequisite for treatment as a suspect class" (emphasis in original)). 143. Id. at 442 ("We disagree ... with the Court of Appeal's conclusion that it is appropriate to reject sexual orientation as a suspect classification, in applying California's equal protection clause, on the ground that there is a question as to whether this character- istic is or is not 'immutable.'"). 144. See id. 145. Id. at 443. 146. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 426 (emphasis in original) (explaining that mar- riage has been deemed a fundamental right by both the California Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court). [Vol. 12:1 MOVING BEYOND THE "IMMUTABILITY DEBATE" right.1 47 The court pointed to state precedents,14 8 such as Sail'er Inn v. Kirby, in which the California Supreme Court struck down a law prohibit- ing the hiring of female bartenders,1 4 9 and Perez v. Sharp, in which the same court struck down the California anti-miscegenation law rooted in the traditional idea that the right to marry was limited to intra-racial couples.1 5 ° In the Marriage Cases, the court held that Proposition 22 was unconsti- tutional on both due process and equal protection grounds under the Cal- ifornia constitution because the State failed to meet its burden of demonstrating that Proposition 22 addressed a "compelling state inter- est.",151 The court found "the interest in retaining the traditional and well-established definition of marriage" was not compelling because al- lowing same-sex couples to marry did not harm the existing concept of marriage.1 52 On the other hand, denying marriage equality significantly harms same-sex couples and their families.1 53 Also, addressing much controversy, the court held that "affording same-sex couples the opportu- nity to obtain the designation of marriage will not impinge upon the relig- ious freedom of any religious organization, official, or any other person by requiring religious institutions to perform marriages for same-sex couples." 154 147. Id. at 452 (holding that "retention of the traditional definition of marriage does not constitute a state interest sufficiently compelling, under the strict scrutiny equal protec- tion standard, to justify withholding that status from same-sex couples"). 148. Id. at 427 (citing Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 485 P.2d 529, 543 (Cal. 1971); Perez v. Lippold, 198 P.2d 17, 26 (Cal. 1948)). 149. Sail'er Inn, 485 P.2d at 533 ("Although an inability to perform the tasks required by a particular occupation, sex-linked or not, may be a justification for discrimination against job applicants .... mere prejudice, however ancient, common or socially accept- able, is not."). 150. Perez, 198 P.2d at 29 (invalidating California anti-miscegenation law). Rejecting the State's arguments in favor of the law, the court stated: Respondent maintains that Negroes are socially inferior and have so been judicially recognized ... and that the progeny of a marriage between a Negro and a Caucasian suffer not only the stigma of such inferiority but the fear of rejection by members of both races. If they do, the fault lies not with their parents, but with the prejudices in the community and the laws that perpetuate those prejudices by giving legal force to the belief that certain races are inferior. Id. at 26 (citation omitted). 151. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 401. 152. Id. 153. Id. ("While retention of the limitation of marriage to opposite-sex couples is not needed to preserve the rights and benefits of opposite-sex couples, the exclusion of same- sex couples from the designation of marriage works a real and appreciable harm upon same-sex couples and their children."). 154. Id. at 451 (addressing concerns by religious groups that permitting same-sex couples to enter into legal civil marriages would unduly burden the various religious defini- 20091 THE SCHOLAR Shortly after the California decision, the Supreme Court of Connecti- cut, in Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health, similarly held that bar- ring marriages between same-sex couples was unconstitutional because it violated the Connecticut constitution's equal protection provisions.' 55 In that case, the court modeled its equal protection analysis after that of the federal courts and held that gays and lesbians are a quasi-suspect class satisfying four factors articulated by the United States Supreme Court for determining suspect classifications.15 6 Those factors include two require- ments: (1) that "the group has suffered a history of invidious discrimina- tion";15and (2) "the characteristics that distinguish the group's members bear 'no relation to their ability to perform or contribute to society' ,;158 along with two subsidiary considerations: (1) whether the characteristic that defines the group's members as a discrete group is "immutable" or otherwise beyond members' control;' 5 9 and (2) whether the group is "'a minority or politically powerless.""'6 ° tions of marriage). The court attempted to reassure these groups that "no religion will be required to change its religious policies or practices with regard to same-sex couples, and no religious officiant will be required to solemnize a marriage in contravention of his or her religious beliefs." Id. at 451-52. 155. Kerrigan v. Comm'r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 482 (Conn. 2008). 156. Id. at 425-26. But the court noted that the United States Supreme Court had only recognized gender and illegitimacy as "quasi-suspect" classifications. Id. at 426. 157. Id. at 426 (citing United States v. Virginia (VMI), 518 U.S. 515, 531-32 (1996); Massachusetts Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976) (explaining that elderly people have faced a history of discrimination)). 158. Id. (quoting Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973)). 159. Id. (citing Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 638 (1986)). The Connecticut court also noted that, even though immutability is a factor, it is not determinative of quasi-suspect status because the United States has granted this status even when non-immutable traits are at issue. Id. at 429 n.20. The court stated that: [F]or purposes of determining whether a group is entitled to suspect or quasi-suspect class status-and, in contrast to the considerations of historical discrimination and whether the group's distinguishing characteristic bears on the ability of its members to participate in and contribute to society-"immutability is not a requirement, but a factor." Id. (quoting Janet E. Halley, Sexual Orientation and the Politics of Biology: A Critique of the Argument from Immutability, 46 STAN. L. REv. 503, 507 (1994)). 160. Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 426 (quoting Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 602 (1987)). The court considered immutability and political powerlessness to be relevant, though not dispositive. Id. at 429. As the majority put it: Because the court has identified the immutability of the group's distinguishing charac- teristic and the group's minority status or relative lack of political power as potentially relevant factors to the determination of whether heightened judicial protection is ap- propriate, we, too, shall consider those factors for purposes of our inquiry under the state constitution. Id. [Vol. 12:1 MOVING BEYOND THE "IMMUTABILITY DEBATE" The Connecticut court noted that immutability "has been deemed to be a relevant consideration because it 'make[s] discrimination more clearly unfair" 6 1 and acknowledged that, while a number of courts had rejected the claim that sexual orientation is "immutable," other courts and many scholarly commentators had reached the opposite conclusion.1 62 The Su- preme Court of Connecticut stated: "Although we do not doubt that sex- ual orientation-heterosexual or homosexual-is highly resistant to change, it is not necessary for us to decide whether sexual orientation is immutable in the same way and to the same extent that race, national origin and gender are immutable because, even if it is not, the plaintiffs nonetheless have established that they fully satisfy this consideration." '1 63 The court went on to cite prior cases describing the importance of sex- ual intimacy and the significance of sexual orientation to personal iden- tity." 4 Specifically citing to the Marriage Cases, the majority concluded: "It is apparent that, '[b]ecause a person's sexual orientation is so integral an aspect of one's identity, it is not appropriate to require a person to repudiate or change his or her sexual orientation to avoid discriminatory treatment.' "165 Thus, the court found that, given sexual orientation's central role in the right to self-determination, it was the kind of "distinguishing characteris- tic" defining the plaintiffs as a group that should be afforded heightened protection under an equal protection analysis. 166 Relying on prior cases, the court found that it would be "abhorrent" to penalize a person for not changing a characteristic that could only be changed at the expense of "significant damage" to self-identity.167 The court also rejected the argument that Romer v. Evans precluded application of heightened scrutiny, explaining that, in Romer, the Su- preme Court had no reason to apply heightened scrutiny when the 161. Id. at 436 (quoting High Tech Gays v. Def. Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 909 F.2d 375, 377 (9th Cir. 1990) (Canby, J., dissenting)). 162. Id. at 436-37. 163. Id. at 437. 164. Id. at 437-38 ("fT]he United States Supreme Court has recognized that, because 'the protected right of homosexual adults to engage in intimate, consensual conduct ... [represents] an integral part of human freedom."' (quoting Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 576-77 (2003)). 165. Kerrigan v. Comm'r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 438 (Conn. 2008) (quoting In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 442 (Cal. 2008), superseded in part by constitutional amendment, CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5, as recognized in Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48 (Cal. 2009)). 166. Id. 167. Id. at 438-39. 2009] THE SCHOLAR amendment at issue could not even survive the rational basis test.168 Fur- ther, the court stated that when Lawrence overruled Bowers, the United States Supreme Court established that moral disapproval alone was an insufficient basis to justify discrimination, actually opening the door for the states to provide heightened protection for gay and lesbian people.'6 9 In Kerrigan, the court found that sexual orientation is a quasi-suspect classification requiring intermediate scrutiny, and the State was not able to demonstrate that the marriage limitation was "substantially related to an important governmental interest.' 1 70 While the Connecticut court analyzed "immutability" much like the California Supreme Court did, it did not conclude, like California, that a finding of immutability was "unnecessary. '171 Rather, it held that the immutability factor was "satisfied."' 7 2 In essence, the Connecticut Su- preme Court, like California's, found that immutability was not required to invoke heightened scrutiny, but still found that it was a relevant "fac- tor" that was met in the Kerrigan case. 173 What was "satisfied," however, was something short of "immutability" in the strict sense. Accordingly, the court seemed to conclude that the centrality of sexual orientation to personhood is "close enough" to a finding of immutability. The Iowa Supreme Court took a similar path. 17 4 Like Connecticut, it also invalidated a marriage limitation on the basis that a ban violated the Equal Protection Clause under intermediate scrutiny analysis.' 75 The Iowa court's decision in Varnum v. Brien was unanimous. 176 Like the 168. Id. at 468 ("Because the [Clourt indicated that the Colorado constitutional amendment could not withstand even rational basis review, the lowest level of judicial scrutiny, the [C]ourt had no reason to decide whether heightened review was appropriate." (citing Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 624 (1996))). 169. Id. at 467 (explaining that, by considering the Texas statute at issue in Lawrence v. Texas in terms of due process rather than equal protection, the Supreme Court high- lighted the fact that homosexuals were entitled to the same right to privacy as heterosexu- als). The Kerrigan court stated, "Lawrence represents a sea change in United States Supreme Court jurisprudence concerning the rights of gay persons.... In stark contrast to Bowers, Lawrence recognizes that gay persons, no less than heterosexuals, are constitution- ally entitled to freedom from state interference in matters of sexual intimacy." Id. 170. Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 481. 171. See id. at 438. 172. Id. 173. Id. 174. Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 904 (Iowa 2009) (invalidating Iowa's marriage law permitting marriage only between opposite-sex couples under intermediate scrutiny analysis). 175. Id. (concluding that, after application of intermediate scrutiny to Iowa's law ban- ning marriage for same-sex couples, the sexual-orientation classification furthered no im- portant governmental objectives). 176. Id. at 907. [Vol. 12:1 MOVING BEYOND THE "IMMUTABILITY DEBATE" Connecticut Supreme Court, the Iowa court analyzed the traditional "im- mutability" factor of sexual orientation and agreed with other courts that this factor was satisfied because of sexual orientation's centrality to identity. 1 77 The court stated that gays and lesbians were situated similarly to heter- osexuals under the civil marriage statute because gay and lesbian couples are also "in committed and loving relationships, many raising families," and concluded that "official recognition of their status provides an insti- tutional basis for defining their fundamental relational rights and respon- sibilities. ,171 The court rejected claims that the marriage statute did not classify based upon sexual orientation, arguing that offering gays and les- bians the right to marry only someone of the opposite sex is "no right at all."1 17 9 Because the court found that the Iowa statute failed intermediate scru- tiny, it was unnecessary to examine the applicability of strict scrutiny to that case.18 ° The State was unable to provide any justification for the statute that could survive intermediate scrutiny,1 81 which requires that the statute be "substantially related to an important governmental objective. ,182 Significantly, despite overwhelming evidence of systematic discrimina- tion against gays and lesbians, the California Supreme Court was the first 177. Id. at 893 (noting that "[t]he constitutional relevance of the immutability factor is not reserved to those instances in which the trait defining the burdened class is absolutely impossible to change" and adopting the reasoning that sexual identity is integral to one's identity). Like Kerrigan, this court held that gays and lesbians satisfied the four considera- tions that invoke heightened scrutiny: history of invidious discrimination, ability to contrib- ute to society, immutability, and political powerlessness. Id. at 889-96. The court explained that there is overwhelming evidence that gays and lesbians have historically been the targets of discrimination, and it is well-established and accepted that sexual orientation is not relevant to one's ability to contribute to society. Id. at 889-92. The court went on to articulate that sexual orientation is immutable because it is so much at the core of one's identity that it would be unthinkable to require an individual to change it, assuming change were even possible. Id. at 892-93. Finally, the court described the lack of marriage equal- ity and ongoing challenges as indications that gays and lesbians are politically powerless in the context of equal protection. Id. at 895. 178. Id. at 883. 179. Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 885 ("Viewed in the complete context of marriage, in- cluding intimacy, civil marriage with a person of the opposite sex is as unappealing to a gay or lesbian person as civil marriage with a person of the same sex is to a heterosexual."). 180. Id. at 896. 181. Id. at 897-904 (explaining that the State offered five objectives: (1) protecting "the traditional notion of marriage"; (2) promoting an optimal environment to raise chil- dren; (3) promoting procreation; (4) "promoting stability in opposite sex relationships"; and (5) conserving resources, none of which qualified as important governmental interests sufficient to withstand heightened scrutiny). 182. Id. at 896-97 (quoting Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988)). 2009] THE SCHOLAR state supreme court to explicitly hold that sexual orientation is a "suspect classification" for equal protection purposes.183 Other states that have concluded that gays and lesbians have a right to marry have done so with- out making this finding."8 Massachusetts found that limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples failed even rational basis review, obviating the need to decide whether gays and lesbians fall under a suspect classification.' 85 Connecticut's supreme court found that gays and lesbians are entitled to intermediate scrutiny,' 8 6 as did the Supreme Court of Iowa.'8 7 The fed- eral courts have never explicitly extended to gays and lesbians the protec- tions of strict scrutiny or even intermediate scrutiny. 1 88 Thus, while the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees equal protection, the federal courts have never fully protected LGBTs under that provision. IV. PROPOSITION 8 AND THE PECULIAR VULNERABILITY OF LGBTs "A few weeks after our wonderful and amazing two-day wedding I was driving home from work, got off the freeway ... and there they were. I had seen the signs, but I guess I did not expect to see the [protestors supporting Proposition 8]. My heart began to beat furiously. I glared intently at one woman from my car window and I swear she actually looked down. Per- haps this is a projection, but I sensed that she saw me, my face, my eyes, my pain, and she felt ashamed. There were a lot of them, more than 50. But then, as I approached the median ...there was one young woman, very small, with dark hair, standing there, surrounded by the pasty-faced yellow- shirted glossy-eyed fancy-printed-sign holders, with a homemade sign on a piece of cardboard that simply said 'No on 8.' 1 screamed out my car win- dow that I'd be right there. By the time I parked, a small man with head of 183. See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 441-42 (Cal. 2008), superseded in part by constitutional amendment, CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5, as recognized in Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48 (Cal. 2009). 184. E.g., Kerrigan v. Comm'r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 430-32 (Conn. 2008); Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 896-97; Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 961 (Mass. 2003). 185. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 961. 186. Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 430-32. 187. Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 896-97. 188. Jeremy B. Smith, Note, The Flaws of Rational Basis with Bite: Why the Supreme Court Should Acknowledge Its Application of Heightened Scrutiny to Classifications Based on Sexual Orientation, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2769, 2770 (2005). As Smith points out: Traditionally, only a few classifications have merited heightened scrutiny - most nota- bly gender and race classifications. Despite their ostensible qualification for height- ened scrutiny based on criteria set forth by the U.S. Supreme Court, gay men and lesbians have not yet been treated as a suspect class and thus classifications based on sexual orientation have been historically subject to rational basis review. Id. (footnotes omitted). [Vol. 12:1 MOVING BEYOND THE "IMMUTABILITY DEBATE" curly reddish brown hair had arrived carrying a bunch of no on 8 signs. He did not know who I was, but he handed me a sign. Another night, at the same street corner, I remember asking him 'Harvey, why are you here, why are you doing this?' And without a beat he answered 'I am trying to save my life."' -Laura Kanter 1 8 9 On November 4, 2008, the voters of California became the first to strip vested marriage rights away from members of a judicially protected mi- nority group. 90 For several months prior to the passage of the proposi- tion, gays and lesbians enjoyed the right to marry alongside their straight counterparts. 9 Thus far in other states, when majorities have passed laws defining marriage as being only "between a man and a woman," voters did so before same sex couples were actually allowed to marry in those states.192 In Florida and Arizona, for example, where voters passed constitutional amendments similar to California's, the voters did so as a "pre-emptive strike"; the courts in those states had not yet recognized that same-sex couples had a right to marry.19 3 Perhaps because Califor- nia has often been in the vanguard of social progress, the battle over Pro- position 8 raged far beyond the state's borders. 9 4 Proposition 8 was an attempt to repudiate the California Supreme Court's decision recognizing the fundamental equality of gays and lesbians and to enshrine in Califor- nia's state constitution the limitation on marriage contained in the earlier (and now-invalidated) statute. Proposition 8 was supported by fifty-two 189. My Eve of Justice Speech, http://lauraflaps.blogspot.com/2009/03/my-eve-of-jus- tice-speech.html (Mar. 16, 2009, 23:11 PST). 190. Jesse McKinley & Laurie Goodstein, Bans in 3 States on Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2008, at Al, available at 2008 WLNR 21173920 (stating that Proposition 8, which superseded the Marriage Cases by amending the California constitution to prohibit marriage between same-sex couples, passed in California on November 4, 2008). 191. Id. ("In California, where same-sex marriage had been performed since June, the ban had more than 52 percent of the vote, according to figures by the secretary of state, and was projected to win by several Californian news media outlets."). 192. Id. (stating that in Arizona, where marriage between same-sex couples was al- ready banned, citizens voted to continue to prohibit such marriages). 193. Marcus Baram, Gay Marriage Bans Succeeding, THE HUFFINGTON POST, Nov. 5, 2008, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2008/11/05/gay-marriage-bans-succeed-n141286. html (stating that Florida, which amended its constitution in 2008 to preclude marriage equality, had already banned marriage between same-sex couples since 1997); Jesse Mc- Kinley & Laurie Goodstein, Bans in 3 States on Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 5, 2008, at Al, available at 2008 WLNR 21173920 ("In Arizona, where same-sex marriage was al- ready against the law, the victory for Proposition 102, which amends the [sitate [c]onstitution, was met with a shrug by some."). 194. Cf. Join the Impact, Prop 8 Remains-What's Next?, http://jointheimpact.com/ tag/prop-8/ (last visited July 18, 2009) (detailing efforts to organize marriage equality sup- porters to prevent amendments like Proposition 8 from passing in other states). 2009] THE SCHOLAR percent of California voters195 and was recently upheld by the California Supreme Court, which analyzed the peculiar system by which Californi- ans can amend their state constitution. 196 Focusing on the fact that Pro- position 8 did not constitute a fundamental change to the structure of state government, the court rejected the argument that Proposition 8 was an invalid "revision" of the state constitution, as opposed to a valid "amendment." '1 9 7 Proposition 8, however, plainly and explicitly deprives gay and lesbian citizens of marriage rights,19 8 though marriage has already been recog- nized as a "fundamental right" by the California Supreme Court.1 99 Moreover, under California law, Proposition 8 denies a fundamental right to a group of persons whose minority classification (sexual orientation) has been deemed "suspect" by the state's highest court. 2 00 That made Proposition 8 unlike prior initiatives that the courts upheld based upon the sanctity of voter initiative. 1 195. Jesse McKinley & Laurie Goodstein, Bans in 3 States on Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2008, at Al, available at 2008 WLNR 21173920. 196. Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 110 (Cal. 2009). 197. See id. 198. Id. at 59 ("Proposition 8 ... added a new section [to] the California constitution, providing: 'Only marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in California."'). 199. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 426 (Cal. 2008) (concluding that marriage is a fundamental personal right), superseded in part by constitutional amendment, CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5, as recognized in Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48 (Cal. 2009). The court also noted that it is a flaw to describe the right to marry as the right to "same-sex marriage." Id. at 421. 200. See id. The California Supreme Court held that marriage is a fundamental right for all people, including same-sex couples. Id. Moreover, the court in Marriage Cases explained that: The flaw in characterizing the constitutional right at issue as the right to same-sex marriage rather than the right to marry goes beyond mere semantics. It is important both analytically and from the standpoint of fairness to adopt plaintiffs' argument that we recognize that they are not seeking to create a new constitutional right-the right to "same-sex marriage"-or to change, modify, or... "deinstitutionalize" the existing institution of marriage. Instead, plaintiffs contend that, properly interpreted, the state constitutional right to marry affords to same-sex couples the same rights and bene- fits-accompanied by the same mutual responsibilities and obligations-as this consti- tutional right affords to same sex couples. For this reason, in evaluating the constitutional issue before us, we consider it appropriate to direct our focus to the meaning and substance of the constitutional right to marry, and to avoid the poten- tially misleading implications inherent in analyzing the issue in terms of "same-sex marriage." Id. at 421 (footnote omitted). 201. See, e.g., People v. Frierson, 25 Cal.3d 142, 186 (1979) (upholding voter initiative that reinstated the death penalty after an earlier finding by the California Supreme Court that the death penalty was unconstitutional). [Vol. 12:1 MOVING BEYOND THE "IMMUTABILITY DEBATE" Nevertheless, on May 26, 2009, the California Supreme Court upheld Proposition 8 as a proper amendment to the California constitution in Strauss v. Horton, which set the precedent that a bare majority vote can, in fact, strip constitutional rights from a suspect class.20 2 But the court also held that the approximately eighteen thousand marriages between same-sex couples would remain valid because Proposition 8 cannot be applied retroactively. 0 3 The court articulated two factors as the basis for its decision.20 4 One was the "meaning and scope of the constitutional change at issue., 20 5 The court reasoned that the "meaning and scope" of Proposition 8 was to limit the use and official recognition of the word "marriage" to opposite- sex couples.20 6 The other factor was the "quantitative and qualitative ef- fect" that the constitutional change would "have on the basic governmen- tal plan or framework embodied in the preexisting provision of the California constitution., 20 7 The quantitative aspect was quickly dis- missed as evidence of an amendment, since Proposition 8 was short and simple.20 8 In its discussion of the qualitative effect, the court found that Proposi- tion 8 was not a revision to the state constitution, despite the fact that Proposition 8 eliminated rights recognized in the Marriage Cases.20 9 The 202. Strauss, 207 P.3d at 62. 203. Id. (noting presumption against retroactive application and finding that language in voter information material was "insufficient to demonstrate, clearly and unambiguously, that the voters must have intended a retroactive application" (emphasis in original)). 204. Id. at 61. 205. Id. 206. Id. at 69 (deconstructing the opinion in the Marriage Cases and parsing out the right to the word and institution of "marriage" from the general rights to privacy, due process, and equal protection). 207. Strauss, 207 P.3d at 69. 208. Id. at 69 ("Quantitatively, Proposition 8 unquestionably has much less of an ef- fect on the preexisting state constitutional scheme than virtually any of the previous consti- tutional changes that our past decisions have found to constitute amendments rather than revisions."). 209. Id. at 100 (holding that the Marriage Cases "did not make a qualitative revi- sion"). The court explained: [I]nitiative measures that, like the current Proposition 8, cut back on the greater level of protection afforded by preceding court decisions and were challenged as constitu- tional revisions on the ground that the constitutional changes they effected deprived individuals of important state constitutional protections they previously enjoyed and left courts unable to fully protect such rights. Nonetheless, in each case this court did not undertake an evaluation of the relative importance of the constitutional right at issue or the degree to which the protection of that right had been diminished, but instead held that the measure did not amount to a qualitative revision because it did not make a fundamental change in the nature of the governmental plan or framework established by the [c]onstitution. 20091 THE SCHOLAR majority explained that because gays and lesbians maintain the familial recognition and protections of domestic partnerships post-Proposition 8, the rights of privacy, due process, and equal protection remain intact and effective.2 1 ° The court further explained that Proposition 8 merely carves out an exception-marriage-to those core constitutional principles and noted that rights are subject to change through California's initiative process.2 11 While explicitly stating that it was not suggesting that the rights af- fected by Proposition 8 were "unimportant or insignificant," the court went on to note that the California amendment process "never has been reserved only for minor or unimportant changes to the [c]onstitution."'212 In essence, the court found that significant changes, even those affecting the fundamental rights of a suspect classification, can be brought about by majority will in California.2 13 Proposition 8 powerfully demonstrates the peculiarly vulnerable posi- tion of LGBTs. 214 A voter initiative aimed at a minority group that was explicitly protected by "suspect classification" status under the federal Constitution would likely be rejected as unconstitutional, as illustrated in the case of Mulkey v. Reitman, in which the California Supreme Court invalidated an initiative amendment on the grounds that it violated the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. 21 5 That initia- tive was aimed at denying African-American citizens the benefits of non- discrimination.21 6 Because race is a "suspect classification" for federal Id. 210. Id. at 75-76. 211. Id. As the court stated, Proposition 8 "must be understood as carving out an exception to the preexisting scope of the privacy and due process clauses with respect to the particular subject matter encompassed by new provision." Id. at 75. 212. Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 102 (Cal. 2009) (emphasis in original). 213. See id. at 129 (Moreno, J., dissenting). The rule the majority crafts today not only allows same-sex couples to be stripped of the right to marry that this court recognized in the Marriage Cases, it places at risk the state constitutional rights of all disfavored minorities. It weakens the status of our state [clonstitution as a bulwark of fundamental rights for minorities protected from the will of the majority. Id. A full consideration of Justice Moreno's powerful dissenting opinion is beyond the scope of this Article. 214. See Ronald Steiner, Understanding the Prop 8 Litigation: The Scope of Direct Democracy and Role of Judicial Scrutiny, 14 NExus 81, 86 (2009) (explaining that LGBTs are particularly vulnerable in states that have initiative systems because of the majoritarian nature of the process); cf Strauss, 207 P.3d at 129 (Moreno, J., dissenting) (noting that all "disfavored minorities" are at risk after majority decision upholding Proposition 8). 215. Mulkey v. Reitman, 413 P.2d 825, 892 (Cal. 1966), affid, Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 381 (1967). 216. Reitman, 387 U.S. at 372. [Vol. 12:1 MOVING BEYOND THE "IMMUTABILITY DEBATE" equal protection purposes, the court found that African-Americans' rights are immune from attack by a state majority.2 1 7 LGBTs do not have similar protections in the federal judicial sys- tem. 2 18 The failure of the United States Supreme Court to designate sex- ual orientation a "suspect classification" leaves LGBTs' rights open to further assault beyond Proposition 8.219 Even in relatively progressive California, sexual orientation discrimina- tion has led to the commission of hate crimes.2 2 ° Indeed, the California Department of Justice's "Hate Crime in California 2007" statistical re- port 22 1 notes that reported "sexual orientation hate crimes have consist- ently been the second largest bias motivation of hate crimes since 1998, accounting for at least 18 percent of all hate crime offenses. "222 Moreo- ver, reported hate crimes against the LGBT community increased 77.2% between 2006 and 2007.223 More recently, Santa Clara County in Califor- nia has reported a threefold increase in hate crimes against LGBT people from 2007 to 2008, which the prosecutor of that county attributes to the controversy surrounding Proposition 8.224 In 1986, gay and black civil rights activist Bayard Rustin noted that "twenty-five years ago, the barometer of human rights in the United States [was] [B]lack people. That is no longer true. The barometer for judging the character of people in regard to human rights is now those who consider themselves gay, homosexual, lesbian. ' 225 Documented evi- 217. Id. at 373 (ruling that an initiative that authorized discrimination in the housing market was unconstitutional because it violated a fundamental right without serving a com- pelling state interest). 218. See Jeremy B. Smith, Note, The Flaws of Rational Basis with Bite: Why the Su- preme Court Should Acknowledge Its Application of Heightened Scrutiny to Classifications Based on Sexual Orientation, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2769, 2770 (2005). For a fuller discus- sion of this point, see Part II of this Article. 219. See id. (stating that the Supreme Court has not given LGBTs the status of "sus- pect classification"). 220. CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS CENTER, CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, HATE CRIME IN CALIFORNIA 2007 3 (2008), http://ag.ca.gov/cjsc/publications/hatecrimes/ hc07/preface07.pdf. 221. Id. at 1. 222. Id. 223. Id. at 7 ("Anti-homosexual hate crimes increased 77.2 percent from 57 in 2006 to 101 in 2007."). 224. Tracy Kaplan, Surge in Anti-Gay Hate Crime Cases, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Mar. 16, 2009, available at http://www.topix.com/forum/county/santa-clara-ca/TSQN3R5EL NBKFEPTF ("Hate crime cases involving anti-gay sentiment shot up in Santa Clara County last year, a striking increase that a leading prosecutor attributes to controversy over Proposition 8, the voter-approved ban on gay marriage."). 225. Brother Outsider: The Life of Bayard Rustin (PBS television broadcast Jan. 20, 2003). 20091 THE SCHOLAR dence unfortunately shows the extent to which gays and lesbians are still singled out for persecution and abuse.2 2 6 V. MOVING BEYOND PROPOSITION 8 In Romer, the United States Supreme Court invalidated Colorado's Amendment 2 without having to reach the question of whether sexual orientation qualifies as a "suspect" classification. 22 7 Given the extreme nature of the amendment at issue, the Court found that the amendment was motivated by "animus" and was, thus, precluded by the Equal Pro- tection Clause, even when evaluated under the relatively forgiving ra- tional basis test.228 It is unlikely, at this point at least, that the Supreme Court would invalidate Proposition 8 on such a basis. Rather, the Court might well accept a "rational basis" for upholding "traditional" mar- riage, 229 despite the fact that animus underlies the motivations of many who voted to support Proposition 8.230 The official campaign for Proposition 8 was sophisticated, avoiding a direct appeal to "animus." 2 31 The campaign was "kinder and gentler," in Eskridge's words, than past campaigns,23 2 with relatively benign ads por- traying well-meaning neighbors of gays who proclaimed a belief in rights for gays and yet a concomitant belief that the term "marriage" should be preserved for unions between men and women.233 Thus, the argument 226. CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS CENTER, CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, HATE CRIME IN CALIFORNIA 2007 3 (2008), http://ag.ca.gov/cjsc/publications/hatecrimes/hc 07/prefaceO7.pdf. 227. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996). 228. Id. at 632. 229. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 585 (2003) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (sug- gesting that preserving the "traditional institution of marriage" is a legitimate state interest). 230. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., How Government Unintentionally Influences Cul- ture (The Case of Same-Sex Marriage), 102 Nw. U. L. REv. 495, 496 (2008) (noting that "religious persons opposing same-sex marriage often find their most enthusiastic audience consists of bigots and homophobes"). Professor Eskridge points out that the tendency to "demonize" marriage equality is counterproductive: "Probe more deeply, and the effect is even more disturbing. Demonizing gay marriage as the great threat to traditional marriage not only scapegoats gay people, but deflects attention away from genuine threats to the institution, including high divorce rates, deadbeat dads, domestic violence, and so on." Id. 231. See Protect Marriage - Yes on 8, http://www.protectmarriage.com/ (last visited Aug. 6, 2009) (campaigning for passage of Proposition 8). 232. See William Eskridge, Professor of Jurisprudence, Yale Law School, Remarks at the "Democracy's Dilemma: The Case of Proposition 8" AALS Executive Committee Roundtable, American Association of Law Schools Annual Meeting (Jan. 9, 2009). 233. See Protect Marriage - Yes on 8, http://www.protectmarriage.com/ (last visited Aug. 6, 2009) (containing information provided by the "Yes on 8" campaign). [Vol. 12:1 MOVING BEYOND THE "IMMUTABILITY DEBATE" that Proposition 8 was not motivated by animus alone would, at least, be easier to sustain than the arguments for Colorado's Amendment 2.234 It also seems unlikely that the Supreme Court would frame the issue as the California Supreme Court did, asking whether same-sex couples have a fundamental right to marry, rather than whether there exists a funda- mental right to "same-sex marriage., 23 5 Just as the Lawrence Court fo- cused on the right to intimate privacy in setting aside an anti-sodomy law, the California Supreme Court focused on the right to marriage, not the right to "same-sex marriage. '2 36 It is all too common, however, for the right to be defined by the group "targeted by the law.",237 This "collapsi- ble error," as Professor Rush describes it, or a tendency to narrow the description of the right so that only the disfavored minority is seeking it, is epitomized by Justice Scalia's dissent in Lawrence, in which he framed the issue as the right to engage in "homosexual sodomy., 23' The Califor- nia Supreme Court, in its 2008 Marriage Cases decision, correctly recog- nized that the right being sought by same-sex couples was simply the right to marry the persons of their choice, a right shared by all citizens.2 39 While the Supreme Court framed the issue of anti-sodomy laws in a simi- lar way in Lawrence ,240 it is considerably less clear that the Court would do so in the marriage context. If the federal courts are not as likely to recognize marriage in terms of a broad fundamental right, exclusion from which must be justified under "4strict scrutiny" analysis, then the other avenue for LGBTs to attain con- stitutional protection is to seek recognition of sexual orientation as a 234. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996) (noting that Colorado's stated ra- tionale for Amendment 2 was to protect the rights of employers and landlords who might object to homosexuality itself). 235. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 419 (Cal. 2008) ("Although our state [c]onstitution does not contain any explicit reference to a right to marry, past California cases establish beyond question that the right to marry is a fundamental right whose pro- tection is guaranteed to all persons by the California [c]onstitution." (citations omitted)), superseded in part by constitutional amendment, CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5, as recognized in Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48 (Cal. 2009). 236. Id. at 421. 237. Sharon E. Rush, Whither Sexual Orientation Analysis? The Proper Methodology When Due Process and Equal Protection Intersect, 16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 685, 743 (2008) (arguing that courts should avoid "committing the Collapsible Error, which happens when the underlying right is defined by the group targeted by the law" (footnote omitted)). 238. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 586 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (focusing on the right to homosexual sodomy rather than the majority's broader focus on the right to privacy). 239. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 426. 240. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564 (framing the constitutional issue as whether con- senting adults had a right to privately engage in sexual conduct that was burdened by the state's anti-sodomy law). 2009] THE SCHOLAR "suspect" classification.2 41 While the Court has never done this, Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Lawrence, suggesting that Romer had, in fact, applied a more searching version of rational basis review for sex- ual orientation-based discrimination, might presage the willingness of the Court to recognize that LGBTs are entitled to heightened scrutiny under the Court's jurisprudence.2 42 That LGBTs have suffered from discrimi- nation and that sexual orientation is unrelated to the ability to work or participate in society is well-established.2 4 3 Historically, courts have also referred to immutability as a "necessary prerequisite to suspect classification., 24 4 The California Supreme Court decision, which did not rely on a finding of immutability of sexual orien- tation, is significant because it "highlights the court's changing under- standings of immutability and suspect classifications., 24 5 Importantly, despite the fact that the court later upheld the passage of Proposition 8, its earlier finding that sexual orientation is a suspect classification is un- disturbed,2 46 and this finding and its underlying rationale provide kernels of hope for further development of rights jurisprudence for LGBTs. The description of sexual orientation as "integral," rather than "immu- table," may provide a workable framework for further development of equal protection doctrine with regard to LGBTs, even in the federal 241. Of course, even gaining this status would not guarantee marriage equality, as courts might yet find that there is a "compelling state interest" in preserving the "tradi- tional" definition of marriage. Preservation of traditional marriage would be far more dif- ficult under strict scrutiny than under the rational basis test, however. See id. at 539 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (suggesting that preservation of traditional marriage would be a "legitimate" state interest under the rational basis test). Moreover, even leaving marriage equality aside, receiving protection as a "suspect classification" would benefit LGBTs in other areas in which they have faced discrimination, such as adopting children. 242. See id. at 584 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("In [Romer], we refused to sanction a law that singled out homosexuals 'for disfavored legal status.' The same is true here. The Equal Protection Clause 'neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens."' (citing Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623, 633 (1996))). 243. See Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 889-92 (Iowa 2009) (stating that the his- tory of discrimination against LGBTs is well-established). 244. See, Recent Case, State Constitutional Law-California Supreme Court Declares Prohibition of Same-Sex Marriages Unconstitutional-In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008), 122 HARV. L. REV. 1557, 1561 (2009); see also Nicole R. Hart, Note, The Progress and Pitfalls of Lawrence v. Texas, 52 BuFF. L. REV. 1417, 1440 n.157 (2004) (not- ing that courts "seem to rely heavily on immutability"); see also Part II of this Article. 245. Recent Case, State Constitutional Law-California Supreme Court Declares Pro- hibition of Same-Sex Marriages Unconstitutional.-In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008), 122 HARV. L. REV. 1557, 1558 (2009). 246. Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 59 (Cal. 2009) (noting that the limited question before the court is whether the 2008 amendment to the California constitution was a valid amendment, as opposed to an unlawful revision). [Vol. 12:1 MOVING BEYOND THE "IMMUTABILITY DEBATE" courts.24 7 Based on the authors' own experiences, we believe that sexual orientation is indeed integral to one's sense of self, and the failure of courts to more forcefully protect vulnerable sexual orientation minorities has led to tragic results. Ultimately, focusing on immutability leads courts to ask the wrong question, just as asking whether there is a right to "same-sex marriage" or "homosexual sodomy" incorrectly frames the issues. Immutability ques- tions are inextricably intertwined with questions about the origins of ho- mosexuality. In his book, Love Undetectable, Andrew Sullivan notes that the question of from "where homosexuality comes" is at once both fasci- nating and, in an important sense, irrelevant.2 48 In Sullivan's words, "It seems to me that the only relevant political issue with regard to the na- ture of homosexuality in a free society is whether it is honestly exper- ienced by adult citizens as involuntary, whatever its genesis., 249 It is this authenticity of experience, a sense of a core part of personhood, that is captured in the notion that sexual orientation is "integral." Also cap- tured within that term is the notion of integrity and the avoidance of any stamp of inferiority, such as that which has too often branded the LGBT community. 21° Not only in politics, but also in law, this honest sense of self is relevant and deserving of full protection. "I was thirteen when I first thought I was gay. It was as I sat in my Latin class, thinking about the crushes I was getting on girls, and the exact words that came to me were 'oh, my God, I'm a queer... .' When Proposition 8 passed, it felt as if I had been thrust back to eighth grade and most of the world hated me." -Linda J. May251 247. See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 426 (Cal. 2009) (describing sexual orien- tation as "fundamental" to one's identity), superseded in part by constitutional amendment, CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5, as recognized in Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48 (Cal. 2009). 248. ANDREW SULLIVAN, LOVE UNDETECTABLE: NOTES ON FRIENDSHIP, SEX, AND SURVIVAL iX (1998). 249. Id. 250. See Lambda Legal, Lambda Legal's Safety Scale: Respect for Same-Sex Couples' Relationships, http://data.lambdalegal.org/publications/downloads/fs-lambda-legals-safety- scale.pdf (last visited Aug. 4, 2009) (noting the inferior treatment of gays and lesbians under the laws of the various states). 251. Appendix of Exhibits in Support of Brief of Amici Curiae Individual Chapman University Organizations, Faculty, Staff, and Students, Orange County Equality Coalition, and Other Orange County Community Members Including Legally Married Same-Sex Couples, in Support of Petitioners at 27-30, Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48 (Cal. 2009) (No. 168047), available at http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/courts/supreme/highprofile/documents/s 168047-amcur-chapman.pdf (providing the story of Linda May, a single, "out" lesbian). 2009] THE SCHOLAR "Since the passage of Proposition 8.. ., the requirement that I 'support and defend' the California [c]onstitution 'without any mental reservation' has left me with a crisis of conscience because in fact I have grave reserva- tions about the requirement that I do anything to 'uphold' or 'defend' a part of the [c]onstitution that strips away a fundamental right from a pro- tected minority group." -Dean Inada 252 "To insist that a different legal status be substituted for my marriage is to deny something that is so basic to my existence and so integral to who I am that it would detract from me as a human being and would discard some- thing that is a core element of my life .... In our own lives and those of friends, we have observed the scars and real damage, measured in human terms and human lives." -Thomas J. Peterson 2 5 3 "I was depressed and very emotional.... I both worry for my and my husband's civil rights, and those of our children, given the discrimination that Proposition 8 placed into the Constitution of the State of California." -Jeffrey L. Van Hoosear 54 VI. CONCLUSION While sexual orientation minorities have won limited victories in the United States Supreme Court, and there has been some progress in ex- panding federal protections for this class,255 the repeal of anti-sodomy laws is not enough. Federal protections remain extremely limited, leaving LGBTs peculiarly vulnerable in the federalist system.25 6 Many states 252. Id. at 21 (providing the story of Dean Inada, an elected member of the Orange County Democratic Central Committee, 70th Assembly District). 253. Id. at 34-36 (providing the story of Thomas J. Peterson, a fifty-two-year-old mar- ried gay man). 254. Id. at 39-40. 255. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 564 (2003) (invalidating a Texas anti- sodomy law as an unconstitutional violation of the right to privacy); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 627 (1996) (striking down a Colorado constitutional amendment "withdraw[ing] from homosexuals, but no others, specific legal protection from the injuries caused by discrimination"). 256. See Jeremy B. Smith, Note, The Flaws of Rational Basis with Bite: Why the Su- preme Court Should Acknowledge Its Application of Heightened Scrutiny to Classifications Based on Sexual Orientation, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2769, 2794 (2005) (stating that federal courts refuse to consider sexual orientation a suspect class); see also Parts II and IV of this Article. [Vol. 12:1 MOVING BEYOND THE "IMMUTABILITY DEBATE" provide no real protections to LGBTs, and even those that do may be usurped by the voters.25 7 As if speaking directly to the United States, Spanish Prime Minister Jos6 Luis Rodrfguez Zapatero said to the members of his parliament before they voted to legalize marriage between same-sex couples on June 30, 2005: "We are not the first but I am sure we will not be the last. After us will come many other countries, driven, ladies and gentleman, by two unstoppable forces: freedom and equality. '25 8 Perhaps the California Su- preme Court's landmark 2008 decision can provide a framework for achieving both. 257. See M. Katherine Baird Darmer, "Activist" Courts, Misleading Wedge Politics and the Tragedy of Proposition 8, 14 NEXUs 69, 70 (2009) ("It is an unfortunate feature of democracies that the majority can pass laws that disfavor minority groups."); Ronald Steiner, Understanding the Prop 8 Litigation: The Scope of Direct Democracy and Role of Judicial Scrutiny, 14 NExus 81, 84-85 (2009) (describing many states' initiative systems, allowing the citizens of each state to vote directly on measures to change state constitu- tions); see also generally Part IV of this Article. 258. Paula L. Ettelbrick, International Gay & Lesbian Human Rights Commission, Global Warming to Gay Rights: The Worldwide Trend of Recognizing Same-Sex Marriage Will Likely Continue, http://www.iglhrc.org/cgi-bin/iowa/article/pressroomliglhrcscommen- taries/298.html (last visited Aug. 6, 2009). 2009] 
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work_yszg6nksxnbrxljc7u22muu77y	----	[PDF] Breaking the Silence: Time to Talk About Race and Racism | Semantic Scholar Skip to search formSkip to main content> Semantic Scholar's Logo Search Sign InCreate Free Account You are currently offline. Some features of the site may not work correctly. DOI:10.1097/ACM.0000000000001416 Corpus ID: 7351512Breaking the Silence: Time to Talk About Race and Racism @article{Acosta2017BreakingTS, title={Breaking the Silence: Time to Talk About Race and Racism}, author={David A. Acosta and Kupiri W. Ackerman-Barger}, journal={Academic Medicine}, year={2017}, volume={92}, pages={285–288} } David A. Acosta, Kupiri W. Ackerman-Barger Published 2017 Sociology, Medicine Academic Medicine Recent events in the United States have catalyzed the need for all educators to begin paying attention to and discovering ways to dialogue about race. No longer can health professions (HP) educators ignore or avoid these difficult conversations. HP students are now demanding them. Cultural sensitivity and unconscious bias training are not enough. Good will and good intentions are not enough. Current faculty development paradigms are no longer sufficient to meet the educational challenges of… Expand View on Wolters Kluwer journals.lww.com Save to Library Create Alert Cite Launch Research Feed Share This Paper 57 CitationsHighly Influential Citations 2 Background Citations 15 Methods Citations 1 View All Topics from this paper Health Occupations benefit Paper Mentions Blog Post Saroo Sharda: We need to talk about racism Latest BMJ blogs 5 March 2020 57 Citations Citation Type Citation Type All Types Cites Results Cites Methods Cites Background Has PDF Publication Type Author More Filters More Filters Filters Sort by Relevance Sort by Most Influenced Papers Sort by Citation Count Sort by Recency “I Didn't Know What to Say”: Responding to Racism, Discrimination, and Microaggressions With the OWTFD Approach Sylk Sotto-Santiago, Jacqueline Mac, F. Duncan, Joseph Smith Sociology, Medicine MedEdPORTAL : the journal of teaching and learning resources 2020 3 PDF View 2 excerpts, cites background Save Alert Research Feed Commentary: Racism and Bias in Health Professions Education: How Educators, Faculty Developers, and Researchers Can Make a Difference R. Karani, L. Varpio, +4 authors B. O’Brien Sociology, Medicine Academic medicine : journal of the Association of American Medical Colleges 2017 18 Save Alert Research Feed Interrupting Microaggressions in Health Care Settings: A Guide for Teaching Medical Students Rhonda Acholonu, T. Cook, R. Roswell, R. Greene Psychology, Medicine MedEdPORTAL : the journal of teaching and learning resources 2020 4 PDF Save Alert Research Feed The Need for Anti-Racism Training in Medical School Curricula. N. Ahmad, M. Shi Psychology, Medicine Academic medicine : journal of the Association of American Medical Colleges 2017 7 Save Alert Research Feed Twelve tips for responding to microaggressions and overt discrimination: When the patient offends the learner Danielle Wheeler, J. Zapata, D. Davis, C. Chou Psychology, Medicine Medical teacher 2018 14 View 2 excerpts, cites background Save Alert Research Feed Early Childhood Teacher Educators Perception of Their Own Critical Reflection on Race, Ethnicity, and Culture N. Porter Psychology 2019 View 1 excerpt, cites background Save Alert Research Feed Addressing Racism in Medical Education An Interactive Training Module. Tanya White-Davis, J. Edgoose, +4 authors G. Saba Psychology, Medicine Family medicine 2018 16 PDF Save Alert Research Feed Responding to Racism in the Clinical Setting: A Novel Use of Forum Theatre in Social Medicine Education Joel Manzi, Sharon L. Casapulla, +5 authors Christina Randolph Sociology, Medicine The Journal of medical humanities 2020 Save Alert Research Feed Using Sociodrama to Foster Cultural Humility among Faculty and Students in the Academic Medical Center S. Loue Psychology 2018 4 PDF View 1 excerpt Save Alert Research Feed A Qualitative Study of New York Medical Student Views on Implicit Bias Instruction: Implications for Curriculum Development Cristina M. Gonzalez, Maria L. Deno, E. Kintzer, Paul R. Marantz, Monica L. Lypson, M. McKee Medicine Journal of General Internal Medicine 2019 3 PDF View 2 excerpts, cites background Save Alert Research Feed ... 1 2 3 4 5 ... References SHOWING 1-10 OF 16 REFERENCES SORT BYRelevance Most Influenced Papers Recency Dialogue as skill: training a health professions workforce that can talk about race and racism. J. Murray-García, Steven Harrell, J. A. García, E. Gizzi, Pamela Simms-Mackey Medicine The American journal of orthopsychiatry 2014 29 Save Alert Research Feed Insurgent Multiculturalism: Rethinking How and Why We Teach Culture in Medical Education D. Wear Sociology, Medicine Academic medicine : journal of the Association of American Medical Colleges 2003 189 PDF Save Alert Research Feed Remembering Freddie Gray: Medical Education for Social Justice D. Wear, J. Zarconi, J. Aultman, M. R. Chyatte, A. Kumagai Sociology, Medicine Academic medicine : journal of the Association of American Medical Colleges 2017 47 Save Alert Research Feed Cultural competency 2.0: exploring the concept of "difference" in engagement with the other. D. Wear, A. Kumagai, Joseph D. Varley, J. Zarconi Sociology, Medicine Academic medicine : journal of the Association of American Medical Colleges 2012 35 PDF Save Alert Research Feed Beyond Cultural Competence: Critical Consciousness, Social Justice, and Multicultural Education A. Kumagai, M. Lypson Medicine Academic medicine : journal of the Association of American Medical Colleges 2009 456 PDF Save Alert Research Feed Levels of racism: a theoretic framework and a gardener's tale. C. Jones Sociology, Medicine American journal of public health 2000 1,106 PDF Save Alert Research Feed Racism in healthcare: Its relationship to shared decision-making and health disparities: a response to Bradby. M. Peek, A. Odoms-Young, M. Quinn, R. Gorawara-Bhat, S. Wilson, M. H. Chin Medicine Social science & medicine 2010 30 PDF Save Alert Research Feed Commentary: Diversity 3.0: a necessary systems upgrade. Marc A. Nivet Sociology, Medicine Academic medicine : journal of the Association of American Medical Colleges 2011 108 PDF Save Alert Research Feed Racism in Medicine: Shifting the Power J. N. Olayiwola Medicine The Annals of Family Medicine 2016 14 PDF Save Alert Research Feed A PIECE OF MY MIND. My Name Is Not "Interpreter". R. Montenegro Medicine JAMA 2016 25 Save Alert Research Feed ... 1 2 ... Related Papers Abstract Topics Paper Mentions 57 Citations 16 References Related Papers Stay Connected With Semantic Scholar Sign Up About Semantic Scholar Semantic Scholar is a free, AI-powered research tool for scientific literature, based at the Allen Institute for AI. Learn More → Resources DatasetsSupp.aiAPIOpen Corpus Organization About UsResearchPublishing PartnersData Partners   FAQContact Proudly built by AI2 with the help of our Collaborators Blog posts, news articles and tweet counts and IDs sourced by Altmetric.com Terms of Service•Privacy Policy The Allen Institute for AI By clicking accept or continuing to use the site, you agree to the terms outlined in our Privacy Policy, Terms of Service, and Dataset License ACCEPT & CONTINUE 
work_ytfel5j6pfelbj72tvtto4qu2u	----	Racial Stress and Trauma Interview 071116 English-only FINAL Name:___________________________ Date:_____________________ Ver 1.0 UConn RACIAL/ ETHNIC STRESS & TRAUMA SURVEY (UnRESTS) Guide for Interviewer Interview Questions (Instructions for interviewer are italicized.) A Introduction to the Interview Note the difference between race (the group society puts a person in based on their appearance) and ethnicity (a person’s culture based on their heritage). They may be different or the same. The US Census recognizes several specific racial categories, including Black, White, Asian, and Native American. Hispanic is an ethnic group, but many consider Hispanic/Latino a race, which is acceptable for this interview. A1 Sometimes people have very bad experiences that cause feelings of stress or even trauma. Some people have several difficult experiences over a lifetime that are manageable individually, but together they lead to feelings of stress or trauma. I want to talk to you about some of your experiences of stress or trauma as it relates to your race or ethnicity. If patient’s racial and ethnic group is unclear: How would you describe your race and ethnicity? Ensure that discussion only includes incidents where at least one of the involved factors was race or color. A2 People may be discriminated against or mistreated for many different reasons (e.g., gender, sexual orientation, age, disability, faith, etc.) but I am interested in experiences connected to your race – or your race as perceived by others. However, if you have experienced discrimination due to a combination of factors (i.e., gender+race, such a being called “an angry Black woman” because you stood up for yourself), we can talk about that too. B Racial and Ethnic Identity Development If yes, ask the patient to elaborate. B2 Are there other racial or ethnic groups that people assume you belong to based on your appearance? Ask the patient to describe this. B3 When was the first time you became aware of race or ethnicity? When was the first time you remember feeling different, excluded, or singled out because of your apparent race or ethnicity? Assess for things like positive messages from parents, racial socialization, negative messages from others, media, stereotypes, etc. B4 What sort of things, positive or negative, did you learn about your race and ethnicity growing up? (May not apply to immigrants.) 2 Assess for feelings of ethnic/racial pride and/or stigma/shame. Rate each question (1-6) based on response from patient. For each affirmative answer, solicit an example. For each negative answer, ask “why not?” Ethnic/Racial Identity Score: (B5) Total _____________ B5 I want to understand a bit more about how you feel about being a(n) (enter race & ethnicity here) person. I’m going to ask you a few questions about that. 1. Would you say that you feel strong attachment to your ethnic (or racial) group? Very Much (2) – Somewhat (1) – No (0) 2. Would you say that you have a lot of pride in your ethnic group and its accomplishments? Very Much (2) – Somewhat (1) – No (0) 3. Would you say that you are active in groups that include mostly members of your own ethnic group? Very Much (2) – Somewhat (1) – No (0) 4. Would you say that you have a strong sense of belonging to your ethnic group? Very Much (2) – Somewhat (1) – No (0) 5. Would you say that you think a lot about how life is affected by your group membership? Very Much (2) – Somewhat (1) – No (0) 6. Would you say that you have often talked to others about issues related to your ethnic group? Very Much (2) – Somewhat (1) – No (0) B6 How much of your free time do you spend with people from your own racial/ethnic group? Assess for wish to be White, non- stigmatized, and/or privileged group member. B7 Many people note that it can be difficult to be an ethnic or racial minority. Have you ever wished you were a member of the majority group (i.e., a White person)? Assess for composition of workplace/school and racial climate. B8 What is the ethnic/racial environment like in your place of work/school? How comfortable do you feel there as a ( enter race here ) person? 3 C Experiences of Direct Overt Racism Give examples, if needed. This may include harassment at work, threats, victimization by law enforcement, etc. Elicit a description of the event. C1 Can you share with me a time you were impacted by racism? This could be something that someone else either said or did to you. I am especially interested in any experiences where you were concerned about your safety and the event was very upsetting. If needed: If you can’t think of any instances like that, then any racist experience will be fine (i.e., being followed in stores, called racial slurs, etc.). Determine when the event occurred. C2 How old were you when this happened? Be careful not communicate doubt that this was in fact a racist event. C3 What led you to believe this event happened due to your race? Assess for degree and type of distress experienced, e.g., anger, depression, anxiety. C4 How upset were you by this experience? If distress was present: Are you still upset by it? Determine if experience was a trauma. C5 Did you fear for your life, health, or safety? If yes: In what way? Assess for adaptive versus maladaptive coping strategies. C6 How did you cope with this experience? Assess for availability and use of support system. C7 How did other important people in your life respond when you told them about this? Ask about other experiences of racism. C8 Can you tell me about another experience of racism like that? If necessary: This can be any other situation where you were fearful, concerned about your safety, or if the event was very upsetting. Determine when the event occurred. C9 How old were you when this happened? Be careful not communicate doubt that this was in fact a racist event. C10 What led you to believe this event happened due to your race? Assess for degree and type of distress experienced, e.g., anger, depression, anxiety. C11 How upset were you by this experience? If distress was present: Are you still upset by it? Determine if experience was a trauma. C12 Did you fear for your life, health, or safety? If yes: In what way? Assess for adaptive versus maladaptive coping strategies. C13 How did you cope with this experience? Assess for availability and use of support system. C14 How did other important people in your life respond when you told them about this? 4 D Experiences of Racism by Loved Ones Elicit a description of the event. D1 Can you share with me a time you were impacted by racism as a result of something that happened to someone close to you? Determine when the event occurred. D2 How old were you when this happened? Be careful not communicate doubt that this was in fact a racist event. D3 What led you to believe this event happened due to race? Assess for degree and type of distress experienced, e.g., anger, depression, anxiety. D4 How upset were you by this experience? If distress was present: Are you still upset by it? Determine if experience was a trauma. D5 Did you fear for the life, health, or safety of that person? Assess for adaptive versus maladaptive coping strategies. D6 How did you cope with this experience? Assess for availability and use of support system. D7 How did other important people in your life react to this? Elicit a description of the event. D8 Can you share with me another time you were impacted by racism as a result of something that happened to someone close to you? Determine when the event occurred. D9 How old were you when this happened? Be careful not communicate doubt that this was in fact a racist event. D10 What led you to believe this event happened due to race? Assess for degree and type of distress experienced, e.g., anger, depression, anxiety. D11 How upset were you by this experience? If distress was present: Are you still upset by it? Determine if experience was a trauma. D12 Did you fear for the life, health, or safety of that person? Assess for adaptive versus maladaptive coping strategies. D13 How did you cope with this experience? Assess for availability and use of support system. D14 How did other important people in your life react to this? 5 E Experiences of Vicarious Racism Give examples as needed, e.g., shooting of unarmed Black teen, racially-motivated hate crime, wars due to ethnic cleansing, etc. E1 Can you share with me a time you were impacted by racism as a result of something you learned about – for example, on the news or in your community – that involved someone you did not know personally? Determine when the event occurred. E2 How old were you when this happened? Be careful not communicate doubt that this was in fact a racist event. E3 What led you to believe this event happened due to racism? Assess for degree and type of distress experienced, e.g., anger, depression, anxiety. E4 How upset were you by this experience? If distress was present: Are you still upset by it? Determine if experience was personally traumatic. E5 Did this event make you worry about your own well-being, health, or sense of safety? Assess for adaptive versus maladaptive coping strategies. E6 How did you cope with this experience? Assess for availability and use of support system. E7 How did other important people in your life react to this? F Experiences of Covert Racism Microaggressions include brief, exchanges, in the form of seemingly innocent and innocuous comments, subtle or dismissive gestures, and tones that send denigrating messages to people of color because they belong to a minority group. F1 Often minorities are the target of subtle or covert racist experiences in the form of what we sometimes call “microaggressions.” Define if needed. How often would you say that you experience these? Elicit a description of the event. F2 Can you give me a recent example? Elicit a description of the event. F3 Can you give another example? Elicit a description of the event. F4 Can you give another example? F5 How stressful is it for you when these sorts of things happen to you? Assess for adaptive versus maladaptive coping strategies. F6 How do you cope with these experiences? F7 Have you experienced any changes in your ability to manage microaggressions? Note: Sections C-F may be duplicated to capture additional events. 6 G . Racial Trauma Assessment Assess for PTSD if any experiences previously described qualify for DSM-5 Criterion A event. Think about all of the experiences we discussed concerning racism and discrimination as you answer the following questions: Note: For each positive response, ask for an example and note frequency. Re-Experiencing (Need 1 for PTSD diagnosis) G1. Have you had reoccurring, unwanted distressing memories about racism-related experiences? YES NO G2. Have you been having bad dreams or nightmares related to racism, or about feeling powerless or excluded? YES NO G3. Have you had the experience of feeling as if a past racism-related event was happening to you all over again (like a flashback)? YES NO G4. Do you get very emotionally upset when reminded of racism-related experiences? YES NO G5. Have you had negative physical reactions when reminded of racism- related experiences (e.g., stomach ache, heart racing, shaking)? YES NO Avoidance (Need 1 for PTSD diagnosis) G6. Have you been trying hard not to think about upsetting racist experiences you’ve had? YES NO G7a. Have you tried to avoid activities, places, things, or situations that remind you of the racism-related experiences you have had? YES NO G7b. Have you tried to avoid certain types of people because you worry they will behave in a racist way (i.e., White people, law enforcement, bosses, etc.)? YES NO Negative Changes in Cognition & Mood (Need 2 for PTSD diagnosis – count only one from #9 and/or #10) G8. Are there any important parts of your experiences with racism that you cannot remember? YES NO G9a. Have you been viewing yourself in a more negative way because of racism (e.g., “I should be a stronger person”)? YES NO 7 G9b. Have you been viewing others in a more negative way due to racism (e.g., ”I can’t trust White people”)? YES NO G9c. Do you feel as if the world is a dangerous place because of your experiences with racism? YES NO G10a. Have you blamed yourself for your experiences of racism, or for things that may have happened afterwards due to racism? YES NO G10b. Have you blamed others who were not involved for your experience, or for things that may have happened afterwards? YES NO G11. Have you had ongoing negative feelings such as fear, horror, anger, guilt or shame because of your racism-related experiences? YES NO G12. Have you lost interest in activities you used to enjoy? YES NO G13. Have you been feeling detached, cut-off, or alienated from other people? YES NO G14. Have you had difficulty experiencing positive feelings? Or do you feel emotionally numb? YES NO Physiological Arousal & Reactivity (Need 2 for PTSD diagnosis) G15. Have you been more irritable or (physically or verbally) aggressive? YES NO G16. Have you been taking more risks or doing things that might harm you or others (e.g., reckless driving, taking drugs, having unprotected sex)? YES NO G17. Have you been overly alert or on-guard (e.g., checking to see who is around you, sitting in places where you can see everyone, etc.)? YES NO G18. Have you been jumpy or more easily startled? YES NO G19. Have you had a hard time staying focused or concentrating? YES NO G20. Have you had a hard time falling asleep or staying asleep? YES NO Dissociative Symptoms (Need 0 for PTSD diagnosis) Note: These may be more likely when you get upset or stressed, esp. when triggered by experiences of racism. G21. Do you ever have times that you feel detached from your body, disconnected from your sense of self, or like a robot? (depersonalization) YES NO 8 G22. Do you ever have times that everything seems rather unreal, dreamlike, distant, or distorted? (derealization) YES NO Distress & Interference (Need 1 for PTSD diagnosis) Clinically significant Not clinically significant G23. Have these difficulties been upsetting for you? (all symptoms discussed so far) YES NO G24. Have these difficulties been getting in the way of your everyday life (e.g., relationships, work, school, parenting, or other important activities)? YES NO Duration of Disturbance (Need 1 month or more for PTSD diagnosis) 1 month or more Less than 1 month G25. How long have you been feeling these things? YES NO For a DSM-5 diagnosis of PTSD, the examinee must have: q at least 1 symptom in the Re-Experiencing category, q at least 1 symptom in the Avoidance category, q at least 2 symptoms in the Negative Changes in Cognition & Mood category (count only one from #9 and only one from #10), q at least 2 symptoms in the Physiological Arousal & Reactivity category, q at least 0 symptoms in the Dissociative Symptoms category, q at least 1 symptom from the Distress & Interference category q The Duration of Disturbance must be a YES answer. Reference the DSM-5 for exclusion criteria. LIKELY DIAGNOSES: _____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
work_yts5eagk5zeslecftbdwx5sysi	----	Leitura Flutuante, n. 4, pp. 3-42, 2012. REGULATING HOMOPHOBIC HATE SPEECH: BACK TO BASICS ABOUT LANGUAGE AND POLITICS? Abstract: Recently, there has been an explosion of legislation designed to curb ‘hate crime’ that has been introduced by the previous Labour Government after 1997. This paper takes the most recent instance of incitement to hatred on grounds of sexual orientation as its starting point. I discuss the legisla- tion in the context of debates around free speech and artistic autonomy. Making use of post-stucturalist, psychoanalytic and discourse theories I argue that there are conceptual and practical difficulties attached to the regulation of hate spe- ech if analysed through a politics of subversive repetition. I conclude that a better approach is to think about language as reciprocal communication and to develop a politics of sustai- ned engagement with society that ultimately adopts a more voluntary approach to changing popular uses of language. Key-words: homophobia; hate; language; queer; politics. ARTIGOS Andy Harvey* On 9 July 2009 the House of Lords had the opportunity to debate for the second time in the space of eighteen mon- ths1 the issue of the law that criminalises incitement to hatred on the grounds of sexual orientation. More specifically their Lordships were concerned with the Government’s attempt 4Andy Harvey Leitura Flutuante, n. 4, pp. 3-42, 2012. to remove the amendment to the incitement to hatred provision, which the previous year the Lords had inserted into Part 3A of the Public Order Act 1986. The amendment purports to protect free speech by allowing, ‘In this Part, for the avoidance of doubt, the discussion or criticism of sexual conduct or practices shall not be taken of itself to be threatening or intended to stir up hatred.’ The debates in Parliament over incitement to hatred and the free speech amendment offer a timely opportunity to consider anew the issue of the regulation of what is generally called ‘hate speech’. The House of Lords felt obliged to retain the free speech amendment despite the fact that only the more extreme incidents of hate speech are the target of the law on incitement to hatred, because it merely prohibits words and materials that are threatening, and not just offensive or insulting. Proponents of legal regulation con- tend that threatening words and materials should be prohibited because they overstep the mark of acceptable boundaries of freedom of expression and generate a climate of fear within a culture of hate. One of the main arguments in favour of hate speech legislation is on the grounds that such speech may lead to violence or disorder, hence the incorporation into the Public Order Act of provisions to outlaw incitement to 5 Regulating Homophobic Hate Speech Leitura Flutuante, n. 4, pp. 3-42, 2012. hatred.2 Banning the most virulent forms of hate speech may also shift the centre of gravity of public discourse in a more favourable direction and it may then be possible to pay more attention to day-to-day insults and harassment (Iganski, 2008). In the light of the apparently endemic levels of homophobia in society in general (Dick, 2008; Kelley, 2009) and schools in particular (Hunt and Jensen, 2006; Guasp, 2009), is it not necessary to set some boundaries as to what it is and is not acceptable to say in respect of each other? Moreover, as studies of homophobic violence demonstrate, physical attacks are often accompanied by verbal insults (Perry, 2001; Mason, 2002; Chakraborti and Garland, 2009). Hate speech ‘can transform the generic hazards of hetero- -normativity into the tangible threat of more severe hostility’ (Mason, 2002: 84). On this analysis it is not possible to make any firm distinctions between attacks and insults – the boundaries become blurred. Legislating against hate speech, so advocates of legal regulation such as Stonewall suggest, sends a strong symbolic signal that such behaviour is unacceptable in a civilised society. This paper focuses on some of the theoretical debates on identity and the politics of identity that have surrounded hate speech and its regulation. In so doing I am interested in examining critically the practical political possibilities 6Andy Harvey Leitura Flutuante, n. 4, pp. 3-42, 2012. that arise out of those theories. Judith Butler subtitled, Excitable Speech, her intervention in 1997 into the field of hate speech, as A politics of the performative. She argues against legal regulation in favour of a politics of language in which the words of hate are taken and resignified, and in the process rendered (relatively) harmless (Butler, 1997). Butler’s work has been hugely influential and several of the other key writers that I discuss, such as Ruthann Ro- bson, Michael Cobb and Gavin Butt, also develop theory for explicitly political aims. These might be summed up as seeking queer3 liberation through language and imagery rather than through formal law. (Robson, 1998; Butt, 2005; Cobb, 2006). I aim to subject these claims to scrutiny and to answer the question: how might practical political possi- bilities arise from theoretical debates around hate speech and its regulation? Firstly I consider the question of how hate speech plays a role in the constitution of the identity of its tar- gets but in so doing I note the necessary limits placed on those who, through language, would attempt to construct the ‘other’ as objects of hate. Keeping in mind both the constituting effect of language and its limitations I go on to analyse the practical possibilities of language and ima- gery as tools of political liberation. I do so especially with 7 Regulating Homophobic Hate Speech Leitura Flutuante, n. 4, pp. 3-42, 2012. regard to subversive strategies adopted by some queer activist/artists and critically evaluate the effectiveness of such strategies based on the reworking of the words of hate. I conclude with a few instances of where we might look for evidence of a shift in public discourses away from homophobia and tentatively suggest an alternative way forward that brings back into view the notion of language as reciprocal communication. Hate speech and the construction of identity: the limits of power According to Barbara Perry, ‘hate speech and hate acts construct a hierarchy of identities in which the hegemonic form is affirmed simultaneously with the marginalisation of others’ (Perry, 2001: 180). However, as Raewyn (formerly Bob) Connell has pointed out, oppressed groups of men may, at certain times and places, reap some of the benefits of hegemonic masculinity – because they are still men. Further- more the dominant position is not fixed forever but is always contestable (Connell, 2005). By building on Foucault’s insights that power is disparate yet unevenly distributed within society (Foucault, 1976), a new analysis is possible, that opens up the option of examining the dynamics of homophobic hate speech in a way that allows space and provides opportunities for gay 8Andy Harvey Leitura Flutuante, n. 4, pp. 3-42, 2012. men and lesbians to resist and rework the definitions of others even while being constituted by them. If ‘one comes to exist by virtue of [the] fundamental dependency on the address of the “Other”’ (Butler, 1997: 6) then hate speech contributes, albeit in ways that may sometimes be unpalatable, to our notions of individual and group identities and, by extension, to the political priorities of social movements built around group identities. For example, Stonewall, the leading UK gay rights pressure group, came into existence as a response to Section 28 of the Local Government Act 1988, a particularly nasty and gratuitous piece of homophobic legislation that denigrated and profoundly disrespected gay lives. One con- sequence of that law was to galvanise and politicise many gay men and lesbians, so can, in this light, be seen as having a positive social effect, in direct contradiction to that which was intended by the Government of the day. In thinking about how hate speech operates in the construction of identities it is necessary to bear in mind Butler’s contention that ‘one cannot know in advance the meaning that the other will assign to one’s utterances’ (Bu- tler, 1997: 87). It follows that hate speech can be construed in ways contrary to which it was intended. People may present counter-arguments, ridicule its notions, be frightened by it, or treat it in myriad other ways on the grounds that ‘anything 9 Regulating Homophobic Hate Speech Leitura Flutuante, n. 4, pp. 3-42, 2012. [can] be made to look good or bad, important or unimportant, useful or useless, by being redescribed’ (Rorty, 1989: 7). Bu- tler takes up the same argument from a more psychoanalytic position when she counsels against hate speech legal regu- lation, arguing that all language can instead be resignified. She utilises Jacques Derrida’s concept of ‘mimesis’ in which he maintains that for speech to be a ‘speech act’ it must be iterable (Derrida, 1981). If the speech act can be iterated (or cited) then it can be repeated, but it can also, in a sort of linguistic turn on Darwinian evolution, be altered. The citation itself contains the necessary ingredients for ‘deviance, miscitation, recontextualisation, and the possible transformation or loss of an enunciation’ (Levinson, 1999: 84). We do not need to look outside of the speech act itself. Derrida’s insights, allied with Foucault’s notion of non-centred and disparate power provide the twin pillars for Butler’s theory of performati- vity and the opening up of an apparent space for political action. By also utilising Austin’s theories of illocutionary and perlocutionary speech (Austin, 1962) language is shown to have a communicative quality and construed as meaningful by the listener (Hornsby, 2003). In these ways we can see how spe- ech becomes detached from the speaker and is subject to interpretation by the listener. 10Andy Harvey Leitura Flutuante, n. 4, pp. 3-42, 2012. Hate speech, as a species in the genus of dominant discourses, helps to construct ‘other’ identities not just as individuals, but as part of a group. Gail Mason goes on to complicate this picture by drawing on Hannah Arendt’s distinc- tion between ‘what’ we are and ‘who’ we are (Arendt, 1958; Mason, 2002). Put simply, ‘what’ we are can be conceived of as our public identity, or how we are constituted by others through discourse. Hate speech and, it is argued here, hate speech legal regulation, has the effect of constructing gay men and lesbians as victims, a status which becomes known to the individual. Mason contends that this public identity is complemented, often in a contradictory way, by a private notion of ‘who’ we are. We may, on this analysis, be publicly apprehensive (behaving as a victim) as a consequence of the prevalence of hate speech within dominant discourses, but we may also be intensely proud of ‘who’ we are even if we don’t feel confident enough to express that pride in all the ways that we might wish. This is a useful insight that points up some of the limitations of perpetrators of hate speech to be able to fashion people solely as silent objects of hatred. It also opens up a space for personal agency in the construction of identity. Although Mason recognises the public (what) / private (why) divide is permeable it remains a key element in Arendt’s 11 Regulating Homophobic Hate Speech Leitura Flutuante, n. 4, pp. 3-42, 2012. original analysis but it is a problematic way of conceiving identity as queer theorist, the late Eve Sedgwick argued in compelling fashion in her nuanced writing on the complexi- ties of gender and sexual identifications (Sedgwick, 2008). Making such a firm division understates the way that the public and private seep between each other: the proud gay man may not feel quite so proud as he drops his partner’s hand as a consequence of the audible mutterings of others. Those mutterings do not even need to be hostile since they can easily be interpreted as such within a cultural regime of hate and violence. On the other hand the gay men may continue, proudly, defiantly, to hold hands visibly. Or they may just ignore the ‘noises off’ or just not connect it with themselves. As Butler argues, subjectification is a complex and uncertain business and ‘not all utterances that have the form of the performative ... actually work’ (Butler, 1997: 16). In other words, the ‘attempt to name us in insulting terms is precisely that: an attempt’ (Mason, 2002: 115). The insult may miss its mark in all sorts of ways in the process of interpretation by the listener. Language, it might be said, ‘marks the finitude of the subject’s mastery, for numerous reasons, one being that it pivots on the other’s understanding which no speech act can determine’ (Levinson, 1999: 88). 12Andy Harvey Leitura Flutuante, n. 4, pp. 3-42, 2012. Not only can speech acts never completely constitute the ‘other’ but attempts at such constitution can also be resisted. Even if hate speech does hit home ‘one is also pa- radoxically, given certain possibilities for social existence’ (Butler, 1997: 2) through the process of resignifying the offending words. Furthermore if identity is performative then it relies on continual repetition and, since being inter- pellated by hate speech is only temporary and transient, it cannot define one’s identity. To sum up: ‘no command ever fully hailed the subject into being’ (Levinson, 1999: 89). This argument appears sound but it is worth remembering the recent research undertaken by Stonewall. It is the repetitive nature of homophobic bullying that makes it so psycholo- gically and physically debilitating (i.e. constituting) for its victim. Lucy, 25, says: ‘insults and minor attacks are a part of our day-to-day lives and so often we do not realise we should report them or seek help. From an early age, we are bullied in the playground, attacked for who we are or beaten for who we date’ (Dick, 2008: 4). Mason rightly cautions that it is important to acknowledge the constitutive power of hate speech while recognising the space for agency as well. Ho- wever, in the context of her argument that agency is opened up in the ‘who’ we are it is worth noting that Lucy speaks of being bullied for ‘who’ she is rather than for ‘what’ she is. 13 Regulating Homophobic Hate Speech Leitura Flutuante, n. 4, pp. 3-42, 2012. Persistent and repetitive bullying can break down the already shaky public/private divide and invade deep into the ‘who’, acting upon and constituting the individual, even if it does not (cannot) succeed in totally defining that person. Rethinking the political possibilities of language Post-stucturalist theory sets great store by the contin- gency of language, selfhood and community: it is to language that we must look for political strategies rather than any appeal to a shared ‘human nature’. Richard Rorty argues that funda- mental cultural shifts can take place through language to the extent that he posits, ‘Europe did not decide to accept the idiom of Romantic poetry, or of socialist politics, or Galilean mechanics... Rather, Europe gradually lost the habit of using certain words and gradually acquired the habit of using certain others’ (Rorty, 1989: 6). Leaving to one side whether a whole continent can possess agency (Elsthain, 1992), in Rorty’s view the power of language enables a restructuring of the very thought of entire civilisations. The implications of this are profound in our quest to tackle homophobia; it might, in Rorty’s account, be literally talked out of existence by adop- ting different words and sentences that then become the established vocabulary. By definition, this new vocabulary is as contingent as the one it replaces thus emphasising the 14Andy Harvey Leitura Flutuante, n. 4, pp. 3-42, 2012. necessity for constant political vigilance. Butler is equally optimistic about the power of language to effect change. She argues that ‘one of the tasks of a critical production of alternative homosexualities will be to disjoin homosexuality from the figures by which it is conveyed in dominant dis- course’ (Butler, 1997: 125). Rorty and Butler provide some of the foundational postmodern conceptual tools with which we might refashion the world in and through language. How might we go about doing this? What problems arise? What, if any, evidence is there of success? a) The ‘emancipatory violence’ of words A most imaginative reworking of the violence of homo- phobia into something positive is provided by Ruthann Robson. From an understanding that violence, especially violence from the law, is a feature of lesbian life, she re-imagines violence not in terms of the victimisation that is offered by social movements such as Stonewall, but as a positive attribute of lesbianism. It is a violence that is borne out of but then directed against ‘the law’s system of heterosexual and male hegemony’ (Robson, 1998: 16). She uses the metaphor of ‘fire’ to represent violence since fire encapsulates destruction but is also essential in the process of renewal. Out of violence comes rebirth, the Phoenix arises, or in the popular rendition of Nietzsche’s famous maxim: ‘that which does not kill me 15 Regulating Homophobic Hate Speech Leitura Flutuante, n. 4, pp. 3-42, 2012. makes me stronger’. There is an undoubted attraction in being able not just to resist violence but to use its force for good. Robson argues, from Derrida, that all law must be, by definition, coercive (Moran and Skeggs, 2004). As illustra- tion, in 1990 the US passed the Hate Crime Statistics Act in order to record the incidence of hate crime but in so doing it also included provisions disallowing queers similar legal protections that are afforded to racial minorities, thus per- petrating a legal violence against gay men and lesbians. In the same way we recall that the free speech amendment of the Public Order Act 1986 enshrines in law that ‘In this Part, for the avoidance of doubt, the discussion or criticism of sexual conduct or practices or the urging of persons to refrain from or modify such conduct or practices shall not be taken of itself to be threatening or intended to stir up hatred.’ Robson might argue that this legal provision is violent towards queers in ways that go beyond this explicit amendment. The ‘protective’ ele- ment of the statute, referring to ‘sexual orientation’ and operating equally in favour of homosexuals and heterose- xuals, ‘obscures power differentials between heterosexuals and homosexuals’, and ‘the degendering of the category of sexual orientation is a violence against lesbians’ (Robson, 1998: 21). She would refuse, though, to accept the label of victim that this statute attempts to pin on queers but would 16Andy Harvey Leitura Flutuante, n. 4, pp. 3-42, 2012. seek instead to rework the violence of the law through the violence implied in ‘the fire that warms us [as well as] burns us’ and that is ‘directed at emancipatory change’ as opposed to ‘conservative change’ (Robson, 1998: 27). Robson’s study provides queer activists with a possi- ble way of conceiving of violence as a positive political tool. However, a number of dangers reside within her analysis. Leslie Moran and Beverley Skeggs are especially concerned that she makes such a clear divide between ‘emancipatory’ (lesbian) and ‘conservative’ (legal) violence. She seems to be saying that lesbian violence will be emancipatory almost by definition without considering the possibility of a conservative effect. In so doing she seems to overlook Derrida’s insight that language contains within itself its own possibilities for its opposites: the emancipatory must, therefore, contain an element of the conservative (Moran and Skeggs, 2004). At a practical level, violence, in the form of direct action, is not a new political tool used by gay activists; the AIDS Coalition to Unleash Power (ACT UP) have used tactics such as trashing the conference display stands of pharmaceutical companies as part of their campaign to raise awareness of corporate profiteering from AIDS. The political dangers of direct action were brought into sharp relief during the 1990 US presidential campaign of Pat Robertson, a homophobic evangelical preacher, when he 17 Regulating Homophobic Hate Speech Leitura Flutuante, n. 4, pp. 3-42, 2012. announced that the core of his campaign would be opposition to abortion and homosexuality. ‘Robertson’s announcement was greeted by an angry group of activists, many from ACT UP... Robertson could not have prayed for a better greeting. In photos published across the country, the angry mob, to- ting ROBERTSON EQUALS DEATH posters, managed to make Robertson look reasonable by comparison’ (Gallagher and Bull, 1996: 16). Ruthann Robson provides us with a way of thinking about hate speech that does not necessarily render its target constituted as victim, but we need to remain alive to the fact that language, even emancipatory language, can escape from the intentions of the speaker. To overcome this problem it may be useful to think about the politics of language in rather different terms. b) Disclosing the ‘queer Word’ Michael Cobb offers a similar vision to Robson in that he wishes to turn the rhetoric of violence, particularly the rhetorics of religious violence into a positive political stra- tegy. Whereas Butler’s psychoanalytic treatment proposes a resignification of language that slips into and out of the gaps where hate speech misses its targets, Cobb wishes to ‘mine the hostility and politics of the old and very rhetorical forms of national [US] belonging that have always been religiously legitimated by... instances of strong conservative language’ 18Andy Harvey Leitura Flutuante, n. 4, pp. 3-42, 2012. (Cobb, 2006: 10). In so doing he eschews the politics of difference because different identities are significantly constituted by the dominant discourses, including hate speech, of the nation state. Instead he ‘advocates a politics already embedded in the worst words of the nation’ because, ‘despite the particular rhetorical violence inflicted perniciously upon queers by conservative, collective expressions of US be- longing, LGBTQ feeling, politics, aesthetics, and ideologies have long understood the kind of power the repetition of religious hate speech offers’ (Cobb, 2006: 10). Contrary to Rorty or Butler, Cobb is not trying to wrest the meanings of words to make different ends, but to harness the emotional power of those words, especially the power of religious feeling, so as to effect a queering of religious hate speech, which he calls the ‘queer Word’. Cobb argues that the emotive language of religious hate speech, because it resembles racist speech, enables queers to access the political territory of resistance staked out by African Americans in their demands for civil rights. While acknowledging the difficulties that such an analogy ine- vitably raises (Butler, 1997; Robson, 1998), Cobb maintains that the repetition of religious hate speech allows queers to tap into the politics of race. Crucially he argues that the analogy makes use of the troubled politics of identity such 19 Regulating Homophobic Hate Speech Leitura Flutuante, n. 4, pp. 3-42, 2012. that ‘the rhetorical connection that queers make to race is emotional, sentimental, and charged with a peculiar political force’ (Cobb, 2006: 13). He insists that the sites of political resistance lie primarily in the literary and figurative and that these sites open up possibilities for strategic fictions that explore the notion of what it means ‘to feel like, rather than be, a racial minority’ (Cobb, 2006: 14). He understands that the ‘like race’ analogy is essentially phantasmatic, but one that can and must be manipulated for queer cultural and political advantage; a quest for freedom rather than a search for truth. Cobb’s notion of freedom is no Rortyan ‘shining city on a hill’ liberal utopia, but it does make use of the emotional strength of such evocative religious phrases, for Cobb’s crucial insight is that religious words do not actually mean very much. The constant liturgical repetition has di- sembowelled religious words of meaning but endowed them with a massive feeling of power. Take the word ‘Amen’: to discuss what this word ac- tually means is to miss the point, for ‘it is a strong speech act, enabling the religious thought, experience, or emotion to have definitive weight’ (Cobb, 2006: 69). Religious words imbue political and legal discourse for this very reason; they shroud those discourses in a sense or feeling of power that no meaning could ever convey. Therefore, Cobb argues, a 20Andy Harvey Leitura Flutuante, n. 4, pp. 3-42, 2012. queer political strategy should not engage with a Butlerian ‘resignification’ project which he sees as offering mainly a therapeutic role, carving out a space in language in an otherwise hostile environment, having forever to guard the gates of a fragile edifice that we, ourselves, have built. Instead he argues for a wholesale queer adoption of the religious language, the language of hate. Such an adoption would give queer access to an almost primal, elemental set of words that give the appearance of being sovereign and ‘essential’, and which enable the expression of queer desire as queer emotion. It is the through the arousal of emotion, rather than the confession of desire where Cobb sees political possibilities. Cobb’s project is of great value in opening up a po- tential means by which the most powerful words, the words given sovereign force, can be used queerly. There is a certain practicality about the project as well; many people cannot be or do not want always to be political storm troopers on the queer front line, but may also wish to lead private lives of honesty and fulfilment to their queer selves. Accessing the religious language of hate and turning it into the expression of queer emotion, while at the same time maintaining a de- gree of personal safety in a hostile world, has its attractions. However, Cobb’s attempts to develop a political strategy out 21 Regulating Homophobic Hate Speech Leitura Flutuante, n. 4, pp. 3-42, 2012. of an arousal of queer emotion elicits a problem with the very advantage his theory allows; the fact that using religious lan- guage allows for the expression of queer feelings while at the same time disguising queer desire. He acknowledges that his political project is to be undertaken obliquely but by failing to change the meaning of language of hate then it is hard to see what political progress can be made. Anger may have been stirred but there are few clues as to how it might be channelled and utilised for queer liberation. Cobb seems to be weighed down by the forces of societal oppression and although he suggests an interesting way out, it is surely not correct to start a political campaign from a position where you believe that the ‘historical story of queer difference can never compete with the guaranteed force and meaning of the sovereign’s word – the force and meaning that comes, in part, from its hatred of queers’ (Cobb, 2006: 70). By ad- mitting that queers will never be able to compete successfully against sovereign oppression Cobb offers a personal survival tactic, not so very different from his accusation against Butler, rather than a political strategy. A partial answer to the problem might lie in strategic use of the Althusserian notion of interpellation. In his inves- tigation of queer disclosures in the New York art world Gavin Butt contends that queer artists, in a period (1948 – 1963) 22Andy Harvey Leitura Flutuante, n. 4, pp. 3-42, 2012. of extreme hostility against gays, were forced to conceal their sexuality from public view. However, on an interpreta- tive register, art could reveal sexuality to those who could decode it; like a dog whistle, art has the power to call to perverse identifications, which remain invisible or silent to the majority who lack the interpretative skills (Butt, 2005). These days we might call it our ‘gaydar’, picking up the signals that hail us. In Go Tell It on the Mountain, published in 1953 at the height of McCarthyism, James Baldwin invests the cha- racter John with the full emotive force of religious language. In this way John is singing a powerful ‘hidden’ song to queers all around him, giving them, in turn, voices through powerful emotive language and identification through ‘the realm of the interpretative imaginary’ (Butt, 2005: 109). This interpretati- ve imaginary is so strong that it can decode silence itself as queer and at the same time, as Cobb predicts, may forestall it being returned as violence. For instance, Allen Ginsberg’s 1956 poem, Howl, ‘a supremely campy poem’ (Bergman, 1993: 107), was the subject of a US obscenity trial for the line ‘Who let themselves be.... [six dots] in the... [three dots] by saintly motorcyclists and screamed with joy’. The judge ruled that the prosecution case was inadmissible since they could only speculate as to the missing words. ‘The law, at least in respect of the homoeroticism of Howl, was therefore only interested 23 Regulating Homophobic Hate Speech Leitura Flutuante, n. 4, pp. 3-42, 2012. in that which was legible as cultural text. The realm of the interpretative imaginary, and its plural and oscillating field of identifications, was consigned to the realm of the unreal, to that which was not “really there” and therefore unavailable to be legislated against’ (Butt, 2005: 159). It should be noted here that by remaining at least partially hidden, queer artists did nothing to diminish the culture of suspicion entertained by McCarthyite inquisitors, that closeted homosexuals occupied positions power and influence in the highest reaches US so- ciety; in fact it fuelled that suspicion. Nevertheless our brief consideration here of Baldwin’s novel and Ginsberg’s poem brings us to a point where we can consider in more detail the role of subversive strategies adopted by queer activist/artists in a quest for political freedoms. Artistic freedom and subversive strategies Set free by post-stucturalist theories, queer activists were quick to appropriate language and imagery ‘as a means of subverting and attacking it from within’ (Adler, 1996: 1504). What are the implications of this for hate speech regulation? Despite attempts at its re-appropriation by gay activists, the term ‘queer’, for example, still remains a term of abuse. Can we both ban the speech that hates while at the same time retain the subversive parodies that may help us? Is it 24Andy Harvey Leitura Flutuante, n. 4, pp. 3-42, 2012. possible, for example, to ban homophobic graffiti that says ‘Fight AIDS Kill a Quere [sic]’ (Adler, 1996: 1523) yet allow gay artist David Wojnarovicz to photograph and display the same words to highlight the ignorance of those who misspell queer as ‘quere’? Amy Adler suggests that a number of cri- teria might be developed to help in the task. These are: (1) artistic status, (2) context, (3) effect, or victim’s assessment of harm, and (4) speaker’s intent. There are a great number of difficulties in determining artistic value or context, but perhaps more than anything we should be wary of giving the courts the job of making those decisions (Adler, 1996; Butler, 1997; Zingo, 1998). Even if we are prepared to trust in the judgement of the courts, Adler maintains that there is an inherent conflict between criteria (3) and (4) that is impos- sible to resolve. What can be done in the situation where the speaker says, ‘I was being satirical, or ironic, in my use of hate speech’ but the ‘victim’ says, ‘I was hurt by those words’? This is not, in any sense, an academic debate. In 2006 the BBC received a complaint from a viewer who found the Catherine Tate Show offensive because viewers were invited to laugh at the obvious and exaggerated gayness of the character Derek Faye. In this case the BBC Board of Go- vernors ruled in favour of the show because the series was dominated by extreme, ridiculous characters that were ‘not 25 Regulating Homophobic Hate Speech Leitura Flutuante, n. 4, pp. 3-42, 2012. meant to be taken literally or too seriously’ (Sherwin, 2006). This is not a conflict that can be resolved by any appeal to theory. Adler maintains that if hate speech is banned then much activist speech will get caught up in the same net on the ‘effect’ criteria. If activist speech escapes on the ‘in- tent’ principle then many victims may feel that they have been hurt. A better question is to ask whether activist/artist pa- rodies are so subversive in the first place and, even if they are, do they work on a political level? Counter-hate speech strategies are dependent, at least partly, on parody to work their seditious magic. The hate-filled text stands, usually quite clearly, in the background and irony is the rhetorical mechanism by which the parodic text can be distinguished from the original. It is the recognition of the irony within the reworked text that ‘allows the decoder to interpret and eva- luate’ (Hutcheon, 2000: 31) the new subversive text. ‘Parody, then, in its ironic ‘trans-contextualisation’ and inversion, is repetition with difference’ (Hutcheon, 2000: 32). Parody, therefore, is said to work through the practice of resigni- fication because as ‘Nietzsche writes in the Genealogy of Morals, ‘the entire history of a “thing”, an organ, a custom can be a continuous sign-chain of ever new interpretations and adaptations’ (Butler, 1993: 224). No words are fixed 26Andy Harvey Leitura Flutuante, n. 4, pp. 3-42, 2012. forever in their meaning. It is, of course, this mutability of language that poses such difficulties for effective legislation against hate speech. In fact the subversive political goal is to effect such a change. However, Butler herself warns of some of the limitations of resignification because ‘neither power nor discourse are rendered anew at every moment; they are not as weightless as the utopics of radical resig- nification might imply’ (Butler, 1993: 224). The problem is that the parodic text never completely escapes its source; to do so would, by definition, stop it from being parodic. This is the consequence of Derrida’s insights: at the limit pa- rody is impossible. Therefore, the paradox of parody is that ‘its transgression is always authorised. In imitating, even with critical difference, parody reinforces. In Foucauldian terms, transgression becomes the affirmation of limited being’ (Hutcheon, 2000: 26). It is the trope of irony that creates the critical distan- ce that enables parody to go about its political business. This work must, as we have seen, be a limited project. It cannot, within its own terms, overturn the weight of history. In the same way as censors are often compelled to repeat the speech they wish to ban, then parodists, however subversive, are condemned to re-inflict the wounds they seek to heal. The question, then, becomes more a question 27 Regulating Homophobic Hate Speech Leitura Flutuante, n. 4, pp. 3-42, 2012. of balance and judgement; is it better to allow activist/ artist subversive parodists to work, or is it necessary to ban the ‘words that wound’ (Matsuda, 1989; Matsuda, Lawrence, Delgado and Crenshaw, 1993; Lawrence, 1999)? Does David Wojnarovicz’s photograph work better to ridicule the perpe- trators of hate, or worse to repeat the harm? Does the 1992 cult film Romper Stomper which portrays the hate-filled violence of an Australian fascist group, better show their ignorance, lack of trust in each other and ideological hollo- wness, or does it merely reiterate Nazism as a legitimate political creed? These examples highlight one of the key practical difficulties of irony as politics; the ironic intent, in order to work, needs to be decoded correctly by the recipient. It often fails in this task.4 Back to basics? Language for the purpose of communication Has the post-stucturalist political project come up short against the internal limits of its own linguistic possibilities? Brett Levinson, for one, seems to think so. He utilises Jacques Lacan’s idea that ‘his majesty, the baby’ is introduced to the limits of his own power because his demands on the supplier (usually the mother) cannot be met. In other words the limits of language are exposed to the baby. He contends that while language ‘discloses a limit, it does not represent a prohibition’ 28Andy Harvey Leitura Flutuante, n. 4, pp. 3-42, 2012. (Levinson, 1999: 90). The problem is that the subject, formed through experiences as a baby, has misrecognised the limits of language as a prohibition rather than an opening up, implied by the limit that is also a boundary, to the social world. Since the subject has made this misrecognition then it is forever trying to reclaim its (imaginary) independence. The conse- quence is that the subject will always seek to transcend the prohibitive statute in order to attempt to free itself from the limits (misrecognised as prohibitions) of language. In this way, ‘legal injunctions... license their own subversion’ (Levinson, 1999: 90). It is clear, from this analysis, that a counter-hate speech subversive strategy contains within it the elements of its own structural weakness. It is argued here that the insights provided by psychoanalytic theory would indicate that a better policy may be to encourage the subject to engage with the ‘other’ since the function of language is relational, binding the self to the social (Ben- jamin, 1998). Understanding the finitude of language, and therefore also of law, acts as a warning to those who would displace one law with another because, ‘no law can dictate the precise line, limit, or boundary between what it permits and what it prohibits... the limit of the law is the limit of the law, the finitude of its determination or domain, as well as of its counter-determination’ (Levinson, 1999: 91). So much 29 Regulating Homophobic Hate Speech Leitura Flutuante, n. 4, pp. 3-42, 2012. then for Butler’s queer political project (Butler, 1990; 1993; 1997) which Levinson dismisses as an attempt by the (albeit newly empowered) queer subject to make itself the imagi- nary and, therefore, doomed master, and which must fall on exposure to its inevitable limit. In Excitable Speech, Butler may have overstated the political case for resignification, not fully taking into account Derrida’s insight that words must always and forever contain within themselves the seeds of their own destruction. Ho- wever, there may be a better way of reading Derrida that provides more fruitful political possibilities. Rorty argues that a more productive understanding of Derrida, taken from his later writings5, is to say that he uses language to enter a phantasmatic world whereby he is able to recontextualise his philosopher predecessors, especially Hegel, Nietzsche and Heidegger, without falling into an essentialist identity trap of “we” which would fix them (and him) in language (Rorty, 1989). From here it is arguable that Michael Cobb has avoi- ded Butler’s pitfall as he does not attempt to overthrow the current master signifier and replace it with a new one, but to utilise the current one for new, darkly phantasmatic, que- er purposes. He argues for a political project that appropria- tes the language of hate that is religious language in order to evoke a fiction, the fiction being that ‘queer’ is ‘like race’ 30Andy Harvey Leitura Flutuante, n. 4, pp. 3-42, 2012. thus appealing to the heart rather than to the head. It is in this emotional appeal that Cobb’s theory escapes the pro- blems of resignification because it is not concerned with the meanings of words, but rather with the raw feelings those words might conjure. In other words, ‘within that awful aes- thetic, we have a babbling that produces an emotional for- ce that impresses an intense feeling of wrong’ (Cobb, 2006: 99). By strategically utilising the notion of interpellation we can see how these queer emotions can have a communicati- ve, and therefore, political purpose. If liberationist politics are not about a shared sense of anger and resentment then what are they about? Cobb argues for hitching a ride on the politics of civil rights through the queer appropriation of the language of emotion. We may be able to go further: Gavin Butt considers that it is impossible to recapture a queer his- tory, and therefore queer liberation, through the traditio- nal techniques of study of documents and other artefacts because the homosexual will inevitably have been erased from that history. No amount of pointing to rare examples of queer visibility such as the seventeenth-century London molly houses (Cook, 2003; Cocks and Houlbrook, 2006) will make up for the long stretches of historical silence. So what to do? Butt suggests taking the scraps of knowledge and the fragile ways we know the things we think we know and 31 Regulating Homophobic Hate Speech Leitura Flutuante, n. 4, pp. 3-42, 2012. to build structures of new knowledge from those tenuous foundations with our own imagination as the architect. He shows us how by exploring the gossip that surrounded and was part of the New York art world in an extended decade of the 1950s. He takes that gossip, or what he presumes to be that gossip, and produces his own new history. In so doing he recaptures Andy Warhol’s ‘swish gayness’ and Jasper Johns’ rejected artwork6. His book ‘revels in... flirtatious queer- ness – both in terms of subject and method’ (Butt, 2005: 164). Queer knowledge needs queer methods for discovering that knowledge. Imagination can be called upon as part of the queer political project since existing knowledge is al- ready saturated by hetero-normative fictions. Phantasmatic ways of understanding the past, attuning ourselves to hear the hushed calls of our queer predecessors, are necessary to unearth and reveal a new queer historical record. In this way it is possible to reunite post-stucturalist theories with a politics of identity that may escape the theoretical and practical holes in which ‘resignification’ finds itself. Conclusion How might some of these theoretical considerations help us think about the politics of hate and the development of counter-strategies to those who do the hating? I will offer 32Andy Harvey Leitura Flutuante, n. 4, pp. 3-42, 2012. two recent but different approaches to try to ground some of the theory in the urgent matter of day-to-day politics. A recent 60-second film commissioned by the Football Association shows a man making homophobic abusive com- ments to people on the street, on a train and in a workplace and, finally, at a football game7. The idea behind the film is to highlight that homophobic abuse is unacceptable in daily life so why should it be acceptable at a football match? The film attempts a resignification of language by bringing wi- thin the scope of meaning of homophobic speech a notion of unacceptability, even to imbue homophobic language with the idea that it is deplorable. The problems are clear. Some people may regard homophobic abuse as acceptable and the message will be resisted or simply not recognised. In a strategy that echoes the theoretical work of Michael Cobb the film uses the very language of hate to underscore its message. It is debateable whether this approach offers a path towards queer freedom or if it merely re-inflicts the harms it wishes to avoid: possibly there is an element of both and it is a question of judgement whether it is effective. It may even, in a Foucaultian process of reverse discourse, help constitute and embolden those who would hate. Perhaps the film misses its mark most significantly by failing to recognise that as Ignanski shows, it is precisely on the street, train and 33 Regulating Homophobic Hate Speech Leitura Flutuante, n. 4, pp. 3-42, 2012. workplace that hate speech is to be found in its day-to-day manifestations. These are not arenas where hate is found to be unacceptable: it is tolerated all too often. A rather different approach has been taken in the critical field of education by the No Outsiders project which aims to integrate anti-homophobia materials across the breadth of school life, both inside and beyond the curriculum. Evidence over the twenty-eight month project demonstrated significant positive changes in attitudes to- wards gay people from pupils, parents and staff (DePalma and Atkinson, 2009). This project spurns an easy approach to tackling homophobia through a simple resignification of lan- guage but offers instead a sustained engagement with people and the issues. It is a practical example of how language can be put to its communicative purpose so that it opens the subject to the social world. Rather than attempting to close down language and keep the ‘other’ at bay, it provides a space for engagement and, at least partial mutual understanding, even if we can never know the ‘other’ fully. This approach does not interpellate queer identities by stealth but rather calls us into the full light of day. It is, of course, a strategy not without its risks as it pulls down defensive shields that 34Andy Harvey Leitura Flutuante, n. 4, pp. 3-42, 2012. might otherwise protect us. But those defences, otherwise known as the closet’s walls, are shaky, unreliable and with no foundation in queer lives. The debates will and must continue, but as we move towards the second decade of the twenty-first century it is certain that, as a consequence of feminist, post-stucturalist and queer thinking, the oppressed ‘other’ has become more visible and revealed in a positive light. At the same time it is arguable that the discourse of hate, at least in the form of ‘discrimination’, may also have altered for the better in the last twenty years. Jon Gould makes the point that speech codes, which in the US have been struck down under the First Amendment, are, in fact, endemic throughout US society. He argues that this apparent paradox can be explained because the ideological basis of speech codes, such as respect for others, has taken hold at the level of the public. Gould calls it the ‘mass constitutionalism of hate speech regulation’ (Gould, 2006: 184). Such codes may be voluntary but all the more powerful for that. Similarly in the United Kingdom, most large employers have equal opportunities policies that ban certain forms of discriminatory language, even if obedience is partial and enforcement patchy. Educational establishments usually insist, at least in theory if not always in practice, on mu- tual respect in and out of the classroom in order not just 35 Regulating Homophobic Hate Speech Leitura Flutuante, n. 4, pp. 3-42, 2012. to enable equal access to learning but also to promote a harmonious educational atmosphere. In some parts of the public realm at least, there appears to have been a shift in discourse at the levels of policy and practice (Anderson, 2009; 2011). Perhaps we really are witnessing in this process a ‘Rortyan’ redescription of vocabularies in which the language of hate slowly disappears as individuals and eventually who- le societies lose the habit of using such language. Rorty was ever the utopian! These are, though, grounds for optimism. There is some embryonic evidence that a more voluntary approach, using language as a means to connect subjects to the social world, with sustained education and awareness campaigns, perhaps enhanced with occasional splashes of ironic humour, can help change public and private discourses in positive ways. 36Andy Harvey Leitura Flutuante, n. 4, pp. 3-42, 2012. Notes * Andy Harvey is a Doctoral student in the Department of Psychosocial Studies at Birkbeck, University of London. His research interests are in sport, gender and sexuality. His peer-reviewed articles include, “Staging the Sixties, ‘This Sporting Life’ by David Storey”, Thirdspace journal (accepted for publication), “Regulating Homophobic Hate Speech”, Sexualities Journal (March 2012), “Tom Brown’s Schooldays: ‘Sportsex’ in Victorian Britain”, Critical Survey (May 2012). He is the winner of the 2012 Sport Literature Association’s Lyle Olsen award for best graduate essay for “It’s only a game? Sport, sexuality and war in Don DeLillo’s End Zone”. 1 The House of Lords first debated the provision between Ja- nuary and May 2008 during the passage through Parliament of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008. 2 The first conviction under the provision was on January 20th 2012 at Derby Crown Court. For a discussion on the nuga- tory effect of the incitement provisions in relation to religious hatred see Goodall, K, (2007) ‘Incitement to Religious Hatred: All Talk and No Substance?’ Modern Law Review 70(1): 89 -113. 3 The term ‘queer’ is used in this paper not only to mean 37 Regulating Homophobic Hate Speech Leitura Flutuante, n. 4, pp. 3-42, 2012. gay men and lesbians but also to imply a political agenda of rights and freedoms. 4 A famous example of this phenomenon was the British sitcom, ‘Till Death Us Do Part’ where the racist protagonist, Alf Garnett, was favourably received by the majority of viewers in complete contrast to the intentions of the scriptwriter and actor. 5 Rorty discusses Derrida’s 1987 book, ‘The Post Card: From Socrates to Freud and Beyond’, especially ‘Envois’, as an excursion into fantasy, albeit only in a private context. 6 In 1958 the curator of the Museum of Modern Art in New York refused to buy John’s ‘Target with Plaster Casts’ because one of the casts was of a penis. 7 The film can be found at http://www.kickitout.org/1057. php (accessed 2 May 2010). 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Normativita Fatti Valori. Macerata: Quodlibet pp. 297-310... HUNT, R. and Jensen, J. (2006). The School Report: The ex- perience of young gay people in Britain’s schools. London: Stonewall. HUTCHEON, L. (2000). A Theory of Parody: The Teachings of Twentieth-Century Art Forms. Urbana: University of Illinois Press. IGANSKI, P. (2008). Hate Crime and the City. Bristol: Policy Press. KELLEY, P. (2009). Filling in the Blanks: LGBT hate crime in London: London: GALOP. Kick it Out (2012) Let’s Kick Racism out of Football. Available at: http://www.kickitout.org/1057.php (accessed 1 June 2012). 41 Regulating Homophobic Hate Speech Leitura Flutuante, n. 4, pp. 3-42, 2012. LAWRENCE, F.M. (1999). Punishing Hate: Bias Crimes under American Law. London: Harvard University Press. LEVINSON, B. (1999). ‘Sex without Sex, Queering the Market, the Collapse of the Political, the Death of Difference, and AIDS: Hailing Judith Butler’. Diacritics 29: 81 – 101. MASON, G. (2002). The Spectacle of Violence: Homophobia, gender and knowledge. London: Routledge. MATSUDA, M. (1989). ‘Public Responses to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim’s Story’. Michigan Law Review 87: 2320 – 2381. MATSUDA, M., Lawrence, C., Delgado, R. and Crenshaw, K.W. (1993). Words that Wound : critical race theory, assaultive speech, and the First Amendment. Boulder, Colorado: Wes- tview Press. MORAN, L. J. and SKEGGS, B. (2004). Sexuality and the Politics of Violence and Safety. London: Routledge. PERRY, B. (2001). In the Name of Hate: Understanding Hate Crimes. London: Routledge. ROBSON, R. (1998). Sappho Goes to Law School. New York: Colombia University Press. RORTY, R. (1989). Contingency, irony, and solidarity. Cam- bridge: Cambridge University Press. 42Andy Harvey Leitura Flutuante, n. 4, pp. 3-42, 2012. SEDGWICK, E. K. (2008). Epistemology of the Closet, Second edition. Berkeley: University of California Press. SHERWIN, A. (2006). Gay means rubbish, says BBC. London: The Times, June 6 2006. ZINGO, M. T. (1998). Sex/Gender Outsiders, Hate Speech, and Freedom of Expression: Can they say that about me? Westport: Praeger. 
work_yvilwik375duzd72nl4wd3duka	----	James Jennings | Professor Emeritus, Urban & Environmental Policy & Planning, Tufts University Skip to primary content James Jennings Professor Emeritus, Urban & Environmental Policy & Planning, Tufts University Search Main menu Home Research Interests Books Articles & Chapters Research & Evaluation Reports Professional & Public Service Welcome James Jennings received a B.A. from Hunter College in 1971, and a Ph.D. in Political Science from Columbia University in 1976. His dissertation is titled, “Puerto Rican Leadership Patterns in New York City”. He was appointed Professor of Urban and Environmental Policy and Planning at Tufts University in 2001. Professor Jennings has taught graduate courses on social policy and community development; and race and class in U.S. society. Between 1979 and 1983 he served on the faculty of Harvard University as Assistant Professor of Afro American Studies. He taught the following undergraduate courses: Black Politics; Ethnic Politics; Black Urban Communities; Politics of Urban Education; Puerto Rican Politics; and Black Political Thought. In 1983 he was appointed Dean of the College of Public and Community Service at the University of Massachusetts Boston. After serving five years in this position, he was appointed Director of the William Monroe Trotter Institute and then Senior Fellow at The Trotter Institute and Professor of Political Science in the Africana Studies Department until 2001 when he joined the faculty of Tufts University as a full professor. Professor Jennings has held visiting appointments at Northeastern University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology; and Yale University. See James Jennings Vitae > Contact James Jennings > Proudly powered by WordPress Disclaimer | Non-Discrimination | Privacy | Terms for Creating and Maintaining Sites 
work_yvspegftdvchbfvlpysxj46cua	----	Apprendicitis 2000] 419 APPRENDICITIS: A TROUBLING DIAGNOSIS FOR THE SENTENCING OF HACKERS, THIEVES, FRAUDSTERS, AND TAX CHEATS Justin A. Thornton* Mark H. Allenbaugh** [T]he immediate aim of criminal legislation cannot be any of the things which are usually mentioned as justifying punishment: for until it is settled what conduct is to be legally denounced and discouraged we have not settled from what we are to deter people, or who are to be considered criminals from whom we are to exact retribution, or on whom we are to wreak vengeance, or whom we are to reform .1 The difficulty I have is that nowhere have we defined what the distinction is between an element of the offense and an enhancement factor.2 It’s just drafting. Is that what it is?3 INTRODUCTION On June 26, 2000, the United States Supreme Court issued a momentous, but nearly overlooked, decision regarding constitutional * Mr. Thornton is a white collar criminal defense attorney practicing in Washington, D.C. As a Department of Justice trial attorney for ten years, Mr. Thornton successfully prosecuted throughout the United States more than 75 complex criminal fraud cases. He is a recipient of the Tax Division’s Outstanding Attorney Award and the IRS Assistant Commissioner’s Award. In private practice since 1987, Mr. Thornton now represents individuals and businesses under investigation or prosecution for whit e collar criminal offenses, including tax fraud and related matters. Mr. Thornton also co-chairs the Tax Enforcement Subcommittee of the ABA’s White Collar Crime Committee, and serves as an advisor to the United States Sentencing Commission. Mr. Thornton’s e-mail address is JAT@ThorntonLaw.com. ** Mr. Allenbaugh is a staff attorney at the United States Sentencing Commission and serves on the Commission’s Economic Crimes Policy Team. He is a graduate of American University’s Washington College of Law where he served as the Associate Articles Editor for the American University Law Review. Mr. Allenbaugh also lectures courses in philosophy, logic, and business and professional ethics, at the George Washington University, Washington, D.C. Mr. Allenbaugh’s e-mail address is MAllenbaugh@ussc.gov. The authors extend their gratitude to Dr. Nicholas Kittrie of American University’s Washington College of Law for his helpful comments, suggestions, and insight. The views and arguments expressed herein solely are the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official views or opinions of the United States Sentencing Commission, or any of its staff. 1 H.L.A. HART, P UNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY : ESSAYS IN THE P HILOSOPHY OF LAW 8 (1968). 2 Justice Thomas, Transcript of Oral Argument at 44, Apprendi v. New Jersey (No. 99-478). 3 Justice Breyer, Transcript of Oral Argument at 6, Apprendi v. New Jersey (No. 99-478). 420 GEO. M ASON L. REV. [VOL. 9:2 limitations on the imposition of penalty enhancements.4 In Apprendi v. New Jersey,5 the Court held that “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”6 This constitutional rule, however, does not so much limit the type of “sentencing factor”7 a judge may consider when enhancing a sentence so much as it limits the effect of that enhancement. As the Court noted in Apprendi, “the relevant inquiry is one not of form, but of effect—does the required finding expose the defendant to a greater punishment than that authorized by the jury’s guilty verdict?”8 Post-Apprendi circuit court decisions indicate that the majority of circuits read Apprendi as providing nothing more than a constitutional ceiling on the effect sentencing enhancements may have on a sentence. Courts may enhance a sentence up to, but not over, the statutory maximum penalty for the offense of conviction.9 This focus on the literal holding of Apprendi, however, is overly formalistic, as the implications of Apprendi’s rationale are more far-reaching. That Apprendi signals something more is indicated by the avalanche of motions and appeals that have inundated state and federal courts regarding the constitutional validity of potentially thousands of sentences. As of this writing, well over one hundred United States Circuit Courts of Appeals decisions have been issued discussing Apprendi’s impact on federal sentences, and many more are certain to follow. So quickly has “Apprendicitis” infected the federal appellate 4 On the same day as the Apprendi decision, the Supreme Court also issued a highly anticipated opinion rega rding whether Miranda v. Arizona, 383 U.S. 903 (1966), had been overruled in 1968 by 18 U.S.C. § 3501. See United States v. Dickerson, 530 U.S. 428 (2000). In all likelihood, however, the Court’s 1999 term will be remembered not for reaffirming a suspect’s Miranda rights, but rather, as discussed below, for ushering in a revolution in sentencing reform not seen since the implementation of determinate sentencing schemes nearly two decades ago. Ironically, this second revolution may signal the demise of the first. 5 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000). 6 Id. at 2362-63. 7 According to the Court, the term “sentencing factor” may be described as follows: a circumstance, which may be either aggravating or mitigating in character, that supports a specific sentence wit hin the range authorized by the jury’s finding that the defendant is guilty of a particular offense. [However], when the term ‘sentence enhancement’ is used to describe an increase beyond the maximum authorized statutory sentence, it is the functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense than the one covered by the jury’s guilty verdict. Indeed, it fits squarely within the usual definition of an ‘element’ of the offense. Id. at 2365 n.19. 8 Id. at 2365 (emphasis added). 9 Compare United States v. Hernandez, 228 F.3d 1017 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that because sentencing enhancement did not exceed ten-year statutory maximum sentence for conspiracy, the rule in Apprendi was not violated), with United States v. Nordby, 225 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that because sentencing enhancement exceeded five-year statutory maximum for drug trafficking where no amount was specified in the indictment, rule in Apprendi was violated). For a summary of selected post -Apprendi decisions, see Carmen D. Hernande z, Apprendi v. New Jersey -Lower Court Decisions (Nov. 2000) (unpublished manuscript), at http://www.dcfpd.org/fdtg/apprendi/apprendi.htm. 2000] APPRENDICITIS 421 courts with sentencing appeals that one federal appellate court judge has implored both federal and state defendants to “hold their horses and stop wasting everyone’s time with futile [Apprendi] applications” for leave to commence successive collateral attacks on their sentences.10 Needless to say, Judge Easterbrook’s plea has fallen on deaf ears as the horses continue to haul Apprendi appeals to the circuit courts’ doors. The onslaught of sentencing appeals should come as no surprise. Justice O’Connor anticipated this result when she stated in her dissenting opinion in Apprendi that “[i]n one bold stroke the Court today casts aside our traditional cautious approach and instead embraces a universal and seemingly bright-line rule limiting the power of Congress and state legislatures to define criminal offenses and the sentences that follow from convictions thereunder.”11 Justice O’Connor emphasized further that the rule in Apprendi may very well apply “to all determinate-sentencing schemes in which the length of a defendant’s sentence within the statutory range turns on specific factual determinations (e.g., the United States Sentencing Guidelines).”12 Thus, not only is Apprendicitis infecting the dockets of both state and federal courts, but it also may infect the very foundations of the Sentencing Guidelines. This Article discusses Apprendi’s implications for the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (Guidelines), specifically with respect to sentencing offenders convicted of economic crimes. As the authors discuss below, “relevant conduct”13 determinations made by judges to enhance an offender’s sentence, rather than the nature of the offense, “drive”14 the sentences for offenders convicted of federal economic crimes. As Apprendi impacts most directly those crimes whose sentences are driven by relevant conduct, and the sentences for economic crimes are driven almost entirely by relevant conduct, the authors contend that Apprendicitis necessarily will infect—perhaps more than any other type of offense—the substantive sentencing law for economic offenses. The authors conclude that in light of Apprendi’s constitutional rule, the cure for Apprendicitis may require overhauling the current Guidelines for economic crimes, especially with regard to the Guidelines’ near-exclusive reliance on “loss” 10 United States v. State of Indiana, 226 F.3d 866, 867 (7th Cir. 2000) (Easterbrook, J.). Writing for a unanimous panel, Judge Easterbrook stated: Richard Talbott is among the throngs of state and federal prisoners who believe that Apprendi v. New Jersey undermines their sentences . . . . If the Supreme Court ultimately declares that Apprendi applies retroactively on collateral attack, we will authorize successive collateral review of cases to which Apprendi applies. Until then prisoners should hold their horses and stop wasting everyone’s time with futile applications. Id. at 868 (emphasis added) (internal citatio ns omitted). 11 Apprendi, 120 S. Ct. at 2381 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) . 12 Apprendi, 120 S. Ct. at 2391 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 13 See infra Pt. II.A. 14 See infra Pt. III. 422 GEO. M ASON L. REV. [VOL. 9:2 as the determinative sentencing factor. I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF SENTENCING FACTORS A. The Move Away from Unfettered Sentencing Discretion In 1972, Judge Marvin Frankel of the United States District Court Judge for the Southern District of New York, famously articulated the need for sentencing guidelines.15 According to Judge Frankel, judges were being afforded too much discretion in sentencing because only the statutory minimums (if any) and maximums bounded their discretion.16 Additionally, judicial exercise of this broad sentencing discretion essentially was placed beyond appellate review.17 Indeed, even the Supreme Court, quoting Judge Frankel, acknowledged that “while judges are required to explain other rulings, . . . ‘[t]here is no such requirement in the announcement of a prison sentence.’”18 Not surprisingly, the de facto unfettered discretion afforded judges at sentencing led to enormous disparities in the penalties similar offenders received for similar offenses.19 On October 12, 1984, in response to the growing presence of unwarranted sentencing disparities in the criminal justice system, the United States Congress passed bipartisan legislation intended to make federal sentencing more uniform among offenders, and more proportional to the seriousness of the various federal offenses.20 The legislation— known as the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984—created “an independent commission in the judicial branch of the United States,”21 whose purpose is “to establish sentencing policies and practices for the Federal criminal justice system that . . . provide certainty and fairness in meeting the purposes of sentencing, avoid[] unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants with similar records . . . while maintaining sufficient flexibility 15 See generally MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER (1972). 16 See 18 U.S.C. § 3581 (1999) (setting forth the maximum terms of imprisonment for felony and misdemeanor offenses). 17 See United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 447 (1972) (“[A] sentence imposed by a federal district judge, if within statutory limits, is generally not subject to review.”). 18 See Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 441-42 n.15 (1974) (quoting Marvin E. Frankel, Lawlessness in Sentencing, 41 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 9 (1972)). 19 See Boyce F. Martin, Jr., The Cornerstone Has No Foundation: Relevant Conduct in Sentencing and the Requirements of Due Process, 3 SETON HALL CONST. L. J. 25, 27-28 (1993) (describing various studies illustrating gross sentencing disparities among judges sentencing similar offenders for similar offenses) . 20 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (1999); William W. Wilkins & John R. Steer, Relevant Conduct: The Cornerstone of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 41 S.C. L. REV. 495, 495 (1990); USSG Ch. 1. Pt. A(2) (noting Congress’ delegation of “broad authority to the Commission to review and rationalize the federal sentencing process”). 21 See 28 U.S.C. at § 991(a). 2000] APPRENDICITIS 423 to permit individualized sentences when warranted . . . .”22 The policies and practices developed by the United States Sentencing Commission (Commission) first took effect on November 1, 1987.23 Pursuant to the Sentencing Reform Act, however, the Guidelines are subject to periodic review and revision “in consideration of comments and data coming to [the Commission’s] attention.”24 B. Mandatory Federal Sentencing Guidelines and Statutory Co nstraints The Guidelines are not discretionary. “The court, in determining the particular sentence to be imposed, shall consider . . . the kind of sentence and the sentencing range established for the applicable category of offense committed by the applicable category of defendant as set forth in the guidelines issued by the Sentencing Commission . . . .”25 According to Justice Scalia, “[w]hile the products of the Sentencing Commission’s labors have been given the modest name ‘Guidelines,’ they have the force and effect of laws, prescribing the sentences criminal defendants are to receive. A judge who disregards them will be reversed.”26 Indeed, a sentencing judge may only depart from the Guidelines if “the court finds that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the [G]uidelines,” such that a different sentence would be warranted. 27 Consequently, if a sentence “was imposed as a result of an incorrect application of the sentencing [G]uidelines,” either the defendant or the government may appeal the sentence.28 On appeal, “[i]f the court of appeals determines that the sentence was imposed in violation of law or imposed as a result of an incorrect application of the sentencing [G]uidelines, the court shall remand the case for further sentencing proceedings . . . .”29 Thus, “[f]rom a defendant’s perspective, the legislature’s decision to cap the possible range of punishment at a statutorily prescribed ‘maximum’ would affect the actual sentence imposed no differently than a sentencing commission’s 22 Id. § 991(b)(1)(B). 23 See Pub. L. No. 98-473, Title II, 98 Stat. 1987 (1984) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3559 (1999); 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (1999)), § 235(a)(1), as amended by Pub. L. No. 99-217, §§ 2, 4, 99 Stat. 1728 (Dec. 26, 1985); Pub. L. No. 99-646, § 35, 100 Stat. 3599 (Nov. 10, 1986); Pub. L. No. 100- 182, § 2, 101 Stat. 1266 (Dec. 7, 1987). 24 28 U.S.C. § 3553(o) (emphasis added). 25 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), (4)(A). 26 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 413 (1986) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 27 See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b). 28 See 18 U.S.C. § 3742 (a)(2), (b)(2) (1999). 29 18 U.S.C. § 3742(f)(1) (emphasis added). 424 GEO. M ASON L. REV. [VOL. 9:2 (or a sentencing judge’s) similar determination.”30 In light of the fact that the Guidelines essentially are laws, Justice Scalia has contended that the Sentencing Commission really is “a sort of junior-varsity Congress.”31 According to the Guidelines themselves, “the sentence may be imposed at any point within the applicable guideline range, provided the sentence (1) is not greater than the statutorily authorized maximum sentence, and (2) is not less than any statutorily required minimum sentence.”32 If the Guidelines require the imposition of a sentence greater than the statutory maximum, then the statutory maximum becomes the guideline sentence.33 The same holds true for sentences in which the Guidelines would impose a sentence below the applicable statutory minimum sentence; in those cases, the statutory minimum becomes the Guideline sentence.34 For example, “[i]f the applicable Guideline range is 51-63 months and the maximum sentence authorized by statute for the offenses of conviction is 60 months, the Guideline range is restricted to 51-60 months.”35 Under the federal system, therefore, the Guidelines play a much more important role in sentencing than statutory maximums, for it is the Guidelines’ sentencing range, and not statutory maximums, that ultimately determine the maximum and minimum terms of imprisonment. Consequently, statutory maximum and minimum terms of imprisonment set only the outer bounds for valid Guidelines application, and otherwise do not affect the Guidelines’ application or the Guidelines’ status as de facto sentencing laws.36 C. McMillan v. Pennsylvania : Distinguishing Sentencing Factors from the Elements of a Crime In 1986, just prior to the enactment of the first version of the Guidelines, the Supreme Court enunciated a distinction between “sentencing factors” and elements of crimes. In McMillan v. Pennsylvania , the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a Pennsylvania statute providing for a mandatory minimum five-year sentence “if the sentencing judge—upon considering the evidence introduced at the trial and any additional evidence offered by either the 30 Apprendi v. New Jersey, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 2401 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 31 Mistretta , 488 U.S. at 427. 32 USSG § 5G1.1(c). 33 See id. at § 5G1.1(b). 34 See id. at § 5G1.1(b). 35 Id. at § 5G1.1, comment., backg’d. 36 For statutory minimum sentences in certain specified contexts, however, a judge may sentence below the mandatory minimum sentence via the “safety valve” provision. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(1)-(5); USSG § 5C1.2. 2000] APPRENDICITIS 425 defendant or the Commonwealth at the sentencing hearing—finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant ‘visibly possessed a firearm’ during the commission of the offense.”37 Although acknowledging that “the Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged,”38 the Court specifically rejected the claim that “whenever a State links the ‘severity of punishment’ to ‘the presence or absence of an identified fact’ the State must prove that fact beyond a reasonable doubt.”39 Instead, the Court held that states have broad discretion in defining the elements of crimes and in defining the sentencing factors that may enhance the punishment for those crimes.40 Moreover, the states, as well as the federal government, may delegate their authority to define sentencing factors to sentencing commissions.41 The only check on states’ discretion in defining the elements of crimes and sentencing factors is the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. According to McMillan, states may not define the elements of a crime or the attendant sentencing factors in such a manner that would “offend[] some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.”42 Quite famously, then Associate Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority in McMillan, offered—with respect to whether a particular statutory construction would offend fundamental traditions of justice—only that “[t]he statute [must not] give [the] impression of having been tailored to permit the [sentencing factor] to be a tail which wags the dog of the substantive offense.”43 Just when a sentencing factor tail begins to wag the dog of the substantive offense, however, has never clearly been explained by the Court.44 Nevertheless, it is clear that the Court believed that an appropriate balance could be struck between sentencing based upon only those facts making up the elements of the offense of conviction, and sentencing based upon those facts plus additional facts determined by a judge at a sentencing hearing. The rule in McMillan, then, essentially is that if judge- 37 McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 81 (1986) (emphasis added). 38 Id. at 84 (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970)) (internal quotations omitted). 39 Id. (quoting Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 214 (1977)). 40 Id. at 85. 41 See Mistretta , 488 U.S. 361, 389 (holding that the Constitution does not “prohibit[] Congress from assigning to courts or auxiliary bodies within the Judicial Branch administrative or rulemaking duties”); id. at 374 (determining that “Congress’ delegation of authority to the Sentencing Commission is sufficiently specific and detailed to meet constitutional requirements”). 42 McMillan, 477 U.S. at 85 (citations and internal quotations omitted). 43 Id. at 88; see also Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463 (1943) (invalidating criminal statute that created presumption that convicted felon who possessed a weapon obtained it in interstate commerce). 44 See infra note 109. 426 GEO. M ASON L. REV. [VOL. 9:2 determined sentencing facts, rather than jury-determined convicting facts, primarily determine the sentence, then fundamental principles of justice are compromised. The diagram below illustrates the sentencing factor universe after McMillan. The black disc in the middle of the diagram represents the elements of a crime that either must be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, or stipulated to by the defendant in a plea agreement. Although the overwhelming majority of convictions are the result of plea agreements,45 for purposes of brevity, we denominate such facts as jury- determined elements. In contrast to the black inner disc, the white area surrounding the disc represents those facts a judge may consider in enhancing the sentence. We denominate such facts as judge-determined enhancements. Although both are factual—as opposed to legal— determinations, McMillan also set forth the rule that both jury-determined elements and judge-determined enhancements may contribute to the determination of an offender’s ultimate sentence without offending Constitutional principles. Figure 1: Sentencing Universe after McMillan D. Jones v. United States: Reining in Sentencing Enhancements More recently, in Jones v. United States,46 the Supreme Court, echoing Chief Justice Rehnquist’s caveat in McMillan that the sentencing 45 According to Commission statistics for fiscal year 1999, over 94% of approximately 55,000 federal convictions were the result of plea agreements. See UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, 1999 SOURCE BOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS 20. 46 526 U.S. 227 (1999). 2000] APPRENDICITIS 427 factor “tail” should not “wag[] the dog of the substantive offense,”47 emphasized that “[m]uch turns on the determination that a fact is an element of an offense rather than a sentencing consideration.”48 Indeed, determining whether a fact is a criminal element or a sentencing factor is of paramount importance to procedural due process. The elements of a crime must be charged in the indictment and proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt; sentencing factors, however, need only be determined by a judge by the preponderance of the evidence standard.49 Still, “the question of which factors are which is normally a matter for Congress.”50 In Jones, the Court found that a federal carjacking statute that specifically provided a sentencing enhancement for serious bodily injury was an unconstitutional penalty enhancement.51 As in McMillan, the Court reiterated that there are due process limitations, as well as notice and jury trial limitations, to what a state can define as a crime.52 Likewise, the Court held that these same constitutional limitations also apply to what a state can define as a sentencing factor. According to the Court in Jones, “McMillan is notable not only for acknowledging the question of due process requirements for fact-finding that raises a sentencing range, but also for disposing of a claim that the Pennsylvania law violated the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial as well.”53 Nevertheless, the Court recognized the very real danger that would arise from legislatures’ being afforded too much discretion in denominating certain factors as criminal elements, and others as sentencing enhancements. For example, if a potential penalty might rise from 15 years to life on a non-jury determination of fact, the jury’s role and relevance would correspondingly shrink from the significance usually carried by determinations of guilt to a low-level, marginally relevant gate-keeping function.54 In such cases, a jury finding of fact necessary for a maximum 15-year sentence simply would open the door to a judicial finding of fact sufficient for life imprisonment. This example illustrates how unlimited legislative power to articulate sentencing factors, and the weight those factors have on a sentence, invites erosion of the jury’s function to a point against which a line necessarily must be drawn.55 Such was the problem the Court sought to address in Jones. Justice Kennedy’s dissent in Jones noted that “[t]he rationale of the 47 McMillan, 477 U.S. at 88. 48 Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 232 (1999). 49 See id. 50 United States v. Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. 224, 228 (1998). 51 See Jones, 526 U.S. at 236 (noting that “Congress probably intended serious bodily injury to be an element defining an aggravated form of the crime”). 52 See id. at 242. 53 Id. 54 See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 2359 (2000). 55 Id. at 243-44. 428 GEO. M ASON L. REV. [VOL. 9:2 Court’s constitutional doubt holding makes it difficult to predict the full consequences of today’s holding, but it is likely that it will cause disproportion and uncertainty in the sentencing systems of the States.”56 Justic e Kennedy was concerned, in other words, that the holding of Jones would confront those states that had adopted sentencing guideline regimes “with an unexpected rule mandating that what were once factors bearing upon the sentence now must be treated as offense elements for determination by the jury.”57 Thus, it was clear that at least some of the Justices believed that a principle for distinguishing elements of crimes from sentencing factors needed to be articulated. E. Apprendi v. New Jersey: Toward a Principled Distinction of Elements and Enhancements Close on the heels of Jones, the Supreme Court decided Apprendi v. New Jersey.58 Charles Apprendi pleaded guilty in a New Jersey state court to felony firearm possession.59 In New Jersey, felony firearm possession carries a 10-year statutory maximum term of imprisonment.60 Pursuant to the New Jersey hate crime statute, however, a finding that there was racial bias involved in the felony firearm possession increased the maximum penalty from 10 years to 20 years.61 The prosecutor moved the court to enhance Mr. Apprendi’s sentence pursuant to the hate crime statute.62 At the sentencing hearing, the judge found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Mr. Apprendi’s offense—felony firearm possession—was conducted with racial bias.63 As a result of, and pursuant to, the hate crime sentencing enhancement, the court sentenced Apprendi to a 12 year term of imprisonment.64 56 Id. at 271 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 57 Id. 58 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000). 59 Id. at 2352. 60 The New Jersey statute in question classifies the possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose as a “second-degree” offense. See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:39-4(a) (West 1995). Such an offense is punishable by imprisonment for “between five years and 10 years.” § 2C:43-6(a)(2). 61 N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:44-3(e) (West Supp.2000). A separate statute, described by that State’s Supreme Court as a ‘hate crime’ law, provides for an ‘extended term’ of imprisonment if the trial judge finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that ‘[t]he defendant in committing the crime acted with a purpose to intimidate an individual or group of individuals because of race, color, gender, handicap, religion, sexual orientation or ethnicity.’ N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:44-3(e) (West Supp.2000). The extended term authorized by the hate crime law for second-degree offenses is imprisonment for ‘between 10 and 20 years.’ § 2C:43-7(a)(3). Apprendi, 120 S. Ct. at 2351. 62 See id. at 2352. 63 Id. 64 See id. 2000] APPRENDICITIS 429 Mr. Apprendi appealed his sentence arguing that the hate crime statute violated his constitutional right to due process of law, and that the hate crime enhancement in fact was an element of a separate offense—an offense that should have been included in the indictment and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.65 Both the New Jersey appellate court66 and the New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed Mr. Apprendi’s sentencing enhancement and ultimate sentence.67 The New Jersey Supreme Court held that “the Legislature simply took one factor that has always been considered by sentencing courts to bear on punishment and dic tated the weight to be given that factor.”68 Therefore, in the view of the New Jersey Supreme Court, both the enhancement and the hate crime statute were constitutionally valid. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari on November 29, 1999,69 heard oral arguments on March 28, 2000, and issued its opinion on June 26, 2000,70 in which it reversed the New Jersey Supreme Court and remanded the case for resentencing.71 In doing so, the Court held, as previously noted, that “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”72 In essence, the Court held that if a sentencing factor increases the penalty beyond the statutory maximum for the conviction, then, following McMillan, the sentencing factor has become the “tail” which “wags the dog of the substantive offense,” i.e., the sentencing factor has become the “functional equivalent” of a criminal element.73 Consequently, following 65 See id. 66 See State v. Apprendi, 698 A.2d 1265 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997). 67 See State v. Apprendi, 731 A.2d 485 (N.J. 1999). 68 Id. at 494-495. 69 See State v. Apprendi, 731 A.2d 485 (N.J. 1999). 70 See Apprendi, 120 S. Ct. at 2348. 71 Id. at 2367. 72 Id. at 2362-63. In Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998) (5-4), the Court held that a prior criminal conviction may be treated as a sentencing factor and may constitutionally increase the statutory maximum penalty beyond the statutory maximum penalty for the offense of conviction. See id. In Apprendi, however, although declining to overrule Almendarez-Torres, the Court did note that “it is arguable that Almendarez-Torres was incorrectly decided.” Apprendi, 120 S. Ct. at 2362. Furthermore, Justice Thomas, who sided with the bare majority in Almendarez-Torres, stated in his concurrence in Apprendi that he had “succumbed” to “one of the chief errors of Almendarez-Torres” by “attempt[ing] to discern whether a particular fact is traditionally (or typically) a basis for a sentencing court to increase an offender’s sentence.” Apprendi, 120 S. Ct. at 2379 (Thomas, J., concurring). In light of the bare majority in Almendarez-Torres, Justice Thomas’ concurrence suggests that if Almendarez-Torres was decided today, even prior convictions would be considered elements of crimes. 73 Apprendi, 120 S. Ct. at 2365 n.19 (“[W]hen the term ‘sentence enhancement’ is used to describe an increase beyond the maximum authorized statutory sentence, it is the functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense than the one covered by the jury’s guilty verdict.”). 430 GEO. M ASON L. REV. [VOL. 9:2 Jones, when a legislatively ordained sentencing factor increases the statutory maximum punishment, the defendant’s Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process, and Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial, are violated inasmuch as the sentencing factor in question really is a criminal element.74 Thus, Apprendi clarified the holding in McMillan and expanded the holding in Jones by enunciating a new “constitutional rule”75 —a constitutional rule that sets the outer bounds a sentencing factor may play in determining a defendant’s ultimate punishment. Figure Two, below, indicates how Apprendi has changed the sentencing landscape since McMillan and Jones. As before, the black center represents the elements of a crime that either must be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, or pleaded to by the defendant. The dark gray area surrounding the black center indicates those sentencing factors that may be considered by a court for purposes of enhancing a sentencing. If those sentencing factors increase the statutory maximum penalty to which the defendant is exposed, then those sentencing factors become elements of a substantive offense and, accordingly, must be determined by a beyond a reasonable doubt standard. Figure 2: Sentencing Factor Universe after Apprendi The Court in Apprendi noted “the novelty of a legislative scheme that removes the jury from the determination of a fact that, if found, exposes the criminal defendant to a penalty exceeding the maximum he would receive if punished according to the facts reflected in the jury verdict 74 See id. at 2355. 75 See id. at 2363. 2000] APPRENDICITIS 431 alone.”76 Especially in light of this novelty, legislative schemes such as the Guidelines must “remain true to the principles that emerged from the Framers’ fears ‘that the jury right could be lost not only by gross denial, but by erosion.’”77 As such, “[t]he judge’s role in sentencing is constrained at its outer limits by the facts alleged in the indictment and found by the jury. Put simply, facts that expose a defendant to a punishment greater than that otherwise legally prescribed [ar]e by definition ‘elements’ of a separate legal offense.”78 Unfortunately, Apprendi’s “constitutional rule” seems to place the cart before the horse, for Apprendi appears only to limit the effect that sentencing factors may have on enhancing a penalty, rather than provide a rule for distinguishing sentencing factors from criminal elements. This sentiment was articulated by Justice Thomas during oral argument in Apprendi: “[t]he difficulty I have is that nowhere have we defined what the distinction is between an element of the offense and an enhancement factor.”79 This short-coming of Apprendi already appears to be creating a split in the circuits. F. United States v. Garcia -Guizar: Expanding Apprendi Shortly after the Court’s decision in Apprendi, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals decided United States v. Aguayo-Delgado.80 There, the Eighth Circuit held that under Apprendi, “if the government wishes to seek penalties in excess of those applicable by virtue of the elements of the offense alone, then the government must charge the facts giving rise to the increased sentence.”81 If the government does not seek a penalty increase in excess of the statutory maximum penalty for the offense of conviction, then the court may consider those factors that otherwise would increase the sentence beyond the Apprendi limit, provided that the court does not use 76 Id. at 2359. 77 Id. 78 Id. at 2359 n.10 (emphasis original). In his concurrence, Justice Thomas reiterated this point regarding the distinction between elements of a crime and sentencing factors, but with a slightly different flavor: “What matters is the way by which a fact enters into the sentence. If a fact is by law the basis for imposing or increasing punishment—for establishing or increasing the prosecution’s entitlement—it is an element.” Apprendi, 120 S. Ct. at 2379 (Thomas, J., concurring). Presumably, Justice Thomas’ definition of what constitutes an element is far more encompassing than the majority’s insofar as Justice Thomas’ definition does not incorporate reference to “a punishment greater than that otherwise legally prescribed,” i.e., the statutory maximum punishment. Indeed, on its face, Justice Thomas’ definition of an element would subsume all sentencing factors for they are a “basis for. . . increasing punishment” and for “increasing the prosecution’s entitlement”. Id. 79 Transcript of Oral Argument, at 48, Apprendi v. New Jersey (No. 99-478), available at 2000 WL 349724 (Edward C. DuMont, Esq., Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.; on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondent). 80 220 F.3d 926 (8th Cir. 2000). 81 Id. at 933. 432 GEO. M ASON L. REV. [VOL. 9:2 those factors to exceed the Apprendi limit.82 Soon after the Eighth Circuit’s decision, however, the Ninth Circuit expanded Apprendi’s holding. In United States v. Garcia -Guiza,83 the Ninth Circuit held that where a “judge’s finding, made under a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard, increased the statutory maximum penalty to which [a defendant] was exposed[,] . . . the constitutional rule recognized by Apprendi [was violated].”84 Thus, the Ninth Circuit appears to be indicating that those types of sentencing factors that merely expose a defendant to a higher statutory maximum penalty violate Apprendi. In contrast, the Eighth Circuit in Aguayo-Delgado clearly states that mere exposure is not enough to violate Apprendi—actual effect must be given to the sentencing factors in order for there to be an Apprendi violation. Figure Three below indicates this additional realm in the sentencing universe as articulated by the Ninth Circuit: if a sentencing factor merely exposes a defendant to a penalty beyond the statutory maximum for the offense of conviction, then it violates the constitutional rule in Apprendi. The medium-gray ring indicates those additional sentencing factors that may be affected by this reading of Garcia-Guizar that sentencing factors that merely expose an offender to a higher statutory maximum penalty really are criminal elements. Figure 3: Sentencing Universe after Garcia-Guiza 82 Id. at 934; see United States v. Nordby, 225 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 2000). 83 227 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir. 2000). 84 Id. at 1129 (quoting Nordby, 225 F.3d at 1058-59). The Ninth Circuit, however, held that because the defendant had failed to object to the enhancement at the sentencing hearing, the Apprendi violation was subject to plain error review. See Nordby, 225 F.3d at 1060. As the Apprendi error did not affect the defendant’s substantial rights, the circuit court did not take notice of it. See id. Nevertheless, had the de fendant timely objected to the enhancement, the circuit court would have reviewed the error under the less deferential de novo standard. Consequently, but for the absence of an objection, Garcia -Guizar may have resulted in a substantially different outcome for the defendant. 2000] APPRENDICITIS 433 II. SENTENCING FACTORS AND CRIMINAL ELEMENTS: IS IT JUST DRAFTING? A. The Role of Relevant Conduct McMillan concerned the extent to which a state may delegate sentencing decisions to its judiciary. To be sure, the Court’s holding affirmed the constitutionality of sentencing enhancements, and also reaffirmed the constitutionality of a federal court’s consideration of “specific offense characteristics” for sentencing purposes: “we reject[] the claim that whenever a State links the ‘severity of punishment’ to ‘the presence or absence of an identified fact’ the State must prove that fact beyond a reasonable doubt.”85 Indeed, a “State need not ‘prove beyond a reasonable doubt every fact, the existence or nonexistence of which it is willing to recognize as an exculpatory or mitigating circumstance affecting the degree of culpability or the severity of the punishment.’”86 Rather, proof by a preponderance of the evidence standard for sentencing factors is sufficient for purposes of due process.87 As contemplated under the Guidelines, specific offense characteristics are nothing more than those facts identified by the Commission, “the existence of which” the Commission recognizes either as an aggravating or a mitigating circumstance “affecting the degree of culpability or the severity of the punishment.”88 Aggravating specific offense characteristics—sometimes known as adjustments—include the defendant’s “role in the offense, the presence of a gun, or the amount of money actually taken.”89 In contrast, mitigating specific offense characteristics consist of acceptance of responsibility,90 and in the case of organizational defendants, the presence of a compliance program.91 As already noted, conduct constituting sentencing factors (i.e., conduct identified either as a specific offense characteristic or as grounds for an adjustment) often is not charged in the indictment, inasmuch as sentencing factors do not constitute an element of the offense charged. For example, 26 U.S.C. § 7201 provides that “[a]ny person who willfully 85 McMillan, 477 U.S. at 84 (quoting Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 214 (1977)). 86 McMillan, 477 U.S. at 84 (quoting Patterson, 432 U.S. at 207). 87 See McMillan, 477 U.S. at 91. 88 Id. at 84 (quotations omitted). 89 USSG Ch.1 Pt. A(4)(a)(3). 90 See USSG § 3E1.1(a) (providing for sentence mitigation “[i]f the defendant clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility for his offense”). 91 See USSG § 8C2.5(f) (providing for sentence mitigation “[I]f the offense occurred despite an effective program to prevent and detect violations of law”); see also id. § 8C2.5(g) (providing for sentence mitigation if organization self-reported offense to government in timely manner and prior to commencement of investigation). 434 GEO. M ASON L. REV. [VOL. 9:2 attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any tax imposed by this title or the payment thereof shall . . . be guilty of a felony.”92 Thus, the specific amount of tax a defendant has attempted to evade is not an element of the offense of federal tax evasion.93 The amount of tax involved, however, is relevant for guidelines sentencing purposes—the greater the amount of taxes evaded, the greater the punishment.94 Thus, the amount of taxes evaded serves as a specific offense characteristic, which is provable by a mere preponderance of the evidence, even though the amount of taxes evaded is not an element of the crime of tax evasion. This additional conduct—conduct not alleged in the indictment—that a sentencing judge may consider for sentencing purposes is denominated “relevant conduct” by the Guidelines. Relevant conduct consists of all acts and omissions committed, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, procured, or willfully caused by the defendant; and in the case of a jointly undertaken criminal activity . . . all reasonably foreseeable acts and omissions of others in furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal activity, that occurred during the commission of the offense of conviction, in preparation for that offense, or in the course of attempting to avoid detection for that or responsibility for that offense; [and] . . . all harm that was the object of such acts and omission.95 Just as the Pennsylvania state legislature required only a preponderance of the evidence standard to prove the existence of a sentencing factor, so the Commission also has adopted the position “that use of a preponderance of the evidence standard is appropriate to meet due process requirements and policy concerns in resolving disputes regarding application of the [G]uidelines to the facts of a case.”96 Indeed, the federal circuit courts uniformly have held that “the burden of proof for all factual 92 26 U.S.C. § 7201 (2000). 93 Although not explicitly enunciated in 26 U.S.C. § 7201, numerous circuit courts of appeals require proof of a substantial tax due and owing in tax evasion cases. See e.g., United States v. Citron, 783 F.2d 307, 314-15 (2d Cir. 1986); United Stat es v. Marcus, 401 F.2d 563, 565 (2d Cir. 1968). Nevertheless, an exact amount of tax due and owing need not be charged. See Citron, 783 F.2d at 314- 15; Marcus, 401 F.2d at 565. The Ninth Circuit has held, however, that as there is no substantiality requirement in 26 U.S.C. § 7201, only “some tax deficiency” needs to be proved to warrant conviction. See United States v. Marashi, 913 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1990). Still, and in any case, no circuits require a specific amount of tax to be alleged in order sustain a conviction for tax evasion. 94 See USSG § 2T1.4. This section of the Guidelines sets forth the “Tax Table.” The Tax Table increases the amount of punishment according to the amount of “tax loss” involved. Tax loss simply is “the total amount of loss that was the object of the offense (i.e., the loss that would have resulted had the offense been successfully completed).” USSG § 2T1.1(c)(1). So, for example, if an individual defendant underreports $100,000 on his personal income tax return, the Guidelines presume that the defendant would have had to pay income tax at a rate of 28% on that unreported income. See USSG § 2T1.1(c)(1)(A). Consequently, in that case, the tax loss would be $28,000, unless “a more accurate determination of the tax loss can be made.” See USSG § 2T1.1(c)(2). 95 USSG § 1B1.3(a)(1-3) (“Relevant Conduct (Factors that Determine the Guideline Range)”). 96 USSG § 6A1.3, comment. The Commission added this language to the Guidelines’ commentary by amendment 387, effective November 1, 1991. See USSG App. C. 2000] APPRENDICITIS 435 matters at sentencing is preponderance of the evidence.”97 When applying the Guidelines, the sentencing judge must consider relevant conduct.98 Relevant conduct represents a purposeful policy decision on the part of the Commission to incorporate “real offense” sentencing, into an otherwise “charge offense” sentencing scheme.99 So- called “pure real offense” sentencing bases sentencing determinations “upon the actual conduct in which the defendant engaged regardless of the charges for which he was indicted or convicted . . . , or upon the conduct that constitutes the elements of the offense for which the defendant was charged and of which he was convicted . . . .”100 In contrast, “pure charge offense” sentencing considers only the conduct that constituted the elements of the offense for which the defendant was convicted.101 Consequently, “[a] pure charge offense system would overlook some of the harms that did not constitute statutory elements of the offenses of which the defendant was convicted.”102 The Commission ultimately opted for a hybrid approach that “moved closer to a charge offense system [, but one that] . . . contain[ed] a significant number of real offense elements.”103 Some of these “real offense elements” include the offender’s “role in the offense, the presence of a gun, or the amount of money actually taken.”104 These real offense elements are codified in the Guidelines as specific offense characteristics and adjustments. The Commission justified incorporating “real offense” considerations into the Guidelines’ sentencing structure by emphasizing the fundamental distinction between the assessment of guilt for criminal conduct and the determination of penalties for such conduct. The principles and limits of sentencing accountability . . . are not always the same as the principles and limits of criminal liability. Under [the sentencing guidelines], the focus is on the specific acts and omissions for which the defendant is to be held accountable in determining the applicable guideline range, rather than on whether the defendant is criminally liable for an offense as a principal, accomplice, or conspirator.105 97 FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, GUIDELINE SENTENCING: AN OUTLINE OF APPELLATE CASE LAW ON SELECTED ISSUES 287 (Sept. 1998)(citations omitted). 98 See id. (stating that the guideline sentence “shall be determined on the basis of [relevant conduct]”) (emphasis added). 99 USSG Ch.1 Pt. A(4)(a), p.s. 100 Id. 101 Id. 102 Id. 103 Id. 104 Id. 105 USSG § 1B1.3, comment. (n.1). 436 GEO. M ASON L. REV. [VOL. 9:2 B. The Limits of Legislative Authority as to Sentencing Factors Relevant conduct long has been given considerable importance in sentencing jurisprudence. Over fifty years ago, the Court stated that “[h]ighly relevant[,] if not essential to[,] [the judge’s] selection of an appropriate sentence is the possession of the fullest information possible concerning the defendant’s life and characteristics.”106 This sentiment is codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3661: “No limitation shall be placed on the information concerning the background, character, and conduct of a person convicted of an offense which a court of the United States may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence.”107 According to the Court, relevant conduct merely “corresponds to those actions and circumstances that courts typically took into account when sentencing prior to the Guidelines’ enactment.”108 Perhaps most important for purposes of constitutional due process is the fact that relevant conduct determinations need only be established by a preponderance of the evidence. According to Judge William W. Wilkins, Jr. (first Chair of the Commission), and Commission Vice-Chair John R. Steer (former General Counsel of the Commission), a preponderance of the evidence standard for relevant conduct determinations provides sufficient due process protection. Pre-guidelines pronouncements by the United States Supreme Court and other courts indicate that a preponderance of the evidence standard comports with fifth amendment due process requirements when sentencing factors, including those within the ambit of Relevant Conduct, are contested . . . . The guidelines enhance procedural fairness by largely determining the sentence according to specific, identified factors, each of which a defendant has an opportunity to contest, through evidentiary presentation or allocution, at a sentencing hearing. The advent of guideline sentencing thus presents no convincing reason to conclude that constitutional standards are somehow stricter when guidelines are used to assist in fashioning the appropriate sentence, or that policy considerations compel use of a higher standard. Hence, courts should apply the guideline adjustments within the realm of Relevant Conduct wh en those adjustments are established by the preponderance of the evidence.109 As the Court noted in McMillan, courts generally are to defer to the legislature in making this determination: an element of a crime is whatever a legislature says it is, and likewise, legislatures, or their designees (e.g., sentencing commissions) may determine what factors will count as sentencing enhancements, and the weight those factors are to be given. Nevertheless, even the legislature does not have unfettered 106 Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949) (quoted in United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 151-52 (1997)). 107 18 U.S.C. § 3661 (2000). 108 Watts, 519 U.S. at 152 (internal quotations omitted). 109 Wilkins & Steer, supra note 20, at 518-19 (footnotes omitted). 2000] APPRENDICITIS 437 discretion in drafting criminal legislation.110 Articulating exactly where to draw the line between an element of a crime and a sentencing factor is difficult, if not impossible, to identify. Nevertheless, it is important not only to recognize that there is distinction between elements of crimes and sentencing factors, but to understand the necessity of the distinction. Without a clear conceptual distinction between elements of crimes and sentencing factors, there is no reason in principle why a legislature simply could not recognize just one general crime—wrong-doing—and then proceed to enunciate dozens of sentencing factors for that crime ranging from mere jay-walking to homicide.111 Under such a sentencing scheme, even jaywalkers conceivably could be exposed to a term of life imprisonment, depending on the sentencing enhancements imposed. In the language of Chief Justice Rehnquist, such a criminal statute would be impermissibly “tailored to permit the [sentencing enhancement] to be a tail which wags the dog of the substantive offense.”112 Thus, the essential problem with a single criminal statute for mere wrong-doing, for which there may be dozens of associated sentencing enhancements, is that the sentencing enhancements drive the sentence, rather than the nature of the offense itself. Under such a regime, the conduct associated with the enhancement is what is penalized, rather than the conduct associated with 110 Indeed, the following excerpt from oral argument in Apprendi between Justice Thomas and Respondent Lisa S. Gocham, Deputy At torney General for New Jersey, illustrates an example of legislative over-reaching, but also notes a remaining problem for identifying the line over which criminal legislation may not pass. QUESTION: What if a legislature had a statute that authorized a crime called wrongdoing, just prove anything wrong, and then it had a—and the jury has to find the wrong, but then the judge is directed to impose a whole range of sentences, depending on what the wrong is, and he has to do it just by a preponderance of the evidence. I suppose that would be perfectly okay. MS. GOCHMAN: No. That would probably go way too far. That would be too extreme. It's very vague. It's very overbroad. It wouldn't give notice to criminal defendants of exactly what their conduct was, what the requisite mens rea was. QUESTION: Well, they could perhaps have a checklist of 95 different things that would qualify as wrongdoing. Any one of those is found, then you turn over the matter to the judge, and from there on it's up to the judge on the basis of the preponderance of the evidence, and no jury required. MS. GOCHMAN: Well, we're not suggesting at all that we can take away from the prosecutor's burden to prove mens rea beyond a reasonable doubt, or any of the traditional elements of traditional offenses. That's not at all what we're arguing here, so that that hypothetical would, of course— QUESTION: Well, what is the constitutional line, in your view, about what can be an element, and what can be a sentencing factor? What's the line? Transcript of Oral Argument at 29-30, Apprendi v. New Jersey (No. 99-478) (emphasis added) . 111 Justice Scalia posed a similar hypothetical in his dissenting opinion in Monge v. California, 524 U.S. 721, 738 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting). “Although California’s system is not nearly that sinister, it takes the first steps down that road. The California Code is full of ‘sentencing enhancements’ that look exactly like separate crimes, and that expose the defendant to additional maximum punishment.” Id. at 739. 112 McMillan, 477 U.S. at 88. 438 GEO. M ASON L. REV. [VOL. 9:2 the elements of the crime. This situation would have the unpalatable effect of turning the judge essentially into a jury—a jury, moreover, that need only be convinced by a preponderance of the evidence. Somewhere between drafting one crime with dozens of associated enhancements and drafting a different statute to cover every possible permutation of criminal conduct lies a practical and just reality. Although it is well-settled that legislatures have the authority to draft legislation criminalizing certain conduct, and likewise, to identify enhancements for such conduct, there are constitutional limitations on the exercise of this authority. Thus, in response to Justice Breyer’s query during oral argument in Apprendi—“It’s just drafting. Is that what it is?”113—the answer, of course, must be “No.” Indeed, as the Court held in McMillan, legislative fiat alone does not dictate the validity of a sentencing factor.114 After all, according to Justice Scalia in Monge v. California 115—a case addressing the constitutionality of a state sentencing enhancement based upon prior criminal conduct, “[i]f the protections extended to criminal defendants by the Bill of Rights can be so easily circumvented [by legislatures],” then most of those rights would be nothing more than “vain and idle enactment[s], which accomplished nothing.”116 Accordingly, “[t]he fundamental distinction between facts that are elements of a criminal offense and facts that go only to the sentence. . . delimits the boundaries of. . . important constitutional rights, like the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury and the right to proof beyond a reasonable doubt.”117 In order to avoid “flouting” common morality “and bringing law into contempt” through ad hoc drafting of criminal statutes, Professor Hart has suggested that the concepts of proportionality and uniformity should inform legislatures when distinguishing elements of crimes from sentencing enhancements: “The guiding principle is that of a proportion within a system of penalties between those imposed for different offences where these have a distinct place in a commonsense scale of gravity.”118 So as to maintain the integrity of this system of penalties, legislatures and sentencing commissions should avoid filling their criminal codes with “ ‘sentencing enhancements’ that look exactly like separate crimes.”119 With this in mind, Justice Stevens—foreshadowing the issue he would later confront in Apprendi—noted the following in his dissenting opinion in McMillan. 113 Justice Breyer, Transcript of Oral Argument at 6, Apprendi v. New Jersey (No. 99-478). 114 See McMillan, 477 U.S. at 86. 115 524 U.S. at 738 (1998). 116 Monge, 524 U.S. at 738 (1998) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 96 (1872)). 117 Monge, 524 U.S. at 738 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 118 See HART, supra note 1, at 24-25. 119 Monge, 524 U.S. at 738. 2000] APPRENDICITIS 439 Today the Court holds that state legislatures may not only define the offense with which a criminal defendant is charged, but may also authoritatively determine that the conduct so described—i.e., the prohibited activity which subjects the defendant to criminal sanctions— is not an element of the crime which the Due Process Clause requires to be proved by the prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt. However, a st ate legislature should not dispense with the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt for conduct that it targets for severe criminal penalties. Because the Pennsylvania statute challenged in this case describes conduct that the Pennsylvania Legislat ure obviously intended to prohibit, and because it mandates lengthy incarceration for the same, the conduct so described should be considered an element of the criminal offense, requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt.120 In light of the potential impact such a distinction has on the applicability of fundamental constitutional rights, “[i]t is critical that the moral force of the criminal law not be diluted by a standard of proof that leaves people in doubt whether innocent men are being condemned.”121 Certainly, if a defendant is punished for conduct that properly should have been charged in an indictment and proved beyond a reasonable doubt—but otherwise was not, then indeed, the moral force of the criminal law is left open to question.122 In such situations, the imposition of the sentencing enhancement becomes a de facto conviction, and the judge has become the jury. Given Justice Stevens’ dissent in McMillan coupled with Justice Scalia’s dissent in Monge, and Justice Thomas’ concern expressed during oral argument in Apprendi regarding “the constitutional line. . . [dividing] what can be an element, [from] what can be a sentencing factor,”123 it is telling that Justice Stevens authored the majority opinion in Apprendi, in which both Justices Scalia and Thomas joined. Although the constitutional rule enunciated in Apprendi appears, on its face, only to concern those situations wherein sentencing enhancements increased the statutory maximum penalty, the rule in Apprendi should be read more expansively, especially considering the constituents of the majority. For if the rule in Apprendi is applicable only in situations where the statutory maximum penalty has increased, then in the words of Justice O’Connor, the rule amounts to nothing more than a “mere formalism.”124 Legislatures easily could comply with this purported rule simply by making all crimes subject to high statutory maximum penalties.125 Thus, under such a formalistic reading, “the Court’s principle amounts to nothing more than 120 McMillan, 477 U.S. at 96 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 121 Boyce F. Martin, The Cornerstone Has No Foundation: Relevant Conduct in Sentencing and the Requirements of Due Process, 3 SETON HALL CONST. L. J. 25, 37 (1993) (citing In re Winship 397 U.S. 358, 363-64 (1970)). 122 See HART, supra note 1. 123 Transcript of Oral Argument at 29-30, Apprendi v. New Jersey (No. 99-478). In Monge v. California , 524 U.S. 721 (1998), Justice Scalia also expressed a concern regarding the limits on legislative authority in drafting sentencing factors. See Monge, 524 U.S. at 738 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 124 Apprendi, 120 S. Ct. at 2389 (O’Connor, J. dissenting). 125 See id. at 2390. 440 GEO. M ASON L. REV. [VOL. 9:2 chastising [the legislature] for failing to use the approved phrasing in expressing its intent as to how [sentencing factors] should be punished.”126 Consequently, this reading of the majority’s opinion “accords, at best, marginal protection for the constitutional rights that it seeks to effectuate.”127 As Justice O’Connor noted, “given the pure formalism of the above reading[] of the Court’s opinion, one suspects that the constitutional principle underlying its decision is more far reaching.”128 Certainly, it must be. Rather than reading Apprendi formalistically, the holding should be read as a clarification of a rule —albeit, a still somewhat vague, and perhaps incomplete rule —delineating the distinction between elements of a crime and sentencing enhancements. Under this reading of Apprendi, the fact that a sentencing enhancement increases the statutory maximum penalty serves only as an indicator that the rule is being violated, but should not be read as the rule itself. Rather, the rule in Apprendi should be read as requiring that “a state legislature may not dispense with the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt for conduct that it targets for severe criminal penalties.”129 In essence, the substantive, as opposed to formalistic, rule in Apprendi is that the more severe the sentencing enhancement imposed for particular conduct, the more likely that the conduct in question should be considered an element of a crime.130 Whether the sentencing enhancement increases the statutory penalty to which the offender is exposed is irrelevant. Support for this substantive reading of Apprendi recently was provided by the Court when it summarily vacated United States v. Valensia.131 In Valensia, the defendant had pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute, and conspiracy to distribute, 35.71 kilograms of methamphetamine.132 Pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(viii), the statutory minimum sentence for conspiracy to manufacture and possess such an amount of methamphetamine is ten years, and the statutory maximum is life. Based on the amount of drugs involved, the district court calculated the defendant’s base offense level to be 38, which translated into a sentencing guideline range of 235-293 months imprisonment.133 The district court then enhanced the defendant’s base offense level by four levels based upon the defendant’s leadership role in the drug conspiracy, 126 Id. (quoting Jones, 526 U.S. at 267 (Kennedy, J., dissenting)). 127 Id.. at 2389. 128 Id. at 2391 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 129 McMillan, 477 U.S. at 96 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 130 Of course, precisely when the severity of a penalty turns a sentencing factor into an element of a crime is uncertain. Nevertheless, as we argue below, in some instances the answer is clear. 131 222 F.3d 1173 (9th Cir. 2000), vacated, 121 S. Ct. 1222 (2001) (Mem.). 132 See id. at 1181. 133 See id. 2000] APPRENDICITIS 441 and possession of a firearm during the course of the conspiracy, bringing the defendant’s adjusted offense level to 42.134 The district court then deducted three levels for the defendant’s acceptance of responsibility, which reduced the defendant’s offense level to 39 for a sentencing range of 262-327 months imprisonment. Had the four-level enhancement not applied, however, then the three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility would have reduced the defendant’s offense level from 38 to 35, or down to a sentencing guideline range of 168-210 months imprisonment.135 On appeal, the defendant argued that the four-level enhancement, which increased his minimum sentence by 94 months, or nearly eight years, was “extremely disproportionate and may not be imposed unless the district court has applied the clear and the convincing evidence standard.”136 The Ninth Circuit disagreed noting, in part, that “the enhanced sentence f[e]ll within the maximum sentence for the crime alleged in the indictment,” and therefore a preponderance of the evidence standard was sufficient.137 Moreover, the Ninth Circuit cited Apprendi in support of this rationale for refusing to require the district court to apply any standard greater than a preponderance of the evidence.138 As the relevant statutory maximum sentence in Valensia was life, the “formalistic” reading of the rule in Apprendi was not violated inasmuch as no sentencing factor possibly could increase the defendant’s sentence beyond the statutory maximum. Although the Ninth Circuit’s decision appeared to be consistent not only with Apprendi, but with every circuit court of appeals decision interpreting Apprendi,139 on March 5, 2001, the Supreme Court summarily vacated Valensia.140 Ironically, the Court remanded the case to the Ninth Circuit with instructions to reconsider its decision in light of Apprendi.141 Thus, as it appears that the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Valensia was based on a formalistic reading of the rule in Apprendi, the Court’s decision to vacate Valensia signals that there indeed is more to Apprendi than mere 134 See id . 135 See id . 136 Id. 137 Id. at 1182. 138 See id . at 1182 n.4. 139 See United States v. Robinson, 241 F.3d 115, 119 (1st Cir. 2001) (holding that no Apprendi violation occurs when sentence is below default statutory maximum); accord United States v. Houle, 237 F.3d 71, 79-80 (1st Cir. 2001); United States v. Garcia, 240 F.3d 180, 184 (2d Cir. 2001); United States v. Thompson, 237 F.3d 1258, 1262-63 (10th Cir. 2001); United States v. Williams, 235 F.3d 858, 863 (3d Cir. 2000); United States v. Kinter, 235 F.3d 192, 202 (4th Cir. 2000); United States v. Keith, 230 F.3d 784, 787 (5th Cir. 2000) (per curiam), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 1163 (2001); Hernandez v. United States, 226 F.3d 839, 841-42 (7th Cir. 2000); United States v. Aguayo-Delgado, 220 F.3d 926, 933-34 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 600 (2000); see also discussion supra Part I.F. 140 See Valensia v. United States, 121 S. Ct. 1222 (2001) (Mem.). 141 See id . 442 GEO. M ASON L. REV. [VOL. 9:2 formalism. C. Two Roads Converged in a New Jersey Wood, and That Is Making All the Difference There are two “roads” in the history of Supreme Court sentencing jurisprudence that lead to Apprendi. One road regards the constitutionality and role of relevant conduct in sentencing determinations. Along this road, the Court has recognized and legitimized the distinct role of sentencing factors in the sentencing process. For purposes of determining whether to enhance a sentence, courts may consider certain conduct—sentencing factors—that otherwise is not included in the indictment. Furthermore, the Constitution permits such conduct to be proved by a mere preponderance of the evidence, for only elements of a crime need to be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. The other road to Apprendi regards the constitutional limit imposed on legislative discretion in drafting criminal statutes. Although legislatures generally are free to identify the elements of a crime and the factors that may enhance punishment for that crime, recent Supreme Court sentencing jurisprudence suggests strongly that legislatures may not draft criminal statutes in such a way that sentencing factors trump criminal elements. In other words, legislatures may not draft criminal statutes that make the conduct underlying the sentencing factor the focus of punishment, rather than the conduct constituting the elements of the criminal offense.142 As legislatures may not delegate to another body authority they themselves do not possess, it follows that sentencing commissions, to whom legislatures have delegated authority to promulgate sentencing guidelines,143 likewise may not draft sentencing guidelines to include sentencing factors that trump the elements of the crime. The tension between the impact sentencing factors have in determining sentences on one hand, and the integrity of due process on the other, is exemplified in a line of circuit courts of appeals cases upholding higher standards of proof for severe sentencing enhancements. In these cases, the appellate courts favored a clear and convincing standard of proof for enhancements that had a significant impact on the defendant’s sentence.144 Although the Supreme Court has yet to address the issue 142 See McMillan, 477 U.S. at 88. 143 See Mistretta , 488 U.S. at 371. 144 In United States v. Kikumura , 918 F.2d 1084, 1098-1102 (3d Cir. 1990), the Third Circuit upheld a district court’s use of the clear and convincing standard of proof at sentencing. Likewise, the Second Circuit has held that “a more rigorous standard should be used in determining disputed aspects of relevant conduct where such conduct, if proven, will significantly enhance a sentence.” United States v. Shonubi, 103 F.3d 1085, 1089 (2d Cir.1997). Two other circuits have suggested the same. See United States v. Townley, 929 F.2d 365, 369-370 (8th Cir. 1991); United States v. Restrepo, 946 F.2d 2000] APPRENDICITIS 443 directly, in light of its recent sentencing jurisprudence discussed above, it is likely that the Court will side with those circuit courts that opt for higher standards of proof in cases where relevant conduct “would dramatically increase the sentence.” Indeed, as the Court stated in Apprendi, If a defendant faces punishment beyond that provided by statute when an offense is committed under certain circumstances but not others, it is obvious that both the loss of liberty and the stigma attaching to the offense are heightened; it necessarily follows that the defendant should not—at the moment the State is put to proof of those circumstances--be deprived of protections that have, until that point, unquestionably attached. 145 In light of the law-like nature of the Guidelines146 and a non- formalistic reading of Apprendi,147 it follows that potentially any sentencing factor may have to be proved by a higher standard depending on how much the sentencing factor enhances the sentence. To paraphrase the Court, as sentencing factors increase punishment under the Guidelines, “both the loss of liberty and the stigma attaching to the offense are heightened.”148 As a result, a more rigorous standard may be appropriate. In Figure Four below, the remainder of the sentencing universe is shaded light gray to indicate the potential that all sentencing factors may have to be determined under a higher standard of proof if they would dramatically increase the sentence. If the increase is so dramatic that the sentencing enhancement tail wags the dog of the substantive offense, the enhancement becomes an element of the offense. 654, 661, n.12 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 961 (1992); Restrepo, 946 F.2d, at 661- 663 (Tang, J., concurring), id. at 664-679 (Norris, J. , dissenting); id. at 663-664 (Pregerson, J., dissenting) (advocating the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard). Specifically within the context of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, the Supreme Court has “acknowledged” this line of cases that require a higher standard of proof for conduct that significantly enhances the sentence. In United States v. Watts, the Court noted the following: The Guidelines state that it is “appropriate” that facts relevant to sentencing be proved by a preponderance of the evidence, and we have held that application of the preponderance standard at sentencing generally satisfies due process. We acknowledge a divergence of opinion among the Circuits as to whether, in extreme circumstances, relevant conduct that would dramatically increase the sentence must be based on clear and convin cing evidence. United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 156 (1997) (citing Kikumura , 918 F.2d at 1102, for the proposition “that [the] clear-and-convincing standard is implicit in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b), which requires a sentencing court to ‘find’ certain facts in order to justify certain large upward departures”). 145 Apprendi, 120 S. Ct. at 2359. 146 See supra Part I.B. 147 See supra Part II.B. 148 Apprendi, 120 S. Ct. at 2359. 444 GEO. M ASON L. REV. [VOL. 9:2 Figure 4: Present Sentencing Universe III. APPRENDI’S IMPACT ON SENTENCING OFFENDERS CONVICTED OF ECONOMIC CRIMES Although the current sentencing jurisprudence largely is focused on Apprendi’s effect on drug sentences,149 the Court’s rationale in Apprendi is just as applicable to economic crimes. Applying Apprendi to the sentencing regime for economic crimes is significant inasmuch as roughly one quarter of all federal offenses sentenced under the Guidelines concern some form of economic crime.150 In light of the so-called “new technology” offenses—e.g., hacking, distributed denial of service attacks, and computer-based “pump-and-dump” securities fraud schemes,151 this proportion is likely to increase. Unlike sentencing for virtually all other federal crimes, sentencing for the most common forms of economic crimes152 is driven entirely by sentencing factors. In contrast to economic crimes, sentencing for other offenses, such as drug and violent crimes, is determined predominately by 149 See, e.g., United States v. LaFreniere, 236 F.3d 41 (1st Cir. 2001) (holding that Apprendi does not require drug amount to be charged in indictment when district court sentences defendant within statutory maximum); United States v. Angle, 230 F.3d 113 (4th Cir. 2000) (holding that Apprendi requires drug amount to be charged in indictment if amount increases statutory maximum penalty); accord United States v. Doggett, 230 F.3d 160 (5th Cir. 2000); United States v. Flowal, 234 F.3d 932 (6th Cir. 2000); Aguyao-Delagado , 220 F.3d 926 (8th Cir. 2000); United States v. Nordby, 225 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 2000). 150 See UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, 1 9 9 9 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS 12. 151 See, e.g., Vogel v. Sands Bros. & Co., 126 F. Supp.2d 730 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (involving a pump-and-dump scheme); United States v. Zeneski, 912 F. Supp 43 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (involving hacking). 152 According to the most recent Commission data available, fraud, theft, and tax offenses constitute the vast majority of economic crimes sentenced under the guidelines. See id. 2000] APPRENDICITIS 445 the nature of the offense, the severity of which is reflected in their respective “base offense levels.”153 The base offense level represents the Commission’s assessment of the relative severity of particular crimes,154 and serves as the initial starting point for Guideline sentencing adjustments.155 The base offense levels range from a low of one, which corresponds to a term of zero to six months imprisonment, to a high of 43, which corresponds to a term of life imprisonment.156 For drug crimes, the base offense level ranges from six to 38 depending on the type and amount of drug involved in the offense.157 For violent crimes resulting in death, the base offense level ranges from 10 to 43 depending on whether the homicide constituted involuntary manslaughter or first degree murder.158 In contrast, the base offense level for tax and fraud only is six,159 and for theft, the base offense level only is four.160 No term of imprisonment is required for sentences corresponding to these low offense levels.161 As these base offense levels indicate, the Commission does not view economic crimes as being necessarily as serious as, for example, violent offenses.162 As a result, sentencing for economic crimes has little, if 153 The Guidelines assign a “base offense level” to each class of criminal conduct. See USSG § 1B1.2(a); 28 U.S.C. § 994(m) (“The Commission shall. . . independently develop a sentencing range that is consistent with the purposes of sentence described in section 3553(a)(2) of Title 18, United States Code.”); 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (articulating, inter alia , need for sentences “to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for t he offense”). 154 See United States v. Gurgiolo, 894 F.2d 56, 57 (3d Cir. 1990). 155 See USSG § 1B1.1(a). 156 See USSG Ch. 5 Pt. A (“Sentencing Table”). 157 See USSG § 2D1.1(c) (“Drug Quantity Table”). 158 See generally, USSG § 2A1.1 - 2A1.4. 159 See USSG § 2F1.1(a). If no tax loss is involved, the base offense level for tax fraud is six. See USSG § 2T1.1(a)(2). Unlike the fraud guidelines, however, which contain a “loss table” in the specific offense characteristic section, (see USSG § 2F1.1(b)(1)) the tax guidelines provide for alternative base offense levels depending on the amount of loss involved. See USSG §§ 2T1.1(a)(1), 2T4.1. The distinction is unimportant for our purposes inasmuch as relevant conduct determines the ultimate offense level whether through adjustments, as is the case in the fraud guidelines, or through selection of the initial base offense level, as is the case for tax. 160 See USSG § 2B1.1(a). 161 See USSG Ch. 5 Pt. A; USSG § 5B1.1 (authorizing, generally, term of probation for low offense levels). 162 This is not to say that the Commission views economic offenses as minor offenses per se. Indeed, it does not. See, e.g., USSG § 2T1.1, comment., backg’d (“Tax offenses, in and of themselves, are serious offenses.”). Rather, the point is that economic offenses can range from relatively minor offenses, e.g., a $500 tax fraud, to extremely serious offenses, e.g., a $500 million tax fraud. See id. (“[A] greater tax loss is obviously more harmful to the treasury and more serious than a smaller one with otherwise similar characteristics.”). Hence, economic offenses are not inherently very serious offenses, but very well can be (and often are). In contrast, inasmuch as all aggravated assaults are inherently dangerous, they are inherently very serious offenses, which is why the base offense level for aggravated assault is higher than it is for tax evasion. Compare USSG § 2A2.2(a) (setting base offense level at 15 for aggravated assault), with USSG § 2T1.1(a)(2) (setting base offense level at 6 for tax evasion resulting in no tax loss). Thus, the base offense levels reflect that aggravated assault simpliciter is viewed as more serious than tax evasion simpliciter. 446 GEO. M ASON L. REV. [VOL. 9:2 anything, to do with the nature of the economic crime, but practically everything to do with the amount of “loss” involved, i.e., “the value of the property taken, damaged, or destroyed,”163 including the value of any money taken164 or taxes evaded.165 Indeed, the tax Guidelines’ own background commentary states that the tax fraud “[G]uideline relies most heavily on the amount of loss that was the object of the offense.”166 Similarly, the background commentary to the fraud Guidelines provides that the “primary factors upon which this [G]uideline has been based” are “the amount of loss and whether the offense was an isolated crime of opportunity or was sophisticated or repeated.”167 Finally, the background commentary to the theft Guidelines states that “[t]he value of the property stolen plays an important role in determining sentences for theft and other offenses involving stolen property because it is an indicator of both the harm to the victim and the gain to the defendant.”168 For example, depending only on the amount of loss involved, a defendant convicted of fraud pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1001, although he initially would receive a base offense level of six (zero to six months imprisonment), theoretically could have his sentence increased to an offense level of 23 (46 to 57 months imprisonment). Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1001, the statutory maximum term of imprisonment for fraud is five years.169 Thus, based upon loss determinations alone, an offender’s sentence can increase from potentially zero months imprisonment, up to almost the statutory maximum term of imprisonment. Indeed, it appears that economic crimes are the only sorts of offenses that can swing from potentially no prison time to close to 100% of the statutory maximum term of imprisonment based on relevant conduct determinations alone. Clearly, the expression that loss “drives” the sentences for economic crimes could not be more accurate.170 In light of our analysis of Apprendi, therefore, we consider whether loss wags the dog of the substantive economic offenses. 163 See, e.g., USSG § 2B1.1, comment., n.2. 164 See USSG § 2F1.1, comment., n.8. 165 See USSG § 2T1.1(c)(1). 166 USSG § 2T1.1, comment., backg’d. 167 USSG § 2F1.1, comment., backg’d. 168 USSG § 2B1.1, comment., backg’d.; ROGER W. HAINES, JR., ET. AL., FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES HANDBOOK 220 (2000) (“The principal determinant of sentence length for cases of theft, embezzlement, receipt of stolen property, and property destruction sentenced under § 2B1.1 is the amount of the ‘loss.’”). 169 See 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (2000). 170 See Bruce Zucker & Michelle Carey, Capturing the Harm: Defining “Tax Loss” for use in Federal Sentencing, 15 AKRON T AX J. 1, 5 (2000) (referring to sentencing guidelines for economic crimes as “loss driven”); Frank O. Bowman, Coping With Loss: A Reexamination of Sentencing Federal Economic Crimes under the Guidelines, 51 VAND. L. REV. 461, 464 (1998) (“The primary determinant of sentence length for federal economic criminals is the amount of ‘loss’ resulting from an offender’s conduct.”). 2000] APPRENDICITIS 447 According to Mark Knoll and Professor Richard Singer, the traditional methods used by the federal courts to find elements of crimes were relatively straightforward. “If the fact in dispute was part of the statutory scheme and directly related to the defendant’s level of punishment, then it had to be (1) alleged in the indictment, (2) proved to the jury, and (3) proved beyond a reasonable doubt in order to sustain the sentence imposed.”171 Given that loss is inextricably intertwined both with the nature of economic crimes and with the sentencing provisions for economic crimes, there is no obvious reason why loss should not be considered an element of a criminal offense. According to Mr. Knoll and Professor Singer, “prior to McMillan and the [Guidelines], value was considered an element by federal courts.”172 Indeed, thirty years ago, the Second Circuit held that “[a]lthough. . . the section of the Criminal Code here in question does not make value in excess of a certain figure an element of the crime but rather a fact going only to the degree of punishment, we assume the Sixth Amendment entitles a defendant to have that fact determined by the jury rather than by the sentencing judge.”173 At the very least, recalling Justice Stevens’ dissent in McMillan,174 where loss operates to increase dramatically a defendant’s sentence, a high loss amount should be treated as an element of the offense. Merely because the loss may not increase a defendant’s sentence above an otherwise applicable statutory maximum term, however, is of no consequence; the tail may still wag the dog from under the statutory maximum table. The non-formalistic reading of Apprendi advocated earlier still speaks against allowing large loss amounts to remain mere sentencing factors.175 After all, according to Justice Stevens’ majority opinion in Apprendi, “the relevant inquiry is one not of form, but of effect-does the required finding expose the defendant to a greater punishment than that authorized by the jury's guilty verdict?”176 Consequently, if “[t]he judge’s role in sentencing is constrained at its outer limits by the facts alleged in the indictment and found by the jury,”177 then a jury’s guilty verdict authorizes a sentence consistent only with the base offense level for the applicable Guideline, which, for economic crimes, will be equivalent to zero to six months imprisonment. If, according to Justice Thomas,178 it literally is 171 Mark D. Knoll & Richard G. Singer, Searching for the “Tail of the Dog”: Finding “Elements” of Crimes in the Wake of McMillan v. Pennsylvania , 22 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1057, 1078 (1999). 172 See Id. at 1079. 173 United States v. Kramer, 289 F.2d 909, 921 (2d Cir. 1961) (Friendly, J.). 174 See McMillan, 477 U.S. at 96 (Stevens, J. dissenting). 175 See supra Part II.B. 176 Apprendi, 120 S. Ct. at 2365 (emphasis added). 177 Id. at 2359 n.10. 178 Id. at 2369 (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing against validity of sentencing enhancements). 448 GEO. M ASON L. REV. [VOL. 9:2 true that “a crime includes every fact that is by law a basis for imposing or increasing punishment,”179 the upshot, of course, would be that all sentencing factors must be determined beyond a reasonable doubt, which would eviscerate real-offense sentencing. Concededly, such a literal reading is rather extreme and likely untenable in this era of determinate sentencing schemes. Nevertheless, in light of what we have argued, Apprendi suggests strongly that the days are numbered at least for sentencing factors like “loss,” where they essentially function as elements of a crime. CONCLUSION Apprendi v. New Jersey has irrevocably altered the sentencing landscape at both the federal and state levels. Apprendi’s impact likely will be felt not only by legislatures in terms of how they draft new criminal statutes, but also by sentencing commissions in terms of how they draft sentencing guidelines. Justice O’Connor’s fear that Apprendi has placed in jeopardy all determinate sentencing schemes—including the Guidelines—remains to be seen, but the prognosis of their demise is unlikely. Whether particular Guidelines are sufficiently immunized from Apprendicitis, however, is another matter. We have argued that given their near-exclusive reliance on loss, the fraud, theft, and tax Guidelines are so vulnerable to Apprendicitis, that they likely will require substantial modification. For the time being, federal and state sentencing case law will continue to exhibit symptoms of Apprendicitis. Until the Supreme Court articulates a principled distinction between criminal elements and sentencing enhancements, Apprendicitis will continue to spread unchecked. ADDENDUM On April 6, 2001, shortly before the publication of this Article, the Commission voted unanimously to adopt a group of proposed amendments to the Guidelines collectively known as the “Economic Crime Package.”180 The Package fundamentally alters sentencing for offenders convicted of economic crimes by, inter alia, consolidating under one Guideline the Guidelines for theft,181 fraud,182 and property destruction,183 and by 179 Id. at 2372 (Thomas, J. concurring) (emphasis added). 180 See UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, FOURTH REVISED P ROPOSED AMENDMENT: ECONOMIC CRIME P ACKAGE §2B1.1, comment. (n.2(A)(i)) (4th rev. ed., Apr. 6, 2001) [hereinafter ECONOMIC CRIME P ACKAGE]. 181 See USSC §2B1.1 (2000). 182 See USSC §2F1.1 (2000). 2000] APPRENDICITIS 449 adopting a new loss table.184 As was the case with respect to each of these individual Guidelines, “loss”185 remains the principal sentencing factor for determining the sentence under the new, consolidated Guideline. Loss, however, has taken on an altogether new meaning. Whereas loss previously was thought to include only “direct damages”186 and exclude “consequential damages,”187 loss now is defined as “the reasonably foreseeable pecuniary harm that resulted from the offense,”188 with pecuniary harm defined as “harm that is monetary or that otherwise is readily measurable in money.”189 Reasonably foreseeable pecuniary harm, in turn, simply “means pecuniary harm that the defendant knew or, under the circumstances, reasonably should have known, was a potential result of the offense.”190 Consequently, as reasonably foreseeable pecuniary harm may include consequential, or otherwise indirect, damages,191 the definition of loss now encompasses a greater range of pecuniary harms. As a result, loss, as a sentencing factor, will play an even greater role in, and have more of an effect on, the determination of sentences for offenders convicted of economic crimes. In light of this modification, loss may now be even more susceptible to Apprendicitis than ever before. 183 See USSC §2B1.3 (2000). 184 See ECONOMIC CRIME P ACKAGE, supra note 180, §2B1.1(b)(1). 185 See supra notes 163 - 165 (defining previous definition of loss for fraud, theft, and tax offenses). 186 See Fred S. Tryles, A Critique of the Operation of the Theft and Fraud Guidelines from the Perspective of One Probation Officer, 10 FED. SENT. R. 131 (1997) (stating that “[t]he current theft or fraud guidelines limit the functioning of relevant conduct by counting only direct loss”). 187 See, e.g., United States v. Thomas, 62 F.3d 1332, 1346 (11th Cir. 1995) (“The fact that the Commission deliberately allowed an increase for consequential damages in some but not all types of frauds indicates that ‘the absence of an increase. . . is a result of design rather than inadvertence.”) (citation omitted); United States v. Newman, 6 F.3d 623, 630 (9th Cir.1993) (“[i]f the Sentencing Commission had intended to include consequential losses, it could have included them in the definition of loss.”); see also United States v. Marlatt, 24 F.3d 1005, 1007-1008 (7th Cir. 1994) (suggesting that exclusion of consequential damages from loss calculation “is no doubt to prevent the sentencing hearing from turning into a tort or contract suit”); United States v. Wilson, 993 F.2d 214, 217 (11th Cir. 1993) (“[W]e note that avoiding the calculation of consequential injury relieves the district court of a potentially onerous factfinding burde n and may also promote the objective of uniformity in sentencing outcomes.”); Newman, 6 F.3d at 630 ( holding that calculation of consequential damages for arson or theft “would be too complex and would not necessarily reflect the defendant’s culpability accurately”). 188 See ECONOMIC CRIME P ACKAGE, supra note 180, §2B1.1, comment. (n.2(A)(i)). 189 Id., §2B1.1, comment. (n.2(A)(iii)). 190 Id., §2B1.1, comment. (n.2(A)(iv)). 191 See id., §2B1.1, comment. (n.2(A)(v)) (including in certain types of cases losses that previously had been denominated as “consequential damages” under prior versions of Guidelines). 
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work_yzvaj4aixrhavcfla4tpnws4cm	----	8_Nicolosi_paper_quasi def www.imagojournal.it Migration as a symbolic ressource for political storytelling. Emergency imaginary, hate-speech and media in Italy. The article has a twofold purpose: firstly, it highlights how the theme of migration declined in terms of emergency has become a social imaginary, that is a fundamental symbolic resource for the storytelling that fuels the political communication of Italian parties. It shows that this interpretation represents a primary cultural framework creating a climate of "moral panic". Such a climate has justified very restrictive and deadly actions and policies. Secondly, the article aims to show that the stratification of these policies has finally consolidated a mass structural violence sustained and legitimized by two closely related forms of immaterial violence: symbolic violence and cultural violence. Abstract Keywords Emergency | Imaginary | Hate | Moral panic | Violence Authors Guido Nicolosi gnicolos@unict.it Dipartimento di Scienze Politiche e Sociali | Università di Catania La migrazione come risorsa simbolica dello storytelling politico. Immaginario emergenziale, discorsi d’odio e media in Italia Number 14 - Year VIII / December 2019 pp. 101-123 Number 14 – Year VIII / December 2019 www.imagojournal.it 102 Guido Nicolosi La migrazione come risorsa simbolica dello storytelling politico 1. Introduzione Questo articolo presenta una riflessione ancorata a diverse evidenze raccolte nell’ambito di tre ricerche empiriche condotte dall’autore negli ultimi 15 anni. Queste evidenze confermano e specificano quelle raccolte da un’importante letteratura che è stata prodotta in Italia in ambito sociologico sul tema del rapporto tra media e migrazioni. La prima ricerca (2005) ha analizzato con un approccio metodologico misto quali- quantitativo sui testi la rappresentazione del fenomeno migratorio nella stampa locale, in comparazione con la stampa nazionale. La seconda (2014) è stata condotta all’indomani dei tragici eventi di Lampedusa del 3 ottobre 2013 ed è stata pubblicata in Francia nel 2015 sulla rivista Communications (n° 97). In essa, abbiamo comparato la narrazione dei fatti di Lampedusa realizzata dai media italiani con i racconti diretti degli stessi avvenimenti fatti dagli abitanti di Lampedusa. La terza ricerca, di tipo qualitativo e sui testi, invece, è stata condotta tra febbraio e ottobre 2018 nell’ambito di un laboratorio di ricerca, formazione e comunicazione condotto presso l’Università di Catania e finalizzato al contrasto dell’hate-speech1. Il laboratorio ha prodotto un’analisi sistematica delle campagne di comunicazione e di propaganda anti-migrazione realizzate sui social media (twitter, facebook, youtube) dai gruppi estremisti neo- fascisti della cosiddetta “galassia nera” (in particolare Casa Pound e Forza Nuova) e dei due maggiori partiti politici italiani cosiddetti “populisti”2: la Lega per Salvini Premier (populismo di destra) e Movimento Cinque Stelle (populismo trasversale).3 1 Il laboratorio è stato sostenuto e finanziato da Facebook all’interno del programma “P2P: Facebook Global Digital Challenge”. 2 Il populismo, nella sua formulazione originaria, può essere definito come un atteggiamento ideologico che, sulla base di principî e programmi genericamente ispirati al socialismo, esalta in modo demagogico e velleitario il popolo come depositario di valori totalmente positivi. Oggi, come sostenuto da Peter Sloterdijk (2018), rappresenta più una forma di propaganda politica strumentale – spesso insincera – con la quale leader politici aspiranti o di fatto cercano il consenso popolare attraverso una retorica che blandisca gli elettori e li faccia sentire speciali, soprattutto per attenuare il senso di discriminazione della gran parte di loro. Il termine è stato usato in questi ultimi anni per definire ascese politiche diverse (Trump, Farage, Tsipras, Grillo, Podemos, Le Pen), ma complessivamente basate su una contestazione delle classi dirigenti, soprattutto politiche e su uno spiccato «anti-elitismo». w 3 Il trasversalismo o sincretismo politico è una concezione politica sistematizzata come un insieme di posizioni politiche, ideologiche e partitiche che uniscono aspetti delle politiche di sinistra con quelle di destra. Il trasversalismo non implica necessariamente moderatismo centrista, non si occupa da fare da mediatore neutrale per trovare dei compromessi (tra destra e sinistra), bensì prende diversi aspetti di entrambe le posizioni e li concilia in un'unica ideologia. Number 14 – Year VIII / December 2019 www.imagojournal.it 103 Guido Nicolosi La migrazione come risorsa simbolica dello storytelling politico 2. La narrazione emergenziale nei media tradizionali come fonte di “panico morale” La letteratura sociologica di riferimento ha ormai ampiamente dimostrato come in Italia i processi ordinari di newsmaking degli ultimi 30 anni sul tema dell’immigrazione siano stati fortemente caratterizzati all’interno di una cornice (frame) interpretativa di tipo “emergenziale”. Pur cambiando nel corso degli anni l’issue di riferimento, il quadro è rimasto costantemente invariato e di tipo “emergenziale” (Nicolosi 2016). Nei primi anni ’80, gli italiani devono riconfigurare il proprio immaginario scoprendo per la prima volta di vivere in un Paese che attrae flussi e in una primissima breve fase il frame mediatico emergenziale presenta il migrante come “vittima” (emergenza razzismo). Parallelamente, però, comincia a consolidarsi un nuovo paradigma emergenziale che diventerà egemonico fino ai giorni nostri e che presenta il migrante come colpevole o comunque come minaccia reale o potenziale. Sono gli anni ’90, in cui si definisce il binomio emergenza-criminalità (Mansoubi 1990; Marletti 1991; Cotesta 1999; Dal Lago 1999; Censis 2002; Morcellini 2009; Musarò e Parmiggiani 2014) e in cui si presenta per la prima volta al pubblico il tema degli sbarchi e dell’invasione (o dell’ondata, dello tsunami, ecc.). Sufficiente ricordare le immagini degli arrivi nei porti pugliesi delle navi cariche di migranti provenienti dall’Albania. In anni più recenti, al binomio emergenza-criminalità si è andato affiancando quello emergenza- terrorismo e agli sbarchi da est si sono sostituiti quelli da sud. Necessario ricordare che queste rappresentazioni mediatiche cristallizzano e assolutizzano pezzi parziali di realtà molto più complesse. I migranti delinquono più degli italiani? Non sempre, né dappertutto. Sicuramente non i regolari. Mentre è certo che sono soprattutto i migranti le vittime dei principali crimini commessi nel nostro paese (Barbagli 1998). I migranti sbarcano nelle nostre coste rischiando la vita? Solo una piccola parte degli arrivi (tra il 10 e il 30 per cento a seconda dei periodi), certamente una frazione decisamente minoritaria rispetto ai migranti residenti. I migranti sono terroristi? In Europa non esiste un nesso evidente (Roy 2016) e atti terroristici eclatanti sono stati realizzati da cittadini europei “immigrati di seconda o terza generazione” (espressione ambigua e ossimorica). E così via dicendo. Tuttavia, queste rappresentazioni semplificate e distorte finiscono col definire un’agenda mediatica (McCombs e Shaw 1972) decisamente rilevante. In particolare, esse nutrono e alimentano una narrazione emergenziale del fenomeno che risulta essere evidentemente egemonica. Le statistiche ci mostrano una realtà “oggettivamente” non allarmante del fenomeno, 4 ma l’opinione pubblica sembra 4 Restando ai numeri, secondo l’ISTAT l’Italia nel 2015 aveva una popolazione immigrata composta da poco più di cinque milioni di persone, circa l’8 % della popolazione residente totale. Abbiamo ovviamente sul territorio nazionale delle grandi differenze geografiche. Nel Sud Italia, generalmente questa percentuale è significativamente più bassa (in Sicilia attorno al 3%). Number 14 – Year VIII / December 2019 www.imagojournal.it 104 Guido Nicolosi La migrazione come risorsa simbolica dello storytelling politico “stregata” da un immaginario fobico e iperbolico.5 Il successo di questa evidente discrasia tra reale e immaginario denuncia un diffuso e stratificato sentimento di paura radicato in pregiudizi, stereotipi e comprensibili preoccupazioni economiche della popolazione autoctona. Esso denuncia anche un evidente e pericoloso processo di costruzione di “panico morale”. Questo concetto è stato reso famoso da Marshall McLuhan (1964) e da Stanley Cohen (1972) e definisce una situazione in cui si assiste alla diffusione di un sentimento collettivo di paura che individua un certo fenomeno come un “male” in grado di minacciare il benessere della società. Questi autori hanno sottolineato il ruolo giocato dai media nella costruzione di questa condizione. Il panico morale, infatti, viene causato da notizie più o meno distorte a scopo sensazionalistico dai vari media e può derivare da un’esposizione sproporzionata di un fenomeno reale o fittizio (questo tema verrà ripreso anche dalla Scuola di Birmingham dei Cultural Studies). Il panico morale dipinge sempre un “diavolo” popolare caricaturale e stereotipato su cui si sfogano le ansie e i problemi della comunità, secondo la nota teoria del capro espiatorio (Gerard 1982). Facendo leva sulla “coltivazione” (Gerbner 1994) trentennale di questo immaginario emergenziale, la comunicazione politica più recente ha chiaramente utilizzato la migrazione come una risorsa simbolica fondamentale dello storytelling politico. Come è noto, in politica, i fatti contano meno delle paure dei cittadini e negli ultimi anni si sono fatti avanti alcuni spregiudicati attori in grado di intercettarle e alimentarle. Gruppi e partiti politici che agiscono come “imprenditori della paura” (Milani 2013) in grado di capitalizzare efficacemente gli effetti di una “strategia della tensione” continuamente alimentata. Lo dimostra l’avanzata, ovunque in Europa, della destra xenofoba e del populismo trasversale (ad esempio in Italia il M5S), sempre portatori di un sentimento anti-immigrazione. Ma anche i governi, anche quelli “non populisti”, hanno potuto trarre vantaggio dalla gestione emergenziale del fenomeno. Ad esempio, rassicurando gli elettori con politiche repressive o con accordi con i paesi di partenza.6 Oppure, grazie ad una gestione clientelare delle strutture, degli organismi e dei fondi stanziati in maniera emergenziale e quindi raggirando le normali procedure previste 5 Un sondaggio realizzato da Ipsos-Mori nel 2017 mette in rilievo come in Italia il 66% della popolazione afferma che gli immigrati siano “troppi”. Solo il 15% degli italiani sono in grado di stimare correttamente la percentuale di immigrati presenti nel territorio nazionale. Mediamente, gli italiani ritengono che la popolazione immigrata sia pari al 30%. Solo il 10% degli italiani ritengono che l’immigrazione possa avere un impatto positivo. 6 Ad esempio, il “Trattato di amicizia e collaborazione” del 2008, che prevedeva, di fatto, la costruzione di lager commissionati alla Libia volti a bloccare i flussi migratori direttamente alla partenza che all’Italia sarebbero costati circa 5 miliardi di dollari in 20 anni, prezzo che fu presentato all’opinione pubblica come “risarcimento” all’ex colonia. Oppure l’accordo Italia-Libia siglato dal Ministro Minniti (Governo Gentiloni) a Roma il 2 febbraio 2017, in cui si prevede che, in cambio di un controllo più stringente dei flussi migratori in partenza dalla Libia, Roma finanzi infrastrutture per il contrasto dell’immigrazione irregolare, formi il personale e fornisca assistenza tecnica alla guardia costiera e alla guardia di frontiera libica. Questi accordi hanno sollevato diversi dubbi e contestazioni dal punto di vista etico. Number 14 – Year VIII / December 2019 www.imagojournal.it 105 Guido Nicolosi La migrazione come risorsa simbolica dello storytelling politico dalla pubblica amministrazione.7 O ancora, come merce di scambio da usare nei negoziati con l’Unione Europea.8 Inoltre, è anche vero che il lavoro encomiabile e fondamentale delle ONG e di tutti coloro che operano nel settore del soccorso e dell’accoglienza si nutre ed è alimentato indirettamente da una narrazione emergenziale. L’emergenza, quindi, è finita col diventare “senso comune”, immaginario collettivo. “luogo comune” di incontro di interessi, pratiche, culture anche profondamente diversi e spesso contrapposti. Alcuni leciti e nobili (le ONG ad esempio). Altri molto meno. Per questa ragione, le pratiche alternative che mirano ad uscire da questa logica incontrano resistenze o indifferenze trasversali anche radicali.9 La cultura emergenziale si presenta con i tratti tipici della profezia che si auto-avvera. Essa non è frutto di una condizione oggettiva, ma finisce col produrla, all’interno dei paesi di accoglienza (Dal Zotto 2014) e al loro esterno. Le scelte strategiche in materia di migrazione effettuate dall’Unione Europea nel suo complesso o dai singoli Stati, orientate a contrastare i flussi (chiusura ed esternalizzazione delle frontiere, rimpatri forzati, penalizzazione della migrazione clandestina, riduzione drastica delle quote d’ingresso regolare, strategia “militare- umanitaria”, finanziamento della guardia costiera libica, ecc.), hanno trasformato un processo strutturale arcaico e antico in un’inesorabile ecatombe di uomini, donne e bambini. Altrove (Nicolosi 2018b), ho sostenuto la tesi che nonostante vi siano tutti i segni di una sinistra e drammatica «semiotica del genocidio» 10 non sia corretto utilizzare il termine “genocidio” per rappresentare l’attuale condizione poiché la questione primaria riguarda l’esistenza o meno di una precisa volontà e strategia genocidiaria. Ritengo che non sia facile dimostrare l’esistenza di un’esplicita pianificazione coordinata da parte di enti e/o autorità (probabilmente internazionali), strategicamente finalizzata allo sterminio dei migranti per ragioni politiche. Da un 7 In Italia, diverse inchieste della magistratura hanno evidenziando come all’interno delle politiche emergenziali possono annidarsi sacche di corruzione e di scambio elettorale (caso CARA di Mineo). 8 Il governo Renzi ha notoriamente ottenuto una certa flessibilità sui conti pubblici da parte dell’UE in cambio di una “gestione” italiana dell’”emergenza migranti”. D’altronde, anche i governi dei paesi di emigrazione (pensiamo alla Libia), usano i flussi migratori come arma di ricatto nei confronti dei Paesi “di accoglienza”, per ottenere sostegno politico, accordi commerciali, danaro, ecc. 9 La parabola del caso Riace e la sorte politico-giudiziaria di Mimmo Lucano ne sono un esempio illuminante. Al netto dei problemi gestionali che la sua amministrazione ha forse incontrato (lo dirà la magistratura), l’accanimento politico nei suoi confronti dimostra, a contrario, la bontà di un modello finalizzato a uscire dalla logica dell’emergenza per entrare (come auspica d’altronde il sistema SPRAR) in quella dell’integrazione e della valorizzazione strutturale della migrazione come risorsa sociale, culturale ed economica. 10 L’espressione è stata evocata dall’antropologa Annamaria Rivera, in un’intervista rilasciata al quotidiano Il Manifesto (04/09/2015): «la proliferazione di muri e fili spinati; i mucchi di cadaveri di asfissiati durante trasporti da bestie da macello; la marchiatura di massa degli esuli, bambini compresi, a rendere letterale la loro stigmatizzazione; i campi per migranti irregolari, con topografia, routine e violenza quotidiane simili a quelle dei lager […]» Number 14 – Year VIII / December 2019 www.imagojournal.it 106 Guido Nicolosi La migrazione come risorsa simbolica dello storytelling politico punto di vista sociologico, ritengo invece assai rilevante l’aver messo in luce le sinistre assonanze “semiotiche” tra le pratiche di “gestione” dei migranti (nelle sue varie fasi) sostenute direttamente o indirettamente dall’UE, l’ecatombe di migranti in atto e le tragiche esperienze di sterminio del nostro più oscuro passato recente. D’altronde, questa è la mia tesi, non ritengo necessario evocare il genocidio come categoria giuridica specifica per mostrare l’esistenza di un’inaccettabile violenza di massa. Da un punto di vista sociologico, infatti, esistono diverse forme di violenza (Galtung 1969). Accanto alla violenza diretta e volontaria, che implica sempre e necessariamente una responsabilità soggettiva (e penale) precisa, esiste anche una violenza “oggettiva”, che possiamo definire strutturale. Questa è allo stesso tempo indiretta e sistematica ed informa i meccanismi sociali dell’oppressione (Farmer 2004). Meccanismi che sono consapevoli e inconsapevoli. L’infernale mix di strategie politiche, legali, amministrative, militari e comunicative messe in atto dall’UE, e dai singoli paesi al suo interno, in questi ultimi anni ha creato le condizioni strutturali dell’esercizio di un’inaudita violenza di massa (internamento, separazione delle famiglie, respingimenti, naufragi, morte, ecc.) nei confronti di centinaia di migliaia di persone (uomini, donne, bambini) civili indifese, al fine di limitarne o scoraggiarne la migrazione. Così come ha ampiamente argomentato Hannah Arendt (2012), con specifico riferimento alla Shoah, la creazione del neologismo genocidio rappresentò un passaggio cruciale per la presa di coscienza della gravità dei fatti accaduti in Europa nel corso della Seconda guerra mondiale. Dare un nome a fenomeni nuovi, può aiutare a reificarne le dimensioni, darne concretezza, identificarne e comprenderne le cause e le eventuali responsabilità politiche e giudiziarie. Forse, può anche servire a ridurre le probabilità che questi fenomeni possano riproporsi in futuro. Altrove, ho proposto di nominare con una sineddoche provocatoria l’insieme di queste strategie e di questi atti con il termine diasporicidio. L’obiettivo era quello di sottolineare la matrice evidentemente tanatogenetica di politiche “agoniche” nei confronti del processo diasporico. 11 L’accanimento strutturale anti-diasporico rende (consapevolmente?) la migrazione una tanato-diaspora e produce un’ecatombe di migranti. Non penso si possa arrivare a riconoscere e attribuire precise responsabilità penali individuali, ma certamente esistono delle importantissime responsabilità morali e politiche che possono essere rilevate. 11 Il termine “diaspora” rappresenta la principale emergenza terminologica di un nuovo sguardo sociologico che negli ultimi anni si è affacciato sul tema delle migrazioni. Esso tende a cogliere i soggetti e i gruppi migranti non più unicamente in rapporto con i contesti di destinazione, ma come inseriti attivamente in più ampi e diversificati spazi fisici e sociali, tra i quali un ruolo privilegiato spetta senz’altro alla società di provenienza. In particolare, si è via via affermata una concezione “decentrata” del termine, concezione che si oppone all’uso tradizionale, secondo il quale il termine diaspora evocava l’esilio da un centro territoriale, la perdita di legame con l’origine e la possibilità di un ritorno al proprio paese (Dufoix 2003; 2011). Number 14 – Year VIII / December 2019 www.imagojournal.it 107 Guido Nicolosi La migrazione come risorsa simbolica dello storytelling politico 3. Migrazione, violenza simbolica e violenza culturale: discorsi d’odio e social media Il pilastro fondamentale su cui si regge la violenza strutturale è la violenza culturale. La sistematica svalutazione di culture o gruppi sociali particolari può esserne infatti fonte d’ispirazione e giustificazione. Tuttavia, in stretta connessione con la violenza culturale, esiste anche la violenza simbolica (Bourdieu 1998), ovvero una violenza “invisibile” (ma portatrice di effetti materiali e reali) attraverso la quale alcuni significati vengono imposti come legittimi, dissimulando i rapporti di forza di cui sono in realtà espressione. I media sono uno strumento fondamentale nel processo di costruzione delle categorie mentali che materializzano la violenza simbolica. Ma si rivelano anche estremamente utili nel sostenere strategie mirate di violenza culturale estremamente raffinate. La tesi che qui presentiamo è che la violenza strutturale di massa su cui si fonda il “diasporicidio” ottenga legittimazione da una doppia violenza “immateriale”: a) la violenza simbolica operata dai media tradizionali (i media mainstream in particolare) volta a dematerializzare la dimensione tragica della morte in migrazione e, più in generale, a sostenere un processo di “sparizione” dei corpi materiali dei migranti; b) la violenza culturale realizzata da alcuni gruppi politici ideologicamente orientati (hate speech). Per quanto attiene la violenza simbolica, i media mainstream hanno elaborato un paradigma deresponsabilizzante basato su un frame interpretativo auto-assolutorio e consolatorio. Esiste un’emergenza migrazione legata a cause esterne su cui non abbiamo possibilità di intervenire (guerre, fame, disperazione, ecc.). Questa emergenza rinvia ad un’eccezionalità quasi “meteorologica”: avviene come potrebbe avvenire un’alluvione, uno tsunami, un nubifragio. Non a caso le metafore giornalistiche utilizzare sono proprio queste: tsunami, onda anomala, ecc. Contro questa emergenza eccezionale, cosa possiamo fare? Nulla o poco. Come ho mostrato con riferimento alla tragedia di Lampedusa del 3 ottobre 2013 (Nicolosi e Panebianco 2015; Nicolosi 2018a), i media hanno anestetizzato la portata drammatica degli eventi. Essi hanno fondamentalmente nascosto all’opinione pubblica la violenza strutturale subita dai migranti, realizzando un sistematico e simbolico “occultamento di cadavere”.12 Ma la violenza strutturale si fonda anche su un altro pilastro, ovvero la violenza culturale. La narrazione emergenziale la alimenta, nella misura in cui essa rappresenta il capitale primario a disposizione degli “imprenditori della paura”. L’hate speech ne è il prodotto più evidente. Secondo la definizione fornita dall’Oxford English Dictionary, esso rappresenta un « abusive or threatening speech or writing that expresses prejudice 12 Un ruolo importante lo ha avuto un regime iconografico che ho definito “tropico”, volto a traslare e metamorfizzare retoricamente, fino alla rarefazione, i corpi e i cadaveri dei migranti. Sull’importanza delle immagini “traumatiche” nella costruzione della memoria (Bonucci 2018). Number 14 – Year VIII / December 2019 www.imagojournal.it 108 Guido Nicolosi La migrazione come risorsa simbolica dello storytelling politico against a particular group, especially on the basis of race, religion, or sexual orientation». Si tratta di una forma particolarmente insidiosa di violenza culturale. Una rappresentazione statistica dell’hate speech è particolarmente difficile da realizzare, dato l’ampia tendenza all’under-reporting e all’under-recording, soprattutto in Italia. Pertanto, i dati ufficiali disponibili riescono a fotografare e restituire solo un segmento estremamente parziale del fenomeno. Inoltre, i dati disponibili sulle discriminazioni e sui crimini d’odio, raccolti sia da fonti istituzionali che da associazioni e ONG, risultano spesso frammentari e difficilmente comparabili. L’Ufficio nazionale antidiscriminazioni razziali (UNAR) ha incontrato la medesima difficoltà nel tentativo di aggregare dati provenienti da fonti diverse (oltre ai propri dati, anche quelli del Ministero dell’Interno, del Ministero della Giustizia, di altre fonti istituzionali e delle associazioni/ong), al fine di elaborare il primo Piano nazionale d’azione contro il razzismo, la xenofobia e l’intolleranza. Secondo i dati raccolti dall’Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) dell’Organizzazione per la cooperazione e per lo sviluppo economico (OCSE), in Italia dal 2013 al 2017 abbiamo assistito ad un incremento esponenziale dei crimini d’odio registrati dalla polizia, passando rispettivamente da 472 a 1048 (+122%). All’interno di questi 1048, la distribuzione per motivazione (rappresentata nel grafico 1) presenta una realtà molto netta che conferma la sensazione impressionistica di un clima generalizzato di risentimento e in cui le motivazioni a sfondo razziale e xenofobico rilevano in maniera nitida (79%). Grafico 1. Distribuzione dei crimini d’odio in Italia nel 2017 per motivazione (Fonte: ODHIR). Se guardiamo alla distribuzione per tipologia di crimine, una parte importante di questi crimini, circa un terzo, sono legati alla fattispecie “incitamento alla violenza” (337 casi, ovvero il 32%). 79% 6% 15% Razzismo e xenofobia Orientamento sessuale o identità di genere Discriminazioni contro disabili Number 14 – Year VIII / December 2019 www.imagojournal.it 109 Guido Nicolosi La migrazione come risorsa simbolica dello storytelling politico Grafico 2. Distribuzione per tipologia di reato nel 2017 (Fonte: ODHIR). Un dato altrettanto rilevante riguarda il ruolo giocato dai media digitali nella crescita e diffusione dell’hate-speech e ci viene fornito dall’UNAR. Stando ai dati relativi alle segnalazioni ricevute, a partire dal 2013 le discriminazioni on line avrebbero superato quelle registrate nell’ambito della vita pubblica e dell’ambiente lavorativo: più di un quarto dei casi rilevati o segnalati (26,2%), contro il 16,8% del 2012. Sempre l’UNAR riferisce di rilevare online, mediante il proprio Osservatorio media e internet, circa 7000 casi potenzialmente discriminatori che si traducono in circa 30 casi al giorno di effettiva discriminazione. Tra i vari canali usati un ruolo fondamentale lo ricoprono soprattutto i social network. In particolare, il monitoraggio svolto dall’Osservatorio nel 2016 (report del 2017) ha messo in evidenza come in quell’anno in Italia ci sarebbero stati ben 2652 casi di discriminazione, il 69% dei quali riguardanti fatti di natura etno-razziale. L'Ufficio ha lavorato su 2939 segnalazioni, di queste il 90% sono risultate effettivi casi di discriminazione, il 6,4% (187) sono state considerate dubbie e solo il 3,2% (97 casi) non pertinenti. La maggiore fonte di discriminazione continua ad essere quella etnico- 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 Vi ole nz a f isi ca In cit am en to all a v iol en za Fu rto /r ap ina Da nn i a lla pr op rie tà In ce nd io do los o Pr ofa na zio ne to mb e At tac ch i lu og hi di cu lto Di stu rb o d ell a q uie te Va na da lis mo Co mp or tam en ti m ina cc ios i No n s pe cif ica to Number 14 – Year VIII / December 2019 www.imagojournal.it 110 Guido Nicolosi La migrazione come risorsa simbolica dello storytelling politico razziale che sfiora il 69% dei casi, di cui il 17% riguarda la comunità 'Rom, Sinti e Caminanti (RSC)" e il 9% le discriminazioni per motivi religiosi o per convinzioni personali. Dopo quelle legate alla razza il 16% delle discriminazioni riguarda i disabili, il 9% quelle legate all'orientamento sessuale e all’identità di genere e infine il 5% all'età. Grafico 3. Discriminazioni online 2016 (Fonte: Osservatorio Media e Internet - UNAR) L’Osservatorio per la sicurezza contro gli atti di discriminazione del Ministero dell’Interno (OSCAD) riferisce di 2532 segnalazioni ricevute dal 10 settembre 2010 al 31 dicembre 2018. Di queste, circa il 45% riguardano casi di reati di odio (hate crime) e circa il 15% casi di discriminazione sul web (hate speech). 69% 16% 9% 5% Discriminazioni etno-razziali Disabili Genere e identità sessuale Età Number 14 – Year VIII / December 2019 www.imagojournal.it 111 Guido Nicolosi La migrazione come risorsa simbolica dello storytelling politico Grafico 4. Distribuzione segnalazioni per tipologia discriminatoria di Hate Crimes e Hate Speech 2010-2018 (Fonte: OSCAD) Come è possibile vedere nel grafico 4, la stragrande maggioranza (ben il 59%) delle segnalazioni di hate crime e hate speech riguardano casi legati all’etnia e alla razza. Aggiungiamo che l’OSCAD, così come altre fonti (ad esempio Lunaria, ONG impegnata nell’analisi del fenomeno), riferiscono di un trend di crescita esponenziale dei casi di incitamento all’odio sul web, ovvero casi di violenze verbali su siti, blog e social network razzisti. In generale, tutte le fonti istituzionali e non governative attestano un preoccupante incremento del fenomeno.13 13 Discorso analogo può essere fatto sull’antisemitismo. Un rapporto del Kantor Center dell’Università di Tel Aviv realizzato in Italia grazie ai dati raccolti dall’Osservatorio Antisemitismo della fondazione CDEC (Centro di Documentazione Ebraica Contemporanea) di Milano nel 2018, riferisce di 197 episodi di antisemitismo, il 66% in più rispetto al 2017 e al 2016. Nessun caso di aggressione fisica. Circa il 68% di questi episodi sono avvenuti sul web. Facebook è in particolare il social network più utilizzato. Dei 133 episodi di antisemitismo accaduti sul web, 70 sono stati rilevati su Facebook, 25 su Twitter, 9 su YouTube, 28 in siti Internet e 1 su WhatsApp. 59%19% 13% 8% 1% Etnia/razza Credo religioso Orientamento sessuale Disabilità Identità di genere Number 14 – Year VIII / December 2019 www.imagojournal.it 112 Guido Nicolosi La migrazione come risorsa simbolica dello storytelling politico 4. Discorsi d’odio e gruppi politici organizzati Il trend fin qui presentato trova un’inquietante conferma nell’ambito delle attività di comunicazione dei gruppi politici organizzati. Già nel 2009, il consigliere sulla sicurezza informatica del Ministero dell’Interno registrava un importante incremento dei gruppi politici di discussione di natura razzista: 1.200 gruppi rispetto agli 800 dell’anno precedente. Secondo la mappatura dell’attività dei partiti, delle organizzazioni e dei movimenti xenofobi sui social media realizzata nel 2015 nell’ambito del progetto PRISM (Preventing, Inhibiting and Redressing Hate Speech in New Media), l’elenco dei partiti, organizzazioni e movimenti che si distinguono per l’elevata capacità di diffondere i discorsi di incitamento all’odio è estremamente lunga: • siti internet di partiti/movimenti politici di estrema destra; • siti antisemiti (neonazisti e/o cattointegralisti, antisionisti, cospirativisti e negazionisti); • siti di cosiddetta “controinformazione” xenofobi e razzisti. Il gruppo di ricerca ha effettuato una selezione all’interno di questo elenco, individuando i più influenti, sia nella vita pubblica, sia in rete, e più presenti sui social network. La scelta finale è quindi ricaduta su: Lega, Casa Pound Italia, 14 Forza Nuova,15 Resistenza Nazionale,16 Losai.eu/Radio Spada.17 L’analisi dell’uso dei social media realizzata da Prism rileva che Facebook e Twitter sono i canali in assoluto più utilizzati. In particolare, Lega e CasaPound Italia preferiscono utilizzare Twitter, tutti gli altri sono più attivi su Facebook: in tal senso, Twitter sembra configurarsi come uno strumento utilizzato per lo più dai partiti e dalle organizzazioni più strutturate, in maniera più vicina ai tradizionali mezzi di comunicazione politica. 18 14 Movimento politico della destra radicale, oggi alleato della Lega Nord, nonostante lo scarso consenso elettorale ottenuto negli anni (meno dell’1%)55 ha conquistato una buona visibilità grazie a un uso intelligente dei mezzi di comunicazione, tra cui i social network, e l’accento sui temi sociali, in primis il disagio abitativo degli italiani. Al suo interno è presente un movimento studentesco denominato “Blocco studentesco”. 15 Movimento politico neofascista, con posizioni xenofobe, antizigane, antisemite, cattointegraliste, omofobiche. Tra i primi movimenti dell’estrema destra a fare uso di social network, ha saputo conquistare una buona visibilità, anche se i consensi elettorali sono molto contenuti (meno dell’1%). 16 Sito di controinformazione di estrema destra, attraverso un sito, un blog e un profilo Facebook, divulga e rilancia le notizie riportate da altri siti e pagine Facebook ad esso collegati, come identita.com, tuttiicriminidegliimmigrati.com, voxnews, info, le pagine Facebook “Italia agli italiani”, “Stop agli immigrati” e altre. 17 Network di siti web gestiti da giovani cattolici estremisti, che in maniera non sempre esplicita si richiamano al suprematismo cattolico, all’antisemitismo, al cospirativismo e all’islamofobia. 18 Al contrario, il leader politico della Lega Salvini è estremamente attivo su Facebook, dove riesce a ottenere un seguito ben maggiore rispetto a quello della Lega Nord: è evidente come si sia compiuto un processo, fruttuoso dal punto di vista elettorale, di personalizzazione del partito. Number 14 – Year VIII / December 2019 www.imagojournal.it 113 Guido Nicolosi La migrazione come risorsa simbolica dello storytelling politico Dall’analisi dei contenuti e delle parole più usate realizzata nell’indagine, si confermano le specificità tematiche su cui ogni singolo gruppo ha puntato nel costruire la propria retorica: l’attenzione ai temi sociali e ai valori tradizionali degli “italiani” nel caso di Casa-Pound e Forza Nuova; l’insistenza xenofoba su migranti e rom nel caso della Lega Nord e di Resistenza Nazionale, quest’ultima in chiave più criminalizzante e con una stigmatizzazione islamofobica; infine, il proselitismo religioso per il network cattolico. In base a quanto è evidenziabile attraverso la tipologia di mappatura condotta, l’incitamento all’odio sembra vertere più sulle tradizionali parole chiave della retorica populista e delle nuove destre (“popolo”, “sovranità”, “italiani”, “immigrati”), che su parole marcatamente d’odio (la parola più radicale in tal senso è quella formata dall’hashtag #stopinvasione): l’hate speech appare cioè condotto attraverso strategie retoriche e discorsive che non si esplicitano attraverso parole apertamente violente L’analisi della campagna elettorale del 2018 realizzata da Gangi (2018) mette in evidenza come le diverse formazioni politiche che compongono la galassia della destra italiana abbiano utilizzato il tema della migrazione come collante. Una convergenza “sovranista” in grado di assottigliare le differenze che hanno storicamente frammentato queste realtà dal dopoguerra ad oggi. La issue anti-immigrazione è stata talmente potente da travalicare gli steccati classici delle formazioni dichiaratamente di destra, infiltrandosi anche nella retorica del Movimento Cinque Stelle. Quest’ultimo infatti si è gradualmente spostato dalle originarie tematiche prettamente ecologiste per adottare una posizione decisamente ambigua nei confronti della migrazione. Questo processo non nasce certamente con le elezioni politiche del 2018. il Movimento 5 Stelle, inizialmente considerato una costola della sinistra è invece lentamente diventato un partito caratterizzato da una forte trasversalità politica, geografica e di classe. Tutto impegnato ad aumentare a dismisura il proprio consenso, ha inizialmente sempre rifiutato responsabilità significative di governo (a livello nazionale), consapevole del fatto che le scelte di governo implicano necessariamente una selezione tra gli interessi e i bisogni da accontentare (e da scontentare). Sull’immigrazione, così come su moltissimi temi, il Movimento di Beppe Grillo si è sempre mostrato sfuggente. Inizialmente su posizioni terzomondiste, col cambiamento della base elettorale e l’ampliamento del consenso trasversale abbiamo assistito ad un ribaltamento discorsivo di grande rilievo. I toni e le forme simboliche della comunicazione del Movimento si sono allineate sempre più con quelle adottate dagli altri partiti xenofobi. Grillo, in nome del Movimento, ha più volte chiesto che “gli immigrati giunti irregolarmente sul suolo italiano che non rientrano nello status di rifugiati venissero espulsi”. Definendo questa misura una “questione di civile buonsenso”. Ricordiamo che nel parlamento europeo il Movimento 5 Stelle ha poi stretto alleanza con l’Ukip di Farange e che molte posizioni espresse da diversi esponenti del Number 14 – Year VIII / December 2019 www.imagojournal.it 114 Guido Nicolosi La migrazione come risorsa simbolica dello storytelling politico movimento mostrano una strategia elettorale e comunicativa apertamente xenofoba. La sociologa Iside Gjergji in un articolo pubblicato sul Fatto Quotidiano, giornale vicino al Movimento stesso, l’8 agosto del 2015 ha efficacemente descritto la strategia del Movimento 5 stelle sul tema immigrazione: un mix di ignoranza, di razzismo, di linguaggio da bar e di brama populista, mirante a togliere voti e simpatie a forze politiche più simili (almeno rispetto all’idea complessiva di società), ovvero al cartello elettorale Lega Nord-Casa Pound”. Correttamente, la Gjergji definisce questa strategia come “shock and awe strategy” (“stordisci e sgomenta”), tipica delle forze politiche populiste e xenofobe. Come efficacemente affermato dalla sociologa, essa consiste in uno schema consolidato: Fondato sempre su notizie false (fake news) o verosimili, ma decontestualizzate e ricontestualizzate in frame fittizi che ne distorcono il senso fino alla menzogna sul tema migrazione, dunque, i discorsi d’odio in Italia non sono realizzati solo dai gruppuscoli di estrema destra, ma anche da partiti politici più strutturati e con un ampio consenso elettorale. Certamente ci sono importanti differenze. Sfacciata e orgogliosamente xenofoba la strategia comunicativa della Lega (figura 1). DATI SHOCK (falsi o mix vero /falso) CITAZIONI di episodi di cronaca nera o giudiziaria PROPOSTE CONCRETE E SEMPLICI(STICHE): "giro di vite"; "tutti a casa"; "nienti ricorsi" (senza spiegare fattibilità e costi) FINTA DISTINZIONE tra profughi buoni e profughi cattivi (“chi ha diritto e chi non ne ha”) CONTRAPPOSIZIONE noi / loro Number 14 – Year VIII / December 2019 www.imagojournal.it 115 Guido Nicolosi La migrazione come risorsa simbolica dello storytelling politico Figura 1. Esempi storici di campagna anti-immigrazione della Lega Molto più sofisticata e ambigua quella del Movimento Cinque Stelle (figura 2).19 19 Ovviamente i due partiti hanno due elettorati solo parzialmente sovrapposti. Il M5S ha un consenso molto più ampio (nonostante le proiezioni più recenti abbiamo molto assottigliato la forbice tra i due) e molto più trasversale dal punto di vista della composizione socio-economica. Number 14 – Year VIII / December 2019 www.imagojournal.it 116 Guido Nicolosi La migrazione come risorsa simbolica dello storytelling politico Figura 2. Esempi di campagna anti-immigrazione del M5S Come già mostrato in un altro recente saggio (Nicolosi 2018), attraverso un prodigioso artificio retorico, il M5S motiva le proposte politiche della destra estrema (“Immigrazione: obiettivo sbarchi zero. L’Italia non è il campo profughi dell’Europa”) con le analisi sociali (le condizioni di sfruttamento dei migranti) tipiche della riflessione critica della sinistra. L’espediente comunicativo, finalizzato ad accontentare l’elettorato ampio e trasversale del proprio target politico, è di questo tipo: Un aspetto rilevante consiste nel fatto che entrambe le campagne attingono però al medesimo immaginario simbolico emergenziale che ha alimentato la comunicazione di Problema: I migranti vengono sfruttati dal sistema capitalista; i migranti senza lavoro sono costretti a delinquere; i migranti sono vittime della tratta; i migranti rischiano la vita per arrivare in Italia L'emergenza immigrazione è una situazione inaccettabile Soluzione: blocchiamo l'immigrazione Number 14 – Year VIII / December 2019 www.imagojournal.it 117 Guido Nicolosi La migrazione come risorsa simbolica dello storytelling politico massa negli ultimi anni: i barconi, il mare, le orde, ecc. Un immaginario talmente pervasivo da diventare luogo comune e accomunare tutti gli attori in campo. Anche quelli maggiormente in contrapposizione con le posizioni ideologiche dei gruppi xenofobi e quindi utili come esempio emblematico di tipo “a fortiori” (figura 3 e 4). Figura 3. Immagine della campagna per la raccolta donazioni di MSF Figura 4. Frame del video della cantante MIA (singolo Borders). Number 14 – Year VIII / December 2019 www.imagojournal.it 118 Guido Nicolosi La migrazione come risorsa simbolica dello storytelling politico La possibilità di partire da un immaginario condiviso e “dato per scontato”, ma in realtà distorto nella sua semplicistica forza generalizzante. Come detto, infatti, la crisi dei rifugiati rappresenta la drammatica condizione di una frazione estremamente ridotta di migranti. Senza volere sminuire la portata e la rilevanza di questa crisi, la sovrapposizione immaginaria tra questa condizione e il fenomeno migratorio ha avuto degli effetti perversi su cui è necessario riflettere criticamente senza cedere a comprensibili tentazioni emotive. Anche questa sovrapposizione spiega il successo delle strategie narrative adottate da Lega e M5S con il conseguente (pur temporaneo) sodalizio politico. Parliamo di due forze politiche che, nella loro diversità ideologica, su questo tema mostravano una convergenza politica particolarmente importante. Questo aspetto è particolarmente rilevante nell’economia complessiva del nostro discorso poiché con la formazione del governo Lega-M5S la violenza culturale dei discorsi di odio si è trasformata da “mera” comunicazione politica con finalità elettorali a spregiudicata (e ambigua) forma di comunicazione pubblica e istituzionale. Come è facile comprendere dalla campagna sulla cosiddetta “chiusura dei porti” (figura 5) lanciata nel 2018 dal Ministro degli Interni Matteo Salvini (Lega) e sostenuta dal Ministro delle Infrastrutture Danilo Toninelli (M5S). Figura 5. Campagna “Chiudiamo i porti” dell’ex-Ministro dell’Interno Salvini Parlo esplicitamente di campagna di comunicazione pubblica per sottolineare come, ad oggi, nessuno sia stato in grado di recuperare alcun atto formale che decretasse ufficialmente la chiusura dei porti. Com’è infatti noto, questa, in ottemperanza dell’articolo 83 del Codice della navigazione, può essere disposta dal Ministero delle Number 14 – Year VIII / December 2019 www.imagojournal.it 119 Guido Nicolosi La migrazione come risorsa simbolica dello storytelling politico Infrastrutture e Trasporti per motivi di ordine pubblico, laddove il Ministero degli Interni li preveda con specifico provvedimento formale. Nonostante le rassicurazioni di Toninelli sulla presenza di questo provvedimento, né i giornalisti, né i marinai, né tantomeno i legali delle navi delle ONG coinvolte hanno mai recuperato traccia materiale di questo atto. Al contrario, la successiva approvazione dei cosiddetti decreti- sicurezza (in particolare il bis) era orientata a costruire ex post un fondamento giuridico formale e materiale a questa campagna. Abbiamo assistito ad un fenomeno importante e drammatico d’inversione temporale nel tradizionale rapporto che siamo abituati a registrare tra diritto e comunicazione pubblica. In questo caso, la comunicazione non ha seguito, ma anticipato la produzione del diritto. Per poi diventare nuovamente comunicazione (figura 6) Figura 5. Campagna di comunicazione sui decreti sicurezza 5. Conclusioni L’intento di questo saggio è stato duplice. In prima battuta, ho tentato di mettere in evidenza come il tema della migrazione declinato in termini “emergenziali” sia diventato una risorsa simbolica fondamentale nello storytelling che alimenta la comunicazione politica dei partiti italiani. Conseguentemente, ho cercato di mostrare come questa interpretazione emergenziale rappresenti il frame culturale primario che ha alimentato la definizione di un clima di “panico morale”. Tale clima ha giustificato azioni e politiche di contrasto ai flussi migratori molto restrittive che si sono rilevate drammaticamente mortifere. Qui si sostiene la tesi secondo cui la stratificazione nel Number 14 – Year VIII / December 2019 www.imagojournal.it 120 Guido Nicolosi La migrazione come risorsa simbolica dello storytelling politico tempo di queste politiche abbia finito col consolidare una violenza strutturale di massa sostenuta e legittimata da due forme interrelate di violenza immateriale: la violenza simbolica e la violenza culturale. In entrambe, un ruolo decisivo lo giocano i media, sia quelli tradizionali che quelli social. In tal senso, ancora una volta è possibile ribadire il principio che vecchi e nuovi media non possono essere considerati come due sfere separate e autonome, ma come al contrario essi debbano essere analizzati come due diversi pilastri di un medesimo panorama mediatico o anche mediascape (Appadurai 2012). Essi andrebbero ovviamente considerati in un contesto integrativo e di reciproca alimentazione grazie a fenomeni di spillover20 e crossmedialità. L’aspetto rilevante qui consiste nel fatto che trent’anni di immaginario emergenziale sull’immigrazione (declinato nelle sue molteplici forme: razzismo, criminalità, terrorismo, invasione, ecc.) sviluppato e sostenuto dai media tradizionali (stampa e tv in primo luogo) hanno finito per rappresentare la principale risorsa simbolica su cui è stato attivato il cantiere identitario sovranista nella sua componente anti- immigrazione. Come avviene in altri contesti della cultura di massa, e al di là delle retoriche entusiastiche sugli User Generated Content (UGC), le principali risorse utilizzate dagli utenti sui media digitali e soprattutto i principali frame culturali di riferimento (spesso immagini) all’interno dei quali dare senso a queste risorse sono stati generati all’esterno, ovvero cinema, informazione, stampa, libri, video, ecc. I discorsi d’odio veicolati sui social media hanno trovato un humus fertile nella cultura emergenziale prodotta in trent’anni di comunicazione distorta sull’immigrazione. Un processo cominciato ben prima che nascessero i social media. In questa prospettiva, anche la classica dicotomia tra informazione corretta veicolata dei media tradizionali e “istituzionali” e fake-news prodotte nell’ambito di media informativi “disintermediati” andrebbe rivista più attentamente e con maggiore oggettività. Le fake-news diventano virali anche se trovano un “luogo comune” in cui proliferare. Nel caso dell’immigrazione questo “luogo” simbolico era già stato ampiamente prodotto al di fuori dei social media. Certamente, questi hanno svolto una funzione acceleratrice e di propagazione di grande rilievo, ma sarebbe riduttivo o strumentale fermarsi a questo. La definizione di un assetto “fobocratico”21 delle società contemporanee sembra rappresentare un collante unificante in tutto il continente europeo, probabilmente anche a causa di un profilo demografico sempre più caratterizzato dalle fasce 20 Il termine nasce in economia per rappresentare il fenomeno per cui un’attività economica volta a beneficiare un determinato settore o una determinata area territoriale produce effetti positivi anche oltre tali ambiti. Nell’ambito dello studio dei media il termine può essere usato per indicare l’effetto di “travaso” (di notizie, immagini, immaginari) da un medium all’altro a cui è facile assistere nella quotidianità (vedi anche Nicolosi, 2012) 21 La fobocrazia è letteralmente l’arte del governo mediante la paura (Di Cesare, 2017). Number 14 – Year VIII / December 2019 www.imagojournal.it 121 Guido Nicolosi La migrazione come risorsa simbolica dello storytelling politico anagrafiche “over”. Qui abbiamo tentato di mettere in risalto lo specifico ruolo giocato in Italia dai media (tradizionali e nuovi) nell’alimentare e amplificare questa tendenza. Sarebbe interessante svilupparne l’analisi comparativamente. D’altronde, il tratto più preoccupante della comunicazione politica italiana riguarda, come evidenziato nella parte finale del saggio, la trasformazione della comunicazione politica in comunicazione istituzionale. Da una parte, questa metamorfosi non è del tutto nuova ed evoca sinistre affinità con i regimi autoritari dei primi del Novecento.22 Dall’altra, dimostra plasticamente quanto la violenza immateriale basata sulla cultura e sulla comunicazione possa avere delle ricadute e delle conseguenze drammaticamente materiali e concrete sui corpi, sulla carne delle persone. Sarà estremamente interessante analizzare il cambiamento nelle strategie narrative e comunicative sul tema dell’immigrazione che il Movimento cinque stelle inevitabilmente dovrà realizzare dopo l’accordo politico di governo realizzato nell’estate del 2019 col Partito Democratico all’indomani della crisi di governo provocata dal Ministro Salvini e che ha avuto come esito la nascita parlamentare di una nuova compagine governativa con la fuoriuscita della Lega. Ancora una volta, l’Italia si presenta come uno straordinario laboratorio politico in grado di anticipare rischi e tendenze destinate a svilupparsi anche in altri contesti sociali e politici. Bibliografia Appadurai A. (1990) Modernità in polvere. Dimensioni culturali della globalizzazione, Milano, Cortina. Arendt H. (2012), La banalità del male. Eichmann a Gerusalemme, Milano, Feltrinelli. Barbagli M. (1998), Immigrazione e sicurezza in Italia, Bologna, il Mulino. Bonucci M. M. (2018), Montrer les camps. Photographie et construction de la mémoire de la Shoah, in C. Delporte et I. Veyrat-Masson, La puissance des images, Paris, Nouveau Monde Éditions, 149-176. Bourdieu P., La domination masculine, Paris, Éditions du Seuil. Censis (2002), Tuning into diversity. Immigrati e minoranze etniche in Italia, Roma. 22 Il fascismo italiano inaugurò una nuova stagione tragicamente moderna nell’utilizzo politico dei mezzi di comunicazione di massa. Lo stesso Hitler riconobbe più volte di considerare Mussolini il suo maestro nell’arte della propaganda e della comunicazione. Number 14 – Year VIII / December 2019 www.imagojournal.it 122 Guido Nicolosi La migrazione come risorsa simbolica dello storytelling politico Cohen S. (1972), Folk Devils and Moral Panics, St. Albans, Paladin. Corte M. (2002), Stranieri e mass-media, Padova, Cedam. Cotesta V. (1999), Mass media, conflitti etnici e immigrazione, Studi Emigrazione, XXXVI, n°135 Di Cesare D. (2017), Terrore e modernità, Torino, Einaudi. Dufoix S., Les diasporas, Paris, PUF. Dufoix S., La dispersion. Une histoire des usages du mot diaspora, Paris, Éditions Amsterdam. Dal Lago A. (1999), Non-persone. L’esclusione dei migranti in una società globale, Milano, Feltrinelli. Dal Zotto E. (2014), Frame dell’emergenza e migrazioni forzate. Il caso dell’’Emergenza Nord-Africa, in P. Musarò e P. Parmiggiani (a cura di), Media e migrazioni. 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(2016), Lampedusa. Corpi, immagini e narrazioni dell’immigrazione, Milano, Franco Angeli. Nicolosi G. (2018), Lampedusa, 3 Octobre 2013 : Amatomy of a Social Representation, International Journal of Cultural Studies, 21(5): 539-552. Nicolosi G. (2018), Narrare (la morte) in migrazione. «Semiotica del genocidio», violenza culturale e “diasporicidio”, in S. Mazzone, Narrare le migrazioni tra diritto, politica ed economia, Acireale-Roma, Bonanno, p. 333-348. Roy O. (2016), La peur de l’Islam, Paris, Le Monde/Éditions de l’Aube. Sloterdijk P. (2018), Dopo Dio, Milano, Raffaello Cortina. 
work_z57f5ldnk5ctfbwnm5btutdbsy	----	An Examination of Sexual Orientation- and Transgender-Based Hate Crimes in the Post-Matthew Shepard Era Robert J. Cramer Sam Houston State University Andre Kehn The University of North Dakota Charlotte R. Pennington and Hayley J. Wechsler Sam Houston State University John W. Clark, III University of Texas, Tyler Jacklyn Nagle The University of Alabama Recent state and federal legislation such as the Hate Crimes Prevention Act (HCPA) addresses hate crime prevention and punishment. Two pivotal questions that arise in the development of such legislation are (a) should hate crime perpetrators be subject to penalty enhancements? and (b) should protections be extended to sexual and transgender minority individuals? This article presents two studies addressing these questions employing a two-step vignette methodology. Jury-eligible community members provided sentencing and blame attribution ratings for one of three hate crime scenarios (i.e., anti-African American, antigay, or antitransgender), as well as penalty enhancement agreement (i.e., yes/no) and measures of need for affect (Study 1) and need for cognition (Study 2). Patterns of findings across studies suggest that participants comply with hate crime legislation instructions in general, but sentencing decisions are consistently moderated by whether a participant agrees with the penalty enhancement aspect of hate crime legislation. Moreover, need for affect and need for cognition differentially impact perceptions of hate crimes; need for affect demonstrated predictive associations with victim blame, whereas need for cognition moderated relations with perpetrator sentence and blame judgments. Results are discussed with emphasis on the state of federal hate crime legislation, antigay and antitransgender prejudice, and future directions in research and policy. Keywords: hate crimes, gay, transgender, need for affect, need for cognition Hate, or bias-motivated, crimes pose a unique social and polit- ical polemic. Hate crimes are defined as those “motivated by biases based on race, religion, sexual orientation, ethnicity/national origin, and disability” (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2011). Psychologically speaking, hate crimes are driven by bias based on actual or perceived membership in a minority group (e.g., racial or sexual minority; Herek, 1989; Sullaway, 2004). Given the increas- ing frequency of hate crimes (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2011), and their resulting negative social and psychological out- comes for victims and their families (e.g., Cheng, 2004; Herek, 2007), legal and social science perspectives jointly convey that hate crime legislation is a pressing sociopolitical topic of debate. A basic assumption underlying establishment of hate crime laws is that offenders contribute to unfair treatment of minority group members (Adams, 2005) based on prejudiced attitudes (Bantley, 2008). Moreover, emerging empirical data demonstrates that vi- carious victimization in the form of similar emotional and psycho- logical trauma can occur for fellow minority group members (Perry & Alvi, 2012). Many hate crime laws, in turn, include stipulations to enhance punishments for offenders, whereas others contain separate charges for hate crimes (Adams, 2005). In re- viewing these laws, morality and equity are often driving forces needing consideration in discussions of hate crime legislation. For example, legal scholars have argued that societal beliefs concern- ing morality are reflected in the passage and enforcement of hate crime laws (e.g., Berard, 2010). Hate crimes laws are not without their criticisms, however. Numerous concerns have been raised in scholarly literature and public forums, including, but not limited to, violation of free speech (Bessel, 2010), inequity between hate and other types of crime (Sullaway, 2004), and overtaxing the legal system (Glaser, 2005). While empirical support varies for these claims, the implications seem clear: public opinion concern- ing hate crime legislation is heated and can affect outcomes, such as enhanced punishment for offenders. What do we know about the frequency and reasons for hate crime law support? Overall, there appears to be some agreement that hate crimes deserve repudiation (Glaser, 2005). However, the This article was published Online First April 1, 2013. Robert J. Cramer, Department of Psychology and Philosophy, Sam Houston State University; Andre Kehn, Department of Psychology, The University of North Dakota; Charlotte R. Pennington and Hayley J. Wechsler, Department of Psychology, Sam Houston State University; John W. Clark, III, Department of Criminal Justice, University of Texas, Tyler; Jacklyn Nagle, Department of Psychology, The University of Alabama. The authors would like to thank Veronica Cuervo for her generous assistance with this project. Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Robert J. Cramer, Sam Houston State University, Department of Psychology and Philosophy, Box 2447, Huntsville, TX 77341. E-mail: Rjc021@shsu.edu T hi s do cu m en t is co py ri gh te d by th e A m er ic an P sy ch ol og ic al A ss oc ia ti on or on e of it s al li ed pu bl is he rs . T hi s ar ti cl e is in te nd ed so le ly fo r th e pe rs on al us e of th e in di vi du al us er an d is no t to be di ss em in at ed br oa dl y. Psychology, Public Policy, and Law © 2013 American Psychological Association 2013, Vol. 19, No. 3, 355–368 1076-8971/13/$12.00 DOI: 10.1037/a0031404 355 mailto:Rjc021@shsu.edu http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0031404 extent to which agreement with policy is present and enforced is less clear. Empirical data show that law enforcement agencies attempted to enforce laws and build bridges with minority sectors of the community (Haider-Markel, 2001). Public opinion data concerning hate crime legislation suggests that support grossly differs by political beliefs, as well as geographic and socioeco- nomic factors (e.g., Johnson & Byers, 2003). In one of the only critical empirical investigations assessing rationales for support or dissent with hate crime legislation, Plumm and Terrance (in press) conducted a content analysis of qualitative statements of partici- pants who viewed crime vignette scenarios. Of note is that the authors reported that the most frequent themes in support of conviction of hate crimes were based in legal or morality state- ments. While not a direct indication of support for hate crime legislation, such rationales for support may imply legal and moral attitudes impact decision making in hate crime cases. The courtroom is a practical setting in which the hate crime debate can play out. Of particular interest in a trial is whether potential jurors agree with the penalty enhancement aspect of hate crime laws. Whether hate crime legislation includes protection of these minority group members has been shown to impact support for hate crime laws (Johnson & Byers, 2003). Following this logic, differing opinions on the matter may contribute to varying degrees of willingness to increase prison terms postcriminal conviction of a hate crime offender. The present studies aimed to more directly investigate whether hate crime law attitudes impact judgments. Evaluation of this question was accomplished in two ways. First, we evaluated the effect of hate crime instruction (see Research Question 1 below). Second, we assessed the effects of agreement concerning the penalty enhancement portion of hate crime laws. Sexual Orientation and Transgender Hate Crimes In October 1998, Mathew Shepard became the victim of one of the most heinous and media publicized antigay hate crimes in the last few decades (Mathew Shepard Foundation). A litany of ad- vocacy, legislative, and research efforts proliferated following this event. Despite these efforts, gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender (GLBT) individuals remain among the most victimized groups in the United States (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2009). Hate crimes are particularly frequent among GLBT persons (Herek, 2009; National Coalition of Anti-Violence Programs, 2009). Anti- GLBT hate crime victims suffer from increased risk for a range of negative psychiatric sequela. including, but not limited to, anger, depression, acute stress, anxiety, and fear of harm (e.g., Herek, 1993; Taylor, 2007). Stacey (2011) demonstrated that anti-GLBT hate crimes tend to be more violent than those against racial minority victims. With the negative impacts of hate crimes in mind, policies have been implemented to protect the vast range of affected victims (Gerstenfeld, 2011). Contemporary efforts at hate crime legislation began with the Anti-Defamation League of B’nai Brith (ADL), a group that fights against anti-Semitism and other forms of bigotry, who made significant strides in addressing gaps in laws directly addressing hate crimes (Gerstenfeld, 2011). The ADL drafted a model ethnic intimidation statute in 1981 that protected against crimes of intimidation by reason of race, color, religion, national origin, or sexual orientation. This legislation eventually passed in a number of states, and the ADL’s (along with various other organizations) efforts to persuade states to pass hate crime legis- lation led to other states quickly following suit (e.g., Code of Ala. § 121–5–13, Cal. Pen. Code § 422.6, FL Stat. § 775.085, MI Comp. Laws § 750.147b, TX Code of Crim. P. Art. § 42.014). By 2009, only 5 states had not passed some kind of penalty- enhancement-type law (Leadership Council on Civil Rights, 2009). Existing hate crimes legislation today is quite diverse, with some laws acting as penalty enhancers, increasing the sentence for crimes motivated by bias, and other laws adding separate substan- tive offenses for which the offender is convicted in addition to his conviction for the underlying crime (Gerstenfeld, 2011). Differ- ences between states exist as well. For example, some permit any crime to qualify as a hate crime, whereas some limit their defini- tion of hate crimes to particular offenses such as harassment or assault (Jacobs & Potter, 1998). Other states specify that that the victim must have been chosen “because of” or “by reason” of his or her group, whereas different states only require some sort of evidence that the crime demonstrates some type of prejudice (Gerstenfeld, 2011). Ultimately, in all of these cases, the defendant faces more severe penalties when a hate crime is committed, whether because of penalty enhancements or separate hate crime charges. Presently, all statutes include at least ethnicity, religion, or race protections, but only 31 include sexual orientation, 27 include gender, 31 include some sort of disability, and 12 include transgender or gender identity (Gerstenfeld, 2011). The ADL and its allies looked next to the federal government for hate crime legislation. The first federal law relating specifically to hate crimes was the Hate Crime Statistics Act (28 U.S.C. 534), which required the Department of Justice to collect data on hate crimes and publish the results (Gerstenfeld, 2011). The law was strongly supported in Congress. Only four senators voted against the law, and they cited their reasoning to be because sexual orientation was included in the protected categories. This law was eventually permanently extended. The federal government went on to pass the Hate Crimes Sentencing Enhancement Act, (28 U.S.C. 994) and the Violence Against Women Act (Violence Against Women Act, 1994). The Hate Crimes Sentencing Enhancement Act served as a federal penalty enhancement statute requiring penalties to be increased at least three levels if the defendant was convicted of a bias crime. The Violence Against Women Act allowed victims of gender-based crimes to sue their attackers and receive compensatory and punitive damages. Following all of these efforts, the federal government also moved toward a specific hate crime prevention law; accordingly, a law entitled Hate Crimes Prevention Act was proposed in 1998. Serial efforts died in Congress for the next decade until 2009, when the bill—now called the Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crime Prevention Act (HCPA P. L. No. 111– 84) —was finally passed by the U.S. House of Representatives (Gerstenfeld, 2011). The HCPA included protection for victims targeted because of their sexual orientation or gender identity (Gerstenfeld, 2011). After much revision, the final version was ultimately signed by President Barack Obama on October 28, 2009 (Bessel, 2010). As enacted, the law includes protections for crimes committed of actual or perceived color, race, religion, national origin, sexual orientation, gender, gender identity, and disability (Gerstenfeld, 2011). Most germane to the present discussion, this federal legis- lation increases the punishment for hate crime perpetrators and T hi s do cu m en t is co py ri gh te d by th e A m er ic an P sy ch ol og ic al A ss oc ia ti on or on e of it s al li ed pu bl is he rs . T hi s ar ti cl e is in te nd ed so le ly fo r th e pe rs on al us e of th e in di vi du al us er an d is no t to be di ss em in at ed br oa dl y. 356 CRAMER ET AL. allows for the Department of Justice to assist in investigations and prosecutions of these crimes (Human Rights Campaign, 2009). Despite legislation protecting sexual and transgender minority individuals in the courtroom, there appears to be relatively little research on jury perceptions and legal decision making in this area. Instead, antiracial hate crimes have received the most attention from researchers (Stacey, 2011). For example, recent literature suggests that levels of racism are associated with recommended sentence lengths for racially biased motivated hate crime perpe- trators and amount of blame attributed to hate crime victims (e.g., Saucier, Hockett, & Wallenburg, 2008; Saucier, Hockett, Zanotti, & Heffel, 2010). Overall, literature to date suggests that a crime committed against an African American by a Caucasian perpetra- tor is perceived to be less acceptable and more deserving of a harsher sentence than when the same crime is committed with an African American perpetrator and a Caucasian victim. While antiracial hate crimes have been the center of most research, anti-GLB hate crimes are beginning to gain researchers’ interest. The burgeoning literature on lay and student mock juror perceptions of hate crimes against sexual minorities shows two consistent findings: (a) perpetrators of anti-GLB hate crimes are punished and blamed more compared with other types of crimes (e.g., Cramer et al., 2010; Cramer, Wakeman, Chandler, Mohr, & Griffin, in press; Rayburn, Mendoza, & Davison, 2003), and (b) certain participant attitudes influence sentencing and blame judg- ments of victims and perpetrators in these situations (e.g., Lyons, 2006; Plumm, Terrance, Henderson, & Ellingson, 2010; Rayburn et al., 2003). Perceiver characteristics most relevant to these judg- ments to date include sexually prejudiced or homophobic beliefs (e.g., Rayburn & Mendoza, 2002), authoritarianism (Cramer et al., in press), and perceptions of the victim (e.g., Plumm et al., 2010). Although the HCPA includes protection for transgender individu- als, juror perception of hate crime research has yet to take this population into consideration. Utilizing jury-eligible members, the present studies aimed to understand perceiver perceptions of antigay and antitransgender hate crimes as indicated by perceptions of blame and sentence lengths. The present studies evaluated the extent to which perceptions of antigay and antitransgender hate crimes were similar or different to anti-African American hate crimes. Individual Differences: Cognitive-Experiential Self Theory and Need for Affect (NFA) Cognitive-Experiential Self-Theory (CEST; Epstein, 1990) is a useful framework for conceptualizing individual differences in information processing. The central tenet of CEST argues for two separate yet correlated methods of receiving and processing stim- uli: rational and experiential systems (Kirkpatrick & Epstein, 1992). The rational system is grounded in the understanding of rules and logic, and features conscious processing and decision- making (Kirkpatrick & Epstein, 1992). The experiential system, however, operates via heuristic, intuitive mechanisms such as emotion, focuses more on ultimate outcomes (as opposed to un- derstanding internal processing), and is most often beyond con- scious awareness (Kirkpatrick & Epstein, 1992). CEST has been applied to various domains of psychology, including to mock juror perceptions of defendant attractiveness (e.g., Gunnell & Ceci, 2010) and sexually violent predator evalu- ations (Lieberman, Krauss, Kyger, & Lehoux, 2007). Much of the mock juror CEST literature evidences the influence of experiential processing. For example, mock jurors manipulated into an expe- riential mode find less valid clinical testimony to be more persua- sive, while mock jurors in a rational mode found more valid actuarial testimony to be influential (Krauss, Lieberman, & Olson, 2004; Lieberman & Krauss, 2009; Lieberman et al., 2007). Al- though it is not assessing CEST constructs directly, the present study employs this framework to understand individual differences reflective of the rational (need for cognition [NFC]) and experi- ential (NFA) modes of viewing stimuli. Indeed, it is noteworthy that development of the rational subsystem in CEST is based, in part, on the NFC scale. Hate crimes can elicit strong, emotionally charged reactions (Sullaway, 2004). As such, NFA (Maio & Esses, 2001), defined as an individual’s preference to avoid and approach positive and negative emotions, may be helpful in understanding how jurors’ preferences for emotion influence subsequent opinions and atti- tudes in a hate crime case. Individuals who are high in NFA may be more inclined to experience extreme opinions or strong atti- tudes toward controversial issues and social groups because they embrace emotional sensations when processing information (Maio & Esses, 2001). In addition, willingness to engage emotions has been associated with positive attitudes and heightened accuracy and memory when receiving affect-based messages (Haddock, Maio, Arnold, & Huskinson, 2008). Because emotions can impact legal decision-making (Bornstein & Wiener, 2010), preference for emotion may play a crucial role in the way jurors process information in the courtroom (Griffin & Patty, 2010). To that end, affect has been found to be especially important as a mitigating factor of juror perceptions and judgments in emotionally laden scenarios (e.g., Bright & Goodman- Delahunty, 2006; Kerr, 2010). Empirical data on the exact nature of NFA in juror scenarios is limited, however. In a study investi- gating behavioral manifestations of defendant remorse, only mock jurors who scored high on the NFA scale were predisposed to recommend a life sentence over the death penalty (Corwin, Cra- mer, Griffin, & Brodsky, 2012). The authors proposed that mock jurors high in NFA may have been drawn toward a more positive, less severe sentencing decision because of their need to approach emotionally charged situations. In another study depicting graphic crime scene photos, mock jurors high in NFA led to higher ratings of guilt (Adams, Neal, Titcomb, & Griffin, 2010). Contrary to Corwin and colleagues (2012) findings, mock jurors high in NFA identified with negative emotions associated with the graphic stimuli, which led to more severe guilt ratings. Given these studies, NFA may affect perceptions affectively laden based legal scenar- ios such as a hate crime case. The Present Studies Given the state of hate crime research and policy, we examine the impact of jury instructions, hate crime law penalty enhance- ment agreement, and victim type on sentencing and blame out- comes across two studies (see Research Questions 1 to 3). In the first study, NFA is examined as an individual difference moder- ating perceptions of hate crimes (see Research Question 4), whereas study two investigates the potential influence of NFC (see Research Question 5, Study 2). Perceptions of blame were in- cluded as criterion measures along with sentencing because attri- T hi s do cu m en t is co py ri gh te d by th e A m er ic an P sy ch ol og ic al A ss oc ia ti on or on e of it s al li ed pu bl is he rs . T hi s ar ti cl e is in te nd ed so le ly fo r th e pe rs on al us e of th e in di vi du al us er an d is no t to be di ss em in at ed br oa dl y. 357HATE CRIMES bution of blame is a common metric in hate crime research (e.g., Cramer et al., 2010; Plumm et al., 2010) and a legally relevant aspect of determination of punishment and damages (Fiegenson & Park, 2006; Wiley, 1999). In light of the current state of hate crime legislation and research reviewed, we examine the following research questions in the present study. Research Question 1: Do jury-eligible individuals respond as directed to jury hate crime instructions (following suit with federal hate crime legislation) by decreasing blame toward the victim, and increasing blame and sentence toward the perpetrator? Research Question 2: Does jury-eligible individuals’ agreement with hate crime law penalty enhancement impact, directly or in a moderating manner, perceptions of victim blame, perpetrator blame and sentencing decision? Research Question 3: Does type of hate crime victim (i.e., African American, gay, or transgender) affect, either directly or via a moderating effect, perceptions of victim blame, perpetrator blame and sentencing decision? Research Question 4: Does jury-eligible individuals’ level of NFA have effects on, either directly or in a moderating manner, perceptions of victim blame, perpetrator blame and sentencing decision? Study 1: Juror Instructions, Hate Crime Penalty Enhancement Agreement, and NFA Method Participants. A total of 305 jury panel members from an urban jurisdiction in the southwestern United States participated in research. Twelve participants were dropped prior to analyses be- cause of failure to indicate whether or not the crime in question was a hate crime. We were left with a final sample of 293 participants (Mage � 46.88, SD � 12.77). The sample was com- prised of 166 women (56.70%). The breakdown by race was as follows: 218 Caucasians (74.4%), 30 African Americans (10.2%), 16 Hispanics/Latinos (5.5%), 10 Biracial individuals (3.4%), 7 Asian Americans (2.4%), 3 Native Americans (1%), and 9 indi- viduals who identified themselves as other (3.1%) participated in the study. The sample was slightly conservative (M � 4.39, SD � 2.35) on a 10-point scale with higher scores indicating more liberal views. Procedure. Data were collected during juror orientation ses- sions. Specifically, court staff and a researcher introduced a vol- untary research opportunity to jury-eligible community members reporting for jury service. Participants were notified of standard research rights (i.e., confidentiality, anonymity, risks/benefits and the right to withdraw) both verbally and in writing. Participants electing to participate were also provided the opportunity to ask questions. Participation in the study required approximately 20 min per person, and was part of a larger project investigating jury-eligible persons’ legal attitudes. Measures/Materials. Demographics. The demographics form asked for the partic- ipant’s age, gender, race, religion, education level, crime victim- ization history, and political orientation. NFA. The NFA (Maio & Esses, 2001) scale is a 26-item questionnaire assessing the degree to which people require intense emotional experiences. Two subscales, avoidance and approach to emotional situations, each contain 13 sum totaled items (all on a seven-point scale). A total NFA score can also be obtained by summing all 26 items. Sample statements include “We should indulge our emotions” and “It is important for me to be in touch with my feelings.” Internal consistencies are all over .80 (Maio & Esses, 2001). The total score was used in the present study and had an acceptable Cronbach’s alpha (� � .75). Crime vignette manipulation/jury instructions. The crime scenario serving as the baseline condition for each participant was modified from Cramer, Chandler, and Wakeman (2010). It fea- tured a two-step jury instruction vignette methodology (see Ap- pendix). Thus, the jury instruction variable is defined by prepost ratings of sentencing or blame after the introduction of step two described below. Step one included details of a crime (2nd degree murder), as well as demographic and situational information about the perpetrator and victim. Jurors were then provided sentencing instructions and federal sentencing guidelines for 2nd degree mur- der. Participants then indicated ratings of sentencing (in years and months), as well as victim and perpetrator blame (see description below). In step two, each participant then received one of three supple- mental hate crime instruction manipulations. These instructions indicated that the crime was a race-, sexual orientation-, or transgender-based hate crime (see Appendix). Additional sentenc- ing guidelines were provided for increased sentencing enhance- ment for hate crimes in such a case. The participant then completed identical ratings of sentencing and blame, as in the baseline por- tion, thereby allowing for prepost hate crime instruction changes in sentencing and blame. It is noteworthy that the task of deciding penalties in hate crimes reflects an externally valid situation in that jurors are involved with the sentencing of hate crimes. In fact, a 2000 Supreme Court ruling based on a racially driven shooting (Apprendi v. New Jersey) yielded a decision that jurors should decide penalties in cases where hate-motivation or other factors involved raise maximum potential punishment (Legal Information Institute, n.d.). Hate crime penalty enhancement agreement. After receiving the vignette manipulation and providing sentencing recommenda- tions, participants were asked “Do you think that the fact that this was a hate crime should result in increased punishment for the perpetrator?” (i.e., yes/no). Thus, we evaluated whether partici- pants agreed with the sentencing enhancement portion of federal hate crime legislation. Perceptions of blame scale. The participants were also given the Perceptions of Perpetrator and Victim Blame Scales (PPBS/ PVBS; Rayburn et al., 2003), which possesses 14 paired adjective ratings (e.g., harmful-harmless) sum totaled for a score reflecting the degree to which the person is blameworthy for a situation presented in the previous vignette. Instructions for the scale can be applied to blame of a victim or of a perpetrator. The scale dem- onstrates consistently high reliability (Cramer et al., 2010; Ray- burn et al., 2003). The Cronbach’s alpha for the scales were as follows in Study 1: Perpetrator blame scale preinstruction (� � .85), perpetrator blame scale postinstruction (� � .87), victim blame scale preinstruction (� � .88), and victim blame scale postinstruction (� � .92). T hi s do cu m en t is co py ri gh te d by th e A m er ic an P sy ch ol og ic al A ss oc ia ti on or on e of it s al li ed pu bl is he rs . T hi s ar ti cl e is in te nd ed so le ly fo r th e pe rs on al us e of th e in di vi du al us er an d is no t to be di ss em in at ed br oa dl y. 358 CRAMER ET AL. Sentencing. Sentence was provided by each participant in years and months. Ratings were converted to years for analyses below. Results Data analysis. These results are divided into two sections. First, we examine the main and interaction effects of hate crime instructions, hate crime penalty enhancement agreement, and vic- tim type (i.e., African American, gay or transgender) on sentencing recommendations, victim blame, and perpetrator blame. Second, we examine the main and moderating roles of NFA on the above- mentioned dependent variables. Generalized Estimating Equations (GEEs; Ballinger, 2004; Hanley, Negassa, Edwardes, & Forrester, 2003) were utilized to adequately assess the main and interaction effects while controlling for the correlated nature in our dependent measures. Hate Crime Instructions, Hate Crime Penalty Enhancement Agreement, and Victim Type. Sentencing. Generalized Estimating Equations were used to assess whether jury-eligible individuals’ agreement with federal hate crimes legislation impacts, directly or via moderating effects, sentencing recommendations, perceptions of victim blame and perpetrator blame. The first model examined sentencing recom- mendations as a function of hate crime legislation instructions, hate crime penalty enhancement agreement, and victim type, as well as the interaction terms of the predictor variables while controlling for race of the participant.1 Model reduction through backward elimination resulted in a best fitting model including a main effect of hate crime instructions, Wald’s chi-square (1) � 336.67, p � .001. Sentencing length increased from preinstruction, M � 21.63, 95% confidence interval [CI] [20.83, 22.43], to pos- tinstruction rating (M � 28.86, 95% CI [27.91, 29.82]). The main effect was qualified by a significant interaction between hate crime instructions and hate crime penalty enhancement agreement, Wald’s chi-square (1) � 32.03, p � .001. Pairwise comparisons revealed, preinstruction, individuals disagreeing with hate crime enhancement (M � 22.27, 95% CI [21.16, 23.37]) differed signif- icantly in their sentencing recommendations from individuals agreeing with hate crime enhancement (M � 20.99, 95% CI [20.12, 21.85]), p � .03. Analogously, but stronger in magnitude, postinstruction, individuals agreeing with hate crime penalty en- hancement gave significantly longer sentencing recommendation (M � 30.45, 95% CI [29.46, 31.45]) than individuals disagreeing with hate crime penalty enhancement (M � 27.28, 95% CI [25.89, 28.67]), p � .001 (Figure 1a). There was no main effect of victim type and victim type did not interact with any of the other predic- tors. Victim blame. The second model examined victim blame rat- ings as a function of hate crime legislation instructions, hate crime penalty enhancement agreement, and victim type, as well as the interaction terms of the predictor variables while controlling for race of the participant.2 Model reduction through backward elim- ination resulted in a best-fitting model, including a main effect of hate crime instructions, Wald’s chi-square (1) � 18.46, p � .001. Victim blame decreased from preinstruction (M � 42.28, 95% CI [39.51, 45.04]) to postinstruction rating (M � 39.39, 95% CI [36.40, 42.37]). This main effect was qualified by a significant interaction between hate crime instructions and hate crime penalty enhancement agreement, Wald’s chi-square (1) � 19.06, p � .001. Pairwise comparisons revealed victim blame ratings of individuals who disagreed with hate crime penalty enhancement did not change significantly from preinstruction (M � 41.84, 95% CI [38.45, 45.24]) to postinstruction (M � 41.89, 95% CI [38.16, 45.62], p � .97). Victim blame ratings of individuals agreeing with hate crime penalty enhancement were significantly reduced from preinstruction (M � 42.71, 95% CI [39.75, 45.68]) to postinstruc- tion (M � 36.89, 95% CI [33.60, 40.17]), p � .001 (Figure 1b). As with sentencing, no effects involving victim type were observed. Perpetrator blame. The third model assessed perpetrator blame ratings as a function of hate crime instructions, hate crime penalty enhancement agreement, and victim type, as well as the interaction terms of the predictor variables while controlling for race of the participant.3 Model reduction through backward elim- ination resulted in a best-fitting model, including a main effect of hate crime instructions, Wald’s chi-square (1) � 11.47, p � .001. Perpetrator blame increased from preinstruction (M � 78.64, 95% CI [75.92, 81.35]) to postinstruction rating (M � 80.80, 95% CI [77.76, 83.84]). This main effect was qualified by a significant interaction between instructions and hate crime penalty enhance- ment agreement, Wald’s chi-square (1) � 4.30, p � .04. Pairwise comparisons revealed perpetrator blame ratings significantly in- creased for individuals agreeing with hate crime legislation from preinstruction (M � 79.56, 95% CI [76.85, 82.26]) to postinstruc- tion (M � 83.05, 95% CI [80.18, 85.92]), p � .001. However, perpetrator blame ratings for individuals disagreeing with hate crime penalty enhancement did not change from preinstruction (M � 77.71, 95% CI [74.18, 81.25]) to postinstruction (M � 78.56, 95% CI [74.36, 82.75]), p � .41 (Figure 1c). Again, no significant effects involving victim type were observed. NFA. Sentencing. To assess the moderating role of NFA on sen- tencing recommendations, victim blame, and perpetrator blame, three separate GEE models were run. The first model assessed sentencing recommendations as a function of hate crime instruc- tions, hate crime penalty enhancement agreement, victim type, NFA, and the interaction terms of the predictor variables while controlling for race of the participant. The main effect of NFA did not have an influence on sentencing recommendations and none of the 2-way, 3-way, or 4-way interactions including NFA reached significance. Victim blame. The second model assessed victim blame as a function of hate crime instructions, hate crime penalty enhance- ment agreement, victim type, NFA, and the interaction terms of the predictor variables while controlling for race. Model reduction through backward elimination revealed a significant main effect of NFA, Wald’s chi-square (1) � 6.64, p � .01. NFA had a negative relationship (� � �.15, p � .003) with victim blame. In other 1 To ensure that race of participant did not influence our results, the interaction between race of participant and victim type was included in the model. The interaction was nonsignificant, Wald’s chi-square (6) � 10.40, p � .11. 2 The interaction term of race of participant and victim type was in- cluded in the model and was nonsignificant, Wald’s chi-square (6) � 8.55, p � .20. 3 The interaction between race of participant and victim type was non- significant, Wald’s chi-square (6) � 2.73, p � .84. T hi s do cu m en t is co py ri gh te d by th e A m er ic an P sy ch ol og ic al A ss oc ia ti on or on e of it s al li ed pu bl is he rs . T hi s ar ti cl e is in te nd ed so le ly fo r th e pe rs on al us e of th e in di vi du al us er an d is no t to be di ss em in at ed br oa dl y. 359HATE CRIMES words, individuals scoring high on NFA blamed the victim less. The main effect was qualified by a significant interaction between NFA and hate crime instructions, Wald’s chi-square (1) � 4.67, p � .03. As can be seen in Figure 2, preinstructions, NFA did not impact individuals’ victim blame ratings. However, postinstruc- tions, individuals high in NFA blamed the victim significantly less than individuals low in NFA. Perpetrator blame. The third model assessed perpetrator blame as a function of hate crime instructions, hate crime penalty enhancement agreement, victim type, NFA, and the interaction terms of the predictor variables while controlling for race. No significant effects (main and interactions) involving NFA were observed. Discussion The most prominent findings in Study 1 were (a) an overall pattern of blame and sentencing consistent with jury instructions, (b) a consistent interactive effect between hate crime instructions and penalty enhancement agreement, and (c) the impact of NFA on perceptions of victims, but not perpetrators. We address each of these in turn. As dictated by the HCPA and statues in many states, convicted hate crime offenders face increased sentences (Gerstenfeld, 2011; Human Rights Campaign, 2009). A corollary supposition stem- ming from enhanced punishment is that hate crime offenders warrant such actions because they have intentionally or blatantly targeted a minority group member (Adams, 2005), an action con- sidered morally reprehensible by some (Berard, 2010). Moreover, intent and moral responsibility are often reflected in evaluation of blameworthiness in the psychological and legal literatures (e.g., Chockler & Halpern, 2004; Wiley, 1999). Interaction findings of hate crime instructions and agreement with policy dovetail well with this legal-moral understanding of hate crimes. S en te nc in g (in y ea rs ) 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 Preinstruction Postinstruction a Hate Crime Agreement Hate Crime Agreement eergasiDeergA V ic tim B la m e 30 35 40 45 50 Preinstruction Postinstruction b eergasiDeergA P er pe tr at or B la m e 60 70 80 90 10 0 Preinstruction Postinstruction c Hate Crime Agreement eergasiDeergA Figure 1. (a) Sentencing recommendations by hate crime penalty en- hancement agreement and jury instructions for Study 1. (b) Victim blame ratings by hate crime penalty enhancement agreement and jury instructions for Study 1. (c) Perpetrator blame ratings by hate crime penalty enhance- ment agreement and jury instructions for Study 1. -40 -20 0 20 40 60 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 NFA V ic tim B la m e Preinstruction Postinstruction Figure 2. Victim blame ratings by hate crime instructions and need for affect. T hi s do cu m en t is co py ri gh te d by th e A m er ic an P sy ch ol og ic al A ss oc ia ti on or on e of it s al li ed pu bl is he rs . T hi s ar ti cl e is in te nd ed so le ly fo r th e pe rs on al us e of th e in di vi du al us er an d is no t to be di ss em in at ed br oa dl y. 360 CRAMER ET AL. First and foremost, jury-eligible community members complied with federal legislation by increasing perpetrator sentence and blame, as well as decreasing victim blame. Enhancing severity of punishment and blame for hate crime offenders is consistent with previous hate crime studies employing less representative (e.g., undergraduate) samples (e.g., Cramer et al., 2010, Cramer et al., in press), and are in line with prior blame attribution studies in this regard (e.g., Plumm et al., 2010; Rayburn et al., 2003). These bodies of literature were also extended by present findings in that agreement with penalty enhancement laws exacerbated the impact of hate crime legislation on sentencing recommendations and blame in all contexts. Based on established moral-legal perspec- tives of hate crime legislation discussed above (e.g., Adams, 2005; Wiley, 1999), the implication may be that the impact of hate crime agreement is a direct result of views that targeting any minority group is morally reprehensible, and therefore worthy of increased imprisonment. Additionally, as perceived intent is often subsumed in blameworthiness judgments, increased blame for hate crime perpetrators suggests that intent to target a minority group was present. NFA is an individual difference characteristic gaining traction in psycho-legal literature (e.g., Corwin et al., 2012; Griffin & Patty, 2010). When interpreting present results, it is important to note that NFA reflects one’s penchant to engage both positive and negative emotions (Maio & Esses, 2001). Previous research shows that high NFA mock jurors (i.e., those willing to engage emotion) demonstrate leniency to remorseful defendants (Corwin et al., 2012) and negative views of offenders in the presence of graphic evidence (Adams et al., 2010). Curiously, in a hate crime scenario, one in which emotion is salient (Sullaway, 2004), NFA had no effect on perceptions of offenders. Rather, victim blame was negatively associated with perceptions of victim blame overall. Careful inspection of the NFA by hate crime instructions interac- tion demonstrated that, after learning the offender committed a hate crime, high NFA individuals blamed the victim less than low NFA counterparts. NFA theory would suggest that those with a preference for engaging emotion felt sympathy/empathy for the victim, resulting in less blame. In all, present findings contribute to an increasing understanding of how NFA differentially influences perceptions of victims and perpetrators by context. Lack of effects of NFA concerning perpetrator-related judg- ments is somewhat puzzling. This raises question as to what other individual difference characteristics may operate for jurors during hate crime trials. We addressed this in Study 2 by examining a logical cognitive parallel construct to NFA: NFC. We also evalu- ated the replicability of findings from Study 1 related to hate crime instructions, agreement, and victim type. Study 2: Juror Instructions, Penalty Enhancement Agreement, and NFC Individual differences in the motivation to engage in effortful, cognitive activities may influence how information is processed, especially when confronting the complex material (Cacioppo, Petty, Kao, & Rodriguez, 1986) that deal with stigmatized indi- viduals (Petty, Fleming, & White, 1999). The NFC represents the extent to which individuals enjoy and put forth effort in thinking (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982). Generally, individuals high in NFC have been found to be more influenced by argument quality and recall a higher amount of messages than individuals low in NFC (Cacioppo, Petty, & Morris, 1983). When exposed to a cognitive- based message, those who showed a greater level of NFC were associated with a higher number of correct responses pertaining to the argument, and were able to identify more positively with the message (Haddock et al., 2008). Concerning trial information, individual differences in NFC may influence how jurors perceive evidence, consequently affect- ing their decision-making. For example, mock jurors high in NFC were more likely to render verdicts supporting high-quality testi- mony (Salerno & McCauley, 2009) and detect methodological errors in expert testimony (McAuliff & Kovera, 2008). Mock jurors low in NFC more frequently supported low-quality testi- mony (Salerno & McCauley, 2009). Based on these studies, it may be argued that high NFC mock jurors engage in careful processing of trial information, even when it is complex, whereas low NFC counterparts are less inclined to do so. NFC may have important implications for decision-making in hate crimes. It is suggested that high-prejudiced individuals may be less motivated to produce nonprejudiced responses (Dunton & Fazio, 1997), which leads to the inference that they would engage in less effortful attention and processing of messages from a stigmatized source (Petty et al., 1999). Low-prejudiced individuals have been found to engage in high elaboration of messages from a sexual minority source, while high-prejudiced individuals had similar processing of messages from sexual minority and hetero- sexual sources (Petty et al., 1999). However, these findings in- cluded stigmatized sources of persuasive messages rather than stigmatized content, which may yield similar or different findings related to disparities in perceiver NFC. Therefore, Study 2 evalu- ates the role of NFC in perceptions of victims (i.e., antigay, anti-African American, and antitransgender hate crimes) who may be the targets of prejudice via hate crime victimization. The goals of Study 2 were (a) to evaluate the replicability of Study 1 findings (see Research Questions 1–3 for Study 1), and (b) to investigate juror NFC as an alternative juror characteristic that may mitigate perceptions of hate crimes. Research Question 5: Does jury-eligible individuals’ level of NFC affect, either directly or in a moderating manner, perceptions of victim blame, perpetrator blame and sentencing decision? Method Participants. A total of 237 jury panel members from an urban jurisdiction in the southwestern United States participated. Six participants were dropped prior to analyses because of failure of indicating whether or not the crime in question is a hate crime. We were left with a final sample of 231 participants (Mage � 46.55, SD � 12.45). The sample was comprised of 138 women (59.70%). The breakdown by race was as follows: 159 Caucasians (68.8%), 30 African Americans (13%), 22 Hispanics/Latinos (9.5%), 4 Biracial individuals (1.7%), 8 Asian Americans (3.5%), 1 Native Americans (.4%), and 7 individuals who identified them- selves as other (3%) participated in the study. The sample was slightly conservative (M � 4.85, SD � 2.48). Procedure. The Study 2 procedure was identical as in Study 1. Measures/materials. Demographics, crime vignette manipu- lations, jury instructions, hate crime penalty enhancement agree- T hi s do cu m en t is co py ri gh te d by th e A m er ic an P sy ch ol og ic al A ss oc ia ti on or on e of it s al li ed pu bl is he rs . T hi s ar ti cl e is in te nd ed so le ly fo r th e pe rs on al us e of th e in di vi du al us er an d is no t to be di ss em in at ed br oa dl y. 361HATE CRIMES ment, victim/perpetrator blame, and sentencing were identical to Study 1. The Cronbach’s alpha for the victim blame and perpetra- tor blame scales were as follows in Study 2: Perpetrator blame scale preinstruction (� � .84), perpetrator blame scale postinstruc- tion (� � .87), victim blame scale preinstruction (� � .85), and victim blame scale postinstruction (� � .92). NFC. The Need for Cognition-Short Form (NFC-SF; Ca- cioppo, Petty, & Kao, 1984) scale is an18-item questionnaire assessing the degree to which people engage in effortful cognitive processing. Each self-statement is rated on a five-point scale for a sum totaled score. Sample items include “Thinking is not my idea of fun” (reverse scored) and “I prefer my life to be filled with puzzles that I must solve.” Reliability and validity of the scale are both consistently appropriate (Cacioppo et al., 1984). Cronbach’s alpha in the current sample was good (� � .87). Results Data analysis. The same analytic plan as in Study 1 was employed for Study 2. We assessed the effects of hate crime jury instructions, hate crime penalty enhancement agreement, victim type, and NFC on sentencing recommendations, victim blame rating, and perpetrator blame ratings. Hate crime jury instructions, Hate crime penalty enhance- ment agreement, and Victim type. Sentencing. As in Study 1, GEE was utilized to assess if jury-eligible individuals’ agreement with hate crime penalty en- hancement impacts, either directly or via moderating effects, sen- tencing recommendations, perceptions of victim blame, and perpetrator blame. The first model examined sentencing recom- mendations as a function of hate crime instructions, hate crime penalty enhancement agreement, and victim type, as well as the interaction terms of the predictor variables while controlling for race of the participant.4 Model reduction through backward elim- ination resulted in a best fitting model including main effects of hate crime jury instructions, hate crime penalty enhancement agreement, and victim type, as well an interaction between hate crime jury instructions and hate crime penalty enhancement agree- ment. The main effect of hate crime instructions was significant, Wald’s chi-square (1) � 321.71, p � .001. Sentencing length increased from preinstruction (M � 21.28, 95% CI [20.07, 22.49]) to postinstruction rating (M � 28.94, 95% CI [27.61, 30.28]). The main effect of victim type was significant, Wald’s chi-square (2) � 11.91, p � .003. Participants gave longer sentencing recommen- dations when the victim was described as gay (M � 26.51, 95% CI [25.25, 27.77]) compared with when the victim was described as transgender (M � 23.82, 95% CI [22.40, 25.23], p � .001). There was no difference between the African American and gay or the African American and transgender conditions. The main effect of hate crime penalty enhancement agreement was significant, Wald’s chi-square (1) � 3.78, p � .05. Individuals agreeing with hate crime penalty enhancement (M � 25.78, 95% CI [24.51, 27.06]) gave longer sentencing recommendations than individuals not agreeing with hate crime penalty enhancement (M � 24.44, 95% CI [22.97, 25.91]). The main effects of hate crime instructions and hate crime penalty enhancement agreement were qualified by a significant interaction between the two predictor terms, Wald’s chi-square (1) � 17.78, p � .001. Pairwise comparisons revealed, preinstruc- tion, hate crime penalty enhancement agreement did not influence sentencing recommendations (p � .52). However, postinstruction, individuals agreeing with hate crime penalty enhancement gave significantly longer sentencing recommendations (M � 30.51, 95% CI [29.14, 31.88) than individuals disagreeing with hate crime legislation (M � 27.37, 95% CI [25.59, 29.16], p � .001, Figure 3a). In other words, although sentencing recommendations increased from preinstruction to postinstruction, the sentencing recommendations given by individuals who also agree with hate crime legislation was 3 years longer than sentencing recommen- dations given by individuals disagreeing with hate crime legisla- tion. Victim blame. The second model examined victim blame rat- ings as a function of hate crime jury instructions, hate crime penalty enhancement agreement, and victim type as well as the interaction terms of the predictor variables while controlling for race of the participant.5 Model reduction through backward elim- ination resulted in a best fitting model including a main effect of hate crime jury instructions, Wald’s chi-square (1) � 9.73, p � .002. Victim blame decreased from preinstruction (M � 46.81, 95% CI [44.76, 48.85]) to postinstruction (M � 44.95, 95% CI [42.68, 47.23]). This main effect was qualified by a significant interaction between hate crime jury instructions and hate crime penalty enhancement agreement, Wald’s chi-square (1) � 9.80, p � .002. Pairwise comparisons revealed victim blame ratings of individuals who disagreed with hate crime penalty enhance- ment did not change significantly from preinstruction (M � 46.49, 95% CI [43.53, 49.46]) to postinstruction (M � 46.50, 95% CI [43.22, 49.77], p � .99). Victim blame ratings of individuals agreeing with hate crime penalty enhancement were significantly reduced from preinstruction (M � 47.14, 95% CI [45.00, 49.27]) to postinstruction (M � 43.41, 95% CI [40.83, 45.99]), p � .001, Figure 3b). Victim type was not a significant predictor in the model and no interactions involving victim type reached significance. Perpetrator blame. The third model assessed perpetrator blame ratings as a function of hate crime jury instructions, hate crime penalty enhancement agreement, and victim type, as well as the interaction terms of the predictor variables while controlling for race of the participant.6 Model reduction through backward elimination resulted in a best fitting model including only a main effect of hate crime jury instructions, Wald’s chi-square (1) � 15.29, p � .001. Perpetrator blame increased from preinstruction (M � 76.79, 95% CI [74.55, 79.03]) to postinstruction rating (M � 79.66, 95% CI [77.34, 81.98]). No other main effects or interac- tions reached significance. NFC. Sentencing. As in Study 1, three GEE models were run to assess the moderating role of NFC on sentencing recommenda- tions, victim blame, and perpetrator blame. The first model as- sessed sentencing decisions as a function of hate crime jury in- structions, hate crime penalty enhancement agreement, victim 4 The interaction between race of the participant and victim type was nonsignificant, Wald’s chi-square (6) � 5.88, p � .44. 5 The interaction between race of the participant and victim type was nonsignificant, Wald’s chi-square (6) � 3.97, p � .68. 6 The interaction between race of the participant and victim type was nonsignificant, Wald’s chi-square (6) � 4.30, p � .64. T hi s do cu m en t is co py ri gh te d by th e A m er ic an P sy ch ol og ic al A ss oc ia ti on or on e of it s al li ed pu bl is he rs . T hi s ar ti cl e is in te nd ed so le ly fo r th e pe rs on al us e of th e in di vi du al us er an d is no t to be di ss em in at ed br oa dl y. 362 CRAMER ET AL. type, NFC and the interaction terms of the predictor variable while controlling for race of the participant.7 Model reduction through backward elimination resulted in significant 3-way interaction between victim type, hate crime agreement, and NFC, Wald’s chi-square (2) � 9.77, p � .01. As seen in Figure 4, the combi- nation of disagreement with hate crime penalty enhancement and low NFC appears to account for significant findings. Individuals who disagree with hate crime penalty enhancement and were low in NFC provided the longest sentencing recommendations when the victim was described as gay, and shortest when the victim was transgender. Sentencing was approximately equal across other combinations of victim type, penalty enhancement agreement and NFC. Victim blame. The second model assessed victim blame as a function of hate crime jury instructions, hate crime penalty en- hancement agreement, victim type, NFC and the interaction terms of the predictor variables. No significant effects (main or interac- tions) involving NFC were observed. Perpetrator blame. The third model assessed perpetrator blame as a function of hate crime jury instructions, hate crime penalty enhancement agreement, victim type, NFA and the inter- action terms of the predictor variables. Model reduction through backward elimination resulted in a best fitting model including an interaction between hate crime instructions and NFC, Wald’s chi-square (1) � 5.63, p � .02. As can be seen in Figure 5, preinstructions, individuals high in NFC blamed the perpetrator less than individuals low in NFC. Postinstructions, this trend reversed and individuals high in NFC blamed the perpetrator more than individuals low in NFC. Discussion Perhaps the most robust outcome of the present investigation concerns penalty enhancement agreement and instructions with hate crime penalty enhancement. Study 2 results replicated the interactive effect of hate crime instructions and agreement; it failed to emerge when predicting perceptions of perpetrator blame, how- ever. Taken as a whole, present findings portray an intriguing picture of jury-eligible community members’ approaches to hate crimes. In accordance with the HCPA, offenders were repeatedly punished with increased prison terms across studies. Despite this general trend, beliefs concerning these penalty enhancements wid- ened the gap in blame and punishment. This raises the possibility that mock jurors did not remain completely impartial in following the law, a potentially concerning finding addressed in more detail below. Most empirical data addressing support or dissent for hate crime laws pertains to inclusion of specific victim groups (e.g., Johnson & Byers, 2003; Plumm & Terrance, in press). Building on this trend, our findings revealed empirical support that perceptions of the penalty enhancement can matter across type of victim, espe- cially in terms of blame attributions (an exception to this is the significant three-way interaction on sentencing involving policy agreement, NFC and victim type discussed later). Numerous ex- planations may explicate the potency of agreement with policy. Previous research shows a multitude of individual differences such as low authoritarianism to be important in perceptions of hate crimes (e.g., Cramer et al., in press). Also, criticism of hate crime policy abound. Rationales against hate crime laws include violat- ing free speech (Bessel, 2010), creating systemic inequity in the punishment of offenders (Sullaway, 2004), and prosecuting crimes unnecessarily, further taxing the criminal justice system (Glaser, 2005). Belief structures underlying support and disagreement alike are important to examine in a nuanced fashion to continue to promote understanding the impact of agreement with hate crime policy in and out of the courtroom. 7 No effects involving race of participant and need for cognition on any of the dependent measures were significant. S en te nc in g (in y ea rs ) 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 Preinstruction Postinstruction a Hate Crime Agreement eergasiDeergA V ic tim B la m e 35 40 45 50 55 Preinstruction Postinstruction b Hate Crime Agreement eergasiDeergA Figure 3. (a) Sentencing recommendations by hate crime penalty en- hancement agreement and jury instructions for Study 2. (b) Victim blame ratings by hate crime penalty enhancement agreement and jury instructions for Study 2. T hi s do cu m en t is co py ri gh te d by th e A m er ic an P sy ch ol og ic al A ss oc ia ti on or on e of it s al li ed pu bl is he rs . T hi s ar ti cl e is in te nd ed so le ly fo r th e pe rs on al us e of th e in di vi du al us er an d is no t to be di ss em in at ed br oa dl y. 363HATE CRIMES An aim of this set of studies was to assess whether victim type mattered in the blame and punishment of hate crime victims and perpetrators. Overall, the answer appears to be that ‘it depends on other factors.’ Study 1 results yielded no significant effects of victim group membership, defined by being African American, gay or transgender. In Study 2 a qualified main effect of victim type emerged dependent on factors of perceiver NFC and agree- ment with penalty enhancement policy. While the influence of NFC is explored further below, the consistent pattern that emerged concerning victim type is that, when discrepancies appeared, gay and transgender victims were treated differently. It is necessary to keep in mind that differences by victim type only emerged in Study 2. The HCPA provides the legal backdrop to understand analyses of victim type. Finding roots in prior equal rights movements such as African American and other civil rights of the 1960s and 1970s (Gerstenfeld, 2011), GLBT civil rights have gained traction in the last two decades, resulting in legislation such as the HCPA. Among the various alterations to existing federal hate crime leg- islation incorporated in the HCPA was inclusion of gay and transgender individuals (Human Right Campaign, 2009). Study 1 results alone suggest equitable treatment of gay and transgender victims. However, Study 2 paints a more complicated picture. Perpetrators of all three types of crimes were sentenced equally until perceiver NFC and instructions were factored into the equa- tion. Inspection of Figure 4 indicates that low NFC (i.e., less preference for critical thinking and cognitive stimulation) and hate crime disagreement foster differential punishment of hate crime perpetrators. Surprisingly, the combination yields harsher punish- ment of antigay hate crime perpetrators, perhaps because of con- temporary shifts in acceptance of gay individuals. In essence, the simplistic thinking underlying punishment of antigay hate crime offenders may take the effect of “public perceptions of gay people are getting better, so I should follow suit.” It is equally plausible that low NFC individuals engaged in impression man- agement, punishing an offender because they believe following jury hate crime instruction to be a socially desirable response. 30 40 50 60 70 80 0 10 20 30 40 50 Hate Crime Agreement NFC S en te nc in g (in y ea rs ) Gay Victim African American Victim Transgender Victim 30 40 50 60 70 80 0 10 20 30 40 50 Hate Crime Disagreement NFC S en te nc in g (in y ea rs ) Figure 4. Sentencing recommendations by victim type, hate crime penalty enhancement agreement, and need for cognition. Hate Crime (Dis)agreement refers to whether participants agree with the penalty enhancement portion of the hate crime laws. 30 40 50 60 70 80 70 75 80 85 90 95 10 0 NFC P er pe tr at or B la m e Preinstruction Postinstruction Figure 5. Perpetrator blame ratings by hate crime jury instructions and need for cognition. T hi s do cu m en t is co py ri gh te d by th e A m er ic an P sy ch ol og ic al A ss oc ia ti on or on e of it s al li ed pu bl is he rs . T hi s ar ti cl e is in te nd ed so le ly fo r th e pe rs on al us e of th e in di vi du al us er an d is no t to be di ss em in at ed br oa dl y. 364 CRAMER ET AL. Despite HCPA inclusion of transgender individuals as a pro- tected group, individuals who disagree with penalty enhancement and fail to critically analyze the information presented in the trial scenario do not follow HCPA requirements pertaining to transgen- der individuals. This may be because of both a lack of understand- ing of who transgender individuals are (i.e., lack of exposure/ knowledge), and a lack of critical processing of information (i.e., low NFC; Cacioppo et al., 1986). Given this possibility, low NFC individuals disagreeing with penalty enhancements may find it a cognitively easier decision to downgrade sentence severity toward a victim type they possess no knowledge of. Alternative explana- tions exist, however, including that a lack of familiarity with transgender persons may coincide with transphobia, generally de- fined as an irrational fear of transgender individuals (Nagoshi et al., 2008). If this is the case, irrational fear of unknown transgender minorities may drive the improved situation for perpetrators of antitransgender hate crimes. A final domain warranting comment is the role individual dif- ferences in preference for emotion and cognition play in the assignment of blame and sentencing. As in previous jury research, both NFA (e.g., Adams et al., 2010; Corwin et al., 2012) and NFC (e.g., McAuliff & Kovera, 2008; Salerno & McCauley, 2009) proved useful in illuminating juror perceptions of hate crimes. As summarized earlier, NFA was related only to attributions of victim blame. On the contrary, NFC moderated perceptions and decisions about hate crime offenders. The three-way interactive effect on sentencing summarized above is consistent with previous NFC findings that low NFC persons display simpler views of human behavior when increasing offender punishment (Sargent, 2004). In the case of present findings, low NFC individuals disagreeing with penalty enhancements for hate crimes may have been more puni- tive to antigay offenders because of simplistic interpretations of the offender’s behavior (e.g., “the offender is a bigot, and should therefore be punished”). This pattern may have reversed for pun- ishment of antitransgender offenders because of a lack of clarity of transgender issues. The lack of understanding, paired with neces- sity for increased thinking through the issue, may have yielded decreased sentences among low NFC participants. NFC also moderated the impact of instructions on perpetrator blame, such that high NFC participants, compared with low NFC individuals, blamed perpetrators more after receiving instructions and information that the crime was hate-motivated. The supposi- tion here is that high NFC individuals were likely more motivated to consider the law (i.e., jury instructions) and incorporate them into perceptions of offender intent and blame. Consideration of legal instructions resulting in negative views of the offender con- tradicts the findings of Leippe, Eisenstadt, Rauch, and Seib (2004) who reported that high NFC persons gave greater scrutiny to strong evidence cases, resulting in less conviction proneness. The case evidence, by inference, is arguably strong in the present study because the offender was already convicted, yet blame toward that offender was greater among high NFC persons. The disparate findings suggests that the high level of scrutiny applied by high NFC persons to the guilt phase of a trial operates differently in the sentencing phase. Placed in the CEST (Epstein, 1990) framework, NFA and NFC findings offer insight into logic and experience driven processing preferences in a hate crime context. Recalling that hate crimes tend to evoke strong emotions (Sullaway, 2004) and that NFA impacted only perceptions of victims in the present investigation, CEST suggests that jurors may be engaging primarily in experiential system when viewing victims of hate crimes. Susceptibility to heuristically or emotionally driven processing of hate crime vic- tims is consistent with previous findings that experiential proces- sors respond to surface level cues such as defendant attractiveness (Gunnell & Ceci, 2010). Operating on the assumption that high NFC is reflective of preference for a logical, effortful processing subsystem (Cacioppo et al., 1986, 1983), CEST would support that this style of processing may be consistent with a rational system in light its logic-driven nature (Kirkpatrick & Epstein, 1992). There- fore, placed in a CEST framework, the moderating effects of NFC observed in the present study suggest a rational-dominant style in perceptions of hate crime offenders. Limitations and Implications for Policy, Practice, and Research Our research also possesses limitations worthy of noting. Meth- odologically, a growing trend is inclusion of jury deliberation in experimental paradigms (Wiener, Krauss, & Lieberman, 2011). Moreover, vignette methods, while valuable and commonly em- ployed, are limited in terms of over isolation of just one or a few aspects of a trial. Our two-step vignette requiring jurors to provide multiple ratings of sentencing and blame is clearly limited in regard to external validity, as jurors only render such decisions once in a trial. Another limitation pertains to the assessment of hate crime agreement in that it is foreseeable that a participant could disagree with the policy but still follow the law. The sample used, while more representative than prior research in this area of research in many regards, was drawn only from one region of the United States. Because attitudes toward sexual minorities can influence perceptions of hate crimes (e.g., Cramer et al., in press), these attitudes were not controlled for in the present study. In regard to external validity, while hate crime research is important, the ability to apply individual-level juror findings is also hampered by the fact that many hate crimes do not reach trial, as they are often difficult to prosecute for many reasons. As hate crime research progresses, our findings, especially the inconsistent main effect of victim type between Studies 1 and 2, can be tested using these variations in methodology and sample. Also of note for future research is the potential utility of transphobia, attitudes toward sexual minorities, knowledge of and exposure to GLBT persons, and moral- ity beliefs concerning the justice system and hate crime policies. Differential treatment toward gay and transgender victims may benefit from a metaperspective of prejudice, especially given the potentially far-reaching implications beyond the courtroom. From a public perception standpoint, successive decades have witnessed new civil rights movements. Social-legal perspectives demonstrate time shifts in types of prejudice and potential social acceptance of each minority group. For example, empirical data suggest both racism and sexism transitioned from overt hostility to subtle dis- crimination (e.g., Sears, 1988; Swim, Aikin, Hall, & Hunter, 1995). Moreover, negative racial attitudes impact public percep- tion of a range of crime policies (Green, Staerkie, & Sears, 2006). While racial prejudice has changed in many respects, political reform also reflects some gained social and legal equity (e.g., inclusion of racial minorities in hate crimes legislation). It is possible that the same shifts are occurring for gay individuals. In short, this data provides preliminary evidence that gay individuals T hi s do cu m en t is co py ri gh te d by th e A m er ic an P sy ch ol og ic al A ss oc ia ti on or on e of it s al li ed pu bl is he rs . T hi s ar ti cl e is in te nd ed so le ly fo r th e pe rs on al us e of th e in di vi du al us er an d is no t to be di ss em in at ed br oa dl y. 365HATE CRIMES are treated equally in the context of a hate crime. Moreover, the HCPA and various state laws now protect sexual minority persons. Overt discrimination such as inequitable treatment in a jury con- text may have given way to other forms of subtle discrimination beyond the courtroom. Based on interactive effects with policy accord and NFC, the same may not be true for transgender indi- viduals; despite being protected under some legislation, overt discrimination may still exist in the courtroom. From a public policy perspective, hate crime legislation and associated GLBT issues have pervaded the political consciousness and coverage, especially since Mathew Shepard’s 1998 murder. In evaluating the extent to which anti-GLBT prejudices may or may not have changed, social scientists and policymakers may en- deavor to examine how such controversial issues impact not only jury behavior, but other policy-relevant domains such as voting, housing, and marriage decisions. Indeed, these are ripe topics to address existing levels and manifestations of overt or subtle sexual prejudice, transphobia, and social equality for GLBT individuals. The present set of studies also may inform jury selection for attorneys and trial consultants. Briefly, jury consultants and attor- neys aim to de-select, or strike, potential jurors who cannot be impartial given the unique set of facts in a given case (Brodsky, 2009). For example, Cramer, Adams, and Brodsky (2009) illus- trate how a range of individual differences such as authoritarian- ism and NFC may be utilized during jury selection in a child sexual abuse trial. The present study possesses similar potential utility insofar as agreement with penalty enhancement and NFC are germane to the case facts in a criminal hate crime trial. For instance, defense attorneys in a hate crime against a gay victim may strike low NFC individuals who agree with penalty enhance- ment, as such individuals appear to view perpetrators in a rather extreme manner. Likewise, as blame or culpability attributions often factor into civil trial outcomes, NFA and NFC may be considered for their respective impacts on perceptions of victims and perpetrators of hate crimes. The present study possesses potential strengths in that it is consis- tent with current directions in juror research. Wiener et al. (2011) recommended a two-step process where principles are first estab- lished using student and other convenience samples. Then, such findings can be replicated and extended among community samples in order to enhance various types of validity. 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T hi s ar ti cl e is in te nd ed so le ly fo r th e pe rs on al us e of th e in di vi du al us er an d is no t to be di ss em in at ed br oa dl y. 367HATE CRIMES http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/hate-crime/2010 http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10979-006-9026-z http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11211-005-6825-1 http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11211-005-6825-1 http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/bsl.939 http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0146167208314871 http://dx.doi.org/10.3818/JRP.3.1.2001.29 http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/aje/kwf215 http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-4560.2007.00544.x http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-4560.2007.00544.x http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0886260508316477 http://www.hrc.org/laws_and_elections/5660.htm http://www.hrc.org/laws_and_elections/5660.htm http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0047-2352%2803%2900004-7 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0047-2352%2803%2900004-7 http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.63.4.534 http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/bsl.621 http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/bsl.621 http://www.civilrights.org/publications/hate%20crimes/lccref_hate_crimes_report.pdf http://www.civilrights.org/publications/hate%20crimes/lccref_hate_crimes_report.pdf http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/99-478.ZS.html http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/99-478.ZS.html http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0021-9010.89.3.524 http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/jip.91 http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/bsl.771 http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/019027250606900104 http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-6494.694156 http://www.matthewshepard.org/our%20story http://www.matthewshepard.org/our%20story http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1559-1816.2007.00310.x http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1559-1816.2007.00310.x http://ncavp.org/common/document_files/Reports/2008%20HV%20Report%20%20maller%20file.pdf http://ncavp.org/common/document_files/Reports/2008%20HV%20Report%20%20maller%20file.pdf http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0269758011422475 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00918360903489101 http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1016214632062 http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1016214632062 http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0886260503254513 http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0146167204264481 Saucier, D. 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Mr. Jones has already been found guilty of 2nd degree murder. The only question before you, the jury, is to determine Mr. Jones’s sentence. Below are the details for the jury’s consideration: The Victim • Mr. Anthony Smith • 44 year-old male • Professor of chemistry at the University of Miami since September of 1992 The Perpetrator • Mr. Morgan Jones • 40 year-old male co-worker of Mr. Smith’s On February 3, 2001 Mr. Jones arrived unexpectedly at the home of the victim, Mr. Smith, at approximately 7:30 p.m. After a short argument at the front door, Mr. Smith attempted to shut the door on Mr. Jones. Mr. Jones reportedly over-powered Mr. Smith and forced his way into the victim’s home. As shown in the trial, Mr. Jones drew a gun from inside his coat and shot the victim twice in the chest. According to witness testimony, Mr. Jones and Mr. Smith were professional colleagues, but not close friends. Several of the vic- tim’s family members and colleagues testified that Mr. Jones had never been to Mr. Smith’s home. Before the night of the crime, Mr. Jones had verbally expressed dislike of the victim. Mr. Jones’ background revealed no prior criminal record. Sentencing Instructions: Federal sentencing guidelines for 2nd degree murder suggest a sentence of 235-293 months (19 years, 7 months – 24 years, 5 months). Given the federal sentencing guidelines for 2nd degree murder, how many months or years would you recommend for the above crime? There is no minimum amount of time to assign. Please write your answer in the space below and indicate months/ years. It is important that you use only the information provided in the case summary and on this sheet; please answer honestly. Your recommended sentence: _______ (years) __________ (months) Step 2: Hate Crime Instruction Manipulation and Postinstruction Sentencing Rating Additional Sentencing Information At his trial the perpetrator, Mr. Jones, a white male, testified that he was overcome by rage and targeted the victim because he was a black/gay/or transgender male. Hence, the murder was a hate crime. Sentencing Instructions: Federal sentencing guidelines for hate crimes suggest an in- crease of 3 punishment levels. Therefore, federal sentencing guide- lines for a 2nd degree murder hate crime suggest a sentence of 324-405 months (27 years, 0 months – 33 years, 9 months). Given the federal sentencing guidelines for a 2nd degree murder hate crime above, how many months/years would you recommend for the above crime? There is no minimum amount of time to assign. Please write your answer in the space below. It is important that you use only the information provided in the case summary and on this sheet; please answer honestly. Your recommended sentence: ________ (years) __________ (months) Received May 31, 2012 Revision received October 1, 2012 Accepted October 3, 2012 � T hi s do cu m en t is co py ri gh te d by th e A m er ic an P sy ch ol og ic al A ss oc ia ti on or on e of it s al li ed pu bl is he rs . T hi s ar ti cl e is in te nd ed so le ly fo r th e pe rs on al us e of th e in di vi du al us er an d is no t to be di ss em in at ed br oa dl y. 368 CRAMER ET AL. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0886260507313774 http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0886260507313774 http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0886260509358386 http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0886260509358386 http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0886260510390950 http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0886260510390950 http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0095399707305548 An Examination of Sexual Orientation- and Transgender-Based Hate Crimes in the Post-Matthew Shep ... Sexual Orientation and Transgender Hate Crimes Individual Differences: Cognitive-Experiential Self Theory and Need for Affect (NFA) The Present Studies Study 1: Juror Instructions, Hate Crime Penalty Enhancement Agreement, and NFA Method Participants Procedure Measures/Materials Demographics NFA Crime vignette manipulation/jury instructions Hate crime penalty enhancement agreement Perceptions of blame scale Sentencing Results Data analysis Hate Crime Instructions, Hate Crime Penalty Enhancement Agreement, and Victim Type Sentencing Victim blame Perpetrator blame NFA Sentencing Victim blame Perpetrator blame Discussion Study 2: Juror Instructions, Penalty Enhancement Agreement, and NFC Method Participants Procedure Measures/materials NFC Results Data analysis Hate crime jury instructions, Hate crime penalty enhancement agreement, and Victim type Sentencing Victim blame Perpetrator blame NFC Sentencing Victim blame Perpetrator blame Discussion Limitations and Implications for Policy, Practice, and Research References Step 1: Pre-Hate Crime Instruction Vignette/Sentencing Form Step 2: Hate Crime Instruction Manipulation and Postinstruction Sentencing Rating 
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work_z5onmzqfuzce7bak2cbqt27rh4	----	Science Magazine www.sciencemag.org SCIENCE VOL 336 18 MAY 2012 825 C R E D IT S ( T O P T O B O T T O M ): © J U S T IN M IN N S /A L A M Y ; S S P L V IA G E T T Y I M A G E S YOU’RE ALONE IN A DARK ALLEY LATE AT NIGHT. Suddenly a man emerges from a doorway. If you are a typical white American and he is a young black man, within a few tenths of a sec- ond you will feel a frisson of fear as your brain automatically categorizes him. Your heart beats faster and your body tenses. In this event, nothing happens. He glances at you and moves away. You walk on, feeling foolish for fears based merely on his membership in a racial group. Tension and suspi- cion between groups— whether based on racial, ethnic, reli- gious, or some other difference—fuel much of the world’s vio- lence. From the endur- ing feuds of the Middle East and Northern Ire- land, to the vicious raids of South Sudan, to the gang warfare that plagues American cit- ies, even to bullying in schools and skirmishes between fans of rival sports teams, much of the confl ict we see today erupts because “we” are pitted against “them.” Some of the prejudice behind these con- fl icts is not conscious: Your fear spiked in that dark alley before your conscious brain had even registered the young man’s skin color. This prejudice apparently stems from deep evolutionary roots and a universal tendency to form coalitions and favor our own side. And yet what makes a “group” is mercurial: In experiments, people easily form coalitions based on meaningless traits such as preferring one painter over another—and then favor oth- ers in their “group,” giving them more money in games, for example. “In arbitrarily con- structed, meaningless groups with no history, people still think that those in their ingroup are smarter, better, more moral, and more just than members of outgroups,” says Harvard University psychologist James Sidanius. A wide and deep literature has explored these innate biases in the 40 or so years since they were fi rst discussed. Now researchers have begun to ask why humans are apparently primed to see the world as ingroups and out- groups. What factors in our evolutionary past have shaped our coalitionary present—and what, if anything, can we do about it now? Several avenues of research are probing the origins of what many psychologists call ingroup love and outgroup hate. Researchers are testing the implicit biases of young chil- dren and even primates, and devising exper- iments to ratchet bias up and down. Evolu- tionary researchers are trying to parse the group environments of our ancestors and are debating just how big a selective pressure came from outgroup male warriors. “The ori- gin of all this is the all-consuming question of the past few years,” says Harvard psycholo- gist Mahzarin Banaji. Group love For many researchers, our cruelty to “them” starts with our kindness to “us.” Humans are the only animal that cooperates so exten- sively with nonkin, and researchers say that, like big brains, group life is a quintessential human adaptation. (In fact, many think big brains evolved in part to cope with group liv- ing.) Studies of living hunter-gatherers, who may represent the lifestyle of our ancestors, support this idea. Hunter-gatherers “coop- erate massively in the fl ow of every imagin- able good and service you can think of,” says anthropologist Kim Hill of Arizona State University (ASU), Tempe, who has studied Humans everywhere divide the world into “us” and “them.” Why are we so tribal? A warrior past? Battles among hunter-gatherers such as these Papua New Guineans suggest to some that ancient wars shape modern fears. Fear of “them.” Members of outgroups can spark automatic, implicit prejudice. Online sciencemag.org Podcast interview with author Elizabeth Culotta (http://scim.ag/6083_hc1). Published by AAAS o n A p ril 5 , 2 0 2 1 h ttp ://scie n ce .scie n ce m a g .o rg / D o w n lo a d e d fro m http://science.sciencemag.org/ 18 MAY 2012 VOL 336 SCIENCE www.sciencemag.org 826 C R E D IT S ( T O P T O B O T T O M ): S T R IN G E R I R E L A N D /R E U T E R S ; Y A R R O W D U N H A M hunter-gatherers for 35 years. “Anything you need in daily life, the person next to you will lend you: water, sticks for fi rewood, a bow and arrow, a carrying basket—anything.” Thus the group buffers the individual against the environment. “Our central adap- tation is to group living,” says psychologist Marilynn Brewer of the University of New South Wales in Sydney, Australia. “The group is primary.” When the ingroup is loved, by defi nition there must be a less privileged outgroup. “One can be expected to be treated more nicely by ingroup members than by outgroups,” as Brewer put it in a seminal 1999 paper. “It is in a sense universally true that ‘we’ are more peaceful, trustworthy, friendly, and honest than ‘they,’ ” she wrote. If groups compete for ter ritory or resources, favoring the ingroup necessarily means beating the outgroup and can esca- late into hostility, Brewer notes. Several other researchers (see p. 876) have recently argued the reverse: that over time, hostili- ties between groups fostered ingroup love, because more cooperative groups won bat- tles. Whichever came fi rst, researchers agree that outgroup hate and ingroup love may have spurred each other. In the United States and some other coun- tries, the sharpest division between groups is often racial. But researchers agree that it’s not that white people have evolved to be sus- picious of black people per se or vice versa. Such an evolved prejudice could only arise as the result of frequent negative interactions between races in the past, explains anthropol- ogist Robert Boyd of the University of Cali- fornia, Los Angeles. But thousands of years ago, people didn’t cross continents to meet each other. “In the distant past, we had very little experience interacting with people who were physically very different from us,” Boyd says. “That’s only since 1492. Ethnic distinc- tions, however, are presumably quite old.” Thus racial prejudice is a subset of a much broader phenomenon. “This is not just about racism,” says psychologist Susan Fiske of Princeton University. The targets of outgroup prejudice vary from culture to culture and over time— Sidanius refers to them as “arbitrary set” prejudices. In Sri Lanka, it may be Tamils; in Northern Ireland, Catholics or Protestants; in India, the Untouchables. Fiske notes that the world over, the greatest prejudice is often aimed at people without an address, such as gypsies and the homeless. Whoever the tar- get, we have a psychological system that pre- pares us to “learn quickly, in whatever cul- tural context we’re in, what are the cues that discriminate between us and them,” says psy- chologist Mark Schaller of the University of British Columbia, Vancouver, in Canada. This doesn’t mean that prejudicial behav- ior is inevitable, Schaller says. “These preju- dices tap into very ancient parts of our minds, and it’s happening at a very quick, automatic level,” he says. “But we have recently evolved parts of our brains that allow us to engage in slower, more rational thought. When I expe- rience that fear in a dark alley, it may take me another half-second for a more rational thought to kick in, but I’ll get there, if I have the motivation and means to do so.” Shoot or don’t shoot Psychologists have become master manipula- tors of prejudice in the lab, with clever experi- ments that reveal underlying biases. In the Implicit Associations Test, for example, peo- ple are asked to rapidly categorize objects and faces; the pattern of mistakes and speed shows that people more quickly associate negative words such as “hatred” with outgroup faces than ingroup faces. “It takes signifi cantly lon- ger to associate your ingroup with bad things and the outgroup with good things,” Sidanius says. In disturbing tests using a video game, people looking at a picture of a person car- rying an ambiguous object are more likely to mistake a cell phone for a gun and shoot the carrier if he is an outgroup male. This type of bias shows up in all cultures studied and in children; it also appears in people who say they are not prejudiced and who work consciously for equality. “This is in every single one of us, including me,” Banaji says. It starts young. In work in review, Yarrow Dunham of Princeton, Banaji, and colleagues found that Taiwanese toddlers assumed that a smiling racially ambiguous face was Tai- wanese, but a frowning one was white; white, American 3-year-olds similarly preferred their ingroup. Even our primate cousins categorize oth- ers into ingroups and outgroups. Chimps obviously have outgroup bias: They some- times band together and attack and kill mem- bers of other troops. Last year, a study man- aged to uncover primates’ implicit expecta- tions of “us” and “them” for the fi rst time. Laurie Santos of Yale University, work- ing with Banaji and others, adapted a psy- chological test for rhesus macaques, g roup-living monkeys whose lineage diverged from ours about 25 million to 30 million years ago. The researchers assumed that the macaques would stare lon- ger at outgroup faces, who might be more dangerous, or at groups of photos that paired things they liked with outgroup faces they didn’t like. In a series of experiments pub- Religion, not race. Groups divide along many axes, including religion, as when protesters and police clash in Northern Ireland. Whose group? Taiwanese toddlers thought racially ambiguous faces like these were Taiwanese when smiling and white when looking angry. Published by AAAS o n A p ril 5 , 2 0 2 1 h ttp ://scie n ce .scie n ce m a g .o rg / D o w n lo a d e d fro m http://science.sciencemag.org/ www.sciencemag.org SCIENCE VOL 336 18 MAY 2012 827 SPECIALSECTION C R E D IT : L A U R IE S A N T O S lished in the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Santos and colleagues found that macaques looked longer at pho- tos of outgroup members. They also looked longer at photos of outgroup members next to pictures of fruit, and at photos of ingroup members with spiders and snakes. Seeing such apparent bias in primates sug- gests it is evolutionarily ancient. This “coher- ence of results across species and ages is satis- fying,” Banaji says, and tells us that outgroup bias is “core to our species.” While these researchers probe bias in different populations, others are exploring how to manipulate it. Our attitudes toward outgroups are part of a threat-detection system that allows us to rapidly determine friend from foe, says psychologist Steven Neuberg of ASU Tempe. The problem, he says, is that like smoke detectors, the system is designed to give many false alarms rather than miss a true threat. So outgroup faces alarm us even when there is no danger. Neuberg and Schaller have studied what might turn this detection system up and down. When you feel threatened, you react to danger more quickly and intensely; people startle more easily in the dark. That’s why prejudice rears its head in a dark alley rather than a well- lit field. In a variety of studies, Neuberg, Schaller, and their col- leagues have manipulated people into feeling unconsciously more fearful or conf ident and found that measures of outgroup bias respond. Canadians taking tests in the dark rated Iraqis as less trust- worthy and more hostile than other Canadi- ans. Sinhalese in Sri Lanka stereotyped Tam- ils as more hostile after being primed with a geographic context that made them feel out- numbered. And white undergraduates were more likely to misperceive anger on the faces of black men—but not whites—after watch- ing a scary scene from the movie The Silence of the Lambs. Schaller adds that some peo- ple seem to go through life more cognizant of threats than others, and that prejudice is more easily intensifi ed in these people. These fi ndings can inform real-life trag- edy, researchers say. On the evening of 26 February, a Hispanic man named George Zimmerman shot an unarmed black teenager, Trayvon Martin, in a gated community in San- ford, Florida. Zimmerman told police that he followed Martin suspecting criminal activ- ity, was attacked, and fi red in self-defense. Researchers cannot speak to what happened that night. But when Zimmerman fi rst spot- ted Martin, the situation was a “perfect storm” for triggering feelings of vulnerability and implicit prejudice, Neuberg and Schaller say. It was dark and raining. Martin, 17, though slender, was tall. Zimmerman, 28, was quite alert to crime in his neighborhood; he had started the neighborhood watch. Martin was young, male, and black, an outgroup stereo- typed as dangerous by whites and Hispanics in the United States. “We would predict that under those circumstances this kind of thing would happen more often,” Neuberg says. If certain situations turn implicit preju- dice up, can it be turned down? Schaller notes that making people feel safer can moderate this bias, whether through specifi c priming or more generally with lower crime rates or a better economy. To unconsciously prime her own mind, Banaji has created a screen saver that displays stereotype-smashing images. Other researchers say that deliberately engag- ing the slower conscious mind may help. For example, in addition to skimming all job applications quickly, a manager might read the fi les of minority applicants with care. Men in the crosshairs Martin is a good example of how outgroup prejudice falls hardest on men, Sidanius says. He argues that this has specifi c evolutionary roots: Because it is men who typically make war, it was outgroup men who attacked our ancestors; it was also men who were more likely to be killed in combat. “Back in the Pleistocene, outgroup males really were dan- gerous,” he says. If natural selection has shaped our minds to be wary of outgroup males, then they should face more prejudice than outgroup women, says Sidanius, an African American who himself was the target of hate crimes as a young man. He and colleagues have assem- bled a devastating catalog showing how this is true for black men in America. As com- pared with black women, black men are more likely to be victims of hate crimes, receive harsher jail sentences for compa- rable offenses, pay more money for cars—the list goes on and on. Data suggest that West Indian and South Asian men in the United Kingdom face similarly dispro- portionate bias, Sidanius says. Building on these ideas, in March, Melissa McDonald of Michigan State University in East Lansing and colleagues pro- posed what they called the “war- rior male hypothesis,” arguing that natural selection has shaped men’s minds, more than women’s, toward belonging to coalitions. They predict that men are more prejudiced than women, and some data show this. But others aren’t so sure that intergroup war was a prominent feature of our prehistory (see p. 829). Foragers depend on far- fl ung networks to gain access to the social and natural resources of others, notes anthropologist Polly Wiessner of the University of Utah in Salt Lake City. The !Kung of Africa, whom Wiessner studied for decades, “may travel for hundreds of miles to visit exchange partners in less familiar areas, with no fear of unknown males,” she says. Whether or not humans have evolved to fear outgroup men per se, researchers agree that we are prone to categorize and some- times fear outgroups. “What we’re arguing is a natural preference for drawing ingroup- outgroup boundaries. It can be race, reli- gion, nationality, dialect, or arbitrary set dif- ferences,” Sidanius says. “But once those boundaries are drawn, people like to dis- criminate across them.” –ELIZABETH CULOTTA On the lookout. Macaques stared longer at photos of the faces of outgroup members than at ingroup faces. Published by AAAS o n A p ril 5 , 2 0 2 1 h ttp ://scie n ce .scie n ce m a g .o rg / D o w n lo a d e d fro m http://science.sciencemag.org/ Roots of Racism Elizabeth Culotta DOI: 10.1126/science.336.6083.825 (6083), 825-827.336Science ARTICLE TOOLS http://science.sciencemag.org/content/336/6083/825 MATERIALS SUPPLEMENTARY http://science.sciencemag.org/content/suppl/2012/05/17/336.6083.825.DC1 CONTENT RELATED file:/content/sci/336/6083/news-summaries.full http://science.sciencemag.org/content/sci/336/6083/818.full PERMISSIONS http://www.sciencemag.org/help/reprints-and-permissions Terms of ServiceUse of this article is subject to the is a registered trademark of AAAS.ScienceScience, 1200 New York Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20005. The title (print ISSN 0036-8075; online ISSN 1095-9203) is published by the American Association for the Advancement ofScience Copyright © 2012, American Association for the Advancement of Science o n A p ril 5 , 2 0 2 1 h ttp ://scie n ce .scie n ce m a g .o rg / D o w n lo a d e d fro m http://science.sciencemag.org/content/336/6083/825 http://science.sciencemag.org/content/suppl/2012/05/17/336.6083.825.DC1 http://science.sciencemag.org/content/sci/336/6083/818.full http://www.sciencemag.org/help/reprints-and-permissions http://www.sciencemag.org/about/terms-service http://science.sciencemag.org/ 
work_z6b2txu42bgg3knsyqljihj4im	----	e276 AACE CLINICAL CASE REPORTS Vol 2 No. 3 Summer 2016 Copyright © 2016 AACE Commentary TRANSGENDER ANXIETY, CULTURAL ISSUES, AND CANNABIS IN OBSESSIVE-COMPULSIVE DISORDER Monnica T. Williams, PhD; Terence H.W. Ching, MS Submitted for publication April 14, 2016 Accepted for publication April 18, 2016 From the Department of Psychological Sciences, University of Connecticut, Storrs, Connecticut. Address correspondence to Dr. Monnica T. Williams, University of Connecticut, Department of Psychological Sciences, 406 Babbidge Road, U-1020, Storrs, CT 06269-1020. E-mail: monnica.williams@uconn.edu. DOI: 10.4158/EP161356.CO To purchase reprints of this article, please visit: www.aace.com/reprints. Copyright © 2016 AACE. Safer et al (1) report on the interesting case of a patient with severe, anxiety-producing doubts about his gender identity. He is described as a 20-year-old African American male with a sexual identity characterized by same-sex attraction. His obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) symptoms started abruptly after the use of mari- juana, at which point he began to question his gender identity. Specifically, he suffered from obsessions of being transgender that caused him marked distress, engaged in functionally impairing mental and behavioral compulsions such as “testing” his reactions to certain thoughts or imag- es and reassurance seeking. He also experienced suicidal ideation without active suicide plans or intent. It may be interesting to consider possible reasons why the patient presented with this particular form of OCD at this time. OCD symptoms often focus on what is most salient to those afflicted, and sexual identity may be partic- ularly salient in adolescents and young adults due to their developmental stage. Greater awareness of transgender issues due to greater representation in the media is likely to contribute to increased questioning and worry about gender dysphoria among young people prone to OCD. In addition, the role of cultural issues in this case must also be considered. There is greater stigma of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer identity within the African American community, and transgender African Americans are disproportionately likely to experience discrimination and violence from hate crimes than their transgender white counterparts (2). These social realities may have contrib- uted to heightened anxiety and more obsessional worries in this particular patient. Proper assessment of OCD is therefore vital, and even more so with the presentation of such understudied symptoms. OCD can be particularly challenging to diag- nose by non–mental health professionals, especially when symptom presentations are unusual or have sexual themes. Furthermore, covert compulsions, which are common among those with sexual obsessions in OCD, are often missed by clinicians, which may result in a missed diagno- sis or underestimate of symptom severity (3,4). This is why an assessment by an experienced mental health profes- sional is essential if the patient exhibits doubts or anxiety about gender re-assignment surgery. For example, when assessing for transgender obsessions in a clinical inter- view, clinicians should determine if the unwanted thoughts about gender dysphoria (particularly about the possibility of gender re-assignment) are ego-dystonic. The second edition of the Yale-Brown Obsessive Compulsive Scale includes a question that asks specifically about gender identity, so this may be a good starting place (5). Lastly, the onset of OCD symptoms after cannabis use has been reported in the relevant literature. For example, OCD symptoms have been linked to cannabis use in both case reports and epidemiologic studies (6-8). In our own clinical practice, we have observed the onset of new OCD symptoms in conjunction with a single use of cannabis in adolescents and young adults. Cannabis is known to predispose youth to motivational, affective, and psychotic disorders; there is strong evidence of the psychopathogenic effects of cannabis on the developing brain, and prospec- tive longitudinal studies indicate that early cannabis use is associated with major depressive disorder and substance See accompanying article, p. e268. Transgender Anxiety, AACE Clinical Case Rep. 2016;2(No. 3) e277 Copyright © 2016 AACE use disorders (9). In this case study, marijuana may have potentiated the patient’s existing vulnerability to OCD – a vulnerability evidenced by prior subclinical symptoms and family history (i.e., brother with diagnosed contamination- based OCD). Thus, we strongly discourage cannabis use by young people with OCD or at risk for OCD. Nonetheless, further study of the relationship between cannabis and OCD is warranted. DISCLOSURE The authors have no multiplicity of interest to disclose. REFERENCES 1. Safer DL, Bullock, KD, Safer JD. Obsessive-compulsive disorder presenting as gender dysphoria/gender incongru- ence: a case report and literature review. AACE Clinical Case Rep. 2016;2:e268-e271. 2. Stotzer RL. Gender identity and hate crimes: violence against transgender people in Los Angeles County. Sex Res Social Policy. 2008;5:43-52. 3. Glazier K, Calixte R, Rothschild R, Pinto A. High rates of OCD symptom misidentification by mental health professionals. Ann Clin Psychiatry. 2013;25:201-209. 4. Williams MT, Farris SG, Turkheimer E, et al. Myth of the pure obsessional type in obsessive-compulsive disor- der. Depress Anxiety. 2011;28:495-500. 5. Storch EA, Rasmussen SA, Price LH, Larson MJ, Murphy TK, Goodman WK. Development and psychometric evaluation of the Yale–Brown Obsessive- Compulsive Scale—Second Edition. Psychol Assess. 2010; 22:223-232. 6. Crum RM, Anthony JC. Cocaine use and other suspected risk factors for obsessive-compulsive disorder: a prospec- tive study with data from the Epidemiologic Catchment Area surveys. Drug Alcohol Depend. 1993;31:281-295. 7. Douglass HM, Moffitt TE, Dar R, McGee R, Silva P. Obsessive-compulsive disorder in a birth cohort of 18-year- olds: prevalence and predictors. J Am Acad Child Adolesc Psychiatry. 1995;34:1424-1431. 8. Wallace D, Martin A, Park B. Cannabinoid hyperemesis: marijuana puts patients in hot water. Australas Psychiatry. 2007;15:156-158. 9. Chadwick B, Miller ML, Hurd YL. Cannabis use during adolescent development: Susceptibility to psychiatric illness. Front Psychiatry. 2013;4:129. 
work_z7qex2wwanhypboymgw5i7xguu	----	Police Engagement with Muslim Communities : Breaking Out, Breaking In, and Breaking Through This is a repository copy of Police Engagement with Muslim Communities : Breaking Out, Breaking In, and Breaking Through. White Rose Research Online URL for this paper: http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/118648/ Version: Accepted Version Article: Bullock, Karen and Johnson, Paul James orcid.org/0000-0001-6391-7906 (2018) Police Engagement with Muslim Communities : Breaking Out, Breaking In, and Breaking Through. Policing and Society. pp. 879-897. https://doi.org/10.1080/10439463.2017.1339706 eprints@whiterose.ac.uk https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/ Reuse Items deposited in White Rose Research Online are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved unless indicated otherwise. They may be downloaded and/or printed for private study, or other acts as permitted by national copyright laws. The publisher or other rights holders may allow further reproduction and re-use of the full text version. This is indicated by the licence information on the White Rose Research Online record for the item. Takedown If you consider content in White Rose Research Online to be in breach of UK law, please notify us by emailing eprints@whiterose.ac.uk including the URL of the record and the reason for the withdrawal request. 1 POLICE ENGAGEMENT WITH MUSLIM COMMUNITIES: BREAKING OUT, BREAKING IN, AND BREAKING THROUGH Karen Bullock Professor of Criminology Department of Sociology, University of Surrey Paul Johnson Professor of Sociology Department of Sociology, University of York ABSTRACT This article considers the character of engagement between UK police forces and Muslim communities and citizens. It examines, from the perspective of police personnel, a range of factors that prevent police organisations from ‘breaking out’ of constraints that currently hinder their engagement with Muslim communities, limit police officers from ‘breaking in’ to Muslim communities in ways that would improve engagement, and facilitate police officers in ‘breaking through’ barriers between them and Muslim communities. The aim of the article is to offer a critical insight into engagement between police officers and Muslim communities and citizens that may aid and enhance such engagement in the future. Enhancing positive engagement between the police service and Muslim citizens is vital in the context of contemporary concerns about Muslim communities being the focus of a multiplicity of counter-terrorism and counter-extremism strategies and, as a result, Muslims citizens retreating from participation in public life. KEY WORDS Faith and Religion, Islam, Muslim communities, Neighbourhood policing 2 INTRODUCTION Over the last three decades there have been concerted efforts in the UK to promote the participation of Muslim citizens and communities in state institutions and public life. This has been especially notable in respect of policy arenas relating to community cohesion, equality and discrimination, and security. However, establishing and maintaining the participation of Muslim communities and citizens has not been straightforward in a social context characterised by controversies about the rationale for engagement, the appropriateness of the mechanisms designed to facilitate engagement, and the benefits claimed to be created by increased engagement. Such controversies have intensified as Muslim communities and citizens have, following the ‘7/7’ terrorist bombings in London in 2005, become the focus of a multiplicity of counter-terrorism and counter-extremism strategies (Spalek et al, 2009). It has been suggested that, as a consequence of this, Muslim citizens are now retreating from participation in state institutions and public life (Citizens UK, 2016). In this article we focus on one area of engagement between the state and Muslim communities and citizens in the UK: that which takes place in the context of public policing. Understanding such engagement is important because it is arguably one of the most critical ways in which religious faith and the state intermix. Public policing forms the ‘coal face’ at which many contemporary questions about and practical solutions to issues relating to religious freedom and human rights are negotiated. Moreover, successfully facilitating the participation of Muslim citizens (and those of other religious faiths) in policing is now seen as a vital means by which community cohesion is achieved and maintained (McFadyen and Prideaux, 2011). The aim of this article is to offer a critical insight into engagement between policing and Muslim communities and citizens that may aid and enhance such engagement in the future. MUSLIM PARTICIPATION IN STATE INSTITUTIONS AND PUBLIC LIFE: A SHORT HISTORY The 1980s saw the start of major changes in respect of the engagement of Muslim communities and citizens with state institutions and public life (Vertovec, 2002; Gilliat-Ray, 2010; O’Toole et al, 2013). Up until the 1980s the engagement of Muslims, as people of faith, with state institutions and public life had been marginal and reticent. Muslim 3 engagement with the state was comprehended and structured as a form of engagement based on ethnicity rather than religion (Vertovec, 2002). Moreover, dominant Islamic legal opinions discouraged the participation of Muslims in non-Islamic political systems and, although such opinions were keenly debated, this resulted in some Muslims choosing on principle not to engage with state institutions and public life (Hussain, 2004: 378). Since the late 1980s, however, there has been a growing consensus in the UK and elsewhere in Europe that Muslims should be viewed as full citizens of plural, democratic states (Hussain, 2004). Indeed, the participation of Muslim citizens in state institutions and public life has become seen as vital to secure the successful future of European states (Hussain, 2004). As a consequence, by the end of the 1980s many Muslim citizens had integrated into state institutions and public life and discussion of matters relating to Islam were treated like those of any other minority, ‘special interest’ group (Vertovec, 2002). Significant shifts in debates in the UK Parliament can be seen as indicative of this social change: whereas Islam and Muslims were infrequently mentioned in Parliament in the three decades prior to the end of the 1970s, during the 1980s there was a dramatic increase in discussions about the Islamic faith and Muslims in Britain that has continued to the present day. Although the increase in attention paid by parliamentarians to British Muslims during the 1980s was inexorably tied to concerns about ‘Islamic fundamentalism’, it became increasingly common to hear senior politicians express the view that ‘Britain has the fullest respect for Islam and for Moslem communities here’ (John Wakeham MP, Leader of the House of Commons, HC Debate, 2 March 1989, vol. 148, col. 404). Since the 1980s religious faith, as distinct from race or ethnicity, has increasingly been recognised as a facet of individual identity around which political engagement activities should be oriented. Moreover, from the late 1990s UK governments have increasingly sought to engage with Muslim communities and groups (O’Toole et al, 2013). Such engagement has been viewed as necessary in the context of a range of disparate national and international occurrences such as the controversy surrounding the 1988 publication of ‘The Satanic Verses’ by Salman Rushdie, the campaigns for law prohibiting discrimination based on religion or belief, the debates regarding state funding of Islamic faith-based schools, and the participation of the UK in international conflicts such as those in Bosnia (1992–95), the Gulf (1990-1991), Iraq (2003-2009), and Afghanistan (2001-2014) (Smith, 2002; Vertovec, 2002; Hussain, 2004; O’Toole et al, 2013). Engagement between the state and Muslim communities and citizens has also been propelled by wider debates about the extent to which Muslims 4 have been and should be assimilated into ‘mainstream’ British society (for a discussion, see: Lewis, 2007). These debates have themselves been recently intensified by concerns about Islamic radicalisation and the involvement of Muslim citizens in political extremism and terror (O’Toole et al, 2013). Moreover, the evolving political landscape of the UK has motivated and mobilised Muslim citizens and communities to become more vocal in articulating their views on and demands for change of the activities of state institutions (Hussain 2004). However, the increased participation of Muslim citizens in state institutions and public life should not be understood merely as the outcome of periodic crises, grievances, and security concerns (O’Toole et al, 2013). Rather, it should be seen in the context of the mainstream political agenda of encouraging engagement between state institutions and Muslim communities and citizens in order to strengthen local governance and foster democratic renewal (Dinham and Lowndes, 2008; O’Toole et al, 2013; see also Putnam, 1995; 2000; Giddens, 1998). In this sense, the participation of Muslim citizens in state institutions and public life can be seen as one outcome of the broad commitment of UK policymakers to encourage people of faith to play a greater role in key aspects of civil society (Dinham and Lowndes, 2008; O’Toole et al, 2013). Faith-based organizations, in particular, have been viewed as having an important role to play in the realisation of policies aimed at promoting social inclusion, improving community cohesion across ethnic lines, facilitating partnership working, accessing hard-to-reach minority communities, and renewing democratic structures at the local level (Dinham and Lowndes, 2008). Indeed, engaging faith-based organizations in the delivery of government policy has been a vital part of the broader ‘third-way’ government strategy of mobilizing the resources of civil society in pursuit of citizen well-being and better governance (Dinham and Lowndes, 2008: 818). MUSLIM PARTICIPATION IN POLICING Within the broader context of debates about the participation of Muslim citizens in state institutions and public life, there have been calls for the greater participation of Muslim citizens in the organization, implementation, and governance of public policing. These calls are closely linked to criticisms about constabularies being unresponsive to and detached from the communities they serve, as well as to concerns about racism in policing (for example, Scarman, 1981; Macpherson, 1999). Consequently, constabularies have increasingly been 5 expected to consult, promote interaction, and engage with Muslim citizens and communities in order to improve the quality of the services they provide and (re)establish their legitimacy in providing those services (Scarman, 1981; Macpherson, 1999; Jones and Newburn, 2001; Bullock, 2014). This has resulted in a proliferation of formal police-community meetings, informal networking, social research, and, more recently, the use of social media to communicate and interact with Muslim citizens. The primary aim of such engagement is to elicit views about current priorities for crime control, generate information and intelligence about crime and criminal activities, and promote police-community collaboration in responding to and resolving crime and social problems (Jones and Newburn, 2001; Bullock, 2014). Because of the predominance of the concern to address racism in policing, a focus on questions relating to race and ethnicity in police-community engagement with Muslim communities has sometimes obscured the relevance of religious faith to policing (Chakraborti, 2007) but religious faith is formally established as a dimension of communities that constabularies are expected to engage with (NPIA, n.d.). Police engagement with Muslim communities and citizens needs to be understood within the context of the growth in police-community consultation that has characterised the development of community policing since the late 1970s. Community policing has become a dominant policing paradigm, rhetorically and organizationally, in the UK (as well as in other European states and the USA) and is designed to bring citizens, communities, and constabularies together by prioritising foot patrols, police-community partnerships, and collaborative problem solving (Alderson, 1979; Manning, 1984; Kelling and Moore, 1988; Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux, 1990; Fielding, 2005). Community policing has, more recently, become a major component of anti-terrorism policy in the UK. Whereas counter- terrorism policies have traditionally emphasised ‘hard’ policing tactics (such as covert surveillance and the use of informants) to generate intelligence, ‘soft’ community policing models (which stress interaction, engagement, and partnership) are now dominant (Briggs et al 2006; Innes, 2006; Lowe and Innes, 2008; Innes and Roberts, 2008; Bettison, 2009; Spalek and Lambert, 2010; Spalek, 2010; McFadyen and Prideaux, 2014). It has been argued that grounding anti-terrorism work in soft community policing models may be more effective than utilizing hard policing tactics because the former builds up trust through the establishment of long-term community ties, breaks down suspicion of the police, and is responsive to community defined problems (Innes, 2006). Community policing, which attempts to facilitate greater police-community interaction, is said to promote information exchange and generate 6 intelligence that is vital to policing terrorism (Innes et al, 2006; see also Newman and Clarke, 2008; Lyons, 2002). Police engagement with Muslim communities and citizens comprises both ‘general’ and specialist anti-terrorism policing strategies. However, such engagement has not been without problems. Previous research has drawn attention to the practical problems which have arisen in the implementation of community policing initiatives because of, for example, the lack of representativeness in the Muslim groups consulted, the absence of clarity in the breadth and scope of engagement activities, and the inability of some communities to meaningfully engage (e.g. Briggs et al 2006; Innes, 2006; Spalek et al 2008). Other problems have been more ideological in nature. For example, a perceived or actual conflation of general community engagement with anti-terrorism policing has made some Muslim citizens suspicious of the police – with the so-called ‘war on terror’ being viewed as a proxy for a ‘war on Islam’ – and soft community policing interventions have therefore been undermined by their association with hard anti-terror interventions (Spalek and Imtoual, 2007; Spalek, 2010; Choudhury and Fenwick, 2011). Consequently, whether as the result of a deficit in police legitimacy, or practical problems, it has proved challenging for the police to engage with Muslim citizens and communities. METHODOLOGY AND OVERVIEW OF OUR ANALYSIS In the remainder of this article we consider, from the perspective of police personnel, a number of factors that influence, enable, and inhibit the engagement of Muslim citizens and communities with the police service. In so doing, we draw on qualitative data derived from research on the role of religious faith in policing. The research was carried out in three randomly selected constabularies in England between 2015 and 2016. All three constabularies granted and facilitated access to their personnel and premises. To maintain confidentiality and anonymity we do not name the constabularies. The constabularies are regionally diverse (all three are county forces in England, with one in the south, one in the midlands and one in the north) and comprise a mixture of urban, suburban and rural policing contexts. All three constabularies have relatively low crime rates compared to the average for England and Wales. 7 The research comprised 21 qualitative interviews with a mix of officers and police staff. To ensure confidentiality and anonymity the roles of the participants are not revealed in the analysis that follows. The participants were drawn from neighbourhood policing teams, counter-terrorism units, and diversity directorates and all have extensive experience of engaging with faith communities. As ‘key informants’ or organizational ‘proxies’ (Parsons, 2008) these research participants were selected because of their unique insight into the role of religious faith in the work of their constabularies. Participants were asked to discuss the nature of their role and how it brought them into contact with Muslim communities and citizens, to reflect on the nature of their interaction with Muslim communities, and to comment on the organizational benefits of such interaction. They were asked to identify any problems or difficulties they faced when attempting to encourage engagement between Muslim citizens and the police service. Furthermore, participants were asked to discuss what mechanisms existed to facilitate interaction between police and faith groups, to what extent the constabulary was engaged with issues relating to faith and how other officers perceive engagement work. The participants were not asked explicitly about their own faith and the role that this may play in operational policing, although a minority of them did discuss this. Since personal religiosity has been shown to influence day-to-day police practice (see Prideaux and McFadyen, 2013) we consider this issue, where relevant, when discussing our findings (see also: Bullock and Johnson, 2016). Moreover, whilst the issue of counter- terrorism was not a specific focus of the interviews – because the primary aim of the research was to consider the relevance of religious faith to policing more broadly – participants did identify counter-terrorism policing as an influence on their engagement with some, predominantly Muslim, faith-based organizations and, accordingly, we consider this in our analysis. Interview data were thematically analysed in light of the aims of the study and extant literature in the field. This involved a process of data familiarisation, generating codes, forming initial themes, and reviewing and refining those themes (Braun and Clarke, 2006). Given the sample of participants from which the data were generated – police personnel – the thematic analysis must be understood as an interrogation of police perceptions of and attitudes toward the relationship between Muslim communities and the police service. The thematic analysis does not, therefore, definitively determine whether such perceptions and attitudes accurately represent the beliefs or experiences of Muslim citizens. Rather, it provides an insight into how police personnel, informed by their operational experiences, 8 construct a certain ‘reality’ (Berger and Luckmann, 1966) in respect of Muslim communities and how this, in turn, forms a basis for their professional decision-making. The thematic analysis of the qualitative interview data is presented below in three sections which each explore different aspects of engagement between constabularies and Muslim communities and citizens. In the first section, ‘breaking out’, we explore factors that are perceived to emanate from constabularies which make engagement with Muslim communities and citizens problematic. In the second section, ‘breaking in’, we consider certain problems and concerns relevant to Muslim communities that officers must be able to deal with in order to gain access to them. In the third section, ‘breaking through’, we examine factors that might facilitate and enhance engagement between the police service and Muslim communities and citizens. BREAKING OUT In this section we explore a number of factors that emanate from within constabularies that are understood by the police personnel that we interviewed to make engagement with Muslim communities and citizens problematic. We consider how the current organization and delivery of particular police services can generate suspicion and mistrust amongst Muslim communities, and go on to explore how this can encourage a culture of non-engagement between Muslim communities and constabularies which, in turn, may result in Muslim citizens choosing to adopt forms of self-policing. Police work breeds suspicion and mistrust Suspicion and mistrust of the police was a major concern of the police personnel we interviewed. As we explore below, our participants identified a number of policing policies, organizational behaviours, and officer attitudes, that they regarded as undermining trust in constabularies and stifling engagement with Muslim communities. Counter-terrorism and ‘Prevent’ Our participants expressed the concern – reflected in previous research (Briggs et al 2006, Spalek and Imtoual, 2007; McFadyen and Prideaux, 2014) – that British counter-terrorism 9 policing has raised suspicion, undermined trust, and depressed engagement between the police and Muslim communities and citizens. Participants tended to agree that this is because those in Muslim communities may feel that counter-terrorism officers are ‘spying’ on them or asking them to report on the activities of their peers or families. As an example of this, one of our participants described how persuading those in Muslim communities to give officers information about religious radicalisation was made difficult by suspicions that such information would be used to target specific individuals: So, it’s about building up a trust. Trust within the community. To say, ‘Listen, if you give us some information, it’s not going to lead to an arrest, it’s going to lead to other work which is more around the safeguarding world.’ So that’s what we do. But it’s been a real challenge with community, getting community referrals. (INT9) In light of such problems, and in order to alleviate community anxieties, the bulk of police engagement work with Muslim communities is conducted under the remit of neighbourhood policing rather than being linked explicitly to counter-terrorism policing (McFadyen and Prideaux 2011). However, in spite of this, participants drew attention to how the problem remains that many Muslim citizens are suspicious of what they regard as the ‘real agenda’ behind police engagement work. As one participant described it, many Muslim citizens respond to the engagement work carried out by neighbourhood police officers by saying: ‘You’re doing [something] tactically to us under the pretext of something else and we […] don’t trust you’ (INT6). Suspicion of the police among Muslim citizens may stem, in part, from the introduction and allocation of specific government funding designed to promote cooperation between the police and Muslim communities. The allocation of such funding to particular projects in Muslim communities – which has been organized on the basis of direct applications by Muslim faith-based organizations (usually Mosques) to constabularies – has been dependent on those who have received the funding engaging with ‘Prevent’ activities. Prevent is one aspect of the UK Government’s counter-terrorism strategy, ‘Contest’, and, although it is not uniquely a police programme, ‘understanding and cooperation between police and communities’ is at the heart of the Prevent strategy (HM Government, 2011, para 3.43). Participants regarded tying the allocation of resources designed to promote engagement with Muslim communities to Prevent to be an approach that risked alienating the very people the 10 funding is designed to win over (see also: Kundnani, 2009). For one, such an approach has ‘reinforced some of those beliefs, that actually it’s a bit smoke and mirrors here’ (INT6). Similarly, other government funding programmes related to preventing terrorism was seen to raise suspicion in Muslim communities. For example, in respect of a policy initiative announced by the former prime minister David Cameron (BBC News, 2016), which linked funding for English language classes for Muslim women to terrorism, one officer stated: ‘He [Cameron] made in his speeches the connection between that and terrorism, so straight away a certain community said why is terrorism and English and being Muslim all in the same sentence?’ (INT16). It has been recognized from the outset that a potent criticism of Prevent is that its anti- extremism agenda has been formulated by government rather than communities and that this, in turn, leads Muslim citizens to be suspicious that the Prevent agenda serves only the interests of state actors, such as the police, rather than themselves (Briggs et al 2006; Spalek and Imtoual, 2007; Innes et al, 2011). A focus upon policing potential extremism and terrorism in Muslim communities fails to acknowledge that these communities are often socially and economically deprived, that citizens are concerned about a wider range of problems other than terrorism, and that communities often require the police to help resolve these problems (Choudhury and Fenwick, 2011; Spalek and Imtoual, 2007; Spalek and MacDonald, 2010; Innes et al, 2011; O’Toole et al, 2013). Indeed, although the state has increasingly sought to engage with Muslim communities on the basis of an anti-terrorism agenda, many Muslim citizens view the priorities for state action at the local level in very different ways (Spalek and Imtoual, 2007; Choudhury and Fenwick, 2011; Innes et al, 2011). Our participants drew attention to this tension and stated that problems important to Muslim communities must be acknowledged and addressed if people in those communities are to be encouraged to turn their attention to matters of interest to the state: [I]n order to deal with one issue you need to deal with other issues […] [W]hat I mean by that is in order to deal with preventing violent extremism, actually the public want you to deal first of all with dog fouling and social behaviour, and the car which was damaged outside the mosque, and when you’ve done that, they actually might talk to you about something else. But you’re going to deal with these issues first. (INT14) 11 Such a view concurs with previous studies that have shown that many Muslim citizens feel that they are viewed by the police as members of a ‘suspect group’ which is itself the primary object of anti-terrorism policy and surveillance activities (Awan, 2012; Briggs et al, 2006; Chakraborti, 2007; Pantazis and Pemberton, 2009; Spalek, 2010; Choudhury and Fenwick, 2011; Spalek and McDonald 2010; O’Toole et al 2013). Therefore, as our participants explained, it is important for police officers to demonstrate that they are interested in helping to solve the wide range of problems experienced by many of those in Muslim communities: ‘it is difficult to engage with communities who have been tarnished or feel they are being victimised’ (INT16). The strong and enduring feeling of victimisation was seen by our participants to create a number of problems in respect of police engagement work. First, participants stated that many Muslim citizens and community organizations put up ‘barriers’ when officers seek to engage in respect of any subject: There’s definitely barriers as a police officer, because people are suspicious. So there might be barriers in relation to the media, there’s so much going on, there’s so much stuff in the media about terrorism, Islamophobia. So if you go to a mosque they’re so suspicious. (INT15) Second, participants agreed that the existence of barriers between the police and Muslim communities could lead to Muslim citizens being less likely to call on the police when they are victims of crime: ‘Because of everything that’s on the media, you know, we get the backlash, because we get basically painted with the same brush, “all the Muslims are terrorists, all the Muslims are this”, and they go, “well what can the police do?”’ (INT17). Third, participants stressed that, given the social context in which policing operates, most officers are anxious not to make problems worse: ‘Although the engagement is great, and any intelligence is great for the wider picture, we don’t want them to make their community feel even more in the spotlight’ (INT9). Illegitimacy and racism Barriers between the police and Muslim communities and citizens need to be understood within the context of the long-term legacy of accusations of police racism (Scarman, 1981; Macpherson, 1999). Our research participants, although critical of claims about the continued existence of racism in policing, believed that much police work is interpreted by Muslim 12 citizens through the lens of racism and that this can influence their willingness to engage with officers. Therefore, as Chakraborti (2007) notes, irrespective of the legitimacy of claims about Islamophobia in policing, the perception of many Muslim citizens that policing is inherently discriminatory has implications for their relations with the police (see also Tyler et al, 2010). In this respect, participants drew attention to how the characterisation of constabularies as bastions of ‘institutional racism’ (Macpherson, 1999) continues to cast a long shadow: ‘once you’re branded with that kind of name, “institutionally racist”, then everybody thinks, “Oh my god, the police are racist, I can’t possibly go to them for help, because they’re racist”’ (INT17). One officer described ‘battling, day in, day out’ with the idea that constabularies are institutionally racist but, despite this constant ‘battle’, expressed the view that perceptions of racism continue to taint the service and make engagement work difficult (INT8). As this officer elaborated: ‘[…] all the police force, all police service, is tainted. We’re racist and we’re useless. No we’re not, that’s ridiculous […] And that’s what we’re facing’ (INT8). The belief that the police service is racist can lead to problematic perceptions of the legitimacy of police actions. In turn, perceptions of whether police actions are legitimate have been shown to influence whether citizens cooperate with the police (Tyler et al, 2010). In this respect, participants drew attention to how some Muslim citizens, especially younger citizens, view the actions of police officers as illegitimate and that this influences their willingness to engage and, moreover, may influence the willingness of others in their social networks to engage. As one officer explained: ‘if I give somebody a ticket for not wearing a seatbelt, lo and behold they aren’t going to be too chuffed […] they go into the mosque or place of worship and they are talking [and] it has a ripple effect.’ (INT16) Similarly, another officer describes how ‘one thing happens to one person, and it’s amazing how quickly that information, or misinformation, is then passed to the rest of the community members’ (INT7). These are examples of how routine police actions, such as the issuing of a fixed penalty notice for a driving related offence, can produce a ‘ripple effect’ in Muslim communities and cause the spread of ‘misinformation’ about the police. The key concern of our participants is that the essence of the ‘information’ that ‘ripples’ out is that the police service is racist. 13 Under policing and being let down Although concerns about the impact of over policing – especially by way of counter- terrorism activities – were a strong characteristic of our participants’ accounts of police engagement with Muslim communities, some participants also expressed concerns about the problematic impact on engagement work created by the under policing of Muslim communities. These concerns are perhaps unsurprising given that Muslims communities often suffer from high levels of victimisation – especially in respect of religiously motivated hate crime – high levels of fear of crime, and low confidence in the police (Chakraborti, 2007). Such problems have been exacerbated by the events of ‘9/11’ and ‘7/7’ which have had the effect of increasing fear of victimisation, strengthening perceptions of vulnerability, and reducing well-being in Muslim communities (Chakraborti, 2007). Our participants drew particular attention to the police response to religiously motivated hate crimes committed against Muslim citizens – which they recognized had not always been satisfactory – and how this has influenced the attitudes of Muslim citizens towards the police and created a lack of willingness to engage with officers. For example, when talking about the sudden disbandment of a specialist hate crime unit in one constabulary – which reportedly happened without consultation and no explanation from senior officers – participants drew attention to how ‘a lot of the community were quite angry about it, and we got the brunt of that’ (INT11). This officer stated that the consequence of the closure of this ‘specialised unit who could oversee officers and advise officers’ was that ‘all that skill and knowledge is gone’ which, in turn, means that if you’ve got an officer who goes to a person who’s a victim of hate crime, they, they’re limited to what support they can offer them, and they perhaps don’t have the full knowledge of the impact of that crime on that individual. Because it’s a very personal crime, if someone calls you names because you’re white or black or because of religion, people don’t comprehend why they’re being targeted. (INT11) This officer, like other participants, pointed out how under policing, illustrated here by the withdrawal of specialist services, can make communities ‘quite angry’ and that this can result in individuals being less willing to engage with the police. 14 Foreign nationals The problem of suspicion and mistrust of the police in Muslim communities was seen by our participants to be particularly acute among non-British nationals. This is because, as many participants explained, foreign nationals may have negative perceptions of policing which originate from their experiences of law enforcement in jurisdictions beyond the UK. To illustrate this, noting that perceptions of the police ‘depends [on] what area they’ve come from’ and ‘what kind of experiences they’ve had’, one officer stated: ‘It’s not a problem with us, but what their ideas are and what they think’ (INT7). Or, as another officer put it when describing ‘distrust of the police’: ‘people migrated to Britain from Pakistan, and there’s very little trust in the Pakistan police force, and they bring those prejudice over, and transfer them to the British police force’ (INT9). These negative perceptions of British police officers, born from cultures of policing in other jurisdictions, were seen to potentially make engagement work with non-British nationals in Muslim communities extremely difficult. Cultures of non-engagement and self-policing Whilst, as we noted above, there has been increasing participation of Muslim citizens in state institutions and public life in the UK, our research participants drew attention to what they regarded as an enduring culture of non-engagement between Muslim citizens and constabularies. In discussing this, participants frequently referred to what they regarded as the difficulties in engaging Muslim women: ‘You know, it’s far more complicated, you can’t just steam in like we do, you know, for the white British ladies, it’s just, it’s not as easy as that’ (INT18). One of the key reasons given by our participants for why ‘it’s not as easy’ to engage Muslim women was the difficulty of engaging with women through mosques. Participants described a wide range of obstacles that they had encountered when trying to engage with women who attend mosques in their constabularies. A female officer, for example, noted that whilst she had access to a small budget that could be used to organize crime prevention events for Muslim women, the process of getting access to these women via local mosques could be very frustrating (INT15). To illustrate this, she described how she might find it difficult to gain access to the contact details for those leading the women’s groups at the mosque and, even if she acquired such information, how she might then be asked to request permission from the mosque committee. The mosque committee, she said, might ask her to speak to the imam who, in turn, might request that the women’s husbands were consulted. 15 The outcome of these negotiations, this officer told us, may be influenced by the gender of the officers engaging with the mosque. In this respect, she stated, male officers may be more likely to gain access to women’s groups in mosques because the mosque committee will say ‘actually, you’re probably better getting [a male colleague] to speak to the imam, to ask permission for you to go to the women’s group’ (INT15). However, if a male officer manages to negotiate such access he can then subsequently encounter difficulties when attempting to communicate directly with women. For example, a male officer told us: ‘as soon as I walk in and there is ladies straightaway covering their faces, and they turn their backs to me and that kind of thing, that is a lot more difficult to break down, because that is a cultural difference’ (INT20). Officers, both male and female, regarded the restrictions they face at mosques to be frustrating but they told us that they put their personal views aside in order to achieve the desired outcome of gaining access: ‘you know, we get that, we get in there and I get that level of service, then I have to put my own frustrations aside’ (INT15). This officer noted that, even when access is gained, there are some crime-related matters, such as female genital mutilation (FGM) or domestic violence, which those in mosques may be especially resistant to discussing with the police: [I]t’s very hard to go into groups and say, ‘I’m here, I’m from the police, one of the things we are interested in talking about is FGM’ [….] and through a traditional cultural background, if the husbands know that that’s what the talk is about, that’s what the group is about, it won’t engage (INT15). The only way of dealing with the limitations imposed by ‘traditional culture’, as this officer told us, is to build up trust and confidence in policing over time: ‘For me, I think the most important [thing for] people is to have that, a little bit of confidence, and by having confidence is a bit about knowing you and seeing, actually seeing, somebody’ (INT15). Although building confidence in policing through engagement with mosques is regarded as vital, officers are aware of the need to be constantly ‘sensitive’ when dealing with particular crime-related problems. For example, one officer described how she would be very careful when giving a talk about domestic violence to a group of women in a mosque: 16 You have to pretend it’s... I didn’t say it was domestic violence when I went to do the talk. ‘Healthy relationships’, I think, or I don’t even think I termed it quite as... I can’t remember what I termed it as, because if for a minute the men thought the women were going to that, that is family honour, we’re done, so. (INT18) ‘Family honour’, as this officer notes, is a cultural matter that officers must be sensitive to if they are to engage with Muslim women in respect of crimes such as domestic violence. Participants were clear that officers must find ways of persuading Muslim women with ‘traditional’ views that matters relating to ‘family life’ fall within the ambit of public policing. Participants acknowledged, however, that this is extremely difficult because for reasons such as honour, pride, embarrassment, and fear, ‘they will try to sort it out within their mosque’ (INT20). The response of Muslim citizens and their community organizations to attempt to ‘sort out’ crime-related problems themselves means that, according to our participants, Muslim citizens are engaging in forms of self-policing. One officer explained such self-policing in the following terms: ‘I think that’s born out of they think maybe the police won’t understand or sometimes it can almost be a little bit of embarrassment that this issue is happening in our community, we will deal with it ourselves’ (INT15). Our participants saw it as incumbent on the police, therefore, to ‘go out there in the community and speak to these people and try to build their confidence and their trust’ (INT17) in order to encourage Muslim citizens to engage with constabularies. This continued engagement is vital because, using the example of attempting to persuade Muslim women to report domestic violence, one officer explained: I’ve been to enough domestics in my time where I’ve seen they’ve been whipped with belts but they haven’t talked to me, they’ve kind of gone and they’ve shown me […] I just think that’s dreadful, I think it’s dreadful that domestic violence full stop is…, but I think the fact that they don’t feel they’ve got access, they don’t trust us necessarily. (INT18) However, building confidence and trust in the police service among Muslim citizens in this way was seen as far from straightforward. To illustrate, participants stated they felt a constant conflict of interest between building trust and facilitating engagement on the one hand and, on the other hand, following constabulary guidelines and enforcing the criminal law. For example, positive action policies in respect of domestic violence encourage officers to arrest 17 a criminal suspect where such action can be justified (HMIC, 2014). However, our participants believed that following such a policy might make women less likely to engage with the police in the future. This leaves officers, as they told us, in a ‘Catch 22’ situation because their attempt to positively protect Muslim citizens can frustrate their attempts to build up trust. Such a situation can be compounded when Muslim citizens – women in particular – are made vulnerable as a consequence of social isolation, unclear immigration status, and poor English language skills. BREAKING IN In this section we explore a number of factors that our participants say must be negotiated in order for successful engagement between the police service and Muslim communities to take place. We consider the ‘risk’ that participants associated with working with Muslim communities, the importance they attached to officers’ understanding of religion, and the significance they placed on the personal commitment and longevity of officers working with Muslim communities. Officer conception of ‘risk’ Previous research has shown that matters relating to religion, as one aspect of the diversity agenda within British policing, are often understood by officers to give rise to ‘unpredictable’ or ‘unreasonable’ risks (McFadyen and Prideaux, 2014: 608). Our participants identified a range of risks that officers associated with religion, many of which relate to officers’ anxieties about engaging with Muslim citizens and communities in ways that might be deemed ‘wrong’ and liable to get them into trouble. Many participants drew attention to how officers were frightened of offending Muslim citizens. To illustrate, one officer noted: ‘We’re often scared because we don’t want to offend, or we don’t want to say the wrong thing’ (INT10). For another: ‘Well, I think officers are frightened when it comes to dealing with certain communities. I think there’s a culture of the fear of doing something wrong’ (INT9). As McFadyen and Prideaux (2014) argue, such fear appears to be, in part, motivated by diversity agendas in constabularies that stress that officers must avoid causing offence to and demonstrate sensitivity towards minority communities. In attempting to observe diversity agendas, officers fear that ‘doing something wrong’ may lead to disciplinary action and this, in turn, creates anxiety and a reluctance to engage. 18 Indeed, our participants drew attention to how this type of anxiety tinges many aspects of operational police work. For example, the following extract illustrates how officers may be concerned about whether or not to take off their boots when entering Muslim households: I’ve had examples of officers going on emergency work, and asking should they take their boots off when they go into someone’s house. Now if you’re on an emergency call, your safety is primary, and then the individuals you’re going to is secondary. Taking off your boots negates both of those, and it’s about officers feeling, having the confidence to say ‘no, this is what I need to do’. They are quite frightened with dealing with certain BME communities. (INT9) It is clear from this, and from other examples provided to us by our participants, that officers can be anxious about offending Muslim citizens and, as a consequence, this can sometimes lead them to behave inappropriately in certain crime-related situations. Our participants said that addressing the anxieties among officers about the risks associated with engaging with Muslim communities was therefore essential. Understanding Islam Many of our participants stated that most police officers have a limited understanding of Islam and that this can create problems when they attempt to engage with Muslim communities. Our participants agreed that this limited understanding of Islam relates not just to scriptural matters but also to broader cultural issues relevant to diverse Muslim populations. This was seen to be problematic and participants were unanimous that it is necessary for officers to have at least some understanding of the detail of the communities […] and it’s about, it includes things like where abouts they’re from in Pakistan, the regions they’re from in Pakistan and the differences that brings about culturally. The difference in their faith, different strands of Islam itself, so yeah, understand those complexities really. (INT10) As the following extract indicates, understanding geo-cultural differences among Muslim communities in the UK was viewed as important for understanding differences between Muslim citizens at the local level: ‘Just because they are Muslim doesn’t mean to say they are 19 all going to get on. There is different sets within Muslims, and we have learnt that as well’ (INT20). Being aware of these differences within Islam and between Muslim communities was thought by participants to help officers identify tensions and to navigate them in order to facilitate engagement. Many of our participants stressed that being attentive to dimensions of ‘culture’ was paramount when trying to understand the dynamics of Muslim communities. To illustrate, when describing divisions among particular groups of people in Muslim communities one officer noted that: ‘I think faith has played its role in those divisions but I think underpinning it all is culture and tradition’ (INT16). Our participants were aware that many officers struggle to ‘unpick’ matters of culture and faith and that this is an area where we need to do more work in policing, […] to untangle and to make people feel more confident that sometimes it isn’t a religious issue, it’s a cultural issue dressed up as a religious issue, and therefore we are not being religiously insensitive or faith group insensitive by challenging something that is a cultural norm, that is also not acceptable. (INT2) To expand on this, in respect of domestic violence, one officer explained that it ‘is always an interesting issue, because in some faiths and communities domestic violence is seen as less of a taboo than in others, is sometimes seen as far more acceptable in some communities than others’ (INT1). The perception that domestic violence may be ‘far more acceptable’ in Muslim communities was understood by participants, as the following extract illustrates, to generate a certain amount of confusion in respect of how best to respond: [W]e had a case where a man had beaten his wife up and said, ‘well, it’s allowed in the Koran’, and the officer was then in a bit of a quandary, because she didn’t know whether what he was saying was correct, she didn’t really know if that was a proper reason why you could hit your wife, and then she was also worried about offending the chap. And so that issue came up, and obviously, I’m not an expert on the Koran, but my Muslim colleagues will say no, the Koran doesn’t allow that. (INT11) Our participants saw improving officers’ understanding of faith and its link to cultural relations to be vital to successful engagement with and policing of Muslim communities. 20 Personal commitment, longevity, and trust Previous research has shown that police engagement with Muslim citizens is often reliant on relationships built up between police officers and gatekeepers in Muslim communities over time (Innes, 2006; Choudhury and Fenwick, 2011). Our participants similarly stressed that police engagement with Muslim citizens is reliant upon trusted relationships being established between a small numbers of police officers and gatekeepers in Muslim communities – with gatekeepers usually being located in mosques. Such relationships were seen as important by our participants because they can help overcome negative perceptions of the police in the wider community and encourage citizens to engage with police officers (see also Innes, 2006). To illustrate, one officer stated: I mean it’s not just the Muslim culture, I’m sure it’s all walks of life, but it’s the classic thing of, ‘oh the police are all a bunch of arseholes, but you’re alright [officer’s name], or you’re alright [officer’s name]’, or whatever the case may be; ‘you’re not like the rest of them’. (INT12) Many of our participants made similar statements and the importance of maintaining ‘personal’ relationships between key officers and Muslim communities was consistently stressed. Such relationships were said to establish the trust between officers and communities that is necessary to facilitate meaningful dialogue and the exchange of information. Strong trust relationships between police officers and Muslim communities are generally forged over long periods of time: ‘The key to my role is longevity, you can’t, you can’t knock up at a mosque, knock on the door and ask a question, because you’ll get an answer of, “there’s no problem here, the issue is somewhere else”’ (INT9). This extract serves to illustrate the point, repeatedly made by participants, that officers who are unknown to those in mosques will face difficulties when trying to engage, whereas an officer who has a long- term relationship with a mosque will more easily gain access. For example, one officer explained: ‘It [access] only works usually with continued engagement. If you go once or twice then they get to know your face a little bit, but if you keep going and going and going…’ (INT20). This illustrates the point that repeated and consistent engagement with a community and its organizations is necessary to establish the relationships needed to facilitate information sharing. Consequently, as this officer explained to us, ‘for an officer who goes 21 into neighbourhood policing and works six weeks and goes into another community, and then moves on, often it’s very difficult to create those links, those partnership working and getting the trust from certain people out there’ (INT19). However, several participants told us that the importance of maintaining long-term relationships was not well understood within constabularies. Participants explained that police service managers were often unable or unwilling (because of financial or other resourcing pressures) to maintain officers in particular engagement roles over long periods of time. As a consequence, participants described how some officers seek to maintain the relationships they have built up with communities ‘in their own time’, outside of their formal roles, because they regard these relationships to be of considerable importance. Although participants saw close relationships between key officers and Muslim communities as essential for facilitating police engagement, they also viewed such relationships as potentially problematic. One problematic aspect identified by participants related to how those in Muslim communities might become ‘over reliant’ upon particular trusted individuals and willing to deal only with them (see also Choudhury and Fenwick, 2011). This, our participants noted, can be particularly problematic in emergency situations. For example, one officer described the problems that arose from one incident: ‘There was a bomb threat made to the mosque, and that phone call came through to me. Thankfully I was working, because if I’m at home […] my phone is off. But they didn’t call the police because, to them, I was the police’ (INT12). Because to those in the mosque this officer represented ‘the police’ they, faced with a bomb threat, contacted him via his mobile phone rather than dial 999 to ask for emergency assistance. This problem of over reliance on individual officers is exacerbated when individuals leave their posts in communities. In such cases, contacts are severed and, in the absence of a personal link to the police service, Muslim citizens may choose not to contact constabularies when they face crime problems. BREAKING THROUGH In this section we consider a number of our participants’ ideas about how to enhance police service engagement with Muslim communities and address the complexities involved in doing so. We examine ideas relating to how better understanding of religion among officers might be generated, how to encourage officers to better interpersonally engage with Muslim citizens, and the role of Muslim officers in engagement work. 22 Generating understanding Our participants agreed that if engagement between the police service and Muslim citizens is to be enhanced, police officers must be equipped with an awareness of the key issues that concern Muslim communities. Police officers are currently provided with training, briefings, and opportunities to interact with faith groups as part of their probation and on-going training. However, our participants told us that there are limits to gaining knowledge about Muslim communities through formal, structured forms of training and that understanding of faith groups is most likely to be gained experientially (see also McFadyen and Prideaux, 2014). This is undoubtedly true since the issues facing Muslim communities are so broad and diverse that, as one officer put it, ‘if you try to cover everything [in training], it is impossible, when you look at all the different themes out there and all the different communities’ (INT20). Participants tended to see it as the responsibility of officers to educate themselves about Islam and Muslim communities: ‘it’s a bit like I imagine academia, you read for a university degree, you are not taught it’ (INT16). For this officer, then, what is important is that all police officers should have an ‘interest in picking up a national paper, watching the news, what’s on the Internet and so forth’ (INT16). Participants indicated, however, that many police officers are not generally motivated to ‘educate themselves’ about Muslim (and other) faith communities and that a continued lack of understanding amongst officers may undermine engagement between constabularies and faith groups. Treating people with respect and delivering a service As we explored above, treating people with respect, sensitivity, and empathy was seen as essential in driving engagement between constabularies and Muslim communities. However, our participants also told us that officers must be willing to show an active interest in aspects of Muslim communities and, as such, should enquire and ask questions about faith. One officer put it like this: ‘There’s no point pretending you’re going to understand and know everything there is to know, so you just go and […] be curious and ask questions’ (INT10). Or, as another stated: It’s just really getting out there in the community […] if you don’t go out and speak to people you’re never going to, you’re not going to understand what their issues are 23 within that community. It’s alright you sitting here thinking or assuming what’s going on, but until you go out there… (INT17) In other words, engagement should be respectful but this should not be translated into a ‘hands off’ approach. Respect, participants stated, must be balanced with active engagement: ‘we go along, we are quite open, we explain what we do, and if we need to ask a question we will ask it. And a lot of officers are sometimes a little bit frightened of doing that’ (INT20). Our participants stressed that officers must be supported in overcoming being ‘a little bit frightened’ if engagement with Muslim communities is to succeed. Our participants also stressed that engagement is more likely to succeed when constabularies deliver a ‘good service’ to communities, including Muslim communities, rather than a ‘specific service’. Whilst awareness of and attention to certain unique cultural or social needs was viewed as important, it was seen as more important to ensure that Muslim communities, like all other sections of society, receive a consistent, respectful and good quality service from the police. In discussing this, participants stressed that short-term or ‘gimmicky’ interventions are best avoided. For example, one officer described what he regarded as the problem of encouraging officers to learn multiple conversational greetings in minority languages as a way of facilitating engagement: I've seen senior officers, their solution was we should have a handbook and give it to every officer to greet somebody in Punjabi […] or whatever and I think, well hang on a second, what about, are you going to tell them to speak in German, in French and greetings in whatever language, you are not really going to get to that because that book will be too big and officers won't be able to cope. (INT16) As this quote suggests, such approaches were regarded as gimmicks, not long-term solutions, and, at best, merely a means of papering over problems and complexities. Role of Muslim officers For participants, ‘[putting] your own house in order’ (INT7) was one way of generating greater understanding of and engagement with Muslim communities. In this respect, improving the diversity of constabularies was seen to be of primary importance (see also 24 Macpherson, 1999). As a senior officer stated: ‘I just think to myself if we’re not fair, transparent and inclusive of people, be it faith, be it anything, any protected characteristic, then how on earth are we expecting our people to operate that way with the people they’re coming to terms with’ (INT1). Recruiting, encouraging, and supporting officers of faith was therefore seen as vital (for a discussion of the challenges involved in increasing police recruitment of Muslim citizens, see: Awan, Blakemore and Simpson, 2013). Participants drew attention to the importance of support networks and organizations for officers of faith, the need to facilitate and encourage the practice of religious rituals (such as prayer) whilst on duty, and the need to support liaison officers in raising awareness of matters of faith: ‘this is about recognizing that actually police officers have faith and police officers are part of that community, so why would we not be inclusive of that’ (INT1). However, whilst increasing diversity and inclusivity in the police service is generally regarded as desirable, it is not necessarily seen to lead to more effective engagement with ‘hard-to-reach’ communities. Previous research has shown, for example, that there are both positive and negative aspects of deploying officers to carry out work with citizens on the basis of shared faith (McFadyen and Prideaux, 2011). Whilst the personal faith of an officer can be a resource on which he or she can draw when seeking to engage, it can also create challenges and conflicts of interest. For example, officers with a particular faith may be expected to experts in that faith, or to be the medium for all contact with a wider faith community, and, as a result, may become inappropriately or excessively utilized by constabularies (McFadyen and Prideaux, 2011). Our participants were aware of the complexity surrounding the position of Muslim officers in their constabularies. They pointed out that some Muslim officers possess language skills, social experience, and cultural understanding that can facilitate engagement between the police service and Muslim communities. They also stated that Muslim officers might have an interest in working with Muslim communities. As one Muslim participant explained about her engagement work with Muslim communities: ‘I feel so passionate about it […] I wanted to join the police to help the community […] so I’ve kind of been lucky to fall into this role’ (INT17). However, this participant also noted that her faith did not guarantee her access to communities ‘because when you talk about Muslims or Hindus or Sikhs, when you start breaking it down, there’s different types of Muslims, different types of Sikhs and if you’re not part of that religion or that group you don’t really know’ (INT17) (for a discussion of 25 how diversity in and between ‘minority’ religious groups creates challenges for policing, see: Sian, 2013). This participant, like others, also stressed that non-Muslim officers can engage with Muslim communities under the right conditions – notably, as we explored above, when officers proceed sensitively, are willing to learn, and persist in a role over time. Indeed, the dominant view among our participants was that the way that officers treated people is more important than their own personal faith. Matching Muslim officers to Muslim communities was not seen as the panacea to breaking down barriers to engagement. CONCLUSION This article has provided a critical insight, from the perspective of police personnel, into the considerable challenges that constabularies face in creating and sustaining productive engagement with Muslim communities and citizens. Such engagement, as we have shown, is fraught with difficulties and characterised by complexities. Indeed, although such engagement is now a dominant aspect of counter-terrorism policing in the UK, it has the potential to erect and sustain, rather than remove, barriers between constabularies and Muslim communities and citizens. Whilst it is clear that the importance of sustained engagement between constabularies and Muslim communities is acknowledged, too little has been done to support and integrate engagement activities into mainstream policing. The difficulties and complexities identified by police personnel – which are multi-faceted and arise from both within and beyond the police service – must be comprehended and resolved if the laudable aim of improving police engagement with Muslim communities and citizens is to succeed. The perceptions of police personnel discussed in this article may, we suggest, provide the basis for a wider research and practice agenda in policing designed to improve engagement with Muslim communities. Although the findings presented in this article are based on research undertaken with a relatively small sample, which means they may not be representative of the entire spectrum of views and opinions of all UK police personnel, the police personnel who comprised the samples can be seen as ‘key informants’ or ‘organisational proxies’ who can be expected to have a good understanding of the issues discussed. Furthermore, as we noted above, whilst the perceptions and attitudes of police personnel may not reflect the beliefs or experiences of Muslim citizens, they nevertheless provide an important insight into how police personnel comprehend and approach engagement work. Understanding the challenges of police engagement with Muslim 26 communities and citizens from the standpoint of police personnel provides the basis for a number of recommendations, which we summarize and consider below. First, to ‘break out’ of the constraints that emanate from within constabularies and make engagement with Muslim communities and citizens problematic the police service will need to find more effective ways of addressing suspicion and mistrust among those in Muslim communities. Indeed, there is a clear need to better understand what engagement strategies are effective in generating cooperation between police and Muslim communities. Similarly, there is a need to better understand how certain strategies might actively hinder engagement with certain citizens such as, for example, Muslim women, who have frequently been side- lined by existing strategies (Spalek et al, 2008). Crucially, then, the police service needs to focus on finding better ways of building the trust of all Muslim citizens in policing and, specifically, in counter-terrorism policing. There is a need to invest more resources in strategies that seek to reach out to and work in tandem with Muslim communities to develop and implement anti-terrorism policies and to understand how these operate. For example, the anti-terrorism agenda has been criticised for failing to understand the nature of Muslim identities in the UK and, as a consequence, perpetuating a problematic link between faith, extremism and radicalisation (Spalek and Imtoual, 2007; Spalek and MacDonald, 2010). An exploration of how it may be possible to engender a more socially inclusive approach among police officers that acknowledges multiple Muslim identities and facilitates a wider appreciation of diversity among Muslim populations would be welcome. However, it is clear that promoting trust in policing among Muslim citizens will only be achieved when constabularies are able to demonstrate the elimination of ‘institutional racism’ in the delivery of services more broadly. One key way this can be achieved is by ensuring the effective and consistent delivery of police services to Muslim communities. Building trust in policing through the ‘fair’ delivery of services to Muslim communities is necessary to combat cultures of non-engagement with constabularies. Officers therefore need to be encouraged and feel empowered to proactively engage with Muslim communities in order to enhance the belief among Muslim citizens that the police service can and will positively respond when crime or other issues arise. In addition, it must be understood that police engagement practices do not occur within a vacuum and issues arising from international socio-political events, as well as national changes in social and economic policy, influence whether Muslim citizens are willing to engage with the police. Although engagement is clearly influenced by a wide range 27 of social and political factors, little is known about, for example, how exogenous factors, such as war or foreign policy, influence street-level engagement between police and Muslim communities. Improving understanding of how such factors can undermine the generation of effective engagement would be welcome. Second, to ‘break in’ to Muslim communities it is necessary for constabularies to address a strong perception among officers that engaging with Muslim citizens poses certain significant ‘risks’. Officers are clearly hesitant, given the potential for their actions to be perceived as racist, to engage in situations where they feel they may make interactional mistakes. Constabularies therefore need to acknowledge such anxieties and positively encourage officers to overcome any ‘risk aversion’ they feel. One reason such risk aversion exists is because of a lack of understanding of Islam among officers. This lack of understanding is not confined to ‘scriptural’ matters but encompasses social and cultural issues specific to Muslim communities and, moreover, the ways in which religion and culture inform each other. Constabularies should also ensure that long-term links are developed and maintained between Muslim communities by, for instance, resourcing engagement officers to remain in posts long-term. Moreover, they should champion those officers who have the personal commitment to maintaining long-term engagement activities as a means of building trust in the police service and regard such championing as a means to encourage a similar commitment in others. Because trust between the police and communities appears to be dependent on relationships built between particular individuals, and because the success of these relationships seems to depend on the ‘personality’ and commitment of individual officers (Choudhury and Fenwick, 2011; see also Innes 2006), consideration should be given to the ‘qualities’ that police officers need to have in order to sustain engagement. Harnessing and extending those qualities within police engagement strategies among a greater range of police personnel could avoid those in Muslim communities over-relying on particular police personnel and feeling ‘let down’ when such personnel are not available. Finally, to ‘break through’ barriers preventing engagement between constabularies and Muslim communities we think that there are a number of practical actions that constabularies can take. One key priority for constabularies should be to develop new strategies for encouraging opportunities for officers to gain greater understanding, through experiential rather than formal learning, of matters relating to Muslim (and other faith) communities. 28 Another priority should be to encourage officers to engage with Muslim communities in ways that balance respectful, sensitive and empathic interaction with quizzical and active interest. Officers need to be encouraged not to feel ‘frightened’ of showing to those in Muslim communities that they may lack awareness of a wide range of community-specific issues but are open and willing to learn. In other words, officers should be encouraged not to paper over problems or complexities that arise from interaction with Muslim communities but seek to confront them in an open and frank manner. Clearly, this already takes place in constabularies in a number of formalized ways but officers need to be encouraged to engage in candid communication in day-to-day operational activities without fearing they will offend. Constabularies also need to think critically about the role of Muslim officers, how to support these officers, and whether deploying Muslim officers to work in Muslim communities enhances engagement between the police service and Muslim citizens. Further empirical examination of the position of Muslim officers within police organisations and exploration of how their social and cultural capital enables them to build partnerships with particular sections of the Muslim population (Spalek et al, 2008) would be welcome. 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work_zcbiehnrrbfttalwj4s6eebkve	----	Cronfa - Swansea University Open Access Repository _____________________________________________________________ This is an author produced version of a paper published in : Race & Class Cronfa URL for this paper: http://cronfa.swan.ac.uk/Record/cronfa33861 _____________________________________________________________ Paper: Burnett, J. (2017). Racial violence and the Brexit state. Race & Class, 58(4), 85-97. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0306396816686283 _____________________________________________________________ This article is brought to you by Swansea University. Any person downloading material is agreeing to abide by the terms of the repository licence. Authors are personally responsible for adhering to publisher restrictions or conditions. When uploading content they are required to comply with their publisher agreement and the SHERPA RoMEO database to judge whether or not it is copyright safe to add this version of the paper to this repository. http://www.swansea.ac.uk/iss/researchsupport/cronfa-support/ http://cronfa.swan.ac.uk/Record/cronfa33861 http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0306396816686283 http://www.swansea.ac.uk/iss/researchsupport/cronfa-support/ Racial violence and the Brexit state Whatever else Brexit means or does not mean, it certainly means racism. Born of fortuitous circumstances, lacking programme or policy, the government has had to find its ‘mandate’ in the twin Brexit themes: that immigration is unravelling of the nation, and anything foreign, except investment, is abhorrent to its ethos – thus giving a fillip to popular racism and elevating institutional racism to fully-fledged state racism. Of course there were signs of state racism from the time of the first Immigration Act in 1962, but these were counterbalanced by anti-discrimination legislation and community programmes – and for a while the way was opened to a truly multicultural society, the foremost in Europe, and its exemplar. The difference today is that racism and xenophobia have become tied into the state itself, making nativism the state ideology and ‘take back control’ its political culture. In the post-referendum period, racial violence and harassment, as this report graphically shows, became widespread and brazen. But in going along with the dominant narrative, the government reduced racial violence, a socially-based issue, to individualised ‘hate crime’. And in so siphoning off racism and racial violence to the terrain of law and order, the government conceals its complicity in creating state racism. The struggle then is on two levels, both at once: against state racism and against ‘hate crime’. A. Sivanandan The explosion of racist violence that followed the announcement of the EU referendum result on 24 June 2016 has been well documented. Though the political direction of travel in the UK on issues of immigration, race, religion and refugee policy has largely been disconnected from that violence, the sheer level of racist abuse and attacks could not be ignored. Home Secretary Amber Rudd, launching a hate crime strategy a few days after the referendum, declared that hate crimes were ‘utterly unacceptable’ and must be ‘stamped out’. Former Prime Minister David Cameron described the situation as ‘despicable’,1 whilst the new one, Theresa May, said that hate ‘has no place in the UK’.2 For Metropolitan Police Chief Bernard Hogan-Howe, the 2,300 (plus) racist incidents reported to the police in the thirty-eight days after the referendum, were a ‘horrible spike’.3 The Institute of Race Relations’ thesis is that the spike in race hatred has had a direct impetus from the divisive approach to race, religion and migration which is now official policy. To put it simply, if a hostile environment is embedded politically, why should we be surprised when it takes root culturally? What do hate crimes tell us about the culture of the country we are living in, and is it possible to trace a relationship between ‘hate’, media frameworks, government policy and institutional practices? These are the questions we seek to answer in our examination of post-referendum racial violence.4 The legitimation of racial violence In the aftermath of the EU referendum, incidents of racist abuse began to be shared on social media almost immediately, with several online platforms being set up specifically to collate and document the extent. Long-established advocacy and campaigning organisations also noted sharp increases in the number of incidents being reported to them, as well as requests for support. A few weeks after the referendum, for example, The Monitoring Group brought hundreds of people together in London in order to ‘respond, address and move forward’ in a ‘hostile and racially charged Britain’.5 Meanwhile, the Bristol-based Stand Against Racism and Inequality (SARI) revealed that more people were approaching it for advice, and Just West Yorkshire later called for an audit of ‘race hate crime arrangements’ because of concerns about the response to violence and abuse in the region.6 The police, meanwhile, were producing regular statistics on hate crime, and there was an intense media focus on racist violence in the UK, with particularly brutal incidents receiving blanket coverage.  In the first four days after the referendum, 85 hate crimes were reported to True Vision – a police-funded online reporting mechanism – compared to 57 in the same period four weeks earlier.  In the seven days after the referendum, the National Police Chiefs’ Council (NPCC), which runs the True Vision online reporting mechanism, received 331 allegations of hate crimes, compared with a weekly average of 63.7  In the fortnight after the result, British Transport Police (BTP) received 119 allegations of racist abuse or violence taking place on British railways.8  Between 24 June and 2 July, 599 racist incidents were reported to Scotland Yard: an average of 67 per day, compared to 44 per day prior to the referendum.9  Between 16 June and 30 June, more than 3,000 hate crimes were reported to the police across the UK: a 42% increase on the same period in 2015.10 Whilst the majority of the 134 incidents examined were incidents of racist abuse, they also included physical assaults, arson attacks, death threats and stabbings. Several people were hospitalised. Most of these incidents were in England; and whilst the most frequent ‘targets’ were European migrants (particularly eastern European migrants) and Muslims, these were not the only people targeted. There were incidents against black people. Jewish people were targeted. People were singled out for attack on the basis of speaking a foreign language, or presumptions about their ‘right’ to be here. Children were amongst those who received abuse, sometimes travelling to or from school. Fifty-one of the incidents included references either explicitly to the EU referendum and its outcome, or the messages that it conveyed (such as ‘taking the country back’). And there has been a distinct intensification of particular forms of racist violence which link to it. 1. The referendum result was taken by some as affirmation that the country was not only now ‘theirs’, but that it was theirs ‘again’. In this way, there was a sense of history being corrected and of historical wrongs (immigration, primarily) being righted. One person for example, who racially abused a woman in London, referred to ‘this lot’ having lost the election, and that it was time for them to ‘go back’ out of ‘our country’. Another person was asked if he was from the EU and then told to ‘fuck off back to your country’ and to ‘get the fuck out of our country’. One person who was assaulted was chased by his attacker first, who also shouted ‘go back home you fucking immigrant’. 2. The referendum was envisaged as a sign that a set of assumed legal and cultural ‘norms’ could be reasserted. Thus, for example, in one incident a woman walking with her 9-year-old daughter was approached by a man who racially abused her, ripped off her niqab and reportedly told her ‘You’re in Britain, live by British rules’. In another, a threat of anti-Muslim violence was accompanied by the message that there is only ‘one law’ in the UK, and that the victim had to ‘abide by it’. An eastern European woman was reduced to tears by a man telling her to ‘Just go home. We voted you out. You will have to leave the country soon’. When she threatened to call the police, the man’s response was to tell her to call ‘whoever you want’ as this is ‘our country, our law’. What these and other incidents pointed to was the manner in which the referendum fostered a notion that a set of institutional norms, which had been subverted by the presence and management of ‘diversity’, could now be re- established. 3. The racist violence that was legitimised was underpinned by a racism tied to ‘entitlement’. The racist abuse of one person mistakenly assumed to be a Polish national, who was told ‘we only tolerate you lot because of the income you bring in’, indicated a form of racism within which people were only accepted in the UK on the basis that they brought skills/capital. In another, a homeless migrant was deliberately picked out and assaulted, in part because he was homeless. Here was a very clear message: outsiders are acceptable only when profitable. 4. Voting or visibly campaigning for the UK to remain in Europe was taken by some to be a form of betrayal. In a few isolated cases, people from BAME communities were targeted after the referendum result seemingly because they had actively campaigned prior to it. One locally prominent ‘Remain’ campaigner found that the windows of his business had been smashed; another activist was accosted and told to ‘get out the country’. 5. Anti-migrant and anti-Muslim racism, in particular, intersected in the context of the EU referendum. The EU referendum, of course, did not create racism. Rather, the campaign drew on and fed into existing forms of racism, particularly Islamophobia, whilst underpinning forms of racism of its own. As our sample illustrates, the range of people targeted was broad, and in around two-thirds of the incidents, the victims were Muslims or eastern European migrants. This should not be surprising. For in the context of a referendum which in many ways became a proxy for a debate about who should or should not be in the UK, and if so under what conditions, anti-Muslim racism and anti-migrant racism intersected. In both cases, the targets have been portrayed routinely as societal antibodies. In both cases, they are regarded as undermining and irreversibly transforming the cultural and political basis of the nation. For Muslim communities the debate, over the last few years, about British values in the context of counter radicalisation measures, has led to a situation in which Muslims as a whole are presented as holding values antithetical to Britishness. 6. The ‘newness’ of post-referendum racism is rooted in and sustained by the structural racism of ‘old’. There has been a significant upsurge of interest in racial violence after the referendum, with the implication that a previously ‘tolerant’ nation has been tipped over some precipice. But this is ahistorical. As we have emphasised elsewhere, the abuse that appeared to characterise much of the post-referendum racism that we have documented – ‘go home’, ‘taking our country back’ and so on – has historical echoes. The racism that has certainly intensified following the referendum is given legitimacy not just by the referendum itself, but by the forms of racism embedded as national policy in the decades leading up to it, for example in debates over immigrant numbers, media scares about scroungers, policies like Prevent which stigmatise whole communities. And in this context, it is indicative that certain messages previously belonging solely to the far Right are now found in dominant policy positions. 7. The racial violence that has intensified following the referendum result is the fallout of policy. In the above context, the racist violence that has followed the referendum is not a just a ‘spike’, a ‘jump’ or a ‘spate’, as the mainstream consensus has it. It is the literal manifestation of the political climate which sustains it. As a report published by three groups set up after the referendum has suggested – istreetwatch, Worrying Signs and #postrefracism – the 645 racist incidents it collated on social media are indicative of the ‘increasing normalisation of xenoracist narratives and the manifestation of the “hostile environment principle”’.11 And the Commission for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) has warned that UK counter- terrorism policy has ‘created an atmosphere of suspicion towards members of Muslim communities’.12 And this comes on the back of repeated criticisms, including a statement from the independent reviewer of terrorism laws that the Prevent strategy causes ‘mistrust’.13 We would go further. Almost every utterance shouted alongside a specific racist attack, is already a dominant ideological policy position. In other words, much of the racist abuse that has followed the referendum result has had its gestation within policy measures which express the same aim. There is a parallel, of course, between the ‘leave’ campaign’s unofficial slogan of ‘taking the country back’ and the racist abuse that urges the same. But there is also a parallel between the racist assault of a homeless migrant, who is not deemed to be economically productive, and the public spectacle of the police, immigration authorities and other agencies rounding up homeless migrants and ‘removing’ them for the same reason. Likewise, there is a parallel between a racist violence that is practically carried out as some perverse form of public duty and state policies which place legal demands on a variety of agencies to racially profile ‘service-users’, and track down irregular migrants. And there is a parallel, too, between the abuse of Muslim communities on the basis that they need to live by ‘British rules’, and a policy framework which routinely demands the same and suggests that this is not the case. A review of some of the policy statements that have dominated the UK in the last five years (see below) makes clear how many of these retrograde positions, far from emerging during the referendum debate, preceded it. They have for years been part of Britain’s political landscape and, as the Prime Minister has made clear, are now going to intensify in the post-referendum context. View larger version The interpretation of racial violence Smug political elites are disconnected from the problems of ordinary people struggling under the impact of market forces. And much post-referendum analysis has correctly interpreted the Leave vote as a protest vote against this, not just against immigration. But, ironically, when it comes to post-referendum hate crimes, the same analysts and media commentators shy away from any political analysis, and show scant awareness of the long history of racist violence in the UK. Liberals from the ‘Remain camp’, in particular, have clung to the belief that racist hate crimes are simply a by-product of Brexit, whilst Conservatives in the ‘Leave camp’ argue that racism is down to a minority who have misunderstood the legitimate demand to ‘take back control’ – a view reinforced by the Daily Mail and the Sun which both supported the Leave campaign. Either way, racism is represented as a failing located within a thuggish minority, to be punished and dealt with solely under the rubric of law and order. Within each narrative, it was accepted, in the immediate aftermath of the referendum at least, that there had been a surge in violence and that the most important thing was to deal with it quickly in order to preserve social cohesion and the social order. It was the increased level of media reporting in those initial days that framed such an acknowledgement. A closer examination of the stories reported, however, reveals the very narrow lens through which the media looks, which, in turn, reproduces very limited understandings about racism. According to our data, the numerical upsurge is clear. There were almost seven times more racist incidents reported on by the media in the month after the referendum (134) than in the same month in 2015 (21). A statistic that whilst reflecting an increase in incidents of racist violence, on the one hand, indicates a heightened interest in racial violence, on the other. But what this increased reporting of racial violence also reflects is the way in which the relationships between the media, the criminal justice system and political authorities were shaping notions of how post-referendum racism was to be understood. Relying on the police for the story Following the referendum result, the National Police Chiefs’ Council (NPCC) requested weekly ‘returns’ on reported hate from police forces. Eight weeks later, it decided to stop publicising the weekly returns, effectively sending out a signal that the ‘surge’ or ‘spike’ was now subsiding.14Figure 1 shows the proportion of hate crimes reported to the NPCC in the week before, and the eight weeks after the referendum (when ‘returns’ were no longer obligatory) compared to the corresponding weeks in 2015. It also presents data from media-reported incidents on our database. And as it suggests, the media reporting of racial violence increased, initially, at a much higher rate before, eventually, falling roughly in line with police statistics. Figure 1. Percentage change in police-reported hate crimes. Why is this significant? One reason is that it suggests that the media defers to the police when deciding when racial violence is newsworthy. In the month after the referendum, of the 134 incidents that we collated, sixty-one (47 per cent) appeared to originate from the police, either from press releases appealing for information about an incident, or from otherwise police-initiated stories. This does not include a further 16 per cent of stories which appeared to originate from other criminal agencies and representatives. Or, in other words, following the referendum the criminal justice system was a dominant source of information on racist violence and which examples of racist attacks to highlight. Through the Freedom of Information Act we obtained data on the number of racist incidents recorded by each police force in the month after the referendum. The total number of incidents recorded from the fifteen police forces that reported the highest numbers was 6,516.When compared to the media-reported incidents that we collated, this would indicate that police forces, on average, either released information publicly on, or the media reported on, around 2 per cent of this number. This is consistent with many other forms of interpersonal violence. But given the media’s apparent reliance on the police as ‘a source’, it does provide one indication of the extent to which a level of selectivity exists as to which racist attacks are brought to public attention, and in what context. Whilst the media focus on racial violence intensified, the number of incidents brought to public attention to frame this discussion were few. And one implication is that, from our sample at least, information appears to be released on those incidents where policing appears to reside at the centre of the solution to racist violence. ‘Balance’ and the construction of consensus The criminal justice system does not just have a role in providing information as to which incidents of racist violence to look at – our sample indicates that the media invariably looks to the police, too, to interpret such violence. According to our data, there is a hierarchy of interpretation which, in practice, means that when the media seeks to give meaning to an incident it turns (respectively) to the police, other criminal justice agencies, political figures, ‘community representatives’ and only finally to the victims or victims’ families. The journalistic notion of ‘balance’ and ‘objectivity’ is central to this. For, according to our data, when stories originated from outside established sources of authority (from the public, for example), it was almost always left to the police, or some other accredited institution, to interpret them. (Conversely, this was less likely when a case originated from the criminal justice system itself, and its portrayal of events did not need to be ‘balanced’ by another.) Even when victims of racist violence were approached for comment about racist attacks, it was generally only in terms of the emotional impact that an attack had had. That is, they were approached only as ‘victims’. What appeared not to be encouraged was for people to draw on their experience and offer any analysis of why it happened, or what should be done. This, in the majority of cases, was the job for the criminal justice system or other spokespeople speaking from an acknowledged position of authority. Thus ‘balance’ was maintained, consensus was constructed. There are a number of consequences to this police and elite-led framing of post- referendum racial violence.  Policy solutions to racial violence are narrowed to its policing. ‘The media’, of course, is not monolithic. And there have been a number of detailed and enquiring media investigations into racial violence and living under siege.15 Further, there have been some intrepid journalists who have questioned policing following the referendum. But in the main, racial violence is understood as threatening the social order. It becomes a matter for crime-reporting, not for social analysis. The police are depicted as a ‘thin blue line’ defending the nation against chaos, and the solution, therefore, resides in more powers and more resources for the criminal justice system. This was reflected, for example, in the uncritical championing of the government’s hate crime strategy after the referendum. That the response to racism resides largely in the bolstering of the criminal justice system, a smattering of educational projects and dealing with under-reporting is accepted as commonsense. Racial violence becomes defined narrowly as a law-and-order issue, without even a nod to all the policies and the climate which provide for its gestation. The government’s updated hate crime plans – ‘Action against hate’ (2016) – has ‘five areas for the next steps for Government and community partners to take to tackle hate crime’:  ‘Preventing hate crime by dealing with the beliefs and attitudes that can lead to hate crime’;  ‘Responding to hate crime in our communities with the aim of reducing the number of hate crime incidents’;  ‘Increasing the reporting of hate crime’;  ‘Improving support for the victims of hate crime’;  ‘Building our understanding of hate crime’.  The dominant narrative of racist violence following the referendum consequently becomes one of individualised ‘hate’, divorced from any political context. At best the context is the language of the referendum itself. Racist violence was generally framed simply as part of a ‘spike’ following the referendum. This in turn portrayed racism as some kind of aberration in an otherwise tolerant country. According to the deputy commissioner of Scotland Yard Craig Mackey, for example, the referendum result had ‘unleashed something in people’.16 It was a sentiment echoed again and again by political figures and criminal justice representatives, and reproduced in the media. Without in any way downplaying the level of racist abuse and violence following the referendum, its roots have to be sought in the way that a much broader political context (including the policies and practices of successive governments) had been its pump primer. But unable or unwilling to acknowledge this, political figures have articulated racist violence as the domain of isolated ‘thugs’ or ‘yobs’. The implications of this are that racism becomes defined as something rooted in the actions of a few, often already marginalised, communities. In this framework, it is the responsibility of benevolent political figures and a neutral political process to intervene.  The media disassociates itself from the construction of popular racism. The role of the media is almost entirely removed from any discussion about the creation of a climate which can lead to racial violence. Some of the newspapers and media outlets highlighting examples of racist violence after the referendum, and condemning it the loudest, have in fact been part of concerted long-term campaigns against all manner of ‘undeserving’ asylum seekers, migrants and BAME communities, not to speak of the demonising of ‘terrorist’ Muslims. Under the guise of having an ‘honest debate’ about race and immigration, they have regurgitated tropes of migrant threats/invaders, along with notions of a multicultural enemy within. Tabloids like the Daily Mail and the Sun, which have consistently spoken up for ‘the majority’ and attacked migrants and Muslims, sometimes with the most scaremongering of front pages, were amongst the first to embrace a law-and-order stance for dealing with the perpetrators of violence and hate. The Daily Mail, for instance, could be accused of double standards, for condemning the ‘hate-filled’ ‘racist thugs’ who set fire to a Polish family’s property, when it had carried headlines such as ‘Migrants: how many more can we take?’. Likewise the Sun, which had carried headlines such as ‘we’re stuffed’, a ‘tide of refugees’ is ‘filling Europe’, now condemns the ‘horrific abuse’ painted on a refugee family’s door. Leader writers at the Sun opined, ‘we are appalled at reports of racist abuse in the wake of last week’s EU vote and utterly condemn attempts to provoke division in our society’, concluding that, ‘Anyone caught inciting racial hatred must feel the full force of the law’. Conclusion The racial violence following the referendum, as this report shows, took its brief and even its slogans from the broader racist policies, practices and narratives peddled by previous Labour and Conservative-led governments. But these are assiduously ignored when it comes to providing the official explanation of and remedy for racial violence. Racial violence is, on the one hand, abstracted from the conditions that create and sustain it and re-interpreted as a baseless manifestation of immoral individualised hatred, which, in a democratic society, has to be loudly and publicly condemned. On the other hand, the threat to social cohesion that racism risks, is not, in the official narrative, to be met with social solutions, but through policing. That this narrative is continuously reproduced by political figures, establishment spokespeople and media outlets is no coincidence. It emerges from the echo-chamber in which they operate. Figure 2. Examples of strident headlines. If this report augurs anything it is the danger of what a nativist Brexit state will look like. ‘Brexit means Brexit’ is already being translated for BAME and migrant communities into ‘Brexit means racism’ – not just on the ground but also in the repressive proposals already emanating from politicians and government departments in October 2016. For example, pregnant women having to hand over proof of immigration status before giving birth in hospitals, a proposed targeted visa system for EU migrants, the Department of Education demanding to know the nationality of school pupils, the proposed calling in of ‘debts’ of foreigners who have used the NHS. A nation state, which is (in the globalised world of the twenty-first century) defined specifically to divide those who rightfully belong from those who do not, will by definition enshrine racism. The discourse we can expect in the run-up to the triggering of Article 50 could be even more pernicious than that of the referendum debate. The referendum may be over but the ‘vote’ as to what kind of multicultural society we remain is in the making. References 1. Whale Sebastian, ‘David Cameron condemns “despicable” racist abuse after referendum result’, Politics Home, 27 June 2016, https://www.politicshome.com/news/europe/eu-policy- agenda/brexit/news/76638/david-came/ 2. ‘Hate crime awareness week 2016: Therea May’s message’, Prime Minister’s Office, 8 October 2016, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/hate-crime-awareness-week-2016- theresa-mays-message/ 3. Weaver Matthew, ‘“Horrible spike” in hate crime linked to Brexit vote, Met police say’, Guardian, 28September 2016. 4. The paper is built around a consideration of 134 racist incidents that were reported in the media in the first month after the referendum: from 24 June to 23 July 2016. It draws on the database developed by the IRR, which uses an online news aggregator which sources stories covered in local and national newspapers, as well as online news services. Where necessary, information has been supplemented through FOI requests. 5. ‘Brexit, racism and xenophobia – listen to the event here’, The Monitoring Group (12 July 2016), http://www.tmg-uk.org/brexit-racism-and-xenophobia-listen-to-the-event-here/. 6. View JUST West Yorkshire’s press releases here: http://justwestyorkshire.org.uk/. 7. Piggott Mark, ‘Hate crimes soar by 400% in first week after referendum result following Brexit result’, International Business Times, 30 June 2016. 8. ‘Race hate crime on UK railways soared after Brexit vote, figures show’, Guardian, 22 August 2016. 9. Smith Hayden, Hayhurst Clare, ‘Three race hate crimes every hour since EU referendum, says Met police’, Independent, 5 July 2016. 10. ‘Met police deputy chief links Brexit vote to hate crime rise’, BBC News (20 July 2016), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-london-36835966. 11. Komaromi Priska, Post-referendum Racism and Xenophobia: the role of social media activism in challenging the normalisation of xeno-racist narratives (UK, Worrying Signs, iStreetWatch and Post ref racism, 2016). 12. Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Concluding observations on the twenty- first to twenty-third periodic reports of United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (Geneva: CERD, 2016). 13. Anderson David, Supplementary written evidence submitted by David Anderson Q.C. (2016), http://togetheragainstprevent.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Written-evidence- submitted-by-David-Anderson-Q.C..pdf. 14. ‘Tackling hate crime remains a priority’, National Police Chiefs’ Council, 7 September 2016, http://news.npcc.police.uk/releases/tackling-hate-crime-remains-a- priority. 15. Younge Gary, ‘“Eggs thrown, windows smashed, a family attacked in a park”: how Brexit impacted east Europeans’, Guardian, 31 August 2016. Google Scholar 16. ‘Hate crime “still far too high” post-Brexit – police’, BBC News, 22 July 2016, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-36869000. 
work_zdeo5vggqrh7nanpocnrbomyfi	----	Social Justice Lite? Using Emotion for Moral Reasoning in Diversity Practice Social Justice ‘Lite’? Using Emotion for Moral Reasoning in Diversity Practice Deborah N. Brewis* Emotion is an aspect of diversity practice that is relatively overlooked in the literature. This paper expands Nussbaum’s theorization of emotion as a constituent part of moral reasoning and her proposal that compassion can promote gender equality. By discussing empirical examples from a study with diversity practitioners working in the United Kingdom, I suggest that emotion can be used as a means to a variety of ends and that the concept of ‘utility’ helps identify them. By being aware of how emotion is mobilized, it becomes possible to evaluate when emotion seeks to achieve social justice and where it is coopted to seek social justice ‘lite’, that is, instances where social justice is instrumental. Building on this, the notion of, compassion, articulated as the expan- sion of the ‘I’ — the positioning of oneself and the other as ends-in-themselves — offers potential to re-appropriate some of the neoliberal individualism that has hitherto been identified as prob- lematic within the ‘managing diversity’ approach. Keywords: diversity, Nussbaum, equality, emotion, ethics ‘Diversity management’ has become an increasingly dominant way in which differences amongpeople are understood and governed within western organizations over the last 25 years (Kelly and Dobbin, 1998), and has featured in scholarly consideration of how organizations respond to gender inequality for some time (Kirton and Greene, 2010; Liff, 1997; Metcalfe and Woodhams, 2008). It has been considered a distinctive discourse (Ahmed, 2007; Liff, 1997; Lorbiecki and Jack, 2000) and set of practices (Prasad et al., 1997; Swan, 2009, 2010). The philosophical writings of thinkers such as Bourdieu (Özbilgin and Tatli, 2011; Tatli, 2011), Foucault (Ahonen et al., 2014; Ahonen and Tienari, 2009), and within psychoanalysis (Vachhani, 2014), have provided rich materials with which to explore and theorize what the managing diversity approach entails for marginalized individuals and groups. This paper seeks to contribute to this body of work by examining the use of emotion in the work of diversity practitioners. The importance of emotion in diversity practice was an unexpected finding that emerged from a larger empirical study into the relations of power/knowledge involved in constructing the ‘diversity practitioner’ as a distinctive type of organizational expert and in (re)constructing the subject of the diversity trainee. Emotion has been considered to a limited extent in scholarship on diversity management, and on its predecessors, notably equal opportunities and affirmative action, traditions that were most embedded in the United Kingdom (UK), Australia, New Zealand and North America. Existing scholarship focuses on the ‘bad feelings’ in individuals that were elicited by former approaches, and the ‘good feelings’ that diversity promises to organizations. These discus- sions tend to position emotions as a by-product or outcome of diversity practice and only secondarily as a tool that is mobilized deliberately within interventions. This paper takes up Martha Nussbaum’s (2003) theory of emotion as a constituent part of thought, and her proposal that emotion, in the form of compassion, can act to promote gender equality by informing moral reasoning. I develop this by suggesting that emotion can potentially be used as a means to a variety of ends, providing illustrative Address for correspondence: *Kingston Business School, Kingston Hill Campus, Kingston Hill, Kingston-Upon-Thames, KT2 7LB, United Kingdom; e-mail: d.brewis@kingston.ac.uk Gender, Work and Organization Vol. 24 No. 5 September 2017 doi:10.1111/gwao.12171 © 2017 The Authors. Gender, Work & Organization Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd. This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. bs_bs_banner http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ examples from my empirical research with diversity practitioners operating in the UK. I suggest that ‘utility’, decoupled from utilitarianism in its classic forms, is a concept that can help us identify these ends. I argue that by being aware of the ways that emotion is mobilized, it becomes possible to evaluate where emotion seeks to achieve social justice and where it can be coopted to seek only social justice ‘lite’. Considering emotion through utility highlights the danger in taking emotion for granted as having social justice at its heart — the heart, it is suggested, is vulnerable to misdirection. Nevertheless, the paper returns to Nussbaum and the promise that emotion holds for equality. I articulate compassion as the expansion of an individual’s concept of ‘I’ and the positioning of both oneself and the other as ends-in-themselves. It is argued that this understanding of emotion, as a tool of diversity practice, offers potential to promote equality by re-appropriating some of the individualism that has been identified as problematic in the managing diversity approach. Understanding emotion in relation to equality interventions The core way in which emotion features in the literature on programmes that predate managing diversity but which also related to issues of equality and organising difference, is in reporting the emotional response to them from organizational actors. During the 1960s and 1970s, some organiza- tions in the United States (US) commissioned ‘cultural sensitivity’ and ‘group dynamics’ training which aimed to change people’s attitudes towards marginalised groups. These were reportedly positive in tone and used stories designed to promote understanding and the celebration of cultural differences (Lasch-Quinn, 2001, pp. 169-93). However, others were asked to take part in intensive ‘encounter groups’ wherein participants would engage in frank discussions on issues of inequality and prejudice. This technique directly addressed the matter of the unequal distribution of power in society and sought to elicit recognition from privileged groups that discrimination and inequality were rife. Encounter groups were criticised for becoming a ‘ritual of racial reprimand’ designed to exorcise ‘white guilt’ (Lasch-Quinn, 2001), for targeting and intimidating white men, and for dealing with emotionally charged issues in a public forum (Lindsay, 1994). In the UK, equal opportunities initiatives differed from those that took place in the US in terms of the inequalities that were of chief concern, and that the approach was sometimes assimilatory (for example, teaching immigrants about British culture and the English language). But the UK programmes also shared common ground with those of the US when taking an integrationist (or pluralist) approach that promoted learning about other cultures. As a response to the introduction of the Race Relations Act 1976, programmes in the UK also turned to educating white British people about their prejudice towards marginalised groups (Bhavnani, 2001, pp. 77-8). These too became associated with the solicitation of guilty feelings from white middle-class participants (Brown and Lawton, 1991, p. 26). There are also indications of hostile feelings toward the programmes more generally. In the US, the concept of ‘political correctness’, designed to ameliorate relations between social groups and foster mutual respect, was branded a contravention of rights to free speech (Crawley, 2007; Mobley and Payne, 1992; Penketh, 2000). Equality training in the UK was likened to preaching (Bennett and Keating, 2008) and brainwashing (Karp and Sutton, 1993; Hemphill and Haines, 1997). Added to this was a disengagement and fatigue from those on the receiving end of equality initiatives (Ahmed, 2007, p. 237) and a sense of isolation by those tasked with delivering them (Kirton et al., 2007; Kirton and Greene, 2009). Discussion of emotion in this literature features largely as a negative reaction by members of privileged groups to interventions around the issue of inequality. In all, they are regarded as having a record of producing what we might refer to as ‘bad feelings’. Positioning itself in contrast with this, discussion of emotion in relation to the managing diversity approach focuses its rhetoric on being far more positive, even celebratory in tone (Prasad et al., 1997), a tool for ‘organisational pride’ (Ahmed and Swan, 2006, p. 98). It seeks not only to be more understandable to staff by articulating itself in the language and concerns of the local organization, but also to be more palatable (Foster and Harris, 2005) and less confrontational (Taylor et al., 1997). Instead of speaking directly to the inequality suffered by particular groups in organizations, managing diversity talks up the value of difference to staff recruitment, retention, absenteeism and 520 GENDER, WORK AND ORGANIZATION © 2017 The Authors. Gender, Work & Organization Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.Volume 24 Number 5 September 2017 creativity (see Liff, 2003). It somewhat shifts attention away from group-based inequalities to render difference a characteristic of individuals, which can be utilised and managed. Ahmed (2010) argues that, ultimately, managing diversity appears to promise ‘happiness’ not only to individuals; by posi- tioning the agenda as about value, skills, and making conditions better for everyone; but to the orga- nization as a whole: a resolution to the conflicts that difference can cause. In this way, the managing diversity agenda distances itself emotionally from the bad feelings associated with former approaches. I want to suggest, drawing on the work of Nussbaum and examples from my research with diver- sity practitioners, that emotion warrants further discussion in the critical analysis of diversity prac- tices. Current literature tends to focus on whether approaches to diversity elicit the outcomes of good or bad feelings — it is the rarer exploration of emotion as a key part of how interventions are made that I wish to pursue here. Organizing difference — philosophical underpinnings Two traditions of moral philosophy explain how difference has generally been conceived of and responded to in UK organizations: equal opportunities and managing diversity can be read as being underpinned by John Rawls’s theory of justice and by utilitarianism (Gagnon and Cornelius, 2000; van Dijk et al., 2012). The relationship between these approaches and their underpinnings in moral philosophy warrants some elucidation to introduce the dominant ways in which moral reasoning has hitherto been regarded in organizations. Rawls’s (1971) theory of justice centres on achieving fair and equitable treatment of all persons. His thinking is guided by the Kantian proposition that morality is something fundamental; independent of individuals and their circumstances. Rawls proposes that society should be organised per principles made from the ‘original position’; a situation wherein actors are faced with a decision about how to organise society but do not know where in society they will subsequently find them- selves. Moral reasoning is therefore conducted from a position of naivety about one’s own fate; one is protected by a ‘veil of ignorance’; to ensure that choices have justifiable effects on all members of that society. We see Rawlsian philosophy in how organizations develop practices that will treat peo- ple fairly, irrespective of characteristics such as gender, for example in recruitment and promotion. The notion of equal treatment is enshrined in anti-discrimination laws and the equal opportunities policies that they have precipitated. Utilitarianism, most famously developed by Bentham (1748—1832) and later Mill (1806—1873), is also fundamentally concerned with fairness. Like Rawls’s theory of justice, it is informed by the assumption that people are driven by psychological egoism and is mistrustful of the decisions that people would make if left to their own devices (Stewart, 2009, p. 15). A utilitarian logic responds to the challenge of ensuring actions are taken for the good of others in a different way to Rawls: it stipulates that an action may be deemed morally defensible if it maximises utility for the greatest number of people — the ‘utility principle’. Commonly in the hedonic traditions of Bentham and of Mill utility is defined as ‘happiness’. Happiness is regarded as the only end that is a good-in-itself, where other actions or outcomes are only instrumentally good in so far as they lead to happiness. Thus the utility principle is also known as the ‘greatest happiness principle’. It helps to deal with questions of the type: ‘what kind of conduct is morally optimal when we are facing different courses of action all of which will affect people in more or less positive ways?’ (Jones et al., 2005, p. 28). Utilitarianism provides a basis for moral reasoning that does not rely on religion or tradition, nor a veil of ignorance as proposed by Rawls. Extrapolating this logic, the notion of utility can be defined in various other ways aside from a hedonic happiness, towards other societal goods such as health, economic prosperity, education and so on. Thus, the utilitarian stance can be seen within the ‘business case’ that is central to the managing diversity approach (Dickens, 1994; Kirton and Greene, 2010; Liff, 2003; Noon, 2007), wherein the rationale provided for promoting, for example, the numbers of women within an orga- nization is closely tied to organizational performance concerns. Here, utility is defined as the prosper- ity of the organization. This approach gained popularity in the 1990s and is thought to have been a 521SOCIAL JUSTICE ‘LITE’? © 2017 The Authors. Gender, Work & Organization Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd. Volume 24 Number 5 September 2017 response to the fact that equal opportunities policies often did not translate into action (Hoque and Noon, 2004). It may be argued that the utilitarian logic can also be seen to underpin equality legisla- tion as it aims towards a societal good, but this is only true where happiness is equated with social justice, or if the utility is itself defined as social justice. The problem with connecting utilitarianism to equality legislation per se is that laws seek to protect the rights of the individual irrespective of whether this protection would contribute to maximising the overall happiness of the population, or a utility per some other definition, for example wealth. Utilitarianism is referred to as a consequentialist position within ethical theory because it is concerned with the consequences of actions as being key to the judgement of whether they are to be considered morally defensible; the ends justify the means by which they are achieved (Freeman, 1994, p. 313). Kant takes a deontological, or so-called ‘non-consequentialist’, position with respect to moral reasoning. As Jones et al. point out, this term is somewhat misleading since Kant was indeed concerned with the consequences of actions as a consideration of their moral worth, but moral ends for Kant, and for Rawls, were solely what might be considered ‘noble’ rather than hedonistic goals — oriented toward justice, human dignity and freedom (2005, pp. 44-6). Noble ends are considered to be ‘morally desirable features of states of affairs or of social institutions’ (Scanlon, 1978, p. 99, cited in Gaus, 2001). There are different variations of these moral philosophies (‘rule’ and ‘act’ utilitarianism, and ‘hypothetical’ and ‘categorical’ deontology) that differ in the type of rule for moral action that they produce, but these finer distinctions are not central to the concerns of this paper. It is important to acknowledge that nor is managing diversity a homogenous approach: previously, scholars have noted that it manifests in different ways in different organizational functions (Zanoni and Janssens, 2015) and sectors (Tomlinson and Schwabenland, 2010), and its distinctiveness from equal opportu- nities has been keenly debated (Liff, 1997; Liff and Dickens, 2000; Lorbiecki and Jack, 2000). Despite these complexities, the distinction between the two forms of moral philosophy, which guide the dom- inant approaches to organising difference, is an important one to focus on. This is because a distinc- tion is made within them between fairness and equality: where both ethical approaches are concerned with morality by way of establishing actions that are fair, those who follow the Rawlsian formulation for moral reasoning are specifically concerned with equality understood as relating to distribution across the population. Utilitarianism is a logic for making fair decisions, but may result in highly un- equal outcomes provided it maximises overall happiness. Without a specific connection between the no- tions of equality and fairness, people whose interests differ from those of the majority may get left out. Further to this consideration of exactly how the collective acts as a basis for determining moral ac- tion, it is worth noting here that individualism has also been identified as a problematic aspect of the managing diversity approach. It has been voiced that the ‘valuing difference’ discourse within diver- sity (Liff, 1997) hides the ‘histories of struggle’ between social groups (Ahmed, 2007, p. 238) in the way that it frames organizational concern with difference in terms of the needs, preferences, and skills of each individual. An individual-focussed approach is also potentially damaging to the promotion of equality since more structural changes to organizations and actions such as collective bargaining can become sidelined. However, the notion of the individual has traction in today’s organizations which operate within a society where a neoliberal discourse is strong. Neoliberalism privileges the individ- ual as a site of agency, responsibility and fulfilment (Miller and Rose, 1990, p. 25; Rose and Miller, 2008, p. 18). The concern with both individualised and collective approaches to promoting equality is picked up again later in the discussion. Returning to moral philosophy, a deontological approach is in danger of being too universal about outcomes that are deemed noble: it risks imposing objectives upon groups that do not share them. In response to these weaknesses, Martha Nussbaum (1999) proposes a ‘capabilities approach’ to women’s equality, later articulated as a more general approach to addressing difference in organiza- tions by Gagnon and Cornelius (2000). This framework builds on virtue ethics (van Dijk et al., 2012) to walk a line between the other dominant approaches. It does so by defining the end of a moral action as one that allows a person the ‘ability to fashion life in accordance with their own view of what is deepest and most important’ (Nussbaum, 1999, p. 227). This applies not only to the freedom to make 522 GENDER, WORK AND ORGANIZATION © 2017 The Authors. Gender, Work & Organization Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.Volume 24 Number 5 September 2017 choices but also to one’s capability to make them. As a neo-Aristotelian approach, it draws on the notion of eudaimonia or ‘human flourishing’ as a defining characteristic of capability. For Nussbaum, a moral end is that which allows a person to lead a truly human life. This differs from what is known as ‘preference utilitarianism’ (for example, Singer, 2011/1980) because the goal is to satisfy those conditions that enable capabilities (Nussbaum, 1999, p. 228), and that which is needed to enable capability may not be manifest in conscious preferences. The centrality of eudaimonia to Nussbaum’s moral stance is key to understanding the role that she attributes to emotion in moral reasoning. The next passage discusses this alongside the place of emotions within moral philosophy. Conceiving emotion in relation to moral reasoning Although there has been some challenge to it, the traditional view is that utilitarian moral philosophy asks the deliberator to set their feelings aside in favour of rational thinking, which is regarded as being separate from emotion (Baron, 2011). The utility principle is proposed as a way of doing just this, by offering an emotion-free calculation for moral reasoning. Nussbaum (2003) provides an alter- native proposal, which suggests that pain and other bad feelings do not rational thought, but are an integral part of human thought and therefore human rationality. She attempts to foreground emotion in the promotion of equality across nations, arguing that emotion plays a vital role in moral reason- ing: it anchors morality in equality while avoiding the danger of imposing a universal manifestation of this equality onto different cultures. Emotions, as part of thought (rather than as an effect of it), offer an evaluative dimension that relates to eudaimonia. Emotional response to an object, be it a situ- ation or potential action, is understood to be informed by beliefs about that object that derive from ‘one’s most important goals and projects’ (Nussbaum, 2004, p. 443). Comparing this theory with a deontological position, there is no supposition of an original position nor veil of ignorance as prerequisites for moral deliberation. However, it does share a noble goal which privileges the humanity of each of society’s members. In fact, Jones et al. propose that Kant’s philosophical position relies less on rules than is often presumed, and that his injunctions for moral reasoning are designed to encourage ‘looking into your own heart’ (2005, p. 49). There is here an evident connection with Nussbaum and with the importance of the feelings that derive from one’s core as an important moral guide. Nussbaum also likens her ethical proposal to a ‘eudaimonistic Utilitarianism in the spirit of Mill’ (2004, p. 446). By this, she is explaining that her proposal may be regarded as a consequentialist form of moral philosophy, if capabilities are defined as a legitimate utility. In this comparison, Nussbaum separates utility from necessarily being defined as happiness. But if utility can be redefined, then there may well be other ways in which this can happen and that this does happen in practice. Going one step further to not only decouple utility from happiness but also from the greatest happiness principle, leaves the concept of utility simply as the ‘ends’ to which moral reasoning is oriented. In this sense, utility can act as a lens which can be used to identify the ‘what’; what the intended purpose is of eliciting emotion of others in diversity practice, it can be used to ask: what are the ends to which emotional response is oriented? To illustrate how emotion may be used to different ends in diversity practice, I turn to data from my own research. These examples are not intended to give a comprehen- sive picture of the different ends that are in play within the field, but to show that emotion is a means that can be turned to different ends; different forms of utility; and that emotion continues to be a cen- tral part of interventions that address difference within organizations. The empirical examples, which will be used to illustrate how emotion can be used in diversity practice to different ends, are taken from a larger piece of research with diversity practitioners. The role of emotion in diversity practice was an unexpected finding of the research and inspired an exploration into the philosophical underpinnings of moral reasoning in relation to diversity practice. In the wider study, the discourses used by diversity practitioners when accounting for their role and practices, as well as during diversity training itself, formed the basis for an exploration of the relations of power/knowledge involved in constructing the subject of the ‘diversity practitioner’ and in 523SOCIAL JUSTICE ‘LITE’? © 2017 The Authors. Gender, Work & Organization Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd. Volume 24 Number 5 September 2017 seeking to (re)construct the diversity trainee. The 37 diversity practitioners who took part worked in a variety of regions in the UK, and in public, private and third sectors. Participants were interviewed and/or observed between October 2012 and October 2013. The examples show variations in the way that emotional response can be elicited from others, and are used to suggest that greater attention to how emotion features in diversity practice is essential to evaluating its potential to promote equality. Emotion for social justice In their training practices, diversity practitioners sometimes seek to elicit an emotional response in their trainees. One resource that was drawn upon to achieve this was emotive narration of an individ- ual’s experience of discrimination or maltreatment. For example, an extract from my field notes de- scribing part of a webinar on the topic of hate crime: A picture of disabled young man appears on a slide — Stephen — the trainer describes how the boy was having an 18th birthday party, was disabled and openly gay. He was a victim of a homophobic hate crime and died from burn injuries. In another case, the trainer personalises the case by saying ‘Francesca, or “Frankie” to her friends’. She was also eighteen years old and had a disability. Rather than a picture of Frankie, a picture of her mum, Fiona appears. Instead of using this image to enhance a description the affective fallout of the incident, like I had expected, the mum in the story turns out to be the perpetrator of the hate crime. Frankie was burnt so badly that she needed to be identified by her dental records. These are very violent stories. The final case involves Ian, who had previously attended a workshop con- ducted by the trainer. The openly gay man had been out drinking with a friend of his on a Monday night. He received verbal abuse from a ‘young blonde lady’ and, receiving a physical attack from another man, had ‘crashed down to the ground’ that led to his death. There must have been many people around but the teenagers attacked him anyway, we are told. The trainer also has personal connections to [the victim], she says: ‘hate crime is not an academic issue for me, it touches my life constantly’. A picture of the young woman appears. Finally, the case of Stephen Lawrence is presented in detail. (Extract from field notes observing Erin1) The real life nature of the case, connection to the trainer herself, and the accompanying photo- graphs displayed on screen, seek to make the experiences of others more emotionally accessible to the trainees. Observing, I was struck by the gravity of the attacks and a painful feeling, which was en- hanced by the humanising details used to describe the victims, such as their youth, personalities, and relationships with others. ‘Frankie to her friends’ juxtaposes with the serious and dehumanising na- ture of the crimes. Narratives such as these encourage an emotional response and an emotional iden- tification with the victims. Given that this example is taken from a webinar on hate crime, the gravity of the pain elicited is greater than in other examples that diversity practitioners were observed using in other forms of training, but narratives of discrimination within the workplace or service-use were featured in the presentation of case studies which trainees were asked to discuss. Diversity practitioners also used their own experiences as a resource to promote emotional identi- fication, giving examples of discriminatory treatment from their lives. Three diversity practitioners talked about how they had experienced unjust treatment because of their disabled status, and another two described how their race had elicited prejudice. The narrating of experiences from one’s own life, like the use of personalising details in the previous examples, served the diversity practitioners in promoting what might be termed ‘emotional proximity’. These techniques attempt to bring the ‘other’ into the space of the self, to move others from the status of objects to subjects: as one diversity practitioner explained, ‘I talk about some of my own personal experiences which really resonates with them because it makes it more human for them’ (Rebecca). Some diversity practitioners further attempted to encourage emotional identification by asking that participants enunciate it. For example, one practitioner showed trainees the classic example of Jane Elliott’s (19702) ‘Eye of the Storm’, known as the ‘blue-eyed/brown-eyed exercise’, which depicts the emotional response of 524 GENDER, WORK AND ORGANIZATION © 2017 The Authors. Gender, Work & Organization Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.Volume 24 Number 5 September 2017 children who are placed in a situation of inequality. This was used as a prompt to ask trainees to recount a time when they felt that they had been treated unfairly. These examples seek to elicit the feeling of another’s pain to motivate trainees to alleviate that pain wherever it is possible for them to do so. Gerry said: People don’t really feel things for abstract — you know ‘because Africa is suffering’ … Jonny’s suffering and he’s having a hard time — ‘Right? I can do that.’ I try to do the same with the training, bring it down to the person in case studies, real videos showing people, so that people actually feel something. If they feel something, then they’ll do something. Gerry describes how emotional response and emotional identification is meant to lead to the reasoning that the moral action is to ease ‘suffering’. The easing of suffering is positioned as utility. It is a social justice-oriented use of emotion, since the alleviation of pain is the end-in-itself. In the example, above, a general claim is made about the nature of people — that people are motivated to act to relieve the pain of others and feel this to be a legitimate utility, if they can identify with it and feel that pain themselves. One diversity practitioner made a variation of this claim — that people might act sympathetically towards others when they themselves have experienced sympathy from others: What’s quite interesting working in the public sector is how ... is having to appeal to that more human side because it’s that bit that appeals to the values of the people who have tended to enter the NHS [National Health Service] [...] because it’s a worthwhile thing. They think it’s good for society, good for community, quite often they join the NHS because they’ve had a personal experience either within their family or themselves they may want to give something back in a way. (Sophie) Here the feelings of guilt previously identified of older training approaches give way to a feeling of pain on behalf of the other. Rather than being inwardly reflective (in the hopes of eliciting reform), the techniques described above are outwardly inflected; seeking identification by increasing emotional proximity (in the hopes of eliciting sympathy). This approach is ostensibly less threatening to the core of the individuals who participate in training and so are less likely to evoke a hostile response. It may well be the case that this emotional technique was also used in older forms of training, but examples of the ‘guilt’ approach were not observed and did not feature in the accounts that I collected. The only response that contained echoes of this former approach, presented the reforming of individuals as a spontaneous repercussion of the training content: People will leave the room and say I’m really sorry but I need to apologise to somebody. [...] You know, and then you get people who will say I’ve got to stop some of the things that I’m doing. [Some] don’t leave the room but recognise that things that they’ve been doing are not acceptable. (Joan) Despite the variations above, these examples have in common the utility of social justice as an end-in-itself. But this is not always the case in how emotional response is used, as the following examples will show. Emotion for social justice ‘lite’ The way that emotion featured in accounts of diversity practice did not always align to social justice in a straightforward way. For instance, considering the needs of people suffering disadvantage was sometimes linked to a feeling of satisfaction: in a subsequent section of her interview to that quoted above, Sophie, asserted that considering the needs of others produces: ‘that good feeling that you get from doing the right thing’. The utility of the emotional response being elicited is oriented to a personal concern. It is implicitly suggested that acting to alleviate the pain of others is a source of good feelings. This formulation of the use of emotion as part of moral reasoning is more individualised than that of those which are oriented to social justice proper. Social justice is an 525SOCIAL JUSTICE ‘LITE’? © 2017 The Authors. Gender, Work & Organization Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd. Volume 24 Number 5 September 2017 instrumental utility rather than an end-in-itself, rendering it what can be considered social justice ‘lite’. The adjective ‘lite’, coined originally to describe a low-fat version of a drink or food product, is often added to a noun postpositively to denote that it is lacking in substance or is unthreatening. Evoked here, ‘lite’ indicates the instrumental positioning of social justice, a transient good that is used to seek what is considered a more substantial or legitimate utility. From my data, it was evident that emotion may also be tied to one’s own feelings in an additional way: one diversity practitioner described how she articulated the ‘moral case’ by invoking hypothetical situations wherein the individual’s own pain is in play, or a feeling of pain on behalf of another would usually be inescapable: ‘Well it is but the moral case is, you know, “if this was you …” and this is why we do the case studies — “if this was your mother, if this was your son or your daughter”’. (Joan) This, I would like to argue does not make the wellbeing of the other an instrumental utility in quite the same way and I will return to discuss it later in this text. In the former articulation, though, by introducing the interests of the individual themselves, an assumption is made of a primarily self-interested nature to people, in keeping with the neoliberal discourses that position the individual as an entrepreneurial agent (Thorsen and Lie, 2006). This aligns with utilitarianism in that a key feature of the neoliberal rationality is the congruence it endeavours to achieve between a responsible and moral individual and an economic-rational individual. It aspires to construct responsible subjects whose moral quality is based on the fact that they rationally assess the costs and benefits of a certain act as opposed to other alternative acts (Lemke, 2002, p. 12). A further incarnation of this is to be found in accounts where emotional response is connected with interests of the organization’s business: [I get] people to think about a time when they were treated unfairly in some way or discriminated against and just to sort of talk about it and maybe share it with the person next to them, or whatever. And then what we do is look at the, you know, ‘how did that make you feel?’ and have a list of different responses to that situation, you know, whether people are upset, angry, or frustrated. And then sort of say to people well, ‘what do we know about — if young people are feeling this — what do you know about how they are going to achieve at school?’ And so I suppose in a way that is making a business case isn’t it? (Amy) One cannot say for certain whether the achievement of children is an instrumental utility for the business of the school or is a utility as end-in-itself; such a judgement could only be made based on what action is taken when the two interests are in conflict; but what the diversity practitioner is trying to do in this section of interview is to assert that she uses business case arguments in her work. The very seeking to establish a business case within her work in the public sector indicates that ‘business’, as utility, is valued within the field. Tomlinson and Schwabenland (2010) have previously argued that in the third sector, business and social justice cases can be reconciled, meaning that business utilities which are evoked in this sector may not necessarily entail a shift to social justice lite, as hinted towards in another account about diversity practice in the NHS: I’ve noticed over the last year or so that we’ve found that the most successful organizations in changing culture around this work … we’re really tapping into the emotional the ethical — the human side — of equality. So now what I’m finding is that where I’m being asked to do work it’s far less about policy governance, all of that kind of persuasion around business case, and it’s far more about getting together staff stories, patient stories, what’s gone wrong in complaints, what’s going wrong in grievances, and trying to pull together information so people understand and feel, in a very human way, the impact of getting it right. (Sophie) Although Sophie ostensibly seeks to step away from using a business case and describes her use of emotion as being distinct from it, her reference to using examples of ‘complaints’ and ‘grievances’ points to a business interest in caring for patients so that they are satisfied as customers. A positioning of the patient as customer and the public health service as business makes it possible for her to speak with business and social justice vocabularies at the same time. The fact that she does so indicates that the orientation of moral reasoning towards business concerns is still important. It is clear that in other 526 GENDER, WORK AND ORGANIZATION © 2017 The Authors. Gender, Work & Organization Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.Volume 24 Number 5 September 2017 sectors emotion could also be directed towards organizational ends, for example towards the importance of ensuring satisfied employees, service users and customers as instrumental utilities of business. One cannot say that the use of emotion to reach utilities that are in the interest of a business is necessarily immoral, because in a philosophical sense it is guided by a utilitarianism that defines the population for which utility is to be maximised as being limited to the organization, or rather, the shareholders (or equivalent). The examples show how emotion acts as a bridge between different forms of utility, it is used as a means to promote the achievement of different ends. Recognising this, means that emotion cannot be taken for granted as a positive force for equality within moral reasoning and thus greater attention needs to be paid to how emotion is used. In particular, those who seek better conditions for people of marginalised groups and who seek to promote greater equality in society, need to be vigilant that practices which involve promoting emotional response do not always have social justice at heart; that the heart can be coopted by organizations to make social justice contingent or to limit it. This caution is issued from a position wherein it is assumed that emotion can be useful as a force for social justice. I would like at this point to return to Nussbaum and to articulate in greater detail how her notion of ‘compassion’ can help us to understand the promise that emotion holds for social justice, as a part of moral reasoning. I also suggest that compassion also helps us to derive a position that mitigates the problematic elements of individualist and collectivist features of approaches to organising difference. Nussbaum’s compassion as a vehicle for equality As described in the opening sections of this piece, the concept of eudaimonia is central to Nussbaum’s understanding of both the self and equality: following Aristotle, eudaimonia represents for her that which is qualitatively constituent of a person’s existence as being truly human. This notion of human- ity is closely connected with that of capabilities. Emotions, for Nussbaum, are that which not only texture one’s own experience, turning them from a ‘flat plane to a mountain range’ (2005, p. 443), but also serve as a resource to evaluate the experience of others — we feel pain, when the capability for the eudaimonia of another is breached. Specifically, Nussbaum proposes that in this circumstance we feel what is described in the philosophical literature as ‘pity’ (pitié) but which she names compassion: ‘Compassion is an emotion that has often been relied on to hook our imaginations to the good of others and to make them the object of our intense care’. (Nussbaum, 2004, p. 447). Compassion is understood to be part of rational thinking: it refuses the idea, rooted in Stoicism, which is asserted in some modern moral theories that emotions can and must be separated from thought as not to ‘mislead’ moral deliberation (Nussbaum, 1996, p. 28). It is because we may experience compassion for others, and that this plays a role in the way we formulate morality, that emotion is regarded by Nussbaum as being central to the pursuit of social justice. To this end, she considers how compassion can be built into moral and civic education, political leadership, economic thought on welfare and development, legal rationality and public institutions (1996). But I would like to suggest that the work of diversity practitioners offers a window for compassion to become part of private enterprises as well as public and not-for-profit organizations; that diversity practitioners may act as a disruptive force to those discourses which either suppress emotion in favour of calculation alone — particularly in a utilitarian sense — or orient emotion towards an instrumental utility, and thus stifle compassion. Moreover, diversity practitioners occupy a pedagogical position and Nussbaum suggests that education can aid in moral development, that ‘although knowledge does not guarantee good behaviour, ignorance is a virtual guarantee of bad behaviour: stigmatization of the other is much easier when people know nothing or nothing complicated, about religious or cultural tradition’. (Nussbaum, 2005, p. 10). Education about the conditions and experience of others can be said not only to seek the development of knowledge, but the increase in emotional proximity between persons. In the analysis presented earlier, it was asserted that the method of connecting one’s own pain to that of another did not represent a formulation of social justice lite in quite the same way as the other 527SOCIAL JUSTICE ‘LITE’? © 2017 The Authors. Gender, Work & Organization Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd. Volume 24 Number 5 September 2017 examples given. Although it can be argued that the alleviation of other’s pain is an instrumental utility to avoiding one’s own pain, felt through identification, this identification is an essential root of being able to feel compassion for others. Nussbaum is careful to stipulate that compassion does not, and cannot, rest on the transference of one’s own experience of pain onto the situation of another, she says: ‘it is for another, and not for oneself, that one feels; and one is aware both of the bad lot of the sufferer and of the fact that it is, right now, not one’s own. If one really had the experience of feeling the pain in one’s own body, then one would precisely have failed to comprehend the pain of another as other.’ (1996, p. 35). This is important when it comes to considering diversity with respect to differences among people — compassion needs to be able to travel across differences in experiences and values. The key connection between ‘separateness’ of the experience of the self from the other and emotional identification with the other, is the vulnerability that is central to the human condition (1996, p. 37). The quote presented earlier proposes a hypothetical, ‘[what] if this was you?’ (Joan). The fundamental uncertainty of life is common to us all and enables the pain of the other to be identified within a deep, existential and embodied way. One could interpret this as the other being taken into the self, the ‘I’, and made an end-in-itself on the basis of the very core of human life. Surprisingly, given her refutation of much of their thought, Nussbaum finds an eloquent example from the Stoics in how the process of taking the other into the ‘I’ might happen: Imagine, they say, that each of us lives in a set of concentric circles — the nearest being one’s own body, the furthest being the entire universe of human beings. The task of moral development is to move the circles progressively closer and closer to the center, so that one’s parents become like oneself, one’s relatives like one’s parents, strangers like relatives, and so forth. (1996, p. 48) There are a number of potential problems with compassion as a means to seeking social justice. First, practical concerns could be raised about the reliability of compassion and how far compassion can be extended; that diversity practitioners could risk losing support for equality initiatives that have beneficiaries who are less proximate or visible, who are too emotionally distant because they occupy different spaces, will not benefit until some years hence, or who seem too different. This may well be a practical problem if compassion is not achieved at the level proposed and if diversity practitioners become overly reliant on it without sufficient legal or institutional recourse: individual compassion cannot replace formal change at the level of societal or institutional practices. Second, a related challenge is that displays of emotion could act as lip-service simulacrum of compassion. Third, an ethical problem may also be posed: that seeking to influence the emotional experience of others amounts to an attempt to govern their ‘souls’ (Dean, 1994, p. 145; Rose, 1990); to promoting a neoliberal project of the self (Brewis, 1996); and that it tasks them with additional emotional labour. To the latter count, first of all, we might insist that Hochschild (2003/1983) did not necessarily position emotional work as something bad in itself, but rather drew attention to the exploitation and under-valuation of such work (see also Cornelius, 2002, p. 203). To the former count, it may be possible to argue that the utilities of social justice and equality justify such a use of power, something that I will explore in more detail elsewhere to discuss the research from which the empirical examples are taken. Therefore, at this juncture, we may wish to recommend a critical vigilance with regards to the use of emotion work for organizational utility. I would like to close this discussion with a few words about the implications of the framework laid out in this paper with regards to the problematics of both individual and collective-focussed approaches that feature in the literature on organising difference. Where it has been recognised that individualism endangers the visibility of persistent group-based disadvantage (Ahmed, 2007, p. 237), as discussed, individualistic approaches also have currency in organizations as they are less threatening to those from privileged groups and aligns to the dominant neoliberal paradigm of the self. However, this research has also raised an aspect of focussing on the collective that is problematic. Where the collective is understood to be a population which is to be morally governed per the utility principle, equality is not necessarily safeguarded. What a person feels for another is important in 528 GENDER, WORK AND ORGANIZATION © 2017 The Authors. Gender, Work & Organization Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.Volume 24 Number 5 September 2017 ensuring that others are utilities; are ends-in-themselves; and are not means to other utilities. Emotion, in the form of compassion toward individual others, offers a potential way to provide this safeguard by building a connection between fairness and the notion of equality. This middle-ground position is found by considering the individual both as ends-in-themselves and as part of the collective ‘I’, which is based on a shared experience of existential vulnerability. A recognition of shared vulnerability not only creates linkages across difference but gives access to an embodied sense of when when the threat of harm is unequally distributed. In this view, being compassionate means (a) feeling the pain of each and every individual, while (b) reasoning that where the pain of compas- sion is felt, not only is this a sign that individual capabilities have been compromised, but also of a breach of equality. Moreover, as Nussbaum asserts, emotion is a means by which moral reasoning is focussed on the local, and protected from the danger of universalizing across different groups in the manifestation of equality (Nussbaum, 2004). Emotional identification can thus offer a mode of considering the other in both the particular and the general; as what might be termed a compassionate individualism. Finding this middle-ground is to somewhat re-appropriate individualism and to wrest moral reasoning from a neoliberal orientation. Conclusion This piece has attempted to foreground emotion as an important part of interventions that seek to promote gender equality. It has argued that emotion is not only an outcome of such interventions, causing ‘good’ or ‘bad feelings’ as it has generally been the focus of discussion in the literature on diversity work so far, but is a key part of how they are made. This argument invites further examina- tion of the dynamics of emotion within diversity work, for example in relation to the emotion work carried out by diversity practitioners and its implications for both practitioner and marginalised groups. It has also contributed to understanding the philosophical underpinnings of diversity work by suggesting that the concept of utility understood as ‘ends’ can help us to critically reflect on how emotion is mobilized in organizations. By looking at empirical examples of how emotion is used by diversity practitioners to increase emotional proximity, it has been argued that emotion can be used in different ways, some that promote social justice (where the capabilities of individuals are regarded as ends-in-themselves) and others that promote it instrumentally as social justice lite (where social justice is contingent on some other utility). Such insights may be built upon within the literature on diversity but also developed in the examination of other areas of organizational activity which seek to mo- bilise emotion as a tool to shape, direct, or transform, for example in corporate social responsibility’ (CSR). In the realm of equality work, this form of analysis inspired the introduction of Nussbaum’s conceptualisation of emotion as a way to understand how emotion might serve to remedy some of the shortcomings in approaches to diversity practice. Inspired by Nussbaum’s ‘compassion’, I have argued that the recognition of emotion as part of moral reasoning holds potential to promote consideration of marginalised groups through the tying of fairness to equality: since compassion is conceptualised as a pain that is felt for others where there is a breach of capabilities and where there is inequality. Moreover, the encouragement of emotional identification with each and every other, by taking the other into one’s concept of ‘I’, offers a way of negotiating the problematic elements of individual and collective-focussed approaches to organising difference. Compassion is therefore not only put forward to safeguard equality but to protect against universalism in striving for it. Although the promotion of compassion in diversity practice may present some practical and ethical challenges, it promises to do two important things: first, to mitigate some of the shortcomings of utilitarian and deontological approaches to moral reasoning and, second, to somewhat re- appropriate the problematic individualism that has such currency within the neoliberal discourse of managing diversity. We might call this strategy a sort of compassionate individualism. Nussbaum acknowledges that compassion for others cannot be a panacea for inequality, but provides a useful and important tool to battle with it: ‘Compassion is not the entirety of justice; but it both contains a powerful, if partial, vision of just distribution and provides imperfect citizens with an essential bridge from self-interest to just conduct’ (1996, p. 180). As such, the research raises questions about how the 529SOCIAL JUSTICE ‘LITE’? © 2017 The Authors. Gender, Work & Organization Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd. Volume 24 Number 5 September 2017 notion of compassion for each and every other may be taken further and mobilized for social justice in other areas to confront neoliberal discourse and the individualism that it champions. Conflict of Interest The author has no relevant affiliations or conflicts to declare. Funding The empirical study from which examples are taken for this paper was funded by the Economic and Social Research Council. Acknowledgments I would like to express my thanks to the issue editors and reviewers for their generous and construc- tive comments on this piece. My thanks are also due to Dr Deborah Dean and Professor Kim Hoque at Warwick Business School for their support during the research on which this piece is based, to Pro- fessor Martin Parker for his insights on an earlier draft, and to the Institute of Advanced Study at the University of Warwick for its support during the period of review. Notes 1. Participants were given pseudonyms. 2. See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jo4JfbEZACU (accessed 13 January 2017). References Ahmed, S. (2007) The language of diversity. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 30,2, 235–56. Ahmed, S. (2010) The Promise of Happiness. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Ahmed, S. and Swan, E. (2006) Doing diversity. Policy Futures in Education, 4,2, 96–100. Ahonen, P. and Tienari, J. (2009) United in diversity? Disciplinary normalization in an EU project. Organization, 16,5, 655–79. Ahonen, P., Tienari, J., Meriläinen, S. and Pullen, A. (2014) Hidden contexts and invisible power relations, A Foucauldian reading of diversity research. Human Relations, 67,3, 263–86. Baron, J. (2011) Utilitarian emotions: Suggestions from introspection. Emotion Review, 3,3, 286–7. Bennett, J. and Keating, F. (2008) Training to redress racial disadvantage in mental health care, race equality or cultural competence? Ethnicity and Inequalities in Health and Social Care, 1,1, 52–9. Bhavnani, R. (2001) Rethinking Interventions to Combat Racism. ERIC Sterling, VA: Stylus Publishing. Brewis, J. (1996) The Making of the ‘Competent’ Manager Competency Development, Personal Effectiveness and Foucault. Management Learning, 27,1, 65–86. Brown, C. and Lawton, J. (1991) Training for Equality, A Study of Race Relations and Equal Opportunities Training. London: Policy Studies Institute. Cornelius, N. (ed.) (2002) From equal opportunities to managing diversity to capabilities: A new theory of workplace equality. Building workplace equality: Ethics, diversity and inclusion. Padstow: Thompson. Crawley, R. (2007) Talking it out. Equal Opportunities International, 26,5, 497–506. Dean, M. (1994) ‘A social structure of many souls’, Moral regulation, government, and self-formation. Canadian Journal of Sociology/Cahiers Canadiens De Sociologie, 19,2, 145–68. Dickens, L. (1994) The business case for women’s equality, is the carrot better than the stick? 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(1996) Compassion: The basic social emotion. Social Philosophy and Policy, 13,1, 27–58. Nussbaum, M. (1999) Women and equality: The capabilities approach. International Labour Review, 138,3, 227–45. Nussbaum, M.C. (2003) Upheavals of thought: The intelligence of emotions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Nussbaum, M.C. (2004) Precis of ‘Upheavals of Thought’. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 68,2, 443–9 Nussbaum, M.C. (2005) Radical evil in the Lockean state: The neglect of the political emotions. Journal of Moral Philosophy, 3,2, 159–78. Özbilgin, M. and Tatli, A. (2011) Mapping out the field of equality and diversity: Rise of individualism and voluntarism. Human Relations, 64,9, 1229–53. Penketh, L. (2000) Tackling institutional racism, Anti-racist policies and social work education and training. Bristol: Policy Press. Prasad, P., Mills, A.J., Elmes, M.B. and Prasad, A. (1997) Managing The Organizational Melting Pot, Dilemmas of Workplace Diversity. London: Sage. Rawls, J. (1971) A Theory of Social Justice. Cambridge, MA: Belknap. Rose, N. (1990) Governing the Soul, The Shaping of the Private Self. London: Routledge. Rose, N. and Miller, P. (2008) Governing the Present. Cambridge: Polity. Singer, P. (2011/1980) Practical ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Stewart, N. (2009). Ethics. Cambridge: Polity. Swan, E. (2009) Putting words in our mouths, diversity training as heteroglossic organisational spaces. In Ozbilgin, M. (ed) Equality, Diversity and Inclusion at Work, A Research Companion. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, pp. 308–21. Swan, E. (2010) Commodity diversity, Smiling faces as a strategy of containment. Organization, 17,1, 77–100. Tatli, A. (2011) A Multi-layered Exploration of the Diversity Management Field, Diversity Discourses, Practices and Practitioners in the UK. British Journal of Management, 22,2, 238–53. Taylor, P., Powell, D. and Wrench, J. (1997) The evaluation of anti-discrimination training activities in the UK. International Labour Organization. Available at: http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/--- ed_protect/---protrav/---migrant/documents/publication/wcms_201195.pdf (last accessed 22 February 2016). 531SOCIAL JUSTICE ‘LITE’? © 2017 The Authors. Gender, Work & Organization Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd. Volume 24 Number 5 September 2017 http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_protect/---protrav/---migrant/documents/publication/wcms_201195.pdf http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_protect/---protrav/---migrant/documents/publication/wcms_201195.pdf Thorsen, D.E. and Lie, A. (2006) What is neoliberalism? Oslo: University of Oslo, Department of Political Science Available at: http://folk.uio.no/daget/neoliberalism.pdf (last accessed 22 February 2016). Tomlinson, F. and Schwabenland, C. (2010) Reconciling competing discourses of diversity? The UK non-profit sector between social justice and the business case. Organization, 17,1, 101–21. Vachhani, S.J. (2014) Always different?: exploring the monstrous-feminine and maternal embodiment in organisation. Equality, Diversity and Inclusion: An International Journal, 33,7, 648–61. van Dijk, H., van Engen, M., and Paauwe, J. (2012) Reframing the business case for diversity: A values and virtues perspective. Journal of Business Ethics, 111,1, 73–84. Zanoni, P. & Janssens, M. (2015) The power of diversity discourses at work, On the interlocking nature of diversities and occupations. Organization Studies, 36,11, 1463–83. Biographical note Deborah N. Brewis is a researcher of organization and critical management and Lecturer in Organisational Behaviour at Kingston Business School. Her research interests centre around (in)equalities, gender, ethics and the management of the ‘self’ in relation to work. She is currently writing about the relations of power/knowledge in the practices of diversity practi- tioners and conducting a new research project around digital social influencers. 532 GENDER, WORK AND ORGANIZATION © 2017 The Authors. Gender, Work & Organization Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.Volume 24 Number 5 September 2017 http://folk.uio.no/daget/neoliberalism.pdf 
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work_zj4aesarjvcm7gayrwoocetveu	----	Teaching the Immigration Debate in Freshman Composition Teaching the Immigration Debate in Freshman Composition Michael Hale Radical Teacher, Number 84, Spring 2009, pp. 18-30 (Article) Published by University of Illinois Press DOI: For additional information about this article [ This content has been declared free to read by the pubisher during the COVID-19 pandemic. ] https://doi.org/10.1353/rdt.0.0028 https://muse.jhu.edu/article/262639 https://doi.org/10.1353/rdt.0.0028 https://muse.jhu.edu/article/262639 RADICAL TEACHER • NUMBER 8418 Teaching the Immigration Debate in Freshman Composition By Michael Hale After the largest immigration raid in U.S. history to date, the New York Times ran an editorial entitled “The Great Immigration Panic” condemning the anti- immigrant hysteria sweeping our country. It suggests that a time will come “once the enforcement fever breaks, when we look at what has been done and no longer recognize the country that did it . . . . A nation of immigrants is holding another nation of immigrants in bondage, exploit- ing its labor while ignoring its suffering . . . .” While the language is clear and mov- ing, the tone is one of defeat because it concedes, “There are few national figures [read politicians] standing firm against restrictionism.” The editorial concludes, “Children someday will study the Great Immigration Panic of the early 2000s, which harmed countless lives, wasted bil- lions of dollars and mocked the nation’s most deeply held values.” Sadly, much of the immigrant rights movement has taken a similar poignant yet defeated tone since 2006. Looking at the current crisis in the immigrant rights movement from the perspective of a progressive teacher, I had to ask myself what I am doing to engage my students—not “someday”—but right now in this national debate. Not only do students need the critical tools to look beyond the vast amounts of disinforma- tion and propaganda in order to construct more informed, reasoned opinions (a point the editorial agreed with), but they also need to develop a sense of agency that enables them to participate actively in the struggles against anti-immigrant hyste- ria (a point that liberal publications will rarely concede). Only intelligent decisions arrived at through reflection and research fused with an understanding that change only happens with the active participa- tion of masses of people, peppered with a healthy sense of outrage, will begin to overcome one of the most dangerous and recurrent tendencies in American society. I have been involved in immigrant rights movements since my childhood in Los B E T W E E n H A L F -M iL L iO n A n D A M iL L iO n P r O T E S T E r S M A r C H A G A in S T i M M iG r A n T L A W i n L O S A n G E L E S . P H O T O B Y M A r C u S rt 84 text.indd 18 3/25/09 12:06:22 pM NUMBER 84 • RADICAL TEACHER 19 Angeles, from the Sanctuary Movement for Central American refugees in the 1980s to the fights against Proposition 187 in the 1990s to the struggles against anti- Arab hostility after 2001 to the massive immigrant rights marches in 2006. Most recently, I moved to Toledo, Ohio, and worked for the Farm Labor Organizing Committee (AFL-CIO) helping to orga- nize migrant farmworkers, mostly of Mexican and indigenous descent, in the Midwest and South. In my experience, the most successful immigrant rights move- ments do not wait on politicians to solve problems, but rather empower immigrants to speak for themselves and educate fellow immigrants and allies about the root causes of immigration. At the same time, successful movements create more allies and empower them to go into their com- munities and defuse the scapegoating and disinformation that consumes too many U.S. citizens. This article will discuss how I developed a freshmen composition class that tries to transfer the lessons I learned as an immigrant rights organizer into the freshmen composition classroom. The debate over undocumented immi- gration lends itself well to a research- focused composition class. With my syl- labus structured around purpose-driven writing situations, I try to break the larger debate down into a series of problems that students must confront in order to under- stand the issues, obtain reliable informa- tion, and form well-reasoned opinions. Each problem, and the strategies I teach in order to overcome the problem, match- es with an objective of the composition course. Thus, all students learn about and engage in the issue while developing the writing skills needed to succeed in the course and in their future classes. At the same time, the class helped a small percentage of students develop an activist consciousness that motivated them to par- ticipate in the immigrant rights marches, a union conference, and a campus-wide panel discussion on The North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Crisis in the Immigrant Rights Movement The immigrant rights movement in the United States has been on the defensive ever since the breath-taking marches in 2006. Millions of people marched against the repressive Sensenbrenner Act (HR 4437)—a bill that aimed to increase the criminalization of undocumented immi- grants to unprecedented levels and also to criminalize anyone who aided undoc- umented immigrants such as teachers, nurses, social workers, or clergy. The marches were the largest series of demon- strations in the last 20 years and arguably the largest demonstrations ever in U.S. history. After that inspiring show of force, the last two years have been among the most difficult for immigrants and their allies due to a number of factors. Immigrant com- munities have lived in greater fear than at anytime in recent history with hundreds of workplace and home raids by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), count- less families separated by detention and deportation, horrendous deaths occurring in ICE detention facilities, and a rising number of hate crimes.1 The movement underestimated the extreme methods the Bush administration would use to create a sense of crisis and fear. The immigrant rights movement also underestimated the anger that was mobi- lized by organized anti-immigrant forces. Anti-immigrant forces are nowhere near rt 84 text.indd 19 3/25/09 12:06:23 pM RADICAL TEACHER • NUMBER 8420 the size of the immigrant rights move- ment, yet those small groups of mostly white middle-class people are given far more respectability by the media and politicians. More importantly, they are given disproportionate access to broadcast countless lies about immigrants meant to whip up fear and hatred. Scapegoating immigrants and people of color in order to confuse economically struggling voters during times of war and crisis, thereby distracting them from the real source of their suffering, has a long and ugly history in the United States (Higham). Most importantly, too much hope was pinned to the Democratic Party and Washington-based national immigrant rights organizations that quickly moved to compromise with the Bush Administration on guest worker proposals without imme- diate legalization (Bacon, “Time to Build a Stronger, More Radical Movement”). More immigrants have died in ICE deten- tion facilities in the last five years than prisoners in Guantanamo or Abu Ghraib (Ruiz). Yet while many Democrats speak about Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo as a national shame, no leading Democrat, including Obama, mentions a word about the horrors of ICE detention or the suf- fering of the undocumented even when one of the largest immigration raids hap- pen in Laurel, Mississippi, the same week as their convention. With the defeat of all federal immigration reform legisla- tion, the immigrant rights movement has been unable to re-organize itself with the same sense of determination it had in 2000, placing it in a defensive posture. Using the disorganization of the immi- grant rights movement to their advan- tage, the anti-immigrant movement is channeling their efforts into hundreds of bills proposed at the state and local level.2 Like the Jim Crow laws, black codes, restrictive covenants, and sundown laws local and state governments used to repress African Americans migrating from the South to the North and West during the last century, these new bills aim to make life extremely difficult for immigrant communities. Because many of these bills focus on the large and grow- ing Latino population, some immigrant rights activists and scholars have begun to use the term “Juan Crow” to describe the systematic use of the laws to prevent the undocumented and those perceived to be undocumented from gaining full equality (Lovato). The bills essentially try to make every aspect of life from finding a place to live to finding a job to obtaining medical ser- vices to accessing higher education subject to verification of one’s status. Many bills also focus on making English the offi- cial language and deputizing local law enforcement to act as ICE agents. Several states are debating whether to ask state employees to act as ICE agents as well. As a result of Proposition 200, teachers in Arizona are asked to turn over names of students whom they suspect of being undocumented. The North Carolina leg- islature recently passed a law prohibiting undocumented students from attending any public college or university, and states that offer in-state tuition to undocu- mented students who graduated from high school such as California are under increased pressure to reverse their policy. Socially Conscious, Purpose-Driven Writing My experience teaching a composition class focused on the immigration debate ranges from positions I have held as rt 84 text.indd 20 3/25/09 12:06:23 pM NUMBER 84 • RADICAL TEACHER 21 an adjunct at several transfer-oriented community colleges in Los Angeles, California, to a trade-oriented commu- nity college in Toledo, Ohio, where I currently teach. While between 40-70% of my students in Los Angeles were work- ing-class Chicano/as and Latino/as some- where between first and third generation, the majority in Toledo are working-class white and African American students somewhere between third and sixth gen- eration. The grandparents of most of my African American students migrated from the South during the Great Migration to the North. While practically every Chicano/a and Latino/a student is made to feel their immigrant heritage, most of my Toledo students (despite Toledo’s Polish, Irish, German, Hungarian, and Southern cultural background) have no sense of their immigrant/migrant heri- tage. Teaching the immigration debate gave my students the opportunity to devel- op their writing skills by confronting a demanding issue that was being dis- cussed in their homes, in their places of worship, in their local and national newspapers, and in the streets of their community. The urgency and ubiquity of the issue gave many (but certainly not all) the excitement and motivation necessary to put in the hard work it takes to write college-level essays. At the same time, the new focus allowed me to break away from the standardized composition syl- labus while still fulfilling all the required course objectives. It also engaged my interest more than assignments created by administrators and solved many of the problems that plague freshmen composi- tion students who are asked to write a research paper, too often for the first time in their life. Breaking Away from the Standardized Syllabus The desire to teach a syllabus of chal- lenging reading, rigorous writing, and critical thinking often conflicts with the subtle and not-so-subtle push to teach an unchallenging standardized composition syllabus. If I take the standardized route, I feel guilty my students are just passing through, not learning what they need to survive; if I take the challenging route, I live in constant anxiety that I will lose my job and have to write my parents for a loan, again. Too often, adjuncts give in to the need for security and simply long for creating a challenging syllabus. If faculty question any administrator on the simplified assignments in most standardized composition syllabi, they will be told how freshmen need the sim- plest assignments possible in order to master complicated rhetorical modes like compare and contrast and cause and effect.3 Examples of assignments given by administrators are “Compare your favor- ite flavor of ice cream to your least favorite flavor of ice cream” or “Write a letter to Santa Claus describing in precise detail the gift you would most like to receive this Christmas.” As much as I would like Santa Claus to fulfill my wish of grading all my papers for the year, I find it hard to see how this helps students learn how to prepare for the difficult assignments they will confront in their upper division courses, nor do I see how these assign- ments overcome the “who cares” factor in order for students (and instructors for that matter) to gain the motivation to do the hard work involved in college-level writing (and grading). Slowly I began to move away from the standardized compo- sition syllabus and instead worked to place rt 84 text.indd 21 3/25/09 12:06:24 pM RADICAL TEACHER • NUMBER 8422 the students’ needs above my feelings of insecurity. Assignments Before I give any writing assignments, I find it important to set the tone for the semester and engage students right away with the urgency and complexity of the issue that they will spend the semester researching from various angles. I have tried a number of strategies to accomplish this, but the most effective has been a video documentary that presents the vari- ous sides of the issue but centers on the humanitarian aspects of immigration.4 Video seems to capture students’ attention better and drive home the magnitude of the issue. The first time I taught a composition class focused on the immigration debate, I ended the class with a video. A white male student, in his final reflection essay, explained why it would be better to start the class with a video. He wrote: When reading about immigration, it is very difficult to see the real people in the story. The film brought real people to life and showed the losses that they had achieved . . . . [The documentary] really helped me take into perspective that no matter what anyone says, immi- grants are human beings, and we are all the same. Many Americans today feel superior to the rest of the world, and this creates the biggest problem of all. As a human being, I believe that everyone is equal, and the documentary created a way to reiterate that belief of equality. Other students wrote about how the documentaries helped them realize that they had many false ideas about immi- grants. A female African American stu- dent wrote, “After watching the movie, I saw that many of my ideas and opinions about immigration, the struggle immi- grants go through to get here and how they are treated, was very naïve.” From this realization, she was also able to con- nect the racism experienced by undocu- mented immigrants to the racism faced by African Americans. “Like black people, immigrants a lot of times are treated like they should not even be alive. They are taken advantage of . . . because people think less of them.” Assignment 1 Summary: Which Side Are You On? Immigration is a controversial issue that cannot be easily divided into left, liberal, and conservative categories. Because it places the students on unfamiliar ground that does not conform to traditional par- tisan American politics, the immigration debate provokes more critical thinking than a discussion of welfare or affirmative action, where the lines are drawn along more familiar boundaries. For example, conservative students who support the Bush administration do not know how to process his administration’s vocal support of “immigration reform” with their standard AM-radio, anti- immigrant rhetoric. Interestingly, there is considerable division in the Republican Party over immigration reform. Indeed, the Wall Street Journal editorializes, “No issue more deeply divides American con- servatives today than immigration. It’s the subject on which we get the most criti- cal mail by far . . .” (“Conservatives and Immigration”). A vocal minority of the Republican Party, represented by people like Representative Tom Tancredo and Pat Buchanan, wants strict enforcement rt 84 text.indd 22 3/25/09 12:06:24 pM NUMBER 84 • RADICAL TEACHER 23 and immigration restriction. A whole host of cultural nationalist, xenophobic, and racist hate groups orbit around this section of the Republican Party (Barry, “The Politics and Ideologies of the Anti- Immigrant Forces”). They have a popu- list message that speaks to disaffected working-class and middle-class voters. In contrast, a large percentage of the neo- conservative section of the Republican Party, represented by figures such as Bush and McCain, are more subservient to the growing demands from U.S. corporations for a large exploitable work force. They promote enforcement combined with a guest worker program and a long, com- plicated, and expensive path to legaliza- tion that keeps new immigrants in a state of constant fear of deportation and, therefore, more exploitable (Bacon, “How U.S. Corporations Won the Debate Over Immigration”). On the other side, liberal or left stu- dents must not only contemplate the divisions within the Republican Party but also divisions within the Democratic Party—particularly the newly elect- ed more conservative Democrats often referred to as the Blue Dog Coalition (Anderson). In addition, there are strong divisions between Washington-based immigrant lobbying groups and orga- nizations created by and predominantly composed of immigrants that work at the grassroots level for unconditional legal- ization and family reunification (Bacon, “Time to Build a Stronger, More Radical Movement”). For example, in a controver- sial editorial “Change of Heart on Guest Workers,” the National Council of La Raza (NCLR) withdrew its support for unconditional legalization for the undoc- umented and instead crossed over to the neocon/neoliberal camp by supporting a guest worker program advocated by the McCain-Kennedy coalition.5 There are also debates between leftist and liberals over open borders versus regulated bor- ders (La Botz). Additionally, nonpolitical religious students are being challenged by their spiritual leaders to adopt more pro-immigrant positions.6 Lastly, envi- ronmental groups have been split between Malthusians who advocate sharp reduc- tions in population and social justice envi- ronmentalists who research deeper root causes of environmental devastation than simply over-population. The Sierra Club has witnessed terrible fighting between these factions (“Hostile Takeover”). The first assignment asks students to summarize the positions of the vari- ous organizational forces involved in the immigration debate. It allows students to develop knowledge of the broader scope of the issue while sharpening their criti- cal thinking and writing skills. Instead of starting with the rhetorical mode, I start with the writing situation (how do you sort out the various factions in this debate?), and then have the students discuss which rhetorical mode would best fit the par- ticular demands of the writing situation. Sorting out these different factions lends itself well to a classification and division assignment. Students can choose to clas- sify and divide one side of the debate or both sides in a compare and contrast for- mat organized around a category such as “economic arguments.” For example, Tom Barry, a prominent investigative journal- ist on immigration issues, insists, “Anti- immigration forces include partisans of the two main political parties as well as adherents of parties and movements on the political left and right that fall outside mainstream political thinking” (“Politics and Ideologies of the Anti-Immigrant rt 84 text.indd 23 3/25/09 12:06:25 pM RADICAL TEACHER • NUMBER 8424 Forces”). In fact, Barry subdivides the restrictionist side of the immigration debate into six categories: Restrictionist Policy Institutes, White Supremacist, Malthusian Environmentalist, Paleo- Cons, Neo-Cons, and Border Vigilantes. Barry’s point underscores the uncommon nature of the immigrant rights debate, and how it requires deeper thinking than many other issues in order to form an opinion. Using Tom Barry’s article as a model, the first assignment asks students to write a 4-page essay in which they subdivide the pro-immigrant forces into categories they create. They select two articles from an online reader I prepared with links to articles from Barry, Bacon, La Botz, The Interfaith Worker Justice Center, and Guskin and Wilson in order to conduct research on the pro-immigrant forces. This assignment makes students reach beyond the simplistic pro/con, two-sided structure by which most controversial issues get framed in current U.S. poli- tics; each side is examined carefully to reveal many more factions than originally thought. Assignment 2 Investigation: Where Does that Information Come From? It is hard to find a topic that has pro- duced more news reports, studies, and dinner-table discussion than undocu- mented immigrants. The ability to cut away the unneeded or unreliable infor- mation using tools that are more objec- tive than subjective allows students to see the clarifying power reading and research can provide. While there has been an explosion of information cover- ing immigration, it ranges from rigorous scholarly inquiry to deliberatively mis- leading fear-mongering. With an unprec- edented number of interlocking lobbying groups, think tanks, pundits, and politi- cians, anti-immigrant groups are able to greatly influence the national discussion.7 Disinformation abounds!8 It has never been more important to teach meticulous investigation and evaluation of sources. I teach seven overlapping techniques of information evaluation (relevance, evi- dence, authorship, publisher, bias, timeli- ness, and comprehensiveness) advocated by most reference librarians and many research handbooks, but I also teach stu- dents that they should follow the money and study the leadership. Perhaps because it feels like a covert, defiant activity, my students really enjoy this. This is generally one of the most popular assignments. I use two large partisan organizations as investigative targets. These two organiza- tions produce a considerable amount of the information discussed in the main- stream media. The first is a corporate lobbying group named the Essential Worker Immigrant Coalition (EWIC); the second is an anti-immigrant think tank, the Federation for Immigration Reform (FAIR). On the surface, both are well-funded Washington-based organiza- tions that produce professional studies, Congressional testimony, interviews, and opinion/editorials for newspapers, radio, and television. However, EWIC is a lobbying coalition of large corporations like Wal-Mart and employer associations like the National Builders Association in alliance with certain national DC-based immigrant rights organizations like the National Council of La Raza, unions like SEIU, and religious institutions like the Council of Catholic Bishops. It is headed by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and rt 84 text.indd 24 3/25/09 12:06:25 pM NUMBER 84 • RADICAL TEACHER 25 fervently advocates for a guest worker pro- gram that would reproduce the indentured servitude programs of the past like the infamous Bracero Program (“Close to Slaver y”). Likewise, FAIR is not a disinterested research institute. It was founded and is still run by some of the most active elements of the a n t i-i m m i g r a n t movement.9 The second assignment asks students first to conduct a full-text Lexis Nexis database search to assess how often both organizations have been quoted in the daily papers within the last year and then write a reflection journal entry. Next, I send students to both websites (www. ewic.org and www.fairus.org) and ask them to evaluate the information pro- vided based upon the merits of its schol- arship and threats to its validity using criteria mentioned above. This assignment allows my students to understand that even information that appears authorita- tive requires rigorous scrutiny. To see the ways information is manipu- lated is not shocking for most of my immi- grant students. They often come from countries where corruption and propa- ganda is assumed to underlie most “news” reports. A Mexican student once told me that the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) (a center-right political party that ruled Mexico for over 60 years) runs sto- ries that “only children can believe.” This can lead to a paralyzing sense of hope- lessness. On the other hand, for many of my middle-class suburban students, the realization that they are being lied to can be very jarring. They take the discovery almost personally. Many move from com- plete trust to complete distrust. While I encourage students to have a suspi- cious attitude toward informa- tion in a conten- tious debate, a cynical or hopeless attitude only rein- forces and some- times even justifies the apathy already present in many young people. What is missing, I tell my students, is agency on the part of the student. Between accepting everything others tell you or rejecting everything and withdrawing, there is the middle ground of critically evaluating information and constructing your own opinion. This is an important revelation for many students. In a final journal entry, a Mexican woman spoke about an overwhelming feeling that things just happened to her and her family. She compared that feeling before to a new feeling she had: This class didn’t show me anything I didn’t already know in terms of the problem. I have already witnessed first hand what happens when a Mexican tries to cross the border . . . . You take your life into your hands for the promise of something beautiful . . . . I was mad before . . . often confused. . . . I knew the reality even before, but to see it from a distance through watching a documen- tary and reading articles made me think more clearly . . . . The class gave me facts and information to fight back against haters who often lie to make their case. The feeling of being able to research thoroughly, think clearly, and defend her- betWeen accepting everything others tell you or rejecting everything and WithdraWing, there is the middle ground of critically evaluating information and constructing your oWn opinion. rt 84 text.indd 25 3/25/09 12:06:26 pM RADICAL TEACHER • NUMBER 8426 self effectively gave her a sense of agency. Other students said that they felt as if they could participate in political discussions/ debates with their family members and friends for the first time in their lives. Additional Assignments Essays 3 and 4 focus students on critiqu- ing an argument of their own choosing within the immigration debate. I often ask them to find a direct quote claiming some- thing significant about immigrants from a pro- or anti-immigrant position. Their task is to assess the validity of the claim using scholarly sources—for example “all immi- grants are criminals,” “immigrants do not pay taxes,” or “immigrants pay billions into social security.”10 These assignments force them to search beyond the talking heads and dig for substantial informa- tion from peer reviewed sources such as academic journals, government publica- tions from the Census Bureau or Bureau of Labor Statistics, and nonpartisan think tanks such as the Pew Hispanic Center. They learn to interrogate the sources and the information they find with probing questions: After considering the totality of information gathered on a given claim, are there patterns in the information? Discrepancies? Agreements? What is the significance of the data? To where are their conclusions trying to lead? After completing essays 1-4, my students have outlined the complicated factions within the debate, amassed a sizable portfolio of research, and hopefully formed a position within the debate. In their final assignment, students write a 10-page research paper and argue for a solution to a specific issue within the debate using the research they have gath- ered throughout the semester. Of the three basic positions a student generally takes (open borders with unconditional legal- ization, regulated borders with some form of legalization, and enforcement only), no student has moved from one to another extreme. Each semester I have taught the immigrant debate, a few students choose open borders (particularly immigrant stu- dents and religious students), a few stu- dents remain locked within their enforce- ment-only position (but at least with a much more informed outlook), while most students move from an enforcement-only to supporting regulation of some form. Of the students who choose the regulation position, many were very interested in a visa program modeled after the European Union that would allow people from the Western Hemisphere to travel and work freely across borders.11 Some students saw this as pragmatic, some saw it as repara- tions for U.S. military interventions, and some saw it as a way to help the struggling U.S. economy without reproducing the harshest aspects of the Bracero Program. Results While focusing my students on the immigration debate allowed me to move away from the standardized syllabus and make challenging assignments that focused on critical thinking and argumen- tation, I found that it also solved many other problems that plague freshman composition students and composition instructors. By focusing the entire class on one debatable issue, the students had an opportunity to develop a broad knowledge of that issue; this helped to prepare the students to write their research paper. In my experience, many students who strug- gle through the first several assignments panic when they have to write a 10-page rt 84 text.indd 26 3/25/09 12:06:26 pM NUMBER 84 • RADICAL TEACHER 27 research paper. After reading numerous articles throughout the semester, they not only developed their opinions but also a good databank of sources to back them up. Their writing had a clear purpose, and because everyone was working on the same issue, they could find their position within a group of similar and opposing positions and collaborate in like-minded groups much more easily. My new focus also solved several prob- lems that plague me as an instructor. Immigration was an issue that chose me more than I chose it, mostly because I could no longer ignore it. I was tired of placing such a huge firewall between my classroom and my outside activism. The immigration debate engaged my interest as a teacher in a way that standardized assignments did not. I had surprising suc- cess in getting a small number of students to engage with the issue outside of the classroom. Several students became so interested in the issue that they partici- pated in immigrant rights marches. They did so because they were tired of seeing the abuses immigrants face. The main reason my immigrant students said they participated was to help their families live without fear of deportation. I also invited three students to give their papers on corporate-sponsored guest worker proposals at a union-sponsored forum on immigrant rights in Los Angeles. Writing on a social justice issue helped build a strong activist consciousness tem- pered by serious academic research. At the forum, a student opened her talk with an analysis informed by her study of the Bracero Program: “Ever heard the phrase ‘We learn history to help us prevent from making the same mistakes’? Well, it seems as though we have not learned from our past mistakes. The guest-worker program proposed by President Bush is a bad rep- etition of history.” During the 2008 Democratic primaries, both Obama and Clinton swept through Ohio speaking critically about NAFTA. In general, Ohio Democrats have a deep hatred of NAFTA. A New York Times editorial on 24 February 2008 argued, “Criticisms of trade agreements in Ohio are as predictable as praise for ethanol in Iowa.” Ohio voters see it as the principle reason manufacturing jobs have left the state. However, the vast majority never consider the effect NAFTA has had in Mexico or Canada. After listening in class to a Oaxacan guest speaker tell his family’s story of losing their corn farm after NAFTA passed, several students remarked that his story was conspicuously absent in the current discussion occurring in Ohio. Those students and I attended a campus-wide discussion on NAFTA and the election held by the political sci- ence department. During the question and answer session, I raised the issue of NAFTA’s effect on Mexican peasants and how it has forced millions of people across the border; I was quickly told that my question was outside of the range of the discussion. One of my students immediately jumped up, stood in line, and asked a similar question. He said to the moderator, “I used to be like you. I never thought about how NAFTA affected any- one besides my father who lost his job as a parts supplier.” He then related the story of the Oaxacan man and talked about how he believed the unemployed from Mexico and Ohio had much in common. It was one of the most rewarding experiences I have ever had as a teacher. It is this sense of agency that I really want my students to develop. rt 84 text.indd 27 3/25/09 12:06:27 pM RADICAL TEACHER • NUMBER 8428 Notes 1 For a look at increased detention see Detention Watch Network http://www. detentionwatchnetwork.org/. For deaths occurring in ICE detention see the Washing- ton Post’s investigative series Careless Deten- tion http://w w w.washingtonpost.com/ w p-sr v/nat ion /specia ls/imm ig rat ion / index.html and the New York Times special series “Immigration Detention: In-Custody Deaths.” For hate crimes see The Year in Hate by SPLC http://www.splcenter.org/ intel/intelreport/article.jsp?aid=886. 2 See National Immigration Law Center’s Local Law Enforcement Page for an overview http://w w w.nilc.org/ i m m l a w p o l i c y/ L o c a l L a w/ i n d e x . htm. For an overview of the types of anti- immigrant ordinances see http://w w w. immig ra ntsol ida r it y.org/ Documents/ Nov06OverviewLocalOrdinances/FIR- MOverviewofOrdinanceTypes.pdf. 3 While I believe these discussions are happening in every level of higher educa- tion, it is pushed harder and less hidden at the community college level. 4 There are many recently released documentaries focusing on immigrant communities in the United States. Here is a short list of recommendations: Wetback: the Undocumented Documentary follows two Nicaraguan men as they travel across Central American, Mexico, and the U.S. border. Casey Peek and Jose Palafox’s New World Border analyzes free trade policies and abuses happening on the U.S./Mexico border—particularly focusing on Clinton’s Operation Gatekeeper. National Net- work for Immigrant and Refugee Rights’ UPROOTED: Refugees of the Global Econ- omy follows migrants from Bolivia, Haiti, and the Philippines after policies from the World Trade Organization (WTO) and The International Monetary Fund (IMF) devastated their countries. El Immigrante by John Sheedy, David Eckenrode, and John Eckenrode examines the Mexican and American border crisis by telling the story of Eusebio de Haro, a young Mexican migrant, who was shot and killed during one of his journeys north. Point of Attack directed by Kathleen Foster follows the attacks against Arab immigrants after 9-11. These are all short documentaries that can be shown in one class meeting. 5 Janet Murgia, president of NCLR, wrote an editorial in the Washington Post announcing their reversal. This set off a wave a criticism. Nativo Lopez’s “NCLR’s Embrace of Bracero-type Program a Tro- jan Horse” is one of the strongest. 6 For example Cardinal Mahony in Los Angeles promised that he would instruct his bishops to disobey the law if HR 4437 passes. For an overview of religious posi- tions on immigration, read the Interfaith Worker Justice’s “For You Were Once a Stranger: Immigration in the U.S. Through the Lens of Faith.” 7 There are numerous studies that uncover the interconnectedness of the anti-immigrant movement in terms of its funding sources and ideologies including ties to the eugenics movement and White Power movement. Here are a few titles: “The Puppeteer” and “The Teflon Nativ- ists” by the Southern Poverty Law Center; Tom Barry’s “Whose Side Are You On” and “What’s FAIR Got to Do with It” 8 There are many reports that discuss this issue. Here are a few titles: Fair- ness and Accuracy in Reporting’s “CNN’s Immigration Problem Is Dobbs the exception—or the rule?”; Amy Goodman’s “The Dubious Mr. Dobbs.” Media Mat- ters has an ongoing archive of articles on this subject at http://mediamatters.org/ issues_topics/immigration. rt 84 text.indd 28 3/25/09 12:06:27 pM NUMBER 84 • RADICAL TEACHER 29 9 See note 4. 10 Several excellent articles and books have been recently published debunk- ing the common myths about immigra- tion. Guskin and Wilson’s The Politics of Immigration: Questions and Answers; Aviva Chomsky’s “They Take Our Jobs!”: and 20 Other Myths about Immigration; for a short- er article, see “Top 5 Immigration Myths the Campaign Season” by the American Immigration Lawyers Association. 11 This is a position advocated by Bal- demar Velásquez, founder and president of the Farm Labor Organizing Commit- tee-AFL-CIO, called the Freedom Visa (www.floc.com). Works Cited Andersen, Ericka. “Hybrid Politics: Blue America Goes Red.” Human Events. http://w w w.humanevents.com /ar ticle. hp?id=21169&key words=ariz&g t, 18 June 2007. Bacon, David. “How U.S. Corporations Won the Debate Over Immigration.” Multi- national Monitor. Winter 2005. http://dba- con.igc.org/ Img ra nts/2 0 0 4 cor pswon. html, 4 June 2008. ---. “Time To Build a Stronger, More Radical Movement.” American Prospect. 24 July 2007. http://www.prospect.org/cs/ articles?article=time_for_a_more_radi- cal_immigrantrights_movement. 4 June 2008. Barry, Tom. “The Politics and Ideologies of the Anti-Immigration Forces.” Coun- ter Punch. 25 June 2005. http://w w w. counterpunch.org/barry06252005.html, 4 June 2008. ---. “What’s FAIR got to do with it?” 19 Jan. 2006. http://rightweb.irc-online. org/rw/3053.html, 4 June 2008. ---. “Whose Side Are You On.” NACLA (2005). http://w w w.nacla.org/art_dis- play.php?art=2555. Chomsky, Aviva. “They Take Our Jobs!” and 20 Other Myths about Immigration. New York: Beacon Press, 2007. “Close to Slavery Guest Worker Programs in the United States.” Southern Poverty Law Center 2007. http://www.splcenter. org/legal/guestreport/index.jsp. “CNN’s Immigration Problem.” Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting. 24 Apr. 2006. http:// www.fair.org/index.php?page=2867. “Conservatives and Immigration.” Edi- torial. Wall Street Journal [Washington DC]. 10 July 2006. http://w w w.opin- i o n j o u r n a l . c o m /e d i t o r i a l / f e a t u r e . html?id=110008632, 4 June 2008. “For You Were Once a Stranger: Immi- gration in the U.S. Through the Lens of Faith.” Interfaith Worker Justice (2006). h t t p : // w w w . i w j . o r g /a c t n o w / i m m / IWJhndbk_4May07LORES.pdf. Goodman, Amy. “The Dubious Mr. Dobbs.” Democracy Now. 5 Dec. 2007. http://www. d e m o c r a c y n ow. o r g / blo g / 2 0 0 7/1 2 /5/ the_dubious_mr_dobbs. “The Great Immigration Panic.” New York Times (03 June 2008): 22. Guskin, Jane and David Wilson. The Poli- tics of Immigration: Questions and Answers. New York: Monthly Review Press, 2007. Higham, John. Strangers in the Land: Pat- terns of American Nativism, 1860-1925. New Jersey: Rutgers University Press; 2nd edition, 1988. “Hostile Takeover.” Editorial. Intelli- gence Report. Spring 2004. http://www. rt 84 text.indd 29 3/25/09 12:06:28 pM RADICAL TEACHER • NUMBER 8430 splcenter.org/intel /intelrepor t /ar ticle. jsp?aid=379, 4 June 2008. “Immigration Detention: In-Custody Deaths.” New York Times. Times Topic. ht t p: //topics.ny t i mes.com /top/refer- ence/t imestopics/subjects/i /immig ra- t ion _ detent ion _us/incustody_ deat hs/ index.html. La Botz, Dan and Ana Avendaño. “Open Border Debate.” New Labor Forum (2008). Lopez, Nativo. “NCLR’s Embrace of Bra- cero-type Program a Trojan Horse.” Border Voz. 26 Feb. 2007. http://www.bordervoz. org/guestworker.html#anchor_15. Lovato, Roberto. “Juan Crow in Geor- gia.” The Nation. 8 May 2008. http://www. thenation.com/doc/20080526/lovato. Murguia, Janet. “A Change of Heart on Guest Workers.” Washington Post 11 Feb. 2007. http://www.washingtonpost.com/ w p -d y n /content /a r t ic le /2 0 0 7/0 2 /0 9/ AR 2007020901947.html. “The Puppeteer.” Intelligence Report. Sum- mer 2005. http://w w w.splcenter.org/ intel/intelreport/article.jsp?pid=180, 4 June 2008 Ruiz, Albor. “Immigration’s human rights shame is now a moral crisis.” Daily News. 18 May 2008. “The Teflon Nativists FAIR Marked by Ties to White Supremacy.” Intelli- gence Report. Winter 2007. http://www. splcenter.org/intel /intelrepor t /ar ticle. jsp?aid=846. “Top 5 Immigration Myths this Campaign Season.” 2007. American Immigration Lawyers Association. http://w w w.aila. net/content/default.aspx?docid=24201. rt 84 text.indd 30 3/25/09 12:06:28 pM 
work_zkbjepqdr5hvvncaih4nvqhm64	----	Legislating Intersex Equality: Building the Resilience of Intersex People through Law This is a repository copy of Legislating Intersex Equality: Building the Resilience of Intersex People through Law. White Rose Research Online URL for this paper: http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/128521/ Version: Accepted Version Article: Garland, F and Travis, M (2018) Legislating Intersex Equality: Building the Resilience of Intersex People through Law. Legal Studies, 38 (4). pp. 587-606. ISSN 0261-3875 https://doi.org/10.1017/lst.2018.17 © The Society of Legal Scholars 2018. This article has been published in a revised form in Legal Studies https://doi.org/10.1017/lst.2018.17. This version is free to view and download for private research and study only. Not for re-distribution, re-sale or use in derivative works. eprints@whiterose.ac.uk https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/ Reuse Items deposited in White Rose Research Online are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved unless indicated otherwise. They may be downloaded and/or printed for private study, or other acts as permitted by national copyright laws. The publisher or other rights holders may allow further reproduction and re-use of the full text version. This is indicated by the licence information on the White Rose Research Online record for the item. Takedown If you consider content in White Rose Research Online to be in breach of UK law, please notify us by emailing eprints@whiterose.ac.uk including the URL of the record and the reason for the withdrawal request. mailto:eprints@whiterose.ac.uk https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/ 1 Legislating Intersex Equality: Building the Resilience of Intersex People through Law Fae Garland and Mitchell Travis1 This article presents the findings from the first qualitative study to consider the relationship between intersex experience and law; representing a significant contribution to a currently under-researched area of law. Since 2013 there has been a global move towards the legal recognition of intersex, with Australia, Germany and Malta all using different techniques to construct and regulate intersex embodiment. This article is the first to compare and problematise these differing legal approaches in the legal literature. In doing so it demonstrates that many of these approaches are grounded in ideas of formal equality that lead to the entrenchment of vulnerability and fail to build resilience for the intersex community. Through engagement with the intersex community a more contextual account of substantive equality is enabled encouraging new approaches to law and social justice. Our qualitative study revealed that prevention of non-therapeutic medical interventions on the bodies of children was understood to be the key method to achieving equality for intersex embodied people. Whilst this is the cornerstone of intersex-led legislative reform such an approach necessitates support through a mixture of formal and substantive equality methods such as anti-discrimination law, education and enforcement procedures. This article concludes by offering a series of recommendations to legislators capable of enabling substantive intersex equality. The last 20 years has seen a global increase in the legal recognition of intersex.2 Whilst a number of qualitative studies have examined the experiences of intersex persons in relation to medicine, this article offers findings from the first study to examine the practical impact that law has had on the lives and experiences of intersex embodied people. As such, this article offers new empirical evidence to an under-researched area. While the legal trend towards recognising intersex embodied people3 is still in its infancy, this movement is gaining significant momentum and a growing 1 This project was made possible by funding from the Socio-Legal Studies Association small grants scheme and the generosity and vision of our participants. We would also like to thank Anne Barlow, Neil Cobb, Georgiann Davis, Sarah Devanney, Chris Dietz, Sam Lewis, Michael Thomson and Julie Wallbank for their insightful comments on an earlier version of this article. All mistakes remain our own. 2 In 2003, Australia’s Department for Foreign Affairs and Trade recognised a third marker on passports. Since then, different jurisdictions have brought in legislative provisions designed to offer greater protections to intersex: See e.g. South Africa’s Judicial Matters Amendment Act 2005; Scotland’s Offences (Aggravation by Prejudice) (Scotland) Act 2009; Australia’s Sex Discrimination Amendment (Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity and Intersex Status) Act (Cth) 2013; Germany’s Gesetz zur Änderung personenstandsrechtlicher Vorschriften (Personenstandsrechts-Änderungsgesetz—PStRÄndG) 2013; Jersey’s Discrimination (Sex and Related Characteristics) (Jersey) Regulations 2015; Finland’s laki miesten ja naisten välisestä tasa-arvosta/lag om jämställdhet mellan kvinnor och män, Act no. 609/1986; Bosnia-Herzegovina’s Law on the Prohibition of Discrimination 2009; and Malta’s Gender Identity, Gender Expression and Sex Characteristics Act 2015 (GIGESC). Iceland is considering introducing legislative protections similar to the Maltese approach in 2017. 3 The terminology for intersex is contested. See e.g. G Davis (2015) Contesting Intersex: The Dubious Diagnosis. New York: New York University Press. The authors use the term ‘intersex embodiment’ as it highlights the material and biological basis of intersex as well as how intersex is socially constructed through institutions such as medicine, family and/or law. For the authors, embodiment takes place at the intersection of the material, the discursive and the institutional. This tripartite lens allows us to consider how the materiality of the body is situated, understood and http://www.statesassembly.gov.je/AssemblyPropositions/2015/P.40-2015.pdf 2 number of states are debating the possibility of legislative reform. Such discussions inevitably draw upon the experiences of other legal systems. However, many of these legal frameworks have yet to be critically evaluated in the academic literature and consequently it is unclear how far, if at all, these different approaches have actually responded to the needs and claims of the intersex community. Indeed, legal recognition is not always a liberating experience4 and there is a danger that law could actually decrease the resilience of intersex embodied people. 5 At present, the majority of states do not legally recognise intersex and continue to rely on a medical narrative that prioritises medical intervention to ‘normalize’ intersex bodies, rendering individuals invisible at the institutional and political levels as well as perpetuating bodily harms.6 Such states can be seen as failing to engage with formal or substantive accounts of equality. In contrast, some states such as Germany and Australia have introduced formal equality provisions that focus on status and identity using, for example, third sex/gender markers on official documents and anti- discrimination law in an attempt to level the social playing field.7 Others, such as Malta, have adopted a more holistic approach to legal reform based on a substantive equality model that concentrates on protecting the bodily integrity of intersex children by prohibiting unnecessary surgeries.8 This article considers contemporary legal responses to intersex and the critique of these reforms from semi-structured interviews with members of the intersex community. In doing so, the authors use vulnerability theory to expose how law’s continuing ignorance around sex as a spectrum, and latterly its focus on formal equality works to disenfranchise intersex embodied people. Moreover, vulnerability theory is used to argue that the state has a responsibility to redress ongoing social and legal inequalities that intersex embodied people face.9 Accordingly, the article sets an agenda for legislative reform informed by the needs and desires of the intersex community. Intersex Embodiment and Entrenched Inequalities constructed. The impacts of these constructions on the body make it ultimately impossible to understand materiality outside of the confines of discourse and institutions. Such an analysis therefore pays attention to medical and legal legacies around intersex but does not privilege them or attempt to pathologize intersex experience. Consequently, this article does not use the medical term Disorders of Sex Development (DSD) or Differences of Sex Development due to their privileging of medical power/knowledge. For more discussion of embodiment see M. Travis (2018) ‘The Vulnerability of Heterosexuality: Consent, Gender Deception and Embodiment’ Social and Legal Studies. And C. Dietz (forthcoming) ‘Governing Legal Embodiment’ 4 A. Kolbe (2009) Intersex, A Blank Space in German Law? In Critical Intersex, ed. Morgan Holmes. 147-170. Farnham: Ashgate. 5 C Mackenzie (2014). The Importance of Relational Autonomy and Capabilities for an Ethics of Vulnerability. In Vulnerability: New Essays in Ethics and Feminist Philosophy, eds. Catriona Mackenzie, Wendy Rogers, and Susan Dodds. 33-59. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Wallbank, Julie & Herring, Jonathan. 2013. Introduction: Vulnerabilities, Care and Family Law. In Vulnerabilities, Care and Family Law, eds. Julie Wallbank and Jonathan Herring. 1-21. Oxon: Routledge. 6 M Travis (2014) ‘Accommodating Intersexuality in European Union Anti-Discrimination Law’ 21(2) European Law Journal 180 – 199, 182. 7 Germany’s Gesetz zur Änderung personenstandsrechtlicher Vorschriften (Personenstandsrechts-Änderungsgesetz—PStRÄndG) 2013 states, § 22 Abs. 3: ‘(3) If the child can be assigned to neither the female nor the male sex, then the child must be entered into the register of births without such a specification. A recent decision by the Bundesverfassungsgericht went beyond this to highlight a need for the positive recognition of a third gender option (Order of 10 October 2017 – 1 BvR 2019/16). Australia's Department for Foreign Affairs and Trade recognises a third marker on passports while the Sex Discrimination Amendment (Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity and Intersex Status) Act (Cth) 2013 inserted section 5(c) into the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 to recognise intersex as a possible ground for anti-discrimination. 8 See e.g. Malta’s GIGESC. 9 M.A. Fineman (2010) The Vulnerable Subject and the Responsive State, 60 Emory L.J. 251, 268 At 266 n 53 3 In recent history, intersex embodied people have largely been absent from legal concern and instead constructed as a medical ‘problem’ forestalling questions of identity and legal protection. Consequently, intersex bodies have been regulated informally by the medical profession which has constructed a biomedical narrative of intersex through a catalogue of sex development ‘disorders’ and ‘diseases’ that (despite their often benign nature) are portrayed as requiring medical intervention.10 This narrative has traditionally embedded these issues within the private sphere and outside of public concern and thus state responsibility. Predominantly, the medical goal has been to ‘normalize’ or ‘fix’ these bodies through interventions to ensure they adhere to the sex binary. Surgeons routinely surgically alter children born with ambiguous genitalia, arbitrarily allocating them as male or female,11 which typically results in a lifetime of surgical treatments and hormonal dependency to maintain their allocated sex. 12 These interventions are usually non-therapeutic, having no medical benefit, and yet can lead to lifelong physical problems. Thus, such practices have been condemned by advocacy groups, human rights organizations and supranational bodies including the UN and the Council of Europe.13 Surgical interventions tend to occur soon after the child is born14 which, combined with the culture of secrecy that accompanies intersex conditions, has led to an erasure of intersex in political and legal discourse and often within the familial institution. Little is known about intersex outside of the medical profession and the shame and stigma attached to a ‘Disorders of Sex Development’ label prevents families and individuals from speaking out. Indeed many families go to great lengths to hide such a ‘diagnosis’.15 Given law’s role in determining who does and does not legitimately participate in society, its failure to recognize intersex people has had profound implications. Legal silence effectively legitimizes the medical account of intersex as a purely material concern, permits attempts to ‘normalize’ these bodies and enables their social or cultural erasure. Thus, law aligns itself with the biomedical discourse of intersex depicting such bodies as deviant or unruly and in need of taming.16 In doing so, law reaffirms a binary understanding of sex and consequently places intersex individuals outside of the scope of law; unable to participate in or to challenge the dominant biomedical narrative. Law’s silence is therefore not neutral; rather it perpetuates the existence of a striking power imbalance between intersex people, their families and the medical profession. In terms of vulnerability analysis, the medical profession also needs to be understood in relation to its embeddedness and context. For the purposes of this article, this embeddedness needs to be understood in terms of the binary sex model. The history of the medical profession is tied to notions of binary sex which it reinforces and legitimises (through the privileging of scientific knowledge) in order to maintain its own epistemic primacy. Treatment and diagnoses, therefore, must be understood through a general cultural, social and state acceptance of sex as binary. Within 10 Davis (2015). 11 See e.g. Fausto-Sterling, Anne. Sexing the Body: Gender Politics and the Construction of Sexuality. New York: Basic Books. 12 Julie A. Greenberg (2012) Intersexuality and the Law: Why Sex Matters (New York University Press: London) 5. 13 Greenberg (2012) 5 – 6. Problems can include osteoporosis, infection, scarring, incontinence and sexual functioning as well as psychological trauma. The UN has deemed such medical interventions to be “harmful practices”, “violation[s] of integrity” and “inhuman treatment” UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Juan E. Méndez, 1 February 2013, A/HRC/22/53, at para. 77 available at <http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/RegularSession/Session22/A.HRC.22.53_English.> (accessed 21/06/2016). See also Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, Resolution 1952 C hi l dre n’s ri g ht to phy si c al i nte g ri ty , 2 0 13 < http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-XML2HTML- en.asp?fileid=20174&lang=en> (accessed 07/12/2016). 14 Typically these interventions are at birth, before sex must be formally registered. In England and Wales section 2 Births and Deaths Registration Act 1953 provides that the sex of the child (and other details) must be given to the Registrar of births and deaths within 42 days. 15 Davis (2015). 16 Travis (2014) 182, I Karpin & R Mykitiuk (2011) 'Feminist legal theory as embodied justice' in Fineman, M.A. (ed), Transcending the Boundaries of Law: Generations of Feminism and Legal Theory (Routledge: Oxon, UK) pp. 115-130. 4 this context medical knowledge that reaffirms contemporary cultural norms is privileged over the lived experiences of individuals who do not conform to this binaristic model who are routinely characterised as a very small, unrepresentative minority.17 Moreover, such an analysis is attentive to the pressures that medical professionals face from other institutions. The familial institution, for example, exerts considerable pressure on medical professionals to produce a ‘normal’ child in order to create certainty and stability for their own normative worldview. As a result, decision making in this field is a complex entanglement of cultural and social norms, scientific knowledge claims and medical pragmatism. Against this background, law is often seen as a tool of empowerment giving centrality to the voice, desires or best interests of the child.18 Law is capable of levelling the playing field; and therefore the gradual legal recognition of intersex potentially indicates a shift in power and knowledge whereby intersex individuals can be framed in both medical and legal terms.19 Yet it is unclear how far, if at all, increasing juridicial responses to intersex are actually challenging this dominant medical narrative. Indeed, differing legal constructions of intersex can entrench vulnerability rather than enhance resilience. This article seeks to examine the efficacy of current approaches through interviews with intersex people in order to ascertain methods of enhancing their resilience through law and other institutions. Vulnerability Theory and Intersex Legal Reform: From Formal to Substantive Equality Martha Fineman’s work on vulnerability is a useful framework through which to examine current state responses to intersex. Vulnerability theory positions individuals in terms of both their material embodiment and embeddedness within social institutions and relationships.20 This theory starts from the position that we are all vulnerable. This vulnerability is both universal (we are all susceptible to disease or disaster) and particular (there may be differences in access to healthcare, or home insurance that exacerbate or mitigate these vulnerabilities). As vulnerability can never be eradicated, Fineman suggests that approaches to vulnerability should be understood in terms of resilience. As such, her work is useful for thinking through the ways in which the state and other institutions can increase or reduce individual and group resilience. For vulnerability theorists, the universal nature of vulnerability also necessitates a new relationship with the state. In contrast to neoliberal approaches that have seen the state withdraw from intervention on the basis of maximising autonomy, a vulnerability analysis highlights that such neoliberal understandings are rooted within a model of formal equality which perpetuates existing levels of social inequality. Approaches grounded in formal equality tend to frame injustice in terms of recognition rather than redistribution.21 Such approaches often fail to address the underlying causes of inequality instead 17 S F Ahmed Et al (2016) ‘Society for Endocrinology UK guidance on the initial evaluation of an infant or an adolescent with a suspected disorder of sex development’ 84 (5) Clinical Endocrinology 771-88. 18 J Bird, ‘Outside the Law: Intersex, Medicine and the Discourse Rights’ 12 Cardozo Journal of Law and Gender 65, 66. 19 Bird (2005) 67. 20 M Fineman, (2008) ‘The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the Human Condition’, 20 Yale Journal of Law and Feminism. 1 – 23. Fineman, (2010) 251-275. M Fineman (2012) 'Elderly' as Vulnerable: Rethinking the Nature of Individual and Societal Responsibility’, 20 The Elder Law Journal. 101- 141. M Fineman (2014) ‘Vulnerability, Resilience, and LGBT Youth’ 23 Temple Political & Civil Rights Law Review 307-329. 21 N Fraser (2003) in N. Fraser and A. Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-Philosophical Exchange, (Verso, London). 5 focussing their efforts towards anti-discrimination. 22 Moreover, Fineman’s vulnerability thesis exposes the liberal autonomous subject as a myth23 and further highlights the danger of formal equality as it ignores context and the material inequalities that may exist between individuals. A vulnerability analysis demands the state be responsive in a manner that is attentive to substantive equality. As Fineman writes: … the idea of the vulnerable subject was largely prompted by dissatisfaction with the equality approach and the limited ability of equality theory… to address the persistent and growing structural and political inequalities in… society…. Formal equality… leaves undisturbed – and may even serve to validate – existing institutional arrangements that privilege some and disadvantage others…. Formal equality does not challenge existing allocation of resources and power.24 Vulnerability is therefore an important device to “examine hidden assumptions and biases folded into legal . . . practices” and demands that the state has a responsibility to redress existing social and legal inequalities. 25 Part of this responsibility necessitates the state to actively monitor institutions in terms of their success at promoting resilience and to intervene where they are not operating in an egalitarian manner.26 Yet, formal equality is becoming the dominant method employed by states to address the needs of intersex embodied people. Largely, legislative responses can be divided into three themes: non- responsive, status-based and holistic. While the majority of states (including the UK) are non- responsive maintaining this medical/individual power imbalance, the most common state response has been to recognise intersex ‘identity’ within law either by integrating intersex as a ‘protected characteristic’ within anti-discrimination law and/or by using third markers to signify an intersex ‘status’. Australia, 27 for example, has specific anti-discrimination legislation, which recognizes intersex status as a protected characteristic (alongside characteristics generally appertained/imputed to persons of intersex status). Additionally, some Australian states have allowed birth certificates to omit sex where the sex of a child has been indeterminate,28 and in 2003, Australia was the first country to allow ‘X’ markers on passports for intersex individuals. This was expanded in 2011 to include all those of indeterminate sex.29 South Africa30 and Jersey31, have specific anti-discrimination legislation that includes ‘intersex’ within the protected 22 As shall be discussed in the context of intersex, such approaches fail to engage with the main concerns of the intersex community. These approaches may be better, however, than a UK approach which has made no attempt at equality. 23 See M Fineman, (2008) ‘The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the Human Condition’, 20 Yale Journal of Law and Feminism. 1 – 23. 24 Fineman (2012) 131-132. 25 Fineman (2010) 266 n 53. 26 Fineman (2013) 19, n 3. 27 See n 8. 28 This has occurred in Victoria and New South Wales. E.g. in Norrie v NSW Registrar of Births, Deaths and Marriages [2013] NSWCA 145 the High Court of New South Wales held that the registrar could record the sex of someone as ‘non-specific’ rather than ‘male’ or ‘female’. Here, the Court acknowledged that: ‘… [n]ot all human beings can be classified by sex as either male or female …’. 29 See <https://www.passports.gov.au/passportsexplained/theapplicationprocess/eligibilityoverview/Pages/changeofsex doborpob.aspx> (accessed 07/06/2016). Individuals have to provide medical evidence of their intersex status. The right to a non-binary passport has also recently been won in the US <http://www.lambdalegal.org/in-court/legal- docs/zzyym_co_20161122_order> (last accessed 16/1/2017) 30 Section 16 Judicial Matters Amendment Act 2005 amended the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act (2000) so that section 1 now includes intersex within the protected characteristic of sex. 31 The Discrimination (Sex and Related Characteristics) (Jersey) Regulations 2015 amended the Discrimination (Jersey) Law 2013 to include intersex within the definition of sex. 6 characteristic of ‘sex’, Finland 32 includes ‘gender features of the body’ within the protected characteristics of ‘gender identity and gender expression’ and Greece and Bosnia-Herzegovina33 prohibit discrimination and hate crimes made on the basis of ‘sex characteristics’. Scotland offers more limited recognition not within anti-discrimination law,34 but through an extension of ‘hate crime’ legislation.35 Germany, although having no specific anti-discriminatory provisions, allows for third markers on birth certificates to be used for intersex embodied children36 and it, alongside an increasing number of other states, permits individuals (including intersex embodied people) to choose a third marker on passports.37 While there are a variety of ways through which a state may formally embed ‘intersex’, unpicking the effect that this will have on the individual/medical professions’ power imbalance is complex. Status-based approaches are focused on formal rather than substantive equality; the mechanisms employed, like anti-discrimination law, do not attempt to redress substantive inequalities as they do not directly challenge the authority of the medical profession. Instead, they formally recognize intersex as a legal category rather than redressing the resilience of these individuals. Anti- discrimination law may go further than third markers to offer intersex individuals basic protections within the workplace and beyond, but it is not designed to prohibit medical interventions and thus it is unclear how far such provisions will shift power away from the medical jurisdiction towards intersex individuals. Moreover, as most of these provisions are based on the existence of an intersex status, they inevitably require some affirmative action through self-identification by the individual (or indeed their parents)38 to ‘activate’ their legal ‘intersex’ identity.39 Thus, the individual (or parents) must openly challenge the biomedical discourse and the culture of erasure themselves before legal provisions based on status are able to take effect. At the same time institutions incentivize individuals (and parents) to conform to heteronormative and binary-led values and make it exceptionally difficult to make choices outside of these constraints.40 Only Australia has a broader approach that not only prohibits discrimination on the grounds of intersex status, but also on the grounds of characteristics generally imputed to intersex individuals. 41 This broader approach may allow for a richer variety of possibilities in the formation and defense of their legal identity. Nonetheless, there is still the real possibility that legal recognition of intersex status may empower in the long-term: the creation of a legal space will increase the visibility of intersex individuals at the institutional and discursive levels. Bird, for example, argues that such legal acknowledgement of intersex will not only create greater space for political negotiation, but it may create a social space for individuals to participate in if they so wish. 42 This may in turn give 32 Section 3(5) laki miesten ja naisten välisestä tasa-arvosta/lag om jämställdhet mellan kvinnor och män, Act no. 609/1986, Finland’s Gender Equality Act was amended in 2015 to extend protections to intersex individuals. 33 Article 2 Law on the Prohibition of Discrimination 2009 was amended in July 2016. 34 Scotland’s anti-discrimination law is governed by the Equality Act 2010 which does not recognise intersex as a protected characteristic. This Act also covers England and Wales. 35 Section 2 Offences (Aggravation by Prejudice) (Scotland) Act 2009. Rather problematically, however, intersex falls under the definition of ‘transgender identity’ under s 8(a). 36 See n 7. 37 New Zealand also allows ‘X’ on passports for those of ‘indeterminate/unspecified’ sex, however, there is no mention of ‘intersex’ and applicants are classified as ‘transgender applicants’ thus it is questionable how far intersex individuals would be able to use this third marker. See <https://www.passports.govt.nz/transgender-applicants> (last accessed 06/06/2016). Outside of the West, Bangladesh allows a third marker for its trans, intersex or third- gender individuals. 38 In Germany, for example, the decision to not assign male or female to an intersex infant may rest with the parents. 39 Greenberg (2012) 49. 40 See e.g. M. Travis 2018). 41 Section 5C Sex Discrimination Act 1984. 42 Bird (2005) 67. 7 individuals a legal platform to legitimately challenge the authority of the medical profession and fundamentally instigate broader social changes that redress substantive inequalities. While formal equality approaches are becoming the favoured state solution, only one state at the time of writing, Malta, has adopted a ‘holistic’ approach43 that responds to the most important agenda issue for the intersex community: Malta specifically outlaws unnecessary sex assignment treatment and surgery on intersex minors through the Gender Identity, Gender Expression and Sex Characteristics Act 2015 (GIGESC). Section 15 GIGESC defers sex reassignment surgery and surgical interventions on sex characteristics until the individual is able to make an informed choice. Section 15(2) recognises there may be some exceptional circumstances whereby surgery takes place where a minor is unable to provide consent but states that ‘medical intervention which is driven by social factors without the consent of the individual concerned will be in violation of this Act’. This form of legal governance directly challenges the medical jurisdiction over intersex bodies as it allows individuals rather than their families and doctors to make ‘decisions affecting their own bodily integrity and physical autonomy’.44 Additionally, Malta permits individuals to self-determine their own gender identity (without medical evidence); 45 extends its ‘hate crime’ legislation to incorporate sex characteristics and also sets out sex characteristics as a protected category within its anti-discrimination law.46 Thus Malta has an expansive approach that decouples legal regulation of intersex embodiment from the biomedical narrative and instead attempts to redress substantive inequalities. Indeed the major purpose of these reforms were not only to recognise intersex embodied people, but also to attempt to integrate intersex embodied people as full participants within Maltese society.47 This article evaluates the implications of these different approaches in practice and considers whether the more formal-based mechanisms have failed to increase the resilience of intersex persons. To do so this article presents findings from an empirical study that examined the ways in which intersex people are governed. Methodology This was a qualitative study designed to produce an in-depth and detailed examination of legal reform in the area of intersex equality. The authors conducted 17 semi-structured interviews with intersex rights activists between August 2014 and August 2016 of whom 14 identified as intersex. 48 Although this sample is therefore small, it is nevertheless appropriate for such a qualitative study.49 Moreover, the cultural and medical invisibility of intersex makes this group very 43 Although legislative reform is currently being debated in Iceland. 44 Objects and Reasons, GIGESC. 45 Section 4 GIGESC allows individuals to change official records of their gender without any requiring medical evidence. 46 Section 4 GIGESC allows individuals to request change in first name and recorded gendered to reflect self- determined gender. No medical evidence is necessary. Section 10(3) amends Article 83B of the Maltese Criminal Code to include offences motivated on the basis of gender expression and sex characteristics. Section 14 GIGESC prohibits discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, gender identity, gender expression and sex characteristics’ discrimination. 47 Section 4 allows individuals to request change in first name and recorded gendered to reflect self-determined gender. No medical evidence is necessary. Section 10(3) amends Article 83B of the Maltese Criminal Code to include offences motivated on the basis of gender expression and sex characteristics. Section 14 GIGESC prohibits any discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, gender identity, gender expression and sex characteristics’ discrimination. 48 Fourteen were interviewed by telephone, three submitted electronic email responses either because of resources or because they did not want to be interviewed. One telephone interview involved two of the respondents who wanted to be interviewed together. 8 difficult to access particularly when constrained by time and resources. Thus the authors used purposive sampling as they wanted to interview individuals who were likely to be aware of global developments in intersex rights, namely activists,50 and suitable participants were identified and contacted through organizational websites and also by snowballing. 51 The sample includes individuals from non-responsive states like the UK, Denmark, USA and Sweden; status-based states like Australia and Germany; and holistic states such as in Malta and the proposed legislative reforms in Iceland. Whilst individuals were from a range of cultural and social backgrounds and thus do not represent the views of the entire intersex populace, the close interconnectedness of the international intersex activist community meant participants were aware of various global legal developments. Thus, individuals were helpfully able to draw on the practical experiences within their own cultural, social and legal contexts as well as offer comparisons with alternative approaches. Perhaps due to the method of participant recruitment the study does not contain the views of activists or intersex people from the global south. This may have important ramifications on the ability to extrapolate from this data in a number of different contexts. Certainly, this is an avenue worthy of future exploration.52 Given the sensitive nature of this topic, the authors ensured that the study complied with the SLSA’s ethical guidelines by using information sheets to ensure consent was fully informed, participation was voluntary, anonymous and confidential.53 The authors also asked individuals from two independent intersex organisations, (one UK-based, the other USA-based) to scrutinise the interview schedule and information sheets. The interviews themselves explored how far these differing types of legal governance increase the resilience of intersex individuals and examined the individual’s understanding of and relationship with law. This involved specific questions about the use of anti-discrimination law, third markers on passports and also the prohibition of surgery as well as more general questions relating to the interplay of law and medicine. The data were analysed using thematic analysis54 whereby themes were generated against the backdrop of vulnerability theory producing four main substantive themes: Intersex Concerns, the Fallacy of Formal Equality Approaches; The Transformative Potential of Formal Equality; and Challenging Substantive Inequality. The interviewees’ responses encouraged us to think more critically about jurisdiction and medical authority and their embeddedness within legal relationships. This creates a point of reflection for developing informed policy and guides responses to these issues at a state level. Intersex Concerns: Substantive Rather than Formal Inequalities 51 This term ‘activists’ also includes support groups and education workers. For a comprehensive explanation of the ways in which activism has developed in the intersex movement see Davis (2015), A Dreger & A Herndon (2009) ‘Progress and Politics in the Intersex Rights Movement: Feminist Theory in Action,’ GLQ: A Journal of Lesbian and Gay Studies, vol. 15, no. 2, 199-224. 52 A few particularly pertinent question may be how far activists from the global south identify as being part of this ‘global community’ or are capable of joining such a community and how far their concerns mirror those of activist groups in the global north. 53 The information sheets set out the project’s details and contact details of intersex support groups. Participants were made aware that they could withdraw from the process at any time, and all data was anonymised by removing any identifying information. To ensure confidentiality, access to non-anonymised data was limited to the authors. For the Socio Legal Studies Association’s Statement of Principles Guiding Empirical Research see http://www.slsa.ac.uk/images/slsadownloads/ethicalstatement/slsa%20ethics%20statement%20_final_%5B1%5D. pdf (accessed 09/06/2016). 54 This six step process was なょ to familiarise one╆s self with the data┸ にょ generate initial codes┸ ぬょ search for themes┸ ねょ rev iew themes┸ のょ define and name themes and はょ┸ produce the report┻ V Braun and V Clarke┸ ╅Using Thematic Analysis in Psychology╆ (2006) 3 Qualitative Research in Psychology 77, 84 and 87. 9 The respondents, unsurprisingly, indicated that many inequalities faced were substantive (embedded, structural and systemic) rather than formal (individual and localised). These inequalities arose out of the medical/individual power imbalance and the medical profession’s failure to understand intersex: it attributed intersex characteristics to be biological mistakes rather than ‘natural variations’. The consequence of this mistaken categorization was that the medical interventions used to ‘treat’ these ‘disorders’ were considered inappropriate. Nearly all respondents framed cosmetic genital surgeries on children as having no real certifiable benefit and instead often contributing to long-term mental and physical health problems.55 “… [The Medical profession] changes something which is a natural variation of humanity through to illness. They are created as patients that have a medical problem and they didn’t have one in the first place. …” (Respondent 7).56 “… most intersex, at least I know, are very, very traumatised and suffer from physical and psychological harm of these genital surgeries during childhood.” (Respondent 5) Respondents critiqued the lack of long-term follow up studies that track the effect of such medical interventions and called for a stop to these practices and for more research to be collected.57 “… there aren’t enough studies that really track the longitudinal effect of intersex people who don’t have their reproductive organs … I think that’s what the medical community should actually invest in given that they’re doing these surgeries, and in a way, it’s leaving people out in the cold ….” (Respondent 15) Not only were individuals concerned that the early timing of these interventions meant children had little voice in these matters, but many respondents were concerned that individuals and/or their parents were not fully informed or consulted by the medical profession. This finding of a lack of informed consent is being increasingly supported by other literature.58 “When you are seven and you realise that your mother especially and also your father are very stressed, everybody is stressed and it has to do with your genitals, and then you consent out of wish to please or to take this stress away. Everybody knows that most children are doing things because they want to be accepted or liked or because they want to please their parents, and the doctors.” (Respondent 5) Moreover, this medical approach is also accompanied by a rhetoric of secrecy leading to the erasure of intersex from mainstream discourse of which parents, as Respondent 7 put it, ‘become complicit in [erasure] innocently’: “… Doctors largely dissuade intersex people from contacting intersex support and advocacy groups rather than encourage participation” (Respondent 2). Additionally, some individuals indicated that medical records were difficult to access or were often incomplete: “… [it is very hard] 55 This evidence has been found elsewhere. See Greenberg (2012) 21 – 25; T Jones, B Hart, M Carpenter, G Ansara, W Leonard and J Lucke (2016) Intersex: Stories and Statistics from Australia. Intersex: Stories and Statistics from Australia (Cambridge, UK: Open Book Publishers) available at <http://interactadvocates.org/wp- content/uploads/2016/01/Intersex-Stories-Statistics-Australia.pdf> 109 – 113 and Chapter 6; C Minto, L Liao, C Woodhouse, P Ransley, S Creighton (2013) ‘The Effect of Clitoral Surgery on Sexual Outcome in Individuals who have Intersex Conditions with Ambiguous Genitalia: A Cross-Sectional Study’ 361 Lancet 1252-7; and also UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Juan E. Méndez, 1 February 2013, A/HRC/22/53, at para. 77 available at <http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/RegularSession/Session22/A.HRC.22.53_English.> (accessed 21/06/2016). 56 This is reflected in the literature, see e.g. S Preves (2003) Intersex and identity: The Contested Self (Rutgers University Press: New York). 57 This criticism has been reflected in the academic literature. See, for example, Greenberg (2012) 21; S Creighton (2001) Surgery for Intersex 94(5) Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine 218-220; and M Holmes (2005) ‘Distracted Attentions: Intersexuality and Human Rights Protections’ 12 Cardozo Journal of Law and Gender 127 – 133. 58 See e.g. T Jones et al (2016) 106 – 109. 10 to get this information that hospitals and medical professionals do not seem very willing to share it” (Respondent 8). All bar one participant stated that the fundamental concern of the intersex movement was therefore to prevent such unnecessary surgeries and in doing so directly challenge and override the medical jurisdiction:“We need protection from irreversible, non-therapeutic medical intervention on intersex infants and children who cannot provide informed consent” (Respondent 2). However, it was evident that this group felt unable to challenge the authority of the biomedical narrative alone and that their voices for the most part went unheard by the medical community: “… it’s unbelievable to me that clinicians do not want to hear from people, from a population who has been affected. How they insist that they have done the right thing when hundreds if not thousands of people are saying, ‘No, you have not,’ it’s mindboggling.” (Respondent 4) Many respondents felt that the intersex community lacked the resources to combat the dominance of the binary sex model perpetuated by the medical profession, which respondents stated was “very strong, very powerful, very well-funded”.59 Comparatively, intersex activists, charities and organisations were unfunded, relying mostly on unpaid volunteers from a variety of backgrounds. One respondent could not take part in this project because “we have no employed staff and work on [the organisation] in our spare time”. 60 Moreover, respondents indicated that mobilisation within the intersex community was difficult on account of the trauma that individuals suffered and fear of exposure. “You are very weak. You are in a very weak position and it’s because most of them are traumatised and are not capable to do this work and go public. Most intersex people I know, they are really afraid that somebody knows that they are intersex, even in the family.” (Respondent 5) Additionally, many individuals may not want to challenge the medical profession as they are reliant on the provision of medicine on account of their initial medical intervention: “… when you have a child and then they do the castration when he’s little and the parents really know when the child is after ten years we will need a doctor who gives us prescription for hormones. So there’s also a dependency. They are dependent on the doctors and then they don't want to criticise them because there’s some fear of reprisals in the background.” (Respondent 6) This type of statement highlights the complexity of the embeddedness of the intersex person as they remain reliant upon the very institution they seek to alter. Consequently, respondents viewed law as an integral part of a broader strategy to challenge this power imbalance between medicine and intersex. “… until doctors and clinicians are being sued and they feel it economically, I think that is going to have the biggest impact, that and then along with that education in the mainstream media.” (Respondent 4) The Fallacy of Formal Equality Approaches Given that the respondents highlighted substantive rather than formal inequalities, it is perhaps unsurprising that respondents were largely critical of state approaches which only focused on formal equality. Criticisms of formal equality fell into three themes: ineffectiveness, limiting the intersex movement and creating harm. 59 Respondent 15. 60 Respondent 10. 11 Formal Equality as Ineffectual Many respondents claimed that status-based approaches failed to tackle the day-to-day concerns of intersex people and there was a general sense that status-based reforms would be ineffectual in practice. While interviewees generally recognized the potential that third markers like ‘X’, ‘O’ or ‘I’ on official state documentation (such as passports or birth certificates) had in terms of challenging the sex binary (and thus an important development for non-binary trans people who wish to choose a non-gendered or third gender marker) the majority believed third markers were not appropriate to address specific concerns about the embeddedness of intersex people within their institutional context. Many stated third markers would be ineffective as most intersex individuals would not actually use ‘X’ on documents like passports. “It’s not an intersex issue. Most intersex are not interested in this.” (Respondent 5) “…most intersex people … either identify as being male or female and that is reflected on the passport.” (Respondent 1) Respondents were slightly more positive about using anti-discrimination law as a vehicle for empowering intersex individuals. For some, this was simply because anti-discrimination law carried with it basic social protections in the workplace and beyond which has transformative potential in terms of the day-to-day reality of intersex embodied people: “… many people feel the need to lie in their place of work …they might have to see doctors to deal with the ramifications of what has been done to them, for example to access hormone replacement therapy if they’ve faced some sort of sterilisation and often these treatments are only accessible through specialists facilitating the need to travel to see medical professionals …. For someone who doesn’t have any protections in place, it doesn’t feel like something you can safely share in your workplace whereas if the community knows that ok, this is protected, even if I mention it or say something that people piece together, then my job security is safe. Then that’s sort of a different reality to be surviving in.” (Respondent 8) Nevertheless, most respondents recognised the limited protective function of anti-discrimination law as it did not challenge, interfere with or even recognise the medical jurisdiction over intersex bodies: “[The] adoption of anti-discrimination legislation in Australia has made not the slightest difference to the human rights abuses intersex people face in that country” (Respondent 9). Indeed, the ruling in Carla (Medical Procedure) (2016) emphasised this criticism: here, despite the introduction of Australia’s federal anti-discrimination law in 2013, the Australian Family Court ruled that parents can consent to cosmetic genital surgery on their infant, even where it results in sterilisation, without having to seek the court’s approval.61 Some accused states of merely playing ‘lip-service’ to the needs of the intersex community rather than offering effective reforms. Respondents emphasised more generally that law needed to “have teeth” to the intersex community’s needs or it would be “a waste of time”,62 raising questions over whether anti-discrimination law alone will have any meaningful impact in practice. Individuals were concerned that status-provisions would have limited legal effect in practice; it was not common place for intersex individuals to experience discrimination in the workplace on a day-to-day basis; and consequently ignored the real material experiences of intersex individuals. 61 Carla (Medical procedure) [2016] FamCA 7 (20 January 2016). See M Carpenter (2016) “The Family Court case Re: Carla (Medical procedure) [2016] FamCA 7” available <https://oii.org.au/31036/re-carla-family-court/> (last visited 20/01/2017) for a critique of the case. 62 Respondent 7. 12 “This is lip service. This protects no one… I don't know of any intersex people who've been discriminated against in the workplace because they're intersex people … if I don't see the terms bodily autonomy, or the right to self-determination in anyone's statement of, "We enacted this or that," all I see is people unable to protect themselves continuing to be unable to protect themselves.” (Respondent 3) By focusing only on status, law has a superficial understanding of the intersex material experience and fails to fully understand the real issues faced by intersex embodied people. Consequently, some respondents involved in legal reform discussions in their own countries stated that they did not look towards states that had just used identity focused approaches: “We did not look so much towards anti-discrimination legislation in Australia which is on the basis of intersex status whereas we decided to take the approach of gender identity which is a very different approach because when you are getting into say protections that we want because they are of special importance to our community then we feel that is a much more holistic approach to making sure that everyone in our community will be offered these protections. There isn’t the need to prove your status.” (Respondent 8) This approach was highly reminiscent of Fineman’s focus on the institutional context that leads to inequality: “Discussions about discrimination tend to focus on particular episodes or specific situations and victims, and do not necessarily incorporate an analysis of the structures in which such actions are manifested….”63 This statement encapsulates the reasons behind the majority of participants’ rejection of both anti-discrimination law and third gender markers. Such an approach does not disturb the social structures that contribute to the creation of these problems. Anti- discrimination law and third gender markers fail to challenge the medical approach to intersex embodiment. Both these types of law do little to challenge this medical-construction and only offer compensation to individuals willing to engage with these legislative approaches on a case-by-case basis. Such narrow jurisdictional conceptualizations entrench a lack of resilience into the very construction of (and political possibilities around) intersex. As a consequence autonomy, rights and bodily integrity must be at the forefront of “institutional reform, not individual damages.”64 Status-based approaches are rooted in formal equality and do not ostensibly challenge the medical governance of intersex bodies ignoring the evidence that non-therapeutic medical interventions are harmful and continues to be performed on intersex children without their consent.65 Thus, such legal approaches ignore the calls to prohibit such practices from advocacy groups, human rights organizations and supranational bodies that seek to advance towards more substantive understandings of equality.66 Formal Equality as Limiting the Intersex Movement: Silencing Infant Genital Mutilation (IGM) and Perpetuating Misunderstandings Respondents were concerned that by effectively entrenching this limited understanding of intersex within law, such legislation may continue to perpetuate and reinforce narrow understandings of formal equality that presume that discrimination is the only barrier to achieving equality.67 The danger is that policy-makers and society may then believe that the matter has been rectified and many respondents were concerned that this would actually strengthen the hold of the medical jurisdiction by silencing narratives and the voices that challenged the medical regulation of intersex 63 Fineman (2014) 116. 64 Fineman (2014) 110. 65 Creighton (2001); and Holmes (2005), M Carpenter (2016). 66 UN Human Rights Council (2013), Council of Europe (2013). 67 M Fineman (2013) Equality, Autonomy, and the Vulnerable Subject in Law and Politics. In Vulnerability: reflections on a New Ethical Foundation for Law and Politics, eds. M Fineman and A Grear. 1 - 27. Farnham: Ashgate. H Collins (2003) ‘Discrimination, Equality and Social Inclusion’, 66 Modern Law Review 16. 13 bodies: “… it’s used to silence discussions about IGM ” (Respondent 6). Not only did respondents think status-based responses were most common as they were an ‘easy’ quick-fix option but some respondents believed the misplaced direction of the legislative response was also due to policy makers’ lack of understanding and interest in issues faced by intersex individuals: “For the politicians and so on, it’s easy to do this registration stuff because they can say, ‘We have done something for the intersex. What’s the problem?’” (Respondent 5). The failure to address the pressing issue of intersex surgeries was attributed by many respondents to the frequent conflation of intersex matters with other LGBT concerns. Most respondents emphasised the similarities between LGBT and intersex groups in terms of their “overlapping concerns … to do with the binary ideologies around sex, gender and sexuality”68 and the strategies necessary to fight cultural and institutional norms. However, some respondents believed that policy makers failed to identify the specific intersex concerns; namely that children undergo early medical interventions on account of being intersex. “Sometimes policy makers deal with trans issues and believe that by doing so they are covering intersex issues as well, not realising that protections put in place that benefit trans people while they benefit part of our community it’s not the grounds or key demands of our community.” (Respondent 8) This is perhaps unsurprising given that adopting the strategies and drawing analogies with other groups that are historically protected is a necessary strategy in a system where equality is constructed as anti-discrimination.69 Fineman, Fraser and others have emphasised that an anti- discrimination approach can create competition between would-be allies in the search for social justice.70 Groups have to compete for resources and can be hostile to those who attempt to draw analogies as they may view the tactic as ‘diluting’ their protection through ‘lesser claims’.71 “There is increasingly money available but it always goes for discrimination and LGBT issues. In our experience the intersex groups who define themselves as LGBT they get the funding, but groups like us who want a change in the medical practice we get shunned.” (Respondent 5) Fineman further critiques anti-discrimination law on the basis that identity characteristics can mask differences within groups (either based on identity or status). Participants were aware of these dangers and were particularly concerned that policymakers continuing conflation of trans and intersex issues could lead to negative consequences for intersex embodied persons. Similarly, identity-based approaches can conceal differences between groups and the general population. As Fineman notes: “Such division can undermine political effectiveness and impede coalition building.”72 The similarities between intersex embodied persons and society in general cannot be understated, with many participants seeking to enjoy the rights (such as bodily integrity) already enshrined in law and possessed by the majority of the population rather than creating new and unique legislation based on status. For most, problems did not arise through overt discrimination but instead felt that the state and its institutions created the inequalities that they faced. For Fineman, “in situations of disadvantage in which overt discrimination is not an issue, the characterization of vulnerability as individualized and attached to only certain groups can obscure various forms of structural inequality.” 73 These status-based approaches grounded in formal 68 Respondent 13. 69 Fineman (2013) 15. 70 Fineman (2013) 15. Fraser (2003). 71 Fineman (2013) 15. 72 Fineman (2014) 109. 73 Fineman (2014) 109. 14 equality contribute to clashes over funding and divisions between various advocacy and activist groups. Whilst some participants were pragmatic about sharing funding with, or obtaining through the broader LGBT coalitions, others were anxious that this might erase specifically intersex concerns from the agenda.74 Others still were concerned about the use of an identity category as the basis of legal protections. Formal Equality as Harmful Even more concerning, respondents emphasised that status-based approaches could actually in practice be harmful. The majority thought that using a third marker such as ‘X’ routinely to signify intersex would expose information that many did not want to be in the public domain: “… they don't want to stick out. If they had the possibility they wouldn't use this opportunity to put an X instead of F or M … they are really afraid that somebody knows that they are intersex, even in the family” (Respondent 5) In fact, an automatic third marker could actually make individuals less resilient; it would further serve to ‘other’ intersex individuals presenting intersex as a deviant or lesser sex thus ostracizing individuals at both cultural and institutional levels: “The moment you start putting Os and Xs on there, it’s like aren’t you stigmatising a group? Are you empowering them? Are you giving them more freedom or are you taking freedom away? … if I had an ‘X’ on … my passport, I would not feel happier I think. I would not feel like I had more freedom”. (Respondent 12) Moreover, some were concerned that using a third marker to signify intersex embodied people would further distort narratives surrounding sex and intersex. A third sex approach would fail to recognise sex as a spectrum with an infinite combination of possibilities and simply lead to a tertiary system with rigid categories: “I oppose them as far as “X” includes intersex. The use of “X” for intersex establishes or reinforces a notion that intersex is not “male” or “female”. This is nonsense. Sex is a spectrum from male to female (or vice versa) and intersex is a blend of both.” (Respondent 2) Most notably then, the respondents emphasised that a third marker should not be compulsory for intersex embodied individuals; X “should not be predicated on having intersex anatomy.”75 Rather, third markers should be available for any individual who wished to use one.76 Similar concerns about ‘othering’ and ‘exposure’ were played out in birth certificate discussions. Consequently many respondents were highly critical of the approach adopted in Germany. In 2013 Germany became the first European state to recognise third gender markers on birth certificates.77 Section 22 of the Gesetz zur Änderung personenstandsrechtlicher Vorschriften (Personenstandsrechts- Änderungsgesetz—PStRÄndG) 2013 states that ‘If the child can be assigned to neither the female nor 74 See, for example, recent controversy whereby an IVF company specializing in the removal of intersex traits in embryos sponsored a LGBTI event. <https://oii.org.au/30555/sponsorship-elimination-intersex-traits/> (Last accessed 13/7/16). 75 Respondent 4. 76 This would fit the trend towards self-declaration in legal gender recognition for trans people (e.g. Ireland, Norway and Malta) and additionally benefit non-binary identities. For a critique of self-declaration see C Dietz (forthcoming) ‘Governing Legal Embodiment’ 77 Germany’s Gesetz zur Änderung personenstandsrechtlicher Vorschriften (Personenstandsrechts-Änderungsgesetz—PStRÄndG) 2013 15 the male sex, then the child must be entered into the register of births without such a specification.’ 78 This seismic change to understandings of sex and gender in Germany was undertaken without similar changes to existing anti-discrimination law or marriage law. 79 Consequently, German intersex people are at an increased (rather than decreased) risk of discrimination and will be, in many instances, unable to marry. Alongside an increasing number of other states, it also permits individuals (including intersex people) to choose a third marker on passports.80 Such changes, although raising the visibility of intersex people also serve to decrease their resilience.81 Moreover, while some respondents felt the ability to leave birth certificates blank where children were of indeterminable sex would alleviate the time pressures placed on parents potentially preventing them from making hasty and irreversible decisions, many respondents were concerned that a blank or third marker on birth certificates would actually increase the chance of medical interventions. “… allowing a birth certificate to be filed with an indeterminate marker would give parents time and doctors time to come to rational decisions and that that would discourage surgery. There’s been various fears about it, including fears that doctors will say, ‘Well, I must… if you don’t let me do surgery, I have to mark unknown on the birth certificate,’ or that parents or doctors will rush the surgery to avoid that unknown marker. We haven’t seen yet how it plays out.” (Respondent 14) Certainly, recent evidence suggests that intersex babies born in Germany after 2013 who had been registered as ‘other’ had had their legal sex changed to boy or girl very quickly and at the same time the number of surgical interventions on intersex babies in Germany has increased since the law was amended.82 Germany’s approach may therefore be implicitly pressurizing parents to place their children into the sex binary to avoid their child being categorized as ‘X’ Most respondents believed that sex/gender markers should be entirely removed from official documents like birth certificates and passports,83 not just those who are intersex: “… any sort of third category on a birth certificate can, in fact, be dangerous… because it may warrant medically unnecessary intervention, so parents may authorise such procedures in order to prevent their child from being placed into any third category. To me, the bigger issue is why do we need those categories at all?” (Respondent 12) While respondents felt society was not ready to move away from sex/gender markers entirely, some respondents called for greater fluidity on birth certificates so children could amend the birth 78 § 22 Abs. 3: (3) 79 M Travis (2014) ‘Accommodating Intersexuality in European Union Anti-Discrimination Law’ 21(2) European Law Journal 180 – 199, 182. 80 New Zealand also allows ‘X’ on passports for those of ‘indeterminate/unspecified’ sex, however, there is no mention of ‘intersex’ and applicants are classified as ‘transgender applicants’ thus it is questionable how far intersex individuals would be able to use this third marker. See <https://www.passports.govt.nz/transgender-applicants> (last accessed 06/06/2016). Outside of the West, Bangladesh allows a third marker for its trans, intersex or third- gender individuals. 81 Some of these concerns may have been mitigated by a recent court ruling that held that people claiming a third gender could utilise existing anti-discrimination law on gender (Order of 10 October 2017 – 1 BvR 2019/16). . 82 Amnesty International (2017) ‘First Do No Harm; Ensuring the Rights of Children with Variations of Sex Characteristics in Denmark And Germany’ (Amnesty International: London). 83 For an interesting discussion on this point see D Cooper & F Renz (2016) ‘If the State Decertified Gender, What Might Happen to its Meaning and Value?’, 43 Law and Society 483 16 certificate if they wanted to. Participants noted that this alone however, would not do enough to challenge the medical profession’s continued use of non-therapeutic interventions. For vulnerability theorists, relationships between the state and ‘vulnerable groups’ based on identity politics are often enacted in two overlapping ways. The first relates to groups who are discursively (and perhaps institutionally) constructed in negative terms (such as immigrants, refugees or criminals). State intervention in these contexts consists of surveillance and regulation and can often be punitive and stigmatising. The second relates to groups seen as ‘deserving’ (such as the elderly or the impaired) where state responses are frequently paternalistic and also stigmatising. These two approaches are by no means exclusive and there are many instances of state regulation being paternalistic through surveillance and regulation.84 Paternalism, stigmatisation, surveillance and regulation have been the hallmarks of medical approaches to intersex embodiment. Certainly, participants were wary of paternalism, stigma and surveillance in their rejection of third gender markers. Moreover, these types of legislation highlight the dangers of focusing on formal rather than substantive equality. State constructions of intersex as a third sex through legislation fail to take into account the wishes and desires of the intersex community, the majority of which define as male or female. The next section also addresses legal identity but moves the discussion to the possible benefits of formal equality law. The Transformative Potential of Formal Equality While many comments regarding formal equality were negative, there was evidence of cautious optimism from respondents in relation to the potential of status-based approaches: many respondents felt that more formal mechanisms of equality could trigger more substantive changes at both a social and institutional level. Formal Equality: A Symbolic Shift Most notably, respondents praised status-based reforms for having instigated a symbolic shift. Status-based reform not only acknowledges the existence of intersex but also means intersex individuals would now be included in a social and legal space where before they had been absent: “It does get the term intersex in front of the public; it does force legislative bodies to engage with the material….” (Respondent 3) Thus, the creation of this legal space was viewed by optimistic respondents as a powerful and effective starting point for meaningful change; anti-discrimination legislation had created a space for negotiation. In the Australian system, the legislation was brought in during a consultation around wide-raging reforms to anti-discrimination law. In the initial construction of the bill, intersex had been framed as a gender identity issue. Consultation spearheaded by intersex groups allowed for the legislation to be more informed and so was seen as ‘opportunistic’ (respondent 16) rather than as the result of extensive lobbying. Such legal reforms were therefore commended for their potential to raise social awareness about intersex, and others acknowledged that it would now be easier to campaign for more rights in these states. “… there are just still so many people that don’t know what intersex is and therefore, so many people who are at the mercy of doctors who are misinforming them when their intersex children are born … anything that 84 See e.g. Clough, Beverley. 2014. Vulnerability and Capacity to Consent to Sex – Asking the Right Questions? Child and Family Law Quarterly. 26:371-396. 17 raises the profile of the issue and just raises awareness that intersex people exist … is relevant for sure …. In terms of getting these laws passed and getting the senate hearings they’ve got and things like that, they’ve been very effective in raising the visibility and the profile and getting government bodies on their side and that is a very important step to changing the [medical] regime.” (Respondent 14) Formal Equality: A Starting Point for More Substantive Changes Moreover, despite extensive criticisms of anti-discrimination law and third markers, other respondents remained optimistic that legal recognition of intersex status may be empowering in the long-term: the creation of a legal space will increase the visibility of intersex individuals at the institutional and discursive levels. Bird, for example, argues that such legal acknowledgement of intersex will not only create greater space for political negotiation, but it may create a social space for individuals to participate in if they so wish.85 This may in turn give individuals a legal platform to legitimately challenge the authority of the medical profession. The introduction of anti-discrimination law, or indeed any status-based reform was considered a positive ‘first-step’ towards a more holistic approach. Anti-discrimination law was therefore seen as the start of the challenge to the medical jurisdiction and to rectifying social inequalities in other areas. One respondent drew attention to the fact that the introduction of anti-discrimination law in both Malta and Australia had led to the creation of intersex-specific policies being developed in other fields such as education.86 Thus, while many of these ‘optimists’ recognised the shortfalls in terms of protection, they emphasised the fact that such reform must still be viewed as a victory: “I think I’m a big proponent of working with what we’ve got, and … yeah, you can critique this, but we need to call it a victory … this isn’t the most important step. It’s something that we can work with. It’s something that is valuable and it’s something that can give breathing room, a little breathing room to a very few people ….” (Respondent 14) Challenging Substantive Inequalities Despite this optimistic theme, the respondents believed that legislative reform that embraced substantive equality was the only way to truly redress the inequalities faced by intersex embodied people. Substantive Equality: Able to Redress Medical/Individual Power Imbalance While there were mixed responses to a solely status-based approach, all bar one participant felt that bodily integrity was the core issue for any state-led reform. Non-therapeutic interventions on infants should be deferred until the individual was old enough to consent and fully understand the risks associated with surgery. Legal approaches grounded in identity were seen as focussing on adults at the expense of the needs of children. In this context the role of law was clear; to protect the bodies of children from non-therapeutic medical interventions. This focus on bodily integrity has been mirrored in legal research around intersex issues.87 Participants felt more safeguarding 85 Bird (2005) 67. 86 Respondent 17. 87 M Fox, & M Thomson (2006) ‘Cutting it: Surgical Interventions and the Sexing of Children’, 12 Cardozo Journal of Law and Gender 81-97. E Grabham, (2012) ‘Bodily Integrity and the Surgical Management of Intersex’ 18 Body and Society 1-26. P-L Chau & J Herring (2002) ‘Defining, Assigning and Designing Sex’ 16 International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 327-367. F Ammaturo (2016) ‘Intersexuality and the ‘Right to Bodily Integrity’; Critical Reflections on Female Genital Cutting, Circumcision, and Intersex ‘Normalizing Surgeries’ in Europe’ 25 Social and Legal Studies, 591-610. 18 was needed in regards to surgery. They highlighted the sterilising nature of surgery and felt this ought to have judicial oversight. All respondents bar one believed the preferred solution was a rights-based approach that both focused on preventing surgeries and offering substantive protections to redress inequalities: “… I think it’s, again, human rights issues, creating spaces, having laws that are inclusive of intersex folk, but also creating provisions in school, at work, and protections for people who are intersex. And I think as there is more visibility, that will inform more policy. But I think it’s important to really… use the UN, human rights decree about the basic things that people need in order to live and to thrive .…” (Respondent 15) For many respondents, Malta offered a model of good practice for other states to follow having brought in a suite of holistic intersex reforms in 2015 which most notably prohibits unnecessary sex assignment treatment and surgeries on minors.88 As one respondent stated, “Malta is a beacon of hope.”89 Substantive Equality: Driven by the Intersex Community Malta’s legal reforms were considered so successful because policy makers had actually engaged in meaningful conversations with intersex individuals and groups, and thus the legislation was driven by the community’s needs and experiences. “[Policy-makers must work] extremely closely with the community themselves. People from those communities should serve as advisors to any legislative changes that are being proposed that affect their community. These are the people who will know how the proposed policies or legislation will work in practice.” (Respondent 8) Thus respondents articulated the need to educate policy-makers and legislators. Many also indicated that education needed to be targeted at the medical profession and wider society; legal reform alone would not change the mistreatment of intersex embodied individuals. “[Law is] a step … I really believe that other things have much bigger impacts. I think you have to [also] change the hearts and the minds of society.… I would like to see obligatory education for all clinicians, from sociologists, counsellors to psychologists to psychiatrists to all medical personnel and clinicians … that’s not just a two-hour lecture once in their whole training…. And along with that education of clinicians I would like to see intersex as something that is put into a school curriculum. (Respondent 4) Despite this positivity, given how recent this reform is in Malta, the full effects are yet to be understood. In other countries medical intervention continues to be structured as an emergency thus requiring surgical intervention early. Even where this is presented as a choice, parents are often willing to defer to medical expertise given the discursive and institutional invisibility of intersex issues. 90 Additionally, Malta permits individuals to self-determine their own gender identity (without medical evidence); 91 extends its ‘hate crime’ legislation to incorporate sex characteristics and also sets out sex characteristics as a protected category within its anti- 88 See n 42 - 45 above. 89 Respondent 11. 90 See e.g. K Karkazis (2008) Fixing Sex: Intersex, Medical Authority and Lived Experience (Duke University Press: London); Davis (2015). 91 Section 4 GIGESC allows individuals to change official records of their gender without any requiring medical evidence. For a critique of the ways in which self-determination of gender can be implemented see C. Dietz (forthcoming) ‘Governing Legal Embodiment’. 19 discrimination law.92 Thus Malta has an expansive approach that decouples legal regulation of intersex embodiment from the biomedical narrative and instead recognises and attempts to integrate intersex embodied people as full participants in Maltese society. However, it is important to note that Malta’s approach is not without criticisms and the intersex community has voiced concerns that its law lacks ‘bite’: doctors who conduct such surgeries only face a minimal fine93 and the law does not prevent parents from seeking treatment in other jurisdictions where such practices are not prohibited. Rather, the positivity is directed at Malta’s broader attempt to protect bodily integrity. In contrast to third gender markers and anti- discrimination law, approaches based around bodily integrity challenge the power, knowledge and jurisdiction of medicine by removing intersex subjects from its pathologizing domain. Such shifts relocate intersex embodiment away from the scope of intervention, regulation and surveillance towards equality, potentiality and resilience. This approach takes responsibility for the fact that many of the problems faced by intersex embodied people are caused by institutions and attempts to ameliorate these difficulties. Moreover, this practice encourages state responsibility for the medical profession and allows for disruptions of and negotiations around medical power and knowledge. This paradigm shift in the substantive equality obligations of state responsibility allow for bigger questions than simply ‘what jurisdiction does this fall under?’ instead enabling discussions around educational reform, legal protections and changes on an institutional rather than individual level.94 Furthermore, this institutional reframing goes beyond discussions of the public/private divide. Consequently, intersex embodied persons can be protected from not only law and medicine, but also the family, the education system and other (private) networks of potential support or harm. Such an approach prevents jurisdiction being articulated in ways that prevent state responsiveness. Whilst some may question the value of placing such powers in the state’s hands (that go beyond the public domain and into the private sphere), this article would contend that the state has to be the body that responds to these issues. Firstly, this is because such responses to intersex embodiment foreground the responsibilities of the state to all its subjects. Secondly, these responses acknowledge the role the state has played in creating the conditions for problems around intersex embodiment to occur (if not creating the problems directly). Thirdly, such an approach recognises that these are not individual issues but are persistent, pervasive and systemic. As such, the state is central to real progress in realising substantive equality and the goals of intersex advocacy, activist and educational groups.95 Recommendations 92 Section 4 GIGESC allows individuals to request change in first name and recorded gendered to reflect self- determined gender. No medical evidence is necessary. Section 10(3) amends Article 83B of the Maltese Criminal Code to include offences motivated on the basis of gender expression and sex characteristics. Section 14 GIGESC prohibits discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, gender identity, gender expression and sex characteristics’ discrimination. 93 €500 - €1,000 s 11(3) GIGESC. 94 See e.g. T Jones (2016). Also K Roen (2008) ‘But We Have to Do Something’: Surgical ‘Correction’ of Atypical Genitalia 14 Body and Society 47- 66. 95 It is worth returning here to the potential ramifications on these recommendations of a lack of participants from the global south. Our participants all came from states that are 'welfarist' and relatively benign (which have strong civil societies, 'rule of law' and have moved from legal frameworks based on sexual 'wrongs' to ones based on sexual rights). Our recommendations are thus based on the assumption of substantial state capacity which may thus limnit the contexts to which they can be applied. 20 Accordingly we recommend the following measures to be taken by states. First and foremost, non- therapeutic medical interventions on intersex children must be prohibited until they are able to provide informed consent themselves. The importance of this finding cannot be understated and supports a growing call in medical law to ensure the protection of bodily integrity for all people.96 In turn, therapeutic treatment must be closely monitored to ensure it does not adhere to reasoning that relies upon aesthetics or normativity or present statistical information in a manner that is unduly biased.97 Additionally, much more could be done to bring intersex embodied children and their families into contact with other intersex persons. This would provide a mixture of education and support allowing these families to ask questions in a de-pathologized environment. This, however, would require state funding of intersex organizations or new roles to be created within the medical profession – relying on voluntary contributions would make the application of this policy unreliable and patchy. 98 Secondly, educational reform is needed to combat binary understandings of sex and gender. Such an approach should highlight sex and gender as a spectrum rather than as a binary. Long-term, this strategy would destabilize constructions of non-therapeutic medical interventions as ‘emergencies’ allowing for a greater range of choices to be available to intersex embodied people and families alongside raising general awareness and acknowledgment of intersex concerns. At least for the medium term, children should continue to be registered as male or female, but with greater fluidity built into the legal categorizations of sex and attention paid to children’s wishes and desires.99 Thirdly, anti-discrimination law can be a useful tool, but only when used in conjunction with bodily integrity. If bodily integrity is not prioritised, anti- discrimination law risks being symbolic and worse, potentially entrenches intersex embodied persons into systems of marginalization. Consequently, where states like Germany and Australia have begun to introduce status-based reform, these must be accompanied by more holistic measures to offer any real resilience to intersex embodied people. Fourthly, third markers (on passports and birth certificates) were seen as largely unhelpful to the intersex community. Mandatory third gender markers on birth certificates for children were thought to actually lower the resilience of intersex embodied children and as such should not be an area of legislative reform. These community-informed recommendations attempt to set a new agenda for intersex reform grounded in substantive rather than formal notions of equality. Conclusion This article presents the findings of the first qualitative study of the relationship between intersex embodied people and law. The timing of this study is opportune as there is a global shift in the management and regulation of intersex embodied people away from medical models towards legal approaches. However, the ways in which legislation has sought to protect intersex embodied people has been inconsistent and achieved mixed results. Our study found that formal equality models of intersex regulation such as third gender markers on passports and birth certificates 96 Fox & Thomson (2006), Grabham (2012) Chau & Herring (2002), Ammaturo (2016). 97 For example, removal of testes is often based on the likelihood of becoming cancerous but the statistics highlight that these chances are less than the rates for breast cancer. By such reasoning all breast buds should be removed before puberty in order to prevent cancer. These arguments are not, however, mobilized against breast cancer and highlight the ways in which statistics and the power/knowledge of the medical profession are used against intersex embodied persons and their families. 98 While these developments could take place through changes in healthcare policy rather than law, our respondents remain largely mistrustful of the medical profession. Moreover, 30 years of patient advocacy work has yet to lead to medical reform in this area. 99 Births and Deaths Registration Act 1953 21 received a largely negative reception from the intersex community and were accused of being at best ineffectual and at worst potentially harmful. Many were more critical noting that such reforms failed to address the institutional roots of the problem pitting individuals against one another instead of focussing their attentions on the role of the state. Solely status-based reforms (as in Australia and Germany) were seen as being driven by non-intersex individuals and groups, and – in the case of mandatory third gender categories for children – as capable of entrenching vulnerability. Anti-discrimination laws (as in Australia) received mixed results. While much of this criticism reflected concerns about formal equality, it is important to note the optimism with which many spoke: that this was a starting point, such legislation may raise the visibility of intersex concerns; a potential opening for future negotiation. Thus it may be that formal equality has a role to play in terms of instigating broader changes at a cultural and institutional level. Rather, it is where formal equality is seen by the state as being a means to an end, or the final point in achieving equality that danger lies and the message here is clear for status- based jurisdictions: recognising intersex formally must not be seen as the end point in these discussions. The participants saw the deferment of medical interventions on children’s bodies until the child could participate in the decision (alongside other reforms) as the key area for achieving susbstantive equality. Malta, at the time of writing, is the only state to prohibit such interventions (at least in surgical form) through law and was seen as the gold standard of institutional engagement with intersex issues.100 In part, this is because legislative developments were holistic and involved changes to the education system as well as anti-discrimination law. State responsibility for its subjects’ bodily integrity trumps pathologizing accounts of intersex embodiment and cuts across the public/private divide. This requires a reorientation of jurisdiction but is certainly not outside the realms of possibility. These reformulations give intersex embodiment a legitimacy that is absent within medical discourse and open up the material experiences and political possibilities available to these individuals. 100 Chile has also prohibited these surgeries. 
work_zkedagerxzgf7pgggri6f3ufpy	----	10.11648.j.hss.20140206.11 Humanities and Social Sciences 2014; 2(6): 139-142 Published online October 20, 2014 (http://www.sciencepublishinggroup.com/j/hss) doi: 10.11648/j.hss.20140206.11 ISSN: 2330-8176 (Print); ISSN: 2330-8184 (Online) Measures to improve the effectiveness of the training for new police officers –with a focus on Central Police Academy Sungmin Bang, Changho Kim * Dept. of Security Management, Kyonggi University, Suwon, Korea Email address: kch@kgu.ac.kr (C. Kim) To cite this article: Sungmin Bang, Changho Kim. Measures to Improve the Effectiveness of the Training for New Police Officers –With a Focus on Central Police Academy. Humanities and Social Sciences. Vol. 2, No. 6, 2014, pp. 139-142. doi: 10.11648/j.hss.20140206.11 Abstract: Training programs for police officers provide necessary knowledge and skills for fulfilling daily tasks. Moreover, the moral aspect of the training instills discipline in the recipients to function as volunteers for the citizens. Therefore, it is the starting point for the new officers to not only achieve their individual goals, but to contribute to the organizational aim. Unfortunately, the training provided at the Central Police Academy (CPA) in South Korea suffers from the overwhelming amount of courses provided to the trainees over a short period of time and an overemphasis on the theoretical aspects of work. In this study, current states of the training in the United Kingdom and the United States are reviewed. A couple of things to note in the US system is that the content of training is becoming more diverse and the training period is being extended. Furthermore, it is a military-style training. A unique characteristic of the UK training is that it has employed the “apprenticeship” system. This study discusses issues with the training for new police officers in South Korea by examining comparable aspects in the United States and the United Kingdom. Extension of training period, practice-oriented education, and benchmarking the apprenticeship-based program in the United Kingdom are suggested. Additionally, assessing individual characteristics thoroughly at the school is recommended in order to increase the overall outcome of the police work. Keywords: Public Security Training Institute, Police Officer, New Officer, Training Program, Central Police Academy 1. Introduction In the rapidly changing and the complex environment, the police has strived to produce quality workforce. Also, raised civil awareness demands high-quality security work from the police. To fulfill the increasing demand, newly hired officers and inspector-level officers are trained at the Central Police Academy (CPA and the Police Training Institute and the Korea National Police University (KNPU), respectively. Nonetheless, the length (i.e. 34 weeks for new officers, 52 weeks for cadets, and 48 months for the KNPU students) and depth of the training are considered insufficient to provide the necessary training. Since the police officers comprise 82.4% of the lower-rank officers, the training targeting them must be emphasized. Therefore, this study explores ways to increase the quality of training that to provide adequate lessons and help raise the officers’ awareness for working properly as public servants. In addition, the suitability of the training period is reviewed as a measure to improve the current training system for new police officers. Specifically, this article aims to tackle the issue of the short period of training which affects the quality of lessons. Also, ways to improve the related human and resource infrastructure are discussed. In the current research, face-to-face interviews were carried out with new police officers who were under training at the Central Police Academy (CPA). The interviews were conducted from March to May 2014, and each semi-structured interview lasted for one and half hour on average. Additional phone calls were made when there was a need to clarify the information provided. As the interviews were conducted, it became evident from the tenth subject onward that similar content was being discussed repetitively, which made continuing the interviews unnecessary. The final number of interview participants was fifteen. During the interview, focus was placed on the effectiveness of the training programs for new police officers. 140 Sungmin Bang and Changho Kim: Measures to Improve the Effectiveness of the Training for New Police Officers –With a Focus on Central Police Academy 2. Literature Review 2.1. Definition of Police Education Training Police education training refers to the effort invested by the national agency to provide opportunities for the officers to gain the knowledge and techniques needed for their work and develop their values and attitudes [1]. Therefore, the police training helps individual officer contribute to the organizational goal achievement in a democratic and an efficient way. 2.2. The Relationship between Police Training and Learning Period Some scholars argue that the learning period should be perceived as one of the finals steps before actual hiring of an individual [2]. To illustrate, this is a good opportunity to asses’ individual competence in carrying out the necessary tasks. This method is also used in other professional fields including medicine, law, and academia. According to scholars, the learning period before getting into actual work should at least be one year to reap the benefits [2]. Unfortunately, the learning period in the Korean context is little more than its mere presence without the systematic implementation. 2.3. Discussion of the Effectiveness of the Training for New Officers 2.3.1. Components of Police Training Instructor, student, training environment, and training stage comprise police training. In order for police educational training to be successful, each component must maintain its normal functions [3]. Instructors convey messages and knowledge and even acts as the mediators who can transform the students’ behavior and characteristics. Students are expected to be multi-specialists in this fast-changing era. specifically, well-rounded individuals are well suited for the dynamic work environments of the police organization. Moreover, the tools and resources must be updated and available to facilitate the learning experience. Finally, different aspects of the police work that are crucial in performing daily work are included in the training sessions. 2.3.2. Factors of Training Satisfaction Satisfaction level of training is affected by diverse factors including human, physical, and psychological correlates. Training satisfaction increases the efficiency of the training and affects the educational performance directly and indirectly [4]. The factors of educational training can be categorized into external and internal factors. External factors are related to individuals and internal factors that are related to the school and the instructors [4], suggests that training satisfaction can be classified into the training design, operation, and content [5]. 3. Characteristics of the Training for Newly Hired Officers in the United States and the United Kingdom 3.1. Training System for New Police Officers in the United States The specific length and content of training vary by state an training institution. However, one common trend is that the material covered in the training programs is becoming more diverse and the length of training is extended. In this study, the case of Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) is examined. First, individuals who have passed the entry examination go through the eight-month long intensive training at the LAPD Police Academy. The trainees get paid for their participation. In addition to the education provided in class related to the laws, interpersonal relationship, foreign language, report writing, etc., outdoor training such as self-defense, shooting, and driving, ect is included. Specifically, physical training and self-defense are an important part of the program. Because of the high-level intensity, the trainees are recommended to review the process and prepare themselves for it. Following is the detailed description of the training system at LAPD. First, 230 hours of training is required on arrest and report, investigation, wireless communication, report writing, traffic accident investigation, enforcing traffic-related laws, etc. Second, 40 hours of training is included for defensive driving and other driving strategies in cases of emergency. Third, 113 hours of firearms training includes safe handling and storing firearms, marksmanship, carrying firearms, and methods to handling chemical substances. Fourth, 100 hours of training is provided on human relations, including maintaining positive relationships with the media, stress management, effective communication, hate crime, missing person cases, and domestic violence. Fifth, 105 hours of training is related to different laws on confiscation, evidence collection, arrest, and sex crime and crime against minors. Sixth, 142 hours of physical training aimed to promote the maintenance of healthy bodies, positive mind set, and endurance is provided. In this part of the training, self-defense is covered. As the statistics show, more than 100 officers die at workplace and about 40,000 officers are attacked by offenders; so this part of the training is highly emphasized. Police officers usually work independently from each other but team work is still emphasized [6]. Seventh, tactics training teaches the trainees about patrol strategies, making arrests at the crime scene, checkpoint searches, how to use fatal weapons and their limitations over the course of 98 hours. Eighth, the LAPD Specific Training includes high-level strategic techniques, special strike strategies, usage of the computers installed in vehicles, regulations on alcohol addiction and other work-related matters, cultural diversity Humanities and Social Sciences 2014; 2(6): 139-142 141 training, usage of K-9, air force back up plans, disassembling bomb, etc. [7]. As described above, the focus of the LAPD training is simulation of actual work setting and it is carried out in a manner that is similar with military training. Despite the fact that the police organization is citizen-oriented, the officers receive military style training owing to the characteristics of their work, so private and individual opinions are often ignored [8]. [9]. 3.2. Training System for New Police Officers in the United Kingdom The training system in the United Kingdom has been implemented for a long time and it is a useful method to sort out the individuals who might not be suitable to accomplish their duties despite the fact that they have passed the entry exams. In addition, it is meaningful because it is a good opportunity for the individuals to self-examine and self-discipline [9]. The IPLDP emphasizes the development of curricula. The point here is that the supervising agency is responsible for the trainees at the base level and higher level agencies are in charge of training and managing police officers and operating the training system. Particularly, the previous model with six stages are transformed by the national occupation standard and learning demand model and are adjusted to the individual learning style, effort, past experience, certificates, and intrinsic attitude and behavior. The 23 items of the standard comprised the 22 models which are again categorized into four stages. The first three stages are the independent components and are fulfilled before actual patrol work. Stage-1: 3-5 weeks of introduction courses given at local agencies. They include emergency situation management, risk management, hygiene and safety education, ethnicity and diversity, professional standard, usage of fundamental techniques, and local issues. Individuals are sworn in and the official authority is given to them. Stage 2: Community safety and training on public safety (2-3 weeks of training in which the trainees learn about related laws, ways to respond to and participate in solving the local crime problems, and are dispatched using risk evaluation. In this process, constant communication is necessary between supervisors. Stage 3-Patrol under supervision (flexible programs about laws, policies, and guidelines that vary by location). From this point, officers create the crime investigation models of IPLDP version and select courses. Until they finish every training, the trainees learn about the investigation processes and acquire necessary skills. Also, case file writing and management are included. To help increase suitable responses in real-life situations, trainers and supervisors try to simulate real-life environments even in indoor training sessions. Stage 4-Independent patrol (trainees go through about 30 days of supervised patrol first). In addition, in-class training that is required and that is optional are provided separately. Trainees give presentations on training performance which is assessed by an evaluator. The evaluation process follows the National Occupational Standard (NOS). If proof of course fulfillment for any of the training described above is submitted, the trainee can obtain waiver for the course. Moreover, in the case in which there are no instructors available, other authorized agencies can provide the training. In this case, the training hours can be transferred for college or graduate school credits or approved as the level 3 National Vocational Qualification (NVQ) [10]. Furthermore, for the smooth process of IPLDP, the National Centre for Applied Learning Technologies (NCALT) is in the process of developing a program. 4. Improvement Measures for Training of New Officers 4.1. Extension of Training and Enhancing the Training System Much discussion has been focused on the need to extend the length of training. Also, the system that produces the officers who are ready to work in real-life situations and promotes work ethics must be implemented. 4.1.1. Increasing Capability of Instructors Capable instructors are an important part of effective training. One-on-one training and mentor system will be helpful and providing coaching and feedback for presentation is also suggested for the change. 4.1.2. Reinforcement of Moral Education The moral of individual officers is very important because they will have direct interactions with the citizens. Texts that are aligned with the goal of establishing appropriate moral and ethics should be prepared and mentor system and counseling should be provided continually. Additionally, the trainees that need special attention must be managed separately to maximize their training outcomes. 4.1.3. Establishment of Comprehensive Real-Life Practice Town to Improve Adjustment to Actual Situations Police officers’ work must be specialized because the police activities place a great emphasis on the interaction between citizens and the police. Therefore, a place where the officers can reenact, review, and practice what they have learned will increase the applicability of their training to real-life situations. 5. Conclusions Compared to the training for new police officers in advanced countries, the training in Korea has been considered ineffective due to its short period. Specifically, the lack of applicability to real-life situations, inability of the training to sort out unsuitable individuals, the lack of emphasis on moral education have been pointed out as main weaknesses. Also, the problem with the legal status of the 142 Sungmin Bang and Changho Kim: Measures to Improve the Effectiveness of the Training for New Police Officers –With a Focus on Central Police Academy trainees and inappropriate training environments have contributed to the low training satisfaction level. Developing diverse teaching methods and moral education programs must be considered to increase the work ethics and moral of new police officers. Furthermore, the training before actual employment and new employee training must happen concurrently to increase the quality of training and improve the morale of the officers. Moreover, quality education provided by capable instructors is an important part of the improvement plan. Lastly, reasonable and wise distribution of resources should be the basic premise of the change. Improving the training and education programs for new officers must be viewed from a broad perspective since it will affect the future of the police organization. Currently, each government sector is going through its own issues but the problem of the training provided at CPA must be addressed comprehensively. With more number of quality officers being added to the organization, the quality of the instructors must improve as well. One way to accomplish this goal is to improve the pay and benefits for the instructors, which can work as a motivating factor and draw more qualified personnel to do the job. Nonetheless the most important thing is to reduce the amount of teaching load so the instructors have enough time to prepare their lectures and study the relevant material before each lesson. References [1] H. Lee and B. Jo and E. Choi, “Introduction to Police Administration”, Korea Institute of Criminology, 2006. [2] Fyfe, J. James and R. Greene and Walsh and F. William and Wilson and O. W., & McLaren and Roy Clinton. , Police Administration(5th ed.), New York: The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc pp.309-310,1997 [3] H. Lee, “Police Administration”, Seoul: Bupmunsa, 2007. [4] E. Han, “An Analysis of Academic station of Provincial College education”, 23(3 ):pp. 379-399 , 2003 [5] M. Kim, “Training of local officials Satisfaction Implications and Challenges” 18(2):pp. 21-40,2007 [6] J. Jeong, “Study in South Korea police education and training systems”6: pp.7-27,1995 [7] M. Kim, “A Study on Improving the Police Training System of Police Cadets at the National Central Police Academy”.2008 [8] Westley, “study of professional and organizational learning in schools”, 1990. [9] J. Jung, “Privatization and New Directions in the study of Policing”, 2006. [10] H. Park, “A Study on the Improvement of the Korean Local Police Service in the Era of Municipal Policing”, 2007. 
work_zkjiovzs2jdnhibamfo2mxgc7q	----	University of Birmingham Parallels with the hate speech debate: Floyd, Rita DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210517000328 License: Other (please specify with Rights Statement) Document Version Peer reviewed version Citation for published version (Harvard): Floyd, R 2017, 'Parallels with the hate speech debate: the pros and cons of criminalising harmful securitising requests', Review of International Studies. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210517000328 Link to publication on Research at Birmingham portal Publisher Rights Statement: This article has been published in a revised form in Review of International Studies [http://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210517000328]. This version is free to view and download for private research and study only. Not for re-distribution, re-sale or use in derivative works. © British International Studies Association 2017. 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Apr. 2021 https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210517000328 https://research.birmingham.ac.uk/portal/en/persons/rita-floyd(ed984b2c-1446-44e0-91a0-528e117c6ed1).html https://research.birmingham.ac.uk/portal/en/publications/parallels-with-the-hate-speech-debate(a1037e6f-8261-4341-af14-bc5c849284f2).html https://research.birmingham.ac.uk/portal/en/publications/parallels-with-the-hate-speech-debate(a1037e6f-8261-4341-af14-bc5c849284f2).html https://research.birmingham.ac.uk/portal/en/journals/review-of-international-studies(5a3120e1-dddf-434f-b09c-8785419a65dc)/publications.html https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210517000328 https://research.birmingham.ac.uk/portal/en/publications/parallels-with-the-hate-speech-debate(a1037e6f-8261-4341-af14-bc5c849284f2).html 1 Bio: Dr Rita Floyd is Birmingham Fellow in Conflict and Security at the University of Birmingham. Her work on securitization theory has been published widely, most recently in The Cambridge Review of International Affairs and in Contesting security: strategies and logics (edited by Thierry Balzacq, Routledge, 2015). She has also published widely on environmental and climate security, most recently in Conflict, Security & Development. She also has an interest in the English school, with her work on the value of solidarism recently published in the Journal of International Relations and Development. Institutional address: Department of Political Science and International Studies, University of Birmingham, Muirhead Tower, Edgbaston, B15 2TT, UK Email address: r.floyd@bham.ac.uk mailto:r.floyd@bham.ac.uk 2 Parallels with the hate speech debate: The pros and cons of criminalising harmful securitising requests Rita Floyd 1 Abstract This article argues that public expressions of Islamophobia are best understood as securitising requests (i.e. calls on powerful figures/bodies to treat an issue in security mode so that extraordinary measures can be used to combat it), especially in those cases where Muslims are feared and disliked because of the perception that Islamic people are prone to violence and terrorism. This article argues that harmful and derogatory securitising requests targeting racial, ethnic, or religious minorities are on par with hate speech and it highlights the fact that many contemporary societies are now seeking legal protections against such security speech (expressed most notably in the desire to ban Islamophobia). It is from this perspective that this article poses an important research question: With a view to protecting those adversely affected, are legal protections against harmful and offensive securitising requests justified? The research question can be answered by drawing parallels to the existing hate speech debate in legal and political theory. The research reveals that, although the case against legal protections of harmful and defamatory security speech is ultimately more convincing, security speech alone can be so damaging that it should be informed by a number of ethical considerations. This article goes on to suggest three criteria for governing the ethics of requesting securitisation. As such this article fills a lacuna in the ‘positive/negative debate’ on 1 I am grateful to three anonymous reviewers for this journal for their helpful suggestions and comments. For written comments or conversations on earlier versions of this article, I would like to thank Adam Crawford, Jonathan Floyd, Steven Hutchinson and Mark Webber. I am also grateful to Jonathan Herington for discussions on just securitisation. As ever, all mistakes and oversights are my own. 3 the ethics of security that has engaged with securitisation, but that has failed to consider the ethics of speaking security. Keywords securitisation, hate speech, PEGIDA, Muhammad cartoon crisis, harm, Islamophobia, positive/negative debate, security 4 Introduction One consequence of the terrorist attacks in France, Brussels, Nice, and Germany in 2015 and 2016 and the ongoing migrant crisis is the rise of populist right-wing movements and parties across the European continent. These groups have used the recent terrorist attacks to increasingly portray refugees and migrants (especially those of Muslim origin), as threats to security. In Germany, the leader of the Alternative for Germany (Alternative für Deutschland or AFD) Frauke Petry, for instance, requests that the German government secures Germany’s external border and has recommended that police and border guards should not rule out using firearms against illegal refugees if they do not respect the sovereignty of territorial borders (Zeit online, 2016). Her suggestion was backed by several high ranking AFD politicians, including, initially at least, Petry’s deputy Betrix von Storch and AFD MEP Marcus Pretzell (Stern, 2016). In a similar vein, after the initial (and later dismissed as false) speculation that the perpetrators of the November 2015 Paris attacks were refugees, and that “terrorist-refugees” were planning similar attacks in Munich. Lutz Bachman, leader of the PEGIDA (Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamisation of the West), movement spoke (on Twitter) of “RefugeISIS” – not refugees (Harding, 2016). Likewise after the 2015 New Years’ eve events in Cologne, where approximately eighty women were sexually assaulted and/or mugged by up to a thousand young men with migrant backgrounds, and consecutive similar incidents in numerous public swimming pools and discotheques, Bachman (during a Facebook video post) was wearing a T-shirt with the slogan ‘Rapefugees not welcome’, seemingly declaring that all refugees are security threats to (German) women wherever they go (Die Welt, 2016). Bachman uses these crass expressions to underline PEGIDA’s request to German politicians that they secure borders and also German identity. In his own words: ‘we [PEGIDA] demand here today, the creation of tougher immigration laws […] modelled 5 on the example of Canada or Switzerland. Deportation […] of Islamists and religious fanatics. [….] More means for national security [Innere Sicherheit] […] to deal with new threats and challenges.’ (Bachman, 2015: 3, author translation) The social and political construction – in language and lately also in visual depiction – of security threats has been a major concern for critical security studies for many years, evinced by the popularity of the Copenhagen school’s securitisation theory (Buzan et al, 1998). In security studies, securitisation refers to the process by which an issue is removed from the ordinary democratic process and placed in the realm of the high politics of security, where conventional rules no longer apply and where extraordinary means may be used to address the issue (Buzan et al., 1998). For many scholars in the field, a case of successful securitisation consists of both a securitising move (a speech act that declares an entity as threatening) coupled with audience acceptance and palpable, usually extraordinary, security action (Buzan et al., 1998; Balzacq 2011); it does not refer to security measures that successfully avert a (perceived) threat. This article argues that Bachmann and Petry’s remarks are best understood as securitising requests, which is to say rhetorical moves aimed at persuading others (usually more powerful actors) to securitise, but that are not in and of themselves successful securitisation. The scholar Juha Vuori puts the logic of these sorts of securitising speech acts in more technical terms: The perlocutionary effect intended by [securitising requests], is to convince decision makers of the urgency of a threat, so that they will agree to raise the issue onto their agenda and effect the suggested measures. The illocutionary point […] is directive, as the point is to try to get other people to do things, to get the hearer to carry out the course of action as represented by the propositional content e.g., to do X in order to repel threat Y. (2011:197) 6 The concept of securitising requests is important because it theoretically captures that securitising actors and their securitising moves do not exist in a political vacuum; rather they are influenced by a variety of actors including political advisors, opposition politicians, public intellectuals, newspaper editors and ordinary people. In other words, by actors whose intention in speaking security is not to announce, or seek legitimation for, the use of potentially extraordinary measures, but rather by actors who seek for others - more powerful actors- to securitise. In western liberal democracies, the media (specifically tabloid newspapers) serve as perhaps the most important entities in requesting securitisation. In the United Kingdom, for example, the Daily Mail has for years requested the securitisation of migration (Squire, 2914:85; see also Said,1997), and as such influenced the BREXIT referendum; both the initial decision to hold a referendum as well as its outcome (cf. Vultee, 2011; Croft, 2012:213). Although the logic of securitising requests is implicitly recognised by many scholars, it is common practice to refer to all instances of security speech as securitising moves. In other words, this paper is also an opportunity to clear up this conceptual oversight within securitisation studies. While the concept of securitising requests is important in its own right (notably how precisely they influence securitising actors), this article is primarily concerned with ethics of speaking security. Securitising requests are important in this context. Not only do they highlight that by speaking security actors do distinct things (i.e. advance towards securitization or else request that other actors securitise), but also a focus on securitising requests enables a focus on a much larger group of people than attention to securitising actors and their securitising moves would allow. Nonetheless, since both securitising requests and securitising moves are forms of speaking security, any recommendations concerning the ethics of security speech following this analysis apply to both forms of security speech. 7 In order to probe the ethics of speaking security this article starts by suggesting that securitising requests that are harmful and derogatory to racial, ethnic, or religious minorities are best understood as expressions tantamount to hate speech. Specifically, it is suggested that even in cases where the securitising request is not expressed using overtly offensive language; the identification of a minority as threatening simply because of who they are changes the minority’s standing in society and its effects are thus on a par with those of hate speech. The equation of certain forms of security speech with hate speech is an important one. It draws attention to the fact that the existing hate speech debate, which is focused primarily on racism, downplays the concept that harmful speech can also be motivated by genuine fear. 2 PEGIDA, for instance fears not only the threat posed from terrorist migrants/refugees but also the loss of German identity due to Islamisation (Bachmann, 2014:3). Hence the issue is not whether or not one has the right to express racist views, but instead, whether or not one may express fear even in the starkest possible terms. The link between security speech and hate speech also shows – as will be argued later – that harmful or derogatory security speech can cause retaliation by those offended, leading to real insecurity for societies in which the security speakers reside, while it can also stimulate hate crimes against minorities. Most importantly – for the purposes of this article – the link between hate speech and some forms of security speech highlights the fact that legal protections are increasingly being sought against specific kinds of harmful and offensive securitising requests. For the most part this takes the form of politicians, organisations, and parties seeking the elevation of public expressions of Islamophobia 3 to a criminal act. Before I can provide details, it is important to stress at this point that Islamophobia is ill defined and its meaning contested. (see, for 2 In the context of the Muhammad Cartoon crisis, for example one popular argument was ‘that equating Islam with terrorism, violence, and death is […] racism’ (Bleich, 2006: 17). 3 It should be noted that not all expressions of anti-religious or blasphemous speech are hate speech. Tariq Modood suggests, for example, that the Danish newspaper’s intention in publishing the cartoon was to ‘bring Muslims in line’ and ‘to teach Muslims a lesson’ (2006,5; see also Carens (2006, p.34) 8 example, Allen, 2010; Sayyid and Vakil 2010; Esposito and Kalin, 2011) The Runneymede Report, Islamophobia: A Challenge for Us All from 1997, which has been instrumental in establishing the term in popular debate, defines Islamophobia as ‘the dread, hatred and hostility towards Islam and Muslims perpetrated by a series of closed views that imply and attribute negative and derogatory stereotypes and beliefs to Muslims’ (cited in Esposito, 2011: xxiii). Strictly speaking, and as Chris Allen has convincingly argued, the conceptual ‘phenomenon’ of Islamophobia 4 denotes a hatred of Islam, while ‘expressions’ of Islamophobia ‘target religious or theological tenants of Islam’ (2010: 15,136). For the most part, however, as Fred Halliday notes ‘expressions of Islamophobia are ‘anti-Muslim’ rather than ‘anti-Islamic’. The rhetoric is against people, not religion’ (cited in Allen, 2010:135), and the term Islamophobia etymologically incorrect. Consequently many analysts now think that what is generally referred to as Islamophobia is really racism, specifically (cultural) racism and racialisation (Meer and Modood, 2009; Meer, 2013). In addition to the fact that racism here is a problematic label, because ‘Muslims are not a ‘race’’ (Sayyid, 2010:13), an exclusive focus on racism obscures that –for all its problems- Islamophobia is also about fear. Attributing ‘fear’ and ‘phobia’, however, runs the risk of exonerates the person having the phobia because a phobia is an ‘illness’. (Sayyid, 2010: 12; Allen, 2010:136). Consequently, if as I do here, one wishes to highlight the fear element in Islamophobia, it is important to recognise that some of this might be caused by already existing racism, whilst racism itself might also be caused by fear. With this in mind, let me now turn to the empirical examples demonstrating the increased desire to criminalise Islamophobia. In the United Kingdom for example, the former Labour leader Ed Miliband – in the run up to the 2015 election – vowed to make Islamophobia illegal (Chapman, 2015). Meanwhile the Subcommittee on the Constitution and 4 The threshold for what sort of thing counts as Islamophobia is different for different people because –it is widely acknowledged – that some people (mainly Muslim leaders) use it to knock down legitimate criticisms of Islam. (Allen, 2010:3) 9 Civil Justice within the United States House of Representatives is currently discussing a bill (Resolution 569, sponsored by Donald S. Beyer, Jr. of the Democratic party) that seeks to condemn ‘violence, bigotry, and hateful rhetoric against Muslims in the United States’ (https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-resolution/569/all-info), even though the U.S. constitution does not include hate speech protections. In Germany, section 130 of the German criminal Code ‘incitement to hatred’, which has its origin in Germany’s holocaust, has been amended twice in recent years and the law now prohibits ‘defaming segments of the population’ in speech and/or written materials. (German Criminal Code, 2015, §130) 5 Moreover, since the fatal shooting at the French satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo and the terrorist attacks in Paris in November 2015, non-state actors and individuals are urging the European Union (E.U.) to consider a Europe-wide ban on Islamophobia (Cerulus, 2016), as such events – like the London 7/7 bombings and similarly motivated terror attacks – have led to an increase in hate speech and hate crimes against Muslims. Finally, in response to the Danish cartoon crisis, the United Nations General Assembly and its Human Rights Commission (UNHRC) passed a special resolution (on 26 March 2009) ‘condemning the “defamation of religion” as a human rights violation’ (Waldron, 2012: 124). In light of these empirical developments, the principal research question addressed in this article is this: With a view to protecting those adversely affected, are legal protections against specific kinds of harmful and offensive securitising requests justified? In order to answer the research question, this article draws parallels to the longstanding debate on hate speech protections in legal and political theory that arose in the context of such provisions in some states (most European states) but not others (notably the United States). The key issue 5 Bachman was charged for ‘Volksverhetzung’ for ‘Rapefugees not welcome’ under this amended law in Mai 2016. Petry,who had separately been reported to the authorities for firearm remark, were not followed up by the prosecutor in Mannheim in February 2016 as they were deemed in line with freedom of speech. Noteworthy is that Petry had done much to downplay and ameliorate the remark immediately after it was made. https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-resolution/569/all-info 10 is whether utterers of securitising requests should be allowed to ‘say’ 6 what they like in line with the right to free speech as is (most prominently) stated in the U.S. Constitution’s first amendment, or should the language and visuals of such securitising requests be curtailed in the way hate speech is in many European countries under various statutes, most commonly criminal codes (The Legal Project, 2015). Analysing security requests using this lens, reveals that security speech, as opposed to securitisation (here: successful/satisfied only after policy change has occurred), merely causes indirect harm (i.e. it leaves people feeling insecure and/or offended), while criminalisation is a proportionate response only to direct harm. Instead of advocating criminalisation, this article suggests that people ought to act in a socially and politically responsible manner and consequently, request securitisation ethically. This article sketches out three substantive criteria governing the ethics of requesting securitisation. The criteria advanced concern when to request securitisation and how to do so, and utilise existing research on ‘just securitisation’ (Floyd, 2011, 2015, 2016a). As such this article also seeks to be an important contribution to the ‘positive-negative’ debate on security/securitisation featured primarily in this journal (e.g. Floyd, 2007, Roe, 2008a, 2012 Hoogensen Gjørv, 2012; Nyman, 2016), that has made much of the ethics of securitisation, but that hitherto failed to engage with the ethics of speaking security. This article is structured as follows: Section I advances the concept of securitising requests as distinct from securitising moves and securitisation. Section II examines the case for advocating legal protections against harmful security speech utilising key insights from the hate speech debate found in legal and political theory. Section III outlines the case against such protections following the same method. Section IV sets forth three criteria governing the ethics of requesting securitisation. The conclusion summarises the argument advanced. 6 In inverted commas here, because it technically also includes visuals. 11 I. What are securitising requests, how are they distinct from securitising moves and successful securitisation? The concept of securitisation originates from the work of the Copenhagen school, and specifically from that of one of its key members, Ole Wæver. After the Cold War, security policy both widened and deepened to include non-traditional security issues (e.g. environmental degradation, economic decline, migration) and referent objects of security policy other than the state (e.g. the environment, large banks) (Buzan and Hansen, 2009). Securitisation theory is able to capture analytically many of these new forms of security because it holds that security is a social and political construction, whereby issues become security threats only when they are considered to be that by relevant actors. In other words, it does not matter as such whether threats are objectively present (i.e. real). Today, securitisation scholarship comprises a number of competing strands of securitisation, many of which have extended, refined, and clarified important aspects of the Copenhagen school’s original theory (see, for example, various in Balzacq, 2010; Williams, 2003; and Hansen, 2000). In part, this theoretical work is driven by numerous inconsistencies and even contradictions in the Copenhagen school and/or Wæver’s work. For purposes of this article, it is important to note that there is some confusion over when securitisation ‘succeeds’. The Copenhagen school appears to vacillate between tying the success of securitisation to the acceptance of the securitising move by an audience (for example, in the case of terrorism in the United Kingdom, when the general public has accepted that there is a terrorist threat) and the adoption of extraordinary measures and/or exceptional means (e.g. in the U.K. terrorism case when exceptional policy change occurred). Thus, on the one hand, they argue that securitisation is defined by ‘three components (or steps): existential threats, 12 emergency action, and effects on interunit relations by breaking free of rules’ (Buzan et al., 1998: 26), suggesting that extraordinary emergency measures are a necessary part of securitisation because rules are tantamount to ‘the normal way’ (ibid.). On the other hand, some passages of the seminal Security: A New Framework for Analysis suggest that securitisation is not decided by the use of extraordinary emergency measures in that same way. Instead, it argues that ‘we do not push the demand so high as to say that an emergency measure has to be adopted, only that the existential threat has to be argued…’ (ibid, 25); while in his single authored work, Wæver has repeatedly stated that ‘security is a speech act’ (Wæver, 1995). As a consequence, some scholars have argued that if the linguistic speech act element, which is seemingly so central to original securitisation theory is taken seriously, then securitisation succeeds at the point of audience acceptance (for example, in the case of the securitisation of terrorism in the United Kingdom, securitisation succeeds when the general public accepts arguments put forward by the executive that there is a terrorist threat), and adoption of security measures does not come into it. Vuori, for example, writes that ‘security measures and their public securitisation are theoretically and at times even practically separate from each other, and thereby the application of security practices cannot be a sufficient criterion for the success of securitisation’ (Vuori, 2011: n98). In this vein he goes on to identify five types of ‘securitisation’: ‘(1) securitisation for raising an issue on the agenda, (2) securitisation for deterrence, (3) securitisation for legitimating past acts or for reproducing the security status of an issue, and (4) securitisation for control’ in addition to (5) ‘securitisation for legitimating future acts’, which he attributes to Wæver (Vuori, 2008: 76). While Vuori seems to offer an elegant way out of the extensive debate that has ensued on whether or not security measures have to be exceptional to qualify as such, he overlooks that the Copenhagen school actually differentiates between securitisations that, we may say 13 (merely) exist (i.e. at the point of audience acceptance) and those that are successful (i.e. when, in addition to a relevant audience accepting a securitising request, security measures are adopted (Collins, 2005). In the case of U.K, terrorism, for example, this refers to the various new laws and police powers that came after. The reason why the school draws this distinction is that the former leaves one unable to sort the ‘important cases [of securitisation] from the less important ones’, because ‘many actions can take [the securitisation form] on a small scale’ (Buzan et al., 1998: 25). In successful securitisation, then, at least for the Copenhagen school, securitisation and security measures are not separate processes at all, while the securitising move is a part of securitisation (successful or otherwise). Moreover, in successful securitisations, utterers of securitising moves and securitising actors are one and the same; indeed, securitising actors use language to – in Vuori’s terms – legitimate past or present action, to deter and to control, in ways that they then act on. Or, as I have argued elsewhere, bona fide securitising actors 7 use language either to warn off an “aggressor” (loosely: any agent at the source of a threat) or to promise protection to a referent object, or, in some cases, to do both (Floyd 2010, 2016b). This said, however, it is possible for other actors to speak security. Securitising actors (mostly) speak security in order to move or advance further in the direction of securitisation 8 , for example, by seeking acceptance from a designated audience for the necessary policy change (Roe, 2008). Other speakers of security, however, have neither the intention nor the capabilities to perform securitisation 9 . Instead, their purpose in speaking security is to request securitisation from another – usually more powerful – entity. 10 Vuori refers to this as agenda- 7 Without going into excessive detail, it can be argued that securitisation scholarship ought to be more consistent with regards to terminology. It is misleading to label anyone who can utter a securitising speech act a securitising actor; instead the securitising actor is the one who either acts on the threat, or who is in a position of power to instruct others to act (but of course this holds only if one believes that successful securitisation involves policy change). 8 This qualifier mostly is necessary because securitising actors may not be truthful in their intention (cf Floyd 2010) 9 Notably the Copenhagen school denies individual persons the capability to securitise outright. 10 Often but not necessarily the state 14 setting ‘securitisation’, but he is an exception, most other scholars indiscriminately use the term securitising move for all instances of speaking security, even if many, at least implicitly, recognise different logics informing security speech. 11 It is reasonable to suggest that this conceptual oversight stems from the fact that for many scholars securitisation is satisfied/succeeds at the point of audience acceptance, regardless what follows on from this. If, however, we accept that successful securitisation involves policy change we can see that security speech serves different purposes. Securitising requests are separate from securitising moves because they are not uttered with the intention to legitimate, explain, or announce behaviour that will follow or that has gone before; instead, they are addressed to those in a position to conduct successful securitisation (e.g. to those that can enact policy change). 12 It is difficult to say at what point a securitising request succeeds. At least three options present themselves, one is at the point of audience acceptance (i.e. when the request has been heard), arguably, however, the request is only granted when the designated securitising actor securitises, ergo securitising requests succeed at the point of securitisation. This logic, however, implies that only securitisation could remedy the problem identified in the initial securitising request, when it is possible that politicisation by the targeted actor might solve the problem. All the same, securitising requests and the conceptual separation off from securitising move, enables us to see that securitising moves can be influenced by these primary speech acts. Indeed, an important issue to observe is that while securitising actors 11 Take for example, Claire (now Cai) Wilkinson’s work on securitisation in Kyrgyzstan prior to the ousting of President Akaev, which has done much to question the linear logic of process in securitisation. In the article, Wilkinson identifies ‘an initial securitizing move [….] at the local level by a number of candidates’ (2007:17) opposing the ruling government, aiming to organise the fractured opposition from its supporters. She further argues that this same initial securitising move together with counter-securitisation by the ruling government informed, indeed constructed the securitising actor, insofar as opposition leaders came together, and began echoing the initial securitizing move in their own rhetoric. (ibid: 19) Given this, Wilkinson observes: ‘securitizing moves do not exist in isolation and may be simultaneously or subsequently linked to other securitizing moves that in total contribute to a securitization even if they are individually unsuccessful’ (2007:20). My point here is not that Wilkinson is incorrect, but simply that conceptually it makes more sense to describe Wilkinson’s initial securitising move as a securitising request, while the Opposition’s speech act was the securitizing move. 12 Who this is precisely varies for different theorists as it depends on one’s understanding of what sort of measures count as security measures (i.e. only extraordinary ones, or also more ordinary ones) (cf. Floyd 2016b) 15 need to be in a position of power to perform successful securitisation, anyone can utter a securitising request. That does not mean that everyone has access to the same platforms, or that everyone will be heard equally well, but simply that anyone who has a voice, or who can write, can in principle utter a securitising request (see van Mill, 2015). Anyone, that is, who possesses the physical capability to speak or write and is not silenced by structural constraints, including fear (see Hansen, 2000). This inclusiveness is the reason why this study on the ethics of speaking security commences from a focus on securitising requests as opposed to securitising moves by securitising actors. A holistic ethics of speaking security recognises that ordinary people can –in principle- facilitate securitisation. This said, any general rules regarding the ethics of speaking security generated by such a study also apply for securitising moves, as both securitising requests and securitising moves are forms of speaking security, neither do securitising actors have special rights exempting them from all possible ethical standards. This article now turns to the question of whether anything goes; i.e. should people be permitted to say or write what they want, or whether there should be protections, that is to say legislation that criminalises some kinds of securitising requests, notably those that target or single out racial, religious, or ethnic minorities? 13 In other words, and given the empirical context against which this paper is set, are laws banning public expressions of Islamophobia justified? Before this article dives into the discussion, a word on the meaning of criminalisation is necessary as there is some debate over the proportionality of certain punitive measures (especially non-pecuniary ones, such as imprisonment) for using denigrating speech (see, for example Baker and Zhao, 2013). Although this article does not start from the premise that securitising requests should be criminalised, it does not engage with the debate over what 13 These speech acts are related to the criminalisation of minorities such as asylum seekers who have been identified not only as deviant or criminal but also as threats to the welfare state system in the UK and other European Union member states (see, for example, Banks, 2008; Huysmans 2000). 16 type of punitive measure is most appropriate (despite the fact that this could sway one’s thinking either way). Instead, the research starts from the lowest common denominator, namely, it considers the issue criminalised if it is written into criminal law regardless of the nature of the punitive measures adopted. II. The case for protections against harmful and offensive securitising requests Lest there be any doubt, it is important to be clear that when contemplating protections against security speech, this article is not concerned with legislating against all possible kinds of securitising speech acts but merely against a few select types. Freedom of speech is an essential value in liberal democracies; among many other things we can see the value of free speech on matters of security in the fact that everyone’s potential ability to put important issues on the agenda can have positive consequences. Thus, quite regardless of whether or not they result in successful securitisation, once phrased in security terms issues are often more likely to be heard, discussed, and acted on. As a case in point, consider the recent warnings by scientists that the widespread overuse of antibiotics (especially broad-spectrum ones) is considered a threat to global health security, public health and – in some countries (notably the United States) – to national security, because it leads to antibiotic and microbial resistance. In England these warnings have led to new guidelines for general medical practitioners concerning the frequency of prescriptions for antibiotics (NICE, 2015). So, in contemplating protections against securitising requests, this article is concerned only with a specific type of such requests, namely ones that single out or target racial, ethnic, or religious minorities. This article distinguishes between two different ways of doing so: (1) in plain, but not offensive securitising language; or (2) in an overtly offensive way, for example, by using dehumanising language (e.g. by comparing people to animals or diseases), or by employing 17 racially or culturally motivated slurs, including ridicule. 14 An example of the first kind comes from the United Kingdom after the 7/7 London bombings, when Muslims were repeatedly identified as threatening because they were considered likely to become radicalised and engage in terrorist acts (see Pantakis and Pemberton, 2009; Croft, 2012). As Stuart Croft notes, the connections between ‘Islam and terrorism; sharia law and barbarism; sharia law, Islam and a threat to British values’ were primarily made by ‘powerful social actors [and] major media organizations’ (ibid, 212). For example, by polling Londoner’s comfort levels of sitting next to Muslims on public transport in case they might blow themselves up (Croft, 2012: 213). Precisely through such means, the relevant actors requested government to get tough on Muslims, and for example, not build a new mosque near the 2012 Olympic Park, to disallow Muslim faith based schools, and instead to create a Britain based on British values (Croft, 2012). An example of the second way of making security requests was mentioned with Bachman’s neologisms of “Rapefugees” and “RefugeISIS” in the introduction, and PEGIDA’s request to elected politicians to protect Germany and Germans from such threats. For a further example, consider the case of British media personality and Sun newspaper columnist Katie Hopkins who, during the ongoing migrant crisis in Europe, called illegal migrants ‘cockroaches’, ‘a plague of feral humans’, ‘spreading like norovirus on a cruise ship’, and requested that the British government and EU governments need to adopt Australian style security measures (Hopkins, 2015). In her own words: 14 At this point it is worthwhile to remind ourselves that within securitisation theory it is not necessary that the word security is spoken. Wæver argues as follows: ‘In practice it is not necessary that the word security is spoken. There can be occasions where the word is used without this particular logic at play, and situations where it is metaphorically at play without being pronounced. We are dealing with a specific logic which usually appears under the name security, and this logic constitutes the core meaning of the concept security, a meaning which has been found through the study of actual discourse with the use of the word security, but in the further investigation, it is the specificity of the rhetorical structure which is the criterion – not the occurrence of a particular word.’ (Wæver 1995: 49 FN15) 18 It’s time to get Australian. Australians are like British people but with balls of steel, can-do brains, tiny hearts and whacking great gunships. Their approach to migrant boats is the sort of approach we need in the Med. They threaten them with violence until they bugger off, throwing cans of Castlemaine in an Aussie version of sharia stoning. And their approach is working. Migrant boats have halved in number since Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott got tough. We don’t need another rescue project. The now defunct £7million-a- month Mare Nostrum — Italy’s navy search and rescue operation — was paid for (in part) by British taxpayers. And we don’t need a campaign from Save the Children to encourage more migrants to take the journey. What we need are gunships sending these boats back to their own country. (ibid, 2015) Although the boundaries between these two kinds of securitising requests are somewhat fluid – and clearly offence may be taken whatever the language – there are good analytical reasons for differentiating between the two. In particular, arguments for permitting securitising requests of the first kind do not preclude the need for banning securitising requests of the second kind. The primary reason for why one might want to prohibit both kinds of securitising requests is because of the probable consequences they may have for those that are the subject of security speech (i.e. the minorities in question). Thus, those identified as security threats (i.e. the relevant minority) might feel increasingly insecure in society, fearing vigilante attacks. In the UK, the Tell MAMA ( Measuring Anti-Muslim Attacks) project not only reports a ‘200 percent’ increase in anti-Muslim hate crime in 2015, but identifies ‘the misrepresentation of Muslims in Britain from certain media sources, politicians and public figures’ as a primary cause. (Tell MAMA, 2016:6 &11; see also Said, 1997). Although securitising requests do not necessarily lead to securitisation or hate crime, they can nevertheless instil change in society. In particular, the securitising requests that concern us here may render society as a whole more xenophobic and racist. Xenophobia and racism, in 19 turn, are harmful because they – to use Didier Bigo’s apt phrase – further ‘insecuritise’ minorities within society (Bigo, 2000). The linkage between speech and insecurity is also stressed by Jeremy Waldron in his 2012 book The Harm in Hate Speech on the need for protections against hate speech. Waldron argues that hate speech deprives people of security because it erodes what John Rawls referred to as ‘well-ordered societies’, 15 by denying certain groups the fundamentals of such societies, namely ‘that all are equally human, and have the dignity of humanity, that all have an elementary entitlement to justice, and that all deserve protection from the most egregious forms of violence, exclusion, indignity, and subordination’ (Waldron, 2012: 82– 83). In Waldron’s view one important measure in assuring these fundamentals – and thus maintaining and even creating well-ordered societies – is by legislating against hate speech and defamation (ibid.: 81). ‘[H]ate speech laws aim not only to protect the public good of dignity-based assurance, but also to block the construction of this rival public good that the racists and Islamophobes are seeking to construct among themselves’ (ibid., 2012: 95). All these are important points; they are relevant here because they show that securitising requests of the first kind resemble hate speech closely. Accordingly, while securitising requests of the first kind do not use offensive language, the use of the language of security (i.e. the identification of a minority as a ‘security threat’ because of who they are) alone is degrading. The use of security language changes, indeed reduces, the standing of affected minorities in society. Securitising requests of the first kind also reveal that ‘hate speech’ can be motivated by something other than hatred, or in other words, by something other than racism and xenophobia. Instead ‘hate speech’, or better ‘harmful speech’, can be motivated by fear, specifically fear of the minority posing a security risk. Of course, if such 15 For Rawls a well-ordered society is ‘a formal ideal of a perfectly just society implicit in Rawls’s contractarianism. It is a society where (a) all citizens agree on the same conception of justice and this is public knowledge; moreover, (b) society enacts this conception in its laws and institutions; and (c) citizens have a sense of justice and willingness to comply with these terms’ (Freeman, 2007, 484). For discussion of how this idea [i.e. well ordered society] fits in within Rawls' wider commitments, see J. Floyd (2015). 20 fears are entirely unwarranted (i.e. because no credible empirical precedent involving the minority exists) it becomes inseparable from racism, while it is also the case that securitising requests motivated by fear often end up producing racism and xenophobia. Nevertheless we ought to recognise that expressions of harmful speech, including Islamophobia are based not exclusively on hatred but also on fear. It should be obvious that if all of the above reasons on why there should be protections against harmful securitising speech hold for securitising requests of the first kind, then they also hold for securitising requests of the second kind, as the latter are a more serious case of the former. That said, there are additional reasons for curtailing securitising requests that use offensive language when they single out or target racial, ethnic, or religious minorities. Yet, it is not always easy to know when something is offensive. In hate speech legislation, offending is seen as a step down from instilling hate and is not generally covered. 16 One reason for this is the extremely subjective nature of offence. Specifically, thresholds for when offence is taken differ widely with age, culture, religion and also with who the speaker is. Plus, it is possible to offend without intending to do so. For example, the Caucasian Oscar-nominated actor Benedict Cumberbatch had to apologise profusely for causing offence when he referred to black actors as ‘coloured’ in an interview with a U.S. broadcaster (Bakare, 2015). The comments were made in the context of Cumberbatch bemoaning the absence of equal opportunities in the industry. With offence hard to capture, it is important to recognize that it might be extremely difficult to provide legislation criminalising securitising requests that use offensive 16 However many states’ efforts to widen hate speech legislation means that legislation increasingly includes mere offending, especially as states are trying to regulate trolling and expressions of hate speech in social media. See for example the above mentioned section 130 of the German criminal Code, or Section 127 of the Communications Act 2003 in England 21 language. 17 However, in the interest of (national) security, the case for criminalising these is strong, because they are doubly dangerous. Not only do they ‘insecuritise’ minorities, erode well-ordered society and potentially lead to hate crime, they also run the risk of rendering the general population insecure because offence (especially against religious beliefs) might cause retaliation. Conversely, if offending in this way is punishable by law, the offence is less likely to cause retaliation and/or to occur in the first place. In recent years we have seen revenge attacks in response to securitising requests of the second kind (i.e. those that use offensive language or visuals) in the aftermath of the so- called Muhammad cartoon crisis. Lene Hansen has argued that especially in the age of the internet, images are prolific and influential and ought to be included into a theory of securitisation (Hansen, 2011a). This is because ‘to constitute something as a matter of security is to make a political intervention’ (ibid., 53) and images (especially iconic images) can have political implications (Hansen, 2015, see also Croft, 2012: 104-6). This political intervention can take a number of forms. Hansen suggests that images can very readily depict ‘the Other as demonic, barbaric, evil, and menacing’ while they can also be used to belittle the Other ‘constituting him/her/it as insignificant, weak, small, cowardly, backward, or feminine, as someone “to be laughed at rather than hated or feared”’ (Hansen, 2011a: 59). ‘A depiction through demonization’, Hansen further argues, ‘constitutes a threat to be conquered while a strategy of belittling makes the threat manageable’ (ibid.). Either way, images, like words, may thus be utilised to call on powerful actors to securitise any given issue or (perceived) threat. Hansen nevertheless holds that images ‘securitise’ usually in conjunction with spoken or written words that give a specific meaning to the image. Words are necessary because the image itself can convey multiple meanings. For example, ‘the lit turban-bomb, the bushy 17 Notably some courts (specifically U.S. courts) arbitrate successfully on similar matters with high subjectivity, including by using legal tests for establishing what is pornography or the way some courts apply the “reasonable person” standard. 22 eyebrows, and the piercing eyes [of Kurt Westergaard’s (in)famous bomb-turban cartoon] evoke on the one hand a violent, possibly terrorist-suicidal subject; on the other this is a disembodied face, devoid of spatial and temporal location with no other subjects present’ (ibid., 63). She further argues, however, that clear meaning was given to the cartoons, which were obviously belittling, in the context of several accompanying editorials in Danish newspapers which identified the West as existentially threatened ‘from “Muslim” imams as well as from the wider “Islamic worldview”’ and [requested that] “Western society” and “Muslims” deter this threat (Hansen, 2011b: 364). One way of resisting the narrative suggested in securitising requests is through counter-securitisation. 18 Many Muslims were greatly offended by the cartoons and how they were being contextualised in Denmark and abroad with many media outlets republishing the cartoons. Their publication led to widespread violent protests (including in Pakistan, Afghanistan and North Africa), terrorist attacks (besides Charlie Hebdo also deadly shootings in Copenhagen in February 2015) and arguably a deepening (or indeed the initial creation) of a ‘clash of civilisations’ (Burke et al, 2006). Given the climate in which these cartoons were published (i.e. during the global war on terror) these consequences were not only probable but also foreseeable. Since individual newspapers clearly do not have that foresight and may very well be motivated by agendas (especially financial or political) other than one of greater overall security, it is reasonable to suggest that legislators should intervene and curtail the spreading of unnecessarily offensive securitising requests (in this case offensive images accompanied by offensive editorials) by criminalising such security speech. This suggestion is made on the basis of empirical evidence. Researchers have found that civil hate speech protections have a positive effect on ‘mediated outlets’ because staff are trained to be sensitive to hate speech 18 In securitisation studies resistance is usually considered a form of desecuritisation (i.e. the act of resisting securitisation) (see, for example, Vuori, 2014), but there is no reason why resistance cannot also take the form of ‘counter-securitisation’ (i.e. resisting someone else’s security speech through one’s own security speech and action ), or indeed we can say that securitisation is motivated by wishing to resist a (perceived) threat. 23 legislation (Gelber and McNamara, 2015: 649). Indeed, the effects of what Gelber and McNamara call ‘the “laws” educative role’ (ibid, 650) is such that it is reasonable to suggest that had unduly offensive securitising requests been controlled by legislation (i.e. criminalised), it is a serious possibility that the massacre at the French satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo in which twelve staff were killed by two Islamist gunmen might have been avoided. At a minimum, it is likely that the magazine would have abstained from publishing the images and the accompanying editorial. III. The case against protections of securitising requests whatever their nature The case against protections of any kind of securitising request starts from the assumption that free speech is a fundamental value of liberal democratic societies that ought not to be curtailed. Most advocates of free speech believe that hate speech legislation is unwarranted and that the only things that ought to be curtailed are pornography involving minors and extreme libel (see Waldron, 2012: 145). When it comes to security we can see the value of free speech quite clearly; thus in Western liberal democracies anyone is allowed to criticise their government for making people (feel) insecure, whether by misguided foreign policy, exaggerating the terror threat, monitoring populations through technologies including surveillance, or for not providing adequate military hardware for armed forces in combat situations. If we start to curtail some kinds of securitising requests by legislation then where does it stop? In times of crisis, when unanimity is key and often assured (Neal, 2012), might not the legislator be tempted to prohibit criticism of executives’ policies or indeed ‘desecuritising requests’? In the United States, for example, criticism of the official governmental line in response to the terrorist attacks of 9/11 was considered deeply unpatriotic (Evangelista, 2008: 60; Croft, 2006). At the time, the prevailing mood was 24 captured in George W. Bush’s often used phrase ‘Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists’ (Bush, 2001), while at the same time, the PATRIOT Act and subsequent counter- terrorist activities, which allowed the extended surveillance of suspected terrorists by the newly created Department of Homeland Security were widely regarded as reminiscent of McCarthyism (Edwards, 2015: 409). A second deontological argument against protections is that securitisation theory tells us that insecurity is a matter of perception and politics (Gad and Petersen, 2011; Taureck, 2006). Surely if one is scared of something or someone, one should have the right to say it, regardless of the consequences. This is particularly important in light of the fact that fear can be a direct result of governmental policy. For example, one may believe that the U.K. government has with its counter-terrorist policies created a ‘suspect Muslim community’ (Pantazis and Pemberton, 2009), and thus driven hitherto moderate Muslims into radicalisation with the result that they now pose a concrete threat to oneself and other British people. The right to voice one’s opinion in this case is essentially the late Ronald Dworkin’s, (2009) legitimacy argument in favour of free speech. Much simplified, he argues that in a democracy everyone is forced to live by some laws that they do not agree with (he has in mind laws about positive discrimination), because of the consequences of those laws (i.e. admittance to jobs, etc.); if one is not allowed to voice one’s discontent against the law in question, then the legislator is illegitimate because – in a democracy – legitimacy arises from everyone having a voice. In his own words: Fair democracy requires … that each citizen have not just a vote but a voice: a majority decision is not fair unless everyone has had a fair opportunity to express his or her attitudes or opinions or fears or tastes or presuppositions or prejudices or ideals, not just in the hope of influencing others (though that hope is crucially important), but also just to confirm his or her standing as a 25 responsible agent in, rather than a passive victim of, collective action. (Dworkin cited in Waldron, 2012: 175, author emphases) A third argument against protections of securitising requests – whatever their nature – is that securitising requests can fail out in the open. 19 This is essentially an extrapolation of the argument by many opponents of hate speech protections that opinions are better out in the open than driven underground (Barendt, 2005a, 2005b). Allowing securitising requests to fail democratically would render a stronger well-ordered society. Notably, historical evidence suggests that a society whose citizens live according to governing principles that they believe in is bound to be stronger than one where universal values are enforced top-down by the legislator (cf. Buzan, 2004: 253). Indeed, criminalisation of securitising requests can create further resentment against the feared group(s). Instead of being addressed, the issue could then be driven underground where it might gain momentum, perhaps in part, out of resentment against the legislator (cf. Barendt, 2005b). Finally, it is not clear in what sense securitising requests cause factual, direct harm. In a 2013 critical reply to Waldron’s The Harm in Hate Speech, Dennis Baker and Lucy Zhao argue that Waldron fails to distinguish between theoretical harm and factual harm. They argue that no factual harm is caused when putative victims simply feel that their dignity is compromised by denigrating speech (Baker and Zhao, 2013: 625, 637). They also remind us of what precisely states seek to prevent by means of hate speech legislation: Incitement type offenses aim to prevent the harmful riot (as an example) from eventuating and thus criminalize the expression (means) used to encourage others to consummate the offense of rioting. D is not punished for the expression in itself, but for using expression to try to encourage a harmful riot. 19 Any definition of failure depends, of course, on one’s definition of success. Given the difficulties with that (cf.p.14), at a minimum level, however, we can perhaps say securitising requests fail when they are not picked – up by the designated securitising actor 26 The harm that the state is trying to prevent with such offenses is the riot, rather than the speech in itself. (Baker and Zhao, 2013, 626) In this context, it is important to recall that unlike with straight forward hate speech, the utterer of the securitising requests does not want the ‘audience’ to do abhorrent and harmful things (i.e. commit hate crimes). Instead they want the securitising actor (i.e. the audience of the securitising request) to securitise the issue; and it is conceivable that – sometimes at least – abhorrent language is used primarily to stress the urgency of the matter and to get a powerful audience’s attention. In short, even overtly offensive securitising requests are not incitement to hatred, but rather requests for protection of valued referent objects driven by fear and hatred. This is important because it means that criminalisation is a disproportionate response because securitising requests (i.e. security speech) does not in fact cause factual or direct harm, but merely theoretical or indirect harm, insofar as targeted groups perceive greater levels of insecurity or feel offended. Direct, factual harm is caused only when someone in the position to securitise follows up on the requests and securitises the issue. For example, it is well established that in the United Kingdom Muslims were not only disproportionally affected by new terror legislation following the 7/7 bombing, but some of the measures (notably detention without trial) were directly harmful (e.g. Pantakis and Pemberton, 2009; Croft, 2012). Arguably, however, the use of security measures that are directly harmful is unjustifiable only if the securitisation itself is unjust 20 . At most, we can thus debate whether unjust securitisation can or ought to be criminalised, while the criminalisation of securitising requests is always unjustified. 20 With the ethics of security and securitisation only just emerging in security studies (see Nyman and Burke, 2016; Browning and McDonald, 2013), the precise meaning of unjust securitisation is not set in stone. Judging by the well-established literature on the morality of war (security’s closest relative), however, it is to be expected that just securitisation will have to involve considerations concerning proportionality, expected outcome, right intention and so on (Floyd: 2011, 2015, 2016a). 27 Direct harm is also caused when a counter-securitisation is launched (as is the case with revenge attacks), but these clearly are an unintended consequence of the initial securitising request and most certainly not the intention of those requesting securitisation. Finally, direct harm is caused when vigilante commit hate crime against minorities informed by the securitising request. It is one thing to argue that we ought to be allowed to say what we want, but may we also say it in the way we want? In other words what possible arguments are there for not restricting securitising requests of the second kind (those that are overtly offensive to minorities)? Existing legislation on hate speech covers some but not all overtly offensive acts possible here, in spite of the fact that this legislation is growing. But there are problems with legislating against overtly offensive securitising requests. Waldron, for one, argues that ‘offense is not a proper object of legislative concern … [unlike dignity it is not about] objective or social aspects of a person’s standing in society’ but rather, it is about ‘subjective aspects of feeling, including hurt, shock, and anger’ (Waldron, 2012: 103, 106). At least three more arguments are relevant in this context, and all of them can be exemplified using the Charlie Hebdo case. The first is advanced as part of Charlie Hebdo’s editorial supporting publication of the cartoons, where it was argued that ‘the suggestion that you can laugh at everything, except certain aspects of Islam, because Muslims are much more prickly than the rest of the population – what is that, if not discrimination?’ (cited in BBC News, 2015). In other words, all faiths are equally ridiculous, fanciful and/or sacred, and if we are allowed to laugh at one of them, then by implication, we should be allowed to laugh at all of them (cf. R. Hansen, 2006: 12). Second, peace researchers have suggested that humour can not only be a conflict generator, but also a tool for peacebuilding (Zelizer, 2010). Recall Lene Hansen’s point that the bomb-turban cartoon can be interpreted in different ways. Specifically, ‘the cartoon relies 28 upon a generic image of “the non-Western” as looking wilder, more rural, and less modern than a Western subject, yet with the possible exception of the turban, the imagery is not distinctly Muslim’ (Hansen, 2012: 63). Precisely because it is not distinctly Muslim, it could have presented those Muslims who consider the views of radicalised ‘Islamists’ un-Islamic with a means to distance themselves from such people, and to strengthen a joint French, Danish, etc. identity with their fellow countrymen and women. Such togetherness and unity could help counteract radicalisation with fewer young Muslims being caught between different worlds. Indeed, in the United Kingdom, counter-terrorism police are already working together with a Muslim comedian to counter-act radicalisation is secondary schools (Talwar, 2015). Finally, it is fairly safe to assume that individuals who act in the abhorrent way that Saїd and Chérif Kouachi (the Charlie Hebdo gunmen) did in response to offensive and belittling cartoons would have done so anyway in revenge against foreign policy choices etc. In the aftermath of the shooting it emerged that both individuals had become radicalised over a long period of time and one had previously been arrested on his way abroad to commit jihad; in other words, the ideological commitment was already there, the cartoons may have simply been the catalyst. IV. Requesting securitisation ethically While the arguments on both sides are strong, from the point of view of securitisation, one of them carries more weight than the others because it goes right to the heart of the difference between simply speaking security and securitisation proper (i.e. security speech plus policy change). This is the argument that legal protections against harmful and derogatory security speech are a disproportionate response because the harm caused by such speech acts is 29 indirect/theoretical, and accordingly, that only direct, factual harm, as that caused by securitisation may warrant criminalisation. 21 Yet, even if criminalising harmful securitising requests (including banning expressions of Islamophobia) is to be rejected on the grounds of proportionality, the analysis also suggests that mere security speech is or should not be free from ethical considerations. Not only because indirect harm is hurtful to the minorities in question, but also because it detracts from the fundamentals of a well-ordered society. Given that everyone can speak security by requesting securitisation, we can say that principles governing the ethics of speaking security ethically apply to all persons, and not only to securitising actors when uttering securitising moves. The existing and growing literature on ethics and security/securitisation, sometimes known as the ‘positive/negative debate on security’, has so far failed to engage with the ethics of security speech. Ethical concerns over securitisation and hence the need for moral criteria governing securitisation arises largely from the ill-effects of the exceptional measures legitimised by securitisation (Floyd, 2011, 2016a). Or, in other words, the very issue of its ethics has arisen because securitisation causes direct harm and causing harm can supposedly only be justified if securitisation itself is just. Since securitisation theory is very much concerned with security speech, a theory of just securitisation is incomplete without considering also the ethics of security speech. An ethics of speaking security must start from the concept of securitising requests not only because securitising requests are much more inclusive than securitising moves, but also because securitising requests can influence securitising moves. This article proposes that two issues are important in this regard: when to request security and how to request security. In the following each is addressed in turn. By drawing on the ‘just war’ tradition, I have argued elsewhere that the single most important criterion for just securitisation is the presence of a just cause, because exceptional 21 This is not to suggest that unjust securitisation ought to be criminalised, merely that it could – in certain circumstances- be warranted 30 measures can only be justified in the presence of a real threat (Floyd, 2011). 22 Given that the use of exceptional measures is the objective of those requesting securitisation, we can reasonably require for persons requesting securitization to be as certain as they can be that the issue (including the racial, ethnic, religious minority) presents a real threat before they utter security speech. The connection between objectively present or real threats and ethics is made by a number of scholars writing on ethics and security, albeit usually not from the perspective of securitisation (e.g. Burke, Lee-Koo and McDonald, 2014 and various in Nyman and Burke, 2016). Indeed the invocation of real threats seems antithetical to the very idea of security as a social and political construction. This said, it needs to be remembered that the Copenhagen school, or at least Ole Wæver, does not hold that there are no such thing as objective existential threats, but rather that ‘security threats’ are socially and politically constructed. In his own words: ‘Lots of real threats exist, but they do not come with the security label attached’ (Wæver, 2011: 472). With some notable exceptions (Balzacq, 2010), securitisation scholars tend to be only interested in how issues achieve security threat status; and some might deny the possibility of ascertaining threat status as it is impossible to know all the morally relevant facts about a situation. This assumption is not disputed here. Consequently, instead of requiring that relevant persons need to establish the objective presence of threats in a ‘fact-relative sense’ (Parfit, 2011: 162), a judgement about the status of a threat needs to be true in an evidence-relative sense. Evidence-relativity ‘refers to the situation when the available evidence suggests decisive reasons that the beliefs people hold about a given situation are true’ (ibid.). In practice this means that persons intent on requesting securitisation must aim to gather evidence of the threat level of someone/-thing approximating the actual facts before requesting securitisation. In the case of the suspected link between refugees and migrants and terrorism, for example, the PEGIDA leadership 22 Wæver (2009) reasons along similar lines when he argues that securitisation requires existential threats. 31 should have checked the facts on migrant and refugee involvement in the Paris terror attacks, which was dismissed as false soon after the attacks. Persons requesting securitisation intent to bring about securitising moves and securitisation. If this is so, then requesting securitisation ethically also means that persons requesting securitisation need to be as sure as they can be that the issue in question is ideally treated as a matter of security and not simply as a political matter. This requires them not only to anticipate the probable consequences of an ensuing successful securitisation, but to measure – as best as possible - these consequences against not securitising. The securitisation of terrorism and the resulting treatment of Muslims in the United Kingdom after the 7/7 bombings, for example, led to an increase in home-grown radicalisation and recently the issue of the return of foreign fighters, throwing doubt onto the initial decision to securitise or – at least – about the way it was done (Fierke, 2007). Importantly, even if there is a real threat, securitisation as opposed to politicisation is not always the best solution. Moving on to the issue of how to request security ethically, it is helpful to consider Tariq Modood’s argument (made in the context of the Muhammad cartoon): ‘One relies on the sensitivity and responsibility of individuals and institutions to refrain from what is legal but unacceptable. Where these qualities are missing one relies on public debate and censure to provide standards and restraints’ (2006:6). That Modood is correct in identifying, what we might call ‘a collective standard of communication’ is apparent from the fact that the above cited securitising requests by a Petry, Bachmann, and Hopkins require little in the way of explanation as being unacceptable; instead they rather speak for themselves. A decisive feature about securitisation is that it legitimises the use of exceptional measures, yet the examples suggest that requesting securitisation ethically means to observe the collective standard of communication. In other words, even a real threat does not legitimise exceptionally derogatory and defamatory speech. 32 Moreover, the examples discussed above also show that in the interest of peace and security it is not always wise to say or publish anything and everything at all times. The Muhammad cartoon crisis, for example, was made worse by newspaper and magazine editors’ decision to exacerbate a sensitive issue by re-publishing the initial offending cartoons and by commissioning new, equally offensive ones. Waldron has a valid point when he argues: ‘Often, the best that [newspaper editors] could say for [re-publishing the cartoons] was that they were upholding their right to publish them. But a right does not give a right- bearer a reason to exercise the right one way or another’ (Waldron, 2012: 126). However, given that many politicians and security organisations (the police, border agencies, etc.) benefit from a politics of fear that often involves singling out minorities, it must be acknowledged that self-censorship faces many obstacles (see, for example, Wacquant, 2014; Huysmans, 2006; Simon 2001). Although the principles of the ethics of speaking security have here been developed in the context of securitising requests, it goes without saying that these apply also to securitising actors and their securitising moves. There is simply no reason why securitising actors should be exempt from these basic rules of engagement. Rules that, if obeyed, could reduce the level of harm caused in society considerably. In summary, we can now say that just security speech has three components: 1) there is a threat that is real in an evidence-relative sense and 2) when securitisation is likely to be a better solution than politicisation, whereby ‘better’ is measured in terms of the least amount of overall greater insecurity caused. Finally, when speaking security 3) observe existing collective standard of communication, and – in the interest of peace and security – exercise a degree of self-censorship. 33 Conclusion In contemporary Europe and elsewhere there is a discernible trend towards either tightening existing hate speech legislation or introducing new legislation in order to curtail the defamation of migrants and refugees as security threats and/or terrorists. For the time being, this is most clearly expressed by an increased willingness to ban Islamophobia. In the context of these developments, this article has critically engaged with the justifiability of criminalising requests to securitise that are harmful or derogatory to racial, ethnic, or religious minorities in order to protect those adversely affected. It has done so by drawing parallels to the existing hate speech debate in legal and political theory. As part of the analysis offered, this paper developed the novel analytical concept securitising requests, which captures security speech uttered not by securitising actors intent on securitisation, but rather security speech expressed by ordinary people intent on persuading powerful actors to securitise. It was argued that even securitising requests that do not use overtly offensive language, but simply single out racial, ethnic, or religious minorities as security threats are tantamount to expressions of hate speech because the link to security due to who these groups are is in and of itself degrading. It was further argued that the recognition of securitising requests as expressions of hate speech reveals the important insight that harmful speech is based not only on hate, but also on fear. Conceived as such – from the point of view of security – the case against protections is more convincing. In part because one positive of liberal democracies is that citizens are allowed to express their security fears, including of government policy. The analysis further revealed that, although criminalising harmful and offensive securitising speech can lead to an increase in security for affected groups and that it can pre- empt violent counter-securitisation, punitive measures are a disproportionate response 34 because even offensive and derogatory security speech causes only indirect harm (i.e. they leave members of minorities feel insecure, or they offend members of religious etc. groups). This is in line with the rationale behind many state’s longstanding hate speech legislation which seeks to prevent primarily the consequences of hate speech (i.e. hate crime, terrorism), and which recognises the adverse consequences for democratic process if offensive speech is criminalised. On the basis of these arguments this article concluded that laws banning public expressions of Islamophobia - at least in those cases where Muslims are feared and disliked because of the perception that Islamic people are prone to violence and terrorism, as well as similar securitising requests - are not justified. Far from negating the significance of indirect harm, however, this article went on to suggest that all persons ought to request security ethically. This article then outlined where the focus should be: when to request security and how to do so. 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(2016) ‘What is the value of security? Contextualizing the negative/positive debate’, Review of International Studies, 92(5), 821-839 Pantakis, C. and S. Pemberton (2009), ‘Reconfiguring Security and Liberty: Political Discourses and Public Opinion in the New Century’, British Journal of Criminology, 52, 651–667 Parfit, D. (2011), On What Matters, Vol. 1, Oxford University Press Roe, P. (2008a) ‘The “Value” of Positive Security’, Review of International Studies, 34, 777 – 794 Roe, P. (2008b). Actor, audience (s) and emergency measures: Securitization and the UK's decision to invade Iraq. Security Dialogue, 39(6), 615-635. Said, E.W.(1997) Covering Islam: How the media and the experst determine how we see the rest of the world, London: Vintage Books Sayyid, S. and AbdoolKarim Vakil (2010) Thinking through Islamophobia: Global Perspectives, London: Hurst & Company Simon, J. (2001), ‘Fear and Loathing in Late Modernity: Reflections on the Cultural Sources of Mass Imprisonment in the United States’, Punishment and Society, 3(1), 21–33 https://www.nice.org.uk/advice/ktt9/resources/non-guidance-antibiotic-prescribing-%09especially-broad-spectrum-antibiotics-pdf https://www.nice.org.uk/advice/ktt9/resources/non-guidance-antibiotic-prescribing-%09especially-broad-spectrum-antibiotics-pdf 41 Stern, (2016) ‘AfD-Vize von Storch: Schusswaffen-Äußerung war Fehler’, available at http://www.stern.de/politik/deutschland/afd-vize-von-storch--schusswaffen- aeusserung-war-fehler-6692738.html [accessed 3/3/2016] Squire, V. (2009) The Exclusionary Politics of Asylum, Basingstoke: Palgrave Talwar, D. (2015) ‘Badman: Trying to prevent radicalisation with humour’ BBC Asian accessed 4 November 2016 at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-31004012 Taureck, R. (2006), ‘Securitisation Theory and Securitisation Studies’, Journal of International Relations and Development, 9:1, 53–61 Tell MAMA (2016) The geography of anti-Muslim hatred Tell MAMA Annual Report 2015, Faith Matters: London The Legal Project (2015), ‘European Hate Speech Law’, available at http://www.legal- project.org/issues/european-hate-speech-laws (accessed 22/04/2015) van Mill, D. (2015), ‘Freedom of Speech’, in Edward N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy available at http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2015/entries/freedom- speech/ (accessed 01/04/2015) Vultee, F. (2011) ‘Securitization as a media frame: what happens when the media ‘speak security’ In Thierry Balzacq (ed.) Securitization Theory: How Security problems emerge and dissolve’ London: Routledge 77-93 Vuori, J. A. (2011), ‘How to do Security with Words: A Grammar of Securitization in the People’s Republic of China’, University of Turku, Finland, unpublished manuscript http://www.stern.de/politik/deutschland/afd-vize-von-storch--schusswaffen-aeusserung-war-fehler-6692738.html http://www.stern.de/politik/deutschland/afd-vize-von-storch--schusswaffen-aeusserung-war-fehler-6692738.html http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-31004012 http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2015/entries/freedom-%09speech/ 42 Wacquant, L. (2014) ‘Marginality, Ethnicity, and Penality: A Bourdieusian Perspective on Criminalization’, in R. A. Duff et al. (eds.), Criminalization: The Political Morality of the Criminal Law, Oxford University Press, ch. 10 Wæver, O. (2009), ‘What exactly makes a continuous existential threat existential? in Oren Barak and Gabriel Sheffer (eds.) Existential Threats and Civil-Security Relations, Lanham, Lexington Books, pp. Wæver, O. (1997) Concepts of Security, Institute of Political Science: University of Copenhagen, Denmark Wæver, O. (1995), ‘Securitization and Desecuritization’, in Ronnie D. Lipschutz (ed.), On Security, New York: Columbia University Press Waldron, J. (2012), The Harm in Hate Speech, Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press Waldron, J. (2010), Torture, Terror and Trade-Offs: Philosophy for the White House, Oxford University Press Wilkinson, C. (2007) ‘The Copenhagen school on Tour in Kyrgyzstan: Is Securitization Theory useable outside Europe?’ Security Dialogue, 38(1), 5-25 Williams, M. C. (2003), ‘Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics’, International Studies Quarterly, 47, 511–531 Zeit online (2016), ‘AfD will Flüchtlinge notfalls mit Waffengewalt stoppen’, available at http://www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2016-01/frauke-petry-afd-grenzschutz-auf- fluechtlinge-schiessen [accessed 3/3/2017} http://www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2016-01/frauke-petry-afd-grenzschutz-auf-fluechtlinge-schiessen http://www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2016-01/frauke-petry-afd-grenzschutz-auf-fluechtlinge-schiessen 
work_zmkzlkxsmvgftc7wh2bhs35pbu	----	Cronfa - Swansea University Open Access Repository _____________________________________________________________ This is an author produced version of a paper published in : Race & Class Cronfa URL for this paper: http://cronfa.swan.ac.uk/Record/cronfa33864 _____________________________________________________________ Paper: Burnett, J. (2013). Britain: racial violence and the politics of hate. Race & Class, 54(4), 5-21. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0306396813475981 _____________________________________________________________ This article is brought to you by Swansea University. Any person downloading material is agreeing to abide by the terms of the repository licence. Authors are personally responsible for adhering to publisher restrictions or conditions. When uploading content they are required to comply with their publisher agreement and the SHERPA RoMEO database to judge whether or not it is copyright safe to add this version of the paper to this repository. http://www.swansea.ac.uk/iss/researchsupport/cronfa-support/ http://cronfa.swan.ac.uk/Record/cronfa33864 http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0306396813475981 http://www.swansea.ac.uk/iss/researchsupport/cronfa-support/ Racial violence and the politics of hate In January 2012, a 61-year-old taxi driver in Bedford, Mehar Dhariwal, was viciously beaten to the ground by a customer who kicked and punched him as he screamed racist abuse. Covered in blood, Mr Dhariwal was taken to a hospital but no scan was carried out and his broken ribs went undetected. A few days later he was dead. In July 2012, after moving to Barnsley, south Yorkshire, just six weeks before, a family of asylum seekers had to be rehoused. Youths had been throwing stones at the property, showering the family with glass. The mother, four months pregnant, had to be taken to hospital and later reported that her 3-year-old daughter was so traumatised that she barely ate. In November 2012, a father of a Muslim family who had just moved into their new home in Nottingham answered a knock at the door, to find a burning crucifix wrapped in ham on the doorstep. The fear and insecurity has forced the family to move. Racism is changing in the UK. If the crude forms of racism of industrial capitalism were directed at the workers from the West Indies and Indian subcontinent brought in to fill postwar labour shortages, the racism of postindustrial capitalism is being directed at new migrants who find themselves providing the manpower for ever more flexible labour markets, and at ‘settled’ migrants who have been forced into the twilight worlds of the service economy. It is a racism embedded in neoliberalism, set against a backdrop of globalisation, where towns and cities reflect a national picture of poverty entrenched amid prosperity. It is a racism where the poor and poorer still are left to fight it out over deregulated employment, as social protections are steadily eroded. Racism as everyday violence is a common occurrence.1 In 2011/12, police forces recorded over 37,000 racially or religiously aggravated crimes, over 100 per day, in England and Wales.2 The Crime Survey for England and Wales suggests that this is just a fraction of the actual number.3Even taking into account the limitations of ‘official’ statistics, the figures give some indication of the extent of the humiliating verbal abuse, taunts, harassment and assaults that form the backdrop to so many people’s lives. Yet this is not reflected in the general perception of the issue, nor is such violence usually deemed newsworthy. It has been dealt with, goes the orthodoxy, in the Macpherson Inquiry and Report (1999) into the murder of Stephen Lawrence and subsequent police activity. Hence, in 2012, the conviction of two of Lawrence’s killers, nineteen years after his murder, was universally celebrated (including by the police who had been so complicit in the injustice originally meted out to his family). While the pervasive, even institutional, racism of the criminal justice system may, it was felt, have initially underpinned the failure to track down the killers, that was now all in the past. Anodyne messages that there was ‘more to be done’ were trotted out by politicians, newspaper editors and opinion formers, insinuating that, though the country might be blemished by the odd bit of racism and discrimination, Britain was ultimately heading in the right direction. What follows suggests something different. It has its origins in a report published by the Institute of Race Relations in 2010 called Racial Violence: the buried issue, which analysed over 600 racist attacks over a one-year period.4 More immediately, it draws from an investigation into the patterns of racial violence in three relatively small UK cities which followed this report: Plymouth, Stoke-on- Trent and Peterborough.5 In the first instance, the patterns we have identified provide evidence of a changing geography of racial violence which is spreading from the urban to the suburban: from the metropolitan cities historically associated with racist attacks, to smaller areas which do not necessarily have these same histories. Second, they further indicate how the scope of racist attacks is widening, incorporating new targets and intensifying violence. Each of these cities is experiencing relatively recent population changes, be it from the dispersal of asylum seekers, the natural growth of BME communities, the drawing in of migrant workers to restructured economies, the pull-in of international students or, simply, the outward flight of better-off white families. In Plymouth, for example, in south-west England, the proportion of the city’s residents from a BME community increased from 1.6 per cent in 2001, to about 9.1 per cent in 2009. This population shift was related to (among other factors) the dispersal of asylum seekers, a drive to increase the number of international students and the natural growth of existing BME communities. But in addition to these economic and social changes, a new ‘common sense’ racism is also permeating national policy-making and practice. It asserts that the UK is under persistent threat – from Muslims whose faith is deemed antithetical to its values and identity; from asylum seekers and migrant communities whose very presence threatens to impoverish it; and from black communities whose cultural mores are infecting it (turning the whites black, according to the prominent historian, David Starkey).6 It is a racism which is passed off as pragmatism and legitimised as economically and culturally necessary. This is the climate that fosters and sustains racial violence. If the anti-racist struggles of a generation ago recognised that combating racist attacks necessarily involved challenging the state’s denial that racism existed, then the anti-racist struggles of today necessarily involve challenging the state’s denial of its own complicity in creating such racism. And it is in the places where racism is spreading, apparently unchecked and well below the radar of mainstream political concern, that the impact of this denial is being played out. From racism to pragmatism Increasingly among policy-makers, academics and intellectuals, there is a propensity to talk of the UK as entering an age of hyper-, supra-, or super- diversity.7 The exact terminology varies, but reflects the demographic changes which have taken place over the last few decades and are continuing apace. These changes, a swirling consequence of the UK’s former and ongoing imperial adventures, the end of the cold war, the expansion of the European Union, the crippling debt burdens and poverty forced upon the global South and the seismic upheavals engendered by globalisation, are here to stay. The responses to them, including an equally swirling mix of rancorous press campaigns and state policies and practices managing and controlling ‘race’ are reshaping the parameters of racism in the twenty-first century. The creation of multicultural Britain has been a predominantly ‘urban’ experience, particularly in the context of a postwar demand for labour in the manufacturing and service industries. These patterns of migration have continued to shape the geography of demographics; London and those towns and cities which imported labour in this period remain by far the most ethnically mixed parts of the UK. (In 2009, about 45 per cent of England and Wales’ BME population lived in London.8) Yet what those who claim the dawn of a new epoch refer to is not just the fact of ethnic and religious diversity, but its kind and its local distribution. According to one academic, this incorporates not just the diversity of old, but patterns of migration that have accelerated since the 1990s. (Such patterns, for example, have come to include those formally seeking protection and those with fewer restrictions on their movement as a result of European Union expansion.9) Unlike the migrations of ‘old’, this ‘new’ migration is increasingly geographically dispersed. Although it predominantly affects the UK’s major urban centres, it is also being experienced on a greater scale in smaller towns and cities; in addition it is impacted upon by the internal migrations of existing BME communities.10 Whereas fewer than 6 per cent of the population of England and Wales were from a BME background in 1991, this had risen to 13 per cent in 2001 and about 20 per cent in 2011. ‘Groups outside the white British majority are increasing in size and share, not just in the areas of initial migration, but throughout the country,’ some demographers have claimed, before adding ‘and our projections suggest that this trend is set to continue’.11 It is against this backdrop, and, more specifically, the policies established to ‘manage’ and stem population change, as well as the fears stoked up by demonising it, that a new geography of racial violence has begun to emerge across the UK. Many of those who talk of an age of diversity merely point out that the UK’s demography is shifting. But throughout the twenty-first century, the idea that ‘diversity’ (never mind ‘super-diversity’) threatens solidarity and identity – a concept once the domain of the political Right – has been normalised. Multiculturalism is now regarded as one of the key determinants of an array of ills ranging from rioting to terrorist attack.12 ‘Race relations’ policy has been reworked to both assimilate and exclude (internally, through a vernacular of community cohesion and integration and externally, through reform of immigration and asylum legislation) on the basis of perceived cultural adaptability of the new migrants and economic benefit to the nation.13 In all of this, considerable effort has been taken to maintain that the management of diversity is nothing more than an exercise in pragmatism: a necessary step for a benevolent nation on the cusp of being overwhelmed. Hence, a range of commentators, thinktanks and opinion formers on population change have been accorded the status of experts, with their ‘analyses’ regurgitated by the media and insinuated into policy debates. Migration Watch UK, for example, a well-known privately funded thinktank, has, for a decade, lobbied about immigration, with its findings cited extensively and uncritically as impartial knowledge. Bolstered by an advisory council drawn from former and existing members of academe, business sectors and the judiciary (among others), the organisation’s achievements to date include providing research for a cross- party parliamentary group on ‘balanced migration’ and a petition, publicised by the press and signed, at one point, by 1,000 people per hour, calling on the government to ‘get immigration down to a level which will stabilise the population’.14 Migration Watch UK is, of course, only one source of ideas on managing population change, but it shows how the repeated projection of apocalyptic future scenarios can trickle down – and up. In the mid-2000s, taking inspiration from a government report arguing that the pace of population change was ‘simply too great in some areas at present’, it congratulated policy-makers on restricting one avenue of immigration whilst simultaneously arguing that ‘there is clear evidence of a link between the proportion of ethnic minorities in a particular area and the rate at which the white population has declined’.15 These and similar findings have fuelled a media storm about ‘minority white cities’ – held up as a signifier of the UK’s dystopian future unless radical remedial action is taken. No matter that, as the academics Nissa Finney and Ludi Simpson have expertly shown, much of the information on which these views are based comes from a hodgepodge of (wilful) statistical misinterpretation and untruth. They nonetheless result in the perpetuation of myths – about integration, segregation and migration – that have permeated mainstream politics.16 The prime minister, for example, in his first major speech on immigration after taking power (heralded as a forthright assessment of how migration threatens ‘our’ way of life) explained how ‘For too long, immigration has been too high’, maintaining that it was ‘untruthful and unfair’ not to talk about it. Population change, he said, was leading to ‘discomfort and disjointedness’, and the ‘largest influx of people Britain has ever had’ was placing ‘real pressure on communities’.17 Of course, there are debates to be had about the real pressure being put on communities throughout the UK. What else could follow the biggest transfer of public money into private hands Britain has ever seen, as a result of the banking and financial crisis and the government’s savage austerity measures, hollowing out the basis of communities and forcing people into unemployment. Decades of neoliberalism have already torn out the heart of many former industrial towns and cities,18 concentrating economic power in the capital and the south-east of England, so that now the richest 10 per cent in the country own more than half of its overall wealth, compared to less than 1 per cent owned by the poorest 10 per cent. In the process, neoliberalism has eroded many ties of community solidarity in favour of fostering a winner-takes-all morality, elevating entrepreneurialism and competition as the way to order human interaction.19 Such factors shape the context in which population change, increasingly being experienced beyond the urban areas with which it is historically associated, is, indeed, an issue that many local authorities are suddenly having to respond to. Holding such debates requires an understanding of the processes of globalisation which have impoverished and uprooted millions, some of whom have ended up on Britain’s shores. It is globalisation, as both the expresser and facilitator of fundamental shifts in the nature and operation of capitalism that, within the UK, has transformed the economy and led to a perpetual state of poverty within prosperity. But these are issues which those formulating or implementing policies to deal with ‘super-diversity’ do not reckon with. Instead, the problem is reduced to the management of race, necessitating a series of techniques devoid of context. A few nods to the ‘richness’ of ‘diversity’ are offset against calls to manage and limit the ‘negative effects’ of migration. Britain, the narrative goes, has been paralysed for too long by political correctness and unable to speak out against the negative impacts of population change (be it externally, from migration, or internally, from the ‘natural’ growth and movement of BME communities). Hence, it is necessary to seize the moment. This is not ‘racism’ (as the columnists, spokespeople, opinion formers, thinktanks and intellectuals are always at pains to point out), but bravery;20 for if these issues are not tackled head-on, then the real beneficiary will be the far Right. But the potential for an honest conversation is never realised, as the most powerful voices arguing that diversity erodes the national ‘ties that bind’ crowd out all others. New geographies of racism Economic decline To understand the current trend, the city of Stoke-on-Trent is a good starting point. Stoke, in north Staffordshire, embodies what economic commentator Aditya Chakrabortty calls the UK’s ‘de-industrial revolution’:21 a revolution that has led to a fall in the number of people employed in manufacturing from about 6.5 million in 1979 to about 2.5 million some thirty years later (or almost 30 per cent of Britain’s national income to about 12 per cent in the same period). Once a global manufacturing heartland, Stoke’s pottery industry was practically annihilated by the ruthless transfer of production to lower-wage economies overseas, going from employing about 50,000 people in the 1970s to about 7,000 in 2011. Legacies of its industry, though, remain. They are there in the attempts by the local authority to kick-start a tourist drive, enticing visitors to see the once-working factories – a reminder of England’s industrial past; in the older generation’s chronically high levels of workplace illnesses such as respiratory tuberculosis and lung cancer; and in the fact that the transition to a service economy has done little to alter the reality that over half of Stoke’s population are, according to government statistics, in the most deprived quintile in England and the city has some of the highest levels of child poverty in the country.22 Stoke briefly hit the headlines in 2001, when Asian and white youths took to the streets to protect their homes from the potential threat of fascist marches. Against a backdrop of uprisings by Asians in several (mainly northern) towns and cities, fighting against fascists and the police, it was one of several incidents that led to the emergence of the ‘community cohesion’ agenda: a policy framework underpinned, essentially, by an argument that the disorders had happened because some communities were leading ‘parallel lives’ to mainstream society, and were, thus, proof of the ‘failure’ of multiculturalism.23 While this policy position came to dominate political orthodoxy, Stoke itself quickly resumed its former position as somewhere generally ignored by the political classes unless something major happens. And so, when something major did happen, seven years later, it shook the political establishment. By 2008, the city had nine extreme-right British National Party (BNP) councillors; the organisation had established itself as the main opposition to the Labour party, and there was a credible possibility that Stoke could become the first city controlled by the far Right in the UK. That it didn’t was down to a combination of dedicated anti-fascist campaigning and, to a lesser extent, the BNP’s own internal infighting. Yet, amid all the hand-wringing by the major parties that followed (the national Labour party went so far as to parachute in its own election candidate in an attempt to claw back voters), what was ignored was that the BNP had been able to draw on a combination of local concerns about poverty and the lurch to the racist Right in mainstream politics. It was this that was leading to a changing geography of racial violence way beyond the confines of this one city. The demonisation of asylum seekers Nowhere was this clearer at the beginning of the twenty-first century than with regard to asylum seekers. Vilified by politicians and press as thieves and liars, they were frequently dispersed to the run-down areas of smaller towns and cities throughout the UK where they could easily be marked out. Not surprisingly, this resulted (and continues to result) in localised climates of hostility. Dispersal, as Arun Kundnani has argued, produced ‘its own anti-dispersal: a not-in-my- backyard mobilisation, in which each locality fought to have asylum seekers moved on somewhere else’.24 In many cases this was reinforced by local politicians and local media which reiterated the messages of their national counterparts; condemning the presence of a group of people uniformly depicted as a mass of scroungers was easily passed off as simply a defence of the rights of more longstanding residents. In Peterborough, for example, the mayor described his own city as a ‘crime-ridden, rubbish-strewn hellhole’, arguing that it had gone into ‘asylum meltdown’ and railing against those who had learned to ‘milk the system’. Three local councillors wrote an open letter to the leaders of the three main political parties, lamenting how population change had led to an increase in crime, a climate of fear and the overwhelming of services. Just two years after the national policy of dispersal had begun, police revealed that they had recorded two thousand racist attacks against asylum seekers throughout England and Wales,25 a pattern of violence which has continued. At their most extreme, such attacks have proved fatal.26 But murders are only the most brutal end points of the emergence of a specific form of violent racism which has led to children being hounded from schools, adults being hounded from their homes, and families being hounded from the towns and cities where they have sought safety. Islamophobia and anti-Muslim racism Such attacks indicate what can happen when a particular group is used as a political scapegoat, but refugees are not the only group under threat. Islamophobia, embedded within the war on terror, has fuelled anti-Muslim violence across the UK;27 proving deadly in some cases.28 As this violence has continued over the last decade, it has morphed from unprovoked attacks on individuals – including the ripping off of niqabs, spitting and assaults – to encompass anything seen as Islamic. Bolstered by a set of conspiracy theories about ‘Islamification’, violence is frequently directed against mosques, Islamic centres and institutions. These are attempts literally to stop Islam from having any foothold in British cities – even buildings set to be converted into mosques have been vandalised to the point of obliteration. ‘Burn the lot of them out’, wrote a former soldier on Facebook just before he ran a gas-pipe into a mosque in Stoke in 2010.29Attacks of such kind throughout the UK are becoming routine.30 Climates of fear There are others, too, living in a climate of fear: the migrant workers who are employed in economies that have been radically transformed over the last decades. In Peterborough, a city which has increasingly turned to its outlying agricultural hinterlands in the face of economic difficulties, migrant labour has become more and more embedded within its economy. Such is the extent of this economic restructuring, that, in 2009, one in every five jobs in the city was going to migrant workers, many of whom were from the eastern European countries that entered the EU in 2004 and 2007. And what has since happened reveals some of the real costs of the UK’s ruthless demand for cheap labour. With many workers exploited to the point of near slavery and then fired to make way for new ones, over time, a series of makeshift tent-villages began to appear on roundabouts and in parks, providing accommodation for the desperate and destitute. The hostility generated was predictable: one councillor called them ‘vagrants’ and a ‘drain’ on other residents, telling the press, ‘If they are not going to contribute to this country, then, as citizens of their home country, they should return there.’ Some residents evidently had their own ideas about how to help this process along, taking matters into their own hands and torching the tents. Racial violence is now structured into postindustrial Britain, particularly its night- time economy where ‘new’ migrants and asylum seekers alongside ‘older’ discarded BME workers feel the brunt of unemployment as industries are dismantled.31 Yet, as discrimination locked them out of work in mainstream employment, and lack of capital prevented them establishing large-scale enterprises, alternative employment sectors such as taxis, restaurants and take- aways – where racism is now routine – became the only options.32 Workers, frequently un-unionised and working alone, bear the brunt of alcohol-fuelled violence. In Stoke, for example, the violence directed against those BME communities working in its night-time economy over the last few years has involved lumps of masonry being thrown at people, demands for takeaway staff to hand over protection money and taxi-drivers having to barricade themselves in their vehicles. Meanwhile, in Plymouth, a city reeling from the gradual hollowing out of its shipbuilding and defence industries that has turned to the service sector in a drive to restructure its economy around tourism, racist attacks within the night-time economy reached such proportions that, in 2000, specialist police initiatives were developed in response, such as installing audio and video recording equipment in businesses. Some taxis in the city display stickers bluntly telling potential customers that the driver is ‘English’, giving them the opportunity to choose a white driver. The politics of hate Racial violence is spreading against a backdrop of generalised hostility to what is increasingly dubbed ‘super-diversity’; hostility that has been normalised as pragmatic ‘common sense’. A lethal combination of capitalist restructuring and policies to ‘manage’ diversity by targeting the ‘diverse’ have created the climate for racial violence to flourish. But policy-makers now, post Macpherson and influenced by a neoliberal world view in which social ills are caused by individuals’ shortcomings, rather than social and economic inequities, are revising how such violence should be viewed and combated. Now racial violence is part of a ‘hate crime’ agenda. The term ‘hate crime ’originated in the US,33 but the hate crime ‘agenda’ in the UK can be traced back to the New Labour government’s flagship legislation, the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (enacted just prior to the Macpherson Report).34 This introduced higher maximum penalties for crimes designated as being racially aggravated; i.e. motivated in part by an individual perpetrator’s racial hatred. The concept of hate crime has consequently come to prominence in the workings of the criminal justice system. At its core is a rhetorical commitment to criminalise hatred, bringing to bear the full force of criminal justice agencies and, if applicable, the penal system in a drive which is both punitive and symbolic. The former, by way of an assumption that the way to combat racism is through longer prison sentences and harsher punishment; the latter by way of an assumption that it is criminalisation that sends out a message that the state is taking racism seriously. ‘While people continue to be attacked and even killed because of who they are, we owe it to them, their families and their communities to carry on the fight against hatred’, says the latest Equalities Minister.35 Yet, what the amalgamation of hate crime definitions into the workings of the state has done is to invert the gaze from the world to the individual. ‘Hate crime’ displaces racism (once again36) from the social (and political) to the psychological – and thereby absolves the state of institutionalising racism. In itself, this is somewhat ironic. One of the triggers for a concerted focus on the devastating impacts of racial violence was, as alluded to above, the Macpherson Report. It stated publicly and officially – verifying what generations of community activists had been saying for years – that a reality of brutal racist attacks could not be divorced from an equally brutal reality of police indifference, criminal justice inertia and ultimately institutional racism.37 Yet what has emerged in the years following the report is what sociologist Henry Giroux has described (in relation to the US) as a racialisation of politics combined with a personalising of racism.38 In this, the state creates the conditions for racist violence at exactly the same time as it promises to amass greater powers to combat it. Institutional racism is being erased from public debate (aside from a nod to, e.g., glass ceilings in elite professions),39 even as the tracking down and imprisonment of racist offenders is triumphantly celebrated. Successful prosecutions are circulated through a local press always eager for positive criminal justice stories, and an image of continual reform is maintained. That all kinds of interracial crimes, including those involving young black men using the word white about police during an altercation, are now being prosecuted as ‘hate crimes’ serves to further inflate the notional significance of ‘hate’. In part, this stems from the division of hate crime into a series of ‘strands’, whereby racism is located alongside other (in policy-speak) ‘personal characteristics’. Racism, in this context, is seen alongside homophobia, homophobia alongside disability crimes, disability crimes alongside crimes against transgender people, and so on. All, of course, are groups that suffer horrific abuse and that face multiple forms of prejudice. But what this leads to is a categorisation of hate crime in which all vie for an equal status of victimhood. It creates a form of identity politics; not to be included is seen as a kind of insult, as proof that such and such a victimhood is not taken seriously. So, after the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 came into force, it was followed by calls to encourage the government to create tougher sentencing criteria for other potential crimes of ‘hate’ such as medical condition, political opinion and sexual orientation.40 In 2003, the Criminal Justice Act placed a duty on the courts to increase the sentence of any offence deemed to be aggravated by the victim’s disability or sexual orientation.41 The current definition of hate crime focuses on disability, gender-identity, race, religion or faith and sexual orientation.42 Partners in (hate) crime From the 1950s to the 1990s BME people fought to get racial violence accepted as a crime. They marched, picketed police stations, formed community patrols, asserted in court that ‘self defence was no offence’. They created grassroots anti- racist monitoring groups and, in the 1980s,even some progressive local authorities monitored racial violence and the police. This was a learning process for the community and an education for the local state. But those days of politics are over. The hate crime agenda enables the criminal justice system, in conjunction with a host of ‘partners’ from the statutory and non-statutory world, to define what racism is and how it should be dealt with. With organisations representing various victims’ groups forced into a bizarre competition to have their cause acknowledged by the government, their struggles have often consequently been focused on finding space to be accommodated within local frameworks of crime control, rather than asking critical questions of these agencies. And in this context, a whole sub-tier of professional bodies and organisations has either been established or had their work adapted over the last decade. Hate crime has been structured into the local state, embedded and professionalised within local authorities through an array of hate crime officers, diversity representatives, criminal justice agencies and those established ‘third-sector’ organisations which have been recognised as having a legitimate stake in the hate crime world. At its core, such an approach dovetails with an increasing enthusiasm for multi- agency working, accelerated by the New Labour government but continued by the Coalition, which has subtly restructured the basis of state power.43 Through a plethora of networks and multi-agency meetings, such working groups rely on securing consent for the policing of ‘hate’. This approach echoes practices that were put in place in the 1980s after the urban uprisings in Brixton, Mosside, Toxteth, Chapeltown and other inner-city areas. The encouragement of a network of trusted partners and liaison bodies, linked together through a series of strategy meetings and working groups, harks back to Scarman’s consultative committees which, according to critics, were exercises in co-opting the community into policing.44 Similarly, today the fight against racism is being removed from those communities feeling its effects to be relocated within local institutional structures. This has particular resonance in areas which are suddenly experiencing racism in its most raw form and do not have traditions of anti-racist campaigning at community level. This is not to denigrate the often tireless work of some individuals in racial equality councils and other organisations who seek, often with little support, to counter racial injustice. But it is to say that, in the absence of community-based networks, local authorities and criminal justice agencies have appropriated anti-racism, deflecting its politics and muting its anger, and locating it as a professional service working within the structures of the state. On the one hand, this has manifested itself in the plethora of community cohesion projects aimed at encouraging ‘mixing’, good neighbourliness and shared values. If ‘hate’ stems from the individual, the thinking goes, then it is the government’s responsibility to reduce tensions by creating the space for shared activities and cross-community contact.45 On the other, the government, as well as the criminal justice system, have created a network of ‘partners’ and stakeholders at both national and, through multi-agency working, local, levels. And it is through these structures that officially sanctioned partnerships can define among themselves what the priorities are in fighting ‘hate’. Thus, organisations working within the structures of the hate crime agenda decide which communities are in need of ‘protection’, where police officers may most effectively be deployed, and so on. The problem, though, is that, in practice, such partnerships are unequal, with the police and local authorities having most power.46 The consequence is that alliances made between different partners fighting ‘hate’ can break down when community-based concerns come up against the aims of more powerful partners. In Peterborough, for example, when the English Defence League (EDL) held a protest at the end of 2010, the police persuaded young Muslims to avoid the area, discouraging them from holding a counter-protest, on the pretext of maintaining order. This was presented as a deal under which the police said that, if the counter-demonstration was not held, they would contain the EDL. Yet, in the event, the EDL came to the city and its members were allowed by police to gather and give particularly insulting speeches, calling the prophet a paedophile. Such scenes – of police forces and local authorities dissipating local protest against the EDL – have been replicated elsewhere. In Leicester, for instance, the police and the city council ‘undertook a wide-ranging programme to dissuade local people from engaging with or taking part in lawful marches and assemblies on 4thFebruary [2012]’, according to the Network for Police Monitoring (NETPOL).47 Ultimately, the appropriation of ‘anti-racism’ allows state agencies to present themselves as a set of neutral institutions working to ensure public order for all by intervening in the tensions between communities. This, in turn, enables the policing of ‘race’ to go relatively unchallenged. So, in response to new social issues associated with demographic change, a series of intensifying criminal justice and immigration strategies have been put in place that have met little resistance. Thus, for example, in Peterborough, migrant workers forced to live in tents in abject poverty, exploited and destitute, were subjected to new forms of immigration raids. Police, UK Border Agency (UKBA) staff and local authority officers prowled the city, rounding up this new class of homeless, backed up by a compliant, embedded media – including the BBC.48 The official line that these immigration sweeps were actually for the benefit of those being subjected to them, that facilitating their removal from the country would help them, raised barely a murmur. Questions were never asked about the viability or morality of bodies such as UKBA, the police and local authorities criminalising communities and enhancing racism, even as they worked ‘in partnership’ on hate crime strategies. The reality is that the rhetorical commitment to stamp out racism has emerged at exactly the same time as a reinvigorated commitment to deal with, criminalise and discipline ‘race’. Not only has this criminalisation been driven by ideological shifts in racism, such as the targeting of Muslims under the rubric of anti-terrorism,49 it is set against a backdrop of the targeting and surveillance of communities by the criminal justice system that has become entrenched as the damaging impacts of neoliberalism have taken hold. As Sivanandan has described it: ‘Thirty years of neoliberalism and financialisation’ have broken up the working class into a ‘precariat’ and an (officially termed) ‘residual’ social group ‘of the never-employed, estate denizens, inner-city youth, refugees, asylum seekers – the flotsam and jetsam of market society’.50 It is this sub-section of the populace – those who make up the ‘collateral damage of unchecked market economics’51 – multicultural in make-up, but in which BME communities are overrepresented, that is seen as needing to be managed and contained by the criminal justice system. And, where there are no community networks to resist such inroads, what limited accountability there is often resides in infrastructures such as law centres or citizens’ advice bureaux which have adapted their remits; in those occasional radical staff members of racial equality councils; or in those support centres that have sprung up to provide advice and guidance to ‘new’ migrants. But these are exactly the sorts of organisations that are currently being starved of funding under the doctrine of austerity. They are some of those feeling the brunt of 40 per cent cuts to the legal aid budget and £95 billion cuts to public services.52 The far Right and anti-white racism This replacement of an anti-racist movement and redefinition of hate crime as any criminal offence ‘motivated by hostility or prejudice based on a personal characteristic’,53 has opened up space for all kinds of groups to stake a claim that the ‘real’ racism is that faced by white (or, more specifically, white-British) people. The failure to acknowledge the role that state policies and practices play in setting the conditions for racial violence leaves only a definition of hate as springing from internalised rage or, at most, ongoing animosities between communities. In this conspectus, everyone has equal claim to being a victim of hate; everyone can potentially be an offender. Of course, the notion of anti-white racism is not new. The far Right has for decades aimed to promote and play on fears that a white majority is being overrun and overridden by hordes of immigrants.54 Nor are such ideas confined to the far Right. The perception that majority ‘culture’ is being diluted, for example, has long been a staple of the right-wing press (as well as certain thinktanks).55 But at a time when the claim that the UK’s ‘super-diversity’ poses a threat is legitimised by mainstream politics, ideas of anti-white racism have particular appeal. And it is in those areas undergoing forms of population change that they can rapidly gain purchase. The far Right’s appropriation of hate crime and success in turning it into a concept of anti-white racism can be partly gauged by its electoral support. The BNP managed to gain unprecedented popularity in the mid-2000s in various towns and cities in the UK for a combination of reasons. But it was buttressed by the way mainstream parties ceded ground to the far Right, ostensibly to prevent people from voting for it. Meanwhile, the BNP was able to manipulate the genuine concerns of white communities, over immigration, asylum and Islam, in those places which had been left to rot by mainstream political parties. Using the language of hate crime, far-right groups have made considerable efforts to assert that they are the ‘real’ victims. It is this, in part, that has provided the basis for continued far-right campaigning, despite electoral setbacks. Ironically, while the state’s commitment to combating hate crime appears to have increased as it has abandoned any real understanding of institutional racism, the EDL, the BNP and other far-right groups have seized the concept and used it for their own ends. Thus, whilst marches and rallies are still mobilised against the building of mosques and Islamic centres, they are increasingly also held to protest that the criminal justice system is institutionally biased against white people.56 And they are held in defence of Christian values that, it is claimed, are being ‘eroded’ by a political elite too paralysed by political correctness to defend the interests of the nation.57 And they are held in ‘remembrance’ of white people who have been killed or injured in what they allege are racist attacks. In Stoke, for example, after a BNP supporter was killed in 2008 by his Muslim neighbour, whom he had subjected to years of racist abuse and harassment, the BNP presented him as a ‘white martyr’.58 Such cynical attempts to make political capital from horrific incidents have been resisted by bereaved family members who have condemned the far Right for attempting to gain support.59But, worse, the fall-out of such far-right organising can be detected in an enhanced climate of violence: the Kurdish family forced to barricade themselves in their own takeaway from a baying mob of EDL members in Plymouth, for example, or the taxi-drivers forced to stop working on the eve of an EDL march in Stoke after receiving death threats. The parameters of racial violence have changed dramatically over the last two decades: geographically (the phenomenon has spread), conceptually (it has been redefined as hate crime), politically (it has been claimed by the far Right) and strategically (it is being managed by state and private agencies not combated by the community). And all at a time when the age of austerity cuts financial support to community infrastructures and creates the conditions of competition among the poor and poorer where racial violence can thrive. Local activists, anxious to deal with popular racism and racial attacks, for want of radical left strategies, still look hopefully over their shoulders to local authorities to help set up community initiatives, without seeing the extent to which local authorities are now compromised. Such an understanding, of course, is made all the harder as popular discourse divorces violent racism from its political, economic and ideological contexts. Obviously one cannot just replicate old struggles in new conditions, but we can learn from the lessons of the past and remould them into contemporary struggles. All the conditions are there and all the possible allies. References 1. According to research by the Institute of Race Relations, roughly five racist attacks per year have proved fatal in the UK since the teenager Stephen Lawrence was stabbed to death in London in 1993. See Athwal Harmit, ‘96 murders since Stephen Lawrence’s’, IRR News (5 January 2012), available at: http://www.irr.org.uk/news/96-murders-since-stephen- lawrences-2/ Google Scholar 2. Statistical News Release: hate crimes England and Wales 2011/12, Home Office (13 September 2012), available at: http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/science-research-statistics/research- statistics/crime-research/hate-crimes-1112/hate-crimes-1112-snr?view=Binary 3. The Crime Survey for England and Wales used to be known as the British Crime Survey. Its name changed in April 2012 to better reflect the geographical area covered. It is based on information provided by about 50,000 people who are asked about their experiences of crime over the preceding year. 4. Athwal Harmit, Jenny Bourne and Rebecca Wood, Racial Violence: the buried issue (London, Institute of Race Relations, 2010). Google Scholar 5. See Burnett Jon, The New Geographies of Racism: Plymouth (London, Institute of Race Relations, 2011); The New Geographies of Racism: Stoke-on-Trent (London, Institute of Race Relations, 2011); and The New Geographies of Racism: Peterborough (London, Institute of Race Relations, 2012). These reports can be downloaded from: http://www.irr.org.uk/research/geographies-of-racism/ Google Scholar 6. Quinn Ben, ‘David Starkey claims “the whites have become black”’, Guardian (13 August 2011), available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2011/aug/13/david-starkey- claims-whites-black Google Scholar 7. For example, see Nathan Max, ‘The economics of super-diversity: findings from British cities 2001–2006’, SERC Discussion Paper 68 (London, Spatial Economics Research Centre, 2011). Google Scholar 8. Rogers Simon, ‘The ethnic population of England and Wales broken down by local authority’, Guardian (18 May 2011). Google Scholar 9. Vertovec Steven, ‘The emergence of super-diversity in Britain’, Vancouver Centre of Excellence Working Paper No. 06-14 (Vancouver, Vancouver Centre of Excellence, 2006). Google Scholar 10. See Reeve Kesia, ‘New immigration and neighbourhood change’, in Flint John, Robinson David, Community Cohesion in Crisis? New dimensions of diversity and difference (Bristol, Policy Press, 2008), pp. 177–98. Google Scholar 11. Tran Mark, ‘Ethnic minorities to make up 20% of UK population by 2015’, Guardian (13 July 2010), available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2010/jul/13/uk-population-growth- ethnic-minorities Google Scholar 12. See, for example, Wright Oliver, Taylor Jerome, ‘Cameron: my war on multiculturalism’, Independent (5February 2011), available at: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/cameron-my-war-on-multiculturalism- 2205074.html Google Scholar 13. McGhee Derek, Intolerant Britain? Hate, citizenship and difference (Milton Keynes, Open University Press, 2005). Google Scholar 14. Slack James, ‘Thousand people an hour sign up to e-petitions website calling for debate on migration’, Daily Mail (2 November 2011), available at: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2056265/MigrationWatch-UK-Thousand-hour- sign-e-petition-calling-immigration-debate.html. Google Scholar 15. Migration Watch UK, ‘The impact of chain migration on English cities’, Policy Briefing 9.13 (London, Migration Watch UK, 2005). Google Scholar 16. Finney Nissa, Simpson Ludi, ‘Sleepwalking to segregation?’ Challenging myths about race and migration (Bristol, Policy Press, 2009). Google Scholar 17. Porter, ‘David Cameron: migration threatens our way of life’, Telegraph (13 April 2011). Google Scholar 18. See Harvey David, A Brief History of Neoliberalism (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005). Google Scholar 19. Wacquant Loïc, Punishing the Poor: the neoliberal government of social insecurity (Durham, NC, Duke University Press, 2009). Google Scholar CrossRef 20. When in summer 2012, Labour leader Ed Miliband claimed that his party had got it ‘wrong’ in power by not imposing more stringent controls on those from the countries entering the EU in 2004 and 2007, the response from the Conservatives and the right-wing press was a bizarre mixture of self-congratulation and rage. Self-congratulation, because they said it confirmed how right they were all along, and rage because they claimed that Britain has been irreversibly altered for the worse, and this admission has come too late. For a prime example, see Stephen Glover, ‘So Labour now says it’s NOT racist to debate immigration. What sick hypocrisy’, Daily Mail (22 July 2012), available at: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/debate/article-2163445/Ed-Miliband-So-Labour-says-NOT- racist-debate-immigration-What-sick-hypocrisy.html 21. Chakrabortty Aditya, ‘Why doesn’t Britain make things any more?’, Guardian (16 November 2011), available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2011/nov/16/why- britain-doesnt-make-things-manufacturing Google Scholar 22. This information, and further specific information about racist attacks in Stoke, Plymouth or Peterborough, is taken from the respective investigations into racial violence, cited earlier. 23. Cantle Ted, Community Cohesion: a new framework for race and diversity (London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2005). Google Scholar CrossRef 24. Kundnani A., The End of Tolerance: racism in the 21st century (London, Pluto Press, 2007), p. 85. Google Scholar 25. ‘Violence against refugees reaches new high’, Independent (16 September 2002). 26. Athwal Harmit, Driven to Desperate Measures: 2006–2010 (London, IRR, 2010). Google Scholar 27. Ameli Saied R., Ahooei Ebrahim Mohseni, Ehsan Shaghasemi and Maryam Rahimpour, Getting the Message: the recurrence of hate crimes in the UK (London, Islamic Human Rights Commission, 2011).Google Scholar 28. Dodd Vikram, ‘Islamophobia blamed for attack’, Guardian (13 July 2005), available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2005/jul/13/race.july7 Google Scholar 29. ‘Stoke-on-Trent arsonists jailed’, BBC News (8 December 2011), available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-stoke-staffordshire-16098897 30. Burnett Jon, ‘Attacks on Islamic institutions increase’, IRR News (28 July 2011), available at: http://www.irr.org.uk/news/attacks-on-islamic-institutions-increase/ Google Scholar 31. For information on the night-time economy, see Hobbs Dick, Philip Hadfield, Stuart Lister and Simon Winlow, Bouncers: violence and governance in the night-time economy (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003). Google Scholar 32. Kundnani Arun, ‘From Oldham to Bradford: the violence of the violated’, Race & Class (Vol. 43, no. 2, 2001), pp. 67–72. Google Scholar 33. See, for example, the discussion of this in Larry Ray and David Smith, ‘Racist offenders and the politics of “hate crime”’, Law and Critique (Vol. 12, no. 3, 2001), pp. 203–21. 34. Following Stephen Lawrence’s death, and set against a backdrop of spiralling racist attacks, there had been calls from some quarters for a new offence of racially motivated violence to be incorporated into the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, but this never came to fruition, in part because of resistance by the home secretary Michael Howard. See Leng Roger, Taylor Richard, Wasik Martin, Blackstone’s Guide to the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (London, Blackstone, 1998), p. 41. Google Scholar 35. Featherstone Lynne, ‘Foreword’, in Challenge It, Report It, Stop It: the government’s plan to tackle hate crime (London, HM Government, 2012), p. 4. Google Scholar 36. See Sivanandan A., Communities of Resistance: writings on Black struggles for socialism (London, Verso, 1990), pp. 94–5 and 146–7. Google Scholar 37. For discussion, see, for example, Rowe Michael, Policing, Race and Racism (Devon, Willan, 2004). Google Scholar 38. Giroux Henry A., The Terror of Neoliberalism: authoritarianism and the eclipse of democracy (London, Paradigm, 2004), p. 57. Google Scholar 39. Delivering a lecture thirty years after the 1981 riots in Brixton, south London, Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg claimed that a ‘great deal’ had been achieved since the 1980s, but that there was still a ‘very, very long way to go’ in addressing inequality. He said that banks and football clubs needed to do more to eliminate the ‘racial ceiling’ in the respective professions. See ‘Nick Clegg targets “racial ceiling” in banks and sport’, BBC News (24 November 2011), available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-15868844 40. Rowe Michael, op. cit., p. 105. 41. For an overview of legislative developments see Home Office, Hate Crime – the cross- government action plan (London, Home Office, 2009). Google Scholar 42. Challenge It, Report It, Stop It, op. cit. 43. Coleman Roy, Reclaiming the Streets: surveillance, social control and the city (Devon, Willan, 2004). Google Scholar 44. Gordon Paul, ‘Community policing: towards the local police state’, in ed. Scraton Phil, Law, Order and the Authoritarian State (Open University Press, Milton Keynes, 1987), p. 134. Google Scholar 45. Flint John, Robinson David, op. cit. 46. For a discussion of criminal justice partnerships working more broadly, see Crawford Adam, The Local Governance of Crime: appeals to community and partnerships (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1997). Google Scholar 47. Netpol, Report on the Policing of the English Defence League and Counter Protests in Leicester on 4th February 2012 (London, Netpol, 2012), p. 2. Google Scholar 48. See, for example, ‘New clampdown on Peterborough’s homeless migrants’, BBC News (4 August 2011), available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-cambridgeshire- 14405868 49. Campaign Against Criminalising Communities, ‘UK anti-terror regime: creating hatred of Muslims as a suspect community’, Statement for the Conference: Confronting anti-Muslim hatred in Britain and Europe (21 May 2011), available at: http://campacc.org.uk/index.php?mact=News,cntnt01,detail,0&cntnt01articleid=95&cntnt 01origid=15&cntnt01returnid=53&phpMyAdmin=I8srdJ5PC9Q2-jYJb4LpEkCqV17 Google Scholar 50. Sivanandan A., ‘The market state vs the good society’, Race & Class (Vol. 54, no. 3, 2013). Google Scholar 51. Parenti C., Lockdown America: police and prisons in an age of crisis (London, Verso, 1999), p. 46. Google Scholar 52. For discussion of the attack on legal aid, see Mansfield Michael, ‘Legal aid cuts: if barristers don’t defend justice for all, who will?’, Guardian (22 May 2012), available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2012/may/22/legal-aid-cuts-what-price- justice Google Scholar 53. ‘Hate crime’, Home Office (accessed 28 September 2012), available at: http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/crime/hate-crime/ 54. See, for example, Walker Martin, The National Front (Glasgow, Fontana, 1977). Google Scholar 55. Law Ian, Race in the News (Basingstoke, Palgrave, 2002). See also Erfani-Ghettani Ryan, ‘Did Macpherson manacle the police?’, IRR News (13 September 2012), available at: http://www.irr.org.uk/news/did-macpherson-manacle-the-police/ Google Scholar 56. See, for example, ‘Eleven arrested during English Defence League rally in Rochdale’, Manchester Evening News (9 June 2012), available at: http://menmedia.co.uk/manchestereveningnews/news/s/1581021_eleven-arrested- during-english-defence-league-rally-in-rochdale 57. Bristow Tom, ‘Norwich reverend whose council ban sparked EDL protest denies link to right-wing group’, Norwich Evening News (2 October 2012), available at: http://www.eveningnews24.co.uk/news/norwich_reverend_whose_council_ban_sparked _edl_protest_denies_links_to_right_wing_group_1_1539649 Google Scholar 58. In a scathing article, even the right-wing Daily Mail accused the BNP of exploiting the incident with ‘a cynicism that beggars belief’. Bracchi Paul, ‘How the BNP shamefully tried to create a “white martyr” for their own grubby ends’, Daily Mail (31 May 2008), available at: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1023196/How-BNP-shamefully-tried-create- white-martyr.html Google Scholar 59. In Hyde, in the north-west of England, for example, in 2012 a mother pleaded with the EDL not to march on ‘behalf’ of her son, who had been seriously assaulted by a group of Asians, saying ‘I certainly don’t want [his] name being dragged into something we don’t agree with’. See ‘Family of Hyde Park “race attack” victim Daniel Stringer-Prince urge English Defence League to call off protest march’, Manchester Evening News (20 February 2012), available at: http://menmedia.co.uk/manchestereveningnews/news/s/1485994_family-of-hyde-race- attack-victim-daniel-stringer-prince-urge-english-defence-league-to-call-off-protest-march. 
work_znamitx5r5eulkccgakvpn6ps4	----	Freedom of Information (FOI) as a data collection tool for social scientists RESEARCH ARTICLE Freedom of Information (FOI) as a data collection tool for social scientists Joanna Clifton-Sprigg 1☯ , Jonathan JamesID 1☯*, Sunčica Vujić1,2☯ 1 Department of Economics, University of Bath, Bath, England, United Kingdom, 2 Department of Economics, University of Antwerp, Antwerp, Belgium ☯ These authors contributed equally to this work. * j.james@bath.ac.uk Abstract This paper evaluates a method of generating a unique dataset that has been underused—a Freedom of Information (FOI) request. The UK’s FOI Act came into force in 2005, allowing the public to make requests of publicly held data. We set out to understand the determinants of the quality responses to FOI requests. We also explain how requests can be made and provide suggestions to construct effective data-driven requests. We applied for data on hate crime from all police forces and on uptake of maternity leave from all universities. We find that observable characteristics of the local area, police force and universities neither deter- mine whether the request was fulfilled, nor the speed of response, suggesting that the data from these FOI requests are representative of the institutions from which they were requested. Introduction Hate crime and maternity and shared parental leave uptake (or rather the lack of it) feature heavily in the current public discourse in Britain and are of serious concern for policy makers. The issue of hate crime surfaced at the forefront of the public debate in the UK following sig- nificant migration inflows into the country, which led to conspicuous changes in population composition [1]. Recently, however, there has been a visible surge in reported hate crimes fol- lowing the country’s Referendum on the Membership of the European Union [2] [3]. At the same time, the ongoing debate around gender pay gap and attempts to close it have brought to the fore the issue of the failed implementation of the shared parental leave, which was intro- duced in April 2015 in the UK. Specifically, the low uptake of shared leave and low awareness of citizens of its existence have been extensively covered by media (see [4] for example). Despite their high visibility and importance for policy-making, these topics are still heavily under-researched. This is largely due to the lack of available quantitative data, which would permit rigorous empirical (econometric) analysis. For example, while government data are being increasingly opened up and made available, they often lack variables or characteristics that would be useful or essential to the researcher. Crime datasets in the UK are one particular example of this. Even though detailed aggregate crime statistics are publicly available, the indi- vidual level crime data are not only difficult to obtain, but also difficult to match to other PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0228392 February 21, 2020 1 / 14 a1111111111 a1111111111 a1111111111 a1111111111 a1111111111 OPEN ACCESS Citation: Clifton-Sprigg J, James J, Vujić S (2020) Freedom of Information (FOI) as a data collection tool for social scientists. PLoS ONE 15(2): e0228392. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal. pone.0228392 Editor: Pablo Dorta-González, Universidad de las Palmas de Gran Canaria, SPAIN Received: August 14, 2019 Accepted: January 14, 2020 Published: February 21, 2020 Copyright: © 2020 Clifton-Sprigg et al. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited. Data Availability Statement: The data has been deposited at the University of Bath Research Data Archive: https://doi.org/10.15125/BATH-00763. Funding: The author(s) received no specific funding for this work. Competing interests: The authors have declared that no competing interests exist. http://orcid.org/0000-0002-8206-1637 https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0228392 http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1371/journal.pone.0228392&domain=pdf&date_stamp=2020-02-21 http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1371/journal.pone.0228392&domain=pdf&date_stamp=2020-02-21 http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1371/journal.pone.0228392&domain=pdf&date_stamp=2020-02-21 http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1371/journal.pone.0228392&domain=pdf&date_stamp=2020-02-21 http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1371/journal.pone.0228392&domain=pdf&date_stamp=2020-02-21 http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1371/journal.pone.0228392&domain=pdf&date_stamp=2020-02-21 https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0228392 https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0228392 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://doi.org/10.15125/BATH-00763 relevant characteristics (for a more detailed discussion, see [5]). [6], who examined the impact of tougher sentencing on crime, required crime and police data at highly localised geographical areas, which are typically not provided in published statistics. [7] exploited timing of alcohol consumption and required detailed information on the time when crimes are committed. [8] required monthly counts of hate crimes broken down by the ethnicity of a victim in their investigation of the impact of terrorist attacks on hate crime. Each of these papers used Free- dom of Information (FOI) requests to gather administrative data that are not routinely available. Similarly, the publicly available data related to uptake of maternity and shared parental leave in the UK are insufficiently detailed to permit analysis of their determinants, especially their financial conditions. This is also the case for higher educational institutions in the UK, even though they generally lead in provision of information related to any matters regarding gender equality. For example, many of the UK higher educational institutions have taken explicit steps to address gender inequality as part of the Athena Swan Charter (https://www. ecu.ac.uk/equality-charters/athena-swan/). Nonetheless, many of them do not make their pol- icy documents publicly available. For example, often one cannot find details of their occupa- tional maternity and shared parental leaves provided in addition to the statutory entitlements, which would allow researchers (or potential job applicants, for that matter) to gauge generosity of the employer. Similarly, many but not all universities publish their salary scales. More importantly, one may require anonymised individual level data on uptake of leave to compare and contrast the uptake at various institutions and consider key determinants. Such data are currently not available. In relation to this, recently FOI requests were used by BBC in order to write an article about the referrals of university staff to counselling services [9]. Motivated by the pressing research questions, which are also present in the current public discourse, such as hate crimes and maternity and shared parental leave uptake, and insufficient public data availability, this paper focuses on an important potential source of self-generated data that has not received much attention, nor has (yet) been fully exploited by the economists and other social scientists—Freedom of Information (FOI) requests. In line with the data gaps identified earlier, we consider two different FOI data requests and evaluate their effectiveness in 1) obtaining previously unavailable data and 2) generating representative data. In doing so we make the following two contributions to the field of economics and related social sciences; first, the data we obtained will allow us to undertake novel analyses on hate crime and family policies, which will be of academic and policy importance. Second, by demonstrating repre- sentativeness of the two independent FOI data sets we are hoping to convince researchers of their usefulness and reliability, instilling confidence in this data collection method and thus popularising its use for the future. The FOI acts have been introduced in many countries over recent decades “in response to domestic or international pressures for transparency and good governance” [10]. The US passed an FOI act in 1966, followed by Australia, Canada and New Zealand in 1982, Ireland in 1997 and the UK in 2000 (coming into force on January 1 st , 2005). [10] assess performance of the FOI act in the UK in comparison to other countries by considering the total number of requests made over time, percentage of requests granted and whether refusals to provide data are appealed against. FOI allows researchers access to bespoke datasets, which are typically administrative, given the FOI’s focus on the public sector, from tax records to schooling. The commitment by various governments to open up their data has led to a vast number of datasets becoming increasingly publicly available. Further, administrative data have a number of advantages over survey data. Specifically, administrative samples have universal coverage (and hence large sample sizes) and fewer issues with measurement error or attrition compared to traditional surveys [11] point out the wealth of administrative data that is collected across a Freedom of Information (FOI) as a data collection tool for social scientists PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0228392 February 21, 2020 2 / 14 https://www.ecu.ac.uk/equality-charters/athena-swan/ https://www.ecu.ac.uk/equality-charters/athena-swan/ https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0228392 wide range of domains of the public sector and how lack of access to it is threatening the domi- nant position of the US in economics research. At the same time countries, which allow researchers to use administrative data, have lengthy procedures in place in order to access them. FOI requests can partly help overcome this. The aim of this paper is to understand the determinants of the quality of the responses to FOI requests. One concern with obtaining data from the FOI requests could be that those authorities that respond might be systematically different from those which do not and there- fore the researcher obtains a non-representative sample. Therefore, we subsequently analyse whether there is any differential selection among institutions from which data are requested with respect to provision of the data along their observable characteristics. Specifically, we doc- ument the determinants of two particular FOI requests we made—i) for the data on hate crime from all police forces in the UK and ii) for the data on the uptake of maternity leave from all UK higher education (HE) institutions, based on their HE status as registered with the Higher Education Standards Agency (HESA). In addition, we explain how researchers can make FOI requests and provide tips on how to make those requests more successful. We do so as it is apparent that researchers are currently not fully exploiting the FOI provision to access the data, which have already been collected but are simply unpublished. [10] show that only a tiny proportion of the population make FOI requests—only one or two per thousand of the popula- tion per year. The lack of engagement with the FOI requests may be due to the fact that access to data is not always guaranteed. Although public authorities are legally obliged to respond to the FOI requests and provide data within 20 working days (in case of UK, for example), they do not always do so. They may refuse to provide the data on the grounds of cost or breach of data protection, or may not have the requested data. To preview the results, we do not find that observable characteristics of the local area or the police force determine whether the request for provision of hate crime data was not fulfilled at all or in part, nor the speed at which it was responded to. Similarly, university characteristics such as size, age composition and salary of staff, total income, ranking or Research Excellence Framework (REF) submission statistics, do not predict the likelihood of response to the request and provision of data by UK universities. The Research Excellence Framework (REF) is a system for assessing the quality of research in the UK higher education institutions. The outcomes of REF evaluation play a crucial role in determining a university’s future research funding and its reputation (see [12]). This suggests that the data collected from an FOI request are broadly representative of the institutions from which they were requested and that results obtained from analysis using them should be externally valid. In the next section, we explain the FOI law in the UK and illustrate how to make an FOI request (in the UK). Section III documents the determinants of the two requests we made, Sec- tion IV provides potential constraints when making FOI requests, while Section V concludes the paper. How to make an FOI request The Freedom of Information Act 2000 came into force on January 1 st 2005 in the UK. It pro- vides access to information held by public authorities by making them publish information about their actions and by allowing the public to request information from them. The UK “enacted FOI within the context of an information revolution that has made government more open and information easier to use, store, access, and distribute” [10]. Also, there was a strong government commitment and political will to implement an effective FOI regime. The UK has an exceptionally wide coverage, with an estimated 100,000 public bodies being subject to the Act all at once: central and local government, the National Health Service (NHS), Freedom of Information (FOI) as a data collection tool for social scientists PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0228392 February 21, 2020 3 / 14 https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0228392 maintained schools and other educational institutions, armed forces, police, and other public bodies and offices. Together with New Zealand, UK FOI regime fares best, given its openness and high level of political and official support [10]. FOI requests are free, and requests must be made in writing. Authorities typically have a contact email address or an online application form through which the requests can be made. These can be found on dedicated FOI webpages as part of the authority’s website. While it is not necessary to state that the request is made under the FOI act, doing so helps avoiding any confusion and sets the clock ticking. Requests must be acknowledged (although, in practice, not all institutions actually acknowledge the receipt of the request, despite the legal obligation to do so) and answered within 20 working days. If clarification is required, the clock is re-set; the countdown begins again from the day clarification is received. Before making a request, it is important to explore whether the required data can be found elsewhere because, in such a case, the institution in question is likely to refuse provision of the data and instead direct the researcher to the relevant data source. Furthermore, the data of interest to researchers may have been previously requested. A good starting point is the web- site www.data.gov.uk which contains datasets from all central government departments, local authorities and various public sector bodies. Many organisations also publish the responses to previous FOI requests in their disclosure logs. Therefore it is useful to search through these already existing sources of data prior to making a new FOI request. Determinants of response to the two FOI requests In this section we examine the determinants of response to the two FOI requests that we have undertaken. When using the data obtained by the FOI requests, a researcher may worry that authorities, which replied to an FOI request, might systematically be different from those, which did not reply; therefore, selection bias may be a concern. This exercise is intended to establish whether any particular characteristics make an authority more likely to respond. A request for hate crime data from the UK police forces Data collection. On March 2 nd 2017 we contacted 47 police forces in the UK with an identical request (the full text of the request can be found in the supplementary material) to provide monthly statistics on the reported number of hate crimes by type of crime, by ethnicity and by nationality of the victim covering the period from January 2011 to February 2017. The requests were randomly allocated between the three authors with two exceptions. The first exception was Essex police, which was contacted as a pilot area to determine the feasibility of the request. The second exception was Avon and Somerset police; the police force was con- tacted to determine whether being contacted by an academic based locally might increase the likelihood of a positive response. The characteristics of the response across areas are provided in Table 1. Specifically, the response rate was 98%, with one police force not replying. The request was completed on average within 20 days, the exact time within which institutions are obliged to respond. In 28% of cases the request was completed late, usually due to the need to follow up with clarification. The police forces responded in three ways—by refusing to share any information (11%) due to cost or data unsuitability, by providing some data and by pro- viding all requested data. When only partial information was sent back, it was typically justi- fied by the lack of data or the cost of providing additional data being greater than the cost limits set out in Section IV. Among the successful responses, some of the data provided were not in accordance with the requested format (e.g., providing quarterly or annual instead of monthly data). Freedom of Information (FOI) as a data collection tool for social scientists PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0228392 February 21, 2020 4 / 14 http://www.data.gov.uk https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0228392 Analysis. We want to investigate whether these differential responses were determined by either characteristics and circumstances of the police force or of the area it was covering. We examine two outcomes–i) whether the police force provided any data (sensu lato) and ii) whether the provided data were what we requested (e.g., monthly and not quarterly or annual) (sensu stricto). We have coded the Right Data such that it equals to one if data were suitable to use in the analysis, and zero otherwise. The latter corresponds to “unsuitable data” in Table 1 (10.3% out of 89% who provided data of some kind). Data were deemed unsuitable for the analysis if they were (a) of annual frequency; (b) of quarterly frequency; (c) entirely different from what we have asked for (e.g., no counts, no types of hate crimes, etc). Overall, Right Data is equal to one for 35 police forces and zero for the remaining 10 police forces, thus providing sufficient variation to make a prediction. We estimate a probit model of the following form: PðDatai ¼ 1j xÞ¼ Fðb0 þ PF 0 igþ LA 0 idþ LL 0 iyÞ where Data indicates one of the two responses set out above. Among the determinants of the FOI request we consider police force (PF) characteristics including total size, overall funding and staff available to process the requests. Forces with more funding might be better placed to deal with the FOI requests and may be less inclined to divert funds from administrative staff Table 1. Summary statistics- FOI request to police forces. Panel A. Descriptives Panel B. Justification provided Number of police forces Number of police forces 47 Reasons for refusal to provide data overall Request response rate 98% Cost 5 Follow up / clarification required 28% Not appropriate for this research 1 Late request completion 28% average completion time (working days) 19.8 Reasons not all data provided Refused data provision 11% Information not held 5 Provided data of some kind 89% Cost 2 all requested data 44.7% most (or all) requested data 78.7% Reasons data provided not suitable unsuitable data 10.3% Wrong information (e.g. annual or quarterly) 3 Police force not territorial 2 Panel C. Police force characteristics Panel D. Local area characteristics mean st.dev. mean st.dev. Total police force 6111.96 12600.76 Disposable income per head in 2016 18640.83 2573.63 Total administrative staff 83.54 93.77 Unemployment rate (16–64 year olds) in 2016 4.49 1.07 Administrative staff (per 100 police force) 2.02 0.81 Administrative staff (per 100 population) 0.02 0.06 % population working age 63.29 2.62 Number of non-white employees (per 100 police force) 1.50 1.63 % population UK born 88.37 14.97 % population white 91.63 9.08 Funding in £ (per 10000 population) 2771296 8446972 % population Christian 62.78 6.88 Total offences (per 100 police force) 2210.78 643.65 % population no religion 25.19 5.19 Reported hate crimes, 2014–2015 (per 100 population) 0.101 0.11 Reported racist incidents, 2014–2015 (per 100 population) 0.112 0.102 Migration flow (per 100 population) 0.32 0.26 Note: Data come from the following sources: police force characteristics and crime statistics—Home Office; local area demographic characteristics—2011 Census; labour market characteristics—ONS. Information about the police forces refers to year 2015/2016, the most recent data available. The crime statistics capture year 2014/2015. The local area demographics reflects the situation at the time of the 2011 Census. The reference year for labour market characteristics is 2015. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0228392.t001 Freedom of Information (FOI) as a data collection tool for social scientists PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0228392 February 21, 2020 5 / 14 https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0228392.t001 https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0228392 towards more front-line policing. The likelihood of the request being completed and being completed on time should increase with the size of the administrative team. We also examine local area characteristics (LA) such as the demographic and ethnic make-up of the area and the proportion of hate crime offences in the period prior to when the request was made. It could be the case that more diverse areas have experienced greater exposure to hate crime and as such have already implemented better data collection practices making it easier to access the data. Finally, we examine the local labour market (LL) conditions of the area. Table 2 presents the results of this analysis with two different dependent variables—whether any data were provided and whether the right data were provided. We present the marginal effects from a set of probit regressions. All regressions include the variables with coefficients reported in the table as well as two dummy variables indicating the contact person on the research team responsible for the request. In columns 1 and 6 we only include the police force characteristics—size per 100 population, number of admin staff per 100 population and fund- ing of the police force per 10000 population. The regressions are run on a sample of 45 police Table 2. The determinants of the response to an FOI request of all police forces in the UK. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) Dependent Variable. Any Data Right Data Size of police force 0.629 0.981 1.209 2.520 (per 100 of the population) (0.705) (2.282) (0.928) (2.515) Size of admin team -22.309 -10.540 -36.396� -74.989 (per 100 of the population) (16.233) (44.503) (22.095) (63.694) Total funding 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 (£ per 10000 population) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) Crime Hate crimes -0.486 10.255 -0.567 0.804 (per 100 population) (0.416) (19.099) (0.508) (2.980) Local population characteristics % population working age -0.079�� -0.141 -0.045 0.034 (0.031) (0.215) (0.043) (0.062) % population white 0.085�� 0.37 0.049 0.215 (0.035) (0.547) (0.043) (0.202) % population non-UK born -0.007 0.005 0.014 0.050 (0.016) (0.040) (0.026) (0.063) % population of non-Christian religion 0.175��� 0.703 0.064 0.249 (0.062) (1.049) (0.066) (0.234) Local labour market disposable income per head -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) unemployment level -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) Pseudo-R2 0.194 0.072 0.235 0.042 0.563 0.153 0.040 0.057 0.022 0.342 Observations 43 43 45 45 42 43 43 45 45 42 Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if any requested data / right data were provided. Reported coefficients are marginal effects from probit regressions. Regressions are run on a sample of 45 police forces, as two police forces (British Transport Police and Doverport) are non-territorial. All regressions include two dummy variables indicating the contact person on the research team responsible for the request. Robust standard errors in parentheses. �, �� and ��� respectively denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level. Data sources: FOI requests, 2011 Census, Home Office and ONS. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0228392.t002 Freedom of Information (FOI) as a data collection tool for social scientists PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0228392 February 21, 2020 6 / 14 https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0228392.t002 https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0228392 forces, as two police forces (British Transport Police and Doverport) are non-territorial. Hence, there are no local area characteristics available for them. We find no relationship between provision of right data and the police force characteristics. Next, we examine whether the incidence of hate crimes is correlated with the response to the FOI request (columns 2 and 7). We find no relationship. We have also used a more general measure of crime (i.e., total crimes committed per 100 population) instead of the hate crime variable. The regression results remain unchanged. Then we consider the demographic characteristics of the area (col- umns 3 and 8) and find correlations between provision of any data and the share of population who are white (+), the share of population who are of non-Christian religion (+) and the share of population of working age (–). There is no relationship between these characteristics and provision of right data. Lastly, we consider the role played by the local labour market charac- teristics (columns 4 and 9) and find no relationship with either of the dependent variables. When we include these variables together in a regression (columns 5 and 10), all coefficients become statistically insignificant. As can be seen from pseudo-R 2 reported in Table 2, inclu- sion of various police force characteristics increases the explanatory power of the model, as expected. Overall, we conclude that the above characteristics do not determine the responsive- ness of police forces to our FOI request. Robustness checks. In the supplementary material we also provide results (S2 Appendix Table A) of the regressions using two alternative measures: i) whether the police force pro- vided all requested data (i.e., monthly number of hate crimes by type, by ethnicity of victim and by nationality of victim), and ii) whether the request was completed late (i.e., after the 20 working day target). No characteristics we study seem to determine late provision of data. We find positive and marginally significant correlations between the local population characteris- tics and provision of all requested data. As an additional check (S2 Appendix Table B), we have also dropped two London-based police forces (Metropolitan and City) from the main regressions. This is because due to the London allowance wages paid to administrative staff, processing the requests in London increases the cost of complying. The regression results con- sidering provision of any data remain unaltered. In regressions considering provision of right data, when all controls are included together, the coefficients on some of the local population characteristics become significant but only at 10% level. Furthermore, due to the potential issue that many police forces provided data of some kind and as such there is little variation in the dependent variable, we estimate a version of the logis- tic model that takes into account such ‘rare’ events. Specifically, we fit a logistic model by penalized maximum likelihood regression set out by [13] and implemented in Stata by [14]. The results, in the supplementary S2 Appendix (Table C), are qualitatively and quantitatively similar to those obtained using a probit model. While we have chosen variables which we thought, a priori, were most likely to be determi- nants of receiving the data it could well be the case that other variables may be more important. To address this issue, we have run a series of alternative specifications using alternative vari- ables to the ones we chose. In Tables D and E of the S2 Appendix, where the dependent vari- ables are “Any Data” and “Right Data” respectively, we have re-estimated the full model, as set out in Table 2 columns 5 and 10, and have in turn replaced each variable (with the exception of those that capture local labour market characteristics, and the proportion of working age population, due to lack of obvious alternatives) with at least one alternative. For example, we have replaced the size of the police force with the size of the police force who are BME (Black and Minority Ethnic), we have replaced hate crimes with violent crimes, and we have made various replacements of ethnicity, country of birth and religionvariables. In total, we have esti- mated nine different specifications that have used thirteen different variables. Of the 362 parameters estimated, as shown in S2 Appendix Table D, none are statistically significant. In Freedom of Information (FOI) as a data collection tool for social scientists PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0228392 February 21, 2020 7 / 14 https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0228392 S2 Appendix Table E we find just 5 coefficients which are statistically significant at the 10% level and one at the 5% level. In summary, this additional analysis does not alter our conclusions. A request for data on maternity leave uptake at the UK universities Data collection. On August 24 th 2018 we contacted 162 universities in the UK with an FOI request. We chose higher education providers registered with the Higher Education Stan- dard Agency (HESA) (https://www.hesa.ac.uk/support/providers). We excluded those which operate under an umbrella of another institution. For example, the Hull York Medical School is a joint venture between the University of York and Hull University. As such the respective universities include information about the Medical School staff in their statistics. The exact wording of the request can be found in the supplementary material. The request asked for indi- vidual level data for years 2010–2017 about employees who took maternity leave, including their age, university department they have worked at, pay grade, the number of weeks of leave taken and whether they have taken any shared parental leave with their partners. Furthermore, we also requested the following university and department level statistics for the same period: total number of staff employed and by gender; overall number of professors and split by gen- der; total number of employees who took maternity or shared parental leave. The same person sent all requests. The response rate and the type of responses provided can be found in Table 3. Table 3. Summary statistics—Universities. Panel A. Response rate and reasons for not providing data Number of universities 162 Request response rate 78% Among respondents: Refused data provision 9% Provided data of some kind 91% all requested data 65.50% partial data 25.50% Reasons for refusal # of universities data protection 8 new HR system, data unavailable 1 capacity 1 Panel B. Characteristics of universities Mean S.D. Total number of staff employed 2575.09 2532.11 Proportion of staff aged 35 or under 0.28 0.06 Admin staff as proportion of all staff 0.51 0.11 Average academic salary (in thousands £) 49.79 10.47 Average professional services salary (in thousands £) 31.60 3.67 Income in 2016/2017 per member of staff (in thousands £) 83.07 41.20 Rank in the league tables 66.11 37.92 Total number of staff submitted to REF 339.43 449.72 Number of REF 4� publications 20.00 12.41 Number of REF 3� publications 40.39 10.45 Note: Data sources: FOI request, HESA data on income and staff composition in 2016/17, The Complete University Guide (league tables), REF website (REF submission statistics). https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0228392.t003 Freedom of Information (FOI) as a data collection tool for social scientists PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0228392 February 21, 2020 8 / 14 https://www.hesa.ac.uk/support/providers https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0228392.t003 https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0228392 The overall response rate was high with 78% of contacted universities acknowledging the receipt of the request. The response rate was lower than in the case of police forces discussed above and it is perhaps surprising given the legal duty to respond. This could be due to there not being a credible threat of punishment. The Act can be breached in three ways: 1) fail to respond adequately to a request; 2) fail to adopt the model publication scheme, or do not pub- lish the correct information or 3) deliberately destroy, hide or alter requested information. The third breach is a criminal act whereas the first two are unlawful. The Information Commis- sioner’s Office (ICO) cannot impose fines if a body fails to comply with the Act, nor can they require the organisation to provide compensation to anyone for breaches of the Act. For fur- ther details see: https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-freedom-of-information/ complaints/. Of those who responded, 91% provided some data—either as requested or aver- ages (due to concerns about breach of data protection). Only 9% of respondents refused provi- sion of data. In most cases this was due to the data protection concerns; one university argued that they lacked capacity to provide the data and one argued that due to new HR system being introduced, the requested data could not be retrieved. Analysis. As explained earlier, we would like to ensure that the heterogeneity in responses from the higher education institutions is not driven by the systematic differences between them; if this were the case, the external validity of the data would be compromised. We exam- ine two outcomes—i) whether the university responded to the request and ii) whether the requested data were provided. The choice of first outcome was dictated by the fact that, unlike in case of police forces in the UK, many HE institutions simply did not respond to the request. Given the nature of the FOI request one could argue that the universities may refuse to provide data if they lack resources to comply with the request (i.e., have small administrative teams), have small proportion of young and/or female employees who are likely to take maternity leave (as then identification of such individuals from the data is more likely) or perhaps do not have attractive maternity pay policies and thus their employees take short leaves. Specifically, we estimate a probit model of the following form: PðDatai ¼ 1j xÞ¼ Fðb0 þ UNI 0 igþ RANK 0 idþ REF 0 iyÞ where Data is an outcome variable as set out above. We consider the following characteristics as determinants of the response and data provision. First, we consider general university (UNI) characteristics. These include the number of staff employed, percentage of staff under the age of 35, administrative staff as proportion of all staff, average salaries of academic and administrative staff, institution’s income per member of staff. It might be the case that the big- ger the institution, the more likely they are to comply given that they may have less of an issue with the data protection, given a small chance of revealing information about individuals due to publishing small data samples. This might also be the case for those institutions with youn- ger academics. Furthermore, they may have better capacity to process the request. Second, we consider measures that could signal the quality of the institution. These include league table data (i.e., the university rank) (RANK) and information from the Research Excel- lence Framework 2014 (REF) submission, which includes total number of staff submitted to REF, a number of 4-star and a number of 3-star publications (according to the Association of Business Schools (ABS) academic journal guide). We control for the reputation of a given uni- versity as we expect more reputable institutions to be more likely to comply with the FOI requests, because they often have dedicated teams who handle all FOI requests. Results are presented in Table 4. We present the marginal effects from a set of probit regres- sions. In columns (1) and (5) we include the general university characteristics—the total num- ber of employees, proportion of staff under 35 years of age, administrative staff as proportion Freedom of Information (FOI) as a data collection tool for social scientists PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0228392 February 21, 2020 9 / 14 https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-freedom-of-information/complaints/ https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-freedom-of-information/complaints/ https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0228392 of all staff, average salaries and income per member of staff. We find that there is no statisti- cally significant relationship between most of the variables and response rate as well as data provision. There are two exceptions here: first, we find a positive significant relationship between the average academic salary at an institution and the likelihood of responding to the request. Second, institutions with a higher proportion of staff under the age of 35 are also more likely to respond. The first relationship could be indicative of the fact that more generous employers (who also are likely to have better maternity leave provisions) are more willing to share the requested information. The second observation may suggest that institutions which experience higher levels of maternity leave uptake may be more willing to share the data—per- haps because of lesser concerns related to data protection, thanks to the size of the cohort tak- ing leave. Nonetheless, both relationships become insignificant upon inclusion of further controls on REF performance and League Tables ranking of the university. We then also examine whether the ranking in the university league tables plays a role for the analysed outcomes (columns (2) and (6)). We find no meaningful relationships. Table 4. The effect of university characteristics on response to the FOI request. Dependent variable Responded Provided requested data (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) University characteristics Total number of staff employed -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) Percentage of staff under 35 years old 1.040� 1.545 0.861 0.951 (0.567) (0.963) (0.643) (1.037) Admin staff as proportion of all staff -0.420 0.407 -0.094 0.694 (0.410) (0.536) (0.465) (0.602) Average academic salary (in thousands £) 0.018�� 0.011 0.010 0.007 (0.009) (0.012) (0.010) (0.013) Average salary of admin staff (in thousands £) -0.014 0.012 -0.003 0.021 (0.013) (0.017) (0.015) (0.020) Income per member of staff (in thousands £) 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.000 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) League Tables rank -0.000 0.001 -0.000 0.000 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) REF scores Total staff submitted to REF -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) REF submissions ranked 4� -0.000 -0.002 0.001 0.007 (0.004) (0.008) (0.004) (0.009) REF submissions ranked 3� 0.002 0.003 -0.000 -0.006 (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) Observations 155 131 151 127 155 131 151 127 Pseudo-R2 2 0.060 0.00067 0.0061 0.069 0.025 0.00022 0.0014 0.044 Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ��� p<0.01, �� p<0.05, � p<0.1 The reported coefficients are marginal effects from probit regressions. Data sources: FOI request, HESA data on income and staff composition in 2016/17, The Complete University Guide (league tables), REF website (REF submission statistics). https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0228392.t004 Freedom of Information (FOI) as a data collection tool for social scientists PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0228392 February 21, 2020 10 / 14 https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0228392.t004 https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0228392 Subsequently we investigate correlations between the response to the request and data provi- sion and the REF outcomes of the institutions (columns (3) and (7))—none of the REF charac- teristics determine the outcomes in question. Lastly, we include all the characteristics in the final regression and, as before, uncover no statistically significant relationships. As can be seen from pseudo-R 2 reported in Table 4, inclusion of various university characteristics increases the explanatory power of the model, as expected, but overall the control variables explain rela- tively small proportion of variation in the dependent variable. Therefore, we conclude that the observable characteristics of HE institutions do not determine whether and in what way they respond to the FOI request. Robustness checks. Due to potential concerns over the lack of variability in the dependent variables, we have also fitted a logistic model by penalized maximum likelihood regression using the same regression specification as above. The results are qualitatively and quantita- tively similar to those estimated using a probit model and can be found in the supplementary material (S2 Appendix Table F). In addition, we have also used alternative variables to those used in the main analysis to ver- ify whether the choice of control variables may have driven the reported lack of correlations. For example, given the gendered nature of the FOI request, one may be concerned that it is not the university characteristics as a whole but rather female-specific characteristics which may determine an institution’s response to such a request. Therefore, in S2 Appendix Table G in the supplementary material we have replaced some of the university characteristics with gender-focused alternatives, where possible. For example, we have used the proportion of female staff rather than total staff numbers and we have used the female to male wage ratios, separately for professional and academic staff, instead of average wages. These results are simi- lar to those found in the main analysis and do not alter our conclusions. FOI requests—Potential constraints There are several constraints, which the researcher faces when making an FOI request. First, knowing whether the data required is available is sometimes difficult to ascertain. As described above, a priori search of the disclosure logs or the central government data collection website (data.gov.uk) can help narrow this down. However, the answer may still not be obvious. Therefore, in order to improve the success of a request, particularly when contacting multiple authorities with the same request (for example, in our FOI requests we contacted every police force and every higher education institution in the country), we recommend choosing one or two authorities to pilot the request. This piloting would allow one to see whether the data are collected and held by the authority (department). In the case of requests to only one depart- ment an informal email asking about data availability might suffice. The second major constraint is cost. A request can be refused if the cost of releasing the data exceeds £600 for central government, Parliament and the armed forces, and £450 for other public authorities. This threshold is based on a standard rate of £25 per person per hour, meaning that a request can be refused if more than 18 hours are needed to complete it. The piloting will also allow the researcher to gauge whether the request is within the cost limits of the FOI Act. The third major constraint is the protection and privacy of individual data. According to Part II, Section 40 of the FOI legislation a public body may refuse a request if personal informa- tion is being requested. All exemptions can be found in Part II, Sections 21–44 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000; many examples are discussed here: https://www.whatdotheyknow. com/. A further complication is a recent roll out of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), which addresses protection and privacy of individual data within the European Freedom of Information (FOI) as a data collection tool for social scientists PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0228392 February 21, 2020 11 / 14 https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/ https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/ https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0228392 Union (EU) and the European Economic Area (EEA), as well as the export of personal data outside of EU and EEA areas. Taking these two jointly, the FOI data request might be refused on the ground that it leads to identification of particular individuals. For example, in our request to Higher Education institutions in the UK, we asked for provision of anonymised, individual level data regarding uptake of maternity leave, seniority level and age of an employee. In case of small departments within universities, the request may have permitted identification of an individual despite data being anonymised, because very few individuals took maternity leave in a given period. Therefore, these institutions refused to provide the data. The format of the data poses the fourth constraint. Obtaining data from a number of public authorities involves sending multiple requests, and various institutions collect and catalogue the data in different ways. This heterogeneity of the data collection process makes it unlikely that requested data are provided in the same format by all institutions, which then increases the cost of data processing by a researcher. Therefore, we suggest providing the authority with an example of the data format that is required, i.e., an empty excel sheet with an exemplary data format. If an FOI request is denied, the authority will reply setting out the reasons for refusal. If the provided reasons are not satisfactory, one can in first instance ask for an internal review of the decision (by writing back to the authority refusing the request), and subsequently appeal to the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO). The ICO is an independent regulatory office that deals with Data Protection Act 1998, Privacy and Electronic Communications (EC Directive) Regulations 2003, the Freedom of Information Act 2000, and the Environmental Information Regulations 2004. At each stage, the initial request and responses will be reviewed. However, appeals happen infrequently and the process is likely to be lengthy. A third of complaints took over three months to resolve in 2015/16. Conclusions Questions like what is the relationship between Brexit and the rise of race and religious hate crime or what is the uptake of the shared parental leave and by whom stand high on the research and policy agenda in the UK. Despite their high visibility and importance for policy- making, these topics are still heavily under-researched. This is largely due to the lack of avail- able quantitative data, which would permit rigorous empirical (econometric) analysis. We have put forward what we believe to be an underused (by economists and other social scien- tists) method of collecting a potentially unique dataset—a Freedom of Information (FOI) request. We briefly describe how to make a request with a focus on researchers who in the main will be requesting the data. Our two main tips to improve the success of requests are i) to pilot the request and ii) provide the authority with an example of the required data format. Finally, we examine the drivers of the two requests we recently made—one to all police forces in the UK and one to all Higher Education institutions in the UK. We find that the observable characteristics are not significantly correlated with the probability that a request was satisfied, suggesting that the data from these FOI requests are broadly representative of the institutions from which they were requested. We further recommend that researchers using FOI to gather data compare responders and non-responders to examine if replies are driven (at least) by observable characteristics. Supporting information S1 Appendix. Text of the FOI request 1. (DOCX) Freedom of Information (FOI) as a data collection tool for social scientists PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0228392 February 21, 2020 12 / 14 http://www.plosone.org/article/fetchSingleRepresentation.action?uri=info:doi/10.1371/journal.pone.0228392.s001 https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0228392 S2 Appendix. Determinants of the FOI request. (DOCX) Acknowledgments We thank Michèle Belot and John Hudson for useful comments and suggestions, as well as participants at the annual conference of the European Society for Population Economics (ESPE) in Bath for useful comments and suggestions. We have complied fully with the guidelines of the journal regarding work using personal data from third party sources. We have undertaken the following steps to ensure compliance: 1) The data were obtained using FOI requests, which facilitates access to individual level data only if personal anonymity is maintained, 2) The data obtained have been anonymised by the provider (these were aggregate statistics in case of police forces and individual but fully anon- ymised data in case of universities) and therefore posed no risk to privacy, and 3) No personal identifying information was accessed and the information used could not threaten personal privacy of individuals. Together with the paper, we have also enclosed a Data Availability Statement. Author Contributions Conceptualization: Joanna Clifton-Sprigg, Jonathan James, Sunčica Vujić. Data curation: Joanna Clifton-Sprigg, Jonathan James, Sunčica Vujić. Formal analysis: Joanna Clifton-Sprigg, Jonathan James, Sunčica Vujić. Investigation: Joanna Clifton-Sprigg, Jonathan James, Sunčica Vujić. Methodology: Joanna Clifton-Sprigg, Jonathan James, Sunčica Vujić. Project administration: Joanna Clifton-Sprigg, Jonathan James, Sunčica Vujić. Resources: Sunčica Vujić. Validation: Jonathan James. Visualization: Joanna Clifton-Sprigg, Jonathan James, Sunčica Vujić. Writing – original draft: Joanna Clifton-Sprigg, Jonathan James, Sunčica Vujić. Writing – review & editing: Joanna Clifton-Sprigg, Jonathan James, Sunčica Vujić. References 1. Demireva N. Immigration, Diversity and Social Cohesion. Migration Observatory briefing, COMPAS, University of Oxford, UK, 2017. 2. Weaver H. Hate crime surge linked to Brexit and 2017 terrorist attacks. The Guardian. 2018 Oct 16. [Cited 2019 June 6]. https://www.theguardian.com/society/2018/oct/16/hate-crime-brexit-terrorist- attacks-england-wales 3. Dodd J. Brexit will trigger rise in hate crimes, warns police watchdog. The Guardian. 2018 Jul 19. [Cited 2019 June 6]. https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/jul/19/brexit-will-trigger-rise-in-hate-crimes- warns-police-watchdog 4. Gheyoh Ndzi E. No wonder dads aren’t taking shared parental leave—most employers have failed to embrace it. The Conversation. 2018 Oct 22. [Cited 2019 June 6]. https://theconversation.com/no- wonder-dads-arent-taking-shared-parental-leave-most-employers-have-failed-to-embrace-it-104290 5. Machin S, Marie O, Vujić S. The crime reducing effect of education. The Economic Journal, 2011; 121(552): 463–484. 6. Bell B, Jaitman L, Machin S. Crime deterrence: Evidence from the London 2011 riots. The Economic Journal. 2014; 124(576): 480–506. Freedom of Information (FOI) as a data collection tool for social scientists PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0228392 February 21, 2020 13 / 14 http://www.plosone.org/article/fetchSingleRepresentation.action?uri=info:doi/10.1371/journal.pone.0228392.s002 https://www.theguardian.com/society/2018/oct/16/hate-crime-brexit-terrorist-attacks-england-wales https://www.theguardian.com/society/2018/oct/16/hate-crime-brexit-terrorist-attacks-england-wales https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/jul/19/brexit-will-trigger-rise-in-hate-crimes-warns-police-watchdog https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/jul/19/brexit-will-trigger-rise-in-hate-crimes-warns-police-watchdog https://theconversation.com/no-wonder-dads-arent-taking-shared-parental-leave-most-employers-have-failed-to-embrace-it-104290 https://theconversation.com/no-wonder-dads-arent-taking-shared-parental-leave-most-employers-have-failed-to-embrace-it-104290 https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0228392 7. Francesconi M, James J. Liquid Assets? The Short-Run Liabilities of Binge Drinking. The Economic Journal. 2018. https://doi.org/10.1111/ecoj.12627 8. Hanes E, Machin S. Hate crime in the wake of terror attacks: Evidence from 7/7 and 9/11. Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice. 2014; 30(3): 247–267. 9. Richardson H. University counselling services ‘inundated by stressed academics’. The BBC. 2019 May 23. [Cited 2019 June 6]. https://www.bbc.com/news/education-48353331 10. Hazell R, Worthy B. Assessing the performance of freedom of information. Government Information Quarterly. 2010; 27:352–359. 11. Card D, Chetty R, Feldstein M, Saez E. Expanding Access to Administrative Data for Research in the United States. NSF SBE 2020 White Paper, National Science Foundation Directorate of Social, Behav- ioral, and Economic Sciences, Arlington, VA. 2010. 12. Radcliffe R. REF 2014: why is it such a big deal? The Guardian. 2014 Dec 17. [Cited 2019 June 6]. https://www.theguardian.com/higher-education-network/2014/dec/17/ref-2014-why-is-it-such-a-big- deal 13. Firth D. Bias reduction of maximum likelihood estimates. Biometrika. 1993. 80:27–38. 14. Coveney J. 2008. FIRTHLOGIT: Stata module to calculate bias reduction in logistic regression. Statisti- cal Software Components S456948, Boston College Department of Economics [revised 25 Jul 2015] Freedom of Information (FOI) as a data collection tool for social scientists PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0228392 February 21, 2020 14 / 14 https://doi.org/10.1111/ecoj.12627 https://www.bbc.com/news/education-48353331 https://www.theguardian.com/higher-education-network/2014/dec/17/ref-2014-why-is-it-such-a-big-deal https://www.theguardian.com/higher-education-network/2014/dec/17/ref-2014-why-is-it-such-a-big-deal https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0228392 
work_zooqta7tdbb3ji7eqslroou7rm	----	Extremist ideology as a complex contagion: the spread of far-right radicalization in the United States between 2005 and 2017 ARTICLE Extremist ideology as a complex contagion: the spread of far-right radicalization in the United States between 2005 and 2017 Mason Youngblood 1,2✉ Increasing levels of far-right extremist violence have generated public concern about the spread of radicalization in the United States. Previous research suggests that radicalized individuals are destabilized by various environmental (or endemic) factors, exposed to extremist ideology, and subsequently reinforced by members of their community. As such, the spread of radicalization may proceed through a social contagion process, in which extremist ideologies behave like complex contagions that require multiple exposures for adoption. In this study, I applied an epidemiological method called two-component spatio- temporal intensity modeling to data from 416 far-right extremists exposed in the United States between 2005 and 2017. The results indicate that patterns of far-right radicalization in the United States are consistent with a complex contagion process, in which reinforcement is required for transmission. Both social media usage and group membership enhance the spread of extremist ideology, suggesting that online and physical organizing remain primary recruitment tools of the far-right movement. In addition, I identified several endemic factors, such as poverty, that increase the probability of radicalization in particular regions. Future research should investigate how specific interventions, such as online counter-narratives to battle propaganda, may be effectively implemented to mitigate the spread of far-right extremism in the United States. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-020-00546-3 OPEN 1 The Graduate Center, City University of New York, New York, NY 10017, USA. 2 Queens College, City University of New York, New York, NY 10017, USA. ✉email: myoungblood@gradcenter.cuny.edu HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES COMMUNICATIONS | (2020) 7:49 | https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-020-00546-3 1 12 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 () :,; http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1057/s41599-020-00546-3&domain=pdf http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1057/s41599-020-00546-3&domain=pdf http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1057/s41599-020-00546-3&domain=pdf http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1057/s41599-020-00546-3&domain=pdf http://orcid.org/0000-0003-2123-1716 http://orcid.org/0000-0003-2123-1716 http://orcid.org/0000-0003-2123-1716 http://orcid.org/0000-0003-2123-1716 http://orcid.org/0000-0003-2123-1716 mailto:myoungblood@gradcenter.cuny.edu Introduction T he far-right movement, which includes white supremacists, neo-Nazis, and sovereign citizens, is the oldest and most deadly form of domestic extremism in the United States (Piazza, 2017; Simi and Bubolz, 2017). Despite some ideological diversity, members of the far-right often advocate for the use of violence to bring about an “idealized future favoring a particular group, whether this group identity is racial, pseudo-national, or characterized by individualistic traits” (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), University of Maryland, 2017). Over the last decade, the far-right movement was responsible for 73.3% of all extremist murders in the United States. In 2018, this statistic rose to 98% (The Anti- Defamation League Center on Extremism, 2019). The increasing severity of far-right extremist violence, as well as the associated rhetoric on social media (Davey and Ebner, 2019; Winter, 2019), has generated public concern about the spread of radicalization in the United States. Former extremists have referred to it as a public health issue (Allam, 2019; Bonn, 2019), an idea advocated for by some policy experts as well (Sanir et al., 2017; Weine and Eisenman, 2016). There is little evidence that radicalization is primarily driven by psychopathology (Misiak et al., 2019; Post, 2015; Webber and Kruglanski, 2017). Rather, radicalization appears to be a process in which individuals are destabilized by various environmental factors, exposed to extremist ideology, and subsequently rein- forced by members of their community (Becker, 2019; Jasko et al., 2017; Jensen et al., 2018; Mills et al., 2019; Webber and Kru- glanski, 2017). Even “lone wolves”, or solo actors, often interact with extremist communities online (Holt et al., 2019; Kaplan et al., 2014; Post, 2015). As such, radicalization may spread through a social contagion process, in which extremist ideologies behave like complex contagions that require multiple exposures for adoption (Guilbeault et al., 2018), which has been observed for political movements more broadly (González-Bailón et al., 2011). Previous research suggests that extremist propaganda (Ferrara, 2017), hate crimes (Braun, 2011; Braun and Koopmans, 2010), intergroup conflict (Buhaug and Gleditsch, 2008; Gelfand et al., 2012), and terrorism (Cherif et al., 2009; LaFree et al., 2012; Midlarsky et al., 1980; White et al., 2016) exhibit similar dynamics. The environmental factors favoring radicalization, referred to here as endemic factors, include variables like poverty rate that may influence an individual’s risk of adoption in particular regions. As such, endemic factors have the potential to enhance or constrain the spread of contagions through populations across geographic space. Although significant research has been done on how endemic factors predict radicalization (and resulting vio- lence) (Goetz et al., 2012; LaFree and Bersani, 2014; McVeigh, 2004; Medina et al., 2018; Piazza, 2017), few studies have inves- tigated how these factors interact with contagion processes. The aim of this study is to determine whether patterns of far-right radicalization in the United States are consistent with a contagion process, and to assess the influence of critical endemic factors. After controlling for population density, I assessed the following endemic factors that have been implicated in previous research on radicalization, extremism, and mass shootings: poverty rate (Durso and Jacobs, 2013; Gale et al., 2002; Kwon and Cabrera, 2019b; Lin et al., 2018; Medina et al., 2018; Piazza, 2017; Sutt- moeller et al., 2015, 2016, 2018), unemployment rate (Espiritu, 2004; Gale et al., 2002; Goetz et al., 2012; Green et al., 1998; Jefferson and Pryor, 1999; Majumder, 2017; Pah et al., 2017; Piazza, 2017), income inequality (Goetz et al., 2012; Kwon and Cabrera, 2017, 2019a, b; Majumder, 2017; McVeigh, 2004; McVeigh and Cunningham, 2012), education levels (Durso and Jacobs, 2013; Espiritu, 2004; Florida, 2011; Gladfelter et al., 2017; Kwon and Cabrera, 2017, 2019a; McVeigh et al., 2014), non-white population size (Gladfelter et al., 2017; LaFree and Bersani, 2014; McVeigh, 2004; Medina et al., 2018), violent crime rate (Glad- felter et al., 2017; McVeigh and Cunningham, 2012; Sweeney and Perliger, 2018), gun ownership (Anisin, 2018; Lin et al., 2018; Pah et al., 2017; Reeping et al., 2019), hate groups per capita (Adamczyk et al., 2014), and Republican voting (McVeigh et al., 2014; Medina et al., 2018). Furthermore, I aim to determine whether individual-level variables, such as social media use, enhance the spread of far-right radicalization over space and time. Social media platforms increasingly appear to play a role in radicalization, both as formal recruitment tools (Aly et al., 2017; Awan, 2017, Bertram, 2016; Wu, 2015) and spaces for extremist communities to interact (Amble, 2012; Dean et al., 2012; Pauwels et al., 2014; Winter, 2019). If social media platforms augment physical organizing (Bowman-Grieve, 2009; Holt et al., 2016), then they may also enhance the spread of radicalization. Although social media platforms relax geographic constraints on communication, evidence suggests that social media networks still exhibit spatial clustering. For example, the majority of an individual’s Facebook friends live within 100 miles of them (Bailey et al., 2018), the probability of information diffusion on social media decays with increasing distance (Liu et al., 2018), and online echo chambers map onto particular locations (Bastos et al., 2018). Since complex contagions require reinforcement, and the majority of online friendship ties are within a close radius, the diffusion of extremist ideologies online should still exhibit some level of geographic bias. This idea is supported by evidence that social media enhances physical organizing among extremists (Bastug et al., 2018; Gill et al., 2017; von Behr et al., 2013), and anecdotes of “self-radicalized” individuals using social media to contact other extremists in their area (Holt et al., 2019). In order to model the spread of far-right radicalization I used a two-component spatio-temporal intensity (twinstim) model (Meyer et al., 2017), an epidemiological method that treats events in space and time as resulting from self-exciting point processes (Reinhart, 2018). In this framework, future events depend on the history of past events within a certain geographic range. Event probabilities are determined by a conditional intensity function, which is separated into endemic and epidemic components. This allows researchers to assess the combined effects of both spatio- temporal covariates and epidemic predictors. Epidemic, in this framework, refers to any level of contagion effect and does not necessarily imply uncontrollable spread. With a couple of notable exceptions (Clark and Dixon, 2018; Zammit-Mangion et al., 2012), previous applications of self-exciting point process models in terrorism and mass shooting research have not simultaneously modeled diffusion over both time and space (Collins et al., 2020; Garcia-Bernardo et al., 2015; Johnson and Braithwaite, 2017; Lewis et al., 2012; Porter and White, 2010; Tench et al., 2016; Towers et al., 2015; White et al., 2013). The radicalization events in this study, which correspond to where and when a radicalized individual’s extremist activity or plot was exposed, came from the Profiles of Individual Radicali- zation in the United States (PIRUS), an anonymized database compiled by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), University of Maryland, 2017). PIRUS is compiled from sources in the public record, and only includes individuals radicalized in the United States who were either arrested, indicted, or killed as a result of ideologically-motivated crimes, or were directly asso- ciated with a violent extremist organization. I chose to use PIRUS instead of the Terrorism and Extremist Violence in the United States (TEVUS) database because events in PIRUS are ARTICLE HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES COMMUNICATIONS | https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-020-00546-3 2 HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES COMMUNICATIONS | (2020) 7:49 | https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-020-00546-3 disambiguated by individual and include social variables that may influence the diffusion process. A contagion effect in this modeling framework could result from one of two forces. The first is a copy-cat effect, in which individuals copy behaviors observed directly or in the media. Although this effect has been proposed in terrorism and mass shooting research in the past (Nacos, 2009; Towers et al., 2015), it seems to be a more plausible contagion mechanism for specific methods of violence (Helfgott, 2015) (e.g., suicide bombings (Tominaga, 2018)) rather than radicalization more broadly. The second is linkage triggered by activism and organizing, or ideologically-charged events (e.g., elections, demonstrations, policies), in that region. To differentiate between these two forces, I included two sets of epidemic predictors in the modeling. The first two event-level variables, plot success and anticipated fatal- ities, might be expected to increase epidemic probability if a copy- cat effect is present. This is because successful large-scale events are probably more contagious due to increased media coverage (Towers et al., 2015). Alternatively, the two individual-level variables, group membership and social media use, might be expected to increase epidemic probability if activism and orga- nizing drive the linkage between events. Methods Data collection. All individual-level data came from PIRUS. Only individuals with far-right ideology who were exposed during or after 2005 (the earliest year with social media data) with location data at the city-level or lower (n = 416; F: 6.0%, M: 94.0%) were included (see Figs. 1 and 2). For each individual, the date and location of their exposure (usually when their activity/plot occurred), whether their plot was successful (34.9%), the antici- pated fatalities of their plot (0: 69.5%, 1–20: 26.0%, >20:2.6%, >100: 1.9%), whether they were a member of a formal or informal group of extremists (58.4%), and whether social media played a role in their radicalization (31.2%), were included. Unknown or missing values for each predictor (plot success: 0.5%, anticipated fatalities: 13.5%, group membership: 0%, social media: 54.8%) were coded as 0. To ensure that the coding procedure for missing predictor values did not introduce bias, I checked whether the results of the full model were consistent after multiple imputation with chained equations and random forest machine learning (see Table S1). The location of each exposure was geocoded from the nearest city or town using the R package ggmap (Kahle and Wickham, 2013). Since domestic terrorists tend to commit acts in their local area (Klein et al., 2017; Marchment et al., 2018; Smith et al., 2008), I assumed that exposure locations reflect where individuals were radicalized. State-level gun ownership was estimated using a proxy measure based on suicide rates and hunting licenses (Seigel et al., 2014). Using data from 2001, 2002, and 2004 (the only three years for which state-level gun ownership data is available), Seigel et al. found that the following proxy correlates with gun ownership with an R2 of 0.95: 0:62 � FS S � � þ ð0:88 � HLÞ � 0:0448 ð1Þ where FS/S is the proportion of suicides that involve firearms (from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, or CDC), and HL is hunting licenses per capita (from the United States Fish and Wildlife Service) (Seigel et al., 2014). Missing suicide rates (five years for DC, two years for Rhode Island) were replaced with the mean values for that state. State-level hate group data was collected from the Southern Poverty Law Center, while violent crime data was collected from the Federal Bureau of Investiga- tion’s Uniform Crime Reporting Program. County-level demographic data was collected from the US Census using the R package censusapi (Recht, 2019). This included population density, poverty rate, Gini index of income inequality, percentage of the population that is non-white, percentage of the population that has at least a high-school diploma, and unemployment rate. County-level income, race, education, and unemployment data is only available after 2009, so the 2010 data was used for 2005–2009. County-level presidential election voting records were collected from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Election Lab, and non-election years were assigned the data from the most recent election year. Geographic data was collected from the US Census using the R package tigris (Walker, 2019). Model specification. Twinstim modeling was conducted using the R package surveillance (Meyer et al., 2017). To convert the data to a continuous spatio-temporal point process, all tied locations and dates were shifted in a random direction up to half of the minimum spatial and temporal distance between events (1.52 km and 0.5 days, respectively) (Meyer and Held, 2014). Step functions were used to model both spatial and temporal interactions. Visual inspection of the pair correlation function for the point pattern indicates that the data is significantly clustered up to 400 km (see Supplementary Fig. 1). As such, the spatial step function was split into four 100 km intervals with 400 km as the maximum interaction radius (Nightingale et al., 2015). The temporal step function was split into four six-month intervals up to two years (based on the the high degree of variation in radicalization and attack planning times among domestic extremists (Bouhana et al., 2018; Silkoset, 2016; Smith and Damphousse, 2009)). I attempted the analysis with different combinations of power-law, Gaussian, and Student spatial functions, and exponential temporal functions, but these varia- tions converged to unrealistically steep spatial and temporal interaction functions that approached zero around two km and two days, and appeared to be significantly influenced by the tie- breaking procedure (Meyer and Held, 2014). Population density (county-level) was log-transformed and used as an offset endemic term. A centered time trend was also included to determine whether the strength of the endemic component has shifted over time. Poverty rate (county-level), Gini index of income inequality (county-level), gun ownership (state-level), percentage of the population that is non-white (county-level), percentage of the population that has at least a Fig. 1 The number of far-right extremists exposed in the PIRUS database between 2005 and 2017. Number of cases is on the left, and cumulative number of cases is on the right. HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES COMMUNICATIONS | https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-020-00546-3 ARTICLE HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES COMMUNICATIONS | (2020) 7:49 | https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-020-00546-3 3 high-school diploma (county-level), unemployment rate (county- level), percentage of voters that vote Republican in presidential elections (county-level), violent crime rate per thousand residents (state-level), and number of hate groups per million residents (state-level) were included as dynamic endemic predictors that change annually. Plot success, anticipated fatalities, group membership, and social media radicalization were included as epidemic predictors. All possible models with all possible combinations of predictors were run and ranked by Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC) (Burnham and Anderson, 2002). The best fitting model with the lowest AIC was used to assess the effects of each variable on event probability. Rate ratios were calculated by applying exponential transformation to the model estimates. Permutation test. To determine whether the spatio-temporal interaction of the epidemic component was statistically sig- nificant, I used the Monte Carlo permutation approach developed by Meyer et al. (Meyer et al., 2016). Using this approach, a twinstim model with all endemic predictors from the best fitting model and no epidemic predictors was compared to 1000 per- muted null models with randomly shuffled event times. For each permutation I estimated the reproduction number (R0), or the expected number of future events that an event triggers on average, which represents “infectivity”. A p-value was calculated by comparing the observed R0 with the null distribution of the subset of permutations that converged. For additional support, I also ran a likelihood ratio test and a standard Knox test of spatio-temporal clustering. The Knox test was conducted with spatial and temporal radii of 100 km and six months (the upper bounds of the first steps in the step functions), respectively (Knox and Bartlett, 1964). Simulations. To further assess the quality of the model, I con- ducted simulations from the cumulative intensity function using Ogata’s modified thinning algorithm according to Meyer et al. (2012). Using the parameters of the best fitting model, I con- ducted 1,000 simulations of the last six months of the study period and compared the results to the observed data. Results The results of the best fitting model (ΔAIC < 2), which included seven endemic and two epidemic predictor variables, are shown in Table 1. Firstly, there is a statistically significant time trend whereby the endemic rate decreases by 4.6% each year, indicating that the strength of the epidemic component has increased over time. There appears to be a baseline increase in the endemic component between 2008-2012 which likely corresponds to the financial crisis (Funke et al., 2016), as well as a significant spike in the epidemic component around 2016 which likely corresponds to the presidential election (Giani and Meón, 2019; Rushin and Edwards, 2018) (Fig. 3). There are also significant positive effects of poverty rates (p < 0.01) and the presence of hate groups (p < 0.0001) on radicalization probability. Interestingly, the percentage of voters that vote Republican in presidential elections (p < 0.0001), the percentage of the population that is non-white (p < 0.05), and unemployment rates (p < 0.0001) appear to have sig- nificant negative effects on radicalization probability. Gun own- ership, education level, and violent crime all have no significant effect on radicalization probability. When Republican voting was replaced with the absolute percent difference between Republican and Democratic voting, a proxy measure for the competitiveness of elections, it was no longer significant. A variance inflation factor test identified no multicollinearity problems among the time-averaged endemic predictors (VIF < 3) (Zuur et al., 2010). Both group membership and radicalization via social media have strong and significant positive effects on epidemic prob- ability. Exposures of individuals who belong to formal or informal extremist groups are over four times more likely to be followed by Fig. 2 The untied locations of far-right extremists exposed in the PIRUS database between 2005 and 2017. The color of each county corresponds to its log-transformed population density. Table 1 The results of the twinstim modeling, with estimated rate ratios (RR), Wald confidence intervals, and p-values. RR 95% CI p-value Time trend 0.946 0.91–0.98 0.0015 Poverty 1.052 1.02–1.09 0.0025 Unemployment 0.871 0.82–0.93 <0.0001 Republican voting 0.969 0.96–0.98 <0.0001 Non-white population 0.989 0.98–1.00 0.038 Education level 0.980 0.96–1.00 0.075 Hate groups 1.191 1.12–1.27 <0.0001 Violent crime 0.930 0.84–1.03 0.17 Group membership 4.563 1.57–13.28 0.0054 Social media 2.722 1.55–4.76 0.0005 Endemic predictors (including the overall time trend) are in the top portion of the table, whereas epidemic predictors are in the bottom. ARTICLE HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES COMMUNICATIONS | https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-020-00546-3 4 HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES COMMUNICATIONS | (2020) 7:49 | https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-020-00546-3 future exposures in close spatial or temporal proximity (p < 0.01). Similarly, exposures of individuals radicalized on social media are almost three times as likely to be followed by future exposures (p < 0.01). Anticipated fatalities and plot success did not appear in the best fitting model. Estimates of the decaying spatial and temporal interaction functions, as well as model diagnostics, can be seen in Supplementary Figs. 2 and 3, respectively. A variance inflation factor test identified no multicollinearity problems among the epidemic predictors (VIF < 3) (Zuur et al., 2010). Based on the permutation test, the observed R0 (0.31) is sig- nificantly higher than the null distribution of the converged permutations (Nconv = 739, p < 0.01) (Fig. 4). This indicates that the spatio-temporal interaction in the epidemic model is sig- nificant. Both the likelihood ratio test of the epidemic against the endemic model (p < 0.0001) and the Knox test (p < 0.0001) sup- port this result. The results of the simulations can be seen in Figs. 5 and 6. On average the simulations neatly match the observed cumulative number of exposures between June 2017 and January 2018 (Fig. 5), indicating that the model accurately captures the tem- poral dynamics in the data. Similarly, the model appears to do a good job of capturing the spatial dynamics in the data, although it is clearly weighted towards high population density areas (Fig. 6). Discussion By applying novel epidemiological methods to data on 416 extremists exposed between 2005 and 2017, this study provides evidence that patterns of far-right radicalization in the United States are consistent with a contagion process. Firstly, the esti- mated reproduction number is significantly higher than those from simulated null models, indicating that endemic causes alone are not sufficient to explain the spatio-temporal clustering observed in the data. The reproduction number for radicalization (R0 = 0.31) is also lower than one, suggesting that extremist ideologies behave like complex contagions that require reinfor- cement for transmission. Fortunately, this means that extremist Fig. 3 The total intensity (in black), as well as the isolated endemic component (grey), over time. Total intensity can be interpreted as the proportion of radicalization probability that is explained by the endemic and epidemic components. Fig. 4 The results of the Monte Carlo permutation test. The grey bars show the null distribution of R0 from the 739 permutations that converged, whereas the red dashed line shows the observed R0 (0.31) calculated from the twinstim model. Fig. 5 The cumulative number of exposures during the last six months of the study period (red). The results of 1000 simulations are shown in grey. Fig. 6 The exposure locations during the last six months of the study period. The color gradient, ranging from blue (low) to yellow (high), represents a Gaussian kernel density for the results of 1000 simulations with a bandwidth of 200 km. The contour lines segment the kernel density into 10 levels. HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES COMMUNICATIONS | https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-020-00546-3 ARTICLE HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES COMMUNICATIONS | (2020) 7:49 | https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-020-00546-3 5 ideologies are unlikely to spread uncontrollably through popu- lations like seasonal influenza (R0 = 1.28) (Biggerstaff et al., 2014), but outbreaks can occur under the right endemic and epidemic conditions. For example, regions with higher rates of poverty and hate group activity are more likely to experience far- right extremism, whereas regions with a larger non-white popu- lation, more Republican voting, and higher rates of unemploy- ment are less likely to experience far-right extremism. Most importantly, radicalizations involving extremist groups or social media significantly increase the epidemic probability of future radicalizations in the same location. This suggests that clusters of radicalizations in space and time are driven by activism and organizing rather than a copy-cat effect. The fact that group membership significantly increases the epidemic strength of events, and the presence of hate groups significantly increases radicalization probability, suggests that local organizing remains a potent recruitment tool of the far-right movement. This idea is reflected in recent increases in rallies across the country, such as “Unite the Right” in Charlottesville, VA in August of 2017, that have been attended by regional chapters of white nationalist and militia organizations. It also suggests that concerns about typological “lone wolves” radicalized over social media should not overshadow the persistent and expanding far-right movement in the United States. Only 10.8% of people in this study were radicalized on social media inde- pendently of an extremist group, indicating that solo actors are still the minority in the far-right movement. That being said, solo actors radicalized on social media, such as Omar Mateen (Pulse nightclub shooting in 2016) and Dylann Roof (Charleston church shooting in 2015) (Holt et al., 2019), are typically deadlier than group members in the United States (Phillips, 2017), and should thus be the subject of much future research. Radicalization on social media also significantly increases the epidemic strength of events, indicating that social media plat- forms augment physical organizing and that the diffusion of extremist ideologies online is likely geographically biased. The increasing role of social media in far-right extremism and radi- calization is well established (Costello and Hawdon, 2018; Holt et al., 2019; Lowe, 2019; Ottoni et al., 2018; Winter, 2019). Social media platforms like Twitter provide extremist communities with low cost access to large audiences that might not otherwise engage with far-right content (Bertram, 2016; Wu, 2015). For example, one report found that only 44% of people who follow high-profile white nationalists on Twitter overtly express similar ideologies (Berger and Strathearn, 2013). As mainstream plat- forms clamp down on hate speech, extremist users have just shifted their traffic to alternative sites such as 8chan and Gab (Blackbourn et al., 2019; Hodge and Hallgrimsdottir, 2019). Given the centrality of social media in far-right organizing, future research should explore how counter-narratives (van Eerten et al., 2017; Voogt, 2017) and other strategies could be used to fight the spread of extremist ideologies online. The results indicate that county-level poverty rates increase the probability of far-right radicalization. While there is little to no evidence that poverty predicts extremism at the state-level (Durso and Jacobs, 2013; Gale et al., 2002; Lin et al., 2018; Piazza, 2017), studies at the county-level have found that poverty predicts both mass shooting rate (Kwon and Cabrera, 2019b) and hate groups (presence (Medina et al., 2018) not longevity (Suttmoeller et al., 2015, 2016, 2018)). This discrepancy between geographic reso- lutions indicates that using state-level poverty data obscures local variation. The results of this study also reveal a negative effect of unemployment rate on radicalization, adding to the remarkably contradictory evidence for links between unemployment and extremism in the United States (Espiritu, 2004; Gale et al., 2002; Goetz et al., 2012; Green et al., 1998, Jefferson and Pryor, 1999; Majumder, 2017; Piazza, 2017). Although this result appears to be counter-intuitive, I hypothesize that poverty and unemployment may interact in driving radicalization. For example, individuals from regions where jobs are plentiful but poverty remains high may be the most disillusioned and susceptible to extremist ideologies. Interestingly, income inequality did not appear in the best fitting model, and had no significant effect when included. This suggests that overall deprivation, as measured by poverty rate, is more important in driving radicalization than inequality. Previous studies that have found a positive impact of income inequality on hate groups or crime either used state-level data (Majumder, 2017), did not account for poverty rate (Goetz et al., 2012; McVeigh, 2004), or combined income inequality with poverty rate into a single index (McVeigh and Cunningham, 2012). Interestingly, both unemployment (Pah et al., 2017) and income inequality (Kwon and Cabrera, 2017, 2019a, b) appear to be strong predictors of mass shootings. Although this seems paradoxical, the majority of mass shootings are not ideologically driven (Capellan, 2015), so the socioeconomic drivers may be different than for far-right radicalization. Violent crime appears to have no influence on radicalization. Although one study of the Ku Klux Klan found that high levels of far-right activity can increase homicide rates in the long-term (McVeigh and Cunningham, 2012), there is little evidence that violent crime rates drive increases in extremist violence or radi- calization (Sweeney and Perliger, 2018). Hate crime is only very weakly correlated with violent crime (Gladfelter et al., 2017), and extremist violence is even more rare (LaFree and Dugan, 2009), so they are likely driven by different factors. Previous studies have found strong evidence for a negative relationship between education and hate crime rates (Espiritu, 2004; Gladfelter et al., 2017), a positive relationship between education and mass shooting rates (Kwon and Cabrera, 2017, 2019a), and no evidence for a relationship between edu- cation and hate group organizing (Durso and Jacobs, 2013; Florida, 2011; McVeigh et al., 2014). The results of this study are consistent with the latter category, which makes sense given that the majority of the plots in the dataset were non-violent. The negative effect of Republican voting on event probability could be because individuals on the far-right of the political spectrum who live in counties with more Democratic voters may feel more partisan hostility (Miller and Conover, 2015). Inter- estingly, this effect does not appear to be the result of more competitive elections (Suttmoeller et al., 2015), as the absolute difference between Republican and Democratic voting did not significantly influence event probability. Alternatively, the nega- tive effect of Republican voting may be due to the fact that many of the rural counties that lean heavily Republican have low population densities and no recent history of extremist violence. A previous study that found mixed evidence for a positive influence of Republican voting on the presence of hate groups excluded counties without hate groups from the modeling, which may have eliminated this skew effect (Medina et al., 2018). The fact that the percentage of the population that is non-white negatively predicts far-right extremist violence is consistent with the intergroup contact hypothesis, which suggests that prolonged contact between racial groups reduces conflict under certain conditions (Allport, 1954). Although other researchers have suggested that population heterogeneity increases far-right radi- calization (McVeigh, 2004), the only study to find evidence of this in the United States did not explicitly account for population density (LaFree and Bersani, 2014). Other studies controlling for population density have found that both anti-black hate crimes and hate groups appear to be more common in white dominated, racially homogeneous areas (Gladfelter et al., 2017; Medina et al., 2018). Despite mixed evidence for the intergroup contact ARTICLE HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES COMMUNICATIONS | https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-020-00546-3 6 HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES COMMUNICATIONS | (2020) 7:49 | https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-020-00546-3 hypothesis, it is widely accepted that community diversity and tolerance is key to fighting radicalization and extremist violence globally (Ellis and Abdi, 2017; Ercan, 2017; Gunaratna et al., 2013; Hoffman et al., 2018; Southern Poverty Law Center, 2017; United Nations Development Programme, 2016). Gun ownership does not predict radicalization in this model, which is unsurprising since only 30.5% of people in this study planned on committing fatal attacks but interesting given the centrality of gun control in debates following mass shootings in the United States (Joslyn and Haider-Markel, 2017; Luca et al., 2020; Pierre, 2019). Despite strong evidence that gun ownership is linked to mass shooting rates at the national-level (Reeping et al., 2019), evidence for same pattern at the state-level remains mixed. Previous studies have found that it either positively predicts mass shootings overall (Reeping et al., 2019), when combined with particular gun control laws (Anisin, 2018), or not at all (Lin et al., 2018; Pah et al., 2017). Unfortunately, CDC funding for research on gun ownership was restricted by Congress in 1996 after lob- bying by the National Rifle Association, so potential links between extremist violence and gun ownership remain under- studied (DeFoster and Swalve, 2018; Lemieux, 2014; Morall, 2018; Winker et al., 2016). Several limitations of this study should be highlighted. Firstly, the PIRUS database only represents a subset of radicalized indi- viduals in the United States. The creators of the database used random sampling to maximize its representativeness over dif- ferent time periods, but there remains a possibility of spatial or temporal bias in the original data due to underreporting by vic- tims and law enforcement effort (DiIulio, 1996). Instances of hate crime are notoriously underreported relative to other forms of crime (Pezzella et al., 2019), because victims often fear retaliation or mistrust the police (Pezzella, 2017; Weiss et al., 2016; Wong and Christmann, 2016). There is also a great deal of variation in hate crime training among police departments, and the personal beliefs of individual officers can influence whether or not instances are reported (Boyd et al., 1996; Pezzella, 2017). Both of these factors are likely to be more pronounced in areas with legacies of far-right extremist violence, and historical crossover between far-right groups and the police (Barnes, 1996; Johnson, 2019; Rowe, 1976). In addition, the geographic locations of events are only geocoded to the city-level, potentially enhancing the spatial clustering of the data. Furthermore, social media data were missing for a significant number of individuals (54.8%). The significance level of the estimate for social media usage is extre- mely low and robust to imputation, indicating that it likely reflects a real effect, but researchers should exercise caution when interpreting this result (Safer-Lichtenstein et al., 2017). Lastly, the spatial resolution of three of the endemic predictors was limited to the state-level, which may have flattened some important local variation. One of these variables, gun ownership, was also a proxy measure. Policymakers should release historical restrictions on research funding for gun violence and hate crime research to improve data resolution for future studies. In conclusion, far-right radicalization in the United States appears to spread through populations like a complex contagion. Both social media usage and group membership enhance the contagion process, indicating that online and physical organizing remain primary recruitment tools of the far-right movement. In addition, far-right radicalization is more likely in Democrat- majority regions with high poverty and low unemployment, fewer non-white people, and more hate group activity. While the federal government has acknowledged the threat of far-right extremism (The Department of Homeland Security, 2019), funding for organizations researching or fighting the movement has decreased in recent years (O’Toole, 2019). Based on the results of this study, I recommend that policymakers reconsider their funding priorities to address the expanding far-right extremist movement in the United States. 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HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES COMMUNICATIONS | https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-020-00546-3 ARTICLE HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES COMMUNICATIONS | (2020) 7:49 | https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-020-00546-3 9 https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2019.1585628 https://bit.ly/2yWtmu8 https://doi.org/10.1177/0002764218823844 https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3102652 https://bit.ly/2SibIIc https://bit.ly/2SibIIc https://bit.ly/35j4TLN https://bit.ly/2VLy5If https://bit.ly/2xhCCsB https://bit.ly/2KJzxVa https://bit.ly/2VMRkBc https://bit.ly/37AOnIn https://bit.ly/3cVtvNm Competing interests The author declares no competing interests. Additional information Supplementary information is available for this paper at https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599- 020-00546-3. Correspondence and requests for materials should be addressed to M.Y. 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To view a copy of this license, visit http://creativecommons.org/ licenses/by/4.0/. © The Author(s) 2020 ARTICLE HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES COMMUNICATIONS | https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-020-00546-3 10 HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES COMMUNICATIONS | (2020) 7:49 | https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-020-00546-3 https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-020-00546-3 https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-020-00546-3 http://www.nature.com/reprints http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ Extremist ideology as a complex contagion: the�spread of far-right radicalization in the United States between 2005 and 2017 Introduction Methods Data collection Model specification Permutation test Simulations Results Discussion Data availability References Acknowledgements Competing interests Additional information 
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work_zowy6vxwdvhhzir7asvxl7lbyq	----	TF_Template_Word_Windows_2016 University of Birmingham Islamophobia and the Problematization of Mosques Allen, Chris DOI: 10.1080/13602004.2017.1388477 License: Other (please specify with Rights Statement) Document Version Peer reviewed version Citation for published version (Harvard): Allen, C 2017, 'Islamophobia and the Problematization of Mosques: A Critical Exploration of Hate Crimes and the Symbolic Function of ‘Old’ and ‘New’ Mosques in the United Kingdom', Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, vol. 37, no. 3, pp. 294-308. https://doi.org/10.1080/13602004.2017.1388477 Link to publication on Research at Birmingham portal Publisher Rights Statement: This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs on 16th October 2017, available online: http://www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/13602004.2017.1388477 General rights Unless a licence is specified above, all rights (including copyright and moral rights) in this document are retained by the authors and/or the copyright holders. 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Apr. 2021 https://doi.org/10.1080/13602004.2017.1388477 https://research.birmingham.ac.uk/portal/en/persons/chris-allen(9f691767-9503-4ff6-8447-23cb85a83df1).html https://research.birmingham.ac.uk/portal/en/publications/islamophobia-and-the-problematization-of-mosques(1a75bddf-2b75-4dde-9d5b-a1487b1c798e).html https://research.birmingham.ac.uk/portal/en/publications/islamophobia-and-the-problematization-of-mosques(1a75bddf-2b75-4dde-9d5b-a1487b1c798e).html https://research.birmingham.ac.uk/portal/en/journals/journal-of-muslim-minority-affairs(87f05220-ddc8-4bdd-a4bc-5ce44178a83e)/publications.html https://doi.org/10.1080/13602004.2017.1388477 https://research.birmingham.ac.uk/portal/en/publications/islamophobia-and-the-problematization-of-mosques(1a75bddf-2b75-4dde-9d5b-a1487b1c798e).html Submitted to the Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs for consideration of publication. Islamophobia and the Problematization of Mosques: A Critical Exploration of Hate Crimes and the Symbolic Function of ‘Old’ and ‘New’ Mosques in the UK ______________________ CHRIS ALLEN Abstract Most scholarly studies have tended to focus on the building of new and proposed mosques, and in particular how they are sites of conflict and contestation symbolic of wider ‘problems’ associated with Muslims and Islam in the U.K.. This study focuses on an overlooked aspect within this, the extent to which attacks on mosques that are neither new nor proposed perform a similar symbolic function. Presenting new empirical evidence from research undertaken with ten mosques across the United Kingdom that had been targeted for attack, we begin by exploring the existing literature on the problematization of mosques using the lens of critical Islamophobia studies to do so. Setting out what is known about attacks on mosques in the British setting, empirical findings from the research are used to illustrate the type and manifestation of attacks experienced, going on to consider the drivers and catalysts for them. Exploring the similarities and differences between the conflict and contestation associated with new mosques and the attacks on mosques that are not new, this study concludes that some resonance exists in the symbolic function mosques continue to serve in the community. In conclusion, the significant resonance between Islamophobically-motivated attacks against mosques with those against the individuals are considered. Keywords: mosques; Islamophobia; Muslims; problematization; hate crime; United Kingdom Introduction The content of the existing scholarly canon or literature about mosques in Britain and Europe is almost singularly focused on the socio-political opposition, conflict and contestation directed towards ‘new’ mosques, be that mosques that are merely proposed or mosques that have been more recently built. As a result, very little knowledge is available about existing mosques or those that might be termed ‘old’ in existing scholarly works. This study therefore not only responds to this significant gap in the field but so advances knowledge by presenting the findings from new, previously unpublished research into hate crimes targeting existing or what might be termed ‘old’ mosques in Britain. ______________ Chris Allen is a Lecturer in the Department of Social Policy, Sociology and Criminology at the University of Birmingham, UK. He has a PhD in Theology from the University of Birmingham UK and a BA in religious studies from the University of Wolverhampton, UK. He is a Fellow of the Higher Education Academy and Royal Society of Arts. He has been researching issues relating to the problematisation of British Muslim communities for almost two decades and has particular expertise in Islamophobia on which he has published widely in the UK and elsewhere. Submitted to the Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs for consideration of publication. It is noteworthy that this is the first time research of this kind has been undertaken. Building on the premise that opposition, conflict and contestation directed at new and proposed mosques is somewhat symbolic in that it reflects the wider socio-political ‘problematization’ of Muslims and Islam in contemporary society, we argue that while innately and uniquely different, existing and old mosques also perform a symbolic function when they become targets for hate crimes. Consequently, this study posits that all mosques – irrespective of whether old or new, existing or proposed – not only have the potential to be associated with the socio-political ‘problems’ attributed to Muslims and Islam but so too have the potential to be sites through which those same socio-political ‘problems’ are able to be played out. The analysis presented here builds on existing knowledge and understanding about mosques in Britain whilst simultaneously presenting new thinking that will further challenge accepted understandings and meanings. Mosques, Conflict and Contestation It was just over a decade ago that the first batch of studies relating to the ‘problems’ associated with the building and construction of mosques in contemporary Europe first began to emerge. Focusing on various locations, studies began to explore the process of problematization through the lens of opposition, conflict and contestation. In doing so, they drew critical attention to the potential detrimental impacts that were becoming evident at the regional, national and local levels. In the French setting, Cesari 1 for example considered how opposition to the building of new mosques reflected wider societal tensions about how the influence of Muslims and Islam were perceived to be moving from the private to the public sphere. As she pertinently noted, it was extremely rare that any opposition being expressed was about the buildings themselves. Similar too Saint-Blancat & di Friedberg 2 who noted how the building of new mosques in Italy was also linked to broader questions about Muslims and Islam in the country: how Italy was seen to be changing and what ramifications the presence of Muslims and Islam were likely to have. For them, new mosques functioned symbolically in that they provided a focus onto which concerns and fears about the perceived cultural and religious ‘Otherness’ of Islam and Muslims could be projected. For Landman & Wessels 3 and McLoughlin 4 in the Netherlands and England respectively, it was the impact of new mosques on the physical landscape that was most important; in both settings, the changes were used as evidence to fuel increasingly pervasive discourses about the Islamification of Europe’s inner cities. For Jonker 5 , a different perspective emerged out of research that focused on the ‘unsolved’ conflict surrounding the proposed mosque in Berlin-Kreuzberg, Germany. Noting that something of a concerted opposition to the proposed mosque began in 1999, Jonker 6 went on to explain how this dramatically changed after 9/11. Not only did the level of opposition significantly increase but so too was there a marked shift in arguments about why the mosque should be opposed. For her, the 9/11 attacks catalysed a ‘curve of anger’ across Germany – indeed replicated across much of Europe 7 – that created a greater mistrust and suspicion about Muslims and Islam among the German populace. As Jonker 8 illustrated, opposition to the proposed mosque became increasingly informed by this mistrust and suspicion whereby they would increasingly question the ‘true’ motive for building the Submitted to the Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs for consideration of publication. mosque. So too was the opposition increasingly focused on the perceived ‘Otherness’ of Muslims and Islam, both of which were routinely being referred to as an enemy of Germany, Europe and ‘the West’ at different junctures. Stressing the symbolic function of new mosques as highlighted previously, Jonker’s 9 findings went further by showing that local opposition to new mosques was as readily influenced and shaped by international events as indeed those relevant to the local or national settings. For her, new mosques functioned as mere proxies for all that was seen to be problematic about Muslims and Islam without any differentiation whatsoever. A number of scholarly works have sought to develop this including Allievi 10 , Göle 11 , Kassimeris & Jackson 12 , Arab 13 and Kuppinger 14 . One new mosque that has attracted significant scholarly inquiry is in Dudley, England. While Reeves, Abbas & Pedroso 15 and Kassimeris & Jackson 16 offer interesting perspectives, Allen’s 17 various studies offer particular insight into the wide range of factors that shape and inform the opposition being shown towards new mosques. Across these studies, these have variously included: the town’s medieval skyline; the height of a nearby church steeple in comparison to the proposed mosque’s minaret; the ‘Islamification’ of Britain; Governmental counter-terror legislation; the ‘War on Terror’; and the threat of Islamist terror groups globally 18 . What emerges is an amalgam of local, national and global factors which at once appear to be equally relevant but which at the same time are in a constant state of flux given the wider global, national and local contexts. All however were underpinned by the distinct notion of the ‘Otherness’ of Muslims and Islam and the view that this ‘Otherness’ was very ‘real’ in the threat it posed to Dudley and its residents. Quoting one local resident, this was evident when opposition was justified on the belief that mosques were not places of worship. As they put it, the minarets resemble “…look out posts…I know what they say they are…but the design of the buildings seem more fortified castles than spiritual houses” 19 . Another useful illustration of the problematization of new mosques can be seen in Switzerland and the 57% majority who voted in favour of banning the building of minarets in 2009 20 . Given that only four of the country’s 150 mosques had minarets at the time of the referendum, the outcome was somewhat surprising given it placed no restrictions whatsoever on the actual building of new mosques. According to Nussbaum 21 , the vote offered an unprecedented illustration of how extremely minor and at times seemingly irrelevant issues attributed to Muslims and Islam have the potential to be easily and rapidly transformed into public crises that have profound national, political and cultural significance. For Stussi 22 , the referendum has to be understood as entirely symbolic: irrespective of how few minarets there were in Switzerland, the referendum symbolised the concerns, fears and anxieties the Swiss public had about Muslims and Islam. Consequently, the referendum also empowered those who had concerns, fears and anxieties to act. While the outcome of the referendum was little more than a hollow victory, the majority vote was seen to be an overwhelming success. From a symbolic point of view, it could be interpreted that halting the building of minarets was a small step in the process of halting Muslims and Islam and by default, the further Islamification of Europe. Submitted to the Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs for consideration of publication. Given that the primary focus of these studies has been on new mosques, a concurrent process has been underway albeit one that has been largely overlooked in scholarly studies. As Allen 23 noted in Dudley, while the proposed mosque provided the main focus of attention there was a ‘curve of anger’ emanating from the new mosque’s epicentre which seemed to catalyse a number other mosques being attacked nearby. Having been established for a number of decades before the proposed new mosque, preliminary investigations would appear to suggest that none of what might be referred to as ‘old’ mosques had previously experienced any sustained or long-term attacks or backlash. However as Allen 24 noted, two ‘old’ mosques near the site of the proposed ‘new’ mosque in Dudley suffered arson attacks while another had a nail bomb detonated outside it. It is interesting to note that this would appear to be the extent of any investigations into the type and nature of attacks against ‘old’ as opposed to ‘new’ mosques in the existing scholarly literature. Here, the findings of new qualitative research not only sought to address this identified gap in the scholarly literature but so too build upon and develop Allievi’s 25 theoretical premise that like ‘new’ mosques, ‘old’ mosques also function as convenient symbols against which those wishing to vent their anxieties, anger and bigotry about Muslims and Islam can do so. In essence, this study seeks to begin to explore the similarities and differences that might exist between attacks on ‘old’ and ‘new’ mosques. Approaches and Methods In identifying the gap in the existing body of scholarly evidence, this study presents the findings from qualitative research that surveyed the occurrence of attacks perpetrated against mosques that had been established for longer than five years. We shall begin by considering the scale and prevalence of attacks against mosques in the British context, setting out what is currently known, including a focus on how such attacks are manifested. There will also be some consideration of the impact such attacks have. Drawing on the emergent themes, the findings will be positioned within the existing scholarly evidence relating to new mosques. 26 At the same time, the findings will be critically contextualised through the theoretical lens of recent Islamophobia studies. In conclusion, some reflections will be offered on why existing studies have to date overlooked attacks on ‘old’ mosques; the ways in which this study contributes new knowledge towards establishing a better understanding of how mosques are symbolic of wider processes of problematization; and finally what questions might necessarily need to be asked in terms of future research. The methodological approach underpinning this research was co-designed and co- produced with the charitable organisation Faith Matters and its Government funded Tell MAMA service (MAMA being an acronym for ‘Measuring Anti-Muslim Attacks’). MAMA offers a third-party reporting service for those who become victims of Islamophobic hate crime whether be that against the individual or the material (for instance mosques, schools, businesses and so on). Designed to largely replicate a similar reporting service facilitated by the Community Security Trust (CST) for those who become victims of Anti-Semitism, MAMA not only records attacks but so too signposts victims to other sources where Submitted to the Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs for consideration of publication. additional support can be found, be that legal, emotional or other. Like the CST service, MAMA also collates and subsequently publishes its data as a means of establishing a more comprehensive picture of the scale and prevalence of Islamophobic attacks. This is a welcome development because as Hargreaves 27 rightly notes, data relating to Islamophobic hate crime has historically been as weak as it has been problematic. While MAMA’s data is still embryonic, it is expected over the next half decade a more robust picture will begin to emerge thereby going some way towards addressing the somewhat disparate data that currently exists. 28 It is worth noting however that it is currently estimated that around 70 per cent of all Islamophobic attacks are never reported to any statutory organisation or service 29 and so even with greater monitoring and recording, the emergent picture is likely to remain somewhat incomplete. This presents methodological barriers for researchers given that it is difficult to know exactly which and indeed how many mosques have been targeted for hate crimes against them. Co-designing and co-producing the research with MAMA provided a means to overcome this. Given that MAMA had established relationships of trust with those reporting attacks, its support staff first sought to identify and then secondly recruit participants for the research. Acting as a bridgehead, they made initial contact with those who had reported attacks against mosques. Introducing the research to them, MAMA’s support staff addressed any initial questions potential respondents had. It was only then, once consent to participate had been sought that those reporting attacks against mosques were introduced to researchers. Having collaborated with MAMA to design the questions, researchers went on to undertake in-depth interviews. In total, ten in-depth interviews were undertaken. In addition, informal discussions were had with MAMA’s support staff from which notes were compiled and subsequently used to inform broader thinking and analysis. The approach to sampling was necessarily non-probabilistic and purposive given the constraints of identifying those that had reported attacks via MAMA and were necessarily trusting to participate and share their experience. Of course, this has implications for generalizability. While so, the fact that all respondents had direct knowledge and experience of hate crimes being perpetrated against their respective mosques also meant that their identification and subsequent participation was also undeniably appropriate. As a further safeguard, it was required that all respondents had been the person reporting the attack to MAMA and equally important, that they held a suitable position of responsibility within the mosque, for instance being a member of the executive committee or centre manager. This ensured that respondents had credibility in terms of the nature of the attack and on the impact it had on those affiliated or using the mosque. Unsurprisingly, this placed considerable constraints on the number of appropriate respondents that were first identified and secondly expressed a willingness to participate. Nonetheless, it was still possible to engage a geographically diverse number of respondents: three were based in the South East of England (including London), one in the South West, four in the Midlands, and one in each of the North West, North East and Northern Ireland. Of those interviewed, eight respondents identified as being male, two as female. Of these, the majority (eight) identified as being of Asian ethnicity (Bangladeshi, Indian or Pakistani). One each of the two other respondents Submitted to the Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs for consideration of publication. identified as Arab and White British. For the protection of those interviewed, the names of respondents have been replaced by pseudonyms as indeed have the names and precise locations of mosques. A Critical Perspective on Islamophobia MAMA encounters two challenges when recording hate crimes against mosques: first, in terms of how to define an attack; second, how to appropriately categorise them for recording purposes. The situation is made more complex by the fact that Islamophobia remains a contested concept 30 what with the most oft cited definitions tending to be literalist and therefore not fit for purpose. Many resonate with that posited by the Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia 31 which defined Islamophobia somewhat over-simplistically as a mere fear or dislike of Islam and by consequence, all Muslims. In both the public and political spaces, similarly simplistic definitions have been all too recurrent in the rhetoric of both advocates and critics alike, the latter routinely arguing that it is far from irrational to ‘fear’ Islam thereby negating how Islamophobia is far more akin to other discriminatory phenomena such as racism or homophobia. Consequently, Shyrock 32 is right to note that general references to Islamophobia remain largely impervious to nuance. Vakil 33 therefore is correct when he argues that it is more important to be clear about what is meant by Islamophobia when using it rather than what it means in any essential sense. Within scholarly literature, changes are afoot with those such as Klug 34 suggesting that the study of Islamophobia has ‘come of age’. Moosavi 35 too who suggests that gone is the time to question or contest Islamophobia; now it just needs to be better understood. This can be seen in a number of key texts to have emerged over the past half-decade or so including Allen 36 , Sheehi 37 , Lean 38 , Taras 39 , Tyrer 40 , Chakraborti & Zempi 41 and Carr 42 . Common to these is a more critical approach to how Islamophobia is both conceived and understood. Both Allen 43 and Sheehi 44 for example conceive Islamophobia as an ideological phenomenon in that what is known and understood about Muslims and Islam is embedded in variously complex systems of signifiers and symbols which shape and inform the social consensus 45 . Accordingly for them, Islamophobia is not restricted to any specific action, practice or discrimination but is instead evident in a vast array of different social, political and cultural processes whereby the identification and recognition of Muslims and Islam as both ‘Other’ and ‘problem’ are routinely consumed without question or contestation. What is known and understood about Muslims and Islam therefore can be seen to be little more than ideological constructs. For Clarke 46 , ideological constructs function through reinforcing and reifying notions that purport to demarcate who ‘we’ are and more importantly, demarcate who ‘we’ are not. Deploying processes of stigmatization and marginalization, what ensues is an unquestioned acceptance that all Muslims and Islam without differentiation can be reduced to a unidimensional homogenous entity. Undeniably ‘Other’, that unidimensional homogenous entity also becomes attributed with a series of negative and stereotypical characteristics that are at once, not only irremovable but more importantly eternally fixed. Referred to by Allen 47 as ‘normative truths’, through informing what he goes on to describe as ‘Islamophobia Submitted to the Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs for consideration of publication. thinking’ so they become the sole means through which Muslims and Islam are known and subsequently understood. Given the normative truths confer the belief that it is therefore ‘common-sense’ to be suspicious and fearful of Muslims and Islam 48 , so it becomes relatively easy to rationalise and justify the need to respond or resist– as indeed hate and attack them also, in the most extreme circumstances. Consequently, the normative truths provide a means by which those seeking to vent anger, bigotry or hate in the form of a hate crime – in particular, an attack which targets a mosque – are able to locate justification and legitimacy. Though Allen 49 is keen to stress that not all recipients to such normative truths are Islamophobic, he adds that ‘Islamophobia thinking’ is far from the preserve of those perpetrating attacks. It is from this understanding that MAMA defines what constitutes an Islamophobic hate crime. For it, an Islamophobic hate crime is any malicious act that is directed at Muslims (or those thought to be Muslim), their material property (including mosques), or organisations where there exists evidence that the motivation, content or perpetrator focused on a perceived Muslim identity or other symbol of Muslims or Islam. Understood within the theoretical frame of Islamophobia, such an attack is one that would appear to be motivated, rationalised or justified on the basis of the normative truths relating to Muslims or Islam. This enables a clear and coherent understanding of what constitutes an Islamophobic hate crime while ensuring resonance with the scholarly and theoretical canon also. In doing so, it goes some way towards closing the gap between academic and practice-based settings while also acknowledging Vakil’s 50 concern about the need for clarity when referring to Islamophobia. Hate Crimes Targeting Mosques: Nature and Scope The British Government’s National Counter Terrorism Security Office 51 has previously expressed concern about what it believed to be a worrying rise in the number of attacks being perpetrated against mosques. While it failed to evidence this or indeed support its claims with appropriate statistics, MAMA’s various annual reports and associated datasets would appear to confirm the Government’s concerns. When recording attacks on mosques, MAMA uses six categories: graffiti smashed windows, desecration, violent break-ins arson, and bombings. In terms of research, these categories reflect the ‘high-level’, ‘low-level’ categories of Islamophobic attack first posited by Allen & Nielsen. 52 In this way, graffiti, smashed windows and desecration would be low-level while violent break-in, arson and bombings high-level. Of the hate crimes recorded by MAMA, most might be best deemed as being low- level. Accounting for just over 70 per cent of all hate crimes recorded, this too concurs with Allen & Nielsen’s 53 finding that the majority of Islamophobic incidents are typically low- level. Whilst so, it is necessary to stress that low-level does not equate to low impact 54 . Take for instance hate crimes involving graffiti. While rightly categorised low-level, the potential impact of graffiti is extremely wide, going way beyond those who first saw it and reported it. If that graffiti was to include a threatening message – a common feature of much graffiti appearing on mosques - so the threat has the potential to impact everyone who sees it or at least identifies with the group the threat is directed at. Routine dismissals of low-level attacks are therefore not only unfounded but also quite inappropriate 55 . Submitted to the Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs for consideration of publication. A recurrent feature of mosque graffiti reported to MAMA was the linking of Muslims and Islam to evil, violence and terrorism. Others included messages about not belonging in Britain and the need to ‘go home’. The incorporation of far-right and neo-Nazi groups or the emblems appropriated by them were also prominent. Of these, the English Defence League (EDL) and National Front (NF) () were particularly recurrent as were swastikas. Three of the participants reported graffiti at their mosques. At the Medina Mosque and Jamia Mosque, participants spoke of incidents targeting the mosque as being ad hoc, the perpetrators appearing to throw paint over external walls. At the Medina Mosque, the paint was accompanied by eggs and rotten tomatoes also. At the Al-Salafi Masjid, Suleiman explained how the graffiti included a clear anti-Muslim message and a far-right emblem. Islam was sceptical though about whether this was ‘proof’ of the far-right’s involvement. Explaining how he tried to keep an open mind, he said: “I genuinely can’t tell if these people necessarily belong to a far-right group…it only takes one or two individuals to commit these kinds of incidents”. Unlike Suleiman, Musab Hassan at the Holt Road Mosque was convinced of far-right involvement. Accounting for around 23 per cent of all mosque attacks recorded by MAMA, smashed windows were common in that they seemingly require little planning or pre- meditation. One might speculate whether smashed windows are more opportunistic than other types of attack. At the Holt Road Mosque, various windows were smashed during evening prayers. Hassan explained how on hearing glass being broken, worshippers ran outside and confronted three men who “were causing a commotion”. Verbally abusing the worshippers, the three men then proceeded to enter an adjoining yard where old chairs and tables were stored. Emerging with a large table, the participant explained how the men threw it through another large window causing shattered glass to spray everywhere. Hassan referred to the men as “EDL members”. When asked about this, he explained that the EDL had not only targeted the mosque in recent weeks but had also uploaded abusive and intimidating videos to YouTube. Hassan said he recognised the men from the videos. Stressing the perceived culpability of the EDL, he spoke of further incidents including attacks on local Muslim-owned shops and young Muslims being subjected to abuse and intimidation on their way home from school. While none of those interviewed had reported incidents involving desecration or forced entry, MAMA’s data states that these account for 15.0 and 13.5 per cent of all attacks respectively. Attacks involving desecration appear to be becoming increasingly common however. Most focus on the belief that pig meat and blood is haram (forbidden) for Muslims and thereby unclean. Consequently, desecrations increasingly involve pig meat or carcasses – especially heads, feet and blood – being left in or around mosques. The earliest recorded attack of this kind in Britain was post-9/11 when ten pigs’ heads were found outside a mosque in Exeter. 56 Since then, numerous others have occurred in such diverse locations as Blackpool 57 , Cheltenham 58 , and Ellesmere Port. 59 Similar incidents involving pig’s heads have also been shown to target individual Muslim families as well. 60 As regards high-level attacks, MAMA recorded attacks involving forced entry, arson Submitted to the Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs for consideration of publication. and bombings. From analysing the data, forced entry was nearly always accompanied with menacing or abusive behaviour that intimidated worshippers and mosque staff. Some of the hate crimes recorded also noted that forced entry was accompanied by material damage, most typically involving the smashing of furniture. While none of the participants experienced forced entry, three experienced arson while another experienced bomb attacks. From MAMA’s data, arson attacks targeting mosques appear to be increasingly timed to coincide with communal prayers. This was what occurred at the Markazi Masjid. Shagufta explained how she was outside the mosque at the time and saw the firebomb land on the roof. Accompanied by her husband, she said she immediately called 999 while he tried to evacuate the mosque. Given the fire service arrived soon after, Zeb said the amount of damage caused was minimal but as she noted, “it could have been far worse…especially if we’d not been outside the mosque and everyone had not acted so quickly”. She went on to explain how many in the local community had been shocked by the attack. As she said, the fact that those behind the attack would have known “it was a mosque and that we use it for praying” was particularly chilling. Unlike at the Markazi Masjid, the arson attack on the Al-Manar Islamic Centre took place overnight while the mosque was empty. It also completely destroyed the mosque. As Rafiq rhetorically asked, “the attack was really shocking, why would someone go to such lengths?” Resulting in thousands of pounds of damage, Rafiq explained that it was not the first time the mosque had been attacked. On a previous occasion, he said that someone had broken into the mosque, “…made a big pile of stuff and tried to set it alight. It was deliberate…it didn’t ignite like this time though”. At the Newtown Mosque, Aneesa aid that the arson attack followed a break in. As she explained, two young men - who were subsequently arrested by the police – got into the mosque through some smashed windows. Once inside, she said the two men started a fire just behind the mosque’s front doors. Despite igniting, she explained how the fire failed to spread meaning that the damage was minimal. As she went on, it was only evident around the doors of the mosque and part of its frontage. Of the two mosques where bombs attacks occurred – the Islamic Dawah Centre and Makki Masjid – the respondents at each said they had no recollection of their mosques having been attacked previously. The attacks at both mosques were however extremely similar: an explosive device being left outside the mosque before being detonated while worshippers were inside praying. At the Makki Masjid, this coincided with one of the evening prayers; at the Islamic Dawah Centre the bomb was detonated to coincide with Friday prayers when the mosque was at its most full. Despite both bombs being detonated, there were no injuries at either location. Shaikh from the Makki Masjid said, “we heard a loud noise but couldn’t see anything and just thought that someone was messing around…so we didn’t do anything about it”. At the Islamic Dawah Centre, Waqar recounted similar occurrence. There, worshippers only reacted once an unusual amount of debris was found in the car park and road outside. According to both participants, it was only after police had undertaken a full investigation were worshippers prepared to accept the debris was the result of detonated explosives. At the Makki Masjid, Shaikh explained how the general response was one of incredulity adding how it was only after the police’s forensic officers showed him the remains of the bomb did he Submitted to the Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs for consideration of publication. himself believe it was a bomb. Hate Crime Targeting Mosques: Drivers and Catalysts There was some disagreement among the respondents as to what the drivers and motivations for the hate crimes targeting their respective mosques might have been. Eight respondents said they felt they were direct consequence of various atrocities and terror incidents involving Muslims typically claim to be acting in the name of Islam. At Al-Manar and Newtown Mosque, respondents were less sure but at the same time could not think of any other reason why their mosques might have been targeted. At Al-Manar, Rafiq said he would prefer to believe the attack was unprovoked and perpetrated by opportunists. If it was not, he added, it would require him to lose faith in humanity. Similar too for Aneesa at Newtown Mosque: “there was not any apparent reason for it…It was an unprovoked attack”. When pressed, Aneesa was adamant there was no evidence to link the attack to any incident involving Muslims elsewhere. It was interesting therefore that she later acknowledged the possibility of a link in the mind of the perpetrators between those Muslims who commit atrocities and acts of terror and those “ordinary” Muslims who used the facilities at the Newtown Mosque. While clearly reluctant, she resigned herself to the fact that there was a chance that her mosque being targeted was the “result of prejudices and anger that some groups have in society towards Muslims.” Among those respondents who made the link more explicitly, there were however some differences of opinion. Shaikh for example was receptive to the possibility that “…anybody would turn to the idea that [any attack] was a backlash to an incident”. But he tempered this by adding how “…it could just be a random attack or a revenge on someone or something that is not connected to anything…but we think it may be connected.” For Asif at the Medina Masjid, there was little doubt about a link. He was clear that events that occurred at the national and international levels were present in the minds of those perpetrating attacks against mosques and indeed, individual Muslims at the local level. At the Jamia Masjid, Yahya agreed: “It was definitely a reaction to recent events” citing the murder of Lee Rigby in London and the Charlie Hebdo attacks in Paris. As he explained, his mosque had always enjoyed good relations with local non-Muslim communities and so for him it would need something significant and undoubtedly horrific to change the views of those who know the mosque. Suleiman at the As-Salafi Masjid voiced similar: “…because the incidents are so horrific…they cause a backlash and antagonise a lot of people”. For him, this was the key driver for perpetrators. It was Zeb from the Markazi Masjid whose articulation was particularly pertinent. For her, the attack was a manifestation of “a form of hatred towards Islam”. As she went on, the mosque “was targeted…because the building is a symbol of Islam”. By making this link, Zeb was suggesting similar to that being expressed in various scholarly works where mosques were shown to have a symbolic function. Suleiman too inferred something similar in relation to how mosques have been shown to have a symbolic function in the existing literature. Albeit with less clarity, Suleiman said that the Markazi Masjid was an “easy target” for those seeking revenge against Muslims and their religion. In recalling Allen 61 , it is likely that such Submitted to the Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs for consideration of publication. views would have drawn upon the notion and role of normative truths. Indeed, these were evident in other ways too including how a number of respondents spoke about the ongoing problematization of Muslims and Islam in contemporary British – and for some, Western - society. For Shaikh, evidence of this could be seen in how “the media and authorities constantly create negative portrayals of Muslims”. Going on, he said this was particularly problematic because “people are simple…they look at headlines and they make their minds up for them”. For Shaikh, this contributed to the process of “creating Islamophobia”. In other words, the recurrence and perpetuation of the normative truths about Muslims and Islam function by reinforcing and reifying Islamophobia and Islamophobic thinking. At the Islamic Dawah Centre, Awan said that it was important to remember how the present setting was “difficult times for Muslims…” before adding that “…the media does not help in this sense”. For him, the national media was guilty of constantly reinforcing a whole raft of negative stereotypes about Muslims and Islam, many of which were accepted and subsequently digested without question or critique by the general public. While Awan felt “the media has a responsibility” in society, Khan agreed although added that there was little evidence of this when it came to Muslims and Islam. Zeb’s observations were again pertinent in this respect. Agreeing with Awan’s view that these were ‘difficult times for Muslims’, she added how in “…times of trouble, the politicians and media do not help us [Muslims]”. Stating that she felt personally disappointed by this, she said it was so important that politicians and the media “play a very crucial role in the ways some people react to these types of incidents”. But as she went on, even if Muslims and Islam were to be presented in more positive frames she believes that “…the damage is already done”. As she concluded, “…the vilification of Muslims and Islam is increasing more and more”. At the South Street Mosque, Dawud explained how people “always want a scapegoat” when terror atrocities occur. Suleiman at the As-Salafi Masjid agreed, adding that a “sort of vulnerability” becomes quickly apparent among both Muslims and non-Muslims in the wake of such incidents. As he put it, “not only does it feel that the [Muslim] community is attacked collectively for a crime that is committed by someone else…it also feels they are under siege and held responsible for what happened wherever that may be”. The result for him is the view that “the whole [Muslim] community has been punished”. Some resonance with ideological Islamophobia would again appear to be apparent in the way in which the participants seem to believe that there are certain meanings and understandings about Muslims and Islam that duly inform the social consensus. So too would there seem to be some resonance with the notion of reductionism within emergent theories relating to Islamophobia, where Muslims and Islam become a unidimensional; homogenous entity attributed with a series of negative and stereotypical characteristics. This would seem to underlie the views expressed about how all Muslims without differentiation appear to be seen to be unquestionably culpable. Symbols, Problems and Targets As noted previously, this study aims to contribute to new knowledge and thinking to what Submitted to the Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs for consideration of publication. appears to be a gap in the existing body of scholarly literature relevant to the problematization of mosques. To date, studies have largely focused on the conflict and contestation associated with the building and construction of new and proposed mosques, in particular how they function symbolically where perceived problems, anxieties and fears associated with Muslims and Islam are more widely seen to be played out. The study seeks to go beyond this, instead focusing on what appeared to be a somewhat overlooked yet concurrent phenomenon that incorporated all mosques – including those that in the context of this study might be described as old and established - as a way of trying to improve understanding about the process of problematizing mosques. Before considering the new insights achieved by doing so, it is worth reflecting on why this particular focus of inquiry appeared to be overlooked in scholarly studies. Probably the most realistic explanation would appear to relate to the issue of information and data. It is only in recent years that the systematic recording of data relating to Islamophobic hate crimes, whether against individual Muslims or the material entities associated with them or their communities, has begun in earnest. The findings presented here then go some way to establishing a new frontier for scholarly inquiry and investigation in the field of critical Islamophobia studies. As highlighted in this research , some clear resonance exists between the canon of scholarly literature relevant to new and proposed mosques and the new evidence presented here relevant to hate crime targeting older and more established mosques. In this way and quite irrespective of whether new or old, all mosques would appear to function as sites where the problematization of Muslims and Islam can be played out, be that via opposition and conflict in the case of new and proposed mosques or via graffiti, damage or arson among others in the case of older and more established mosques. In line with Landman & Wessels’ observations about the visible identification of new mosques on the changing urban landscape 62 , Suleiman appears to be suggesting similar when speaking about how he felt the distinct architecture of the As-Salafi Masjid made it an “easy target”. In explaining this, he said that not only had the mosque originally been built in an area where few Muslims lived but so too did it embody a style that was starkly different from other buildings in its locale. While Suleiman seems to inadvertently make a link between some of the factors that are relevant for both new and old mosques – architectural design - maybe there is a tangible impact relating to ‘difference’, be that real or symbolic. If so, might it be possible that the tangible differences of mosques become more noticeable and therefore more symbolic in the wake of terror atrocities. It might also be possible that tangible difference also feeds into what McLoughlin 63 referred to as an increasingly pervasive discourse about Islamification. This too resonates with Saint-Blancat & di Friedberg’s 64 observations about how new mosques were increasingly being seen to symbolise cultural and religious ‘Othernes, not least because of the number of respondents who made explicit links between hate crimes targeting their respective mosques and terror atrocities and incidents both nationally and internationally. Similarly, this would seem to reinforce Saint-Blancat & di Friedberg’s 65 other observation that mosques are increasingly becoming sites through which “symbol[s] of a national debate” can be played out. It would also appear that mosques are increasingly sites where anxieties, anger and other similar feelings can be directed and vented. As such, a local- Submitted to the Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs for consideration of publication. national nexus can be seen in the widespread acknowledgement that an incident occurring either nationally or internationally involving Muslims committing atrocities had the very potential to prompt and catalyse a hate crime targeting a mosque and its Muslim community locally. Here too was clear evidence to support Stussi’s 66 explanation of the symbolic function of mosques, in particular how wider societal fears and anxieties about Muslims and Islam and the problems associated with them become the lens through which mosques are framed. And as with the Swiss minaret ban, so it might be that this provides some insight into why individuals and groups choose to perpetrate such attacks if, that is, the attacks are considered in the context of seemingly needing to have a ‘response’ to Muslims and Islam. This can also be framed by Jonker’s 67 study and the transformative impact of atrocities and incidents where Muslims or Islam are blamed or held responsible. Catalysed by the ‘curve of anger’, Jonker 68 showed how opposition to the building of new mosques became more angry, vitriolic and hateful following 9/11. For the majority of those interviewed here, a similar although again unacknowledged ‘curve of anger’ was seen to have been catalytic in the perpetration of most of the attacks. As well as Jonker 69 , so too does this resonate with studies that have shown the impact of ‘trigger events’ and the preponderance of Islamophobic attitudes and attacks that follow. 70 Knowing that trigger events prompt a sharp but temporary increase in attacks against Muslims, existing scholarly literature has only been able to illustrate this with regards to attacks perpetrated against the individual. Here though, it would seem that something similar might also occur as regards Islamophobic incidents that target the material and physical as well. While noting the limitations of this research as regards generalizability, it is however legitimate to posit that in the contemporary setting it would appear that distinct similarities exist between the problematization of new and proposed mosques and those that are older and established as regards the symbolic function each perform. Likewise also, that there appears to be some significant similarities between Islamophobically motivated attacks catalysed by trigger events quite irrespective of whether they are perpetrated against the individual or the material. To what extent might this also be a basis upon which to affirm broader theories about new and proposed mosques from the existing body of scholarly evidence? As Göle 71 noted, because mosques are no longer seen as mere places of worship but as cultural constructions of difference and ‘Otherness’, so they become symbolic of all that is contemporarily known and understood about Muslims and Islam, in particular that which is believed to be problematic. As before, the building and development of new mosques was shown to be inextricably bound to the social and political constructions about Muslims and Islam in the contemporary setting. Might it be that now, all mosques without differentiation of age, history, design and so on can – at times – also be inextricably bound to the social and political constructions about Muslims and Islam? If those social and political constructions are seen to be equivalent to the concept of normative truths, in that they shape and inform that which is contemporarily known about Muslims and Islam – thereby informing the social consensus – then it would be fair to conclude that the symbolic function performed by mosques is indeed underpinned by an ideological Islamophobia. The lens of critical Islamophobia studies therefore provides a better understanding and explanation of the Submitted to the Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs for consideration of publication. processes of problematizing mosques, of why they become sites of conflict and opposition, and also the symbolic function they perform in the contemporary social and political settings. Consequently, it would appear correct to suggest that ‘Islamophobia-thinking’ – founded on the normative truths - can be not only easily and swiftly deployed but so too deployed in ways that are rather more dynamic, protean and transient. With this in mind, further investigation into the ongoing problematization of all types of mosques would appear to be something that is increasingly necessary and undoubtedly overdue. NOTES 1 Jocelyne Cesari. ‘Mosques in French Cities: Towards the End of a Conflict?’ Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 31, no. 6, 2005, pp. 1025-43. doi:10.1080/13691830500282634. Accessed on 12/01/2017. 2 Chantal Saint-Blancat and Ottavia Schmidt di Friedberg. ‘Why Are Mosques a Problem? Local Politics and Fear of Islam in Northern Italy.’ Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 31, no. 6, 2005.pp. 1083–1104. doi:10.1080/13691830500282881. Accessed on 26/01/2017 3 Nico Landman and Wendy Wessels. ‘The Visibility of Mosques in Dutch Towns.’ Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 31, no. 6 (2005): 1125–40. doi:10.1080/13691830500282725. Accessed on 26/01/2017 4 Seán McLoughlin. ‘Mosques and the Public Space: Conflict and Cooperation in Bradford.’ Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 31, no., 6, 2005pp. 1045–66. doi:10.1080/13691830500282832. Accessed on 12/01/2017 5 Gerdien Jonker. ‘The Mevlana Mosque in Berlin-Kreuzberg: An Unsolved Conflict.’ Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 31, no. 6 (2005): 1067–81. doi:10.1080/13691830500282683. Accessed on 14/12/2016 6 Ibid. 7 Chris Allen and Jorgen S. Nielsen, Islamophobia in the EU After 11 September 2001: Summary Report. Vienna: EUMC, 2002. 8 Gerdien Jonker. ‘The Mevlana Mosque in Berlin-Kreuzberg: An Unsolved Conflict.’ Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 31, no. 6, 2005pp. 1067–81. doi:10.1080/13691830500282683. Accessed on 14/12/2016 9 Ibid. 10 Stefano Allievi. Conflicts over Mosques in Europe: Policy Issues and Trends. London: Alliance Publishing Trust, 2009. 11 Nilüfer Göle. ‘The Public Visibility of Islam and European Politics of Resentment: The Minarets- Mosques Debate.’ Philosophy & Social Criticism 37, no. 4, 2011, pp. 383–92. doi:10.1177/0191453711398773. Accessed on 12/12/2016 Submitted to the Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs for consideration of publication. 12 George Kassimeris, and Leonie Jackson. ‘British Muslims and the Discourses of Dysfunction: Community Cohesion and Counterterrorism in the West Midlands.’ Critical Studies on Terrorism 5, no. 2, 2012, pp. 179–96. doi:10.1080/17539153.2012.684970. Accessed on 26/01/2017 13 Pooyan Tamimi Arab. ‘Mosques in the Netherlands: Transforming the Meaning of Marginal Spaces.’ Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 33, no. 4, 2013, pp. 477–94. doi:10.1080/13602004.2013.866349. Accessed on 12/12/2016 14 Petra Kuppinger. ‘Mosques and Minarets: Conflict, Participation, and Visibility in German Cities.’ Anthropological Quarterly 87, no. 3 (2014): 793–818. doi:10.1353/anq.2014.0034. Accessed on 24/01/2017 15 Frank Reeves, Tahir Abbas, and Dulce Pedroso. ‘The Dudley Mosque Project: A Case of Islamophobia and Local Politics.’ Political Quarterly , Vol. 80, no. 4, 2009, pp. 502–16. doi:10.1111/j.1467-923x.2009.02048.x. Accessed on 25/09/2016 16 George Kassimeris, and Leonie Jackson. ‘British Muslims and the Discourses of Dysfunction: Community Cohesion and Counterterrorism in the West Midlands.’ Critical Studies on Terrorism Vol. 5, no. 2, 2012,pp. 179–96. doi:10.1080/17539153.2012.684970. Accessed on 26/01/2017 17 Chris Allen. ‘Between Critical and Uncritical Understandings: A Case Study Analyzing the Claims of Islamophobia Made in the Context of the Proposed “Super-Mosque” in Dudley, England’. Societies, Vol. 3, no. 2, 2013, pp. 186–203. doi:10.3390/soc3020186 Accessed on 26/01/2017 Chris Allen, ‘Anti-Social Networking: Findings From a Pilot Study on Opposing Dudley Mosque Using Facebook Groups as Both Site and Method for Research.’ SAGE Open 4 (2014). doi:10.1177/2158244014522074 Accessed on 25/09/2016 Chris Allen, “Stop Dudley Super Mosque and Islamic Village”: overview of the findings from a pilot study’ in D. Enstedt, G. Larsson, and E. Pace, eds., Religion and Internet, Leiden: Brill: 2015. Chris Allen, ‘Facebook as anti-social media: using Facebook groups to engage opponents to the building of Dudley Mosque’ in, S. Cheruvallil-Contractor & S. Shakkour, eds., Digital Methodologies in the Sociology of Religion, London: Bloomsbury, 2015. 18 Ibid. p.7, 19 Chris Allen, ‘Anti-Social Networking: Findings From a Pilot Study on Opposing Dudley Mosque Using Facebook Groups as Both Site and Method for Research’, SAGE Open 4 (2014a). doi:10.1177/2158244014522074. Accessed on 25/09/2016 20 Marcel Stüssi, ‘Banning of Minarets: Addressing the Validity of a Controversial Swiss Popular Initiative,’ Religion & Human Rights, Vol. 3, no. 2, 2008, pp. 135–53. doi:10.1163/187103208x347376. Accessed on 26/01/2017 21 Martha Craven Nussbaum, The New Religious Intolerance: Overcoming the Politics of Fear in an Anxious Age, 1st ed. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2012. Submitted to the Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs for consideration of publication. 22 Marcel Stüssi, ‘Banning of Minarets: Addressing the Validity of a Controversial Swiss Popular Initiative’, Religion & Human Rights, Vol. 3, no. 2, 2008 pp. 135–53. doi:10.1163/187103208x347376. Accessed on 26/01/2017 23 Chris Allen, ‘Between Critical and Uncritical Understandings: A Case Study Analyzing the Claims of Islamophobia Made in the Context of the Proposed “Super-Mosque” in Dudley, England’, Societies, Vol. 3, no. 2, 2013, pp. 186–203. doi:10.3390/soc3020186 Accessed on 26/01/2017 Chris Allen, “Stop Dudley Super Mosque and Islamic Village”: overview of the findings from a pilot study’ in D. Enstedt, G. Larsson, and E. Pace, eds., Religion and Internet, Leiden: Brill, 2015. 24 Chris Allen, ‘“Stop Dudley Super Mosque and Islamic Village”: overview of the findings from a pilot study’ in, D. Enstedt, G. Larsson, and E. Pace, eds., Religion and Internet, Leiden: Brill, 2015. 25 Stefano Allievi, Conflicts over Mosques in Europe: Policy Issues and Trends, London: Alliance Publishing Trust, 2009. 26 Ibid. Chris Allen, ‘Anti-Social Networking: Findings From a Pilot Study on Opposing Dudley Mosque Using Facebook Groups as Both Site and Method for Research.’ SAGE Open 4 (2014). doi:10.1177/2158244014522074 Accessed on 25/09/2016 Chris Allen, “Stop Dudley Super Mosque and Islamic Village”: overview of the findings from a pilot study’ in D. Enstedt, G. Larsson, and E. Pace, eds., Religion and Internet, Leiden: Brill: 2015. Chris Allen, ‘Facebook as anti-social media: using Facebook groups to engage opponents to the building of Dudley Mosque’ in, S. Cheruvallil-Contractor & S. Shakkour, eds., Digital Methodologies in the Sociology of Religion, London: Bloomsbury, 2015. 27 Julian Hargreaves, ‘Half a Story? Missing Perspectives in the Criminological Accounts of British Muslim Communities, Crime and the Criminal Justice System’, British Journal of Criminology, Vol., 55, no. 1, 2015, pp. 19–38. doi:10.1093/bjc/azu091. Accessed on 14/04/2017 28 Chris Allen and Jorgen S. Nielsen, Islamophobia in the EU, op. cit. 29 Fundamental Rights Agency, Data in Focus Report: Muslims, Vienna: European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2009. 30 Chris Allen, Islamophobia, op. cit. 31 Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia, Islamophobia: A Challenge for Us All; Report of the Runnymede Trust Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia, London: The Runnymede Trust, 1997. 32 Andrew Shyrock, Islamophobia/Islamophilia: Beyond the Politics of Enemy and Friend, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010. Submitted to the Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs for consideration of publication. 33 Abdool Karim Vakil, ‘Who’s Afraid of Islamophobia?’ in Thinking Through Islamophobia: Global Perspectives, Salman Sayyid and Vakil Abdoolkarim, eds., London: C. Hurst & Co Publishers, 2010. 34 Brian Klug, ‘Isamophobia: A Concept Comes of Age’, Ethnicities, Vol. 12, no. 5, 2012, pp. 665– 81. doi:10.1177/1468796812450363. Accessed on 26/01/2017 35 Leon Moosavi, ‘Orientalism at Home: Islamophobia in the Representations of Islam and Muslims by the New Labour Government’, Ethnicities, 2014. doi:10.1177/1468796814525379. Accessed on 26/09/2016 36 Chris Allen, Islamophobia, op. cit. 37 Stephen Sheehi, Islamophobia: The Ideological Campaign against Muslims, Atlanta, GA: Clarity Press, 2011. 38 Nathan Lean, The Islamophobia Industry: How the Right Manufactures Fear of Muslims, London: Pluto Press, 2012. 39 Raymond Taras, Xenophobia and Islamophobia in Europe, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2012. 40 David Tyrer, The Politics of Islamophobia: Race, Power and Fantasy, United Kingdom: Pluto Press, 2013. 41 Irene Zempi and Neil Chakraborti, Islamophobia, Victimisation and the Veil, London: Palgrave Pivot, 2014. 42 James Carr, Experiences of Islamophobia: Living with racism in the neoliberal era, London: Routledge, 2015. 43 Chris Allen, Islamophobia, op. cit. 44 Stephen Sheehi, Islamophobia: The Ideological Campaign against Muslims, Atlanta, GA: Clarity Press, 2011. 45 Chris Allen, ‘Between Critical and Uncritical Understandings: A Case Study Analyzing the Claims of Islamophobia Made in the Context of the Proposed “Super-Mosque” in Dudley, England’, Societies, Vol. 3, no. 2, 2013, pp. 186–203. doi:10.3390/soc3020186. Accessed on 26/01/2017 46 Simon Clarke, Social Theory, Psychoanalysis and Racism, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003. 47 Chris Allen, Islamophobia, op. cit. 48 Ibid. 49 Ibid. Submitted to the Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs for consideration of publication. 50 AbdoolKarim Vakil, ‘Who’s Afraid of Islamophobia?’ in Thinking Through Islamophobia: Global Perspectives, edited by Professor Salman Sayyid and Abdoolkarim Vakil, London: C. Hurst & Co. Publishers, 2010. 51 National Counter Terrorism Security Office, Counter Terrorism Protective Security Advice for Places of Worship, London: National Counter Terrorism Security Office, 2011. 52 Chris Allen and Jorgen S. Nielsen, Islamophobia in the EU, op. cit.. 53 Ibid. 54 Chris Allen, Arshad Isakjee, and Ozlem Young, ‘Maybe We Are Hated’: The Experience and Impact of Anti-Muslim Hate on British Muslim Women, Birmingham: University of Birmingham, 2013. 55 Kenan Malik, Transcript of Kenan Malik’s Film “Are Muslims Hated?, 2005. http://www.kenanmalik.com/tv/c4_islamophobia.html. Accessed on 12/12/2016 56 BBC News, ‘Guard Dumped Pigs’ Heads at Mosque’, BBC England, 6 August 2002. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/2176553.stm. 57 Gazette. ‘Mosque Pig Head Attack “shock”’, 15 November 2014. http://www.blackpoolgazette.co.uk/news/crime/mosque-pig-head-attack-shock-1-6955038. Accessed on 04/04/2015 58 Richard Hartley-Parkinson, ‘Racist Ex-Soldier Who Stuck a Pig’s Head to Mosque Gates in “Revenge” for Extremists Burning Poppies Is Jailed for Four Months’, Daily Mail, 30 August 2012. http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2195840/Racist-ex-soldier-stuck-pigs-head- mosque-gates-revenge-extremists-burning-poppies-jailed-months.html. Accessed on 04/04/2015 59 Rachel Flint, ‘Ellesmere Port Man Arrested after Pig’s Head Placed Outside Islamic Centre’, Chester Chronicle. 23 October 2014. http://www.chesterchronicle.co.uk/news/chester-cheshire- news/ellesmere-port-man-arrested-after-7985814. Accessed on 04/04/2015 60 Chris Allen, "Exploring the Impact of Islamophobia on Visible Muslim Women Victims: A British Case Study", Journal of Muslims in Europe, Vol. 3, no. 2, 2014, pp. 137-159. Chris Allen, "‘People hate you because of the way you dress’ Understanding the invisible experiences of veiled British Muslim women victims of Islamophobia", International Review of Victimology, Vol. 21, no. 3. 2015, pp. 287-301. 61 Chris Allen, Islamophobia. op. cit. 62 Nico Landman and Wendy Wessels, ‘The Visibility of Mosques in Dutch Towns’, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, Vol. 31, no. 6, 2005, pp. 1125–40. doi:10.1080/13691830500282725. Accessed on 26/01/2017 http://www.kenanmalik.com/tv/c4_islamophobia.html http://www.blackpoolgazette.co.uk/news/crime/mosque-pig-head-attack-shock-1-6955038 http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2195840/Racist-ex-soldier-stuck-pigs-head-mosque-gates-revenge-extremists-burning-poppies-jailed-months.html http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2195840/Racist-ex-soldier-stuck-pigs-head-mosque-gates-revenge-extremists-burning-poppies-jailed-months.html http://www.chesterchronicle.co.uk/news/chester-cheshire-news/ellesmere-port-man-arrested-after-7985814 http://www.chesterchronicle.co.uk/news/chester-cheshire-news/ellesmere-port-man-arrested-after-7985814 Submitted to the Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs for consideration of publication. 63 Seán McLoughlin, ‘Mosques and the Public Space: Conflict and Cooperation in Bradford’, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, Vol. 31, no. 6, 2005, pp. 1045–66. doi:10.1080/13691830500282832. Accessed on 12/01/2017 64 Chantal Saint-Blancat and Ottavia Schmidt di Friedberg, ‘Why Are Mosques a Problem? Local Politics and Fear of Islam in Northern Italy’, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, Vol. 31, no. 6, 2005, pp. 1083–1104. doi:10.1080/13691830500282881. Accessed on 26/01/2017 65 Ibid., p. 1092 66 Marcel Stüssi, ‘Banning of Minarets: Addressing the Validity of a Controversial Swiss Popular Initiative’, Religion & Human Rights, Vol. 3, no. 2, 2008, pp. 135–53. doi:10.1163/187103208x347376. Accessed on 26/01/2017 67 Gerdien Jonker, ‘The Mevlana Mosque in Berlin-Kreuzberg: An Unsolved Conflict’, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, Vol. 31, no. 6, 2005, pp. 1067–81. doi:10.1080/13691830500282683. Accessed on 14/12/2016 68 Ibid. 69 Ibid. 70 Chris Allen, Islamophobia. op. cit. 71 Nilüfer Göle, ‘The Public Visibility of Islam and European Politics of Resentment: The Minarets- Mosques Debate’, Philosophy & Social Criticism, Vol. 37, no. 4, 2011, pp. 383–92. doi:10.1177/0191453711398773. Accessed on 12/12/2016 
work_z73bamsi6zbslf26ffoejt3stu	----	Final Report: Empirical Assessment of Domestic Radicalization (EADR) The author(s) shown below used Federal funding provided by the U.S. Department of Justice to prepare the following resource: Document Title: Final Report: Empirical Assessment of Domestic Radicalization (EADR) Author(s): Michael Jensen, Ph.D., Gary LaFree, Ph.D. Document Number: 250481 Date Received: December 2016 Award Number: 2012-ZA-BX-0005 This resource has not been published by the U.S. Department of Justice. This resource is being made publically available through the Office of Justice Programs’ National Criminal Justice Reference Service. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. Final Report: Empirical Assessment of Domestic Radicalization (EADR) Report to the National Institute of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice Principal Investigator: Michael Jensen, Ph.D. Co-Principal Investigator: Gary LaFree, Ph.D. Project Manager: Patrick A. James, M.A. Project Researchers: Anita Atwell-Seate, Ph.D. Daniela Pisoiu, Ph.D. John Stevenson, Ph.D. Herbert Tinsley, M.A. Grant Manager: John Picarelli, Ph.D. December 2016 This resource was prepared by the author(s) using Federal funds provided by the U.S. Department of Justice. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice 2 About This Report This report is part of the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) project, “Empirical Assessment of Domestic Radicalization (EADR),” led by Michael Jensen, START, University of Maryland. All questions about this report should be sent to: majensen@umd.edu. This project was supported by Award No. 2012-ZA-BX-0005, awarded by the National Institute of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice. The opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this publication are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect those of the Department of Justice. About START The National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) is supported in part by the Science and Technology Directorate of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security through a Center of Excellence program led by the University of Maryland. START uses state-of-the-art theories, methods and data from the social and behavioral sciences to improve understanding of the origins, dynamics and social and psychological impacts of terrorism. For more information, contact START at infostart@start.umd.edu or visit www.start.umd.edu. Acknowledgements For helpful comments/assistance on the project, the authors thank Gary Ackerman, William Braniff, Peter Henne, Omi Hodwitz, John Kennedy, Richard Magill, John Picarelli, Charles Ragin, Aaron Safer-Lichtenstein, John Sawyer, Anna Tan and NIJ’s reviewers. The authors would also like to acknowledge the data collection contributions of Bria Ballard, Erin Copland, Sara Shirvan, and START’s student interns. This resource was prepared by the author(s) using Federal funds provided by the U.S. Department of Justice. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice http:www.start.umd.edu. mailto:infostart@start.umd.edu mailto:be sent to: majensen@umd.edu 3 Contents About This Report ....................................................................................................................................................2 About START...............................................................................................................................................................2 .....................................................................................................................................4 Acknowledgements..................................................................................................................................................2 List of Tables and Figures Executive Summary .................................................................................................................................................5 Project Overview.......................................................................................................................................................7 Project Design and Data Collection Methods ...........................................................................................8 Data Analysis.......................................................................................................................................................12 Project Findings......................................................................................................................................................14 Part I: Ideological Comparisons..................................................................................................................15 Problem statement.......................................................................................................................................15 Descriptive comparison of ideological groups.................................................................................15 Implications ....................................................................................................................................................24 Part II: Explaining Violent Extremism......................................................................................................27 Problem Statement ......................................................................................................................................27 Theoretical rationale...................................................................................................................................28 Methodology ...................................................................................................................................................31 Structure of the Dependent Variable ...................................................................................................31 Structure of the Independent Variables .............................................................................................32 Control Variables ..........................................................................................................................................35 Missing Data Techniques...........................................................................................................................36 Empirical Results and Discussion..........................................................................................................38 Part III: Radicalization Pathways ...............................................................................................................46 Problem Statement ......................................................................................................................................46 Theoretical Rationale..................................................................................................................................46 Conceptual Constructs................................................................................................................................49 Methodology ...................................................................................................................................................53 Results ...............................................................................................................................................................62 Discussion........................................................................................................................................................70 Implications for CVE....................................................................................................................................73 Implications for Criminal Justice Policy in the United States .............................................................74 Suggestions for Future Research ....................................................................................................................77 Appendices ...............................................................................................................................................................79 Appendix 1: Rates of missingness for variables in logistic regression models......................79 Appendix 2: Missing data techniques for quantitative analysis ...................................................80 Appendix 3: Bivariate correlations between variables in logistic regression model..........83 Appendix 4: Regression model for cases 2000-2015 ........................................................................85 Appendix 5: Regression model excluding environmental and animal rights extremists ..86 Appendix 6: Case Membership in Solution Paths................................................................................87 Appendix 7: Qualitative codebook.............................................................................................................91 Appendix 8: Case Membership in Solution Paths – raw data...................................................... 100 Appendix 9: Raw data for fs/QCA analysis.......................................................................................... 101 References ............................................................................................................................................................. 102 This resource was prepared by the author(s) using Federal funds provided by the U.S. Department of Justice. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice 4 List of Tables and Figures Table 1 - Age of individuals in PIRUS............................................................................................................16 Table 2 - Gender of individuals in PIRUS.....................................................................................................17 Table 3 - Education level of individuals in PIRUS....................................................................................17 Table 4 - Adulthood socioeconomic stratum of individuals in PIRUS............................................17 Table 5 - Immigrant status of individuals in PIRUS................................................................................18 Table 6 - Type of group membership of individuals in PIRUS...........................................................19 Table 7 - Evidence of group competition for individuals in groups in PIRUS.............................19 Table 8 - Clique membership for individuals in PIRUS .........................................................................20 Table 9 - Prison radicalization of individuals in PIRUS.........................................................................20 Table 10 - The duration of radicalization of individuals in PIRUS ...................................................21 Table 11 - United States military status of individuals in PIRUS......................................................21 Table 12 - Evidence of history of abuse as a minor for individuals in PIRUS..............................23 Table 13 - Evidence of history of abuse as an adult for individuals in PIRUS .............................23 Table 14 - Evidence of mental illness for individuals in PIRUS.........................................................23 Table 15 - Evidence of alcohol/drug abuse for individuals in PIRUS.............................................24 Table 16 - History of criminal activity for individuals in PIRUS .......................................................24 Table 17 - Structure of independent variable ...........................................................................................34 Table 18 - Structure of control variables.....................................................................................................37 Table 19 - Multivariate regression model...................................................................................................40 Table 20 - Regression models: comparison of missing data strategies .........................................44 Table 21 - Conceptual constructs ...................................................................................................................50 Table 22 - Descriptive statistics of conceptual constructs ..................................................................55 Table 23 - fs/QCA calibration scheme ..........................................................................................................63 Table 24 - Tests for necessity...........................................................................................................................65 Table 25 - Results of truth table......................................................................................................................68 Table 26 - Robustness tests...............................................................................................................................70 Table 27 - Overview of missing data strategies........................................................................................82 Figure 1 - Necessary and "near" necessary conditions .........................................................................56 Figure 2 - Sufficient and "near" sufficient conditions ............................................................................57 Figure 3 - Necessary condition test for cognitive frame alignment.................................................66 Figure 4 - Necessary condition test for community crisis ...................................................................66 This resource was prepared by the author(s) using Federal funds provided by the U.S. Department of Justice. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice 5 Executive Summary The Empirical Assessment of Domestic Radicalization (EADR) project uses a mixed- method, nested approach to explore a number of key research questions related to radicalization, including: • what are the demographic, background, and radicalization differences between and within the different ideological milieus? • are there important contextual, personal, ideological, or experiential differences between radicals who commit violent acts and those who do not? • is it possible to identify sufficient pathways to violent extremism? and; • are the causal mechanisms highlighted by extant theories of radicalization supported by empirical evidence? To address these questions, EADR researchers built the largest known database on individual radicalization in the United States: Profiles of Individual Radicalization in the United States (PIRUS). The database includes 147 variables covering demographic, background, group affiliation, and ideological information for 1,473 violent and non-violent extremists from across the ideological spectrum. The database was analyzed using comparative descriptive statistics and multivariate logistic regression techniques. Additionally, project researchers produced 56 life-course narratives of individuals who radicalized in the U.S., which were analyzed using fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (fs/QCA), a methodology that makes it possible to determine the causal conditions and pathways that are most salient for explaining radicalization to violence. EADR produced a number of findings that are relevant for domestic countering violent extremism (CVE) programs, law enforcement, criminal justice policy, and academic research. First, a descriptive comparison of individuals in the PIRUS data shows that with the exception of participation in pre-radicalization criminal activities, many regularly highlighted radicalization warning indicators, such as economic deprivation and low educational attainment, are not more common among extremists than they are for the general population. CVE programs designed to address feelings of relative deprivation may be ineffective in many cases. The results also indicate that it is important to consider age and gender when designing prevention and intervention programs as a part of domestic CVE efforts. Programs designed for juveniles and men may be ineffective for preventing radicalization among older individuals, who are especially prevalent among the far right and single-issue milieus, and women, who are found in large numbers on the far left. In addition to addressing issues of age and gender, intervention programs should look to take advantage of the comparatively long radicalization durations that exist across the ideological spectrum, which often last several months or years, and they should target the face-to-face and virtual social networks that mobilize lone and group-based extremists to act. This resource was prepared by the author(s) using Federal funds provided by the U.S. Department of Justice. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice 6 Second, through a set of robust statistical models, the project identified a number of factors that indicate which extremists are most likely to engage in violent acts. All other things held constant, pre-radicalization criminal activity and post-radicalization clique membership are strongly associated with violent outcomes among radicalized individuals. To the extent that law-enforcement agencies and CVE programs prioritize potentially violent individuals over others when resources are constrained, this finding suggests that their focus should be placed on individuals with prior interactions with the criminal justice system and those who are known to associate with others holding extreme views. Other factors uncovered by this analysis suggest that individuals on the far right and those motivated by Salafi jihadist ideologies are more likely to engage in violence, while those with stable employment histories and those motivated by animal rights and environmental concerns are significantly less likely to do so. Lastly, EADR reveals that psychological, emotional, material, and group-based factors can combine in complex ways to produce many pathways to violent extremism. Social and behavioral indicators of radicalization are embedded in complex processes that unfold in non-linear ways. Using fs/QCA techniques, the project reveals that both a sense of community victimization and a radical shift in individuals’ cognitive frames are necessary conditions for radicalization to violent extremism. These necessary conditions combine with a host of other factors to produce eight sufficient pathways to violent extremism. Of these, the majority are driven by psychological and emotional vulnerabilities that stem from lost significance, personal trauma, and collective crises. These findings suggest that successful CVE programs and counter-narratives need to address feelings of community victimization in ways that challenge myths and misperceptions, but also acknowledge legitimate grievances. Programs that place an undue focus on particular communities are likely to be counterproductive by exasperating feelings of collective victimization. Successful programs, on the other hand, will be tailored to specific ideological groups and sub-groups, and will address the underlying psychological and emotional vulnerabilities that make individuals open to extremist narratives. The results of the EADR project lend good support to radicalization mechanisms that are based on personal and collective psychology. That said, our analysis failed to account for the radicalization pathways of 15 of 35 cases of violent extremism that were analyzed, which indicates that extant radicalization research does not account for all of the causal conditions that can contribute to radicalization processes. Future research efforts should focus on interviews with extremists and panel surveys of at-risk populations in order to identify these missing conditions. Doing so will also allow researchers to more closely chart how attitudinal and behavioral traits change over-time. The results of these efforts should be used to inform domestic CVE efforts, especially when it comes to program design and evaluation. CVE programs are only likely to succeed if they reflect an empirical understanding of the myriad causes of radicalization and its consequences. This resource was prepared by the author(s) using Federal funds provided by the U.S. Department of Justice. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice 7 Project Overview Despite more than a decade of intense interest in the issue of radicalization, there remains weak empirical grounding for our current understanding of the structures and processes by which some individuals come to adopt extremist ideologies and engage in ideologically motivated violence (Borum 2011; Horgan 2008; Neumann and Kleinmann 2013).1 Extant research on radicalization has been marred by limitations in scope (i.e., only focusing on radical Islamists, for example [Borum 2011]), a lack of empirical data, and insufficient variation on the dependent variable (i.e., only studying those individuals who successfully commit violent acts) to explain radicalization processes (Gill 2015; Borum 2011). Renewed policy interest in radicalization makes it crucially important to address these shortcomings and to ensure that future research efforts are based on rich data and rigorous methods. The purpose of the Empirical Assessment of Domestic Radicalization (EADR) project is to advance an empirical foundation for understanding radicalization to violent extremism in the United States. EADR pursues this by collecting quantitative and qualitative data on the phenomenon, and by using statistical and qualitative methods to assess the explanatory capabilities of the causal mechanisms that are highlighted by extant theories of radicalization. In particular, the EADR project addresses several key questions related to radicalization, including: • what are the demographic, background, and radicalization differences between and within the different ideological milieus? • are there important contextual, personal, ideological, or experiential differences between radicals who commit violent acts and those who do not? • is it possible to identify sufficient pathways to violent extremism? and; • are the causal mechanisms highlighted by extant theories of radicalization supported by empirical evidence? These questions are addressed in more detail in the findings sections below. As a part of the EADR project, the research team built the largest known database on individual radicalization in the United States: Profiles of Individual Radicalization in the United States (PIRUS). The database, which includes demographic, background, group affiliation, and ideological information on 1,473 individuals, can serve as a foundation for future empirical work on radicalization, and act as a tool by which public officials, law enforcement, community organizers, news media, and the general public come to better understand how individuals radicalize to the point of engaging in illegal behaviors. The next section of the report details the project design and data collection methods that were used over the course of the project. This section describes how the PIRUS database was constructed and it provides definitions of key terms. The next section gives a brief overview of the analysis techniques that were utilized, including short descriptions of the 1 This is a shortcoming of terrorism research in general. See Lum et al. 2006. This resource was prepared by the author(s) using Federal funds provided by the U.S. Department of Justice. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice 8 quantitative and qualitative techniques that were used. Each of the next three sections detail findings from the project that directly address the research questions noted above. These sections provide further details about the particular methods that were used to answer each question and they detail the policy implications of the findings. The next section provides a short discussion of the implications of the project for criminal justice policy in the United States. The final section addresses the limitations of the current study and provides suggestions for future research. Project Design and Data Collection Methods This project seeks to address the shortcomings in extant research on radicalization by using a mixed-method, nested approach that analyzes rich large-N and qualitative data in an integrated fashion. The advantage of this approach is that it allows for the detailed study of generalizable causal processes and mechanisms across cases (McCauley and Moskalenko 2008) in addition to the standard statistical analysis (e.g. multivariate regression analysis) of individual casual factors (Lieberman 2005). This is particularly important for research on radicalization which is increasingly being understood as complex processes driven by multiple causal factors (Horgan 2008; Borum 2011).2 The nested approach adopted for this project used preliminary results from the statistical tests to help inform case selection and analysis using a number of selection criteria to insure a diverse sample of cases, a method best suited for hypothesis testing and exploratory analysis (Seawright and Gerring 2008). The qualitative findings were then linked back to the quantitative results, providing a conceptual framework of the mechanisms and pathways through which the indicators derived from the statistical models can be interpreted. For the purposes of the EADR project, radicalization is defined as the psychological, emotional, and behavioral processes by which an individual or group adopts an ideology that promotes the use of violence for the attainment of political, economic, religious, or social goals. We treat as violent extremism those acts that intend to kill or injure in pursuit of political, economic, religious, or social goals. Given the dearth of empirical data on radicalization, this project entailed significant quantitative and qualitative data collection efforts. To facilitate these analyses, the project team used publically available sources to build a cross-sectional dataset of attributes for 1,473 individuals who radicalized in the United States to the point of violent or non-violent ideologically motivated criminal activity, or ideologically motivated association with a foreign or domestic extremist organization. The PIRUS database includes 147 variable fields that contain detailed information on the individuals’ criminal activities and/or violent plots, their relationships with extremist groups, their radicalization processes, their attachment to ideological milieus, and their demographic characteristics and personal histories. Sources referenced include: newspaper articles, websites (e.g., government, terrorist group, watchdog groups, research institutes, personal information finder sites), secondary datasets, peer-reviewed academic 2 On multiple conjunctural causation, see Ragin 1987. This resource was prepared by the author(s) using Federal funds provided by the U.S. Department of Justice. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice 9 articles, journalistic accounts including books and documentaries, court records, police reports, witness transcribed interviews, psychological evaluations/reports, and information credited to the individual being researched (verified personal websites, autobiographies, social media accounts). Unlike some radicalization studies that focus on specific ideological groups (Borum 2011), the PIRUS data include domestic extremist individuals from across the spectrum of radical ideologies in the United States. Broadly categorized, those ideologies are Islamist, far right, far left, and single issue. Islamist. We recognize that the terms “Islamist”, “jihadism”, and “jihadist” are applied inconsistently in both academic and policy circles, and can imply a wide range of meanings based on the context in which they are used.3 For this project, we use the broad term “Islamist” in reference to the religio-political methodology practiced by Sunni Islamist- Salafists who seek the immediate overthrow of incumbent regimes, and the non-Muslim geopolitical forces which support them, in order to pave the way for an Islamist society which would be developed through martial power. Although there are a number of Islamist-Salafist thinkers who do not advocate for violent military strategies to achieve their goals (e.g., Muhammad Nasiruddin al-Albani), in the U.S. context, the individuals we classify as “Islamists” are most commonly connected to, or inspired by, violent Islamist- Salafist groups that have their roots in the onset of “global jihadism” of the 1980s, including al-Qaeda and its affiliated movements (Sadowski 2006). There are a number of ideological tenets commonly elaborated by Islamist-Salafist groups, including the imposition of shari’a with violent jihad as a central component, the creation of an expansionist Islamic state, or khalifa, and the use of local, national, and international grievances affecting Muslims, which are aired in an overtly religious context (Simcox and Dyer 2013; Hoffman 2006; Mogahadam 2016). Far right. There exists a broad range of far right beliefs and actors (often overlapping movements), including both reactionary and revolutionary justifications of violence (George and Wilcox 1996). In its modern manifestation in the United States, the ideology of the far right is generally exclusivist and favors social hierarchy, seeking an idealized future favoring a particular group, whether that group identity is racial, pseudo-national (e.g., the Texas Republic) or characterized by individualistic traits (e.g., survivalists) (Chermak, Freilich, and Suttmoeller 2013; Simi and Bubolz forthcoming). The extremist far right commonly shows antipathy to the political left and the federal government. As a result of this heterodoxy, this category includes radical individuals linked to extremist religious groups (e.g., Identity Christians), non-religious racial supremacists (e.g., Creativity Movement, National Alliance), tax protesters, sovereign citizens, militias, and militant gun rights advocates. 3 For a thorough review of the challenges in defining these terms, see Sedgwick 2015. This resource was prepared by the author(s) using Federal funds provided by the U.S. Department of Justice. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice 10 Far left. The far left in the United States is essentially class-oriented and consists primarily of individuals and groups that adhere to belief systems based on egalitarianism and the mobilization of disenfranchised segments of the population (George and Wilcox 1996). With roots in the leftist student movement and radical prison reform movement of the late 1960s, traditional far left extremists generally sought the overthrow of the capitalist system, including the United States government, in order to replace it with a new, anti- imperialist economic order that empowers members of the “working class” (Smith 1994). The traditional left included groups that maintained a distinct racial identity (e.g., Black Panther Party), which were motivated by a mix of economic grievances and race-based issues. Today, the far left is more commonly identified by followers of animal-rights and environmental protection issues. While not all animal rights or environmental groups are inherently leftist in orientation (for instance, there are Green Fascists), the vast majority of these individuals and groups identify with leftist political positions and have thus been included in the far left category for the purposes of this project. Single issue. Single issue extremists are individuals who are motivated primarily by a single issue, rather than a broad ideology. Examples in the PIRUS data of single issue extremists are individuals associated with the Puerto Rican independence movement, anti- abortion extremists that were not motivated by traditional far right issues (anti- government, race superiority, etc.), members of the Jewish Defense League, and extremists with idiosyncratic ideologies (e.g., Ted Kaczynski). Data collection and coding for the quantitative portion of the project occurred in several stages. First, starting in January 2013, researchers used open-sources and extant START research products to collect a list of names and preliminary background information on approximately 3,900 individuals from various ideological milieus and time frames for possible inclusion in the dataset. Second, starting in June 2013, researchers coded each of these observations to determine whether the individuals should be included in the dataset based on the following set of inclusion criteria: • The individual met all three of the following: o The individual radicalized in the United States; o The individual espoused ideological motives; and o The individual engaged in ideologically motivated acts. • The individual also met one of the following five criteria: o The individual was arrested; o The individual was indicted for a crime; o The individual was killed as a result of his or her ideological activities; o The individual is/was a member of a designated terrorist organization; or o The individual was associated with an organization whose leader(s) or founder(s) has/have been indicted of an ideologically motivated violent offense. This resource was prepared by the author(s) using Federal funds provided by the U.S. Department of Justice. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice 11 Third, also starting in June 2013, researchers coded the relevant background, contextual, and ideological information on a random sample of individuals who were selected for inclusion in the dataset. Random sampling techniques were used to ensure that the database is representative of radicalization in the U.S. at all points in time that are covered by the project (1945 to 2013).4 The criteria coding and full coding stages occurred in multiple waves taking place in summer 2013, fall 2013, and spring 2014, thereby producing sub-sets of fully coded data that allowed for preliminary analysis in the initial phases of the project (see, for example, Jensen, James, and Tinsley 2015). Criteria evaluation continued throughout the life of the project and eventually yielded 1,473 individuals for inclusion in the final dataset. Coders double-coded approximately 10% of the individuals in the data to allow for iterative reliability tests of the coding instrument for each stage of the coding process. Researchers used the Krippendorf’s alpha procedure to test for inter-rater reliability across the double-coded cases (Krippendorf and Hayes 2007). The score for the first wave was 0.68, the score for the second wave was 0.73, and the score for the third wave was 0.76. As a standard for acceptable reliability is 0.7, these scores indicate that the data is reliable and that the coding procedure improved between the three waves of full-coding. Moreover, to ensure overall quality of the data, project researchers systematically reviewed and cleaned the data in fall 2014 and spring 2015. In the initial data collection phase of the project, researchers adopted a systematic approach to handling missing data. Whenever information for a particular variable was not presented in the sources, coders were instructed to treat the information as missing, even if strong logical arguments could be made for treating the values as “No” or “0”.5 In these cases, coders assigned a missing value code of “-99”, or “-88” if the observation was not logically possible (e.g., group-relevant variables when the individual was a lone actor). Only when there was confirmation in sources that the accurate variable value is “No” or “0” did researchers code the value as such. While this approach ensures against the unlikely possibility of erroneously coding values as absent, it also produces high rates of missingness for many variables. High percentages of missing data can render statistical tests more difficult, so the research team adopted several strategies to mitigate the challenges posed by missing data, including fixed-value and expected maximization imputation (King et al. 2001). A detailed discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of the various techniques for handling missing data is found in later sections of the report. Finally, data collection and coding for the qualitative portion of the project began in summer 2013. Using a nested analysis approach, researchers selected 56 individuals from the first two waves of full coding to be subjects of the life-histories based on three factors: 4 While every effort was made to ensure the representativeness of the data, it is important to note that given our reliance on open-sources, the sample likely reflects news reporting trends over time. That is, as reporters shift their focus over time from one ideology or movement to another, it becomes increasingly easier to identify individuals who are associated with the groups that are under intense media scrutiny, and increasingly harder to identify those who are not. Thus, the post-9/11 period in the PIRUS data is likely over-representative of Islamist extremists. 5 A strong case could be made for coding values as “No” or “0” when no information is found for variables that are typically well-documented, such as military service, marriage, or children. This resource was prepared by the author(s) using Federal funds provided by the U.S. Department of Justice. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice 12 the availability of critical information related to their backgrounds and activities in public sources; their participation as a member of a group or movement representing the far left, far right, or radical Islamist ideological milieus; and their status as most-likely or least- likely cases (Eckstein 1975; George and Bennett 2005) for extant theories of radicalization. This last case selection criterion is explained further in the case selection section of the report. Adopting a uniform template to allow for comparison across cases, researchers completed the life-course histories by fall 2014. Starting in fall 2014, researchers developed a codebook representing five core radicalization research programs: psychological models (Kruglanski et al. 2009; Kruglanski et al. 2014), social identity theory (Hogg 2001; Hogg and Terry 2000; Hogg and Adelman 2013; McCauley 1989; Borum 2011), recruitment theory (Gerwehr and Daly 2006; Borum 2011), social movement theory (Tarrow 2011; Wiktorowicz 2004; Gerwehr and Daly 2006; Borum 2011; Cross and Snow 2011), and cost/benefit theory (Crenshaw 1987; McCormick 2003; Maxwell Taylor and Quayle 1995; Roy 2004; Horgan 2008; Pisoiu 2011). The codebook is organized by core causal mechanisms, which when taken together represent the various radicalization processes proposed by each theory. Using MAXQDA data analysis software, coders evaluated the life- course histories and applied the relevant codes to instances in the text where the indicators are apparent. All life-course histories were double-coded to ensure reliability, and then cleaned, reviewed, and verified by the project researchers. Data Analysis The analyses of these data involved the use of statistical and qualitative methods, which will be described in detail in later sections of the report. The statistical investigations of the PIRUS database seek to explore similarities and differences among key individual characteristics across the ideological spectrum and to establish which conceptual components derived from theories of criminology reliably explain shifts from non-violent to violent extremism. Researchers relied upon comparative descriptive statistics and multivariate logistic regression modeling to address those questions, respectively. Given the nature of the data and collection methods, a number of variables in the PIRUS database, particularly those representing private and sensitive information, show non-trivial amounts of missing data. After extensive review, the research team used several methods for dealing with missing data, including variable reconstruction, regression-based multiple imputation (Tsikriktsis 2005; Musil et al. 2002), and expected maximization imputation (G. King et al. 2001; Tsikriktsis 2005). Techniques for managing missing data are further explained in Appendix 2. The data collected from the qualitative life-course narratives were analyzed using fuzzy set/qualitative comparative analysis (fs/QCA) (Ragin 2000; Ragin 2008; Schneider and Wagemann 2012), which allowed for the appraisal of radicalization mechanisms and made it possible to determine the causal conditions and pathways that are most salient for explaining radicalization to violence. Set theory methods are an especially useful way of This resource was prepared by the author(s) using Federal funds provided by the U.S. Department of Justice. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice 13 analyzing radicalization because they were designed to deal with causal complexity, such as multiple pathways and non-linear causation, and they rely on the use of data where the main outcome of interest does not vary across the cases (i.e. all individuals radicalized) (Schneider and Wagemann 2012). Using fs/QCA it is possible to establish the universe of radicalization pathways among all the cases in our sample, as well as the causal conditions along those pathways that represent critical junctures in individuals’ radicalization trajectories. This resource was prepared by the author(s) using Federal funds provided by the U.S. Department of Justice. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice 14 Project Findings The findings of this project help to answer the four research questions that are described above. More specifically, a descriptive comparison of the individuals in the PIRUS database show how the four main ideological groups that are common in the U.S. are similar or different on a number of key points, including demographics, group involvement, and background characteristics. The insights generated from these findings not only provide a baseline empirical understanding of extremism in the U.S., they also inform policies on countering violent extremism (CVE), which currently are tailored to addressing the needs of at-risk individuals who may be susceptible to Islamist radicalization, but fail to equally consider extremism on the far right and far left (Schanzer et al. 2016). Similarly, the results from the statistical tests reveal which variables and theoretical perspectives are the best at explaining violent behaviors among radicalized individuals. These findings are important for policy makers that seek to counter radicalization and illegal extremist activities, including law enforcement agents who need empirically informed information on how best to allocate scarce resources (Freilich and Chermak 2009). Finally, the findings from the fs/QCA analysis show how the behavioral, social, and structural indicators from the statistical tests are related to underlying psychological emotional, material, and group conditions, all of which combine in various ways to make- up major pathways to violent extremism. These results make it clear that efforts to prevent radicalization to violence will only succeed if they take seriously the cognitive and emotional factors that mobilize individuals to engage in violent forms of political activism. This resource was prepared by the author(s) using Federal funds provided by the U.S. Department of Justice. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice 15 Part I: Ideological Comparisons Problem statement Extent research has failed to rigorously compare Islamist, far right, far left, and other extremist movements despite prima facie indications that there are important differences in the radicalization causes and processes for individuals who act across these milieus (Borum 2011). While it may be appealing to draw lessons from better-studied populations of extremists when developing policies that are primarily targeted at countering al-Qaeda, the Islamic State, or similar groups, the research team knows of no empirical effort to assess the comparability of Islamist, far right, far left or other radical ideologically-driven movements in the United States. Given the foundation in different belief systems and widely divergent behaviors that each of these ideologies encourage prior to and following their adoption of violence, this research investigates important differences in in the radicalization causes and processes of individuals across these milieus. Depending on the nature and salience of these differences, effective counter radicalization efforts might require different policies to be directed towards each movement and therefore indicate that a broad-brush approach to counter-radicalization might be less effective or even counterproductive. Descriptive comparison of ideological groups We begin with a descriptive analysis of the PIRUS database, highlighting some important differences and similarities in the characteristics and radicalization processes of individuals across the ideological spectrum. We orient our analysis on four broad ideological milieus: far right, far left, Islamist, and single issue, as we have defined above.6 We start by describing the demographic characteristics of individuals in the dataset and how they vary across different ideologies, focusing on age, gender, education level, socioeconomic status, and immigration status. Next, we turn to delineating the similarities and differences across ideological groups in terms of group involvement, group dynamics, “clique” membership, the duration of radicalization, as well as the role of prison in the radicalization process. Finally, we evaluate individuals across the ideological spectrum in terms of background characteristics and personal histories, including military experience, a history of abuse, criminal background, mental illness, and alcohol/drug abuse. Demographics Table 1 compares domestic extremists by age. On average, individuals on the far right and those motivated by a single issue tend to be significantly older at their date of public exposure than their far left or Islamist counterparts.7 However, the modal age for far right 6 The PIRUS dataset does contain variables that provide a more nuanced aggregation of the primary ideologies that motivated the individual (e.g., Far right extremists further classified by white supremacist, anti-government, militia, etc.). Those figures are available upon request. 7 By date of public exposure, we mean the date at which the individual’s radical activity first came to public attention. This usually corresponds to the individual’s arrest or plot/plot attempt, or earliest mention of the individual in publically available sources, so as long it is related to the plot/radicalization of the individual. If only the month and year are known, we default to the first day of the month. If only the year is known, we default to first day of the year. The individual’s date This resource was prepared by the author(s) using Federal funds provided by the U.S. Department of Justice. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice 16 extremists is equal to that of the modal age of the entire sample, showing a positively skewed distribution of ages among the far right. This suggests that while the majority of far right cases are still relatively young, there is a higher propensity for far right extremists to radicalize and act at an older age than for far left and Islamist extremists. Across all measures of central tendency, the far left is the youngest group, followed by Islamist cases as the second youngest. Moreover, both the far left and Islamists have relatively small standard deviations on age, suggesting that it is much less likely for individuals who subscribe to far left and Islamist ideologies to become publically exposed at older ages than it is for far right and single issue extremists.8 Ideology Age Age Age Std. Valid % (mean) (median) (mode) deviation N missing All cases 34.18 31 26 13.22 1,395 5.2% Islamist 30.08 27 25 9.76 217 2.2% Far right 37.76 36 26 14.21 611 4.7% Far left 28.21 26 22 9.17 285 5.9% S. issue 35.63 33 33 13.81 282 8.1% Table 1 - Age of individuals in PIRUS. Note: Age is defined as the age of the individual at their date of public exposure, which is the date at which the individual’s extremist activity/plot first came to public attention. Usually the time of incident or arrest or earliest mention of the individual in publically available sources, so long as these are related to the plot/radicalization of the individual. Consistent with other studies examining the role of gender among political extremists (Bloom, 2012; Freilich et al, 2014), males significantly outnumber females by a large margin in all ideological categories.There are some noteworthy differences, however, when comparing gender frequencies between groups. Shown in Table 2, nearly one-quarter of extremists on the far left are female. In contrast, females only make up approximately five percent of far right, four percent Islamist extremists, and 11 percent for single issue extremists. 9 Ideology Male (%) Female Valid N % (%) missing All cases 90% 10% 1,473 0% Islamist 95.6% 4.1% 222 0% Far right 95.3% 4.7% 641 0% Far left 75.6% 24.4% 303 0% S. issue 88.9% 11.1% 307 0% of public exposure is referenced multiple times in this report, and is a central component to the PIRUS codebook. It is referenced as the point in time at which many variables that are dynamic in nature are recorded. For example, the variable measuring the individual’s marital status uses the date of exposure as a time of reference. 8 To validate the observed differences in means, we performed Lavene’s test for equality of variances and independent- samples t-tests for each ideological comparison pair (Islamist-Far Right, Islamist-Far Left, Islamist-Single Issues, etc.). For each pairing, there was a statistically significant difference in age at date of public exposure at the p = .05 level (2-tailed test). 9 A chi-squared test was performed and a statistically significant relationship was found between ideological category and gender, Χ2 (3, N=1473) = 99.48, p = .000. This resource was prepared by the author(s) using Federal funds provided by the U.S. Department of Justice. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice 17 Table 2 - Gender of individuals in PIRUS The education levels of extremists vary considerably when compared across ideological groups. Illustrated in Table 3, our data show that individuals on the far right are less educated than other groups, with only 25.4% of valid cases holding a college degree or higher compared to the sample average of 43.3%. Individuals on the far left show the highest levels of educational achievement, with 55% of valid cases having attained a college degree or higher, followed closely by single issue extremists. Islamist extremists are near the average, with 41% holding a college degree or higher.10 Ideology Did not High Some College Valid N % finish school college degree or missing high diploma (%) higher school (%) (%) (%) All cases 15.7% 21.4% 19.6% 43.3% 547 62.9% Islamist 16.5% 23.7% 18.7% 41.1% 139 37.4% Far right 23.9% 30.3% 20.4% 25.4% 142 77.8% Far left 10.5% 13.5% 20.8% 55.2% 163 46.2% S. issue 11.7% 18.4% 17.5% 52.4% 103 66.4% Table 3 - Education level of individuals in PIRUS Note: measured by the highest level of education completed by the individual’s date of public exposure. There are some noteworthy differences and similarities in socioeconomic status when comparing Islamist, far right, far left, and single issue extremists. Table 4 shows a pattern for SES which is similar to education level and ideology: individuals on the far left are more likely to come from an economically secure background (18.9%) when compared to the far right and Islamist extremists (10.7% and 7.9%, respectively). Far right individuals, on the other hand, are the most likely to come from disadvantaged economic backgrounds at 25.3%. Despite these differences, the majority of extremists from all ideological groups were classified as having a middle-class socioeconomic background, with Islamists having the highest rate with 71.7%.11 Ideology Low SES Middle SES High SES Valid N % missing All cases 21.5% 65.4% 13.1% 670 54.5% Islamist 20.4% 71.7% 7.9% 152 31.5% Far right 25.3% 64.0% 10.7% 253 60.1% Far left 19.7% 61.4% 18.9% 132 56.4% S. issue 17.3% 64.7% 13.1% 133 56.7% Table 4 - Adulthood socioeconomic stratum of individuals in PIRUS Some significant differences exist in the generational status of individuals in the PIRUS data. By a large margin, Islamist extremists had the highest numbers of first and second 10 A chi-squared test was performed and a statistically significant relationship was found between ideological category and education level, Χ2 (9, N=1547) = 39.45, p = .000. 11 A chi-squared test was performed and a statistically significant relationship was found between ideological category and socioeconomic status as an adult, Χ2 (6, N=670) = 14.59, p = .024. This resource was prepared by the author(s) using Federal funds provided by the U.S. Department of Justice. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice http: 71.7%.11 http: higher.10 18 generation immigrants, making up 80% and 55% of all immigrants in the dataset in those categories, respectively. Furthermore, a majority of Islamist cases were either first or second generation immigrants, at 60.7%. However, this immigrant generation statistic remains roughly consistent with figures from the U.S. Muslim population at large (Pew Research Center 2011) which is majority first-generation immigrants. Individuals classified as far right have the lowest levels of first or second generation immigrant status, at 1.3% overall. Table 5 provides a breakdown of these figures.12 Ideology Not an Second First Valid N % immigrant generation generation missing immigrant immigrant All cases 88.2% 2.5% 9.2% 1421 3.5% Islamist 39.3% 9.7% 51.0% 206 7.2% Far right 98.7% .8% 0.5% 639 0.003% Far left 95.0% 3.0% 2.0% 302 0.003% S. issue 93.1% 0.7% 6.2% 274 0.1% Table 5 - Immigrant status of individuals in PIRUS. Note: An individual is classified as a second generation immigrant if one or both the individual’s parents were born outside the United States. An individual is classified as a first generation immigrant if they were born outside the United States. Extremist group involvement When comparing individuals’ membership in extremist groups across ideological milieus, some important differences stand out. Shown in Table 6, individuals classified as far left had the highest rate of affiliation with a formal extremist group (i.e. an extremist group with identifiable organizational structure, defined roles within the group, and clarity in group goals and ambitions) at 72.9%. Far right extremists also show a relatively high rate of involvement in formal extremist groups at 58.6%, but were also often associated with informal extremist groups—a classification of organization with less leadership structure or defined roles, and includes groups often referred to as ‘cells’ and small, informal militias. Individuals described as Islamists and single issue had the lowest rate of group membership overall, with 23.1% and 18.2% acting without any known group affiliation, respectively. Islamists were also the ideological milieu most likely to be associated with informal groups and least likely with formal groups. It is important to note, however, that across all ideologies, membership or affiliation with a group, extremist or otherwise, tends to be the norm. This finding supports the notion that radicalization ought to be considered as a distinctly social process, regardless of ideological preference.13 Groups advocating the same political or social causes are often in competition for the same base of sympathizers and resources, and they may escalate to increasingly violent behavior in an effort to win support (Bloom 2004; Findley and Young 2012; Biberman and Zahid 2016). 12 A chi-squared test was performed and a statistically significant relationship was found between ideological category and generational status, Χ2 (6, N=1421) = 581.94, p = .000. 13A chi-squared test was performed and a statistically significant relationship was found between ideological category and group membership status, Χ2 (9, N=1451) = 185.13, p = .000. This resource was prepared by the author(s) using Federal funds provided by the U.S. Department of Justice. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice http: ideological preference.13 http: these figures.12 Ideology No Member Member Member Valid N % identifiable of of formal of legal missing group informal group group group only All cases 14.4% 22.1% 56.9% 6.7% 1451 1.5% Islamist 23.1% 35.3% 39.8% 1.8% 221 0.004% Far right 13.3% 25.4% 58.6% 2.7% 631 0.02% Far left 6.6% 13.9% 72.9% 6.6% 303 0.0% S. issue 18.2% 13.5% 49.3% 18.9% 296 0.04% Table 6 - Type of group membership of individuals in PIRUS Note: An informal group is defined as an extremist group, often small in size, which lacks a clear hierarchical structure or defined roles. A formal group is defined as an extremist group with a clear organization structure, defined roles within the group, and clarity in group goals and ambitions. Likewise, competition within a group may lead to factionalization and polarization, heightening the risk of the formation of more extreme ‘splinter groups’ (Cronin 2011). Table 7 shows that evidence of competition within or between extremist groups over influence, power, resources, and status varied widely when investigated across groups’ ideological orientations. Of valid cases, by a large margin, far right extremist groups exhibited the highest levels of inter- and intra-group competition, at a little over 50%. By contrast, Islamist groups tended to be much more cooperative, experiencing infrequent competition between or within groups for influence or status. While significant, it should be noted that this finding may be influenced by the fact that compared to radical Islamist groups, considerably more far right groups are in open existence in the United States, thereby increasing the risk that groups fall into competition with one another.14 Ideology Group No group Valid N % missing competition competition All cases 35.8% 64.2% 542 63.2% Islamist 13.8% 86.2% 116 47.7% Far right 50.4% 49.6% 226 64.7% Far left 34.9% 65.1% 109 64.0% S. issue 28.6% 71.4% 91 70.3% Table 7 - Evidence of group competition for individuals in groups in PIRUS Note: Group competition is classified as competition within the group or with other groups for status, power, resources, or other things around the time in which the individual was a member. It is a widely held notion in the field of radicalization studies that the formation of strong social bonds between members of small, informal groups can play a pivotal role in the adoption of violence-justifying ideologies (Sageman 2008). As these informal groups, or “cliques”, form, members are more vulnerable to developing a collective identity which lowers the psychological threshold for committing violent acts for the purpose of attaining ideological goals (McCauley and Moskalenko 2008). Table 8 shows that the presence of such cliques are common for extremists across all ideologies, lending further support to the 14A chi-squared test was performed and a statistically significant relationship was found between ideological category and group competition, Χ2 (3, N=542) = 47.64, p = .000. This resource was prepared by the author(s) using Federal funds provided by the U.S. Department of Justice. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice http: fall into competition with one another.14 20 notion that radicalization is a highly social phenomenon. Individuals subscribing to far left and Islamist ideologies are members of these small, insular groups a majority of the time and at roughly the same rates. Far right extremists are also frequently members of cliques, although at a slightly lower rate. Only extremists who radicalized along a single-issue ideology were below the 50% threshold for clique membership.15 Ideology Member of a Not member Valid N % missing clique of clique All cases 55.7% 44.3% 867 41.1% Islamist 64.4% 35.6% 177 20.3% Far right 53.7% 46.3% 369 42.4% Far left 64.2% 35.8% 165 45.5% S. issue 41.7% 58.3% 156 49.2% Table 8 - Clique membership for individuals in PIRUS Note: Clique is defined as a close-knit, insular, and exclusive group of extremists containing at least two individuals. A clique can exist within a larger extremist group (e.g. a clique of operatives within al-Qaeda) and separately from an organized group such as a clique of close associates that plans an extremist act. Despite recent concerns about the radicalization of Muslims in U.S. prisons (Crabtree 2015; Cillufo, Cozzens, and Ranstorp 2010), the PIRUS data show that the occurrence of prison- based radicalization is generally low (see Hamm 2008 for similar results) and that there are not significant differences in the occurrence of prison radicalization across ideologies. Illustrated in Table 9, less than 5% of the individuals in the database radicalized, either partially or completely, while in prison. Islamists do not appear to be significantly more at risk than far right or far left extremists to adopt extremist beliefs while in prison.16 Ideology No evidence In prison, no In prison, Valid N % missing of prison time impact on some rad. impact on rad All cases 92.9% 3.1% 4.1% 1,473 0% Islamist 94.1% 0.9% 5.0% 222 0% Far right 92.2% 3.3% 4.5% 641 0% Far left 91.1% 5.0% 4.0% 303 0% S. issue 95.1% 3.1% 4.1% 307 0% Table 9 - Prison radicalization of individuals in PIRUS Note: Individuals in the category of “In prison, some impact on radicalization” include cases where the radicalization process began before but accelerated in prison, cases where radicalization began but reached higher levels after prison, and cases where radicalization began and reached its highest levels in prison. Cases with missing information on this variable were coded as “No evidence of prison time”. Measured as the duration of time between the first evidence of radicalization, either cognitively or behaviorally, to when the individual was first publically exposed as an 15 A chi-squared test was performed and a statistically significant relationship was found between ideological category and clique membership, Χ2 (3, N=867) = 23.392, p = .000. 16 A chi-squared test was performed and did not find a statistically significant relationship between ideological category and prison radicalization, Χ2 (6, N=1473) = 10.36, p = .110. This resource was prepared by the author(s) using Federal funds provided by the U.S. Department of Justice. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice http:risk than far right or far left extremists to adopt extremist beliefs while in prison.16 http:ideology were below the 50% threshold for clique membership.15 21 extremist, the duration of radicalization varies moderately when examined across ideological categories. Individuals on the far right and those motivated by a single-issue exhibit the longest duration of radicalization compared to far left and Islamist extremists, with nearly one-half of cases taking five years or more. Across all ideologies, radicalization processes taking only one year or less are relatively rare—only occurring 17.6% of the time overall. More than any other group, Islamist extremists take an intermediate amount of time to radicalize, from one to five years. A comparison of the duration of radicalization between ideological groups is found in Table 10.17 Ideology One year or One to five Five years Valid N % missing less years or more All cases 17.6% 42.7% 39.7% 597 59.6% Islamist 14.9% 61.7% 23.4% 141 36.5% Far right 21.9% 30.0% 48.1% 210 67.2% Far left 14.8% 47.7% 37.4% 58 80.8% S. issue 16.5% 34.1% 49.5% 45 85.3% Table 10 - The duration of radicalization of individuals in PIRUS Note: Duration of radicalization is defined by the amount of time between the individual’s first evidence of radicalization, either cognitively or behaviorally, and the individual’s public exposure as an extremist. Background characteristics Military service among individuals in the PIRUS dataset is somewhat uncommon overall, with only 18.8% of cases having a confirmed record of a military background, as illustrated by Table 11. That figure is driven primarily by individuals on the far right, with 29.2% having military experience. Moreover, of those with a history of military service, the majority of individuals did not undergo their radicalization until they had already left military service. This figure holds true for all ideological groups. Indeed, the PIRUS data show that only in rare circumstances do individuals adopt radical beliefs while they are still active members of the military.18 Ideology No military Yes, inactive Yes, active at Valid N % missing experience at time of time of radicalization radicalization All cases 81.2% 14.4% 4.4% 856 41.9% Islamist 89.5% 7.0% 3.5% 172 22.5% Far right 70.8% 22.3% 6.9% 305 52.4% Far left 88.7% 7.5% 3.8% 213 29.7% S. issue 81.9% 14.4% 4.4% 166 45.9% Table 11 - United States military status of individuals in PIRUS Note: Inactive at time of radicalization refers to individuals whose radicalization process began while they were no longer in active military service in the US military. Active at time of radicalization refers to individuals whose radicalization process began while they were an active service member in the US military. 17 A chi-squared test was performed and a statistically significant relationship was found between ideological category and radicalization duration, Χ2 (6, N=597) = 41.44, p = .000. 18 A chi-squared test was performed and a statistically significant relationship was found between ideological category and military status, Χ2 (6, N=856) = 41.56, p = .000. This resource was prepared by the author(s) using Federal funds provided by the U.S. Department of Justice. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice http:active members of the military.18 22 Tables 12-16 report on a number of characteristics covering the personal backgrounds and histories of individuals contained in the PIRUS dataset, specifically abuse history, mental illness19, alcohol/drug abuse, and a history of criminal activity. Table 12 and Table 13 compare rates of abuse among extremists in PIRUS, showing relatively little evidence of abuse.20 On average, 3% of individuals in PIRUS were found to have been abused as children, and even fewer were abused during adulthood. These findings stay fairly consistent across ideologies at low levels, suggesting that individuals with a history of abuse are no more likely to radicalize to one particular ideology over another.2122 The documentation of mental illness and other psychological issues are also relatively uncommon for individuals in the PIRUS data, both for the sample as a whole and for the individual ideologies.23 Seen in Table 14, the percentage of individuals with evidence of mental illness or other psychological issues reported in source materials does not rise above 10% for any specific ideological group.24 Also rare among individuals in PIRUS are documented histories of drug or alcohol abuse.25 Table 15 shows that evidence of dependency on drugs and/or alcohol are at low levels similar to mental illness. Far right extremists are the group most likely to develop drug/alcohol abuse at 10.1%, although that relatively high figure may be explained, in part, by demographic differences such as gender, age, and socioeconomic status.26 Lastly, Table 16 examines the frequency of pre- radicalization criminal histories among individuals included in the PIRUS data. Individuals on the far right displayed the highest propensity for a criminal background, with 63.1% of valid cases having some sort of criminal history. Moreover, at 25.7%, far right extremists had the highest levels of having a violent criminal past when compared with Islamist, far left, and single issue extremists. Islamist extremists were the only group to have a majority 19 For this project, clinical diagnoses or popular speculation of the following were coded as “yes” for mental illness: schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, and major depression. 20 This variable captures the presence or absence of evidence of abuse in source materials, which may not reflect actual rates of abuse among extremists. However, the rates reported here are generally in line with statistics on abuse for the U.S. population as a whole. See United States Department of Health and Human Services 2015. Furthermore, this variable records mentions of abuse in source documents that may or may not have been verified by the opinions of psychologists or medical professionals. Given the scope of this project, it was not possible to independently verify claims of abuse that were made in source materials. 21 A chi-squared test was performed and did not find a statistically significant relationship between ideological category and evidence of abuse as a child, Χ2 (3, N=1473) = 1.37, p = .771. 22 A chi-squared test was performed and a statistically significant relationship was found between ideological category and evidence of abuse as an adult, Χ2 (3, N=1473) = 8.78, p = .032. This statistically significant finding is likely driven by the lack of a single case of adulthood abuse among single issue extremists and very few for far right extremists. 23 It is important to highlight that this variable measures the presence or absence of evidence of mental health disorders in source materials and likely does not capture actual rates of mental health issues among extremists. Given that mental illness is serially under-reported in the U.S. (Takayanagi et al. 2014), actual rates of mental health disorders may be higher than what are reported here. Furthermore, this variable records mentions of mental health disorders in source documents that may or may not have been the result of clinical diagnoses. Given the scope of this project, it was not possible to independently verify claims of mental health issues that were made in source materials. 24 A chi-squared test was performed and did not find a statistically significant relationship between ideological category and evidence of mental illness, Χ2 (6, N=1473) = 6.90, p = .330. 25 This variable measures the presence or absence of evidence of substance abuse in source materials and likely does not capture actual rates of substance abuse among extremists. Furthermore, this variable records mentions of substance abuse in source documents that may or may not have been verified by medical professionals. Given the scope of this project, it was not possible to independently verify claims of substance abuse that were made in source materials. 26 A chi-squared test was performed and a statistically significant relationship was found between ideological category and evidence of alcohol/drug abuse, Χ2 (3, N=) = 12.55, p = .006. This resource was prepared by the author(s) using Federal funds provided by the U.S. Department of Justice. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice http:age, and socioeconomic status.26 http:abuse.25 http: any specific ideological group.24 http: ideologies.23 http:abuse.20 23 of cases show no evidence of a criminal background.27 Despite the notable differences across ideological groups, participation in pre-radicalization criminal behavior is still common for all extremists in the PIRUS data. Ideology No evidence Evidence of Valid N % missing of abuse as abuse as minor minor All cases 97.0% 3.0% 1473 0% Islamist 95.9% 4.1% 222 0% Far right 97.3% 2.7% 641 0% Far left 96.7% 3.3% 303 0% S. issue 97.4% 2.6% 307 0% Table 12 - Evidence of history of abuse as a minor for individuals in PIRUS. Note: This includes abuse by family members, non-family members, or both. Cases with missing information for this variable were coded as “No evidence of abuse as minor”. Ideology No evidence Evidence of Valid N % missing of abuse as abuse as adult adult All cases 99.0% 1.0% 1473 0% Islamist 98.7% 1.3% 222 0% Far right 99.99% 0.001% 641 0% Far left 97.7% 2.3% 303 0% S. issue 100% 0.0% 307 0% Table 13 - Evidence of history of abuse as an adult for individuals in PIRUS Note: This includes abuse by family members, non-family members, or both. Cases with missing information for this variable were coded as “No evidence of abuse as adult”. Ideology No Yes, Yes, Valid N % evidence of popular professional missing mental speculation diagnosis illness All cases 91.6% 4.6% 3.8% 1473 0% Islamist 90.0% 5.9% 4.1% 222 0% Far right 93.4% 4.8% 1.8% 641 0% Far left 95.0% 3.0% 2.0% 303 0% S. issue 90.2% 4.9% 4.9% 307 0% Table 14 - Evidence of mental illness for individuals in PIRUS Note: cases with missing information for this variable were coded as “No evidence of mental illness or psychological issues”. 27 A chi-squared test was performed and a statistically significant relationship was found between ideological category and pre-radicalization criminal activity, Χ2 (9, N=678) = 39.87, p = .000. This resource was prepared by the author(s) using Federal funds provided by the U.S. Department of Justice. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice http:of cases show no evidence of a criminal background.27 24 Ideology No evidence of Evidence of Valid N % missing alcohol/drug alcohol/drug abuse abuse All cases 92.4% 7.6% 1473 0% Islamist 92.4% 7.6% 222 0% Far right 89.9% 10.1% 641 0% Far left 94.4% 5.6% 303 0% S. issue 95.8% 4.2% 307 0% Table 15 - Evidence of alcohol/drug abuse for individuals in PIRUS Note: cases with missing information for this variable were coded as “No evidence of drug and/or alcohol abuse”. Ideology No History of History of History of Valid % missing previous minor serious violent N criminal non- non- criminal activity violent violent activity criminal criminal activity activity All cases 45.9% 24.3% 12.5% 17.3% 678 54.0% Islamist 59.5% 23.0% 6.3% 11.1% 126 43.2% Far right 36.9% 21.3% 16.0% 25.7% 268 58.2% Far left 49.1% 25.2% 13.8% 11.9% 159 47.5% S. issue 47.2% 31.2% 9.6% 12.0% 125 59.3% Table 16 - History of criminal activity for individuals in PIRUS Note: history of criminal activity refers to criminal activities taking place prior to their public exposure as an extremist. Minor criminal activity is defined as a misdemeanor or infraction offense. Serious criminal activity is defined as a felony offense. Implications The descriptive comparisons of individuals in the PIRUS data reveal a number of similarities and differences across the four main ideological categories, each of which have important implications for domestic law enforcement and CVE programs. First, a comparison of key demographic characteristics shows that it is important to consider age and gender when designing prevention and intervention programs as a part of domestic CVE efforts. Current CVE programs overwhelmingly target at-risk youth (King and Mohamed 2011; Romaniuk 2015; Vidino and Hughes 2015; Veenkamp and Zeiger 2015) and while younger individuals certainly make up a large percentage of domestic extremists, comparisons across ideologies reveal that the radicalization of older individuals is more common than originally believed, especially among far-right and single-issue extremists. Programs designed for juveniles and young adults may be ineffective for preventing radicalization among older individuals, many of whom are not struggling with the same pressures that confront youth (pursuing higher education, starting a family, etc.), but are instead burdened by the pressures of adulthood, such as supporting children. Likewise, while extremism in the U.S. is generally dominated by males, the high rates of females that This resource was prepared by the author(s) using Federal funds provided by the U.S. Department of Justice. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice 25 are involved in far left movements suggests that programs designed to target these groups must consider the unique factors that motivate women to join extremist movements. Second, a comparison of group affiliations among individuals in the PIRUS data reiterates the long-held notion that radicalization is a social process (Borum 2011; Hogg 2001; Wiktorowicz 2004; Sageman 2008). While lone actor behavior appears to be on the rise in the U.S. (Weimann 2012; Lenz 2015; Teich 2013), law enforcement and CVE programs should not lose sight of the social networks, both face-to-face and virtual, that mobilize individuals to act (Klausen 2015). For CVE programs, this finding highlights the importance that peers play in both the radicalization and counter-radicalization processes. In fact, programs designed for prevention and intervention may be most effective when they are led by peers as opposed to professional program administrators. For law enforcement, this finding reiterates the importance of focusing efforts on undermining extremist organizations, especially on the far-right and far-left. This is not to suggest that lone actors do not pose a threat. Rather, it is to say that law enforcement will need to adopt diverse interdiction strategies that are tailored to group-based and lone offenders. Third, the comparison of individuals in the PIRUS data show that radicalization is typically a long process. While online environments may be speeding up radicalization timelines on average (Jensen et al. 2016), radicalization is typically a process that takes several months, which suggests that there exist windows of opportunity for intervention. In order for CVE programs to take advantage of these openings for intervention, community education efforts must target those who are in the best position to recognize when an individual has begun to gravitate towards extremist views, which in all but the rarest cases are family members and friends. Education efforts should focus both on informing community members about which behaviors constitute concerning activities (e.g. associating with known extremists, making drastic lifestyle changes, expressing extreme views, etc.) and on educating individuals about the assistance programs that are available in their communities. Finally, a comparison of background characteristics of individuals in the PIRUS data shows that with the exception of participation in pre-radicalization criminal activities, many regularly highlighted warning indicators, such as economic deprivation and low educational attainment (Moghaddam 2005; Elbakidze and Jin 2015; Ali and Li 2015), are not more common for extremists than they are for the general population.28 Rates of mental health issues, drug and alcohol abuse, and childhood trauma are also generally low and consistent across ideologies. This is not to suggest that these factors are unimportant for domestic CVE. On the contrary, our findings (see below) and those of others (Weine et al. 2015) suggest that mental health and social service professionals have important roles to play in CVE efforts. Rather, it is to suggest that profiling based on these warning signs is likely to prove ineffective. That said, the high rates of pre-radicalization criminal behaviors 28 The claim that economic deprivation and low education levels are associated with increased rates of terrorism is commonly made by the news media and politicians, but research efforts have largely failed to find any link between relative deprivation and terrorism. See Piazza 2006; Krueger 2007. This resource was prepared by the author(s) using Federal funds provided by the U.S. Department of Justice. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice http:population.28 26 do suggest that CVE programs may benefit from leveraging existing programs that are geared toward addressing the needs of individuals who may be drawn to criminal activity. Furthermore, law enforcement should prioritize their focus on those individuals who have a history of interacting with the criminal justice system. While these individuals may not radicalize at greater rates that non-criminals, as noted below, they are significantly more likely to engage in violent behaviors after radicalizing. This resource was prepared by the author(s) using Federal funds provided by the U.S. Department of Justice. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice 27 Part II: Explaining Violent Extremism Problem Statement Research on violent extremism represents one of the major growth areas in social science scholarship over the past two decades.29 During this period, important research has been conducted that provides a clearer picture of the mechanisms by which individuals and groups come to adopt extreme views (McCauley and Moskalenko 2008), and valuable insights have been generated on the processes that drive extremist organizations to abandon non-violent protest in favor of violent attacks (Bloom 2004; McCauley and Moskalenko 2008; Kydd and Walter 2006). However, scholarship that has sought to identify the factors that are most commonly correlated with violent action has been inconsistent and inconclusive (Neumann and Kleinmann 2013; Gill 2015). The inability to generate cumulative knowledge on the factors that are associated with violent radicalization has been the product of three principal shortcomings in the ways researchers have conceived of radicalization and the designs that they have used to study it. First, researchers that study radicalization often conflate attitudes and behaviors despite decades of social psychological research showing only weak connections between extreme beliefs and extreme actions (Jones and Harris 1967; Sabini 1995). Survey and experimental research has consistently found strong support for radical ideologies across the political spectrum—and even for the use of violence in support of them—but very few people actually engage in such behavior (McCauley and Moskalenko 2008; Lemieux and Asal 2010). Likewise, there are examples of individuals who have committed serious acts of political violence with relatively weak ideological justifications; most famously Abu Nidal and Carlos the Jackal (Borowitz 2005). The emerging consensus is that there are multiple pathways into violent extremism (Horgan 2008; Borum 2011), which has led to the creation of numerous typologies to cluster and capture these different processes (Venhaus 2010; McCauley and Moskalenko 2008; Cross and Snow 2011). Indeed, Borum (2011) specifically identifies a pressing need to better understand the connection between attitudinal and behavioral aspects of radicalization. Second, despite more than a decade of intense interest in the issue of radicalization, there is only weak empirical grounding for the current understanding of the characteristics of those who radicalize to the point of violence (Githens-Mazer and Lambert 2010; Borum 2011; Della Porta and LaFree 2012). The main concern here is that most empirical studies of radicalization concentrate only on those who have actually used violence for an extremist cause but do not consider those who may share similar ideological convictions but have not used violence in their pursuit (Borum 2011). There have been a few recent attempts to address this major limitation with varying levels of academic rigor and methodological transparency, including the New America Foundation’s Homegrown Threat project, which provides basic biographical information on 310 violent jihadist and non-jihadist extremists, the Triangle Center on Terrorism and Homeland Security’s annual report on domestic 29 This section is drawn from Jensen et al. 2016. This resource was prepared by the author(s) using Federal funds provided by the U.S. Department of Justice. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice http: decades.29 28 jihadi arrests and perpetrators (Kurzman 2015), the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies’ study of 117 jihadists in the United States and United Kingdom (Gartenstein- Ross and Grossman 2009), and START’s ongoing Terrorism and Extremist Violence in the United States (TEVUS) project, which integrates, among other things, profiles of indicted Islamist, far right and far left individuals from the American Terrorism Study (ATS) and the Extremist Crime Database (ECDB) (Smith and Damphouse 2007; Freilich et al. 2014). With the possible exception of the ECDB, which includes non-violent ideological crime, non- ideological criminal associates and prior criminal activities of far right extremists, none of these efforts identifies at-risk individuals who did not radicalize to the point of committing violence. Thus, in currently available data sets there is virtually no variation on the dependent variable, severely limiting the inferential power of these studies. Finally, while excellent work has been done to trace and analyze the radicalization pathways of individuals and small groups, variously highlighting the role of psychological processes (Horgan 2008; Horgan 2009; Kruglanski et al. 2009), small group dynamics (Sageman 2004), and social movement catalysts (Wiktorowicz 2004; Wiktorowicz 2005), most of these studies rely on limited case evidence to support their claims. Very few have attempted to utilize systematically collected and coded data to generate robust inferences about causes and effects. The large-scale empirical projects that have been conducted have tended to focus exclusively on providing a cross-sectional analysis of individual attributes that at least theoretically can be compared to known population averages. While this may provide some insight into what increases individuals’ susceptibility to radicalization, it provides little information about how they reached the point of violence or when particular interventions might have been effective. In short, there have been few quantitative empirical analyses of the characteristics of those that engage in politically-motivated violence in the United States. This section seeks to address this absence by identifying a number of conditions that are proposed in extant criminological research as good explanations of individual participation in illegal violence. These conditions are tested for their ability to explain shifts from non-violent to violent behaviors among a broad spectrum of extremists who have supported a range of ideological views, including both those who used violence and those who did not. Theoretical rationale In order to develop a series of hypotheses about the correlates of criminal violence, we draw from relevant theories in criminology and terrorism studies that purport to explain criminal behaviors at the individual level. These include social control, social learning, peer effects, and outbidding perspectives. It is important to note that it is not our intention to test these theories or appraise their relative strengths and weaknesses. Rather, it is our goal is to determine if any insights can be gleaned from these perspectives that may be used to improve our understanding of individual-level violent extremism. We acknowledge that most theories from criminology are intended to explain variation in non-crime and crime, as opposed to non-violent crime and violent crime, and that attempts to apply these perspectives to new outcome areas will require some adjustments to the ways in which the This resource was prepared by the author(s) using Federal funds provided by the U.S. Department of Justice. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice 29 theories and their related concepts are operationalized. Nevertheless, we argue that these perspectives provide a useful starting point for an exploratory analysis of the correlates of extremist violence. The findings generated from such an analysis are not only likely to provide important policy implications, but also to highlight avenues for further empirical study. Below we draw on these theories to develop a series of exploratory hypotheses about individual participation in acts of political violence. We then use the PIRUS database to determine which, if any, of the hypotheses enjoy empirical support. Social Control Social control perspectives generally hold that deviation from conforming behaviors is more likely to occur when bonds to family, friends, and conventional society are weak (Hirschi 1969; Gottfredson and Hirschi 1990; Laub and Sampson 1993). Overwhelmingly, extant empirical research on those who have committed crime has been aimed at testing whether key life events, such as marriage, employment, or military service, have the potential to alter criminal trajectories, with findings largely supportive of the substantial impact of these positive “turning points” (Laub and Sampson 1993). While most theoretical and empirical work examines the effect of positive turning points on desistance from crime, turning points can also be negative in nature by promoting continued or accelerated involvement in negative behavior. For instance, research has demonstrated that negative life experiences, including residence in dilapidated living environments, dysfunctional family environments, school dropout, and substantial periods of unemployment, result in a lower likelihood of desistance from crime and an increased likelihood of offending (Bersani and Chapple 2007; Chung et al. 2002; Fergusson and Horwood 2002; Wiesner and Capaldi 2003). From the perspective of social control, continued criminal behavior, including participation in criminal violence, may be explained by weak bonds to family and society, and the absence of positive turning points (e.g. marriage). H1: Compared to other extremists, extremists who experience “positive turning points” are less likely to participate in violence. H2: Compared to other extremists, extremists with weak bonds to family are more likely to participate in violence. Social Learning/Peer Effects In contrast to the social control perspective, social learning theory emphasizes that small- group interactions and communication are the primary drivers of deviant and criminal behavior. This perspective emphasizes the impact of social influences, particularly family members and peers (Warr and Stafford 1991). Within this context there is an evolving learning process that involves the transmission of defining behaviors as right or wrong through imitation, modeling, conditioning, and reinforcement (Akers 2009). Put simply, the social networks in which individuals are embedded—family, mentors, and especially peers—will influence them in important ways. This can occur through mechanisms, such as fear or ridicule and loyalty, which produce compliance and status enhancement (e.g., acceptance, reward systems) in adolescent peer networks (Warr 2002). People will be This resource was prepared by the author(s) using Federal funds provided by the U.S. Department of Justice. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice 30 influenced according to the frequency, intensity, duration, and priority of their relationships with others, who in turn help create and mold definitions of behaviors (Akers 2009). The social learning/peer effects perspective has some similarities to group dynamics models of violent extremism, which suggests that the in-group/out-group biases that form in small cliques can often lead to extreme forms of violent expression and groupthink (Bion 1961; Allison 1971; Janis 1972; McCauley 1989; Post 1998). The intense bonds experienced within cliques, and the weak bonds tying individual members to those outside cliques, eventually change the calculus of conformity and remove a brake on the individuals’ participation in violent extremism. It is important to note that although group dynamics often lead to conformity by the individual, the individual can at times also influence the beliefs and behavior of the group, implying that small groups that form for one purpose can sometimes be re-tasked through the influence of in-group opinion leaders (Moscovici and Nemeth 1974). Based on these perspectives, extremists may be more likely to engage in violence when they have family members that are involved in extremist activities and when they are members in close-knit, insular groups. This reasoning leads to our next two hypotheses: H3: Compared to other extremists, those with radical family members are more likely to participate in violence. H4: Compared to other extremists, extremists who are members of radical cliques are more likely to participate in violence. Outbidding Researchers that study how non-violent political organizations transition into violent extremist groups often stress the important role that rivals play in the escalation of extremist behaviors (Bloom 2004; Bloom 2007; Kydd and Walter 2006; Findley and Young 2012). Competition with rival groups often compels individuals to abandon non-violent forms of political expression in favor of violent acts, which are increasingly viewed by the group as a more effective way to garner attention, obtain resources, and establish leadership within a community. The process of outbidding has been to shown to play an important role in the adoption of extreme forms of political violence, including suicide terrorism (Bloom 2004; 2007) and the deliberate targeting of children (Biberman and Zahid 2016). Similarly, the pull towards increasingly extreme behaviors is common in organizations that experience significant in-fighting over organizational leadership, vision, and routines (Cronin 2011). Such competition within organizations often leads to dangerous splintering, where individuals who were once allies find themselves in opposing factions that are vying for support from a common constituency. Opposing factions are often pulled toward increasingly extreme forms of political behavior in order to outdo each other and establish a hierarchy within the political movement. Following the logic of outbidding theory, extremists will be more likely to engage in violence when they are members of groups or This resource was prepared by the author(s) using Federal funds provided by the U.S. Department of Justice. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice 31 cliques that are engaged in competition with rival organizations or are members of groups that are suffering from internal splintering. H5: Compared to other extremists, those who are engaged in competition with rival groups or fellow group members are more likely to participate in violence. Methodology We utilized information from the PIRUS database to establish which variables drawn from various criminology and radicalization theories are regularly associated with increased probabilities of violence among individuals who radicalized in the United States. In order to isolate the effects of the indicators, the model specifications include a variety of control variables, which are discussed below. To generate findings, we use a multivariate logistic regression model where the dependent variable is a dichotomous measure of whether the radicalized individual engaged in acts of violent or non-violent political resistance. Structure of the Dependent Variable The dependent variable (violent/non-violent) is coded “1” for individuals who committed or intended to commit an act of violence and “0” for individuals who committed non- violent acts. We treat as violent those cases where there is clear evidence that individuals were conspiring to kill or injure even if they failed to do so. We treat as non-violent all cases where it is clear from source documents that individuals did not intend to harm people, including acts of vandalism, illegal protest, fraud, and acts of property destruction where the perpetrators took measures to ensure that no one would be hurt or killed. Usually binary classification schemes are straightforward and easy to implement. However, within the universe of radicalized individuals, because of their interactions with law enforcement, including interdiction and extra-judicial execution, the dependent variable could feature many cases of incorrectly censored data about non-observations of violence. For example, individuals who were killed or incarcerated before they could successfully complete an act of violence would appear to be non-violent in a simplistic implementation of dichotomous classification. We avoided this problem by factoring in the recorded intent of the radicalized individual. Functionally, radicalized individuals who intended to do violence are treated as identical in the empirical model as individuals who successfully committed violence. Classifying individuals in this way removes the latent variable of capacity to perform violence from clandestinely shaping the empirical results. In summary, individuals were coded ‘1’ for the violence variable if they met any of the following conditions: • Active participation in operational actions/plots that resulted in casualties • Active participation in operational actions/plots that intended to result in causalities but were unsuccessful • Conspiring to kill or injure but were interdicted in the plotting phase Non-violent radicals, on the other hand, are those individuals who meet any of the following criteria: This resource was prepared by the author(s) using Federal funds provided by the U.S. Department of Justice. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice 32 • Are not charged with any violent criminal act but were known members of an extremist group • Actively participated in operational actions/plots not intending to result in causalities (e.g., property destruction, vandalism) • Engaged in only legal/aboveground activism in support of extremism ideology • Participated in armed standoffs that were defused without injury (e.g., Montana Freemen, Ruby Ridge) • Received “terrorist” training but did not act on it • Incited others to violence but no direct action themselves • Threatened but undertook no direct action or operational progress toward a plot • Involved in a plot targeting a building (arson/explosives) that did not intend to produce any causalities • Possessed illegal weapons but no operational plans for violence Structure of the Independent Variables For each hypothesis outlined above, we extracted representative variables contained in the PIRUS data that best operationalize the underlying theoretical concepts.30 Based on the Age-Graded Theory of Informal Social Control (Sampson and Laub, 1993), which in part emphasizes the role played by social bonds in adulthood as explaining participation in criminal behavior, we matched the following variables with “positive turning points” outlined in H1: marital status, that is whether the individual was married at the time of their public exposure as an extremist; stable employment history, that is whether the individual had stable employment in the period leading up to their public exposure as an extremist; and military history, which we separated into two measures of military service: one if the individual’s military service was prior to their public outing as an extremist (past military experience); and one if the individual’s military service was concurrent with their public exposure as an extremist (active military). Another component of social control theory posits that weak bonds to family can increase an individual’s propensity to commit crimes. To operationalize this concept put forward in H2, we draw upon childhood abuse; that is, whether the individual suffered abuse, either physically, sexually, or verbally, at the hands of family or non-family members, as a child. The social learning perspective, most commonly represented by Akers (2008), suggests that individuals learn behaviors and attitudes which are transmitted to them by close family members. Because we are interested in learning what best predicts the propensity to engage in violent extremism, we selected the variable from PIRUS radical family member to operationalize the concept outlined in H3. 30 We chose the variables from the PIRUS dataset that best operationalize the underlying concepts that were gleaned from the theoretical perspectives described above. However, given that the PIRUS database was not created in order to model these theories, the variables that we selected are not, in most cases, perfect operationalizations of the theories, nor do they provide exact measurements of the theories’ respective concepts. For example, as a cross-sectional dataset, PIRUS is not ideal for assessing arguments about changes over time, such as those made by social control and social learning perspectives. That said, we believe that the PIRUS data provide a useful starting point for an exploratory analysis of the applicability of these theories to questions of violent extremism. Future research efforts can improve on this initial analysis by collecting and analyzing individual-level time-series data. This resource was prepared by the author(s) using Federal funds provided by the U.S. Department of Justice. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice http:concepts.30 33 Similarly, the peer effects research perspective argues that the presence of close-knit peer groups can lead to a greater risk of engaging in extreme behaviors that the individual may otherwise not consider. We thus measure the role of peer effects put forward in H4 by whether the individual was known to be associated with a “clique”, or a close-knit insular group of two or more fellow extremists. Lastly, outbidding between groups and in-fighting within groups has been shown to play a possible role in escalating the level of violence committed by the group. To best capture this concept posited in H5, we utilize the variable group competition, which is coded for whether there is evidence that the group with which the individual in question was associated was experiencing competition with other groups or within the group for status, power, or resources. Table 17 below shows how each independent variable in the model relates to the criminological concepts outlined above and how they were calculated for analysis in the logistic regression models.31 All independent variables are recoded into dichotomous measures. The marital status and employment history of the individual are determined at the date of their public exposure, defined as the time at which their radical activity first became public knowledge. This date usually refers to the date of their first arrest or indictment for an ideologically motivated criminal offense, or earliest mention of the individual in open sources, so long as it is related to the individual’s radical activity. Military experience, both past and active, were recorded as they related to when the individual began their radicalization process. Thus, past military experience is recorded as 1 for individuals whose military service preceded their radicalization process, while active military is recorded as 1 for individuals whose time in the military coincided with the onset of their radicalization. In order to build the final model (Model 5), we added the independent variables associated with each theory to the model specification that came before. This step-wise approach to model design enables empirical extrapolation of two things. First, by cumulatively adding variables from different theories with a constant set of controls, we can observe how the addition of variables from each theoretical perspective changes the significance level and magnitude of variables from the base model. Second, in the final specification of the models, we can compare the relative explanatory power of each of the theoretically derived factors. 31 Bivariate correlations between the independent variables included in the model can be found in the Appendix. The results of these correlations indicate that there are no significant interactions between the independent variables, and thus the model that is tested below is not biased by multicollinearity. This resource was prepared by the author(s) using Federal funds provided by the U.S. Department of Justice. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice http:logistic regression models.31 ’ ’ ’ ’ Construct Variable name Description Social control Married The individual s marital status at their date of public exposure Social control Stable The individual s work employment history leading up to history their date of public exposure Social control Past military The individual s experience radicalization took place after they had left the US military Social control Active in military The individual s radicalization took place while a member the US military Social bonding Abused as child Evidence that the individual was abused, either verbally or physically, as a child Social learning Radical family A family member of the dividual was involvedin in radical activities Peer effects Clique The individual was a membership member of a clique, defined as a close-knit, insular, and excl group of extremi usive tss Outbidding Group The individual was a competition member of an extremist group in which there was competition within the ou or with othergr grou p ps for status, power, or resources Table 17 - Structure of independent variable Structure of variable 0=Single, Divorced, Separated, or Widowed 1=Married (religious or civil marriage) 0=Long-term unemployment, underemployment, or unstable employment 1=Regularly employment/stable employment 0=No military history, or active member of military at time of radicalization 1=Inactive member of military at time of radicalization 0=No military history, or inactive member of military at time of radicalization 1=Active member of military at time of radicalization 0=No evidence of childhood abuse 1=Evidence of childhood abuse 0=No radical family members known to have engaged in radical activities 1=Family members known to have engaged in radical activities 0=Not a member of a clique 1=Member of a clique 0=No group competition 1=Group competition This resource was prepared by the author(s) using Federal funds provided by the U.S. Department of Justice. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice 35 Control Variables We identified fifteen variables from the research literature on violent crime for inclusion in the models that control for the effects of various factors that are not covered by the theories described above. These controls can be grouped into four distinct conceptual categories. In the first category are standard controls from the base empirical model of crime: previous criminal history (Bushway, Paternoster, and Brame 2003; D. P. Farrington 1987; Gendreau, Little, and Goggin 1996; Langan and Levin 2002), mental illness (Monahan 1995; Mulvey 1994), education (D. P. Farrington 1987), and gender (Canter 1982; Daly and Chesney-Lind 1988; Steffensmeier and Allan 1995). These standard controls from empirical criminological models are included because much of the classification of radicals in the dependent variable stems from observations linked to being charged with a crime. Without these standard criminological controls, it would be difficult to estimate which variables, beyond those associated with violent criminal activity in general, were prevalent in the violent behavior of radicals. In the second category are two control variables for age which acts as measures of individual or life-cycle time. It has been shown that people are more likely to engage in crime up to a certain age, and then increasingly less likely as they get older (Farrington 1986; Gottfredson and Hirschi 1986; Hirschi and Gottfredson 1983). The model includes controls for age and the non-linear effects of age, using age-squared. The third category includes control variables associated with three of the four sub-types of radical ideologies: Islamist, far right and far left.32 The inclusion of the ideological categories controls for differences in violence-justifying beliefs that may be present across the ideological spectrum. For example, certain groups on the far left expressly discourage the use of violent tactics, and we assume that norms such as these will suppress participation in violence for certain individuals. In the final category are controls for the “wave” of radicalization that the individual was a part of, which acts as a measure of the effects of time on the permissibility of violence and violent radicalization. For example, studies have shown that crime in the United States, in particular violent crime, has been steadily decreasing since its peak in the early 1990s (Truman and Langton 2015). We assume that the decline of violent crime over time is uniform among extremists and non-ideological criminals. We dropped the 2000s decade from the model, using it as the reference category for the other decades because that temporal category contains the largest number of radicalized individuals in the PIRUS data. Table 18 illustrates how the research team operationalized and coded the control variables used in the model. All the variables are dichotomous measures, except for age, age squared, and the education variable, which is an ordinal scale from 0 to 3, with 0 indicating that the individual did not complete high school, and 3 signifying that they attained a college degree. As an added level of validation, we test Model 5 using 4 different missing data protocols, drawn from prior research (results are reported in Table 22.) See Appendix 2 for a detailed discussion of the missing data protocols. 32 Single-issue was used as the reference category and was thus excluded as a control variable. This resource was prepared by the author(s) using Federal funds provided by the U.S. Department of Justice. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice 36 Missing Data Techniques Missing data is a challenge that all researchers confront, but it is particularly important for research such as this based on open source data collection. A number of the variables in the PIRUS database are designed to capture private or sensitive information, often about personal experiences and conditions that are well documented to be serially under- reported (e.g. mental health disorders; Takayanagi et al. 2014). In some instances, relying on publically available sources to collect data on these variables resulted in non-trivial amounts of missing values (see Appendix 1 for variable frequencies). This is unsurprising given the nature of open source data collection where it is frequently impossible to distinguish negative responses from no responses. For example, we might not necessarily expect open sources to report that a given individual was not the victim of abuse or that a particular individual had no record of drug use. The amount of missing data was also likely increased by our selection procedures, which chose cases based on representativeness rather than completeness of information, and our coding guidelines that instructed researchers to be conservative and record values as missing instead of absent (i.e. as a missing code of “-99” instead of a value representing “No”) whenever sources failed to report values. There are several options for dealing with missing data (see Honaker and King 2010; Tsikriktsis 2005). Some rely on researchers’ substantive knowledge and case expertise to fill in missing values, while others employ advanced statistical techniques. Although no method provides a perfect solution, advances in techniques for handling missing data have made it possible to make valid inferences about causes and effects despite missing values on variables of interest. For this study, we identified four techniques for handling missing data that are sensible options given the structure of the PIRUS data and our substantive knowledge of the cases and radicalization processes (see Table 27 in Appendix 2). These are: simple imputation using fixed values (i.e. cold-deck imputation) (Andridge and Little 2010), simple imputation using sub-group means (Tsikriktsis 2005), regression-based multiple imputation (Rubin 2004), and multiple imputation based on expected maximization calculations (G. King et al. 2001; Honaker and King 2010) . We provide a brief summary of these techniques in Appendix 2. In the first five specifications of the model that is tested below, we used a parallel qualitative effort to make the best choices about how to treat the missing data. We replaced missing values with fixed values on variables for which logic or cumulative knowledge provided accurate estimates. These variables include: This resource was prepared by the author(s) using Federal funds provided by the U.S. Department of Justice. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice 37 Control variable Previous criminal activity Mental illness Education Gender Age Islamist ideology Far right ideology Far left ideology Exposure 1950s Exposure 1960s Exposure 1970s Exposure 1980s Exposure 1990s Exposure 2010s Description Evidence that the individual engaged in criminal activity prior to their radicalization Evidence that the individual had a known history of psychological issues and/or mental illness The highest level of education completed by the individual by their date of public exposure The individual’s gender The age of the individual at their date of public exposure The individual became radicalized as part of an Islamist movement The individual became radicalized as part of a Far right movement The individual became radicalized as part of a Far left movement The individual’s date of public exposure occurred in 1959 or earlier The individual’s date of public exposure occurred between 1960 and 1969 The individual’s date of public exposure occurred between 1970 and 1979 The individual’s date of public exposure occurred between 1980 and 1989 The individual’s date of public exposure occurred between 1990 and 1999 The individual’s date of public exposure occurred between 2010 and 2015 Structure of variable O=No evidence of previous criminal activity 0.5=Evidence of previous, non-violent minor criminal activity (e.g. misdemeanor) 1=Evidence of previous non-violent serious criminal activity, or violent crime 0=No evidence of psychological issues and/or mental illness 1=Evidence of psychological issues and/or mental illness 0=Did not complete high school 1=High school diploma 2=Some college, no college degree 3=College degree or higher 0=Female 1=Male Numerical (years) 0=No, other ideology 1=Yes 0=No, other ideology 1=Yes 0=No, other ideology 1=Yes 0=No, other decade 1=Yes 0=No, other decade 1=Yes 0=No, other decade 1=Yes 0=No, other decade 1=Yes 0=No, other decade 1=Yes 0=No, other decade 1=Yes Table 18 - Structure of control variables This resource was prepared by the author(s) using Federal funds provided by the U.S. Department of Justice. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice 38 • Past military—given well-documented records of military service, missing values were assumed to be “no” if no record of service could be found • Active military—same as above • Abused as child comparatively rare phenomenon. —cumulative knowledge suggests that childhood abuse is a 33 Thus, a value of “0” (“no”) was entered for cases where no mention of childhood abuse could be found in source materials • Previous criminal activity when records of criminal activ —like military service, missing values were treated as “no” ity could not be found • Mental illness—there is considerable asymmetry between reported and estimated rates of mental health disorders in the United States (Takayanagi et al. 2014), making it particularly difficult to accurately compensate for missing data on variables related to mental health conditions. However, since the PIRUS data err on the side of inclusion when it comes to mental health, treating clinical diagnosis and popular speculation as evidence of mental illness, we believe that the data do not suffer from the same extensive under-reporting that impacts many other data collection efforts. Furthermore, based on the observed rates of mental health conditions in the PIRUS data, imputing missing values would lead to a drastic over- representation of mental health conditions in the data, as high as 50% of all cases. Therefore, cases for which no mentions of mental health issues could be found in source materials were recoded from “unknown” to “no”. For the remaining variables, which include stable employment history, marital status, clique membership, group competition, radical family, age, and education, we used the expected maximization multiple imputation technique. However, as a check on the robustness of our findings, we re-ran the final model specification against four complete datasets that each handle missing data according to the techniques that are described in Appendix 2—expected maximization, regression-based multiple imputation, sub-group mean imputation, and fixed value imputation. The results of these tests are reported below. Empirical Results and Discussion The results of the step-wise modeling technique are reported in Table 19, with the columns representing the following models: Model A: base criminological (controls) Model 1: base criminological + social control Model 2: base criminological + social control + social bond Model 3: base criminological + social control + social bond + social learning Model 4: base criminological + social control + social bond + social learning + eer s Model 5: base criminological + social control + social bond + social learning + p peer effect effects + outbidding34 33 According to the United States Department of Health and Human Services, fewer than 12 out of every 1000 children, or 1.2%, suffer some form of abuse. See United States Department of Health and Human Services 2015. 34 We ran Model 5 for each ideologica category: Islamist, Far Right, and Far Left. However, due to the relatively small number of cases in the Far Left and Is l lamist groups and issues of missing data, we were not able to produce statistically This resource was prepared by the author(s) using Federal funds provided by the U.S. Department of Justice. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice 39 As Table 20 shows, all of the variables that are significant in the various models retain their significance and substantive effects as new variables are added. This means that each step of the step-wise investigation is testing distinct and important aspects of violent radicalization. The practical effect of these stable empirical regularities is that there are many points of interdiction toward both preventing and countering violence among radicalized individuals, each of which are discussed below. The base criminological model (Model A)35, comprised solely of control variables, shows four important findings. First, the decade in which individuals radicalize has a significant impact on the likelihood that they will engage in acts of violent extremism. Relative to the 2000s, which is the decade with the largest number of radicalized individuals in the PIRUS dataset, earlier decades, in particular the 1970s and 1980s, witnessed more individuals who radicalized to the point of committing violence or intending to commit violence. This finding generally supports the conclusions of recent reports based on annual crime statistics, which show that violent crime in the United States has been steadily decreasing since the early 1990s (Blumstein and Wallman 2006; Blumstein and Wallman 2005). This trend appears to extend to radicals and non-radicals alike. Second, all other things held constant, ideology is significantly related to behavior. Not surprisingly, individuals who adhered to ideologies that promote non-violent forms of political resistance were found to be significantly less violent than those on the far right or those who adhere to Salafi jihadist ideologies. However, the relationship between far left ideology and non-violent activism may be a recent trend that is driven by the emergence of animal rights and environmental activist organizations as the dominant actors within the milieu. These organizations typically promote non-violent forms of political resistance, which stands in contrast to traditional far left groups, such as the Weather Underground, who commonly perpetrated acts of political violence. In a subsequent iteration of our model, we excluded individuals motivated by animal rights or environmental concerns in order to determine if the relationship between far left ideology and non-violence holds. When environmentalists and animal rights activists are excluded from the model, there does not appear to be a relationship between far-left ideology and non-violence (see Appendix 5). reliable results for single ideological categories. As noted below, increasing the number of cases across ideologies in order to do this type of analysis is a potentially fruitful area of future inquiry. 35 We ran the model using a single measure for age, which resulted in a significant and negative relationship with the dependent variable. However, when age squared is introduced into the model, the level of significance dissipates, suggestin a non-linear relationship between the age of extremists and the likelihood for violence. That is, individuals show a hi g gher propensity for violence up until a certain age, and then are increasingly less likely to engage in violence as they get older. This resource was prepared by the author(s) using Federal funds provided by the U.S. Department of Justice. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice - - - - - * * * * * * * * - - - * * * * * * * * * - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 40 Independent variable Model A – control Model 1 – H1 Model 2 – H2 Model 3 – H3 Model 4 – H4 Model 5 – H5 variables only conditions added conditions added conditions added conditions added conditions added Married Stable employment history Past military exp. Active military Abused as child Radical family Clique membership Group competition Controls β (SE β) β (SE β) .296 (.194) -.552** (.204) .066 (.248) .348 (.333) β (SE β) .291 (.194) -.534* (.206) .054 (.248) .341 (.332) .422 (.383) β (SE β) .256 (.199) -.551** (.209) .046 (.256) .358 (.363) .364 (.383) .330 (.223) β (SE β) .329 (.207) -.559** (.211) .022 (.264) .450 (.358) .551 (.400) .429 (.228) .898*** (.163) β (SE β) .325 (.209) -.560** (.213) .012 (.274) .448 (.367) .560 (.406) .445 (.231) .908*** (.162) .229 (.228) Previous criminal activity Mental illness Education Gender Age Age (squared) Islamist ideology Far right ideology Far left ideology Exposure 1950s Exposure 1960s Exposure 1970s Exposure 1980s Exposure 1990s .582*** (.179) .756*** (.229) .110 (.094) .291 (.210) .045 (.025) .000 (.000) 1.247*** (.228) .660*** (.171) -.585** (.199) .921 (.562) .824*** (.258) 1.153*** (.220) .956*** (.204) .163 (.178) .510** (.182) .645** (.237) .075 (.089) .319 (.218) .035 (.025) .000 (.000) 1.285*** (.239) .655*** (.177) -.603** (.205) 1.035 (.575) .863*** (.263) 1.176*** (.229) .984*** (.213) .174 (.182) .494** (.182) .616** (.239) .073 (.090) .330 (.219) .036 (.026) .000 (.000) 1.283*** (.239) .658*** (.177) -.603** (.205) 1.043 (.574) .858*** (.263) 1.176*** (.229) .986*** (.213) .170 (.182) .471* (.186) .581* (.246) .070 (.094) .306 (.222) .036 (.026) .000 (.000) 1.269*** (.239) .673*** (.181) -.613*** (.206) 1.173 (.624) .886*** (.267) 1.190*** (.236) 1.004*** (.214) .188 (.184) .441* (.191) .744** (.253) .076 (.097) .330 (.229) .026 (.026) .000 (.000) 1.114*** (.245) .590*** (.182) -.755*** (.210) 1.210 (.637) 1.012*** (.281) 1.250*** (.246) .995*** (.225) .199 (.189) .447* (.191) .729** (.254) .077 (.097) .344 (.229) .026 (.207) .000 (.000) 1.094*** (.246) .617*** (.185) -.757*** (.213) 1.235 (.637) 1.044*** (.284) 1.280*** (.252) 1.002*** (.226) .187 (.190) Exposure 2010s .601** (.212) .602** (.217) .603** (.217) .607** (.220) .688** (.222) .677** (.223) Table 19 Multivariate regression model Note: (n = 1,473). Standard error noted in parentheses, *p≤.05; **p≤.01; ***p≤.001 This resource was prepared by the author(s) using Federal funds provided by the U.S. Department of Justice. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice 41 The same cannot be said, however, for those on the far right or those who adhere to a Salafi jihadist ideology. Regardless of how we model the relationship between ideology and extremist behaviors, far right and Islamist ideologies appear to have a significant and positive relationship to violence. Despite being hard to assess using statistical methods, our results indicate that ideology may play a distinct, non-epiphenomenal role in the likelihood of violence. That is, the relationship between ideology and violence does not appear to be one that is completely driven by selection effects, whereby individuals with violent tendencies choose violent ideologies, and those without violent tendencies choose leftist ideologies. Rather, ideology appears to have an independent effect on shaping individual behaviors. These findings also suggest that ideological frameworks interact with other aspects of a radicalized individual’s life—namely peer-effects and personal stability indicators—to create pathways toward violence in the processes of radicalization. Third, a history of mental illness has a strong relationship to violent outcomes among radicalized individuals. Across all models, mental health issues have a positive and significant relationship to violence, suggesting that mental and public health officials have a role to play in effective responses to violent radicalization (Weine et al. 2015). That said, it should be noted that overall rates of mental health issues in the PIRUS data are low, representing 3.8% to 8.4% of the sample depending on how the variable is measured (i.e. clinical diagnosis only or clinical diagnosis and popular speculation). Moreover, given data limitations, our tests do not model for the possibility that mental health conditions lead to violent outcomes when they are paired with substance abuse, which is a common finding of psychiatry research (see, for example, Swartz et al. 1998). Future research on the link between mental illness and extremist violence should model for this possibility. Finally, pre-radicalization criminal activity is strongly associated with post-radicalization violence. This includes pre-radicalization criminal activities that are non-violent in nature, such as drug offenses and unarmed robbery. This suggests that individuals who engage in criminal activities prior to radicalization may be more likely to participate in more extreme forms of crime once they have adopted extremist ideologies. This finding highlights the importance of integrating CVE programs with existing efforts that seek to keep at-risk individuals from engaging in crime. From a law enforcement perspective, the relationship between pre-radicalization crime and post-radicalization violence indicates that violent radicals typically interact with the criminal justice system prior to committing acts of violent extremism. Thus, it is potentially important to consider criminal histories when making threat assessments or decisions about resource allocations. While these results show that many of the control variables drawn from traditional criminology research are significant forecasters of which kinds of radicalized individuals are most likely to engage in violence, correlates drawn from more recent criminological and social science perspectives were mixed in their ability to explain violent extremism. In terms of the theories that we reviewed, variables from two—social control and social learning—showed significant relationships with violent extremism. This resource was prepared by the author(s) using Federal funds provided by the U.S. Department of Justice. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice 42 From a social control perspective, we found a strong, negative relationship between stable employment history and the propensity for violence among individuals in the PIRUS data. As social control theory suggests, the acquisition and maintenance of employment may act as a positive turning point that forces individuals away from paths to violent extremism. It should be noted, however, that when we run the model for post-2000 cases only, the relationship between stable employment and non-violence drops away (see Appendix 4). We believe that this change is likely driven by the fact that a larger percentage of young people (i.e., individuals who have not been in the workforce long) make up the post-2000 cases in PIRUS. Future research should continue to explore the relationship between employment and non-violence, paying particular attention to how that relationship changes as individuals get older. The two other turning points that are emphasized by social control—marriage and military service—do not appear to have an effect on the probability that radicals will engage in violence. Thus, our results indicate that there is limited support for H1. In regards to theories of social learning, our results show a strong positive relationship between clique membership and participation in violent extremism, H4. That is, when peers organize as small, insular groups, there appears to be a strong pull towards increasingly extreme behaviors. However, we did not find support for the argument that individuals with radical family members are more likely to engage in violent extremism, H3. Thus, social learning in the context of politically-motivated violence may be driven by peers more so than family members. The strong effect of peers on individual participation in violence is a conclusion that is also reached by those who study in-group/out-group dynamics and group biases (Hogg 2001; Kruglanski et al. 2014; McCauley and Moskalenko 2008), and which is also supported by the results of the qualitative analysis that is detailed below. While much has been made of the apparent recent increase in lone actor behavior in the United States and around the world, our findings suggest that radicalization to violence remains a process that is distinctly social. Individuals who act alone may nevertheless still establish close relationships, both virtual and face-to-face, with peers that contribute to their movement towards violence (Klausen 2015). Thus, CVE and law enforcement efforts to counter violent extremism should not ignore the mobilizing effects of social networks just because an increasing number individuals are acting more independently. Our results do not support either H2, which was drawn from social bond perspectives, or H5, which was based on theories of outbidding. We caution that these results could be driven by modeling decisions and context. For example, our failure to find a relationship between weak familial bonds and violence may, in part, be driven by our operationalization of the variable, which uses the presence or absence of childhood abuse as a measure of the strength of an individual’s bonds to their family. Certainly, childhood abuse is not the only metric by which to judge familial relationships, and in some cases individuals may actually establish strong bonds with their family members despite being subjected to verbal or physical abuse.36 Future research on violent extremism should seek to flesh-out the typological space in regards to social bonds, and determine if any other measures show 36 For example, individuals who are subjected to physical or emotional abuse may establish close bonds with their siblings. This resource was prepared by the author(s) using Federal funds provided by the U.S. Department of Justice. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice http:physical abuse.36 43 significant relationships to extremist violence. Similarly, outbidding may be more salient to extremist violence outside of the United States, where formal extremist organizations are more prevalent and competition over scarce resources is more intense (Bloom 2004). Viewed together, our results indicate that theories from criminology may provide important clues for understanding extremist violence. However, it is also certainly true that criminological perspectives gain significant inferential power when they are integrated and combined with common control measures, such as a history of criminal activity. As will be discussed in greater detail in the next section, we believe that this lends support to the view that radicalization to violence is best understood as a complex causal process that is driven by the conjunction of many unique factors. Robustness tests. Given that several of the variables included in the models showed high rates of missing values, we ran the final fully-specified model against three other versions of the PIRUS dataset, each of which treat missing data in unique ways. The results of these robustness tests are reported in Table 20. Column one shows the expected maximization- based findings that are discussed above. Column two shows the results when values are assigned to missing data using regression-based multiple imputation. Imputed values in this dataset were predicted using variables that had no or low rates of missing values and that were representative of demographics, ideation, and behavior: • Age • Gender • Ideology • Previous criminal activity • Violence Column three displays the findings when missing data are replaced with sub-group means. Since significant clustering occurs within ideological groups (see previous section of the report), we opted to use ideology as the primary sub-group of which individuals in the data are members. We then replaced missing values with the mean for the ideological sub-group for each individual according to the individual’s ideological affiliation. Finally, column four shows the results when the model is run against a dataset that uses fixed-value imputation to replace missing data. The fixed values were selected based on logical probabilities and substantive knowledge. They are: • Marital status = not married • Employment = employed • Radical family member = no radical family members • Clique membership = not a member of a clique • Group competition = no group competition • Education = finished high school As Table 20 shows, the key factors that show a significant relationship to violence in the expected maximization model, including stable employment history, clique membership, previous criminal activity, mental illness, and ideology, retain their significance and - This resource was prepared by the author(s) using Federal funds provided by the U.S. Department of Justice. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 44 Independent variable Expected Maximization Regression-based Subgroup mean Fixed value substitution model model multiple imputation substitution model (n=1,395) model Married Stable employment history Past military exp. Active military Abused as child Radical family Clique membership Group competition β (SE β) .325 (.209) -.560** (.213) .012 (.274) .448 (.367) .560 (.406) .445 (.231) .908*** (.162) .229 (.228) β (SE β) .366 (.200) -.512** (.188) .013 (.234) .400 (.319) .547 (.381) .396 (.353) .831*** (.137) .100 (.292) β (SE β) .202 (.147) -.600** (.209) .173 (.218) .414 (.317) .585 (.376) .242 (.301) .823*** (.156) .175 (.206) β (SE β) .232 (.149) -.454* (.187) .107 (.233) .060 (.309) .527 (.370) .011 (.200) .698*** (.129) .145 (.177) Controls Previous criminal activity Mental illness Education Gender Age Age (squared) Islamist ideology Far right ideology Far left ideology Exposure 1950s Exposure 1960s Exposure 1970s Exposure 1980s Exposure 1990s Exposure 2010s .447* (.191) .729** (.254) .077 (.097) .344 (.229) .026 (.207) .000 (.000) 1.094*** (.246) .617*** (.185) -.757*** (.213) 1.235 (.637) 1.044*** (.284) 1.280*** (.252) 1.002*** (.226) .187 (.190) .677** (.223) .410* (.194) .711** (.233) .097 (.103) .345 (.227) .019 (.025) .000 (.000) .978*** (.243) .494** (.182) -.898*** (.218) .997*** (.258) 1.249*** (.224) 1.005*** (.202) .170 (.180) .651** (.210) .240 (.588) .531*** (.169) .743** (.230) .081 (.090) .333 (.205) .046 (.023) .000 (.000) .924*** (.249) .534*** (.176) -.891*** (.214) 1.064 (.550) .973*** (.249) 1.214*** (.211) .953*** (.192) .146 (.174) .661** (.203) .544*** (.170) .629** (.226) .058 (.075) .293 (.210) .030 (.024) .000 (.000) .961*** (.231) .567*** (.166) -.777*** (.201) 1.048 (.557) .883*** (.259) 1.234*** (.218) .872*** (.197) .128 (.179) .589** (.203) Table 20 Regression models: comparison of missing data strategies Note: n = 1,473 except n fixed value substitution model, where n=1,395 due Standard errors noted i in parentheses,*p≤.05; **p≤.01; ***p≤.001 to list-wise deletion of cases with unknown value for Age and Age squared, This resource was prepared by the author(s) using Federal funds provided by the U.S. Department of Justice. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice 45 substantive effects, regardless of how missing data are treated. Previous criminal activity shows a stronger relationship to violence when missing data are replaced by using sub group means or fixed values. However, previous criminal activity is significant and positive across all datasets, suggesting that it is a strong correlate of violent behavior. Similarly, the depression effect of stable employment decreases slightly when missing data are replaced with fixed values. Again, however, since stable employment is significant and negative across all datasets, we can have some confidence in its observed effect on violent behavior. Overall, the results of these tests indicate that our findings are robust and are not driven by our preferred missing data technique. That said, future research should continue to build on existing data collection efforts to reduce rates of missing values and to increase the number of cases in order to ensure that the potential deleterious effects of missing data are kept to a minimum. Future research. Future research efforts can build on these findings in a number of important ways. First, given the relatively small numbers of far left, Islamist, and single issue cases that are included in the PIRUS database, we are not able to run the above statistical models for specific ideological milieus. Therefore, we cannot assess whether the findings that are discussed above hold when we look only at the individuals who adhere to a certain ideology (e.g., Islamists). In order to perform this type of analysis, future efforts should bolster existing data collections, paying particular attention to increasing the number of cases from across the ideological spectrum.37 37 Future data collection efforts should not only increase the numbers of far left and Islamist cases, as doing so would bias the overall sample and compromise the reliability of any general findings derived from analyses of the data. This resource was prepared by the author(s) using Federal funds provided by the U.S. Department of Justice. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice http:number of cases from across the ideological spectrum.37 46 Part III: Radicalization Pathways Problem Statement The statistical models that are detailed in the previous section identify a number of factors that are associated with violence among extremists. While useful, models such as these are significantly limited in their ability to explain the temporal, causal processes through which individuals come to adopt radical views that justify the use violence for political goals. These processes are complex, non-linear (i.e., having a certain level of the cause is not always associated with having a certain level of the outcome, as would be predicted in the net-effects/correlational line of thinking), and driven by underlying psychological, emotional, material, and group-based motivators that are difficult to model in statistical tests.38 Moreover, radicalization to violence is a phenomenon that is often characterized by equifinality (i.e., multiple pathways to the same outcome) (Bennett and Elman 2006), multifinality (i.e., many outcomes from the same starting point) (George and Bennett 2005), and non-uniformity in the relationship between holding radical beliefs and engaging in radical behaviors (Borum 2011). Despite some advances in the ability of statistical tests to model for complex causality (Braumoeller 2003), traditional quantitative methods are largely inappropriate for the study of complex radicalization processes. The qu both treating rad alitative analysis that is detailed in this section seeks to address this shortcoming by icalization to violence as causal processes and by exploring those processes using data and methods designed to handle causal complexity. Our approach in this section is different than the standard statistical techniques that were used above, where causation was treated as linear and which sought to establish the net-effects of various indicators (i.e., total variability explained in the outcome) on the propensity for violence. This section uses set- 2008; Goertz and Mahoney 2012) theory , which conceives of causal conditions in terms (Schneider and Wagemann 2012; Ragin 2000; Ragin of necessity or sufficiency (defined in Appendix 5) to show how causal mechanisms logically combine to produce multiple sufficient radicalization pathways to violence. The results of this section show how the indicators of violence mentioned above are embedded in complex radicalization processes that are largely driven by particular cognitive and emotional developments. In particular, we find that both a sense of community victimization and a radical shift in individuals’ cognitive frames are necessary conditions for radicalization to violent extremism. These necessary conditions combine with a host of other factors to produce eight sufficient pathways for violent radicalization, most of which are driven by the presence of psychological and emotional vulnerability, and the intense need for emotional rewards. Theoretical Rationale To move from profiles to processes, we grouped extant models of radicalizat respective research programs and focused our efforts on identifying the casual ion into their 38 This section is drawn from Jensen, Seate, and James 2016. This resource was prepared by the author(s) using Federal funds provided by the U.S. Department of Justice. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice http:tests.38 47 mechanisms that are emphasized by each perspective. The five research programs that we analyzed are psychological models, social identity theory, group-based recruitment theory, social mobilization theory, and cost/benefit theory. We chose to focus on radicalization research for two reasons. First, radicalization research emphasizes the underlying psychological, emotional, material, and group-based processes of radi greater extent than do theories from criminology. Incorporating insights from these calization to a far perspectives into our analysis of radicalization to violence is critical for understanding t phenomenon. Second, theories from the field of radicalization research are rarely tested he using rich data and rigorous methods (Neumann and Kleinmann 2013).39 Most commonly, they are supported by limited evidence from a handful of cases, which is often anecdotal in nature. Using the data and methods that are described below, we provide an initial test of these theories and assess their relative strengths and weaknesses when it comes to explaining violent extremism. Not surprisingly, we found considerable overlap between the research programs when it comes to their core assumptions and the causal mechanisms they put forth. To facilitate the assessment of the perspectives, we mapped the conceptual overlap between them and then identified ten unique conceptual constructs in which all of the causal mechanisms from the research programs could be grouped. Below we briefly describe the five key radicalization research programs that we reviewed and we detail the mechanisms that were extracted from each and their pairings in the ten conceptual categories. Individual-level psychological models. Psychological models of radicalization emphasize the complex cognitive and emotional processes that motivate individuals’ involvement in extremism (Borum 2011a; Horgan 2005; Taylor and Horgan 2006). In particular, psychologists (Bhui and Dinos 2012; Kruglanski et al. 2009; 2014) who study extremism highlight the importance of cognitive and emotional Kruglanski et al. vulnerabilities, which are often the products of identity-seeking behavior in adolescence or early adulthood. In order to fulfill a search for personal identity, or to overcome a sense of vulnerability or diminished self-worth, individuals derive personal meaning and value through group membership or identification with a cause greater than themselves (Borum 2011a; Bhui and Dinos 2012; Kruglanski et al. 2009; Kruglanski et al. 2014). Prominent among psychological models of extremism is the quest for personal significance theory, which argues that extremists are motivated by the activation of the significance quest, defined as the “fundamental desire to matter, to be someone, to have respect” (Kruglanski et al. 2014, 73). While arguably all humans are similarly motivated, Kruglanski et al. (2009; 2014) posit the presence of an ideological component that identifies involvement in terrorism as an appropriate means to gain (or regain) a lost sense of significance, followed by processes of socialization and implementation. While personal circumstances, such as blocked ambitions or job loss, can lead to the loss of significance, 39 Several studies compare radicalization theories, drawing similarities and differences. These works, however, do not assess the comparative strengths and weaknesses of the theories using empirical data. See, for example, King and Taylor 2011; Hafez and Mullins 2015. This resource was prepared by the author(s) using Federal funds provided by the U.S. Department of Justice. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice http:Neumann and Kleinmann 2013).39 48 traumatic experiences in childhood, such as experiencing abuse or parental abandonment, may also play a role in fostering a sense of significance loss (Simi et al. 2015). Social identity models. In general, social identity theory argues individuals’ membership in identity groups (e.g., race, gender, extremist groups) influences how people see, think, and feel about themselves. More specifically, these identities are important because they provide information about how individuals should think and behave, thereby reducing their uncertainty about the social world, while providing the individual a positive sense of self (Tajfel and Turner 1986; Turner 1985). Drawing from this perspective, Hogg (Hogg and Terry 2000; Hogg 2001) argues that group leaders are an important part of understanding group processes, including extremist groups, because group leaders reflect what characteristics are needed for group membership. In other words, extremist groups and their leaders provide important cues for how individuals understand their social world. This is particularly important for individuals who feel uncertain about things that are relevant to the self. One important communicative strategy that group leaders use is called black sheeping. In black sheeping, the communicator uses a group member’s actions to show that this is not how group members should think or behave. In relation to the influence of the group on individuals, the more prominent group dynamic concepts and theories that have been put to use in the study of terrorism are: group polarization; groupthink; in-group/out-group bias; diffusion of responsibility; and rule compliance. Recruitment models. The recruitment approach focuses on extremist organizations and their efforts to draw recruits to support their political ambitions. From this perspective, group behaviors and messages are the units of analyses. As Gerwehr and Daly (2006) note, there is not much progress in the “scientific study on the vulnerability of recruitment by terrorist groups” (emphasis added). Similarly, Borum (2011) finds individuals to recruitment to be an important, yet so far neglected, field of inquiry. Gerwehr and Daly (2006) argue that recruitment to extremism can occur in a number of ways, including public and proximate; public and mediated; private and proximate; and private and media tailore ted. It is important to note that for recruitment to be effective, messages need to be d to an audience’s cultural, social, and historical background. For this reason, the recruitment perspective draws heavily from approaches that emphasize psychological and emotional variables (e.g., dependent personality, mental trauma associated with personal and community crises). Social movement models. Social movement theory is a broad field out of which ‘framing theory’ has so far been put to the most use (Bo study of Islamic radicalization stands out as a central rum, 2011). Quintan Wiktorowicz’s 2005 work that connects social movement theory to the study of radicalization. Wiktorowicz develops a radicalization model with several phases: cognitive opening (triggered by a crisis), religious seeking (as a result of the cognitive opening), frame alignment, and indoctrination. Frame alignment refers to the linkage between the interpretative frames (i.e. lenses through which reality is perceived and interpreted) of the radical organizations with those of prospective constituents. The This resource was prepared by the author(s) using Federal funds provided by the U.S. Department of Justice. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice 49 decision to engage in extremist violence is rational and motivated by gain, but defined in the terms of the newly acquired frames. Cost/benefit models. Cost/benefit models are based on the assumption that extremists are not different from non-extremists in terms of socio-demographic characteristics or decision-making processes (Crenshaw 1987; McCormick 2003). From this perspective, individual radicalization is the product of a rational (though perhaps bounded) decision- making process in which the costs and benefits of alternative strategies are weighed prior to action. Extremist behaviors are determined to maximize potential benefits while minimizing costs. So-called ‘lures’ or ‘selective incentives’—forms of material gain which render ‘being a radical’ attractive—play an important role in the radicalization process by convincing individuals that the gains from extremist activities outweigh the costs (Pisoiu 2011). The way such incentives might function was explained by the adoption of rules and values based on the feedback of the social environment—the observation of models and rewards and punishments received (Bandura 1973), and conceptualized as behavioral reinforcers (Max Taylor and Horgan 2001). Conceptual Constructs From these research programs, we identified over 70 causal mechanisms (see Appendix 7) that have been proposed as conditions that drive radicalization to violence. These run the gamut from psychological and emotional causes, to material benefits and group dynamics. Instead of attempting to directly test the applicability of these research programs on the data, we opted to organize the different theoretical mechanisms according to their conceptual similarities (see Table 21) and to use the conceptual constructs as the conditions included in the set-theory analysis. There are several justifications for this approach, including the considerable thematic overlap in the mechanisms that are detailed, the lack of processor pathway hypotheses in extant theories, and the ability to drastically increase the overall causal complexity of the analysis. 40 Before moving on to a description of the 10 causal constructs that we identified, it is important to reiterate that the conceptual overlap among theories of radicalization is extensive, which makes it difficult to organize individual causal mechanisms into neatly demarcated conceptual categories. The 10 conceptual constructs that we have developed here are distinct in terms of their constitutive attributes, but they are also deeply inter- connected. However, this should not be viewed as an obstacle to the investigation of causal pathways for three reasons. 40 Tests of set-coincidence (Borgna 2013) revealed no significant overlap between these conceptual constructs, and, thus, all were retained for analysis. This resource was prepared by the author(s) using Federal funds provided by the U.S. Department of Justice. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice - - - - - - - - - - - 50 Psychological rewards Material Rewards Personal Crisis Community Crisis Recruitment A.1: Significance restoration A.2:Individual significance gain A.3: Social significance gain A.4: Group prestige A.5: Uncertainty relief A.6 : Heroism A.7: Individual recognition A.8: Emotional rewards B.1: Paradise B.2: Status B.3: Material Reward C.1: Economic crisis C.2: Socio cultural crisis C.3: Personal crisis C.4: Crisis driven cognitive opening C.5: Emotional distress C.6 Crisis driven religious seeking D.1: Collective crisis situation D.2: External threat D.3: Political crisis D.4: Cognitive opening D.5: Imminent existential threat E.1: Public proximate E.2: Public mediated E.3: Private proximate E.4: Private mediated A.9: Moral rewards A.10: Avoidance of significance loss Cognitive Frame Alignment Psychological Vulnerability Physical Vulnerability Group Norms Group Biases F.1: Frame alignment F.2: Indoctrination F.3: Authority of frame articulator F.4: Empirical evidence F.5: Universal truth F.6: Incremental learning F.7: Individual learning F.8: Forming interpretive frames F.9: Framework exclusivising F.10: Rules directed redesigning G.1: Humiliation G.2: Helplessness G.3: Socially based significance loss G.4: Group boundaries G.5: Uncertainty G.6: Emotional distress G.7: Cultural disillusionment G.8: Anomie G.9: Broken family G.10: Loose family G.11: Lack of affection from parents G.12: Loose community relations G.13: Dependent personality G.14: Socio cultural crisis H.1: Physical distress H.2: Material distress H.3: Family dysfunctionality H.4: Community dysfunctionality H.5: Economic crisis I.1: Leadership prototypicality I.2: Leadership importance I.3: Leadership norms I.4: Black sheeping I.5: Rule compliance I.6: Authority of frame articulator I.7: Uncertainty relief J.1: Group influence J.2: Groupthink J.3: External threat J.4: Typicality threat J.5: In group/out group bias J.6: Dehumanizing rhetoric J.7: Diffusion of responsibility J.8: Social isolation J.9: Interpretative frameworks Table 21 Conceptual constructs This resource was prepared by the author(s) using Federal funds provided by the U.S. Department of Justice. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice 51 First, the connections between the conceptual constructs that we have developed and their constitutive causal mechanisms are often temporal in nature and help us to understand radicalization to violence as processes that unfold over time. For example, while the individual mechanisms that make up the personal crisis and psychological vulnerability constructs are inherently similar, they may stand in temporal relation to one another, where crises are the causes of vulnerabilities. Second, the method that we have chosen—fs/QCA—treats overlaps between sets (our conceptual constructs) as normal social phenomena and it is designed to handle this type of complexity. What is important from an fs/QCA perspective is that the calibration scheme which is used is sufficiently detailed to accurately describe what it means for a case to be fully in one set (conceptual construct) as opposed to another. Table 23 below details how we have defined membership in the various causal constructs. Finally, to ensure that our conceptual constructs do not overlap to the point of mutual constitution, we performed tests of set-coincidence (Borgna 2013) and found that our conceptual constructs easily cross the threshold for uniqueness, meaning that all could be retained for our analysis. Personal crisis. Personal crises refer to events experienced by individuals who experienced intense trouble, difficulty, or danger leading to personal instability (e.g., Wiktorowicz 2005). Several prominent radicalization theories surmise that the instability stemming from personal crises makes some individuals vulnerable to radicalization. Specifically, recruitment models (Gerwehr and Daly 2006) argue that while there is no “one-size-fits-all” (p. 75) recruitment strategy, those who experienced personal crises may be able be particularly vulnerable at recruitment pitches that are framed as social advancement. Social movement models (e.g., Wiktorowicz 2005) suggest that the instability that comes from personal crises allow for a cognitive opening wherein the person’s belief system can be changed to align with more radical beliefs. To capture personal crisis, we coded the cases for emotional distress, economic crises, personal discrimination, personal experience with death or crime, or crisis-driven cognitive opening. Community crisis. Similar to personal crisis, community crisis refers to events that are characterized by intense trouble, difficulty, or danger that leads to personal instability (e.g., Wiktorowicz 2005). However, unlike personal crises, community crises occur to members of the community, which can evoke psychological and communicative processes related to group dynamics. All theories reviewed above indicate that community crises are an important precursor to radicalization, including psychological models (e.g., Kruglanski et al. 2014), social identity models (e.g. Hogg 2001), recruitment models (e.g., Gerwehr and Daly 2006), social movement models (e.g., Borum 2011), and cost/benefit models (e.g., Max Taylor and Horgan 2001). To measure community crisis, we coded for group-facilitated cognitive opening, collective crisis situation, feelings of external or imminent threat posed by other social groups, and political crises. Psychological vulnerability. Psychological vulnerability refers to cognitive and emotional characteristics that threaten a person’s sense of self, which in turn makes them vulnerable This resource was prepared by the author(s) using Federal funds provided by the U.S. Department of Justice. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice 52 to the adoption of radical beliefs and engagement in radical behavior (e.g., Kruglanski et al. 2014). Four of the reviewed theories predict that psychological vulnerabilities play an important role in the radicalization process, including psychological models (e.g., Kruglanski et al. 2014), social identity models (e.g., Hogg 2001), recruitment models (e.g., Gerwehr and Daly 2006), and social movement models (e.g., Borum 2011). We coded for psychological uncertainty, personal humiliation, personal helplessness, socially-instilled significance loss, failure to assimilate to dominate cultures, emotional distress, cultural disillusionment, anomie, divorce or other family separation, loose or distant family relations, lack of attention/affection from family, loose or distant relations from community members, socio-cultural crisis, and dependent personality. Psychological rewards. Psychological rewards refer to cognitive and emotional benefits that are received, or believed will be received, from adopting radical beliefs and/or engaging radical behaviors (Hogg 2001; Kruglanski et al. 2014). These cognitive and emotional benefits are thought to positively influence a person’s sense of self (Hogg 2001; Kruglanski et al. 2014). Three of the perspectives reviewed above propose that psychological rewards are important drivers in the radicalization process, including, psychological models (e.g., Kruglanski et al. 2014), social identity models (e.g., Hogg 2001), and (bounded) cost/benefit models (e.g., Max Taylor and Horgan 2001). To capture psychological rewards we coded for significance restoration, individually-based significance gain, socially-instilled significance gain, group prestige, psychological uncertainty relief, heroism, personal status, recognition, emotional rewards, and moral rewards. Physical vulnerability. Recruitment models argue physical vulnerabilities make people susceptible to recruitment into extremists groups (e.g., Gerwehr and Daly 2006). Physical vulnerability is when individuals are in situations or experience circumstances where their basic needs are not met, such as not having access to important resources, such as food, shelter, and the like. We coded for physical vulnerabilities at both the personal and community levels. Material rewards. Material rewards refer to incentive or benefits that are physical or real, or perceived to be physical or real by the individual. Both cost/benefit (e.g., Gerwehr and Daly 2006), and social movement (e.g., Borum 2011) perspectives predict that some individuals are driven to engage in radical behaviors because they believe will receive material rewards, achieve a form of status that will allow them to receive future material rewards, or go to paradise (i.e., an other-worldly place where individuals will go if they martyr themselves). Recruitment. Recruitment models suggest that many individuals need access to extremist groups to solidify their radical beliefs and have the resources needed to engage in radical behaviors (Gerwehr and Daly 2006). Gerwehr and Daly (2006) put forth four methods of recruitment: public and proximate; public and mediated; private and proximate; and private and mediated. This resource was prepared by the author(s) using Federal funds provided by the U.S. Department of Justice. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice 53 Group biases. Group biases refer to a pattern of cognitions (e.g., beliefs, values) wherein a person favors social groups (e.g., racial/ethnic groups, extremist groups) that they are a part of, or wish to be a part of (termed ingroups) over groups that they are not a part of (termed outgroups). Given that many radical behaviors are committed by, or on behalf of, extremist groups, it is not surprising that group biases are predicted to be a driving factor in engaging in radical behaviors (e.g., Hogg 2001; Kruglanski et al. 2014; Taylor and Horgan 2001). To capture group biases we coded the cases for group-based radicalization, groupthink (McCauley and Moskalenko 2008), external threat of another social group, whether the external threat was typical of intergroup threat, ingroup/outgroup biases, dehumanizing rhetoric, diffusion of responsibility, forming interpretative frameworks, and social isolation. Communicating group norms. Both social identity and occupational choice perspectives surmise that exposure to communication endorsing the need to hold radical beliefs and engage in radical behaviors is part and parcel of the radicalization process. Specifically, social identity model of leadership (e.g., Hogg 2001) argues that many of these messages about group beliefs, values, and subsequently actions are likely to come from group leaders, and group leaders that embody group characteristics (i.e., are prototypical members are the group) are more likely to be persuasive. Similarly, occupational choice models suggest that the authority of the message articulator likely influences a person’s willingness to hold extremist beliefs and engage in radical behaviors. Hence, we coded leadership importance, leadership prototypical, authority of frame articulator, communication of group rules, uncertainty relief, and black sheeping. Cognitive frame alignment. Drawing from social movement perspectives, cognitive frame alignment refers to the learning processes an individual undergoes in forming radical beliefs (Bandura 1973; Borum 2011). This notion is rooted in both theory and evidence in social psychology that cognitions (e.g., attitudes and beliefs) are predictive of human behavior (see Kraus, 1995 for a meta-analytic review). To capture cognitive frame alignment, we coded for frame alignment, indoctrination, frame exclusivising, authority of the frame articulator, empirical evidence of the belief system, universal truth of the belief system, incremental learning, individual learning, forming interpretative frameworks, and rules directed redesigning. Methodology Given the study’s emphasis on radicalization as a complex causal process, we utilized case study methods designed to handle conjunctural causation and non-linearity in order to assess the mechanisms detailed above. Specifically, we used process-tracing techniques (Bennett and Checkel 2014; A. L. George and Bennett 2005; Collier 2011) to write life- course narratives for a sample of U.S.-based extremists. We then coded the cases for the presence of the key mechanisms that were extracted from the five research programs. Finally, we used fs/QCA in order to test for causal necessity and show how the proposed causal mechanisms combine to form causal conjunctions that are sufficient for individuals to be members of the set of violent extremists. This resource was prepared by the author(s) using Federal funds provided by the U.S. Department of Justice. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice 54 Case selection. The research team compiled life-histories for 56 individuals who radicalized in the U.S. between 1960 and 2013. These individuals were selected for inclusion in the set-theory analysis based on four factors: the availability of critical information related to their backgrounds and activities in public sources; their participation as a member of a group or movement representing the far left, far right, or radical Islamist ideological milieus; their values on key variables from the statisticalanalysis described in the previous section, and their statuses as most-likely or least-likely cases for extant theories of radicalization (Eckstein 1975; George and Bennett 2005). This last case selection criterion is especially important. Since one of the goals of this analysis is to assess the explanatory strength of the causal mechanisms that are highlighted by radicalization theories, cases were selected in part on the types of challenges for explanation that they pose for the theories and their respective causal logics. Most-likely cases are those that show high values on the particular causal conditions that are highlighted by a theory, and thus, should display the outcome that is predicted by the theory. Least-likely cases, on the other hand, are those that show low values on the conditions that are emphasized by a theory and, thus, should fail to display the outcome that is posited by the theory (Eckstein 1975). Mechanisms that help explain least-likely cases are considered to have strong explanatory power, while those that fail to contribute to explanations of most-likely cases are considered to be less important as general explanatory conditions. In addition to these case selection criteria, we took efforts to ensure that our sample of cases is representative of the larger population of extremists in the U.S. As the previous section shows, extremists in the U.S. tend to be overwhelmingly male (approximately 90%), are typically around 28-32 years of age at the time of their involvement in extremist activities, and are fairly well educated. The sample used in this section is 91% male, has an average age of 31 years at the point of involvement in extremist acts, and is dominated (52%) by individuals who attended or completed college. Case coding. Using MAXQDA data analysis software, coders evaluated the life-course histories and applied the relevant codes (see Appendix 7) to instances in the text where the mechanisms were apparent. All life-course histories were double-coded to ensure reliability and then cleaned and reviewed by the project researchers. See Table 22 for basic descriptive statistics of the conceptual construct coding. This resource was prepared by the author(s) using Federal funds provided by the U.S. Department of Justice. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice 55 Condition Mean Std. Dev. Cases Personal Crisis 0.69642 0.43227 56 Community Crisis Psychological Vulnerability Psychological Rewards Physical Vulnerability Material Rewards 0.83482 0.70535 0.66964 0.49553 0.13839 0.32485 0.37233 0.33108 0.41640 0.30222 56 56 56 56 56 Recruitment 0.44196 0.47946 56 Group Norms Group Biases Cognitive Frame Alignment Violent Extremism 0.49553 0.78125 0.95982 0.67857 0.46649 0.34738 0.15509 0.35265 56 56 56 56 Table 22 - Descriptive statistics of conceptual constructs Fuzzy-set/Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fs/QCA). The cases studies described above were analyzed using fs/QCA techniques. Fs/QCA was chosen because of its unique ability to handle causal complexity and its focus on necessary and sufficient causation (Schneider and Wagemann 2012). Fs/QCA relies on a fundamentally different logic of inference than traditional quantitative based approaches, which are grounded in inferential statistics (Ragin, 2008). Instead of attempting to isolate the net-effects of independent variables, QCA conceives of the social world in terms of membership in sets (e.g. the set of democracies) and the relationships between sets (e.g. the relationship between the set of countries with fair elections and the set of democratic countries). QCA looks for consistent commonalities among cases that are members of the same set and asks whether those commonalities are necessary or sufficient for membership in the set (Ragin 2008). In contrast to quantitative approaches, QCA assumes that set relations are asymmetrical and non-linear, driven by complex processes, such as equifinality and multi-finality (defined above), and that causation is typically conjunctural in nature (i.e. conditions combine to produce set membership) (Schneider and Wagemann 2012; Ragin 2008; Goertz and Mahoney 2012). We next provide a brief description of the important concepts of fs/QCA before moving on to our analysis results. Necessary conditions. Necessary conditions are causes which must be present for an outcome to occur, but also causes whose presence do not guarantee the occurrence of the outcome (Goertz and Starr 2002; Mahoney, Kimball, and Koivu 2009). In set-theoretical terms, tests for necessity measure the extent to which the outcome Y is a subset of cause X; that is, the extent to which all cases that are members of the outcome set Y are also members of the condition set X (Schneider and Wagemann 2012; Ragin 2008). For example, all U.S. presidents are members of the set of U.S. citizens, but not all members of the set of U.S. citizen are members of the set of U.S. presidents. The uncovering of necessary conditions is often an important discovery, especially for young research fields, since they are the conditions that make outcomes of interest possible. Of course, in the social world, things rarely display the type of rigid uniformity (always absent or always present) built This resource was prepared by the author(s) using Federal funds provided by the U.S. Department of Justice. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice 56 Figure 1 - Necessary and "near" necessary conditions into this strict conception of necessary causes, which has led social scientists to instead think of causes as “near” necessary conditions—causes which usually must be present for the occurrence of an outcome (Ragin 2008). See Figure 1 for an illustration of these concepts. Sufficient conditions. A condition is sufficient when its presence causes the occurrence of an outcome, but the outcome may also be caused by other (and conceptually unrelated) conditions (Mahoney, Kimball, and Koivu 2009; Ragin 2008; Schneider and Wagemann 2012). In set-theory, a sufficient condition X is a subset of the outcome Y; that is, all cases that are members of the condition set X are also members of the outcome set Y. For instance, all men who are members of the set of bachelors are also members of the set of unmarried individuals, but the set of unmarried individuals also contains men and women from other set groups, such those who are divorced, widowed, or are too young to marry. While necessary conditions are those factors which make outcomes possible, sufficient conditions are those which cause outcomes to occur, and, thus, they are especially important to scientific exploration. As is the case with necessary conditions, however, social and behavioral phenomena very rarely follow the law-like pattern (if X, then Y) that is built into statements of sufficiency, causing social scientist to think of sufficiency in terms of conditions that are almost always sufficient for the occurrence of an outcome (see Figure 2). This resource was prepared by the author(s) using Federal funds provided by the U.S. Department of Justice. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice 57 Figure 2 - Sufficient and "near" sufficient conditions INUS conditions. In social science, a causal condition typically only has a sufficient relationship with an outcome of interest when it is combined with other causes. Causes that combine with others to form sufficient conjunctions are commonly known as INUS conditions (Mackie 1965; Mahoney, Kimball, and Koivu 2009). In formal terms, an INUS cause is a necessary, but not sufficient, part of a conjunction of conditions which are collectively sufficient, but not necessary, for producing an outcome (Mackie 1965). INUS conditions make up the solution pathways (termed causal recipes, see Ragin, 2008) that are the products of fs/QCA analysis and are of central importance to studies of causal complexity. Truth tables. The main tool that researchers utilizing QCA use to uncover solution pathways is the truth table. Truth tables contain rows that represent all possible logical combinations of the causal conditions equal to 2k, where k equals the number of causal condition that are being retained as potential INUS conditions (Ragin 2000; Ragin 2008). Once constructed, truth tables are minimized using Boolean techniques, leaving behind those conjunctions of causes that are sufficient to produce membership in the outcome set. In short, “the truth table elaborates and formalizes one of the key analytic strategies of comparative research—examining cases sharing specific combinations of causal conditions to see if they share the same outcome” (Ragin 2008: 24). In fs/QCA analysis, the strength of empirical support for the solution paths that are generated by the logical minimization of a truth table is generally derived from two descriptive measures—consistency and coverage. Consistency. Consistency measures the extent to which the data support the set-theoretic claims that are implicit in the logic of necessary and sufficient causes. In other words, for necessary conditions, consistency measures the extent to which the outcome is a subset of the causal condition, while for sufficient relationships, consistency measures the extent to which the causal condition is a subset of the outcome (Schneider and Wagemann 2012). These scores range from 0 (i.e., not consistent with the set-theoretical claim) to 1 (i.e., This resource was prepared by the author(s) using Federal funds provided by the U.S. Department of Justice. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice 58 completely consistent with the set-theoretical claim). While researchers have not yet reached a universal consensus on which consistency scores to use as the benchmarks for necessity and sufficiency, most agree that in tests for necessity, conditions with a consistency score of 0.90 or higher can be consider necessary for the outcome (Ragin 2008; Schneider and Wagemann 2012), while in tests of sufficiency, consistency scores of 0.80 and higher signal that the cause is “mostly” a subset of the outcome (Ragin 2008). Consistency scores for necessary conditions are calculated by using the following formula, where !" is the degree of membership in set X, and Yi is the degree of membership in set is the degree of membership in set Y: ∑ min !", #"#" ≤ !" = ∑ #" The formula for sufficiency consistency is: ∑ min !", #"!" ≤ #" = ∑ !" Coverage. Coverage measures the proportion of cases that display an outcome of interest explained by a solution pathway. Coverage is conceptually similar, but not mathematically equivalent, to measures of explained variance that are reported in statistical tests. Since solution pathways often contain one or more of the same INUS conditions, coverage can be thought of as the total proportion of cases covered by a solution pathway (raw coverage) or the unique portion of cases that are covered by that pathway alone (unique coverage) (Ragin 2008). Coverage can also be calculated for all of the solution pathways combined (solution coverage), which effectually measures the proportion of the data in a given study displaying the outcome that are covered by the various combinations of the causal conditions that are included in the study. Coverage for sufficient conditions is calculated by using the following formula: ∑ min !", #"!" ≤ #" = ∑ #" Fuzzy sets. When it was first introduced, QCA involved the analysis of simple dichotomous measures of set membership in causes and outcomes, what is known as crisp set QCA, which treats both causal inputs and outcomes as binary (Ragin 1987). However, given that the social world rarely conforms nicely to simple present/absent classifications, This resource was prepared by the author(s) using Federal funds provided by the U.S. Department of Justice. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice 59 researchers now more commonly think of set membership in fuzzy terms, where cases can have membership scores ranging anywhere in the continuum between 0 (i.e., the condition is completely absent) and 1 (i.e., the condition is completely present) (Ragin 2000; Ragin 2008). This allows for much finer grained analyses, where cases can be more in than out of a set and vice versa, and it frees researchers from making membership decisions that are not backed by substantive knowledge or empirical evidence. Moreover, fuzzy scores retain a key strength of set-theory, where researchers are forced to think critically about what it means for a case to be a member of a condition or outcome set. Unlike traditional quantitative analysis, which treats any difference in measurement as meaningful, fs/QCA requires that researchers make informed decisions about the ontology of concepts (Goertz 2005) and decide at which points measurement differences are no longer conceptually meaningful. For example, a researcher might decide that full democracy is made up of competitive elections, civil liberties, and a free press. All cases displaying those attributes would be assigned membership scores of 1 in the set of full democracies. Cases that display additional attributes, such as legislative constraints or executive cohesiveness, would not be given a higher score since those features are not additionally useful for determining which countries are democracies and which are not. Calibration. The process of assigning membership scores to cases for causal conditions and outcomes is known as calibration (Ragin 2008; Basurto and Speer 2012; Schneider and Wagemann 2012). To calibrate data for fs/QCA analysis, researchers must first use their topic and case expertise to decide what case attributes constitute full membership (a score of 1), full non-membership (a score of 0), and full ambiguity (a score of 0.5, not in or out of the set) for all causal conditions and the outcome. For example, a researcher looking to assign case membership in the set of democracies might use the POLITY index and decide that all countries with scores of 7 and above are fully in the set (a score of 1), all countries with scores 0 and below are fully out of the set (a score of 0) and all countries with a score of 3 are fully ambiguous (a score of 0.5). The cases displaying the remaining POLITY values would be given membership scores that fall between the anchor points. There are numerous methods for assigning intermediate scores, including statistical and theoretical approaches (Ragin 2008). The decision of which to use should be driven by the particular questions that the researcher hopes to answer and the type of data he or she is using. Steps in conducting fs/QCA. Once all cases have been calibrated for set membership in the proposed causal conditions and the outcome, the completion of fs/QCA analysis occurs in several stages. It is important that researchers complete all of these steps to uncover all meaningful relationships in the data and to ensure that those findings are robust. Necessity tests. The first step in carrying out fs/QCA analysis is to determine which conditions, if any, are necessary for the occurrence of an outcome. As noted above, in social science, conditions are usually “near” necessary, as opposed to always present. The “nearness” of a condition to the pure conceptualization of necessity is measured by calculating the proportion of cases that have values on a cause which are greater than or equal to their values on the outcome. Expressed graphically, necessity tests measure the This resource was prepared by the author(s) using Federal funds provided by the U.S. Department of Justice. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice 60 number of cases that cluster on or below the main diagonal on XY plots in comparison to those that fall above the main diagonal (see Figures 3 and 4). As previously stated, the consistency cutoff for necessity is .90. Tests for “trivialness” and true logically contradictory cases (TLCs). Tests for necessity often reveal important relationships between conditions and outcomes, but researchers must be careful to recognize that the constraining effects of necessary conditions on outcomes are lessened if the conditions are trivial (Goertz 2006), or contain true logically contradictory cases (TLCs) (Schneider and Wagemann 2012). Trivial necessary conditions are those which are consistently fully present even though membership scores in the outcome set vary from fully absent to fully present. In other words, trivial necessary conditions are those which must be present, but are limited in their ability to explain variations in outcomes. Trivial necessary conditions can still be important findings, but given consistently high set membership scores, they must be married with additional causal conditions to have any analytical leverage. By comparison, TLCs are those cases that display set membership scores that place them in the outcome set (i.e. greater than 0.5), but out of the condition set (i.e. less than 0.5) (Schneider and Wagemann 2012). TLCs are a particularly problematic type of inconsistent case because they directly violate the logic of necessity, which stipulates that the outcome cannot occur in the absence of the necessary condition. Conditions that contain TLCs should be included in later tests for sufficiency since the outcome can occur in their absence. Measuring the extent of a condition’s “trivialness” as well as detecting the presence of TLCs, are accomplished using simple XY charts that plot all cases according to their membership scores in the causal conditions and the outcome. Trivial necessary conditions are ones that display case clustering along the far right vertical axis, while TLCs are markers that have scores above 0.5 on the Y axis, and scores below 0.5 on the X axis. Truth table construction. With tests for necessity complete, the next step in fs/QCA analysis involves the construction of a truth table. The most important decision researchers must make in the construction of the truth table is to determine which conditions to include, which in turn has an impact on the range of possible INUS conditions that can be uncovered. It is common in fs/QCA research to drop necessary conditions from the truth table since the table allows for tests of sufficiency, not necessity (Ragin 2009). However, more recent scholarship on fs/QCA cautions against dropping necessary conditions from table if those conditions are non-trivial or contain TLCs (Mello 2013). Non-trivial necessary conditions can also be sufficient, either on their own or in conjunction with other causes, for the occurrence of the outcome. Removing them from the truth table analysis limits the ability of researchers to uncover potentially meaningful relationships. Likewise, the exclusion of necessary conditions that show the presence of TLCs from the truth table precludes the possibility of identifying the causal conjunctions that explain the occurrence of the outcome in spite of the absence of “near” necessary conditions. Sufficiency tests. Similar to tests of necessity, “near” sufficient conditions are identified by calculating the proportion of cases that fall on or above the main diagonal in XY plots in This resource was prepared by the author(s) using Federal funds provided by the U.S. Department of Justice. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice 61 comparison to those that fall below. As noted above, since sufficient conditions are comparatively rare in the social sciences, tests for sufficiency usually seek to identify the universe of INUS causes, or the conjunctions of individual causal conditions, that are sufficient for explaining the occurrence of an outcome. The process of identifying INUS conditions involves the logical minimization of the truth table using Boolean techniques. This process requires that researchers make two critical decisions. First, researchers must decide which rows in the truth represent sufficient conditions for the outcome. This is most commonly done by assigning a cutoff for sufficiency using the raw consistency scores of the individual rows in the truth table. While there are many suggestions for choosing a raw consistency cutoff in the fs/QCA literature, researchers most commonly use the 0.80 consistency (see discussion above) threshold for determining which truth table rows constitute sufficient conditions for outcome set membership (Ragin 2008). This value should only be used, however, after careful analysis reveals the absence of natural breaks in consistency scores and tests show that none of the rows with consistency scores of 0.80 or higher contain TLCs (Schneider and Wagemann 2012). Second, researchers must decide whether to use the truth table rows that lack empirical evidence, known as logical remainders, in the logical minimization procedures. Given the limited diversity that is common in the social world (Ragin 2008), researchers are likely to find that the majority of the rows in their truth tables lack empirical content. Logical remainders can be used as counterfactuals to further simplify the complexity of the INUS combinations that are left after standard Boolean minimization techniques have been applied. The use of logical remainders requires that researchers make knowledge-based decision about the presence or absence of each of the causal conditions that are include in the truth table. If such knowledge does not exist, researchers should avoid using logical remainders for further logical minimization. Robustness tests. Upon the completion of the logical minimization of the truth table, researchers should perform at least two robustness tests to ensure that the combinations of INUS conditions that they have uncovered are, in fact, sufficient conditions for outcome set membership. First, researchers should look for the presence of any TLCs in any of the solution paths. This is done by using XY plots to determine if any cases that are members of the individual solution paths (i.e. values greater than 0.5) have values on outcome membership that put them outside of the set (i.e. less than 0.5). Again, TLCs are problematic because they contradict the logic of sufficiency, which states that a case will exhibit the outcome if the solution condition is present. Second, researchers should test to ensure that none of the solution paths are simultaneously sufficient for the negation of the outcome (~Y). Simultaneous subset relations significantly lessen the analytic value of INUS conjunctions since those solution paths are sufficient for explaining the cases that are members in an outcome set but are also sufficient for explaining those cases that fail to exhibit the outcome (Schneider and Wagemann 2012). Simultaneous subset relations are determined by calculating the solution path’s raw consistency and proportional reduction in inconsistency (PRI) scores for both the outcome and its negation. Solution paths that display high raw consistency and PRI scores on the outcome, and low consistency and PRI This resource was prepared by the author(s) using Federal funds provided by the U.S. Department of Justice. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice 62 scores on the negation of the outcome, have clear non-simultaneous subset relations and can be considered sufficient conditions for the outcome (Schneider and Wagemann 2012). Results Calibration. The 56 cases included in this study were calibrated for membership in the ten causal conditions and the outcome using a manual, theoretical approach (see Appendix 6 for case calibration scores). The research team used its knowledge of the conceptual constructs described above to determine which combinations of causal mechanisms from the conceptual constructs constitute full membership in a particular set (a score of 1), which combinations are indicative of a case being more in than out of the set (a score of 0.75), which mechanisms are associated with full ambiguity (a score of 0.5), the combinations that suggest that a case is more out than in the set (a score of 0.25), and the requirements for exclusion from the set (a score of 0). This calibration scheme was chosen because of the use of non-numerical data and for the particular analytical benefits it provides. This scheme forces researchers to use theory and substantive knowledge to determine what mechanisms constitute necessary, sufficient, and INUS conditions for set membership, and, thus, it allows for a more direct assessment of the explanatory capabilities of causal mechanisms than a calibration scheme based on regularities found in the data. The details of the calibration scheme that we used are listed in Table 23. The table shows how the mechanisms that were drawn from the various theories were weighted to establish membership in the conceptual sets. For example, an individual was treated as fully out of the set of “personal crisis” if they failed to show evidence of the presence of any of the mechanisms that were identified as belonging to that conceptual category. An individual was deemed to be more out than in the set (i.e. a 0.25) if they showed evidence of the presence of either, but not both, an economic crisis or socio-cultural crisis. When both were present, the individual was deemed to be neither in nor out of the set (i.e. a 0.5). Individuals were determined to be mostly in the set (i.e. 0.75) when there was evidence that they experienced a crisis-driven cognitive opening. Finally, an individual was deemed to be a full member of the set (i.e. a score of 1) if they showed evidence of experiencing a personal, non-material crisis or severe emotional distress, or if a crisis-driven cognitive opening combined with either an economic crisis or a socio-cultural crisis. This resource was prepared by the author(s) using Federal funds provided by the U.S. Department of Justice. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice “ “ “ “ ” * - * * - *~ *~ *~ *~ ~ ” ” * * * * * ~ ” ” - Condition 0 .25 Psychological Rewards Material Rewards Personal Crisis Community Crisis Recruitment Cognitive Frame Alignment No codes No codes No codes No codes No codes No codes Any single A” code B.1+B.3 only C.1+C.2 only D.3 only E.2 only (~F.1 F.2 F.9)*(any one remaining “F” code) Psychological Vulnerability Physical Vulnerability Group Norms No codes No codes No codes codes) G.5*(any remaining “G H.1+H.4 only I.4+I.5+I.7 Group Biases No codes codes) J.1*(any remaining “J Violent extremism (outcome) Renunciation of the use of Property damage but no violence for political goals violence against person(s) Table 23 fs/QCA calibration scheme Legend: + = Logical OR, * = Logical AND, Bold = necessary condition, Italics = sufficient condition, ~ = Ab .5 .75 Any two A” codes Any three A” codes B.1 B.3 only C.1*C.2 only C.4 only D.4 only D.1+(D.3 D.4) E.1+E.4 only (~F.1 F.2 F.9)*(any F.1+F.2+F.9+(any three two remaining “F” codes) remaining “F” codes) G.5 only G.5 “G *(any single remaining ” code) H.1 H.4 only H.3 (H.1+H.4) (I.4 I.5)+(I.4 I.7)+(I.5 I.7) I.1+I.2+I.6+I.3 J.1 only J.1 “J *(any single remaining ” code Support for, but no direct Intent to perpetrate violent participation in, violence act(s) against person(s) sence of condition, - = Score not applicable 63 1 Any four A codes B.2 only C.3+C.5+C.6+(C.4 (C.1+C.2)) D.2+D.5+(D.1*D.3)+(D.1*D.4) E.3 only (F.1+F.2+F.9)*(any single remaining “F” code)+(~F.1*+~F.2+~F.9)*(any four remaining “F” codes) G.5*(any two remaining “G codes) H.2+H.5+(H.3*H.1*H.4) (I. (I.1 1+I.2+I.6+I.3)*( I.4+I.5+I.7)+ *I.2)+(I.6*I.3)+(I.1*I.3) J.1*(any two remaining “J codes) Actual or attempted violence against person(s) This resource was prepared by the author(s) using Federal funds provided by the U.S. Department of Justice. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice 64 In order to stay consistent with the quantitative analysis that was done in the previous section41, we calibrated the outcome set according to the following scheme: individuals who engaged in acts meant to cause injury or death were considered to be fully in the set (i.e. a score of 1); individuals who intended to participate in acts meant to cause injury or death, but nevertheless failed to do so because of law enforcement intervention, were coded as mostly in the set (i.e. a score of 0.75); individuals who materially supported the violent actions of others, but showed no intention to personally engage in violent acts, were coded as fully ambiguous (i.e. a score of 0.50); individuals who engaged in illegal acts that were not intended to cause death or injury (e.g. vandalism, property destruction, etc.) were scored as mostly out of the set (i.e. a score of 0.25); and individuals who denounced acts meant to kill or injure were scored as fully out of the set (i.e. a score of 0). Tests for necessity. With calibration complete, the research team measured the set relations of the ten causal conditions described above in relation to the outcome (violent extremism) to determine if any cross the 0.90 consistency threshold for necessity. The results, which are reported in Table 24, show that two conditions—cognitive frame alignment and community crisis—pass this threshold and can be viewed as “near” necessary causes of violent extremism. This is potentially a very significant finding, as it suggests that radicalization to violence will not occur in the absence of dramatic shifts in an individual’s cognitive belief system or in the absence of a deeply held perception that the individual is a member of a community that has been victimized. To assess the robustness of these claims, the team measured the extent to which these conditions approach “trivial” necessity and also determined if any True Logically Contradictory Cases (TLCs; see Appendix 6 for more information on “trivialness” and TLCs) were present for either of the conditions. Figure 3 shows all 56 cases included in t plotted according to their membership scores in the condition set “cognitive frame his study alignment” and the outcome set “violent extremism.” While TLCs are not present (as evidenced by the lack of cases in the shaded area of the graphic), the cases cluster around the far right vertical axis, which reveals that cognitive frame alignment is likely a trivial necessary condition for violent extremism. This finding is not altogether surprising, as one of the main contentions of this and other studies (Borum 2011) is that t incongruity between extremist beliefs, which are commonly violence- here is often justifying, and extremist behaviors, which are less commonly violent. 41 The calibration of the outcome set reflects the definition of violence (i.e., an individual’s participation in acts meant to kill or injure for the purpose of achieving political goals) that is used throughout this project. We recognize, however, that alternative definitions of violence could be adopted, including those which treat property violence as parallel to acts which harm people. Considering this, we used alternative calibrations of the outcome set, including ones that treated property violence and material support to a terrorist group as an act of violence. However, these alternate calibrations of violent extremism did not significantly change the fs/QCA results that are reported. This resource was prepared by the author(s) using Federal funds provided by the U.S. Department of Justice. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice - 65 Condition Consistency Coverage Personal Crisis ~Personal Crisis Community Crisis ~Community Crisis Psychological Vulnerability ~Psychological Vulnerability Psychological Rewards ~Psychological Rewards Physical Vulnerability ~Physical Vulnerability Material Rewards ~Material Rewards Recruitment ~Recruitment Group Norms ~Group Norms Group Biases ~Group Biases Cognitive Frame Alignment ~Cognitive Frame Alignment 0.736842 0.289474 0.901316 0.138158 0.782895 0.309211 0.782895 0.328947 0.348684 0.664474 0.182411 0.835526 0.460526 0.565789 0.513158 0.506679 0.802632 0.236842 0.960526 0.046053 0.717949 0.647059 0.732620 0.567568 0.753165 0.712121 0.793333 0.675676 0.854839 0.623457 0.903226 0.658031 0.707071 0.688000 0.702703 0.681416 0.697143 0.734694 0.679070 0.777778 Table 24 Tests for necessity Note: ~ = Negation of condition. Threshold for a necessary condition is 0.90. Thus, while most extremists experience a process that leads to a radical alteration in their perceptual frames, comparatively few actually engage in violent acts (see also McCauley and Moskalenko 2008). In short, while cognitive frame alignment helps explains the psychological changes that make violent extremism possible, it less useful as a contributing explanation for why some extremists avoid engaging in violent activism. Similarly, Figure 4 plots the cases membership scores in the condition set “community crisis” and the outcome. Community crisis displays far less trivialness than cognitive frame alignment, with cases scattered more evenly on or below the main diagonal. This suggest that the presence of community crisis not only makes violent extremism possible, but that its presence at least partially drives case membership in the violent extremist set. Unlike cognitive frame alignment, however, community crisis contains two TLCs, as indicated by the markers that fall in the shaded area of the chart. In practical terms, this means that, while somewhat uncommon, violent extremism can occur in the absence of the development of a sense of belonging to a community that has been collectively victimized. Community crisis is, thus, a “near” necessary condition for violent extremism and it is important to determine what conjunction or conjunctions of additional causes make violent extremism possible in the absence of a sense of community victimization. Tests for sufficiency. With tests for necessity complete, the research team moved on to the creation of the fuzzy set truth table that allows for the identification of causal conjunctions that are sufficient explanations of the outcome. Since one of the necessary conditions, community crisis, contained TLCs, it was retained for inclusion in the truth This resource was prepared by the author(s) using Federal funds provided by the U.S. Department of Justice. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice - - 66 Figure 3 Necessary condition test for cognitive frame alignment Note: Size of markers indicates number of cases. Figure 4 Necessary condition test for community crisis Note: Size of markers indicates number of cases. Red markers = TLCs. This resource was prepared by the author(s) using Federal funds provided by the U.S. Department of Justice. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice 67 table, while the other, cognitive frame alignment, which did not have TLCs, was removed (see Ragin 2009 on removing necessary conditions from truth table analyses). Next, a 9fuzzy-set truth table was constructed that contained 512 rows (i.e., 2 discussion above) representing all of the logically possible combinations of the INUS , see truth table conditions that were retained for tests of sufficiency. Next, we removed all rows from the truth table that failed to be sufficient explanations for at least one of the 35 cases of violence included in the study (i.e. logical remainders) leaving 19 rows for final logical minimization using Boolean algebra methods. We used the 0.80 raw consistency cutoff suggested by Ragin and others (Ragin 2008; Schneider and Wagemann 2012) for determining which table rows constitute sufficient conditions for the occurrence of violent extremism. This decision was made after the careful examination of the truth table revealed no natural breaks in raw consistency scores and subsequent tests showed that none of the table rows contained TLCs. Finally, we decided to rely on the complex solution to the truth table, which does not utilize logical remainders for further logical minimization of the truth table. This was done for two reasons. First, since little cumulative knowledge has been generated by empirical radicalization research, the use of logical remainders to further simplify the truth table would likely make assumptions that are not backed by empirical evidence. Second, further simplification of the truth table was hampered by the large number of theoretical constructs that were included in the truth table. In fact, when conditions were allowed to be either present tor absent, the intermediate and complex solutions were identical. Only when we made unjustified assumptions about the presence or absence of the conditions was the intermediate solution any simpler than the complex solution.42 The results of the logical minimization of the truth table are reported in Table 25. The procedure yielded eight pathways, or conjunctions of INUS conditions, that are sufficient explanations for violent extremism.43 The complex solution had an overall coverage of 0.55 and a consistency score of 0.91, indicating that a significant proportion of cases exhibiting violent extremism are covered by the sufficient pathways, and that the claims of sufficiency (i.e. that the pathways are subsets of the outcome) are strongly supported (see Appendix 8 for case membership in the pathways).44 To facilitate a discussion of the solution, paths that share a core set of conditions can be grouped together 42 For example, the intermediate solution produced simpler pathways when conditions like personal crisis were treated as “always present” for radicalization to violence. Since radicalization research has not produced a cumulative understanding that personal crises always precede radicalization, this is an unjustified assumption. 43 The fs/QCA analysis was repeated with ideology included as a causal condition, but the results only reiterate the findings from the previous section; that is, far right, Islamist, and single issue ideologies are present in the pathways described below that lead to violent outcomes. 44 Given that set-theory is based on an epistemological foundation that emphasizes causal asymmetry and views as the goal of social science research to make small, incremental gains in explaining social phenomena, fs/QCA anticipates that a potentially large number of cases displaying outcome set membership will not be covered by solution pathways. In fact, Ragin (2008, 56) suggests that a solution coverage score greater than 0.30 constitutes a significant social science finding. Our pathways cover 20 of the 35 cases which displayed outcome set membership, which is well above the average for fs/QCA research. This resource was prepared by the author(s) using Federal funds provided by the U.S. Department of Justice. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice http:membership in the pathways).44 http:explanations for violent extremism.43 http:solution.42 - 68 Raw Unique Path P. Crisis C. Crisis P. Vuln. P. Rew. Phy. Vul. M. Rew. Recruit. G. Norms G. Biases C. Frame Coverage Coverage Consist. Cases Path 1 Path 2 Path 3 Path 4 Path 5 Path 6 Path 7 Path 8 .118421 .039474 1.00000 5 .184211 .032895 .965517 8 .105263 .052632 .842105 3 .085526 .026316 .812500 4 .164474 .085526 .892857 7 .039474 .032895 1.00000 1 .019737 .019737 1.00000 1 .065789 .065789 .833333 2 Table 25 Results of truth table Solution Coverage: .552632 Solution Consistency: .913043 = Presence of condition = Absence of condition Note: Blank cells equal “Don’t Care”. Cognitive Frame Alignment is a necessary condition and, thus, was not included in the fuzzy truth table. It is included here as a reminder that its presence is necessary in each path. This resource was prepared by the author(s) using Federal funds provided by the U.S. Department of Justice. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice 69 Paths 1-5. Paths 1-5 share the presence of community crisis, psychological vulnerability, and psychological rewards, in addition to the necessary condition of cognitive frame alignment. Since community crisis, psychological vulnerability, and psychological rewards are INUS conditions, they can be combined with the presence or absence of other conditions to produce multiple sufficient pathways to the same outcome. Uncovering this type of equifinality is one of the important benefits of fs/QCA. In four of the five paths (paths 1, 2, 3, and 5) the base conditions combine with personal crisis to produce the outcome, and in four of the five paths (1, 2, 4 and 5), group biases combine with the base conditions. Three conditions—physical vulnerability, group norms, and recruitment—vary in terms of presence, absence, or relevance across the five paths. Given that these conditions are sometimes present and sometimes absent, but the outcome remains the same, we can logically surmise that these conditions are not critical to producing membership in the set of violent extremists for any of these paths.45 Rather, it the persistent presence of the core conditions that is driving membership in the outcome set for these paths. Finally, in three of the paths (2, 4, and 5) material rewards are absent. This suggests that, regardless of the presence or absence of physical vulnerability, individuals who travel on these paths are not motivated by status, wealth, or other forms of personal material gain. Path 6. This path represents the conjunction of the two conditions—community crisis and cognitive frame alignment—that were found to be “near” necessary conditions for the outcome. All other conditions are absent, or not relevant, meaning that violent extremism can occur when only a sense of community crisis and a shift in perceptual frames are present. However, this pathway is exceptionally rare, as indicated by its low coverage score for the pathway. Path 7. This path represents the only solution where it possible for a case to be a member of the violent extremist set but not a member of the community crisis set. In this path, psychological vulnerability, physical vulnerability, material reward, personal crisis, and cognitive frame alignment combine to produce membership in the outcome. This path, like path 6, is rare, with a coverage score of less than 2%. Path 8. In this path, community crisis combines with the full range of group conditions (recruitment, biases, and norms) to produce membership in the set of violent extremists. It is important to notice that this path only leads to membership in the outcome in the absence of personal psychological and material motivators. In other words, this solution represents a group-led pathway to violence. This pathway has relatively high unique coverage (6.5%), suggesting that it may be an important explanation of violent extremism in cases where the other pathways do not appear to be at play. Robustness tests. Post minimization tests reveal that none of the solution paths contain TLCs, as evidenced by the lack of markers in the shaded areas of the XY plots in Appendix 6. 45 On this type of logical minimization, see Ragin 2008. This resource was prepared by the author(s) using Federal funds provided by the U.S. Department of Justice. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice http:producing membership in the set of violent extremists for any of these paths.45 70 Violent Extremism ~Violent Extremism Path 1 Raw consistency 1.00000 PRI 1.00000 PRODUCT 1.00000 Raw consistency 0.11111 PRI 0.00000 PRODUCT 0.00000 Path 2 0.96551 0.96551 .932223 0.17241 0.17241 0.02972 Path 3 0.84210 0.81250 .684210 0.26315 0.12500 0.03289 Path 4 0.81250 0.81250 .660156 0.36363 0.12500 0.04545 Path 5 0.89285 0.85000 .758928 0.32142 0.05000 0.01607 Path 6 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 0.50000 0.00000 0.00000 Path 7 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 Path 8 0.83333 0.66666 .555554 0.58333 0.16666 0.09721 Table 26 - Robustness tests Note: PRI = Proportional Reduction in Inconsistency. ~ = Negation. Sufficiency consistency cutoff is 0.80. Tests were also performed to determine if any of the solution paths are sufficient for membership in the negation of the outcome (i.e. not violent extremism). The results are reported in Table 26. The combination of high consistency and Proportional Reduction in Inconsistency (PRI, see appendix 5 for more information) scores on the outcome, and low consistency and PRI scores on its negation, suggest that none of the solution paths simultaneously sufficient for being a member of the violent and not violent extremism sets (see Appendix 5 for a discussion of simultaneous set relations). Discussion Radicalization researchers suggest that a number of psychological, emotional, material, and group-based factors contribute to the processes of individual radicalization that lead to violent extremism. However, extant studies have not shown how these factors logically combine to produce pathways to violence, nor have they shown, using empirical evidence and rigorous methods, what role individual factors and conjunctions of factors play in relationship to violent extremism. This study has sought to fill those gaps by showing how mechanisms from various theories combine, often in complex ways, to produce unique pathways to violent extremism and to show what roles, in terms of necessity or sufficiency, that those conditions play in outcome set membership. To that end, this study reveals many important insights into the processes that may lead individuals down paths to politically- motivated violence. First, this study finds that two conditions—cognitive frame alignment and community crisis—are “near” necessary conditions for radicalization to violent extremism. This suggests that radicalization to violence is unlikely to occur in the absence of a cognitive realignment that biases individuals’ perceptions of self and other or in the absence of the development of a sense of being a member of a community that has been collectively victimized. As necessary conditions, when present, neither of these factors ensure that an individual will radicalize to the point of violence. Rather, these conditions help to set the environment in which radicalization to violence is possible. This resource was prepared by the author(s) using Federal funds provided by the U.S. Department of Justice. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice 71 It is important to reiterate that cognitive frame alignment appears to be a trivial necessary condition for radicalization to violence, meaning that the condition is typically fully present even though the outcome (violent or non-violent) varies. Cognitive frame alignment, thus, is best understood as a permissive condition that helps shape the environment in which radicalization to violence is possible. Given that radicalization research is not currently based on widely shared understandings of the conditions that make the phenomenon possible, the relationship of violence to shifts in cognitive frames is an important one, trivial as it may be. That said, on its own, cognitive frame alignment has very little analytical power to explain why some individuals are members of the violent extremist set while others are not. On the other hand, the finding that a sense of community crisis is a “near” necessary condition for radicalization to violence is potentially far more significant, both for theory and practice. This finding supports the views of social movement models of radicalization and grievance-based explanations of terrorism (e.g., Crenshaw 1981; Piazza 2011), which emphasize that extremist violence is often intimately tied to real or perceived discrimination in identity-based communities. Moreover, while radicalization researchers commonly make statements of necessity when referring to mechanisms which may be linked to radicalization to violence, to date, no study has systematically assessed whether these conditions in fact constitute necessary conditions for membership in the violent extremist set. For example, Kruglanski et al. (2009) argue that the desire for personal significance and the adoption of an ideology that glorifies extremist behaviors are necessary (and sufficient) conditions for participation in violent extremism. However, while these arguments are logically sound, they have remained largely untested in quest for significance research. Our findings suggest that the quest for status is not a necessary condition for violent extremism. Rather, it is a sense of community crisis, and the inability to achieve significance or the loss of significance that may accompany it, that acts as a near necessary condition for violent extremism. The quest for status or material gain only plays a small role as an INUS condition in a pathway to violence that is comparatively rare in comparison to the others. It is important to note that this finding does not refute quest for significance theory. Rather, it helps to clarify a key debate in the research program by showing that significance loss, rather than significance gain, is the key mechanism that acts as a necessary condition for violence extremism. Second, our findings reveal that pathways that combine individual psychological and emotional vulnerabilities with perceptions of community victimization are particularly important for explaining shifts to violence. In fact, of the 20 cases of violent extremism that are fully explained by our analysis, 17 (85%) are members of one or more of these pathways (paths 1-5). Along these paths, personal vulnerabilities exert causal influence by fueling identity-seeking behaviors in individuals, who then find direction in extremist narratives and meaning in camaraderie with like-minded individuals. It is clear that individual-level psychological variables do not act in isolation, however. Mechanisms from social identity models of radicalization are critically important to understanding how This resource was prepared by the author(s) using Federal funds provided by the U.S. Department of Justice. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice 72 psychological and emotional vulnerabilities are translated into violent action. Social identity perspectives show how biasing dynamics persuade individuals that their personal deficits are largely the result of their membership in a community that has been collectively victimized or threatened. As individuals, cliques, and groups become more insular, common mechanisms of cognitive bias, such as groupthink, in-group/out-group bias, and diffusion of responsibility, set in, convincing individuals that the alleviation of community grievances and the amelioration of threats to community survival will only occur through violent action (e.g., Hogg 2001). This lends support to extant research that views radicalization as a process where non-ideological sources of personal vulnerability, such as traumatic experience (e.g. the loss of a loved one), distant or broken familial relationships, or group disparagement, combine with ideological drivers, which are often present in the group context, to produce violent expressions of political or social grievance (e.g. Simi et al. 2015). By comparison, our results show that material factors are rarely the main drivers of radicalization to violence. In fact, material causes are only present in one of the solution pathways (path 7), which in turn only covers one of the cases violent extremism included in this analysis. Likewise, group-driven radicalization (path 8), whereby individuals without psychological or emotional needs find themselves, often through personal relationships, on a slippery-slope to violence (McCauley and Moskelenko 2008), are comparatively rare in comparison to pathways based on psychological and emotional drivers. Only two cases included in the study are members of the primarily group-driven radicalization pathway. This suggests that while radicalization to violence can be based purely on group dynamics or material rewards, untangling the puzzle of radicalization will require grappling with psychology and emotion more so than material gain or recruitment. Finally, the results of the fs/QCA analysis demonstrate the incredible complexity of the processes that lead to violent radicalization. Despite including over 70 causal mechanisms in our coding scheme, constructing a truth table with more than 500 possible logical combinations, and identifying eight unique pathways to violence, our analysis does not account for the pathways of 15 of the 35 violent individuals in our sample. This reaffirms our belief that extant models of radicalization are limited in their ability to understand the phenomenon, and that future research must be based on research designs and methods that can account for causal complexity. This is not to discount the utility of “net-effects” methods or to suggest that fs/QCA is a silver bullet solution. Rather, it indicates that future efforts to explain radicalization are only likely to succeed if they embrace methodological diversity and look to leverage the comparative strengths of the full range of quantitative and qualitative methods. Future studies may also benefit from drawing on mechanisms that help explain parallel processes that drive similar extreme or deviant behaviors, such as membership in non- ideological street gangs (e.g., Decker and Pyrooz 2015), recruitment into religious cults (e.g., Dawson 2009) or participation in organized crime (e.g., Shelley and Picarelli 2002). Furthermore, analysis will need to move beyond the individual-level to show how This resource was prepared by the author(s) using Federal funds provided by the U.S. Department of Justice. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice 73 individual, group, community, national, and international level variables combine to produce unique pathways to extremist violence. Implications for CVE Understanding how radicalization works is key to designing CVE programs that can prevent at-risk individuals from following a path to violent extremism. Our study has several important implications for CVE research and program administration. For instance, our findings highlight the central role that perceptions of collective crisis play in radicalization processes. CVE programs must be designed to deal with these perceptions without exasperating them. In particular, CVE programs must be broad-based and not limited to a particular ideological milieu. Focusing CVE efforts on a particular community may contribute to the perception that the community is being collectively targeted and victimized, which this study has uncovered as a key component in violent extremism. In such instances, CVE programs designed along such lines may in fact be counter-productive, increasing alienation rather than alleviating it (see also Schanzer et al. 2016). That said, our findings do suggest that efforts to counter extremist narratives and recruitment efforts must address perceptions of community victimization. This includes not only challenging myths or misperceptions of community victimization, but also acknowledging legitimate community grievances. Moreover, counter-narratives and actions on the ground must be closely matched to ensure that both are working towards a common goal. Close unity of effort between all actors that play roles in CVE, including family members, community leaders, and law enforcement, is the best way to achieve this synergy. Finally, our findings show that radicalization to violence is primarily psychological and emotional, rather than material. CVE efforts should be driven by those who are in a place to recognize when an individual may be vulnerable to extremist narratives. This is most likely to be family, friends, and others that interact with the individual on a routine basis. CVE programs must empower those who are closest to at-risk individuals through education and support services, which should include participation from mental health and social services professionals. This resource was prepared by the author(s) using Federal funds provided by the U.S. Department of Justice. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice 74 Implications for Criminal Justice Policy in the United States This project has sought to answer four primary research questions: • what are the demographic, background, and radicalization differences between and within the different ideological milieus? • are there important contextual, personal, ideological, or experiential differences between radicals who commit violent acts and those who do not? • is it possible to identify sufficient pathways to violent extremism? and; • are the causal mechanisms highlighted by extant theories of radicalization supported by empirical evidence? The analyses of these questions show that there is no “one-size-fits-all” model of radicalization. Significant background, demographic and radicalization differences are present across the ideological spectrum, and the processes by which individuals and groups come to engage in extremist behaviors are complex, often resulting from a host of psychological and emotional factors that are difficult to model. CVE and law enforcement are likely to succeed in countering extremism only if they are designed to cope with this complexity by including all relevant actors and policy options in domestic programs. In particular, this study reveals the following implications for criminal justice policy in the U.S.: • Significant differences in background characteristics, group affiliations, and radicalization processes exist across the ideological milieus. CVE programs must be applied to all ends of the ideological spectrum, as opposed to focusing only on individuals who are at-risk of Islamist radicalization, and those programs must be tailored to particular ideological categories and sub-categories. • While the radicalization of individuals on the far left and those motivated by Salafi jihadist ideologies tends to occur in early adulthood, individuals on the far right and those who are motivated by single-issues often radicalize later in life. CVE programs that are designed to target at-risk youth may be ineffective for preventing extremism among older individuals, who are often dealing with pressures that are quite different from those experienced by young adults. • The conventional wisdom that radicalization is more common among individuals who come from low SES backgrounds and/or lack educational opportunities is generally not supported by the PIRUS data. Most extremists come from middle class backgrounds and have at least some college education. That said, stable employment may decrease the risk that individuals with extreme views will engage in violent behaviors. Stable employment often leads to the development of positive social relationships and places demands on individuals’ time that depress extremist activities. CVE programs that emphasize the acquisition of job-relevant skills may be effective for promoting sustained employment among at-risk individuals. • Despite an increase in lone actor behavior in the U.S., radicalization remains a distinctly social process. Group and clique membership rates remain high across the ideological spectrum. CVE programs and law enforcement interdiction strategies This resource was prepared by the author(s) using Federal funds provided by the U.S. Department of Justice. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice 75 must be aware of the vital role that peer relationships, both face-to-face and online, play in the radicalization processes of lone and group-based offenders. • While competition between extremist groups in the U.S. is not significantly linked to an increase in violent behavior, group rivalries exist in high numbers on the far right. Research suggests that competition within and between groups can produce disillusionment with extremist movements for certain individuals. Programs designed to aid the disengagement processes of those on the far right should be aware of the role of group competition in fostering dissatisfaction within the milieu. However, those programs should also be mindful that significant barriers to exit may form for certain individuals who are members of groups that are plagued by significant intra and inter-group rivalries. • Clique membership is high across the ideological spectrum and is linked to an increase in violent behaviors. As peers organize into small, insular groups, common biasing mechanism, such as group think and in-group/out-group bias, often set in, producing increasingly extreme behaviors. Programs based on counter-narratives must be aware of the cognitive biases that exist in cliques, most of which make members less responsive to the disconfirming evidence that may be central to counter-narratives. • The rates of prison radicalization in the U.S. are low and even across the ideological spectrum, suggesting that it is not a common pathway for most extremists nor is it limited to a particular ideology. To the extent that programs for preventing or countering radicalization in U.S. prisons are implemented, they should span the ideological spectrum. • Radicalization is typically a long process, often lasting years for individuals, most often those on the far right. Recent evidence, however, suggests that online environments may be speeding up radicalization processes, reducing them to several months in many cases. Nevertheless, windows of opportunity exist for intervention programs. Those programs should be led by family, friends, community leaders, and others that are in a position to take notice of radical changes in an individual’s belief system. • While documented mental illness is relatively uncommon among extremists, our results indicate that mental health conditions may be linked to higher propensities for violent behavior. CVE programs based on prevention and intervention may benefit from the inclusion of mental health professionals (Weine et al. 2015). Future research efforts should explore the extent to which violent tendencies are amplified when mental illness is paired with substance abuse (Swartz et al. 1998). • Individuals who engage in pre-radicalization criminal behaviors are significantly more likely to attempt or commit acts of violence post-radicalization. Domestic CVE should leverage existing programs that are geared toward steering at-risk youth away from crime. Moreover, law enforcement should prioritize their focus on individuals with a history of interactions with the criminal justice system. • Radicalization indicators are often the observable effects of underlying psychological and emotional processes. These processes are complex and are driven by feelings of lost significance and community victimization, as well as the intense need for psychological and emotional rewards. CVE programs must be aware of This resource was prepared by the author(s) using Federal funds provided by the U.S. Department of Justice. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice 76 these underlying processes and should not amplify feelings of community victimization by putting undue focus on particular communities. Once again, the integration of mental health and other social service professionals in CVE may be critical to the success of prevention and intervention efforts in many cases. • CVE counter-narratives need to address feelings of community victimization in a way that challenge myths and misperceptions, but also acknowledges legitimate grievances. Narratives should focus on alternatives to violence for addressing community grievances. • Successful CVE programs will need to address the underlying psychological and emotional vulnerabilities that make individuals open to extremist narratives. These vulnerabilities may be the results of traumatic experiences (e.g. the loss of a loved one), or they may result from senses of personal and community marginalization. While these implications provide useful lessons for CVE efforts, it is important to emphasize that as a research community we have just begun to scratch the surface of what empirical research can tell us about radicalization and the programs that are designed to prevent it. We hope that future research will look to inform domestic CVE, especially when it comes to programmatic design and evaluation. CVE programs are only likely to succeed if they reflect an empirical understanding of the myriad causes of radicalization and its consequences. This resource was prepared by the author(s) using Federal funds provided by the U.S. Department of Justice. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice 77 Suggestions for Future Research Despite the inherent complexity of radicalization, the EADR project shows that it is possible to study extremism using empirical methods. We believe that researchers should make a commitment to rigorously appraise the arguments that they make about radicalization and violent extremism, whether they conform to, or challenge, conventional wisdoms. We also feel strongly that criminal justice policy in the U.S. should reflect evidence-based research. To these ends, we offer several suggestions for future research. First, while the PIRUS database represents one of the first large-scale efforts at compiling systematic data on individual-level radicalization, there are limits to its use for fine-grained or targeted analyses. The database contains a sample of extremists in the U.S. from 1945- 2013, which, when examined as a collective, allows for the use of advanced statistical techniques for hypothesis testing or exploratory analysis. However, the database is not currently large enough to use those same techniques on most subsets of the data, including particular decade or ideological groups. Thus, in most cases, it is not possible to use the PIRUS data to determine if posited causal relationships, or observed findings, are supported for sub-samples of the data. Perhaps the most basic, yet potentially the most important, research advancement that could made in the near term would be to augment existing databases with additional cases in order to allow for these types of analyses. In addition, efforts should be made to establish new collections that allow for time series analyses. These collection efforts would need to be based on interviews with extremists and panel surveys of at-risk populations, similar to the National Longitudinal Surveys that were conducted annually by the Bureau of Labor Statistics from 1979-1994. While such efforts are undoubtedly resource intensive, they provide the best chance for understanding the temporal processes that produce varied extremist outcomes. Moreover, these data would allow for trajectory analyses whereby researchers could establish how life-course events, such as experiencing trauma, getting married, having children, or establishing a career, alter individual pathways to or from extremism. Second, research efforts should continue to examine radicalization as a set of complex processes, paying particular attention to the psychological and emotional turning points that drive individuals toward increasingly extreme behaviors. Although the qualitative portion of this study focused on identifying complex relationships, building on over 70 causal mechanisms that have been identified in the radicalization literature, we were unable to account for the radicalization pathways of 15 of the 35 cases of violent extremism that we reviewed. This suggests that despite substantial academic effort in recent years, we have not yet identified all of the causal conditions, or their potential interactions, that can contribute to radicalization processes. Future efforts should draw on research from cognate subject areas, such as membership in street gangs and criminal organizations, in order to identify causal conditions or processes that may be missing from extant radicalization research. This resource was prepared by the author(s) using Federal funds provided by the U.S. Department of Justice. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice 78 Moreover, due to data limitations, we were unable to account for some potentially important causal interactions, such as the relationship between mental illness, substance abuse, and violent behavior. Future research efforts should look to identify and assess the importance of such causal interactions, which is critical not only for understanding radicalization processes, but also for establishing the full range of professionals that should be involved in CVE program administration. This will require researchers to confront the challenges of collecting data on sensitive topics. Radicalization researchers may be able to glean lessons from the fields of public health or psychiatry, where scholars routinely confront similar data collection challenges. Finally, future research efforts should be integrated with on-the-ground CVE program administration, focusing in particular on program design and evaluation. To date, there has been relatively little integration of research and domestic CVE, and studies (Williams, Horgan, and Evans 2016) suggest that program design and evaluation may be afterthoughts for most program administrators. Researchers have potentially important roles to play in domestic CVE efforts. Most researchers are well suited to ensure that programs are designed to reflect empirically-derived findings about radicalization processes and they are also particularly skilled when it comes to designing flexible and reliable measures of program effectiveness. Through the integration of research and CVE, it should be possible to design prevention and intervention programs that are effective from the outset, adaptable to changing environments, and sustainable over time. This resource was prepared by the author(s) using Federal funds provided by the U.S. Department of Justice. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice 79 Appendices Appendix 1: Rates of missingness for variables in logistic regression models Variable Married Missing value % 51.0% Stable employment history Past military experience Active in military Abused as child 61.2% 41.9% 41.9% 91.9%46 Radical family Clique membership Group competition Previous criminal activity Mental illness 80.0% 41.1% 63.2% 54.0% 80.7% Education 62.9% Gender 0.0% Age Islamist ideology Far right ideology Far left ideology Exposure 1950s Exposure 1960s Exposure 1970s Exposure 1980s Exposure 1990s Exposure 2010s 5.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 46 This rate reflects the original coding of this variable, which treated no mentions of abuse in source materials as “unknown” as opposed to “No.” This variable was later reconstructed to treat no evidence of abuse in source materials as “No” or “0” in order to facilitate statistical analyses. This resource was prepared by the author(s) using Federal funds provided by the U.S. Department of Justice. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice 80 Appendix 2: Missing data techniques for quantitative analysis For this study, we identified four techniques for handling missing data that are sensible options given the structure of the PIRUS data and our substantive knowledge of the cases and radicalization processes (see Table 27). These are: simple imputation using fixed values (i.e. cold-deck imputation) (Andridge and Little 2010), simple imputation using sub- group means (Tsikriktsis 2005), regression-based multiple imputation (Rubin 2004), and multiple imputation based on expected maximization calculations (G. King et al. 2001; Honaker and King 2010). Simple imputation using fixed values. With this technique, missing data are replaced with fixed values that reflect logical probabilities or researchers’ substantive knowledge about the variables under investigation. If missing data satisfy the “missing at random (MAR)” assumption, this technique often results in a simple mode substitution. When this assumption is not satisfied, this technique requires that researchers draw on the cumulative knowledge that has been generated in a particular research field to make informed decisions about the likely values of missing data. This knowledge may result from other data collection efforts, and the technique may amount to replacing missing values with observed values from another data source (Andridge and Little 2010). This technique has the particular advantage of incorporating logic and substantive expertise into the imputation process, which can produce imputed values that better reflect empirical evidence. On the other hand, this approach replaces missing values with unobserved data, which can bias results if those values are not based on cumulative knowledge. Moreover, techniques that replace missing data with fixed values reduce variance, which can suppress observed relationships by pulling correlation estimates toward zero. Such a reduction in variance also has the effect of increasing the likelihood of producing Type II errors in the data; that is, an erroneous failure to reject the null hypothesis, or in other words, reporting a “false negative”. Simple imputation using sub-group mean substitution. With this technique, missing data for a particular case are replaced with the mean values of the sub-group of which the case is a member (Tsikriktsis 2005). For example, missing values for a subset of female survey respondents could be replaced with the mean scores of women in the sample with valid data. This technique works well when the data allow for the identification of distinct sub-groups and when those sub-groups provide sufficient valid data to generate reliable sub-group means. If, on the other hand, sub-groups cannot be identified, or the sub-groups are not sufficiently large to produce reliable means, this approach is likely to bias results. While sub-group mean substitution allows for the retention of some variance in imputed values, the process does downwardly bias variability, which can weaken observed relationships. In this model, researchers imputed missing data based on the means of ideological sub-groups (Islamist, Far right, Far left, and Single issue). Regression-based multiple imputation. This technique uses observed data and multivariate regression methods to predict values that are missing on a particular parameter or set of parameters (Rubin 2004). Missing values are imputed several times to This resource was prepared by the author(s) using Federal funds provided by the U.S. Department of Justice. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice 81 reflect uncertainty, producing a number of “complete” datasets that researchers can use to perform standard statistical tests. Multiple imputation techniques have the advantage of retaining the entire sample and preserving variance, thus yielding stronger observed relationships. Moreover, multiple imputation techniques allow researchers to use their substantive expertise to determine which variables in their data should be used to predict missing values. A key limitation of the technique, however, is the requirement that missing data satisfy the MAR assumption. Imputing values for variables that do not meet the MAR assumption can lead to biased coefficient estimates. Unfortunately, social science data are often missing for reasons related to their true values (e.g. individuals may not want to report their income when it is especially high or low), which limits the applicability of multiple imputation techniques in some instances. Expected maximization. Rather than using regression coefficients to predict missing values, expected maximization estimates missing values using an iterative algorithm that is based initially on maximum likelihood estimation (G. King et al. 2001; Honaker and King 2010). The second iteration predicts the missing values based on the maximum likelihood estimates, and third iteration based on the values from the second iteration. This process continues until there is convergence on the parameter estimates. This method can greatly increase the accuracy of results when the models are specified correctly. If the models are not specified correctly, however, this method can produce biased estimates. This resource was prepared by the author(s) using Federal funds provided by the U.S. Department of Justice. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice 82 Technique Simple imputation – fixed value Simple imputation - subgroup mean substitution Regression- based multiple imputation Expected maximization Description Missing value is replaced with “0” or another fixed value that represents a baseline expectation for the variable that is being imputed Missing value is replaced by the mean value of the subgroup of which the individual is affiliated Estimates relationships among variables, and then uses coefficients to estimate the missing value An iterative process of multiple imputation that continues until there is convergence in the parameter estimates When to use When imputing values for variables that are commonly reported on in sources and for which good cumulative knowledge exists When it is easy to define subgroups and subgroups are large enough to provide a reliable mean When more than 20% of the data are missing and the variables are highly correlated When distributional assumptions are met Advantages Utilizes researcher’s knowledge of source availability and variable distributions to make informed predictions Sample retention, easy to calculate, could give better estimates compared to “missing as fixed value” imputation Estimated data preserve deviations from the mean and the shape of the distribution Speed of computation, produces independent imputations, converges nonstochastically, works well in large samples Disadvantages Replaces missing cases with unobserved data, which could introduce bias Reduces variance in sample, arbitrary nature of defining subgroups in some situations Distorts the number of degrees of freedom and could artificially increase the relationships The variance of distribution may be biased in small samples, in data with many variables relative to the number of observations, or in highly skewed categorical data Studies Andridge and Little (2010) Ford (1976) Cohen and Cohen (1983), Frane (1976), Raymond and Roberts (1987), Little and Rubin (1987), Little (1988) King et al. (2001), Dempster, Laird, and Rubin (1977), McLachlan and Krishnan (2008), Orchard and Woodbury (1972) Table 27 - Overview of missing data strategies This resource was prepared by the author(s) using Federal funds provided by the U.S. Department of Justice. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice 83 Appendix 3: Bivariate correlations between variables in logistic regression model Violence (DV) Married Stable employment history Past military background Active military Abuse Child Radical Family Clique membership Group competition Previous criminal activity Psych history Violence (DV) 1 -.074* -.125** .019 .057* .066* -.089** .141** -.003 .104** .107** Married -.074* 1 .119** .022 .044 -.062* .177** .021 -.019 -.016 -.087** Stable employment history Past military background Active military -.125** .019 .057* .119** .022 .044 1 -.062 -.011 -.062 1 -.055* -.011 -.055* 1 -.137** .044 .028 .033 -.028 -.050 -.001 -.025 -.054 -.035 -.012 .011 -.132** .057* .106** -.106** .097** .080** Abuse Child .066* -.062* -.137** .044 .028 1 -.109** -.085** -.004 .128** .177** Radical Family -.089** .177** .033 -.028 -.050 -.109** 1 .071 -.064 -.114** -.155** Clique membership .141** .021 -.001 -.025 -.054 -.085** .071 1 .017 -.005 -.138** Group competition -.003 -.019 -.035 -.012 .011 -.004 -.064 .017 1 .027 -.043 Previous crim. .104** -.016 -.132** .057* .106** .128** -.114** -.005 .027 1 .192** activity Psych history .107** -.087** -.106** .097** .080** .177** -.155** -.138** -.043 .192** 1 Education -.118** .107** .177** -.002 -.114** -.074** .096** -.018 -.057 -.199** -.066* Gender .104** -.021 .021 .092** .066* -.035 -.073* -.025 .071 .053* .052* Age -.078** .372** .119** .187** .013 -.048 .132** -.129** -.045 .065* .015 Islamist .118** -.034 .014 -.043 -.004 .026 -.129** .087** -.172** -.034 .023 Far Right .092** .083** -.035 .066* .047 -.017 .077* -.017 .145** .064* .015 Far Left -.171** -.141** -.010 -.043 -.022 .009 -.027 .060* .010 .012 -.064* Exposure 1950s .009 .049 .047 -.004 .082** -.018 .040 -.010 .026 .026 -.008 Exposure 1960s .000 .008 -.032 .042 -.029 .011 .030 -.038 .101** .016 -.030 Exposure 1970s .029 -.080** .002 .002 -.025 -.009 .000 -.003 .105** -.047 -.038 Exposure 1980s .047 .104** .015 -.009 -.021 -.035 .076* .028 .023 -.050 -.062* Exposure 1990s -.082** .068* -.003 .031 -.012 .021 .079* -.017 -.032 -.026 -.001 Exposure 2000s -.051 -.079* .004 -.024 -.009 .005 -.115** .064* -.080* .039 .037 Exposure 2010s .090** -.031 -.011 -.030 .077** .014 -.060 -.066* -.074* .064* .088** This resource was prepared by the author(s) using Federal funds provided by the U.S. Department of Justice. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice This resource was prepared by the author(s) using Federal funds provided by the U.S. Department of Justice. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice 84 Education Gender Age Islamist Far Right Far Left 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 2010s Violence (DV) -.118** .104** -.078** .118** .092** -.171** .009 .000 .029 .047 -.082** -.051 .090** Married .107** -.021 .372** -.034 .083** -.141** .049 .008 -.080** .104** .068* -.079* -.031 Stable .177** .021 .119** .014 -.035 -.010 .047 -.032 .002 .015 -.003 .004 -.011 employment Past military background Active military -.002 -.114** .092** .066* .187** .013 -.043 -.004 .066* .047 -.043 -.022 -.004 .082** .042 -.029 .002 -.025 -.009 -.021 .031 -.012 -.024 -.009 -.030 .077** Abuse Child -.074** -.035 -.048 .026 -.017 .009 -.018 .011 -.009 -.035 .021 .005 .014 Radical Family .096** -.073* .132** -.129** .077* -.027 .040 .030 .000 .076* .079* -.115** -.060 Clique membership Group competition Previous crim. -.018 -.057 -.199** -.025 .071 .053* -.129** -.045 .065* .087** -.172** -.034 -.017 .145** .064* .060* .010 .012 -.010 .026 .026 -.038 .101** .016 -.003 .105** -.047 .028 .023 -.050 -.017 -.032 -.026 .064* -.080* .039 -.066* -.074* .064* activity Psych history -.066* .052* .015 .023 .015 -.064* -.008 -.030 -.038 -.062* -.001 .037 .088** Education 1 -.168** .214** -.004 -.130** .098** -.031 .027 .030 .014 .008 -.040 -.011 Gender -.168** 1 .053* .083** .155** -.245** .013 .008 -.079** -.048 .010 .064* .024 Age .214** .053* 1 -.128** .232** -.223** .027 -.085** -.153** .041 .120** -.005 .033 Islamist -.004 .083** -.128** 1 -.370** -.214** -.044 -.120** -.164** -.182** -.160** .362** .178** Far Right -.130** .155** .232** -.370** 1 -.447** -.039 -.020 -.207** .003 .199** -.033 .044 Far Left .098** -.245** -.223** -.214** -.447** 1 -.005 .226** .265** -.085** -.102** -.065* -.147** Exposure 1950s -.031 .013 .027 -.044 -.039 -.005 1 -.030 -.041 -.046 -.053* -.070** -.037 Exposure 1960s .027 .008 -.085** -.120** -.020 .226** -.030 1 -.110** -.126** -.143** -.189** -.100** Exposure 1970s .030 -.079** -.153** -.164** -.207** .265** -.041 -.110** 1 -.172** -.196** -.258** -.137** Exposure 1980s .014 -.048 .041 -.182** .003 -.085** -.046 -.126** -.172** 1 -.223** -.295** -.156** Exposure 1990s .008 .010 .120** -.160** .199** -.102** -.053* -.143** -.196** -.223** 1 -.335** -.178** Exposure 2000s -.040 .064* -.005 .362** -.033 -.065* -.070** -.189** -.258** -.295** -.335** 1 -.234** Exposure 2010s -.011 .024 .033 .178** .044 -.147** -.037 -.100** -.137** -.156** -.178** -.234** 1 85 Appendix 4: Regression model for cases 2000-2015 Independent variable Expected Maximization model β (SE β) Married -.397 (.309) Stable employment history -.453 (.296) Past military exp. .350 (.386) Active military -.071 (.433) Abused as child -.015 (.589) Radical family -.622 (.489) Clique membership .814*** (.240) Group competition -.399 (.377) Previous criminal activity .740** (.261) .817* Mental illness (.327) Education -.085 (.141) .122 (.409) Age -.083* (.038) Gender .001 (.000) Islamist ideology .351 (.347) Far right ideology .182 (.333) Age (squared) Far left ideology -2.481*** (.476) Logistic regression model Note: n = 614, standard error noted in parentheses. *p≤.05; **p≤.01; ***p≤.001 This resource was prepared by the author(s) using Federal funds provided by the U.S. Department of Justice. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice 86 Appendix 5: Regression model excluding environmental and animal rights extremists Independent variable Married Stable employment history Past military exp. Active military Abused as child Radical family Clique membership Group competition Previous criminal activity Mental illness Education Gender Age Age (squared) Islamist ideology Far right ideology Far left ideology Exposure 1950s Exposure 1960s Exposure 1970s Exposure 1980s Exposure 1990s Exposure 2010s Expected Maximization model β (SE β) -.270 (.182) -.528* (.206) .007 (.228) .381 (.319) .570 (.370) -.444 (.397) .836*** (.172) -.236 (.249) .384* (.179) .762*** (.239) -.099 (.099) .498* (.220) (.025) .000 (.000) 1.400*** (.294) .914*** (.224) .075 (.424) 1.274* (.567) .831** (.289) 1.176*** (.229) 1.108*** (.197) .218 (.176) .715*** (.208) Logistic regression model Note: n = 1,473, standard error noted in parentheses. *p≤.05; **p≤.01; ***p≤.001 This resource was prepared by the author(s) using Federal funds provided by the U.S. Department of Justice. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice 87 Appendix 6: Case Membership in Solution Paths Note: Size of circles denotes number of cases. Shaded area = True Logically Contradictory Cases (TLCs). This resource was prepared by the author(s) using Federal funds provided by the U.S. Department of Justice. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice 88 This resource was prepared by the author(s) using Federal funds provided by the U.S. Department of Justice. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice 89 This resource was prepared by the author(s) using Federal funds provided by the U.S. Department of Justice. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice 90 This resource was prepared by the author(s) using Federal funds provided by the U.S. Department of Justice. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice - — — 91 Appendix 7: Qualitative codebook Codes A.1. Significance restoration A.2 Individually based significance gain A.3 Social significance gain A.4 Group prestige A.5/I.7 Uncertainty relief A.6 Heroism A.7 Individual recognition Explanation and/or manifestations Significance restoration is when an individual tries to regain a sense of personal worth (self esteem, value, respect, being a valued member of society, etc.) which was lost. Significance restoration typically entails a desire for revenge or payback on the part of the individual or group that has lost significance. An individual desires social status in a community a place in history, heroism, or martyrdom and sees engagement in terrorism as a way of achieving it. The individual gains this significance without having lost it previously. Individuals on a quest for significance often rationalize that such significance can only be gained in their own death, Socially inculcated (i.e., instilled) significance gain refers to the socialization process in their culture – pervasive social beliefs according to which extremist behavior is worth pursuing. In some cultures extremists are socialized to believe that the only way to be remembered after death is to die for the organization’s cause. For example, being brought up in a diaspora community in the US whose culture advocates radical beliefs or behavior. Group prestige refers to reports that the individual perceived an extremist organization as prestigious or elite and the individual anticipated gaining a level of prestige or importance by joining the group. The group relieves an individual's sense of uncertainty about actions or identity by being homogenous, hierarchical, and having a clear message about goals, behaviors, and out-groups. This includes proximate groups as well as virtual communities. The person anticipates or has achieved the attainment of heroism and glory through his/her deeds. This is typical or martyrdom, but can also refer to more general instances of showing courage or gaining a place in history (more than just prestige or status, see below). The person anticipates or receives acknowledgement or supportive approval from the immediate or broader social environment for his/her deeds. This resource was prepared by the author(s) using Federal funds provided by the U.S. Department of Justice. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice - - - - 92 A.8 Emotional rewards A.9 Moral rewards A.10 Avoidance of significance loss A.11 Individual- based religious seeking B.1 Paradise B.2 Status B.3 Material rewards C.1/H.5 Economic crisis C.2/G.14 Socio- cultural crisis C.3 Personal crisis The person aims at obtaining emotional types of rewards, such as affection, love. The person aims at the achievement of superior political, social or religious purposes through individual actions, the idea of ‘making a difference’ Prevention of significance loss is when an individual is motivated to avoid humiliation, shame or a loss of honor in the future. Individual based religious seeking is a self driven process that occurs when the individual searches for some satisfactory system of religious meaning to interpret and resolve his or her discontent and is not necessarily connected to a crisis or the influence of an external actor. Religious seeking is most likely where an individual’s religious views and/or established religious institutions seem inadequate in addressing concerns. Paradise refers to an other worldly place where individuals will go after a suicide mission. This should be coded when there is evidence that gaining paradise is an individual incentive for radical behaviors (pursuing the spiritual self-interest over the corporeal self-interest). The individual does not necessarily have to commit a suicide attack for this code to apply. The person anticipates or has achieved a top position in a particular social environment though certain deeds for the organization, such as becoming the leader of that organization. The person anticipates receiving some kind of material reward, such as money or property. An economic crisis is when needed financial resources are lost or financial resources cannot be achieved. Mere poverty is not sufficient here, unless there is evidence that the person or his/her family was not poor before, or they are unsuccessfully trying to overcome a situation of financial difficult mobility. ies. Examples include losing a job, living on welfare assistance, or blocked economic A socio cultural crisis is when an individual feels or perceives that he/she is not valued in a society based on his belonging to a certain group, apparent in instances such as feeling a sense of cultural weakness, humiliation, or racism. A personal crisis is when a person experiences victimization by crime or the death of a valued member of their family or social network (e.g. spouse, parent, mentor, etc.) This resource was prepared by the author(s) using Federal funds provided by the U.S. Department of Justice. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice - ’ - - - 93 C.4. Crisis-driven cognitive opening C.5/G.6 Emotional distress C.6 Crisis-driven religious seeking D.1 Collective crisis situation D.2/J.3 External threat D.3 Political crisis D.4 Cognitive opening D.5 Imminent existential threat E.1 Public- proximate When an individual has experienced a crisis event which leaves them more receptive to radical belief systems. This is a self-driven behavior and not instigated by an outside group. Emotional distress or dissatisfaction can be in the form of, for example, extreme stress, sufferance, depression, shock, disappointment, etc. Crisis driven religious seeking is when the seeking behavior is tied to an individual s experience of a crisis event or shock, and is not facilitated by an outside group. A collective crisis situation is when an individual or group perceives an existential threat to one’s group (either their proximate group or a broader identity-based group), and sees that acting on the crisis would provide an opportunity to gain lost significance. External threat is when an individual or group perceives an existential threat to one’s group. External threats could be their government, another government, other terrorist groups, etc. A political crisis is when a government commits acts of violence or ill treatment against its people, such as repression, torture, or political discrimination. The political crisis does not have to be targeting the individual’s identity-group directly, but there must be evidence that the individual felt a sense of crisis (empathy). For example, a white activist who expresses shock over political discrimination against blacks. The individual experienced a cognitive opening through the crisis generating outreach efforts of a group or an external actor. For example, an outside group can instill a sense of urgency in an individual about to need to address a pressing concern (i.e., generating moral shock). Instances when the person perceives a serious and imminent existential threat to oneself, the group or the cause. This must be imminent and thus requiring, in the perception of the person, immediate action, as opposed to ‘mere’ constant threat. Public proximate recruiting is conducted in person and in an environment visible to the general public or authorities. Examples include prison settings, sidewalk proselytizing, public demonstrations, or wartime experiences (e.g., life during an occupation) This resource was prepared by the author(s) using Federal funds provided by the U.S. Department of Justice. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice - - - - 94 E.2 Public-mediated E.3 Private- proximate E.4 Private- mediated F.1 Frame alignment F.2 Indoctrination F.3/I.6 Authority of the frame articulator F.4 Empirical evidence F.5 Universal truth Public mediated recruiting is a broad and indirect approach akin to propaganda, but not necessarily hidden from authorities. Examples include using public channels like television or radio, newspapers, graffiti, posters, or public web sites and social media. Private proximate recruiting takes places out of the public eye and in intimate settings. This strategy relies heavily on personal appeals tailored specifically for a targeted individual or a small group. Examples include training in a clandestine compound, peer proselytizing, or attending a closed seminar or ritual. Private mediated recruiting combines a mass media approach with intimacy or clandestinity in which a message is tailored for a specific audience and is largely out of the sight and control of authorities. Examples include niche marketing (e.g. jihadist magazines), restricted websites, or “car- trunk” videos. Niche websites (e.g., online jihadist forums, Stormfront.org) should be coded as Private-mediated, even if they are not password protected. Frame alignment refers to instances when the ideology disseminated by an organization resonate (i.e., are congruent) with the ideas or beliefs that the individual held prior to exposure to a group. For example, a black person who had experienced racial discrimination readily adopts the Black nationalist views of an extremist group. Indoctrination refers to a situation or process where the individual adopts a radical ideology, including the justification for violence, as disseminated or preached by someone else or a group. This is different from Frame alignment because the radicalized individual must not have shared these beliefs prior to contact with the group. The person has been in contact or has listened to individuals who possess superior, expert knowledge as compared to the receiver and thus are convinced about the validity of the ideological messages. The person was presented with, or found him/herself, perceived empirical evidence supporting particular interpretative frameworks. Examples of this could include domestic political issues such as government corruption, economic destitution in some communities, or unequal distribution of wealth. It could also include video or photographic evidence of abuse, death, or other conflict atrocities as powerful visual confirmations of oppression. The person was presented with, or found him/herself, a series of universal truths, such as religion or human rights, which support particular interpretative frameworks. An example of this could include This resource was prepared by the author(s) using Federal funds provided by the U.S. Department of Justice. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice - 95 F.6 Incremental learning F.7 Individual learning F.8/J.9 Forming interpretative frameworks F.9 Framework exclusivising F.10 Rules directed redesigning G.1 Humiliation G.2 Helplessness G.3 Socially based significance loss the justification of radical behaviors by appealing to religion or normative beliefs (e.g., human rights, constitutional rights, rights of self-determination, etc.) The person adopts new, radical interpretative frameworks on the foundation of pre radicalization beliefs (which were adopted during previous socialization). For example, an individual who attended pro-life rallies in early life with their family and then goes onto adopt a radical anti- abortion ideology. This is likely to happen gradually and not rapidly. The person adopts new radical interpretative frameworks through individual study, such as reading books or surfing the Internet. Instances when new radical interpretative frameworks emerge through discussions within a group in otherwise inconspicuous circumstances. Process where the type of knowledge accessed and defended becomes increasingly exclusive and absolute. This can be seen in decreased tolerance for other opinions, willingness to use violence (as opposed to previous instances), and other instances of opinions becoming more extreme. An example of this could include referencing ‘conspiracy theories’ that align with their radical beliefs at the expense of or downplaying ‘mainstream’ sources of information. Instances when the newly acquired interpretative frameworks impact on everyday life, such as physical appearance, eating habits, prayer, the kinds of social relations the individual entertains, etc. Humiliation refers to events that lead an individual to perceive that they have lost social standing in, or value to, their community. These events can be personal tragedies, such as divorce, illness, or infertility, or conflict-related events, such as the death of a loved one at the hands of an out-group. At an individual level helplessness refers to the inability to reach individual goals due to the poor economic, social or political conditions of the community or state. Socially based significance loss refers to instances where one’s social identity, values, or beliefs are disrespected by others. This can occur for the individual or for the group the individual is a member of. Includes instances of pervasive discrimination, such as “Islamophobia,” and the enactment of laws limiting the ability of certain groups to publically practice their beliefs. This resource was prepared by the author(s) using Federal funds provided by the U.S. Department of Justice. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice - 96 G.4. Group boundaries G.5 Uncertainty C.5/G.6 Emotional distress G.7 Cultural disillusionment G.8 Anomie G.9 Broken family G.10 Loose family G.11 Lack of attention/affection from the parents G.12 Loose community relations G.13 Dependent personality Group boundary host refers to feelings/reports that the individual was unable to assimilate to the dominant group prior to radicalization (e.g., person was not able to assimilate into the Western culture where they reside). Uncertainty is an aversive state that an individual feels when they cannot anticipate future events or plan what course of action should be taken to achieve goals. It also includes uncertainty about their own identity (who they are and how they should behave). Emotional distress or dissatisfaction can be in the form of, for example, extreme stress, sufferance, depression, shock, disappointment, etc. The person was in search of or expected a certain ideal, such as an ideal society (e.g., ‘the American Dream’) or ideal social relationships, and was disappointed by that ideal or their inability to achieve it. Anomie is when the person does not possess or does not adhere to any kind of normative system to guide and regulate his/her existence – these could be religious beliefs or value systems or more general moral rules and principles. An indicator of anomie could include following a criminal lifestyle prior to radicalization. Broken family refers to divorce or separation of the individual’s parents, or if the individual him/herself undergoes a divorce or separation. Loose family refers to very distant emotional relations among the family members. Physical distance is not a sufficient condition – there must be evidence of emotional distance Lack of attention/affection from the parents is when the individual was neglected, or did not receive adequate love and care from the parents. It can also refer to an individual receiving negative types of attention from parents, for example physical or emotional abuse. Loose community relations refers to very distant relations among the community members. For example, the individual lives in a divided community in which some members are not accepted or avoided altogether (e.g., parallel communities) The person has been described as suggestible, impressionable, easy to convince or influence by others, with a low tolerance for ambiguity. Simply being naive is not a sufficient condition). This resource was prepared by the author(s) using Federal funds provided by the U.S. Department of Justice. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice - 97 C.2/G.14 Socio- cultural crisis H.1 Physical distress H.2 Material distress H.3 Family dysfunctionality H.4 Community dysfunctionality C.1/H.5 Economic crisis I.1 Leadership prototypicality I.2 Leadership- Importance I.3 Leadership norms I.4 Black sheep A socio cultural crisis is when an individual feels or perceives that he/she is not valued in a society based on his belonging to a certain group, apparent in instances such as feeling a sense of cultural weakness, humiliation, or racism. Physical distress or dissatisfaction refers to extreme stress, pain, dissatisfaction with current physical possibilities. Material distress or dissatisfaction refers to the individual’s perceived inability to provide for oneself or for one’s family. Examples include frustration from losing a job, living on welfare assistance, or experiencing blocked economic mobility. It is not enough for the individual to simply be poor, but must show evidence of dissatisfaction with their material well-being. Family dysfunctionality (other). This includes the family not being able to provide basic needs to the individual, such as food and shelter. An individual’s community does not provide a support network for fulfilling basic needs (e.g. job assistance, access to education, etc.) An economic crisis is when needed financial resources are lost or financial resources cannot be achieved. Mere poverty is not sufficient here, unless there is evidence that the person or his/her family was not poor before, or they are unsuccessfully trying to overcome a situation of financial difficult mobility. ies. Examples include losing a job, living on welfare assistance, or blocked economic Leadership refers to reports that the individual was mentored, or heavily influenced by a leader that was perceived to be typical of the extremist organization. In other words, the leader was perceived to embody the same values and beliefs espoused by the organization. The leader does not necessarily have to be in physical or direct contact with the individual for this code to apply. The relationship between the individual and the leader was perceived as important to the individual. Examples of this code could include the individual emulating the behavior of the leader, taking their advice, following their instructions, or looking up to them. A leader in the organization communicated (either orally or via writing) with the individual about the group norms of the organization. The individual was exposed to discussions about a fellow group member’s actions as being unacceptable to the organization. This resource was prepared by the author(s) using Federal funds provided by the U.S. Department of Justice. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice – - - 98 I.5 Rule compliance F.3/I.6 Authority of the frame articulator A.5/I.7 Uncertainty relief J.1 Group influence J.2 Groupthink D.2/J.3 External threat J.4 Typicality threat J.5 In-group/out- group bias J.6 Dehumanizing rhetoric J.7 Diffusion of responsibility In rule compliance the extremist group exerted pressure on members to conform to the internal rules and norms of behavior of the group. The person has been in contact or has listened to individuals who possess superior, expert knowledge as compared to the receiver and thus are convinced about the validity of the ideological messages. The group relieves an individual's sense of uncertainty about actions or identity by being homogenous, hierarchical, and having a clear message about goals, behaviors, and out-groups. This includes proximate groups as well as virtual communities. Group influence refers to instances where the individual’s opinions or behaviors became more extreme in a group context and as a consequence of group dynamics than the ones individual members held or exhibited before joining the group. Groupthink refers to instances where individuals prioritized consensus with the group about a decision at the expense of the consideration of better alternatives. For example, an individual who later describes that alternative courses of action, such as non-violence, were not considered in the context of the group. External threat is when an individual or group perceives an existential threat to one’s group. External threats could be their government, another government, other terrorist groups, etc. A typicality threat is when the individual’s membership in their extremist group is questioned. In other words, the individual is perceived by others in the group as not adhering to the group’s norms or values. Also known as the ‘group serving attributional style’ group cohesion that occurs when individuals and/or groups attribute positive characteristics to in group/out group bias is a mechanism of their own social group and negative/threatening ones to the those outside of the group. Dehumanizing rhetoric refers to when people outside of the organization are discussed in ways that make them appear to be less than human. This can be both describing an out-group or other individual in non-human or immoral terms. Examples would include describing an individual as a “pig” or “rat” or comparing him/her to a Nazi. Diffusion of responsibility refers to when individuals downplay the liability of their own actions by placing the accountability onto the group, which could lead to a lower threshold for individual This resource was prepared by the author(s) using Federal funds provided by the U.S. Department of Justice. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice 99 J.8 Social isolation F.8/J.9 Forming interpretative frameworks violent behavior. An example of this could include advocating for violence in group terms, but deflecting personal responsibility for that violence. Evidence of the diffusion of responsibility could also be an individual describing their actions as “going along with the group.” Instances when the group or the individual is becoming more and more isolated from the previous, non-radical social environment. This could include no longer associating with non-radical friends, abandoning previous activities, or purposely quitting one’s job. Instances when new radical interpretative frameworks emerge through discussions within a group in otherwise inconspicuous circumstances. This resource was prepared by the author(s) using Federal funds provided by the U.S. Department of Justice. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice 100 Appendix 8: Case Membership in Solution Paths – raw data Subject ID Path 1 Path 2 Path 3 Path 4 Path 5 Path 6 Path 7 Path 8 Violent Extremism ~Violent Extremism 1169 0 0 0.25 0.25 0 0 0 0 1 0 2071 0 0.75 0 0 0.25 0 0 0 0.75 0.25 1002 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.5 0.5 0.5 3592 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.75 0 1 0 1144 0 0 0 0.75 0 0 0 0 0.5 0.5 4704 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 3148 0 0 0.75 0.75 0 0 0 0 1 0 5822 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.5 0.5 1182 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0.75 0.25 3709 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1139 0 0.75 0 0 0.75 0 0 0 0.75 0.25 1174 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.5 0 0 0 0 0.75 0.25 3107 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.25 0.75 4517 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.25 1 0 3868 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 5386 0 0 0 0.25 0 0.5 0 0 0.5 0.5 1088 0 0 0 0 0.75 0 0 0 0.75 0.25 5940 1 0.25 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 9061 0 0.75 0 0 0.75 0 0 0 1 0 3159 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 4520 0 0.25 0 0 0.25 0 0 0.25 0 1 5944 0 0.75 0 0 0.75 0 0 0 1 0 1041 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.75 0.5 0.5 1109 0 0 0.5 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 3508 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0.75 0.25 3023 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.25 0.75 3071 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2104 0 0 0.25 0.25 0 0 0 0 0 1 5546 0 0 0 0 0 0.25 0 0 0.5 0.5 3230 0 0 0.25 0.25 0 0 0 0 0 1 4205 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.25 0.75 5473 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 4634 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.75 0.25 2042 0 0 0 0 0.25 0 0 0 0.75 0.25 4708 0 0 0 0 0 0.75 0 0 1 0 4527 0 0 0 0.25 0 0 0 0 1 0 1027 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.5 0.5 0.5 1050 0.75 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.75 0.25 2107 0 0 1 0.25 0 0 0 0 0.75 0.25 1005 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.75 1 0 1160 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 3163 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 5954 0 0.25 0 0 0.75 0 0 0 0.75 0.25 3293 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 4692 0 0 0.25 0.25 0 0 0 0 0.25 0.75 4467 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 3126 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 3470 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.5 0.5 1048 0 0 0 0 0.25 0 0 0 0.5 0.5 9060 0.25 0.75 0 0.25 0 0 0 0 1 0 3028 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 3411 0.75 0.75 0 0.75 0 0 0 0 1 0 3050 0.75 0.75 0.25 0.75 0 0 0 0 1 0 3525 0.75 1 0 0 0.25 0 0 0 1 0 3068 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.25 0.75 1141 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 This resource was prepared by the author(s) using Federal funds provided by the U.S. Department of Justice. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice http:0.750.75 101 Appendix 9: Raw data for fs/QCA analysis Subject ID Personal Crisis Community Crisis Psychological Psychological Rewards Physical Vulnerability Material Recruitment Group Group Cognitive Frame Violent Extremism Vulnerability Rewards Norms Biases Alignment 1169 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0.75 1 1 1 2071 1 0.75 1 1 1 0 0.25 1 0.75 1 0.75 1002 0 1 0.5 0.25 0 0 1 1 1 1 0.5 3592 1 0.25 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1144 0 1 0.75 0.75 0 0 0 0.25 1 1 0.5 4704 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 3148 1 1 1 0.75 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 5822 0 1 0 0.5 0 0.25 0 0 1 1 0.5 1182 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0.75 3709 1 0 1 0.75 0 0.25 1 1 1 0.75 1 1139 1 1 1 1 1 0.25 0.75 1 1 1 0.75 1174 0.25 1 0.5 0.75 0.5 0.25 0 0 1 1 0.75 3107 0 1 0.25 0.5 0 0 1 0 1 1 0.25 4517 0 0.75 0.5 0.75 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 3868 0.75 0 1 1 0 0.5 0 0.5 1 1 1 5386 0 0.5 0.25 0.5 0 0 0 0 0.5 0 0.5 1088 1 0.75 0.75 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0.75 5940 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 9061 1 1 1 1 0.75 0.25 1 1 0.75 1 1 3159 1 1 0.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 4520 0.5 1 0.75 0.25 0.25 0 1 1 0.75 1 0 5944 1 1 1 0.75 1 0 1 1 0.75 1 1 1041 0 1 0 0.25 0 0 1 1 1 1 0.5 1109 1 1 1 1 0.5 0 0 0 0 0.5 1 3508 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0.75 3023 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0.25 3071 1 1 0.25 0.25 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 2104 1 1 1 0.25 0 0 0 0 0.75 1 0 5546 0 1 0 0.5 0 0 0 0 0.75 1 0.5 3230 1 0.25 1 0.5 0 0 0 0.5 0.5 1 0 4205 0.5 0 0 0 0 0 0.25 0 0 1 0.25 5473 1 1 1 0.5 0 0 0 1 0.75 1 0 4634 1 1 0.25 0.25 0 0 1 0 1 1 0.75 2042 1 1 0.75 0.25 0 0 1 1 0.75 1 0.75 4708 0 0.75 0.25 0.25 0 0 0 0 0 0.75 1 4527 0 1 0.25 0.5 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1027 0 1 0.5 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0.5 1050 1 1 0.75 1 1 1 0 0 1 0.75 0.75 2107 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0.25 1 0.75 1005 0 1 0 0.25 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1160 1 1 1 1 0 0.25 0 1 0.25 1 1 3163 1 0 1 0.5 0 0 0 0.25 0.5 1 0 5954 1 1 1 0.75 0.25 0 1 1 1 1 0.75 3293 0.5 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 4692 1 0.5 0.25 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0.25 4467 0 1 0.25 1 0.5 1 1 1 1 1 1 3126 1 1 1 0.5 1 1 0.75 1 1 1 1 3470 0.5 1 0.25 0.75 1 1 0.75 1 1 1 0.5 1048 1 1 1 0.5 0 0 1 0.25 1 1 0.5 9060 1 1 1 0.75 1 0 0 0.75 1 1 1 3028 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 3411 1 1 1 0.75 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 3050 1 1 1 1 0.75 0 0 0 0.75 1 1 3525 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0.25 1 1 1 3068 1 0.25 1 1 1 0 0 0.25 0 1 0.25 1141 0 1 1 0.75 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 This resource was prepared by the author(s) using Federal funds provided by the U.S. Department of Justice. 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work_zsfhzvhhwzgiteqgyzt4pnubjq	----	religions Commentary Soft Islamophobia Namira Islam Muslim Anti-Racism Collaborative (MuslimARC), PO Box 577, Southfield, MI 48037, USA; namira@muslimarc.org Received: 3 August 2018; Accepted: 12 September 2018; Published: 15 September 2018 ���������� ������� Abstract: This article explores Islamophobia as a system of oppression by examining policies and practices found in liberal or left-leaning “anti-Islamophobia” spaces in the United States that limit the efficacy of the fight for justice. These include the reification of “Muslim” as a cultural category of brown foreigners, the lack of structural analysis around anti-Muslim hate, and the discomfort with and erasure of Islam as a faith in favor of “cultural” Muslims. The article then briefly proposes alternate ways forward that center the Muslims most affected by the intersections of race, class, gender, and religion in work against Islamophobia so that advocates can more effectively and directly address a system of Islamophobia. Keywords: Muslims; Islam; Islamophobia; racism; narrative; social justice; culture; United States; advocacy; allyship 1. Introduction In 2017, I was the fifth Muslim speaker to present at a convening where dozens of people had gathered from across the country to discuss ways in which we could combat anti-Muslim hate. I was the first to reference scripture. During the Q&A and after heading back to my seat, the non-Muslim clergy in the room were enthusiastic to cite their own holy texts and build upon the conversation that my bringing up Qur’an had started. I found the entire experience both frustrating and humorous—despite organizers choosing to center Muslims, the agenda included no time for any of the daily prayers and there was no space designated for prayer for the Muslim attendees. Islamophobia was the focus. Islam was an afterthought. Unfortunately, this reflects an issue that occurs in multiple spaces in our current climate. Islamophobia, also sometimes labeled “anti-Muslim hate”, refers to the long-standing system of discrimination that is enshrined in law and policy to specifically target those who practice the Islamic faith, i.e., individuals who are known as Muslims. Islamophobia “target[s] people or property associated, or perceived to be associated with Muslims”. (OSCE 2017). In this paper, I will be specifically discussing trends within liberal spaces, i.e., those spaces where advocates are generally supporters of the Democratic Party and endorse public spending on programs such as education, health care, and economic inequality. These individuals are supporters of social justice and are attempting to push back against various forms of discrimination against minorities within the United States (Krugman 2017). There are three distinct issues with how well-intentioned liberal allies are addressing Islamophobia. First is the lack of structural analysis around anti-Muslim hate. Second is the transformation of “Muslim” into a cultural category akin to any other ethnic or cultural group, despite this identity—and the animus targeting it—centering around faith. Lastly, there is a discomfort with Islam as a faith and an erasure of Islam as a faith that includes guidance on issues of exploitation and oppression. Together, these issues damage Muslim communities and slow down the fight against structural racism. Hate crimes are on the rise against those who are perceived to be Muslim. Social media Religions 2018, 9, 280; doi:10.3390/rel9090280 www.mdpi.com/journal/religions http://www.mdpi.com/journal/religions http://www.mdpi.com http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/rel9090280 http://www.mdpi.com/journal/religions http://www.mdpi.com/2077-1444/9/9/280?type=check_update&version=2 Religions 2018, 9, 280 2 of 16 is playing a different role, with one study finding that President Donald J. Trump’s “tweets on Islam-related topics are highly correlated with anti-Muslim hate crime after, but not before the start of his presidential campaign, and are uncorrelated with other types of hate crimes”. (Müller and Schwarz 2018, p. 1). Systems of surveillance, deportation, detention, and mass incarceration continue to target and harm Muslims and those perceived to be Muslim. There are specific methods that academics, organizers, activists, non-profit leaders, clergy, students, and others can utilize in order to avoid further entrenching Islamophobia. By examining the links between Islamophobia and other distinct systems of oppression, advocates can determine more efficient, targeted ways of dismantling these oppressive policies. Anti-Islamophobia work in the United States can and should draw upon the strengths of increased diversity and inclusion that better reflect American Muslim communities. In this piece, I draw upon numerous sources, including relevant articles and media; informal interviews with academics, organizers, and activists; social media and other online forum discussions; and first-hand experience within community organizing spaces across the United States over a period of four years to provide commentary on developing trends in anti-Islamophobia advocacy. 2. “Brown” and Foreign as a Cultural Category Islamophobes often ask how their rhetoric could be racist if “Muslim” refers to those who follow a faith tradition and not to those who are of a certain racial background. In the same breath, however, many Islamophobes stereotype all Arabs as Muslims and all Muslims as Arabs. In a 2014 study of over one thousand films, Jack Shaheen “documents the tendency to portray Muslim Arabs as Public Enemy #1—brutal, heartless, uncivilized Others bent on terrorizing civilized Westerners”. (Shaheen 2014, p. 8). In reality, globally, over 60% of Muslims are of Asian background (Cornell University Library 2018). Thus, Islamophobia builds upon concepts like nativism (Scholastic n.d.) and xenophobia (UNESCO n.d.), where Islamophobes point to Islam as a “foreign” belief system that is considered dangerous in part due to it being “un-American”. This is shown in how readily the stereotypes regarding national origin and citizenship play a role in who Islamophobes have targeted. Non-Muslims who are “perceived to be Muslim” have been attacked or discriminated against in places of worships, in communities, and in places of public transit. Islamophobes have frequently uttered statements like “go back to your country” or other common anti-immigrant talking points. These attacks have included people who are Sikh, Christian and Arab, Christian and African, and other non-Muslim South Asians, Latinos, and African-Americans. Below are four examples of such occasions where Islamophobes have harassed non-Muslims who fell within their stereotype of “foreign” and “Muslim” and therefore a terrorist: • In November 2015, Kayla Gerber, a 24-year-old non-Muslim actress, singer, dancer, and one-time finalist in Miss Canada National, was assaulted by a man who “pinned her against a wall” and screamed at her to “take off [her] f****n hijab and get the f**k out of his country” (Haines 2015). Gerber is Jamaican-Canadian and “had wrapped her scarf around her head to keep her ears warm” (The Caribbean Camera Inc. 2015). • In December 2015, an “older, white man” harassed Juan Calero, a 21-year-old non-Muslim Latino NYU student, calling Juan “a terrorist” and telling him “to leave the country”. NBC News reported that Calera said that he “is not Muslim, but is often mistaken as one because of his beard and curly hair” and that this was the fourth time he had experienced anti-Arab and anti-Muslim harassment (Akbar 2015). • In 2016, Laolu Opebiyi, a British Nigerian Christian man, experienced a phenomenon labeled “flying while Muslim” on an EasyJet flight when he was “removed from a plane by armed police at Luton airport after a fellow passenger read a message on his mobile phone about ‘prayer’ and reported him as a security threat”. “Flying while Muslim” colloquially refers to the act of being profiled or harassed by another passenger, airline staff, or security personnel for being perceived to be Muslim during air travel, possibly resulting in removal from a plane or disruption to a booked flight (NPR 2018). Opebiyi was texting on his phone in a “conference call prayer group, Religions 2018, 9, 280 3 of 16 which was [titled] ‘ISI men’—an acronym for ‘iron sharpens iron’, from the Bible quote ‘As iron sharpens iron, so one person sharpens another’.” (Biblica, Inc. 2011). • In 2017, a “routine trip to a strip mall in Canada almost turned deadly for a [non-Muslim] Latino family when Mark Phillips, baseball bat in hand, approached Sergio Estepa, Mari Zambrano, their 13-year-old son and a friend, informing them that they were under arrest for being ‘ISIS terrorists’.” (Rosario 2017). In footage filmed by Zambrano, Phillips is heard shouting, “Terrorist. Terrorist. We have a French terrorist here” in response to the family speaking Spanish and then “‘ISIS! ISIS! We have ISIS right here’, referring to the militant group Islamic State in Iraq and Syria”. Estepa sustained injuries, including “a cracked rib and large bruise” in the attack and Phillips was arrested and “charged with aggravated assault and three counts of assault with a weapon”. (Dubinksi 2017). In these incidents, visual markers of faith—like a headscarf, beard, and texts about prayer—and perceived indicators of ethnic background or national origin played a role in how these non-Muslim individuals were treated. In incidents that have targeted South Asians and Middle Easterners who are non-Muslim, turbans, long beards, and language have played a role (Basu 2016). However, in many spaces across the United States, advocates position “Muslim” in a similar cultural category in a manner similar to Islamophobes by conflating Middle Eastern or South Asian background with Muslim identity. Despite visual indicators of faith—whether from the Islamic faith or a different faith—playing a role in Islamophobia, anti-Islamophobia advocates often do not reject broad categorizations that all Muslims are “‘brown’ and foreign”. Instead, mainstream representation frequently focuses on Arab and South Asian Muslims while excluding or under-representing the experiences of Black Muslims (especially African-American Muslims), Latino/Hispanic Muslims, East Asian Muslims, and white Muslims. Assimilation into the United States—a topic that centers an immigration framework by suggesting Muslims are new to this country or to American culture—is frequently a talking point for telling American Muslim stories, with journalists framing it as “American culture often presents two opposing paths for young Muslims”. (Green 2017). Debates over whether Muslim identity is “compatible” with American identity continue even though American Muslims are ethnically diverse with no clear racial majority. At least 20% of American Muslims are African-American and the fastest growing religious group in the United States is Latino Muslims, with up to 8% of American Muslims identifying as Latino (Pew Research Center 2017). However, since the 2016 election, I and other advocates have observed multiple activists, organizations, and groups include only South Asian or Middle Eastern representation for the Muslim perspective in panels, media appearances, or reports that include communities who are under increased attack during the Trump administration. These panels often also include non-Muslim voices from Black, Latino, and East Asian backgrounds, reinforcing that a Muslim is someone who comes from a Middle Eastern or South Asian background. Thus, even though many West, Central, and South Asians are not Muslim—and many Blacks, Latinos, and East Asians are Muslim—these panels reinforce the silos that white supremacy has created about non-white identities: “Pick one”. This false equivalence presented between Muslim identity and Middle Eastern/South Asian identity occurs in non-profit funding, national convening spaces, government agency task groups, and in media coverage. Agencies and working groups utilize terms like “MASA” (Muslim, Arab, South Asian) and “AMEMSA” (Arab, Middle Eastern, Muslim, South Asian) to describe communities that are impacted by Islamophobia despite the number of incidents in which someone who is “perceived to be Muslim”—and is therefore subject to Islamophobia—is a non-Muslim African, Latino/Hispanic, Native American/indigenous person, or multi-racial. The terms MASA or AMEMSA therefore do not adequately capture the wide range of groups that are impacted by Islamophobia, especially when these groups are distinctly American communities and not from abroad. The omission is glaring because the first Muslims on American shores were enslaved Africans who were subject to policies that targeted their existing faith practices, including Islam (Beydoun 2014). Additionally, Religions 2018, 9, 280 4 of 16 the most widely known American Muslims—individuals such as Malcolm X, Muhammad Ali, Kareem Abdul Jabbar, and others—are Black Muslims. In 1959, Mike Wallace and Louis Lomax produced a documentary with coverage of the Nation of Islam, titling it “The Hate that Hate Produced”, with Wallace reporting that “the message of the play, is that the white man has been put on trial for his sins against the black man. He has been found guilty. The sentence is death. The play is sponsored, produced, by a Negro religious group who call themselves “The Muslims”.” (McPhail 2002). Wallace would later note that “actually it was the first time that the Black Muslims came to the attention of White America”. (Washington University Digital Library 1988, p. 125). This history should deepen how advocates understand—and challenge—Islamophobia today. As Margari Hill, the Managing Director of the Muslim Anti-Racism Collaborative (MuslimARC), notes: The effect of using Muslim as a cultural identity includes reifying South Asian and Arab hegemony in Muslim discourses. One particular issue is using “Arab and South Asian” as a synonym for Muslim, or in a grouping that is intended to be open to all Muslims but only uses some names and ethnicities. [ . . . ] [T]he cultural category has resulted in the exclusion of Black Muslims in the discussion of Muslim civil liberties or the effects of Islamophobia. Black American Muslims have been under surveillance and discrimination many decades before 9/11. (Hill 2015b). These silos that result in centering “Muslim” as a cultural identity similar to other cultural identities are thus creating an artificial paradigm for advocates. Terms and organizing structures like “MASA” or “AMEMSA” leave out impacted communities, further cement inaccurate stereotypes about Muslim foreignness, and split anti-Islamophobia organizing away from Black, Latino, and indigenous anti-racism organizing, because Islam and Muslims are separated from Black and Latino community priorities, despite how Black and Latino Muslims and non-Muslims are impacted when they too are perceived to be Muslim. American Muslim communities could greatly benefit in the work to challenge Islamophobia by increasing partnership with other American non-white communities who are addressing structural racism, anti-Blackness, and anti-immigrant sentiment, since these all stem from white supremacist narratives about who is American and who belongs in the United States. Since Muslims are the second most diverse faith group in the United States (Lipka 2015), an average American Muslim space should have representation from all different racial backgrounds and therefore provide an intersectional lens to Muslim-led community organizing. Instead, there is division even within Muslim communities, where the impacts of policy and narratives that pit non-white groups against each other play out despite faith tying American Muslims communities together. Anti-blackness within the Muslim space results in silence and apathy about racist policies, the perpetuation of “good immigrant, bad immigrant” narratives results in support for anti-Latino sentiment, and xenophobia leads to a disregard for foreign policy impacts on countries abroad. These all play a role in the fractures among American Muslim communities (Hill 2015a). The Muslim Anti-Racism Collaborative (MuslimARC), founded in 2014, was created in part specifically to address these divisions. It has worked with over 12,000 individuals in 40 cities across the United States through workshops, lectures, panels, and other sessions that begin to educate communities about systemic racism, critical anti-Islamophobia activism, and the history of colonialism and global white supremacy. This response highlights how much work there is to be done on creating new avenues for political education and unity. 3. More than Roses and Meet-And-Greets to Fight Islamophobia The first issue with how many advocates currently address Islamophobia is the lack of analysis around Muslim identity. The second is the lack of understanding around systems of discrimination. New resources are beginning to provide a deeper analysis about what “Islamophobia” is and is not. In particular, American Islamophobia, by critical race scholar Khaled Beydoun (2018), Religions 2018, 9, 280 5 of 16 and the #IslamophobiaIsRacism syllabus by Su’ad Abdul-Khabeer, Arshad Ali, Evelyn Alsultany, and others, begin to approach Islamophobia from a structural lens that centers critical race theory. The #IslamophobiaIsRacism syllabus authors argue that “anti-Muslim racism” is a more accurate term to use than Islamophobia: This syllabus reframes “Islamophobia” as “anti-Muslim racism” to more accurately reflect the intersection of race and religion as a reality of structural inequality and violence rooted in the longer history of US (and European) empire building. . . . It also connects the histories of various racial logics that reinforce one another, including anti-Muslim racism, anti-Black racism, anti-Latinx racism, anti-Arab racism, and anti-South Asian racism. By focusing on understanding Islamophobia as anti-Muslim racism, this syllabus challenges the idea that the problem is one of individual bias and that simply knowing more about Islam will necessarily lead to a decrease in anti-Muslim racism. (Abdul Khabeer 2018). Others have suggested different terms as well, but whichever term is utilized, Islamophobia is not simply about interpersonal disagreements between Muslims and non-Muslims, or about a “fear” of Muslims that non-Muslims act on. As mentioned, Islamophobia refers to the long-standing system of discrimination that is enshrined in law and policy to specifically target those who practice the Islamic faith, i.e., individuals who are known as Muslims. On the right-leaning end of the political spectrum, Islam as a religion is posited as fundamentally incompatible with Western values and a threat to the United States and other “enlightened” nations. Islamic law is described as “sinister” or #creepingsharia (Posner 2011), “barbaric”, and “rigid”, and the religion itself is commonly portrayed as a political affiliation more than a bona fide faith (Elliott 2011). A 2011 report published by the Center for American Progress entitled “Fear, Inc.” explored the “roots” of the “Islamophobia network” in the United States and concluded that: A small group of foundations and wealthy donors are the lifeblood of the Islamophobia network in America, providing critical funding to a clutch of right-wing think tanks that peddle hate and fear of Muslims and Islam—in the form of books, reports, websites, blogs, and carefully crafted talking points that anti-Islam grassroots organizations and some right-wing religious groups use as propaganda for their constituency. Some of these foundations and wealthy donors also provide direct funding to anti-Islam grassroots groups. . . . Altogether, . . . seven charitable groups provided $42.6 million to Islamophobia think tanks between 2001 and 2009. (Ali 2011). The report further found that Islamophobia think tanks were a “key source” of Islamophobic talking points for “right-wing politicians, pundits, and grassroots organizations”, including individuals like former Speaker of the House of Representatives Newt Gingrich. The think tanks provided these individuals and organizations “with a steady stream of reports mischaracterizing Islam and warnings about the dangers of Islam and American Muslims”. (Ali 2011, p. 3). In 2015, the Center for American Progress published “Fear, Inc. 2.0”, noting that both reports “reveal how a well-funded, well-organized fringe movement can push discriminatory policies against a segment of American society by intentionally spreading lies while taking advantage of moments of public anxiety and fear”. (Duss 2015, p. 2). Thus, these Islamophobic narratives are drafted and amplified into the mainstream by a million-dollar industry (Rifai 2016). The prevalence of these narratives leads to buy-in for the enactment of policies like the PATRIOT Act, the War on Terror (Watson Institute for International & Public Affairs n.d.), no-fly lists, indefinite detention in Guantanamo Bay (Fox 2018), “Countering Violent Extremism” CVE programs, and the Muslim Ban (ACLU of Washington n.d.), which have collectively had a devastating impact (Anderson et al. 2017) on American Muslims and Muslims abroad. The narratives dehumanize (Maiese 2003) Muslims—likening Muslims to “vermin” or a “cancer” or some other non-human entity (Clark 2014) because of an “allegiance” to Islam—and the resulting policies are often indiscriminate in Religions 2018, 9, 280 6 of 16 who they harm, targeting civilians and children, since, under these narratives, all Muslims are seen as less than human and therefore justifiable targets to keep those who are seen as human safer. As noted in contextualizing the 2018 Supreme Court decision upholding the Trump administration’s travel ban: Suspicion of Muslims guides our foreign policy: Teenagers and other civilians across the Middle East have been killed or seriously injured by US drone strikes and bombs (Watson Institute for International & Public Affairs n.d.). Due to the decades-long War on Terror, US drones have killed civilians at weddings (Almasmari 2013) and taught young children to fear the sky. And civilians living in at least five of the countries that are on the Muslim Ban list have been or are currently on the receiving end of US bombs and airstrikes (Mohdin 2017). The US justifies this violence based on the narrative that all Muslims are inherently prone to “terror” and that civilian casualties are just the price we need to pay for national security. Our nation denies the Muslim men still being held at Guantanamo Bay (Fox 2018)—men who were never charged with a crime—the right to a trial. When Trump was elected, progressives everywhere feared he would implement a “Muslim registry”, a policy that already happened after 9/11 when some immigrants from 24 majority-Muslim countries were required to register and regularly check-in (Lind 2016) with government officials. The program, called the National Security Entry-Exit Registration System, or NSEERS, helped the government fine, arrest, and deport Muslims. Today, Muslims are among those that ICE rounds up for deportation. This past Ramadan, Somali Muslim immigrants were hindered from freely practicing their faith while detained in an ICE facility in Florida (Saleh 2018). (Islam 2018a). A common talking point for Islamophobes is that anyone who becomes Muslim or is born Muslim is currently a terrorist or will someday become a terrorist through exposure to the “true teachings” of Islam, which, they argue, are antithetical to American, European, or Western values. Many liberal advocates—whether they are Muslim or non-Muslim—often accept this framework by setting out to disprove or debate the talking points about Muslims instead of deconstructing and rejecting the talking points altogether. This is apparent in the embrace of stories of Muslim soldiers and veterans (Wright 2016), the centering of narratives about Muslim doctors (McCrummen 2017; Warikoo 2017) and “badass” Muslim women (Sanchez 2017; Abdelrahman 2017). Additionally, the amplification of stories where Muslims are giving (Rozen 2017) in charity (Soubry and Streeting 2017) or “breaking stereotypes” (Guthrie 2017) by getting along with Christians, Jews, or the queer community are utilized to disprove talking points as if giving in charity or building interfaith relationships are newsworthy or extraordinary when Muslims are involved instead of routine, everyday occurrences for the world’s 1.5 billion Muslims. The embrace of Muslims by non-Muslim liberals—as demonstrated by the most recent Democratic party messaging on the issue, for example—is still couched in terms of national security and compatibility with Western values (Beydoun 2016), except this time, everyday Muslims are “patriotic Americans”, “good immigrants”, “law-abiding citizens”, and therefore “staunch allies” in the fight against “Muslim extremism”. Even among liberal allies, American Muslim experiences are filtered within a “good Muslim, bad Muslim” narrative about who is joining the fight against terrorism. (Mamdani 2002). This continues to frame terrorism as a distinctly Muslim problem, one that needs to be resolved within the community, instead of a geopolitical problem that requires a more nuanced analysis. Thus, when these advocates look to challenge Islamophobia, they often do not acknowledge the systematic nature of the issues at hand and instead focus their priorities on increased dialogue between Muslims and non-Muslims. This is done under the assumption that if only American non-Muslims understood their American Muslim neighbors, Islamophobia would lessen. This core theory not only centers the concerns of the “persuadables” (Islam 2018b) who are “misinformed” about Islam, but places the burden on American Muslims, who make up 1.1% of the US population (Besheer 2018), to conduct outreach in as friendly and non-threatening a manner as possible to stop Islamophobia. Religions 2018, 9, 280 7 of 16 Despite the increased number of hate crimes against Muslims and those perceived to be Muslim, and the devastating losses that Muslims worldwide have faced at the hands of terrorist groups like ISIS, these narratives place responsibility on Muslims to change hostile hearts and minds. American (and British and Australian and European) Muslims have handed out roses (Copoglu 2016), spent hours sitting outside with donuts to answer questions (Annear 2015), and published writing and art about American Muslim families and dreams and hopes in an effort to humanize Muslims. However, a study of US history—especially African-American history—demonstrates that familiarity with public figures or individuals from marginalized backgrounds does not automatically translate into the dismantling of racist laws or systems. General support or interpersonal understanding does not translate to distinct law or policy on its own. Moreover, individuals can claim to support individual groups or communities while still executing harmful laws and policies. As an example, President Trump has claimed that he loves or gets along tremendously with “the Muslims” (Gray and Lee 2015) or “the Blacks” (CBS News n.d.) while simultaneously instituting discriminatory policies against Muslims around the world and against African-Americans since taking office. Thus, narrative and interpersonal work must be coupled with policy and advocacy work to accomplish systemic change. From personal observation, while there are individuals and groups organizing against Islamophobia from a policy and advocacy lens, many of the people who are salaried to challenge Islamophobia on a policy level are non-Muslim white liberals or Muslims who self-label as “more culturally Muslim” than religious. Often, the Muslims who are grounded in faith-based community spaces are there pro bono to advise on the actions that the liberal groups will work on so that these actions are more respectful to Muslim communities. These individuals are sometimes grounded in mosques and other community spaces and are relied upon for access to Muslim American spaces but not given adequate resources to properly execute on outreach or educational campaigns. More research about these policy spaces against Islamophobia is needed to explore racial and religious demographics and properly determine the statistics. If needed, advocates could then begin to implement policies of diversity and inclusion in these anti-Islamophobia spaces to ensure that more funding is provided for those who are directly impacted, and that more salaried staff come from marginalized backgrounds. Without a restructuring of resources, we will continue to have an environment where those most starkly in danger of Islamophobic vigilantes or government targeting are held at a distance by policy advocates when they seek to discuss how to organize against a system that spies, jails, deports, and ultimately destroys lives. This hesitation to center the Muslims who are most affected in a way that allows for those Muslims to truly lead—and be funded—to do the work for their communities, despite their lives depending on it, is still a function of Islamophobia. While this function may not be as harsh or dangerous as traditional understandings of Islamophobia, it is still dangerous and is thus something I have labeled “soft Islamophobia”. Soft Islamophobia occurs when those who are most directly impacted by Islamophobia are systematically disenfranchised from the work that liberal organizations, individuals, and groups are leading to challenge Islamophobia. Soft Islamophobia ensures that those individuals are prevented from accessing financial resources, leadership spaces, and strategy sessions. Soft Islamophobia often transforms “Muslim” into a cultural category, centers the preferences of white “persuadables” on how they want to understand Islam, and dismisses the structural underpinnings of Islamophobia in favor of interpersonal dialogue that is focused on Muslims who “break the stereotypes” that are supplied by the Islamophobia narrative industry. Thus, the narrative campaigns that are launched in response to Islamophobia fixate around “Muslims who are just like you”, i.e., the typical American non-Muslim. This still allows space for narratives—and, thus, policies—that alienate and target the Muslims who are not like the typical American non-Muslim, i.e., those Muslims who are “too religiously conservative” or fail to meet another standard about who deserves protection from discrimination. This often includes Muslims who speak accented or broken English, Muslims who are low-income, and/or Muslims who have a criminal background. Thus, when narrative campaigns predominantly feature middle to upper class Religions 2018, 9, 280 8 of 16 Muslims who are from white collar professions or are involved in law enforcement or national security work, larger issues of class, xenophobia, nativism, and our broken systems of immigration and mass incarceration play a role in leaving certain Muslims vulnerable to Islamophobia. There is also a tension to include Muslims who are actively ritualistically religious or to allow Muslim leaders to draw on faith in deeper ways to support the anti-Islamophobia work that is happening. A clear example of this is how governmental CVE programs (Boyd 2016) seek to monitor and track whether someone is fasting more, praying more, attending religious lectures, keeping halal (the Islamic equivalent of keeping kosher or following specific dietary guidelines), growing a beard/wearing the headscarf, or learning how to speak Arabic. Increasing religiosity is still seen as a precursor to terror, since the underlying assumption that “Islam = dangerous” has not shifted despite people being more accepting of certain kinds of Muslims. This leads to the third issue, the erasure of Islam as a religion that provides specific guidance on all avenues of life. 4. When Faith Is Apparently Still the Problem Despite what Vice President Mike Pence may say (Jacobson 2018), Americans as a whole are in an era of increased distance (Jacobson 2018) from organized religion. People are unchurched (Rainer 2007), unsynagogued (Davidman 2007), untempled, and unmosqued (Eid 2014). Sentiments like “I’m spiritual, but not religious” are common, and many individuals express a discomfort with rituals and rites. This widespread discomfort with engaging with religion or citing scripture in activist and organizing spaces is not shocking given the current climate. Today, those who are most often referencing religion in the news or in politics come from fundamentalist perspectives and backgrounds—whether that element is Christian (Blades 2017), Jewish (Berger and Khoury 2017), Buddhist (Strathern 2013), Hindu (Safi 2017), or Muslim. Many of these individuals are newsworthy especially because they are using religion to justify limiting the rights of others to life, liberty, or the pursuit of happiness, and their behavior is resulting in the death and suffering of innocent people. Thus, those opposing these actions often eschew religion altogether (Cox 2017). The “religious left” (Jenkins 2017) may have scholars and clergy who deeply engage with scripture, but from personal observation and in speaking with other activists, in many liberal spaces, only generic references are made to religious sentiments, if any sentiments are included at all during these gatherings. Individuals in these spaces may include an opening prayer or reflection, references to interfaith harmony or “the golden rule”, and mention religious holidays and multicultural neighborliness, but this is carried out in more of a superficial way. Individuals are hesitant to seek or host a deeper engagement with Islam, despite how many Islamophobic narratives claim to cite specific verses or events in Islamic history. In this context, who is fighting Islamophobia—and how—sits within the tension of celebrating religious plurality while also being deeply uncomfortable with religion as a whole and Islam in particular. Thus, the focus pivots to Muslims as individuals in an attempt to disprove Islamophobic assertions about women, religious plurality, fundamentalism, and more, which cedes grounds to the think tanks and other organizations who consistently generate fear-mongering content about sharia law, among other religious topics. When individual Muslims are the focus, Middle Eastern or South Asian Muslims who demonstrate Islamic religious practices in an Americanized way are often celebrated by mainstream media. For example, many well-known Muslim women role models in the news and popular culture today are trendy with hijab style (Khan 2012), wear full faces of makeup (Weiner 2017), and/or consistently use social media channels that often amplify aspects of hyper-individualistic celebrity culture, like Instagram. Fashion companies who choose to exploit Muslim women’s labor outside of the United States to make their products have hired American Muslim women models who wear the headscarf to market their products. (Sanghani 2016). While this is lauded as positive messaging against Religions 2018, 9, 280 9 of 16 Islamophobia, it still leaves the door open to negative narratives about Muslim women who may still be considered oppressed or fundamentalist because they do not wear makeup, do not pin their headscarf in a particular style, or who speak out against unethical business practices in the fashion and beauty industries. Research is needed on this topic of American Muslim women in the context of soft Islamophobia. In contrast to the politics around the hijab and Muslim women’s modesty, the stories of Muslims who embrace their “Muslim heritage” (Kloub 2016) but not Islamic tenets (Nomani 2015) are also centered and amplified in an effort to push back against Islamophobic narratives. By talking about eating pork (Kid 2013), drinking alcohol (Diab 2018), not praying/fasting, that Muslim is seen as a non-threat since Islam is not a part of their life. It is a function of soft Islamophobia if the only Muslims who are granted space in mainstream publications and broadcast television are those who have distanced themselves from the faith. Additionally, under this belief that all religious institutions are oppressive—and Islamic religious institutions are threatening in particular—Muslims who are holidays-only “spiritual” practitioners or “cultural Muslims” are often covered by media outlets. For example, Ramadan has been framed like Christmas (Khalil 2014), with the commercialization of crescent-shaped trees, advent calendars, greeting cards, and Party City decorations (Salam 2018). While these stories do not necessarily harm the fight against Islamophobia and certainly do amplify the voices of a wide range of Muslims, they also do not address the core of Islamophobia messaging and policy, which specifically targets those who visibly appear to be Muslim or who are increasing their ritualistic worship on a more frequent level. Governmental CVE programs are not interested in bacon-eating, alcohol-drinking Muslims. Surveillance programs are tied to the mosque and log who attends on a more regular basis. Thus, there is still a positioning of “Muslim values” against “American values”. With the increase of “spiritual” practitioners of religion on the political left and the dominance of the conservative practices of the religious right, softening the religious tenor of Islam is one way to become “American enough” to be safe in the eyes of both Islamophobes and liberals who are uncomfortable with religion. This is also another reason why the transition of “Muslim” into a cultural category is so problematic. If Muslim is a cultural or ethnic category similar to any other racial/ethnic background, Muslims would be expected to show up on panel discussions or in the media with only the faintest mention of hadith, Qur’an, or Islamic history—these verses and stories and philosophies should be generic, feel-good, and inspirational, and the focus should be more about the individual Muslim and their life story. Through personal observation, I have noted how in multiple events, no other Muslim speaker even generically references Islamic theology. The focus is on Muslims as people and not on Islam as a faith. Islam is thus still seen as inherently dangerous and compatible in this country only if it is practiced in small doses. Is it truly progress in anti-Islamophobia work to have an audience for this softer approach to Islam? In the end, this approach still creates an environment where Muslims are othered, surveilled, and profiled if they practice their faith. If liberals and conservatives alike—of all races and backgrounds—still “keep an eye” on the religious Muslims because of this unchanged belief that if anyone is going to go into a murderous path, it is going to be the religious one, what policy changes could possibly follow? By celebrating and amplifying the narratives of only the American Muslims that fit within liberal frameworks of who is a “good American”, this leaves the Islamophobic frameworks intact to justify the targeting and harassment of other types of Muslims, both domestically and abroad. 5. Conclusions Solidarity is about centering the most affected (Islam 2018c). Several Islamophobic attacks in recent years have impacted victims who are elderly, immigrant Muslims (Sidahmed 2016); young, African/Black Muslims (Carey 2017); low-income Muslims (Solis 2016); and/or women in hijab Religions 2018, 9, 280 10 of 16 (Aziz 2011). These individuals are facing the intersections of race, class, gender, and religion and are left vulnerable when not included in leadership development, strategy sessions, funded organizing roles, narrative change work, or other opportunities due to the soft Islamophobia that does not think to include individuals from these demographics. To intervene against soft Islamophobia and work more efficiently to dismantle the system of Islamophobia, advocates should consider the following 7 tactics and methods: (1) Increase internal education and training on racial justice. By undergoing trainings on anti-racism organizing, cultural competency, and critical anti-Islamophobia activism, organizations and institutions will be better equipped to understand the structural underpinnings of Islamophobia. This means any campaigns can draw on wider historical memory and avoid strategies that may not get to the roots of organized Islamophobia. (2) Strategically engage in solidarity practices. Advocates should work on challenging the structural underpinnings of anti-Blackness, xenophobia, and other oppressive forces that impact multiple communities. These forces affect different ethnic groups of Muslims, which limits the capacity of those groups to advocate for justice. Additionally, since these forces all stem from one specific foundation, by challenging them together, it will become easier to assess what tactics will work against Islamophobia specifically. More importantly, by undermining the institutions and systems that allow for Islamophobia to exist, Islamophobia will also lessen. (3) Center the leadership and guidance of Muslims who are most likely to be targeted through violent policy and vigilante action. This can be done by conducting more community needs assessments, consulting with grassroots leaders in a more equitable manner, and ensuring that resources are provided to those who are on the front lines so that they can invest more of their time and energy into this work. Advocates should actively aim for more inclusion in the activism space for underrepresented Muslim voices—and not just millennial or ‘woke’ or ‘cool’ Muslims who are easily consumable by the general American public. (4) Shift the narratives about Muslims in the media to also amplify the stories of Muslims who attend mosque events, are affiliated with a house of worship, and/or dress more conservatively. Focusing on the narratives of Muslims who are proudly unmosqued and have no connection to a house of worship is not the same as amplifying the voices of the loved ones of people who were killed while at the mosque (Page 2018) or capture the pain of those who have faced arson in their house of worship (Cuevas 2017). Additionally, focusing on liberal Muslimah media figures (Shukla 2016) or “culturally-Muslim” male (Mallenbaum 2017) comedians (Firestone 2017) does not mean that a serious-looking long-bearded man in a thobe (an ankle-length long-sleeved loose flowing outfit), or a woman wearing a niqab (face veil), is going to feel the benefits of that acceptance. These individuals are still seen as the “foreign” and dangerous risk. While those Muslim narratives may not be as “stereotype-breaking” (Global Fund For Women 2017), it is important that advocates hold a space for a truly diverse set of voices and include not just the voices that are currently included but also additional voices that are underrepresented. (5) Improve the diversity in the room and work to ensure inclusion in those spaces. Cast a wider net that better reflect the racial demographics of American Muslims. Any anti-Islamophobia convening or gathering should include people who represent more of the variety of stories, priorities, and expertise that exist within the American Muslim space. Additionally, reach out to Muslims of all different backgrounds, and especially be more cognizant of inclusion for those who practice rituals of religion daily. The commercialization of faith practices—including Ramadan decorations in stores or hijabs/headscarves for sale in department stores—alone will not lead to better policies for all. That system of oppressive policies is already in place and it is critical for advocates to continue protecting religious plurality in the United States. (6) Resist narrow and rigid classifications of which communities are impacted by Islamophobia. Push back against the idea of embracing “Muslim” as a cultural category and placing it in Religions 2018, 9, 280 11 of 16 contrast to other categories like Black, East Asian, or Latino. “Muslim” is not a cultural category, and American Muslims come from all different ethnic backgrounds. Thus, indicators of religiosity—like the headscarf, a beard, or communications about prayer—often lead to people of all backgrounds being perceived as Muslim and therefore targeted. Since whether someone is “perceived to be Muslim” often rests on visual cues that stem from the practice of religious tenets, more focus is needed on learning about religion and not letting fundamentalism from other parties impact how we go about understanding Islam in America. (7) Undertake a deeper historical analysis. Advocates should look further into the history of Islam in America, and review the deep, multi-century-long discussions about Islam, democracy, and interfaith societies that span the globe. More research is needed on Muslims in the United States, and especially on communities that have been here for generations, specifically examining their strategies and tactics for challenging discrimination. In communities around the country, it is critical to the well-being of those who are most affected by Islamophobia that conversations grow deeper than superficial conversations about “diversity” or “multiculturalism”. On a policy level, advocates should not consider the work against Islamophobia complete if an American-born Muslim woman is welcomed and celebrated but her immigrant mother still fears walking outside. The work is not complete if a Muslim cabdriver or mosque-goer or “auntie” or “uncle” wearing non-Western clothes is still at risk. The work is not complete while Muslim men are still detained in Guantanamo Bay despite never being formally charged or when drones are still being dropped on civilians abroad or when Black Muslims are political prisoners for their work. #BlackLivesMatter applies to Muslims (MuslimARC 2014). Bangladeshi Muslim women garment workers are dying in fires (War On Want 2015) to sew trendy, “cheap” clothes that American Muslim women are modeling. The Rohingya (Al Jazeera 2018) are being slaughtered at the hands of Buddhists, and Latino Muslims are facing deportations (Kaleem 2017). Native American Muslims are still at Standing Rock (MuslimARC 2016). By understanding the ties between structural forces, advocates can begin to unravel the knots. For claims that “Islam is not incompatible with Western values”, advocates should instead interrogate how those Western values are being defined in the first place. Advocates should examine whether those who argue that they represent “Western values” are holding white supremacy, unchecked materialism, and militarism as the defining characteristics of the West. As a country, we continue to face crossroads where we can choose how we respond to those who embrace racism, poverty, and war as essential elements of what represents America. By understanding Islamophobia as a structural force that cannot be siloed from other forms of hate, advocates can begin to dismantle the oppressive systems that cause so much pain and suffering to millions domestically and abroad. Funding: This research received no external funding. Acknowledgments: Thank you to the MuslimARC national network for deepening the conversations around Islamophobia. To Margari Hill: my deepest gratitude for your leadership in deconstructing concepts and sharpening the analysis around Islam, Muslims, and advocacy in the United States. 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Available online: https://portlandtribune.com/pt/9-news/368047-248115-telling-their-story (accessed on 29 July 2018). Sanghani, Radhika. 2016. How the hijab went high-fashion and divided Muslim women. The Telegraph. (Telegraph Media Group), February 18. Available online: https://www.telegraph.co.uk/women/life/how-the-hijab- went-high-fashion-and-divided-muslim-women/ (accessed on 14 September 2018). Scholastic. n.d. Nativism in America and Europe. Scholastic. Available online: https://www.scholastic.com/ teachers/articles/teaching-content/nativism-america-and-europe/ (accessed on 29 July 2018). Shaheen, Jack. 2014. Reel Bad Arabs: How Hollywood Vilifies a People. Northhampton, Massachusetts: Interlink. Shukla, Sebastian. 2016. Muslim Woman to Appear in Playboy in a Hijab. CNN, September 28. Available online: https://www.cnn.com/style/article/playboy-hijabi-woman-trnd/index.html (accessed on 29 July 2018). Soubry, Anna, and Wes Streeting. 2017. 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Why Are Buddhist Monks Attacking Muslims? BBC News, May 2. Available online: https: //www.bbc.com/news/magazine-22356306 (accessed on 29 July 2018). The Caribbean Camera Inc. 2015. Non-Muslim Suffers Islamaphobic Attack. The Caribbean Camera, November 25. Available online: http://www.thecaribbeancamera.com/community-events/non-muslim-suffers-islamaphobic- attack/ (accessed on 29 July 2018). UNESCO. n.d. Xenophobia; United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization. Available online: http://www.unesco.org/new/en/social-and-human-sciences/themes/international-migration/glossary/ xenophobia/ (accessed on 29 July 2018). War On Want. 2015. Sweatshops in Bangladesh. War On Want, June 23. Available online: https://waronwant.org/ sweatshops-bangladesh (accessed on 29 July 2018). Warikoo, Niraj. 2017. At Ramadan, Group Pushes Positive Images of Muslims. Detroit Free Press, May 26. Available online: https://www.freep.com/story/news/2017/05/26/new-report-says-muslims-michigan- contribute-lot-medicine-business-politics/332800001/ (accessed on 29 July 2018). Washington University Digital Library. 1988. Interview with Mike Wallace. (W. U. Texts, Interviewer). October 12. Available online: http://digital.wustl.edu/e/eii/eiiweb/wal5427.0729.168mikewallace.html (accessed on 6 September 2018). Watson Institute for International & Public Affairs. n.d. Civilians Killed and Wounded; Watson Institute Costs of War. Available online: https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/costs/human/civilians (accessed on 29 July 2018). Weiner, Zoe. 2017. How 16 Hijabi Women Use Makeup to Express Themselves. Bustle, May 22. Available online: https://www.bustle.com/p/how-16-hijabi-women-use-makeup-to-express-themselves-39355 (accessed on 29 July 2018). Wright, Robin. 2016. Humayun Khan Isn’t the Only Muslim American Hero. The New Yorker, August 15. 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Introduction “Brown” and Foreign as a Cultural Category More than Roses and Meet-And-Greets to Fight Islamophobia When Faith Is Apparently Still the Problem Conclusions References 
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work_zsqgz2imlnhizl3igxeslkyna4	----	DP 19-005 econstor Make Your Publications Visible. A Service of zbw Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft Leibniz Information Centre for Economics Entorf, Horst; Lange, Martin Working Paper Refugees welcome? Understanding the regional heterogeneity of anti-foreigner hate crimes in Germany ZEW Discussion Papers, No. 19-005 Provided in Cooperation with: ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research Suggested Citation: Entorf, Horst; Lange, Martin (2019) : Refugees welcome? Understanding the regional heterogeneity of anti-foreigner hate crimes in Germany, ZEW Discussion Papers, No. 19-005, ZEW - Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung, Mannheim This Version is available at: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/193168 Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your personal and scholarly purposes. You are not to copy documents for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public. If the documents have been made available under an Open Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence. www.econstor.eu D I S C U SS I O N PA P E R / / H O R S T E N T O R F A N D M A R T I N L A N G E / / N O . 1 9 - 0 0 5 | 0 2 / 2 0 1 9 Refugees Welcome? Understanding the Regional Heterogeneity of Anti-Foreigner Hate Crimes in Germany Refugees Welcome? Understanding the Regional Heterogeneity of Anti-Foreigner Hate Crimes in Germany∗ Horst Entorf† and Martin Lange‡ January 30, 2019 Abstract In this article, we examine anti-foreigner hate crime in the wake of the large influx of asylum seekers to Germany in 2014 and 2015. By exploiting the quasi-experimental assignment of asylum seekers to German regions, we estimate the causal effect of an unexpected and sudden change in the share of the foreign-born population on anti-foreigner hate crime. Our county-level analysis shows that not simply the size of regional asylum seeker inflows drives the increase in hate crime, but the rapid compositional change of the residential population: Areas with previously low shares of foreign-born inhabitants that face large-scale immigration of asylum seekers witness the strongest upsurge in hate crime. Economically deprived regions and regions with a legacy of anti-foreigner hate crimes are also found to be prone to hate crime against refugees. However, when we explicitly control for East–West German differences, the predominance of native-born residents at the local level stands out as the single most important factor explaining the sudden increase in hate crime. Keywords: hate crime; immigration; natural experiment; regional conditions JEL classification: J15, R23, K42 ∗Acknowledgments: We thank Paul Berbée, Deborah-Ann Cobb Clark, Maddalena Davoli, Christian Dustmann, Christina Gathmann, Lennart Kraft, Matthew Lindquist, Friedhelm Pfeiffer, Pamela Quendrai, Joakim Ruist, Seonho Shin, Katrin Sommerfeld and Konrad Stahl for helpful discussions. We also thank participants at the annual conferences of the European Society of Population Economics (Glasgow), European Economic Association (Lisbon), Verein für Socialpolitik (Vienna), European Association of Labour Economists (St.Gallen) and at seminars at ZEW Mannheim, CReAM UCL, and SOFI Uni Stockholm for valuable comments and feedback. Finally, we thank Martin Ungerer for sharing the data on regional asylum seeker assignments with us and Steve Pischke for making the data of Krueger and Pischke (1997) available to us. Martin Lange acknowledges funding from the Fritz Thyssen Foundation under grant number 10.17.1.002WW. All remaining errors are our own. Correspondence: †Goethe University Frankfurt, RuW, Postbox 48, 60629 Frankfurt am Main, Germany, entorf@wiwi.uni-frankfurt.de; ‡ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, Postbox 103443, 68034 Mannheim, Germany, martin.lange@zew.de. mailto:entorf@wiwi.uni-frankfurt.de mailto:martin.lange@zew.de 1 Introduction Immigration and anti-foreigner crimes increased dramatically in recent years in Western countries. Germany, as a prime destination country for international refugees in Europe, registered 890,000 incoming asylum seekers in 2015 alone (Bundesministerium des Innern, 2016b),—a more than one percent increase in population size. During the same time, 923 criminal offenses were perpetrated against asylum seekers and their accommodations, more than a five-fold increase from 2014 (Bundesministerium des Innern, 2016a). This sharp increase in hate crimes directed at foreigners was largely unexpected. Hate crimes, the most severe form of openly expressed anti-foreigner hatred, carry economic and social costs and are thus relevant for policy makers. They affect immigrants’ integration efforts and strain social cohesion, not only between native residents and immigrants, but also among the native resident population (Gould and Klor, 2016; Deole, 2018; Steinhardt, 2018). Despite the severity, salience, and relevance of these incidents, limited empirical evidence exists on the nature and causes of hate crimes. Why do these hate crimes arise? Are there underlying patterns in the sudden increase of these incidents? In this article, we elucidate the question of how the large influx of asylum seekers in 2014 and 2015 spurred anti-foreigner hate crime in Germany. Using detailed panel data at the county level, we analyze how the size of the inflow of asylum seekers is associated with attacks against this group. Moreover, we investigate the influence of regional conditions to cover and better understand the high heterogeneity of hate crimes across Germany. Using a quasi-experimental design, we identify the causal effects of the regional inflow of asylum seekers on the rise in anti-foreigner hate crime. Since a government quota system is used to distribute asylum seekers among German regions, the usual problem of the residential self-selection of immigrants can be alleviated. Our setting provides a unique example of the large-scale immigration of ethnically different migrants from primarily Middle Eastern and African countries to German regions. Some of these regions were previously widely unpopular and avoided by immigrants. This natural experiment allows us to observe and quantify the otherwise latent, intangible anti-foreigner attitudes of the incumbent local population. 1 We contribute to the economic literature on crime against minorities by accounting for the motivations of hate crime offenders. Similar to Krueger and Pischke (1997) and Falk, Kuhn, and Zweimüller (2011), we consider economic hardship or strain as a factor influencing the rise in hate crimes. The paper most similar to ours is by Krueger and Pischke (1997), which addresses the question of whether the regional variance in economic hardship, measured by unemployment at the county level, can explain the unequal distribution of hate crimes in Germany in the beginning of the 1990s. They found that local unemployment rates (and most other explanatory variables) became statistically insignificant after including dummy variables for East and West Germany. We use their striking result as a point of departure and reexamine whether there are indeed no other explanations for hate crime in Germany besides the (East-West) differences rooted in German history. However, unlike Krueger and Pischke (1997), who assembled a data set on hate crimes at the county level based on newspaper reports, and also different from Falk et al. (2011), who used time series data of the German federal states, our study is based on recent official administrative hate crime records at the county level.1 Moreover, and perhaps even more important, we go beyond previous contributions by evaluating alternative explanations of hate crime, building on the work of McDevitt and Levin (1993) and McDevitt, Levin, and Bennett (2002), who discuss potential background factors and develop a typology of hate criminals. Specifically, we focus on the roles of economic conditions, change in the ethnic composition of the local population, and importance of a hate crime legacy. Among the considered hypotheses, we analyze Green, Strolovitch, and Wong’s (1998) theory of defended neighborhoods. In their model, hate crime victimization tends to be higher when a rapid increase in ethnically different migrants occurs in a previously homogenous area with a predominant racial group of incumbents. Inhabitants of regions with only limited previous experience of immigration might react more vehemently to incoming foreigners than those living in areas with a high share of preexisting migrants. 1Counties in Germany are classified as the NUTS 3 level, comparable to counties in the United States. 2 Our results provide no evidence of a simple homogeneous effect of asylum seeker inflows on the emergence of hate crimes in Germany. Instead, we find that regional differences account heavily for the rise in hate crimes. Our first-difference estimates show that hate crime increases most pronounced in areas that now have large inflows of asylum seekers, but previously only had a limited number of foreigners. In addition, our evidence indicates that counties with a slack labor market or that had already witnessed hate crimes in the 1990s are now predominantly experiencing a rise in local hate crime. Moreover, we confirm large differences in hate crimes between East and West Germany. Different from Krueger and Pischke (1997), our results reveal that these differences can be explained by the interplay of immigrant inflows and regional variations in the ethnic composition of the incumbent population. Economic conditions or a legacy of hate crime cannot explain the grave differences between the former two parts of Germany. The remainder of this article is organized as follows. The next section provides information on the context of our study and addresses the related literature. We describe our data on asylum seeker assignments, hate crimes, and other socio-demographic and socio-economic variables at the regional level in section 3. We then describe the German asylum seeker dispersal policy and our identification strategy, followed by the econometric approach in section 5. Section 6 presents the main estimation results and section 7 the additional sensitivity analyses. In section 8, we discuss the relevance of our findings and provide our conclusions. 2 Context and Related Literature Episodes of violence against minorities and in particular, against foreigners have long been part of German history. Outbursts range from medieval times over Nazi-Germany to post-unification periods (Voigtländer and Voth, 2012; Krueger and Pischke, 1997; Falk et al., 2011). The last well documented attacks against foreigners before the current wave of violence against asylum seekers occurred in the beginning of the 1990s, after the reunification of East and West Germany. While pogrom-like attacks against refugees in Hoyerswerda in 1991 and Rostock-Lichtenhagen in 1992 led to worldwide dismay, they were only two drastic examples of a widespread phenomenon. In 3 this period, the upsurge of anti-foreigner violence was accompanied by the large-scale immigration of ethnic Germans from former USSR countries and asylum seekers fleeing the Yugoslavian civil war. Similar to the 1990s, when immigration and attacks against foreigners increased sharply and simultaneously, the latest and largest increase in immigration to Germany spurred xenophobic attacks. In 2014 and 2015, more than one million asylum seekers, primarily from the Middle East, entered Germany to seek asylum. The largest portion of immigrants came from countries riddled with civil war such as Syria (36.9%), Afghanistan (17.6%), and Iraq (13.3%), and were mostly young (73.8% are aged under 30 years) and male (65.7%) (BAMF, 2017). The inflow of people with a different ethnic origin dominates the sharp increase in net migration to Germany. Figure 1 depicts the net foreign migration to Germany and hate crime against asylum seekers from 2011 to 2015 on the left and right axes respectively. While hate crime against asylum seekers was almost absent in 2011, it increased in the following years, jumping sharply in 2015. Contemporary to the high net migration in 2015, hate crime against asylum seekers peaked with 923 incidents that year. These figures clearly show that hate crime is increasing in Germany, and that this trend is strongly correlated with the recent inflow of asylum seekers to the country. However, hate crime incidents are not limited to Germany, but a widespread phenomenon in many industrialized countries. In England and Wales, the British Home Office reported 49,419 racially motivated hate crimes in 2015/16, an increase of 15 percent from 2014/15 (Corcoran, Lader, and Smith, 2015). For the United States, according to estimates of the U.S. Department of Justice (2014), 293,800 incidents of nonfatal violent and property hate crime victimization occurred in 2012 against persons aged 12 years or older residing in US households. Similar to experiences in other countries, the majority of victims perceived that the offender was motivated by bias against their ethnicity (51 percent) or race (46 percent; the survey allowed multiple responses).2 Van Kesteren (2016), who analyzed survey data on hate crime victimization from 2The general problem with published hate crime figures is that the share of undocumented crimes might be high. The U.S. Department of Justice (2014) estimated that about 60 percent of total and violent hate crime victimization were not reported to the police. This has consequences for an econometric analysis of hate crime, which must consider that documented hate crime figures might represent only the tip of the iceberg. 4 Figure 1: Foreign net migration and hate crime in Germany from 2011 to 2015 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 N um be r of in ci de nt s N et m ig ra ti on in t ho us an ds Net migration to Germany Hate crimes against asylum seekers Source: Data on foreign net migration is from the Federal Statistical Office. Data on hate crime against asylum seekers is from the Federal Criminal Police Office. Own depiction. 14 Western European countries, notes that in all countries, immigrants are disproportionately exposed to hate crimes. Given the emergent importance of hate crime, this topic has been studied in various scientific disciplines and theoretical explanations are manifold. The important difference between hate crime and regular crime is the restricted motivation of offenders, which is based on prejudice toward minorities of a different race, religion, or sexual orientation. Green, McFalls, and Smith (2001) defined hate crime as “... unlawful, violent, destructive, or threatening conduct in which the perpetrator is motivated by prejudice toward the victims putative social group”. Moreover, they classified hate crime, providing psychological, social-psychological, historical-cultural, sociological, economic, and political explanations at the individual or societal level of analysis. At the individual level, one influential explanation is based on the social identity theory, according to which people obtain their self-esteem from the groups they belong to (in-groups) and tend to have negative views about other groups (out-groups). Tajfel and Turner (1979) link this to the emergence of 5 prejudice: Individuals try to enhance their self-image by enhancing the status of the group to which they belong through prejudiced views and by discriminatory behavior against members of the out-group. Akerlof and Kranton’s (2000; 2005) approach of identity economics and its fundamental notion of the utility of identity is grounded in similar ideas. Allowing racial identities, Antecol and Cobb-Clark (2008) use this theoretical framework to explain racially motivated offensive behavior among US military personnel. Other prominent explanations relate to the societal level.3 We focus on three major hypotheses for the occurrence of hate crime: economic hardship, changes in the ethnic composition of the local population, and the long shadow of previous hate crime events. The most widely debated question in the economic literature on hate crime is the relevance of economic conditions in the formation of anti-foreigner violence. The main argument is that aggression against out-groups (such as refugees and immigrants) is harsher the more intense the competition for resources, i.e., the more unfavorable are economic conditions. Previous German evidence on the impact of economic conditions yields mixed evidence. Krueger and Pischke (1997) and Falk et al. (2011) analyzed right-wing extremist crimes in Germany in the aftermath of the Yugoslavian civil war in the 1990s. Using state-level data from 1996 to 1999, Falk et al. (2011) found a significant link between unemployment as a measure of economic conditions and right-wing hate crime. However, based on newspaper incident data, Krueger and Pischke (1997) did not find a significant relationship between anti-foreigner hate crime and economic variables. In their paper, the only significant explanation of hate crime was the East Germany dummy, i.e., as the region with little previous interactions between migrants and non-migrants. Green et al. (1998) and Hopkins (2010) propose explanation other than economic strain for increased hate crime. They argue that hate crimes against minorities are a consequence of whites’ resistance against the sudden influx of minorities. Green et al. (1998) stress that hate crime rises in previously culturally and ethnically homogenous areas that are now experiencing a drastic change in the composition of residents. They confirm their model of “defended neighborhoods” 3Detailed surveys on existing theories are provided by Green et al. (2001), Dustmann, Fabbri, and Preston (2011), and Mocan and Raschke (2016), among others. 6 for crimes against Asians, Hispanics, and Blacks in predominantly white areas in New York City in the years 1987-1995, while no relationship was found between racially motivated crime and labor market conditions. Hopkins (2010) adds to the theory of defended neighborhoods the notion of a broad anti-minority climate at the national level, which is important in explaining nationwide increases in hate crimes. Furthermore, convincing empirical evidence demonstrates the importance of historic events and adoption of institutions for modern-day attitudes and behavior (e.g., Grosjean, 2014; Couttenier, Grosjean, and Sangnier, 2017; Satyanath, Voigtländer, and Voth, 2017). Most related to our study is the work by Voigtländer and Voth (2012). They analyze the legacy of anti-Semitic hate crimes in interwar Germany, finding that indicators of twentieth-century anti-Semitism are significantly and positively correlated with medieval pogroms. Interestingly, their findings are related to defending-neighborhood explanations. Their results show that areas with lower hate crime persistence were those with higher levels of trade and persistent immigration, as predicted by the defended neighborhood hypothesis, in combination with the explanation of (a lack of) economic hardship. Following the scientific debate on anti-foreigner sentiment, until now, no unified literature exists on the causes of this phenomenon. We contribute to the various strands of the literature by addressing several potential explanations of hate crime in a unified empirical framework. We extend previous analyses, which mainly focused on the economic reasons for hate crime, by accounting for alternative hypotheses such as defended neighborhoods and the legacy of hate crimes. We do so by investigating the increase in hate crimes after massive immigration of ethnically different asylum seekers to an industrialized country. Most important, we estimate the effect of hosting newly arrived immigrants on the rise in hate crime, enabling for a causal interpretation of the relationship between immigration and upsurge in hate crimes. 7 3 Data and Descriptive Statistics 3.1 Hate Crime Statistics We employ data on attacks against asylum seekers for the years 2013 to 2015. Relying on administrative police records, we observe all registered incidents of hate crimes against asylum seekers’ accommodations and the asylum seekers living in these. Since the police do not register victims’ residence status, hate crimes against asylum seekers can only be identified by the place where the crime was committed, i.e. in other words, against persons living in asylum seeker accommodations. Thus, we can only observe the lower bound of attacks against this group. However, recorded incidents at asylum seeker accommodations can be considered as undoubtedly targeted against this group of recently immigrated foreigners, since these accommodations are salient and likely known to perpetrators. In addition, in time period under investigation asylum seekers had just arrived in Germany, making it likely that they are centering on their accommodations. Following a xenophobic incident at an asylum seeker accommodation, the local police admin- istration note the event as hate crime against asylum seekers. All these events were reported to the Criminal Police Offices of the German states (Landeskriminalämter) and finally to the Federal Criminal Police Office (Bundeskriminalamt, BKA). Each entry entails information on the time, place, and type of attack.4 We collected this data using the replies of the Federal Government to several parliamentary inquiries of DIE LINKE party for 2013 to 2015 (see for instance Deutscher Bundestag, 2014). In contrast to many other studies relying on survey or newspaper data (Krueger and Pischke, 1997; Jäckle and König, 2017; Müller and Schwarz, 2018), we employ official hate crime records. These, like most other crime statistics, are prone to under-reporting. However, compared to Jäckle and König (2017), who use a data set on attacks against asylum seekers based on newspaper reports collected by the Amadeu Antonio Foundation in 2015, our data set includes almost 4Figure A1 in the appendix visualizes the number of hate crime incidents by type. 8 50 percent more entries than does their database. By using administrative data, we avoid the shortcomings of alternative data sources, such as selective media attention, to report only shocking incidents of anti-foreigner hate crime. This type of under-reporting could be especially problematic in regions where negative attitudes against foreigners are dominant, thus biasing the regional documentation of hate crimes. Since our analysis relies on variation between counties, this is crucial for our identification strategy. Furthermore, the strict regulations in police reporting, mean that this bias in administrative police records is considerably unlikely. We use all attacks labeled as right-wing extremist hate crimes. By that, we exclude the possibility of including intra-refugee community hate crimes such as between Iraqis and Iranians living in the same group accommodation. As a robustness check in section 7, we restrict the analysis to violent hate crimes including arson attacks and assaults to focus on salient crimes, which are less prone to under-reporting biases. All other non-violent but clearly xenophobic actions constitute a widely ranged measure of anti-foreigner, mostly racist, and extreme right political behavior directed at threatening, insulting, or defaming asylum seekers. Examples of non-violent hate crimes are swastika graffiti at asylum seeker accommodations or threatening their lives at gunpoint. Ultimately, we use 1,155 incidents for the whole of Germany from 2013 to 2015. In 2014, 171 cases of hate crimes against asylum seekers occurred. When asylum seekers’ immigration to Germany spiked in 2015, hate crime incidents peaked at 925, of which 74 were arson attacks and 63 assaults. Panel (a) in Figure 2 depicts the distribution of attacks per 100,000 residents. Almost 72 percent of the German counties experienced at least one attack against asylum seekers from 2013 to 2015, and almost one quarter encountered a minimum of one violent attack. In 2015, after adjusting for population size, every most-affected region was in the eastern part of Germany. The rural area of Sächsische Schweiz-Osterzgebirge in Saxony had the most incidents with 9.76 attacks per 100,000 residents in 2015, followed by the counties of Uckermark and Saale with 8.24 and 7.99 attacks per 100,000 residents respectively. 9 Figure 2: Attacks against and assignment of asylum seekers per 100,000 residents 2 - 11 (93) 1 - 2 (95) .01 - 1 (96) 0 - .01 (118) (a) Hate crimes 1000 - 7200 (102) 900 - 1000 (80) 700 - 900 (116) 0 - 700 (104) (b) Asylum seeker assignments Note: Panel (a) displays the regional distribution of hate crimes against asylum seekers in 2013–2015 normalized by 100,000 residents. Panel (b) shows the regional distribution of the number of assigned asylum seekers in 2015 normalized by 100,000 residents. The black dots mark the presence of a state-run large-scale asylum seeker reception center. 3.2 Asylum Seeker Data Our source of asylum seeker data is Gehrsitz and Ungerer (2016), who collected data from the States Ministries of Interior on the assignment of asylum seekers to counties. Their data provide information on the number of asylum seekers assigned to subordinate counties by the States Ministries of Interior in 2014 and 2015. In our main analysis, we estimate Intention-to-Treat (ITT) effects on the rise in hate crimes against asylum seekers. Using the number of assigned asylum seekers alleviates concerns regarding the potential endogeneity of asylum seeker location choices or about counties trying to influence the actual number of asylum seekers hosted. However, 10 subordinate counties may have tried to influence assignments from the state authorities. We empirically investigate this concern in section 4. In addition, we use information on the presence of a large-scale asylum seeker reception center (EAE), also collected by Gehrsitz and Ungerer (2016). These centers have high visibility and might be more likely to be chosen as hate crime targets. We investigate whether the existence of a local EAE is associated with more hate crime against asylum seekers. The map in Panel (b) in Figure 2 presents the assignment of asylum seekers to counties per 100,000 residents in 2015. Darker areas indicate a larger number of assignments per 100,000 residents. The black dots mark the presence of an EAE. The range of newly assigned asylum seekers spans from none to almost 7,200 asylum seekers per 100,000 residents.5 3.3 Regional Characteristics by Occurrence of Hate Crime To understand the relation between attacks against asylum seekers and regional characteristics, we calculate the means and standard deviations of several socio-demographic and economic indicators by the occurrence and non-occurrence of attacks in the counties. Table 1 presents these statistics using data (i) of all counties in Germany; (ii) for counties that experienced at least one attack in 2013, 2014, or 2015; and (iii) for counties without a single recorded attack in these years. The last column in Table 1 reports the differences in means between counties with and without attacks against asylum seekers. The asterisks highlight statistically significant differences. Panel A shows the average number of attacks per county and Panel B general demographic statistics. Panel C to E give first impressions on how potential explanations for anti-foreigner hate crime are distributed across counties with and without attacks. Data at the county level for 2013 to 2015 are supplied by the Federal Statistical Office of Germany (Statistisches Bundesamt), Federal Returning Officer (Bundeswahlleiter), and the BKA. 5The State of Bavaria (south-east) stands out on the map as hosting relatively few asylum seekers. This is for two reasons. First, Bavaria tends to not distribute asylum seekers to regions immediately, but keeps them for a longer time in state-administered reception centers. Second, since almost all asylum seekers entered Germany by the so-called Balkan route, they arrived in Bavaria first. Because of the administrative costs involved in registering asylum seekers at the Bavarian-Austrian border, the number of asylum seekers Bavaria was to host was reduced. 11 With the exception of variables only available for a certain period (e.g., election outcomes), all county statistics in Table 1 are averaged over our estimation period of 2014 and 2015. Panel A in Table 1 shows that on average, 1.36 attacks occurred per county, of which 0.20 were registered as violent hate crimes. When normalizing the number of attacks by population size, the respective frequencies are 0.67 attacks and 0.08 per 100,000 residents. These figures indicate that hate crimes against asylum seekers are not frequent, but rare and extreme cases of anti-foreigner hatred. Regarding the demographics in panel B, the resident population of counties with and without attacks differs greatly, but only marginally in terms of population density. Counties without any attacks have fewer residents, but a higher density. As mentioned, attacks happen disproportionately often in counties belonging to the former territory of the German Democratic Republic. Among all counties that experienced at least one attack, about one fourth are located in the East (the share of eastern counties among all counties is 18.88 percent). In comparison, of the 118 counties without attack, only 4 (or 3.38 percent) are part of eastern Germany. We also examined the migration patterns of natives within Germany. Counties with and without attacks do not seem to have different residential turnovers in our estimation period. According to Willems, Eckert, Würtz, and Steinmetz (1993), hate crime perpetrators are predominantly young males with low scholarly achievement. Thus, we report the share of males aged less than 35 years and share of school dropouts. P-values of the tests of equality of means suggest that on average, counties with attacks have more school dropouts, but a lower share of males aged less than 35 years. There is no statistical difference between the affected and non-affected groups of counties in terms of violent crime records. Note that the share of foreign-born crime suspects is considerably higher in counties without attacks. Regarding panel C, counties facing attacks against asylum seekers have a statistically signifi- cant higher share of citizens with German nationality than those without attacks. This supports the notion that immigrants usually bypass areas in which they expect hostile behavior from the resident population. Notably, there is no statistically significant difference in the number of 12 Table 1: Summary statistics by counties with and without attacks Total With attack Without attack Diff. mean sd mean sd mean sd Panel A: Attacks on asylum seekers Number of attacks 1.36 3.08 1.93 3.52 − − − Number of violent attacks 0.20 0.71 0.28 0.83 − − − Attacks per 100k residents 0.67 1.17 0.94 1.29 − − − Violent attacks per 100k residents 0.08 0.27 0.12 0.32 − − − Panel B: Demographics Number of residents in thousands 203.20 235.25 230.89 270.64 136.55 77.82 94.35*** Residents per km2 523.74 687.07 497.24 710.35 587.51 624.35 -90.27* Share of Cities over 100k residents in % 16.52 37.16 16.20 36.87 17.30 37.90 -1.10 Share of counties in the East in % 18.88 39.16 25.35 43.54 3.38 18.10 21.98*** Net internal migration of natives % -0.03 0.29 -0.02 0.29 -0.04 0.29 0.02 Share of males under 35 in % 18.48 1.79 18.27 1.84 18.98 1.57 -0.72*** Share of school dropouts in % 5.69 2.27 5.93 2.38 5.13 1.88 0.79*** Share of vacant private housing 5.60 2.95 5.90 3.08 4.89 2.48 1.00*** Violent crimes per 100k residents 188.63 98.34 185.67 93.15 195.74 109.72 -10.07 Share of non-German crime suspects in % 25.62 11.58 24.34 11.45 28.70 11.33 -4.36*** Panel C: Immigration Share of natives in % 91.72 4.82 92.36 4.62 90.20 4.95 2.16*** Assigned asylum seekers per 100k res- idents 546.62 455.29 553.80 386.27 529.32 589.82 24.48 Share of counties with refugee recep- tion center in 2015 36.77 48.25 35.92 48.02 38.82 48.84 -2.90 Panel D: Economy GDP per capita in 1k Euro 34.11 14.55 32.80 14.26 37.26 14.77 -4.47*** Unemployed persons per 1k residents 32.51 14.33 33.93 14.60 29.09 13.07 4.84*** German Index of Socioeconomic De- privation in 2012 44.55 16.95 46.10 17.17 40.81 15.83 5.29*** Panel E: Voting Voter turnout in 2013 federal election in % 71.62 3.82 71.66 3.73 71.48 4.20 0.18 Extreme right vote shares in 2013 fed- eral election in % 1.49 0.84 1.51 0.90 1.40 0.59 0.11*** AfD vote shares in 2017 federal elec- tion in % 12.59 5.27 12.72 5.68 12.03 3.02 0.69*** N 804 568 236 804 Notes: The first two columns show the mean and standard deviation (sd) of county variables for all counties. Columns three and four display the mean and standard deviation of county variables only for counties with at least one recorded attack against asylum seekers in 2014 or 2015. Columns five and six display the mean and standard deviation of county variables only for counties without any recorded attack against asylum seekers between 2013 and 2015. Column seven displays the difference in means between columns five and three. Statistical significant differences are indicated by asterisks according to: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 13 assigned asylum seekers. This may indicate that the German dispersal policy was not undermined by attacks against asylum seekers. Finally, both groups of counties have approximately the same share of those hosting a refugee reception center. Panel D suggests that economic conditions matter, since there are statistically significant differences between counties with and without attacks. GDP per capita is higher and unemploy- ment figures lower in regions without hate crime attacks. We confirm this differential using an index of socioeconomic deprivation (GISD).6 The higher the index, the more deprived the area under consideration. Panel E includes two statistics regarding the federal election in 2013. The timing of the election is convenient, since it was conducted the year before the large-scale immigration of asylum seekers began. The immigration of asylum seekers was not on the top of the political agenda, and did not mobilize masses of voters. Counties with attacks against asylum seekers do not statistically differ in terms of voter turnout. However, voters living in counties with hate crimes against asylum seekers cast slightly more votes for extreme-right parties.7 The same is true for votes for the party “Alternative für Deutschland” (AfD). At the federal election in 2017, they ran an election campaign based solely on anti-immigration and anti-asylum seeker sentiments. In doing so, they mobilized many voters and garnered more than 12 percent of the votes cast. To summarize, there are strong differences between counties with and without hate crimes against asylum seekers in terms of economic conditions, demographics, and ethnic composition. However, we do not find any indication of selection mechanisms that may have directed asylum seeker assignments to regions in which they would be at a lower risk of being a victim of a hate crime. 6The index was introduced by Germanys Federal Institute for Research on Building, Urban Affairs and Spatial Development (Kroll, Schumann, Hoebel, and Lampert, 2017), and is based on a (factor analytic) weighted average of the three dimensions of education, occupation, and income. 7We classified the National Democratic Party, Republicans, and The Right as extreme right parties. 14 4 Asylum Seeker Dispersal Policy in Germany To attach a causal interpretation to our estimates of local asylum seeker inflows and regional conditions on the emergence of hate crime attacks, we rely on the exogeneity of the assignment of asylum seekers with respect to regional characteristics influencing hate crime. For this exogeneity assumption to hold, it is required that asylum seekers cannot choose their place of residence and that counties cannot decide on the number of asylum seekers they want to host. Both conditions are likely to be fulfilled in the German context of asylum immigration because of a national dispersal policy. Based on the federal system in Germany, asylum seekers are assigned to different locations in a two or three-stage procedure. In the first stage, newly arriving asylum seekers are assigned to a state. Then, within a state, they are either allocated to a county and then to a municipality or directly to a municipality. The typical way asylum seekers move through the German assignment scheme in the time of the large influx of asylum seekers was as follows (see also BAMF, 2016). When asylum seekers passed the German border, they were picked up by police officers and registered at the closest reception center incorporating a local branch of the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF). At these centers, asylum seekers were assigned to one of the German states (Länder) based on a quota regulating the division of federal financial burdens between the states.8 The quota is based on two thirds of the relative tax revenues and one third of the relative population sizes of the states. A computer program called EASY (Erstverteilung der Asylbegehrenden) assigns asylum seekers to reception centers in a particular state according to the rules of this quota. In the second step, asylum seekers are assigned either to counties or directly to municipalities within the state.9 This process varies by state, since each has its own law on how to organize the 8This quota is called “Königsteiner Schlüssel” and was originally designed to regulate the financial contributions of the states to federal institutions of research and education. Nowadays, it is widely applied to several topics including the allocation of asylum seekers. The shares for each state are published annually in the Bundesanzeiger from the Federal Ministry of Justice and Consumer Protection. 9Exceptions are the city-states Berlin and Hamburg, which do not further assign asylum seekers to subordinate authorities, but allocate them within the city. 15 allocation of asylum seekers. The majority of states first assign asylum seekers to counties and then to municipalities within the county (see Wendel, 2014). State-to-county or state-to-municipality assignments are primarily based on the population size of counties and municipalities. This is directly stated in the respective state law or implicitly demonstrated by the rules implemented based on the population size of the subordinate level.10 In our analysis, we employ the assignment to counties. Therefore, we take the first stage of the assignment process—from the federal to state level—as given, and use variations in the local treatment intensity of hosting asylum seekers. Since we use the county-level aggregate inflow of asylum seekers in our approach, it does not matter whether states assign asylum seekers to counties first and then to municipalities or directly to municipalities. Asylum seekers are bound to stay at their assigned places as long as no final decision on the application for asylum has been made. Non-compliance is sanctioned with a fine, and if repeatedly disobeyed, with a prison sentence of up to one year. More important, asylum seekers receive monetary benefits and free housing at their assigned place. Since most asylum seekers depend on these benefits, non-compliance is highly unlikely. County-Level Assignments of Asylum Seekers Variations in the intensity of hosting asylum seekers stem from the administrative assignments of asylum seekers to counties. By using the administrative assignments from states to subordinate counties, we overcome selection based on the preferences of asylum seekers or non-compliance of hosting regions. However, given the population-based quota system of the German states, a population-normalized measure of the inflow of asylum seekers (as we use it) should have no variation between counties in the same state. However, we observe within-state variation in our assignment data (see Panel (b) in Figure 2). Although asylum seekers should be assigned according to the population size of the counties, 10Two states have additional criteria. North Rhine-Westphalia assigns asylum seekers to municipalities at 90 percent by population size and 10 percent by land size. Brandenburg does the same, but adds a component reflecting the state of the local labor market. An overview on these allocation schemes by state is provided by Geis and Orth (2016). 16 some counties were assigned more asylum seekers per 100,000 residents than others in the same state. Gehrsitz and Ungerer (2016) conclude that the sheer mass of the inflow in 2015 stretched the allocation scheme to its maximum. As a result, decisions on the place where asylum seekers were ultimately hosted were often determined by the availability of group accommodations. In informal talks with the authorities involved in the allocation process, many told us that they adjusted the assignments because of a lack of suitable accommodations in the counties. In some states, the possibility to deviate from the original quota because of a local lack of housing is explicitly stated in the respective state laws. Thus, it seems that both population sizes and readily available group accommodations governed the distribution of asylum seekers. In our empirical analysis, we use the population-normalized number of assignments as a source of exogenous variation for the intensity of hosting recently arrived asylum seekers. For this approach to be feasible, counties should not impact the number of asylum seekers hosted. Although imposing any influence is highly unlikely given the hierarchical federal structure in Germany, subordinate counties could perhaps have argued for fewer assignments based on (a) available housing capacities, (b) their economic condition, (c) problems with criminal activity, or (d) a tense political situation. In Figure 3 and Table 2, we provide empirical evidence that most of these arguments seem to not be the case. Figure 3 depicts the correlation between the number of assigned asylum seekers per 100,000 residents and four county-level variables. In Panel (a), the share of vacant private housing is indeed positively correlated with the number of assigned asylum seekers. This supports the claims of the state authorities. In addition, as visible in Panels (b), (c), and (d), the assignment of asylum seekers does not seem to be correlated with GDP per capita, crime rates, or the vote shares of extreme right-wing parties. Especially Panel (d) is important for the case of hate crime against asylum seekers as an outcome variable. If, for instance, counties with known or supposed high levels of hostility against foreigners were able to reduce their share of assigned asylum seekers or if state authorities decided to spare these counties, the correlation between the two measures is expected to be negative. 17 Figure 3: Correlation between the number of assigned asylum seekers per 100,000 residents (X-axis) and county-level characteristics (Y-axis) 0 5 10 15 S ha re o f v ac an t p riv at e ho us in g in % 0 500 1000 1500 2000 Assigned asylum seekers per 100,000 residents (a) Vacant private housing 0 50 00 0 10 00 00 15 00 00 G D P p er c ap ita 0 500 1000 1500 2000 Assigned asylum seekers per 100,000 residents (b) GDP per capita 0 10 00 0 20 00 0 30 00 0 T ot al c rim es p er 1 00 ,0 00 r es id en ts 0 500 1000 1500 2000 Assigned asylum seekers per 100,000 residents (c) Total crimes 0 1 2 3 4 5 V ot e sh ar es o f e xt re m e rig ht p ar tie s in % 0 500 1000 1500 2000 Assigned asylum seekers per 100,000 residents (d) Extreme right-wing vote shares Note: The Figure displays the correlation between the number of assigned asylum seekers to counties in 2015 per 100,000 residents and (a) the share of vacant private housing in 2015, (b) GDP per capita in 2015, (c) number of total crimes per 100,000 residents in 2015, and (d) county-level vote shares of extreme right-wing parties at the 2013 federal election. That is, strong political anti-foreigner support would have led to fewer asylum seekers in a county. Panel (d), however, suggests that there is no systematic relationship between asylum seeker assignments and the vote shares of parties with a clear anti-immigration agenda. Although severe protests against the intake of asylum seekers occurred in some places, there is no documented evidence about any acknowledgment of anti-foreigner sentiment in the assignment process. We can more formally test this proposition by regressing the local assignment of asylum seekers per 100,000 residents on measures of latent xenophobia. Column (1) in Table 2 presents 18 Table 2: Determinants of Asylum Seeker Assignment Assigned asylum seekers per 100,000 residents Extreme-right vote share2013 (%) 18.750 -6.928 (17.727) (19.917) Hate crimes per 100k residentst-2 1.361 2.693 (3.680) (3.713) County in the East -146.136 (90.182) City with more than 100k residents -77.678∗∗ (34.886) GDP per capitat in 1k EUR 5.337 (3.450) Unemployment per 1k residentst 2.124 (2.286) Reception centert (EAE) -17.377 (27.957) Vacant housingt (%) 19.502 ∗∗∗ (6.472) Violent crimes per 100k residentst -0.280 (0.318) Constant 301.169∗∗∗ 315.102∗∗∗ 100.608 (48.213) (47.385) (163.686) State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes adj. R2 0.503 0.502 0.519 N 788 788 788 Note: Columns one to three show the OLS estimates of the determinants of asylum seeker assignments to counties in 2014 and 2015. Standard errors are clustered at the county level and displayed in parentheses. Statistical significance is indicated by asterisks according to: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. the results of a linear regression including extreme-right parties vote shares as a measure of latent xenophobia. As an alternative measure, we also use hate crimes against asylum seekers in 2012 and 2013, i.e., before the recent large influx. The rationale is the same as in the case of extreme-right voting: Regions that previously experienced incidents of anti-asylum seeker hatred might be able to argue in favor of receiving (relatively) less asylum seekers. The estimated coefficients for extreme right-wing voting and for hate crimes in previous years are statistically insignificant. The coefficient for extreme right-wing voting is large, but positive, indicating that, if at all, more votes for extremist right parties would be associated with more asylum seekers. This suggests that pre-existing local hostility against asylum seekers did not drive or influence 19 their assignment. The result holds when controlling for other factors that might have influenced the assignment of asylum seekers (Table 2, column three). German asylum authorities claim that the availability of housing capacities is one main driver explaining the variation in asylum seeker assignments. Furthermore, cities with a population of more than 100,000 residents were on average assigned about 77 asylum seekers per 100,000 residents less than other counties. Since housing possibilities in big cities are scarce, this again reflects the importance of the availability of accommodations for the assignment of asylum seekers. Thus, we conclude that the evidence provided in Figure 3 and Table 2 supports the assumption regarding the orthogonality of the assignment of asylum seekers to county characteristics prior to the influx. Relying on this assumption and by conditioning the factors determining the assignment, we are able to estimate and identify a causal ITT effect of asylum seeker inflows on the increase in hate crimes. 5 Econometric Approach We want to test the hypothesis that the recent influx of asylum seekers to Germany has led to a significant increase in attacks. In particular, we want to investigate why some regions are more prone to hate crime against asylum seekers than others. The analysis considers several channels of influence and focuses on economic, demographic, and social conditions. As suggested by the reflections and conjectures in previous sections, the link between hate crime and asylum seekers may be non-linear and dependent on interactions with third factors such as the preexisting ratio of incumbent natives relative to foreigners. Therefore, we are interested in the following relationship: hate crimect = δasylum seekersct + φCC2013 + γasylum seekersct × CC2013 + Xctβ + θc + θs + θt + uct , (1) 20 where hate crime is measured as the total number of attacks against asylum seekers in county c in year t normalized by 1,000,000 residents in 2013. The main explanatory variable asylum seekersct is normalized by 1,000 residents in 2013.11 CC denotes the potential county-level characteristic of interest, which will differ according to the respective hypothesis under consideration. The parameters δ and γ are the main coefficients of interest to evaluate the influences of asylum seekers and county-level characteristics on the formation of anti-foreigner hate crime in Germany. For the analysis of county-level characteristics, we use interacting explanatory variables only for 2013, the year prior to the main inflow of asylum seekers, to avoid any endogenous changes in regional characteristics in response to the immigration shock. To interpret δ and γ as causal parameters, we estimate first-differenced regression equations to eliminate time-constant unobserved heterogeneity between the counties (θc). This is important, since regions are subject to long-lasting structural attributes, which are not perfectly covered by socio-demographic and socio-economic variables. Moreover, the nature of unexpected inflows of asylum seekers suggests a natural foundation of a first-difference specification. The estimation equation takes the following form: ∆hate crimect = δ∆asylum seekersct + γ∆asylum seekersct × CC2013 + ∆Xctβ + ∆θt + ∆uct , (2) where we use the annual difference between the periods 2013–2015, resulting in a panel of T = 2, t = 2014, 2015 with all n = 402 counties in Germany. Since we do not have information on the stock of asylum seekers, we take the annual county-level assignments in 2014 and 2015 as a measure of ∆asylum seekersct. To be even more restrictive, we retain state fixed effects (θs) to control for state-specific trends; for example, to control for potential changes in police spending or asylum policies between states. As motivated in the introduction, CC represents the variables constituting the hypotheses of defended neighborhoods, economic hardship, and legacy of hate crime. For instance, the question 11The different scales of the dependent and main independent variable were selected to facilitate the interpretation of the estimated coefficients in section 6. 21 regarding the validity of the theory of defended neighborhoods is whether hate crime is most pronounced in areas where few foreigners lived before and which is now exposed to a large and sudden influx of asylum seekers. Our empirical model enables testing this hypothesis, since we can explicitly incorporate the interaction of county-specific inflow of asylum seekers with the pre-influx share of native-born residents as of 2013. Evidence for the validity of this hypothesis is obtained if the average marginal effect of asylum seekers on hate crime and estimated parameter γ are positive, and the marginal effect increases with the share of natives (indicators of economic hardship and hate crime legacy are considered analogously). X constitutes a vector of time-varying covariates, including annual changes in the share of German-born residents, unemployed persons per 1,000 residents, GDP per capita, as well as the net internal migration of natives and share of foreign-born alleged offenders of violent crimes. Since the literature on hate crime perpetrators suggests that young male adults or adolescents with low scholastic achievement perform the majority of hate crimes (Willems et al., 1993), X also includes annual changes in the share of males younger than 35 years and in the share of school dropouts in each county. To be diligent about omitted regressors that correlate with our main explanatory variable “assignment of asylum seekers” (see section 4), we also control for the share of vacant housing and presence of large-scale reception centers. In addition, we include dummies for states and years, and cluster standard errors at the county level. 6 Results 6.1 Simply more Hate Crimes due to an Increasing Number of Potential Hate Crime Victims? We first present the results of regressing hate crimes on asylum seeker inflows without explicitly considering differences in regional conditions. We do this to isolate the victim supply effect, namely the effect of a mere increase in the number of asylum seekers in a particular county on hate crime against asylum seekers in this area. Table 3 provides the results of this regression in column 22 (1) without and (2) with additional covariates and state and year fixed effects. We estimate the ITT effect, which informs us about the effect of asylum seeker inflows when these (strictly) follow administrative assignments. The unconditional baseline regression shows a statistically significant parameter estimate of 0.937, indicating that the inflow of one additional asylum seeker per 1,000 residents would have led to approximately one additional attack per one million residents. After controlling for covariates and including state and year fixed effects, the ITT effect is reduced by two thirds of its original magnitude (0.325), losing its statistical significance. This result suggests that, conditional on county characteristics and state and year fixed effects, no direct and linear link exists between the size of asylum seeker inflows and hate crime attacks–a surprising result. Generally, it is expected that a higher supply of potential victims per capita should lead to more observed acts of hate crime against this group. An explanation for this finding may be that a certain threshold of incoming asylum seekers must be passed before potential perpetrators lash out against newcomers (analogous to tipping-point models, see Card, Mas, and Rothstein, 2008). In addition, asylum seeker accommodations must be salient to be attacked by aggressors. A lack of visibility of local group accommodations might reduce the probability of attacks. To investigate both potential explanations for the non-significance of the effect of asylum seeker inflows on hate crime, we focus on counties with very high inflows of asylum seekers (exceeding a threshold) or that run large-scale asylum seeker reception centers (high salience). The models in columns (3) to (4) show the estimated coefficients for asylum seeker inflows and the interaction effect of asylum seeker inflows with dummy variable D, which takes on the value 1 if the county is located in the upper quartile of asylum seeker assignments and 0 otherwise. For both specifications, we find positive, but only marginally statistically significant main effects and negative statistically insignificant interaction effects. It thus seems that counties in the upper end of the asylum seeker distribution do not experience more attacks against asylum seekers than those with less asylum seekers per capita.12 Columns (5) to (6) show the estimates for the interaction with dummy variable EAE, which takes on the value 1 if the county hosts a 12The same holds true when we split counties at the median instead of at the 75th percentile. 23 Table 3: The Effect of Inflow Size and Reception Centers on Hate Crime (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Asylum Seekers 0.937∗∗∗ 0.325 0.572∗ 0.571∗ 0.707∗∗∗ 0.756∗∗∗ (0.137) (0.198) (0.331) (0.309) (0.191) (0.188) Asylum Seekers × D [ Inflow > Q4 ] -0.231 -0.217 (0.198) (0.196) Asylum Seekers × EAE -0.508∗∗∗ -0.534∗∗∗ (0.136) (0.134) Covariates No Yes No Yes No Yes State Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes Year Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes adj. R2 0.27 0.39 0.37 0.40 0.36 0.39 N 804 804 804 804 804 804 Note: The table shows the first-difference regression results of hate crime against asylum seekers per 1 million residents on assigned asylum seekers per 1,000 residents and interacted with dummy variable EAE, which takes on the value of 1 if the county has a large-scale reception center and 0 otherwise, or with dummy variable D, which takes on the value of 1 if the county is within the fourth quartile of asylum seeker assignments and 0 otherwise. Covariates include first-differences of GDP per capita, unemployed per 1,000 residents, and the shares of natives, net internal migration of natives, males aged less than 35 years, school dropouts, foreign suspects of violent crimes, vacant private housing, and an indicator for EAEs (except for columns (5) and (6)). Standard errors are clustered at the county level and displayed in parentheses. Statistical significance is indicated by asterisks according to: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. large-scale reception center and 0 otherwise. For counties hosting an EAE, we find fewer attacks on asylum seekers. A high salience of asylum seeker accommodations seems not to be driving the results. Instead, this finding indicates that counties with smaller, more spatially fragmented, and decentralized forms of housing experience more attacks against asylum seekers. We conclude from the regression analyses that the size of the inflow of asylum seekers and a high salience of accommodations do not automatically translate into higher numbers of attacks against this group. Thus, it is crucial to study the local interplay of the size of the influx and prevailing ethnic composition, as well as the economic and social situation to better understand the regional heterogeneity of hate crime offenses. As clarified in subsequent sections, even a small number of asylum seekers in responsive regions might have larger effects than a massive inflow to regions with low levels of anti-foreigner sentiment. 24 6.2 Regional Factors Determining Hate Crime In this subsection, we analyze whether the effect of asylum seeker inflows on hate crimes is magnified by local ethnic composition or economic or historical characteristics. We refer to these hypotheses as defended neighborhoods, economic hardship, and the legacy of hate crime respectively. Columns (1) and (2) in Table 4 present the tests of the defended neighborhood hypothesis. We empirically test the hypothesis by interacting the local inflow of asylum seekers with the share of German-born residents in the county as of 2013. We then construct a measure capturing both the size of the arriving ethnically different inflow and local predominance of the incumbent population. Statistically significant negative coefficient estimates of asylum seeker inflows and statistically significant positive estimates of the interaction with the pre-existing share of natives are visible in both models. This implies that the number of attacks against asylum seekers is higher in regions with relatively larger shares of incumbent natives, and lower in regions with an already relatively large share of foreigners. As the average marginal effects (AME) are positive, we conclude that the results are in line with the defended neighborhood hypothesis. Furthermore, the magnitudes of the AME exceed the corresponding values of the baseline regression without interactions (0.459 instead of 0.325, see column (2) in Table 3). Evidently, what matters is not purely the absolute size of incoming asylum seekers, but the encounter of unaccustomed natives with massive inflows of (ethnically different) foreigners. Columns (3) and (4) in Table 4 report the effects of asylum seeker inflows on hate crime depending on the extent of economic hardship. We expect that in regions with poor labor market conditions, asylum seekers are considered as competitors of local job seekers or for welfare benefits, specifically for those who are low-skilled and unemployed. In most of the empirical literature, economic hardship is measured by unemployment.13 To ensure that we cover the economic situation at the time before the massive inflow of asylum seekers, we use the unemployment 13In section 6.4 we discuss an alternative measure of economic hardship, an indicator of the relative deprivation of counties (cf. Kroll et al., 2017). 25 Table 4: Effect of Inflows and Regional Conditions on Hate Crime Defended Neighborhoods Economic Hardship Legacy of Hate Crimes (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Asylum Seekers -10.323∗∗∗ -6.177∗∗∗ -0.172 -0.437 0.521∗∗∗ 0.212 (2.008) (1.449) (0.277) (0.307) (0.169) (0.143) Asylum Seekers × Share of natives 12.126∗∗∗ 7.143∗∗∗ (2.171) (1.631) × Unemployment 0.030∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ (0.007) (0.008) × Attacks90s 0.736∗∗∗ 0.457∗∗∗ (0.198) (0.127) AME [ Asylum Seekers ] 0.944∗∗∗ 0.459∗∗∗ 0.871∗∗∗ 0.318∗ 0.980∗∗∗ 0.500∗∗∗ (0.083) (0.133) (0.121) (0.192) (0.091) (0.149) Covariates No Yes No Yes No Yes State Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes Year Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes adj. R2 0.35 0.41 0.33 0.41 0.31 0.40 N 804 804 804 804 804 804 Note: The table shows the first-difference regression results of hate crime against asylum seekers per 1 million residents on assigned asylum seekers per 1,000 residents interacted either with the share of Germans living in the county in 2013 (Defended Neighborhoods), number of unemployed persons per 1,000 residents in 2013 (Economic Hardship), or a dummy variable Attacks90s, which takes on the value of 1 if hate crimes against foreigners occurred in the county between 1991 and 1993, and 0 otherwise (Legacy of Hate Crimes). For the covariates see Table 3. Standard errors are clustered at the county level and displayed in parentheses. Statistical significance is indicated by asterisks according to: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. figures as of 2013. Because registered unemployment rates depend on the size of the labor force, which depends on the participation rate and potentially high number of people out of the labor force, we instead use the number of unemployed per 1,000 residents as our interaction variable.14 As before in columns (1) and (2), we obtain a statistically significant estimate of the interaction parameter γ for the economic hardship hypothesis. The nonlinear effect depending on the local unemployment situation is as expected: One additional asylum seeker in a region with a large number of unemployed persons has a higher marginal effect on attacks against asylum seekers than in a region where the number of jobless people is small (cf. the negative sign of δ, and positive 14Using the number of unemployed persons per residents instead of the unemployment rates does not alter our results quantitatively or qualitatively. 26 one of γ). However, after adding controls, the AME, though still marginally significant, does not differ much from the baseline coefficient in Table 3. Thus, on average, economic conditions might not play a great role in explaining the rise in hat crime, but may be relevant in regions where a high number of asylum seeker coincides with a high number of unemployed persons. Using data by Krueger and Pischke (1997), who investigated the high and rising rate of anti-foreigner hate crimes during the early 1990s, we test whether historical patterns of hate crime have amplified current aggression against asylum seekers. To do so, we interact the inflow of asylum seekers with a dummy variable, which takes on the value 1 if hate crime events were already documented in the years 1991–1993 in the county, and 0 otherwise. Columns (5) to (6) in Table 4 confirm that regions with former anti-foreigner incidents, which happened 25 years ago, face significantly more attacks than those without attacks at that time. The AME substantially increases from 0.325 in Table 3 to 0.500 after considering previous regional patterns of hate crime. This important finding shows that the current upsurge in hate crimes is not only related to the contemporary factors of ethnic composition or economic conditions, but also rooted in the legacy of the long-lasting xenophobic attitudes that have persisted in affected regions up to today. 6.3 Differences between East and West Germany The previous section elucidated the regional factors explaining hate crime against asylum seekers. Germany’s distinct history of division into two countries with different political systems means it is important to more closely examine at regional subsamples. Moreover, panel (a) in Figure 2 shows that different levels of hate crime rates between the two former parts of Germany exist. In this section, we estimate separate coefficients for East and West Germany, acknowledging the historic and prevailing differences. This exercise seems especially important, as previous and current anti-foreigner attacks are predominantly located in the East of Germany (see section 3 as well as Krueger and Pischke, 1997). We introduce the dummy variable East, which takes on the value 1 if the county is located in the area of the former communist German Democratic Republic (GDR), and 0 otherwise. Column 27 Table 5: East-West Effects of Regional Conditions on Hate Crime Baseline Defended Neighbor- hoods Economic Hardship Legacy of Hate Crimes Unified Frame- work (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) Asylum Seekers 0.178 -2.482∗∗ -0.049 0.090 -3.653∗∗∗ (0.133) (1.252) (0.211) (0.090) (1.259) Asylum Seekers × East 1.673∗∗∗ -3.425 1.440 2.161∗∗∗ -0.382 (0.355) (12.043) (1.218) (0.518) (13.855) × Share of natives 2.939∗∗ 3.816∗∗∗ (1.390) (1.331) × Share of natives × East 5.052 2.056 (12.394) (14.015) × Unemployment 0.007 0.009 (0.005) (0.006) × Unemployment × East 0.001 0.001 (0.024) (0.024) × Attacks90s 0.377∗∗∗ 0.357∗∗∗ (0.104) (0.104) × Attacks90s × East -0.771 -0.750 (0.553) (0.600) AME [ Asylum Seekers ] 0.524∗∗∗ 0.467∗∗∗ 0.595∗∗∗ 0.620∗∗∗ (0.117) (0.135) (0.119) (0.115) AME [ Asylum Seekers ] if East=0 0.230∗∗ 0.175 0.310∗∗∗ 0.420∗∗∗ (0.110) (0.131) (0.107) (0.116) AME [ Asylum Seekers ] if East=1 1.515∗∗ 1.660∗∗∗ 2.004∗∗∗ 1.533∗ (0.627) (0.501) (0.355) (0.817) Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes adj. R2 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.44 0.44 N 804 804 804 804 804 Note: The table shows the first-difference regression results of hate crime against asylum seekers per 1 million residents on assigned asylum seekers per 1,000 residents, either interacted with the share of Germans living in the county in 2013 (Defended Neighborhoods), number of unemployed persons per 1,000 residents in 2013 (Economic Hardship), or a dummy variable Attacks90s, which takes on the value of 1 if hate crimes against foreigners occurred in the county between 1991 and 1993, and 0 otherwise (Legacy of Hate Crimes). Triple interactions involve the dummy variable East, which takes on the value of 1 if the county belongs to the former territory of the German Democratic Republic and 0 otherwise. For the covariates see Table 3. Standard errors are clustered at the county level and displayed in parentheses. Statistical significance is indicated by asterisks according to: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 28 (1) of Table 5 represents the baseline regression without any interactions with county-level characteristics. There are strong differences in the effect of asylum seeker inflows on hate crime offenses between East and West Germany. While the effect for West German counties is quite small and statistically insignificant, in the East, it is large and statistically significant. In East Germany, for one additional asylum seeker per 1,000 residents, there will be almost two additional attacks against asylum seekers per one million residents in East Germany. The probability of a newly arriving asylum seeker becoming a victim of a hate crime in East Germany is ten times greater than in West Germany. This striking difference makes it necessary to analyze the impact of defended neighborhoods, economic hardship, and the legacy of hate crimes separately for East and West Germany. In particular, because of native dominance, high unemployment and historical hate crime incidents are phenomena mostly prevalent in the eastern part of Germany. Taking East-West differences into account, we reconsider the test of the defended neighborhood hypothesis. Column (2) in Table 5 displays the parameter estimates of the defended neighborhood hypothesis separately for East and West Germany. The estimated coefficient confirms the significance of the relationship between asylum seeker inflows and hate crime in Table 4: Larger shares of German-born residents are associated with steeper increases in hate crime. The coefficient of the interaction of asylum seeker inflows and the dummy for counties in the east is statistically insignificant. This noteworthy result implies no particular East-specific effect of asylum seeker inflows on hate crime after taking differences in the ethnic predominance of natives into account. As differences between East and West of the average marginal effects are still large, the reason they persist must be evident in the East-West differences of the regional shares of natives, i.e., the constituting explanatory factor of the defended neighborhood hypothesis. To visualize the stark differences between the previously separated parts of Germany, Figure A2 presents contour plots of predicted hate crime events for county combinations of asylum seeker inflows and the share of German-born residents. As is clearly visible, the number of hate crime incidents increases with the share of natives and with asylum seeker inflows. Furthermore, the number of predicted hate crime events is much larger for any combination of inflows and 29 share of natives in the East than in the West. Column (3) in Table 5 presents coefficient estimates of the economic hardship hypothesis when allowing for East-West differences. As with the analysis of defended neighborhoods, the AMEs of asylum seeker inflows are substantially larger in the East. However, the AMEs for East and West Germany are considerably smaller than in the case of defended neighborhoods. In addition, the parameter estimate of γ is contrary to previous estimates on economic hardship (see Table 4) statistically insignificant. Thus, it seems that controlling for East-West differences picks up the variation in unemployment, rendering coefficient estimates insignificant. This result suggests that tensions on local labor markets do not drive the huge difference in hate crimes between East and West Germany. A surprising result given the ever-present idea of a direct relationship between economic conditions and xenophobia. We conclude that anti-foreigner hate crime, as the most severe measure of xenophobia, is seemingly influenced by non-economic motives. The bottom row of Figure A2 visualizes the impact of unemployment and asylum seeker inflows on hate crime. While for West Germany unemployment and the size of the inflow seem relevant for hate crime events, the number of predicted hate crimes only slightly varies with unemployment in the East. Turning to the hypothesis of hate crime legacy (Table 5, column (4)), we confirm the large differences between the AMEs in the East and West. Moreover, the coefficient of the interaction of asylum seekers and attacks in the 1990s is large and highly significant. Different from previous estimations, the coefficient of Asylum Seekers × East is very large and highly statistically significant (2.161), indicating a pure East German shift. Thus, present-day differences in hate crime between East and West Germany cannot be explained solely by historical hate crime patterns. We conclude from this analysis that hate crime in the 1990s is an important explanatory variable of present-day hate crime (as also shown in Table 4), but is not sufficient to explain the upsurge of hate crime today. After separately inspecting the hypotheses of defended neighborhoods, economic hardship, and legacy of hate crimes separately, we test whether some explanations are possibly superior 30 to others. We do so by including the full set of interactions of all competing hypotheses into a single regression model. As evident in column (5) in Table 5, our results are closely aligned with previous findings. The coefficients of the interaction terms including the share of natives are magnified when compared to single estimates (3.816 instead of 2.939). We consider this a strong confirmation of the validity of the defended neighborhood hypothesis. The estimated coefficient of the interaction of asylum seeker inflows with unemployment remains statistically insignificant. The high statistical significance of the coefficient of the interaction with hate crimes in the 1990s pertains in the full model, indicating that its significance in Column (4) does not result from omitting unemployment and the share of natives. All coefficient estimates of regressors including an East interaction are statistically insignificant. These outcomes corroborate findings on the validity of all the hypotheses, but especially strengthen the relevance of the explanation of defended neighborhoods. 6.4 Further Influences and Hypotheses The public debate on hate crime in Germany revolves around the roles of deprivation and right-wing attitudes as potential sources of frustration and anti-foreigner crime in East Germany. Indeed, deprivation seems related to the formation of hate groups and extremist parties, as has been shown by Dustmann et al. (2011) and Adamczyk, Gruenewald, Chermak, and Freilich (2014). Evidence provided by Müller and Schwarz (2018) suggests that hate speech and right-wing anti-refugee sentiment spread by the AfD via social media (Facebook) predicts violent crimes against refugees. Another cause for hate crime could be the motive of retaliation. Evidence in favor of retaliatory behavior has been reported by Hanes and Machin (2014). We thus include a regional index of deprivation, the share of foreign-born suspects of violent crimes, and the vote shares of right-wing extremist parties as further potential explanations of hate crime. An unexpected finding of our previous analysis is the lack of importance of economic conditions in the rise of hate crime. One concern could be that in times of a booming German economy, unemployment figures might not fully capture economic conditions. Therefore, in this section, we 31 use an alternative indicator of economic hardship, namely the German Index of Socioeconomic Deprivation (GISD). Social and economic deprivation refers to limited access to economic and social opportunities and participation because of poverty, a lack of access to jobs, political voice, or exclusion from general progress (see Kroll et al., 2017, for more information on the dimensions and conceptualization). Column (1) in Table A1 provides the main findings concerning regional deprivation. As in section 6.3, we explicitly incorporate East-West differences. The results of the regression using the GISD indicator rather than unemployment figures are fairly similar (recall Table 5). The AMEs are very near the baseline effects, suggesting that both unemployment and the deprivation index do not add much explanatory power to the rise in hate crime. Another channel, which explain the upsurge in hate crimes, could be the motive of retaliation. Unfortunately, we cannot directly test this hypothesis, because we do not have information on victim-offender relations when asylum seekers are the perpetrators. In addition, we have no information regarding whether the perpetrators of anti-foreigner hate crime have been victims of asylum seekers before. However, the literature on the victim-offender overlap (Haidt, 2003; Jacobs and Wright, 2010) points out that retaliation is not necessarily addressed against the perpetrator. Through the random redirection of hate, any available person of the out-group can be victimized, leading to a general climate of violence and fear. Moreover, the motive of retaliation can be reinforced if there are many salient cases among the majority population. We try to uncover a potential “climate” of retaliatory motives by merging data on foreign crime suspects15 from the German Police Statistics (Polizeiliche Kriminalstatistik, PKS) with our existing county-level database. We focus on the share of foreign-born suspects among all suspects involved in a violent crime, since these crimes most likely provoke retaliatory behavior. In column (2) in Table A1, we display the ITT estimates of interactions with the share of foreign-born suspects of violent crimes. The parameter estimates of the interactions with 15A suspect is the outcome of the police investigation of a crime. Suspects can be viewed as alleged criminals, as they are not charged or convicted. However, from the perspective of the police, they are very likely to have committed the crime under consideration. 32 foreign-born suspects are both negative, marginally statistically significant in the case of γ and statistically insignificant for the specific additional East effect. Although the effect of asylum seeker inflows remains positive on average (see the AMEs), it is higher in regions with relatively smaller shares of foreign-born crime suspects. Thus, the hypothesis of retaliation cannot be confirmed with the data at hand. The negative sign initially seems counterintuitive; however, note that a relatively small share of crimes committed by foreigners are observed when the portion of foreigners in the population is relatively small and the share of natives high. This outcome is analogous to that of the defended neighborhoods hypothesis: High shares of incumbent inhabitants are associated with higher rates of hate crime. Nonetheless, the major East-West differences cannot be explained by our measure of retaliatory behavior as the coefficient of Asylum Seekers × East is large and statistically significant. Finally, we expect to observe more hate crimes against asylum seekers in regions with a relatively large number of right-wing nationalists, who tend to openly express their hostile attitudes against foreigners. We measure the existence of extreme right-wing attitudes using the local vote shares of extreme right-wing parties at the federal election in 2013. Focusing on the federal election in 2013, we obtain an indicator of already existing latent anti-foreigner attitudes prior to the large influx of asylum seekers. As seen in column (3) in Table A1, the results concerning the AMEs are within the usual range of other models. Contrary to expectations, we could not detect a statistically significant association between rising hate crime and asylum seeker inflows. We conclude from this analysis that hate crime does not seem to be a phenomenon limited to areas with a high salience of right-wing extremist views. It must be understood in a more general setting. 7 Sensitivity Analysis In the previous section, we confirmed that the hypotheses of defended neighborhoods and legacy of hate crime incidents largely explain the upsurge in hate crimes. However, there has been no convincing support for the hypothesis of economic hardship. We now explore the robustness of 33 these findings by considering different estimation models, looking at the subset of violent hate crimes, and controlling for additional potentially confounding variables. 7.1 Count Data Estimation Since hate crime events are the most extreme expressions of anti-foreigner attitudes, their frequency is small. Therefore, as an alternative approach to analyzing the upsurge in hate crime, these events can be treated as count data. In Table A2, we report the negative binomial regression results of a model using the number of hate crime incidents as the dependent variable instead of the first-differenced population normalized hate crime statistics used thus far. To control for the size of the counties, we include the population size as of 2013 as an additional regressor. The results in Table A2 confirm our previous results from section 6.3. Coefficient estimates in the models capturing defended neighborhoods and the legacy of hate crime events are in line with both hypotheses. The hypothesis of economic hardship is again not supported by the estimates. Likelihood Ratio tests of the Poisson model restriction of mean dispersion are rejected for every model, favoring the chosen negative binomial model over a standard Poisson model. 7.2 Violent Hate Crimes Thus far, hate crime comprised all types of hate-related criminal incidents directed against asylum seeker accommodations and their inhabitants. As the inclination of violent perpetrators to express hatred against foreigners should be more intense than for non-violent hate crime offenders, we examine whether our results also hold for violent hate crimes such as arson and assaults. As committing a violent hate crime means crossing the threshold from an aggressive attitude to aggressive action, these incidents are relatively rare. At the same time, they are more noticeable to the public and therefore, considerably less likely to be under-reported than non-violent xenophobic incidents. Table A3 provides the results of the regression of the three main hypotheses, now with violent hate crime as the dependent variable. As violent incidents occur less frequently than non-violent 34 hate crimes, the estimated coefficients are smaller than in previous tables. Column (1) presents the regression results for the baseline specification including the East Germany dummy. Again, as in the analysis comprising all hate crime incidents, there is a stronger effect in the East than in the West. Columns (2) to (4) show the regression estimates and average marginal effects for the hypotheses of defended neighborhoods, economic hardship, and legacy of hate crime respectively. Only the coefficient estimate for the defended neighborhoods hypothesis retains its sign and statistical significance when compared to the results based on the total number of hate crimes (see Table 5). That is, the interaction between asylum seeker inflows and the share of natives in the incumbent population is confirmed as a driver of violent hate crime incidents. The hypotheses of economic hardship and hate crime legacy do not explain the rise in violent hate crimes. As before, the defended neighborhood hypothesis seems the most stable explanation for the rise in hate crime in East and West Germany in recent years. 7.3 Further Sensitivity Analyses In appendix A.1, we provide evidence that the results obtained thus far are not driven by outliers, clustering of standard errors, or omitted variable bias. Table A4 presents the results of our main analysis, but excluding Berlin. Since Berlin is the largest city in (East) Germany and witnesses a high number of hate crime events, the results, especially for East Germany, could be driven by this outlier. However, the regression results appear to be insensitive to the exclusion of Berlin. Table A5 shows the regression results of our main analysis using standard errors clustered at the state level. This procedure allows for correlation of the error terms within states, but reduces the number of clusters substantially to 16 (the number of German states). Again, statistical significance is not driven by the choice at which level standard errors are clustered. In the regression analyses presented in Tables A6, A7, and A8, we control for potentially confounding variables. Table A6 includes the local clear-up rates of all crimes and violent crimes as a measure of local police force efficiency. Following Zenou (2003) and Piopiunik and Ruhose (2017), we include spatial lags of hate crime as control variables to capture potential spatial 35 spillovers of hate crime. Specifically, we construct spatially lagged outcome variables as the sum of first-differenced hate crimes per one million residents weighted either with travel time by car (Table A7) or jump distance (Table A8) between county centroids. It seems the regression results from section 6.3 were not affected by the inclusion of these additional control variables. 8 Conclusion Germany’s “refugees welcome” enthusiasm on the one hand and attacks against asylum seeker shelters throughout the country on the other indicates the two faces of Germany’s response to Europe’s escalating experience of refugee immigration. In this article, we analyze the association of the size and regional distribution of the inflow of asylum seekers with the spatial upsurge of attacks against this group. We adopt three hypotheses from different disciplines regarding the causes of hate crime. Specifically, this study focuses on the hypotheses of defended neighborhoods, economic hardship, and the legacy of hate crime events. To identify the influence of exogenous asylum seeker inflows, we use a quota system in Germany, which is used to distribute asylum-seekers across German regions. We employ data on administrative assignments to estimate the intention-to-treat effects of asylum seeker inflows on the rise in anti-foreigner hate crime in Germany. Our results reveal that there has been no homogeneous link between asylum seeker intake and hate crime. We find that the size of the inflow does not automatically translate into a higher number of attacks against asylum seekers. Recent inflows of asylum seekers only impact the rise in hate crimes when they were assigned to areas with a previously very low share of foreign-born inhabitants, to regions under economic strain, or to those with a legacy of anti-foreigner hate crimes. Similar to Krueger and Pischke (1997), we confirm a much larger upsurge in hate crimes in East than in West Germany—a phenomenon still present, 25 years after German reunification. The defended neighborhood hypothesis of Green et al. (1998) stands out as the most robust explanation of the rise in hate crime in both regions of Germany. Thus, we are able to contribute to explanations of the larger average hostile reaction to immigration in East Germany. 36 In addition, we analyze the robustness of our findings and examine further channels through which hate crime might evolve. When analyzing violent hate crimes only, the hypothesis on defended neighborhoods retains its explanatory power. We further consider retaliation motives and study the correlation between hate crime and extreme right-wing voting behavior. None convincingly explain the rise in hate crime, but implicitly corroborate the relevance of the defended neighborhood hypothesis. Our findings at the regional level can be rationalized by a severe out-group bias at the individual level. Grattet (2009) pointed out that the reason for such hatred might be that ethnic outsiders pose a significant challenge to the shared cultural identity of the neighborhood. Card, Dustmann, and Preston (2012) similarly argue (economically) that a loss of compositional amenities is reducing the approval of immigration. Policy makers might consider the results of our study by raising awareness and compassion when assigning asylum seekers to areas with limited experience of immigration. Information campaigns and increased public funds for these areas might reduce latent out-group biases and compensate for a potential loss in compositional amenities. Our study documents and explains the regional variation in outbursts of extreme anti- foreigner attitudes against the newly arrived group of asylum seekers. As our data and empirical analyses are at the regional level, we cannot elucidate the individual characteristics of victims and perpetrators such as educational background and unemployment experience. However, given the importance of the question regarding where attacks take place, which is emphasized by many hypotheses in the fields of economics, social sciences, criminology, psychology, and political science, we believe that the causal empirical evidence from this study significantly contributes to understanding the rise in hate crime. 37 References Adamczyk, A., J. Gruenewald, S. M. Chermak, and J. D. Freilich (2014). 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Right Voting (1) (2) (3) Asylum Seekers -0.110 0.474∗∗ 0.374∗ (0.196) (0.197) (0.213) Asylum Seekers × East 0.962 1.927∗∗∗ 1.579 (1.217) (0.627) (0.972) × GISD 0.007∗ (0.004) × GISD × East 0.009 (0.019) × Share foreign suspects -0.011∗ (0.006) × Share foreign suspects × East -0.047 (0.044) × Ext.right vote share -13.068 (11.838) × Ext.right vote share × East 10.384 (32.488) AME [ Asylum Seekers ] 0.475∗∗∗ 0.511∗∗∗ 0.508∗∗∗ (0.126) (0.121) (0.129) AME [ Asylum Seekers ] if East=0 0.184 0.214∗ 0.152 (0.119) (0.115) (0.115) AME [ Asylum Seekers ] if East=1 1.549∗∗∗ 1.170∗∗ 1.904∗∗∗ (0.467) (0.508) (0.547) Covariates Yes Yes Yes State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes adj. R2 0.44 0.44 0.43 N 804 804 804 Note: The table shows the first-difference regression results of hate crime against asylum seekers per 1 million residents on assigned asylum seekers per 1,000 residents, either interacted with the German Index of Socioeconomic Deprivation from 2012 (Deprivation), the share of foreign-born suspects for violent crimes in 2013 (Retaliation), or the vote shares of extreme right parties at the federal election in 2013 (Ext. Right Voting). Triple interactions involve the dummy variable East, which takes on the value of 1 if the county belongs to the former territory of the German Democratic Republic and 0 otherwise. For the covariates see Table 3. Standard errors are clustered at the county level and displayed in parentheses. Statistical significance is indicated by asterisks according to: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. i Table A2: Negative Binomial Estimates of Inflows and Regional Conditions on Hate Crime Defended Neighborhoods Economic Hardship Legacy of Hate Crimes Unified Framework (1) (2) (3) (4) Asylum Seekers -0.473∗∗ 0.022 0.006 -0.644∗∗∗ (0.193) (0.023) (0.014) (0.232) Asylum Seekers × East -0.559 -0.026 0.022 -0.395 (0.344) (0.057) (0.032) (0.392) × Share of natives 0.537∗∗ 0.681∗∗∗ (0.210) (0.241) × Share of natives × East 0.535 0.394 (0.367) (0.402) × Unemployment -0.000 0.001 (0.001) (0.001) × Unemployment × East 0.000 -0.000 (0.001) (0.001) × Attacks90s 0.044∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗ (0.014) (0.014) × Attacks90s × East -0.053∗ -0.044 (0.028) (0.030) Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Counties’ Population Size Yes Yes Yes Yes State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Test of Poisson restrictions 55.74 90.58 85.68 51.72 [p-value] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] pseudo R2 0.23 0.22 0.23 0.23 N 804 804 804 804 Note: The table shows the negative binomial regression results. The number of hate crimes against asylum seekers is used as dependent variable. The main independent variable assigned asylum seekers per 1,000 residents is either interacted with the share of Germans living in the county in 2013 (Defended Neighborhoods), the number of unemployed persons per 1,000 residents in 2013 (Economic Hardship), or the dummy variable Attacks90s, which takes on the value of 1 if hate crimes against foreigners occurred in the county between 1991 and 1993 and 0 otherwise (Legacy of Hate Crimes). Triple interactions involve the dummy variable East, which takes on the value of 1 if the county belongs to the former territory of the German Democratic Republic and 0 otherwise. For the covariates see Table 3. Standard errors are clustered at the county level and displayed in parentheses. Statistical significance is indicated by asterisks according to: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. ii Table A3: East-West Effects of Inflows and Regional Characteristics on Violent Hate Crime Baseline Defended Neighbor- hoods Economic Hardship Legacy of Hate Crimes Unified Frame- work (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) Asylum Seekers 0.040 -0.636∗∗ 0.048 0.041 -0.698∗∗ (0.027) (0.313) (0.059) (0.028) (0.349) Asylum Seekers × East 0.227∗∗ -2.055 0.236 0.135 -2.659 (0.100) (1.816) (0.296) (0.156) (2.111) × Share of natives 0.747∗∗ 0.798∗∗ (0.351) (0.367) × Share of natives × East 2.293 2.849 (1.916) (2.153) × Unemployment -0.000 0.001 (0.002) (0.002) × Unemployment × East -0.000 -0.001 (0.005) (0.005) × Attacks90s 0.002 0.000 (0.032) (0.032) × Attacks90s × East 0.110 0.150 (0.157) (0.177) AME [ Asylum Seekers ] 0.090∗∗∗ 0.081∗∗∗ 0.081∗∗ 0.093∗∗∗ (0.026) (0.028) (0.032) (0.030) AME [ Asylum Seekers ] if East=0 0.053∗∗ 0.034 0.035 0.055∗∗ (0.023) (0.024) (0.029) (0.028) AME [ Asylum Seekers ] if East=1 0.134 0.272∗ 0.246∗∗ 0.092 (0.093) (0.143) (0.102) (0.146) Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes adj. R2 0.18 0.19 0.18 0.18 0.18 N 804 804 804 804 804 Note: The table shows the first-difference regression results of violent hate crime against asylum seekers per 1 million residents on assigned asylum seekers per 1,000 residents, either interacted with the share of Germans living in the county in 2013 (Defended Neighborhoods), the number of unemployed persons per 1,000 residents in 2013 (Economic Hardship), or the dummy variable Attacks90s, which takes on the value of 1 if hate crimes against foreigners occurred in the county between 1991 and 1993 and 0 otherwise (Legacy of Hate Crimes). Triple interactions involve the dummy variable East, which takes the value of 1 if the county belongs to the former territory of the German Democratic Republic and 0 otherwise. For the covariates see Table 3. Standard errors are clustered at the county level and displayed in parentheses. Statistical significance is indicated by asterisks according to: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. iii Table A4: East-West Effects of Inflows and Regional Conditions on Hate Crime (excluding Berlin) Baseline Defended Neighbor- hoods Economic Hardship Legacy of Hate Crimes Unified Frame- work (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) Asylum Seekers 0.181 -2.240∗ -0.052 0.092 -3.441∗∗∗ (0.134) (1.278) (0.211) (0.091) (1.272) Asylum Seekers × East 1.759∗∗∗ 14.216 1.467 2.208∗∗∗ 20.978 (0.357) (17.493) (1.213) (0.519) (19.201) × Share of natives 2.674∗ 3.561∗∗∗ (1.414) (1.345) × Share of natives × East -12.872 -19.667 (17.920) (19.546) × Unemployment 0.007 0.010∗ (0.005) (0.006) × Unemployment × East 0.002 0.004 (0.024) (0.024) × Attacks90s 0.379∗∗∗ 0.362∗∗∗ (0.104) (0.104) × Attacks90s × East -0.727 -0.894 (0.555) (0.607) AME [ Asylum Seekers ] 0.539∗∗∗ 0.482∗∗∗ 0.613∗∗∗ 0.634∗∗∗ (0.118) (0.135) (0.119) (0.114) AME [ Asylum Seekers ] if East=0 0.227∗∗ 0.178 0.315∗∗∗ 0.420∗∗∗ (0.112) (0.132) (0.107) (0.115) AME [ Asylum Seekers ] if East=1 2.490∗∗∗ 1.723∗∗∗ 2.082∗∗∗ 2.685∗∗∗ (0.910) (0.497) (0.357) (1.036) Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes adj. R2 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.45 N 802 802 802 802 802 Note: The table shows the first-difference regression results of hate crime against asylum seekers per 1 million residents on assigned asylum seekers per 1,000 residents, either interacted with the share of Germans living in the county in 2013 (Defended Neighborhoods), the number of unemployed persons per 1,000 residents in 2013 (Economic Hardship), or the dummy variable Attacks90s, which takes on the value of 1 if hate crimes against foreigners occurred in the county between 1991 and 1993 and 0 otherwise (Legacy of Hate Crimes). Triple interactions involve the dummy variable East, which takes on the value of 1 if the county belongs to the former territory of the German Democratic Republic and 0 otherwise. Berlin is excluded from the estimation sample. For the covariates see Table 3. Standard errors are clustered at the county level and displayed in parentheses. Statistical significance is indicated by asterisks according to: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. iv Table A5: East-West Effects of Inflows and Regional Conditions on Hate Crime (with State-Level Clustered Standard Errors) Baseline Defended Neighbor- hoods Economic Hardship Legacy of Hate Crimes Unified Frame- work (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) Asylum Seekers 0.178 -2.482∗ -0.049 0.090 -3.653∗∗∗ (0.118) (1.335) (0.179) (0.071) (1.115) Asylum Seekers × East 1.673∗∗∗ -3.425 1.440 2.161∗∗∗ -0.382 (0.317) (14.336) (1.271) (0.221) (16.099) × Share of natives 2.939∗ 3.816∗∗∗ (1.478) (1.159) × Share of natives × East 5.052 2.056 (14.705) (17.081) × Unemployment 0.007 0.009 (0.006) (0.007) × Unemployment × East 0.001 0.001 (0.024) (0.024) × Attacks90s 0.377∗∗∗ 0.357∗∗∗ (0.055) (0.066) × Attacks90s × East -0.771 -0.750 (0.448) (0.483) AME [ Asylum Seekers ] 0.524∗∗∗ 0.467∗∗∗ 0.595∗∗∗ 0.620∗∗∗ (0.057) (0.068) (0.055) (0.052) AME [ Asylum Seekers ] if East=0 0.230∗∗ 0.175 0.310∗∗∗ 0.420∗∗∗ (0.096) (0.111) (0.088) (0.086) AME [ Asylum Seekers ] if East=1 1.515∗ 1.660∗∗∗ 2.004∗∗∗ 1.533∗∗ (0.725) (0.508) (0.214) (0.670) Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes adj. R2 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.44 0.44 N 804 804 804 804 804 Note: The table shows first-difference regression results of hate crime against asylum seekers per 1 million residents on assigned asylum seekers per 1000 residents, either interacted with the share of Germans living in the county in 2013 (Defended Neighborhoods), the number of unemployed persons per 1000 residents in 2013 (Economic Hardship), or a dummy variable Attacks90s which takes on the value of 1 if hate crimes against foreigners occurred in the county between 1991 and 1993 and 0 otherwise (Legacy of Hate Crimes). Triple interactions involve a dummy variable East which takes on the value of 1 if the county belongs to the former territory of the German Democratic Republic and 0 otherwise. For covariates see Table 3. Standard errors are clustered at the state level and displayed in parentheses. Statistical significance is indicated by asterisks according to: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. v Table A6: East-West Effects of Inflows and Regional Conditions on Hate Crime Controlling for Clear-up Rates Baseline Defended Neigh- borhoods Economic Hardship Legacy of Hate Crimes Unified Frame- work (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) Asylum Seekers 0.204 -2.326∗ -0.015 0.116 -3.483∗∗∗ (0.126) (1.213) (0.212) (0.093) (1.276) Asylum Seekers × East 1.643∗∗∗ -4.147 1.452 2.160∗∗∗ -0.894 (0.362) (11.986) (1.231) (0.520) (13.775) × Share of natives 2.794∗∗ 3.665∗∗∗ (1.343) (1.334) × Share of natives × East 5.769 2.614 (12.333) (13.932) × Unemployment 0.007 0.009 (0.005) (0.006) × Unemployment × East 0.000 0.001 (0.024) (0.025) × Attacks90s 0.361∗∗∗ 0.343∗∗∗ (0.104) (0.103) × Attacks90s × East -0.794 -0.767 (0.557) (0.603) AME [ Asylum Seekers ] 0.543∗∗∗ 0.488∗∗∗ 0.608∗∗∗ 0.631∗∗∗ (0.113) (0.129) (0.117) (0.115) AME [ Asylum Seekers ] if East=0 0.253∗∗ 0.200 0.328∗∗∗ 0.432∗∗∗ (0.109) (0.126) (0.108) (0.118) AME [ Asylum Seekers ] if East=1 1.482∗∗ 1.676∗∗∗ 2.005∗∗∗ 1.528∗ (0.625) (0.503) (0.355) (0.817) Clear-up rates for violent and total crime Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes adj. R2 0.43 0.44 0.43 0.44 0.44 N 804 804 804 804 804 Note: The table shows the first-difference regression results of hate crime against asylum seekers per 1 million residents on assigned asylum seekers per 1,000 residents, either interacted with the share of Germans living in the county in 2013 (Defended Neighborhoods), the number of unemployed persons per 1,000 residents in 2013 (Economic Hardship), or the dummy variable Attacks90s, which takes on the value of 1 if hate crimes against foreigners occurred in the county between 1991 and 1993 and 0 otherwise (Legacy of Hate Crimes). Triple interactions involve the dummy variable East, which takes on the value of 1 if the county belongs to the former territory of the German Democratic Republic and 0 otherwise. For the covariates see Table 3. Standard errors are clustered at the county level and displayed in parentheses. Statistical significance is indicated by asterisks according to: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. vi Table A7: East-West Effects of Inflows and Regional Conditions on Hate Crime Controlling for Spatial Spillovers by Car Driving Time Baseline Defended Neigh- borhoods Economic Hardship Legacy of Hate Crimes Unified Frame- work (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) Asylum Seekers 0.172 -2.473∗∗ -0.038 0.088 -3.671∗∗∗ (0.135) (1.245) (0.209) (0.093) (1.301) Asylum Seekers × East 1.658∗∗∗ -3.753 1.406 2.154∗∗∗ -0.312 (0.358) (12.102) (1.225) (0.518) (14.030) × Share of natives 2.922∗∗ 3.831∗∗∗ (1.383) (1.368) × Share of natives × East 5.371 1.994 (12.448) (14.171) × Unemployment 0.007 0.009 (0.006) (0.006) × Unemployment × East 0.002 0.001 (0.024) (0.025) × Attacks90s 0.374∗∗∗ 0.357∗∗∗ (0.108) (0.106) × Attacks90s × East -0.770 -0.750 (0.553) (0.601) AME [ Asylum Seekers ] 0.517∗∗∗ 0.465∗∗∗ 0.592∗∗∗ 0.622∗∗∗ (0.122) (0.139) (0.128) (0.123) AME [ Asylum Seekers ] if East=0 0.225∗∗ 0.172 0.308∗∗∗ 0.422∗∗∗ (0.113) (0.135) (0.114) (0.128) AME [ Asylum Seekers ] if East=1 1.485∗∗ 1.650∗∗∗ 1.997∗∗∗ 1.542∗ (0.644) (0.506) (0.365) (0.837) Spatially lagged outcome by driving time Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes adj. R2 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.44 0.44 N 804 804 804 804 804 Note: The table shows the first-difference regression results of hate crime against asylum seekers per 1 million residents on assigned asylum seekers per 1,000 residents, either interacted with the share of Germans living in the county in 2013 (Defended Neighborhoods), the number of unemployed persons per 1,000 residents in 2013 (Economic Hardship), or the dummy variable Attacks90s, which takes on the value of 1 if hate crimes against foreigners occured in the county between 1991 and 1993 and 0 otherwise (Legacy of Hate Crimes). Triple interactions involve the dummy variable East, which takes on the value of 1 if the county belongs to the former territory of the German Democratic Republic and 0 otherwise. For the covariates see Table 3. Standard errors are clustered at the county level and displayed in parentheses. Statistical significance is indicated by asterisks according to: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. vii Table A8: East-West Effects of Inflows and Regional Conditions on Hate Crime Controlling for Spatial Spillovers by Jump Distance Baseline Defended Neigh- bor- hoods Economic Hard- ship Legacy of Hate Crimes Unified Frame- work (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) Asylum Seekers 0.177 -2.476∗∗ -0.054 0.090 -3.776∗∗∗ (0.135) (1.254) (0.213) (0.092) (1.335) Asylum Seekers × East 1.666∗∗∗ -3.516 1.454 2.165∗∗∗ -0.009 (0.363) (12.055) (1.211) (0.523) (13.936) × Share of natives 2.931∗∗ 3.922∗∗∗ (1.394) (1.395) × Share of natives × East 5.138 1.735 (12.403) (14.096) × Unemployment 0.007 0.010 (0.006) (0.007) × Unemployment × East 0.001 0.000 (0.024) (0.024) × Attacks90s 0.378∗∗∗ 0.361∗∗∗ (0.108) (0.106) × Attacks90s × East -0.772 -0.750 (0.554) (0.601) AME [ Asylum Seekers ] 0.523∗∗∗ 0.469∗∗∗ 0.598∗∗∗ 0.629∗∗∗ (0.123) (0.139) (0.128) (0.123) AME [ Asylum Seekers ] if East=0 0.229∗∗ 0.177 0.312∗∗∗ 0.430∗∗∗ (0.113) (0.135) (0.112) (0.127) AME [ Asylum Seekers ] if East=1 1.509∗∗ 1.672∗∗∗ 2.012∗∗∗ 1.576∗ (0.639) (0.503) (0.371) (0.824) Spatially lagged outcome by jump distance Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes adj. R2 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.44 0.44 N 804 804 804 804 804 Note: The table shows the first-difference regression results of hate crime against asylum seekers per 1 million residents on assigned asylum seekers per 1,000 residents, either interacted with the share of Germans living in the county in 2013 (Defended Neighborhoods), the number of unemployed persons per 1,000 residents in 2013 (Economic Hardship), or the dummy variable Attacks90s, which takes on the value of 1 if hate crimes against foreigners occurred in the county between 1991 and 1993 and 0 otherwise (Legacy of Hate Crimes). Triple interactions involve the dummy variable East, which takes on the value of 1 if the county belongs to the former territory of the German Democratic Republic and 0 otherwise. For the covariates see Table 3. Standard errors are clustered at the county level and displayed in parentheses. Statistical significance is indicated by asterisks according to: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. viii A.2 Figures Figure A1: Type of hate crime against asylum seekers in 2014 and 2015 Note: Left panel shows non-violent hate crimes against asylum seekers whereas the right panel depicts violent hate crimes against asylum seekers. Data comes from the Federal Criminal Police Office (see section 3). Own depiction. ix Figure A2: Predicted Hate Crime Incidents against Asylum Seekers per 100,000 Residents 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 1100 1200 1300 A S In flo w p er 1 00 k R es id en ts .85 .87 .89 .91 .93 .95 .97 .99 Share of Natives in 2013 .2 .4 .6 .8 P re di ct ed H at e C rim e In ci de nt s (a) West Germany: Defended Neighborhoods 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 1100 1200 1300 A S In flo w p er 1 00 k R es id en ts .85 .87 .89 .91 .93 .95 .97 .99 Share of Natives in 2013 0 1 2 3 P re di ct ed H at e C rim e In ci de nt s (b) East Germany: Defended Neighborhoods 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 1100 1200 1300 A S In flo w p er 1 00 k R es id en ts 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 Unemployed per 1000 Residents in 2013 .2 .4 .6 .8 1 P re di ct ed H at e C rim e In ci de nt s (c) West Germany: Economic Hardship 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 1100 1200 1300 A S In flo w p er 1 00 k re si de nt s 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 Unemployed per 1000 Residents in 2013 .5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 P re di ct ed H at e C rim e In ci de nt s (d) East Germany: Economic Hardship Note: The Figure displays the number of predicted hate crime events against asylum seekers for combinations of the size of asylum seeker inflows per 100,000 residents and with either the share of German-born residents in 2013 (defended neighborhood hypothesis) or the number of unemployed persons per 1,000 residents in 2013 (economic hardship hypothesis). x ZEW – Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung GmbH Mannheim ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research L 7,1 · 68161 Mannheim Phone +49 621 1235-01 info@zew.de · zew.de Discussion Papers are intended to make results of ZEW research promptly avail able to other economists in order to encourage discussion and suggestions for revisions. The authors are solely respons ible for the contents which do not necessarily represent the opinion of the ZEW. IMPRINT // Download ZEW Discussion Papers from our ftp server: http://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/dp/ or see: https://www.ssrn.com/link/ZEW-Ctr-Euro-Econ-Research.html https://ideas.repec.org/s/zbw/zewdip.html Introduction Context and Related Literature Data and Descriptive Statistics Hate Crime Statistics Asylum Seeker Data Regional Characteristics by Occurrence of Hate Crime Asylum Seeker Dispersal Policy in Germany Econometric Approach Results Simply more Hate Crimes due to an Increasing Number of Potential Hate Crime Victims? Regional Factors Determining Hate Crime Differences between East and West Germany Further Influences and Hypotheses Sensitivity Analysis Count Data Estimation Violent Hate Crimes Further Sensitivity Analyses Conclusion Appendix Tables Figures 
work_zxorp7yf4na6nnytg2b5ob7wii	----	sjny315-sore-NY00006825.dvi Social Justice Research, Vol. 18, No. 3, September 2005 ( C© 2005) DOI: 10.1007/s11211-005-6825-1 Intergroup Bias and Inequity: Legitimizing Beliefs and Policy Attitudes Jack Glaser1 Policy attitudes relating to group-based inequities are in many cases founded on tenuous legitimizing beliefs which are contradicted by empirical evidence. Policy issues, and their attendant legitimizing beliefs, are considered, including affirmative action, colorblindness/“racial privacy,” hate crime legislation, same- sex marriage, and, in greater depth, capital punishment and racial profiling. Primary themes underlying the legitimizing beliefs include denials that group- based biases and inequities exist, overestimations of the societal costs of inequity- reducing policies, valuing public safety above civil liberties, and discounting the adverse effects of inequity-reducing policies. KEY WORDS: inequity; legitimizing beliefs; policy attitudes; affirmative action; colorblindness; hate crime; racial profiling; same-sex marriage. INTRODUCTION Group-based inequities (i.e., disparities between racial, ethnic, gender, na- tional origin, sexual orientation, and other groups in access to resources, rights, and protections) have been well documented, even in the present, post-civil rights era. Extensive studies (e.g., Council of Economic Advisors, 1999; Zweigenhaft and Domhoff, 1998) have documented pervasive disparities that cannot be ac- counted for without making reference to discrimination, across numerous domains of life. Innovative techniques for unveiling biased attitudes (e.g., Crosby et al., 1980; Greenwald and Banaji, 1995) and behavior (e.g., Ayres, 2001; Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2003; Correll et al., 2002) reveal that group-based inequities are at least in part due to continuing prejudice and discrimination. Even survey research that indicates generally improving explicit attitudes toward minorities 1All correspondence should be addressed to Jack Glaser, Goldman School of Public Policy, University of California, Berkeley, California; e-mail: jackglaser@berkeley.edu. 257 0885-7466/05/0900-0257/0 C© 2005 Springer Science+Business Media, Inc. 258 Glaser also shows that a substantial proportion of the American population approves of racial segregation, with approximately 40% disapproving of interracial marriage (e.g., Schuman et al., 1997). Despite the prevalence of such inequities and the processes, such as institu- tional and individual discrimination, in place to perpetuate them, there is consid- erable resistance to policies intended to redress them. Some of this opposition no doubt arises from nonprejudiced, principled objections, sometimes arising from libertarian views about government intervention. But much of the basis for such opposition appears to come from ideologies and beliefs that serve the function of rationalizing policy positions that have the effect of perpetuating or even exacer- bating inequities. The present analysis considers a set of those beliefs, examining statements exemplifying them, made by opinion leaders such as politicians, news columnists, pundits, and academics. Scientific (logical, mathematical, and empir- ical) analyses are brought to bear on assessing the validity of these beliefs. Legitimizing Beliefs/Ideologies All societies have group-based inequities, but most modern societies have aspirations toward equality for all members. This discrepancy requires some psy- chological effort to tolerate (Jost and Banaji, 1994). Legitimizing ideologies and beliefs can serve to reconcile this dissonance by providing rationalizations for inequality. As Jost and Major (2001a) explain, “attitudes, beliefs, and stereotypes serve to legitimize social arrangements and to provide ideological support for social and political systems” (Jost and Major, 2001a, p. 4) and specific policy positions (see Jost and Major, 2001b, for a comprehensive compilation of theories and research on the psychology of legitimacy). Much of the research on group-based inequities and legitimacy has focused on how subordinate groups legitimize their disadvantage and therefore do not chal- lenge the system (e.g., Ellemers, 2001; Jost, Burgess, and Mosso, 2001; Jost and Banaji, 1994; Olson and Hafer, 2001; Major and Schmader, 2001). In this vein, Sidanius and colleagues (Sidanius et al., 2001; Sidanius and Pratto, 1999) make a useful distinction between “consensual” and “dissensual” beliefs (i.e., those that are shared by high and low status groups versus those that are not, respectively). They note, however, that legitimizing beliefs (or “myths,” in their terminology) tend to be consensual because when shared by low status groups legitimizing myths are more effective in sustaining the hierarchical system (e.g., by preventing rebellion). Perhaps the most fundamental legitimizing beliefs with regard to social in- equities are what Ridgeway (2001) calls “status beliefs,” which are beliefs about the actual value or worth of different people and groups. In some sense such status beliefs are related to ideology more generally, with conservatives being more ac- cepting of inequality (e.g., Bobbio, 1996; Jost, Glaser, Sulloway, and Kruglanski, 2003; Muller, 2001). However, in the contemporary public discourse on civil rights Intergroup Bias and Inequity 259 policies, explicit expression of such beliefs is typically taboo and therefore un- available. Consequently, more subtle legitimizing beliefs, such as the belief that society is meritocratic, which nevertheless require a certain indifference to group- based inequities, are more common and will be the focus of the present analysis. These constitute one type of what Jost and colleagues (e.g., Jost and Hunyady, 2005) would refer to as system-justifying beliefs. This is not to say that status beliefs are not influential; it is just that they are unlikely to appear overtly in most current political or public policy discourse. Furthermore, system-justifying beliefs may at least in part serve only as surface rationalizations for underlying status beliefs, although this is not necessarily the case. Sniderman and Tetlock (1986) demonstrated that at least some opposition to affirmative action can be attributed to “principled conservative” (or perhaps more precisely, libertarian) objections to threats to individual opportunities. It is useful in this realm to distinguish between policy attitudes that support reducing inequities and those that serve to maintain the inequities. Sidanius and colleagues, in their work on Social Dominance Theory (SDT), refer to related constructs—“hierarchy-enhancing” and “hierarchy-attenuating” beliefs. SDT le- gitimizing ideologies mostly have to do with differences between groups with regard to value and deservingness, which clearly serve to justify inequities. In the present analysis, I will focus primarily on beliefs that enable one to oppose or sup- port inequity-attenuating policies (such as affirmative action or hate crime statistics legislation). Most of these beliefs presume that equality (at least equality of op- portunity) is desirable, whereas hierarchy-enhancing ideologies may explicitly support inequality. In either case, these ideologies serve to perpetuate inequality. Case Studies in Legitimizing Beliefs To better understand the role of the psychology of legitimizing beliefs in pol- icy attitudes, it is useful to examine several cases in which we can compare beliefs to empirical or historical evidence. Legitimizing beliefs will be illustrated with public statements by opinion leaders. Several cases (affirmative action, desegrega- tion, colorblindness/racial privacy, same-sex marriage, and hate crime laws) will be discussed first to illustrate the breadth of the phenomenon of legitimizing be- liefs with regard to civil rights policies. Subsequently, more in-depth, empirically based examinations of beliefs about racial disparities in capital punishment and about racial profiling will be provided. Affirmative Action Affirmative action is “the expenditure of energy or resources by an organiza- tion in the quest for equality among individuals from different, discernible groups” 260 Glaser (Crosby, 2004, p. 5). This technically precise definition does not necessarily re- flect common conceptions of affirmative action which are, in part, determined by implementations that have deviated from what Crosby (2004) describes as the “classical” policy. Nevertheless, the U.S. Supreme Court has consistently reined in such deviations, prohibiting, for example, the racial or gender quotas that are sometimes associated with affirmative action. At its core, affirmative action en- tails “affirmative” (i.e., proactive) steps to ensure that typically underrepresented groups are represented (primarily in schools and jobs) in proportion to the qualified applicant pools from their groups. Affirmative action policies presuppose that there is not yet equality of oppor- tunity. Otherwise, affirmative steps to ensure it would not be necessary. Hence, a legitimizing belief that supports opposition to affirmative action holds that there is equal opportunity, and discrimination is not prevalent in contemporary society. This belief is exemplified by statements from Ward Connerly, the University of California Regent who sponsored the successful 1996 ballot measure (Proposi- tion 209) banning affirmative action in California government practices. Connerly has asserted, for example, “Most Americans believe that all of us are created equal and that success is ensured by discipline, hard work, aspiration, and belief in the individual” (Connerly, 2002). It is important to note that, while ignor- ing the possibility of different levels of success, Connerly attributes success (in fact, “ensured” success) to qualities of the individual and his or her motives and behaviors, explicitly disregarding the role of discrimination or disparities in op- portunities due to family or community resources. A corollary to this belief is what can be called the “momentum metaphor” (versus the “inertia metaphor”) for civil rights, which holds that once basic principles of equality (e.g., the Fourteenth Amendment,2 the Brown vs. Board of Education ruling) are set in place, society will naturally roll toward equality. A second corollary holds that discrimination is rare because those who discriminate will be punished by the free market, at least in highly competitive markets (Becker, 1957). Discriminating employers will limit their pool of applicants, overlooking talented people who will serve competitors. Consequently, they will be deterred from discriminating or selected out of the market. Setting aside that discriminators are unlikely to recognize that they have underperformed as a consequence of discrimination, that there is no guarantee that competitors will not also discriminate, and that there are psychological “rewards” for discriminating (e.g., not having to interact with people against whom one is prejudiced) that may offset the financial costs, empirical research (as referenced above, e.g., Ayres, 2001; Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2003; Council of Economic Advisors, 1999; Schuman et al., 1997; Zweigenhaft and Domhoff, 1998) clearly indicates that prejudice and discrimination are still prevalent. Consequently, the 2It should be noted that, while the Fourteenth Amendment is often held up as a milestone in American civil rights, it explicitly restricted the guarantee of federal voting rights to men. Intergroup Bias and Inequity 261 claim that affirmative action is unwarranted because discrimination is extinct is not supportable. A more subtle legitimizing belief, which allows (though tends to understate) that group-based disparities in opportunities exist, holds that affirmative action violates fundamental American values at least as much as the existing inequities do. This view is exemplified by Yale Law Professor Peter Schuck’s assertion that, “Affirmative action in its current form, however well-intentioned, violates the distinctive, deeply ingrained cultural and moral commitments to legal equality, private autonomy, and enhanced opportunity that have served Americans well— even though they have not yet served all of us equally well” (Schuck, 2002a; p. 27). Here, the emphasis on “legal equality” grants superior status to de jure rules (i.e., those that are codified, even if not practiced), over de facto rules (i.e., those that in reality dictate people’s outcomes). This focus allows one to disregard very real disparities in access and outcomes in deference to a legal ideal. Similarly, the emphasis on “private autonomy” gives preference to the right of each individual even if, in the aggregate, the common good is not well served. Finally, the notion of “enhanced opportunity” implies that everyone has opportunities. This argument, being difficult to falsify, serves to distract from the very real disparities in opportunities that arise for minorities and women. A legitimizing belief (perhaps one held by more liberal people) that can be seen as supporting affirmative action holds that affirmative action itself is benign— that it does not have adverse effects. It is difficult to find public statements that explicitly endorse this view, but it is reasonable to assume that many supporters of affirmative action at the very least fail to consider that programs that utilize preferences (e.g., giving weight to minority status) can have the effect of depriving qualified high status group candidates of opportunities. While such programs are not consistent with classical definitions of affirmative action (Crosby, 2004), nor the post-Clinton “mend it, don’t end it” era manifestations, and have in fact been deemed unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, there have been many instances of such programs (e.g., those overturned in The Court’s 1978 Bakke and the 2003 Gratz v. Bollinger cases). Nevertheless, it is not clear that there is a widely held belief among supporters of affirmative action that it is benign. To the contrary, statements in support often grant that there are negative consequences of affirmative action, “You can believe (as I do) that affirmative action is often a justifiable form of discrimination, but you cannot sensibly believe that it isn’t discrimination at all” (Michael Kinsley, Editor of Slate.com, in the Washington Post, September 30, 2001). Furthermore, social scientific analyses of affirmative action often acknowledge that when pref- erences are involved, discrimination is present (e.g., Krieger, 1998) and that the specter of affirmative action can serve to stigmatize minorities and females (e.g., Crosby, 2004; Heilman et al., 1992, 1998; Pratkanis and Turner, 1996). It has also been noted, however, that in the absence of an effective system for enforc- ing antidiscrimination law, affirmative action may be the acceptable lesser of two 262 Glaser evils (Krieger, 1995, 1998), and that strategies can be employed to eliminate the stigmatizing effects of affirmative action (Pratkanis and Turner, 1996). Colorblindness An alternative strategy to affirmative action aimed at promoting racial equality is “colorblindness.” Although this ideal ostensibly has the same goal as affirmative action, it is starkly different in its approach. Rather than focusing on racial cate- gories to ensure equal opportunity, the colorblind approach calls for ignoring race. In the words of Ward Connerly, who sponsored the ill-fated 2003 “Racial Privacy Initiative” (Proposition 54)3 aimed at barring California government agencies (in- cluding universities) from categorizing people by race, ethnicity, color, or national origin (RECNO): “There is no reason the government should classify its citizens along lines of skin color, ethnic background or where their ancestors came from” (Connerly, 2002). The legitimizing belief that Connerly appears to hold for this policy stance is that ignoring race/ethnicity will lead to greater equity and social harmony. This belief is reflected in an official response on the Proposition 54 website to a “frequently asked question” (FAQ), “By helping California government stop obsessing about race, RPI will unite us to create a colorblind state for our children and grandchildren, one that is more respectful of the inherently private and complex nature of racial identity” (http://www.racialprivacy.org/content/faq/need.php). Not surprisingly, given that Connerly is one of the chief detractors of affirmative action, this belief appears predicated on the same premise that undergirds opposition to affirmative action; that discrimination is obsolete. This belief is evidenced in a commentary on Connerly’s American Civil Rights Coalition website by prominent affirmative action opponent Shelby Steele. Steele, arguing in favor of the Racial Privacy Initiative, claims that racism is a profitable myth propagated by liberals, and that “arrayed against all this is a much smaller ‘conservative’ debunking industry that tirelessly argues that today racial disparities are rarely the result of ongoing racism. We are dissenters from the corrupt priority of chasing the profits in racism over human development” (Steele, 2002). Simultaneously, and somewhat paradoxically, advocates of colorblindness believe that the adoption of a colorblind mentality is necessary for preventing discrimination. No doubt, when employment, admissions, and other resource allocation de- cisions are made without consideration of race, ethnicity, or gender for that matter, discrimination on those bases is precluded. This might lead one to advocate for colorblind decision-making (unless the institution wishes to implement affirmative action to promote diversity and/or redress historical inequities). However, the ap- plication of colorblindness to governmental policies has been more far-reaching. 3Originally dubbed the “Racial Privacy Initiative,” once a certified ballot initiative, the proposal became officially known as “Classification by Race, Ethnicity, Color, or National Origin” (CRECNO). Intergroup Bias and Inequity 263 Specifically, Connerly’s Racial Privacy Initiative sought to preclude state govern- ment from not only making decisions based on RECNO, but gathering RECNO data and even classifying people on the basis of RECNO with existing data. The rationale was that by forcing the government (where control is possible) to ignore RECNO, the broader society would move in the direction of colorblindness. This colorblindness (i.e., the absence of perception of racial differences) would, in turn, promote equality and social harmony. Psychological research strongly contradicts this theory. First, a long tradi- tion of research indicates that humans make group-based categorizations invol- untarily and ubiquitously (e.g., Bruner, 1957; Fazio et al., 1995; Gaertner and McLaughlin, 1983; Tajfel, 1978). Of even more direct relevance, research has shown that the adoption of a “colorblind” (as opposed to a “multicultural”) mind- set leads to greater racial bias on both implicit and explicit measures (Richeson and Nussbaum, 2004). These results may derive from “rebound” effects resulting from attempts to suppress thoughts about group category differences. In fact, Macrae et al. (1994) demonstrated that attempts to suppress stereotypes about a group ultimately yielded more extreme stereotype-based descriptions. These findings build on Wegner’s (1989) well-supported theory that thought suppression typi- cally has “ironic” effects. Consequently, simply willing oneself to be “colorblind” is likely to be inadequate, if not counterproductive, in ameliorating discrimination and inequities. In addition to the psychological analysis, policy analysis indicates that sweep- ing colorblind policies (e.g., CRECNO) are ill-advised. Specifically, in projecting the impact of the CRECNO initiative, Michaelson et al. (2003) concluded that the type of data the state would have been prohibited from collecting and using are necessary for meeting societal objectives such as monitoring discrimination, litigating discrimination, conducting health-related research, and law enforce- ment. Tellingly, Connerly’s co-sponsor of the affirmative action-banning Propo- sition 209, Thomas Wood, opposed Proposition 54 because it would make en- forcement of 209 difficult, if not impossible. Perhaps the primary reason that colorblindness policies are unlikely to reduce inequity is because contemporary discrimination is most often perpetrated not by institutions, but by independent ac- tors who obtain their social category information informally (e.g., through meeting applicants or inferring race, ethnicity, or gender from names and addresses). Con- sequently, the legitimizing belief that forced colorblindness will promote equality does not appear supported, unless the related belief, that discrimination is obsolete, is also correct, which it appears not to be, as discussed above. Same-Sex Marriage There are several bases of opposition to granting the right to homosexual couples to marry, chief among these being religious arguments referencing biblical 264 Glaser prohibitions on sodomy. However, the most common public argument to emerge reflects the legitimizing belief that same-sex marriage undermines the family institution. The most influential opponent of same-sex marriage, President George W. Bush, stated, in this regard, that, “The union of a man and a woman is the most enduring human institution, honored and encouraged in all cultures and by every religious faith.” Similarly, and with more immediate effect, a three-judge panel of the United States Court of Appeals (2004) for the 11th Circuit ruled with regard to adoption by same-sex parents in Florida, whose legislature had banned such adoptions, that with regard to “alternative family arrangements, none has proven as enduring as the marital family structure, nor has the accumulated wisdom of several millennia of human experience discovered a superior model.” The US Supreme Court recently declined to hear an appeal of this decision. In addition to posing an impossible dilemma for would-be homosexual adop- tive parents by prohibiting same-sex marriage while prohibiting adoption by same- sex couples because they lack the family structure of marriage, Florida law exhibits an acute double standard that belies the legitimizing beliefs supporting discrimina- tion against homosexuals: First, Florida allows gays and lesbians to serve as foster parents. Furthermore, Florida allows single heterosexuals (clearly not meeting the standard of “marital family structure”) to adopt children. In fact, one quar- ter of adoptions in Florida are by single people. Florida law also allows for the case-by-case consideration of adoption applications from those with failed previ- ous adoptions, a history of substance abuse, and a history of domestic violence (Greenhouse, 2005). There is no blanket ban on these categories in the interest of excluding suboptimal family situations for adoptees. Further promoting the optimal family structure argument against same-sex marriage, the Family Research Council’s web-publication of “Ten Arguments From Social Science Against Same-Sex ‘Marriage”’ (Family Research Council, web-posting) attempts to legitimize opposition with the following putatively sci- entific claims: • Children hunger for their biological parents; • Children need fathers; • Children need mothers; • Evidence on parenting by same-sex couples is inadequate; • Evidence suggests children raised by homosexuals are more likely to ex- perience gender and sexual disorders; • Same-sex “marriage” would undercut the norm of sexual fidelity within marriage; • Same-sex “marriage” would further isolate marriage from its procreative purpose; • Same-sex “marriage” would further diminish the expectation of paternal commitment; Intergroup Bias and Inequity 265 • Marriages thrive when spouses specialize in gender-typical roles; • Women and marriage domesticate men; A full-length article would be required to consider the evidence for and against the above claims. However, if one were to accept that the research is accurately depicted and appropriately applied, it would at least appear to support the argument that same-sex marriage is suboptimal for childrearing purposes—although the sole item that directly addresses that (the fourth in the list) is supported by a claim only that studies reporting comparable outcomes for children of same-sex parents are not conclusive. Aside from this, only the fifth item (regarding “gender and sexual disorders”) provides an argument that same-sex marriage, to the extent that it increases the rate of same-sex parenting, may be uniquely harmful. The remaining arguments can be applied to other forms of unconventional parenting— single parents (by choice, separation/divorce, vows of celibacy, or widowing), adoptive (i.e., nonbiological) parenting, parenting by people who have become infertile and therefore cannot further procreate, or parenting by people with gender- atypical roles (e.g., working mothers). Consequently, a simple rhetorical analysis of the leading arguments against policies allowing same-sex marriage reveals the underlying legitimizing belief—that same-sex marriage undermines the institution of the family—to be inadequate, if not wholly unsupported. Hate Crime Criminal acts of violence, intimidation, or destruction that are motivated by bias against a group to which the victim or victims belong (a.k.a., hate crimes) disproportionately affect minority groups, especially Jews, African Americans, and homosexuals (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2004). Consequently, policies designed to deter or lessen the impact of hate crimes primarily benefit minority groups. The primary policies that have been instituted with regard to hate crime are data collection, such as the federal Hate Crimes Statistics Act (HCSA) of 1990, and federal and state sentencing enhancement laws which add time to prison terms when intergroup hate can be established as a motive for a given crime. Although there is broad consensus that hate crimes are abhorrent and should be prevented, there is considerable opposition by some policy-makers to data collection and sentence enhancements. A legitimizing belief that often accom- panies opposition to hate crimes legislation is that hate crime laws overburden the criminal justice system, either through requiring excessive data collection or congesting courts with cases that really reflect lesser crimes.4 The Georgia State Supreme Court, for example, recently ruled to negate the state’s existing hate 4A “legitimizing belief” of sorts that is popular in the social sciences, despite admonitions to the contrary (Reed et al., 1987) is that hate crimes result from economic deprivation (e.g., Hovland and Sears, 1940; Tolnay and Beck, 1995), but recent analyses strongly indicate that this is not the case (Glaser et al., 2002; Green et al., 1998, 1999). Nevertheless, this persistent belief could serve to 266 Glaser crime law for being “unconstitutionally vague” because it used an “any bias or prejudice” criterion (Botts v. The State, October 25, 2004). This type of belief is most often exhibited in opposition to the inclusion of gender as a protected status in hate crime legislation. In fact, despite efforts by liberal US lawmakers, gender has never been included in the HCSA, but eventually crimes motivated by misogyny were included in the Violence Against Women Act in 1994 (Jenness and Grattet, 2001). Such opposition is based on a curious denial of a basic tenet of hate crime laws, which is that they apply to dimensions and not to categories. For example, when the Federal Bureau of Investigation collects hate crime statistics from other law-enforcement agencies, as mandated by the HCSA, included in the category of “race” are not solely anti-minority hate crimes. Rather, anti-White hate crimes are included as well. Likewise, anti-Protestant hate crimes are logged, as are anti-heterosexual. All categories, and therefore all people, are covered under this scheme, and nevertheless, the courts are not overburdened with hate crime cases, which are, in fact, quite rare. The same logic would apply to including anti- female (and anti-male) hate crime by adding gender as a protected status. The high standard of proof for demonstrating bias-motivated intent is high enough alone to keep caseloads manageable (e.g., Apprendi v. New Jersey, US Supreme Court, June 26, 2000). Racial Bias in Capital Punishment Aside from the obvious legitimizing myth that the death penalty is justified because it has a deterrent effect, a belief that is not supported empirically (see e.g., Levitt, 2002), one belief that may serve to sustain support for capital punishment despite concern over disproportionate impact on racial minorities, is that there is no racial bias in the administration of the death penalty. A corollary to this belief, in response to the plain statistics revealing racial disparities, is that Blacks are more likely to get the death penalty solely because they are more likely to commit violent crimes. Confronted with the fact that nearly 70% of federal capital defendants are Black or Hispanic, the US Department of Justice (DOJ) responded in a formal report that, “The offenses that may lead to homicides and capital charges are not evenly distributed across all population groups” (US DOJ, 2001). However, this claim is incorrect because the determining factor appears to be not so much the nature of the offenses as the race of the victims. According to the Federal Death Penalty Resource Counsel Project (as cited in Eggen, 2002), from 2000 to 2002, the US Justice Department pursued the death penalty for Blacks charged with killing Whites approximately three times as often as for Whites charged trivialize concerns that hate crimes reflect serious group conflict, while suggesting that they are no more controllable than are economic cycles. Intergroup Bias and Inequity 267 with killing Blacks. Furthermore, an earlier congressional report revealed that “racial minorities are being prosecuted under federal death penalty law far beyond their proportion in the general population or the population of criminal offenders” (Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights Committee on the Judiciary, 1994, summary). Despite years of research findings indicating racial disparities in the admin- istration of the death penalty (e.g., Baldus et al., 1998; United States General Accounting Office, 1990), recent research provides an understandable basis for believing there is no racial bias in American capital punishment. However, further examination reveals this reasoning to be superficial. Specifically, Blume et al. (2004) conducted an extensive analysis of death penalty data and found that over the past 23 years, a slightly lower proportion of Black murderers were given the death penalty, but that this was driven by the fact that the death penalty was very rarely awarded when the victims were Black, which is by far the most common case. When victims were White, the death penalty was most likely to be given, but significantly more so when the offender was Black. Hence, there is a clear and dramatic racial bias in the administration of the death penalty that is determined by both the race of the offender and the race of the victim. The belief that there is no racial bias in the death penalty is perhaps based in part on the assumption that racial bias operates explicitly, as evidenced by this DOJ statement: “[Federal prosecutors] are experienced legal professionals whose values and practices are shaped by general societal attitudes and the specific val- ues of the legal system that strongly condemn discrimination based on race or ethnicity” (US DOJ, 2001). The presumption evidenced in this statement is that, absent a deliberate, coordinated attempt to discriminate, discrimination does not happen. Psychological research on subtle and implicit forms of bias strongly indi- cate otherwise (e.g., Correll et al., 2002), as does experimental research directly testing the effect of race on judgments of guilt and sentencing (e.g., Sommers and Ellsworth, 2001). With regard to the influence of this particular legitimizing belief on policy positions, the connection between beliefs about bias in the administration of the death penalty and support for that policy have been directly investigated. Glaser et al. (2004) found, in a sample of university undergraduates, there was a strong, statistically significant, negative correlation between believing there is racial bias in the administration of the death penalty and support for the death penalty (see Table I). Furthermore, support for the death penalty also correlated significantly with political conservatism, which was also negatively related to believing there is racial bias in the death penalty and positively related to two measures of anti-Black prejudice. Glaser et al. (2004) also found that the belief that there is racial bias in the administration of the death penalty was negatively related to assignment of the death penalty to a hypothetical murderer (r = −0.30, p < 0.05). In other words, those who were less likely to agree that there is racial bias in capital punishment were more likely to indicate that the defendant should be executed. This relation 268 Glaser Table I. Adapted From Glaser et al. (2004) Internal Support Believe racial bias Sentence motivation to for death in death penalty defendant control prejudice penalty administration Conservatism to death Anti-Black prejudice −0.49∗∗∗ 0.46∗∗∗ −0.54∗∗∗ 0.42∗∗∗ 0.21∗ Internal motivation to −0.17 0.14 −0.26∗ 0.03 control prejudice Support for death penalty −0.41∗∗∗ 0.38∗∗∗ 0.61∗∗∗ Believe racial bias in DP −0.32∗∗ −0.30∗∗ Conservatism 0.29∗∗ ∗p < 0.05; ∗∗p < 0.01; ∗∗∗p < 0.001. was slightly (although not statistically significantly) stronger when the murderer was ostensibly Black (r = −0.38), suggesting that the denial of racial bias in the administration of the death penalty reflects at least in part attempts to legitimize policy positions that are actually motivated by indifference to inequities. This interpretation is bolstered by the strong negative correlation between belief in racial bias in the death penalty and measures of anti-Black prejudice, and perhaps even more compellingly by the strong correlation between anti-Black prejudice and support for the death penalty. Similarly, Mitchell and Sidanius (1993) found that conservatism and Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) were positively related to support for the death penalty and that this was especially so for members of high status groups. Sidanius and colleagues (Sidanius et al., 2001) have also observed a relation between support for the death penalty and the “belief that blacks get fair trials in the United States,” in addition to endorsement of the Protestant Work Ethic and SDO. Conservative support for the death penalty may at least in part be explained by Sargent’s (2004) finding that low need for cognition people (who may be more politically conservative, see e.g., Jost et al., 2003) are more punitive, perhaps because they are less willing to make complex attributions about the factors contributing to a given crime. In sum, the belief that there is no racial bias in the administration of the death penalty, a belief more prevalent among conservatives, is directly related to support for the death penalty, but also to anti-Black prejudice. The accuracy of the belief, however, is strongly contradicted by criminal justice statistics. Racial Profiling Official and public sentiment toward racial profiling—the use of race, eth- nicity, or national origin by law enforcement to determine suspicion—has been generally very negative. Nevertheless, policy initiatives to address racial profiling have been few and typically lacking enforcement mechanisms. In fact, members of the US Congress have been unable for several years to pass the End Racial Intergroup Bias and Inequity 269 Profiling Act, which would grant power to federal agencies to enforce a ban on racial profiling. In 2003, the Bush Administration did proclaim a ban on racial profiling in federal law enforcement, but this administrative decree provided no evaluation or enforcement mechanism and, in fact, served instead to institutional- ize racial profiling by making an explicit exception for national security. A cluster of legitimizing beliefs appears to undermine support for enforceable bans on racial profiling. First, there is the belief that racial profiling is necessary because police cannot describe criminals effectively without using race. Yale Law professor Peter Schuck (in a journal article entitled “The case for profiling” that was republished repeatedly on the Internet) provides a good illustration of this legitimizing belief being used to support an equity-undermining policy position, “No one would think it unjust for [an airport security] officer to screen for Osama bin Laden, who is a very tall man with a beard and turban, by stopping all men meeting that general description. This is so not only because the stakes in ap- prehending him are immense but also because in making instantaneous decisions about whom to stop, the official can use gender, size, physiognomy, and dress as valuable clues.” (Schuck, 2002b, p. 61). This belief is a relatively transparent ra- tionalization because it clearly conflates racial profiling with suspect descriptions, but racial profiling does not involve suspect descriptions in the manner described by Schuck. Bin Laden is a specific suspect who has committed a specific crime. Racial profiling does not involve the investigation of a specific crime already com- mitted by a specific individual suspect. As opponents of profiling put it, “Usually you have a crime and you are looking for a suspect. With racial profiling you have a suspect and you are looking for a crime.” Another legitimizing belief that supports policy inaction is that racial profil- ing does not really happen. Heather MacDonald, perhaps the leading conservative voice on racial profiling, writes that, “. . . since the advent of video cameras in patrol cars, installed in the wake of the racial profiling controversy, most charges of police racism, testified to under oath, have been disproved as lies” (MacDonald, 2001). MacDonald’s primary basis for arguing that racial profiling does not hap- pen, however, is the redefinition of the practice by differentiating between “hard” and “soft” profiling, with the former meaning using race as the sole factor for sus- picion and the latter meaning including race among multiple factors. MacDonald then argues that hard profiling is intolerable discrimination, but that it is ex- tremely rare. She maintains that soft profiling is a rational and acceptable police strategy. Most students of intergroup relations would probably conclude that the use of race as a single factor for making a criminal justice decision reflects a blatant form of oppression. The term profiling, however, strongly implies the construction of a multifaceted description (a “profile” rather than a “category”), and is, in fact, derived from the earlier developed law enforcement procedure of criminal profiling, in which a suspect profile is developed in response to features of a particular crime (e.g., a serial murder). By redefining racial profiling as “hard 270 Glaser profiling,” MacDonald makes profiling sound more like an aberration and therefore less worthy of policy intervention. Racial profiling, even what MacDonald would call “soft profiling,” is very difficult to document because data showing racial discrepancies in who is stopped by the police may only reflect different crime rates or different rates of authenti- cally suspicious behavior. There is, nevertheless, considerable evidence that racial profiling does in fact happen with considerable frequency. In addition to survey research indicating that Black respondents are far more likely to report having been stopped by the police based on race (e.g., Newport, 1999) and enough anec- dotal accounts to fill a book (e.g., Russell, 1998) are revelations from a number of states in the mid-1990s, including most prominently those from New Jersey, which included the disclosure of state police documents instructing highway patrol officers to employ profiles which included race and ethnicity in drug interdiction efforts. This evidence was supported by careful analysis, conducted by statisti- cian John Lamberth, that was presented in court to demonstrate racial profiling had occurred in New Jersey (State v. Pedro Soto, 734 A. 2d 350 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law. Div. 1996), as cited in Harris, 2002). Lamberth employed “benchmarking” methods to account for differences in presence and behavior (e.g., traffic infrac- tions) between White and minority drivers, concluding that minority drivers were stopped by New Jersey Troopers at rates disproportionate to their presence and behavior. One of the more compelling empirical analyses providing evidence of racial profiling has come from the Office of the Attorney General of the State of New York (1999). Their investigation of New York City’s aggressive “Stop and Frisk” program revealed not only that Black and Hispanic men were more likely to be stopped than were White men, but that among those who were stopped, Whites were most likely to be arrested, indicating that police had a lower threshold for suspicion for minorities who were stopped (see Ayres, 2002, for a discussion of such “outcomes tests”). The California Highway Patrol recently acknowledged that Latino drivers in the Central Valley were more likely to be subjected to “consent searches.” This disparity is most likely indicative of racial profiling because consent searches, by definition, preclude the kind of basis for suspicion or probable cause that would be used to give a nonethnic explanation of ethnic disparities.5 There is considerable evidence—survey, anecdotal, and empirical—that racial profiling is widespread, unless it is defined narrowly as stops based solely on race. Recognizing that, mathematically, the inclusion of race, ethnicity, or national origin in a law-enforcement profile raises the probability that members of the tar- geted group or groups will be disproportionately stopped and arrested indicates that such “soft profiling” (in MacDonald’s terminology) needs to be contended with as a policy problem. 5The CHP has, in response to this revelation, banned the use of consent searches. Intergroup Bias and Inequity 271 Even for those who might acknowledge that racial profiling happens, another legitimizing belief undermines support for efforts to prohibit it. This belief holds that racial profiling is societally benign because it has adverse effects on criminals only. It is reflected in the comments of those who describe being profiled as a mere “inconvenience” (e.g., Wilson and Higgins, 2002)6 or call for a simple “show of grace” by those who stopped and searched by airport security because of their national origin (e.g., Asghar, 2002). This belief dismisses the possibility that being stopped and searched by law enforcement can be publicly humiliating and stigmatizing, not to mention time consuming. Because racial profiling is likely to cause police to stop a disproportionate number of people from targeted groups, and because many, if not most, people stopped by the police are innocent of crime, profiling necessarily leads to higher rates of intrusions on the lives of innocent minority people relative to innocent Whites. Furthermore, for relatives of criminals who are caught through profiling there is a disparate impact because they are more likely than relatives of White crim- inals to have their lives and family structures disrupted by the absence of wage earners, the added costs of legal representation, the demoralization of children, etc. While some may find it difficult to find fault in depriving people of crimi- nal members of their families, the advantage this system poses for Whites (and other less profiled groups) is in conflict with American principles of equality of opportunity. Similarly, the combination of racial profiling and felon voting rights disenfranchisement laws has the further implication that minority groups may be less well represented in government due, not to higher crime rates, but to higher enforcement rates. Perhaps the most influential and pervasive legitimizing belief with regard to racial profiling is that it is efficient and therefore rational. This reasoning— focus attention where crime is most likely and you will reduce crime the most—is intuitively appealing and is widely evidenced. With regard to counterterrorism, Indiana University Professor of Humanities and Law Fedwa Malti-Douglas made this argument in the New York Times, noting the seeming conflict of interest due to her Middle Eastern ethnicity, “There will be more Richard Reids and John Walker Lindhs, who will not be found through profiling. Yet it is a fact that the particular terrorist group sworn to our destruction, Al Qaeda, is made up largely of Middle Easterners. It is not unreasonable to direct increased attention to passengers with some connection to the Middle East” (Malti-Douglas, 2002). With regard to the more traditional, drug war profiling, noted criminologist James Q. Wilson made this argument on the editorial page of the Wall Street Journal, asking rhetorically, “Black men are six to eight times more likely to 6The core of Wilson and Higgins’s (2002) complaint is that random airport security searches unnec- essarily burden people (e.g., elderly, White women) who have an extremely low probability of being a threat. This overlooks the fact that for random searches to serve as a deterrent they have to be, and appear, truly random, so that they cannot be circumvented, and that random searches and profiling are not mutually exclusive but, rather, are complementary security tactics. 272 Glaser commit violent crimes than are white men. When the police patrol the streets trying to prevent crime, should they stop white and black men at the same rate?” (Wilson and Higgins, 2002). The most likely reason for the uncertainty (“6 to 8”) in Wilson’s Black-to-White violent crime ratio is that it is probably based on crime victimization surveys, not crime reports. This is problematic with regard to justifying racial profiling because profiling is typically employed in “victimless” crimes, primarily drug crimes, where survey research indicates that White and Black rates of illicit drug use are approximately equal (Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, 1999) and where police stop and search data indicate that Whites who are searched by the police are more likely than Blacks who are searched to possess contraband (Lundman, 2004).7 More importantly, even if Blacks or Middle Easterners are certain to have a higher rate of a targeted criminal behavior, the utility of using race or ethnicity in identifying suspects of such crimes is very limited because of the low base rates for such crimes (especially terrorism). Here, the logical fallacy of “affirming the consequent” is relevant because, while it may be logical, for example, to say that all terrorists are Middle Eastern (although we know for a fact that this is not true), it is absurd to say that all (or even a nontrivial proportion of) Middle Easterners are terrorists (see Glaser, 2002, for a more thorough discussion). Even if we assume that there is a nontrivial racial disproportion in proneness to commit a certain type of crime (say illicit drug possession or transportation), there is reason for concern about the efficacy of racial profiling to improve police efficiency and thereby reduce crime. To address this concern, and in the absence of useful, available data on actual criminality rates and profiling rates, I have conducted mathematical simulations to model the effects of racial profiling on police efficiency (i.e., capturing more criminals with fixed resources) and criminal justice disparities (i.e., incarcerating disproportionate numbers of minorities) (see Glaser, 2005, for a full report). This model attempts only to simulate the effect of profiling as it is consensu- ally defined (as the police stopping members of one group more than members of other groups). It is assumed that those among the stopped who are actually crimi- nals will be arrested and incarcerated. With these simple assumptions we can test the effect that profiling has on criminal capture rates. The model is tested under varying conditions—with different criminality rates and different profiling rates. A primary finding is that, even when the targeted group does not have a higher criminality rate, over time, profiling leads to disproportionate incarcerations of members of that group. Furthermore, when the targeted group does have a higher criminality rate, the long-term gains in criminal captures tend to be modest, and sometimes even net losses (if profiling is extreme) because the continued focus 7Findings that searched Whites are more likely than searched Blacks to possess contraband cannot be interpreted as proving that Blacks have a lower drug crime rate than do Whites, primarily because Blacks tend to be searched at higher rates than are Whites. However, they do indicate that White drug courier rates are comparable to those of Blacks. Intergroup Bias and Inequity 273 Fig. 1. Effect of racial profiling over time: No criminality differences. (From Glaser, 2005). on one group, while its at-large criminal population is depleted due to profiling, becomes counterproductive. Figure 1 depicts the effect on incarceration rates for two groups when they have equal criminality rates but the minority group is profiled. In this case, the profiling necessarily leads to more captures of the targeted group (Group A), but the overall net effect is fewer criminal captures because police continue to focus attention on a group with a declining at-large criminal population while ignoring a group whose at-large criminal population is rising due to that same neglect. Figure 2 depicts a case in which the targeted group really does have a sub- stantially higher criminality rate (four times that of the other group). In this case, there is an initial increase in criminal captures that attenuates over time, ultimately asymptoting back at the status quo, which is 5%. Fig. 2. Effect of racial profiling over time: Criminality differences. (From Glaser, 2005). 274 Glaser Table II depicts a range of degrees of profiling, depicted as the ratio of percents of the populations stopped for the two groups. This table is restricted to a scenario in which the targeted group has a criminality rate four times that of the remaining population. What is clear from this simulation is that the most efficient (in terms of increased captures given fixed resources) degree of profiling is when the profiling ratio corresponds to the criminality ratio (4 to 1). Deviations in either direction diminish capture rates, but it is noteworthy that when profiling becomes extreme (e.g., a 20-to-1 or even a 25-to-0 ratio), that capture rates actually dip under the status quo—i.e., there is negative efficiency. Also of interest is the finding that the same long term capture rate (54.9% of criminals) is achieved with a less dramatic stop ratio (3-to-1) while having a less disparate impact on the two populations (17.04 and 2.6% of Groups A and B incarcerated, respectively, vs. 17.86 and 2.4% with a 4-to1 ratio). This final capture rate takes longer to achieve and has a lower early peak than with the 4-to-1 ratio, but the long-term effect is nevertheless the same for criminal incapacitation and less dramatic for group disparities in incarceration. In conclusion, racial profiling, as modeled with straightforward, simple assumptions, has at best modest, and perhaps negative efficiency value, creates dramatic criminal justice disparities even where criminality disparities do not exist, and is therefore not as “rational” as its legitimizing belief holds. It is worth noting that racial profiling could also prove “efficient” (i.e., more criminals are incapacitated per stop/police time when a particular group is tar- geted) if the targeted group is more likely to be convicted and incarcerated having been stopped. This could be independent of their actual criminality rate. If there are biases against this group at later points in the criminal justice process (e.g., de- cision to arrest, decision to prosecute, decision to try juveniles as adults, decision to convict, decision to incarcerate vs. parole, disparities in quality of legal repre- sentation), profiling that group will indeed lead to higher rates of incarcerations per stops even if the group does not have a higher criminality rate. It is hard to imagine, however, that this is a crime-mitigation process that would be endorsed by anyone but the most fairness-indifferent policy-makers. In sum, despite public outcries, policies intended to mitigate racial profiling that go beyond mere symbolism have received only narrow support, considerable apathy, and some stiff resistance. Underlying this pattern of response appears to be a cluster of legitimizing beliefs that enable policy makers and enforcers alike to dismiss the prevalence and/or the adverse consequences of racial profiling, and overestimate the benefits. Logical and empirical analyses contradict these beliefs. Overarching Themes The preceding analysis examined a set of cases of policy areas involv- ing group-based biases and inequities. Affirmative action, colorblindness/racial Intergroup Bias and Inequity 275 T ab le II . E ff ec ts of P ro fi li ng R at es ,A ss um in g 25 :6 .2 5— or 4: 1— C ri m in al it y R at io P ro fi li ng ra te O ut co m es % G ro up % G ro up R at io of % of G ro up A % of G ro up B % of to ta l A st op pe d B st op pe d pe rc en ta ge s st op pe d in ca rc er at ed (% of G ro up A in ca rc er at ed (% of G ro up B in ca rc er at ed (% of to ta l pe r cy cl ea pe r cy cl eb (G ro up A : G ro up B ) cr im in al s in ca rc er at ed )c cr im in al s in ca rc er at ed )c cr im in al s in ca rc er at ed )c 25 .0 0 0. 00 25 :0 20 .8 3 (8 3. 3) 0. 00 (0 .0 ) 4. 17 (4 1. 7) 20 .8 3 1. 04 20 :1 20 .1 6 (8 0. 6) 1. 08 (1 7. 2) 4. 89 (4 8. 9) 20 .0 0 1. 25 16 :1 20 .0 0 (8 0. 0) 1. 25 (2 0. 0) 5. 00 (5 0. 0) 16 .6 7 2. 08 8: 1 19 .2 3 (7 6. 9) 1. 84 (2 9. 4) 5. 32 (5 3. 2) 15 .0 0 2. 50 6: 1 18 .7 5 (7 5. 0) 2. 08 (3 3. 3) 5. 42 (5 4. 2) 13 .8 9 2. 78 5: 1 18 .3 8 (7 3. 5) 2. 23 (3 5. 7) 5. 46 (5 4. 6) 12 .5 0 3. 13 4: 1 17 .8 6 (7 1. 4) 2. 40 (3 8. 5) 5. 49 (5 4. 9) 10 .7 1 3. 57 3: 1 17 .0 4 (6 8. 2) 2. 60 (4 1. 7) 5. 49 (5 4. 9) 8. 33 4. 17 2: 1 15 .6 2 (6 2. 5) 2. 84 (4 5. 5) 5. 40 (5 4. 0) 6. 82 4. 55 1. 5: 1 14 .4 2 (5 7. 7) 2. 98 (4 7. 6) 5. 27 (5 2. 7) 5. 00 5. 00 1: 1 12 .5 0 (5 0. 0) 3. 13 (5 0. 0) 5. 00 (5 0. 0) N o te . G la se r (2 00 5) . a G ro up A is th e m in or it y gr ou p, co m pr is in g 20 % of th e to ta l po pu la ti on an d, in th is se t of sc en ar io s, ha vi ng a cr im in al it y ra te of 25 % . b G ro up B is th e m aj or it y gr ou p, co m pr is in g 80 % of th e to ta l po pu la ti on an d, in th is se t of sc en ar io s, ha vi ng a cr im in al it y ra te of 6. 25 % . c T he pe rc en t of gr ou p in ca rc er at ed st at is ti cs re fl ec t th e pe rc en t af te r re pe at ed cy cl es an d th e tr en ds ha ve re ac he d th ei r as ym pt ot es . N um be rs in pa re nt he se s ar e th e pe rc en t of th e cr im in a l po pu la ti on w it hi n ea ch gr ou p th at w ou ld be in ca rc er at ed as a fu nc ti on of ra ci al pr ofi li ng . 276 Glaser privacy, hate crime data collection and penalty enhancements, same-sex marriage, capital punishment, and racial profiling were considered in order to examine promi- nent beliefs that underpin attitudes toward policies intended to address inequities and, in the case of hate crime, intergroup violence. The list of policies and beliefs is not intended to be exhaustive, but does include some of the most prominent civil rights issues facing the United States, with an emphasis on criminal justice where racial disparities are particularly dramatic. At the very least, it is evident that many beliefs held and promoted by prominent opinion leaders are tenuous, but there also appear to be some consistent themes that flow through the beliefs identified here, themes that may be identified as more fundamental legitimizing ideologies that give rise to policy-specific beliefs. Discounting Group-Based Inequities The most prominent and perhaps most fundamental theme is the discounting of group-based inequities. This appears with regard to affirmative action, where discrimination is often described as obsolete, thereby undermining the need for policies to compensate for it. The denial of discrimination and disparate op- portunities is also a necessary belief in support of colorblind policies, at least as manifested in the Racial Privacy Initiative wherein it is assumed that, in the absence of unequal opportunity, the only barrier to interracial and interethnic har- mony is racial and ethnic categorization. Denial, even at the highest levels of law enforcement, that there are racial disparities in the administration of the death penalty enables support of that policy. And denials that racial profiling happens, in part facilitated by narrowly defining racial profiling as relying solely on race (or ethnicity, or national origin), probably undermine the motivation to effectively ban the practice. The ample empirical evidence (cited above) that prejudice and discrimination are still common, if not ubiquitous, poses a profound challenge to this belief orientation. Overestimating Societal Costs of Inequity-Reducing Policies For those who may yield to the evidence of inequity, there are still ideolog- ical bases for opposing policies aimed at combating discrimination or reducing inequities. For example, in the case of hate crime laws mandating data collec- tion or sentence enhancements, opponents of such policies do not deny that hate crimes occur and pose a societal problem. Some do, however, claim that data collection poses an intolerable administrative burden (and, in fact, hundreds of law-enforcement agencies are not in compliance with the Hate Crimes Statistics Act). Furthermore, opponents of hate crime laws argue that special protection of certain categories will congest the criminal justice system. This contrasts with reality because the burden for proving hate motivation is high, and consequently Intergroup Bias and Inequity 277 hate crime prosecutions are very rare. Such beliefs also contradict simple logic, as in the case of opposition to the inclusion of gender as a protected status, which would not differ administratively from the prior inclusion of other dimensions such as race, ethnicity, and religion. Similarly, opponents of laws and regulations aimed at tracking and pro- hibiting racial profiling often cite the time expenditures for filling out additional demographic items in police stop reports. Law-enforcement groups are of mixed minds about this burden, but by no means endorse the notion that data collection is undesirable (e.g., Fridell, 2004; Fridell et al., 2001). These arguments involve a concern that at least on its surface appears primarily pragmatic. Beliefs legitimizing opposition to same-sex marriage bear a superficial re- semblance to these societal cost beliefs because they involve not so much a denial of the inequity of depriving same-sex partners the right to marry, but a concern over the effect of same-sex marriage on traditional marriage and family struc- ture. Often there is the claim by opponents of same-sex marriage that they hold no bias against homosexuals but rather worry, as the Family Research Council’s list (Family Research Council, web-posting) articulated that same-sex marriage is bad for families and children. Because the harms asserted by same-sex mar- riage opponents apply as well to other forms of nontraditional, but uncontested family structures (e.g., single parents, adoptive parents, divorce, etc.), the cold pragmatism of the opposition is likely just a veneer for heterosexism, and hence a legitimizing strategy. Valuing Public Safety Above Civil Liberties The complement of overestimating the societal costs of equity-enhancing policies is overestimating the benefits of equity-attenuating policies. Specifically, the claim that racial profiling is an efficient strategy, when coupled with the belief that the public safety garnered by this efficiency is worth the civil liberties lost by treating minority groups differently, can lead to endorsement of racial profiling of the type exhibited by Wilson and Higgins (2002). This belief has strong intuitive appeal, but does not stand up to logical scrutiny (Glaser, 2005). Perhaps more importantly, the component that involves accepting the subordination of one group’s (or groups’) civil liberties to the interest of public safety involves not so much a legitimizing belief as an unadulterated ideological stance—one that values public safety above civil liberties. Discounting the Negative Effects of Inequity-Attenuating Policies Those who oppose inequity-attenuating policies are not unique in being sus- ceptible to legitimizing beliefs. It is possible that many who support affirmative action turn a blind eye to the likelihood that individual applicants (in particular, 278 Glaser White males) will in some instances be deprived educational, employment, and other opportunities due to affirmative action programs that involve preferences for candidates from underrepresented groups. This state of affairs is implicated in legal cases that have revealed the use of quotas and point systems in education admissions programs, policies that have been deemed illegal. Nevertheless, the denial of adverse effects of policies like affirmative action does not appear to be influential in support for such policies. Most proponents of affirmative action ac- knowledge the potential for “reverse discrimination” but reason that the aggregate good of raising equality of opportunity for many whose groups have been histor- ically oppressed and who contend with negative stereotypes outweighs the risk of reducing opportunity for some whose groups have been historically privileged and who benefit from positive stereotypes. In this sense, this “liberal” orientation places societal equity above individual opportunity. In conclusion, while there are a variety of types of legitimizing beliefs that undergird opposition to inequity-attenuating policies, a possible first-order le- gitimizing ideology common to those belief constellations might be a general indifference to inequities, or at least a higher prioritization of other ideals such as safety and cost-effectiveness. Indeed, the prevalence of such a legitimizing ide- ology is consistent with Social Dominance Theory’s (Sidanius and Pratto, 1999) basic premise that people vary in their acceptance of, or even preference for, social hierarchies. Because social dominance orientation correlates with political conser- vatism, and because political conservatives have a higher tolerance for inequality (Jost et al., 2003; Muller, 2001), it should not be surprising that those who tend to adopt the beliefs that serve to perpetuate inequities tend to be conservative, and no doubt those who adopt legitimizing beliefs that serve to attenuate inequities, tend to be liberal. Many of the specific beliefs relating to civil rights policies appear to be merely emergent properties of a more fundamental ideological orientation. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The author thanks Richard J. Nussbaum and Jackson Cone for their help finding quotes exemplifying legitimizing beliefs. REFERENCES Asghar, R. (2002). A show of grace for safety’s sake. Los Angeles Times, July 6, p. B23. Ayres, I. (2001). Pervasive Prejudice? Unconventional Evidence of Race and Gender Discrimination, University of Chicago Press, Chicago. Ayres, I. (2002). 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